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Modernization and Cultural Democratization in East Asia

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Hannah June Kim

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Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, Chair
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2019

DEDICATION

To

Christine

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Modernization and Cultural Democratization in East Asia

By

Hannah June Kim

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2019

Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, Chair

This dissertation examines how much progress the middle class in East Asia has made in transforming into citizens of democratic states. The following research questions are addressed: Are middle-class citizens in East Asia committed to democracy? Are they willing to become the vanguard of the democratization process in the region? Do they prefer liberal democracy to other regime types, as middle-class citizens in the West are believed to? I contend that the classic relationship between modernization and democratization may not be applicable to the East-Asian context. I argue that this is because of a particular history of state-led development in East Asia, which limited growth in liberal democratic political culture and altered the commitment of the middle class to liberal democracy. I demonstrate these differences through the notion of democratic citizenship, which observes the cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns of democratic commitment. Using data from the World Values Survey and Asia Barometer Survey, I reveal consistent differences in how middle-class respondents in the East view democracy. Moreover, I find that middle-class respondents with higher state dependency are less likely to view democracy in the liberal terms favored in the West. These results contribute to broader debates about modernization and political culture worldwide.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

East Asia is one of the world's largest and most dynamic regions. Both full-fledged dictatorships and consolidated democracies reside in the region, with some areas being completely poverty-stricken and others rich (Inoguchi and Carlson 2006). Relative to other parts of the world, however, East Asia remains democratically underdeveloped. Only three of the region's numerous countries are full-fledged democracies, and these few democracies may be in distress due to the region's resistance to democratization (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, and Shin 2009; Shin 2012).

The democratic system in East Asia is relatively new. Japan was the first to democratize in 1945, with South Korea and Taiwan following in the 1980s. Although six democracies exist in the region, only the abovementioned three are fully consolidated.[1] Other democracies, such as the Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar, are regressing and failing to function as liberal democracies because of limited press freedom, the growth of military rule, and transitions back to one-party systems. Indeed, authoritarianism continues to be a strong competitor to democracy, and a large proportion of citizens in East Asia continue to support autocratic systems (Chu et al. 2009). With little commitment to democracy and democratic values, a high chance exists that a consolidating democracy will weaken and deconsolidate into a nondemocratic one.

Despite its limited democratization process, East Asia's socioeconomic growth has been exponential. Many countries experienced "The East Asian Miracle" by achieving high rates of economic growth within just a few decades. This combination of economic development and democratic underdevelopment contradicts the central claim of *modernization theory*, which contends that "the more well-to-do a nation, the more likely the chances it will sustain

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[1] The six include one second-wave democracy, Japan, and five third-wave democracies: Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan (Shin 2012).

democracy" (Lipset 1959). According to the theory, democracy will follow socioeconomic development through a shift in bargaining power from the elites in the upper class to the middle class, creating a newly empowered group that pushes for democratic reforms (Lipset 1959; Przeworski 1999; Moore 1966; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2005).

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between modernization and cultural democratization in East Asia. Essentially, it examines how much progress the middle class has made in transforming into citizens of democratic states. The following research questions drive this study: Are middle-class citizens in East Asia committed to democracy? Are they willing to become the vanguard of the democratization process in the region? Do they prefer democracy to other regime types, as middle-class citizens are believed to in the West? Do democratic orientations among the middle classes vary between those living under one-party dictatorships, one-party authoritarian regimes, and democracies?

In this dissertation, I contend that the classic relationship between modernization and democratization is not applicable to countries in East Asia because of differing perceptions of democracy among the middle classes. I argue that middle-class groups in the region are unlikely to be committed to the liberal democratic system because of different understandings of democracy, and as such, they are less likely to support it in its classic form. I theorize that this is because of the state-dependent economic model in East Asia, under which state-led economic development has altered the commitment of the middle classes to liberal democracy. I demonstrate these differences throughout this dissertation by comparing levels and patterns of middle-class orientation toward democracy across the region as well as cross-regionally through the notion of democratic citizenship.

Relevant research on modernization theory, the middle class, and cultural democratization in East Asia is limited in breadth and depth. Theoretically, previous studies have not examined how state-led economic modernization could influence the middle class' views on democracy in East Asia. Empirically, little systematic effort has been made to determine whether the middle classes in East Asia are committed to democracy, although some have looked at characteristics of the middle class in specific countries or areas (see Koo 1999; Hattori Funatsu 2003; Nathan 2016; Chen and Lu 2011; Chen 2013; Anderson 2011). Conceptually, many empirical studies have focused on a standard definition of liberal democracy and have not explored the idea that democracy can hold various meanings.[2] This dissertation attempts to overcome limitations in the literature by suggesting new methods of studying the commitment of the middle class to democracy in East Asia.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide a discussion of the determinants of democracy discussed in the literature. Second, I discuss the role and importance of the middle class in the democratization process. Third, I describe how differences in economic development influence feelings of dependency towards the government and how that could alter their democratic orientations. Fourth, I introduce important concepts used in this study, including the notion of democratic citizenship, the group that encompasses the middle class, and the selection of countries used to describe the East and the West. Fifth I explain the data and methodology used in this dissertation. Finally, I conclude with brief chapter outlines.

Determinants of Democracy

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[2] Some scholars have utilized other conceptions of democracy (Lu and Shi 2015; Chang, Chu, and Huang 2011; Shin 2012) but have not applied it to modernization theory and the middle classes in East Asia.

What explains the emergence of democracy? What motivates citizens to support democracy over other regime types? Numerous debates have been held on the various determinants that lead to democratization and democratic consolidation, many of which have focused primarily on how and why people do or do not support democracy. Of them, several complementary theoretical perspectives exist, including *democratic political learning theory*, which attributes increasing democratic support to longer and positive experiences with democratic institutions (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Rose, Mischler, and Haerpfer 1998; Converse 1969; Dahl 1989; Fuchs 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995) because repeated involvement with a political process over time familiarizes people with the system in which they live (McClosky and Zaller 1984).[3] *Regime performance theory* similarly emphasizes how well democratic regimes perform and how citizens assess the democracies under which they live (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Rose et al. 1998; Shin and McDonough 1999).[4] In the same vein, *social capital theory* posits that a vibrant and robust civil society that fosters growth in association activism as well as the norms of reciprocity and interpersonal trust leads to viable support for democracy (Diamond 1999; Norris 2002; Putnam 1993),[5] whereas *socialization theory* recognizes how different life experiences—particularly during childhood—can be a powerful force in shaping political attitudes.[6]

Other variants include distributional consequences of economic development. The *redistributivist theories of regime change* suggest that economic inequality can have highly different political consequences for democracy's prospects. Democratization is more likely either

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[3] This is also called the *political learning and resocialization model.*
[4] Katz and Levin (2015) demonstrated how poor government responses reduce support for democracy.
[5] See Chambers and Kopstein (2006) for an in-depth discussion on civil society and the state, and Chambers and Kopstein (2001) for a discussion on how civil society can negatively impact support for liberal democracy.
[6] Similar research shows how political communication and predispositions early on in the life cycle can change citizens' underlying opinions (Tesler 2015).

when inequality is low (Boix 2003) or at middling levels (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; 2006). Moreover, the *elite competition approach* focuses on the relationship between economic growth, inequality, and regime change, and suggests that inequality fosters democratization because incentives for democracy increase among the elite (Ansell and Samuels 2014).

Modernization and Democratization

Many of the theories on the determinants of democracy have implicitly or explicitly adopted the fundamental tenets of *modernization theory*. In its most general form, this theory contends that socioeconomic development is a necessary condition, or *sine quo non*, of liberal democratization (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, 2000). As countries become wealthier, they are more likely to democratize. Although scholars have debated the proposition, igniting decades of intense debate on the conditions most conducive to democratization, most political scientists consider the theory one of the most robust findings in the field and continue to use it to explain democratic regime transitions.

Among the numerous driving forces, *modernization theory* emphasizes the crucial role of the middle class in the creation and sustenance of democracy. The middle class is a vital element in the democratization process because it is crucial in the struggle for power, because economic interests drive those in the upper class to prefer nondemocratic systems and those in the lower class to prefer democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). That is, the middle class plays a critical role when the working class attempts to seize power for redistribution and the upper class attempts to keep it, and thus, the political stance and demands of middle-class people can be considered critical in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (Koo 1991).

The prominent role of the middle class has attracted debates on their democratic orientations, which have been grouped into unilinear and contingent approaches (Chen 2013).

The unilinear approach supports the idea that a growing middle class works as the "main thrust of the democratization movement" (Hattori, Funatsu and Torii 2003: 129-130). The contingent approach, by contrast, assumes that the relationship between economic development and democratization is dynamic and that democratic orientations are contingent upon salient sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions (Chen 2013: 5). That is, the middle class will shift its democratic orientation depending on its association with an authoritarian state, social and material satisfaction, class fragmentation, and worry over political instability. Following the contingent approach, I argue that East Asia seems to defy the general thrust of modernization because of its history of state-dependent modernization, which has increased middle-class people's feelings of dependency on the state, thereby altering their democratic orientations.

From the Perspective of the Middle Class

Differences in Economic Modernization

Over the past few decades, East Asia has experienced rapid economic growth, which has closed the economic gap between the East and West; furthermore, the region has seen an average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of almost 8% (Welzel and Dalton 2017:1). Both the democracies and nondemocracies were resource-poor economies that started from low per capita income, but soon experienced high rates of economic growth. For example, between 1965 and 1990, Japan's GDP per capita grew from 9,828 to 26,930, Korea from 970 to 6,330, Taiwan from 995 to 8,800, and Singapore from 2,312 to 14,210 (Krueger 1995:11).[7] The impressive performance of economies in the region was called "The East Asian Miracle" by the World Bank because of its persistent high growth rates, which grew faster than any emerging market in the world through the promotion of investment, opening up to export manufacturing,

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[7] This is based on US$ during the 1990s.

and strong government interventions. More impressive is that countries such as South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Singapore achieved such high rates of economic growth within four decades when advanced economies of Western Europe took centuries to achieve the same (Quibria 2002).

State-led economic development, also called developmental or crony capitalism, played a crucial role in the region's rapid economic growth. East-Asian governments provided an infrastructure that took control of the economy by intervening, regulating, and planning growth through means such as facilitating exports by adopting export-oriented trade policies; furthermore, the governments shifted the labor force from agricultural to industrial employment (Krueger 1995:23), leading to the creation and growth of a middle class. Indeed, states participated in the development of the middle class from the very beginning. In South Korea, for example, the state built government institutions to help capitalist classes grow (Chibber 2005). Similarly in Taiwan, the government implemented a series of policies to create and nurture local private entrepreneurs who eventually comprised the middle class in a place where such a class had been nearly nonexistent (Evans et al. 1985:253). The middle class thus developed a dependency on the government for its survival and prosperity (Bellin 2000, 2002; Brown and Jones 1995; Englehart 2003; Johnson 1985; Jones 1998). The dependency that developed among the middle class toward the state eventually changed their actions and behaviors, creating stark contrasts between middle classes in the East and West.

Differences between the Middle Classes in the East and West

In the West, the middle class participated as prominent actors in the democratization process. They learned to defy the state and push for property rights as well as redistribution. In the East, however, the middle class played an insignificant role in the development process because of the strong role of the state in socioeconomic development. States in East Asia

prioritized economic development over political and social development, and economic growth nurtured middle-class citizens into deferring to the state because it provided a better standard of living and improved employment opportunities.

In addition, the length of economic growth and modernization influenced the behavior of middle-class groups and their orientations toward democracy. In the West, modernization proceeded through two stages, one during the seventeenth century and the other during the twentieth (Huntington 1966). Because modernization spanned centuries, democracy became a large part of Western society, whereas in the East, countries' modernization occurred within the span of a few decades, providing democracy little time to establish itself as a fixed regime and making the overthrow of democratic regimes more likely. Ultimately, middle-class citizens in the East had very little time to not only accept but also comprehend and support what constitutes a democracy—and therefore have less attachment to it as a regime system. Middle-class citizens in the East Asian nondemocracies, moreover, had even less opportunity to comprehend and accept democracy due to limited contact and lack of experience and familiarity with the liberal democratic system.

Feelings of Government Dependency

This combination of state-dependent economic modernization and limited democratic experience increased the middle classes' dependency on having a strong state and decreased their commitment to liberal democracy. Governments in East Asia developed business structures that provided incentives to support strong states with active, interventionist policies; this contradicts the liberal democratic system, which often supports laissez-faire leadership.[8] As such, the middle classes' orientations and dependency that developed toward the government influenced their commitment to democracy through limiting their commitment to liberal democracy and altering

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[8] See Lewin, Lippitt and White (1939) for details on the three styles of leadership and decision-making tendencies.

their democratic orientations. Although middle class groups in East Asia today may be less likely to actually depend on the government, feelings of government dependency still remain.

Implications

These differences in economic modernization, the development of middle-class characteristics, and growing development of government dependency have four implications. First, state-dependent modernization in the East and West can lead to different trajectories in socioeconomic growth in the two regions, and even within different countries in East Asia, leading to systematic differences in how the middle class view democracy. Second, state-dependent modernization can alter the processes of cultural democratization and lead to different democratic political orientations among middle-class groups. Third, these differences can be observed through a multidimensional definition of democratic citizenship, which demonstrates how conceptions of, support for, and behaviors toward democracy vary among the middle class. Finally, these differences among the middle class can imply that democracy is not a one-size-fits-all phenomenon but one that varies in type, implying that the classic causality between modernization and democratization may not be universally applicable to different cultural contexts.

Important Concepts

Democratic Citizenship

Democratic commitment can be measured in various ways.[9] To thoroughly investigate differences among middle-class groups, I examine how committed such groups are to the liberal

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[9] See Nie et al. (1996); Bratton (2013); Almond and Verba (1963); Fox (1994); Bratton and Van de Walle (1996); Dalton (2008); and Shin et al. (2005) for various types of democratic measures. Nie et al. (1996) measured democratic orientations through two dimensions: democratic enlightenment, which includes behaviors and cognitions that lead to political self-interest, and political engagement, which includes qualities that change norms

notion of democracy through the concept of democratic citizenship. Democratic citizenship is a multidimensional concept used to observe whether individuals will embrace liberal democracy as "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991). It has been measured in various ways, yet most relevant literature on analyzing democratic commitment have conceptual, theoretical, and methodological limitations. Many scholars have focused on regime or structural orientations and have failed to consider process and cognitive orientations. Thus, democratic citizenship is narrowly or thinly viewed as a unidimensional phenomenon and narrowly focused concept (see Tilly 1996). It often requires the identification of some democratic properties but does not differentiate those properties from its alternatives (Sartori 1987; McClosky and Brill 1983; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Schmitter and Karl 1991). For example, when people are asked to define democracy, the properties named vary and sometimes include authoritarian traits (Canache 2012; Chu et al 2008; Welzel 2013). Moreover, it rests on the assumption that people understand what a democracy entails and that this understanding is the same across cultures and regions. In reality, however, democracy is a highly contested concept that has various meanings to different people, varying in quality and quantity as well as cross-nationally and longitudinally (Ariely 2015; Ariely and Davidov 2011; de Regt 2013; Moncagatta 2015; Shin and Kim 2017).

The present study treats democratic citizenship meaningfully as a phenomenon that measures differences in popular conceptions of democracy with three dimensions: the cognitive, the affective, and the behavioral. The cognitive dimension focuses on understandings, the

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along with democratic understanding and adherence. Other scholars have used the civic culture approach by defining it as "participation in popular collective action and engagement with political leaders and institutions, including elections and within a rule of law," which stems from "a political understanding of citizenship based on civic engagement and participation" (Bratton 2013); using the framework of disengaged parochials and passive subjects (Almond and Verba 1963); or measuring it as clients who seek patronage (Fox 1994; Bratton and Van de Walle 1996). Engaged democratic citizenship has been defined by citizens who are assertive, independent, and who often focus on the welfare of others (Dalton 2008), whereas democratic political sophistication analyzes "patterns of political orientations that would promote the process of democratization by expanding electoral democracy and removing the residues of authoritarian politics" (Shin et al. 2005).

affective dimension emphasizes support, and the behavioral dimension focuses on action. Specifically, the cognitive dimension focuses on how people conceptualize democracy, whether they can differentiate between democratic and autocratic properties, and which democratic properties they consider essential. In essence, it taps into democratic attitudes through different domains of democratic knowledge; it asks which democratic properties are considered essential as well as which are the most and least prevalent; and whether people view democracy more procedurally or substantively, more liberally or illiberally, and more broadly or deeply.

The affective dimension focuses on whether people support democracy by further analyzing whether they favor democracy over other forms of government, specifically autocratic ones, as well as whether they prefer democracy as both political ideals and a collective political enterprise. It asks whether people support democracy; whether they prefer democracy to autocratic rule; and what the indicators of democratic support or democratic decline are.

The behavioral dimension is equated to defending democracy and refers to whether people are willing to fight for democracy through political activity. This dimension is illustrated by political behavior and active participation to examine how people drive the democratic process to influence the behavior of political institutions, which can lead to certain desired outcomes. It asks whether people are willing to defend democracy and democratic rule despite its limitations; and whether their political actions will change if democratic institutions do not perform satisfactorily.

Measuring democratic citizenship as a multidimensional phenomenon helps overcome many of its limitations as a tool for comparing the contours and sources of democratic citizenship across both democratic and authoritarian countries. These core dimensions of democratic citizenship are key components to a healthy and effective democracy.

Table 1.1 Dimensions of Democratic Citizenship.

Cognitive Dimension	Affective Dimension	Behavioral Dimension
• How do citizens conceptualize democracy? • How informed are they about democratic properties? • What properties do they understand most and least? • Do they understand it procedurally or substantively, liberally or illiberally?	• How much affinity do citizens feel toward democracy? • Do they feel attached to other forms of government, such as autocracy? • Are they likely to embrace democracy as "the only game in town"?	• How willing are citizens to fight for democracy? • Are they willing to defend democratic rule in spite of its failures? • Will they continue to protect democracy even if the institution does not perform to the satisfaction of its citizens?

The Middle Class

It is particularly difficult to define the middle class. The middle class today is significantly different from the bourgeoisie originally described by Barrington Moore (1966), since the bourgeoisie entailed urban capitalists who had the ability to act independently while the middle class today is broadly defined as those who are not poor or immensely wealthy (Cheeseman 2015; van de Walle 2012). The middle class has been identified in various ways in the literature, including forms of employment (Goldthorpe 1980), levels of education (Lipset 1959), amount of wealth (Inglehart 1990), and lived poverty (Cheeseman 2014). The middle class has also been defined by the purchasing power parity of households (Banerjee and Duflo 2008), median per capita income (Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato 2000) and even food budget, share of expenditure used for entertainment, health care, and domestic infrastructure.[10] In

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[10] See Banerjee and Duflo (2008) for details on different forms of measurement of the middle class.

addition to these objective measures, subjective measures have also been used to identify the middle class through self-reported class status.

Identifying class through income, however, continues to be the most commonly used method since income leads to changes in education, employment, and other forms of socioeconomic growth (Inglehart 1990; Lipset 1959; Cheeseman 2015). Similarly, this study identifies the middle class through reported income. Adopting Easterly's (2001) measurement of the middle class, which is composed of those between the 20th and 80th percentiles of income within a group, I use similar percentiles in the listed scales of income. This measurement is most commonly used, and it considers both subjective and objective measures. Moreover, it provides a simple and standardized way to measure similar groups of people from different countries and various regime types.

The East and The West

The empirical work that follows systematically compares the democratic citizenship of the middle classes in three democracies in the East with that in three democracies in the West along with three East-Asian democracies with three East-Asian nondemocracies. Adopting the TNT Principle, this study observes cross-national, cross-regional, and within-national variations among the selected countries through comparing the democratic orientations of middle classes in democracies in the East with those in the West; through comparing those in East-Asian democracies to those in nondemocracies; as well as providing one in-depth case study.[11] More specifically, I compare three consolidated democracies with high levels of socioeconomic growth in the East, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (the only full-fledged democracies in the region)

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[11] A comparative methodology often incorporates a research design that is referred to as the "TNT Principle," which compares across time, across nations, and across types of institutions (Grofman 1999a).

with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the West, which Welzel (2013) described as the "New West."

Subsequently, I examine six countries in East Asia that are commonly grouped as the Confucian Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.[12] These comparisons highlight differences and similarities among the middle class through various typologies and analytical frameworks, to link various groups across the three core characteristics of democratic citizenship. Next, I explore whether feelings of government dependency influence all three dimensions of democratic citizenship (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) among the middle class living in democracies in the East and West as well as among those living in democracies and nondemocracies in East Asia.

Databases and Method of Analysis

To properly test the aforementioned arguments, this study used two datasets to provide descriptive and relational results. The World Values Survey (hereinafter the WVS) is a nationally representative survey that provides both cross-national and time-series–based data through interviews. The WVS consists of questions based on economic development, democratization, social capital, and subjective well-being, and focuses on people's values and beliefs over time. Although a total of six waves of the survey currently exist, this study uses the 6th wave (2010–2014) to provide both comparisons among the middle class by region (East and West) along with in-depth cross-regional and within-country analyses of countries in East Asia.[13]

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[12] See Shin (2012) for details on Confucian Asian countries and Welzel (2011) for different groupings of Western democracies.

[13] Wave 1 (1981–1984), Wave 2 (1990–1994), Wave 3 (1995–1998), Wave 4 (1999–2004), Wave 5 (2005–2009), and Wave 6 (2010–2014).

The Asian Barometer Survey (hereinafter ABS) is a survey database located in Taiwan that includes reliable public-opinion data with randomly selected samples of the adult population of each country in the region.[14] The ABS includes several questions that concern cultural democratization. Four rounds of the survey were conducted from 2001 to 2014, and the present study attempts to draw data from the last wave (2014–2016) for the six East-Asian countries being studied and compare East-Asian democracies with nondemocracies.

Chapter Outline

This dissertation includes a total of five chapters in addition to the Introduction and Conclusion. The five chapters are split into three sections. The first two examine how middle-class citizens conceptualize democracy; these different conceptions are compared by region and regime type. The following two chapters discuss whether middle-class citizens support democracy or autocracy as well as compare levels of support by region and regime type. The final chapter provides a case study of South Korea and analyzes whether the middle class there are willing to defend democracy despite its limitations as a form of government.

In Chapter 2, I begin my analysis with the conceptualization and understandings of democracy. I examine cognitive patterns among the middle class in the East (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and West (the United States, Australia, and New Zealand). I identify which democratic properties are the most and least preferred among the middle class in both regions, as well as and whether they conceptualize democracy in particular manners. These analyses are intended to address four questions: How do the middle class in East Asia identify the essential features of democracy? How broad or narrow are their understandings of democracy, and what

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[14] Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

properties do they value most and least? Do they conceptualize democracy more procedurally or substantially, or more liberally or illiberally? How do all four of these conceptions differ from the middle class in consolidated democracies in the West?

Chapter 3 examines how those living in similar cultural and social environments understand democracy, and explores these differences among those in six East-Asian Confucian-based societies with varying political contexts: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore, and Vietnam. This chapter examines middle-class East Asians more in depth and asks: How *differently* do East Asians understand democracy? Through a similar conceptual framework but more detailed analysis to that of Chapter 2, I examine how middle-class East Asians from different countries and regime types identify essential democratic properties and which properties are most and least prevalent among them.

Chapter 4 examines the affective dimension of democratic citizenship (i.e., the extent of middle-class support for democracy in the East and West). I gauge the extent of the middle class democratic support by comparing it with autocratic support, as well as analyze whether this is increasing over time. Through this, I explore one of the main propositions of this study; that is, whether feelings of government dependency influence democratic support. I attempt to answer three central and closely related questions: Do middle-class citizens in East-Asian democracies support democracy? Do they prefer democracy to other regime types? What are the indicators of democratic decline in East Asia and are they similar to those of the West?

In Chapter 5, I investigate potential variations in democratic support between two subgroups within East Asia: the middle class in East-Asian democracies and nondemocracies. Furthermore, I analyze autocratic support to estimate whether democratic support is superficial. I attempt to answer three central and closely related questions: Do middle-class East Asians

support democracy or autocracy? Does support vary among those in democratic and nondemocratic regimes in East Asia? Do feelings of government dependency influence support among middle-class people in the region?

In Chapter 6, I analyze the behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship by observing how much middle-class citizens are willing to defend democracy through various forms of political participation in South Korea. I examine the actions of middle-class citizens and how they influence the behavior of political institutions, which can lead to certain outcomes through mass political behavior and participation. I attempt to answer three questions: Are citizens willing to defend democracy? Are middle-class citizens willing to defend democratic rule, despite its limitations? Will their political actions change if democratic institutions do not perform to their satisfaction?

Finally, in Chapter 7, I highlight all major empirical findings of the study before discussing the crucial political implications of these findings for the middle class in East Asia. Furthermore, I discuss the theoretical implications for what this means for the future of democracy in the region.

PART 1: THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION

This section examines how middle-class citizens conceptualize democracy as well as how their understandings of democracy vary. Furthermore, it discusses how the relationship between East-Asian middle-class citizens and their governments developed because of the prominent role of states in their historical economic growth. In the following chapter, I depict the role of government dependency in how middle-class citizens understand democracy in the East and how it varies in the West. Subsequently, I consider how conceptions of democracy vary between countries in East Asia.

CHAPTER 2:
CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS

Theories of democratization contend that democracy emerges both as a universal value and the most preferred system of government, arguing that it is the only political model with global appeal (Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 2005; Welzel 2013; Fukuyama 1992). Notwithstanding recent claims of an "authoritarian resurgence," support for democracy remains strong even in authoritarian countries (Klingemann 1999; Inglehart 2003), yet even the most cursory analysis shows that many people who state they support democracy and democratic regimes often remain attached to authoritarian practices (Carrion 2008, Chu et al. 2008b; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Dalton and Shin 2014; Hale 2011, 2012; Rose, Mishler and Munro 2011; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Shi 2008, 2014; Shin 2012, 2015, 2017; Sin and Wells 2005; Welzel and Alvarez 2014). Moreover, many avowed supporters of democracy claim the regimes under which they live are democratic when they are not (Achen and Bartels 2016). Undeniably, many people have their own perceptions of democracy, or simply understand it differently (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Welzel 2013). These puzzling findings make re-examining how democracy as a concept is understood necessary, because "democracy means little if there is no clear understanding of what it means" (Welzel 2013: 310).

In this chapter, I examine the cognitive patterns among the middle class in the East (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and West (The United States, Australia, and New Zealand). I address the following questions: How do the middle class in East Asia identify the essential features of democracy? How do their conceptions of democracy differ from the middle class in consolidated democracies in the West? Theoretically, I argue that different trajectories in socioeconomic modernization altered the processes of cultural modernization and that this has

led to systematic differences in how people conceptualize democracy. Empirically, I subject these theoretical expectations to public-opinion data in the 6th wave of the WVS. I reveal consistent differences in how middle-class respondents in the East and West conceptualize democracy. Moreover, I find that middle-class respondents in East Asia with stronger feelings of state dependency are less likely to understand democracy in the liberal terms favored in the West.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I address different definitions and measures of democracy in relevant literature. The third section introduces a new framework for measuring democratic conceptions and provides descriptive statistics of each measurement. The fourth section describes differences in development in the regions and how that shaped various democratic conceptions among the middle class. The fifth section describes the data and methodology along with the typologies used in this study. The sixth section presents my results, including multiple regression analyses, which demonstrate how state-led development shapes middle-class orientations, and the final section presents the conclusions of the chapter.

Measuring Conceptions of Democracy

Public-opinion data have been used as an essential tool to examine how ordinary citizens understand democracy (Huang, Chu, and Chang 2013). Although democracy is broadly defined as government by the people, much of the literature has emphasized measuring democracy through its origins, installation, consolidation, and survival; this has recently expanded in scope to identifying and assessing its quality (Morlino et al. 2011).

Democracy scholars now utilize numerous strategies to effectively and systematically unpack the "D-word" and determine various definitions that people associate with democracy.

One method is to identify whether people can differentiate democratic regime characteristics from authoritarian ones (Cho 2014). The conventional wisdom of public-opinion studies posits that understandings of a political concept depend on people's cognitive capacity to distinguish between characteristics that help define and reject it (McClosky and Zaller 1984). Other methods include open- and close-ended survey questions, both of which gauge respondents' democratic conceptions. Open-ended surveys ask respondents questions such as "What does democracy mean to you?" (Canache 2012; Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Shi and Lu 2010), whereas close-ended survey questions consider respondents' choices of the most essential characteristics of democracy (Bratton and Mattes; Carnaghan 2011; Miller, Helsi and Reisinger 1997; Welzel 2011).

In addition, analytical frameworks have been applied. Lijphart (1999) switched the focus of inquiry by examining the qualities, rather than the quality, of democracy. Welzel (2011) continued along this trajectory by observing liberal democratic conceptualizations through a three-factor model, which used 10 items from the 5th wave of the WVS and divided the meaning of democracy into the following four subcomponents: liberal, social, populist, and authoritarian dimensions.

A similar analytical framework for assessing democratic qualities was first applied to Asian-Pacific countries in the early 2000s (Morlino et al. 2011). Morlino (2011) distinguished three dimensions—procedural, content, and outcome—all of which had their own subdimensions. This assessment methodology was applied to Taiwan's young democracy to measure people's perceived qualities of popular support for democracy (Chang, Chu, and Huang 2011). These were used to create a two-by-two typology of democratic orientations that differentiated between four types of democrats—consistent democrats, critical democrats, nondemocrats, and superficial

democrats—as well as to tap into people's value orientations toward some core liberal democratic values, including political equality, accountability, liberalism, and pluralism using questions that avoid the "D-word" (Chu and Huang 2010). Eventually this was also used to measure popular understandings of democracy as well as explore the origins of democratic conceptions in 12 East-Asian societies through variations between substantive- and procedure-based democracy (Lu 2013).

A New Framework

Many different methods exist to conceptualize and measure democracy.[15] Although various classificatory schemes have been applied to certain areas worldwide, none have provided an East–West comparison. Furthermore, the taxonomies themselves have often been limited in their breadth and depth.

I use an approach that compares the cognitive patterns among middle-class people in the East and West. This approach consists of four interrelated questions that capture people's broad understandings of democracy. First, I investigate whether people in both regions can identify essential democratic features, and then I examine how broadly people understand democracy and which democratic properties they value the most and least. Third, I assess whether people conceptualize democracy more procedurally or substantially. Finally, I analyze whether people conceptualize democracy more liberally or illiberally. I attempt to answer each question by comparing middle-class respondents in democracies in the East to those in democracies in the West.

Identifying Democracy

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[15] See Fuchs (1999); Dalton, Shin, and Jou (2007); Welzel (2011, 2013); Pereira (2012); Huang (2014); Canache (2012); Baviskar and Malone (2004); Bratton et al. (2005); and Ferrin and Kriesie (2014) for various democracy measurements.

The first question asks how well middle-class people identify democratic properties. To analyze popular conceptions of democracy, I focus on the following questions: How do middle-class people identify democratic properties? How do they understand their constituents? To identify their system recognition, I use four questions from Wave 6 of the WVS that focus on the importance of four regime properties with the following instruction:

> *"Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means 'not at all an essential characteristic of democracy' and 10 means it definitely is 'an essential characteristic of democracy.'"*

The properties include: (1) interpreting laws religiously; (2) military intervention in politics; (3) electing leaders in free elections; and (4) protecting civil liberties.[16]

To assess how middle-class respondents identify the essential properties of democracy, I examine responses to this set of four survey questions related to democratic properties and deduct autocratic identification from democratic identification. That is, I create a −2 to +2 index to examine whether respondents can differentiate democratic properties from autocratic ones. The lower the score, the less likely respondents are to be able to differentiate between the two regime types, whereas the higher the score, the more likely they are to be able to do so.

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[16] The questions ask respondents to answer on a 10-point scale, where scores of 1 and 10 mean not at all essential and essential characteristics of democracy, respectively. For this measure, scores above the midpoint of 5 indicate being essential, whereas those below refer to not at all essential. Religious interpretation of the law and military intervention in politics (V132 and V135) are not essential characteristics of a democratic institution and are often associated with authoritarian regimes. As such, these two questions are classified as nonessential characteristics. Moreover, free elections and civil rights (V133 and V136) are considered core tenets of a democracy and considered here as essential democratic traits. Any responses including "Don't Know" or "No Answer" have been omitted.

Table 2.1 Democratic Identification by Region.

	West	East
−2	0.31	0.72
−1	2.41	1.39
0	17.19	9.69
1	26.59	25.06
2	53.51	63.15

Table 2.1 shows that among members of the middle class, similar proportions exist of those who can and cannot differentiate regime traits in the East and West. However, those in the East have proportionally more respondents who can differentiate all the properties based on regime type (63.2%), whereas the West has a little over half (53.5%). The major difference between the two groups is in the proportion of those who are unsure about the properties, with nearly 10% in the East and 17.2% in the West.

Depth of Democratic Understanding

To analyze how differently middle-class people understand democracy, determining the breadth and depth of their understanding is crucial. This not only looks at whether they can identify essential democratic properties but also how well they can identify them. This question observes whether respondents view democracy as a unidimensional or multidimensional phenomenon (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999; Lijphart 1999). The unidimensional framework defines democracy narrowly or thinly in terms of a few characteristics of a chosen dimension, such as elections and a universal franchise. The multidimensional phenomenon defines democracy broadly in terms of several dimensions, including liberalism.[17] The second question, as such, asks about the breadth and depth of democratic understanding. Do middle-class people

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[17] These broad and narrow definitions of democracy are also called minimal and maximal or supplemental definitions as well as thin and thick definitions (Coppedge 1999). This has also been characterized as a method of tapping indirect definitions (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007).

define democracy unidimensionally or multidimensionally? What properties do they value most and least?

Analyzing the breadth of their democratic conceptions considers the total number of democratic properties respondents identify as democratic, because this allows researchers to observe both the range and scope of their democratic conceptions as well as the complexity of those conceptions (Canache 2012). Furthermore, comparing the means of those properties helps identify what respondents consider the most and least important of the properties surveyed. The more properties they identify, the broader and more complex their democratic understandings.

To measure how broadly or narrowly middle-class people understand democracy, I use nine questions on regime properties from the same wave of the WVS. These questions ask whether people agree or disagree with statements regarding certain principles or institutions that are believed to be essential to democracy, asking respondents to rate the importance of nine regime properties on a 10-point scale following the same instructions as the previous section.[18]

Table 2.2 Democratic Breadth and Depth by Country.

	West	East
Electing leaders in free elections	87.3	89.3
Guaranteeing gender equality	86.3	83.2
Protecting civil liberties	74.7	82.4
Government taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor	47.3	73.8
Receiving state aid	51.4	76.8
Promoting income equality	21.6	44.6
Having citizens obey rulers	56.8	67.4
Military interventions in politics	77.6	87.6
Religious interpretation of the law	90.5	89.4

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[18] The questions include the four listed above as well as five others for a total of nine, which entail (1) electing leaders in free elections; (2) guaranteeing gender equality; (3) protecting civil liberties; (4) taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor; (5) receiving state aid; (6) promoting income equality (7) having citizens obey their rulers; (8) military intervention in politics; (9) interpreting laws religiously. If respondents score higher on any of these than the scale midpoint of 5, these scores are counted towards the total.

In both groups of countries, properties such as "electing leaders in free elections" and "gender equality" are viewed as the most essential characteristics of a democracy. However, social democratic characteristics such as "the government taxing the rich and giving to the poor," along with "equal income," are significantly higher in the East than in the West. Nondemocratic properties such as religious interpretations of the law and military intervention are viewed as the least essential properties of a democracy among both groups.

Figure 2.1 presents the average of both middle-class groups using a combination of all nine questions. The lower the percentage, the more likely the group is to view democracy narrowly. The higher the percentage, the more likely the group is to have broader understandings of democracy. Both regions have broader understandings of democracy, yet those in the East have broader views than those in the West by nearly 12%. The breadth–depth scale shows that those in the East have broader understandings of democracy with 77%, whereas those in the West have slightly narrower understandings with 66%.

Figure 2.1 Democratic Breadth and Depth by Region.

Minimal Understandings of Democracy

The third question expands upon the narrow—or unidimensional—definition of democracy. Two unidimensional definitions exist based on minimal definitions of democracy: *procedural* and *substantive*. Procedural definitions include political institutions and procedures such as elections, whereas substantive definitions include those based on outcomes such as equality, responsiveness, welfare, and economic growth (Welzel 2013). Of the two definitions, the procedural type is much more widely used in the literature than the substantive type. In fact, much empirical research on democracy is based on the "procedural minimum," which often equates democracy to a set of institutional procedures, such as free and fair elections and guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, and association (Collier and Levitsky 1997). In reality, however, both procedural and substantive definitions of democracy are core aspects of a democracy because procedures do not automatically generate the outcomes that are viewed as normatively desirable.

Do middle-class people conceptualize democracy more procedurally or substantially? Do those in the East understand democracy more procedurally or substantially than those in the West? To compare the prevalence of procedural understandings over substantive ones, I construct two 3-point indexes measuring levels of substantive and procedural conceptions separately. Next, I construct a 7-point index of procedural–substantive conceptions by deducting scores of the substantive index from the procedural index.[19] This takes the average of the mean of the three substantive conceptions and deducts it from the average of the mean of the three procedural

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[19] These questions have the same instructions as above and include (1) electing leaders in free elections, (2) protecting civil liberties, and (3) guaranteeing gender equality. For the *substantive* conceptions, a set of three items tapping policy outcomes is used to construct a 4-point index of substantive conceptions, which include (1) promoting income equality, (2) receiving state aid, and (3) taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor.

questions, allowing for clearer observations of those with more procedural understandings of democracy, those with more substantive ones, or those with an equal amount of both.[20]

Table 2.3 presents the proportions of each middle-class group on this −3 to +3 index. Larger percentages from −3 to −1 indicate a more substantive understanding of democracy, whereas larger percentages from +1 to +3 indicate a greater procedural understanding. In general, those in the East have higher levels of substantive understandings of democracy compared with those in the West, whereas those in the West have much greater procedural understanding of democracy than do those in the East.

Table 2.3 Substantive−Procedural Views of Democracy by Region.

	West	East
−3	0.08	0.24
−2	0.61	1.09
−1	3.79	7.91
0	22.46	40.12
1	30.5	34.86
2	24.26	12.74
3	18.29	3.03

Liberal or Illiberal Understandings of Democracy

The last question expands upon the procedural definition of democracy and disaggregates democratic and undemocratic procedures as liberal and illiberal properties. Liberal traits include core democratic properties such as "electing leaders in free elections" and "protecting civil liberties." Liberal conceptions of democracy also include the absolute rejection of illiberal traits, such as "military intervention in politics" and "religious interpretation of the law" (Welzel 2013). Of the two subcategories of the procedural measure, the liberal procedural definition is much

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[20] Democracy should not be defined exclusively in terms of a procedural minimum. The term "electoralism" has highlighted its shortcomings (see Karl 2000).

more prominent than its illiberal counterpart, and the two must be differentiated to examine preferences for liberal democracy (Shin and Kim 2018). An individual's understanding of democracy can be considered truly liberal if that individual emphasizes liberal democratic meanings while simultaneously rejecting its illiberal meaning (Welzel 2013; Carrion 2008; Zakaria 1997, 2007). This differentiation allows for an evaluation of the way in which people conceptualize democracy through analyzing whether or not authoritarian characteristics are mistaken for democratic ones, and vice versa (Shin and Kim 2018).[21]

Do middle-class people understand democracy liberally or illiberally? Do those in the East understand democracy more illiberally than those in the West? To measure orientations toward liberal democracy, I count the illiberal notion against the liberal notion, and subsequently deduct the illiberal index from the liberal index to construct a 7-point overall index of liberal−illiberal conceptions. This takes the average of the mean of the three liberal conceptions and subtracts them from the average of the mean of the three illiberal items; that is, each person's average support of the three questions is calculated based on illiberal meanings of democracy, which is deducted from the average support of the three questions based on liberal meanings. The resulting difference is standardized into an index ranging from −3 to +3. The minimum of −3 indicates complete dominance of the illiberal notion of democracy over the liberal one, whereas the maximum of +3 indicates the exact opposite. A score of 0 indicates that the two notions are even. In other words, negative scores indicate that a respondent has a more illiberal understanding of democracy, whereas positive scores indicate a more liberal understanding.

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[21] The same method used previously is adopted to measure the liberal definition of democracy, using a set of three items tapping democratic procedures and constructing a 4-point index of liberal conceptions. These questions include (1) electing leaders in free elections; (2) protecting civil liberties; and (3) guaranteeing gender equality. A set of three items tapping illiberal definitions is also used to construct a 4-point index of illiberal conceptions, including: (1) interpreting laws religiously, (2) military intervention in politics, and (3) having citizens obey their rulers.

Table 2.4 presents the differences in *liberal–illiberal* understandings by each group. In general, the descriptive statistics for this index do not show significant differences between those in the East and West, with both regions showing relatively more liberal orientations at approximately 80%. However, proportionally more middle-class respondents in the West have full liberal understandings of democracy compared with those in the East.

Table 2.4 Illiberal–Liberal Views of Democracy by Region.

	West	East
−3	5.63	2.45
−2	3.62	4.66
−1	10.45	14.31
0	39.59	44.95
1	27.72	26.08
2	9.41	5.64
3	3.59	1.91

This four-dimensional framework for democratic conceptualization reveals that the middle classes in the East have significantly different understandings of democracy to those in the West. In particular, middle-class East Asians seem to have broader and more substantive-based conceptions of democracy than do those in the West. As mentioned in the Introduction, these differences may stem from differences in economic development, and specifically the critical role of the state in rapid growth.

Differences in Development

Although the abovementioned framework reveals clear differences in the conception of democracy among the middle class in the East and West, this effect might be enhanced because of a history of state-led economic development, which limited growth in political–cultural development in East Asia. In the East, the state played a crucial role in developing business

structures and pushing for the growth of the middle class. Thus, the middle class there has a strong incentive to support strong states with active, interventionist policies and develop feelings of dependency toward the state, and furthermore they are more likely to reject the Western liberal notion of democracy, which often supports laissez-faire leadership.[22] As such, people with higher levels of government dependency, particularly those in the middle class with a mutually supportive relationship with the government, can be expected to be less likely to conceptualize democracy in its liberal Western form. Accordingly, this chapter proposes the following hypotheses:

> **H1:** People in East-Asian democracies are less likely to identify traditional democratic properties and less likely to conceptualize democracy procedurally and liberally because of high levels of government affinity.

> **H2**: Middle-class people in East-Asian democracies who support having a strong state are less likely to identify traditional democratic properties and less likely to conceptualize democracy procedurally and liberally than those with less feelings of state dependency.

Data and Methodology

Using the 6th wave of the WVS, I examine cross-national and cross-regional variation by first comparing democracies in the East to those in the West, followed by comparing differences across middle-class groups between the two regions.[23] To meaningfully compare the two regions, this study considers consolidated democracies in the East as well as those in the West. In the East, three consolidated democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are included because they are the three modernized democratic Confucian countries in the region, part of what was called Confucian Asia (Shin 2012). The West includes consolidated democracies in what Welzel (2013)

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[22] See Kurt Lewin (1939) for details on the three styles of leadership and decision-making tendencies.
[23] The 6th wave is from 2010 to 2014.

describes as the New West.[24] This entails the oldest democracies, including the two liberal and

consolidated democracies of Australia and New Zealand and the United States, which is the

largest democracy in both physical size and population as well as the oldest continuous

democracy and democratic constitution (Taylor et al. 2014).[25]

Independent Variable: Feelings of Government Dependency

I measure feelings of government dependency through a combination of two items:

Government Responsibility and *Government Ownership of Business*. The *Government*

Responsibility item asks respondents to choose whether the "Government should take more

responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" or "People should take more responsibility

for themselves" on a 10-point scale. This is reverse-coded, and thus dependence is on the high

end. The *Government Ownership* item asks respondents to choose whether "Private ownership of

business and industry should be increased" or "Government ownership of business and industry

should be increased," again on a 10-point scale. These two items are combined and standardized

into a scale ranging from 0 (government independence) to 1 (government dependence), with

decimal fractions indicating intermediate positions. Notably, variables related to state

dependency include the specific government dependency questions that appeared most salient in

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[24] See Welzel's *Freedom Rising* (Chapter 8) for details on these groupings. There are more countries included in each grouping, but I incorporate all that are in Wave 6 of the WVS. There are five Western groups, but I only include the New West because they have strong consolidated democracies from the first wave. The other groups have contentious democracies (for example, the Old West includes Cyprus and the Return West includes Estonia, both of which are not often considered consolidated democracies). All of the countries in both groups have a Polity IV score of 10, with the exception of South Korea which scores an 8, showing that all of the countries included in this study are strong and consolidated democracies.

[25] See Taylor, Shugart, Lijphart, and Grofman (2014) for a list of 31 democracies and their wave of democratization. Four of the six countries used in this study are first-wave democracies. South Korea and Taiwan are the only second-wave democracies included in the categories.

the minds of citizens. Controls include government employment, gender, age, marriage, political interest, and financial satisfaction.[26]

The middle class is measured through respondents' reported income. On a scale of 1 to 10, those who reported between 4 and 8 were coded as middle class.

Dependent Variable: Conceptualizing Democracy

The four dependent variables used to capture people's conceptions of democracy stem from the four abovementioned interrelated questions. This includes the democratic identification of essential features of democracy, the breadth and depth of property identification, which properties are valued the most and least, whether democracy is conceptualized more procedurally or substantially, and whether people understand democracy more liberally or illiberally.

Regression Analyses

To explore the forces that shape accurate and divergent conceptions of democracy with respect to the most and least essential properties, as well as to explore how these forces differ across people in the East and West, I use multivariate regression analyses for each of the four questions by region. Table 2.5 below shows the effect of government dependency on democratic identification, the breadth and depth of democratic understandings, procedural-based conceptualizations, and liberal-based understandings. The results show that in both regions, higher levels of government affinity lead to an increase in identification and a decrease in breadth and procedural- and liberal-based conceptions of democracy. In the East, however, identification is statistically not significant while government affinity has a negative and statistically significant influence on the three other properties.

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[26] The political interest variable is a combination of how much political interest people have and how important they view politics to be. Financial satisfaction is included as a control to ensure that support for a strong state is not based merely on respondents' financial situations.

The full table (see Appendix A) presents all eight models for H1, including the control variables. Four models reveal government dependency among citizens in the West and the other four reveal dependency among those in the East. The results for all four measurements of democratic understandings are presented along with results for the control variables. As previously mentioned, government dependency leads to lower levels of broad conceptions of democracy; lower levels of procedural-based understandings (and higher levels of substantive-based conceptions instead); and lower levels of liberal-based understandings (and higher levels of illiberal conceptions instead) of democracy among citizens in both regions. Moreover, among the controls, government employment and gender significantly influence some determinants among those in the West, yet have no significant effect in the East. Political interest, age, and financial satisfaction seem to affect certain models in both regions.

Table 2.5 Government Dependency on Democratic Conceptions.

	West				East			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**
Dependency	0.037***	-0.045***	-0.120***	-0.029***	0.007	-0.032***	-0.060***	-0.024***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.593***	0.748***	0.690***	0.519***	0.805***	0.921***	0.616***	0.581***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)

$* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001$

Table 2.6 Middle Class Government Dependency on Democratic Conceptions.

	West				East			
	Model 9	**Model 10**	**Model 11**	**Model 12**	**Model 13**	**Model 14**	**Model 15**	**Model 16**
Dependency	0.032***	-0.047***	-0.118***	-0.033***	0.012	-0.025**	-0.060***	-0.028**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.588***	0.753***	0.685***	0.504***	0.804***	0.931***	0.627***	0.564***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

$* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001$

Table 2.6 similarly illustrates the effect of government dependency on democratic identification, the breadth and depth of democratic understandings, procedural-based conceptualizations, and liberal-based understandings among the middle classes in both regions. The results indicate that in both regions, higher levels of government affinity lead to an increase in identification and a decrease in breadth and procedural and liberal conceptions of democracy; all are statistically significant with the exception of democratic identification among the middle class in the East.

In addition, among the four measurements, government dependency has the strongest negative effect on procedural-based understandings. This implies that those who are more supportive of the government are more likely to conceptualize democracy through its substantive properties, many of which include economic support from the state.

The full table (see Appendix A) presents the regression models in depth, and again, there are eight models for H2; four models reveal government dependency among citizens in the West and the other four reveal dependency among those in the East. The results for all four measurements of democratic understandings are presented along with results for the control variables. As mentioned previously, government dependency leads to lower levels of broad conceptions of democracy; lower levels of procedural-based understandings (and higher levels of substantive-based conceptions instead); and lower levels of liberal-based understandings (and higher levels of illiberal conceptions instead) of democracy among citizens in both regions. Moreover, among the controls, government employment and political interest significantly influence all four models in the West, yet have little to no effect on any of the models in the East. Political interest, age, and financial satisfaction seem to affect certain models in both regions.

As H1 predicted, support for a strong state predicts lower levels of liberal and Western democratic understandings among people in East-Asian democracies. Furthermore, as H2 predicted, this also seems to be the case for the middle class. More remarkable is that government dependency has similar—if not more—of an impact among the middle class in the West, which implies that government affinity could influence variations in democratic understandings in the West if more middle-class people feel dependent on the government. Because this is more often the case in the East, feelings of government dependency can be inferred to significantly influence breadth of understanding as well as lead middle-class respondents to have more substantive and illiberal understandings of democracy.

Conclusion

This chapter tapped into broader questions about modernization and democratic attitudes, which were discussed through four domains of democratic knowledge. This study asked four questions, all of which were interrelated, regarding different manners in which democracy is conceptualized and understood. Starting with broad questions and ending with narrow ones, it showed that compared with the West, the East has higher proportions of middle-class people who are uninformed, find socialist democratic properties more essential than those in the West, have lower levels of procedural understanding and higher levels of substantive-based understanding, and lower proportions with liberal understandings of democracy. In addition, multiple regression analyses found that, as H1 predicted, support for a strong state predicted lower levels of liberal and Western democratic understandings among people in East-Asian democracies. Moreover, as H2 predicted, support for a strong state predicted lower levels of liberal and Western democratic understandings among the middle class in East-Asian

democracies. However, this was also the case for those in Western democracies. If middle-class groups in the West were as dependent on states as those in the East, similar results would be found.

The questions, although disaggregated, were interrelated and worked in line with the broader question of how democracy is conceptualized. How do ordinary citizens understand and conceptualize democracy in East Asia? Do significant differences exist among those in the East and those in the West? How are their understandings different based on class? Theoretically, this study introduced the role of state intervention into the theories of modernization and differentiated state-dependent modernization in East Asia from that in the West. These two types of socioeconomic modernization affect the processes of cultural modernization differently. In the East, state-dependent modernization encourages people to support state intervention in their public and private lives, which creates a state-dependency orientation. These orientations discourage people from embracing emancipative values, which are essential for a liberal conception of democracy. In the West, however, state-independent modernization leads people to have state-independent orientations, which encourages them to uphold emancipative values. As a result, they favor the idea and practices of a liberal democracy. Because of these different processes, the theories of modernization unintentionally create different understandings of democracy in the East and West.

Since the "The American Voter," studies have consistently discussed democratic citizenship and how support for democracy varies. However, these discussions can only continue if the notion that some aspects of democracy are more salient than others is accepted, as well as that this differs in various cultural contexts and through various modernization processes. To understand the varying levels of democratic support that East-Asian citizens have shown in the

literature, it is crucial to first account for the different ways in which democracy is
conceptualized and the varying components East Asians may associate with democracy. Only
then will it be possible to properly analyze democratic support and properly define the ideal
democratic citizen.

Appendix A: Full Statistical Models

Full Table 2.5

	West				East			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Govt. Dependency	0.037***	-0.045***	-0.120***	-0.029***	0.007	-0.032***	-0.060***	-0.024***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Govt. Employment	0.035***	0.051***	0.019**	0.014	0.005	0.009	0.001	0.015
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.002	-0.020**	-0.017**	-0.01	-0.003	-0.013*	-0.005	0.009
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.009**	0.004	-0.008*	0.002	-0.015***	-0.014**	-0.002	-0.008
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Marriage	-0.003*	0.001	0.005***	-0.004*	-0.001	-0.002	0.00	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Interest	0.025***	0.043***	0.024***	0.018***	0.002	0.010*	0.014***	-0.016***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Financial Satisfaction	-0.017***	-0.021***	0.00	-0.001	-0.010*	-0.01	0.002	-0.009
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.593***	0.748***	0.690***	0.519***	0.805***	0.921***	0.616***	0.581***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Full Table 2.6

	West				East			
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Govt. Dependency	0.032***	-0.047***	-0.118***	-0.033***	0.012	-0.025**	-0.060***	-0.028**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Govt. Employment	0.031***	0.051***	0.027**	0.020*	0.003	0.008	-0.005	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.002	-0.026**	-0.016*	-0.008	-0.002	-0.008	0.004	0.019*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.005	0.003	-0.005	0.002	-0.011	-0.014*	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Marriage	-0.003	-0.001	0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.00	0.003
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Interest	0.028***	0.045***	0.030***	0.021***	0.001	0.004	0.010*	-0.007
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Financial Satisfaction	-0.013*	-0.015*	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007	-0.006	0.003	-0.008
	'(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.588***	0.753***	0.685***	0.504***	0.804***	0.931***	0.627***	0.564***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

$* \; p<0.05, \; **p<0.01, \; ***p<0.001$

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CHAPTER 3:
VARYING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA

The various connotations that accompany the notion of democracy have led to numerous academic debates among democracy scholars worldwide. Although most conceptions of democracy relate to how democratic ideas and practices are established within a society, many empirical puzzles that stem from measuring democracy cannot be effectively addressed because of their various meanings (Lu 2013). The manner in which democracy is conceptualized is especially critical in newly emerging democracies, particularly those in East Asia, as they continue their attempt to consolidate when the region maintains a large degree of regime diversity (Pei 1998). Moreover, East Asia continues to experience rapid and constant changes, which has led these countries to become substantially different to those under Western democracy, particularly in their institutional arrangements, ideologies, and forms of leadership. Many countries in East Asia, including nondemocracies such as China and Vietnam and even democracies such as Japan and South Korea, continue to challenge the Western liberal conception of democracy (Morlino et al. 2011).

Chapter 2 examined how middle-class East Asians understand democracy and how their conceptions of democracy compare with those in the West. I found that, relative to those in the West, middle-class East Asians are less likely to identify core democratic properties and less likely to conceptualize democracy in procedural and liberal terms. To provide more systematic empirical evidence from East Asia, this chapter examines how those living in similar cultural and social environments understand democracy and explore these differences among the middle class

in six East-Asian Confucian-based societies: Japan, South Korea (Korea hereafter), Taiwan, China, Singapore, and Vietnam.[27]

How *differently* do middle-class East Asians understand democracy? Using a similar conceptual framework from the previous chapter and providing more detailed analyses, I examine how middle-class East Asians identify essential democratic properties and which properties are the most and least prevalent among them using the fourth wave of the ABS.[28]

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The following section describes the existing taxonomies of democracy and introduces the framework used in this chapter. The third section discusses the survey battery and how the questions based on popular understandings of democracy will be analyzed. Using this instrument, the fourth section demonstrates the cross-country and cross-regime variance in the surveyed middle-class East Asians' conceptions of democracy through multiple and multilevel regression analyses. Finally, the fifth section concludes the chapter and provides suggestions for future research.

Conceptions of Democracy in East Asia

Four components of democracy have been regularly and repeatedly emphasized by East-Asia democracy scholars: (1) norms and procedures, (2) freedom and liberty, (3) social equity, and (4) good governance.[29] The extant literature on democracy has further grouped these four components into two broader dimensions: procedure-based and substantive -based definitions. The dimensions of social equity and good governance taps into the substantive -based definition

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[27] See Shin (2011) for details on Confucian Asia.

[28] The third wave of the ABS designed a new survey battery with a close-ended format to gauge democratic conceptions in East-Asian societies. This new instrument is also in the fourth wave of the ABS, and this chapter uses the same set of questions to facilitate dialog with existing research.

[29] See Canache (2012); Dalton, Shin, and Jou (2007); Lu (2013); Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013); and Shin (2012) for details on this framework.

of democracy, since it prioritizes the outputs of a political system, emphasizes the instrumental value of democracy, and focuses on improving government performance. The components of norms and procedures, along with freedom and liberty, fall into the procedure-based definition, since it emphasizes the decision-making process along with the intrinsic value of democracy.

Much of the recent democracy literature in East Asia looks at distinct patterns of democratic conceptualization using survey data. Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013) and Lu (2013) used a battery of questions from the third wave of the ABS to categorize these four components.[30] They combined the dimensions of social equity and good governance to indicate a substantive-based democratic conception while simultaneously merging the dimensions of norms and procedures, or freedom and liberty for procedure-based democratic understandings. They found that in general, East Asians do not prioritize procedure-based democratic conceptions.

A New Framework for the Middle Class

In this chapter, to facilitate further meaningful dialog within the existing research, I follow the aforementioned framework to examine popular understandings of democracy and gauge democratic conceptions among the middle class in East Asia. Moreover, I provide comparisons by individual countries and regime types. I ask and attempt to answer four broad questions through this framework: Are middle-class groups in East Asia capable of identifying essential properties of democracy? Do middle-class groups understand democracy broadly or narrowly? Which are the most and least prevalent democratic properties among the middle class, and do these vary significantly across individual countries and regimes? Do middle-class East Asians understand democracy more substantively than procedurally, as it is known in the

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[30] According to the Asia Barometer Survey, this survey battery was made to effectively capture East Asian respondents' varying conceptualizations of democracy. Moreover, it offers valuable information by minimizing subjective bias (Lu 2013) and easing the implementation and increasing the quality of collected data (Lu 2013).

literature? How prominently do they regard liberal values as an essential property? Is liberalism a prominent feature of democracy among East Asians?

Survey Items

To differentiate between the four dimensions of democracy and two categories of substantive- and procedure-based democracy, I adopt similar measurements to those used by Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013) and Lu (2013) and adopt the same battery of items from the third wave. However, instead of the third wave, I use four questions designed in the fourth wave of the ABS that ask respondents to identify the meaning of democracy. In this set, respondents are asked to choose the most essential characteristic of democracy from four groups of statements. Each group has four choices that tap into the four components, as well as link to the ideas of (1) norms and procedures, (2) freedom and liberty, (3) social equity, and (4) good governance. Respondents are asked to pick one statement for each question to represent what they consider to be the most essential characteristic of a democracy.[31]

> *Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. If you have to choose only one from each four sets of statements that I am going to read, which one would you choose as the most essential characteristics of a democracy?*

Q88. (1) Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor. (Social equity)
(2) People choose government leaders in a free and fair election. (Norms and procedures)
(3) Government does not waste any public money. (Good governance)
(4) People are free to express their political views openly. (Freedom and liberty)

Q89. (1) The legislature has oversight over the government. (Norms and procedures)
(2) Basic necessities, such as food, clothes, and shelter, are provided for all. (Social equity)
(3) People are free to organize political groups. (Freedom and liberty)
(4) Government provides people with quality public services. (Good governance)

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[31] To minimize question order effect, the order of the components in the four groups are rotated. See Lu (2013) for details on the four components.

Q90. (1) Government ensures law and order. (Good governance)
      (2) Media are free to criticize what the government does. (Freedom and liberty)
      (3) Government ensures job opportunities for all. (Social equity)
      (4) Multiple parties compete fairly in the election. (Norms and procedures)

Q91. (1) People have the freedom to take part in protests and demonstrations. (Freedom and liberty)
      (2) Politics is clean and free of corruption. (Good governance)
      (3) The court protects ordinary people from abuse of government power. (Norms and procedures)
      (4) People receive state aid if they are unemployed. (Social equity)

In addition, the four components merge together into pairs to differentiate between procedure- and substantive -based democratic conceptions. That is, the four categories are recoded into binary variables that stand for procedure-based (norms and procedures or freedom and liberty) versus substantive -based (social equity or good governance) democratic conceptions. Substantive -based democracy includes social equity indicators such as a lower income inequality, more access to basic necessities, better job opportunities, and aid for unemployment. It also includes good governance indicators such as good management of public money, public services, maintenance of political order, and clean government. Procedure-based democracy, on the other hand, includes norms and procedures indicators such as free elections, party politics, and rule of law along with freedom and liberty indicators such as freedom of speech, association, and media.[32]

This battery of items is grouped together in various manners and used to answer in-depth questions based on the broader questions, all of which are reiterated and described in detail in the following section.

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[32] See Lu (2013) and Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013) for details on this framework.

Democratic Capabilities

The first question examines how capable middle-class East Asians are of identifying essential properties of democracy. Capability refers to the extent to which respondents are able to choose one of four properties of social equity, norms and procedures, good governance, and freedom and liberty. To answer this question, I examine whether respondents chose one of the four properties each time the four properties were mentioned. This creates a 5-point index in which respondents' choice options vary from a low of 0 to a high of 4. The lower the score, the less likely respondents were to be able to identify properties, whereas the higher the score, the more likely they were to be able to identify democratic properties.

Overall, a significant proportion of middle-class East Asians are fully capable of identifying democratic properties, with a range from the lowest proportion of 32.7% (China) and the highest proportion of 56.8% (Korea). The largest proportions of those who were unable to identify democratic properties came from China (6.4%) and Singapore (4.5%).

Table 3.1 Identifying Democratic Properties by Country.

	Japan	**Korea**	**Taiwan**	**China**	**Singapore**	**Vietnam**
0	2.2	0.2	3.3	6.4	4.5	1.9
1	1.9	0.3	6.6	3.4	1.5	1.4
2	2.8	5.0	47.5	10.3	5.0	6.2
3	55.3	37.7	42.6	47.3	51.3	48.9
4	37.8	56.8	38.3	32.7	37.7	41.6

The two subregions indicate that those in democracies have a greater proportion of fully capable respondents, registering a higher score of 47.6, whereas those in autocracies have a lower proportion of 36.3%. Conversely, those in democracies have a smaller proportion of those who are unable to identify properties (0.6%), whereas those in autocracies have a larger proportion at nearly 5%.

Table 3.2 Identifying Democratic Properties by Regime Type.

	Democracies	Nondemocracies
0	0.6	4.7
1	1.7	2.4
2	5.0	8.0
3	45.1	48.7
4	47.6	36.3

Breadth and Depth of Democratic Understanding

Of the four democratic properties, which are the most popular or prevalent among the middle class in East Asia? Which is the least popular? Table 3 lists the breadth of prevalence among each property; that is, what proportion of respondents chose each property as an essential property at least once (on a scale of 0 to 1). As the mean scores show, the popularity of the categories varied significantly, from a low of 0.38 for the freedom measure in Vietnam and Japan to a high of 0.86 for good governance in Japan.

Overall, the most prevalent property is good governance, followed by equity, norms, and freedom. Moreover, for all individual countries, the property of good governance registered the highest score. For all countries except Korea, freedom registered the lowest scores; in Korea, equity was the lowest.

Table 3.3 Breadth and Depth by Country.

	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	China	Singapore	Vietnam
Social Equity	0.63	0.53	0.62	0.65	0.72	0.75
Norms & Procedures	0.50	0.70	0.68	0.67	0.55	0.57
Good Governance	0.86	0.77	0.72	0.68	0.77	0.81
Freedom	0.38	0.57	0.43	0.33	0.38	0.42

Based on subregions, in both democratic and nondemocratic countries, good governance is the most prevalent property and freedom is the least prevalent, and furthermore, freedom is

significantly lower as a democratic property in nondemocracies. This implies that in general and

contrary to Western democratic countries, freedom is not essential for democracy among the

middle class in East Asia.

Table 3.4 Breadth and Depth by Regime Type.

	Democracies	Nondemocracies
Social Equity	0.59	0.69
Norms & Procedures	0.65	0.61
Good Governance	0.77	0.73
Freedom	0.48	0.36

Substantive Versus Procedural Democratic Understanding

Do East Asians understand democracy more substantively than procedurally, as it is

known in the literature? For this question, I combine the dimensions of social equity and good

governance to indicate substantive-based definitions of democracy, as well as the dimensions of

norms and procedures and freedom and liberty to indicate procedure-based definitions. The

procedural index includes the number of times respondents chose freedom or norms as an

essential property, whereas the substantive index includes the number of times respondents chose

equity or governance as an essential property. The index of procedural conceptions takes the

procedural index and deducts the substantive index. The values on this index range from a low of

−2 to a high of +2. When democracy is conceived exclusively in procedural terms, it takes on the

highest value of 2, whereas when it is conceived exclusively in substantive terms, it takes on the

lowest value of −2.

Overall, the majority of respondents have substantive-based understandings of democracy.

In particular, Japan has the largest proportion of respondents with fully substantive conceptions

of democracy at 23.8%, with Singapore and Vietnam following with 22.3% and 21.5%,

respectively. Korea has the smallest proportion with 9.7%, and instead has the largest proportion

of those with a balanced (or mixed) understanding at 32.7%. Taiwan, on the other hand, has the

largest proportion of respondents with fully procedural understandings at 10.7%, which is

significantly higher than the other countries, which all have less than 5%.

Table 3.5 Substantive–Procedural Views by Country.

	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	China	Singapore	Vietnam
−2	23.8	9.7	15.2	14.3	22.3	21.5
−1	30.9	23.5	31.1	29.2	31.5	33.1
0	30.0	32.7	27.0	36.1	29.7	28.8
1	13.1	29.3	16.1	15.8	13.7	14.4
2	2.2	4.8	10.7	4.7	3.0	2.1

Examining the substantive–procedural scale by regime type reveals similar proportions

for both democracies and nondemocracies. The majority of respondents have substantive

understandings of democracy, although those in democracies have slightly more respondents

who have procedural-based conceptions.

Table 3.6 Substantive–Procedural Views by Regime Type.

	Democracies	Nondemocracies
−2	14.79	18.03
−1	27.81	30.76
0	30.09	32.66
1	21.05	14.96
2	6.26	3.59

The averages from each country also show similar results, with the middle class

conceptualizing democracy through more substantive properties.[33] Although middle-class

respondents in all six countries prioritize substantive democratic properties, those in Korea,

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[33] See Appendix B for table.

China, and Taiwan are relatively less likely to than those in Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam. Among all six, those in Vietnam prioritize substantive democratic properties the most, whereas those in Korea prioritize it the least. A comparison by subregion shows that autocracies have a much more substantive understanding of democracy, with a mean of −0.447, whereas democracies exhibit a mean of −0.238.

Liberal Versus Illiberal Democratic Understanding

How prominently do middle-class citizens regard liberal values as essential for democracy? Is liberalism prominent in understanding democracy among those in democracies or nondemocracies? For this question, I create a liberal index that deducts the equity index (scores of 0 and 1) from the freedom index (scores of 0 and 1). This creates a 3-point index from −1 to +1, with −1 referring to orientations toward a social democracy, 0 referring to orientations toward a mixed democracy, and 1 referring to orientations toward a liberal democracy.

With the exception of Korea, the majority of middle-class respondents in all countries have a social democratic view of democracy, and less than a quarter in every country view democracy liberally.

Table 3.7 Illiberal–Liberal Views by Country.

	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	China	Singapore	Vietnam
−1	43.1	28.0	44.2	46.8	47.8	48.2
0	38.8	40.5	31.3	38.1	38.9	36.6
1	18.1	31.5	24.5	15.1	13.4	15.1

Although the middle class in democracies exhibit more liberal democratic understandings than do those in autocracies, the majority from both subregions still understand democracy illiberally.

Table 3.8 Illiberal–Liberal Views by Regime Type.

	Democracies	Nondemocracies
−1	37.06	47.42
0	36.91	37.88
1	26.03	14.7

In addition, the mean values show that middle-class respondents from all countries view democracy more illiberally than liberally.[34] Similarly, those in democracies and autocracies have more socialist-based understandings of democracy, although those in autocracies are slightly more likely to do so.

Regression Results

In addition, I demonstrate how feelings of government dependency may alter the aforementioned framework of democratic conceptualizations among the middle class in East Asia. As shown in the previous chapter, state-led economic development led to limited growth in political–cultural development among the middle classes, and instead led to greater feelings of government dependency. These feelings may continue to have significant effects on the limited democratic knowledge among middle-class citizens in East-Asian democracies, because state-led development played a critical role in economic growth. However, this feeling of dependency may have stronger effects among the middle class living in nondemocracies due to the continuing strong, or image of, the state and the lack of experience with a democratic system. Accordingly, I propose the following hypotheses.

H1. Higher levels of government dependency will lead to lower levels of the cognitive dimension of democratic citizenship among middle-class people in East Asia.

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[34] See Appendix for table.

H2. Higher levels of government dependency will lead to lower democratic identification and lower procedural and liberal views of democracy among middle-class people in East-Asian nondemocracies more than in democracies.

Dependent Variables

I consider conceptions of democracy by examining the middle class' capability to identify democratic properties, their breadth and depth of understanding, whether their orientations toward democracy are procedural or substantive, and whether orientations are more liberal or illiberal in nature. The first two measurements can be measured simultaneously, and thus, there is a total of three dependent variables; the responses are coded on a 0 to 1 scale.

Independent Variables

The independent variable includes an item that asks whether respondents want to live under their system of government more so than under any other system.[35] The responses were coded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 being strongly agree. The middle class is measured using respondents' reported income. On a scale of 1 to 5, those who reported three and four were coded as middle class. Control variables include trust in government, political interest, education, gender, age, religiosity, employment, and marriage. All variables are recoded to a 0 to 1 scale.

I first run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to determine whether this feeling of dependency has an effect on the four measurements of democratic conceptualizations. I examine this among the middle class in East Asia overall and by regime type, leading to nine separate models.

Results

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[35] ABS (Q86): I would rather live under our system of government than under any other that I can think of.

The coefficient plots below present the results of multiple regression analyses of nine models in three different plots: East Asia overall, democracies, and nondemocracies.[36] The first plot illustrates the effects of government dependency on democratic identification and breadth, procedural–substantive conceptions, and liberal–illiberal conceptions, after controlling for other variables. For all three conceptions, higher levels of government dependency predict lower and statistically significant levels of democratic conceptions. More specifically, higher levels of government dependency predict a decrease of 1.4 percentage points in democratic identification and democratic depth, a decrease of 3.1 percentage points in procedural-based understandings (and conversely more substantive-based understandings), and a decrease of 4.1 percentage points in liberal-based understandings (and conversely more illiberal-based understandings). More broadly, dependency predicts lower levels of identification and depth but lower procedural-based conceptions and even lower liberal-based conceptions of democracy.

The results are similar when I separate the middle-class respondents by regime type, examining the groups that live in democracies and nondemocracies; however, the results are statistically nonsignificant. This implies that although dependency may have an effect on East Asia as a whole, it has no significant effect based on those living under different regime types.

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[36] The coefficient plots convert the effects of government dependency on democratic conceptualizations after controlling for other variables into a figure summarizing the fitted models' parameters.

Figure 3.1 Coefficient Plots for Democratic Understanding.

The full table (see Appendix B) presents all nine models in depth.[37] As mentioned previously, the results of the main predictor are only statistically significant for the region as a whole and not so for different regime types. Education has a positive and statistically significant effect for the region as well; those with higher levels of education were more likely to have Western liberal understandings of democracy. Similarly, employment is a positive and statistically significant predictor for Western, liberal democratic understanding for those in democracies, whereas political interest is a positive and statistically significant predictor for all three groups. As H1 surmised, higher levels of government dependency predict lower levels of the cognitive dimension of democratic citizenship among middle-class people in East Asia. Furthermore, as H2 predicted, higher levels of government dependency lead to lower democratic identification in all four measurements among those in East-Asian nondemocracies more than in democracies; however, the results are statistically nonsignificant.

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[37] The full coefficient plot is also available. See Appendix F.

Multilevel models are also included for the first three models of all six countries (see Appendix B). The data is observed on two levels: individuals and countries. While the level-1 predictors observe individual-level data, the level-2 predictor includes countries and polity scores. The models including the level-2 predictor, however, are not statistically significant.

Conclusion

This chapter examined how conceptions of democracy among East Asians vary based on the countries in and regime types under which they live. To examine this in detail, I used various democratic measures as a central conceptual tool and defined it in both broad and specific terms. Overall, middle-class groups in East Asia seemed to differ in their democratic understandings through their abilities to identify different democratic properties along with a greater emphasis on substantive-based properties and lower emphasis on liberal-based properties of democracy.

Although a significant majority of middle-class East Asians had the full capability to identify democratic properties, the freedom dimension registered the lowest score of breadth and depth; that is, freedom was considered the least essential property among the four main dimensions. Moreover, all of the middle-class respondents had significantly more substantive-based understandings of democracy than procedure-based ones, although those in autocracies are more likely to prioritize substantive-based understandings than those in democracies. Furthermore, only a small minority of respondents had a liberal understanding of democracy in all countries, with a larger proportion in democracies than in autocracies. The regression results further showed that feelings of government dependency are likely to decrease democratic identification, procedural-based conceptions of democracy, and liberal-based conceptions of

democracy among the middle class in the region overall, although there were no significant effects based on regime type.

        The way in which democracy is conceptualized and understood can have significant implications to commitment to the democratic form of government for those living in both regime types in East Asia. In democracies, dissatisfied democrats may resort to civil disobedience or may become apathetic toward politics, both of which can seriously damage the quality of democracy. In nondemocracies, satisfied citizens can support authoritarian leaders and avoid any chances for regime transition. Indeed, the lens through which people evaluate democracy defines its success and whether they will support the democratic form of government. This continues in the next section.

Appendix B: Additional Statistical Models

Substantive–Procedural Views Means by Country

	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	China	Singapore	Vietnam
Mean	−0.61	−0.04	−0.24	−0.33	−0.56	−0.58

Substantive–Procedural Views Means by Regime Type

	Democracies	Nondemocracies
Mean	−0.238	−0.447

Illiberal–Liberal Views Means by Country

Japan	Korea	Taiwan	China	Singapore	Vietnam
−0.25	−0.04	−0.198	−0.318	−0.344	−0.331

Illiberal–Liberal Views Means by Regime Type

Democracies	Nondemocracies
−0.110	−0.327

Full Table for Figure 3.1

	East Asia			Democracies			Nondemocracies		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Dependency	-0.014*	-0.031***	-0.041***	-0.003	-0.008	-0.013	-0.012	-0.028	-0.034
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.014	-0.012	-0.021	-0.021	-0.055	-0.041	-0.037	-0.04	-0.101
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Employment	-0.003	0.001	-0.016	0.048	0.139***	0.216***	-0.003	-0.078	-0.084
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Education	0.046*	0.100**	0.154***	-0.007	-0.023	-0.028	0.009	0.067**	0.035
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Gender	-0.006	-0.002	-0.022	-0.009	-0.002	-0.029	-0.004	-0.002	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Marriage	0.001	-0.005	0.023	-0.012	-0.008	0.013	0.013	-0.012	0.018
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Religion	0.008	0.018	0.038	0.006	0.02	0.043	0.021	0.036	0.063*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Political Interest	0.072***	0.058*	0.087**	0.047*	0.072*	0.093*	0.106***	0.022	0.057
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Constant	0.826***	0.437***	0.417***	0.838***	0.411***	0.369***	0.791***	0.436***	0.435***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)

$* \ p < 0.05 \ ** \ p < 0.01 \ *** \ p < 0.001$

60

Conceptions of Democracy

Multilevel Model of the Middle Class in East Asia

	East Asia		
	Model 10	**Model 11**	**Model 12**
Dependency	0.001	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Age	-0.016	-0.027	-0.045
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.042)
Employment	0.001	0.006	-0.006
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Education	0.040+	0.079*	0.131**
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.044)
Gender	-0.007	-0.003	-0.024
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Marriage	-0.004	-0.013	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Religion	0.016	0.033*	0.058**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Political Interest	0.075***	0.077***	0.095**
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Polity	0.033	0.035	0.060
	(0.034)	(0.070)	(0.082)
Constant	0.758***	0.335***	0.279***
	(0.035)	(0.062)	(0.077)
N	2083	2083	2083
Log Likelihood	481.575	269.883	-960.193
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-939.169	563.765	1944.385
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-871.528	631.406	2012.026
	* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001		

PART 2: THE AFFECTIVE DIMENSION

The previous section analyzed how middle-class citizens conceptualize democracy, as well as depicted the role of government dependency on the cognitive dimension of democratic citizenship (i.e., how middle-class citizens *understand* democracy). In addition, those chapters implied a strong bond between East-Asian middle-class citizens and their governments because of the history of their governments' prominent role in economic growth in the region. In this section, I supplement the previous chapters by examining how middle-class citizens *support* democracy through the affective dimension of democratic citizenship.

CHAPTER 4:
DECLINING DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT FROM THE MIDDLE CLASS

Democracy scholars have long maintained that citizens worldwide have a strong normative commitment to the democratic form of government. This is particularly the case for established and consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe, in which a mass basis of support is believed to remain widespread. However, recent studies have shown that public support for democracy in democracies in the Western world is falling, especially in the young and upper-income groups (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). This harrowing hypothesis may challenge the very existence of democracy since democracy is deemed consolidated only when citizens view it as "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991).

This chapter examines middle-class citizens' attitudes toward democracy in consolidated democracies in East Asia and compares them with those in consolidated democracies in the West.[38] I attempt to answer three central and closely related questions: Do middle-class citizens in East-Asian democracies support democracy? Do they prefer democracy to other regime types? What are the indicators of democratic decline in East Asia, and are they similar to those of the West?

In this chapter, I argue that among middle-class people in East Asia, support for the democratic system is rapidly declining and that this is enhanced by lingering feelings of government dependency. I demonstrate this by first describing the erosion of democratic support among middle-class groups in the East and West. Subsequently, I offer an explanation for why democratic support is declining among middle-class citizens in East Asia, i.e., how government

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[38] As in the previous section, the consolidated democracies from the West include the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, whereas those in the East include Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Western countries are part of Welzel's (2011) grouping on the "New West" in "Nations of Assessments of Democracy by Culture Zone" in *Freedom Rising*. All six countries score consistently highly on both the Polity IV index (above 8 out of 10) and the Freedom House index (above 82 out of 100).

dependency is increasing autocratic support. Next, I provide the data and methodology to support this theory and then conclude with the implications.

Erosion of Democracy and Democratic Support

Is democracy dying? Although the fear of democratic erosion has existed for decades, it has recently increased because of the growth of populism in the Western world and the consolidation of authoritarian rule in China and Russia. The election of Donald Trump in the United States, who has consistently praised dictators, encouraged violence, and threatened his rivals, along with the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, have led to deep concerns about democratic backsliding in the two oldest democracies (Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2017). The growth of populist attitudes, seen through increasing support for France's National Front, the rise of the Five Star Movement in Italy, and the growth of "illiberal democracy" in Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Hungary have further increased fears about democracy's future in Europe (Galston 2018).

Furthermore, students of democracy have engaged in the debate on democratic backsliding. Many scholars continue to believe that the erosion of democracy is unlikely (Norris 1999; Dalton 1999; Ekman and Linde 2005; Voeten 2017; Zilinsky 2019), with Norris (1999) characterizing the current malaise as the rise of the "critical citizen" that will eventually improve the quality of the democratic process. Democracy pessimists, however, are just as numerous (Diamond 2015; Levitsky and Way 2015; Bermeo 2016). Former democracy optimists Francis Fukuyama and Larry Diamond both have their doubts, with Fukuyama worrying that "democracy is being threatened in a way I have not experienced in my lifetime" and Diamond (2015) mentioning that the progression of democracy halted around 2006, and that this could "deepen and tip over into something much worse." Fareed Zakaria (1997) famously warned of

the "rise of illiberal democracy," and even more recently, Yascha Mounk (2018) stated that "the very survival of democracy is now in doubt."

Notwithstanding the robust discussion of these issues in the Western world, less attention has been given to the status of democracy in East Asia. Relatively speaking, support in East-Asian democracies seems robust. Japan's democracy has remained stable, with the public comfortable with the status quo and pleased with the current state of Japanese democracy. The public credits Japanese governance with producing a free, just, and safe society (Stokes and Devlin 2018). Citizens in South Korea recently worked what many believe to be a democratic miracle, organizing multiple large-scale, peaceful protests that led to the impeachment of then president Park Geun-hye and abolished her corrupt government in 2016 (Chang 2018). In Taiwan, the rise of social movements, grassroot organizations, and civil society groups has helped Taiwanese people construct a democratic society (Hsiao 1990). These groups have not only demanded changes from the government but also propelled liberalizing change (Wright 1999), with one of the most recent examples coming from the Sunflower Movement in 2014. Moreover, the three East-Asian democracies seem as strongly consolidated, if not more so, than democracies in the West, and have recently been touted as great examples of democratic success.

These three democracies have demonstrated much greater durability than those in Southeast Asia; democracy in the Philippines has been struggling with the dictator-like leadership of Rodrigo Duterte; Thailand has been torn between a meddling military and corrupt democracy; and Indonesia's democracy seems perennially on the verge of collapse (Case 2017).

Declining Democratic Support

Although relevant studies have emphasized the strength of democracy and the significant amount of support democracy has received in East Asia, survey results indicate less

enthusiasm.[39] The 6th wave (2010–2014) of the WVS revealed that 12.5% of respondents in the

West responded that having a democratic political system is bad.[40] Those in the East showed

similar results (13.7%), implying that at least 1 in 10 people living in consolidated democracies

in both regions are either dissatisfied with democracy or unlikely to support it.

Figure 4.1 Support for Nondemocratic System by Region.

The results drawn from all socioeconomic strata seem to hold when researchers zero in

on the middle class.[41] Among middle-class respondents from democracies in both regions, 11.2%

in the West and 13.3% in the East did not support a democratic political system.[42] Middle-class

East Asians are proportionally just as likely, if not more so, than those in the West to believe that

democracy is not an effective system of government.

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[39] See Chu et al. (2009) for a discussion on solidified support for democracy in East Asia.
[40] The responses include "Fairly bad" or "Very bad" for "having a democratic political system."
[41] The middle class here is measured through a reported income scale. This is discussed in detail in the Data and Methods section.
[42] [42] The responses include "Fairly bad" or "Very bad" for "having a democratic political system."

Figure 4.2 Nondemocratic Support by Region among Middle Class.

This trend of declining support extends across age groups. As Foa and Mounk (2016) maintained, younger generations exhibited less commitment to democracy than do their older counterparts. From the oldest cohort to the youngest, the difference in democratic withdrawal among middle-class respondents was approximately 9.5% in the West and 5.5% in the East.[43]

Figure 4.3 Nondemocratic Support by Age and Region among Middle Class.

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
[43] Only one person was over 90 years in East Asia and was removed. There was a 4.5% difference between the two regions among the proportions of those who believe democracy to be bad among the youngest cohort, a 2.1% difference in the second youngest, and 3.7% and 3.4% differences among the following cohorts, respectively.

Because the concept of democracy carries a brand name, this question is often believed to lead to skewed results. People often support democracy superficially without supporting key democratic norms. Moreover, they will voice support for it as an institution even when they disagree with its practices. However, the results for this question alone indicate diminished enthusiasm for democracy as a form of government.

Openness to Authoritarian Alternatives

One could maintain that democracy is only truly at risk when there is a competing and appealing form of government (Foa and Mounk 2016). Questions in the WVS ask about military rule and dictatorial leadership, both of which have commonly been used to measure support for authoritarian governments.[44] Overall, nearly 30% of middle-class respondents were likely to support authoritarianism in the West, whereas 48.2% were likely to do so in the East, showing that a large proportion of middle-class respondents in both regions support these nondemocratic alternatives.

Furthermore, among middle-class respondents, 26.4% the West and over 50% (52.2%) in the East chose "Fairly good" or "Very good" for these items. In other words, one out of four people in the West and one out of two in the East are likely, to some degree, to support autocracy. Moreover, while democratic forms of government are losing support and authoritarianism is gaining support in both global regions, this is especially the case in the East.

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[44] Support for authoritarianism includes two items: 'Having a strong political leader who does not have to bother with parliaments and elections' and 'Having the army rule.'

Figure 4.4 Autocratic Support by Region among Middle Class.

Although younger generations of the middle class appear less committed to democracy, support for authoritarian alternatives is high among all age groups in both regions.[45] When the age groups are compared, however, an approximately 5% difference exists between the oldest and youngest cohorts in the East. In the West, the youngest generation shows the most support for authoritarian traits (46.5%) and the older generations exhibit support of 29.4% on average. Although members of the youngest generation may be becoming much more open to authoritarianism in Western democracies, as Foa and Mounk maintained, support for authoritarianism seems spread fairly evenly among all age cohorts in the East.

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[45] There was only one person aged over 90 in East Asia and was removed.

Figure 4.5 Autocratic Support by Age and Region among Middle Class.

East–West Differences: The Remnants of Authoritarianism

These observations raise the question of why democratic support is declining among middle-class groups in both regions, as well as why support is declining more rapidly in the East. As the previous chapters provided a strong link between feelings of government dependency and different conceptions of democracy, similarly here I speculate on the effects of government dependency on declining democratic support.

In East-Asian democracies, state-led economic growth greatly enhanced the dependency of middle-class citizens on their governments. Not only did states play a critical role in the creation of the middle class but also helped sustain middle-class growth through the creation of white-collar jobs and providing steady benefits (Chen 2013; Chen and Lu 2011). The result was an intimate and mutually supportive relationship between middle-class citizens and their governments in East-Asian democracies, whereas middle-class citizens in Western democracies remained highly independent from their governments.

Furthermore, in East-Asian countries in general, those who feel dependent on the government are much less likely to embrace democracy as the "only game in town" because such citizens prefer strong governments that can be counted on to sustain their standard of living and help create and maintain stable jobs with good benefits. This contradicts the very core of democracy and works to buttress one of the main tenets of autocratic rule: having a strong central power. Indeed, because democracy is relatively new in East Asia and the region has historically revolved around authoritarianism,[46] autocratic traits remain resilient in these countries (Hall and Ambrosio 2017).

Contrasts between the two regime types can further amplify a democracy's flaws, making it more difficult for middle-class citizens in particular to support democracy. The democratic system can be seen as a threat to middle-class people because it contains redistributive demands that work in favor of the working class and do not protect middle-class interests, leading to feelings of instability among middle-class citizens (Fukuyama 2012). Moreover, the recent transition to democracy has allowed a good proportion of the populace to experience both a strong authoritarian and new and somewhat fragile democratic institution. The sharp change during the regime shift provided a greater contrast between the two types of regimes. The greater the contrast between democratic and autocratic regimes, the easier it becomes to notice the current institution's limitations and flaws, and the easier it is to become cynical about democracy as a political system. The less satisfied people become with their new democratic institutions, the more likely they are to look for alternative institutions, such as one with strong authoritarian elites (Svolik 2012). In this regard, the middle class may end up actively supporting authoritarian rule and rejecting democratic policies (Ozbudun 2005).

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[46] Japan democratized during the second wave in 1945, whereas the democracies in South Korea and Taiwan came in the late 1980s during the third wave of democratization. The United States, Australia, and New Zealand, however, have been democratic for more than 100 years. See Huntington (1991) for descriptions of each wave.

For these reasons I surmise that the far smaller government-dependent middle class in the West does not as readily lead to a withdrawal of support for democracy; in the East, however, where the level of government dependency is much higher, the middle class is more likely to abandon support for democracy and favor authoritarian alternatives. This led me to propose the following hypotheses.

H1. Government dependency does not influence democratic withdrawal among middle-class citizens in Western democracies.

H2. Government dependency increases democratic withdrawal among middle-class citizens in East-Asian democracies.

Data and Methodology

The basic data for this chapter come from the 6th wave of the WVS conducted during 2010–2014. To measure the affective dimension of democratic citizenship, I conduct multiple regression analyses of the determinants of democratic support in both regions. The dependent variable is the withdrawal of democratic support during 2010–2014 and the main predictor variable is feelings of government dependency. I only include middle-class respondents, which are measured on a reported income scale. Measures of all variables including control variables are converted to a 0 to 1 scale.

Dependent Variable: Withdrawal from Democracy

To measure democratic support, I use a direct measure of negative attitudes toward the democratic system, which can be defined as *withdrawal from democracy*. I use the item that asks about having a democratic political system (V130) and whether the democratic political system is good for governing the country.[47] The responses to this item are reverse-coded so that rejecting

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[47] This item is used by Foa and Mounk (2016) and their critics, and they also consider the negative responses to this item.

the idea of having a democratic system is scored on the high end for measuring the degree of increase in negative responses to support for a democratic order. I standardize the scale into a range from 0 (strongly supporting democracy) to 1 (strongly rejecting democracy), with decimal fractions indicating intermediate positions.

Independent Variables

As in Chapter 2, I measure feelings of government through a combination of two survey questions from the WVS. The first question asks whether business ownership should be private or owned by the state (V97), and the second asks whether the government should take more responsibility than the people (V98; reverse-coded).[48] I consider self-reported levels of income to measure the middle class, with those who reported between 5 and 8 on a scale of 1 to 10 coded as middle class. Control variables include sociodemographic variables (age, education, gender, and marriage) along with controls related to government dependency, including confidence in the government, government employment, interest in politics, importance of politics, and financial satisfaction.

As in Chapter 2, the consolidated democracies in the West are the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, whereas those in the East are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.[49]

Methodology

Because I am primarily interested in determining how much one can predict a middle class respondent's support for democracy based on their feelings of government dependency along with control variables, I create two different models for middle-class respondents in the East and those in the West. I use regression analyses in addition to the descriptive statistics

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[48] The first question (V97) asks whether business and industry should be private or whether government ownership should be increased, whereas the second question (V98) asks whether or not governments should take more responsibility than people. The second question was reverse-coded.

[49] See *Freedom Rising* by Welzel (2011) for more details on different groupings of Western countries. This set of Western countries is defined as the "New West."

shown above to gauge the explanatory power of government dependency along with each set of controls on democratic withdrawal. The interpretation of the coefficient for the predictors is withdrawal for support; that is, higher coefficients imply less support for democracy.[50]

Analysis

All analyses are derived from OLS regression models. The results of a bivariate regression analyses of only the effect of government dependency on democratic withdrawal among middle-class respondents in the West and East on a 0 to 1 scale (See Appendix C). The results show that in both regions, higher levels of government dependency lead to higher levels of democratic withdrawal, with a 3.8% increase in the West and 12.1% increase in the East. However, only the result for East Asia is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), implying that a significant effect only exists among middle-class citizens in the East, not in the West.

Table 4.1 presents the results of a multiple regression analyses on the effect of government dependency on democratic withdrawal among middle-class respondents in the West and East on a 0 to 1 scale. That is, it shows the effects of government dependency including all of the abovementioned control variables (see the Appendix C for the full version). Similarly, the results show positive coefficients for both regions, with a 2% increase in the West and 10.5% increase in the East. Not only does the East show a significantly higher percentage but also a statistically significant on ($p < 0.001$), whereas the West does not. In other words, holding other variables constant, an increase in government dependency produces a 10.5% increase in democratic withdrawal among middle-class citizens in the East, whereas it has no significant effect in the West.

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[50] A baseline model including only the respondents' demographic profile and coding for all variables is listed in the Appendix.

Table 4.1 Government Dependency on Democratic Withdrawal by Region.

Democratic Withdrawal	M1	M2
	West	**East**
Govt. Dependency	0.020	0.105***
	(0.024)	(0.029)
_cons	0.406***	0.273***
	(0.038)	(0.041)
N	2,118	1,763

To provide a clearer picture, the coefficient plot below presents the results of the multiple regression analyses in Table 4.1. Specifically, it converts the effects of government dependency on democratic withdrawal after controlling for the other variables into a figure that summarizes the fitted models' parameters.

Figure 4.6 Coefficient Plot for Democratic Withdrawal by Region.

As mentioned in Table 4.1, higher levels of government dependency in the West lead to approximately 2% higher levels of democratic withdrawal among middle-class respondents. However, this result has a small coefficient and is statistically nonsignificant. Among the

controls, however, age, education, confidence in the government, government employment, and interest in politics emerge as statistically significant predictors, with all variables exhibiting negative coefficients. Increases in confidence in the government, government employment, political interest, age, and education were all likely to lead to withdrawal of support for democracy in the West. Among them, political interest had the strongest effect.[51] As H1 predicted, government dependency has no statistically significant effect on democratic withdrawal among middle-class citizens in the West.

By contrast in the East, government dependency emerges as a powerful predictor for declining democratic support. The predictor is positive, implying that government dependency increases democratic withdrawal; that is, an increase in government dependency leads to a 10.5% increase in democratic withdrawal and the coefficient is statistically significant at $p < 0.000$. Similar to in the West, age, confidence in the government, and interest in politics are negative and statistically significant predictors; furthermore, older respondents, those confident in their governments, and those interested in politics are more likely to withdraw support.[52] As H2 predicted, government dependency has a strong and positive effect on democratic withdrawal among middle-class citizens in East Asia.

Summary of the Results

The goal was to determine what affects nondemocratic support among middle-class people in East Asia. As in previous chapters, this section examined several indicators of democratic support. The main difference between the two regions in regard to democratic support between the East and West was in the feelings of government dependency. As H1 predicted, government dependency had no statistically significant effect on increasing support

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[51] The full regression table is provided in Appendix C.
[52] The full regression table is provided in Appendix C.

for nondemocratic institutions among middle-class citizens in the West. Moreover, the coefficient was low at only 2%. Moreover, as H2 predicted, government dependency had a significant effect on increasing support for nondemocratic institutions among middle-class citizens in the East. Although government dependency prevents middle-class citizens from embracing democracy in the East, it had no significant effect in the West.

The results for control variables from both models were similar. Those that were confident in their democratic systems, interested in politics, and older were less likely to support nondemocratic regime types as well as to withdraw from democracy. As Foa and Mounk (2016) predicted, those who are younger were more likely to withdraw from democracy; however, I found this to be the case among middle-class respondents in both regions.

Discussion and Conclusion

Do middle-class citizens in East Asia support democracy? Do they support democracy more than their counterparts in the West? Through an examination of democratic support among middle-class groups in Eastern and Western democracies, I found that a high level of democratic withdrawal existed among middle-class groups in both regions. Furthermore, I found that democratic withdrawal was higher among those in the East than in the West. The results from the regression analyses suggested a critical difference between the two regions in their declining democratic support: *government dependency among middle-class respondents had a strong effect on declining democratic support in East Asia but not in the West*. Stated more broadly, the middle class in East Asia is likely to withdraw from democracy largely because of its close and dependent relationship with the state.

I drew two inferences from these findings. First, given the causal relationship between government dependency and democratic withdrawal in East Asia, the middle class may become

more supportive of democracy *if* dependence on the government is significantly weakened. As the findings indicated, education, political interest, and financial satisfaction can eventually drive middle class support for democracy. However, this rests on the strengths of the government and whether it will continue to maintain this bond with the middle class.

The second is that this positive correlation between government dependency and democratic withdrawal will challenge the unilinear approach, which argues that economic development inevitably leads to the emergence of a middle class that will push toward democratization. If the middle class continues to remain dependent on the government, even the wealthy and consolidated democracies in East Asia are prone to backsliding.[53] As such, *modernization theory* (Lipset 1959) and the arguments that concern the strength of wealthy democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000) would be difficult to replicate in East-Asian democracies.

These conclusions offer a bleak view for democracy, and recent sobering events signal that this trend of democratic withdrawal will continue, with democracy facing numerous challenges worldwide. The results from this chapter show that East Asia is no exception, and may in fact be even bleaker because the region also encompasses stable authoritarian and semidemocratic regimes. Indeed, "East Asian governments are a mix of democracy, liberalism, capitalism, oligarchy, and corruption—much like Western governments circa 1900" (Zakaria 1997). As a result, examining the erosion of democratic support among nondemocratic countries in East Asia may elucidate whether the region as a whole will become more enthusiastic about democracy or whether it will continue to backslide. I discuss this in the following chapter.

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[53] The most recent World Bank reports show that the GDP for the US, Australia, and New Zealand was 19.4 trillion USD, 1.32 trillion USD, and 205.9 billion USD respectively. In the East, Japan boasts a GDP of 4.87 trillion USD, Korea 1.53 trillion USD, and Taiwan 572.6 billion. Due to the rapid growth and economic success of the three East Asian democracies, moreover, they have been called variations of the Asian Tigers, the Flying Geese, and the Asian Miracle.

Appendix C

Bivariate Regression Analyses of Government Dependency on Democratic Withdrawal.

Democratic Withdrawal

	West	**East**
Govt. Dependency	0.038	0.121***
	(0.023)	(0.028)
_cons	0.184***	0.228***
	(0.010)	(0.016)
N	2,383	1,832

Full Table 4.1

Democratic Withdrawal	M1	M2
	West	**East**
Govt. Dependency	0.020	0.105***
	(0.024)	(0.029)
Confidence in Govt.	-0.125***	-0.047*
	(0.023)	(0.021)
Govt. Employment	-0.057***	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.015)
Political Interest	-0.152***	-0.093***
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Importance of Politics	-0.023	0.025
	(0.027)	(0.023)
Financial Sat.	-0.031	-0.073**
	(0.024)	(0.026)
Age	-0.096***	-0.103**
	(0.027)	(0.032)
Education	-0.035***	-0.015+
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Gender	0.009	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Marriage	-0.009	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.014)
_cons	0.502***	0.377***
	(0.030)	(0.035)
N	2,118	1,763
R2	0.108	0.039
Adj. R2	0.103	0.033

CHAPTER 5:
THE EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT IN EAST ASIA

Relevant literature shows that democracy has been recognized and supported by political leaders and citizens worldwide, as "virtually the only political model with global appeal, no matter what the culture" (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 70). It has been the most successful political idea in modern history (Eggel 2017), with the public supporting it because it is the best alternative (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999). However, recent studies have shown that popular support for democracy among the public has been declining (Foa and Mounk 2016) or flat (Voeten 2016).

In the previous chapter I examined democratic support among the middle class in consolidated democracies in the East and West. I found that democratic support is declining in both regions and that feelings of government dependency decrease support among the middle class in the East but not in the West. In this chapter, I examine the affective dimension in more detail by systematically comparing democratic support by regime type in East Asia. That is, I observe whether democratic support from the middle class varies in democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and nondemocracies (China, Singapore, and Vietnam).

Do middle class East Asians support democracy or autocracy? Does support vary among those in democratic and nondemocratic regimes in East Asia? What are the indicators of declining democratic support among middle-class people in the region? I find that, in general, middle-class people living in democracies are more likely to genuinely support democracy than those in nondemocracies. Furthermore, I find that feelings of government dependency influence support in the region as a whole, but this does not vary by regime type.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section describes differences in support for democracy and autocracy among people living under different regime systems. The third section offers an explanation for why support may or may not vary among middle-class citizens under different regime types in East Asia. The fourth section describes the data and methodology, the fifth section provides results, and finally, the sixth section presents the conclusions.

Teetering Democratic Support

Support for democracy by regime type

The years between 2006 and 2016 have been described as a "decade of decline" for liberal democracy (Eggel 2017). Many recent studies have shown that democratic support is declining worldwide, leading to democratic fragility in consolidated democracies (Foa and Mounk 2016; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Nye et al. 1997). The reasons behind this argument are numerous. Those in democracies may be less inclined to support democracy because the gap between expectations and experience may be wide, particularly in societies that have only recently gone democratization. Moreover, citizens may hold unrealistic hopes for democracy and become quickly disappointed (Norris 1999). Others argue that established democratic institutions do not respond effectively or efficiently to popular demands (Inglehart 1990), whereas others contend that social groups are unable to moderate citizen demands, leading to an excess of democracy from the citizenry and ultimately toward a crisis of democracy (Crozier et al. 1975; Huntington 1981).

By contrast, numerous findings have shown that overt support exists for democracy among those living in autocratic countries and that they view democracy as the best form of

government (Dalton and Ong 2005; Lu and Shi 2015; Shi 2008; Zhai 2018; Letsa and Wilfahrt 2018). Those living in autocracies may desire a democracy for different reasons, but many see the benefits of a democratic system. For example, those with low socioeconomic status may prefer a democracy for its economic advantages, whereas those with high socioeconomic status may prefer it for political advantages (Letsa and Wilfahrt 2018). Those living in autocracies may instead believe that they live in democratic countries. Autocratic leaders, including dictators in Cuba and North Korea as well as China, Vietnam, and Singapore, praise democracy and claim their own regimes to be democratic (Chu and Huang 2010). This exertion of influence often encourages the public to believe the same.

A similar political paradox can be observed in East-Asian countries. Studies have shown that citizens in one-party authoritarian governments express stronger support for democracy than citizens of liberal Asian democracies (Chu and Huang 2010; Kang 2004). In Vietnam, for example, large majorities (71.6%) have stated that democracy is the best form of government (Dalton and Ong 2005), whereas significantly lower levels of support were found in Korea and Taiwan (Chu and Huang 2010). Moreover, a large majority of respondents living in China believe their country to be democratic.

These trends can be found among the middle class in East-Asian countries. According to the fourth wave of the ABS, a large proportion of the middle class in nondemocracies exhibit higher levels of democratic support.[54] Three questions in the ABS ask about democracy in respondents' countries as well as democratic support. The first item asks respondents how much

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[54] The fourth wave of the ABS spans the years 2012–2014.

of a democracy their country is and the second asks how suitable democracy is for their country. The third item asks whether or not democracy is the best form of government.[55]

- *In your opinion, how much of a democracy is your country?*
- *Do you think democracy is suitable for your country?*
- *Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Democracy may have its problems but it is the best form of government."*

In all three, respondents in nondemocracies were more likely than those in democracies to believe their country to be more democratic, that democracy is more suitable for their country, and that democracy is the best form of government.

Table 5.1 Democratic Support by Region Among the Middle Class.

	Democracies	Nondemocracies
How Democratic	61.8	82.5
Democracy Suitable	79.6	85.4
Democracy Best Govt.	89.2	91.4

Significant differences can also be observed in democratic support by age. Responses to an item in the 6th wave of the WVS indicated that the middle class in democracies are more likely to view the democratic system negatively than those in nondemocracies across the majority of age cohorts. Moreover, the decline in support in democracies is stronger among younger generations, whereas in nondemocracies, the decline in support is slightly weaker among younger people. In other words, those in democracies are proportionally more likely to reject democracy while those in nondemocracies are less likely to. Furthermore, although this democratic erosion is increasing among younger people in democracies, it is not increasing among them in nondemocracies.

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[55] In the first and third item, four responses are collapsed into two. In the second item, 10 responses are collapsed into two.

Figure 5.1 Nondemocratic Support by Age and Region.

These findings are puzzling. In East Asia, countries have historically democratized because of immense support from the people. Ordinary citizens have played a prominent role in the fight for political freedom and democratic institutions in democracies. Examples of this include the democracy movements in Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s, which eventually triggered democratization processes. The experience with strongman or military rule (or both) in Korea (e.g., Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan) and Taiwan (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek) encouraged people to fight for democracy.

These findings also imply that democratic support can be simultaneously wide and shallow. Indeed, more than a decade of research using cross-national survey data has similarly shown that support for democracy often coexists with the acceptance of nondemocratic forms of government (Bratton 2002). This could be applied to East Asia as well, because most East Asians live in countries with a long history of autocratic rule and have different understandings of democracy due to remnants of authoritarian rule.

Support for authoritarianism by regime type

Democratic support involves a detachment or rejection of authoritarian or nondemocratic alternatives. An aversion to authoritarianism has the same weight as support for democracy because democracy can only be supported if other forms are rejected (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007). This suggests that support for liberal democracy can be conceived in terms of support for—or rejection of—autocratic rule. Moreover, the questions on authoritarian support intentionally omit the word "democracy" because the word carries a brand name. Questions with the word "democracy" could invite positive answers that seem socially desirable without actual support for the regime type (Chu and Huang 2010; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Chu, Welsh and Weatherall 2012; Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Dalton and Shin 2014).

Two questions from the ABS, as well as a combination of the two, explore whether respondents would favor a return to conceivable authoritarian alternatives: strongman rule and military rule.

- *We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.*
- *The army (military) should come in to govern the country.*

Table 5.2 shows that middle-class people in nondemocracies are more likely than those in democracies to support autocratic traits such as military dictatorships and authoritarian leadership. That is, although smaller proportions show support for authoritarian leadership and army rule in democracies, larger proportions show support in nondemocracies.

Table 5.2 Autocratic Support by Region Among the Middle Class.

|	Democracies	Nondemocracies
Strong Leader	16	**24.3**
Army Rule	4.8	**29.6**
Autocracy	17.3	**37.4**

Similar trends are also observed in various age cohorts. A combination of the same two items from the 6th wave of the WVS shows that middle-class support for authoritarianism is slightly higher in nondemocracies than in democracies. Furthermore, while support is proportionally larger for younger generations in nondemocracies, there seems to be proportionally less autocratic support among them in democracies.

Figure 5.2 Autocratic Support by Age and Region.

Other measures that consider autocratic support exhibit similar results. Dalton and Shin (2014) constructed an index of a scale of democratic preferences in which they deducted preferences for autocracy from preferences for democracy. By combining the two items on autocratic support and subtracting the average from support for democracy, support for democracy was still much higher among the middle class in democracies than in nondemocracies in East Asia.

Figure 5.3 Democratic–Autocratic Support by the Middle Class.

Authoritarian Dependency

Do middle-class East Asians support autocracy? Does autocratic support vary among those in democratic and nondemocratic regimes in East Asia? As described previously, state-led economic growth encouraged a mutually supportive relationship between the middle class and their governments. The state played a crucial role in developing middle classes by creating jobs and providing stability and benefits. This in turn encouraged the middle class to support a strong state and neutralized potential opposition. Therefore, in East Asia, authoritarian governments are often supported because of their seemingly strong state image and the manners in which they boost middle class economic self-interests through increasing public-sector employment and offering various perks for loyalty (Rosenfeld 2017).

Moreover, decades of socialization to nondemocratic values in the region, including communism and Confucianism, have led the middle class to orient themselves toward the strengths of authoritarian governments. Confucian cultural traditions remain dominant and

significantly influential, and the values that come from this ideology are often inconsistent with democratic ones (Dalton and Ong 2005). The more people adhere to the collectivistic or hierarchical values of the predemocratic period, the more cautious they are about embracing democracy as their preferred form of government (Shin 2012).

In democracies, those with higher levels of government dependency may be much more likely to embrace autocracy because citizens shift their support for regime change based on their assessments of how such changes serve their interests. If the democratic system is not promoting their priorities, citizens become less supportive of the process, and if they feel that it hinders them, they become more supportive of authoritarianism. By contrast, in nondemocracies, those with higher levels of government dependency may be less likely to support autocracy because the middle class continues to experience flaws that exist in authoritarian forms of government. Although the strong state is one they can rely on in theory, it may not be in practice. As such, we can surmise that higher levels of government dependency will increase autocratic support and those in democracies may be more supportive of authoritarianism, whereas those in nondemocracies may be less supportive. As such, the hypotheses for this chapter are as follows:

H1. Those who feel dependent on the government among the middle classes in East Asia may be less likely to support democracy and more likely to support autocracy.

H2. Those who feel dependent on the government among the middle classes in East-Asian democracies may be more likely to support autocracy.

H3. Those who feel dependent on the government among the middle classes in East-Asian nondemocracies may be less likely to support autocracy.

Data and Methods

The basic data for this chapter come from the 4th wave of the ABS (2012–2014) and includes three democracies (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) and three nondemocracies (China, Singapore, and Vietnam). To measure the affective dimension of democratic citizenship in the context of East Asia, I include multiple regression analyses of the region as a whole, of democracies separately, and of nondemocracies separately. The dependent variable is measured through autocratic support (i.e., democratic withdrawal), and the main predictor variable is feelings of state dependency. As in previous chapters, the analyses focus only on middle-class respondents, which is measured using a reported income scale. Measures of all variables, including the controls, are converted to a 0 to 1 scale.

Dependent Variable: Support for Authoritarianism

Similar to the previous chapter, I use a measure of negative attitudes toward the democratic system, which here is defined as *support for autocracy*. I combine two items that tap into authoritarian sentiment to create a 3-point index. The first item asks whether *we should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.* The second item asks whether *the army (military) should come in to govern the country.* The responses suggest that scores on the high end show more support for autocracy, whereas those on the lower end show less support for autocracy (and by default more support for democracy). I standardize the scale into a range from 0 (strongly rejecting authoritarianism) to 2 (strongly supporting authoritarianism).

Independent Variables

As in previous chapters, I measure feelings of state dependency through an item that asks whether respondents agree with the following statement: *I would rather live under our system of government than under any other that I can think of* (Q86). The responses are on a 4-point scale

that is standardized into a scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree), with decimal fractions indicating intermediate positions.

The middle class is again measured through respondents' reported income. On a scale of 1 to 5, those who reported 3 and 4 were coded as middle class. Control variables include sociodemographic variables (age, gender, marriage, education, and religiosity) along with political interest and importance of government.

Methodology

Because I am primarily interested in determining how much one can predict a middle-class respondent's support for autocracy based on their feelings of government dependency along with control variables, I created three different models for middle-class respondents in East Asia: one examines support for autocracy in East Asia overall, one analyzes support for autocracy in democracies, and one observes support for autocracy in nondemocracies. I present regression analyses in addition to the abovementioned descriptive statistics to gauge the explanatory power of feelings of government dependency along with each set of controls on autocratic support. The interpretation of the coefficient for predictions is autocratic support; that is, higher coefficients imply less democratic support.

Analyses

All of the analyses use OLS regression models. The results of a bivariate regression analysis of only the effect of feeling government dependency on autocratic support among middle-class respondents in the region, democracies in the region, and nondemocracies in the region on a 0 to 1 scale (see Appendix D for table). The results show that in East Asia overall, feelings of government dependency increase autocratic support by 23.7% ($p < 0.001$).

Furthermore, dependency increases dependency in democracies by 7%, although this is nonsignificant, and by 23.3% in nondemocracies ($p < 0.05$). This implies that government dependency increases autocratic support and conversely decreases democratic support.

Table 5.3 below presents the multiple regression results. The table shows that, controlling for other factors, increasing feelings of state dependency has a positive and statistically significant effect on middle-class groups in East Asia overall, but not in democracies and nondemocracies separately.

Table 5.3 Government Dependency on Autocratic Support by Region.

	M1	M2	M3
	East Asia	**East Asian Democracies**	**East Asian Nondemocracies**
Govt. Dependency	0.150**	0.083	-0.084
	-0.058	-0.057	-0.197
_cons	0.272**	0.422***	-0.089
	-0.083	-0.086	-0.221
N	1526	1204	322
R2	0.026	0.02	0.078
standard errors in parentheses			
="* p<0.05 ** p<0.01		*** p<0.001"	

The full table (see Appendix D) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis on the effect of feelings of dependency on autocratic support among middle-class respondents in East Asia overall and in both regime types on a 0 to 1 scale. That is, it shows the effects of feelings of dependency including all of the abovementioned control variables. Similarly, the results show positive coefficients in East Asia as a region and in democracies, with a 15% increase in the overall region and an 8.3% increase in democracies. However, the result is only statistically significant for the overall region (at $p < 0.01$). The result is negative in nondemocracies, implying that feelings of dependency decrease autocratic support, although it is statistically nonsignificant. In other words, increasing feelings of government dependency

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produce a 15% increase in autocratic support in the region overall, whereas they have no significant effect when separated by regime type. Moreover, in democracies, higher education levels predict lower levels of autocratic support among the middle class. In nondemocracies, increasing government importance predicts higher levels of autocratic support among middle-class citizens by 70%, whereas older middle-class people are less likely to support autocracy by 33.8%.

As H1 predicted, in general, higher levels of feeling dependent on the government among middle-class citizens in East Asia predict an increase in support for autocracy. As H2 predicted, those who feel dependent on the government among the middle class in East-Asian democracies may be more likely to support autocracy. As H3 predicted, those who feel dependent on the government among the middle class in East-Asian nondemocracies may be less likely to support autocracy. However, for both H2 and H3, the results are statistically nonsignificant. Although the main independent variable for H2 is positive (8.3%) and that for H3 is negative (8.4%), feelings of government dependency have no statistically significant effect on autocratic support among middle-class citizens by regime type.

Conclusion

Is democracy declining in East Asia? Did democracy ever fully establish itself in the region to begin with? An examination of support among the middle class in East Asia suggested that democracy is either eroding in the region or that it never fully consolidated in the first place. Moreover, the results suggested that the middle class will continue to support autocracy so long as their state continues to maintain its position in supporting them. This leads to a dire conclusion: *democracies in East Asia may suffer considerably because of declining democratic*

support, especially if the middle class continues to maintain close relationships with their governments. Indeed, democratic regimes cannot survive without support from their own people, and East Asia is lacking that support from the group that is supposed to be the strongest and most avid supporters. To truly ascertain whether democracy will endure or break down among East-Asian democracies, whether democracy will be defended when it actually starts to erode must be examined. I discuss this in the following chapter.

Appendix D

Bivariate Regression Analyses of Government Dependency on Autocratic Support.

	East Asia	East-Asian Democracies	East-Asian Nondemocracies
Govt. Dependency	0.237***	0.070	0.233*
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.114)
_cons	0.168***	0.184***	0.266**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.080)
N	2234	1289	945
R2	0.009	0.001	0.004
Standard errors in parentheses			
="* p < 0.05	** p < 0.01		*** p < 0.001"

Full Table 5.3

	M1	M2	M3
	East Asia	**East-Asian Democracies**	**East-Asian Nondemocracies**
Govt. Dependency	0.150**	0.083	-0.084
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.197)
Political Interest	0.009	-0.034	0.222
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.150)
Importance of Govt	0.265***	0.086	0.701***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.168)
Age	-0.123+	0.008	-0.338*
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.170)
Gender	-0.017	-0.028	0.088
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.080)
Marriage	-0.011	-0.037	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.051)
Education	-0.220*	-0.130**	0.174
	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.214)
Religiosity	-0.012	-0.130**	0.164
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.125)
_cons	0.272**	0.422***	-0.089
	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.221)
N	1526	1204	322
R2	0.026	0.020	0.078

Standard errors in parentheses

="* p < 0.05   ** p < 0.01   *** p < 0.001"

PART 3: THE BEHAVIORAL DIMENSION

Thus far, I have focused on the cognitive and affective dimensions of democratic citizenship, both of which examine the *attitudes* of the middle class toward democracy. The cognitive dimension examined *conceptions* of democracy and how democracy is *understood,* whereas the affective dimension analyzed *support*, both of which emphasize attitudes toward democracy. This chapter illustrates the behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship and whether the middle class *acts* to defend democracy.

CHAPTER 6:
THE MIDDLE CLASS AND PROTEST CULTURE IN SOUTH KOREA

Are citizens willing to defend democracy? Furthermore, are middle-class citizens willing to defend democratic rule, despite its limitations? Will their political actions change if democratic institutions do not perform to their satisfaction? Although attitudes toward democracy are crucial to a democracy's success, active participation is also a key component to a healthy and effective democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Foa and Mounk 2016). Indeed, people participate in politics to drive the democratic process and influence the government, its leaders, and their actions (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Dalton and Welzel 2014).

In this chapter, I examine the actions of middle-class citizens and how they influence the decisions made by political institutions through mass political behavior and participation. That is, I analyze the *behavioral* dimension of democratic citizenship by observing how much middle-class citizens are willing to defend democracy through various forms of political participation in Korea. I selected Korea as a case study because the country has been heralded as one of the most dynamic and analytically interesting democracies from the third wave (Chu, Diamond, and Shin 2001; Diamond, B. Kim, and P. Kim 2000; Diamond and Shin 2000; Diamond and Shin 2014). Not only has Korea been one of the most successful cases of rapid industrialization and democratic consolidation, but the country also developed a political culture that has empowered citizens through political activism and helped them master the art of protest (C. Kim 2017; S.C. Kim 2016; Premack 2016; Chang 2018; Koo 1999; 2002).

In the next section, I explore how Korean citizens defend democracy through outpouring political activism and the intensity of protests before and after democratization. In the third section, I distinguish the differences between peaceful protests and other forms of political

activity in Korea and explain why this distinction is critical. The fourth section describes how

feelings of government dependency can influence both categories of political activity, and I

contend that it has an effect on peaceful demonstrations but not on other forms of political

activity. The fifth section describes the data and results, and finally, the sixth section concludes

and describes the implications for the future of Korean democracy.

Political Activism and Defending Democracy in Korea

The Beginning of Democratization Through to National Protests

It has been over 30 years since Korea democratized and left behind its contentious

authoritarian history. Since then, the country has been a shining example of rapid and successful

democratization, with the peaceful transition from military dictatorship to a representative

democracy; the quick creation of a multiparty system, free and fair elections, and the peaceful

transfer of power between parties; and the smooth transformation of an entrenched system of

developmental capitalism into a competitive market economy (Shin and Park 2008). Before

democratization, however, Korea endured a long authoritarian period from 1948 to 1987. As one

of the most authoritarian societies during that time, the First Republic lasted through the first

presidency with Rhee Syngman's civilian dictatorship from 1949 to 1960 and through the Third,

Fourth, and Fifth Republics with Park Chung-hee's military dictatorship from 1961 to 1979,

Chun Doo-hwan's coup d'état in 1979, and his subsequent rule until 1988.

There were several nationwide uprisings to stop authoritarian rule during Chun Doo-

hwan's coup d'état, two of which played critical roles in the events that led to democracy. The

Gwangju Uprising began on May 18, 1980, when hundreds of thousands of citizens in the city of

Gwangju protested against martial law.[56] Chun's military forces unleashed tanks and helicopters on the city, ending the uprising in less than 2 hours and repressing the rebellion; however, the event became a pivotal moment in the struggle for democracy by sparking the *June Democracy Movement* in 1987.[57] The *June Movement* sparked Chun to announce he would pass power to another military ruler without direct elections, triggering a public outcry that led to several prodemocracy demonstrations. One of these rallies, called the "Peace Parade," brought out middle-class groups who had held back until then, helping the movement gain momentum.[58] With the help of the middle class, the "Peace Parade" officially ended Chun's tyrannical rule on June 29, 1987, and the democratization process began in Korea.

The Maturation of Democratization Through to the Candlelight Revolution

The middle class and general public as a whole have continued to play a significant role in Korean political culture by actively participating in protests. This was clear when the protest culture reached new heights during the 2016–17 *Candlelight Revolution*.[59] According to media reports, anywhere from hundreds of thousands to 2.32 million to 16 million Koreans came together to protest government corruption and abuses of power in Gwanghwamun Square over the course of 6 months (Chang 2018; Campbell 2018).[60]

The Candlelight Revolution began with a demand to impeach the then President Park Geun-hye (박근혜) when news broke that President Park allowed long-time friend Choi Soon-sil

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[56] This event is also called the May 18 Democratic Uprising, the Gwangju Massacre, and 5.18.
[57] This event is also referred to as the 6.10 Democracy Movement, the June Democratic Uprising, and the June Struggle.
[58] The Peace Parade began when a tear gas bomb hit Yonsei University student Yi Han-yeol (이한열) and he was fatally injured during one of the demonstrations on June 9. Over a million people protested to end dictatorship after this incident through the Peace Parade.
[59] This event is also called the 2016–17 South Korean Protests, the Park Geun-hye Resignment Nationwide Movement, and the Candlelight Struggle.
[60] The protests occurred every Saturday from October 2016 to April 2017.

(최순실) to meddle in private domestic and foreign policies and access confidential government documents and information (Harris 2017; Fendos 2017).[61] President Park and her administration were also found to have blacklisted 10,000 political opponents, including filmmakers, writers, artists, and academics critical of the president and the government's policies; those on the blacklist were denied state funding and were unable to pursue their careers. Through the news of these events, Park's popularity declined substantially and her approval ratings had dropped to less than 5% by October 2016 (Lee 2018; Fermin-Robbins 2018).

Indisputably, these practices of political corruption and influence-peddling enraged the masses. The protests eventually forced National Assembly legislators to impeach the president, which was unanimously ruled as being just by the Constitutional Court, leading to Park's dramatic downfall from president to prisoner (Chang 2018). These protests led Park to become the first president to be impeached through democratic procedures in Korea, and the uprising came to be known to "serve as inspiration to defenders of liberal democracy around the world" (Mounk 2018: 185).

An Emphasis on Peaceful Demonstrations

What is most fascinating about these protests is that they were large, well-organized, and most critically, nonviolent. Tens of thousands of people took part in the *Gwangju Uprising*, over one million participated in the *June Democracy Movement,* and over sixteen million participated in the *Candlelight Revolution*. During each of these events, civil society groups worked quickly and successfully through high levels of internal cohesion and independence (S.C. Kim 2016:74);

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[61] This has also been called "Choi Soon-sil gate" (Harris 2017; Fendos 2017). Choi, who had no credentials or authorization, coerced *chaebols* (conglomerates) into donating more than US$69 million to her foundation, demanded donations to fund her daughter's equestrian activities, and pressured Ewha Women's University to illegally admit her daughter.

furthermore, they were nonviolent. When soldiers threw tear gas grenades at the protestors during the *Gwangju Uprising*, the protestors threw back rolls of toilet paper (Adesnik and Kim 2008), and the *June Democracy Movement* led the "Great National March of Peace" (국민평화대행진). Moreover, during the *Candlelight Revolution*, protestors held candles in front of the Blue House for twenty consecutive Saturdays.

Such successfully organized peaceful demonstrations have become a cornerstone of political activity in Korea. They have become a part of the norm as democratic space expanded and provided a political space for Korean citizens to freely express their views (S.C. Kim 2017). Candles, moreover, have become an icon of peace, because they offer "a new platform that enabled protestors to convey their seriousness of intent through peaceful means" (S.C. Kim 2017). Peaceful demonstrations are often festive and involve dancing and art, and they often have more in common with peace-ins and family festivals where performers sing protest songs and hold each other accountable for unruly behavior (Harris 2017; Ahrens 2016). In essence, Korea's peaceful protests have taken on a life of their own.

Because of the success of these protests and their nonviolent nature, a large proportion of Korean citizens (72%) continue to participate in peaceful demonstrations much more than they do in conventional political activities such as voting (58%).[62] Furthermore, a large proportion of the middle class are much more likely to participate in peaceful demonstrations (75%) than vote (56%), which seems to also be increasing among the youth.

Figure 6.1 illustrates the proportion of middle class respondents who recently participated in peaceful demonstrations by age cohorts. Proportionally, younger people have participated

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[62] The questions come from Wave 6 of the WVS. A gender gap seems to exist in peaceful demonstration participation in Korea. Proportionally, 64% of women have recently participated in peaceful demonstrations compared with 83% of men.

more in peaceful demonstrations than have older ones, although more than half of the

respondents from older generations have also participated in peaceful demonstrations.

Figure 6.1 Peaceful Demonstrations by Age.

Peaceful Demonstrations by Age Cohort

Measuring Political Activity: Distinction Between Two Categories

Although peaceful demonstrations have become a notable part of Korean political culture,

people do participate in other forms of political activity as well. Political activity largely

encompasses "legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the

selection of governmental personnel and the actions that they take" (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978).

The most conventional form includes voting and the nonconventional forms include signing

petitions, joining boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, and joining strikes. Figure 6.2

shows that a large proportion of middle-class people in Korea participate actively in all forms. In

particular, larger majorities of the middle class participate in signing petitions and attending

peaceful demonstrations.

Figure 6.2. Proportion of Political Activity among Middle Class.

Political activity can be measured in various manners.[63] Although various categories from the literature possess merit, they are limited in the case of Korea because peaceful demonstrations are ubiquitous and have taken on a life of their own. As such, peaceful demonstrations can be expected to have highly different effects compared with other forms of political activity. To create this distinction, I measure political activity in two ways by separating peaceful protests, measuring them separately, and combining other forms of political activity, which include signing petitions, joining strikes, joining boycotts, violent protests, group problem-solving, and other forms of protest.[64] These two groups combined are most likely to encompass the fundamental dimensions of middle-class political participation.

Impact of Government Dependency on Political Participation

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[63] See Verba et al. (1978); Jennings (1997); Manion (1996); Shi (1997); and Chen (2000, 2004) for various definitions and measurements of political activity.

[64] To identify the major cluster or category of political participation, I ran an exploratory factor analysis on the four WVS items in the second category. Two major factors emerged from the factor analysis, each of which deals with a category of political participation.

As I discussed in previous chapters, the dependency that middle-class citizens feel toward their government may influence their attitudes toward democracy. This was seen through the cognitive and affective dimensions of democratic citizenship, because members of the middle class who felt dependent on the government often had broader understandings of democracy and were less likely to be supportive of it. Similarly, those who feel dependent on the government could be expected to be less likely to defend democracy through political action as well as to participate in political activities that could be considered as challenging the state, simply because they have less desire to challenge a government with which they have close ties.

Because peaceful protests have become an iconic part of Korean political culture, however, this form of political action alone may have significantly different effects. Indeed, while those with higher levels of government dependency may in general be less likely to participate in political activity, they may be more likely to participate in peaceful protests than in other forms of political activity because these protests are often considered a cultural activity rather than a direct form of attacking the government. Furthermore, it may provide them with an opportunity to air their grievances without directly challenging the government. Accordingly, I separate peaceful protests from other forms of political activity and propose the following three hypotheses and test them in this chapter.

> **H1**. Government dependency has a negative effect on political activity among middle-class citizens in Korea.

> **H2**. Government dependency has less of an effect on peaceful demonstrations than other forms of political activity among middle-class citizens in Korea.

Empirical Analysis

To explore these hypotheses, I run several analyses. The first examines the effects of government dependency on political activity excluding peaceful protests. The second analysis

tests the effects of government dependency on peaceful demonstrations. To explore H1 and H2, I use the the sixth wave (2010–2014) of the WVS and run OLS regressions.[65]

Dependent Variables

For the dependent variables, I separate the question on peaceful demonstrations from other forms of political activity, including signing petitions, joining strikes, joining boycotts, and other forms of protest.[66]

Table 6.1 Categories of Political Activity.

DV	Group 1	Group 2
WVS Wave 6: "Political action"	"Signing a petition" "Joining strikes" "Joining in boycotts" "Any other act of protest"	"Attending peaceful demonstrations"

Independent Variables

For the independent variable, I use the same items to measure *feelings of government dependency* that was used in Chapters 2 and 4. I combine two questions from the 6th wave of the WVS that ask whether the government should own more firms and whether it should be responsible for its people. The responses were coded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 being strongly agree.

Similar to previous chapters, the middle class is measured using respondents' reported income. On a scale of 1 to 5, those who reported 3 and 4 were coded as middle class. Control variables include trust in government, political interest, importance of politics, financial

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[65] Responses from the WVS (V85-V89) include responses of "Have done," "Might do," and "Would never do" for Political action: Signing a petition, Joining in boycotts, Attending peaceful demonstrations, Joining strikes, Any other act of protest. Items from the ABS did not include any specifically on peaceful demonstrations and thus could not be used for this section of the chapter.

[66] See the Appendix for the proportion of middle-class Koreans who have participated in each political activity.

satisfaction, and social status along with the commonly used variables education, gender, age, religiosity, employment, and marriage. All variables are recoded to a 0 to 1 scale.[67]

Results

   Figure 6.3 below presents the marginal effects of government dependency on both the dependent variables of political activity and peaceful protests controlling for all other variables (using a 0 to 1 scale). The graph indicates that increasing feelings of government dependency leads to a decline in various forms of political activity and an increase in peaceful protests.

Figure 6.3 Marginal Effects of Dependency on Political Activity.

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
[67] Nearly 60% of the middle class has the highest level of education. See Appendix E for the full figure.

Table 6.2 displays two OLS regressions separately from Figure 3 (see Appendix E for full table). The first presents the effects of government dependency on all forms of political activity (excluding peaceful demonstrations) while the second illustrates the effects of government dependency only on peaceful demonstrations. The results indicate that increasing feelings of government dependency predict a decrease in political activity and an increase in peaceful protests. The patterns suggest that, as H1 predicts, government dependency has a negative effect on political activity. As H2 predicts, moreover, dependency has less of an effect on peaceful demonstrations; however, both are not statistically significant.

Table 6.2 Government Dependency and Political Activity

	Model 1: Political Activity	Model 2: Peaceful Protests
Dependency	-0.392	0.185
	(0.834)	(0.173)
Constant	2.235	0.200
	(1.816)	(0.230)
* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$		

Conclusion

Korea is a democratic paradox. In one sense, the growth of peaceful demonstrations illuminates the maturation of Korea's democracy and the democratic nature of its citizens. In another, however, the demonstrations against political corruption highlight the weakness of its party system as a mechanism for political mediation. Although Korean citizens have proven themselves to be icons of democracy, the country fails to have the highest democracy and freedom scores.[68] In fact, Korea has the lowest democracy score among the nine countries observed in this study.

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[68] Korea has a score of 8 on the Polity IV index and a score of 83 on the Freedom House Index.

Will middle-class Koreans continue to defend democracy, in spite of the government's limitations? The findings from this chapter suggest that it is possible due to the surging popularity of protest culture in Korea, but this is contingent on the continuing prominence of peaceful protests as well as the role of the state on middle class growth. Although middle-class Koreans may continue to participate in peaceful and successful protests, they may not defend democracy if the culture of peaceful protests dissipates. Moreover, they may not defend democracy if their dependency on the government increases over time. Indeed, middle-class Koreans may be less willing to challenge the government in the future even if it does not uphold its democratic ways.

Appendix E

	Full Table 6.2	
	Model 1: All Activity	**Model 2: Peaceful Protests**
Dependency	-0.392	0.185
	(0.834)	(0.173)
Age	-2.253	-0.295+
	(0.947)	(0.155)
Education	-0.709	-0.056
	(0.915)	(0.148)
Class	-2.179	-0.250
	(1.206)	(0.189)
Gender	*-0.936*	-0.014
	(0.563)	(0.063)
Marriage	1.726	0.124
	(0.610)	(0.078)
Financial Satisfaction	0.163	0.148
	(0.649)	(0.176)
Political Interest	-0.831	0.217
	(0.914)	(0.131)
Importance of Politics	-0.282	-0.054
	(0.639)	(0.128)
Constant	2.235	0.200
	(1.816)	(0.230)
	* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001	

CHAPTER 7: FINAL THOUGHTS
REASSESSING THE DEMOCRACY DEBATE

Barrington Moore's legendary aphorism "no bourgeois, no democracy" (1966) has remained prominent in comparative politics, with its notion that a strong and independent middle class constitutes a critical factor in a state's likelihood for democratizing and sustaining its democracy. Many renowned scholars have supported this theory (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2005; Moore 1966; Lipset 1959; Dalton 1999; Easton 1975; Dahl 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996). The middle class acts as a critical element in the democratization process because it is crucial in the struggle for power, because "the shift in relative bargaining power from the ruling elites to the middle class allows the latter to prevail and sets democratization in motions" (Anderson 2011). While the working class attempts to seize power for redistribution and the upper class attempts to keep it, because economic interests drive both classes, the middle class serves as the deciding factor—the "main thrust"—toward democratic development (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Hattori, Funatsu, and Torii 2003).

Are middle-class citizens committed to liberal democracy in East Asia? Do they prefer liberal democracy to other regime types, as middle-class citizens are believed to in the West? The research reported in this study sought to explore these and other related questions concerning modernization theory and cultural democratization from the perspective of the middle class. To this end, I began with a broad discussion of modernization theory and cultural democratization in East Asia. I discussed the manners in which modernization theory has been described in the literature and how it highlights the role of the middle class. I introduced the question of whether or not the middle classes have played a critical role in the democratization process in East Asia by examining whether they are committed to democratic politics. In studying their democratic orientations, I introduced the notion of democratic citizenship, which

emphasizes how people understand democracy (cognitive), whether or not they support it (affective), and whether they are willing to defend it (behavioral).

Through this, I identified and analyzed the distinct patterns in which middle-class citizens understand, support, and defend democracy in East Asia. I examined the democratic orientations of the middle class in three consolidated democracies in the East (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and compared them with those of three consolidated democracies in the West (the United States, Australia, and New Zealand). Subsequently, I compared democratic orientations of middle-class groups within East Asia by comparing democracies in the East (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to those of three nondemocracies (China, Singapore, and Vietnam), making some comparisons by individual countries as well as providing a case study of South Korea.

In this final chapter, I first discuss the contributions of this study by highlighting the most notable findings reported in earlier chapters. I then evaluate the central claims and counterclaims surrounding *modernization theory* in view of these findings. I conclude by discussing some limitations and examining the implications of the findings on cultural democratization and the future of democracy in East Asia.

Notable Findings

Are middle class East Asians committed to democratic politics? Do the middle class prefer democracy over other forms of government, and will they fight for it? To answer these questions in depth, I analyzed the middle class' commitment to democracy in three steps. First, I examined middle-class groups in East-Asian democracies and compared them with democracies in the West. This included three consolidated democracies in each region to provide a systematic comparison: the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the West, which Welzel (2011)

described as the "New West," and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the East. Next, I compared

middle-class groups in six countries in East Asia: the three democracies of Japan, South Korea,

Taiwan, and the three nondemocracies of China, Singapore, and Vietnam. These six countries

make up Confucian Asia (Shin 2011) and allow for systematic comparisons by individual

countries and regime types. Finally, I examined the democratic orientations of the middle class in

these analyses through the notion of democratic citizenship. Using a combination of the sixth

wave of the WVS and the fourth wave of the ABS, I analyzed differences in democratic

orientations among the middle class through the cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions

of democratic citizenship. These analyses suggested the following three points about the

prevalence and influence of democracy among middle-class East Asians.

The first point is that the middle class in East Asia conceptualize democracy very

differently to those in the West, but not so among themselves. Compared with those in the West,

middle-class respondents in the East were less likely to have in-depth understandings of

democracy by more than 10%, and were more likely to view democracy substantively and

illiberally. Indeed, Chapter 2 showed that over 18% of middle-class respondents in the West

viewed democracy procedurally, whereas only 3% did so in the East. Moreover, within East Asia,

I found little differences in democratic conceptualization. Although the middle class in

democracies were more capable of identifying core democratic properties by nearly 10%, both

subregions preferred good governance over freedom, substantive properties over procedural ones,

and illiberal properties over liberal ones. As Chapter 3 described, 37% of those in democracies

viewed democracy illiberally, whereas 47% did in nondemocracies.

Equally notable is that the middle classes in East Asia are not quite attached to

democracy as a system of government. While recent literature and my own results showed that

support for democracy is declining in the West, I found that it is declining even more rapidly in the East. Chapter 4 demonstrated severe democratic erosion in both regions, with 28% in the West and over 50% in the East supporting autocracy. Moreover, this democratic withdrawal and increasing autocratic support seem to be more prominent among the younger generations. Chapter 5 explicated variations in support within East Asia, and found that support for autocracy is stronger among middle-class groups in nondemocracies (37.4%) than in democracies (17.3%), as well as that authoritarian dependency was more prominent among younger cohorts in both subregions.

Lastly, middle-class groups may defend democracy to some degree, but only when it suits them. In Chapter 6, I found that middle-class groups in South Korea will defend democracy by participating in demonstrations, most notably peaceful ones, but that this form of participation is deeply influenced by the protest culture that exists within the society. Moreover, it seems triggered by the Candlelight Revolution against political corruption rather than an effort to defend democracy.

These three points suggest that the middle classes in East Asia have significantly lower levels of democratic citizenship than do those in the West. They also suggest that the middle classes in East Asia may have fundamentally different views of democracy. Through their different cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns, it can be surmised that middle-class East Asians may be committed to democracy but not its liberal, Western form, and furthermore, this may be caused by the history of state-led economic growth in East Asia.

Reassessing Modernization Theory and Government Dependency

Three sets of competing theories exist in literature on the determinants of democracy. The first set concerns the importance of socialization on cultural democratization, including *democratic political learning theory, regime performance theory, socialization theory,* and *social capital theory*.[69] The second set concerns the role of political economy and inequality on democratization, including the *redistributivist approach* (Acemoglu and Robinson 2003, 2005; Boix 2003) and the *elite-competition framework* (Ansell and Samuels 2014). The third set concerns the orientations of middle-class groups and how class fragmentation, political instability, and social/material satisfaction influence democratic support, discussed through the *unilinear* and *contingent approaches* (Chen 2013).

As one of the most prominent and robust findings in comparative politics, *modernization theory* encompasses various fragments of each of these competing theories and emphasizes one main factor in the consequences of socioeconomic modernization on cultural change: the role of the middle class.[70] Indeed, the middle class must fully embrace liberal democracy to fully transform authoritarian regimes into fully functioning democratic ones.

This study applied *modernization theory* in the context of East Asia and observed the cultural-democratic orientations of the middle class. Theoretically, this study showed that state-led economic growth (state-dependent modernization) in East Asia allowed states to play a central role in the creation and development of middle-class groups, fostering a dependent and mutually supportive relationship. This altered the manner in which the middle class viewed the government, which then influenced how they view democracy. Empirically, findings of this study showed that higher levels of government dependency lead to lower levels of liberal democratic understanding (cognitive) among those living in East-Asian democracies, as well as

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[69] See Shin (2012) for a full description of these determinants.
[70] There are many variants of modernization theory, one of which is neomodernization theory, which emphasizes the growth of emancipative values on cultural change (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013).

lower levels of liberal democratic support (affective) among those living in any of the six East-Asian countries, and lower levels of political activity among the middle class in South Korea (behavioral), with the exception of peaceful protests.

The theoretical and empirical results have implications for the democracies in the West as well. They suggest that similar feelings of government dependency could have influenced Western middle classes to have less liberal views of democracy *if* their governments played a crucial part in economic growth. As Chapter 2 illustrated, middle-class respondents in the West were also inclined to view democracy less procedurally and more illiberally if they felt more dependent on their governments through a mutually supportive relationship. The main difference is that the West adopted state-independent modernization, whereas the East adopted state-dependent modernization, and as such, state-led economic growth played a crucial role in middle class development in the East, whereas capitalist development had little to no role in middle class development in the West.

Implications

Much work remains to be done in conceptualizing, measuring, and speculating about the relationship between state-led economic modernization, the middle class, and democratization. This study provided a limited account of this relationship by analyzing six countries in East Asia and comparing democracies in the East with those in the West. The range of countries in East Asia and the West that this study considered was limited, and providing additional analyses of other state-led economies in other regions such as Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia could also lead to noteworthy findings. Adding in other state-independent economies from the West could also lead to more generalizable implications. In addition, this work could be enhanced by

providing additional analyses of democratic citizenship and socioeconomic growth over time. Although this study analyzed democratic orientations using wave four of the ABS and wave six of the WVS, it could benefit greatly from analyses prior to these time frames to observe how commitment to liberal democratic politics has changed during the past few decades. Moreover, comparing countries with high levels of socioeconomic growth with those with lower levels, as well as comparing the middle class to other classes, could be helpful for observing whether economic growth influences the intensity of feelings of government dependency.

Theoretical Implications for Modernization Theory

This study attempted to take one step forward from limitations in the current literature on democracy and *modernization theory*. I applied *modernization theory* to East Asia and examined patterns among the middle class' democratic orientations. I also introduced the notion of democratic citizenship to provide a multidimensional measurement of democratic commitment. I showed that, despite its global aspirations, *modernization theory*'s emphasis on the role of the middle class has remained relatively Euro-centric and suggested that feelings of government dependency are one explanation for why the middle classes in East Asia remain reluctant to push for liberal democracy.

Political Implications for Democratization in East Asia

Will East Asia fully democratize? The findings from this study offer a bleak view for liberal democracy. Many people in East Asia face numerous problems of growing discontent and disillusionment with democracy, and institutions often compete against previously effective authoritarian and semi-authoritarian neighbors and past regimes. "If democracy does not shine in the eyes of the people of East Asia, its demonstration effect will be very limited and the prospects for further democratization in the region will be cast in doubt" (Chang, Chu, and

Huang 2011). While countries in the region continue to thrive economically, the middle class remains uncommitted and unenthusiastic to liberal democratic politics and show ambiguous orientations toward liberal democracy. As such, the results of this study imply that the classic causality between modernization and democratization may not be universally applicable to different cultural contexts.

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