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Reconstructing the Concept of Democratic Deliberation

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Although democracy is a contested concept, much of this contest begins with substantial agreement. Theorizing is anchored by a focus on the nature of the individual citizen. There follows a normative consideration of personal rights, namely autonomy and its social corollary, equality. The problem of democratic governance is conceived accordingly. It is one of crafting institutions that facilitate collective decision-making in a manner consistent with these fundamental values and thus with the common good. Beyond this quite general orientation, significant divergence emerges over how individuals are conceptualized and consequently over how autonomy and equality should be defined. Division over how best to institutionalize democratic governance follows.

Here I will focus on the recent contribution to this theoretical debate made by the advocates of deliberative democracy. To begin I will briefly sketch the deliberative position.¹ I will then critically consider the adequacy of its conception of the individual and offer an alternative view of cognition, emotion and communication. I conclude by presenting the implications of this alternative for the understanding of the democratic values of autonomy and equality and for the conception of democratic procedure.

Deliberative Democracy: the Anglo-American View

Deliberative democratic theory emerges in the 1990s partly as a response to the “aggregative” view of democracy advanced by rational choice theorists. In this latter view, the individual is conceived as rational in a very limited sense. The individual is postulated to have a set of preferences that are ordered according to their desirability. She is then assumed to orient her thinking and action to pursue the satisfaction of these preferences in light of the constraints and opportunities present in the situation before her.² The individual as citizen is conceived accordingly, that is as a self-directing actor who orients her initiatives in the political arena so as to realize her interests. Building on this conception of the citizen, autonomy is defined as the ability to freely affect collective decisions in a manner consistent with the pursuit one’s own preferences. In complementary fashion, equality is defined as social relationship in which individuals have equivalent opportunity to freely pursue their interests in this collective, political domain. In this light the institutions of governance are designed so as to allow this free and equal pursuit of interest. The key mechanism developed is the political election complemented by a notion of government by law. In the attempt to better realize these political goals, the specific contours of governance are developed differently in theories of direct or representative democracy, but the foundational assumptions remain largely the same.

Endemic to this aggregative view of democracy is the potential conflict between personal preferences and the collective good. With it emerge questions of legitimacy and compliance. Why would individuals oriented by their own interests accept outcomes that are inconsistent with those interests? Why would the losers in an election accept the outcome and abide by its consequences when this contravenes the rational pursuit of their interests? Rational choice theorists answer by suggesting that the conditions render apparently undesirable outcomes acceptable. Losers abide by electoral outcomes precisely because it is in their interest to do so. They may have lost in the recent election but they may win in the next. Accepting the present outcome supports the legal arrangement that insures that today’s winners will accept their future loss. Moreover government has the means to enforce the results of elections and the ensuing public policy

thereby increasing the cost of defection. Some have also argued that these expressly political forces must be supplemented by a reservoir of social trust or “social capital” that binds people to one another and to the political arrangements they create (e.g., Putnam 1993). In sum, the conditions of action bring the pursuit of personal interest into line with the requisites of the political system thereby reducing problems of legitimacy and compliance. Critics suggest that while this solution may obtain when conditions are ideal, it is less workable in fragmented, complex societies where minority groups may have little hope of ever winning an election, where the use of executive power to force compliance from those who do not accept the law can be costly and is often ineffective, and where social trust is systematically undermined both by a multiculturalism that reinforces social cleavages and by an ethos of individualism that erodes all social ties and commitments.

The advocates of deliberative democracy offer a very different view of individuals and a commensurately different understanding of basic political values and how to best realize them in the design of political institutions. In its conception of the individual, this deliberative view builds on John Rawls’ theories of political justice (1993). Here the individual citizen is defined to have significantly greater cognitive capacities and moral potential than citizens are attributed in rational choice theories. According to Rawls, all individuals are (or more exactly, must be) logical, rational and reasonable. In their logic, individuals are explicitly assumed to have the basic cognitive capacity to argue with reasons, to recognize criteria of justification, to understand rules of evidence, to be logical (to follow rules of inference and deduction) and to reflect on their own presuppositions. Implicitly it is assumed that individuals have the cognitive capacity to construct systems of interrelated propositions and abstract principles of relationships and to effectively use these constructions for the purpose of interpretation, explanation and evaluation. In their rationality, individuals are assumed to be able to consider and order their specific preferences and values relative to their overall life plan and their sense of a higher-order good. In their reasonableness, they are assumed to be able to take the perspective of the other and thus can fairly consider the claims of another person in that other person’s terms. They are also able to consider not only the personal value of specific actions or outcomes, but also the common value of general principles of interaction (constitutional essentials). Individuals therefore have the capacity to make judgments that are guided by a sense of justice as fairness.

Rawls vacillates in his faith that individuals, even theoretically defined ones, can be relied upon to realize these capacities. Responding to the claim that individuals’ motivations are naturally egocentric, he suggests the use of the “original position” as a cognitive device. The aim is to negate the influence of particular, selfish desires and to encourage the consideration of more general, social concerns. Rawls concludes that armed with this orienting cognitive device and their own natural capacities, individuals can critically reflect on their own views, fairly consider other’s needs as well as their own and participate in defining the common good. Consequently, the interests that these individuals define for themselves are more broadly conceived. As a result any conflict between personally and collectively defined interests are reduced and the problem of delegitimation is diminished commensurately.

Although they largely adopt Rawls’ theory of the citizen, more deliberatively oriented theorists suggest that the personal reflection even when guided by the use of a cognitive device is not sufficient to insure that citizens approach political questions with the requisite reasonableness, rationality and logic. Instead these theorists argue that the desired critical self-reflection and fair orientation to the other can only be realized in an actual encounter with the beliefs, values and arguments of other citizens. The institutional demand to come to agreement on a course of action that others find workable and worthwhile emphasizes the need for perspective-taking, justification and the elaboration of a common good while rendering ineffective any claims that either are not justified or are justified on solely selfish grounds. Thus participation in deliberation leads individuals to reflect and interact in a way that is more logical (Gutmann and

Thompson 1996), rational (Benhabib 2002), just, considerate of others (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Cohen 1997), self-critical (Dryzek 2000) and oriented to the common good (Cohen 1997; Benhabib 2002). The implicit assumption here is that, even if individuals have not fully developed the aforementioned capacities, they still have the requisite ability to participate in deliberation and can readily develop their skills as required in this context.

In the deliberative view, an individual is not only a rational actor who makes choices and acts to satisfy personal interests, she is also an ethical and moral agent who reflects and collaborates. Guided by reflections on her own overarching sense of the good life, a consideration of the interests of others and an understanding of the common good, she is able to reorder existing interests and create new ones. This process is facilitated by constructive conversation with other people in which their views are expressed and one's own are given feedback. The democratic values of autonomy and equality are reconceived accordingly. The concept of political autonomy is redefined in recognition of the individual's increased capacities and broader bases of evaluation. The focus extends beyond the pursuit of one's own particular interests through freedom of expression, choice and action. Emphasis is also placed on the formulation of one's own interests and the common interest through reflection and open, cooperative discussion. The latter requires an expansion of the concept of autonomy to include the freedom to participate with others in a joint attempt to elaborate each other's specific and general interests and to construct a shared sense of just rules of interaction and the common good. In this light, equality is no longer just a matter of an equal opportunity to effect collective decisions. As importantly, equality must be realized in the equal opportunity to participate actively in a cooperative process of addressing public policy problems and of creating the overarching values that orient this policymaking effort.

In this deliberative conception, equality and autonomy require each other. On the one hand, equality is a necessary precondition of autonomy. It is only in a cooperative exchange between equals that both the self-expression and critical self-reflection required for the self-reflective construction of one's understandings and interests is possible (e.g., Warren 1992). Where the self dominates, self-criticism truncates and narrows. Where the other dominates, self-expression is suppressed. In either case, the self that is constructed is a distortion and any true autonomy is compromised. On the other hand, equality requires autonomy. Deliberative equality is equality of effective participation (e.g., Bohman 1996, 1997; Knight and Johnson 1997). The latter can only be achieved by citizens who have full deliberative autonomy and thus have the capacity to express their own interests in a way that others can comprehend, and to reflect on those interests in light of ideas and aims voiced by other people. Where autonomy is compromised meaningful equality cannot be achieved.

The problem of democratic governance is reconsidered in this light. Given the broader conception of autonomy and equality, the emphasis on the design of institutions such as elections or referenda that allow individuals to freely pursue their personal interests by equally contributing to collective decision-making are regarded as inadequate. Instead the focus is on constructing institutional arrangements that create the opportunity for full and equal participation by citizens in a joint, cooperative process of clarifying, elaborating and revising common conceptions and values in the course of defining and judging specific problems and their solutions. The solution is governance by citizen deliberation. Most of the theoretical efforts of deliberative democrats have focused on elaborating the conditions, procedures and salutary effects of the political institution of deliberation.

Deliberative democrats suggest a number of conditions that must be met if an interaction is to be a fully deliberative democratic exercise. Several prior conditions must be met before the deliberation actually begins. First, there must be a suspension of action to create the political space for the deliberation to take place. There must be some assurance that decisions will not be taken and practical action will not be initiated until after the deliberation has been completed. Second, once this political space is created, it must be

inclusive. This requirement is variously elaborated as the inclusion of all those parties potentially affected or of all the relevant points of view. A third requirement that follows closely on the second is that the deliberation be public so that all those affected but not directly involved can be apprised of and potentially respond to the substance of the deliberations (e.g., Guttman and Thompson 1996). Finally there is a requirement that the results of the deliberation be binding on all those involved (Cohen 1997). This last requirement insures that the deliberation is not regarded as an inconsequential exercise.

The deliberation itself must meet certain standards of conduct. First, it must be governed by a concern for autonomy. On the one hand, this requires that participation in the deliberation be free. The participants must be able to formulate and express their own views of the various issues that are raised. On the other hand, it necessitates that the integrity and value of each participant be acknowledged. This demands that each not only is free to speak, but that each also is heard with respect and consideration. Second, the deliberation must be guided by the concerns of equality. Each participant must have an equal opportunity to speak and to persuade his audience (e.g., Bohman 1997; Knight & Johnson 1997). Third the outcomes of deliberation must be consistent with the associated values of justice as fairness and democracy as governance oriented to the common good and guided by the principles of autonomy and equality. For some theorists such as Gutmann and Thompson (1996), such an orientation to justice and democracy can only be insured by the stipulation of constitutional constraints. For others such as Benhabib (1996), Cohen (1996, 1997) and Knight (1999), the conditions of deliberative practice themselves not only embody these goals but also orient participants toward achieving them. Fourth, deliberation must consist primarily of the exchange of reasons for two purposes: that of communicating one's own views in a way that can be understood and accepted by the other, and that of coming to understand the meaning and value of the other's views in her terms. In this vein, deliberation should be based upon or should establish a shared appreciation of the truth and right of the reasons for the collective choices being made.

The claim here is that when these prior conditions are met and the standards of conduct are followed, the ensuing discussion will be fully deliberative. As such it will consist of a respectful and reciprocal expression, correction, revision and restatement of views. In the process, thinking will become more logical and self-reflection will become deeper and more critical. As a result, personal beliefs, values and preferences will change. At the same time, this will encourage the discovery of a common ground for agreement, one that will yield more just and legitimate recommendations for public policy.³ This in turn will provide a basis for both a renewal of interest and faith in democratic governance (thus addressing current problems of declining interest and participation in politics) and a means for social reintegration (thus addressing the problems of a socially destructive individualism and a socially disintegrative multiculturalism).

Regarding Human Nature and Communication

I am sympathetic to the concerns that drive deliberative democrats. Like the deliberative democrats, I find the conception of the individual of rational choice theorists and aggregative democrats too simple, their conception of autonomy and equality too narrow and their conception of democratic governance consequently inadequate. I also believe the turn to deliberation with its implicit recognition of the importance of a cooperative social engagement to be a productive move. That said I believe that the revisionist efforts of the deliberative democrats have not gone deep or far enough. In this vein, I will argue that the foundational assumptions regarding individuals overestimate their cognitive abilities, incorrectly equate the abilities of all individuals, and fail to attend to the emotional dimension of interpersonal connection. In the process, the social dimension of cognition is underestimated and the relationship between

cognition, communication and community is misunderstood. Sketching an alternative perspective, I draw out the implications of this view for defining orienting political values and designing political institutions.

Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Cognition

As already noted, deliberative democratic theory is anchored by a set of assumptions regarding individuals, assumptions that explicitly focus on individuals' cognitive capacities. In this light, deliberative democratic theory can be understood as an attempt to elaborate the political implications of a particular cognitive psychology. In the latter regard, it is assumed that individuals have the capacities for rational (in the full sense defined above) self-direction, for reasonable engagement with others and for logical inference. Moreover it is assumed that individuals, once they have grown to be normal adults, are broadly equal in their ability to exercise these capacities so as (a) to self-direct in a manner consistent with their own overarching sense of the good, (b) to engage others in a manner which recognizes the perspective and integrity of those others, and (c) to participate in argument in a logical, reasoned manner. Because of this, all individuals are accorded equal rights to autonomous political participation in democratic for a designed to offer participants the greatest freedom for self-expression and constructive engagement.

My concern here is that this characterization of cognition is significantly incorrect. To begin, there is a good deal of social cognition research that suggests that individuals are not particularly logical in their reflections about themselves or in their analysis of the circumstances they must confront. For example, the research on causal attribution indicates that when people are explaining or predicting social phenomena, they attend more to factors that are more readily seen or are more distinctive and they do not integrate the information assimilated in a particularly integrative or logical fashion. (e.g., Kelley 1973; Taylor and Fiske 1978). These conclusions are reinforced by other research on cognitive heuristics that demonstrate that when people reason they utilize various cognitive shortcuts rather than logical reflection or rational calculation (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1973). Similarly social cognition research has demonstrated the difficulty people have with abstract thought and the rational calculation of probabilities (Smelund 1963; Quattrone & Tversky 1984). This failure to think logically is complemented by other research that shows that on questions that matter, people's judgments of themselves and others are powerfully influenced by pre-existing prejudices. On the one hand, there is research on cognitive consistency (Heider 1958) and cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Abelson et al. 1968) that addresses how emotional commitments and pre-existing preferences distort the analysis of causes, effects and categorical associations of new observations in a direction that supports prior judgments. On the other hand the research on cognitive schemas demonstrates that even beliefs that are not value laden or emotionally charged can powerfully distort how people interpret the significance and deduce the implication of incoming information (Fiske and Taylor 1991).

As one might expect, these deficiencies in social cognition are reflected in how people engage one another in groups. A good deal of the research on small group behavior and communication provides evidence of people's evident inability to understand and fairly consider other people's perspectives, to think critically about their own position or the social conventions to which they adhere, or to think about problems creatively and generate novel alternatives. Researchers study (and practitioners initiate) attempts to structure social interaction with these failures in mind. These include asking participants to engage in games involving such unconventional social behavior such as brainstorming, role-playing and free-associating (e.g., Jarboe 1999; Propp 1999).

In sum, there is a great deal of social psychological research that suggests that individuals generally do not think in the logical, rational or reasonable way and do not evidence the communicative competence assumed by deliberative democratic theory. Research in developmental psychology raises further questions regarding the adequacy of deliberative theorists' characterization of cognition. In the deliberative democracy

literature (and in most social psychological research), cognition is typically conceived as a set of distinct skills or capacities. Following the tradition of Piaget (1970; Inhelder and Piaget 1958) and Vygotsky (1962, 1978) research on cognitive development offers a more dynamic, integrative view of cognition. To begin, cognition is understood in pragmatic terms, that is as a purposive activity whereby an individual attempts to operate on and within the world around her. This operation is not simply a matter of calculation nor does it involve simply arranging representations relative to one another. Calculation and arrangement do not constitute thinking, but rather are two of its manifest products. In this sense thinking is viewed as a constructive activity. In the cognitive operation of coordinating one's own effort to act on objects in the physical environment or to interact with others in the social environment, the various actions and objects deployed are placed in a subjectively constructed relationship to one another. In this manner, these objects and actions are subjectively reconstructed as elements of the individual's purposive reasoned activity and each is defined by the particular role it plays. In this manner thinking produces the representations and connections that constitute an individual's understandings and judgments. This pragmatic conception of thinking is supplemented by a structuralist claim that there is a distinctive quality to how cognition operates and therefore to the quality of the representations and conceptual relations that are constructed. This distinctive quality of thinking should be evident across the various specific representations, understandings, evaluative judgments and action strategies that the individual constructs.

Viewed from this perspective, logic, rationality and reasonableness are not simply a set of distinct (even if interdependent) capacities. Rather they reflect a common underlying structural capacity, one that has been substantively differentiated by the different types of problems addressed in the course of everyday experience (inferential relationships between claims in the case of logic, subjective relationships among preferences, beliefs and actions in the case of rationality, and relations with other people in the case of reasonableness). In my own work, I have suggested that these specific cognitive capacities are various manifestations of one underlying mode or form of reasoning that I have termed systematic (Rosenberg 2002). This systematic reasoning entails the subjective juxtaposing of propositions and interactions and leads to the creation of systems and principles of interrelationship. These systems and principles are precisely the type of cognitive structures that can support the capacities that deliberation requires. The ability to construct integrated webs of interrelated beliefs, preferences and actions is critical both to rational self-reflection and to reasonable perspective taking. These enable the thinking subject to place specific claims or actions in the broader context of the person as system, both as a locus of meaning and as a personality, and to interpret their meaning and judge their value accordingly. In the case of rational reflection, the system in question is the self. In the case of reasonable perspective taking, the system of concern is another person. Similarly the related capacity to construct principles of relationship is critical to the abstract considerations of logic and justice. In the first case, principles of relationship provide a basis for generating general rules of inference for relating different types of claims. In the second case, they provide a basis for generating general rules of fairness for relating individuals (as systems) to one another.⁴

Apart from emphasizing the formal qualities of thinking, the cognitive developmental approach also focuses on how the underlying structure of cognition can be transformed. The basic argument here is that the individual as a child has an initial way of reasoning which is inadequate to the requirements of operating effectively in the world around him. Through a process of subjective reflection and an internalization of external direction, the individual's reasoning develops through a series of stages during childhood and adolescence until the structure of her thinking approximates the structure of her environment. At each of these stages, the individual thinks in a qualitatively different way producing differently structured cognitive strategies and understandings. At the last stage, development stops and the structure of the individual's adult cognition is formed. Whereas all people may share the same genetically conferred potential for full cognitive development, their social environments may differ in ways that affect how far development

progresses. Insofar as they are structured differently, social environments place different kinds of cognitive demands on the individuals who inhabit them, thereby by encouraging further cognitive development or making it unnecessary. As a result, adults who have grown up and lived in structurally different social contexts may develop qualitatively different ways of reasoning.

The suggestion that different adults may reason in structurally different ways has important implications for our consideration of deliberative democracy. First, it suggests the possibility that some people have a deeply structured inability to be logical, rational or reasonable in the manner assumed by the deliberative democratic theory. Indeed, several different strands of cognitive development research indicate that not only some, but perhaps most people lack the requisite capacity to reason. Neo-Piagetian research on adult cognition suggests (contrary to traditional Piagetian theory) that most people may not develop formal operational thought and therefore will have difficulty incorporating overarching, abstract or hypothetical considerations into their reasoning. It suggests that individuals may actively construct concrete categories and causal connections, but that they will be unable to reflect on the manner (logical or justified) in which they craft those constructions (Kuhn et al. 1977; Selman 1980; Kegan 1994). Similarly Kohlbergian research on moral judgment suggests that most people may not develop post-conventional moral reasoning and therefore will be unable to critically reflect on the conventional social mores and categories they use to guide their judgments of what is right and wrong (Kohlberg 1981/84). Finally my research on social and political reasoning suggests that most people are unable to think systematically and therefore are unable to think of themselves or others as systems with their own integrity and functional requirements. Similarly they are unable to construct general rules of relationship to guide considerations of logic or justice as fairness (Rosenberg 2002). Thinking in a linear or sequential rather than a systematic manner, most people are therefore unable to deliberate adequately. Failing to adequately consider the perspective of the listener, most people do not present their own views in a sufficiently elaborated manner so that others can fully understand them. In addition, most people tend to view the different views that others' express not as constructive input, but rather as an obstruction or simply incorrect. Overall the opportunity for discussion and argument is not viewed as cooperative exercise leading to greater insight and mutual benefit, but rather it is understood as a zero sum game that ends in some participants winning and others losing (Rosenberg 2003).

A second implication speaks to the assumption of the universality or that all normal adult citizens share a common set of cognitive capacities. Whereas the social psychological research suggests that individual's capacities are less than assumed by deliberative democracy, it retains the assumption of universality. All people's thinking is demonstrated to be inadequate in roughly the same way. Cognitive developmental theory contravenes this view. It suggests that whereas most adults of the kind typically studied in social psychological research (American, middle class, mostly 1st and 2nd year university undergraduates) may reason in the same way, some adults reason in a structurally more developed way than this and others reason in a less structurally less developed way. This suggests the problem for deliberative democratic theory is not only the adequacy of citizens' reasoning, but also their equality. Some deliberative democrats have worried about differing social backgrounds and consequently unequal abilities to mobilize cultural resources in deliberation (e.g., Bohman 1997). The problem here is even more difficult, suggesting that inequalities in effective participation may not just be a matter of cultural exposure and familiarity, but rather a matter of fundamental inequalities in the ability to be logical, to be self-reflective, to take the perspective of the other and to comprehend issues of fairness.⁵

In sum, the social psychological and the developmental psychological research suggest that individuals may be far less logical, rational and reasonable than deliberative democratic theory assumes. The implication to be drawn in both cases is that deliberative institutions should not be conceived simply as settings for free exchange in which citizen capacities for reflection and engagement can be realized. The social psychological research on cognition and communication points to various cognitive deficiencies and

implies that deliberative settings must be carefully structured to compensate accordingly. Interaction must be designed to provide incentives and information that foster specific thinking patterns or techniques of engagement that will overcome the particular inadequacies identified. In this sense, the research suggests that deliberations be regarded as remedial institutions.

The cognitive developmental research suggests that this remedial orientation to deliberation may not be sufficient. The claim here is the inadequacies exhibited by individual participants are not just specific errors in reasoning or judgment, but rather are reflections of a general, structural inability to comprehend and properly respond to the complexities of fair, constructive political deliberation (particularly in a settings where there are deep socio-cultural differences among the participants). Consequently, deliberations must be more than remedial; they must be sites for political education and development. Thus they must be designed not with an eye to introducing specific procedures or social games to correct specific deliberative deficiencies, but rather as pedagogical devices for fostering the structural cognitive development required for competent participation in deliberation.

In addition, the cognitive developmental research highlights what is clearly evident to those who have facilitated or observed citizen deliberations (or class room discussions) – citizens evidently differ in their capacity to construct arguments, provide justifications, take another’s point of view and to reflect critically on their own views or the social conventions to which they adhere. Apart from the problem of citizen development, this raises the problem of equality. Insofar as some participants have greater deliberative capacities than others, their contribution is likely to be more effective and the ensuing agreements are likely to be more favorable to them. This normative problem is exacerbated by a practical problem. People who reason in structurally different ways are likely to understand and to respond to the same circumstances quite differently. Thus any institutional arrangements must be crafted in recognition of how these arrangements may be subjectively reconstructed in quite different ways with quite different practical results.

Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Affect and Emotion

In its characterization of the individual, deliberative democratic theory has followed the trajectory of most democratic theory and focused on the individual’s cognitive attributes. In so doing, the theory remains largely silent on the affective or emotional qualities of human nature. At most it provides a further rationale for ignoring these concerns by either relegating them to the domain of variable personal preferences or by subordinating them to a reason that is capable of denying, ordering and reconstructing them. However with its emphasis on constructive communication, deliberative democracy may require not only a certain level of cognitive capacity, but also a certain degree of positive emotional engagement. On the face of it, it seems that the very possibility of the kind of deliberation the theory postulates depends on such an emotional engagement to foster the kind of consideration that democratic deliberation demands. It seems unrealistic to assume that a commitment to fairly consider another’s concerns can be based simply on the recognition that another person, as a thinking, sentient personality, is formally equivalent to oneself and therefore equally deserving of attention and consideration. Similarly it seems unrealistic to assume that a commitment to a common good will emerge solely on the basis of reflections on what is ethical and reasonable. Not only does this raise the issue of the practicality of institutions constructed with such assumptions in mind, but it also raises issues about the adequacy of a theoretical construction which only explicates human sociality on cognitive grounds.

It seems to me that any adequate conception of the communicative orientation of individuals in a deliberation must incorporate an appreciation of the important role played by affective bonds and emotional connection. It is not enough to recognize the integrity of the other. One must also be emotionally connected

to that person. By this I mean that one cares about that person, that one can empathize with their position and can make that other person's pains and pleasures one's own. It is this caring that transforms the recognition of the integrity of the other into a motivating concern that can then fuel the effort to understand and support that other's nature. Similarly it is a feeling of being part of a community that provides the emotional impetus for participating in the joint definition of a common good and enhances the subjective sense of the value of the good so defined.

The success of deliberation depends not only on the exercise of appropriate cognitive capacities, it also requires a kind of emotional connection to foster the commitments to engage others and consider the common good in the manner required. Consequently deliberations must be structured with this in mind. As attention must be paid to foster appropriate cognition, so attention must be paid to creating emotional bonds. Thus whereas it may be true that argument by reasons focused on the policy question at hand may be necessary to arriving at just solutions (Habermas 1984, 1996; Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1997), it is also the case that exchanging narratives about personally significant life episodes (Young 1996) and sharing meals together (Forester 1999) and participating in activities designed to create a sense of group identity may be necessary to creating the emotional connection needed to motivate the kind of argument desired. The key here is to recognize that deliberation does not just require establishing the conditions for the full realization of cognitive capacities, it also requires conditions that foster emotional engagement, mutual nurturing and an affective tie to one's community.

Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Communication

Finally I would like to examine more closely the conception of communication that orients most discussion of deliberative democracy. Although it plays a central role, communication is itself subject to little direct theoretical consideration. Within most deliberative democratic theory such a consideration is rendered unnecessary because communication is assumed to be a largely successful activity and a neutral medium of social exchange. In the first regard, the deliberative democratic understanding of communication builds on the assumptions regarding cognition discussed earlier. Because individuals have the capacity to be logical, rational and reasonable, they are also assumed to be competent interlocutors. In this light, communication is regarded as an essentially non-problematic phenomenon. Variation in individuals' experience and social position may produce substantial differences in beliefs and preference that make communication more difficult. However the capacities implied in the communicative competence of the interlocutors provides means for understanding and respecting these differences. It also provides a basis for transcending these differences by moving to higher order concerns and an overarching common good.⁶ In the second regard, communication is understood to be a neutral vehicle for transporting subjectively constructed views back and forth between the subject-communicators. Languages may differ in manifest syntax and may vary in their vocabularies for different kinds of objective or subjective phenomena, but they are all regarded as basically comparable vehicles for the expression of an individual's beliefs and preferences and for the statement of the reasons why they are held. Consequently, communication as a medium for the expression of meaning is assumed to have little independent impact on the individual's capacity to deliberate and is subject to only passing commentary in this respect.

Although the impact of communication on an individual's cognitive capacity and communicative competence is regarded to be minimal, the social conditions of deliberation are considered quite relevant to an individual's interests and motivations. These conditions are understood to define a reward structure that affects the value of the different kinds of initiatives that speakers and listeners in a communication may

pursue. In this vein, analysts worry about the division of power among participants and how unequal power distributions can define the interests of the powerless in such a way as to distort or silence their contribution to the policy being discussed. The basic rules of deliberation are considered in a similar way. Thus a decision rule is analyzed in terms of the kinds of communicative behaviors it is likely to reward positively and thus encourage and the kinds of behaviors it is likely to reward negatively and thus discourage. In this vein, some theorists argue for the decision by consensus because it rewards more desirable communicative acts (such as a more elaborated statement of one's own position cast in terms that the listener can understand and value) and discourages less desirable acts (such as an assertion of narrow self-interest or an attempt to bargain strategically).⁷

Some of the difficulties of this view of communication are suggested by the earlier criticisms of its underlying cognitive psychology. There it was argued that individuals, at least most individuals, do not exhibit or readily acquire the cognitive abilities or the communicative competence assumed in deliberative democratic theory. Insofar as this is true, communication cannot be regarded as non-problematic. When there are differences in experience and cultural background and therefore differences of belief and value, it is unlikely that most individuals will be able to deliberate with one another productively. Instead they will simply tend to talk past one another or to engage in a reciprocal denial of the validity of each other's claims. At best, civilities may produce polite, but superficial accord. Even when individuals begin with broad agreement on the substantive issues and values at play there is also the problem of potential variation in the basic communicative competence of the individual participants. Communication under the condition of pre-existing commonalities may be more productive, but the inequality of capacity is likely to result not in a just outcome, but in one that advantages the more capable participants.

The developmental view of cognition also suggests that communication is more than just a neutral medium or vehicle. Communication has a structure, one that reflects the communicative capacities of the individuals involved. We do not have to turn to cognitive developmental psychology to recognize that children of different ages vary in their level of cognitive development, that this is evident in how they communicate with one another and that the qualities of the conversations in which they participate will vary accordingly (e.g., Dimitracopoulou 1990). We are also aware that adults differ in their ability to talk abstractly, to reflect on their own presuppositions, to make sense of another person's perspective or to express their own point of view in a way that other people can understand. This is reflected in the ways their conversations differ, for example, in the degree to which their conversations merely accompany what is currently happening or are largely independent of any ongoing activity, the degree to which their discussion consists of an exchange of loosely related assertions or involves the giving of reasons and the subsequent interrogation of the reasons given, or the degree to which their arguments consist of the selfish attempt to impose a personal view or the cooperative attempt to build better understanding (Rosenberg 2003). The suggestion here is that these differences of conversational style reflect underlying differences in the structure of the communication taking place.

In addition to suggesting a more structural and differentiated view of communication, developmental psychological theory also suggests that communication cannot simply be understood to be derivative or epiphenomenal. Cognitive and social development are understood to be the product of the dynamic interplay between the cognitive structure of the individual's reasoning and purposive action on the one hand and the social structure of the interaction between individuals on the other. In some sociological conceptions, these two levels of structuration are regarded as necessarily isomorphic.⁸ Here however the claim is that although these two levels operate on the common ground of what people do or say to each other, the collective structuring and the personal structuring of action may differ from one another qualitatively. It is precisely this combination of difference and interdependence or interpenetration that produces the dynamic tension which motors both cognitive and social development.⁹

The independence and distinctive quality of a cognitive structure are evident in the manner in which the individual subjectively reconstructs the definition of the communicative situation in a manner consistent with his own way of reasoning. An example of this is how a deliberation may be socially defined as a cooperative effort by equally valued individuals to construct a commonly accepted path of action and yet it may nonetheless be subjectively reconstructed by some individuals merely as another means for realizing one's personal goals and confirming one's own identity. More important in the present context is the independence and distinctive quality of the social structuring of communicative exchanges. This is evident in how those exchanges may be governed by rules and may sustain meaningful cooperation around subject matter that the individual participants do not fully understand. An example of effective social regulation without subjective understanding is how, by following specific rules of expression (e.g. the rules of a brainstorming session), people may be led to novel considerations and to more openly regard other people's contributions even though they may have little sense of the logic behind the specific rules they are following. They are doing what is required without appreciating why it is important to do so. An example of meaningful conversation without subjective understanding is offered by what transpires in undergraduate seminars on political theory. It is often the case that in the context of a discussion about a theory, the students can meaningfully respond to one another in a manner guided by the rhetoric of the theory. However any interruption of this discourse that asks one of the participants to explain or to justify what they have argued in greater depth or in common parlance is likely to reveal (often to the student as well as the interrogator) that she has very little subjective understanding of the meaning what she had just said. Nonetheless, moments earlier she had meaningfully participated in an intersubjectively regulated exchange. Research that involves the in-depth probing of individual's explanations and evaluations of commonplace social and political events indicates that like in the case of the aforementioned seminar, a shared cultural rhetoric often operates to lead individuals to contribute to a conversation in a way that exceeds what they can subjectively accomplish without the support that specific rhetoric affords.

The psychological significance of the structural difference of communication is its transformative impact. Participation in communicative exchanges that the individual finds difficult to understand and hard to negotiate constitute a powerful impetus to development. Recurring exposure to experiences of this kind initiate a process of what Piaget refers to as "reflexive abstraction" (Inhelder and Piaget, 1956.) To begin the individual doubts the adequacy of his understandings and performances. Rather than simply operating to achieve specific ends, this doubt fosters a reflection on the mode of operating itself. In other words, the individual's thought becomes more reflexive. This act of reflecting on one's cognitive practice becomes a bootstrapping activity. In attempting to think about one's current way of thinking, a new and more developed, integrative or abstract form must be generated to meet that task. The result is a gradual transformation in the quality of one's reasoning or cognitive development. This reflexive abstraction is complemented by a process of internalization. In the course of participating in communicative exchanges, the individual is exposed to ways of interacting, ways of making conceptual connections and to ways of defining matters of concern that are different than what she would typically be able to generate. In the attempts to interact effectively, the individual attempts to follow the examples that other people's behavior provide. The subjective reconstruction of these examples may be inadequate, but the moves made and the foci adopted are nonetheless novel and are incorporated into the individual's thinking. This provides guidelines and direction for the construction of new forms of understanding and thereby facilitates the transformation of reasoning.¹⁰

One important implication of this understanding of communicative structures and their role in cognitive development is that individuals' cognitive capacities are not simply realized in social interaction, they are also constructed there. While the quality of communicative structures clearly are affected by the cognitive operations (the thinking) of the individuals involved, those cognitive operations are themselves, at

least in part, a product of the communicative exchanges in which an individual is regularly involved. Those exchanges structure the co-operation between individuals and thus the operations of each of them. In this manner, communicative exchanges determine the quality of cognition, thereby rendering it a social product and thus socio-historically relative rather than universal.¹¹

This view of communication as having differently structured forms and a potentially transformative impact on individuals' cognition leads to a very different understanding of democratic deliberation. In this light, deliberations must not be regarded simply as empty stages that provide a venue for the realization of citizenship. Nor must the design of these deliberative stages focus simply on the removal of obstructions that may inhibit freedom or give unequal scope for maneuver. Instead, deliberation must be understood as a site for the construction and transformation of citizenship. In deliberation, citizens are made as well as realized. The operative metaphor here is that of a school, but of particular kind. The educational goal is not the transmission of specific beliefs and values, although these are by no means irrelevant. Rather the central aim must be to foster the requisite cognitive development for a fuller autonomy, a greater communicative competence and a better ability to engage in a collaborative effort to make good and just public policy.

Finally when considering the qualities of communication it is important to also consider questions of emotion, commitment and identity. As mentioned earlier, a key requirement of deliberation is that individuals take an empathic, caring attitude toward one another. Only then is it likely that an individual will be motivated to try to understand the other people's perspectives, to respect the beliefs and values they express and to meet both their needs as well as her own. Communication provides a vehicle for fostering this orientation of productive, respectful engagement. Through communicating their personal stories to one another, individuals may reveal their past experiences, feelings and values and thus both become familiar and vulnerable to one another. This kind of engagement helps produce the trust (a result of the successfully risking vulnerability) and the caring (a response to the other's vulnerability) needed to motivate the kind of perspective taking that deliberation requires. At the same time, communication creates a density of interaction that, if properly structured, may help craft a sense of common identity that can overcome conventional social differentiations and divisions. This common identity then becomes another basis for empathy, a conduit for responding to another as to one's self. Without considering these issues in any depth, we may conclude that communication may constitute a means that opens or bonds people to one another and to their community (be it of the group of deliberators themselves or the larger community of which they are a part). Thus while communication depends on caring/empathy for the orientation to others it requires, communication also can foster those emotions. Similarly while communication depends on common identification and community for the orientation to the common good it needs, it also can generate them. This recognition of the impact of communication on emotion also has implications for an understanding of democratic deliberation, one that complements the preceding consideration of its cognitive impact. Here again the suggestion is that deliberation cannot be conceived simply as an open arena for the free and equal exchange of views. Depending on the circumstances both of the deliberation and the larger cultural setting in which it takes place, the communicative exchange that takes place may or may not foster the caring and empathy required. Indeed that exchange may simply reinforce existing social cleavages and deepen the suspicion and hostility that may exist among the participants. To succeed, most deliberation will require facilitation. In this case, that facilitation must attempt to foster the type of communication that encourages the development of the caring and empathy. Thus deliberation continues to be viewed as pedagogical device for the construction and transformation of citizenship. Here however the aim broadens to include the emotional as well as the cognitive development required for democratic participation.

Concluding Remarks: Rethinking Deliberative Democratic Politics

As noted at the outset, deliberative democratic theory emerges as a corrective to a view of democracy that assumes individuals to be narrowly rational agents pursuing their own personal interests and thus conceives of political autonomy as a matter of free choice and political equality as a matter of collective choice based on an equal counting of the individual preferences. In this vein, considerations of democratic governance focus on elections and law that protects political freedoms and equality. Operating with a different notion of the individual, deliberative theorists offer a more expanded notion of democracy. Here individuals are assumed to be logical, rational and reasonable. They are thus assumed to be essentially self-reflective agents who not only identify interests and pursue them, but actively define and critically reconsider those interests in light of regulative values that are abstract, overarching and encompass other people's interests as well as one's own. In this light, autonomy is conceived not only as a matter of free choice, but also as a matter of having the opportunity to develop the values and understandings that underlie choice. This is realized through critical self-reflection, a process that may be self-motivated but is more often stimulated in the context of constructive communication with other people. Political equality is conceived in these terms. While recognizing the importance of having individuals' choices count equally, political equality is also understood to depend on an equality of opportunity to express one's position and have it constructively engaged by others. The conception of equality thus expands to include a concern for reciprocity. The normative requisites of democratic governance are understood accordingly. The institutional solution is democratic deliberation that is organized to be inclusive, public and fair. In this setting, participants are given free and equal opportunity not only to contribute to collective choices, but also to cooperate in the construction of a shared sense of justice and the common good to guide their specific policy decision-making.

Drawing on a large body of research in social and developmental psychology, I have argued that foundational assumptions deliberative democrats make regarding individuals' cognitive capacities are incorrect. The social psychological research suggests that most people do not have the logical, self-reflective and perspective-taking capacities that democratic deliberation requires. While providing data that supports this conclusion, the developmental psychological research on adults further suggests that there is an underlying structure to reasoning that dictates the qualities of an individual's logic, rationality and reasonableness and that this may differ from one person to the next. Thus not only does developmental research suggest that most people cannot participate in deliberation in the manner that deliberative democratic theory requires, but that the quality and consequent effectiveness of their participation will be unequal.

Rejecting foundational assumptions regarding cognition, the foregoing constitutes a damaging critique of deliberative democratic theory. But the intent here is not to dismiss deliberative democratic theory, but to reconstruct it. The aim is to build on a more adequate concept of the individual and to sketch the direction which future deliberative democratic theory can take. In my view, the value of the focus on deliberation is that it leads democratic theory beyond a consideration of individuals as essentially asocial agents that act simply to maximize their personal interests under conditions of collective action. However I do not believe that the deliberative democrats have gone far enough in their consideration of the social character of the individual, either as a subject or an agent. In this regard, they have a tendency to continue to characterize cognition as an essentially psychological attribute, one that reflects a basic and universal human nature. They also tend to reduce the emotional bond between people to a secondary question of private

needs or desires. In complementary fashion they view communication as a mere vehicle for conveying the statements of personal preference, belief or justification between individuals.

Claiming that individuality has an irreducibly social aspect, I have argued that a certain capacity to reason is not simply an attribute of human nature, but is something that is developed in the course of an individual's struggle to act in a world where others' actions and reactions are socially structured. The social context thus creates the circumstances the individual must attempt to understand and thereby enters into the process of cognitive development. Insofar as social environments are structured differently, they create different forms of social "co-operation" and thereby lead individuals to "operate" and thus reason in fundamentally different ways. These structural differences are then reflected in the quality of their inferences, their self-reflection and their perspective-taking. In a similar vein I have also argued that valuing others is an affective inclination that is socially constructed through the experience of certain kinds of interactions with others. Communicating can provide a means for individuals to share intimacies and thereby introduce and find themselves in each other. Participating in the life of a community can foster greater communication and provide the experience of a shared fate and a common identity. If they are structured appropriately, communication and participation in a community can thus produce the emotional connections that lead individuals to sympathize with and care for one another.

This consideration of the social dimension of human nature suggests a very different conception of communication than that adopted in most deliberative democratic theory. It suggests that communication is not merely a vehicle for conveying one person's understandings and preferences to another. While the structure of communication is clearly affected by the cognitive capacities and emotional orientation of the individuals involved, the communicative interaction is itself a structuring force that produces its own characteristic form of intersubjective engagement. This is reflected in the kind of purposes to which communication is oriented, the manner in which interlocutors regard one another, the nature of the claims that are made, how these claims are linked to one another, how and on what basis justifications are made, and how disagreements are resolved. In this manner, the structure of a communicative interaction creates demands and sets limits that affect how the individual participants can operate on and relate to one another. The quality of their reasoning and consequently their capacity to be logical, rational and reasonable may thus be affected. Similarly, communication can shape the nature of individuals' emotional connection to one another. Depending on how it is structured, communicative interaction can create empathic connection and motivate reciprocity and constructive self-reflection, or it can produce indifference, dislike and aggression. In sum, the structure of the communicative exchanges contributes to the constitution of the individuals involved, both as cognizing subjects and as motivated agents.¹²

This alternative view of human nature and communication has important implications for the interpretation of the basic values of autonomy and equality underlying democratic theory. In the case of autonomy, the individual whose autonomy is to be politically realized is complexly conceived. Like in most democratic theory, that individual is a self-directing agent, but here that self-direction does not involve simply the pursuit of interests. It also and more importantly involves the creation of the interests to be pursued. At this level, the individual is not only a self-directing agent, that is the author of his own interest, but also an emotionally connected partner (thus valuing other selves as well as itself) and an interlocutor that incorporates a fair consideration of others' views in critically reflecting on her. In this view, the self-directing, emotionally connected and reflectively communicative aspects of autonomy are regarded as interdependent qualities. The realization of this complex autonomy is not simply a matter of personal freedom in which social circumstances are regarded as a potential source of constraint and subordination. Rather autonomy is understood to be a developmental achievement in which social circumstances are regarded as a potential source of facilitation. Unlike in most democratic theory, the individual is not assumed to have the capacity for autonomous action. Rather that capacity must be achieved through social

interaction that is structured so as to help the individual to develop the cognitive capacity, emotional orientation and communicative competence for full autonomy.

The meaning of the value of equality is also reconstructed in this light. Equality of choice or participation is a relational value that makes easy sense when the individuals involved have both an equal and full capacity for autonomous action. When they do not, the question of how they should be related to one another becomes a more difficult one. The difficulty of the question is further increased when the autonomy of the selves involved not only speaks to their independence from, but also to their dependence on one another and sees the two to be critically intertwined. Equality here implies not only comparability, but also as importantly it entails complementarity. It is not only an arrangement where each individual is equally free and able to act, but also one where individuals complement one another in ways that foster each other's development as autonomous beings in the manner described above. As in the case of autonomy, this complex relation of equality is regarded less as a present reality than as a potential achievement, one that requires the development of political institutions and community.

In this light the concerns of democratic governance expand. It is not simply about the protection of individual rights and collective decision-making. It must also address the need for the development of individuals into autonomous citizens, for the creation of social exchanges that are complementary as well as equal and for the transformation of the sites of those exchanges into integrating communities. Democratic politics therefore cannot simply be about liberation and equality. It must also be about transformation and constructive engagement. As suggested by the deliberative democrats, a key institutional means whereby this can be facilitated is the citizen deliberation. However it is not enough to think of this as a venue for inclusive, equal participation in what will naturally be collaborative decision-making. Deliberative institutions must also be designed as pedagogical devices for fostering the capacity for personal autonomy and constructive interpersonal relations that the governance of the lives of real people requires.

Practical political issues of democratic procedure must be reconsidered in this light. The focus remains on deliberation, but now as a means of political pedagogy as well as collective decision-making. The question then is how to institutionalize deliberations such that they facilitate free and equal participation and, at the same time, foster psychological and social development. As means of democratic political pedagogy, the demands on institutional design are complex. On the one hand there is the present need to orchestrate interactions in a way that both reflects individuals' currently capabilities and encourages further development. Here care must be taken to recognize individual differences in cognitive and emotional development and to consider the different ways in which deliberations may have to be institutionalized to meet their individual needs. To facilitate deliberation in a way that fosters the desired complementarity of intersubjective engagement and the desired level of sympathetic emotional connection, freedoms may be abridged and inequalities introduced. On the other hand, the goal is not simply to socialize individuals or teach them to follow routines. Rather the aim is emancipatory – it is to encourage the development of a greater capacity to self-reflect, to self-direct and to do so in a way that is more responsive to the needs of others and the common circumstance that the self and others share. In this light, the pedagogical aim must be to reduce the need for pedagogy. Consequently, the use of rules of engagement and the intervention of facilitator-leaders must be designed in light of the goal of ultimately eliminating these externally imposed structures. In sum, citizens' limits must be clearly identified and addressed, but at the same time their integrity, worth and potential must always be recognized. The orientation here is not simply one of pedagogy, but one of democratic pedagogy. As such it is not an act of disparagement or diminution, but one of caring and respect.

This view of deliberation as a venue for citizenship building as well as citizen participation in collective decision-making carries with it certain obvious dangers. Important questions arise regarding the powers of those who facilitate deliberations. The potential for abuse is real and crafting an appropriate

conceptual and institutional response will be difficult. The point here is that this task is unavoidable. Individuals have fundamentally unequal capacities for logic, rationality and reasonableness. Moreover most individuals do not currently have the capacities or orientation required by democratic deliberation. Placing these individuals in free and open contexts designed for people who have full cognitive capacities and an appropriate emotional orientation will lead to deliberation, but not of the kind imagined by deliberative democratic theorists. Rather than argument with reasons oriented to the perspective of listeners intermingled with critical self-reflection, deliberation is likely to consist mostly of simple assertions of subjective viewpoints oriented to realizing private interests that may be tempered by polite acquiescence or subtle subordination to the desires others express. Rather than a cooperative construction of new insight and a common good, the resulting decisions are more likely to reflect existing social conventions and the current distribution of power and interests. Theory must address the problem of developing the cognitive capacities, emotional orientation and social context for democratic deliberation. It must do so not as an afterthought, but rather as an integral part of the basic conceptualization as well as the implementation of deliberative democracy.

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Endnotes

¹ Here I focus on a family theories generated by American authors that operate within the broad framework of liberal democratic theory. In so doing, I do not focus on an important alternative view of deliberation developed by Jurgen Habermas (1984/87, 1996). Although he is frequently cited, Habermas' understanding of communication and reason has had relatively little impact on the American literature apart from a few notable exceptions such as Seyla Benhabib (1996, 2002). When he is cited favorably, the epistemological bases of his theory of communicative action are typically ignored and his view is assimilated to an epistemological stance more similar to that of John Rawls. This said, I believe Habermas' contribution to be very important and I therefore intend to deal with it separately elsewhere.

² There is very little attention to psychological processes. Thus the question how a preference ordering is constructed is regarded as a secondary consideration and left unclear. Similarly the nature of cognitive processes is not specified, but rather is loosely conceived in terms of some vague notions of logic and common sense.

³ This common ground is sometimes assumed to already exist either explicitly or implicitly in the larger, shared political culture of the participants. This is suggested by the relativism of the later Rawls (1993) with his invocation of the critical role of a pre-existing "overlapping consensus." For most deliberative theorists, this common ground is conceived in more universalist terms and inheres in the essential quality of the human condition. For liberals this resides in the nature of the individual. For theorists who follow Habermas (1984/87), this common ground is found in the structure of the intersubjective engagement inherent in discourse itself.

⁴ For more elaborate description of systematic thinking and its capacity to generate systemic or principled cognitive structures, see Rosenberg (2002, Chapter 4). In the language of Piagetian cognitive developmental psychology, one would argue that the cognitive capacities posited by deliberative democratic thought are those that would be produced by fully formal operational reasoning. The key point here is that both the traditional Piagetian view and the one I have presented share common implications: that there is an underlying structure to thinking and that this may vary from one person to the next.

⁵ This is not to claim essential cognitive differences between individuals of different class, ethnic or racial background. Rather this is to suggest that differences in the structure of the social and communicative context to which individuals are exposed may produce basic differences in how those individuals reason.

⁶ This move is variously understood either as a joint elaboration of a pre-existing but unrecognized shared cultural presuppositions (as in Rawls 1993) or as a cooperative reconstruction of the essential (and thus universal) logic of communication itself (as in Habermas 1984; 1996).

⁷ For example, see Benhabib (1996); Cohen (1997).

⁸ See for example, Parsons' view of the relationship between personality and social structure, Parsons (1964); Bales and Parson (1955); or Habermas' view of the relationship between the structure of communication and cognitive structure (Habermas 1979).

⁹ Cognitive developments focus almost exclusively on the psychological impact of the developmental dynamic (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget 1956; Kohlberg 1981/84; Kegan 1994). In my attempt to develop a more general structural pragmatic position, I have argued that is also important to analyze the transformative impact this social psychological dynamic may have on social structures.

¹⁰ Developmental psychologists following the Vygotskian tradition emphasize this process of internalization of structured ways of reasoning close to, but beyond one's own. See for example, Vygotsky (1962, 1968); Wertsch (1991); Valsiner (1992); Hogan & Tudge (1999).

¹¹ At the same time, this social effect occurs in tandem with and ultimately through the individual's subjective struggle to coordinate her own action and in so doing construct her own understandings and purposes. Thus the intersubjective construction of cognition is realized relative to the subjective effort of reflexive abstraction. In this sense, the structuring force of communicative settings is subjectively realized in the facilitation, inhibition or reversal of the development of cognition.

¹² As a counterpoint to the individualism of deliberative democratic theory, the emphasis here is on the constructive quality of communicative exchange. However this is not to suggest that communication is a wholly self-constituting force and that individuals are simple by products of the communicative structures in which they are articulated. The social dynamic here is more complex. At the same time that communicative structures are in part self-constituting, they are also constituted by how it is individuals are capable of engaging one another and following social instruction. Similarly individuals are partly self-constituting and partly constituted by the communicative and interactive settings in which they regularly find themselves. It is this that produces the social psychological dynamic that motors both social and psychological development. For a more elaborated statement of this position, see Chapter 2 of Rosenberg (2002),