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The mobility of Sicilian populations and the nature of Sicilian citizenship, 409-202 BCE

By

Randall David Souza

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

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## Abstract

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University of California, Berkeley

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From at least the end of the Bronze Age, Sicily has been a site of interaction among different population groups, so that by the Classical and Hellenistic periods Greeks, Carthaginians, Italians, Romans, and native Sikels and Elymians were circulating on the island. Mass enslavements, transfers or eliminations of city populations as well as new foundations are common events in the relevant literary and documentary sources, and are crucial to understanding life there. In this dissertation I combine historical and material evidence to argue that there was higher mobility in Sicily over the fourth and third centuries than elsewhere, due initially to the nearly constant tension among the imperial powers—Syracuse, Carthage, and Rome—operating on the island, whose forced destructions, relocations, and foundations weakened the connections of people to their homes. This lack of connection in turn encouraged greater voluntary and individual movement, and as the Sicilian concept of citizenship became more provisional, it raised problems of group cohesion that affected the island's social, economic, and military history. As a consequence cities could no longer count on a reliable citizen army; land had to be redistributed periodically, generating conflict; and certain population groups dissolved entirely requiring their members to find new identities. This instability of civic and ethnic divisions contributed to the emergence of the island of Sicily itself as the most salient basis for a group membership.

My first two chapters document the most significant episodes of population movement and attempt to unravel the various modes of movement and population manipulation. In the first I introduce the record of Sicilian mobility motivated by political, economic, and geographic considerations. Politically, tyrants and empires exercised autocratic control over the disposition of the populations subject to them. Economic considerations motivated some of these manipulations, and disparate economic conditions could also encourage group mobility aside from such forced movements. Sicily's paradoxical insularity—being a very large island—may have conditioned the economy, agricultural organization and imperial policies, while simultaneously giving mobile Sicilians a stable identity no matter where on the island they moved. In the second chapter I explore more closely the specific logic of particular forms of mobility. The goal of this chapter is to differentiate and analyze modes of movement and instances of non-movement in order to clarify the causes and effects of each mode, and to have a more secure basis on which to pursue comparative evidence in later chapters.

With this foundation in place, the second part of the dissertation examines the nature of citizenship in an environment of high mobility through a series of thematic chapters. In Chapter Three on exiles and diasporas, I argue that the dispersal, wandering, and irregular reunion of populations promoted the communication of defining cultural practices between groups. Diasporas in particular represented a spatial extension of the citizen community beyond political boundaries. In Chapter Four I show how the recruitment, circulation, and semi-retirement of mercenaries both affected settled communities and created alternative, mobile ones. Chapter Five addresses the enslavement of populations, tracing the similarities with the condition of exiles but with emphasis on communities of the enslaved in other polities, and on the itineraries traveled between slave and free. I discuss the effects of economically-driven mobility in Chapter Six, arguing that Sicily's orientation toward grain production and export led to a low-level structural mobility.

One corollary of mobility is the diverse and variable composition of populations, a potential obstacle to group cohesion. Throughout the dissertation I focus on the historical, archaeological, and documentary data relevant to the development and maintenance of communities. In Chapter Seven I mobilize this data in arguing that the diffusion and hybridity of communities created by high mobility constructed Sicily itself as the most relevant container of its populations. Rather than privileging the static and bounded *polis*, I examine alternative and distributed groupings through the practices that united them or differentiated one from another. These communities of practice sometimes aligned with and sometimes cut across other group boundaries. My engagement with the material record and with individuals and groups ignored or glossed over by the historical sources is intended to move beyond the political and military focus of previous scholarship. In addition to the evidence of domestic objects and funerary ritual, I utilize official documents as well as the abundance of informal writing to characterize the practices distinctive to certain Sicilian populations. Understanding routine practices might explain how certain communities did or did not cohere as groups when mobility was high; understanding the relative importance of different groupings or communities might explain how regions become meaningful bases for identity. In the case of Sicily, the internal distinctions faded and the island came to define its inhabitants.

To those on the move

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## Introduction

Mobility and citizenship are both concepts that have begun to receive increased attention in scholarly and popular consciousness over the past half-century. Globalization, however defined, has been accompanied by a massive increase in human mobility, with consequences for nearly every aspect of life in territorial nation-states dedicated to protecting the interests of their citizens. It is easier than ever to travel long distances, whether for leisure, business, or survival, and while immigration and emigration have probably always been more or less pre-eminent issues in domestic politics, new fields of study have emerged to address the causes and consequences of human mobility, and the nature of citizenship and belonging, in both the past and the present. When people move, they disrupt stable sociopolitical arrangements and generate new ones; the very concept of ‘society’ has come under critique by students of mobility.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, a careful appreciation of the practical constituents of citizenship have led to an awareness that legal citizenship is only a convenient shorthand for a whole range of duties, privileges, and beliefs.<sup>2</sup>

In the context of the ancient Mediterranean, *The Corrupting Sea* marked and produced new interest in mobility for Classical scholars; Horden and Purcell in turn depend on Braudel’s characterization of the Mediterranean sea as a connective force of the populations surrounding it.<sup>3</sup> The sea meant transportation of goods, people, and ideas, and mobility corrupts. Ancient historians are now moving beyond the usual reified political entities and asking questions about populations on the move, about the diverse populations of ancient cities, and about variable and contextual group affiliations. The recognition that large portions of the population of the ancient Mediterranean were or could be mobile has led to new questions about social, political, and economic life—we have, in effect, been ignoring or downplaying the role of a significant demographic phenomenon, and as we try to follow our mobile subjects the world of stable *poleis* and *urbes* is no longer quite so clean.

Populations in Sicily were particularly unstable. Migrations from the Italian mainland recorded in mythology and perhaps archaeology were followed by Greek and Carthaginian colonization (however defined), and by the fifth century BCE tyrants could transplant or depopulate entire cities. Yet the Carthaginian invasion of 409 turned thousands of people into refugees, and brought Dionysius I to power in Syracuse. His massive transfers and dislocations reverberated throughout the island for generations and affected the structure of Sicilian mobility, so I chose to begin my study at the end of

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<sup>1</sup> E.g., Urry (2000); Cresswell (2006). Randolph and Avrutin (2012, p. 6) propose a way forward: “In short, one advantage to paying attention to what happens ‘on the move’ is that it can help up appreciate the intersection of many political, social, and cultural forces within the past and analyze their interplay without asserting the absolute supremacy of one over the other.”

<sup>2</sup> Efforts along these lines drive the journal *Citizenship Studies*, which began publication in 1997. In the context of the modern Mediterranean, the regional program of Nikolaïdis and Nikolaïdis (2006) includes a call for the development of “a Mediterranean citizenship (in the socio-political rather than legal sense), where citizenship is understood as being grounded in, and a means of generating, the key values of belonging, rights, and participation” (p. 367). See also McNevin (2011), an inquiry into “the shifting grounds of citizenship—the potential for migrants, irregular migrants in particular, to challenge traditional notions of who a citizen is and what a citizen does” (p. 120) in the high-mobility environment of the contemporary United States.

<sup>3</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000); Braudel (1995).

the fifth century. The fourth and third centuries saw a greater intensity of displacement and movement, but by the end of the Second Punic War the situation on the island seems to have cooled down and it did not seem fruitful to track populations into the second century. Large-scale and coerced movement had largely stopped by the end of the Second Punic War and would not resume until the Caesarian colonization of the first century—an interesting phenomenon but a different project from mine. My aim is to capture two centuries of markedly increased mobility in Sicily, though future work could of course incorporate this earlier and later material as well.

I began this project as a study of Sicilian group dynamics, asking how and why different collections of individuals (cities, leagues, associations, families, among others) developed, maintained, and failed to maintain boundaries. It quickly became apparent that the real question, and the greatest challenge to group coherence, was mobility, whether voluntary or compelled. Indeed, the growing literature on mobility and migration highlights the complex ways in which different forms of mobility interact, and the difficulty of assessing the agency of mobile populations.<sup>4</sup> I will employ this theoretical material in Chapter Two, where I address the distinctive modes of Sicilian mobility.

I had also been particularly struck by the reading, early in my graduate career, Bruno Latour's *Reassembling the Social* (an introduction to Actor-Network Theory, though he would deny it). Latour stresses the amount of work necessary to create and maintain social ties, work that can be accomplished by individuals as well as objects.<sup>5</sup> A corollary of his view of group formation as an unstable and dynamic process is the recognition that we learn best about groups by the slippages and failed attempts at defining a group, what he calls "controversies."<sup>6</sup> Communities do not simply emerge or persist, but are produced through the actions of potential community members and the physical and conceptual structures they create.<sup>7</sup> As I hope to show, the pervasive dislocation and relocation of people makes the task of maintenance even harder, and there not all potential groups always succeeded. High mobility meant that even preserving the status quo took great effort.<sup>8</sup>

Another way of naming an abstract sense of belonging is community, a concept that admits many possible meanings and drives much of my study. While community is often used simply as a synonym for city, I use it to mean any grouping of individuals at any detectable scale, and for their sense of belonging together. Communities are built around shared ideas and practices, and exist on many scales: cities are in fact composed of several overlapping and competing communities. Communities are also mutable, and along with internal development, the interaction created by large-scale population

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<sup>4</sup> In particular, different mobilities can be seen to follow some of the rules of path dependence: see, e.g. O'Reilly (2011). On the agency of migrants, see Fussell (2012).

<sup>5</sup> Latour (2005, p. 28): "Relating to one group or another is an on-going process made up of uncertain, fragile, controversial, and ever-shifting ties." On objects, see Latour (2005, pp. 63-86).

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Latour (2005, p. 23): "...instead of taking a reasonable position and imposing some order beforehand, ANT claims to be able to find order much better *after* having let the actors deploy the full range of controversies in which they are immersed."

<sup>7</sup> I.e., the "imagined community" of Anderson (1991); cf. Isbell (2000).

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Purcell's unmasking of the static urban community as a construct of urban populations themselves: Purcell (2005).

movements broke down some communities and created others.<sup>9</sup> Studies of communities based on shared ideas are fascinating, but for late Classical and early Hellenistic Sicily there is nothing like Cicero's letters or Plato's dialogues.

Based in an understanding that social groups are dynamic, I propose to approach communities through shared practices, which survive somewhat more durably in the historical and archaeological record. Without blithely jumping from practice to belief, I proceed on the premise that two people doing substantially the same thing do share something, whatever they may think about it. The shared practice group, as a concept, is motivated in part by Latour's injunction that "[t]he task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up by the analyst."<sup>10</sup> But it is also strongly inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*—the sum of practical, generative logic that enables and forces members of a group to act in ways conducive to maintaining membership in the group. He defines a "social class...[as] a class of biological individuals having the same *habitus*, understood as a system of dispositions common to all products of the same conditionings."<sup>11</sup> I am not searching for anything so solid as a social class, but the idea that a similar *habitus* (and therefore similar practices) is what defines a group is attractive to anyone studying the past, especially in a context where evidence for ideas and beliefs are limited. The archaeologist-historian can, following Bourdieu and Latour, look for evidence of practices, from which an understanding of social groups might be constructed.

A far more complex concept is citizenship. I am primarily concerned with two major referents of the term: first, the legal status of being a member of a political entity, and second, the sense of belonging to a social entity. David Cook-Martín provides a concise and useful expression, albeit in a modern context, of the difference: there is "formal or legal citizenship" based on status, and "affective and participatory citizenship" based on identification with the group.<sup>12</sup> Typically scholars of the ancient world have concentrated on legal aspects of citizenship, and I too will use the word unmodified when I am discussing legal status. Yet citizenship of each kind raises questions about the other, and the title of the dissertation is meant to evoke both legal and affective connotations. It would be extremely interesting to know what rules and customs Sicilian *poleis* and other political units used to legally differentiate members from non-members in the fourth and third centuries BCE, but such information is almost completely lacking. Instead, we have abundant evidence for the ways in which Sicilian populations enacted membership in their communities through practice, and this affective citizenship, which is getting increasing scholarly attention, offers the best way to understand the dynamics of group formation on the island.<sup>13</sup> We already know

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<sup>9</sup> I am in full sympathy with Hall (2005, p. 262): "Any historical analysis needs to take into account the fact that social and ethnic identities are not so much *a priori* 'containers' that determine the behaviour of their constituents as they are discursive constructions instigated by the intersection of political, social and cultural structures and individual agency."

<sup>10</sup> Latour (2005, p. 23). Cf. also O'Reilly (2011, pp. 14-31) on communities of practice among modern migrant populations, and

<sup>11</sup> Bourdieu (1990, p. 59). Cf. Bourdieu (1984, p. 223): "The agents only have to follow the leanings of their *habitus* in order to take over, unwittingly, the intention immanent in their corresponding practices, to find an activity which is entirely 'them' and, with it, kindred spirits."

<sup>12</sup> Cook-Martín (2013, p.7).

<sup>13</sup> For example, both legal and participatory citizenship are implicated in conclusion of recent illuminating study of residence in contemporary Moscow. Light (2012, p. 80): "Post-Soviet Moscow's residence policies

that the movement of populations creates issues related to legal status; I am interested in mapping the effects on group dynamics and belonging. In brief, I make an argument that mobility and interaction led to the growth of an island-wide affective citizenship in Sicily as Sicilians came to think of themselves as belonging to the same group.

This dissertation proceeds in three steps. The first establishes the parameters of the study: Chapter One tells the story of Sicilian population mobility over the fourth and third centuries BCE, setting the stage for the rest of the study. Chapter Two attempts to place these two centuries of instability in a Mediterranean context, and to examine the various modes of mobility, particularly those distinctive to the Sicilian case. In the second part of the dissertation, I take up four key aspects of Sicilian mobility: Chapter Three addresses exiles and refugees, Chapter Four investigates mercenary service, Chapter Five deals with the mobility of the enslaved, and Chapter Six attempts to connect features of the Sicilian agricultural economy with the emergence of an insular consciousness. In each of these chapters I attempt to outline both the sources of these phenomena and their effects on the communities involved. The final part of the dissertation proposes, largely on the basis of archaeological and documentary evidence, that the erosion of group boundaries caused by mobility was expressed in the common practices of Sicilian populations. Chapter Seven traces these practical links between different groups, arguing that shared practices formed connections across political and social boundaries. As Sicilian populations came to share more with each other, subdivisions faded and they became not just Greeks or Peloponnesians or Carthaginians in Sicily but Sicilians.

Translations are my own unless otherwise specified. Transliterations of Greek and other toponyms largely follow those of the *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, with few exceptions (e.g. “Sicily” for the name of the island). Personal names largely follow the Greek spelling. All dates are BCE unless otherwise specified.

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have created a de facto urban citizenship that is implemented through tacit municipal policies and enforced by police and other city officials.” See also Coleman and Blumler (2009) on the consequences of increasing connectivity through the internet on legal and affective modes of citizenship. One may also note the thorough integration of belonging as a concept in the legal analysis of citizenship and migration of Hartnell (2006).

## Acknowledgements

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I would like to take a moment here to recognize the absence of Crawford Greenwalt, who was universally such a good person that I will leave it at that.

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This work could not have been done without the vigilance and support of my dissertation committee. For their valuable insights, criticisms, and occasional approval, I thank Emily Mackil, J. Theodore Peña, Kent Lightfoot, and Jonathan Prag. In particular, Emily's heroic service as dissertation chair kept this project from dissolving, and Jonathan's irreplaceable Sicilian expertise kept me in light with current developments. All faults in the following pages are, of course, my own.

Thanks to all my family for the best of what families do. I am only trying to justify your pride in me. For love and support from the East Coast, I thank my parents Karen and Steve. For keeping one foot in the ancient world, his love, and his presence in the South Bay, my brother Aaron.

Finally, Caitlin, whose belief I would never have thought I needed so much, and who never stopped telling me I could do it.

## 1. A population history of Sicily, 409-202 BCE (Fig. 1)

‘And do not change your minds about the voyage to Sicily on the grounds that it will be against a great power. For its cities are populated with mingled crowds and they admit easy transformations and additions of citizens; and because of this no one furnishes himself, as he would if it were a question of his own fatherland, either with weapons for the defense of his body or with reliable equipment for the use of his land, but each one gets for himself whatever he thinks he can win by speaking or by creating civic strife, and if he does not succeed, taking other land from the community to settle. Nor is it likely that such a mass of people would either pay attention to deliberation with a single mind or turn to action collectively...’ (Thucydides 6.17.2-4)

Occasionally an archaeological discovery or a rare contemporary document inscribed on stone reminds us that life in Sicily was not all war, rapine and financial extortion by tyrants, but no continuous history can be built out of such scraps, not even a cross-section view of society in Syracuse, let alone Akragas or Messina, in any given decade. [Finley (1979, p. 74)]

### Introduction

The history and mythology of Sicily contain no claims to autochthony except that made by the elusive Sikans; in the written record (a Hellenic one, but the only one available to us) Sicilians of every era were believed to have come from somewhere else. Ausonians, Morgetes, Sikels, Elymians, Carthaginians, and Greeks all had origins outside of Sicily and a tradition of immigration to the island.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Sicily was never unified politically until the end of the third century BCE, though even as a Roman province it initially remained socially and culturally diverse.<sup>2</sup> In the centuries before Roman homogeneity set in, the arrival, movement, dispersal, and formation of population groups were processes directly bearing on the lives of Sicilians everywhere.<sup>3</sup>

Sicily was of course not the only place in the ancient Mediterranean where cities were founded and sacked, where military settlements became *de facto* (or *de iure*) cities, where populations shifted or disappeared. During the period examined in this dissertation (ca. 409-202 BCE) the expansion of Macedon, the campaigns of Alexander, the wars of his Successors, and the Roman expansion into Italy caused populations to

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<sup>1</sup> The Sikans evidently claimed to be autochthonous but Thucydides (6.2.2) rejects their mythology and makes them immigrants from the Iberian peninsula. Prestianni Giallombardo (2009, p. 71) characterizes Thucydides’ program as follows: “Lo storico ateniese sottolinea con forza la non autoctonia di tutte le popolazioni giunte nel tempo in Sicilia, nessuna delle quali affonda le sue radici nella terra isolana, ed insiste a più riprese sulla eterogeneità [sic] della popolazione, sulla loro mistione...”

<sup>2</sup> For example, as Siebert (1982-1983, p. 63) notes (based on Cicero, *In Verrem* II 2.49.123-5) “still at the time of Verres the old citizens [i.e. the descendants of original citizens] of Akragas and Herakleia insisted on their rights against the new citizens, who were brought in toward the end of the Second Punic War. More than 130 years had not led to an integration.”

<sup>3</sup> Moggi (2006, p. 78): “A questo punto si potrebbe allargare ulteriormente il quadro [from conflict between Greek cities], prendendo in considerazione le distruzioni o destrutturazioni di centri indigeni al momento delle *ktiseis* o nelle fasi di espansione delle *poleis* coloniali, insieme a numerosi casi di trasferimento di popolazioni, di sostituzione violenta o di massiccia integrazione dei corpi civici e di concessione della *politeia* a consistenti nuclei di soldati mercenari: si tratta, infatti, di una serie di fenomeni che, se non hanno portato alla cancellazione delle città in quanto tali, hanno tuttavia prodotto in esse cambiamenti spesso rilevanti e qualche volta radicali.”

(image source: <http://www.utexas.edu/courses/introtogreece/lect7/img1grksicilymap.html>)



move, change, and disappear in characteristic ways. In earlier periods there had been Greek and Phoenician colonial foundations and Athenian cleruchies (settlements of citizens abroad); later the Romans would plant colonies, move large numbers of people through legionary deployments, and eventually negotiate population transfers along the northern border of the Empire. Still, late Classical and early Hellenistic (LCEH hereafter) Sicilian mobility is distinct both in quantity and quality: there are relatively more populations recorded in motion in Sicily over these two centuries than elsewhere, while the regular frequency and insular constraints of that motion meant that Sicilian mobility was more endemic than episodic and as a result less comprehensible through single and independent causes.

Thus the principal question I will attempt to answer in the first part of the dissertation is why populations of all kinds in Sicily were so mobile, and whether their mobility was due mainly to particularly Sicilian conditions or common Mediterranean ones.<sup>4</sup> In this chapter I introduce the major episodes of population movement in a conventional narrative that takes the pursuit of tyranny and imperial growth as the proximate cause. As Finley observed, the available evidence determines to some extent the questions that can be asked and satisfactorily answered, though I hope to show that the historical and material record of LCEH Sicily does reward further close study. Since Finley's time Sicilian history has remained a story of tyrants, wars, and high politics, despite important epigraphical discoveries, new theoretical tools, and a proliferation of archaeological evidence, all of which might allow us to write a different kind of history.

In the course of this chapter I will also raise the main issues to be considered in greater detail later on, among them diasporas and the circulation of exiles (Chapter Three); the circulation of mercenaries from outside Sicily (Chapter Four); mass enslavements and the redeeming of prisoners (Chapter Five); the organization of Sicilian agriculture and economic conditions on a large island receiving attention from two or more imperial powers (Chapter Six).<sup>5</sup> I am nevertheless aware that each factor operated simultaneously and in combination with the others. For example, the development of Late Classical Sicilian tyranny affected the economy and the island's imperial geography; the economy conditioned the tyrants' policies and the conceptual division of the island; *de facto* partitions of the island created a particular economic landscape and perhaps contributed to the growth of tyranny.

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<sup>4</sup> Moggi (2006, p. 77): "un fenomeno abbastanza frequente nell'occidente greco, ma particolarmente diffuso in Sicilia, quello della destrutturazione e della dissoluzione delle *poleis*." Moggi contrasts (pp. 77-8) the situation in the west with that of "Grecia metropolitana," citing evidence that in general the mainland Greeks of the contemporary period were reluctant to destroy cities or their populations [e.g. Athens after the Peloponnesian War]. "È un fatto, comunque, che le distruzioni di città sono rare ed eccezionali nella realtà metropolitana e che, se rapportate al numero delle *poleis*, hanno una frequenza e una incidenza nemmeno paragonabili a quelle che si riscontrano in Sicilia" (p. 78). Siebert (1982-1983, p. 33) also claims a particular if not unique place for Sicily in discussions of population movements.

<sup>5</sup> Moggi (2006, pp. 78-9) offers several reasons for the high frequency of Sicilian city and population destructions: "la familiarità con operazioni che comportavano la eliminazione o la destrutturazione degli insediamenti indigeni sia al momento della fondazione sia nelle successive fasi di espansione della *apoikia*," "il fatto che si trattava di città 'fondate,' la cui origine poteva essere fissata in un tempo relativamente recente..." "le sub-colonie: se fondate da una metropoli locale per rispondere a certe sue esigenze...l'*apoikia*-madre era eteressata a (e di norma in grado di) imporre alla *apoikia*-figlia un rapporto di dipendenza, ignoto alla sfera della colonizzazione transmarina...", and finally the organization of Sicilian *poleis* and populations under an *arche* or *eparchia/epikrateia*, neither of which wanted to rule functioning *poleis*, as opposed to the hegemonic leagues of mainland Greece.

As LCEH Sicily saw the rise of powerful tyrants and empires, these forces were, unsurprisingly, the most common drivers of involuntary population movements in the fourth and third centuries.<sup>6</sup> In addition to their deployment and settlement of mercenaries and armies they often directed non-military dislocations.<sup>7</sup> Although Hieron II, certain Carthaginian or Roman generals, and the host of local tyrants also moved people from place to place, it was Dionysius I and Timoleon, in this respect acting very much like a tyrant, who most often imposed movement on populations subject to their control.<sup>8</sup> Nor was this tyrannical preeminence an innovation of the late Classical period: Hippokrates, Gelon, Hieron I, and Theron had transferred populations between Greek cities since the beginning of the fifth century.<sup>9</sup> While these earlier tyrants may have set the precedent, it was only in the late fifth century that a period of systemic turbulence set in. Alcibiades claimed in 415 that all of this demographic violence had weakened the social fabric of the Sicilian cities, yet there was worse to come. The forced movement of large numbers of people became even more frequent after the disaster of the Athenian Expedition, demonstrating that there was much more weakening still to be done. In large part this was the work of tyrants and aggressive empires; the Syracusan democracy from 466/5 to 406 had apparently kept Sicilian populations relatively stable.

## A. Dionysius I (406-367 BCE)

Dionysius I began his rise at Syracuse in the wake of the disastrous evacuation of Akragas in 406 and later oversaw the evacuations of Gela and Kamarina. These evacuations were all traumatic and did serious damage to the strength of the cities' independent existence, which cannot have been lost on the newly empowered tyrant. His campaigns against the Chalkidian cities, the Sikels, and the Carthaginians were all marked by depopulations, expulsions, and occasionally city foundations, and he also established cities in the Adriatic. Further, his early manipulations of the citizen body of Syracuse made it clear that in his reign no claim to ownership or citizenship could be permanent.

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<sup>6</sup> Any effective political power must manage its population, though tyrants and empires must perhaps do so on a greater scale and with less consent. Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 378): "population itself can be seen as a deployable resource within the diversity of the environment...The management of human numbers is a basic political and economic activity."

<sup>7</sup> Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 34-35) identifies the "forced settlements" made by the tyrants as a "one of the root causes for the population shifts in the Sicilian area" but he seems to mean this quite narrowly and does not make the argument I will propose in this dissertation, that the policies of the tyrants created structural conditions encouraging mobility. Giuliani (1995, pp. 107-8) attributes "questo fare e disfare città e cittadinanze" to the desire of Dionysius to "ridisegnare la geografia politica dei propri domini," i.e. "domini di carattere territoriale continuo." He goes on to argue (pp. 118-9) that in the creation of this territorial empire Dionysius had to "spazzava via i nemici tradizionali della sua Siracusa, imbrigliando la Sicilia orientale in una rete di centri privi di autentiche radici..."; and that (p. 120) "l'insanabile contrasto tra la tradizionale vita delle [*poleis*] e la signoria dionigiana, che tendeva inevitabilmente a comprimere la realtà politica in quanto tale ed a creare città senza storia." He continues (p. 121): "il carattere personale del regime fa sì che queste soluzioni...tendano sistematicamente a penalizzare o a strumentalizzare le realtà cittadine" and Locri as the Syracuse of southern Italy, another capital city.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Braccisi (1998, pp. 83-4) outlines the different political approaches taken by Dionysius I in eastern Sicily, the Straits, and in southern Italy, but in all three theaters Dionysius employed massive transfers of populations.

<sup>9</sup> On archaic and early classical Sicilian tyrannies and their control of populations cf. Luraghi (1994).

The series of Greek cities evacuated and then destroyed in the Carthaginian invasions of 409 and 406 included some of the largest in Sicily: Selinous, Himera, Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina. Whether the inhabitants of any of these cities could have defended themselves better, and whether they should have chosen to die fighting rather than escape, is beside the point. They chose or were compelled to evacuate, and as a result they survived as communities for varying lengths of time and with varying degrees of success.<sup>10</sup> Here I focus on the evacuations of Kamarina and especially Gela as these were, in the historical record, the decision of Dionysius.

In 405 the Carthaginian army of Himilco prepared to attack Gela, and Dionysius effectively deprived the city of defenders, ensuring that its defense or abandonment would be his decision. He had killed the wealthiest Gelooi and used their confiscated property to pay new defenders, which included mercenaries led by Dexippos on behalf of Syracuse and Dionysius' own army.<sup>11</sup> But a cavalry revolt that year led Dionysius to recall all his troops and mercenaries from Gela, leaving the city open to the inevitable attack and siege.<sup>12</sup> Dionysius did return with an army to fight the Carthaginians at Gela but without conclusive results, so he decided to remove the inhabitants of Gela to Syracuse, collecting the inhabitants of Kamarina on the way; the refugee Gelooi and Kamarinaioi eventually left Syracuse for Leontinoi, and were able to return to their cities by a treaty struck at the end of 405.<sup>13</sup>

Two intriguing features of this episode deserve comment. The first is that the Gelooi when first under attack had unsuccessfully tried to send the women and children of the city to Syracuse.<sup>14</sup> Instead these normally secondary citizens had insisted on helping defend the city, by repairing broken stretches of fortification walls and performing other services for the active soldiers.<sup>15</sup> Although Diodorus allows that this makeshift defense was working fairly well, it is noteworthy that the Geloan women and children were willing to challenge the orders of their husbands and parents but could not defy those of the tyrant Dionysius. In fact, the Gelooi do not seem to have suffered any battlefield losses prior to Dionysius' evacuation order, so it is conceivable that they could have continued to defend themselves and outlasted the siege. Instead Dionysius met with his *philoï* who advised him not to force a decisive battle, so he instead compelled the evacuation of populations now effectively at his mercy.<sup>16</sup> This early

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Mackil (2004, p. 508): "An alternative to catastrophe was provided by the cultivation and maintenance of social and political relationships with other poleis, and by the willingness of populations to move, whether en masse, in small groups, or individually." In many of the Sicilian cases, however, social and political relationships were not sufficient to avert catastrophe but only delayed it. Selinous and Himera, for example, were apparently never again poleis after 409, and the ultimate fate of their evacuated populations is difficult to trace. See below in Chapter Three, section A.

<sup>11</sup> D.S. 13.93.1-3.

<sup>12</sup> D.S. 13.96.1-2.

<sup>13</sup> See Fig. 1 Map.

<sup>14</sup> D.S. 13.108.6.

<sup>15</sup> D.S. 13.108.8. On female participation in the defense of cities cf. Loman (2004a).

<sup>16</sup> Caven (1990, pp. 72-73) ignores the circumstances that led to Gela's military weakness and explains the evacuation as the necessary result of strategic factors given that Dionysius had been unable to defeat Himilcon in battle. Anello (1999 [2003], p. 405) refers to Dionysius' "ingegnoso ma complicato piano di difesa di Gela" without mentioning his role in shaping the circumstances under which it came under attack. Consolo Langher (1997, p. 112): "la popolazione si affrettava ad evacuare i vari centri fuggendo in direzione di Siracusa;" (p. 113): "Gela dove Dionisio provocò una sollevazione del *demos*...Non riuscì tuttavia a Dionisio l'intento di salvare Gela."

maneuver of Dionysius shows that he understood the potential benefits of displacing populations rather than fighting to subjugate them. In this case he used the threat of Carthaginian violence to bring thousands of people, who constituted a considerable political and military human resource, to Syracuse; in other instances his own military power would guarantee obedience. Demographic manipulation was a key device for rendering Syracuse the preeminent city in Sicily.

Second, the evacuations were difficult, and insofar as they were forced by the tyrant, constitute a form of demographic violence. Diodorus' accounts of the evacuations of Akragas and Gela may be overly pathetic but the scenes of separated families, grief at material and sentimental losses, suicides, and improper mixing between classes and genders, do suggest the trauma of the escape.<sup>17</sup> Having already ingratiated himself to the common people of Gela by executing the wealthy there, Dionysius must have been happy to bring them to Syracuse, especially if he could also present the evacuation as the only way of avoiding death at the hands of the monstrous Carthaginians. We do not know whether the Gelooi were offered citizenship there, only that they quickly fell out with the regime and went to live at Leontinoi before perhaps returning to Gela.<sup>18</sup> Dionysius could not have planned the entire situation but he did make the evacuations of Gela and Kamarina likely and indeed began them before any disastrous defeat—either a cautious move to act before his hand was forced or a cynical ploy to subjugate those populations on the pretense of military necessity. He might have defended Gela and Kamarina but preferred to defend Syracuse with the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi living there. In the tyrant's political calculations, Gelooi and Kamarinaioi could be temporarily evacuated, but Syracusans could not.

Yet we should be wary of attributing any serious long-range planning to Dionysius at this point, when both his standing in Syracuse and the outcome of his conflict with the Carthaginians were uncertain. In fact, the Carthaginians were only turned from the siege of Syracuse by a plague, hardly a development Dionysius could have counted on. Further, it is just possible that Dionysius' military strategy was actually designed to save as many of the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi as he could, and that this only inadvertently required their evacuation.<sup>19</sup> That suggestion merits some thought, although one must still explain the fact that the evacuations occurred not only on Dionysius' orders but also as a fairly clear result of his prior actions. Perhaps it is best to acknowledge that he was acting under the constraints of emergency, according a healthy privilege to Syracuse over the other Greek cities, and was lucky to retain possession of his own city in the end.

So the birth and consolidation of Dionysius' tyranny seem to have required some enforced movement of populations. He may well have been following the precedent set

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<sup>17</sup> Akragas: D.S. 13.89.2, 13.90.1-2; Gela: D.S. 13.111.5-6. See also the speech of Theodoros against Dionysius at D.S. 14.64.5-69.5, with references to Gela and Kamarina at 14.66.4, 14.68.2. The pathetic nature of these descriptions and the animosity of Theodoros may not necessarily be due to Diodorus' use of a hostile source: see Sanders (1981).

<sup>18</sup> D.S. 13.113.4. Anello (1999 [2003], pp. 405-6) notes that the presence of contingents from Gela, Kamarina, Akragas and Himera in Dionysius' allied army of 397 may indicate the freedom of these populations from Carthaginian tribute: (p. 406) "Segno questo non solo della debole incidenza della signoria cartaginese ma anche di una qualche vitalità di queste città ancora prima dell'azione rivitalizzante di Timoleonte, come del resto evidenzia la partecipazione di contingenti geloi, akragantini e camarinesi al seguito di Dione..."

<sup>19</sup> This is essentially Caven's line of reasoning: Caven (1990, pp. 59-79).

earlier in the fifth century by Gelon, who in the 480s had brought significant numbers of Greeks from other cities (Gela, Kamarina, Leontinoi, Megara Hyblaia) to Syracuse to ensure support in the capital.<sup>20</sup> These dislocations came early in Gelon's reign, and his goal was manifestly to flood the Syracusan citizen body with new members who owed their rights to him. He proved himself acutely aware of the value of demographic resources, and it is unlikely that Dionysius was ignorant of his imperial style.<sup>21</sup> While Gelon had forced evacuations at the tip of his own spear, Dionysius used the threat of the Carthaginians but in the end could not induce the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi to remain in Syracuse. It would be strange indeed if he could bring them to Syracuse but could not keep them there, so it is likely that their secession to Leontinoi had his approval. Indeed, the lone reference to this secession, in Diodorus, is so ambiguous on the question of agency that Dionysius may well have sent them there against their will.<sup>22</sup>

As a more or less established tyrant Dionysius continued to move people around eastern Sicily, and whether the particular method of achieving that end was decree, enslavement, or encouragement the guarantor of its effect was military force. His first manipulations of the Syracusan population were his freeing and enfranchising slaves at Syracuse in 404 (including a land redistribution) and in 396, and his bringing the Leontinoi there as citizens in 403.<sup>23</sup> Diodorus does not say how many slaves were freed in 404, and even if he had we could not trust the number absolutely, but section 14.7 concerns the "security of his tyranny," so there may have been a considerable number, though probably not all. Diodorus adds, incidentally, that not only the newly enfranchised slaves but *aliens* were given Syracusan land in the new distributions. This is remarkable and I will return to it in Chapter Five, on slavery and manumission. The manumission of 396 allowed Dionysius to man 60 ships; at 200 rowers per ship (conservatively) this would have involved 12,000 individuals.<sup>24</sup> The siege of Leontinoi

<sup>20</sup> Gela, Leontinoi: Hdt. 7.156; Kamarina: Thuc. 6.4.3; Megara Hyblaia: Hdt. 7.156 with Thuc. 6.4.2 and Polyaeus, *Stratagema* 1.27.3. See Vanotti (1995, pp. 91-96).

<sup>21</sup> Braudel (1995, pp. 344-52) on royal and imperial capitals as parasites on their territorial possessions. Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 383) make Syracuse an example of a city that could not have grown from its colonial foundation to its Classical- and Hellenistic-period size without "migration of sizeable groups from one region to another." Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 63-5) raises the possibility that the Syracusans suffered from endemic malaria and needed continuous infusions of population even to maintain their numbers.

<sup>22</sup> D.S. 13.113.4: ...τῷ Διονυσίῳ διαφόρως ἔχοντες εἰς Λεοντίνους ἀπηλλάγησαν. The verb can mean "to depart," or "to wish to depart," or "to be dismissed;" I do not insist on any particular reading but emphasize the ambiguity. Even if Diodorus believed that the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi chose to leave Syracuse, his pithy report is not enough to say for certain that the refugees were free to choose the location of their asylum; their precarious position and prior obedience to the tyrant suggest that they may not have enjoyed freedom of mobility within the territory controlled by Dionysius.

<sup>23</sup> "New Citizens" of 404: D.S. 14.7.4; emergency manumissions of 396: D.S. 14.58.1; Leontinoi: D.S. 14.15.4. Caven (1990, pp. 78-79) argues that there was no "full scale redistribution of land" in 404 but that only the land vacated by the cavalry in revolt was involved; he also writes (p. 87) that in 403 Leontinoi were "reincorporated in the Syracusan community...it is best to assume that the landowners remained in possession of their fields, working them by means of slaves or perhaps renting them to long-established Syracusans, and that the proletariat either took service with Dionysius or joined the colony which he established at Adranum..." Braccisi (1998, p. 72) on the Leontinoi: "un'ardita operazione di trasmigrazione di cittadinanza, o di trasfusione etnica, che, d'ora in poi, diviene nota peculiare e dominante del nuovo stato siracusano."

<sup>24</sup> These 12,000 freed slaves could conceivably have included many of the Naxioi and Katanaioi enslaved in 403. If any of these survived the disastrous naval defeat (20,000 men lost) of 396 in Katane, that perhaps explains how they were available for the Rheginoi to place in Mylai in 394.

and the inhabitants' eventual agreement to live at Syracuse as citizens are likewise remarkable as they perhaps represented a renewed attempt on Dionysius' part to flood the Syracusan citizen body with supporters.<sup>25</sup> It also left him a city and territory that could later be assigned to another population, as he did eventually do in 396, giving Leontinoi to a group of 10,000 Peloponnesian mercenaries in place of their promised wages.<sup>26</sup>

It is not easy to follow these populations through their convulsions. It seems reasonable to imagine that most of the evacuated Gelooi and Kamarinaioi arrived safely at Syracuse, that of these most withdrew to Leontinoi, and that of these most returned to their respective homes in Gela and Kamarina after the treaty of 405. We have no information, however, on the numbers of refugees who remained in Syracuse or Leontinoi, though there must have been some.<sup>27</sup> Those at Leontinoi would have thus joined the previous inhabitants of a city that Diodorus describes in 406 as "an outpost of the Syracusans, being full of fugitive and foreign men."<sup>28</sup> The terms *φυγάδες* and *ξένοι* are presumably to be understood with reference to Syracuse and perhaps collectively (and pejoratively) name the entire citizen body of the Leontinoi, whose political constitution we unfortunately do not know. In any event having failed to keep large numbers of grateful Gelooi and Kamarinaioi in Syracuse by using the Carthaginian threat, Dionysius appears to have resorted, two years later, to emulating Gelon exactly and threatening violence directly against the inhabitants of Leontinoi to get them to come to Syracuse. Once there they were no longer Leontinoi but Syracusans, and as we hear nothing of further civic unrest at Syracuse, we must assume that either fear of

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<sup>25</sup> On the earlier fifth-century alterations to the population of Leontinoi by the Deinomenids and the democratic government see Vanotti (1995, pp. 89-102) and Vattuone (1994, pp. 85-89). Vanotti (1995, pp. 103) argues that Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.3.5 is probably accurate in recounting the homecoming in 405 or 404 of the Leontinoi who had living in Syracuse since 422. In any case the treaty of 405 would perhaps have made their return possible. Vattuone (1994, p. 92) concurs: "la città, che *attendeva un cambiamento politico* [italics sic], accolse di nuovo i propri esuli (quelli che ancora non erano rientrati) e forse anche quelli fra i *neopolitai* siracusani che ancora non erano rientrati." This would mean, then, that these individuals and families were twice relocated to Syracuse: first in 422, then again in 403. The departures of both the Leontinoi and the Syracusan cavalry in 405 and 404 could have left Syracuse underpopulated—a condition Dionysius I soon attempted to remedy. Vattuone (1994, p. 93) reads Diodorus' *ten polin ekliontes es Syrakousas metoikisan* to mean that Dionysius once again offered citizenship to the wealthy among the Leontinoi, specifying (fn. 31) that this would be a "ripristino delle condizioni precedenti il trattato con Cartagine" and that Leontinoi received lighter treatment than Catania and Naxos "si può comprendere anche considerando che molti *cittadini siracusani* [italics sic] erano tornati ad abitarla nel 405."

<sup>26</sup> D.S. 14.78.2. Caven (1990, pp. 121-22): "If (as I believe may have been the case) the former landowning citizens of Leontini (who may not have been very numerous) had been permitted to retain their fields and cultivate them *in absentia*, Dionysius must now have found other land for them, perhaps on confiscated Sicel territory."

<sup>27</sup> Consolo Langher (1997, p. 117): "Nel 397 anche i Geloi (rifugiatasi in Leontini nel 405, e da qui passati, dopo il 403, a Siracusa), e molti di coloro che erano stati costretti ad abbandonare la *chora* geloa, si posero al fianco di Dionisio" against Motya.

<sup>28</sup> D.S. 13.95.3. Vattuone (1994, p. 92): "la dipendenza da Siracusa è ben chiara, così come l'ampia ricettività del sito...stranieri e/o mercenari, oltre che esuli (probabilmente anche una parte dei leontinesi rimasti o rientrati dopo la *stasis*) costituiscono il nuovo corpo civico di una città e di una *chora* senza autonomia politica, profondamente trasformata demograficamente negli ultimi anni e *in attesa di un cambiamento*." [italics sic].

Dionysius or genuine contentment with their new homeland kept them from challenging the tyranny.<sup>29</sup>

Afterward Dionysius' demographic policy in Sicily involved transfers altering the populations of other cities as well as that of the capital. In 404 he dismissed a group of Campanian mercenaries, "viewing their instability with suspicion," and these took over the city of Entella in western Sicily, killing the men and taking the women for themselves.<sup>30</sup> Whether or not this episode caused any trouble for Dionysius personally, it shows that a failure to manage powerful and mobile military forces could have unpredictable effects.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps he learned the lesson and put it into effect after capturing Katane and Naxos in 403: he enslaved both populations and brought at least the Katanaioi to be sold in Syracuse.<sup>32</sup> Rather than inviting these populations to enjoy Syracusan citizenship, as would later do with the Leontinoi, he enslaved and sold them, scattering them throughout Syracuse, Sicily, and perhaps elsewhere in the Mediterranean.<sup>33</sup> Mass enslavements will be discussed further in Chapter Five, but for now I note only that following Dionysius' manumission and enfranchisement of an unknown but presumably large number of Syracusan slaves the year before, the capital city may have lacked its usual slave labor force, so that what was needed was not more citizens but more slaves.<sup>34</sup> Dionysius then gave the territory of Naxos to an unspecified group of Sikels to inhabit, and Katane to a group of Campanian mercenaries.<sup>35</sup> When a tyrant was willing and able to engage in such large-scale displacements it was possible to effectively replace antagonistic populations with loyal and dependent ones. When

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<sup>29</sup> See Giuliani (1995, pp. 122-3) on the infusions of immigrants and freed slaves into the Syracusan citizen body, noting (p. 122): "nel caso del trasferimento a siracusa dell'intera popolazione delle città italiote rase al suolo, la sicurezza da parte di Dionigi sulla possibilità di controllare in Siracusa una massa eterogenea in cui non mancavano motivi di risentimento;" and concluding (p. 123): "tutta la nuova compagine cittadina frutto della politica dionigiana non gettò profonde radici."

<sup>30</sup> D.S. 14.9.8-9: ὑφορώμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ἀβεβαιότητα; Fantasia (2006). But see Lee (2000) for an argument that they had actually arrived at Entella ca. 410 and that the takeover was a gradual process not a dramatic massacre.

<sup>31</sup> Entella was consistently hostile to Dionysius during his campaign against Motya in 397, though it is likely that the city's original Elymian inhabitants would have been equally so.

<sup>32</sup> D.S. 14.15.2-3. Caven (1990, p. 86) claims rather simplistically: "Dionysius had clearly decided upon a 'permanent solution' of the Chalcidic problem...the inhabitants...were sold: the customary treatment meted out in the fifth century to peoples who rejected an initial summons to surrender." The solution was not so permanent, as we will see; Dionysius' imperialism touched Greek and Sikel, Dorian and Ionian equally; mass enslavement was not (yet) the standard punishment that Caven imagines it was.

<sup>33</sup> Giuliani (1995, p. 109) suggests that the Leontinoi received lighter treatment because they were "soltanto gli elementi più facoltosi del corpo civico" who had already been brought to Syracuse in 422 and had returned to their original homes in 405 or 404. Aside from not really explaining the lighter treatment, this argument ignores the potential remnants of Akragantine, Geloan, and Kamarinaian refugees there, not to mention the necessary presence of a range of classes in any functioning city. Vanotti (1995, p. 104) takes the same line on the composition of Leontinoi after the treaty of 405: "la liberarono [sc. the Carthaginians] di quella massa di stranieri e di *phygades*, che ormai da tempo la popolavano, resituendole forse una più omogenea identità etnica." I disagree.

<sup>34</sup> The manumission of 396 was followed shortly by Dionysius' defeat of the Carthaginian army outside Syracuse, from which the Carthaginian citizens, Sikels, and a group of Iberian mercenaries escaped leaving the rest of the army to be taken captive: D.S. 14.75.4-9. So in that case too a large-scale manumission had to be compensated by the acquisition of new slaves.

<sup>35</sup> D.S. 14.15.43. These Campanians were not those who had helped Dionysius put down the revolt in 404, and who eventually settled at Entella, but a new group, presumably some of the "mass of mercenaries" Dionysius hired later in 404 (D.S. 14.10.4).

potentially influential populations were not managed, they would find their own solutions.

In fact, the fate of the Naxioi and Katanaioi illustrate the trauma of becoming a population without a home.<sup>36</sup> In 394 the Rheginoi offered to take in anyone driven out by Dionysius, demonstrating that the dislocations caused by the tyrant's wars could be turned to an advantage by a population willing to incorporate the refugees.<sup>37</sup> The Rheginoi then settled "the surviving Naxioi and Katanaioi" in Mylai, so some part of those populations had either escaped Dionysius' chains or had, once enslaved, purchased their freedom or been freed.<sup>38</sup> Alternatively perhaps the Rhegians' offer of asylum induced enslaved Naxioi and Katanaioi to flee there hoping that their slave status would be reversed. While it is true that under normal circumstances anyone whose slave had escaped could demand it back on penalty of seizure, relations between Syracuse and Rhegion were quite hostile; reciprocal legal accords may not have been in effect even if complaints are not preserved in the sources. One might wonder further by what authority the Rheginoi had arranged the settlement in Mylai, and what the existing population there thought about the immigrants.<sup>39</sup> Rhegion played a crucial role in organizing a reunion of dispersed populations that might not have occurred solely with the movement of individuals.

In any event the requirements of tyranny once again displaced the refugees: Dionysius attacked Mylai and expelled the new inhabitants, driving them to live with the Sikels and in other Greek cities.<sup>40</sup> Dionysius cannot have liked to see any other Greek city making decisions about the settlement of populations, as these acts usurped what was now becoming the tyrant's prerogative.<sup>41</sup> More importantly, he could not allow the Naxioi and Katanaioi to reunite but did not need to kill them, since it was primarily *as groups* they could be dangerous to him. Individual Naxioi and Katanaioi could survive, but not the collectives 'the Naxioi' or 'the Katanaioi.'

At least, no Sicilian Greek city could be allowed to assume Dionysius' right to direct the movement of populations within Sicily. In 396, Dionysius had tried to resettle Messina, destroyed by the Carthaginians earlier that year, with a group including Messenians exiled from the Peloponnese. The Spartans objected that Messenians should not be allowed to live in such a good city as Sicilian Messina and Dionysius capitulated, bringing them to the site of Tyndaris instead and leaving Italian Lokrians and Medmaioi

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<sup>36</sup> For a study of several such "wandering cities" see Mackil (2004), who stresses the importance of relationships with stable benefactor cities.

<sup>37</sup> D.S. 14.87.1. A city could also incorporate refugees by including them in a colonial foundation, as Archonides did in the foundation of Halaisa, on which see below.

<sup>38</sup> D.S. 14.87.1.

<sup>39</sup> Caven (1990, p. 127) implies that Mylai was a new Rhegian colony established in 394, but Thucydides 3.90.2-4 has Mylai as a possession (possibly just a fort but more likely a garrisoned city) of the Messanioi in 425, defeated by the Athenians and thereafter allied with them. It is thus clear that there was a pre-existing settlement of some kind at Mylai before 394, as attested also by fifth-century dedications recording victory of the Messanioi over the Mylaioi (*SEG* XXIV 313-314). Cf. Hansen and Nielsen (2004, pp. 216-217).

<sup>40</sup> D.S. 14.87.3.

<sup>41</sup> His campaigns against Tauromenion and his treatment of it (ejection of the Sikels and settlement of his mercenaries), on which see below, were perhaps as much an assertion of his right to determine the disposition of populations in his part of Sicily as they were an execution of military strategy.

from Bruttium as the new Messanians.<sup>42</sup> Dionysius, at pains to keep his Spartan allies happy, in effect recognized their authority over the movement of Peloponnesian populations in this brazen display of anti-Messenian sentiment. He nevertheless demonstrated his own status as well, first by resettling the Messenians at all (rather than letting the Spartans dictate where they would go) and second by reassigning some of Sikel Abakainon's territory to the Messenians' new city.<sup>43</sup> According to Diodorus, the new Tyndaritai were liberal in granting citizenship and quickly gained a fairly large population of 5,000 citizens.<sup>44</sup> These new citizens will have included not only inhabitants of the neighboring territory but also, presumably, refugees, exiles, mercenaries, and runaway slaves who could stand to benefit immensely from the distribution of land and citizen rights.

Dionysius' first major campaign against the Carthaginians raises several issues of tyrant-related mobility. In Diodorus' account, one of the principal motivations for the war was that Greeks were "deserting [ἀποτρέχοντες] to the Carthaginian dominion [ἐπικράτεια], taking with them their cities and their possessions" and Dionysius could see that they could continue to do so as long as there was peace.<sup>45</sup> The language is ambiguous but evocative; they might have been physically moving to the Carthaginian territory or metaphorically delivering themselves and their cities into Carthaginian power—and thereby moving the borderline between Dionysius' territory and the Carthaginians'.<sup>46</sup> Where territorial states are concerned a simple change of allegiance could rewrite the map in a kind of relative mobility, moving the conceptual border rather than the people. However one parses the passage, it is clear that peace had its own rhythms of mobility just as war did, but rhythms that were not easy to control. Part of the reason for this peacetime flight from Dionysius' domains may have been the economic regime in force there, perhaps including tribute and taxes, coinage systems, and popular/tyrannical violence against the wealthy.<sup>47</sup> As the resettlement of the refugee Naxioi and Katanaioi shows, individuals could relocate fairly freely, but once it was perceived to be a group activity, it became problematic.

Having decided to renew the war and in need of skilled workmen, he obtained some by compulsion from among his subjects and attracted others "from Italy and Greece as well as Carthaginian territory with impressive wages."<sup>48</sup> Dionysius' war was thus enabled by mobile or potentially mobile craftsmen, including those from within the

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<sup>42</sup> D.S. 14.78.5. Braccisi (1998, p. 84): "Ciò comporta un drastico spopolamento di Medma, ma, in tal modo, la fidata Locri può meglio controllarne il territorio. Inoltre, in proprio, l'operazione di trapianto etnico le offre anche la possibilità di liberarsi di un'eccedenza di popolazione. La quale, insieme con quella di Medma, violentemente trapiantata a Messina, può ora sopravvivere solo sposando la causa della tirranide." Giuliani (1995, p. 119): the 4,000 Medmaians "furono con ogni probabilità trapiantati compromettendo la sopravvivenza della patria d'origine." Compare Dionysius' later removal of the Kauloniatai and Hipponiatai to Syracuse and donation of their cities and territories to the Lokrians.

<sup>43</sup> D.S. 14.78.5.

<sup>44</sup> D.S. 14.78.6.

<sup>45</sup> D.S. 14.41.1.

<sup>46</sup> Giuliani (1995, p. 117) takes the passage literally, referring to "vere e proprie fughe dal territorio controllato da Dionigi."

<sup>47</sup> Giuliani (1995, p. 117) notes briefly the "controllo e...sensibile influenza anche sul piano economico," emphasizing (fn. 45) the "forte accentramento, mortificazione dell'iniziativa privata e penalizzazione dei ceti abbienti" as well as the new system of bronze coinage that could only be used within the territory controlled by Dionysius.

<sup>48</sup> D.S. 14.41.3.

empire he intended to fight; he could compel labor from his subjects but had to offer attractive pay to induce otherwise free men to come work for him in Syracuse. Tyrants had to work within existing economic conditions, even if their policies could also affect those conditions. In this respect craft labor was similar to mercenary service, in that citizens but not foreigners could be compelled to serve. Citizen soldiers might not require a wage but they often did require some compensation at the end of a campaign; mercenaries might not get their settled wages until after a victory, and they might be compensated by means other than cash payment.<sup>49</sup> In fact mercenary service was only the most visible of the many itinerant skill trades—doctors, metalworkers, carpenters, philosophers, to name a few—that brought individuals across sometimes great distances in response to the market for their labor.<sup>50</sup> These are not exclusively Sicilian phenomena: this account of preparation for war only corroborates that Sicilian powers did in fact draw professional labor from several parts of the Mediterranean.

On the way to Motya Dionysius' army created a wake of movement in its path, as any such massive allied force must. This was another rhythm of mobility in LCEH Sicily: the disturbance caused by the movement of large armies, as in the Carthaginian offensives of 409 and 406.<sup>51</sup> Setting out in 397, Dionysius' army not only sent the populations of opposing cities and territories fleeing or gathering in preparation for the inevitable sieges, but also attracted to itself the contingents of soldiers from the Greek cities.<sup>52</sup> These soldiers, along with those from Syracuse and the mercenaries, were thus transported to the western end of Sicily, if only temporarily; the Sikels in his army were stationed as a garrison in Motya once it was captured, although they probably only remained there until the Carthaginians retook Motya the next year, when they either died defending the city or fled.<sup>53</sup> The inhabitants of the cities opposed to Dionysius, on the other hand, had to prepare for his army either to plunder their land or besiege their city, or both.

The fall of Motya produced large numbers of captives, and their precise fate is rather difficult to pin down. Diodorus is quite explicit that the Motyans as a whole remained on the island and did not flee their city: as soon as Dionysius arrived, they destroyed the causeway leading to the mainland of Sicily; a Syracusan fleet kept any sea traffic from reaching Motya: "And of course it was not possible to flee from the city, since it was surrounded by the sea, and the enemy was in control of the sea."<sup>54</sup> While many Motyans undoubtedly died in the preliminary battles as well as in the slaughter begun when Dionysius' army first entered the city, a significant number were probably alive to take refuge in the city's temples. Dionysius had encouraged this flight, "wishing to sell the inhabitants of the city into slavery in order to gather money," either to pay his mercenaries or to have more liquid cash for other purposes.<sup>55</sup> He paid the soldiers (and

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<sup>49</sup> Thus D.M. Lewis in *CAH* VI<sup>2</sup> 153: "What we know of the coinage...suggests that his basic method of rewarding mercenaries had to be in land-allotments." This argument is supported by the limited silver issues described in Consolo Langher (1997, pp. 119-131).

<sup>50</sup> See McKechnie (1989, esp. pp. 142-177).

<sup>51</sup> The movement of allied contingents is only occasionally discussed but must have been frequent. E.g. the Italiote allies of Dionysius returning home "through the interior [of the island]" after the evacuations of Gela and Kamarina in 405 (D.S. 13.112.3).

<sup>52</sup> Sieges: D.S. 14.48.1, 14.48.4-5; contingents: D.S. 14.47.5-6.

<sup>53</sup> Sikel garrison: D.S. 14.53.5; recapture of Motya: D.S. 14.55.4.

<sup>54</sup> Causeway: D.S. 14.48.1-2; Syracusan naval superiority: D.S. 14.50.4; quotation: D.S. 14.52.2.

<sup>55</sup> D.S. 14.53.2.

it is not clear whether στρατιῶται should include the mercenaries or not) by letting them plunder the city's considerable wealth, and "sold as booty the Motyans who survived."<sup>56</sup> But to whom could he have sold them?

All these events took place before Dionysius and his army returned to Syracuse, so the enslaved Motyans must have been sold at or near Motya. It is unlikely that Dionysius could have sold the slaves to his own soldiers, since the conscripted, allied, and mercenary forces had not been paid yet and would have lacked currency with which to buy them. The owners of the 500 merchantmen accompanying the army are much better candidates for the buyers of the Motyans, and should have had their bases in Greek Sicily since they brought Dionysius' siege engines and other supplies to Motya.<sup>57</sup> If they did buy the slaves, we may assume that they brought them back to eastern Sicily with them, in which case the entire population of Motya will have been either killed or removed by the end of 397. This scenario, however, is inconsistent with the tradition of the foundation of Lilybaion, whose first citizens were held to be survivors from Motya.

The inconsistency makes it quite likely that Dionysius actually sold the Motyan slaves to local (Elymian, Sikan?) inhabitants of western Sicily, perhaps to the people of Eryx, who had capitulated immediately upon his arrival on the west coast. Lilybaion was held to have been founded by the survivors of Motya shortly after 397.<sup>58</sup> As we have seen, the only surviving Motyans were enslaved and sold by Dionysius at or near Motya in 397, so by necessity Lilybaion was populated at least in part by these slaves after they had either run away or been freed. Himilcon's counteroffensive of 396 retook nearly all the Elymian cities of western Sicily as well as Motya itself, so if people in these cities had bought survivors from Motya, they could have been encouraged or forced to give them up. The chain of ownership could have been more or less extended, but it may not have been difficult for the Carthaginians to gather the Motyans together again, perhaps paying for them and freeing them or confiscating them and freeing them. The Carthaginians might also have brought settlers from other parts of their empire to inhabit Motya and Lilybaion, but the foundation of Lilybaion can best be reconciled with the capture of Motya by allowing the Carthaginians to have been primarily responsible for redeeming the Motyan captives, effecting a relocation by a very circuitous route.<sup>59</sup>

Dionysius I had an ambivalent relationship with the Sikans of west-central Sicily. His campaigns against the Carthaginians in 400-397 must have caused some disturbances in their cities via recruiting and the motion of a large army, but he does not seem to have directed military force against them or demanded their submission.

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<sup>56</sup> Plunder: D.S. 14.53.3; slave-selling: D.S. 14.53.4. Caven (1990, p. 106): "...it would seem that many—perhaps most—of them were, in fact ransomed by their neighbours (perhaps by the Segestaeans), as was the common practice." But in fact Dionysius was besieging Segesta along with Entella and is unlikely to have sold them slaves or anything else. I argue below that is more likely to have been other neighbors, perhaps the people of Eryx.

<sup>57</sup> D.S. 14.47.7.

<sup>58</sup> D.S. 22.10.4. Caven (1990, p. 110) condenses what must have been a complicated process: "The former inhabitants of Motya were redeemed and settled on the site, to form the citizen body of the new city." The archaeological record shows that Motya was reinhabited immediately after the destruction, though with declining intensity, until the end of the fourth century according to Famà (2002, p. 50), while the earliest burials at Lilybaion date to ca. 350 according to Bechtold (1999, p. 18). There can be no question of an instantaneous transfer.

<sup>59</sup> It is also possible that Himilcon in 396 settled Carthaginians from Carthage in Motya after recapturing it.

Instead, he appealed to them if not as equals then at least as free actors. In 396 he made them a remarkable offer: temporarily abandon their cities and join his army to repel the Carthaginian counterattack in return for richer land elsewhere in Sicily and the right to return to their homes in any case at the end of the war.<sup>60</sup> Diodorus reports that only a few of the Sikans (i.e. only a few of the cities?) accepted the offer and that they did so out of fear.<sup>61</sup> Still, the offer raises a number of questions. Why did he need them to abandon their cities, and what about the women, children, and other non-military inhabitants? Where was the land Dionysius intended to give them? Was the offer in earnest or did Dionysius intend to, e.g., keep the soldiers in service indefinitely, or settle others in their abandoned/weakened cities? Unfortunately the notice in Diodorus is the only evidence for this episode, and not much can be stated with certainty.

Concurrently with his overarching war against the Carthaginians, Dionysius ordered population transfers to manage his mercenaries as well as the neighboring Sicel populations. Early on in his reign, in 405, the Syracusan cavalry, in revolt against him, withdrew to Aitna-Inessa, which Thucydides describes as a “Sikel town [πόλις μὲν]” in 426.<sup>62</sup> It had apparently also been occupied since 461 by the Peloponnesians and Syracusans ejected from Katane where they had been settled by Hieron I in 476.<sup>63</sup> The exact makeup of Aitna’s population cannot be known, but it certainly included Sikels and Aitna was in some meaningful sense a Sikel city. When Dionysius eventually recaptured the city, in 403, we do not learn of any punishment of the population that had harbored the revolt.<sup>64</sup> In fact, only once, to my knowledge, is Dionysius ever recorded violating the demographic integrity of a Sikel population, when his conflict with the Sikels in Tauromenion led to a failed attack in 394 before he finally expelled them in 392.<sup>65</sup> He had of course fought military campaigns against Sicels elsewhere, but he treated their cities like Greek cities: either submit (i.e. to tribute, perhaps a garrison, etc.) or prepare to go to war. Thus it is crucial to understand the Sicels not as a monolithic ethnic group with central decision-making but as a collection of populations whose most important unit of collective action was still the city. The Sikels in Aitna do not appear to have been displaced in 403, unless *perhaps* they were involved in the Sikel occupation of Naxos after its depopulation.

While Dionysius preferred not to expel, enslave, or otherwise try to eliminate Sikel populations, he did try to co-opt their leaders and institutions. An example of his conciliatory approach is his treatment of Agyris, the tyrant of Agyrion, who hosted the Campanian mercenaries that would rescue Dionysius from the revolt of 404; he also made a treaty with Dionysius in 396, and then hosted the Syracusan army in their conflict with the Carthaginians in 392.<sup>66</sup> Although the relationship could be renegotiated (as it had to be in 396), his policy was to maintain Agyris as an ally. A good example of Dionysius’ more manipulative approach is his foundation of Adranon near Mt. Aitna in

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<sup>60</sup> D.S. 14.55.6-7.

<sup>61</sup> Giuliani (1995, p. 113) discounts this “tiepida risposta” that makes Dionysius look bad as due to the bias of Timaeus.

<sup>62</sup> Cavalry at Aitna/Inessa: D.S. 13.113.4; Thucydides 3.103.1.

<sup>63</sup> D.S. 11.49.1-2, 11.76.3.

<sup>64</sup> D.S. 14.14.2. Caven omits any reference to native inhabitants of Aitna/Inessa, which he believes “had presumably been largely unpeopled since Dionysius expelled the mercenaries”: Caven (1990, p. 112).

<sup>65</sup> Unsuccessful attack: D.S. 14.87.4-14.88.5; expulsion after treaty: D.S. 14.96.4.

<sup>66</sup> Hosted the Campanians: D.S. 14.8.6-14.9.3; treaty: D.S. 14.78.7; Dionysius at Agyrion: D.S. 14.95-14.96.

400, named “after a certain conspicuous temple.”<sup>67</sup> In that case Dionysius appears to have established a city at the site of a temple to Adranos, father of the Palikoi, the principal Sikel gods. The precise nature of the connection between city and sanctuary is unknown, as is the composition of the settlers, but Dionysius’ foundations almost exclusively involved (ex-)mercenaries and sometime Syracusans, so the city of Adranon was most likely established to exert some amount of control over the religious site. But as we know very little about Adranon in any period and nothing else before the arrival of Timoleon, saying more would be only speculation.

Maintaining good relations with Sikel groups was part of the same task as keeping the Campanians happy, and it was facilitated by mass population transfers. In 403 we saw that Dionysius settled his Campanian mercenaries in Katane and a group of Sikels in the territory of Naxos. In 396 Dionysius moved the Campanians in Katane to Aitna, “because of its being an exceptionally strong outpost” according to Diodorus, thereby imposing a new population on what probably had continued to be an inhabited city.<sup>68</sup> This could be seen, like the foundation of Adranon in 400, as a move to impose greater control on Sikel territory, though a more openly military one, and indeed relations with nearly all Sikel populations deteriorated in the mid-390s. The Sikel foundation of Tauromenion in 396 was supported by Himilcon, and thereafter Dionysius was hostile to the city’s inhabitants, until in 392 his treaty with the Carthaginians allowed him to “[eject] the majority of the Sikels who were there and [settle] those of his own mercenaries whom he had chosen as most fitting.”<sup>69</sup> We are not told exactly who these mercenaries were, but again Dionysius imposed a (para)military presence on what had been Sikel land. His negotiated peace with the Carthaginians at Sikel Agyrion was made possible in part by the cooperation of its tyrant Agyris, and in Diodorus’ account the treaty gave Dionysius explicit control over the Sikels.<sup>70</sup> Sikel populations continued to exist well into the fourth century, but Dionysius appears not to have had anything more to do with them, whether because of the treaty, the threat of violence, or because the conflicts are not recorded. The treatment of Tauromenion may have been an exemplary punishment for the other Sikel groups, but in any case it was the last time that Dionysius is recorded displacing Sikels or compensating mercenaries with land.

Dionysius’ later career involved comparatively less manipulation of the populations of other Sicilian cities—perhaps because he was busy in Syracuse, southern Italy and the Adriatic. In 389 he destroyed Kaulonia (in southern Italy), brought its inhabitants to Syracuse as citizens, and gave the territory to the Lokrians; in 388 he destroyed Hipponion (Italy), brought its inhabitants to Syracuse (though not apparently as citizens), and gave its territory to the Lokrians.<sup>71</sup> The situation in southern Italy

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<sup>67</sup> D.S. 14.37.5.

<sup>68</sup> D.S. 14.58.2.

<sup>69</sup> Foundation: D.S. 14.59.1-2; treaty: D.S. 14.96.4. Caven (1990, p. 131) attributes the lack of resistance from the Sikel Tauromenitai to the removal of Carthaginian support for them, and also believes that the mercenaries installed in Tauromenion were Greeks. It does seem clear that at least until 392 the Carthaginians had been protecting Tauromenion.

<sup>70</sup> D.S. 14.96.4.

<sup>71</sup> Caulonia: D.S. 14.106.3; Hipponion: D.S. 14.107.2. Giuliani (1995, p. 109) suggests that the Hipponiatai were in fact made Syracusan citizens. They were restored by the Carthaginians in 379/8: D.S. 15.24.1; Giuliani (1995, p. 117) claims (apparently without evidence) that “appare chiaro comunque che i nuovi

resembles that of eastern Sicily in 403, when Dionysius emptied Naxos and Katane to make room for Sikels and Campanians, respectively. In this case, however, he apparently had no personal quarrel with the Kauloniatai and Hipponiatai, but he was allied with the Lokrians through a marriage connection and was therefore inclined to harm their enemies.<sup>72</sup> That he brought the displaced populations to Syracuse rather than scattering them or selling them as slaves probably attests to another population shortage in the capital, but it is not clear why he gave Syracusan citizenship (and a 5-year tax exemption) to the Kauloniatai and not to the Hipponiatai. Closer to Sicily, after waging proxy wars with the Rheginoi nearly from the beginning of his reign, in 388/7 he starved them into submission and brought 6,000 of them to Syracuse to be ransomed or sold as slaves.<sup>73</sup> The ultimate destination of these captives, like that of nearly all others, cannot be known, but the collective “Rheginoi” had been dissolved, and they would not trouble Dionysius again as they had done by campaigning against his allies (for example in Messina) or aiding his enemies (for example the Naxioi and Katanaioi).

But the days of his massive transfers of Sicilian populations were over. The wars against the Carthaginians in western Sicily produced large numbers of captives and slaves, but we do not know whether they were all sold on the spot or brought back to Syracuse. Greek captives seem always to have been brought back to the capital, at least initially. Besides his Sicilian cities, Dionysius also sent settlers outside of the island. By 385 he had founded one Adriatic colony at Lissos and now founded another at Pharos along with the Parians.<sup>74</sup> One may assume that Syracusans were involved in both of these ventures but besides the cooperation of the Parians no other co-colonists are known. For my purposes here it is sufficient to note that these colonists were removed from Sicily, and unfortunately the creation of Dionysius’ Adriatic colonies are the last instance of population mobility from his reign.<sup>75</sup>

## B. Dionysius II

His son and successor Dionysius II, though certainly a tyrant, did not interfere as much in the populations of the Sicilian cities. Perhaps his difficulties at home in Syracuse prevented it. There is, however, a tradition that sometime between his ascension in 367 and the year 359/8 he had founded two colonies in Apulia to confront the problem of Adriatic piracy.<sup>76</sup> While these colonies naturally involved moving Syracusans and others to Apulia, the motivation for the colonies itself was to promote and protect mobility across the Ionian/Adriatic sea, i.e. between the western and eastern Mediterranean regions. In addition, Dionysius II “having restored a section of the colony [of Rhegion] called it Phoebia” at some point before being deposed for the

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cittadini immesi in quell’anno [390] rimasero in qualche modo un corpo estraneo all’interno della pur variegata compagine civica siracusana.”

<sup>72</sup> It has been suggested that Dionysius’ policies were aimed at making Locri a second capital city for his Syracusan empire: Guilianni (1995, p. 121).

<sup>73</sup> D.S. 14.111.4.

<sup>74</sup> D.S. 15.13.4.

<sup>75</sup> Caven (1990, p. 141) suggests that the colonists sent to the Adriatic included the previously enfranchised inhabitants of Kaulonia and Hipponion; whether they made up most or even a significant number of the colonists can only be speculation.

<sup>76</sup> D.S. 16.5.3.

first time.<sup>77</sup> We do not know if this venture involved the old citizens of Rhegion, enslaved and scattered in 387, or if Dionysius II sent his own settlers (i.e. Syracusans, perhaps mercenaries). In favor of the first interpretation is Diodorus' mentioning a garrison of Dionysius II there in 351, which Leptines and Kallippos defeated and then "restored to the Rheginoi their independence."<sup>78</sup> The fact that the garrison and the population were opposed makes it likely that Dionysius II restored some of the Rheginoi expelled in 387 but also maintained control over the city with a garrison. This was, to our knowledge, the only instance in which he followed his father's model and manipulated the population of a city to his benefit.

### C. Timoleon

After the turmoil of the 350s and early 340s, Timoleon's work in Syracuse and campaigns elsewhere in Sicily involved major changes to Sicilian populations. While Timoleon was not strictly speaking a tyrant, I include him in this category because like Dionysius I, his methods included unilateral settlements and liquidations of people.<sup>79</sup> Likewise, he depended heavily on mercenaries as a disinterested military force. While the chronology is debated, we can be relatively certain that events were not invented out of whole cloth. Between 344 and 339 the Timoleontic resettlement of Sicily brought tens of thousands of Greeks, including Syracusans and other Sicilians living abroad, to eastern Sicily.<sup>80</sup> It is of course not entirely clear what Timoleon's role was in this resettlement, although at the very least he seems to have had the authority to distribute land in Syracuse and perhaps nearby cities.<sup>81</sup> He should therefore have primary credit and responsibility for this influx of Greeks, which was achieved through negotiation and incentives. But Timoleon also had enough military force to impose decisions on subject or defeated populations, as the tyrants did. He took 15,000 captives after his victory over the Carthaginians at the Krimisos in perhaps 340 although we do not know if they were brought to Syracuse or sold in western Sicily.<sup>82</sup> He eliminated the Campanians inhabiting Aitna in 339/8, and may have done the same at Galaria sometime in the

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<sup>77</sup> Strabo 6.1.6.

<sup>78</sup> D.S. 16.45.9. Both the chronology and the events of the late 350s are difficult to reconcile between Diodorus and Plutarch.

<sup>79</sup> Siebert (1982-1983, p. 55) has Timoleon acting very much like Dionysius I: "The annihilation of Leontinoi, whose inhabitants were transferred to Syracuse, appears as a relapse into the politics of the tyrants...What Timoleon did with his own soldiers is not known. He probably set them up in the framework of his settlement activities."

<sup>80</sup> 344: Plutarch, *Timoleon* 23; 339/8: D.S. 16.82.5. The two accounts differ also in the numbers of settlers, but a total in the tens of thousands is not unlikely. Braccisi (1998, p. 97): "...ripopolò Siracusa con circa sessanta mila nuovi cittadini, che qui accorrono da ogni parte della Sicilia...Timoleonte repotenziò così demograficamente la città in linea di assoluta continuità con la politica dei due Dionigi. Ma, in contrasto con loro, egli è un convinto assertore della *polis* classica contro le tentazioni dello stato territoriale." Consolo Langher (1997, p. 178) distinguishes two invitations, one to the Siceliotai in 343 and one to all the Greeks in 338. Cf. D.S. 16.82 and 19.2.8 on the conferral of Syracusan citizenship to immigrants from Carthaginian territory.

<sup>81</sup> In Diodorus the Corinthians first sent 5,000 settlers before Timoleon made his proclamation inviting more, while in Plutarch (*Timoleon* 22) both "Timoleon and the Syracusans" requested settlers from Corinth.

<sup>82</sup> D.S. 16.80.5.

330s.<sup>83</sup> It is well established that his distinctively anti-Carthaginian and anti-Campanian aims corresponded with a policy of encouraging Greek settlement in eastern Sicily, and it is not difficult to see how eliminating foreign populations in the so-called Greek part of Sicily could allow for greater Greek immigration.<sup>84</sup> He wanted eastern Sicily to be repopulated, but as much as possible with Greeks.

Timoleon is famous for creating the conditions in which the Greek cities of Sicily could once again thrive. One of those conditions was an abundance of population, which he achieved by inviting tens of thousands of Greeks from the mainland, perhaps especially from the Peloponnese and northern Greece, to settle in eastern Sicily. He allotted land to these settlers but he also brought the population of Leontinoi to Syracuse once again.<sup>85</sup> There is no real context for this notice, and in the same sentence Diodorus writes concisely that Timoleon “added settlers to Kamarina and enlarged the city;” these data must be more or less taken at face value. Plutarch preserves a treaty struck by the Carthaginians whereby they agreed to return “property and families to those wishing to relocate from there [the *eparchia*] to Syracuse.”<sup>86</sup> By encouraging mobility of Greek populations from western Sicily to Syracuse such a treaty constitutes further evidence that Timoleon intended to fill eastern Sicily especially with Greeks. He can be seen here shifting populations (especially bringing people to the capital) and (re)founding cities in much the same manner as the tyrants had.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore he strategically granted Syracusan citizenship, conferring it on his allied soldiers after the battle of the Krimisos and on the freed inhabitants of Agyrion.<sup>88</sup> Though he did not aspire to perpetual rule, he nevertheless ensured that Syracuse would have plenty of citizens loyal to him and his cause.<sup>89</sup> The people of Leontinoi were probably moved because they had hosted Hiketas, one of Timoleon’s tyrant enemies, though in general Timoleon’s policy was to liberate populations from tyrants, not displace them. Even if Syracusan residence and citizenship were desiderata in general, the Leontinoi did not apparently choose to relocate.

Timoleon is credited broadly with reviving the Greek Sicilian economy, and while there is almost certainly some truth to this, the tradition also preserves some evidence that his responsibility was not so complete as with Syracuse and its surroundings.

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<sup>83</sup> Aitna: D.S. 16.82.4; Galaria: perhaps indicated at Plutarch, *Timoleon* 31.2.

<sup>84</sup> Compare this policy with that of Dionysius I, who had depopulated Greek cities in order to settle Sikels and Campanians there.

<sup>85</sup> D.S. 16.82.7.

<sup>86</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 34.1.

<sup>87</sup> Consolo Langher (1997, pp. 189-90) gives as Timoleon’s three primary objectives “anzitutto rendere Siracusa uno stato autonomo e forte, obbiettivo che Timoleonte mostra di perseguire, sia irrobustendola demograficamente con immissioni di nuovi coloni e con depoliticizzazioni di centri vicini (quelli perietnei, ad esempio) cui si accompagnavano i relativi trapianti etnici [Leontinesi, Centuripini e Agirini furono tutti accolti nella cittadinanza], sia...in secondo luogo, rinsaldare i legami con Corinto, anche attr[a]verso insediamenti di nuovi coloni. Terzo obbiettivo: organizzare la *symmachia* come un complesso di forze reciprocamente collegate contro ogni nemico esterno...” All three objectives involved the (re)settlement of populations, both Greek and non-Greek.

<sup>88</sup> Grant to “all who wished” after the battle of the Krimisos: D.S. 19.2.8. Grant to resettlers as they arrived in Syracuse from elsewhere in the Mediterranean, well before the Krimisos: Plutarch, *Timoleon* 23.2. Agyrion: D.S. 16.82.4. Giuliani (1995, p. 121 and 123-4) on Timoleon’s generosity with citizenship and revitalization of the polis.

<sup>89</sup> Smarczyk (2003, p. 75) argues that one of Timoleon’s primary concerns was to furnish Syracuse with a strong citizen army—an army “with teeth.”

Akragas and Gela are both reported to have been repopulated by other leaders/oikists, suggesting that Timoleon enabled the broader resettlement rather than directing it.<sup>90</sup> In this case as with the treaty allowing Greek immigration from Carthaginian territory and the invitation publicized in mainland Greece, he did not transfer people but rather attracted them. While the praises of Diodorus and Plutarch are overblown, it is undeniable that an increase in Greek population in eastern Sicily allowed greater economic development there (the effects on western Sicily are not much discussed but were probably not as dramatic).<sup>91</sup> The Greeks who came to Syracuse and Sicily under Timoleon generally came willingly because of economic inducements (e.g. wages for mercenaries, land allotments) and political ones (e.g. citizenship), while the non-Greek populations received little attention, and none of it good.

## D. Agathokles

Agathokles' rule was brutal at times, and while he seems to have preferred to enslave, kill, or intimidate subject populations rather than transfer them directly, he did control the mobility of certain populations to his advantage. Part of his brutality was exercised on the Syracusan population, as it was in his rise to power in 317, when 4,000 Syracusans were killed and 6,000 escaped, mostly to Akragas; then again in 310 when he deceived and killed a number of wealthy Syracusans, freed their slaves, and confiscated their property.<sup>92</sup> Democracies and oligarchies could inflict violence on their own populations too, but the threats, confiscations, and murderous purges that attended the rise, maintenance, and fall of tyrannies could drive populations away as effectively as a decree or a forced deportation.<sup>93</sup> His purges at Abakainon in 315, Messana, Tauromenion, Kentoripa, and Galaria in 312, Gela in 311, and Apollonia in 307 must similarly have reverberated in these populations, perhaps encouraging relocation.<sup>94</sup>

The episodes at Messana and Gela are particularly interesting as they show Agathokles to have manipulated populations not only through terror and example but also by direct elimination of groups hostile to him. At Messana he forced the Messanion, under threat of war, both to eject the Syracusan exiles who had gathered there and to accept the return of their own exiles; in Diodorus' summary, they "had driven out of the city those of the foreigners who had the most goodwill toward them and who were most capable of repelling the tyrant" and "had been forced to take back men who had been convicted of crimes."<sup>95</sup> Although we have no indication of the number of Messanian exiles, the Syracusan exiles may have numbered in the thousands—6,000 escaped in 317 and perhaps others trickled out of Syracuse as Agathokles' reign went on. At Gela he

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<sup>90</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 35.2.

<sup>91</sup> E.g. D.S. 16.83.1, Plutarch *Timoleon* 35.1.

<sup>92</sup> 317: D.S. 19.8.2; 310: D.S. 20.4.7. He also murdered Syracusan dissenters in 307: D.S. 20.63.6; relatives of Syracusan soldiers fighting in Libya also in 307: D.S. 20.72.1-5. Siebert 1982-1983, 56-8 stresses that these mass murders involved primarily Greek populations.

<sup>93</sup> And the banishment of so many influential people had consequences, as claimed for example by K. Meister in *CAH VII*.1<sup>2</sup> 390 on Agathokles: "It has been emphasized quite rightly that driving these people from their homes ultimately only shifted the conflict from within to without—between 316/15 and 306 the exiles were the driving force in Sicilian history."

<sup>94</sup> Abakainon: D.S. 19.65.6; Messana and Tauromenion: D.S. 19.102.1-7; Kentoripa: D.S. 19.103.4; Galaria: D.S. 19.104.2; Gela: D.S. 19.107.2-5; Apollonia, where those not killed were enslaved: D.S. 20.56.4.

<sup>95</sup> D.S. 19.102.7.

introduced his soldiers gradually to escape notice, then killed 4,000 of the city's inhabitants and confiscated their wealth along with that of the rest of the city.<sup>96</sup> Besides demonstrating considerable greed Agathokles also showed a willingness to eliminate a significant portion of a city's population if by such an act he could maintain firm control over the rest.

Only once in his reign did Agathokles found a city, actually a refoundation and mercenary settlement of sorts that required the mass murder and deportation of the existing population. In 307 he demanded a contribution from the people of Segesta, and when they resisted he eliminated the male population and sold the women and children as slaves to the Bruttii in Italy.<sup>97</sup> In particular he murdered the poorest citizens, tortured and killed those with property for him to confiscate, and drove some to suicide, so that as Diodorus tells it, the city "was put to death from the youth upward." We might suspect Diodorus of exaggerating here, but the detail about the women and children being sold makes it likely that Agathokles did effectively empty the city of its inhabitants.<sup>98</sup> Also militating for a more or less complete liquidation is the fact that Agathokles subsequently renamed the city Dikaiopolis and "gave it to the deserters as a place to live."<sup>99</sup> These deserters will have been mercenaries, probably angry at the lack of payment, although we cannot know exactly which group of mercenaries or what their origin was.<sup>100</sup> There is no good reason to believe that the original (Hellenized Elymian) citizens of Segesta were ever restored, even though the name did revert. Agathokles had tried to exact the contribution in the first place because he needed money, probably to pay his mercenary soldiers; by exacting the contribution and then further compensating the (prospective) deserters with the city itself, he used two stones to kill one bird.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> D.S. 19.107.4.

<sup>97</sup> D.S. 20.71.1-5.

<sup>98</sup> See most recently Bruno Sunseri (2000), who agrees that the city was more or less completely depopulated but equivocates on its new inhabitants: (p. 183) "il sito non fu abbandonato, ma fu dato da Agatocle come dimora a gente che non sembra avere uno *status* di cittadino: esuli politici, elementi sociali turbolenti, categorie che potevano aver trovato collocazione negli eserciti mercenari. Nessun cenno viene fatto ad una metropoli da cui sarebbero venuti i coloni o a fenomeni di [*ges anadasmōs*]..."; (p. 184) Anche nel caso di Segesta il cambiamento di nome preluderebbe ad un nuovo assetto politico-economico...perché 'Città giusta?'; (p. 188) "La soluzione Segesta-Dikaiopolis poteva rispondere all'esigenza immediata di Agatocle di disporre di un gruppo di uomini fidati a cui chiedere prestazioni di ogni sorta in cambio di concessioni di lotti di terre."

<sup>99</sup> D.S. 20.71.5. Consolo Langher (2000, p. 243): "La punizione dei Segestani poteva essere un monito volto a scoraggiare altre infedeltà. Colpita nella sua componente sociale più elevata, epurata dei subalterni che questa poteva contare tra il popolo minuto, la nuova Segesta, o meglio la nuova Diceopoli, fu subito accresciuta con notevole mistioi etniche. Fu una vera e propria rifondazione..."

<sup>100</sup> A conflict over pay, among other complaints, is recorded at D.S. 20.33.8-20.34.1 for the year 309. We do not even know if the *automoloi* had already deserted or were planning to do so.

<sup>101</sup> Consolo Langher (2000, p. 243): "i nuovi indediati furono gruppi militari fedelai ad Agatocle, che Diodoro definisce [*automoloi*], disertori, militari forse, provenienti dall'esercito di Amilcare battuto presso Siracusa o soldati che avevano abbandonato le postazioni controllate da Cartagine per rifugiarsi presso Agatocle. Ma non potrebbero escludersi esuli segestani (o elimi) di parte radicale, o, forse, esuli radicali al seguito di Agatocle..." Consolo Langher [citing de la Geniere, *MEFR* 1978] notes that archaeological evidence suggests that there was no destruction at Segesta but rather new building and rebuilding there at the end of the fourth century BCE. "In sostanza con la trasformazione di Segesta in Diceopoli e con il ripopolamento di essa con nuovi gruppi a lui fedeli Agatocle costituì una base militare particolarmente fidata nel cuore della Sicilia occidentale."

Except for this episode he was not a city-founder like his predecessors, nor indeed like the Hellenistic kings he aspired to emulate.<sup>102</sup>

In a certain sense, though, Agathokles and the Syracusans more generally were responsible for the Campanian takeover of Messana around 288. After Agathokles' death a group of his Campanian mercenaries fell into conflict with the Syracusans over civic rights, and eventually agreed to leave Sicily; instead they stopped at Messana, killed the men, took their wives, and established themselves as the new inhabitants.<sup>103</sup> It is not clear whether Agathokles had failed to make suitable arrangements for the mercenaries, who now called themselves Mamertines, or whether the Syracusans failed to honor them. But the episode shows, as in the case of Entella in 404, that unresolved relationships between cities, tyrants, and mercenaries could be deadly and disruptive. What is interesting is that these newly-settled mercenaries do not seem to have abandoned entirely the possibilities of mobility. In Chapter Four I will discuss mercenaries in more detail but for now I only note that the Campanians in Entella may have continued to take on assignments as mercenaries after settling there, and that the Mamertines likewise made raids on the cities of eastern Sicily and installed several garrisons.

## E. Minor tyrants

Minor tyrants, ruling a city and its territory rather than an empire like that of fifth-century Akragas or Syracuse, played a role in moving people around Sicily as well, almost exclusively in the form of colonization. Kale Acte on the northern coast of Sicily had been founded by the elder Archonides, tyrant of Herbita, in 446.<sup>104</sup> In 403 his son, the younger Archonides, founded another city on the northern coast at Halaisa, bringing the poor from Herbita, his mercenaries, and a collection of refugees from the war with Dionysius I.<sup>105</sup> Thus Archonides cleared Herbita of its poorest citizens and the "mixed crowd" of refugees while at the same time pacifying and sending away his mercenaries. Although Archonides may have ruled both cities as a tyrant during his lifetime, Halaisa was apparently not a colony in the usual sense of the word. The diverse nature of its first settlers makes it an interesting city to consider, especially since it eventually surpassed Herbita in prosperity; here it is important to note only that the foundation was enabled by tyranny.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Bruno Senseri (2000) argues that Agathokles' refoundation of Segesta as Dikaiopolis, which "seguiva di poco l'assunzione del titolo di *basileus*," was aimed at proving himself equal to Antigonos and Demetrios by acting "da autentico sovrano ellenistico" (p. 188). Her contention that the refoundation also involved freed slaves is not unlikely, and it may be true that Agathocles at Segesta was demonstrating "la consapevolezza...della nuova fisionomia dell'autorità regale—il Re non è solo dispensatore di leggi e benefici, ma è anche in grado, con la sua *auctoritas*, di unire Greci e Barbari, liberi e schiavi..." Still, he did not continue to exercise his *auctoritas* in this way for the rest of his reign.

<sup>103</sup> D.S. 21.18.1-2; Polybios 1.7.1-4.

<sup>104</sup> D.S. 12.8.2.

<sup>105</sup> D.S. 14.16.1.

<sup>106</sup> Prestianni Giallombardo (2003) proposes the sanctuaries attested in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE *Tabulae Halesinae* as evidence for the initial composition of the city's population. The sanctuary of Mellichios may suggest Selinuntinoi (refugees of 409) among the "mixed crowd," that of Adranos may belong to Sikels in the "mixed crowd" as well as the poor Herbitaioi, and that of Apollo (attested in both Herbita and Halaisa) may have housed the cult of both poor Herbitaioi as well as Italian mercenaries.

According to Diodorus, Andromachos, the father of the historian Timaios, gathered together and resettled the surviving Naxioi at Tauromenion in 358/7, in an alternative to the 396 Carthaginian-encouraged Sikel foundation story described above, though not incompatible with it.<sup>107</sup> When we last saw Tauromenion, in 392, it was populated by Dionysius' mercenaries, though we do not know if they were still there when in 358/7 Andromachos (perhaps himself one of the mercenaries or descended from them, or himself a Naxian?) brought in the old Naxioi. When Timoleon arrived in Sicily Andromachos was firmly in command of Tauromenion, and it is possible that the development of his power (anti-tyrannical, according to Plutarch) had its beginnings in the resettlement of the Naxioi there.<sup>108</sup> We are not given an explicit motivation for the resettlement but the Naxioi may have been waiting for an opportunity and took advantage of the weak foreign policy of Dionysius II.

The last of the population-moving tyrants was Phintias of Akragas, who ejected the Gelooi from their city in 280 and forced them to move west along the coast and settle a new city he had built and named Phintias after himself.<sup>109</sup> Phintias was situated just over halfway from Akragas to Gela, but this proximity cannot have been the only motivation for the transfer. If the goal was an eponymous foundation, it failed: the Gelooi continued to conduct political business as Gelooi, and in fact settlement at Gela itself either continued uninterrupted (and curtailed) or resumed shortly after the transfer.<sup>110</sup> Aside from these few examples, however, none of the minor tyrants engaged in much population manipulation, at least as far the historical record goes.

## F. Hieron II

The reign of Hieron II was apparently not characterized by large-scale population movements.<sup>111</sup> Part of the reason for this impression lies in the fact that the Syracusan kingdom was largely stable and peaceful, nor did Hieron fight aggressive wars outside of the kingdom, so that accounts of traumatic wartime displacements are rare in the historical sources. Before taking on the regal title, his victory ca. 269 over the Mamertine fortress of Ameselon permitted him to split the territory it had controlled between Kentoripa and Agrion.<sup>112</sup> It does not seem that there was a civilian population in the fortress itself, but there must have been some people living in and farming the territory, and these individuals will have either been assigned to one of the two cities along with their land, or displaced from it. Diodorus does refer to "charges" (εγκλήματα) against the captured soldiers of the fortress, perhaps stemming out of the initial

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<sup>107</sup> D.S. 16.7.1.

<sup>108</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 10.4.

<sup>109</sup> D.S. 22.2.2.

<sup>110</sup> Documents: Entella tablet C3, for which see Ampolo and Parra (2001) C3 = *SEG* XXX 1118, a decree for the Gelooi, dated to the middle of the third century; the asyilia decree of the Gelooi for the Koan Asklepion, dated to 242 (*SEG* XII 380). Rizzo suggests that the *Gelenses* of Cicero *In Verrem* II.3.103, 192, 4.73 were still resident at Phintias: Rizzo (1999 [2004], p. 409). Archaeological evidence: Bergemann et al. (2011, pp. 159-160) substantiating with survey data the claim of continuity in Rizzo (1999 [2004], p. 410). For archaeological investigations of Phintias, see La Torre (2006). Future references to the Entella decrees follow the numbering system of Ampolo and Parra (2001): A1-3, B1, and C1-3.

<sup>111</sup> Siebert (1982-1983, p. 60) raises the important point that Hieron's kingdom was relatively small, and that most of the island's population was "mired in the war between Carthage and Rome."

<sup>112</sup> D.S. 22.13.1.

imposition of the fortress. The episode is opaque but it does show Hieron, acting solely on military authority, intervening in the disposition of populations. At the Longanos river in 269 or 265 he won a major victory over the Mamertines, killing 8,000 of them, and returned to Syracuse as king.<sup>113</sup>

On the other hand, we do not have nearly the full information on the inner workings of the Syracusan kingdom, so that had Hieron displaced and resettled the populations of the cities subject to him, we might not know of it. While I do not want to argue from the silence of the sources, I also do not want to invent demographic policies that never existed, so I leave the populations of the Syracusan kingdom as relatively stable. Of course that stability could have encouraged voluntary and individual mobility, although we do not have much good direct evidence of this.

## **G. Carthaginians**

The imperial powers of Carthage and Rome could force and encourage populations to move on a scale equal to if not greater than the Sicilian tyrants could, so they ought to be included in this section. I have already mentioned the Carthaginian-prompted settlement of Tauromenion by local Sikel populations, a foundation story I find in no way incompatible with a refoundation by Andromachos. Unfortunately we know comparatively little about the Carthaginian-controlled territory in Sicily and even less about the nature of that control itself, so the population dynamics of late fifth- and fourth-century western Sicily remain opaque. I assume that besides the possible imposition of garrisons, the populations of different cities were subject to the needs of the Carthaginian state even if those needs were rarely excessive.<sup>114</sup> The foundation of Lilybaion and the relocations of Soloeis and Panormos (attested only archaeologically in the absence of fourth- and third-century remains from the known Archaic centers), all in the fourth century, perhaps involved Carthaginian manipulation of nearby city populations, though we do not know the details.

It is nevertheless clear that the Carthaginians could force or otherwise induce groups into and out of cities, especially in the course of the First Punic War. In 260, presumably for strategic reasons, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar (not Barca) destroyed the city of Eryx and moved its population to the nearby and newly fortified harbor city of Drepanon (sometimes called Drepana).<sup>115</sup> This is the first time Drepanon is mentioned in any historical or documentary source, but it is possible (and even likely) that there was a pre-existing settlement at Drepanon closely connected to if not dependent on Eryx. In any case the site was now populated mainly by the former Erycinoi, who did not know when or if they would be able to return to their homes. Later in the war the city of Eryx was captured and surrounded by Roman garrisons above and below the town, which would have prevented any of the former Erycinoi from visiting their famous sanctuary of Aphrodite above the city.<sup>116</sup> Despite the Roman garrisons, a transient population of some kind does seem to have accumulated in subsequent years.

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<sup>113</sup> D.S. 22.13.2-4; Polybius 1.9.7-8.

<sup>114</sup> See Cataldi (2003) for an attempt at a balanced characterization of Carthaginian power in Sicily.

<sup>115</sup> D.S. 13.9.4. Caven (1990, p. 100) claims (without any evidence) that the port at Drepanon was operating already in 397—possible but with the caveat that the ‘port’ was probably closer to natural harbor than to developed shipping installation or settlement.

<sup>116</sup> Before the year 250 in D.S. 24.1.10; 249 in Polybius 1.55.6, 10.

In 244 Hamilcar Barca was able to seize the town between the Roman garrisons according to Diodorus he “killed all the... [and] removed the survivors to Drepana.”<sup>117</sup> While it is likely that the Roman soldiers converged on the city to contest Barca’s occupation, we know that Barca killed all of some group but took a group of survivors away, and it would not make sense for him to arbitrarily kill some of the Roman soldiers but not others. While the lacuna in the passage makes certainty impossible (e.g. some of the Romans could have surrendered) it seems that there was a non-Roman population inhabiting the city of Eryx, either people who had avoided the relocation orders or people from the surrounding areas who had filtered in. Besides documenting the ability of the Carthaginians to relocate populations, the foundation of Drepanon also shows that depopulated or underpopulated urban centers do attract transient inhabitation despite the difficulty of detecting those inhabitants. It also shows how mobility inextricably links sites together, as the histories of Eryx and Drepanon cannot be studied in isolation but must be taken together.

The Carthaginians could also enforce defensive evacuations in the Greek style of the late fifth century. In 250, under pressure from the advancing Roman armies, the Carthaginians removed the population of Carthaginian-controlled Selinous to Lilybaion.<sup>118</sup> The inhabitants of Selinous must have all been loyal supporters of Carthage by that point, or else it would have been suicidal for the Carthaginians to bring them into what was essentially their last remaining stronghold in Sicily. Just as the Syracusans had preferred not to fight for Akragas, Gela or Kamarina, the Carthaginians preferred not to fight for Selinous but instead concentrated their defensive efforts on the impregnable Lilybaion. Just as Syracuse was never taken, neither was Lilybaion.

## H. Romans

The Romans moved and destroyed populations even more frequently, often by means of mass enslavement. At the end of the First Punic War in 241 the Romans required all Carthaginians to leave Sicily, but it is not clear exactly to which populations that stipulation applied.<sup>119</sup> Certainly the Carthaginian armies at Eryx and Lilybaion had to leave, but we do not know about the rest of the population inside Lilybaion, or indeed about the populations of other cities in western Sicily who might conceivably be considered Carthaginian. Probably some of these people were forced to evacuate as well but not all of them.<sup>120</sup> In the course of the war the Romans had tended not to found cities or relocate free populations en masse, though they did regularly enslave the populations of cities that were loyal to the Carthaginians. In addition to the captives taken in battle from the Carthaginian armies and those immediately ransomed back to their communities, the Romans enslaved 25,000 at Akragas in 262, the inhabitants of a

<sup>117</sup> D.S. 24.8.1, cf. Polybius 1.58.2. Polybius at least is explicit that Barca surprised the Romans by taking the city between the garrisons, while Diodorus mentions only that he disembarked by night.

<sup>118</sup> D.S. 24.1.1.

<sup>119</sup> Polybius 1.62.8: “the Carthaginians are to withdraw from all of Sicily...” (ἐκχωρεῖν Σικελίας ἀπάσης Καρχηδονίους...); cf. Appian *Sikelika* II.2: “[the Carthaginians] are to desert Sicily and the smaller islands around it to the Romans...” (Σικελίας Ῥωμαίοις ἀποστήναι καὶ τῶν βραχυτέρων νήσων ὅσαι περὶ Σικελίαν).

<sup>120</sup> Goldsworthy (2000, p. 129) refers to “the complete expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily” but it is not clear who is meant by the term ‘Carthaginians.’ Similarly Bringmann (2007, p. 69): “the withdrawal of the Carthaginians.” Lazenby (1996, pp. 158-9) is possibly only following Polybius in narrating the departure from Sicily of only the Carthaginian army.

small fort Mazara near Selinous in 260, the inhabitants of Mytistratos and Kamarina in 258, and 13,000 at Panormos in 254.<sup>121</sup> Many of these prisoners will have been sent to Rome, many will have been sold within Sicily, and many will have been scattered over the Mediterranean.<sup>122</sup>

At the end of the war Catulus sold at Lilybaion the 10,000 prisoners he had captured in the Battle of the Aegates; these slaves will have traveled many of the same paths as the others the Romans had taken. Thus the Romans appear to have manipulated Sicilian populations primarily through capturing and selling slaves; in the interwar period the only potential documented instance of Roman involvement in Sicilian population dynamics is the Roman *epimeletes* of Entella tablet B1, who oversaw the resettlement of the Entellinoi, expelled from their city during the war.<sup>123</sup> The dossier of seven decrees documenting the expulsion and return of the Entellinoi is quite rich, and will be discussed at greater length in later chapters. It should be noted, however, that other cities were primarily responsible for actually protecting the Entellinoi and returning them to their homes, so the Romans may not have taken a very active interest in the resettlement.

The Second Punic War saw the Romans once again affecting Sicilian populations by means of the slave trade, but they also pursued more conventional demographic violence against Sicilians opposed to them. Rather than just enslaving Sicilian populations, however, the Romans now captured Carthaginians and North Africans and sold them in Sicily, an ironic practice considering the terms of the treaty of 241. In 218, for example, a Roman fleet captured seven Carthaginian ships with 1,700 sailors off Lilybaion, where the victorious Romans returned with their captives.<sup>124</sup> In that same year Sempronius captured the Carthaginian garrison on Malta, and of the 2,000 prisoners he sold all those who were not nobles at Lilybaion.<sup>125</sup> The nobles were presumably to be ransomed or held as hostages for negotiating the release of any Roman prisoners. Then from 210 to 207, the Romans made yearly raids on North Africa, returning each time to Lilybaion with their plunder, which is sometimes specified to have included captives but probably did in all cases.<sup>126</sup> Not all of these captives necessarily remained long at Lilybaion or even in Sicily, but the effect of these raids must have been to flood the cities of western Sicily (and perhaps eastern too) with Carthaginian slaves. The one instance in which the Romans took Sicilian slaves is that of Akragas (now recorded in Latin sources as Agrigentum), which had hosted Carthaginian forces down to 210; Laevinus captured the city, “beat with branches and beheaded with

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<sup>121</sup> Akragas: D.S. 23.9.1; Polybius 1.19.15. Mazara: D.S. 23.9.4. Mytistratos: D.S. 23.9.4. Kamarina: D.S. 23.9.5. Panormos: D.S. 23.18.4-5. See Loreto (2007, pp. 112-123) on Roman terrorism in the First Punic War: (p. 120) “la costante occorrenza nelle guerre romane, almeno in questo periodo, di questi casi di ‘dresdizzazione’, mostra come si sia in presenza di qualcosa che si qualifica come propriamente romano...di un carattere del *Roman way of warfare* e quindi della sua grande strategia, quello del terrorismo militare come mezzo di coercizione politica o militare.”

<sup>122</sup> Finley (1979, p. 116): “...the First Punic War was a disaster for western and southern Sicily, not for Hiero...he and his people no doubt made their profits out of the vast booty thrown on the market year after year.”

<sup>123</sup> Ampolo and Parra (2001) B1 = *SEG* XXX 1120.

<sup>124</sup> Livy 21.50.4-5.

<sup>125</sup> Livy 21.51.1-2.

<sup>126</sup> 210: Livy 27.5.8-13; 209: Livy 27.7.12, 16; 208: Livy 27.29.7-8; 207: Livy 28.4.5-7.

an axe those who were in charge, and sold the rest [of the people] and the booty.”<sup>127</sup> The population living in Akragas was thus enslaved by the Romans twice in just over 50 years.

More direct manipulation of Sicilian populations was also possible; the mass enslavements of the First Punic War may have been more traumatic but Roman actions in the Second Punic War were perhaps more calculated. Marcellus’ destruction of Megara Hyblaia in 214 probably involved the death or enslavement of some part of its population, even if the city was not completely depopulated.<sup>128</sup> In the same year, fearing betrayal, the commander of the Roman garrison in Enna, L. Pinarius, had his soldiers enter the city’s assembly and kill anyone “whose strength or deceit could be feared.”<sup>129</sup> Whether this means that all the city officials, all the citizens, or perhaps all the adult males were killed is unclear but Livy’s description of the panic suggests that it was a substantial part of the city’s population.<sup>130</sup> The Roman settlement of Moericus and his Spanish mercenaries at Morgantina in 210 may have involved the elimination, enslavement, or ejection of the city’s prior population, though we are not told anything about their fate.<sup>131</sup> It is unlikely that they were allowed to remain, since the Romans were rewarding the Hispani with the possession of a city and territory, not with the right to live among disloyal subjects. Also in 210 the praetor Laevinus removed 4,000 undesirable men from Agathyrna (unidentified) to southern Italy to help the Rheginoi raid the Bruttii.<sup>132</sup> Concerned both to make Sicily more stable and to provide their Rhegian allies an unofficial military force, the Romans simply moved the source of instability from Sicily to Italy.

We do have some evidence of direct Roman assistance in restoring Sicilians to their homes. In response to the Sicilians’ protests against Marcellus in Rome, the Senate decreed in 210 that “in the future the Syracusan state would be under the care of the senate, and that they would send instructions to the consul Laevinus that, so far as could be done without a loss to the republic, he should deliberate for the personal fortunes of its citizens,” although the execution of the order is not described.<sup>133</sup> Indeed, Laevinus’ brutal treatment of the population of Akragas in the same year, mentioned above, does not accord well with his claim to the Senate later in the year that “no Sicilian was absent [from Sicily]; those who had previously been absent having fled out of fear, had all been brought back into their cities and were plowing and sowing in their fields...”<sup>134</sup> Nor indeed does the treatment of the populations at Megara, Enna, and Morgantina. Yet there is a notice that in 208 the Romans sent Lucius Manlius as an ambassador to the Olympic games “in order that those Sicilians who were there as refugees because of the

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<sup>127</sup> Livy 26.40.13.

<sup>128</sup> Livy 24.35.2; Plutarch, *Marcellus* 18.2 cf. 20.2; Vallet et al. (1983, pp. 174-5).

<sup>129</sup> Livy 24.37.1-24.39.7.

<sup>130</sup> Livy’s account does not include any survivors nor do the Romans do anything that might involve survivors (like taking captives, making agreements, etc. Levene (2010, pp. 212-3 and 341-3) seems to believe that the entire population was killed. What about the rural population, and the women?

<sup>131</sup> Livy 26.21.12, 17.

<sup>132</sup> Livy 26.40.16-18. They were, according to Livy, “a disorderly crowd...mingled from dregs of all kinds, exiles, debtors, most of them having committed capital crimes when they lived in their own cities under their own laws, and after their similar misfortune had heaped them together at Agathyrna for various reasons, they eked out a living by banditry and plundering.”

<sup>133</sup> Livy 26.32.6.

<sup>134</sup> Livy 27.5.4-5.

war and the Tarentine citizens banished by Hannibal, might return to their homes and know that the Roman people was returning to them all their possessions which they had held before the war.”<sup>135</sup> Unfortunately we do not know how effective this embassy was, though presumably some Sicilians did return to their cities and homes.

## Conclusions

This chapter had three aims. The first was to establish the scale of human mobility in LCEH Sicily through discussion of major episodes of forced population transfers and evidence for voluntary movement. The picture that emerges is one of instability: people frequently moved or were moved, and land and property frequently reassigned. In some places and for some populations there might be a few generations of peace, but they were not insulated from the effects of other populations’ motion. Further, autocrats differed in the extent to which they were willing or able to manipulate subject populations: on the one hand Dionysius I, Timoleon, and the Romans intervened frequently while Dionysius II, Agathokles, and the Carthaginians tended not to do so. This contrast will be developed more fully in a final chapter on the establishment of territorial states.

The second aim was to attempt to explain this mobility by appeal to the logic of tyranny and empire, which at times involved economic and geographic questions as well. These considerations, explored in greater detail in later chapters, will be part of the dissertation’s larger argument about the causes and effects of mobility. What I will argue is that the frequency of large-scale, collective, and imposed movements created a relatively fluid attitude toward landed citizenship, i.e. toward the discourse of urbanism, which in turn encouraged further mobility. I will grant the tyrants and their wars a major causal role in the high degree of Sicilian mobility but also want to explore the self-propagation of a Sicilian dislocated citizenship in the fourth and third centuries.

The third aim was to begin to trace the differences in the kinds of mobility encouraged by the different factors. A more detailed study of the forms of Sicilian mobility will occupy the following chapters, but already it should be clear that not all mobility was the same. Recognizing this diversity of individual and large-scale mobility may help us get around the problem of causality that was raised early in this chapter. That is, I have been attempting to examine causes of mobility, but each of these causes might itself be caused by high mobility.<sup>136</sup> In broad strokes it was clearly a relationship in which mobility affected and was affected by tyranny, economic conditions, and insularity, but a more accurate account must be more nuanced in order to possess explanatory force. By differentiating modes of mobility and by incorporating more comparative Mediterranean evidence it may be possible to clarify when mobile populations were an effect, and when they were a cause. While the circulation of exiles (Chapter Three) and slaves (Chapter Five) was almost certainly attributable to decisions

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<sup>135</sup> Livy 27.35.3-4; cf. Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 61-2).

<sup>136</sup> See, for example Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 358): “So this [redistribution of cheap textiles], like the redistribution of some of the foodstuffs we discussed in Chapter VI, can be regarded as *epiphenomenal to human mobility* [Italics original]”; (p. 377): “human labour...moves in and out of microregions – indeed must do so if redistribution is to take place. Redistribution encourages mobility; crews tend to be heterogeneous in origin.” A critical reader would call this reasoning circular; a sympathetic one would say that the authors are tracing a recursive or discursive relationship.

made by tyrants and imperial officials, economic activity (Chapter Six) was a relatively independent driver of mobility. Mercenaries (Chapter Four) may well have been recruited into service in Sicily, but once on the island they could drive policy as well. In none of these cases is a search for pure cause and effect possible, since the relationship I am trying to describe is a recursive one. In order to set the stage for these thematic studies, in the following chapter I attempt a more theoretical outline of human mobility in Sicily.

## 2. The modes and dynamics of Sicilian mobility

This book tells the story of humanity on the move. It is a disturbing story because few people uproot themselves by choice. Most are compelled to become migrants, refugees, or exiles by forces beyond their control, by poverty, repression, or war...Some know where they are going, confident that a better life awaits them. Others are just fleeing, relieved to be alive. Many never make it. [Salgado (2000, p. 7)]

### Introduction

As we saw in Chapter One, the populations of late Classical and early Hellenistic Sicily were quite mobile. Very often this mobility was imposed on groups by an imperial power, and in Chapters Six and Seven I will further explore the connection between aspiring or growing territorial empires and enforced dislocations. But groups also moved of their own accord, and in a few cases these itineraries are known. In this chapter I organize and discuss the episodes and processes of Sicilian mobility by type with two goals in mind. The first aim is to better understand the causal relationships between these episodes and processes, and the second is to provide a secure basis on which to compare the Sicilian cases with others—comparative work that will become increasingly important in the thematic chapters to follow. The central section of this chapter therefore consists of a typological analysis of population mobility with an emphasis on modes of movement distinctive to Sicily.

It would be easy to blithely select episodes of mobility and assemble them into a general picture of displacement, motion, and instability. Instead, as Graham Oliver has noted, one must take proper account of non-mobility as well.<sup>137</sup> While it is impossible in most cases to determine a population's capacity for movement, Oliver makes the important point that in the right circumstances any location could potentially engender an end or lack of movement.<sup>138</sup> Diaspora communities in Sicily, unsure of their ultimate destinations, illustrate this ongoing decision-making quite well, and provide a transition into some reflections on stability and agency. My overall project on the mobility of Sicilian populations requires an assessment of their stability as well, and I acknowledge that staying put was clearly an option in most cases.

Among modes of movement the distinction most commonly and obviously made has been between voluntary and involuntary.<sup>139</sup> This distinction is both valuable and pernicious: valuable, because it forces us to consider how movement is coerced;

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<sup>137</sup> Oliver (2011, p. 348): "Movement can also imply lack of movement, or end of movement (however temporally defined). If people of the Mediterranean had the capacity to move, why did people stop where they stopped? For some groups and individuals we might ask why people stayed where they were: so why did people *not* move?" [*italics sic*].

<sup>138</sup> E.g., an attractive metropolis like Athens: Akrigg (2011, p. 57); Rome: Holleran (2011, pp. 158-9); one's homeland like Samos after the Exiles Decree: Habicht (1957) and (1972); or growing new foundations.

<sup>139</sup> That is, if the agency of displaced populations is considered at all. Thus Scheidel (2004), in assessing the mobility of the free population of Italy, seriously addresses only state-directed (i.e. involuntary) movement. Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 34-35) identifies the "forced settlements" made by the tyrants as a "one of the root causes for the population shifts in the Sicilian area" but he seems to mean this quite narrowly and does not make the argument I support in this dissertation, that the policies of the tyrants created structural conditions encouraging mobility. For the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy see e.g. Sordi's edited volume *Coercizione e mobilità umana nel mondo antico*: Sordi (1995).

pernicious because nominally voluntary movement took place under sometimes powerful conditions and constraints, while even involuntary movement was sometimes forced by a more or less free actor. The ejection of conquered people from their cities, the dispersal of enslaved populations, and the movement imposed on (rarely chosen by) women and children are extreme examples of the involuntary, though even these people sometimes had other options they chose not to exercise.<sup>140</sup> Likewise the documented free movement of groups and individuals was always nevertheless dictated by social and economic forces beyond their control.<sup>141</sup> These are productive difficulties; I therefore retain the initial framework of voluntary/involuntary in this chapter, even if I intend to supersede it with a spectrum of agencies. The concluding section of the chapter addresses the issue of agency in light of recent ancient and modern scholarship on migration and movement.

At this point it may be useful to lay out, even briefly, some estimations of total population of the cities of Sicily around the end of the fifth century. Such estimates can only be approximate in the extreme; even for Athens and Rome the evidence is not conclusive and there are accordingly strong differences of opinion.<sup>142</sup> Furthermore, as Nicholas Purcell has insisted, the population of a city was constantly changing even from day to day, so the question of whom to count further muddies the waters.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, De Angelis has proposed a set of ranges for territorial extent and maximum population capacity for the major Greek Sicilian cities, based on literary, geographical, and ecological grounds (Table 1).

De Angelis emphasizes that these numbers do not in any way represent the actual population of Sicily at any time. Further, it must be noted that his estimates of capacity are based on hypothetical territorial boundaries of the Archaic and early Classical periods; the many changes in control of land, particularly those of new foundations and transfers imposed or negotiated by treaty, will have significantly altered the distribution of agricultural and therefore population potential. In fact, he goes on to suggest that the actual population of the island may have generally run to around half its maximum capacity.<sup>144</sup> The difference can be explained both by relative underpopulation, and by a significant export of grain and other agricultural products from the island (for which see Chapter Six below). This review has thus far ignored the major Phoenician settlements Motya, Panormos, and Soloeis, as well as the Elymian and Sikel cities, in addition to a constellation of smaller settlements whose political orientation and control of territory are not clear. According to De Angelis, 77% of Sicily's 25,708 km<sup>2</sup> was suitable for agriculture, or 19,795 km<sup>2</sup>; if the Greek cities of his study controlled 12,060 km<sup>2</sup> of that

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<sup>140</sup> Mainly asylum in temples (not always respected), fighting to the death, or suicide—not appealing, but alternatives nonetheless. Even the settlers of new foundations were sometimes coerced into leaving: Cordano (1995). The photographs in Salgado (2000) powerfully capture the difficulties of modern displacements. For the mobility of certain categories of women in the Hellenistic period see Loman (2004b).

<sup>141</sup> A danger of using the term “voluntary” to describe movement is that it obscures those forces and makes rational actors of ancient individuals. Holleran (2011, p. 160): “A variety of factors influence the decision to migrate, some of which go beyond abstract and ahistorical economic theory; the decision-making process of a migrant is not always wholly rational.”

<sup>142</sup> On Athens, cf. Moreno (2007, Ch.1 pp. 3-33); Rome: Purcell (1992) and Scheidel (2008).

<sup>143</sup> Purcell (1992, 648-655). De Angelis (2000, p. 117) explicitly acknowledges this limitation for his estimates of Sicilian agricultural production and population maximums.

<sup>144</sup> De Angelis (2000, pp. 138-139).

|                | Territory size<br>in km <sup>2</sup> (and<br>ha) | Percentage of<br>agricultural land | Agricultural<br>land in ha* | Number of people<br>supportable** |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Syracuse       | 1000<br>(100,000)                                | 86.5%                              | 86,500                      | 108,125-144,165                   |
| Kamarina       | 670<br>(67,000)                                  | 90%                                | 60,300                      | 75,375-100,500                    |
| Megara Hyblaia | 400<br>(40,000)                                  | 83%                                | 33,200                      | 41,500-55,333                     |
| Leontinoi      | 830<br>(83,000)                                  | 80%                                | 66,400                      | 83,000-110,665                    |
| Katane         | 830<br>(83,000)                                  | 60%                                | 49,800                      | 62,250-83,000                     |
| Naxos          | 600<br>(60,000)                                  | 59%                                | 35,400                      | 44,250-59,000                     |
| Zankle         | 1,120<br>(112,000)                               | 57%                                | 63,840                      | 79,800-106,400                    |
| Himera         | 1,260<br>(126,000)                               | 75%                                | 94,500                      | 118,125-157,500                   |
| Selinous       | 1,500<br>(150,000)                               | 86%                                | 129,000                     | 161,250-215,000                   |
| Akragas        | 2,500<br>(250,000)                               | 87%                                | 217,500                     | 271,875-362,500                   |
| Gela           | 1,350<br>(135,000)                               | 86%                                | 116,100                     | 145,125-193,500                   |

**Table 1: De Angelis 2000, p. 125 Table 4**

land, we have 7,735 km<sup>2</sup> for the rest.<sup>145</sup> While we know that Motya controlled a significant part of the Sicilian mainland opposite, very little is known about the territorial extent of Panormos and Soloeis.<sup>146</sup> Thus the Greek cities and at least one of the Phoenician ones possessed large territories and large populations; the political importance and military resources wielded by the cities of the interior from the mid-fifth century on should probably suggest a similar pattern.<sup>147</sup> In broad strokes, the demographic situation at the beginning of my period was one in which most of Sicily's inhabitants were affiliated with one of perhaps 20 large urban centers.

Before delving into a discussion of distinctively Sicilian modes of mobility, however, we need to know what they are. Some population movement on Sicily was normal for any Mediterranean environment, and I am not so interested in the participation of Sicilian populations in trends visible elsewhere as I am in what made Sicilian mobility unique, or at least distinctive. In the following preliminary section I attempt to briefly place Sicilian population movements in the wider Mediterranean context, arguing that Sicilian mobility was relatively high and that communities there differed from those of other regions in their experience of city destructions, ejections, and forced transfers.

<sup>145</sup> De Angelis (2000, p. 138).

<sup>146</sup> But note De Angelis (2009, p. 243 n.17): "Although the Phoenicians also settled in Sicily at this time, the Phoenicians seem, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, to have been more interested in trade rather agriculture [sic] and hence to have had much smaller territories than those of the Greeks."

<sup>147</sup> De Angelis (2009, p. 243) estimates that "...only about four percent of Sicily's surface area was being exploited by...native societies," though his focus is on the Archaic period and he would readily admit that we are ignorant of most changes over time in this regard.

## A. What was especially Sicilian?

If Sicily has a reputation as an especially unstable place, this is probably due to the judgment ascribed by Thucydides to Alcibiades in 415.<sup>148</sup> Yet large displacements of people continued and even increased in the two centuries after the Greeks of Sicily successfully repelled Athens' aggression; Alcibiades' characterization fits the LCEH period better than his own.<sup>149</sup> Fortunately, some quantitative data are available to us, though the chronological ranges and subjective criteria of different surveys do not always reconcile easily. Nevertheless it is possible to give a broad outline of Mediterranean mobility, one in which LCEH Sicily features prominently with certain distinctive modes. The outline will be necessarily vague, since it is not possible for me to investigate every episode of population mobility throughout the entire Mediterranean, nor evaluate the numbers reported by the ancient sources, nor guess at the size of populations for which no numbers are given.<sup>150</sup> I cannot say whether an event affecting 10 cities of 1,000 inhabitants was more significant than an event affecting one city of 10,000 inhabitants. I have simply collected the available numbers produced by other historians, which I take on their own terms.

The *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* provides a wealth of information on the populations of the Greek Mediterranean from ca. 650-325 BCE. Particularly relevant for my purposes are the data collected in Index 20 ("Destruction and Disappearance of *Poleis*") and Index 21 ("*Synoikismos*" [city foundation or consolidation]), both of which suggest unequivocally that Sicily was a region of unstable communities.<sup>151</sup> In Index 20, the second-most city destructions appear in Sicily and southern Italy related to Sicily, with 15 cities affected and 14 years in which a destruction episode occurred; 27 cities in Phokis were destroyed but in only 3 active years.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore the Phokian destructions occurred in only two exogenous episodes, the Persian invasion of 480 and the aftermath of the Third Sacred War in 346, and therefore do not constitute good evidence for any characteristic Phokian instability. In Index 21, Sicily and related cities in southern Italy were the regions with the second-most

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<sup>148</sup> Thucydides 6.17.2-4, quoted in the epigraph to Chapter One and discussed in Chapter Three. Lomas (2000, p. 181) notes the "long tradition of large-scale migration and manipulation of the citizen body, usually generated by tyrants" in the period before Dionysius I, and I argue that that tradition continued into the fourth and third centuries as well.

<sup>149</sup> There are some fourth- and third-century authors who recognized Sicily as unstable: e.g. the laments and fears of [Plato] *Ep.* 7-8 or the past difficulties evoked by Theocritus *Idyll* 16, for which see Bell (2011, pp. 293-7). Diodorus, a Sicilian writing in the first century BCE, attributed the island's Hellenic culture to immigration and interaction (D.S. 5.6.5).

<sup>150</sup> Nor is it possible to fully integrate discussion of Near Eastern antecedents, most notably the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Hittite, and especially Assyrian kingdoms of the Bronze and Early Iron Ages. For punitive deportations see Posener (1957). Schechla (1993, p. 240) notes the "far-reaching demographic, physical, political and economic consequences" of population transfer, and gives the following assessment of the Assyrian case: "Within the approximately 400 years between the reigns of King Tiglath-pileser III (1114-1076 BC) and Assurbanipal (669-627 BC), at least 157 population transfer campaigns are known to have been carried out. The names of at least 500 places were changed in the process, and an estimated minimum of 4.5 million persons were forcibly deported." For a typology of the Assyrian transfers see Oded (1979).

<sup>151</sup> Hansen and Nielsen (2004, pp. 1363-4 and 1365-6, respectively).

<sup>152</sup> Other regions experiencing frequent destructions were Boiotia (7 cities affected in 8 episode-years), The Aegean (6, 6), the Chalkidike (9, 7), Thrace from the Strymon to the Nestos (4, 6), and Ionia (7, 7).

*synoikismoi* with 15 cities affected by 12 events; this time Arkadia had the most cities affected, 16 in 6 active years.<sup>153</sup> If we restrict the chronological span to 409-325, Sicily likewise emerges as a center of population displacement and reorganization: 9 destroyed cities in 7 episode-years (Phokis: 22, 1; Boiotia: 5, 4; Chalkidike: 5, 2; Thrace from the Strymon to the Nestos: 4, 3) and 9 synoikized cities in 5 episode-years (Achaia: 4, 2; Arkadia: 14, 3; Karia: 8, 2). Both overall, and in this restricted span, the Sicilian figures for both destruction and *synoikismos* are far above the average.<sup>154</sup> To judge from this destructive and constructive settlement activity, Sicilian populations must have been highly mobile relative to any nominal Mediterranean baseline.

The *IACP* data is useful for assessing Sicilian distinctiveness in the late Classical period but for the early Hellenistic period other sources are obviously required. Pritchett's fifth volume of *The Greek State at War* compiles valuable evidence for the disposition of captives, often reaching well into the third and even second centuries BCE. In his table of instances where captive populations were killed, Sicily was the setting of 7 out of 65 examples dating from the sixth century to 146 BCE and 5 out of 34 dating from 409-202.<sup>155</sup> His table of instances where captives were enslaved gives Sicily 35 out of 173 examples (sixth century to 117 BCE) and 21 out of 113 dating from 409-202.<sup>156</sup> Sicily does not feature much in his discussions of ransom or release without ransom, although we have seen in Chapter 1 that Dionysius I and the Romans ransomed large numbers of captives on single occasions (Dionysius held 6,000 Rheginoi for ransom in 387; the Romans ransomed 14,000 Panormitai in 254).<sup>157</sup> More significantly, Pritchett's table of cities resettled after the population was killed or enslaved contains 6 Sicilian cases out of 30 from the early fifth century to 217, and 4 Sicilian cases out of 17 from 409-202.<sup>158</sup> Though we do not have accurate Mediterranean population counts against which to measure, Pritchett's figures do seem to give Sicily a disproportionate standing in the realm of captive-taking, and support a characterization of Sicilian cities as frequently suffering serious depletion if not replacement of population.

Sicilian mobility is not unparalleled in the ancient Mediterranean, but it deserves critical attention alongside the mobility generated by, *inter alia*, the demographic policies of Philip and Alexander, the Hellenistic kings, and the Romans (both in the Italian peninsula and, later, in the wider Mediterranean).<sup>159</sup> This dissertation is an attempt to provide that attention but for now I make only the basic observation that

<sup>153</sup> Boiotia (6, 2), Achaia (7, 7), and Karia (8, 3) were also key locations (quantitatively speaking) of *synoikismos*.

<sup>154</sup> For *polis* destructions from ca. 650-325, the mean number of cities affected in a region is 3.33 and the mean number of episode-years is 2.67; for *synoikismoi* the mean number of cities affected is 3.68 and the mean number of episode-years is 2.16. For *polis* destructions from 409-325, the mean number of cities affected in a region is 1.94 and the mean number of episode-years is 1.67; for *synoikismoi* the mean number of cities affected is 2.27 and the mean number of episode-years is 0.92.

<sup>155</sup> Pritchett (1991, pp. 218-219).

<sup>156</sup> Pritchett (1991, pp. 226-234).

<sup>157</sup> Rhegion: D.S. 14.111.4; Panormos: D.S. 23.18.4-5 with Polybius 1.38.

<sup>158</sup> Pritchett (1991, pp. 448-449).

<sup>159</sup> On Philip, Alexander, and the Successors see Cohen (1995, pp. 16-30 and 63-71); Shipley (2000, pp. 54-58). For a detailed 'bottom-up' study of Alexander's veterans, see Roisman (2012). On the Romans, see Scheidel (2004) with bibliography. Lomas (2000, p.182): "This process--the use of itinerant populations to subvert and undermine the status of the polis--is common to many tyrants and hellenistic monarchs throughout the Greek world..." See for example Billows (1990, pp. 292-305) on the "fundamental importance" of Antigonos Monophthalmos' settlement activities for the birth of the Hellenistic world.

whereas the frequent city foundations of the Macedonians and their successors invariably must have involved some coerced movement of populations, neither violent ejection nor forced transfer of established city populations were common in the eastern Mediterranean. Alexander's proposed East-West transfers were never put into effect and we may doubt whether they were ever really a possibility.<sup>160</sup> The Romans frequently enslaved entire populations in Sicily but they did not establish colonies there until the first century BCE. In the course of this chapter and the dissertation as a whole I will wholeheartedly embrace the similarities between the Sicilian situation and episodes attested elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Yet there were distinctively Sicilian modes of mobility, and common modes with distinctive variations in Sicily, and it is to these that we now turn.

## **B. Typological analysis**

### **i. Involuntary Mobility**

#### **a. Elimination**

I include the cases of the partial or total elimination of a population because extermination, while not a form of mobility, nevertheless left a vacuum in the distribution of populations in Sicily. Major disturbances like these must have had consequences, from severely reduced agricultural and economic production to the gradual or acute attraction of new populations to take advantage of opportunity. In mentioning the opportunities created by these vacuums I do not mean to overshadow their devastating effects, only to assert that they belong in a discussion of population dynamics and mobility.

The only case where complete elimination of a city's population is indicated is Timoleon's destruction of the Campanians living in Aitna-Inessa in 339/8.<sup>161</sup> Our only source for this campaign is Diodorus, whose notice while unequivocal is unfortunately quite laconic: Timoleon "besieged the Campanians in Aitna and utterly destroyed them (διέφθειρε)."<sup>162</sup> It is therefore possible that some escaped and survived, or that their wives and children were enslaved rather than killed. In favor of a more or less complete destruction is the fact that there are no clear references to the city after 339/8 in Diodorus, Polybius, or Livy.<sup>163</sup> The city seems to have ceased to operate, surprising since we might have expected Timoleon to fill it with Greek settlers, or for other mobile populations to move in once Timoleon had died. While scholars have a general idea of the city's location, no systematic archaeological investigation has been done that might shed light on the fate or composition of its inhabitants.<sup>164</sup> Even if Aitna was repopulated in Cicero's time, it was apparently abandoned for the rest of the fourth century and all of the third.

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<sup>160</sup> D.S. 18.4.4; see Cohen (1995, p. 18) with bibliography.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Chapter One section C.

<sup>162</sup> D.S. 16.82.4.

<sup>163</sup> Cicero, *In Verrem* II 3.23.57, 25.61, 44.104-45.108; 4.26.59, 51.114 attests unambiguously to a city Aetna (not the volcano) operating in the first half of the first century BCE, but this need not imply that that population was continuous from the fourth century. Strabo (6.2.3) locates the city 80 stadia from Katane; the Antonine Itineraries give the distance as 12 Roman miles (83.6).

<sup>164</sup> Cf. *BTGCI* III s.v. For the ambivalent position see Leone et al. (2007, p. 51); for the identification of Aitna-Inessa with Paternò see Uggeri (2004, p. 249).

There are, however, many instances of partial violent depopulation, in the form of battles and purges. However problematic the battlefield numbers reported by Diodorus may be, it is clear that cities frequently suffered severe losses of military men. The battles for Selinous and Himera in 409, for example, must have cost their populations dearly, even if the losses reported by Diodorus (16,000 Selinuntinoi, 6,000 Himeraioi according to Timaios or 20,000 according to Ephoros) are not accurate.<sup>165</sup> Likewise the 2,000 soldiers in Xenodikos' Akragantine army reported as killed by Agathokles' generals in 307 ought to have had repercussions for the functioning of the Akragantine community, and the 8,000 Mamertines reported as killed by Hieron II at the Longanos in 269/5 must have constituted a significant part of their citizen body.<sup>166</sup> Indeed, the magnitude of the Mamertines' loss can be inferred from their desperate appeal for both Carthaginian and Roman protection. Of course, other smaller battles caused fewer deaths, and these more frequent destructions of small numbers of citizens was a part of life in the ancient world not only in Sicily. In the cases of Selinous and Himera, the consequences of a loss of population were stark, as the cities could not field sufficient defensive military forces. Akragas, on the other hand, seems to have given up on its mission to destabilize Agathokles' empire, although it is worth noting that the Sicilian narrative of Diodorus is not preserved past around 306 so we lack any good documentation of the final decade and a half of Agathokles' rule. The most immediate effect of Hieron's victory at the Longanos was the self-perceived weakness of the Mamertine state—enough of them had been killed that they feared for their existence as a community. The loss of a mercenary meant a reduced payroll, but the loss of a citizen-soldier meant a loss of his economic contribution to the community and a disruption of the social fabric.

Purges were another form of demographic violence, perhaps even more destructive than battles since they were often accompanied by confiscations of property. In the buildup to his evacuation of the Gelooi, Dionysius I had killed the wealthiest citizens of that city and taken their possessions in 405, in order to pay the mercenaries in his army.<sup>167</sup> Although it was disastrous for the city as a whole, those Gelooi who were not purged acclaimed Dionysius' act and honored him with decrees.<sup>168</sup> Thus the community continued to function in the short term. In the long term, however, it had lost a great deal of accumulated wealth that could no longer be invested or even redistributed in Gela, as well as the human resources and potentially useful foreign connections of the upper classes. A century later Agathokles again purged the population of Gela, killing more than 4,000 of them (presumably the wealthiest) and confiscating their property.<sup>169</sup> While this act may have had political motivations, it must also have had demographic, social, and economic consequences even if not all of these are documented. Once again the loss of people meant a loss of connection (therefore of

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<sup>165</sup> D.S. 13.57.6; 13.60.5.

<sup>166</sup> Akragas: D.S. 20.56.2-3 and 62.5; Diodorus specifies (20.56.3) regarding the first defeat that "the Akragantinoi upon encountering this misfortune put an end to their own most noble design [contesting Agathokles' domination of Greek eastern Sicily]." The defeat must have hit Akragas itself fairly hard (recall that at its height in 406 the city had only 20,000 citizens according to Diodorus), even if allied troops were fighting as well. Mamertines: D.S. 22.13.2-6; the young Mamertine state may have contained a higher proportion of military-age men than Akragas did.

<sup>167</sup> Cf. Chapter One section A

<sup>168</sup> D.S. 13.93.3-4.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. Chapter One section D.

stability) and a loss of wealth (therefore potentially of production). Thanks to a generally hostile historical tradition, we know of several cities where Agathokles conducted purges. Not least was Syracuse itself, where besides the slaughter that accompanied his rise to power in 317 (to be discussed below) he murdered dissenters and relatives of the soldiers who were fighting in Libya on two occasions in 307.<sup>170</sup> These horrific actions left holes in the city's demographic, social, and economic fabric; in demographic and economic terms they created demand for more population and more human resources. In social terms the damage might not be reparable.

The Romans killed thousands of citizens of Sicilian cities in the course of the Second Punic War. In 214 the Roman garrison in Enna slaughtered an unquantified but significant number of Ennaioi out of concern that they might revolt, and proceeded to loot their property. Likewise in 212 Marcellus killed an unknown portion of the inhabitants of Megara Hyblaia and in 210 the Romans put down a revolt in Akragas, killing "those who were in charge."<sup>171</sup> The effects of such demographic losses should be clear even if they go unremarked by our sources. Purges and battles were similar strategies used by those with military power to punish or prevent disobedience by subject populations, even at the cost of reducing the productivity of potential tax or tribute incomes. The disruption to the communities involved was a secondary concern, a happy byproduct that made resistance even more difficult.

Yet there is one historical purge that defies this logic. In 392 Agyris, the Sikel tyrant of Agyrion, in preparation for war against the Carthaginian army of Mago, had gathered the 20,000 citizens of his territory (presumably with their families) inside the city where he had stored a great deal of property that he had confiscated in a purge of the city's wealthiest citizens.<sup>172</sup> It would be surprising for a tyrant to weaken his own population, and indeed Agyrion seems to have had a surplus of citizens not a deficit. A siege could be a very bad thing for a large urban population (cf. Akragas in 406 among others), and this internal purge does not seem to have made Agyrion any more vulnerable. Agathokles also killed large numbers of Syracusans and while we either know or can infer the social and economic consequences it is clear that neither the Syracusan state nor Agathokles himself suffered politically. Agyris' purge seems to have been conducted in order to quickly obtain sufficient resources in the city to weather a Carthaginian siege, though when Dionysius arrived the agreement he made with Agyris apparently involved taking all the supplies for his army.<sup>173</sup> It was probably not Agyris' intention to eviscerate his upper classes in order to support a foreign army that would henceforth be in charge of his city's defense, but just as at Gela in 405, that was the result. While Dionysius' (and therefore Diodorus') attention seems thereafter to have shifted to the Straits and southern Italy, Agyris and his city were now dependent on Syracuse, and perhaps it is not a coincidence that we do not hear any more of Agyrion until Timoleon's activities more than fifty years later.

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<sup>170</sup> D.S. 20.63.6-7, 72.1-5.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. Chapter One section H.

<sup>172</sup> D.S. 14.95.4-5.

<sup>173</sup> D.S. 14.95.7.

## b. Ejection

In several cases in our period a city's population was ejected from its city without particular interest in any destination. Dionysius I expelled the Syracusan cavalry, with whom he was in conflict, from their rebel home at Aitna in 403 but did not settle them anywhere or bring them back to Syracuse.<sup>174</sup> In 422 the upper classes at Leontinoi had expelled the lower, and individuals were frequently exiled, yet with the notable exception of Agathokles' reign strife or *stasis* was surprisingly not a generator of masses of exiles in the fourth and third centuries.<sup>175</sup> Indeed Dionysius, who expelled not only Syracusans nominally under his control but also others, provides the prevailing model. In 394 he and the Messanioi (former Medmaioi whom he had settled there in 396) ejected from Mylai the reassembled Naxioi and Katanaioi (whom Dionysius had enslaved in 403 and whose city he had given to the Sikels).<sup>176</sup> As I suggested in Chapter 1, Dionysius seems to have perceived a potential threat from this reunited population, but just as in the original enslavement, in 394 also he did not make provisions for them or set a destination. It is therefore not a great surprise that the Naxioi did eventually reassemble at Tauromenion under Andromachos in the 350s.

Tauromenion was the site of another ejection conducted by Dionysius in the course of his simultaneous struggles with the Chalkidian cities, the Sikels, and the Carthaginians. It was founded in 396 at the instigation of the Carthaginians by the Sikels whom Dionysius had installed in the territory of Naxos, and thereafter became a source of trouble to the Syracusan tyrant. After a failed attempt to capture the city in 394, a treaty struck with the Carthaginians in 392 gave him control over it, and he promptly expelled "the majority of the Sikels who were there," replacing them with his own mercenaries.<sup>177</sup> That Dionysius accomplished control over Tauromenion obliquely by treaty indicates that the Carthaginians had in fact been crucial in its independent existence until then. Where the expelled Sikels went is not specified; as with other ejections we must assume that they scattered to neighboring cities and perhaps further afield.

The tyranny of Agathokles drove many from Syracuse. He himself apparently served as a mercenary leader in Italy in an exile of sorts, before his rise to power.<sup>178</sup> The oligarchs of the so-called Six Hundred had been exiled before the coup of 317, but having returned to Syracuse, 4,000 of them and their aristocratic compatriots were slaughtered by Agathokles' soldiers and disaffected citizens; 6,000 oligarchic or intimidated Syracusans managed to escape to Akragas.<sup>179</sup> This episode should probably

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<sup>174</sup> Cf. Chapter One section A.

<sup>175</sup> Leontinoi: Thuc. 5.4.2-3; an example of an exiled individual is Hermokrates in 409: D.S. 13.63.1. The Leontine expulsion was a move to forestall a land redistribution, on which more in Chapter Six. Agathokles' government was responsible for a massive expulsion to be discussed below. In these conditions, essentially those of *stasis*, exile and expulsion were normal recourses, codified and managed by the Athenians and others in various forms of ostracism: Forsdyke (2005), cf. Gehrke (1985); Berent (1998, pp. 357-8).

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Chapter One section A and Chapter Three section A; Post 396 Messanioi = Medmaeans: D.S. 14.78.5. I discuss the exile in slavery of the Naxioi and Katanaioi, and their reassembly in Mylai, in Chapter Three.

<sup>177</sup> D.S. 14.96.4.

<sup>178</sup> D.S. 19.4.1.

<sup>179</sup> Exile of the Six Hundred: D.S. 19.4.3, 5.4; slaughter and exile: D.S. 19.8.1-2.

not be counted as a true expulsion, since Diodorus specifies that Agathokles' soldiers closed the city gates and tried to prevent people from leaving, but those fleeing perceived their situation to be a question of death or flight and chose flight. Agathokles did not intend to banish them from Syracuse though the effect was the same, and I discuss further the fate of these exiles, under the leadership of Deinokrates, in Chapter Three. After Agathokles' government had refused to surrender to the Carthaginians under Hamilcar in 310 it ejected 8,000 dissenters, who were received by Hamilcar.<sup>180</sup> We are never told what happened to this group, though it could conceivably have joined the other Syracusans in Akragas, since among others it included "the family and friends of the exiles [i.e. those already in Akragas]." Indeed, the gain of several thousand new inhabitants may have led the Akragantines to contemplate their bid against Agathokles in 309.

Yet ejections of city populations were relatively rare, and only one further 'true' ejection remains in our period, the unusually well (though still incompletely) documented ejection of the Entellinoi from their city in the course of the First Punic War. The Entella Tablets and their decrees indicate that the population was forced to leave Entella, and although the Romans were likely responsible for the resettlement, we do not know whether it was they or the Carthaginians who had ejected them.<sup>181</sup> In either case the population was scattered both locally and as far east as Enna, both as slaves and as free refugees. The reason for the expulsion was presumably military, and the Romans seem to have been interested in re-establishing the city as a functioning community, but the specifics of the expulsion itself and the success of its goals are unclear. Archaeological investigation at Entella suggests that the middle of the third century BCE did mark a period of lower and humbler population on the site, but there is no evidence for a widespread destruction, consistent with an ejection or deportation rather than a sack or destruction of the city.<sup>182</sup> The citizen community was, however, able to reconstitute itself fairly quickly after returning home.

A subset of ejections might be discerned in the removal of garrisons. Garrison soldiers were generally not deeply integrated into the communities in which they served and often had hostile relations with them, but once established they nevertheless formed a part of the urban population.<sup>183</sup> Garrisons were imposed and removed with some frequency in Sicily, but here I want only to note the several instances in which we know that one was ejected from a community, as in the other ejections, without a new destination specified. While it is possible to infer the placement and removal of garrisons in the fourth century conflicts between the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Sikels, and during the Punic Wars, we only occasionally get an explicit notice of such activity. Let us begin with perhaps the most significant one: in 307 Agathokles expelled but did not attack the Carthaginian garrison from Therma, his birthplace.<sup>184</sup> Therma had itself

<sup>180</sup> D.S. 20.15.2-6. Cf. "those made into enemies by Dionysius" received by Magon in 393: D.S. 14.90.2-3.

<sup>181</sup> Ampolo and Parra (2001).

<sup>182</sup> Michelini (1992); Michelini (2003, pp. 948-9).

<sup>183</sup> E.g. the appraisal of Chaniotis (2005, p. 88): "For many cities, garrisons were a part of everyday life, usually an annoyance and a burden, an unpleasant instrument of subordination to a foreign power, a cause of disorder, and a significant factor in social, economic, and religious life." He proceeds in the following pages (pp. 89-93) to illustrate both the problems caused by garrisons and the benefits they could potentially confer. See also Chaniotis (2002) for an exploration of social interactions between garrison soldiers and their host populations.

<sup>184</sup> D.S. 20.56.3.

been a Carthaginian foundation, settled in the years after their destruction of nearby Himera in 409 and undoubtedly incorporating some of that population. Though we do not know much about the population of Therma in the fourth century, the fact that there had been a Carthaginian garrison there suggests a considerable Greek population that had to be supervised. The removal of the Carthaginians from that city in particular must have resonated within the Therman community and perhaps even more widely.

The city of Rhegion provides two interesting episodes. The garrison of Dionysius II there was removed by Leptines and Kallippos in 351, perhaps freeing the inhabitants from their political dependence on Syracuse.<sup>185</sup> As I noted in Chapter 1, it is likely that those inhabitants included at least some of the Rheginoi ransomed in 387 or their descendants; Dionysius II seems to have refounded the city while at the same time imposing a garrison on it. Yet around 280 the infamous Campanian soldiers under their leader Decius, serving in the Roman garrison of the city, ejected the Rheginoi themselves in a slightly less violent mirror of the Mamertines' takeover in Messana.<sup>186</sup> The Campanians as a body had recently been granted *civitas sine suffragio* after 338, so the actions of these soldiers, who were Romans of a sort, provoked swift punishment from Rome.<sup>187</sup> A Roman citizen army arrived shortly thereafter and ejected Decius and his company, allowing the Rheginoi back into their city. What is strange here is the inversion of the normal situation in which urban populations are stable but garrisons come and go; instead the garrison expelled the population in order to claim the city as its own. The transition from professional soldier into citizen will be explored through analysis of this and other cases (including Messana, Entella, Katane, and Hippana) in a chapter dedicated to mercenaries. Here I note only that this incident at Rhegion of a garrison expelling its host population is unique in Sicilian-South Italian history—in the other cases the expellers were mercenaries attempting to bring their travels to an end.

Finally, in the First Punic War cities routinely exchanged the garrisons of one side for those of the other. Our best explicit account of this comes from the year 254, in which the people of Iaitas expelled their Carthaginian garrison and turned their city over to the Romans, which presumably meant accepting a Roman garrison.<sup>188</sup> We are also told that several other cities emulated the Iaitinoi, and this kind of contextual decision-making was typical not only for the Punic Wars but also for the prior centuries: a constant shifting of garrisons as subject cities tried to win the favor of the more lenient side or dominated by the more powerful. Depending on how long the garrison had been in place it could have been more or less involved in the social life of the city, though from the moment of its imposition it would have exerted some economic influence—the soldiers were in need of at least food and perhaps other things as well, and they had the coined money to pay for it even if confiscation was routine. The removal of such pressures must have affected their host communities, and while we do not know for certain where the expelled soldiers went, presumably they returned to their camps, or the cities from which they had been recruited, or perhaps they stayed on the road as mercenaries.

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<sup>185</sup> Cf. Chapter One section B.

<sup>186</sup> D.S. 22.1.2-3.

<sup>187</sup> On the citizenship grant of 338 cf. Sherwin-White (1973, p. 40).

<sup>188</sup> D.S. 23.18.5.

### c. Mass enslavement

A more sinister subcategory of population transfer is the mass enslavement of defeated or subject peoples. The Carthaginian invasion of 409, the opening chronological bookend to my study, resulted in several such mass enslavements, and in the following two centuries such events were frequent. Also sometimes documented are the smaller incidents, often raids or battlefield actions, that resulted in the capture of individuals or groups, often soldiers. A certain frequency of low-intensity trade in human beings is assumed to have been normal in Sicily in this period, following paths of contacts between buyers and sellers within and outside of Sicily itself. The mass enslavement of a population was a significant event, not only for the newly enslaved but also for this economic network: the large number of individuals must have traveled the usual channels at first but forged new paths as the market flooded with people for sale.

The situation in Akragas in the aftermath of the Battle of Himera in 480 provides an example of the kind of influence a single mass enslavement could have. According to Diodorus, after Gelon had defeated the Carthaginians he awarded a large number of the captives to Akragas in proportion to their contribution of soldiers, and in addition many Carthaginians who escaped the battle fled into Akragantine territory and were captured there.<sup>189</sup> “The city was filled with captives,” Diodorus writes, having noted that “many private individuals held five hundred captives for themselves.” Whatever the degree of exaggeration, we may safely take the kernel of the story to be true, that Akragas did receive a large number of captured Carthaginians as slaves in the years after 480. Diodorus emphasizes that this large slave labor force enabled the city to construct great monuments, one of many effects such a large newly captive population could have had, and perhaps the most visible reflection of such a population. He attributes the city’s great temples as well as water channels and a large fish pond to the work of this new source of labor. But the presence of these Carthaginian slaves cannot have ended there, and even though the sources do not address other consequences, it is quite likely that at least the economic and probably the social fabric of the city was significantly altered.

Likewise in the fourth and third centuries, thousands of soldiers on all sides were captured, and while we do not know all of their fates, many must have been kept or sold as slaves. Surprisingly there does not seem to have been much of this activity during the wars between Dionysius and the Carthaginians, Chalkidians, or Sikels. The Gelooi under siege in 405 evidently captured some Carthaginian soldiers in raids, but otherwise we must wait until Dionysius’ campaign against Rhegion in the late 390s for significant numbers of non-civilian captives to appear in the record.<sup>190</sup> In 390 the Rheginoi managed to capture a large number of Syracusan sailors, and in the next year the crews of 10 Rhegian ships (perhaps a total of 2,000 men) were captured and enslaved at Dionysius’ friendly Messana.<sup>191</sup> Timoleon captured thousands of Carthaginians in his victory at the Krimisos, and 500 Carthaginians in the garrison at Herbessos were taken by the Akragantinoi in 309.<sup>192</sup> Neither Agathokles nor Hieron II seem to have taken many prisoners of war, although it should be noted that Hieron in at least one instance

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<sup>189</sup> D.S. 11.25.2.

<sup>190</sup> Gelooi: D.S. 13.108.7.

<sup>191</sup> Syracusan captives of 390: D.S. 14.100.4-5; Rhegian captives of 389: D.S. 14.103.3.

<sup>192</sup> D.S. 20.31.5.

(Ameselon) took Mamertine troops into his army, perhaps under compulsion.<sup>193</sup> The Punic Wars, on the other hand, saw a number of battlefield enslavements. In 249 a Roman fleet of 93 warships with their crews were taken by Adherbal off Drepanon, though Catulus made up for this at the end of the First Punic War by selling at Lilybaion all the Carthaginian captives he had made in the Battle of the Aegates.<sup>194</sup> It is also worth remembering that the treaty at the end of the war required the Carthaginians to restore to the Romans the captives they held, though it is not at all known how effectively that clause was enforced.<sup>195</sup> Throughout the Second Punic War the Romans took thousands of Carthaginian soldiers prisoner. In 218 they took 1,700 in a sea battle off Lilybaion and 2,000 on Malta, though it seems that the few nobles were ransomed rather than sold into slavery. In 212 Marcellus took perhaps a thousand Carthaginians prisoner outside of Akragas.<sup>196</sup>

The complete enslavement of a city's population is recorded fairly frequently and was obviously a much more serious blow to community cohesion than the battlefield capture of soldiers.<sup>197</sup> The Naxioi and Katanaioi enslaved by Dionysius I in 403 left empty cities, which were designated for Sikels and Campanians. All of the inhabitants of Motya who survived Dionysius' successful attack in 397 were enslaved, though many of them could have been ransomed or sold in western Sicily since Lilybaion was reported to have been founded by the survivors of Motya. It is possible but unlikely that this population reassembled itself after being brought in chains to Syracuse, and in any case Dionysius is not likely to have wanted to travel all the way home with thousands of captives that had to be fed and guarded. In 387 after starving the Rheginoi into submission he took the remaining 6,000 of them captive and either ransomed them or sold them as slaves. The Romans enslaved 25,000 after capturing Akragas in 262, although the text of Diodorus is ambiguous as to whether this was the city's total population; in 258 they enslaved everyone in Mytistratos, in 254 they captured Panormos and enslaved half of it while ransoming the other half, and in 210 in the Second Punic War they returned to Akragas and enslaved all its inhabitants. It is interesting that only Dionysius I and the Romans are credited with taking a city's entire population as slaves, essentially ending in this way the life of a political and social community. These events occurred only during wartime, and as we will see even partial enslavements could have a similar effect when circumstances had already reduced a population's numbers.

In several instances part of the population of a city under attack either escaped or was killed, while those left behind were captured as slaves. This was the fate experienced by the Himeraioi and Selinuntinoi in 409, and while it is reported that 5,000 Selinuntine women and children were taken this way, no numbers are given for Himera.

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<sup>193</sup> There are in fact attestations of Agathokles capturing enemy ships, but it is not likely that his perennially small army traveled with many captives. Hieron's enrollment of Mamertine soldiers from Ameselon: D.S. 22.13.1.

<sup>194</sup> Captives of 249: Polybius 1.51. In the context of the middle years of the First Punic War D.S. 24.1.5 records a Roman loss of 117 ships and 20,000 men while D.S. 24.1.11 records a Roman loss of 35,000 killed and the same number captured, it is clear that the numbers cannot be trusted but not whether either of these notices refers to the naval battle of 249.

<sup>195</sup> A similar provision was part of the treaty that ended the Achaian War in 146.

<sup>196</sup> Livy 25.41.7.

<sup>197</sup> See Chapter One for ancient citations and Chapter Five for a discussion of slavery and mass enslavement.

Many but clearly not all had escaped. The population of Apollonia was partially slaughtered and partially sold into slavery by Agathokles in 307, and I have already mentioned the similar treatment of the Egestaioi, whose women and children were sold as slaves to the Bruttii in the same year. The Romans captured and sold “most of the people in Kamarina” in 258, and again in the Second Punic War Marcellus enslaved the survivors of his attack on Megara Hyblaia in 214.<sup>198</sup> The event or process that forced the Entellinoi out of their city not only spread refugees throughout western and central Sicily but also led to at least some enslaved citizens’ being freed by the Egestaioi, perhaps indicating that they had been collected for sale at Segesta. In all these cases too, enslaving the remainder of an already weakened population put at least a temporary end to the community in question. The Entellinoi were able to reassemble themselves, and other communities likely attempted to do so as well, though we have little documentation of their successes or failures.

Raids on non-military populations produced captives as well. In 406 Himilcon drove into the territory of Gela and Kamarina and “sated his army with every sort of plunder,” which ought to have included taking human captives.<sup>199</sup> I note that this activity was counterbalanced by the Gelooi taking soldiers from that same Carthaginian army captive through raids and ambushes. Similarly in 393 Magon’s army “took possession of much plunder” in the territory of Messana, where eighty years later (in 312) Agathokles’ general Pasiphilos would also take “many captives;” during the Second Punic War a sudden attack by Hannibal Barca against Rhegion made prisoners of the unwise or unlucky: “all those [Rheginioi] who had gone out over the territory”.<sup>200</sup> These few notices we have of raids on rural populations (or those traveling outside fortified urban centers for other reasons) by invading armies should not be taken to mean that such raids were unusual, since both military and civilian groups could be desirable prisoners. The seizure of unprotected human resources was normal and expected in times of war. The Romans demonstrate this point nicely: in the middle years of the Second Punic War they came close to establishing a routine of making raids on North African territory. From 210 through 207 Livy records either planned or executed raids on various parts of the North African coast, in which human captives formed a part of the booty that was always sold off at Lilybaion.

The mass enslavements recorded in historical sources also must have reverberated throughout the island and beyond as the original displacement resulted in the further movement of these new slaves to their new masters’ properties. Not only did mass enslavement do serious damage to the integrity of the population from which people were taken, but it must also have affected the populations in which they ended up. Enslavement was a means of dispersion, with which imperial powers trusted the slave market to scatter the individuals formerly belonging to a cohesive social unit. It was not always successful in that aim, but in many ways it could be preferable to slaughter, ransom, tribute, or other tools available to a victorious or powerful ruler or general. In contrast to developments elsewhere, Sicilian populations were rarely taken as slaves and left in place; enslavement meant relocation over large and small distances for large and small periods of time.

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<sup>198</sup> Kamarinaioi: D.S. 23.9.5

<sup>199</sup> D.S. 13.108.3.

<sup>200</sup> Magon: D.S. 14.90.3; Pasiphilos: D.S. 19.102.3; Hannibal: Polybius 9.7.10 cf. perhaps Livy 26.12.2.

#### **d. Transfer**

While the cases discussed thus far left the destination of uprooted populations open, there are others in which populations were transferred from one city to another but did not otherwise experience a change in free-slave status. In general this required a military force to guarantee obedience, a method inaugurated by the fifth-century Syracusan tyrants but refined by Dionysius I. In his early campaigns against the Chalkidian cities and the Sikels he forced the movement of populations quite freely in order to reshape the demographic situation he found in eastern Sicily into one more suited to his purposes, as we will see below. Such forced transfers were rare in the eastern Mediterranean until the Hellenistic kings began moving populations around to construct the human landscape they required. Generations earlier, Dionysius used his superior army to force populations to go where he wanted them, in response to conflict between Greeks and Carthaginians, between the different Greek cities, and between different factions in Syracuse itself. In Sicily Timoleon, Agathokles, Phintias, and the Carthaginian generals followed his example.

The first population transfer effected by Dionysius took place before he assumed sole control of Syracuse and was explored in Chapter 1 as his first lesson in population manipulation: his evacuation of Gela and Kamarina in 406. There, I suggested that the outcome of the evacuation, though it did not end up being permanent or complete, could not have been known by the individuals or populations involved, and that it was traumatic to the social and economic fabric of the Geloan and Kamarinaian peoples.

Indeed, population transfer became the hallmark of Dionysius' policy regarding the Chalkidians, Sikels, and Campanian and Peloponnesian mercenaries. In 403 he enslaved the Katanaioi and Naxioi and brought the inhabitants of Leontinoi to Syracuse as citizens.<sup>201</sup> Leontinoi was left empty for the time being but Naxos was given to the local Sikels, and Katane to his Campanian mercenaries. This state of affairs lasted only a short time: in 396 the Carthaginians convinced the Sikels in Naxian territory to move upland to the new city of Tauromenion (discussed under "Foundations" below), while Dionysius moved the Campanians in Katane to the city of Aitna-Inessa, and settled some 10,000 Peloponnesian mercenaries in Leontinoi. As we saw earlier, in 392 Dionysius was able to eject the Sikels from Tauromenion, and he settled another body of mercenaries there. Thus in the course of eleven years Katane and Naxos had been abandoned while Leontinoi, Aitna, and Tauromenion were now home to Dionysius' mercenaries. As for the populations of these cities, the Katanaioi and Naxioi were scattered around Sicily and the Mediterranean as slaves, the Leontinoi had been integrated into the Syracusan citizen body, and the Sikels of Naxos-Tauromenion had been ejected and perhaps scattered among the Sikels of the interior or other Greek cities. We do not know enough about the history of Aitna-Inessa to say whether there was a population there before the Campanians arrived. It had likely hosted a mix of Sikel, Syracusan, and Peloponnesian populations at least until the rebel Syracusan cavalry occupied it in 405; Dionysius captured the city in 403, and given his readiness to deport citizens in his campaigns of that year it would not be surprising if he had emptied it then, either enslaving the inhabitants or bringing them to Syracuse as citizens. But eastern Sicily in 392 looked quite different from the way it had in 403—politically it was

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<sup>201</sup> For the ancient citations for all this activity, cf. Chapter One.

much more amenable to Syracusan hegemony, and none of the communities that had historically attempted to assert independence and autonomy were in a position to assert it now.

Timoleon was a prolific mover of population as well, and in this respect must be seen as a student of Dionysius, in some cases repeating the tyrant's actions exactly. We have seen above how he eliminated the Campanian population of Aitna, though without replacing them at least as far as the historical record preserves. The chronology of Timoleon's time in Sicily is debated but all of his settlement activities are generally placed in the early 330s. He seems to have been responsible for most but not all decisions regarding the destinations of the settlers who came to Sicily from Greece and around the Mediterranean. So, for example, he brought the inhabitants of Agyrion to Syracuse as citizens, and sent 10,000 new settlers to the city. He also removed the population of Leontinoi to Syracuse, as Dionysius I had done, and although as with Aitna we are not told of any repopulation, it would not be surprising if there were some. Timoleon is recorded as the agent behind the resettlement of Kamarina with some of the immigrants, and of course Syracuse itself was repopulated with newcomers as well.

Agathokles generally did not move populations from city to city—as we have seen he regularly purged the citizen bodies of subject cities and of Syracuse itself but usually without supplying replacements. The one exception to this habit is his treatment of Segesta in 307, refounded briefly as Dikaiopolis after he had disposed of the city's prior inhabitants (the men were killed and the women were sold in Bruttium). Agathokles gave the empty city to a group of dissatisfied mercenaries, and since the repopulation was apparently quite rapid it is more properly a case of population transfer rather than a true refoundation. What is striking is that while Dionysius had been constantly pressed to find stable situations for his mercenaries, Agathokles appears only to have evacuated a city and settled them in it this one time. The city is subsequently referred to in historical sources as Segesta, but we do not know whether any of the original inhabitants were able to return, or if the mercenaries were from that time onward Segestaioi as Dionysius' Medemaian resettlers of Messana had become Messanioi. Segesta's relationship with Rome as negotiated in the First Punic War would become quite interesting if the latter were the case.<sup>202</sup> In any case Agathokles appears to have been constrained by monetary and military circumstances at Segesta, and in general did not favor the transfer or settlement of populations.

Finally, in the course of the First Punic War the Carthaginians (but interestingly not the Romans) engaged in the transfer of populations, for military-strategic reasons. In 260 the general Hamilcar (not Barca) moved the population of Eryx to the city's port Drepanon; in 244 Hamilcar Barca had to again remove the inhabitants of Eryx there. Drepanon was in a more defensible location—like Lilybaion it was never captured during the war—but evidently a recalcitrant or itinerant population had accumulated in Eryx in the intervening time, perhaps because of the important sanctuary of Aphrodite/Venus/Astarte. Similarly, in 250 as the Romans were proceeding steadily into western Sicily the Carthaginians evacuated the inhabitants of Selinous to Lilybaion. Selinous had been a Punic city, though undoubtedly with some Greek inhabitants, essentially since 409, and just as in the cases of Gela and Kamarina, and Eryx, the

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<sup>202</sup> See, e.g. Prag (2010a, pp. 186-9) on the surrender of Segesta to Rome in 263 and the probable kinship appeal, based on an Elymian connection to Aeneas, that accompanied it.

population did not choose to leave but was forced to by its defenders, who preferred to defend stronger positions. These defensive evacuations carried out under the pressures of war thus constitute a significant subcategory of population transfers.

By way of conclusion, I note that defensive evacuation was a common enough mode of mobility in Sicilian history that Agathokles could exploit it in his preparations to invade North Africa in 310. In order to gain a supply of wealth and to purge Syracuse of dissenters while he was away, he called an assembly and proposed that whoever did not want to endure a siege should evacuate (the destination is unspecified), then sent mercenaries to murder whoever was attempting to leave the city and confiscated their possessions.<sup>203</sup> The move was clearly aimed at those opposed to him, including especially the wealthy, who had the most to lose in a military defeat and who were already in conflict with the tyrant. We have seen cases in which mobility was imposed, while in this instance mobility was promised but prevented. Population transfers, including evacuations, were not as traumatic as enslavements, but they did manifest the unequal power dynamic: being forced to relocate was a sign that a population was not fully free.

## **e. Foundation**

Founding a city could potentially be as disruptive to regional landscapes as the depopulations of established centers. Sicily's Greek and Punic populations had been immigrants several centuries before, and the cities they founded created an urban landscape that persisted well into the late Classical and Hellenistic periods though not without alteration. Even in this period, a number of new foundations assembled various populations into urban communities, and they preserve some important details about the process and its effects. Most significantly, very few of these foundations involved a long journey for the new settlers. There is some overlap between the categories of foundation, refoundation, and transfer; I omit a section dedicated to refoundation but I hope to address the phenomenon through this section and the previous one.

The Carthaginians were the first to found cities after their invasion in 409: Therma, established near the site of the conquered Himera in the years after 409, and Kephalaion further east along the coast.<sup>204</sup> Diodorus says that they populated Therma in 407 with Carthaginians and other North Africans, but this must be a simplification. We know from archaeological evidence that Himera itself was not reoccupied after 409, so when we read in Diodorus that the Himeraioi were allowed to return home in the treaty of 405, the new city Therma was presumably meant.<sup>205</sup> The Himeraioi, or some of them anyway, appear to have retained some independence of political action, however, since they are recorded providing troops (for Dionysius) and striking treaties (with the Carthaginians); they were either in exile or residents of Therma.<sup>206</sup> The city evidently

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<sup>203</sup> D.S. 20.4.6-8.

<sup>204</sup> For the concurrent foundation of Kephalaion (for which there is no explicit historical record) see Vassallo (2007, p. 196). For archaeological evidence from the Punic *phourion* there: Tullio (1993/1994).

<sup>205</sup> The city's necropolis ceased to be used after the end of the fifth century: Fabbri et al. (2006, p. 613). The residential area of the Classical city can also be confirmed to have been destroyed in 409: Adriani et al. (1970, p. 6).

<sup>206</sup> "Himeraioi" contributing troops to Dionysius' allied army in 397: D.S. 14.47.6; "Himeraioi" signing an agreement of *philia* with Himilcon in 396: D.S. 14.56.2. There could have been several groups in Sicily identifying themselves as Himeraioi—it is clear that following the destruction of the city there was a

had a mixed population from its founding, perhaps including the conquered Himeraioi with their conquerors. The Carthaginians were also responsible for the foundation of Lilybaion, which they populated with the survivors of Motya. In my reading all the surviving Motyans were made captives by Dionysius in 397 and sold either in western Sicily or in Syracuse, so that the only way to place any significant number of them in Lilybaion in the next few generations would have been through a more or less concerted redemption program, one that could only have been executed by the Carthaginians either in Panormos and Soloeis or at Carthage itself.<sup>207</sup> An unknown number of new settlers must also have been brought to the new foundation, which in its ambitious defensive layout likewise required a high degree of organization and a great many resources. Lilybaion was probably less mixed than Therma, but it too was a new home for the former inhabitants of a destroyed city. Motya itself, it is worth noting, continued to be occupied, though increasingly less intensively, until the end of the fourth century.<sup>208</sup>

The Carthaginians were also partially responsible for the foundation of Tauromenion in the former territory of Naxos around 396. In Diodorus' account they encouraged the Sikels placed by Dionysius I in the territory of Naxos to occupy and defend the hill Taurus; subsequent events make clear that it was only the aid (whether material, diplomatic, or both) of the Carthaginians that prevented Dionysius from removing them. The Carthaginians thus seem to have won over these Sikels as allies from Dionysius; Tauromenion owed its existence more to Carthaginian than to Sikel initiative and support. As in previous examples, the source population did not have far to move.

Dionysius I also founded cities, though as should be clear from earlier sections, he preferred to move populations around pre-existing centers. His first foundation was Adranon, established in 400 on the slopes of Mt. Aitna, around the temple of Adranos (a Sikel god and father of the Palikoi). Diodorus says only that he founded a city, though it is possible to fill in some likely details. The sanctuary already existed and this implies a certain concentration of religious and service personnel as well as irregular and perhaps seasonal pilgrimage. Dionysius' other population transfers involved mercenaries or soldiers, and so at Adranon too, whether the new settlers were Syracusans or Italians (the two most likely sources), the initial population of the new city was mixed. We saw in Chapter One and earlier in this chapter that he had repopulated Sicilian Messina, destroyed by the Carthaginians in 396, with Medmaioi from southern Italy. Having attempted unsuccessfully to include 600 Peloponnesian Messenians in this resettlement, he gave them land (taken from existing cities) on the northern coast to found their own city, Tyndaris. In the first place Dionysius' appropriation of territory

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slippage in the referent of the collective noun. A similar phenomenon can be observed at Gela where, despite being relocated to Phintias (Licata), they passed decrees as *Gelooi*: *SEG* XII 380; also there remained Olynthians and Corinthians generations after the destruction of those cities in 338 and 146, respectively.

<sup>207</sup> See Bielman (1994, pp. 294-308) on official redemption of prisoners; (pp. 300-301) on state-sponsored redemption through ransom, discussing e.g. an official mission to redeem citizens of Rhamnous captured by slaves, *SEG* XXIV 154, and an embassy from Mytilene to the Peloponnese charged with ransoming back captured citizens, *IG* XII.2 15. Bielman notes that official intervention usually involved an agnostic attitude toward prior status (p. 301).

<sup>208</sup> For occupation activity in fourth-century Motya cf. Famà (2002, p. 50); Famà and Toti (1997); Rossoni and Vecchio (2000); Nigro (2004).

from neighboring Abakainon may indicate that the rural inhabitants of some of that land were included in the new city. But even if the Messenians were at first the only legitimate citizens of Tyndaris, Diodorus expressly attributes the city's success and very survival to internal harmony and a generous immigration policy.<sup>209</sup> Who exactly the opportunistic newcomers were is not specified, but there were certainly enough populations dispersed and in motion around the turn of the fourth century to provide plenty of human resources. Dionysius' settlers came from far off, but his foundations either incorporated a pre-existing local population or depended on local populations.

Dionysius' colonial ventures in the Adriatic are also relevant to Sicilian population dynamics, since they removed probably thousands of Syracusans from the city and the island. The colonies at Pharos (co-founded in 385 with the Parians) and Lissos (founded "not many years earlier," apparently without cooperation) are unfortunately known only in brief notices of Diodorus so we lack crucial details about their creation.<sup>210</sup> However, it seems that for all the manipulation, deportation, and settlement of populations within Sicily, these two cities were the only true colonies, founded with Syracusan citizens and presumably with an official relationship to Syracuse and Dionysius himself. It has been suggested that the colonists were in fact the former Kauloniatai and Hipponiatai brought to Syracuse in the few years prior, but as far as I can tell this is only speculation based on the sequence of events; as a capital city Syracuse was a prodigious consumer of population and probably did not suffer from excess even with the newly arrived South Italians.<sup>211</sup> What is striking is that Dionysius never sent Syracusan citizens to plant colonies in Sicily or South Italy, and that conversely he did not employ his usual methods (mercenaries, enslavement, forced or encouraged transfer) for his aims in the Adriatic.<sup>212</sup> This difference in approach may simply have been due to a difference in the tyrant's ability to threaten or project military force.

The relatively minor tyrants Archonides the Younger and Phintias founded eponymous cities in the late fifth and early third centuries respectively, for rather different reasons and using different source populations. Archonides, tyrant of Herbita, was apparently spurred by a peace treaty with Dionysius in 403, after which he sent to the coast colonists made up of mercenaries, poor Herbitaioi, and a "mixed crowd" of refugees of the wars in eastern Sicily. Their new city was Halaisa Archonidea (or Archonidion), and it eventually outgrew its relation to Herbita, though Diodorus stresses that even under the Romans common religious practices united metropolis and colony.<sup>213</sup> The prime consideration in this case seems to have been the population

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<sup>209</sup> D.S. 14.78.6: "The Messenians named the city Tyndaris, and conducting civic life with goodwill toward one another, and enrolling many as citizens, they quickly became more than five thousand."

<sup>210</sup> D.S. 15.13.1, 4.

<sup>211</sup> By "consumer" I mean that the city had to attract new inhabitants since the urban population constantly needed replenishment as a result of sickness, war, and poverty, as well as official colonizing ventures. For this identification of the new colonists see Caven (1990, pp. 149-153) for a rather expansive and speculative account of Dionysius' colonization activity in the Adriatic.

<sup>212</sup> Diodorus (15.13.1) says that Dionysius wanted "to appropriate for himself the so-called Ionian crossing, so that he could render the voyage to Epirus safe and have his own cities where ships could put in," and ultimately (probably spurious) to sack Delphi; he did in fact make an alliance with the Illyrians (13.2) but did not involve himself in the disposition of their populations or the urban landscape of the Ionian strait as he had in Sicily and South Italy.

<sup>213</sup> D.S. 14.16.3-4.

pressure of urban poor and high immigration and the financial pressure of having to pay mercenaries, which Archonides relieved through his colonial venture. It is unlikely that the colonists had much say in the matter, as was the case in the foundations and refoundations of Dionysius I.<sup>214</sup>

In very different circumstances Phintias, who became tyrant in Akragas following the death of Agathokles, sacked Gela around 282 and brought its inhabitants to his newly built city also called Phintias (mod. Licata), on the coast about midway between Akragas and Gela. We know that the Gelooi continued as a *polis* community, probably in Phintias, and that at least the territory of Gela itself continued to be sporadically occupied.<sup>215</sup> Still it is possible to see his action in light of other foundations and relocations, as a practical move to keep a subject population close to his capital and a form of demographic violence as well as an exercise and display of imperial power of the type previously commanded only by Syracusan tyrants and liberators. He was not concerned with his home population in Akragas but rather with leaving his mark on the urban landscape of Sicily. While Archonides was certainly motivated by personal renown in his establishment of Halaisa, Phintias' foundation was a pure statement of his aspirations to political relevance.

The population transfers of these minor tyrants are distinctive in one other way. While the new settlers of Halaisa may have come a long way to arrive at Herbita, their journey to the new city was not a long one, nor did the Gelooi have long to travel to their new imposed home. These minor tyrants executed their foundations within a restricted geographical area, using the closest and most convenient populations, as compared to the Syracusan and Carthaginian foundations.

I have already discussed the displacement of the inhabitants of Eryx to Drepanon in 260 above in the section on population transfer, but it might also be considered a foundation. Unfortunately there is very little archaeological evidence for the occupation history of either site, but it is possible to infer that Eryx had a harbor on the coast, and that this is what became the new city of Drepanon in 260. Diodorus specifies that Hamilcar "fortified Drepanon and established a city," before transplanting the Erycinoi there, in a move quite similar to that of Phintias in 282.<sup>216</sup> While there must have been some infrastructure already on the ground at the harbor, there was evidently more work to be done to "establish a city" before the Erycinoi could live there, and this probably qualifies as a foundation. The aim was defense, and once again the distance between source and destination was not great.

Foundations also required, after the first directed settlement, a sustaining influx of unofficial and unconstrained or less constrained immigration in order for the city to grow or even maintain its demographic strength. In this way they offer a good opportunity to explore the gray area between coerced and voluntary mobility. Indeed, the foundation of a city often involved several other modes of coerced and free mobility. It has been argued that according to basic demography Syracuse, for example, could not have survived many generations after its eighth-century founding let alone grown in size without significant additions to its population.<sup>217</sup> We should keep this demographic

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<sup>214</sup> See e.g. Cordano (1995) for a study of "forced departure" of colonists in the foundation of Taras.

<sup>215</sup> See Chapter One section E.

<sup>216</sup> D.S. 23.9.4.

<sup>217</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 383). See also Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 63-5) for the Syracusans' constant need of immigrants to sustain its numbers and the suggestion that this was due to endemic malaria.

consideration in mind with more recent foundations as well, and for that matter for all ancient cities, whenever they were founded.<sup>218</sup> For most of the newly founded cities I have discussed, most of the new settlers probably went under orders of the founding tyrant—the poor Herbitaioi sent to Halaisa, the Messenians sent to Tyndaris, the Gelooi sent to Phintias. Yet along with those forced to move (and their families if they had them), any number of opportunistic volunteers might also have immigrated either from the original source population or from other areas, as Diodorus says explicitly was the case for Tyndaris, and as can be inferred for other foundations as well. In cases like these (and as I will argue, on an island-wide scale as well), forced mobility cut channels of movement that made voluntary mobility easier along them.

## **ii. Voluntary Mobility**

Episodes of voluntary mobility are uncommon in the historical record for Sicily, and like all forms of mobility, are difficult to read in the material record. Inscriptions would aid the investigation, but the Greeks of Sicily did not have much of an epigraphic habit.<sup>219</sup> For the ancient writers of Sicilian history, the willing movement of individuals and groups was not a concern unless it affected the military and political events under consideration, nor could they collect data on those movements.<sup>220</sup> As a result documentation of voluntary mobility is poor, and an assessment of its scope must necessarily rely on comparison, anecdote, and estimation, and produce a tentative impressionistic reconstruction. We must use the documented episodes as much as possible, recognizing that they are cited because of their relevance to a particular historical narrative, but also acknowledge the underlying normal rhythms of voluntary mobility that were never expressly documented. In the sections that follow I examine the main modes of free mobility while questioning how free any of them really were.

### **a. The short term: traders, workmen, and mercenaries**

At a generally high-frequency, low-intensity level, people moved willingly around Sicily, seeking trade or employment. Traders had to bring the products of one location to another, workers both skilled and unskilled might be in greater demand than at home in locations both near and far, and the market for hired soldiers brought career soldiers to whoever was paying the most.<sup>221</sup> This last group, mercenaries, is far better documented than the other two, since the nearly constant wars in Sicily involved their service, though often the documentation consists only in a notice that mercenaries were

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<sup>218</sup> Note for example the mainland Greek Lokrians' concern for keeping their colony at Naupactus before 460 BCE well-populated: *ML* 20; or the Achaians' regulations for immigration to Orchomenos upon its admission to the Achaian league ca. 234/3 BCE: *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 490.

<sup>219</sup> Prag (2002).

<sup>220</sup> Neither Polybius's focus on Rome's ascent, for which see Walbank (2002, pp. 6-21), nor Diodorus' more ecumenical and moralizing mission, D.S. 1.3.1-8 with Sacks (1990, pp. 9-22 and 81-2), gave them anything like an interest in Sicilian demography or social organization, even if these had been preserved by their sources.

<sup>221</sup> Feyel has shown that the majority of workmen recorded in the construction of major Greek sanctuaries did only one term of work and did not return: "...de façon générale, la main-d'oeuvre paraît extrêmement mobile...la majorité d'entre eux...exécutent un ou deux travaux et ne réapparaissent plus": Feyel (2006, p. 332).

recruited. While the circulation of traders, craftsmen, and laborers was not distinctive to Sicily in the LCEH period, the large numbers of mercenaries were. All of these mobile individuals had a home somewhere but spent a significant amount of time away from it. This subsection focuses on the temporary movement of people, and the next will address permanent relocation.

We know that traders and craftsmen were in motion on the island from literary and material evidence as well as from ecological necessity. In preparation for war in 397, Dionysius I expelled the Carthaginian merchants who had been on their ships in the harbor of Syracuse, a move emulated in other Greek cities.<sup>222</sup> In the normal course of life, then, Carthaginian traders could be expected to visit Greek cities; the episode also highlights the importance of sea-traffic in this internal trade.<sup>223</sup> What is interesting about Dionysius' war preparations is that they also involved the attraction of Carthaginian craftsmen (or at least people from Carthaginian western Sicily) to Syracuse in order to manufacture his arms and ships.<sup>224</sup> The movements of traders and workmen need not have aligned just because of origin, language, or ethnicity; the aggression of a hostile tyrant did not preclude him from employing paid professionals belonging to the object of that aggression. For Dionysius the willingness of workmen to travel for work was an advantage, perhaps because he needed them for intermittent war preparations as opposed to continuous work; elsewhere in the Mediterranean the high mobility of workers was a marked disadvantage to those pursuing large and complex construction projects.<sup>225</sup>

Archaeological evidence likewise attests to a regular, if uneven, movement of traders in Sicily. Pots are not people, but they do not travel from place to place without people. While the exact mechanics of this motion cannot be specified, the presence in one location of goods or currency from another does require the distance to have been traversed by one or more individuals. The chain of possession might include a few individuals making relatively long journeys or many individuals making short journeys. The Attic fine pottery that is found as far west as Entella and as far inland as Morgantina must have traveled by such a mechanism.<sup>226</sup> Likewise Punic amphorae and ceramics from Carthage or western Sicily in the Greek cities, the Greek material in western Sicily, and those of both kinds found in the cities of the interior constitute evidence of this kind

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<sup>222</sup> D.S. 14.46.1-2. The clear implication here is that many Carthaginians actually had homes in Syracuse.

<sup>223</sup> That traffic was not always easy to control, as in the case of the Carthaginian merchant "Hannibal the Rhodian" who repeatedly ran the blockade of Lilybaion's harbor in the First Punic War (Polybius 1.46).

<sup>224</sup> D.S. 14.41.2-3. For the generally scarce presence of Carthaginians in the Aegean cf. Chandezon and Krings (2001).

<sup>225</sup> Thus Feyel (2006, pp. 336-40). Feyel notes a number of responses to this instability and mobility in the free labor force, including the use of contracts, slave labor, and wider recruitment of workers foreign to the polity in control of the sanctuary—this last recourse particularly interesting as the increased demand for foreign labor would promote even greater mobility and mixing of populations. See also Burford (1972, pp. 28-36) on the craftsman's place in the citizen community and (pp. 65-7) on the Mediterranean circulation of skilled craftsmen.

<sup>226</sup> Attic imports at Entella: De Cesare (1997). See also Di Stefano (1997) on the wider distribution of Attic pottery in western Sicily, with De Cesare (2003, p. 260): "tale legame [between western Sicilian and Campanian ceramic production and markets], riscontrato già nella diffusione di certi prodotti attici nel V sec. a.C., potrebbe chiarirsi, pensando...a flussi migratori che dovevano forse ricalcare le vie di diffusione ed i canali di smistamento dei prodotti dei loro antenati attici in area tirrenica." Attic pottery at Morgantina: Kenfield (1994, pp. 277-8).

of mobility.<sup>227</sup> Without belaboring the point, the wide distributions of both precious- and base-metal coins confirm that there were people carrying them across the island.<sup>228</sup> The dispersion of a city's products is so common in the Mediterranean that it is sometimes taken for granted; it was nonetheless the result of the movement of ancient individuals.

Mercenaries are a subset of mobile skilled workers, but since their labor was so much in demand and their unemployment so potentially dangerous, they attracted greater attention from ancient history writers, and they merit ours now. Indeed, Chapter Four is dedicated to the peculiar mobility of hired soldiers and armies. Here my concern is limited to assessing the constraints on that mobility, and to the connections between their service and others' mobility. One distinguishing feature of mercenary service from the late fifth century onward was the increased importation of mercenary soldiers from outside the island, primarily from mainland Greece and from southern Italy.<sup>229</sup> Once in Sicily these men had no established homes besides perhaps the military camp, and were thus constantly either moving or prepared to move.<sup>230</sup> Many of them abandoned this transient life, sometimes spectacularly as at Entella in 404 or Messana in 282, sometimes under the direction of a tyrant as at Katane in 403 or Leontinoi in 396, and sometimes more quietly as at Hippana (Montagna dei Cavalli) and perhaps Palike in the fourth century; they might have also filtered into the other cities of Sicily or joined the foundations discussed above.<sup>231</sup>

That mercenaries had some degree of freedom in choosing employers should be clear. One particularly instructive episode of this potential mobility or end of mobility is a Carthaginian treaty struck with the mercenary army of Agathokles in Libya in 307. The treaty offered a cash payment of 300 talents along with the choice of continued paid military service for Carthage or the city of Soloeis as a new home; most of the army took

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<sup>227</sup> To my knowledge no broad survey of such cross-island finds has been done, but individual excavation reports routinely mention non-native amphorae. See also e.g. Spanò Giammelaro et al. (2008) for the circulation of Punic material into indigenous hilltop centers but not their territories, presented as evidence of the centers' importance, and Vassallo (2008, p. 200) for the presence of Italiote and Siceliote fine pottery in the necropoleis of the northern coast.

<sup>228</sup> Caccamo Caltabiano et al. (2006) maps the distributions of Punic and Syracusan bronze coins from archaeological contexts and sporadic finds, showing a considerable presence of each over most of Sicily, though with a degree of respective exclusivity within each mint's 'home area.' A brief survey of precious metal coins in the hoards collected in Thompson et al. (1973), available for manipulation at [nomisma.org](http://nomisma.org), confirms this wide distribution.

<sup>229</sup> For Greek mercenaries see most recently Trundle (2004); for Italic mercenaries see Tagliamonte (1994).

<sup>230</sup> Their most immediate allegiance was to their commander, and by extension to their employer, though relations often broke down and mercenaries often switched sides or deserted completely. A military force without affective ties to any particular place or cause could travel where it wanted, though communal decision-making was not always straightforward, as with Xenophon's Ten Thousand, for which see Nussbaum (1967) and Hornblower (2004).

<sup>231</sup> For the takeover of Entella by a group of Campanian mercenaries discharged by Dionysius I see Lee (2000) with D.S. 14.9.8-9. Capture of Messana by ex-mercenaries of Agathokles: D.S. 21.18.1-3; Polybius 1.7.1-4. Dionysius I settled mercenaries at Katane (D.S. 14.15.3) and Leontinoi (D.S. 14.78.2-3) both in lieu of monetary compensation and for strategic reasons. For the identification of Montagna dei Cavalli as ancient Hippana and its population as (former) mercenaries, see Gandolfo (1997) and most recently Vassallo (2002). For mercenaries at Palike cf. Tagliamonte (1994, p. 148) and Pope (2006, pp. 154-155 and 232).

one of the options, but those who remained faithful to Agathokles' cause were killed.<sup>232</sup> These soldiers had a constricted choice, but it was nonetheless a choice, and the Carthaginian offer demonstrates nicely the felt equivalence between paying mercenaries and settling them on land. Agathokles himself had to settle a group of disaffected mercenaries at Segesta shortly thereafter in the same year (though it is not clear whether they had always been fighting for him or whether they had recently defected to him), apparently because he could not afford them.<sup>233</sup> It is interesting to note in this connection Dionysius' appeal of 396 that the Sikans leave their cities to fight with his army against the Carthaginians and his promise to reward them with richer lands at the conclusion.<sup>234</sup> His attempt to in effect enroll them as mercenaries was not successful and shows the bargaining power that potential soldiers could hold.

What we should imagine, then, is that as elsewhere in the Mediterranean a constant motion of shorter and longer journeys underlay the more dramatic instances of population movement. Indeed, as Horden and Purcell have shown, such mobility is necessary for the resources (including human labor) of an ecologically diverse region to be exploited.<sup>235</sup> While we have no reason to think that these resources were always or ever *fully* exploited, Sicily is certainly diverse enough to have encouraged redistribution. Wheat and barley were undoubtedly the main subsistence and cash crops, but Akragas supposedly became rich from growing olives, wine was not exclusively imported from abroad, and fish and eels could be gathered from the sea.<sup>236</sup> And of course Sicilians imported goods as well, which required not only a merchant's journey to the island but also some amount of internal travel as well.<sup>237</sup> Thus on ecological grounds we can assume a baseline Mediterranean mobility even if we cannot meaningfully assess its scope or scale. Besides these considerations, on social grounds too McKechnie has shown that the circulation of soldiers, merchants, doctors, teachers, and other

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<sup>232</sup> D.S. 20.69.3-5.

<sup>233</sup> D.S. 20.71.1-5. Consolo Langher (2000, p. 243) concurs that that the original population was effectively replaced: "Fu una vera e propria rifondazione..." Segesta's relationship with Rome as negotiated in the First Punic War would become quite interesting if this was the case—see Prag (2010a, pp. 186-9) on the surrender of Segesta to Rome in 263 and the probable kinship appeal, based on an Elymian connection to Aeneas, that accompanied it.

<sup>234</sup> D.S. 14.55.6-7. Giuliani (1995, p. 113) discounts this "tiepida risposta" that makes Dionysius look bad as due to the bias of Timaios.

<sup>235</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 377): "The other variable is human labour, and that, as we have seen, moves in and out of microregions – indeed must do so if redistribution is to take place;" (p. 384): "The underlying motor of Mediterranean movements was, after all, the temporary or perennial maldistribution of the full range of resources on which life depends."

<sup>236</sup> Sicily was already exporting grain in the late 6<sup>th</sup> century: Seratti (2006, p. 118) with Livy 2.9.6, 34.2-5. Akragas' olive wealth: D.S. 13.81.4-5. Sicilian wine: Van Der Mersch (1996). Petrographic analysis confirming local amphora production at Motya, Lilybaion, Soloeis, and Panormos: Bechtold (2012). Fish and fish products: mercenaries passing time fishing for eels outside Syracuse in Plutarch, *Timoleon* 20.2; La Rocca (2004) on archaeological evidence for the production of *garum* on the Isola delle Femmine, just off the northern coast of Sicily. A much more experienced scholar of the Sicilian agricultural economy advises that "we must imagine a wide range of agricultural products in the island, even though it remains difficult to speak of the agricultural history of any one city-state in any sort of depth": De Angelis (2000, p. 112 fn. 6).

<sup>237</sup> E.g., Bechtold's excellent study of North African and Italian amphorae and black glaze ware, Bechtold (2007), demonstrates a robust importing trade in western Sicily. The presence of Punic, Western Greek and (from the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century on) Rhodian amphorae found in excavations throughout inland Sicily attests to the itineraries of the goods inside (wine, oil, or other products) after arrival on the island.

professionals not only at a local scale but also over long distances was a normal part of Mediterranean life.<sup>238</sup> The mobility of doctors may be paradigmatic of the many rhythms of human movement: they traveled shorter or longer distances, and stayed various lengths of time in each city.<sup>239</sup> In addition to these, the distinctive (though not unique) mobile employees in Sicily were mercenaries, on the road for longer and shorter periods of time but always a potential threat to settled communities.

## **b. The long term: migration for economic opportunity**

In contrast to the regular and temporary movements of people for the purposes of redistribution or employment (or both), some individuals and groups relocated voluntarily with the intent of remaining there permanently. Indeed, one of the reasons Diodorus gives for Dionysius' first contemplation of war with Carthage after 400 was the fact that he saw "some of the Greeks deserting to the Carthaginian dominion, taking with them their cities and possessions" and he feared that this would become an even greater trend.<sup>240</sup> The language is ambiguous as to whether or not the desertion was physical but for the purposes of this discussion I take it to be so—literal not figurative. It is not specified what the cause of the flight to Carthaginian territory was, but some combination of better political or economic conditions can be assumed. Similar considerations seem to have motivated the thousands of Greeks from the eastern Mediterranean who took up Timoleon's invitation to settle in Sicily, even if their specific destinations on the island were apparently not their decision.<sup>241</sup> Nor should we forget that Timoleon also promised Syracusan citizenship to those people (presumably Greeks) willing to leave Carthaginian territory.<sup>242</sup> Both Dionysius I and Timoleon were concerned to maintain an abundance of population, and perhaps to deny this advantage to the Carthaginians. Carthaginian craftsmen, or Sicilians familiar with Carthaginian religious practices, may have been resident as far east as Kamarina and Morgantina.<sup>243</sup>

There may be further indirect evidence for voluntary permanent relocation in the growth and decline of cities. The desolation and depopulation of eastern Sicily in the years before Timoleon's arrival may very well have been due to the collective decisions of the inhabitants of those cities, including Syracuse, to abandon them either for political reasons (i.e. the unstable years under Dionysius II, Dion, and many local tyrants) or for related economic ones. It is of course impossible to say that these cities lost population due to abandonment rather than death, or indeed simply a lack of sustaining immigration from elsewhere, but at least some of the depopulation should

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<sup>238</sup> McKechnie (1989, pp. 79-100 and 142-203).

<sup>239</sup> Samama (2003, pp. 25-6). Despite this statement of doctors' mobility, Samama's discussion of their participation in civic life (pp. 59-79) does not take their mobility into account. She seems to have forgotten the traveling doctors when she writes (p. 59): "Le médecin, comme tous les citoyens ou résidents du monde grec, se trouve intégré dans une communauté civique ou politique."

<sup>240</sup> D.S. 14.41.1-3.

<sup>241</sup> See Smarczyk (2003) on Syracuse specifically; see also Consolo Langher (1997, pp. 178-190) on Timoleon's goals, all of which involved the transfer of populations once in Sicily.

<sup>242</sup> D.S. 16.82 and 19.2.8 for the conferral of Syracusan citizenship on these immigrants.

<sup>243</sup> Loomweights (one truncopyramidal and four disc-shaped) with the sign of the Punic goddess Tanit have been found in third-century shops/workshops at Scornavacche near Camarina, though Di Stefano (2008) doubts that the users of these objects understood their religious significance. For a gaming die from Morgantina with the Tanit symbol see Bell (2000).

have come from people leaving. A plausible destination is western Sicily, although of course in the absence of absolute population counts this cannot be confirmed.<sup>244</sup> On the other hand, the growth of cities, particularly new foundations as discussed above, also required voluntary decisions to immigrate.<sup>245</sup> This was made explicit in Diodorus' account of Tyndaris' early years and is implicit in his discussion of Halaisa's rise to economic superiority over its metropolis Herbita.<sup>246</sup> Lilybaion could not have filled its impressively walled city with inhabitants unless many more people joined the surviving Motyans (ransomed or redeemed from slavery) there. Likewise cities with long histories could accumulate massive populations most easily through such immigration. Akragas at its height in 406 had 180,000 non-citizens, according to Diodorus.<sup>247</sup> Syracuse always had a large non-citizen population (including slaves) to enfranchise or exploit if necessary; other cities too will have wanted to attract potential relocators as well (in addition to retaining their own populations), as Oliver has suggested.<sup>248</sup>

### iii. Null cases?

Any comprehensive study of mobility must address stability as well. When mobile or stable populations had choices about their movement, what did they choose? There were many reasons for a community as a whole to remain in place: ancestral homes and tombs, temples, families, occupations, identities, etc. Yet the stable citizen-community was not a haven for all its inhabitants, and as Horden and Purcell have pointed out, mobility could offer an escape from constrictive social or economic realities at home.<sup>249</sup> That whole communities did not tend to pick up and leave should not surprise us, since their decision-making bodies must always have been dominated by the people with the most invested there (both economically and emotionally); they will not have wanted to abandon their effort and capital. We therefore have no instances of a community deciding to uproot itself, though as I have suggested individuals certainly did embrace the uncertainty of mobility, whether at a local scale or across further distances. And we have many instances of groups attempting to return to their homes.<sup>250</sup> Beyond this, the

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<sup>244</sup> For an excellent and concise summary of survey work in western Sicily see Blake and Schon (2010, p. 56) with references, supporting an agnostic view of absolute population figures.

<sup>245</sup> Scheidel (2004, pp. 15-16): "...there is now broad agreement that large pre-twentieth-century cities often experienced a structural deficit of deaths over births and resultant natural decrease that had to be compensated for by inward migration from the countryside." Of course a city's territory was not the only source of immigrants.

<sup>246</sup> On Halaisa, D.S. 14.16.3: "the city made great progress both because of maritime commerce and because of the tax immunity granted by the Romans." On Tyndaris, D.S. 14.78.5-6: "conducting civic life with goodwill toward one another, and enrolling many as citizens, they quickly became more than five thousand."

<sup>247</sup> 200,000 inhabitants minus 20,000 citizens: D.S. 13.84.3.

<sup>248</sup> Oliver (2011, pp. 358-362).

<sup>249</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 384), stressing the potential difficulties of remaining in place, acknowledging (p. 386) the participation of their "mobile types" in pre-existing networks of relationships: "Indeed their travelling reinforces, extends, diversifies the networks of reciprocity and the structures of self-definition, and furthers the cultural, intellectual and social homogeneities which have been so prominent a part of the history of the Mediterranean."

<sup>250</sup> Notably the Greek inhabitants of Selinous after it was captured by the Carthaginians in 409, many of whom must have returned, to judge from archaeological remains, e.g. the Greek-inflected document stamps studied by De Simone (2008) and the votive practices discussed by Sfameni Gasparro (2008) in the fourth century.

unemployed mercenaries' habit of abandoning the market for their services and settling in cities (emptied of many of their former citizens) has been highlighted as evidence for the universal appeal of settled citizen life.<sup>251</sup> While there is certainly an aspect of truth in that idea, the fact is that individuals and small groups were clearly much happier to be mobile than larger groups were. Even in the case of mercenaries, as I show in Chapter Four, dramatic episodes of violent occupations have unjustly overshadowed the continuing recruitment and service of new mercenaries, who of course continued to travel for work.

On any quantitative analysis (i.e. counting the years in which a community moved or was moved against the years in which it did not), I acknowledge that populations tended to remain in place rather than to disperse, and in this sense most communities at most times were null cases. I do not mean to dismiss the attraction of Greek polis life, which was a desideratum for many in LCEH Sicily. Property passed down through family lines, familiar gods, familiar jobs and politics, a history in a place, were all good things. But mobility in and of itself was not necessarily a bad thing: mobility either short or long term might be the only chance for survival (inhabitants of cities under attack), prosperity (inhabitants of poor cities or poor inhabitants of wealthy cities), or a homecoming (communities scattered but with a chance to reunite). While few wanted to be on the road forever, many at least temporarily embraced the possibilities of an unsettled life.

Yet such a quantitative analysis would still encounter the problem of agency. Was picking up and leaving truly an option at every instance (whether counting by years, or any other arbitrary measure), and how would we make such a determination? Perhaps the bias of the historical record toward discrete and completed events has destroyed evidence of movement that was potential, planned, or debated but ultimately not executed. Against such a silence of the evidence, we simply cannot decide for our ancient populations that one year would have been a good one in which to leave, but not another year; without that ability, we can make no quantitative judgment about actual mobility vs. potential mobility. The fact that movement occurred in nearly every case for which we have signs of opportune conditions (for the populations themselves or the powers that moved them), suggests that while stability was desired, under certain circumstances it was preferable to embrace mobility.

#### **iv. Contingent decisions of diaspora communities**

Diaspora communities in LCEH Sicily offer a particularly good illustration of voluntary contingent decision-making about movement, which was practiced not just by groups in exile but by all population groups and individuals. The diaspora situation simply brings the process into higher relief than under normal circumstances since the physical location of a diaspora community is so much more an issue than for a settled community. In fact, besides the communities defecting to Carthaginian territory around 400, the only mode of voluntary mobility for entire population groups is the relocation or return of dispersed populations. The Gelooi and Kamarinaioi who were evacuated to Syracuse in 406, for example, apparently made their own decision to withdraw to

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<sup>251</sup> See e.g. Moggi (2003, p. 980) on the universality of “l’aspirazione a disporre di una *polis* nella quale godere di uno statuto di *politai* di pieno diritto.”

Leontinoi.<sup>252</sup> The Naxioi and Katanaioi taken in by the Rhegians and settled (at least temporarily) at Mylai in 394 may have sought out Rhegion more on individual initiative than as a collective decision, but the lack of an effective central decision-making body in a diaspora community should not surprise us.<sup>253</sup> A century and a half later the Entellinoi ejected from their city seem to have faced a number of different challenges in returning, and while the Entella Tablets themselves attest to functional *polis* infrastructure in the reassembled group, this does not mean that the *boule* or the *halia* were in operation when they were scattered across western central Sicily.<sup>254</sup> The Naxioi eventually returned to nearby Tauromenion, we must assume willingly, under the direction of Andromachos in the 350s, and the “old citizens” of Gela who resettled there under Gorgos in the 330s were probably not forced at spear-point onto the ships.<sup>255</sup>

The decision to return home might seem a natural one, but not all scattered communities attempted to return or succeeded in doing so. A number of circumstances might encourage a diaspora community to return home (poor hosts, political pressure, opportunity) or discourage them from doing so (good hosts, political pressure, lack of opportunity). Since we generally do not know these details about the circumstances of diaspora communities, it is difficult to establish to what extent they affected the decisions ultimately taken. Nevertheless since these groups responded more subtly to social, economic, and political constraints than was possible for the populations forced to move as discussed above, they belong further toward free on a spectrum of coercion.<sup>256</sup> The Gelooi and Kamarinaioi who returned home after the treaty of 405 may have done so on the basis of Dionysius’ treaty with the Carthaginians, but they were not allowed a decision about the initial evacuation.<sup>257</sup> Andromachos’ Naxioi may have followed him because of incentives but they were faced with a choice; Dionysius had not pressured them into slavery two generations earlier but simply enslaved them.

### C. Agency, population flows, migration theory

Although it is difficult to accurately assess agency for most of the modes of mobility discussed above as well as non-mobility, it is nevertheless possible to trace in some cases and infer in others the connections between places that encouraged movement. Some of these channels will have been created gradually through the action of individuals, but many were cut dramatically by more coerced movements of one kind or another. An example of the first are the Greeks fleeing Dionysius’ realm for greener pastures under Carthaginian rule: it is unlikely that they simply wandered west in search of homes but rather ought to have chosen destinations based on prior experience

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<sup>252</sup> Evacuation to Syracuse: D.S. 13.111.1-3. Withdrawal to Leontinoi: D.S. 13.113.4. The move was perhaps a compromise with Dionysius between remaining at Syracuse and leaving Syracusan hegemony altogether.

<sup>253</sup> D.S. 14.87.1.

<sup>254</sup> *SEG XXX* 1117-1123 with Ampolo and Parra (2001).

<sup>255</sup> Andromachos: D.S. 16.7.1. Gorgos and the ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται: Plutarch, *Timoleon* 35.2.

<sup>256</sup> A spectrum of ‘human redistribution’ with directed transfer at one end and free movement at the other is really a variant or derivative of that employed by Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 376) for redistribution in general.

<sup>257</sup> Treaty at D.S. 13.114.1; the inhabitants of Selinous, Akragas, and Himera were also allowed to return to their homes, and all were obliged to pay tribute to the Carthaginians. It is entirely possible that some chose not to return under such conditions, remaining at Leontinoi or fleeing even further afield.

with neighboring communities, trading partners, and their understanding of the environment. Examples of the latter abound, and include the evacuation routes between Selinous, Himera, Akragas, Gela, Kamarina, Messana, and Syracuse, the deportation and enslavement routes to Syracuse, and the itinerary between metropolis and colony—Herbita and Halaisa, for instance.

Recent studies of both ancient and modern mobility have demonstrated the importance of prior connections, including previous forced movement, for mobile populations and individuals. In an assessment of Hellenistic war mobility Chaniotis concludes that personal relationships were key in directing refugees to new destinations.<sup>258</sup> Mackil likewise argues that inter-polis connections provided the safety net for what she calls “wandering cities.”<sup>259</sup> Finally, Feyel notes that the temporary displacement of laborers on the construction projects of large Greek sanctuaries sometimes shaded into longer-term stays.<sup>260</sup> It is clear that such relationships and connections depended on pre-existing movement among the populations involved; the action of ‘normal’ Mediterranean mobility, whether for economic, religious, or other purposes, shaped the perceptions of ancient individuals about potential future mobility—perceptions that could be acted upon at any time though perhaps most likely in a crisis. Likewise the destruction of a city and the removal of its population created a vacuum in its territory that generated new movement. Nowhere is this more evident than on the north coast of Sicily, where after the destruction of Himera in 409 a radically new urban landscape developed from the movement of populations into and within the area.<sup>261</sup>

I have been gesturing at a riverine metaphor throughout this chapter, one that does not completely explain or untangle the relationships between different modes of mobility but rather asserts in the first place that they are related. In other disciplines with a greater abundance and resolution of data, it is possible to conduct a rigorous path analysis showing exactly what the causes and consequences of each contingent development were.<sup>262</sup> Such an analysis is generally not available to the student of ancient Sicily, yet we are not therefore condemned to live with the canonical weak statement of path dependence, that “history matters.”<sup>263</sup> Although we do not have the data to fully model Sicilian population movements, some of the processes involved in path dependence (“increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks, and lock-in”) operated on those movements as well.<sup>264</sup> The concept of path dependence is particularly useful in that it suggests these mechanisms by which significant events and processes reshape the universe of possibilities, a major contribution toward addressing

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<sup>258</sup> Chaniotis (2004a), which along the way asserts a contingency to Hellenistic war mobility—among the characteristics he lists is the fact that (p. 483): “it is not certain whether it will be temporary or permanent”—that ought to be accorded to all mobile and stable populations.

<sup>259</sup> Mackil (2004, p. 508): “An alternative to catastrophe was provided by the cultivation and maintenance of social and political relationships with other poleis, and by the willingness of populations to move, whether en masse, in small groups, or individually...”

<sup>260</sup> Feyel (2006, p. 355).

<sup>261</sup> Himera itself was not occupied as before: Adriani (1970, p. 6); nor was its necropolis used: Fabbri et al. (2006, p. 613). Foundations of Thermai (D.S. 13.79.8) and Kephalaoidion in the former territory of Himera accompanied by a reduction in total site numbers there: Vassallo (2008, pp. 196-8).

<sup>262</sup> E.g. the rigorous method advocated by Mahoney (2000) or the more intuitive version of Page (2006).

<sup>263</sup> This weak statement is lambasted by Mahoney (2000, p. 507); see also Page (2006, p. 87).

<sup>264</sup> Page (2006, p. 88).

questions whose answers are not obvious in the sources available to us. The evacuation of the Gelooi to Leontinoi, for example, must have generated, through the production of a refugee community there, the increasing returns and positive feedback that would encourage other Gelooi in trouble to follow the same path. On the other hand pre-existing networks of slave dealing must have conditioned, through established relationships and routines, where the inhabitants of enslaved cities ended up when they were sold.

This logic is not limited to the ancient Mediterranean, and scholars of contemporary human mobility have more fully investigated the causes and effects of voluntary and involuntary movement. A recent handbook on modern international migration stresses the power of previous itineraries to inform the destinations of new refugees and migrants from the same community.<sup>265</sup> Further, though unsurprisingly, it has been argued that more voluntary relocation such as tourism and other so-called “lifestyle migration,” is not random but follows and shapes other kinds of movement.<sup>266</sup> When the forced population movements of the LCEH period in Sicily were so massive and traumatic, it would be surprising if they did not create or affect the relationships that condition more voluntary forms of mobility.

This insight, that different modes of mobility affect each other, is one valuable contribution of modern migration studies; the second is their increasingly careful treatment of agency.<sup>267</sup> Elizabeth Fussell outlines a particularly useful approach, noting first of all that “[t]he widely accepted voluntary-involuntary dichotomy obscures the range of social structures that facilitate or constrain migration and ignores the precipitating events or conditions that propel migrants.”<sup>268</sup> She proposes instead a “Continuum of Migratory Volition” with one end representing *total volition*, a *proactive* engagement with *conditions* and the other end representing *no volition*, a *reactive* management of *events*.<sup>269</sup> While the event-focused historiography of the ancient Mediterranean may omit conditions perceived by ancient groups, Fussell’s nuanced framework encourages us to assess the agency of our subjects and to recognize that they always faced a choice (even if the alternatives were horrific). Sometimes Sicilian populations took proactive steps to move but generally they reacted to movement imposed on them by militarily superior powers; only once they were already in motion were they normally able to choose where they would go.

Mobility and citizenship are bound up with one another in the scholarly discourse on modern migration as well as the public discourse. In any community the arrival and departure of individuals may have significant effects on the nature of that community: in Michael Walzer’s words “admission and exclusion are at the core of communal

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<sup>265</sup> O’Reilly (2011, p. 146): “Where a forced migrant ‘chooses’ to escape to will often be affected by prior links established through other types of movement.”

<sup>266</sup> O’Reilly (2011, pp. 66-84).

<sup>267</sup> Scholars of Iron Age Mediterranean colonization have of course appreciated the interrelation of different forms of mobility: Tsatskheladze (1994, pp. 113-5) on precolonial activity on the Black Sea; Popham (1994) on “precolonization” in the eastern Mediterranean; Osborne (1998, pp. 256-265) on a similar long history of contact in the West; Papadopoulos and Lord Smithson (2002, pp. 172-193) on resident aliens at Athens in the Geometric period. Of the bibliography on the complexity of cultural interaction in just the western Mediterranean see especially Dietler (2010), Hodos (2006), and van Dommelen and Knapp (2010)).

<sup>268</sup> Fussell (2012, p. 26).

<sup>269</sup> Fussell (2012, p. 40 fig. 2.3); italics on key words mine.

independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination.”<sup>270</sup> This is agency of a different kind—though of no less importance: individuals and communities were responsible for and competent to make decisions not only about their own mobility and group affiliations but also about the mobility and group affiliations of others. I will be exploring the relationship between mobility and citizenship throughout the dissertation but here I want only to register my endorsement of both mobile and stable communities as “fluid, situational, context-specific, and permeable.”<sup>271</sup> Additions and subtractions to a city’s population changed the nature of the collective; even the reintroduction of former residents, such as refugees and exiles, could be problematic.<sup>272</sup>

## Conclusions

A manifestation of these phenomena occurred at Entella in the middle of the third century. When the Entellinoι were driven from their city, some ended up in Enna and Assoro, others were captives in Segesta, and still others perhaps among Entella’s neighboring communities.<sup>273</sup> The refugees ejected from their city likely traveled at least partially based on previously existing relationships, as was certainly the case with Assoro, but what is interesting here is that when the Entellinoι were able to return home their response to their survival recognized and amplified the relationships that had facilitated mobility between the cities. They renewed and created relationships of *isopoliteia* that would allow residents of one city to take up citizenship in the other, they granted proxenies and seating privileges that would make visits to Entella more pleasant, and they extended invitations to their city’s games.

I argued in my M.A. thesis that the response of the newly-returned Entellinoι developed a diplomatic discourse in a network of friendly populations that would insure them against future disaster.<sup>274</sup> There I discussed alongside this diplomatic move the practical effects of the decrees and the interactions they were intended to foster, though I did not address the issue of mobility. While we cannot know the extent to which any of these privileges were activated, the dossier nonetheless documents a landscape of relationships forged in the wake of traumatic and coerced mobility. Archaeological investigation at Entella indicates that the middle of the third century BCE did mark a period of lower and humbler inhabitation on the site, but not an abandonment—the Entellinoι evidently succeeded in preventing another similar disaster.<sup>275</sup> The decrees show how at the official, public level a dramatic episode of population movement could

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<sup>270</sup> Walzer (1983, p. 62). See also Bauböck (2012).

<sup>271</sup> Werbner (2012, p. 216). This view finds strong support in Actor-Network Theory, for which see Latour (2005), in which social relationships require constant maintenance and community, being composed of such relationships, is a fragile construct that can be easily redefined, though of course within limitations.

<sup>272</sup> E.g. the return of the “old citizens” of Gela, discussed above, or the detailed provisions for contemporary reconciliations in Mytilene or Tegea: Rhodes & Osborne (2003) nos. 85 and 101 respectively.

<sup>273</sup> The Ennaioι are explicitly thanked for receiving the refugees (A2). Assoros is cited for its *isopoliteia* with Entella (C1) and the best explanation for this is that some of the refugees took up citizenship at Assoros after escaping. The assistance of the Egestaioι in freeing captive Entellinoι (A3) implies that the captives were probably at some point at Segesta. The neighboring communities, cited in A1 for providing grain for the resettlement, are simply the closest communities that could have hosted the refugees, though there is no concrete evidence for it.

<sup>274</sup> Souza (2009).

<sup>275</sup> Michelini (1992); Michelini (2003, pp. 948-9).

have consequences for future movement. Although most of our Sicilian populations have not left such evocative documentation, their movements too had not only causes but also effects. In the rest of the dissertation I explore those consequences of mobility for the ways in which communities were constituted and maintained.

### 3. Diasporas, exiles, and returns

ergo summotum patria proscindere, Livor,  
desine, neu cineres sparge, cruenta, meos.  
omnia perdidimus: tantummodo vita relictæ est,  
præbeat ut sensum materiamque mali.  
quid iuvat extinctos ferrum demittere in artus?  
Non habet in nobis iam nova plaga locum.  
(Ovid, *Epistulae ex Ponto* IV.16.47-52)

The exile knows that in a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional. Borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory, can also become prisons, and are often defended beyond reason or necessity. Exiles cross borders, break barriers of thought and experience. [Said (2000, p. 185)]

## Introduction

The frequency with which populations and parts of populations were ejected or exiled from their homes is distinctive in the demographic history of LCEH Sicily, though certainly not unique to it. As I suggested in Chapter Two, not only must such a significant form of mobility be explained, but its effects must also be investigated—not least its effects on other forms of mobility. In this chapter I will address the events leading to exile and diaspora in the first section, paying attention to the experience of dispersed communities and the social, economic, and political consequences for communities from whom a part is exiled. In the second section I discuss the diaspora situation and the maintenance of a community in exile. In the third section I focus on the reunion of dispersed populations and the return to their homes, again with special emphasis on how the community was reintegrated. I intend to show that all three stages of exile were disruptive to a community's integrity, whether that integrity was otherwise secure or at risk, and problematized both legal citizenship and the more abstract notion of belonging, an issue to which I will return in Chapter Seven.

The condition of exile throws into high relief the implicit connection between community and place, and between citizenship and political boundary, by severing those connections. It represents an extension or transportation of the community beyond its previous borders, and a new interface between communities. The question of the foreigner, however defined, in the Greek community has long been investigated, though the specific conditions of exile and diaspora less so.<sup>276</sup> What differentiates the expatriate and the exile? What does the exile share with the comrade who stayed put? These are questions that must be addressed by the populations involved, often in dynamic and variable ways, and cannot be comprehensively answered 2,000 years after the fact. The issue was recognized in antiquity, and it has been at the center of modern debates about culture and immigration.

The fullest exploration of citizenship and belonging in antiquity belongs to Aristotle. At the beginning of Book 3 of the *Politics*, he investigates the nature of

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<sup>276</sup> On foreigners in the ancient Mediterranean, see Whitehead (1984), McKechnie (1989) and the essays collected in Lonis (1988) and (1992). On exiles see recently Forsdyke (2005). Exiles play a pivotal role in each of the phenomena McKechnie identifies as notable aspects of the fourth century Greek world: settlement dynamics, mercenary service, piracy, mobile crafts and trades, and royal entourages.

citizenship, defined narrowly (and tautologically) as those who are allowed to perform (collectively) acts of the state. Even within this narrow definition, Aristotle admits that “not everyone will agree that someone is a citizen.”<sup>277</sup> After exploring a number of test cases, including children, the elderly, and those enfranchised in a revolution, he gets to the heart of the issue:

Similar to this question [of the validity of revolutionary enfranchisements] seems to be the topic of how it would be right to say at any time that a city was the same city, or not the same but another city. The most obvious inquiry into this question concerns the place and the people: for it is possible that the place and the people have been separated, and some have settled in one place and some in another.<sup>278</sup>

For Aristotle, this settles the matter: a citizen-body settled in two different places are no longer a single *polis* but two separate ones, and he goes on to ask how a stable or changing population in a single place could be considered to be the same *polis*.<sup>279</sup> Indeed, under normal circumstances, if part of a city’s population moved and settled elsewhere, as in colonies, emporia, and *katoikiai*, those who moved were no longer part of the original *polis*. Exile, whether of individuals or groups, was thus a particularly stark form of community definition.<sup>280</sup> However, several historical instances demonstrate how this logic failed at the margins.

In particular, communities of exiles continued to act as the legitimate representatives of their *poleis* in the fifth-century Aegean, and this could create an ambiguity about the *polis* itself. For example, after the Aiginetans were expelled from their island by the Athenians in 424 and settled in the Thyreatis, the Athenians began to call their own settlers on the island “Aiginetans” while at the same time the Spartans continued to call the refugees “Aiginetans.”<sup>281</sup> Later, in 411, a group of exiled Thasians was working with the Spartans to overthrow the pro-Athenian regime in their homeland—were they not still Thasians though expelled and living in exile?<sup>282</sup> In fact, while deciding whom to include and whom to exclude was a community’s right, a large group of exiles could be a dangerous thing. The Thirty at Athens recognized this and appear to have expelled former citizens from the city only, keeping them within Attica; concurrently the Spartans issued an edict forbidding any other cities from receiving

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<sup>277</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 1275a: οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην.

<sup>278</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 1276a.

<sup>279</sup> That discussion is obviously quite germane to the larger question in this dissertation about the nature of belonging in contexts of dynamic populations in cities, and will be discussed below in Chapter Seven.

<sup>280</sup> Forsdyke (2005, p. 7): “...exile events and their representation are a particularly powerful form of boundary, since the act of expulsion constitutes a concrete expression of group identity through the physical removal of what the community ‘is not.’” Recall the opinion of Walzer (1983, p. 62), quoted toward the end of Chapter Two, that “admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination.” Cf. also Gray (2011) on the unproblematic expulsion of non-citizens in the Greek world.

<sup>281</sup> Piérart (1995, p. 259): “Thucydides, conforming to Athenian usage, but also undoubtedly with a view to respecting a state of fact, reserves the term *Aiginetans* for the Athenian colonists installed on Aigina. But this did clearly did not prevent the Lacedaimonians from continuing to call Aiginetans the inhabitants of the island whom they had gathered in Thyreatis, or those who had fled elsewhere until Lysander resettled them with themselves.”

<sup>282</sup> Thuc. 8.64.3-4.

Athenian exiles.<sup>283</sup> Of course, revolution was a trauma for any city that experienced it: traumatic for individuals because of the threat of violence or injury, and traumatic for the collective at least in part because of confusion as to exactly how far the citizen-group boundary extended.

On the other hand, populations that were in exile because their cities were destroyed also laid claim to be the original *polis*. Plataians brought to Athens between 431 and 427 gained Athenian citizenship but also retained an identity as Plataians; there was no rival group claiming that title, but there was a dislocation between the 400 soldiers and 110 women in Plataia proper, and those residing in Athens.<sup>284</sup> Though the specifics are debated, it is clear that until the citizenship grant of 428 and perhaps even after it, the exact status of the Plataians in Athens was unclear. Complicating matters further was the Athenian grant of Skione to the Plataians, though again it is unclear which and how many of them actually went there.<sup>285</sup> The Plataian citizen-body was not a clearly-defined group, and was not confined to a single area in its exile. Yet we know from Lysias that at least those in Athens had communal meetings each month, and from Thucydides that they served in separate military units in the Athenian army, and everything about their precarious position points to an attempt to maintain an identity as Plataians.<sup>286</sup> At the very least, the community did not pursue a future in diaspora but worked against dispersal and assimilation.

In fact, enough Plataians were able to return to Plataia that they could once again constitute a functioning *polis*. This resettlement lasted only until 373 when the city was once again destroyed by the Thebans and its population was forced to once again save itself by gaining Athenian protection and citizen rights.<sup>287</sup> They were resettled by Philip, and participated with Alexander in the destruction of Thebes.<sup>288</sup> Thereafter the city became the focal point of the Hellenic Koinon, but it is worth noting that twice the *polis* was so seriously threatened (the city was completely razed in 427) that the population had to accept citizen rights elsewhere in order to survive. In the face of existential danger the only way a community could possibly hope to endure was to scatter and hope for a later reunion. While our understanding of the post-373 Plataian community is less detailed than that of their first exile, it can hardly have been a smooth transition, and indeed the existence of Isocrates' speech, whatever liberties it took with the facts, implies that they did have to renegotiate their status with the Athenians.

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<sup>283</sup> Spartan edict: Din. 1.25; D.S. 14.6.1; Justin 5.9.4; Lysias 12.95; Plutarch, *Lysias* 27.2-4. Forsdyke (2005, pp. 198-199) summarizes: "...the Thirty did not intend to create a large group of exiles beyond the borders of Attica..."

<sup>284</sup> Thuc. 2.2.1; for the defenders of Plataia cf. Thuc. 2.78.3. Cf. Osborne (1981-83) D1 with Hammond (1992 pp. 146-147), according to whom only the 212 Plataians who escaped the siege were enfranchised. Kapparis (1995, pp. 375-377) unreservedly rejects this distinction.

<sup>285</sup> Thuc. 5.32.1. Hammond (1992, p. 146) believes that only some of the Plataians left for Skione, while Kapparis (1995 p. 376) believes that most of them did. Hammond also asserts that the slaves liberated after Arginousai in 405 were given not Athenian but Plataian citizenship, which Kapparis expressly denies.

<sup>286</sup> Lysias 23.6; Thuc. 4.67.1-2. Cf. Kapparis (1995, p. 377): "The Plataeans' reluctance to accept integration into the institutions of their fellow Boeotians is one of the most notable examples of a small Greek city very proud of its independence and separate identity."

<sup>287</sup> Theban destruction: D.S. 15.46.6; Xen. Hell. 6.3.1-3. Athenian protection: Isocrates, *Plataikos*. cf. D.S. 15.46.6.

<sup>288</sup> Resettlement: Dem. 19.112 [seems to argue that Philip did not resettle Plataia]; destruction of Thebes: D.S. 17.13.5, Arrian *An.* 1.8.8 cf. Justin 11.3.8.

Similarly, Olynthians and Corinthians continued to self-identify as members of those groups after those cities were destroyed in 348 and 146, respectively.<sup>289</sup> While we do not have explicit evidence of identity conflict in those diaspora populations, they must have somehow negotiated their affiliations with destroyed city and host cities, and the experience of the Plataians must lead us to imagine similar fragmentations of once-unified citizen bodies. I will have more to say on Plataians, Olynthians, and Corinthians below; here I note simply that they constitute cases against which to test Aristotle's belief that relocation generated a new *polis*. Olynthus never again constituted an urban community, but both Plataia and Corinth did: to what extent were they the same Plataia and Corinth that had existed previously? Even if the individuals living in those cities were largely the same ones as before, at least in Plataia it is clear that they thought of themselves differently, to judge from Heracleides Criticus' claim (early third century) that the Plataians were calling themselves "Athenian Boiotians."<sup>290</sup> Aristotle is certainly correct to say that a *polis*, once relocated, can never be the same as it was; in reassembling and reconstructing an exile or refugee community there will always be innovations to social forms. Displacement was an experience that had indelible effects on the populations affected.

Modern scholarship on refugees and diaspora communities points in the same direction. Tension between cohesion of the diaspora community and assimilation in the host community is hardly surprising, but recent studies emphasize both the diverse experiences of groups pulled in several directions as well as the difficulties caused by discontinuous and diffuse concentrations of citizens. What seems to be a universal in such cases is the particularly fraught assumption of various identities by diaspora groups within a host community.<sup>291</sup> For exiles out of their 'home' territory, the shifting and contextual affiliation with several possible groups assumes a greater importance than for long-settled residents.<sup>292</sup> While these modern studies focus largely on national identities and global mobility, they illuminate the dynamics of group affiliations of all kinds, and as I noted in Chapter Two, group cohesion and boundary maintenance is especially at issue in mobile and diaspora communities. To be sure, much scholarly attention to international migration is aimed at building frameworks of economic performance and typologies of refugee movement that are specific to the modern world.<sup>293</sup> Still, conflicting loyalties, painful memories, and difficult cultural choices are likely to have characterized diaspora communities in the past as well, even though nobody was recording the experience.

I have already mentioned some Greek Mediterranean precedents and comparanda for the situation in LCEH Sicily, but I should also note that there are Near Eastern precedents as well. The Assyrians in particular were unusually willing to

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<sup>289</sup> Cf. Millis (2010) for Corinthians, with citations for Olynthians.

<sup>290</sup> *Brill's New Jacoby* 369A fr. 1.11. Mackil (2013, pp. 226-232) discusses Theban appropriation of the Plataian festival of the Daidala (which involved a procession through Plataian territory, among other things) after 427 and again after 373. When the Thebans and other Boeotians were celebrating a local Plataian festival, what did that leave for the Plataians in exile?

<sup>291</sup> Analyses: Rosenau (2004), Choudhry (2010); case studies: e.g. Burns (1999) on Mayan diaspora, Ní Laoire et al. (2011) on various groups in Ireland.

<sup>292</sup> Cf. Pratt Ewing (2004); Fumanti (2010) on the struggles of the Ghanaian Methodist community in London to maintain local connections and Ghanaian ones through "virtuous citizenship"—a key point is the role of religion in mediating conflict between national affiliations.

<sup>293</sup> See e.g. Kunz (1973) and (1981) for such typologies.

relocate entire populations, and while the exact dynamics of diaspora and host community are not known, on theoretical grounds we might expect tension between those who were moved and those who did not.<sup>294</sup> Instead, Oded remarks that in Assyrian deportations, mostly under Tiglath-pileser III, Sargon II, and Sennacherib, “the communal organization of the deportees in exile, even in its contracted form” helped keep dispersed communities happy and loyal, and Oded strikingly compares them to garrisons or colonies of Assyrian nationals.<sup>295</sup> While one may or may not agree that a dearth of revolts in the historical record suggests loyal populations, it is impossible to suppose that the relocations did not disrupt the societies affected. On the other hand, the Achaemenids do not seem to have made major interventions in subject populations or initiated large-scale population transfers outside of their heartland.<sup>296</sup> Again, a lack of evidence for conflict does not mean that there was none. I cite these examples not in order to claim that deportations could be carried out without social consequences, but to show that populations in exile were not new to the wider Mediterranean world. To the extent that empires needed to rearrange the demographic landscape, diaspora groups can be seen as a product of empire, though they could also emerge in other ways. A community could often survive exile or transfer, but whether it remained in a new location or returned and reunited, it was always a new and different community.<sup>297</sup>

## **A. Dispersing, expelling, exiling**

Departure from one’s community is a traumatic act, both for those departing and those remaining (if there are any). In Chapters One and Two we met many of the populations and individuals who were forcibly exiled or chose to go into exile in LCEH Sicily. In this section I examine in detail the circumstances in which these episodes occurred, with particular attention to the motivations of those doing the relocating and to the discontinuous communities produced. I differentiate principally between the evacuation of part or all of a city’s population (typically in response to the arrival of a hostile army), the ejection of a city’s population by a hostile power, and the ejection of part of a city’s population by the city itself (what we typically mean by the word “exile”). In each of these situations the agency of the actors must be assessed, and it often resists categorization as simply voluntary or involuntary. Yet all three types of event produced diaspora communities, whose experience I address in the next section.

In this tumultuous period of Sicilian history, populations evacuated or were evacuated from their homes, either partially or completely. These were particularly difficult relocations, undertaken for survival in the face of a military threat. However, as we will see, it is clear that the foreign power from whom they fled did not always want the population to leave. These instances of evacuation are valuable for my study because

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<sup>294</sup> Cf. Chapter Two section C

<sup>295</sup> Oded (1979, pp. 25, 46-7).

<sup>296</sup> Kuhrt (2001). The Achaemenid Cyrus was in fact responsible ca. 538 BCE for allowing the Jews scattered by the Babylonians to reassemble. The factional strife they engendered in the Aegean world did create exiles and refugees, though this was an indirect result of their imperial expansion and they would likely have been happy to govern consenting Greek cities without manipulating their populations.

<sup>297</sup> So, to name only one obvious example, the historical Diaspora of the Jewish population, including several large scale events over thousands of years, profoundly affected the nature of the Jewish community, cf. Gruen (2009) and Bedford (2002).

of what they reveal about the connection of communities to a particular place. The variable fates of the communities involved are instructive and will be addressed in the next section; what they share is the means by which diaspora communities were produced.

Without a doubt the most significant round of defensive evacuations occurred in the late fifth century when the cities of Selinous, Himera, Akragas, Gela and Kamarina came under threat from Carthaginian armies. These movements reverberated throughout Sicily, changing the social landscape and generating further mobility along the way. The destruction of Selinous in 409 was nearly total: besides 5,000 captives (mostly women, we are given to understand) whose further fate is not recorded, 2,600 Selinuntinoi escaped to Akragas.<sup>298</sup> These survivors were perhaps part of an organized flight from battle but at least in Diodorus's account there was no communal decision to send them away from the city. In an indication of the uncertainty of their situation, Ephesos granted citizenship to two trireme crews of Selinuntinoi, either because it was not yet clear that they would ever be able to return, or because they did not wish to return home.<sup>299</sup> Shortly thereafter at Himera, the decision to evacuate was not made by the Himeraioi but by Diokles the Syracusan commander and his admirals, who were afraid of a Carthaginian attack on Syracuse itself.<sup>300</sup> Half the population was loaded onto Syracusan triremes that took them to Messina, and of the other half some accompanied Diokles on his march back to Syracuse while some remained at Himera, eventually to be captured or slaughtered.<sup>301</sup> Whereas the Selinuntinoi had been offered the possibility of return almost immediately, the Himeraioi had to wait four years for an official resolution.

When the Carthaginians returned to Sicily in 406 they threatened Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina, and it was only the disease in their camp outside Syracuse that persuaded them to strike a deal and retreat. We saw in Chapter One how Syracusan generals were responsible for the evacuations of these cities as well. The large population of Akragas, normally an asset, became a serious liability and led to the city's abandonment when a grain shipment was intercepted. The Carthaginians besieged Gela the next year, by which time the Gelooi had become quite seriously dependent on the goodwill of Dionysius I. He had murdered the wealthiest Gelooi and confiscated their wealth in order to pay mercenaries to defend the city, but promised that he would return with Syracusan soldiers to aid the defense.<sup>302</sup> The city's women and children were helping to rebuild the walls after attacks, and the Geloans were managing to defend themselves fairly well.<sup>303</sup> The Geloan women also refused to leave the defense to the men by evacuating, though when Dionysius ordered a total evacuation they complied,

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<sup>298</sup> D.S. 13.57.1-58.3. The 2,600 were almost immediately allowed to return to Selinous as tributaries of Carthage (13.59.3), but it is far from clear that all of the refugees will have taken up Hannibal's offer.

<sup>299</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.2.10. Archaeological evidence for 409 destruction at Selinous and reoccupation: Mertens (1997) and (2003).

<sup>300</sup> D.S. 13.61.1-6.

<sup>301</sup> Diokles will presumably have taken the inland route up the Himera River, down into the plain of Catania, and down the coast to Syracuse, so either the Himeraioi with him went all the way to Syracuse or they split off at some point (once in the plain of Catania, perhaps) and met their compatriots in Messina.

<sup>302</sup> D.S. 13.93.1-5.

<sup>303</sup> D.S. 13.108.8-9. Cf. Loman (2004a) on female participation in siege warfare.

and Dionysius ordered the Kamarinaioi out of their city along the way.<sup>304</sup> Thus the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi were similarly compelled to evacuate due to the failure of (Syracusan) siege-relief efforts. They ended up at Syracuse but quickly left for Leontinoi, “being in disagreement with Dionysius,” along with the Akragantinoi.<sup>305</sup> The nature of the community at Leontinoi itself is, in turn, quite convoluted and will be addressed in the next section.

According to the treaty recorded by Diodorus (13.114.1), all of these evacuated populations were allowed to return to their cities if they agreed to pay tribute to the Carthaginians. Yet, as I have suggested earlier in Chapter One, we should not be overeager to send all of these refugee populations back to their homes. Undoubtedly, some will have returned. Archaeological evidence from Selinous and Gela confirms that occupation continued, albeit at lower intensity, in both urban centers and in at least the territory of Gela; the case of Himera is more complicated since the new Carthaginian foundation of Therma seems to have replaced Himera as the occupied settlement in that territory.<sup>306</sup> However, there are good reasons to believe that many remained exiles after 405, or integrated themselves into host communities. The first, though perhaps weakest, is a distaste for living as subjects to Carthage. The second is the destruction or loss of the property and capital necessary for life: many refugees would not have had homes to which to return, or the equipment and cash necessary to begin farming again, or the workshops necessary for craft production. Finally, the conditions of exile may not always have been prohibitive, as we have seen in the case of the Selinuntinoi hosted in Akragas, and the Ephesian treatment of the Selinuntine trireme crews. Many Himeraioi, in particular, remained on the move, as we will see in the next section.

I want to mention two additional defensive evacuations, one from a little later in Dionysius’ career and one from the First Punic War. We have already seen that in 403, Dionysius had gained control of Katane, enslaved the population, and given the city to his Campanian mercenaries to inhabit. In 396, as he organized the east coast of Sicily to fight the Carthaginians who had just destroyed Messina, he relocated the Campanians to Aitna-Inessa, “because of its being an exceptionally strong outpost.”<sup>307</sup> In the subsequent military operations Katane appears mainly as an anchorage for ships, usually an empty one; Dionysius seems to have yielded the low-lying and difficult-to-defend port city to the Carthaginians in a move reminiscent of those made on the southern coast. This episode does not usually arise in discussions of Dionysius’ population transfers, perhaps because the population was Campanian rather than Greek; Dionysius was not displacing a *polis* but reassigning mercenaries. A similar relocation occurred in 250, when the Carthaginians evacuated the inhabitants of Selinous to Lilybaion.<sup>308</sup> The Romans had been successfully driving Carthaginian forces west, and it was evidently deemed preferable to defend the impregnable Lilybaion than to attempt to hold Selinous. A combination of Greeks and Carthaginians had lived there, though the lack of historical attention and documentary production in antiquity makes

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<sup>304</sup> D.S. 13.108.6. D.S. 13.111.1-3. Dionysius seems not to have wanted to expend any resources at all on defending Kamarina. Another pathetic departure scene follows at 13.111.3-6.

<sup>305</sup> D.S. 13.113.4.

<sup>306</sup> Selinous: Mertens (1997) and (2003). Gela: Anello (1999 [2004]), Bergemann et al. (2010, pp. 146-160). Akragas: De Miro (1988). Himera: Vassallo (2008). Camarina: Di Stefano (1997-1998).

<sup>307</sup> D.S. 14.58.2.

<sup>308</sup> D.S. 24.1.1.

it difficult to ascertain the degree of their integration and the kind of community they had once at Lilybaion. Archaeological evidence offers little help.<sup>309</sup> It would be nice to know whether their arrival exacerbated the Greek-Punic ethnic divide (as ethnic Carthaginians enjoyed close relations with the Lilybaitai that the Greeks could not) or if a shared sense of trauma after 150 years of cohabitation had consolidated their identification as inhabitants of Selinous over and above these ethnic boundaries.

Thus far we have examined cases in which a city's population evacuated in order to avoid death or capture at the hands of a hostile army. The objective of those armies was to bring the population to submission in order to make them tributary subjects and gain their military resources; only failing this would they kill or enslave them. That objective required that the population not be entirely displaced, and indeed evacuation was a means for the otherwise powerless inhabitants of a besieged city to deny these resources to the enemy.<sup>310</sup> In Sicily, however, it was not the threatened population but another hegemonic power that made the decision to evacuate; rather than an autonomous action of self-preservation, these evacuations were moves made by various powers to assert control over human resources. Those who were evacuated went under the protection of an army whose leader or leaders thus gained a potentially valuable population, if they knew how to manage and exploit it.

Now we turn to the situations where the hostile army, having won control of a city, did not kill or capture the inhabitants, but scattered them. These forces were apparently not interested in maintaining a population on site, nor in killing or enslaving a subject population, but chose instead simply to scatter the former inhabitants of a city. What is remarkable about this choice is that in general, imperial powers tend to retain control over where the populations they displace go, either through the institution of slavery, through forced transfers, or through colonization or recruitment. In what follows we will see how certain populations were simply expelled from their homes and left to manage on their own terms.<sup>311</sup>

I highlight three instances of this phenomenon. The first concerns the Naxioi, defeated and enslaved by Dionysius in 403. I will discuss their experience of mass enslavement in greater detail in Chapter Five, but here suffice it to recall that in 394 some of them had been able to reunite at the call of the Rhegians, who placed them in Mylai along with the reunited Katanaioi.<sup>312</sup> The Rheginoi also attacked the Messanioi (really Medmaioi from southern Italy, settled there by Dionysius in 396), who came out victorious and promptly attacked and captured Mylai. No mention is made of the Katanaioi but the Naxioi were allowed (more likely compelled) to leave under truce: "These men then, departing for both the Sikels and the Greek cities, settled some in one place and others elsewhere."<sup>313</sup> The Messanioi, clearly acting on behalf of Dionysius,

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<sup>309</sup> Bechtold (1999), for example, finds no evidence in the necropolis that might distinguish the new arrivals from Selinous.

<sup>310</sup> One is reminded, distantly, of Croesus' response that once Cyrus had captured Sardis, his rampant troops were destroying Persian, not Lydian, property (Herodotus 1.88). Another way to foil the victor was to fight to the death in a losing cause.

<sup>311</sup> The potential danger of leaving them to their own devices may been seen by the fact that part of Magon's preparations for a counterattack on Syracuse in 393 was to take in "those made into enemies by Dionysius" (D.S. 14.90.3). What exactly this meant is unclear, but certainly it was advantageous to the Carthaginian cause.

<sup>312</sup> D.S. 14.87.1.

<sup>313</sup> D.S. 14.87.3.

effectively prevented the re-coalescence of a Naxian collective; it would be interesting to know whether Diodorus' silence about the Katanaioi means that they were allowed to remain in Mylai but obviously no conclusion can be made. Rather than killing or re-enslaving the Naxioi Dionysius and his proxies in Messana wanted them dispersed.

In that same year Dionysius made a failed attack on the Sikels in Tauromenion. This settlement had been founded in 396, with Carthaginian assistance, just uphill from the site of Naxos by the very Sikels whom Dionysius himself had placed in Naxian territory in 403. It seems that Carthaginian support was crucial to the viability of Tauromenion, since we learn that in 392 Dionysius struck a treaty with the Carthaginian general Magon that gave him control of the city.<sup>314</sup> Accordingly Dionysius, "having received Tauromenion, ejected the majority of the Sikels who were there and settled those of his own mercenaries whom he had chosen as most fitting." Again, rather than enslaving, killing, or imposing tribute on the city's inhabitants, he scattered them—perhaps driven by the necessity of compensating his mercenaries with an emptied city, on which see Chapter Four.

A third instance of wholesale ejection came in the First Punic War, when the inhabitants of Entella were expelled from their city, mentioned in previous chapters.<sup>315</sup> The episode is atypical in Sicily, in that it is recorded by epigraphic documentation and does not appear in the historical record; it is unique in having been recorded by the displaced community itself and not from the perspective of an imperial power. The Entellinoi describe their ejection in vague but suggestive terms: "we were driven from our own land and were wandering" (ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐξεπέτομες καὶ ἐπλανώμεθα, A2.10-11) and "we were being driven from our own land" (ἐξεπίπτομες ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας, A3.8-9). Whereas the people of Enna are honored in decree A2 for taking in the refugee Entellinoi, A3 honors the people of Segesta for redeeming Entellinoi taken prisoner—a useful reminder that in practice subject populations could experience multiple types of coerced mobility at the same time. The supervisory presence of a Roman *epimeletes* in decree B1 marks the Roman involvement in the eventual resettlement, which may in turn indicate that the Romans had ejected the Entellinoi in the first place.<sup>316</sup> On the other hand if Entella had aligned with Rome as had its neighbor Segesta, then it might have been a target of Carthaginian force and an object of Roman aid.<sup>317</sup> As noted at the end of Chapter Two, archaeological evidence from Entella attests a decline in prosperity but not a destruction. It is therefore difficult to say exactly what happened to drive the Entellinoi from their city, other than that the responsible army seems to have taken some prisoners and sold them but let others go free. We will return to the Entellinoi in later sections on diaspora and return.

The most common source of unwillingly scattered populations, however, was the expulsion of part of a community by that community itself, or by those in charge of it. This is what we usually mean by the word "exile," and it was of course common in the ancient Mediterranean as a result of *stasis* and as a tool of despots. Individuals sent into

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<sup>314</sup> D.S. 14.96.4.

<sup>315</sup> As noted in Chapter One I use the text of Ampolo and Parra (2001) as well as its numbering conventions (decrees A1-3, B1, and C1-3).

<sup>316</sup> In the Greek sources an *epimeletes* is left to administer a city after a victory, never to rebuild a city that the enemy has destroyed, e.g. Polybius 3.79.4, 4.80.15.

<sup>317</sup> On Segesta see Prag (2010a) and Corsaro (2003, p. 379).

exile are rarely recorded in Sicily, and in what follows I focus on the groups of various sizes that were banished from their homes.

It should not be surprising, then, that the greatest producers of exiles in LCEH Sicily were the tyrants: the Dionysii and Agathokles. It should, of course, be noted that there were exiles in circulation before the reign of Dionysius I as well.<sup>318</sup> Leontinoi experienced some unrest in the 420s and many of its citizens were living in exile, though the details are not entirely clear.<sup>319</sup> At the outset of the Sicilian Expedition, in 415, the small pro-Syracusan faction in Katane was driven out upon the entrance into the city of Athenian soldiers.<sup>320</sup> And the failed coup in 408 of Hermokrates, who had himself been exiled from Syracuse after the Sicilian Expedition, led to his death and the exile of his surviving supporters, including Dionysius.<sup>321</sup> How Dionysius was able to return legally to Syracuse is not known, but he next appears there speaking in an assembly in 406 preparing his own attempt at tyranny, so he must have regained citizen rights. It is significant that the first item on his agenda was to recall the other exiles, an act to which I return in section C.

Dionysius' habit of displacing populations at spearpoint is already familiar.<sup>322</sup> While he never expelled or exiled Syracusan citizens, in the course of preparing for his offensive against Motya it does seem that he caused the Carthaginian population of Syracuse to go into exile.<sup>323</sup> Diodorus provides the evidence, stating that in 398 "with Dionysius giving them permission, the Syracusans plundered the wealth of the Phoenicians. For not a few Carthaginians lived in Syracuse and they had fine possessions..."<sup>324</sup> While there is no explicit mention of expulsion here, it is reasonable to assume that Carthaginians deprived of all their property would not remain among such a hostile population. Indeed, we learn that the other free Greek cities did expel the Carthaginians living with them, plundering their property; and the Greeks living under Carthaginian rule rioted violently against them.<sup>325</sup> It seems, therefore, that at Syracuse as elsewhere Greek cities effectively expelled a significant part of their Carthaginian populations. These Carthaginians had lived in the Greek cities long enough to accumulate property, and even if they had compatriots in western Sicily the potential impact of their exile should not be overlooked. Syracuse and the other Greek cities had

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<sup>318</sup> Exile, in various forms, was a frequent solution to political conflict in the Archaic and Classical Greek world, for which see most recently Forsdyke (2005), who argues that political exclusion was fundamental to the construction of Greek communities.

<sup>319</sup> The relevant literary evidence is D.S. 12.53.1-54.7; 83.1-3 with Thucydides 5.4.1-5, cf. 6.6.2. See also Vattuone (1994) and Vannotti (1995).

<sup>320</sup> Thucydides 6.50.3, 51.1-2; cf. D.S. 13.4.4-5.

<sup>321</sup> Initial exile: D.S. 13.63.1. Attempted coup, death, and supporters' exile: D.S. 13.75.2-9. Cf. also Rutter (2000). Caven (1990, pp. 44-5) suggests, following D.S. 14.8.5, that Dionysius' adoptive father Heloris protected him from the enforcement of the exile order and helped him regain citizen rights.

<sup>322</sup> Oblique reference to "those who had been exiled by Dionysius and were working against him," perhaps the Naxioi and Katanaioi, received at Rhegion in 394: D.S. 14.87.1. "Those who were in sympathy with Dionysius" were banished from Akragas and Messina in the same year: D.S. 14.88.5.

<sup>323</sup> There is an offhand note (D.S. 14.103.4) that in 389 Croton "had the most exiles from Syracuse," but it is not clear whether Diodorus means the largest number in Italy or the largest number anywhere, nor whether these *φυγάδες* had been driven out or were simply opposed to Dionysius' rule. I am hesitant to treat this statement as evidence of a large Syracusan diaspora caused by Dionysius for which we have no positive evidence.

<sup>324</sup> D.S. 14.46.1.

<sup>325</sup> D.S. 14.46.2-3.

become in a real sense their homes, and being forced to leave would have severed their connections to those homes.

The middle of the fourth century was especially turbulent in Syracuse and eastern Sicily in general. In fact, the tradition about Agathokles' family places his father at Therma during the reign of Dionysius II, as a Rhegian exile, though the circumstances of his expulsion are not known.<sup>326</sup> But we have good reason to believe that Dionysius II had banished Syracusans from their home city as well, based on the exiles Dion found in the Peloponnese in the early 350s.<sup>327</sup> Dangerous conditions in Syracuse led 10,000 "children, women, and the elderly" to attempt to flee the city when the tyrant's mercenaries had broken out of Ortygia and were plundering, killing, and razing with abandon.<sup>328</sup> Dion was able to put a stop to the mercenaries' devastation but not all of the 10,000 would have happily returned to Syracuse, especially if their homes, relatives, and property had already been destroyed. These Syracusans, like the Carthaginians of 397, feared threats of violence, and while they were not ordered to leave or officially exiled, they were effectively forced from their homes into a condition of exile.

The depopulation of Syracuse and eastern Sicily in the years before Timoleon's arrival is generally accepted, and while factional strife can be posited as a major factor it is not as well-documented as we might like. In Plutarch's account the two are not explicitly linked, though it is reasonable to imagine that political instability in Syracuse would lead to depopulation.<sup>329</sup> Unfortunately we do not know whether Syracusans were forced out, or chose to leave when a hostile faction came to power, or were killed; those who did leave may have headed for western Sicily as had some Greeks around 400, or they may have fled further abroad. The fact that Timoleon "granted citizenship in Syracuse to all who wanted it" after the battle of the Krimisos in western Sicily, and the fact that the terms of the peace provided for the restoration of property to those who returned to eastern Sicily from Carthaginian territory, argue in favor of a movement to western Sicily.<sup>330</sup> Similar dispersals likely occurred in other cities—we should not suppose that the numerous minor tyrants with whom Timoleon had to deal rose to power without producing exiles. Unsurprisingly, many of the refugees also headed east: Plutarch tells us that Timoleon and the Corinthians, searching for Sicilian exiles, sent ambassadors to Asia Minor and the Aegean islands, "where they had learned most of the [Syracusan] exiles were living after being scattered".<sup>331</sup> Exiles from eastern Sicily thus appear to have gone both east and west. Timoleon himself rarely dispersed populations in Sicily; most of his activities assembled and recomposed Sicilian communities.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Diodorus (D.S. 19.2.2) calls him Καρκίνος ὁ Ῥηγίνος φυγὰς γενόμενος ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος.

<sup>327</sup> Plutarch, *Dion* 22.4 says that only 25 out of 1,000 Syracusan exiles met Dion at Zakynthos; D.S. 16.10.5 says that 30 came with him but does not give the total number.

<sup>328</sup> D.S. 16.20.3.

<sup>329</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 1.2: "The city was exchanging one tyrant for another constantly, and because of a mass of evils it was nearly deserted..." cf. 22.4: "But upon capturing the city he did not have citizens, since some had died in wars and civil conflicts, and others had fled the tyrannies."

<sup>330</sup> Conferral of citizenship: D.S. 19.2.8; terms of the peace treaty: Plutarch, *Timoleon* 34. In Diodorus, the citizenship grant explains how Karkinos, Agathokles' father, got to Syracuse; he had been living at Therma (a Carthaginian foundation) so it is clear that Timoleon's offer reached at least that far into Carthaginian territory. On the timing of Timoleon's appeals to exiles and grants of citizenship see below in section C.

<sup>331</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 23.3.

<sup>332</sup> He did banish 1,000 mercenary defectors from Syracuse (Plutarch, *Timoleon* 30.2-3), and while those men were not Syracusan citizens nor integral members of the community, Timoleon's liberal approach to community building makes it likely that had they remained loyal they could have been rewarded with

His efforts toward establishing stable and productive Greek communities in Sicily were not successful in the long-term. At Syracuse, at any rate, political combat between oligarchs and democrats continued to cause the exile or flight of the city's inhabitants. The rise of Sostratos' aristocratic faction (allied with the "Six Hundred Noblest") around 325 seems to have sent opponents into exile into southern Italy, though they were in turn exiled when the democrats returned.<sup>333</sup> Agathokles followed the democrats, who were in turn exiled when the oligarchs returned to power.<sup>334</sup> While in exile he prepared his return and once in Syracuse with his supporters launched a bloody and chaotic coup that drove 6,000 Syracusans into exile, mostly at Akragas.<sup>335</sup> These exiles, eventually led by Deinokrates, would be a continual menace to him, and we will return to their activities in the next section. In Syracuse Agathokles continued to weaken the population, and in 310 his magistrates expelled 8,000 Syracusans, "family and friends of the exiles and of any others who could not put up with what they [the magistrates] had done."<sup>336</sup> Having produced a large and hostile exile population he then spent the next several years fighting and co-opting it; he continued to kill and exile individuals, though those events are rarely recorded. We learn, for example, that the grandfather of Hippokrates and Epikydes was exiled from Syracuse for his (alleged) part in the murder of Agathokles' son Archagathos in 307 only because the grandsons played an important role in the Second Punic War in Sicily.<sup>337</sup>

Interestingly, we do not hear much of political exiles in the third century, though we may posit their existence. After the death of Agathokles tyrants once again came to power in Syracuse and in other cities; as in the 350s and 340s this must have led at least to the partial expulsion of the factions that opposed them. Neither Pyrrhus nor Hieron II seems to have done much exiling.<sup>338</sup> Hieron did have 200 exiles from Messana in his army at the Longanos, but it is not clear whether these men had been exiled during the Mamertine takeover, or were themselves Mamertines who had been expelled from their new city.<sup>339</sup> If the former, it is perhaps an indication that Polybius' account of the takeover, in which some of the inhabitants were expelled, is to be preferred over

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citizenship. Consolo Langher (1997, p. 190) reads in his coinage and settlement programs the replacement of polis-based patriotism with that of his new *symmachia*.

<sup>333</sup> Events of 325: D.S. 19.3.5 cf. populist "exiles" at 19.4.2; return of the democrats: D.S. 19.4.3. Diodorus presents the succession of powers in Syracuse under the year 317 (the year of Agathokles' coup) though it must be a compressed account of the years 325-317. See Consolo Langher (2000, pp. 27-64) on the buildup to Agathokles' coup.

<sup>334</sup> D.S. 19.5.4.

<sup>335</sup> D.S. 19.8.2 concerns those who fled the city. At 19.8.6 we learn that of his enemies still in Syracuse "Agathokles ...after gathering together the captives...killed those who were disposed most unfavorably toward him and sent the remainder into exile."

<sup>336</sup> D.S. 20.15.3. They were given a refuge by Hamilcar, whose army was camped outside the city, and although we are not told what happened to them thereafter, it is probable that they joined the exiles in Akragas.

<sup>337</sup> Grandfather exiled: Livy 24.6.2. Charged with Archagathos' murder: Polybius 7.2.3-4.

<sup>338</sup> Cf. Polybius' praise (7.8.2-3): Hieron "established himself as king of the Syracusans without killing, exiling, or causing pain to any of the citizens, and what is most incredible of all is that he not only gained power this way but also maintained it in the same way."

<sup>339</sup> D.S. 22.13.4.

Diodorus', in which they were all killed.<sup>340</sup> Yet the latter is plausible as well, since Hieron was not averse to enrolling Mamertines in his army.<sup>341</sup>

During the Punic Wars only two exiles in the sense we are discussing were recorded. The first was a banishment of officers from a mercenary army (for the community of the army, see Chapter 4). At the siege of Lilybaion in 250, a group of mercenary officers attempted to bring their troops over to the Roman side, but when they left the camp they were discovered and shut outside the walls.<sup>342</sup> While that episode did not involve a large population, it is interesting that the soldiers in effect banished some of their own. In the Second Punic War, after the death of Hieron (*inter defectionem ab Romanis*) the Syracusans had exiled a number of citizens who had advocated remaining loyal.<sup>343</sup> Compared to the frequent official exiles of the fourth century, the third century saw relatively little of this activity.

Two important caveats to the previous statement deserve mention. The first is that there is a lack of fine-grained data from the cities outside Syracusan interest and especially in Carthaginian western Sicily. Determining the conditions in which some or all of a population was forced out of its home depends above all on historical and epigraphic data, neither of which (the Entella documents notwithstanding) is abundant outside eastern Sicily in this period. Thus we know very little about cities in the interior and west of the island that may well have had mobile political factions. The second caveat is that exile was of course a normal legal punishment in Sicily as in much of the Mediterranean at the time, and was therefore not much remarked on. We do, however, get some indications: Agathokles persuaded the citizens of Messana to receive back, in 312, criminals they had banished; the "disorderly crowd...mingled from dregs of all kinds" transferred from Agathyrna to Italy in 210 included banished criminals as well.<sup>344</sup> Thus we must imagine a normal low-frequency exiling of criminals throughout the period.

## **B. Life on the road**

Once driven from their homes, exiles and diaspora communities had to find ways to survive in and adapt to life outside the more stable social, economic, and cultural worlds they had previously shared with their fellow-citizens or neighbors. They had to find hosts and get to them; they had to find ways of co-existing with their new colleagues; and they had to be prepared to do this repeatedly, not necessarily knowing how long they would be allowed to remain in a given place, or if they would ever be able to return to their homes (on which see section C below). Partly at issue was the degree to which exiles and refugees assimilated with their hosts, and we should not forget that the hosts too might have been affected by the encounter.<sup>345</sup> In short, the experience of Sicilian diaspora communities shows that while exile could galvanize community

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<sup>340</sup> Polybius 1.7.2-4; D.S. 21.18.1.

<sup>341</sup> He had earlier enrolled the presumably Mamertine garrison of Ameselon: D.S. 22.13.1.

<sup>342</sup> Polybius 1.43.1-6.

<sup>343</sup> Livy 25.28.4.

<sup>344</sup> Messana: D.S. 19.102.5-7; Agathyrna (location unknown): Livy 26.40.16-17.

<sup>345</sup> See Osborne (1981-1983) and Whitehead (1984, p. 58) summarizing the various inducements routinely offered to non-citizens; Lonis (1992) for the rarer but more comprehensive *anaplerosis*.

coherence, it also exposed both mobile and stable populations to novel social formations and ultimately contributed to the breakdown of single-city communities.<sup>346</sup>

In this section we will begin to see how population mobility in the form of exile helped to erode the exclusive *polis* community in Sicily. Over the course of this chapter and the remaining ones, we will encounter alternative forms of community generated by the movement of people. Zosia Archibald has recently argued that mobility may be implicated in the technical innovations of the Hellenistic period, particularly through the disruption of old social networks and the formation of new ones.<sup>347</sup> She was interested primarily in technical and economic innovation, and thus the social impact of mobility is rather underplayed in her article. What I hope to suggest in this dissertation is that the very organization of communities themselves could change in response to human mobility. With its large-scale dislocations, LCEH Sicily makes a good laboratory for such an argument. In what follows we will encounter some of the communities we saw uprooted in the previous section.

One of the most enigmatic collections of exiles is that of Leontinoi in the late fifth century. In the 420s the city had signed an alliance with Athens but was fighting a war with Syracuse, and suffered from internal strife as well.<sup>348</sup> The details and the chronology are not as clear as we would like, but the city seems to have lost its autonomy, and the Leontinoi were divided between those who took on Syracusan citizenship and those who fought the Syracusans from positions of exile. Indeed the appearance of Leontine exiles pleading their cause at Athens as Leontinoi in 415 shows that they still had the authority to speak for that community, at least in Athenian eyes.<sup>349</sup> Refugees and exiles from otherwise destroyed or enslaved population did often continue to represent their collectives, as for example the Plataians in Athens did. An extraordinary votive inscription found at Carthage appears to document a treaty struck by the victorious Carthaginian generals and the defeated Akragantinoi in 406.<sup>350</sup> Though the *polis* of Akragas was no longer functioning, its former inhabitants were in a position to negotiate a peace directly with the generals a year before Dionysius I did. Unfortunately the stele is quite concise.

Yet the Athenians' stated goal of "restoring the Leontinoi" was never accomplished, since the victory of Syracuse in 413 allowed it to maintain control over the city of Leontinoi. As mentioned earlier, the refugees from Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina ended up there when they fell out with the Syracusans, though it is not at all

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<sup>346</sup> See, e.g., Archibald (2011) on the link between mobility and innovation generally in the eastern Mediterranean, emphasizing that mobility affected the non-mobile as well.

<sup>347</sup> Archibald (2011, pp. 56-61) discusses mobility's impact on social networks.

<sup>348</sup> *ML* 64; Thucydides 5.4.2-6; D.S. 12.53-54. It is especially strange that a city with such an unstable composition, whose population was hardly ever the same from generation to generation, was also one of the only Greek cities to be known only by a collective plural and never by a singular place-name. That is, the word for the city, no matter who inhabited it at any moment, was *Λεοντῖνοι*/*Leontini* i.e. "the Leontinoi" or "the Leontines." The irony of this fact becomes clear when one considers just how unstable the referent of "the Leontines" was; because the conventional term "Leontines" obscures the irony, I will refer to the city as "Leontinoi" and to its population as "the Leontinoi."

<sup>349</sup> Thucydides 6.19.1. A similar continuity of authority in a refugee population may have been operative in the Sybarite treaty with the Serdaioi (*SEG* XXII 336), which according to Lombardo (2008) should date to after the destruction of Sybaris in 511/510 BCE, cf. also Aversa (2008). For the survival of *polis* identity after a city's destruction see Millis (2010) on Corinthians after 146 BCE.

<sup>350</sup> *CIS* I 5510 = *KAI* 302, cf. Amadasi Guzzo (2006). Exiles from Chios notably continued exercising political power during the Peloponnesian War, for which cf. Piérart (1995).

clear whether the Leontine exiles who showed up in Athens 415 were ever able to return home. Diodorus described the city in 406 as “an outpost of the Syracusans, being full of fugitive and foreign men,” and I have suggested that some of the refugees from elsewhere will have remained there even after the treaty of 405 allowed them to return.<sup>351</sup> After all, that treaty provided that the Leontinoi would be autonomous (whereas Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina would be subject to Carthaginian tribute); they could not know that just two years later the Leontinoi would all be forced to go to Syracuse as citizens.<sup>352</sup> Questions of political autonomy notwithstanding, the city of Leontinoi, which had experienced its own history of exile, was also an attractive place for refugees in the late fifth century.

While the gaps in our account of Leontinoi are large, we can nevertheless see that the city was a site of potentially disruptive interaction among refugee and exile groups. Whatever its status was in foreign relations, the former inhabitants of many different *poleis*—Syracuse, Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina, as well as some of the Leontinoi themselves—and perhaps other communities as well were gathered there and would have had to deal with each other. Some communal decision-making must have taken place, and even if it was modeled on an ancestral constitution of the Leontinoi (whatever that may have been), the co-presence of so many diverse groups can hardly have failed to affect domestic politics. It is very unlikely that the few citizens of Leontinoi (if there were any) living there exercised complete authority as perhaps might have been the case in the former *polis* of Leontinoi.

When the Entellinoi were driven out of their city during the First Punic War, many of them ended up at Enna, where they were taken in, though others were enslaved and had to be redeemed by the Egestaioi.<sup>353</sup> Unfortunately we have little indication of how long they were refugees, and whether they went straight to Enna or took a more circuitous route. They must have been absent at least one growing season since they were compelled to take gifts and loans of grain from their neighboring communities upon returning. Complicating the picture somewhat is the fact that they also had a pre-existing agreement of *isopoliteia* with the city of Assoro that they chose to reaffirm, perhaps indicating that some Entellinoi had activated the possibility of Assorine citizenship.<sup>354</sup> Some comparative evidence may clarify this picture, or at least put it in context. Other *isopoliteia* agreements of roughly contemporary date are suggestive in that some allowed refugees to activate the potential citizenship, while others forbade it.<sup>355</sup> When, for example, the Elateians in Phokis lost their city around 198 BCE, the Stympahlians in Arkadia provided them with territory to farm, shared their sacrifices and rituals with the refugees, and in general “considered them to be their own [citizens]”

<sup>351</sup> D.S. 13.95.3. The “foreigners” are foreign in reference to Syracuse, i.e. not Syracusan citizens.

<sup>352</sup> Treaty of 405: D.S. 13.114.1; Leontinoi depopulated by Dionysius in 403: 14.15.4. Vattuone (1994, p. 95) notes that the instability of the city's status and that of its inhabitants was driven by grants of Syracusan citizenship.

<sup>353</sup> Entellinoi at Enna: decree A2; at Segesta: A3.

<sup>354</sup> C1 LL.6-7: ὑπάρχει ἅμιν ἰσοπολιτεία | ποτὶ τοὺς Ἀσσωρίωνος. Compare this with the normal formula in the decrees granting *isopoliteia* from Entella to other cities: εἶμειν αὐτοῖς... ἰσοπολιτείαμ ποτὶ τὸν δᾶμον τῶν Ἐντελλίνων (A1 LL.13-14, A2 LL. 15-17, A3 LL. 15-18) and it is clear that the *isopoliteia* of C1 represents potential citizenship of Entellinoi at Assoro.

<sup>355</sup> The *isopoliteia* between Skepsis and Parion (*BE* 1972 no. 371) provided that exiles were to be received, but the *isopoliteia* between Keos and Histiaia (*IG* XII.5 594) has been restored to prohibit the reception of refugees. See Gawantka (1975) nos. 34a and 9, respectively, for discussion, and Müller (1975).

on the basis of *syngeneia*—loosely understood as “kinship.”<sup>356</sup> This situation most closely resembles that of the Entellinoi, and like the Entellinoi, the Elateians honored their benefactors both in order to thank them and to ensure close co-operation in the future. Cities with kinship relations and individuals with personal connections had a network ready to be activated in an emergency; those without such pre-existing relationships, like the Entellinoi, had to manufacture them.<sup>357</sup>

The Syracusan oligarchs exiled at the beginning of Agathokles’ reign demonstrate how an upper-class diaspora community could maintain its coherence, at least for a time. Their main bases were Messana and Akragas, perhaps the two largest cities just outside the reach of Syracusan hegemony.<sup>358</sup> But they were a great potential liability, and like mercenaries (see Chapter Four) their presence in a city could only be disruptive and was often tentative.<sup>359</sup> At Akragas they gained the sympathy of the Akragantinoi; they called in Akrotatos from Sparta, but he descended into luxury, killed the exiles’ leader So(s)stratos, and lost the exiles the local support that they had enjoyed.<sup>360</sup> Then at Messana in 312, “the one city left of those that were hostile to the tyrant,” the inhabitants were surprised by an attack of Agathokles’ general Pasiphilos, who used the prisoners he had captured as hostages to force the Messanioi to expel the Syracusan exiles there.<sup>361</sup> Deinokrates attempted to settle the exiles, numbering 5,000 and now exiled also from their temporary refuge, in Kentoripa but was prevented from doing so; they ended up in Galaria where they were quickly defeated by Agathokles’ generals.<sup>362</sup> Where they went is not known, though they did not disappear completely.

It seems likely that they were supported in some way by the Carthaginians. In fact their next appearance in the historical record is in Hamilcar’s army attacking Syracuse in 309.<sup>363</sup> It is possible that the Carthaginian general had given them a city in western Sicily to inhabit, or perhaps was diverting supplies to them while they remained in camps or in small cities in eastern Sicily. Agathokles, it must be remembered, was away in Libya, so even eastern Sicily would have been relatively safe for the exiles, especially if they were under the protection of Hamilcar. After 309 they may have reverted to the prior arrangement. We do not hear of the exiles again until 307, when Deinokrates gathered a large army of exiles, presumably from Syracuse as well as other cities, though

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<sup>356</sup> SEG XXV 445 = IPArk 18 (an honorific decree passed by the Elateians upon their return to Phokis) LL. 5-6: νομί[ξ]αντες ιδίους | [πολίτας εἶναι]. Lehmann (1999) argues that the Aitolians were responsible for ejecting the Elateians, against Mitsos (1946/7) and Accame (1949) who argue that the Romans were responsible. See as a starting point Jones (1999) on the utility of kinship as a basis for diplomatic exchanges.

<sup>357</sup> Cf., for example, the links between and mobility of elites in the Archaic period discussed in Ampolo (1976-77).

<sup>358</sup> Significant numbers of exiles are recorded at Messana in 315 (D.S. 19.65.4) and Akragas in 314 (D.S. 19.70.1).

<sup>359</sup> Meister in CAH VII.12, p. 390: “It has been emphasized quite rightly that driving these people from their homes ultimately only shifted the conflict from within to without—between 316/15 and 306 the exiles were the driving force in Sicilian history.”

<sup>360</sup> D.S. 19.70.1-71.6. After Akrotatos’ flight from Sicily the cities opposed to Agathokles struck a peace treaty.

<sup>361</sup> D.S. 19.102.1-4.

<sup>362</sup> D.S. 19.103.1-104.4.

<sup>363</sup> D.S. 20.29.2-6, which specifies that Deinokrates commanded the cavalry, with 31.2 after the Carthaginians were defeated: “Thus the exiles along with the rest of the Greeks appointed Deinokrates as general...” It seems therefore that the exiles had been with Deinokrates in the army the entire time.

it is not specified where they were located.<sup>364</sup> Yet only two years later their exile came to an end. After his decisive victory over Deinokrates' army in 305, won in part by the defection of 2,000 exiles to his side, Agathokles allowed the non-Syracusans to return to their homes but killed 7,000 (or 4,000) Syracusan exiles.<sup>365</sup> Diodorus writes that Agathokles subsequently "received favorably those of the exiles who remained" though this cannot be a very large number; Deinokrates was co-opted into the regime and so perhaps his associates were also spared.<sup>366</sup> Just as when Dionysius I drove the Naxioi out of Mylai, the collective had to be destroyed though individuals were permitted to survive.

The Naxioi underwent two different dislocations in the space of ten years, and only returned home, or near home, almost fifty years after they were first taken away. We saw above how they were driven out of their temporary refuge at Mylai in 394, and it was not until 358/7 that they were again reunited. In that year Andromachos, the father of the historian Timaios, "gathered together those who had survived Dionysius' total destruction of Naxos" and settled them at Tauromenion.<sup>367</sup> That city had been emptied of its original Sikel founders by Dionysius according to the treaty he struck with the Carthaginians in 392 (see above), and resettled with his former mercenaries. We do not have any other information about Tauromenion from that episode until 358/7, so it is not clear whether the city was still populated when Andromachos led the Naxioi there, and we will examine Naxian Tauromenion in Section C below. Incidentally we do not really know whether Andromachos was himself a Naxian; Diodorus names him as a Ταυρομενίτης, but it is not clear if this identifies him as part of Dionysius' mercenary settlement, or is simply proleptic. What is most interesting here, however, is that the Naxioi had apparently remained free refugees for some 36 years, more than an ancient generation, before reuniting. We have no explicit evidence for their exile, but it seems clear that given their eventual reunion many of them must have retained a sense of being Naxians across generations and under pressure to blend in among their neighbors. If Diodorus is right that some ended up with the Sikels and others ended up with the Greeks, it would be extremely valuable to know what influence those hosts had on the refugee community.

Although most of the exile events in Sicily have not left detailed documentation of the diaspora community, some inferences may be drawn from the experience of the Plataians, Olynthians, and Corinthians. As we saw, the Plataians maintained a separate identity in Athens even while availing themselves of Athenian assistance between 431 and their eventual return to Plataia; little is known of their post-373 diaspora although some of them must have sought refuge again in Athens. Those who went to Skione, however many they were, never rejoined the collective, or at least we have no evidence of it. The Olynthians are not recorded as a collective after 348, though individuals would have had a good reason to identify themselves as Olynthians in Greek cities while there was still ambivalence about the Macedonians: they were high-profile victims of Philip's

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<sup>364</sup> D.S. 20.57.1-3. Diodorus specifies that "all of these men had lived continually in exile and in the cares of some suffering," undoubtedly an exaggeration.

<sup>365</sup> D.S. 20.89.1-5. The figure of 7,000 is Timaios'.

<sup>366</sup> D.S. 20.90.1.

<sup>367</sup> D.S. 16.7.1.

aggression.<sup>368</sup> Perhaps as the Greek world was more and more at the mercy of the Macedonians, it became less desirable to call oneself an Olynthian. After 146, on the other hand, refugees from Corinth went on calling themselves Corinthians without implicitly rebuking the Roman state that now controlled their fates. Millis has proposed that they may have been motivated by a knowledge of historical reunifications, Plataia chief among them, and an expectation that they too would be able to return home.<sup>369</sup> Corinth, of course, exerted a much greater cultural strength than Olynthus had; Alexander's destruction of Thebes was more on par, and in fact Thebans continued to be identified as such between 335 and 316/5 when it was refounded by Kassander.<sup>370</sup> The extent to which our Sicilian exile populations knew about developments in mainland Greece is debatable, but in any case they cannot have expected any particular outcome. Wherever they ended up, Naxioi and Katanaioi who escaped slavery may well have been able to trade on their treatment by Dionysius, and this may have encouraged them not to forget their original ethnics, at least for a time. Even the reassembled Naxioi eventually became Tauromenitai.

I argued in the introduction that exile and diaspora ought to have contributed to (stressful) interaction between groups that did not normally interact, and thereby to have mixed the practices that ordinarily would distinguish one group from another. In tracing the itineraries of displaced populations I have attempted to highlight the pieces of evidence that support this idea. Indeed, the subjective judgments of our historical sources point in the same direction. For example, while Diodorus' accounts of city sacks and evacuations certainly run to the melodramatic, some valuable strands can be picked out. Here is his narration of the evacuations of Gela and Kamarina:

...with two cities banished, the countryside was full of women and children and the rest of the multitude; and the soldiers upon seeing these things first became angry at Dionysius, then they felt pity for the fates of the unfortunate, for they saw free children and marriage-age girls hurrying along the road in a manner unworthy of their age, since the state of affairs had removed their reserve regarding and their respect for strangers. They sympathized with the more aged nearly equally, seeing them compelled against their nature to hurry on along with those who were in their prime.<sup>371</sup>

What Diodorus describes, not without an axe to grind with Dionysius, is the breakdown of traditional social order, and while he does not explicitly say so, the real danger of such a breakdown is that it tends to give rise to a slightly different order from what existed previously. A new social order develops, whether one likes it or not.<sup>372</sup> The roads populated by crowds, the mingling of adolescents, the lost respect for strangers and the

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<sup>368</sup> E.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1263, a decree of *thiasotai* in Peiraieus in honor of Demetrios son of Sosandros, Olynthian, dated to 300/299 BCE; *SEG* XVIII 254, an epitaph of an Olynthian (restored) dating to the third or second century; the sculptor Sthennis is identified as an Olynthian by Pausanias (9.30.1, cf. 6.16.8) even though most of his work postdates the destruction of his city.

<sup>369</sup> Millis (2010).

<sup>370</sup> Thebans in the Persian army opposed to Alexander: Arr. *Anab.* 2.15.2-4; Plut. *Apophth. Alex.* 22 (Mor. 181B). Thebans as refugees in Akraiphia: Paus. 9.23.5; at Athens: Aeschin. 3.159; Paus. 9.7.1; Plut. *Alex.* 13.1. Most relevant is the potential contemporary identification of a Theban among Athenian ephebes at Panakton, a border outpost: *SEG* XLVI 249 L.14.

<sup>371</sup> D.S. 13.111.5-6.

<sup>372</sup> It is one of the basic axioms of this dissertation that human mobility can remake social order.

elderly: the city's significant social barriers have been breached.<sup>373</sup> His description of the evacuation of Akragas is less passionate, while similarly drawing attention to the crowding and mixing of the departure from the city.<sup>374</sup> It may well be that hostility of Diodorus' sources to Dionysius preserved more pathetic scenes of the evacuations caused by the tyrant.<sup>375</sup> Nevertheless the fear of letting traditional boundaries collapse remains. And in the mouth of Theodoros in Syracuse, this collapse is tantamount to destroying the cities completely.<sup>376</sup>

Thucydides too recognized that exchanging and mixing members of different political communities would diminish the cohesion of those communities. In a passage cited earlier in Chapter Two, I used the speech of Alcibiades to show that Sicily was known for mobile populations, and I suggested that he and Thucydides had anticipated at the end of the fifth century a process that I am arguing continued to the end of the third. Here I want to highlight Thucydides' causal logic: "For its cities are populated with mingled crowds and they admit easy transformations and additions of citizens; *and because of this* no one furnishes himself, as he would if it were a question of his own fatherland, either with weapons for the defense of his body or with reliable equipment for the use of his land" (italics mine).<sup>377</sup> If cities constantly exchange citizens, the city as a meaningful unit begins to break down.<sup>378</sup> What Alcibiades missed, however, was the ineluctable emergence of community in the conditions he describes. While it would be too much to say that this oversight cost the Athenians the war in Sicily, their defeat certainly does call their reasoning into question. We must not ignore the potential for disparate dislocated people to form meaningful communities in exile.

Again, we are missing a large part of the picture in western and central Sicily, where an unknown degree of interaction took place outside the scope of our literary sources and the chance epigraphic document. Where did the Sikels ejected from Tauromenion in 392 go? It would be a mistake to suppose that they easily and freely melted back into some imagined Sikel nation, but it is difficult to say anything about them with certainty. And were any of the Elymian Entellinoi able to escape the

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<sup>373</sup> The plague in Athens during the Peloponnesian War precipitated a similar social crisis: Thuc. 2.47.1-55.1

<sup>374</sup> D.S. 13.89.3: "...and the road and all the districts of the territory that turned toward the Geloan city were filled with women and children mixed up with girls..."

<sup>375</sup> Theodoros' long speech against Dionysius (D.S. 14.64.5-69.5) in the Syracusan assembly may be invented but it twice cites the evacuations as evidence of Dionysius' malice: "Because of him Gela and Kamarina were subdued" (14.66.4); "in the first war having betrayed Gela and Kamarina he made them uninhabited" (14.68.2).

<sup>376</sup> At D.S. 14.66.4 Theodoros says that Dionysius has "completely destroyed" (ἄρδην ἀνήρηκεν) allied and important cities including Gela, Kamarina, Naxos and Katana.

<sup>377</sup> Thucydides 6.17.2-3: ὅλλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις πολυαντροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥαδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς· καὶ οὐδεὶς δι' αὐτὸ ὡς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος κτλ. (italics mine). It should be admitted that most MSS read πολιτειῶν for πολιτῶν, i.e. "changes and additions to constitutions," though the preferred reading has the advantage of keeping Alcibiades' comments focused on the instability of populations. Gomme et al. (1970 *ad loc.*, p. 250) supports the reading of MS. E as giving "admirable sense," and he renders the other reading as "body (list) of citizens," or "constitutions" so long as *epidochas* becomes "additions to the citizen body resulting therefrom." He shows a great commitment to the argument being concerned with citizens.

<sup>378</sup> Not least as a defensible military unit—see for example Aeneas Tacticus on the dangers posed by foreigners to the city under siege, though Whitehead (1992) argues that in practice resident foreigners often proved valuable to threatened cities.

Campanian takeover of that city in the years before 404? Exiles from the Greek cities do appear to have settled in Carthaginian-controlled western Sicily (Karkinus, Hippocrates and Epikydes, others?), but are these instances indicative of general trends or exceptions to them? I note here that many exiles joined mercenary armies, a topic to be discussed further in Chapter Four.

As we will see shortly, we have the best information for exiles and diasporas that were at least partially successful in reassembling. In some cases we only know that a dispersed population retained a collective identity because it did reassemble. Many dispersed populations simply disappear from the record, and the causes of this require some attention. Let us take the Elymian Entellinoi possibly expelled from Entella by the Campanians as an example, and imagine them to have set out as a group to find a new place to live. It is quite possible that they simply found no refuge either collectively or individually, and either the whole group died or they resorted to brigandage and died out eventually. While undoubtedly life on the road was difficult, and some may have died, to my mind the far likelier possibility is that the group had to split up to survive, with perhaps a few families ending up in each of many other cities. Even if they managed to find generous hosts, if they stayed for several generations the pull of assimilation would have been strong.<sup>379</sup> In this reading the individuals survived and may even have prospered, though they did so not as Entellinoi but as adoptive citizens, or at least residents, of other cities. From the perspective of the diaspora community, assimilation was as dangerous as wandering.

As an ending to this section I want to examine a strange sort of exile in Sicily, that of the disgraced soldiers who survived Roman defeats during the Second Punic War. Beginning with the survivors from Cannae and the “least effective” soldiers of the current dictator (Livy 23.25.7-8) in 216, the Romans also sent over 2,000 evaders of military service to Sicily in 214 (Livy 24.18.7-9), all without specifying a term of service. In 212 the Senate decided that they would not return before the end of the War (Livy 25.5.10-7.4). In 211 more soldiers who survived a defeat the previous year under G. Fulvius were sent to Sicily, and for all of them “A mark of dishonor was added for both groups of soldiers, that they could not spend the winter in towns, nor build winter quarters closer than ten miles from any city” (Livy 26.1.6-10). In 209 more soldiers were condemned to service in Sicily for surviving a defeat under a different G. Fulvius (Livy 27.7.12-13). That same year (209) the Latin allies charged that the Romans’ policy toward these disgraced soldiers was actually damaging the Italian communities from which many of them came. Compared with Hannibal, they said, who returned a captured ally of the Romans without ransom, a recruit “was removed from Italy, more accurately into exile than into military service.”<sup>380</sup> These soldiers did all presumably return to Italy after 202, though we are not explicitly told. The terms of their service in Sicily were harsh and very similar to exile; it would be surprising if some solidarity did

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<sup>379</sup> We do not have evidence of diaspora communities collectively maintaining their identity, as the Plataians did at Athens (cf. the introduction to this chapter). However, it seems quite likely that exiles from the same city living in the same new city would have known each other. In the case of modern Italian immigrants to other countries, the shared experience of mobility and meeting-places for the immigrants creates a new kind of community. Fortier (2006, p. 73): “What the Centro [one such meeting-place in London] offers is not the continuity or reproduction of the old world; it is the production of a *portable* Italianness through traces that are filled with sensuality.”

<sup>380</sup> Livy 27.9.3.

not develop among men literally compelled to remain outside of civilization. Their situation, while its effects on the dynamics of Sicilian exile populations are unclear, does suggest a link with Roman policy in Italy, a topic to which I hope to return in future research.

### C. Reintegration and reformation

Returning home is never as simple as one would like. No less than political exiles, refugees expelled by an outside power or evacuated out of military necessity faced a daunting task in rejoining or reestablishing the communities they left behind. Indeed, the effects of returning exiles and the measures taken to reintegrate them are often better documented than the diaspora experience itself, though they can also shed light on that experience. As far as our sources (literary, documentary, archaeological) go, exiles and refugees tend to disappear from view; only on their return to settled community life do they reappear, and if we are lucky they reveal something about their exile.

Let us return once more to the Entellinoi ejected from their city during the First Punic War. We saw how they depended on the assistance of other communities for survival while in exile, notably the Ennaioi and the Egestaioi. While we do not know the details, they were eventually able to return to their city and reconstitute their community; the production of the Entella tablets and the decrees inscribed on them is a first testament to the functioning of their community. They call the process of return a *synoikismos*, and in one of the decrees they refer to it in the present tense, suggesting that it was ongoing at the time the decrees were passed.<sup>381</sup> The Entellinoi received two kinds of help in their reintegration: grain and “services.” Decree A1 honors a number of neighboring *koina* and individuals for gifts and loans of grain “for the *synoikismos* of the city,” with a minimum recorded total of 810 medimnoi of wheat and 60 of barley.<sup>382</sup> Grain would have been necessary not only to supply food to a population that returned to empty storehouses, but also very likely to provide seed for them to begin planting their fields again. The decree of Elateia for the Stymphalians corroborates the prime importance of grain for an exiled population returning home. In the first place the Stymphalians had allowed the refugees to survive by cultivating land in their territory without paying taxes.<sup>383</sup> Yet, when it became possible for the Elateians to return home, the Stymphalians also interceded with the Achaian League to allow them to bring their grain with them back to Phokis—a famine had led the League to forbid the export of grain from its member cities.<sup>384</sup> The right to return home was practically useless without some support for restarting agricultural production.

Returning communities also need other sorts of assistance. In the Entella decrees these are designated with the vague term *χρεῖαι*, usually rendered in English as “services.” The Roman *epimeletes* Tiberius Claudius provided services for the

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<sup>381</sup> Decree C1, cf. Mackil (2004, p. 504 n. 66).

<sup>382</sup> A1 LL.12-13: ἐς τὸν συνοικισμόν ἢ τῶς πόλιος. Unfortunately we do not know how big the medimnos was, so the total cannot be precisely converted to liters.

<sup>383</sup> SEG XXV 445 LL. 6-7.

<sup>384</sup> SEG XXV 445 LL. 15-18. Cf. Mackil (2013, pp. 308-310 and 472-5) on this episode and the authority of federal states to both permit and prohibit grain exports.

resettlement of the Entellinoi, as did the Assorinoi.<sup>385</sup> Presumably these two very different benefactors provided different kinds of aid. Tiberius Claudius, stationed at Entella in some official capacity (B1 LL.5-6 ταχθεὶς εἰς τὰμ πόλιν | τὰν ἁμὰν) may have been in a position to mediate between the Entellinoi and the Roman state, or to negotiate on behalf of the Entellinoi with other cities. I suggested above that the Entellinoi may have fled to Assoro under the terms of a pre-existing *isopoliteia* and this could in itself have constituted the “services” provided by the Assorinoi; it is also possible that they offered diplomatic or administrative support for getting the *polis* of Entella started again. The Stymphalians’ work with the Achaian League on behalf of the Elateians would also probably have fallen under the rubric of such *χρεῖαι*, and in fact demonstrates how intertwined food, agriculture, and diplomacy were for a community returning to its abandoned home. Similarly, the efforts of the various benefactors who helped the Samians return home after Alexander’s Exiles Decree in 324 BCE include sea transportation for returning citizens and embassies and political services along with other specific and general aid.<sup>386</sup> The fact that Samos is an island brings the issue of transportation into focus, and we must recognize that even for populations scattered over land, returning by land may still have required assistance. What the Entella and Samos dossiers, and the Elateian decree, highlight is that along with the desire and effort of the diaspora community to reassemble, others were needed as well, particularly when external politics had to be managed. Shortly we will see how communities dealt with the internal problems of returning exiles, but thus far the necessity of outside support should be clear.

The problems associated with returning exiles can be seen at Syracuse as well, particularly during the ascendances of Dionysius I and Agathokles. In both of those cases the return of one faction necessitated the expulsion of the other.<sup>387</sup> We do not have access to the details of the strife engendered by the reintroduction of an out-of-favor faction, but we know that it was problematic. While no specific provisions for reconciliation at Syracuse during those episodes are extant, we know from evidence elsewhere what several of the issues must have been. At Mytilene in the late 330s the city took steps to manage the return of its exiles during a tumultuous sequence of allegiances among the Macedonians, the Persians, and their intermediaries.<sup>388</sup> The first decree passed, perhaps in 334, distinguishes between valid legal exile or execution (τις δίκας γενομένας κατ τὸν νόμον, text A LL. 14-15) and exile or execution conducted “in any other way” (ἄλλον τινα τρόπον, text A LL. 16-17), i.e. for political or factional reasons, which must have been invalidated, though the text breaks off before the decree can make this explicit.<sup>389</sup> The second decree lays out the process and principles of reconciliation concerning property, in effect that ten arbitrators from among the exiles and ten from those who remained in Mytilene are to see “that everything shall be settled, or, if not, they shall be as just as possible” (text B LL. 27-28). Oaths are to be sworn, and all the people together are to offer common prayer and sacrifice (text B

<sup>385</sup> Decree B1 LL.6-7: *χρεῖας παρίσχηται* and C1 L.9: *χρεῖας παρέχονται*, respectively.

<sup>386</sup> Habicht (1957); Habicht (1972); cf. also Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 90.

<sup>387</sup> See, in general terms, Zolberg (1983) and Consolo Langher (1997, p.168).

<sup>388</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 85 A-B with notes on context and chronology.

<sup>389</sup> Cf. legal exile at Messana ca. 312 *supra* and *infra*. This first decree also applies interestingly both to citizens of Mytilene and resident non-citizens (LL. 17-20), indicating an interest in protecting the position (and perhaps ensuring the return) of these non-citizens as well.

LL.38-49).<sup>390</sup> The second decree as preserved does not actually provide for much concrete political reintegration, though it does repeatedly call for the current residents to live harmoniously with the exiles. Instead it is largely preoccupied with rival claims on property, arising either from confiscation by the remaining Mytilenaians or from normal procedure for dealing with abandoned property. These claims are to be resolved as much as possible by the parties themselves, and there is a clause that “money is to be available for the implementation of the settlement” (text B LL. 30-31).

Around the same time period, Tegea passed a decree for returning exiles specifying matters in much greater detail. The decree, dated to 324/3, gives rules for the recovery of inherited property by the exiles (LL. 4-9), the distribution of houses (LL. 9-21), festival obligations (LL. 21-24), the adjudication process (LL.24-37), sacred debts (LL. 37-48), examination of the property of the exiles’ wives and daughters (LL. 48-57), as well as the text of an oath to be sworn by the Tegeans who remained in the city (LL. 57-66).<sup>391</sup> While much of the text is enigmatic, the overall concerns are clear, and just as at Mytilene they center on disputed property and pending financial obligations. Controlling who could own property was a central function of the *polis*, and constitutes a fundamental aspect of community definition; the Tegea decree provides unequivocally that each returned exile is to possess not only the right to own property but an actual house (LL. 9-11: “With reference to houses, each [sc. returned exile] shall have one in accordance with the transcript”).<sup>392</sup> Yet the Tegeans also acknowledge other potential issues to resolve. The clause about “festivals from which the exiles have been absent” (LL. 21-22) does not specify what action is to be taken, but it does identify participation and non-participation in the city’s religious life as a question that needed attention. Likewise, the provision that the female relatives of the exiles who married while in exile must have their property audited (LL. 53-57) indicates that not only the economic activities of the exiles but the social ones as well need to be ratified by the reintegrated city. Particularly interesting in this connection is the description of these women as “creeping back” (καθέρπονσι, L. 54); a term that can only be derogatory. Finally, note that the stele preserves only an oath with various expressions of goodwill to be sworn by those who remained in the city, with a *vacat* beneath it; an oath for the exiles might have been inscribed on another stele but this document requires conciliatory action particularly from those who did not leave.

Reconciliation is not entirely undocumented in Sicily. Dated to around the period of the Entella tablets, a single decree from the nearby city of Nakone contains provisions for civic reintegration, and though exile is not explicitly mentioned, the conflict was serious enough to merit attention and may well have seen dissidents ejected from the city.<sup>393</sup> The process is remarkable: groups of five are to be formed, each with one from the two opposing factions and three neutrals (LL. 14-19), and in these units they are to resolve their differences (LL. 19-21) and participate in a sacrifice (LL. 24-27). Every year “all the citizens are to dine among each other” (L. 32), possibly in these groups of five, or possibly *en masse*. This unparalleled process does, however, have similarities to our other reconciliation documents: at Mytilene the newly united citizen body was also to conduct shared sacrifices together, and at Tegea it is implied that the absence of the

<sup>390</sup> See Pulleyn (1997, pp. 173-8) on prayer in reunification, reference from Rhodes and Osborne (2003).

<sup>391</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 101; translations are theirs.

<sup>392</sup> On *enktesis* in general see Henry (1983, pp.204-240).

<sup>393</sup> IGDS 206; see Ampolo and Parra (2001).

exiles from civic festivals was to be remedied. Nearby in western Sicily, the Entellinoi instituted shared sacrifices and invited friendly communities to their festivals in order to solidify their relationships with these communities. Communal feasting, which was probably also fundamental to shared sacrifices, was another means of integration, as for example in the Spartan *syssitia* or the Liparian common messes.<sup>394</sup>

Perhaps the best-known case of a citizen body that was divided and then reconciled is that of Athens in the later years of the Peloponnesian War under the Thirty. The trauma to the community was great enough that reverberations were still being felt in the form of lawsuits well into the fourth century.<sup>395</sup> In many cases property was at stake, an issue highlighted in the Tegea and Mytilene reconciliation decrees, but recriminations and bad blood also lingered. Reconciliation was an ongoing process, and had to be carried out in multiple aspects of Athenian life.<sup>396</sup> Moreover, collective mythology that grouped the supporters of the Thirty with their victims was important following the overthrow of the tyrants.<sup>397</sup> The rule of the Thirty had dislocated the Athenian citizen body, so that there could be serious disagreement about the boundaries and contents of that group. The crisis was not only about who would lead the Athenians, but who counted as an Athenian, and this issue persisted into the reconciliation as well. The democrats were accused of bringing slaves with them when they returned from the Piraeus to reclaim citizenship.<sup>398</sup>

It is worth adding that during the Second Punic War, the Romans were forced to take measures for the return of Syracusans to their homes. Some degree of wartime displacement occurred in the buildup to Marcellus' capture of Syracuse in 211, and in the following year the Senate was compelled to decree that "in the future the Syracusan state would be under the care of the senate, and that they would send instructions to the consul Laevinus that, so far as could be done without a loss to the republic, he should deliberate for the personal fortunes of its citizens."<sup>399</sup> This episode seems to have pertained essentially to seizures and the Roman plundering and acquisition of Syracusan territory by legally accepted means of war. In 208, the Senate ordered L. Manlius to announce at the Olympic games "that the Roman people was returning to them [Sicilian refugees and Tarentines expelled by Hannibal] all their possessions which they had held before the war."<sup>400</sup> The summons seems to have recalled at least some of those displaced from Sicily by the war; three years later, in 205, Scipio had to settle claims between Syracusans and "certain men of Italian descent who were holding on to property by means of the same violence with which they had seized it in war."<sup>401</sup> Again

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<sup>394</sup> Mackil (2013, Ch. 4) explores how ritual, including ritual feasts, built and maintained the community of the federal state.

<sup>395</sup> I can hardly provide all the documentation produced by this watershed event, but the speeches of Lysias, the account of Aristotle in *Ath. Pol.* 35 and the accounts of Xenophon (*Hellenica* 2-3) and Plato are some of the more notable results.

<sup>396</sup> See most recently Shear (2011), who does not explicitly address the return of exiles as such, but does argue that democratic reconciliation was attempted at the physical, material level of the city and thereby in the communal life of its inhabitants.

<sup>397</sup> Wolpert (2002, pp. 75-136), cf. Forsdyke (2005, p. 200). For a fuller exploration of this intentional misremembering cf. Loraux (2002).

<sup>398</sup> *Ath. Pol.* 40.2.

<sup>399</sup> Exchange of *provinciae*: Livy 26.29.1-9; Senatus consultum: Livy 26.32.6.

<sup>400</sup> Livy 27.35.3-4.

<sup>401</sup> Livy 29.1.15-18.

we do not have many of the details but the return of Syracusan refugees was not unproblematic, and required the intervention of the Roman state.

There are several more Sicilian cases for which there is only tantalizing information about the return of exiled or expelled populations. According to Plutarch, in the 330s “those led by Gorgos, sailing from Kos and gathering together the old citizens,” resettled Gela.<sup>402</sup> Asheri interprets this to mean that Gorgos brought new inhabitants to Gela, to be mixed with the Gelooi still living there, and he follows Plutarch in attributing the depopulation to the Carthaginian sack of 406.<sup>403</sup> Yet the sense of συνάγω admits, I think, the possibility that the “old citizens” also departed from Kos, and there are any number of conflicts in the fourth century that might have sent Gelooi out of Gela. Recall that in Timoleon’s time there were many Syracusan exiles in the eastern Mediterranean; Geloans could have ended up there as well.<sup>404</sup> There is also a very circumstantial link, in that a Gorgos is recorded along with his brother Minnion as working with Alexander to restore both citizens of Samos to their homes in the late 320s.<sup>405</sup> It is a remote possibility, but if this were the same Gorgos who sailed from Kos, his sphere of activity off the coast of Karia and his specialization in restoring exiles would be well-attested. In all of this I do not insist that there were no Gelooi living in Gela or elsewhere in Sicily, only that some of the “old citizens” may well have been Geloan exiles.

Toward the end of the Second Punic War Akragas too had to negotiate the reintegration of different groups of citizens. The city had been on the Carthaginian side until 210 when its Numidian guards betrayed it to the Romans; the consul Laevinus massacred the Carthaginian army, then “beat with branches and beheaded with an axe those who were in charge, and sold the rest [of the people] and the booty; he sent all the money to Rome.”<sup>406</sup> The city should have been completely depopulated, since Livy writes of the “news of the disaster to the Agrigentini” and earlier suggests that the *clades* was comprehensive, but it is difficult to reconcile such a depopulation with Laevinus’ subsequent claim to the Senate that “those [Sicilians] who had previously been absent having fled out of fear, had all been brought back into their cities and were plowing and sowing in their fields...”<sup>407</sup> To confuse matters even further, Cicero tells us that the Agrigentines received laws on the composition and election of their council from Scipio, in which the distinction is made between old inhabitants and new settlers brought by Titus Manlius in the early second century, and which presuppose the existence of an

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<sup>402</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 35.2. On the basis of *SEG* XII 380, an asyilia decree for Kos by the Gelooi in 242 BCE containing references to shared ancestry, Asheri (1970) argues that the text of Plutarch should be emended to read ἐκ Κῶ; this reading is ratified by Anello (1999 [2004], p. 406). Pais (1894, pp. 234, 240, and 299) was the first to suggest the change, though based on arguments rejected by Asheri (1970).

<sup>403</sup> Asheri (1970, p. 618).

<sup>404</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 23.3.

<sup>405</sup> *IG* XII.6.1.17; Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 90 B with bibliography, referring also tantalizing to an epigram at Epidauros, *IG* IV<sup>2</sup>.1 616, which as they say honors “Gorgus and his son for [military] deeds [learned] in Cos and for loyalty to the king;” The text of *IG* IV<sup>2</sup>.1 has in LL.4-5: τε . Ι [5] | κὰς πολυαίνητος; Peek (1932, pp. 52-4) restored τε ἔ[ρ]γα [ἐδίδαξε Ἄρεος] | Κῶς πολυαίνητος. Peek’s restoration has not, to my knowledge, been challenged, and so the epigram would seem not only to represent a link to Kos, but also to stretch Gorgos’ activities further west to the Peloponnese, which was closely linked to Sicily throughout the fourth century and especially at that time, cf. Smarczyk (2003 pp. 47-57) and Talbert (1971).

<sup>406</sup> Livy 26.40.8-13.

<sup>407</sup> *fama Agrigentini* *cladis*: Livy 26.40.14; Laevinus’ claim: Livy 27.5.4.

older set of inhabitants.<sup>408</sup> Whatever the circumstances of the city's full or partial depopulation, a new group was introduced early in the second century, and conflict arose over representation. That concern is a common one where an established population absorbs or reabsorbs new settlers.

We know comparably little about Tauromenion after its refoundation by Andromachos and the Naxioi in 358/7. As noted above, the city was possibly still inhabited by the descendants of Dionysius' loyal (Greek) mercenaries and the Sikels he allowed to remain there in 392. Diodorus writes that "while the city was quickly making progress, the settlers obtained great wealth, and the city obtained a remarkable reputation."<sup>409</sup> It is impossible to verify this statement archaeologically, since fourth century Tauromenion is virtually inaccessible to excavators. The rapid growth of a new foundation is not unreasonable, however, and as we saw in the previous chapter supplementary immigration played a role in urban growth as well. Andromachos was still in control of the city when Timoleon landed in 345/4, and was an early ally of the Corinthian, offering the city as a base.<sup>410</sup> No longer do the sources refer to Νάξιοι or make distinctions among the populations in Tauromeion; there are only Ταυρομένιοι. Unfortunately it is not possible for us to make such distinctions either, owing again to the poor archaeological record for this early period. A subset of the Naxioi driven out of their homes in 403 managed to maintain a coherent diaspora community for almost 50 years until they could return to their territory, but their return was to a different city, and it was as a new community.

Significant numbers of exiles could have been produced, as I argued above, by normal legal procedure, and their return was more problematic. As we saw, in 312 Messana was forced by Agathokles to accept back criminals they had banished; the tyrant subsequently had his political opponents in the city killed.<sup>411</sup> Diodorus does not elaborate on the mechanism by which the return of these exiles allowed the assassination of dissidents, nor how exactly the city became subject to Agathokles, but the causal link is there, especially in his account of the Messenians' thought process.<sup>412</sup> It is to be understood, I think, that the returned exiles formed a dominant pro-Agathoklean faction, either because they had originally been so disposed before their expulsion, or because they owed their homecoming to the tyrant.

## Conclusions

My aim in this chapter has been to show the ways in which the phenomena of exile and diaspora disrupted bounded citizen communities and led to the production of

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<sup>408</sup> Cicero, *In Verrem* 2.2.123.

<sup>409</sup> D.S. 16.7.1.

<sup>410</sup> D.S. 16.68.7-9; Plutarch, *Timoleon* 10.4. Timoleon recruited 300 soldiers from the city as well but it was not primarily a source of soldiers for him.

<sup>411</sup> D.S. 19.102.5-7. I admit that it remains possible that anti-tyrant bias in the sources has turned supporters of Agathokles exiled for political reasons into criminals banished in an apolitical legal process.

<sup>412</sup> Their expulsion of non-citizens was also dangerous to their security (19.102.7): "And the Messanians, having expelled from the city those of the foreigners who had the most goodwill toward them and who were most capable of repelling the tyrant, and seeing that of their own citizens those opposed to the tyrant had been killed, and what is more having been forced to take back men who had been judged guilty of crimes, they regretted what had been done, but they were compelled to endure, since they had been browbeaten by the superiority of the powerful."

novel forms of belonging. At a fundamental level evacuation, expulsion, and exile all distributed members of a community across space. The people displaced in this way sometimes scattered to join host communities and new foundations, and sometimes remained distinct for long periods, but none was able to avoid changes in the nature of the collectives to which they belonged. Part of this was due to the experience of exile itself, in which the opposing gravities of definition and assimilation must have pulled some practices one way while letting other practices go the other.

In the absence of abundant documentation we must speak in probabilities, and it is precisely because the historical and material records are so poorly adapted to answering questions of social organization in Sicily that we must have recourse to comparative evidence. The creation of exiles and diaspora communities on Sicily appears to have been linked to the rise and consolidation of tyrannies and to the growth of empires, and although in this respect Sicily does not stand out from other Mediterranean regions, it does offer good evidence for how tyranny generated a specific kind of mobility, above all in the fourth century. Several Sicilian exile populations fled factional strife and could be called political refugees, while others fled imminent violence and could be called war refugees. What appears to be unique in Sicily, at least in the frequency of its occurrence, is the simple expulsion of populations, as for example at Entella but also in the case of the Naxioi at Mylai. At least in Sicily, these expulsions did not last, but rather left the door open for a return. Once separated from their homelands, sometimes leaving their fellow community members behind, diaspora communities first sought refuge, then eventually either a new homeland or a return to their old one.

Exiles both elite and common depended heavily on outside support, based on familial and political connections in the first place, and on communal obligations or opportunistic benevolence in the second. The circulation of exiles thus activated pre-existing links across *polis* boundaries or created new ones, and the more heavily these links were developed, the more easily old social forms could yield to new ones.<sup>413</sup> Whether recorded in our sources or not, all communities scattered by exile or expulsion needed the assistance of other groups for survival at least, and we have seen that such momentous circumstances were ripe for social change. The disorder of a hurried evacuation was only one of the more dramatic aspects of exile; even the inclusion of exiles in their host's festivals or labor market had to change both groups. A *polis* community outside its homeland, especially if distributed among a number of host communities, could not remain exactly the same as it had been. Even if one imagines only Greeks circulating among Greeks, the diaspora community, wherever it went, was a fertile middle ground for hybrid practices.<sup>414</sup> The insights of the current middle ground and encounter approach to Greek colonization are not restricted to the Geometric period or even to colonial situations, whether ancient or modern. Any meeting between different groups can be destructive to existing social boundaries and productive of novel social forms, and I have attempted to bring this understanding to bear on Sicily's fourth- and third-century exile communities. As we will see, other forms of mobility affected group boundaries as well.

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<sup>413</sup> Cf. Archibald (2011).

<sup>414</sup> Thus, for example, Roselaar (2012) proposes the dynamic contexts of Mediterranean trade as a site and mechanism for assimilation of Romans and Italians in the Republic.

#### 4. Mercenaries between mobility and stability

A Cretan approached Iulius the consul in order to betray his side and said, "If you are victorious over your enemies through my action, what reward will you give for this good service?" The general said, "I will make you a Roman citizen and I will consider you an honorable man." The Cretan, confounded by these words, said, "Among the Cretans citizenship is nonsense called by a mild name. For we use our bows in order to get profit, and every arrow is on our own behalf for the sake of money, distributing ourselves over every land and sea. Thus I too have come now for the sake of money; concede the honors of citizenship to those now fighting over it, those who are buying highly-prized nonsense for their blood." The other laughed at this and said, "If the attempt turns out well for us, I will grant you a thousand drachmae." (D.S. 37.18)

#### Introduction

Aside from the particular dynamics of Roman citizenship and the Social War, which provides the context for the epigraph to this chapter, citizenship *was* often something to contend for, with voices, coins, feet, and sometimes with the sword. While the relation of the ordinary foreigner to the citizen was difficult enough to establish (both for people in antiquity and for scholars today), the mercenary, who risked his life for a community he was not officially a part of, brings the whole constellation of concepts involved with citizenship into focus. Mercenaries could be granted citizenship by grateful cities and kings, but they were also capable of appropriating it themselves. Agathokles' Campanian mercenaries had been promised citizenship in Syracuse after his death in 289 BCE but the Syracusans broke that promise and instead paid them to leave the city, sending them on the road. When the opportunity arose, the Campanians took over the city of Messana, killing the men and appropriating the women, and became citizens of their own political entity, the Mamertine state.<sup>415</sup>

Sicilian tyranny depended heavily on the service of mercenaries, first apparently from the Greek world, although during the period under consideration Italian and particularly Campanian mercenaries became popular on the island. The Carthaginians characteristically employed large numbers of allied troops from North Africa, Gaul, and Iberia alongside citizen-soldiers in their armies, and contrary to expectation the first Italian mercenaries were actually hired by the democratic Greek cities Naxos and Katane for use against Syracuse during the Athenian expedition of 415-413.<sup>416</sup> Dionysius I had been acquainted with the use of mercenaries already in his half-hearted defense of Gela in 405, but in 404 he was able to hire a group of Campanians, perhaps the same ones originally fighting for Naxos and Katane, to support him against a coup. The success of this support may have given Dionysius good reason to continue employing Italian mercenaries although his mercenary troops were by no means exclusively Italian.

Mercenaries appear as distinct from citizen-soldiers in the historical record primarily in their mobility and the fact that they were fighting for reasons other than the

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<sup>415</sup> This episode is the starting point and prime mover of Zambon's barely readable study of third century Sicily: see Zambon (2008) with bibliography.

<sup>416</sup> See most recently Lee (2000) and Fantasia (2006) for the activities of these Campanians at the end of the fifth century, and Fariselli (2002) for mercenary service under the Carthaginians and in particular on the development of recruiting channels along which African, Iberian, Gallic, and Italian mercenaries travelled in response to Carthaginian military requirements.

aggression or defense of their home cities.<sup>417</sup> Yet this clear distinction is illusory; individuals might warrant a number of labels over the course of their lives, and politically recognized states came into being and disappeared. Citizens might not require a wage but they often did require some compensation at the end of a campaign; mercenaries might not get their settled wages until after a victory, and they might be compensated by means other than cash payment.<sup>418</sup> Tyrants could and did compel military service from among their home populations, but their dependence on mercenaries (often as a politically disinterested, loyal guard) meant that they had no choice but to pay, and when coined money ran out the next best thing was land.<sup>419</sup> A lone mercenary could not, of course, simply settle in whatever city he pleased, since without the agreement of his host population he would be without civic rights, possibly unable to vote, marry, or even own property. If on the other hand the tyrant granted a city, part of a city, or land to a group of mercenaries, as often happened in LCEH Sicily, there would be objections but probably no successful resistance. Mercenaries settling themselves as a group (as in the cases of Entella in 404 and Messana in 288) enjoyed a similar success rate. The transition from mobile mercenary to settled citizen and the continuum between the two are important aspects of Sicilian mobility.

In this chapter I examine the impact of mercenary service on the overall mobility of Sicilian populations and on the resultant nature of citizenship in communities that employed mercenaries as well as among the soldiers themselves. The growing popularity of mercenaries in the fourth century BCE was a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon, though conditions in Sicily made the employment of mercenaries particularly practical.<sup>420</sup> Imperial powers operating on Sicily could benefit from wider Mediterranean mobility by bringing in soldiers from the Peloponnese, Italy, and elsewhere, and internal Sicilian displacements created a significant labor pool of potential mercenaries. Finally, while mercenaries were often placed or placed themselves in settled communities, they did not thereby renounce the itinerant life, and the successful recruitments of new soldiers demonstrate that down to the end of the third century mercenary service remained both an important motor of mobility and a challenge to the stable citizen community.

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<sup>417</sup> Cf. Morillo (2008), proposing a typology of military service with two axes: political vs. economic determination of terms of service and socially embedded vs. unembedded. What historical sources and modern scholars call “mercenaries” might fall in a range of locations on those axes, depending on why and how they served.

<sup>418</sup> Pritchett (1971, p. 74): “As we have noted, wages of citizen-soldiers and mercenaries alike were virtually dependent on plunder.” Pirates, too, accepted payment in forms other than cash: Gabrielsen (2001) and (2003) mentions the pirates and merchants working with Demetrios Poliorketes during the siege of Rhodes in 305/4 BCE (D.S. 20.82.4-5, 83.3, 84.6) and argues in general against strong distinctions between pirates, merchants, mercenaries, and soldiers.

<sup>419</sup> Thus D.M. Lewis in *CAH* VI<sup>2</sup> 153: “What we know of the coinage...suggests that his basic method of rewarding mercenaries had to be in land-allotments.” An argument supported by the limited silver issues described in Consolo Langher (1997, pp. 119-131). Paying mercenaries with land was a practice with a long history: in the seventh century Psammetichos I had given land (in addition to other payments) to loyal mercenaries (Hdt. 2.154.1-5). Awarding land, especially recently conquered or appropriated land, would of course become a hallmark of the Roman military economy.

<sup>420</sup> Venerable treatments of mercenary service include Parke (1933) and Griffith (1935). Trundle (2004) makes Sicily along with Persian Asia Minor a major factor in promoting Mediterranean-wide mercenary service by Greeks.

## A. Why were so many mercenaries active in Sicily?

While the gradual abandonment of citizen-only hoplite armies and the embrace of mercenary contingents in almost every field army was a Mediterranean process, in Sicily it came to be linked inextricably with tyranny and empire, as for example in the case of Dionysius at Syracuse in 404. Mercenaries had been employed in Sicily since at least 480 BCE, but they first came into prominence at the end of the fifth century.<sup>421</sup> That initial employment of 800 Campanian cavalry by the Naxioi and Katanaioi, to be placed in 414/3 according to Tagliamonte, seems to have been a significant moment in Sicilian military history and began an era in which the demand for mercenaries was high.<sup>422</sup> While they did not succeed in winning the war for the Chalkidians and the Athenians, they did apparently impress both the Carthaginians and Dionysius I, as both of these would seek out Campanians and others in the years to come.

It has been suggested that major social changes within Campania were in part responsible for impelling men to leave Italy for military service, especially in Sicily. While evidence for the political development of Campania in the fifth century is rather difficult to interpret, Tagliamonte suggests that a “social revolution” there spurred the development of Samnite, clan-based elite at the expense of the older “Etrusco-Campanian elites,” and it was these increasingly marginalized Campanians who left Italy in search of a better life elsewhere.<sup>423</sup> Tagliamonte stresses these soldiers’ social exclusion in Campania, so we should imagine that they went abroad seeking not only employment but also community.

Yet other factors deserve attention, especially if we are to explain the large numbers of mercenaries from the Greek Mediterranean. The first is the disastrous end of Athens’ Sicilian Expedition, which left thousands of Athenian soldiers imprisoned in the stone quarry at Syracuse and allied soldiers and sailors scattered throughout Sicily.<sup>424</sup> Nikias’ pessimistic letter to the Athenians in the winter of 414/3 noted that many of the slaves rowing on Athenian triremes had been running away, and that their mercenary sailors had been doing the same by simply escaping to the cities of Sicily, by deserting on the pretense that they were looking for runaway slaves, or by getting the slaves they captured at Hykkara in 415 to serve in their places.<sup>425</sup> Some of these men might have found their way back to mainland Greece but many of them, especially the slaves, must have remained in Sicily. Moreover, the Athenians’ final defeat at the Assinaros River in 413 left a large number of Athenian and allied soldiers in Katane and

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<sup>421</sup> Cf. the mercenaries ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας assembled by the Carthaginians in preparation for the Battle of Himera: D.S. 11.1.5. See also Péré-Noguès (2006) for the Arkadian provenance of some mercenaries employed by the Deinomenids, and de La Genière (2001) for an argument that some of them were Campanians.

<sup>422</sup> Tagliamonte (1994, p. 128).

<sup>423</sup> Tagliamonte (2006, p. 466).

<sup>424</sup> Thucydides’ pithy verdict on the expedition—ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ’ οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν, “few out of many came back home” (7.87.6)—leaves open the possibility that even survivors did not return to Athens but could have remained in Sicily.

<sup>425</sup> Thucydides 7.13.2. I follow Hornblower (2008 *ad. loc.* [pp. 563-4]) on the two major issues in this passage: first that the letter refers to citizens, foreigners “supplied as contingents by subject-allies” according to Gomme et al. (1970 *ad. loc.* [p. 388]), and slaves among the trireme crews, and second that it envisions the foreigners deserting “on the excuse of slave desertion” i.e. saying that they are looking for runaway slaves. Nikias and Lamachos captured Hykkara and enslaved the population in 415: Thucydides 6.62.3 cf. D.S. 13.6.1.

other Sicilian cities as slaves or refugees.<sup>426</sup> Thucydides' statement that the allies among the prisoners in the quarries of Syracuse were sold is probably to be preferred to Diodorus' somewhat self-contradictory claim that they were killed.<sup>427</sup> In these ways, then, many lower-class Athenians, their Greek allies, and their slaves, all unlikely to have had the connections necessary to be ransomed, the means to buy passage home, or even the desire to go home at all, found themselves in Sicily indefinitely.

The end of the Peloponnesian War was a factor in mercenary availability as well. While the cities of Greece certainly continued to field citizen armies in the late fifth and early fourth century, their conflicts were not as broad or consuming as the Peloponnesian War had been, so a surplus of experienced soldiers is likely.<sup>428</sup> Indeed, such a surplus can be inferred from the large numbers of Greeks among Xenophon's 10,000 as well as the growing careers of the fourth-century condottieri. Sicily played a part in this economy as well. Preparing for his campaign against Motya, in 398 Dionysius I obtained a concession from the Spartans to hire as many mercenaries as he could—a grant that would hardly have been offered had the Spartans been suffering a shortage of military manpower—and “in general strove to assemble his foreign army from many peoples and publicized impressive wages.”<sup>429</sup> The overall availability of soldiers for hire in the years around 400 may explain how the tyrant could have had 10,000 mercenaries, mostly Lakedaimonians under a Lakedaimonian leader, to settle in Leontinoi in 396.<sup>430</sup> That after demobilizing those soldiers he simply recruited more—from where, we are not told—underlines the picture of surplus.<sup>431</sup> Thus the end of the Peloponnesian War might be expected to produce a glut of unemployed soldiers, and the evidence bears this out: mercenaries were not hard to find in the early fourth century.

Matthew Trundle states in his recent book that demand and not supply was the key to the growing popularity of Greek mercenaries in the late fifth and fourth centuries. Indeed, he points specifically to demand in the western Persian Empire and in Sicily as the motors drawing thousands of Greeks, primarily from the Peloponnese, into mercenary service.<sup>432</sup> It is important to recognize that he is concerned only with Greek mercenaries, a case of tunnel vision that unfortunately leads him to make the patently false claim that both the Syracusan tyrants and the Carthaginians employed only Greek mercenaries.<sup>433</sup> There were, of course, mercenaries from elsewhere serving in Sicily, but

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<sup>426</sup> Escapees: Thucydides 7.85.3-4.

<sup>427</sup> Thucydides 7.87.3 cf. D.S. 13.19.4 where Diokles proposes selling them; Diodorus later writes (13.33.1) that the Syracusans approved Diokles' plan and executed the allies. As for the Athenians themselves, Hornblower (2008, p. 743) refers to Kelly (1970) arguing that many were ransomed, which seems likely enough in light of *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 125 and Dem. 20.41-2. But many of the Athenians, along with all the Italiotai and Sikeliotai captured with them, were probably held indefinitely or made slaves at Syracuse—the Syracusans are unlikely to have enrolled them as mercenaries and given them weapons.

<sup>428</sup> More broadly, Parke (1933, p. 18): “The peace must have let loose upon the Mediterranean world many Greeks who had become accustomed to earning their livelihood by fighting.” Griffith (1935, pp. 3-4): “...there is probably nothing nearer to a single cause of the increase of mercenaries in the fourth century than the Peloponnesian War itself, which went far towards creating a demand while it certainly provided the supply.”

<sup>429</sup> D.S. 14.44.2.

<sup>430</sup> D.S. 14.78.1-2.

<sup>431</sup> D.S. 14.78.3. This method of exchanging mercenaries was copied by Hieron II, discussed below in Chapter Six.

<sup>432</sup> Trundle (2004, p. 41).

<sup>433</sup> Trundle (2004, p. 72).

his overall point about demand deserves an answer, even if it is not developed as an argument but rather repeated for effect. Despite using economic terms like supply and demand, he ignores their basic and fundamental interaction. Both an increase in supply and an increase in demand will generate an increase in quantity, and Trundle overlooks the possibility that large numbers of unemployed prospective soldiers made the hiring of large mercenary armies attractive to Persian and Sicilian generals. In fact, that is likely to be the better explanation, since as he recognizes, the cost of paying mercenaries appears to have gone down over the fourth century.<sup>434</sup> A decrease in price is consistent with a market seeking equilibrium in conditions of excess supply, not excess demand, though again, both conditions would see an increase in the numbers of mercenaries hired.

In other words, we ought not undervalue the role played by the mass availability of trained and willing soldiers in encouraging states and leaders to hire their armies on the market rather than drafting citizens or conscripting allies—both in the Mediterranean in general and in Sicily.<sup>435</sup> It is hard to imagine Dionysius assembling a mercenary army from *poleis* and other communities if there was a shortage of men. Furthermore, while Dionysius and occasionally the Carthaginians were usually under financial pressure to provide wages to their mercenaries, they both at times were able to defer payment until a victory provided enough booty to cover the back-pay, or a defeat left the soldiers dead, captured, or hired by the enemy. Sometimes this compensation came in the form of a captured city and/or territory. Such deferment drastically reduced the actual cost of maintaining a mercenary army once recruited and made mercenaries even more attractive to prospective employers.<sup>436</sup>

Of course the actions of wealthy states and leaders mattered. But it is not sufficient to assert, as Trundle does, that the “growing fragility of the Western Persian Empire and the chaos of Dionysian Sicily, not to mention mainland Greece as well, created [the need of employers for mercenaries].”<sup>437</sup> Mediterranean history contains no shortage of wars; uncertainty and conflict were not unique to Asia Minor, Sicily, and Greece in the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE. In the case of Sicily at least, one practice of employers demonstrates the way in which their rather capricious demand could lead to ever more mercenaries being hired. There are several instances in which an employer, rather than negotiating with his mercenaries, simply eliminated them and replaced them with new ones if necessary. Dionysius did so in 396, having 1,000 of his most fractious mercenaries abandoned by the cavalry to be killed on the front lines; he later hired a group of Iberian mercenaries that had been in the Carthaginian army.<sup>438</sup> Around 339 Timoleon ejected from Sicily a group of mercenaries who had deserted him before the Battle of the Krimisos—they were killed in Italy by the Bruttii—and sent another group composed of those who had attacked Delphi ahead into western Sicily

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<sup>434</sup> Trundle (2004, pp. 91-98), though he does contest the argument for a stark decline in mercenary wages.

<sup>435</sup> Parke (1933, p. 227): “Their very abundance created new uses for them. Evidently some cumulative process or processes must be assumed to have operated throughout the century and produced this supply of mercenaries.”

<sup>436</sup> So, for example, Miletos granted citizenship to Cretan mercenaries (*Milet* I 3 176ff.) induced, as Sekunda (2010, p. 63) argues, by Attalos II who “wished to demobilize the company of mercenaries, and cease paying wages as quickly as possible.”

<sup>437</sup> Trundle (2004, p. 79).

<sup>438</sup> D.S. 14.72.2-3; D.S. 14.75.8-9.

where they were killed.<sup>439</sup> At Kentoripa in or after 275 Hieron II imitated Dionysius and rid himself of his troublesome veteran mercenaries by sending them ahead and withholding their cavalry backup.<sup>440</sup> Besides these purges, employers occasionally settled mercenaries or otherwise attempted to take them out of circulation; the effect of which would have created the temporary excess demand that Trundle sees as the driver of mercenary service.

## B. Effects of mercenary recruitment

The effects of mercenary recruitment on the populations that provided them are not at all straightforward in the Sicilian case. The resolution of our knowledge does not permit much to be said, for example, about the social, economic, and political consequences of a robust Sicilian demand for mercenaries on the populations of southern Italy, though there must have been some.<sup>441</sup> Similarly little can be said about the role of mercenary recruitment in the evolution of Gallic, Iberian, and North African societies from which both Greeks and Carthaginians hired mercenaries.<sup>442</sup> For Greek prospective mercenaries, however, there is more evidence.

Particularly in relation to the Greek world, literary and documentary evidence suggests that communities considered the recruitment of mercenaries to be one of central importance.<sup>443</sup> While on the one hand they wanted to protect the valuable resource of trained military men, they might, on the other hand, be concerned to avoid having large numbers of unemployed and restless soldiers.<sup>444</sup> In the Hellenistic Mediterranean, cities obliged by treaty to provide mercenaries kept documentation on who was sent abroad.<sup>445</sup> I noted just above that Dionysius had to obtain permission from the Spartans to recruit in Lakonia in 398; Carthaginian recruiting in Greece during the First Punic War, which brought them the talented Lakedaimonian Xanthippos, was conducted through *xenologoi*, recruiting officers.<sup>446</sup> Indeed, Polybius reports that, in the treaty that ended the First Punic War in 241, each side was prohibited from recruiting

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<sup>439</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 30.

<sup>440</sup> Polybius 1.9.4-6: "Having pragmatically fulfilled his aim and having removed all of what was turbulent and seditious from his force, he recruited a sufficient mass of mercenaries himself, and from then on conducted the affairs of his rule in safety."

<sup>441</sup> Tagliamonte (1994, pp. 157-159) on mercenary recruitment from Italy, citing especially "l'attivazione di canali diplomatici e politici" (p. 157) and concluding "Le vie attraverso le quali i mercenari italici raggiungono l'isola sono quelle tradizionali" (p. 159). Neapolis, he suggests, must have been a particularly important node for the transfer of Campanian mercenaries to Sicily.

<sup>442</sup> Partially this lacuna is due to scholarly interest in Gallic, Iberian, and North African mercenaries as they affect Greco-Roman Mediterranean political history. Mercenary service of Gallic peoples: cf. Zecchini (1994), Rankin (1995, pp. 23-26). Importance of military display in Iron Age Iberia: Millett (2001, pp. 159-160). The revolt of Carthage's African allies/mercenaries that lasted from late 241 to 237 BCE (the "Mercenary War") illustrates the potential problems caused by Carthage's recruiting in North Africa.

<sup>443</sup> Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 379). Cf. McKechnie (1989, pp. 85-88) for the relative ease of recruiting pre-existing mercenary units outside the official (and presumably monitored) framework of the *poleis*.

<sup>444</sup> Cf. Miller (1984) for some brief reflections on the popularity of mercenary employment in the fourth century in the Greek world.

<sup>445</sup> Chaniotis (2004a, p. 485) with epigraphic references.

<sup>446</sup> Polybius 1.32.1. The activities of *xenologoi* must likewise have been monitored by the cities from which mercenaries enrolled. On *xenologoi* see Launey (1987, pp. 30-2) and Chaniotis (2004a, p. 486).

soldiers from the territories of the other.<sup>447</sup> While poor economic conditions, often caused by war and neglect, might encourage the men of a city to seek employment as mercenaries elsewhere, as Miller proposed, their very departure could deprive their homeland of the labor needed to restart agricultural production and could thereby deepen the crisis. For them mercenary service was a way out of difficult conditions, though it contributed to the weakening of their home community. Mercenaries departing overpopulated cities conversely left those communities more stable both by reducing population pressure in general and by taking themselves away from potentially lucrative strife at home.<sup>448</sup>

The populations of Sicily themselves did not provide significant numbers of mercenaries for wars either in Sicily or elsewhere. Any association with mercenary service ought to come from the fact that Sicily was a major theater of mercenary warfare.<sup>449</sup> Social and economic effects of recruitment were limited here, in the sense that few cities saw large numbers of citizens drawn away from home. When mercenaries were recruited in Sicily it was mostly from foreign populations including men who had previously served as mercenaries in other conflicts, and a city losing such men might feel some of the effects but the community is unlikely to have suffered as much as if they had been citizens.<sup>450</sup> Throughout the period under consideration, Sicilian populations themselves were largely spared the difficulties of extensive levies, whether for citizen-soldiers or for mercenaries, though of course some of those displaced in the variety of ways discussed in this dissertation could well have turned to mercenary service as a profession. Nevertheless, the predominant pattern was that of mercenary immigration into Sicily and circulation there.

The island as a whole was probably, like most of the Mediterranean region, “predominantly underpopulated,” though cities could certainly accumulate numbers in excess of available resources.<sup>451</sup> A total population well below what the land could support, punctuated by local concentrations and some overpopulated cities, was by no means a situation unique to Sicily. In this general shortage, the recruitment of mercenaries would tend to stress the populations of smaller communities, and could even be seen as a form of demographic violence, though one enacted through legal economic exchange.<sup>452</sup> Not every community will have been able to satisfy the freelance *xenologos* or the official levy-officer. On the other hand cities with an overabundance of population may have experienced recruitment as a relief. While extensive documentation of this dynamic is not preserved, there is some evidence for it. The record of Dionysius’ tyranny, for example, shows that he had some difficulty in raising enough mercenaries from Sicily alone, despite the hypothetical population of available

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<sup>447</sup> Polybius 3.27.1-2, cf. 1.62.8-9 where the prohibition is not mentioned.

<sup>448</sup> Civic strife yields significant rewards for violent men, though this is not unique to the ancient world.

<sup>449</sup> Trundle (2004, p. 54). Obviously *some* Sicilians became mercenaries, cf. a late Hellenistic document from the Arsinoite nome in Egypt, *PSI VI 626 recto* col. 1 lines 9-12, cited in Prag (2009), listing two *Sikeloi* mercenaries.

<sup>450</sup> Sicilian *auxilia* were not recruited in large numbers by the Romans. There were some emergency levies in the Republican period, but even these stopped under the Empire: Prag (2007).

<sup>451</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 378).

<sup>452</sup> Compare, e.g. Dionysius’ starving of Rhegion. How damaging recruitment really was depends on how many recruits were killed, how long the survivors remained mercenaries, and if they ever returned home—and we have good evidence for none of these factors.

soldiers proposed above in section A.<sup>453</sup> While it is true that his preparations for the campaign against Motya in 399-397 were on a massive scale, he met his manpower needs in part by seeking mercenaries “from many peoples” and by offering high wages.<sup>454</sup> Had he restricted himself to Sicilian populations as a source of soldiers, he would not have had enough men. Dionysius’ curious and largely unsuccessful attempt of 396 to uproot the Sikans and turn them into mercenaries, which I noted in Chapter 1, attests a demand for soldiers that went unmet because the communities in question declined to provide them.<sup>455</sup> In this case there was no doubt that releasing the soldiers would weaken the community because Dionysius had asked for the whole (male) population to join his army, but the operative concern was still to maintain a coherent community at home by refusing to send soldiers.

Yet the departure of military-age men was not always so detrimental to the demographic stability of Sicilian communities. The Lakedaimonian Dexippos, acting on behalf of Akragas when it was threatened by the Carthaginians in 406, was able to recruit 700 mercenaries in Gela—though they are unlikely to have been Geloan citizens, time was short and so anyone he recruited is likely to have been already present in Gela or at least not far away.<sup>456</sup> Diodorus dilates on the enormous population of Akragas at this time, just before its destruction, and so Gela too seems to have enjoyed a surplus of inhabitants, since the Gelooi could permit a considerable number of potential defenders to be taken elsewhere while they faced the same Carthaginian threat. The 700 could leave Gela because the Gelooi were not paying them, and because they had no affective connection to the city. Likewise local overpopulation at Herbita in 403, including non-citizen mercenaries, motivated Archonides to send colonists to found Halaisa, though were there a prospective employer many of those colonists could have been recruited as mercenaries.<sup>457</sup> Finally Carthaginian recruiting in Sicily in 396 and 311 was probably restricted to the large subject or allied cities (e.g. Selinous, Therma/Himera, Panormos, Soloeis, perhaps Segesta, and eventually Lilybaion) and so probably did not seriously deplete the populations in those places, though we cannot know for certain.<sup>458</sup> Many records of recruiting in our literary sources do not specify where recruiting was done or where the source populations were, and so have limited utility for a study of Sicilian mercenary populations.

So while we cannot in most cases evaluate the impact of any particular recruiting event, it is clear that the mercenaries employed in Sicily were recruited partly on the island and partly from elsewhere. The hiring away of soldiers from their places of residence (whether in Sicily or not) undoubtedly had different effects on the communities involved, weakening those without large excess population and relieving the population pressure of those with such excess. Of course, much recruiting was done from recently discharged and still mobile mercenaries, career mercenaries, and from those employed in the service of the enemy, and in these cases we cannot hope to trace

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<sup>453</sup> These soldiers are also likely to have been concentrated in large cities where they could survive and not dispersed over the countryside or living in small settlements where existence as a foreigner without rights was more difficult.

<sup>454</sup> D.S. 14.44.2.

<sup>455</sup> D.S. 14.55.6-7.

<sup>456</sup> D.S. 13.85.4.

<sup>457</sup> D.S. 14.16.1-2. Prestianni Giallombardo (2006, p. 114) suggests that these mercenaries may have been Sikels.

<sup>458</sup> 396: D.S. 14.54.6. 311: D.S. 19.106.5.

effects on any home population. Moreover, since most mercenaries active in Sicily had homelands outside Sicily, the impact of their initial recruitment and the story of those non-Sicilian communities that lost members to this profession lie beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we will follow these mercenaries in their active or recurring military service in the next section. Could mercenaries be citizens? Did they maintain any links to their home communities while serving? Did they form links to other communities?

### **C. Effects of mercenary service**

Mercenaries traveled all over Sicily on active duty, spending longer and shorter periods on the move on campaign and remaining for longer and shorter stays in cities and settlements while not fighting. For analytical clarity I address mercenary retirement in the next section, though as we will see there was not always a clear line between the active mercenary and the retired one. There was always a potential for mobility, especially so for professionals whose services were nearly always in demand and who had previously been engaged in networks that employed them and brought them across the island in wartime. Having attempted to explain how mercenaries became available to the states of Sicily, here I want to assess the nature of mobility for the mercenaries actively pursuing military careers, and its relationship to both the legal citizenship these people held and the sense of belonging they experienced.

A second compromise for the sake of analytical clarity is the differentiation of mercenaries from other kinds of soldiers in the first place. While definitions of the term “mercenary” abound, in both ancient and modern contexts, the biggest problem with labeling anyone a mercenary is that the same person can be a mercenary at one moment, a pirate at another, an ally at another, and a citizen-soldier at another. Given the fluidity of kinds of military service, any identifier that pins an individual to a specific motivation for fighting and a specific form of compensation is bound to mislead. John France, describing medieval Europe, writes:

The exigencies of a limited agricultural economy prohibited the creation of regular armies. Short term armies were made up of many different kinds of people enjoying complicated relationships with their commanders...The greater army was a composite of retainers and hirelings, and though the overall commander's money held the whole thing together like a cement, it was less a monolith than a network of complicated relationships. In these circumstances we might do well to regard mercenary as a term of art, a paradigm to which some approximated more than others, but which, in itself, had little contemporary reality.<sup>459</sup>

For ancient Sicily, too, regular armies were rare; each campaign brought soldiers, commanders, and many others together in a new constellation of political, economic, and social relationships.

Luckily we have fairly good documentation in the historical and archaeological records for certain groups of mercenaries such that their itineraries can be at least partially traced. Far from telling a complete story, these partial itineraries nevertheless give some indication of how and how much mercenaries generally moved into, out of,

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<sup>459</sup> France (2008, p. 12).

and within Sicily. Frequently we also have evidence bearing on the relationship of these mercenaries to their original homelands, to their employers, and to the communities in which they stayed for varying periods of time.

Greek mercenaries were also numerous in Sicily in this period, fighting both for the Sicilian Greeks and for the Carthaginians. None of our (Greco-Roman) historical sources is pleased at the idea of kinsmen fighting each other, and Dionysius' crucifixion of the Greeks in the Carthaginian army at Motya can be taken as emblematic of that disapproval.<sup>460</sup> Some of those Greeks were mercenaries but others were residents of the Carthaginian city, and their defense of their homes ought to indicate the degree to which they identified with the neighbors against their kinsmen. On the other hand Plutarch relates that the mercenaries of Timoleon and those of Mago used to fraternize while fishing for eels outside Syracuse, "as they were Greeks and had no cause for private enmities toward one another."<sup>461</sup> The episode is certainly crafted by Plutarch to provide an opportunity to praise Timoleon at the expense of the Carthaginians, but it does suggest that friendly interaction between hostile armies was possible, perhaps more so for mercenaries than for citizens. The Campanians serving in opposite camps at Akragas (mentioned above) may well have had similar contact.<sup>462</sup>

On the other hand, when different mercenary contingents met in the same army, they could be integrated into a mobile military community. Xenophon's mercenary army is perhaps the best-documented of any group of ancient mercenaries, and Nussbaum's study of the Ten Thousand as an organized community with its own brand of citizenship is admirable, and more recently Hornblower and Ma have pursued the question of soldier and mercenary community.<sup>463</sup> Contemporary interest of historians in what they term "soldiering" as a lifestyle recognizes in it an identity parallel to others. Military service, especially by mercenaries in mixed armies, offered a flexible set of identities that could be activated or suppressed depending on the circumstances.<sup>464</sup> While Sicilian sources preserve nothing like the social complexity captured in the *Anabasis*, there are some indications that the patchwork armies of LCEH Sicily could also integrate. For example, when the Syracusan allied army under Daphnaïos arrived to raise the Carthaginian siege of Akragas in 406, his soldiers met those of the Akragantinoi as well as the mercenaries of Dexippos (both the 800 Campanians and the others he had recruited at Gela): "...with the soldiers from the city mixed in...the masses [of soldiers] came together tumultuously in an assembly."<sup>465</sup> The subsequent abuse, accusations, and assassinations are hardly hallmarks of a peaceful community, but the mere fact that the

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<sup>460</sup> D.S. 14.53.4. Admittedly, these Greeks may have been residents of Motya and not mercenaries, but the fundamental point made by Dionysius' exemplary punishment is that Greeks ought not fight for barbarians against Greeks. It should also be noted that the Greekness of Dionysius himself was not universally acknowledged—in 388 Lysias railed against Dionysius as a western Artaxerxes in the *Olympic Oration*.

<sup>461</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 20.2.

<sup>462</sup> I immediately think of the fraternization at Ilerda between the soldiers of Caesar and those of Pompey described by Caesar, *B.C.* 1.73-77, Appian *B.C.* 2.42-3, and Lucan *B.C.* 4.1-401.

<sup>463</sup> Nussbaum (1967; cf. Hornblower (2004) on collective political decision-making and Ma (2004) on mobility of soldiers and the maintenance of group boundaries.

<sup>464</sup> See e.g. the essays in Kennedy and McCormack (2013) on such flexibility in 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century British armies. In the case of Republican Rome, it was not mercenaries but allies who were cast together into heterogeneous armies: cf. Kent (2012) and Rosenstein (2012).

<sup>465</sup> D.S. 13.87.4.

soldiers gathered together for the purpose of communal decision-making is itself an expression of interest in some common good. Selfish individuals and groups could conceivably have taken unilateral action, if the opinion of the collective, and the legitimacy of its decisions, did not matter.

By another token, the more frequent segregation of mercenary units from citizen or allied soldiers in the field and in camp would have served to consolidate the mercenaries' sense of belonging with one another, regardless of their origins. At Akragas in 406 the second group of Campanians hired by the Carthaginians negotiated for their rations by appearing "along with the other mercenaries, nearly all of them," at Himilcar's tent.<sup>466</sup> Mercenaries of all kinds shared common interests and concerns that set them apart from other kinds of soldiers. They tended to camp separately and were typically deployed separately from citizen soldiers, which will have encouraged them to develop ties among each other rather than throughout the army as a whole.

Groups of Campanian mercenaries, who began to arrive on the island in the late 5<sup>th</sup> century, circulated extensively. Perhaps the best-documented itinerary is that of 800 Campanians who were hired by the Katanaioi and Naxioi after the failed Athenian Expedition (after 413), were later garrisoned by the Carthaginians at Entella and supported Segesta against Selinous (410/409), fought for the Greeks and then for the Carthaginians at Akragas (406), returned to eastern Sicily to strengthen the tyranny of Dionysius I (404), and finally settled again at Entella.<sup>467</sup> This group spent nearly 10 years on the move in Sicily and between engagements either returned to their base in western Sicily at Entella, lived scattered in various Sicilian cities, or traveled in camp. They also joined (and probably exchanged members with) other groups of Campanians from time to time, for example at Akragas in 406 when they defected from the Akragantinoi to the Carthaginians, who had hired another body of Campanian mercenaries specifically to oppose the first group.<sup>468</sup> The motivations in that case were apparently entirely economic, since the newer Campanians had been about to defect to the Greeks until the Carthaginians captured a supply convoy and gained the ability to pay their mercenaries well. Then, it must have been to a third body of Campanian mercenaries that Dionysius settled in Katane in 403 and moved to Aitna-Inessa in 396, since Himilcon used the example of the Campanians in Entella to encourage those in Aitna to revolt from Dionysius.<sup>469</sup> The reality of Campanian mercenary migration to and service in Sicily must have been more complex in its chronology, subgroups, and other details, but even the rough differentiation possible with the text of Diodorus reveals some of the relationships between the groups.

The presence of Campanians based in different areas of Sicily has led some scholars to posit a Campanian axis or at least a degree of Campanian solidarity uniting these populations.<sup>470</sup> Entella, Nakone (site not yet located), Aitna-Inessa (not located), Catania, Galaria (not located), Halaisa, and Syracuse, as well as Hippana (Montagna dei Cavalli) are all thought to have hosted Campanian populations at one time or another.

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<sup>466</sup> D.S. 13.88.2.

<sup>467</sup> See Lee (2000, pp. 21-34) for a collection of the literary evidence for this itinerary.

<sup>468</sup> D.S. 13.80.2-5 for the second group of Campanians; D.S. 13.88.5 for the defection of the first.

<sup>469</sup> D.S. 14.61.4-6.

<sup>470</sup> So Prestianni Giallombardo (2006, p. 118): "una presenza sempre crescente di mercenari, di provenienza italica soprattutto...dovette contribuire non poco a creare condizioni favorevoli per l'arrivo e lo stabile inserimento di Roma nell'isola."

The historical evidence for these mercenaries acting in concert is not abundant, but it does suggest perhaps that these populations were aware of each other as sharing a background if nothing else. Just mentioned above, the Campanians in Aitna were asked to take the Carthaginian side as the Campanians in Entella did, an appeal that Diodorus says would have worked had they not already given hostages to Dionysius. In 345/4 the Campanians in Entella, under attack by a Carthaginian army sent to oppose Timoleon, sent out a general appeal for aid; Aitna almost sent help “because of their kinship” but held back after a group of 1,000 hoplites sent by Galaria was caught en route and killed.<sup>471</sup> Galaria was almost certainly inhabited by Campanians at the time, to judge from Diodorus’ phrasing (οἱ τὴν Γαλερίαν πόλιν οἰκοῦντες mirrors his terms for the Campanians in Entella and Aitna, rather than a proper plural ethnic) as well its likely appearance as a target of Timoleon.<sup>472</sup> It therefore seems that in the fourth century when a group of Campanians was in trouble, other Campanians were its best hope for military assistance. By the middle of the third century, the Mamertines could appeal for Roman aid on the basis of a broader Italic kinship.<sup>473</sup> After the Mamertines had taken over Messana, a garrison of Campanians in Rhegion, imposed by Rome and commanded by one Decius, executed a similar seizure. At least one source claims that the Mamertines were involved.<sup>474</sup> Campanians in Sicily certainly paid some attention to the activities of other Campanians (or Italians) on the island or nearby, though there was probably not constant communication or co-ordination.

Archaeological evidence suggests a fairly widely distributed presence of Campanian mercenaries but common cultural forms are not attested. It has been suggested that the distribution of Campanian black-glaze ceramics may trace the movement of mercenaries from the peninsula into and throughout Sicily in the fourth century, but the argument is admittedly tentative.<sup>475</sup> Unfortunately, while we know that, for example, a large number of these mercenaries served in Syracuse both as bodyguards and in the army, no material evidence of them as such survives. Neither Aitna nor Galaria has been located securely, and the archaeological investigation of Katane is made difficult by the modern city of Catania. Epigraphical evidence from Halaisa *may* support the identification of specifically Italic mercenaries there.<sup>476</sup> According to Prestianni Giallombardo, the name *Opikanos* in the Tabulae Halaesinae probably refers to an Oscan; two Latin inscriptions of the second century—one dedicated to Apollo, a god favored by the Mamertines, and one dedicated by *Italicei*—also indicate an Italic presence.<sup>477</sup> Nothing proves, however, that they were mercenaries rather than, for example, traders.

One of the necropoleis at Entella preserves two adjacent burials of Italic style dating to the early fourth century BCE that may have held the remains of a Campanian husband and wife. The husband’s bronze belt and iron spear-blade suggest a military

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<sup>471</sup> D.S. 16.67.3-4.

<sup>472</sup> Plutarch, *Timoleon* 31.2 in which Timoleon makes an expedition against Καλαυρία, certainly not Kalauria (mod. Poros in Greece) but a city in eastern Sicily, in the context of his campaigns against tyrants and Campanians both.

<sup>473</sup> See Prag (2010a, pp. 183-5).

<sup>474</sup> Polybius 1.7.6-13, cf. D.S. 22.1.3.

<sup>475</sup> de Cesare (2006).

<sup>476</sup> Prestianni Giallombardo (2006) prefers to see Italic influence as longer standing.

<sup>477</sup> Tabulae Halaesinae: *IG* XIV 352 col. I L.64, col. II LL. 5, 19-20. Latin inscriptions: *CIL* X 7265 and 7459, respectively.

and perhaps mercenary life, and the location of the wife's bronze fibulae suggests Oscan dress.<sup>478</sup> These are the only Italic-style burials so far found at Entella, suggesting that the Campanian presence there was not heavy in the early fourth century. This seems quite likely: if Lee is correct in his reconstruction then these mercenaries moved frequently between Entella and various battlefields between ca. 410 and 404; there is no reason to insist that in 404 they settled at Entella and never left again. Far more attractive is the possibility that they continued to serve as mercenaries, meaning that many will have been killed while on campaign. The soldiers of that first generation were perhaps not citizens of Entella properly speaking, so they need not have buried their war dead there; subsequent generations appear to have abandoned any markedly Italic funeral practices.

The burials were fully integrated into the necropolis, however, indicating that the deceased could make some claim on the common necropolis. What is most surprising, perhaps, is the apparent presence of a Campanian wife, a presence not particularly compatible with the historical seizure narrative. But Lee has already shown how feeble that narrative is, so it is entirely possible that these mercenaries traveled with families, and perhaps likely that once they had a base of sorts (at Entella) the women stayed there.<sup>479</sup> Alternately the woman may have been a native of Entella, and her dress may have been imposed on her by her husband. Along with this funerary evidence, the onomastic testimony of the Entella Tablets confirms the integration of Oscan names into the city's repertoire by the middle of the third century.<sup>480</sup> The persistence of Oscan names among the city's eponymous officials, aside from the vexed question of whether the individuals were ethnically Oscan, implies a powerful Oscan element in Entella.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify traces of mercenaries' active service in the material record. So for example, while it is known that Entella, Nakone, Halaisa, and Messina all hosted mercenary populations at some point, it is not clear what the archaeological evidence can tell us about their lives specifically *as* mercenaries.<sup>481</sup> In other words, the majority of the material evidence related to mercenaries concerns the process of establishing a settled community and abandoning the occupation of fighting for others. For example, at Montagna dei Cavalli (now agreed to be the location of ancient Hippana) the inhabitants of the city struck bronze coins over Punic undertypes in the fourth century but not, apparently, in the third; the types of the overstruck coins have stylistic affinities with Syracusan coins of Agathokles of the later fourth century.<sup>482</sup> Thus Punic coinage circulated at the site but for a short time in the fourth century the people of Hippana chose to create their own currency. Gandolfo speculatively connects the coinage with the presence of mercenaries "whether one prefers a rather high

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<sup>478</sup> Necropolis A: Guglielmino (2006); cf. Fabbri (2006) for skeletal analysis showing that the osteopathology of the male's shoulders and legs indicates use of the right shoulder and possibly riding a horse.

<sup>479</sup> Lee (2000), proposing that the Campanians were first stationed at Entella in 410/409, cf. Fantasia (2006), who proposes that they first settled there no earlier than 405. Both argue that Diodorus' narrative of sudden and violent takeover (14.9.8-9) certainly compresses the timeframe of the Campanian introduction to Entella and may exaggerate its violence.

<sup>480</sup> Indeed, names and patronyms like Artemidoros son of Eielos (A1, lines 2-3) and Theodoros son of Mamos (B1, line 2) indicate that families used both Greek and Oscan names.

<sup>481</sup> See Prestianni Giallombardo (2006), summarizing the archaeological, epigraphic, and numismatic evidence for Campanian populations in these four cities.

<sup>482</sup> Gandolfo (1997, pp. 794-5).

chronology and the center is considered a mercenary fortress at least from around the middle of the fourth century BCE, or if the proximity to the Syracusan bronzes leads to a lowered dating of the end of the century, which could even be connected with a violent occupation of the site on the part of a contingent of Agathokles' mercenaries" in 312/11.<sup>483</sup> In either case it is significant that the mercenaries will have found the Punic coins in their possession (perhaps their pay) unacceptable as currency in their location. Thus we have another expression of the settled urban community: the mercenaries inhabiting Hippana wanted their own coinage.

Indeed, coinage constitutes one of the few bodies of material evidence that can tell us something about the mercenary lifestyle, though only in a general way. One is on dangerous ground arguing that one or another Siculo-Punic or Syracusan issue was created for a particular body of mercenaries.<sup>484</sup> Rather, it has been convincingly shown that at least in the Hellenistic period, from Agathokles onward, precious metal coins were minted *ad hoc* for the costs of particular campaigns.<sup>485</sup> These costs typically included the payment of mercenaries, which came at the end of a campaign rather than as a daily wage. Such a payment system suggests a cycle of relative poverty and wealth, in which mercenaries got their pay only after fighting—and surviving. Presenting soldiers with the same purpose-made coins could have fortified a sense of solidarity within and between mercenary bands, not to mention groups of allied or citizen soldiers. Yet I emphasize that it is not clear what one could say about the experience of particular groups of mercenaries from the coinage of the superpowers.

Iberian mercenaries were very commonly a part of the Carthaginian armies operating on Sicily. While we do not know much about their experiences, they seem nonetheless to have followed employment over the island and beyond. After Dionysius' seizure of Motya, a group of Iberians in the service of the Carthaginians there refused to surrender and instead negotiated for employment with the tyrant.<sup>486</sup> They next appear in a force of Iberians and Celts sent by Dionysius to the Lakedaimonians in 369 to aid in their conflict with the Boiotians.<sup>487</sup> We are left to wonder where these Iberians spent the intervening 28 years and what they were doing during that time, though both Diodorus and Xenophon agree that they returned to Sicily. It hardly seems likely that Dionysius would have had access to more Iberian mercenaries beyond those he could capture or entice away from the Carthaginians. That these Iberians seem to have maintained some corporate identity (albeit along with Celts, on which see more below) suggests that they

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<sup>483</sup> Gandolfo (1997, p. 795).

<sup>484</sup> So, e.g., Borba Florenzano (1992) notes that Pyrrhus' precious metal issues were on the Attic standard while the base metal coins were based on the Sicilian *litra*, and proposes that the gold and silver were for generals and advisors while the bronze was for mercenaries. I am inclined to view such metrological differences as the result of practical economic considerations; even generals did not transact exclusively in gold and silver coins, and even a single day ought to have earned a mercenary the equivalent of a silver coin.

<sup>485</sup> So concludes Carroccio (2004). In the Mediterranean in general, fewer precious-metal coins were struck in the Hellenistic age relative to other periods: de Callatay (2006). Bronze coinage could thus have been a primary monetary means of mercenary compensation. In a study of the Mithridates VI Eupator, de Callatay (2000, pp. 355-359) finds that periods of intensified minting activity do coincide with preparations for war: "il fait peu de doute que ces frappes ont correspondu à des préparatifs militaires" (p. 356).

<sup>486</sup> D.S. 14.75.8-9.

<sup>487</sup> D.S. 15.70.1; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.20-22.

were not well integrated into the existing community wherever they were stationed. Dionysius' willingness to send them to Greece points in the same direction.

A group of Iberians known as the Hispani, serving under Moericus in the Second Punic War, makes an informative case study. While no source tells us explicitly when and how they came from Spain to Sicily, they first appear among Epikydes' mercenaries holding Achradina at Syracuse in 212, so it seems likely that they had been recruited by the Carthaginians and sent to Epikydes.<sup>488</sup> It is possible that their journey to Syracuse was more complex, as they are possibly to be found among other groups of mercenaries mentioned in connection with events of 214, and might even be connected with Iberians recruited by Carthage and sent to Sicily in the First Punic War.<sup>489</sup> In any case Moericus' betrayal of Achradina to the Romans in 212 earned him and his soldiers the reward of a city, and they were duly given Morgantina in 211 after it had defected and been reconquered.<sup>490</sup> The discovery of a series of coins marked *HISPANORUM* and almost certainly minted at Morgantina confirms their relocation.<sup>491</sup> Like other bodies of ethnic units, their interaction with the larger armies in which they served must have both brought them into contact with other soldiers whose lifestyle they shared but also solidified their sense of being a group apart. The coinage shows that they retained a sense of corporate identity after settling in Morgantina, a period about which the historical record is silent and which is archaeologically not well understood.

The Romans did not employ mercenary soldiers in third-century Sicily, and in fact their settlement of the Hispani is one of the only instances where they dealt with mercenaries in any capacity.<sup>492</sup> In fact, according to Livy they did not employ mercenaries at all until 213 BCE in Spain.<sup>493</sup> Without stepping too deeply into the field of Roman military traditions, I only want to note that their distaste for employing mercenaries in Sicily was all the more remarkable given conditions on the island: the Romans could have easily found mercenaries looking for employment, but apparently were not interested.<sup>494</sup> They did, however, take other steps to relieve population pressure in Sicily, for example transporting 4,000 undesirables from Agathyrna (location in Sicily unknown) to south Italy in 210 to harass the Bruttii on behalf of the Rheginoi.<sup>495</sup> These men, "mingled from dregs of all kinds" in Livy's phrasing, could well have been ex-mercenaries or at the very least were potential mercenaries.

Both Dionysius I and the Carthaginians recruited mercenaries from Gaul to serve in Sicily. Soldiers designated as Celts appear frequently among Carthaginian mercenary contingents from the beginning of the fourth century onward, and although we do not

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<sup>488</sup> Moericus: Livy 25.30.2, cf. 25.27.6-7; 25.27.8-10.

<sup>489</sup> Livy 24.24.7; 24.29.2-4; 24.32.7. First Punic War Iberians: Polybius 1.17.4.

<sup>490</sup> Livy 26.21.12-17.

<sup>491</sup> Buttrey et al. (1989).

<sup>492</sup> The other being an abortive attempt by the mercenaries of the Carthaginians at Lilybaion to betray the city to the Romans in 250: Polybius 1.43.

<sup>493</sup> Livy 24.49.7-8: "...the Roman commanders won over the Celtiberian youth at the same price that had been agreed with the Carthaginians...the Romans had no mercenary soldiers in their camps before the Celtiberians whom they had then [in 213 BCE]."

<sup>494</sup> Instead they preferred to enroll soldiers as *auxilia*, for which cf. Broadhead (2008, p.452), though even this practice was infrequent in third-century Sicily. Jonathan Prag points out *per epistulam* that at least by the time of the Second Punic War the Romans had developed an ideology of citizen soldiers fighting in defense of their homes against the mercenary soldiers of Carthage. Cf. Prag (2011a, pp.16-22) on the rare use of local troops in Sicily and elsewhere during the Republic.

<sup>495</sup> Livy 26.40.16-18.

hear of their exchanging employers, it would be surprising if this did not happen. We should thus imagine them, like the southern Italian and Iberian mercenaries, to have been in circulation in Sicily from the time of their first arrival. Only in the context of the Punic Wars do Gallic mercenaries make an explicit appearance, though in the highly polemicized light of Polybius. In the First Punic War a plot among the mercenary commanders threatened to deliver Lilybaion to the Romans; when Himilcon learned of it he sent one set of envoys to the Celts and another “to the other mercenaries.”<sup>496</sup> This division suggests a recognition that the different mercenary groups required different charismatic leadership, the breakdown of which so doomed the Carthaginians in the Mercenary War of the 230s.<sup>497</sup> As yet, however, the Gauls had not acted differently than other mercenaries. When describing how a company of Gallic mercenaries employed by the Epirots betrayed them around 230, Polybius dilates on the untrustworthiness of the race with this specific group as an example. This group, he says, was composed of exiles and traitors; had pillaged Akragas while employed by the Carthaginians to protect it (presumably before 262); attempted to betray Eryx to the Romans and instead defected when they were unsuccessful; when appointed by the Romans as a garrison of the temple of Venus Erycina, pillaged it instead; and as a consequence were banished from Italy at the end of the First Punic War.<sup>498</sup> Even if the author’s hostility renders each point questionable, they are unlikely to all have been wholly invented, and betrayal and impiety may have simply been a convenient way of talking about a much more mundane and economic decision to change employers.

As a final observation, I note that mercenaries once hired could be brought or sent wherever the employer directed, as part of the wider Mediterranean political situation. Sometimes we know that the travel was temporary. Toward the end of his reign, in 369/8, Dionysius I paid the wages of a group of 2,000 Celtic and Iberian mercenaries (possibly the Iberians he had won over from the Carthaginians at Motya) and sent them to help the Lakedaimonians against Epameinondas and the Boiotians at Corinth.<sup>499</sup> They fought well, and were accordingly sent back to Sicily that same summer, according to Diodorus. Dionysius had enjoyed good relations with Sparta since his rise to power, so this aid is not surprising, though it is interesting that he was at the very same time garnering honors from and concluding an alliance with Athens as well.<sup>500</sup> Athenian diplomatic intervention was fairly obviously aimed at depriving Sparta of his support, which consisted in no small part of human resources. While the historical record leaves those Celtic and Iberian mercenaries in Sicily back in the service of Dionysius I, the island was of course not their original home. We do not know the rest of their story, or whether they ever left Sicily again.

More often, recruited mercenaries brought overseas were not returned by any official diplomacy, as we have seen in the case of Carthaginian recruiting in North Africa, Gaul, and Iberia.<sup>501</sup> Likewise both Dion and Timoleon hired the soldiers for their

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<sup>496</sup> Polybius 1.43.1-5. The contrast between the two groups is highlighted by a *men...de* construction.

<sup>497</sup> Cf. Polybius 1.67.1-13.

<sup>498</sup> Polybius 2.7.6-11. Prag (2010a, pp. 196-7) proposes that the Romans made up for their poor choice of temple guards by appointing a Sicilian garrison, cf. D.S. 4.83.7.

<sup>499</sup> D.S. 15.70.1; cf. Xen. Hell. 7.1.20-22.

<sup>500</sup> RO 33-4 = IG II<sup>2</sup> 103, 105+ 523.

<sup>501</sup> The 5,000 Libyans sent by the Carthaginians along with the 800 Campanians to aid Segesta against Selinous in 410 have unfortunately disappeared from the historical and material record.

Sicilian endeavors at Corinth before transporting them to Sicily; neither seems to have taken steps to return them and Timoleon worked in the opposite direction. The Romans did hire mercenaries to deploy them elsewhere but rather seem to have used force to eject the troublesome Gallic mercenaries from all of Italy, and to deport the rejects of Agathyrna to Calabria.<sup>502</sup> Mercenaries upon the completion of a contract could thus disappear in a number of ways, for example joining new foundations or indeed any community in need of manpower, becoming brigands or pirates, or finding employment with a city whose records are no longer preserved. Tyrants and wealthy cities could afford to spend money and land on settling their mercenaries, but in many cases the soldiers would have simply moved on, since there was no counterpart of the *xenologos* for demobilizing mercenaries. Entering mercenary service meant a usually long term of mobility, one that was subject to economic and political forces far outside an individual soldier's control, and which usually ended at great expense to someone—not always the employer.

The rather unsurprising conclusion of this section is that active military service brought mercenaries to Sicily and moved them around the island as they searched for employment. Greeks, Campanians, Gauls, Iberians, and undoubtedly others formed a major part of armies during two centuries of sporadic but recurrent warfare, during which time companies of soldiers and to a lesser extent the army as a whole formed the dominant social framework for these soldiers. Those on garrison duty might interact with their hosts but any such relations would be especially fragile given the possibility or likelihood that the garrison would leave under orders, be ejected or massacred by the city's inhabitants, or perpetrate a massacre themselves.<sup>503</sup> The army-as-city metaphor is not new, but it is especially apt for mercenaries whose ties to their original or transitory homes were weakened by time and distance. Nikias had encouraged his soldiers in 413 (in vain, as it happens), telling them to “consider that you yourselves are immediately a city wherever you place yourselves...for men are a city, not walls or ships devoid of men.”<sup>504</sup> Mercenaries, no less than Athenians, could constitute the kind of city Nikias envisioned. Except in a few cases to be discussed below, the mercenary band was a way of life for these soldiers, to the extent that they never seem to have sat down for long.

The mercenary lifestyle thus stands in contrast to that of the *polis*. If and when soldiers compose (i.e. constitute) their own city, this is a very different city and a very different community from the *poleis* of the Greek Mediterranean, though it might share features with them. We should not forget that mercenaries were by definition drawn from among men who were willing to give up their native citizenship, or from those who had already left the communities in which they were citizens. Successful mercenaries acted out of self-preservation and profit, perhaps extending favor to their fellow-soldiers but hardly protecting a larger collective. The skills and practices learned as a mercenary did not translate easily to the settled life of the *polis* citizen, as we will see below. Many of the very attitudes and practices that made a mercenary band or an army a cohesive

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<sup>502</sup> See Prag (2011a, pp. 15-22) on the Roman ideological preference for employing foreign troops as *auxilia* rather than as mercenaries; Prag (2007, pp. 76-80) for a survey of the local Sicilian land and sea forces employed by the Romans before ca. 80 BCE.

<sup>503</sup> See e.g. Chaniotis (2002) on the relationship between population and garrison in the Hellenistic world. Needless to say, it was a complicated one, and depending on the circumstances it could oscillate between mutual benevolence and outright hostility.

<sup>504</sup> Thucydides 7.77.4-7. Cf. Hornblower (2008 *ad loc.*).

unit would be out of place in a city. Whatever a man's origin, military service made him an outsider to the civilized world of the *polis*, and success as a member of his new group meant learning an alternative way of belonging. Both his legal citizenship (by which I mean his rights and obligations in the group, as mercenary bands did not pass laws regulating citizenship) and his sense of belonging were different. We should not be surprised that when such men were introduced into *poleis* they did not immediately forget their experience of this fragmented citizenship.

#### **D. Effects of mercenary retirement**

Mercenaries did not serve indefinitely, and when they left active service they were often a disruptive force for civilian populations. The very nature of mercenary service meant that a great deal of their compensation, and the details of their release, was left until the end of their employment. We know, for example, of Dionysius' settlements of mercenaries in eastern Sicily. In the west the picture is much less clear; we do not have any explicit historical account of a comparable Carthaginian policy, though between garrison postings, appropriation of conquered cities and territories, and less violent cohabitations, there was probably plenty of room for their soldiers. It is not clear whether we are ignorant of Carthaginian policy because there was no policy, or because their policy was not recorded in any sources that survive.

Could the archaeologically documented floruit of extensive agriculture in many regions of western Sicily in the fourth century be traces of a decentralized settlement of mercenaries?<sup>505</sup> I note here that when the Romans' disgraced soldiers from Cannae and elsewhere were sent to Sicily during the Second Punic War they "could not spend the winter in towns nor build winter quarters closer than ten miles from any city."<sup>506</sup> Aside from the question of how enforceable the order was, it seems to imply that thousands of soldiers were able to find a place to camp outside the cities of Sicily.<sup>507</sup> The order would also have had the direct effect of segregating the disgraced soldiers from Sicilian civilization, which was located in its cities, creating a separate social world as discussed above in section C. Here, the point is that the countryside could have hidden a large population and the details of its disposition from both the literary and archaeological records, especially if it were a population already used to living in camp. While we have some idea of the scope of rural settlement over these centuries, especially in western Sicily, we do not yet know who those settlers were. Moreover, military camps occupied

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<sup>505</sup> E.g. the Monreale Survey in the upper Belice valley: Johns (1992); the territory of Segesta: Cambi (2003); the territory of Eryx: Filippi (2003); the territory of Entella: Corretti et al. (2006); and now the Marsala Hinterland Survey: Blake and Schon (2010), especially their summary (p.56): "The seven intensive surveys that have been published in western Sicily are consistent in observing a marked upswing in rural settlements in the 4th century BCE, although the precise dates of the expansion, from early in that century to late, vary, as do the types of rural sites represented."

<sup>506</sup> Livy 26.1.6-10.

<sup>507</sup> Whether they lived in temporary army camps all those years or built more permanent structures is not known, though the absence of even a single archaeologically detectable Roman military camp in Sicily argues for temporary camps. In northern Britain (including Scotland) temporary camps have been detected through aerial and ground survey: Jones and McKeague (2009); Dunwell et al. (1995); Hanson (1978). On the difficulty of locating temporary camps around Jerusalem: Geva (1984). In Attica even short-term camps were delineated and constructed in stone—McCredie (1966, p. 99)—"a more readily available material on these hill sites than even mud brick." The absence of known camps from Sicily may thus be partially due to topography and geology.

for even a single year have been uncovered in other parts of the Mediterranean, and their absence in the current archaeological record of Sicily is puzzling. Still, given Sicily's perennial underpopulation, it cannot have been difficult for individual mercenaries to find land on which to retire, or for groups of soldiers to find land with which to support themselves.

Notably, during the First Punic War the Carthaginian army lived for several years in a promising valley in western Sicily. Herkte, located in the hills west of Panormos, was never a permanent city but it seems to have been regularly occupied by armies for extended periods of time. The fact that no city was actually founded there is interesting in itself, as it can perhaps provide a limit case for urbanism in western Sicily. There was never an established population for whom Herkte was home. The first attestation of the place comes in Pyrrhus' march to Lilybaion, in which he overcame "the stronghold of Herkte," which was held by the Carthaginians.<sup>508</sup> The place must have reverted back to the Carthaginians when Pyrrhus left Sicily, although we have little evidence for the frequency of its occupation. A fragment of Diodorus under the year 252/1 records an unsuccessful Roman siege of the site, which means that the Carthaginians there must have had sufficient defenses (natural or built) and access to supplies.<sup>509</sup> Yet the most positive assessment of Herkte's virtues comes from Polybius in connection with Hamilcar Barca's three-year encampment there beginning in 247. He writes that Herkte was

considered to greatly surpass the other places in its suitability for the safety and permanence of an army camp. For it is a steep hill raised from the surrounding territory up to a sufficient height. The perimeter of its upper edge is no less than one hundred stadia, and the place encompassed inside is good for grazing and farming, lying well-situated toward the sea breezes, and being completely devoid of deadly beasts. And it is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs both on the side toward the sea and on the side stretching along the interior, and the areas between these cliffs are in need of small and short construction works. It also has in it a round hill, which takes the position of both an akropolis and a suitable lookout over the adjacent territory. It controls a harbor well-situated for the route from Drepana and Lilybaion to Italy, in which the quantity of water remains plentiful. All three of its approaches are difficult, two being by land and one being by sea.<sup>510</sup>

The scholarly attention that Herkte has received has focused almost entirely on locating it in modern Sicily—not entirely a bad thing since its identification and archaeological exploration could be immensely rewarding.<sup>511</sup> While remains are extant in a number of potential locations, none has been systematically surveyed or excavated. Yet even without such an identification Herkte appears to have had nearly all the characteristics necessary for a city, and it effectively was a city for three years while Hamilcar had his army there, making attacks on Italy and Roman positions in Sicily. It was apparently never occupied on a more permanent basis either before the First Punic War or after, though again a positive identification and investigation of the site could

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<sup>508</sup> D.S. 22.10.4.

<sup>509</sup> D.S. 23.21.1.

<sup>510</sup> Polybius 1.56.3-8 (Paton trans., Loeb ed.).

<sup>511</sup> Hoyos (2001) locates Herkte on Monte Castellaccio just northwest of Panormos. Monte Pellegrino, Monte Pecoraro-Montagna Longa, and Monte Palmita have all been proposed, though Hoyos argues that Monte Castellaccio best fits the scattered evidence we have on the site.

change the picture. If groups of soldiers could not absolutely disappear, they could still support themselves in ways that left very little material or literary evidence.

Furthermore, retirement was a fuzzy concept, and it is clear that mercenaries once settled in a city could leave it just as quickly to take on new employment. For example, if Lee is correct about the chronology of the 800 Campanians' movements throughout Sicily at the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century, then they will have spent nearly 10 years alternating between an encamped or possibly quartered life at Entella and active service across Sicily.<sup>512</sup> By 404 they apparently controlled Entella and until 368/7 remained on the side of Carthage.<sup>513</sup> We subsequently find them fighting only for the defense of their city, though it is also possible that they were induced by the Carthaginians to campaign further afield. The mercenary settlements of Dionysius I should probably be included in this discussion as well. His placement of the Campanians at Katane in 403, and of the Peloponnesians at Leontinoi in 396, were not true city refoundations but temporary arrangements for room and board. These communities, whatever their political status, are interesting because their existence was due to the *fiat* of a de facto king, a foreshadowing of later Hellenistic kingdoms.<sup>514</sup> It has long been recognized that the settlements not only compensated mercenary forces for back-pay, but also placed loyal military forces in strategic places.<sup>515</sup> That the mobility of these mercenaries was still within the power of their employer is demonstrated emphatically by the case of the Campanians at Katane, whom Dionysius transferred to Aitna in 396 "because of its being an exceptionally strong outpost."<sup>516</sup> While it is certainly true that Dionysius attracted many new mercenaries to Sicily from outside the island, he had not forgotten about those already settled there. They could be encouraged or perhaps forced to travel and fight for him too.

The makeup of the army Agathokles used for his coup in 317 further demonstrates how former soldiers might be attracted back into service. The aspiring tyrant "enrolled in his ranks those from Morgantina and from the other cities in the interior who had previously marched together with him against the Carthaginians," who were "all very well disposed toward Agathokles, having received many benefits during the campaigns."<sup>517</sup> Diodorus further specifies that they were hostile to the Syracusan oligarchy of the Six Hundred, and that they hated the whole people of Syracuse because they had to follow their orders. Now, the second of these descriptions suggests that these

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<sup>512</sup> Lee (2000); see above.

<sup>513</sup> On the Carthaginian side: D.S. 14.48.45, 53.5, 61.5; taken by Dionysius I in 368/7: D.S. 15.73.2; taken by Hanno in 345/4: D.S. 16.67.3

<sup>514</sup> Many of Dionysius' techniques have been seen as antecedents to those of the Hellenistic monarchs. The formulation of Adams (2006, p. 45) on the Hellenistic settlements is evocative: "Citizenship was defined as holding land from the king in exchange for military service, and it was the definition used for the groups from which the phalanx was drawn."

<sup>515</sup> As, for example, at Hellenistic Pharsalos (*IThess* I 50) and Dyme (*Achaïe* III no.4) citizenship was awarded to foreigners who had fought to defend these cities partly as a reward for service, though Marchand (2010, p. 342) inclines to military considerations: "These weakened cities incorporated new citizens mainly because they were in need of soldiers."

<sup>516</sup> D.S. 14.58.2.

<sup>517</sup> D.S. 19.6.2-3.

soldiers were officially recruited into the Syracusan army, but I would prefer to see them as mercenaries, based on the following argument.<sup>518</sup>

There are three instances of Agathokles fighting the Carthaginians in the years before the coup: on his first assuming the chiliarchy of his patron Damas; after his return to Syracuse from semi-mercenary exploits in southern Italy; and after he was exiled from Syracuse following a first attempt at tyranny.<sup>519</sup> His first conflicts would have been too long past to engender loyalty and a zeal for revolution. In the second case, though, Diodorus writes that Agathokles fought *ποτὲ μὲν ιδιώτης ὢν, ποτὲ δὲ ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένος*: although the Loeb translation renders *ιδιώτης* as “private soldier,” Agathokles was no infantry grunt and I prefer to translate the word as “private commander.”<sup>520</sup> Thus his soldiers need not have been official recruits of the Syracusans—perhaps they are the soldiers he found in 317. At any rate the passage does highlight the ambiguous nature of military service and the difficulty of differentiating mercenary from soldier, condottiere from commander, and private power from state power. Agathokles’ third confrontation with the Carthaginians was however unequivocally as the leader of mercenary troops: “while he was an exile he put together a private force in the interior.” In light of this background I find it likely that the veterans he assembled in 317 were mercenaries, or had fought with him primarily as mercenaries. If they hated executing the commands of the Syracusan populace, this ill will must derive not from their service under Agathokles but from some other source. And it was these former mercenaries, living at Morgantina and nearby cities, whom Agathokles recalled in 317 for his coup, if not explicitly for another term of mercenary service then certainly with the expectation of special compensation and not as regular soldiers of the Syracusan army.

This dynamic can be observed in a more intense form in Rome during the late Republic. While the patronage of loyal veterans by charismatic Roman generals may well have predated the rise of Marius, his mobilization of those veterans for political purposes set a precedent that dogged the Republic until its demise.<sup>521</sup> Marius had been the first to recruit soldiers from the landless poor, who, like the mercenaries of the fourth and third centuries, depended on their commander for payment.<sup>522</sup> I am not suggesting that Agathokles provided the template for Marius, but rather that similar circumstances gave rise to similar situations: the military service of poor men produced veterans loyal to their commander, who could take advantage of his position as

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<sup>518</sup> Griffith (1935, p. 198) likewise writes that the army was composed of “exiles reinforced with some of the Morgantines and inhabitants of other inland towns (that is to say presumably Sicel mercenaries),” though without arguing in favor of this interpretation.

<sup>519</sup> As chiliarch: D.S. 19.3.1-2; having returned to Sicily: D.S. 19.4.3-4; as leader of a private army: D.S. 19.5.4. Quotations in the rest of this paragraph come from these citations.

<sup>520</sup> This reading makes better sense of the contrast between *ιδιώτης* and *ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένος*—in both cases he was a leader of soldiers, sometimes leading on his own initiative and sometimes officially appointed to command. *Idiotes* never has the meaning of “regular soldier” as far as I know, so the contrast cannot be between serving as a foot soldier and serving as a commander.

<sup>521</sup> See Gruen (1974, pp. 366-8) and Gabba (1976, pp. 3-12) on the progressively decreasing requirements for military service in the generations before Marius. Gabba (1976, p. 12): “Hence the political consequences which attended the establishment of an army based on *proletarii* and which appeared in the first century BC cannot be derived solely from the reform of Marius as the Optimates insisted was the case. Rather they should be seen as originating in the more general condition of Rome in that period of transition which spans the decline of Republican institutions and the rise of the Empire...”

<sup>522</sup> In 107 BCE, cf. Sallust, *Bellum Jugurthinum* 86; Val. Max. 2.3.1; Aulus Gellius 16.10.10.

intermediary between state and soldier. A commander could exert great extralegal power by cultivating a body of veterans, settled into peaceful life but available for action if needed.

Finally, the Mamertines, even once established in Messana, continued fighting far from home, even though they did so for the benefit of their new state and not as employees of other powers. On taking possession of Messana they conducted campaigns as far south as Kamarina and Gela, and sent out garrisons to cities and forts across northeastern and central Sicily.<sup>523</sup> The passages cited above suggest Mamertine garrisons at Mylai, Halasa, Abakainon, and Tyndaris, and a fort at Ameselon (between Kentoripa and Agyrion). These were by no means permanent assignments, nor again were the garrison soldiers receiving pay as mercenaries from another political power. I only mean to emphasize that many of the Mamertines must have spent little time at Messana before going on the march again.

Where groups of former mercenaries do seem to have settled for the duration, they added their own cultural practices to existing ones as they engaged with the emerging Greco-Sicilian norm. The Mamertines, for example, retained or reinaugurated the Campanian office of dual *meddices*, though in the new context of Messana they may not have been the chief magistrates as they were before.<sup>524</sup> There seems to have been a short period of Oscan-Greek interference there, though this was followed by a more fluent use of Greek.<sup>525</sup> At Entella signs of Campanian influence are limited to the two burials mentioned above, the mixed Oscan onomastics and possibly the dual archonship of the Entella decrees, and the early coins minted by the new occupants of the city with the dual legends KAMIIANQN and ENTEΛΛΑΣ.<sup>526</sup> Besides the coins marked *HISPANORUM*, there is nothing distinctively Iberian about post-211 Morgantina. It has been suggested (tentatively) that the cult of Apollo at Halaisa reflects the presence of Campanian mercenaries among the colonists, though the similarity (commented on by Diodorus) of the rites performed there to the rites performed at the Apollo temple in Herbita, the metropolis, makes it less likely that the Halaisa cult owed much to these mercenaries.<sup>527</sup> As far as we can tell, in no case did mercenaries impose their camp life onto a new settlement, and one must wonder if all who settled remained for many generations.

The question of mercenary retirement has been raised by modern scholars as well. Mauro Moggi has used the actions of Campanian mercenaries in Sicily to argue that they always wanted to become citizens, that mercenary service was not an end in

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<sup>523</sup> Kamarina and Gela: D.S. 23.1.4; garrisons and forts: D.S. 22.13.1-2, cf. Polybius 1.8.1.

<sup>524</sup> An inscription recording a dedication to Apollo by two *meddices*: see Crawford (2006, pp. 523-4).

<sup>525</sup> Coin legends of the Mamertinoi were usually in Greek, but one series of the Second Punic War has the Oscan genitive plural MAMEPTINOYM; brickstamps found at Messana have the variants *μμερτινων*, *μμερθινων*, and *μμερτινουμ*: Crawford (2006, p. 524); Tagliamonte (1994, pp. 248-54, 262).

<sup>526</sup> Lee (2000, nos. 8-12) with references and photos. De Vido (2007, p. 307) cautions that the institutions of Hellenistic Entella probably had origins much more complicated than a simple replication of Campanian or Punic practices.

<sup>527</sup> Prestianni Giallombardo (2006, p. 124 n. 94) argues for an “apollinizzazione” rather than a Hellenization of the Mamertines in Messana. In this light I would be tempted to see the Apollo cult at Halaisa as at least partially appealing to Campanian mercenaries, or at the very least a cult they would happily adopt as their Mamertine relatives would later do. But Prestianni Giallombardo (2003, pp. 1075-81) identifies the Apollo cult at Halaisa as essentially Hellenic. Description of the cult in D.S. 14.16.3-4.

itself.<sup>528</sup> While the seizure of cities by mercenaries certainly does suggest that citizenship of some kind was something withheld and desired, I would hesitate to grant the *polis*-citizen lifestyle as a universal goal.<sup>529</sup> Many of the mercenaries we have seen operating in Sicily seem to have attempted to have it both ways: to enjoy some benefits of a base of operations while retaining the mobility to fight far from home. Rather than assigning a uniform aspiration to a diverse group of professionals, it is far preferable to suppose that in any mercenary band some will have preferred to find a place to settle while others will have preferred to continue being mercenaries. This kind of affective citizenship, linked more loosely to place than that of the *polis*, was something mercenaries did want.

In the epigraph of this chapter the Cretan mercenary has no use for Roman citizenship, but in the fourth and third centuries in Sicily, mercenaries desired citizenship and sometimes appropriated it. The Campanians at Entella in the years before 404 saw the advantages of belonging to or reconstituting a community there. Likewise the mercenaries among the colonists heading to Halaisa from Herbita will have been attracted by the possibility of having a regular status that did not depend on the whims of a tyrant.<sup>530</sup> Dionysius never seems to have enfranchised his mercenaries at Syracuse but did settle them in their own communities, at Katane, Leontinoi, and Tauromenion (and perhaps at Adranon).<sup>531</sup> A demand among mercenaries for citizenship is slightly more secure during the reign of Dionysius II, though the narrative is a bit confused. Plutarch records that the Syracusans on the side of Herakleides (and opposed to Dion) secretly offered citizenship to Dion's mercenaries, who had been recruited in Corinth and in Sicily, but that the approach was unsuccessful.<sup>532</sup> Instead Dion took these mercenaries to Leontinoi, where they received both wages and citizen rights.<sup>533</sup> However one wishes to reconcile these two accounts, citizenship remained a carrot to be offered; Dion's mercenaries declined Syracusan citizenship only out of extreme loyalty to their leader, but seem to have accepted Leontine citizenship as an acceptable reward for service. Finally, we should remember that the Mamertine occupation of Messana was partly due, at least according to Diodorus, to a dispute in Syracuse after the death of Agathokles about whether the (Campanian) mercenaries would be given citizen rights.<sup>534</sup> The best reason for such a dispute to have arisen is in

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<sup>528</sup> Moggi (2003, p. 980) argues that the violent seizure of cities by Campanian mercenaries "is to be considered as a reflection of one of the realities at the bottom of the phenomenon of mercenary service: the aspiration to have a *polis* in which to enjoy a statute of *politai* with full rights."

<sup>529</sup> It is worth remembering that we are not certain in all cases that the historical narratives of violent seizure are accurate: Lee (2000), Fantasia (2006).

<sup>530</sup> In general on the foundation of Halaisa see Facella (2006, pp. 77-146), discussing (pp. 82-5) the *misthophoroi* among the colonists and reviewing (pp. 85-99) the material evidence for Campanian influence at Halaesa. Facella concludes that none of it definitively proves Campanian involvement in the city's foundation, preferring instead to see the influence as a result of the city's ongoing contact with the Tyrrhenian sea and with other Campanian groups in Sicily.

<sup>531</sup> On Leontinoi: D.S. 14.78.2. Vattuone (1994, p. 93) rightly notes that this settlement was made possible by the transfer of (most of) the Leontinoi to Syracuse in 403, and reads (fn. 32) the mercenaries' division of the land (D.S. 14.78.3) as evidence of a transformation from a *phourion* into "un'altra realtà"—which I take to mean a *polis*-like community.

<sup>532</sup> Plutarch, *Dion* 38.4-5

<sup>533</sup> Plutarch, *Dion* 39.2, 40.1, cf. 38.6 for the Syracusan vote to not pay the mercenaries; D.S. 16.17.3-4, mentioning only that "the city was in need of money," and omitting any reference to citizenship.

<sup>534</sup> D.S. 21.18.1-2; Polybius 1.7.1-4 does not discuss events at Syracuse prior to 289, and attributes the Mamertines' actions simply to their greed.

fact Agathokles' death, which seems to have left his mercenaries in a difficult situation, especially if nobody wanted to continue paying them. The conflict (armed, according to Diodorus) was resolved with an agreement that they would leave Sicily altogether, though of course they did not quite do so.

Mercenary foundations like Entella, Nakone, and Messana were not necessarily intended to create Greek or Italic *poleis*. Rather, the social organization and communal identity that had held the band together while on the road may have served them equally well once they stopped. The organization may have grown similar to a *polis* over time, but need not have been aimed at final settlement for all. Some mercenaries undoubtedly did give up the profession permanently, but in general, groups of mercenaries did not renounce wholesale the mobility that had enabled their careers and in a sense defined their lives.

The historical record has paid a great deal more attention to mercenaries than to other groups of private citizens, and archaeologists and historians have maintained some of that focus as well, with the result that we have more data on mercenaries than on other populations. Thus mercenaries allow us a privileged view into mobile and potentially mobile populations. What is clear from their situation is that when citizenship is denied to them, they move elsewhere, either voluntarily or under some compulsion. The citizenship in question may include both the legal status that contains other rights, privileges, and duties, and the more abstract concept of belonging.<sup>535</sup> And it is interesting that a similar basic motivation can be seen in other forms of mobility, particularly exile and colonization. While we need not reduce the objects of our study to so-called rational actors, if we can generalize from the experience of mercenaries we might hypothesize that mobility was, in part, a response to a failure of citizenship, either legal or affective. In other words, when *poleis* could not or were not willing to adequately extend some form of citizenship in both senses to certain residents, those people had to find or be relocated to a place where they could belong or create their own community. Successful cities needed immigrants and tried to attract them, whether through grants of legal status or by cultivating a reputation.<sup>536</sup> I do not dismiss the possible economic motivations for mobility, but suggest that social motivations existed as well.

The dynamic has been proposed to explain the initial impetus of Greek exploration, and it did not stop operating after the so-called Colonial period was over. Members of a community deprived of access to social and economic resources may leave in search of opportunities elsewhere. Failure to attain citizenship of both kinds could set people moving, and failure to find it could keep them on the road. Mercenaries in LCEH Sicily had largely already been alienated from their places of origin, but perhaps for some the mercenary band was community enough. Groups of mercenaries might settle down but the communities they joined and formed were by definition unlike the restrictive *poleis* that turned them away, if only in the sense that such communities were explicitly receptive to or composed of newcomers.

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<sup>535</sup> See Cook-Martín (2013, pp. 6-7).

<sup>536</sup> See Oliver (2011).

## Conclusions

From the point of view of their employers, mercenaries had to be managed. They were immensely useful when compensated properly, but could be a source of great trouble if they were unhappy. Tyrants both great and minor, as well as Carthage (which used mercenaries in Sicily despite a general preference for citizen-and-ally armies), occasionally had to pay their hired troops with land by displacing the inhabitants of one or another city. They could also simultaneously achieve other objectives depending on the location chosen, as with the arrangements made by Dionysius I. In similar fashion Agathokles' settlement of (possibly his own) unpaid and unhappy mercenaries at the depopulated Segesta (shortly renamed Dikaionpolis) in 307 not only appeased them but left soldiers with experience fighting against the Carthaginians firmly in the Carthaginian *eparchia*. Thus the employment of mercenaries generated a need for land, which in turn led to the displacement of populations. Of course, the mercenaries could still be paid with cash or booty, which whether obtained by conquest or confiscation could also force people out of their homes. Indeed, large sums could be raised by enslaving populations and then ransoming or selling them, a phenomenon I address in the following chapter.

What I hope to have shown in this chapter is how the circulation of mercenaries on Sicily in the fourth and third centuries affected the communities of the island, both citizen communities and communities of soldiers themselves. The reason that there were so many mercenaries in Sicily is that there was both an increased supply of potential soldiers for hire in the Mediterranean and a growing number of eager employers on the island, from the Carthaginian state and its proxies in western Sicily to the Syracusan and lesser tyrants, to individual communities struggling for autonomy. The Sicilian Expedition in particular has long been acknowledged as a major factor in the growth of mercenary warfare. The practice of paying foreigners for military service was attractive, especially when one could defer that payment until the successful conclusion of the campaign, and substitute plunder, including land, for cash. Once begun, the use of mercenaries became self-perpetuating.<sup>537</sup> It was driven by the upheaval of populations that could not field effective citizen armies and the mobility of individuals without better employment. But it also contributed to that upheaval by placing in the field armies that had to be paid, usually out of the proceeds of aggressive war. Seen in this way mercenary service becomes less of an explanation for the dissolution of *polis* society and more a symptom of that change.<sup>538</sup> Weak cities encouraged mercenary service, which in turn weakened cities.

I do not mean to dwell too much on the causes of mercenary service, since these causes lie in large part beyond Sicily while the effects on the island can be readily comprehended. One of those effects was undoubtedly a weakening of the *polis* as a social and political unit, which scholars have generally been content to bemoan while

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<sup>537</sup> This is the thrust, as I take it of Griffith (1935, p. 198): "Hand in hand with the increase in foreigners went the depopulation among the Greeks themselves, though the extreme instability of the governments meant that soldiers were always needed, and the great number of exiles arising out of the incessant party strife may have meant that there were always plenty of men in need of employment."

<sup>538</sup> Cf. Davies (1993, p. 185) lamenting that mercenaries "helped directly to erode the viability of the city-state as a power unit..." with e.g. Finley (1979, p. 101) lamenting that "there was surely no hope for [the *polis*] in Sicily, where it had never grown strong roots."

noting that the more effective professional soldiers made the ideal hoplite amateur obsolete on the battlefield. While this tactical difference certainly existed, I hope to have shown in this chapter that widespread mercenary service also contributed to evolution of the *polis* by contributing to a new social landscape in which the ideal *polis* citizen group was if not obsolescent then certainly under threat. Civic communities still existed, but increasingly the closed social order based on descent had to give way to communities defined intentionally by their members. Trained and armed soldiers, bound to each other by common experience, had a capacity for self-determination and even aggression that other mobile populations lacked. Not only did mercenaries reshape war, but they also created new and alternative forms of community, and this reconfigured the Sicilian *polis* as well.

## 5. The mostly obscure lives of slaves

καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν  
εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν [“For then a partnership of slaves or of other  
animals would be a *polis*; but in reality it is not one, because they do not share either in  
wellbeing or in living with purpose”] (Aristotle, *Politics* 3.1280a30-33)

...γίνομενης ἀρπαγῆς καὶ ἐφόδου μεθ' ὅπλων καὶ ἀδικήματων ἐπὶ τ(ῇ)ς ὑπαρχούσ(η)ς (ἡ)μεῖν  
χώρας ἐπὶ Δούλων πόλεως... [“...there being seizures and attacks with arms and violence  
against the territory belonging to us at Doulopolis...”] (*SEG XXXIX* 1243, LL. 33-37;  
Colophon, late second century BCE)

“In the Natchez District of Mississippi, slaves cultivated solidarity in ways that created  
not one community but many.” [Kaye (2002, p.2)]

### Introduction

We have thus far examined two aspects of human mobility in which ancient individuals exercised somewhat different agency over their movement. Exiles can be seen either as summarily expelled from their home communities, or as responding to political crises or hostile circumstances by leaving. When the alternative is death, the choice to leave is hardly a free one, and exiles clearly manifested little volition in their travel. Mercenaries, on the other hand, while responsive to market pressures and other conditions, had a range of options. They could choose from several employers (including the enemy they had been hired to fight), they could become brigands, or they could attempt to join settled communities, and these options put their movement on the opposite side of the spectrum. In this chapter I will examine the mobility of a group in Sicily with nearly no agency, to judge from our present evidence: slaves. In fact, while enslaved, individuals did not normally exercise any volition over their movements; only when legally or illegally escaping (and very occasionally when entering) slavery could they do so.

Slaves are often not accounted for in historical sources, though they made up perhaps a majority of the inhabitants of ancient cities. Very little scholarship on LCEH Sicily addresses slavery and enslavement on the island beyond paraphrasing the accounts of the ancient sources.<sup>539</sup> Indeed, the mass enslavement of a population is often the last notice we have of that population, though in some cases the collective was able to reform. Literary narratives of LCEH Sicily therefore best preserve evidence for slaves and slavery at the moment of their enslavement, though there are other scattered notices. We have a very little epigraphic evidence, and almost no archaeological evidence.<sup>540</sup> When a population is enslaved and sold it effectively vanishes from the record, and the same is true of individuals; this is the social death of Patterson's

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<sup>539</sup> Partly this tendency is due to a paucity of evidence, but it also seems to be a product of a general preference for paying attention to elite culture and high politics.

<sup>540</sup> While Morris (2011) and George (2011) express hope for the archaeologies of Greek and Roman slavery, respectively, LCEH Sicily has provided even less of the material on which the research programs they propose might proceed.

landmark study of slavery, to which I will return below.<sup>541</sup> These problems of evidence necessitate a focus on the transition between slavery and freedom, coincidentally the same transition that I have proposed as the location of ex- and future slaves' agency. This chapter therefore also addresses the conceptual boundary between enslaved and free in the context of slaves' physical mobility. Owners and markets directed slaves in various directions, or prevented them from moving, creating disjointed communities not unlike those of exiles; at the same time escape from slavery was often possible only through voluntary displacement.<sup>542</sup>

Like the phenomena discussed in the previous two chapters, neither mass enslavement nor what might be termed normal slavery were unique to Sicily; both must be situated in their Mediterranean context.<sup>543</sup> Yvon Garlan's fundamental examination of Greek slavery makes the distinction first and foremost between what he terms the Helot and the chattel slave.<sup>544</sup> While there is a tradition that the Syracusans enslaved a local population—the Kyllirioi—into a form of Helot servitude in the fifth century, all our evidence for the fourth and third centuries points to the obsolescence of that institution and the vigor of a different dynamic, in which chattel slavery more or less on the Athenian model obtained. What makes the situation a bit more complicated was the mass enslavement, executed by military force and from a relatively early period, of Greek populations by Carthaginians, Carthaginian populations by Greeks, and Greek populations by Greeks. Sometimes the captives will have been scattered, but not always; some enslavements were marked as domestic operations, so that there will have been *de facto* subcommunities of slaves with the same origin and indeed the same story of enslavement, in direct violation of ancient authors' injunctions against keeping slaves of similar origin.<sup>545</sup>

The main sections of this chapter therefore address first the normal circulation of slaves, and second the dramatic enslavements that scattered and concentrated populations outside their homes. As I proposed in Chapter Two, it is important to remember that each of these affected the other: the quotidian slave market was the context in which mass enslavements were conducted, while those enslavements overwhelmed and altered the market as well. Again, the market was certainly not confined within Sicily. I will try to show that, in general, slavery in Sicily encouraged mobility between populations in virtue of the uncertainty of the rule of law, and that in particular the mass enslavements of my period acted to blur the normally clear

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<sup>541</sup> Patterson (1982, p. 38) defines it as the slave's "natal alienation"; to anticipate my argument below, this alienation obviously affects the community from which he or she comes, but Patterson also identifies "the paradox of introducing him as a nonbeing" into the master's community, and the potential tension in that community.

<sup>542</sup> E.g. the Athenians enslaved after defeat in 413 escaped to Katane (Thuc. 7.85.2-4); the Katanaioi presumably did not treat them as slaves but as free men. The picture in Thucydides is one of confusion, where individuals were attempting to take as many personal prisoners as possible; he specifies that some Athenians escaped being enslaved in the first place while "others became slaves and escaped afterward," both groups heading for Katane. Some of the enslaved were redeemed by a certain Epikerdes of Cyrene (IG I<sup>3</sup> 125) cf. Dem. 20 *Against Leptines* 41-42.

<sup>543</sup> Still, De Angelis (2009, p. 243-4) adduces ecological and demographic factors to explain Sicily's embrace of slavery: "...serfdom and slavery were major features of the island throughout antiquity, due to land abundance and the need to control people on this underpopulated but richly endowed landscape for labour purposes."

<sup>544</sup> Garlan (1988).

<sup>545</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 1330a26-28 is perhaps the most-often cited; see below fn. 551 for further citations.

boundary of the city-state. The enslaved joined heterogeneous slave populations in Sicily and elsewhere, and even if they escaped or were freed, the connections they had forged would not instantaneously disappear.

### **A. Normal slavery as a motor of mobility and challenge to community**

In this section I will address the normal circulation of slaves, ex-slaves, and future slaves on Sicily in my period. Ancient Mediterranean slavery, as a form of forced mobility, caused problems of cohesion both for the community from which people were enslaved, as well as for the community in which they were made to serve as slaves. It is not my aim here to establish any special standing for Sicilian slavery; that is the work of the next section. Instead I hope to lay out the background activity of slavery, disruptive in its own way to community cohesion, and to clarify the system that mass enslavements supercharged and overwhelmed. I do not insist on this division between normal and extraordinary enslavement—mass enslavement was part of the system, too—but I utilize it for convenience, since it is precisely the mass enslavements that are distinctive to LCEH Sicily.

People became slaves in a number of ways in the Mediterranean. The children of slave parents became slaves, though this aspect of slavery while interesting in its own right is not particularly promising for my investigation of mobility. In some cases a person could sell himself into slavery either to repay a debt or for survival; this method of enslavement, like hereditary slave status, is relevant for my purposes only in that it created a new slave, who might potentially be sold or relocated later on.<sup>546</sup> However, most slaves came from some form of physical seizure. A person seized by pirates or brigands was often sold as a slave, as were soldiers or civilians captured in war. Unless ransom was quickly paid, the captive could be sold to anyone from anywhere, and resold any number of times, traveling great distances involuntarily and living in a city he or she did not choose.<sup>547</sup>

That the loss of neighbors, family members, friends, or even enemies to the slave trade was traumatic for communities should not be surprising. Naturally our sources lay greater emphasis on the value of elites and the importance of their return, but any group forced to endure the occasional disappearance of some of its members is likely to suffer from the experience. When men were captured in war and sold off, or inhabitants of the countryside were taken unaware by pirates, brigands, or legitimate armies, or indeed travelers were tricked by highwaymen, there was potential trauma to the community from which they came. The regularity of such occurrences should not mask their social effects.

On basic theoretical and comparative grounds, therefore, a community is weakened or threatened when it sends slaves to the market. Indeed, when those enslaved were Greeks, we have good evidence of social consequences. The debate over whether it was just or not for a Greek army to enslave other Greeks is one such indication. Similarly, defenses and responses to pirate raids show that violations of a

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<sup>546</sup> E.g. the account in Diodorus that in 211, despite Marcellus' orders not to enslave any free Syracusan, some of them were in such poverty that they sold themselves into slavery (D.S. 26.20.1-2)

<sup>547</sup> Braund (2011, p. 113) describes the Mediterranean slave trade as "organized around the minimal needs of a fragmented and much-ramified market," and concludes that "[a]lmost anyone might buy or sell a slave, anywhere."

Greek community's integrity were problematic, especially when those taken were citizens.<sup>548</sup> While the loss of a citizen was undoubtedly an economic and political problem as well, that does not mean that the weakening of social bonds was any less troublesome to the community. If one prefers to think in social network terms, removing even a small number of key nodes (i.e. elite citizens) will have serious consequences for the strength and nature of the new network. I only suggest that the considerations we know the Greeks to have had about the damage suffered by a community from whom slaves were taken, applied in general to non-Greek communities as well.

The movement of slaves was nominally entirely in the control of their masters. As a slave, a person had as much personal mobility as his or her master allowed. In general, slaves may have traveled within cities, or between the town center and the countryside, but did not travel much between cities, except to or from slave markets.<sup>549</sup>

Extraordinary examples of slaves acting as international agents for their masters do not, I think, constitute a general feature of Mediterranean slavery. I do not want to downplay the significance of the short-distance mobility of slaves, but clearly the greater motor of mobility was the slave market, which could send a person across the Mediterranean as easily as across town. Their mobility consisted largely in their circulation as commodities; in other words slaves experienced mobility not as people but in their capacity as goods. As goods they received even less documentary attention than grain or oil, perhaps because of collective amnesia created by the cognitive dissonance of such a dehumanizing institution.

In the cities where slaves were owned, they constituted a class apart, and as indispensable as they may have been for the functioning of economy and society, they were problematic nonetheless. Above all, a persistent fear of trouble from slaves led to insecurity.<sup>550</sup> It was recommended not to keep many slaves of similar origin; the mass enslavements discussed below will have made it difficult to follow that advice in Sicily.<sup>551</sup> Slave status may have helped philosophers consolidate the notion of free status, and they may have omitted slaves from their utopias, but the reality was that slaves were a part of the community, and that the nature of that community was affected by the institution of slavery.<sup>552</sup> That masters routinely fathered children with their female

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<sup>548</sup> See for example the particularly evocative response of the city of Teos to pirate activity: *SEG* XLIV 949, as well as similar situations collected in Bielman (1994).

<sup>549</sup> See the excellent study of the 'geography of containment' imposed by Roman slavery, in tension with the 'rival geography' of the slaves themselves: Joshel (2013).

<sup>550</sup> An insecurity that could be exploited, as the Athenians did in their regulations on the export of ruddle from Keos (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1128 = *RO* 40), which offered freedom to slave informers, which *RO* ad loc. describes as "potentially subversive in the extreme." See also Arnaoutoglou (2007) on general concerns about living with slaves and Hunter (1994, ch. 3) on slaves' mere presence as surveillance and a check on citizens' behavior.

<sup>551</sup> Aristotle, 1330a26-28; [Aristotle], *Oeconomicus* 1344b19-21; Plato, *Laws* 776b-778a; Athenaeus 6.264f-265a; Varro *RR* 1.17.5-7. See Zoumbaki (2005) for a summary of slave collectives that finds religious associations to be among the only sanctioned forms of collective slave identity.

<sup>552</sup> In the context of the Islamic Mediterranean, where the stigma of Greek enslaving Greek is mirrored by the injunction on enslaving fellow Muslims, the social effects of incoming slaves in Morocco has been studied by El Hamel (2002). While obviously the social contexts are not the same, El Hamel makes the intriguing observation (p. 29) that "the movement of slaves throughout the [Mediterranean] basin and their permanent establishment in communities that were far from—or, indeed, not so far from—their

slaves, that slaves and free members of the house often slept in the same rooms, that slavery shaded into serfdom, tenancy, and free poverty: all these suggest a deep tension between familiarity (in all its senses) and enforced status lines.<sup>553</sup>

There were, however, ways for slaves to cease being slaves. They could escape, not without difficulty.<sup>554</sup> They could buy their freedom or have it bought for them. They could be manumitted in a number of ways, including by fleeing to temples recognized as havens.<sup>555</sup> While a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the ways in which a freed slave was tied to his or her former master, I would like to focus instead on the potential advantages of mobility for ex- and potentially ex-slaves. Runaways' chances were best far from the cities where their masters lived and for many legally manumitted slaves too, it must have been preferable to move away and live as a free foreigner than to remain in a city where they would continue to depend on their former owners. What I would like to suggest is that the abstract change in status from slave to free was also enacted through a physical displacement of greater or lesser degree. Manumitted slaves had at least to find a new place to live, and while I recognize the potential advantages of remaining connected to a family wealthy enough to own slaves, they will sooner or later have found opportunities for more autonomous existence. Mobility could have been an attractive option for freed slaves and for runaways it was necessary to survival. Just as the entrance into slavery involved an involuntary displacement, the exit from slavery could involve a voluntary move.

When populations were disturbed in other ways, like the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi in 405, there were consequences for slaves as well as free. In the first place, in the confusion of evacuation the distinction between slave and free must have been somewhat blurred, as other social boundaries were in Diodorus' indignant rendering.<sup>556</sup> Second, the legal status of the refugees must have made it difficult to pursue claims against runaways once they had arrived in Syracuse or Leontinoi; even back at home the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi cannot have been in a position to track down all those who had escaped.<sup>557</sup> I see no reason to assume that all the slaves of the Gelooi and Kamarinaioi should have remained with their owners through such a disturbance; while the refugee

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places of origin instigated social changes... slaves, assimilated or not, free or still enslaved, introduced new cultural practices into the societies to which they had been transported." See also Patterson (1982, p. 41).

<sup>553</sup> A tension noted by both Arnaoutoglou (2007) and Tuplin (2007). Arnaoutoglou asserts that, based on Greek legal texts, "the main element fuelling suspicion and fear was the everyday close co-existence of slaves and citizens, at home and in the *agora*." That is, placing two groups of extremely unequal status side by side in the same city created instability. Tuplin argues that slavery was a poisonous model for Greek interstate relations in the fifth and fourth centuries because it prevented *poleis* from co-operating, and that failure to investigate the institution made its use as a model easier. Cf. also Golden (2011) and Edmonson (2011).

<sup>554</sup> See Bradley (1978, p. 334) for the suggestion that "fugitivism was a common form of servile resistance in the Roman period" (bibliography at fn. 35); the analogy with New World slave societies (bibliography at fn. 34) ought to hold for the ancient Mediterranean in general.

<sup>555</sup> See Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005) for the most recent synthesis on Greek manumission.

<sup>556</sup> See above, Chapter Three section B.

<sup>557</sup> *IC* iv 41 col. IV LL.5-17 (Gortyn, fifth century BCE) provides for the recovery of runaway slaves but only within the city's jurisdiction. To my knowledge there are no extant intercommunity laws on the return of runaway slaves, but this does seem like something a hegemon like Athens or Sparta could have regulated among its allies, or a *koinon* among its members. Mackil (2014, p. 57) suggests that the Chalkidian Koinon guaranteed property rights among all the citizens of its member *poleis*, so it could well have enforced transactions involving slaves; Mackil (2013) makes the same argument for koina in general.

citizens thereby lost more property, the refugee slaves might have gained freedom if not citizenship elsewhere. In 403 Archonides of Herbita founded Halaisa with, among others, “a mixed crowd, which gathered into the city because of the war against Dionysius.”<sup>558</sup> Why could there not have been ex-slaves among them? Tyndaris, founded in 396, was particularly generous with its citizenship according to Diodorus, and likewise might have offered an opportunity for runaway slaves to establish themselves as citizens.<sup>559</sup> Besides new foundations and citizenship grants it is also quite plausible that there remained parts of the island, both rural and urban, that remained beyond the reach of Greek property law.

The point I am trying to make is that even in its normal operation, Mediterranean slavery was detrimental to the static cohesion of communities everywhere—both those that lost members to the slave trade, and those where slaves were owned. It may not have been very detrimental, and societies may have been able to cope with the problems posed, but it was fundamentally an institution that weakened the integrity of the community at every stage. People were enslaved and transported against their will, creating within each city substantial groups who had little interest in the city’s welfare; if a slave were ever to be truly free he or she would have to take flight, either as a freedman or a runaway.<sup>560</sup> The institution of *paramone*, which required the former slave to remain with the former master, meant that manumission was not the end of servitude.<sup>561</sup> This is the context in which the mass enslavements of LCEH Sicily took place, and the dynamic was similar in type though not in scale. If Mediterranean cities were able to respond to the challenges of normal slavery, if they could usually find equilibrium, this balance was severely upset by the enslavement of large numbers of people of all ethnicities.

## **B. Mass enslavement as a catalyst to the system**

It is not difficult to see how the influx of thousands of slaves into the slave markets of Sicily would intensify the processes outlined above. While losing some citizens to raids was problematic, when most or all of a community was enslaved, that community suffered a potentially final trauma. While in normal times slave markets may be assumed to have found a balance between supply and demand, an enormous surplus of slaves would have overwhelmed demand, and buyers from further afield must have been required.<sup>562</sup> And in the cities where slaves were bought, large numbers of new

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<sup>558</sup> D.S. 14.16.1. On the foundation of Halaisa see Facella (2006, pp. 77-146) who does not, however, allow that slaves might have joined the σύμμικτον ὄχλον mentioned by Diodorus.

<sup>559</sup> D.S. 14.78.5-6.

<sup>560</sup> Patterson (1982, pp. 39-44) differentiates between an “intrusive” conception of slaves brought from elsewhere and an “extrusive” conception of slaves created internally; summarizing on p. 44: “In the former the slave was an external exile, an intruder; in the latter he was an internal exile, one who had been deprived of all claims of community.” My study is more interested in the consequences of “intrusive” slavery; “extrusive” slavery also affected the strength and nature of the community, though not through mobility or physical displacement.

<sup>561</sup> Maffi (2005, p. 259); Todd (1995, pp. 190-192).

<sup>562</sup> Massive influxes of slaves were also perhaps normal in Mediterranean life as a large battle or pirate raid could put thousands of slaves onto the market. Pritchett (1971, pp. 80-82) on the centrality of military operations to the slave supply in the Greek world; cf. Braund (2011, p. 115): “War had the power to change everything quickly and totally in the Greek world....The main issue was who would win, which at its most extreme meant who would have the power to enslave whom.”

slaves, many of them with the same origins, had to be supervised and adapted to their status. Mass enslavement was a particularly brutal form of exile or *dispora*.

In LCEH Sicily, the three powers most frequently responsible for enslaving populations *en masse* were the Carthaginians in the late fifth century, Dionysius I in the late fifth and early fourth century, and the Romans from the middle of the third century on. Taking captives on the battlefield was a related but different activity (mentioned above as a routine and therefore unremarkable method of enslavement); here I am concerned with the cases in which many or all of the non-combatant inhabitants of a city were forced into slavery. I will address each of the main enslavers in turn, in order to show specifically how their actions affected concepts of belonging and citizenship.

One might well object that mass enslavement was not unique to Sicily in this period: the Athenians frequently reduced recalcitrant allies and neutrals to slavery during the Peloponnesian War, the late third century saw a frenzy of mass enslavement in Greece, and Aemilius Paulus' army famously pillaged Epirus producing 150,000 slaves.<sup>563</sup> In the face of such facts I can only agree that the Sicilian situation is not unique. Nevertheless, those episodes—Athenian manipulation and enslavement of civilian populations, the habit of Cretan and mainland Greek cities to enslave the populations of defeated cities, and Roman activities in Illyria—deserve greater attention, particularly to the ways in which they affected communities on both sides of the conflict. What were the consequences of *andrapodismos* in Athens itself? How did those Greek cities relate to one another when each had enslaved some of the others' citizens? Can we follow the enslaved Illyrians? Furthermore, the chronology of these episodes is significant. In broad strokes, the Athenians' management of their empire may well have inspired or at least informed Carthaginian and later Syracusan policies. Similarly the Romans may have learned to practice mass enslavement in Sicily before they crossed the Adriatic, and the Greek cities of the mainland only began to frequently enslave whole populations after Sicilians had been suffering that treatment for generations.<sup>564</sup>

In fact, it was a fate that Sicilian populations might well have come to expect during the LCEH period. Quantitative comparison is necessarily schematic, given that numbers can rarely be trusted and in many cases no numbers are even given. While acknowledging the imprecision of counting events, we can still note that in Pritchett's compilation of enslavements (which includes all those taken captive, including surrendered soldiers and sailors) 26 out of 113 records from 409-202 BCE involve Sicilian populations.<sup>565</sup> While I am primarily interested in enslavements of civilian populations, a full examination of the circumstances surrounding every Mediterranean enslavement is beyond the scope of this study, and so the percentage (23%) derived

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<sup>563</sup> For a mild view of *andrapodismos* in general, which with enough detachment can be seen as barely detrimental to the cities subjected to it, see Hansen and Nielsen (2004, pp. 120-122); Kulesza (1999) argues that the escape of populations from sacked cities explains how they could thrive shortly after the inhabitants were supposed to have been sold as slaves. For Athenian *andrapodismos* as possibly adopted from Persian practice, see Raaflaub (2009, p. 109). For the late third century in Greece, see Eckstein (2013, p. 321). For Aemilius Paulus in Epirus, see Livy 45.34 and Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus* 29.1-3.

<sup>564</sup> While it is true that the Romans occasionally enslaved civilian populations from the early Republic on, it was not a hallmark of their military strategy as it became in Sicily. The treatment of Cameria in 502 (D.H. 5.49.3-5) and Veii in 396 (Livy.5.22.1) was not on the same scale as the enslavements of the Punic Wars.

<sup>565</sup> See the table compiled by Pritchett (1991, pp. 226-234). Pritchett includes the enslavements of Naxos and Katane as one entry, but I have counted it as two events.

from Pritchett's table will have to serve as a proxy. Though imperfect, it indicates that mass enslavement was a significant phenomenon for LCEH Sicily and deserves attention along with Athenian, Macedonian, and Roman captive-taking elsewhere in the Mediterranean.

Still, literary sources confirm mass enslavement to have been practiced in Sicily from at least the early fifth century. The populations of Kallipolis (perhaps another name for Katane), Naxos, Zankle and Leontinoi were enslaved by Hippokrates, tyrant in Gela, ca. 498-491 BCE.<sup>566</sup> Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegion, led a group of Samians and Milesians in enslaving the Zanklaioi in 494.<sup>567</sup> Gelon, after assuming power in Syracuse, went on to enslave the lower classes of the Leontinoi and sell them outside Sicily sometime in the 480s; he did the same to the lower classes of Megara Hyblaia in 483.<sup>568</sup> The specification that certain populations be scattered outside Sicily is particularly interesting, as it betrays a concern for the potential destabilizing effects of enslaved populations. No such specifications are recorded for the enslavements of the LCEH period. Once sold, a slave could move anywhere as a commodity in demand, and despite Gelon's caution, mass enslavements no doubt contributed to the mixed populations Alcibiades thought to be characteristic of fifth-century Sicily.

While fear of Carthaginian dominance pervaded Greek Sicily throughout the fourth century and perhaps into the third, from 409 onward the Carthaginians actually enslaved relatively few, besides enemy soldiers captured. When they took Himera in 409 they captured an unknown number of women and children; in the capture of Selinous they took 5,000 captives. Akragas was evacuated before they could reach it, but we are told that encamped before Gela in 405, Himilcon took "every sort of plunder," which ought to include unprotected rural inhabitants of the territory. Likewise ten years later Magon raided the territory of Messana, probably taking captives as well; when the Carthaginians defeated the Messanioi they captured some of the inhabitants though most escaped. That is our last indication of the Carthaginians enslaving a civilian population; for most of my period the dreaded Carthaginian enslavement was figurative, not literal. The invasions of the late fifth century were undoubtedly brutal, and killed thousands; nor do I doubt that those enslaved suffered horribly. However in the context of this discussion of slavery, the Carthaginians cannot play much of a part. Those they enslaved truly disappear from the record, and we do not know whether they were sold off in Sicily or taken to Carthage. The potential return of the Selinuntinoi to Selinous and Himeraioi to Therma under the condition of Carthaginian tribute, per the treaty of 405, would seem to exclude the possibility that the enslaved were given or sold to the Carthaginian co-inhabitants of these cities. Thus their itineraries are a dead end, as is the question of Carthaginian mass enslavement.

Dionysius I, on the other hand, repeatedly enslaved whole populations, in the tradition of his Deinomenid predecessors. In fact, despite the charges of Theodoros speaking in the Syracusan assembly (reported by Diodorus in a set piece speech) and his

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<sup>566</sup> Herodotus 7.154.

<sup>567</sup> Herodotus 6.22-23 cf. Thucydides 6.4.5.

<sup>568</sup> Herodotus 7.156. For Megara Hyblaia see also Thucydides 6.4.2 and Polyaeus, *Stratagema* 1.27.3 (where Gelon invited the Megareis to become Syracusan citizens, then imposed a excessive tribute on the ruler of the Megareis, and when he passed this burden onto the Megareis they took Gelon's offer of citizenship rather than paying). See Luraghi (1994, pp. 288-304) on Gelon's consolidation of power at Syracuse through population transfer.

incredulity that Dionysius could be compared to Gelon, the two leaders did at least share that enthusiasm for enslaving subject populations.<sup>569</sup> Dionysius began his consolidation of eastern Sicily by enslaving the populations of Naxos and Katane in 403; Diodorus writes that he “sold the city [of the Naxioi] into slavery” and specifies that he “sold the captives [of the Katananaioi] as plunder in Syracuse.”<sup>570</sup> In neither case was Dionysius the victor in battle but instead he had suborned leaders in both cities; once the cities had been betrayed their inhabitants could not even fight fairly for their freedom but had to accept slavery or presumably be massacred. What is potentially interesting here is an apparent distinction in treatment: the Naxioi may have been sold on the spot during and after the destruction of their city, while the Katananaioi were brought to Syracuse and sold there. Members of both groups could have circulated through slave markets anywhere, but we might expect the majority of the Katananaioi to have ended up in Syracuse, and the majority of the Naxioi to have ended up elsewhere. We do not hear of either group of slaves *per se* in Syracuse or anywhere else; once enslaved their story cuts off.

Yet these enslavements were evidently incomplete, or did not last very long. In 394 the Rheginoi, threatened by Dionysius’ refoundation and fortification of Messana from 396 on, offered to take in those expelled by the tyrant and hostile to him, “and after this settled in Mylai those of the Naxians and Katananaioi who had survived...”<sup>571</sup> Nine years after the putative enslavement of both cities’ populations, there were survivors able to settle in Mylai, which can be explained by one of a number of possibilities. Perhaps not all the Naxioi and Katananaioi were enslaved, and some escaped; Diodorus’ narrative is hardly conclusive and could be read to allow such an interpretation. It is also possible that some of those enslaved were sold to the Rhegians or others opposed to the tyrant, and that they manumitted them in order to fortify an anti-Dionysius stronghold in Mylai.<sup>572</sup> State-level redemption and manumission of politically valuable prisoners was not unheard of in the Mediterranean.<sup>573</sup> On this hypothesis, Dionysius’ political opponents will have bought the enslaved Naxioi and Katananaioi with the express purpose of freeing them, in effect ransoming or redeeming

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<sup>569</sup> Theodoros’ speech, set in the year 396: D.S. 14.64.5–69.5 . Unfavorable comparison to Gelon: D.S. 14.66.1–3. Interestingly, the speech is full of references to metaphorical slavery, the very kind that Tuplin (2007) identified as pernicious to the *polis*. The discourse of slavery in Diodorus and his sources is a question outside the scope of this chapter, though it would make an interesting study.

<sup>570</sup> D.S. 14.15.2–3: τὴν πόλιν [sc. Ναξίων] ἐξηνδραποδίσατο...ἐλαφυροπώλησε τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους [sc. Κατανάιους] ἐν Συρακούσαις.

<sup>571</sup> D.S. 14.87.1.

<sup>572</sup> Even if the buyers did not purchase the enslaved with manumission in mind, a Naxian may have been worth more to them free than as a slave. Of course there is the problem of collective action, since any particular Rhegian would lose money by giving up his slave for the communal good. However, *epidoseis* in times of emergency are common in Greek cities, and if the issue were presented as one of Rhegion’s survival it may have had force. In [Aristotle] *Oeconomica* 1350a12–15, the city of Mende ordered its citizens to sell all their slaves except for one man and one woman, with the proceeds to be loaned to the city. The Rhodians, under siege in 305/4 BCE, “voted to buy from their masters those of the slaves who had proven in the dangerous circumstances to be noble men, to set them free, and to make them citizens” (D.S. 20.84.3, actual execution of the decree at 20.100.1).

<sup>573</sup> In 194, for example, Flamininus asked the Greek cities “that they gather and send to him in Thessaly any Roman citizens who were slaves among them” (Livy 34.50.3); many had been captured by Hannibal and sold off (34.50.5). 1,200 were returned by the Achaian Koinon (34.50.6), which apparently bought them at 500 denarii per captive. Cf. Plutarch, *Flamininus* 13.4–5, who gives the ransom as 5 minae and dramatizes the reunion of captives with their families.

them for a much lower price.<sup>574</sup> What, after all, was the difference between ransom and purchase in order to manumit? A third source of survivors is escape. As runaways, Naxioi and Katanaioi could perhaps expect a warm welcome in Rhegion as a matter of course, but the offer of asylum in 394 may have encouraged and attracted more of them. Diodorus terms those received in Rhegion τοὺς ὑπὸ Διονυσίου φυγαδευομένους (“those made refugees [or exiles] by [or because of] Dionysius”), and a state opposed to the power that enslaved him or her in the first place might view that enslavement as illegitimate and the runaway slave as a refugee.<sup>575</sup> Thus the report in Diodorus may indicate that the Rheginoi welcomed the Naxioi and Katanaioi who had managed to escape, and did not recognize or enforce their status as slaves.

Unfortunately the work of the Rhegians came undone, and the redeemed slaves were scattered once again. Concurrently with the resettlement activity the Rhegians had launched an attack on Messana, allied with Dionysius, and not only did this fail but the Messanioi followed up on their victory by proceeding to Mylai where they “took the city, and sent away under a truce the Naxioi who had been settled in it. These men then, departing for both the Sikels and the Greek cities, settled some in one place and others elsewhere.”<sup>576</sup> The omission of any reference to the Katanaioi is strange, and should not be dismissed as accidental. I propose that Dionysius’ conflict with the Sikels, particularly those whom he had settled in Naxian territory in 403, provides an explanation for differential treatment. In 396 the Carthaginian general Himilcon had induced those Sikels to establish a fortified city on the hill above the ruins of Naxos, which became known as Tauromenion.<sup>577</sup> In the tyrant’s mind this ungrateful and hostile city had to be checked, and releasing the Naxioi, who might want to recover their city and territory from the Sikels, was one way to do this. In favor of such an interpretation are the nearly fatal battle Dionysius fought with the Sikels in Tauromenion in that same year, 394; the acknowledged enmity between Sikels and Naxioi; and the fact that the Naxioi did eventually settle in Tauromenion in 358/7.<sup>578</sup> It is just possible that upon capturing Mylai in 394, Dionysius’ proxies retook the Katanaioi but released the Naxioi in order to let them cause trouble for the Sikels in Tauromenion. On this reading the Naxioi at least, having been enslaved, managed to regain their freedom and lived as a diaspora community among the Sikels and Greeks, until they could resettle in the new city founded in their old territory.

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<sup>574</sup> Hellenistic honorific decrees amply attest the attractiveness of redeeming prisoners either by paying ransom or by negotiating for release later. Bielman (1994, pp. 293-4 and 301-7) describes the processes by which private individuals and states, respectively, could negotiate for the release of captives who had been enslaved. Even if a free citizen were enslaved, he or she would lose all connection with slave status upon release (p.322): “Tout se passe comme si le Grec de naissance libre ne perdait jamais, même asservi, sa qualité virtuelle d’homme libre; il recouvrerait la totalité de ses droits de citoyen sitôt rentré dans sa cité...S’il ne retournait pas chez lui ma s’établissait ailleurs, il était considéré dans son nouveau lieu de résidence, soit comme un affranchi...soit comme un métèque...”

<sup>575</sup> The collocation in Diodorus of the reception of the φυγαδευομένους just before the settlement of the survivors may also imply that he thought the two were causally connected, though his judgment would not in any case be conclusive.

<sup>576</sup> D.S. 14.87.2-3.

<sup>577</sup> D.S. 14.59.1-2. References to “Himilcon’s offers” indicate some degree of official Carthaginian assistance, as does the fact that the Carthaginians were apparently able to cede Tauromenion to Dionysius by treaty in 392.

<sup>578</sup> Battle in Tauromenion: D.S. 14.87.4-14.88.5. Sikel-Naxian enmity: D.S. 14.88.1. Naxioi return to Tauromenion: 16.7.1.

Dionsyius did achieve a signal military victory against the Carthaginians at Motya in 397, and as I argued in Chapters One and Two, he enslaved all the survivors. In short, the Motyans withdrew behind their walls when the siege began, and once it had begun, there was no chance of evacuation or escape—everyone was either killed or captured. After the initial breach of the city’s defenses Dionysius, “wishing to sell the inhabitants of the city into slavery in order to gather money,” had to prevent his soldiers from slaughtering the inhabitants by encouraging the defeated population to seek protection in temples.<sup>579</sup> Diodorus has him sell the surviving Motyans as slaves while still at Motya, a sensible operation for the general of an army of allies far from their homes.<sup>580</sup> It would appear, then, that those enslaved at Motya were dispersed through the slave trade into the cities of western Sicily, who it should be remembered had only capitulated to Dionysius out of fear and who, like the Rheginoi, might not be inclined to view his enslavements as legitimate.

The ancient Greek historical tradition holds that the survivors from Motya founded Lilybaion on the mainland just south of the island.<sup>581</sup> We know from the archaeological evidence that Motya was reoccupied shortly after its destruction, so all of the survivors of Motya did not move to Lilybaion, but all the settlers of Lilybaion could have been survivors from Motya.<sup>582</sup> Lilybaion itself, though very incompletely excavated, actually seems to have become populous only in the later part of the fourth century.<sup>583</sup> Thus its founders could well have been the Motyans enslaved and subsequently either escaped or bought and freed. To whom could Dionysius have sold his captives but to other Carthaginians or locals, if he did not want to lead and maintain masses of slaves along with his army on his campaigns, and needed cash to pay his soldiers?<sup>584</sup> The foundation of Lilybaion was a massive undertaking, to judge from the impressive fortifications dating back to the fourth century, and so official Carthaginian involvement in procuring settlers should not surprise us.<sup>585</sup> If Lilybaion was to be populated with survivors from Motya, then the Carthaginians may have been responsible for buying back their citizens and freeing them.<sup>586</sup> While the Carthaginians apparently had no

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<sup>579</sup> D.S. 14.53.2.

<sup>580</sup> D.S. 14.53.5. For the immediate sale of captives so as not to weigh down a traveling army, see e.g. Polybius 4.75-77: when Philip V captured Thalamai in the Peloponnese, the large number of captives and plunder made his army “heavy and unmanageable,” and forced him to make a priority of selling them off.

<sup>581</sup> See Chapter One, section A.1.

<sup>582</sup> Diodorus tells us that there was a well called “Lilybaion” at the site of the future city, and that this is where Hannibal landed in preparation for the invasion of 409 (13.54.4). While we should be suspicious of anachronism it is unlikely that the Carthaginians of Motya were completely ignorant of the commanding promontory of Lilybaion. Continued occupation of Motya: Famà (2002, p. 50) and Nigro et al. (2004).

<sup>583</sup> The earliest burials known thus far from the Lilybaeum necropolis date to ca. 350 BCE, though these are few compared to those of the third century: Bechtold (1999, p. 18). It is possible that the earliest inhabitants were buried at the nearby Birgi necropolis, whose burials (seventh through third centuries BCE) have not been securely identified with a specific habitation: Griffo (1997).

<sup>584</sup> Catulus immediately sold the captives he had taken in the Battle of the Aegates in 241, probably for similar reasons. Craven (1990, p. 105) attributes a monetary motivation following Diodorus but also infers a degree of mercy from the “not inhumane” Dionysius, which cannot be substantiated in the sources.

<sup>585</sup> On the city’s fortifications and planning see Caruso (2006).

<sup>586</sup> Craven (1990, p. 106) glosses over the distinction between ransoming prisoners and buying slaves in order to free them: “many – perhaps most – of them were, in fact, ransomed by their neighbors (perhaps by the Egestaioi), as was the common practice.” His suggestion that the Egestaioi or other Elymi bought the prisoners is an attractive one, but D.S. 22.10.4 makes the Carthaginians themselves the architects: Lilybaeum “was founded by the Carthaginians...for having gathered together those who had survived [the

opportunity to recover the inhabitants of Motya through ransom, they may have done so piecemeal through the slave trade.

The last recorded enslavement executed by Dionysius was that of the Rheginoi in 387 after he had weakened the city through siege and a deception. He had been engaged in hostilities with them for several years, when in 388 he effectively stole their food supplies and began an 11-month siege.<sup>587</sup> Without adequate supplies the Rheginoi held out as long as they could, but were overcome by hunger and surrendered. Besides the “heaps of the dead” in the subdued city, Dionysius rounded up 6,000 survivors and had them shipped to Syracuse where they could be redeemed for a silver mina each, or else they would be sold as slaves.<sup>588</sup> Once again, the ransom asked was much higher than the price at which a prisoner could be sold as a slave. At that point all living Rheginoi were either living as slaves in Sicily and elsewhere, or were free non-citizens in Syracuse without a homeland (they need not have stayed at Syracuse, however); nobody seems to have been living in Rhegion. There are scant indications that some of these survivors, both enslaved and redeemed, may have reunited in Rhegion, but nothing explicit.<sup>589</sup> The referent of the term Rheginoi is difficult to pin down in this period; by the time Timoleon was preparing his landing in Sicily, whoever they were, they were free and independent.

In the cases thus far examined, mass enslavement turns out to be a type of transformation for the community. Individuals could survive when the collective dissolved, but similarly the collective could survive the loss of some of its members, as certainly happened. The Naxioi, after a long period of enslavement and exile, lived on as Tauromenitai.<sup>590</sup> The survivors of Motya likewise passed through a period of slavery to become the founders of Lilybaion. Our information about the experience of the Rheginoi after 387 is much sketchier, but it is possible that they too regained their homeland. In a sense, these populations passed through a state of slavery and came through changed; the advantage of paying ransom was that one never had to become a slave. Even if, as I am arguing, these individuals and groups managed to escape their enslavement by running away or having others purchase and free them, the trauma of the journey could

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sack of Motya] they settled them in Lilybaion.” But would Dionysius have sold the captives back to the Carthaginians?

<sup>587</sup> D.S. 14.108.1-3. Dionysius ‘stole’ the food by obligating the Rheginoi to sell it to him (according to some principle of neutrality by which they could not refuse to sell) and then taking it on credit; it is unlikely that he ever paid for the food as was promised.

<sup>588</sup> D.S. 14.111.4.

<sup>589</sup> Strabo (6.1.6) reports that Dionysius II “having restored a section of the colony [of Rhegion] called it Phoebia.” According to Diodorus (16.45.9), Rhegion had been “garrisoned by the younger tyrant Dionysius” in 351 but Leptines and Callippus “forced the besieged city to surrender...threw out the garrison, and restored independence to the Rheginoi.” It is hard to imagine Dionysius II restoring the bitter enemies of his father, but there must have been some reason for him to have imposed a garrison, so it is possible that the original Rheginoi had in fact returned home. In fact, if Strabo’s “restoration” was Diodorus’ “garrison,” then perhaps the Rheginoi had already returned by the time Dionysius II began to interfere.

<sup>590</sup> The fate of the Katanaioi is unknown—they may well have been recaptured in 394. The next instance of the term Katanaioi in the literary record is with Timoleon’s arrival in Sicily: in 344/3 Marcus/Mamercus, “the tyrant of the Katanaioi,” made an alliance with him (D.S. 16.69.4; cf. Plutarch, *Timoleon* 13.1), though it is not clear whether Marcus’ subjects were Campanian mercenaries, returned ‘original’ Katanaioi, or others. The subsequent habitation of Katane does not necessarily mean that those enslaved in 403 ever returned to compose a community again.

not be undone. In every case displacement threatened the survival of the enslaved community, and in every case powerful friends were needed. The exact nature and effects of the transformation escape us, since the literary sources give very little information about life in these cities before and after, and modern cities cover Rhegion, Lilybaion, and Katane.

Yet it is possible to make some conclusions based on the evidence available. Lilybaion seems to have retained links in its material culture with Motya, to judge largely from the funerary evidence and its defensive architecture. Of course, Motya itself was already a cosmopolitan settlement at the time of its destruction.<sup>591</sup> The presence of Greek inscriptions in the necropolis of Lilybaion is not a novel Hellenistic phenomenon, as Greek inscriptions were also found in the Motyan necropolis at Birgi.<sup>592</sup> Indeed, the typologies and funerary assemblages at Lilybaion, in their very mixture of Punic and Greek elements, recall the mixed nature of Motya's older necropoleis.<sup>593</sup> The resettled population continued to engage with wider Punic, Sicilian and Mediterranean burial traditions. In addition, Caruso finds the entire fortification system of Lilybaion to be largely similar to that of Motya before its destruction, though it had developed in response to changing techniques of siege warfare.<sup>594</sup> This material connection to Motya should not surprise, since both cities were planned and built by the same authority, and techniques of war affected the entire island.<sup>595</sup> On a material level, then, Lilybaion was Motya reborn, even if the new city incorporated many who had never been Motyans.

Continuities with the earlier Naxian community may also be visible in the material record of Tauromenion. Archaeologically, little of late fifth-century Naxos or fourth century Tauromenion remains, though coinage may offer a clue. Naxos itself was partially reoccupied in the fourth century, though perhaps only in a small port area and an extramural sanctuary at Scalia-Maloprovvido.<sup>596</sup> Coins recalling the distinctive Dionysian iconography of Archaic and Classical Naxian issues were also minted in the fourth century, though the two extant examples are without archaeological context, and so we cannot be sure who minted them.<sup>597</sup> The coins, currently in Berlin, display a crowned youth on the obverse and a crouching satyr draped with vines alongside a herm of Dionysus on the reverse; Rossi expands the legend on the reverse to ΝΕΟΠΟΛΙΤΩΝ. Thus there can be no question that the coins represent a renewal of a community recognizing itself as new in some way, though still maintaining links to the old community of the Naxioi. In general, moreover, it is impossible to say exactly who partially reoccupied Naxos after 403, though it was probably not exclusively repatriated Naxians. Furthermore, once Tauromenion was settled, the coinage of that city made

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<sup>591</sup> Recall that it hosted a group of Greeks loyal enough to defend it against Dionysius in 397 (D.S. 14.53.4).

<sup>592</sup> Lilybaion *defixiones*: Bechtold and Brugnone (1997); Motya inscriptions: Griffo (1997).

<sup>593</sup> Motya necropolis: Ciasca (1980) and (1990); Birgi necropolis: Griffo (1997); Lilybaion necropolis: Bechtold (1999, pp. 279-283).

<sup>594</sup> Caruso (2006, pp. 292, 294-5).

<sup>595</sup> Caruso reports e.g. double-walling (*proteichismata*) at contemporary Heloros, Gela, Tyndaris, Camarina, and Selinous. While we might expect affinities between fortifications at the new foundation of Lilybaeum and the newly populated "Punic" Selinous, Karlsson is emphatic that the walls were not at all similar. Karlsson (1992, 107 n. 453): "I find it unlikely that the chain wall at Selinous was built by the Carthaginians...the Carthaginians concentrated their power on the creation of their new city of Lilybaion, the walls of which are *very* different from those of Selinous..." (emphasis original).

<sup>596</sup> Lentini (2002).

<sup>597</sup> Rossi (2005).

explicit reference to the Naxian patron Apollo Archegetes, along with the Dionysian iconography of the grape cluster.<sup>598</sup> The Tauromenitai, certainly a mixed group, thus laid claim to Naxian heritage though forging a new corporate identity—Naxos itself was no longer a relevant collective.

Most of the fourth century was free of mass enslavements, but Agathokles deserves a brief mention in this discussion, since his efforts to silence dissent among the cities of Sicily led him to enslave some of them. Unlike the enslavements of Dionysius, there is no indication that those enslaved were able to reassemble. In 312 his general Pasiphilos made raids on the territory of Messana, taking many captives, who were presumably enslaved or perhaps ransomed back.<sup>599</sup> In 307, he captured the city of Apollonia and “after he slaughtered most of the Apolloniatai he seized their possessions as plunder.”<sup>600</sup> The passage of Diodorus leaves room for speculation that some of the city’s inhabitants survived and were enslaved, but it is not clear what happened to them, as we do not hear of Sicilian Apollonia again in the historical sources. However, Agathokles saved his most brutal enslavement for the women and children of Segesta, whom he sold to the Bruttii after massacring the adult male population in 306.<sup>601</sup> This episode raises a number of questions, but most relevant for the issue of mass enslavement, it represents a (to my knowledge) unique account of a population enslaved *en masse* and sold *en masse* to a third party.<sup>602</sup> It is very unlikely that those women and children sold abroad in Italy could have escaped to Sicily, or that their kinsmen, if any survived, could have recovered them from the Bruttii. If any of the prior population of Segesta remained or returned there after 306, for those enslaved, enslavement was not a transitional phase but the end of their existence as part of the community.

Aside from Agathokles’ occasional use of enslavement, Sicilian populations appear to have been safe from that fate from the 380s down to the beginning of the First Punic War. This is of course not to say that they did not suffer other, often terrible, fates—there was no broad peace. Still, in terms of slavery and mass enslavement, it was the Romans who employed the practice most heavily, from the beginning of the First Punic War into to the middle of the Second. This is not entirely remarkable, since the Romans had been enslaving conquered armies in Italy for centuries.<sup>603</sup> But they seem to have developed a habit, once in Sicily, of enslaving entire conquered populations, which they had not done much in Italy. Unfortunately this practice and its consequences have not received much attention, and discussions of Roman mass enslavement begin and end with Epirus.<sup>604</sup>

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<sup>598</sup> Cf. e.g. *SNG* I 916 (ca. 358-275 BCE): obverse: laureate Apollo with legend Ἀρχαγέτας and reverse: bull with legend Ταυρομενιτᾶν. *SNG* I 925 (ca. 358-275 BCE): obverse: laureate Apollo and reverse: bunch of grapes with legend Ταυρομε(νιτᾶν).

<sup>599</sup> D.S. 19.102.3.

<sup>600</sup> D.S. 20.56.4.

<sup>601</sup> D.S. 20.71.1-5.

<sup>602</sup> Other questions: who were the ‘Egestaioi’ after 306? Who were the ‘deserters’ to whom Agathokles gave the city?

<sup>603</sup> See Auliard (2002) for a catalog of Roman enslavement of prisoners from 509-292 BCE, in which enslavements of defeated armies figure prominently; only in four of the roughly 25 cases she documents did the Romans enslave part or all of a city’s non-soldier population while in two cases it is not clear whether non-combatants were enslaved.

<sup>604</sup> For Sicily I mention e.g. Hoyos (2011) and Bagnall (2005) not to single them out but simply as an indication that even in recent basic texts and collections the impact of Roman enslavement in the places

The major events have already been mentioned in Chapter One. The Roman capture of Akragas in 262 produced 25,000 captives taken as slaves. In 258 they captured Kamarina and sold “most of the people in Kamarina” into slavery; that same year they also sold the inhabitants of Mazara and Mytistratos into slavery. In 254 they gave the conquered Panormitai the choice between ransom and enslavement; 14,000 were able to pay the ransom, while 13,000 were sold as slaves.<sup>605</sup> There is nothing to suggest that the Romans, operating throughout the First Punic War on foreign territory, kept any of these slaves themselves or shipped them to Italy or Rome for sale; most likely in each case they sold the captives either on the spot or in the nearest Sicilian city. That fact, and the fact that in the turbulence of war nobody was in a position to police the island for runaway slaves, leaves open the possibility that many of those enslaved may have been able to return home. We know that Akragas was inhabited again as early as 254, and archaeological evidence likewise attests more or less continuous occupation there and at Kamarina; Mytistratos has not been located and Panormos is mostly inaccessible under Palermo.<sup>606</sup> In the case of the Entellinoi (see below), assistance came from a neighboring ally. Perhaps similar friendly cities aided the enslaved Akragantinoi after 262, and likewise with the other populations.

The First Punic War was also the setting for the action that displaced the Entellinoi from their city, and led to the enslavement of some of them. There is no clear indication of who was responsible for the ejection or enslavement, but given that the Romans frequently enslaved whole cities during the war while the Carthaginians never did, it is likely that the Romans had taken some of the refugees prisoner. In decree A3 the Egestaioi (Segstans) are thanked for helping to redeem those of the citizens taken captive.<sup>607</sup> It is not clear exactly what happened to the Entellinoi involved, nor what exactly the Egestaioi did to help them, but Segesta had been allied with Rome from the beginning of the war, and may have hosted Romans operating in western Sicily. The Entellinoi may have been enslaved at the moment of their expulsion from Entella, or they may have been taken captive while on the road, as a vulnerable itinerant population. As slaves, they may have been purchased by citizens of Segesta, the government of which subsequently decided to send them back to Entella as free people. Or the Egestaioi may have intervened in slave markets elsewhere, or indeed with private buyers elsewhere, buying the captives for immediate release or negotiating their release. Although we do not have the details that would allow us to choose from these scenarios, what they all require is the official involvement of the *polis* of Segesta in obtaining the freedom of the Entellinoi whether they were held by its own citizens, foreigners from other cities, or even Romans. Entella A3 may thus document, in general, the process I have proposed led to the redemption of the Naxioi and Katanaioi in 394. Incidentally, the only other epigraphic reference to slaves in my period is a possible autoconsecration text of the fourth century, *SEG XLII* 823 from Palma di Montechiaro, near Akragas.<sup>608</sup>

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where it occurred has been largely ignored. Loreto (2007) addresses Roman terrorism in the First Punic War, though in a broad comparative military-political framework, and hardly discusses Sicilian populations themselves.

<sup>605</sup> See Chapter One section H.

<sup>606</sup> D.S. 23.18.2. For continuity at Kamarina, see Di Stefano (2006). Panormos was able to mint coins from the later third century onward: Manganaro (2003).

<sup>607</sup> A3 LL. 9-14: ἀλόν- | των ἀμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν | πολλῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναι- | κῶν ἐβοαθήσαν αὐτοῖς καθὰ | ἐδύνατο ὅπως σωθέωντι ἐς | τὰν ἰδίαν συντόμως.

<sup>608</sup> See also *IGDS* II no. 78.

In the Second Punic War the Romans continued largely apace. Marcellus attacked Megara Hyblaia in 214 and enslaved the survivors; unfortunately we do not know who these people were (they almost certainly have nothing to do with the descendants of the eighth-century colony) or what happened to them after their enslavement. In 210 the Romans finally recaptured Akragas and again sold its entire population as slaves, though we know that the city was once again populated within a few years. Then, each year from 210-207, Roman armies made raids on North Africa—sometimes captives are explicitly mentioned, while sometimes they must be assumed—and sold their haul at Lilybaion.<sup>609</sup> What is interesting about these raids is that they led to the repeated introduction of North Africans as slaves—people whose language and perhaps appearance will have made escape within Sicily more difficult, and redemption by a friendly city less likely.

The broader impact of the mass enslavements conducted by the Romans is difficult to assess. On the one hand, they appear to have enslaved entire populations rather frequently, more frequently than they had in peninsular Italy. On the other hand, in at least some cases the cities where they had enslaved thousands were populated and active again in a very short time. This may be due to exaggeration on the part of our sources, but it may also be due to an extremely short cycle of repopulation, with original inhabitants as well as opportunists, as I have argued may have been the case for those populations enslaved by Dionysius I as well.

To conclude this section on mass enslavements, I want to briefly examine the Sicilian evidence for the converse phenomenon: mass manumissions.<sup>610</sup> It was not uncommon in the Greek cities of the Mediterranean for slaves to be utilized in emergency military operations, and even to be granted their freedom.<sup>611</sup> Indeed, manpower requirements appear to be at the root of the Sicilian manumissions as well. In 404, as part of Dionysius' consolidation of power in Syracuse, he enfranchised slaves and included them as *neopolitai* among the beneficiaries of a land- and house-distribution.<sup>612</sup> It is not known how many slaves were freed in this manner, nor whether they had been slaves held privately, by the Syracusan state, or by Dionysius himself. It is nonetheless interesting that in Diodorus' account not only these freed slaves but also aliens (*xenoi*) shared equally with original citizens in the distribution. Dionysius again freed a large number of slaves in order to boost manpower reserves after the Carthaginians captured Messina in 396, enough to man sixty triremes (perhaps 12,000 people), and this is probably too many to have been his personal property or that of the state.<sup>613</sup> These mass manumissions, laudable as they may be from a modern perspective, nonetheless constitute another strategy by which the tyrant extracted resources from the people of Syracuse.<sup>614</sup> The tyrant was not in the habit of compensating Syracusans fairly

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<sup>609</sup> See Chapter One section H.

<sup>610</sup> We do not know enough about property and citizenship law in Sicily to say whether manumission entailed enfranchisement or not; Dionysius' *neopolitai* (see below) did presumably become citizens, though the possibility remains that most freed slaves did not become citizens of any *polis*.

<sup>611</sup> Garland (1988, pp.163-176). See also Raaflaub (2007, pp. 126-7) with bibliography, on the broken distinction between slave and citizen-soldier, noting at p. 126 the "extraordinary measures the Spartan authorities took to neutralize the potential sociopolitical impact of the helots' military service."

<sup>612</sup> D.S. 14.7.4-5. On the term *neopolites* see Casevitz (2002, p. 101).

<sup>613</sup> D.S. 14.58.1. Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 45-6) asserts that these freed slaves were likely given citizenship as well.

<sup>614</sup> For other innovative revenue collection strategies of Dionysius see [Aristotle] *Oeconomica* II.2.20, 41.

for anything, and he was constantly in need of money with which to pay mercenaries, so it is far more likely that he simply declared the slaves free and eligible for naval service than that he paid their owners for them. An example of such manumission by fiat comes in 392 when, with the army of Mago threatening, Dionysius' soldiers deserted and he resorted to declaring the slaves freed; when the Carthaginians offered to negotiate for peace he agreed and rescinded the manumission.<sup>615</sup> Again it is not clear exactly which slaves were involved, nor precisely why the Carthaginians sued for peace, though it may be that once the slaves had all been enlisted, Dionysius' army seemed to them too powerful to fight. In Chapter Two I noted that Agathokles had used the pretense of a defensive evacuation to massacre wealthy dissenters in 310; after doing so he also "freed those of the domestic slaves who were well-adapted for military service" (ἡλευθέρωσε τῶν οἰκετῶν τοὺς εὐθέτους εἰς στρατείαν).<sup>616</sup> It is to be understood that the newly freed were enlisted as soldiers, though they do not seem to have accompanied Agathokles to Libya. This act was not conceived in military emergency, and probably belongs with Dionysius' first mass manumission as a measure of consolidation.

Thus emergency manumission and/or enfranchisement of thousands of slaves constituted a plausible means by which the enslaved might gain freedom. Though the examples in the previous paragraph all relate to Syracuse, this is probably more due to the Syracusan bias of our written sources than to a particularly Syracusan habit. Many Sicilian cities endured emergency conditions, and opportunities to enlist slaves for defense were numerous. Many of the slaves thus employed must have earned freedom, or at the very least the opportunity to run away with armor and weapons. Extending citizenship to slaves, including the right and obligation to fight in the community's defense, was common for Greek cities facing existential threats; in Sicily as well such grants would have functioned as an entrance to the community for those nominally kept outside it. I have been stressing throughout this chapter the attractiveness of running away, but slaves freed in this way during a crisis may well have felt a responsibility to remain with their liberators—or have been under legal obligation to do so if *paramone* was enforced. It is tempting to imagine that recently enslaved populations, and those from within Sicily, would have taken the first opportunity to flee while lifelong slaves and those brought from outside the island would have been happy to join the community that had kept them enslaved. The fact that the Naxioi and Katanaioi were able to answer the asylum offer of the Rheginoi might indicate that they were freed to fight in 396 and then ran away. But there is no solid evidence, and for the present I must admit that we cannot tell what effect these mass manumissions had on mobility.

## Conclusions

Slaves experienced a mobility that was very different from that of free people. In Buckland's words, "[t]here is scarcely a problem which can present itself, in any branch of [Roman] law, the solution of which may not be affected by the fact that one of the

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<sup>615</sup> D.S. 14.96.3.

<sup>616</sup> D.S. 20.4.8. The Greek does not specify that the freed slaves had been the property of the men who were killed, but it does make sense for Agathokles to have confiscated the slaves along with the rest of the wealth, and such an interpretation would relieve us from asking the questions of authority that could not be answered for Dionysius.

parties to the transaction is a slave.”<sup>617</sup> It should not be controversial to expand his characterization from Roman law to the whole of our inquiry into the past, including the study of human mobility. The most serious consequence of slave status for such a study is that for the inhabitants of the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, the slave trade was a movement of things, not people.<sup>618</sup> Thus we have even less written evidence of the movement of slaves as such, and archaeologists have not yet been able to isolate a material culture of slaves.<sup>619</sup> While of course slaves were people, attempting to study the movement of slaves as if they were free people is bound to fail, since their capacity to produce durable evidence of their lives was suppressed by the institution of slavery. Even finding conclusive archaeological evidence related to elite mobility is difficult; with slaves it is nearly impossible. One of the most brutal aspects of slavery is its ability to erase the humanity of its victims; even if the slaves of antiquity are not invisible to us, they are certainly hard to see.

It is instead at the borders of slave status, in the acts of enslavement and escape or manumission, that we can follow former and future slaves as potentially mobile agents, and tentatively infer movement as slaves. I have tried to suggest in the pages above that movement across these status boundaries was easier in Sicily, where a number of competing states had varying degrees of control over territory, than in Athens, Lakonia, Rome, or Roman Egypt, where regimes of status enforcement were much more developed.<sup>620</sup>

In this chapter we have seen some of these fluid itineraries of enslaved populations, who moved and were moved through space as they crossed between freedom and slavery. One such population, enslaved just before the beginning of my study, may nevertheless be instructive. In 415 the Athenians captured and enslaved the inhabitants of Hykkara on the north coast of western Sicily, gave the empty city to Segesta, then sailed to Katane where they sold the captives for at least 100 talents.<sup>621</sup> This would be a standard enough narrative of a city’s destruction; and indeed Hykkara does not again appear as a community of any kind. But we later learn in Thucydides, through Nikias’ letter to the Athenians, that some of the mercenaries in the fleet, “conducting trade themselves (ἀντὸι ἐμπορεύμενοι), persuaded the trierarchs to put Hykkarian slaves on board instead of themselves...”<sup>622</sup> While most of the slaves must have been sold in Katane, those who replaced the deserting mercenaries would now themselves have to be replaced if the trierarchs wanted to sell them, and it is likely that

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<sup>617</sup> Buckland (1908, p. v).

<sup>618</sup> I agree with Patterson (1982, p. 173), that slaves “always had *some* choice” [*italics sic*], but in the realm of mobility, especially movement outside their master’s city, exercising agency meant shedding, or attempting to shed, slave status. Freedom of movement was the province of the free, and when a slave claimed that freedom he or she was denying his or her slave status. Slave rebellions may not have been aimed at broad abolition, but the participants themselves were certainly not planning to return to servitude: Urbainczyk (2008). See also Vlassopoulos (2011), who argues that the proper framework in which to study Greek slavery is not that of possession but of domination.

<sup>619</sup> See again Morris (2011) and George (2011); see also Joshel (2010) for an attempted reconstruction of Roman slaves’ subjective experiences, desires, and beliefs.

<sup>620</sup> See e.g. Kamen (2013) for the range of institutionalized societal controls that prevented status boundaries from being violated at Athens.

<sup>621</sup> Thuc. 6.62.3-4 has 120 talents; D.S. 13.6.1 has 100 talents, and implies that the Athenians sold the captives on the spot. Both agree that Segesta paid 30 talents for the city itself. See also the rather speculative observations of Plácido Suárez (2002).

<sup>622</sup> Thuc. 7.13.2.

they continued to serve on those ships, since they would not need to be paid. Just what happened to them afterward is not known, but they disappear from the record still with at least the possibility of earning their freedom.

In fact, we can follow the journey of two famous Hykkarian captives, Timandra and her daughter Laïs, who must have been sold in Katana, and then in mainland Greece. Both are recorded as courtesans, and their fate offers a rare window into the experience of enslaved women. Timandra was said to have accompanied Alcibiades on campaigns and was with him when he was murdered in Phrygia in 404.<sup>623</sup> Laïs on the other hand was renowned in Corinth, but apparently traveled to Thessaly where she died.<sup>624</sup> It is not clear when they were separated, but their divergent paths illustrate well that families could be broken up, even a mother with a young daughter. For both the path to any freedom they enjoyed was through their sexuality, but this path was literal as well as figurative. Somewhere on the route from Hykkara to Katane to the eastern Mediterranean they had shed their full captive status. Pausanias even has Laïs traveling to Thessaly of her own accord in search of her lover, displaying a mobility probably not accessible to most Greek women.<sup>625</sup> He and Plutarch both confirm that she was known in antiquity as a Corinthian (though both record her origin at Hykkara), and with this we can see how easily an enslaved population could dissolve, each survivor adapting or being adapted to new circumstances. The rest of the Hykkaran slaves left no mark, and whatever they did they never again formed a community.

A major lacuna is our understanding of Carthaginian practices of slavery, and in particular of slavery in Carthaginian western Sicily. From the early fifth century on, avoiding enslavement to the barbarian Carthaginians was a preoccupation for the Greeks in Sicily, just as mainland Greeks abhorred subjection to the Persians.<sup>626</sup> But the fear of enslavement was greater than the reality, especially given the propensity of Greeks and Romans to actually enslave entire Sicilian populations. It does not seem that the Carthaginians took many civilian slaves from eastern and interior Sicily for service in the western part of the island. Besides the campaigns of 409 and 406, mass enslavement by Carthaginians was not a major threat, though of course, western Sicilian buyers may well have been active in the slave trade. Without arguing too strongly *ex silentio*, it seems quite plausible that the cities under Carthaginian control in western Sicily may have represented a haven for runaways from the Greek cities.<sup>627</sup> The nature of property law and the incentives for enforcement may well have differed sharply between the communities of eastern and western Sicily, so that a runaway from Syracuse to the

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<sup>623</sup> Athenaeus 12.48 535C; Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 39.8.

<sup>624</sup> Plutarch, *Nicias* 15.4; Pausanias 2.2.5; Athenaeus 5.14. Cf. Aristophanes *Ploutos* 179.

<sup>625</sup> See however Loman (2004b), arguing in general for a high degree of mobility for women in the Hellenistic period, especially (pp. 85-99) for prostitutes and courtesans.

<sup>626</sup> Cf. Pindar *Pythian* 1.71-80 praising Hieron I for his victories over the Carthaginians at Himera and the Etruscans at Cumae as “rescuing Hellas from heavy servitude,” with Prag (2010b, pp. 55-59) on the banal rhetorical trope of liberation from barbarian slavery developed by the fifth-century tyrants. Prag further explores the connections between the construct of the enemy Carthaginians with that of the enemy Persians, for which see Cartledge (1993). Miller (2004) examines the complicated and not entirely antagonistic relationship between Greek and Persian cultures, and Prag points the way to a similar approach for Greeks and Carthaginians in Sicily.

<sup>627</sup> Dietler (2010, p. 248) proposes that slaves who escaped from Massalia may have brought new ceramic technologies and styles into the hinterland; a similar dynamic between eastern and western Sicily has not been verified. Runaway slaves certainly carried information of some kinds with them, though not all will have left traces in the record available to us.

growing Lilybaion (for example) could easily have been worth more as a new citizen than as a slave. Perhaps that is already going too far; at any rate it is at least possible that the Carthaginian cities had reasons not to enforce the slave status of every escapee.

Here I highlight a theme related to the slave-free interface discussed above: the potentially widespread escape from slavery by extra-legal rather than legal means, that is, by running away rather than gaining manumission. Throughout the fourth and third centuries, the fragmented legal-political landscape of the island will have made the detection, detention, and repatriation of runaway slaves logistically difficult. Furthermore, we simply do not know what regimes of slavery were operating in most of the island for most of this period, especially in the western part. It is quite plausible that a runaway slave could reach a community that did not have an interest in returning him to his master.<sup>628</sup> This would have been especially true in new foundations like Halaisa and Tyndaris, whom we have already seen were noted for their liberality in granting citizenship to newcomers.<sup>629</sup> Turmoil anywhere would have afforded an opportunity for runaways to blend in.<sup>630</sup> Similarly a runaway who reached a community politically hostile to the power that enslaved him could hope to be treated as a free citizen. As a thought experiment, suppose that a Greek soldier captured by the Carthaginians and sold as a slave in western Sicily managed to escape to Syracuse—would he remain a slave there? Mass enslavements may well have been less complete than the written sources imply, but the resurgence or continued occupation of cities in the years after the putative enslavement of their inhabitants could also have been the result of infilling from neighboring communities as well as original inhabitants who had escaped slavery.

Mass enslavement was not the only means by which Sicilian cities were depopulated, but it was one of the more traumatic ones. In many cases enslavement of survivors removed an already-weakened population from its home and left an empty city, fragmenting and dislocating the former citizen body at the same time. While we have much better documentation of enslavement and deportation than of return and rejuvenation, many of these populations never did reassemble; those that did had a great deal of work ahead of them, as we saw in Chapter Three on the return of exiled populations. There is little evidence for exactly how populations once enslaved negotiated the return to operating as a civic community; indeed we might expect them to underplay their misfortunes.<sup>631</sup> What is certain is that, just as in the case of exile or flight, mass enslavements produced disjointed diaspora populations which, when they

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<sup>628</sup> For example, the Megarians were allegedly receiving runaway Athenian slaves just before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.139.2). The Lakedaimonian occupation of Dekeleia also apparently induced thousands of slaves to run away (Thuc. 7.27.5), even if they were probably sold on to the Thebans.

<sup>629</sup> In a comparable context, that of early Massalia, Dietler (2010, p. 78) writes: “It is also probable that, over time, ‘indigenous’ people may have begun residing at Massalia, and Massalian traders, craftsmen, exiles, escaped slaves, and others at native settlements, further complicating issues of identity...Moreover, it should also be remembered that, as a port city, a good part of the population of Massalia probably consisted of noncitizen foreigners of various kinds from other parts of the Mediterranean (traders, immigrants, slaves, former slaves, etc.).”

<sup>630</sup> According to the author of *Ath. Pol.* 40.2 the democrats who returned from the Piraeus, whom Thrasybulus proposed to enfranchise, included slaves.

<sup>631</sup> Entella decree A3 hardly dwells on the period of enslavement, but the decrees are terse in general. Sekunda (2013, p. 205) notes that at an individual level slaves who had gained freedom would not broadcast their origins, giving examples from Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.3.24, *Anab.* 4.8.4, 3.1.26-32) of former slaves, now employed as mercenaries, hiding their previous experience.

did not dissolve into host communities, could only re-form with members who had at least been exposed to the cultural practices of their hosts. No community could endure such traumatic dislocation and precarious reunification without outside influence.

This chapter has aimed to show first how routine aspects of slavery, from enslavement, to sale and resale, to manumission or escape, imposed movement and acted to break down community coherence. Second, mass enslavements, especially those of Dionysius and the Romans, flooded Sicilian cities with slaves from other Sicilian cities, creating mixed populations everywhere. The fact that slaves disappear from the view of modern historians and archaeologists does not mean that they were no longer a part of the island's social landscape. Many of the communities affected attempted to retain coherence and some succeeded; when a population was enslaved *en masse*, the best chance they had for survival as a group was to find a friendly city to help them reassemble.

## 6. Economic and agricultural organization

"We are dealing, therefore, with a phenomenon [agriculture] that defines the island's place in the history of the ancient Greek world..." [De Angelis (2000, p. 112)]

"[S]ociety and economy depend on exchanges which transcend the boundaries of local regions" [Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 363)]

### Introduction

In the previous chapters we have examined three major modes of Sicilian mobility, from those in which the individuals involved exercised little agency (exiles, Chapter Three), to those in which they exercised agency within some constraints (mercenaries, Chapter Four) to those in which they exercised the most limited agency of all (slaves, Chapter Five). While neither the production of exiles, the employment of mercenaries, nor the use of slaves was unique to Sicily, Sicily hosted a relatively large number of diaspora populations, mercenaries, and enslaved populations. The previous three chapters addressed mass phenomena, attested overwhelmingly in literary sources in which thousands of individuals could be affected in a single event. Yet less dramatic aspects of life in Sicily also contributed to the mobility of its populations. In this chapter I turn to economic organization as a structural factor affecting Sicilian mobilities.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that Sicily's economic situation affected human mobility. I propose that the orientation of the island's economy around producing surplus grain for export led to mobility, which brought members of different communities into contact. In particular, economic organization necessitated that communities on the island collaborate in order for all of their resource needs to be met.<sup>632</sup> The consequences of such interaction will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter. This mobility linked to agricultural production and exchange, along with the mobility of mercenaries, constitutes a distinctive Sicilian phenomenon. On another level, mercenaries were a particularly mobile set of employees, and while their contribution to new forms of community was addressed in Chapter Four, here I will highlight how economic conditions brought thousands of men to an itinerant life in Sicily. These forms of more voluntary movement are therefore the subject of this final thematic chapter.

The Sicilian economy in the fourth and third centuries was not based solely on agriculture or grain, but there is good reason to think that the island's main product was grain for export. There is some evidence for the production of olive oil and wine, in addition to other consumable items, and a recent survey of ceramic production sites clearly documents manufacture at an industrial scale.<sup>633</sup> Amphorae, at any rate, were created to store organic goods, and so represent linked sectors of the island's economy:

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<sup>632</sup> See, however, De Angelis (2006) for a cautionary note, urging scholars to investigate other kinds of agricultural production. He warns that the importance of Sicilian grain was "part of larger political and cultural discourses" (p. 41); an investigation of those discourses would be of great interest.

<sup>633</sup> Olcese (2011-2012, pp. 385-530) on Sicily.

container manufacture and pastoral-agricultural produce.<sup>634</sup> Nevertheless, grain was a major export throughout most of this period. Sicilian grain was famously at issue in the buildup to the Athenian Expedition in 415; we learn from Thucydides that at that time Sicily was providing enough grain to the cities of the Peloponnese to make the prevention of that trade a strategic necessity.<sup>635</sup> This trade cannot have been at the state level, that is, the level of gifts and tribute, but was almost certainly a phenomenon of private shippers, which is unlikely to have been hampered by the vicissitudes of the Peloponnesian War or its aftermath. The existence of monumental granaries of the third century in the *agorai* of two inland centers, Morgantina and Entella, which were on opposite ends of the island, further suggests that large quantities of grain were being produced.<sup>636</sup> Finally there is the bookend of Cicero's *In Verrem*, which attests significant grain exports from Sicily in the first century BCE. Three centuries is a very long time, to be sure, but the island's ecological advantages did not change much, and so it seems likely that grain remained Sicily's most favored product. After all, Sicilians must have been exchanging something for the wine that arrived in Rhodian amphorae found in abundance throughout the island, and as no durable Sicilian goods are found dispersed in the Mediterranean, the best candidate for such an exchange product is grain.<sup>637</sup>

The organization of Sicily's economy, in part conditioned by the tyrants and their wars but also in many respects independent of them, was a factor that could encourage or discourage mobility.<sup>638</sup> While it is possible to identify distinctly Sicilian economic factors conducive to mobility, proving that Sicily's economy created more mobility than other regions' economies would involve a comparative project far beyond the scope of this dissertation.<sup>639</sup> Instead I want to examine the economic processes that I suggest tended to encourage mobility and interaction. Sicily was a very large island, and while the dramatic dislocations discussed in previous chapters certainly mixed populations together, it is also important to recognize the quotidian structural factors that encouraged populations to mix, though far less intensely.

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<sup>634</sup> We know that amphorae of Punic types as well as the so-called "Greco-Italic" types were being manufactured on Sicily, and while we tend to assume that this means olive oil and wine were being produced, other products, perhaps including grain, are possible.

<sup>635</sup> Thuc. 3.86.4. Likewise, in Alcibiades' speech at 6.90.2-4, grain from Sicily, Italy, and Carthage was to support the Athenian war effort against the Peloponnese. While perhaps optimistic, Alcibiades nonetheless indicates a very high estimation of the agricultural productivity of Sicily and its neighboring regions.

<sup>636</sup> Morgantina: Bell (2007). Entella: Parra et al. (1995) and Parra (2003). The granary at Entella appears to have been constructed earlier, around 300 BCE. The lack of other excavated granaries in Sicily is likely due to insufficient exploration, though coastal cities may not have needed granaries if they could survive famine by relying on maritime trade.

<sup>637</sup> For Rhodian amphorae see e.g. Garozzo (2011) on amphora stamps in western Sicily.

<sup>638</sup> Thus D.M. Lewis in *CAH* VI<sup>2</sup> 124-5: "These indigenous populations are rarely of political importance but they may well have been fundamental to the social structure. We have next to no evidence, but it may be the case that agricultural work was in their hands and that the citizen of Syracuse (and indeed of other Sicilian cities) was less closely associated with the land he owned than the Athenian citizen; the mobility of Sicilian populations would be easier to understand if this were so."

<sup>639</sup> Such an argument is implicit the claim of Moggi (2006, pp. 79-80) that "In qualche caso poi, è possibile che la creazione di un 'vuoto', di un territorio 'senza polis'—sostanzialmente conforme al modello magno-greco rappresentato dalle aree di Siri e Sibari dopo la distruzione delle città—sia stata suggerita in Sicilia dalle esigenze poste dalla 'strutturale e radicale mobilità', che caratterizzava le popolazioni delle città siceliote, e soprattutto dalla massiccia utilizzazione dei mercenari." In other words, the tyrants had to displace and manipulate Sicilian populations because of their structural and radical mobility.

The size of cities is relevant here as well. The colonial cities of the Greeks and Carthaginians were large communities that had been cosmopolitan from the outset, meaning that wealthy city-dwellers could live as well in one city as in any other.<sup>640</sup> The extensive territories of these cities and the prevalence of grain monoculture for tribute or export meant that agricultural practices and rural life were much the same all over Sicily. While we do not know the specifics of the Carthaginian *eparchia*, some kind of tribute must have been taken, and this could certainly have structured the approach to agriculture in western Sicily. No regular tax or tribute is recorded for cities of the Syracusan empire-kingdom until Hieron II, but again these sporadic or systematic assessments will have had an effect on the kind of agriculture practiced by those populations.<sup>641</sup> A corollary of large territories is that the borders lie far from urban centers; as a result they may be difficult to define and easy to cross. Rural populations may thus have felt little connection to the political center that nominally ruled them, and farmers would inevitably have interacted with neighbors across political boundaries.

Another economic process in operation was the maintenance of urban populations. As we have seen in Chapter Two, Sicily as a whole was perennially underpopulated, a state that in part enabled the island to export so much grain. Abundant population was an ideological value for the Greek *polis*, but from an economic standpoint there was a minimum population required to exploit a given territory. Without sufficient labor available, a city could not thrive and might even disappear.<sup>642</sup> The best example of a large *polis* was Syracuse itself, the capital city of a Sicilian and south Italian empire. Cities and perhaps especially capital cities require net immigration to survive, let alone grow, and Syracuse in particular demonstrates this quite well.<sup>643</sup> Several times earlier in the fifth century the populations of other cities were brought to Syracuse, sometimes as slaves and sometimes as citizens. Dionysius in his first systematizations of Syracuse did the same, and also freed slaves to create new citizens.<sup>644</sup> It is possible that these interventions on the part of the tyrant were only necessary when voluntary immigration to Syracuse was not sufficient, though we do not have the data to say for certain. Perhaps the lack of intervention from the mid-380s on

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<sup>640</sup> Only 10% of the population of Akragas in 406 was composed of citizens; even accounting for women, children, and slaves there must have been a sizeable foreign population living there.

<sup>641</sup> Bechtold (2007) shows comprehensively that down to the middle of the third century very few Carthaginian amphorae came to western Sicily, though of course this does not preclude trade or exchange of goods by other media.

<sup>642</sup> Cf. Mackil (2004) on cities abandoned because of an insufficient adult male population.

<sup>643</sup> Braudel (1995, pp. 344-52) on royal and imperial capitals as parasites on their territorial possessions. Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 383) make Syracuse an example of a city that could not have grown from its colonial foundation to its Classical- and Hellenistic-period size without “migration of sizeable groups from one region to another.” Siebert (1982-1983, pp. 63-5) raises the possibility that the Syracusans suffered from endemic malaria and needed continuous infusions of population even to maintain their numbers.

<sup>644</sup> Braccisi (1998, p. 71) notes, “Così come la stessa Siracusa precorre ora il modello di spazialità urbana delle loro [sc. monarchi ellenistici] capitali. Infatti, i suoi nuovi abitanti e i molti mercenari qui immigrati contribuiscono a creare una città innaturalmente grande, dove la vita politica più non può essere diretta, sul modello greco, dalla collettività dei cittadini.” Braccisi (1998, p. 83): “...in Sicilia, viene a creare un modello di compagine statale che riesce a superare i confini della *polis*, per evolversi, a sua volta, in stato territoriale. È certo mosso da un’ideologia di potenza che disprezza i limiti della *polis*, ma riesce a edificare, sul capo delle città sottomesse, una struttura politica davvero unitaria, dando vita, in area mediterranea, al primo stato territoriale di matrice greca.”

is what led to the apparently widespread depopulation, especially of the cities, that Timoleon found on his arrival.

Expulsions and secessions as a result of land distributions (planned or actually executed) and other forms of civic strife stemming from economic difficulty can illustrate the connection between mobility and economic conditions. At Leontinoi in 422, for example, the aristocrats seem to have expelled the *demos* from the city (perhaps into the territory, though they soon returned) and then themselves withdrawn and gone to live in Syracuse.<sup>645</sup> Similarly, the high degree of mobility imposed on the various populations of Leontinoi can be attributed in part to geography (Fig. 1, p. 2): Leontinoi lay in a very productive area of eastern Sicily, not far from the capital of an ambitious empire.<sup>646</sup> The plain of Catania was and is valuable agricultural land, and De Angelis estimates that the territory of Leontinoi could have supported up to 110,000 people; it was famous in antiquity for its abundant grain production.<sup>647</sup> Unfortunately specifics about actual population or production, or the distribution of property there, are in short supply. A land distribution like the one Dionysius carried out in 404 might have been enough to send those whose property was confiscated looking for a new home. Unsuccessful land distribution schemes, like the one proposed by Herakleides at Syracuse in 356, are indicative of static economic conditions with little opportunity, and could have led to the emigration of many of the city's poorer inhabitants.<sup>648</sup>

In general, the phenomenon of large-scale individual mobility can best be understood with reference to economic conditions. Mobile tradesmen provide one example, and I have discussed above the flight of Greeks to the Carthaginian territory in the years before Dionysius' campaign against Motya—if in fact the communities were physically in motion, they would constitute good evidence that economic prospects were better in the western part of the island than in the eastern and that such economic prospects were enough to induce people to relocate their homes.<sup>649</sup> Part of the reason for this peacetime flight from Dionysius' domains may have been the economic regime in force there, perhaps including tribute and taxes, his imposition of an all-bronze coinage, and popular/tyrannical violence against the wealthy.<sup>650</sup> In these conditions of agricultural specialization and varying levels of natural resources, the solution to both local overpopulation and underpopulation was relocation, provided only that

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<sup>645</sup> D.S. 12.53.1-54.7; 83.1-3 with Thucydides 5.4.1-5, cf. 6.6.2. Vanotti (1995, p. 106): "ci pare di poter ipotizzare che per la disgregazione del corpo civico leontino risultò determinante il fattore economico, che provocò insanabili spaccature e contrapposizioni nella compagine cittadina."

<sup>646</sup> Vattuone (1994, p. 95): "la *chora* e le *asteis* subiscono questo trattamento per l'essenziale ragione della posizione e fertilità del sito." See also Giuffrida (2002).

<sup>647</sup> De Angelis (2000, pp. 128-129). On the reputation of Leontine grain cf. *BTGCI* VIII pp. 529-530.

<sup>648</sup> Plutarch, *Dion* 37.5.

<sup>649</sup> Cf. above, Chapter Two section Bii. Giuliani (1995, p. 118) notes the uniqueness of the Diodoran expression [*poleis...komizomenous*], suggesting "quasi un trasferire la comunità civica per dar luogo ad una nuova fondazione in territorio cartaginese" and questioning the integrity of the Carthaginian *epikrateia* at this early date. On weighing the relative benefits of mobility and fixity, see Horden and Purcell (2000, pp. 384-6).

<sup>650</sup> Giuliani (1995, p. 117) notes briefly the "controllo e...sensibile influenza anche sul piano economico," emphasizing in fn. 45 the "forte accentramento, mortificazione dell'iniziativa privata e penalizzazione dei ceti abbienti" as well as the new system of bronze coinage that could only be used within the territory controlled by Dionysius.

individuals were willing and able to move.<sup>651</sup> Different communities might be more or less attractive to such mobile individuals, who constituted a potential boon to a city in need of inhabitants.<sup>652</sup> Likewise the waves of immigrants associated with Timoleon's renewal of Greek Sicilian agriculture were not compelled by force but encouraged by economic conditions on the island. Just as the massive population transfers imposed by tyrants and empires could reconfigure the social landscape, so could the large-scale movement of individuals following economic incentives.

Another obvious node of intersection between mobility and economy is the phenomenon of mercenaries, discussed above.<sup>653</sup> In fact mercenary service was only the most visible of the many itinerant skill trades—doctors, metalworkers, carpenters, philosophers, to name a few—that brought individuals across sometimes great distances in response to the market for their labor.<sup>654</sup> Further outside of the evidentiary spotlight agricultural workers also traveled, perhaps across political and conceptual boundaries, according to economic pressures.<sup>655</sup> Particularly in the countryside, neighboring farmers may well have crossed nominal territorial boundaries for water, supplies, or equipment. We have seen that a tyrant could create an immense demand for mercenaries and craftsmen; the shared preference for mercenaries among tyrants, tyrannicides, and the Carthaginians (although not the Romans) meant that the market for them in Sicily was always strong. Further, the frequent *replacement* of entire bodies of mercenaries, after dismissing, eliminating, or settling them, created even stronger demand.<sup>656</sup> Beyond the standard traffic of other itinerant workers, the markedly high demand for mercenaries in Sicily encouraged immigration to the island but also mobility within it, as employment could best be found in different places at different times.

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<sup>651</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000, p. 384-5): “The underlying motor of Mediterranean movements was, after all, the temporary or perennial maldistribution of the full range of resources on which life depends...The common denominator may be no more than the knowledge that movement is an option, and the means, psychological and physical, to undertake it.”

<sup>652</sup> Oliver (2011) proceeds from the premise that such mobility led Hellenistic *poleis* to compete for the favor of potential immigrants. This kind of interjurisdictional competition, on which there is a vast economic literature that one may approach via Kenyon (1997), can be seen in many areas of ancient and modern life: for example, cities in the United States routinely fight each other to attract potentially mobile professional sports teams. Yet in fact, modern nation-states also compete for new citizens and for those they have lost to emigration: cf. Cook-Martín (2013) on Italian, Spanish, and Argentine efforts to gain or recover citizens.

<sup>653</sup> Prestianni Giallombardo (2006, p. 107) sounds a cautionary note on the difficulties of writing a history of mercenary service in Sicily: “questa [storia], oltre ad intrecciarsi con la storia di Cartagine e del suo dominio nell'isola, con la storia del fenomeno tirannico che contraddistingue sulla lunga durata la storia di molte *poleis* e di Siracusa in particolare, si intreccia anche con le storie, molteplici, delle singole e differenziate realtà etniche dalle quali i mercenari provengono; realtà etniche che, tra IV e III sec. a.C. inoltre, si moltiplicano, ampliando e complicando il gioco della domanda e dell'offerta.”

<sup>654</sup> See McKechnie (1989, pp. 142-177) and Chapter Two section Bii.

<sup>655</sup> See, e.g. Horden and Purcell (2000, pp. 382 and 385) on the constant motion of workers over short distances.

<sup>656</sup> Dionysius I dismissed the Campanian mercenaries that had saved him in 404, then hired new ones (D.S. 14.9.8, 10.4); in 396 he eliminated 1,000 difficult mercenaries by ordering the rest of his army to abandon them to be killed on the battlefield outside Syracuse (D.S. 14.72.2-3); also in 396 he settled his 10,000 Peloponnesian mercenaries at Leontinoi, then “enrolled other mercenaries and entrusted his rule to them and to his freed domestic slaves.” (D.S. 14.78.2-3). Hieron II (before his ascension) also sent mercenaries ahead to be slaughtered and immediately replaced them with new ones (Polybius 1.9).

Archaeological survey may help to document the movement of populations but is less helpful in explaining it, and it is worth noting that the rural population could have varied independently of the urban population. Nevertheless, survey data from western Sicily show a general trend toward increased rural occupation beginning around 400 BCE and lasting into the middle of the third century, with local developments attested in slightly greater detail.<sup>657</sup> A comparison with eastern Sicily would be extremely interesting, since an intensification of rural settlement in the fourth and third centuries is nearly a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon. Some confirmation may be found in the continuation and thriving of rural sites in the territory of Gela during the fourth century, though interestingly the second half of the fourth century was an apex of rural habitation.<sup>658</sup> This intensification of agriculture documented more or less across the island ought to have had social consequences for the coherence of the island as a whole.<sup>659</sup> Surveys continue to produce intriguing data on the occupation and exploitation of the countryside, though never quite allowing us to say who exactly was doing the occupying.<sup>660</sup>

## A. Exchange

One way to understand the relationship between mobility and economy is to follow individuals through the economic processes of production, trade or exchange, and consumption. As consumption itself is only indirectly related to mobility through its potential to create demand and spur exchange, and there is no evidence that agricultural production itself created more mobility in Sicily than elsewhere, the crucial process for my purposes is exchange. Of course, both the practices of consumption and the means of production affected exchange, and thus affected mobility, but we can learn more about the mobility of Sicilian populations by asking how goods reached consumers from producers than by studying production and consumption themselves. Exchange was a pan-Mediterranean phenomenon, of course, but as I hope to show, the agricultural organization of Sicily's economy made exchange *between* communities more intense, and this particular kind of mobility generated more interaction across community boundaries. Interaction across community boundaries can, in turn, lead to a decline in the relevance of those boundaries, and I argue that this exactly what happened in Sicily.

The economy of any Mediterranean region will depend on exchange, which can be assimilated to three basic modes. Exchange can be contained entirely within a single city-state, bringing agricultural produce from the territory to the center and crafts and services from the center to the territory; it can distribute the products of each

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<sup>657</sup> Monreale survey (south of Iaitas): Johns (1992); territory of Segesta: Cambi (2003), Bernardini et al. (2000); territory of Eryx: Filippi (2003); territory of Entella: Corretti et al. (2006); territory of Salemi: Di Miceli and Spagnolo (2009).

<sup>658</sup> For Gela see Bergemann et al. (2010, pp. 146-160). Several survey seasons in the territory of Morgantina are reported in Stephen Thompson's unpublished dissertation (University of Virginia), which I have only been able to skim. Besides these two I am not aware of other surveys conducted in eastern Sicily.

<sup>659</sup> Moreno (2007a, p. 69): "The evidence of intensive agriculture and landscape homogeneity also has enormous social repercussions. For agricultural integration is intimately linked to social integration...."

<sup>660</sup> On the ambivalence of survey data and the difficulty of conclusively interpreting it, see e.g. Wichter (2008) and Rathbone (2008), both addressing problems of republican Italian demography but with relevance for the entire Mediterranean.

specialized city-state among the others; and it can deliver the common specialty of a number of city-states outside the region, requiring a range of goods to be imported.<sup>661</sup> These are extremes; no region had entirely self-sufficient cities, or cities with completely balanced specialties, or cities that all produced only a single product.<sup>662</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear that an economy similar to the first type necessarily involves less exchange and interaction *between* city-states than one similar to the second or the third. The second and third models probably involve a similar degree of exchange, interaction, and mobility, though they represent two distinct modes of regional integration: a self-sufficient region and a region defined by its export, respectively. The export model in particular has been posited for colonial situations where an outside power desires to draw resources from the region in question.<sup>663</sup> While Archaic Sicily may well have been organized this way, by the LCEH period the power of mainland Greece was not its colonial relationship but the economic strength of its demand.<sup>664</sup> The explicit core-periphery model of Wagstaff and Cherry is less helpful in this context than the fragmented world of producers, traders, and consumers revealed by Horden and Purcell.<sup>665</sup>

In its orientation toward grain production for export, Sicily resembles most closely this third hypothetical region, though of course some Sicilian cities had other specialties and all were diversified to some degree. What I suggest is that for other regions, exchange focused on the goal of developing complementary specialties.<sup>666</sup> In Sicily, perhaps because of its early underpopulation and potential for agricultural surplus, such a regional economy never developed.<sup>667</sup> Conditions in Sicily were such that interior cities could support themselves virtually on grain production alone, with the

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<sup>661</sup> The first type, the autarkic community of Hesiod's *Works and Days*, had been a fantasy since the beginning of the polis. Cf. Finley (1985, p. 125); Horden and Purcell (2000, pp. 112-122). Ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.* 2.3 contends that every polis had to import something.

<sup>662</sup> See Mackil (2013, pp. 264-284) on the emergence in Greek koina (Boiotian, Chalkidian, etc.) of "resource complementarity and economic interdependence"—i.e. regional autarky akin to the second type of exchange.

<sup>663</sup> Cf. Wagstaff and Cherry (1982, pp. 246-7) on the "dendritic model" of exchange where lower-level producers all contribute to intermediate centers, which contribute to a main export hub, and there is little interaction aside from these direct vertical links. If we imagine Sicily to have possessed a number of such systems in which the lower-level producers might at different points belong to different exchange trees, perhaps there can be room for horizontal interaction.

<sup>664</sup> Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000, pp. 101-105) for a critique of central place theory that applies equally well to all such models of exchange that "yield notions of the historical landscape that are too easy to represent graphically." Nevertheless, De Angelis (2009) posits a recognition among mainland Greeks that Sicily could be exploited far more productively for agriculture than their own territories, and argues that the colonial foundations organized Sicilian agriculture toward bringing that produce back to Greece, an organization that persisted for centuries afterward.

<sup>665</sup> The influence of the core-periphery model, even before it was recognized as such, may be responsible for the general lack of attention to the social and economic histories of production and export. Though this climate may have improved somewhat recently, there is still a major imbalance in scholarly attention in favor of demand and consumption.

<sup>666</sup> See Mackil (2013, pp. 284-289) on efforts of koina to absorb new specialized producers in order to achieve this complementarity.

<sup>667</sup> Along with high demand for resources from mainland Greece, such underpopulation itself may have had social effects. Bintliff (1997, p. 25) cites the claim of Manning (1994) that "the population of the Early Bronze Age Cycladic islands was too low both for demographic needs and resource stability, causing strong inter-island social ties linked to exchange systems." A similar dynamic may have been at work in Sicily.

corollary of frequent interaction with neighbors and port cities.<sup>668</sup> These commercial centers, for their part, could grow grain in their own territories while simultaneously mediating the distribution of other goods to the pure grain producers, a mediation that required movement between them. It is striking that no literary or epigraphic source records the scope of such internal grain trade in the fourth or third centuries.<sup>669</sup> Scattered references to Sicilian grain ships do not allow any conclusions about the communities from which they came, though they do indicate that outsiders considered Sicily to be specific enough a designation.<sup>670</sup> It would also be nice to know who was responsible for moving these goods, whether foreigners traveling extensively in Sicily, professional cosmopolitan Sicilian traders, or a network of small-scale merchants none of whom traveled very far. Such a degree of detail is, however, beyond our reach, so I have dealt instead with movement, interaction, and mobility as abstract concepts, recognizing that while the question of who traveled where matters, it cannot be answered.

It may be useful to examine other grain-producing regions with specialized economies for comparison. Despite the enormous quantity of grain Cyrene provided to the cities of the Aegean and Ionian seas in the 320s, it does not seem to have been known in antiquity as a Mediterranean breadbasket.<sup>671</sup> The Black Sea, on the other hand, was certainly known as a source of grain for the Mediterranean, and has been quite intensively studied. Yet it is a massive region, probably too diverse and expansive to bear useful comparison with Sicily. The Greek colonists as well as the previous inhabitants undoubtedly grew large quantities of grain for export.<sup>672</sup> By the fifth century BCE the Black Sea was sending large amounts of grain to the Aegean through the Hellespont and its tollbooth city, Byzantion.<sup>673</sup> If the coasts of the Black Sea were, like Sicily, dedicated to growing and exporting grain, we might expect coherent regions to have developed tying productive inland areas to ports that could export their produce.<sup>674</sup>

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<sup>668</sup> Renfrew (1982) develops the concept of peer polity interaction: e.g. in the case of the Aegean islands, intensification of agricultural production led to increased interaction as each community saw what others were doing, and this dynamic led to the emergence of a complex system—the Aegean world (p.286); cf. Renfrew and Cherry (1986). Yet he recognizes that the scale of analysis should be variable, and following the dictum of Latour (2005, p. 185) that “[s]cale is the actor’s own achievement,” we may conclude that if Sicilian agriculture led mostly to increased interaction within the island, then the complex system produced would align more or less with the island’s physical borders.

<sup>669</sup> Entella decree A1, in thanking local neighbors who gave grain in an emergency, may attest a local grain market, but not necessarily. There is no source for a baseline internal trade.

<sup>670</sup> The influence of outsider attitudes, especially those of economically and culturally powerful trade partners, on self definition should not be understated and will be explored in Chapter Seven.

<sup>671</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003, no. 96 p. 491): “Curiously we have no other evidence for Cyrene as a source for grain for the cities of classical Greece...” Cf. also Bresson (2011) on the productive capacity and history of Cyrenaica, even noting that “[its] landscape explains why Cyrenaica has often been compared to a large Mediterranean island that would have been appended to the Sahara”!

<sup>672</sup> See Herodotus 4.53 on the fertility of the territory watered by the Dneipr river; 4.17 on Skythians who exported all the grain they grew.

<sup>673</sup> See Gabrielsen (2007, p. 291).

<sup>674</sup> Frisone (2012) notes that in Sicily and southern Italy secondary Greek settlements were placed at river mouths and took the rivers’ names. She observes, “The fluvial valleys that cut deep into the hinterland of many colonial regions and, as we have already said, connected *paralia* and *mesogaia*, reducing some of the difficulties of internal communication over long distances, not only allowed an increase in contact with the inner areas but sometimes, by their contours, guided the paths of the settlers, thus determining

In fact, this is exactly what seems to have happened in the growth of the Spartokid monarchy at Pantikapaion.<sup>675</sup> It seems clear that the economic regime in place shaped interaction between Greeks, Scythians, and others. David Braund comes close to proposing exactly this, though he leaves the issue of mobility implied.<sup>676</sup> A detailed comparison of Pontic and Sicilian grain exports would undoubtedly be rewarding.

Finally, Egypt had a long-standing historical tradition of regional unity, based around the Nile, and external trade, based on the surplus created by the river.<sup>677</sup> However, while the Nile obviously supported agriculture, it also defined the Egyptian kingdom not least by enabling mobility along its length.<sup>678</sup> Individuals seem to have been able to move fairly freely from settlement to settlement, and even from *nomos* to *nomos*, and one is tempted to see in the Ptolemaic and Roman insistence on keeping census records evidence for a relatively mobile population.<sup>679</sup> In general, the Ptolemies adapted their economic policies to the systems they found already in operation, though gathering more taxes, particularly taxes in kind that could feed Alexandria or be exported.<sup>680</sup>

Then there are the famous wine-producing islands of the Aegean: Thasos, Lesbos, Chios, and Rhodes. Producing wine may have generated even more local mobility than growing grain, due to the highly seasonal and time-sensitive nature of harvest, and it required an accompanying ceramic industry that provided containers for the product. However these islands came to develop such specialized export economies, once in operation they will have encouraged interaction among the population of each island. The wide renown of their wines as the islands' specialty (e.g. Rhodian not Lindian wine)

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the choice of new sites of settlement" (p. 95) and argues that rivers were crucial to community identity as well.

<sup>675</sup> Moreno (2007a, pp. 143-210) on the Black Sea; he invites the reader to compare the Spartokidai to the Sicilian tyrants, and the Black Sea to Sicily (p. 172). For the influence of the Greek market on the Black Sea economy see Moreno (2007b). A decree of the Thessalian Koinon ordering a sizeable grain shipment to Rome, *SEG XXXIV* 558, cf. Garnsey et al. (1984), outlines the numerous operations necessary for the production and transport of the grain, which were particularly at issue because the Romans needed it quickly. As Garnsey et al. argue, Thessaly experienced agricultural windfalls and shortfalls, so we might expect a region that more consistently produced a surplus for export to have had more developed links from field to port and beyond.

<sup>676</sup> Braund (2008, p. 362): "Clearly, interaction between Skythians and Greeks occurred at a range of locations around the north of the Black Sea and its interior. It also occurred with different degrees of intensity...Throughout, economic factors seem to drive much of this interaction, but the concomitant conversations between the different cultures (both literal and metaphorical) extended far beyond short-term economic exchanges." See also his earlier treatment of the export economy: Braund (2007); and Gary Reger's study of local trade and travel the Black Sea: Reger (2007).

<sup>677</sup> See Fraser (1972, p. 133). In 446/5 BCE Psammetichos is recorded as giving several thousand medimnoi of grain to the Athenians: Philochorus *FGrH* 398 F 90, cf. Plutarch, *Pericles* 37.3.

<sup>678</sup> Cf. Gibbs (2012, p. 46): "The Nile provided a medium and a focus of a network of communications that facilitated the movement and mobility of individuals information, and items" with Bagnall (2006). For trade along the Nile see Fraser (1972, p. 147); for Rhodes see Fraser (1972, pp. 162-169) and Casson (1954).

<sup>679</sup> Movement of traders: Gibbs (2012, p. 47); internal migration and its regulation: Braunert (1964). For the possibility of rural-urban "migration...on a structural scale" see Tacoma (2012, p. 129) with Bagnall and Frier (1994, pp. 69-70 and 160-9).

<sup>680</sup> Manning (2010, pp. 163-4) concludes that although the Ptolemies did increase both production and taxation, it was hardly the centralized command economy that others had imagined. For the struggle to work within existing structures while simultaneously making long-lasting changes cf. Manning (2003, pp. 130-146) and Manning (2011).

as opposed to individual cities' can only have promoted unity, since everyone on Rhodes would have benefitted from the reputation.<sup>681</sup> Further, aside from Lesbos none of these islands hosted any serious separatist communities after the end of the fifth century.<sup>682</sup> The fact that they were islands also tended to promote unity, a factor I discuss in Chapter Seven below.<sup>683</sup> Sicily was much bigger and more diverse than these islands, but it shared with them a geographical insularity and a reputation throughout the Mediterranean for a single characteristic export.

That Sicily's economic organization encouraged travel and interaction within the island may be demonstrated by the presence of Carthaginian and Greek traders on both coasts. We have already seen that Carthaginian traders both visited and made residences in Syracuse and the other Greek cities. Unfortunately we do not know whether these were Carthaginians from Carthage or Carthaginians from western Sicily.<sup>684</sup> Likewise the Greeks living in Motya may well have been traders. While some will have had specialties in grain, wine, oil, or other products, most will have taken on mixed cargoes. For any of the produce of the interior to reach Mediterranean markets, exchange must have brought it to the coast; perhaps the eastern coast was a particularly desirable waypoint, from which the predominant eastern Mediterranean grain trade would be more accessible.<sup>685</sup> In fact, this eastern orientation may have induced western Sicilian coastal cities to send their grain eastward in search of buyers. This is not to say that merchants did not venture farther west, but they will have had to stop at the ports on the eastern side of the island first, and if they could also fill a ship with grain there, so much the better.

Of course, any such reconstruction of local Sicilian trade is bound to be speculative in the absence of solid data or even anecdotes. Nevertheless, two factors—one geographical and one cultural—are likely to have encouraged the internal exchange of grain aimed for the eastern Mediterranean. First, long-distance transport ships are likely to have avoided passing through the Sicilian Strait if possible. This may have put pressure on the producers of the northern coast to send grain to the east coast either

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<sup>681</sup> On specialization for export in general, see Brun (1997). Papadopoulos and Paspalas (1999, p. 180): "It is clear that in antiquity mention made of the wine of Chios, Lesbos, Rhodes, Thasos, and Kerkyra, for instance, referred to that produced on each respective island as a whole and not just to the product of the main city, and in some cases perhaps also to the *peraia* of the island on the mainland opposite." Interestingly, the point of their article is to highlight precisely the opposite phenomenon in the spread of the name "Mendaian" to wine produced throughout the Chalkidike (not an island, though definitely peninsular).

<sup>682</sup> Lesbos was notoriously and perhaps atypically fragmented for Aegean island, and its *poleis* operated independently even after the formation of the Lesbian Koinon in the early second century BCE. Cf. Mason (1995, pp. 400-2) on intra-island hostilities; Constantakopoulou (2005, pp. 9-11) on the variable referent of the term "Lesbians" and on the Lesbian Koinon as a primarily religious and only weakly political association (p. 15).

<sup>683</sup> Papadopoulos and Paspalas (1999, p. 180) proposes that the areas for which a regional name rather than a city name dominated in designations of wine, "were not only single political units, but places where the name of the central city and its *chora*, even the islands and their *peraiiai*, were used interchangeably fairly often..."

<sup>684</sup> See Prag (2006a) on the lack of distinction in Greek and Roman sources between inhabitants of Carthage and those of western Sicily.

<sup>685</sup> Virtually nothing is known of Sicilian trade in grain with the western Mediterranean aside from Rome.

overland or perhaps by means of merchants experienced at navigating the Strait.<sup>686</sup> Second, while Athens was officially on friendly terms with Carthage, many of the mainland Greek cities that imported grain from Sicily are likely to have preferred to trade in Greek cities there, or at least in ports perhaps more familiar than Motya, Panormos or Soloeis. We know well that Mediterranean trade was an international business, and that merchants and crews of all origins found themselves in all manner of cities. Still, it is plausible that the demand for grain from the eastern Mediterranean spurred an internal Sicilian grain trade that made it easier to meet that external demand.

From an economic point of view, the consequences of dislocation in LCEH Sicily are not necessarily dramatic. Grain was grown everywhere, and if I am right to propose a relatively high degree of inter-community travel for economic purposes, then dislocated populations will have been able to plug back into economic networks with relative ease.

## B. Land

Thus far I have said very little about perhaps the most important factor in an agricultural economy, and a crucial link to belonging in a Greek-style *polis*: land. We have very little information about the nature of individual landholding in LCEH Sicily, but are slightly better informed about the territories claimed by entire communities. Most of these land reassignments are unfortunately attested by quite laconic notices in literary sources, but they are valuable evidence nonetheless. As an example from just before my main chronological span, at the Congress of Gela in 424 BCE it was agreed that all cities should retain their possessions, “but Morgantina would go to the Kamarinaioi once they had delivered a agreed-upon sum (of money) to the Syracusans.”<sup>687</sup> It is not clear exactly what this transfer of ownership, expressed with εἶναι + dative, entailed, though probably we are to understand that the territory of Morgantina became the territory of Kamarina. A number of unanswerable questions present themselves: Were the Morgantine owners dispossessed and expelled, or did they become Kamarinaioi?<sup>688</sup> Was the “agreed-upon sum” paid by the *polis* of Kamarina out of its reserves or the proceeds of a subscription, or was it put up by individuals? Was the land redistributed or was it in effect purchased by those who had contributed money? How did the addition of Morgantina’s territory, which was cut off from the coastal plain of Kamarina by significant mountains, affect economic, political and social life in Kamarina? As we will see, such questions must also be asked of the land reassignments reviewed below; though for the most part they cannot be answered, they do prompt

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<sup>686</sup> Over the fourth and third centuries the north coast developed a more local trade network with the Tyrrhenian Sea and Italy. For amphorae and the products they contained: Bechtold (2007); for fine ceramic production, see de Cesare (2006).

<sup>687</sup> Thuc. 4.65.1. This is the earliest mention of Morgantina in the historical record, though Diodorus later claimed the city had been destroyed by Douketios during his revolt in the 450s: D.S. 11.78.5. We know from excavations at Morgantina that the Iron Age settlement on Cittadella was inhabited throughout the fifth century. Cf. also Cordano and Parise (2013) on how the price of Morgantina was set.

<sup>688</sup> Manganaro (1999, pp. 120-121) suggests that many of the Morgantinoi were already related by blood to the Kamarinaioi, and that Kamarina’s ownership of Morgantina only meant that they collected tribute from it. This is plausible, but speculative.

serious thought about the economic consequences of such transactions and the instability and mobility they may have created.

Land was transferred with some regularity in LCEH Sicily. The conflict between Segesta and Selinous, which brought the Athenians to Sicily in 415 and the Carthaginians in 409, had involved disputes over land: in 416 the two cities had disputed some bordering land, and in 410 it was ceded to Selinous; the Selinuntinoi then claimed another large part of Segesta's territory.<sup>689</sup> In both these cases there was no question of a change of citizenship—the opposing communities wanted land for themselves, and expelled those they perceived as trespassing. The only other case of territory being reassigned by agreement after military conflict is the treaty of 383, in which the Carthaginians gained the territory of Akragas “as far as the river called Halykos.”<sup>690</sup> The Halykos is the modern Platani (Fig. 1, p.2), which runs from the interior of the island and empties into the Mediterranean just west of Heraclea Minoa, about 35 km from Agrigento. While we do not know how far west Akragas' territory had extended originally, even after the settlement the city controlled a very large area. In this case it is quite plausible that the inhabitants of the ceded territory might follow their land into Carthaginian control, as entire cities continued to do throughout the fourth and third centuries.

A rather striking fact of LCEH Sicilian history as we have it is how very few border conflicts there were, in contrast to the frequent battles over territory in the Aegean world. Aside from the late fifth-century war between Segesta and Selinous, which was also about marriage rights, individual cities do not seem to have fought over the boundaries of their territories. Syracuse and the Carthaginians certainly disputed the borders of their respective hegemonies, and so most conflicts arose out of disagreement about whose side a given community should take, and who was in charge of the community. Similarly once the Romans arrived, battles were fought over the allegiance of cities rather than how much land one city controlled. The preoccupations of Diodorus, Polybius, and their sources could undoubtedly have distorted the picture, but it is nevertheless remarkable how infrequently neighboring cities fought over territory. The major issue in Sicily seems to have been the nature and resources of the community and its territory, not its precise extent.

Land conveyed as a gift from an allied military power represents a more frequent type of transfer. In 415, for example, after enslaving the population of Hykkara the Athenians gave the city to the Segestans.<sup>691</sup> While neither Thucydides nor Diodorus explicitly mentions land, with the inhabitants enslaved and the urban center a possession of Segesta, the territory previously claimed by the Hykkarans must have gone to Segesta as well. Dionysius I reassigned land frequently, though this was often as part of a city foundation or refoundation, to be discussed below. His grant of Naxian territory to the Sikels in 403, however, was apparently not made with the idea of establishing an urban center; indeed Sikel Tauromenion was a major nuisance to him. As part of a project to improve his relationship with the cities on the Sicilian straits, the tyrant “gave to the Messanioi a large piece of neighboring territory...”<sup>692</sup> In 392, with Mago's army

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<sup>689</sup> Conflict in 416: D.S. 12.82.3-7. Conflict in 410: 13.43.1-3.

<sup>690</sup> D.S. 15.17.5.

<sup>691</sup> Thuc. 6.62.3, cf. D.S. 13.6.1.

<sup>692</sup> In 398: D.S. 14.44.4. Diodorus sounds a more cynical note when he continues “...rendering them his own by his benefactions.”

near Agyrion, Dionysius promised “a large piece of neighboring territory” to the tyrant Agyris for his support; since it was given, we may suppose that the territory was in fact transferred.<sup>693</sup> In these transfers, there were likely inhabitants on the land, who would either have been ejected or incorporated into the community of the new owner. A city with an abundance of people would likely prefer just land, but a city in need of population might prefer to take in new citizens.

Hieron II’s division of Ameselon in the 260s was a more complex and interesting transaction. In his early operations against the Mamertines Hieron, as a Syracusan general, defeated a Mamertine garrison at Ameselon, enrolled the defeated soldiers in his army, and split the territory between Agyrion and Kentoripa.<sup>694</sup> Diodorus describes Ameselon (site unknown) as a “place” or “town” (χωρίον), though it apparently also controlled the territory (χώρα) that Hieron later reassigned. Though it is possible that the Mamertines themselves farmed this territory, probably there were other inhabitants on the land, from whose produce the garrison soldiers in the fortress took supplies. In this case, Hieron’s division will either have led to their expulsion or their incorporation into the cities of Agyrion and Kentoripa.<sup>695</sup>

Founding a city required land to be reassigned, and while the details of this negotiation are murky for the colonial period, they are sometimes explicit for foundations in LCEH Sicily. The foundations of Therma in 407, Halaisa in 403, Adranon in 400, Lilybaion after 397, Tyndaris in 396, Phintias in 280, and Drepanon in 260 all required land, which was sometimes appropriated from an existing community with a claim on it. Therma assumed control over the territory previously owned by Himera, which was by then defunct as a functioning *polis*, though people continued to identify themselves as Himeraioi.<sup>696</sup> The territory of Halaisa may well have already been controlled by Archonides from Herbita when he sent his colonists there; Phintias was certainly master of the area between Akragas and Gela. Dionysius’ foundation of Adranon may have infringed on Sikel landowners; I have suggested earlier that the pre-existing temple to Adranos on the site must have hosted some local population before Dionysius’ foundation, which possibly involved mercenaries. While we do not know whether the temple of Adranos held the surrounding land as sacred, it seems quite likely that local populations were making some claim on the land that would need to be reassigned to Dionysius’ colonists. But these locals may well have been made citizens of Adranon. In the case of Tyndaris, we are told explicitly that Dionysius “cut off and added to the dominion [of Tyndaris] part of the territory of Abakainon.”<sup>697</sup> Here, given the

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<sup>693</sup> D.S. 14.95.6-7. However, short of support in the same conflict Dionysius had declared that slaves in Syracuse would be free, but revoked the order when the Carthaginians were willing to negotiate a peace treaty.

<sup>694</sup> D.S. 22.13.1.

<sup>695</sup> What is perhaps most interesting from a political viewpoint is that Hieron had not yet been acclaimed king—at least in Diodorus’ narrative this episode comes before the battle of the Longanos River that is conventionally believed to have led to his ascension. Of course, Diodorus could have misplaced the event, but if the present order is accurate, then Hieron’s actions were remarkable for a general in the field.

<sup>696</sup> Indeed, other new cities of the late fifth and early fourth century whose foundations are not recorded in literary sources may also have carved out parts of Himera’s territory. Kephaloidion is perhaps the best example: see Vassallo (2007). The populations and territories of dead *poleis* were frequently incorporated into new or neighboring cities, as at Myous in Ionia or Aigai in Achaia; cf. Mackil (2004, pp. 494-501).

<sup>697</sup> D.S. 14.78.5.

openness of the Tyndaritai to accepting new citizens, it seems likely that the inhabitants of the land could have switched citizenship from Abakainon to Tyndaris.

The details of the foundations in Carthaginian western Sicily are more difficult to parse. Lilybaion may well have been founded within the mainland Sicilian territory formerly claimed by Motya. Since official Carthaginian intervention in the construction and population of Lilybaion is likely (see above, Chapter Five), it is also likely that the Carthaginians managed the settlement of land disputes between the survivors of 397 and the necessary influx of newcomers over the fourth century. Unfortunately we know nothing of Carthaginian administration of land ownership in western Sicily, so it is impossible to say whether farmers were relocated or assigned to the new citizen body of Lilybaion. Hamilcar's foundation of Drepanon in 260 perhaps provides an analog: "having fortified Drepanon and established a city, he transplanted the Erycinoi, and completely destroyed Eryx except for the place around the temple."<sup>698</sup> Whatever the exact meaning of πόλιν καταστήσας, Hamilcar must have made provisions for the distribution of land, either respecting or violating the pre-existing ownership regime. Much as Phintias had done with the Gelooi, Hamilcar had to give the relocated population a way of supporting itself.

Finally, the takeover of a city also entailed the transfer of territory and the expulsion or death of its prior owners. The Campanian founders of the Mamertine state divided among themselves not only property in Messina itself but also the city's land.<sup>699</sup> In this case it is clear that the previous landowners were either killed or expelled. On the other hand, the Romans' gift of Morgantina to Moericus and his mercenaries in 211 explicitly included both city and territory; given that the action was meant to punish the Morgantines for disloyalty years earlier, it seems unlikely that they were allowed to retain valuable land or property that was meant to reward the Hispani.<sup>700</sup> Typologically similar in some ways to the foundations mentioned above, such takeovers were distinct in that existing inhabitants of the transferred territory, if they survived, are unlikely to have continued in ownership and would have had to find new homes or occupations. In many foundations and gifts, by contrast, those whose land was transferred probably stayed in place but became citizens of the community now controlling the territory.

There also exist some epigraphic data on land ownership, dating to the later third century and afterward, though perhaps perpetuating earlier conventions. At least fourteen contracts for the sale of land incised in Greek on lead sheets are known, none earlier than the fourth century.<sup>701</sup> Other probable contracts exist but in a very fragmentary state.<sup>702</sup> Unfortunately very few of the known texts have any archaeological context whatsoever, so dating and provenance are often general or unknown. In several cases the property is clearly agricultural land, and in others it can be fairly inferred. The contracts are always between citizens of the same community, though in the fourth century contract from Syracuse the demotics *Erimeios* and *Perekuataios* attest foreign

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<sup>698</sup> D.S. 23.9.4. At 15.73.3, under the year 368/7 Diodorus refers to "the harbor of the Erycinoi," i.e. the future site of Drepanon.

<sup>699</sup> Polybius 1.7.1-4, cf. D.S. 21.18.1, 3.

<sup>700</sup> Gift: Livy 26.21.17; promise of city and territory: 26.21.12.

<sup>701</sup> Game (2009, pp. 147-166 nos. 78-91); the earliest one, no. 89 from Syracuse, is dated generally to the fourth century.

<sup>702</sup> Manganaro (1989).

origins.<sup>703</sup> It is tempting to read closely into the social and economic situations that gave rise to the sales, but all in all the relatively small number of contracts and their functional purpose render any broad conclusions about land ownership speculative at best.<sup>704</sup> Game does note that prices paid for agricultural land seem to have been higher than those paid for buildings, even apparently luxurious ones, and unfortunately quantitative measurements are not stated nor can they be inferred from the specifications of neighboring plots. Given that many of the documents probably date to the second century, or have no date at all, nothing conclusive can be said about the LCEH period.

The *Tabulae Halaesinae*, a large fragmentary stele probably dating to the second century BCE, preserves an extensive regulation and division of the territory of Halaisa into districts and lots within them. The *editio princeps* is *IG XIV 352*, and the inscription has attracted by far the greatest interest from scholars interested in the cults attested in the city.<sup>705</sup> Manganaro has described the document as “a cadastral map of public land, probably set out in the city’s agora...[responding] to the necessities of a financial rearrangement in the context of the reorganization of the province of Sicily...”<sup>706</sup> As such, the *Tabulae* hold interest for this study primarily for the pre-existing structures they document. I have referred to the attested cult places elsewhere, but as far as economy and agriculture, the land seems to have already been largely devoted to the cultivation of grain and partly planted in olive trees. We have no way to know whether this arrangement goes all the way back to the foundation of the city, but it does confirm that grain was the city’s main product, perhaps exported to the Tyrrhenian market. We learn from Diodorus that by his time Halaisa “made great progress both because of maritime commerce and because of the tax immunity granted by the Romans,” and while Roman involvement probably does not predate the middle of the third century at the earliest, maritime trade in grain could well have helped the city grow wealthy.<sup>707</sup> Beyond that I will refrain from speculating about exactly which aspects of the actual division predate the settlement; this valuable document for Republican Sicily is unfortunately not very helpful for the fourth and third centuries.<sup>708</sup>

If a short digression may be permitted, the Lipari islands provide an extraordinary example of land distribution and community maintenance through economic practice. Diodorus, apparently based on an account of Timaios which itself followed an account of Antiochos of Syracuse, describes an evolving experiment in communal property.<sup>709</sup> A group of Knidian and Rhodian colonists, after failing to settle permanently in southwest Sicily, joined the native Aioliens of Lipara in a new social

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<sup>703</sup> See Game (2009, no. 89).

<sup>704</sup> For example, in no. 86 (Morgantina, third century) the seller is a widow—was she forced to sell her family’s property on the death of her husband? In no. 91 (Katane, no date) the name of the buyer of a tax-exempt house is the patronymic of the seller and the purchase price is only three silver staters—was a successful son selling a privileged property to his father for a nominal fee?

<sup>705</sup> E.g. Prestianni Giallombardo (2003) and (2006), Cusumano (2007). An exception is Burgio (2007), who however focuses on the later republican and Imperial city.

<sup>706</sup> Manganaro (2009, p. 13).

<sup>707</sup> D.S. 14.16.3: τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν λαμβανούσης διὰ τε τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἐργασίας καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων δοθεῖσαν ἀτέλειαν.

<sup>708</sup> Despite the claims of Calderone (1995) and Nenci (1995), which are based on letterforms, consensus seems to lie with Manganaro that the document does not predate the second century BCE.

<sup>709</sup> At 5.9.1-5, cf. Figueira (1984, pp. 179-185) and Buck (1959).

arrangement.<sup>710</sup> At first, in the face of Etruscan piratical harassment, they split naval and agricultural duties, kept all property in common, and held common messes; later they distributed the land of the main island Lipara as private lots but continued to farm the rest of the islands in common; then in a final stage they distributed land on all the islands by lot, and redistributed it every 20 years.<sup>711</sup> In a fascinating passage Thucydides describes the situation the Athenians found on their arrival in 424: “They [the inhabitants] live on one of the islands, which is not large and is called Lipara, and setting out from this island they farm the others, Didyme and Strongyle and Hiera.”<sup>712</sup> Archaic Lipara thus manifests significant intersections between economic organization and community, and mobility and community. First, their scheme of occupational division was balanced by shared property and an institutional form (the common messes) that united the islanders by evening out potential inequalities and giving them shared practices.<sup>713</sup> Second, exploitation of the island group’s resources required frequent travel—a situation not fundamentally different from that of traditional city-territory complexes, but brought into relief because of archipelago geography.

On firmer ground on Sicily, populations were moving over land that could itself be transferred from one community to another. Ownership of land and its transmission through inheritance were crucial to the concept of citizenship in the Greek *polis*.<sup>714</sup> The alienation of one’s land, whether at the individual or collective level, was not only an economic blow but also a symbolic one.<sup>715</sup> When even the consensual sale of land could be so contentious, the reassignment of territory from one community to another must have had serious social consequences. The serious attention given to restoring the property of exiles discussed in Chapter Three, and the arrangements the Romans had to make for the Syracusans after 210, are high-profile attempts to return to a *status quo ante*, but we have no reason to think that they succeeded more than partially. Timoleon could not even promise the returning Sicilians their own land, but had to redistribute it, and his program alone undoubtedly remixed the Sicilian population in eastern Sicily.

### C. Mercenaries and Coinage

Before concluding, it must be acknowledged that in the non-agricultural part of the economy of LCEH Sicily, mercenary service was a major driver. Along with export-oriented agriculture, it was a defining feature of the Sicilian economy in this period. Most coinage minted on the island during the fourth and third centuries seems to have been issued to pay mercenaries (or perhaps more broadly in the case of Hieron II’s

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<sup>710</sup> Despite the claim of Pausanias 10.11.3 that the colonists occupied empty islands or expelled the earlier inhabitants, Figueira (1984) argues persuasively that the Aeolians did welcome the colonists into the new arrangement.

<sup>711</sup> Though they were fighting Etruscan pirates, the Liparians were well known as pirates themselves, and it has been accepted that the common messes (*sussitia*) would have been the mechanism by which both agricultural and piratical profits were redistributed among the population.

<sup>712</sup> Thuc. 3.88.2; Figueira (1984, p. 204) suggests that this “was probably the prevailing manner of farming at all stages of the experiment and even thereafter.” The collective property scheme, even in its third form, may not have survived long into the fourth century, however.

<sup>713</sup> Cf. e.g. Hayden (2001) on the social glue function of sharing meals.

<sup>714</sup> Foxhall (2002).

<sup>715</sup> Gottesman (2012).

Syracuse, to pay soldiers).<sup>716</sup> It is worth remembering too that the earliest Carthaginian coins were probably minted on Sicily in order to pay their mercenaries.<sup>717</sup> Thus mercenaries were crucial to the supply of coined money into the Sicilian economy through their purchases, and to the extent that they were mobile, they distributed that coinage fairly widely.<sup>718</sup> As I suggested in Chapter Four, mercenaries owed their mobility to both social and economic factors; in the context of this chapter I want to emphasize the economic rationale, by which the nature of the market for mercenaries' services required them to travel for employment.

The circulation of the coinage used to pay these mercenaries is a good indication of the mobility they experienced. For example, in the early fourth century mercenaries of Dionysius I overstruck his bronze coins with types of their own choosing. What is particularly interesting is that the locations in which these overstrikes were minted, and the locations in which they are found, follow somewhat overlapping bands running west from Mt. Aitna.<sup>719</sup> These distributions suggest a fairly restricted pattern of mobility among mercenaries, or at least a fairly restricted circulation of their fiduciary bronze coins. The people themselves may have used other currency in other areas of Sicily. While some of the mint locations have been identified (e.g. Entella), others have not, and the sporadic nature of minting raises the distinct possibility that coins were struck by groups of mercenaries who had no fixed home.<sup>720</sup> That they minted coins in their own corporate name indicates a collective identity, though again the sporadic nature of these overstrikes means that such groupings may have been ephemeral.

An interesting feature of coinage circulation in LCEH Sicily is the degree to which the issues of the eastern and western parts of the island complemented each other. For instance, the later fourth century saw the circulation in Sicily of both Siculo-Punic silver tetradrachms and the so-called Pegasi (silver coins of several denominations) minted by a number of western Greek cities, Corinth and Syracuse included.<sup>721</sup> While the coinage of this period has traditionally been seen as competitive—with each authority making a political statement about its authority—Prag suggests that a more useful way to look at the situation is to recognize that the Siculo-Punic issues “fill a clear economic gap on the island in the absence of Syracusan tetradrachms for much of the fourth century...That implies the existence of wider patterns of interaction.”<sup>722</sup> While he does not say so explicitly, the most plausible vectors of such high-denomination coins, and the most likely actors in this broad interaction, are mercenaries. Traders are of course also possible, and trade would explain why, in western Sicily from the end of the fifth century to the middle of the third, the vast majority of transport and table ceramics were made

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<sup>716</sup> Cf. Frey-Kupper and Barrandon (2003); Puglisi (2009); Carroccio (2004). Mercenaries have also been proposed as a vector for Campanian black-glazed ceramic products, another non-agricultural industry, for which cf. de Cesare (2006) and Olcese (2011-2012).

<sup>717</sup> I refer to the earliest Punic-language coins, struck according to Lee (2000) at Entella. The individual cities Motya, Panormos, and Soloeis had minted coins with Greek legends and in Greek iconographic style earlier, however: Guzzetta (2008, pp. 150-152) and Prag (2011b).

<sup>718</sup> Cf. Caccamo Caltabiano et al. (2006).

<sup>719</sup> Caccamo Caltabiano (2002). The band of mints runs just north of the band of find locations.

<sup>720</sup> For the KAMIIANON coinage at Entella see Lee (2000). For a coinage possibly to be identified with Sardinian mercenaries see Cutroni Tusa (2003). For unidentified mints see Puglisi (2009, p. 509 Carta 9).

<sup>721</sup> Puglisi (2009, pp. 367-370); Prag (2011b).

<sup>722</sup> Prag (2011b, p. 5).

locally or came from eastern Sicily and southern Italy.<sup>723</sup> Interestingly enough, the situation seems to have been reversed in the mid-third century, when it was eastern coinage that filled an economic need. Frey-Kupper and Barrandon argue that between ca. 260 and 215, Hieron's bronze coinage performed the same role for western Sicily, where Punic bronzes had ceased to be minted and the local mints had not yet begun operation.<sup>724</sup> Again mobile mercenaries, or at least soldiers, are the simplest way to explain the interconnection between coasts. This is perhaps not so strange, if we remember that traveling armies often required markets, and often paid for what they took. Perhaps the ubiquity of traveling mercenaries itself contributed to the circulation of Hieron's coinages in the West: with soldiers everywhere, western Sicilian merchants would have good reason to accept fiduciary Syracusan bronze.

## Conclusions

The LCEH Sicilian economy was defined by a focus on growing grain for export, and to a lesser extent by the prevalence of mercenary service. I have attempted to show how these economic conditions encouraged mobility among the populations of the island. Along with the coerced dislocations discussed in the previous three chapters, these structural features of LCEH Sicilian life contributed to the interaction that pushed Sicily down the path toward cohesive insular identity. As I will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, smaller Mediterranean islands had already undergone or were experiencing similar processes by the historical period, though of course there were exceptions, notably Lesbos and Keos. Even in islands that developed strong *polis*-identity with strong divisions between the populations of the different *poleis*, there was room for a communal, island-wide collective. In this argument I am not championing an evolutionary model, but rather recognizing that islands tend not to maintain strong internal divisions over the long term, and that interaction caused by mobility is a major driver of the phenomenon. It used to be argued that Mediterranean islands were isolated, homogenous because of the lack of outside interference; with the new emphasis on maritime connectivity and connectivity in general, we must recognize that they developed internal links in a context of external contacts. In the final chapter we will examine Sicily's strange insularity and see what some of those links looked like in practice.

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<sup>723</sup> Bechtold (2007).

<sup>724</sup> Frey-Kupper and Barrandon (2003).

## 7. Sicilian citizenships defined through practice

“So while Mauritius is and is not an island, it can also be argued that the self-defined communities of Mauritius are islands—and at the same time that they are not.” [Eriksen (1993, p. 142)]

“Let us distinguish firmly between the geographical fact of agglomeration: ‘urbanization’, and the social construction of city-community: ‘urbanism.’” [Purcell (2005, p. 252)]

“Orienting practices practically, they embed what some would mistakenly call *values* in the most automatic gestures or the apparently most insignificant techniques of the body—ways of walking or blowing one’s nose, ways of eating or talking—and engage the most fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of the social world...” [Bourdieu (1984, p. 466)]

### Introduction

Thus far, I have argued that the displacement of populations in various ways became frequent in Sicily over the fourth and third centuries (Chapters One and Two); that the circulation of exiles, mercenaries, and slaves challenged the stable *polis* (Chapters Three, Four and Five); and that Sicily’s economy tended to encourage interaction and homogenization through mobility (Chapter Six). I have attempted to show that we should expect the salience of the polis to have waned over those two centuries, and presented some circumstantial arguments for that decline. Throughout the dissertation, though particularly in Chapter Six I suggested that as the populations of Sicily defined themselves less and less by their city of origin, and cities came to host increasingly diverse inhabitants, the island itself became the most significant basis for identification. They were no longer representatives of other cultures in Sicily (Greek, Carthaginian, Italian) or of native groups (Sikel, Elymian) but Sicilians. In this chapter I will support this final stage of the dissertation’s argument with largely archaeological evidence demonstrating the emergence of shared cultural practices among Sicily’s populations.

Like the literary documentation, the material record for LCEH Sicily is quite uneven, and generally thin as compared with earlier and later periods. Nevertheless, there are patterns to be found. In what follows I will not insist on the archaeological evidence as proof of general mobility, since objects and ideas moved more easily than people. I will not argue that a characteristic object type found in two places means anything more than that some people in one community chose to use an object used by some people in another community. In fact, this restraint constitutes the heart of my analysis: by focusing on the practices shared by the inhabitants of different cities rather than setting out to verify civic and ethnic distinctions, we can avoid the speculation that often plagues attempts to follow population movement in the material record. I hope to have shown in the previous chapters how widespread the mobility of people was, based largely on the literary evidence that is best suited to such a demonstration. The archaeological evidence is less well suited to that task, but is indispensable for an investigation of mobility’s effects on social life and group membership. Epigraphic evidence is of course indispensable for both projects.

The first section of this chapter situates Sicily among other Mediterranean islands in an attempt to understand the role played by insularity. The pervasive cultural mixing that makes LCEH Sicily an interesting and important field of study has, ironically, made it especially difficult to talk about life on the island without resorting to essentializing ethnic labels. As Giangiulio has pointed out, both the older Hellenization model and the newer concepts of acculturation and hybridity envision certain groups in Sicily as vanguards of Greek or Carthaginian, or Campanian culture, whose pure form is to be found outside of the island.<sup>725</sup> Such a framework fixes the game in advance. As a corrective I attempt to reconstruct the complex of shared practices that emerged as a result of internal Sicilian mobility, practices that could tie people together both along ethnic lines and across them. This constitutes a first step toward a fair assessment of cultural phenomena such as mixing on the island or connections outside it.<sup>726</sup> The nature of that mixing is the focus of the following sections.

The movement of people, at whatever scale, can lead to changes in practice for both movers and non-movers. A person who travels across a group boundary exposes those he or she encounters to some of his or her practices, and is in turn exposed to some new ones. The adoption or modification of a practice is never automatic, and can oppose a newly encountered practice as well as converge with it. However, in general and over the long term it seems to be the case that when communities come into contact, at least *some* practices of each are adopted. Again this is true on individual as well as mass scales, and while it is the collective scale I am most interested in, very often archaeological evidence strictly speaking only attests the significant activity of a single person.<sup>727</sup>

Thus, after discussing in broad outlines the development of Sicily's insular unity I will trace the evidence for the development of shared practices in several fields I take to be significant for group definition and community maintenance. In examining writing, funerary ritual, and divine ritual and affiliation, I will argue that over time inhabitants of different cities in Sicily came to share some specifics of these practices. If it can be shown that populations came to share practices that were supposed to differentiate one from another, it follows that at the level of practice, those groups can no longer be considered entirely separate communities.<sup>728</sup> In no case were all practices shared between two cities, and no cultural practices were shared universally in Sicily, but we should not expect integration to have been total. Some practices came to be shared fairly widely throughout Sicily, and on this basis I will argue that the massive mobility that challenged closed communities on Sicily also generated communities of shared practice over the island, making an island-wide identity more relevant. The process was still

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<sup>725</sup> Giangiulio (2010, pp. 13-14).

<sup>726</sup> I share the conviction of Gruen (2011, pp. 356-7) that commonalities can be as important to group definition as distinctions.

<sup>727</sup> For a social account of the link between practice and identity on an individual scale, see e.g. Goffman (1959); for a physiological account see Dennett (1991).

<sup>728</sup> King (2000, p. 431): "On this 'practical theory,' social life is the mutually negotiated network of interactions and practices between individuals which is always necessarily open to strategic transformation...there is always indeterminacy in the relations between individuals, which allows for intersubjectively meaningful but creative social action." Nowhere do interactions have greater indeterminacy than in meetings between individuals from different communities, and the "creative social action" is often convergence or at least an innovation that satisfies both parties.

ongoing when the Romans arrived and made western Sicily, then the whole island, a single political unit.

Throughout the dissertation I have been using the term “citizenship” to denote both a legal status and an affective group identity, with some preference for the second aspect. I maintain that preference throughout this chapter—the “citizenships” of the chapter title are the various group identifications generated by the shared practices to be discussed. There is precious little evidence for the legal citizenship status of Sicilian populations; so much of our information comes from the later compilations of Diodorus that even with the occasional epigraphic source it is nearly impossible to be sure of the fourth- or third-century reality. Civic decrees certainly evoke the world of the *polis* but there is no need to import wholesale the restrictive mainland Greek model in order to understand how communities produced these documents. The two aspects of the concept of “citizenship” are of course related, but the state of the evidence is better suited to explaining how Sicilian populations enacted their affiliations than for reconstructing the regulations on community membership.

## A. Paradoxical insularity

Islands, even large islands, tended to homogenize and develop unified identities over time in the Mediterranean. Even where there were multiple *poleis* on a single island, the island could still be a meaningful term of reference for islanders and others.<sup>729</sup> In what follows I will first discuss the development of a shared sense of Sicilian belonging in the context of Mediterranean insularity. The crucial point, not normally spelled out in studies of insularity, is that the main mechanism by which islands consolidated was interaction—interaction enabled by mobility.<sup>730</sup>

The aim of this section is to show that Sicily’s being an island encouraged unity, and while its being a very large island certainly allowed for diversity, it also made Sicily a capacious concept for its inhabitants to understand their identity. Mediterranean islands developed cultural, political, and social unity at different rates, but nearly all had done so to some degree by the end of the first century BCE. As Gary Reger wrote of insular unification, “the general trend [toward consolidation] is clear enough, I think, and suggests that the real issue is not to explain why some islands had one *polis* and others many, but rather to explain why some islands continued to have more than one *polis*.”<sup>731</sup> Of course, he had just concluded that there was no satisfactory way to explain why some islands had several *poleis* and others had just one, though he did identify *synoikismos*—consolidation—as an important mechanism for the trend toward single-polis islands. Sicily, like other large islands, took longer to integrate, and intra-insular mobility was crucial for that process.<sup>732</sup>

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<sup>729</sup> Reger (1997, p. 478): “In sum, there seems to have been a general impulse toward consolidation in the islands. Shared identity as islanders, as Lesbians or Keians or Peparethians, could overcome parochialism and local civic pride, especially when outside pressure made it convenient or necessary to combine forces.”

<sup>730</sup> Thus, for example, Mackil (2013, p. 405) sees the origins of the Greek *koinon* “against a background of intensive religious and economic interactions between communities,” a situation that could only be possible with people traveling frequently between the communities involved.

<sup>731</sup> Reger (1997, p. 478).

<sup>732</sup> Notably, the really large islands do not appear to have been politically unified until the arrival of the Romans, if even then.

Of course, the broad conflict on the island between Greeks and Carthaginians was not uniquely responsible for the flourishing of Sicilian tyranny or the development of a distinctive economic regime. However, in this section I will argue that Sicily's insularity as well as its unstable position between various imperial powers did affect both the desirability for those powers to coerce mobility in subject populations and the willingness of populations to move of their own accord.<sup>733</sup> Greek Sicilian tyranny did depend in some sense on the exaggerated external threat of the Carthaginians.<sup>734</sup> But I am less interested in that dependence than in how the perceived threats on both sides affected the imperial powers' policies regarding subject populations. Instead, I focus on how insularity and the uncertainty and instability of border zones affected voluntary mobility.<sup>735</sup> Both insular politics and insular geography led to internal Sicilian mobility, which in turn challenged the static community and made Sicily itself an increasingly relevant source of identity.

One aspect of insularity is unity, whether real, perceived, or attempted.<sup>736</sup> With smaller islands, especially those comprising only one *polis* like Samos, Delos, or Lipara (actually one *polis* comprising several islands, discussed in Chapter Six), such unity may well have existed on political and social levels, and was duly perceived. A recent study of Aegean insular identity has shown strong tendencies for inhabitants of islands with multiple political communities to identify themselves with the island rather than with their *polis*, and for outsiders to do the same.<sup>737</sup> It is encouraging to find that "...even in a highly 'politicized' world such as that of the Aegean islands there were expressions of identity alternative to the polis," especially given Finley's pessimism about polis institutions in Sicily.<sup>738</sup> If island identity could, in certain circumstances and in certain

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<sup>733</sup> An argument presaged in part by Anello (2006, p. 91): "Vedremo, infatti, come proprio il susseguirsi quasi spasmodico di vicende belliche intervallate da periodo più o meno lunghi di pace abbia fatto sì che la storia dell'Isola nel IV secolo subisse profonde trasformazioni a vari livelli e piani." Anello mentions "geographical" effects: the "scomparsa definitiva di alcune città, mentre altre subiscono gravi ridimensionamenti o radicali trasformazioni etniche" but the article is focused on the political level.

<sup>734</sup> Cf. Prag (2010b) on the tyrants' exploitation of fears about Carthaginian abuses. While Gruen (2011) highlights the connections between canonically hostile groups, the fact remains that plenty of Greek and Roman leaders benefited from popular fear of all sorts of Others.

<sup>735</sup> Instability could also lead populations to consolidate and tighten borders, though there is little evidence of this in LCEH Sicily. Neil (2012) argues that in Perugia unstable political conditions induced cities to assert and control both the physical boundaries of their territory and the theoretical boundaries of their local cultures, while peace allowed for greater communication between communities.

<sup>736</sup> Thus concludes Moggi (2009, pp. 59-60), a survey of small and medium-sized islands. "Certe isole possono non aver raggiunto l'unità o magari nemmeno averla cercata (Eubea, Lesbo, ma anche Ikaros), e tuttavia credo si possa affermare che i Greci, insulari e non, in genera 'si aspettavano' che un'isola fosse unita o tendesse all'unità" (p. 59). The Sicilian reality was quite different from these small and medium-sized islands, but the recognition that it *was* an island brought up the same aspects of insularity, as Hermocrates was trying to do. Cf. Constantakopoulou (2007, pp. 100-106) establishing a current fifth-century image of islands as poor, which was certainly not the case with Sicily; she notes early on that "Isolation and uniqueness are, in fact, inherent in the concept of insularity" (p. 3). Prestianni Giallombardo (2009) finds that in the written sources (Thucydides, Diodorus, Strabo) Sicily "ha oscillato nel tempo tra insularità orgogliosa e pretesa continentalità" (p. 77).

<sup>737</sup> Constantakopoulou (2005), cf. Reger (1997, p. 474): "No matter how many *poleis* an island had, its inhabitants felt an identity as residents of that island as well as, or in addition to, their identity as citizens of a *polis*."

<sup>738</sup> Constantakopoulou (2005, p. 19), cf. Constantakopoulou (2012) on island *koina* as new political communities of polis citizens and non-citizens. Finley (1979, p. 101): "The autonomous, self-governing

contexts, supersede *polis* identity in the Aegean, then it could certainly do so in the case of Sicily. Constantakopoulou does not exactly address the mechanisms behind such conceptual island unification, but first and foremost must be interaction between disparate communities, which depended on mobility between them. A similar process is very likely to have taken place on islands for which only a single *polis* is known, though it must have begun much earlier.

The perception of outsiders also played a role in fixing insular identity. As we saw in Chapter Six, a Mediterranean-wide reputation for a particular product could lead foreigners to lump the various populations of an island together.<sup>739</sup> These perceptions obviously did not determine how islanders identified themselves but did contribute. A key factor in Sicily's case is its Mediterranean centrality—though I dislike the core-periphery paradigm, it nonetheless seems accurate to describe Sicily, in the center of the Mediterranean, as being at the periphery of several cultural worlds in the fourth and third centuries BCE.<sup>740</sup> Geopolitically it was at the frontier of Carthaginian and then Roman expansion, economically and culturally it was at the edge of Greek consciousness, and for Italic, Celtic, Libyan and other western Mediterranean populations it must have been one of the farthest places they knew about. We should not however ignore the ability of culturally powerful outsiders to help shape one's sense of belonging.<sup>741</sup> Of course Sicilians contributed to their own self-identification, but being at a nexus of cultural worlds meant that there was also external pressure to do so from people who did not necessarily care about differentiating the parts and populations of Sicily from one another.

Yet in addressing Sicily's paradoxical insularity, we must also look to the other large Mediterranean islands with histories of multicultural interaction: Sardinia, Crete, and Cyprus. Euboia is an interesting case, though not really multicultural. The Peloponnese is relevant here as well—it is only barely more mainland than Sicily is. I begin with Sardinia, because of its proximity to Sicily, and a partly shared history. Phoenician, then Carthaginian interaction with the native populations of Sardinia from the eighth into the fifth centuries BCE have left traces in the archaeological record but little documentary or literary evidence.<sup>742</sup> As a result it is difficult to say how Sardinians from different parts of the island thought of themselves.<sup>743</sup> Nevertheless, the fact that literary sources almost universally speak of “Sardinians” indicates that at least to outsiders, by the fourth and third centuries that was the most relevant way of describing the island's inhabitants. True, the sources may not record instances when one Sardinian

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Greek city was beyond redemption even in old Greece and there was surely no hope for it in Sicily, where it had never grown strong roots.”

<sup>739</sup> See Chapter Six section A.

<sup>740</sup> See Musti (2004) on the ideology of Sicilian centrality.

<sup>741</sup> The assimilation of Romans and Italians is a good example; Roselaar (2012) attributes the process to the interactions and middle ground generated by Mediterranean trade, while Harris (2007) sees the Rhodians as primarily responsible for conflating the two categories.

<sup>742</sup> On Phoenician settlement in Sardinia, cf. van Dommelen (1998) and van Dommelen (2005).

Lombardo (2012, pp. 78-79) notes that the colonization of Sardinia contemplated by Ionians fleeing Cyrus' advances (Hdt. 1.170) would have involved a single colonial foundation for the entire island. There were urban settlements, though the social structures coinciding with these cities are not known.

<sup>743</sup> However, van Dommelen (2005, p. 149) claims intriguingly that “the limited influence exerted by these foundations [Sulcis and Tharros] on their hinterland, which meant that town and country did not become integrated until the late fifth or fourth century BC.” It is not clear what kind of integration is envisioned.

community acted independently of another; nevertheless there does not seem to be any positive evidence of strong divisions between Sardinian populations from, say, the fourth century onward. The wholesale accession of the island as the Romans' second province (along with Corsica) in 227 BCE contrasts with the piecemeal provincialization of Sicily. In their frequent revolts (236-231, 226/5, 215, 178-173, 163/2, 115-111, 104 BCE) the Sardinians seem to have acted collectively, perhaps deriving some unity from the common enemy and the fact that the Romans dealt with them collectively.<sup>744</sup> In any case, and despite a very fragmentary record, Sardinia appears to have been conceived (by Greeks and Romans, anyway) as unified from a relatively early date, perhaps even in the sixth century.

Cyprus also presents some similarities with Sicily, though some of the historical specifics make it difficult to draw useful parallels. Both had indigenous populations who came in contact with Phoenicio-Punic and Greek newcomers. Yet Cyprus was known by its own geographical name (Alashia) as early as the Late Bronze Age, and was controlled by the Egyptian and then Persian empires, which ought to have generated from the outside a sense of island identity. On this basis one might expect a more unified Cyprus, but in fact its independent kingdoms survived and thrived until the early third century, when Ptolemaic rule ended political fragmentation.<sup>745</sup> These kingdoms, of which perhaps the most famous was that of Evagoras in fourth-century Salamis, may have been the main impediment to the development of Cypriot insular identity, since it was through these kingdoms that Persia and perhaps Egypt ruled the island.

The multiplicity of political communities on Crete was proverbial (*Odyssey* 19.174), yet although hostilities between them continued well into the second century BCE, a Cretan insular identity was nevertheless able to grow, perhaps especially in the eyes of outsiders. In the centuries before political unification under the Romans in 67 BCE, populations from Crete served as mercenaries abroad and conducted piratical raids.<sup>746</sup> Mercenary service may have encouraged their employers to see them primarily as Cretans rather than as coming from independent communities; and pirate raids may have led their real or potential victims to fear and demonize the Cretans as a whole (as, for example, seems to have been the case with the Aitolians, who however did not have strong *polis* traditions).<sup>747</sup> In the case of piracy, any reputation of Cretans in general was balanced by recognition of the island's many communities, as amply attested by the fact

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<sup>744</sup> *Brill's New Pauly* vol. 12 s.v. Sardinia. In Livy's account of the 215 revolt there is a hint of as yet divided populations in his mention of the *Pelliti Sardi*—the “Skin-covered Sardinians,” but even they are still Sardinians.

<sup>745</sup> In 294 BCE. *Brill's New Pauly* vol. 3 s.v. Cyprus.

<sup>746</sup> Chaniotis (1995, p. 43): “...as far as we can judge from the scanty evidence, the economic interaction between Crete and the rest of the Hellenistic world was basically related with the mercenary service and the piracy of the Cretans...” Chaniotis goes on to argue against any significant export from the island, a claim reiterated in Chaniotis (2004b), putting Crete in stark contrast with Sicily in this regard.

<sup>747</sup> For example, Miletos awarded citizenship to Cretan mercenaries in 223/2 BCE on the basis of *πρὸς Κρήτας ὑπαρχούσης οἰκειότητος καὶ συγγενείας* (*Milet* I.3 37a line 2), and Livy (24.30.13-4) describes a contingent of 600 Cretan mercenaries serving under Hieronymos in 214. That Crete and Cretans as a whole were implicated in piracy, cf. Polybius' comment (13.8.2) on the near-contemporary Nabis: “he took part with the Cretans in their piracy on the sea.” For the major role of the Aitolians and Cretans in Hellenistic piracy cf. de Souza (2002 pp. 43-96) and Sheedy (1996, p. 430). On the Aitolians specifically, Scholten (2000).

that agreements of *asylia* were always struck with individual *poleis*.<sup>748</sup> It seems, then, that despite a Mediterranean-wide relevance of the descriptor Cretan, the Cretan cities themselves maintained the affiliation of their citizens throughout the Hellenistic period. A recent survey of the epigraphic habit in Hellenistic and Roman Crete has shown that civic and *polis*-level communal inscriptions decline sharply around the time the island became a Roman province, and individual inscriptions, often linked to the provincial government, come to predominate.<sup>749</sup> This shift in focus from city to individual amounts to what Chaniotis labels “a change in mentality,” which attests not so much the increasing importance of individuals *per se* but the increasing importance of affiliations other than that of the city. This change appears wholly attributable to the beginning of Roman administration, whereas in Sicily I am arguing that the Romans found similar processes already underway.

Unlike the other large islands thus far examined, Euboia, like Sicily, was close enough to the mainland to have been questionably insular. Indeed, the Euripos strait between Euboia and Boiotia was bridged in 411 BCE by a joint Chalkidian/Euboian and Boiotian operation.<sup>750</sup> In Diodorus’ account the Euboians were motivated by their fear that as an island they were especially vulnerable to Athenian naval power, while the Boiotians wanted the bridge “because it was also beneficial to them that Euboia be an island to the others but mainland to themselves.” The bridge thus physically and symbolically attached Euboia to Boiotia, removing it from the universe of Mediterranean islands. Even before this bridging, however, Euboia as a concept had long been superseded by its two most powerful cities, Chalkis and Eretria. In contrast to the island of Rhodes, which was given credit for the colonies planted by its cities, the colonizing ventures that must have involved diverse Euboian populations were ascribed either to the Chalkidians or the Eretrians.<sup>751</sup> Lombardo ascribes this prominence of city over island to the polar conflict between Chalkis and Eretria as manifested in the Lelantine War, though I am not sure that similar circumstances might not have obtained on Crete or Rhodes. In any event, from an early date Euboia was defined by its two main *poleis* in a manner more like mainland region than island, and this condition seems to have persisted well into the period of Roman control.<sup>752</sup> As the island shifted between Athenian, Theban, and Macedonian control, the politically relevant unit was always the city, and there does not seem to be evidence for the development of a broad Euboian identity.

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<sup>748</sup> See Rigsby (1996, *passim*). However, his no. 56 (pp. 159-60) from Tenos is headed δόγματα Κρητ[ῶν], which Rigsby interprets as a “regional heading” presumably governing the whole series of decrees concerning Cretan cities, and indicating some awareness of Crete as a regional unit. Cf. also the Κρητικῶν πολέμ[ωι] of *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 569, ca. 200 BCE.

<sup>749</sup> Chaniotis (2004b, p. 86).

<sup>750</sup> D.S. 13.47.3-5, cf. Strabo 1.1.17, 9.2.2, 8, 10.1.2, 8. Strabo gives the bridge’s length as 2 *plethra* = 66 m. = 202 ft., but *Brill’s New Pauly* 5, s.v. “Euripus [1]” claims that in antiquity the strait had two channels, one 15m wide and the other 18m wide. In any case, the marine geography and distance were not prohibitive to the construction of a bridge, as they continue to be in the case of the Sicilian Strait.

<sup>751</sup> Lombardo (2012, p. 77): “Ancient sources only mention colonies founded by the Chalkidians and/or the Eretrians.”

<sup>752</sup> Athenian cleruchies in 506 and 446/5 targeted the cities, and Chalkis and Eretria participated independently in the Delian League and the Second Athenian Confederacy as well as the Hellenistic Boiotian koinon.

To complete this brief comparative survey, I discuss the Peloponnese, a near-island roughly Sicily's size, with which the island shared a history. In the Peloponnese, a multitude of strong ethnic and political units formed a considerable barrier to peninsular social integration. While Sparta's Peloponnesian League was never coterminous with the Peloponnese, and was of extremely variable relevance, it does unambiguously attest that one could make an appeal to distinct and shared interests there.<sup>753</sup> Pretzler has in fact argued that the aspirational comprehensiveness of the Peloponnesian League promoted a pan-Peloponnesian identity that could be activated as necessary—for example by the later Achaian League.<sup>754</sup> In a passage cited but not discussed by Pretzler, Polybius (2.37.9-11) brags about the Achaian League that

...although many tried in times gone by to lead the Peloponnesians toward their mutual advantage, and nobody was able to accomplish it because everyone was exerting themselves not for the sake of shared freedom but for the sake of their own power, this region has made such great progress and reached such fulfillment in our time that not only has an allied and friendly community of affairs arisen among them but they employ the same customs, weights, measures, and coins, and in addition to these the same authorities, councilors, and judges, *and in general the whole Peloponnese differs from having the condition of a single polis in this alone, that a single wall does not exist for its inhabitants*, but otherwise things are nearly the same for everyone both in the collective and in each city. [italics mine]

Two comparisons immediately present themselves. First, Polybius' pessimistic assessment of Peloponnesian unity before the Achaian League echoes the language used by Thucydides in the mouth of Alcibiades to describe the mixed populations of fifth century Sicily.<sup>755</sup> Both point to greed as the biggest obstacle to collective action, though significantly Polybius does *not* mention mobility or loose citizenship boundaries in the Peloponnese. Second, the idea of Sicily as a single *polis* also existed in [Plato] *Ep.* 7 332c, which inexplicably claimed that Dionysius II had “collected all of Sicily into one *polis*.”<sup>756</sup> Casting aside the veracity of the statement, it is nonetheless significant that the author of the letter could envisage something called “all of Sicily” (πᾶσα Σικελία).<sup>757</sup> In fact, even if the Seventh and Eighth Letters are not really Plato's, they were nevertheless

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<sup>753</sup> The League notably did not include Argos, but did sometimes include Thebans. Origins of the League in the mid-sixth century BCE: Hdt. 1.65-68. Loose organization: Lendon (1994).

<sup>754</sup> Pretzler (2007) usefully collects references to “Peloponnesians” in the literary sources, and concludes (p. 10) “[t]he fact that the concept of ‘Peloponnesian-ness’ developed a life of its own, independently from the organisation which created it, shows how significant it had become to the Peloponnesians themselves.”

<sup>755</sup> Thucydides 6.17.2-4, discussed in previous chapters.

<sup>756</sup> εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν; inexplicable because even if one only counts Greek subjects, Dionysius II is thought to have lost those his father had gained. Polybius' assertion that “the whole Peloponnese” resembles a single *polis* also prefigures the later claim of Aelius Aristides in the second century CE (*Roman Oration* 61) that the Romans had made their entire empire a single *polis*.

<sup>757</sup> The general anti-Punic stance of Letters 7 and 8 makes it unlikely that the author intended to include the Punic populations of western Sicily. However, the exhortation to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily (7.333a, 336a; barbarian threat at 8.353e, imagined success of Dion in “depriving the barbarians of the territory that they now hold” at 8.357a) implies that the author nonetheless conceived of Sicily as the whole island, not just the Greek parts. On the program of the seventh and eighth letters, see Sanders (1994) and Sanders (2008).

likely forged in the fourth century and still reflect fourth-century attitudes.<sup>758</sup> For my purposes it does not matter much whether they were written before or after Timoleon's landing. Polybius was writing in the mid-second century, and was clearly biased, but his mini-encomium of the Achaian League does attest the development of interdependence and regional community on the part of Peloponnesian populations. He certainly attests to the homogenization of customs and perhaps culture. In this case too, mobility may have played a role.<sup>759</sup>

Sicily was famously perceived as disunited, as Alcibiades' speech suggests—and Alcibiades was only referring to the Greek parts of the island. If one takes into account also the native populations and the Carthaginians, the island of Sicily must be counted as one of the least unified islands in the Mediterranean. The term *Sikeliotai* included only the Greek population of Sicily while the terms *Elymoi*, *Sikanoi*, and *Sikeloi* referred to its native groups; *Karchedonioi* apparently included both Carthaginians from Carthage as well as the inhabitants of the Carthaginian-founded cities.<sup>760</sup> The narrow referent of *Sikeliotas* has been vastly underappreciated by scholars positing an early date for a pan-Sicilian identity—the Greeks were not the only people on the island. Without appealing yet to the notion of the territorial state, a certain degree of cognitive dissonance can be posited for the existence of a named island that had no single term (or concept) for its inhabitants until a relatively late stage.<sup>761</sup> This consideration leads to another: besides the *chorai* of the individual cities, there were no regional geographic

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<sup>758</sup> Against the letter's authenticity, on grounds of style and content, see e.g. Edelstein (1966); Sanders (2008) takes a more agnostic position, noting the many potentially convincing arguments on both sides. Nevertheless, he claims unequivocally (pp. 4-5) that "the *Letters* were obviously written in the middle of the fourth century BC by Plato or another of other Academics [sic] or, at the very least, by individuals sympathetic to the Platonic line."

<sup>759</sup> Vlassopoulos (2007) proposes that in addition to a bounded geographic conception of the Peloponnese (as a space that could be "closed off," the very criterion that prevented Polybius from calling it a single *polis*), the experience of Peloponnesians abroad as colonists or mercenaries may have contributed to the development of a Peloponnesian identity. Recall from Chapter Four that many of the mercenaries hired for service in Sicily came from the Peloponnese, in particular from Arkadia, on which see Roy (2004). Aristotle (*Politics* 3.1276a) had made a thought experiment of enclosing the entire Peloponnese with a wall, but found that it self-evidently would not have thereby constituted a single *polis*; the situation had clearly changed by Polybius' time, when the Achaian koinon was rendering the Peloponnese more united than it had ever been and he could conjure up the idea of a Peloponnesian wall as a thought experiment with which to measure the peninsula's new unity.

<sup>760</sup> On *Sikeliotai* see Moggi (2009, p. 51) *pace* Hall (2002, p. 123). Both *Sikeliotai* and *Sikeloi* (as in the Latin *Siculus*) eventually came to be the term used for all inhabitants of Sicily for which see Prag (2009). The lack of specificity in the Greek term *Karchedonios* is a problem.

<sup>761</sup> On islands in the archaic and classical Greek mentality see Ceccarelli (2009, p. 43): "le isole sono più facilmente circoscrivibili, individuabili,--difendibili...L'*Odissea* è 'popolata' di numerose isole, entità discrete, ognuna con un carattere specifico, legato a quello dei suoi abitanti." See also Moggi (2009, p. 52) on the speech of Hermocrates in Thucydides 4.58-65: "...Hermocrate ha fatto ricorso a una serie di manipolazioni, che dimostrano come doveva essere difficile omogeneizzare e ridurre a unità una realtà frammentata e conflittuale come quella della Sicilia; nello stesso tempo, la forte sottolineatura della sua insularità sembra indicare che una terra circondata dal mare doveva apparire, per la sua stessa natura, come un mondo a parte, come un tutto, se non necessariamente destinato, almeno tendenzialmente portato all'omogeneità e all'unità." I note, however, with Frisone (2009, pp. 153-4) that Thucydides' own judgment of Sicily's insularity at 6.1.1-2 is largely negative, stressing as he does its size and the narrowness of the straight separating it from the mainland, twenty stadia.

terms for different parts of Sicily.<sup>762</sup> Nor did Sicily ever have a mainland territory or a *peraia* like Aegean islands did, notwithstanding Dionysius' strong influence in Calabria.<sup>763</sup> This means that an individual had only one conceptual boundary to cross in relocating from one city to another. Wherever he went he would retain his designation of origin, and he would still be a Sicilian.

The nominal geographical unity of Sicily, coupled with a culturally fragmented landscape, meant that mobility did not have to compromise identity.<sup>764</sup> In peacetime Greeks fled from the rule of Dionysius I to the territory of the Carthaginians; Motya had temples for Greeks; Carthaginians lived (apparently happily) in Syracuse and other Greek cities; throughout the island, *polis*- or city-affiliation was important but it could be replaced. Why Sicily did not develop meaningful sub-regions, or a more geographically defined cultural landscape, are difficult questions beyond the scope of this project. Still, the commitment to Sicily as an indivisible geographical unit is also clear from the fact that when Dionysius I imagined building a defensive wall he placed it across the toe of the Italian peninsula—the Calabrian isthmus—rather than anywhere in Sicily.<sup>765</sup> This was a fanciful project, but the point remains that a boundary wall was never envisioned within Sicily.

Many scholars have noted the development of the personal and territorial empires of the Dionysii and Agathokles that dissolved the culture of *poleis* existing for most of the fifth century and renewed temporarily under Timoleon. Likewise, Carthaginian influence in (western) Sicily increasingly took on the form of territorial claims rather than arrangements with individual communities.<sup>766</sup> That the two imperial

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<sup>762</sup> Frisone (2009, pp. 153-4) makes much of Herodotus' notice (7.170) that part of the territory of Akragas was once called *Sikanie* (a name also found in the Odyssey 24.307), but I think that her claim (p. 154) that "la configurazione-denominazione dell'isola nel suo insieme sia stata preceduta dal definirsi di nozioni di alcune sue regioni" cannot be sustained. Thucydides's account of the island's name (6.2.2-5) always takes it to be a single geographical entity, named at various times *Trinakria*, *Sikania*, and *Sikelia*. Frisone's insistence on the construction of the concept of an island Sicily, against the notion of a 'natural region,' is however quite important. The term *eparchia* certainly had geographical connotations but its physical location and extent were so variable that I exclude it as a properly 'regional' name.

<sup>763</sup> On Dionysius and southern Italy cf. Berger (1992). Note also Dionysius' alleged plans to separate Calabria from Italy by a wall or a canal, discussed just below and attested by Strabo 6.1.10 and Pliny, *NH* 3.10.95.

<sup>764</sup> But see Frisone (2009, p. 149) who argues rightly that Sicily's being an island would not have been immediately perceptible to anyone in antiquity due mainly to its size; its insularity "attiene a un livello molto più teorico di quanto noi siamo disposti ad ammettere." Likewise Constantakopoulou (2007, p. 14): "Sicily, in fact, is more than a large island." But Constantakopoulou concedes (p. 16): "Insularity, however, can be applied to areas which were not 'real' islands, or, in other words, what Broodbank described as *perceived* islands." [italics sic] See Broodbank (2000, pp. 16-17) on "analytical" [i.e. established by modern cartography] vs. "perceived" [understood as such by the actors themselves] islands. Frisone argues that Sicily was an analytical island while Broodbank himself takes it to have been a perceived island; he admits difficulty deciding between large island and small continent (p. 17): "An indication that such ambiguities are not unique to our own time can be found in Herodotus' statement, in the fifth century BC, that Sardinia is the 'biggest island in the world' (Book I: 179; Book VI: 1), an assertion of interest because it is wrong even in terms of the size of those water-girt land-masses known in his day—Sicily is considerably larger, and presumably its proximity to Italy compromised its insular status in Herodotus' eyes."

<sup>765</sup> Strabo 6.1.10. Pliny, *NH* 3.10.95 has a canal not a wall but nevertheless imputes to Dionysius a desire to "attach [Calabria] to Sicily."

<sup>766</sup> See Cataldi (2003) for an account of the development of the Punic *eparchia* and the Greek pejorative term *epikrateia*.

powers operating on Sicily came to define a frontier between themselves should not be surprising, nor do we have real evidence of increased population mobility at the border (which was itself mobile); what is interesting is that the reconfiguration of the two powers as territorial empires required them to direct the movement of populations well within their borders.<sup>767</sup> Yet the ongoing political division between Greek and Carthaginian territory in Sicily had already become anachronistic by the middle of the third century when the Romans found themselves in control of the entire island except the Syracusan kingdom where they permitted Hieron II to rule. Internal political boundaries had to withstand the weight of insular geography, and without careful maintenance, they eventually crumbled; cultural boundaries were always likely to be more permeable and they too did not survive the third century.

## **B. Writing, formal and informal**

In this section and the two following I trace some of the shared practices that contributed to the deterioration of those cultural boundaries. Language and writing have long been recognized as a significant basis of community cohesion and differentiation. While other practices that do not rely on language can also perform these tasks, the question “with whom can I speak?” was always fundamental. Indeed a major first distinction made by the Greeks was between those who spoke Greek and the Barbarians who did not. Language practices were obviously more complicated than such a dichotomy suggests, especially in zones of language contact; even among Greek speakers dialects were not always mutually intelligible, and reading and writing ability could vary considerably. Thus while it is important to recognize the values placed on speaking a common language, the actual practices of language use can tell a different story.

While the earliest inscriptions from the Euboian, Corinthian, Megarian, and Rhodian colonies manifest clear dialectal fidelity, by the LCEH period only a few aspects of dialect remain, often preserved in names. The general spread of Doric dialectal features into writing across the island is notable, and can be presumed to have followed Syracusan cultural domination. It is possible that the movement of Syracusans (or Corinthians, after Timoloen) was responsible for this spread, but such an explanation is not by any means the only one. The inhabitants of Entella or Halaisa, for example, could have adopted aspects of Doric dialect on their own terms, for any of the reasons cultural forms are transmitted from one group to another. Crucially, however, some contact and therefore some travel must have taken place, by enough influential people, to have had an effect. This principle serves my argument in the other sections as well: in Sicily as elsewhere in the ancient world, information of all kinds traveled on two feet.

It is a significant fact that the overwhelming majority of preserved inscriptions from LCEH Sicily are Greek. In this period Sicily also produced a few Punic texts, a few Oscan texts, and two or three Latin ones.<sup>768</sup> The majority of the Punic texts are in fact

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<sup>767</sup> Besides the observation of Dionysius I that many Greeks were moving to the Carthaginian territory around 400.

<sup>768</sup> Probably the best-known Latin text is a mid third-century milestone from the area of Corleone, *ILLRP* 1277. Cf. most recently Prag (2006b). A dedication from the area of Palermo may be contemporary or earlier than the milestone: *CIL* X 7265. An undated and fragmentary inscription from Syracuse (*CIL* I<sup>2</sup>

coin legends, and there are a handful of Oscan dedications, for which see below in section i. The epigraphic evidence available to us suggests that Greek of various kinds was being used across Sicily, and in much of what follows the issue at hand is the relationship between those types of Greek, specifically the growing emergence of a regional Doric language community.

## i. Linguistics

I will first address the use of language itself, based both on the relatively few public inscriptions preserved, and more importantly on informal writing, including graffiti, contracts, and *defixiones*, which offer a view into the wider use of language by parts of populations not normally involved in the production of official documents. Where previously script and dialect distinguished the Greek colonial foundations from each other, from the fourth century on those distinctions no longer existed except in occasional usages and in fossilized forms. Doric Greek was becoming the common language of Sicily, such that what was spoken and written in different cities was mutually intelligible despite the persistence of some local idiosyncrasies.<sup>769</sup> This is the “Sicilian Doric Koina” that developed beginning in the fourth century, which Mimblera places generally “in the context of increased interaction among the inhabitants of Sicily due to its particular history.”<sup>770</sup> I hope to have unfolded some of that “particular history” over the course of the dissertation, and thus to have provided some of the grounds for the interaction that she rightly indicates as fundamental to linguistic change. The story is mainly one of Doric resistance to Attic-Ionic influence, and to the extent that Sicily was one of the main locations of that resistance, it follows that in general Sicilians were choosing to speak and write in a way that set them apart from other Mediterranean populations. It must not have been very difficult for an inhabitant of Panormos at the end of the third century to recognize that he wrote and spoke in the same dialect as a Syracusan, but differently from an Athenian or an Alexandrian.

From the very beginning of the Greek presence on Sicily, various dialects had come into contact. The language of the Euboian colonies very quickly took on Doric aspects.<sup>771</sup> Notable, for example, is a graffito from Himera, dated to ca. 400 BCE, with the lone Doric genitive Ἡρακλείδα.<sup>772</sup> It is not clear to what population this sherd should

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3429) is also included by Tribulato (2012) in her catalogue of third-century Latin inscriptions. Latin does begin to appear with some regularity in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century, however.

<sup>769</sup> Cf. Buck (1955, pp. 176-7) on what he terms the “Doric κοινή.”

<sup>770</sup> Mimblera (2012b, p. 246). She also hints tantalizingly at political pride in the Sicilian flavor of Greek (pp. 248-9). More generally her chapter is a good summary of the characteristics of this “*koina*” (so named to mark the term in opposition to the Attic-Ionic *koinē*, and italicized to differentiate it from the plural *koina*—“federal leagues”). The western Mediterranean receives very little attention in Horrocks (2010), other than some remarks on the persistence of Doric dialect features on Rhodes, in the Peloponnese, and in Sicily (pp. 87-88).

<sup>771</sup> In fact, there was a degree of Doric and Ionic mixing already underway by the end of the fifth century: Mimblera (2012a). Here too, Mimblera points to the “complicated history” and “great mixture of the population,” suggesting that the Sicilian Doric *koina* may have been in “gestation” before the fourth century (pp. 218-9). It is not clear how much she is thinking of the early population upheavals of the Deinomenids, and how much of the later Sicilian Expedition, Carthaginian invasions, and the rise of Dionysius I.

<sup>772</sup> IGDS 14b. Dubois compares this genitive ending to the Archaic Ionian termination –ίδεο found in his no. 7.

be attributed, but we can say that someone in the ruins of post-409 Himera (originally a Euboian colony) wrote a genitive in the Doric fashion. Late fifth-century inscriptions from Naxos preserving Ionian dialect forms probably all predate 403.<sup>773</sup> A list of names inscribed on a bronze tablet found at Leontinoi preserves, along with Ionian forms, feminine names ending in the characteristically Doric long *alpha*.<sup>774</sup> Perhaps the most striking example of a change in language practices is the inscription on an Attic relief reused as a dedication to Demeter and Kore in Katane around 300 BCE or earlier. The object comes from the sanctuary of Demeter and Kore found in the excavations in Piazzetta San Nicolo, which also produced many terracotta statuettes of Kore. The text is inscribed on the upper and lower listels of the relief: Δάματρι καὶ Κόραι | [---]ων καὶ ἅ γυνὰ αὐτοῦ Ὁρε[---]αὶ τὰ τέκνα.<sup>775</sup> This object clearly has an interesting history, and one that attests the mobility of people, particularly as its language led Libertini to wonder whether the dedicators came from elsewhere—Dubois himself proposes the area of Metaponto because other dedications that include an extended family description are attested there.<sup>776</sup> What I hope to have shown in the earlier part of the dissertation, however, is that we should have no expectation for Katane to have continued to produce Ionian inscriptions, since the people living in Katane changed so frequently. By the end of the fourth century the Euboian Katanaioi had been enslaved and sold, though they reassembled at Mylai; the city was ruled by a Campanian Marcus/Mamercus when Timoleon arrived in Sicily; and it had defected to the Carthaginian side from Agathokles.<sup>777</sup> Whoever was responsible for the inscription, it demonstrates some of the consequences of population upheaval, including homogenization; it is particularly interesting because it gives the cult of Demeter and Kore, perhaps the most widely shared Sicilian cult, a specific Doric inflection. That the text accomplished this on an Ionian artistic product and on the streets of an ancient Ionian foundation is a greater testament to that upheaval.

Of the two Megarian cities, Selinous has a far greater epigraphic output than its metropolis Megara Hyblaia. Part of the reason for this is that Megara Hyblaia was depopulated early in the fifth century and only seems to have regained the semblance of a discrete community in the third, but Selinous also suffered its own misfortunes—a violent invasion in 409, after which probably a mixed Greek and Punic population inhabited the site, though only until its complete abandonment in 250. Nothing relevant from LCEH Megara Hyblaia has survived. From Selinous, on the other hand, come a few significant inscriptions. The first is a late fifth-century *defixio*—in Dubois’ words “the only Selinuntine *defixio* in an Ionic alphabet that differentiates between vowels”—that has been attributed, like the Katane relief just discussed, to a visitor to the city.<sup>778</sup> It is the only *defixio* from the Malophoros sanctuary that may date to the LCEH period, though it may also predate the city’s capture in 409. There is no reason, however, to

<sup>773</sup> E.g. *IGDS* II 3b, 4b.

<sup>774</sup> *IGDS* II 8. The tablet is dated to the end of the fifth century but was found in an Archaic sanctuary; its function is unclear.

<sup>775</sup> *IGDS* II 14, citing comparanda in southern Italy: *IGDGG* I 48-9 (Metapontion); *SEG* XXXIII 765 (Heraklea); *SEG* XXX 1219 (Taras).

<sup>776</sup> Libertini (1937, pp. 721-726); Dubois ad loc.

<sup>777</sup> Enslavement: D.S. 14.15.1-3; assembled at Mylai: 14.87.1; ruled by Marcus/Mamercus: 16.69.4, cf. Plutarch, *Timoleon* 13.1; defection: 19.110.3. See also Chapter Five section B.

<sup>778</sup> *IGDS* 40. Dubois considers the dative Σελινῶι to be a Doric form of a feminine name, while admitting that it may be an unexceptional dative of a masculine name Σέλινος.

insist that the *defixio* was composed by a visitor rather than a resident. By focusing on exactly who wrote the text we lose sight of the important fact that it was certainly inspired by interaction and mobility between Selinous and cities where an Ionic script was used.

Outside of the Malophoros sanctuary, curse tablets are somewhat more abundant. A *defixio* more securely dated to the fourth century contains both a Doric hypocoristic personal name Ἀρτάμων and what may be an overcorrected aspirated personal name beginning Εὐρ-.<sup>779</sup> Indeed, a number of *defixiones* from Selinous and the nearby Buffa necropolis date to the fourth and third centuries, evidence that the inhabitants of the area were still inscribing in Greek.<sup>780</sup> A dedication to Hera in temple E at Selinous, dated to the end of the third century, preserves a dialectal feminine nominative Ἀρχεσώι but is otherwise in Doric *koina*.<sup>781</sup> Thus Selinous, fairly well separated from the rest of Greek Sicily, nevertheless seems to have produced evidence of dialectal mixing.

The area of the Rhodian cities, Gela and Akragas, has produced some evidence for linguistic mixing. A third-century decree of the Molossians granting proxeny to the Akragantinoi preserves a Rhodian infinitive δόμειν, which Dubois considers proof that the text was prepared by the Akragantinoi themselves.<sup>782</sup> This seems possible in virtue of the three Akragantine ambassadors mentioned in the text, who could have presented the Molossians with a set text for two copies, one of which went back to Akragas. The rest of the short inscription is unremarkable in its Doric dialect. The *asylia* decree of Gela for Kos in 242 contains a number of innovative words but it is impossible to tell if they were inspired by other dialects; nevertheless in at least one place the Koan engraver wrote in his own dialect.<sup>783</sup> More surprising is the presence of Ionic vocalism in the region of Gela: Ἡρακλεία ληιά inscribed on a loomweight, the feminine name Γέλῃ incised on a vase, and the theonym Μαιῖε.<sup>784</sup> A proxeny decree of Akragas for a Syracusan, dated to just after 210, on the other hand, retains a number of Rhodian features as well as an instance of Ionic *koinē*.<sup>785</sup> Rhodian dialect forms include the perfect infinitive γεγόνειν (L.15), as well as the present infinitives τιμῆιν (L.16), εἴμειν (L.19), ἀναθέμειν (L.23), and ἀποδόμειν (L.24). Moreover Dubois, following Buck and Sicca, sees in the -ει- of παρεισχῆσθαι (L.14) an example of Mediterranean *koinē*. These linguistic issues, seemingly attesting the persistence of ancient dialect forms in a city whose population had been repeatedly altered, must also be set in historical context. The document mentions two ambassadors to Rome, who are identified not only with patronymics but papponymics as well (LL.11-12), perhaps an effort to imitate the Roman *tria nomina* (doubtful), or simply an effort to posit a long line of descent. Below I

<sup>779</sup> IGDS II 38.

<sup>780</sup> Bettarini (2005).

<sup>781</sup> IGDS 56. From the drawing it appears that the name should be read Ἀρχεσώι, but I have not seen the inscription, which is on a limestone paving block now in the museum in Palermo inv. 8776 [though their inventory numbering seems to have changed since 1989]. In any event the aspiration or de-aspiration of a medial consonant appears to have been rather common in Sicilian Greek epigraphy, perhaps due to the influence of non-native speakers and writers.

<sup>782</sup> IGDS 184; SGDI 1340. Meyer (2013, p. 90 and fn. 61) confirms the proposal of Hammond (1967, p. 571) to date the inscription to the reign of Pyrrhus.

<sup>783</sup> IGDS 160, L. 20 ποτ' αὐτὸς for αὐτοῦς.

<sup>784</sup> IGDS 168a, d. These inscriptions may, however, be from the second, or even first century.

<sup>785</sup> IGDS 185, cf. Buck (1955, p. 301) and Sicca (1924, p. 125).

suggest that the decree may have been an effort to reestablish Akragantine community ties after the turbulent second half of the third century, and the linguistic features of the text may point in the same direction.

Other cities also experienced language mixing. The civic archives of Tauromenion were written in Doric *koina* though in at least one place a Rhodian infinitive was used.<sup>786</sup> At Morgantina a fourth-century dedication found on a pithos rim, ἱερὸς Ἑλαιελίνου (rather than the expected Doric ἱαρός) may signify that the text belongs to a period prior to Syracusan domination of the city, perhaps around the time of Timoleon.<sup>787</sup> By the late fourth or early third century, people at Morgantina were writing in Doric, as demonstrated by a playful text inscribed in terracotta as well as the late third- and early second-century contracts.<sup>788</sup> The joking text, which includes a series of sigmas and kappas, the names of several animals, an alliterative punning line, and a scatological jab at Zeus (perhaps a comic quotation according to Dubois), may particularly capture the language as spoken at that time in Morgantina. Also from the interior, modern Gibil-Gabib, there is a dipinto on a Sicilian-made pyxis that includes an Ionic dative.<sup>789</sup> While these interior regions were clearly dominated by Doric, Ionic elements were nevertheless used as well.

At Entella, another city with indigenous origins and a population history even more unstable than that of Morgantina, we have only the seven decrees passed probably at the end of the Second Punic War in 241. The decrees are generally written in Doric *koina* but manifestly borrow from other dialects, for example the Rhodian infinitives εἶμειν (A1 LL.13 and 17, A2 L.15, A3 L.15 and B1 L.9), ἀναθέμειν (C2 L. 12 and C3 L.13), and ἀποδιδόμειν (B1 L.13). In general, however, there is significant alteration between forms: εἰς and ἐς, even within the same inscription (eg. A1 L.6 ἐς and L. 9 εἰς); genitive ἁμῶν (C1 L.8) and the adjective ἁμός (nominative singular masculine in B1 L.12, declined in B1 L.6, C2 LL 9 and 25, C3 LL.8 and 21); *koine* plural imperative ἀναθέντων (A2 L.21) and dialect ἀναθέντω (A1 L.29, A3 L.21, B1 LL. 15-16, C1 L.18).<sup>790</sup> These inconsistencies are, to my mind, evidence of a linguistic community influenced by a number of others, and as a whole the decrees present nothing like a unified linguistic profile. By the mid third century language was perhaps less political in western Sicily than it had been, and such an inconsistent use of Greek by the officials of Entella was a sign that no dialect was excluded there, that everyone was making it up as they went along.

The other originally Elymian city that has produced some epigraphic data is Segesta. Its Doric usage appears not to have been affected by Rhodian or Ionic *koine*. However, western and central Sicilian epigraphy of the LCEH period does exhibit a distinctive form: the suffix “-τα” is added to the pronoun αὐτός to produce the reflexive pronoun. Thus, at Segesta we have a woman honoring τὸν αὐτᾶστα πατέρα in the fourth or third century, a man honoring τὰν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦτα around the same time, and a

<sup>786</sup> IG XIV 421-430. IG XIV 430 I 13: ἀγορασθέμειν.

<sup>787</sup> IGDS 190, adjective not commented on by Dubois. Cf. e.g. the contemporary dedication from Adrano IGDS II 106: ἱαρός Ἡρακλ[έος].

<sup>788</sup> Joking text: IGDS 193; contracts: e.g. IGDS 194.

<sup>789</sup> IGDS 170: Ἀγροίτης ἐποιεὶ τὴν σιπιῖδα Ζωπυροῖ.

<sup>790</sup> The same alternation is found in the probably contemporary Nakone decree: L. 16 κλαρώντων but L.17 ποτικλαρώντω.

woman honoring her mother-in law, [τ]ὰν αὐτοῦτα ματέρα in the second century.<sup>791</sup> The formation also appears in the Nakone decree (LL. 19 and 26 αὐτῶντα; L. 27 αὐτοῖστα).<sup>792</sup> The practice is attested as far east as Himera, in a Roman-period dedication, and at Kentoripa, in its second- or first-century kinship agreement with Lanuvium in Latium.<sup>793</sup> It is unclear exactly how such a reflexive could have come into use, though Dubois notes that αὐτός alone can be a reflexive pronoun in a number of Doric dialects.<sup>794</sup> Thus in his view it simply evolved as a way of clearly indicating reflexive meaning. I would add that its use across ethnic borders shows that interaction across them was occurring, so that individuals from different areas in Sicily came to recognize a familiar linguistic feature.<sup>795</sup> However small, this piece of linguistic evidence points to a shared practice documenting mobility and suggesting ways in which individuals in different cities could consider themselves to share something with those elsewhere in Sicily.

The Doric dialect of Syracuse itself evolved over the fourth and third centuries, though as a result it is difficult to attribute new forms to language or dialect contact in Sicily as opposed to internal change or contact with language communities beyond Sicily. So while the epigraphic output of the Corinthian foundations is certainly of interest, it is not from a linguistic or dialectal standpoint: see subsections ii and iii below. As noted at the outset, the development of a Doric *koina* in Sicily was the result of interaction and mobility between populations, largely already Greek-speakers, since indigenous languages had already made their mark on the Greek dialects in Sicily in the sixth and fifth centuries.<sup>796</sup> Quite a lot of the spread of the Doric *koina* can probably also be attributed to mercenaries from outside the island, who would have learned the Syracusan dialect as their first Greek language once in Sicily. It was perhaps to be expected that the language communities on Sicily would eventually converge to some degree, and the fact that this happens above all in the fourth and third centuries is significant. It was at this time that mobility was high enough to bring diverse populations into contact, generating the interaction that would lead to dialect convergence. The language used in Syracuse also changed over this period, as demonstrated by the periodic need to reinterpret the revered law code composed by Diokles in the fifth century.<sup>797</sup>

The Sicilian *koina* was fairly resilient. It evidently lasted until the end of the Hellenistic period, and provided the language for Archimedes; Mimberrera notes that “there are practically no inscriptions entirely in *koina* until the end of the Hellenistic period.”<sup>798</sup> Furthermore, the dialect was not without a political dimension: the Syracusan women in Theocritus’ mime (*Idyll* 15) boast that they are Syracusans,

<sup>791</sup> IGDS II 85, IGDS 213 and 214 respectively. On the phenomenon see Dubois (1986, pp. 102-5).

<sup>792</sup> IGDS 206.

<sup>793</sup> Himera: IG XIV 316, possibly quite late. Kentoripa: IGDS 189 L. 5 αὐτούστα δόγμα. On the document itself see Prag (2010a, pp. 189-193).

<sup>794</sup> Dubois (1986, p. 104) citing Buck (1955 p. 99).

<sup>795</sup> The formation does not occur in the seven Entella decrees, which actually seem to go out of their way to avoid using reflexive pronouns.

<sup>796</sup> Cf. Poccetti (2012), Meiser (2012), Willi (2008).

<sup>797</sup> Mimberrera (2012b p. 249). Such revision of law codes was common e.g. at Athens and Gortyn, and there many examples of old texts reinscribed in a more current dialect and script, see e.g. two epigrams from Thebes inscribed in Boiotian and later in Ionic script: Papzarkadas (2014).

<sup>798</sup> Mimberrera (2012b, p. 248).

descended from Corinthians: “We speak Peloponnesian – surely it’s alright to speak Dorian if you’re a Dorian!?” (LL. 92-3).<sup>799</sup> Willi argues that despite the seemingly Syracusan nature of this boast, it is really a boast about Sicilianness in general, based on the historical conflation of Syracuse and Sicily in the eyes of non-Sicilians since the early fifth century.<sup>800</sup> The perceptions of outsiders may well have conditioned group definition. Willi is on safer ground asserting that by the third century, writing in Doric as Theocritus did was an expression of Sicilian (and more broadly Magna Grecian) identity.<sup>801</sup> Thus, his work was not only the poetry of Syracuse, but of Sicily—albeit a Sicily in which Syracuse still played a major role.

Coin legends offer limited insight into linguistic practices in Sicily. In previous chapters I have discussed the strong link between issuing coins and the expense of paying mercenaries. Minting coins also carried a strong Greek character; in two particularly charged cases non-Greek populations on Sicily employed Greek for the legends of their new coins. Most notably, the first issues from Carthaginian Motya in the late fifth century used a Greek legend MOTYAION and patently imitated Syracusan types before the beginning of the so-called Siculo-Punic coinage with legends in Punic.<sup>802</sup> It has been suggested that the die-engravers must have been Greek, and this may well have been true, but that is not sufficient to explain why this community chose to put its ethnic in Greek on official documents of the city. That choice is brought into even greater relief by the later decision to begin producing coins with Punic legends, and may be indicative of a more conciliatory attitude toward eastern Sicily on the part of its western populations, before war brought the ideological necessity of differentiating one part of the island from another. Further, once the local mints of western Sicily began minting again during the Second Punic War, the language of their legends was Greek as well.<sup>803</sup> The opposite phenomenon can be seen on the coins of the early Mamertine state, which minted issues with the Oscan genitive plural MAMEPTINOYM as well as the Greek genitive MAMEPTINΩN before the Greek version won out.<sup>804</sup> Even in mixed cultural situations, Greek was the regional language, and the cases of Motya and Messana demonstrate how communities alternately joined and resisted this linguistic community.

## ii. Onomastics

Another field of practice best attested by epigraphy is naming practices. In what follows I discuss names common and exclusive (or nearly so) to two or more Sicilian

<sup>799</sup> Πελοποννασιστὶ λαλεῦμεν, ἢ Δωρίσδεν δ’ ἔξεστι, δοκῶ, τοῖς Δωριέεσσι. The translation is that of Willi (2012, p. 266).

<sup>800</sup> Willi (2012, pp. 280-284). I sympathize with the conclusion but not the method; he suggests that “[p]ride in being Syracusan is as it were automatically implied pride also in being Sicilian,” but this seems to me a question to be investigated rather than an automatic implication, and his analogy that “[u]nless we are told otherwise, a French person who is proud of the splendours of Paris will also be proud of French culture more generally” (p. 283) demonstrates an anachronistic allegiance to the discourse of the modern nation state.

<sup>801</sup> Willi (2012, pp. 283-4).

<sup>802</sup> Sfameni Gasparro (2008a).

<sup>803</sup> Cf. e.g. Mangano (2003) for Panormos.

<sup>804</sup> The same transition can be observed in brick stamps at Messana; cf. Mastelloni (2005), and Sironen (1995). For a survey of all the preserved Oscan inscriptions from Messana see Crawford (2006).

cities in the fourth and third centuries.<sup>805</sup> These distinctive shared names *may* be indicative of an exchange of population between the communities in question, though with extremely limited prosopographical data it cannot be proven. It is more important for my purposes that such links demonstrate a shared practice between the two communities, and therefore interaction on a level sufficient to communicate personal or family habits. After discussing these shared names I will mention several cases in which distinctively Sicilian or otherwise unattested names are found in families with Greek names as well. These sequences are further evidence of the mix of naming practices in Sicilian communities.

The name Αἴνησις is attested at Morgantina ca. 300 BCE and at Tauromenion ca. 221 BCE (as well as at Lipara in a feminine version ca. 300).<sup>806</sup> In the LCEH period this name only occurs on Sicily, making it somewhat significant.<sup>807</sup> One would not otherwise have considered Morgantina, Tauromenion, and Lipara to have had much in common in the third century. Another name shared almost exclusively by Sicilian cities is Ἀνταλλος, which appears from ca. 300 onward at Kamarina, Morgantina, and perhaps elsewhere in Sicily, as well as at Issa in Dalmatia, perhaps the result of Dionysius's colonization efforts there in the middle of the fourth century.<sup>808</sup> The name does appear elsewhere in Sicily and in mainland Greece in the following centuries, but it seems to have spread from Sicily. Completely restricted to Sicily is the name Γοργύλος, which was used at fourth-century Syracuse, and perhaps elsewhere on the island in the third century (as well as at Gela-Phintias at the end of the second century).<sup>809</sup> Similar to the situation of Ἀνταλλος is the name Ἐλωρις, which is found in the LCEH period only at Akrai, Syracuse, perhaps elsewhere in Sicily, and Issa in Dalmatia.<sup>810</sup> All these distinctive names connect eastern Sicilian cities (and Lipara), sometimes but not always including Syracuse.

The name Θαρρύδαμος occurs only in Sicily and only in the third century: at Akragas and at Kamarina.<sup>811</sup> Unlike many of the other distinctive Sicilian names, this one appears to be derived from two plain Greek roots, θαρρ-/θαρσ- and δαμ-, and I can conceive of no good reason other than pure chance for the compound to appear only in Sicily in this period. The close chronological range along with the geographical localization on the south coast of the island suggest that the two individuals may have been related. Though not exclusive to Sicily, certain names with the root Θεστ- are

<sup>805</sup> The primary source of data for this section came from a search of the *LGNP* database for names associated with Sicily dated between 409 and 199 BCE in order to capture data ascribed ambivalently to the 3<sup>rd</sup>/2<sup>nd</sup> century (search accessible at [http://clas-lgpn2.classics.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/lgpn\\_search.cgi?region=Sicily;notafter=-199;notbefore=-409](http://clas-lgpn2.classics.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/lgpn_search.cgi?region=Sicily;notafter=-199;notbefore=-409)). The total number of names was 1026.

<sup>806</sup> Morgantina: *SEG* XXXIX 1012 L.6; Tauromenion: *IG* XIV 421 an. 20; Lipara: *SEG* XXXIV 958.

<sup>807</sup> It is also attested at Archaic Thera and ca. 190 at Rhodes. Masculine names ending in -ις are thus not unique in Sicily, but the practice was fairly widespread there, and it is possible that such names were perceived in some way as Sicilian ones.

<sup>808</sup> Kamarina: *SEG* XXXIX 1002 L.5; Morgantina: *IGDS* 192, *SEG* XXXIX 1013 LL. 4 and 8; a vase inscription attributed to Sicily: Vandermersch (1994 p. 162). Issa: Brunšmid (1898 nos. 24, 26, 37, 41).

<sup>809</sup> Syracuse: Mangano (1997) no. 3 L.7; vase inscription attributed to Sicily: Vandermersch (1994 p. 164); Gela-Phintias: *IG* XIV 256 L.42.

<sup>810</sup> Akrai: *SGDI* 3242; Syracuse: Brill's New Pauly s.v.; a vase inscription attributed to Sicily: Vandermersch (1994, p. 166); Issa: Brunšmid (1898 no. 66). It does appear in Iamblichus' *Vita Pythagorica* (p. 146, 3) naming a Samian of the sixth or fifth century BCE, but this is a late source for such a name.

<sup>811</sup> Akragas: *IG* IX.12.1 17A L.93; Kamarina: Mangano (1997) no.1 L.8

overwhelmingly attested there. The simple feminine Θέστη was the name of the sister of Dionysius I, and the only other occurrence is in the form Θέστα in an adoption document from the end of the fifth century at Akragas.<sup>812</sup> The simple masculine Θέστων is likewise prevalent in Sicily, appearing at fifth-century Kamarina, third-century Morgantina and Halontion, and in second-century Halaisa.<sup>813</sup> While a modest number of variants and compounds are found throughout the Mediterranean, there is a concentration around Rhodes. In particular, the variant Θεστιάς is virtually restricted to Hellenistic Kamiros, but also appears at Akragas in the fourth century.<sup>814</sup> A Rhodian cultural connection is entirely possible, but based on the chronology it appears to have run from Sicily back to the Aegean. The root was perhaps not distinctive, but Sicilian populations on both northern and southern coasts as well as the interior made certain variants their own.

An extremely distinctive Sicilian name is Ἰκέτας, which appears in the LCEH period only in Sicily, at Akragas, Herakleia Minoa, Morgantina, and Syracuse.<sup>815</sup> The name Καράϊκος was used only at Morgantina and at Syracuse in the Hellenistic period.<sup>816</sup> Likewise Κέντος was shared only between Akragas, the area of modern Castel di Iudica, and Syracuse.<sup>817</sup> The name Κίπος appears at Katane in the fourth century and Entella in the third (it later occurs at Sparta in the mid-second and at Halaisa in the first).<sup>818</sup> In this case the Campanian population at both Katane and Entella is likely to explain the presence of the Oscan name. Similarly, the name Μάμαρκος/Μάμερκος is more or less restricted to Sicily in the LCEH period, with the exception of a late third- or early second-century example at Neapolis (Napoli).<sup>819</sup> It is certainly an Oscan-inspired name, and is likely a trace of mercenary mobility between eastern and western Sicily. The name Ἰκέτας, on the other hand, cannot be linked with any particular historical phenomenon.

A name that was fairly widespread in Sicily, and only ever appeared in one or two other places is Νεμήνιος. Its first attestation is in Sicily at Heloros in the fifth century, after which it appears at Syracuse in the fourth, and Tauromenion and Adranon in the late third.<sup>820</sup> There is also a Νεομήνιος at Kamarina and a Νουμήνιος at Syracuse.<sup>821</sup>

<sup>812</sup> Dionysius' sister: Plutarch, *Dion* 21.7-9; Akragas: *IGDS* II 76A L.2.

<sup>813</sup> Kamarina: Cordano (1992 no. 42); Morgantina: *SEG* XXXIX 1008 L.5; Halontion: *ArchClass* (1965) p. 202 a; Halaisa: *IGDS* II 196 II L.80.

<sup>814</sup> Akragas: *IG* IV.1<sup>2</sup> 95 L.91.

<sup>815</sup> Akragas: *IG* IX.1<sup>2</sup> 17A L.93; Herakleia Minoa: *SEG* IX 821; Morgantina: Mangaro (1997) no.7 L.1; Syracuse: Brill's New Pauly s.v. (2), (3), (4). There is an early mention of an eighth- or seventh-century Arkadian Hiketas in Pausanias (4.17.2) but, as with Iamblichus, this late attestation should not obscure the primarily Sicilian ambit of the name, which also shows up on Malta in the second century BCE: *IG* XIV 953.

<sup>816</sup> Morgantina: *SEG* XXXIX 1008 L.12; Syracuse: *NotScav* 1961 p. 349.

<sup>817</sup> Akragas: Manganaro *QUCC* 1999 \*[\*] no.39b L.7; Castel di Iudica: Manganaro (1997) no.6 L.3; Syracuse: *Mem Linc.* 8 (1938) p. 127 no.35 L.3.

<sup>818</sup> Katane: *IG* IV.1<sup>2</sup> 95 LL.71-2, cf. *Chiron* 22 (1992) p.390 n.38; Entella: *SEG* XXX 1120 L.1.

<sup>819</sup> Μάμαρκος at Kentoripa: *Chron Arch* 16 (1977) p. 151 n.18; vase inscription attributed to Sicily: Vandermersch (1994, p. 170). Μάμερκος was the tyrant of Katane when Timoleon arrived in Sicily; the name may also be attested in Steisichorus at Himera in the 7<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> century BCE.

<sup>820</sup> Heloros: *IGDS* 99; Syracuse: Manganaro (1997) no.3 L.3 and no. 4 V L.7; Tauromenion: *IG* XIV 421 an. 9; Adranon: *PP* 16 (1961) p. 127.

<sup>821</sup> Kamarina: *IGDS* 123; Syracuse: Nachtergaele (1977, p. 66) nos. 8, 10. The only other places where individuals had this name were Macedonia, at Strepsa and at Polichne, and at Sinope in the middle of the fourth century. Strepsa: *SEG* XXXVII 583 L.4; Polichne: *SEG* XXXVII 596 L.19. Sinope: Grakov (1928,

From the second century BCE onward, the name appears seven more times, always in Sicily; it was clearly a Sicilian name even if Macedonians occasionally used it. In a similar manner, the name Ὀρθων is overwhelmingly Sicilian though it too appeared at Issa, as well as in the toe of Italy. It is attested first at Morgantina in the fourth or third century, at Rhegion and Syracuse from the fourth into the third centuries, and at Tauromenion toward the end of the third century.<sup>822</sup> Like other Sicilian names it appeared at Issa in Dalmatia (twice), but it also shows up in Lokroi Epizephyrioi around 275 BCE; after ca. 200 there are eleven further attestations of the name, seven of which are in Sicily (or at Rhegion).<sup>823</sup> This was an eastern Sicilian name occasionally used elsewhere.

Only a handful of other names were shared between two cities. Πόρταξ appears only at third-century Parthenikon and Iaitas, a notable connection between western Sicilian centers.<sup>824</sup> Σάννων was shared between Kamarina, Rhegion and Tauromenion in the East.<sup>825</sup> These slight connections nevertheless weigh on the side of distinctively Sicilian naming practices. Beyond these there are a number of names shared between two or more Sicilian cites that also appear at the same time elsewhere in the Mediterranean with a frequency that ties them to other regions as well. In some cases there is a strong local connection, to Epirus, Kos, Rhodes, etc., but a full investigation of these onomastic links is beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, I have been interested in the development and use of common names by Sicilian populations who could have recognized the names as uniquely Sicilian.

A few other features of Sicilian onomastics suggest the cultural mixing going on within diverse Sicilian populations. In particular, there are a number of generational sequences in which individuals with non-Greek or entirely unique names are the children or parents of individuals with conventional Greek names. While such sequences do not prove anything about ethnicity, they do indicate that naming practices could be fluid. Whatever the ethnicity of the individuals, the existence of a father with a Greek name and a son with a Punic name shows that it was possible to follow some conventions but not others. In the case of the unique names, we cannot exactly be sure what cultural sphere was mixing with the Greek one, though persistent local memory or even idiosyncrasy are both good explanations. We should also not forget that the names recorded are a very small percentage of the total of those given, more so than in other regions of the Greek-speaking world, so that what appears to us as a hapax may actually have been locally common.

In Syracuse ca. 300, Πάδων (hapax) named his son Γοργύλος (Sicilian name discussed above).<sup>826</sup> Earlier in the century Dionysius I had named one of his sons Ἀπολλοκράτης (hapax).<sup>827</sup> Around 279 BCE, after the death of Agathokles, one of the

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p.118) no. 3. The attested relatives of these two Macedonians, however, had Macedonian names: at Strepsa Νεμήνιος had a son Ἀρνίας and the Νεμήνιος at Polichne had a father Κράσης.

<sup>822</sup> Morgantina: *SEG* XXXIX 1008 L.1; Rhegion: *IG* XIV 2400 L.14; Syracuse: D.S. 20.40.1 (308 BCE), *NotScav* 1961 p. 349 (Hellenistic), and *GVI* 1359 (late 3<sup>rd</sup> century); Tauromenion: *IG* XIV 421 an. 7, 30, 65.

<sup>823</sup> Issa: Brunšmid (1898, pp.7-9) nos. 26, 33; Lokroi: De Franciscis (1972) no. 25 L.5.

<sup>824</sup> Parthenikon: *SEG* XXXII 927; Iaitas: *SEG* XXXI 827.

<sup>825</sup> Kamarina: *SEG* XXXIV 940 L.8, *SEG* XXXIX 1001 L.10; Rhegion: *SEG* XXXIII 781 e; Tauromenion: *IG* XIV 421 an.10.

<sup>826</sup> *IGDS* II 42 L.7.

<sup>827</sup> Brill's New Pauly s.v. Dionysius.

Syracusan politicians who eventually invited Pyrrhus to Sicily was Θοίνων (a Boeotian name attested only in the third century at Chaironeia and Orchomenos), who was the son of Μαμεύς (hapax).<sup>828</sup> The testimony of Diodorus also provides us with a Syracusan Καλλιμένης, son of Ἀλκάδας (hapax) around 343.<sup>829</sup> Finally, third-century Syracuse was also home to a Μινύρα (hapax), daughter of Χαिरύλος (attested earlier on Rhodes and later on Kos).<sup>830</sup> Given the vast numbers of people sent out of and brought into Syracuse over the fourth and third centuries, it would be unwise to speculate too much about these individuals. Nor should it surprise us very much to find onomastic links between Syracuse and the Dorian Aegean; the ascendance of Thoinon is harder to explain.

At Tauromenion ca. 236-232, Ἀμμωνόδοτος (hapax) had two sons, Μόσχος (conventional Greek) and Νεμήνιος (characteristically Sicilian, as we have seen).<sup>831</sup> Around the same time, Νυμφόδορος had a son Σαύλαος (hapax).<sup>832</sup> At the time the city was allied with the Romans, with a population presumably descended from the refoundation of Andromachos. At Kamarina ca. 300 Νεμέρατος (hapax) was the son of Ἀριστόμαχος and Σάννων (Sicilian) was the son of Ζώπυρος.<sup>833</sup> Perhaps later in the third century in the same city a man named Ἐστίας is attested (only other attestation is Kallatis on the Black Sea, and that man had a son named Ζώπυρος).<sup>834</sup> In addition to those who had returned to the city after 405, Timoleon had added settlers to the population, though we do not know from where they came. In any event Zopuros was evidently a favored name there. A fourth-century Geloan Κλεοπάμων (hapax) son of Ἀρχέτιμος was buried in Athens, though without more precise dating information it is difficult to comment on his significance.<sup>835</sup> Two of the men named Θέστων (Sicilian) who lived at Halontion and Morgantina in the third century had sons with the conventional Greek names Ζωΐλος and Δάμαρχος, respectively.<sup>836</sup> At third-century Morgantina Κοιάτωρ (hapax) named his son Ὀλτος (attested only at Morgantina and archaic Athens).<sup>837</sup> As far as we know, Morgantina's population in the third century was overwhelmingly culturally Greek, and it was not until 211 that its demography was significantly altered, though admittedly that is only the present and extremely limited state of our understanding. An artist's signature on a golden vessel whose exact provenance on the island is unknown gives us Ἀχυρίς (hapax) son of Δάμαρχος.<sup>838</sup>

In western Sicily too individuals with distinctive names are found in families with Greek names. Two individuals at early fifth-century Selinous had the name Τίτελος, which was also used at Hellenistic Segesta in the variant Τίττελος. One of the Selinuntines had a father named Φοῖνιξ (widespread in the Mediterranean though hard

<sup>828</sup> For Thoinon: D.S. 22.7.2-3, 6, 8.4; Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 23. Attestations of the name in Chaironeia: *GHI* II 197 L.9 and *IG* VII 2724b L.5; at Orchomenos: *FD* III.1 519 L.1.

<sup>829</sup> D.S. 16.70.6.

<sup>830</sup> *NotScav* 1905, p. 387.

<sup>831</sup> *IG* XIV 421 an. 5, 9.

<sup>832</sup> *IG* XIV 421 an. 10.

<sup>833</sup> *IGDS* 124 L.4; L.8 respectively.

<sup>834</sup> Kamarina: *IGDS* II 59 L.2; Kallatis: *ISM* II 35A L.37.

<sup>835</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 8459.

<sup>836</sup> Halontion: *ArchClass* 17 (1965) p. 202 a; Morgantina: *SEG* XXXIX 1008 L.5. I note also that a Θέστων in later fifth-century Kamarina had a father with the conventional name Ἡράκλειος: Cordano (1992) no. 42.

<sup>837</sup> Manganaro (1997) no. 8. Ὀλτος at Athens: *ARV*<sup>2</sup> pp.53 ff.; at second-century Morgantina: *IGDS* 194.

<sup>838</sup> *SEG* XXXIX 1034.

to resist a Phoenician or Carthaginian connection here), and the other had the name *Νανελαῖος* (unique to Selinous).<sup>839</sup> The Segestan men named *Τίττελος* had conventionally Greek family members: one had a son *Διόδωρος* and the other had a father *Ἀρτεμίδωρος*.<sup>840</sup> It has been suggested that *Tit(t)elos* was an Italic name in origin and this may well be true, but whatever its ultimate origin it was in the mix of western Sicilian names.<sup>841</sup> Whatever the name's origin it is remarkable that the two cities most hostile to each other in western Sicily shared onomastic practices. More certainly Italic is the name *Δέκιος*, which appears at Segesta in the third century for a man whose father had the banal Greek name *Διονύσιος*.<sup>842</sup> Also at Segesta, the hapax name *Δόσσις* is attested for a man who named his son *Ἀρτεμίδωρος*.<sup>843</sup> It is tempting to associate at least the Italic *Dekios* with the mercenaries settled in the city by Agathokles, though this is admittedly speculative.

Lilybaion at the end of the third century demonstrates population mixing both in its internal genealogies and in the composition of its society. By this period the Carthaginian population that had lived there from the fourth century onward had apparently been joined by Greeks and others, most likely migrants from within Sicily. In the later third century BCE *Δαμάτρις*, clearly a Greek name though one that is not attested anywhere else until the second or third century CE at Tegea, appears as the son of a *Πόπλιος* (Italian if not actually Roman).<sup>844</sup> Yet further evidence for a mixed society comes from two *defixiones* found in Tomb 186, one probably dating to the late third century and the other to the early second century.<sup>845</sup> The earlier document, written in Sicilian Doric *koina*, refers to an individual with the Punic name (not rare at Lilybaion) *Apithambal* and another with a Latin praenomen *Numerius*; the curse is for the outcome of a trial in favor of *Numerius*, and a man with the Greek name *Dameas*, perhaps a witness for *Apithambal*, is also cursed. The later text involves individuals with the Greek name *Zopurion* and the Punic name *Mumbor*. From the late third century on, then, the inhabitants of Lilybaion carried names from a number of different cultural origins, whatever their actual family origins. By this time many Sicilian cities had diverse populations, and they shared certain naming practices with other Sicilian and non-Sicilian groups.

### iii. Institutions

In addition to sharing some linguistic and onomastic practices, various Sicilian cities also shared institutions like civic subdivisions and magistracies. In this subsection

<sup>839</sup> *IGDS* 38 L.18 and L.19, respectively.

<sup>840</sup> *IGDS* 213 (3<sup>rd</sup> cent.) and 216 (perhaps 2<sup>nd</sup> cent.), respectively. A third possible *[Τίττ]ελος* (2<sup>nd</sup> cent.) had a father whose name began *Ἀγ-*: *SEG* XLI 829.

<sup>841</sup> For the suggestion that *Tittelos* was Italic in origin, and that its continuity from the fifth century into the third represents a continuation of Elymian aristocratic families' influence in the city's evolution cf. De Vido (2003).

<sup>842</sup> *IGDS* 206. The only earlier attestation of the name is the Campanian *Decius* who led his garrison soldiers to take over Rhegion in the 270s: Polybius 1.7.6-13; D.S. 22.1.3; Dionysios of Halicarnassos 20.4.2. Further Greek-Italic onomastic mixing is of course evident in the Entella tablets.

<sup>843</sup> *NotScav* 1931, p. 398.

<sup>844</sup> *SEG* XXVI 1075. *Πόπλιος* appears in Greek here at Lilybaion earlier than anywhere else.

<sup>845</sup> Bechtold and Brugnone (1997).

I trace these connections between populations, attested largely by epigraphic (with some literary) evidence.

Given the vacillating dominance of Syracuse over Greek Sicily we might expect the most widespread civic subdivision in Sicily to have been the traditional Doric division into three tribes: the Dymanes, the Hylleis, and the Pamphyloi. The existence of at least one of these tribes is attested at Akragas in the late third century, in the proxeny decree for the Syracusan Demetrios mentioned above.<sup>846</sup> What is remarkable about that document is that it comes after a period (the First and Second Punic Wars) when the population of Akragas had repeatedly been subjected to enslavement, massacre, and siege. It is also, to my knowledge the only epigraphic attestation of one of the three Doric tribes in Sicily, though Doric self-identification is attested in Theocritus in the earlier third century.<sup>847</sup> Diodorus, who might have been expected to mention the existence of the tribes in Sicily somewhere, is silent on the question. I therefore think that the Hylleis (and presumably also Dymanes and Pamphyloi) at Akragas are to be explained as a late innovation of a cultural form not previously used much, if at all, in Sicily. After surviving a crisis it was common to solidify or invent bonds that would more firmly entrench and establish the community, and whoever was living in Akragas toward the end of the Second Punic War had certainly survived a crisis.

Demotics, when they appear, are local and difficult to distinguish on the one hand from true ethnics, and on the other hand from unique nicknames. As an example of the first difficulty I would cite the first-century BCE *agoranomos* at Segesta identified with the third name Πετερίνης.<sup>848</sup> Clearly the term makes reference to the west Sicilian city of Petra known from Entella A1, but was there an entire class of Segestans with origins at Petra who were similarly designated, or was the name simply given to this one family that had previously come from Petra? Nenci suggests that by the first century Petra had become a part of Segesta, so that the term was a true demotic.<sup>849</sup> But to push the question even further, is it also possible that the *agoranomos* was from a politically independent Petra and nonetheless took up office in Segesta? An example of the second difficulty can also be found at Segesta, where a third-century inscription includes after the patronymics of two individuals the terms Ταυρέας and Ποσθαῖος, which appear in other locations as personal names.<sup>850</sup> The line between a demotic and an idiosyncratic designation appears blurry, especially when the data set is so small.<sup>851</sup>

However, certain cities do seem to have shared abbreviated demotics. One collection of these abbreviated terms is found in a list of leases given to individuals, perhaps for a festival, inscribed on a stele from Akrai.<sup>852</sup> This document of the late third

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<sup>846</sup> IGDS 185 LL.4-5: προεδρευούσας τῶς φυλᾶς | τῶν Ὑλλέων.

<sup>847</sup> E.g. Theoc. *Idyll* 15. More significantly Jones (1987, pp. 174-175) concludes that three tribes certainly existed in LCEH Syracuse, perhaps but not necessarily the Hylleis, Dymanes and Pamphyloi. He notes that Thucydides and Livy attest multiples of three in descriptions of the Syracusan military (Thuc. 6.72.4, 73.1, 96.3, 7.43.4; Livy 24.4.5), and that the ordinal designation of tribes in Syracusan documents (discussed below) never goes beyond three.

<sup>848</sup> IGDS II 86.

<sup>849</sup> Nenci (1997).

<sup>850</sup> IGDS II 88.

<sup>851</sup> Cordano (1997) calls these designations additional family names and distinguishes them from demotics, though it is not always clear to which category a given term ought to be assigned. Cf. Jones (1987, pp. 4-7) for general observations on territorial units in the Greek world.

<sup>852</sup> IG XIV 217 = IGDS 109, cf. Manganaro (2004). See Jones (1987, pp. 170-176) for Sicilian demotics.

century attests among other things the abbreviated demotics Λ[α]β, Νητ, Πε(ρ), and Κρα. Another late third-century document from Syracuse, a list of names inscribed on a lead tablet, contains these abbreviations along with Πλη, Ἐριμ, Λογ, Μακ, and Ὑπα.<sup>853</sup> Some of these abbreviations can be expanded thanks to a Syracusan contract on lead dating to the fourth or third century, with the demotics Περηκυ(αταῖος), Ἐριμεῖος, and Κραταμει(ς) written out.<sup>854</sup> While confined to a relatively small part of eastern Sicily, the presence of common demotics at the very least shows that different (though politically connected, since Akrai was essentially always subordinate to Syracuse) populations were making similar distinctions in their citizen bodies, and may even be evidence of affiliations that existed beyond and between *poleis*, along the lines of Doric tribes or the Hellenistic guilds. In other words, a citizen of Akrai designated Κρα and a citizen of Syracuse designated Κραταμει(ς) shared something they did not share with other citizens of their *poleis*.

Further subdivisions were often made, and some cities shared the practice of simply numbering the tribe and/or phratry of an individual. It should be noted at the outset that the epigraphic material often preserves only numerals, sometimes in an abbreviated form that can allow for different expansions. One reason that modern scholars have been quick to attribute these numerals to tribal affiliations is the discovery of terracotta sling bullets of the fourth or third century at Troina (ancient Engyon) that preserve explicit references to numbered tribes, though giving phratries/*phatriai* by name.<sup>855</sup> For example, *IGDS* II 94 (2) reads πρώ(τα) φυλ(ά) πα(τρία) | Πιπ(ε)? Ὅρθων | Ἐμ(μ)ενίδα. As a result, the designation of individuals with numerals in contracts inscribed on lead sheets *IGDS* 124 and 125 found in excavations at Kamarina led Manganaro and others to hypothesize that such numbering similarly designated tribe and phratry, though with phratries numbered rather than named. This in turn led to the attribution of *IGDS* 126 and *IGDS* II 50-51, 54 and 59 to Kamarina as well, though these objects lack an archaeological context. They are dated between the third and the second centuries BCE, though not securely; the practice seems to have been to give the secondary designation (in numerals up to 13 and a designation νήτα for “last”) followed by a primary division (in numbers up to two). Double numerals are also given for individuals in a contract on lead from the area of Syracuse, *IGDS* II 42, though the order is reversed and the primary designation (tribe) is given before the secondary one (phratry). This reverse order at Syracuse is confirmed by the *asylia* decree passed by Syracuse for the sanctuary of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia on the Maiander in 207/6 BCE.<sup>856</sup> Finally, a series of terracotta sling bullets from third-century Iaitas in western Sicily carry incised names with an ordinal numeral in the genitive (and one with a *theta* signifying 9), interpreted as numbers of military units (λόχοι) but alternatively perhaps civic designations like those in use in the eastern part of the island.<sup>857</sup> Since the use of civic subdivisions for military organization was very common in the

<sup>853</sup> *IGDS* II 40.

<sup>854</sup> *IGDS* II 42.

<sup>855</sup> *IGDS* II 94. The same formulae and in some cases the same tribe and *phatria* affiliations appear on terracotta sling bullets, dated ca. 104-100 BCE and attributed to various cities in eastern Sicily, collected under *IG* XIV 2407. While it is possible that these two sets of sling bullets represent the continuous use of the same formulae and *phatria* names over two centuries, it is also quite possible that the dating of one or both sets ought to be readjusted.

<sup>856</sup> *IGDS* 97 LL.4-5 προστάτας Ἀρτεμίδ[ωρος (patronymic) | τρίτα πέμπτα.

<sup>857</sup> *IGDS* II 82.

Mediterranean, perhaps the two functions of the numerals need not be mutually exclusive.<sup>858</sup>

We might look for institutional links in other areas of life as well. Surprisingly, no month name is attested at more than one Sicilian city in this period, though this may be due simply to the lacunose epigraphic record.<sup>859</sup> As for the titles of officials that appear in several cities, most are generic ones common in the Greek world, such as ἄρχων, προστάτας, γραμματεὺς, ἱεροθύτας, ἱερομνάμων and ἱεραπόλος.<sup>860</sup> Such shared offices certainly do attest a common infrastructure of civic government, but it is a Greek Mediterranean, not a Sicilian one. It is possible that Sicilian populations perceived their use of common civic-religious offices to be primarily something they shared with other Sicilians and secondarily something they shared with other Mediterranean communities. But that can only be speculation, and from the actual evidence for institutional practices, none of these offices was especially Sicilian.

The amphipolos—an eponymous priest—of Zeus Olympios, a much more distinctive office, was inaugurated at Syracuse by Timoleon. While servants or attendants designated ἀμφίπολοι are known throughout the Greek world, only in eastern Sicily was it an eponymous office. The institution is attested in Diodorus' description of Timoleon's arrangements in Syracuse but surprisingly not in Plutarch's.<sup>861</sup> In fact, Diodorus stresses that the venerable amphipoly was weakened by the Roman grant of citizenship to Sicilians in his own time, which for the present purposes is significant in that it indicates the prior general importance of the office.<sup>862</sup> A contract of the fourth or third century, inscribed on lead from the area of Syracuse (perhaps Akrai), is dated by an eponymous ἀμφίπολος.<sup>863</sup> The same office or an analogue of it appears in a dedication from Kentoripa, dated broadly to the third-first centuries BCE, in which the dedicator is described as Διὶ Ὠρίῳ ἀνφιπολεύσας.<sup>864</sup> It thus seems that this innovation of the later fourth century either spread from Syracuse to nearby populations or that they recognized the Syracusan amphipolos as an eponymous official for their own purposes. The existence of an amphipolos to a different manifestation of Zeus in Kentoripa supports the idea that the institution itself traveled some distance from Syracuse,

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<sup>858</sup> Jones (1987, p. 10 and Index II L).

<sup>859</sup> *IGDS* Index V p. 289 lists 9 months, of which only the Rhodian month Καρνείος appears in two different cities: Gela-Phintias in the first century BCE (no. 161) and Akragas at perhaps the end of the third century BCE (no. 185). *IGDS* II p. 215 lists 8 months, none previously listed in *IGDS* and none occurring more than once. See also the indices of Trümper (1997).

<sup>860</sup> E.g., Dionysius I was designated Σικελίας ἄρχων in several Attic decrees of the early-mid fourth century (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 18, 103, 105); two archons are the eponymous magistrates of Entella decrees A1-3 and B1. ἱεροθύτας at Gela: *IGDS* II 75; Akragas: *IGDS* 185; also appears in western Sicily. ἱερομνάμων at Entella: decrees C1-3; at Nakone: Nakone decree (*IGDS* 206); at Tauromenion: *IG* XIV 421-9; at Gela: *IGDS* 160 LL.34-35; at Segesta: *IGDS* II 89 and *IG* XIV 291. ἱεραπόλος at Gela: *IGDS* 160, *IG* XIV 257, 258; at Morgantina: *IGDS* II 52-53.

<sup>861</sup> Cf. the very brief notes of Sherk (1993, pp. 268, 270-271) and Westlake (1942, pp. 90-91). Cicero, *In Verrem* II.51.126 attests the process of electing an amphipolos by lot from three noble families.

<sup>862</sup> D.S. 16.70.6: ...τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων μεταδόντων τοῖς Σικελιώταις τῆς πολιτείας ἢ τῶν ἀμφιπόλων ἀρχὴν ἐταπεινώθη, διαμείνασα ἔτη πλείω τῶν τριακοσίων ("...for after the Romans gave a share in citizenship to the *Sikeliotai*, the magistracy of the amphipoloi was humbled, having endured more than three hundred years").

<sup>863</sup> *IGDS* II 42.

<sup>864</sup> *IGDS* 188.

though not without taking on local characteristics. Nonetheless an amphipoly of Zeus was an institutional feature of civic life that some cities in eastern Sicily shared.

Although most of western Sicily is dark to us, there are some signs that aspects of civic infrastructure were copied there. Even if Lorenzo Campagna is correct in down-dating the Hellenic urban apparatus (theaters, bouleuteria, etc.) of Segesta and Iaitas to the later third or second centuries and thereby attributing the development of those institutions to the influence of Roman rule, the inhabitants of Segesta and Iaitas did come to share the institutions with eastern Sicilian populations and the rest of the Greek Mediterranean.<sup>865</sup> Epigraphic data has shown that western Sicilian cities shared significantly in institutional practices well before the arrival of the Romans. The Entella tablets in particular evoke a diplomatic network already in place among a number of eastern and western Sicilian cities in the middle of the third century. While the smaller settlements have left less evidence in the literary and epigraphic record that would allow analysis of civic and institutional practices, they are no less likely to have been affected by the demographic upheavals of the fourth and third centuries. We will have to look elsewhere (see below) for evidence of their interaction with the rest of Sicily.

### C. Funerary ritual

Funerary practice offers another focus for my inquiry, since for some important Sicilian cities tombs are the largest class of excavated contexts. Historians since Herodotus (3.38.3-4) have used it as a criterion for group definition:

Darius, when he was in power, having summoned the Greeks who were present, asked how much money would be required for them to be willing to eat their dead fathers; they said that for no amount of money would they do this. After this Darius, having summoned those of the Indians called Kallatai, who eat their parents, while the Greeks were present learning what was said through an interpreter, asked how much money would be required for them to be willing to burn up their dead fathers on a pyre; they shouted very loudly and ordered him to keep a religious silence. These things are customarily practiced to such an extent, and Pindar seems to me to have written correctly when he said that custom is the king of all men. [νόμον πάντων βασιλέα].

However, more recently Sheperd has shown that ethnic groups cannot be reliably detected in the funerary record of Archaic Sicily.<sup>866</sup> In LCEH Sicily the funerary record is if anything more mixed, with many tomb types and contents common to sites of all ethnic labels. *Tombe a fossa* were simple cavities dug into the earth or cut into bedrock for both inhumations and cremations, and occur almost everywhere on the island. Burials *a cappuccina* are also common, with flat tiles set against each other covering the body of the deceased, which may lie on a platform lined by bricks and tiles. Chamber tombs (*a camera*) with one or more subterranean rooms also occur, as well as primary cremations in place (*ustrina*) and secondary cremations re-deposited into a vessel. The fact that tomb typology does not clearly follow ethnic site labels (Punic, Greek, Elymian, etc.) is interesting in itself. The further purpose of this section is to establish how funerary practices were mixed, and to highlight patterns in their distribution.

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<sup>865</sup> See Campagna (2006).

<sup>866</sup> Cf. Sheperd (2005) on the unreliability of funerary criteria for distinguishing ethnic groups.

While no single funerary practice was unique to or universal in Sicily, certain aspects of funerary ritual, including the preferential deposition of certain grave goods, may delineate groups from one another. At Segesta a necropolis in use from ca. 300-200 BCE contained 123 burials, of which 109 were inhumations, 7 were primary cremations and 7 were secondary cremations.<sup>867</sup> At the Caserma Tuköry necropolis at Panormos of 35 tombs excavated in 1996, 13 were primary cremations, 7 were stone sarcophagus burials, 7 hypogea, 5 “isolated ashes” and 3 *enchytrismo*i (inhumation of a child or infant in an amphora).<sup>868</sup>

At Eryx, excavations in 1969 produced 11 primary cremations/ustrina and at least one secondary cremation, of the late fourth-mid third century, but also a great mass of Hellenistic ceramic and other material not associated with a particular burial.<sup>869</sup> This material is not likely to have come from undiscovered inhumations but from many more cremations and ustrina, which have since dissolved into the soil. In both coherent ustrina and among the sporadic finds appear piriform unguentaria, which are extremely common in burials in Greek necropoleis. Because of the presence of these unguentaria and the absence of any inhumations Bisi writes that the Eryx necropolis “presents a fairly different character from that of the other Punic necropoleis of Hellenistic Sicily.”<sup>870</sup> The characterization is not entirely accurate since piriform unguentaria are well-documented at contemporary Lilybaion, and Bechtold notes that they are common not only in the Greek cities of Sicily but also in Sardinia and the Balearic Islands.<sup>871</sup> Still, the potential shared use of a specific funerary vessel across Sicily and Sardinia at a time when Greeks and Carthaginians are recorded as hostile is intriguing. It would seem that burial practice was not an arena in which the inhabitants of Eryx and Lilybaion differentiated themselves from their enemies.

The thousands of burials excavated in the Passo Marinaro necropolis at Kamarina allow for better statistical security than any other site in Sicily. Of the 1644 burials Orsi excavated at Kamarina, ca. 1315 (80%) were inhumations, and 164 (10%) were cremations, of which only 7 were primary cremations.<sup>872</sup> Di Stefano’s excavations there found 447 inhumations (52%) out of 864 total burials; 117 *enchytrismo*i (14%); 26 primary cremations (3%); with the balance made up by “deposition in bare sand.”<sup>873</sup> Thus a broad preference for inhumation, followed by secondary cremation, and the use of *enchytrismo*s for children appears to have been the practice.

Lilybaion’s necropoleis attest a spectrum of funerary rituals, although certain trends stand out. From 350-250 by far the most common practice was inhumation (276 of 318 burials, or 87%), with secondary cremations (26, or 8%), *enchytrismo*s (8, or 2.5%), and primary cremation (8, or 2.5%) also attested. From 250-200, primary cremation was most popular (23 of 48 burials, or 48%), followed by inhumation (21, or 44%) and secondary cremation (3, or 6%).<sup>874</sup> Preferences here seem to align fairly well

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<sup>867</sup> Bechtold (2000, p. 80).

<sup>868</sup> Di Stefano (2000, p. 437).

<sup>869</sup> Bisi (1971).

<sup>870</sup> Bisi (1971, p. 657).

<sup>871</sup> Bechtold (1999, pp. 125-6).

<sup>872</sup> Lanza (1990, p. 185).

<sup>873</sup> Di Stefano (1984-5, p. 738).

<sup>874</sup> Table in Bechtold (1999, p. 24). Information necessary for reading the table is found throughout the book.

with those at Kamarina, perhaps an unexpected common ground between two distant cities.

The necropoleis known to be in use at Akragas in the LCEH period present evidence of varied practices.<sup>875</sup> Excavations in the 1950s near Gate IX uncovered rock-cut and chamber tombs of the fourth century, and in the 1960s burials from the end of the fifth century were evidently uncovered. In Contrada Mosè a monumental necropolis dating from the end of the sixth century was evidently reused, judging from the numerous third-century fusiform unguentaria found in its latest ancient phase. In Contrada Pezzino, a necropolis in use beginning in the sixth century, fourth century burials include inhumations in rock- or earth-cut tombs but also *ustrina* and primary cremations, as well as secondary cremations. Mid-to-late fourth century burials are few and relatively poor, sometimes reusing older tombs; in this period primary cremation of deceased children is attested.

At Messana, burials of the fourth and third centuries have been found sporadically. In Via Cesare Battisti one inhumation from the third century contained five fusiform unguentaria outside the tomb at the level of the cut in the soil on a burned layer; another inhumation covered by tiles (*a cappuccina*) of late third/early second century also contained fusiform unguentaria but also a small pyxis and the remains of an iron strigil.<sup>876</sup> The juxtaposition of a pyxis (generally held to evoke female activities and therefore a female burial) and a strigil (generally held to evoke male activities and therefore a male individual) should challenge both of these generally held intuitions. Another late third/early second burial, a secondary cremation, preserved evidence of fire over the top of the tomb with fifteen fusiform unguentaria, some glass bowls, and some bone items. These grave goods match well the two assemblages marked by Greco-Italic amphorae (perhaps used as containers for remains, which were not otherwise documented) and fusiform unguentaria found in the necropolis at Halaisa, presumed to belong to two third-century burials.<sup>877</sup> It is not surprising that the two nearby centers would, by the third century, attest similar ritual grave deposition, and with unguentaria that resemble but are not identical to those used elsewhere in Sicily. These burials and assemblages do no lack interest but they are not sufficient grounds for general conclusions about the burial practices of the inhabitants of Messana or Halaisa.

Although the LCEH necropolis at Entella ("Necropolis A") has not been fully published, there is some support for a mix of tomb typologies. There are around 85 tombs dating from the fourth to the mid-second century, all inhumations and largely simple *fossa* burials, though with some *cappuccina* coverings and some hypogea.<sup>878</sup> Unfortunately precise numbers are difficult to obtain from the publications, but what is remarkable about the necropolis as a whole is the abundance of alabastra made from alabaster in the grave goods, a phenomenon paralleled in Sicily in the area of Gela and at Vassallagi.<sup>879</sup> The hill (*rocca*) on which Entella sits is composed partly of gypsum and veins of this material are visible in the bedrock, which may explain its popularity there. A material connection with central and southern Sicily would be extremely interesting,

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<sup>875</sup> De Miro (1988) gives little bibliographical information.

<sup>876</sup> Tigano (2001, pp. 95-96).

<sup>877</sup> Tigano (2009).

<sup>878</sup> Di Noto and Guglielmino (2002); cf. Di Noto and Guglielmino (2001).

<sup>879</sup> Di Noto and Guglielmino (2001, p. 183).

though to my knowledge no provenience comparison of the alabastra has been conducted.

Furthermore two tombs of the early fourth century recently studied by Guglielmino provide evidence of funerary ritual. The two are contiguous rock-cut inhumations, both oriented E-W with the head to the E: one male individual aged ca. 25-30, buried with black glazed pottery, a bronze belt, an iron spearhead, a bronze strigil, and a bronze ring still on the left ring finger; and one female individual 40-50 years old at death, buried with black-glazed pottery, wearing three iron fibulae and holding a coin of Akragas in her right hand.<sup>880</sup> In the ring, the coin, and the clothing attested by the fibulae we have evidence of funerary attire and decoration of the dead; according to Guglielmino the spearhead marks the man as a warrior, the belt connects him to Italic burial ritual, while the strigil connects him with elite Greek male exercise (see above on Messana). To my knowledge this is the only burial with a bronze belt known in Sicily, although in a tomb of the late fourth century at Hippaia (modern Montagna dei Cavalli) a diadem was found on the deceased's head, a bracelet on the right arm, and what might be a pectoral band just outside the tomb, all in silver-plated bronze.<sup>881</sup>

Although other aspects of the funerary ritual could be examined, at this point the data can be summarized and some tentative conclusions drawn. Quantitative data from many necropoleis are lacking, so the inhumations and cremations from Akragas and Messana can only be cited anecdotally. Among sites with well-published necropoleis, inhumation was dominant in the fourth century at Kamarina, Lilybaion and Entella, and common at Panormos; in the third century it was dominant at Segesta and Entella though still common at Lilybaion. In the late fourth-early third century primary cremation was dominant at Eryx, and present at Kamarina and Lilybaion; in the third century it characterized nearly half of the burials at Lilybaion and was present at Segesta. Secondary cremations were present at Kamarina and Lilybaion in the fourth century, but later in the third century only at Lilybaion.

Kamarina's use of *enchytrismos* coincided with that of several western Sicilian cities, and in its other burial rituals it seems also to have had affinities with them, in particular Lilybaion in the fourth century. Data from other necropoleis may add to this group of cities where inhumation was widely preferred, but for now we can say that it included at least these two. Eryx, on the other hand, was unsurpassed in its enthusiasm for cremation, until Lilybaion adopted the practice with frequency in the second half of the third century. In the fourth century these two neighboring Carthaginian fortress-cities may not have buried their dead in the same way. Finally, Segesta's wide preference for inhumation throughout the third century perhaps illustrates a divide between the inhabitants of that city and those of both Lilybaion and Kamarina.<sup>882</sup>

A distinctively Sicilian piece of funerary architecture was the *epitymbion*, a stepped grave marker built over the burial. These markers are found in Lilybaion and Entella in the West, Cefalù, and Abakainon (modern Tripi) on the north coast, and at

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<sup>880</sup> Guglielmino (2006).

<sup>881</sup> La Lomina (1993).

<sup>882</sup> One could also include here data from Syracuse and Halaisa necropoleis, as well as typologies of epitymbia.

Syracuse and Morgantina in the East, among other sites.<sup>883</sup> While the form almost certainly draws inspiration from Alexandrian architecture, Wilson nonetheless concludes that “It is, however, so common and so universal in Hellenistic Sicily that it became something of a defining insular specialty in the funerary fashions of the middle class.”<sup>884</sup> Perhaps more so than the plain piriform and fusiform *unguentaria*, which I have suggested became broadly shared funerary vessels, the spread of common funerary architecture was a visible expression of common practices. Visitors or newcomers might not see a funeral in progress, but they could see grave markers like those in their home communities.

What actually emerges from a review of the funerary evidence is something similar to what we saw in the linguistic, onomastic, and institutional areas of practice in section A above: a series of connections between two or more cities, though nothing covering the entire island, as well as some individually eccentric locations. This is perhaps to be expected when the data is so uneven, a circumstance that also makes it unwise to claim anything comprehensive about the nature of funerary practices in Sicily. Only a very few cities have extensive necropoleis that were carefully excavated and fewer of those have been carefully published; in most cases we have only a selection of burials with little idea of how representative they are, quantitatively or qualitatively. While of course new discoveries may significantly alter the landscape, the current state of knowledge about Sicilian burials allows the tentative conclusion that some practices seem to have been shared. While one could have predicted this without any archaeological data, the data does confirm that certain aspects of a significant ritual were practiced in common by populations in different parts of the island. Given the major shifts in populations addressed in the previous six chapters, population mobility is likely to have played a role in scattering these practices across Sicily.

#### **D. Collective and domestic divine ritual**

A community’s relationship with the divine, like its relationship with the dead, was an important field of practice, and one in which groups defined themselves in fellowship or in opposition to others. Since de Polignac championed the importance of shared cult in the creation of the *polis* community, civic religion has been investigated as a means of creating and consolidating group boundaries. Such consolidation undoubtedly continued to occur in LCEH Sicily as well, and on an island increasingly connected by people in motion, shared religious practices and beliefs could also emerge between populations in different *poleis*. Mobility, then, generated religious communities that cut across *polis* boundaries. In this section I address collective rituals and divine affiliations, as well as personal domestic rituals, shared among Sicilian populations.

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<sup>883</sup> Lilybaion: Bechtold (1999, pp. 37-47); Entella: Spatafora et al. (2003); Cefalù: Tullio (2009); Abakainon: Bacci and Coppolino (2009); Syracuse: Orsi (1897 p.481) and Gentili (1959) no. 2605; Morgantina: Sjökvist (1960, p. 128). For a fuller survey of *epitymbia* in Hellenistic Sicily cf. Bechtold (1999, pp.54-5, fns. 128 and 144)

<sup>884</sup> Wilson (2013, p. 113).

## i. Collective ritual and divine affiliation

Sanctuaries and the collected dedications that are sometimes associated with them can be a good measure of a community's collective religious affiliation. I will argue that collective cult in LCEH Sicily is characterized by some common religious practices and affiliations, which cut across city boundaries. High mobility, particularly the displacement and scattering of entire populations, sent the practitioners of local cults to several different cities. By the same token, mobility in the form of migration led individual cities to experience a mixed religious life as members of different religious communities settled in a single place. Over the course of the LCEH period, as citizens could recognize familiar practices in other communities and a diversity of practices in their own, the city became less and less of a unique religious collective.

There is extremely little evidence for activity in the great Doric temples of Sicily after the Classical period. Instead, smaller temples and sanctuaries seem to have been the order of the day. It is quite possible that there are large LCEH temples left to be discovered in Syracuse, Tauromenion, Lilybaion, Panormos, and other centers, but the fact that hardly any well-excavated site in Sicily preserves a monumental temple from this period must be significant.<sup>885</sup> The variety of other religious buildings including Punic-style sanctuaries, non-standard temple buildings, etc., suggest instead that ritual activity was performed in different settings, and that Sicilians did not need their sanctuaries to be monumental as they had been in the earlier fifth century.<sup>886</sup> This trend goes against what can be observed elsewhere in the Mediterranean, as Greek-style temples proliferated over Asia Minor and Greek cities rebuilt older sanctuaries in grander form. While Sicilians of all kinds were clearly absorbing and appropriating parts of Greek culture, they did not appropriate temple architecture with any enthusiasm in the period.<sup>887</sup>

Leaving the question of temple architecture aside, we can consider the gods and goddesses attested on the island. First place must go to Demeter, in some sense a pan-Sicilian deity. Sanctuaries to Demeter operated in the fourth and third centuries at Syracuse, Morgantina, Enna, Akragas, Entella, and Selinous and elsewhere. Timoleon was famously said to have been guided by Demeter in his expedition to Sicily.<sup>888</sup> Earlier in the fourth century, the Carthaginian general Himilcon had plundered the sanctuary of Demeter and Kore at Syracuse while besieging the city in 396, after which a plague decimated the Carthaginian army and perhaps saved Syracuse.<sup>889</sup> It is quite likely that after Syracuse escaped the pressing Carthaginian army, Demeter and Kore gained

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<sup>885</sup> One exception is a small peripteral temple at Akragas, thought to be dedicated to Asklepios, and now dated to the fourth century: Zoppi (2006). Another is "Temple A," a frontal cult building perhaps dedicated to Apollo, at Halaisa (thus post-403): Facella (2006, p. 321) and *NotScav* 1959 pp.293-349 and 1961 pp. 266-321.

<sup>886</sup> Of course, the definition of "monumental" is variable, but aside from Hieron II's Great Altar at Syracuse, for which cf. Karlsson (1996), there are hardly any buildings similar in quality or scale to the large fifth-century temples.

<sup>887</sup> This situation was probably due to both a general lack of funds among even the powerful dynasts and a lack of relevance to Sicilian communities. The second factor deserves more attention than I can give here or have seen given elsewhere.

<sup>888</sup> D.S. 16.66.4-5; Plutarch, *Timoleon* 8.

<sup>889</sup> D.S. 14.63.1-2 cf. 14.70.4-75.9.

particular renown within Sicily as protecting deities.<sup>890</sup> One might have expected that they would have been set in opposition to the Carthaginians, especially since Timoleon's Demeter guided him not only against Dionysius II but against Carthaginian-backed tyrants and eventually the Carthaginians themselves. Instead, we have a tradition in which the Carthaginians imported the cult of Demeter and Kore to Carthage in order to atone for their wrongdoing.<sup>891</sup> While it is certainly possible that the Carthaginians did begin worshipping the gods of those by whom they had been defeated, it would also be reasonable to suppose that this tradition may have developed later. In either case, it allowed Carthaginians access to the pan-Sicilian Demeter and Kore, and it may be useless to speculate about whether it was the defeated Carthaginians or later generations who wanted that access.

In any case, by the end of the fourth century, the goddesses could be described as Sicilian protectors: Agathokles, upon arriving in Africa in 310, ordered his men to burn their ships as a sacrifice to Demeter and Kore, "the goddesses who possessed Sicily" in Diodorus' words.<sup>892</sup> This is hardly a solid piece of evidence for late fourth-century Sicilian attitudes, but it does suggest an awareness both of Sicily as a unit, and of the special role played by Demeter and Kore in its religious universe. Of course, their more ancient role as fertility goddesses and guarantors of agricultural production could have easily accommodated a protective aspect: by ensuring good harvests the goddesses contributed to the prosperity and autonomy of Sicilian communities. Moreover, if groups across Sicily were performing similar rituals for Demeter, she would no longer be a civic patron but an insular one. Specifically, in Sicily worship of Demeter was not a mystery cult as at Eleusis; characteristically for an island with mobile populations such an exclusive regime was not possible.<sup>893</sup> Indeed, over the long term Sicilian Demeter became the predominant goddess.<sup>894</sup>

Outside of Syracuse Demeter took on various aspects. Perhaps best known is the Selinuntine Demeter Malophoros, whose temple continued to be frequented into the fourth century.<sup>895</sup> Morgantina had three major urban sanctuaries for the goddess in the LCEH period, and produced a vast number of terracotta dedications.<sup>896</sup> In the third

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<sup>890</sup> White (1964) sees an explicitly political use of the goddesses' cult, reviewing the same evidence I present in this paragraph. There does not seem to be any evidence for the goddesses specifically as protectors before 396. See now Schipporeit (2008) on the Syracusan expansionist politics that motivated mainly Philistos to locate the Rape of Persephone in Sicily, and Caccamo Caltabiano (2008) on the ideological use of Demeter's image on coins minted by cities in response to the late fifth-century Athenian threat.

<sup>891</sup> D.S. 14.77.4-5.

<sup>892</sup> D.S. 20.7.2.

<sup>893</sup> Hinz (1998, pp. 28-30 and 228-232) on the nature of the Sicilian cult, cf. Burkert (1985, pp. 159-160). For similarities in the Corinthian and Sicilian cults see Bookidis (2008), who argues that they "can only have arisen from persistent contacts [between mainland and Sicily] over the centuries" (104).

<sup>894</sup> De Angelis (2009, p. 245): "In the Archaic and Classical periods, Athens and Sicily had competing versions of the myths of Demeter and Persephone which centered the story on their respective regions...But Sicily ultimately won the day, so that by the time of the Roman Empire at the latest the Sicilian version was preferred because of the island's long-standing importance in supplying grain to Rome."

<sup>895</sup> See Sfameni Gasparro (2008a) on Demeter in fourth- and third-century Selinous; Hinz (1998) with De Miro (2008) for a more comprehensive survey of evidence for the Demeter cult throughout Sicily than is possible in this small section.

<sup>896</sup> For Morgantina's Demeter sanctuaries see (Bell 2008). Cf. White (1964 pp. 273-275). For the terracottas see Bell (1981).

century the entire city of Enna was said to be sacred to Demeter.<sup>897</sup> At Akragas, the “Great Sanctuary” dedicated to Demeter continued in use through the fourth and third centuries but was no longer active after the third.<sup>898</sup> Finally, at Entella both an extra-urban *thesmophorion* and an urban foundation deposit, perhaps evidence of an earlier Demetriad *oikos* have been linked via statuettes of Demeter and Kore to worship of the goddesses.<sup>899</sup> Both archaeological investigations found dedications dating from the sixth century into the third, suggesting that from an early date there were devotees of Demeter and Kore at Entella. Thus buildings securely attributable to the communal worship of the goddesses exist in a number of cities.

Oblique evidence for the goddesses’ cult at Kamarina exists in the form of an extra-urban kiln workshop that produced figurines from the second quarter of the fourth century.<sup>900</sup> In fact, caches of figurines have permitted scholars to posit Demeter sanctuaries at Syracuse (in Piazza Vittoria) and at Gela (Bitalemi) as well.<sup>901</sup> There is thus no shortage of evidence for the widespread cult of Demeter, sometimes with Kore, throughout Sicily.<sup>902</sup> In particular, the broad distribution of typologically similar terracottas across Sicily, especially in the third century, is suggestive of a common religious ritual, or at least of common ideas about how to propitiate the goddesses. It would be especially interesting to know the provenance of terracottas in order to look for patterns in and between sets of dedications, though to my knowledge no scientific analysis has been attempted.

Many Sicilian cities must have had a decidedly mixed religious atmosphere. One good example of this phenomenon is Halaisa, founded by the Sikel leader Archonides in 403. As we learn from the *Tabulae Halaesinae*, in the second century and probably at least as early as the third as well, the city hosted sanctuaries of Apollo, Zeus Melichios, and Adranos.<sup>903</sup> As noted in earlier chapters, Prestianni Giallombardo has argued that the cults reflect the social realities of Halaisa’s demographic makeup, with Sikels, Italians (perhaps but not necessarily Campanians), and Greeks (especially from Selinous) among the early inhabitants.<sup>904</sup> In particular, the dispersal of the cult of Adranos, father of the Palikoi and the preeminent Sikel deity, to Halaisa is significant, since it is likely to have come through Herbita.<sup>905</sup> As I observed in Chapter Two, foundations dispersed populations and their cultural practices between metropolis and colony, but also generated subsequent movement. In the case of Halaisa, to judge from

<sup>897</sup> Livy 24.38-39. Cf. Manganaro (2003) for epigraphic and numismatic evidence for Demeter at Enna.

<sup>898</sup> White (1964, p. 273) and Marconi (1933 pp. 108-9). Cf. also De Miro (2000, pp. 88-95) on the renewal of the chthonic sanctuary of Demeter in the fourth and third centuries, including new altars that “bear the mark of a religiosity of Punic influence” (p. 89). Cf. Zoppi (2004) for a detailed architectural reading a nearby sanctuary at San Biaggio, in use from the later 6<sup>th</sup> century through the First Punic War, that may also have been associated with the cult of Demeter.

<sup>899</sup> Urban *oikos*: Parra (1997) and (2003). *Thesmophorion*: Spatafora et al. (2003).

<sup>900</sup> Pisani (2008), also mentioning a possible temple to Demeter and Kore in Kamarina itself that was apparently destroyed by the Carthaginians in 405.

<sup>901</sup> Syracuse: Voza (1976-1977, p. 558). Gela: Orlandini (2003).

<sup>902</sup> Cf. e.g. the collected studies in C.A. Di Stefano (2008), which demonstrate the lack of a consensus about the origins of the Demeter cult in Sicily (indigenous, colonial, or Deinomenid). Compare e.g. Chirassi Colombo (2008) with Sfameni Gasparro (2008b).

<sup>903</sup> *IGDS* 196.

<sup>904</sup> Prestianni Giallombardo (2003).

<sup>905</sup> On Adranos, attested at Adranon, Palike, and Halaisa, see Cataldi (1992, pp. 77-81); Prestianni Giallombardo (2003); Cusumano (2006).

the cults known in the city in this period, the Sikel population must have been complemented with newcomers. So I tend to agree that the city must have had a highly mixed population, and even in the absence of concrete evidence tying the different cults to distinct population groups, it is significant in itself that the cults of Sikel and Greek gods found such apparently easy cohabitation. Apollo may well have been favored by the Mamertines, but he was first of all a Greek god, in fact the patron of Sicily's first Greek colony, Naxos.

Diodorus compares the situation of Halaeisa to that of its mother-city Herbita ("in later times" relative to the foundation of Halaisa) with some intriguing commentary. He writes that when the city's inhabitants had become prosperous from trade (and a tax exemption from the Romans),

the Halaisinoi denied completely their kinship with the Herbitaioi, considering it shameful that they should be thought to be colonists of an inferior city. Still, not only do rather many kinship ties between them persist down to the present day, but they administer the sacrifices at the temple of Apollo with the same customs. [...οἱ Ἀλαιοῖνοι τὴν τῶν Ἑρβιταίων συγγένειαν ἀπηρνήσαντο, αἰσχρὸν ἡγούμενοι καταδεστέρας πόλεως ἐαυτοὺς ἀποίκους νομίζεσθαι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ μέχρι νῦν παρ' ἀμφοτέραις συγγένειά τε πλείονες διαμένουσι καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸ Ἀπολλώνιον θυσίας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔθεσι διοικοῖσιν.]<sup>906</sup>

First, the economic and political superiority of the Halaisinoi encouraged them (in Diodorus' view at least) to deny that they were the kin of their mother city, on the face of it a rather outrageous claim. Diodorus does not explicitly say so, but it seems quite likely that the occasion for this denial was a request for help by the poor and out of favor inhabitants of Herbita. At any rate the denial must have come in response to an assertion of kinship by the Herbitaeans, if we are right to think of the denial as an event and not a habitual claim made frequently by Halaisinoi.<sup>907</sup> In fact, the colonists of Halaisa had included mercenaries and refugees who were not Herbitaeans, and poor Herbitaeans who might not want to remember their origin, so it is conceivable that after a few generations (the denial falls under Diodorus' "in later times" and so definitely post-241) the Halaisinoi could honestly believe themselves to be not Herbitaeans in origin. The role of Archonides could not be denied, but any individual Halaisan could claim that his ancestors had not been poor Herbitaeans.

Second, the "rather many kinship ties" between the two peoples in Diodorus' time must have had some concrete basis. It is unfortunate that Diodorus specifies only one such tie, the common practice of sacrifice at the Temple of Apollo, but this example is instructive nonetheless. It was not joint sacrifices performed together but separate sacrifices performed according to the same custom (ἔθος) that bound the two populations together. The Temple of Apollo is presumably one of the two temples found in excavations at Halaisa, but this cannot be confirmed as Herbita has not been located and may have been the site of the temple Diodorus had in mind. Alternatively, the

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<sup>906</sup> D.S. 14.16.3-4.

<sup>907</sup> Scholarship on kinship diplomacy tends to focus on successful claims, working under the assumption that unsuccessful claims were not preserved. Jones 1999, for instance, does not record this episode between Herbita and Halaisa, which is only superficially treated in Facella's otherwise excellent study of Halaisa: Facella (2006, pp. 197, 254-5).

“Temple of Apollo” could refer to the temple in each city.<sup>908</sup> In any case, although we do not know the content of the ritual or its exact location, we know that it was performed similarly but separately by the people of Herbita and Halaisa, and that this common practice united the two populations despite the Halaisinoi rejecting kinship ties with the Herbitaeans. Whether the unspecified ties were also common practices, or if they were more conventional relationships of an economic, religious, social, or political nature cannot be known, but we will not go too far wrong if we imagine that both common practices and relationships bound the communities together.

Whatever was case on the north coast, a clearer picture emerges at Entella, where the decrees document a remarkable attempt by the newly resettled Entellinoi to incorporate populations of other cities into the religious life of their city. In some cases the religious connection was explicit. Both Gelooi and Herbitaioi are invited to sacrifice together (συνθύειν) with the Entellinoi.<sup>909</sup> All the communities mentioned in A1, as well as the Assorinoi, Gelooi and Herbitaioi were invited to games (κατακαλεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας).<sup>910</sup> While Entella shared no prior ethnic or religious background with these communities as far as we know, in the future some of them would sacrifice and celebrate festivals together. Various cities and individuals received diplomatic or political honors (*eunoia*, *proxenia*, *isopoliteia*) that could certainly have led to religious interactions. It is no coincidence that the contemporary Nakone decree, which I believe deserves to be read next to the Entella dossier, prescribes common sacrifices for internal strife.<sup>911</sup> Attending the same sacrifices and festivals forged and solidified bonds, and when sacrifices in a sanctuary were no longer restricted to legal citizens of that city, it is safe to say that a significant experience of community was becoming detached from the *polis*.<sup>912</sup>

This was a development that the Romans may have found useful in their early years administering Sicily. Either directly after the end of the first Punic War, or in the period 217-215 BCE the Romans instituted a league of seventeen loyal Sicilian cities devoted to protecting the temple of Venus/Aphrodite/Astarte at Eryx.<sup>913</sup> Sometime before the end of the First Punic War the Romans had set a group of around 3,000 Gallic mercenaries as garrison over the sanctuary at Eryx but they instead pillaged it and were duly banished from Italy after the war.<sup>914</sup> According to Diodorus the Senate decreed that the “seventeen most loyal cities in Sicily should wear gold in Aphrodite’s honor and that 200 soldiers should watch over the sanctuary,” but his notice comes in a general discussion of the goddess at Eryx, so we do not know when the decree was passed.<sup>915</sup> One possibility is that the Sicilian garrison dates to 217, when the Romans introduced the cult of Venus Erycina to the city of Rome,<sup>916</sup> but it is more likely that the

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<sup>908</sup> Facella (2006, p. 321) and *NotScav* 1959 pp.293-349 and 1961 pp. 266-321. There is however no evidence that the temple of Apollo at Herbita predated the temple at Halaisa, if it existed at all. The cult of Apollo may, in other words, have been brought from Halaisa to Herbita rather than the other way around.

<sup>909</sup> Gela: C2 L.18; Herbita: C3 L22.

<sup>910</sup> A1 L.14, C1 LL.13-14, C2 LL.14-15, C3 LL.18-19.

<sup>911</sup> *IGDS* 206 LL.27-33.

<sup>912</sup> Such detachment was in general encouraged both by federal states: see Mackil (2013, ch.4); it was also encouraged by regional cultural-religious associations such as the Dorian Pentapolis, for which see Berges and Tuna (2001), or e.g. the Ionians worshipping together at Panionion in Asia Minor.

<sup>913</sup> Cf. Prag (2010a) for a summary of the evidence, from which my account is drawn.

<sup>914</sup> Polybius 2.7.9-10

<sup>915</sup> D.S. 4.83.7.

<sup>916</sup> Livy 22.9.7-11, 22.10.10, 23.30.13-14, 23.31.9; Ovid *Fasti* 4.872-6, 893-4.

institution dates to the end of the First Punic War. Nothing about importing a cult demands security arrangements at the original sanctuary. The thorough punishment of the Gauls' treachery suggests that the Romans were concerned to maintain order in western Sicily and that this local defense force was the complement to that punishment in making amends for the sacrilege. We can also compare the sizes of the garrisons: 3,000 mercenaries make up a formidable army for wartime defense, while 200 recruits would have been effectively symbolic, and a symbolic gesture fits 241 much better than 217.

Cicero mentions Tyndaris as one of the seventeen cities, and while many other member cities have been inferred only Tyndaris is certain.<sup>917</sup> Several dedications of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE confirm that the soldiers there were indeed Sicilians, under the immediate command of a Sicilian designated *chiliarchos/tribunus militum* and the ultimate authority of a Roman quaestor.<sup>918</sup> What Prag calls a "quasi-league of loyal cities" was thus an instrument that from the end of the First Punic War made the sanctuary at Eryx a concern for many other Sicilian cities. Venus was no longer a local cult of the Erycinoi but a broader one, which drew at least garrison soldiers and likely also dedicators from a significant part of the island. The league owed its existence to a Roman policy decision, but once in place it must have generated significant mobility and interaction among its members. Without an excavated sanctuary or later notices about the cult in the literary sources it is difficult to say how meaningful the organization was, but the shared responsibility for protecting the temple at Eryx would have given the inhabitants of each of the seventeen cities a sense that they were part of something distinctively Sicilian that was greater than their individual *poleis*.

## ii. Domestic and personal divine relationships

In the ancient Mediterranean people routinely appealed to the divine to ensure a favorable result for their productive and reproductive activities. The public festivals like those discussed above were communal appeals, and such rituals undoubtedly contributed to the cohesion of the community as its members gathered and performed the same actions together. A more private example is the songs sung (or commissioned) by potters to guarantee the smooth operation of their workshops, as in the pseudo-Homeric potters' song, where Athena is a tutelary divinity but there is a threat of damage from Circe, Chiron, and several personified evils: Shatter, Smash, Charr, Crash, and Crudebake.<sup>919</sup> Potters singing the same songs in different cities shared something too, though nothing as spectacular as the fellowship of civic festivals. It is likely that craftsmen of all kinds sought divine favor for the results of their labor, and although for most crafts the specifics of this concern elude us, the weavers of Sicily left some of their equipment behind.

That equipment consists of the terracotta discs known as *oscilla* (singular *oscillum*), as well as some angular loomweights. Pyramidal and conical loomweights are generally agreed to have been older than the disc form, which could be either plain or

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<sup>917</sup> Cicero, *Verr.* 5.124.

<sup>918</sup> Inscriptions attesting the garrison and its commander under the Roman quaestor: *CIL* X 7258, *IG* XIV 282, 355

<sup>919</sup> [Homer] Epigram XIV. Cf. most recently Karanika (2014) on women's work songs, including weaving songs.

decorated. Virgil writes of *oscilla* hung on trees in honor of Bacchus, and although we do not know what those *oscilla* really were, the passage has led scholars to use the term for any terracotta object with holes for hanging.<sup>920</sup> The referent of the word *oscillum* was unclear already to Servius, who connected them to the Athenians' search for the bodies of Icarus and Erigona, floral phalloi, cleansing instruments sacred to Liber pater, the heads of conquered enemies, and the Oscans.<sup>921</sup> When archaeologists began to find decorated terracotta discs, particularly in Sicily and southern Italy, they called them *oscilla*, and interpretations alternated between purely functional and purely votive or apotropaic. While Etruscan and south Italian *oscilla* and loomweights appear with some frequency in sanctuaries, in Sicily they are nearly always found in other contexts not explicitly associated with the religious sphere.

Much of the debate about Sicilian loomweights and *oscilla* has thus centered on the distinction between their practical use, on looms, and their religious use, as votives or charms. I follow Siracusano among others in rejecting such a distinction as largely foreign to the ancient Sicilians who produced and used these objects.<sup>922</sup> It is now generally acknowledged that loomweights were functional but held religious significance at the same time. In fact, caches found in pre-397 strata at Motya in rooms 12, 39 and 41 of Insula I in Zone A confirm that both discs and the older pyramidal loomweights could be stored together.<sup>923</sup> In addition, an early third-century loom found *in situ* at Entella preserves traces of its wooden frame and demonstrates that both types of weights could be used on the same loom.<sup>924</sup> Domestic textile production was a social activity in which deities and spirits might be invited to participate or barred from interfering. An *oscillum* could serve simultaneously as a loomweight and an apotropaic device: divine protection was part of the practical use of a loom. Indeed, both the products of weaving and the process of creating them were manifestly religious in many well-documented cases such as the Panathenaic cloak, or Apollo's robe at Amyklai.<sup>925</sup> Even if a loom was being used to weave a more pedestrian textile, the process could still have been experienced as a divine one.

The weavers of ancient Sicily were predominantly women. Most recently Reuthner has shown rather comprehensively that Greek women were at least notionally responsible for domestic textile production even if slaves (including male slaves) did the physical work.<sup>926</sup> But these women almost certainly did not produce their own loomweights, and it is even debatable whether the choice of buying loomweights with a particular name or pattern belonged to the woman who would use it or direct its use. Because we cannot tell for certain who within the household decided what kind of loomweights to use, whether it was slave weavers, the woman of the house, or her husband, the unit of analysis must be the household and not the individual. This means that the distribution of specific *oscilla* could just as easily be due to the adoption of new practices as to the actual relocation of families or populations. Reuthner has inclined me

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<sup>920</sup> Vergil, *Georgics* 2.388-9.

<sup>921</sup> Servius ad G. 2.389

<sup>922</sup> Siracusano (2003).

<sup>923</sup> Rossoni and Vecchio (2000).

<sup>924</sup> Parra et al. (1995).

<sup>925</sup> Reuthner (2006, pp. 267-323).

<sup>926</sup> Reuthner (2006, pp. 128-140).

to believe that many Greek women may well have exercised control over domestic furniture and equipment, but I am hesitant to rule out patriarchal interference.<sup>927</sup>

The encounters between Greek, Carthaginian, Sikel, Sikan, Elymian, and Italian populations on Sicily ought to have continued producing hybrid practices well after the period of colonization. However, full comprehension of hybridity often eludes us even when there are only two groups involved let alone the half-dozen or more interacting in Sicily, and we have very little evidence for the respective original practices that will have contributed to the development of hybrid ones. I therefore stress that the propitiatory words and images I will discuss were shared, while acknowledging that they were hybrid—an acknowledgement that leaves crucial space for different groups to have interpreted these objects and practices differently.

Oscilla with molded faces are by far the most common in Sicily in the late fourth and third centuries. I include here faces of several subtypes: traditional Medusas, more abstract humanized faces, and faces that have been variously identified as gorgons or Silenus masks. In all cases an apotropaic function is possible if not likely. At Gela, they have been found in several well-defined contexts: in a fourth-century deposit over the so-called Monument F, in a Hellenistic kiln discard heap, in a pile of fused and defective examples dating to the late fourth century, under the tile fall of a domestic workshop destroyed ca. 280 BCE, and in the Hellenistic baths, in addition to numerous sporadic or out-of-context finds.<sup>928</sup> At Scornavacche, an industrial settlement near Kamarina but probably closely linked to Gela as well, several examples have been found, all in deposits dating to ca. 320-280.<sup>929</sup> Despite the preponderance of these *oscilla* in the area of Gela, which must have been a production center, they are also found in western Sicily and were probably produced there as well. One comes from Segesta in a third-century fill in Zone B.<sup>930</sup> From Entella comes one example whose context is not specified; it is unfortunately not the in-situ loom mentioned earlier.<sup>931</sup> At Lilybaion gorgon *oscilla* have been found in at least two third-century tombs.<sup>932</sup> Unprovenanced examples in museums on Mozia and in Erice further attest the existence of these objects in western Sicily and may ultimately be traced back to production in Lilybaion.<sup>933</sup>

The gorgoneion *oscillum* type is thus attested first in eastern Sicily in the last decades of the fourth century, almost certainly the product of Geloan workshops. In western Sicily examples appear to date exclusively to the third century, and their appearance in tombs at Lilybaion suggests a funerary reinterpretation of these objects in contrast to their domestic use at Gela.

Other deities could be employed for the protection of loom products as well. A loomweight and four *oscilla* discovered in domestic or workshop contexts at Scornavacche demonstrate that the transmission of cultural practices was not only east to west, or Greek to Punic. In 1954 an angular loomweight with the sign of Tanit incised

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<sup>927</sup> Nevertheless individual weavers or groups of weavers would have had some latitude to choose the work songs they sang, if any; Karanika (2014, pp. 133-135) notes the variety of historical work songs known to us.

<sup>928</sup> Orlandini and Adamesteanu (1960 pp.104-5 fig. 26), Adamesteanu (1954 p.130 Tav. XXXVI, 2), Orlandini (1960 p.155 fig. 4; p. 179 fig. 19, and pp. 196-7 fig. 21, respectively).

<sup>929</sup> Rossi (1978, Tav. II).

<sup>930</sup> de la Geniere (1988, p.308 no. 149, Tav. CCIII).

<sup>931</sup> Bove (1995, p. 166 fig. 9).

<sup>932</sup> Gabrici (1941 p. 293 fig. 50); Bisi (1971 p. 685 fig. 33).

<sup>933</sup> Whitaker (1921 p. 307 fig. 83); Famà (2009, p. 272 nos. 17-18).

before firing on two faces was found in a kiln-workshop, room 31, dating to the Timoleontic-Hellenistic period, not an exclusively religious context but not necessarily an areligious space.<sup>934</sup> The design need not have been executed by a professional, and may in fact represent an individual's desire to mark the tools of her trade with the symbol she thought would best ensure success.<sup>935</sup> In the nearby room 56, four *oscilla* with a molded decoration that has been interpreted as the Tanit sign were found together in 1956.<sup>936</sup> The decoration is abstract, to be sure, but even if it is not a version of the Tanit sign, it might nevertheless have served an apotropaic or protective function.

We do not have analogous loomweights from western Sicily though the Tanit symbol is well-attested there. The Scornavacche loomweight (perhaps along with the *oscilla*) shows that not all cultural transmission was unidirectional; whether a Greek used a foreign symbol for a familiar practice or a Carthaginian used a familiar symbol for a foreign practice, the embrace of even part of the Carthaginian pantheon in eastern Sicily is significant.

Invocations to the Charites, or Graces, are certainly attested on two *oscilla* and possibly also on a further *oscillum* and several loomweights. The Graces would not have been an inappropriate protector of fine clothing, as an epigram of Leonidas of Tarentum attests.<sup>937</sup> In the museum in Messina, probably from eastern rather than western Sicily, an *oscillum* bearing the inscription (which was cut before firing) XAPITEΣ has been dated to the late fourth or early third century on the basis of its letter forms, as it lacks an archaeological context.<sup>938</sup> From excavations at Iaitas comes a second secure *oscillum* with the inscription XAPITΑΣ | ΓΕΡΡΑΙ—the first word cut before firing, the second word after.<sup>939</sup> Isler writes that it comes from a context of “the earlier Hellenistic period” but gives no further information. The second word ΓΕΡΡΑΙ, a term for genitals, has been interpreted as a slur on the weaver or on the Graces themselves; I would prefer to read ΓΕΡΡΑΙ as a more generic obscene exclamation, performing an apotropaic function along the lines of the *aischrologia* of certain religious festivals.<sup>940</sup>

There may be other examples as well. A nineteenth-century scholar, Avolio, reports having seen in Syracuse a small terracotta disc with a trident decoration and “the Greek word signifying *Carite* to which it seems must be supplied the letter *s* *Charites*, the Graces.”<sup>941</sup> To my knowledge this report has not been corroborated, and in any case would only add another museum piece without context. More intriguing but more contested is the series of pyramidal loomweights bearing an inscription XAPI, found in a fifth-century domestic context at Terravecchia di Cuti.<sup>942</sup> They were found with a number of other loomweights whose inscriptions have been read as Greek and

<sup>934</sup> G. Di Stefano (2008 pp.223-4, 230).

<sup>935</sup> While it is true that the symbol must have been created at the time of manufacture rather than use, the rough formation of the object suggests that it may not have been professionally molded and fired. I am not aware of a consensus on the nature of loomweight production, and it does not seem *a priori* impossible for it to have been at least in part a domestic enterprise.

<sup>936</sup> G. Di Stefano (2008 pp. 223-4, 230 fig. 8).

<sup>937</sup> Leonidas of Tarentum, Greek Anthology VII 726.

<sup>938</sup> Bitto (2001 p. 137 no. 60).

<sup>939</sup> Isler (1994).

<sup>940</sup> For *aischrologia*, which significantly is a practice linked to women's worship of Demeter, see Brumfield (1996); Burkert (1985, p. 105); and Carson (1994, pp. 24-7).

<sup>941</sup> Avolio (1829, p. 140), citation from Bitto (2001).

<sup>942</sup> Brugnone (1993, p. 57).

non-Greek names, including the now-famous Kupura/Kupra. Based on these other inscriptions the abbreviation could be of a theonym or personal name, but we ought not to exclude the possibility that it referred to the XAPITEΣ. Even without these doubtful cases the two examples from Messina and Iaitas show that in both eastern and western Sicily the Charites could exercise some protective functions.

Herakles appears in inscriptions as well as in figural decorations as a protecting figure on loomweights. Perhaps the most well-known Sicilian *oscillum*, from Gela, has a gorgoneion on one side and a graffito verse inscription on the other: Ἡρακλῆς ἐνθα κατοικεῖ, μὴ ᾿σίτω μηθὲν κακόν – “Herakles lives here, let no evil enter.”<sup>943</sup> It comes from a Hellenistic deposit dated to ca. 300-280 BCE. The prayer is widely attested with some variation both archaeologically, at Hellenistic Karafto in Iran, at Mylasa, and at Late Antique Thasos as well as in literary sources, namely Diogenes Laertius and Clement of Alexandria.<sup>944</sup> At Thasos it was inscribed on the threshold of a house and Diogenes likewise sets the inscription at a doorway, leading scholars to suggest that the Gela *oscillum* was hung at the door of a house. But the Mylasa inscription was on a small altar, demonstrating that the prayer need not apply only to physical doorways. In my view the object of the Geloan apotropaic formula, the ἐνθα, the “here,” may well have been the loom, the workshop, the family, or the household, with the potential to have represented any of them in the mind of the object’s user.

Another epigraphic reference to Herakles appears on a loomweight from Montagna di Marzo, which unfortunately was quite poorly documented. No context or photograph is given in the report of “a type of «*oscillum*», oval and fired light gray, internally punctured from one pole to the other” with the inscription ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΑ | ΛΗΙΑ | -ΠΣΣΟΣ.<sup>945</sup> The final line is difficult, but the first two appear to label the object as the “stone/weight of Herakles,” with Ionic λῆια for Epic λῆας, according to Dubois. This last feature, in light of the dialect issues discussed above in section A, ought to suggest a date in the third century or later, although as with much informal writing there is ample latitude for idiosyncrasy and accident. It would be imprudent to stake much on the date of the inscription, but the labeling of a loomweight as “Heraklean” is an interesting act that almost certainly involved the deity’s protection over the loom.

*Oscilla* from other sites are decorated with depictions of Herakles. From early Hellenistic Gela comes one with a male bearded face identified by Panvini as Lysippos’ Herakles.<sup>946</sup> Christopher Faraone has suggested that the figure on the reverse side of the Herakles inscription *oscillum* discussed above is Herakles himself, not a gorgoneion.<sup>947</sup> From Monte Saraceno, in a domestic context dating to the early fourth century, comes one with a quadriga on one side and a frontal lion head on the other, which Siracusano proposes may constitute a reference to Herakles’ apotheosis and his lion’s skin.<sup>948</sup> Thus documented appeals to Herakles as protector of textile production are limited to the southeastern part of Sicily.

<sup>943</sup> Its discovery was reported in Orlandini (1968), but see more recently Manganaro (2005 p.15).

<sup>944</sup> Karafto: *BE* 1946-47, 227; Mylasa: *I.Mylasa* I 343; Thasos: Bernand and Salviat (1962 pp. 608-9); Diog. Laert. 6.39, 50, [Diog.] *Ep.* 36. For later variations in Egyptian and Christian contexts see Faraone (2009) and Manganaro (2005).

<sup>945</sup> Li Gotti (1955 p.248 n.20); cf. also *IGDS* 168a.

<sup>946</sup> Panvini (1998 p. 131).

<sup>947</sup> Faraone (2009 p. 232).

<sup>948</sup> Siracusano (2003 p. 606 figs. 1-3).

The decorated loomweights of Sicily suggest certain cultural commonalities between households across the island, though they should not be taken as secure evidence for population movement. A tentative picture nevertheless emerges: among divine protectors the gorgoneion came to enjoy relatively wide popularity along the southern and western coasts, even if its apotropaic role was perhaps modified. Herakles had mainly regional interest in the area around Gela, which was undoubtedly related to his cult as documented in other media by Manganaro.<sup>949</sup> The appeal to Tanit from the workers of Scornavacche is not surprising given the other signs of Punic influence in the area of Kamarina, including the burials discussed above as well as the city's coinage: on the obverse of a silver tetradrachm of the fifth or fourth century, the sign of Tanit appears above the left hand of a charioteer driving a quadriga.<sup>950</sup> The Charites could apparently receive appeals from households in quite different populations across northern Sicily and possibly in Syracuse.

One final observation about the Sicilian *oscilla* is that Athena, the divinity most commonly associated with weaving, is entirely absent. Certain *oscilla* from Taras show an owl spinning wool, but there is nothing comparable from Sicily.<sup>951</sup> This is all the more interesting since from Scornavacche comes one of the best pictorial representations of the goddess in her role as overseer of crafts, a terracotta relief of Athena Ergane.<sup>952</sup> Perhaps the gorgoneion that appears so commonly on the *oscilla* referred to her aegis, or perhaps she was petitioned in other ways in Sicily. It should also be noted that the practice of creating and using loomweights like those discussed here is essentially restricted to Sicily, with some attestations in southern Italy, including the Taras owls and a mix of figural, stamped, and incised *oscilla* from Heraklea in Lucania.<sup>953</sup> The Metaponto survey produced several *oscilla* with figural decorations, and there are evidently examples from Locroi Epizephyrioi as well.<sup>954</sup> Yet of the hundreds if not thousands of loomweights found in excavations at Corinth and Athens, and the many more turned up in nearly every excavation in the Mediterranean, there is hardly a single comparandum.<sup>955</sup>

By studying the pedestrian remains of domestic textile production, we gain access to the normalized patterns of life in Sicily, the *habitus* of various Sicilian groups. I am aware that the low number of well-excavated examples prevents us for the time being from saying much about the wider populations of Sicilian cities, though I hope to have demonstrated the value of paying attention to these humble objects. The fact that some distinctive practices—religious in a broad sense—were shared across geographical distance is an indication of relatively high mobility; the fact that they were shared across what we might have thought were ethnic or civic lines is an indication that perhaps

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<sup>949</sup> Manganaro (2005).

<sup>950</sup> SNG Copenhagen I 171. Thus the charioteer is not only crowned by a Nike as on the standard quadriga type, but also carries or invokes the protection of Tanit.

<sup>951</sup> Taras *oscilla*: Bejor (1973 pp. 204-6 Tav. II-III).

<sup>952</sup> Di Vita (1955 p. 143).

<sup>953</sup> Lo Porto (1961, p. 139, figs. 19-20).

<sup>954</sup> Foxhall (2011 pp. 545-546).

<sup>955</sup> Corinth: Davidson (1952); Athens: Davidson and Thompson (1943), in which the authors report a loomweight with an incised inscription in mixed Attic and Ionic lettering dated to around 420: ΗΕΡΑΚΛΗΣ (p. 87, fig. 33). The authors puzzle over the nominative form of the name, and dismiss the possibility that it was a dedication. The stamps on Corinthian and Athenian loomweights are a quite different phenomenon from the one I am studying.

those lines were not as relevant as we had thought. The *oscilla*, coming in large part from the third century rather than the fourth, thus document a somewhat advanced stage of the cultural mixing I have been proposing as a characteristic of LCEH Sicily.

Evidence for other kinds of personal religious activity, aside from the collective dedications and affiliations discussed in subsection ii above, comes only from isolated inscribed dedications. No literary source attests the private ritual of an individual, and archaeological investigations have not produced reliable evidence for domestic religious activity beyond the *oscilla* just addressed above. A survey of the epigraphic record for such dedications yields a rather diverse cast of deities, with surprisingly little local repetition or overlap between cities. Major deities like Asklepios, Aphrodite, Hermes, Dionysos, Demeter, Kore, and the Dioskouroi all received individual dedications, none from particularly surprising contexts.<sup>956</sup> Local deities did as well, including the river god Heloros and the nymph Timassa, as well as the rather obscure or even controversial Elaielinos.<sup>957</sup> Several gods and goddesses also appear in specific and somewhat surprising manifestations: Artemis Pheraia, Zeus Ourios, and Aphrodite Ourania.<sup>958</sup> There is, as I suggested above, very little overlap, except for scattered dedications to Herakles in the area of Gela.<sup>959</sup>

The evidence of *defixiones* from LCEH Sicily is unfortunately quite scarce. There is a broadly funerary context in the discovery of these objects, which was itself distinctive to Sicily. The curses IGDS 122 and 123, and IGDS II 37-38, 61-63 were all found in necropoleis, usually associated with a burial but never part of the grave goods proper.<sup>960</sup> The practice of depositing curses in a cemetery thus appears to be a Sicilian one shared between eastern and western cities.<sup>961</sup> We might expect to hear about protective or vengeful deities as in the abundant early material, but none appears in the LCEH documents.<sup>962</sup> We are thus left with a number of very fragmentary texts, for which the one common feature is their secondary deposition, perhaps a ritual deposition, in necropoleis.

## Conclusions

In assessing the great variety of the material record of LCEH Sicily, I have attempted to draw attention to the evidence for practices that were distinctive to Sicily but not restricted to a single site. This chapter did not have as its goal a complete survey of fourth- and third-century Sicilian archaeology, numismatics, or epigraphy. Rather, the aim has been to understand how a large island hosting diverse populations could

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<sup>956</sup> Askepios: IGDS 102 (dated 310-280). Aphrodite: IGDS 110 (dated 3<sup>rd</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> cent.). Hermes: IGDS 183 (ca. 300). Dionysos: IGDS 191 (late 4<sup>th</sup> cent.). Demeter: IGDS 198 (3<sup>rd</sup> cent.). Demeter and Kore: IGDS II 14 (ca. 300). The Dioskouri: IGDS II 11 (late 5<sup>th</sup> cent.).

<sup>957</sup> Heloros and Timassa: IGDS 101 (3<sup>rd</sup> cent.). Elaielinos: IGDS 190 (4<sup>th</sup> cent.).

<sup>958</sup> Artemis Pheraia: IGDS 92 (late 4<sup>th</sup> cent.). Zeus Ourios: IGDS 188 (3<sup>rd</sup>-1<sup>st</sup> cent.). Aphrodite Ourania: IGDS 213 (Hellenistic-Roman).

<sup>959</sup> Cf. Manganaro (2005).

<sup>960</sup> The same is true of the two *defixiones* of Bechtold and Brugnone (1997).

<sup>961</sup> For *defixiones* from the necropolis at Selinous (Buffa) cf. Bettarini (2005, pp. 75-94). Compare the collections of Jordan (1985) and Jordan (2000), in which the vast majority of known provenances for *defixiones* outside Sicily are non-funerary.

<sup>962</sup> If one allows the later document from Lilybaion published by Bechtold and Brugnone (1997), which they place in the second century, there are references to the Titans, *atelestoi*, and Demeter.

come to produce an insular identity, by collecting instances where distinct populations shared a way of doing things. Two groups who do everything in separate and distinct ways are self-evidently two different groups; two groups who do everything in the exact same way are really just one group in two parts. Aristotle disagreed, emphasizing the prime importance of place to a community and dismissing out of hand the possibility that a single *polis* could embrace citizens living in different locations.<sup>963</sup> Yet citizen bodies were occasionally divided, and we examined the dynamics of division and reunification in Chapter Three. In reality, any two citizen communities in the ancient Mediterranean shared some practices and were distinguished by other practices, and so a community was defined as much by what it shared and with whom as by what it did that was unique.<sup>964</sup> Moving people bring some, but not all, of their practices with them, and the more practices are shared between two groups, the less they can be called separate.

The social reorganizations demanded by mobility can be seen at many scales. It is hardly controversial to claim that mobility between town and country knit the *polis* together.<sup>965</sup> In Sicily, the expanding community of Syracuse (the city on which we are most fully informed) necessitated large-scale movements of people, and caused what Consolo Langher terms a “break in the closed circle of *politeia*.”<sup>966</sup> While other cities were not necessarily growing, the composition of their populations was certainly changing, and their closed circles must also have been threatened. As Zosia Archibald succinctly puts it: “Change simply happens, and some of it, perhaps much of it, is a function of human interaction involving distances.”<sup>967</sup> It is well documented that Mediterranean islands developed cultural unity over time, and I suggest that in Sicily as elsewhere, mobility was a chief cause.

In this chapter I have attempted to document the emergence of Sicilian communities of practice over the fourth and third centuries. In previous chapters I have tried to establish that certain modes of mobility, and its overall degree, were distinctive to this period, though of course both mobility and cultural interaction took place both earlier and later. The development of shared practices, inspired by interaction and mobility, is the mechanism for the insular integration addressed in section A of this chapter. Despite and in opposition to political fragmentation, shared and distinctive practices are the most significant effect of Sicilian population dynamics and mobility. In proposing mobility and interaction as the causes of cultural change, I follow Walter Scheidel, who finds that mobility provides “a tangible proximate mechanism for ‘Romanisation’ that is missing from every alternative explanation.”<sup>968</sup> In his case, what he calls “emulative homogenization” and “replicative culture change” (i.e.

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<sup>963</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 3.1276a.

<sup>964</sup> Gruen (2011).

<sup>965</sup> Jones (1987, p. 11) explains the overall shift, in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, from hereditary units to residence units by appeal to mobility: “But why, in the final stage, the abandonment of traditional practice? Possibly because hereditary affiliation in combination with the movement of citizens out of the units of their affiliation had resulted, over the centuries, in the loss of territorial cohesion to the extent that the practical administrative advantages of such a disposition were negated. Units established under the new plan would have been free of this complication—permanently.”

<sup>966</sup> Consolo Langher (1997, p. 235): “Naturale corollario del processo di ampliamento della *polis* era stato infatti già dal tempo dei Dinomenidi, la rottura del cerchio chiuso della *politeia*.”

<sup>967</sup> Archibald (2011, p. 45).

<sup>968</sup> Scheidel (2004, p. 23).

Romanization) follow the itineraries of “organized and privileged settlers” (i.e. Romans); in LCEH Sicily mobility was less organized and differences in privilege smaller. Nevertheless, the power of mobility as an explanation can be seen from counterexamples as well. Scheidel mentions “the Achaemenid Empire which in the absence of internal colonization coincided with the lack of comparable ‘Persization’ of a heterogeneous domain.”<sup>969</sup> When the Romans conquered the Boiotian League in 172/1 BCE, despite being asked to leave it intact as a subject polity, they instead dissolved it, finding it “most suitable to divide the Boiotians into individual *poleis*.”<sup>970</sup> And of course, shortly thereafter their division of Macedonia into four non-communicating units had the express aim of preventing unification on any level.

I suggest that all this adds up to a situation where Sicilians, over the fourth and third centuries, were becoming “a floating group with a developing sense of belonging together.”<sup>971</sup> They were not an *ethnos*, nor did they develop a *koinon*, but they were moving slowly toward cultural integration. In his careful examination of Sicilian civic and collective identifiers, Jonathan Prag concludes that by the fourth century Σικελός had lost its ethnic force and was used as a regional term. He concludes: “The epigraphic evidence...suggests that elements of a united Sicilian identity, originally geographically defined, were in existence before the Romans seized control of the island.”<sup>972</sup> Prag and Beck both caution against exalting the collective at the expense of the *polis*, which must always have retained a strong hold on its inhabitants. Indeed, collective and civic identity could complement each other. However, the aim of this dissertation has been to show how mobility weakened the boundaries of *poleis conceived as a closed society of descent-based citizens*. In fourth- and third-century Sicily, that sort of city could not last. Instead, the mobility of Sicilian populations created contingent civic communities that were linked to one another by individual itineraries, shared practices, and eventually a shared identity as Sicilians.

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<sup>969</sup> Scheidel (2004, p. 23).

<sup>970</sup> Polybius 27.1.3: τὸ δὲ κατὰ πόλιν διελεῖν τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς οἰκειότατον; cf. Müller (2014), documenting the religious festivals that nevertheless allowed Boiotian identity to remain intact.

<sup>971</sup> Beck (2014, p. 36), describing the Boiotians of the sixth and early fifth century BCE.

<sup>972</sup> Prag (2013, p. 52). He goes on to propose that “at the same time, the pre-existence of a Sicilian identity, and of a strong sense of Sicily as a place, undoubtedly played a key role in determining the way in which Rome came to treat the island in the third century...”

## Conclusion

People form groups in many ways. Political and social organizations both above and below the level of the city-state could be more or less relevant than the city-state, depending on context. This major contribution of identity scholarship to our understanding of the ancient Mediterranean suggests that we should be wary of imposing the relevance of the *polis* in situations where other ways of assembling a group may have been preferred. My project in this dissertation has been to approach group boundaries, whether city-based or otherwise, as flexible and subject to change when group members can move or be moved.

The fourth and third centuries were a turbulent period for the inhabitants of Sicily. Thousands were killed, enslaved, transferred, ejected, and thousands more responded to the economic imperative to follow the demand for employment. Undoubtedly some or even many individuals and families were able to remain relatively stable in their cities. Yet the hallmark of Sicilian life in these centuries was mobility on many scales, perhaps foreshadowing the massive displacement of eastern Mediterranean populations that marked the Hellenistic period. The fundamental axioms of my argument in this dissertation are that interaction between groups was a primary mechanism for social and cultural change; and that interaction in the ancient world occurred only when people were moving between those groups. Human mobility fosters interaction, interaction makes groups less foreign to each other, and the stronger the ties between groups, the weaker the boundaries between them. The more mobile populations become between geographical units like cities, the more the populations of any two cities come to resemble one another, and the less salient the distinction between geographical units ought to be.

We could divide the inhabitants of Sicily into groups in many ways, some of which may have been perceived and employed by Sicilians themselves. Our conceptual categories need not align with theirs. Today Sicily enjoys a strong insular identity defined both within and against the Italian state and it owes that unity to much more recent history; nevertheless my argument in this dissertation is that the mobility experienced by the fourth- and third-century inhabitants of the island contributed to a similar, if weaker, sense that they had something in common. By the end of the third century BCE one could refer without much ambiguity to “the Sicilians” in a way that would have been impossible in earlier centuries. The rise of this insular group identifier did not necessarily imply the fall of the *polis*, but it was built on relationships and connections that trespassed through and weakened closed civic communities.

I have tried to show that following mobile populations is important in order to understand life in Sicily, and the same could be true for the ancient Mediterranean in general. It would undoubtedly be extremely interesting to see the populations not just of Sicily but of the whole Mediterranean basin in motion over time, though that would be an immense project. Still, unless we are tracking the human constituents of societies, cities, and empires, our sense of history is likely to be too static.

Therefore, in the first part of the dissertation I attempted to present a comprehensive picture of Sicilian population mobility in its Mediterranean context. The goal of Chapter One was to impress on the reader a sense of the instability experienced by Sicilian populations over the fourth and third centuries. Even from a conventional narrative, it is clear that strategic decisions by Dionysius I, Timoleon, and the Romans

(as well as others) uprooted thousands of Sicilians of all backgrounds. Chapter Two made an argument for Sicilian distinctiveness in the magnitude of involuntary displacement, while also recognizing that mobility was governed by varying degrees of agency that can be obscured by an insistence on the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy.

In the second part I examined in greater detail some of the factors affecting mobility and belonging. The dispersal or dislocation of communities into diaspora or exile, as well as the eventual reassembly of communities, put thousands of Sicilians into circulation on the island under more and less traumatic circumstances. Many individuals from outside Sicily arrived as mercenaries and did not leave, blending into the cultural fabric of the island in one way or another. Mass enslavement was a powerful transporter of populations, and set many Sicilian communities into motion through the networks of the slave market. Finally, economic organization (rather than political factors) may help to explain the gradual development of Sicily's insular identity as boundaries between communities weakened.

In the final section, I argue that the interaction generated by human mobility led to a situation where members of different communities shared significant cultural practices, and that it is these intercommunity ties that generated a sense of belonging to an island-wide group. My catalog of these shared practices is hardly comprehensive but it is complete enough to show that by the late third century many Sicilian populations shared distinctive practices with other Sicilians. The connections may only be between two or three communities, but given the state of our historical and archaeological evidence, these shared practices were significant. Like other Mediterranean islands, Sicily came to be culturally unified; it was large enough that this process took relatively longer. It cannot be controversial to claim that human mobility was the motor that drove interaction, which in turn led slowly to integration.

There is much more work to do, and it is my hope that this dissertation has laid a foundation for further study. In particular, archaeological studies focused on either sets of sites or sets of material evidence could contribute to the wider picture of intercommunity interaction. More analytical studies of other Mediterranean regions could further refine our understanding of when and where populations were particularly mobile. Critical investigations of citizenship in contexts with good epigraphic documentation (besides Athens) could allow a more nuanced view of community and belonging than is currently popular. Finally, sustained comparison of Sicilian mobility and citizenship with that of the greater Macedonian and Roman worlds would cast light on both Eastern and Western Mediterranean studies.

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