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Institutional Legacy and the Stability of New Democracies: The Lasting Effects of Competitive Authoritarianism

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Institutional Legacy and the Stability of New Democracies: The Lasting Effects of Competitive Authoritarianism

DISSERTATION

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Ryan Shirah

Dissertation Committee:
Associate Professor Carole Uhlaner, Chair
Professor Russell Dalton
Professor Bernard Grofman

2014

Dedication

For my children.

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Institutional Legacy and the Stability of New Democracies:
The Lasting Effects of Competitive Authoritarianism

By

Ryan Shirah
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Irvine, 2014
Associate Professor Carole Uhlaner, Chair

How does experience with nominally democratic electoral institutions shape the politics and stability of new democracies? Since at least the beginning of the Third Wave, new democracies have sprung up in countries with vastly different electoral experiences; many non-democracies adopted impressively diverse arrangements of nominally democratic electoral institutions that operated with varying degrees of competitiveness, affording substantial diversity to the institutional legacies inherited by emerging democracies. I assess the degree to which these different legacies impact the political dynamics of new democracies. Does institutional legacy affect levels of participation in new democracies? Does it help explain why some emerging democracies restrict political rights and civil liberties? And most importantly, does institutional legacy make democracies more (or less) likely to face a return to authoritarian rule? Building upon recent advances in the comparative study of authoritarian electoral institutions, I define competitive institutional legacies based on the extent

of electoral competition in the preceding regime and apply an original operationalization of the concept to a dataset of 58 new democracies that emerged between 1975 and 2003. In order to answer the questions put forth above, I combine this data with data on regime durability, government crackdowns, and political participation in young democracies. With this new dataset, I conduct cross-national analyses to examine how these key dependent variables vary across democracies with different institutional legacies. The results indicate that legacies of robust, competitive elections lead to more stable new democracies; all else being equal, experience with competitive elections reduces the chances of a return to non-democratic rule, stems the tide of government restrictions on political rights, and prepares citizens to become active participants in the electoral process.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Current political dynamics are inevitably shaped by what has happened in the past. How people participate in government, what they expect of their representatives, and the persona and character of leaders themselves are deeply rooted in the culture and history of a given country. Institutions play an important role in that history. Institutions are both reflections of political culture and products of the sequence of events and circumstances that preceded them. Once adopted, institutions may influence the political dynamics of a society completely independently of the forces that brought them into existence. Particular institutional histories, such as the history of communist rule in Eastern Europe or apartheid in South Africa, can also affect politics in places where they once existed. Even following a regime change, the mark that particular institutions made on a society maay still affect how citizens feel about and participate in government and even in the stability of the political system. For example, research has shown that histories of military rule negatively impact the stability of subsequent regimes (Cheibub 2007); and experience with totalitarianism is thought to reduce protest participation in new democracies (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007). The cluster of political institutions that existed prior to the establishment of a new regime

is referred to here as institutional legacy.[1]

This dissertation deals with one particular type of institutional legacy: legacies of multiparty electoral competition. This project assesses to what extent multiparty legacies affect the political dynamics of Third Wave democracies. I argue that the establishment of multiparty elections (MPE) in nondemocratic regimes has a lasting impact that even after a regime change. New democracies with legacies of MPE may have a significant head-start in several areas if a transition to democracy occurs. More citizens will have experience going to the polls with more than one party on the ballot. More of the significant groups in society are likely to have been brought into the electoral arena and become invested in the institutions of multiparty competition. More potential leaders could have become invested in the electoral process and in political parties that they used to obtain positions of power. Even if these differences fade in a relatively short period of time after democracy is installed, these initial differences may significantly affect politics early on in the life of a new democracy.

While all democracies hold multiparty elections, only some authoritarian regimes hold elections in which opposition freely participates. In Cuba and China, for example, the ruling communist party operates without legal opposition; but in many other places, such as Bangladesh and Mexico, elections during periods of authoritarian rule have been marked by substantial interparty competition. The existence of MPE in nondemocracies can be largely explained by how much cooperation the ruling junta needs to foster; when they have access to natural resource wealth, foreign benefactors, and/or a strong military and police apparatus, dictators are less likely to use parties and legislatures to coopt potential rivals and legitimate their rule (see, for example, Gandhi 2008 and Geddes 2005).[2] This is true of the wealthy, oil-rich monarchies of the Middle East and of many of Latin America's military

[1]By regime, I mean a set of rules governing the political process in a society. Further distinctions between democratic and authoritarian regimes are based on conventional distinctions in the existing literature.

[2]I use the terms *dictator* and *autocrat* to refer to the leadership of any nondemocracy, not to identify a particular type of authoritarian regime.

governments during the twentieth century. On the other hand, autocrats that lack such assets have tended to establish political parties and hold elections to gain an institutional infrastructure in which patronage can be distributed and rival elites can be either promoted or punished (Lust-Okar 2005; Geddes 2005).[3]

The existence of opposition parties and MPE leads directly to systematic differences across authoritarian regimes. For example, opposition parties incentivize opposition elites to become invested in the electoral process and to cultivate a party infrastructure that will support them at the ballot box. At the citizen-level, members of politically salient groups are more likely to become organized and habituated to the process of regular, multiparty polling. These differences have previously been shown to impact various outcomes of interest such as economic growth (Wright 2008*a*) and respect for individual freedoms (Lindberg 2006). If they shape aspects of politics in nondemocracies, then legacies of MPE may also affect the political dynamics of new democracies as well.[4]

I investigate several ways in which legacies of MPE could affect politics in new democracies. The first is regime survival. Experience with MPE could produce new democracies in which a greater number of the politically relevant cleavages in society have become effectively institutionalized, channeling conflicts into the electoral system. Additionally, potential coup leaders are more likely to have invested in the institutional political game and are less likely to move to destabilize the system. If these differences significantly impact regime stability, then new democracies with multiparty electoral experience may be more likely to stave off a return to authoritarian rule than those without such experience.

[3]Chapter 2 deals specifically with the origins of MPE in authoritarian systems and considers the implications for analyses of institutional effects.

[4]The possibility that parties that existed during prior democratic periods might re-emerge after being banned during a period of nondemocratic rule is considered in Chapter 3. Since this would probably lessen the differences between countries with and without MPE, this possibility makes it more difficult to demonstrate an effect for legacies of MPE.

Second, legacies of MPE may also help to prevent minor slips backward during a young democracy's progression from transition to consolidation. Even when not accompanied by full returns to nondemocratic rule, new democracies frequently experience periods of democratic slippage, when rights are restrained or freedoms are curtailed. Some examples include electoral malfeasance, as occurred in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union in the decades following the fall of communism, as well as censoring media outlets, banning particular political parties, or incarcerating political opponents. Following the same logic as above regarding legacies and returns to authoritarian rule, legacies of MPE may be associated with fewer restrictions on political freedoms and civil liberties, though its effect may depend on the particular types of restrictions that we consider.

Third, I examine how patterns of participation differ in new democracies with and without experience with MPE. Where opposition parties have previously existed, groups are more easily mobilized to participate in politics. In new democracies where parties must construct their own institutional infrastructure from scratch, the mobilizing capacity of politically relevant groups is likely to be lower. Thus, electoral experience could lead to more participation, at least in the first few elections following a transition. This effect could be modified, however, if long experience with unfree elections leads to widespread disillusionment and distrust of the democratic process. If citizens are both well-organized and distrustful of the electoral process, we may observe more direct, contentious political action, such as anti-regime protest.

Before examining the mechanisms underlying these arguments, I will first address previous work on the political effects of historical legacies. Existing work has largely dealt with communist and totalitarian experiences and the impact that they may have on a society following a transition to democracy. This dissertation complements the literature in this area by examining the long-term effects of establishing MPE before democratizing. The

arguments in later chapters draw heavily upon recent work on electoral and competitive authoritarianism. Much of the existing research in this area addresses the effects of elections and opposition parties in nondemocratic contexts, but none examines the long-term impacts of these institutions. After demonstrating how the present contribution fits within the existing literature, I lay out in more detail how regimes that hold MPE differ from those that do not and then preview the findings from the remainder of the dissertation.

1.1 Historical Legacies in New Democracies

The literature on democratization has explored how historical legacies may impact politics in new democracies. Of particular interest are the legacies of communist (Pop-Eleches 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011), totalitarian (Linz and Stepan 1996; Bernhard and Karakoc 2007), and military rule (Cheibub 2007; Svolik 2014). Particular legacies are generally treated as short-term hurdles to democratic consolidation. The bulk of the work on authoritarian legacies deals with values and attitudes but political participation and elite incentives have also received some attention (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007; Svolik 2014). Despite the growing literature on elections in nondemocracies, legacies of MPE are conspicuously absent from much of the recent work on historical legacies.

Before reviewing the literature on legacies in new democracies, I discuss the varied definitions of *democracy* and *dictatorship* that have been previously employed and specify how regimes and transitions are conceptualized in this dissertation. Since I am interested in democratic and authoritarian transitions and in looking at specific types of regimes in isolation from one another, I opt for a dichotomous measure of democracy that is better suited to these specific tasks. Alternative conceptual and operational definitions exist and are employed when they better fit the research question at hand.

1.1.1 Democracy and Dictatorship

Democracy is form of government that is generally associated with the selection of leadership through free and fair elections where the ex ante outcome is uncertain (Schumpeter 1942; Przeworski et al. 2000). Other features commonly attributed to democracies include respect for basic human rights and civil liberties, and turnover in leadership. Looking around the world, regardless of the particular conceptual or operational definition that is employed, scholars are largely in agreement about which states can reasonably be called democratic.[5]

The concept of democracy has been treated both as a dichotomy and as continuum in the literature. Those who have argued in favor of a dichotomous conceptualization view democracy as a characteristic that is either present or not (Przeworski et al. 2000; Geddes 1999; Huntington 1991). In contrast, those arguing in favor of graded measures view democracy as something that countries can have more or less of, with the distinction between democracies and nondemocracies being merely a question of where the cut-point exists (Elkins 2000; Lindberg 2006). A methodological debate also continues over which type of measure provides the most reliable and valid indicator of the concept (see Elkins 2000).

How we conceptualize and measure democracy should depend upon the questions that we ask. For some questions, dichotomous measures simply do not make sense, for example, if our goal is too assess how deeply entrenched democracy (autocracy) is as a form of government. For other questions, gradations of democracy will necessarily collapse into dichotomies or other typologies through the adoption of particular cut-points. This is commonly the case when Polity or Freedom House measures of democracy are used in studies of

[5]Some disputes obviously exist, but they usually manifest as disagreements over the exact date of a transition to (or from) democracy or deal with a small handful of difficult cases. An example of the latter is Botswana, which according to Freedom House is a stable democracy, however, it is classified as autocratic by other measures since it has never experienced a peaceful transition of power; the Botswana Democratic Party has controlled the government since independence.

regime change; since both provide a scale (20-point for Polity and seven-point for Freedom House), identifying transitions means throwing away some information and treating all those above a particular value as democratic and all those below as it not (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011).

The present study employs a dichotomous definition of democracy. While it is fully acknowledged that the latent characteristic known as democracy exists along a continuum, for the purposes of identifying the start and end of new democracies, a dichotomous classification is the most appropriate. Specifically, I will use the measure employed by Przeworski et al. (2000), which classifies regimes as democratic if they fill lower houses of parliament and the executive via multiparty elections and there is turnover in executive office. This is a procedural and somewhat minimalist vision of democracy (see Schumpeter 1942). A regime must satisfy all of the above criteria in order to be considered a democracy; everything else is considered to be an autocracy. Autocracies that only meet the standard of multiparty elections (at least for the national assembly) will be the focus of the next section, but they are considered no closer to democracy than those that meet none of the criteria above; instead they are simply a subtype of autocracy.[6]

1.1.2 Communist and Totalitarian Legacies

Post-communist politics is a particularly intriguing area within the study of emerging democracies. The communist experience is generally thought to have left a deep footprint in society that still manifests itself in the emerging democracies of central and Eastern Europe (Pop-Eleches 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). Communism's severe repression of civil society and control over all aspects of life is likely still evident in people's attitudes and expectations

[6]In Chapter 4, I will consider movements toward autocracy (in the form of decreases in Freedom House scores) that do not necessarily correspond to an autocratic transition.

about government.

Many scholars have sought to determine how post-communist legacies impact the development of political attitudes and behaviors that might foster democratic consolidation. Howard (2003), for example shows that citizens in post-communist contexts are generally less participatory than their counterparts in other new democracies. Anderson and Mendes (2006), looking at differences between new and old democracies, show that protest is less likely in post-communist settings than in other new democracies. Pop-Eleches (2007) argues that different aspects of the communist experience, whether cultural, economic, or political, explain different aspects of democratization in post-communist countries. Numerous other studies have explored the effect of communist legacies and other aspects of authoritarian histories on political attitudes (Rorschneider 1999; Rose and Shin 2001; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011).

Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011) present a rigorous theoretical discussion of how legacies could lead to differences in new democracies. They suggest that differences may be the result of communism producing different socioeconomic and institutional contexts, or through changes that occurred in the minds of citizens prior to the transition to democracy. In the former case, differences in mass attitudes or participatory behavior between post-communist and other new democracies may be the result of post-communist societies looking different in other meaningful ways, such as being economically underdeveloped or lacking established political parties. On the other hand, post-communist societies may be different because the people who lived through the part of the previous regime were changed by it; they became disillusioned with organizational life that was merely a puppet of the state, or they became highly suspicious of markets due to pervasive propaganda. Either route could facilitate the observation of differences between new democracies with communist legacies and those with other histories.

Scholars have regularly noted the impact that totalitarian histories can have on political behavior in new democracies. Linz and Stepan (1996) note that the nature of the authoritarian predecessor regime will largely define the set of consolidation tasks before a new democratic regime. For example, they propose that totalitarian (as opposed to authoritarian) legacies will make the task of setting up stable political societies and civic organizations more difficult. Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) demonstrate that authoritarian and totalitarian legacies have different impacts on the propensity for citizens to engage in political protest or join civic organizations. They argue that totalitarian legacies impose a greater burden for the development of democratic civil society than do authoritarian legacies.

Finally, military regimes have been suggested to have a lasting impact on the regimes that emerge in their wake (Cheibub 2007; Svolik 2014). Cheibub (2004) notes that despite the intuitive arguments concerning presidential regimes and democratic failure, a better predictor of democratic failure in new democracies in Latin America is being preceded by a military dictatorship. He posits that past experience in politics makes military officials more likely to intervene in the future, increasing the risk of coups that topple democratically elected leaders. Svolik (2014) includes an indicator of prior military dictatorship in his study of democratic failure and consolidation and shows it to be a significant predictor of regime breakdown.

Thus, scholars have shown that the legacy of the previous regime can clearly impact politics by altering the incentives of military leadership, by shaping the challenges to building a robust civil society, and by actually changing people's attitudes and values. These differences may persist for some time after a transition, as shown by Bernhard and Karakoc (2007), or they may only exist as long as the democracy remains unconsolidated and vulnerable to reversals (Svolik 2014).

Despite the attention that legacies have received in the literature, experience with MPE

has largely been ignored. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore what effects legacies of multiparty competition under authoritarian rule may have on subsequent democracies. This goal builds upon the legacies literature by examining this alternative dimension across which nondemocracies differ.

The next section discusses the extant research on authoritarian elections and the rise of competitive authoritarianism. I demonstrate that the lack of research on electoral legacies may be partially attributable to the belief that the presence of elections portended a move toward full democracy. Scholars have largely dismissed such arguments and recognized electoral institutionalization as a new and important dimension across which nondemocratic regimes differ from one another.

1.2 Competitive Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism has never been cast by scholars as a monolithic antithesis to democracy and representative government. Since at least the mid-1970s, the scholarly community has identified the many meaningful ways in which nondemocracies differ from one another (Hermet 1978; Hyden and Leys 1972; Dinka and Skidmore 1973). Some dictators benefit from abundant natural resource endowments that provide them the capacity to pacify the masses through broad spending programs, as in some small, Middle-Eastern states like UAE and Kuwait (Ross 2001). Other dictators, like Pinochet, rely upon a coercive security apparatus or assistance from foreign benefactors to quiet dissent and disincentivize would-be challengers. The diverse array of institutions and survival strategies that have been adopted reflects the variety of challenges and resources that nondemocratic leaders face (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Wintrobe 2001).

One dimension across which unfree regimes of the last half century exhibit impressive

diversity is that of electoral institutionalization (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). Many modern authoritarian regimes hold multiparty elections. Despite the existence of such nominally democratic institutions as opposition parties and legislatures authoritarian rulers hold onto power through manipulation, intimidation, and outright fraud. The proliferation of such regimes over the last several decades, coupled with their surprising resilience, has lead to the identification of a new and increasingly common subtype of authoritarian regime: competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002; Diamond 2002). How regimes differ with respect to electoral institutions and electoral competitiveness has become one of the most fertile areas for research in comparative authoritarianism (Geddes 2005; Lust-Okar 2005; Lindberg 2006; Gandhi 2008; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lindberg 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010).

The emergence of electoral institutionalization as a viable research program is somewhat surprising when we consider how elections in nondemocracies were treated in the literature just a few years ago. By the late 1980s, a series of observed transitions led to the conclusion that there was no sustainable form of electoral authoritarianism. Huntington famously declared that "liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand" (Huntington 1991). Others had already begun drawing the same conclusion; regimes that adopted nominally democratic institutions did not represent a new variety or subtype of authoritarian regime, they were instead considered transitory states (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; DiPalma 1990; Przeworski 1991). For a decade, the literature on democratization treated dictatorships with electoral institutions as semi–democracies or states in the process of full liberalization. But by the turn of the century the observed facts made this a difficult position to maintain. Dictators remained in power alongside legislatures, political parties, and electoral systems that they had created or inherited. It became clear that electoral authoritarianism was not an ephemeral and unstable state; it was a new

kind of nondemocracy, and it was quickly becoming the norm (Schedler 2002).

Research on nondemocratic elections has benefited from the introduction of new typologies that highlight the electoral distinctions between different authoritarian regimes. Typologies are analytical tools that help us to distinguish cases based on meaningful differences on one (or more) dimension. Among the most widely accepted typologies in the literature on competitive authoritarianism are those put forth by Levitsky and Way (2002), and Diamond (2002). Levitsky and Way (2002) suggest that regimes be classified as *Closed* if they hold no elections, *Hegemonic* if elections are held but no real challengers are allowed to participate, and *Competitive* if elections are at least somewhat contested despite being neither free nor fair.

Mexico and Brazil both fit the conceptual definition of Competitive regimes as both hold routine multiparty elections, though in Mexico, before democratizing in 2000, the ruling party has not been out of power since before World War II; and in Brazil, prior to democratizing in 1979, multiparty elections with legal opposition were continued even while the military maintained control over the government. Malawi prior to 1994 could likely be considered a Hegemonic regime, which routinely held legislative elections though opposition parties were legally barred from participating. Finally, Closed regimes include Nepal and Chile under Pinochet, both cases in which no routine, national polling existed.

Many interesting effects of electoral institutionalization have been documented in the recent literature. Some studies have relied upon typologies like Levitsky and Way's, and have attempted to operationalize them in order to test the effects of Competitive institutions versus those in Hegemonic or Closed regimes (Brownlee 2009; Donno 2013). Others have attempted to measure the effects of particular institutions like legislatures and opposition/ruling parties directly (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007*b*; Lust-Okar 2005; Wright 2008*a*). Using these different specifications of authoritarian elections, scholars have demonstrated

that parties and elections have an impact on various aspects of nondemocratic politics, ranging from economic growth and investment (Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008*a*) to the overall stability of the regime (Lindberg 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Brownlee 2009; Donno 2013).

This dissertation is the first study to address the long-term, post-transition effects of experience with nominally democratic electoral institutions. While previous work established that historical legacies matter for new democracies, scholars have yet to examine the effect of legacies of MPE. Just as the politics of Competitive regimes are affected by the presence of opposition parties and regular polling, they may also see long-term effects of the experience with MPE. The next section lays out the arguments for how Competitive regimes might differ both before and after a democratizing event. Drawing on these arguments, subsequent chapters will present specific hypotheses about how legacies of MPE affect political dynamics on new democracies.

Since I am interested only in the post-transition effects of electoral institutionalization, the focus of this dissertation is on new democracies, not authoritarian regimes. The term *legacy* describes the political history of a new democratic regime – specifically, the characteristics of the regime that immediately preceded it. By Competitive legacies, I mean those particular histories that entailed relatively regular multiparty elections for national-level offices where at least one opposition party was able to participate. By Closed legacies, I mean the electoral legacies of new democracies in which the preceding regime did not meet the criteria for being considered Competitive. The data that will be examined in chapters three though five consist of country-year observations on new democratic regimes since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization.

Table 1.1: New Democracies by Type of Legacy with Year of Democratization

Competitive		Closed	
Bangladesh	1990	Albania	1991
Brazil	1978	Argentina	1982
El Salvador	1983	Armenia	1990
Ghana	2000	Benin	1990
Guyana	1991	Bolivia	1981
Haiti	1993	Bulgaria	1990
Indonesia	1998	Burundi	1992
Kenya	2002	Central African Republic	1992
South Korea	1987	Chile	1989
Mexico	1999	Congo	1991
Panama	1988	Croatia	1991
Peru	2000	Czech Republic	1993
Philippines	1988	Ecuador	1978
Senegal	1999	Estonia	1990
South Africa	1993	Ghana	1978
Sri Lanka	1987	Guinea-Bissau	2000
Taiwan	1995	Honduras	1981
Thailand	1982	Hungary	1990
		Kyrgystan	1991
		Latvia	1991
		Macedonia	1990
		Madagascar	1992
		Malawi	1993
		Mali	1991
		Moldova	1995
		Mongolia	1991
		Nepal	1990
		Nicaragua	1983
		Niger	1992
		Nigeria	1978
		Pakistan	1987
		Peru	1979
		Poland	1989
		Romania	1989
		Russia	1992
		Spain	1975
		Sudan	1995
		Uganda	1979
		Ukraine	1990
		Uruguay	1984
		Zambia	1990

Year of regime transition is taken from Przeworski, Alvarez, Limongi and Cheibub (2000).

The sample of countries analyzed here covers nearly every region of the world. Dates of each democratic transition are taken from Przeworski, Alvarez, Limongi and Cheibub (2000) and they reflect the dates that each country could be considered to have formally completed a transition to democratic rule. The sample of new democracies entered the data following the end of a period of domestic nondemocratic rule. Many of the newly independent states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc are represented in the sample, though a few were omitted that had no prior history of independent statehood (Slovenia, Slovakia) or were lacking data on particular variables (Lithuania).[7] Despite these omissions, Eastern and Central Europe is well-represented in the sample as a result of the cascade of new democracies that emerged with the fall of the Soviet Union.

Table 1.1 illustrates the diversity of those countries considered to have *Closed* legacies. The electoral histories of these countries is far from monolithic and includes experience with noncompetitive elections, locally-competitive elections, one-party elections and no elections at all. Previous work on electoral authoritarianism has explored some of these differences using typologies of electoral authoritarianism that include a third category of *hegemonic* regimes that are presumed to fall between the categories of Competitive and Closed (See Levitsky and Way 2002 and Brownlee 2009). The coding employed here focuses only on the presence of minimally competitive elections at the national-level; this is the distinction that recent research on authoritarian elections has found to be among the most useful for explaining outcomes of interest, including regime stability and liberalization (Lindberg 2006; Brownlee 2009). This is also distinction that is frequently employed when dividing nondemocracies on the basis of their degree of electoral competition. This decision has implications

[7]Despite some history of independent statehood, many of the post-Soviet countries in the sample could be considered to have emerged from a pseudo-colonial period around 1989. Omitting countries that had been consolidated under communist rule or omitting Eastern Europe as a whole would significantly reduce the number of cases examined and leave questions looming as to how legacies of communist rule affect the dynamics presented here. As such, I opted to omit only a couple of states that had no prior history of independence during the twentieth century and were not designated republics within the USSR.

for the empirical analyses that follow; specifically, since many of the regimes coded as *Closed* did have some degree of electoral experience (short of national-level, multiparty elections), it should be more difficult to find an effect for Competitive legacies.[8] The analyses that follow are a first cut at analyzing the impact of electoral legacies focusing on the most analytically distinct regime subtype discussed in the literature. Subsequent work will be needed to examine what other electoral experiences have discernable affects after a transition to democracy.

1.3 Long-term Effects of Multiparty Competition

The mechanisms discussed in this section and in subsequent chapters are drawn from a rich literature on elections in authoritarian regimes. They provide sound theoretical justification for why long-term differences may persist following a regime change. This project will not directly test particular mechanisms; I employ this theoretical framework as motivation for investigating the post-transition differences between regimes with different electoral histories.

The long-term effects of Competitive authoritarianism are rooted in changes that multiparty elections bring about in nondemocracies. In later chapters, I will offer hypotheses about what changes brought about by MPE in Competitive regimes might be related to specific outcomes in new democracies. Here, I first examine how citizen actions and attitudes are affected by the presence of MPE, such as the adoption of norms of participation and new beliefs about the role of individual citizens in the political sphere. Next, I look at how MPE shape the incentives of opposition elites who seek to mobilize supporters and gain legitimacy as well as institutional sources of political power and influence. Then I turn to a discussion of how these changes could persist beyond a regime change and perpetuate

[8]The legacy effect should be less apparent assuming that the same mechanisms driving the effect of Competitive legacies are also at work among states with hegemonic legacies.

systematic differences across new democracies with different legacies.

1.3.1 Citizen Politics: Different Attitudes, Different Actions

Citizens in Competitive regimes can have very different political experiences than those in non-Competitive regimes. Where multiple parties exist and routine elections take place, citizens have the opportunity to develop participatory habits, specifically the habit of going to the polls. They may learn to associate themselves with groups that represent politically salient cleavages (see Posner 2004) and come to see their role as less that of a passive consumer of policy and more as an individual with the right to make claims on the government (see Lindberg 2006a).[9] They also might come to align themselves not just with a group but with a formal political party and form some degree of partisan identity.

In contrast, in non-Competitive regimes, citizens either align themselves with the ruling party or no party at all. In many cases elections are sporadic or nonexistent, and the only interactions that citizens routinely have with their government to voice concerns are working through bureaucratic channels to try to obtain goods and services. Citizens who do not regularly vote in elections are less likely to view themselves as legitimate actors to make claims on government. Instead, they relate to the political system as a subject rather than a participant (see Almond and Verba 1963). Furthermore, many relevant cleavages within society are not expressed formally in the political sphere which is instead monopolized by either a single ruling party or personality cult.

These points highlight the ways that political attitudes and political action might differ between Competitive and non-Competitive authoritarian regimes. Lindberg (2006, 2006a) and Schedler (2009) have pointed to some of these differences as the mechanisms that might

[9]Though in clientelistic systems, those claims usually focus more on procuring goods and services from representatives in exchange for their electoral support (see Lust-Okar 2005).

drive Competitive authoritarian regimes toward democratization. The empirical findings regarding the link between elections and the emergence of democracy are mixed (see Lindberg 2009), but the mechanisms that have been suggested may lead to longstanding differences in political attitudes and behaviors across countries with different electoral histories.

First, citizens under Competitive authoritarianism are more likely to view themselves as active participants in politics (Lindberg 2006a). Even when the outcome of the elections is a foregone conclusion, or the scope of competition is exclusive of some groups, individual citizens in Competitive regimes are explicitly asked to provide input to government regarding their preferences over policy and representation. One might expect that this leads citizens under Competitive authoritarianism to view themselves as rightful participants in the political process. Lindberg (2006) notes that this creeping sense of political efficacy was evident in sub-Saharan dictatorships after the end of the Cold War; citizens began to see themselves as rightful participants in their own governance. Even if they believe that they are playing a rigged game (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009), they adopt a new notion of what their role *should* be as a result of the presence of repeated MPE. Overall levels of political efficacy and democratic beliefs about the proper role of individual citizens might then be more common among Competitive authoritarian regimes as opposed to non-Competitive regimes.

A second potential effect of competitive elections deals with participation and partisan affiliation. Citizens at least have the option of aligning with a non-regime party when MPE are present. While many will still be excluded or marginalized, the presence of some opposition means that more people have the opportunity to form partisan attachments to non-regime political parties under Competitive authoritarianism. Thus, partisan affiliation with non-ruling parties would be expected to be higher in Competitive regimes.[10] Also,

[10]Partisan affiliation may be more complicated than this since some dictators take control of a vibrant multiparty democracy where partisan attachments have already formed – for example, East Germany. In these cases, partisan affiliation may remain latent during a period of nondemocratic rule, but return quickly following the reemergence of democratization. In this case, Competitive and non-Competitive regimes would tend

citizens in Competitive regimes routinely are asked to provide their input via national polling. Over a series of repeated elections, some people will develop a habit of turning out at the polls an casting a ballot, leading to a higher proportion of habitual voters in Competitive regimes.

In contrast, citizens in non-Competitive regimes experience relatively little routine national polling. In many cases, like Iraq before 2003 and Chile under Pinochet, occasional referenda on the rule of the incumbent are the only elections that occur. These do little to foster partisan attachment or instill habits of regular electoral participation. In one-party states like China, patterns of participation exist but do not reflect the electoral participation that is characteristic of functioning democracies as closely as Competitive authoritarian rule. Shi (1997), for example, notes that political participation in Beijing appears very different on the surface than participation in modern democratic regimes, frequently involving informal channels of communication and more contact with local officials to procure goods and services.

Though they may not impact prospects for democratization, these institutional effects may lead to systematic differences between regimes that held regular MPE prior to a democratization and those that did not. Citizens in formerly Competitive regimes should be expected to be more efficacious, more likely to affiliate with a non-regime sponsored party, and more accustomed to regularly casting a ballot in national elections than those in regimes that had no prior experience with MPE.

to look more like one another, making it less likely that my empirical analysis finds systematic differences between the two legacies.

1.3.2 Elite-level Incentives to Organize and Invest

Elites operating in Competitive regimes face a different incentive structure than those in non-Competitive regimes. Under Competitive authoritarianism, at least some opposition elites will have the ability to hold leadership positions in parties independent of the ruling party. This might be enticing for several reasons. First, by demonstrating their capacity to mobilize supporters, they are better positioned to win concessions and patronage from the autocrat (Lust-Okar 2005). Second, establishing the institutional infrastructure of a political party allows them to more efficiently distribute patronage to their top-level allies and maintain their position of relative power (Geddes 2005). By forming a party and working through the electoral and legislative process, elites outside of the autocrats' winning coalition can gain access to resources and legitimate their positions of authority as representatives of particular groups.

In non-Competitive regimes, none of the elites outside of the autocrat's winning coalition or ruling party have the opportunity to create their own party as an institutional support structure and a tool for mobilizing their supporters. Instead, opposition leaders must resort to working through existing institutions such as religious organizations or trade unions in order to challenge the regime. Where opposition elites lack an independent, institutional infrastructure, they could be expected to face a reduced capacity to mobilize supporters and more intragroup conflict. Since they are not invested in the institutional political game, they might also be more willing to engage in system-challenging behavior. Overall, these processes could lead to more turnover in leadership among elites in these positions in non-Competitive regimes than in Competitive regimes.

These differences incentivize very different behavior on the part of elites not currently part of the ruling junta. In Competitive authoritarian regimes, becoming a leader of a

political party can help solidify one's role as the legitimate representative of a politically salient group within society. Mobilizing supporters both further demonstrates the power and importance of the group in question and the organizational strength and influence of the leadership. Elites can also make their positions of power even more secure by using the institutional infrastructure of a formal party to reward allies and coopt their own opposition within their organization. This strategy can help particular elites remain at the helm of opposition political organizations during periods of Competitive authoritarian rule; for example, after splitting with the ruling PRI in the run-up to Mexico's 1988 general election, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas helmed the newly formed Partido de la Revolucion Democratica for almost a decade.

Additionally, forming a party and demonstrating an ability to mobilize supporters offers elites the benefit of support and concessions handed down from those in power. Demonstrating a capacity to mobilize a politically relevant group can help elites win concessions from the ruling junta in the form of patronage, ranging from outright bribes to secure their cooperation to offers of leadership roles within the government to help them effectively represent their interests (see, for example, Lust-Okar 2005). Accruing benefits from incumbents makes it less likely that elite challengers would want to threaten the existence of the current system. This is not to say that opposition elites would necessarily support incumbents, only that being invested in the electoral game reduces the probability that they would initiate potentially destabilizing efforts against the regime. This kind of cooptation and management of elite opposition is exactly what Gandhi (2008) suggests helps some dictators remain in power, as in the case of Morocco where for years following independence, monarchs offered concessions to the leadership of the Istiqlal party in order to maintain their rule.

In contrast, elites in non-Competitive contexts have an incentive to challenge the regime through other organizations. Mainwaring (1988) notes that parties played a lim-

ited role in opposing the closed, frequently military-led, dictatorships in Latin America. Instead, opposition leaders worked through social movement organization or through the church to challenge incumbents. These kinds of strategies could be expected to lead to greater regime-challenging mobilization.

1.3.3 Bringing it All Together

Taken together, the potential impacts of MPE experience on elite incentives and citizen politics offer some insights for how Competitive and non-Competitive legacies might differ from one another. In regimes with Competitive legacies, the primary opposition organizations are political parties that have some investment in the status quo. As a result, while they may be willing to challenge the regime, they are less likely to advocate radical change. Also, citizens in regimes with Competitive legacies should be more accustomed to electoral participation and more comfortable with their role as voter.

In subsequent chapters I refer back to and elaborate upon many of these ideas to propose hypotheses about how and why new democracies with and without experience with MPE might differ from one another. While specific mechanisms are not directly tested, the findings support the conclusion that changes brought about by experience with Competitive authoritarianism account for the variation that we see across regimes with different electoral histories.

While the mechanisms discussed here deal with how politics might differ among different types of authoritarian regimes, the bulk of this dissertation deals with how political dynamics in new democracies are shaped by the past. As such, it is necessary to consider not just how these differences might have emerged, but how we might expect them to change over time. If experience with elections creates some difference in the citizen- or elite-level

politics in nondemocracies, will those differences naturally fade over time as all new democracies experience multiparty competition? The answer is dependent upon the specific political phenomena that one seeks to investigate. In some cases, we might expect differences to even out over time; the effect of higher partisan affiliation in formerly Competitive regimes will likely disappear as all new democracies experience multiparty competition and citizens have a chance to form partisan attachments. In other instances, it might make sense to expect that new democracies with Competitive legacies have a head start that will persist, at least for some period of time, due to the path-dependent nature of some political processes. In later chapters, the way that legacy affects outcomes of interest like survival, backsliding, turnout, and protest will take into account the potentially limited frame of time during which meaningful differences may exist in new democracies.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

Before attempting to establish that Competitive legacies have an effect on new democracies, it is necessary to examine why Competitive regimes exist at all. To the extent that the adoption of elections and parties is endogenous to features that might be driving long-term differences in new democracies, I could be in danger of drawing spurious conclusions about the relationship between legacies and outcomes of interest. The next chapter reviews the literature on the adoption and maintenance of MPE in autocracies. I demonstrate that the most important determinants of whether or not a regime institutionalizes are past experience with democracy, natural resource abundance, and the politicization of the military. Other features, such as strength of the civil society, have an inconsistent or insignificant impact on the presence of multiparty elections and can thus be ruled out as potential confounding factors; in fact, there is some reason to believe that multiparty elections lead to a strengthening

of civil society, not the other way around. The analysis in this chapter allows us to treat the presence of MPE as plausibly exogenous with respect to other potential causes of the outcomes that will be examined in latter chapters. This chapter will inform subsequent analyses on the appropriate control variables to employ and where to use caution when inferring institutional effects.

Chapter 3 examines the impact of legacy on regime survival. Drawing on the discussion above, I offer hypotheses concerning how new democracies with different legacies might differ in their relative risk of experiencing a democratic breakdown. I then introduce the dataset and coding scheme that will be employed throughout the dissertation. The analysis demonstrates that Competitive legacies are associated with significantly reduced risks of authoritarian reversals. This is shown to be true even when controlling for democratic experience, military interventions, and a host of other factors associated with democratic breakdown.

Chapter 4 expands on the previous chapter by looking at how Competitive legacies impact the risk of experiencing more minor backslides that do not necessarily lead to full authoritarian reversals. These include instances in which governments banned particular political parties or suspended certain freedoms. I argue that (similar to the previous chapter) certain long-term effects of Competitive legacies help to reduce the risk of some types of rights restrictions but not others. Specifically, Competitive legacies lead to a broader respect for basic political rights but have no effect on suspensions of civil liberties which are not uncommon as marginalized groups in new democracies attempt to voice their demands. Again, the results are quite robust and are not driven by countries or years that also saw full returns to authoritarian rule.

Chapter 5 turns to an examination of political participation following a democratization. I show that voter turnout follows a different pattern in Competitive legacies than

in other regimes. Specifically, turnout begins lower and then trends upward over the next several elections. In contrast, most other regimes see high turnout in early elections and then a steady decline as the honeymoon period expires. Competitive legacies also lead to systematic differences in protest behavior. Regime-challenging, large-scale protests were less likely in regimes with experience with MPE, perhaps because the prior organization of parties led leaders of opposition groups to become invested in the electoral process and eschew such system-challenging tactics.

I conclude with a consideration of the implications of these findings for the promotion of democracy and a discussion of potential areas for future research on the effects of electoral authoritarian legacies.

Chapter 2

Origins of Competitive Authoritarianism

Pepinsky (2014) asserts that establishing the causal effects of institutions under dictatorship requires a careful examination of the structural factors influencing the adoption or maintenance of such institutions. Otherwise, since institutions are not completely exogenous, we cannot rule out the possibility that authoritarian institutions are epiphenomenal. The literature review in this chapter will identify the factors associated with the adoption (or maintenance) of unfree elections that might also affect political stability following a democratic transition. This will inform subsequent analyses that seek to establish the causal effect that multiparty elections have on political dynamics in new democracies. In the previous chapter, I presented several mechanisms through which Competitive authoritarian legacies might affect politics in new democracies. But what explains the existence of nominally democratic electoral institutions under dictatorship?

We might expect that parties and elections are implemented as concessions to powerful

anti-regime movements or as a necessary response to a robust, well-organized civil society. In this view, regimes that hold multiparty elections are seen an imperfect democracies or regimes in transition; presumably, the same factors that led to the adoption of parties and elections will eventually bring about full liberalization. On the other hand, some have noted that these regimes are no more likely to democratize than other dictatorships and that parties and elections are often adopted to quell divisions among the ruling elite and ease the distribution of patronage (Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). They argue that the presence of elections is not a reflection of a liberalizing society but rather a tool to maintain the status quo.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors underlying the impressive diversity of electoral institutionalization in modern nondemocracies. I review the literature on elections in authoritarian regimes and show that the adoption and maintenance of multiparty electoral competition generally has little to do with the strength of civil society or with the mobilization of pro-democracy movements. Instead, multiparty competition is driven by the need to establish an institutional source of support and legitimacy for incumbents.

Many early scholars cast Competitive authoritarian regimes as transitional, or partial democracies, caught somewhere between authoritarian rule and full democratic consolidation (Przeworski 1991; Huntington 1991). These accounts largely viewed elections as the result of the same democratizing forces that ultimately toppled regimes and replaced them with representative governemnts. The theories of why dictatorships held multiparty elections tended to focus on factors known to be associated with democratization, like a well-developed civil society and a growing economy. Over the last 20 years the literature on authoritarian elections has eschewed such explanations as inappropriate; since Competitive authoritarian regimes have proven to be resilient regime sub-types, with most never transitioning to full democracy, other factors must be driving this emergence of this new form of authoritarianism.

The recent literature on elections in authoritarian regimes suggests several interrelated reasons for the adoption or maintenance of unfree elections. The first set of explanations has to do with the dictator's need to foster cooperation among potential rivals in the elite. This is especially important where the military presents a credible threat of staging a successful coup. Using elections to secure cooperation is less important where leaders have abundant revenue streams from oil or mineral resources to finance their efforts to remain in power. A second explanation, usually applied to Competitive authoritarian regimes of the post-Cold War period, is the need to hold elections in order to gain international legitimacy or satisfy the requirements of international aid organizations. Finally, I introduce an explanation for the maintenance of elections that has been under-theorized in the literature, the role of institutional inertia and inherited institutions. Scholars have largely suggested that dictators might abolish or suspend elections at will but they have failed to adequately consider the potentially substantial cost of institutional change.

The next section outlines the conceptualization of Competitive authoritarianism that will be used throughout the remainder of the dissertation. I then turn to an evaluation of the explanations for why multiparty elections are implemented in nondemocratic contexts. The remaining sections explore these theories further by looking more closely at a handful of cases, and discuss the implications of this analysis for the study of post-transition effects of Competitive authoritarianism.

2.1 Conceptualizing Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarian regimes are nondemocracies that are nonetheless characterized by routine multiparty electoral competition for national-level office. Levisky and Way (2002; 2010) and Diamond (2002) provide the groundwork for the analysis of regimes that adopt

nominally democratic electoral institutions while maintaining control over the state through electoral fraud, coercion, or other means. They suggest a division of authoritarian regimes into three groups: those that do not adopt electoral institutions (Closed regimes), those that adopt electoral institutions but allow for no competition to exist, as in single-party regimes (Hegemonic regimes), and those in which multiparty elections regularly occur and are used to fill national-level offices, even while competition may be unjustly limited, subject to repression and intimidation, and corrupted by fraud (Competitive regimes).

My analysis focuses on Competitive regimes. Specifically, I am interested in regimes that hold repeated multiparty elections over a period of time, not just immediately preceding a regime change.[1] Despite the distinction between Hegemonic and Closed regimes, much of the empirical analysis in the literature has found little meaningful difference between the two (Brownlee 2009; Gandhi 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). The establishment of a process of multiparty polling seems a more compelling distinction; Competitive regimes allow (some) opposition parties to form, organize, and operate in ways similar to democratic systems. These freedoms to exercise voice, develop patterns of political participation, and begin to identify politically salient societal cleavages may have deep and lasting effects on how Competitive regimes fare as democracies if a transition ever occurs. The remainder of this dissertation addresses precisely these implications.

Competitive authoritarian regimes were recently thought of as ephemeral regimes, on the verge of full transition to democracy. While this view was embraced around the end of the Cold War, it had not always been accepted, as scholars had more than a decade before identified electoral institutionalization as a meaningful dimension of variation among stable, authoritarian regimes.[2] As new Competitive authoritarian regimes appeared to persist

[1] Geddes (2005) refers to this as politics during "normal times", as opposed to the political situation once a regime transition becomes imminent.

[2] While Levitsky and Way (2010) limit their analysis the post-Cold War period, they acknowledge the existence of such regimes in previous decades.

without further liberalization, scholars were forced to reexamine the role that elections play in authoritarian regimes beyond opening the door to an eventual transition that only rarely materialized. They determined that Competitive regimes were not transitional or temporary, but instead they represented real and lasting differences in the institutional makeup of nondemocratic states. Just as authoritarian regimes embrace different degrees of hereditary rule or politicization of the military, they also differ on the degree to which they adopt legislatures and multiparty elections. The degree to which authoritarian regimes adopt nominally democratic institutions has been shown to have real impacts on regime durability (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007*a*; Gandhi 2008; Brownlee 2007), foreign investment and growth (Wright 2008*a*), and the distribution of patronage within the regime (Lust-Okar 2005). But why the turn to seemingly incongruent political institutions in the first place?

2.2 Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?

Holding elections is costly. First, there are the direct costs of establishing the infrastructure necessary to allow citizens to cast a ballot (polling places, staff, ballots). More importantly, elections in nondemocracies may provide the opposition with a venue to challenge and possibly unseat incumbents. Given the risks involved and the seeming incongruence of representative institutions, what explains the prevalence of Competitive authoritarianism?

The answers in the literature fall into two groups. First, there are those that see elections as a concession to democratic pressures within society. The sources of this pressure are the same as those that are normally thought to be driving democratization more broadly, namely, things like civic culture, economic development, and mass movements demanding greater freedom. The second explanation has arisen in response to the lack of further democratization in Competitive authoritarian regimes over the recent decades. In this view,

elections are adopted not in response to democratic pressures but rather as a tool to help leaders gain the cooperation of potential rivals from within the ruling elite, offset the risk of coups, and obtain international aid and legitimacy.

The first group of explanations, while intuitive and consistent with some of the data available at the time that they were proposed, has not received much empirical support in recent years. The second set of explanations comes largely from the political economy literature and the burgeoning study of institutions under authoritarianism. They have received substantial empirical support and suggest several specific factors that likely influence the adoption and maintenance of elections in nondemocracies.

2.2.1 Cases of Stalled Democratization

Competitive authoritarian regimes were once thought of as regimes on the path toward full democracy. The incongruence between nominally democratic institutions and autocratic political realities were thought to be unsustainable; regimes that adopted nominally democratic institutions did not represent a new variety or subtype of authoritarian regime, they were instead considered transitory states or semi-democracies (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; DiPalma 1990; Przeworski 1991).

According to this view, elections are adopted as part of the process of liberalization. To find the causes of Competitive authoritarianism, one need look no further than the factors driving countries toward democracy. The observation of gradual democratization in East Asia lent some support to this idea. Countries like South Korea experienced economic growth and mass demands for greater political equality, and this drove the adoption of multiparty elections and, after some time, full democratization. South Korean activists, students, and even members of the judiciary applied steady pressure to the regime, leading

to both the liberalization of the electoral process and eventually a transition to representative government (Lee 2002).

While this explanation fits the East Asian experience to some degree, it does not seem to apply in other regions where the adoption of elections and multiparty competition occurred in the absence of mass movements, economic growth or other pressure to liberalize the political process. For example, Gandhi (2008) describes the adoption of multiparty competition in Morocco as a negotiated settlement between rival elites attempting to entrench their own power and influence. Rather than a concession to democratic forces, this instance appears to be a case of cooptation of the leadership of a rival faction among the ruling elite.

Another potential problem with this explanation is the fact that movements for democracy frequently operate outside of the electoral process and are openly distrustful of electoral institutions. Mainwaring (1988) notes that in Latin America, pro-democracy forces operated through the Catholic church and various social movement organizations rather than forming partes and seeking electoral reform.[3] Instead, they sought greater liberalization of the regime, including reducing restrictions on civil liberties and suspensions of the rule of law. Frequently, mass movements that work through existing electoral institutions elicit the opposite effect; governments ban particular parties or cancel elections in order to restrict competition to those groups that will not meaningfully challenge the rule of incumbents. For example, in Bangladesh, Ershad repressed substantial dissent from various segments of society while holding multiparty elections that excluded much of the pro-democratic opposition (Maniruzzaman 2002).

The critique echoed most frequently by recent scholars stems from the observation that Competitive authoritarian regimes have endured without further liberalization. If the

[3]Of course, forming or joining existing parties was not an option where all opposition was legally banned from operating, such as in Argentina and Chile.

adoption of elections is a concession offered by regimes that face challenges that they cannot otherwise put down, then why have they not been toppled? Despite the democratic forms that they embody, multiparty elections in these contexts are still rife with fraud, repression, and only a minimal degree of ex ante uncertainty about the outcome of polling. Why have the democracy-promoting forces that demanded multiparty competition settled for an incumbent-dominated, rigged game? The answer offered most frequently is that elections are not routinely the product of democratizing forces, but instead are adopted because they help incumbents to coopt and pacify potential challengers within the ruling elite, and demonstrate the legitimacy of the regime on the world stage.

2.2.2 The Political Economy of Authoritarian Institutionalization

Over the last decade and a half, scholars have begun exploring the origins of Competitive authoritarianism from the perspective of incumbents seeking to manipulate the institutional environment in which they operate. Rather than ask what might force leaders to accept multiparty elections, they have begun to explain why dictators might choose to hold multiparty elections. Several interrelated answers have been proposed, and many have been tested using case studies and cross-national data. Anecdotal and statistical findings suggest that these factors go a long way toward providing an explanation for the adoption and maintenance of unfree elections.

Elite Cooperation

Several scholars argue that parties and elections help nondemocratic leaders coopt challengers and protect from themselves from threats within the ruling elite (Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005; Brownlee 2007). By offering potential challengers positions within the ruling party, or

allowing them to form a party of their own and contest some elections, dictators can curb the ambitions of those that might otherwise plot to overthrow them. Also, allowing some potential rivals to become invested in the status quo through the benefits they receive as a condition of their institutional participation ensures that they will be less likely to join a coalition aimed at overthrowing the system (Svolik 2012; Lust-Okar 2005).

Svolik (2012) argues that parties help to encourage sunk investments by party members who naturally come to see their fate as tied with that of the incumbents. Additionally, parties and legislatures offer the institutional infrastructure needed to efficiently distribute patronage to loyal supporters and maintain political control over appointments to positions of power (Svolik 2012; Lust-Okar 2005). Lust-Okar (2005) extends a similar line of argument to the multiparty context, noting that dictators can provide selective incentives to leaders of particular opposition groups by, for example, allow them to participate legally in certain elections, sharing power in the legislature, or, on the other hand, threatening them with exclusion and/or targeted repression. This demonstrates how even multiparty electoral competition can be manipulated by incumbents to coopt or marginalize the leadership of potentially threatening groups. Additionally, Gandhi (2008) argues that multiparty legislatures can serve as peaceful, easily controlled forums for policy compromises to take place.

One exception to these arguments is the case of resource-rich dictators. Where oil or other mineral resources provide a steady stream of revenue to finance repression and cooptation, leaders rely less on formal electoral institutions. Gandhi (2008) demonstrates this empirically using cross-national data to predict whether or not dictators adopt electoral institutions. She finds that dictators in resource-dependent states are significantly less likely to form parties and legislatures than are those in non-resource dependent states. As an example, she points to the conflicting cases of Kuwait and Morocco. As mentioned previously, monarchs in Morocco relied on political institutions to help coopt challengers; in contrast,

Kuwait's abundant oil reserves facilitate a vast network of social spending programs that likely serve to quiet potential opposition. Similarly, Svolik (2012) points to the King of Bahrain's promised disbursement of cash to citizens in the wake of the Arab Spring as a non-institutional method for quelling dissent.

Another exception applies to military dictatorships. When incumbents are also top military officials, they have two distinct advantages in compelling cooperation that other regimes do not. First, they are directly in control of a security and coercive apparatus that can be used to terrorize elite opponents and put down dissent. And second, the institutional infrastructure necessary to easily and efficiently promote allies and coopt challengers already exists in the form of the military itself. As such, Gandhi (2008) argues that military dictators face a decreased need for cooperation and are less likely to adopt nominally democratic institutions than are other autocrats.

Gandhi (2008) conducts a cross-national analysis to establish the systematic predictors of authoritarian electoral institutionalization. Her analysis demonstrates that dictators institutionalize when they need to foster cooperation among elites and those that could lead important groups within society to oppose incumbents. Military regimes and those with vast natural resource endowments are significantly less likely to adopt parties and legislatures whereas those that inherited parties are generally more likely to establish electoral institutions.

Chile under Pinochet provides a clear example of these dynamics. Despite inheriting well-developed political parties upon taking power, Pinochet managed to rule for years without relying on political parties and legislatures; in fact, parties were banned, the legislature was closed, and elections were suspended (Mainwaring 1988). As a military dictator, he could rely upon the military both as an institutional support structure and utilize its repressive capacity to terrorize dissenters and opposition organizations. His revolving alliances

with various industry-leaders also allowed him to exploit Chile's natural resources and use the revenue to maintain his rule.

Coup Risk

A related explanation for the establishment of ruling parties and multiparty elections is to lessen the risk that a dictator will fall to a military coup (Geddes 2005; Lehoucq and Perez-Linan 2013). Political parties can cloak a dictator or ruling elite in some degree of legitimacy. Parties provide incumbents with the infrastructure and supporting cast needed to more efficiently mobilize supporters in demonstrations. Geddes (2005) explains that large electoral victories can also demonstrate support for the regime and the legitimacy of its leadership, and these shows of popular support may serve to deter challenges from the military or factions within it that might otherwise try to take power. Furthermore, since most coups require cooperation between military and civilian regime opponents, the cooptation of potential civilian challengers also serves to reduce the risk of being deposed in a military-led coup (Geddes 2005).

Geddes (2005) also provides some empirical support for the idea that elections and parties help dictators remain in power. She shows cross-nationally that dictators who form parties survive, on average, much longer than those that do not. Furthermore, dictators overwhelmingly come to rely on political parties, whether adopted or of their own creation. Even among dictators who rose to power through a coup, more than half ultimately come to rely on a support party (Geddes 2005). Svolik (2012) indicates that more than two thirds of all nondemocratic leaders deposed in the postwar period have fallen to coups led by the military or other government insiders; and losing power in an irregular manner, such as a coup, also increases the chances of facing jail, exile, or execution, so the incentives to form or adopt a support party and thereby reduce coup risk could be substantial.

International Pressure

Another widely accepted and empirically supported reason for the adoption of multiparty elections is international pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010). In order to stay in the good graces of wealthy trading partners, avoid shaming of international institutions, and attract foreign investment, many dictators have been forced to accept the costs and risks associated with holding regular multiparty elections (Levitsky and Way 2010; Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Levitsky and Way (2010) note that this is particularly true in the post-Cold War period and they offer dozens of brief case studies to support their claims. They argue that the end of the Cold War and the increased effort toward democracy promotion both on the part of Western governments and NGOs served to force the hand of existing or emerging autocrats considering electoral institutionalization. Rather than become politically and economically isolated, many likely chose to adopt at least the nominal institutions of democracy, even if they routinely subverted them in practice. This is the explanation they offer for the marked proliferation of Competitive authoritarian regimes in the 1990s, but they also acknowledge that such regimes existed before, perhaps for similar reasons.

The presence of international pressure was almost certainly at play when Ghana returned to a process of multiparty competition after several years of suspended elections. Despite only "limited domestic pressure for democracy," Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings agreed to enact constitutional reforms and restore multiparty competition to Ghana in 1991, largely due to the need to meet standards set by foreign benefactors (Gyimah-Boadi 1994, 78). Rawlings had led successive coups in 1979 and 1981, and following the enactment of reforms, he retired from the military and founded a new political party, winning the Presidency in 1992 and again in 1996. Following the reforms, Rawlings was able to maintain his hold on power for a decade, just shortly after overseeing nearly a decade of harsh repression.

Institutional Inertia

Multiparty electoral competition likely also exists due to institutional inertia. Most Competitive authoritarian regimes of the last half century inherited a system of political parties and multiparty elections. Gandhi (2008) suggests that this could be an important factor in determining which dictators institutionalize, and she finds empirical support for the effect of inherited institutions on the maintenance of electoral institutions. In my data, authoritarian regimes that had *any* prior experience with democracy during the postwar period were more likely to adopt multiparty elections than those that had not.[4]

Institutions are costly to create and potentially costlier to destroy; abolishing multiparty competition inevitably carries the risk of identifying an incumbent as an autocrat. Most dictators would prefer to be seen as legitimate political authorities. As such, completely dismantling a system of multiparty elections would be less preferable than keeping them in place if they can be manipulated and potentially provide additional benefits, as noted previously. Many Competitive authoritarian regimes succeed at skillfully managing which parties and factions are allowed to contest a given election (Lust-Okar 2005). This kind of management was carefully applied in regimes like Egypt under Sadat, where moderate Islamists in the Waft Party were strengthened and allowed to participate while more extreme Islamists and leftists were excluded, thus dividing the potential opposition and stabilizing the regime for some time (Lust-Okar 2005).

While the process of partisan development may not have followed the same path as Western Europe and North America, parties had developed before World War II in portions of the Middle East and Latin America and also across Africa as colonialism began to unwind in the postwar period. Mainwaring (1988) notes that many countries of South America already

[4] 40% of those with democratic experience became Competitive authoritarian regime; only 20% of those with no prior democratic experience became Competitive regimes.

had well-established political parties by 1930. Certainly, in some of these cases, parties served a different purpose than they commonly do in modern democracies, with clientelistic relationships often being paramount to parties' representative function (Mainwaring 1988). But even in this context, party institutions develop and perpetuate themselves and ultimately become entrenched in a society. Dictators entering this environment after a coup or in the wake of an economic crisis that unseats a democratic government must deal with the electoral institutions that have become a part of the society.

Whether or not authoritarian leaders continue to hold multiparty elections that they inherit will be determined in part by the factors noted above. If the new rulers need to elicit cooperation from rival elites, are at risk of being deposed in a coup, and/or need to garner the acceptance of the international community, then they will be more likely to maintain some of the nominally democratic electoral institutions that they inherit. Even those who come to power in countries with no previous democratic experience are likely, for some of the same reasons, to at least form a ruling party and implement a limited electoral process (Geddes 2005). In some cases, dictators will have resources that allow them to suspend elections and ban all political parties, as was the case following coups in Chile and Argentina. In these instances, the new rulers were able to leverage the institutional strength of the armed forces to support their rule and repress dissent. In Nigeria, despite some democratic experience in the early years after gaining independence, abundant oil reserves allowed a series of autocrats to eschew electoral institutions and rely on oil revenues to support their regime.

2.3 Cases of Authoritarian Rule With and Without Elections

Competitive authoritarian regimes in the postwar period have routinely held multiparty elections. But many other nondemocracies have been able survive for long periods of time without holding multiparty elections or legalizing political opposition. Looking more closely at two contrasting cases will demonstrate that some of the mechanisms discussed above can account for some of the observed differences in electoral institutionalization. First I explore how Pinochet, as a military dictator with substantial access to natural resource wealth, was able to suspend elections and ban all political parties for decades. Then I present the contrasting case of Brazil, where disunity in the military undermined the armed forces as an institutional base of support, and where multiparty elections were allowed to continue despite the unfree rule of a series of military dictators.

2.3.1 Chile

Popularly elected Chilean president Salvador Allende was deposed in a military coup on September 11, 1973. Allende is believed to have taken his own life after the presidential palace faced repeated bombardment from fighter jets and armed invasion. The President had faced severe political turmoil during his first term in office, exacerbated by a sharp economic downturn in the previous year and US efforts to destabilize the regime.

Despite having joined the coup at the last minute, Augusto Pinochet emerged as the leader of the junta that took control of the government and stayed in power for more than a decade and a half. During his reign he brutally repressed civil society and jailed or killed his political opponents. A well-organized security apparatus began almost immediately

after the coup to terrorize the populace, rounding up and torturing political opponents, silencing the media, closing the legislature, and banning political parties (Constable and Valenzuela 1993). Just a couple of weeks after seizing control, a small cadre of Army officers traveled from prison to prison executing detainees in order to terrorize and dissuade potential dissidents. The event, now referred to as the Caravan of Death, lasted almost a month and resulted in the death of dozens of prisoners. The swell of violence that characterized the first few months of the junta's rule abated to some extent in the subsequent years, though the harsh repression of all dissent and regular arrests, disappearances, and executions continued throughout Pinochet's tenure. Freedom of speech, assembly and expression were still largely absent as late as the mid 1980s.

Political parties in Chile were stable and well-established by the time of the coup. Mainwaring (1988) notes that they had emerged before 1930, and reflected underlying social cleavages within society, much like Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue was the path of partisan development in Western Europe. Since they emerged as political manifestations of existing conflicts within society, parties of this type are thought to be stable, enduring institutions (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Still, Pinochet was able to rule Chile without holding a single multiparty election, banning all political parties from legally reorganizing until the eve of a democratic transition in the late 1980s.

Why was Pinochet able to maintain his rule without even a symbolic concession to the multiparty institutions that had preceded him? Despite the suggestion that ties to the US and other Western democracies press dictators to adopt multiparty elections, Pinochet enjoyed the tacit support of Washington from before the coup onward (Ensalaco 1999).[5] Attachments to the west would likely lead to Competitive authoritarianism after the end of the Cold War rather than at it's height, when many Washington administrations viewed

[5]Ensalaco (1999) notes that the US abstained from voting on several UN resolutions critical of the Chilean junta.

right-wing dictators as less of a potential threat than some democratically elected leftist governments.

Pinochet formed rotating alliances with different industry leaders and repressed organized labor, keeping the business community relatively supportive of his reign. Additionally, he could draw on the natural resources of Chile to help finance his government. Ross (2001) shows that Chile is heavily reliant upon mineral exports; on his measure of mineral reliance, Chile ranks fourth in the world. This suggests that the junta had a significant natural resource endowment from which it could draw financial support. The fact that his predecessor had nationalized many of industries on the eve of his ascension to power likely facilitated easier expropriation once the junta took power.

Most importantly, though, was Pinochet's reliance upon the military as a coercive force and an institutional base of power. As the leader of a military junta, Pinochet utilized the force of the Chilean Army to repress dissent and terrorize potential threats from the civil society. Threats from within the military itself could be easily coopted by controlling the rank and assignment of various officers below the level of the junta itself. The use of extremely harsh tactics, including torture, also helped to maintain discipline within the ranks as even those in lower levels of command became terrified of refusing the orders of their superiors (Ensalaco 1999). In this way, the military as an institution provided enough support to the junta to put down threats from rival officers and segments of civil society; as a result, political parties and elections were entirely unnecessary. Pinochet could simply ban parties and repress rival political organizations through brute force.

2.3.2 Brazil

The situation ahead of the 1964 military coup that toppled the democratic government in Brazil was similar in some ways to the situation preceding Pinochet's rise to power in Chile. President Joao Goulart had begun instituting a series of economic and political reforms that troubled the conservative officers in the Brazilian military and aroused the interest of US policymakers (Skidmore 1988). Goulart initially believed that forces loyal to the government would put down the emerging dissent from among an apparently small cadre of the Brazilian military that sought to unseat the President. By April, Goulart's military support had never materialized and he was forced to escape into exile.

As in Chile, the US supported the ouster of the President and his replacement with a military caretaker government, as it suited Washington's global anti-communist strategy. The military leaders that followed after Goulart was deposed at first promised to reinstate democracy in a few short years. Instead, they continued to rule for nearly two decades, employing violence against dissenters and repressing civil society in various ways. Still, they never banned opposition parties or discontinued the process of multiparty competition. Despite years of multiparty polling, it was not until the late 1970s that habeas corpus was restored, emergency powers lifted, and Brazil emerged as a liberal democracy.

Brazil's partisan development looked very different than Chile's. Mainwaring (1988) notes that in Brazil, a strong centralized bureaucracy developed ahead of a parliament and political parties. As a result, the parties that eventually emerged were driven by government actors seeking vehicles for political support. Parties were rarely national, focused on clientelistic relationships between representatives and voters, and reflected more superficial, local cleavages than in Chile or Western Europe. The parties themselves were consequently more easily manipulated by those in power. Presumably, these parties would have been easier

to abolish than those in Chile's entrenched party system. Instead, following the coup that deposed President Goulart, the military elected to continue holding multiparty elections. Mainwaring (1988) suggests that it was precisely the malleable nature of political parties in Brazil that incentivized the military leadership to try to manipulate rather than dispose of the electoral system.

Unwilling to "impose a radical rupture with democratic institutions", the military government in Brazil created an official government party, ARENA (Alianca Renovadora Nacional), and an opposition party, MDB (Movimento Democratico Brasileiro) to maintain the veneer of democratic practices (Mainwaring 1988, 96). Consolidating the party system provided the government with a party organization through which they could legitimate their rule and a distinct opposition organization that was intended to remain relatively ineffectual. As Mainwaring (1988) notes, the MDB actually grew in strength over the next decade and a half and forced the military government to change electoral laws on several occasions before finally abolishing the MDB and restoring the multiparty system in 1979.

The military and economy in Brazil was also strikingly different than in Chile. There was not a single leader (like Pinochet) at the helm. The military itself was characterized by opposing views and factions. This division likely would have made reliance upon the military as a sole source of legitimacy and support for the regime problematic, and may help to explain why Brazilian autocrats did not feel comfortable enough to completely uproot the electoral system. Furthermore, coffee dominated Brazilian exports and, due to price fluctuations, was not a stable source of income for the ruling elite (Skidmore 1988). Without a hierarchical organization to manage potential rivals and absent resource wealth for buying support and financing repression, Brazil's military leadership relied in part on a ruling party as a base of institutional support and legitimacy. The continuation of multiparty polling in Brazil can be accounted for by the weakness of the military as an institution, the lack of abundant resource

wealth, and the power of institutional inertia. In contrast to Chile, the military in Brazil was divided. This increased the need for further legitimation and support from institutions outside of the military itself. Brazil also had relatively fewer natural resource endowments to rely upon; indeed, the economic crisis of the mid-1970s in part precipitated the fall of the military regime and the return to democracy. Like in Chile, the US was involved but did not appear to be the reason for the maintenance of multiparty polling. Still, an inherited system of multiparty competition survived even though the parties themselves were relatively weak, small organizations. The case of Brazil also highlights the role of institutional inertia; it is costly to abolish institutions and, given their relative weakness, the new leadership opted to keep the multiparty system in place and manipulate it to their own ends rather than do away with parties and elections altogether.

2.3.3 Evaluating Explanations

Previous work explored the origins of Competitive authoritarianism using large-N, cross-national data. This brief examination of two contrasting cases from South America is intended to probe the plausibility of the factors that some have suggested influence the decision to adopt or maintain multiparty competition. In the case of Chile, parties and elections were abolished for more than a decade, whereas in Brazil the party system was reorganized and elections continued. Which of the explanations reviewed above appear most relevant in these cases?

The need for elite cooperation is evident in both Chile and Brazil. In Chile, Pinochet could rely on natural resources for financing and a strong military as an institutional base of support. In contrast, the Brazilian military regime had fewer natural resources and and more fractionalized leadership. In the latter case, an official government party was established as

the arguments put forth above would suggest; dictators need the cooperation of potential rivals, and electoral institutionalization is one way to induce that cooperation if the dictator does not have resource wealth and/or a strong military organization to provide it for them.

Both regimes engaged in violence and repression of civil society, but Brazil simultaneously allowed for the creation of a formal opposition party. Institutional inertia provides the best explanation for this choice. Rather than completely do away with democratic institutions, as was the strategy of Pinochet, the military leadership in Brazil reorganized a relatively malleable party system and continued to hold multiparty elections to maintain some semblance of a democratic process (Mainwaring 1988). Given the weakness of the party system in Brazil, manipulation of the electoral system was simply a less costly option than abolishing it altogether.

International pressure did not exert the expected effect in the regimes examined here. In both cases, the US was aligned with the military coups that overthrew leftist presidents and did not clearly impact the decision to suspend or continue elections. This is not surprising given that both cases occurred at the height of the Cold War. Levitsky and Way (2010) propose that after the end of the Cold War, ties to the US and other western nations would incentivize the adoption of multiparty competition. This is actually what we observe in Ghana in the early 1990s, but prior to the end of the Communist threat, US ties had less of a discernable effect on the establishment of parties and elections in nondemocracies; during this time Washington frequently appeared satisfied that a dictator had halted the advancement of socialism and was less concerned with whether or not they maintained any sort of democratic veneer.

Cases outside of South America and the Southern Cone show a similar pattern. Ehrshad first came to power in Bangladesh in a military coup in 1983. His military was fraught with internal division, making it less useful as an institutional base of support and he had

little in the way of resource wealth. He also had to deal with a legacy of party competition and felt that he needed to continue the electoral process in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of his government (Huque and Hakim 1993). Despite initially banning parties and suspending the constitution, Ehrshad soon formed the Jatiya (National) Party and allowed for multiparty competition throughout his tenure.

This brief examination of two countries supports the findings of previous cross-national analyses that found that dictators adopt elections when they need to foster elite cooperation and when they have inherited multiparty systems. The effect of international pressure is probably not consistent over the Third Wave; it likely exerts a clear influence only after the fall of the Soviet Union.

2.4 Lessons for Studies of Competitive Authoritarianism

Studies of the effects of Competitive authoritarianism should carefully consider the origins of multiparty competition. Institutions are always partly endogenous and they are probably more easily changed under dictatorship than under democracy. Understanding why multiparty elections are adopted or maintained is a fundamental step to uncovering any independent effect that these institutions may have on politics and society. Pepinsky (2014) succinctly states this methodological problem in the study of authoritarian institutions: "research designs must be able to distinguish the joint determination of institutions and outcomes from the causal effect of institutions on outcomes" (2).

Scholars have already linked multiparty competition with economic growth (Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008*a*), regime survival (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007*a*; Gandhi 2008; Geddes

2005; Brownlee 2009), and various other outcomes of interest. In order for any of these studies to accurately assess the effect of institutions adopted or maintained by dictators they must account for the structural factors that lead dictators to choose the institutions that they do. This chapter has assessed the reasons why autocrats adopt multiparty elections. It suggests several factors that should be controlled for in subsequent anslyses of institutional effects, including the presence of natural resources, the military/civilian status of the dictator, and previous experience with democracy. The remainder of this project deals with the effects of experience with Competitive authoritarianism and it is important that we take into account the structural features of countries in the data that may be relevant to the outcomes we seek to explain.

Chapter 3

Institutional Legacy and the Survival of New Democracies

While scholars have paid a good deal of attention to the possible democratizing effects of authoritarian elections, very little attention has been given to how experience with authoritarian elections shapes new democracies. As a result, little is known about the lasting, post–transition effects of Competitive authoritarianism. How does the institutional legacy of authoritarian elections affect the experience of new democracies? In particular, does institutional legacy affect the stability and survival of new democratic regimes? Previous work on democratic regime stability has not explicitly investigated the role of electoral legacy, leaving open the question of what kinds of authoritarian electoral institutions offer the best chances of democratic consolidation in the event of a transition from authoritarian rule.

This chapter addresses how Competitive authoritarian experience can impact the prospects for democratic survival following a democratic transition. Existing arguments concerning unfree elections and democratization yield competing hypotheses about the long–

term effects of Competitive authoritarianism providing the opportunity for a critical test. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that even unfree electoral competition does promote democracy, at least in the long run. Competitive authoritarian regimes, if they transition to democracy, tend to survive longer and are less prone to authoritarian backsliding than closed or hegemonic regimes.

These findings have clear implications for policies of states and international organizations aiming to promote lasting democratization. Specifically, my results support the efficacy of efforts to expand electoral competition in nondemocracies. Whether or not parties and elections provide a pathway out of authoritarian rule, they provide experience with electoral competition that makes democracy, should it come about, more sustainable.

The next section briefly outlines the arguments for and against a link between elections and democratization paying careful attention to the implications for any long–term effects of Competitive authoritarianism. Drawing on existing theory, I then develop new hypotheses that are consistent with the competing arguments presented. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to empirical tests of these hypotheses and a discussion of the findings.

3.1 Institutional Legacy and Democratic Survival

A significant number of studies have addressed how elections either foster or forestall democratization. A recent edited volume (Lindberg 2009) is, in fact, devoted to bringing together a diverse set of viewpoints on precisely this question. Many scholars studying political behavior and institutions in authoritarian regimes have offered compelling reasons why we should be skeptical of claims that competitive elections make dictators more vulnerable.[1] Others, drawing heavily upon the work of earlier democratic theorists have proposed reasons to ex-

[1]See Gandhi and Lust–Okar (2009) for a review.

pect a positive electoral effect on both regime failure and probability of democratization. These two lines of argument produce competing hypotheses concerning the relationship between institutional legacy and the stability of democratic successor regimes. Specifically, theories that suggest no relationship between competitive elections and probability of democratic transition imply a null relationship between institutional legacy and the survival of new democracies. In contrast, those suggesting that Competitive authoritarianism promotes democratization imply that institutional legacy is likely related to the stability of young democracies.

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the long–term implications of these competing accounts of the effect of electoral institutions. While dozens of contributions have tested their implications for the likelihood of democratization, none have addressed how the proposed mechanisms might affect long–term democratic stability in the event that a democratic transition takes place.

3.1.1 The Democratizing Effect of Elections

Accounts of how Competitive authoritarianism can be linked to democratization have generally relied on two related mechanisms. First, some have suggested that electoral competition can imbue societies with increased support for democratic norms and values (Lindberg 2006; Birney 2007; Pei 1995). Birney (2007), for example, argues that local elections in China can have a positive effect on both participatory attitudes and the protection of political rights. The liberalizing effects of better elections could be considered real progress toward liberal democracy to the extent that these attitudes and protections, once adopted, are not easily reversed (153). Similarly, Lindberg (2006; 2009) argues that repeated experiences with elections inculcate societies with democratic values. In his data from sub–Saharan Africa,

repeated elections were associated with improvements in a country's Freedom House scores for civil liberties and political rights. His claim is that elections increase respect for basic rights and freedoms which spur liberal reforms and, presumably, could ultimately lead to a democratic transition.

Second, others propose that electoral competition prepares a society for democracy by mobilizing politically salient groups leading to an increase in the cost of oppression and a decrease in the cost of inclusion (Lindberg 2009; Brownlee 2009).[2] Brownlee (2009) finds that Competitive authoritarian regimes are significantly more likely than Closed regimes to be followed by electoral democracy given that a transition occurs. He explains this finding by looking to earlier democratic theorists. He points to Rustow's (1970) claim that democracy is forged by prolonged struggle within a polity, linking this struggle to experience with competitive elections. Similarly, Dahl's (1970) proposition that competition can eventually make inclusion a more appealing strategy than repression suggests that Competitive authoritarianism may change the incentives and values of groups in society in favor of democratic governance. Lindberg (2009) identifies the mechanisms that may help shift away from repression and toward inclusion on the part of incumbents, including a growth in the size and complexity of opposition organizations, increased mass political mobilization, and large–scale investment in democratic institutions and processes (329).

If these are in fact the mechanisms linking competitive electoral institutions and democratization, then what might the long–term effects of these institutions look like? First, if minimally competitive elections increase the acceptance of democratic values and norms then new democracies with a Competitive authoritarian legacy will, on average, have more initial support for and experience with democratic processes than regimes with non-Competitive

[2]A related point is made by a number of scholars who argue that authoritarian elections (especially in instances of perceived electoral fraud) can serve as focal points for collective action and lead to greater overall levels of mass political unrest (Tucker 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Thompson and Kuntz 2004).

legacies. Greater support for widespread political rights and broader acceptance of norms of electoral participation can reasonably be assumed to have a positive effect on prospects for democratic survival. A greater proportion of the electorate would be expected to accept the rights and liberties of others and thus be less inclined to take part in stripping away those rights. Furthermore, more people would be expected to understand and take part in electoral politics, boosting the legitimacy of a new democracy's institutions and its rulers.

Greater mobilization and organization of politically salient groups would also be expected to reduce the risk of authoritarian backsliding in new democracies. In states with Competitive authoritarian legacies, we would expect politically relevant groups to have attained a higher level of organization prior to a transition. This head start in group mobilization is assumed to drive up the costs of repression and reduce the costs of inclusion, which it would then be expected to continue to do following a transition. There is no reason to believe that the same mechanism that led to a decline in repression would not help to prevent its return. Furthermore, groups that are organized and highly invested in the system from the beginning are less likely to try to undermine the democratic process; instead, they are more likely to see their fate as intertwined with that of the new regime.

Even if the differences between regimes with Competitive and non-Competitive legacies evaporate soon after a democratic transition – as all states, regardless of legacy, see increases in the acceptance of democratic values and the activation of politically salient groups – the effect of institutional legacy may be significant. New democracies face their greatest risk of authoritarian backsliding in the first few years after a democratic transition (see Figure 3.2). Since the risk they face is the greatest early on, having broader support for democracy and better organized interests at the moment of transition may in fact be a crucial difference between regimes with different legacies. Broader acceptance of democratic norms and values may help to insulate young democracies with Competitive legacies from some potential

threats to their survival during the tumultuous first decade and first few alternations in power.

Overall, this line of argument implies that Competitive authoritarian regimes will make for longer–lived democracies in the event of a democratic transition. Extending this logic thus leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *New democracies with Competitive legacies will be less likely to return to authoritarian rule than new democracies with Closed legacies.*

3.1.2 The Strategic Adoption of Electoral Institutions

The argument that elections either have no impact on prospects for democratization or that they actually help to sustain authoritarian regimes has also been made (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007*a*; Joseph 1997; Remmer 1999). One challenge to the proposed relationship between elections and democratization is endogeneity: do nominally competitive elections lead to opposition mobilization and the acceptance of democratic values or is the development of an organized, pro–liberalization challenge to the regime the impetus for instituting elections? A related argument comes from those seeking to explain the existence of political institutions under dictatorship in the first place. The general argument is that autocrats institutionalize when they need to, either as a means of political survival (Geddes 2005; Gandhi 2008) or in order to reap the benefits that elections and legislatures may be able to provide (Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005). The adoption of nominally democratic institutions is explained as a rational choice made by self–interested dictators seeking to coopt challengers, counterbalance the power of the military, and/or exploit parties and legislatures for their added efficiencies in the distribution of patronage. Since rulers choose to institutionalize for their own benefit and often directly to maintain their monopoly on power, some have

concluded that a link between elections and democratization would be unlikely (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).

Gandhi (2008) offers a model in which dictators choose to create political parties and legislatures when they need to "mobilize cooperation and to deter larger segments of society from forming active opposition" (100). Here, institutions provide a forum for the distribution of patronage and the cooptation of opposition elements in which transaction costs are reduced and those who may have otherwise threatened the regime become invested in maintaining the status quo. She concludes by questioning the assertion that elections and parties might have democratizing effects, noting that authoritarian elections are a "rigged game" and thus not likely to imbue democratic values to those who may participate (188). Gandhi and Lust–Okar (2009) echo this point and add that the link between elections and democratization is further complicated by evidence that dictators often institutionalize in order to maintain their hold on power.

In contrast to arguments addressed in the previous section, Gandhi (2008) and Gandhi and Lust–Okar (2009) suggest that elections may not instill democratic values or increase the level of opposition that a regime faces. Instead, regimes that need to compromise or coopt the opposition will strategically use institutions in order to do so efficiently, thus maintaining their position in power. While nominally democratic, unfree elections should not be expected to bring about any changes in the acceptance of democratic values because they are themselves inherently undemocratic. Even worse, authoritarian elections may cause citizens to distrust the electoral process so that even following a democratic transition they may be less willing to invest in electoral institutions that were once used to legitimize and prop–up undemocratic rulers.

If unfree elections do nothing to promulgate democratic values or participatory norms, as suggested by Gandhi (2008) among others, then we should see no relationship between

institutional legacy and democratic survival. Unfree elections fail to advance the acceptance of democratic norms and any group mobilization/organization is limited to those interests that incumbents wish to bring into the process. New democracies with either Competitive or non-Competitive legacies are expected to be comparable with respect to the acceptance of democratic values and the mobilization and organization of politically relevant groups. The overall implication of this approach is that unfree elections do not affect societies in the way that the previous account suggests. Since these institutions have no effect on regime stability or democratization, there is no reason to expect their legacy to be associate with longer–lived successor regimes.

Hypothesis 2: *New democracies with a Competitive legacies will be no less likely to return to authoritarian rule than new democracies with Closed legacies.*

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are drawn from conflicting accounts of how authoritarian elections affect prospects for democratization. Since their predictions directly contradict one another, they offer the possibility of a critical test. But first, I consider one complicating factor: the observed relationship between initial levels of political participation following a democratic transition and regime stability.

3.1.3 An Indirect Relationship? Initial Levels of Participation

Some have argued that high levels of participation are hazardous to the survival of young democracies (Dahl 1970). Giving all groups access to the levers of power simultaneously might cause chaos by making large numbers of divisions politically salient, quickly overwhelming the entire system. Wright (2008*b*) argues the opposite; high initial levels of participation actually make for more stable democracies. He provides evidence that gradually bringing different segments of society into the political process following a transition increases

the risk of democratic failure. Initial levels of participation are related to institutional legacy, with Competitive authoritarian regimes seeing a higher initial level of participation following a democratic transition than closed regimes. Thus, institutional legacy may only be related to democratic regime stability indirectly, through its effect on initial level of participation.

Hypothesis 3: *Institutional legacy has no direct effect on democratic survival; it has only an indirect effect working through initial level of political participation.*

The next section details an empirical strategy for testing these three hypotheses. The findings strongly support Hypothesis 1, indicating that Competitive authoritarian regimes make for more stable democracies. Like Wright (2008*b*), I find that initial levels of participation are associated with the survival of new democracies, but institutional legacy also has a direct and independent effect on regime survival.

3.1.4 Endogenous Elections

As discussed in the previous chapter, parties, legislatures and contested elections can be thought of as endogenous institutions; they are created, molded and manipulated by autocrats that want to remain in power. Scholars have still regularly treated them as exogenous with respect to various outcomes of interest like the stability of the regime or the prospects for democratization (Gandhi 2008; Brownlee 2009), but endogeneity may still pose a problem (Pepinsky 2014). If Competitive authoritarianism is partly caused by factors that also affect the likelihood of democratic stability, then our estimates of the effect of competitive elections will be biased. For example, a longstanding democratic movement within a society may force concessions in the form of legalized political parties or more competitive elections and also help to sustain a new democracy in the event that a transition takes place. But the adoption of nominally competitive elections has rarely been the result of mass democratiza-

tion movements, which have tended to either succeed in overthrowing their government (as in Tunisia), or have been silenced by repression (as in Iran). While authoritarian regimes do institutionalize when faced with threats (Gandhi 2008), these threats tend to emerge from elites or groups seeking greater power for themselves rather than political equality for the whole society.

There are some factors thought to be driving the adoption of multiparty elections that are also likely associated with the stability of subsequent democracies. Gandhi (2008) argues that the degree of division and policy polarization within a society makes the adoption of institutions less likely. Divided societies probably also face a greater risk of democratic breakdown. This could cause us to overestimate the impact of Competitive legacies since some of the effect may be due to less fractionalization and polarization, on average. The analysis below makes an effort to explicitly control for societal divisions using a measure of ethnic fractionalization. Wealth is also potentially related to authoritarian institutions. Dictators with access to a steady flow of resource rents are less likely to institutionalize (Gandhi 2008) but they are also less likely to democratize (Ross 2001). Only a small proportion of resource dependent states enter the data as new democracies, but the few that do may be less likely to have institutionalized and also less economically developed as a result of the resource curse. The expected negative effect of low economic development on democratic stability could then mistakenly be attributed to having non–Competitive legacies. To address this, I also control for economic development, economic growth, and natural resource dependence in the analysis that follows. Finally, since military dictatorships are both less likely to hold elections (Gandhi 2008) and less likely to transition into permanent democracies (Cheibub 2007), I also include a dummy for former military regimes.

3.2 Data and Empirical Analysis

This section presents the dataset of new democracies that will be used in the current and subsequent chapters. Since I am interested in authoritarian legacies, the sample will consist of democratic regimes that have recently experienced a transition from authoritarian rule. Competitive authoritarianism was not as prevalent prior to World War II as it has become in the postwar era; also, a number of new democracies emerged during the Third Wave of democratization, beginning in the 1970s. Taken together, this suggests that roughly the last quarter of the twentieth century would be a reasonable timeframe for this study.

Przeworski et al.'s (2000) dichotomous coding of Democratic and Autocratic regimes for nearly every country in the world since the end of World War II allows me to identify all new democratic regimes that emerged during the period of observation.[3] Data was collected from Przeworski et al. (2000) on 58 new democratic regimes that transitioned from authoritarian rule between 1975 and 2003 (675 regime–years). The unit of analysis is regime–year. Of the 58 democratic transitions that occurred, 17 subsequently returned to authoritarian rule. The majority of democratic failures occurred in Africa, but South America, Asia, and Eastern Europe also saw authoritarian backsliding. The spatio–temporal domain of the sample captures the diversity of the dozens of democratic transitions that occurred around the world in the last quarter of the 20th century. The sample includes most, but not all, new democracies that emerged during the period under observation. Two newly created post-Soviet republics, and Lithuania were not included, though the sample contains many cases in Eastern Europe. Taiwan and all microstates (population$\leq$one million) are omitted from most analyses due to lack of available data on key variables. Table 3.1 lists all of the countries in the data, along with their years as democracies.

[3]Details on the coding protocol in Przeworski et al. are discussed in the next section.

Table 3.1: Authoritarian Regimes Succeeded by Electoral Democracies, 1975–2003

Country	Years as Democracy	Country	Years as Democracy
Albania	1992–	Macedonia	1991–
Argentina	1983–	Madagascar	1993–
Armenia	1991–	Malawi	1994–
Bangladesh	1991–	Mali	1992–
Benin	1991–	Mexico	2000–
Bolivia	1979–80, 1982–	Moldova	1996–
Brazil	1979–	Mongolia	1992–
Bulgaria	1990–	Nepal	1991–2002
Burundi	1993–96	Nicaragua	1984–
Cape Verde	1991–	Niger	1993–96, 2000–
Central African Republic	1993–2003	Nigeria	1979–83, 1999–
Chile	1990–	Pakistan	1988–1998
Congo	1992–97	Panama	1989–
Cote d'Ivoire	2000–2003	Peru	1980–90, 2001–
Croatia	1991–	Philippines	1986–
Cyprus	1983–	Poland	1989–
Czech Republic	1993–	Portugal	1976–
Ecuador	1979–2001	Romania	1990–
El Salvador	1984–	Russia	1992–
Estonia	1991–	Sao Tome	1991–
Ghana	1979–81, 2000–	Senegal	2000–
Greece	1975–	Sierra Leone	1996–97, 1998–
Grenada	1984–	South Africa	1994–
Guatemala	1986–	Spain	1977–
Guinea–Bissau	2000–2003	Sri Lanka	1989–
Guyana	1992–	Sudan	1986–89
Haiti	1994–	Suriname	1988–1990, 1991–
Honduras	1982–	Taiwan	1996–
Hungary	1990–	Thailand	1975–76, 1983–91, 1992–
Indonesia	1999–	Turkey	1983–
Kenya	2002–	Uganda	1980–1985
South Korea	1988–	Ukraine	1990–
Kyrgyzstan	1991–2001	Uruguay	1985–
Latvia	1991–	Zambia	1991–

Democratic spells with no end year indicate regimes that were coded as democratic as of January 2004. All microstates (Sao Tome, Cape Verde, Grenada, Suriname, and Guyana) and Taiwan were dropped from the full analysis due to the unavailability of data on control variables. Including these regimes under alternate specifications did not change the substantive or statistical significance of the main results.

3.2.1 Democratic Regime Survival

Transitions were coded according to the criteria offered by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) which classifies regimes as either *Democratic* or *Autocratic*. Przeworski et al. (2000) build upon Przeworski's previous description that "democracy is a system in which parties lose elections" (Przeworski 1991, 10). This is operationalized by Przeworski et al. (2000) by imposing a three-part criteria for the presence of democracy; there must be contested elections for national office that are characterized by ex ante uncertainty, ex-post irreversibility, and repeatability (Przeworski et al 2000, 16). That means that elections must occur in which incumbents face a real possibility of electoral defeat, the outcomes of elections are respected, and turnover in office is actually observed. As the authors note, most indicators of democracy, whether dichotomous or not generally agree on the classification of particular regimes and they show that their measure is in fact almost perfectly predicted using other standard measures in the literature.

In Przeworski et al.'s coding, years in which countries experience a regime transition are coded for the incoming regime, so transition–years are indicated by a change in the type of regime. Dichotomous measures of democracy are widely accepted in the transitions literature (see Geddes 1999, Przeworski et al. 2000, Linz 1975), though some have opted to view democratization as movement along a continuum of democracy or polyarchy (Lindberg 2006; 2009). When trying to examine the effect of electoral institutions on democratization, dichotomous measures may be problematic to the extent that they rely on elections themselves as part of their criteria for the existence of democracy, as most do, including the one used in this study. In practice, however, this measure largely comports with the available alternatives and with the general understandings about when a country has democratized or transitioned to authoritarian rule. Furthermore, since we are interested specifically in how institutional legacy affects the survival of democracy, not necessarily its emergence, the

operationalization used here does not pose a problem.

Countries enter the sample in the year after experiencing a democratic transition. They leave the sample when they either fail or are censored. A regime is considered to fail if it experiences a transition to authoritarian rule. Regimes that enter the sample and do not fail by 2004 are considered censored. Countries can enter and leave the sample multiple times by experiencing multiple democratic transitions within the period under observation.

Figure 3.1 plots the Kaplan–Meier survivor function for my sample.[4] The survivor function estimates the unconditional probability of surviving to time t. Hence, the probability of survival declines monotonically from time zero, where the probability of survival is one. The survivor function shows that democratic regimes of the Third Wave have been somewhat resilient, with roughly three quarters of new democracies expected to survive more than two decades. The survivor function also appears to be flattening out over time which is what we would expect as democracy becomes consolidated.[5]

The hazard estimate is plotted in Figure 3.2. The hazard gives the rate of failure conditional on survival to time t. As we might expect, new democracies face the highest risk of authoritarian backsliding in the first decade or so after a democratic transition, with the risk of failure dropping off substantially by about fifteen years post–transition. The hazard peaks at roughly 7 or 8 years after transition, and rises again at about twenty years post–transition. If democratic values play a role in sustaining young democracies then their greatest impact may be during those tumultuous first few years when the risk of returning to authoritarian rule is near its maximum.

[4]Please see the Appendix for details on the estimation of the hazard, survival function, and Cox models presented below. The estimation of the survival functions accounts for right-censoring and the fact that cases can enter the sample at different points in time during the period under observation.

[5]Substantively, this means that younger democracies failed at a higher rate than older ones in my sample. But this is more appropriately conveyed through the hazard rate.

Figure 3.1: Survival Curve: Persistence of New Democracies



3.2.2 Operationalizing Institutional Legacy

Competitive legacies are coded by looking at the competitiveness of national elections that occurred in the decade prior to a democratization. The goal of this measure is to identify regimes in which multiparty elections were a routine occurrence. In order to be considered Competitive, there must have been at least two years of the preceding 10 in which multiparty elections were held.[6] Elections are considered multiparty if there was a legalized opposition

[6]In a handful of cases, the existing regime was less than 10 years old when a new democracy emerged. If 10 or more of the previous 15 were coded nondemocratic, then the preceding 10 nondemocratic years were considered. If fewer than 10 of the last 15 years were nondemocratic then the case was dropped. Since some regimes held one or more multiparty elections in the course of liberalizing, elections occurring in the year immediately preceding a transition were not considered for the purposes of coding legacies. Both of these steps reduce the likelihood of conflating the effects of multiparty competition with the effects of past democratic experience; they also make it more difficult to demonstrate an effect for Competitive legacies.

Figure 3.2: Hazard Estimate: Risk of Authoritarian Reversal



party (or parties) that actually contested the election.[7] This coding of Competitive legacies emphasizes the need for both *de jure* and *de facto* political opposition. Data on the legality of opposition parties and their electoral participation was taken from Hyde and Marinov (2012).[8]

[7] In rare cases, no opposition parties contested despite being legally allowed; and in rarer cases, some opposition parties were not formally recognized but contested elections anyway.

[8] The literature provides other indicators of Competitive authoritarianism that could be used to code legacy. Brownlee (2009), for example, provides a measure that is based upon the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions and considers both whether elections were competitive (opposition freely participated) and whether non-regime parties actually had any electoral success. Since my conceptualization of Competitive legacies deals almost entirely with the former (the presence of competitive elections) and not with the latter (the outcome of elections), Brownlee's measure is not ideal for my purposes. However, replicating the analyses presented here and in subsequent chapters using an alternative Competitive legacy indicator that is based on Brownlee's measure yields findings that are substantively the same as those presented here. In fact, the two differ in only a few cases.

Table 3.2: Multiparty Elections in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes Prior to Democratization

Country	Transition Year	Elections in Previous Ten Non-Democratic Years
Bangladesh	1990	1988 (L), 1986 (L/E), 1981 (E)
Brazil	1978	1970 (L), 1974 (L)
El Salvador	1983	1974 (L), 1976 (L), 1977 (E), 1978 (L)
Ghana	2000	1992 (L/E), 1996 (L/E)
Guyana	1991	1980 (L), 1985 (E)
Haiti	1993	1987 (L/E), 1988 (L/E), 1990 (L/E), 1991 (E)
Indonesia	1998	1987 (L), 1992 (L), 1997 (L)
Kenya	2002	1994 (L), 1997 (L/E)
South Korea	1987	1978 (L), 1981 (L/E), 1985 (L)
Mexico	1999	1991 (L), 1994 (L/E), 1997 (L)
Panama	1988	1980 (CA), 1984 (L/E)
Peru	2000	1990 (L/E), 1992 (L), 1995 (L/E)
Philippines	1988	1978 (L), 1981 (E), 1984 (L), 1986 (E), 1987 (L)
Senegal	1999	1988 (L/E), 1993 (L/E), 1998 (L)
South Africa	1993	1984 (L), 1987 (L), 1989 (L)
Sri Lanka	1987	1977 (L), 1982 (E)
Taiwan	1995	1986 (L), 1989 (L), 1991 (CA), 1992 (L)
Thailand	1982	1969 (L), 1979 (L)

The abbreviations beside each election year indicate the type of election: (L), legislative; (E), executive; (CA), constituent assembly.

The result of this operationalization is a dummy variable that does not vary over the lifespan of each new democracy in the data. Competitive legacy will be the key explanatory variable in the analyses that follow. About one-third of the new democracies and regime-years in the data are coded as Competitive. Examples of new democracies with Competitive legacies include Bangladesh (from 1990), Brazil (from 1978), and Taiwan (from 1995).

This operationalization focuses on the presence of electoral competition rather than on any actual success for the opposition parties or candidates. Other measures of Competitive authoritarianism, including Brownlee's (2009) operationalization of Competitive regimes, depend on both contestation *and* degree of electoral success achieved by the opposition. For the purpose of examining the arguments put forth above, the distinguishing quality we

are most interested in is the presence of legal electoral opposition parties, not necessarily their rate of success. The present coding of legacy and one based on Brownlee's coding of Competitive regimes differ only in a few cases.

If the proposed pro–democracy effects of Competitive authoritarianism accrue over time with repeated elections, then equating all Competitive legacies, however long or short, is problematic. On average, the effect of Competitive legacy should be greater in countries with more experience with Competitive authoritarianism. The present analysis, however, does not distinguish longer legacies from shorter ones – any state that was Competitive in the 10 years prior to transition is considered to have a Competitive legacy, whether they had been holding nominally competitive elections for one decade or for several. Operationalizing institutional legacy in this way makes it more difficult to find support for Hypothesis 1 than if only states with longer Competitive authoritarian experience had been considered to have Competitive legacies. The results still strongly support Hypothesis 1 over Hypothesis 2.

Figure 3.3 plots the Kaplan–Meier survival estimates for cases with and without Competitive legacies. Almost a quarter of the new democracies with non-Competitive institutional legacies are expected to fail in the first decade following a democratic transition, with nearly half expected to return to authoritarian rule after thirty years. In contrast, regimes with Competitive legacies appear to fare much better with over 80% predicted to survive thirty years or more. A logrank test of the equality of the survivor functions indicates that there is a statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) between the expected survival of new democracies with Competitive legacies and without Competitive legacies.

Figure 3.3 supports Hypothesis 1; within the sample, democracies that were born out of Competitive authoritarian regimes do fare better than those emerging from Closed regimes. But this bivariate analysis does not account for other important factors such as GDP or the level of ethnic conflict that a young democracy faces. The next section specifies a Cox

Figure 3.3: Survival Curves for New Democracies by Electoral Legacy



proportional hazards model for repeated events that controls for several other factors and explicitly tests whether or not the effect of institutional legacy is working through initial levels of democratic participation.

3.2.3 Modeling the Survival of Democracy

The dependent variable of interest in this analysis is the survival of new democracies. More precisely, I am interested in how having a particular institutional legacy affects the probability that a new democracy experiences a transition back to authoritarian rule. An event history analysis is appropriate when modeling the hazard of experiencing some event, as event history models have a built–in set of tools for dealing with several characteristics of

survival–time data, such as censored observations (observations that never experience an event while under observation), temporal dependence, different entry times, and the inclusion of time–varying covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

The semi–parametric Cox proportional hazards model has a major advantage over parametric survival models: the Cox model does not demand that we make any assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard. This allows us to proceed without imposing any assumptions about whether the overall risk of regime failure is rising, falling, or constant over time. Since none of the theory discussed here makes any firm predictions about the shape of the baseline hazard in this case, it is preferable that we not make any unsupported assumptions.[9] Additionally, the Cox model allows us to easily account for the repeated nature of democratic breakdown, which a country may experience more than once.[10]

The next analysis employs a Cox model to investigate the effect of institutional legacy on the survival of new democracies. Standard errors were clustered on country to relax the independence assumption within units. While the properties of this particular Cox model make it an appropriate choice, the main findings are robust to numerous alternative modeling strategies and specifications.

Control Variables

In addition to the institutional legacy variable (Competitive), a number of relevant control variables were included in the analysis.

A country's wealth has been shown to be related to the stability of democracy (Prze-

[9]While tools such as the Aikake Information Criterion can help to choose between different parametric models, Box–Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) argue that in the absence of a strong theoretical justification for imposing any assumptions about the baseline hazard, the Cox model is the best, most flexible alternative.

[10]Residuals–based tests indicate that the proportional hazards assumption is not significantly violated by any of the variables in the model.

worski et al. 2000). The log of each new democracy's GDP is included for each year it remains under observation to account for how differences in wealth might affect the risk faced by new democracies. Since economic downturns might also affect the resilience of the regime, I also include a measure of GDP growth over the preceding year. A dummy variable was added to control for natural resource-dependent states, using the coding provided in Ross (2001). Also included in the analysis is Alesina's (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization which combines racial and linguistic variation within a country. Obviously, greater ethnic diversity might be expected to increase the overall level of conflict in a polity, likely having a negative effect on the stability of new democracies.

Some aspects of a country's authoritarian past are also explicitly controlled for in the subsequent analysis. First, as a measure of past democratic experience, I included the number of years in the postwar period that each country was coded a democracy by Przeworski et al. (2000). I also include for each country the number of continuous years of nondemocratic rule that they experienced prior to entering the dataset.[11] I also include a dummy variable indicating if the previous autocracy had been a military regime, taken from Geddes (2005).

Finally, Wright (2008*b*) argues that higher initial levels of participation make for more stable democracies. His study shows that new democracies in which a greater portion of the population was brought into the political process right after democratization tend to survive longer than democracies where initial participation was relatively limited. This finding leads directly to Hypothesis 3; the assertion that institutional legacy may have no independent effect on the survival of new democracies but rather it may have only an indirect effect

[11] Controls for Central and Eastern Europe or connections to Western countries/organizations were not explicitly included in these analyses. Most of the new democracies without Communist legacies had close ties to some Western governments or IGOs, including virtually all those with Competitive legacies. Hyde and Marinov (2011) offer a dichotomous measure of Western-connectedness that can be used to examine the potential effect of international ties. Including their measure in the analysis does not affect the substantive or statistical significance of the findings presented here. Including a post-Soviet dummy or a dummy for years after 1989 also has no impact on the results and neither was statistically significant.

by altering the expected level of participation just following a transition. To examine this question directly, I employ the same measure of initial participation as Wright (2008*b*): Polity IV's seven–point scale of participatory competitiveness (PARCOM). A country's PARCOM score on the year it became a democracy was used to code the initial level of participation for each regime in the data. Since we are only interested in *initial* or starting levels, a regime's score is the same for every year it remains in the data.[12] Descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
logged GDP	3.105	.480	1.968	4.310
GDP growth	-.009	.131	-.770	1.444
Resource Dependence	.146	.353	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization	.454	.239	.002	.930
Prior Democracy	6.623	10.166	0	33
Age of Predecessor	27.289	15.747	1	54
Military	.172	.378	0	1
Initial Participation	3.375	.950	0	5

3.2.4 Results

Table 3.4 presents the results from two different Cox regressions modeling democratic stability. Model 1 only includes the non-time-varying independent variables representing fixed characteristics of a particular new democracy. Model 2 adds all of the remaining controls. Interpretation is relatively straightforward; coefficients that are negative (positive) and significant indicate variables that are associated with a decrease (increase) in the overall risk of regime failure.

[12]The measures of GDP, GDP growth, and ethnic fractionalization vary over time in the data; PARCOM, Military, Resource Dependence, Prior Democracy, and Age of Predecessor are not time–varying.

Recall that Hypothesis 1 asserts a negative relationship between Competitive legacy and risk of democratic failure, Hypothesis 2 proposes that Competitive legacies are not associated with a reduction in risk of breakdown, and Hypothesis 3 claims that the effect of institutional legacy is entirely operating through initial levels of political participation. A negative and significant coefficient on Competitive (indicating that Competitive legacies are associated with a decreased risk of democratic failure) would be considered support for Hypothesis 1; insignificant or positive coefficients for both institutional legacy variables would be supportive of Hypothesis 2; and Hypothesis 3 would be supported if Competitive is negative and significant but becomes insignificant after *Initial Participation* is added to the model. The findings are strongly supportive of Hypothesis 1 and raise serious doubts about Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.[13] Institutional legacy has a profound effect on the survival of the young democracies in the data, even after controlling for a number of theoretically relevant factors including initial level of participation. Specifically, Competitive authoritarian legacies significantly reduce the risk of breakdown in new democracies; in comparison, regimes with Closed legacies face a risk of failure that is, on average, many times greater.

Competitive legacies are associated with a significantly lower risk of democratic failure than non-Competitive legacies. The effect of Competitive legacy is quite robust, remaining negative and significant in both models. The consistently negative and significant effect of Competitive legacy is strong support for Hypothesis 1 and a major challenge to Hypothesis 2. Moving from Model 1 to Model 2, the effect of Competitive legacy retains its magnitude and statistical significance with the inclusion of additional, time-varying controls. Even controlling for *Initial Participation*, which is also associated with decreased risk of democratic failure, the effect of Competitive legacy remains substantively large and statistically significant. The last column of Table 3.4 reports the results from the full model and the

[13] In a bivariate analysis not reported here, the coefficient on *Competitive* is negative and significant at the 10% level.

Table 3.4: Institutional Legacy and Democratic Regime Survival

Andersen-Gill Cox Model		
	Model 1	Model 2
Competitive	-2.268**	-2.109**
	(.731)	(1.024)
Initial Participation	-.644**	-.630***
	(.151)	(.222)
Prior Democracy	-.051	-.052
	(.046)	(.060)
Age of Preceding Regime	-.058**	-.052*
	(.027)	(.030)
Resource Dependence	-.672	-1.423*
	(.875)	(.714)
Military	-.223	1.867*
	(.845)	(.192)
logGDP		-.366
		(1.026)
GDP Growth		-4.922***
		(1.700)
Ethnic Fractionalization		6.754***
		(2.212)
N	741	675
N–failures	17	17
Log pseudo–likelihood	-53.386	-42.617

$*p < .10 \ **p < .05 \ ***p < .01$

Entries are coefficients from Cox regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

coefficient on Competitive legacy is negative and significant, indicating that there is a robust relationship between Competitive legacy and reduced risks to democratic survival. The results indicate that we can reject Hypothesis 3 as well; Competitive legacies have a significant independent effect on the survival of new democracies beyond any indirect impact they may have by driving up initial levels of participation. Taken together, these results indicate that electoral authoritarian regimes make for more stable democracies if a minimal level of meaningful political competition is allowed to thrive.

Simulated hazard ratios were calculated to examine the substantive significance of this relationship.[14] Simulated hazard ratios allow us to examine how the risk faced by a new democracy changes when we vary its institutional legacy while holding all other covariates constant at substantively meaningful values.[15] The simulated ratio of the hazards faced by a hypothetical country with a non-Competitive rather than a Competitive legacy is 9.3 ($p < .05$). The hazard ratio indicates that all else being equal, a country with a non-Competitive institutional legacy faces a risk of democratic failure that is nine times greater than if the same country had a Competitive legacy. The magnitude of the substantive effect of institutional legacy is quite impressive. New democracies with Competitive legacies face a hazard that is just a fraction of that faced by identical regimes with non-Competitive legacies.

Most of the control variables in the full model (Model 2) behave as expected with few surprises. As Wright (2008*b*) shows, Initial Competitiveness is associated with reduced risk of breakdown ($p < .01$). Higher GDP is not associated with lower risk to democracy; the coefficient on logGDP is not statistically significant. GDPgrowth is strongly associated with democratic survival ($p < .05$), indicating that dynamics have a stronger impact on the stability of new democracies than absolute levels of development. More Ethnic Fractionalization is associated with substantially greater risks of democratic breakdown, but the effect is not statistically significant. Having natural resource wealth also significantly reduces the risk of democratic breakdown, but the effect is only marginally significant ($p < .10$). Interestingly, being immediately preceded by a longer-lived authoritarian regime also increases the chances that a new democracy survives ($p < .10$), even when controlling for past experience with democracy, which surprisingly has no discernable effect.

[14] The hazard ratio is defined as $HR = \frac{h(t|x^1)}{h(t|x)} = \frac{\lambda(t)\exp x^1\beta}{\lambda(t)\exp x\beta} = \frac{\exp x^1\beta}{\exp x\beta}$, where x^1 and x are set values of the independent variables (one in which Competitive = 1 and one in which Competitive = 0) given draws of β from its sampling distribution (Imai, King and Lau 2007; 2008).

[15] *Resources* was held at its mode and all other controls were held at their means.

These findings offer substantial support to the hypothesis that Competitive authoritarian regimes make for more stable and longer–lived democracies (Hypothesis 1). The effect of institutional legacy is both highly statistically significant and substantively meaningful, with Competitive legacies leading to a risk of authoritarian backsliding that is many times smaller than would be expected given a different authoritarian history. Even accounting for the complementary effect of high Initial Participation, institutional legacy can be seen to exert a powerful, independent effect on democratic stability.

The main results of this analysis are quite robust to alternative model specifications and modeling strategies, despite the relatively small number of cases and failures in the data. Estimating models for discrete–time processes and rare events also yields statistically significant results for the effect of institutional legacy. Finally, when employing a host of different parametric models the findings presented here do not change in any meaningful way. The main results are thus supported using a variety of different specifications and estimators.

3.3 Conclusion

Institutional legacies matter. Newly democratized states whose predecessors institutionalized a minimal level of electoral competitiveness are much more likely to remain democratic than states with no pre–transition history of electoral competition. The exact mechanisms driving this process are not entirely clear, though the literature linking Competitive authoritarianism with democratization offers some guidance (see Lindberg 2009*a*). If, as some have suggested, unfree electoral competition instills democratic values and participatory norms then it seems reasonable to expect that such states will have an advantage in the event of a democratic transition. Prior experience with competitive elections might lead to the

adoption of values and norms that help to stave–off authoritarian backsliding. The greater acceptance of democratic norms may help to shepherd young democracies through a tumultuous first decade and first few electoral cycles. Going beyond the first decade, Competitive legacies may provide new democracies with a head start in the building of mass acceptance of the rules of the game and thereby offer them a permanent advantage in terms of democratic stability and consolidation.

The evidence presented strongly supports the conclusion that Competitive legacies make for more stable democracies. Using a duration model for repeated events, I show that Competitive legacies are associated with significantly decreased risk of democratic breakdown among newly democratized states. Simulations show that these effects are substantively significant as well; democracies with non-Competitive legacies face a risk of democratic failure nine-times greater than new democracies with Competitive legacies. Alternative modeling strategies, specifications, and the omission of some potentially influential cases does not impact the significance of these main results.

Many questions remain, especially concerning the specific mechanisms driving the observed relationship between institutional legacy and democratic survival. More detailed theoretical and empirical examinations of the mechanisms thought to contributing to the democratizing effect of elections may lend further insights. Field work in newly democratized states may help to pin down the relationship between experience with institutions and acceptance of democratic norms and values. Any productive efforts to this end will need to take care to address the potential endogeneity between democratic norms and the adoption of competitive elections.

In light of the vigorous debate over the potential democratizing effects of Competitive authoritarianism, it is surprising that no previous work has directly addressed the long–term effects of these institutions. Both sides of the debate offer accounts that yield testable

implications concerning the post–transition effects of Competitive authoritarianism. This study provides strong support for the argument that electoral competition leads to more mobilization and greater acceptance of democratic norms and values. This chapter presents compelling evidence that the post–transition effects of electoral institutions are quite important and deserving of greater attention. Whether or not elections can foster democratic transitions, there is reason to support the adoption of minimally competitive electoral institutions in authoritarian regimes; if a transition occurs, new democracies with Competitive legacies will be much more likely to avoid authoritarian reversals and become stable, established democracies.

Chapter 4

Authoritarian Backsliding

The Third Wave of democratization has led to a great deal of interest in the stability of new democracies. Scholars have investigated the relationship between various factors like economic conditions (Przeworski et al. 2000; Reenock and Sobek 2007), institutional design (Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Gates et al. 2006), and political mobilization/participation (Wright 2008*b*; Aleman and Yang 2011), and democratic regime survival.

Authoritarian reversals are not uncommon in new democracies. But much more frequently, governments restrict freedom while not overreaching so far as to be broadly considered a return to authoritarian rule. Just as Competitive legacies impact the likelihood of authoritarian reversals, they might also affect the less dramatic instances of authoritarian backsliding. The instances of backsliding that occurred in the last several decades are much more numerous than are full reversals and also more geographically dispersed. These crackdowns on basic freedoms sometimes constitute a broader failure of democracy, but more often they are challenging moments that new democracies face on the path to full consolidation.

While research has largely focused on a regime's ultimate outcome (either democratic

consolidation or authoritarian reversal), most new democracies have along the way faced numerous threats to their stability and legitimacy in the form of restrictions on various political rights and freedoms. These instances of authoritarian backsliding have received less attention except in the handful of cases in which they led directly to a breakdown of democracy.[1] This chapter is concerned with the broad class of events in which rights or liberties are restricted in new democracies, whether or not a regime change takes place.

I describe two types of authoritarian backsliding and empirically examine the effect of institutional legacy on each. The first deals with the curtailment of political rights, such as electoral fraud or disenfranchisment of certain groups. The second dimension concerns assaults on civil liberties, which includes abridgements of individual freedoms of speech, association and so on. While these two dimensions are inherently linked in most conceptions of liberal democracy, they are theoretically distinct; respect for the integrity of the electoral process does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with respect for personal freedoms. The two dimensions may provide substitutable strategic choices for those trying to undermine the democratic process in unconsolidated democracies – the same result might be achieved by banning a particular political party or stealing an election as by closing certain media outlets or harassing organizers. Which strategy, if any, is chosen likely depends on numerous characteristics from the political culture and other features of the citizenry to the institutional setting and authoritarian legacy.

For the new democracies that emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the path from democratic transition to democratic consolidation has been neither smooth nor steady. Many new democracies have seen periods in which democratically elected leaders or their opponents have limited individual freedoms and political competition, or impeded the rule of law. These actions can take a variety of different forms, from limiting freedom

[1] Work on state repression has also addressed several specific types of government activity aimed at limiting or eliminating particular rights and liberties. See Davenport (2007) for a review.

of the press to openly disregarding the outcomes of free and fair elections. Occasionally, these have led to a failure of democracy and a return to authoritarianism. Previous work on the stability of new democracies has looked exclusively at regime breakdown and reversions to authoritarian rule (see Reenock et al. 2007, Wright 2008*b*, Svolik 2008). They have not addressed restrictions on rights and liberties that are not associated with a regime change; violations that occur without pushing the regime across some threshold of democracy. While they have not received a great deal of attention in the literature on democratic regime stability, such violations have occurred quite frequently in new democracies.

Of the more than 60 new democracies that emerged since the mid 1970s, fewer than two dozen have experienced a return to dictatorship (see Table 3.1 in the previous chapter). Those that did were mostly concentrated in Africa and Latin America, with a handful in other areas of the world. In contrast, instances of authoritarian backsliding, events that curtail rights and liberties, were significantly more frequent and more widespread, touching nearly every continent and a majority of new democracies. The frequency and distribution of these events makes them fertile ground for examining theories of democratic stability. Furthermore, their prevalence begs for greater scholarly attention and a more thorough understanding of their particular causes and consequences.

Authoritarian backsliding can thus occur with or without a complete return to authoritarian rule. I describe two different types of backsliding: restrictions on political rights and restrictions on civil liberties. Political rights refer to the functioning of government and the electoral process, and civil liberties refer to basic individual rights such as freedom of expression and association. Competitive legacies could be expected to affect the chances of political rights backslides because experience with multiparty competition may build support for broad rights to participate in politics. I utilize annual reductions in Freedom House's Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores to indicate the occurrence of each type of back-

sliding. An analysis of new democracies that emerged between 1975 and 2003 demonstrates that Competitive legacies significantly reduce the incidence of restrictions on political rights. In contrast, only GDP has even a marginally significant impact on civil liberties restrictions. The findings demonstrate that Competitive authoritarianism may help to enshrine some aspects of political pluralism and force leaders to be inclusive, but not restrict the capacity of the government to suspend basic freedoms. This chapter also shows that there is a meaningful distinction between the two types of backsliding and suggests that the restrictions on political rights (electoral fraud, corruption, restricted participation) may be more closely associated with democratic failure than restrictions on civil liberties.

This analysis builds upon the existing literature in several ways. First, I distinguish two theoretically distinct dimensions upon which new democracies can experience backsliding from liberal democracy. Second, I incorporate recent findings on the stabilizing effect of broad political participation (Wright 2008*b*) and the democratizing effect of Competitive authoritarianism (Brownlee 2009) and show both to be related to one dimension of authoritarian backsliding. Finally, I analyze events that do not meet the standard definition of regime change but that are conceptually linked to democratic regime failure.

The next section discusses two types of authoritarian backsliding and how they may be impacted by pre-transition electoral experience. I then present an operationalization of backsliding that utilizes existing data from Freedom House. The empirical section presents the results of a duration analysis of each type of authoritarian backsliding and discusses possible problems and extensions.

4.1 Authoritarian Backsliding

Recent research has investigated many of the factors associated with democratic regime stability (Reenock and Sobek 2007; Wright 2008*b*; Svolik 2008; Aleman and Yang 2011). Generally, these studies have dealt exclusively with events that forced a country beyond some threshold of democracy, indicating the failure of the regime. A good deal less is known about curtailments of rights and liberties that occur in the absence of an actual regime transition.

Authoritarian backsliding can be understood as any significant decrease in the political rights or civil liberties enjoyed by citizens in a new democracy. Backsliding can take a number of different forms from the corruption of a particular branch of government to the stifling of a free press to electoral malfeasance and beyond. Given the breadth of the concept it makes sense to try to group together kinds of backsliding that resemble one another. Freedom House's distinction between political rights and civil liberties provides a useful analytic shorthand for classifying two types of authoritarian backsliding. Backsliding can either take the form of restrictions of civil liberties – individual rights to things like speech and association – and political rights – the proper functioning of government and elections. An example of backsliding on the political rights dimension includes widespread allegation of electoral fraud, as occurred in Benin's 2001 presidential election which multiple candidates boycotted (Freedom House 2003). Alternatively, restrictions on political rights could take the form of failure of proper government functioning due to corruption as in the case of Guatemala's judicial system in 2002 (Pena 2007). Backsliding on civil liberties includes attempts to silence dissent by banning popular protest as seen in Malawi in 2002 (Freedom House 2003a).

Backsliding may or may not be accompanied by an authoritarian reversal (a return to

authoritarian rule) and it may or may not be directly caused by those currently in control of the government,[2] but backsliding on either dimension is theoretically related to democratic failure. In some cases, it is caused by the same driving force that ultimately undoes a democratic regime, such as an executive's desire to hold onto power.[3] Events that restrict either political rights or civil liberties should also be expected to have a negative impact on the legitimacy of government and on the probability that the regime survives over the long-term. As leaders resort to stealing elections or silencing dissent, the system that put them in power likely begins to appear no more proper than the authority derived by the dictators that preceded them.

While the two types of backsliding are related to one another and to democratic breakdowns, they are also theoretically distinct. Restrictions on civil liberties and political rights do not frequently occur simultaneously, suggesting that they might represent substitutable strategies for undermining the democratic process or quieting dissent. For example, harassing opposition leaders could be as effective as electoral fraud at achieving some goals and it may be more or less costly depending upon the particular institutions, culture, and history of a given country. Both forms of backsliding represent a threat to the consolidation and stability of a new democracy, but each is likely driven by different factors. This suggests that while the same factors known to be associated with democratic breakdown may help explain backsliding, they might do so differently, with some factors being related to only one or the other dimension of backsliding.

[2]The working definition used here is deliberately broad so as to encompass actions that are taken by challengers or incumbents, with or without the full force of the state supporting them, and whatever the outcome of the action may be.

[3]Every failed democracy in my data faced at least one backsliding event on each dimension prior to returning to authoritarian rule.

4.1.1 Competitive Legacies

Do Competitive legacies reduce the probability of experiencing a backsliding event? The previous chapter established a link between multiparty electoral experience and the survival of new democracies. As was discussed, this can be explained by some of the literature explaining how elections push regimes toward greater liberalization. In particular, relative to Closed regimes, Competitive regimes should see more groups mobilization and investment in the political process on the part of leaders of politically relevant segments of society. This could be seen in Brazil, where political parties contested elections despite military control and, following the transition to democracy, continued with the same party infrastructure that they had maintained for decades (Mainwaring 1988). Additionally, repeated multiparty elections likely leads greater political efficacy and a sense of citizenship among those who participate than would otherwise exist, as Lindberg (2006) suggests in his work on sub-Saharan Africa. Following a transition to democracy, formerly Competitive regimes then benefit from having more politically relevant groups mobilized and organized into political parties and more citizens prepared to voice their demands to the government. Leaders of various groups are thus less likely to attempt to subvert the new regime, and more likely to work within it and exploit the political institutions that they have established; and citizens are better organized to pressure leaders who might seek to subvert the democratic process.

These same mechanisms could be expected to reduce the instances of political rights backsliding. Political rights include things like respect for broad participation and free and fair elections. In democracies with Competitive legacies, citizens who have become accustomed to casting a ballot and have gained some respect for political pluralism are less likely to tolerate the suspension of elections or banning of political parties. Furthermore, leaders would likely avoid these methods of repression as they should appear more costly in regimes with Competitive legacies.

Hypothesis 1*: New democracies with Competitive legacies should face a lower risk of political rights abuses than new regimes with Closed legacies.*

Backsliding on the civil liberties dimension is not as clearly associated with electoral legacies. First, while Competitive regimes at least claim to uphold political rights, they have routinely engaged in harsh repression of basic personal freedoms. For example, in Brazil, the military leadership allowed opposition parties to thrive, largely because they were easily manipulated, while simultaneously cracking down on media outlets and movement organizations that challenged the regime (Mainwaring 1988). Second, much of the work on tolerance and the adoption of democratic attitudes indicates that citizens in new democracies frequently support political equality while simultaneously approving of harsh, repressive tactics to deal with groups that they find offensive or threatening (see, for example, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998). This failure to reject authoritarian solutions may manifest as support for repression of particular groups or tightening of government control over various segments of society; the mobilization that Competitive regimes afford groups prior to a democratization may help to curtail the oppression of any one group through the development of a pluralist system with cross-cutting cleavages (Dahl 1970). Overall, these considerations do not allow us to make a clear prediction about the effect of Competitive legacies on the frequency of civil liberties restrictions.

4.1.2 Previous Empirical Work

Studies of democratic stability have largely ignored instances of backsliding that did not accompany a regime transition. Aleman and Yang (2011) note that such an approach is somewhat ahistorical since it ignores the fact that regime change is often incremental, tak-

ing place over a number of years. Their approach is to model transitions in one direction or another without the use of a particular cutpoint to create a democracy/autocracy dichotomy.[4] They take as their dependent variable a three-point change in a country's Polity score occurring within a three year period regardless of the overall level of democracy. This approach is more inclusive than most in that it allows for events that do not necessarily change the commonly understood classification of a country's regime-type. Still, Aleman and Yang restrict their analysis to countries that experience a three-point shift in their Polity score which is frequently significant enough to be considered an indicator of a regime change. Many of the events on either dimension of authoritarian backsliding would not elicit a full three-point shift in a country's Polity score.

The analysis that follows utilizes Freedom House's Civil Liberties and Political Rights scores to identify events that might otherwise be overlooked. Aleman and Yang also allow for the occurrence of "autocratizing transitions" in regimes of all types, both democratic and authoritarian (18).[5] In contrast, I confine my discussion and analysis to democratic regimes.[6]

While prior work has not addressed the broader conceptualization of backsliding that is presented here, many of the same variables found to be related to democratic failure should also relate to restrictions of political rights and civil liberties. Economic development has routinely been shown to inoculate democracies from authoritarian reversals (Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006; Aleman and Yang 2011). While there is some evidence that institutional (Gates et al. 2006) or political (Aleman and Yang 2011) factors might play a larger role, the hypothesis that high income supports democracy is among the longest-

[4]See Elkins (2000).

[5]The only exception is for those regimes whose Polity score makes the requisite shift mathematically impossible.

[6]The focus on new democracies is in keeping with the purposes of this dissertation. In addition, it may be more appropriate to examine democracies and autocracies separately since the same factors might not be theoretically relevant for explaining crackdowns in both types of regime.

standing in the literature (see Lipset 1959). If development plays a pivotal role in preventing returns to dictatorship then there is reason to believe that it may forestall restrictions of political rights and liberties as well.

The institutional arrangement that existed prior to the emergence of a new democracy may have longstanding effects on the successor regime. Several types of institutional arrangements have been shown to have an impact on regime stability and the prospects for democratization. It makes sense then to look at what impact different institutional legacies may have on the stability of a new democracy. Geddes' (1999) typology of authoritarian regimes based on their power base has been shown to be related to authoritarian regime stability. In addition to Geddes' own analysis, Brownlee (2009) shows that military regimes are much more fragile than other nondemocracies. Aleman and Yang (2011) further show that military regimes tend to be more likely to face autocratizing transitions, though this finding is really only relevant to nondemocracies. As Cheibub (2007) notes, military intervention into politics tends to be repetitive, which would indicate that new democracies emerging out of military dictatorships might be more likely than others to face military grabs for power, coups, or violent repression at the hands of security forces.

The next section presents an operationalization of both types of backsliding and provides some descriptive statistics. The operationalizations of each kind of backsliding serve as the dependent variables in the analysis that follows. I include the measure of Competitive legacy that was introduced in the previous chapter, as well as several relevant control variables, in order to explain authoritarian backsliding in new democracies over the last few decades.

4.2 Data and Methods

I examine the factors associated with authoritarian backsliding in the same set of 58 new democracies that emerged between 1975 and 2003 as employed in the previous chapter. The Cox models presented here are stratified to account for the multiple backsliding events that each new democracy can experience.

4.2.1 Authoritarian Backsliding

Authoritarian backsliding is measured using Freedom House's annual scoring of political rights and civil liberties. Both scales range from 1 to 7 with higher numbers indicating less freedom on a given dimension. Backsliding events are identified by any year in which the Freedom House political rights or civil liberties score increased for a country in the sample. Regime-years in which the political rights (civil liberties) score increased are coded as experiencing an authoritarian backslide on the political rights (civil liberties) dimension. Regime-years with an increase are coded as one, all other years are coded as zero. This produces two binary dependent variables for each type of backsliding.[7]

Backsliding on political rights (civil liberties) occurred 63 (51) times in the sample. Unlike full authoritarian reversals, which happened only 17 times in the sample and clustered largely in Africa and Latin America, backsliding on political rights occurred in nearly two-thirds of the countries in the sample (n=40) and touched almost every region. About half of those experienced a subsequent backsliding event. Backsliding on civil liberties followed a similar distribution. Table 4.1 provides details on which regimes experienced one or more of each type of event.[8]

[7] On a handful of occasions scores increased solely due to changes in the survey methodology employed by Freedom House; these regime-years are coded as zero to reflect that no backsliding occurred.

[8] No regime in the sample experienced more than four of either type of backsliding event.

Table 4.1: Authoritarian Backsliding in New Democracies, 1975-2004

Political Rights		Civil Liberties	
One event	*Two or more*	*One event*	*Two or more*
Benin	Albania	Bangladesh	Albania
Bolivia (1978)	Argentina	Benin	Argentina
Chile	Armenia	Bolivia (1978)	Armenia
Ecuador	Bangladesh	Bolivia (1981)	Brazil
El Salvador	Bolivia (1981)	Bulgaria	Central African Republic
Estonia	Brazil	Burundi	Congo-Brazzaville
Guinea-Bissau	Burundi	El Salvador	Ecuador
Latvia	Central African Republic	Haiti	Guatemala
Madagascar	Congo-Brazzaville	Macedonia	Kyrgystan
Mali	Croatia	Malawi	Mali
Moldova	Guatemala	Mongolia	Nicaragua
Niger (1992)	Haiti	Nepal	Nigeria (1999)
Panama	Honduras	Niger (1992)	Pakistan
Peru (1979)	Kyrgystan	Peru (1979)	Panama
Peru (2000)	Macedonia	Sri Lanka	Philippines
Philippines	Malawi	Sudan	Spain
Romania	Nepal	Thailand	
Sri Lanka	Nicaragua	Ukraine	
Sudan	Pakistan	Zambia	
Uganda	Ukraine		
Uruguay	Zambia		

The dates in parentheses indicate the dates of democratization for countries with multiple spells of democracy in the data. Columns one and three list the regimes that experienced only one backsliding in either category, respectively. Columns two and four list those that experienced multiple events in either category, respectively.

Table 4.1 shows that many new democracies face authoritarian backsliding of one type or another. It also shows that several of the failed regimes in the sample experienced both types of backsliding, many more than once. Pakistan, for example, experienced multiple regressions on both dimensions and ultimately failed; similarly, Central African Republic went through numerous backsliding events on both dimensions before devolving into civil war.

In contrast, some countries are missing from Table 4.1 because they experienced no

backsliding on either dimension. Several countries experience no backsliding events at all, including Ghana, South Korea and Indonesia. While these cases are the exception rather than the norm, it is worth noting that regimes with a competitive legacy represent one half (7) of those that experienced no events (14). Since formerly Competitive regimes are only roughly one-third of the sample, this might indicate that multiparty experience is associated with less backsliding, but it is necessary to examine how legacies impact each type of legacy separately while controlling for other relevant factors in order to establish such a link.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are graphs of the hazard estimates for political rights and civil liberties backslides, respectively.[9] In both cases the risk of a backslide spikes at roughly the same time as the risk of a regime failure, at around five to seven years after democratizing. The risk of experiencing either type of event drops dramatically as the age of the regime exceeds 10 to 15 years.

4.2.2 Model

The data are a binary cross-sectional time series that can be analyzed with the tools of event history modeling. Every regime is at risk of experiencing a backslide each year it is in the sample. Each regime experiences at most one event per dimension, per year, and remains in the sample and at risk until it either fails or is censored. The Cox proportional hazards model provides the flexibility necessary to deal with this data. The Cox model does not make assumptions about the distribution of the baseline hazard of experiencing a backsliding event, unlike other parametric models that force the data to fit a particular distribution (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Additionally, the Cox model can be easily modified to accommodate data with repeated events.

[9]Please see the Appendix for details on the estimation of the hazard and Cox models presented below.

Figure 4.1: Hazard Estimate: Political Rights Restrictions



Since there are repeated events within a single spell of democracy, I would like to model a situation in which failures occurring in the same country are not considered independent of one another. Additionally, the model should account for the fact that second events can only occur after a first event and third events can only occur after a second, and so forth. The conditional gap-time Cox model can accommodate this type of data. Standard errors are clustered on regime in order to relax the assumption of independence between backslides that happen in the same democratic spell. Also, stratifying by the previous number of backslides allows us to estimate a different baseline hazard for first, second, and subsequent events.[10] Since there were only a handful of fourth backslides of either type, the stratification was

[10]Estimating various other models, including discrete-time duration models and parametric models does not affect the substantive findings presented below.

Figure 4.2: Hazard Estimate: Civil Liberties Restrictions



limited to identifying those cases at risk of first, second, and then any subsequent event.

4.2.3 Independent Variables

The analyses of each type of backsliding employ many of the same controls as were used in the previous analysis of regime survival. Since backsliding can be considered a generalization of authoritarian reversals, many of the same controls are still quite relevant. Both analyses include as controls measures of the initial breadth of participation (PARCOMP), previous democratic experience, longevity of the preceding dictatorship, resource dependence, economic development (logGDP) and growth (change in GDP from the previous year), ethnic fractionalization, and former military dictatorships.

Both models also include Freedom House's democracy score which is computed by combining both the political rights and civil liberties scales. This will indicate whether or not backslides happen at all levels of democratic performance or only among those new democracies that transition but begin a very slow process toward full liberalization. Since we might expect the latter to be true of countries with a Closed legacy, including democracy score as a control should make it more difficult to find an effect for Competitive legacies.

Since we already know that electoral legacies are associated with regime persistence, it is appropriate to check that any relationship between legacy and backsliding is not driven entirely by cases in which democracy ultimately failed. To this end, I include a failed regime indicator and interact it with Competitive legacy. The failed regime indicator is coded one for all years of an regime that ultimately returned to authoritarian rule, and zero for all years of every regime that remained democratic for the entire time under observation. The interaction between failed regime indicator and Competitive will allow us to examine the effect of legacy both in permanent and failed spells of democracy. A failure indicator is also included to indicate regime-years in which full authoritarian reversals occurred.[11]

Finally, crackdowns may be related to the degree of anti-government mobilization that a regime faces. Using Banks' (2013) annual count of anti-government protests, I constructed a variable that represented the change in the number of anti-government protests from the previous year. Since protest levels are related to the cultural, social, and economic features of a particular place, the dynamic control is more appropriate than a static or lagged count of protests. This allows us to examine whether increases in the level of anti-government activity are related to crackdowns of political or civil liberties.[12]

[11] Omitting the controls for failed regime, failure year, and the interaction term does not affect the substantive or statistical results presented below.

[12] Establishing whether protests lead to crackdowns or vice versa is beyond the scope of this project. The variable included controls for whatever relationship exists between repression and dissent.

4.3 Results

Table 4.2 presents the results for the analysis of both types of backsliding. Interpretation is fairly straightforward: positive (negative) coefficients indicate an increased (decreased) probability of a backsliding event. The first column reports the results for the political rights model and the right column reports the results from the civil liberties model.

Competitive legacies are associated with a significant reduction in the risk of political rights restrictions. On average, new democracies with Competitive legacies face a risk of political rights backsliding that is barely one-third the risk faced by those with Closed legacies. Specifically, holding all other variables constant, the probability of experiencing a backsliding event on the political rights dimension is 62% lower for Competitive legacies as opposed to Closed legacies (hazard ratio $= .377,\ p < .05$). Moreover, the results in the second column indicate that this relationship holds for both failed and permanent democracies. The coefficient on Competitive in the interactive model indicates the effect of Competitive legacy among those states that did not return to authoritarian rule; the negative and significant coefficient ($p < .05$) indicates that even among permanent democracies, political rights backsliding is less likely if there is a legacy of multiparty competition. The magnitude of the effect is only slightly reduced when considering only permanent democracies, with Competitive legacies being associated with a 59% lower risk of backsliding. The coefficient on the interactions between Competitive and failed democracies does not quite reach standard levels of statistical significance ($p = .105$), but the negative sign indicates that the relationship is likely even stronger among non-permanent democracies. This is strong support for Hypothesis 1 and it indicates that electoral experience has a similar effect on backsliding as it has been shown to have on authoritarian reversals.

The effect of Competitive legacy on civil liberties backsliding is not statistically differ-

ent from zero. Experience with multiparty competition does not appear to do anything to forestall the all too frequent crackdowns on freedom of speech and expression that occur in new democracies.

Several other variables also demonstrate different relationships with one type of backsliding than with the other. Economic development (logGDP) reduces the likelihood of political rights restrictions ($p < .01$) but has no discernable impact on curtailments of civil liberties. Many of the wealthiest new democracies in the data, including South Africa, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic, experienced few, if any, events on the political rights dimension. Ethnic fractionalizaton is associated with fewer political rights backslides ($p < .01$) but the direction of the estimated effect reverses itself when looking at civil liberties, though it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the latter case. Higher scores (more freedom) on the combined Freedom House score are strongly associated with a decreased risk of political rights backsliding ($p < .01$), but are not significant in the civil liberties model.

Interestingly, protest appears to be negatively related to civil liberties abuses and positively related to political rights restrictions. An upward trend in anti-government protest is strongly related to the risk of civil liberties abuses; each additional large-scale, anti-government demonstration relative to the previous year is associated with a 13% decrease in the likelihood of a civil liberties backslide (hazard ratio $= .869$, $p < .05$). Amazingly, each additional demonstration is associated with a similarly-sized *increase* in the chances of a political rights backslide. Depending on the direction of causality, this could indicate that mass mobilization can help to prevent some government abuses while making others more likely.

Table 4.2: Predicting Authoritarian Backsliding: Conditional Gap-Time Cox Models

	PR Backslides		CL Backslides	
Competitive	-.975**	-.901**	-.243	-.186
	(.427)	(.441)	(.261)	(.391)
Initial Participation	-.002	-.017	-.179	-.171
	(.202)	(.206)	(.478)	(.181)
Prior Democracy	.032*	.029	.026	.023
	(.018)	(.019)	(.021)	(.025)
Age of Preceding Regime	-.002	-.013	.015	.013
	(.014)	(.055)	(.015)	(.016)
Resource Dependence	.172	.134	.227	.209
	(.548)	(.579)	(.439)	(.451)
LogGDP	-1.514***	-1.477***	-.387	-.361
	(.535)	(.533)	(.536)	(.582)
GDP growth	-2.092*	-2.123*	-1.160	-1.193
	(1.234)	(1.233)	(1.514)	(1.807)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.804***	-1.766**	.983	.989
	(.910)	(.886)	(1.804)	(1.051)
Military Legacy	.535	.584	.526	.547
	(.434)	(.438)	(.589)	(.588)
Democracy (FH)	-1.114***	-1.110***	-.693***	-.689***
	(.132)	(.183)	(.146)	(.146)
Protest	.123**	.123**	-.145**	-.144**
	(.062)	(.061)	(.069)	(.068)
Failed Regime	-.748*	-.721	-.064	-.039
	(.425)	(.445)	(.462)	(.462)
Failed Regime X Competitive		-.523		-.415
		(.940)		(.779)
Reversal	1.513***	1.542***	-.285	-.271
	(.552)	(.571)	(.666)	(.669)
N (n events)	626 (58)	626 (58)	626 (51)	626 (51)

$*p < .10 \quad **p < .05 \quad ***p < .01$

Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered on democratic spell and observations are stratified by previous number of events within each spell.

Many of the factors that have been shown to be associated with authoritarian reversals are not related to authoritarian backsliding. Breadth of participation at the outset of democracy is not statistically significant in either model and neither is economic growth. The relationship between both and democratic survival has been well-established using different samples and modeling strategies.[13] The lack of a discernable effect on backsliding indicates that further research is needed to help understand what factors drive both types of events.

Indonesia's experience comports with the findings presented regarding political rights restrictions. Factors reducing the risk of Indonesia experiencing a political rights backslide include a Competitive legacy, increasing level of economic development, and high degree of ethnic fractionalization. Indonesia is among the set of countries that never experienced a backsliding event. In contrast, Pakistan had a non-Competitive legacy and experienced multiple political rights backslides despite having a highly diverse society and a similar level of economic development.

Diagnostics and robustness checks indicate that the results are valid and not particularly sensitive to changes in modeling strategy or the inclusion of influential outliers. The proportional hazards assumption is satisfied by the political rights model but not by the civil liberties model. Estimating the civil liberties model as a parametric or discrete-time duration model does not affect the statistical significance of any of the results reported above. Alternate model specifications upheld the findings in the political rights model as well.[14]

[13] In addition to the previous chapter, see, for example, Wright (2008*b*) and Epstein (2006).

[14] Restricting the dependent variable to those events that were not accompanied by an authoritarian reversal, or looking exclusively at minor backslides (a one-point change in score), does not significantly affect the results. Also, adding a dummy variable identifying all regimes that ultimately failed and interacting it with Competitive indicates that while the legacy effect is stronger in regimes that ultimately collapsed, it is still negative and significant in permanent democracies as well.

4.4 Discussion and Conclusions

The new democracies of the Third Wave have been quite resilient. Of dozens of new democracies to have emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century, fewer than a third have returned to an autocratic form of government. The resiliency of these regimes becomes even more clear when we look at the number of instances in which the legitimacy and/or functioning of democracy was threatened by restrictions on political rights or civil liberties. In some cases, authoritarian backsliding was a precursor to an ultimate return of dictatorial rule. But in many other cases the backslides were themselves reversed, and the march toward stability and consolidation continued.

Authoritarian backsliding on the political rights dimension is more likely in democracies with Closed legacies, lower incomes, stalled democratic consolidation, increasing political unrest, and, surprisingly, less ethnic fractionalization. Also surprising is the lack of a clear connection between backsliding and either economic growth or the initial breadth of participation; both have been shown to be very clearly associated with democratic survival.

The same model has much less success explaining curtailments of civil liberties. The stark difference in the results indicates that the conceptual distinction between the two types of backsliding is substantively meaningful. The effect of ethnic fractionalization even appears to go in different directions for each type of backsliding. Protest is strongly and negatively related to the risk of civil liberties violations, but positively correlated with political rights restrictions. The failure of many of the same variables that explain political rights restrictions to account for the occurrence of civil liberties restrictions indicates a need for further investigation of the causes of each type of backsliding. It also may indicate that restrictions on civil liberties are less closely associated with failures of democracy than are curtailments of political rights.

Authoritarian backsliding is a challenge faced by most of the new democracies of the modern era. Further work should address how backsliding is related to long–term democratic performance and whether or not certain types of backsliding events have particularly strong impacts on the probability that a regime fails. Improving our understanding of this phenomenon will better inform our expectations for newly democratized states and help to predict the impact of certain events on the stability of fledgling democracies.

Chapter 5

Electoral Legacies and Political Participation

Does experience with multiparty elections prior to democratization affect patterns of participation in new democracies? Opposition parties and nominally competitive multiparty elections have become mainstays of many modern authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian legacies are known to impact political attitudes and behavior in new democracies, but prior work has not explored the potential effects of multiparty electoral experience in particular. Electoral experience may have important effects, from mobilizing groups in the electorate to shaping citizens' trust in parties and the electoral process. Some of these effects can be expected to last even beyond the lifespan of Competitive authoritarian regimes, continuing to affect political dynamics and patterns of participation in new democracies.

I offer several hypotheses concerning the potential effects of Competitive legacies and then examine how legacies impact two types of participation in new democracies since the beginning of the Third Wave. My findings indicate that while Competitive legacies are asso-

ciated with lower voter turnout in early elections, this effect does not persist over subsequent elections. Additionally, Competitive legacies appear to inhibit anti-regime protest, perhaps because politically relevant groups have had a head start in mobilizing and becoming invested in the institutional political process. Taken together, these findings further support the idea that multiparty experience makes for more more stable political dynamics in new democracies.

Scholars have argued that different authoritarian experiences can impact the political dynamics of democratic successor regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). In Eastern Europe, legacies have been shown to impact the development of civil society and civic participation (Howard 2003), attitudes and orientations toward government (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011), and political participation, including protest activity (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007). This work has demonstrated the impact that communist legacies in particular have had on the development of social trust and civic organizations which then affect the level of participation that we observe. Other studies have focused either on the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian legacies (Linz and Stepan 1996; Bernhard and Karakoc 2007), looking cross-regionally and over longer spans of time. While these have been shown to reflect meaningful differences, the effect of particular institutions, especially electoral institutions, has not been as deeply investigated.

This chapter looks at how Competitive legacies affect two forms of political participation in new democracies: voter turnout in national elections and anti-government protest. These two forms of participation have important implications for the stability of new democracies. Trends in voter turnout are often considered behavioral manifestations of aggregate satisfaction with the political system. Even dictators frequently point not only to their margins of victory but also to broad turnout in their elections as signals of their regime's legitimacy. Furthermore, what explains patterns of voter turnout in new democracies is a

matter of current debate (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Fornos, Power and Garand 2004; Pacek and Pop-Eleches 2009). Anti-regime protest, if sufficiently large and well-organized, can have obvious consequences for the stability of newly elected democratic governments. Having the opportunity to organize and become invested in the institutional political process (perhaps even before democratization), may mean that fewer groups in formerly Competitive regimes are likely to act in ways that might destabilize the government, particularly as countries face those tumultuous first few peaceful transitions of power under democratic rule.

5.1 Authoritarian Legacies and Participation in New Democracies

Scholars have regularly noted the impact that authoritarian histories can have on political behavior in new democracies. Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that the nature of the authoritarian predecessor regime will largely define the set of consolidation tasks before a new democratic regime. For example, they propose that totalitarian (as opposed to authoritarian) legacies will make the task of setting up stable political societies and civic organizations more difficult. Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) demonstrate that authoritarian and totalitarian legacies have different impacts on the propensity for citizens to engage in political protest or join civic organizations. They argue that totalitarian legacies impose a greater burden for the development of democratic civil society than do authoritarian legacies.

Many scholars have sought to determine how post-communist legacies impact the development of political attitudes and behaviors that will foster democratic consolidation. Insofar as attitudes and orientations toward government shape political action, these are important

to consider when trying to assess the impact of legacies on participation. Howard (2003), for example, notes that citizens in post-communist contexts are generally less participatory than their counterparts in other new democracies. Anderson and Mendes (2005), looking at differences between new and old democracies, show that protest is less likely in post-communist settings than in other new democracies. Pop-Eleches (2007) argues that different aspects of the communist experience, whether cultural, economic, or political, explain different aspects of democratization in post-communist countries. Numerous other studies have explored the effect of communist legacies and other aspects of authoritarian histories on political attitudes (Rorschneider 1999; Rose and Shin 2001; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011).

One way that authoritarian histories might influence participation in new democracies is by shaping or repressing civil society. If dictators dismantle civic organizations, citizens might lack the social capital and interpersonal trust that civic organizations foster and that are so integral to various forms of political mobilization and participation. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011) note that this could be especially true in the former Soviet Union where civil society was largely replaced by puppet organizations under the control of the state, leading to widespread distrust that might manifest in reduced social capital and mass participation in post-Soviet states.

Civil society may be limited to different degrees in both Competitive and Closed regimes, leading to differences in how prepared the citizenry is to mobilize and participate in politics following a transition to democracy. The Soviet Union and Chile under Pinochet are obviously examples of the former, but even where multiparty elections are embraced, autocrats have routinely continued to repress civil society; indeed, it may be the case that elections are feasible in some dictatorships only when repressing some of the civic organizations that might otherwise form opposition parties and threaten the regime. Ershad, for example, used repression to marginalize and terrorize segments of civil society that

were the most threatening to his rule, while simultaneously embracing multiparty elections (Maniruzzaman 2002).

Studies of voter turnout in new democracies have frequently noted that history might play a role in aggregate electoral participation. For example, Kostadinova and Power (2007) note that different levels of turnout in new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe can be largely explained by different historical experiences. Turnout in new democracies has also been found to display a honeymoon effect, in which turnout is high for first elections and then declines steadily for several electoral cycles thereafter (Kostadinova 2003; Fornos, Power and Garand 2004; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Pacek and Pop-Eleches 2009). Other scholars, though, have found no such pattern in earlier data (Turner 1993). Past democratic experience in particular has also been shown to increase turnout in new democracies (Kostadinova and Power 2007).

The persistence of these historical effects may be conditioned by the quality of democracy in the new regime. Unconventional political activity has long been shown to be on the rise in advanced democracies (Barnes et al. 1979), so we might expect that it would increase following a transition to democracy, as groups within society become free to petition their government without fear of reprisal. Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) argue that the opposite has occurred; while protest may have peaked during transitions to democracy, the post-transition period for many is characterized by a decrease in protest politics. Catterberg and Moreno (2005) argue that this is mirrored by a decline in political trust. In both cases, it is expected that the post-honeymoon declines should be accompanied by a resurgence in both trust and elite-challenging behavior as a democracy becomes consolidated.

The presence of organized, non-regime parties prior to and immediately following a transition may impact participation as well. Experience with multiparty elections may increase the extent of linkages between groups in society and political parties, which Powell

(1986) has argued may impact aggregate turnout. Parties can serve as mobilizing structures (see McCarthy, McAdams and Zald 2003) for organizing collective action. Party infrastructure and even reputation could be used to recruit participants and supporters to take to the streets in protest or to support a particular alternative at the ballot box. The potential for party infrastructure to be somewhat dual-purpose raises several interesting questions about the potential effects that Competitive legacies might have on new democracies; specifically, does the existence of functioning political parties mean that more conflict in society will be funneled into the electoral process? Or does the existence of capable mobilizing structures imply that electoral *and* non-electoral participation will be higher in democracies with Competitive legacies as leaders utilize their organizations to make claims on government through different channels?

As discussed in Chapter 2, studying the effects of authoritarian legacies on political dynamics in new democracies is wrought with methodological challenges. In many cases, it could be argued that the particular legacies under investigation are epiphenomenal. Some aspects of legacy are arguably not independent of other features of society that may also affect politics after a regime change. For example, is a legacy of repression to blame for frequent political violence in a new democracy, or is there some other factor (perhaps deep ethnic divisions) that could have led to both? Examining the effect of legacies always entails a careful consideration of the potential endogeneity of legacy. A second complication with investigating historical legacies is the issue of how legacy effects persist over time. Theoretically, we might expect some legacies to last a generation, dissipate after the first few elections, or persist indefinitely. Theoretically defining the temporal span of the expected effect is extremely important for being able to construct tests of a theory's implications. As Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011) note, there are numerous paths through which legacy could exert an effect on new democracies; frequently the persistence of a particular effect may be

useful in helping us determine through which path it is operating.

5.2 Competitive Authoritarianism and Political Participation

In Competitive regimes, multiparty elections are a routine occurrence. While they do not provide the kind of real contestation that occurs in liberal democracies, they do provide a venue for opposition interests to mobilize. Repeated elections may also bring about changes in citizen attitudes toward government and patterns of political activity. It is possible that some of the changes to the political culture and organizational structure of politics have effects that persist beyond the life of a particular regime.

In Chapter 3, I introduced two strands of the literature on Competitive authoritarianism that yield different predictions about how Competitive legacies might impact regime stability in new democracies. The same arguments in the literature provide competing insights regarding patterns of participation following a transition to democracy as well. On one hand, scholars like Lindberg (2006; 2009) cite the democratizing effects of unfree elections. They note that multiparty elections may allow opposition forces to organize and coordinate their efforts to unseat incumbents (Howard and Roessler 2006), or change the political culture by instilling democratic values and participatory norms (Lindberg 2006). Another group of scholars has focused on the regime-sustaining effects of Competitive authoritarianism. Noting that citizens recognize that they are playing a rigged game, Lust (2009) asserts that unfree elections may have the opposite effect by fostering "public disillusionment with democratic institutions" (Lust 2009, 131).

If Competitive authoritarianism fosters distrust in the basic institutions of electoral

democracy, then how would we expect Competitive legacies to affect participation in new democracies? Citizens would likely be more skeptical about parties and elections and less likely to participate in elections, at least early on. Since attitudes can change rather rapidly following a regime change (Dalton 1994), new experiences with functioning democratic institutions should lead many of those who abstained at first to subsequently become regular participators.

Hypothesis 1: *New democracies with Competitive legacies should see lower voter turnout in their first elections than new democracies with Closed legacies, but the difference should disappear in subsequent elections.*

All else being equal, distrust of institutional channels of participation may lead citizens to engage in more direct forms of political action, such as protest. However, as citizens embrace institutional channels of interest articulation over time, they may be expected to move away from direct action.

Hypothesis 2: *New democracies with Competitive legacies should see more protest in their first few years than those with Closed legacies, but the difference should disappear over time.*

Alternatively, multiparty elections may lead citizens to change their view of themselves from that of a subject to that of a participant (see Almond and Verba 1963). Citizens in Competitive regimes would be more likely to develop the habit of electoral participation, which could be expected to last through a regime change and be evident early in the life of a new democracy. The mobilization of politically relevant interests may also play a role. The existence of multiparty elections almost necessarily opens the door to various associational freedoms that may not exist elsewhere. More of the politically relevant interests in a society

would be expected to be mobilized after several years under Competitive authoritarianism than in settings without multiparty elections. Since groups that have had a chance to form and organize themselves are better able to mobilize their supporters, turnout could be expected to be higher in formerly multiparty regimes.

Hypothesis 3: *New democracies with Competitive legacies should see higher voter turnout in their first elections than new democracies with Closed legacies.*

Group mobilization may also have an impact on protest in new democracies. In new democracies, groups that have not yet been able organize sufficiently to gain access to an institutional channel of political influence may engage in contentious political activity instead. Integration of politically relevant interests into the institutional electoral process is a major challenge faced by new democracies, and those with Competitive legacies may have a head start if groups were able to begin organizing and working through the electoral process prior to democratization. Such mobilization can be assumed to take some time, so new democracies with Competitive legacies could be expected to maintain an advantage over other new democracies as a result of their head start.

Hypothesis 4: *New democracies with Competitive legacies should see less anti-government protest than new democracies with Closed legacies.*

As before, the analyses below statistically control for a host of potential confounding variables including aspects of a country's past not captured by legacy.

5.3 Empirical Analysis

The next section analyzes the hypotheses put forth above using the dataset of new democracies and the coding of Competitive legacy that was introduced in Chapter 3. Since the dependent variables are quite different from the previous analyses, I include a host of new control variables.[1]

5.3.1 Turnout

Table 5.1 reports the average turnout for the first five elections in each new democracy in the data, by type of legacy.[2] Following previous cross-national work on turnout (see Powell 1986, Lijphart 1997) I use voting age population as the denominator when calculating percentage of voters casting ballots. This is generally preferred to measures that use the eligible population, since electoral laws delineating eligibility can vary greatly in different places, the eligible population is a significantly more difficult calculation than the population over a particular age. The average turnout in first elections is somewhat lower for regimes with Competitive legacies (59%) as opposed to non-Competitive legacies (65%). The difference is quite modest and seems to disappear almost entirely after the first election. The difference might be seen as weak support for the idea that Competitive legacies cause citizens to be skeptical about the efficacy of the electoral process, however the effect would appear to be somewhat insignificant.

Figure 5.1 plots voter turnout for both types of legacy and the average for all regimes. Overall, Competitive legacies see a positive trend in turnout following their first election,

[1]Though the controls for military legacy and resource dependence are not particularly relevant here, adding them to the analysis does not affect the substantive or statistical significance of the results.

[2]Turnout figures were taken from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int), and reflect the number of voters casting a ballot as a proportion of the total voting age population of the country (VAP). Turnout is for parliamentary elections (for the lower house in bicameral legislatures).

whereas non-Competitive legacies have a slightly negative or flat trend from the first election onward. This indicates that Competitive legacies do not experience a honeymoon effect in which citizens flock to the polls in large numbers only to stay home in subsequent elections. In fact, neither legacy, nor the sample as a whole, display this type of pattern on aggregate.

Looking case by case reveals that most non-Competitive legacies are associated with either flat or negative trends in voter turnout. Some countries do see a honeymoon effect, and almost all of them have non-Competitive legacies. Conversely, nearly every country that sees a clear, positive trend in turnout has a Competitive legacy. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 plot the turnout for three cases with Competitive legacies and three cases with non-Competitive legacies. These plots show some of the differences in trends across legacies that may account for the patterns that are observed in the aggregate data (lower turnout for Competitive legacies at first, then little difference between the two and a honeymoon effect for some non-Competitive legacies).

Model

The data are election-years with between 1 and 5 observations per new democracy. The number of observations for each election (first, second, and so on) are given in Table 5.1. Using the pooled data to estimate the effect of legacy via OLS is potentially problematic since there is the possibility of correlated errors and heteroskedasticity across panels. Previous studies of turnout have dealt with these issues in different ways. Fornos et al. (2004) and Pacek et al. (2009) employ random-effects estimators and Kostadinaova and Power (2007) and Pacek et al. (2009) estimate panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs). I report the results from OLS regressions on the pooled data with robust standard errors clustered on country. Other models using generalized estimating equations and PCSEs yielded results that were substantively and statistically the same as the simpler specification.

Table 5.1: Average Turnout (VAP) in Parliamentary Elections, Third Wave Democracies

	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
All legacies	62.81	64.00	64.37	63.49	67.71
	(59)	(52)	(41)	(27)	(15)
Competitive Legacies	58.72	66.28	67.24	63.94	68.84
	(18)	(16)	(10)	(6)	(5)
Closed Legacies	64.61	63.07	63.44	63.37	67.14
	(41)	(37)	(31)	(21)	(10)

Note. N in parentheses.

Controls

A more thorough examination of the effect of legacy on turnout needs to account for various potential confounding factors. Previous studies of voter turnout in new democracies provide a useful guide as to what controls might be needed.

The first set of factors include differences in political institutions. I include controls for presidential systems, single-member electoral districts (SMDs), and compulsory voting. Presidential systems and SMDs are represented by dummy variables. Several previous studies have shown that district magnitude has an impact on turnout (Fornos et al. 2004; Kostadinova and Power 2007). Additionally, Pacek et al. (2009) have demonstrated that type of executive may have an effect. Compulsory voting is almost always accounted for in models of turnout, though, as Fornos et al. point out, it is usually included as a dummy variable that fails to distinguish between laws that carry penalties for noncompliance and those that are merely symbolic. My control for compulsory voting can take the value of zero, 1, or 2; it is zero if there is no compulsory voting law, 1 if there is a law but nonvoters are not sanctioned, and 2 if the compulsory voting law is actually enforced.[3]

[3]Data on compulsory voting laws comes from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, www.idea.int.

Another set of controls deals with demographics. I control for urbanization, population density, and literacy. Urbanization and population density are closely related measures and both are taken from Banks' Cross-National Time Series Dataset. The estimation of literacy comes from the UN. More urbanization, closer contact to others and better education are thought to potentially impact aggregate turnout (Fornos, Power and Garand 2004). Two of the most densely populated countries in the sample – South Korea and Bangaldesh – also accounted for two of the highest annual counts of demonstrations.

Other controls deal explicitly with the new regime's history. To control for past democratic experience I include a count of the number of years since 1945 that the country was considered a democracy by the Przeworski et al. (2000) coding. I also include controls for the length of the last nondemocratic spell and the breadth of political competition in the first year after democratizing. This is important to include because it controls for formal restrictions on the participation of particular segments of society, which we do not want to conflate with group mobilization (or lack thereof) prior to democratizing.

I also control for economic development (GDP per capita), age of the regime in years, and include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the regime remained a democracy until 2004 (permanent democracy).[4]

Results

The first column of Table 5.2 presents an analysis of the determinants of turnout in the first parliamentary elections in new democracies.[5] If experience with phony elections makes citizens less likely to engage in electoral participation, then Competitive legacies should have

[4]Restricting the analysis to regimes that remained democratic does not significantly affect the results presented below.

[5]Some cases were dropped due to missing data on control variables.

a negative effect on turnout. The coefficient on Competitive legacy is negative and significant ($p < .10$), and it is much larger in magnitude than the initial investigation suggested. According to the model in column 1, for first elections, Competitive legacies lead to a level of turnout that is 14 points lower, on average, than non-Competitive legacies. Initial competitiveness of participation is also significant ($p < .10$). The effects of many of the remaining controls are also in the expected direction but not statistically significant. This suggests that experience with competitive elections prior to democratization may be driving down conventional participation, at least immediately following a regime change.

The second column of Table 5.2 presents the pooled model, consisting of the first five elections. Again, Competitive legacies and initial competitiveness exert a negative and significant impact on turnout, though the magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller. The decline in significance of Competitive legacy is consistent with Hypothesis 1, which suggested that differences in turnout should lessen over time. More of the historical features also appear to play a role in the pooled analysis with years of democracy and length of the most recent spell of nondemocratic rule appearing to positively affect turnout in the first five elections.[6] Finally, in the pooled model, permanent democracies appear to have higher turnout than the handful that would eventually return to authoritarian rule. Though many cases drop out of the analysis due to missing data, the estimation of a limited model on a larger sample of cases supports the central findings presented here; Competitive legacies appear to be negatively associated with overall voter turnout.

Table 5.3 presents the results from regressions using the pooled data and incorporating variables to account for how turnout changes over time. The regressions in all four columns included the variables from the previous table as well. In the first column, I add dummy

[6]While it may appear counterintuitive that length of prior dictatorship *and* prior democracy years would positively impact turnout, it may be the case that length of the previous dictatorship is acting as a proxy for recent political stability, which could be positively related to voter turnout.

Table 5.2: Predicting Turnout in First Five Parliamentary Elections

	First Election	First Five Elections
Competitive	-13.992*	-11.068**
	(7.553)	(4.463)
Prior Democracy Years	.361	.597***
	(.458)	(.192)
Age of Preceding Regime	.125	.309**
	(.314)	(.145)
Initial Competitiveness	-9.583**	-6.047**
	(3.586)	(2.260)
Urbanization	-.0001	-.0001
	(.0004)	(.0001)
Population Density	.001	.001
	(.001)	(.001)
Literacy	.248	.092
	(.148)	(.112)
GDP	12.745	7.229
	(9.309)	(7.075)
SMD	-1.362	4.920
	(9.218)	(9.445)
Compulsory Voting	-4.927	4.193
	(6.524)	(3.191)
Presidential System	2.913	3.005
	(8.231)	(4.211)
Age	-.338	.132
	(2.707)	(.276)
Permanent Democracy	8.666	11.181**
	(8.199)	(4.392)
Cons	28.125	29.915*
	(27.343)	(16.181)
N	37	132
R-squared	.47	.36

$^{*}\ p < .10 \quad ** \ p < .05 \quad *** \ p < .01$

Note. Entries are OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Data was not available for several key control variables for a number of countries in the data. The Appendix reports the results of a reduced model that contains nearly every county in the sample. The substantive and statistical significance of institutional legacy remains largely unchanged.

variables for the second through fifth election to examine what effect sequence might have on turnout. The coefficient on Competitive legacy remains negative and significant in all models. While none of the election dummies reach statistical significance, they are all negative, as one would expect based on previous findings that turnout tends to decline following the first election (see Konstadinova and Power 2007). The coefficients on interactions of Competitive legacies with each of the election dummies are all positive, as we would expect from the previous examination of the data; after the first election, the negative effect of Competitive legacies begins to dissipate. However, only the coefficient on the interaction between fifth election and Competitive legacy reaches statistical significance. An alternative way to account for the order of elections is to include a count of elections as in columns 3 and 4. In column 4 an interaction between Competitive legacy and the election counter is also included. The election counter is negative and the interaction between the counter and Competitive legacy is positive, both as we would expect, though neither is statistically significant. Overall, the findings from the models in columns 2 and 4 indicate that Competitive legacy may continue to have a negative impact on turnout for the first few elections, but certainly by the fifth election, if not before, the effect of legacy is gone. However, since only a small handful of countries in the data have a fourth or fifth election, this finding can only be taken as suggestive of a broader trend.[7]

The findings from the analysis of turnout indicate that Competitive legacies lead to lower turnout in the first few elections but then their effect disappears. On average, the negative effect of Competitive legacies on first elections is somewhere between 11 and 14 percentage points. The findings are strongly supportive of Hypothesis 1, indicating that Competitive authoritarianism leads to disillusionment with the democratic process. They

[7]The countries observed holding fourth and fifth elections were relatively evenly split between Latin America and Eastern Europe. Since almost all of the African and Asian democracies either were censored or failed prior to that point, it would be inappropriate to consider this sample of remaining cases to be representative of all new democracies.

Table 5.3: Predicting Turnout in First Five Parliamentary Elections II

	Dummies	Dummies	Election Count	Election Count
Competitive	-12.140***	-13.921**	-11.666**	-18.180**
	(4.309)	(6.057)	(4.335)	(6.910)
Second Election	-.047	-.104		
	(3.982)	(4.162)		
Third Election	-5.113	-6.049		
	(6.261)	(6.685)		
Fourth Election	-11.255	-11.601		
	(8.223)	(8.605)		
Fifth Election	-4.536	-7.065		
	(8.193)	(8.491)		
Count of Elections			-2.130	-2.618
			(2.317)	(2.436)
Elect2*Competitive		.417		
		(5.825)		
Elect3*Competitive		5.374		
		(6.423)		
Elect4*Competitive		4.051		
		(7.833)		
Elect5*Competitive		17.657**		
		(8.636)		
Electcount*Competitive				3.232
				(2.161)
Cons	25.528	26.051	30.073*	30.815*
	(16.586)	(17.292)	(16.462)	(16.803)
N	132	132	132	132
R-squared	.385	.393	.366	.375

$^{*}\ p < .10 \quad ** p < .05 \quad *** p < .01$

Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. All controls from previous regressions included but not reported.

also disconfirm Hypothesis 3; group mobilization and participatory habituation under Competitive authoritarianism does not lead to higher aggregate electoral participation in new democracies.

While this finding is important to understanding turnout in new democracies, it doesn't

indicate a difference across legacies that would be expected to have a substantive impact, say, on the legitimacy of the political system or the stability of the new regime. The differences are simply too short-lived. This implies that Competitive authoritarianism does not have a long-term, anti-democratic effect, though it does offer some empirical support to Lust's (2009) disillusionment hypothesis.

5.3.2 Protest

To examine how legacies impact the frequency of anti-regime protest, I draw on two additional variables from Banks' CNTS data (2007). The first is an annual count of the number of anti-government demonstrations in each country. The second is an annual count of riots in each country. The protest variable counts every instance of a peaceful demonstration of 100 or more people voicing opposition to the government or its policies. Riots are considered any violent demonstration involving more than 100 participants. Both anti-government protests and riots are expressions of dissatisfaction with the current regime or with particular policies and they are examples of interest articulation occurring outside of institutional channels. The raw, unstandardized count of events is used as the dependent variable; the mean annual count of protests is .843 (max=24), and the mean count of riots is .402 (max=16).[8]

Modeling counts of protests and riots is not a straightforward process. I have opted to keep the counts of protest in their natural form rather than weight them by population. This is in part because population may not be the most appropriate metric to consider when weighting events of this type. What might be more important is the ability of individuals to organize and pressure their government in groups sizeable enough to be considered by the Banks measure. I thus explicitly control for population density in the analysis that follows

[8] Alternative measures of protest, including the World Values Survey, do not provide coverage of most countries in the sample in the years immediately following democratization.

and I leave the dependent variables in their natural form so that they can be directly interpreted in terms of the number of riots or demonstrations that a country could be expected to see in a given year. For example, South Korea and the Philippines saw eight and 10 demonstrations during their first year, respectively (compared to a sample average of .84); and both countries are among the most densely populated countries in the sample.

Since both demonstrations and riots are count variables that always assume non-negative, discrete values, and since both are characterized by overdispersion, I use a negative binomial model to assess the factors associated with each.[9] Since the data are a cross-sectional time series, there are potential problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The numbers of demonstrations or riots in a particular country from one year the next are likely correlated. Clustering standard errors on country allows us to relax the assumption that observations within the same regime are entirely independent. Additionally, we might want to account for potential temporal dependence. Several methods exist for dealing with these issues including generalized estimating equations and random effects models. Rather than employ a more complicated modeling strategy, I include a cubic polynomial ($age,\ age^2,\ age^3$); only the results for age are displayed. This is a simple method for examining the impact of time on the distribution of protest events that is commonly employed in disctret-time duration analyses. Adding a lagged value of the dependent variable did not affect the significance of the main results.[10] Tests of model fit indicated that the random effects estimator yielded slightly better estimates but the results do not differ in their substantive or statistical significance from the pooled negative binomial model with clustered

[9] Overdispersion is the tendency for counts to cluster in particular country-years. In terms of the current model, observing a single demonstration in one country-year increases the likelihood that we will see more demonstrations in that country-year. The α value obtained by estimating the negative binomial model indicated that overdispersion in the data is significant. Please see the Appendix for details on the estimation of the negative binomial.

[10] Adding a lagged count is not the best method for dealing with issues of temporal dependence in event count models, but it can serve as a robustness check given the correlated nature of the data (Zorn 2001).

standard errors.[11]

Many of the control variables from the previous analysis are included in the analysis of protest; I continue to control for age, population density, urbanization, democratic persistence, previous democracy, length of last dictatorship, initial competitiveness of participation and GDP. A few additional controls are also included. A measure of GDP growth is added since anti-government protest may be sparked by economic shocks. Also, I include Freedom House's democracy scores for each country-year to adjust for the possibility that protest may be less likely in states were governments have not respected the rights of citizens and/or engaged in repression.[12] Finally, a dummy variable for central and Eastern Europe is also included to examine whether post-communist states are more or less likely to face anti-government protest as some of the literature discussed above has suggested.[13]

If Competitive legacies lead to fewer riots and anti-regime demonstrations, then the sign on the coefficient for legacy should be negative. This would indicate support for Hypothesis 4. If the sign is not positive, or if the relative count of riots and demonstrations increases more rapidly in regimes with Competitive legacies, it would indicate at least partial support for Hypothesis 2.

The results in the first column of Table 5.4 indicate that Competitive legacies are associated with less anti-government protest overall ($p < .05$).[14] The controls for other aspects of a country's history were not significant. Regimes with less freedom see significantly less

[11] Tests of model fit for non-nested models estimated via maximum likelihood include the Aikake Information Criterion and Schwartz' Bayesian Information Criterion. See Greene 2003.

[12] Freedom House scores range from 1 to 7 with higher number indicating less freedom.

[13] A post-communist control is utilized here because several studies have suggested that communism's destruction of civic institutions and social capital might decrease mass political action in post-communist regimes. Including a post-communist dummy (or, alternatively, a dummy variable for all years post-1989) in previous analyses does not affect the reported findings.

[14] As in the previous analysis, the lack of data for some control variables causes a small number of cases to drop out of the sample. Estimating a reduced model on the full sample reduces the significance of the coefficient on Competitive legacy only slightly ($p < .10$).

protest, as we might expect; where democracy is less entrenched, incumbents might still resort to strong-arm tactics to deal with dissent, thus disincentivizing the use of protest and other elite-challenging behavior. As the literature on post-Soviet democracies has suggested, new democracies in central and Eastern Europe also see significantly less anti-regime mobilization, perhaps as a result of the lack of social trust and stable, civic institutions to organize mass political action. Age is also negatively and significantly associated with protest, indicating that as democracy becomes consolidated, citizens engage in less contentious political action. The latter finding is consistent with the idea that as more groups become invested in democratic institutions, the number of groups willing to engage in potentially destabilizing mass protest declines.

The second column introduces an interaction between Competitive legacy and age of the current regime. The coefficient on Competitive becomes indistinguishable from zero but the interaction term is negative and highly significant ($p < .01$), indicating that as regimes with Competitive legacies become consolidated, they see a faster institutionalization of mass dissent. This finding supports the hypothesis that multiparty histories lead more groups to become invested in the institutional political game early on in the life of a new democracy. The results using riots as the dependent variable (columns 3 and 4) are largely the same.

The findings suggest that new democracies with Competitive legacies, more economic development, and those formerly under Soviet control can be expected to see the least anti-regime mobilization. Countries like Pakistan, with neither a Competitive nor Soviet history and only moderate levels of economic development experienced relatively more anti-government mobilization, while states like Brazil (Competitive legacy) and Albania (communist legacy) experience little. Anti-regime mobilization in Argentina has been predictably above average given its lack of prior experience with Competitive elections and high degree of urbanization.

Table 5.4: Anti-government Protest in Third Wave Democracies

Dependent Variable:	Demonstrations	Demonstrations	Riots	Riots
Competitive	-.685**	.051	-.979**	.036
	(.347)	(.536)	(.444)	(.711)
Age*Competitive		-.110***		-.178**
		(.041)		(.076)
Prior Democracy Years	.003	.004	-.027	-.028
	(.020)	(.019)	(.024)	(.022)
Age of Preceding Regime	-.002	.004	-.015	-.012
	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)	(.012)
Initial Competitiveness	-.160	-.197	-.360	-.381***
	(.137)	(.136)	(.154)	(.145)
Urbanization	.00001	-.00002**	.00002**	.00004***
	(.00001)	(.00001)	(.00001)	(.000001)
Population Density	.0001	.0001***	.0001***	.0001***
	(.00003)	(.00003)	(.00003)	(.00002)
GDP	.780**	.728**	1.287**	1.142***
	(.314)	(.298)	(.382)	(.348)
GDP change	.082	.165	1.917*	1.945*
	(.492)	(.434)	(1.078)	(1.007)
Freedom House	-.346***	-.349***	-.487***	-.481***
	(.110)	(.104)	(.159)	(.144)
Central/East Europe	-.883**	-.822**	-1.108**	-.986*
	(.356)	(.360)	(.532)	(.515)
Permanent Democracy	.423	.448	.209	.178
	(.359)	(.330)	(.464)	(.440)
Age	-.292**	-.265**	-.378**	-.270
	(.117)	(.110)	(.184)	(.193)
Cons	.022	-.033	.092	-.052
	(.787)	(.729)	(1.120)	(1.016)
N	620	620	620	620

$^{*}\ p < .10 \quad ** \ p < .05 \quad *** \ p < .01$

Note. Entries are coefficients from negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.

It is worth noting that these findings are not apparent when all of the control variables are omitted from the model. In fact, in the bivariate analysis of demonstrations and legacy, the sign of the relationship actually changes and comes close to reaching statistical

significance. This is not surprising when we consider some of the cases with Competitive legacies had very high counts of protests and riots. Perhaps in part due to their high population density, countries like South Korea and Bangladesh experienced some of the highest levels of anti-regime mobilization in the data. The findings reported here indicate that once we account for the affect of other factors such as urbanization and economic development, the *conditional* relationship between multiparty legacies and protests and riots is strongly negative and statistically significant.

The analysis of protest largely supports Hypothesis 4 and the idea that groups are better able to mobilize and find an institutional channel of access under Competitive authoritarianism. They further indicate that this head start has a lasting effect that actually gets larger as a new democracy emerges and begins to consolidate. Hypothesis 2 receives less support from this analysis; citizens do not turn to direct political action in new democracies with multiparty legacies. An alternative hypothesis is that disillusionment drives down efficacy, leading to less voter turnout *and* less protest. But the effect of disillusionment appears to fade quickly when it comes to turnout; it is not clear why it would have an increasing effect on protest participation.

The findings about how protest and turnout change over time should both be qualified to some extent. Since the sample of countries is not static, we are not comparing the same countries at all points in time; those that entered the data later were censored while those that entered earlier had the opportunity to fail and drop out of the sample. That means that as we analyze events occurring in older and older democracies we should consider why some democracies remain in the sample and other do not. In many cases, Latin American and east European regimes are those that provide data on the oldest new democracies in these analyses, while many of the African and Asian cases either reverted to authoritarian rule or emerged so late as to only contribute data on their first several years of existence.

This is a problem social scientists are accustomed to accepting as a consequence of our reliance upon observational data, but too frequently studies fail to explicitly state the limits of their findings. In this case, we can say that the findings from the previous two chapters are relatively robust in that they stand up to alternate model specifications and statistical approaches that account for censored data. In the present chapter, we can stand firmly behind the static results while the over-time findings are somewhat tentative as the same countries are not being compared as a consistent panel. These inferences are informed suggestions that future research should seek to confirm or disconfirm as more and better data become available.

5.4 Conclusion

The spread of Competitive authoritarian regimes has raised many new questions about democratization and political development. Though they were once assumed to be ephemeral, hybrid regimes have persisted and proven that they are deserving of further study. Electoral institutionalization is simply one more dimension across which authoritarian regimes can vary, and like other dimensions it may reflect meaningful differences in political stability, chances of liberalization, and the political dynamics of regimes that succeed them.

The literature suggests different ways that authoritarian histories might affect participatory patterns in new democracies. The destruction of civil society could reduce the mobilizing capacity of the citizenry, leading to depressed levels of protest and electoral participation, as has been seen in Eastern Europe. Other patterns observed in new democracies include a honeymoon in which protest peaks immediately following a transition and then recedes as the realities of democratic governance set in only to rebound as democracy becomes consolidated. Arguments put forth here suggest that the presence of non-regime political

parties might lead to greater capacity for political mobilization, but also a tendency to direct mass action toward electoral channels. Additionally, I have suggested that experience with rigged elections might make new democracies with Competitive legacies less likely to experience a spike in participation (honeymoon) following a transition to democracy as citizens there may have become acutely aware of how democratic institutions can be used to subvert the will of the people.

The findings reported here indicate that experience with multiparty elections prior to a democratization affects patterns of participation in new democracies in intuitive ways. Turnout in early elections tends to be lower where dictators had previously used unfree elections to legitimize their rule. The effect of Competitive legacy is consistently negative in every specification that was tested. As strong as this finding is, the evidence suggesting that the effect of legacy on turnout is short-lived is equally compelling. Previous studies have identified a honeymoon effect in which turnout is higher in first elections and then declines as citizens become disillusioned with the progress and promise of democratic government (Fornos, Power and Garand 2004; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Pacek and Pop-Eleches 2009). The turnout differences reported here do not appear to be wholly due to a honeymoon effect working only in regimes with non-Competitive legacies; new democracies with Competitive legacies not only didn't see decline in turnout, they saw a clear pattern of turnout growth. This indicates a pattern contrary to the findings in previous studies that is consistent with citizens in formerly Competitive regimes exhibiting skepticism toward electoral institutions immediately following a regime change.

The patterns with respect to protest indicate clear differences across legacies. Controlling for a host of other factors, Competitive legacies are associated with fewer large-scale, anti-government demonstrations and fewer riots than non-Competitive legacies. I argue that this is because groups that might otherwise have been likely to take to the streets to challenge

the government or attempt to destabilize the regime become more quickly institutionalized in regimes with Competitive legacies. The previous years of mobilization and organizing make the shift to democratic electoral politics easier and more swift in new democracies that succeed Competitive authoritarian regimes. The long-term, unintended consequences of multiparty elections and other institutions are a factor that should be considered when examining politics in new and developing democracies.


Turnout in New Democracies, by Type of Legacy
70
65
60
55
50
Turnout %
1
2
3
4
5
Election
Average
Competitive
Closed


Turnout in Three New Democracies with Non-competitive Legacies
100
80
60
40
20
0
Turnout %
1
2
3
4
5
Election
Mongolia
Bolivia
Albania


Turnout in Three New Democracies with Competitive Legacies
100
80
60
40
20
0
Turnout %
1
2
3
4
5
Election
Brazil
El Salvador
Sri Lanka

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Most nondemocratic regimes have now adopted electoral institutions like parties and legislatures. Building on existing work that seeks to better understand the effects of these institutions, this dissertation has investigated some of the long-term effects of Competitive authoritarianism. I have argued that the changes brought about by multiparty competition can persist beyond a democratic transition and result in systematically different political dynamics in new democracies with Competitive legacies and those without.

The main findings of the preceding analyses are summarized below.

Among states that have recently experienced a transition to democracy, Competitive authoritarian legacies are associated with

- A lower risk of regime failure and authoritarian reversal,
- Fewer restrictions on political rights,
- Lower voter turnout in founding elections, with a positive turnout trend over time, and

- Fewer large-scale, anti-regime protests.

All of the findings suggest that Competitive authoritarianism exerts a continued impact following democratization. Multiparty legacies make for regimes that are less likely to return to authoritarian rule and also less likely to violate the political freedoms of citizens. This might be attributable to broader group mobilization and institutionalization; as more groups are invested in the electoral game from the start, fewer are likely to challenge the stability of the political system. Greater pluralism may also play role as the broader participation of diverse groups checks the ability of any particular segment of society to restrain the political rights of any other. The findings regarding authoritarian backsliding and authoritarian reversals are robust and apparent even when controlling for a host of other potentially influential factors.

The differences in participation are equally striking. Competitive legacies make for new democracies that both vote and protest at lower rates than those without multiparty histories. However, while the differences in anti-regime protest persist over time, with Competitive legacies exhibiting significantly less, the differences in turnout disappear relatively quickly, usually within the first few elections. Lower initial turnout might reflect the lack of a honeymoon effect in formerly Competitive regimes, as well as a potential distrust of electoral institutions that for years were manipulated by nondemocratic leaders. Less regime-challenging mass protest could be due to greater electoral institutionalization of political relevant groups, especially among their leaders; opposition elites might be more interested in mobilizing electoral support for their party than challenging the regime in the streets.

Further work is needed to address the mechanisms that are driving these differences. While I have suggested a number of plausible factors to consider, none of the empirical analyses here directly test the mechanisms by which Competitive authoritarianism affects

political outcomes in new democracies. In order to establish the precise linkages between electoral histories and stability, additional research will need to examine factors like citizen attitudes toward government, the peacefulness of the regime transition, and the choice of institutions leading up to and following a transition to democracy. Pinning down the mechanisms behind the political participation findings will likely require new, cross-national data on political attitudes to determine if Competitive legacies are associated with more or less trust in the electoral process and more of less support for democracy as a means of solving the nation's problems.

While the mechanisms remain untested, the analyses here have made an effort to rule out the possibility that the differences found are a result of the same factors driving the adoption of multiparty elections in the first place. Chapter 2 provides guidance by reviewing the known causes of Competitive authoritarianism according to the most recent and rigorous literature. Subsequent analyses in the dissertation controlled for factors that might cause us to otherwise infer a correlation between Competitive legacies and outcomes that was actually spurious. Finally, the broad spatio-temporal domain of the sample analyzed here suggests that the findings are applicable across continents before and after the Cold War.

The next sections address some of the broader implications of the findings both for the academic literature on democratic regime stability and for applied efforts to spread democracy around the world.

6.1 Competitive Legacies and Democratic Survival in the 21st Century

The findings presented here regarding Competitive legacies are in some ways analogous to Przeworski et al.'s (2000) findings regarding income and democracy. Przeworski et al. show that while economic development might not be directly related to democratic transitions, greater wealth is strongly correlated with democratic persistence. Similarly, while previous literature has questioned the democratizing effect of Competitive authoritarianism, my findings indicate that Competitive authoritarian experience makes for democracies that are much less likely to revert to authoritarian rule. The implications of both findings are hopeful for the future of enduring democracy in the world; as both greater economic development and multiparty elections spread among autocracies, the set of potentially stable democracies gets larger and larger. If multiparty elections pave the way for lasting democracy, as the results in each of these analyses suggest, then multiplying the number of Competitive authoritarian regimes in the world will increase the likelihood that more of the democratizing transitions that we observe going forward are permanent. In fact, multiparty competition in nondemocracies has spread rapidly in the last quarter century, suggesting that more new democracies will be more prepared to sustain along the tough road toward consolidation.

The practice of democracy promotion would do well to continue efforts to expand multiparty competition in authoritarian regimes. Whether tied to aid agreements or member status in international organizations, forcing dictators to accept even limited multiparty competition may pave the way for lasting democracy, even if competition is too limited and controlled to have any impact on the downfall of the regime. Greater electoral competition only has a potentially negative impact when it leads to electoral protests that are met with state repression, as we saw in Iran following the 2009 presidential elections; and electoral

protest has sometimes helped to topple regimes and pave the way for democratization, as in Tunisia and Ukraine. In addition to expanding economic development, expanding Competitive authoritarianism would help set the stage for the emergence of new democracies that are characterized by significantly more stability than those without multiparty electoral experience.

6.2 Competitive Authoritarianism, Historical Legacies, and Politics in New Democracies

The findings presented in the previous chapters are relevant to several areas of ongoing research. By addressing the long-term implications of Competitive authoritarianism, I extend the research being done on the impact of unfree elections. Since I have investigated the effects of Competitive *legacies*, the methodological difficulties of attributing effects to partially endogenous institutions have been highlighted. To establish that multiparty experience is not epiphenomenal, my analysis was informed by a careful examination of the factors associated with the adoption and maintenance of unfree elections. Incorporating the discussion from Chapter 2 into the remainder of the analyses in this dissertation has allowed me to address Pepinsky's (2014) concerns about institutions and outcomes of interest being driven by the same underlying, structural factors. The need to address the potential for spurious associations is especially clear in this case since I deal explicitly with legacies, but the issues that Pepinsky raises apply to all studies that seek to uncover the effects of potentially endogenous institutions. Going forward, studies of authoritarian elections should address the issue of co-determination between explanatory institutions and outcomes of interest and take steps to ensure that reported findings concerning institutional effects are valid.

Historical legacies have important impacts on politics, but scholars should carefully consider the temporal variability of legacy effects. As we saw in the previous chapter, some of the effects of Competitive legacy maintained over time, like the impact of protest; on the other hand, the effect of legacy on voter turnout appears to diminish relatively quickly, and so too might the effect of legacy on backsliding and regime stability. Studying legacies requires that we consider how the effect of past experiences might change over time. In some cases, effects could be reasonably assumed to remain constant, but in others the effect of legacies might dissipate, while in still others, the effects of the past might become even more pronounced as different histories place politics on divergent, path-dependent trajectories (see Pierson 2004).

Studies of politics in new democracies have not ignored the effects of historical legacies. In fact, work on political attitudes has explicitly addressed how past experiences with communism or totalitarianism might affect how citizens feel about the political system. I have demonstrated that multiparty electoral experience also exerts an independent impact on political participation and the political stability of new democracies. The findings presented here should be of interest to scholars of new democracies, especially those seeking to explain stability, voter turnout and protest mobilization. The previous chapter, for example, presents evidence that the honeymoon effect, where turnout for founding elections is marked by above average turnout, exists primarily in regimes that have little multiparty electoral experience. Patterns of protest also differ substantially across legacy, indicating the authoritarian electoral past might be an important factor to consider when seeking to explain mass participation in new democracies.

6.3 Directions for Future Research

Further work needs to be completed to establish exactly how Competitive legacies affect new democracies in the manner demonstrated here. Pinning down the causal mechanisms would involve looking at how Competitive authoritarian experience affects things like political attitudes, modes of transition, and the particular clusters of institutions that new democracies adopt or maintain. Perhaps the presence of formal parties and legislatures lead to less violence and conflict during transitions to democracy. If so, then the more peaceful experience might help account for some of the differences that we observe in new democracies with different legacies. Competitive experience might also impact the institutional arrangement of new democracies, making some better equipped to deal with intergroup conflict through the political process. Multiparty electoral experience also likely effects citizens and their feelings toward government. More work needs to be done to establish how Competitive authoritarian legacies affect trust in political institutions and support for democracy to better understand how historical legacies affect citizen politics.

Appendix

Calculation of the Survivor Function ($S(t)$) and Hazard Rate ($h(t)$)

The survivor function $S(t)$ provides the unconditional probability of surviving beyond time t. Thus, to estimate the survivor function, the Kaplan–Meier estimator employs the formula:

$\widehat{S(t)} = \prod_{j|t_j \leq t}(\frac{n_j - d_j}{n_j})$

Where n_j is the number of cases at risk at time j, and d_j is the number of cases that actually fail at time j. The equation implies that the survivor estimate at any time, t, is equal to the probability of surviving beyond time t (given that a case made it to t) multiplied by the probability of surviving beyond time $t-1$ (given survival to $t-1$) multiplied by the probability of surviving beyond $t-2$ (given survival to $t-2$) and so on. Put differently, assume $Pr(t)$ is the probability of surviving past time t *conditional on survival up to time* t. Then the survivor estimate $\widehat{S(t)}$ at any time, t, is given by:

$\widehat{S(t)} = Pr(t) \times Pr(t-1) \times Pr(t-2) \times ...Pr(0)$

where $Pr(0)$ is the probability of surviving beyond time zero (the beginning of observation) which is equal to one ($Pr(0) = 1$). Thus, $\widehat{S(t)}$ gives the unconditional probability of surviving to time t by taking the product of the *conditional* probabilities of survival up to time t.

The hazard estimate $h(t)$ is simply the derivative of the cumulative hazard $H(t)$. $h(t)$ is estimated by applying a smoothing function to the Nelson–Aalen estimate of $H(t)$ (since the $H(t)$, like $\widehat{S(t)}$, is a step function) and taking its derivative. The Nelson–Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard is given by:

$\widehat{H(t)} \;=\; \sum_{j|t_j \leq t}(\frac{d_j}{n_j})$

where d_j is the number of cases that failed at time j and n_j is the number of cases at risk a time j. For more details on the derivation of hazard and survivor estimates see Box–Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) or Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May (2008).

Estimation of the Conditional Gap–Time Cox PH Model

The partial–likelihood (PL) for the Cox model is given by:

$PL \;=\; \prod_{i=1}^{N} \frac{e^{X_i\beta}}{\sum_{j \in R_i} e^{X_j\beta}}$

where R_i is the set of cases at risk at time t_i (when case i fails). Partial Likelihood can be treated the same as likelihood for these purposes.

The conditional gap–time model alters the Cox model in two ways. First, it uses robust standard errors clustered on unit (for details on the theory behind the application of robust variance estimators in duration modeling see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Second, events are stratified to account for the inherent ordering of events in the data. Substantively, this means that we allow for a country's first failure of democracy to be considered a different animal than its second or subsequent democratic failure. Technically, stratification means that we estimate a different baseline hazard for each category across which the data are stratified, allowing the baseline hazard to vary across event–type but keeping parameter estimates fixed. All estimation was conducted using Stata. For additional details on stratified Cox PH models see Box–Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) or Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May

(2008).

Estimation of the Negative Binomial

The likelihood function for the negative binomial is given by:

$L = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\Gamma(y_i+\alpha^{-1})}{y_i!\Gamma(\alpha^{-1})}(\frac{\alpha^{-1}}{v_i+e^{x_i\beta}})^{\alpha^{-1}}(\frac{e^{x_i\beta}}{\alpha^{-1}+e^{x_i\beta}})^{y_i}$

The expected value of Y is equal to $\lambda_i = e^{x_i\beta}$. The variance of Y is $\lambda_i(1+\lambda_i)$, where $\alpha > 0$. The magnitude of α indicates the severity of the overdispersion present; for values very close to zero, overdispersion is not significant and could be ignored, implying the Poisson model could be used. When α is significantly different than zero, the negative binomial will generally be more appropriate. $\ln(\alpha)$ is estimated since α is restricted to be greater than zero. For more information on the negative binomial and its alternatives, see Long (1997).

Alternative Specification of Turnout (from Table 5.2)

Table 6.1: Predicting Turnout in First Five Parliamentary Elections

	First Election	First Five Elections
Competitive	-12.802**	-8.284*
	(5.209)	(4.179)
Prior Democracy Years	.729**	.603***
	(.361)	(.208)
Age of Preceding Regime	.136	.324*
	(.244)	(.177)
Initial Competitiveness	–	–
Urbanization	–	–
Population Density	.001	.001
	(.001)	(.001)
Literacy	–	–
GDP	11.100*	4.107
	(6.237)	(4.779)
SMD	9.575	10.855
	(8.629)	(8.455)
Compulsory Voting	-.200	6.414**
	(4.116)	(2.939)
Presidential System	-5.411	.612
	(4.651)	(3.622)
Age	.405***	.325***
	(.086)	(.067)
Permanent Democracy	12.900**	10.105**
	(5.222)	(4.478)
Cons	11.488	23.240
	(15.022)	(14.761)
N	53	167
R-squared	.44	.31

$^{*}\ p < .10 \quad ** \ p < .05 \quad *** \ p < .01$

Note. Entries are OLS regerssion coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. "–" indicates variables that were dropped from the model in order to achieve a larger N.

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