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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Symbolic Racism in a Multicultural Context: Understanding Bias Among, and
Towards, Latino Americans

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

by

Patrick Florence Rock

2016

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Symbolic Racism in a Multicultural Context: Understanding Bias Among, and
Towards, Latino Americans

by

Patrick Florence Rock

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor David O. Sears, Chair

While considerable research has examined the structure (e.g., reliability), origins (e.g., predictors) and consequences (e.g., policy attitudes) of anti-Black symbolic racism among White American respondents, far less research has probed this construct among non-White respondents or non-Black target groups. The current dissertation examined the structure, origins and consequences of symbolic racism as it applied to a broader ethnic context, specifically, as it was expressed among White respondents towards Latino targets (e.g., anti-Latino symbolic racism; Study 1) and as it was expressed among Latino respondents towards Black targets (Study 2). I used multiple years of the Los Angeles County Social Survey, employing reliability analysis, correlational analysis and regression analysis to probe my questions of interest. I found that Whites' anti-Latino symbolic racism showed roughly comparable structure, origins and consequences as their anti-Black symbolic racism. In contrast, Latinos' symbolic racism did not show comparable structure, origins, or consequences, relative to White respondents who had

been prompted with the same anti-Black symbolic racism questions. Implications regarding the use of symbolic racism as a measure of bias towards non-Black targets and among non-White respondent populations are discussed.

The dissertation of Patrick Florence Rock is approved.

Matthew Barreto

Denise Chavira

Yuen Huo

David O. Sears, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016

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Biographical Sketch

Patrick Rock graduated from Swarthmore College with Highest Honors before pursuing an MA in Developmental Psychology and a PhD in Social Psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles. A recipient of the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and the UCLA Chancellor's Prize, Rock has published first-author articles in the *Journal of Social Development* and the *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology* and has presented research posters and a symposium talk at major social and developmental psychology conferences. He is currently the principal investigator on a grant examining the impact of research workshops in the academic and social development of underrepresented students at UCLA, as well as collaborating with Devon Carbado on work exploring the implications of contemporary racial bias research for discrimination law. His ongoing dissertation work, advised by David Sears, explores how contemporary forms of racial bias are expressed towards, and by, Latino Americans.

Rock's research accomplishments are accompanied by considerable teaching experience and recognition. In addition to his teaching assistant work, Rock serves as an adjunct member of the faculty at the American Jewish University, teaching social as well as developmental psychology courses in the College of Arts and Sciences and teaching Educational Psychology to students in the Masters of Arts in Teaching program. Rock's excellence in teaching has been recognized by the UCLA Psychology Department in his selection for the Summer Teaching Practicum, within which he taught UCLA undergraduates during the Summer 2015 term. Further, he was entrusted with the training and mentorship of all first-time TAs in the department with his appointment as the Teaching Assistant Consultant for the Psychology department during the 2015-2016 year.

General Introduction

A growing body of research has shown that, while endorsement of traditional racial prejudice may be on the decline among White Americans, Whites' endorsement of more contemporary forms of bias remains strong (Bobo, Kluegel & Smith, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986). In particular, research suggests that Whites continue to endorse symbolic racism, a form of bias characterized by claims that Black-White racial disparities in such domains as income, wealth and educational achievement stem from Blacks' failure to embrace traditional American values of hard work and self-sufficiency (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). This form of bias, as well as similar forms such as racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders, 1996) and modern racism (McConahay, 1986), has been shown to powerfully predict Whites' support for a range of race-relevant political decisions (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman, 1997).

Yet, up to this point, psychological research has primarily adopted a Black-White binary in its examination of symbolic racism. As with much of early prejudice research, symbolic racism was initially composed to tap into the rhetoric endorsed by Whites towards Blacks, and little work has examined whether the items and theorized structure of this bias extend are appropriate for use outside of that initial racial pairing. Few studies have examined, for instance, how symbolic racism is endorsed or applied by non-White respondents towards Black targets. Likewise, few studies have tested how symbolically racist sentiments are expressed towards non-Black targets (Henry & Sears, 2002).

These gaps limit the predictions that social science researchers are able to make about racial dynamics in the United States, a country that is rapidly diversifying. Whereas

a Black-White orientation was reasonably appropriate for the demographics of early to mid 20th century American history,¹ Latino immigration has skyrocketed in recent decades, and Latinos have quickly surpassed Black Americans as the country's largest racial minority group.² Nowhere is this more obvious than in cities like Los Angeles, where waves of Latino immigration since the 1960s have resulted in one of the most diverse cities in the country, and where Latinos have long been the most populous racial minority group.

An expanded understanding of Latinos' expression of symbolic racism towards Blacks is both pragmatically and theoretically important. Pragmatically, Latinos represent a rapidly growing demographic in the United States, particularly in urban areas with existing Black populations. On many issues, Latinos have acted in coalition with Black Americans, while on other issues, they have voted against Black interests (Barreto, Gonzales & Sanchez, 2014). A better understanding of the factors underlying Latinos' political choices will inform political mobilization efforts.

Moreover, with respect to the theory of symbolic racism, Latinos represent an interesting population in which to evaluate the presence and impact of this bias. Although research suggests that Latinos endorse a range of stereotypical views of Blacks (e.g., DiTonto, Lau & Sears, 2013; Johnson, Farrell & Guinn, 1997; McClain et al., 2006; Sawyer, Wong & Lee, 2008; Weaver, 2011), far less is known regarding their expression of symbolic racism. What little work has been done (e.g., DiTonto et al., 2013; Segura &

¹ Notably, even in those early years, America was never a two-race society, but the prominent political issues discussed in the early 20th century were primarily focused on Black-White relations.

² Asian American immigration, too, has risen, but will not be the focus of any of my analyses

Valenzuela, 2010) suggests that anti-Black symbolic racism is considerably more complex among Latinos than it is among Whites. This is unsurprising, given that Latinos' social status, as it relates to symbolic racism, is far from simple. On the one hand, Latinos experience racial discrimination and thus may be more aware of structural factors limiting Blacks' success than are Whites. On the other hand, Latinos are overwhelmingly either immigrants themselves or the children of immigrants, and are thus likely to hold tightly to the values of individualism that characterize many immigrant narratives (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006).

For these reasons, Latinos' endorsement of symbolic racism towards Blacks was the focus of Study 1 of this dissertation. In exploring this topic, I examined Latinos' bias on four dimensions, looking at (1) their overall endorsement of this sentiment towards Blacks, (2) the coherence, or reliability, with which they endorse the items within the symbolic racism scale, (3) the determinants of their bias, with a focus on anti-Black racial affect and conservatism, and (4) the consequences of their bias, with a focus on support for policies designed to assist Blacks or ameliorate Blacks' experience of prejudice.

Thus, Study 1 built on the symbolic racism literature by focusing attention on a relatively understudied respondent population: Latinos. Study 2, in turn, took a look at symbolic racism as it was applied to a relatively understudied target group—Latino targets. Here, too, there is pragmatic and theoretical value to such a direction. Pragmatically, a better understanding of the contemporary prejudice Whites express towards Latinos is critical to predicting how Whites are likely to vote on the immigration and bilingual education issues that are increasingly taking front stage in the American political scene. In studies of issues associated with Black Americans, symbolic racism,

more so than traditional prejudice, has been found to predict policy endorsement. Yet, relative to the multitude of research documenting that measurements of coded prejudice like these scales predict anti-Black policy support, far less is known regarding the ways scales like these predict anti-Latino policy support. As a result, an expanded understanding of Whites' endorsement of anti-Latino bias is imperative to efforts to secure support for a range of Latino-relevant political issues.

From a theoretical perspective, too, anti-Latino symbolic racism among Whites, and the predictive capacity of this bias for hot-button policies like immigration, offers an interesting test of symbolic racist theory. The major political issues related to Black Americans (e.g., welfare, affirmative action) typically garner objection on the basis of the claim that Blacks are undeserving of these provisions. As such, symbolic racism, tapping into Whites' beliefs about Blacks' lack of work ethic and refusal to take responsibility for their own actions, preferring instead to blame negative outcomes on racial bias, provides a cognitively consistent explanation for rejecting policies that offer Blacks additional, perceived-to-be-undeserved, benefits. In contrast, criticisms of Latinos tend to focus on somewhat distinct themes—criticisms that Latinos are unwilling to follow appropriate procedures in entering the country, for instance—and it is unclear whether symbolic racism will represent a coherent or predictively powerful ideology when applied to Latino targets and Latino-relevant political issues. A better understanding of anti-Latino symbolic racism would thus insight into whether this rhetoric is meaningful when applied to a group that is, in some ways, similar to Blacks (e.g., relative racial position) but in other ways, different (e.g., largely immigrant population).

Thus, the first goal of Study 2 was to investigate Whites' endorsement of symbolic racism towards Latinos. As in my assessment of Latinos' bias towards Blacks, I examined Whites' bias towards Latinos on multiple dimensions, looking at (1) the coherence, or reliability, with which they endorsed the items within the anti-Latino symbolic racism scale, (2) the determinants of their bias, with a focus on anti-Latino racial affect and conservatism, and (3) the consequences of their bias, with a focus on support for policies associated with Latino-coded topics like immigration and English language learning. Moreover, as in Study 1, Study 2's analyses continued to elaborate on what we know about the role of education as a moderator of symbolic racism's effects.

While the investigation of these questions would be valuable in any population, the study of symbolic racism expressed by Latinos towards Blacks, and by Whites towards Latinos, is especially pertinent in the city of Los Angeles. The theory of symbolic racism, which I address in more detail in the following pages, places an emphasis on the importance of experience applying a racial attitude toward the consideration of political issues related to that racial group (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). The theory proposes that individuals who have had more experience applying symbolic racist rhetoric to political issues (e.g., the merits of affirmative action) will tend to become more consistent in their application of this rhetoric over time. Los Angeles thus offers a unique opportunity to understand anti-Latino symbolic racism among Whites who have engaged with Latino-relevant political issues for many decades, as Los Angeles has been among the first sites for debates over topics like bilingual education. Likewise, Los Angeles is uniquely suited for the study of anti-Black symbolic racism attitudes among Latinos, as it allows for the inclusion of

Latino respondents who have engaged with Black-relevant political issues for a considerable length of time, due to Blacks' long history in the Los Angeles area.

This dissertation proceeds as follows: First, I will start in this general literature review with a review of the extant literature regarding Whites' endorsement of symbolic racism against Blacks. Specifically, I will address the evidence supporting three of symbolic racism theory's major claims: That symbolic racism is a coherent, internally consistent ideology; that it has origins in both conservative ideology and prejudice; and, that it has emergent predictive power, explaining policy attitudes above and beyond the capacity of its component parts.

Following the conclusion of this general literature review, I will engage the primary questions of this dissertation. In Study 1, I will address how anti-Black symbolic racism is likely to function among Latinos, while in Study 2, I will address how anti-Latino symbolic racism is likely to function among Whites. Each of the two studies will be preceded by a review of the relevant literature and will be followed by a discussion of the findings. Following the conclusion of the second study, I will wrap up this dissertation with a more general discussion of the relevance of this project.

The Theory of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among White Americans

Symbolic racism, developed in response to declining rates of more traditional, explicit forms of anti-black prejudice, proposed that contemporary bias was the product of two existing attitudinal positions: anti-black racial affect and traditional, race-neutral, Protestant values (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). In the blending of these components, Kinder and Sears suggested that a new set of racialized complaints

emerged wherein whites rejected initiatives to help blacks “based on moral feelings that blacks violate...traditional American values” (Kinder and Sears, 1981, p. 416). Early symbolic racism items accused blacks of asking for too much and doing too little for themselves, thus violating the key American ideals of hard work and self-sufficiency (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976).

An initial and obvious advantage of the symbolic racism items was that white Americans, whose endorsement of explicitly-racist items had declined in recent years, nonetheless endorsed symbolically-racist statements at relatively higher rates. Kinder and Sears (1981), for instance, found that one to two thirds of whites believed blacks received more benefits and more attention from the government than they deserved, took advantage of welfare subsidies, and entered social spaces where they were not welcome. In contrast, with a measure of old fashioned racism, researchers found such low rates of endorsement that they couldn't include it in their analyses (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears et al., 1997). McConahay (1986) interpreted such findings as evidence that symbolic racism items were not as obviously measures of racism, and were therefore somewhat less susceptible to social desirability concerns. Indeed, he showed that responses to symbolic racism items were far less impacted by conditions that typically enhanced socially-desirable responding, such as when the experimenter was black (McConahay, Hardee & Batts, 1981).

Coherence of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among White Americans

Symbolic racism has long been conceptualized as a unidimensional construct (Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005) composed of four cognitively-coherent

themes: claims that Blacks experienced inferior outcomes due to lack of work ethic, claims that Blacks were demanding too much from Whites while doing too little for themselves, claims that racial discrimination was no longer a serious issue, and claims that Blacks had received, and continued to receive, undeserved advantages in such domains as school and the workplace (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Researchers have argued that these four themes reflect a “consistent internal logic: If the civil rights era had ended discrimination, blacks’ continuing disadvantage had to be due to shortcomings among blacks themselves; and if that were true, both their demands for special attention and any special gains were illegitimate” (Henry & Sears, 2002; pg. 256). Thus, while any one item might only address one of the themes directly, even that one item is likely to reflect the overarching belief system of the individual (Tarman & Sears, 2005).

This claim of cognitive consistency, however, was not without its detractors (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). In response to the criticism that symbolic racism represented a diverse set of claims, rather than one coherent ideology, Henry and Sears (2002) used a range of datasets, including both community samples and college student samples, to evaluate the internal reliability of symbolic racism. They found that the items that had been used to measure symbolic racism across a range of studies demonstrated considerable coherence, correlating highly with one another and with respondents’ score on the scale as a whole. Using factor analysis, they likewise demonstrated that the items in the symbolic racism scale were best approximated using a single-factor solution, indicating coherence across the scale rather than the existence of multiple sub-dimensions within it. These findings suggest that respondents were, indeed, expressing a coherent

ideology, rather than a collection of relatively independent policy attitudes or moral claims (Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005).

Yet, while symbolic racism is understood to reflect a coherent ideology in its mature form, researchers have found that internal consistency of the measure varies as a function of both age and education. Examining the association of age with endorsement of symbolic racism, Henry and Sears (2002; 2009) found that individuals' symbolic racism was more crystallized in adults, relative to college students. They defined crystallization as "the extent to which an attitude is psychologically well formed and meaningful to an individual" (Henry & Sears, 2009; pg. 570), and measured it by looking at the consistency, stability and predictive power of the construct in a cross-sectional study.

The authors reasoned that young adults had been shown in prior research to have a relatively primitive understanding of the conservative ideologies underlying symbolic racism (e.g., Converse, 1964; Kinder, 1986) and that symbolic racism likely became more coherent over time as adults' more basic understanding of conservatism became more coherent. The same explanation was taken to underlie the finding that more educated Whites tended to show more coherence in their expression of symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002), a finding that I elaborate more on in the introduction to Study 1.

In sum, research suggests that symbolic racism is composed of four tightly related themes, which cohere into a single consistent ideology. I turn next to the evidence supporting the second claim of symbolic racism theory: That the approach is, indeed, rooted in racial prejudice, not merely conservative ideology.

Origins of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among White Americans

Kinder and Sears (1981) argued that symbolic racism was the product of two existing attitudinal positions: anti-black racial affect and traditional, race-neutral, conservative ideological values of hard work, individualism and delayed gratification. The researchers proposed that traditional values like individualism and hard work, in their generalized form, were “too cognitively impoverished to evoke a strong response,” (Sears, 1988, pg. 76) while, placed in context of strong racial attitudes, they were fully cognizable (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988). Sears and colleagues proposed that these traditional values gained new emotional tenor as they were applied to Black Americans, creating a particularly virulent source of policy attitudes (Kinder & Sears, 1981).

A broad set of studies have confirmed that traditional racial prejudice and expressions of conservative values (measured either by direct measures of individualist ideology, or by conservative ideology more broadly, which serves as a highly-correlated proxy of traditional values) are significant predictors of symbolic racism. These findings support the theorists’ initial claims that such sentiments underlie the endorsement of this rhetoric (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). Importantly, however, these predictors did not explain endorsement of symbolic racism completely, supporting Kinder and Sears’ (1981) initial proposition that symbolic racism was more than merely the sum of these two existing attitudes.

The claim of emergent properties in symbolic racism was further bolstered by research using factor analysis. Sears and Henry (2003) entered indicators of conservative ideology, racial bias, and symbolic racism into a factor analysis, and found that

conservative ideology and racial bias loaded on two separate factors, while the symbolic racism items loaded strongly, and equally well, on both. They concluded that, while conservative values and racial animus exist relatively independently in their raw form, symbolic racism represents the “glue that links [them] in the contemporary era” (pg. 264). Moreover, the researchers found that a measure of Black individualism (using items like “If Blacks work hard, they almost always get what they want”) were correlated only modestly with endorsement of a non-racialized measure of individualism and with anti-Black affect (Sears & Henry, 2003).

Research has shown that symbolic racism is made up of conservative ideology and racial bias, but also stands alone as an independent construct. I turn next to the final claim I will address: That symbolic racism contributes unique emergent predictive power, above and beyond the capacity of its component parts.

Consequences of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among White Americans

From the start, symbolic racism theorists proposed that the construct should have substantial explanatory power that exceeded the sum of its parts (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). This is perhaps the most well-developed area of research on symbolic racism, with dozens of studies supporting the relative contribution that symbolic racism items make to predicting a range of policy attitudes, above and beyond the predictive capacity of its component parts (e.g., conservatism and traditional racial bias). Early research, for instance, found that rejection of “black equality” explained more variance in support for racial policy attitudes than did the additive variance of anti-black affect and general equality values (Sears, Huddy & Schaffer, 1986). Symbolic

racism likewise predicted opinions on affirmative action (Hughes, 1997; Jacobson, 1985; Sawires & Peacock, 2000), welfare (Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius & Krosnick, 2009) and crime (Green, Staerke & Sears, 2006). It predicted vote preference in elections for black politicians (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2009; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Knuckey & Orey, 2000; McConahay, 1986; Payne et al., 2010; Tesler and Sears, 2010) and in an election involving a former grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan (Howell, 1994). Methodologically, symbolic racism was repeatedly shown to account for variance above and beyond more general conservative values and old fashioned racial bias (Sears & Henry, 2003; see Sears & Henry, 2005, for a review), even when relatively impoverished scales of symbolic racism were used (e.g., Sears & Allen, 1984).

Recent research has provided clarification of symbolic racism's predictive power, by showing that different items are predictive of different types of attitudes. Specifically, a two-dimensional structure of symbolic racism has been validated, showing that the items separate into two interrelated parts (Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005). The first component is referred to as internal symbolic racism, and includes items that emphasize Blacks' inferior values, such as the claim that Blacks demand too much assistance and need only to work harder if they wish to succeed. The second component is referred to as external symbolic racism, and includes items that emphasize the undeserved advantages that are currently given to Blacks, and the lack of discrimination hindering Blacks at this moment in time (Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005).

Importantly, despite being highly correlated, these two dimensions have been shown to predict different attitudes (Tarman & Sears, 2005). Green and colleagues, for instance, have shown that internal symbolic racism is more predictive of punitive crime

policies (e.g., use of the death penalty), and argue that this stems from the sense that Blacks refuse to play by the rules of society (e.g., the protestant work ethic) and, being morally deficient in this way, deserve harsh punishment (Green, Staerkle & Sears, 2006). In contrast, the researchers found that external symbolic racism was predictive of opposition to preventive crime policies (e.g., prisoner education), and reasoned that this opposition stemmed from the sense that Blacks have already received too many advantages, and deserve no further services (Green et al., 2006).

Thus, research on symbolic racism has supported three major claims: That symbolic racism represents a coherent ideology, that it is comprised of the blend of traditional racial prejudice and conservative values, and that it has emergent predictive power above and beyond the capacity of those individual components. Moreover, some research suggests that internal and external dimensions of symbolic racism may uniquely predict policy attitudes that are more closely tied to these items. Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that education may moderate these findings, such that those who are better educated are expected to be more consistent, both within the symbolic racism items and in the associations between symbolic racism and its component parts (conservatism and racial affect) and policy attitudes.

Project Overview

This dissertation extended the existing literature in two major directions. In Study 1, I extended symbolic racism research to an infrequently studied population: Latino Americans. In doing so, I engaged two major sets of questions. First, I investigated how the strength of endorsement, coherence, origins and consequences of symbolic racism

compared across samples of White and Latino Americans. Second, I asked whether being more educated was associated with attenuated or strengthened relationships either (a) among items within the symbolic racism scale or (b) between symbolic racism as a whole and theoretically congruent variables. The existing research behind these areas of inquiry will be covered in the introduction to Study 1, setting up the series of five specific hypotheses that I evaluated.

In Study 2, I further extended the research on symbolic racism by examining it with a new target group—Latino Americans. In this study, I asked whether symbolic racism continued to remain a coherent, predictive construct, when the items were adapted to focus on Latinos, rather than Blacks. In addition, as in Study 1, I investigated whether education acted as a moderator in any of these analyses. Following my write up of Study 1, I will introduce Study 2, with an elaborated consideration of the existing literature that speaks to these topics, and a series of specific hypotheses regarding these questions.

Study 1

Introduction

The first extension I explored in this dissertation was to address the form and function of Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism. In doing so, I addressed five hypotheses, covering the endorsement, coherence, origins and consequences of Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism, as well as the role of education in moderating these trends. This introduction will address each of those five predictions, justifying them using past research and outlining my approach to testing them.

Endorsement of Symbolic Racism Among Latinos

Hypothesis 1 relates to the endorsement and structure of Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism. Prior research offers good reason to think that Latinos should express such bias, although symbolic racism specifically has been studied infrequently. With respect to bias more broadly, however, the literature supports a broad and consistent pattern of Latino endorsement of anti-Black stereotypes and attitudes, even relative to Whites' own expressions of bias. Latinos feel less warmly towards Blacks than do Whites and demonstrate stronger implicit bias as well (DiTonto et al., 2013). On average, they list Blacks as the least desirable marriage partners (compared to other Latinos, Asians and Whites; Hernandez, 2007) and nearly a third of Latinos report that few or no Blacks are easy to get along with (McClain et al., 2006). A majority of Latinos view Blacks as less intelligent than their own group (DiTonto et al., 2013; Johnson, Farrell & Guinn, 1997) and report that few or almost no Blacks can be trusted (McClain et al., 2006). Such biases are found in both recent immigrants and native-born Latinos, likely deriving from the

largely congruent popular stereotypes of Blacks found in North and Latin America (de la Cadena 2001; Dulitzky, 2005; Hanchard, 1994; Winant, 1992).

Moreover, a variety of studies have revealed that Latinos endorse sentiments that fall in line with symbolic racist rhetoric, suggesting that this rhetoric may not be so difficult for Latinos to adopt. For instance, Latinos say that Blacks are lazy (DiTonto et al., 2013; McClain et al., 2006; Weaver, 2011), as well as saying that Blacks prefer to be on welfare to working (Johnson, Farrell & Guinn, 1997). Likewise, research by Hunt (2007) using General Social Survey data from 1977-2004 suggests that Latinos' attitudes about the sources of Black-White disparities are becoming more similar to those of Whites over time. Hunt (2007) finds that Latinos have shown declines over time in endorsement of structural explanations (e.g., lack of access to education, discrimination) for Black-White gaps in jobs, income and housing, and increases in the perception that Blacks' lack of motivation alone was is explanation for these gaps.

On the other hand, the few studies that have directly addressed whether Latinos express symbolic racism towards Blacks find that their rates of response, relative to Whites, are somewhat inconsistent. Using the data from the 2008 American National Election Study, researchers have found that Latinos do express symbolic racism, but that they appear to respond less uniformly to the items than do Whites (DiTonto et al., 2013; Segura & Valenzuela, 2010; Barreto et al., 2010). Specifically, whereas Latinos and Whites don't differ on levels of endorsement of what Segura and Valenzuela (2010) call "negatively valenced racial resentment"—claims that Blacks should try harder and don't deserve special favors—Latinos are more likely than Whites to endorse "positively valenced racial resentment"—claims that Blacks have gotten less than they deserved and

that slavery and discrimination have hindered Black success. Said differently, Latinos appear, at least in prior research, to simultaneously be more likely than Whites to fault Blacks for their own lack of success and also to be more likely than Whites to acknowledge that structural factors contribute to racial gaps in some part. On the other hand, one study found that Latinos and Whites don't differ in their endorsement of this sentiment. Henry and Sears (2002), examined a sample of Latinos, Whites, Asians and Blacks, and found that only Blacks demonstrated unique endorsement rates, tending to agree with symbolic racism significantly less than the other ethnic groups.

As such, I began my analysis of the data by examining the rates of endorsement of symbolic racism among Latino respondents, comparing them to White respondents. In doing so, I examined both individual items and scale means, to identify whether particular items differ in level of endorsement between the two ethnic groups. Despite one exception to this (Henry & Sears, 2002), most of the work on Latinos' stereotyping and bias towards Blacks supports their endorsement of symbolically racist sentiment. I thus predicted that Latino respondents would endorse it at levels similar to Whites, if not higher, in this study.

Hypothesis 1: Latinos will generally endorse symbolic racism at rates as high if not higher than White respondents

Coherence of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among Latinos

My initial analyses of level of endorsement of different items positioned me well to examine the coherence of anti-Black symbolic racism among Latinos. In particular, my

second set of analyses will evaluate whether the items within the symbolic racism construct correlate with one another in the same patterns (e.g., along internal and external lines, as well as across the full scale) among Latinos and Whites. As I described above, the existing literature paints a mixed picture of Latino sentiments towards Blacks. On the one hand, Latinos endorse a range of anti-Black stereotypes consistent with symbolic racist rhetoric, while simultaneously acknowledging structural inequalities, a sentiment which is at odds with symbolic racist ideology. This asymmetry is not altogether surprising, given that Latinos are themselves, at times, the targets of discrimination. As such, they may have personal insight into how discrimination holds back success.

Regardless of the reason for their impact of the existing of discrimination in the world, however, such inconsistency limits what coherence the symbolic racism construct as a whole can achieve. And, indeed, preliminary data collected by Henry and Sears (2002) regarding coherence of symbolic racism among Latinos shows that symbolic racism in Latino samples is less internally consistent (e.g., less reliable) than in White samples. Moreover, when we expand our view to research that more broadly examines the relative organization of symbolic racism themes among Latinos as opposed to Whites, considerably more evidence points in the direction of relative disorganization among Latinos (e.g., DiTonto et al., 2013; Henry & Sears, 2002; Segura & Valenzuela, 2010; Barreto et al., 2010). Based on these findings, I predicted that Latinos would generally show lower coherence in symbolic racism, relative to Whites.

Hypothesis 2: Latinos will show less coherence (reliability) in the anti-Black symbolic racism scale, relative to White respondents. They are specifically

unlikely to demonstrate the same two-dimension structure of internal and external symbolic racism as is seen among White Americans.

Origins of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among Latinos

My next inquiry dealt with the determinants of Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism. Given that the same items are used to evaluate symbolic racism in White and Latino samples, one might expect the components of symbolic racism (specifically, anti-Black racial affect and measures of conservatism) to be substantially similar in these two groups. On the other hand, given the findings related to lower coherence in Latino samples, it is likely that racial affect and conservatism will be somewhat less closely tied to endorsement of this rhetoric, or may be tied only to specific elements within the symbolic racism scale.

And, indeed, Segura and Valenzuela (2010) have evaluated this question in a national sample of Latinos, finding that party identification (their measure of conservatism) was correlated with symbolic racism endorsement three times more strongly among Whites ($r=.28$) than among Latinos ($r=.09$). My own research will expand on these findings by examining this phenomenon in a Los Angeles sample of Latinos and evaluating how symbolic racism among Latinos correlates with a broader set of predictor variables. I expected the same patterns to emerge, such that Latinos would demonstrate lower overall relationships between the theoretical determinants of symbolic racism and the construct itself.

Hypothesis 3: Latinos' expression of anti-Black symbolic racism will be significantly predicted by their anti-Black racial affect, their political ideology and their party identification, but these relationships will be weaker than those observed among White respondents.

Consequences of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among Latinos

Finally, I explored whether anti-Black symbolic racism among Latinos is associated with the same consequences, and associated as strongly with those consequences, as is demonstrated in White samples. Interestingly, despite Latinos' pattern of stereotyping Blacks, evidence suggests that Latinos frequently support Black political issues and Black candidates for office (Barreto et al., 2014; Barreto et al., 2010). Indeed, research suggests that Latinos' bias is overall not as closely related to policy preferences as the bias of White Americans (DiTonto et al., 2013; Segura & Valenzuela, 2010). For instance, some research found that it was only very weakly related to attitudes like support for Obama or preference between Obama and Clinton in the 2008 presidential primary race, while it was substantially related to these attitudes among Whites (Barreto et al., 2014; Segura & Valenzuela, 2010; Tesler & Sears, 2010). As such, my own analyses on this subject will contribute to a growing consensus, in one direction or the other, regarding the association between Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism and their policy attitudes. To the extent that some degree of cognitive consistency exists in Latinos' considerations of Black policy issues, I predicted that anti-Black symbolic racism should at least be predictive of policy attitudes. The degree to which they would be predictive, on the other hand, was not clear to me a priori.

Hypothesis 4: Latinos' expression of anti-Black symbolic racism will predict their rejection of Black-relevant policies, but these relationships will be less robust than those observed among Whites.

Education as a Moderator of Symbolic Racism Coherence and Predictive Capacity

Finally, I explored the role of education as a moderator of the coherence of symbolic racism among Latinos, of the relationship between symbolic racism and its component parts (origins) and of its predictive capacity for policy attitudes (consequences). In so doing, I built on a considerable literature showing that more educated individuals tend to show more crystallization in their political attitudes. That is, the attitudes themselves tend to be more internally consistent, and the attitudes are more powerfully and more consistently predictive of policy preferences, relative to less educated respondents (Converse, 1964; Sears, 1969; Zaller, 1990; 1992).

The idea that education should be associated with more consistent relations within symbolic racism may be somewhat counterintuitive, given that education is also associated with lower levels of prejudice overall, and some researchers have theorized that higher education should equip individuals to contain their initial prejudiced reaction and instead act based on their egalitarian values (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman et al., 1991). Nonetheless, research suggests that this is not how education functions in most cases. Instead, evidence shows that education tends to increase the strength with which racial bias predicts racial policy preferences, such that the more educated tend to show more consistency between their attitudes and their policy preferences (Sidanius et

al., 1996, 2000). Such results have been interpreted to mean that increased education allows individuals to more easily and more consistently assess the policy position that is in line with their attitudes, racial or otherwise, and consequently act based on that attitude (Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Education, in this theorizing, is thought to facilitate rational decision making, rather than leading to any particular decision.

With respect to symbolic racism, the moderating role of education has been studied a number of times but has produced somewhat mixed results. For instance, Federico and Holmes (2005) have shown that symbolic racism is more predictive of support for harsh criminal justice policies (e.g., capital punishment and “three strikes” laws) among respondents who had completed a bachelor’s degree. Likewise, Federico (2004) found that symbolic racism was more strongly related to attitudes towards welfare (a racially-coded policy) among more educated respondents. On the other hand, other work has not confirmed this relationship, with college educated Whites showing significantly indistinguishable relationships between racial policy preferences and symbolic racism (Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman, 1997). As a result, this remains a fruitful avenue of further research.

Moreover, education has rarely been examined as a moderator of Latinos’ symbolic racism attitudes specifically, likely owing the relative dearth of studies of Latinos expression of bias more generally. This is unfortunate because education represents an unusually relevant moderating variable for understanding how Latinos compare to Whites in their bias, given that Latinos’ average level of education is lower than that of Whites, both in the world and in the typical research sample. Consequently,

any observed differences between these two ethnic groups may be partially attributable to educational differences.

Just one study has addressed this topic, and even then, it only addressed the question of whether education moderated the coherence of anti-Black symbolic racism (and not how education might moderate other aspects of Latinos' symbolic racism). Henry and Sears (2002) found that, indeed, Latino respondents with some college experience demonstrated greater coherence in the symbolic racism construct than did their Latino counterparts without college experience. Because there is so little on this subject, however, there is still much to understand about how education functions in the context of Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism. My final analyses in Study 1 therefore addressed this issue, asking whether education moderated the relationship between Latinos' anti-Black symbolic racism and their anti-Black affect, their conservatism, and their policy attitudes. Because this question spans my other analyses, it will not be presented as a separate section but rather will appear within each of the other results subsections.

Hypothesis 5: Among both Whites and Latinos, level of education will moderate the coherence of anti-Black symbolic racism, as well as its associations with both predictor and outcome variables. More educated respondents from both ethnic groups will show greater coherence of the construct and more robust associations between symbolic racism and relevant predictors and attitudes.

In sum, my first study examined five research questions related to issues of the endorsement, coherence, origins and consequences of anti-Black symbolic racism among

Latinos, as well as the role of education in moderating these phenomena. I turn next to the analytic approach with which I addressed these questions.

Analytic Approach

The approach I used to address the above hypotheses is detailed below. Notably, the approach for Studies 1 and 2 were largely identical.

Endorsement. For consideration of the rates at which Whites and Latinos endorse symbolic racism, basic descriptive statistics were generated. T-tests were used to directly compare groups (e.g., Latinos vs. Whites) and a one-way univariate analyses of variance was used to examine whether ethnicity, education level, or the interaction of these variables, predicted endorsement of the individual items or the full scale.

Coherence. Coherence of the symbolic racism scale was evaluated using Cronbach's α reliability analysis. In this analysis, higher values (closer to 1) indicate greater coherence of the construct, while lower values (closer to 0) indicate lack of coherence. In order to compare Cronbach's α values from independent samples, I employed the independent samples Feldt test (Feldt, 1969). The Feldt test produces a value ("W") which functions as an F value would, with degrees of freedom based on the size of each the two samples ($df = N_1 - 1, N_2 - 1$). For my analyses, I took advantage of the Excel based calculator for independent samples Feldt tests, designed by Suen (2009).

As a second pass at the coherence of symbolic racism among Latino respondents, I examined the inter-item correlations within the symbolic racism scale. This allowed me to identify any particular sets of items which were contributing to (or taking away from) the overall scale reliability, and allowed me to specifically evaluate whether the group in

question demonstrated the two dimensional internal-external structure of symbolic racism found in prior research (Tarman & Sears, 2005). This structure would be supported by a pattern of stronger correlations between items in the same dimension (e.g., between denial of the impact of slavery and endorsement of the claim that Blacks have received more than they deserved in recent years) and weaker but positive correlations between items that crossed dimensions (e.g., between denial of the impact of slavery and claims that Blacks could succeed if they worked harder). In contrast, the finding that items within the same dimension do not correlate with one another positively, or that items crossing dimensions correlate with one another in unexpected ways (e.g., weakly, negatively, or more robustly than those within a single dimension) would suggest that the data demonstrates an alternative structure to symbolic racism than the model presented in prior literature.

Origins. To examine how strongly symbolic racism among was associated with its theorized component parts of racial affect and conservatism among Latino respondents, I used hierarchical linear regressions. For each analysis, I regressed symbolic racism on the relevant control variables in the first step, followed by racial affect and conservatism variables in the second step. I tested whether racial affect and conservatism explained unique variance in symbolic racism by evaluating the significance of the change in variance from the control model to the full model (e.g., the significance of the $R^2 \Delta$ value for the second step of the regression).

Origins analyses were conducted separately for each of the relevant demographic groups in the study (Latinos, Whites, high and low education) and were used to evaluate whether there appeared to be any differences in the patterns shown by the different

populations. To test whether any observed differences (e.g., a stronger association between symbolic racism and racial affect in one group, relative to another) were significant, I conducted a final model that contained the full sample and which used interaction vectors for ethnicity and education.

Consequences. To examine how robustly anti-Black symbolic racism predicts policy attitudes among Latino respondents, I again used linear regression analyses. For each analysis, I regressed the policy attitude (e.g., support for bilingual education) on my control variables in the first step, followed by racial affect and conservatism variables in the second step. In the third and final step, I added anti-Latino symbolic racism to the model. I tested whether symbolic racism explained unique variance in policy attitudes by evaluating the significance of the change in variance (the $R^2 \Delta$) between the second model (e.g., that which contained control variables, racial affect and conservatism) and the final model (e.g., all of the above as well as symbolic racism). As with origins, my analyses of the policy attitudes associated with symbolic racism were conducted separately for each of the relevant demographic groups in the study. To test whether any observed differences were statistically significant, I conducted a final model that contained the full sample from the relevant study and which used interaction vectors to investigate whether symbolic racism interacted significantly with respondent ethnicity or education. Notably, ethnicity and education interaction models were fully identical until the final step, when the specific interaction variables for that moderator were added to the model.

Method

Participants

The analytic samples for both studies were drawn from the data collected in the Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS). The LACSS was a random-digit-dial telephone survey of adult residents of Los Angeles County, collected annually from 1992-2002. A Spanish language translation of the survey was created, and participants could opt to take the survey in either Spanish or English. Although the survey largely remained similar across the annual data collections, survey items changed somewhat across years and three survey years, identified as appropriate based on the variables they contained, were selected for each of the two studies included in this dissertation.

For Study 1, Latinos and Whites from the 1997, 1999 and 2000 collections of the survey were included. These years were chosen because they were the years when Latino respondents answered anti-Black symbolic racism questions. Demographic characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1.

Measures

Demographic Variables

Ethnicity. Participants self-reported their ethnicity, choosing from among major pan-ethnic groupings (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian and Alaska Native). Respondents in the survey were included in Study 1 if they self-identified as either White or Latino/Hispanic.

Age. Participants self-reported the year they were born, which was used to create an age variable based on the year in which the survey was collected.

Gender. Participants self-reported their gender as male or female.

Income. Participants self-reported their annual, pre-taxes, household income. Income reporting categories were divided into \$10,000 increments through \$90,000 (e.g., \$21,000-30,000), after which categories were divided in \$35,000 increments (e.g., \$91,000-\$125,000). Income was included in analyses as a continuous variable.

Religious Attendance. Participants reported how often they attended religious services, marking whether they attended at least every week, almost every week, a few times a month, a few times a year, or hardly ever. Religion was included in analyses as a continuous variable with five levels.

Immigration Status. Immigration status was a single variable, computed based on a series of questions about participants' own experience(s) with immigration and their parents' experience(s) with immigration. Participants indicated whether they themselves had been born in the United States, as well as whether their parents had been born in the United States. Those who indicated that they had been born outside the country were asked the number of years they had lived in the United States as well as whether they were a United States citizen. Using the information participants provided in these questions, five immigration status categories were created: Native-born children of native-born parents (here called "third generation respondents"), native-born children with at least one immigrant parent (here called "second generation respondents"), individuals who had immigrated to the United States and became citizens prior to completing the survey (here called "new citizens"), individuals who immigrated to the United States ten or more years prior to completing the survey but had not become American citizens (here called "long-term non-citizen residents"), and individuals who

immigrated to the United States less than ten years prior to completing the survey, who had not become American citizens (here called “new immigrants”). Criteria and proportions of Latinos in the sample in each immigration status group are included in Table 2. Immigration status was not included in analyses of White respondents.

Education. Participants indicated the number of years they had attended school, as well as indicating specifically the number of years they spent in college. In line with Henry & Sears (2002), we examined the moderating effect of education by comparing results for respondents with no college experience to respondents with one year or more college experience. This produced somewhat uneven group sizes (e.g., only 25% of Latinos in the high education group, and only 25% of Whites in the low education group). Nonetheless, cell sizes remained sufficiently large for analysis, and this cutoff produced the most similar cell sizes possible, given the disparate educational attainment of the two groups.

Attitudinal Variables

Symbolic Racism. Symbolic racism was assessed for Study 1 using a four-item scale that has demonstrated high levels of reliability in prior samples (For a review, see Henry & Sears, 2002). Items used to assess this construct were identical in the three years included in Study 1 (1997, 1999, 2000) and preliminary analyses indicated that participants from the three years showed comparable patterns of results. Therefore, the three smaller samples were combined to create one larger dataset. Participants were asked to rate their agreement, on a four-point scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, with four statements:

1. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
2. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
3. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
(Reverse Coded)
4. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
(Reverse Coded)

Items sympathetic to Blacks were reverse coded, such that higher scores on the scale reflected more negative attitudes towards Blacks. After reverse coding the relevant items, responses were converted to a scale of 0-1, such that a response of Strongly Agree was coded a 1, a response of Agree was coded a .66, a response of Disagree was coded a .33 and a response of Strongly Disagree was coded a 0. Mean responses to the different items are included in Table 3.

184 participants, or roughly 13% of our overall analytic sample for Study 1, declined to answer at least one of the four symbolic racism questions. Preliminary analyses indicated that excluding participants who skipped a question did not change the pattern of results meaningfully. Consequently, I included these participants in analyses of the full symbolic racism construct (e.g., the 4-item version) calculating their overall score using whatever items they responded to. Because the specific dimensions of symbolic racism (internal and external) have only two items each, participants were only included in analyses of these dimensions if they had responded to both of the relevant questions.

Conservatism. Participants were asked a number of questions to assess their political conservatism. First, they were asked to identify their political views as liberal, moderate, or conservative. Those who indicated that they were liberal or conservative were asked whether they considered themselves “very” or only “slightly” liberal or conservative. The second set of questions asked participants to identify whether they considered themselves a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, affiliated with another political party, or unaffiliated with a party. Those who indicated that they considered themselves a Democrat or a Republican were given the opportunity to indicate if they were a “strong” or “a not very strong” Democrat or Republican. Those who indicated that they considered themselves an independent were given the opportunity to indicate whether they leaned towards the Democrat party or towards the Republican party. Responses were coded such that higher scores indicated greater conservatism or stronger affiliation with the Republican party. Respondents across both ethnic groups averaged responses roughly at the midpoint of the ideological and party identification scales, although Latinos showed a slight tendency to lean towards the Democratic party (See Table 1).

Racial Affect. Participants completed a feelings thermometer for each of the four major racial-ethnic groups (Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Asians), indicating on a scale of 1-100 how warmly they felt towards the group. Racial affect was calculated by subtracting the score participants gave for Blacks from the score they gave for their own group. Thus, positive scores on this measure indicate relative preference for one’s own group, while negative scores indicate relative preference for Blacks over one’s own group, and scores of 0 indicate lack of preference.

Policy Endorsement. Participants rated their support for two policies. First, they were asked whether they felt that spending on programs that assisted blacks should be increased, decreased, or kept at current levels, a policy we refer to henceforth as *Spending on Blacks*. Second, they were asked to give their opinion on whether it is the government’s responsibility to guarantee equal opportunity for Blacks and Whites to succeed, a policy we refer to from here on out as *Equal Opportunity*. Responses were coded such that higher scores reflected support for decreasing money spent on Blacks and rejecting the premise that the government has an obligation to guarantee equal opportunity for Blacks and Whites. The full text of the policy prompts is below.

- **Spending on Blacks:** Should spending for programs that assist blacks be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
- **Equal Opportunity:** Equal opportunity for blacks and whites to succeed is important but it's not really the government's job to guarantee it. (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree)³

Results

Analytic Approach

I tested the first four hypotheses of Study 1 in four sets of analyses. Tests of the fifth and final hypothesis—that education would moderate the coherence and predictive capacity of symbolic racism—were incorporated into each of the primary four sets of analyses.

³ Listed are the actual response options given to the participant. These responses were reverse coded such that higher values were, in my analyses, indicative of rejecting equal opportunity policies.

In my first set of analyses, I addressed the overall endorsement of symbolic racism items as a function of ethnic background and education level, using univariate analyses of variance. I followed these initial analyses with an examination of the coherence of symbolic racism using reliability analyses. Reliability of the scale—the consistency with which respondents answered different questions within the symbolic racism measure—was assessed using Cronbach’s α reliability analysis. Higher values (closer to 1) in this analysis indicate greater coherence of the construct, while lower values (closer to 0) indicate lack of coherence.

In order to compare Cronbach’s α values from independent samples (e.g., Whites with and without college experience), I used the Feldt test (Feldt, 1969). The independent samples Feldt test produces a value (“W”) which functions as an F value would, with degrees of freedom based on the size of each the two samples ($df = N_1 - 1, N_2 - 1$). Significance for this test can thus be evaluated using standard F statistic significance calculations. For my analyses, I took advantage of the Excel based calculator for independent samples Feldt tests, designed by Suen (2009).

As a second pass at the coherence of symbolic racism targeting Latinos, after establishing the scale reliability for each of our four sub-groups (Whites with high or low education; Latinos with high or low education), I clarified the source of respondents’ high or low reliability scores by examining the inter-item correlations within the 4-item symbolic racism scale. This allowed me to identify any particular sets of items which were contributing to (or taking away from) the overall scale reliability, and allowed me to specifically evaluate whether the group in question demonstrated the two dimensional structure of symbolic racism found in prior research (Tarman & Sears, 2005). This

structure would be supported by a pattern of stronger correlations between items in the same dimension (e.g., between denial of the impact of slavery and endorsement of the claim that Blacks have received more than they deserved in recent years) and weaker but positive correlations between items that crossed dimensions (e.g., between denial of the impact of slavery and claims that Blacks could succeed if they worked harder). In contrast, the finding that items within the same dimension do not correlate with one another positively, or that items crossing dimensions correlate with one another in unexpected ways (e.g., weakly, negatively, or more robustly than those within a single dimension) would suggest that the group in question demonstrates an alternative structure to symbolic racism than the internal-external model presented in prior literature.

My third set of analyses addressed the origins (determinants) of symbolic racism among Latinos and Whites. I used hierarchical linear regressions to examine the additional variance explained in the model by conservatism and racial affect—two theorized components of symbolic racism endorsement—on top of the variance explained by control variables. I examined the capacity of these factors to predict unique variance in symbolic racism by regressing symbolic racism first on control variables (age, income, religious attendance, gender and immigration status), and then assessing the additional variance explained when I add the variables of interest—party identification, ideology and anti-Black racial affect. These analyses allowed me to test whether respondents from different sub-groups showed the same conceptual patterns that symbolic racism theory expects—specifically, a pattern such that we find positive relationships between conservatism, racial affect and symbolic racism. That is, I should find that respondents who are more conservative, identify more with the Republican party, and more strongly

prefer their own group over Blacks, should also endorse symbolic racism more enthusiastically.

My fourth and final set of analyses focused on the consequences of symbolic racism, examining how endorsement of this bias predicted support for two different racialized policy topics: The amount of money the government spends on programs for Blacks (*Spending on Blacks*) and the obligation the government has to maintain equal opportunity in employment practices (*Equal Opportunity Policies*). For analyses of consequences, each of the policy attitudes was regressed on control variables, conservatism variables, racial affect and symbolic racism. In these analyses, I examined the unique variance in policy attitudes that was explained by symbolic racism, after accounting for the variance explained by the control variables, the conservatism variables and racial affect. The finding that symbolic racism explains significant amounts of unique variance in these attitudes would be in line with prior findings of the power of this construct to explain policy preferences above and beyond its component parts. In contrast, if I should reveal that symbolic racism was not predictive of policy attitudes for Latino respondents, this would provide useful evidence that an alternative model of the determinants of policy preferences is needed.

Because I was interested in ethnicity and education based differences in patterns of coherence, origins and consequences of symbolic racism, I examined how ethnicity and education moderated each of the phenomena that I explored. For each of the four sets of analyses listed above, I began by documenting the patterns shown in each of the four relevant demographic groups (e.g., low education Latinos, high education Latinos, low

education Whites and high education Whites).⁴ After documenting these patterns, and highlighting any apparent differences between the groups, I conducted analyses of the full sample, using interaction vectors representing moderation on the basis of ethnicity and education. These analyses tested whether any differences that seemed to fall on educational or ethnicity lines, were sufficiently robust as to reach statistical significance.

Endorsement of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Items Among Latinos and Whites

I hypothesized that Latinos would endorse symbolic racism at rates comparable to Whites, if not even higher. A univariate analysis of variance revealed a main effect of ethnicity ($F(1, 1385) = 28.36, p < .001$) on scale means, confirming that Latinos ($M = .57$) endorsed symbolic racism more strongly than did Whites ($M = .48$). The results also indicated a main effect of education, ($F(1, 1385) = 15.49, p < .001$), such that respondents without any college education ($M = .57$) endorsed symbolic racism more strongly than did respondents with at least one year of college education ($M = .49$). Finally, there was a significant interaction of these two factors, $F(1, 1385) = 3.971, p = .046$. Simple effects tests clarified the interaction, revealing that high education Whites ($M = .46$) endorsed symbolic racism at significantly lower rates than low education Whites ($M = .54$), $F(1, 1385) = 16.57, p < .001$, whereas high education Latinos ($M =$

⁴ Although it is common to first test the significance of a moderating variable and only follow up significant moderation with split-sample tests, I approach these analyses differently because of the relative dearth of even descriptive data regarding symbolic racism expressed by, and towards, Latino Americans. Thus, even if the interaction does not reach significance, there is value to documenting general ethnic or education-level differences in attitudes or the associations among those attitudes.

.55) showed comparable endorsement of symbolic racism to low education Latinos ($M = .58$), $F(1, 1385) = 2.01, p = .156$.

Coherence of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among Latinos and Whites

I hypothesized that Latinos would demonstrate a lower level of coherence (reliability) in their symbolic racism endorsement, relative to Whites. This hypothesis was confirmed: Cronbach's α analyses indicated that Whites in our sample showed strong coherence in the symbolic racism construct, producing a value of $\alpha = .671$ for the four item scale. This was significantly stronger than the coherence shown by Latinos ($\alpha = .174$), $W(640, 570) = .3983, p < .001$. Likewise, respondents with no college experience ($\alpha = .226$) demonstrated significantly lower scale reliability than those with at least one year of college ($\alpha = .633$), $W(681, 528) = .4742 p < .001$.

In examining the four demographic groups separately (see Table 3), I found evidence suggestive of the roles of both ethnicity and education in determining the coherence of symbolic racism endorsement. Latinos without college experience showed the lowest reliability ($\alpha = .064$), followed by Latinos with at least one year of college education ($\alpha = .353$), Whites without college education ($\alpha = .511$) and Whites with at least one year of college education ($\alpha = .707$). Feldt tests revealed that the difference between Latinos with and without college education was significant, $W(451, 209) = .691, p = .001$, as was the difference between Whites with and without college education,

$W(564, 162) = .5992, p < .001$.⁵ Likewise, Whites with college education showed greater reliability than Latinos with college education, $W(564, 208) = .459, p < .001$, and Whites without any college experience showed greater reliability than Latinos without any college experience, $W(162, 451) = .5224, p < .001$. Indeed, even the two groups that were most similar in terms of reliability—Latinos with college experience and Whites without—showed significant differences, $W(162, 208) = .756, p = .031$, albeit less robust than the other comparisons. I thus confirmed my hypothesis that Whites would show greater coherence of symbolic racism than Latinos, and that respondents with greater education would show greater coherence than those with less education.

My next analyses evaluated whether Whites and Latinos demonstrated the presence of the two underlying dimensions of symbolic racism: Internal symbolic racism (including items referencing individual-level attributions for racial disparities in domains like wealth and education) and external symbolic racism (including items referencing structural attributions for the same disparities). Tarman and Sears (2005) found, in a sample of White respondents, that these two constructs represented two dimensions of the same underlying ideology—symbolic racism—and maintained some conceptual distinctiveness but ultimately correlated strongly and positively with one another.

Inter-item correlations of the present study's data, divided by ethnicity and education, revealed that only high-education Whites demonstrated the pattern of relationships among symbolic racism variables that was reported by Tarman and Sears (2005). In this group, the two internal symbolic racism items correlated moderately and

⁵ Although we only report statistical tests of the significant differences between each of the closest pairs of α values, each of the comparisons of more distant pairs (e.g., low education Latinos and high education Whites) was significant at the $p < .001$ level.

positively with one another, at $r = .47$, while the two external symbolic racism items showed a similarly strong and positive relationship ($r = .47$). The correlations between items that crossed dimensions correlated more weakly than those within dimensions, but still demonstrated a positive and highly significant relationship (see Table 4).

Among other educational and ethnic groupings, however, the pattern departed somewhat from what we would expect to find if symbolic racism were best represented by the two-dimensional structure identified by Tarman and Sears (2005). Although every group showed significant correlations among the internal and external symbolic racism items (e.g., within each dimension), correlations between items that crossed dimensions were far less consistent. Low education Whites looked most similar to prior findings, with significant correlations between some of the internal and external items, but marginal or absent correlations between others. High education Latinos departed from the prior pattern even further, showing no significant correlations between any of the items that crossed dimensions, while low education Latinos showed significant *negative* associations among internal and external symbolic racism items, reaching significance in two cases and marginal significance in a third (See Table 4). In examining composites of the two dimensions (e.g., averages of each set of two items), the same patterns emerged. For Whites, internal and external symbolic racism correlated significantly and positively, $r = .39, p < .001$. On the other hand, for Latinos, they were correlated negatively ($r = -.09, p = .034$).

These findings challenged the idea that symbolic racism operates as a coherent ideology among low education Latinos, and to a lesser some extent among high education

Latinos as well.⁶ They suggested that, among Latinos, the 4-item symbolic racism scale cannot reasonably be treated as a single scale.⁷ As a result, I proceeded in the remaining analyses of Study 1 to treat symbolic racism as a set of two variables—made up of the internal symbolic racism items on one hand, and the external ones on the other, and evaluating their significant contribution to the model separately.

Origins of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism among Latinos and Whites

With respect to the origins of symbolic racism among Latinos, I predicted that Latinos' expression of anti-Black symbolic racism would be significantly predicted by their anti-Black racial affect, their political ideology and their party identification, but that the strength of these relationships would be somewhat attenuated, relative to Whites. Moreover, I argued that more educated respondents—White or Latino—should show stronger relationships between these variables.

⁶ While high education Latinos did not show significant negative correlations (e.g., dissociation), they failed to show significant positive associations, which also renders their results inconsistent with the claim that internal and external symbolic racism are closely related dimensions of the same underlying construct.

⁷ The possibility that Latinos were responding by acquiescing (e.g., giving a response of Agree or Strongly Agree) a disproportionate amount of the time was considered, given that the observed dissociation of internal and external symbolic racism items could also be produced by such a pattern of responding. Using items not included in the symbolic racism scale—specifically, social dominance orientation items—I assessed level of acquiescence by counting the number of times Latinos responded “agree” or “disagree” within a set of six items. Half the items were reverse coded for dominance orientation, which allowed for the calculation of acquiescence scores that were independent from actual endorsement of social dominance. Although my analyses revealed that Latinos did tend to acquiesce more often in general, analyses in which this tendency was factored out of the symbolic racism items (e.g., by regressing the items on acquiescence and using the residuals for analyses) did not produce substantively different inter-item correlations or reliability patterns.

I first examined this with raw correlations among the variables (See Table 5). I found that correlations between internal and external symbolic racism on the one hand, and conservatism and racial affect on the other, followed the patterns predicted by symbolic racism theory more broadly only among high-education Whites (See Table 5). In this group, internal and external symbolic racism were each correlated significantly and positively with political ideology (liberal/conservative), party identification (Democrat/Republican), and racial affect (feeling more warmly towards one's own group/feeling more warmly towards Blacks). Moreover, Whites showed particularly high correlations among internal and external symbolic racism ($r = .45$) and among ideology and party identification ($r = .67$).⁸

The predicted associations between these variables were far less potent among other demographic groups, however. Among low education Whites, the two measures of symbolic racism (internal and external) and the two measures of conservatism (ideology and party identification) were correlated with one another. However, internal symbolic racism was correlated only with ideology, not with party identification or racial affect, and external symbolic racism was not correlated significantly with any of the theorized components of symbolic racism. Among high education Latinos, only party identification and ideology were significantly correlated, while all other relationships were too weak to reach traditional significance. Finally, among low education Latinos, in line with my

⁸ In finding these patterns, it is notable that we conceptually replicated and extended the findings of Segura and Valenzuela (2010), who found that Whites showed a three-times stronger correlation between party identification and symbolic racism in their national sample of Whites ($r=.28$) and Latinos ($r = .09$). In our findings, the same pattern emerged, but even more robust differences were present, for both internal and external symbolic racism, and for both party identification and political ideology.

inter-item correlations from the prior set of analyses, internal and external symbolic racism had a significant negative correlation, suggesting dissociation of these dimensions.

In other words, for low education Latinos, Blacks' negative outcomes were perceived as simultaneously being Blacks' own fault, based on poor work ethic and pushiness (internal symbolic racism) as well as being the fault of systematic discrimination (external symbolic racism).⁹ While such explanations are by no means unreasonable—quite plausibly, a group may produce their own outcomes through factors like effort while simultaneously being held back by structural discrimination—they are not consistent with the symbolic racism ideology as it has been set forth thus far.

Turning next to regression analyses, I found that conservatism and racial affect explained significant unique variance (on top of the variance explained by controls) in internal symbolic racism only among White respondents with at least one year of college education (See Table 6). Indeed, in this population, adding political ideology, party identification and racial affect to the model explained an additional 18% of variance in internal symbolic racism, whereas variance explained in the other three groups did not exceed 2%. The same pattern of results, albeit somewhat attenuated, emerged in regression analyses of the determinants of external symbolic racism (See Table 7).

Among Whites with at least one year of college education, conservatism and racial affect explained significant unique variance (10%) whereas among other groups, it produced at most 4%.

⁹ Although this makes it sound like a positive correlation, items regarding external symbolic racism were reverse coded, such that a negative correlation between these dimensions actually involves endorsement of both sets of explanations (individual and structural) for Blacks' outcomes.

Examining the components of symbolic racism more specifically, my analyses revealed that the variance explained was primarily driven by the effect of political ideology and racial affect for internal symbolic racism, and by political ideology alone for external symbolic racism. In both cases, the relationship was in the expected direction: respondents who reported being more conservative politically, and who reported a greater preference for their own group over Blacks, tended to also endorse internal symbolic racism more strongly. Party identification, in contrast, did not show a significant relationship with either of the symbolic racism dimensions, and racial affect did not show a significant capacity to predict unique variance in external symbolic racism, despite playing a significant role in the internal symbolic racism analysis.

The second strongest (e.g., most variance explained) model for internal symbolic racism was that of high-education Latinos, for whom 12% of the variance in internal symbolic racism was explained by the model. Interestingly, however, this variance was not explained by the theorized components of symbolic racism (ideology, party identification and racial affect), all of which had non-significant coefficients. Instead, the majority of the variance explained among educated Latinos was the result of the control variables, specifically, gender and immigration status. Women's endorsement of internal symbolic racism was significantly lower than that of men, and respondents with more immigration experience reported marginally higher internal symbolic racism than did those who had less immigration experience. Demographic control variables explained 11% of the variance in internal symbolic racism among high-education Latinos, compared to just 7% among high education Whites, and just 4% and 3% about low-education Latinos and Whites, respectively (See Table 7).

Following my analysis of the individual groups, I used regression analyses of the full sample, with interaction variables entered at the final step, to examine whether either education or ethnicity moderated the relationship of conservatism and racial affect to either dimension of symbolic racism. In examining ethnicity I found that ethnicity interacted with ideology and racial affect, such that ideology and racial affect were significantly more strongly related to internal symbolic racism among Whites than among Latinos. In addition, ethnicity interacted significantly with ideology to predict external symbolic racism, with Whites again showing a stronger relationship of these two variables than Latinos. These findings are summarized in Tables 8 and 9.

I found that education likewise interacted significantly with ideology and racial affect to predict internal symbolic racism (see Tables 10 and 11), and with ideology to predict external symbolic racism. As with ethnicity, in all cases, the expected pattern emerged: Respondents with greater education showed stronger relationships between symbolic racism and its theorized component parts.

Consequences of Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Among Latinos and Whites

Finally, my last set of analyses examined the consequences of symbolic racism endorsement, looking at how symbolic racism predicted support for governmental spending for Blacks and for equal opportunity policies. I predicted that the relationship between symbolic racism and policy support should be stronger among Whites and among the more educated, relative to Latinos and the less educated.

Looking first at raw correlations (see Table 12), both internal and external symbolic racism were correlated significantly with both Black spending attitudes and

equal opportunity policy support, among both high and low education White respondents. In contrast, among Latino respondents, internal symbolic racism was correlated significantly only with equal opportunity policy support, while external symbolic racism was correlated significantly only with Black spending attitudes (although it was marginally significantly correlated with Black spending attitudes). Unlike in analyses of coherence and origins, where both education level and ethnicity differences were immediately apparent, in examining the raw correlations for our policy attitudes, only ethnicity seemed to play a substantive moderating role.

To explore these relationships more fully, I conducted linear regression analyses for each of our four sub-samples. Among both high and low education Whites (See Table 13), we found that symbolic racism explained significant additional variance in attitudes towards governmental spending on Blacks.¹⁰ Between external and internal symbolic racism, external racism was the more consistent predictor, with respondents who denied the role of racism in holding back Blacks and who felt that Blacks had already received more than they deserved tending to also report that they believed Black-oriented programs should receive less funding from the federal government. Likewise, though not as robust an effect, internal symbolic racism was also a significant predictor of this attitude among more educated Whites, and a marginally significant predictor among less educated Whites (See Table 14). Again, this relationship was in the direction symbolic racism theory would predict: Respondents who reported that Blacks could succeed if they

¹⁰ Interestingly, symbolic racism explained similar amounts of unique variance among high and low education Whites (13% vs. 14%), although the high education White model was ultimately more robust ($R^2 = .283$ vs. $.192$) due to the more considerable role played by ideology in predicting attitudes towards governmental spending on Blacks, among educated Whites.

only worked hard and had been demanding too much from society already tended to also report that the government should spend less money on Black-oriented programs, rather than more.

Turning next to equal opportunity policy support, a similar but distinct pattern emerged, this time favoring the impact of internal symbolic racism. Among high education Whites, respondents showed significant relationships between both internal and external symbolic racism and equal opportunity policy support, with a robust final model explaining 28% of the variance in this outcome. The significant effect of internal symbolic racism was echoed in the models for low education Whites and high education Latinos, although it was only marginally significant among low education Whites. In contrast, external symbolic racism was only marginally significant for one other group—high education Latinos—producing a far less consistent pattern of predictions, relative to internal symbolic racism.

In contrast, among Latinos, the expected positive relationship between external symbolic racism and policy support emerged, while no relationship between internal symbolic racism and policy support was demonstrated. In combination with the finding that low-education Whites showed only a marginally significant relationship between internal symbolic racism and policy support for governmental spending on Black-relevant programs, this points to a broader pattern of external symbolic racism demonstrating a far more consistent relationship with support for this policy than internal symbolic racism.

Thus, my findings generally documented that, while high education Whites showed relationships between both forms of symbolic racism and both attitudes, other groups showed more selective patterns of relationships. Specifically, high education

Latinos and low education Whites only showed significant relationships between external symbolic racism and support for governmental spending on programs for Blacks, and between internal symbolic racism and equal opportunity policy.

To test the significance of these apparent group differences in the robustness of the relationship between symbolic racism and policy attitudes, I conducted full sample analyses with interaction vectors. I found that both ethnicity and education level significantly moderated the relationship between external symbolic racism and Black spending attitudes, with more educated respondents and White respondents showing more robust patterns in these relationships (See Tables 15 and 16). Ethnicity additionally marginally significantly moderated the relationship between internal symbolic racism and support for this policy, such that Whites showed a stronger relationship between Black spending support and internal symbolic racism than did Latinos.

Looking next at equal opportunity policy support, I found that both ethnicity and education level significantly moderated the relationship between internal symbolic racism and equal opportunity policy support, such that these relationships were stronger among Whites and among more educated respondents (see Tables 17 and 18). This moderation was significant for education level while it was marginally significant for ethnicity. No moderation effects emerged for the relationship of external symbolic racism to equal opportunity policy support: The relationship between these two variables was not significantly different for high as opposed to low education respondents.

Discussion

The analyses described in Study 1 were selected in order to investigate two major areas of inquiry: First, I explored whether the strength of endorsement, coherence, origins and consequences of symbolic racism were similar across two ethnic groups: Whites, who have historically been studied in symbolic racism research, and Latinos, who have rarely been assessed using these measures. Second, I asked whether education moderated any of these patterns, examining whether it was associated with attenuated or strengthened patterns of relationships between theoretically related variables and within the symbolic racism construct itself.

With respect to the first question, I found that symbolic racism, despite being endorsed more strongly among Latinos, was considerably less consistent in the Latino sample than in the White sample, both with respect to the items themselves (e.g., the construct's reliability), and with respect to the associations between the bias and its theorized component parts (e.g., the origins) and between the bias and theoretically consistent policy attitudes (e.g., the consequences). Latinos demonstrated lower internal consistency in symbolic racism, weaker associations between symbolic racism and political ideology, and less robust associations between endorsement of symbolic racism and support for policies like equal opportunity protections.

Latinos' lower coherence in symbolic racism, relative to Whites, could originate in a range of factors, which should be explored in full. It might be that Latinos, on average, had less exposure to symbolic racist rhetoric, either because they were raised outside the United States or because they lived in ethnic enclaves and did not engage actively with American politics. Future research should examine immigration status as a

moderator of coherence, as well as looking at factors like media consumption, language ability, and neighborhood composition.

It might also be, however, that the symbolic racism scale simply did not relate directly enough to the negative stereotypes that Latinos saliently associated with Blacks, and so they demonstrated lower coherence purely out of relative lack of practice considering these sentiments towards Blacks. Although prior research has shown that Latinos do endorse stereotypes of Blacks consistent with symbolic racist rhetoric, it is also the case that Latinos have a considerably different relationship with Blacks, relative to Whites. They are more likely to live in the same neighborhoods, attend the same schools, and work in the same low paid industries, and as such may have unique stereotypes that come up in these more interpersonal settings, rather than the stereotypes relevant to political topics. Future research should investigate the possibility that other expressions of stereotyping towards Blacks, might show greater coherence in Latino respondent samples.

My finding that Latinos show relatively attenuated relationships between political ideology and symbolic racism raises questions regarding the meaning of ideology among Latinos. Whereas, among Whites, liberal and conservative may be nearly synonymous with a preference for particular political policies, largely falling along Democratic or Republican party lines, the same may not be true among Latinos. For instance, Latinos may associate the word conservative with particular sexual mores or religious observance, in line with the use of that word within another culture, rather than associating liberal and conservative with the sorts of policies typically considered congruent to these labels in the United States.

Finally, future research should address the explanations underlying the relatively weak relationships between Latinos' symbolic racism endorsement and their policy attitudes. For instance, it may be that, among Latinos, policy attitudes that benefit Blacks are seen as simultaneously benefitting Latinos, despite being explicitly directed at a different group. An equal opportunity policy for Blacks might be endorsed if Latinos felt it would protect their own group from discrimination, even if they felt that Blacks didn't experience discrimination or need protections. What looked like a disorganized pattern of relationships between symbolic racism and policy support in my analyses could more accurately reflect a missing variable regarding Latinos' perception of those policies' effects.

With respect to the moderating role of education, I found that more educated respondents showed lower endorsement of symbolic racism overall, but stronger relationships between symbolic racism, its theorized origins, and the relevant policy attitudes. Respondents who had completed at least one year of college showed higher reliability of the symbolic racism scale, stronger associations between symbolic racism and ideology, and more power to predict unique variance in responses to two different racially-charged policy proposals. These findings are in line with prior research, which has shown that education is associated with both lower endorsement of prejudice and higher consistency of that prejudice to policy preferences (Federico & Holmes, 2005).

Although not an a-priori primary focus of this project, the analyses in Study 1 also offered considerable insight into the two dimensions of symbolic racism: Internal symbolic racism and external symbolic racism. Among Whites, responses to items focused on individual-level ("internal") explanations for racial inequality (e.g., work

effort) were closely correlated with responses to items focused on structure-level (“external”) explanations for racial inequality (e.g., discrimination). In contrast, the internal and external dimensions of symbolic racism were far less related among Latinos, and even demonstrated a pattern of dissociation (e.g., negative correlation) among less educated Latino respondents. Future studies that employ non-White respondents should carefully evaluate whether symbolic racism is sufficiently coherent to be included as just one predictor, or whether using its two dimensions separately as predictors is more appropriate.

Internal and external symbolic racism were also not consistently predicted by the same factors, nor were they consistently related to the same attitudes. In this respect, my work provides conceptual replication for the work of Green, Staerkle and Sears (2006), who found that the two dimensions explain policy support in conceptually meaningful but distinctive ways. For instance, external symbolic racism was more consistently predictive of support for governmental spending on programs for Blacks. Given that governmental action represents a system-level intervention, it is unsurprising that support for such an intervention would be predicted by beliefs about whether the government has done enough for Blacks already.

In contrast, internal symbolic racism was a more consistent predictor of support for equal opportunity policies. This, too, makes sense, if one considers that equal opportunity policies are a response to the premise that individuals are not being allowed to advance, despite being capable or qualified. For respondents who believe Blacks are to blame for their own outcomes, on the basis of deficient work ethic, for instance, equal opportunity policies are not the solution. Likewise, given that equal opportunity policies

have been a main thrust of the civil rights movement historically, respondents who feel Blacks are demanding too much from society already (e.g., the second core component of internal symbolic racism) may very well be thinking about demands for more protections as being particularly offensive. Future research should continue to expand the set of policies being assessed, and researchers might consider using experimental priming methods (e.g., having respondents read about internal or external symbolic racism explanations for inequality) to establish a causal relationship between symbolic racism and policy support.

Despite the important contributions of Study 1, a number of limitations apply, pointing the direction for future studies. First, respondents in the study were residents of Los Angeles County, a strength of the project because it allowed me to evaluate how Latinos engage with anti-Black bias in a city where both groups have had a longstanding demographic presence. Yet my reliance on this dataset did limit how much we can confidently generalize these findings to other cities in the United States. Future research should evaluate whether the patterns observed in these studies replicate among Latinos in cities where Blacks are not strongly represented, or in cities where one group or the other has only recently arrived in substantial numbers, to clarify how Latinos' attitudes might shift under such conditions.

The second limitation relates to my division of respondents into high and low education groups. While Latinos and Whites were both divided at the same point (e.g., as having either no college experience or at least one year of experience), this does not mean that the educational experiences of the two "high education" groups were even remotely similar. Latinos in this group represented the very most educated of their ethnic sample

(roughly the top quarter of the sample) whereas Whites in the high education group were made up of all but the least educated of their ethnic sample (roughly the top three quarters of the sample). Latinos in the top quartile of their community in education might have other unique characteristics that impacted their responses (e.g., unusually strong intellect), whereas Whites in the top 75% of their community are less likely to be distinctive in these ways, on average.

Moreover, Latinos and Whites receive, on average, considerably different educational experiences, such that the same number of years of education can mean exposure to dramatically different academic contexts or subjects. Given that symbolic racism theory proposes that experience applying racial ideology to political issues should be associated with more coherent endorsement of symbolic racist views, education can reasonably be thought of as a prime context in which to engage in this type of thinking. Yet, given that students of color, relative to Whites, disproportionately attend schools where critical thinking is less emphasized (Anyon, 2006), it may very well be that the experience these two theoretically similar groups have in thinking about symbolic racism and applying it, is in fact quite disparate.

These limitations in the comparability of high education Latinos and Whites make it very difficult to make a firm conclusion regarding the effect of education on symbolic racism. For instance, it may be that the reason low education Whites nonetheless showed greater coherence of the symbolic racism construct, relative to high education Latinos, was that low education Whites had in fact received higher quality education in their briefer academic careers, relative to the education received by Latinos in their lengthier academic careers. Future researchers should attempt to study more truly educationally

equal samples, perhaps drawing from among Whites who attended the same schools as a sample of Latinos, to allow a more effective test of the relative contributions of ethnicity and education to political consistency.

In conclusion, Study 1 analyses revealed that Latinos show distinct patterns of racial attitudes towards Blacks, departing from White respondents in a variety of respects. Moreover, I demonstrated that education plays a powerful role in symbolic racism findings, moderating the coherence of the construct itself as well as the relationship of symbolic racism to both theoretical predictors and racially relevant policy attitudes. I return to the broader implications of these findings in the general discussion. Before I turn to that, however, I extend symbolic racism research in a second direction, in Study 2, examining a relatively under-examined version of the symbolic racism scale in which Latinos, rather than Blacks, are the topic of the items.

Study 2: Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism Among White Americans

Introduction

The second extension of the research that this dissertation explored was to address the coherence, origins and consequences of an alternative symbolic racism scale adapted to focus on Latino Americans as the denigrated group (rather than Blacks). In these analyses, as in Study 1, I explored the moderating role of education in symbolic racism's associations with both predictor and outcome variables. I addressed these topics in a series of four hypotheses. This introduction will justify each of those four predictions, describing past research on each subject.

The Coherence of Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism Among Whites

Henry and Sears (2002) reasoned that Whites' anti-Black symbolic racism was more crystallized among older people, and among more educated people, because older and more educated individuals had had more experience applying the ideology and had developed more elaborated understanding of its principles. Based on this reasoning, anti-Latino ideologies of any kind might be expected to be less coherent than anti-Black ideologies, due to the relatively recent influx of Latino immigrants and the Black-White racial narrative that has dominated political debates historically.

On the other hand, the reasons Henry and Sears (2002) proposed for anti-Black symbolic racism being a coherent ideology remain true for anti-Latino symbolic racism as well: If an individual believes that Latinos do not suffer discrimination, yet continue to achieve at levels below those of whites, then demands for special attention are unjustified and receipt of special privileges is undeserved. There is no particular reason to believe

that anti-Latino sentiments should garner logical lapses in reasoning about such issues, and thus these sentiments may indeed be consistent when applied to Latinos as well.

Moreover, stereotypes of Latinos are somewhat consistent with stereotypes of Blacks, which may facilitate adoption of anti-Latino symbolic racism among White Americans who are already familiar with anti-Black symbolic racist sentiments. Like Blacks, Latinos are stereotyped by Whites as being irresponsible, lazy, dependent and unreliable (Cross & Maldonado, 1971). Although Latinos are also sometimes seen as hard-working (e.g., Triandis, Lisansky, Chang, Marin & Betancourt, 1982), this positive stereotype is comparatively rare (Niemann, 2001). Likewise, the perception that Latinos are unwilling to pursue immigration in a legally sanctioned manner is consistent with the symbolic racist sentiment that the American social system is basically fair, making any attempt to work outside of it (e.g., by engaging in undocumented immigration) inappropriate.

Finally, the Los Angeles County Social Survey is uniquely suited to offer a population in which these considerations are of less concern. Specifically, individuals who have been raised in Southern California have the potential to have acquired anti-Latino prejudice prior to encountering specific Latino-relevant political issues, just as other Americans acquire anti-Black prejudice in this way. Likewise, because Latinos have been a presence in Southern California for many decades, respondents in the sample likely have considerably more practice engaging with political issues like immigration, relative to what we might see in the rest of the country. Thus, we might find patterns of coherence, origins and consequences that are similarly powerful to those observed in anti-Black symbolic racism.

Thus, while Whites' anti-Latino symbolic racism may be somewhat less internally consistent than their anti-Black symbolic racism, it is nonetheless likely to show considerable coherence. My first hypothesis in Study 2 therefore predicts that anti-Latino symbolic racism will achieve acceptable levels of coherence, but will not approach the level of reliability seen in analyses of anti-Black symbolic racism.

Hypothesis 6: Anti-Latino symbolic racism will achieve acceptable reliability in a sample of White respondents but reliability will be lower than that of anti-Black symbolic racism, in the same sample.

Origins of Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism Among Whites

A second topic that Study 2 addressed was whether anti-Latino symbolic racism among Whites is the byproduct of the same factors as anti-Black symbolic racism among Whites. Recall that anti-Black symbolic racism is predicted significantly—but not entirely—by two major factors: anti-Black racial affect and conservatism. The relative contribution of each of these factors has been a matter of considerable debate, with critics proposing alternately that symbolic racism is merely a redundant measure of one of them or the other (e.g., Carmines & Merriman, 1993; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1998; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986, Tetlock, 1994; see Sears & Henry, 2003; 2005, addressing these points).

That symbolic racism correlates significantly, but not absolutely, with each of these measures, has been a critical finding in the efforts to establish anti-Black symbolic racism as a unique construct (Sears & Henry, 2003; 2005). With a measure of anti-Latino symbolic racism, then, the most reasonable way to proceed is to ask, first, whether it is

correlated with appropriate measures (e.g., anti-Latino racial affect and conservatism) and second, whether it is independent from these measures (e.g., demonstrating moderate but not high or nearly-absolute correlation). Moreover, we can ask whether anti-Black symbolic racism itself predicts anti-Latino symbolic racism, addressing the question of whether these represent two heavily overlapping, partially overlapping, or generally independent constructs.

The robustness of these relationships is difficult to predict. On the one hand, anti-Latino symbolic racism is a relatively less-discussed rhetoric, compared to anti-Black symbolic racism. As I discuss above, the policy topics typically associated with Latinos (e.g., immigration, bilingual education) do not map on perfectly to symbolic racism themes like work effort or denial of discrimination. Moreover, because Latinos have a relatively lesser place in the American political consciousness, compared to Blacks, consideration of racial bias towards Latinos may simply be less practiced overall, resulting in less consistent responses across anti-Latino symbolic racism and related attitudes. Less coherent responses to the measure mean less predictive power for the measure, so the robustness of anti-Latino symbolic racism's relationships with other variables may be prematurely compromised if it is incoherent to start with.

In the current sample, then, I predict a replication of the origins findings from anti-Black symbolic racism research. Specifically, I expect anti-Latino symbolic racism to be significantly predicted by both Latino thermometer ratings and conservative ideology, but to nonetheless emerge as an independent construct. If anything, given the relatively recent influx of Latino populations in the United States, I might expect the correlation of Latino thermometer ratings and anti-Latino symbolic racism to be

marginally lower than that found in classic anti-Black symbolic racism studies, although I don't expect it to be so low as to not be significant, given the centrality with which Latino-relevant issues have dominated Southern Californian political discussions for decades.

Hypothesis 7: Anti-Latino symbolic racism will demonstrate significant associations with its theorized component parts: Anti-Latino affect and conservatism.

Consequences of Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism Among Whites

The next topic I turned to was the question of how anti-Latino symbolic racism predicted policy preferences, above and beyond its component parts (conservatism and the Latino thermometer) and the relevant control variables. Researchers have found that stereotypes of Latinos as lazy are predictive of White support for the DREAM act (Medeiros & Sanchez, 2011) and immigration policy support (Lu & Nicholson-Crotty, 2010). Anti-immigrant sentiment is likewise negatively correlated with the perception that Latino immigrants are integrating effectively into the United States (Kiehne, 2014). These findings suggest that the perception of Latinos' endorsement or failure to endorse traditional American values likely play a role in White support for Latino-relevant political policies, which is consistent with the symbolic racism approach.

Indeed, for some policies relevant to Latinos—those in which specific services or resources are provided or denied to Latinos—the classic symbolic racism reasoning can be applied relatively directly. If Latinos are perceived as unhindered by discrimination,

and therefore fully responsible for any negative outcomes they may experience, they should not be given special provisions like separate bilingual education classes. Likewise, if immigrants are seen as taking resources (e.g., citizenship) that they have not earned, then such resources should be denied to them (or at least denied to them for a period of time after they immigrate, presumably until they have “earned” such resources by demonstrating loyalty or other contribution to the United States).

On the other hand, Latino-relevant policies are certainly not as directly related to the symbolic racism framework, relative to Black-relevant policies. For instance, while both groups have policy issues related to the provision of special benefits to the ethnic group (bilingual education for Latinos, governmental spending on programs for Blacks), the policies differ in the degree to which they are presented as zero sum affairs. Whereas funding for causes associated with Blacks (e.g., welfare) is discussed in debates over the use of limited tax dollars, bilingual education takes place in existing classrooms, educating students who must be in school regardless.¹¹ Likewise, while debates over the appropriate number of immigrants to admit annually to the country can be thought of in terms of Latinos pushing for too much progress, too quickly (just as Blacks are accused of demanding too much change, too quickly), these objections are fundamentally distinct: In the case of Latinos, the “push” is for entrance into American society—indeed, a compliment for American Whites—while in the case of Blacks, the push is about existing American citizens demanding to receive equal treatment and representation, a demand

¹¹ In reality, both these issues involve some zero sum considerations—hiring a teacher for a bilingual education class may require firing a teacher currently employed, and bilingual education may be perceived as requiring disproportionate resources of the school, whether or not that is true in reality. My point is only that the emphasis in bilingual education debates is somewhat more complex than merely the use of funds for a specific population.

which necessarily requires the dominant group to concede the current unjust state of affairs.¹² Because Latino-relevant policies share some conceptual overlap with the themes of symbolic racism, but do not fully cohere to this rhetoric, I predicted that anti-Latino symbolic racism would be less predictive of policy support, relative to findings among Whites considering anti-Black symbolic racism in Study 1.

Hypothesis 8: Latino-relevant policies will be significantly predicted by endorsement of anti-Latino symbolic racism, but these effects will be less robust than those observed in analyses of Whites considering anti-Black symbolic racism and Black-relevant policies.

Education as a Moderator of Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism

Finally, as in Study 1, I investigated the role of education as a moderator of all the processes I describe above. Because I did not find anything in the literature to indicate that education should moderate anti-Latino symbolic racism differently than it moderates anti-Black symbolic racism, I merely make the identical prediction in the two studies:

¹² Again, this is not an absolute statement. Whites certainly experience considerable anxiety over Latinos' entrance to the country and the United States eventually becoming a majority minority state. This clearly reflects an anxiety over loss of power, just as the claim that Blacks are pushing too quickly for racial equality does. Nonetheless, the emphasis of the debate differs in the two cases. Whereas the debate regarding Blacks centers on whether the society is inherently broken and requires fixing (a debate which should easily prompt cognitions about whether Blacks have or have not been held back by discrimination), immigration debates focus on whether or not Latinos are worth of citizenship in the United States (a debate which may prompt thoughts about Latinos pushing for too much entry, too fast but which does not focus on Latinos' attempts to change social inequality directly).

That more educated respondents should show more consistent, coherent patterns of symbolic racism sentiments.

Nonetheless, Study 2 expanded on Study 1 in its examination of education's moderating role because of the use of a different educational cutoff. In Study 2, participants were divided based on whether they had earned a college degree or not, a considerably higher cutoff than was used in Study 1. This was possible because only Whites were included in this sample, and their median education is considerably higher than that of Latinos. This adaptation allowed me to ask whether education serves as a moderator among Whites when the cutoff between groups is at roughly the median of the population, rather than at the 25th percentile (as was true in Study 1).

Hypothesis 9: Level of education will moderate the coherence of anti-Latino symbolic racism, as well as its associations with both predictor and outcome variables. More educated respondents will show greater coherence of the construct and more robust associations between anti-Latino symbolic racism and relevant predictors and attitudes.

Method

Survey methods in Study 2 were largely identical to those used in Study 1. Modifications and elaborations on the methods as they were described in Study 1 are identified below.

Participants

As in Study 1, the analytic sample for Study 2 was drawn from Los Angeles County Social Surveys. Study 2 employed three years of data collection: 1999, 2001 and 2002. These years were chosen because they were the years in which considerable numbers of White respondents answered symbolic racism items within which Latinos, rather than Blacks, were the targets of the statements. Only White respondents were included in the analyses for Study 2, producing analytic samples of 290, 223 and 238, from 1997, 2001 and 2002, respectively. Demographic characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 19.

Measures

Demographic Variables

Education. Participants were classified in Study 2 according to whether or not they had completed a bachelor's (BA) degree. Respondents who had earned less than a BA degree (including Associate's degrees) were contrasted with those who had earned a BA degree or higher. Notably, this is a different dividing line than was used for Latinos in Study 1. The reason for this change is that Latinos, overall, had lower rates of education, such that dividing on the basis of college education would have created vastly unevenly sized groups. In contrast, Whites had somewhat higher rates of education, such that dividing on the basis of some college education created groups that were as evenly sized as possible.

Attitudinal Variables

Anti-Latino and Anti-Black Symbolic Racism.¹³ One goal of this research was to compare respondents' endorsement of symbolic racism towards Blacks to their endorsement of the same concepts and themes being applied to Latinos. Although it would be possible to do so by asking the same questions twice, substituting in blacks and then Hispanics as the target group (and indeed, this is what was done in 1999), this is not an ideal approach because respondents may be motivated to answer in consistent ways to the two sets of items. As such, including identical items with just the group substituted out runs the risk of producing illusory correlations between the two versions of symbolic racism.

To limit such biases, respondents in 2001 received different items for anti-Latino and anti-Black symbolic racism, with the distinct items matched with one another on symbolic racism theme. This was accomplished as follows: First, two comparable items were chosen from each of three symbolic racism themes. For instance, to represent the theme of deficient work ethic, the items "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks (Hispanics) would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites," and "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and

¹³ Given the variance in associations between internal and external symbolic racism found in Study 1, it would be ideal to look at these as separate dimensions in Study 2 as well. I chose not to do this for two reasons. First, the vast majority of respondents in Study 2 are White respondents with at least one year of college education, and for this group, internal and external symbolic racism consistently acted together in Study 1. Second, the anti-Latino symbolic racism scale given to respondents only had three items, of which just one was an internal symbolic racism item. Using this item as the complete internal symbolic racism item would give disproportionate emphasis to the role of this item (referencing work ethic) rather than balancing emphasis between the two themes of internal symbolic racism (work ethic and being too demanding of change).

worked their way up. Blacks (Hispanics) should do the same without any special favors” were selected, both of which reflect this theme. Additional items were chosen from two other themes—denial of discrimination and undeserved advantages. The items were split into two sets of three items, with each set containing a single item from each of the three themes.

Finally, each respondent (depending on random assignment to either subgroup A or subgroup B) was given the first set of items applied to Latinos (e.g., “It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Hispanics would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites”) followed later on by the second set, applied to Blacks (e.g., “Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.”). Any given respondent, then, answered six different questions, with three questions about each group. This process counterbalanced any unique features of a single item, such that it was equally likely to have been answered in reference to Hispanics as in reference to Blacks. Thus, it dealt with the issue of respondents’ desire to answer consistently without losing the validity of having comparable questions for each scale.¹⁴

In 2002, the same process was followed to create two new sets of questions. Unlike in 2001, however, four items were used in each set, with the final theme of Blacks being overly demanding and creating tension unnecessarily making up the fourth and

¹⁴ This was relevant because certain sets of items, regardless of which group they were applied to, tended to generate inconsistent (low reliability) responding. Because these items were applied equally often to Black and Latino targets, however, this should not impact the overall results regarding whether responses to anti-Black symbolic racism is more coherent than responses to anti-Latino symbolic racism.

final question for the scale, for a total of eight questions asked of respondents in all (four with Blacks as the target, four with Latinos as the target).

Symbolic racism item responses were reverse coded, transformed to a 0-1 scale, and aggregated, in identical fashion to Study 1, with separate scores for each target group (Blacks, Latinos). The items used in each of the five samples (1999, 2001A, 2001B, 2002A, 2002B, where A and B represent split samples receiving counter balanced items) are included in Table 20 and 21. Preliminary analyses indicated that participants from the five samples showed comparable overall levels of symbolic racism and comparable patterns of results. Therefore, the samples were combined to create one larger dataset for our main analyses, except where otherwise noted.

Racial affect. Two racial affect variables were calculated, to reflect respondents' affect towards Blacks as well as Latinos. For each target group, a difference score between the respondent's feelings of warmth towards their own group (their rating on a White thermometer item) and their feelings of warmth for the outgroup being considered (their rating on the Black or Latino thermometer items) was calculated. For analyses of anti-Black symbolic racism (e.g., when comparing the power of anti-Black and anti-Latino symbolic racism to predict an outcome), a thermometer difference score was calculated using Blacks as the out-group (e.g., White thermometer rating – Black thermometer rating). For analyses of anti-Latino symbolic racism, a thermometer difference score was calculated using Latinos as the out-group (e.g., White thermometer rating – Latino thermometer rating). As in Study 1, positive scores on the racial affect measure indicated relative preference for Whites over the target racial outgroup, while negative scores indicated relative preference for the outgroup over Whites, and scores of

0 indicated lack of preference (e.g., that the respondent reported feeling equally warmly towards their own group (Whites) and the outgroup being discussed (Blacks or Latinos).

Policy Endorsement. In all, we analyzed participant support for a total of four policies, with different policies addressed in different years of the data. Two of the four policies focused on immigration. Participants in all three survey years rated their support for increasing, decreasing or keeping static current immigration rates in the United States. In addition, participants in 2001 and 2002 reported whether they felt the United States makes it too challenging, appropriately challenging, or not challenging enough, for immigrants to attain American citizenship. We refer to these policies, henceforth, as *Immigration Rates* and *Citizenship Barriers*. In both, higher scores indicate the more anti-immigrant sentiment: lower immigration rates or higher citizenship barriers.

The remaining two policies focused on the use of English as opposed to non-English languages¹⁵ in schools. Participants in 2001 and 2002 provided their support for schools providing classes in immigrant children's native languages, a policy we refer to as *Linguistic Support*. They responded whether they believed it was most appropriate for schools not to teach immigrant children in their native tongue at all, to do so for just a brief transitional period, or to do so throughout their academic career. Participants in 1999 and 2001 additionally reported their support for *Bilingual Education*, a policy that was distinguished from Linguistic Support insofar as the emphasis was abstract and non-specific, rather than describing specific teacher behaviors. In each of these two policies, higher scores indicate the more pro-English sentiment: More English in schools, less bilingual education. The full text of the four policies is below.

¹⁵ While the policies did not explicitly state it, Spanish was the focus of such policy debates and was likely assumed to be the focus of the questions.

- **Reduce Immigration:** Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?
- **U.S. Citizenship:** Do you feel the U.S. today makes it too difficult or too easy for immigrants to get American citizenship, or is it about right the way it is?
- **Linguistic Support:** There are several different ideas about how to teach children who don't speak English when they enter our public schools. Please tell me which of the following statements best describes how you feel: all classes should be conducted only in English; some classes should be conducted in the children's native language for a year or two until they learn English; or many classes should be conducted in the children's native language all the way through high school.
- **Bilingual Education:** How do you feel about bilingual education? Are you strongly in favor of it, somewhat in favor of it, somewhat opposed to it, or strongly opposed to it?

Results

Preliminary Analyses: Endorsement of Symbolic Racism Items Overall

Preliminary analyses assessed the rates at which Whites endorsed each of the individual symbolic racism items and the scale as a whole. Although individual items within the same scale did generate stronger or weaker endorsement in the sample, the same items applied to different target groups (e.g., an item assessing whether Blacks just need to work harder and an item assessing whether Hispanics just need to work harder) produced generally similar endorsement levels. In the aggregate, too, scale means were

comparable across samples. Moreover, scale means for the same items applied to different ethnic groups were nearly identical (See Tables 20 and 21).¹⁶ This was confirmed by correlational analysis, which revealed that respondents demonstrated relatively high consistency between their responses to symbolic racism applied to the different target groups. Examining composite scores, symbolic racism responses to anti-Black symbolic items and anti-Latino items were moderately and positively correlated with one another ($r = .52, p < .001$).

Coherence of Symbolic Racism

I predicted that anti-Latino symbolic racism would achieve acceptable reliability but would fall short of the reliability levels seen when respondents answered anti-Black symbolic racism.¹⁷ The results of my reliability analyses partially supported this hypothesis. I found that reliability was stronger for anti-Black than for anti-Latino symbolic racism in all five samples (See Table 20). However, this difference only reached significance for the 2002 sample, where Sample 2002B's reliability in response to items about Latinos ($\alpha = .595$) was significantly lower than Sample 2002A's reliability

¹⁶ Notably, in order to compare average scores for the same items applied to different target groups, it was necessary to compare across samples (as no single respondent, outside of those in 1999, received the same items for the two target groups). As such, in stating that the same items generated nearly identical scores, we are referring to comparisons of 2001A items about Latinos being compared to 2001B items about Blacks (the same items, different groups of respondents), and vice versa, for questions about Blacks.

¹⁷ In this statement, I am comparing samples that viewed the same items, for different target groups. For instance, sample 2001A is compared with sample 2002B, as these groups saw the same items about Hispanics and Blacks, respectively. I am not comparing Sample 2001A's responses for anti-Black items to their responses for anti-Hispanic items, as such a comparison is compromised by the fact that different sets of items have different coherence more broadly.

in responses to the same items applied to Blacks ($\alpha = .747$), $W(112, 111) = .6247, p = .007$.

I next examined the role of education in predicting coherence, expecting to see greater coherence among more educated respondents. Again, the general pattern of the data supported the conclusion that education (in this case, college degree) is associated with greater coherence in symbolic racism. Across the ten sets of items (5 sets each for two target groups), respondents with BA degrees produced more consistent responses (higher Cronbach's α) for eight of them, and the other two sets were similar to one another (.45 vs. .46 for 2001B anti-Black items, and .76 vs. .74 for 2002A anti-Black items).¹⁸ Using Feldt tests, I evaluated whether the differences observed reached statistical significance. For two of the samples, Sample 1999 and Sample 2001A, respondents with college degrees demonstrated higher reliability in both their responses to anti-Latino symbolic racism and their responses to anti-Black symbolic racism items, $W(142, 142) = .508, p < .001$ for 1999 anti-Latino items, $W(284, 284) = .298 p < .001$ for 1999 anti-Black items, $W(92, 92) = .584 p = .003$ for 2001A anti-Latino items, and $W(118, 118) = .415 p < .001$ for 2001A anti-Black items. In addition, Sample 2002A showed significant differences between respondents with and without college degrees for anti-Latino items, $W(108, 108) = .66 p = .01$, although the same difference did not emerge for anti-Black items.

To understand the consistent, if not significant, pattern of lower coherence in anti-Latino symbolic racism items, I next looked at inter-item correlations for the items within each of the scales. As I have displayed in Tables 22 and 23, there was no single item or

¹⁸ Sample 2002A likewise had extremely similar values across the two educational groups, although in that case, the balance favored the more educated respondents.

items that drove down the coherence of anti-Latino symbolic racism, relative to the anti-Black scales. Rather, the items within the anti-Latino symbolic racism scale showed a consistently lower correlation with one another than the same items in the anti-Black symbolic racism scale. Although the items in the anti-Latino symbolic racism scale did consistently achieve significance at the $p < .001$ level, 11 of the 12 inter-item correlations¹⁹ were more robust in the anti-Black scale. As a general pattern, then, respondents' answer to any question on the anti-Black symbolic racism scale was considerably more informative as to their responses to other questions, relative to answers on the anti-Latino symbolic racism scale.

Notably, the correlations were particularly disparate when we examined the relationship within the external symbolic racism dimension. This dimension includes two items: One addressing the role of discrimination in Blacks or Latinos outcomes, and one dealing with whether Blacks and Latinos have received more (or less) than they deserved in recent years from the government. For anti-Black items, the responses to the prompt asking how much discrimination currently holds back Blacks and the prompt asking whether Blacks had gotten more, less or as much as they deserved from the government in recent years, were moderately correlated, at $r = .46$. For anti-Latino items, responses to the same two prompts were only weakly correlated, at $r = .20$ (both $ps < .001$). Likewise, for anti-Black items, the responses to the prompt asking how much historic discrimination had held back Blacks and the prompt asking whether Blacks had gotten more than they deserved from the government in recent years (e.g., the equivalent

¹⁹ Although theoretically, with eight items, there should be 28 correlations, over half of these were missing due to the use of different items in different scales (e.g., only one of the work ethic themed questions was ever asked of any respondent, with respect to any given ethnic group target).

external symbolic racism items in the alternate set of questions administered to respondents), were correlated at $r = .238, p < .001$, while the same items were uncorrelated when applied to Latinos, at $r = .01$, n.s. In contrast, correlations were more similar, across target groups, for items within the internal symbolic racism scale (Try Hard and Demand, and Irish and Tension, see Tables 22 and 23.²⁰

In sum, I found that Whites showed lower consistency in their responses to symbolic racism items applied to Latinos, relative to responses to these items applied to Blacks, but only once demonstrated sufficiently disparate reliability to reach traditional significance standards. In addition, I found that respondents with bachelor's degrees consistently attained stronger reliability than those without, producing higher reliability for 8 out of the 10 possible sets of items and reaching significance on 5 of those sets.

Although coherence of the anti-Latino symbolic racism scale did not demonstrate significantly lower reliability than the anti-Black symbolic racism scale in most samples, respondents did demonstrate unique patterns of inter-item correlations in response to the two target groups. Specifically, I found that correlations between external symbolic racism items (e.g., denial of discrimination and claims that Blacks/Latinos have received more than they deserved) were considerably more related in anti-Black scales than they were in anti-Latino scales.

²⁰ Because only the 2002 sample received a sufficient number of items (two per dimension) to examine internal and external symbolic racism as separate dimensions, and because most of our analyses include more than just the 2002 sample, we do not explore the unique corollaries or outcomes of these individual dimensions in the current study. However, for reference, we found that the dimensions of internal and external symbolic racism were correlated nearly twice as strongly with one another when Blacks were the target group ($r = .37, p < .001$) than when Latinos are the target group ($r = .20, p < .001$).

Origins of Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism

My next research question concerned the origins of anti-Latino symbolic racism. Specifically, I was interested in exploring whether conservatism—party identification and ideology—and racial affect—the difference in response between the in-group (White) and outgroup (either Black or Latino, depending on the analysis) thermometer scales—were predictive of symbolic racism towards Latinos. I predicted that these relationships would be significant in nature.

Examining the raw correlations between these variables, I found that anti-Black symbolic racism and anti-Latino symbolic racism were each correlated significantly with anti-Latino affect, anti-Black affect, party identification and political ideology (see Table 24). Interestingly, the relative strength of the relationships was not as robustly different as one might predict. For instance, while anti-Latino affect was more strongly correlated with anti-Latino symbolic racism than with anti-Black symbolic racism, this difference was trivial in size ($r = .23$ for anti-Latino symbolic racism vs. $r = .18$ for anti-Black symbolic racism). Likewise, while anti-Black affect was more strongly correlated with anti-Black symbolic racism than anti-Latino symbolic racism, again, this difference was trivial ($r = .15$ for anti-Black symbolic racism, vs. $r = .12$ for anti-Latino symbolic racism). Moreover, anti-Latino affect was more strongly correlated (albeit trivially) with anti-Black symbolic racism ($r = .18$) than was anti-Black affect ($r = .15$).

To further clarify these relationships, I conducted hierarchical linear regressions, examining the variance in anti-Latino symbolic racism explained by anti-Latino and anti-Black racial affect, as well as ideology and party identification. I conducted these analyses with the sample split by college degree status to allow me to examine how

respondents with and without college degrees might differ in these relationships. Results showed that, among respondents with college degrees, anti-Latino affect, political ideology and party identification were all significantly predictive of anti-Latino symbolic racism, while anti-Black affect predicted anti-Latino symbolic racism only marginally (see Table 25). These variables combined with our control variables to produce a strong model, $R^2 = .247$, with the attitudinal variables contributing nearly all of that variance (22%) while control variables accounted for just 3% of the overall variance in anti-Latino symbolic racism.

In contrast, among respondents without college degrees, these variables were far less powerful in their predictive capacity. Coefficients for political ideology and anti-Latino affect reached significance, but the attitudinal variables as a group explained only 14% of the variance in anti-Latino symbolic racism and the model as a whole explained just 18% of the variance in this outcome. However, analysis of the full sample, with education entered as an interaction vector with each of the attitudinal variables, revealed no significant interaction between education and these attitudes on symbolic racism (see Table 26). High and low education respondents did not differ in the strength of the relationship of these predictors and anti-Latino symbolic racism.

Consequences

My final set of analyses examined the consequences of anti-Latino symbolic racism, evaluating a range of different policy attitudes. Specifically, I was interested in how Whites' endorsement of anti-Latino symbolic racism predicted their support for policies on immigration (Immigration Rates and Citizenship Barriers), and the use of

Spanish in school settings (Linguistic Support and Bilingual Education). This line of questioning allowed me to explore whether anti-Latino symbolic racism functions similarly to anti-Black symbolic racism, insofar as it predicts conceptually-close policy attitudes. I expected to find that anti-Latino symbolic racism would explain significant variance in Latino relevant policy attitudes, above and beyond control variables, anti-Latino affect and conservatism. Moreover, I expected these patterns to be especially robust among respondents with college degrees.

In line with my predictions, I found a relatively consistent pattern for respondents with college degrees. Specifically, I found that, in three of the four outcomes—immigration rates, citizenship barriers and linguistic support—anti-Latino symbolic racism was a significant predictor of policy attitudes, explaining between 5%, 3% and 3% of the variance in the model, respectively. In the fourth outcome, Bilingual education, anti-Latino symbolic racism was a marginally significant predictor of policy support, explaining 2% of the variance. Respondents in all the models who were more symbolically racist tended to support more conservative policy attitudes: lower immigration rates, greater barriers to citizenship, less linguistic support for new immigrant students and less use of bilingual education.

For respondents without college degrees, on the other hand, less consistent results emerged. When examining immigration rates attitudes, anti-Latino symbolic racism did emerge as a significant predictor, $b = .76$, $SE = .38$, $p = .047$. In this model of respondents without college degrees, the addition of anti-Latino symbolic racism contributed an additional 2% variance to the outcome—not as much as the 5% among educated respondents, but nonetheless significant in size. For the other outcomes,

however, anti-Latino symbolic racism was not significant. Respondents with higher endorsement of this rhetoric did not demonstrate a tendency to endorse higher barriers to citizenship, less use of students' native language (e.g., Spanish) in schools, or to oppose bilingual education broadly.

Interestingly, despite the fact that respondents with college degrees more consistently showed significant associations between symbolic racism and policy support, the total variance explained by the models did not differ consistently between respondents with and without college degrees. For immigration rates, the model explained 15% of variance among respondents with BA degrees and 12% among respondents without. For linguistic support, the model explained 18% of variance among respondents with BA degrees and 14% among respondents without. While, for citizenship barriers, the model explained considerably more variance among more educated respondents (26%) than among the less educated ones (11%), for bilingual education, the model actually explained more variance among less educated respondents (29%) than among more educated ones (24%).

One explanation for these findings that other variables were more powerful in the less educated samples. We found some evidence to this point, with ideology emerging as a significant predictor of immigration rates and bilingual education, but only among the less educated respondents. Interaction analyses of immigration rates and bilingual education, including the full model (e.g., all racial affect and symbolic racism scales, along with controls and conservatism) with interaction vectors crossing ideology with educational background, revealed that this difference in predictive capacity of ideology did not reach significance for either immigration rates or bilingual education, $ps > .1$.

My final set of analyses examined whether the education group differences we observed in our prior analyses were sufficiently robust as to reach statistical significance. To test this, I created an interaction model, with controls, conservatism, racial affect and symbolic racism, followed by interaction vectors that crossed education level (BA degree) with symbolic racism. The four interaction models (for the four policy attitudes) are summarized in Table 32.

Despite the differences I observed among the samples, education level (BA degree) not interact significantly with anti-Latino symbolic racism for any of the four policy attitudes. In all analyses, the two groups, despite showing apparently different patterns of responses, did not distinguish themselves sufficiently to provide compelling statistical evidence that the differences were more than random.

Discussion

Study 2 was designed to assess whether symbolic racism continued to remain a coherent, predictive construct, when the items were adapted to focus on Latinos, rather than Blacks, as well as whether education moderated those patterns of results. I investigated the reliability of anti-Latino symbolic racism, comparing it to the reliability of anti-Black symbolic racism, and I looked at how closely it was predicted by theoretically relevant factors (e.g., anti-Latino racial affect) as well as how strongly it was associated with theoretically relevant policy attitudes (e.g., immigration attitudes).

I found that Whites' coherence (reliability) in responding to anti-Latino symbolic racism items was consistently weaker than their coherence responding to anti-Black symbolic racism items, but that these differences only reached statistical significance in

one of our five samples. Similarly, I found that respondents with BA degrees showed more consistent responses than those without degrees to both scales, with reliability statistics that were higher in 8 out of 10 sets of items. The relatively lower coherence observed in anti-Latino symbolic racism was explained by the overwhelmingly lower inter-item correlations in this scale, relative to anti-Black bias, and especially by the lower correlations between items in the external symbolic racism dimension—those dealing with structural explanations for inequality. This pattern suggests that Latinos may have engaged in more complex consideration of structural inequalities in the United States. For instance, Latino respondents might be able to simultaneously consider the possibility that Blacks have received entitlements they didn't deserve, while also remaining aware of the ways in which Blacks have been hindered by systemic oppression. In contrast, Whites tend to show coherence in external symbolic racism, suggesting that they are not considering external explanations for inequality in such a complex manner.

These findings are important as they suggest that further work is needed in order to develop a high quality assessment tool for anti-Latino contemporary prejudice. Indeed, the finding that Whites showed a pattern of generally lower coherence in responding to anti-Latino symbolic racism than anti-Black symbolic racism is perhaps unsurprising given that Latinos and rhetoric against them has long been less central to the American political consciousness, and thus less practiced, compared to anti-Black bias. On the other hand, the fact that these differences were not huge, and the fact that only one of the five samples was sufficiently more coherent with respect to anti-Black symbolic racism as to reach significance highlights that anti-Latino sentiments may not be all that far behind

anti-Black sentiments, in terms of coherence. In this respect, replicating this research in other locales, including those in which Latino populations are small or absent, and Latino-relevant issues are not central to local political concerns, will be important, as it may be that the even-somewhat comparable coherence levels in the current sample were a product of using Los Angeles residents who had considerable practice engaging with Latino-relevant policy issues.

The somewhat lower coherence in anti-Latino symbolic racism also highlights the potential for future research to design measures of contemporary racial bias that better reflect the dynamic political position and racial status of Latinos. Whereas the themes of symbolic racism, based strongly on the Protestant work ethic, lend themselves moderately well to some discussions of Latino topics (e.g., the question of whether immigrants are deserving of more or less provisions by the federal government) other themes, appropriate for conversations of Black Americans, are less intelligible in the Latino context. Future researchers should endeavor to create measures of contemporary anti-Latino bias that allows for recognition of stereotypes of being unwilling to follow the rules (e.g., preferring to immigrate “illegally” rather than following appropriate processes), as well as stereotypes of lack of interest in acculturation and assimilation (e.g., preferring to speak Spanish rather than learn English). These themes, crucially missing from the symbolic racism scale designed for the White-Black American context, would enrich our understanding of anti-Latino sentiments and likely contribute to a more coherent set of scale items.

Another explanation for the relatively low coherence in all our samples in this study, relative to other studies of symbolic racism, is that we only used three items to

assess symbolic racism towards each group, for two out of three of the samples (2002 was the exception). the fact that our respondents saw just three items per symbolic racism scale limits the conclusions we can make about the coherence of the items. Three item scales are typically low coherence, as measured by Cronbach's α reliability statistics, even when the inter-item correlations are strong. As a result, it is difficult to identify whether anti-Latino symbolic racism would look more coherent, given a longer scale. Furthermore, even a four-item scale (e.g., the number of items used in the Study 1 analyses) would allow for a second internal symbolic racism item to be measured, which would have allowed us to explore whether the differences in what each sub-dimension predicts that we found in Study 1 were also present when examining anti-Latino symbolic racism.

With respect to origins of symbolic racism, I found that educated respondents (those with BA degrees) showed a theoretically consistent pattern of results, with anti-Latino affect, political ideology and party identification all playing significant roles in predicting anti-Latino symbolic racism, and together explaining considerable variance in this attitude. Respondents without college degrees showed the same overall pattern, but were consistently weaker in the relationships of these origin variables to anti-Latino symbolic racism, and explained less variance in this attitude.

These findings suggest that anti-Latino symbolic racism, despite being more recent in its introduction to the American psyche, nonetheless adheres to the theoretically predicted model. The symbolic politics approach suggests that racial attitudes are predispositions introduced early in life, and are only later applied in considerations of political topics. As such, the relatively strong capacity of anti-Latino affect to predict

anti-Latino symbolic racism may be a consequence of the long-standing presence of Latinos in Los Angeles (e.g., since before many respondents were born). Future research should explore whether individuals who do not have contact with Latinos until adulthood show similar patterns of results.

Examining the consequences of anti-Latino symbolic racism in our respondents with college degrees, I found that anti-Latino symbolic racism consistently predicted support for our four different policy attitudes. Endorsing symbolic racism was associated with support for lowering immigration rates, raising barriers to citizenship, reducing the linguistic support available for immigrant students in school and reducing the use of bilingual education.

Finally, my analyses of education as a moderator reinforced my findings from Study 1, showing that more educated respondents generally do show stronger reliability among the items of symbolic racism and stronger associations of symbolic racism with origin variables. However, education was not associated with stronger relationships between anti-Latino symbolic racism and support for Latino-relevant policies. Further research should investigate whether these results were unique to the outcomes I studied, or whether this lack of moderation is a feature more generally present among Latinos. Likewise, future work should examine whether a different education cutoff would result in significant moderation effects, such as one that more effectively split the Latino sample into two halves.

Nonetheless, my finding that education played a significant role as a moderator of some aspects of symbolic racism in both Studies 1 and 2 is informative because the education cutoffs for these two studies were distinctly different. In Study 1, respondents

were split by whether they had attended at least one year of college, a benchmark that nearly three quarters of Whites had attained, but only roughly one quarter of Latinos had reached. In contrast, Study 2 divided respondents (all of whom were White) on the basis of whether they had completed a full college degree. As such, my finding that education acted as a moderator in both these studies not only validates the education-political consistency moderation hypothesis in general, but specifically validates the relative robustness of education to perform in this manner. That is, the fact that education typically acted as a significant moderator for Whites, whether the dividing line between groups was placed at a low or a high benchmark, suggests that this effect is fairly robust.

General Discussion

The current work sought to answer two critical questions regarding the theory of symbolic racism. First, I asked whether or not it could be used effectively as a measure of anti-Black bias, among non-White respondents. Second, I asked whether or not it could be used effectively as a measure of anti-Latino bias. In both cases, I found that the answer was more complicated than a simple yes or no. With respect to non-White respondents, I found that anti-Black symbolic racism lacked coherence in a Latino respondent sample, even when I examined it among the most educated Latino respondents. Moreover, I found that Latinos' symbolic racism was less associated with the components that symbolic racism theory says should compose it—namely, conservatism and anti-Black affect—relative to White respondents. Finally, Latinos' symbolic racism was less robust as a predictor of their policy attitudes, again, as compared to White respondents.

These findings emphasize that symbolic racism, developed for use with White respondents, cannot effectively be generalized to Latino respondents, without substantial reconsideration of the basic tenets of the theory. While the structure, origins and consequences of symbolic racism remained similar in some ways across racial groups (e.g., insofar as both groups demonstrated correlations between the two internal symbolic racism and between the two external symbolic racism items), the patterns of findings were sufficiently distinct as to suggest that this rhetoric takes on a substantively different form in Latino populations. As such, any use of it to predict policy attitudes should be pursued with caution.

On the other hand, symbolic racism displayed a relatively strong, albeit not perfect, capacity to perform among White respondents discussing Latino targets. Although the associations among the variables were relatively weaker than those found when Whites were responding to anti-Black symbolic racism, the general patterns predicted by the theory of symbolic racism nonetheless emerged in relatively similar fashion when these two symbolic racism target groups (Latinos and Blacks) were studied. As such, while anti-Latino symbolic racism may not represent the most elaborated means by which to study anti-Latino bias, it nonetheless appears to perform its function adequately as a measure of contemporary racial bias among White respondents. This suggests that researchers can comfortably continue to use it in this manner, although, as we discuss below, alternative approaches that more specifically target anti-Latino stereotypes may be prudent.

The two studies included in this dissertation extended the research on symbolic racism in a number of key ways, each of which points to opportunities for future

research. First, I extended the research on the structure, origins and consequences of symbolic racism, showing that the construct loses some coherence when it is applied to non-Black targets (e.g., anti-Latino symbolic racism, Study 2) but nonetheless retains the capacity to predict relevant policy attitudes, among White respondents (e.g., immigration and language policy attitudes, Study 2). This raises key questions regarding the form that racial bias takes in Whites—namely, whether Whites operate with a specific, targeted set of attitudes towards each of a number of different ethnic groups (e.g., towards Latinos, towards Blacks) or whether Whites operate with a general ethnocentric approach (see Kinder & Kam, 2010), tending to denigrate any racial outgroup and to adopt whatever rhetoric is available to do so. Such an approach would explain why symbolic racism, which was designed for the measurement of bias towards Black targets and which makes less sense in the anti-Latino target context (e.g., as evidenced by the relatively lower coherence) nonetheless continued to predict Latino-relevant policy attitudes.

Notably, it is not the first time that symbolic racism items have been applied to a second social group. Indeed, one of the primary criticisms leveled at symbolic racism research is that it represents principled individualism, and thus it does not, at its core, reflect racial attitudes at all. Carmines and Merriman (1993), for instance, showed that woman- and poor-targeted economic individualism items both showed significant capacity to predict variance in racial policy preferences. They proposed that this was evidence that objections to racial policies like affirmative action stemmed from a more general individualist philosophy, held by most in the United States, rather than specifically racialized content.

Sears and Henry (2003) responded to Carmines and Merriman (1993) by demonstrating that Black-targeted individualism items (e.g., “Most Blacks who don’t get ahead should not blame the system; they really have only themselves to blame”), more strongly predicted racial policy attitudes than did the same items applied to women, while items applied to women more strongly predicted gender policy attitudes than did the same items applied to Blacks. In doing so, they improved on the prior research’s methods by using identical items and by examining the full set of implications that a claim of cognitively consistent principled individualism implies. These findings supported symbolic racism researchers’ claims that their scale, while based in individualist rhetoric, represents a blend of racial affect and individualist sentiments, rather than merely representing a pure form of individualism.

Rather than merely reiterating the earlier argument that symbolic racism does not truly reflect racial animus, the current studies point to a subtler possibility. Specifically, my findings suggest that the themes brought up by symbolic racism may be applied non-specifically towards a second outgroup—Latinos—that matches the key characteristics of the first, African Americans. That is, Latinos too constitute a low status racial/ethnic group in the United States). If Whites do indeed respond to racial policies that are more relevant to Latinos than to African Americans with this sort of subtle ethnocentrism—applying the value-laden objections that they evolved for the latter to the former, even when those objections don’t fit perfectly with the stereotypes or policy topics relevant to the new group—this would have major implications for efforts to mobilize support for Latino-relevant policies.

Nevertheless, future research would be necessary to clarify whether these findings replicate in a national sample such as the ANES, as well as looking at whether they replicate in more recent data collections. Contemporary data would help to clarify whether this pattern of less constrained responding (e.g., low reliability) towards symbolic racism items has changed at all over the past 15 years, as Americans across the nation have become more familiar with Latino-relevant policies and Latino citizens. Likewise, the relationship between symbolic racism and policy attitudes may have become stronger as White respondents have become more familiar with Latinos as a target group, but they may also have become weaker, if Whites have become more considered and elaborated in their thinking about Latinos. Future research, particularly employing a national sample that can examine respondents in locations with more or fewer Latino immigrants, would help clarify the current status of anti-Latino bias among Whites.

Even as my research validated the use of symbolic racism with a non-Black target group, it challenged the use of this scale with non-White respondents. The finding that Latinos' attitudes don't show as much constraint as whites' do in their expression of anti-Black symbolic racism replicated prior findings (Henry & Sears, 2002) with a larger sample. Specifically, I found that Latinos showed lower reliability of the symbolic racism scale, even among relatively more educated Latino respondents.

The combined findings of my two studies and the prior work suggest that it will be critical in future research to investigate exactly in what ways Latinos' racial attitudes function differently than those held by Whites. For instance, it may be that the relative unconstrained nature of Latinos' symbolic racism stems from a lack of familiarity with

the rhetoric reflected in the symbolic racism belief system, perhaps because, as a heavily immigrant group, they are not yet as engaged with American political discourse.

Research that looks at factors like generational status, age when entering the United States, acculturation, and language ability could all start to probe whether it is the case that Latinos are familiar with the ideology but think differently about it, or whether they merely have given less consideration to the relevant concepts. For instance, it might be the case that Latinos who primarily consume English-language media (and are thus presumably exposed to the core elements of the symbolic racism belief system) show comparable coherence in symbolic racism to Whites, while those who primarily consume Spanish-language media show lower coherence.

We also found that Latinos' symbolic racism predicted policy attitudes less consistently than did Whites, again raising the question of how Latinos are engaging with both the policy attitudes and the symbolic racism attitudes. For instance, it may be that Latinos see downstream benefits for their own racial group as a consequence of such Black-relevant policies as affirmative action, and thus their beliefs about Blacks play little role in determining their support for policy attitudes. It may be, in contrast, that Latinos' sense of whether policies are likely to support their own interests are playing more of a role in these decisions. Future research should probe the outcomes which Latinos believe to be likely from different Black-directed policies, to investigate whether Latinos show the same associations of symbolic racism and policy support in the event that they see the policy as having no potential benefits for their own group (e.g., in the event that they are in the position which Whites occupy in such deliberations).

Beyond enhancing the literature on symbolic racism's coherence and predictive capacity, my work also expands our understanding of the role that education plays in racial bias. In line with prior findings (Henry & Sears, 2002), the high education respondents in my sample (Study 1) reported lower overall endorsement of symbolic racism, but stronger coherence within the construct and between it and other relevant variables. These findings reinforce the possibility that education may, indeed, lead to better race relations. However the onus remains on future research to identify exactly the mechanism by which education not only lowers prejudice but also empowers individuals to act on their newly liberalized attitudes in a consistent manner. However, my work leaves open the relative contributions of such collinear factors as education, socioeconomic status, ethnic background and generational status. Future research would benefit from a systematic exploration of how each of these factors is associated with symbolic racism endorsement and its effects. For example, further research might examine the bias and policy support among first generation immigrants as opposed to third generation Mexican-Americans.

While the present studies begin to explore important questions regarding how racial bias operates in a multiracial society, they demonstrate the urgent need for researchers to continue to grapple with this topic. Whereas the symbolic racism scale effectively taps into the particular anxieties and frustrations that White Americans have with Black Americans—frustrations based on the perception that Blacks defy values of hard work and self-reliance—these sentiments only partially map onto perceptions of Latinos and Latino-relevant policies, like immigration, and may map even less effectively onto bias towards other racial groups, like Asian Americans. It will be critical in the years

to come for researchers to move beyond sole reliance on Black-White approaches to the study of racial-ethnic relations, and begin to adapt existing theories and create new theories that explain intergroup relations in the new, multicultural, American landscape.

Table 1. Sample Characteristics, Study 1

	Latino Respondents			White Respondents		
	1997	1999	2000	1997	1999	2000
Year	1997	1999	2000	1997	1999	2000
N (Analytic)	206	265	196	277	290	161
% Total Analytic Sample ²¹	43	48	55	57	52	45
Gender	43 % M 56 % F 1% Miss ²²	44 % M 56% F	40% M 60% F	43% M 57% F	44% M 56% F	47% M 52% F 1% Miss
Age (Mean Yrs)	35.6	35.8	37.7	45.3	48.1	47.1
Attended One Year College (or more)	66% No 34% Yes	69% No 31% Yes	71% No 29% Yes	18% No 82% Yes	26% No 74% Yes	25% No 75% Yes
Religious Attendance (Mean)	2.64 ²³	2.80	2.74	3.91	3.58	3.85
Income (Mean)	3.18 ²⁴	3.37	2.88	5.94	6.25	6.06
Ideology (Mean)	4.22 ²⁵	4.19	4.00	3.99	3.98	3.64
Party ID (Mean)	3.24 ²⁶	2.85	3.05	3.85	3.73	3.51

²¹ % of Analytic Sample for Study 1 (not % of collected sample)

²² Refers to respondents who did not provide information about their gender

²³ Religious attendance was self-reported on a 5-pt scale from Every Week to Hardly Ever. A three on the scale corresponds to reporting attending services a few times a month, while a 4 corresponds to a few times a year.

²⁴ Income was self-reported on a 12-pt scale ranging from (1) Less than \$10,000 total family annual income before taxes, to (12) Over \$150,000 total family annual income before taxes. A three on the income scale corresponds to a response of \$21,000-\$30,000, while a six corresponds to a response of \$51,000-\$60,000.

²⁵ Ideology was self-reported on a 7-pt scale from Strong Liberal (1) to Strong Conservative (7). The midpoint of the scale, a four, corresponds to a response of neither liberal nor conservative, with the participant denying any tendency to feel more similar to either group

²⁶ Party identification was reported on a 7-pt scale from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (7). The midpoint of the scale, a four, corresponds to a response of Moderate, with the participant denying any tendency to lean either Republican or Democrat. A three on the scale corresponds to a response of leaning towards identifying with Democrats.

Table 2. Immigration Status Designations and Distributions

Status	Criteria	%	%	%
		Latinos 1997	Latinos 1999	Latinos 2000
3 rd Generation	Respondent born in United States (US) Both respondent's parents born in US	13	10	9
2 nd Generation	Respondent born in US At least one of R's parents born outside US	18	19	18
New Citizen	Respondent born outside US Respondent has attained American citizenship	20	20	23
Long-Term Non-Citizen Resident	Respondent born outside US Respondent immigrated 10+ years ago to US Respondent has <i>not</i> attained American citizenship	34	35	38
New Immigrant	Respondent born outside the US Respondent immigrated < 10 years ago to US Respondent has <i>not</i> attained American citizenship	14	14	11
Total		100	100	100

Table 3. Mean Responses to Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Items and Scale Reliability
(Split by Ethnicity and Education)

	Latinos		Whites	
	≥ 1 yr College N = 209	No College N = 452	≥ 1 yr College N = 565	No College N = 163
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (History of Discrim) (R)	.49 (.35)	.44 (.35)	.49 (.33)	.50 (.35)
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Less Than Deserve) (R)	.52 (.32)	.56 (.31)	.52 (.29)	.55 (.32)
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Try Harder)	.59 (.35)	.67 (.33)	.45 (.31)	.59 (.31)
Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. (Too Demanding)	.60 (.31)	.65 (.31)	.38 (.31)	.51 (.33)
Scale Mean and Standard Deviation	.55 (.20)	.58 (.17)	.46 (.23)	.54 (.22)
Scale Cronbach's α	.35	.06	.71	.51

Table values are Mean (Standard Deviation)

Responses were keyed such that higher scores reflected more racially conservative sentiment. (R) indicates that responses were reverse keyed, prior to estimation of mean, because the item was originally keyed such that lower responses were more racist.

Table 4. Inter-Item Correlations in Anti-Black Symbolic Racism (Split by Ethnicity)

Latinos, \geq 1 year College				
	Internal Items		External Items	
	History of Discrim	Less than Deserve	Try Harder	Too Demanding
History of Discrim	1	.40***	-.06	.02
Less than Deserve		1	.12	.03
Try Harder			1	.25***
Too Demanding				1
Latinos, No College				
	Internal Items		External Items	
	History of Discrim	Less than Deserve	Try Harder	Too Demanding
History of Discrim	1	.25***	-.14**	-.09 [‡]
Less than Deserve		1	-.11*	-.07
Try Harder			1	.22***
Too Demanding				1
Whites, \geq 1 year College				
	Internal Items		External Items	
	History of Discrim	Less than Deserve	Try Harder	Too Demanding
History of Discrim	History of Discrim	Less than Deserve	Try Harder	Too Demanding
Less than Deserve	1	.47***	.28***	.30***
Try Harder		1	.42***	.31***
Too Demanding			1	.47***
Whites, No College				
	Internal Items		External Items	
	History of Discrim	Less than Deserve	Try Harder	Too Demanding
History of Discrim	1	.45***	.20*	.21**
Less than Deserve		1	.06	.15 [‡]
Try Harder			1	.20*
Too Demanding				1

Notes: [‡] $p \leq .1$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5. Correlations among Conservatism, Racial Affect, and Anti-Black Symbolic Racism (SR)

Latinos, No College					
	Internal SR	External SR	Ideology	Party ID	Racial Affect
Internal SR	1	-.15**	.14**	-.02	-.04
External SR		1	-.04	.00	-.02
Ideology			1	.04	-.01
Party ID				1	.06
Racial Affect					1
Latinos, ≥ 1 year College					
	Internal SR	External SR	Ideology	Party ID	Racial Affect
Internal SR	1	.04	.13 [‡]	.02	.05
External SR		1	.05	-.07	.01
Ideology			1	.29***	.07
Party ID				1	.13 [‡]
Racial Affect					1
Whites, No College					
	Internal SR	External SR	Ideology	Party ID	Racial Affect
Internal SR	1	.23**	.22**	.11	.03
External SR		1	.05	.00	.03
Ideology			1	.37***	.07
Party ID				1	-.10
Racial Affect					1
Whites, ≥ 1 year College					
	Internal SR	External SR	Ideology	Party ID	Racial Affect
Internal SR	1	.45***	.38***	.30***	.26***
External SR		1	.32***	.25***	.11*
Ideology			1	.67***	.12**
Party ID				1	.14**
Racial Affect					1

Notes: [‡] $p \leq .1$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 6. Origins of Internal Symbolic Racism (Split by Ethnicity and Education)

	Sample Education	Latinos		Whites	
		No College	≥ 1 yr College	No College	≥ 1 yr College
		<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Controls	Constant	.397 (.096)***	.501 (.119)***	.586 (.113)***	.518 (.061)
	Female	-.002 (.029)	-.094 (.043)*	-.012 (.046)	-.043 (.023)‡
	Income	.000 (.009)	-.012 (.009)	-.009 (.007)	-.016 (.004)***
	Immigration Status	.021 (.013)	.032 (.019)‡	—	—
	Religious Attendance	-.002 (.010)	-.013 (.014)	-.002 (.014)	.000 (.007)
	Age	.003 (.001)**	.003 (.002)	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)*
Components	Political Ideology	.015 (.007)*	.014 (.011)	.017 (.013)	.048 (.008)***
	Party Identification	.005 (.008)	-.003 (.012)	.001 (.012)	.002 (.007)
	Racial Affect	.000 (.000)	.000 (.001)	.000 (.001)	.004 (.001)***
	R ² Δ, Add Controls	.035	.105	.031	.074
Significance Add Controls	F(5, 319) = 2.313 <i>p</i> = .044	F(5,152) = 3.574 <i>p</i> = .004	F(4, 123) = .993 <i>p</i> = .414	F(4, 419) = 7.235 <i>p</i> < .001	
R ² Δ, Add Components	.015	.011	.016	.181	
Significance Add Attitudes	F(3, 316) = 1.675 <i>p</i> = .172	F(3, 149) = .630 <i>p</i> = .597	F(3, 120) = .672 <i>p</i> = .571	F(3, 415) = 33.289 <i>p</i> < .001	
R ² Model	.050	.116	.070	.253	
Significance Model	F(8, 316) = 2.083 <i>p</i> = .037	F(8, 149) = 2.454 <i>p</i> = .016	F(7, 119) = .851 <i>p</i> = .547	F(7, 416) = 19.357 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: ‡*p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Model represents a summary of four hierarchical linear regressions. At step 1, control variables were added (Female, Income, Religious Attendance and Age). At Step 2, conservatism variables and racial affect were added. All coefficients and standard errors are those from the final model (e.g., with all variables included).

Table 7. Origins of External Symbolic Racism (Split by Ethnicity and Education)

	Sample	Latinos		Whites	
	Education	No College	≥ 1 yr College	No College	≥ 1 yr College
		<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Controls	Constant	.683 (.102)***	.489 (.128)***	.159 (.123)	.399 (.069)***
	Female	-.055 (.031) [‡]	.012 (.047)	.007 (.050)	-.030 (.025)
	Income	.006 (.010)	.020 (.009)*	.022 (.008)**	.000 (.004)
	Immigration Status	-.014 (.015)	.012 (.021)	—	—
	Religious Attendance	.003 (.010)	-.003 (.015)	.041 (.015)	.000 (.008)
	Age	-.002 (.001) [‡]	-.002 (.002)	.000 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Components	Political Ideology	-.006 (.008)	.012 (.011)	.034 (.015)*	.043 (.009)***
	Party Identification	-.006 (.009)	-.022 (.013) [‡]	-.009 (.013)	.000 (.008)
	Racial Affect	.000 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
	R ² Δ, Add Controls	.034	.021	.092	.013
Significance Add Controls	F(5, 310) = 2.169 <i>p</i> = .057	F(5, 157) = .685 <i>p</i> = .636	F(4, 125) = 3.183 <i>p</i> = .016	F(4, 422) = 1.347 <i>p</i> = .252	
R ² Δ, Add Components	.005	.022	.040	.100	
Significance Add Attitudes	F(3, 307) = .516 <i>p</i> = .671	F(3, 154) = 1.190 <i>p</i> = .316	F(3, 122) = 1.856 <i>p</i> = .141	F(3, 419) = 15.764 <i>p</i> < .001	
R ² Model	.039	.044	.132	.113	
Significance Model	F(8, 307) = 1.543 <i>p</i> = .142	F(8, 154) = .876 <i>p</i> = .538	F(7, 122) = 2.651 <i>p</i> = .014	F(7, 419) = 7.607 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: [‡]*p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Model represents a summary of four hierarchical linear regressions. At step 1, control variables were added (Female, Income, Religious Attendance and Age). At Step 2, ideology and affect variables were added. All coefficients and standard errors are those from the final model (e.g., with all variables included).

Table 8. Ethnicity as a Moderator of the Relationship of Conservatism and Racial Affect to Internal Symbolic Racism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	.598 (.043)	.432 (.046)***	.503 (.050)***
Female	-.043 (.016)**	-.039 (.015)**	-.038 (.015)*
Income	-.012 (.003)***	-.012 (.003)***	-.011 (.003)***
Immigration Status	.021 (.008)**	.021 (.008)**	.023 (.008)**
Religious Attendance	-.010 (.005)*	-.003 (.005)	-.002 (.005)
Age	.002 (.001)***	.002 (.001)***	.002 (.001)***
Latino	-.100 (.022)***	-.109 (.022)***	-.228 (.041)***
One Year College	-.054 (.019)**	-.036 (.018)***	-.035 (.018) [‡]
Political Ideology		.028 (.004)***	.016 (.006)**
Party Identification		.007 (.004) [‡]	.001 (.006)
Racial Affect		.001 (.000) [‡]	.000 (.000)
Interaction: Ideology by Ethnicity			.023 (.009)**
Interaction: Party ID by Ethnicity			.004 (.009)
Interaction: Racial Affect by Ethnicity			.002 (.001)**
R ² Δ Step	.167	.052	.016
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7, 1027) = 30.609 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 1024) = 22.657 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 1021) = 7.231 <i>p</i> < .001
R ² Full Model		.240	
Significance Full Model		F(13, 1021) = 24.837 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: [‡] *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 9. Ethnicity as a Moderator of the Relationship of Conservatism and Racial Affect to External Symbolic Racism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	.590 (.045)***	.494 (.050)***	.598 (.054)***
Female	-.038 (.017)*	-.036 (.017)*	-.031 (.017)‡
Income	.006 (.003)*	.006 (.003)*	.007 (.003)*
Immigration Status	-.015 (.008)‡	-.015 (.008)‡	-.012 (.008)
Religious Attendance	.002 (.005)	.006 (.005)	.008 (.005)
Age	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)‡	-.001 (.001)*
Latino	-.040 (.024)‡	-.045 (.025)‡	-.230 (.045)
One Year College	-.010 (.020)	.000 (.020)	.001 (.001)
Political Ideology		.018 (.005)***	-.001 (.006)
Party Identification		.002 (.005)	-.009 (.007)
Racial Affect		.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Interaction: Ideology by Ethnicity			.040 (.010)***
Interaction: Party ID by Ethnicity			.008 (.009)
Interaction: Racial Affect by Ethnicity			.001 (.001)
R ² Δ Step	.016	.019	.026
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7, 1028) = 2.417 <i>p</i> = .019	F(3, 1025) = 6.824 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 1022) = 9.266 <i>p</i> < .001
R ² Full Model		.061	
Significance Full Model		F(13, 1022) = 5.107 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: ‡ *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 10. Education as a Moderator of the Relationship of Conservatism and Racial Affect to Internal Symbolic Racism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	.598 (.043)***	.432 (.046)***	.494 (.053)***
Female	-.043 (.016)**	-.039 (.015)**	-.034 (.015)*
Income	-.012 (.003)***	-.012 (.003)***	-.012 (.003)***
Immigration Status	.021 (.008)**	.021 (.008)**	.023 (.008)**
Religious Attendance	-.010 (.005)*	-.003 (.005)	-.003 (.005)
Age	.002 (.001)***	.002 (.001)***	.002 (.001)***
Latino	-.100 (.022)***	-.109 (.022)***	-.096 (.022)***
One Year College	-.054 (.019)**	-.036 (.018)*	-.135 (.042)***
Political Ideology		.028 (.004)***	.016 (.006)**
Party Identification		.007 (.004) [‡]	.004 (.006)
Racial Affect		.001 (.000) [‡]	.000 (.000)
Interaction: Ideology by One Year College			.020 (.009)*
Interaction: Party ID by One Year College			-.001 (.009)
Interaction: Racial Affect by One Year College			.003 (.001)***
R ² Δ Step	.173	.052	.014
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7,1027) = 30.609 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 1024) = 22.657 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 1021) = 6.188 <i>p</i> < .001
R ² Full Model		.238	
Significance Full Model		F(13, 1021) = 24.527 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: [‡] *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 11. Education as a Moderator of the Relationship of Conservatism and Racial Affect to External Symbolic Racism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	.590 (.045)***	.494 (.050)***	.588 (.057)***
Female	-.038 (.017)*	-.036 (.017)*	-.031 (.017)‡
Income	.006 (.003)*	.006 (.003)*	.006 (.003)‡
Immigration Status	-.015 (.008)‡	-.015 (.008)‡	-.013 (.008)
Religious Attendance	.002 (.005)	.006 (.005)	.007 (.005)
Age	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)‡	-.001 (.001)‡
Latino	-.040 (.024)‡	-.045 (.025)‡	-.033 (.025)
One Year College	-.010 (.020)	.000 (.020)	-.149 (.046)***
Political Ideology		.018 (.005)***	.001 (.007)
Party Identification		.002 (.005)	-.004 (.007)
Racial Affect		.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Interaction: Ideology by One Year College			.032 (.010)***
Interaction: Party ID by One Year College			.003 (.009)
Interaction: Racial Affect by One Year College			.001 (.001)
R ² Δ Step	.016	.019	.015
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7, 1028) = 2.417 <i>p</i> = .019	F(3, 1025) = 6.824 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 1022) = 5.298 <i>p</i> = .001
R ² Full Model		.050	
Significance Full Model		F(13, 1022) = 4.157 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: ‡ *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 12. Correlations Between Symbolic Racism and Black-Relevant Policy Attitudes (Split by Ethnicity and Education)

Correlated Measures	Latinos		Whites	
	≥ 1 yr College Correlation	No College Correlation	≥ 1 yr College Correlation	No College Correlation
Internal SR + Spending on Blacks	.09	.01	.39***	.23**
Internal SR + Equal Opp Policies	.19**	.13**	.39***	.21**
External SR + Equal Opp Policies	.13 [†]	-.09 [†]	.39***	.22**
External SR + Spending on Blacks	.31***	.11*	.43***	.39***

Notes: [†] $p \leq .1$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 13. Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Symbolic Racism and Support for Government Spending on Blacks (Split by Ethnicity and Education)

	Sample Education	Latinos		Whites	
		No College	≥ 1 yr College	No College	≥ 1 yr College
		<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Controls	Constant	.891 (.251)***	1.178 (.269)***	1.047 (.274)***	1.023 (.136)***
	Female	.127 (.077) [‡]	-.037 (.097)	.005 (.118)	.025 (.057)
	Income	.049 (.024)*	-.015 (.019)	.012 (.019)	.008 (.009)
	Immigration Status	.067 (.035) [‡]	.029 (.044)	—	—
	Religious Attendance	-.009 (.075)	-.129 (.093)	.071 (.127)	.034 (.071)
Components	Age	.004 (.003)	.005 (.004)	.001 (.003)	-.001 (.002)
	Political Ideology	.047 (.020)*	.005 (.024)	.017 (.035)	.049 (.021)*
	Party Identification	.019 (.021)	.049 (.026) [‡]	.003 (.030)	.029 (.018)
SR	Racial Affect	.005 (.001)***	.004 (.002) [‡]	.003 (.003)	.002 (.002)
	Internal Symbolic Racism	-.048 (.150)	.033 (.181)	.413 (.245) [‡]	.345 (.129)**
	External Symbolic Racism	.277 (.139)*	.624 (.166)***	.758 (.213)***	.704 (.121)***
	R ² Δ, Add Controls	.037	.026	.012	.010
	Significance Add Controls	F(5, 288) = 2.205 <i>p</i> = .054	F(5, 144) = .778 <i>p</i> = .567	F(4, 108) = .320 <i>p</i> = .864	F(4, 352) = .913 <i>p</i> = .456
	R ² Δ, Add Components	.064	.045	.037	.142
	Significance Add Components	F(3, 285) = 6.796 <i>p</i> < .001	F(3, 141) = 2.283 <i>p</i> = .082	F(3, 105) = 1.373 <i>p</i> = .255	F(3, 349) = 19.541 <i>p</i> < .001
	R ² Δ, Add Symbolic Racism	.013	.086	.143	.130
	Significance Add Symbolic Racism	F(2, 283) = 2.139 <i>p</i> = .120	F(2, 139) = 7.100 <i>p</i> = .001	F(2, 103) = 9.121 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 347) = 31.482 <i>p</i> < .001
	R ² Model	.115	.157	.192	.283
Significance Model	F(10, 283) = 3.661 <i>p</i> < .001	F(10, 139) = 2.598 <i>p</i> = .006	F(9, 103) = 2.721 <i>p</i> = .007	F(9, 347) = 15.200 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: [‡] *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Model represents a summary of four hierarchical linear regressions. At step 1, control variables were added (Female, Income, Religious Attendance and Age). At Step 2, ideology and affect variables were added. All coefficients and standard errors are those from the final model (e.g., with all variables included).

Table 14. Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Symbolic Racism and Support for Equal Opportunity Policies (Split by Ethnicity and Education)

	Sample Education	Latinos		Whites	
		No College <i>b</i> (SE)	≥ 1 yr College <i>b</i> (SE)	No College <i>b</i> (SE)	≥ 1 yr College <i>b</i> (SE)
Controls	Constant	2.230 (.427)***	2.237 (.511)***	2.421 (.441)***	1.144 (.233)***
	Female	-.025 (.129)	-.180 (.184)	.017 (.192)	.142 (.098)
	Income	.030 (.040)	-.088 (.037)*	-.010 (.031)	.023 (.016)
	Immigration Status	.023 (.059)	.009 (.083)	—	—
	Religious Attendance	.120 (.126)	-.157 (.178)	-.091 (.205)	.101 (.121)
Components	Age	.003 (.005)	-.001 (.008)	-.002 (.005)	.001 (.003)
	Political Ideology	.019 (.033)	.001 (.045)	.028 (.058)	-.008 (.036)
	Party Identification	.012 (.035)	.100 (.050)*	-.019 (.049)	.080 (.031)*
	Racial Affect	.003 (.002)	-.005 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.002 (.004)
SR	Internal Symbolic Racism	.320 (.248)	.779 (.344)*	.657 (.397)‡	1.120 (.220)***
	External Symbolic Racism	-.115 (.233)	.507 (.315)‡	.498 (.347)	1.042 (.208)***
	R ² Δ, Add Controls	.011	.050	.004	.008
	Significance Add Controls	F(5, 288) = .664 <i>p</i> = .651	F(5, 142) = 1.485 <i>p</i> = .198	F(4, 110) = .116 <i>p</i> = .976	F(4, 359) = .730 <i>p</i> = .572
	R ² Δ, Add Components	.012	.029	.014	.093
	Significance Add Components	F(3, 285) = 1.205 <i>p</i> = .308	F(3, 139) = 1.453 <i>p</i> = .230	F(3, 107) = .520 <i>p</i> = .670	F(3, 356) = 12.340 <i>p</i> < .001
	R ² Δ, Add Symbolic Racism	.007	.049	.053	.174
	Significance Add Symbolic Racism	F(2, 283) = 1.032 <i>p</i> = .358	F(2, 137) = 3.876 <i>p</i> = .023	F(2, 105) = 2.976 <i>p</i> = .055	F(2, 354) = 42.606 <i>p</i> < .001
	R ² Model	.031	.128	.071	.276
	Significance Model	F(10, 283) = .901 <i>p</i> = .533	F(10, 137) = 2.010 <i>p</i> = .037	F(9, 105) = .894 <i>p</i> = .534	F(9, 354) = 14.981 <i>p</i> < .001

Notes: ‡ $p \leq .1$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Model represents a summary of four hierarchical linear regressions. At step 1, control variables were added (Female, Income, Religious Attendance and Age). At Step 2, ideology and affect variables were added. All coefficients and standard errors are those from the final model (e.g., with all variables included).

Table 15. Ethnicity as a Moderator of the Relationship of Symbolic Racism and Spending on Blacks Policy Attitudes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	1.776 (.105)***	1.448 (.109)***	1.034 (.115)***	1.273 (.134)***
Female	.002 (.042)	.013 (.040)	.045 (.039)	.041 (.039)
Income	.010 (.008)	.010 (.008)	.010 (.007)	.010 (.007)
Immigration Status	.009 (.021)	-.003 (.020)	.002 (.019)	.004 (.019)
Religious Attendance	.044 (.045)	-.011 (.044)	.004 (.042)	.009 (.042)
Age	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Latino	.009 (.058)	-.011 (.057)	.042 (.055)	-.310 (.118)**
One Year College	-.087 (.049) [‡]	-.035 (.047)	-.028 (.055)	-.028 (.045)
Political Ideology		.056 (.011)***	.042 (.011)***	.039 (.011)***
Party Identification		.031 (.011)**	.028(.011)**	.025 (.011)*
Racial Affect		.005(.001)** *	.005 (.001)***	.005 (.001)***
Internal Symbolic Racism			.232 (.078)**	.048 (.108)
External Symbolic Racism			.575 (.072)***	.353 (.101)***
Interaction: Internal SR by Ethnicity				.275 (.153) [‡]
Interaction: External SR by Ethnicity				.388 (.146)**
R ² Δ Step	.007	.081	.076	.011
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7, 906) = .946 <i>p</i> = .470	F(3, 903) = 27.205 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 901) = 41.141 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 899) = 5.940 <i>p</i> = .003
R ² Full Model			.164	
Significance Full Model		F(14, 899) = 13.772 <i>p</i> < .001		

Notes: [‡] *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 16. Education as a Moderator of the Relationship of Symbolic Racism and Spending on Blacks Policy Attitudes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	1.776 (.105)***	1.448 (.109)***	1.034 (.115)***	1.181 (.136)***
Female	.002 (.042)	.013 (.040)	.045 (.039)	.045 (.039)
Income	.010 (.008)	.010 (.008)	.010 (.007)	.010 (.017)
Immigration Status	.009 (.021)	-.003 (.020)	.002 (.019)	.002 (.019)
Religious Attendance	.044 (.045)	-.011 (.044)	.004 (.042)	-.001 (.042)
Age	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Latino	.009 (.058)	-.011 (.057)	.042 (.055)	.039 (.055)
One Year College	-.087 (.049) [‡]	-.035 (.047)	-.028 (.045)	-.238 (.118)*
Political Ideology		.056 (.011)***	.042 (.011)***	.040 (.011)***
Party Identification		.031 (.011)**	.028 (.011)**	.027 (.011)**
Racial Affect		.005 (.001)***	.005 (.001)***	.005 (.001)***
Internal Symbolic Racism			.232 (.078)**	.149 (.116)
External Symbolic Racism			.575 (.072)***	.408 (.106)***
Interaction: Internal SR by One Year College				.098 (.151)
Interaction: External SR by One Year College				.295 (.145)*
R ² Δ Step	.007	.082	.076	.005
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7,906) = .946 <i>p</i> = .470	F(3, 903) = 27.205 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 901) = 41.131 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 899) = 2.449 <i>p</i> = .087
R ² Full Model			.170	
Significance Full Model		F(14, 899) = 13.174		<i>p</i> < .001

Notes: [‡] *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 17. Ethnicity as a Moderator of the Relationship of Symbolic Racism and Equal Opportunity Policy Attitudes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	2.663 (.176)***	2.267 (.188)***	1.607 (.198)***	2.100 (.232)***
Female	-.034 (.070)	-.013 (.069)	.038 (.067)	.029 (.066)
Income	-.003 (.013)	-.003 (.013)	.003 (.013)	.003 (.013)
Immigration Status	.039 (.034)	.031 (.034)	.023 (.033)	.028 (.033)
Religious Attendance	.106 (.075)	.044 (.075)	.054 (.072)	.066 (.071)
Age	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.000 (.002)	.000 (.002)
Latino	.126 (.096)	.072 (.098)	.198 (.095)*	-.510 (.203)*
One Year College	-.213 (.081)**	-.162 (.081)*	-.133 (.078)‡	-.134 (.077)‡
Political Ideology		.054 (.019)**	.023 (.019)	.016 (.019)
Party Identification		.054 (.019)**	.047 (.018)**	.042 (.018)*
Racial Affect		.003 (.002)‡	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Internal Symbolic Racism			.873 (.135)***	.537 (.186)**
External Symbolic Racism			.542 (.124)***	.046 (.174)
Interaction: Internal SR by Ethnicity				.449 (.262)‡
Interaction: External SR by Ethnicity				.896 (.251)***
R ² Δ Step	.016	.032	.070	.017
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7, 913) = 2.156 <i>p</i> =.036	F(3, 910) = 10.278 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 908) = 36.177 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 906) = 8.868 <i>p</i> < .001
R ² Full Model			.136	
Significance Full Model			F(14, 906) = 10.156 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: ‡ *p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* ≤ .001

Table 18. Education as a Moderator of the Relationship of Symbolic Racism and Equal Opportunity Policy Attitudes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	2.663 (.176)***	2.267 (.188)***	1.607 (.198)***	2.093 (.233)***
Female	-.034 (.070)	-.013 (.069)	.038 (.067)	.044 (.066)
Income	-.003 (.013)	-.003 (.013)	.003 (.013)	.005 (.013)
Immigration Status	.039 (.034)	.031 (.034)	.023 (.033)	.026 (.033)
Religious Attendance	.106 (.075)	.044 (.075)	.054 (.072)	.041 (.072)
Age	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.000 (.002)	.000 (.002)
Latino	.126 (.096)	.072 (.098)	.198 (.095)*	.198 (.095)*
One Year College	-.213 (.081)**	-.162 (.081)*	-.133 (.078)‡	-.844 (.200)***
Political Ideology		.054 (.019)**	.023 (.019)	.018 (.019)
Party Identification		.054 (.019)**	.047 (.018)**	.044 (.018)*
Racial Affect		.003 (.002)‡	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Internal Symbolic Racism			.873 (.135)***	.477 (.198)*
External Symbolic Racism			.542 (.124)***	.097 (.182)
Interaction: Internal SR by One Year College				.477 (.198)*
Interaction: External SR by One Year College				.731 (.248)**
R ² Δ Step	.016	.032	.070	.015
Significance R ² Δ Step	F(7, 913) = 2.156 <i>p</i> =.036	F(3, 910) = 10.278 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 908) = 36.177 <i>p</i> < .001	F(2, 906) = 7.723 <i>p</i> < .001
R ² Full Model			.134	
Significance Full Model		F(14, 906) = 9.970 <i>p</i> < .001		

Notes: ‡ $p \leq .1$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 19. Analytic Sample Characteristics, Study 2

Year	1999	2001	2002
N (Analytic)	290	223	238
Ethnicity	100% White ²⁷	100% White	100% White
Sex	44% Male	41% Male	52% Male
	56% Female	55% Female	47% Female
		4% Missing	1% Missing
Age	M = 48	M = 47	M = 50
BA Degree	55% No	51% No	60% No
	45% Yes	45% Yes	40% Yes
		4% Missing	
Religious Attendance	M = 3.54 ²⁸	M = 3.51	M = 3.85
Income	M = 6.24 ²⁹	M = 6.11	M = 6.04
Ideology	M = 3.98 ³⁰	M = 3.79	M = 3.95
Party ID	M = 3.71 ³¹	M = 3.7	M = 3.98

²⁷ For Study 2, only White participants were included in the Analytic Sample.

²⁸ Religious attendance was self-reported on a 5-pt scale from Every Week to Hardly Ever. An average group response of 3.5 corresponds to between A few times a year (4) and A few times a month (3).

²⁹ Income was self-reported on a 12-pt scale ranging from (1) Less than \$10,000 total family annual income before taxes, to (12) Over \$150,000 total family annual income before taxes. A six on the income scale corresponds to a response of \$51,000-\$60,000.

³⁰ Ideology was self-reported on a 7-pt scale from Strong Liberal (1) to Strong Conservative (7). The midpoint of the scale, a 4, corresponds to a response of neither liberal nor conservative, with the participant denying any tendency to feel more similar to either group.

³¹ Party identification was reported on a 7-pt scale from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (7). The midpoint of the scale, a 4, corresponds to a response of Moderate, with the participant denying any tendency to lean either Republican or Democrat.

Table 20. Mean Responses to Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism Items and Scale Reliability, Divided by Sample

	1999 N = 143	2001A N = 93	2001B N = 121	2002A N = 109	2002B N = 112
Theme: Denial of Discrimination					
How much discrimination against Hispanics do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead? (Amount Discrim) (R)	.38 (.25)		.35 (.27)		.42 (.26)
Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Hispanics to work their way out of the lower class. (History Discrim) (R)		.53 (.32)		.53 (.34)	
Theme: Undeserved Advantages					
Over the past few years, Hispanics have gotten less than they deserve. (Less Deserve) (R)	.53 (.37)		.53 (.33)		.65 (.30)
Over the past few years, Hispanics have gotten more economically than they deserve. (More Deserve)		.25 (.28)		.26 (.26)	
Theme: Work Ethic					
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Hispanics would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Try Hard)	.43 (.36)		.46 (.36)		.51 (.36)
Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Hispanics should do the same without any special favors. (Irish)		.72 (.30)		.74 (.33)	
Theme: Excessive Demands					
Hispanics are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. (Demand)					.43 (.34)
How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Hispanics are responsible for creating? (Tension)				.26 (.21)	
Scale Mean and Standard Deviation	.45 (.22)	.5 (.20)	.44 (.23)	.45 (.18)	.5 (.22)
Scale Cronbach's α (Full Sample)	.478	.328	.571	.473	.595
Scale Cronbach's α (BA Degree)	.630	.501	.594	.558	.623
Scale Cronbach's α (No BA Degree)	.271	.145	.543	.326	.548

Notes:

Table values are Mean (Standard Deviation)

Responses were keyed such higher scores were more racially conservative. (R) indicates that responses were reverse keyed, prior to estimation of mean, because the item was originally keyed such that lower responses were more racially conservative.

Table 21. Mean Responses to Anti-Black Symbolic Racism Items and Scale Reliability, Divided by Sample

	1999 N = 285	2001A N = 93	2001B N = 119	2002A N = 113	2002B N = 112
Theme: Denial of Discrimination					
How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead? (Amount Discrim) (R)	.32 (.24)	.34 (.24)		.33 (.28)	
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (History Discrim) (R)			.52 (.35)		.57 (.35)
Theme: Undeserved Advantages					
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Less Deserve) (R)	.45 (.29)	.6 (.32)		.57 (.33)	
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. (More Deserve)			.27 (.32)		.24 (.29)
Theme: Work Ethic					
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.(Try Hard)	.45 (.31)	.48 (.34)		.52 (.36)	
Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (Irish)			.63 (.35)		.66 (.33)
Theme: Excessive Demands					
Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. (Demand)				.51 (.35)	
How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Blacks are responsible for creating? (Tension)					.35 (.24)
Scale Mean and Standard Deviation	.41 (.2)	.47 (.24)	.48 (.26)	.49 (.25)	.45 (.21)
Scale Cronbach's α (Full Sample)	.54	.60	.52	.75	.60
Scale Cronbach's α (BA Degree)	.77	.78	.45	.76	.61
Scale Cronbach's α (No BA Degree)	.21	.47	.46	.74	.53

Notes:

Table values are Mean (Standard Deviation)

Responses were keyed such that higher scores were more racist. (R) indicates that responses were reverse keyed, prior to estimation of mean, because the item was originally keyed such that lower responses were more racist.

Table 22. Inter-Item Correlations in Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism (Full Sample)

	Amount Discrim	History Discrim	Less Deserve	More Deserve	Try Hard	Irish	Demand	Tension
A.Disc	1	—	.20***	—	.21***	—	.41***	—
H.Disc		1	—	.01	—	.28***	—	-.08
L.Des			1	—	.20***	—	.24*	—
M.Des				1	—	.28***	—	.31***
Try					1	—	.41***	—
Irish						1	—	.19*
Dem							1	—

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 23. Inter-Item Correlations in Anti-Black Symbolic Racism (Full Sample)

	Amount Discrim	History Discrim	Less Deserve	More Deserve	Try Hard	Irish	Demand	Tension
A.Disc	1	—	.46***	—	.25***	—	.29**	—
H.Disc		1	—	.24***	—	.37***	—	.19*
L.Des			1	—	.32***	—	.48***	—
M.Des				1	—	.36***	—	.36***
Try					1	—	.47***	—
Irish						1	—	.36***
Dem							1	—

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 24: Correlations among Conservatism, Racial Affect, Anti-Black, and Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism

	Anti-Latino SR	Anti-Black SR	Anti-Latino Affect	Anti-Black Affect	Party ID	Ideology
Anti Lat SR	1	.52***	.23***	.12**	.33***	.38***
Anti BI SR		1	.18***	.15***	.29***	.37***
Anti-Latino Affect			1	.48***	.14**	.16***
Anti-Black Affect				1	.09*	.13**
Party ID					1	.63***

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 25. Origins of Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism (Split by Education)

		College Degree N = 183		No College Degree N = 224	
		<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Controls	Constant	.302***	.083	.359***	.065
	Female	.012	.029	-.019	.032
	Income	-.003	.004	-.010*	.004
	Religious Attendance	-.011	.010	.002	.009
	Age	.000	.001	.000	.001
Attitudes	Political Ideology	.033**	.011	.025**	.008
	Party Identification	.019*	.009	.010	.007
	Anti-Black Affect	-.002 [‡]	.001	.000	.001
	Anti-Latino Affect	.004***	.001	.002*	.001
	R ² Δ, Add Controls	.032		.045	
Significance Add Controls	F(4, 179) = 1.473 <i>p</i> = .212		F(4, 220) = 2.619 <i>p</i> = .036		
R ² Δ, Add Attitudes	.215		.138		
Significance Add Attitudes	F(4, 175) = 12.483 <i>p</i> < .001		F(4, 216) = 9.133 <i>p</i> < .001		
R ² Model	.247		.184		
Significance Model	F(8, 175) = 7.167 <i>p</i> < .001		F(8, 216) = 6.069 <i>p</i> < .001		

Notes: [‡]*p* < .1 * *p* < .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Model represents final step of hierarchical linear regression. At step 1, control variables were added. At Step 2, ideology and conservatism variables were added.

Table 26. Moderation of the Relationship of Symbolic Racism to Conservatism and Racial Affect

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Constant	.546***	.049		.356***	.051		.372***	.053	
Female	-.016	.021	-.038	.006	.019	.014	.007	.019	.016
Income	-.007*	.003	-.106	-.007*	.003	-.105	-.006*	.003	-.100
BA Degree	-.045*	.022	-.104	-.014	.021	-.032	-.087 [‡]	.045	-.201
Religious Attendance	-.014*	.007	-.100	-.005	.006	-.037	-.004	.007	-.028
Age	.001	.001	.061	.000	.001	.009	.000	.001	.020
Political Ideology				.029***	.007	.265	.025**	.008	.230
Party Identification				.013*	.006	.138	.009	.007	.097
Anti-Black Affect				-.001	.001	-.075	.000	.001	-.020
Anti-Latino Affect				.003***	.001	.210	.002*	.001	.088
BA Degree * Ideology							.009	.013	.094
BA Degree * Party ID							.010	.012	.109
BA Degree * Anti-Black Affect							-.002	.001	-.101
BA Degree * Anti-Latino Affect							.002	.001	.088
R ² Δ Step					.166			.011	
Significance Step					F(4, 399) = 20.962 <i>p</i> < .001			F(4, 395) = 1.424 <i>p</i> = .228	
R ² Model		.047			.212***			.223***	
Significance Model		F(5, 403) = 3.945 <i>p</i> = .002			F(9, 399) = 11.942 <i>p</i> < .001			F(13, 395) = 8.737 <i>p</i> < .001	

Notes: [‡]*p* ≤ .1 * *p* ≤ .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Table 27. Correlations Between Anti-Latino Symbolic Racism and Latino-Relevant Policy Attitudes

	BA Degree Earners	Degree Non-Earners
Immigration Rates	.31***	.24***
Citizenship Barriers	.33***	.19**
Linguistic Support	.32***	.27***
Bilingual Education	.34***	.16*

Table 28. Relationship of Symbolic Racism to Immigration Rates Attitudes (Split by Education)

	Latino Model		Black Model		Combined Model	
	BA Degree	No BA Degree	BA Degree	No BA Degree	BA Degree	No BA Degree
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	2.795 (.407)***	2.593 (.389)***	2.688 (.354)***	2.266 (.325)***	2.753 (.417)***	2.575 (.392)***
Income	-.033 (.021)	-.009 (.024)	-.022 (.019)	.007 (.021)	-.031 (.021)	-.005(.025)
Age	.001 (.005)	..000 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.004 (.004)	.001 (.005)	.002 (.004)
Female	-.093 (.139)	-.124 (.146)	-.065 (.125)	-.031 (.127)	-.101 (.140)	-.115 (.146)
Religious Attendance	-.011 (.047)	.067 (.049)	-.027 (.043)	.078 (.042) [‡]	-.014 (.048)	.058 (.049)
Anti-Latino Racial Affect	.002 (.005)	.003 (.004)	—	—	.001 (.006)	.006 (.005)
Anti-Black Racial Affect	—	—	.002 (.004)	.000 (.003)	.001 (.005)	-.002 (.004)
Party Identification	-.010 (.046)	.022 (.040)	.030 (.041)	.032 (.035)	.001 (.047)	.019 (.040)
Ideology	.064 (.053)	.122 (.048)*	.027 (.049)	.097 (.041)*	.033 (.057)	.109 (.048)*
SR Hispanic	1.192 (.363)***	.763 (.382)*	—	—	.958 (.411)*	.859 (.434)*
SR Black	—	—	1.235 (.283)***	.685 (.293)*	.530 (.369)	-.014 (.383)
R ² Δ Addition of Symbolic Racism Variables	.054	.016	.073	.018	.066	.021
Significance Symbolic Racism Variables Step	F(1, 171) = 10.755 <i>p</i> = .001	F(1, 218) = 3.984 <i>p</i> = .047	F(1, 220) = 19.055 <i>p</i> < .001	F(1, 275) = 5.473 <i>p</i> = .020	F(2, 167) = 6.502 <i>p</i> = .002	F(2, 212) = 2.494 <i>p</i> = .085
R ² Model	.139	.120	.153	.102	.153	.122
Significance Model	F(8, 171) = 3.447 <i>p</i> = .001	F(8, 218) = 3.703 <i>p</i> < .001	F(8, 220) = 4.951 <i>p</i> < .001	F(8, 275) = 3.897 <i>p</i> < .001	F(10, 167) = 3.015 <i>p</i> = .002	F(10, 212) = 2.954 <i>p</i> = .002

Notes: [‡]*p* < .1 * *p* < .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted. All coefficients reflect the final model, with all variables included. Significance symbolic racism step statistics reflect the change in variance explained when symbolic racism variable(s) were added to the model.

Table 29. Relationship of Symbolic Racism to Citizenship Barriers Attitudes (Split by Education)

	BA Degree <i>b</i> (SE)	No BA Degree <i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	1.643 (.344)***	1.747 (.284)***
Income	-.009 (.018)	.000 (.019)
Age	-.001 (.004)	-.001 (.003)
Female	-.149 (.121)	.045 (.107)
Religious Attendance	.015 (.042)	.070 (.036) [‡]
Anti-Latino Racial Affect	.004 (.004)	.006 (.003) [‡]
Anti-Black Racial Affect	—	—
Party Identification	-.024 (.040)	.033 (.029)
Ideology	.105 (.047)*	.019 (.035)
Symbolic Racism	.698 (.336)*	.271 (.269)
R ² Δ Addition of Symbolic Racism	.032	.006
Significance Symbolic Racism Step	F(1, 111) = 4.331 <i>p</i> = .040	F(1, 156) = 1.021 <i>p</i> = .314
R ² Model	.189	.094
Significance Model	F(8, 119) = 3.232 <i>p</i> = .002	F(8, 156) = 2.028 <i>p</i> = .046

Notes: [‡]*p* < .1 * *p* < .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted. All coefficients reflect the final model, with all variables included.

Table 30. Relationship of Symbolic Racism to Linguistic Support Attitudes (Split by Education)

	BA Degree	No BA Degree
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	2.54 (.38)***	2.45 (.33)***
Income	.02 (.02)	.00 (.02)
Age	.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)
Female	-.27 (.14)*	.21 (.13) [‡]
Religious Attendance	-.02 (.05)	-.03 (.04)
Anti-Latino Racial Affect	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)
Party Identification	-.06 (.05)	.05 (.03)
Ideology	.09 (.05) [‡]	.01 (.04)
SR Hispanic	.77 (.37)*	.47 (.32)
R ² Δ Addition of Symbolic Racism Variables	.03	.01
Significance Symbolic Racism Variables Step	F(1, 117) = 4.30 <i>p</i> = .040	F(1, 159) = 2.14 <i>p</i> = .15
R ² Model	.15	.12
Significance Model	F(8, 117) = 2.62 <i>p</i> = .011	F(8, 159) = 2.68 <i>p</i> = .009

Notes: [‡]*p* < .1 * *p* < .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted. All coefficients reflect the final model, with all variables included. Significance symbolic racism step statistics reflect the change in variance explained when symbolic racism variable(s) were added to the model.

Table 31. Relationship of Symbolic Racism to Bilingual Education Attitudes (Split by Education)

	BA Degree <i>b</i> (SE)	No BA Degree <i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	.639 (.528)	.135 (.458)
Income	.015 (.028)	.018 (.029)
Age	.017 (.007)*	.012 (.005)*
Female	-.089 (.182)	-.227 (.174)
Religious Attendance	.033 (.059)	.181 (.056)***
Anti-Latino Racial Affect	.008 (.006)	.004 (.005)
Party Identification	.013 (.059)	.016 (.046)
Ideology	.163 (.067)*	.147 (.053)**
Symbolic Racism	.811 (.430) [‡]	.700 (.462)
R ² Δ Addition of Symbolic Racism	.024	.013
Significance Symbolic Racism Step	F(1, 114) = 3.549 <i>p</i> = .062	F(1, 130) = 2.291 <i>p</i> = .133
R ² Model	.225	.251
Significance Model	F(8, 114) = 4.140 <i>p</i> < .001	F(8, 130) = 5.839 <i>p</i> < .001

Notes: [‡]*p* < .1 * *p* < .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted. All coefficients reflect the final model, with all variables included. Significance symbolic racism step statistics reflect the change in variance explained when symbolic racism variable(s) were added to the model.

Table 32. Moderation of the Relationship of Symbolic Racism to Policy Attitudes (Full Sample)

	Immigration Rates <i>b</i> (SE)	Citizenship Barriers <i>b</i> (SE)	Linguistic Support <i>b</i> (SE)	Bilingual Education <i>b</i> (SE)
Constant	2.842(.303)***	1.891 (.225)***	2.530 (.261)***	.104 (.377)
BA Degree	-.491 (.257) [‡]	-.545 (.203)**	-.225 (.237)	.310 (.304)
Income	-.017 (.016)	-.006 (.013)	.006 (.015)	.021 (.020)
Age	.001 (.003)	-.001 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.014 (.004)***
Female	-.099 (.101)	-.048 (.079)	.002 (.093)	-.162 (.124)
Religious Attendance	.027 (.034)	.044 (.027) [‡]	-.026 (.032)	.106 (.040)**
Anti-Latino Racial Affect	.005 (.004)	.007 (.003)*	.005 (.003) [‡]	.006 (.004)
Party Identification	.012 (.030)	.026 (.023)	.014 (.027)	.017 (.036)
Ideology	.082 (.036)*	.034 (.028)	.037 (.033)	.117 (.042)**
SR Hispanic	.899 (.399)*	.361 (.296)	.698 (.354)*	.208 (.494)
BA Degree by SR Hispanic	-.086 (.572)	-.124 (.452)	-.335 (.532)	.414 (.666)
R ² Δ Addition of Interaction Term	.001	.028	.007	.001
Significance Interaction Term Step	F(2, 387) = .330 <i>p</i> = .719	F(2, 266) = 4.538 <i>p</i> = .012	F(2, 275) = 1.114 <i>p</i> = .330	F(2, 245) = .206 <i>p</i> = .814
R ² Model	.176	.178	.124	.262
Significance Model	F(13, 387) = 6.351 <i>p</i> < .001	F(13, 266) = 4.442 <i>p</i> < .001	F(13, 275) = 2.992 <i>p</i> < .001	F(13, 245) = 6.696 <i>p</i> < .001

Notes: [‡]*p* < .1 * *p* < .05 ** *p* < .01 *** *p* < .001

Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted. All coefficients reflect the final model, with all variables included. Significance interaction term step statistics reflect the change in variance explained when a variable representing the interaction of anti-Latino symbolic racism and BA degree was added to the model.

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