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Another Thanksgiving Dinner: Language, Identity and History in the Age of Globalization

by

Michiko Uryu

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Claire Kramsch, Chair

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Professor Daniel O'Neill

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Another Thanksgiving Dinner: Language, Identity and History in the Age of Globalization

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By Michiko Uryu

Abstract

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Intercultural communication is often discussed with reference to the participants' culturally different knowledge, its impact upon their conversational styles and the accompanying effect on success or failure in communicating across cultures. Contemporary intercultural encounters, however, are more complicated and dynamic in nature since people live in multiple and shifting spaces with accompanying identities while national, cultural, and ideological boundaries are obscured due to the rapid globalization of economy, the accompanying global migration and the recent innovations in global information/communication technologies.

Re-conceptualizing the notion of context as conditions for discourse occurrences, this dissertation research aims to explore the social, cultural, ideological and historical dimensions of conversational discourse between participants with multiple and changing identities in an intercultural global context. An ethnographic research was conducted during 2006-2007 in an American non-profit organization founded 50 years ago to foster social and cultural exchanges among female foreign visitors at a prestigious American university in New England, USA. Building on Deborah Tannen's famous Thanksgiving dinner (Tannen 1983), a 30 minute conversation among a Russian, a German and two Japanese speakers, who participated in the Thanksgiving Program, was tape-recorded and analyzed together with playback interviews and participants' journals. The study disclosed that participants not only brought ideological and historical elements in the given intercultural communicative context but also started viewing themselves in the mirror of the "Other" and ultimately constructed their "Self" in "Other" with reference to their cultural memories of WWII and their postwar histories. The following contrastive study of three German and three Japanese subjects' journals and the transcriptions of their interviews with the researcher further confirmed history's impacts upon intercultural communication research.

The result shows the benefits of triangulating the relationship between Japan and Germany with the U.S. from inclusion of a third participant and/or a third perspective in the studied context. Accordingly, it suggests the need for a post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis in our globalized world (Blommaert 2005). Conversational style in intercultural encounters needs to be researched from an ecological perspective that takes into account the ideological and historical dimensions of speaking subjects.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Overview of the Research Site – University Community, History and Discourse

Newtown is a beautiful city located in the New England region of the U.S., whose historical, traditional, cultural and religious connections to Europe date to the colonial era. It is also internationally well known as the home of East Coast University, one of the oldest and most prestigious American universities. The institution is respected for its tradition of attracting and producing numerous figures of state and intellectual authorities, including future and current American presidents, foreign heads of state and preeminent scholars. The university's reputable name attracts socially and culturally privileged people from both inside and outside of the U.S.; thus, the university community traditionally has a large foreign population of scholars, researchers, and students as well as their families.

In order to support these international visitors, the university, like many other prestigious American universities, has a number of organizations aimed at assisting them in their social and cultural adjustment to life in the U.S. The Office for International Students and Scholars, for instance, offers various cultural resources and social activities such as English conversation classes, language exchange programs, social gatherings for international spouses and partners, and so forth. These programs not only serve to help foreigners improve their English language skills, but also provide them with a social setting in which to meet other members of the university community and share information with one another. The city of Newtown similarly offers many social and cultural activities that give foreign visitors opportunities to participate in and integrate into the local community. Both university and local communities openly welcome these international visitors and celebrate their ethnic diversity, in the hope that they will enjoy their stay at the university.

The research site, “Organization for World’s Women” (OWW), is one of those aforementioned non-profit organizations, which is specifically aimed at assist female internationals’ “orientation and adjustment to the new community”¹. It is composed of welcoming, hospitable and supportive volunteers, both American and foreign, who “not only meet with new members every week to become better acquainted, but also are available at other times to help solve the problems of daily living in a foreign country.” In order to “provide a social setting where new friends are made and new experiences are shared,²” the coordinators organize regular weekly meetings featuring programs with various international and cultural themes, accompanied by social activities. Foreign coordinators, for instance, often give presentations about their countries and lead craft activities to share their cultures with other members. Local coordinators also introduce American culture and tradition to the visitors whenever national holidays and celebrations approach. In addition to these cultural activities, they sometimes bring members to historical and cultural sites in the community on field trips, and invite them for tea parties at their (beach) houses and official residences at the university. By providing these services and activities, the coordinators hope that foreign members will be able

1 From the brochure of OWW (fall/ 07).

2 From the website of OWW (spring /08). Note that the website was updated in August, 2008.

to (1) socialize, make friends, and practice English; (2) learn about the town, state, and New England region; (3) learn about other nations and cultures; (4) learn about America and its traditions; and (5) feel at home. These coordinators are, needless to say, all well-intentioned, wishing only to help foreign visitors to the community while contributing to “fostering international and intercultural understanding.”³

Such a spirit of prevalent hospitality and charity on the part of local people toward foreigners is not new to the cultural tradition and history of both East Coast University and the larger Newtown community. It is crucial to note, for instance, that Newtown was originally established as a theological community by English Puritans in early European settlement in the 16th century, and Puritan religious Orthodoxy has been embedded in local people’s social practices as a cultural phenomenon. It is therefore not surprising that the university, as a local higher institution, was essentially influenced by the community’s particular religious disposition, and has traditionally offered various social and religious activities to promote solidarity among members of the community and displays of charity in cooperation with other locals.

This charitable spirit was extended to international visitors to the university community during the modern era, especially after WWII, when the economic and cultural supremacy of the U.S. attracted intellectuals and students from all over the world. Although the university had originally demonstrated a bias toward upper-class, white Christians, and was considered as a social elitist institution in the U.S., it began to invite and accept international students and scholars as a part of its population, just like other famous American universities, due to these postwar academic trends (Bergharn 1995, 2001; Junker, 2004). Such demographic changes made local people more conscious of the new postwar world order and America’s leadership role in the Western world, as they hosted those foreigners.

As many historians note, the postwar era was indeed an age of American dominance, especially in the Western capitalist world. It was during this time that many intellectuals visited the U.S. to learn about America’s advanced economic system, vast scientific knowledge and advanced technology. In addition, social elites of other Western nations wished to be connected to American elites, given the political, economic, and strategic hegemony of the U.S. among the Western bloc. In this light, it is understandable that those Americans living in the communities of prestigious American universities, especially among the upper-middle class, would be willing to assist international visitors and teach them about American tradition and culture, which they believe lies at the root of America’s unprecedented prosperity during and after WWII.

Such religious and cultural factors in the community and U.S. postwar history in general are, needless to say, reflected in the prevalent characteristics of non-profit organizations. Not surprisingly, the site where the present research was conducted, OWW, was once closely related to both the university and Christianity, although no longer. Its supporting organization, International Association of Newtown (IAN), was originally founded in 1949 by the university’s Christian Association, primarily to assist foreign students and scholars affiliated with East Coast University and their families. In the mid-1950s, the organization became independent from the university, partnering with local organizations such as the Rotary Club. Concomitantly, it

³ OWW is financially sponsored by a local grant-giving organization, International Association of Newtown, which supports local projects that foster international and intercultural understanding.

launched its Hospitality Program, which later became the International Community Friendship Program that sponsored the International House as a residence, and offered host family programs to foreign visitors at the university. It also has supported cultural and social activities for foreigners, such as OWW and regular classes in English as a second language, since its advent. Although the original body of the organization dissolved in 2006 due to financial reasons, it was reorganized as a grant giving organization, whose mission continues to be on “supporting and strengthening mutual understanding between the people of the local community and the rest of the world.”⁴

The history of IAN and OWW above suggests the following points to bear in mind. First, IAN was essentially founded as a Christian association designed to provide a location for religious practices. Second, IAN and OWW were both launched by local residents in order to respond and adjust to the changing postwar world order and accompanying new role of the U.S. In other words, IAN and OWW were both established under the postwar power structure and its accompanying discourse, which associated traditional Christian charity with a larger responsibility of hospitality on the part of the new postwar leader. More importantly, this charity and hospitality inevitably projected accompanying American ideologies, with the tacit implication that there were power differentials between Americans and other foreigners: the former was expected to teach its “advanced” knowledge unidirectionally to the latter.

This established international order and discourse, however, have changed drastically following the end of the 20th century. At the end of the Cold War, with the ostensible victory of Western liberal democracy over radical socialism and communism, people viewed the world as a unipolar place, in which the U.S. was the sole superpower. But, as Huntington (1996) and others keenly predicted, the world soon became multipolar with the ascendancy of the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and Asia’s ascending economic power on the other. This tendency has accelerated since, with the subsequent rise of Russia, India, South American and Middle Eastern countries, and so forth. More importantly, people began to change their worldview in order to adjust to these transformations. They began to recognize, for instance, that America’s postwar hegemony and the Pax Americana were no longer valid. Consequently, voices were raised against the U.S. suggesting that America need to play a different role in world politics and change the prevailing discourse.

Without exception, these changes have irrevocably affected foreigners’ views of the U.S., and by implication, their everyday communicative practices. Like many intellectuals, the wives of international visitors to East Coast University and Newtown are sophisticated enough to realize that the prevalent postwar discourse observed in OWW is outdated. Some keenly notice it to be a production of Cold War ideology, which had been discursively constructed partly by Americans, for Americans. While local Americans may take for granted the postwar sense of charity and hospitality mentioned earlier, some foreign visitors find it difficult to automatically accept the discourse and the accompanying power differentials between locals and foreigners at these international gatherings. On this account, there is an undeniable gap between the local coordinators and international visitors in their understanding of, and expectations for international and intercultural encounters in this setting.

4 From the website of the organization (09/08).

In observing the differences between the two parties in the research study, however, I do not intend to imply that the postwar ethos of charity and hospitality is necessarily ill-intended or negative. Rather, I am interested in discerning how and to what extent the prevalent postwar discourse as a legacy of a particular time period impact upon intercultural communications taking place in the present time when the 20th century's ideology of the Pax Americana is severely put into question. This inquiry is intriguing for those who wonder how foreigners now conceive the postwar history such as American hegemony and accompanying ideology of the Pax Americana, both of which controlled the Western world for the last six decades. These questions are timely because the world order has been drastically altered since the end of the Cold War and, as many scholars claim, the world is no longer dominated by a single or even dual set of powers, ideologies, and worldviews. Instead, the world is now a multipolar society, where many people are aware not only of ethnic, cultural, traditional, and religious diversity, but also of multiple and conflicting powers, ideologies and worldviews.

Taking into account the fact that we have now entered a new age, I believe it to be relevant to study intercultural communication in the OWW context for the following reasons. First of all, the study will provide documentation of intercultural communication taking place at the present time, where ideological frames have been removed and people of different backgrounds can easily encounter with one another. That is, it will inform us in detail of what socially, culturally and ideologically different knowledge and worldviews those foreigners bring to the conversation in the current transitional era. Second, the study will indicate how these foreign participants come into conflict and manage any such "differences" in an intercultural communicative context. Finally, the study will further document and analyze what emerges from these conflicts, and more generally, their management of socially, culturally and ideologically "different" knowledge and worldviews through everyday communicative practices. In other words, it is my intention to discern what ideologies are developed by these foreign visitors as they deliberately practice their identities in the given context through their contacts with others. By documenting how these foreigners attempt to "transit" from an older global era to the current one while living in the U.S., I hope to illustrate what reality foreign visitors have constructed in this age of globalization, in which the world consists of diverse elements that continue to dynamically interact with and modify one another while evolving in unpredictable ways.

Preliminary Observation of the Research Site

With all of these goals in mind, I began to attend and observe OWW meetings as a potential research site in the spring of 2005. I preferred OWW for the following two reasons. First, I was interested in studying the U.S. in an attractive context that would reflect its progressive and cosmopolitan characteristics. As is well known, the U.S. has historically remained open to immigration, and adjusts well to ethnic and cultural diversity. In this regard, it is considered to be more diverse and dynamic than other nations, and could be said to directly reflect the modern trend of globalization, and hence is. Accordingly, as a Japanese researcher from a less ethnically and culturally diverse society, I was hoping to observe how intercultural communication takes place in such a modern and cosmopolitan context, where people with "different" backgrounds are naturally and generously accepted.

Secondly, I was searching for a relatively ordinary social setting, in which interlocutors' communicative practices would be less confined by power differentials and limited language skills. Unlike classroom or corporation settings, OWW seemed a desirable place since people share similar social backgrounds, and therefore could easily and freely converse with one another with fewer social constraints. Moreover, most members' language skills are adequate for expressing their thoughts. Having considering these factors, I naturally assumed that this choice of research site would provide optimistic answers to my inquiries above. I naïvely expected to be impressed by how smoothly and tactfully those foreign visitors managed various differences. Ultimately, by using this venue, I expected some sort of positive outcome.

Soon after beginning to participate in OWW weekly meetings, however, I became aware of several issues. First, OWW is an international gathering that invites any female in the community without discrimination. Nevertheless, most members are German and Japanese, with a smaller cohort representing other countries, especially those in Western Europe and economically developed nations of South America and Asia. Although there are a few people from Eastern Europe and Russia, they generally disappear after participating once or twice. Second, there seems to be a divide between local coordinators and foreign visitors, since they do not frequently interact with one another. Third, within that divide there is yet another separation between Japanese on the one hand, and Germans and Caucasians on the other. They are most likely to sit at separate tables and speak in their own language to each other. Finally, and most importantly, I observed frequent tension and conflict in foreign members' reactions to certain programs. In particular, some members tended to react negatively to and severely criticize those American programs offered by the local coordinators, but not the programs of other foreign coordinators. During and after these programs they would often make some disturbed, annoyed, and even contemptuous statement to other internationals. These negative reactions eventually became quite visible in both the subjects' journals, and later, interviews with the researcher once they felt comfortable sharing their thoughts and feelings with me.

I found this latter phenomenon quite perplexing, since I had initially had very favorable expectations for intercultural communication in that "modern and cosmopolitan" context. It seemed to me that generally speaking, both foreign participants and coordinators were quite open-minded when it came to the "different cultures" introduced by foreign coordinators. Oddly, however, some participants do not necessarily show the same kind of generosity or enthusiasm towards American culture and traditions, despite having come to the meetings in part to learn about the host country. After witnessing foreign participant' ambivalent reactions exclusively towards the American programs, I began to realize that "cultural difference" may not the primary contextual factor causing these tensions and conflicts. Instead, there may be other factors significantly affecting these foreigners' worldviews and accompanying communicative practices, while eliciting their ambivalent feelings toward Americans.

Further observation, close analyses of the subjects' journals, and interviews eventually confirmed my intuitions. I could discern the presence of "history" behind these subjects' communicative practices. More specifically, it seems to be modern history — especially WWII and the postwar period — that crucially affects these subjects' views of American people, culture and society. This should not be surprising since, as many historians agree, those two periods not only transformed the 20th century world order, but also impacted the social and ideological

spheres of those nations involved with WWII and the Cold War that followed. Given that the WWII and postwar legacies serve as social and ideological foundations for the modern global context, it is fair to assume that those subjects' distinct sets of knowledge and worldviews have partly been established by their cultural memories of WWII history, and constructed under the postwar power structure and accompanying discourse. Therefore, I was strongly convinced of the necessity for focusing on not only the cultural, but also the historical dimension of intercultural communication as an essential part of the studied context.

Following this strategy, the study first must de-contextualize the university and relevant local community, which includes OWW. In doing so, they should not be viewed simply as a "modern and cosmopolitan" place where people from various countries and cultural backgrounds come together, carrying shared historical narratives and views of the 20th century similarly to one another. Instead, each community should be considered a highly ideological and historical place, which was established under the postwar power structure in order to facilitate the expression of a Cold War ideology based on the Pax Americana. Accordingly, the study will specifically focus on subjects of two nationalities, German and Japanese, whose relationships to postwar American ideology are quite ambivalent. As the study will indicate, it is not accidental that these two countries comprise the majority of the seats at this international gathering offered by upper-middle class Americans, while also holding ambivalent views regarding American people, culture and society due to their respective countries' modern histories.

In sum, this study will attempt to reveal the way in which the historical component of one's identity can significantly affect his/ her worldview and accompanying communicative practices, alternately reinforcing and resisting the dominant postwar power structure and discourse. By closely examining the essential relationship of these subjects' identities to modern history, the study intends to show how those embedded historical factors echo to other voices while dynamically interacting with each other. It also attempts to discern what ideologies emerge, now that people are beginning to feel more emancipated from the traditional power structure and dominant ideologies, and are searching for a new narrative for the reality and new identity under the post-Cold War new world order. Finally, having illustrating how history often irrupts intercultural communication and highlights problematic issues, the study will raise critical questions about the way in which intercultural communication research is conducted with reference to the contemporary global context, and help in the search for a more valid model to accommodate the changing dynamics of this new era.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, and Research Questions

Intercultural Communication – Its History and Main Scope

According to Kramsch (1998), the term “intercultural communication” is defined as the following:

The term ‘cross-cultural’ or intercultural refers to the meeting of two cultures or two languages across the political boundaries of nation-states. They are predicated on the equivalence of one nation-one culture-one language, and on the expectation that a ‘culture shock’ may take place upon crossing national boundaries. In foreign language teaching a cross-cultural approach seeks ways to understand the Other on the other side of the border by learning his / her national language. The term intercultural may also refer to communication between people from different ethnic, social, gendered cultures within the boundaries of the same national language. Both terms are used to characterize communication, say, between Chinese- Americans and African-Americans, between working-class and upper-class people, between gays and heterosexuals, between men and women. Intercultural communication refers to the dialogue between minority cultures and dominant cultures, and are associated with issues of bilingualism and biculturalism (Kramsch, 1998, p.81-82).

As stated above, the field of intercultural communication primarily concerns the relationship between “communication” and the broadly defined term “culture,”⁵ and hence is often studied as an interdisciplinary field. It has been studied in the context of these relatively unrelated fields because of its historical background. Kramsch (2001) explains that the field of intercultural communication originally “grew out of the practical, competitive needs of post-Second World War American international diplomacy and business” (p.202), and thus in the U.S. has mostly been studied in fields of behavioral science such as linguistics, psychology and communication. By contrast, in Europe, intercultural communication was “a direct outcome of the social political upheavals created by the large scale immigrations into the industrialized countries” (p.202), and hence has been more related to fields such as anthropology, sociology and so on. Since this field has a highly diverse and complex background whose landscape has been changing,⁶ I shall limit the focus of my study of intercultural communication primarily to the area relevant to linguistics, due to my scholarly stance and training as an applied linguist. The following chapter and data analysis will accordingly concern the linguistic dimension of intercultural communication. With an emphasis on literatures of intercultural communication between Westerners (mostly Western Europeans and Americans, for historical and institutional reasons) and Asians (mostly East Asians, Indians, and other natives) as a starting point of this chapter, I will discuss what has been

5 Although, the term “culture” is somewhat nebulous, in the context of the present study, it is defined by Edgar & Sedgwick as the following: “It (culture) entails recognition that all human beings live in a world that is created by human beings, and in which they find meaning. Culture is the complex everyday world we all encounter and through which we all move. Culture begins at the point at which humans surpass whatever is simply given in their natural inheritance. The cultivation of the natural world, in agriculture and horticulture, is thus a fundamental element of a culture. As such, the two most important or general elements of culture may be the ability of human beings to construct and to build, and the ability to use language [understood most broadly, to embrace all forms of sign system].” (Edgar & Sedgwick, 2002 p.102).

6 See, for instance, Deardorff, 2009; Gudykunst, 2005; Gudykunst & Mody 2001, 2003; Holliday, 2004; Kiesling & Paulston, 2005; Kotthoff & Spencer – Oatey, 2007; Landis, Bennett & Bennett 2004 and many other.

studied already and what has not yet been targeted in the field, ultimately addressing certain issues that I would like to discern in my dissertation research.

The linguistic field relevant to intercultural communication was initially launched in the 1950s by Edward Hall, who worked for the U.S. State Department. His popular work studying cross-cultural issues between Americans and other ethnicities (Navaho, Japanese, etc.) are practical and cater to Foreign Service personnel who need to acquire intercultural communication skills. In *“The Silent Language”* (1973), Hall analyzed many aspects of non-verbal communication such as pitch, rhythm, intonation, kinesics, chronemics, and so forth, all of which essentially affect mutual understanding among people of different cultural backgrounds. In his next book, *“The Hidden Dimension”* (1990), he coined the word “proxemics,” examining various cultural concepts of space and how such differences influence practical situations such as personal business relations, cross-cultural exchange, etc. in modern society. In terms of intercultural communication between Asians (especially Japanese) and non-Asians (Americans, for instance), *“Beyond Culture”* (1976) is notable among Hall’s works. He introduced the concept of “context” in his comparison of Western (including both Western Europeans and Americans) culture to that of Asia, characterizing these two different types of society as either “a high context culture” or “a low context culture.”⁷ According to Hall, the former is dramatically represented by Japanese society, while the latter is typical of northern European societies. In analyzing the two types, Hall ultimately suggested that it is critical to examine such differences in culture, because these contextual factors significantly influence people’s communicative practices.

Parallel to the aforementioned work by Hall, linguists also began to explore the notion of context, primarily in terms of social and cultural aspects of both language and language use. The subsequent emergence and establishment of fields such as Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics are especially notable for indicating the academic trend since the end of the 1960s towards studying context as a part of the study of language. These two fields in fact largely share similar interests and goals; namely, to examine and discern what contextual factors affect an interlocutor’s utterances (and a writer’s written text), and how these utterances and text are affected, while influencing the way in which the listener (and the reader) understands and interprets the expression of the given texts. With respect to Interactional Sociolinguistics, its specific goal is to address and reveal the relationship between speech texts and the social world to which a speaker belongs. Among various ways of understanding the relationship between text and context, Gumperz’s notion of “contextualization” is especially prominent. According to Gumperz (1992), texts are “indexically” made to fit into a particular socio-cultural context by addressers, in order to further help addressees to properly understand the full meaning of the given text. He refers to such social and cultural elements that serve meta-communicative functions as “contextualization cues,” which in turn refer to “any verbal and nonverbal signs that help speakers to hint at, or clarify, and listeners to make such inference” (p.229). Since the interpretive process of the situated (or context-bound) utterance is highly reliant on the context, Gumperz argues that the addressee is required to pick up those contextualization cues designating both linguistic

7 More specifically, Hall states that a high context culture is the one in which much of communication is non-verbally understood because of the shared context. A low context culture, on the other hand, relies more on verbal communication due to less shared context.

(including prosodic)⁸ and paralinguistic signals⁹ for the situated understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of meaning.¹⁰

In light of such vital impact of social and cultural factors upon language use, it is not surprising that the notion of “contextualization” would inevitably address some issues belonging to the field of intercultural communication. Since interlocutors are most likely to have dissimilar socio-cultural knowledge accompanied by expectations of understanding each other in an intercultural communicative context, potential communication breakdowns are understood to attribute to “contextualization” of language use. Such problematizations of the intercultural communicative context were soon examined by researchers concerned with how culturally different ways of speaking affect or impair conversations among those with different cultural backgrounds. Gumperz (1992), for instance, studied how socio-culturally different expectations of participants impair the conversation between British and Indians in the job interview setting. Scollon and Scollon’s study (1990) also showed that culturally different ways of speaking not only impair conversation between Anglo-Americans (Canadians) and Athabaskans, but also reinforce negative stereotypes about each other. Focusing on a particular business context, Yamada (1997) studies how cultural factors embedded in each participant’s corporate culture cause miscommunication between Japanese and American businesspeople.

Like Interactional Sociolinguistics, Pragmatics impacted the field of intercultural communication as well. Although Pragmatics originally was launched as a part of Semantic Studies in order to reveal universal rules governing contextual influence upon textual meaning, the validity of such “universality” was soon called into question when applied to those pragmatic rules operated by people of different cultural backgrounds. Some contrastive studies comparing Anglos (usually Americans or British) and non- Anglos (most commonly, East Asians such as Japanese or Chinese), for instance, indicate that there is a cultural relativity in terms of showing one’s politeness to others in conversation. According to these studies, such a difference may derive either from a culturally constructed concept of one’s face (Gu, 1990; Mao, 1994; Matsumoto, 1988), or culturally diverse ways of discerning appropriate features of social interactions (Ide, et al., 1992). In addition to these studies of politeness strategies, Watanabe (1993) also indicates that there are culturally different features in terms of framing conversation between Japanese and Americans, such as opening and closing of the discussion, argumentation strategies, etc.¹¹

Influenced by Interactional Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics, Applied Linguistics also began to explore the field of intercultural communication. Applying Austin’s speech act theory (1962),¹² researchers of SLA (Second Language Acquisition) were especially interested in studying how

8 Also intonation, stress, pitch and register shift.

9 Paralinguistic signs include tempo, pausing, hesitation, conversational synchrony, including latching or overlapping of speaking turns and other tones of voice expressive cues. (Gumperz, 1992 p.231)

10 They include participants’ personal background knowledge, their attitudes toward each other, socio-cultural assumptions concerning roles and status, social values associated with various message components, and so on.

11 These studies related to Politeness strategies conducted by Asian scholars are notable as they began to object to the universality of pragmatic rules while starting to refer to “cultural relativity” as a central issue in the field of Semantics. These studies ultimately contributed to the establishment of the pragmatic field as a separate one from the semantic field.

12 When one says something, he/she is doing something. Interest in this type of act, speech act theory, was introduced by John Austin. In outlining his theory, Austin was resisting the view of language that help that all meaningful sentences or propositions which declare something are descriptions of states of affairs, and hence either true or false. In his own search for ways of coping with language as a form of action, Austin ultimately proposed an alternative view of utterances that they are all saying and doing at the same time, and thus, all sentences contain both constative and performative elements.

language learners' cultural knowledge affects their communicative behaviors in a target language and possibly causes communication breakdowns (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper, 1989; Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993; Wierzbicka, 1991; Wolfson & Judd, 1983).¹³ The study of such differences in expectations based on cultural knowledge is generally called "cross-cultural pragmatics" or "interlanguage pragmatics," the latter of which specifically focuses on "non-native speaker's use and acquisition of linguistic action patterns in a second language." It should be noted that comparisons of interactions for various speech acts (complimenting, thanking, apologizing) between native speakers (of a target language, usually English) and non-native speakers are usually assessed by the native speaker's pragmatic rules. Moreover, studied interlocutors are generally categorized only as language learners with a particular ethnic background, and hence, their interactions with native speakers of a target language are assessed only for purposes of discerning the relative similarities to and differences from native speakers' norms with respect to pragmatic comprehension, communicative effect of speech act, pragmatic transfer, etc (Firth & Wagner, 1997).¹⁴

The aforementioned studies that focused on the impact of (social and) cultural differences on intercultural communicative contexts have undoubtedly produced the critical body of literature in the field. The legacy of these studies has been to comprehensively document what social and cultural carriers participants bring to the conversation, and how they do so, while also discerning how they manage such differences in the interactional intercultural context. Yet, one needs to bear in mind that the strength of these studies is quite limited in the contemporary study of language and culture, since they mostly focus on understanding textual meanings with reference only to the given context on the interactional level. In other words, these studies account only for particular social and cultural dispositions which a speaker is habituated to operating in conversing with others, at the same time being inclined to view a speaker's social or cultural identity only in the static manner. The implications of such a limitation is quite crucial if one takes into account social and cultural theories suggesting that one's identity in the late modern phase is intricate, as he/she lives in multiple social, cultural and ideological discourse systems (Gee, 1990, 1992). Accordingly, there is a greater need for alternative analytical approaches to the fields of both Linguistics and intercultural communication,¹⁵ which would allow for the connecting of a text on the interactional level to social, cultural and ideological discourse systems, with reference to one's multiple identities.

In responding to such a need for an alternative theory, Scollon and Scollon's (2001) work is notable for taking a speaker's attribution to multiple discourse systems into consideration to offer

13 As for more advanced work of cross-cultural pragmatics, see Gardner & Wagner (2004), Kasper (2001, 2006) Kasper & Rose (2005), Markee (2000) and others.

14 This Firth & Wagner's article is particularly important in the field of Applied Linguistics because the authors' criticism regarding these earlier studies of cross-cultural pragmatics, and the accompanying controversy over the native speaking researcher's view of non-native speakers as only a language learner, ultimately allowed some researchers to look for an alternative view of language learners as social subjects with multiple and changing identities. In addition, they began consider the possibility that L2 learning significantly affects one's construction of identities, while their emerging identities also change the existing discourse. In this light, Firth & Wagner's study allowed researchers in the field to open new discussion about the social and ideological aspects of L2 learning in relation to the L2 learner's multi-lingual subjectivities. As for other pioneers, also see McGoarty 1999, Norton 2000, Pavlenko & Lantolf, 2000 and many others as critical works for the fields of SLA and Applied Linguistics. Also see new trends, such as the Complexity theory (Larsen-Freeman 2008) and the ecological perspective (Kramsch 2002), which will be discussed later in this paper.

15 There are more advanced versions of studies relevant to Interactional Sociolinguistics, Pragmatics and Applied Linguistics, which not only take into account social and ideological dimensions in understanding text and context, but significantly contribute to fields currently relevant to intercultural communication. See, for instance, Coupland & Jaworski (1997), Jaworski (1994, 1995 & 2000), Roberts & Sarangi (1993), Sarangi (1994, 1996), Sarangi & Roberts (2002), Thurlow (2002) and many others in addition to those in footnotes [7] and [8].

a new analytical approach to their theoretical framework. Their book, “*Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach*,” targets those professional communicators across discourse systems; especially Asians (East Asians) and Westerners (North Americans). The authors first presented the major tenets of discourse analysis on the interactional level such as speech acts, politeness phenomena, face-work, inferences, frames, turn-taking, etc. Then, they tried to connect these analyses to a larger discourse level. Here, they state that their broader concept of discourse systems is based on the following four elements: forms of discourse,¹⁶ socialization,¹⁷ ideology,¹⁸ and face-system.¹⁹ This approach appears to be quite successful and useful in understanding how one’s everyday communicative practices on the interactional level are related to a larger social, cultural and ideological level of discourse.

Yet, Scollon and Scollon’s theoretical framework still carries potential danger. In providing examples of primary discourse systems, the authors characterized them as rather concrete and therefore generalized concepts – Utilitarian Discourse, Corporate Discourse, Gender Discourse, and so on – which ironically reflect their binary view of two parties having totally opposite natures (e.g. collectivism vs. individualism). Note that such an essentialized description of intercultural communication seems to be attributed to their ambiguous conceptualization of a form of power as the one creating reality in discourse. More specifically, their view²⁰ of “discourse” appears to adopt the Foucaultian perspective of discourse where the reality-creating power lies; thus, everyone is dominated by and subordinate to it. In their discussion, however, the authors explain very little regarding the issue of power and its significant role in discourse. Although their “discourse” involves various elements such as ideologies, socialization, and face-work, they only refer to the issue of power in terms of designating the power differential in social positions where people work on face-threatening acts.²¹ As a consequence, the authors ultimately failed to overcome the structuralist framework, since their theoretical framework did not effectively combine two different discursal levels properly. Ironically, as Kramersch points out, their “discourse about discourse system is itself a discourse system” (Kramersch, 2002 p.282). Here, the question is whether it is satisfying to always frame intercultural communication in the static manner. Kramersch further refers to this point as follows:

At the beginning of the twenty first century, the essentialization of national traits and cultural characteristics – i.e. the comparison of differences between one native and one foreign culture, seen as stable spaces on the map and permanent in time – seems too reductionist. Such a view of intercultural communication research doesn’t reflect the complexities of a post-colonial, global age in which people live in multiple, shifting spaces and partake of multiple identities often in conflict with one another, and where the possibility for one individual to better his or her chances of success are not as clear as was once believed.

(Kramersch, 2001, p.205)

16 Functions of language and non-verbal communication

17 Primary and secondary, education, enculturation, acculturation

18 History, Belief, values and religion

19 Social organization, kinship, the concept of self, in-group and out-group relationships, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

20 Scollon and Scollon explain three concepts of discourse. Yet, the most important one in their theoretical framework is the broadest concept of discourse. They explain it as follows: (such) broad systems of discourse form a kind of self-contained system of communication with a shared language or jargon, with particular ways in which people learn what they need to know to become members, with a particular ideological position, and with quite specific forms of interpersonal relationships among members of these groups.

21 Such a notion of power is explained by Brown and Levinson’s (1978 and also 1987) theories in the politeness strategies.

As Scollon and Scollon's framework suggests, focusing on a particular discourse system and one's socio-cultural identity for further contrastive study may be one way to understand a particular aspect of intercultural communication. Yet, the field of intercultural communication needs an alternative way to go beyond the constraint of traditional views of nation, culture, language and identities since, in the age of globalization, individuals usually live in multiple and shifting spaces with accompanying identities. Moreover, national, cultural, and ideological boundaries become obscure due to the rapid economic globalization, accompanying global migration, and recent innovations in global information/communication technologies. In light of such a complicated and dynamic nature of contemporary intercultural encounters, what might be lacking in Scollon and Scollon's theoretical framework²² is critical examinations not only of the relationship between ideology and power in discourse, but also the changing nature of socio-cultural factors and their impacts upon one's multiple identities in the global context.

In the following section, therefore, I would like to address what elements need to be considered in the theoretical framework for my study, taking into account the aforementioned constraints of traditional intercultural communication research. To begin with, I shall first discuss how an analysis of ideology and power in relation to one's identities (or subjectivities) necessitates an examination of the study of language with reference to Fairclough's application of social theories to the field of linguistics; namely, Critical Discourse Analysis. While appropriating his model, however, I will also discuss its theoretical conflict with the contemporary post-structuralist theories, that is, the aforementioned "sense" of dynamism. Following these discussions, I would like to ultimately offer an alternative theoretical framework that not only aims to overcome the static notion of the relationship between text and context, but also to capture the dynamic phenomenon emerging in contemporary intercultural encounters.

Critical Discourse Analysis and the Poststructuralist Theories – Language, Power and Identity

In the course of the rise of social and cultural studies, the relationship between text and context drastically changed in the study of language, as the issues of power and ideology began to be taken into account in understanding texts. Norman Fairclough at the University of Lancaster is one of the leading theorists who combined social and cultural theories with the field of linguistics. In the 1980s, he primarily pooled the Foucaultian notion of discourse and power²³ and Bourdieu's theory²⁴ of habitus and symbolic capital, and further theorized how power comes

22 Since 2001, however, Scollon and Scollon had continued to develop their analytical approaches and theories in a way that brought them closer to the post-structuralist perspectives. See "*Discourse in Place: Language in a Material World*" (2003) and "*Nexus Analysis: Discourse and the Emerging Internet*" (2004).

23 The term "power" has a variety of meanings. Traditionally, power is understood as the exercise of force or control over individuals or particular social groups by other individuals or groups. Within this view power was often considered as something to exercise, which is connected to an authority to possess (e.g. possession of power by a monarch). In this sense, power is inevitably something extrinsic to the constitution of both individuals and society. Within the post structuralist view, however, power and authority are not necessarily synonymous. That is to say, power does not really mean something that is exercised over individuals or groups. Instead, the French Philosopher (and also historian) Foucault redefines power as being constitutive (existing) of the relations existing between groups as well as being constitutive of individuals or group identity themselves. Such a notion of "power" as an existence of social relations between groups and individuals is usually mediated by various social practices and institutions (e.g. those of education, politics, religion, law and so forth). What important here is that, on Foucault's view, language plays a significant role in expressing power, since forms of discourse (i.e. ways of speaking about the world of social experience) both constitute and situate those various social practices and institutions. In other words, language functions as a form of social practice, which mediates power through an institution.

24 Bourdieu explains the term, "linguistic capital" as "the capacity to produce expressions a propos, for a particular market" (2001: 18). In his economic metaphor, Bourdieu considers the social context as a field (market), which is "structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources or capitals" (14: Ibid.). In such a field, he considers that

into play in discourses through social institutions and one's socio-cultural practices.²⁵ According to Fairclough, texts produced on the interactional level are a part of a larger discourse system, which is highly ideologized to support the existing power structure and system in a particular society. Therefore, whenever one speaks, he/she inevitably reinforces the existing social structure by reproducing its supporting ideology without realizing it. In other words, on Fairclough's view a speaker is not the one depicted by Saussure (1983), who encodes and decodes texts when communicating with others, but a social actor, whose body is subjugated to the existing social system while his/her perceptions of the world are essentially regulated, controlled and normalized through technologies, knowledge and discourse, all of which further function to support the interest of the dominant group as ideology. Accordingly, people's conversations, according to Fairclough, are not only exchange of utterances and meanings but also exchange of capital and exploitation from differences in the social system (or distinction in Bourdieu's term). In this light, Fairclough suggests that what appears to be simply "differences" on the surface of the given text on the interactional level may actually be "deficiencies" on a larger discursive level.

Fairclough's theory in "*Language and Power*" (1989), needless to say, significantly impacted upon the field of linguistics which later developed as a new field, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The contribution of CDA was establishment of a theoretical framework that clearly explains how the micro structure of conversation is essentially related to the macro structure of social institutions and societies. Consequently, CDA's application of Marxist (and also Gramscian) views of producing and understanding text and talk as social practices allows those practitioners to focus on social, political and ideological dimensions of language and language use. As many of the CDA studies indicate, those theories especially shed light on various issues relevant to social inequality and power that were observed in late modern society,

people constantly exchange different kinds of capital and compete with each other through their social actions. Language, on this view, is considered as one of those resources (capitals) with which people play their social roles in socially structured situations (fields) as social practices. Note that in Bourdieu's theory, the notion of capital is often connected with power and becomes symbolic capital, which endows an authority (the legitimacy of exert power) to individuals. According to Bourdieu, more specifically, it is the institution which empowers capital with symbolic value. When one gains symbolic capital, he is therefore entitled to carry out the act that his/her utterance claims to perform. It should be noted that Bourdieu's view of the relation between symbolic (usually cultural, especially linguistic) capital and institutions accords partly with Austin's notion of felicity conditions as conventional procedures in terms of performativity. As an illustration, policemen can, for instance, use a number of imperatives, direct use of interrogative and overwhelming control over turn taking when they examine a witness (Also see Fairclough 1989) only because he/she is endowed with power from the institution. On Bourdieu's view, certain discourse types, which derive from the distinct nature of linguistic forms as linguistic capital, are profoundly related to the interest of particular groups of people through institutions, and thus gain symbolic power. In other words, such beliefs support the institution to determine what kind of capital should be valued as symbolic. Here, those coherent sets of belief, which specifically derive from interests of particular groups of people, are termed as ideology. Moreover, for any society, the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas. In order to rule ideas, language is hence used through discursive discourse practices, which embed a particular ideology as the interest of a particular group of people in the society.

²⁵ According to Fairclough, discursive discourse practices first mediate such ideology with particular linguistic forms, and then naturalize those particular beliefs and ways of seeing the world as commonsense. Fairclough specifically discusses the process of naturalization by explaining the relationship between discourse, commonsense, and ideology. He claims that ideologies are embedded in features of discourse that are taken for granted as a matter of commonsense. Although the discursive commonsense is ideological and contributes to sustaining unequal power, ideology does not necessarily equal commonsense. This is so because, as Fairclough argues, there is always some degree of ideological diversity; hence, certain ideologies struggle amongst each other to gain the dominant status (symbolic power), taking the linguistic form in social institutions. As the result of competition, the dominance relationship among discourses with diverse ideologies is determined. More importantly, once a certain discourse becomes the dominant one, it is subject to a process of naturalization. In that process, Fairclough explains, the dominant discourse subjugates an institution and suppresses or contains the dominant types so that it ceases to be seen as arbitrary, but instead as natural and legitimate. That is to say, it simply appears to be the way of conducting oneself. When ideology becomes commonsense, it is therefore not perceived as an ideology. In this light, ideology is considered to be most effective only when it is disguised. Accordingly, it is reasonable to ultimately assume that political interests of a particular group of people often determine our understanding and knowledge of the world. Moreover, certain key discourse types are embodiments of ideological assumptions, and serve to sustain and legitimize existing relations of power. Likewise, both the structured order of discourse and the ideologies that they embody are determined by the relationship between power institutions and their society as a whole. What is important here is that power relations are constructed through social struggle when social grouping with different interests engage with each other. People with power in institutions not only legitimize existing power relations, but also reproduce and naturalize the unequal social relationship through discourse.

such as social classism and capitalism (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, Fairclough, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, Wodak, 1997a), feminism (Wodak, 1997b), racism (Van Dijk, 1987, 1991, 1993; Wodak & Reisigl 1999), and so forth. By attempting to reveal how particular ideology is institutionalized in one's speech while discerning how power comes into play in one's everyday communicative practices, CDA ultimately changed both the theoretical frameworks and analytical approaches in understanding texts.

Having respectively acknowledged Fairclough's theory and the beneficial aspects of CDA above, one nevertheless needs to bear in mind some severe criticisms that have been directed towards their view of the relationship between text and context. In his book, "*Discourse*," Blommaert (2005) thoroughly summarizes these criticisms raised by other theorists and practitioners such as Widdowson (1995, 1996, & 1998), Schegloff (1997), Slembrouck (2001) and others. According to Blommaert, one major problem that he and others find is that those CDA studies are generally "diagnostic" rather than "holistic." More specifically, as Blommaert emphasizes, the CDA analyses primarily focus both on linguistic data as a visible form of one's knowledge and social practices, and on its relationship with the social world in which these practitioners "believe" as a critical reference of "context." Blommaert considers such visibility and availability of text and background knowledge to be problematic, since studies are only based on visible linguistic data and available knowledge of the world, both of which are also a part of a larger discourse to which these researchers belong. For him, the very absence of discourse, in contrast, often tells us "an enormous amount about the conditions under which discourses are being produced (by who? when? for what purpose?) and circulated (who has access to them and who doesn't)" (p.35). As one might have already noticed, this criticism precisely echoes Kramsch's previous critique of Scollon and Scollon's theoretical framework, again, that their "discourse about discourse system is itself a discourse system." Although CDA pays a high price for "critical awareness," it is ironic that "the linguistic bias" of CDA disguises some essential components which critically comprise the existing discourse.

Aside from "the linguistic bias" of CDA, there is another critical issue relevant to these practitioners' "diagnostic" inclinations in viewing discourse. According to Blommaert, CDA gives a limited account of an interlocutor's performativity in discourse, and hence, tends to neglect the accompanying dynamics and changes in discourse. This criticism echoes with newly emerging post-structuralist theories in Applied Linguistics, such as the Complexity theory (Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008) and the Ecological system theory (Kramsch, 2002). Because these post-structuralist theories not only advocate a more dynamic and comprehensive view of the relationship between text and context, but ultimately offer an alternative approach to capturing the "holistic" account of discourse, now I would like to refer to their view of an interlocutor's multiple identities and performativity in discourse, and the latter's impact upon text and context.

Firstly, it is important to recall that CDA practitioners generally conceptualize an interlocutor as a rather concrete account of an "ideologized" social subject, whose social or cultural identities are usually subjugated to a dominant group's ideology and hence confined to

the existing discourse system.²⁶ However, some post-structural theorists consider such a view to be problematic, since it neglects not only that one has multiple identities, but also that these identities are fluid and constantly changing their states in a complex manner as he/she consistently interacts with various forms of “inorganic, organic, biological, psychological, or social” (Larsen-Freeman, 2002, p.39) systems in everyday life. In order to better understand such a flexible account of a speaking subject’s multiple identities and the accompanying communicative practices, consider the following post-structuralist view of one’s identities as multiple subject positions in performing the ideologized body with his/her agency in the contingent context.

Both Althusser (1970) and Laclau (1977, 1985, 1990, 1994, 1996), for instance, consider that there are no “essential or permanent” identities, but that these are only subject positions instead. More specifically, these positions begin with an empty condition, although they are eventually “filled up, or made to mean, as they are ideologized” (Schirato & Yell, 2000, p.83). Because one’s identities remain fluid and flexible due to multiple subject positions with congruence to the given context, Althusser and Laclau both consider that one’s identities are ultimately “always undergoing changes of meaning; and able to carry a variety of meanings” in principle (Schirato & Yell, 2000, p.83).

Similarly to Althusser and Laclau, Butler (1997) also maintains that a subject’s body is produced as meaningful, regulated, normalized and evaluated by particular ideologies through everyday social and cultural practices. On her view, one’s identities (subjectivities) are therefore his/her practices and performances of the ideologized body when he/she responds to various discourses in a contingent context. Like Althusser and Laclau, Butler also claims that one’s identities are flexible in discourse, as one has his/her will and agency to define oneself through speech by capturing a moment between an illocutionary force and a perlocutionary effect. From the poststructuralist perspectives, in short, a social subject not only reproduces the existing ideologies by repeatedly practicing assigned identities, but also re-signifies different meanings through speech and re-defines both the game and the field that he/she plays, by “crossing” his/her multiple identities with different linguistic resources (Rampton, 1995).

In light of such a dynamic view of the relationship between text and context, it would seem beneficial to apply the poststructuralist theories to CDA’s theoretical framework when studying intercultural communication. This is the case because they not only provide us with our critical reference of the contemporary world in relation to language and language use, but also allow us to examine multiple interactions among a myriad of factors in order to understand how they form discourse dynamism through interlocutors’ social positioning. The poststructuralist theories, accordingly, help us to take a holistic view in understanding the changing nature of function and meaning of one’s communicative practices in discourse, on both interactional and larger social levels in the contemporary world. Such a holistic account of discourse, needless to say, is significant to better understanding intercultural communication in the age of globalization, in which people can borderlessly encounter and exchange various cultural, social and ideological knowledge while co-constructing a new reality of the world through their discursive practices.

26 Although Fairclough did not originally neglect the active and thus creative aspect of a social subject (agent), such ability is often referenced by CDA practitioners to further confirm their view of the social world as a critical reference of the given context. (See p.39 and Chapter 7 in Fairclough’s “Language and Power.”)

In the following part, I would like to address both research questions and the theoretical framework. By combining various theories relevant to intercultural communication (including discourse analysis) that I have reviewed above, I search for an alternative approach to fully understanding my participants' communicative practices, while better capturing the dynamics taking place at the studied research site. As indicated above, the following theoretical framework of my study essentially adopts Fairclough's notion of the double layered context with the interactional and larger discursive levels. In understanding the context on the interactional level, analytical approaches will be highly reliant upon Sociolinguistic theories – especially those about social positioning with reference to one's identities – although they will be re-framed into the poststructuralist perspectives. Regarding the context on the larger discursive level, I will again refer to CDA's analytical approaches with reference to social and cultural theories. This level of analysis may primarily address the deterministic aspect of one's communicative practices, while showing the changing aspect of both text and context as well. Furthermore, Fairclough's theoretical framework will still need to be revised due to the complexity of the social-cultural context, which essentially consists of both synchronic and diachronic aspects. As we shall see later, close examinations of the diachronic aspect of the social, cultural and ideological context will significantly affect the following analysis of my data.

Theoretical Framework

Text and Context on the Interactional Level – Social and Cultural Identity and Positioning

In studying discourse in an intercultural communicative context, the most visible phenomenon that one can initially observe is the relationship between a text and the surface layer of a context; namely, the interactional level of the context. As previously noted, both Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics contributed to a considerable degree of the theoretical body of knowledge regarding what social and cultural factors affect one's utterances, and how, in everyday interactions. These theoretical and analytical approaches are especially useful for the data of my study since all of my participants have different cultural knowledge, albeit sharing relatively similar social backgrounds with one another. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that they will bring both cultural and social carriers into the given intercultural communicative context when they interact with each other. These Sociolinguistic theories will then serve to address the first research question; that is: (1) *what social and cultural knowledge do participants bring to the conversation and how do they manage "socio-cultural differences" in the interactional intercultural context.*²⁷

Now, I would like to further reframe these theories from the poststructuralist perspectives, as the rest of the analysis further accounts for its attribution to and impact upon a larger social and ideological discourse. In order to bridge between the interactional level and the larger discursive level, we need to agree on the following poststructuralist view of language; that is to say, language functions as a mode of social action and thus one's communicative practices are part of a larger social and ideological discourse. More specifically, according to Hanks, "to speak is to take up a position in a social field in which all positions are moving and defined relative to one another" (1996, p.201). In a society, people create roles for one another and reinforce the

27 This research question, in other words, focuses on the first dimension of discourse, namely, the social and cultural aspects of text and context.

difference between them, as they speak in congruence with those roles. In other words, speakers assign roles to other participants through the way they talk and the way they categorize their audiences, whereas audiences construct speakers through their interpretations and reactions (Johnstone, 2002). In this respect, people not only follow the conventional way of talking based on their social roles in that particular moment, but also reinforce both the conventions²⁸ and their social roles through their interactions with others. Because their social roles construct their multiple social and cultural identities, every time they speak, their social and cultural identities that are performed by their ways of talking construct and reinforce a certain kind of discourse, which in turn constructs and discourse constructs and reinforces their social and cultural identities.

In considering the relationship between one's multiple social (and cultural) identities and their way of speaking, Goffman's (1974) notion of "footing" offers one way to examine what aspect of identity one takes in relation to his/her utterances in a contingent context. In his introduction of "footing" as one's alignment set in relation to his/her use of language, Goffman attempts to explore the notion of self that is constructed through social interactions. He explains, "a change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance" (p.128). According to Goffman, the shift of a speaker's footing in the course of interaction is usually conducted by changing his linguistic style – such as register – just like the change of physical stance, dress, etc. In this light, one's change of linguistic style could be understood as his/her shift from one identity to another in the given context.

In addition to the notion of "footing," the notion of indexicality offers one's display of social and cultural identity. Indexicality originally refers to a property of social actions and utterances whose meanings rely on the particular context within which they occur (Hanks, 1996). Note that indexicality is generally understood to have a universal nature, although it could be viewed in a much broader sense as well in the contemporary study of language. According to Ochs (1996), for instance, indexicality includes the meaning of any cultural forms that a member of the culture uses to give meaning to social situations. It is hence observed in any categories relevant to those social situations such as social identity, social acts and activities, and affective and epistemic stances on any level of speech, from the phonological to pragmatic levels.

Now, I would like to draw attention to social and cultural theories by discussing another way of observing one's positioning in interactions, taking into consideration the relation between language and power. Firstly, Bourdieu (1991, 2001) states that one's interactions with others represent his/her cultural practices of both producing meaning in relation to others, and negotiating the system of meaning with others in the contingent context. More specifically, he conceptualized culture or cultural value (such as knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions such as language) as a set of resources (or in Bourdieu's term, "cultural capital") with which

28 Fairclough relates one's way of talking and interpreting to social "convention" that he is assumed to hold. He also explains the relation between such convention and his notion of "discourse" in the following way: "the way in which actual discourse is determined by underlying conventions of discourse. I regard these conventions as clustering in sets or networks which I call order of discourse...these conventions and orders of discourse, moreover, embody particular ideologies. The term of discourse and practice have what we might call a "felicitous ambiguity": both can refer to either what people are doing on a particular occasion, or what people habitually do given a certain sort of occasion. That is, both can refer either to action, or to convention. The ambiguity is felicitous here because it helps underline the social nature of discourse and practice, by suggesting that the individual instance always implies social conventions - any discourse or practice implies conventional types of discourse or practices" (Fairclough, 1989, p.28).

people play their social roles, just like material wealth (or economic capital). On his view, the social contexts can thus be considered as “fields” or “markets,” where people constantly exchange different kinds of capital and compete with one another through their social actions.

Furthermore, the notion of a capital as a set of resources for a particular cultural field is often connected with power and becomes symbolic capital, which further endows individuals with the legitimacy to exert power. More specifically, according to Bourdieu, it is a cultural (and hence ideological) institution which empowers capital with symbolic value or authority. When one gains symbolic capital, therefore, he/she is entitled to carry out the act that one’s utterance claims to perform. Because a field (or a market) is “a structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the different kinds of resources or ‘capitals’” (Bourdieu, 2001, p.14), Bourdieu deems one’s possession of symbolic capital and his/her performance of such possession to both indicate one’s social position in the given field in discourse.

As indicated above, one’s communicative practices of his/her social and cultural identities on the interactional level are crucially related to a larger social and thus ideological discursive level. In order to clarify this point, consider again how Bourdieu’s notion of capital as a set of resources for a particular cultural field is used to exercise power in the given field. According to Bourdieu, certain uses of and references to cultural forms are profoundly related to the interest of particular groups of people through institutions, and hence gain symbolic power. More specifically, because an institution is an organization that represents a regular and continuously repeated social practice, it is, on the one hand, influenced by the sets of beliefs that belong to a certain group of people governing the institution. Such beliefs, on the other hand, also support the institution in determining what kind of capital should be valued as symbolic. Here, what one needs to bear in mind is that those coherent sets of beliefs, which specifically derive from interests of the dominant group of people in the society, are termed as ideology (Fairclough, 1989) or misrecognition (Bourdieu, 2001). As Marxist theorist notably claims, the ruling class²⁹ is the ruling ideas of the society. In order to rule ideas of the society, one’s discursive practices of social and cultural roles in everyday communicative interactions inevitably function to reproduce the dominant group’s ideology, ultimately reinforcing the existing system and structure of the society.

Context on a Larger Social and Ideological Level - Global Capitalism, Neo-Colonial Discourse and Linguistic Imperialism

Now, I would like to consider what ideas of the dominant group of both global and domestic societies come into play to affect the participants’ social and cultural identities and the accompanying communicative practices. In understanding both social and ideological backgrounds of the studied text and context, I would like to first note the following facts. First, the participants are all foreign immigrants or visitors living in the U.S. Second, they all have higher educational backgrounds and upper and/or middle class social backgrounds. Third, their linguistic tool in the intercultural communicative context is primarily English. These are salient characteristics that I observe in the participants’ social and ideological backgrounds. Focusing on these three major components of linguistic interactions in the study – namely, “setting,”

29 The idea that ruling class is ruling ideas primarily stems from the views of both Marxism and the sociology of knowledge.

“participants,” and “linguistic code,” and their relationship with issues of power, control and hegemony – I would like to further attempt to discern what ideologies need to be taken into account in the analysis of my data. The following theories will thus serve to answer the second research question; namely, (2) *what ideologies come into play in the intercultural communicative context.*³⁰

Let us consider the first two components, “the setting” and “the participants,” in relation to the dominant system of the contemporary world; that is, global capitalism and the accompanying neo-colonial ideology and discourse. It should be noted that the connection between the historically political nature of the research site and the economically and educationally high profile of the participants (and their spouses) are key to understanding the prevalent ideology behind the studied intercultural communication. As stated in the previous chapters, the research site was originally established in the Cold War era due to the necessity for university-affiliated American locals to help foreign students, scholars and their spouses who were visiting the institution. Such a trend was, needless to say, related to the U.S. political, economic, strategic and cultural supremacy over the Western countries after WWII, and the accompanying hegemonic control of the Western bloc under the Cold War regime. Because the Pax Americana brought both economic prosperity and political and strategic stability in the West, the U.S. claimed the summit in the stratified Western society while American values and beliefs were deemed to have worth and authority in the democratic and capitalist world (Maier, 1991, 2006; Pells, 1997). Accordingly, political, economic, and intellectual elites – primarily from Western countries – assemble in the U.S, especially in those prestigious higher educational institutions, in order to further gain symbolic cultural and social capital (Berghahn, 1982, 1986, 1995, 2001).³¹ Note that such a tradition was essentially produced by the Cold War power structure, Western capitalist system and accompanying ideologies. Yet, this tendency did not cease, but continued even after the Cold War when the communist regime of the Soviets collapsed. Because the victory of Western democracy and capitalism over communism at the end of the 1980s had proved the former’s legitimacy (Fukuyama, 1992), the inexorable trend of globalization allowed those Western countries to quickly dominate the former Eastern bloc under the Western capitalist system through their “economic support,” while allowing the U.S. to continue its hegemonic control of the world as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era.

In light of this hegemonic influence of the U.S., and the dominant power and control of Western capitalism as a new form of “colonialism” over the contemporary world,³² one may easily surmise how the setting and the high social and educational profiles of the participants are related to one another. It is the prevalent neo-colonial ideology and discourse, which created the research site as a place for those members of the dominant discourse community to practice their social, cultural and ideological identities in the U.S. In order to clarify this point, consider the following facts. Firstly, all participants came from those countries that are either major or newly emerging economic powers of global capitalist world. In other words, their countries are all connected to the U.S. to some extent, due to their consensus regarding the global capitalist

30 This question focuses on the 2nd dimension of discourse, that is, the ideological aspect of text and context.

31 Also, see the collection of articles in both “The American Impact on Postwar Germany” (Pommerin, 1995) and “The United States and Germany in the Ear of the Cold War, 1945-1968: A Handbook, Volume 1” (Junker, 2004)

32 A largely accepted definition of neo-colonialism (from the social, political, cultural, ideological and historical perspectives) is as follows: “it includes retention of military basis, exploitation of resources, preferential trade treaties, imposed unification of colonies conditional aid, and defense treaties.” See Bennett’s essay in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol2. Also see others such as Maier (2006), Pyle (2007) and so forth.

system and the supporting ideology. Because these countries became members of the dominant group of global society, their institutions serve as an ideological state apparatus to produce people who not only agree on the symbolic value of capital, but also to some extent reproduce the supporting ideology and discourse in order to ultimately reinforce the existing system.³³

Such connections between the participants' nations and their powerful membership in the global capitalist world further explains the social, cultural and ideological backgrounds of both the interactional intercultural context and the participants' communicative practices. As previously noted, the research community was historically established to serve one of the most prestigious universities in the U.S, which today often symbolically represents both Cold War and the post-Cold War American political, economic, and cultural supremacy. Because participants' spouses (and some participants) are essentially economic or intellectual elites of their countries, it is fair to presume that they came to the research community primarily to earn additional symbolic capital, either at the higher educational institution or multinational corporations located in the community.³⁴ Accordingly, the participants assemble at the research site because they all belong to the dominant group of the global capitalist society, and hence are connected to each other through symbolic capital of the neo-colonial discourse system in spite of their ethnically, nationally and culturally different backgrounds. In light of both the historically political nature of the research site and the high educational and social profile of the participants, the participants' social and cultural identities and the accompanying communicative practices in the interactional level are, in short, both largely subjugated to neo-colonial ideology and discourse.

Now, I would like to further consider the relationship among the neo-colonial ideology and discourse, their impact on the participants' social, cultural, and ideological "shared-ness" and "sameness," and the third component, a linguistic code. It is crucial to first note that all the participants possess sufficient competence to express their thoughts and understand others in English during the meeting, although there is a range in their communicative competences. This phenomenon is significant and should not be taken for granted in the study, as it further indicates a close relationship between the (neo)-colonial form of modern globalization and symbolic power of English as a lingua franca. To clarify this issue, let us now consider how English language gained its symbolic value as a lingua franca, and what it means to acquire English language in the contemporary world.

As some sociolinguists and applied linguists have argued, the function of English as a lingua franca is essentially related to the colonialist form of the modern world system, the supporting ideology and the accompanying discourse, all of which have been prevalently practiced since the end of the 16th century and have created the foundation for the existing global socio-economic system and power structure at the present time.³⁵ More specifically, it is generally known that

33 Note that the reference above to the prevalence of global capitalism is my attempt to indicate its historical background as part of the existing world system, not the description of its ongoing process of development and current state. As we shall see later, the balance of power among these nations has been drastically altered over the last decade, while the world and its power structure have significantly changed despite still belonging to a shared global capitalist society.

34 There are some North American branches of major multinational corporations in the region, due to their historically strong ties with the higher educational institution's lab work and research.

35 The colonialist feature of the global spread of English and teaching of English has been popularly discussed in Applied Linguistics. Among many studies relevant to these issues, the following three are particularly influential, Phillipson's *Linguistic Imperialism* (1992), Pennycook's *English and the Discourse of Colonialism* (1998) and Said's *Orientalism* (1978). In his influential book, "*Linguistic Imperialism*," Phillipson deliberately describes the hegemonic imposition of English as a lingua franca and the accompanying problematic issues. More specifically, he warns that the global spread of English is aimed at promoting the expansion of particular ideologies that belong to certain societies. It also allows

English language first began to function as a lingua franca due to the necessity for increasing intercultural communications between British colonizers and indigenous people in the initial stage of settlement, when the British Empire colonized those non-European regions such as North America, a part of Asia, Africa, the Pacific and others. English then rapidly spread all over the world, as it became institutionalized within these colonized societies in order to further rule the local people and ultimately alter political, economic, cultural and hence ideological spheres of the British colonies (Phillipson, 1992; Pennycook, 1998). In this light, English significantly contributed to the colonizers' control of the colonized people and societies, and hence greatly supported the British Empire's prosperity in the colonial era. As the historical background above suggests, the global spread of English in the modern era, in short, is significantly related to the British colonial history, while the function of English as a lingua franca necessarily entails colonialist features.

Such a modern trend of global integration (or colonization), decelerated, however, once European colonizers exhausted their ruling power due to a series of wars occurring during the 19th and the 20th centuries. The unprecedentedly large scale of WWII in the 20th century ultimately ended the colonial era, as many of those colonies became independent after the war. Yet, a new colonial system resumed shortly after the U.S. took political, economic, strategic and cultural initiatives to promote the Cold War regime based on the Pax Americana in the West. This continuance of the (neo) colonial system and accompanying discourse accordingly characterized the Western world system once again; this time, exerting a rather indirect control over subordinate nations through economic and military support (Maier, 1991, 2006). Note that this revival of the (neo) colonialist trend irrevocably allowed English to be institutionalized and

those who possess English as capital to exploit those without the capital by constructing structural and cultural inequalities in the society. Accompanying Phillipson's discussions above, Pennycook also argues that the permeated view of the global spread of English as neutral, natural and beneficial is not only false, but also masks the prevailing colonialism practiced through the teaching of English. Such practices reinforce not only foreign language teaching as a way to exercise symbolic violence, but also the false representation of the former colonizer and colonized. Referring to the episode of Robinson Crusoe's teaching English to Friday, Pennycook further claims that ideologies of English education as colonial practices leads to construct of Self and Other by deliberately rationalizing the superiority and indispensability of the civilization of "Self" and their language to that of "Other." Note that such false representation of particular ethnicities is first introduced by Said as Orientalism, and often discussed as a negative ideology that is embedded in both the colonial and post-colonial discourses. Said states that in claiming knowledge about "Orientals," what Orientalism did was to construct them as Self (European) and Other (especially Middle Eastern people, for Said). By describing purported "oriental" characteristics (irrational, uncivilized), Said further explains, Orientalism provided a definition not of the real "oriental" identity, but of European identity in terms of the oppositions which structured its account. Consequently, the "irrational" Other delineates the "rational" Self. The construction of Other in Orientalist discourse, Said continues, is a matter of asserting self-identity, and the issue of the European account of the Oriental Other is thereby rendered a question of power. Applying Said's notion of Orientalism, both Phillipson and Pennycook's arguments originally center on the phenomenon seen in the former colonized countries such as India, Hong Kong, etc. Yet, a similar phenomenon has been also observed in non-colonized countries, too. Japan is, for instance, one of those countries that have been influenced by the hegemony of English and the accompanying colonial discourse. According to both Tsuda (1990, 1997) and Suzuki (1999), although neither the U.S. nor the U.K has ever colonized Japan, the English language has been the symbolic representation of Anglophone power in both the colonial and the post-colonial periods. More specifically, in the colonial period, English was a symbolic representation of Western power since it was the language of the major colonizers, who ruled vast areas of the world due to their possession of the most advanced knowledge regarding modern armaments, military tactics, medicine, technologies and so forth. Moreover, in the post-colonial era, English has not only been the language that belongs to the U.S. as a superpower, but also a lingua franca in the global capitalist world. Consequently, English education has been prioritized both on the institutional level and societal level, due to its practical utility and promise of economic benefit. Yet, it should be also noted that in spite of its beneficial image, some scholars have raised the negative consequences derived from such excessive enthusiasm for English language learning. For instance, Tsuda claims that the major problem is that the Japanese have become a victim of Linguistic Imperialism, because they overestimate the power of English while unquestionably absorbing "misrecognition" of the world embedded in the language as the supporting ideology. That is to say, he claims, such overestimation of English misleads the Japanese not only to reproduce the symbolic power of English as a lingua franca by uncritically believing its value, but also to be "Anglo-maniac" (Oishi 1993), and thus consider the Western worldview to be universal and superior. Furthermore, their attitude towards native speakers' English as ideal also reinforces the hierarchy of English varieties in which this native English reigns supreme. All of these issues are, needless to say, a part of Colonial Discourse since power seems to be unequally distributed through a particular language, which is embedded with a particular worldview. The communicative practices with language, on this account, not only reinforce such an unequal power structure, but also reproduce the distorted representation of the world (especially the relationship between the possessing and the unpossessing), which reflects only a particular group's interest.

spread as a lingua franca once again on a much larger scale, since it was not only the language of the new superpower of the world, but also a “lingua franca” in the age of economic globalization. Accordingly, the global trend of capitalism and the accompanying neo-colonial ideology and discourse created a “neutral,” “natural,” and “useful” image of English, while spreading ideologies of English as a lingua franca all over the world in the form of colonial discourse, Orientalism and so on (Kubota, 1998, 1999; Oishi 1993; Pennycook, 1998; Tsuda 1990, 1996, 1997). The popularity of English as a commonly shared linguistic code for intercultural communication in the age of globalization, on this account, is crucially associated with the dominant socio-economic system of the contemporary world and the supporting ideology and discourse. In sum, as Phillipson (1992) and others claim, the dominance of English in the global world as a lingua franca is a result of global capitalism and the accompanying (neo) colonial ideology and discourse, which leads to a political and ideological phenomenon known as “*Linguistic Imperialism*” (Kachru, 1985, 1986; Suzuki, 1999 and many others).

Taking into account the aforementioned political and ideological aspects of English as a lingua franca of the contemporary global world, one may now rightly understand why my participants are all able to speak English well. Firstly, for those who belong to the global capitalist society, English language is not just a foreign language but a symbolic (linguistic) capital that they are required to earn through their socio-cultural institutions as ideological state apparatus. Here, they all agree on the symbolic value of this particular language, while habituated to practice their social identities by either recognizing or exerting its symbolic power in domestic society. Yet, communicative competence of English also has significant meaning for those who belong to the dominant group of both domestic and global societies. Due to its symbolic value in the global capitalist world, they are expected to learn this particular language and acquire communicative skills in order to further become a competent member of the dominant discourse community (Bourdieu, 2001; Gee, 1990, 1992). On this account, it is necessary not only to view English as capital for participants to play a game in the field, but also to consider their motivations and acquisition of English as “investment.” This is the case because the function of English as a lingua franca, and its symbolic value, are crucially related to the prevalent (neo) colonial form of the global capitalist system of the world. Accordingly, as Norton (2000) might claim, the participants’ motivations, acquisition and use of English need to be understood as a part of their social practices of the neo-colonial subjectivity in the given context.

Third and Fourth Dimensions of the Context – History and Ecological Perspectives

So far, I have discussed how the modern world system of global capitalism and the prevalent (neo) colonial ideology and discourse affect three major components of the studied linguistic interaction: “setting,” “participants,” and “linguistic code.” Specifically focusing on their social and cultural “shared-ness” and “sameness,” I also attempted to discern how the larger ideological factors allowed the participants to recognize each other as an “insider,” while simultaneously defining those who do not belong to the dominant discourse community³⁶ as an “outsider” and hence, “Other.”

36 Kramsch explains the notion of speech community as one composed of people who use the same linguistic code whereas the notion of discourse community refers to “the common ways in which members of a social group use language to meet their social goals” (Kramsch, 1998, p.6). Since the participants’ linguistic shared-ness includes both language and language use, I prefer to use the term, “discourse community” rather than “speech community” here.

Note, however, that seemingly uniform social and cultural subjectivities of the participants are in fact essentially discrete, and thus different from each other, since each participant's domestic social context has its own historical trajectory in reaching its current place and position in the global society. More specifically, it is generally recognized that all the participants and their countries currently belong to the dominant group of global capitalist society although their particular cases of when, how, and why they committed to their relationships with the U.S. historically differ from one another. For instance, American economic, cultural and social capital has been symbolically valued in both (West) German and Japanese societies since the postwar era when the U.S., as a leader of the Allied Powers, primarily occupied those two nations and controlled political, economic and cultural spheres of their societies due to these nations' geo-strategically important positions in Europe and Asia during the Cold War (Berghahn, 1986; Dower, 1999; Maier, 1991, 2006; Pyle, 2007). In this light, both West Germany and Japan's neo-colonial relationships with the U.S. similarly underwent two different stages, transitioning from their postwar status as occupied and controlled by the U.S. to the current one as politically, economically, and strategically allied with the U.S. after their economic recovery from the war. Yet, strictly speaking, these two nations' historical trajectories significantly differ from each other in regards to their process of modernization and industrialization after the mid-19th century. While the First Reich quickly gained military power and took an imperialistic course after the unification of Germany in 1871, modern Imperial Japan began during the Meiji restoration (in 1868) as a response to threats of Western colonization, which was later followed by consolidation and integration into colonial power (Nakamasa, 2005; Pyle, 2007).

As for Russia, it began to participate in the global capitalist world recently, after partly appropriating the Western capitalist rules and recovering from its economic crisis of the 1990s. Unlike (West) Germany and Japan, however, Russia (both the modern Russian Empire and communist Soviet regime) had not only been a major imperialist force in Eastern Europe during the modern era, but had been a long-term rival of the U.S. during and after WWII. In other words, Russia might be committed to the U.S. over as part of the global capitalist system even though it never experienced U.S. occupation or political and strategic control like West Germany and Japan. In light of the participants' nations having such different trajectories in modern history, in sum, it may be fair to assume that participants' social and cultural subjectivities in the neo-colonial discourse are constructed upon different historical foundations. Accordingly, the historicity of each participant's neo-colonial subjectivity is discrete from the other, thereby differently affecting both their communicative practices and the contingent context.

This difference in participants' historical subjectivities in the neo-colonial discourse is the final key component of the theoretical framework for my study. As I previously noted, my framework primarily adopts Fairclough's notion of double-layered socio-cultural context, which allows me to partly explain how the synchronic aspect of the socio-cultural context is inevitably and simultaneously related to its diachronic aspect. Unfortunately, however, the theoretical framework above explains very little about the complexity of this diachronic aspect of the socio-cultural context. More specifically, Fairclough's double-layered socio-cultural context is originally described in the two-dimensional plane, while presupposing that it is established on the shared historical ground as the third dimension. Yet, such a view of the historical dimension with one archive that is in single-layered form, with a single time scale, is too simplistic when applied to the study of intercultural communication, in which interlocutors converse with one

another without sharing either social, cultural and ideological backgrounds or a common historical basis.

As generally understood, in intercultural communicative contexts interlocutors often bring significantly dissimilar social, cultural, and ideological carriers into the contingent context, as they come from different societies with various social systems and structures. The crucial problem here is the fact that each society or system to which they belong has its own historical foundation consisting of multiple layers of time scale, each of which further develops at different speeds and with various processes of transformation³⁷ (Braudel, 1981). In this light, intercultural communicative contexts are far more complicated than they appear at first glance, because the double-layered socio-cultural context is constructed on the multi-layered historical discourses with different time scales. Accordingly, a particular ideological discourse that one can observe “here and now” is only a synchronized form of multiple, separate and individual discourses, which are in fact simultaneously occurring in each historical layer of the same context. Blommaert explains such complexity of discourse in the following way:

We have to conceive of discourse as subject to *layered simultaneity*. It occurs in a real-time, synchronic event, but it is simultaneously encapsulated in several layers of historicity, some of which are within the grasp of the participants while others remain invisible but nevertheless present. It is overdetermined, so to speak, by sometimes conflicting influences from different levels of historical context. The different layers are important: not everything in this form of overdetermination is of the same order; there are important differences between the different levels and degrees of historicity...people can speak from various positions on these scales. Thus synchronicity of discourse is an illusion that masks the densely layered historicity of discourse. It is therefore easy but fallacious, to adopt synchronicity as the level of analysis in discourse analysis, because we run the risk of squeezing the analytically crucial differences between the layers of historicity in a homogenized and synchronized event, thus having to make ‘either-or’ decisions on aspects of meaning that occur simultaneously, yet are of a different order. (Blommaert, 2005, p.130-131)

Above and elsewhere in his book, “*Discourse*,” Blommaert (2005) warns that, despite “layered simultaneity” of discourse, one often tends to “squeeze all the layers into one” and further “construct coherent comparative discourses, of quality, competitiveness, and ‘culture’ within the here-and- now” (p.134) in order to make sense of the world. Such synchronization in discourse, he continues, is however misleading, as it does not account for crucial components of social, cultural and ideological aspects of the context, such as “the histories of origin and development, the different speeds of change, and so on.” Note that these historical elements are all significant because they create a particular “historically contingent” position from which one speaks in discourse, which in turn ultimately affects one’s social, cultural, and ideological positioning in the given context at the present time. Given this fact, the real work of comparison among different histories and different conditions of emergence possibly could crystallize each participant’s particular epistemic stances in the contingent context – namely, from what history one speaks – while allowing for an understanding of what history one speaks as he/she enacts

37 Such as “structural or slow time,” “conjunctual or intermediate time”, and “event time.” One may be aware of the latter two, while the first is out of one’s reach.

and performs one's social, cultural and ideological identities in discourse. In sum, in order to better understand interlocutors' social, cultural, and ideological positioning at the synchronic level of discourse, it is necessary to take into account the diachronic aspect of the context as well. Accordingly, the following study must inevitably add a third research question, namely: (3) *What is the impact of the modern history³⁸ on the two subject national' construction of their identities and the accompanying worldviews (especially their views of the United States), as well as their communicative practice³⁹?*

Now, I would like to briefly finalize the theoretical framework designed to allow me not only to include the historical aspect as the third dimension of the context, but also to ultimately capture the dynamics emerging from the encounter between the second and third dimensions as the fourth dimension of the intercultural communicative context. As previously noted, it is important to first emphasize that the following study will essentially adopt Fairclough's double-layered context as the basis for the second-dimensional plane of the theoretical framework. That is to say, two contexts encompassing both the interactional and larger social levels are interrelated to one another, as interlocutors are all considered social subjects whose interactions are partly subjugated to a larger social and ideological discourse. Yet, this theoretical framework requires an additional historical aspect as the third dimension since, as I mentioned earlier, the notion of context inexorably encompasses both the synchronic and diachronic aspects that are interrelated to one another. More specifically, social, cultural and ideological discourses, which construct one's subjectivities, are all built upon a particular historical foundation of the society with multiple layers of time scales. Accordingly, historical elements consisting of each foundation significantly affect one's social, cultural and ideological positioning in the contingent context at the present time.

Lastly, I would like to suggest that the three-dimensional planes of contextual structure and accompanying dynamics just mentioned, that emerged from the encounter among the first, second and third dimensions, ultimately need to be encapsulated by an extra comprehensive frame; namely, the fourth dimension of context. This is so because, as the post-structuralist theories previously indicated, a visible discourse observed in a particular time and space is not the stabilized phenomenon which is permanently repeated in and reinforced by interlocutors' everyday communicative practices, but rather the evolving one which emerged from dynamic contact between various forms of a system and one's speech with performativity. In this light, an observable discourse needs to be viewed to some extent as a discursively practiced process of becoming, since discourse always affects one's subjectivities while one's discursive practices of his/her subjectivities persistently have an effect on the discourse as well. More importantly, such dynamics in discourse have been taking place on a much larger scale in a non-linear way at the present time, due to the rapid globalization of the economy and accompanying global migration, as well as the rapid spread of global information technologies; all of which make national, cultural, and ideological boundaries much more obscure than before. In sum, the dynamics observed in discourse are built upon various social, cultural, ideological and historical foundations, while emerging discourse is discursively practiced by interlocutors of diverse backgrounds and thus changes its state in an unpredictable manner. Given such dynamism of

38 Although I use "modern history" as a rather general term, the study will – not exclusively, yet particularly – focus on WWII and the postwar history, as we shall see later. Note that this particular focus essentially attributes to the fact that the two nations that my participants are from (West Germany and Japan) both have been under the existing archives since the end of WWII.

39 This question serves to focus on the 3rd dimension of discourse; namely, the historical aspect of text and context.

discourse in the age of globalization, it is appropriate for me to attempt to capture a comprehensive view of the observable discourse as a phenomenon emerged from social, cultural, ideological and historical contact in the contingent intercultural communicative context. My study will therefore raise the final research question, that is to say: (4) *how do the participants construct both their identities and new reality of the world through their interactions with the researcher and others in the intercultural communicative context*⁴⁰?

40 This question serves to capture dynamic discourse occurrence emerging from contacts of the participants and the accompanying social, cultural, ideological and historical positioning in the given context.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology

Research Site – Community and Organization

The research was conducted in a college town in the U.S., home to one of the most prestigious American universities. The community belongs to one of the original “thirteen colonies” which date to the nation’s birth, and hence, it has traditionally shared some common cultural and religious features with Europe. The city is rather small, with a core population of approximately 124,000.⁴¹ Yet the downtown area is well developed,⁴² boasting many cultural institutions to meet the needs of well-educated, wealthy students and scholars who can afford the high tuitions. The main campus is characterized by Collegiate Gothic style buildings, which are not only scenic but architecturally significant. The university possesses several museums that contain world famous artwork and paintings, as well as one of the nation’s best libraries and archives. These facilities are a testament to the school’s prestigious standing; it has a longstanding tradition of producing numerous public figures and intellectuals from the U.S. and elsewhere.

Given that the university attracts students and scholars from all over the world, the community has many non-profit organizations to assist these international visitors in their personal and social adjustment to their new home. Some of these serve people directly associated with the university, such as researchers, visiting scholars and students, while others offer various social and cultural activities for spouses and children such as English language learning classes, playgroups, and so forth.

I conducted my ethnographic research and discourse analysis on 6 female participants of Japanese and German nationality, who attended the weekly program meetings run by one of these organizations. OWW is a local non-profit organization, whose aim is to “bring together women of many nationalities⁴³ who live in the region.” Although the organization is not exclusively targeted at university-affiliated visitors, the majority consist of spouses of those people, with the rest comprised of wealthy locals and spouses of executives representing foreign multinational corporations.

Weekly program gatherings are usually held at a local Christian Baptist church every Tuesday during the semester, from 09:30 to 11:30 a.m., and offer a nursery service. Members consist of random participants, two main coordinators, and about ten supporting coordinators who plan weekly meetings.⁴⁴ The number of participants varies, depending on the weekly

41 Annual Estimates of the Population for All Incorporated Places in the state (http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/files/SUB-EST2006_9.csv 07/29/08)

42 In contrast to the wealthy appearance of the immediate campus area and suburbs, however, the campus periphery shows another side of American society. Several blocks away from campus, for instance, it is not safe for the general public. These residential areas are heavily populated by minorities and immigrants who came to the U.S. for financial reasons. Some houses and stores have iron bars, and unemployed adults are commonly observed loitering outside their houses during the daytime. In place of sophisticated restaurants, there are many fast-food franchises in these areas. Playgrounds exist, yet high school teenagers and homeless people are observed there instead of little children. Although these areas are certainly part of the town, one can easily identify a social and racial divide within it.

43 From the website of the organization (07/29/08).

44 About one-third of the supporting coordinators are considered to be honorable members who have been involved with the organization for many decades. Thus, they are very old, and most are not able to play an active role in the program.

program content. Some programs (such as the one featuring Japanese culture, or the cooking class) are more popular and may attract over twenty people, whereas others (a museum tour) may interest fewer than ten people. The weekly gatherings generally focus on cultural topics like ethnic costumes and cuisines, as well as both international and American traditions and their related cultural events. The organization is religiously unaffiliated; nevertheless, many programs include religious features (especially Christianity) since the majority are from Europe, North and South America, and share those European religious traditions.

Despite the organization's primary goal of inviting women from a diverse set of cultural and ethnic backgrounds, it is notable that the majority of seats are usually dominated by two groups, German and Japanese. Both groups not only attend as an audience, but in some cases are actively involved in the organization as leading and supporting coordinators. Their considerable influence in the organization inevitably affects the contents of weekly programs.⁴⁵ More relevantly, it affected my study, especially in terms of selecting research subjects. Although I had been initially interested in focusing on Japanese participants' interactions with other members in this intercultural communicative context, the Germans' consistent attendance and active contributions to the program meetings ultimately led me to conduct a comparative study of Japanese and German visitors, whose nations shared analogous political, economic, ideological and historical relationships with the U.S. during the postwar era.

Recruitment of the Subjects

During the 2005-2006 academic years, I had attended weekly gatherings to become acquainted with my research site and the people there, as a foreign newcomer to the community. At these meetings, participants would usually get together and make small talk while doing assigned activities such as crafts and games over a cup of coffee and home-made sweets. Like many foreigners at common social gatherings, they were also comfortable discussing issues facing them in everyday life such as their social adjustment to the community, impressions of American society, perplexing experiences caused by so-called "cultural differences," struggles with learning and speaking English as a second language, children's bilingual education, concerns about maintaining one's national identity in a foreign community, and so on.

From regularly meeting with these members every week over the course of an entire year, I eventually established a fairly close relationship with some Japanese, a few Germans and other nationals. In retrospect, it was not difficult for me to become close with other participants (excepting coordinators) since we were mostly foreign visitors searching for new friends in the community. By and large, they were very open-minded and friendly towards each other. Not surprisingly, most of them were well-educated, and thus able to clearly express their thoughts and everyday experiences in both their mother tongues and English. They are also intelligent and discerning enough to critically observe the target community, and compare it with their own. By the end of the preliminary observation period, I felt comfortable enough to recruit some members for my study focusing on the political and historical aspects of intercultural communication.

Establishing essential criteria for subjects, I prioritized the following two conditions; (1) subject needs to regularly attend the program meetings at least twice a month; and (2) subject

⁴⁵ Japanese people, for instance, often introduce their traditional culture through a tea ceremony, kimonos, etc., while Germans support locals' presentation of American culture and tradition due to their familiarity to Protestant Christian culture and European traditions.

needs to be able to speak at least beginning-level English, and ideally, intermediate-level.⁴⁶ Before embarking upon my research in the fall 2006, I recruited three Japanese subjects individually and privately. They agreed to attend weekly gatherings, write journals, and meet regularly with me for interviews. In addition to those Japanese subjects, I intended to study other foreign nationals in order to investigate the different forms of cultural knowledge and multiple perspectives that they brought to an intercultural communicative context. At the first meeting of the 2006 academic year, I was allowed to explain my purpose and details of my research to all the members and recruit some of them for the study. After the meeting ended, one German (Martha) and one Russian (Olga) came to me and expressed some interest in participating.

Despite both being willing to share their thoughts and experiences in the U.S., Olga unfortunately had to drop out of the study due to her inadequate English writing skills. A week later, another German female (Bianka) heard about my study from one of the Japanese subjects (Kayo), and volunteered to join. At the second gathering, I recruited another German female (Angela) for her frankness and keen observation of American society, as well as her English skills. Finally, one of the main German coordinators (Tanya) volunteered to keep journals; however, she could not complete her participation since she was sick at the beginning of the semester and also would have to leave the community later on due to her spouse's job.

Description of the Studied Subjects - German Subjects⁴⁷

The German and Japanese subjects came to the U.S. primarily due to their spouses' occupational situation. They usually come from upper and middle-class social backgrounds; their spouses all have at least a Master's degree, and more often, a Ph.D. or M.D. from prestigious universities in either their home countries or the U.S. While subjects' educational backgrounds vary, all of them have at least a bachelor's degree or the equivalent. Collectively, their social and educational backgrounds imply that they came to the U.S. primarily seeking symbolic capital, and not for economic reasons. This is reflected in their having come to this community in order to enhance the spouses' careers, or provide better job opportunities.

Martha

Martha is a 30 year old German female, originally from Hamburg in the northern part of Germany. Her husband is an associate professor in economics, who intends to stay at East Coast University as a visiting professor for two years. She moved to Newtown with her husband and 30 month old son in October, 2005. They reside in a relatively wealthy part of town, where many students, university-affiliated faculty, and professionals live. She is quite sociable, and always tries to remain involved in the various social activities offered by the university. On weekdays, she attends a playgroup with her son for international spouses and children. She also regularly participates in a weekly "Mommies" English conversation class with toddlers, as well as another

⁴⁶ I added as an essential condition a level of linguistic competence sufficient to communicate with other members (and to write journals in English, for non-Japanese participants), since my primary interest was how his / her cultural knowledge would irrupt intercultural communication taking place when conversing with others. I am, however, profoundly aware of Blommaert' claim that one's lack of linguistic capital often displays the complex nature of the relationship between language and society more eloquently than actual spoken text. His point accords with Olga's cancellation of her participation due to her inadequate English writing skills. Although she had strong opinions and critical thoughts regarding the OWW, members, American society and so on, her inadequate English deprived her of the opportunity to present them for my research.

⁴⁷ As the following profile indicates, the German subjects are all from the former West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany.)

social gathering for international visitors to the university, both of which are usually held in the university campus. As her active participation indicates, Martha speaks fluent English, using proper grammar and a rich vocabulary. Her advanced level may partially derive from her educational background. She earned her bachelor's degree in English literature, studying Shakespeare's poems, which influenced her to care about the correctness of her English usage.

Martha started attending the OWW weekly meetings in December, 2005. Her primary motive was to meet other people of various cultural backgrounds. She was also attracted to the program itself, which introduced both American and foreign cultures and traditions. It should be added that she decided to join my research because she was also interested in the field of intercultural communication. While socializing with foreigners and locals in the community, she would often encounter problematic situations in which she was confused and frustrated by conversations with other people of different cultural backgrounds, especially Americans. She volunteered to keep a journal and share her experiences as a study subject, presumably, because she hoped to learn how cultural differences cause a communication breakdown. She also hoped to educate the researcher about how foreign visitors struggle with cultural differences in this new community.

Angela

Angela is a cheerful and friendly German female, aged 41, from Mannheim. She had previously been a nurse at an intensive care unit before coming to the U.S. Her spouse was a physician in Germany, and now manages a multinational pharmaceutical company. She moved to Newtown with their two children (9 year old girl and 7 year old boy) in July, 2006 due to her spouse's transfer to a branch office in New England. They live in Maple Shade, a wealthy suburb where many faculty and medical professionals reside. She explained in a later interview that they live in Maple Shade only because the corporation has housing for its executives, and assigned them to live there "for the company's own interest." Whatever the reason, she enjoys her social life in Maple Shade, getting to know the local people and community through various activities. She regularly attends social get-togethers offered by the International Shoreline Club, which is exclusive to residents of Maple Shade and Woodstown. Since the suburb has traditionally housed employees of multinational corporations, the local Americans there are prepared to host these foreigners not as "immigrants," but as "guests." They are also familiar with foreign language and culture, especially those of Western Europe due to their many personal and social connections to that region.

Angela began attending the OWW weekly gatherings in the fall semester of 2006. Her primary motive was to meet and befriend Germans as well as people from different countries. Although she senses an invisible barrier between newcomers and the local members and coordinators, she gets along well with everyone thanks to her cheerful personality. Her outgoing nature also inspired me to invite her to participate in my study, since I was looking for someone who would speak about herself quite openly and honestly. Despite her concerns about her inadequate English writing skills in English, Angela willingly consented. Keeping journals in English was a challenge for her, but her writing drastically improved by the end of the study, as she had hoped.

Bianka

Bianka is a 63 year old German woman from Munster, the northwestern part of Germany. She came to U.S. in mid-2005, due to her spouse's business transfer to a branch office in New England, where he is also an executive of the pharmaceutical company where Angela's husband works. Before moving to the U.S, she was living in Kobe, Japan. She fell in love with the Japanese people and culture during her stay, and had hoped to live there as long as possible. When she first came to Concordia, a wealthy suburb near Newtown, she was profoundly disappointed by her new environment. Americans and their cultural behaviors are, according to her, "so different from the Japanese people I used to talk to." In contrast to her earlier comfortable adjustment to the Japanese people, culture and society, she found it extremely difficult to deal with the "culturally different behaviors" of American people.⁴⁸ As Pells (1997) might expect, Bianka encountered a common problem faced by Europeans; namely, that "They (Americans) look like us (Europeans) but are not like us." This disappointing revelation discouraged her from meeting local people in the community for a few months after her arrival. She began attending at the OWW meetings in spring, 2006 in order to meet people from other countries, especially Japan. Since she found it difficult to adjust to the new culture and people, she hoped that the international gatherings would help her to transition more smoothly from one culture to another. The OWW gatherings thus served as "practice" for her cultural adjustment to the U.S.

At the OWW meetings, Bianka is usually quiet, yet sociable. She is not only a good listener, but a sophisticated speaker with a vast and knowledge of history, international politics and foreign cultures. Aside from participating in the OWW, she audits some courses (about British fine arts) at East Coast University, and joins museum tours in the community. She also sometimes attends at book meetings at a local synagogue to discuss designated history books with Jewish people.⁴⁹ Although Bianka is usually rather reserved and modest in conversation, one senses that she has a profound knowledge of WWII history, and a passionate desire to discuss it, presumably due to her many years struggling with Germany's stigmatized history. She does not avoid disturbing topics such as Nazi history and the Holocaust. If an Israeli member brings up the Holocaust to defend the Israel's current aggression towards Palestinians, she not only patiently listens but tries to engage her in meaningful dialogue. Unlike other Germans, who would rather keep silent on the matter, Bianka fearlessly discusses these subjects and searches for a reasonable account through dialogue. As we shall see, she not only helped me to understand the historical burden carried by Germans after WWII, but significantly contributed to disclosing the potential pitfalls of intercultural communication, whereby history unexpectedly interrupts conversation and sends it in an unpredictable direction

Japanese Subjects

Tomoko

48 In the interview with the researcher, she further explained her disappointment in the following way: "When I came to US, I figured the people here are so much different from the Japanese people I used to talk to. I felt more comfortable to talk to Japanese people and their way to be friendly to other people. They keep some distance from me, but they are also friendly and care about me. American people, they are very friendly, almost overwhelmingly friendly. They are like "How's it going?" (Loud voice), but doesn't mean that they care about you. The greetings echo form here to there, but doesn't come to me. They don't care who I am but they just say it. So, when I came from Japan to here, it was like I was falling from the cliff." (Interview, November in 2006)

49 Mostly books relevant to the Holocaust, or similar historical incidents such as the Turkish genocide of Armenians.

Tomoko is a 54 year old Japanese female, from Tokyo, Japan. Her spouse is a professor in geology at East Coast University. She came to Newtown in 2004, having spent more than 17 years outside of Japan in places such as Australia, Germany, and — in the U.S. — Colorado and Minnesota. Not surprisingly, she is quite familiar with both European and American cultures. She also speaks some German and very good English, an extensive vocabulary.

Like many others trying to get used to a new environment, Tomoko is actively involved with various social activities in Newtown. For instance, during the week she teaches Japanese to local Americans at a private institution as a part-time job. She also teaches at a regional Sunday school for Japanese elementary, middle and high school students who wish to maintain their Japanese skills during their stay in the U.S. As a female teacher who has raised two children in foreign countries, Tomoko shares her experience and cultural knowledge with temporary Japanese visitors and their children.

Tomoko has attended the OWW meetings since 2004. As for others, her initial motive was to meet people from different countries and exchange useful information with each other. She was also interested in regularly seeing other Japanese in the community, and speaking her language with them. In 2005, she became a coordinator who provided weekly programs such as introductions to Japanese culture and teaching craft making. As a coordinator, she is quite aware of the cultural and generational gaps between the other local coordinators and foreign visitors. Many of these coordinators are elderly, and somewhat “old-fashioned” in their charitable intentions. “They (local coordinators) want to introduce the community and their traditional culture, but foreign visitors are interested in more practical issues such as children’s bilingual education and the American educational system that their children need to adjust to.” She also finds many of the local coordinators to be rather Eurocentric and not particularly interested in learning other cultures. In her eyes, they are more interested in teaching their own culture to newcomers, and consequently she often experiences a cultural and racial divide within the group of coordinators.

Kayo

Kayo is a 42 year old female from Osaka, the second largest city in Japan. Among all the subjects, she is the only one with an educational and professional background in the U.S. She was originally a professional architect for a major construction company in Japan. In the early 1990’s, she attended Harvard University for two years to earn her Master’s degree in Architecture with the company’s financial support. After continuing with the company for awhile, she eventually decided to pursue her Ph.D. degree at Kobe University in Japan. In 2001, Kayo moved to Newtown after marrying a Japanese urban architect, who had earned his Master’s degree at Cornell University and worked at a private company in the U.S. When she arrived, she was a Ph.D. candidate searching for a faculty job in the U.S. A few years later, however she and her husband would ultimately open their own business in the area.

As her educational background and professional independence might suggest, she speaks brilliant English, with proper grammar and a rich vocabulary. She explains that she had always been interested in Western cultures and languages from childhood, because “they are so different

from ours.” This made her highly motivated to learn European languages such as English and German in school. In middle and high school, for instance, she regularly listened to radio programs in English. In college, she took courses in German at the *Goethe Institute* in Kyoto. Kayo’s interest in Western culture also reflects her present social life. In Newtown, she regularly meets local American and European friends, such as a retired French professor, a former medical doctor from Eastern Europe, and Bianka. Her friends are quite intelligent, and enjoy share their knowledge of literature and history with each other.

To enhance her social life, Kayo began attending the OWW in 2003, hoping to meet other people of various cultural backgrounds. She was also looking for “network,” and gathers useful information that might help her find a job in the future, since the people involved with the program were the university-affiliated. Not long after, she became a coordinator to meet the program’s needs for a Japanese coordinator who could “speak both Japanese and English and take care of other Japanese participants.” Like Tomoko, Kayo faces certain difficulties in running the program as a coordinator. However, her problem has less to do with handling cultural and generational gaps between participants and coordinators, than bringing together people who have different national, cultural and ideological backgrounds. In order to avoid any awkward scenes, she attempts to maintain a rather ideologically and politically neutral environment, in which everyone will feel comfortable.

Miki

Miki is a 32 year old Japanese woman from Tokyo. She is originally from a wealthy family, which had owned several companies and a large amount of real estate in the Tokyo area. She came to the U.S. in 2000 with her spouse, who was earning his Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. In 2004, she moved to Newtown when her spouse obtained a faculty position at East Coast University. They live in the same safe, beautiful and wealthy neighborhood as Martha.

Shortly after arriving, Miki began to assimilate into the community through activities such as auditing courses and joining museum tours. After having a baby, she began attending the “Toddlers’ Playgroup” program offered at the International Center affiliated with the university. Miki has been participating in OWW since 2004 to make friends and meet other Japanese people. She enjoys the gatherings, but does not actively participate like the other Japanese subjects due to her lack of confidence in speaking English. She is also sometimes intimidated by the “Western” coordinators who organize and dominate the program. Consequently, she feels more comfortable speaking with other Japanese and “just to have a good time with them” during the meetings. Such a passive attitude as a foreign guest in the U.S. is a common feature shared with many Japanese visitors to the university community.

Despite Miki’s rather “ordinary” attitude towards interactions with international visitors and coordinators, she in fact has a very unique family background that significantly affects her worldview, especially of the U.S. and WWII history. Her parents were both left-wing activists during the 1960s, when Japanese intellectuals and college students were protesting the presence of the U.S. military in Japan due to the Vietnam War. Her parents were profoundly influenced by Marxist ideas while strongly opposed to America’s political and strategic control of Japan.

Because of her parents' educational and political tendencies, she was expected to learn the history of WWII and the U.S. occupation thoroughly, especially the latter of which is not normally taught in detail in Japanese history classes. She herself is neither an activist, nor anti-American. Yet, her knowledge of WWII and postwar history acquired through the family discourse has undeniably affected her present view of the U.S., as we shall later observe.

Data Sources

I collected data throughout the academic year of 2006-2007, applying ethnographic and discourse analysis methods. The ethnographic component involved my direct observation and participation in 29 weekly program meetings, and the accompanying field notes. I also collected textual documentation that would help me better understand the nature of the program and characteristics of the community. These included documents such as Web pages about the organization, its founding organization and the university, as well as handouts distributed during weekly program meetings.

As a critical source for my study, I attempted in-depth interviews with not only 6 subjects but also coordinators, presenters and attending participants if necessary. With each of my subjects, I spent approximately 3 -5 hours for interviews, i.e., about 25 hours total. These interviews were held either at the research site or other social settings such as my house or downtown cafeterias and restaurants. I chose these settings in the hope that adding a private component to the meetings might contribute to a comfortable, more intimate dynamic. I sought to elicit some additional, hidden information that they would not have disclose in a more formal interview. In addition to revealing the subjects' personal circumstances in the U.S., and their individual social and educational backgrounds, these interviews ultimately were designed furnish more accurate and comprehensive accounts of their feelings, opinions and narratives in recounting weekly program meetings as well as everyday events.

In addition, I relied upon subjects' journals to chronicle their thoughts and everyday experiences in the researcher's absence. As Norton (2000) indicates in her study, this method helps the researcher to understand how the subjects perceive the various social events and interactions they encounter, and the extent to which these perceptions are based on either socially "constructed" or "self-constructing" worldviews over a particular time period. The journals, in other words, were a critical source for observing how they evolved in a new community while interacting with their environment. As such, the content was not only confined to their thoughts about the program meetings themselves, but tended to include more comprehensive accounts of the subjects' lives in the U.S. — their friends and social activities — as well as particular events that they wished to share with the researcher. Despite not being required to write any specific number of entries, most of them wrote quite regularly — about 3-5 entries per month.

In addition to the ethnographic approach described, my research is also highly reliant upon methods of discourse analysis, since one primary focus of my study was linguistic analysis of the subjects' intercultural communicative practices. In collecting linguistic data, I made audio and video recordings of 29 weekly program meetings that took place over the course of two semesters. Some small group conversations were also audio-recorded while subjects and other participants (including the researcher) were doing assigned activities such as games and craft-

making were also audio-recorded as well. Following the discourse analysis methodology suggested by Atkinson & Heritage (1999), all audio-recorded conversations were transcribed.

Due to my limited German skills, the subjects used either English or Japanese when writing journals and during interviews. Japanese subjects generally wrote their journals in Japanese, though some were comfortable code-switching between English and Japanese at both lexical and syntactic levels. The German subjects, meanwhile, were asked to use English. While this was not their mother tongue, they seemed quite comfortable using it as a lingua franca for my research, presumably since the researcher's own identity as a non-native English speaker might have encouraged them to view the language as simply a "tool for communication."

Researcher and Researched

Lastly, it is very important that I note one crucial issue that might have fundamentally affected all of these sources of data: namely, the researcher's personal relationship with the researched subjects. As the procedure description indicates, I was involved with weekly program meetings not only as a researcher, but as a foreign visitor of the community who shared some similar background and experience with other participants. Of course, my attempts to establish friendly relationships with members, while largely derived from my intention to later capture their honest opinions in both journals and interviews, was in no way manipulative.

Ultimately, with some of my subjects I accomplished my goal: they felt comfortable talking about delicate issues as a close acquaintance, not only as a research subject. As we shall see, some subjects openly expressed their critical views of the U.S., alluding to its recent imperialist attitude toward Iraq and ethnocentric view of other races. This reflected, in great part, the common bond we held with respect to a cynical view of U.S. foreign policy both present and past, especially surrounding WWII and the U.S. postwar occupation. Such invisible ties, whether resulting from all of us being foreign visitors to the U.S. or representing formerly vanquished countries, provided additional and precious information for my study.

However, it must be acknowledged that these subjects were quite aware of the researcher's particular historical, political and ideological disposition especially in regard to the U.S. In this light, the data is clearly context-bound, since it represents the product of a contingent context, co-constructed by the researcher and researched, through their interactions and accompanying communicative practices reflecting their social, cultural and national identities. I shall revisit this issue in dealing with the methodological considerations in the conclusion chapter.

CHAPTER 4

“Another” Thanksgiving Dinner Conversation

Deborah Tannen’s discourse analysis of Thanksgiving dinner conversation is a pioneering work. Adopting a micro-analytic approach, she studied the discourse of six interlocutors at the Thanksgiving dinner table and examined the specific linguistic devices that constituted the participants’ conversational styles, how they used these devices in order to communicate with each other, and ultimately, their extent of success or failure in building rapport. In the preface to her re-edited book in 2005, Tannen stated that the study presents “the framework for analyzing cross-cultural communications,” even though all the participants were Americans who would appear to be rather socioculturally homogeneous. According to her, these participants “use language to signal their conversational intentions in systematically different ways; all but one acquired their conversational styles while growing up in the same country but in different ethnic and regional settings.” Hence, “The frame work of analysis can then be applied to conversations among speakers of radically different cultural and linguistics backgrounds and in more public context” (Tannen 2005: xvii – xviii).

Taking into account Tannen’s statement above, in this chapter I will first attempt to analyze my own data, adopting an interactional sociolinguistic approach. In a curious coincidence, the data for my study is yet another “Thanksgiving dinner conversation” in the intercultural communicative setting. Four participants (including myself, as in Tannen’s study) are not only from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, but from radically different “historical” and “ideological” backgrounds as well. They appeared at an international gathering specifically in order to learn about an American holiday, Thanksgiving. In attending, they had the following goals: (1) socialize, make friends, and practice English; (2) learn about the town, state, and region; (3) learn about other nations and cultures; (4) learn about America and American traditions; and (5) feel at home. In this study, we will observe the extent to which they accomplish these goals. In the event that they fail, we shall consider which elements might possibly have led to a breakdown in communication and prevented those goals from being realized.

Background

Promptly at 10 a.m., on November 15, 2006, a weekly gathering began at a local Baptist Church in Newtown. The topic for the day was “American Holiday, Thanksgiving.” Approximately 20 people showed up, including six local and foreign coordinators and other foreign guests. Thanksgiving dishes colorfully decorated the table at the front of the room, including a roasted turkey, cranberry sauce, mashed potatoes with marshmallows, pumpkin pie, green vegetables, cake, etc. These American traditional holiday dishes were all served and introduced by local coordinators. As soon as the members took their seats, one of the oldest coordinators, Caroline appeared in Native American costume and feathers, mimicking the Indian war cry. Then, she began to describe the origins of Thanksgiving: the Pilgrims’ arrival on the East Coast of North America and Native Americans’ assistance to these European settlers. She explained how the Europeans were able to survive the first winter by learning to grow corn and other crops from the Natives. Thanksgiving, according to Caroline, was first celebrated together

by European settlers and Native Americans to thank their respective gods for the good harvest. Following Caroline's introduction, the university Provost's wife, Tiffany, took over the presentation, providing additional information. While Caroline had focused on the holiday's historical aspect, Tiffany emphasized the apolitical, non-historical and non-religious nature of Thanksgiving, explaining that it is a holiday for family and friends to get together and just relax. Furthermore, she continued, one need not worry about his/her religious background, nor is there the need to send cards or give presents as with Christmas. According to Tiffany, the holiday is "for everyone" beyond cultural, ethnic and religious boundaries. After this brief presentation, another local coordinator explained how to roast a turkey for Thanksgiving. After about 25 minute of presenting, each member took some food on her plate, sat down at the table with others, and began eating.

I looked for a table at which to sit, hoping to tape-record some private conversations of other guests in a small group setting. Unfortunately, however, most tables were occupied by the same ethnic or racial groups. Japanese members, for instance, were sitting with other Japanese and speaking their own language with each other, as were Germans. Even the local coordinators were sitting together and chatting by themselves. The only "intercultural communication" taking place appeared to be at one table where a Russian (Olga) and German (Bianka) were sitting together and eating. Since I hoped to record "intercultural communication among people of different cultural backgrounds," I decided to sit with them, asking them for their consent. Already aware of my research,⁵⁰ they readily agreed.

Before proceeding to the discourse analysis, it is important to note that these two participants were not only interested in my research, but also willing to provide "good" data for "the study of intercultural communication." In other words, they were ready to cooperatively present their "different cultural knowledge" of Thanksgiving as an exemplar of intercultural communication between well-educated, well-intended, open-minded, and ultimately "good" participants. At this point, nobody at the table (including myself) could imagine how disastrously our conversation would end – as we shall see in the final part of this chapter.

Analysis I: Fostering International and Intercultural Understanding (Line 001-134)

In this section, four participants are discussing the similarities and differences between American and European traditional and religious celebrations, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas. The conversation begins with my question to Bianka about whether Germans also have a similar celebration:

[Excerpt 1]

B=Bianka (German), K= Kayo (Japanese) O= Olga (Russian), and R=Researcher (Japanese)
001 R: ((Laugh)) you, you think, you said you have Thanksgiving in Germany?
002 B: Yes. But not a way the Americans do it.
003 R: Uh-huh?
004 B: Usually, it's a very, (1.0) uh, Christian =

50 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bianka is one of three German subjects who wrote journals as part of my research. As for Olga, she initially wanted to join my study as a subject, but had to cancel due to her inadequate ability to write in English.

005 R: [Uh-huh?
006 B: = Celebration. Religious celebration (XXX) only the churches
007 R: [Uh-huh? [Huh?
008 B: we devoted to the church, the church especially the (XXX)
all the greens and foods.
009 R: Oh, OK.
010 B: That's, that's I remember.
011 R: Oh.

The first utterance in Line 001 is a crucial move in the transcript, since it directs other members to frame the conversation in a particular way. More specifically, by asking such a question, I take a position as an “Asian (Japanese)” foreign participant, who is unfamiliar with European and Christian culture and tradition in the context of an international and intercultural meeting. This utterance also indicates my status as a “good” participant who is willing to learn about different cultures and traditions in order to accomplish the program’s aforementioned goals. Taking her lead from the given context and my initial position in the conversation, Bianka likewise plays an assigned role in the following sentences. In responding to my question, she deliberately takes a position as a European foreign participant, who wants to share her European cultural knowledge and Christian tradition with a non-European foreign participant. Bianka explains that Germans also celebrate a somewhat similar holiday to Thanksgiving, though more religiously oriented. In Lines 003, 005, 007, 009 and 011, I frequently back channel to Bianka’s utterances in order to demonstrate my active attendance.

Replacing Bianka, Olga joins the conversation in Line 012, also taking a position as a European participant sharing a common cultural and religious ground with Germans and Americans. She first tries to assist Bianka in describing “European” versions of Thanksgiving by referring to the Russian celebration of “Good Harvest.” Corresponding to Olga, Bianka mentions that Germans celebrate “*Erntedankfest*” as well. Soon after, Kayo joins the table. As a foreign coordinator, she suggests that Bianka introduce *Erntedankfest* in the upcoming program, “Holidays of the World” the following month. I also suggest that Bianka talk about Christmas, since Germany is known for its famous Christmas markets. Note that my suggestion here employs high-involvement strategies to show a sense of rapport, designed to indicate my connectedness and shared-ness with Bianka by implying, “I am familiar with your culture.” At the same time, I take a position as a “researcher who studies German subjects,” by showing off my familiarity with German culture to other members.

So far, so good. Everyone plays her expected role: Kayo and I play the role of a “good” Japanese audience, eager to learn about European culture and tradition as a part of our introduction to the American Thanksgiving holiday. In order to encourage the others to speak more while showing our active attention, we frequently nod, back channel, and ask relevant questions. Likewise, Bianka and Olga play assigned roles as “good” European participants, willing to compare their culture to that of Americans. More importantly, they become more connected not only with Americans, but also with each other as they take similar roles in the conversation. Indeed, it appears that Americans, Russians and Germans are all connected, since they share common European cultural, traditional and religious backgrounds.

After five minutes of conversation has elapsed, Bianka and Olga summarize their understanding of the day's topic as the following;

[Excerpt 2]

043 B: Thanksgiving here, everybody goes to home

044 O: Christmas here, they come together, too.

045 R: Uh-huh

046 O: Really huge, you know.

047 B: Thanksgiving, every religion,

048 R: Uh-huh?

049 B: Thanksgiving, every religion celebrate, the Jews, Muslims, Hindus.
Thanksgiving is for everyone. ((Smile))

Lines 043 and 044 above show an interesting correspondence. Bianka states “Thanksgiving here, everybody goes to home” (Line 043) in order to emphasize a point to which one of the local coordinators, Tiffany, previously referred: that Thanksgiving is a holiday primarily for “family reunion” in which people get together to enjoy holiday dishes. Then, Olga cooperates (Line 044) by summarizing her understanding of yet another major American holiday, Christmas, as a family reunion. It is interesting to see how these two sentences not only share the same syntactic structure, but also rhythmically respond to one another through the use of two contrastive verbs (go and come), like a poem. Then, in Lines 047 and 049, Bianka further refines Tiffany's point: Thanksgiving is a “non-religious” holiday that everyone can celebrate beyond ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries. Finally, Bianka sums up Thanksgiving holiday in the most inclusive and idealistic way possible: “Thanksgiving is for everyone.” Mission accomplished.

At this point, all participants at the table (including myself) naturally accept such a utopian view of the holiday “as is,” seeming to understand it in the way intended by the coordinators, without realizing the naïveté of such an account. In order to better understand why these foreign participants naturally absorb this view,” it may be necessary for us to take into account larger social and historical contexts even though Tannen's micro-analytic approach does not closely focus on this aspect.⁵¹ Here, we should consider the possibility that the positive perceptions of the American Thanksgiving holiday held by Bianka and others members might be related to their similarly idealized view of the U.S. as a modern, advanced and cosmopolitan society. As I mentioned in the Introduction (and will refer to elsewhere), the U.S. has developed into a multiethnic and multicultural society constituted by people with various ethnic, cultural and

51 Yet, this does not mean that Tannen dismisses larger contextual factors in her interpretation of the conversation. In the preface to the latest edition in 2005, she refers to the connection between Interactional Sociolinguistics and prevalent social theories as follows: “Thus, in addition to providing a theory and method for understanding how meaning is created in verbal interaction, work in interactional sociolinguistics has also addressed issues of social inequality and mutual stereotyping in multiethnic societies. In his retrospective essay, Gumperz (2001:218) highlights this aspect of his research, which he calls ‘a main IS [Interactional Sociolinguistics] themes’: the ‘inherent linguistic and cultural diversity of today's communicative environments.’ He notes that interactional sociolinguistics can bridge the gap dividing two theoretical approaches: one that locates diversity in the ‘macro societal conditions, political and economic forces, and relationships of power in which they were acquired (Bourdieu 1977, 1994) and another that takes a ‘constructive approach,’ claiming that an understanding of how social worlds are created in interaction must precede an inquiry into the macro societal conditions subsumed under the rubric diversity.’ The claim, in other words, is not that linguistic features directly account for societal injustice, nor that their existence denies societal injustice, but rather that in order to understand and address issues of social injustice, it is necessary to understand how ‘political and economic forces, and relationship of power’ interplay with linguistic processes by which ‘social worlds are created in interaction.’”

religious backgrounds. This cosmopolitan nature developed even further after WWII, when the U.S.'s economic and cultural supremacy attracted people from all over the world. As the demographics of the university community evidently suggest, modern American society is popularly conceived as a liberal cosmopolitan state, in which people cooperatively live together beyond considerations of ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries. In this light, it is not surprising that those foreign participants would naturally absorb the “utopian” discourse of American Thanksgiving, since throughout modern history the holiday has presumably been viewed as a symbolic representation of the idealized America.

After agreeing upon such a “utopian⁵²” view of Thanksgiving, the participants continue to expand on the issues raised. Kayo (and I), for instance, search for some common ground with Europeans’ traditional celebration of “Good Harvest” by referring to a Japanese national holiday at the end of November (Lines 050 – 055). Although the date (Nov. 23) closely corresponds to the American Thanksgiving, it is a non-religious “Labor Day” that shares no common ground with either “Good Harvest” or Christianity. While Japanese participants fail to develop the topic or their sense of rapport with other European members, Olga successfully takes over, introducing other Christian celebrations in Russia as European traditions. She first explains that Russians used to have a variety of religious celebrations before the Russian Revolution, but could resume them only after the Cold War due to communism (Lines 056- 067). Then, she refers to *Lent*, introducing one of the most important religious practices of Eastern Christianity to other members (Lines 069- 078).

Unfortunately, however, both Bianka and I (and possibly Kayo) misconstrue Olga’s reference to Lent as reflecting the Catholic heritage due to our familiarity with Western Christianity.⁵³ The conversation proceeds as follows:

[Excerpt 3]

- 079 R: Do you have a term like, a, kind of a term that you cannot eat meat, =
080 R: = like, uh, Christian tradition?
081 O: Yeah, yeah.
082 B: That’s Catholic. Not Protestant.
083 O: No, Orthodox, too.
084 R: [Only Catholic? ((Responding to B))
085 K: [I see. ((Responding to B))
086 O: No, Orthodox, too. (XXX)
087 R: What?
088 O: Orthodox. In Russia, it’s Orthodox Church.
089 K: ((to R in Japanese)) O, Ooso—dokkusu?
090 B: [Orthodox
091 R: Oh, Orthodox. OK.
092 R: ((To K in Japanese)) オーソドックスってなんになるんですか?
(What does “Orthodox” mean?)
093 K: ((To R in Japanese)) さあ、わかんない。((laugh))

52 This “utopian” account is not directly given by the participants, but is rather my interpretation of their views.

53 I went to one of the oldest Catholic high schools in Japan.

(I don't know)

094 X: ((Passing by the table and asking)) How's the food?

095 R: It's very good.

096 K: [Delicious.

Above, Bianka first explains to the two Japanese that *Lent* is a Catholic practice, not Protestant (Line 082), then in Lines 084 and 085, we (mis)understand this. Olga immediately corrects Bianka twice, persistently explaining that Russian Orthodox Church also practices *Lent* as well (Lines 083 and 086). However, I am still unable to figure out what Olga is referring to because I cannot catch her pronunciation of "Orthodox" (Line 087). Olga then re-pronounces the term, "Orthodox" in order to make things clear (Line 088). Following Olga's lead, Kayo also tries to help me to understand the term by re-pronouncing it in the Japanese way as "Ooso – dokkusu," while showing her slight uncertainty with a rising tone (Line 089). Although I finally understand that Olga is talking about Russian Orthodox (Line 091), I still do not know what this actually is. Pretending for Olga that I am familiar with "Russian Orthodoxy," I secretly ask Kayo what this means in Japanese, in Line 092. But Kayo only answers, "I don't know," with an ambiguous chuckle. Rather than pursue this further, we both turn our attention to one of the coordinators (X in the excerpt above) and give her compliments about the turkey (Lines 095 and 096).

Not surprisingly, the interactions above not only disturbed Olga, but eventually alienated her from other members. In order to help explain why such an unpleasant situation occurred, I would like to shed light on the larger social context impacting the participants' communicative practices. First, it is crucial to note that other members are either not interested in or not familiar with Eastern Christianity primarily as a result of modern history. Bianka is originally from (West) Germany, where traditions of Western Christianity such as Protestant and Catholicism are predominant. With respect to the two Japanese participants, the majority of Japanese people have traditionally not been Christians, but Buddhists. Although they may be familiar with the Christian religion and culture from events of modern history,⁵⁴ they are primarily familiar with the Catholic and Protestant forms due to Japan's strong historical ties with Western European countries, especially following the Meiji Restoration (in 1868). Additionally, three participants are from the former Western bloc of the Cold War, where due to the "Iron Curtain" people had very little access to traditional Russian culture (and religion). In short, it seems that these geographic, historical and political factors critically affected the participants' communicative practices in the contingent context above, and ultimately fostered a feeling of estrangement among them.

Olga's sense of estrangement inevitably made her feel more strongly "Russian," as opposed to just a foreign participant. Accordingly, she is now eager to introduce and explain Russian culture and religion as a vital source of her national identity. In the following excerpt, she enthusiastically explains practices from her part of the world, especially the Eastern Orthodox religious practices and their accompanying cultural influence. In doing so, she tactfully focuses on the "difference" between Eastern and Western Europe.

54 Roman Catholic Christianity was first introduced to Japan in the 16th century by Portuguese missionaries, but was prohibited by the Tokugawa shogunate later in the 16th century, up until the middle of the 19th century.

[Excerpt 4]

- 105 O: Because changing a calendar from Julian calendar.
106 R: [oh, oh, the moon calendar to =
107 =Like Luna calendar to (1 sec) to, the, (1 sec). Is it a Luna calendar or
different calendar?
108 O: Luna, I don't know. No, not Gregorian calendar
109 K: [Julian calendar
(1.0.)
110 R: Huh. (0.5) Interesting.
112 O: [So, this is, just different. I know similar a lot.
113 O: Probably, some like you see different, but I see lot of similarity
114 B: Because they come from one rule.
115 O: [Ye::s, yes
116 B: and just separated
117 K: Yes.
118 R: [religion?
119 B: Catholic and Orthodox.
120 O: [Yeah.
121 R: What do you mean "Orthodox"? Orthodox?
122 B: Just another (0.5) =
123 O: [yeah
124 B: = different =
125 O: = line of Christianity
126 R: Are they different varie(ty), uh, different, uh, (0.5) strea::m (0.5) of Christianity?
127 B: Yes.
128 O: Yeah.
129 K: In Japanese, we call it "Russian Orthodox" because Russia (XXX)
130 R: [Oh, Russian Orthodox.
131 B: Is this Greek? Greek people?
132 R: [Yeah, yeah
133 O: And Russians.
134 R: Oh, OK. Interesting.

In the above exchange, Olga introduces the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church traditionally uses the Julian calendar instead of the Gregorian calendar, and therefore that Russians celebrate Christmas two weeks later than Catholics and Protestants. Note that she actively plays the role of a good foreign participant who is willing to share her cultural knowledge and religious traditions, while the other three members similarly play assigned roles as a "good foreign participants." In contrast to their previous neglect of and indifference to the Russian Orthodox Church, this time, both Japanese and German participants actively listen to Olga. I, for instance, frequently back channel, adding my own knowledge to Olga's explanation in order to encourage her to speak more (Lines 106, 107, 118, 121, 126, 130 and 132). I also show my interest in Russian culture by positively evaluating it as "interesting" (Lines 110 and 134). Bianka, for her part, takes a similar position to Olga as a "European" participant. Yet, this time, she tactfully acknowledges Russian Orthodox as not only a major Christian denomination,

but possibly a more important sect than the Protestant one (Line 119). Kayo also attempts to show her familiarity with “Russian Orthodox” by implying that this is also well-known in Japan.

The conversation then reverts to its initial spirit of cooperation. As Tannen’s study suggested, we observe various linguistic devices which interlocutors tactfully adopt in order to build rapport with one another, in the search for sameness and shared-ness. Although they might occasionally encounter cultural differences and experience a sense of alienation, ultimately they manage to accept such cultural “differences” as “interesting” but not offensive. Note that the participants’ frequent use of two adjectives, “different” (lines 128, 132, 133, 144, and 146) and “interesting,” are especially salient to this aspect of the data, indicating not only their positive acceptance of “different” cultures, but also the successful attainment of the goals stated earlier. In order to “foster mutual understandings of each other with different backgrounds,” they adroitly use these evaluative adjectives to manage “cultural differences” observed in an international and intercultural communicative context.

Analysis I addressed the range of cultural knowledge that foreign participants brought to the conversation in this given intercultural communicative context, and illustrated how they attempted to build a sense of rapport in their search for connection and common ground with one another. Additionally, it documented how easily those participants showed themselves to differ from one another in spite of their cooperative attitudes and goodwill. As witnessed above, seemingly trivial differences in culture unexpectedly prevented them from connecting with each other; at least temporarily. Most importantly, however, it is crucial to note that those foreign participants in the conversation were not necessarily disturbed by “cultural differences” in contrast to the prevalent conviction in the field of Intercultural Communication. Instead, they were (at least ostensibly) able to manage cultural differences effectively, by positively accepting and evaluating them in an open-minded spirit and by employing some linguistic devices as effective communicative tactics. Such unexpected findings, I assume, may possibly derive from the social background and accompanying cosmopolitan spirit of the participants involved. More specifically, their readiness to encounter cultural differences and flexibility in handling the intercultural communicative context are both tacitly expected and required for upper (middle) class and well-educated female visitors to the U.S. in a globalized age. In other words, because their upper (middle) class social identity is associated with a modern cosmopolitan identity, the participants were prepared to celebrate such “cultural differences.” In this light, it is not surprising that they could handle each other’s different cultural knowledge very well, since they were “fostering intercultural and international understanding” while deliberately practicing their “privileged upper (middle) class” identity.

Analysis II: Omen (Line 135 -182)

Four participants continue to develop the conversation in reference to Olga’s interest of Eastern Christianity. Deliberately cooperating with Olga, Bianka expands the topic by mentioning that the current Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is located in Istanbul. Kayo and I overtly react to this piece of trivia by taking positions as Asian / Japanese (non-European / non-Christian) foreign participants, who wish to learn about the major European religion of Christianity (see Lines 136, 137, 139, 141, 142, 144 and 146 in Appendix). When I

ask Bianka and Olga why the Patriarch lives in Turkey (Lines 144 and 146), Olga tries to provide some historical background (Line 148):

[Excerpt 5]

- 148 O: [One is, Ottoman Empire had a prosperous time
149 B: Yes. In old time.
150 O: Yeah. They, you know, took a lot of part of Russia, a lot of countries,
151 R: [Oh::
152 K: So the country went up north
153 O: [Yeah, yeah. =
154 O: = Then, Russia, send them back ((laugh))
155 R: [OK, I see::
156 K: Huge continent, connected ((laugh))
157 O: [Yeah, yeah.
158 R: [Huh
159 O: So, why, I think it's (XXX) because of, because Ottoman Empire.

Olga implies that Istanbul is a mecca for the Eastern Orthodox Church due to the historical ascendancy and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire in Eastern Europe (Line 148). At first glance, this utterance would appear to be a simple statement about Eurasian history. However, it needs to be carefully examined as the issue of Istanbul's importance is not just a cultural topic relating to Christianity, or to a historical event on the Eurasian continent during the Middle Ages. Instead, for Olga, it is inextricably associated with a vital part of her "Russian" ethnic identity.

Tracing events back to the Roman Empire, Olga, like many other Russians, strongly believes that they are the legitimate successors to the Roman (and Byzantine) Empire, as well as Christianity. The Russian Empire was thus the "Third Rome," which fought against "Muslim" Ottoman. On this view, the history of Constantinople (Istanbul) is inevitably treated as a significant part of "Russian" history, where the battle over Constantinople symbolically represents the historical rivalry between the Russian (and Roman) Empire and the Ottoman Empire over European, Balkan, and African territories. In the excerpt above, Olga explains that the Ottoman Empire conquered a large part of Eastern Europe, which she considers to be a part of "Russia." Kayo, in response, tries to demonstrate her historical knowledge about Eurasia in the Middle Ages, implicitly referring to both the Fall of Constantinople (the end of the Byzantine Empire) and the subsequent Ottoman Empire, which conquered most of the Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, in its heyday (Line 152). In Line 154, however, Olga immediately corrects Kayo, explaining that the Russian Empire fought back against the Ottomans, driving them back from Europe. Oblivious to Olga's patriotic intention, Kayo is naively impressed by Olga's historical narratives, taking great interest in the historical dynamics of the Eurasian continent (Line 156). Simultaneously, however, she feels an irrevocable sense of alienation from Germans and Russians as "a Japanese," whose history was always isolated from the rest of the world before the modern era.

Not surprisingly, the emergence of Olga's "Russian" identity slowly yet inevitably evokes other members' own national identities, while affecting their communicative practices in the

contingent context. To further develop the conversation, Bianka decides to provide another piece of trivia for the others; namely, the Ottoman Empire's mode of colonial rule. In the excerpt below, she explains that the Ottoman Empire did not convert its subjects to Islam (Lines 160, 162, 164 and 167). Her reference to this unique characteristic of the Ottoman Empire (*Millets*) is a crucial move in the transcript since this will ultimately lead the conversation in an unexpected direction.

[Excerpt 6]

160 B: O, o, Ottoman Empire, very seldom interfered. (1.0)
161 R: Inter?
162 B: They did not, ah, convert people.
163 R: Uh-huh?
164 B: They say, "You live but have to pay taxes"
165 R: Oh, OK.
166 K: [Ah, I see.
167 B: So, they left them but for taxes.
168 R: Uh-huh.
169 K: [That's wise ((chuckle))
170 B: It is. ((chuckle))
171 K: [Clever. ((chuckle)) (XXXX) but they want money ((chuckle))
172 B: Yes. ((chuckle))
173 O: So, when they go, (0.5) so far, but they had money
174 B: Even after Jews were expelled from Spain =
175 K: [Uh-huh?
176 B: = they went to Turkey.
177 R: Yeah?
178 B: So that does Muslims.
179 R: [Because they can't keep their religion?
180 B: Yes.
181 O: Uh-huh.
(1.0.)

It is often said that the Ottoman Empire's longtime prosperity was largely a function of its economic, cultural and religious policies. More specifically, the Ottomans' generosity towards different ethnic groups and specific religions was closely related to its economic goals, since the government aimed to consolidate and extend its power through state revenue without damaging the subjects' prosperity and causing social disorder. Accordingly, Ottoman society was religiously and culturally fragmented, since subjects' cultural and religious unity was secondary to the state's economic prosperity. Bianka explains these points in Lines 160- 167, which Olga supplements with additional information in Line 173. Again, Kayo and I play an assigned role of good audience/student of world history. While I primarily back channel to Bianka (Lines 161, 163, 165, 168 and 177), Kayo actively responds to the interlocutors with positive evaluative comments on the Ottoman Empire's method of colonial rule, such as "wise" and "clever" (Lines 169 and 171). The conversation seems well-developed, with everyone either actively or passively involved. In addition to fair distributions of participants' turn takings, the transcript also reveals

the pleasant atmosphere which prevails in the conversation, with the chain reaction of chuckles in Lines 170, 171 and 172.

Bianka then refers to yet another piece of additional trivia in Line 174, saying that the Ottoman Empire accepted “even” Jews after they were prosecuted and expelled from Spain. Ostensibly, the sequence of the conversation is not particularly strange, since Bianka only shares her historical knowledge of the Eurasian continent with other members in order to “foster international and intercultural understanding.” Yet, Line 174 serves as a foreshadowing of the disastrous end to the conversation. In light of its crucial effect on the rest of the conversation, I would now like to closely examine the other meanings brought to the conversation in this particular exchange.

To begin with, Bianka’s reference to “expelled Jews from Spain” might seem abrupt and disruptive to the conversational flow. Particularly for me, as a Japanese researcher, her utterance does not seem to logically follow from her previous topic of the Ottoman Empire’s political and economic policies for sustaining state revenues. Such inconsistency makes more sense, however, if one takes into account the common cultural knowledge shared by herself (and Olga) regarding the issue of racism in Europe.

As 20th century history vividly demonstrates, it is often said that there has been deep-rooted anti-Semitism in Europe dating from its very beginnings. Given Christianity’s dominance, Europeans occasionally discriminated against Jews for their ancestral religious beliefs and cultural religious practices, even trying to convert them to Christianity. Jews who refused to convert and religiously assimilate were either persecuted and expelled, or in the worst case, executed. In light of such extensive hatred and prejudice towards Jews in Europe, the age of the Ottoman Empire was a relatively peaceful time for them since their religion and culture was protected. To illustrate the Empire’s exceptional generosity towards Jews, in Line 174 Bianka pointedly refers to the Spanish monarchy as a representative European counterpart during the Middle Ages. Despite the fact that these two states were both multicultural and multiethnic in the 15th century, their treatment of pagans was strikingly different. Unlike the Ottoman Empire which accepted Jews due to their economic benefits, the Spanish monarchy persecuted them, confiscating their property for its own political and economic benefit in the name of the Christian god. Bianka’s reference to the notorious “Spanish Inquisition” indicates such a “difference” between Islam and Christian cultures in terms of ruling pagans of the state (see also Line 178). Yet, did she cite the Ottoman Empire’s generosity towards different ethnicities, cultures, and religions merely to provide others with additional cultural knowledge? In order to fully understand what she “really” intended in referring to the “Spanish Inquisition,” we need to further explore the historical context behind this utterance, with respect to Bianka’s “European” and “German” identity.

In the “Playback” session, Bianka explained that her intention in making the comment in Line 174 (and her reference to the Ottoman Empire) was to make a severe criticism of European colonial practices from the 16th to the 20th century. During this period, Europeans “(re) discovered” the Americas, Asia, and Africa, and continuously colonized the indigenous pagans as “Other,” converting them to Christianity. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, which co-existed with the colonized without altering their culture, the Europeans exploited the “Other” by directly

ruling, displacing and executing indigenous populations. Such a negative account of Europe's colonial history informed Bianka's association of the European Christian mentality with the Spanish Inquisition. For her, the latter serves as historical evidence for these Christians' intolerance toward "different" religions and cultures, due to their sense of superiority over the non-European and non-Christian "Other." By this account, her positive view of the Ottoman Empire acts as a counterpart to her hidden criticisms of Western colonization and the accompanying European racist ideology of "Orientalism."

Bianka's criticisms indeed come off as a righteous condemnation of the darker side of Christianity in European history. One may wonder, however, why this "Western" subject needs to judge Europeans' racist and colonialist practices so severely. Is this because she is performing her upper-class identity to other foreign audiences as a well-educated and liberal European? Or, is it because she is from Germany, which was less notorious for these practices than other Western European colonizers such as England, Spain, Portugal, France, and Netherlands? The utterance in Line 174 is a key to the next stage of the conversation. Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that this utterance is intricately entangled by multiple historical layers, and we can no longer analyze it with the micro-analytic approach that Tannen had adopted in her study. In order to untangle it, we must depart from "Interactional Sociolinguistics" and enter the realm of "postmodern sociolinguistics." With the aid of a multi-dimensional "ecological" approach, I will now take into account the multiple time scales of communicative practices in analyzing these participants' interactions; namely, what Blommaert calls the layered simultaneity and synchronization of history.

When Bianka referred to the Spanish Inquisition in criticizing Western colonization, this choice of historical incident was not accidental. By implicitly claiming that the colonization of both Old and New Worlds had been fundamentally based on a racist ideology and an accompanying sense of superiority, Bianka consciously pointed to those Europeans' wrongdoings towards the "Other." Their racist practices were first directed at non-Christian Jews in Europe in the pre-colonial era, and then extended to non-Europeans in the colonial era. In both cases, Europeans persecuted, displaced and sometimes executed "Others," committing what are now called "crimes against humanity." However, why does this "synchronized" term of "crimes against humanity" in different eras in human history matter so much to her?

From a close examination of journals and interviews with Bianka, I began to realize how much WWII and postwar history have affected Bianka's (and other German subjects') worldview(s) as well as her (their) communicative practice(s) today. Although I shall come back to this issue in detail in the following chapter, it should be noted that (West) Germany's Nazi past and the accompanying Holocaust have not only severely stigmatized its nationhood but also inevitably alienated (West) Germans from other Western Europeans during the postwar era. Because of the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust, Germans were first indicted by other Europeans in the Nuremberg Trials and then judged as guilty for their "crimes against humanity." Consequently, Germans were often regarded as "a cancer of Europe" (Dower 1999), needing to be re-educated and re-disciplined through various denazification programs. WWII history, on this account, severely damaged Germans' postwar national identity not only by fating them to carry a burden of guilt, but also branding them as an "Other" of the Western "Self."

Given Germany's tainted nationhood and stigmatized national identity which essentially derived from their guilt over these "crimes against humanity," Bianka's reference to the Ottoman Empire now makes sense. Her disguised criticisms of European colonial history represent an implicit expression of her anger and frustration toward the hypocrisy of other Western Europeans, who would indict Germans' crimes against humanity without ever questioning their own inhuman acts in the past. This resentment, which is compounded by her cultural memories of her country's "bitter" postwar history (e.g. the Allied occupation, "double standard judgment" of the Nuremberg Trials, and West Germans' long-term atonement for the Holocaust as well as having to endure eternal accusations from the European victims), ultimately provoked her to radically question (Western) Europeans' claims to righteousness, justice and innocence in their own colonial history.

Analysis II addressed how history unpredictably, yet unavoidably, interrupts the participants' communicative practices, as their ethnic (or national) identities slowly emerge in the intercultural communicative context. In the excerpts above, both Olga and Bianka initially referred to the Ottoman Empire's history in order to share their cultural knowledge of Christianity and its history with Asian participants. As we have witnessed, however, they eventually began to use this history to speak of "their interest." For instance, Olga brought up the subject in order to imply the historical rivalry between the Russian and Ottoman Empires while Bianka referred to the *Millet* to ultimately criticize Western Europeans' colonial practices and accompanying hypocrisy with which they indicted Nazi Germany's crimes against humanity. The participants were, in other words, speaking of history as a way of reflecting their own interests. In this light, historical references indeed contain potential meaning, since each participant's subjectivity reacts differently to the various historical elements floating in the air. As we shall see, the participants eventually begin to incorporate their own set of meanings into their historical references, while deliberately practicing their ethnic (or national) identities.

Analysis III: Communication Breakdown – Misunderstanding and Change of Frame from Culture to History (Line 183-233)

As Bianka's German identity slowly emerges, she becomes more inclined to introduce her country and people to other members. In the following excerpt (which follows Excerpt 7), she mentions that the current Bishop of Rome (the Pope) is visiting Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople in Istanbul (in November 2006). Connecting this trivia to the previous topic of Eastern Christianity and the Ottoman Empire, Bianka speaks of the new Pope, Benedict XVI:

[Excerpt 7]

183 B: And the Pope is now, I think, although a little, a little difficult with Turkish government, the Pope is trying to reach the Orthodox (0.5) Pope in Turkey now in November.

184 R: Yeah?

185 K: [Huh?

186 R: Really? The Pope is the German Pope, and he wanna meet the Orthodox Pope?

187 B: Yes. The Pope of Rome.

188 O: Oh, this is so (XXX). He is, so, German, yeah.

189 B: Yes, yes, yes, yes ((excited))
190 K: ((chuckle)) That's right
191 R: ((chuckle)) [ye::s, that's right, yes.
192 O: ((chuckle))
193 K: That's right. ((chuckle))
194 B: For me, it's always (XXX)
195 O: [Yeah, yeah, yeah ((chuckle))
196 K: ((chuckle))

At the beginning of the excerpt above, I initially play the role of “audience” because of my “non-Christian European” identity and sense of alienation from the given theme. As soon as I hear Bianka mention the “Pope” in Line 183, however, I surmise that she wants to talk about the new “German” Pope. Having finally found a chance to contribute to the conversation, I add my knowledge to Bianka’s statement, simultaneously showing my sense of rapport with her by giving what she wants in Line 186 (implicitly revealing that the new Pope is “German”). Olga picks up on this, realizing that Bianka’s interest is not in the Pope’s visit to Istanbul, or his holiness’s contact with the Patriarch. Instead, Bianka wants other people to notice that the Pope is now “German.” Bianka’s excited reaction in Line 189 proves that my assumption was right. In Line 190, Kayo finally understands Bianka’s intention and confirms it as a true fact.

Note that the participants’ interactions between Lines 189 and 196 illustrate how they cooperatively build a sense of rapport with each other in the conversation. The most salient example is the chain reaction of chuckles in Lines 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, and 196. Similarly, Kayo’s utterance of “That’s right.” (Line 190) rhythmically echoes between myself and herself three times, in a type of resonance. Furthermore, Bianka’s initial reaction to my reference to the German Pope in Line 189 (“Yes, yes, yes, yes.”) is similarly adopted by Olga in Line 195. The sequences of these lines thus could be compared to music being played by an orchestra. Each utterance is exquisitely attuned to the other’s, creating a collective sense of harmony. Again, the conversation is thus far quite satisfying for everyone. They not only develop the conversation cooperatively by sharing their cultural knowledge, but are satisfied with their successful face-work.

However, after this, communication suddenly breaks down – due to me. After all the participants at the table have shared in Bianka’s excitement, she further explains how proud Germans are of the new Pope, referring to a catchy tabloid headline, “We are the Pope”:

[Excerpt 8]

197 R: Isn't that a big thing for German people?
198 B: Yes.
199 R: [Yeah?
200 B: We have a paper
201 R: Yeah?
202 B: *Bild* means picture news paper. It's a very cheap tabloid
203 R: [Uh-huh?
204 B: This paper said, “We are the Pope”.

205 R: Ah? Really?
206 K: ((chuckle))
207 B: Yeah.
208 R: ((chuckle)) Yeah? But isn't that politically incorrect? ((chuckle))
209 B: ((distraught)) Yes. Yes. But when he became the Pope, there was a problem.
Because, he was, ah,
210 R: He was, uh, Nazi.
211 B: ((distraught)) Nazi.
212 K: Oh, really?
213 R: Yeah. But you know, that was, uh, they had to
214 K: (XXX)
215 B: [But at that time, everybody.
216 B: ((to Kayo)) Sorry. I was interrupting
217 R: [I know, I know
(1.0.)

When I pointed out that the headline sounded “politically incorrect” in Line 208, Bianka’s previously excited tone and smile immediately disappeared. The pleasant atmosphere at the table turned to gloom, and the two other participants looked bewildered and concerned. Apparently, we all realized that I had accidentally touched upon a taboo subject at this international meeting. That is, I threw a damper on the conversation by inappropriately bringing a historically delicate issue for German participants to an “apolitical” intercultural gathering. In the OWW, both coordinators and participants usually avoid politically and historically delicate topics in order to save everyone’s face. In the situation above, however, I unexpectedly caused Bianka to lose face by alluding to this stigma for Germans, accidentally humiliating her. Such an undesirable situation derived not only from my inappropriate reference to that history but also from Bianka’s “misunderstanding” of my intention, and hence, a “miscommunication” occurred. In order to understand exactly how this misunderstanding developed, I would like to first explain my intention behind my statement in Line 208, and then consider how Bianka misread this, taking into account the historical and ideological contextualization cues affecting our communicative practices.

First, I suggested that the phrase, “We are the Pope,” sounded inappropriate because I was implicitly critical of the Germans’ overt celebration over the victory in the conclave. Theoretically, the conclave is an election to choose a spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus should not be treated as a “competition” (at least publicly). I was also aware of the racially sensitive aspect of this conclave, especially for non-Europeans. Although it drew worldwide attention in 2005 due to the possibility of choosing the first non-European Pope, ultimately – as expected – a “European” was chosen as supreme spiritual leader. While I understood Germans’ excitement over the result, I also felt that they should have been more considerate of those non-European Christians, who never play a crucial role in the “politics” of the Roman Catholic Church even though they are also “Christians.” In short, my ambivalent remark about the headline, in hindsight, primarily derived from my viewpoint as a non-European “Other.”

Bianka, however, did not understand my intention. Instead, she automatically thought that I was hinting at “another” issue about the Pope; namely, his membership in *the Hitler Youth* during WWII. Both during and after the conclave, certain people questioned Benedict XVI’s qualifications for this reason. Accordingly, Bianka presumed that I was saying, essentially: “It is not PC to express your joy so overtly because he has an unethical background in his personal history.” Bianka’s facial expression immediately informed me that she had misunderstood my implication, so bewildered that she could not even finish her sentence in Line 209. When she hesitated, I took over and tried to finish her sentence by adding the complement object that I presumed she would use in Line 210. Unfortunately, this latching did not serve well as a cooperative conversational device to exhibit rapport between myself and Bianka. On the contrary, it made the situation even worse because I used an unpleasant and inaccurate term, “Nazi,” to describe the Pope’s past. Surprisingly, Bianka seemed to accept my inaccurate expression and reluctantly used it in Line 211.

Bianka’s reluctant acceptance of my expression might be regarded as quite strange, especially if one takes into account her knowledge of this topic. Specifically, membership in *the Hitler Youth* was mandatory for all male youngsters in Germany after 1939. Although the Pope’s family was opposed to the Nazi party and regime, he was forced to join due to this legal obligation. Given this context, one could question whether it was appropriate for me to call the Pope “Nazi.” More importantly, why did Bianka choose not to provide me with this more historically accurate information? Why didn’t she “educate” me?

In the Playback session, Bianka remembered this encounter quite well. When I asked her why she did not correct my inaccurate characterization of the Pope, she explained that she had felt “helpless.” The first time she heard me use the term, “Nazi,” she was shocked; in her own words, “I was almost paralyzed.” She wondered why “this friendly and nice researcher” would identify the Pope in such a way. For her, the term, “Nazi” does not simply signify the name of a political party in modern German history. Instead, it is used like a “weapon,” which severely hurts many Germans’ feelings and renders them speechless subjects who “surrender” any further discussions about their past. Although at that moment she could not logically explain why she was so shocked, she strongly felt that “something was quite wrong” with my utterance in Line 2310. She thought, if this “knowledgeable researcher,” who is familiar with German history, still calls a German child (and thus, the Pope) a “Nazi,” then what can I do? Ultimately, Bianka felt desperate because she had unexpectedly witnessed that I was “just like most American media people,” who make it sound as though all Germans (including women and children) were fanatical supporters of Hitler during WWII.

Ironically, in contrast to Bianka’s image of me as a “knowledgeable” researcher, I actually knew very little of the Pope’s alleged involvement with the Nazi party during the war when the conversation was recorded. I had briefly read the newspapers which said that the Pope had a “Nazi” past. I was not aware that membership in *the Hitler Youth* had been legally obligated for all German youth during the war. Nor was I aware of the extremely negative connotations of the term – especially in the U.S. – since I am not a native English speaker. When I naïvely used the word “Nazi” in Line 210, in retrospect, I had not thought much about my choice of words or had any intention of insulting her. I was simply careless and insensitive about the English term I was using. Unfortunately, my insensitive word choice and ignorance regarding this history had an

extremely unfortunate effect on this interaction. Bianka later expressed her bitter feelings about the incident in the following way: “You (the researcher) insulted me without knowing that.”

Bianka’s disappointment inevitably alienated her from other participants, while simultaneously leading her to feel more “German” than other categories, such as European Christian or foreign participant in the current context. The emergence of her German identity accordingly compelled her, in order to protect the reputation of ordinary Germans, to explain to the other members why the Pope had been a “Nazi” at that time. In Line 215, she carefully explains that all Germans were “Nazi” during the war because it was a totalitarian regime controlled by Hitler. By objecting to my inappropriate word choice in such a way, Bianka tries to defend the Pope (and other ordinary Germans) without defending those “real” Nazi officers. Then, she implicitly poses the question of whether it was appropriate to treat those *Luftwaffenhelfer* (child soldiers deployed during the WWII) as equivalent to the SS proper. Here, Bianka attempts to indirectly modify the popular connotation or “the second-order signified” (Barthes 1957) of “Nazi,” which generally includes any Germans serving for the nation during WWII.

However, Bianka failed to alter the connotation successfully because her utterance (Line 215) accidentally overlapped with Kayo’s (Line 214). Interestingly, her agenda was then taken over by myself. As one can easily imagine, I was feeling extremely awkward about my face-threatening act towards Bianka, while desperately hoping to repair it. While I initially was stumped, Bianka’s defense of the Pope in Line 215 (“But at that time, everybody”) suddenly reminded me of another similar case involving Gunter Grass. This connection ultimately allowed me to redress my previous face-threatening act:

[Excerpt 9]

218 R: You know, I was thinking about the same thing. Ah, (0.5) cause ah,
the author of Tin Drum

219 B: What?

220 R: You know, “Tin Drum”? The movie. Tin Drum. Yeah, you know.
He’s, uh, his name is, M: Uh, *Gunter Grass*.

221 B: Uh. Uh-huh.

222 R: [*Gunter Grass*.

223 B: Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

224 R: You know, and, he, you know, he, you know, he, he was accused,
especially by Polish people just because he belonged to Nazi. =

225 R: = But I’m sure at that point everybody had to belong to.

226 B: [It was very difficult not to and survive

227 R: Yeah, like not to. And, I’m surprised everybody actually thought that he wasn’t?
That’s impossible, right? (XXX)

(1.0)

228 R: You know, so, I, but,

229 B: [((to Y))(XXX)

230 R: But, European people are, very, uh, (0.5), very, sensitive.

231 B: Yes. Of course.

232 R: [Very sensitive.
233 O: [Yeah.

By associating the Pope with a Nobel Prize-winning German writer, Gunter Grass (Lines 218-222), I was expressing my sympathy for those *Luftwaffenhelfer* who grew up in Germany during the war and became involved with the Nazi regime in any way by default (Lines 224-227). Although I was initially trying to demonstrate my sympathy for Bianka as a token of politeness, I was eventually provoked by my own utterance, as my stammer indicates (Line 224). I also explicitly displayed my anger towards those Polish people who never forgave the Germans. I thus found myself in the ironic position of appearing to speak on behalf of those ordinary Germans during the war, although I am not even German. Moreover, in Line 225, I referred to the historical situation with a tone of certainty (“I’m sure”) even though I did not live in Germany during WWII. I also used modal auxiliaries (“had to”) to emphasize that any German nationals were actually “irresistibly forced” to contribute to the war. But, how would I know that? How could I be so sure about my knowledge of German society under the Nazi regime, if I did not even grow up listening to the older generation’s war experiences, and learning about the WWII history in a German classroom?

In retrospect, it was my “Japanese” identity that enabled me to speak as if I knew more about the wartime situation in Germany. In speaking on behalf of Germans, my “Japanese” identity as a former Axis national slowly yet inexorably emerged, leading me to subconsciously defend ordinary German people. However, my support for Germans should not be misconstrued as a mere expression of my camaraderie with Bianka as a former Axis national. In truth, I criticized Polish people not only to defend Germans but also to express my own interest through my communicative practice of Japanese identity. In order to fully untangle the complex interactions described above, I would like to provide additional context for these utterances of mine, especially my reactions to the information regarding the two Germans’ past involvement with *the Hitler Youth* and *Waffen-SS*, and my own feelings about the current historical controversy over WWII in Asia.

When I first heard about the Pope’s past, I was not surprised. As a Japanese national, whose nation had once been under totalitarian control due to excessive nationalism, I understood how easily and inevitably ordinary people could become involved with the military during wartime. Instinctively, I responded to the Pope’s story with pity, assuming that he had probably suffered in having to unwillingly go through such experiences. Simultaneously, I was unsettled by some Europeans’ unforgiving attitudes toward the Germans, even after 60 years. The news made me realize how difficult it is for Germans to overcome their stigmatized past. These vague feelings later became convictions when I read an article about Gunter Grass’s confession about his past as a member of *Waffen-SS*, and Europeans’ negative reactions to it (in August, 2006). Although he was known as a prominent political activist who had criticized the Nazi regime for the last several decades, some Europeans still accused him severely and mercilessly. It seemed that Gunter Grass’s past moral efforts meant nothing as long as he had once been involved with the Nazis. In short, when I heard about both news events, I had the bitter realization that those Germans would never be liberated from their Nazi legacy.

Not surprisingly, this sense of distress was also directed to my own people and country. Similarly to Germany, Japan is also currently in conflict with other Asian nations, such as China and Korea, over its reading of WWII history. These controversies have been exacerbated by China's successful emergence in global capitalist society as a growing economic power. These newly developing geopolitical factors have become intertwined with other historical issues that haunt Asia (e.g. the Nanking Massacre, Comfort women, Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese people's traumatic experiences of the A-bombs and Tokyo Trials), ultimately rendering these issues unsolvable. Such underlying concerns led me to conflate Germans' issues with ours. Consequently, I found myself speaking on behalf of Germans, yet in reality was also speaking for Japanese. By criticizing Europeans' unforgiving attitudes, I was implicitly showing my frustration toward other Asians as I practiced my Japanese identity.

Analysis III addressed how two parties miscommunicated and misunderstood each other due to their differing focuses and sets of knowledge regarding the given topic. As observed above, history unexpectedly interrupted the conversation once more, evoking the participants' sense of otherness in relation to either their race or historical stigma. Yet the analysis also illustrated more dynamic, and hence "ecological," aspects of communicative practices. As Bianka's re-signification of the term "Nazi" indicates, participants began to alter the prevalent discourse surrounding this piece of modern history, casting doubt upon the "taken-for-granted" view of WWII history. In this light, the communication breakdown and accompanying efforts at repair functioned as a catalyst to change the entire frame of ongoing intercultural communication from "talking about cultural differences" to "talking about different cultural memories of the WWII and postwar history." Accordingly, participants no longer aimed to share "different" cultural knowledge with one another, but were now ready to bring together "different" pieces of their respective WWII and postwar histories to complete a bigger puzzle. In other words, as their national identities were evoked by other members, all parties became geared toward constructing an alternative view of the world – as we shall see in the following section.

Analysis IV: Application of the Legitimate Genre – Talking About Political Issues in the Apolitical Context (234-277)

As observed above, I have attempted to repair my face-threatening act against Bianka by blaming Polish people. Yet, an uncomfortable atmosphere remains, since nobody knows how to react to my oddly aggressive defense of Germans. Everyone seems to be waiting to observe which direction the conversation is to proceed. Should we continue discussing the same topic, or should we switch to something ahistorical and apolitical? If we continue, how can we discuss such a delicate issue without threatening each other's face? Although Bianka remains silent at first like the others, ultimately she decides to continue speaking about German history:

[Excerpt 10]

- 234 B: Yes. For sixty years, we are not allowed to put our flag on.
235 R: Sixty years?
236 B: Sixty years.
237 R: Yeah?
238 K: National flag?

239 B: National flags. Everybody was, “No”, to the national flags (XXX)
230 R: [There, there was a law? =
241 R: = Or people just didn’t do it?
242 B: [No, no.=
243 B: = Because, uh, because we lost war, we felt such a guilt.
244 R: Oh, OK.
245 B: We did so much bad things to so many people.
246 R: [Uh-huh?
247 B: killed Russians.

Above, Bianka shares (West) Germany’s unknown postwar history, such as Germans’ sense of stigma and their burden of guilt, with the Russian and Japanese participants. In explaining how Germans have suffered from their past, she offers the others a glimpse of her postwar identity as an “accused, stigmatized and alienated” German, keenly aware that these members are not hostile but rather sympathetic towards Germans. In Line 234, she tactfully uses the passive tense (e.g. not allowed) in order to imply that there was an external force: the constant surveillance and interference from (West) Germany’s neighbors. Then, she carefully shifts her position to the “repentant” German identity, displaying deep regret for Nazi Germany’s wrongdoings during WWII (Lines 237, 241, 243, and 245). Here, she attributes Germans’ rejection of this expression of national patriotism to an internal force – their sense of guilt. In shifting from one position to another, Bianka performs the complicated nature of her postwar German identity.

The interactions above also provide an interesting example of how each of the participants appropriates the newly adopted “genre” to discuss a politically delicate issue, while avoiding the possibility of threatening each other’s face. The two Japanese participants tactfully treat Bianka’s delicate topic as nothing more than just “different” cultural knowledge of the postwar history by taking a position as “good foreign participants” in the international gathering. Moreover, they reinforce their active attention to Bianka by frequently nodding, back-channeling and asking relevant questions as a “good audience” and “curious listener.” As may have been noticed, these interactional patterns significantly resemble those observed before when participants were discussing European holiday celebrations and Christianity. Within this frame, the Japanese participants no longer are compelled to take a political and emotional position as a former Axis national who feels stigmatized. Instead, the adopted genre enables them to act as if they were simply foreign visitors who wanted to acquire new cultural knowledge. In other words, the participants’ application of the legitimate genre functioned to strike a balance between a politically delicate topic (Germany’s Nazi legacy) and apolitical social context (a cooperative international and intercultural gathering) by framing their communicative practices in a generically appropriate, and hence legitimate, way. With the aid of such communicative tactics, they may comfortably continue to discuss politically delicate topics, even in such an apolitical setting.

The participants’ provisional application of the legitimate genre successfully restored a more friendly and social atmosphere. In order to further develop the conversation within this frame, they now made efforts to display some rapport and politeness towards one another. Bianka, for instance, spoke of her deep regret for Nazi Germany’s aggression in Europe and sorrow for

Russian soldiers' death on the Eastern Front out of an awareness of Olga's attendance and in an effort to be polite, by carefully performing her "repentant German" identity. In response to such face-work, Olga attempts to demonstrate her own goodwill:

[Excerpt 11]

248 O: But, I, you know, in my generation, we are already pretty good with German people.

249 R: ((laugh))

250 O: So, especially Russia, probably not other nations, yes. But, I mean, Russian, = and even (XXX) you know, this is called *Великая Отечественная Война*⁵⁵ in Russian

251 R: [Because the part of =

252 R: = Germany was, a communist coun, country.

253 B: [Yes.

254 R: And, it's pretty major, right?

255 O: But also, it was the Cold War. Nobody say why Americans took a part, too.

256 K: ((to Bianka)) We are still hesitant to be, too, too patriotic to my own country, I understand. But hesitate to flag of your own country. I understand that.

Above, Olga displays her empathy for those Germans accused of the Nazi past (Lines 248). Then, she makes a friendly overture to Bianka by telling her that young Russians do not care about the past anymore, while slightly hedging with the caveat that this may not be the case for other European nations. Ostensibly, Olga's show of rapport derives from her position as a foreign participant of OWW, who tries to handle the topic of WWII tolerantly. Note, however, that she simultaneously takes a position as a Russian national, who speaks for Russians. In Line 250, for instance, she implies that Russians are more generous and forgiving than other Europeans despite being the primary opponents and victims of Nazi Germany during the war. Here, the emergence of Olga's "patriotic Russian" identity (which she always signals by saying "I love my country from the bottom of my heart!") inevitably leads her to make the point that the European theater of WWII was dominated by the conflict between Nazi Germany and Russia, while other European nations did not play significant roles.

Olga's speech act was, however, infelicitous due to my following response. Instead of viewing her politeness in a positive light and recognizing the patriotic intentions behind her face-work, I automatically interpreted Russians' "generosity" not as genuine, but as political and therefore rather negative. More specifically, I implied that Russians are so generous to Germans today because they had cut a "good deal" after the war (Lines 251). Recall that the Allied Powers divided Germany into four sections after the latter's unconditional surrender in 1945. This partitioning ultimately resulted in Germany's being divided into West and East for over four decades. Furthermore, during the Cold War, East Germany was annexed by the Soviets as a part of the Communist bloc, thus becoming a frontline of that new "war." Considering this history, I naturally interpreted Olga's statement not as a politeness strategy with Bianka, but simply a display of the same "aggressively" patriotic Russian identity used to claim Germany as its own territory after WWII.

55 It is called the Great Patriotic War in Russia

It is crucial to note that there is yet another historical layer underlying my negative interpretation of Olga's utterance about "generous" Russians. Retrospectively, I admit that I have had a biased view about Russians because of my cultural memories of WWII history. At the very end of WWII, the Soviets unilaterally terminated the neutrality pact with Japan, and then quickly invaded Manchuria, brutalizing Japanese civilians in the process.⁵⁶ In spite of these "crimes against humanity," however, they were not even indicted in the war trials (held by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East) since they were among the victors. Given such negative historical memories, it is not surprising that I automatically refused to accept Olga's implication of Russian generosity. Although I myself did not experience WWII or Operation August Storm in Manchuria in the summer of 1945, my cultural memories as a Japanese national obscured her real intentions from me, ultimately made her speech act infelicitous.

Meanwhile, my negative reference about the Russians above (Lines 251 and 254) significantly provoked Olga. She was dissatisfied not only with the failure of her speech act but with my negative re-signification of her utterance; that is, "Russians' generosity only derives from their exploitation of other countries after WWII." In Line 255, she quickly picked up on the negative nuance of my comment, although she vitally misunderstood my implication as being derived from the Cold War American propaganda as opposed to cultural memories of the Red Army during WWII. Strongly objecting, Olga claimed that the Soviets' control of East Germany was simply a result of the Cold War (Line 255).

Yet, Olga's attempt to defend her people and country was unsuccessful; this time because Kayo suddenly took the following turns. In Line 288, Kayo showed her sympathy for Bianka's feelings of guilt and Germans' accompanying repudiation of nationalism. In lines 256, she further displayed her camaraderie with Bianka by referring to her own reluctance about waving a Japanese national flag. Here, Kayo appears to be taking a position as a foreign participant, who shares with Germans a similar historical past. At the same time, however, she is implicitly taking a position as a leftist "liberal Japanese," who is "repentant and regretful for Japan's aggression against Asian nations during WWII." In this light, Kayo's utterances not only show her sense of rapport with Bianka, but indicate the emergence of her national identity.

Since even Kayo (who usually remains relatively silent during a politically and historically sensitive conversation) had expressed her sympathy for Germans, Bianka now feels quite comfortable sharing even more knowledge about (West) German postwar history with those non-Western European participants. This time, however, she decides to inform her account from a different viewpoint, shifting from a "repentant" German to a "frustrated" one who vents her frustration against a primary victim of Nazi Germany; namely, the Jews in Israel. Referring to an internet political forum on a liberal German newspaper site, "*Der Spiegel*," she describes how persistently one Israeli Jew demanded that Germans make unending atonement:

[Excerpt 12]

267 B: Uh, *Spiegel*.

268 R: *Spiegel?*

⁵⁶ It is often called "Operation August Storm."

269 B: It's like "Mirror." *Spiegel* means a mirror.
 270 R: Oh, OK.
 271 B: [It's on there. It's so *interesting*. There is one, one Jew. He still demands =
 272 R: [Uh-hum?
 273 B: = Germans have to go like this (Putting her head down on the table).
 274 R: (0.5) Yeah, yeah.
 275 B: [we shouldn't say anything against Israel, it would be (XXX).=
 276 B: = So, you can, you can do whatever you want to we, Germans, say
 "It's OK. We are Jewish." He, he demands that.
 277 R: No. I understand that.

Bianka's use of the verb "demand" in Line 271 implies, first, a strong belief on the part of the subject (an Israeli man) regarding his right to claim eternal apologies and atonement for the past from the Germans. The word also slightly connotes a power differential between the two parties; that he can demand what he wants regardless of Germans' will. The verb's implications are further reinforced by the adverb "still," as she implicitly suggests that he has continued to ask for Germans' apologies even after they had been sufficiently given. In Line 273, Bianka equates the Israeli man's forceful demand with an unquestionable obligation by using the modal auxiliary "have to." In line 275, she reinforces the same nuance with the use of another modal auxiliary, "should not," to imply the Israelis' coercively moralistic attitude towards the Germans.

Needless to say, Bianka's reference to the Israeli man's claim contains an implicit criticism of Israeli Jews' unending demands for Germans' atonement. It should be noted that this kind of covert criticism is still considered taboo both within and outside of Germany. Yet, Bianka and other members seem quite comfortable discussing such a sensitive topic here, in the given context. Because of their application to the legitimate genre, they are now able to speak of politically sensitive issues openly in an apolitical environment. Bianka, for instance, adroitly presented the anecdote about *Der Spiegel* not as a "criticism," but as an "*interesting*" topic. It becomes "interesting" when presented as new and illuminating information to these participants, serving as a good example of how people from different nations come into conflict with one another due to "*different*" expectations. Corresponding to Bianka's frame of conversation, other members also tactfully appropriated the legitimate genre. For instance, I deliberately take a position as a curious audience by actively back channeling to Bianka and encouraging her to speak more (Lines 274 and 277).

In retrospect, however, my active attendance did not derive purely from my position as a foreign audience. Again, I have to confess that my responses to Bianka were not genuinely dedicated to building rapport. Instead, I was probably speaking from my own personal agenda. My superficial performance as a sympathetic foreign audience masked my hidden practice of national identity as a Japanese. In actively showing my sympathy for Bianka, I was projecting Japan's situation onto that of Germany, in venting my frustration over other Asian people's refusal to forgive Japan for its crimes against humanity during WWII. Ultimately, my sympathy was directed at both the Germans and Japanese, each of whom been trapped by the legacy of WWII for over 60 years.

Analysis IV addressed the visible emergence of the participants' national identities, along with their cultural memories of WWII and postwar history. While driven by hidden desire to talk about their people, nations and own versions of the history, they are also keenly aware of the significant gap between the politically sensitive nature of their topics and the apolitical nature of the given context. In search of a compromise, they eventually apply the legitimate genre through the use of communicative tactics, in order to speak openly and comfortably. Nevertheless, this collusion of one's practices of national identity with the discursal genre is a double-edged sword. While it may enable one to speak about politically sensitive issues in the given context on the one hand, it may unexpectedly provoke them and make them even more radically nationalistic on the other. As we shall see, this collusion of factors will not only open their hidden wounds, but lead them to react negatively to Americans at an international gathering where they had initially aimed to understand, appreciate and celebrate the American holiday of Thanksgiving.

Analysis V: The Second Communication Breakdown – Clash of two Cold War Ideologies Over the WWII History (Line 278- 317)

So far, we have observed a slow yet inexorable emergence of the participants' respective "national" identities as the conversation proceeds. As the analyses above revealed, small historical fragments floating in the air react with one another and almost unpredictably evoke their national (and ethnic) identities in the contingent context. We also have observed that the participants deliberately created an appropriate conversational context in which to discuss politically delicate matters of interest at an otherwise apolitical and utopian international meeting. Now, we shall observe how unpredictably conversation evolves when these various components "chemically" interact.

Bianka's story about the Israeli was smoothly accepted by other foreign participants due to the legitimacy of the adopted genre. Encouraged, Bianka continues the rest of her story:

[Excerpt 13]

- 278 B: [We shouldn't, uh, criticize Bush, "because he freed us".
279 K: [Uh-huh
280 R: [Yeah.
281 B: Bush. We have to be obedient.
282 K: [(XXXXXXXXXXXXX)((laugh))
283 R: [Really? ((chuckle))
284 O: What about Soviet Army? (XXX)
285 R: [((to B)) Really
286 B: Did you say something? The Soviet Union?
287 O: No, they didn't do anything, actually. They didn't.
288 B: They didn't do anything. They just bring communism in our country.
289 O: Yes, yes. They didn't save those Jews.
I, I am so surprised nobody knows in Israel =
290 R: [((chuckle))

Although initially having presented the information about Israel as merely “*interesting*,” Bianka now implicitly criticizes the Middle East foreign policy of both Israel and the U.S. Bush administration. In the excerpt above, she practices her postwar German identity, which is frustrated over both Israeli and U.S. abuses of WWII historical narrative to justify their controversial acts against Palestinians and Iraqis at the present time. Yet, she simultaneously self-deprecates Germany’s conformist attitude towards these nations (Line 281), being bitterly aware that Nazi Germany’s aggression in Europe essentially caused today’s tragedy in the Middle East. In her utterances in Lines 278 and 281, we catch a glimpse of Germans’ ambivalent postwar identity, in which their sense of guilt for the Holocaust is coupled with their moral indignation at the ongoing atrocities in the present world.

In contrast to Bianka’s hidden distress and internal struggle outlined above, the two Japanese participants simply play their expected roles as good audience members. Both Kayo and I are entertained by Bianka’s story, pretending that there is nothing offensive, provocative or politically delicate, but only “*interesting*.” Kayo, for instance, actively listens to Bianka by back channeling and making relevant comments with cheerful chuckles (Lines 279 and 282). Similarly, I back channel, ask questions back and chuckle cheerfully in order to demonstrate my regard for Bianka (Lines 280, 283, 285 and 290). As previously explained, the legitimacy of the assigned genre enables them to freely discuss formerly delicate issues without hesitation.

This superficially peaceful atmosphere is, however, broken by Olga. Out of the blue, in Line 284, she suddenly brings up the Soviet Red Army’s important role in liberating Jews. At first glance, this question seems neither coherent nor cohesive to the larger flow of conversation. Yet, this makes more sense if one takes into account Olga’s very different cultural memories of WWII from those of Americans and nationals from the former Western bloc, including Germans. Olga, like many Russians, strongly believes that it was not Americans but “Russians” who vanquished Nazi Germany and saved many Jews from those extermination camps. This Russian version of the historical account makes sense when one considers the following facts. First of all, the most prominent battlefields in the European theater were on the Eastern Front. Second, many concentration camps were located in Poland, and hence, first discovered by Russians when they reclaimed Poland. For example, the first major concentration camp, *Majdanek*, was liberated by Russian soldiers in 1944. One of the most notorious extermination camps, *Auschwitz*, was also discovered by Russians in January, 1945. Other liberations in *Ravensbrück* (April, 1945) and *Theresienstadt* (May, 1945) followed. Although these historical facts are a vital part of WWII history, they are often omitted from Western history textbooks. More significantly, they have been lost to the cultural memories of the West as a result of the Cold War and its “Iron Curtain.”

It is understandable, then, that Olga felt extremely uneasy about the prevalent discourse in this particular conversation. When listening to Bianka and observing other participants’ reactions, in her insecurity she initially heard the implication that the Israeli man had “naturally” believed that Americans had saved Jews from the Holocaust. Then, the two Japanese “naturally” agreed on the same premise in their effort to make sense of Bianka’s sarcastic statement in Line 278. Although Olga had previously tolerated the ignorance of the other participants with respect to Russian culture and religion, she could simply not endure their one-sided version of this aspect of the history. Olga began to perceive an invisible enemy in the conversation, which had not only eliminated the Russian side of WWII history from the cultural memories of those Japanese and

German participants, but exploited this history in order to sustain its power in the postwar new world order in West. Accordingly, Olga felt the need to resist against this invisible enemy and the followers, both of whom naturally practice the postwar American ideologies in front of her. One could say that Olga's inner conflict represents a direct projection of the chaotic state of intercultural communication at the present time, in the aftermath of the Cold War. As we are observing now, two different Cold War ideologies inevitably clash and disclose its politically biased and manipulative features.

Launching a counterattack, Olga raises a rhetorical yet provocative question in Line 291 designed to implicitly criticize Israeli Jews' "ungrateful" attitude towards Russians for their liberation. Then, she corrects their historical reading, aggressively denying that American soldiers saved Jews from the Holocaust. In the following interaction between Olga and Bianka, we observe a communication breakdown due to their different assumptions about each other's positions. In Line 287, Olga uses the third person pronoun, "they," to signify Americans, claiming that Americans had not done anything for the Jews at the end of the war. In the following line, Bianka takes over Olga's sentence to finish as if she is operating a cooperative device to show camaraderie. Yet, they significantly miscommunicate with one another. Bianka not only misattributes Olga's signification of "they" as Russians instead of Americans, but describes Russians as an unwelcoming force, which did nothing commendable, merely communizing the eastern part of Germany.

Why did such miscommunication occur between them? It seems to me that Olga naturally assumed that Bianka would take her side to criticize Americans and Israelis, on the logic that Germans are "the enemy of my enemy" and hence, her friend. On the contrary, Bianka did not frame the conversation as expected. Although Bianka might view Americans negatively due to her "ambivalent" postwar German identity, she also refused to take the Russian side in criticizing Americans and Israelis. In her memories as a West German, Russia is not a friend, but just another enemy of WWII, the postwar era and the Cold War.

Having failed to realize the severity of the miscommunication between the two, Olga misconstrues Bianka's response as one of agreement and sympathy. Supported by this (false) sense of empathy, she decides to continue her story:

[Excerpt 14]

291 O: = the victory day, May 9th, I told, "what are you doing? This is Victory day."

an' they say "Excuse me, America was a winner."

"Excuse me:! When did they (the U.S.) become winner?"

"You, Soviet Union never did this." (0.5)No. ((voice is shaking))

292 B: They just came to, to, uh, oppressed.

293 O: [Yeah, yeah.

294 R: [Uh-huh?

295 O: That's so *funny*.

296 B: [Yes.

297 O: Those Jews, wro, wrote, you know, books, how American save them.

How many of those family saved (by) Russians from Soviet.

298 R: American saved Jew people, Jews?
299 O: I think (Russians saved Jews) a lot more than (Americans did). ((laugh))
300 R: ((laugh))
301 O: That's so *funny*.
302 R: [That's *interesting*, but
303 B: [It's very *interesting*.

In the excerpt above, Olga explicitly reveals her anger toward Israelis over their dismissal of the Red Army's contribution to the Holocaust liberation. She reenacts the interaction between herself and the Israelis with whom she had presumably spoken in the past. Although she enforced the Russian version of WWII history upon those Israelis, they not only flatly rejected it but provocatively corrected her historical knowledge (Line 291). Depicting the voice of one of those Israelis, Olga is terribly provoked as her shaking voice indicates. In contrast to Olga's rage, Bianka continues this utterance quite calmly as she takes the following turn. In Line 292, she imitates an Israeli voice expressing his negative view regarding the Stalinist Soviets' purge of Jews in the postwar era. At first glance, Bianka's revival of the imagined Israeli's voice seems to represent her use of a cooperative device to show her sense of camaraderie ("I understand your point very well.") Yet, she simultaneously implies that Russians were anti-Semitic and executed Jews just like Germans. In other words, even while remaining polite to Olga, Bianka adroitly pursues her own agenda of "fixing" the prevalent view of Germans as the "only" persecutors of Jews in modern European history.

Having expressed her anger, Olga finally realizes that she is being inappropriately emotional for someone who was ostensibly only referring to "different" cultural knowledge of WWII history. To rectify this, she accordingly attempts to bring the legitimate genre back to the context again by evaluating her anecdote as "*funny*" (Line 295). Note that Olga's use of the adjective has a double function here; it not only repairs the damage but also pacifies her own anger by dismissing Israelis' view of the liberation as a "funny" joke. Exploiting the adjective's neutral connotations, Olga continues her *funny* story about those Jewish narratives of WWII. In Line 297, she angrily discloses how some Holocaust survivors had even written in their memoirs that they owed their lives to Americans. By sarcastically asking the actual number of the Jews saved by Russians, she harshly criticizes these survivors' "ungrateful" attitude towards the Red Army. In response to Olga, I also rhetorically ask whether Americans had ever saved Jews from Nazi concentration camps. This response — which is rather provocative, needless to say — suggests the irresistible emergence of my own "ambivalent" postwar Japanese identity, which on the one hand appreciates the U.S. occupation and control of Japan after the war, while on the other hand feeling strong antipathy about America's heroic discourse of WWII history.

Provoked by my hidden intention, Olga now expresses her anger in a nearly hysterical manner. In Line 299, she once again dismisses Israelis' cultural memories of WWII as a ridiculous joke, while simultaneously pretending to enjoy such a different historical view as "*funny*". Unfortunately, Olga's communicative tactics are no longer effective in disguising her strong indignation and inappropriately provocative behavior at a happy Thanksgiving table. In order to guide Olga back on the right track, Bianka and I rectify the context for her by supportively evaluating her historically controversial and politically sensitive anecdote as "*interesting*" (Lines 302 and 303).

In spite of these communicative tactics on the part of other members described above, Olga still cannot get over her frustration and resentment, continuing to vent these feelings:

[Excerpt 15]

304 O: It was a Israeli system.

305 R: Uh.

306 O: I, I, I don't even, you know, I think in, our kids, for example, my kids, if they do not have Russian experience, they do not have another part experience. They'll never know that even Soviet Union was some part, (0.5) = some part, I would say.

307 R: Uh-huh?

308 O: Yeah. Because they teach kids completely ((laugh))=

309 R: = Yeah. *Different* history. *Different* history.

310 O: [Yes. Yes.=

311 O: = An' if you knew an' explain my books to him from, you know, high school, = an' you don't hear, you know, "utopia", but, but you say here, "do not, do not say, it's in blood", because it's, whatever they say, =

312 O: = it's theirs, you know,

313 R: [Uh-hum

314 O: But for you should know

315 R: [Yeah, yeah.

316 O: (XXX) there's *difference*. For Russian solders

317 R: *Different* history, especially, you know =

Above, Olga first emotionally complains that her Russian children only learn the American version of WWII history, which "neglects" the Soviets' involvement with the war as well as their contribution to the Allies' victory. To her eyes, the American version not only took away all the glorious parts of WWII history from Russians, but also abused that war history to glorify its own country and history. Olga consequently derides America's Hollywood deed of WWII not as just "*different*," but rather, "(completely) ridiculous." Yet after airing her concerns, she still cannot dismiss the fact that her children inevitably absorb the American "utopian" version of WWII and the accompanying American ideology. For Russians, Olga claims, WWII (which primarily signifies the Eastern Front) is nothing like heroic Hollywood movies, but was unprecedentedly brutal, bloody and tragic because of the immense loss of lives of soldiers and civilians. Accordingly, Olga is concerned how such a "*different*" version of WWII may not only negatively affect her children's construction of Russian identity, but also mislead them in the future to view war as something clean, heroic and utopian. In this light, her complaint above needs to be understood as a show of her fear about the potential consequences of learning "*different*" history. That is to say, by learning a "*different*" kind of history, her Russian children not only lose a vital part of their Russian "identity," but also are eventually re-constructed their identities not as "cosmopolitans" but as "Americans," who have a limited view of the world and history.

Analysis V has discussed how each of the participants tried to take a balanced position in discussing a politically sensitive topic in an apolitical, intercultural communicative context. In the excerpt above, as earlier, we observe that they rectified the inappropriate conversational atmosphere through the use of communicative tactics. When Olga was uncontrollably provoked by her historical memories, for instance, I finished her sentences for her, describing the American version of that history as “*different*” (Line 309) but not as ideologically manipulated or ridiculously funny. By using such a neutral but still evaluative adjective, I was trying to bring the legitimate genre back to the context while gently reminding Olga of the rules of the gathering, that is to say: “we are here only to learn and share “*different*” cultural and historical knowledge in order to better understand each other.”

Yet, such conversational tactics are becoming less effective as the conversation proceeds. This is because various historical elements have already clashed with one another at different levels in the given context, and severely fractured each participant’s existing view of the world. As a consequence, participants begin to critically view both the U.S. and the prevalent discourse supporting their “utopian” version of WWII history on the one hand. They also decide to put different pieces of the modern history together and construct an alternative view of the world on the other hand. In the following part, we are finally going to observe what ideology emerges from the intercultural communicative context in the post Cold War era in the context of the new world order.

Analysis VI: Anti-Americanism at the Thanksgiving Dinner Table – Alternative View of the WWII History (Line 318- 332)

Although Olga has accepted the American version of WWII history as merely “*different*” (Line 362), she still cannot get over the fact that the Russia's side of the story was removed from history books in Western countries. She continues to express her frustration and anger:

[Excerpt 16]

- 318 O: Yeah. Because so many people died for this an’ you know, how to say,
I, I can’t believe how Russian, you know, government, know,
a, accept it an’ cannot say anything, you know, uh,
I, I can’t. It’s in memory of those people die in this war, it’s so, it’s so *unfair*.
319 B: Because this war really was something to not just conquer but to defend
320 O: Yes. Of course. An’ if know this is whatever, Stalin did all his, you know,
but, compared to Hitler, he’s not the same.
Whatever he did, but, he made this, but (0.2)

Above, Olga rails against the fact that no one in the West cares about the death of those Russian soldiers, who fought against Nazi Germany and led the Allies to victory in WWII. This realization, needless to say, vitally hurts her pride because her cultural memories of WWII, especially soldiers’ sacrifice for the nation, constitute a significant part of her “patriotic” Russian identity. Feeling helpless in the face of Westerners’ neglect of these sacrifices, she becomes frustrated by the American version of WWII history which has prevailed throughout the world, even after the Cold War. Knowing that such an outcome had essentially derived from the Cold

War and subsequent Soviet “defeat,” Olga’s frustration and resentment are now directed towards the Russian government, which allowed such a humiliating situation to develop. Her use of the modal auxiliary, “cannot,” in Line 318 slightly implies her frustration with the weakness of post-Cold War Russia, which not only suddenly fell from power, but disappeared from the major stage of world politics for over a decade. Ignoring the fact that the Russian version of WWII history was also manipulated for the purposes of Cold War propaganda, Olga calls the American view of WWII “*unfair*” to Russians.

Olga’s criticisms about such an “*unfair*” account of WWII history is somewhat echoed by Bianka. In Line 369, she attempts to show her sympathy for Olga by supporting the “Russian” view of WWII history. Keenly aware that American propaganda had manipulatively described the Soviet Red Army as nothing but an evil and aggressive force led by Stalin, Bianka implies that such a view is also biased. She further explains that the Soviets waged war not only to expand their territories in Europe and the Balkans but to defend themselves from Nazi Germany. Hence, Olga’s “patriotic” view of the war, in her view, certainly makes sense for Russians. Nevertheless, Bianka’s generous interpretation of the Russian perspective in WWII, especially regarding the Eastern Front, sounds very odd if one takes into account the following. First, Bianka is knowledgeable enough about WWII history to be quite aware that the Stalinist Soviets, just like Nazi Germany, had a plan to invade other nations in Europe before and during the war. She thus knows that the Russian account of waging war purely for defense is not necessarily true. Second, she directly experienced both the war and Germany’s defeat as a child. This means that she inevitably witnessed and frequently heard about the Red Army’s brutal revenge on German civilians in the aftermath of WWII. Furthermore, she lost her father in a Russian POW camp after the war. Taking these facts into account, it is unlikely that Bianka would truly disagree with the prevalent view of the Red Army as “unprecedentedly brutal” and “evil.”⁵⁷ Why, then, did Bianka try to support Olga, even including the Russian’s “patriotic” version in her own depiction of WWII history?

Bianka’s enigmatic motivations can be explained by reference to the complicated nature of postwar German identity, which includes both a German “repentant” about the past, and a German “frustrated” over his/her own stifled voice. By taking a position as a “repentant” German, she considers Hitler’s notion of *Lebensraum* and its accompanying racism to be the ideology primarily responsible for the unprecedented disaster in Europe. On this account, the Soviets waged the war because Hitler initially had a plan to conquer the Soviets and establish a master race. Her “repentant” German identity thus inevitably led her to feel that Germans were responsible for “any” fallout from WWII in the European theater.

Yet simultaneously, Bianka’s utterance disguises another side of her postwar identity and accompanying motivation. Taking a position as a “frustrated” German, she feels sympathetic for Olga. As a vanquished national of WWII, she understands what it is like not only to lose a war, but to lose the voice to speak of one’s own history. When Germany lost the war, the Allies held Germans solely responsible for the outcome of the war, (Germany’s aggression in Europe, and the Holocaust) but did not bother to ask why they had supported National Socialism or behaved aggressively towards other Western European countries in the first place. While Bianka feels that Germans have no excuse for the Holocaust, she is often frustrated by the fact that their own

57 All of the information is disclosed in several interviews in addition to my private conversation with her.

explanation has been completely neglected. In losing the war, Germans not only lost a voice to speak freely of their own history, but found themselves branded as “brutally evil,” as if this reflected their essential nature.

It is therefore understandable and natural that Bianka would project the bitter circumstances of Germany's postwar reception onto Russia. Her memories of the postwar era enable her to understand how Olga feels about the prevalent historical view of WWII, and why she calls it “*unfair*.” Profoundly aware of the truth that the victor can write not only their own history, but also that of others, Bianka feels sympathy for Olga because the Russian side of the story has been neglected and even abused to serve the winner’s political purposes. Consequently, she decides to speak out against the victor (i.e., the U.S., as victor of both WWII and the Cold War) by implying that the Russian (and German) version(s) of WWII history still constitute(s) an essential chapter even though to the winner they may be dismissed as a “loser’s account.” Given Bianka’s association of postwar Germany's situation with Russia's, we can now understand her real intention and motivation behind her utterance. In short, Line 319 is a show of her “frustrated” postwar German identity, which desires to voice objection to the winner’s heroic account of the history at the cost of an unspeakable “Other.”

Not fully appreciating Bianka’s underlying agenda, Olga takes for granted the former's support for the Russian view of history. In Line 320, Olga not only asserts the Soviets' legitimate reasons for waging war against Germany and other nations, but further vigorously protests the common analogy made between Stalin and Hitler by the West. She also justifies Stalin's executions and other notorious policies as having been necessary for the welfare of the Soviets. According to her, Stalin was not an evil dictator⁵⁸ (as many Westerners believe) but a good leader, in that he not only saved the nation from Hitler and Nazi Germany, but made it a strong postwar superpower of the Eastern bloc. By strongly contradicting the West's prevailing view of Stalin, Olga ultimately gives voice to a critique of American Cold War propaganda, which has not only equated Stalin with Hitler as an evil figure of the 20th century, but negatively described her country and the history in order to project the U.S. as an opposite figure in the mirror.

Ignoring Olga’s revisionist of Stalin which is made at the expense of Germany, Bianka tries to attract the attention of the two Japanese participants, who have been listening to these criticisms as if it had nothing to do with them. In order to forcefully bring them into the controversy, Bianka reminds them of the “*unfair*” account of WWII history for the Japanese:

[Excerpt 17]

321 B: If you know that there were concentration camps here, too. For Japanese people.

322 K: [Oh::

323 O: Yeah, Because they were, because they were

324 K: [During World War II

325 B: Even for Japanese people who sent young men to war.

326 K: Yes.

58 This view is, needless to say, one-sided as well. Just as Olga claims Stalin to have been a “good” leader for Russians, right-wing Germans might view Hitler's policies (with the exception of the Holocaust and the invasions of nations such as Poland) to have not been entirely bad; instead, they might suggest that certain policies helped the German economy.

327 B: At good.

328 R: And you know what, the best part is that they didn't do it to German people.
German people. An' you know what.

Actually the German people who sent the money to Germany.

They knew that but they didn't do. They didn't have a concentration camp.

329 K: I know.

330 R: It's *interesting*.

((Coordinators rang a bell to other members to stop talking and eating.

They stated informing about a next week program.))

In Line 321, Bianka effectively mentioned the “concentration camps” that interned Japanese-Americans in the U.S. during WWII. It is unclear why Bianka chose this rather provocative term instead of “internment camps.” Her reference to this historical incident certainly implies a criticism of America’s hypocrisy in ignoring its own crimes in WWII. Collocating “Japanese-American internment camps” with “Jewish concentration and labor camps,” Bianka points to Americans' racism against the Japanese; the majority of those interned were “American” citizens at that time.⁵⁹ Additionally, she claims that some had even been loyal enough to send their own sons to fight for the U.S. against Nazi Germany, one of Japan’s allies.⁶⁰ Suggesting that America’s crimes against humanity were essentially based on racism against non-Europeans, Bianka questions the double standard of justice followed by the U.S. and other allies, which self-righteously indicted only vanquished nations in international trials after the war.

This effort at provocation apparently had some effect. While Kayo showed little emotion, I reacted sensitively to Bianka’s implication of Americans as racist. I was provoked, first, by the fact that Japanese-Americans were almost exclusively targeted through the confiscation of their property and forced detention in internment camps during the war. As some historians are beginning to point out, Executive Order 9066 was carried out primarily against Japanese-Americans on a much larger scale than any other Allied national ancestries. In trying to understand where such “different” treatment originated, I (like many Japanese people) have naturally concluded that American racism towards non-Europeans lies directly behind such discrimination. This view is further supported by my knowledge that most well-known acts of espionage and sabotage against the U.S. during the war were carried out by either Germans or Americans of German ancestry.⁶¹ Even though it was apparent that these individuals posed a greater threat than Japanese-Americans, the U.S. government did not impose similar policies upon Germans.

Yet in retrospect, my overreaction to Bianka’s remark was rooted in another cultural memory of WWII: the Americans' use of the A-bombs in Japan. As a Japanese national who grew up in Nagasaki, the memories of WWII are inseparable from those tragic scenes of destruction and faces of the survivors. When I think about this incident, I cannot help but suspect racist motives in the White House's decision to use the bombs against us instead of the Germans.

59 "The War Relocation Authority and The Incarceration of Japanese Americans During World War II: 1948 Chronology," or www.trumanlibrary.org, Retrieved 11 September 2006.

60 What Bianka is referring to here is the 442nd Infantry or formerly the 442nd Regimental Combat Team of the United States Army. The unit was primarily composed of Japanese Americans, many of whose families were interned during WWII. The soldiers fought in Europe, mostly Italy, France and Germany during WWII. The unit is one of the most decorated units in U.S. military history.

61 Most well-known cases are the following three; the Duquesne Spy Ring, Operation Pastorius and Operation Elster.

I feel especially convinced of this when I consider that the U.S. government's initial motivation for creating a nuclear weapon derived from Americans' fears regarding Nazi Germany's nuclear ambitions⁶² This, coupled with many Americans' outspoken hostility toward Germans and accusations over the Holocaust make me wonder "why" they chose us. In short, Bianka's reference to this expression of American wartime racism immediately evoked such suspicions and deep-seated anger, and echoed my own veiled criticism of American "justice," that had only indicted our crimes but not theirs. It might be accurate to say, then, that I was not provoked so much by the specific incidents of Japanese-American internment camps or atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as by the "racism" which led those decision makers to treat Axis enemies differently based on race.

Shortly after expressing my anger in Line 328, however, I realize that as a researcher I have made inappropriately emotional and provocative statements. To rectify the situation, I use a rather neutral adjective, "*interesting*," evaluating Bianka's reference to the Japanese-American internment camps as new knowledge. Although this move seems to superficially diffuse the tense atmosphere, the strong emotions lingering at the table cannot be suppressed any longer. Even after the coordinator has officially ceased the day's program, Bianka persists in her resentment over American racism towards non-Europeans, and their double standard of justice:

[Excerpt 18]

331 B: You should be angry about that. They also drop Atomic bombs. Not even one but two. They drop it because they are racist, too. If you think about it it's funny they celebrate Thanksgiving. What happened to those Indians? They killed them. What is "Thanksgiving" then?

332 R: You are right.

In Line 331, Bianka bluntly refers to one of the most controversial issues in WWII history; namely, the U.S.'s use of A-bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Well aware that this is a blot on American history and a somewhat taboo subject, Bianka outspokenly cites this crime against humanity. Inevitably, her criticisms are extended to Americans' other crime against humanity prior to the 20th century. In severely condemning (White) Americans for their persecution and genocide of Native Americans, she makes explicit reference to today's program, American Thanksgiving Holiday. Despite my efforts to preserve my role as researcher, I could no longer handle the situation at this point. In Line 332, I do not even attempt to rectify the situation, since Bianka's statement has stoked my own bitter feelings about my country's history. In the end, I simply agree with Bianka's critical view of Thanksgiving.

The final analysis addressed what ideology emerged from the intercultural communication even when the participants primarily sought to discuss and share different cultural knowledge in a spirit of goodwill. In the early stages of the conversation, not only did the participants attempt to positively accept various cultural "differences," but they readily agreed with the coordinators' apolitical and rather rosy view of colonial history, served with turkey and cranberry sauce. As

62 The Einstein-Szilárd letter proves this possibility. On August 2, 1939, the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt received a letter signed by Albert Einstein, which advised him that Nazi Germany might be researching the use of nuclear fission to create atomic bombs. It consequently suggested that the U.S. begin researching the possibility as well.

the conversation proceeded, however, this “utopian” version of modern American history was put into question as they realized that in the process, their histories might also have been exploited by the host nation for political and ideological purposes after WWII. By the end of the program, they consequently exposed the negative legacies of modern American history while strongly objecting to the mythical nature of Americans’ historical view of WWII. In contrast to their initial desire to learn about American culture and tradition, it is ironic that three out of the four participants (Kayo excepted) ultimately manifested anti-Americanism at a gathering where they were supposed to “foster international and intercultural understanding.”

Rethinking of Tannen’s Study and Blommaert’s “Forgotten Context”

As we have observed above, the “Thanksgiving dinner conversation” of my study has proven far more complicated, confrontational and problematic than the one studied previously by Tannen. While both dinners began in a spirit of universal goodwill, one had a happy ending in spite of some difficult moments, whereas the other ended disastrously in frustration and resentment.⁶³ Such differences may be partially attributed to the contingent nature of communication; nevertheless, I still can detect some vital elements that contributed to such differences. In order to isolate the factors that caused my study to have such a different outcome from Tannen’s, in the final part of this chapter I will attempt, first, to compare the two studies in terms of research methodology and content. Then, I will discuss the implications of my study. Ultimately, my revisiting of Tannen’s study aims to address the contextual factors that may need to be taken into account in the study of discourse at the present time, as a response to Blommaert’s recent argument about “forgotten context.”

First, I would like to note that there is a time lag of about 30 years between my study (from 2006 on) and Tannen’s earlier one (starting in 1978).⁶⁴ This means that some major changes have occurred in the research methodologies as well as the international order itself. Regarding the former, it is important to realize that the conceptualization of the notion of “context” has significantly changed. As Blommaert summarizes, context is generally characterized to “address the way in which linguistic forms – ‘text’- become part of, get integrated in, or become constitutive of larger activities in the social world” (2005: 39). It “comes in various shapes and operates at various levels, from the infinitely small to the infinitely big” (p.40). Accordingly, Blommaert reasons, context is “potentially everything and contextualization is potentially infinite.” At the time that Tannen studied her participants, however, the notion of context had a rather limited focus, especially in Interactional Sociolinguistics.⁶⁵ Specifically, studies of conversational interactions were more inclined to discern salient linguistic signs and devices, which signified particular socio-cultural features of an interlocutor — such as gender, social class, race, ethnicity and so forth — as primary sources of contextualization. In short, the trend of discourse analysis then was to clarify how those observable, and thus visible, variables would affect an interlocutor’s speech in conversation.

63 See Tannen’s study (62-63: 1984, 2005). All of her participants had quite positive memories about the Thanksgiving dinner conversation overall.

64 Tannen’s “Conversational Style” was published in 1984, though the data was collected in 1978 and analyzed after that.

65 This term, according to Tannen (2005), is characterized by some discursal analytical approaches such as “speech act theory, ethnography of communication, pragmatics, conversational analysis, and variation analysis.” (Tannen, 2005, p.:xvi)

This limited view of context and contextualization was soon refined and further developed, especially by those followers of the School of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The major contribution of CDA is that it expanded the notion of context by adding yet another contextual layer to the study of discourse; namely, the sociopolitical dimension with reference to power. Through this inclusion of a sociopolitical component, CDA provides a bridge between the analysis of discourse practices on the interactional level, and the analysis of discursive events as instances of social practices on the larger social level. Such an interdisciplinary approach, in successfully combining linguistics with social theories,⁶⁶ enabled practitioners to explain how one's everyday interactions not only affect but also create social worlds and social inequality. More importantly, their view of speech in a larger context as social and institutional practices inevitably led them to modify the concept of an interlocutor as an ideologized social subject. That is to say, an interlocutor is considered to be a social actor who is "produced, regulated and normalized through mechanisms and discourse of cultural institutions" (Schirato & Yell 2000:105), and hence, whose speech functions to unconsciously reinforce the existing social structure through various institutions, as an ideological state apparatus.

CDA's refined notion of context was developed yet further when postmodern theories began to shed light on the multiple, active and transformational nature of a speaking subject and impact of one's speech on the social system through everyday interactions.⁶⁷ On this view, a speaker's communicative practices, with its multiple subjectivities, constantly interact with context on both the interactional and larger sociopolitical levels in an infinite number of ways, while various contextual factors themselves significantly affect one's subjectivities and the accompanying communicative practices as well. Accordingly, the notion of context has become acknowledged to be not only multi-dimensional and complex, but dialogic and therefore, dynamic. Additionally, this extensive view of the co-constitutive relationship of discourse and society enabled practitioners to begin shifting their focus from particular types of societies to a much larger global society, namely, the world system as the final instance of contextual frame of discourse. In sum, the contemporary trend in the study of discourse is now to take a more ecological perspective⁶⁸ in viewing text and context as being merged; not as distinctly separate entities.

Taking these changes into account, now I would like to discuss how my study differs from Tannen's in terms of the research methodology. As I mentioned earlier, Tannen's study primarily treated context as "direct referential contribution to text-meaning" (2000, p. 55), to use Blommaert's expression. This means that Tannen's notion of context is uni-dimensional and linear, while she regards the visible features surrounding the text as static. To this extent, participants' socio-cultural backgrounds are considered objective variables, which permanently constitute particular parts of their identities. Because her study essentially did not account for the multi-dimensional and multi-structural aspect of context with reference to the issue of power, it ultimately neglected the multiple and transformational nature of participants' subjectivities. One consequence is that Tannen fails to fully reveal "why" her participants said (and did) certain things and developed the conversation in a particular way in a particular time and space, despite successfully explaining what these participants said, and why, "here and now."

66 Especially Foucault's notion of discourse and Bourdieu's notions of symbolic capital, field, habitus, etc.

67 Notably, Butler's argument over the speech act theory and performativity.

68 See Kramsch (2002) and Larsen-Freeman & Cameron's (2008) applications of Ecological System theory and Complexity System Theory for the study of discourse.

In contrast, my study adopted an ecological stance in viewing context as “conditions for discourse production” (Blommaert, 2005, p.66). That is to say, I consider the participants’ interactions as a phenomenon emerged from the political, social, cultural and historical “contacts” of their subjectivities in the contemporary world. Furthermore, I take into account the world system as the final instance of context, and its impacts on the participants’ subjectivities. With all this in mind, my study aims to untangle the complexity of the text and discern “how the linguistic generates the economic, social, political, as well as how the economic, social and political generate the linguistic” (p. 66). Such different views of the relationship between text and context are vital to understanding how the two studies differ in terms of conversational content, as well as participants’ interactions. To clarify this point, I would like to point to another change taking place over the last 30 years: the recent transformation of the world system and its impact on the text of my study.

To begin with, we must recall the major changes to global society and its underlying social structure that took place in 1989. The Cold War ended, and the Soviets fell from power both politically and economically. Accordingly, the Iron Curtain was lifted, and the world is no longer divided into two binary ideologies and socio-political systems. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War promoted global migration accompanied by the global spread of capitalism, seemingly proving the legitimacy of American postwar ideologies such as the Pax Americana, liberal capitalism and democracy. Consequently, the U.S. enjoyed a political, economic and strategic hegemony in a relatively unipolar world for over ten years following the end of the Cold War. Free market fundamentalism was promoted according to the interests of American and other Western capitalists, while decisions were made – primarily by the U.S. – to control a new international concern: the Middle East. We appeared to be at “The End of History” — the victory of U.S. and Western liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992).

History, however, never ends but continues. Not surprisingly, then, certain changes began to be observed in the world in the meantime. For us, the most important of these has been the balance of power between the U.S. and Europe in the 21st century. After the Cold War, the former Eastern European nations pleaded for membership in the EU, and leading to the latter's drastic expansion in both territory and population. Such an expansion not only signaled Europe as a rising world power, but resulted in two other changes. First, former Western European nations, especially France and united Germany, took over the helm of the EU as leading economic and political powers which sought to unite Europe and control its economy. Germany’s newfound position as a leader of Europe inevitably led Germans to re-evaluate their nation while re-examining their postwar history. Second, the expansion of the EU community unavoidably evoked a Pan-European identity among its people. As their new European identity continues to emerge, Europeans (especially Western Europeans) have become aware of their significant position on the world stage, and have begun to view the U.S. not as their leader but as a rival in the global competition.

Like Europe, Asia has witnessed some changes. At the end of the 1990’s, China — unlike the Soviet Union — successfully integrated itself into global capitalist society without having to replace its existing political regime. With its enormous market, China immediately cut a conspicuous figure on the international scene, bolstered by its large population. Consequently, the balance of political and economic power inevitably changed in Asia where during the Cold

War, Japan had once dominated economic matters on the U.S.'s behalf. The rise of China as a new superpower has allowed it to claim political and economic leadership in Asia, while casting a shadow on the political, economic and strategic Japanese-U.S. relationship; one result is that the Pax Americana appears to less effective for many Japanese today (Pyle, 2007).

In light of these major post-1989 developments, one may rightly understand why my “Thanksgiving dinner conversation” was more complex than Tannen’s. Apparently, the change in the larger social context — or to use Foucault’s term, the change of an archive — significantly affected the subjectivities and accompanying communicative practices of the participants in my study. From the content perspective, the participants in my study are currently experiencing the transition from the Cold War era to a new age, with a new world order, and are acutely aware that they no longer share so much common ground in understanding the world. Under the influence of rapid globalization and changing world order, they are constantly and inevitably exposed to different and sometimes unimaginably new knowledge and worldview of others while developing their political, historical and ultimately ideological thoughts faster than ever. Such chaotic nature of the present gives a greater need to construct an alternative reality that reflects their present figures and voices. It also allows them to more critically re-examine their old archives, especially their knowledge of the world in the previous era on the other hand. In this light, it is not surprising that my participants almost consistently focused on political and historical issues even though they had initially come to the gathering in order to share their “cultural” knowledge. This speaks to the fact that they are discursively enacting and practicing newly emerging identities, while deliberately constructing a new reality reflecting their own political interest.

All of these examinations of the impact of recent global changes on participants’ subjectivities and their accompanying communicative practices not only help to better explain what (and why) one says (and does) in a particular time and space, but prevent us from acquiring an easy yet fallacious understanding of the text. It is too simplistic, and therefore untenable, to conclude that the complexity of a studied text can primarily be attributed to the degree to which participants share the same socio-cultural background. Here, consider Tannen’s study. Her participants were all Americans who shared relatively homogeneous backgrounds. However, would it have made any significant difference in the conversational content with respect to politics and history if the table had included at least some foreigners? During the Cold War era, many foreign visitors to the U.S. came from the Western bloc. While they might have had different political or historical opinions from others, the opinions themselves were still considered part of the range of possible options. In other words, they were not unknown to other parties’ fields of knowledge precisely because they shared the same archive in understanding the world. It therefore seems quite unlikely that foreign visitors in the U.S. at that time were able to discuss political and historical issues in a similar manner to that observed in my own study. The Russian perspective on WWII and the Holocaust, for instance, was unavailable to many people in the West then; meanwhile, the German and Japanese subjects would probably not even consider freely contradicting the U.S. account of the WWII and postwar histories. In this respect, it is certainly not the shared-ness of participants’ socio-cultural backgrounds, but an alternative view of discourse as a phenomenon and context as conditions for discourse production, which differentiates one study from another when it comes to understanding the complexity of content as well as participants’ interactions.

Thus far, I have discussed how changes in research methodologies and the larger world system over the last 30 years crucially differentiate my study from Tannen's Thanksgiving dinner conversation analysis. The trend of postmodernism and its impact on the study of discourse has enabled me to closely examine participants' interactions with reference to issues of power, and explore the sociopolitical context on the macro-level, as well as the dialogic and dynamic relationship between discourse and society. The multiple and transformational subjectivities of the participants, and their current experiences of the transition from one era to another, has certainly contributed to a historically and politically more complicated understanding of the text. Indeed, as Blommaert states, "some things can only be said at certain moments, under certain conditions. Likewise, and very often, as a correlate of this, some things can only be researched at certain moments and under certain conditions" (2005, p.66). On this account, ecological perspectives in the study of discourse allow for a better understanding of my data.

Still, it is important to note that these factors do not adequately explain why the participants said (and did) certain things in the given context. Specifically, they do not fully reveal why particular historical events of WWII, or Middle East politics, matter so much to these participants. Neither do they account for the anti-Americanism that developed as the subjects discussed politics and history at a Thanksgiving dinner table in the U.S. In short, we are still unclear on what "load" these participants carry and bring into the intercultural communicative context.

This inquiry leads us to the final goal of this chapter: to address the question of what contextual factors need to be taken into account in the study of discourse. In order to discern what context has been "forgotten" (Blommaert, 2005, p.56) in a critical analysis of discourse, let us reconsider Blommaert's account of discourse as a phenomenon;

The fact that certain discourse forms only become visible and accessible at particular times and under particular conditions is itself an important phenomenon, which tells us a lot about our societies and ourselves, and which necessarily situates particular discourses in the wider sociopolitical environment in which they occur. The stories have a particular 'load' which relates to (and indexes) their place in a particular societal, political and historical moment. Removing this load from the narratives could involve the risk of obscuring the reasons for their production as well as the fact that they are tied to identifiable people and to particular, uniquely meaningful, circumstances that occasioned them (2005, p.66).

On Blommaert's view, it is often contemporary sociopolitical situations which create pressure to "force all kinds of 'hidden transcripts' to the surface" (p.66), by forcing people to make contact. This view certainly makes sense if one considers how trends of global migration and the U.S.'s economically and politically powerful position after the Cold War, made it possible for those German, Japanese and Russian participants to make a contact in a prestigious college town there. Yet, there is another critical factor beyond these external stimuli, which has partly conditioned and determined the occurrence of discourse as well. What made the spontaneous occurrence of this discourse "intrinsically historical" (p.100) was the historicity of

each participant's national identity, whereby her historical knowledge and cultural memories constitute a particular historical trajectory as a foundation of her national identity. This trajectory disposes her to view the present world in a particular way, since the reality of her identifiable group is partly based on its shared view of history. Accordingly, the historicity of one's national identity, while on the one hand limiting one's choices and freedom regarding perception, thought and action, also on the other hand allows one to relate the present and the past by connecting continuity and discontinuity of meanings, while relating coherence and incoherence of discourse through synchronization of history. In short, one's communicative practices have historical "constraints and consequences to speech"⁶⁹ (Hanks, 1996), because history is a matrix (context) which constitutes the contemporary world that one constructs in practice. On this account, it seems erroneous to assume that the anti-Americanism we observed had developed spontaneously and accidentally. Instead, such ideological thoughts probably existed at the back of their minds long before the actual Thanksgiving dinner conversation. The spontaneous contact taking place among these participants, in other words, had the result of forcing these hidden transcripts to the surface as their political and historical views echoed with each other in the given context. In this respect, a further examination of history's impact on the national identities of these subjects is indispensable to an understanding of the historical, political and ultimately ideological loads that they brought into the given intercultural communicative context.

In the next chapter, my ambition is to discern the historical trajectories of six German and Japanese female visitors (including Bianka and Kayo), in their interactions at the research site. By carefully examining the subjects' journals and interviews,⁷⁰ I will attempt to reveal the extent to which their historical knowledge and cultural memories had affected the construction of their national identities and the accompanying communicative practices at the present time. Note that the historicity of their national identities is intricate and difficult to discern; as such, it requires a more advanced form of questioning than that traditionally used for questions such as "Who are they?" or "Where did they come from?" Instead, I will ask questions that take into account the fact that particular historical event(s) and era(s) significantly affected a nation's archives, or an individual's knowledge of the world. Given that the contemporary world system is built upon the one of the previous era, it seems reasonable to look to WWII and the following postwar period (the Cold War) as a critical foundation of their national identities. This is further reinforced by the fact that most participants are (West) German and Japanese; that is, both are from countries that were key participants in WWII. One must recall that WWII not only drastically changed the existing international system and structure, but also placed these two nations under U.S. control while essentially altering their respective archives according to U.S. interests during the

69 This view perhaps best accord with Merleau-Ponty's view, summarized by Hanks as the following: "This is not to say that the realization of the subject through talk proceeds unfettered, limited only by the free will and states of the subject. To posit this would be to ignore the fundamentally social grounding of language, the constraints on what can reasonably be said, and the numerous expectations and responsibilities summarized under the rubric of speakerhood. . . In other words, although in the abstract sense any speaker can produce any utterance, in the social sense this is never the case. There are always constraints and consequences to speech. This marks the opposite tendency of subjective projection through speech. In the very same utterance that expresses a speaker, projecting her into the world, the world is introjected into the speaker. As Merleau-Ponty put it, it is in the world that we find ourselves, and when we look within, it is the world that we find. At its strongest, this tendency may reach overt domination, forcing a speaker to speak in a certain way. Or it may be a matter of hegemony, the invisible compulsion whereby context defines the limits of what is thinkable, including the self-image of the speaker. Insofar as language belongs to context, this is the relativity thesis at its most insidious" (Hanks 204- 205:1996).

70 It should be noted that I was only able to analyze Japanese and German subject, and not the Russian, Olga, even though she played a significant part in the discourse surrounding the studied text. Despite wanting to participate in my study as a subject, Olga could not due to her insufficient ability to write in English. She certainly has a great deal to tell me about her perception of the U.S. as a former enemy of the Cold War; nevertheless, her voice is taken away in part because of that previous Cold War, her stigma over the Soviet' loss in the war, and resistance against learning the former enemy's language.

following Cold War. The WWII and postwar histories, together, shaped these participants' contemporary national identities in two related ways: the events of WWII stigmatized each participant's nationhood and nationality, while subsequent postwar history constrained their voices from speaking their own histories. The forthcoming discourse analysis of these two national identities in relation to their respective histories will provide a better explanation for the subjects' views of contemporary American society, American colonial history, and more recently, the Iraq War and other American foreign policy in the Middle East. The hope is that by understanding discourse at the microscopic, individual level, I will be better able to analyze and understand it at the macroscopic, societal level.

CHAPTER 5

Who Is Speaking? : The Historical Construction of Subject Positions and the Role of the Researcher in Intercultural Communication Research

German's Sense of "Otherness" and European's Guilt over Non-European "Other"

In the previous chapter, we observed that Bianka had provoked my own cultural memories; in my case, of the Japanese WWII experience. By collocating the U.S. internment of Japanese-Americans and use of A-bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki with its earlier genocide of Native Americans, she claims that the U.S. is guilty of its own "holocaust," indicting America for its "crimes against humanity" committed toward the "Other" throughout history. Some may find Bianka's comparison of the Holocaust to the Native American slaughter to be inappropriate, since these two incidents occurred in different epochs. Similarly, some may feel unsettled to hear her compare America's conduct to that of Nazi Germany given that the Holocaust is generally regarded as an "unprecedented" historical event with "no comparisons," due to its sheer scale and uniquely inhuman, mechanical character.

The problems derived from what Blommaert calls "synchronization" in the discourse above are attributable to complexities that arise in the participants' contact, and the accompanying projection of their "Self" in the mirror of the "Other" as well as their construction of "Self" in the "Other" in the contemporary world. What crucially affects the intercultural communicative context here is the participants' historical construction of their subject positions in relation to others – from what history they speak and on what history they speak. In order to understand how participants' historical knowledge and cultural memories affect their communicative practices, it is necessary to understand the specific historical events that determine their nation's archives while constructing their national identities.

In this chapter, it is my aim, through subjects' journals and interviews, to explore the relationship between one's national identity and her cultural memories of WWII and the subsequent postwar period, for both German and Japanese participants. I also aim to discern how such cultural memories affect subjects' construction and discursive practices of identity in the presence of the researcher. As we shall see, the German subjects' cultural memories of the Holocaust, Nuremberg Trials and subsequent denazification programs not only contributed to Germans' sense of "otherness" as European "Self," but also crucially shapes their worldview and communicative practices at the present time. Likewise, for the Japanese participants, cultural memories of their country's defeat and American occupation impacted their national identities in isolating their "Self" from both Westerners and Asians. By closely examining how history impact upon two nations' archives and construction of national identities, the chapter will discuss the participants' historical construction of their positions in the mirror of the researcher with multiple subjectivities in the given contexts.

To begin, let us revisit the day of the Thanksgiving program. After the gathering, Bianka wrote the following:

It is not so easy anymore to put on an Indian (Native American) dress without ridiculing yourself or the Indians. When you hear about the history of the facts about the first settlers and their behaviors towards the Indians it is strange to listen to what we had to listen to. Indians are not worth a Holocaust memorial?
(Journal / November in 2006)

While Bianka would usually use the journals to express her thoughts regarding everyday life in the U.S, this case was different. It seems to me that the log represented a “continuance” of the previous conversation at the Thanksgiving dinner in which she had raised a rhetorical yet provocative question in her last statement. Because I felt that Bianka had not yet “resolved” this unfinished conversation, I decided to hold a playback interview session with her later on. The following is an excerpt from the beginning of the interview:

R: In the last conversation, you criticized Americans’ ignorance of their own history and arrogance to condemn Germany’s past. And, you also wrote this log in your journal. Why did you mention a Holocaust memorial here?

B: The atomic bomb was nothing but the Holocaust caused all these bad things not only for Americans, but for everybody. Of course, I said this as sarcasm.

R: Uh, hum.

B: Imagine if Japanese build a “Gembaku (A-bomb)” memorial museum here? That means enough for the Americans. But, why don’t Japanese build a “Gembaku” memorial museum here? You have a right to do it. You have a right. I mean, if there was a time that German people did something really bad, I cannot complain. I cannot complain. But, you see these (Holocaust) memorials everywhere in this country. You’ve seen these museums everywhere in Germany. And you still have another site of remembering, another site of remembering. What is that? Why don’t you build memorials for reminding A-bombs everywhere? Remind A-bomb. Because you were involved in the war.

(Interview / Dec in 2006)

The interview begins with my inquiry above. As indicated, I initially take a position here as a researcher, not as a Japanese participant. In answering my question, instead of explaining the connection between Native Americans and a Holocaust memorial, Bianka once more brings up the topic of A-bombs. As previously shown, she feels a sense of “otherness” as a European because of the Holocaust. Identifying as the “Other” of European “Self,” she tries to place me in the position of non-European “Other,” so that I might view the Japanese as victims of a “holocaust” just like the Jews in Europe. In the beginning of the interview, Bianka primarily practices her postwar, “repentant” German identity, which reflects Germans’ regret over the Holocaust and their sense of national responsibility for the burden of the past. Yet later, this “repentant” attitude shifts to a “frustrated” one, reflecting her longstanding resentment of this stigma, which has tainted German national pride and identity. In order to understand this ambivalent, contradictory and complex postwar German identity, I first would like to describe postwar events in (West) Germany and their impact upon the later construction of such an identity.

West Germany’s postwar history can be summed up by the following four stages: (1) Compensation; (2) Accusation; (3) Stigmatization; and (4) Re-education. In the first case, the

Bonn government was required to make reparations to the victims of the Holocaust and other victims of the war. Also, the government was required to financially support the establishment of Israel.⁷¹ The ghastly nature of the Nazi crimes allowed the rest of Europe to not only hold Germans responsible for the war, but go so far as to perceive Germany as “a cancer in a fundamentally mature Western society” (Dower, 1999, p.79). Such a condemnatory view of Germans inspired the Allied Powers to indict and punish former Nazis in the Nuremberg Trials, and establish “denazification” programs⁷² to extinguish any remnants of Nazism from the cultural, political, judicial, and economic spheres of German society. Finally, Germans’ rehabilitation and reeducation were urgent to the Allied Powers, who sought to give Germany a significant role in the forthcoming Cold War against the Communist bloc (Maier 1988).

In light of these four aspects, it is reasonable to assume that Germany’s defeat and postwar treatment history directly informed the foundation of West Germany and its construction of a postwar German identity. For instance, the process of compensation, accusation, and stigmatization compelled (West) Germans⁷³ to experience remorse over their earlier support of the Nazi regime, and direct or indirect involvement in the Holocaust. Understandably, this repentance for the past became a central principle in the foundation of a renewed Germany. The Bonn government established legal and political principles designed to prevent the recurrence of Nazism, and cleanse Germany’s tainted past, during the initial stages of reconstruction.^{74 75} In addition to using legal means, the Bonn government also made considerable efforts toward preserving the memory of this Nazi legacy in the public sphere. According to Craig (1964, 1981), furthermore, German educational institutions teach children about this era through educational activities such as history classes, school trips to former concentration camps, visits to Holocaust memorial museums, and so on. Consequently, Germans are tied to their stigmatized past and moral responsibility for the Holocaust, regardless of whether they had been involved with the war or not.⁷⁶ “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (mastering the past) has therefore become a task embedded in Germans’ postwar national identity (Maier, 1988).

71 Mass protested the Israeli government’s signed on the reparations agreement with West Germany. However, the reparations ultimately supported the financial problems that Israel had due to 1948 war between Arab and Israel.

72 Allied initiatives of the denazification program followed directives issued by the Allied Control Council and accomplished by each occupational zone. The primal aim was to thoroughly exclude any residues or the physical symbols of the Nazi regime. Following the directives, the Allied intended to specify and prosecute those who were outside of the Nuremberg trials. Through the program, those who were de-nazified were executed as exile from the public office, forced labors, forfeiture and so on.

73 It is significant to note that Austrians’ and East Germans’ views of their victimization of the European Jews differ from West Germans’. According to Mochida (1990), the Austrian government decided to take their position as the first victim of Nazi after the WWII. In this “Victim theory,” Austria was forced to be annexed to the Greater Germany (Anschluss) although Anschluss was involved with the ethnic cleansing of Balkan. As for East Germany, the government considered the foundation of German Democratic Republic based on the Socialists’ victory over Fascism (Nakama 2005). That is to say, East Germany was founded by those persecuted communists by Nazi, and hence they were also the victims.

74 By applying the international laws adopted in the Nuremberg Trials for its constitution as Basic Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, the government has been able to strictly control over its people for any misleading interpretations of the Nazi regime and Hitler after the war.

75 This government resolution against Nazism is explicitly observed in the criminal laws, which stipulating penalties for plausible presentation of Hitler or public denial of the Holocaust as incitement.

76 In order to accomplish this aim, according to Maier (1988), the Bonn government and chancellors repeatedly emphasize the necessity of German’s demonstrations of their constant regrets in both written and spoken speeches as the following; “On several occasions, most notably on the fortieth anniversary of the Reich surrender, he (Weizsäcker) eloquently recognized that Germans must always remind themselves of the Nazi past, that it continued to be a national responsibility, even if most current Germans were too young to have had even a remote role in putting Hitler into power or supporting him. Chancellor Kohl also delivered a sensitive statement at Bergen-Belsen that sanctioned no West German moral evasiveness. “Germany under the National Socialist regime filled the world with fear and horror. That era of slaughter, indeed of genocide, is the darkest, most painful chapter in German history. One of our country’s paramount tasks is to inform people of those occurrences and keep alive an awareness of the full extent of this historical burden” (Maier, 1988, p. 11). The rationale of this stipulation is, as Maier states, “insofar as collection of people wished to claim existence as a society or nation, it must thereby accept existence as a community through time, hence must acknowledge that acts committed by earlier agents still bind or burden the contemporary community (p.14).

This “repentant” German identity explains Bianka’s acceptance of the numerous Holocaust memorials throughout Germany, Israel and Eastern Europe. She considers these memorials to be important for Germans, in reminding them of the horrors that racism brings to the human condition, and how easily civilization can regress. In this light, a Holocaust memorial has a special meaning and function in Germany because it represents a place for many Germans to perceive their country’s conduct of 60 years ago through the eyes of the “Other” and strengthen their resolve to combat discrimination and war. However, she questions whether Holocaust memorials in the U.S might carry a separate meaning and function. The conversation between the two hints at this:

R: Are there many memorials in Germany?

B: Yes. Because we had a lot of concentration camps. They belong to Germany, but this is not the case. They are in Germany and Israel, and maybe, somewhere that Germany occupied. But, why are these Holocaust memorials here? That’s something I don’t understand. I mean, they (Americans) didn’t help us. But during Holocaust, some Jews who try to be free and go to America. And they moved here. But, why do they need to remember that in this country?

(Interview / Dec in 2006)

Above, Bianka raises the question of why Americans “need” to build Holocaust memorials in the U.S. She is aware that the U.S. was not allied with Nazi Germany, and is also aware that the U.S. accepted many Jews fleeing Europe both before and after WWII. One might argue, then, that she is well-aware of the generally accepted wisdom that these memorials serve as a remembrance of the Holocaust. Yet, she still perceives an ulterior motive in America’s “exemplary” conduct during and after the war. As we shall observe, Bianka’s question is rhetorical, intended to further call into question America’s postwar foreign policy and the current state of affairs in the Middle East.

Before we examine Bianka’s real intention, however, I would like to mention my own historical position by making brief reference to Japanese postwar history and discourse. In the interaction above, I took the position of researcher, emphasizing my unfamiliarity with the issues surrounding Holocaust memorials and their locations. I also accepted the earlier position of “non-European” that Bianka had assigned me in the previous interaction. Note, however, that here I did not necessarily accept the new position of victimized “Other.” My avoidance of such a role indicates that I was confused by the assigned identity, and rejected Bianka’s interpellation of my historical subjectivity. In retrospect, I did not view the Japanese as war victims, especially when talking to a German about the Holocaust. In other words, I experienced the German’s guilt as projected Japanese guilt over that country’s Asian victims, but not projected American guilt over Japanese A-bomb victims.

Such confusion of historical positioning partly derives from my postwar Japanese identity’s being constructed from the legacy of the American occupation of Japan, and its accompanying postwar discourse. As Dower fully explained in *Embracing Defeat* (1999), GHQ (General Headquarters of Far East) disclosed the hidden atrocities committed in Asia to Japanese people

after the war, while simultaneously prohibiting them from freely discussing the recent war⁷⁷ from any viewpoints not favorable to those of the victors.⁷⁸ More importantly, the pragmatism of the Japanese government led it to acquiesce with GHQ's policies in order to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. in the new Cold War context. What Etoh (1994) calls "the sealed linguistic space" to describe the massive scale of American censorship during the occupation period,⁷⁹ significantly affected the postwar discourse and prevented the Japanese from focusing on their victimization during and after the war.⁸⁰ Ironically, this postwar discourse generated by authorities such as GHQ and the Japanese bureaucracy becomes intertwined with another, more leftist postwar discourse which criticizes wartime military propaganda and nationalist discourse while urging Japanese citizens to take moral responsibility for their military's atrocities and brutalization of other Asians in a manner analogous to another Axis nation, West Germany, and her postwar compensation for the Holocaust.⁸¹ In short, this discourse has not only contributed to the postwar Japanese identity, but caused Japanese people to view themselves both through the eyes of victors and those Asian victims.⁸² As a consequence, I could not easily compare the A-bomb tragedy to the Holocaust in the given context since, like many Japanese, I tend to repress the taboo of viewing Japanese as victims of the war.

My confused historical position in relation to the Holocaust is further illustrated by the following excerpt. After Bianka explains her difficulty in understanding Americans' need to

77 Dower refers to "the categories of deletions and suppression" in CCD's key log and explains in detail in the chapter (410-419). According to him, the list above includes suppression not only of any criticisms not only of SCAP, the U.S. or occupation, but also of other allied nations such as Russia, UK, Korea, China, and Allies in general. It also censors any criticisms of "Japanese treatment in Manchuria (referring to treatment of Japanese POWs or civilians by Russians and Chinese after Japan's capitulation), and Allies' Pre-War Policies" in addition to "Defense of War Propaganda (describing as "any propaganda which directly or indirectly defends Japan's conduct of and in the War") Nationalistic Propaganda, Justification or Defense of War Criminals and many others.

78 Again, Dower explains this process in detail in the chapter 14 as well. He says, "Controlling commentary about the recent war naturally was of utmost importance to the victors at the outset of the occupation. They considered it essential to suppress any rhetorical appeals that might rekindle violent wartime passions and thereby either imperil the security of occupation personnel or undermine their reformist agenda. In a more active rather than reactive direction, the Americans deemed it necessary to educate the general populace about the many aspects of Japanese aggression and atrocity that had been suppressed by their nation's own censorship machinery. This was reasonable mission, a formidable challenge, and a delicate undertaking, for it posed- and ultimately failed to escape - the danger of simply replacing the propaganda of the vanquished with that of the victors. All prior ways of speaking about the war became incorrect and unacceptable. Any criticism of the prewar policies of the victorious Allies was categorically forbidden. All past propaganda became a portmanteau violation, as it were, of the media codes. Even controversial but entirely reasonable statements about the global milieu in which Japan's leaders embarked on war (the shock of the Great Depression, the breakdown of global capitalism, worldwide trends toward protectionism and autarchy, the models as well as pressures of European and American imperialism, Western racism, and the countervailing racial and anti-colonial ideals of Pan Asianism) could be deemed no merely incitements to unrest, but also transgressions of "truth," not to speak of criticism of the occupation's policies and of the victorious powers. What now was "true" of course, was the Allied version of the war, which the media had to endorse by acts of commission as well as omission" (p.412-413).

79 According to Dower, "censorship was conducted through an elaborate apparatus within GHQ from September 1945 through September 1949, and continued to be imposed in altered forms until Japan regained its sovereignty...In practice, the censorship apparatus soon took on a life of its own. A sprawling bureaucracy was created under the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) within the Civil Intelligence Section, and CCD's censors were closely abetted by the "positive" propagandists for democracy within the Civil Intelligence and Education (CI&E) Section. Censorship was extended to every form of media and theatrical expression - newspapers, magazines, trade books as well as textbooks, radio, film, and plays, including the classical repertoires...Over the course of their four-year- regime, CCD's examiners also spot-checked an astonishing 330 million pieces of mail and monitored some 800,000 private phone conversations. Censored materials included foreign as well as Japanese writings, meaning that the vanquished were not allowed to read everything the victors read...The overall censorship operation eventually came to entail extensive checklists for taboo subjects, and in the best Orwellian manner these taboo included any public acknowledgement of the existence of censorship..." (p.406-407)."

80 Dower spent pages for explaining how CCD censored and disguised the victimized aspect of the war for Japanese, the atomic-bomb experience in particular. According to him, writing about the atomic bomb experience did not appear in nation-wide publication until the end of 1948. By that time, Dower states, "survivors of the bombs found it exceedingly difficult to reach out to one other for comfort, or to tell others what nuclear war meant at the human level" (p.414). Needless to say, Dower continues, that "the visual record of nuclear destruction was even more thoroughly suppressed...the first graphic representation of the human effects of the bombs did not appear until 1950...).

81 See Mochida (1991) and many other Japanese historians' similar comparison between A-bombs and atrocities in Asia.

82 Dower precisely states the victors' view of the war as the following: "In Allied eyes, the Japanese simply had reaped what they had sown. The terror bombing of Japanese cities, culminating in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was seen as an appropriate homecoming for the horrors Japan had visited on others throughout Asian and the Pacific" (Dower, 1999, p.415).

build Holocaust memorials in the U.S. above, I am still trying to make sense of her analogy between Holocaust memorials in the U.S. and A-bomb museums built by Japanese in the U.S. Ultimately, I adopt a tentative position as wrongdoer of the war, asking her if the situation is comparable to the Chinese building a Nanking Massacre memorial in Japan. Bianka's response is, however, more complex than I expected.

R: Are you saying that it is like the situation if Chinese people build a Nanking Massacre memorial in Japan?

B: I think Holocaust is so unique, and so is the A-bomb. The war crimes, your country did to Koreans and Chinese was war crimes. But, now Americans do, not the same, but, to some respects, in Iraq. You see Iraq. These Iraqi people didn't do anything to Americans, but they are dying now and they are raped by the soldiers. What war behind us? And what do they do when the Iraq War is over? What will they do? They'll build another memorial of American soldiers who fought against foreign soldiers. They should build a memorial for the people who had to die. This is not a war for Iraq. They don't call it a war.

(Interview / Dec in 2006)

Bianka clearly states her belief that my analogy is wrong because the Holocaust is a "unique" crime, as she takes the position as "Other" of European "Self." Germany's tainted nationhood and sense of "otherness" essentially derive from the "unprecedented" nature of Nazi Germany's crimes against European Jews, not upon the massive casualties of Russian soldiers or brutalization of Russian, Ukrainian, Polish and other Eastern European civilians at the Eastern Front. After the war, the full disclosure of the Nazi concentration camps shocked not only Jews but Europeans in general, including Americans. Because of its "unprecedented" brutality and inhumanity, the Holocaust, as Maier states (1988), was regarded as "a legacy of evil in a class by themselves, irreparably burdening any concept of German nationhood" (p.1). Ultimately, the extraordinary nature of this event causes Germans to fear that their nation will be "forever tainted, like some well forever poisoned," and leads them to perceive themselves as the "Other" of Europe.

At the risk of touching upon delicate and controversial issues, this German sense of "otherness" due to the "unprecedented" crimes against humanity needs to be further elaborated with reference to the postwar context. Firstly, the Nuremberg Trials were conducted primarily by the four Allied Powers because there were no neutral organizations with global jurisdiction after WWII (Nakamasa, 2005). Ideally, one would suggest the involvement of the United Nations. However, as is generally known, the United Nations has no legal authority or means of physical enforcement to control nations. Moreover, after the war the UN was substantially comprised of the Allied Powers. It seems natural, then, that the victors would take the initiative of establishing and controlling the tribunals using ex-post facto laws.

Yet, more recently, some have put into questions such shared view and "natural" acceptance of the Allied Powers' postwar treatment of Axis powers. For instance, MacDonogh (2007) maintains that the victors arguably abused the postwar situation by establishing legal institutions

and laws in order to further punish the defeated nations legitimately.⁸³ On this account, it could be argued that the Nuremberg Trials reflect the myth of Allied “justice” which is primarily based upon the Allied view of events during the war, and thus indicted Germans’ crimes but not those of the Allies.

Yet, Bianka does not necessarily object to the victors’ judgment in the Nuremberg Trials or the subsequent denazification programs. While she feels that the trials might not have been completely fair to Germans, it is undeniable that the Nazis committed serious crimes and must atone for them. The Holocaust, in her view, is especially shameful to Germans precisely because victimized Jews were just civilians, who “did not do anything wrong to Germans yet unreasonably sought out as an outsider.” What she calls into question here is, in short, not whether the Allied Powers were guilty or not in WWII. Neither does she inquire whether the U.S. should atone for the use of A-bombs. What she really criticizes above is the fact that the U.S. not only neglected negative legacies of their conduct of the war but still continues questionable acts upon non-European “Other” in the present time. Here, Bianka was speaking upon contemporary issues, namely, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and American soldiers’ mistreatment of Iraqi civilians from the postwar historical position of an ordinary (West) German, who had not allowed protesting the Allied Powers’ mistreatment of German civilians in the end of the war.⁸⁴

Viewed from this perspective, Bianka’s conflation of the Native American genocide, A-bombings, Holocaust memorials, and U.S. invasion of Iraq makes better sense. For her, a Holocaust memorial in the U.S. is a symbolic representation of the Euro-centric myth surrounding modern history. This myth glorifies European civilizations while privileging their own standard for justice, which had first been projected onto the non-European “Other,” and is now projected onto former Nazi Germany. Yet the real thrust of Bianka’s interrogation is not to target the victors’ double standard of justice, but rather, their unevolved account of modern history and lack of remorse for their own role in it, all of which strengthen Europeans’ sense of superiority over the “Other” while preventing them from finding a solution to world peace and cosmopolitanism. In short, Bianka’s frustration and resentment over the American version of modern history is an expression of her disappointment over the moral ambiguity demonstrated by the Cold War America.

The analysis of the interaction between Bianka and myself in the playback interview session above indicates the complexity of intercultural communicative context, whereby participants’ cultural memories and knowledge intermix through one’s projection of “Self” onto that of the “Other,” and come into play in the historical construction of subject positions in the contingent context. As we saw in the previous chapter, Bianka’s attempt to emphasize America’s guilt for the A-bombs is a combination of various factors, including the camaraderie she feels with a Japanese visitor who belongs to a former Axis country, the common cultural memories and similar historical trajectories of Germany and Japan in postwar history, and, of course, the previous conversation at the Thanksgiving dinner. Yet, there are other factors that helped Bianka to construct this historical position. For instance, Bianka lived in Japan for two years before

83 MacDonogh explains the logical basis of the Allied Power’s invention of both legal institutions and laws as the following: “If there were to be trials, there had to be a law to try them – the old maxim runs *nulla poena sine lege* (there is no crime without laws, sometimes rendered as *nullum crimen sine lege*). The Allied had to invent to a body of law that would criminalize Nazi offences and backdate it to cover the period in question” (MacDonogh, 2007, p. 430).

84 See MacDonogh’s “*After the Reich*” (2007), which fully documented what happened to German civilians after the defeat.

coming to the U.S. Her strong attraction to and respect for Japanese people and culture, accidental witnessing of English teachers' reproduction of colonial discourse upon Japanese students in Kobe,⁸⁵ and her friendship with members of upper-class, older generations of Japanese in Kyoto who held a cynical view of the U.S. occupation and control in postwar Japan, presumably came into play. Furthermore, it is undeniable that my presence as a Japanese researcher with an Asian appearance, coupled with her historical knowledge of the Japanese as A-bomb victims – a knowledge written on my body – evoked her European guilt over the “Other.” In sum, in the intercultural communicative context, one reads the history of the “Self” in the mirror of the “Other” in various ways, while constructing his/her historical position in relation to the “Other’s” history in a non-linear manner.

German’s Practices and Construction of New “European” Identity in the Mirror of “Non-European” Researcher

As witnessed above, Bianka, as a German visitor in the U.S., regards contemporary American society in a cynical light due to her sense of “otherness,” which was constructed by her experience and cultural memories of WWII and postwar history. It is reasonable for us to consider history to play a crucial role in one’s communicative practices, since it affects a nation’s archives and the dominant discourse of a society, which in turn ultimately constructs one’s national identity. Yet, this does not mean that historical components always react in a linear way in intercultural communicative contexts. For instance, two other young German subjects also feel a sense of “otherness” towards Americans during their visits to the U.S. Yet their subject positioning in relation to my subjectivities significantly differ from what we have observed in Bianka’s case. In this section, I will still focus on Germans’ sense of “otherness” and cultural memories of WWII and the postwar history, but do so in the context of several different historical trajectories that developed from the same foundation in the intercultural communicative context.

First, let us examine the case of Angela, a young and cheerful German subject aged 41. She is well-educated and interested in discussing politics, economics, history, culture, and so on. One day, we had an interview session in which we discussed the recent gatherings. I asked her if she had noticed anything in particular during the past week’s Swedish program. Her answer was rather unexpected:

R: During the Swedish Program, did you notice anything about their description of the country?

A: IKEA!

R: What about IKEA?

A: IKEA is now more Dutch because the first owner of IKEA company had a big history of Nazi connections. He was involved with the National Socialism in Germany. And because of this, German people and Swedish people were very close together at that time. Sweden has a history of the National Socialism, too. But nobody is talking about it. I

85 In a private conversation, Bianka told me one episode that she encountered in Kobe during her visit in Japan. One day, she was taking a walk at Rokko Island and ran into a group of people, with one “American or Canadian” teacher of English at Canadian Academy and other Japanese students. He began to talk about how barbaric war time Japanese people are along with his conviction that both Japan and Japanese people need to earn western sense of morality as the nation and the people are both still underdeveloped in the contemporary global context. Bianka was first very shocked and then resented. She told me, “I was so angry that I wanted to slap his face” (Private conversation in 2007).

mean, look at the first owner. He was involved with Nazis, and he was against Jewish people in Sweden, yeah? It (Sweden) is not a small country. I think he was not the only one. But, nobody was talking about this.
(Interview / December in 2006)

Angela had been slightly frustrated to listen to a Swedish coordinator's presentation about major industries in Sweden such as SAAB, Nokia, and IKEA. The buried frustrations and questions that remained in many Germans' minds since the trials – are Germans the only ones guilty because they supported the Nazi regime? – suddenly rushed to Angela's lips. A similarly negative reaction was also observed in Bianka. During the Swedish Program, she had felt uneasy listening to a Swedish coordinator describing the racial features of Swedish people, and say that "Normally people are tall, have blonde hair and blue eyes." Bianka felt "it was inappropriate to talk about their 'white-ness' in the international meeting."⁸⁶ Needless to say, these two subjects' reactions derive from the postwar discourse based on the Nuremberg Trials and the following denazification culture, that is, Germans' self-criticism of the Nazi regime and its propaganda of the Aryans as a master race.

The subjects' frustration about the Swedish program paradoxically demonstrates Germans' sense of European "Self" specifically through their sense of "otherness." Their reactions are even more interesting when compared to those of Japanese subjects towards the program, or a Swedish coordinator's interest in Japanese life during WWII. A young Japanese subject, Miki, wrote the following:

The coordinator wore an ethnic costume like "Heidi"⁸⁷ and stood on the map, and talked about Scandinavian history and races such as Finns, Norwegians and others. According to her, the Nordic race changed the color of eyes and skins and became "white" as it moved from the southern part of Europe. I found this story very interesting. As an example, she also showed us a picture of her grandchildren, all of who certainly had blond hair and fair and clear skin. Then, she and another Swedish coordinator talked about famous Swedish corporations such as IKEA, Erickson, SAAB, and so on. These corporations however do not belong to Scandinavian capitalists any longer.
(Journal / November in 2006)

While Bianka immediately perceived the description of the Nordic race as rather ideological,⁸⁸ Miki simply accepted it as an accurate racial description of northern Europeans. Such different ways of understanding the same program can be partly attributed to each person's degree of self-identification with Scandinavians. Unlike Miki who essentially separates herself from Europeans, Angela and Bianka both overreact to the coordinator's description of the Nordic race, or secret Nazi histories of European corporations,⁸⁹ precisely because they fundamentally identify themselves with Scandinavians as "white Europeans."

86 From the transcript of the interview with Bianka in December, 2006.

87 "*Heidis Lehr und Wanderjahre*" by Johanna Spyri. The story is familiar to many Japanese people because of Miyazaki's famous TV series (1974), "Heidi, Girl of Alps."

88 See William Z. Ripley's "Race of Europe" published in 1899, which ideologized biological features of white Europeans and implied racial supremacy of the Nomadic race. Needless to say, this Nordic theory was a source of Nazi Germany's ideology of Aryan as a master race.

89 For instance, see <http://www.boingboing.net/2008/01/07/from-nazi-collaborat.html>.

In another interesting example, when the same Swedish coordinator, Sofia, asked Kayo how accurately the famous book, “Memoire of Geisha”, depicts life in wartime Japan, Kayo received a very positive impression. She writes:

Sofia (the Swedish coordinator) said (at the meeting) that she has been reading “Memoir of Geisha.” Regardless of whether the book accurately depicts the Japanese society in wartime (and it does not need to accurately describe it anyway since it is supposed to be a “fiction”), I think it is a pretty well written story. Sofia said that she was interested in the Japanese people’s life in war time. Since she is mid-70 year old and about the same age with my parents, she is more or less familiar with the wartime situation. Yet because Sweden was not directly involved with an actual battle, (I think) she perhaps realized that the Japanese situation was different from that of Sweden. I think it is wonderful to have a friend like her, who wants to discuss with me about the wartime Japanese society instead of geishas.

(Journal / November in 2006)

Kayo had been surprised by the nature of the coordinator’s question. Unlike many Westerners, Sofia seemed interested in a “real” picture of Japanese people as opposed to an “exoticized” and “orientalized” description. This implication that a non-Axis (Allied) European would care about wartime Japan and regard Japanese people and culture in an un-orientalized manner, pleased Kayo.

These Japanese subjects’ reactions to the Swedish coordinator’s communicative practices crystallize not only their own self-identification, but also that of German subjects. Whereas the former identify themselves as “non-European” in the given context for the simple reason that they are racially different from Caucasians, in contrast, Angela and Bianka inevitably notice differences between Swedish and Germans, leading to a sense of “otherness” while still identifying as white Europeans. Yet it is important to note here that such German’s sense of “otherness” towards the Swedish people does not necessarily affect their communicative practices in the linear manner when they converse with me. While Bianka often sees me as a former Axis national, Angela simply identifies me as a “non-European” Japanese researcher. Angela’s binary view of European vs. non-European participants further disposes her to practice the postwar German identity as a European with the sense of “otherness” in the presence of a non-European audience. By providing the disguised European history of WWII and the postwar histories as trivia, Angela ironically practices her “European” identity at the same time in the given context.

As the conversation proceeds, Angela explains how difficult it is for Germans to “master the past” in order to become a qualified member of the Western European community. Maintaining her position as the “Other” of yet European “Self,” she mentions another interesting piece of trivia – in an odd coincidence, once more about Gunter Grass.

(Angela is explaining the persistent surveillance of Germany by other European nations, the U.S. and Israel)

A: Do you know Gunter Grass? He confessed on his birthday that, um, he was a Nazi soldier. And people really accused him. If you were Nazi once, you cannot get away from

it. I was also reading this New York Times article the other day. The article was about this German old woman who married to a Jewish guy. During the WWII, she was a soldier in a concentration camp. American government always looks for those ex Nazi people. They have a file of these people, and look after German people (in the U.S.) by their facial features and last name. They found out she was an ex Nazi after her husband died. One day, the police came to her house and kicked her out from the country. After that, she can never go back to the U.S. She was over 80 years old. All of her family and kids are in America. She has no family in Germany anymore. But it doesn't matter. People cannot get away from the past. She started her new life in the U.S. But she was not allowed to have a new life and being a new person. It is awful.
(Interview / Dec in 2006)

Angela shows her frustration toward those neighboring European nations for their “unforgiving” attitude towards Germany. Her anecdote about these two “denazified” and “normalized” Germans implies the delicate nature of “*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*.” Because the war trauma is so great, it does not seem to matter that Germans have assumed national responsibility and remained repentant. Her frustration over Germany’s “forever tainted” nationhood and identity is also observed in her self-censorship. When her Belgian husband once suggested that they hoist their national flags just like their American neighbors, Angela had overreacted:

R: So, you guys don't like to show patriotic acts in public because of the war?

A: Uh, hum.

R: But does it still matter? Everyone waves its national flag these days. You can see American flags everywhere here, too.

A: OK. Let me tell you something. My husband is a half German and half Belgian. He is very proud of being Belgian, and one day he said that we can put three flags at the entrance of my house, Belgian, German, and American. I said, “No way! Are you crazy?” We are afraid of waiving a German flag because of the war. During WWII, we occupied countries around Germany and did a lot of bad things. So, after we lost war, all the countries like France, America, or Britain, they are all watching us and make sure that we don't become nationalistic again. We are so ashamed of being German. That's how schools teach us. In Germany, schools teach us how bad our grandfathers, fathers, and our people are. So, we try not to be nationalistic. In the US, people celebrate July 4th, but in Germany, only the chancellor gives a speech. That's it. We don't celebrate our holiday for the nation. People don't waive German flags. If we do that, other countries in Europe and the U.S. say, “After this (saluting “*Heil Hitler*,”) you can't do that.” They are so afraid that we will be nationalistic again, and the Nazis will revive. Some people even believe that Hitler didn't die. I think it is really stupid. They say that Hitler is still alive and try to get us again... If you are German, people label you Nazi people.

(Interview in Dec 2006)

Above, Angela overtly expresses her sense of “otherness” as a European to the non-European/ foreign audience. Implying that Germans have been treated differently by other Westerners, she vents her resentment of the constant surveillance of Germany's patriotism by other nations since the end of the war. At the same time, she presents herself as a “denazified”

and “normalized” German, in order to convince the Asian researcher of Germans’ rehabilitated state; her frustration stems from her belief that the U.S. and neighboring nations of Europe need not to worry about Germany or another Hitler. Unlike Bianka, who projected her identity as a disgruntled German resentful of Americans’ co-opting of postwar narrative onto another Axis national, here Angela constructs and practices a “rehabilitated” German identity projected onto a non-European researcher.

Angela’s discursive practices of a rehabilitated German identity needs to be further examined against the backdrop of Germany’s new position in the European community. As the 2006 World Cup makes evident, German’s stigmatized past and fear of European surveillance has began to disappear in recent years. Another young German subject, Martha, refers to Germans’ regaining of national pride and ability to liberate themselves from the past:

R: Why were Germans reluctant to wave national flags until very recently, I mean, until World Cup?

M: Well, we are still working on our embarrassment, or bad feelings, bad conscience by our past, WWII. So, I think that for a quite long time after WWII ended, it was not possible for the German people to, um, to heal, or to work, to work the bad experiences, to work it out, or you know...it was just not possible that the trauma was too big. So, I think that the discussion about it and try to get over it was just started recently. Not so long ago. That’s why we were still not able to show our nationality, national identity.

R: And you had World Cup.

M: Yeah, yeah. ((smile)) I just know what my friends and family told us the reason that the World Cup was really like, uh, new awakening for Germany. Like, we are a nice nation, we are, it’s ok to be self-confident, and to show that we are Germans and to support our German national team, and to wave flags... But before, if I saw someone waving a national flag in Germany, I thought “Woo, you are right wing, or nationalistic”, or even like, “You are little bit like Nazi.” It was just not considered OK to show the German flags...

(Interview / Dec 2006)

Martha’s humble yet unconcealed joy over Germans’ recovery, witnessed on the microscopic level, indicates, on the macroscopic level, major changes in the fabric of contemporary German society. The passage of 60 years has not only seen the disappearance of the primary actors in the historical discourse of the Third Reich, but also allowed a united Germany to take on a central role in the EU in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Rudolf Hess’s death in 1987 symbolizes, most Germans who were directly involved with the Holocaust had disappeared by the 1990’s (Mochida, 1990). Their absence, in turn, made it easier for some Germans not only to objectify but also relativize their stigmatized history. Note that the time lag and the accompanying “normalization” of Third Reich history were both crucial to the emergence of a “healthy and constructive” German national identity, as Nolte persistently maintained in his controversial essay,⁹⁰ as well as the following *Historikerstreit* in 1986-87.

90 “*Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will*” (The past that will not pass away) was published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in 1986. In this essay, Nolte attempted to objectify and ultimately relativize the Third Reich history by comparing the Nazi regime with other totalitarian regimes, preeminently with Stalinist Russia. In his view, the rise of National Socialism in Germany was a response to Germans’ fear of Stalin’s class genocide “Bolsheviks,” which was carried out in an “Asiatic manner far from European civilization.” The fear, Nolte argues, eventually made Germans feel that Russians might possibly carry out such an “Asiatic” conduct” against them. Nolte further argues that Hitler’s fear for

Objectification and relativization of the past, in other words, has allowed younger Germans to “deal with their past in a more productive and less obsessive manner” (Maier, 1988: 29).

Note that the change chronicled above also further needs to be discussed with reference to still another major international development only two years after the historical dispute over something “undebatable” in postwar Germany: namely, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the end of the Cold War and accompanying expansion of the European community significantly bolstered Germans’ self-identification as “European,” due to Germany’s newfound political and economic leadership. This change of archive in both Germany and the new Europe, accordingly, led many Germans to feel as if they finally recovered from their stigmatized past, even while allowing them to construct and practice a new German-European identity in the global communicative context.

Such discursive practices of a “new European and German” identity is especially visible in Angela’s interactions with myself, the non-European researcher. Reflecting her “European” identity in the mirror of my “Asian” identity, Angela expresses her emergent, German identity as an EU leader, referring to the recent state of affairs in Europe, particularly the Serbian –Albanian conflict and the genocide committed in Kosovo in 1999. Taking a position as a rehabilitated and normalized German national, whose country is no longer supervised but now supervising the rest of Europe, she condemns the Milosevic dictatorship and his brutalization of the Albanian minority, both of which bitterly evoke Germans’ own situation six decades earlier. Then, she claims that the dictator and his followers must be punished by “Western justice,” in a manner similar to that of the Nuremberg Trials. Ultimately, Angela maintains, they need to be reeducated about a “Western” sense of morality in order to be a true member of European society.

Angela’s strong opinion regarding the ethnic cleansing by Serbians further leads her to scrutinize U.S. foreign policy and the double standard it often follows in keeping the international peace, especially during the G.W. Bush administration. Criticizing the U.S.’s lack of leadership in Yugoslavia and in Sudan, she skeptically questions its motivations:

R: When did Germans change their view of the U.S. recently?

A: I think we get more emancipated from the U.S. and in the last ten years, I think, you know? But, we became more critical since I think, um, the first Gulf War in Iraq. And there was a war in Europe, between Serbian and Croatia. But the U.S. did nothing. Europe asked them for help and involvement.

R: They did?

A: I think so. That’s what critical newspapers like *Der Spiegel* said. They (Americans) had no interest because this part of Europe has no natural resources. No oil. No nothing. And, then, they are not interested. I think all these things are driven by industrial benefits. The President (Bush) himself has nothing to say. He only wants to play a big game...But, you have to look into what Americans are interested in when they don’t do anything. All these countries like Croatia had no help since they have nothing to offer to the U.S. As for Germany, we still think, “OK. They (the U.S.) can do something and help others, but they have their own interest, too.” Their own benefit is usually natural resources. And,

Russian’s “barbaric deed” and reports of atrocities during the Stalinist Purge might have inspired him for the Final Solution. On this account, Nolte considers that Gulag Archiplago is more original than Auschwitz.

look at some African countries. They still stay in warfare, Sudan, Ethiopia, and um, Eritrea, Darfur. Nobody's going there. It's only UN...But, no American soldiers. (Interview / April in 2007)

In Angela's eyes, the U.S. does not seem to be judging those wrongdoers, even though ethnic cleansing and the crimes against humanity it entails remain widespread. Her disappointment in the U.S. reflects Germans' ambivalent feelings about U.S. justice and its peacekeeping role after the war, both of which Germans had accepted until very recently. Some Germans like Angela and Bianka are largely convinced that the Allied Powers' judgment of the Nazi leaders and their crimes was legitimate, although they still cannot condone the Allied Powers' punishment of Germany after the war because of their biased political interests in Europe during the Cold War era. Such criticisms are especially targeted at the U.S, which only became a superpower after WWII. The U.S.'s non-intervention in contemporary ethnic conflicts and crimes against humanity, to Angela and Bianka, confirms that this country's sense of "justice" is biased, and such biases led America to punish, stigmatize and discipline West Germany, which ultimately enabled America to accomplish its ambitions in the Cold War context. Ironically, Germans' heightened sensitivity to ethnic conflicts and crimes against humanity – a product of their own legacy – now causes them to challenge their postwar leader's notion of "justice."

Yet, unlike Bianka, Angela maintains a constructive attitude by discursively practicing her new "European and German" identity. In presenting herself as representing a leader of the new European community, she implies that Europe is not only politically, economically, and culturally different from the U.S. but also capable of putting these differences into practice in the pursuit of world peace. differently. Her criticisms of American foreign policy and involvement in the recent state of affairs in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East points to Germany's gradual disengagement from its postwar history and its accompanying construction of a new identity in the post-Cold War context.

Thus far, we have observed how WWII and the various postwar histories affect German subjects' discursive practices of their national identities, which are reflected in their journals and interviews. As noted at several points, West Germany was initially the product of the Cold War context – and as such, has been committed to a political, economic and strategic alliance with the U.S. since the occupational period – even while essentially sharing its prewar history and culture with the rest of Europe. Such a complicated historical development for modern Germany, needless to say, has significantly affected (West) Germans' identification of their "Self" in a contemporary global context. For instance, some Germans may regard themselves as a "younger brothers" of the U.S. in their appropriation of American values and beliefs into cultural, social, political and economic spheres after WWII. Accordingly, they might feel more of a kinship with Americans than Europeans. Others, however, might strongly feel themselves to be essentially "Europeans" due to their shared-ness of a long history in Europe and its various cultural legacies, from which they identify as "culturally advanced" European whose ancestors established the foundations for the U.S. and American culture.⁹¹ More importantly, as Bianka and Angela

91 See, for instance, Pells' analysis of Europeans' view of American culture in both the pre and postwar era in "Not like us: How Europeans have loved, hated, and transformed American culture since World War II" (1997). Also, see Bergharn's (2001) introductory analysis of the postwar American foreign policies in Europe, which was essentially driven by their ambition to change European elites' ideas about "inferior", "vulgar" and "commercialized" American culture.

repeatedly showed, some may still remember the bitter defeat and the American occupation and control, which shaped Germans' sense of stigma and "otherness" as Europeans. German national identity is thus not only ambivalent but unpredictable in intercultural communicative contexts like the research site, which itself directly reflect the postwar discourse by its very nature. This is due to the fact that participants' construction of historical position and the accompanying communicative practices of their national identities are affected, first, by the chemistry between their sense of "otherness" and other participants' multiple subjectivities; and second, by the subsequent projection of their "Self" onto the "Other" in the contingent context.

Taking into account such complexities in the process of Germans' self-identification in intercultural communicative contexts, it is not surprising that each German participant would historically construct a different subject position from one another in relation to my subjectivities in a non-linear manner, and discursively practice discrete types of German national identities in the study above. Bianka, for example, had an essentially cynical view of American history and current foreign policy based on the stigma attached to Germany's past and her accompanying sense of "otherness" as a European, both of which severely damaged her proud image as a "civilized German with great cultural legacies." In her contact with me, however, she projected this sense of stigma and European guilt for the "Other" in history together with my subjectivities as a non-European victim of the European "holocaust." This further allowed her to historically construct and discursively practice not only a "frustrated" German identity, which outspokenly criticizes the U.S.'s double standard of justice and racism toward the non-European "Other" as evidenced by the A-bombs and Antebellum Native American slaughter, but a German national who is now free of the Cold War American discourse, and scrutinizes U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

In contrast to Bianka, Angela practices a less bitter German identity which reflects Germany's new role as a leader of Europe, in the presence of myself, a non-European researcher and audience. Although she is also critical of the American leadership in the postwar world and its double standard of justice, she retains both American and European values and beliefs as a "rehabilitated" and "reeducated" German of the postwar generation, hoping that Germany and Europe will ultimately play a different role from the U.S. in their contributions to world peace.

Finally, Martha, who had been initially interested in "intercultural communication" and spontaneously joined my research study, kept many journals in which she shared her opinions about how "culturally different" European Germans and Americans misunderstand each other. However, this dichotomy of European vs. American, as well as her own denial of history's impact on intercultural communication, led her to misattribute her sense of alienation from American society to mere cultural differences, as well as reinforce common negative stereotypes of "serious" Germans and "superficially polite and unreliable" Americans.

All of the phenomena observed in the German subjects here – their critical views of the U.S. and its foreign policy, their realization and discursive practices of "European German" identity, and even their struggle with the feeling of "otherness" and stigmatized national identity – are now becoming more highly visible than ever. These hidden transcripts have come to the surface precisely as a result of the ongoing transition of archives taking place in both German society and the world at large. Indeed, as Blommaert maintains, the visibility and accessibility of certain

discourse forms at a particular time and under particular conditions is itself an important phenomenon, since they reflect “the wider sociopolitical environment in which they occur” (Blommaert, 2005, p.66).

Before we move on to the Japanese participants, I need to mention some issues that I encountered while studying my German subjects. When reading Martha’s journals, which specifically focused on cultural differences between Europeans (and Germans) and Americans, I felt a little awkward. Despite the fact that I had only given her the general instructions to write “anything” about her life and experiences in the U.S. her focus was primarily limited to intercultural (mis)communications between her and Americans or other Europeans, but not with any other races. As the research proceeded, I asked her to write more about her experiences with other ethnicities, especially Japanese participants, since they represented the largest population at the gatherings. In spite of this, I ultimately found that her journals were focused largely on European and American participants from the gathering and larger university community.

Similarly, I had an awkward feeling when interviewing Angela. She was quite knowledgeable about politics, economics, contemporary foreign affairs, and the literature and history of various cultures. However, she knew very little of subjects not related to Europe or the U.S. Her familiarity with certain foreign affairs in the Middle East and Africa, for instance, was only based on the fact that they happened to represent current interests for the EU or NATO. Likewise, she knew little of what transpired in the Pacific theater during WWII. Yet, she showed limited interest in learning more about those events, even while at the same time demonstrating an eagerness to expound upon events in the European theater as though the latter was all that mattered. In retrospect, I found it quite disconcerting that these two otherwise well-educated and worldly Germans would know so little about Asia.

This awkward feeling that I experienced when studying the data for Martha and Angela – namely, my disappointment and frustration about their ignorance and indifferent attitudes towards non-European spheres of the world, led me to then wonder why “I” felt in such a way. Often in these encounters, I not only felt that they were neglecting a part of the world that I belonged to by overlooking history as well as the current state of affairs in Asia, but also that they felt the need to “teach me” about European culture, history and concerns; in short, about “their” world. Of course, there is nothing wrong with this latter goal; after all, they are my study subjects, and it is their role to share their experiences and thoughts with me. Their focus on Americans of European descent may not seem so odd if one recalls that the community in which they live is not only the home of one of the oldest universities in the U.S., but located in a wealthy region of New England which has traditionally been populated by many European descendents. I might have simply overreacted to their focus and interest surrounding Europe and the U.S., in assuming that they might practice this same colonial discourse upon me. Still, why did I misconstrue the situation in such a way? In other words, why was I so “timid” or afraid of being interpellated as a peripheral and unequal “Other⁹²”?

92 Yet, some Japanese might perceive such Germans’ attitudes as their practice of the colonial discourse on non-European “Other.” See, for instance, Matsubara’s initial motive to write “*Raumschiff Japan*” (1998). Matsubara wrote the book in German precisely because she intended to speak against their Orientalist view of non-European “Other.”

Conducting the research study helped me, eventually, to understand where my awkward feeling and ambiguous anxiety ultimately came from. When I was interviewing Bianka one day about the Holocaust and Nazi war crimes in Europe, I unexpectedly found myself linguistically vulnerable in the given situation.

R: Do you think, in your view, Germans generally think the Holocaust is a war crime?

B: No, not a war crime... They just sort out one group, and attack this group, even though they were their own members of the state. These Jews were Germans. They just got the stamp that “you were not worth being what we are.” The reason why was because, I think, “they (Jews in Germany) were very critical. They were very well-educated. And, they had a lot of money.” So, if you put them away, so that “I have money and I don’t have critics, and it’s better go for it.”...I don’t think they think it was a war crime because it didn’t happen during the war. I mean, maybe they did it through other people during the war against other countries like Poland... And, maybe you can see it as a war crime but it didn’t start in that way. The funny thing is that Hitler said “all these wonderful people are blond and big.” But they allied with Japan. But, you are not blond or huge people. So, the theory...they needed Japan but because of your looking, Hitler shouldn’t have reached to your hand. You shouldn’t have reached to his hand to fight with him because “You are black, not European looking with this blond.” He wanted “to make the world blond and without colors.” It was contradictive. But, maybe, “only as long as we have conquered all this world.”...

(Interview / Dec in 2006)

While Bianka was referring to Nazi Germany’s brutalization of European Jews and Slavic people, I was similarly wondering whether or not the Japanese military’s conduct toward other Asians had originated with the war. However, as soon as Bianka criticized Hitler’s propaganda of Aryans as a master race, I suddenly realized that she no longer regarded me as an Axis national, but as a non-European “Other” despite our previous sense of camaraderie established upon the shared cultural memories of the bitter defeat and postwar history. Significantly, in Bianka’s account, the Holocaust had emerged from Germans’ jealousy toward wealthy European Jews as “Other,” and the accompanying prejudice described above echoes the 1996 claim by a famous American Jewish historian, Daniel Goldhagen, that prevalent anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany was a driving factor for Germans’ support of Nazis and the subsequent Holocaust. Not realizing that Bianka had already shifted her position to that of “European” experiencing a sense of guilt over the Jewish “Other,” I was still accommodating myself to Germans and perceiving WWII from a victimizer’s viewpoint. But when Bianka uttered the sentence, “You are black,” I found myself completely at a loss for words, scarcely able to believe my ears. For some moments, I felt too unsettled and bewildered to continue the conversation with her, as I tried to figure out why this “nice” friend, who “respects and loves Japanese culture and people,” had suddenly made such a racist remark.

In retrospect, in the exchange above, I reacted in the same way as Bianka when had misunderstood me to be calling the Pope “Nazi.” In that case, Bianka overreacted even though I was “only” animating the voice of the Western media that had described his background with an adjective disguising an extremely negative intention. As for this speech event, the study of German subjects’ interviews and journals had already suggested that history impacts their

national identities, creating their sense of “otherness” due to the stigma of the past. This also explained why Bianka was so linguistically “vulnerable” at the Thanksgiving dinner table conversation, while disclosing how the following “synchronization” of discourse occurred in the given context. Ironically, here in the later exchange, I was similarly overreacting to Bianka, even though she was “only” animating multiple voices of Hitler, German fascists, National Socialists and so forth. Now, it is clear that it was not Bianka but other voices that made such a racist remark, due to the heteroglossic nature of discourse (Bakhtin, 1981).

This experience made me wonder what had really happened in the speech event above. Of course, one could argue that I misconstrued Bianka’s utterance and intention because we are both non-native speakers of English, and hence did not pay full attention to such a slight nuance. Nevertheless, I could not dismiss my intuition that there might be another factor to make me feel so vulnerable to her language. More specifically, as mentioned earlier, I appeared to have a constant fear and anxiety about the German subjects’ potential interpellation of me as a “less significant” Asian “Other” as compared to Europeans when conducting my research. But, why did I have such a fear? Is it because discourse analysis is my field, causing me to become too sensitive to other people’s use of language towards me? Or, did other Japanese participants at the gathering also have similar feelings of “timidity” in front of Western audiences, frustration about the latter’s neglect of non-European spheres of the world, or even fear of potential racist remarks? In other words, did those Japanese people, who live in the U.S. and speak English adequately like myself, also feel that vulnerable to the language of Germans and other Western participants over such trivial matters?

These questions above led me to closely examine Japanese subjects’ national identities and sense of “otherness,” in relation to their cultural memories of history in the global context. Recall that in the previous section, two young Japanese participants, Kayo and Miki, both seem to naturally accept racial and cultural differences between Europeans and Asians. Their attitudes are certainly normative and appropriate if one takes into account that an intercultural communicative context is a place where people from various parts of the world encounter each other and hence their ethnically and culturally different carriers come into play. Accordingly, participants of an international gathering such as the research site are expected to be tolerant of such “differences” in order to successfully communicate with each other as “good” cosmopolitan members in the global context. However, some postmodern theorists might argue that racial and cultural “differences” are never detectable in such a way in the modern era, since global context integrates all parts of the world into its system, and creates a highly stratified social structure based upon such “differences.” In this light, it is possible that the system of differences itself may be exploited to the advantage of a particular group of people, who possess a dominant share of the global world’s unequally distributed power and wealth by promoting a particular ideology as common sense. Since a particular “different” racial or cultural background could be perceived as a symbolic representation of the dominant group’s power in the global context, the aforementioned neutral sense of “difference” needs to be carefully examined with reference to power and the subjects’ worldviews.

The following analysis, therefore, aims to explore how Japanese participants perceive both racial and cultural differences as well as the global world in their everyday experiences in the U.S., while they discursively practice their Japanese national identity in their journals and

interviews. Unlike the German subjects who naturally practiced their European German identity reflected in the mirror of myself as a former Axis national or non-European “Other,” Japanese participants’ practices of their “Self” is rather complicated since they see themselves in the mirror of myself, a native of Japan but holding a higher educational degree from an American institution and living in the U.S. Additionally, because they also know that I study intercultural communication focusing on Japanese people in the U.S, they first see themselves in the mirror of the researcher and then compare themselves with the Japanese populace in the eyes of Westerners, ultimately constructing their Japanese identities upon the respective outcomes of those comparisons. As a consequence, their discursive practices and construction of the Japanese “Self” is built upon multiple time scales of social, cultural, ideological and historical contexts, due to the complex historicity of modern Japan and Japanese identity.

The Colonial Discourse and Japanese Subjects’ Sense of “Otherness” in the Mirror of Westerners

The Japanese participants’ natural acceptance of racial and cultural differences between European/ American people and themselves as Japanese/Asian is usually detected as being non-ideological and non-critical in character, accompanied by a superficially innocent admiration and attraction to Europeans as a “different” race, which inherits and practices “different” cultural traditions from those of Japanese. Such a neutral and universal notion of “attraction to differences,” however, needs to be discussed with reference to issues of power, since one’s preference for a particular culture and people over others often disguises underlying ideological motives and historical backgrounds.

First, I would like to begin with the following interaction between myself and Kayo, both of whom had previously participated in the Thanksgiving dinner conversation. Note that among the Japanese subjects and participants at the gathering, Kayo and I share quite similar social and educational backgrounds. For instance, we both went to national universities in Japan for an undergraduate education, and then received higher educational degrees from American institutions. Because of our common background, I was interested in her motivations for coming to the U.S. The conversation between the two of us proceeded as follows:

R: What was your primary motive and attraction to studying abroad?

K: When I was in a middle school, my father, who was a professor (in Japan), went to Vienna in Austria on his sabbatical. Unlike now, he couldn’t take us with him to Europe back then. So, he wrote us letters almost daily and let us know about his life in Europe. Because of this experience, I was originally interested in studying in Germany or wherever people speak European languages. Of course, I was not even thinking about studying other Asian languages, say, Chinese, at all at that time. European countries looked so different from Japan. So, I simply thought to myself, “I have to go and see Europe or America since they look very different from Japan. They seem more interesting than Asia.” ...Frankly speaking, I probably had a similar feeling to that of Japanese people in Meiji era. They simply wanted to learn “different” culture because they thought western culture was so different from and thus “superior to” Japanese culture. Retrospectively, I was really simple minded and naïve back then. I realized my

idea was wrong only after I came to the U.S. I soon realized that not everything in the West is superior to our culture.
(Interview / May in 2007)

Above, Kayo explains that her primary motive for studying abroad originally derived from her innocent attraction to and curiosity about the “different” European culture. The longer she stays in the U.S, however, the more skeptical she becomes about the dominant Japanese view of Western culture as “superior” to Japanese culture. Explaining her psychological growth as a person, Kayo resorts to an analogy for Japan’s growth as a nation. Projecting the general populace of contemporary Japan and herself in the past onto the Japanese of the Meiji era, she confesses having been naïve enough to blindly believe that the West is superior to Japan in all respects. Significantly, in her account the general Japanese populace is symbolically depicted as being confined in a small island and barely in touch with any Westerners, who thus still fantasize about Western people and culture based on their insufficient knowledge and naïve account of the “real” Western world. In other words, by using this analogy, Kayo separates herself from other ordinary Japanese people while attempting to construct and discursively practice a different type of contemporary Japanese identity; one which travels the world, possesses sufficient capital in the global market, and thus is liberated from the colonial discourse that has dominated Japanese society since the 19th century. Needless to say, her position is constructed in the mirror of myself as a Japanese “cosmopolitan” researcher from an American university, whom she assumes is “awake and “progressive” in contrast to those “blind,” ordinary Japanese people trapped in an “outdated” ideology in the 21st century, during this age of globalization.

But do those contemporary “ordinary” Japanese people naïvely and blindly believe Western culture to be “different from” and hence “superior to” Japanese culture, as Kayo implied above? How do they really perceive “cultural and racial differences” between Westerners and Asians? Another young Japanese subject, Miki, who has lived in the U.S. for several years and possesses a reasonable degree of linguistic knowledge and communicative skills in English, openly admits that ordinary Japanese, including herself, still have prejudice towards “foreign culture” and “foreign people,” depending on their “racial” background. With the caveat that she would speak as if she were a typical “Japanese of the Meiji era,” Miki describes contemporary Japanese people’s hidden practices of the colonial discourse and their accompanying sense of racism:

(Miki and the researcher are discussing everyday experiences of intercultural communication)

R: Have you ever met foreigners who can speak Japanese fluently in the U.S?

M: Yes, I have. I know someone who can speak Japanese almost as well as native speakers.

R: How do you feel when he talked to you in Japanese in the U.S?

M: I liked it. I mean, I usually appreciate it if any foreigners are interested in our culture or language because I think they like us. That’s why they learn to speak our language.

R: Any foreigners? Do you feel differently toward westerners and Asians even if they both speak Japanese well?

R: Ah...that’s a sensitive question, isn’t it? But, I do. I have to admit I do feel differently. To Asian speakers of Japanese, I might take it for granted a little because they are Asian. I take it for granted that they are interested in Japanese culture and language partially

because I think Japanese culture is a leading culture in modern Asia. So, I take it natural that other Asians are interested in our language and culture. Of course, this idea is totally wrong and inappropriate because there is no reason for them to be naturally familiar to or fond of Japanese culture and language. When white people speak Japanese to me, however, I just can't help myself overreacting to them. I go, "Woowoo! You speak Japanese very well!" ((laugh))

R: Why do you react so differently? ((laugh))

M: I guess because I feel inferior to them. It is like the movie, "Roman Holiday." When someone superior come close to you, you are pleased.

R: Where does this sense of "inferiority" come from then?

M: It comes from our cultural background, doesn't it? For example, we naturally perceive that listening to western music is cooler than Japanese music. We feel in the same way for western cinemas and couture. Cultures always come from the West. They are imported from the West because they are superior to ours. These hidden messages (embedded) in the imported culture make us believe we are inferior to the West. In other words, I think it is "culture" that makes us feel inferior to western people...I think Japanese people naturally conceive the western world as "the world." Within my understanding, Asia is not really the center of this world at least for most Japanese people. I mean, I just naturally and physiologically feel Asia is not really "international" place although it theoretically is. This prejudice is perhaps associated not only with racial issues in the modern history but also with economic issues. I think our sense of "superiority" and "inferiority" to others, in another word, is always associated with both racial and economic matters.

(Interview / July in 2007)

What Miki attempts to explain here echoes Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power and value of a particular culture in a particular market. In order to understand how "different" European culture became more valuable and powerful than other cultures from the standpoint of contemporary Japanese society, it is necessary to take into account the larger ideological and historical contexts of the global world in the mid-nineteenth century, which created the national foundation for the modern Japanese state after 200 years of the Tokugawa seclusion policy.

In his review of Japan's trajectory in world history, Pyle (2007) explains that Japan has traditionally adopted a conformist strategy in its international affairs when dealing with the most powerful nation of any particular epoch. Since the global context surrounding Asia and Japan in the modern era was the colonial age, with "the new world order imposed by Western imperialism,"⁹³ the Meiji leaders "responded the challenge of the international system not with resistance, but with a marked realism, pragmatism and opportunism" (p. 75), by accepting and adapting to the rules and practices of the European system. Notably, during the nation's transformational period, the Meiji government sent significant numbers of Japanese elites as

93 In his description of the birth of the modern Japan, Pyle persistently use the term, "force", to imply Japan's irresistible situation in the global western world. He says; "In 1853, Commodore Perry arrived on Japan's shores with his flotilla of American ships to *demand* trade, setting off a tumultuous and chaotic period...In many respects, Japan was ripe for radical change. There was discontent in all social classes owing to the dislocations caused by long term social and economic change. But it took an *external threat* to shape the forces that led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa and the establishment of the new Meiji government. The fifteen-years period from 1853 to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when Japan established a new government and set about the pursuit of national power, is one of the most turbulent in the recorded history of the country. When this period was over, however, Japan had in place a vigorous young ruling clique with a fierce determination to meet the *challenges* of the new international environment in which Japan found itself" (Pyle, 2007, p.67-68).

envoys to Europe and the U.S. “to import all manner of new technology and finished manufactured goods” and “to emulate the institutions of the most successful nations.” The logic behind their diplomatic policy was that such rapid transformation would be crucial for modern Japan in order to “survive and compete in the new economic environment” and “the anarchic realm of international relations⁹⁴” (p.68-69) of the colonial age. Accordingly, the Meiji government decided to transform all spheres of the nation to Western ways while risking Japanese cultural identity, in order to accomplish two goals: namely, to put an end to the unequal treaties imposed by the West during the Tokugawa era, and to fully participate in the new East Asian order.

Taking into account the aforementioned ideological and historical contextual factors, it is reasonable to assume that European culture has never been considered simply “different,” either by modern Japanese society or the global world. As Miki claimed previously, Western culture was indeed not only technologically advanced but also made possible “the first truly global international system” (Pyle, 2007, p. 67) through its contribution to the development of industrial civilization and accompanying economic growth. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the modern Japanese psyche naturally conceives European culture as a symbolic representation of the Western military and economic powers that ruled and controlled the modern world with their colonial system during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to their cultural memories of the modern era, in other words, many Japanese people still retain their view of the West as “superior” while continuing to practice the colonial discourse in their everyday life.

Miki’s account of the impact of modern colonial history upon contemporary Japanese views of both Westerners and themselves helps to explain why those ordinary people have such a skewed image of Western culture and people, and react in such a manner. Yet one may wonder why she speaks on behalf of the Japanese people when she maintains the image of a “cosmopolitan” who currently lives in the U.S., speaks English without any problems, and even has some Western friends. In order to understand why she ultimately justifies the “physiological” sense of racial and cultural inferiority to the West felt among Japanese, it is necessary to further consider what position she takes here, and what identity she constructs and discursively practices in the mirror of the researcher.

First, Miki persistently claims during the interview session that she is different from myself or Kayo, even though we are each identifiable by others in general as “a Japanese female who resides in the U.S.” According to her, I and Kayo are “unordinary” Japanese participants in the meeting because we not only live in the U.S., but have earned Western cultural capital at American institutions and are therefore capable of standing as equals against Westerners over their “different” sense of values, if required. In other words, Miki views each of us as “a real cosmopolitan” Japanese, who has already conquered the stigma of “Other” and departed from the colonial discourse in which she and most Japanese people are still trapped. (As we shall later see, this view of Kayo and myself is quite inaccurate.)

94 Pyle explains the Meiji government’s policy making for changing Japan into the modern state was essentially driven by the new economic system of the global market promoted and established by the Industrial Revolution in the U.K. He says, “The Meiji leaders instinctively grasped the interaction of economics and security. Thus it was not only the international state system and the distribution of power among states that had powerful effects upon the character of Japan’s domestic regime, but the international economy as well. From the time in the mid-nineteen century when Japan’s leaders realized the extent of Western industrial as well as military power, the determination to overcome Japan’s economic backwardness dominated their policy-making” (Pyle, 2007, p.68).

In contrast, Miki considers herself and most other Japanese females in the university community to be “tourists,” who are temporarily living in the U.S. based on their spouses’ career choices, but not because of ambitions of impacting the host society or competing with other Westerners on the international stage or in the global market. When I asked her a critical question about Japanese views of different races, she felt it necessary to speak for the psyche of the general Japanese populace by proxy, on the presumption that I would no longer understand how “typical” Japanese feel towards Westerners. By animating the voice of ordinary Japanese people living in Japan, and explaining why they react to Westerners in a certain way despite increasing opportunities to meet foreigners in an age of globalization, Miki tries to explain the ambiguous position in which she currently stands. Using me as a mirror to view herself as a Japanese “departed” from the colonial discourse, she discursively practices a mixture of a “tourist” and “cosmopolitan” Japanese identity, which lives in the U.S. and is keenly aware of the existence of the colonial discourse and its effects, while remaining unable to overcome the stigma of “Other” that is deeply inscribed in the modern Japanese identity.

These references to “different” Western culture on the part of the two Japanese subjects indicate that the colonial discourse is not only prevalently practiced in contemporary Japanese society, but significantly affects the modern Japanese national identity by creating their sense of “inferiority to” and “otherness toward” Westerners. The important consideration here, however, is not their awareness of the existence of the colonial discourse but their construction and discursive practices of two different types of Japanese identity in the U.S. based on their awareness of the discourse. Kayo, for instance, constructs her identity as a cosmopolitan “awake” from the false reality that Japanese society forces her to believe through everyday communicative practices of the colonial discourse. In order to resist this discourse, she describes (and perhaps tries to perceive) racial and cultural differences as merely “different” in her interviews and journals in order to further deny the Orientalist view of “inferior” Japanese culture seen in the mirror of a “superior” West. In this light, her superficially natural acceptance of cultural differences is, in fact, not “natural,” but instead needs to be understood as the communicative practice of her “awakened” cosmopolitan identity which rebels against the imposed misrecognition of Western and Japanese cultural values that is based on the world order of the colonial age.

In contrast, Miki constructs a Japanese “tourist” identity in spite of her cosmopolitan background. Although she struggles with her sense of “inferiority” to Westerners, her lack of cultural capital in the U.S., as well as her sense of “otherness” in the Western world, inevitably make her not only “timid⁹⁵” to Westerners but also reluctant to change the existing colonial discourse. As a consequence, unlike Kayo, Miki ultimately accepts “racial and cultural difference” as an ideologically misrecognized “distinction.” Consequently, she practices an

95 Bourdieu explains that one’s timidity or shyness is socially constructed. He says: The distinctiveness of symbolic domination lies precisely in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and constraint. The “choices” of the habitus (for example, using the ‘received uvular ‘r’ instead of the rolled ‘r’ in the presence of legitimate speakers) are accomplished without consciousness or constraint, by virtue of the dispositions which, although they are unquestionably the product of social determinisms, are also constituted outside the spheres of consciousness and constraint. The propensity to reduce the search for causes to a search for responsibilities makes it impossible to see that *intimidation*, a symbolic violence which is not aware of what it is (to the extent that it implies no act of intimidation) can only be exerted on a person predisposed (in his habitus) to feel it, whereas others will ignore it. It is already partly true to say that the cause of the timidity lies in the relation between the situation or the intimidating person (who may deny any intimidating intention) and the person intimidated, or rather, between the social conditions of production of each of them. And little by little, one has to take account thereby of the whole social structure (Bourdieu, 2001, p.51).

assigned “inferior Other” identity, reinforcing the existing colonial discourse, because she does not feel entitled to either challenge or negotiate with the dominant view held by the modern global world.

In this section, I analyzed two Japanese participants’ references to their views of “different” Western culture and people. As we observed above, a close examination of their construction and discursive practices of these two different Japanese identities in the U.S., as well as their positioning in relation to me as a researcher, allowed us to understand that the colonial discourse significantly affects these subjects’ communicative practices at the present time by creating their sense of being “inferior” to Westerners, while making them feel “Other” in the global context in which Westerners primarily take leading roles. More importantly, the subjects’ superficially natural acceptance of racial and cultural differences between Japan and the West, which we had previously conceived as the same phenomenon, in fact represented two discrete results despite having essentially developed from the same foundation; namely, Japanese nationals’ sense of “otherness” in the West throughout modern history. In the following section, I will continue to analyze the Japanese participants’ communicative practices with reference to their sense of “otherness,” further exploring what phenomena emerge from this same foundation. By focusing on how differently each person not only reacts to, but impacts the existing colonial discourse and accompanying dominant view of the contemporary world, I would like to discern how each Japanese subject constructs and practices her Japanese identity differently in the given context.

Racism, Linguicism and Linguistic Vulnerability

As we observed above, contemporary Japanese national identity is crucially subjugated to the colonial discourse and accompanying Orientalist ideology that are the result of modern world history. In order to fully understand their sense of “otherness” and “inferiority” to Westerners, however, one needs to further clarify what “Western racial and cultural supremacy” really means for contemporary Japanese people.

To start, let us take a look at the following excerpt of my interview with Miki. In the previous part, she explained that ordinary Japanese people feel inferior to Westerners, due to the West’s cultural and economic supremacy in the modern era. Yet she further reveals what “the West” signifies by adding more historical references to her sense as “Other” in the prevalent colonial discourse in contemporary Japan.

(Miki explains that the Japanese sense of “cultural inferiority” is relevant to both racial and economic matters.)

R: How do you distinguish what nationals are superior or inferior to Japanese then? For example, do you lump French and British with other Europeans, say, Polish or Danish people?

M: No, no. not any Europeans, but what I mean are those of G7 or G8 European countries. Except Americans, I think Japanese people feel intimidated to people of these countries.

R: Interesting. Do you think your sense of inferiority to the “West” come from the modern Japan’s historical relationship with the European countries or the U.S. or maybe both? Is that why you are referring to the U.S?

M: From the historical viewpoint, yes, of course. I think Japanese people have a strong inferiority complex to the U.S. and Americans because of the defeat. The defeat certainly affects our view of Americans and their culture. But not only the defeat, but also the prevalent culture in (contemporary) Japan also affects, too. For example, we constantly watch TV programs about the history of the occupied Japan or the Japanese history under the U.S. control. I think these things affect our view of American people and culture even though young generations like me did not experience the defeat or the American occupation. Even now, Japanese politicians always have to wait for the tacit approval of the White House when they decide “our” national policies. We have the postwar history that we have always had to obey to America’s orders. Whenever we speak of “rebel against” or “say ‘No,’” we are targeting American policies but we are not thinking about anybody else such as Europe. We don’t feel such a tension to European countries anymore.

R: I see. So, you feel in such away even though you did not experience these historical events.

M: Well, I have to use the term, “culture,” again. I think such sense of inferiority to the U.S. prevalently penetrates in Japanese people’s psyche and culture.

(Interview / July in 2007)

Above, Miki explains that the “European cultural supremacy” that prevailed in modern Japanese society was replaced by “American” supremacy after WWII, when Japan had not only lost the war, but was occupied by American forces for the first and only time in its history. While admitting that she perceives G7 or G8 European countries as “superior” to Japan (and needless to say, these are the former major Western powers of the colonial age), she further emphasizes that she and many Japanese people feel an even stronger sense of inferiority with respect to the U.S., due to their cultural memories of the defeat, the following U.S. occupation, and the postwar history established upon the Pax Americana in the context of the Cold War. Note that Miki explains the psyche of the general postwar Japanese populace very clearly and logically. In fact, her voice here is echoing the voice of the political left in postwar Japan, to which her parents both represented in fighting against the U.S. and the supporting political right in postwar Japan⁹⁶ over the anti-Red purges, peace treaty movement and opposition to the Korean War. Borrowing the left’s voice against the postwar Japanese government’s pragmatism as well as U.S. foreign policy in Far East Asia in the Cold War context, she speaks on behalf of the Japanese people in explaining how the psychological wounds of modern Japanese were exacerbated not only by the occupier, but also by its own people.⁹⁷

Miki’s view regarding Japanese people’s sense of “inferiority” to American people and culture, along with the history including the defeat, occupation and postwar Japan’s conformist policy in regards to the U.S., is also echoed by another Japanese subject’s reference to the prevalent neo-colonial discourse in postwar Japanese society. Tomoko, a 54 year old teacher of Japanese in the U.S., has traveled the world and lived in Germany, Australia, and the U.S. due to her spouse’s career choice. In her interview, she refers to an episode involving other European colleagues at a foreign language school in Newtown, who frequently complain about the misbehavior of “culturally different” American students. She then explains the reason why those

96 Namely, it signifies the Japanese government, bureaucrats and LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). Also see Dower’s chapters, 6, 7, and 8.

97 See, for instance, Komori (2001).

French, German and Russian teachers are so outspoken in their criticism of Americans: she believes that they feel “culturally” superior to Americans. The interaction proceeds as follows:

T: I can accept such “culturally different” misbehaviors as “different.” But, those Europeans cannot take it because they perhaps think the U.S. was originally a colony of Europe, because of the history.

R: Comparing to Europeans, do you think Japanese look up Americans?

T: I think so. For example, when my children were very young, I took them back to Japan. Many Japanese people (in Japan) were all impressed by my children just because they speak English. They said, “Wow, your children are so smart. They speak English even though they are so young!”

R: Where do you think such attitude comes from?

T: Perhaps from their parents who are older than my generation. In their narratives, “When we lost the war and had nothing to eat, Americans brought great culture.” Theoretically speaking, it was a defeat in which we were “destroyed.” But somehow, many Japanese people still feel that the U.S. “restored” Japan instead of “destroyed.” I think their sense of inferiority to Americans probably comes from their memories of the postwar history.

R: What county do you think Japan lost the war to, then?

T: Ah...it was America. I guess, because they occupied us. I mean, GHQ occupied Japan. That’s the only narrative we have ever heard after the defeat during the postwar era. Although I have never seen any American soldiers, I think those who are about 10 years older than I am probably saw them around, right? I used to hear them discussing whether they got a chewing gum or not (by American soldiers) even long after the occupational period ended. I guess the Occupational Forces gave them a strong impression when they distributed foods. For those people, “the” chewing gums had such a great impact upon their image of the defeat and the victor.

(Interview / January in 2007)

Tomoko first states that Europeans’ intolerant attitudes towards the culturally different behaviors of American students can be attributed to their sense of “superiority” over Americans, due to the European colonial history in North America. While acknowledging that Japanese do not share a common racial, cultural and historical background with Americans as Europeans do, she nevertheless attributes her sense of “otherness” not only to such “differences,” but to the Japanese national’s sense of “inferiority” to Americans due to the defeat and the postwar American occupational period. In her narrative, she depicts Japanese cultural memories of the occupational period by projecting it onto the stereotypical image of the occupation: namely, American GIs passing out candy and chewing gum to Japanese children from their army jeeps.⁹⁸ Interestingly, this picture that Tomoko draws by animating the voice of elderly people who directly experienced the U.S. occupation, echoes with Dower’s description of the Japanese people’s popular acceptance of the U.S.’s reform of the nation as “gifts from heaven” after the defeat. Dower explains that ordinary Japanese perceived national reforms such as demilitarization and democratization positively, due to their “exhaustion and despair” or

98 See the famous photograph in Dower’s “Embracing Defeat” (1999, p.72). According to him, the postwar Japan’s national reform was generally perceived by Japanese people as “Gifts from heaven.” The caption says: “The most effective “gifts from heaven” purveyed by occupation troops were often the simplest: sweets, cigarettes, and chewing gums, accompanied by offhanded friendliness. “Give me chocolate” became a catch phrase for the approach children adopted toward the conquerors within days after the first GIs arrived.”

“*kyodatsu*” (Dower, 1999, p.87) over the recent defeat. However, as Tomoko keenly senses and Dower persistently claims, the U.S. occupation ultimately reinforced a Japanese “colonial mentality” by injecting all spheres of the society⁹⁹ with American values and beliefs. In short, although ordinary Japanese people in both postwar and contemporary Japan had such positive cultural memories of the U.S. occupation, inevitably they also had to retain their sense of inferiority with respect to the victor nation and its nationals, while reinforcing the colonial discourse even after the occupational period.

In addition to the impact of the GIs’ chewing gum upon the postwar Japanese colonial mentality, there is another important episode that suggests contemporary Japanese people’s sense of inferiority to Americans: their reaction to the English skills of Tomoko’s children. Tomoko perceived this as a demonstration of their inferiority complex, whereby these Japanese seemed to view English not just as another foreign language, but as a symbolic representation of American hegemonic power in the postwar global world. In fact, such a skewed view of the English language among the Japanese has been discussed by Japanese applied linguists¹⁰⁰ such as Kubota (1998, 1999), Tsuda (1990, 1996, 1997), Suzuki (1999) and Ohishi (1993). They argue that English language disguises colonialist and Orientalist ideologies, while English education in Japan becomes an ideological state apparatus used to make its people practice these ideologies. Accordingly, some suggest, the English language may ultimately evoke their sense of inferiority to a native speaker of English. As they claim, linguicism (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1989) that is accompanied by linguistic imperialism in the modern global world, and racism that is accompanied by the colonial and neo-colonial discourses, seem to be associated with one another in the mind of contemporary Japanese people.

Does one’s inadequate English skills really evoke his/her sense of racial inferiority, however? Miki, who initially admits her sense of inferiority to Westerners, explains how her “poor” linguistic skills in English (although her English may still be objectively evaluated as advanced) confusingly make her feel “Other” to Europeans and Americans in intercultural communicative contexts in the U.S. In the interview, she describes her feelings as follows:

R: How do you feel when you talk to other participants in the gatherings?

M: To be honest, I feel a little intimidated or uncomfortable to talk to Germans or other white people. I don’t necessarily have the same feeling for other Asian participants.

R: What do you mean by “feeling intimidated” to Germans and others?

M: I am afraid if they might respond me coldly or unfriendly.

R: Have you ever had such an experience?

M: Yes. Well, I don’t have discriminatory experience by my acquaintances though. When I was taking care of documents for house settlement or apartment hunting, for example, I often asked myself “Do they treat me like this because I am Asian?”

99 Dower repeatedly claims in the chapter that such occupiers and occupied’ positive view of the national reform as “gifts from heaven” hid the colonial practices of the U.S. occupation. He says: “The occupiers themselves naturally looked on their “revolution from above” more positively. Yet in many ways, even from their elevated and righteous vantage point, this was a moment when idealism and cynicism meshed, when democratic aspirations became entangled with colonial mentalities in unexpected, not to say unprecedented ways. The reformers were also proconsuls. They were, as has been said of other Americans in other situations, sentimental imperialists. As administrators whose careers were altered and accelerated by the victorious war, they possessed what John Kenneth Galbraith, in a related context, characterized as “an arrogant certainty of high purpose” (p.72-73.).

100 Some of their claims are inspired by these earlier works in Applied Linguistics such as Kachru (1986), Phillipson (1992) and especially Pennycook (1998).

R: Is it because you are Asian? Or do you think there are any other reasons?

M: I think because I cannot speak English fluently. Even though I think I am speaking English, they sometimes tell other people, "This girl cannot speak English." It is like a prejudice. So, I get hurt if someone tells her friends in front of me, "No, she can't speak English" or "she doesn't understand what you say (in English)." It could be partly true. My English may not be fully intelligible for them...but, have you ever noticed even some (white) coordinators are a little bit like that, too? They come and talk to those Japanese people who can't speak English well. They are nice though, it seems to me that they are kind to you because they want to feel good about themselves. It is like, "I like myself because I am so kind."

(Interview / July in 2007)

In the excerpt above, Miki explains that her sense of intimidation from Westerners (including Americans and Europeans) in the international gathering derives from her fear of being poorly treated due to her racial background as an Asian "Other." While referring to Westerners' discriminatory gaze, however, she slowly shifts her attention from "Westerners" in general to "American" strangers in the U.S., who treated her poorly due to her inadequate English skills that prevented her from understanding their utterances. Curiously, her sense of stigma derived from this linguicism leads her to return once again to the context of the international gathering. Having previously stated that her acquaintances never treated her poorly in the way that strangers did, she nevertheless implies that the condescending attitudes of those Western coordinators and participants stigmatize her and hurt her pride just as much as the treatment by American strangers.

Miki's comment above is striking, given that she experiences a sense of stigma based on her inadequate linguistic competence even though some of the Westerners there (such as Germans) are also non-native speakers of English like her. Here, she has confused her racially "inferior" sense of "Other" with her sense of stigma over her inadequate language skills. Such confusion occurs, I assume, occurs because she conceives racism and linguicism to essentially derive from the same modern Western ideologies; namely, colonialism and Orientalism. In other words, the Japanese cultural memories of modern history's rule by the West inevitably allow her to perceive two different types of discriminatory acts as fundamentally the same phenomenon, even though the archive of the Western colonial era has been replaced by the new one of the postwar neo-colonial era. As a consequence, she is linguistically vulnerable in the Western context because she takes a position not only as a non-native speaker of English, but also as a racially stigmatized "Other" due to the colonial discourse and Orientalism as a common ideological ground for the contemporary global world established by the West.

Like Miki, Kayo, who speaks almost native-level English, perceives racism and linguicism as counterparts of the same discourse of the modern global world. However, in contrast, she does not confuse two different modes of discrimination as the same. Instead, she regards linguicism as an alternative form of racism. One day, Kayo and I are talking about a young Japanese female in the community, who speaks fluent English and accordingly believes that no racism exists towards someone who speaks native-like English. The conversation proceeds as follows:

R: I guess she makes such a remark because she feels that she is not discriminated by Americans because of her English skills. I don't think that's true. Well, it is true that "it helps" if you speak very good English, I mean, English with least foreign accents. Furthermore, the less discrimination you might receive if you speak the upper social class English. But, I don't think even native like English cannot erase or change our appearances. Even now, for example, I go for job interviews (in American institutions), knowing that it is probably disadvantage to be aware of myself as a "handicapped" in the situation. I am handicapped because of my English with foreign accent, being a female and physically short and tiny, and looking younger than my age, and being Asian. In my appearance wise, I try to change anything as much as possible and try to conquer my disadvantages. "Professor" jobs are an authority in the American society, right? So, I try to change myself and make me look like an authority. But, I cannot change Americans' image of Asian as "young looking" or "childlike appearance." Apart from naming it as "discrimination," we cannot change their prejudice against our "Asian" appearance, can we?

R: Have you ever had any racial discriminatory acts or hate speech because of your appearance?

K: No, luckily, I haven't had any bad hate speeches yet. I think it is partially because people in this community are usually well-educated and sophisticated and don't show their sense of racism. But, it's not because I speak "native-like" English. That's not true at all... Speaking of "native-like" English, don't you feel people in the east coast are not really generous to foreigners' English? I notice that they are less tolerant to grammatically incorrect sentences or foreign accents. I also notice that they consider "foreigners' English" is "not good." They are not like, "It is good that you speak decent English even though you are not a native speaker."... Sometimes, they correct my English with good will. I know that they do so for their kindness. But, I cannot help realizing that "I am still not equal to you."... They are not generous to my English with foreign accents partially because they live in (traditionally conservative) New England. It is also because of their age, too. Some coordinators at the meeting are seventy to eighty years old. American people of that age used to think, "We have to help Asians and Africans." The reason why I don't care about their (condescending) attitudes so much anymore is perhaps because they usually withdraw such (condescending) attitude when they realize I speak English. So, if we speak English well, it certainly helps. But that does not fundamentally change their (skewed) view of us or solve the real problem underneath. (Interview / May in 2007)

Kayo, who competes with Americans and others in the Western global market, is well aware of the ulterior nature of English linguisticism for non-Europeans. She acknowledges that linguistic prejudice against non-native speakers on the part of native speakers who are European descendants is often just another way of expressing their sense of racism against a non-Western "Other" in a more direct and overt manner. However, her possession of cultural and linguistic capital in the Western market usually enables her to be less vulnerable to some interlocutors' racially discriminatory intentions, by refusing their condescending offers while standing as a linguistically independent foreign visitor in the U.S. Yet, she ultimately feels it pointless to even think about changing Westerners' Orientalist view of the non-western "Other," or claiming equal status for her foreign-accented English in comparison to native speakers' English.

It is noteworthy that both Miki and Kayo, whose self-identification and possession of Western cultural capital significantly differ from one another, somehow came to the same conclusion in the intercultural communicative context. That is to say, in order to survive in the Western global context, they must accept the assigned role of “Other” in the existing colonial discourse while continuing to practice and reinforce the unequal system even though this is against their will. Such acquiescent tendencies are consistently observed in their communicative practices throughout the research. Recall, for instance, that Kayo did not speak her own thoughts about WWII or postwar history at the Thanksgiving dinner table, even though all the other participants were airing their controversial yet honest thoughts to one another. She later told me that she thought that my active participation and role in raising a provocative issue to discuss with other participants was “inappropriate,” both as a researcher and as a good participant of the international gathering, because “it not only evokes negative memories and feelings from people but also creates unpleasant atmosphere at the table of gathering.” In order to keep social harmony at the gathering while remaining a “happy butterfly,¹⁰¹” Kayo and Miki each pretend to ignore any delicate topics relevant to recent history. When American strangers emotionally expressed their anger about the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack in front Miki, for example, she remained silent despite feeling “strange” internally as she thought, “What they did to us with atomic bombs was much worse (than the Pearl Harbor attack).” Likewise, Kayo avoids referring to anything about WWII, such as her grandfather’s death in the Philippines during the war. She feels a taboo against mentioning WWII stories from the Japanese point of view, due to the “awkward” response from Americans. Most of the time, in such cases, Americans do not respond to her at all.

Their acquiescent attitude regarding the prevalent colonial discourse and accompanying worldview can be further observed, not only in their “socially proper” and “polite” behavior as good participants of the international gathering, but also in their reconciling of the “exoticized” and “orientalized” images of Japanese nationals imposed by Western audiences. Miki, for instance, knows that Western people treat her and other Japanese participants like an “exotic Japanese doll” attending at the international gathering as a “extra” audience. Yet, she accepts her role because she feels that this (being assigned an exotic role) is still “better than no roles assigned.” Similarly, Kayo accepts her role as an “Oriental” Japanese participant at the meeting, in which she is only asked to talk about “exotic” Japanese cultures such as tea ceremonies, flower arrangements, Kimonos, Noh, and so forth as a foreign coordinator. While dissatisfied with the fact that few Westerners are interested in the “real” and living people and culture of postwar and contemporary Japan, she ultimately reinforces their “exoticized” image by introducing traditional cultures in the international meeting.

It is important to note that these two participants began their experiences in the U.S. as either a racially or culturally inferior “Other” to Western people and culture due to the prevalent colonial discourse and accompanying Orientalist view of the world. After several years in the U.S, however, they came to realize such a colonialist view of “inferior” Japan to be false, having

101 In the interview, Kayo used a word, “butterfly” to describe the participants of the gathering including her, who only wants to enjoy programs and chitchatting with others. She says: “In order to be a ‘happy butterfly’ they (both the coordinator and the participants) usually try to avoid talking anything political and ideological. Did you notice that? As for me, although you might find it insincere, I rather like to take a neutral and apolitical position in conversations. I like to know political and ideological issues though, I don’t want to cause any negative feelings or bad atmospheres by talking about these political issues.”

re-evaluated Japanese people and culture as something to be proud of. Ironically, however, their lack of self-confidence resulting from the dominance of the colonial discourse in the contemporary world inevitably prevented them from constructing an alternative Japanese identity that would reflect their self-(re)evaluation of the nation, people and culture. Moreover, their desire for and sense of survival in the Western field has allowed them to avoid any conflicts with Western audiences who assign them an “exotic” image of the Japanese national. As a consequence, they ultimately practice the colonial discourse while reinforcing only an “exotic” and thus “orientalized” image of “Other” in the international and intercultural communicative context, in order to “at least” protect their “Japanese cultural identity” in the Western global world¹⁰²(Kubota, 1999).

The close examinations of two subjects’ communicative practices of their “cosmopolitan” Japanese identities in their interviews and journals above revealed how they struggle with their assigned non-European identities as “culturally and /or racially inferior” “Others” of the Western global world. Yet, as we observed, they voluntarily accept the existing discourse and conventional worldview despite their unwillingness, and ultimately practice their assigned identity in the U.S. discursively. Some might evaluate their non-confrontational manner and mentality as positive, since it not only saves other people’s faces in the various intercultural communicative contexts, but also establishes a safe environment for intercultural dialogues with others of different social, cultural, ideological and historical backgrounds. Furthermore, some may also argue that their voluntary acceptance and practices of the assigned subjectivities are their choice and tactic for survival in the Western global context, in which the colonial discourse and accompanying Orientalist view are still dominant. On such a realistic account, these subjects’ performance of “normative cosmopolitan” identity may be considered to represent approval on their part, since they do not cause confrontational scenes but adroitly manage intercultural communicative contexts with cultural savvy, astuteness, appreciation, and so forth.

Nevertheless, one needs to bear in mind that such successful intercultural communications are achieved at a cost of the feelings of those “Others,” who must live in the global world established primarily upon Western values and beliefs. Although both Kayo and Miki initially searched for a place where people would come close to and understand each other beyond racial, national, and cultural boundaries by respecting one another’s equal status, it is ironic that they instead ultimately reinforced their sense of “otherness” to Westerners, by reproducing the colonial discourse. While it is important to acknowledge not only that the conventionality of speech helps interlocutors to understand each other, but also that face work in the conversation strengthens rapport with one another in intercultural communicative contexts, one still should not dismiss such hidden aspects of unequal social practices. In this light, these Japanese subjects’ discursive practices of their “cosmopolitan” identities in the Western context, while socially and pragmatically felicitous, are in fact emotionally infelicitous. Is there, then, any alternative way for them to escape the trap of colonial discourse and construct their cosmopolitan identity without becoming bitter – yet, without injuring others?

102 In her article, “Japanese Culture Constructed by Discourse,” taking Japanese culture as an example, Kubota argues that cultural determinism has been prevailed in the field of applied linguistic literatures, which encompass the colonial discourse and Orientalism. While such “Otherness” has been constructed by Western “Self”, Kubota claims that the Japanese also co-construct their image of “Other” in order to protect their ethnic identity from drastic Westernization after the World War II. Challenging the essentialized notion of Japanese culture, the author ultimately suggests a new understanding of concepts in cultural contexts and advocates a perspective of critical multiculturalism as optional model for English education in Japan.

Construction of an Alternative “Cosmopolitan” Identity and Linguistic Survival

The last example that I would like to show is a discrete case involving a Japanese participant from those two cases above. Like Kayo and Miki, an elder subject, Tomoko, also notices an ulterior intention of racism behind native speakers’ linguistic prejudice against non-native and non-European speakers of English in their speech. However, instead of becoming vulnerable to such ambiguous yet injurious speech, she believes that one may still sustain one’s pride and survive in the Western field by managing the situation in a legitimate way. In the interview, she refers to one episode involving her spouse, who is a successful scholar in the international academic field and a leading professor of his department at one of the most prestigious universities in the world. One day, he and his colleagues were interviewing foreign candidates for a faculty position. When making their comments about a Taiwanese scholar, one of his American colleagues evaluated him negatively due to his “English with a bad Chinese accent.” She continues:

T: Then, he (the colleague) added that he can understand my husband’s English. So, he (my husband) was really annoyed. Think about it. When you take a scholar for your department, you ask him to do a seminar and then interview him. You do so because you are interested in his academic career and research interests. But, he gave a negative evaluation just because of his English with foreign accent. My husband took it as an offence because the candidate was judged in such a superficial way...So, he said to the colleague, “That’s true. I sometimes don’t understand whatever those Germans or European candidates are saying in English either. They have a thick accent, too.” His colleague didn’t say anything after that...my husband noticed that he (the colleague) usually shows favor to European researchers for academic positions. So, he knew that he (the colleague) was complaining about the Taiwanese researcher’s English as a good excuse for rejection.

R: I see. You can always improve one’s language skill, but not necessarily his academic ability. Evaluating one’s competence based on the language skill is then really superficial. Do you think we also evaluate other people in the same way?

T: I think so. If other Asians speak bad Japanese, people make fun of them. But, if Americans speak Japanese a little, they are all impressed. But, speaking from a language teacher’s viewpoint, I think there is also another reason why people overreact to Americans who speak foreign languages like Japanese. You don’t find very many people who speak (non-European) foreign languages around here. First of all, they don’t have to learn foreign language because they speak English. Secondly, if they learn foreign languages, they are usually European languages, which are not so different from English. So, most Americans don’t seem to understand how difficult it is to speak a foreign language, which is completely different from your mother tongue. But, their indifference to foreign languages also reflects their view of the world...They don’t seem to understand “the world” also belongs to non-Europeans either. When my son was in a high school and took a world history class, the teacher started the first class from the eve of America’s independence.

Z: (Tomoko’s Japanese friend): That’s American history, how the nation became “America.”

T: Yeah. So, my husband went to school and asked the teacher, “Which part of the world does Asia belong to?” Since he was a young teacher, he was really bewildered.
(Interview / January in 2007)

The first part of the episode is interesting, as it exemplifies the case of Butler’s theory of performativity described in “On linguistic vulnerability¹⁰³” (1997). In the previous part of the interview, Tomoko had referred to her spouse’s struggle with the prevalently conservative atmosphere at this American institution in New England. Noticing the slight sense of racism behind his colleague’s comment about the Taiwanese scholar’s English, he decided to “re-signify” the same sentence and “cite against the ordinary purpose” while causing “a reversal effects.” Implicitly criticizing the colleague’s racial preference for European candidates but without disadvantaging accented English, he countered the disguised intention of that negative comment made about the non-European scholar’s English with a Chinese accent. In doing so, he further re-framed the context by suggesting that everyone take into account the candidates’ academic records but not their English with foreign accents. Without overtly accusing or confronting his colleague, Tomoko’s spouse ultimately created a ground for “fair play” between foreign scholars in the given context.

The latter part of the conversation, once again, interestingly exemplifies her spouse’s communicative practices used to fight against American institutions’ “Eurocentric” view of the world. Fully appreciating that Americans generally view Asia as “peripheral” to the rest of the world, Tomoko’s spouse implied that the rest of the world not on the European and American continents is equally part of “the world.” By asking such a legitimate question, he called American ethnocentrism into question here.

Note that Tomoko animated the voice of her spouse with reference to the two episodes above in order to illustrate her point that Americans’ sense of racism and linguistic often derive from their Eurocentric view of the world. Taking a position not only as a teacher of Japanese language in the community but also a world traveler over the last twenty years, she refers to her family’s tactics as a way of not only avoiding, but also fighting against Westerners’ practices of the colonial discourse upon them and those Westerners’ interpellation of one’s identity as non-European “Other” in the Orientalist manner. In the presence of the Japanese researcher from an American institution, who wishes to know how Japanese people in the U.S. manage such difficult situations, Tomoko constructs and discursively practices a different type of Japanese “cosmopolitan” identity from that of Kayo; one which legitimately deals with Westerners’ racial and linguistic prejudices, revises the existing reality of the world and ultimately survives in global intercultural communicative contexts in which the Western worldviews and rules are still dominant.

103 In her article, Butler calls into question Austin’s conventional nature of speech acts. She criticized the Austinian notion of speaking subject who is presupposed to speak conventionally without his / her subjectivity. Moreover, this conventionality is connected to Althusser’s notion of “ritual form of ideology”, i.e. Austin’s notion of illocutionary force is conditioned by the ritual form as convention. Although the illocutionary force produces certain consequences by saying and doing something with a certain intention, Butler claims that the saying and the consequences produced are temporally distinct from each other. This is because illocutionary force proceeds by way of conventions, whereas perlocutionary effect proceeds by way of consequences. In such sense, the perlocutionary effect, in contrast to the illocutionary force, involves not only the agency of addressor but also that of the addressee. Consequently, Butler strongly claims that, through the form of re-signification, a speech can be cited against its ordinary purpose and perform a reversal effect. Butler’s understanding of Performativity as a renewable action without clear origin of the legitimacy that conventional use of language has provides powerful insight that speech acts not merely repeat and reinforce the social convention of acts but also carry the potentiality of the speaking subject to change the convention.

Tomoko and her spouse's construction and discursive practices of a different type of "cosmopolitan" identity appear to suggest their readiness for departure from the colonial discourse and accompanying colonial mentality of the modern Japanese national identity after living in the West for many years. In their search for an alternative Japanese national identity, they found themselves partly in Asians, who share similar cultural and racial backgrounds with Japanese in history. The first episode involving her spouse's protest against the institution's prevalent Eurocentrism, for instance, indicates that he projected himself onto the Taiwanese scholar in the given context because he had also had an experience of being negatively judged by Americans due to his appearance and linguistic disadvantage. Unlike German subjects who often express their pan-European identity in the U.S, it is unknown how closely Japanese subjects feel to other Asians in general there. Yet, at least in my research data, they certainly show a sense of familiarity to other Asians and often even identify themselves as such, due to their racial and cultural shared-ness.

Tomoko continues to talk about her experiences in the U.S. as a language teacher, with regard to racial and linguistic issues in intercultural communications that she encountered in the past. When she mentioned that traditional Japanese culture had essentially developed from a "great" Chinese culture and civilization, her American students were all surprised. She says:

T: In the language class, I was talking about traditional Japanese culture and said, "China is a great country, and without Chinese culture and civilization, Japanese culture would not even exist." After I said, I realized that those American students were all gaping at me. Then, one student asked me, "Are you actually admiring China?"

R: What does it mean?

T: I guess Americans somehow believe that Japanese all look down on Chinese people because of modern Asian history. I was very surprised to see their reactions, too. They were shocked because I referred to China positively. They seem to understand Asia only by looking at modern history of Asia. Because I persistently explained the long relationship between China and Japan in history after that, they all listened to me with an amazed look.

(Interview / January in 2007)

One way to escape from the colonial discourse is by speaking from a different historical position and bringing a different discourse into the given context, and then constructing a new identity upon it in the presence of the audience. Above, Tomoko emphasizes a pre-colonial discourse in Japan, in which China was the center of the Asian world and Chinese culture was considered symbolic capital in society. In doing so, she implicitly denies Western perceptions of modern Japan and the Japanese national's body, both of which were partly yet not fully created by Western civilization in modern history.

This discovery by Tomoko and her spouse of their Japanese "Self" outside of the (neo) colonial discourse not only emerged from their sense of non-European "Other" in Western society, but was paradoxically encouraged by "other" Westerners outside of the U.S. As I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, America's hegemonic era following the Cold War has been slowly shifting to a multi-polar society, especially in the wake of the expansion of the European Union, recovery of Russia, and rise of China, India and South America. In the mid-

1990's, they visited Germany for one year on sabbatical. This was the post-Cold War era, when East and West Germany had finally reunified after 45 years of separation and begun reconstructing a "new" Germany. It was also a crucial era for Europe, as the end of the Cold War pointed to Europe's constructing a new community in which Germany would given a new role as a political, economic and strategic leader of Europe, as opposed to a frontline nation. During their visit, Tomoko and her spouse witnessed both Europe and Germany's transition from the Cold War regime of the Pax Americana to a regime with a new world order. Among various experiences, most striking for her was that Germans and other Europeans could comfortably communicate with each other in their respective "Englishes." Recalling her visit to Germany, Tomoko describes her impression:

T: Before I visited Germany, I used to think "I have to speak English like a native speaker." That's how your teacher teaches English in Japanese school. I had never thought, "It is OK to speak my English with Japanese accent." So, I used to first make a grammatically correct sentence in my mind and then uttered. I simply didn't have an idea, "It is OK to speak clumsy English as long as I can communicate with other people."...But when I was in Europe, I noticed that people spoke "strange" English. They were not ashamed of speaking English with their own accents or embarrassed to use such clumsy English to each other at all. Then, I realized, "Oh, maybe it is OK to speak clumsy English because it is just a tool for communication." In Europe, many people use multiple languages, and I guess it might partly be their tradition to be generous to foreign accented languages. Although they are bilingual or multilingual, that does not mean that they speak each language perfectly. Because they understand that, they look comfortable and confident to speak English with their accent.

R: That's a quite different attitude from ours, isn't it? We tend to be more hyper-corrective when speaking a foreign language, especially English. I don't necessarily feel in the same way for a second foreign language like German or Chinese though. Do you think this is also because of Japanese postwar history?

T: Maybe. It is like a child from a poor family, who doesn't want to talk about its background, right? Many Japanese people still believe that learning English is listening to a native speaker's talk about American or British cultures. They don't really think of expressing themselves and telling about Japan to people from other countries.

(Interview / March in 2007)

While many Japanese tend to view English as a symbolic representation of the hegemonic power of the former British Empire and the postwar America in modern history, and thus care about the ownership¹⁰⁴ of the language, those Europeans deliberately separate historical and ideological components from the language and dynamically adopt it as a linguistic tool for communication in the new age of globalization. Apart from the question of whether their adoption of English as a lingua franca in Europe might raise other kinds of issues there, it is

104 Also see Widdowson's article, "The ownership of English" (1994). He calls into question the prevailed assumption that the ownership of English as an international language belongs only to native speakers. Although some educated native speakers often claims that their English serves for international communication and thus standards of intelligibility should be maintained, the author argues that such claim not only neglect the fundamental nature of an international language as dynamic and diverse, but also encompass the double standard that the linguistic standards can be set instable only by native speakers. Widdowson's major claim is that English spread should be considered as a dynamic adaptation and non-conformity against existing conventions since such vitality of the language is precisely the evidence of the quality of an international language. This claim indicates a quite liberal view and attitude of Europeans toward foreign language learning although Widdowson is a native speaker of English, a British.

important to note here that Tomoko learned from Europeans their liberal “spirit” in perceiving English as “a lingua franca,” which belongs to everyone in the world. This spirit, according to her, often helps her to actively communicate with other people in English without being “timid” to symbolic violence by a native speaker of English in intercultural communicative contexts. Needless to say, this significantly affects her construction of a new type of Japanese “cosmopolitan” identity, which may not speak native-like English, yet confidently communicates with other people in intercultural communicative contexts.

So far, we have observed Tomoko’s construction and discursive practices of a different kind of “cosmopolitan” Japanese identity, which not only includes Asian cultural identity, but also entails Europeans’ liberal spirit in adopting English as “their” language and their confident attitude toward the former superpower of the world. Her practices of this cosmopolitan identity certainly represent a timely phenomenon that we can currently observe, as Japanese people have begun questioning American values and beliefs, re-examining their own cultural legacies, and searching for a new identity in the post-Cold War world. Many Japanese fully acknowledge that their nation has much work to do in order to recover its relationship with the rest of Asia, unlike the situation of Germany in Europe. As the recent and unprecedented defeat of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party indicates, however, people are also keenly aware of the necessity for adjusting to a new age of globalization and a new world order. Accordingly, they are finally willing to shift from the neo-colonial relationship with the U.S. to a more independent one by building a new relationship with other nations, especially other Asian nations. Seen in this light, once again, as Blommaert claims, Tomoko’s construction and practices of a new “cosmopolitan” Japanese identity represents a crucial phenomenon because they “tells us a lot about a lot about our societies and ourselves, and which necessarily situates particular discourses in the wider sociopolitical environment in which they occur” (Blommaert, 2005, p.66).

History’s Impact upon Intercultural Communication

In this chapter, I attempted to discern how history affects one’s construction of national identity and the accompanying communicative practices in intercultural communicative contexts, by examining both German and Japanese participants’ journals and interviews. In order to understand what discourse emerges from their contacts with me as a researcher with multiple subjectivities in the course of the research, I first carefully examined the subject positions that each participant takes in the speech event; not only relative to myself, but also in relation to their knowledge and cultural memories of history. Then, I also looked at my own subjectivity with regard to my own knowledge and cultural memories of history in the interviews with each participant. Scrutinizing how history comes into play in each participant’s projection of his/her “Self” in the mirror of “Other”, I tried to explore how both the research subjects and the researcher co-construct their own subjectivities in discourse through the research.

The data analysis above yielded some significant findings. First of all, it revealed that modern history significantly impacted upon the participants’ communicative practices at the research site, as it created not only the archive of the contemporary global world, but also crucially affected Germany and Japan’s national foundations and accompanying national identities. More specifically, as we observed above, German and Japanese nationals both feel “a sense of otherness” in an intercultural communicative context due to modern history, especially

WWII and the postwar histories. German subjects, for instance, feel a sense of alienation from other Westerners because of their stigma over the Holocaust and the Allied Powers' postwar occupation and control of Germany. Similarly, Japanese participants show their sense of "otherness" – particularly to Westerners in the international global scene – due to the prevalent colonial discourse and accompanying Orientalist view of the world. Such a sense of "otherness," needless to say, affects both German and Japanese participants' perception of the world and the accompanying communicative practices, especially in the research context which directly reflects the postwar American Cold War discourse. Their sense of "otherness" and the accompanying struggle related to their stigma, fear of other people's interpellation of them as "Other," constant anxiety, and "linguistic vulnerability" often make them socially timid while generally constraining their choices of subject positions and the accompanying communicative practices when conversing with others in the intercultural global context. Moreover, due to their "linguistic vulnerability," the participants easily overreact to each other's utterances and/or misconstrue others' real intentions in conversation. Consequently, it is ironic that many of them ultimately feel that their participation in the gathering is not necessarily "emotionally felicitous," despite the fact that everyone had originally wished to understand each other beyond cultural, national, ideological, and historical boundaries with universal goodwill.

While history impacts upon intercultural communication in a constraining manner,¹⁰⁵ one also needs to bear in mind that it can affect the given context in dynamic and creative respects as well. In order to understand how history evokes such a sense of creativity and dynamism in discourse, it is now necessary to re-conceptualize the notion of one's "national identity" from the poststructuralist viewpoint. As we have observed above, each participant "historically" co-constructs the subject position in the given context by projecting his/her "Self" in the mirror of "Other" in interactions. Depending on what one sees as his/her "Self" in the mirror of me with multiple subjectivities and multiple historicities, he/she can then decide which particular position in discourse to take and how to construct his/her "Self" in the "Other" in the given context. Likewise, their decisions in positioning themselves dynamically affect my own stance and accompanying communicative practices as well. Taking into account such a dynamic interplay between the researcher and the subject, it is apparent that one's sense of "otherness" matters in discourse because it allows one not only to detect the other party's sense of "otherness," but to connect one's "Self" with that of others through their process of projection. This unpredictable chemistry in interaction further allows both participants to invite one another to his/her historical discourse established on different worlds in different time scales. Ultimately, they may co-constructively develop their own discourse not only with multiple timescales, but also with multiple voices.

One might still argue that such discourse occurrence is not necessarily considered "creative," since the discourse is developed only "within boundaries of hegemonies" (Blommaert, 2005, p.106). As Blommaert claims, it is nevertheless innovative "because it is measurable against normative hegemonic standards, because it creates understandable contrast with such standards"

105 Blommaert well summarizes Foucault's view of history's impact upon discourse with reference to his notion of "archive" as the following: "Foucault addresses the issue of macro-sociological forces and formations that define and determine what can be said, expressed, heard, and understood in particular societies, particular milieus, particular historical periods. These largely invisible contexts of discourse operate both the level of discursive events – communicative behaviors – and at the level of the discursive product – the text-artifact, the document. And the effect of their operation is to create and impose boundaries of what can be meaningfully (functionally) expressed within the scope of the archive. Whenever we speak, we speak from within a particular regime of language...the effect of this is hardly a matter of individual awareness..." (Blommaert, 2005, p.102).

(p.106). More specifically, according to Blommaert, “It (discourse) develops within hegemonies while it attempts to alter them, and so may eventually effectively alter them by shifting the borders and by creating new (contrasting) forms of consciousness; it produce ‘supplement’ to what is already in the archive’, so to speak” (p.106). In this light, it is reasonable to assume that history plays a crucial role in discourse dynamism because it directly affects “the centre of the (altering) process”, that is, “the individual agent, a subject often living with idiosyncratic ideas and concepts, fantasies and nightmares, who out of his/her own personal experience in society starts to feel that dominant understandings do no longer work” (Blommaert, 2005, p.106). As we observed in this chapter, one’s knowledge and cultural memories of history significantly affect the participants’ projections of each other’s subjectivities with regard to their historicities. This further allows an emergence of a new discourse from their contacts and will eventually alter the original archive slowly in the future. In sum, the study of discourse, especially in the global context, requires a careful examination of “history,” as it allows us not only to better understand within what hegemonic boundaries one’s communicative practices are situated, but also to discern in what “borderline zone of existing hegemonies” (p.106) their creative practices are situated, and how they develop a new discourse that changes the world.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

The Role of the Researcher and Methodological Considerations

In this study, I discussed how history impacts upon intercultural communicative contexts in both constraining and dynamistic ways. I also addressed that researchers need to take into account the world system as a final instance of the context. Re-defining the notion of “context” as “discourse occurrence,” I further suggested that researchers in the field of intercultural communication carefully examine multiple interactions among a myriad of factors, in order to understand how they form discourse dynamism. In the last chapter of this study, I would like to finally discuss an additional crucial factor that affected both the research context and the research itself: namely, the researcher’s role in the study of intercultural communication. In discussing this issue from epistemological, phenomenological, and methodological perspectives, it is necessary for us to first re-think the relationship between the research subject and the researcher from the post-structuralist perspective.

In their introduction of “the complex theory” as an application of the post-structuralist approaches for the field of Applied Linguistics, Larsen-Freeman & Cameron (2008) addressed the issue that not only the relationship between the researcher and the researched, but also the research itself, need to be re-conceptualized with regard to the notion of “objectivity.” In traditional (social) scientific research perspectives, it is often assumed that the researcher and the researched are essentially separated from each other and hence, the researcher is supposed to be able to observe and study the researched from the objective stance. As we observed above, however, my role as an active listener, observer and participant of the research site and its impacts upon the research data collection and analysis necessarily put such a discrete notion of objectivity vs. subjectivity into question. Instead, it echoes Larsen-Freeman and Cameron’s claim that “no matter how a researcher tries, total objectivity - a view of matters apart from who he or she is - can never be achieved” (Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008, p243).

Such an uncertain view in measuring the research object is not so uncommon in a field of social science, or even in a field of hard science. In Sociolinguistics, for example, William Labov (1972) discussed this issue as “the observer’s paradox.”¹⁰⁶ According to him, the observation of an experiment or an event is inevitably affected by the act of investigation or observation. Similarly, in Physics, “the Heisenberg uncertainty principle” claims that even a small element of the ecological system, such as a particle, cannot be measured with an absolute sense of objectivity because the act of observation changes the particle itself. Regarding my study, the research participants’ subject positions are significantly affected by my subjectivities and their historicities in interactions, and vice-versa. Because the researcher and the research subjects historically co-construct their subject positions in the interactional communicative context, in other words, there is no total objectivity but only the “relationality” of subjectivity and objectivity in the research data. In better understanding what identity a research subject performs

106 Similar claim is also made in the field of psychology as “the Hawthorne effect.”

in the contingent context, it is therefore crucial for the researcher to put him/herself on the line and factor in his/her own subject position in the research context.

Now, I would like to further re-consider my role as a researcher from the epistemological point of view. Firstly, it should be noted that very initial conditions of the research study, such as my choice of the research organization among many other potential intercultural sites, significantly reflects my subjectivities with particular social, cultural, ideological and historical backgrounds. As a Japanese academic researcher who studies intercultural communications at an American institution, I naturally chose the research site because I was familiar with the place as a Japanese visitor of the university community in the U.S. Needless to say, such natural senses of availability, familiarity and even comfortableness are secondary to my (postwar) Japanese national identity and the accompanying habitus, because the site was originally launched in the Cold War context as a place where local Americans could host foreign visitors from former enemy countries through cultural exchange programs. On this account, the seemingly natural choice of the research site was, in fact, “constrained by the general patterns of inequality” (Blommaert 2005) of the contemporary world due to the researcher’s subjective experiences.

Similarly, the contrastive study of German and Japanese participants reflects my subjectivities as well. Because of the historical and ideological background of the research organization, primary participants of the gatherings were German and Japanese nationals, both of whose nations were not only vanquished in WWII but also developed a neo-colonial relationship with the U.S. after the war. Accordingly, it was easy for me to choose Germans as a mirror to understand my primary interest of the subject, namely, Japanese participants and their views of American people, culture and society. In addition to such social, historical and ideological constraints of the research site, my subjectivities are reflected in my own eagerness to study German subjects. Like many Japanese scholars who study postwar history and national identity, I was also interested in Germans’ view of both WWII history and the postwar compensation for the Holocaust as well as their neo-colonial relationship with the U.S., due to a similar historical trajectory of the two nations in modern history.

As the theory of relativity may suggest, however, my reflexive awareness of such positive effects as my own biases simultaneously informs me about the hidden aspect of the research. That is to say, my subjectivities allowed me to naturally eliminate other possibilities such as studying other research sites because of my unfamiliarity for and inaccessibility of those options. Moreover, I could not study other nationals due to my lack of other linguistic tools or interest, or simply the absence of other nationals from the research site. This issue is well addressed by the fact that my study does not include any further analysis of journals and interviews of Russian nationals. On the first day of the research at the meeting, I had an opportunity to talk about my research and openly recruit research subjects for the study. Then, two females, Olga and Martha, came to me and showed their interest in my research, agreeing upon their participation in the research for one year. The following week, however, Olga came to me and informed me that she was not able to participate in the research because it was too difficult for her to write journals in English. Although she was eager to join in and share her view of American people, culture and society, she ultimately could not fully participate due to her lack of writing skills in English, as well as her unwillingness to learn the language of the U.S.

Olga's case evidently proves Blommaert's claims of the importance of studying "forgotten context." In his criticism of CDA's "linguistic" bias, Blommaert strongly argues that a critical study of language needs to take into account the very "absence of certain discourse events and the particular shape of others *because of matters of resource allocation should be a major preoccupation*" (Blommaert, 2005, p.61). According to him, "Looking at issues of resources makes sure that any instance of language use would be deeply and fundamentally socially contextualized; connections between talk and social structure would be intrinsic." Without acknowledging the very absence of certain discourse events, in other words, one cannot fully understand in what social structure the studied discourse is "situated" in the "world system" as a final instance of the context. Ironically, one way of being able to detect such "invisible" forms of discourse for me was to take into account the very fact that I could not study Olga sufficiently, and that the analysis of her journal is not included in this research. Indeed, as Blommaert maintains, "There is no conversation analysis possible when people don't converse because they do not share resources." Yet, it is important for researchers to bear in mind that such absence of certain discourse events still exists and plays a significant part of a larger discourse in which we all immerse ourselves. In sum, reflexive analysis of my own subjectivities with reference to the research data collection allowed me to be aware that not only the research data, but also the research itself, is situated in the larger global context.

Now, I would like to discuss how the researcher's subjectivities impact upon the research data from a phenomenological viewpoint. As we observed above, my Japanese identity significantly affected the research subjects' communicative practices in the research context, most prominently at the Thanksgiving dinner table conversation. For instance, as soon as I realized Bianka's overreaction to my calling the pope a "Nazi," I immediately shifted my position from a non-European audience to a former Axis national along with Germany in order to further defend ordinary Germans from Goldhagen's interpellation of them as "Hitler's willing executioners"¹⁰⁷ (Goldhagen, 1996). I did so because I projected my image of "Self" as an ordinary Japanese in wartime onto that of ordinary Germans, based on my cultural memories of WWII and the postwar history of Germany and Japan. In other words, taking a position of an "imagined" wartime Japanese national, I was speaking to Bianka from a particular historical position that projected the past onto the present. The consequence of my change of this subject position in relation to Bianka's overreaction is noteworthy, as it triggered a chain-reaction in the way the other participants also performed "imagined" national identities. This phenomenon eventually allowed them to co-construct an interactional ground at the dinner table in which they re-historicized WWII and the postwar events by (re)living the history as an imagined event in the present time.

107 The debate about the participation of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust was revived by Daniel Goldhagen's 1996 book. In his book, "Hitler's willing executioner," he dismissed the prevailed myth that the systematic genocidal program as the Holocaust was rather unknown to the most ordinary Germans. Instead, he argues that millions Germans knew of the mass slaughter with general understanding, if not approval. More specifically, on his view, hundreds of thousands of Germans contributed to the genocide with the large system of subjugation in the vast concentration system, where the Jews were murdered not only in the gas chamber but also with hands of those "ordinary" Germans in the police battalions. The ideology that made such vast mobilization and the systematic genocide possible, according to Goldhagen, was the Germans' shared worldview of the Anti-Semitism prevailed in the German society in its history. In the series of discussions, he strongly argues that the widespread Anti-Semitism in the German society evolved in the end of the 19th century as "Eliminationist" Anti-Semitism and consequently drove Germans to contribute to the mass slaughter of Jews as Final Solution. Needless to say, this argument caused the second Historikerstreit, as the Goldhagen debate from 1996 – 1997. See, for instance, Wehler (1998) and others.

Note that such a phenomenon is not necessarily limited only to a researcher who is “actively” engaged in the conversation with his/her research subjects. The act of the researcher only as an interviewer with a rather neutral attitude, or even his/her mere presence, also impacts upon their communicative practices. For instance, consider Bianka’s reference to the U.S. conduct in the war during the interview session in the beginning of Chapter 5. Although we did not mention anything about the Pacific theater of WWII or atomic bombs in the earlier stage of the conversation, her visual perception of me with an Asian appearance, in addition to her knowledge of my national background, evoked her sense of guilt for the non-European “Other” when she projected her wartime German identity onto that of Americans. Albeit the absence of American participants or even bystanders in the given context, in other words, she still saw a shadow of wartime Americans through the sign of stigma on my body, due to her semiotic practices of German identity with the sense of guilt.

Such a complex nature of one’s discursive practices of his/her identity, as a phenomenon, is well explained by Blommaert. In his book, “*Discourse*,” he re-conceptualizes the notion of identity with regard to ideology not as “a property or a stable category of individuals or groups” but rather as “particular forms of semiotic potential, organized in a repertoire.” He further explains:

...ideologies, in practice, as packages of diverse elements tied together by factors that have little to do with textual or philosophical coherence and more with *the occasion, the particular point in time, and the actors involved*. Ideologies proved to be multifaceted, and a textual analysis of ideologies requires a historical analysis as well. In the field of identities, similar conclusions were reached. Rather than the established ‘big’ categories such as ‘man’-‘woman’, ‘black’-‘white’, ‘upper-class’-‘lower-class’, and so forth, we saw how people organized repertoires of identities tied to *semiotic resources strongly depending on spatial positioning –the position from which one speaks – and allowing the production and semiotisation of fine shades and distinctions in identity work*. (Blommaert, 2005, p.234-235)

In light of such contingent nature of one’s identity, it is necessary for the researchers to take into account their subjectivities in understanding the research participants’ communicative practices. This is so because, as Blommaert stated above, their construction and discursive practices of their identities are crucially related to semiotic resources which they can afford in the given context. Since not only the act of participation of the researcher but also his/her presence inevitably impacts upon the data itself, regardless of whether he/she wants this or not, the researcher’s subjectivities should be included in the study as a part of the contextual factors that affect the linguistic data.

Finally, the aforementioned epistemological and phenomenological implications of the researcher’s role in the intercultural communication research raise some further methodological considerations. The study shows the benefits of triangulating the relationship between Japan (Germany) and the U.S. with a third participant from Germany (Japan) or Russia. More specifically, I could understand Bianka’s resentment about the American view of the Holocaust and WWII better only after I saw how Olga vigorously supported Bianka’s opinion. Similarly, my ambiguous frustration about the victors’ double standard of justice and perceived racist

policies was fully revealed only after Bianka and Olga strongly protested against America's narrative of justice having been performed at both the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In this light, the existence of a third participant in the research adds a crucial dimension to the given context, since it not only functions as a mirror for each participant of the conversation to see him/herself and his/her relation to the U.S. in the eyes of the other, but also allows the researcher to objectify him/her and his/her relation to the others as well. In crystallizing why a subject said certain things in a particular time and space, in other words, the researcher can take into account a third participant's perspective as a means of measure against the participant's utterance.

Given the aforementioned benefits, it is now reasonable to say that intercultural communication research can benefit from inclusion of a third participant and/or a third perspective in the studied context. This is so because the researcher can see the subjects and their communicative practices not only from his/her subjective viewpoint, but also from the third party's stance as well. Note that this task inevitably requires the researcher to analyze him/herself as both an insider and an outsider of the research context. Reflexive analysis of the researcher's double role as "the third place" (Kramsch, 1993) then allows him/her not only to more objectively understand in what social structure the studied discourse is "situated" in the "world system" as a final instance of the context, but also to discern in what "*borderline zone of existing hegemonies*" (Blommaert, 2005, p.106) the subjects' creative practices are situated. This inclusion of the reflexive moment in the analysis is a post-structuralist moment that enriches intercultural communication research. By not only including actual national identities and historical events but also looking for proxy identities and empathized and projected events, the researcher is able to detect how participants develop a new discourse that changes the world by living and re-living the imagined spaces of a subjectively experienced History.

After the Research - The Research Site and the Participants Afterwards

That simple phenomenon in itself – people talking and writing, using language for specific functions – is not an unquestionable given, and analysis should not start, so to speak, as soon as people open their mouths. *It should have started long before that.* (Blommaert, 2005, p.67. Italics are mine)

This research was initially launched in order to discern whether history matters in intercultural communications. As a foreign visitor to[in] the U.S, I often noticed that some people speak of "history" in intercultural communicative contexts where they aimed to refer to their "cultures." Conversely, I also detected that some people talk about "culture" in order "not" to speak about "history." My suspicion of "history" as a significant element that affects one's communicative practices in intercultural settings was the primary motivation for conducting the research at the site.

In closing, I would like to refer to what happened to the research site and the participants afterwards. The post-structuralist theory-based research indicated not only that history irrupts intercultural communication, but also that the involvement of the researcher impacts upon the research context. The synthesis of discourse continues before and after our interactions during the research. Very often, however, we cannot know the meaning of these interactions until some time has passed.

I completed the data collection for my research in May, 2007. This was the last month of the academic year for the program and we had an annual luncheon party at the Provost's house as a closing ceremony. The program paused during the summer since it is a transitional period. Some foreign visitors usually leave the U.S. for vacations, while others may leave permanently as their spouses finished their contracts with the university employers. Those who remain in the university community wait for the arrival of new foreign visitors and students in September, when a new academic year starts at the university.

Before the year of 2007 began in September, two participants had left the community. Martha, who was visiting the university for two years, left after the spring semester as her spouse had to go back to Germany. At the end of her visit, she dissatisfactorily showed her disappointment over not making real American friends during her stay. She wrote in her journal that Americans are "only superficially nice to foreigners" while "never really wanting to be close friends with us," due to an invisible cultural barricade between insiders and outsiders. Another German participant, Angela, also left the community during summer because of her spouse's unexpected transfer resulting from the global economic crisis. In addition, Kayo, who was a foreign coordinator, also disappeared from the program since she had to look for a teaching job at an American academic institution outside of the university community.

Regarding those who remained in the community, two other Japanese participants are still involved with the program. Tomoko continues to work as a coordinator, taking on yet more responsibility for organizing the program after the main coordinators (four Germans) left the community in both 2007 and 2008. Miki also re-appeared in the program in 2009 after a two-year break due to her pregnancy and raising her daughter. This time, however, she is no longer playing a role of "an exotic Japanese audience" but actively participating in the program as one of the main coordinators. She takes a central position in running the gathering by planning programs for the new academic year, applying for a fund from various organizations in the community, and inviting newly coming foreign females to the gathering. So do Olga and Bianka. Similarly to Tomoko and Miki, Olga is now actively involved with the organization as a foreign coordinator. She occasionally introduces Russian culture and traditions to other people without hesitation. It is also noteworthy that her English, which she had not been able to further develop for the last 15 years since first coming to the U.S., is now drastically improved. Accordingly, she can easily communicate with other members in English while making friends with some of them. As for Bianka, she also became a foreign coordinator in both 2008 and 2009 along with Olga. Together, they not only introduce their cultural traditions as a successor to the former coordinators, but also carry out reform within the gathering by inviting guest speakers from outside in order to promote active discussions about politics, art, history and so forth. One day, Bianka asked me in an e-mail if I knew anyone who could give a talk about "intercultural communication" from a "more critical viewpoint." At the end of the e-mail, she added, "women of the world need more than just 'a needle' and 'a cup of tea.'" Implying that contemporary intercultural gathering requires "critical thinking," "open-minded-ness" and "dialogue" rather than a mere solidarity over crafts and cakes, she hopes that the international and intercultural gathering will become a place for foreign visitors of the community to openly discuss various issues in the world and globally think of the world together.

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APPENDIX

Transcription (Thanksgiving Dinner Conversation)

Date: November 15, 2006

Time: 10 a.m.

Place: A local Baptist Church

B=Bianka (German), K=Kayo (Japanese), O=Olga (Russian), R=Researcher (Japanese),

001 R: ((Laugh)) you, you think, you said you have Thanksgiving in Germany?

002 B: Yes. But not a way the Americans do it.

003 R: Uh-huh?

004 B: Usually, it's a very, (1.0) uh, Christian =

005 R: [Uh-huh?

006 B: = Celebration. Religious celebration (XXX) only the churches

007 R: [Uh-huh? [Huh?

008 B: we devoted to the church, the church especially the (XXX)
all the greens and foods.

009 R: Oh, OK.

010 B: That's, that's I remember.

011 R: Oh.

(2.0.)

012 O: Do you like to say something, "Thank you", what it's like. =

013 B: [What)

014 O: = to work in prosperity in this life, it's important

015 B: [(XXX harvest?)

016 O: Uh-huh.

017 R: = Oh, OK.

018 B: (XXX) Harvest (XXX).

019 O: I think it, if you look at this, it was after harvest, something like this

020 R: Uh-huh

021 O: Probably not names Thanksgiving, but it, ah, you know, like, after harvest, people

022 together and makes everything with meals,

023 B: [Do you have XXX?

024 R: Uh-huh

025 B: [even the name of "*Erntedankfest*", means "Harvest thank"

026 R: Uh-huh

027 B: [(XXX) Thank you for good harvest]

028 O: [yes. I think in Russia is the same.

029 B: (XXX)

030 R: Is that the same day, or different, some, sometime in November?

031 Or almost the same day?

032 B: [It's in November.

033 R: [Really?

034 B: (XX) 31st. (XX) have to be something like that.

035 R: [Uh-huh, uh-huh.

036 B: Because usually we go to church on 31st.
(A Japanese participant, Kayo, joins in the conversation)

037 R: ((To Kayo)) なんかね、サンクスギビングがジャーマニーにもあるって話で・・・
(Well, they are saying that they have Thanksgiving in Germany)
(10.0 not able to transcribe because multiple people speak at the same time)

038 K: I am not sure

039 O: [(XXXXXXXXXX) you can celebrate.
(4.0. Silence)

040 K: I'm not sure if I understand (XXX), what we have in program on
28th of November. But the Holiday of the world, and the, I think you talk about
Thanksgiving in Germany.

041 B: [yeah, yeah,

042 R: Maybe you can talk about Christmas. Like the Christmas is a big thing in
Germany. Christmas market, you should talk about it. ((laugh))

043 B: Thanksgiving here, everybody goes to home

044 O: Christmas here, they come together, too.

045 R: Uh-huh

046 O: Really huge, you know.

047 B: Thanksgiving, every religion,

048 R: Uh-huh?

049 B: Thanksgiving, every religion celebrate, the Jews, Muslims, Hindus.
Thanksgiving is for everyone. ((Smile))

050 K: We have it in Japan, don't we? Just a day, we don't celebrate ((laugh))

051 R: [We have, but-uh, that's, uh

052 K: Labor's day.

053 R: [Labor's day

054 B: Labor's day?

055 R: Yeah. (0.5) Sort of Labor's day.

056 O: But you know, it's like Christianity, when it comes those days, even sometimes,
you know, it's religious like, every Christian religion has, uh,
another day of (XXX) like Memorial Day, not celebrate like here.
But, because, it's, they can do this, but, all the Christian religions, I think.
But probably, I think you know, probably, I think you can say the same like, say after
harvest,

057 R: Uh-huh

058 O: [I heard it from grandma, they did the same.

059 R: Uh-huh.

060 O: After, you know, before the tradition something like, I don't know.

061 She didn't follow those traditions because after communism, we stopped.

062 R: [In Russia?

063 O: Yes.

064 R: Really?

065 O: But she knew she should remember how the childhood, you know, it was.

I was made it in January, January 12th. It will give you something. It was in January, they have something, period, you can't eat meat or kill it. So, and she said usually we didn't slay (XX) or kill it when you couldn't eat meat. Because without, you know, meat no good day, so, when (XXXX) give this, I don't show that January 12th, and she said "Ok, this is very good day, because you can eat food without sin."

066 K: Without?

067 O: Without sin.

068 K: Without sin?

069 O: [Yes. Because, sometimes, you know, like, I (XXXXX) =

070 R: [Sin. Oh.

071 O: = (XXX)

072 B: *Lent*?

073 O: Yeah. You don't eat meat, you know, something like eggs, something.

074 R: [uh-huh? [Oh, OK.

075 K: Is that a special week?

076 O: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

077 R: [Oh, really?

078 O: Before you eat feast, yeah

079 R: Do you have a term like, a, kind of a term that you cannot eat meat, =

080 R: = like, uh, Christian tradition?

081 O: Yeah, yeah.

082 B: That's Catholic. Not Protestant.

083 O: No, Orthodox, too.

084 R: [Only Catholic? ((Responding to B))

085 K: [I see. ((Responding to B))

086 O: No, Orthodox, too. (XXX)

087 R: What?

088 O: Orthodox. In Russia, it's Orthodox Church.

089 K: ((to R in Japanese)) O, Ooso—dokkusu?

090 B: [Orthodox

091 R: Oh, Orthodox. OK.

092 R: ((To K in Japanese)) オーソドックスってなんになるんですか?

(What does "Orthodox" mean?)

093 K: ((To R in Japanese)) さあ、わかんない。((laugh))

(I don't know)

094 X: ((Passing by the table and asking)) How's the food?

095 R: It's very good.

096 K: [Delicious.

097 O: A lot of the things, things, probably at the States, different because two weeks apart because Russia allowed another kind of calendar

098 R: Uh-huh?

099 O: Yeah. It's eastern, not eastern, this is eastern Orthodox but Christmas,

Ah, Catholics celebrate for December 25th.

100 R: Uh-huh?

101 O: [But Russian, Christmas, ah, January 7th.

102 R: January 7th?
103 O: Uh-huh. Two weeks apart.
104 B: [Oh.
105 O: Because changing a calendar from Julian calendar.
106 R: [oh, oh, the moon calendar to =
107 =Like Luna calendar to (1 sec) to, the, (1 sec). Is it a Luna calendar or
different calendar?
108 O: Luna, I don't know. No, not Gregorian calendar
109 K: [Julian calendar
(1.0.)
110 R: Huh. (0.5) Interesting.
112 O: [So, this is, just different. I know similar a lot.
113 O: Probably, some like you see different, but I see lot of similarity
114 B: Because they come from one rule.
115 O: [Ye::s, yes
116 B: and just separated
117 K: Yes.
118 R: [religion?
119 B: Catholic and Orthodox.
120 O: [Yeah.
121 R: What do you mean "Orthodox"? Orthodox?
122 B: Just another (0.5) =
123 O: [yeah
124 B: = different =
125 O: = line of Christianity
126 R: Are they different varie(ty), uh, different, uh, (0.5) strea::m (0.5) of Christianity?
127 B: Yes.
128 O: Yeah.
129 K: In Japanese, we call it "Russian Orthodox" because Russia (XXX)
130 R: [Oh, Russian Orthodox.
131 B: Is this Greek? Greek people?
132 R: [Yeah, yeah
133 O: And Russians.
134 R: Oh, OK. Interesting.
135 B: And guess where the head of Orthodox is. (1.0) Where is his house?
Do you know that?
136 R: What? What?
137 K: [What?
138 B: The head of Orthodox church. Do you know where he set his house?
139 K: [No?
140 B: Istanbul in Turkey.
141 R: Istanbul in Turkey? Really? ↗
142 K: [Oh. Ohhh. ((laugh))
143 B: Nobody knows that.
144 R: Really? Because he is Turkish?
145 B: No, no. It's

146 R: [He just wanna live there?
 147 B: Turks are, they were very
 148 O: [One is, Ottoman Empire had a prosperous time
 149 B: Yes. In old time.
 150 O: Yeah. They, you know, took a lot of part of Russia, a lot of countries,
 151 R: [Oh::
 152 K: So the country went up north
 153 O: [Yeah, yeah. =
 154 O: = Then, Russia, send them back ((laugh))
 155 R: [OK, I see::
 156 K: Huge continent, connected ((laugh))
 157 O: [Yeah, yeah.
 158 R: [Huh
 159 O: So, why, I think it's (XXX) because of, because Ottoman Empire.
 160 B: O, o, Ottoman Empire, very seldom interfered. (1.0)
 161 R: Inter?
 162 B: They did not, ah, convert people.
 163 R: Uh-huh?
 164 B: They say, "You live but have to pay taxes"
 165 R: Oh, OK.
 166 K: [Ah, I see.
 167 B: So, they left them but for taxes.
 168 R: Uh-huh.
 169 K: [That's wise ((chuckle))
 170 B: It is. ((chuckle))
 171 K: [Clever. ((chuckle)) (XXXX) but they want money ((chuckle))
 172 B: Yes. ((chuckle))
 173 O: So, when they go, (0.5) so far, but they had money
 174 B: Even after Jews were expelled from Spain =
 175 K: [Uh-huh?
 176 B: = they went to Turkey.
 177 R: Yeah?
 178 B: So that does Muslims.
 179 R: [Because they can't keep their religion?
 180 B: Yes.
 181 O: Uh-huh.
 (1.0)
 182 R: Huh?
 183 B: And the Pope is now, I think, although a little, a little difficult with
 Turkish government, the Pope is trying to reach the Orthodox (0.5) Pope
 in Turkey now in November.
 184 R: Yeah?
 185 K: [Huh?
 186 R: Really? The Pope is the German Pope, and he wanna meet the Orthodox Pope?
 187 B: Yes. The Pope of Rome.
 188 O: Oh, this is so (XXX). He is, so, German, yeah.

189 B: Yes, yes, yes, yes ((excited))
190 K: ((chuckle)) That's right
191 R: ((chuckle)) [ye::s, that's right, yes.
192 O: ((chuckle))
193 K: That's right. ((chuckle))
194 B: For me, it's always (XXX)
195 O: [Yeah, yeah, yeah ((chuckle))
196 K: ((chuckle))
197 R: Isn't that a big thing for German people?
198 B: Yes.
199 R: [Yeah?
200 B: We have a paper
201 R: Yeah?
202 B: *Bild* means picture news paper. It's a very cheap tabloid
203 R: [Uh-huh?
204 B: This paper said, "We are the Pope".
205 R: Ah? Really?
206 K: ((chuckle))
207 B: Yeah.
208 R: ((chuckle)) Yeah? But isn't that politically incorrect? ((chuckle))
209 B: ((distraught)) Yes. Yes. But when he became the Pope, there was a problem.
Because, he was, ah,
210 R: He was, uh, Nazi.
211 B: ((distraught)) Nazi.
212 K: Oh, really?
213 R: Yeah. But you know, that was, uh, they had to
214 K: (XXX)
215 B: [But at that time, everybody.
216 B: ((to Kayo)) Sorry. I was interrupting
217 R: [I know, I know
(1.0.)
218 R: You know, I was thinking about the same thing. Ah, (0.5) cause ah,
the author of Tin Drum
219 B: What?
220 R: You know, "Tin Drum"? The movie. Tin Drum. Yeah, you know.
He's, uh, his name is, M: Uh, *Gunter Grass*.
221 B: Uh. Uh-huh.
222 R: [*Gunter Grass*.
223 B: Yeah. Yeah, yeah.
224 R: You know, and, he, you know, he, you know, he, he was accused,
especially by Polish people just because he belonged to Nazi. =
225 R: = But I'm sure at that point everybody had to belong to.
226 B: [It was very difficult not to and survive
227 R: Yeah, like not to. And, I'm surprised everybody actually thought that he wasn't?
That's impossible, right? (XXX)
(1.0)

228 R: You know, so, I, but,
 229 B: [((to Y))(XXX)
 230 R: But, European people are, very, uh, (0.5), very, sensitive.
 231 B: Yes. Of course.
 232 R: [Very sensitive.
 233 O: [Yeah.
 234 B: Yes. For sixty years, we are not allowed to put our flag on.
 235 R: Sixty years?
 236 B: Sixty years.
 237 R: Yeah?
 238 K: National flag?
 239 B: National flags. Everybody was, “No”, to the national flags (XXX)
 230 R: [There, there was a law? =
 241 R: = Or people just didn’t do it?
 242 B: [No, no.=
 243 B: = Because, uh, because we lost war, we felt such a guilt.
 244 R: Oh, OK.
 245 B: We did so much bad things to so many people.
 246 R: [Uh-huh?
 247 B: killed Russians.
 248 O: But, I, you know, in my generation, we are already pretty good with
 German people.
 249 R: ((laugh))
 250 O: So, especially Russia, probably not other nations, yes. But, I mean, Russian, =
 and even (XXX) you know, this is called Великая Отечественная Война¹⁰⁸
 in Russian
 251 R: [Because the part of =
 252 R: = Germany was, a communist coun, country.
 253 B: [Yes.
 254 R: And, it’s pretty major, right?
 255 O: But also, it was the Cold War. Nobody say why Americans took a part, too.
 256 K: ((to Bianka)) We are still hesitant to be, too, too patriotic to my own country,
 I understand. But hesitate to flag of your own country. I understand that.
 257 B: Always. But, since now, I, uh, in uh, computer,
 they have a forum in the newspaper,
 258 R: Uh-hum?
 259 B: An’ you can, uh, give your comment.
 260 R: Uh-hum?
 261 B: So, many, many Germans are all discussing politics.
 262 R: Yeah?
 263 B: An’ I go in there,
 264 R: [Oh, really?
 265 B: an’ discuss with them
 266 R: [What’s the name?
 267 B: Uh, *Spiegel*.

108 It is called the Great Patriotic War in Russia

268 R: Spiegel?

269 B: It's like "Mirror." *Spiegel* means a mirror.

270 R: Oh, OK.

271 B: [It's on there. It's so interesting. There is one, one Jew. He still demands =

272 R: [Uh-hum?

273 B: = Germans have to go like this (Putting her head down on the table).

274 R: (0.5) Yeah, yeah.

275 B: [we shouldn't say anything against Israel, it would be (XXX).=

276 B: = So, you can, you can do whatever you want to we, Germans, say
"It's OK. We are Jewish." He, he demands that.

277 R: No. I understand that.

278 B: [We shouldn't, uh, criticize Bush, "because he freed us".

279 K: [Uh-huh

280 R: [Yeah.

281 B: Bush. We have to be obedient.

282 K: [(XXXXXXXXXXXXX)((laugh))

283 R: [Really? ((chuckle))

284 O: What about Soviet Army? (XXX)

285 R: [((to B)) Really

286 B: Did you say something? The Soviet Union?

287 O: No, they didn't do anything, actually. They didn't.

288 B: They didn't do anything. They just bring communism in our country.

289 O: Yes, yes. They didn't save those Jews.
I, I am so surprised nobody knows in Israel =

290 R: [((chuckle))

291 O: = the victory day, May 9th, I told, "what are you doing? This is Victory day."
an' they say "Excuse me, America was a winner."
"Excuse me!! When did they (the U.S.) become winner?
"You, Soviet Union never did this." (0.5)No. ((voice is shaking))

292 B: They just came to, to, uh, oppressed.

293 O: [Yeah, yeah.

294 R: [Uh-huh?

295 O: That's so *funny*.

296 B: [Yes.

297 O: Those Jews, wro, wrote, you know, books, how American save them.
How many of those family saved (by) Russians from Soviet.

298 R: American saved Jew people, Jews?

299 O: I think (Russians saved Jews) a lot more than (Americans did). ((laugh))

300 R: ((laugh))

301 O: That's so *funny*.

302 R: [That's *interesting*, but

303 B: [It's very interesting.

304 O: It was a Israeli system.

305 R: Uh.

306 O: I, I, I don't even, you know, I think in, our kids, for example, my kids,
if they do not have Russian experience, they do not have another part experience.

They'll never know that even Soviet Union was some part, (0.5) =
some part, I would say.

307 R: Uh-huh?

308 O: Yeah. Because they teach kids completely ((laugh))=

309 R: = Yeah. *Different* history. *Different* history.

310 O: [Yes. Yes.=

311 O: = An' if you knew an' explain my books to him from, you know, high school, =
an' you don't hear, you know, "utopia", but, but you say here,
"do not, do not say, it's in blood", because it's, whatever they say, =

312 O: = it's theirs, you know,

313 R: [Uh-hum

314 O: But for you should know

315 R: [Yeah, yeah.

316 O: (XXX) there's *difference*. For Russian solders

317 R: *Different* history, especially, you know =

318 O: Yeah. Because so many people died for this an' you know, how to say,
I, I can't believe how Russian, you know, government, know,
a, accept it an' cannot say anything, you know, uh,
I, I can't. It's in memory of those people die in this war, it's so, it's so *unfair*.

319 B: Because this war really was something to not just conquer but to defend

320 O: Yes. Of course. An' if know this is whatever, Stalin did all his, you know,
but, compared to Hitler, he's not the same.
Whatever he did, but, he made this, but (0.2)

321 B: If you know that there were concentration camps here, too. For Japanese people.

322 K: [Oh::

323 O: Yeah, Because they were, because they were

324 K: [During World War II

325 B: Even for Japanese people who sent young men to war.

326 K: Yes.

327 B: At good.

328 R: And you know what, the best part is that they didn't do it to German people.
German people. An' you know what.
Actually the German people who sent the money to Germany.
They knew that but they didn't do. They didn't have a concentration camp.

329 K: I know.

330 R: It's *interesting*.

((Coordinators rang a bell to other members to stop talking and eating. They stated informing
about a next week program.))

331 B: You should be angry about that. They also drop Atomic bombs. Not even one
but two. They drop it because they are racist, too. If you think about it
it's funny they celebrate Thanksgiving. What happened to those Indians?
They killed them. What is "Thanksgiving" then?

332 R: You are right.