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The Latina Jacobins: Marxist-Leninist Latina Women, Industrial Unionism, and the Fall of Labor in the Southwest, 1919-1952

By

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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

The Latina Jacobins: Marxist-Leninist Latina Women, Industrial Labor Unions, and the Fall of Labor in the Southwest, 1919-1952

by

Francisco X. Martín del Campo

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Waldo E. Martin, Chair

This dissertation explains the decline of labor unions in the Southwest during the mid-twentieth century by studying Latina radicals' political activities from strike wave that occurred after World War I through the first two years of the Korean War. Although working-class Latinas joined industrial labor unions in large numbers, labor leaders and reformers throughout the region failed to propose comprehensive fiscal, administrative, social, and political reforms during the 1930s. CIO affiliates consolidated their gains, won NLRB elections, and formed political action committees after the U.S. entered World War II, and industrial workers won equal pay, desegregated unions, and inched closer towards winning industry-wide bargaining after 1943. The colonial war against Korea and the deportation of Luisa Moreno caused industrial unionism's demise, because they discouraged police officers from allying with other workers, made dismissals of Communist public employees possible, and isolated Sinophiles within the military.

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Introduction

The stories of industrial workers' victories in North America during the 1930s and 1940s have been told and retold many times, but their lessons have not withstood the test of time. This dissertation seeks to explain this discrepancy by studying radical Latina women's political activities in the Southwest during the first half of the twentieth century. This was an era when the mantra of "industrial unionism" was an inspiring rallying cry for many people, because there was no comparable source of solidarity. Industrial unionism was a captivating concept due to its militant and egalitarian principles, and its degree of popularity correlated most closely with capitalism's threats. It became more imperative for revolutionaries and reformers to cooperate as the severity of fascists' threats increased.

Industrial unionism was one of the most consequential social movements of the twentieth century, and its impact stretched beyond the zenith of labor unions' power during the mid-twentieth century. The purpose of this claim is not to ignore the courage that the leaders of "the second Reconstruction" demonstrated in the southern states after the Korean War but rather to attribute some of the credit for their successes to both inter-generational knowledge and laborers' hard-earned lessons from the 1930s and 1940s. Historians of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) have characterized that era alternatively as either the "left-led unions" or "civil rights unionism," and what these ideas share is emphasis on laborers' internationalism from the strike wave after World War I until the sit-down strikes that occurred in factories and relief offices throughout North America after 1935. Industrial, blue-, and white-collar workers' activities converged rapidly and compelled the national government to act decisively – but inadequately – against disfranchisement and segregation laws that had always violated the constitution's reconstruction amendments. The facts that some of the changes that industrial unionists demanded required so much time to achieve and additional action by the next generation of leaders is not evidence of failure but rather the magnitude of the challenges that they confronted. Industrial unionists often failed to win their immediate demands, but they still challenged customs and won victories for Communism that had previously appeared unrealistic.[1]

The extreme inequality that pervaded the Southwest between World Wars I and II was a daunting barrier for industrial unionists, but it did not deter Latinos in the region from responding. It is both compelling and perhaps also troubling that the most successful leaders in Spanish-speaking communities were usually radical Latina women such as Luisa Moreno, Emma Tenayuca, and Josefina Fierro de Bright. There were many reasons why this was so, and Latino males' ignorance was certainly one of them. The hardships that Latino workers endured in an hostile environment during those years offer invaluable lessons , but it also requires confronting some inconvenient facts regarding who those early Latina leaders were and why they failed. The answer is not simply Anti-Communism but rather how it affected labor relations, war issues, and contradictions within the region's political economy.

One cannot know why the power of labor unions declined during the last third of the twentieth century without first explaining both why it first gained power, and this requires a representative study of industrial unionists' activities from the CIO's separation from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) during the winter of 1936-7 through the first two years of the Korean War. Latina and Latino workers sought to increase their individual and collective autonomy in the Southwest through a variety of means that ranged from labor activities, friendship, theater, film, sex, abstinence, rioting, marriage, and contraception, but it was only through industrial labor unions that they fulfilled their leadership potential. Although labor unions excluded working-class Latina women from many occupations, they found allies and demanded equal pay for equal work, equal rights, and real protection through Communist affiliates. Communist Party leaders and reformers in the Southwest failed to create a comprehensive strategy to propose extensive fiscal, administrative, social, and political reforms as the Mexican and Russian Revolutions ended during the late 1930s, and military leaders refused to revolt in southern states at key junctures in 1934, 1937, 1940, 1943 (which coincided with an Argentine pro-labor military coup during June), and 1945.[2]

Radical Latina women acted based on the knowledge that they themselves would not directly benefit from their activities. Union leaders did not waste time by relishing in their economic gains but rather acted quickly to demand equal pay, voting rights, and the desegregation of unions, and it was farmworkers in California's Central Valley and Latina industrial workers in south Texas that initiated during the mid-1930s. While the sit-down strikes won collective-bargaining rights temporarily, they failed to win permanent concessions. Employers remained intransigent, and their behavior prevented industrial unionists from consolidating their gains and expanding into industries where labor unions had previously been weak until the U.S. entered World War II. This was why working-class women won equal-pay legislation and contract provisions after 1942 and did not halt their advances after the end of the war.

World War II did not defeat aggressors either within the bourgeoisie of North America or their imperialist and anti-labor allies within the international ruling class, and this stark reality became evident immediately after the war ended. Historians have long agreed that the CIO's opposition to disfranchisement and segregation in the South diminished when it should have intensified during its "Operation Dixie" campaign, but what impact did the CIO's retreat in the southern states have on industrial unionism in the Southwest? Although Anti-Communist members of the CIO's executive board invented numerous rationales to purge Communist affiliates, they never stated a valid reason why working people should abandon the alliance with the Soviet Union that enabled them to defeat the Nazi government in Germany during the war. The Truman administration's reversion to a "containment strategy" after the first postwar strike

wave did provide such a rationale through a combination of repression and co-optation, and thi entailed ignoring totalitarianism in capitalist countries, aiding Zionist militias' ethnic cleansing of Palestine, and enabling the killing of between three and four million people during the colonial war against Korea. Both the Korean War and the deportation of radical labor leader Luisa Moreno on October 24, 1950, allowed imperialists to isolate internationalists within both the military and labor unions, dismiss Communist public employees, and discourage police officers from allying with other workers.[3]

Theory and Method

Early Latina labor historians were social and cultural anthropologists, and their interviews with older Latino adults, or "testimonials," became one of the discipline's intrinsic methods before a new fad of "whiteness studies" proliferated within academia. The dearth has severely retarded intellectuals' knowledge of Latina and Latino workers' oft-dangerous social and ecological environments and their ability to remedy pressing political and economic problems, and this dissertation attempts to address this gap by studying how Latina workers' political activities in the Southwest from 1919 through 1952. Explaining Latina labor history's marginality requires linguistics, structuralism, postcolonialism, literary criticism, feminism, and black studies and using interviews, official reports, periodicals, and archival collections. Latina labor history necessitates integration these academic works through inter-disciplinary engagement with social and political theory and various disciplines to study the lives of working-class women and women of color properly. The academic literature on "women of color" and "intersectionality" grew during the 1980s and early 1990s with alongside the historiographies of the CIO and white-collar workers.[4]

Early CIO historians concentrated on the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee, or SWOC, and auto workers' sit-down strikes in the Midwest that prevented non-strikers from crossing picket lines. Walter Galenson argued that industrial unionists' primary concerns were the scope of work and the amalgamation of "unskilled" and "craft" unions, and he concluded that CIO affiliates succeeded due to dynamic leadership, the Democratic Party's electoral victories, and improving economic conditions after 1932. Others selected white-collar workers as their subject of inquiry during the 1980s, and Jürgen Kocka found that the U.S. economy had a greater percentage of female employees in white-collar and professional occupations than Germany's, that income inequality during the 1930s was worse in the U.S., and that unemployment rates for industrial and blue-collar workers tended to be both higher and associated more closely with market fluctuations. Although white-collar workers in North America were more likely to join independent, unaffiliated unions more than blue-collar workers, many also joined the CIO's Communist-affiliated United Professional and Office Workers of America (UPOWA), the United Public Workers of America (UPWA, which formed after two white-collar unions merged in 1946), and the United Electricians (UE), as well as the AFL-affiliated American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Robert H. Zieger published an authoritative history of the CIO during the mid-1990s in which he argued that CIO leaders' attempts to project "manly strength" belied their fragile and uncertain status vis-à-vis employers and that the CIO reached its zenith of strength and institutional cohesion during World War II.[5]

Feminist historian Dana Frank has more recently studied female department-store workers' sit-down strike at Woolworth's chain store in Detroit with the AFL-affiliated Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) from February 27 until March 5, 1937, argued that newspapers insinuated that the strikers were girls who were too preoccupied with their "boyfriends," and concluded that labor scholars need to better account for gender. The

department-store workers' strike compelled the AFL to include women and indicated blue- and white-collar workers' solidarity during the sit-down strikes. Many industrial labor unions in the Southwest maintained similar bonds with AFL affiliates when the Korean War began. Working people were accustomed to analyzing military questions by then, and they knew that the alliance with Soviet and Chinese Communists was essential for the allied victory. Radical Latina women in the Southwest were ideal leaders of coalition of workers and liberals after World War II.[6]

Although studies of CIO history and white-collar workers were growing by the mid-1990s, the proliferation of "whiteness theory" failed to consider social and demographic factors and limited labor historians' ability to explain why members of the Democratic Party voted for Ronald Reagan in large numbers during the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984. "Whiteness theorists" demonstrated anti-intellectual tendencies which include ignoring the importance of occupation and age, incomplete evaluations of quantitative evidence, and the design of research projects and arguments that are too narrow and subject to arbitrary changes in scope. They could explain the causes of segregation in North America, because they ignored the relative importance of long-term historical patterns that resulted from market integration, intra- and inter-regional variation, corruption, the distribution of powers, and the significance of homeownership. Some attempted to support their claims by citing housing segregation and support for George Wallace's 1968 presidential candidacy in the Detroit area, which is a city that endured four major economic recessions from 1949 through 1960. Whiteness theorists ignored, the relative importance of both real-estate speculation and corruption and the pivotal question that Zieger posited in his impactful study regarding whether the CIO executive board's decision to purge eleven Communist-affiliated unions caused labor unions in North America to decline during the mid-twentieth century.[7]

Early Latina anthropologists' and historians' theories and investigative methods varied by the early 1980s, and they that working-class Latina women were the key leaders in the Southwest's "heavy industries." One of the first studies of Latina women in North America was Oscar Lewis's 1966 anthropological investigation, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty – San Juan and New York*, in which Lewis argued that there existed a "a culture of poverty" among Latina-headed households in New York City that was both an adaptation and a reaction to migration. Two graduate students in UCLA's history and anthropology departments, Magdalena Mora and Adelaida R. Del Castillo, concentrated on labor organization (especially in apparel and electrical industries), recent increases in forced sterilizations, and the prevalence of misogyny and chauvinism within the Chicano student movement in an edited volume they published fourteen years later, and they argued that investigators needed to analyze female liberation "within the context of national oppression and class conflict." Anthropologist María Patricia Fernandéz-Kelly engaged with "world systems" theorists to study women's working conditions in the textile and electrical industries, or "maquiladoras," of northern Mexico, and an historian and an anthropologist each published investigations of Latina cannery workers in California soon after. Anthropologist Patricia Zevella argued that most Chicana workers competed with Mexican, Afro-American, and migrant women for employment within a "caste" system, refused to separate family from work, and created a "workplace culture" that still reinforced a gender-based international division of labor.[8]

Perhaps the most influential study was Vicki Ruiz's history of cannery workers in California from 1930 through 1950. Ruiz contended that Mexican women in southern California first attained leadership positions in the United States by participating in the activities of the United Cannery, Agricultural, and Packinghouse Allied Workers of America's (UCAPAWA).

Ruiz concluded that the union collapsed after World War II due to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' (IBT) raids of UCAPAWA locals in northern California, Congress's passage of the Taft-Hartley Act which required all officers of certified unions to sign Anti-Communist affidavits, and postwar Anti-Communism. The leadership of a Guatemalan-born labor organizer and California state CIO vice-president Luisa Moreno – whose real name was Blanca Rosa Rodríguez López - was especially important. Ruiz's investigation began Latino intellectuals' assessment of the activities of radical Latina leaders such as Manuela Solis Sager, Emma Tenayuca, Josefina Fierro de Bright, and Moreno.[9]

Each of these anthropologists and historians in-person interviews with Latina workers and labor organizers as part of their methods, and what interviewees did not say during their "testimonials" was often as important as what they did say. Participants used psychoanalysis and reverse psychology to answer questions, and these testimonials soon became essential for the study of Latina labor history. Black-feminist intellectuals began arguing simultaneously for an "intersectional" analysis of identity after the noted Communist leader, Angela Davis, published her autobiography, *Women, Race, and Class*, in 1981. Legal scholar Kimberlé Williams called nine years later for investigators to use the categories of race, nationality, gender, age, legal status, sexuality, and class synthetically, and this became the template for intersectional studies of working-class women and women of color in North America. Ethnic Studies scholar Evelyn Nakano Glenn asserted soon after that sociological, or "relational," methods were useful for studying working women's paid work together with their unpaid, reproductive labor such as caring for the elderly, children, and disabled family members and other household tasks as part of the same, market-based economy.[10]

Discussion

Women's labor historians have argued that disagreements manifested during the 1920s between equal-rights feminists who attributed "differences between the sexes" to environmental factors and social feminists, or "maternalists," who believed firmly in biological differences based on gender, and the basis of these disputes were older, intellectual debates from the nineteenth century. Suffragist leaders in North America adhered to impotent single-issue and state-level strategies, and they refused to either ally with labor unions or seek the passage of night-work laws (as their counterparts in western Europe had since the mid-nineteenth century) prohibited employers from assigning night shifts to women. Social feminists' narrow goals and Supreme Court decisions that codified gender-based protective legislation while only guaranteeing employment rights for male workers limited the impact of reformers' efforts as a result. Garment workers responded by joining the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) and striking in large numbers after 1908. The Wilson administration co-opted garment workers' militance by establishing the Women's Bureau within the Department of Labor in 1919, and Congress passed the twentieth amendment that granted suffrage to most women one year later. Equal-rights feminists soon failed to persuade Congress to pass an equal-rights amendment to the constitution, or the "Lucretia Mott Amendment," during the decade that followed.[11]

A gender-based international division of labor, expanding trade, and investors' decision to centralize textile production in mills and factories pushed many working women in England and North America into seeking wage work after the mid-eighteenth century. A prevailing ideology that valorized "the family wage," "the male breadwinner," and male-centered households propagated the notion that working women needed less pay, and this "women's wage" devalued their ideas, skills, and beliefs. Individualism constrained industrial workers'

ability to strike in North America after the 1830s and forced working-class women to fight what historian Alice Kessler-Harris has characterized as a "three-front war" against their employers, union leaders, and families. The result was that while suffragists in Europe and Australia linked their efforts to pass gender-based protective legislation with social rights like welfare relief and parental leave and placed varying emphases on either the health and well-being of women and children or a "just wage," suffragists in North America did not seek comparable passage of night-work laws, link maternalist legislation to other necessary reforms, or form a third party by the early twentieth century. They instead cooperated with the National Consumers' League to pass legislation at the state level and seek relief and aid from philanthropists.[12]

Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton founded the National Women's Suffrage Association in 1869, and it differed from previous suffragist organizations due to its leaders' goal of demanding only voting rights instead of proposing comprehensive reforms. It merged with its rival, the American Women's Suffrage Association, twenty-one years later to form the National American Women Suffrage Association (NAWSA), and its leaders appealed to state governments instead of the national government during the following decade after observing suffragists' successful use of the strategy in western states. Suffragists in the southern states remained committed to seeking state-level legislation, and their counterparts in the western states favored both seeking a constitutional amendment and forming a third party. Both male labor leaders' exclusion of women and suffragists refusal to seek alliances with labor unions were among the most important factors for causing women's union membership in North America to decline between 1900 and 1910 from approximately 3.3% to 1.5%. Female labor leaders, socialists, and members of a new labor organization, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), responded by initiating a campaign to recruit garment workers from eastern states into the ILGWU the towards end of the decade.

Social feminists and "maternalists" were both committed to a conserving the gender-based division of labor, and the Supreme Court's privileging of contract law, or "freedom of contract," also constrained equal-rights feminists' activities. The Supreme Court began codifying protective legislation through its 1905 decision for the case of *Lochner v. New York* (1905), which held that state laws that regulated male workers' hours violated the fourteenth amendment's due-process clause. The Supreme Court allowed state governments to limit the working day for women three years later through its decision for *Muller v. Oregon* (1908). Supreme Court members further codified the notion of a "male breadwinner" when they ruled in *Truax v. Raich* (1915) that the fourteenth amendment only guaranteed the "right to work"," or the right to seek employment, for male citizens. The jurists guaranteed economic rights for working-class men, and a positive notion of justice was one of their primary motivations.[13]

The founder of the National Women's Party (NWP), Alice Paul, was charismatic and a strong tactician, but suffragists' divisions regarding strategic questions during the 1910s diminished her ability to lead effectively. Suffragists in Britain supported the Labor Party and destroyed property when they protested, whereas Paul neither proposed a comprehensive set of reforms nor criticized private property due to her fear southern suffragists would associate the property damage with John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry before the civil war. White suffragists in North America excluded members of the National Association of Colored Women's Clubs and Ida B. Wells from their march on Washington, D.C., on March 3, 1913, and one of NAWSA's leaders in the western states, Carrie Chapman Catt, founded the Woman Suffrage Party, emerged as Paul's rival, and established the League of Women Voters after Congress passed the twentieth amendment. Suffragists resorted to "shock tactics" after the U.S.

entered World War I which included picketing the White House and burning an effigy of "Kaiser Wilson," and one NAWSA organizer presaged "cold-war" rationales by comparing the suffragists' tactics with the "extraordinary violence" and dictatorial rule that she perceived in Mexico and Europe. Was Alice Paul a shrewd and calculating opportunist or an equal-rights feminist that was the product of her environment?[14]

The Supreme Court continued to narrow the meaning of economic citizenship after World War I, and equal-rights feminists failed to win a constitutional amendment in the decade that followed the ratification of the twentieth amendment. Members of the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of minimum-wage laws briefly in its decision for *Stettler vs. O'Hara* (1917), and they reversed course six years later by ruling in *Adkins vs. Children's Hospital* (1923) that minimum-wage laws violated the fifth amendment's due-process clause. This decision established a new precedent by holding that wages must be based on competitive ability and that equal pay legislation violated economic laws, and this precedent ignored working-class women's social environment. Historians disagree what caused the split between equal-rights and social feminists after Congress refused to pass the Lucretia Mott Amendment in 1923. Christine Lunardi argues that social feminists also believed that gender is biologically natural, and Alice Kessler-Harris contends that social feminists argued that maternalism deprived women of equal employment opportunity. Equal-rights feminists based on their ideas and strategies on the Declaration of Sentiments which Elizabeth Cady Stanton published in 1848, and they concluded that maternalism could not guarantee social, political, and economic citizenship for women.[15]

Working-class women's living conditions in southwestern states were harsh, and historians have argued that Latinos' identities within the region originated in European settlers' subjugation of indigenous peoples and pervasive vigilantism after the U.S.-Mexico War. Ken Gonzales-Day found that wealthy Californios in Los Angeles distanced themselves from working-class residents of Sonoratown after 1848 by using the word "cholo," and he contends that lynching was the result of the judiciary's failure to check majoritarianism. William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb argue that the vigilance committees which formed in California's mining districts during the 1850s were "critically important" for arguments in favor of capital punishment and that Mexican laborers in Texas were more likely to work in groups, that lynch mobs tended to target them in groups, and the number of Mexican migrants they lynched spiked during the 1910s. Carrigan and Webb also found significantly that residents of Mexico City were among the most vociferous and effective opponents of lynch law within the region. Raúl A. Ramos has called for using "transnational" methods to study Mexican migration, and Monica Muñoz Martinez emphasizes the importance of the Texas Rangers' extrajudicial killings, vigilantes' desecration of Mexican corpses, and folk ballads, or *corridos*, as evidentiary sources.[16]

Capitalists in North America augmented labor demand within the region during the 1920s by using their profits from World War I to invest in many kinds of manufacturing, and this caused both substantial economic variation within different sub-regions and for Mexico to endure a large trade deficit by the mid-1930s. The average value of the commodities that U.S. manufacturers exported to Mexico at the Calexico station in Baja California was more than the average value of the commodities they exported at the El Paso-Juárez crossing (especially agricultural machinery and automobiles), while the total value of U.S. exports that shippers transported to Mexico each month from El Paso during the first half of 1934 was greater than what they transported through Calexico. U.S. exports through Calexico during 1934 were

primarily automobiles, tractors, gasoline, oil, agricultural implements, and construction materials, and their total value rose during the year from $53,846 to $110,926. The total value of the commodities that U.S. importers transported through the station increased during 1933 and 1934 from $351,439 to $476,374, and the total value of the commodities that U.S. exporters each year between 1933 and 1935 was $1,375,869, $1,484,506, and $2,484,881. The commodities that U.S. manufacturers exported to Mexico from El Paso were primarily petroleum, wheat, grains, iron, machinery, and copper from mining districts, and the total value of exports that shippers transported monthly during the first six months of 1934 fluctuated between $218,448.07 to $340,778.60.[17]

Investors caused substantive growth and development within the region by diversifying the economy after World War I, and an increased percentage of young, working-class Latina women sought wage work soon after by competing for higher wages in semiskilled blue- and white-collar occupations during the 1930s and 1940s. Although the proportion of U.S.-born women of Mexican descent who worked in farm labor decreased from 19.7% to 6.3%, the percentage of this population employed in blue-collar occupations rose from 25.3 to 30.9 during those two decades. The proportion working in semiskilled blue-collar occupations increased from 21.9% to 28.1%, and the percentage employed in white-collar occupations – mostly clerical work and sales - more than doubled from 15.4 to 32.4. The percentage working in semiskilled white-collar positions increased from just 10.1 to 23.9. A smaller proportion of young, working-class Latina women worked in agriculture during the 1930s and 1940s by competing for employment in semiskilled blue- and white-collar occupations.[18]

An early historian of the AFL, Philip Taft, argued during the late 1950s that the federation underestimated “the daring, resourcefulness, and generosity” of the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), the American Clothing Workers of America (ACA), the ILGWU, and other CIO affiliates after 1935, and he criticized AFL leaders for responding to Communist workers’ activities “more direct[ly] and rigorous[ly]” than to corruption - and especially racketeering - within labor unions. Examples of such corruption included Al Capone’s criminal syndicate’s installation of the International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees’ (IATSE) vice-president during 1934, the complaint of the ILGWU’s District Council No. 18 in Brooklyn during the 1940s that the painters’ union’s executive board refused to allow them to remove their business agent, Jake Wellner, despite a jury’s recent conviction of him on extortion charges, and the AFL’s expulsion of both the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) for “harboring criminal elements” during the mid-1950s. Ronald Rodash contended in a 1969 study that the president of the AFL during the early twentieth century, Samuel Gompers, strengthened “rightist European conservatives” within the labor movement during World War I by refusing to demand more substantial concessions. Rodash argued further that AFL and CIO leaders accommodated the Truman administration similarly when it adopted its infamous “containment” strategy after the mid-term elections of 1946, and their strategy backfired in Latin America by providing support for La Confederación de los Trabajadores de América Latina (Workers’ Confederation of Latin America, or CTAL) inadvertently. Taft changed his “tune” during the early 1970s when he argued that AFL leaders rejected alliances with labor unions in Communist and fascist countries due to their supposed opposition to totalitarianism.[19]

Organization

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter One studies Latina women’s political activities in Colorado’s coal and sugar-beet districts from 1919 through 1933. Mexican

women attempted to participate in parent-teachers' associations and were among the leaders of Mexican organizations that appealed to Spanish-American residents, and young, working-class Latina women in Huérfano and Las Animas counties joined picket lines when radical coal miners led a statewide strike during the winter of 1927-8. Although sugar-beet workers formed a union, *La Asociación de Betabeleros* (the Beet Workers' Association, or ATB) that included women towards the end of the coal miners' strike, the customary gender-based international division of labor prohibited most Latina members from attaining leadership positions within union. The union folded when state federation of labor withdrew its support after the election of 1930, and it still created social bases in the state for Latina leadership, an internationalist agricultural labor union, and a political organization of working-class Spanish speakers during its three years of existence.

Chapter Two examines the causes and effects of the San Francisco General Strike of 1934. The strike allowed longshoremen's, cooks, and stewards' unions to win control of the hiring process on west-coast waterfronts, desegregate locals in Seattle and San Francisco, and lead a frenetic organizing campaign, the "march inland," during the first wave of sit-down strikes. Agricultural, cannery, and warehouse workers in the Central Valley soon began demanding equal pay, and industrial unionists also needed to respond to additional challenges in Los Angeles. Communist Party leaders and reformers cooperated during the first mayoral recall election of a major U.S. city as industrial workers joined unions in large numbers towards the end of the decade, but they failed to take advantage of the momentum by proposing comprehensive reforms. Farmworkers' concomitant campaign in the Central Valley faltered subsequently as its leaders attempted to challenge the legality of county governments' anti-picketing ordinances.

Chapter Three investigates industrial workers' attempts to form labor unions in south Texas during the 1930s and particularly the leadership of Tejano radicals in agricultural, cigar, apparel, and pecan industries. Communist Party leaders Manuela Solis Sager and Emma Tenayuca led agricultural strikes and protests in San Antonio against both Border Patrol officers' treatment of Mexican migrants and cuts to relief programs after 1935. Industrial unionists' activities culminated with the famous pecan shellers' strike in San Antonio as UCAPAWA launched its statewide organizing campaign, and CIO unions sought to form a "united front" with AFL affiliates while laborites and liberals in the city allied during another successful mayoral recall campaign. Communist Party leaders and reformers also failed to propose comprehensive reforms and instead deferred the responsibility to Tenayuca. Industrial unionists lost momentum abruptly when vigilantes targeted Tenayuca and another Tejano labor leader, Telesforo Oviedo, for retaliation during August of 1939.

Chapter Four studies industrial unionists' activities in southern states during the 1930s and 1940s, which began when sharecroppers in central Alabama rebelled at the height of the unemployment crisis during the Hoover administration. Much of industrial unionists' failure to win lasting victories resulted from their refusal to revolt with mid-level military officers during key moments over the next fifteen years. This was mainly due to the obstinance of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union's (STFU) executive council, although industrial unionists and military officers remained unprepared after the end of World War II. This critical error gave the bourgeoisie and the imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class time to regroup and pass right-to-work laws four southern and southwestern states. Labor unions were subsequently not in position to challenge the Truman administration's invasion of Korea.

Chapter Five studies growth and urban politics in Los Angeles from industrial unionists' organizing campaign during the west-coast maritime workers' strike of 1934 through the first two years of the Korean War. Working women entered labor market to an unprecedented degree in southern California after the U.S. entered World War II, and Latino youth resisted both soldiers' and sailors' frequent harassment and the continued exclusion of black and Latino workers from employment in war industries, public-housing projects, and restrictive deed agreements by leading the first major riots in North America during June of 1943. UCAPAWA and ILWU locals demanded equal pay for cannery, drug-store, and civil-service workers in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties, and the U.S. Navy, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), and the county government responded to wartime protests by desegregating the Navy's officer corps, public-housing projects, and jury selection. The mayor of Los Angeles, Fletcher Bowron, and the governor, Earl Warren, both refused to prosecute vigilantes during several postwar strike waves, which enabled vigilantes to continue targeting black denizens with impunity. Industrial unionism suffered a major setback as a result of the invasion of Korea and the deportation of Luisa Moreno during autumn of 1950, because these two events discouraged police officers from allying with other workers despite their recent formation of a union and criticism of the Bowron administration's treatment of Latino residents.

Chapter Six shifts returns the mining districts of the west-central states where the wives of members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, or Mine-Mill, in Butte County, Montana, founded the first ladies' auxiliary units in North America during the early 1890s. The chapter explains how the "center of gravity" in mining districts moved after World War I from the coal industry to non-ferrous copper, lead, and zinc industries before a little-known war veteran in Grant County, New Mexico, Ernesto Velázquez, led approximately one hundred thirty-five zinc miners and their wives during the famous "Salt of the Earth strike" from October 17, 1950, until January 24, 1952. The members of Mine-Mill Amalgamated Local 890 responded to a superior court's anti-picketing injunction by allowing the ladies' auxiliary unit to lead the union's picketing activities, and a factional conflict soon emerged between Velázquez and the union's president, Cipriano Montoya, who abused and later killed his wife, Feliciana "Chana" Peña Montoya, during the strike. The auxiliary members ceased their picketing activities after non-strikers attacked them violently with their automobiles on August 23, and labor internationalism within the region collapsed after the strike. New Mexico's senator, Dennis Chavez, was a vocal supporter of the Truman administration's containment strategy, persuaded the governments of Mexico and other Latin American countries to recognize the Zionist entity in Palestine, and advocated aiding Anti-Communist labor leaders after the onset of the Korean War, and he remained silent throughout the Empire Zinc Strike.

Industrial unionism was a significant political force in North America during the 1930s and 1940s, and it was working-class Latina women's best means of fulfilling their true potential. Communist labor leaders and auxiliary units were often the most ardent supporters of working-class women's fight for equality. The sit-down strikes of the 1930s were unprecedented events that allowed working people to seize direct control of the means of production, and they won more major concessions and consolidated their gains in the decade that followed. These victories resulted in few lasting gains for Latino workers due to both the Truman administration's invasion of Korea and the deportation of Luisa Moreno. These two events isolated radical Latina women from other internationalists within and without the region, and it was several more decades before they had another chance to lead working-class people's struggle for self-determination.

Chapter One

Migrants and Amazons: Working-Class Spanish Speakers, the State Federation of Labor, and Custom in Colorado, 1919-1933

The heterogenous origins of industrial unionism in the Southwest were evident in the sugar-beet and coal-mining of Colorado during the 1920s. Mexican migrants and Spanish-Americans from New Mexico and southern Colorado found employment in the lower plains and mountainous areas after 1900. Relations between Mexican and Spanish-American migrants ranged from cooperative to conflictual and depended on demographic, economic, and social factors. Prejudice against Mexican families left Mexican women with few alternatives but to participate in social clubs, churches, parent-teacher associations (PTAs), and union activities to augment their autonomy. Yet it was only through labor unions that Mexican laborers allied with other industrial workers both within and without the region.

The sugar-beet industry grew substantially in Colorado after the U.S. Congress imposed steep tariffs on sugar imports in 1897, and its legal restrictions on European migration during and after World War I led companies to recruit laborers in southern Texas and El Paso. Women's leadership was essential for union activities in Mexican communities during the early 1920s, and it enabled them to challenge a polity that encouraged both de jure and de facto discrimination against Mexican residents through a discourse that associated Mexican men with crime. Young, working-class Latina women responded by following their counterparts from eastern and southern Europe by participating in picketing activities during the radical-led – and infamous - "Columbine strike" from October of 1927 until February of 1928. The governor deployed the National Guard regiments from the onset, and the environment devolved after mid-December when the state law enforcement officers targeted, arrested, and killed Mexican men. Spanish-speaking beet workers' formed the ATB towards the end of the strike, which included women

but failed to challenge the gender-based international division of labor. The union folded when the state labor federation withdrew its brief support after the general election of 1930, although it did create social bases in the state for Latina leadership, an internationalist agricultural labor union, and a political organization for working-class Spanish speakers.[1]

This chapter contributes to the historiography of Latino labor by studying Mexican and Spanish American workers' activities in both mining and agricultural industries together. These unions did not discriminate based on national origins or religion, and Mexican women's leadership was necessary for any strike to succeed. Labor historians have tended to concentrate on miners' unions and especially the Columbine strike, although some have also turned their attention more recently to the activity of Mexican and Spanish-American workers. This chapter examines the activities of both beet workers and coal miners, since they often had similar education levels, hailed from Spanish-speaking communities, and joined the same unions in Colorado. The formation of the ATB itself resulted from radicals miners' activities during the Columbine strike.[2]

Male-centered theories regarding wage labor, or what some might call the "theory of male entitlement," through the 1930s often defined social rights in terms of the "family wage" (as opposed to "a woman's wage") and linked citizenship to wage work. Marxist-Feminist intellectuals found a correlation between households' varying costs for social reproduction and women's decisions to seek wage work while attempting to explain the causes of gender-based employment segregation, and others criticized labor-segmentation theorists for failing to analyze the connections between wage labor and community health. Ruth Milkman argued that women in female-dominated industries tended to struggle more with workplace discrimination than hiring, and she cautioned against making general conclusions with regards to gender-based employment. Other scholars contended that a gender-based international division of labor forced female blue- and white-collar workers to compete for higher wages as working women's incomes became increasingly unequal, and this was especially true during the 1920s when an increased percentage of both married and unmarried women sought wage work. De jure discrimination and prejudice against Mexican laborers in Colorado and Texas also limited their ability to seek higher wages.[3]

It is true that high wages during World War I and the subsequent proliferation of new technologies, consumer goods, and cheap credit allowed consumption in North America during the 1920s, but these changes did not challenge the belief that Mexican women were not qualified for higher-paying occupations or the "woman's wage." The "flapper" phenomenon diminished the artificial distinction between home and work for many, but the flappers were primarily white-collar workers and did not represent the experiences of married women whose proportion of the female wage-earning population increased during the decade from 22.8% (less than two million) to 28.8% (over 3 million). The notion of the selfish, individualistic woman provided rationales for less pay and opposing minimum wage laws, and Mexican women in North America were vulnerable in other ways. Novelist Daniel Venegas portrayed the deportation of a Mexican family after the wife finds her husband cheating on her with a "*pelona*," or flapper, at a movie theater in his 1928 Spanish-language novel, *Las Aventuras de Don Chipote*. Although working-class Latina women aspired for higher wages, employment, housing, and legal discrimination against their parents also relegated them to low-wage industries and especially farm labor.[4]

Members of the National Women's Party (NWP) sought to continue the suffragists' success after Congress passed the twentieth amendment by proposing an equal-rights amendment (also known as the "Lucretia Mott Amendment"), and the Wilson administration attempted to co-opt the Russian Revolution, in part, by establishing the Women's Bureau within the

Department of Labor in 1919. The director of the Women's Bureau during the 1920s, Mary Anderson, was a social feminist who adhered to the doctrine of "separate spheres," supported only gender-based protective legislation, and opposed the Lucretia Mott Amendment and equal-pay legislation, and Alice Paul faced a major challenge for the NWP's leadership from radical journalist from Denver, Doris Stevens, during the mid-1930s. There were no social citizenship or "social rights" in North America by the 1930s. Some historians have argued that while minimum wage laws are exemplary of social citizenship, childcare programs pertain to economic citizenship.[5]

Marxist-feminist historians have analyzed social and economic citizenship, and Latino historians have questioned the extents to which Mexican working-class culture in Colorado was unique and typical for the region. Rejecting the notion that Mexicans and Spanish-Americans in Colorado had merely mimicked their counterparts in larger states like Texas and California, historian Dennis Nodín Valdés argued that Spanish-speaking communities in Colorado had a particular set of characteristics. Segregation made the experiences of Mexicans and Spanish-Americans workers in the sugar beet industry much more similar to those of Afro-American workers as opposed to "German-Russians" who also worked in beets in the lower plains. Nodín Valdés argued that Mexican residents endured worse kinds of prejudice than their Spanish-American counterparts. These differences did not prevent Mexican and Spanish-American beet workers from attempting to cooperate through the ATB.[6]

Few Colorado historians studied Mexican labor before the 1980s. Although it was tangentially pertinent to Mexican workers, social scientists first investigated the widespread employment of child labor in the sugar beet industry during the 1910s. Latino historians have tended in recent decades to examine the impact of the Ku Klux Klan's (KKK) activities on Mexican communities in Colorado. Ernesto P. Vigil argues that KKK members in the state often targeted Catholics and Mexicans after they founded the statewide organization during May of 1921. Although many elected officials' (including a governor) within the Republican Party were openly KKK members during the 1920s, few historians have examined their activities in relation to Mexican and Spanish-American workers' union activities.[7]

This chapter studies the impact of beet workers' and coal miners' union activity in Colorado during the 1920s. Part I examines the development of the sugar beet industry and migrations (especially from northern and central Mexico) both to the state after 1900. Part II investigates the character of work, social relations among beet workers, tenants, farmers and law enforcement; and Spanish-speaking women's political activities. Part III analyzes the Columbine strike's impact on beet workers' union activities, the state federation of labor, party politics. These sections will contribute to the historiography of labor in Colorado by studying the relationship between the state federation of labor and the Democratic Party.

"openly opposed the election"

The development of Colorado's sugar-beet industry began incrementally during the last third of the nineteenth century and accelerated rapidly with the rise of the Great Western Sugar Company (GWSC) during the early 1900s. Colonial settlers forced indigenous peoples onto reservations shortly after the U.S.-Ute treaty of 1868, and insufficient investment delayed the introduction of large-scale, intensive agriculture into lowland areas and the foothills of the western plains until Congress passed tariffs on sugar imports after 1886 and 1897. These tariffs enabled the new industry to grow exponentially and make Colorado the leading sugar-beet producer among all U.S. states by World War I. Sugar-beet companies first recruited German-Russian laborers from Nebraska during the early 1900s, and their labor agents soon turned to

Mexicans and Spanish-Americans workers. Mexican migrants sought employment throughout the western states, and some worked in the state's sugar-beet and coal districts.

The sugar beet industry required the ethnic cleansing of indigenous peoples, tariff legislation, the introduction of irrigation systems, and new soil and water management practices to enable economies of scale. The GWSC commenced refining operations in the South Platte River Valley at the turn of the century in the town of Loveland, Larimer County. Sugar beets differed from other cash crops due to their ability to grow within alkali soils, and growers needed to restore the soil's nutrients after the first few years intensive capital-investment. The company completed a major drainage project in the valley and established more refineries in Eaton, Greeley, and Windsor (each of which is located in Weld County), as well as in Fort Collins, Larimer County, and Longmont. Table I lists the years and locations in which the GWSC established its refineries from 1900 through 1927.[8]

The sugar-beet industry depended heavily on tariffs from its very inception. Although Congress's tariff legislation in 1887 failed to make sugar-beet production profitable, the "Dingley Tariff" that it enacted ten years later did. Investors needed higher tariffs due to competition with Cuban and Filipino sugar growers and traders. Filipino growers and merchants were not subject to tariffs restrictions but rather were "duty-free," and they expanded operations significantly after 1917. The sugar-beet industry's dependence on tariffs did not by itself explain why "an official of the United States Beet Sugar Association, which included Great Western as a member" decided to "openly opposed the election" of Democratic candidate Alfred E. Smith during the presidential campaign of 1928.[9]

Sugar beet companies concentrated beet production within three of the state's distinctive sub-regions, which were the northeastern South Platte River Valley, the Arkansas River Valley (which is bound by southeastern counties and the state of Kansas), and the foothills of a mountainous area near Grand Junction and Delta. The GWSC consolidated its market share in the South Platte River Valley quickly during the early 1900s, which left it in a position to maintain its advantage by World War I. The company's competitors within the state never overcame their subsequent disadvantages. The Holly Sugar and American Sugar companies purchased lands in the Arkansas River Valley, and they located production near refineries to reduce transportation costs. Small-scale farmers purchased small plots of land in the foothills near the Grand and Garrison rivers. [10]

Although this initial struggle for territory had ended when the U.S. entered World War I, increased wartime demand for imports in Europe made another spurt of market expansion possible. Colorado also became the leading sugar beet producer in North America during the war. California, Colorado, and Utah were producing the most beets annually by 1913, and the state surpassed California by the end of the decade. The GWSC expanded its land holdings over the next several years until they dwarfed those of the Holly and American Sugar Companies by a factor of nine. Colorado's sugar-beet industry was relatively efficient, since it both possessed 30.2% of total beet acreage and was responsible for 35.6% of total production in North America by 1927.[11]

The expansion of the state's sugar-beet industry caused farmers' labor demands to increase, and this was why began recruiting contract workers indirectly through refining companies. Sugar-beet companies' recruiters did not travel far initially to find labor. The first beet workers to migrate to the South Platte River Valley were "German-Russians" from southern Colorado "converged" with them quickly over the next few years. Beet workers' Nebraska during the early 1900s, and Belgian, Japanese, and Spanish-American migrants from contracts

Table I: Establishment of Sugar Refineries in Northeastern Colorado By Year

Location	Year	Location	Year	Location	Year
Loveland	1900	Longmont	1903	Fort Lupton	1920
Eaton	1902	Sterling	1905	Ovid	1926
Greeley	1902	Brush	1906	Johnstown	1927
Windsor	1903	Fort Morgan	1906		
Fort Collins	1903	Brighton	1917		

Paul Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte Valley, Colorado," pg. 102.

usually covered approximately twenty acres of land, and this was between three and four times as the average acreage of beet workers' contracts in Michigan. The early and rapid expansion of beet acreage, introduction of new technologies, and improvement of production and transportation processes in Colorado's sugar-beet industry caused labor demand and migration to increase after the Spanish-American War.[12]

Sugar-beet workers who labored in Colorado originated from many regions, and employers in both sugar-beet and coal mining industries recruited Mexican workers increasingly during World War I. It is also true the number of Mexican sugar-beet workers had surpassed the number of Spanish-Americans by as early as 1905. Labor demands depended on labor supply and market conditions, and a shortage of German-Russian labor after 1912 led sugar companies to recruit more Spanish-Americans from the coal-mining districts of Pueblo, Walsenburg, and Trinidad in southern Colorado. Coal companies hired more Mexican workers despite receiving opposition from both coal operators and sugar-beet companies. Few German-Russians worked in sugar beets by 1917 due to pervasive anti-German sentiments, and this forced companies to search elsewhere for labor. The GWSC recruited more Spanish-Americans from New Mexico initially, and other companies' labor agents traveled to El Paso, Texas, to contract migrant workers. The Colorado state legislature banned German-language instruction in public schools, and it mandated primary- and secondary-school attendance for children in 1919. Tens of thousands of Mexican laborers moved to Colorado as the Mexican population rose in the state from approximately 3,200 to 57,676 between 1920 and 1930.[13]

Employers recruited Mexican labor amidst increased calls for restricting Mexican migration during the late 1920s. Sugar companies contracted with Mexican workers (many of whom had never previously worked in sugar beets) from the Texan cities of El Paso, Fort Worth, and San Antonio in much greater numbers after 1919. Much of this population growth was due to the GWSC's new strategy of recruiting entire families instead of only Mexican men that it commenced one year later. The Holly Sugar Company's labor agents contracted 600 workers from El Paso and another 200 from New Mexico; the American Sugar Beet Company recruited 1,000 laborers from El Paso; and the GWSC recruited between 4,000 and 5,000 laborers from El Paso, 2,500 from New Mexico, 2,500 from Denver, and an undetermined amount from Kansas City during the winter of 1927-8. Although some migrant workers remained in Colorado during the winter, many others sought higher wages in the Midwest's railroad, steel, and automobile industries.[14]

The construction of transcontinental railroads had caused market integration in Mexico and the U.S. from the 1860s and early 1880s, and it is worth asking whether the cause of Mexican migration to North America was the result of wartime anti-German sentiments and the

immigration restrictions for eastern and southern European countries that Congress passed during the 1920s. Many Mexican beet workers took advantage of the U.S.'s massive industrial growth by leaving the fields to work in newer industries and especially automobile factories in midwestern cities and towns like Chicago, Detroit, Saginaw, Flint, and Pontiac. Employers in Colorado's sugar-beet industry that paid daily wage that were between $2.80 and $3.24 for agricultural work, and automobile companies paid between $4 and $4.50. The Texas state government sought to stem northward migration of Mexican workers by enacting the "Emigrant Agency Law" during the early summer of 1929. The statute attempted to restrict the recruitment activities of sugar beet and railroad companies and Mexican workers' ability to seek higher wages outside the state through taxation and regulation.[15]

Many beet workers in Colorado were from Mexico's northern and central states and sought refuge during the mid-1910s. Latino labor historian Rodolfo Acuña has argued that migrants from northern Mexico created new neighborhoods in western U.S. cities and towns called "Chihuahitas," that they named after the Mexican general, Francisco "Pancho" Villa, who Served as governor of the Mexican state of Chihuahua briefly during 1913-1914. These networks of working-class Mexicans extended at least as far north as Colorado and possibly Chicago. Paul Taylor interviewed a man during the beet harvest of 1928 who reported that the town of Walsenburg, Huérfano County, received a steady "stream" of migrants from the state of Chihuahua, and a member of a fraternal club, *la comisión honorífica* [the Honorific Commission], reported that most Mexican residents in Longmont also were. A Mexican woman, Signera Torres, informed Taylor that the entire Mexican neighborhood at Fort Morgan was originally from Chihuahua. J. Limón observed that most Mexican residents of Gilcrest were from the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato, and another interviewee from the town claimed they heard that every migrant worker from Michoacán migrated to Chicago (Table II presents information regarding the regional origins of Mexican migrants who resided in the Winter Garden District of South Texas, Chicago, and the Imperial Valley of California).[16]

Several other people that Taylor interviewed were from Guanajuato and had worked previously in both California and Texas and for railroad companies in the Midwest before migrating to Colorado. One tenant farmer, Pablo González, left the state in 1912 as a result of the "Madero revolution", and he found employment at a cement plant in Colton, California, and at a ranch in Texas. González also picked grapes near Stockton, California, and melons and cotton in the Imperial Valley, and his also worked for railroad companies in California, Oregon, and near Chicago. His friend, Ramón Cárdenas, had leased land in Guanajuato before migrating and worked both at a cement plant and in agriculture in California. Cárdenas served as president of a Mexican labor organization, *Socieded Obreras Libres* [Free Workers' Society], in Beckham, Colorado, as well.[17]

The state's beet industry functioned through a contracting system based on written contracts that the GWSC introduced in 1901, and its purpose was to prevent employees from quitting to work for other employers. These contracts included "holdback" clauses that allowed growers to withhold beet workers' wages as collateral during each growing season, and the stipulations strengthened bonds and alliances between farmers sugar companies, and financiers. The company consulted with the Mountain States Beet Growers' Association before drafting its labor contracts, and its field managers and superintendents were responsible for mediating labor disputes between beet workers and growers. Growers contracted with the sugar companies through different terms that guaranteed their security. The GWSC offered a "minimum payment" if prices decreased, and it increased payments on a sliding scale when sugar prices increased.[18]



Paul Taylor, "Note on Streams of Mexican Migration." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (September, 1930), pg. 287.

Rapid price fluctuations sometimes forced sugar companies and growers to adjust. The company's experiment station in Longmont began to disseminate information regarding new cultivation techniques through its monthly newsletter, *Through the Leaves*, in 1913, and it advised growers to address problems pertaining to substandard housing within six years. The newsletter published farmers' letters written and articles that discussed recent agronomics research. A Colorado historian who studied Mexican and Spanish-American migration to northeastern Colorado, Gregory Chase, found that editors published more articles that encouraged growers to build adequate housing for beet workers after 1918, and there was another sharp increase during the late 1920s. *Through the Leaves* helped farmers maintain their quality of life by reducing costs.[19]

Companies' were beet workers' and farmers' main creditors in sugar-beet districts, and growers also vied with companies to offer loans to beet workers. The GWSC was the only company that offered growers loans indirectly through banks. The companies offered two kinds of credit to beet workers. They attempted to coerce Mexican migrants residing permanently in sugar-beet districts during winters with housing loans, and they offered credit before each planting season to purchase commodities from local merchants. Whereas beet workers in the Arkansas River Valley received credit directly from the company, beet workers in the South Platte River Valley procured loans directly from farmers.[20]

"I don't see no difference"

Beet workers, tenants, and farmers cooperated to produce, clean, and transport sugar for refineries, and Mexican migrants had a limited number of employment options within a highly-competitive labor market. They had few alternatives but to work in sugar beets and coal mines, and this offered a major potential source of comradery with other working-class Spanish speakers who shared an environment that included low wages and dangerous working conditions. Mexican workers' undocumented status, low wages, and exclusion from parent-teacher associations exacerbated inequality within the state, and many Spanish-Americans

reverted to a prejudicial and pervasive discourse that associated Mexican laborers with crime without evidence. Mexican migrants still augmented their individual and collective autonomy through a variety of means. Many took advantage of Protestant and Catholic churches' evangelical competition (especially in Huérfano County) and joined a variety of social clubs, and many of their actions coincided with major strikes and union activities in the state's mining districts for which Mexican women's leadership was central.

Beet laborers' work was arduous. Farmers were responsible for planting during the second week of April, and beet workers' first tasks were to "block" and "thin" the plants for five or six weeks after the plants were between one and one-and-a-half inches high. Blocking entailed using a bread hoe to remove beets with lesser yields while leaving the rest twelve inches apart. Another beet worker who was usually young followed blocking by weeding and thinning by hand. Beet workers weeded for a second or third time during the summer either by using a hoe or by hand. They needed to block and thin the plants quickly from six in the morning until seven in the evening, and many migrated during June and July to work in other crops and industries in Colorado and the Midwest.[21]

Farmers were responsible for irrigation, and beet workers returned to hoe (which did not need to be completed as quickly) for four or five weeks. Six or seven weeks transpired before farmers hired crews and used a horse-drawn machine called a "lifter" to loosen the beets in the ground, and beet workers harvested the plants during October. Beet laborers yanked the plants from the ground, began cleaning them by knocking them together several times, and placed them in a pile, and another beet worker used an eighteen-inch knife hooked sharply at the end to "top," or "hook," chopping off the plant's crown of leaves "with a steep, downward stroke." Pulling and topping also needed to be completed quickly due to impending frosts during the winter. One former beet worker recalled that work crews used coal miners' lamps to continue harvesting at night and worked through the next day.[22]

Either the farmer or a member of their crew loaded the beets onto a wagon or a truck and washed them as they transported the commodities to local refineries, and farmers were attempting to introduce labor-saving machinery by the autumn of 1928 to haul and load beets from storage piles. Sugar beets are bulky and heavy, and companies reduced transportation costs by locating their refineries near sugar-beet farms. High transportation costs and distance from urban markets also led farmers in the Lower Platte River Valley to depend heavily on monoculture by "maximizing" beet acreage. Refineries operated seasonally for approximately four months, and sugar companies did not employ Mexican labor at these factories. The refineries operated during the harvest, and this was one of the reasons it was difficult for beet laborers to search better wages throughout the year.[23]

Both beet laborers and growers contracted with sugar companies, whereas tenants, or "leasers," were "in between." Some Mexican beet workers did occasionally become tenants, and this was especially true for migrants who worked in sugar-beet districts before World War I. Leasing was less common in the South Platte River Valley than the Arkansas River Valley, and there were two kinds of tenancy. Some tenants paid one-fourth to one-fifth of beets yields, one-third of grains and corn, and one-half to three-fifths of alfalfa to landlords who paid their water taxes and maintenance costs, and others who leased land that farmers did not own completed tasks that included maintained irrigation systems, hauling manure, and half of planting in exchange for two-fifths of the beet yield (another two-fifths went to the farmer and the last fifth to the landlord). Paul Taylor found that tenancy rates in Colorado's sugar- beet districts increased between 1917 and 1927 from fifty-seven to sixty-seven percent. Table III presents

information regarding the national origins of sugar-beet farmers in the towns of northeastern Colorado from 1909 through 1927, and Table IV contains information for ninety tenants of Mexican descent in northeastern Colorado during the year 1927.[24]

Mexican farmworkers also migrated to other parts of Colorado in search of higher wages. A "good number" found work in the coal mines of Weld, Erie, and Lafayette counties located in the central part of the state and further south in Walsenburg, and this explains, in part, why the international representative for the Industrial Workers of the World's (IWW) executive board, Paul Seidler, estimated that approximately forty percent of Mexican miners in the state had previously worked in beets. Others found employment working in Ingleside's limestone quarries near Fort Collins, feeding farmers' livestock, and harvesting melons in the Arkansas Valley, and those few who owned dry farms in New Mexico returned there after harvests. At least one sugar-beet company assisted employees to find work in railroads, mining, or picking cotton, and this explains why the author of a Works Progress Administration (WPA) study of sugar-beet workers in Weld County found during the late 1930s that many found work in other occupations (especially other agricultural crops but also railroads and coal mining) and families' average "tenure" in farm labor was approximately seven years. Conditions were different when unemployment reached critical levels ten years earlier, since many Mexican laborers had no alternative but to winter on farms or in nearby towns.[25]

Relations between beet workers, tenants, and growers varied according to the character of work at each farm and locality, and far too many were silent in response to widespread prejudice against Mexican laborers. Some Spanish-Americans emphasized their European ancestry while ignoring their Mexican ancestry, and they did so while proponents of immigration restriction and law enforcement officers targeted Mexican communities. A sheriff informed Paul Taylor that two-thirds of arrests of Larimer County were of Mexican and Spanish-American residents. Although his deputy reported that most offenses were for petty crimes (and Taylor's own examination of county records found that only twenty-six percent of arrests were either of Mexican or Spanish-American residents), the sheriff still claimed that "we'd be better off without them." A clerk in Ft. Collins, T. Aragon, stated that Spanish-American residents disliked Mexican residents based on their perception that many were illegally producing and selling alcohol, or "bootlegging."[26]

The notion of "Mexican criminality" was one of several potential causes of conflict between working-class Spanish speakers, and employers used this antagonism to their advantage. Some Spanish-American residents emphasized their European ancestry to distinguish themselves from Mexican laborers. Although one beet worker from Denver, John Vazquez, asserted to Taylor both that he was Castilian and his Spanish was "purer," he also acknowledged that some of his ancestors were indigenous people. Sugar-beet companies exploited these divisions ruthlessly, since a labor intendant from Iliff, Logan County, admitted that his company paid lower wages to Mexican employees based on the rationale that they "don't know what the work is worth." Mexican communities were vulnerable, and many Spanish-American workers sought to avoid similar circumstances by distancing themselves socially and politically.[27]

Some observers argued that the source of divisions between Mexican and Spanish-American residents within the state was competition for employment, and yet evangelical rivalry between Protestant and Catholic clergy gave working-class Spanish speakers the opportunity to form new bonds and alliances. A Methodist minister in Brush, Morgan County, named Bauman delivered sermons in Spanish at six towns in northeastern Colorado, and he reported that a Catholic person from the town of Hudson, Gutiérrez, both attended a Presbyterian school in New

Table III: Nationality of Sugar Beet Growers in Northeastern Colorado Between 1909 and 1927

Factory District	**Mexicans**	**Japanese**	**German-Russians**	**Others**	**Total**
Eaton	3	8	233	416	660
Greeley	28	5	188	467	688
Windsor	0	0	251	228	479
Fort Collins	15	0	328	515	858
Loveland	6	1	256	245	508
Longmont	17	18	170	822	1,027
Fort Lupton	18	69	67	265	419
Brighton	33	47	159	510	749
Brush	6	5	220	204	435
Fort Morgan	5	10	322	218	555
Sterling	5	10	197	254	466
Ovid (includes small amount of acreage in Nebraska	17	18	199	268	502
Total in N.E. Colorado 1909	20	133	665	3,171	3,989
Percent, 1909	0.5	3.3	16.7	79.5	100
Total in N.E. Colorado 1927	153	191	2,590	4,412	7,346
Percent, 1927	2.1	2.6	35.2	60.1	100

Paul Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte Valley, Colorado," pg. 184.

Table IV: Country of Birth for Ninety Beet Growers of Mexican Descent in Eight Towns of Northeastern Colorado, 1927

	Mexico	U.S.
Ovid	13	2
Eaton	3	0
Loveland	2	0
Greeley	13	15
Brighton	5	14
Longmont	2	9
Fort Collins	0	7
Brush	4	1
Totals	42	48

Paul Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte Valley, Colorado," pg. 188.

Mexico and was "sympathetic" to their denomination. Protestant and Catholic clergy soon closed ranks by cooperating as the unemployment crisis worsened. The state chapter of the lay-Catholic organization, the Knights of Columbus, responded to deteriorating economic conditions in 1926 by establishing the Mexican Welfare Committee. Although the committee was primarily concerned with limiting Protestant missionaries' success among Spanish-speaking Catholics (especially regarding school enrollment), its director, Thomas Mahony, delivered a speech to the Grace Methodist Church in Denver during the autumn of 1929.[28]

Although Protestant and Catholic leaders cooperated, religion remained a taboo subject in many Spanish-speaking communities. T. Aragon explained to Taylor that most Mexican and Spanish-American Catholics refused to marry white residents due to their Protestant religion. The aforementioned Mexican woman from Fort Morgan, Signera Torres, argued that there were intense religious division within Chihuahita based on residents' hostility towards her recent conversion to Methodism. Protestant leaders also vied with each other to recruit new church members. Protestant Mexicans in southern Colorado and especially the coal-mining communities of Las Animas and Huérfano counties (where the Spanish-American community was well-established) were usually Presbyterians. IWW organizers were most active in these counties during the year before the statewide coal miners' strike.[29]

Protestant leaders' evangelical successes among working-class Spanish speakers caused concern for their Catholic rivals, and members of both religious groups evinced prejudice that limited their ability to recruit new members. Although he refuted the notion that Mexican and Spanish-American migrants stole Euro-American residents' employment opportunities, Mahony asserted without evidence that Mexicans and Spanish-Americans had "dumped" unemployed people on Catholic charities in Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska during his 1931 speech to the Mexican Welfare Committee. There was also evidence of prejudice within Protestants' ranks. Social scientist Robert McLean advised Protestant churches to avoid associating with KKK members to improve their chances of converting the state's Mexican and Spanish-American residents. Prejudice and bigotry within various Catholic and Protestant denominations threatened to hinder their missionary projects among Spanish-speaking people in midwestern states.[30]

There is direct and indirect evidence that there were many active KKK chapters in the Arkansas and South Platte river valleys during the 1920s, and this included the activities of teachers and educational administrators. Two interviewees reported to Taylor that one KKP chapter had recently held a rally that led to a riot in Brighton, Adams County, and this was after both the Mexican community and the town's population as a whole had grown during the mid-1920s. A principal in Swink, Otero County, named Welch stated that he resisted local members efforts to "lobby" for the dismissal a Spanish-American janitor, and he admitted that he refused to enforce the state's school-attendance law for Mexican children. Welch also acknowledged that while "amalgamation may be the solution of the Mexican problem," he "did not want to see it." The superintendent of schools for Weld County, F.A. Ogle, responded to one student's claim that her teacher was a KKK member by labeling her a "dirty Mexican."[31]

Segregation and de jure discrimination were new phenomena in Colorado during the 1920s, and property owners were often leading proponents. KKK members convinced several business owners in northeastern Colorado to post signs that read "No Mexicans Allowed." Others put up signs in Longmont which claimed that their services were for the "White Trades Only," and the owner of a theater in the town of Delney also mandated segregation. Taylor also found that there were "race restrictions" for housing in Brighton. Mexican residents and their

allies resisted these practices openly on some occasions, such as when they persuaded proprietors in Greeley, Weld County, to remove exclusionary signs.[32]

Taylor himself also evinced beliefs about Mexicans that did not comport with his evidence, and his reasoning paralleled other social scientists' who asserted after the mid-1960s that a "culture of poverty" was an explanatory factor. Taylor did acknowledge that "unfavorable economic conditions" such as low sugar prices were why both Mexican migrants moved to the state and why residents demonstrated prejudice against Mexican laborers during the 1920s. Yet Taylor lamented Mexican beet workers' supposed "lack the ambition to get ahead economically" and that "the cultural gap to be bridged is greatest in the case of the Mexicans." Taylor's reasoning reified "culture," was tautological, and confounded cause and effect. This was why his conclusion did not adequately explain the causes of prejudice.[33]

Working-class Spanish speakers in Colorado endured prejudice while seeking employment, and they responded by joining mutual-aid societies, churches, and schools. Their participation in both clubs such as La Cruz Azul [the Blue Cross] and honorific commissions demonstrated their affinity for Mexican history and politics, and they sought to protect migrants from exploitative employers and prejudicial residents. Yet the available resources that Mexican organizations was sometimes limited. A prison chaplain reported to the Catholic National Welfare Committee that many Mexicans migrants often legal counsel. Mexican residents' motivation for joining Spanish-speakers' organizations was not nostalgia or "culture" but rather increasing their autonomy, and there were only a few avenues for them to accomplish this.[34]

Mexican residents' primary means for improving their families' health and well-bring was increasing and developing their skills, and the purpose of schools was for their children to do this. Mexican women's strategy was to join PTAs. Taylor found evidence that several Mexican women in Colorado did so by the fall of 1929, but several school administrators prohibited them. This did not deter all of them, and an elementary school principle in Rocky Ford, Otero County, reported that Mexican women were attending PTA meetings with their children. Conflicts between Mexican and Spanish-American students were another barrier for Latino students to pursue their education. One high school student who aspired to become a teacher, Katie Martinez, informed the researcher that Mexican and Spanish-American youth at her school teased each other frequently.[35]

Mexican laborers needed Spanish-Americans and other residents to cooperate on an egalitarian basis so they could improve their lives more quickly, and the extent that they did varied by neighborhood and locality. One Spanish-American clerk from Berwind Canyon, Las Animas County, reported that that the local chapter of the Hispanic-American Alliance [*La Alianza Hispano-Americana*] included Mexican residents who had recently migrated from the state of Nuevo León and central Mexico. One tenant farmer, Juan Rodríguez, asserted that "I don't see no difference" between Mexicans and Spanish-Americans. Perhaps the best evidence of comradery between working-class Spanish speakers was their decision to join industrial labor unions. Nor was this tendency always limited to Spanish-speaking laborers, since a mining superintendent in Wilson, Dolores County, reported both that Mexican residents joined the IWW and that the "Negroes and Mexicans" in the area were "get[ting] along alright."[36]

Mexican women's leadership of social clubs in Colorado often coincided with major labor strikes during the early 1920s. The international vice-president of the UMW's fifteenth district, Felix Pogliani, provided Taylor with invaluable information by reporting that miners in Weld and Boulder counties first won collective-bargaining agreements in 1910, and they continued striking over the next four years before the total Mexican population in the state from

1,618 to 3,218 doubled between 1918 and 1922. Mexican, Russian, Slavic, and Polish coal miners struck with the IWW for five months in 1922 before law enforcement officers appealed to militias and rangers to intervene. Mexican women organized a chapter of La Cruz Azul that year in the mining town of Morley, Las Animas County, and Mary and Eva Pérez formed another in the northern town of Brush one year later. Doña Josefa y Domínguez established La Sociedad Mutualista in that town during 1927, and the organization opened its membership to both Mexican and Spanish-American residents.[37]

"greatly admired for their excellent qualifications and zest"

Many Mexican and Spanish-American workers in Colorado concluded that industrial unionism was their best means of achieving more individual and community autonomy. Many coal miners were UMW members before they joined IWW-affiliated unions during the 1920s, and their activities culminated with the statewide coal strike that sought to end regional wage disparities. Young women joined picket lines in Trinidad, Las Animas County, when the strike began, and the state government responded by targeting Mexican strikers violently. The ATB's leaders failed to include working-class women, because they refused to criticize the gender-based international division of labor, reified relations between women and men, and tended to "think" tautologically. The ATB soon folded when the AFL withdrew its support immediately after the election, and beet workers participated in a regional farm labor strike two years later.

The beet workers' decision to form the ATB was a direct consequence of the Columbine strike. The southern district was where IWW led the strike and law enforcement officers targeted Mexican workers violently. Organizers in Walsenburg recruited women to the picket lines when the strike began on October 18, and they intended for the pickets to function as "a test case" for the entire southern district. The Mexican consul in Denver, José Y. Vazquéz, implored Mexican residents of the town to refrain from cooperating with the IWW at a meeting that evening. IWW organizers had already been active in southern Colorado for approximately one year, so it was hardly surprising that Mexican residents did not heed the consul's advice.[38]

The initial newspaper accounts of the strike mentioned little about Mexican strikers apart from Vazquéz's counsel during the meeting in Walsenburg. The initial reports pertained rather to the leadership of young women of eastern and southern European descent who recruited picketers during the second week of the strike, which was not long after the IWW moved its strike headquarters from Trinidad to Walsenburg. Seventeen-year old Millie Cuchich spoke to a meeting of several hundred strikers in Walsenburg, and law enforcement officers in Trinidad released strike leaders Milka Sablich and Kristen Svanum of Butte, Montana, from jail. Their strategy succeeded, since fifty women joined the picket lines the day after twenty-year old Julia Talentino "assailed" strikers in Trinidad for refusing to "get on the line." Working women's leadership caused strike activities in Huérfano and Las Animas counties to grow.[39]

Governor William H. Adams responded swiftly by altering his strategy from excluding the IWW from negotiations to declaring martial law and assigning military personnel to the southern districts. Adams refused Huérfano County officials' request to order an anti-picketing injunction when the strike commenced, and he soon proposed that not the IWW but rather the UMW represent strikers for negotiations in Walsenburg on October 25. Adams appointed state police colonel Louis Scherf to direct the newly-reconstituted state law enforcement department, or the "Colorado Rangers" (which the state government had abolished during the spring of 1927), one week later, and he detailed at least eighty state police and national guardsmen to the southern district. Adams ordered the National Guard to send Douglas bombers from Denver to

join the reconnaissance missions of three observation planes in Pueblo. Adams's response to picketers' success was to assign more law enforcement officers to the mining districts.[40]

The governor's deployment of military personnel did not impact the strikers' activities substantially. Law enforcement officers arrested every known IWW leader in the southern district, and picketing in the northern district continued throughout the month of November as the "military presence" increased there as well. At least 1,000 members met in Lafayette on November 8 to discuss a proposal to appeal directly to the state's industrial commission, and IWW members in Fort Lupton held another meeting three days later. A state police officer in Weld County informed reporters soon after that they planned "a radical change of policy" that entailed collaborating with the Rocky Mountain Fuel Company's (RMFC) guards at its Columbine mine in the town of Serene to halt picketing activities. One of their primary motivations was to prevent the strike from spreading to other areas of Colorado.[41]

The miners garnered support from other unions in the state as government officials evinced strong disagreement – and perhaps even divisions – regarding how to respond. Both railroad workers in southern Colorado and denizens of Denver rallied to the miners' cause, and a federal judge issued a ruling that affirmed the principle of habeas corpus. 400 employees of the Denver and Salt Lake Railroad Company and members of trainmen's and locomotive engineers' unions in Moffat, Saguache, voted during early November to strike for wage increases. Federal District Court Judge J. Foster Symes approved writs of habeas corpus for four jailed strikers one week later, and both a Communist-affiliated legal-aid organization, the International Labor Defense (ILD), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sent representatives to two large rallies in Denver the next day where speakers protested the "'armed intervention' by the state" in both Spanish and English. Law enforcement officers' tactics backfired, in other words, and allowed the strikers to garner popular support and a modicum of legal protection.[42]

State officials escalated – while pretending to de-escalate – the conflict by attempting to divide the strikers, and their method was to use grotesque "profiling" tactics against Mexican strikers. They began by targeting Mexican strikers in southern Colorado. Law enforcement officers responded on November 22, 1927, by firing on approximately 600 picketers at Columbine mine, killing six people, and injuring over thirty others. Both *The New York Times* and *The Nation* printed articles regarding the attacks, and Sherf claimed through testimony several days later that the picketers "stormed" the mine's gate in the southwestern part of Weld County. Historians have found recently by reviewing company informants' reports that police officers also arrested sixty-four people during a raid at the union hall in Trinidad on December 25, and Mexican residents of the town responded several weeks later by protesting that law enforcement officers were "turning out some of the Spanish Americans" while "holding the Old Mexicos." Officials altered their strategy after their violent actions at the Columbine mine by harassing and incarcerating Mexican strikers.[43]

The officials' new strategy impacted the strike, although the specific extent was not immediately apparent. The IWW agreed to participate in mediation during early December as temperatures lowered to sub-zero levels. The industrial commission first received testimony from miners in the northern district, and its hearings for that area concluded on December 23. The commission conducted its hearings for the southern district on January 12, and it coincided with law enforcement officers' violent targeting of Latino protestors in Walsenburg. State police murdered a teenager, Celestine Martinez, and Clemente Chavez on the day that the commission held its hearing in the town, and they defended their actions by claiming that some protesters had been sniping. The industrial commission completed its hearing that day.[44]

Figure 1. *The Rocky Mountain News*, November 14, 1927, pg. 1.

The strike ended gradually after the industrial commission concluded its hearings when some mining operators began to offer wage increases. The strikers disagreed how to proceed, and they voted on February 7 on a proposal to end the walkout pending the industrial commission's decision regarding the mine operators' proposal. The locals in Aguilar, Valdez, and Trinidad were the only that voted to return to work. An IWW organizer, A.O. Embree, advised the strikers to "remember the sacrifices made by your fellow workers," and the rest of the locals also agreed to return to work twelve days later. No district attorney or state prosecutor ever investigated or charged the police officers who killed eight people during the strike. There is no credible evidence that strikers used violence.[45]

A member of the IWW, Ed Delaney, asserted that the strikers won concessions for all of their original twenty-two demands, but there was little justice in the strike's outcome due to elected officials' refusal to investigate the killing of strikers. Although the strikers had originally demanded $7.75, the companies raised daily wages by one dollar to up to $6.52 for miners in the southern district and $7.27 for those in the northern district. UMW-affiliated miners in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri also struck for daily wages of $7.50 during the winter, and employers conceded the demanded wage to 5,000 of 57,000 strikers in southern Illinois. The RMFC signed a contract with the UMW's fifteenth district that included a clause for "a definite method of settling disputes" during the following August, and liberal attorney Edward P. Costigan – who represented union members during the Ludlow strike of 1913-4 and was a member of the Tariff Commission - was one of the signatories. The coal strike of 1927-8 was mixed victory at best, because it did not resolve the problems of labor repression and regional wage differentials.[46]

Agricultural workers in northern Colorado continued to organize after the coal miners' strike ended. Their challenges included the state labor federation's calls for excluding Mexican migrants in response to rising unemployment and deciding whether to support Costigan's senatorial candidacy during the spring of 1930. Although both growers and the state labor federation first proposed restricting Mexican migration during the first half of 1928, the federation opted to support the ATB briefly two years later. The federation made this decision at the same convention where delegates voted to support Costigan's campaign, but their support ended soon after the election. Beet workers' wages continued to decline as a result. They responded by joining an agricultural labor strike that occurred throughout the Midwest.

The ATB was not the first beet workers' union in Colorado, and its leaders incorporated the organization during the last month of the coal strike before its membership grew substantially during the next two years. A group of beet workers first met in Fort Lupton, Weld County, on February 5, 1928, and they commenced by appointing a committee to draft a union constitution. Leaders opened the union's membership to all agricultural workers in North America regardless of gender, religion, or nationality, and it formed other locals in Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Kansas. The union announced its demands for wage increases from twenty-four to thirty dollars per acre to be paid in advance and a union contract with a closed shop one month after its founding meeting, and its leaders claimed they recovered wages from 343 contractors during the union's first year. The personal notes of an AFL organizer from Texas, Clemente Idar, indicate that between 10,000 and 12,000 agricultural workers joined the union. Appendix A presents a list of officers for each local, and it includes the name of Latina leader, "Magdalene L. García," from Johnstown.[47]

Congress's response to the beet workers' activity was to deliberate whether to impose new restrictions on migration from Latin American countries. Texas congressman John C. Box, proposed a bill to "increase the immigration border patrol for the purposes of enforcing immigration laws," and he requested information from the American Sugar Beet Company's superintendent, E.F. Heckman of Denver, regarding the IWW's activities in the sugar-beet districts. The committee also heard testimony from the GWSC's representative, C.V. Maddux, one day later, and he estimated that twenty-five percent of the beet workers that the company employed were Mexican, Spanish-American, and German-Russian. Maddux reported that most criminal cases involving Mexicans and Spanish-Americans in 1924-5 were either "for violation of the Volstead Act [which implemented the eighteenth amendment's requirement to prohibited the production, sale, or transportation of alcohol] or for garnishments to collect for second-hand automobiles that had been sold to them on the pay-later plan." The percentage of criminal cases that county courts, district courts, and justices of the peace in seven counties reviewed that involved Mexican workers was either the same or lower than each county's average, and the only exception was the cases that Weld County's justice of the peace considered in 1925.[48]

Growers responded to the ATB's initial success in recovering wages by echoing Box's call for excluding Mexican migrants, seeking permission to expand beet acreage, gaining more control over prices by restricting trade, and attempting to intimidate laborers through several other means. They sought to renegotiate their own contract with the GWSC through their regional organization, the Rocky Mountain Sugar Beet Growers' Marketing Association, and the association also called for negotiating restrictions on "imported," or "duty-free," sugar from the Philippines. The marketing association signed a contract with the company that excluded any restrictions on beet acreage soon after the Colorado Supreme Court ruled four to three during July of 1928 that growers could sign individual contracts with the company. Members of the Colorado State Grange also conferred with the National Guard's intelligence officers, attempted to lower wages further to twenty dollars per acre, and called for replacing Mexican workers with Russian, Bulgarian, and other European migrants. Growers in Kansas and Nebraska blacklisted known union members and leaders, and an official from the state labor federation reported during the summer of 1930 that the company recruited thousands of Filipino laborers to work in sugar beets.[49]

The state labor federation's executive board supported imposing new restrictions on Mexican migration, and their reasoning was similar to the growers'. While they acknowledged that coal miners struck the previous winter due to "low wages, unreasonable and unwarranted

working and living conditions, and the denial of the right to organize," the executive board asserted in its report to the federation's annual convention in Colorado Springs during June of 1928 their real intent was to "destroy" the AFL-affiliated UMW. The secretary of the federation, John E. Gross from the machinists' union in Pueblo, Pueblo County; the president of the UMW's fifteenth district, Earl R. Hoage; and J.O. Stovic of the typographical workers' submitted a resolution which also claimed that over 60,000 "unskilled workers" entered the U.S. during the previous fiscal year and called for placing "the nationals of the Republic of Mexico under a quota as provided for Europeans entering America." Felix Pogliano resigned his positions as vice-president and executive-board member by the next year's convention. There is no explanation within the convention proceedings.[50]

The federation changed its strategy abruptly during the late spring of 1930 by simply ignoring its earlier calls for restricting Mexican migration when it aided the ATB's activities. The AFL's president, William Green, assigned Clemente Idar during May to organize agricultural workers in Colorado. Idar met on May 26 with Gross, Stovic (who was also the secretary of the state federation's political committee), and UMW member Eduardo González of Louisville on May 26. Idar went to the beet districts and served as the ATB's General Organizer for several months, and the state federation "prophesied" that the union would affiliate with the AFL at the closing session of its annual convention in Pueblo two weeks later. The federation's decision had the potential to give unprecedented support for agricultural trade unions as Costigan launched his senatorial campaign.[51]

Although it is difficult to infer both what Idar's precise orders were and why his assignment ended so quickly, he hinted what the union's major challenges were as he visited sugar-beet districts across the plains. Idar wrote in one report that there were several women who "hold office, and [they] are greatly admired for their excellent qualifications and zest displayed in the interest of the laboring masses of their craft." The AFL's executive board reverted abruptly back to its previous "craft unionism" strategy soon after by again excluding agricultural workers. Green's "new" position that "'it is difficult to comprehend how a national charter could be issued to an organization which does not exist.'" Idar responded during the autumn that "hardly any skilled mechanics of any kind are known to work in the agricultural fields where this type of workers operate [sic]," and he expressed surprised that the AFL's president was no longer "'desirous and hopeful to enable these workers through organization to fight successfully for better wages, reasonable hours of employment and tolerable working conditions.'"[52]

The AFL executive board's reversion to its craft-unionism strategy was one of the reasons why the ATB folded, and both Idar's field report and the union's roster of officers indicate that there were also several sources of divisions within the union. Why were there so few female officers even though its membership was open to all agricultural workers? The drastic gender disparity within the ATB's leadership was at least partly due to what legal scholar Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw has characterized as "power expectations," and this phenomenon would have manifested as male members' belief that only they were the union's natural leaders. The gender-based international division of labor – and the ideology that reified and "fetishized" it - was customary for many families. The disproportionate representation of males within the union's elected leadership was not rooted in either biology or nature but rather another tautology, and the purpose of that tautology was to subordinate Latina women.[53]

The de facto exclusion of women from the ATB's leadership limited the union's ability to win substantial victories, although this does not explain why Green refused to grant the ATB's request for a charter. The state labor federation changed new prerogative during the summer of

1930 was the support the senatorial campaign of Costigan, who had twice previously run for governor on the Progressive Party's ticket. Costigan launched his campaign during August by railing against tariffs as a "prohibitive statute" that "shut our surplus production, especially farm crops, out of…foreign markets" and even blamed attributed them as a cause of unemployment. Costigan's platform also included "enlarged restraints on immigration in periods of depression," farm relief programs which included lowering freight rates and "stabiliz[ing] the prices of farm products," a "scientific tariff" based on "impartial fact-finding," public-works projects, and social insurance for older adults and unemployed people. The state labor federation also endorsed Adams's bid for gubernatorial re-election at its sixth biennial state labor political convention in Pueblo on June 6.[54]

The state's Republican Party voters were more divided than Democrats before their primary. The KKK's state organization remained an active politically after it lost the governorship in 1927. Judge L.C. Stephenson of Sterling, Logan County, granted an injunction against the growers' marketing association's contract with the GWSC in a ruling that he delivered during the following April, and he did so on the grounds that the association's refusal to accept the company's offer caused their failure to find a market. The judge soon reported receiving "numerous threatening letters from either KKK members or 'persons who work under cover like the Klan does.'" The KKK's state organization splintered into two factions two years later when Republicans divided between the primary candidacies of William V. Hodges or George H. Shaw. While most of the KKK aligned with Hodges' campaign, the "Citizens Patriotic League" – which claimed about 7,000 members – supported Shaw's.[55]

With the ATB's decision to request a charter from the AFL came the labor federation's requisite that it ally with the state's Democratic Party, and this raised further questions whether members should support the party's candidates before the general election. The ATB's officers supported Costigan's candidacy as well as Democratic candidates for sheriff and secretary of Weld County. Both the union's leading officers and Idar argued in a union circular addressed to "our Spanish-American compañeros" that Costigan's "veins carry Spanish blood," and they announced their plan to send a contingent to march in the Labor Day parade in Denver. Up to 30,000 members of ninety-four unions marched during the parade, and this included a group of the beet workers who, according to one local newspaper, "tickled the hearts of officials in the reviewing stand when they passed by uncovering their heads as they brought up the rear." There is no evidence that Costigan ever reciprocated ATB's support, and such reciprocity on the part of either Costigan or the state labor federation was necessary for the union to continue functioning during the unemployment crisis.[56]

Beet workers and other farm laborers continued trying to form a viable collective-bargaining agent after the election. Consular officials in Colorado repatriated at least 2,000 Mexican migrants during 1931 and assisted Mexican farmworkers who sought enforcement of their labor contracts. Beet, tomato, and bean pickers also negotiated wage increases with growers in Fort Lupton on June 25 of that year, and agricultural workers in the northern district formed the "Beet Workers' United Front Committee." Wages for blocking and thinning fell to as low as thirteen dollars per acre, and beet workers in the state struck for union recognition and wages of twenty-three dollars during the following spring as part of a larger action that elicited the participation of approximately 18,000 agricultural workers throughout the plains region. Charles Gwynn and Joe Salazar reported at a meeting in Fort Morgan on the first day of the strike that the Workers' International Relief Committee in New York was sending aid.[57]

The strikers confronted a number of significant challenges as they picketed, and those challenges foreshadowed similar ones for industrial workers who struck during the next few years. Weld County commissioners announced that the county government was refusing to distribute relief to strikers. Law enforcement officers arrested eighteen men and six women who picketed in Weld County, and the governor appointed "state law enforcement" officer Samuel Lee to investigate laborers' conditions in northern sugar-beet districts. Farmers in the Pueblo district were "armed and organized" by the end of the strike's second week, and law enforcement officers arrested scores of picketers. The people they detained included both a pool hall operator and Ismal Vega of Denver, and Vega was one of thirty-three unarmed protesters that officers arrested at the farms of Gus Johnson and T.R. Malone near Avondale, Pueblo County. The beet thinners' strike was both a culmination of Mexican workers' activities in the state during the 1920s and a harbinger of industrial workers' future strikes that followed.[58]

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White settlers removed the Ute nation and other indigenous peoples from the Colorado territory after the U.S.-Mexico War, and this enabled the development of the state's sugar-beet industry. The industry also required tariff protections to ensure that companies remained profitable, and Congress did not comply until the end of the nineteenth century. Sugar-beet and mining companies responded to growing labor demand after 1912 by replacing German-Russians with Mexican and Spanish-American laborers, and working-class Spanish speakers became a larger percentage of the state's population as a result. Many Mexican residents suffered due to undocumented legal status, low wages, exclusion from parent-teachers association, and a prejudicial discourse that associated them with crime. This is why they needed Mexican women to participate and lead labor unions.

While Mexican women sought to increase community and individual autonomy by leading Spanish speakers' organizations and PTAs, it was through labor unions that working-class Latina women could ally with other industrial workers in the region. Their efforts began in coal-mining districts and culminated with the IWW-led Columbine strike during the winter of 1927-8, and this allowed younger Latina women to join other working women who were leading the union's activities. Beet workers' decided to form the ATB towards the end of the coal miners' strike, but its leaders' tautologies were rote. This prevented the union from both criticizing a gender-based international division of labor that was customary and accepting that it was necessary for female members to have proportional representation. The ATB collapsed shortly after its leaders decided to support Edward P. Costigan's senatorial campaign, but it still created social bases in Colorado for Latina leadership, an internationalist farm labor union, and a political organization for working-class Spanish-speaking residents that continued to exist after World War II.

Chapter Two

The March Inland Reconsidered: The San Francisco General Strike, Equal Pay, and the Founding of the CIO in California, 1919-1943

The CIO had its most recent roots in the western states, as it did in other regions, in the labor upheavals of the early 1930s and especially the San Francisco General Strike from July 12-19, 1934, which was the closest workers came to achieving a labor government outside of the Soviet Union since the Paris Commune of 1870. Communists within longshoremen's and marine cooks and stewards' unions in San Francisco represented the popular will in both the Bay Area and northern California by including black and Filipino workers, gay union members, and women as leaders, and it was their leadership that resulted in a general strike that challenged the authority of waterfront employers, isolated the imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class, and thereby won the desegregation of industrial unions on Seattle's and San Francisco's waterfronts locals and control over the hiring process through a "union hiring hall" for all west-coast dock workers. The ILA's San Francisco local then launched a furious organizing campaign after the general strike, or a "march inland," to recruit warehouse workers in the Bay Area, and radical cannery and agricultural workers' in California soon followed with demands for equal pay for equal work that together created a social basis for the CIO's separation from the AFL in the entire region. At the heart of the march inland was the CIO's organizing campaign among agricultural workers that intended to win not only collective-bargaining rights but also other labor, civil, and constitutional freedoms – including equal pay - for seasonally-employed, migrant farmworkers whom Congress had excluded, along with domestic workers, from each social reform that it passed during the 1930s. The leaders of the march inland believed that it was necessary to form unions at every stage of the production

process, or within the entire "supply chain," and this required including agricultural and domestic workers.[1]

The success of the march inland depended on the CIO's success in both the southern states and also the city of Los Angeles, which experienced several protracted "spurts" of extended demographic and industrial growth during the first half of the twentieth century. The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), which emerged from the San Francisco longshoremen's warehouse campaign that challenged the teamsters' union as west-coast locals of the ILA separated and soon represented, along with UCAPAWA, industrial and white-collars workers who demanded equal pay throughout Los Angeles by the early 1940s. The metropolis was the epicenter for new entertainment and aviation industries that stimulated numerous ancillary industries, and the number of CIO-affiliated unions in the city that represented industrial, blue-, and white-collar employees such as longshore, warehouse, cannery, furniture, auto, aviation, film, drug-store, newspaper, and public-sector workers during and after the strike waves of 1933-4. Yet southern California still presented major challenges for industrial unions and CIO leaders due to the relative strength of employers, apartheid housing and segmented labor markets, frequent raids by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) of radical trade unionists' and gay men's activities after 1915, and the pervasive harassment of Latino youth in a city that had been a decisively "open-shop town" since 1890, and they failed subsequently to alter local governments' housing, harbor, and police commissions; challenge corrupt zoning practices that allowed special exceptions, or "variances," that caused dangerous working and living conditions" address low graduation rates among black and Latino youth; or create state- and regional-level strategies to achieve proportional representation, campaign-finance and fiscal reforms, and a planned economy that ended market-based housing construction. The flaws in their strategy left farmworkers isolated, moreover, and unable to challenge the growers effectively before the Nazi-Soviet Pact resulted in a brief détente between the Soviet Union and Germany during August of 1939.

The first studies of the march inland examined the union activities of either cannery or warehouse workers in the Sacramento Valley, respectively, that began shortly after the general strike, but these early authors both disagreed on what the precise origins of the concept were and indicated no knowledge that striking farmworkers demanded equal pay as the first wave of sit-down strikes occurred throughout North America from 1936-7. Gerald A. Rose contended in 1972 that it was machinists in the East Bay Area who initiated an organizing campaign in the canning industry between 1935 and early 1937, which was also when central labor councils issued charters for ILA-affiliated cannery unions that formed at "cannery warehouses" in the San Joaquin Valley. Rose cited Stuart Jamieson's oft-cited dissertation, "Labor Unionism in American Agriculture," to support his claim that cannery workers' demands during a strike in Stockton in the spring of 1937 included hourly wages of sixty-two and one-half cents for men and fifty cents for women. Harvey Schwartz found six years later in his study of the San Francisco warehouse workers' union (which also had affiliates in Stockton and Sacramento), *The March Inland*, that the local included women, that more Afro-American dock workers more often procured jobs hauling freight cargo in Oakland, and that the campaign halted in Stockton due to the rival teamsters' union's successful campaign among truck drivers, employers' preference for both the IBT and San Francisco Muni Workers' Union president Edward Vandeleur as negotiating partners, and the increased isolation of UCAPAWA in the Central Valley towards the end of the decade. Other academic investigators have analyzed the long-term impact of Communist-led dock workers' activities on later lesbian, bisexual, gay, and

transgender social movements on the west coast, while Vicki Ruiz emphasized in *Cannery Women, Cannery Lives* that UCAPAWA was unique among labor unions in North America for electing Latina and Latino officers at almost every level and argued that Mexican women were essential contributors to California canneries' "work culture."[2]

Historians have long argued that working-class women in North America used a doctrine based on both a class-centered notion of "separate spheres" and positive notions of justice to create networks of power and "access routes" to political influence that existed in opposition to the individualistic values inherent to a more middle-class oriented "cult of domesticity." Some have also concluded that economic inequality both distorted many communities' priorities by the 1930s and enabled the propagation of a new, male-centered false consciousness that was, in part, a reaction to the increased numbers of married women entering the workforce, had a detrimental effect on employed married women's self-images as workers, and all but blamed their "luxury wage" (as opposed to male workers' "necessary wage") for juvenile delinquency, whereas other historians have contended that employers did not engage in typical profit- and rent-seeking behaviors during the decade but rather attempted to enforce an ideology based on sex-typing that exacerbated gender-based employment segregation. The proportion of married women in the female workforce rose from 22.8% to 35% between 1920 and 1940 while birth rates for women in the U.S. as a whole decreased by 1933 to seventy-four per 1,000, and their mean wages rose by 1940 from fifty-five to sixty-three percent of male workers' wages due to the expansion of light and service industries, the national government's enforcement of minimum-laws, and the relocation of textile factories to southern states. Though only ten percent of U.S. women were earning wages by 1936, employers hired them at faster rates during the mid-1930s despite high turnover due to childbirth, marriage, or lack of promotions. The Supreme Court defined women as especially vulnerable to low pay in its decision *West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish* (1937), and it ignored the female category entirely three years later when it validated the Fair Labor Standards Act in *U.S. v. Darby* (1940).[3]

What was the march inland? Who were the workers and leaders, and what were their demands? Many historians have argued that farmworkers' exclusion from the national government's social reforms during the 1930s prevented them from establishing a viable collective-bargaining agent, but this argument does not explain either why farmworkers in Hawaii *did* win a viable union towards the end of the decade by affiliating with the ILWU or how the United Farm Workers still won three-year contracts in California in 1970 without ever receiving comparable legal protections. What made industrial unionists' activities during the 1930s different was that they also attempted simultaneously to resolve the crisis of sharecropping and farm tenancy in southern agriculture, which was indeed necessary for their success. Agricultural labor leaders in California were therefore among the progenitors of movements for equal pay, civil rights, and equal protection for foreign-born migrants, and it was these activities that made the march inland the vanguard of industrial unionists' campaign in the region. This chapter is organized in three parts. Part I explains both the causes of the San Francisco General Strike as well as its impact on warehouse workers' union activities that followed. Part II analyzes several key agricultural and cannery workers' strikes that demanded equal pay and occurred while the CIO separated from the AFL. Part III examines the CIO's organizing campaign in southern California from the sit-down strikes until the L.A. Riots, which occurred as large numbers of people from the South – and especially from the western Gulf States of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi – were migrating to the city in search of refuge and work.

"bring on the general strike!"

The catalyst for the march inland was the west-coast maritime workers' strike of 1934, which represented the popular will in both the Bay Area and northern California as a whole by including black and Filipino workers, homosexual members of the Marine Cooks and Stewards Association (MCS), and women as leaders; demanding a union hiring hall and the desegregation of their unions; and leading a general strike during July. The general strike isolated the imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class long enough to win union hiring halls for the west-coast districts of both the ILA and MCS, and it altered the "balance of power" between labor and capital in the western states for the rest of the century by diminishing the waterfront employers' authority. The general strike first launched a new trade union movement in the western states, in other words, by uniting the working classes of the Bay Area and northern California. Radical members of the ILA's west-coast locals continued leading the workers' movement in the region in the years that followed by organizing frequent wild-cat strikes on the docks from early 1935 until the hundred days' strike began during late October of 1936, recruiting employees at warehouses and canneries in the Central Valley, and targeting transportation industries in Los Angeles during the first wave of sit-down strikes. Yet while the longshoremen's activities desegregated the hiring process on the docks of San Francisco and Seattle and created a militant workers' tradition with immense power over the Pacific Trade, it also had little impact on the continued exclusion of black workers by both the ILA's Portland local and executive board of the San Pedro local; corrupt zoning practices, or "variances," in southern California; the bourgeoisie's support for apartheid practices within the state's housing and labor markets; and imperialists' nascent alliance with the Nazi government in Germany.

Foreign-born workers constituted, as now, a large and important segment of the working classes, and their numbers included residents who found permanent, year-round employment and Mexican migrants who sought seasonal employment in the agricultural, canning, and service industries both within the state and in other regions. Many foreign-born workers, such as the parents of the Japanese-American Communist Party leader, Karl Yoneda, also sought asylum from their countries of origin due to any combination of war, political persecution, and the targeting of civilians by either state or non-state actors. Yoneda was born in the U.S. and received his formal education in his mother's hometown of Hiroshima, and he refused conscription into the Japanese Army before moving to Los Angeles when members of the Japanese Workers Association were organizing the Southern California Farm Workers Committee with both Mexican and Filipino laborers in 1926. Yoneda then became one the most active radicals on the west coast before his internment and military service in the south Pacific during World War II. Police arrested Yoneda with seventeen foreign-born labor organizers (seven of whom were Japanese, Filipino, or Mexican, and the rest from Europe) three years later for distributing anti-imperialist leaflets to Japanese soldiers in San Pedro, and Yoneda also served as a picket captain when from hundreds to upwards of 10,000 Chinese-American San Francisco residents protested the loading of scrap metal onto Japanese ships in 1938. He was also among the organizers of the cannery workers in the Sacramento Valley who struck for equal pay for equal work during the first months of the march inland.[4]

Agriculture was the only employment option for many foreign-born migrants in the U.S. West during those years, since a growing urban population increased the demand for fruits and vegetables. Both the construction of Macadam and gravel roads and the introduction of motor trucks reduced growers' dependence on railroads companies during the 1920s, while a threefold-increase in demand for lettuce and the subsequent tenfold increase in lettuce acreage made that vegetable the third-most valuable in North America. California growers' share of U.S. lettuce

production increased to two-thirds as a result, and the percentage of U.S. vegetable farmers who used motor trucks for transportation also rose from thirty-seven to eighty-four percent. Lettuce yields still declined after 1932, however, which led some growers with sufficient capital to invest in "truck trailers" for harvesting. The number of tractors used in the U.S. soon increased by approximately one-third between 1935 and 1938 to a total of 1,527,989, and the number of tractors sold annually in the U.S. exceeded the total number in use one year later. Tables I through IV present information on farmers' adoption of automobiles by type of crop and truck weight.[5]

While the tasks of loading, scheduling, and routing that trucking required were more "flexible" than the horse-railway combination, seventy-five percent of truck farmers' operations remained in local areas due to higher long-distance shipping costs. Trucking also entailed lower labor costs in relation to the total tonnage shipped, since the cost of one truckers' labor remained mostly constant (though there was no similar reduction in the labor costs for teamsters' loading and unloading cargo) while the total tonnage capacity and the total possible distance that they could drive both grew with the size of the trucks. The expansion of local trucking operations was especially extensive in California due, in part, to the construction of Macadam or gravel roads that connected between twenty-eight and thirty-five percent of the state's farms by 1930. Working conditions for truck drivers were often dangerous, as evidenced by the report of a teamsters' union member to the California State Labor Federation's annual convention that some of the larger trucking companies were not providing trucks with functional brakes.[6]

Market integration in the region entailed investment not only in agricultural and trucking but also urban industries, which required the growth of a large working-age population, in turn. The area's lawmakers - and especially the authors of housing and zoning laws – enabled the establishment of apartheid neighborhoods through restrictive deed agreements and the location of factories in residential areas before the regional planning commission finally began attempting to curb the practice by drafting its first comprehensive zoning plan in 1946. The Supreme Court ruled initially in *Buchanan v. Warley* (1917) that overtly-racist municipal zoning laws violated the fourteen amendment's due-process clause, which also implied that the amendment's scope included protecting persons from discrimination by municipal and county governments. Yet California soon became the first state outside of the South to permit private residents to enact restrictive deed agreements with the state supreme course case of *L.A. Investment Co. v. Gary* (1919), which set a precedent, according to housing attorney Loren Miller, that other state courts soon cited in their jurisprudence on restrictive deeding before the Supreme Court approved of the practice when it ruled in *Corrigan v. Buckley* (1926) that judicial enforcement of restrictive deed agreements was not a state action "defined" by the fourteenth amendment's equal-protection clause. The owners of new and growing industries were already establishing major operations throughout the cities and suburbs of Los Angeles County by then, and these included the Ford Motor Company's location of a plant in Long Beach that allowed it to gain port access, aircraft companies' establishment of factories in Santa Monica and Burbank (which stimulated the growth of the central business district), and rubber companies' establishment of their regional offices nearby in South L.A. Officials in municipal and county governments allowed some companies to locate factories in black and Latino residents through "variances," or special exceptions, while other employers that desired more space for their production processes tended to locate their factories, in contrast, in the southeastern areas of the county.[7]

With the economic crisis of the early 1930s came an increased number of LAPD raids on both Communists and gay men. This did not deter Communists in the city from either holding



Eugene G. McKibben and R. Austin Griffin, "Change in Farm Power and Equipment: Tractors, Trucks, and Automobiles." Works Progress Administration, National Research Project. Report. No. A-9, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Dec. 1938 , pg. 42







Data approximated based on graph in McKibben and Griffin, "Change in Farm Power and Equipment: Tractors, Trucks, and Automobiles," pg. 49.

meetings in Long Beach and Hollywood or protesting the incarceration of labor leader Tom Mooney at the 1932 Olympics, however, and gay men often frequented the dance halls, cafes, and speakeasies in a vice district that both stretched from the harbor area through the southern half of the city and was part of an environment that included the bohemian clubs which formed alongside a growing film industry. Yoneda was then the director of the Los Angeles chapter of the Communist legal aid organization, the International Labor Defense (ILD), and he met his future spouse, ILD district secretary Elaine Black, through her efforts to bail out strikers. Black's supervisor, labor organizer Ida Rothstein, took an assignment as an organizer in the Fillmore district during early 1933, while Black herself had her second abortion, separated from her first husband, and eloped with Yoneda in Oregon before moving to San Francisco. LAPD officers also began targeting gay people in the city (some of whom had recently fled New York City after a series of police raids there from 1930-32) that year, and the city council also enabled a "gay panic" four years later by establishing a Sex Bureau within the police department as the city's mayor, Frank L. Shaw, faced corruption allegations and an impending recall election.[8]

California's criminal-justice system was then also prone to charges of corruption and prejudice due, in part, to a "war on drugs" that, even then, raised doubts among many penal reformers regarding whether punitive measures were actually the best means of reducing substance abuse, crime, or juvenile delinquents' recidivism rates. After leading a raid on the KKK's headquarters in Inglewood during the spring of 1921, Los Angeles District Attorney Thomas Lee Woolwine found that ten percent of public officials and police officers in California's cities, including U.S. Attorney Joseph Burke, police chief Louis D. Oaks, and sheriff William I. Traeger, were among the approximately 1,500 KKK members who resided in Los Angeles. Police reformers avoided addressing the problems of corruption, prejudice, and an ineffective drug war by concentrating instead on cutting costs and eliminating bureaucratic waste, since this accommodated industrial growth and "economies of scale." The San Francisco police chief, William J. Quinn, merged the department's Crime Prevention Bureau with its newly-formed Anti-Radical Bureau during the summer of 1934, for example, which accepted the routine violations of Communists' civil and constitutional rights as normal. The California Taxpayers' Association noted the Massachusetts state government's recent establishment a state police force after the strikes of 1919 and proposed centralizing law enforcement police powers in California into a similar department.[9]

San Francisco police officers were the employers' primary enforcers during those years, and the popularity of west-coast maritime workers' cause in the Bay Area can be explained to at least some extent by the city's long-term demographic and economic growth as well as its particular combination of working-class, cosmopolitan, and commercial characteristics. The general strike needs to be studied, in other words, alongside both San Francisco's demographic and neighborhood history and its long-term development patterns. Black and Chinese neighborhoods were both part of a large working-class district that extended from the area south of Market Street to industrial zones in the city's southwestern parts, whereas several of the city's middle-class neighborhoods were located in the Richmond and Sunset districts. San Francisco's laboring population was divided almost evenly between blue- and white-collar workers, and, although only about one-third of the city's 600,000 residents were women, about sixty-one percent were either foreign-born or first-generation immigrants. This relative parity between blue- and white-collar workers was one of San Francisco's distinctive characteristics, and one of its effects was the location of brothels in the affluent neighborhood of North Beach by the late 1940s.[10]

Much of the city's segregation was due to middle-class residents' enactment of restrictive deed agreements, and this relegated most black and Chinese residents to the Fillmore and Chinatown neighborhoods near the city's financial district where the quality of housing was often substandard. A 1939 housing survey found that there were three times as many substandard as satisfactory dwelling units in Chinatown, and thirty-seven percent of the city's substandard dwellings were in the Fillmore district. The city's segregationists received further support when the city housing authorities of San Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond opted to follow the "neighborhood pattern" – based as it was on restrictive housing agreements – when it segregated their first public housing projects shortly before the U.S. entered World War II. Yet both the Fillmore and Chinatown were still major bases of support for the general strike. The Communist organizers who were active in Chinatown during the west-coast maritime workers' strike included MCS leader Revels Cayton of Seattle, Ben Fee (who soon became an ILGWU organizer), and several gay stewards who were also members of MCS's "progressive" leadership caucus.[11]

The urgency with which workers throughout the Bay Area joined the general strike was due, in part, to the momentum that a large series of strikes led by the Communist-affiliated Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union (CAWIU) had already created during the previous autumn and culminated with a three-week strike by up to 18,000 cotton pickers in both central California and Arizona's Salt River Valley. Although they failed to win union recognition and the enforcement of their civil and human rights, the strikers succeeded in isolating the growers and garnered a significant degree of support from other unions, religious leaders, and young people when a group of vigilante growers and at least one member of the LAPD's Red Squad, Carl Abbott, killed three Mexican strikers - two in Pixley and one in Arvin - during two, separate attacks on October 10. A wave of lynching soon swept both the South and California towards the end of the year as large numbers of industrial workers prepared to strike for collective-bargaining rights over the next two years. The CAWIU soon collapsed during the general strike, but the Filipino Labor Union (FLU) still cooperated closely in Santa Barbara later that year with members of a mutual-aid society, the *Confederación de Uniones of Obreros Mexicos* (many of whom were Yaquis), and the AFL-affiliated Fruit and Vegetable Workers Union Local 18211 to win a contract. Japanese shed-owners in nearby Guadalupe soon attempted to avoid "another Salinas" by offering "as much as fifty per cent white help adjustment" to local residents (instead of hiring only Japanese farmworkers) during a strike by 1,500 CIO-affiliated cauliflower, celery, and shed workers three years later.[12]

It is only in rare instances that workers and peasants within North America have attempted to both seize control of the means of production and desegregate labor unions simultaneously, and shed-owners' hopes and fears during late 1937 were indicative of the San Francisco General Strike's lasting impacts. The radicals' power in the ILA's Pacific Coast District first became evident at its annual convention two months before west-coast maritime workers began their strike. The "San Francisco bloc" outvoted the "San Pedro bloc" to allow recall elections for the executive board instead of calling referenda when twenty percent of members signed a petition, by a margin of sixty-one to twenty-two. The radicals failed to win a majority on the west-coast district's executive board at the convention, but they did pass resolutions against unloading ships carrying the Nazis' flag and to form a waterfront federation that included sailors and other maritime workers. The San Francisco local's decision to form a strike committee one month later proved especially prescient, and Anti-Communist leaders of the

city's Central Labor Council were soon ruling radicals' calls for a general strike as out of order by mid-June.[13]

The strike's immediate cause was dock workers' degrading working conditions and especially the hiring process called the "shape-up" system, but neither these inhumane conditions nor the strikers' commitment to winning a union hiring hall explains why so many workers in northern California joined the general strike. Laborers were seeking in those years to "hustle a job" out of the "fink hall," in the words of one San Pedro longshoremen, so that they could work at "any dock you could hustle bustle," but their employment often depended on fortunate timing and specifically being at a pier during the arrival of a cargo-laden ship. One of the worst and most frequent occupational dangers was falling from the winch into the hatch, and "the older men" also often "work[ed] themselves to the point of exhaustion." The ILA only permitted Afro-Americans to join the Cotton Compress local (and there was just one Afro-American member, A. Humphries, of the San Francisco strike committee), which forced black laborers in San Francisco to join a segregated beneficial association if they wanted to work at the Luckenbach dock. Mexican laborers, for their part, could only find employment in the Los Angeles harbor district before the strike as ship scalers that painted and removed barnacles from ships, while younger workers who did not find employment on the docks would often try their luck as a fisherman, at a cannery, or at sea.[14]

The impact of the strike by 38,000 west-coast maritime workers varied considerably by sub-region and was greatest in the San Francisco Bay Area, since it left sixty vessels in San Francisco idle as opposed to between ten and twenty-four in Los Angeles, eighteen in Portland, and twenty in Seattle (though the strike did not initially extend to San Diego). While the press in San Francisco was, with the exception of *The Catholic Monitor*, opposed to the strike, this apparently-unified opposition masked the substantial support that the strikers had from other Bay Area workers. A group of police officers refused assignments from police chief Quinn, for instance, and the Portland police department dismissed twelve other officers due to their sympathy with the strikers. One officer who had just completed police training, Ray Seyden, recalled decades later that "we came from the same neighborhoods as those guys on the waterfront" and that they, too, were "union men" who were not "ready to have our heads beaten in." The police then lacked both "workmen's compensation" and health insurance, which may also explain, at least in part, why some alleged that police officers in Los Angeles accepting illicit payments from shipowners.[15]

The membership of the Sailor's Union of the Pacific (SUP) included many Wobblies, Trotskyists, and anarcho-syndicalists, and it is impossible to overstate the importance of their support when they joined the strike on May 16 without authorization from their executive board. MCS followed suit the next day, as did unions of masters, mates, and pilots and engineers one week later. Members of the ILA's San Francisco local demonstrated their "preparedness," furthermore, by seeking alliances with teamsters early on, while their counterparts within the Communist-led Marine Workers' Industrial Union (MWIU) sought support among the sailors. The radicals' strategy for countering Anti-Communists' charges against them was to both offer the sailors a seat on the joint-strike committee and try to redirect attention towards forcing them to defend *their* actions instead. Teamsters in San Francisco, Oakland, Seattle, and Los Angeles voted to boycott the waterfront when the strike began, and those in Oakland, along with machinists' locals of stevedores and auto workers, refused to cross picket lines by handling "hot cargo." San Francisco teamsters soon passed a resolution on June 7 to refuse to handle freight – but not truck – cargo, while stevedores in New York City struck in solidarity briefly before the

Dorothea Lange, *Woman at Microphone, San Francisco* (1934)

ILA's president, Joseph P. Ryan, ordered them to return to work.[16]

Business owners in the Los Angeles neighborhood of Sonoratown opposed market integration through the 1910s, and the establishment of railroad facilities, rapid population growth, intense competition, zoning ordinances, restrictive deeding practices, and employment discrimination imposed substantial limitations on black and Latino residents' social mobility in Watts and East L.A. over the next fifteen years. Competition between the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific railroad companies led them to establish a series of depots, warehouses, and ancillary industries in East L.A. as well as in Oxford, Ventura County, after World War I, and this displaced many Mexican residents who moved subsequently to Watts and other working-class suburbs and made East L.A. a major financial and industrial center during the next decade. Loren Miller also found that the city government annexed Watts in 1926 "at the instigation of the-then potent Ku Klux Klan in order to prevent its burgeoning Negro population from taking over governmental functions and power." A majority of the city's 37,000 black residents lived in an area near Central Avenue bounded by Long Beach and Slauson Avenues and Main and Sixth Streets by 1930, and many of East L.A.'s working-class Latino denizens resided in the outer neighborhood of Maravilla. Table V presents populational data regarding residents of both zoned areas and Los Angeles County as a whole between 1927 and 1938.[17]

Economic activity in San Pedro's harbor district - where a consortium for Chinese and Japanese produce-sellers and Anglo investors had established a produce market in 1909 - made it a major potential "base," meanwhile, for union activity by the 1930s. Those without cars used the district streetcar system for transportation, and waterfront workers began planning activities to win a hiring hall and "equalized hours" with a meeting of longshore workers on July 26, 1933, at a hall the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion used on Tenth Street and Myler. The San Pedro ILA local soon joined the labor councils of both Long Beach and San Pedro as well as the state federation of labor during the fall. Members also carried a motion to endorse "San Francisco's stand" for hourly wages of one dollar fifty cents, a six-hour day, and a hiring hall



Data approximated from tables published by the Southern California Regional Planning Commission's annual report of 1939.

after Bridges attended a regular meeting during January. The extent to which the local's executive board committed to striking that year remains debatable, however, since one SUP historian found that most of the strikers in San Pedro were not longshoremen but rather sailors.[18]

This is not to suggest that there were no longshoremen in San Pedro who joined the strike. One member, Peter Grassi, was originally from Chicago and had lived for several years in Biloxi, Mississippi, before his father led his family's move to Los Angeles that occurred between 1917 and 1919 while he worked in the shipyards. Grassi stopped attending school in the ninth grade shortly before his father died from cancer and worked both at a fish cannery and selling newspapers on skid row at the Navy landing on Sixth Street before becoming a sailor in 1929. He then found jobs working at the outer harbor, hauling coal, nitrate, and cement to and from ships after he bribed an employer with homemade wine. Grassi picketed the outer harbor as police escorted non-strikers through the lines when several Seattle-based shipping and fish-packing companies threatened to transport their cargo through San Pedro.[19]

Though it did not elicit nearly as much popular outrage as the police killings in San Francisco did two months later, the first instances of police brutality occurred in San Pedro and Seattle during the first few weeks of the strike. Police officers killed strikers Dick Parker and Tom Knudson infamously after 300 picketers tore down fences in an attempt to prevent non-strikers from crossing their picket line, and law enforcement officers also killed both ILA member Shelby Daffron and sailor Ole Helland in Seattle. There were also reports of fights between strikers and police officers on the waterfronts of Oakland and Seattle as the strike began, and San Francisco-based Afro-American weekly, *The Spokesman*, reported that "riots and skirmishes" occurred on the San Francisco waterfront after police attempted to escort black and Filipino non-strikers across picket lines. Police officers in Oakland and San Francisco soon launched a "combined drive" that resulted in arrests of four members of the Young Communists' League (YCL) and Elaine Black on May 24 (though high-level Communist strike leaders such Revels Cayton and Sam Darcy were actually meeting regularly at a farm in Oregon), while the

shipping companies in San Pedro obtained an anti-picketing injunction and colluded with armed deputies to unload bananas from the *S.S. California*.[20]

As the YCL's statewide membership rose to 600, law enforcement agencies escalated by attacking and using other repressive measures against protesters. A YCL chapter in San Francisco responded to police officers' attack of picketers without warning on May 28 by holding an anti-war meeting at 765 Howard Street in San Francisco on National Youth Day two days later, and 200 attendees of that meeting then marched along the Embarcadero from the area around the ILA's relief headquarters towards the corner of Stuart and Mission streets. Police officers in plain clothes chased the young protestors through Market Street before attacking them at the corner near the headquarters, while protestors formed the San Francisco Committee Against Police Brutality at 121 Haight Street. A women's group led their first planned demonstration against police brutality with children, and Elaine Black Yoneda was one of the speakers at their rally. Black Yoneda began carrying a copy of the Bill of Rights in her purse, and Joseph P. Ryan issued a charter for ILA Auxiliary No. 3829 on June 5.[21]

The waterfront employers announced that they were willing to negotiate with "a 'secession' group of 'conservative' strikers" led by the former president of the San Francisco ILA local, L.J. Holman, ILA president J. P. Ryan, Seattle teamsters' union president David Beck, and both the president and secretary of the San Francisco teamsters' union, and they formulated an agreement with ten steamship companies - four of which their head offices in New York and two of which were foreign lines - that was to cover every west-coast port. The agreement would have raised hourly wages from seventy-five to eighty-five cents retroactively to December 10, included hourly overtime pay of one dollar twenty-five cents for shifts after five o'clock, and stipulated "joint and equal control of employment policies by employers and employees' representatives and joint and equal management of hiring and dispatching [sic] halls." The radicals on strike committee opposed the agreement, however, and continued demanding both a union hiring hall and that "all men be dispatched by a union dispatcher." It was at that moment during the early summer that west-coast longshore workers' strike diverged from the Trotskyist-led teamsters' strike in Minneapolis by making a crucial decision to reject the proposed agreement and "hold out" for a hiring hall, which enabled them to deliver one of industrial workers' most effective challenges to corruption and "boss unionism" in North America during the entire decade. Writer Mary Heaton Vorse charged several years later that Beck disbanded a picket line during the strike at the behest of the "Association of Growers" to allow for the transportation of a list of perishable fruits and vegetables that included "almost everything."[22]

Although longshoremen in Portland refused to even vote on Ryan's proposed agreement, a majority of longshoremen in Los Angeles disagreed with the other west-coast locals by voting in favor by a margin of 638 to 584 (though the district's constitution required a two-thirds' majority for approval). It remains uncertain to what extent that vote tally represented the actual will of the membership, however, since there was no "follow-up" vote soon after at the local's membership meeting on June 18 regarding a tabled motion for the local's secretary, A.H. Peterson, to resign. The mayor of Seattle pledged to collaborate with mayors in Portland, Tacoma, and three other coastal cities, meanwhile, and use "whatever force [was] necessary" to open the ports. The response of the San Francisco radicals to the union leadership's attempt to sign the agreement was – just as Ryan had predicted – to call for a general strike. It was both the painters' union and the city's oldest machinists' union, Local 68, that first answered the call by scheduling votes on June 19-20, and a teamsters' local in Oakland soon followed suit. The longshoremen's union sent committees and large delegations of between fifty to 400 members to



ILWU Local 13 Records. Courtesy: CSU Northridge

appeal to the city's other unions, while San Francisco Central Labor Council President Edward Vandeleur ruled the radicals' calls for a general strike at their weekly meetings consistently as out of order.[23]

The Matson Navigation Company was the undisputed leader of the "Big Three" shipping companies that opposed the strikers, and the city of San Francisco was the last conduit in North America for a large proportion of the Hawaii trade. Unlike the American-Hawaiian and Dollar Steamship companies, Matson claimed two of the city's ports as its "home base." The ships that docked at pier thirty-two went to Honolulu, while those at pier thirty, which were either the company's freighters or carried the Oceanic Steamship Company's cargo, traveled to the South Seas and Australia. Yet the shipping companies' actions proved highly divisive for residents of San Francisco. One scion of "two generations of successful San Francisco businessmen," Edith Jenkins, recalled half a century later, for example, that upper-middle-class families "were like armed camps" during those years with women and children supporting the strikers and men favoring the Industrial Association.[24]

The first major clash occurred at pier thirty-eight on July 3 shortly after the mayor and police chief decided to open the port through the use of force during early July, and a major clash then occurred between strikers and law enforcement officers for four hours subsequently at pier thirty-eight on the afternoon of June 3 when the company attempted to unload a rice shipment at the McCormack docks. The strikers also received information from teamsters that day regarding a truck that was passing near the corner of Third and Mission streets, which also allowed them to prevent the Matson Line from unloading police-escorted trucks at a warehouse near the pier. It was also then that members of two railroad unions working freight cars employed by the state-owned Belt Line Railway Company along the Embarcadero ceased crossing picket lines. 1,000 mounted police forced back 5,000 strikers at pier thirty-four to the front of piers thirty and thirty-two near Rincon Hill (which was near the Southern Pacific Railroad Company's depot at Third and Townsend streets) two days later, where the strikers repelled tear gas for half an hour before seeking higher ground up the hill. A noted photographer of the Battle of Iwo Jima, Joe Rosenthal, was beaten on the Embarcadero that day and later asserted that those fights on the docks were much more violent than the famous World War II battle.[25]

Howard Sperry was a sailor, a WWI veteran, and a member of the American Legion, and Nicholas Bordoise (who was also known as either "Dutch" Dridritch or Nicholas Candereorakis), was a member of both the cook's union and the ILD's defense committee that had been going to meet with Elaine Black and ILA member Henry Schmidt. The strikers halted their picketing activities immediately and restated their call for a general strike as National Guard units directed by David Prescott Barrows seized control of the ports of Oakland and San Francisco within an hour and at a cost of $10,000 per day. Employees on the Bay Bridge construction project also ceased working due to the bullets that flew across the waterfront that day. Both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General also proposed sending additional Army troops, while the mayors of the east bay cities of Oakland, Berkeley, Alameda, Piedmont, Emeryville, and San Leandro resolved to "take over the direction of public life." One observer later recalled that the presence of national guardsmen had "incensed" the teamsters and that law enforcement agencies discharged officers who protested their orders to attack strikers.[26]

Momentum shifted decisively towards a general strike the following week when shop machinists, boilermakers, welders, culinary workers, taxi drivers and chauffeurs, retail workers jobbing butchers, laundry workers and drivers, delivery drivers, sausage makers, sheet metal, hod carriers, cement and iron workers, and laborers in San Francisco and Oakland joined the strike, while streetcar workers' unions opted to defer, in contrast, to the central labor council's decision. Two days after the Alameda County Central Labor Council called for a strike vote on July 10, 20,000 members of San Francisco's Central Labor Council - including 3,400 teamsters - attended a meeting where delegates voted to strike by a margin of sixty-three to six (though forty-nine of the "yes" votes came from unions without official representation on the council) before selecting their representatives to the general strike committee. Thousands of pile drivers, carpenters, engineers, steel workers, and other skilled employees on both the Bay Bridge and Golden Gate projects also refused to work. The editor of *The Spokesman*, John Pittman, had asserted – and incorrectly - during May that it was no mystery why "so many Negro 'scabs'" had felt "greater loyalty" to their "intestines" when considering their previous exclusion from the ILA. Pittman no doubt expressed the general sentiment two months later, however, when he opined that "Union labor's greatest enemy" was "the employer who uses the strike-breaker" and asserted that it was time to "bring on the general strike!"[27]

While they converted many to the cause of social equality, neither the workers in the Bay Area nor radical longshoremen in San Pedro could overcome the established AFL leadership. The San Francisco Central Labor Council's president, Edward Vandeleur, chaired a general strike committee in which unions with smaller memberships received the same number of votes as larger unions representing teamsters, shipyard workers, and longshoremen, though the committee did also include Mary McKay of the Cracker Packers' Auxiliary. Printing, telephone, and telegraph workers joined the general strike on its second day, while the committee's radicals introduced resolutions to increase the number of general strike committee members and to "fight profiteering" in housing and food. The San Pedro local's secretary, A.H. Peterson, recaptured his seat on the executive board, whereas members carried a motion on July 17 to reject a request for a meeting in Los Angeles by MCS members on the grounds that "work was already under way in that regard with [the] Los Angeles Central Labor Council."[28]

The general-strike committee controlled governmental functions for the strike's duration, and their responsibilities included both the administration of municipal services and approving exemptions for food and fuel. It also issued permits for owners of restaurants, butcher shops, and other businesses who had allowed their employees to form trade unions to continue their

operations as well as for the transportation of groceries, fruits, vegetables, and meats. It also released gas and fuel-oil supplies "to everybody," permitted the operation of fifty-one restaurants, halted liquor sales, and closed taverns and liquor dispensaries. San Francisco Muni workers and an additional 20,000 streetcar and ferry workers in the east bay also defied the general strike committee's agreement with San Francisco city officials on July 17 by refusing to return to work. Police launched a series of raids against radical organizations that day, while the Waterfront Employers' Union agreed to participate in arbitration.[29]

Law enforcement officers' raids enabled a surge of vigilante activities against strike leaders, which coincided with an increased military presence throughout the Bay Area. The governor first deployed three infantry regiments of the 1,500 national guardsmen and an artillery unit of 500 soldiers, and the number of national guardsmen equipped with tanks, machine guns, and bayonet-pointed rifles increased within a day to 6,000 (including 400 at the Oakland waterfront). San Francisco mayor Angelo Rossi appointed attorney F.M. McAuliffe as the chair of a "general citizens' committee of 500," while various law enforcement agencies deputized approximately 5,000 people in the East Bay. With the raids also came detentions of immigrants who were more vulnerable for removal. One radical leader claimed, for instance, that the Department of Labor deported foreign-born workers whom vigilantes and police had detained.[30]

The San Francisco Chronicle described the vigilantes' leaders as "conservative union labor," while the local Legionnaires who also participated in the raids may have been, as a columnist for *The Nation* suggested, "a little ashamed" of their conviction "that the original strikes were only the result of control of the I.L.A. and the maritime unions by a radical minority." Twenty-five teamsters in San Francisco collaborated in raids of offices at Fillmore Street, as did other teamsters in Oakland and Richmond. The Industrial Association also recruited 200 truckers and warehouse workers from Los Angeles to participate in the raids, and one journalist found that it was the association that was defining the actual objectives of the raids. Vigilantes targeted not only the Ex-Servicemen's League's headquarters in San Francisco but also organizations and individuals in Oakland, Richmond, Hayward, and San Jose. The SFPD's Anti-Radical Squad arrested Elaine Black, MWIU organizer Harry Jackson, and Joseph Wilson, and Jackson later admitted in his testimony that he had visited both New Orleans and New York during the previous two years as part of the dock workers' organizing campaign.[31]

With police officers' and vigilantes' targeting of foreign-born strike leaders in the Bay Area came increased xenophobia and jingoism that vilified them as the supposed causes of both unemployment and social conflict. A leading NRA administrator, Hugh Johnson, called for deporting "these alien marine workers" to "make jobs for American workingmen," for example, as part of an "America First campaign." Though he denied that he was proposing mass deportations of "aliens and non-declarants" as a means of reducing unemployment and "destitution problems," the Army general contended that any undocumented immigrant who "pretends to lead an economic group of our people in the direction of a strike" should be subjected to deportation. Violent extremists also found allies within the Nazi regime across the Atlantic in Germany. William R. Hearst met with Adolf Hitler and high-level officers in Germany's foreign relations and espionage agencies during the summer of 1934, and the American League Against War and Fascism charged Hearst with accepting $400,000 from the Nazi regime in exchange for the use of his International News Service.[32]

Legionnaires in the bohemian enclave of Carmel, Monterey Bay County, organized a post in response to the local John Reed Club's activities, which included holding meetings to raise among the "summer vacationists, clerks, old ladies, Negro maids and working men, little

San Jose Evening News, July 19, 1934

money for the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama and identifying supporters within the community merchants, artists, and college graduates without job." The poet Langston Hughes was living in Carmel and delineated the strike's purpose succinctly in his account of the raids when he wrote that "one of the express objectives of the San Francisco strike was the opening of the longshoremen's union to Negroes without discrimination." "A number of liberals" had fled from San Francisco, according to Hughes, "to the mountains, to the seashore, to summer homes, to Indian dances in the desert," while vigilantes threatened to destroy the property and boycott the owner of the building where club members were meeting. Hughes recalled further that four black "political opportunists" joined the Peninsula Citizens' Committee and that a city councilman and the police commissioner "began to inquire among the few Negroes in the village, mostly domestics" as citizens' committees also formed in San Francisco and nearby towns. Members of the club had escorted Hughes out of the town after he was "singled out as especially worthy of attack," and Hughes recounted further that "irresponsible youths and street corner cowboys aroused" by "rumors of malicious intent" had "filled the town" and that these rumors claimed he "was frequently seen on the beach and in cars [and in the] of [sic] company of white women, that I called them by their first name, that I was a bad influence on the Negroes of the towns, that I aspired to social equality with the white race, [and] that I ought to be run out of the village, tarred and feathered."[33]

The end of the general strike was not due to the raids, however, but rather to the decisions of the general-strike committee's chair, Edward Vandeleur. Vandeleur ordered the allowance of sales of gasoline and fuel oil supplies supervised by national guardsmen before the central labor council issued a permit, and some radicals also charged that middle-class residents became "alienated" by a permit system that became "a racket" which provided privileged access to large department stores at the expense of small grocers and butchers. *The San Francisco Chronicle* reported that it was major oil companies (which had already forced gas stations to close by refusing to ship supplies to the city) that "were the first to ignore the 'strike regulations' and resume business" after the waterfront employers agreed to arbitration. The general-strike committee approved an amendment on June 19 proposed by a delegate from the typographical

William Randolph Hearst with Nazi Officials Alfred Rosenberg and Roese of the Nazi's "international spy system."
American League Against War and Fascism Pamphlet, San Francisco Main Library Biographical Collection,
William Randolph Hearst.

workers' union to end the strike by a margin 191 to 174 after Vandeleur ruled rival amendments submitted by delegates from cooks' the cloakmakers' unions to continue the general strike as out of order, although the minutes of the meeting minute indicate that the delegate from the chauffeurs' union, Dixon, went on the record as stating that he "did not want to go out of the meeting and tell his men to go back to work, that he did not want to be crucified and that he was absolutely against it." The national guard then withdrew from the Bay Area as the shipowners agreed to recognize the SUP, and the various maritime unions – first masters, mates, and pilots' and marine engineers' and then ILA and MCS locals – returned to work soon afterwards.[34]

The longshore arbitration board awarded west-coast ILA locals with a six-hour day, wage increases, overtime pay, a joint hiring hall, and a grievance procedure to be administered by a labor relations committee less than two weeks after the general strike ended. Perhaps even more important were provisions for work crews' elections of stewards and dispatchers, since the latter award included a technicality that gave maritime unions the chance to win union hiring halls – and thereby seize control of the means of production and trade - outside of the formal collective-bargaining process. The wage and hour provisions that established a six-hour day allocated two hours of overtime pay for shifts that still totaled eight hours, which increased longshoremen's monthly wages from twenty to thirty-seven dollars. Yet although the San Francisco longshoremen's local desegregated its work crews immediately after the general strike, the maritime unions had not yet won a hiring hall. The longshoremen won it, in part, as a result of the provision for union elections of dispatchers, since those elections allowed longshoremen in San Pedro and elsewhere along the west coast to "get this hall as [a] hiring hall" when the shipping companies only sent "observers" (who were not a signatory of the original agreement) to the first labor relations committee meeting at the dispatcher hall that was to occur during early January of the next year.[35]

The desegregation of longshoremen's, cooks', stewards', and sailors' unions went part and parcel with their winning of hiring halls. Although they did not win a "six-hour day," the SUP also won its first hiring hall outside of contract negotiations and began admitting Afro-American seamen soon after the 1934 strike. 500 members of the Colored Marine Beneficial Association joined MCS after the longshoremen "simply closed down" its office, while MCS members elected Paul Boyles as dispatcher. Revels Cayton recalled in an interview with MCS historian Allan Bérubé that "you couldn't tell right away that Boyles was gay, at least not until the 4th or 5th time you met" him and that "it was Boyles who "did more than anyone else to integrate the union" by assigning the first Afro-American stewards with seniority rights to work in all-white freighter ships. Cayton and Ben Fee, who were then living together in Chinatown, were also responsible for defining the connections between unions' obligations to administer hiring halls and to ensure equal access for non-white and homosexual members.[36]

Most gay MCS members were, according to Cayton, either stewards or waiters. Although MCS also won a hiring hall in 1935 with support from the longshoremen although despite the fact that the agreement that signed two years later only provided for a "preferential" hiring hall, union hiring halls remained the norm for MCS until the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ordered employers to eliminate preferential hiring clauses in 1950. Some of the first elected dispatchers were waiters and janitors, but MCS continued to exclude Filipino workers from full membership until the spring of 1944. A radical labor organizer from the island of Luzon, Allos "Carlos" Bulosan, documented parts of the CIO's farm labor organizing campaign in California after 1935 in his famous 1943 memoir, *America Is In the Heart*, in which the author analyzed the frequent and often casual violence that female, Filipino, and black laborers endured while he attempted to find a new home throughout the western states." Yet while Bulosan was also a vocal critic of sexist customs practiced in his country of origin and provided a credible account of vigilantes' and law enforcement officers' repression of striking Filipino farmworkers (and especially during the 1936 lettuce strike in Salinas), he described the "sudden contact of the [Muslim] Moros" in the Philippines "with Christianity and with American ideals" without evidence as "actually the liberation of their potentialities as a people and the discovery of the natural wealth of their land."[37]

Communist-led longshoremen won both the respect of other workers and employers' ire by conducting a variety of wildcat strikes, or "quickies," and other "independent job actions" after the end of the general strike, and sailors and east-coast longshoremen soon organized similar activities during early 1936. The Waterfront Employers' Association counted twenty-nine work stoppages by longshoremen during the first several months after the strike and then another 569 over the next two years. The shipowners' initial response was to retaliate against sailors for their cooperation with longshoremen during the "Vancouver 'hot cargo' strike" against the Shipping Federation of British Columbia by locking them out of the steam-schooners. Yet the militant job actions by San Francisco longshoremen and other maritime workers were persistent and frequent enough to either cause frustration among the shipowners or threaten their long-term profits. The "Big Three" shipping companies hatched a plan with east-coast waterfront employers to lock out longshoremen at every west-coast port, but the attempted boycott failed disastrously – and tellingly - when San Francisco-bound vessels docked instead at San Pedro and Portland.[38]

The west-coast ILA's victory depended, more than anything else, on its alliance with Afro-American dock workers. There were up to fifteen black members of the west-coast longshore workers' strike committee and three black members of the maritime workers' Joint

Strike Committee. With the exceptions of the Portland and San Pedro locals, the west-coast ILA fulfilled that commitment to a notable extent after the strike ended by supporting the inclusion of black workers within both local memberships and the San Francisco Central Labor Council. The San Francisco longshoremen's union desegregated its work crews immediately as Bridges proclaimed during early August of 1934 that "the doors of the San Francisco International Longshoremen's Association will never again be closed to Negro labor," and two black candidates won elections to the central labor council soon after. West-coast members of the CIO-affiliated ILWU separated from the ILA during the wave of sit-down strikes two years later, and black members of the San Francisco longshoremen's union began attaining more "skilled" positions with higher pay over the next several years.[39]

Communist-affiliated farmworkers' unions, like the maritime workers' unions, organized major interracial strikes for collective-bargaining rights after several committees participated in local or state labor agencies' mediation efforts and signed contracts with Japanese growers in 1934, although some of these agreements stipulated less pay for female workers and enabled growers to bargain collectively with only their preferred employees. The Monterey County Industrial Relations Board mediated negotiations that yielded this kind of contract after a lettuce workers struck in Salinas during the autumn of 1934, for example, after packing and vegetable associations in Salinas agreed to participate in arbitration. Mexican farmworkers soon took the lead the following year by leading at least six (mainly in Orange and San Diego counties) of the eighteen agricultural strikes which occurred in California during 1935. Growers often responded to such strikes by attempting to divide farm labor unions by offering concessions to their preferred employees. Some Japanese growers in southern California only offered contracts with higher wages and overtime pay, for instance, to male and permanent workers.[40]

Soon echoing the rising calls for separation from the AFL were militant farmworkers' demands for equal pay, whereas the state federation of labor, while advocating the abolition of prejudice based on class, "race," religion, political affiliation, and occupation, refused adopt any demands for equal pay. The farmworkers began to demand equal pay during the latter half of 1936 as they prepared to call for another general strike in southern California. The vice-president of the state labor federation's first district, E.F. Nelson, complained at its annual convention during September that the AFL-affiliated San Diego County Agricultural Workers' Union was receiving "attacks" from the newly-formed, radical-led Confederation of Mexican Labor Unions (CUOM), while the fourth district's vice-president informed the convention that the federation had recently revoked charters for Communist-affiliated farm labor unions in Delano and Porterville. Yet *The Berkeley Daily Gazette* also reported that conference delegates delivered "shouts of approval" in response to calls for a general strike. The Salinas Valley Citizens' Association soon distributed a circular (perhaps in response to demands for equal pay) which claimed that it was offering hourly wages of sixty cents to both male and female trimmers.[41]

The farmworkers did receive some support from both congressional legislation which attempted to establish minimum wages and restrictions on child labor for sugar workers in 1934 and warehouse and cannery workers' organizing campaigns in northern California over the next two years. After they lost a labor relations board election and struck with San Francisco longshoremen during the spring of 1935, the warehouse workers' union, ILA Local 38-44, reached an agreement with the California & Hawaiian Company (C & H) for employees at the world's largest sugar refinery in Crockett. After Contra Costa County's sheriff, John A. Miller, ordered the disbandment of the newly-formed Citizens' League led by a former Canadian Army officer, Colonel Henry Sanborn, the company soon capitulated quickly to another strike by

warehouse workers in the east bay. While the warehouse workers at Crockett joined the San Francisco ILA local's warehouse unit, refinery workers opted to join a different AFL affiliate. The radicals in the ILA expanded their union, in other words, as their counterparts in agriculture began a new push for unionization.[42]

The Weighers', Warehousemen's & Cereal Workers' ILA Local 38-118 soon represented ninety percent of employees at the Rice Growers' Association's (RGA) mill in west Sacramento by January of 1936, and its total membership rose from approximately fifty to 125 over the next seven months. One of the union's first proposals was to require that millers provide growers with credit at six percent interest in exchange for an agreement by growers to pledge their "warehouse receipts" to the company as security. The union signed a contract with RGA three months later, and its agreement the next year included clauses for hourly wages - seventy-two and one-half cents for mill workers and seventy cents for warehouse workers – and a forty-four hour week. They also won overtime pay (time-and-one-half), holidays, vacation time, call-in pay, a shift-minimum of four hours, a grievance procedure, a hiring hall, and union elections for stewards at each warehouse. The teamsters' local in Marysville also achieved its largest membership ever that year, while the warehouse workers' union's Sacramento River Valley units represented almost 300 employees by February of 1939.[43]

Mill workers about seventy-miles north of the state capital in Biggs first struck against the San Francisco-based Rosenberg Brothers and Company on March 23, 1938, before the strike spread to RGA's and Capital Rice's mills three weeks later. The strikers were eligible to collect unemployment insurance from the state government by then, but teamsters' decisions to cross picket lines still enabled the company to ship its products to New Orleans and Puerto Rico. After Capital Rice reached an agreement with the strikers during May, the union issued a press release blaming their lack of a contract for RGA workers on the company's president, E.L. Adams, as well as the "upstate Associated Farmers." Yet despite the evidence of increased collusion between sugar mill companies and the Associated Farmers' chapters in northern California, the warehouse local's delegate to the ILWU's founding convention that year, J.M. McNair, reported it organized all of the warehouses in the city.[44]

Although the networks of warehouses in southern California had closer links with the cotton trade, the ILA's warehouse unit in Los Angeles also emerged amidst a burst of organizing activities in the years following the west-coast maritime workers' strike. Members voted in two meetings during the spring of 1935 to approve monthly levies of fifty cents for the union's strike fund, to allocate $100 to the cotton compress workers' union and place "all L.A. Compress on the unfair list," and to expand the number of executive board members to twenty-one (including dispatchers). A member of the film studio carpenters' union "spoke for the Furniture Union now on strike" against that growing industry soon after at another union meeting two months later. Even the San Pedro local's district organizer, A.H. Petersen, implored members in September to establish a warehouse workers' local, since San Pedro was "rapidly becoming the strongest Union town on the Pacific Coast." Members responded by concurring with the executive board's recommendation to revoke the green cards of union members who refused to join the warehouse workers' local.[45]

"a huge corral-like structure"

Farmworkers in California continued to lead union activities while participating in local labor boards' mediation efforts during the first two years after the general strike, and they added equal pay to their list of demands as the first wave of sit-down strikes spread across North America from 1936-7. Growers and law enforcement officers responded to farmworkers'

attempts to form industrial labor unions by forcing strikers into "concentration" camps and founding an organization called the Associated Farmers, which soon depended heavily on the contributions of southern California citrus growers. Cannery strikers in Stockton failed to win equal pay during the spring of 1937 after teamsters crossed their picket lines, but the strikes by agricultural and cannery workers for equal pay was an essential step for the establishment of a new, CIO-affiliated union, UCAPAWA, that soon recruited members of AFL-affiliated cannery unions. It was therefore farmworkers' efforts to win both equal pay and equal protection under the law that, combined with west coast maritime unions' campaign to consolidated its control over the union hiring hall, launched the CIO in the western states. Yet this new alliance of blue-collar workers still needed to challenge employers in southern California, which was an area where an apolitical bourgeoisie maintained firm control of local and state politics.

Growers formed the Associated Farmers as west-coast maritime workers were preparing to strike in 1934, and the association had close ties with a plethora of shipping, financial, industrial, petroleum, and utilities companies. Its establishment first became evident when the state chamber of commerce's agricultural department and the state farm bureau federation responded to an impending strike by Mexican and Filipino melon and lettuce workers in the Imperial Valley during the autumn of 1933 by collaborating with growers to establish its first county units, and its initial aims included passage of county anti-picketing and anti-camping ordinances (which remained one of its primary goals for the rest of the decade), the establishment of a "state police system," and deportations of "undesirable aliens." A Senate investigation found towards the end of the decade that the organization had an "association" with the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and some historians have concluded that the infamous leader of the citrus growers, Charles Teague, led the association initially by seeking alliances and cooperation with both San Francisco-based companies and the American Legion. Though the Industrial Association of San Francisco refused to submit their financial records to the Senate investigative committee, UCAPAWA president Donald Henderson asserted that the California Railroad Commission's annual reports published in 1935 and 1935 – which are not available at the state archives – indicated that the Associated Farmers' funders included the Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railroad companies, banks, and oil firms. The organization claimed 5,139 dues-paying members and 5,682 affiliated individuals (including at least one chapter in Maricopa County, Arizona) by 1939, and citrus grower Charles Teague's California Fruit Growers Exchange's budgetary contributions increased from $3,500 of $25,000 to approximately $15,000 of $24,000 from 1935-8.[46]

Cannery and agricultural workers demanded equal pay and collective-bargaining rights in conjunction with the march inland by organizing major strikes in celery, orange, and lettuce industries in 1936, while farmworkers in Salinas adopted what some described as the "quickie" tactic. Mexican, Filipino, and Japanese farmworkers formed the Federation of Agricultural Workers Unions of America early that year, and Mexicans and Filipino celery pickers near the border struck together against both H.P. Garin Company's farm in San Diego and the Chula Vista Vegetable Exchange soon after. Mexican farmworkers in San Diego County received solidarity from local ILA and AFL affiliates the following year when they struck against the county's vegetable association. The labor relations board's regional director in Los Angeles, Tom Nylander, mediated negotiations in Venice during the summer of 1934 for new agreements for daily wages of two dollars and a nine-hour day, meanwhile, and the Mexican consul in Los Angeles, Ricardo Hill, sought Nylander's aid two years later when another diverse group of striking farmworkers began issuing demands that were even more radical. 350 members of the

CUOM, the Filipino Labor Union (FLU), and the Japanese Farm Workers' Union struck against Japanese *patrones* on April 1, 1936, for a ninety-percent union hiring hall, minimum hourly wage of thirty-five cents (as well as forty cents for planting and picking), a nine-hour day, overtime pay of time-and-one-half, and equal pay.[47]

Strike leaders included C.D. Mensalves (who led the FLU's pro-CIO faction), Communist Party member Lillian Monroe, and William Velarde (a CUOM member and veteran of the 1933 cotton strike in Pixley), and celery pickers themselves soon threatened a general strike against Japanese growers after the second week of the strike. The secretary of the Southern California Japanese Farmers Association, Skinichi Kato, complained to the regional labor board before the strike began that "the entire background of the Monroe women's operations in California have been radical and communistic." The strike grew subsequently to between 2,500 and 4,000 farmworkers throughout Los Angeles County, and Ricardo Hill was soon reporting to the Mexican ambassador in Washington, D.C. on April 30 that he visited the strikers in concentration camps. Hill concluded that the strike was likely to spread to other counties after members of the LAPD's Red Squad beat eight picketers on April 25. The strike ended when 385 growers agreed through mediation to offer a sixty-percent union hiring hall and a minimum hourly wage of thirty cents for members of the CUOM's rival, the Confederation of Mexican Farmworkers' and Labor Unions (CUCOM).[48]

2,700 Filipino celery and shed workers in San Joaquín County with the then-unaffiliated Filipino Agricultural Laborers Association (FALA) then struck during the early winter of 1936, which caused the closure of eight sheds outside of Stockton and eventually won them hourly wage increases of between five and ten cents. There were reports that county sheriff Harvey O'Dell erected barricades during the strike, however, while the district attorney dismissed charges against only three of eleven arrested Filipino strikers for violating the county's anti-picketing ordinance. The state chamber of commerce's agricultural committee began collaborating closely, for its part, with both the Associated Farmers and relief administrators. Farmworkers had attended a conference during early June in Stockton with representatives from the Granger Association, the state federation of labor, women's clubs, and civic groups in which they agreed to demand daily wages of three dollars, an eight-hour day, and overtime pay. Knowing full well that the state federation had no intention of acting upon its conference resolutions, Harry Bridges, who also attended the Stockton conference, proposed later that year for the AFL to hold statewide elections for officers of a new agricultural, cannery, and packinghouse workers' union.[49]

Although it did not include a demand for equal pay, a large strike by Mexican orange workers during that summer also provides evidence that growers, law enforcement, and local and state officials were forcing farmworkers into concentration camps in California. It began on June 11 as the celery strike was still ongoing when 2,500 to 3,000 orange pickers, at least some of whom had participated in a strike by Mexican, Filipino, and white farmworkers in Orange County during the previous year, participated in another strike organized by Velarde, Monroe, Mensalves, and a "notorious Japanese communist" named N. Daguchi. One of the strikers' primary concerns was their allegations of rampant nepotism, bribery, selling of jobs, and extortion within the hiring system, and their major supporters included the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) in Mexico, the ILD, and the state federation of labor. As local law enforcement arrested approximately 160 strikers for minor traffic violations, citrus growers in Orange County responded by reviving the Associated Farmers, establishing the Orange County Protective Association to prepare for negotiations, and suggesting that strikers were cooperating

with Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas. Hill led a group of consular officials which brokered an agreement to end the strike without union recognition in exchange for wage increases and the elimination of transportation and equipment charges, and one could still observe even after the end of World War II, as Fred Ross, the noted protégé of the Anti-Communist organizer Saul Alinsky, did, "a huge corral-like structure" on the outskirts of Placencia while the editor of a Spanish-language newspaper, Ignacio "Nacho" Lopez, told Ross how "they strangled the 1936 Citrus [sic] strike." Deputy state labor commissioner Thomas Barker also mediated later that year when Mexican vegetable workers struck for hourly wage increases from twenty-five to thirty cents, while the CUOM joined the CIO as it prepared to expand its signed agreements with Japanese vegetable growers in southern California to include Euro-American vegetable growers in citrus, walnut, and other agricultural industries.[50]

Over 500 members of the Watsonville unit and 1,444 members of the Salinas unit (many of whom were Euro-American migrants from Texas and Oklahoma) of Fruit and Vegetable Workers Local 18821 led another impactful strike by lettuce workers, teamsters, and boxmakers for union recognition, time-and-one-half for overtime work on seven holidays, the right to refuse to cross picket lines, a "union label," and "equal rights of pay, privileges and conditions for women and men alike" during the early autumn of 1936. The strikers received support from the local teamsters' union, since the secretary and business representative rejected an offer from employers for a preferential hiring clause during negotiations. A truck drivers' union in Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Monterey, and San Benito counties passed a resolution that Mensalves also signed which stated that they would not sign new contracts until the striking lettuce workers won a satisfactory agreement, although another group of truckers crossed picket lines against a local ice company and several packing sheds. Female protesters were soon picketing both city hall and the county jail, and both police officers and the executive secretary of the Salinas Valley Citizens' Association, Carriel Cruse, reported one week later that Elaine Black was again bailing out detained strikers in the area. *The Produce News* also reported that the lettuce workers had planned their strike in conjunction with that of the maritime workers on October before arbitration proceedings delayed it for several weeks.[51]

Growers in Monterey County established a unit of the Associated Farmers' unit soon after a representative of the Industrial Association, Paul Eliel, visited before also attending a meeting of the Growers-Shippers' Association on June 4, and it was H.L. Strobel - who testified to the Senate's investigative committee on the "quickie" strikes in Salinas – who became responsible for coordinating activities between the county unit and the Growers-Shippers' Association of Central California. The individual charged with "managing" the city police, sheriff's deputies, and state highway patrol officers was Canadian Army colonel Henry Sanborn of Marin County, who also edited a periodical called *The American Citizen* and supervised the activities of a lieutenant, "Sheriff" Carl Abbott, who claimed at one point that "3,000 longshoremen were headed to Salinas." Although the Grower-Shippers' Association characterized Sanborn's "role" as acting only in an "advisory capacity" as opposed to leading the operation, one NLRB trial examiner later found that the association employed a detective agency's private guards on the police department's "tab" and concluded that the overall "impression" of law enforcement officers' actions during the Salinas lettuce strike of 1936 was "one of inexcusable police brutality, in many instances bordering on sadism." Officers received advice from a tear-gas expert, Ignatius McCarthy (who had advised San Francisco police officers during the general strike) on how to use the "nauseating yellow gas," while local ice company

sought to intimidate the strikers' potential allies by refusing to sell its products to grower and packer Tracy Waldrum after he signed a contract that included a preferential-hiring clause. The association later prevented the rehiring of strikers at lettuce sheds in the Imperial Valley and Arizona by requiring that employees carry clearance cards.[52]

Vigilantes also constructed barricades near the Marinovich and Travers-Sakota sheds on Beach Road, the Salinas Valley Ice Company's plant, and twelve other packing sheds. The growers received further assistance, meanwhile, when the county's district attorney, Harry Nolan, advised detained strikers to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges and accept suspended sentences for violating the county's anti-picketing ordinance. Yet the lettuce strikers still continued to receive a significant amount of support from labor unions that represented employees in a variety of industries in southern California. The Monterey County Central Labor Union passed a resolution that condemned anti-picketing ordinances and requested aid from central labor councils and unions in San Francisco and Los Angeles, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Local #448 in Los Angeles issued a formal protest against collusion between law enforcement officers, growers, and packers. The Screen Actors Guild raised $1,000 (Gary Cooper, Jean Muir, and Lionel Stander were "among the early subscribers," but the state labor federation's resolutions committee still refused, however, to either declare all of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association's lettuce unfair or call for the establishment of a state council of agricultural, shed, packinghouse, and cannery workers.[53]

While the strikers received over $10,000 from unions in the Bay Area and Los Angeles by late August, the Los Angeles Central Labor Council's executive board was "hesitant" to provide legal aid for the "injunction suits" against strikers. There was also stark evidence of growers' and shippers' substantial wealth, political power, and that it allied covertly with the state federation of labor, since two shipping firms in Salinas that agreed to terms with the union were unable, for example, to find purchasers of their ice when the other shipping companies in the area sent their lettuce instead to heavily-guarded packingsheds in Los Angeles. Trimmers, packers, car loaders, and both union and non-union truck drivers all handled lettuce despite AFL organizer Joseph Casey's recent assurance to "local union men" that workers would treat lettuce shipped from Salinas as "hot" cargo. The grower-shipper association complied with the governor's request to negotiate with the state federation of labor by offering preferential employment to local residents of Salinas, and Lillian Monroe assured Edward Vandeleur that the farm labor union's members "desire[d] to be affiliated to the A.F. of L. under the right conditions to work cooperatively with all of your unions in the agricultural industry." The strikers then rejected their employers' offer, which did not include a preferential hiring hall, by a margin of three to one.[54]

Filipino strike leaders included Mensalves and Nick Losada (who soon also led a faction of radical Filipino farmworkers into the CIO-affiliated UCAPAWA), and among the members of their coordinating committee were representatives from Local 18211, the FLU, the newly-formed IBT Local 287, and Boxmakers' Union No. 1063. Up to 1,000 members of the Filipino Workers' Association (FWA) in Salinas participated in the lettuce strike despite their confinement within the Growers-Shippers' Association's concentration camps that hundreds of armed guards were monitoring. Carlos Bulosan attributed the failure of the lettuce strike to an agent provocateur, "Helen," who disappeared soon after the collapse of the FWA. Yet the west-coast maritime workers' unions' periodical, *The Voice of the Federation*, also reported on the strike and found some Filipino workers were arguing that "the 100 percent Americans" amongst the white shed workers on strike, who had assumed during the 1934 lettuce strike that "if the

Filipino workers came out the reign of terror would start again," had their "confidence…rudely shattered in Salinas last week" when they refused to join their strike. The reporter described a "reign of terror instituted against the Filipino workers in 1934" as "just a dress rehearsal to the 1936 terror of last week," except there were not "any Filipinos involved in the strike."[55]

The Associated Farmers was not idle during such a significant strike. *The Produce News* cited an unnamed source who reported that the AFL had pressured U.S. officials to "reopen the lettuce matter through a Federal investigation," for example, by threatening to reveal correspondence between members of the Associated Farmers and "several southern California cooperative leaders." The source stated further that the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, colluded with growers to form AFL-affiliated labor unions of packers, vegetable workers, truck drivers, and teamsters for the purpose of preventing them from joining CIO affiliates instead. The Associated Farmers' bulletin also reprinted a letter that Edward Vandeleur wrote to AFL president William Green shortly after the Stockton conference that informed Green that a Socialist Party member, Julius B. Nathan, was attempting to lead the formation of agricultural labor unions before assuring Green that they were "willing to let the Associated Farmers know at all times what we plan to do." The strikers voted to return to work by a margin of 613 to 342 after Vandeleur reached an oral agreement with the Industrial Association, and the Watsonville unit of Local 18211 soon applied for a charter from the AFL while the Salinas unit joined the CIO within a year.[56]

Although it did not make a significant effort to organize farmworkers, the state labor federation did have a strong presence in the state's canning industry. The federation's response to the lettuce strike in Salinas was, in fact, to re-organize its cannery laborers' council. The federation merged the Watsonville unit and other disaffected members of Local 18211 with Local 20973 and installed Charles Real during October as president of the California State Council of Cannery Workers (which promptly initiated negotiations with the California Processors and Growers Association). Yet an NLRB trial examiner ruled soon after that employers had colluded to coerce workers into joining the AFL-affiliated Cannery Workers' Union, which casted further doubts on the state labor federation's organizing campaign among cannery workers. Also dubious was the federation's decision the following September to award the teamsters' union with jurisdiction over cannery warehouses, agriculture, wineries, packingsheds, and fruit wrappers in the Imperial Valley.[57]

As the state federation launched its cannery workers' campaign, many laborers in the canning and agricultural industry joined the CIO's campaign to recruit 10,000 packingshed workers in southern California's citrus industry in the years before and after the U.S. entered World War II. UCAPAWA won certification, meanwhile, as the collective-bargaining representative for packingshed workers in Salinas. A judge issued an injunction to prevent employers from coercing packers into refusing to hire blacklisted strikers, and the NLRB's Trial Examiner found that growers and the grower-shipper association collaborated through a "citizens' association" before ordering the Association to bargain collectively with UCAPAWA Local 18. Radical organizer Lillian Monroe also visited migrants at camps in Kern and Fresno counties as the leaders of UCAPAWA in California prepared for another organizing campaign among farmworkers in the San Joaquin Valley. Although the ninth circuit of appeals overturned the NLRB ruling four years later, UCAPAWA Local 18 still soon won elections and signed contracts to represent lettuce workers at sheds in Salinas, the Imperial Valley, and Arizona.[58]

While they lost the Salinas strike, industrial unionists and UCAPAWA re-doubled their efforts to replace the canning and agricultural industry's "contractor system" with a union hiring

hall and to amalgamate cannery and agricultural workers' unions as much as possible. The cannery workers' campaign began in the east Bay Area city of Pittsburgh, where 500 fish cannery workers struck for two weeks against the B.E. Booth Company during December of 1936 and won five-cent hourly wage increases to a total of forty-five for women and fifty for men, two hours' call-in pay for female employees, five-cent raises for continued labor after eight-hour shifts, and time-and-a-half after twelve hours. Employees at five of the California Packing Company's (Cal-Pak) canneries in the East Bay then struck four months later. Yet while teamsters in Oakland disobeyed AFL president William Green's order to cross striking warehouse workers' picket lines, their counterparts in San Leandro complied by hauling spinach across cannery workers' picket lines.[59]

The state labor federation soon held another organizing conference in San Francisco for agricultural labor unions during the following February that credentialed delegates from Mexican and Filipino trade unions, cannery unions, Harry Bridges, and the central labor councils of Santa Clara, Alameda, San Mateo, Monterey, Marysville, Vallejo, and Contra Costa. Lillian Monroe served on the credentials committee, which permitted delegates from Bakersfield, the Japanese Agricultural Workers' Union, and the Alaska Cannery Workers Union to participate during the second day. Monroe also introduced a resolution to "protect the rights of labor against 'Vigilantism.'" The ILA assigned a longtime union member who was the first Afro-American delegate on the central labor council, J. Jones of Local 38-106, to recruit cotton compress workers for Agricultural Workers Union No. 73 during the summer of 1936, meanwhile, and ILD organizers Mary Imada and Karl Yoneda enrolled over 1,000 Japanese agricultural and cannery workers from the Stockton area in UCAPAWA shortly before the cannery workers' strike. The Stockton Central Labor Council also granted permission for Agricultural Workers Union No. 20221 to organize cannery workers on March 22, though some of the strikers who picketed at the Stockton Food Products Company plant one month later were wearing ILA stickers.[60]

One of the cannery workers' primary demands – like celery and lettuce strikers demanded the previous year - was equal pay for equal work, which would have entailed hourly wage increases from forty cents for women and fifty cents for men to a "sixty cents minimum" for each group of employees. Both the Stockton local's business agent and the central labor council's president proceeded with a vote on a general strike as union members in Stockton expanded their picketing operations to Cal-Pak's cannery. While a "Committee of Sixteen" that opposed a general strike formed to fulfill a "mission of good will" with a "citizenary [sic] of Stockton" (which they defined as farmers, merchants, bankers, cannery operators, AFL members, and public officials), the Maritime Federation of the Pacific reported that 897 of the approximately 1,000 workers employed by the Stockton Food Products, Mor-Pak, Pak-Well, and Richmond-Chase companies' employees opted to join the Agricultural Workers Union. One anti-CIO leaflet reported that most picketers at the canneries were Filipino agricultural workers and that Vandeleur again brokered an end to the strike. Although they won union recognition, union elections, and formed a negotiating committee, the state labor federation refused to concede to their demand for a federal charter that included jurisdiction over agricultural workers.[61]

The strike ended when teamsters crossed picket lines at the Stockton Food Products cannery (where deputies used tear gas and caused injuries that sent fifty-four persons to the local hospital), while the employers "pushed out" the radicals by bargaining instead through the Committee of Sixteen with the San Joaquin County Central Labor Council. Strikers only ceased picketing the plant, however, when a representative from the central labor council agreed to

establish a labor union for agricultural workers. Vandeleur also barred the Stanislaus County Central Labor Council from issuing a charter to a union of 200 cannery workers in Modesto, for his part, and then negotiated an agreement that covered 60,000 employees at ninety-six canneries. As the NLRB conducted its trial examination of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California (but refused to subpoena Vandeleur), the Fruit and Vegetable Workers Union's locals in the Salinas Valley demanded an immediate resumption of contract negotiations. The teamsters in Stockton refused to vote, however, on the question of a general strike to support their efforts.[62]

"self-styled 'progressive' daily newspaper"

Los Angeles was one of industrial unionists' most important "battlegrounds" during the second half of the 1930s, since it was a city with a reputation for anti-union politics along with a growing set of industries. The San Pedro longshoremen's victory during the west-coast maritime workers' strike was the first step towards making the harbor district one of the CIO's primary "bases" for its organizing campaign among workers in the city's warehouse, cannery, agricultural, apparel, transportation, communications, aircraft, entertainment, furniture, and newspaper industries, and the coast-wide dockworkers' strike of 1936-7 escalated the campaign successfully due, at least in part, to both cooperation by members of the longshoremen's union's ladies' auxiliary, MCS, and SUP, respectively, and the Confederation of Mexican Workers' (*Confederación de Trabajadores de México*) boycott of U.S. shipping companies. Unions limited most of their political activities, however, to an anti-vice campaign, the recall of Mayor Shaw, and occasional challenges to restrictive deeding practices, which left a new Latino civil rights organization, the Congress of Spanish-Speaking People (*El Congreso de Pueblo Que Habla Español*), with few allies as it sought more comprehensive reforms regarding housing, health, law enforcement, and voter turnout. The result was that reformers and union leaders failed to force local officials to appoint more accountable police, harbor, and housing commissioners; challenge zoning regulators' practice of allowing variances which enabled employers to locate factories in black and Latino communities; end market-based housing development; address low graduate rates among black and Latino youth; or formulate state- and regional-level strategies to curb the power of the Associated Farmers and other employers; and demand a centralized and planned economy. While industrial unionists' flawed strategy did not prevent Filipino peach thinners in Marysville, Yuba County from winning concessions from grower Joseph DiGiorgio after its second strike during the summer of 1939, they did not have sufficient time overturn legality of county governments' anti-picketing ordinances before the U.S. entered World War II.

The Los Angeles service industry – which was the city's largest economic sector - employed over 320,000 people by 1940, while an additional 250,000 residents were working in a trade and another 200,000 in manufacturing industries. The city had already become the region's epicenter of industrial growth and was soon first among all U.S. cities in the production of aircrafts, motion pictures, and oil tool and oil well equipment; second in rubber and automobile assembly; third in food processing and petroleum refining; and fourth in apparel and furniture. The state's employers – especially in southern California – were receiving twelve percent of all U.S. government war contracts by October of 1942, the number of persons employed in war industries tripled from approximately 70,000 to 215,000, and state's total population increased by half a million over the next two years. There were ten auto plants within the city's limits by 1948, and the Douglas and Lockheed aircraft companies were producing all of the U.S. military's Air Force and Navy patrol bombers, two-thirds of the Air Force's jet fighters, and eighty percent of new attack planes by then. Over 200 delegates from AFL and CIO unions

joined with archbishopric charities director Thomas O'Dwyer's Los Angeles Citizens Housing Council (CHC) and the California Housing and Planning Association during February of 1942 in responding to severe wartime housing shortages by calling for the construction of 60,000 new housing units in the areas of Burbank-Glendale, Inglewood-Hawthorne, Santa Monica, Southwest L.A., and the harbor district, although the state's Commissioner of Immigration and Housing, Carey McWilliams, soon criticized both the Division of Defense Housing Coordination in Washington, D.C. and the Federal Works Agency for failing to plan their housing projects in San Diego adequately. Table VI presents information on population growth in southern California from 1920 through 1950.[63]

The "hundred days' strike" of 1936-7 occurred while – and, indeed, was the means by which – west-coast longshore and warehouse unions separated from the ILA and joined the ILWU. The participation of 37,000 sailors was crucial for the strike's success, and so were longshoremen's and sailors' activities in Hawaii (some of which resulted in thirteen-month jail sentences for violating the territorial government's anti-picketing law). Although Hawaiian longshoremen had founded the Honolulu Longshoremen's Association (HLA) in 1907, the HLA still had yet to receive a charter from the ILA's executive board two years after a new group of longshoremen organized Locals 36 and 37 in 1934. The strikers' primary goals were to consolidate the union hiring hall, end the practice of blacklisting, and expand their strike to dock workers at ports in the Gulf and East coasts. Strikers on the east coast only returned to work upon receiving orders from the executive board of the masters', mates', and pilots' union, whereas the HLA and the machinists' union in San Francisco were among the most ardent supporters of continuing the strike through the spring of 1937.[64]

The San Pedro local's executive board opted during September of 1935 to classify both the sorting of cargo and the discharging of the lift board as "longshore work" instead of "warehouse work," and ILA Locals 38-82 (San Pedro) and 38-120 (San Diego) began both admitting "green card men who have ILA picket duty and who are qualified longshoremen" and recruiting truck drivers, loaders, and teamsters to the Maritime Federation of the Pacific by the end of the year. The executive board also responded during January of 1936 to a message from United Furniture Workers (UFW) Local 1561 by sending a delegate to their meeting and carried a motion to recommend that the warehouse local refuse to handle out-bound freight when furniture workers launched their strike. The west coast joint-policy committee of affiliated unions also voted in San Francisco during the hundred days' strike to exempt perishable cargo by a margin of fourteen to six after Bridges relayed a question from the U.S. Marshall to direct workers in unloading 4,216 banana stems on the *S.S. California* one day after the Ladies Auxiliary began operating a soup kitchen, and one auxiliary member and wife of an executive board member who attended the union's annual convention in 1935, Mrs. Bruce, also reported to the joint-strike committee regarding the auxiliary's plans for upcoming dance and holiday parties.[65]

The San Pedro strikers' goal was to secure complete control over the length and assignment of their work shifts on both ships and docks through a union hiring hall, and there were close links between their efforts and those of other workers in L.A. that had few precedents in the city. When a member, Thomas, collected funds for auxiliary member Elise Twing's burial at a membership meeting during the late 1940s, he cited her "fine work" specifically during the "1934-36 strike" in ensuring that "no longshoremen or seaman ever went hungry" by supplying food supplies to the strikers (the SUP also offered Twing honorary membership). The strikers



Report from the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, June, 1952 (based on U.S. Census data).

received donations from unions throughout Los Angeles and southern California, and they also sent hundreds of members to join furniture and transportation workers' picket lines. The San Pedro local's executive board protested Joseph P. Ryan's telegram to a controversial Mexican trade union federation, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), "requesting they work *The Santa Elena*," after the CTM declared a boycott against U.S. ships (including those owned by the United Fruit Company) that were re-directing cargo to the Port of Ensenada San Francisco Central Labor Council's secretary, J O'Connell, over whether to exempt "releasing films aboard a vessel in San Pedro." A federal judge issued a writ that ordered the in Baja California. The San Pedro local won full control of the hiring hall and also the "six and two" workday, though the United Fruit Company's continued intransigence was already evident in its refusal to negotiate throughout the strike.[66]

Another new leader among west-coast sailors also emerged during the strike in the form of Harry Lundeberg, who was an SUP member from Norway and a vocal opponent of oil-tanker workers' a disastrous strike in Modesto during the spring of 1935. Lundeberg also spoke at a joint policy meeting against a motion during the hundred days' strike to permit the Portland local's strike committee to allow the unloading of feed corn from Argentina from a Norwegian steamer, *Primero*, on the grounds that it would set a precedent, and Bridges retorted that the situation differed since he claimed it was citizens, not employers, who were "threatening to unload the ship." While the union's relief committee cooperated closely with members of the ladies' auxiliary, Lundeberg opposed the longshoremen's proposal for a unified bargaining strategy amongst the maritime unions and instead engaged in separate negotiations with

ILA Local 38-82 (San Pedro) during the 1934 strike. Courtesy: CSU Northridge

employers. Lundeberg soon reported to the joint policy committee that the Luckenbach Company had "tentatively agreed to West Coast wages," and, though he described the provision as a "preferential hiring hall" in his telegram to the San Pedro joint strike committee, he later testified that the SUP first won a hiring hall as a result of their limited participation in the strike. The SUP reached an agreement with the shipowners after one month and ceased sending representatives to meetings for the Maritime Federation's District Council No. 4 soon after.[67]

It was also during the hundred days' strike that MCS members first elected Revels Cayton, who had become the secretary-treasurer of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific's San Francisco District Council after the general strike, as business agent. Cayton was chair of both the MCS's strike committee and the Bay Area Strike Committee, and he also had a seat on the joint policy committee. The radical labor leader ensured that every work crew of fifty or more persons had direct representation on MCS' strike committee, which was why the number of committee members increased from eleven to fifty-five. The original eleven members then became its executive committee. MCS members also elected Cayton - who later co-founded a chapter of the Council for Civic Unity in Los Angeles after the war - as the union's Fourth Patrolman during those early years.[68]

The hundred days' strike coincided with an unprecedented wave of sit-down strikes across the U.S. from 1936-7 in agriculture, warehousing, canning, aircraft, communications, film, relief, and transportation industries as well as in the Works Progress Administration's (WPA) relief offices (white-collar workers depended on relief increasingly after 1934 as their savings depleted, and female white-collar workers tended to receive less relief on average than males). Up to 10,000 work-relief employees in San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties struck against dismissals and for ten percent wage increases, for example, while 150 others held a sit-down strike at the San Francisco city administration's office on First Street. The Douglas Aircraft Company's employees also organized a sit-down strike at the company's plant in Santa Monica soon after Lockheed Martin recognized IAM Aeronautical Mechanics Lodge 727 and as the North American Aircraft Corporation was starting to manufacture twin-engine

aircrafts at its new plant in Inglewood. While Bridges argued to the strike committee that west-coast sailors should organize pickets instead of sit-down strikes, industrial unionists at southern port cities like Port McArthur, Texas, also considered seizing direct control of ships (*The Voice of the Federation* reported that maritime workers in Houston, Texas, did not have sufficient time to organize such an action). Yet despite the union's connections with other unions' strikes in Los Angeles and elsewhere, Local 13's executive board still "preferred" to establish a separate Industrial Union Council district for the CIO's sixteen affiliates in the harbor district.[69]

The local's executive board proposed to separate CIO councils for L.A. and the harbor district amidst a wave of labor strikes and municipal reforms that continued until the U.S. entered World War II. Communications workers in the city launched a new organizing campaign when twenty-three members of the American Radio Telegraphists' Association struck against the Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company during the winter of 1935-6. The American Newspaper Guild launched negotiations for its "Hearst units" in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles during early May of 1937, and its unit at *The Los Angeles Evening Herald-Express* demanded weekly wages of sixty-five dollars for employees with five years of seniority, a five-day and forty-hour work week, wage increases of ten percent (and five cents per line for space writers), and severance pay for up to twenty-four weeks. The attorney of jurist Harlan G. Palmer's, Willis Sargent, delivered blue slips to *The Hollywood Citizen-News* political editor and formed LANG president Roger Johnson, drama editor Elizabeth Yeaman, and editorial writer Mel G. Scott, Jr. on May 13, 1938, and the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild (LANG) picketed offices of the "self-styled progressive newspaper" in Hollywood with members of the AFL, the National League of Women Shoppers, and the CIO. The strikers received pledges of support from musicians, studio painters, screen writers, screen directors, typographical workers, and projectionists with IATSE, and the League canceled subscriptions and boycotted capitalists who purchased advertisers. The two-month strike ended when Palmer agreed to reinstate eighteen strikers and the five discharged employees, and LANG signed a collective-bargaining agreement with provisions for weekly minimum wages of twenty to forty-five dollars based on experience, a forty-hour week, severance pay from one to twenty-six weeks after twenty years of employment, vacation, sick leave, and compensation of seven cents per mile when employees purchased fuel and used their own automobiles as part of their work for the newspaper.[70]

Vice consul Eduardo Zambrano mediated negotiations between a Mexican mutual-aid society and Japanese employers representing Venice Palms Industrial Association, meanwhile, when celery workers in Venice struck again during the spring of 1938, and the agreement they composed indicated that the mutual-aid society and the Associated Farmers had agreed to a minimum hourly wage of thirty-five cents, abolition of the contract system, the exchange of information on members and employees, a grievance procedure, and a ban on the hiring of Filipinos. The local chapter of the League of Women Shoppers soon organized "an effective consumers' boycott" one year later in solidarity with Laundry Workers' Local 357's seven-day strike against "one of the most oppressive sweat ships in the city," the Wardrobe Linen Supply and Laundry Company, in response to the company's dismissals of eleven employees, and both Dorothy Connelly and Alice Cohee of LANG were "of great assistance in contacting the general public with appeals for assistance" during the strike. The strikers, whose supervisors had reportedly "punched the cards for the women" and sometimes only paid for eight hours of work for ten-hour shifts, won an eight-hour day, wage increases of up to forty percent, starting weekly salaries of eight to fourteen dollars, paid vacations, and back-pay worth more than $2,000. CIO organizers founded the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU) when communication workers in

Pasadena struck during July, while ILWU Local 13 donated $350 to the union's newly-formed L.A. warehouse unit, Local 26, during the "L.A. Drug lockout" later that year after it launched an impactful organizing campaign among the city's drug store workers. It was within this flurry of union activity in southern California that the state CIO council elected Philip "Slim" Connolly of LANG as president and Louis Goldblatt of the ILWU as secretary-treasurer at its convention during August of 1938 and that convention delegates passed a resolution which favored state ownership of both the aircraft and arms industries.[71]

ILWU Local 26 received its charter, $10,000 from both the San Francisco ILWU Local 10 and the ILA's west-coast district, and volunteers from the ILWU Local 13 for picketing duties as a result of its strike against the Owl Drug Company during October of 1936, and the union soon became a leading supporter of equal pay in Los Angeles by the late 1940s. The west-coast district held a convention the following May where attendees carried an amendment that a delegate from San Francisco proposed to "give serious consideration to organizing the workers inland before organizing the waterfront," declared a boycott of Cal-Pak, and refused to carry Bruce's proposed amendment that the convention only re-endorse the B.C. Policy Committee if it were "composed of bonafide maritime unions" while members in the area of Vancouver were striking. Local 26 struck against the Taylor Mill – as did fishermen's and textile workers' unions – during the summer of 1938, but teamsters in the city handled hot cargo during both UCAPAWA's crucial Cal-San strike one year later and a citrus workers' strike in 1940. A "dissident" leader among L.A. teamsters, Lou Sherman, later recalled in an interview that the IBT's international executive board replaced the local's officers with international representatives during the mid-1930s, and Local 26 soon moved from targeting drug and mill industries to recruiting scrap-metal workers between 1940 and 1941.[72]

The number of union members represented by Los Angeles Central Labor Council's (AFL) various affiliates grew between from approximately 100,000 to 120,000 between 1937 and 1939 as the federation vied with the CIO to recruit new members in southern California. UCAPAWA Local 64 in San Diego signed a contract with Van Camp Sea Food as Local 49 was launching an attempt to organize Los Angeles County's lucrative dairy industry, and Local 92 won an NLRB election one year later to represent 1,300 employees of the California Walnut Growers Association. As some locals sought permission to establish women's auxiliaries, Local 75 received NLRB certification during the autumn of 1939 to represent over 400 California Sanitation Company (Cal-San) employees after waging a successful strike and boycott of the largest canning plant in Los Angeles. Yet female Local 75 members employed by Cal-San still received hourly wages that were five or ten cents less than their male counterparts, and it was these kinds of "disparities" that led the union within a year to assign Luisa Moreno and Frank Lopez of the furniture workers' union as lead organizers among the city's cannery workers.[73]

One of UCAPAWA's leading agricultural labor organizers, Luke Hinman, was born in the Sacramento Valley during 1905 and joined a John Reed Club in northern California during the early 1930s before serving as the AFL-affiliated Watchmakers' Union Local 115's business manager in Los Angeles. Hinman volunteered soon after to fight for the Republicans with the Abraham Lincoln Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, and, upon his return, he acted as UCAPAWA's state director for its agricultural labor campaign. Luisa Moreno wrote to another key UCAPAWA organizer, Clyde Johnson, that Hinman was "certainly a very wonderful person" and "well-liked by everyone." Both Ted Rasmussen and he soon replaced Dorothea Ray Healey when UCAPAWA launched its organizing campaign in the state's walnut industry, and

he joined ILWU Local 13 on March 4, 1943. Tables VII through XI present information on the California Federation of Labor's affiliations and total membership from 1909 through 1940.[74]

A former grocery salesman, Frank L. Shaw, first won mayoral election in 1933 before leading what became one of the most controversial administrations in L.A.'s history. He placed his brother, Joe, in charge of the city's police and fire departments, before his brother began selling promotions for up to $500. Critics soon alleged that the administration was selling civil-service positions, and the city council voted to amend the city charter by a very narrow margin one year later when it forbade the removal of police officers except by trial boards composed of other police officers. Delegating such "self-investigative authority" to police departments not only had a negative impact on district attorneys' willingness to prosecute cases of officer misconduct but also imposed another barrier for urban reformers seeking to better police accounting. LAPD historian Edward Escobar has argued that the FBI's "war on crime" during the 1930s led police departments to change their strategies from responsive to preventive, which created another barrier for reformers by making Los Angeles police officers overly sensitive to criticism and especially challenges to their authority.[75]

Although a grand jury refused to indict Shaw on charges of mismanaging Los Angeles General Hospital's funds, one jury member and a local restauranteur, Clifford E. Clinton, both hired a private detective, Harry Raymond, to continue investigating the administration and launched a reformist organization called the Citizens Independent Vice Investigating Commission (CIVIC). Officers from the LAPD's "intelligence squad" unit then conducted surveillance of Raymond and detonated a bomb in his car on Seventh Street in front his home, and a police officer admitted soon after to District Attorney Buron Fitts - whose "racket squad" had been investigating racketeering charges at the Santa Anita racetrack – that the captain of detectives and director of the police intelligence squad, Earle E. Kynette, was at least partially responsible for the bombing. Although police chief James E. Davis refused Fitts' demand to suspend the entire squad, a jury found one police captain guilty of attempted murder. Four of Shaw's seven appointees (including the Executive Director of the Catholic Welfare Bureau, Thomas O'Dwyer) declined subsequently to serve on his citizens' inquiry committee, while the assembly's speaker, Williams Moseley Jones, announced that he would chair a committee to investigate reports of "police terrorism, vice, graft and corruption" and local CIO affiliates opted to endorse the mayoral candidacy of grand jury member Fletcher Bowron. The major issues during the 1938 election season were corruption, the mayoral recall, and an anti-picketing ordinance called Proposition 1, but anti-vice reformers also propagated a discourse inflected with what one historian has described as a "language of moral anxiety" during the election season despite the end of prohibition five years earlier.[76]

Vigilantes in southern California capitalized on the impending crisis of the late 1930s, as they did elsewhere, by targeting national minorities and working-class women for abuse and forced sterilization. California eugenicist C.M. Goethe told a colleague after visiting Germany as early as 1934, for example, that "your work has played a powerful part in shaping the opinions of the groups of intellectuals who are behind Hitler." Nine state hospitals sterilized 1,703 people forcibly during a spike in the practice between 1936 and 1940, and these sterilizations constituted about one-third of the 5,203 that the California state government administered after 1919. The percentage of Mexicans sterilized also rose from 15.4 to 21.3 during those two decades. There is also evidence that some LAPD officers were committing sexual assaulting working-class Latina women with impunity, since Mexican waitresses complained to the Congress of Spanish-Speaking People that police officers arrested them for prostitution charges


Table VII: Total Number of Labor Councils Affiliated with the California Federation of Labor, 1909-1940
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939


Table VIII: Total Number of Local Unions Affiliated with California Federation of Labor, 1909-1940
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939



Data in published in The Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention of the California Federation of Labor, Santa Monica, September 23-28, 1940, pg. 42.

before forcing them to "offer" sex in exchange for their release from jail.[77]

Luisa Moreno and a Mexican-American youth leader, Bert Corona, aided a fish cannery workers' campaign at the Van Camp plant in San Diego that soon established that county's only UCAPAWA local, meanwhile, and their actions were probably the impetus for vigilantes' subsequent attempts to expel Latino workers from the area. Organizer Robert Galván soon sought protection from an army patrol to thwart a mob of KKK members. That organization's San Diego chapter, the Exalted Cyclops Klan, also several conducted raids in Mexican territory, lynched Mexican persons, used Mexican migrants for "target practice," and disfigured their corpses, and vigilantes in the city also formed a chapter of another notorious vigilante organization called "the Silver Shirts." The noted Los Angeles attorney and author, Carey McWilliams, blamed the Associated Farmers for the revival of the KKK during the following summer, ALthough it did not deter the CIO's affiliates from making concrete gains in San Diego. Warehouse workers in the city formed ILWU Local 38 by the spring of 1940 and soon received five dollars weekly from the longshoremen's local in San Pedro.[78]

The Latino civil-rights organization, the Congress of Spanish-Speaking People, or El Congreso, sought to overcome these barriers and was at forefront of social reformers' activities in southern California from its formation in 1938 until it folded in 1943. El Congreso initiated voter registration drives, petitioned city council to allocate more funds for public housing and health services, sought to improve the county's criminal justice administration for juveniles, and called for the elimination of the Red Squad and any other anti-labor squadron within the police department at its second annual convention in 1939. Convention delegates also resolved to amend the city charter to "place the police department under the control of the people." The organization was among the first in the city to force representatives from law enforcement agencies to meet and discuss municipal problems with reformers formally, and it succeeded in curbing LAPD officers' sexual assaults of Latina residents by reverting to citizens' arrests. El

Congreso also led a march of 1,000 people to the governor's office to protest both a state highway patrolman's killing of seventeen-year old Faustino Sanchez and the alleged suicide of thirteen-year old Benjamin Moreno at Whittier Reformatory, to which the governor responded by appointing an investigative committee.[79]

There was also a pressing need for reform in the California countryside, and the large migration from the "Dust Bowl" which stretched from Oklahoma and northeastern New Mexico to California during the first years of the FDR administration was both one of the strongest impetuses for housing reform and led relief administrators to construct some of the state's first farm labor camps. The construction of migrant labor camps required a significant degree of coordination between local, state, and national governmental agencies, and housing shortages in the region became even more acute in the smaller towns and cities of the state's agriculturally-productive valleys. New Jersey was the first state to establish a state housing authority, and Carey McWilliams, who was, by then, the state government's director of California Division of Immigration and Housing (DIH), soon proposed a similar statewide program for California. Rents were very high for many of the San Joaquin Valley's denizens, but officials' refusal to consider rent controls meant that the Farm Security Administration's (FSA) labor camps were among their only sources of relief from high housing costs. McWilliams also found that people on relief in the San Joaquin Valley were using an average of eighty percent of their disbursements to purchase housing.[80]

There was a struggle for authority within FSA camps between residents who elected camp councils and the administration's camp managers, and was the latter group's attitudes towards the CIO that most often constrained farm labor leaders' union activities. When editors of a camp newspaper in Shafter advertised UCAPAWA meetings alongside upcoming baseball games to be held at "the Mexican colony," for instance, the administration replaced camp manager Charles Berry with Roy C. Mork after Berry insisted that the CIO deserved space within the newspaper despite its recent publication of an anti-CIO letter by a group of growers, shippers, law enforcement agents, a druggist, and a bookkeeper. Camp residents' itinerant status also caused high turnover among both residents and leadership. Campers in Arvin elected a representative to "deal personally" with the "agitators" there, but managers soon had to appoint a temporary replacement who lived "right next to where all the agitatin' is going on" when the previous one quit after finding employment at a packinghouse. Many growers and FSA managers considered the CIO's presence in the camps a nuisance (which was also why the Kern County Board of Supervisors banned John Steinbeck's novel, *The Grapes of Wrath*), and CIO representative soon announced that the purpose of their meeting during late August of 1939 was not "to discuss or cuss the Management of the Camp, or anything in or about the camp."[81]

CIO organizers acted in an austere environment due, in part, to the relief administration's retrenchment after 1936 that escalated quickly when state administrators purged cotton strikers from relief programs and began targeting undocumented immigrants, in particular, for exclusion. The state relief administration withheld relief from cotton pickers in Kern County who struck for five weeks in 1939 against twenty-five percent wage cuts to seventy-five cents per hundred pounds, and the WPA removed 2,200 people in eight counties from its relief programs during March of the following year. McWilliams claimed fifteen months later that the purpose of withholding relief had been to prevent recipients from paying union dues. The number of undocumented residents on relief also increased from 569 to 2,473 during the first half of 1939, and the state legislature responded one year later by excluding undocumented immigrants who arrived after July 1, 1924, from relief programs. ILWU Local 13's executive board sought to

address the state's rural crisis by supporting orange and cotton strikers, donating hundreds of dollars to both UCAPAWA and John Steinbeck's Committee to Aid Agricultural Organization, and sending a delegate to the founding convention of El Congreso.[82]

Canning companies signed an agreement with the AFL-affiliated National Council of Agricultural Workers, and UCAPAWA's farm labor campaign in the region collapsed soon after in Marysville, Yuba County, where 350 Filipino-led pear thinners who had recently arrived from the Imperial Valley responded to the Earl Fruit Company's wage cuts by striking during May of 1939 for dismissal of the company's "efficiency expert." One striker who had recently picked cotton in Pixley, Carrie Morris, became a CIO organizer after the Marysville strike and was soon recruiting migrants in the camps to UCAPAWA Local 302 (Pixley and Kermon) during the cotton strike later that year. A second strike in Marysville against the DiGiorgio Fruit Company occurred three months later and won five-cent wage increases, the rehiring of discharged employees, and a "verbal agreement" with law enforcement officers, the superintendent, and the president of the Associated Farmers. DiGiorgio only rehired forty strikers, however, while law enforcement agencies arrested seventeen picketers and convicted three for violating the county's anti-picketing ordinance.[83]

Joseph Di Giorgio first purchased the Earl Fruit Company (which was then a California-based shipping company) seven years after he co-founded the Baltimore Fruit Exchange in 1904, and he purchased his first properties in Florida during the last year of World War I. DiGiorgio and two other major shipping companies (including Cal-Pak) became farmers' major creditors by the early 1930s. The investor entered the wine business in 1932 when he began trading and shipping the Italian Swiss Company's products at Asti Forty, and he also used credit from Bank of America and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to purchase the Del Vista Winery in Delano six years later. The famous camp manager, Tom Collins, noted in his monthly report for June of 1936 that DiGiorgio and Herbert Hoover both purchased labor advertisements in Oklahoma and Arkansas and refused to follow farmers' lead by raising hourly wages. Di Giorgio was also one of the United Fruit Company's main competitors in the banana trade, and forty percent of his company's overall operations were in either Florida or California by 1959.[84]

The FSA's camp manager in nearby Yuba City, Yuba County, was Frank Iusi, who overrode the Marysville camp council by defending "former strikebreakers," according to UCAPAWA Local 19 President Rufus T. Bell, when he assumed control of the camp one year later. Bell charged further that Iusi had not only used "abusive language" that had "so intimidated the workers that many of them do not dare express an opinion" but also thrown "a woman bodily out of the camp office." After consulting with Louis Goldblatt, Luke Hinman – whose attorney had recently procured bail on charges of violating the anti-picketing ordinance through a writ of habeas corpus - requested donations from the warehouse workers' union, the newspaper guild, and the Alaska Cannery Workers' Union to raise $3,000 for legal defense of arrested strikers to pay for an appeal of their anti-picketing cases to the state supreme court. The state labor federation had long recognized that anti-picketing ordinances allowed the "virtual suppression of civil liberties" and favored state legislation to remedy the problem. Hinman suggested that Dorothy Ray contact Carey McWilliams (who soon took the lead promptly of a new committee that appealed directly to the governor) with the goal of discrediting the Associated Farmers and eliminating anti-picketing ordinances, since this would allow them to "proceed to organize agriculture on a state-wide scale."[85]

Although UCAPAWA abandoned its farm labor campaign soon after the Marysville strikes ended, labor strikes continued in Los Angeles and especially in the aircraft industry until

FDR detailed soldiers to the North American Aviation company's plant in Inglewood during June of 1941. The Puerto Rican General Confederation of Workers (CGT) also affiliated with the CIO before requesting support for its organizing campaign within the Caribbean's sugar industry during the fall of 1940, and the Food and Canning Workers' Union of South Africa demanded both the arming of non-European peoples and also, along with the Cape Federation of Labor Unions, the chance to "become skilled workers" two years later. Luisa Moreno announced that the union's agricultural campaign in south Texas had failed during a speech at UCAPAWA's annual convention in 1940, meanwhile, and she argued that the union should concentrate its resources on "the most important industries" in "the most important regions" before she identified San Antonio's pecan and cigar industries specifically as potential targets. She asserted the next day that U.S. imperialism in Latin America was the root cause of undocumented immigrants' legal status as non-citizens and that it deprived "development" and "independence" from their countries of origin simultaneously. Moreno then cited a report that a Los Angeles law enforcement officer had recently admitted to having "just killed a Mexican" to argue both that there was little difference between Mexican migrants' social statuses and those of their U.S.-born children's social statuses and that law enforcement and other governmental agencies deprived "Spanish speaking Americans throughout the Southwest" of their voting rights while also subjecting them to brutal treatment.[86]

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Industrial unionists' did not cease their activities after the U.S. entered the war, and Communist-affiliated union's adherence to a no-strike pledge caused the number of strikes to dwindle during the next two years. A delegate who represented a sharecroppers' union in southeastern Missouri, Zella Whitfield, followed Moreno's speech by informing the convention that Moreno had sent her "literature on Women's Auxiliaries" that she used to organize "the women" in "canning groups, sewing groups, and helping to start a large sharecroppers camp," and members of ILWU Local 13 in San Pedro soon resolved to hold a conference during December of the following year discuss "Spanish speaking problems" shortly before the local's executive board granted Bert Corona permission to speak with members on behalf of El Congreso. Far too much time had passed by then, however, to address inequality in the Southwest. Wartime riots in southern California did not occur suddenly but rather resulted from the bourgeoisie's longstanding acceptance of apartheid in the cities of North America over the previous two decades. It was their actions that caused both prejudice based on gender, nationality, residence, occupation, and sexual orientation and de jure discrimination to pervade within the region's housing and labor markets, schools, public-health administration, and community-police relations before inequality intensified during the late 1930s.

White longshoremen's inclusion of black and Filipino workers, homosexual MCS members, and women as leaders in San Francisco, as well as their demands for a union hiring hall and the desegregation of unions during the west-coast maritime workers' strike of 1934, represented the popular will in the Bay Area and northern California, and the general strike they led isolated the anti-imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class, won both union hiring halls for west-coast longshoremen's unions and the desegregation of ILA locals in Washington state and the Bay Area, and launched industrial unionists' organizing campaign in California. Agricultural, canning, and warehouse workers in the Central Valley then continued the campaign in the years that followed while adding the demand of equal pay. Yet CIO leaders in southern California still confronted antagonistic anti-labor ideologues and, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the detrimental effects of restrictive deeding practices. This did not

stop industrial unionists from recruiting new members and winning more victories, however, as the war industries expanded in southern California after 1939. The race to re-develop southern California's coastline near the harbor districts was just beginning, and there was also rapid economic growth in those areas during the first half of the 1940s.

Chapter Three

Communism and Anti-Fascism: Tejano Radicals, Industrial Unionism, and the Labor-Liberal Alliance in South Texas, 1924-1943

Over 2,000 pecan shellers and crackers from San Antonio's West Side voted to strike on the evening of January 31, 1938, shortly after the city's largest pecan shelling company, the Southern Pecan Shelling Company (SPSC), announced wage cuts to five cents per pound for pieces, six cents for halves, and forty cents per hundred pounds for crackers. There was a lengthy pause among employees of one factory assembled the next morning before a young (and pregnant) migrant worker and Communist labor organizer from south Texas, Manuela Solís Sager, jumped onto a table and yelled, "Well, what are you going to do? Are you going to sit there, or are we going to strike?" The strikers erupted with conversation as "suddenly, everyone was talking, and people began to call '*Vamos a la huelga* [let's go out and strike]*!*'" 6,000 pecan workers then did just that before they elected another Communist labor organizer from San Antonio, Emma Tenayuca, as their spokesperson later that night, and their numbers grew rapidly to approximately 10,000 over the next twenty-four hours.[1]

While historians have long recognized that the pecan workers' strike of 1938 was a pivotal moment for UCAPAWA and the CIO's organizing campaign in San Antonio, both its precise causes and the extent to which it impacted the region's political economy remain open for debate. The strike was the culmination of efforts by Mexican labor organizers in south Texas to form labor unions through unemployed committees, the Workers' Alliance, and the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) in the Río Grande Valley. Yet few have analyzed the pecan shellers' strike in the context of the momentum that both Alliance chapters and AWOC created by striking frequently, forming unions throughout south Texas, and protesting against both Border Patrol officers whom they charged with brutal treatment of Mexican migrants and cuts to the WPA's relief programs during the first wave of sit-down strikes. The strike also launched an alliance of AFL- and CIO-affiliated unions as well as radicals and reformers in south Texas that soon registered voters (though they also had to pay a poll tax)

to support the third-party candidacy of former House representative Maury Maverick during the city's mayoral recall election. Yet reformers failed, like their counterparts in Los Angeles, to challenge the board of alderman, the municipal and county governments' various commissions, or to formulate state- and regional-level strategies to achieve proportional representation, campaign-finance and administrative reforms, and a planned economy that could improve fiscal, housing, healthcare, and education laws, and instead deferred these questions to Communist labor organizer Emma Tenayuca, whom vigilantes targeted during a meeting at the city's municipal auditorium on August 25, 1939.

Few historical studies of the pecan shellers' strike have analyzed its significance for the CIO's organizing campaign in Texas after 1935, and this chapter examines both the causes of the strike and its historical impact on unions and politics in the southern part of the state. Historians have rightly emphasized the momentum created by textile and cigar workers' earlier trade union activities in the city, the activities of agricultural labor unions and Workers' Alliance (*Alianza Obrera*) chapters, and the rapid emergence of Tenayuca's leadership during the first wave of sit-down strikes (1936-37). While these studies have tended to separate trade union activities in the city from the Río Grande Valley, this chapter studies workers' movements in south Texas together as part of the process whereby both members and organizers migrated seasonally between both areas in search of employment. The social basis of the popular front in south Texas was, as elsewhere, an alliance between workers and liberals, and it gained momentum quickly in San Antonio as a result of the Workers' Alliance activities such as the pecan shellers' strike that, along with its active campaigning on the West Side, contributed greatly to Maury Maverick's mayoral victory on the Fusion Party's ticket. Laborers' activities in both city and countryside must be studied together, in short, to explain the tumultuous rise and fall during the late 1930s of both the workers' movement in south Texas and Maverick's tenure as mayor.[2]

The roots of laborers' social bonds in south Texas were in extended familial networks, similar migration patterns, and their shared experiences as workers in both agriculture and urban factories and sweatshops. Many shared connections amongst employees specifically in the sub-region's agricultural, pecan-shelling, cigar, and garment industries; through their participation in labor unions and Workers' Alliance chapters; and by cooperating with radical Tejana leaders such as Solis Sager and Tenayuca. Although Alliance members were often migrating seasonally between the Rio Grande Valley and San Antonio when the pecan shellers' strike began, many others were permanent residents of the West Side. The Alliance, which first formed during the city's unemployed demonstrations during the early part of the decade, grew steadily in the years after Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and was most able to coordinate industrial unionists' activities in the city with their counterparts in the countryside due to its high membership among seasonally-employed workers who migrated between both areas. Migrant workers' bonds with labor leaders strengthened considerably before the pecan shellers' strike due to a series of sit-down strikes and protests against relief cuts in downtown San Antonio led by Tenayuca that coincided with UCAPAWA's launch of a statewide organizing campaign in Texas.

The garment industry had long been a major employer of women and girls in North America by the 1920s, and there was intense factionalism in New York City at that time between Communists and Socialists within the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU). There were two types of production within dressmaking and shirtwaist industries, which were large-scale, "inside" factories that purchased raw materials and planned production and pervasive sweatshops, or "runaways," located in residential households that resulted, along with high

turnover, from competition between the economy's competitive and monopolistic sectors. Italian and other Latina girls tended to begin working in the industry at the age of fourteen and, along with Syrian, Lebanese, Armenian, black, Puerto Rican, and Mexican women, joined the workforce in large numbers during the 1930s, and this was in contrast to Jewish girls who tended to seek wage work a few years later and were less likely than Latina women to return to their jobs later after marriage. Union labels stabilized the industry in "certain parts of the country" during the first half of the twentieth century when employers relocated production to southern states as well as Pennsylvania's anthracite coal region after World War I, but the union's contracts often lacked proper enforcement and did not keep pace with living costs after World War II.[3]

ILGWU Local 25 in New York City established a labor center in Pennsylvania's Pocono Mountains in 1919, but the union's predominantly-male Jewish leadership also both supported the British foreign secretary's Balfour Declaration which declared support for a Jewish state in Palestine and divided Italian dress- and cloak-makers into different units after World War I. Factional conflicts soon emerged between multilingual, Marxist members and the union's Anti-Communist, Anglophile, and nativist officers amidst debates over the union's education program, proportional representation as a result of a large strike in 1926, and competition to lead more strikes in large, east-coast cities through the rest of the decade. The union's problem of overrepresentation of male Jews and underrepresentation of black and Italian members became increasingly acute after 1924 as both the proportion of Jewish membership fell and Jewish members' average age rose, Local 8's militant support for the amalgamation of dress- and cloak makers' unions in San Francisco during its strike in 1930 also presented another challenge to east-coast leaders' strategy of dividing said units. Another key source of contention pertained to pedagogy for its worker's education programs, which a leader of Local 25's education program, Fannia Cohn, had developed with support from the New York City Department of Education in 1915 before the union's president divided the union into two different locals five years later. Cohn later lost her position as the union's first female vice-president in 1928 after she proposed a "democratic shop delegate system of union governance" that would have centralized power within the membership.[4]

Historians have argued that garment workers' working conditions in Los Angeles were typical for the industry as a whole, though the city's garment industry also differed due to the presence of a large film industry that established new styles and stimulated additional growth. Employers in Los Angeles also often ignored the state's minimum-wage law and did not pay employees for the time they spent at factories when they were not working, and male cutters, fitters, and pressers from New York City's Lower East Side also moved in large numbers to southern California during the 1920s when Latina sewing machine operators were becoming a growing proportion of the industry's labor force. Yet the union's membership rolls in the city did not exceed its 1926 levels of approximately 3,000 in the two decades that followed despite two unionization campaigns from 1933-4 and 1941-2. Many have argued that the ILGWU's leadership in L.A. did not "understand" social bonds in Latino communities and refused to hire a Spanish-speaking organizer until the 1970s, while others have contended that Latino members often considered Jewish employers and supervisors to be part of the Anglo world. An investigator found during the mid-1990s that Latina ILGWU leaders whom she interviewed had families and partners who instilled in them "a strong sense of justice," egalitarian ideals, a work ethic, and collective consciousness.[5]

The ILGWU's president from 1933 until 1966, David Dubinsky, was born in Poland and first joined the union shortly after he arrived in Ellis Island in 1911 when he became a member of cutters' Local 10 (in which foreign-born members were a minority), and he soon won election to the local's executive board, supported pro-war socialist congressman Meyer London's unsuccessful bid for reelection in 1918, and became local president three years later when the New York City locals refused to join a garment workers' strike in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston. Dubinsky also supported the fundraising projects of a Jewish labor organization, the Histadrut, to establish colonies in Palestine during the 1920s, negotiated the introduction of new pressing machines in exchange for employer-funded unemployment schemes for displaced pressers (and later boasted that the union became a "pattern setter" for corporate-welfare programs that eventually included paid vacations, sickness and in-patient diagnostics, and employer-contributed pensions), and was the subject of a Senate investigation for racketeering charges in 1957. Dubinsky opposed the amalgamation of cloak- and dress-makers' unions and led a strike by cloak-makers in New York City and Boston in 1929 (which was the year he won election as the international's secretary-treasurer), and social scientists have recently argued that his leadership disrupted both national and international working-class solidarity. Dubinsky later concurred infamously with Zionist physicist Chaim Weizmann's claim in a speech to the Histadrut during December of 1947 that Palestine did not contain sufficient territory for the new Jewish minority and asserted the union was part of the "worldwide free labor movement."

Solis Sager and Tenayuca were both among the most recognizable labor leaders in south Texas during the late 1930s, and their testimonials contain both the firsthand memories of real-life participants and the wise observations of female labor leaders with decades of lived experiences. Tenayuca continued to believe that women could only achieve emancipation through socialism by the early 1980s, while Solis Sager remained a member of the Communist Party for her entire life. Sager's testimonial is also one of the few primary sources that documents both the character of agricultural work and her organizing activities with her husband in south Texas. Both of their testimonials are therefore essential for the histories of both south Texas and the Southwest as a whole. Why did so many Tejano and Tejana workers join the Workers' Alliance? What was the impact of the pecan workers' strike on society and politics in San Antonio and the Rio Grande Valley?

This chapter answers these questions and is organized into three parts. The first investigates the character of agricultural work in the Rio Grande Valley as well as the particular constraints that the presence of Border Patrol agents imposed on labor organizers in south Texas after 1926. The second examines industrial unionists' activities in south Texas during the 1930s, the development of the pecan industry of San Antonio, and the first steps of UCAPAWA's organizing campaign in Texas. The third section studies the brief rise and fall of a coalition of the Popular Front in San Antonio led by Emma Tenayuca, who issued demands for work relief, medical care, public housing, and municipal reforms shortly before the U.S. entered World War II. This chapter contributes to the scholarship, in short, by analyzing relations between agricultural workers in the valley and industrial workers in San Antonio and the leadership of radical Tejanas from the passage of the Border Patrol Act in 1926 through World War II.

"she died on my arms"

The combination of frequent economic crises and labor repression by law enforcement officers after World War I took a severe toll on migrant workers' health and well-being in south Texas. Border Patrol agents targeted Mexicans increasingly after Congress passed a series of restrictions on European and Asian immigration during the 1920s and often initiated

administrative proceedings for removals as the numbers of unemployed people grew during the Hoover administration. Yet despite the efforts by employers, immigration authorities, and local law enforcement to target them, many Tejano workers still joined the Workers' Alliance. Founded in 1932 as a response to the unemployment crisis, the Alliance's membership rose after its founding in 1932 as Congress granted industrial workers in San Antonio – but not domestic and agricultural workers - collective-bargaining rights by passing the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1934. Both industrial workers' subsequent economic and political victories in San Antonio and the Alliance's growing strength amongst farmworkers in the Rio Grande Valley in the years that followed provided the Workers' Alliance with the ability to Communicate with laborers throughout south Texas.

The repression of migrant farmworkers entailed not only vulnerability to enforcement officers and border surveillance but also extremely exploitative working conditions in the Río Grande Valley. One of the largest sources of agricultural production in south Texas was the sub-region's onion industry and especially in Dimmit and Webb countries. Some of those Mexican agricultural workers who labored on the absentee-owned onion farms of Webb County were among the first to join *La Asociación de Jornaleros*, which members formed in Laredo during 1933. Tables 1-3 present information on total annual onion production in Texas by county from 1924 until 1929 as Laredo that were "practically uninhabited" with the exception of Mexican farmworkers.[6]

Like many farmworkers in California, farmworkers in Texas often followed an internal migration circuit within the state's boundaries that followed harvests of major cash crops and especially cotton, fruits, and vegetables. Onion workers' first tasks after the end of the cotton-picking season were to plant seeds during November, which they completed daily at a rate of approximately fifteen laborers per acre by sowing onion seeds three inches apart in an acre row. Daily wages for planting in 1928 ranged from $1.50 to two dollars. Farmworkers then migrated after planting to work on spinach farms until the May harvests of spinach, onions, and cauliflower. Landowners in Webb County also began to increasingly measured by acreage, production, and average yield per acre, respectively. Officials from a local chamber of commerce estimated to agricultural economist Paul Taylor that a mere twelve men residing in hotels owned approximately 12,000 acres of onion farms near the border city of grow citrus trees, especially grapefruits and oranges, as well as grapes, by the late 1920s.[7]

Farmworkers worked in very hot weather from dusk until dawn. Onion pickers harvested by pulling the plants from the ground before cutting off their roots and placing them into a sack, and Solis Sager recalled that she would hold a big sack of onions that her father picked, shake the dirt off, and place them into boxes that each contained approximately one hundred bulbs. If they remained true to their word, growers paid wages of three cents per box and a total of $1.25 to $1.50 per day. The onion industry in south Texas became quite lucrative during the 1920s, since total onion acreage in the U.S. grew for all but one of the years from 1924 until 1929. Tables 4-6 contain tables of onion production in Texas, Louisiana, and California during that period as measured by total acreage, production, and average yield per acre.[8]

Many farmworkers migrated again after the onion harvest to work in either the cotton fields of Texas or in the sugar beet fields of the Mid-West. There were two cotton-picking seasons in Texas, though the precise times of each season varied considerably according to county and sub-region. The cotton-picking season lasted from early June until mid-September in Lubbock to pick cotton. When the Texas Rehabilitation Commission (TRC) began to offering relief programs after March of 1933, county administrators learned quickly that farmworkers



Table I: Annual Onion Acreage in Texas By County, 1924-1929
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Atascosa
Bee
Caldwell
Dimmit
Frio
Jackson
Jim Wells
Karnes
Kleberg
LaSalle
Lower Valley
Maverick
Medina
Nueces
San Patricia
Travis
Uvalde
Val Verde
Webb
Willacy
Wilson
Zavalla
Acreage 1924
Acreage 1925
Acreage 1926
Acreage 1927
Acreage 1928
Acreage 1929



Table II: Annual Onion Production in Texas By County, 1924-1929
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Atascosa
Bee
Caldwell
Dimmit
Frio
Jackson
Jim Wells
Karnes
Kleberg
LaSalle
Lower Valley
Maverick
Medina
Nueces
San Patricia
Travis
Uvalde
Val Verde
Webb
Willacy
Wilson
Zavalla
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929 (Forecast)



"Bermuda and Creole Onions," USDA Bureau of Agricultural Economics, February 20, 1928 and April, 29, 1929, Folder 43, Carton 12, PST.







"Bermuda and Creole Onions," USDA Bureau of Agricultural Economics, February 20, 1928 and April, 29, 1929, Folder 43, Carton 12, PST.

most of south Texas' rural counties, whereas it usually lasted from the mid-August until the end of the year in many areas of both east and west Texas. Not all families remained within the same sub-region of Texas, Solis's family migrated to San Marcos, for example, and even as far as tended to apply for relief in larger numbers after the end of the cotton-picking season.[9]

Agricultural workers' living conditions in Texas were not easy. Manuela Solis was born in San José, Texas on April 27, 1912, and was the oldest of seven surviving children. Solis's mother was a school teacher from Mexico, and her father was a miner and union member from the northwestern Mexican state of Coahuila. Her family lived originally in Dolores, Webb County, until the coal mines closed during the 1920s. She began resisting her oppressors at a young age when she was a member of a local ecclesiastical organization for Catholic girls, *Las Hijas de María* [The Daughters of Mary], and responded to the expulsion of her friend who suffered from tuberculosis by refusing to participate in the church's fundraising activities.[10] Solis's family moved to Laredo to work in agriculture after her father lost his job as a miner. Her mother gave birth nine times, and Solis acted as translator during their two deliveries when doctors were present. Her mother passed away during her ninth delivery, as she recalled in an interview later in life:

"But in the long run I'm very thankful, and I usually thank the good old Lord for having me - the strength to survive all these things, you know, 'cause my mother died on my arms and we were picking cotton in Corpus, in Taft. And she died, the same thing as a lot of people."

As she became increasingly conscious of the presence of "class conflict," Solis began organizing agricultural workers in south Texas at the age of fifteen or sixteen.[11]

Solis was soon a key link with Mexican labor unions as industrial workers in south Texas began attempting to form their own unions during the 1930s. Solis and other cotton pickers in south Texas led one of the decade's first "sit-down strikes" in response to a grower's wage cut from twenty-five cents to twelve cents per hundred pounds. The strikers instead won wage increases to thirty-five cents per hundred pounds. Solis also organized a garment workers' union in Laredo shortly after Congress passed NIRA, and she received a sponsorship for a scholarship to study at La Universidad Obrera (Workers' University) at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) in Mexico City from Mexican union leader Diego Velázquez soon after in 1934. Solis studied labor law and "*preparación syndical* [union training]" at the university as a general from the state of Michoacán, Lázaro Cárdenas, began a six-year term as president amidst populists' demands for agrarian reform that won extensive land redistribution in areas that included the northern states of Mexico.[12]Solis's education entailed not only participating in strikes and labor schools but also frequent observations of changing law-enforcement patterns near the border, since Border Patrol gents south Texas began targeting Mexican workers during the late 1920s. This pattern differed little from how law enforcement officers - and especially the Texas Rangers - had targeted Mexican migrants since the 1910s, but the smuggling of both migrants and narcotics also occurred more frequently by the end of the following decade. Congress first established the Border Patrol in 1924 as it also imposed restrictions on immigration from eastern and southern Europe, Asia, and Japan. Smugglers soon responded to the Border Patrol's surveillance by moving their trafficking routes to more remote areas further west in places like Nogales, Arizona, since there were fewer officers stationed in that area. Although Congress exempted migrants from Caribbean and Latin American nations from its immigration quotas until 1965, Border Patrol offices still assigned more agents further west near El Paso and began targeting migrants from Mexico before the Hoover administration initiated a

Photo of Manuela Solis Taken During Early 1930s, from Elda Silva, "Labor's Other Torch Bearer," *The San Antonio Express News*, March 24, 2002, pg. 1J.

massive removal campaign.

The U.S. government's exemption of Mexican migrants from its immigration quotas did not deter law enforcement officers from targeting them, because immigration agents had several administrative mechanisms that allowed them to either prevent their entry or remove them after they arrived. U.S. consular agents approved fewer visas for Mexican applicants beginning in 1926, for example, which is why *The El Paso Herald-Post* estimated five years later that their denials of migrants' visa applications, along with their stricter enforcement of the "head tax" charged at customs offices for each person crossing the border, had together caused a greater decrease in the Mexican population than removals. While the year 1926 was also when Border Patrol agents first started to prioritize smuggling, or "bootlegging," operations by migrants from eastern and southern Europe and China, they soon turned their attention to the large number of Mexican migrants seeking refuge from the "Cristero War" between Mexican Catholics and anti-clericals that occurred over the next three years after bishops closed churches throughout the country. The Border Patrol was also responsible for enforcing prohibition laws by preventing the entry of narcotics, though there is little evidence that Mexican migrants were fleeing narco-traffickers during those years as opposed to civil war and conflicts over agrarian reform.[13]

The concentration of wealth and land ownership had caused much social unrest in Mexico and other Latin American and Caribbean countries since their wars for independence. Mexican revolutionaries attempted to resolve the problem through ratifying article twenty-seven of the Constitution of 1917, which mandated land redistribution for communal and individual farmers. Large landowners in the northeastern state of Tamaulipas – which is bounded to its north by the Río Grande River close and the border city of Nuevo Laredo – reacted to the implementation of article twenty-seven as violently as any Mexican state after 1929. Mexican President Emilio Portes Gil approved two applications during late June of that year to

redistribute over 5,500 hectares of land to two communally-owned farms, or *ejidos*, in the Jaumave municipality near Cuidad Victoria. The National Agrarian Commission (*Comisión Nacional Agraria*, or CNA) also approved the redistribution of 725 hectares the following year in Méndez, which is a town located outside the city of Matamoros that is just miles away from Brownsville.[14]

Residents of another *ejido* outside Cuidad Victoria, La Laguna, marched and held a demonstration in Matamoros four days after the CNA approved an *ejido* in Méndez during the summer of 1930. Over a dozen members of rural police forces, or "rurales," led by Aniceto Cifuentes attacked the group of *ejidotarios* led by municipal president Arturo Peña by firing on them as a farmworker, Felípe Zárate, was speaking to the crowd. The attack killed seventeen people, including a pregnant woman named Martina Dera, and injured twelve others. The Mexican Communist Party's (PCM) weekly organ, El Machete, reported that newspapers had based their reports on the testimony of a "traitor," Rodríguez Triana. Violent over land redistribution were more frequent in the Mexican states of Tamaulipas, Michoacán, and Veracruz after the revolution due to landowners' recalcitrant reaction to agrarian reform.[15]

Though it did not itself cause Mexican laborers to emigrate to North America, the U.S.'s prohibition policy during and after World War I did have a series of unintended effects that included violent conflicts between Border Patrol agents and Mexican migrants. Some of this was undoubtedly due to many agents' recent employment as Texas Rangers, who had long targeted Mexican workers in the state – and often assumed they were foreign-born – even before Congress passed new immigration restrictions in 1921 and 1924. *The San Saba News* reported just two years after Congress established the Border Patrol, for example, that those who had been "long in the service develop an uncanny skill in picking out aliens." Agents placed the smuggling of migrants and narcotics within the same "priority" category, and this resulted in "clashes" between patrol agents and "bands of aliens or liquor smugglers" that became, according to one local newspaper, "not infrequent" within a year. The conflict intensified so quickly that the chairman of the San Benito Chamber of Commerce, John T. Lomax, called a meeting at the beginning of the planting season during the winter of 1929-30 to discuss the "mistreatment, intimidation, and general demoralization of the Mexican people along the border." [16][17]

While at least some employers criticized Border Patrol agents' mistreatment of Mexican migrants in south Texas, the Department of Labor often found willing collaborators amongst local law enforcement officers who targeted Mexican workers for removal as the unemployment rate increased during the early 1930s. The number of deportations from Laredo spiked in 1930 after the end of the onion-picking season, for example, while a majority of the Border Patrol's arrests in its twenty-second district (which included Texas's entire southern boundary) during the first half of 1932 occurred within the El Paso sub-district in west Texas. Yet law enforcement officers continued to target labor organizers when the unemployment rate decreased after 1932. Emma Tenayuca co-authored an article in *The Communist* five years later that charged San Antonio police officers with both collaborating with Border Patrol agents to harass leaders of the unemployed demonstrations during the early 1930s and targeting Mexican Alliance members for deportation, and she later recalled in a interview that law enforcement officers also targeted cigar workers who struck against the Finck Cigar Company shortly after Congress passed NIRA. When the police chief of Dallas denied that his department cooperated with Border Patrol agents to target Mexican residents during the winter of 1932-3, the Mexican consul nevertheless concluded that the police chief "did not look with good eyes upon any Mexican."[18]

While many have long noted that prejudice and discrimination against Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in south Texas were prevalent during the 1920s and 1930s, it remains significant that both Solis Sager and Tenayuca cited such prejudice and discrimination as motivation for their political activities. They both noted in their interviews that Texans were among the first criticize the mistreatment of Mexican people and other Spanish speakers in the state. Writer H. Blumberg attributed the deportations to chauvinism, for example, in their letter to the editor of *The El Paso Herald-Post*. Observing that many tenements in south El Paso were vacant and that businesses owners had lost many customers, Blumberg lamented how "deportations, wholesale in nature, threaten to depopulate the El Paso district of its entire Aztec population." Newspapers in the state published critical opinions such as Blumberg's only rarely, but their support aided the activities of labor leaders such as Solis Sager and Tenayuca who sought to challenge the pervasive prejudice, segregation, and disfranchisement of Spanish-speaking laborers.[19]

Unemployed people and migratory workers in south Texas continued organizing during the nadir of unemployment despite the Hoover administration's removals of Mexican and Mexican-American people. Their primary "vehicle" for doing this was the Workers' Alliance, which first formed during the spring of 1932. Although many members' initial motivation for joining was to seek protection from removal, the Alliance changed its emphasis soon after to demanding relief and public-works programs to ameliorate unemployment. The organization's membership grew subsequently as agricultural, cigar, pecan-shelling, and garment workers attempted to form unions. It was the local Alliance chapters which created social bases for labor organization in south Texas's city and countryside that led to the pecan shellers' strike.

While the Hoover administration's response to the unemployment crisis was mass removals, workers' most popular demands in San Antonio were relief and collective-bargaining rights. "Hunger marches" spread throughout Mexican cities during the spring of 1931, and large numbers of unemployed people in the U.S., including in Austin and San Antonio, also demonstrated for relief the following year. Associated closely with the problem of unemployment was low wages, and several reports indicated that pecan shellers' wages fell during the nadir of unemployment to as low as one penny for a pound of pieces. All of these problems pushed workers in south Texas towards the Workers' Alliance. Some of the original members had previously been members of mutual-aid societies, and most members were Communists, anarchists, and socialists by the mid-1930s.[20]

The Alliance formed during one of industrial workers' first strikes in San Antonio. Tejana and Anglo cigar workers at the Finck Cigar Company's plant launched their first strikes in 1932, which was also when Solis's future husband, James Sager, moved to the city to work as an Alliance organizer and just one year after Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical, *quadragesimo anno* [fortieth year], which re-affirmed the Vatican's support for the pro-labor edict that it had issued in 1891. The first Finck strike failed to win concessions and offered harsh lessons for labor organizers, and the subsequent dismissals of strikers soon led Alliance members to demand unemployment relief. Finck identified as a Catholic, and a local priest labeled the strikers Communists (including during confessions). Police officers broke both that strike and another one against the company that employees organized soon after Congress passed NIRA, and sheriff Albert West took a picture with a pair of boosting while boasting of how he would "greet" female cigar workers during the next strike.[21]

It was during the second cigar workers' strike against Finck in 1933 – and particularly the sheriff's egoistic and misogynistic boasting - which first motivated Tenayuca to join the

Alliance. Local Alliance chapters were soon organizing unemployed Mexican residents of the West Side who sought relief provisions from the WPA's offices in downtown San Antonio, which did not began discriminating against applicants based on their legal statuses until 1937. Alliance chapters held their weekly meetings on Sundays, and they formed committees to accompany Mexican applicants when they visited the WPA office. Tenayuca also recalled that she accompanied former cigar workers that Finck had dismissed and translated for them during their trips to the WPA office. Their efforts had a positive impact on labor activities, because Alliance claimed ten chapters and approximately 10,000 members in San Antonio by 1937.[22]

The Alliance was therefore the primary vehicle by which working people on San Antonio's West Side organized themselves during the 1930s. Its social bases were laborers employed not only by the city's cigar industry but also textile, pecan, and municipal-garbage workers and tailors who also struck during the second half of 1934, and they included approximately 10,000 pecan shellers who struck for higher wages (especially for the shelling of "half meats," or "halves") on two occasions - the first time successfully - at fifty plants. Labor demands for both the pecan-shelling and textile industries in south Texas were primarily seasonal, and factory owners both located production in residential sweatshops instead of within industrial zones and permitted workers' weak representation through "company unions" after 1934. Both industries relied heavily on a "reserve army" composed, in large part, of Tejanas, who received piece wages and often shared connections with migratory agricultural workers through family and friends. Textile workers who labored in residential areas usually needed to complete their orders quickly, and low-quality shells often compelled pecan shellers to work longer hours for the same pay as those who received better ones. Both groups of Tejano workers were often vulnerable to employers' unfair labor practices.[23]

Law enforcement officers in south Texas violated many cigar, garment, pecan, and agricultural workers' civil and constitutional rights during the 1930s, and radical Tejanas who attempted to organize textile workers needed timely information to respond to their repression. Solis co-founded, along with another textile worker, Anselma Padilla, La Asociación de Costureras (the Sewers' Association) in Laredo during 1933 and served as the union's chair over the next two years, and the demands that they formulated included both higher wages and the relocation of production from sweatshops located in residential areas to factories. Emma Tenayuca wrote circulars for the ILGWU in San Antonio during her first years of political activity, and neither Solis Sager nor Tenayuca participated in the ILGWU's activities for very long. Tenayuca argued that the ILGWU's locals in Texas both lacked an effective strategy for developing leadership and refused to answer Tenayuca's call for solidarity during the pecan shellers' strike. Although the ILGWU was one among the major unions that separated from the AFL and formed the CIO during the sit-down strikes, Dubinsky led the garment workers' union's reaffiliation with the AFL in 1941.[24]

The pecan-shelling industry of San Antonio, though similar in its social organization, almost certainly employed more Tejanas than the textile industry. Pecan workers' bargaining agent in San Antonio before the arrival of UCAPAWA was La Unión de Nueceros (the Pecan Shelling Workers' Union), and it was as much a company union as any ILGWU local was in south Texas. The union's chair after 1932 was Magdeleno Rodríguez, who led an unemployed demonstration that year, and he opposed the NRA codes one year later that set – but failed to enforce - hourly minimum wages of fifteen cents for shellers in southern states that were one-and-a-half cents less than the code for shellers in other states. Yet there was little enforcement of this unequal wage code in southern states until the pecan shellers' strike of 1938. Although up to

4,000 pecan shellers and crackers joined a rival, "truly independent" union, *El Nogal*, during the mid-1930s, *La Unión de Nueceros* enjoyed the patronage of the SPSC's owner, Julius Seligman.[25]

"the who-gives-a-damn gang"

The pecan workers' strike's impact on local politics became evident soon after it began, since it received coverage from out-of-state newspapers and lasted six weeks. Yet the strike was also the result of momentum that labor leaders created through a series of dramatic Alliance-led protests at several government offices in downtown San Antonio during the first half of 1937, which occurred shortly after previous activities by the organization's WPA relief committees and the formation of the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) in the Río Grande Valley two years earlier. One of the first significant labor actions began on April 10, 1935, when up to 2,000 farmworkers in the onions, carrots, broccoli, and beets industries of Webb County struck over the course of five days for daily wages of $1.20, a ten-hour day, and overtime pay. Manuela Solis (who acted as translator) and James Sager (who married Solis later that year) were among the major leaders of the strike, and Solis Sager later recalled that growers and law enforcement officers sent the national guard after the strikers blocked highways before two large growers conceded the wage demand to approximately 500 strikers.[26]

The strike proved to be one of the first steps of a statewide organizing campaign that continued as the Sagers organized locals of La Asociación de Jornaleros (the Day Laborers' Association) throughout the valley over the next several years, and the support of local residents was essential for their initial success in overcoming obstacles in a segregated environment. They rented a room for their office from a man, "Rómulo," from the city of Monterrey, for example, after a hotel owner refused to accommodate the "interracial" couple. They began their activities in Brownsville by cooperating with the local carpenters' union, and they had established union halls in most of the upper Río Grande Valley's largest towns by the end of 1937. AWOC members also convened a meeting in Corpus Christi on January 23, 1937, that Juan Peña of Laredo chaired, and its attendees included representatives local unions of oil workers (such as the meeting's secretary and president of Oil Workers' Union Local 316, Henry Weir), carpenters, and longshoremen; several Alliance chapters in San Antonio (one of which was called the "WPA branch"); mutual-aid societies; James Sager; and a labor federation in Nuevo Laredo. Peña also appointed a credentials committee that included M. Gómez from "Local 20212," J. Sanchez from Workers' Alliance Branch 1 in San Antonio, and S.M. Elliott of Oil Workers' Union Local 343, and the received messages of support from both the Agricultural and Cannery Workers Union and the labor periodical *Organizador Agricola* [Agricultural Organizer] in Colorado.[27]

After Sager reported to attendees on labor conditions in the valley, the conference launched a binational unionization campaign in agriculture by concentrating on onion pickers before moving towards farmworkers in other crops over the course of the summer. The attendees set demands for a minimum wage, the inclusion of female and male farmworkers within federal and state labor legislation, and "unemployed demands for seasonal labor," and they also both approved proposals for the Alliance's statewide organization and the Legislative Institute of Houston to introduce relief measures to the state legislature and elected five officers to the executive board (including the president of the Workers' Alliance in San Antonio, José Luna). Although they did not ultimately succeed in establishing a statewide farm labor union, agricultural workers in Laredo launched industrial unionists' campaign in south Texas that continued into the summer. Members of "*la socieded de jornaleros* [the day laborers' society]" and La Junta Patriótica [The Patriotic Union] marched silently across the bridge on the border on

May 1 with permission from local authorities, before locking hands with their allies from Nuevo Laredo. The CIO's campaign began officially towards the end of the summer when UCAPAWA entered the valley summer and held a "*reunión de aniversario* [anniversary meeting]" for Local 45 in Laredo on August 24, 1937. The list of organizations which sent representatives again included several from Nuevo Laredo and other areas in Mexico.[28]

Alliance members in San Antonio had already organized a series of protests earlier that year despite immigrant agents' threats of removal, and they demanded both improvements in relief administration and protection from law enforcement officers' alleged brutality towards both dissidents and Mexican migrants. The first protests occurred during mid-February – just months after a majority of voters in both the city of San Antonio and statewide had approved bond measures for public works projects - when Tenayuca acted as the spokesperson for seventy-five "angry relief clients" who "stormed" the mayor's office in city hall in demand of faster distribution of surplus relief commodities, and a detachment of Border Patrol agents from the county sheriff's office responded the next day by arresting twenty protesters at the surplus commodities corporation's office. Alliance members then organized another protest at the mayor's office in which Tenayuca charged the officers with beating several Alliance members whom they had arrested, and the mayor, C.K. Quin, responded by denying that the law enforcement officers had jurisdiction over either those detentions or those that the county sheriff's deputies had arrested during a protest against the detention of Alliance member Juan Zacarias. Alliance leaders assigned an investigator after Tenayuca and Luna sent wires to its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and the organizers next protested a hearing at the U.S. Immigration Office in downtown San Antonio that the director of its twenty-second district, William A. Whalen, chaired. Whalen pledged to investigate the Border Patrol agents' actions, but he later attributed subsequent delays to witnesses' refusals to testify at the federal building.[29]

The WPA's tenth district soon announced its intention to remove undocumented migrants from relief rolls, and Alliance members' response was to organize a dramatic protest against relief cuts during the early summer. While Tenayuca first led a group of twenty people to meet with Quin during June of 1936 in response to the TRC's announcement of plans to terminate its work-relief programs, it was the tenth district's decision to remove of 15,000 people- including 1,000 residents of Bexar County – from the state government's relief rolls one year later that chanting "we want jobs!" at the WPA's office on the Gunter Building's seventh floor in downtown San Antonio on June 29, 1937. Law enforcement responded by arresting five protestors, issuing criminal charges against Tenayuca, and police officers raiding the Alliance's headquarters and local chapters later that day. Both a union pamphlet and a historical study of San Antonio written during the 1940s indicate that Alliance members also organized sit-down strike at city hall in the year before the pecan shellers' strike. Solis Sager later recalled that police cited a typographical workers' strike as a rationale for their raid of the Day Laborers' Association's office in Harlingen during November, which soon led UCAPAWA's president, Donald Henderson, to re-assign the two organizers to San Antonio.[30]

Alliance members' protests against relief cuts and police raids affected the pecan workers' strike due to both the momentum they created for the CIO's statewide labor organizing campaign and divisions they caused among the Democratic Party's state and local leaders. House Representative Maury Maverick responded by establishing a chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), while Tenayuca received pro bono legal representation from an assistant state attorney, Everett Looney. The governor later appointed Looney as chairman of the state industrial commission, which investigated labor conditions during the pecan shellers' strike.

Jose E. Luna, General Organizer for the Workers' Alliance, outside U.S. Immigration Office in Federal Building during Protest Against Alleged Beating of Migrant Workers By Border Patrol Agents, February 23, 1937, San Antonio Light Collection, L-1540-CCC.

WPA Protest, June 29, 1937, San Antonio Light Collection, D-1575-B.

WPA Protest, June 29, 1937, San Antonio Light Collection, L-1575-A.

Solis Sager's activities on January 31, 1938, were, furthermore, a direct consequence of the compelled approximately 200 Alliance members to participate in a sit-down strike while police raids in Harlingen that convinced Henderson to reassign her husband and she to San Antonio. Alliance members' activities in south Texas during the year before the pecan sheller's strike launched UCAPAWA's and the CIO's statewide organizing campaign in Texas, and the increased number of raids by law enforcement officers were indicative of disagreements over strategy among both employers and the state Democratic Party.[31]

Alliance members' actions during that year directed many San Antonio residents' attention towards Emma Tenayuca's leadership on the West Side. Tenayuca was born on December 21, 1916, and raised by her maternal grandparents in a relatively-unsegregated neighborhood in the West Side near the downtown area, and she recalled in an interview that "what really kept" the neighborhood "together" was a local church, St. Agnes Church, led by a priest, Lockwood, that included the city's Afro-American residents. Tenayuca heard Mexican radicals' and labor recruiters' calls while visiting the city's La Plaza de Zacate with her grandfather on Sundays as a young girl, and one of the earliest political debates that she heard in her household was the discussion between her grandfather and uncles regarding whether to vote for an anti-KKK gubernatorial candidate, Ma Ferguson, during the 1924 primary. Tenayuca noted that the KKK was then "very, very strong" in San Antonio and especially on the West Side, but this did not deter her from becoming a debate champion as a student at Brackenridge High School. Both her familial upbringing and radicals' activities in La Plaza de Zacate impacted Tenayuca's political beliefs, and they help explain why the newspaper report regarding cigar workers' second strike against the Finck Cigar Company that she read one year after large demonstrations of unemployed people occurred in San Antonio and Austin motivated her to support their cause.

Map of major shelling plants, labor organizations, and protests in central San Antonio during 1937 based on 1929 map published by the Texas State Library and Archives <https://tsl.texas.gov/arc/maps/images/map1052a.jpg>.

Tenayuca's first political activities as a high school student included joining not only the debate club but also the League of United Latin American Citizens's (LULAC) women's auxiliary. LULAC was then one of the only Latino organizations that opposed segregation openly in Texas, but it was also an organization that excluded undocumented Tejanos and had adopted English as the organization's sole official language since its founding in 1928. Both LULAC's core ideology and its exclusionary membership rules made it incapable of explaining the causes of the economic crisis, whereas Tenayuca began reading Marx and Tolstoy at the age of fifteen, co-founded a newspaper, and joined a reading group that some local authorities described as the "who-gives-a-damn-gang" and had an office in downtown San Antonio where members discussed socialist literature and current events. It was at this moment in Tenayuca's life that she read an article regarding Sheriff Albert West's intention to beat working women for striking against the Finck Cigar Company and began volunteering with workers' organizations in south Texas.[32]

Wages in the pecan shelling industry – which was then San Antonio's largest employer - rose simultaneously from their nadir during the early 1930s, but employers responded by subcontracting cracking and shelling operations to manufacturers in residential neighborhoods on the West Side. There were at least 400 shelling and cracking shops in Bexar County by the winter of 1933-34 as a result, though the number of legal operations dwindled after the city's health department passed a licensing ordinance two years later. Many shellers and crackers

worked in residential workshops that were overcrowded and lacked adequate ventilation and lighting. The subcontracting system also presented additional challenges for the strike's organizers due to the prevalence of unlicensed operations, the West Side's high rates of infant mortality and tuberculosis, and the fact that many shops were located several miles away from the nearest union meetings.[33]

Why did the pecan shellers strike again during early 1938? It is true that the strike began in response to a pay cut, but it was not nearly as severe as the wage cuts that shellers and crackers endured earlier during the decade. Tenayuca herself recalled that the Workers' Alliance gained "tremendous momentum" during the winter when migrant workers failed to find employment in the Río Grande Valley and when beet workers from Colorado and Michigan returned to the West Side. What was different in 1938 was that local Workers' Alliance chapters received newspaper coverage for their protests during the first wave of sit-down strikes from 1936-37 as the CIO separated from the AFL. The previous protests by the Workers' Alliance, UCAPAWA's statewide organizing campaign, and a particularly disastrous year for migratory workers therefore created unique conditions for a large strike in the city's largest industry. The strikers received popular support and became leaders of an alliance of workers and liberals in south Texas that remained active over the next eighteen months.[34]

The historiography of the pecan shellers' strike has produced new questions in recent years about UCAPAWA President Donald Henderson's decision to remove both Tenayuca and Solis Sager from the strike's organizing committee after the first week. H.A. Shapiro found in his 1952 study of "mechanization" in the pecan shelling industry that Henderson replaced Tenayuca with a CIO organizer from Colorado, J. Austin Beasley, but this does not explain why Solis Sager later claimed in an interview that Henderson also removed her from the strike's leadership. Solis Sager expressed resentment over Henderson's decision, while Tenayuca reported, for her part, that Henderson had already decided to remove Tenayuca before he arrived in San Antonio. Some have argued more recently that Henderson actually assigned UCAPAWA organizer Luisa Moreno – as opposed to Beasley - to direct the strike. Moreno soon moved further southward to the Río Grande Valley after the strike ended as part of the union's organizing campaign among cotton pickers.[35]

Between one-half and two-thirds of all pecan workers in the city joined the strike over the next several days, because many Alliance members had already participated in various union since the unemployment demonstrations at the beginning of the decade. Strikers formed committees each morning to determine the locations of picketing activities, and thousands attended their nightly meetings. The Alliance's effective leadership explains why police chief Owen Kilday's typical, repressive measures such as threats of removal, mass arrests (including upwards of 300 in a single day), and the use of tear gas failed to deter the strikers. The five-week strike was the largest by Latina workers in North America during the 1930s, and it only ended when the governor, James Allred, persuaded SPSC's owner, Arthur Seligman, to participate in arbitration. Both the Alliance's strong organizational structure and the determination of rank-and-file members on the picket lines resulted in an historic – yet also ephemeral - victory.[36]

Members of both *La Asociación de Jornaleros* and the Workers' Alliance began their campaign in south Texas during the onion pickers' strike in 1935. Migratory workers were often among the first West Side residents to observe changing social and economic conditions in the valley, since they moved frequently between urban and rural areas while seeking wage work. The protests in downtown San Antonio two years later against relief cuts

Cassie Jane Winfree, state labor chair for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, addressing pecan strikers at a union hall on Pecos St. and Matamoros St. (James Sager is on her right), February 5, 1938, San Antonio Light Collection, 1751-A.

and Border Patrol agents' mistreatment of Mexican migrants were part of the CIO's larger campaign to win major concessions from employers. Large numbers of unemployed farmworkers moved to the West Side during the winter of 1937-8 and Solis Sager's impromptu speech on a table at a shelling plant further motivated large numbers of pecan shellers and crackers to strike. The pecan workers' strike was the culmination of Tejana radical leadership in south Texas since the early 1930s, and it created an unprecedented degree of momentum for labor activity.

"The Good Neighbor Policy Begins at Home!"

The pecan shellers' strike was a watershed moment in the history of industrial unionism in Texas due to its effective challenge to both employers and Quin's mayoral administration. Yet the strike was also only the beginning of a growing political conflict – and, indeed, a collision course - between the alliance of workers and liberals and Anti-Communists. The Workers' Alliance continued its efforts to obtain better relief measures for unemployed people and also began demanding the construction of public-housing units on the West Side after Congress passed the Housing Act during the summer of 1937, and a coalition of laborites and intellectuals responded to House representative Maury Maverick's primary loss shortly after the strike by supporting his candidacy in the city's mayoral recall election during the spring of the following year. Members of CIO and AFL affiliates also cooperated to register voters through the Labor Non-Partisan League (LNPL), but the San Antonio Communist Party deferred the task of creating a comprehensive reform program to Tenayuca alone. The alliance between Communists and reformers disintegrated subsequently when vigilantes targeted both the president of the pecan shellers' union, Telesforo Oviedo, and Emma Tenayuca during the summer of 1939.

Although its impetus was the pecan shellers' strike, the labor-liberal alliance began to form during reformers' previous attempts to improve relief administration within a county

Democratic Party that had a reputation for corrupt, machine-style politics. The problems with relief administration became evident shortly after the legislature established the state's relief commission, which appointed local relief boards directly for Bexar and eighteen of the state's other 254 counties. Controversy erupted briefly in San Antonio during October of 1934, for example, when the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission's (TRC) accounting department investigated a case involving a pregnant Mexican woman whose infant died during childbirth shortly after administrators denied her relief application. TRC administrators may have believed that their decision comported with the FDR administration's decision to exclude striking cotton pickers from relief rolls during its first two years. While TRC's director, Adam Johnson, wrote to the director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), Harry Hopkins, that the claims of both investigators and a "dyed-in-the-wool" communist preacher named "Mr. Rail" were untrue, Johnson also acknowledged that "the relief set-up in Bexar County is rotten to the core" and that they were "going up against the strongest political machine in Texas."[37]

Johnson did not dispute that the county relief board withheld relief from a pregnant woman in need. The newly-elected House Representative, Maury Maverick, soon complained to Johnson regarding the "slowness" in correcting the county's relief administration, and Johnson's responded that the TRC needed more time to evaluate each county's particular conditions. The municipal government was reluctant to enact relief programs, since San Antonio's mayor, C.K. Quin, still had not ordered the construction of the commission's district headquarters in the city by October of the following year. When the TRC's funding for work-relief programs expired during late June of 1936, Johnson explained to Maverick that only city and county governments were responsible for relief administration and that Maverick needed to contact the county judge and the mayor to "make them acquainted with the situation" if "you have needy people in your county."[38]

While neither correspondent stated it explicitly, many relief recipients in Texas were undocumented laborers. *The Laredo Times* reported that it was the second-generation congressman from Houston, Martin Dies, Jr., who was the most vocal opponent of including undocumented people in relief programs. Dies first expressed his opposition during a minor diplomatic controversy regarding a decision by the Mexican consul in Laredo, Juan E. Richer, to convene a meeting of La Asociación de Jornaleros on March 15, 1936. There were important discrepancies between the English and Spanish versions of the newspaper's article, however, since the English version cited José Jacobs's statement that immigration agents and Border Patrol officers were violating the law by detaining people without warrants and that they had "a right to demand a warrant of arrest." The Spanish version emphasized, in contrast, that the union's president, Maximino Juárez, sought cooperation with U.S. officials by requesting and receiving the assembly's permission to allow both an "*inspector de migración* [immigration inspector]" and an official from Ft. MacIntosh to attend the meeting.[39]

Richer did not lead the meeting, and the mere fact that he convened it placed the consular official suddenly in the middle of a potential diplomatic crisis. The county district attorney, John A. Valls, investigated and threatened attendees with lengthy prison sentences, while a local district court judge recommended a grand jury investigation for alleged "outrages" against the flag and violations of the law during the meeting. Some conservative, Spanish-language newspapers such as *El Porvenir* labeled Richer's activities similarly as "openly communistic" and argued that the meeting "attacked" the U.S. flag. The editors of *The Houston Chronicle* published an editorial three days later which repeated the accusations of both a state senator and the grand jury that the Cárdenas administration had "communistic leanings" and announced their

approval of the administration's dismissal of Richer. The Mexican Foreign Relation's office soon distributed a circular to consuls in Texas that relayed presidential orders to refrain from participating in political activities, but this directive ignored the question of whether supporting the enforcement of Mexican migrants' human and political rights in the U.S. is a political activity.[40]

Dies first accused Richer of recruiting Mexican workers for La Asociación de Jornaleros during a speech in the House on March 23, and the representative from east Texas soon had an evocative interaction with Maverick on the House floor. As Dies read copies of various speakers' statements during the meeting, he responded to Maverick's question regarding whether they were from Richer by retorting that "a Mexican Consul presided over this meeting" and further claimed without evidence that Richer was acting based on the Cárdenas administration's orders. Dies then changed the discussion's scope to Mexican-born migrants on relief by reading a letter from a Laredo resident which asserted that a majority of relief recipients in the city were undocumented. The writer proposed suspending both Mexican migration to the U.S. and naturalization processes for migrants who arrived during the previous two to five years and had yet to apply for citizenship, and it is crucial to note that Dies - who soon became the chair of the Anti-Communist House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) before the U.S. entered World War II - was much more concerned with the attendees' legal statuses than their political or party affiliations.[41]

State governments' exclusion of undocumented people from their social programs in the Southwest again became an issue when Congress passed the Housing Act, since the San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA) that the city commission established soon after excluded undocumented residents from the city's first public-housing projects. Among the SAHA's five commissioners was a Catholic priest, Carmelo Tranchese, who had been a vocal supporter of housing legislation since he arrived in San Antonio in 1932. Housing segregation in the city was not as rigid as in other U.S. cities at that time, and SAHA segregated its first five housing projects by reserving eligibility for two projects on the West Side only for Mexican-American residents and two projects on the East Side only for Afro-American residents. "Local real estate and political interests" were staunch opponents of the projects, and the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) also refused to support until Eleanor Roosevelt visited during March of 1939. While the first units at the Alazán Court became available to West Side residents by the following August, later studies indicated that the two projects were insufficient to fulfill housing needs.[42]

The state resources available to Mexican families were thus quite limited by the late 1930s, and the pecan shellers' strike altered the "balance-of-power" between labor and capital in San Antonio by forcing the city's largest employer to negotiate a contract with an industrial labor union. New leaders soon emerged within Pecan Shelling Workers' Union Local 172 after the strike, and mayoral campaign sought to ameliorate the effects of declining support within the East Side's Afro-American community during his primary loss. Labor organizers assisted Maverick's campaign by distributing information regarding how to pay the poll tax of $1.50 in advance to potential voters on the West Side despite the pecan shelling industry's low wages and increasing unemployment. Seligman also introduced newer, "labor-saving machinery" to the SPSC's production processes, which reduced the number of shellers to approximately 1,800 who then began to work year-round. Many of the pecan shellers and crackers who struck could not vote in the recall election, because they left the city to work in sugar beets out of state.[43]

Although it is difficult measure their precise impact, LNPL members on the West Side also campaigned for Maverick's mayoral candidacy on the Fusion Party's ticket. Maverick first won a majority of votes from the West Side during the primary election of 1936, and the LNPL established its headquarters in the area soon after Maverick lost the Democratic primary of 1938. The LNPL's support for Maverick's campaign was of major significance for the alliance between workers and liberals, since it occurred soon after the CIO's split with the AFL. The city's established Democratic Party leaders were also becoming increasingly divided. This explains why a socialist labor organizer, George Lambert, predicted to Local 172's business agent, Santos Vazquez, that Maverick would "win in a cinch" due to in-fighting between Quin and the Board of Commissioners two months before the election.[44]

The spring of 1939 was a crucial time for industrial unionists on the West Side due to both their attempts to appeal to Afro-American voters on the East Side and the CIO's organizing campaign. Considered by some to be organized labor's best ally in the U.S. South during the 1930s, Maverick ran as a Fusion Party candidate who supported both health and housing programs. Vazquez and Oviedo were, meanwhile, the leaders of UCAPAWA Local 172's own voter-registration campaign. Vazquez had begun to experience health problems, however, and soon accepted a position with the Veterans' Administration in Biloxi, Mississippi, while Oviedo had been absent from San Antonio until late February. Another union member, Juanita Muñoz, had also just returned from the noted labor school in Tennessee, the Highlander Folk School, when she began participating in the union's educational programs.[45]

Perhaps the best measure of the intense anticipation for the mayoral election were the election results. There was a record turnout for local elections that day, and at least some of this was due to 9,374 Mexican residents of San Antonio having paid their poll tax. Twenty percent of Afro-American voters on the East Side also voted for Maverick, which was sufficient to defeat the Quin machine temporarily. High unemployment remained the reality, however, since over 5,000 people applied for city jobs during the first two weeks after the election. Both congressional cuts to relief programs and the FDR administration's new requirement that states contribute a greater share of appropriations for work projects further dampened the euphoria from Maverick's victory.[46]

Tenayuca not neither present in San Antonio during the mayoral campaign, since she was in the midst of an extended stay at the Communist Party's headquarters in New York City until June of 1939. One can still infer some of her conclusions about the campaign from both the article she co-authored with her husband, Homer Brooks, and the San Antonio party's political platform that she wrote one month after her return to the city. Tenayuca and Brooks' article, "The Mexican Question in the Southwest," was not merely a polemic, since it both reported on Mexican workers' union activities and proposed strategy for allying with both Afro-Americans and liberal supporters in the southern states. The authors called for abolishing segregation and disfranchisement through black and Latino solidarity and UCAPAWA, which was responsible for leading the CIO's farm labor campaign throughout North America. Although article was a political the document, the authors intended it to start a debate on strategies for creating and strengthening new alliances among workers and national minorities.[47]

The article contains the "voices" of two Marxist authors who sought reach a single conclusion together. Tenayuca's voice was that of a humanist who referred often to abolition, the limitations of the FDR administration's "Good Neighbor" strategy, and the possibility of unity among all migrant workers and Anglo-American allies, while Brook's voice was that of an economist. The authors contended that Mexican-Americans in the Southwest did not constitute a

Emma Tenayuca returning from New York City.
June 7, 1939, San Antonio Light Collection, L-2156-B.

nation, because they, unlike Afro-American residents in "the black belt," lacked "territorial and economic continuity" and lived an "economic life" that was supposedly more integrated with Anglo-Americans. Yet the authors still argued that "the American bourgeoisie" had "hindered the process of national unification" in the Southwest. The authors neither distinguished between human rights and political rights nor analyzed the negative impact of the Democratic Party's exclusion of domestic and agricultural laborers from its social reforms on working-class solidarity.[48]

The authors intended their article to function as a primer for community organizers in both southern and western states who could adjust the strategies appropriately based on local conditions, and the ability to adapt was especially important in areas like south Texas where the alliance between workers and liberals. Tenayuca both wrote the San Antonio party's program and reported to the party's convention on the limited success of Maverick's mayoral campaign on the East Side after she returned to the city, and her party program what was actually a "progressive" platform for improving social services, expanding work relief programs, and reforming the municipal government. Her platform included government funding for social clubs for Mexican-American and Afro-American youth, health clinics, and a request for $35,000,000 from Congress for local housing projects; the "equalization" and re-valuation of taxes; and elections for aldermen by ward instead of on a city-wide basis. Tenayuca recommended supporting a congressional anti-lynching bill (of which there had been much debate during the mid-1930s) soon after the Senate had filibustered an anti-lynching bill which the House had passed one year earlier. Tenayuca and Brooks's article outlined the Communist Party's organizing principles, in short, for expanding the nascent alliance of workers and liberals, and Tenayuca, whom many Tejanos nicknamed "La Pasionaria" after the most noted female leader of the Republican government during the Spanish Civil War, wrote the local party's political platform based on those same principles.[49]

The local Communist party's program appealed to some San Antonio residents due to the inherent limitations of the Democratic Party's governing coalition in Congress, which relied heavily on the support of landowners, employers, and workers in the "solid South." The "riot" which occurred at the municipal auditorium on August 25 was one of the consequences of those contradictions, as was the ability of its leaders to escape punishment. Communist Party leaders decided to hold the meeting just days after the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939-41), but their decision to proceed also needs to be considered in the context of both the U.S. government's arms embargo against the Spanish Republicans after the Nazi regime bombed the civilian population in Guernica during April of 1937 and the British government's subsequent strategy of "appeasement" the following year. Yet Maury Maverick's decision to permit the assembly did undoubtedly receive considerable opposition and even threats of force from the American Legion (which held its state convention in Waco from August 26 to August 29) before the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Newspaper reports indicated that most of the rioters were not war veterans but rather young males aged fifteen to twenty-five, and they only ceased rioting at the urging of former archdiocese chancellor, Marcus A. Valenta, from the San Francisca de Paula parish.[50]

The riot was not, moreover, the only vigilante action against Tejano labor organizers from the West Side to occur that summer. Magdaleno Rodríguez attempted to recruit employees of the Azar and Soloman Companies to join the Pecan Shellers' Union [*La Unión de Nueceros*] earlier that summer and led a group of nine who called out employees while blaring loud music at the Sureueto and San Jacinto plants - as well as at another plant at 1703 Colima Street where Local 172 President Telesforo Oviedo was located that day - during mid-June. Rodríguez then attacked Oviedo with a shotgun on San Fernando Street's 800 block, and this was just days after up to 10,000 male and female Anti-Communists rioted at the municipal auditorium. A shot was fired and Oviedo injured, but the union president did not suffer from gunshot wounds. A student at the Highlander Folk School, Margaret, expressed surprise regarding the attack to local progressive activist Latane Lambert, since it did not "seem possible that 'cry-baby' Rodríguez would have had the nerve."[51]

The environment was very tense when the San Antonio party held its meeting, and it was eventually a controversial decision due to the contemporaneous announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Tenayuca's supporters have argued that she had opposed the pact privately before deciding to proceed with the meeting and that few Communist Party members knew the extent of Stalin's repression until the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered his "secret speech" in 1956, but this not explain why members refused to criticize the "show trials" that occurred in Moscow during 1937. Emma Tenayuca joined the party that very same year and later cited Elizabeth Gurley Flynn's decision to join as one of her major influences. The issue is that historians, like many of her contemporaries, have held Tenayuca to a different standard and ignored how the vigilantes targeted her, in particular, for retaliation. She had, irrespective of her actual actions, a much smaller "margin for error" than her powerful adversaries did, and this was despite the fact that her actual intentions, her strategies, and her ideology were each different from the rioters'.[52]

The opposition's most detailed arguments came from six attorneys who demanded that Maverick withhold a permit from the Communist Party for their meeting. One was that the auditorium had been dedicated to veterans who died during World War I, and it was certainly true that few civilians then - as now - had ever experienced the trauma of war as soldiers did. Their argument was irrelevant to the Communist Party's activities, since it formed after the end

Telesforo Oviedo, copied from “San Antonio, The Cradle of Texas Liberty,” pg. 10, George and Latane Lambert Papers, Box 27, Folder 9.

of a world war in which, like the second, the U.S. and Russia were actually allies. Some historians have also suggested that it was immoral and unwise to hold the meeting so soon after the announcement of the agreement. Yet the facts are that there is no evidence which indicates the rioters who did resort to violence that summer were ever opposed to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and *The San Antonio Light* reported, furthermore, that some vigilantes actually saluted Nazis during the riot.[53]

The lawyers’ second argument was that Maverick should only permit Communists to meet at a different location for the sake of the general welfare, and this argument was also deficient due to its reliance on several dubious assumptions. One assumption was that a Communist assembly would offend veterans whose political convictions were presumably homogenous (and are certainly not assumed to be Communists themselves). This particular contention implied both that no Communists had ever served in the U.S. military and that officials should revoke their constitutional rights based on the fear that enforcing them would offend war veterans. Another assumption was that the potential for vigilante violence always outweighs the need to enforce Communists’ constitutional rights, and this ignored the fact that the only threats of violence that occurred before the meeting were from Anti-Communists. Anti-Communist veterans’ ability to achieve some semblance of catharsis through inexcusable acts of violence was more important for these attorneys, in short, than Communists’ constitutional rights.[54]

Maury Maverick had his own political and legal reasons for permitting the assembly, since the Communist Party included leaders of industrial labor unions and the CIO whose growing memberships were a major potential source of Democratic support. One of Maverick’s arguments for permitting the assembly cited a recent Supreme Court decision in the case of *Hague vs. the Congress of Industrial Organizations* (1938), which ruled that the mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey, could not prohibit CIO members from distributing their literature. Maverick also offered a somewhat less-persuasive argument that the city had no history of lynching. His

first argument should have been sufficient, but there is little evidence that Maverick's opponents were much concerned with the severity of the supposed "threat" – much less how to respond based on the principle of proportionality - when they plotted their attack on the Communist meeting. Maverick's most powerful argument came in the form of a wry observation that "big, brawny, brave men" were "making threats over a twenty-two year old tubercular Mexican girl."[55]

Though the last argument was unlikely to have ever won in a court of law, events during the riot proved that it was quite accurate despite Maverick's detailing of many law enforcement officers to "keep the peace." *The San Antonio Light* reported that most of the up to 10,000 rioters were young males and also included a "sprinkling" of veterans led by the commander of the Alamo chapter of the American Legion, Clem Smith, and the police chief, Ray Ashworth, estimated that seventy-five percent of rioters were males between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five. Ashworth assigned over 100 police officers to various security posts by five in the evening, but the highway patrol commission refused to send additional units in support. The leaders of the 500 protesters who assembled outside the auditorium by seven-thirty did include "ex-servicemen," but the rioters' numbers then grew quickly to at least 2,000 before they broke through police lines and passed the pleading former archbishop as Tenayuca arrived onthe scene at around eight o'clock. Their first casualty was a photographer for *The San Antonio Light*, George Bartholomew, whom one rioter struck with a brick in the rear of his cranium, and police officers and firemen used tear gas and fire hoses to no avail as the rioters injured twenty people, including ten police officers, two firemen, and the police chief.[56]

Smith then led the group of male and female rioters – many of whom were not from San Antonio – as they charged the auditorium while singing songs like "The Eyes of Texas" and chanting slogans like "lynch 'em!" and "Kill the Reds!" The organizers attempted to continue the meeting inside the auditorium, which had the capacity to seat 120 people. The protesters "drowned out" the voice of the Texas Communist Party's educational director, Elizabeth Benson, with their chants from outside the auditorium when she first rose to speak, and Tenayuca's response of leading a rendition of "The Star Spangled Banner" infuriated the mob even further. They threw rocks that broke all of the windows in the auditorium, and they then chanted, "We want Ashworth, we want Maverick!" as they stormed the building, forced the attendees to flee, and listened to impromptu speeches by former Republican gubernatorial candidate Alexander Boynton, former district attorney Walter Tynan, and New York "newspaperman" John Renery. The mob then dispersed after taking a "sympathetic attitude" towards Valenta, who led them in prayer before they marched to the Alamo.[57]

Why did Tenayuca find herself on the defensive, since it was the rioters who were the aggressors? Was it due to outrage over the Nazi-Soviet Pact? The state's Legionnaires continued to criticize Maverick in the days that followed for permitting the meeting, and the manager of radio station KMAC, Howard Davis, canceled a broadcast with Tenayuca that they had scheduled before the riot. Tenayuca was able to speak on the radio station WOAI, where she asserted that the rioters' real aim was to attack "New Deal Democrats" before issuing the Texas Communist Party's official response:

> What is most important now, is not the issue of the Communists' right to use the city auditorium, but whether the people of San Antonio and Texas are going to let the reactionary 'copperhead' Democrats confuse the issue which is, shall democracy be made effective for the needs of the people, and therefore shall democracy survive.

There was no evidence of shame or regret in Tenayuca's statement, which indicated that

lingering memories and traumas from the American Civil War and Reconstruction had a much greater impact on politics in the region than the Nazi-Soviet Pact.[58]

The competition to explain why the riot occurred continued during the following month, and it was through this gradual process of attempting to "make sense" of the event that Tenayuca and the Sagers all but disappeared from the historical record for decades. Latane Lambert asserted in a letter to the chair of the American Committee for Anti-Nazi Literature in New York City, William E. Dodd, Jr., that *The San Antonio Light* had yet to publish the most disturbing photographs taken of the riot, including those by a second photographer, Cliff Potter, who was also present. Lambert implored to no avail for Dodd, Jr. request that the newspaper's editors publish the photographs. Yet Anti-Communists only "won the peace" in San Antonio when HUAC blacklisted Tenayuca in 1940, although the Tejana labor leader continued to participate labor activities within the state for several more years after the U.S. entered World War II.[59]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) reports on Tenayuca after the riot indicate that she was active in Houston under the alias "Beatrice Giraud" from 1941-43, while Oviedo organized spinach workers in the Rio Grande Valley. She could not find consistent work when she returned to San Antonio as she aid striking garment, laundry, and cement workers upon her return, and she moved to northern California towards the end of the decade to study at San Francisco State University and become a school teacher. Tenayuca left the Texas Communist Party by then, but Manuela Solis and James Sager remained members for the rest of their lives. Other members and leaders of the Workers' Alliance and UCAPAWA, such as Telesforo Oviedo, migrated to the Río Grande Valley after the pecan shellers' strike to organize onion and spinach workers, though it was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that another major strike by garment workers occurred in San Antonio. The repression of Tejano radicals - and especially of Tenayuca - was therefore a pivotal event that checked industrial unionists' gains in south Texas, because it both halted the momentum that the pecan shellers' strike created and limited the impact of the CIO's victories to Maury Maverick's election as mayor for a single term.[60]

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AWOC and the Workers' Alliance were at the forefront of Latino workers' demands for justice during the 1930s, and this was why these organizations were "the heart" of both UCAPAWA's statewide organizing campaign and the reform movement in south Texas. Although the alliance of Communists and Anti-Fascists won the mayoral recall election during the spring of 1939, it was not, by itself, sufficient to ameliorate the impending crisis caused by the appeasement of the Nazi government in Germany. A comprehensive program for fiscal, social, political, and administrative reforms to achieve a planned economy were necessary to accomplish this. The pecan workers' strike was a watershed in the history of south Texas that convinced migratory workers from the West Side to participate in electoral politics, but the targeting of Tenayuca by both vigilantes and especially HUAC made it possible to discredit the most respected labor leader and political reformer within the area. The negative effects of their actions included eliminating both the momentum and the gains that the workers' movement had garnered in south Texas, isolating the labor movement in south Texas from the labor movement their allies in other parts of the Southwest, and forcing industrial unionists to divert resources away from other activities in the southern states.

Although this chapter emphasizes the leadership of Tenayuca, the Sagers, and Oviedo, there were many other members and leaders who rose to the occasion before, during, and after the pecan workers' strike. The best evidence of this is the 10,000 pecan shellers and crackers who joined the strike immediately after Solis Sager stood on a table in a pecan-shelling plant as

well as the thousands of strikers and supporters who attended nightly meetings over the next six weeks. While mass arrests and tear gas did not deter them from participating in strike activities, vigilante mobs had much more success in diminishing industrial workers' success by targeting Tenayuca for retaliation. Tenayuca, Solis Sager, and Oviedo were only three of the many "organic intellectuals" who emerged on the West Side during those years, and yet the Texas Communist Party was no hydra. It was rather a new cadre of younger - and vulnerable – industrial labor leaders in south Texas who guided both the formation of the labor-liberal alliance and UCAPAWA's statewide organizing campaign in Texas.

Chapter Four

The CIO's Southern Organizing Campaign, 1929-1950

The Southeastern Division of the CIO-affiliated Textile Workers Organizing Committee's (TWOC) launched its organizing campaign among cotton-mill workers after over 100 textile unions had received charters from the AFL and as strikes within the industry were spreading throughout the region from 1936-7. The CIO's southern public-relations representative, Lucy Randolph Mason, opined in a letter to TWOC representative Sidney Hillman that southern workers lacked education and experienced leadership which were among "the greatest needs in the South," and she argued to Eleanor Roosevelt that the CIO needed to "stand by" the striking textile workers despite the spontaneity of their actions. Possible explanations for their supposed "disorganization" included law enforcement agencies' frequent violations of their rights, the paucity of meeting spaces available for workers' organizations, an antagonistic press, sweatshop conditions in runaway shops, and the special privileges that townspeople accorded to employers (especially in the textile industry) to entice them into relocating production in southern states. Several CIO organizers also reported at a clothing and furniture workers' conference in Roanoke that dismissals and plant closures "ushered in the present business depression." Yet members of the Textile Workers' Union of America (TWUA) still received union recognition at five mills in Columbia, South Carolina and for 700 others in Huntsville, Alabama, over the next year, and garment workers in Dalton, Georgia, won the first union contract for that industry in the black belt during July of 1939.[61]

Reformers and industrial unionists aided tenant farmers' and sharecroppers' unions frequently after 1930, and this helps explain why early historians of the "New Deal" in southern states who studied farmworkers' plight concentrated on the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU). War veterans, industrial workers, and tenant farmers in the black belt failed to ally with mid-level military officers, white-collar workers, and professionals and seize control of cotton-, tobacco-, and sugar-related branches of industry within the region after sharecroppers in Tallapoosa County, Alabama, rebelled during 1931-2. The STFU's members and its executive council divided over the questions of proportional representation on the executive council and affiliation with UCAPAWA during the first wave of sit-down strikes, and this was a major

barrier for revolution against liberal landowners, industrialists, and military officers. Radical military officers' and industrial unionists' failure to revolt allowed the southern ruling class and its bourgeois allies to regroup and pass "right-to-work" legislation and constitutional amendments in Florida, Arizona, Arkansas, and Tennessee after 1943, and radicals were still unprepared during and after the postwar strike wave to both defend black leaders in towns and cities and seize the means of production within the most valuable branches of industry. This left UCAPAWA (which changed its name to the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers, or FTA, in 1944) and the ILWU vulnerable to CIO affiliates' Anti-Communist raids in North Carolina and Louisiana after Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act during the spring of 1947, because it diminished industrial unionists' ability to communicate and cooperate with workers along the Mississippi River as they inched towards achieving industry-wide bargaining, tobacco and textile workers' unions were desegregating, and state governments were passing equal-pay legislation.[62]

Sixteen states and the territory of Alaska passed equal pay laws from 1943 through 1955 after Congress refused to enforce the War Labor Board's (WLB)'s directive order which required that employers in war industries offer equal pay during November of 1942, but the Taft-Hartley Act's requirement that certified unions' officer sign affidavits that they were not members of the Communist Party and the CIO executive board's expulsion of eleven Communist-affiliated unions during the winter of 1949-50 imposed severe constraints on working women's political activities throughout North America. The Communist-affiliated United Electricians' (UE) adherence to the principle of proportional representation resulted in women constituting thirty-five percent of its elected officers after World War II, and its executive board supported female members' seniority rights when the CIO's executive board expelled the union during the autumn of 1949 before it targeted ten other Communist-affiliated unions. Another affiliate from the "Anti-Communist bloc," the United Rubber Workers (URW), also had 142 contracts with equal-pay clauses by the end of the war. This was after the Supreme Court overturned the precedent set in *Adkins vs. Children's Hospital* (1923) by ruling in *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish* (1937) that the fourteenth amendment granted states the right to define personhood and enact minimum-wage laws, and Congress passed social-security legislation two years later that excluded motherless children, required means-testing for aging husbands, and enabled "second-class citizenship" through its paying-in principle. These events transpired as debate over fiscal reform commenced between supporters of "community property" in the southern states and proponents of joint-income tax returns for married couples that continued until they agreed to allow wage-earning married couples to receive an average tax cut of twenty-percent based the tax rate of the lesser earner's income in 1947, and historian Alice Kessler-Harris has argued that this compromise discouraged legislators and "an influential segment of the public" from supporting more equitable taxation of the wealthy.[63]

The years between the sit-down strikes of 1936-37 and the anti-Communist purges of the late 1940s were critical for the history of industrial unionism in the southern states. Why did industrial unionists attempt to organize workers throughout the region before, during, and immediately after the U.S. entered World War II, and why did their efforts fail? CIO historians have recently emphasized industrial unionists' commitment to "civil rights unionism," which encompassed both collective-bargaining issues related to wages and working conditions and their challenges to disfranchisement, segregation, and apartheid. While internationalist labor unions won major concessions from employers in southern states during World War II, their leaders' unwillingness to rebel at key moments enabled Anti-Communists within the CIO to take the

offensive after the war through their own organizing campaign, Operation Dixie, that coincided with their raids of Communist-affiliated unions. The United Steelworkers of America (USA) led many of these raiding activities, and its president, Philip Murray, led the CIO executive board's contemporaneous attempt to force its affiliates to support the ERP and oppose Henry Wallace's third-party presidential candidacy in 1948.

This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I studies farmworkers' strikes during and immediately after the nadir of the unemployment crisis of 1929-30. Part II investigates the conflict between the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union's (STFU) members and its executive counsel regarding CIO affiliation and anti-Communism during the late 1930s. Part III examines labor strikes, lynching, and raiding activity in southern states after World War II, and it concludes by analyzing how the STFU found "new life" by recruiting packinghouse workers in California's agricultural valleys. This chapter demonstrates that industrial unionists won important concessions from employers and that revolution was their only means of achieving victory.

"not the time for any kind of strike"

Industrial unionists confronted festering social conflicts that had led to widespread violence during the years after World War I. Sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and wage laborers responded to landowners' proliferation of tractors, replacement of sharecroppers with wage laborers, and the unemployment crisis during the 1920s through cooperation, and sharecroppers in Alabama decided to protest "southern justice" by forming an independent union with aid from the steelworkers' union in Birmingham. Agricultural workers appealed for the government to provide relief, and miners' unions demanded more district autonomy from the UMW's executive board. Most members of the STFU resided in the upper Mississippi River Delta and Oklahoma, and they received both fairer coverage from newspapers and support from leaders of the British Labor Party during the mid-1930s. Socialist members of the executive council refused to ally with sharecroppers' union in the black belt, the Share Croppers' Union (SCU) to form an anti-fascist "united front" as their counterparts in France did, and they depended on funds from philanthropists instead of raising dues to finance the union's strikes.

Southern workers organized strikes, unemployed councils, and protests for better relief and criminal-justice reform during the early 1930s. Sharecroppers in Phillips County, Arkansas, struck during the cotton-picking season of 1930 for wage increases from twenty-five to forty cents per hundred pounds, and hundreds of black sharecroppers and white tenant farmers from the town of England marched to demand that the Red Cross administer relief more quickly in what became known as the "England Food Riot." Sharecroppers in Holmes County struck two years later. An organization of progressive ministers, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), scheduled for a black sociologist, Charles S. Johnson, to speak at their conference on unemployment at Fisk University that it organized during the autumn of 1931. The FOR also took a position with regards to "the Manchuria situation" by endorsing the Inter-organization Council on Disarmament's resolution against Japan's occupation of northeastern China.[64]

World War I veterans organized a march on Washington, D.C. to demand early disbursement of their bonuses on July 28, 1932, and the twelve-year old daughter of a deceased cavalry veteran from Pasadena, Patricia Murphy (who later became a member of the Navy's first class of female cadets during the early 1940s), attended the march with her mother and later recalled that "you never knew" if Hoover was going to win reelection. "Everyone" in the capitol "was in the service of some kind," and she described an "absolutely unforgettable" scene that was like "one of those pictures that's in your mind, you know." There were many "little ragtag

kids with diapers hanging down and bare feet and walking across the hills there and mountains coming into Washington," D.C., where they "slept out in the open." Murphy wondered constantly "how it was all going to end" and "whether we'd have enough to do it" even though "I knew we should," and she described her experience during the demonstration to her social studies class in California soon after.[65]

The combination of proliferating tractors, the replacement of sharecroppers with day laborers on cotton farms, and the concentration of land ownership in cotton districts caused increased unemployment. Agricultural-equipment companies - and especially the International Harvester and Rust Brothers companies - vied to automate by researching and developing new, expensive cotton-picking machines that only required one or two operators. The Rust Brothers Company designed all-purpose tractors after 1915 that could traverse hilly and lowland terrain. These experiments led directly to the introduction of the two-plow, two-row tractor in 1934, and these kinds of machines represented over seventy percent of all U.S. tractor sales within just three years. These were not ideal for estates in hilly, western-central areas like central Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma where the terrain was rugged and labor costs often greater, and the STFU' secretary, H.L. Mitchell, estimated that the percentage of union members employed as wage laborers increased between 1934 and 1940 from ten to seventy percent between 1934 and 1940.[66]

Cotton districts in the upper Mississippi River valley were not far from the coal mines of the Ozark mountain range in western Arkansas, and both northern Alabama and that area were where the UMW's affiliates first demanded district autonomy during the early 1930s (the UMW had the largest union membership among the Arkansas Federation of Labor's affiliates by 1936). The executive board responded by appointing district officers directly and reserving the authority to place any local under a "trusteeship," and it relented somewhat in 1934 by permitting union elections. The twenty-first (which encompassed Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas) and fiftieth (which included Alabama and Florida) districts led miners' efforts to demand better representation within the UMW, and the executive board conceded autonomy for five of the union's twenty-three districts by 1937. A Presbyterian minister and World War I veteran who became one of the few radical members of the STFU's executive council, Claude Williams, organized black and white miners in Paris, Arkansas, during 1930, and he also worked with sharecroppers in lowland areas further west before he founded the Proletarian Church and Labor Temple. The UMW competed with separatist miners' unions such as the Progressive Miners of America, and between 12,000 and 20,000 members from southern Illinois joined when it formed in 1932. Alabama was another major stronghold for both miners' and sharecroppers unions, and several UMW locals within the state signed a "District Contract" in 1934 with provisions for wage increases, a welfare and retirement fund, and better enforcement of safety codes (an editorialist complained four years later that the state's new governor, David B. Graves, refused to deploy the national guard against striking textile workers).[67]

The SCU formed during a burst of labor activities that included a remarkable series of protests that the ILD led against the rape convictions which several all-white juries in Alabama issued during 1931-2 against eight young, black men, and the accused's supporters dubbed them "the Scottsboro Boys cases." H.L. Mitchell later recalled that steelworkers from Birmingham founded the SCU in 1931, and one of the SCU's leaders during the mid-1930s, Clyde Johnson, claimed that a that an individual from the Camp Hill, Tallapoosa County, requested an organizer from a Birmingham-based Communist newspaper, *The Southern Worker*, that year. Sharecroppers' meetings in Camp Hill to discuss the Scottsboro boys resulted in a violent

Courtesy: Columbia University in the City of New York.



Rust Brothers Tractor. Horne and McKibben, “Mechanical Cotton Picker,” WPA Report, August, 1937, pg. 8.

confrontation with law enforcement officers, and a similar event occurred the following year in Reeltown, Tallapoosa County. The SCU's first five locals formed on August 6, 1931, after landlords and law enforcement officers murdered Ralph Gray at Camp Hill, and a domestic worker, founder of several locals in Pike Road, Montgomery County, and secretary of the Montgomery local, Mary Jackson, made contact with Johnson three years later when he received a new assignment from Communist Party leaders. A former steelworker, Al Jackson, was the union's secretary, and Johnson arrived shortly after members struck during chopping and picking seasons.[68]

The SCU's growth during the early 1930s enabled it to garner popular support throughout the black belt. One of the SCU's first members and leaders was a tenant farmer from Dadeville, Tallapoosa County, Hosea Hart, who lived near Camp Hill. Hart organized farmworkers in the state's eastern counties such as Tallapoosa, Chambers, Macon, and Montgomery, and the union located its headquarters on his farm. The Alabama Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners' first secretary was an instructor at the all-white University of Alabama named Joe Gelders. The SCU grew to over 300 locals (including one in Tennessee) by early 1935, and its executive committee soon both included a women's section and had representatives from Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina.[69]

Johnson documented many of the SCU's activities over the next several years. Johnson was the son of a railroad conductor from Minnesota, studied engineering at a junior college in Brooklyn, and participated in several student strikes in New York City that an organization called "the Student League" during 1932-3. It was not long after those strikes - and as cannery and agricultural workers in North America were attempting to form unions - that the Student League became "interested in helping out an agricultural organization." Johnson received an assignment in Rome, Floyd County, Georgia, where he organized cotton pickers against relief cuts and met a farmer from Marietta, Cobb County, Don West, who had once been a member of a farm labor organization called Agricultural Wheel that was active during Reconstruction. Johnson then moved to Birmingham with a student from the Highlander Folk School began working with miners and steelworkers. Johnson became the editor of *The Southern Farm Leader* within a year (and soon learned by late 1934 that "the CIO was going to be formed"), liaised between UCAPAWA and government agencies during 1937-8, led negotiations between both the beet workers' union' in Colorado and the GWSC and the pecan shellers' union in San Antonio and the SPSC, and partnered with another Communist labor organizer from Massachusetts, Clive Knowles, after World War II to sign up CIO members among black, white, and Mexican oil workers in Texas.[70]

The SCU's strikes elicited much support from many politically-minded observers, and this led the Socialist Party (SPUSA) to attempt to create a different "industrial basis" by recruiting tenant farmers and sharecroppers into the STFU. An Arkansas resident requested an organizer from the SPUSA's national office during September of 1933, and two members, Edward and Martha Johnson, worked with H.L. Mitchell to re-organize the state party in Arkansas by establishing a local in the Delta and cooperating with a group that they described as "the Memphis Socialists." The SPUSA's leader, Norman Thomas, soon tasked Mitchell and another party member who was the son of a prominent landlord, Clay East, with establishing a union of tenant farmers and sharecroppers. The founded the STFU at a meeting in Tyronza, Poinsett County, during July of 1934. Both unions soon sought affiliation with the CIO but failed due to the actions of the STFU's executive board, because the STFU's refusal to ally with the SCU left it with few alternatives but to merge with the AFL-allied Farmers' Union.[71]

Pike Road local in Montgomery County, Alabama. *Southern Farm Leader*, January, 1937.

The SPUSA launched the STFU as sharp divisions within its National Executive Council (NEC) resumed between the "Old Guard" faction, "Militants," and "professional revolutionists."

The Old Guard included both labor organizers such Powers Hapgood and a socialist preacher and popular anti-lynching activist, Howard Kester, who co-founded the STFU and boasted in his correspondence shortly after the STFU formed that it insisted on using "a revolutionary tactic." One can infer the nature of Norman Thomas' relationship with each faction by analyzing the complaint of a professional revolutionist, Francis A. Hensen, during July of 1935 that Thomas behaved like an "almost complete wash out" and "did not please" either the Old Guard or "the Left" at a recent NEC meeting. Sharecroppers' urgent need for relief and enthusiasm for union activity mitigated the NEC's factionalism temporarily, and Mitchell evidenced this by claiming to Kester that up to 2,000 agricultural workers joined the union during its first two weeks. The union's popularity also explains both why Mitchell assigned another SPUSA member who had recently been arrested with a "negro preacher," Ward Rodgers, to organize in Paris and why the executive council assigned several more organizers during the winter.[72]

The STFU's leaders acted based on a "legalist" strategy, and its deficiencies were immediately evident. The most pressing concern during the winter of 1934-1935 was, according to the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) secretary, Lucille Milner, "aroused public opinion" in Atlanta in response to police raids and the "notorious anti-red legislation" that was "producing a reign of terror" in Alabama and Georgia. Kester warned the ACLU's founder, Roger Baldwin, similarly that "anti-red hysteria" was "gradually spreading to other states." The STFU's leaders fundraised legal aid for evicted strikers, and they filed lawsuits for sharecroppers to receive cash payments from the FDR administration's Agricultural Adjustment Administration's (AAA) program that paid U.S. cotton farmers to withhold their product from the market. The STFU soon appealed directly to the FDR administration to require that the AAA

issue payments to sharecroppers instead of their landlords, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) southern director, I.W. Duggan, complied with the STFU's requests three years later – and before an economic recession - by announcing the department changed its rules regarding the distribution of AAA payments to sharecroppers.[73]

The USDA's initial refusal to issue AAA payments to sharecroppers, landlords' evictions of union members, and "anti-red" repression during 1934 and early 1935 caused conflicts that soon led some STFU members to strengthen their appeals to the FDR administration by seeking an anti-fascist "united front" with the SCU. A former economics professor, Donald Henderson, organized the first "agricultural conference" during January of 1935 in Washington, D.C. that an official whom the FDR administration fired as part of a "purge" of the AAA, Gardner Jackson, chaired, and Mitchell recalled that the conference was "part of the Unemployed Congress." The STFU's delegation included an SPUSA organizer from Marked Tree, Poinsett County, E.B. McKinney, who told the secretary of the USDA's director, Henry Wallace, that the delegation planned to "just sit down" in his office until he complied. Wallace responded by assigning an attorney, Mary Connor Myers, to investigate whether the evictions were an effect of the USDA's decision to issue sharecroppers' AAA payments to landlords, and Mitchell later attested that Wallace's assistant, Chester C. Davis, suppressed Myers' subsequent report. The SCU's three delegates included a part-time domestic worker, organizer, and songwriter, Annie Mae Meriweather, whose husband, Jim, was one of four strike leaders in Lowndes County, Alabama, that vigilantes killed the previous year.[74]

Conflicts in northeastern Arkansas escalated when the STFU's delegates returned from the conference. Mitchell found that few landlords were members of the farm bureau, and some had issued eviction notices to tenants. Landowners and law enforcement officers colluded with vigilantes to raid and attack the STFU. Ward Rodgers was a FERA employee who worked for an adult-education program, and *The Memphis Press-Scimitar* published his claim that Tyronza's school superintendent, R.A. Lynch, objected vehemently to Rodgers' involvement in the adult-education programs, his membership in the SPUSA, and his possession of a copy of an issue of *The Southern Worker* before he told him to "get out of town." A group of members that included A.B. Brookins soon fled across the river and formed a "Refugee Local" in Memphis when vigilantes fired on their homes, and *The New York Times* opined several weeks later that "the most fundamental rights of free speech and assemblage have been abridged" in "some" of the "communities" in eastern Arkansas.[75]

The SCU and the STFU were natural allies due to their shared economic interests and need for defense. Members of both unions were discussing forming a united front by early 1935. The FOR's executive committee considered allowing representatives from the ILD to join their delegation to interview the governor of Alabama during January of 1933, and they advised Howard Kester to "use his discretion." Kester co-founded a radical workers' school in Tennessee, the Highlander Folk School, the previous year; was "instrumental" in establishing a new state party in that state which included Afro-Americans; and organized black and white coal miners in Fentress County, Tennessee. The unstated question was who would lead a united front.[76]

The STFU formed a secret alliance with the SCU that its executive council was reluctant to acknowledge, and its organizing principle was self-defense. One of the SCU's organizers, Al Jackson (who appears to have also used the alias "Al Murphy"), suggested forming a united front with the STFU at a meeting at the Highlander Folk School during the latter half of 1934. Representatives of both socialist and communist parties met at Commonwealth College in Mena,

Arkansas, on January 22 to discuss the question further. Rodgers denied that the STFU considered the offer, and the attendees (who included E.B. McKinney) agreed to form a united front, establish defense committees, and cooperate for legal aid, relief, union autonomy for the UMW's twenty-first district, and a forthcoming anti-lynching conference in Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee. The two unions' delegations to the USDA's conference on sharecropping and farm tenancy in Washington, D.C. were part of their attempts to form a united front.[77]

Sharecroppers' unions needed a united front to overcome vigilantes' and law enforcement officers' repression. SPUSA members who attended the second U.S. Congress Against Fascism established the Committee for Socialist Action for a United Front during September of 1935, and residents of Chattanooga and New Orleans responded to lynching and unemployment by forming united fronts. Sharecroppers who struck risked not only arrest but also peonage or death. The STFU's newspaper, *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, reported that farmworkers joined the "united front defense committee" after the killing of two forced laborers at the Pulaski County Prison Farm and death sentences against two teenagers during the chopping season the following year. United fronts enabled striking sharecroppers to create alliances, fundraise legal aid, and defend themselves.[78]

United-front defense committees confronted substantial challenges due to the dangers that members of sharecroppers' unions endured on a daily basis, and the STFU's internal debates regarding whether to form a united front with the SCU led some to ask if the two unions should amalgamate into a single organization of wage laborers, southern sharecroppers, and tenant farmers. Rodgers reported to Kester and Mitchell during March of 1935 that the SCU first proposed a merger when radicals in Arkansas were debating whether they should "openly go as Communists or not." Two SCU representatives soon held "preliminary talks" at a conference with the STFU five months later in which they agreed to form a joint committee and hold another conference on September 1 "for the purpose of bringing both unions into a single organization." Yet when Mitchell wrote to Kester two weeks later that McKinney, Walter Moskop, and J.R. Butler had "engineered the deal," Kester suggested the executive council table the issue until a "committee of inquiry" had investigated and submitted a report.[79]

Thomas and Kester were among leading opponents of forming united fronts and amalgamation within the SPUSA, and Anti-Communist leaders of AFL affiliates agreed. Thomas advised Mitchell to remain "on the friendliest possible terms with any and every union of agricultural workers," and he cautioned that a merger would "raise the cry of Communist against you in any strike" and "enormously complicate your relations with the A.F. of L." Officials within the Arkansas Federation of Labor refused to seat one of its members, J.R. Butler, threatened to expel Williams during its annual convention two weeks later. Kester both denied he was a "narrow sectarian" and asserted he "was willing to cooperate with Communists," and he argued that the proposed merger had no potential advantages and that the STFU should not "listen to the dictates of theoreticians maneuvering for positions and headlines in the newspapers." Kester soon cited rumors that the president of UCAPAWA, Donald Henderson, was appealing to STFU organizers Walter Moskop, Odis Sweeden, and McKinney as justification for his skepticism regarding "the 'united front' about which I hear a great deal but see very little actual demonstration.[80]

Many laborites respected Kester for his internationalism and anti-lynching activities, and Mitchell's tenure as the STFU's executive secretary was controversial for other members of the executive council to such a degree that he twice submitted his resignation during the union's first

three years. The first occasion was his response to ten charges that other members of the executive council levelled which included misusing funds, sending McKinney on assignment to Chicago without permission, and making an unauthorized statement denying affiliation with the SCU, and the result was a unanimous resolution "that he resign or be voted out." The council found him not guilty of all charges. Members called for his resignation again two years later, and Gardner Jackson implored them to reconsider by alluding to the CIO's supposed intention to "take over a large number of agricultural laborers unions, most of which are now affiliated with the American Federation of Labor."[81]

Divisions within the executive council was a significant barrier that STFU members could only overcome through collective action, and members in northeastern Arkansas responded by striking in large numbers while demanding that the executive council establish a statewide organization. Up to 10,000 SCU members in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi disseminated handbills which claimed strikers' right to armed self-defense when they called a choppers' strike on May 1, and Clyde Johnson later recalled that the strike and the handbills "seemed to go like wildfire" among cattle-raising members in Lowndes County (many of whom were World War I veterans) before SCU members won wage increases to seventy-five cents per hundred pounds. One of the union's circulars stated that strikers at thirty-five estates in seven counties won daily wages of one dollar. The strikers included both mill workers and white members in Chambers and Tallapoosa counties who provided sharecroppers with sanctuary after the shootout in Reeltown. Strike leaders remained vulnerable, and vigilantes' killing of a black ILD organizer in Selma was evidence.[82]

The STFU's executive council administered a survey to members while they prepared for a cotton pickers' strike during July which found they favored striking for one dollar per hundred pounds by large margins. 11,186 of 11,636 members of approximately ninety locals, or "Community Councils," voted to strike, and 7,735 of 10,238 voted later that summer to demand dollar per hundred pounds. SCU members also struck during picking season at J.R. Bell's estate in Alabama, which was the largest in Lowndes County and where Mitchell visited during the previous year. The executive council also received an organizing grant from a philanthropic organization that Baldwin directed, American Fund, for the strike, and a Communist STFU member from Edmondson, Crittenden County, Arkansas, Van Ryan, conducted another survey of preachers and churches in the entire Delta. The executive council postponed its decision regarding a potential merger until after the cotton pickers' strike, which won hourly wage increases from sixty-five to seventy-five cents for approximately 4,000 "day laborers" (including employees of the Twist Brothers' estate in Cross County that had been "notorious of ill treatment of their workers" including those who had "been held in peonage for many years").[83]

Black STFU members in Arkansas needed defend themselves from landlords' and law enforcement officers' targeting of black members and landowners' concomitant attempts to co-opt. Union members at the Dewey-Chapman Company's 30,000-acre estate held a meeting with a Methodist minister, J. Abner Sage, to protest evictions of members in Marked Tree (some of whom were also domestic workers). Sage decried that law enforcement officers found a letter on Rodgers' person that expressed support for a "united front between all radical organizations" when they arrested him. Sage's strategy was to establish the Marked Tree Cooperative Association, and its stated purpose was to both "place farmers on land to make a crop for the coming year and try to find jobs for all the unemployed." The cooperative excluded black people and did not collect dues, and "reign of terror" enveloped estate workers during mid-March when a black union member was "almost beaten to death."[84]

More sinister than Sage's proposed cooperative was the formation of a new paramilitary organization, the "Green Shirts," that attempted to recruit members soon after the incidents at Marked Tree by masking its leaders' intentions with a false veneer of inclusiveness and benign patriotism. One of its first leaders was a World War I veteran and former middle-school teacher who served as the STFU's first president, William A. Stultz, that worked as a sharecropper during the early 1930s, and his landlord responded to the "tremendous following he earned as union president by "substitut[ing] a Negro family for his." Stultz's landlords in both Parkin and Wynne evicted his family, and STFU members found them "homeless upon the highways of Cross County." Powers Hapgood accompanied them when they visited the Transient Bureau in Memphis, and officials referred them back to Cross County where a relief administrator, Lillian Harvey, deduced that his family was ineligible for relief. Mitchell reported shortly after Stultz's address to the justice of the peace on June 12 that he had "openly allied with the planters" before recanting quickly upon learning he could not "get in on the money."[85]

Part of Stultz's motivation for getting "mixed up" with the Green Shirts was almost certainly a desire to save his infant son that died one year later, and another individual, J.O. Green of Poinsett County, attempted simultaneously to establish another front organization called the Tenant Farmers' and Labor's Patriotic Union of America. The Green Shirt's leaders opened membership all persons aged fourteen years or older "without discrimination as to sex, race or religious belief," and its emblem contained a swastika. It received most of its donations, according to Mitchell, from middle-class residents, and it "failed to line up" the Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company's employees in the mill town of Truman. Employers sought to mask their attempts to target and exclude black workers through company unions and what one southern historian, Steven Hahn, has described as "paramilitary politics."[86]

Relations between landlords and farm labor unions continued to devolve into violence as rubber workers in Akron, Ohio, launched industrial workers' first wave of sit-down strikes during April of 1936. The wave of repression began when a "fair and liberal planter" from Parkin, C.H. Dibble, succumbed to his creditor's threats of foreclosure by refusing to sign a contract and evicting union members. Vigilantes raided killed a black southern, Willie Hurst, during a raid at St. Peter's Church on January 13, and a socialist professor from Tennessee who was one of the STFU's donors, William B. Amberson, reported one month later that the WPA's offices in Arkansas denied relief to evicted sharecroppers. The STFU responded by preparing for a cotton choppers' strike, and the subsequent wave of "eviction terror" that spread during March after their strike vote led Gardner Jackson to appeal again for the FDR administration to intervene. This did not deter black women within the STFU from remaining active by demanding both representation within the STFU's executive council and a separate charter for their women's council in Wynne.[87]

The cotton choppers' strike during the spring of 1936 received a substantial degree of support. Members of thirty-seven locals voted by a margin of 6,118 to 285 to strike for daily wages of $1.50, a ten-hour day, and overtime pay, and Mitchell insisted their proposed "day hand strike" was only "a last resort." *The Memphis Press-Scimitar* reported that members of the Workers' Alliance distributed literature "among negroes and whites" in the city during the strike. Kester wrote to a colleague at Cornell University that UMW's president, John Lewis, was "increasingly interested in what we are doing down here," and McKinney travelled to the east coast with Moskop to appeal for funds. McKinney informed Mitchell that many of the people with whom he spoke hoped for the strike's success and sought to discuss "how well you have got it arrange[d]" with him while he was away.[88]

The STFU's executive council sought donations for legal defense, and officials' within the FDR administration and senators' refusals to investigate and prosecute peonage cases made members' need for allies more urgent. The Department of Justice did not investigate charges of "enticing labor" based on the rationale that such actions did not violate national laws, and an assistant attorney general did not act when the Aetna Bonding Corporation denied bond to arrested strikers one year later. The Senate's Committee on the Rights of Labor and Civil Liberties investigated neither "lynch law" nor the practice of convict leasing during its pivotal hearings from 1937 through 1944. One member from Widener, Douglas Cobbs, argued that the union succeeded in stopping "linching [sic] and murding [sic] among negroes" in St. Francis County. The national government was inactive, and sharecroppers gained protection only through their own resolve to defend themselves.[89]

McKinney argued that it was "not time for any kind of strike" during the spring and that the union should instead prepare for "future strikes." Day laborers in Arkansas's Delta area were the strike's major proponents. The strike's epicenter was Crittenden County where most members were day laborers, and strikers in Cross and St. Francis counties were mostly tenants and sharecroppers. The union's central wage and contract committee voted in Memphis on April 28 to demand daily wages of $2.50 and expand the strike on May 18 to include sharecroppers, tenants, and tractor operators. Wage laborers in the upper Delta sub-region used the momentum that strikers created to their advantage, and it was inconsequential that drought caused fewer weeds to grow and labor demand to decline.[90]

Paul Peacher owned a saw mill and ten parcels of wooded land that he rented to tenants, and he was the marshal for the town of Earle. Peacher arrested approximately thirty-five people on May 20, forced at least thirteen into peonage, and murdered both Eliza Nolden and organizer Frank Weems, and he later defended his actions by claiming that forced peonage "was customary." The U.S. Attorney in Little Rock, Fred A. Ingrid, refused to issue peonage charges until widespread protests occurred vigilantes flogged a resident of Wynne, Reverend William Bennett, to death, and these protests included both the UMW's executive board's call for an investigation into peonage on "privately-owned plantations," and Illinois governor Henry Horner's refusal to extradite an STFU member, Sam Bennett (who fled a lynch mob in St. Francis County), from his sanctuary in Chicago. The STFU described Peacher's farm as a "concentration camp," and it reported that Ingrid owned many acres in Pulaski County. A jury convicted Peacher of a minor charge one year later, and he opted to pay a $3,500 fine rather than serve a two-year jail sentence.[91]

The state government allied discreetly with employers. The governor responded to strikers' "mass demonstrations" by assigning details of rangers and national guardsmen to cotton districts. An investigator from the Federal Council of Churches, James Myers, maintained that the "extreme hostility" towards the STFU was not because the union was "interracial as such." It was rather due to employers' "passionate determination" to "maintain 'white supremacy'" in counties with a black majority, and Myers contended that "any thought of a Negro demanding anything through a Union is resented with a vicious reaction which absolutely knows no bounds." One union organizer stated that only a few small farmers agreed to pay wages of one dollar per hundred pounds, and *The Sharecroppers' Voice* published a report that strikers won daily wages from between one dollar and $1.25.[92]

The number of STFU members reached its acme despite forced peonage and killings, and the executive council deliberated how to recruit new members in other areas. The executive

Courtesy: Columbia University in the City of New York.



Data retrieved from *The Richmond Times-Dispatch*, August 20, 1939, pg. 1.

council considered a strategy of "encircling" Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama during 1935 by recruiting farmworkers in Texas, Oklahoma, and Missouri before moving to Kentucky and Virginia, and organizers would have completed the project by appealing to industrial workers in North Carolina and Florida. Kester argued the plan was the "opposite case" of the "Communist attack," and Mitchell abandoned it the following year after concluding that "the older South" was "hardly worth attempting to organize." Kester was "quite unhappy" with the union's decision to affiliate with UCAPAWA several years later and emphasized the "wisdom" of developing "a sturdy movement throughout the Southwest." Oklahoma and Texas were "radically different" environments where "the technique that worked in Arkansas may have quite the opposite effect," and he recommended that Gardner Jackson consult with Odis Sweeden and "the Southwest crowd."[93]

The Oklahoma state organization's success depended on members in Creek County, and black residents had maintained more autonomy there since reconstruction than most other areas in the southern states. Many freedmen spoke a Creek language, and the Creek Treaty of 1866 guaranteed them forty acres of land and a mule, equal rights, and shares of tribal revenues. These revenues enabled freedmen to establish eight schools between 1868 and 1876, and the Creek National Council (CNC) also founded a boarding school in Tullahassee, Wagoner County. White settlers' frequent encroachments forced the CNC to sell its remaining lands and dissolved itself in 1902, and the Oklahoma state government ratified a new constitution five years later that both categorized African Creeks as "colored" and forced several schools in Creek County to close. 300 members in Muskogee formed six new locals during the autumn of 1936, and the state legislature established a "Landlord-Tenant Relationship Department" one year later.[94]

The negative effects of proliferating tractors and drought on cotton districts in western Texas were extreme. Cotton pickers' wages ranged from between twenty-five to thirty cents per hundred pounds in 1935, and landowners purchased "larger and larger plots of ground" during the following year. Tractor drivers worked fourteen- to sixteen-hour shifts and sometimes as long as twenty-four consecutive hours, and their monthly wages ranged from forty to fifty dollars. One small-scale farmer from "the worst area on the plains" reported to an organizer that landlords evicted tenants who refused to operate tractors, and they removed "the waste of a part grain crop" from their agreements with tenants. "The plains country," the farmer concluded, "don't [sic] want white people."[95]

STFU members in west Texas segregated their locals, and they analyzed the impacts of drought and migration on farmworkers' ability to form unions during 1936. The STFU hired a Methodist preacher and former UMW organizer, C.E. Dykes, to lead its activities. The president of a new STFU local in Lubbock identified himself as a "radical who believes in revolution," and he reported to Dykes both that white tenants in the area formed a chapter of the Farmers' and Laborers Cooperative League one year earlier and landlords were "liberal and willing to cooperate with unions." White locals' included transients, although some contended that the most active members were permanent residents who paid regular dues. One member and former landowner from Grassland, Lynn County, Fred Mathews, found that union leaders' "chief obstacle" was "the 'poor white'" who "refused to accept that 'machine farming' is here to stay."[96]

The president of the "colored local" in Lubbock, Lubbock County, Charles Deo, informed Dykes that there were approximately seventy members, and this exceeded the membership of the local he organized in Tahoka, Lynn County, by a power of ten. The local's name had previously been the Farm Labor Union, and it was white STFU members organized the

first local for black residents before theirs “blew up.” Members of the colored local soon established working committees and an executive board that met weekly, and it was designing programs to improve policing, street lights, and street pavement. Deo argued that displaced white farmers began to identify as workers during 1929. Members of the locals had held joint meetings occasionally, and Mexican residents were both “fairly well-organized” and had not rejoined since the white local ceased functioning.[97]

“**the principle of industrial unionism**”

The STFU affiliated with UCAPAWA during September of 1937, and relations between locals and the executive council deteriorated as a result of that action as well as disagreements regarding the executive council’s reluctance to establish offices for and distribute resources to state organizations. Members of the SCU, the STFU, and UCAPAWA deliberated proposals to reform the systems of land-tenure, AAA payments, and criminal-justice administration, while socialist members of the executive council identified Claude Williams - who led workers’ education programs in Little Rock that included black people – as a threat. They withheld the union’s per capita from UCAPAWA soon after affiliation, and a majority of its members proceeded to expel, suspend, or push out every black member and Williams by early 1939. Industrial unionists and radical military officers suffered a major setback during a strike wave from 1936-7 as a result, because they were not in position to seize control of cotton districts and textile mills. Evicted sharecroppers, wage laborers, and tenants responded to these failures by organizing a sit-down strike on several highways near the Delta in southeastern Missouri, and this was the STFU’s last major protest before the U.S. entered World War II.

Divisions grew within the STFU after the cotton choppers’ strike during 1936 because executive council members’ feared Williams’ popularity and opposed affiliating with UCAPAWA, and mid-level leaders in Oklahoma and Arkansas demanded state organizations stridently. Oklahoma locals’ only representative on the executive council, Odis Sweeden, used Communist labor organizers’ activities in Creek County and the geopolitical value of both Oklahoma and the presence of migrants in Arizona and California as leverage. The state council also desired a second representative on the executive council, and Sweeden complained on several occasions that they were not allocating sufficient funds for organizers and a statewide office before threatening during the spring of 1937 to “pull the Oklahoma situation loose and set up our own agencies for support.” Sweeden also warned that STFU leaders did not have sufficient funds “to take care” of the “situation” in Creek County where Communists were causing “some trouble” within five or six locals. The Oklahoma leader informed Kester that he was considering moving to either Arizona or California and “could be of very valuable assistance to the union in its fight with the International.”[98]

The STFU debated affiliating with the CIO at its annual convention in Muskogee (where both McKinney and Sweeden served as members of the credentials committee) during January of 1937, and Mitchell’s goal was to centralize power within the executive council. *The Muskogee Times-Democrat* estimated that ninety percent of the convention’s 200 delegates were “colored,” and another newspaper described the audience as “composed largely of gray-haired Negroes” who asserted that “the land is the common heritage of the people.” One female delegate, Mary L. Jones, reported to the convention that Edmondson was a “colored town” with both a “colored mayor” and a “colored policeman,” and she also proposed establishing a canning cooperative for surplus meats to end their dependence on commissaries. The delegates agreed to hire paid organizers, demand the “guaranteed possession of the land either as working farm families or cooperative associations of such farm families,” and to call for a civil liberties bureau within the

Department of Labor, but they did not make a decision regarding the distribution of dues between local, county, state, and national offices. Delegates approved a proposed amendment to the union's constitution that Mitchell co-sponsored which allowed the executive council to select newly-created position "national secretary," and they carried the recommendation of the Constitutional Committee's majority report that only the executive council had the authority to collect union dues.[99]

The first major controversy involved the director of the UMW's twenty-first district, David Fowler, who had opposed Claude Williams during dispute over regional autonomy and acted as the CIO's representative at the convention. Fowler assured Kester (who voted against CIO affiliation) several weeks earlier that he "was ready to cooperate in helping reorganize" the radical labor school, Commonwealth College in Mena, Arkansas, and he threatened to walk out after a newspaper published what Kester described as "a very inaccurate story" regarding the convention's first session. Mitchell allied with Fowler's faction as members pushed for affiliation. Mitchell signed a statement at Fowler's urging which stated that the union was not "controlled by a group of individuals" from Commonwealth College and requested disciplinary measures against Williams and the Arkansas Socialist Party's secretary, Donald Kobler. The state's socialist party responded by criticizing Mitchell's statement as indicative of alliance with the state's "reactionary forces."[100]

The executive council also disagreed with UCAPAWA's executive board over the significance of the union's depleted strike fund and the increased proportion of black members. The union had no strike fund when the picking season began in 1938, and this forced it to depend heavily on donations from philanthropists in Memphis and northern cities who sometimes attempted to impact its goals, strategies, and tactics. Mitchell acknowledged that the union was not "self-sustaining," and Hazel Whitman and Purnell Benson of the FOR indicated their disapproval of the cotton pickers' proposed strike to the union's secretary in New York City and astonishment that "it was difficult to find white members" in northeast Arkansas to participate in an upcoming "planter-sharecropper conference." The union's demographic composition was indeed changing, but they were ignoring the fact that a majority of residents in the Delta counties were people of African descent. Mitchell estimated the percentage of black membership increased during the mid-1930s from forty to seventy-five, and William T. Amberson calculated that the increase was from fifty to eighty-five percent in locals and from thirty to seventy percent at the union's collectively-managed "Delta Farm" in Mississippi.[101]

The union's debate regarding UCAPAWA and CIO affiliation was also controversial, and it was one of the major reasons the UCAPAWA's founding conference in Denver during June of 1937 was a pivotal event for the industrial unionists' activities in southern states. UCAPAWA's executive board assigned five organizers to both the fourth (which encompassed California, Arizona, and Nevada) and fifth (which included Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Alabama) districts, and this was the most that any district received. The SPUSA was in the midst of a fiscal crisis during the late summer and fall of 1937 as a result of declining dues payments by "leading sections of the party," and Kester cited the STFU's financial problems as his rationale for opposing CIO affiliation. Kester was part of a minority within the STFU – though not the executive council – regarding question of affiliation with UCAPAWA. Convention delegates voted in favor by a large margin.[102]

The STFU's affiliation with UCAPAWA gave credibility to the latter's farm labor campaign, and it occurred while cotton pickers in Arkansas – which was then home to 101 of the union's 118 locals - prepared for another strike. Members in Crittenden County requested

permission from the executive council to strike for $1.25 per hundred pounds during mid-August, and the union held a special convention in Memphis to discuss applying for a charter six weeks later. Delegates adopted several resolutions that explained why they favored affiliation. Mitchell complained that "the average southern white man" would conclude that Claude William's proposed resolution against "race discrimination and race segregation" signified support for social equality. Convention delegates' other resolutions supported establishing a "general office" in Wynne for a state organization in Arkansas (which members requested during the spring of 1935) and that "a certain proportion" of funds be allocated to the new state organization. Delegates refused to pass the executive-council members' proposed resolution to apply for a charter directly to the CIO instead of from UCAPAWA unless "Lewis or his aides put their guarantee of affiliation in writing."[103]

Delegates' resolution to affiliate with UCAPAWA offered hints of what the term "industrial unionism" meant for them, and what it did not state was that nine of the executive council's thirteen members were white. The Fellowship of Southern Churchmen's Committee on Church and Labor lauded the CIO earlier that year for its "great constructive service to our society" and for "standing for the principle of industrial unionism" while "giving active support to the great masses of unskilled and semiskilled workers in their efforts to build great industrial unions." The committee went on to discourage the CIO from being "deterred from such support by propaganda of the 'red-baiting' variety" and advised that it not hesitate in "carrying out the principle of inclusion of all workers in an industry regardless of race." The authors of the convention resolution for affiliation described their union similarly as one based on "an industrial form of organization" and the principle of industrial unionism, and they announced that the STFU should "dedicate itself to the emancipation of the cotton field workers." Claude Williams also proposed an inadequate resolution to the problem of the white overrepresentation within the union by nominating Leon Jackson for a position on the executive council and arguing in favor of selecting members "equally between the races."[104]

Fowler and Mitchell recommended affiliation at the convention only "on the basis of an autonomous union" and with a guarantee that the STFU would receive jurisdiction over southwestern states. Convention delegates also rejected the proposal from an army general and former Texas NRA administrator, Lawrence Westbrook, to form a joint committee to eliminate restrictions on the cotton industry and "regain the world market with a government subsidy on the amount used in America," which would "substantially compensate," according to Westbrook, for the resulting decline in wages. Kester complained to WPA director Harry Hopkins that *The New Republic* published two articles which criticized Westbrook and had "attacked" his loyalty and integrity. Mitchell was one of the three members of the executive council who voted against applying for a charter from UCAPAWA, and another, J.R. Butler, denied Mitchell's request to appeal directly to John Lewis for a CIO charter during an executive council meeting shortly after the convention. Kester warned to Norman Thomas that Mitchell had "real" opponents among both members and officers and "judgment will eventually overwhelm him[,] and probably do a great deal of harm both to him and to the STFU," and he suggested Mitchell submit his resignation six months later.[105]

The executive council responded to the union's affiliation with UCAPAWA by refusing to deliver monthly per capita payments to UCAPAWA's executive board. Members evinced the rationale they invented to passing a resolution immediately after the STFU received its charter from UCAPAWA which claimed that it was "impossible to expect" seasonal workers to pay monthly dues that increased from twenty-five to fifty cents. They proceeded to demand that the

CIO return all per capita payments to the STFU during the summer of 1938. The STFU suspended the publication of its newspaper and was ten months in arrears by October. The SPUSA-affiliated Workers' Defense League launched a separate "campaign," meanwhile, to "end peonage" in southern states.[106]

These divisions between Socialists and Communists grew as cotton prices and wages declined, unemployment increased, and the international crisis intensified. The director of the Delta Farm in Mississippi, Sam Franklin, Jr., found that the price of cotton fell to seven cents, which was five cents less than the previous year. Kester concluded that wages were as low as thirty cents in central Georgia. Lucy Randolph Mason reported that weekly wages for cotton mill workers in southern states ranged from between two and three dollars and that wage cuts and unemployment within the industry were especially severe in South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. CIO representative John Brophy advised regional directors and field representatives to respond by concentrating more resources on locals' unemployment committees.[107]

The economic recession coincided with a dearth of donations from philanthropists' donations to sharecroppers' unions that they based increasingly on political expedience, and the American Fund's decision to cease providing monies to Commonwealth College during early 1938 on the grounds that the college was "too radical for the Southern movement it professes to serve" was an early example of this. Norman Thomas inquired what should be "done about Claude Williams" and what Kester "think ought to be done" during late October, and the SPUSA leader advised five months later that members of the executive council "take the aggressing" by issuing "a strong and convincing statement" for disaffiliation from UCAPAWA that they would need "to back up." Thomas emphasized the purpose of his proposal was "to protect your life, to save yourselves against the doctrinaire and Communist practices of Henderson and others in control," and Mitchell responded by suggesting that their faction "expose him [Williams], by action in the union, outside of party membership." Kester withdrew his "consent" for Williams' nomination as Commonwealth College's non-resident member five days later, and Mitchell circulated copies of a letter to Rodgers, McKinney, and Kester which affirmed their intention "to create in the minds of the rank and file a suspicion of Williams." The executive council filed charges against Williams soon after.[108]

Thomas's allies on the executive council sought to disaffiliate from UCAPAWA and expel Williams, and they began by targeting black council members during the summer of 1938. Butler accused McKinney of making arrangements that enabled him "to handle all business of the Union that any way affects Negro membership" during July and claimed that this "virtually means a separation of the Union." Butler claimed to find evidence of Communists' plans to form a separate "dual union" in a document that he supposedly found in Williams' coat pocket, and Butler withdrew his subsequent request for Williams's resignation before both submitting charges against McKinney and calling for a special executive council meeting to discuss the union's "relationship, as a non-political trade union organization, to Commonwealth College." Executive-council members accepted J.E. Clayton's resignation, and they conducted their own show trials for W.L. Blackstone and McKinney before they filed charges against Williams. Council members reinstated McKinney later that year, and Mitchell later claimed that Butler provided a trial report to a representative of east Texas congressman Martin Dies, Jr.[109]

The Socialist-allied faction of the STFU's executive council was attempting to consolidate power by removing rivals, and members in Missouri responded by organizing the sit-down strike during January of the following year. The famous highway protest in the southeastern part of the state was not the first highway "encampment" that decade, because

evicted sharecroppers executed similar actions during 1936 when farmworkers near Parkin won the establishment of the Delta Cooperative Farm in Mississippi through a roadside demonstration after C.H. Dibble evicted a large number of members. Mitchell reported that fifty families established four camps on Highway 50 later that year, and hundreds of members also "scattered over the countryside" when cotton choppers organized their strike. The Missouri highway sit-down strike occurred when severe flooding in Arkansas and Missouri led to another wave of evictions during the winter of 1938. The strikers in southeast Missouri worked with Williams and "Al Murphy" in St. Louis to lead one of the most harrowing protests of the decade.[110]

100 black and white evictees – some of whom had originally been displaced by another flood during the spring of 1937 – cast out onto parts of Highways 60 and 61 between the cities of St. Louis and Memphis shortly after sunrise on the morning of January 10. They carried their bedding, cooking equipment, sewing machines, furniture, livestock, and automobiles, and their numbers soon grew to over 1,000 people over the course of the day. Most of them ate pork, bread, and coffee, and some owned chickens and horses. Those who did not have lumber used blankets, quilts, and wire fences to keep their tents warm. The strikers received an immediate outpouring of support. Their protest ended several days later when the state government's health commissioner, Dr. Harry Parker, ordered the highway patrol to force them to move them to the side of the road.[111]

The strikers' spokesperson was a lifelong sharecropper from Mississippi, O.H. Whitfield, who became a celebrity briefly as a result of their protest. Both the Domestic Workers Union and the Friends of the Sharecroppers offered funds for Whitfield to visit Chicago, and the Senate's Unemployment Committee scheduled Whitfield to testify on March 1. The strikers needed to hold Whitfield accountable after he disseminated an open letter on behalf of the executive council. Whitfield to admitted another council member, F.R. Betton that he allowed Mitchell – who was planning another fundraising trip on the east coast – to read and alter the contents of his letter, and warned that "these people are going to demand an international state CIO setup" irrespective of his actions and some of his friends might "drop me flat" if detractors characterized him as a Communist. Whitfield advised the council that leaders of UCAPAWA intended to hold a convention in St. Louis on March 12 that was its first of three that it held over the next several weeks to establish state organizations in Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas.[112]

Members of the Missouri locals and the executive council cooperated during the highway protest, but their split became increasingly apparent as it ended. Delegates from Mitchell's faction held its own convention in Memphis where they voted to disaffiliate from UCAPAWA, refrained from applying for an AFL charter, and agreed to launch an organizing campaign in "Cotton, Rice, and Tobacco." *The Memphis Press-Scimitar* reported that Mitchell led a walkout of "all of the white delegates" as well as also "a majority of the Negroes" at the convention. The STFU's depleted strike fund prevented it from striking when the cotton-picking season began later that year, and Mitchell estimated during December that approximately half of STFU members and most of its new members from Missouri were white. Whitfield's faction formed the Missouri Agricultural Workers' Council, and they purchased a "large tract of land" in the state towards the end of the year.[113]

It was not just the STFU that was unprepared for the worsening international crisis, and one of the effects was a spike in lynching. Kester investigated a lynching of two young men in Canton, Mississippi, concluded that four extralegal executions had actually occurred in the area. Gordon McIntire of the Louisiana Farmers' Union visited Ruston, Lincoln Parish, after vigilantes tortured and lynched a nineteen-year old black man, W.C. Williams, and he found evidence that

one of the perpetrators was a dairy farmer, B. Cook, who had previously participated in two other lynch mobs. Kester authored several anti-lynching reports and argued that vigilantes were changing their strategies by acting through smaller groups that did "the mob's work smoothly and efficiently." He also contended that the KKK was responsible for the recent "anti-labor and anti-Negro sentiment activity so apparent" in the region.[114]

"a pall of fear"

The CIO's organizing campaign continued after the U.S. entered World War II as industrial unionists gained momentum from both auto workers' activities in Memphis during the spring of 1940 and tobacco workers activities in Winston-Salem during June of 1943, but industrial unionists' and radical military officers' refusal to revolt gave the bourgeoisie and their allies within the anti-labor and imperialist wings of the international ruling class the opportunity to regroup and enact "right-to-work" laws in Florida, Arizona, Arkansas, and Tennessee. Industrial unionists struggled subsequently to protect black leaders in Tennessee, Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia and seize control of the most valuable branches of various cotton-, tobacco-, and sugar industries in southern cities and towns before and during the postwar strike wave. Their refusal to take up arms also left industrial unions in New Orleans and Winston-Salem vulnerable to Anti-Communist laborites' raiding activities after Republicans won control of the House of Representatives during the midterm elections of 1946. Anti-Communists labor leaders' raids diminished the FTA's strength in California, which was where Mitchell assigned Hank Hasiwar and Ernesto Galarza to recruit members on behalf of the STFU's successor, the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU), as the IBT raided the FTA's last locals in the state.

One of the industrial unionists' greatest challenges in southern states during the 1930s was Memphis. Claude Williams held trainings in Memphis for UCAPAWA's Southern States Cotton Council during the spring of 1940, and his People's Institute for Applied Religion launched a campaign with the CIO against "Boss Ed Crump['s] political machine." A TWOC organizer from the city, William DeBerry, argued in an article that the CIO reached a "turning point" when white Ford workers visited UCAPAWA's union hall after their counterparts in Detroit went on strike. Either white or black workers often predominated in both employment and union representation in the South's industries, and the CIO's affiliates in Memphis desegregated their meetings during the early 1940s. CIO membership in the city grew by fifty percent from approximately 20,000 (including members of International Woodworkers of America's locals at ten lumberyards and a rubber workers' union at a Firestone plant) to 30,000 during 1943-4, and over 5,000 workers were members of the city's Gas, Coke, & Chemical Workers' Union by 1946.[115]

Regional wage differentials in agriculture remained drastic, and sharecroppers' unions continued attempting to address low wages after the U.S. entered the war. An STFU survey of convention delegates during October of 1942 found that cotton pickers received between seventy-five cents and $1.25 per hundred pounds in Arkansas, between one dollar and $1.50 in Missouri, seventy-five cents in Mississippi, and eighty cents in Alabama. Odis Sweeden reported that piece-wages were between $2.50 and three dollars in New Mexico and between three and four dollars in Arizona (where employers were requesting 10,000 laborers and the average cost of living was lower than Oklahoma, Arkansas, or New Mexico). Regional wage differentials encouraged farmworkers in southern states to seek employment in other areas of North America, and they explain why cotton pickers who did not migrate organized a wild-cat strike during the early 1940s. Mitchell noted in a 1973 interview that while the STFU's executive council

permitted members to strike throughout the war, Donald Henderson ordered striking cotton pickers in southeast Missouri to return to work.[116]

Many agricultural laborers' best option in southern states during the war was to seek employment in cities, and the STFU executive council was in good position to aid recruitment and transportation. Mitchell reported to the NEC during January of 1940 regarding his plan to lead an organizing committee that would form a "migratory workers local" with assistance from representatives in Texas, Arizona, and California. Mitchell proposed to officials from the War Manpower Commission (WMC) and the U.S. Employment Service (USES) two years later that the union send 1,000 members to work in Arizona and Florida, and he contacted a grower in Florida to inquire furtively whether he was "interested in working out a deal direct [sic] with us." The union's initial arrangement was for the FSA to pay transportation costs while the STFU coordinated placement with USES, and the contingencies of war – and specifically the FSA's cancellation of its orders during early 1943 - led the executive council to instead cooperate with the AFL-affiliated Amalgamated Meat Cutters' Union to send most of the members who had signed up to work at plants in Bridgeton, New Jersey.[117]

The FDR administration adopted a new strategy after the U.S. entered the war of requiring employers to negotiate "in good faith" by enforcing the maintenance-of-membership clauses in labor unions' contracts with employers, and this both enabled the growth of grievance arbitration and allowed industrial workers in southern towns and cities to form viable collective-bargaining agents without striking. Lucy Randolph Mason asserted to the CIO's director of organization, Allan Haywood, in 1943 that the CIO was becoming more popular among both among "Negro workers" and "professional and business groups." The CIO's southern public-relations representative also informed a social worker that the CIO was strongest in the towns of Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. The CIO's activities extended to virtually area of the region during the war, and its members won significant victories in lumber, furniture, oil, transportation, and many other industries. Many southern laborers also migrated and sought employment in the war industries in southern California, and this was one of the links industrial unionists' campaigns further west.[118]

A combination of experienced leadership, new members, and the contingencies of war enabled CIO affiliates to establish the first bargaining units in many areas, and this created momentum for industrial unionists' organizing campaign in southwestern states. Cotton-compress and cotton-seed oil industries in the Gulf extended as far as the Salt River and San Joaquin valleys in Arizona and California, and UCAPAWA affiliates won major concessions at those factories. Various branches of the cotton industry connected UCAPAWA locals in southern and southwestern states, and industrial unionists were able to take advantage of employers' concessions. UCAPAWA began by recruiting peanut and tobacco industries in the Chesapeake and the Carolinas just before the U.S. entered World War II. Many workers from the Chesapeake to east Texas who joined UCAPAWA soon won concessions that included wage increases, overtime pay, vacation, and paid holidays, and some locals signed collective-bargaining agreements that included Emancipation Day as a paid holiday.

The CIO assigned organizers to recruit members at peanut factories in the Tidewater area during early 1937, and they won an NLRB election among employees of the Planter's Nut and Chocolate Company in Suffolk during November by a margin of three to one. UCAPAWA issued a charter for a new collective-bargaining agent, Local 232, that signed agreements with five peanut companies two years later which covered 2,400 employees in both that city and the town of Franklin. The chief steward of Local 26, Robbie Mae Riddick, chaired the local's first

political action committee. UCAPAWA won crucial victories after the CIO's executive board granted it jurisdiction over tobacco-related industries during early February of 1941. UCAPAWA's initial strategy was to recruit cigar workers in western and northern cities, in New Orleans, and workers in the stemmeries of Richmond, Virginia, before "tackling the giant cigarette factories" in North Carolina.[119]

There were many stemmeries and cigarette factories throughout Virginia and the Carolinas, and the center of cigarette production was Winston-Salem (which was also the location of two textile mills that Agnew W. Bahnson owned along with a third in Virginia). *The UCAPAWA News* reported during early 1943 that the R.J. Reynolds Company's refusal to raise wages above the "hiring rates" was a "major cause of discontent" for employees. Over 6,000 of the company's 10,000 production workers had already joined the union when O.H. Whitfield spoke at a rally on May 30. Whitfield, Williams, and Harry Koger led an organizers' training in Memphis for employees in the cotton and cotton-seed processing industries during late 1940, and Williams' People's Institute held its first meeting in St. Louis one year later. The institute held its second training in Winston-Salem during late spring of 1943, and one of the union's field representatives, "Mr. Whitefield," also visited employees of the R.J. Reynolds Company's main competitor, the American Tobacco Company, in Charleston, South Carolina, shortly before UCAPAWA's Tobacco Workers Organizing Committee (TWOC) won an NLRB election in the city later that summer.[120]

The CIO's "breakthrough" in Winston-Salem began one week before Emancipation Day when laborers, "spreaders," and machine operators in the company's stemmery machine department organized a sit-down strike over "equalization" of pay and workload grievances that spread to stemmery workers and grew quickly into a city-wide general strike, and the union recruited 2,000 new members on June 20. TWOC both aired daily radio broadcasts and recruited actress Karen Morley to speak at rallies as part of its campaign before an NLRB election, and it won a significant victory beforehand by signing contracts with three leaf-house companies. UCAPAWA won the election by a two-to-one margin and negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement that included one year of parental leave, and the FTA later won compulsory check-off (which required employers to deduct union dues from paychecks automatically) during early 1945 after the regional war labor board issued a directive order against the company. Locals in the Carolinas and Virginia levied new monthly dues of ten cents during early 1944 to fund its newly-established Tri-State Council, and employees of the Larus and Brothers Company in Richmond who had joined several peanut workers' unions amalgamated their units (although they lost an election to the AFL-affiliated Tobacco Workers International Union the following year). All of the TWUA's locals in Virginia allowed black and white members to attend regular meetings by 1945, and tobacco workers' unions in Charleston and Winston-Salem and a furniture workers' union in Sumter were among the only CIO affiliates in the Tri-State area that permitted black members to run in their unions' elections.[121]

The CIO's wartime victories encompassed several branches of the cotton industry in mid-southern states, and sharecroppers and tenant farmers continued attempting to form viable collective-bargaining agents during the early 1940s. The holiday-pay provision in UCAPAWA's second agreement with the Shearman Company of Little Rock, Arkansas, that it signed during early 1942 was possibly the union's first which made Emancipation Day an official holiday. The holiday provision for the agreement that Local 75 of Houston, Texas, signed with cotton compress companies included both Emancipation Day and Mexico's Independence Day, September 16, as official holidays. Local 85 in Truman, Arkansas, signed a contract with the

"Poinsett Manufacturing Company," and it recruited tenants, sharecroppers, and day laborers at Judd Hill's estate. Another UCAPAWA affiliate in the area was an agricultural local in Turrell (Crittenden County), and it had agreements with cotton compress, cotton seed oil, fertilizer, and box companies by the end of the war.[122]

Industrial unionists' southern organizing campaign was arguably most successful in Alabama after the U.S. entered the war, and there were more than 32,000 CIO members in Birmingham by 1944. Steel-, textile, and mine workers in the city joined CIO affiliates in large numbers, and the largest group was employees of the Tennessee Coal & Iron Company who voted to join USA by a margin of 9,549 to 1,178. USA also won an NLRB election for employees at Republic Steel Company's plant in Gadsden, Etowah County, and the TWUA won an election at the Dwight Manufacturing Company's plant by a margin of 1,837 to 205. The CIO's regional director in the city, Carey Haigler, reported to Mason towards the end of the war that there had been "some progress in upgrading negro [sic] workers according to skill and seniority." This included supervision of an "all Negro crew."[123]

While the CIO was winning major victories in a variety of industries throughout the mid-South, UCAPAWA's victories among cotton-compress and packinghouse workers in Arizona and Florida were significant for enabling industrial unionists to create social bases in both states. Migrants from Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas joined the union's first locals in Arizona during the late 1930s, and packingshed workers at thirty-one factories in Phoenix struck shortly before the U.S. entered the war. Local 78 signed contracts that covered workers at thirty-two sheds as a result of the strike, and it signed the first "Union Shop contracts" in the Imperial Valley during the winter of 1942-43. Cotton-compress and cotton-seed oil production was concentrated in Phoenix, Memphis, and Houston, and the union issued a credible threat to the Anderson-Clayton Company when members in New Orleans voted to strike by a margin 125 to one during the fall of 1941 (the Phoenix local signed a collective-bargaining agreement with the company two years later). Citrus and laundry workers in Orlando, Orange County, joined Local 4 and protested the "importation of Bahamian labor," whereas laundry workers in Miami - where the CIO leaders alleged that city officials were threatening union members working at shipyards and laundromats – opted to affiliate with the UMW. Local 4 also recruited 400 unemployed members to work for the Campbell's Soup Company in Camden, New Jersey, and Local 9 received jurisdiction over shed workers in South Dade County as well as other areas of the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, Mississippi, Virginia, and New Hampshire.[124]

UCAPAWA-affiliated locals also won major breakthroughs in Gulf cities after the U.S. entered the war. A member of the STFU's executive council, J.E. Clayton, organized six STFU locals in the Houston area during 1938, and he charged in a letter to Howard Kester that "Henderson and Co." attempted to recruit him for "the establishment of a Texas District of UCAPAWA" in the eastern part of the state. The STFU's executive council voted to disaffiliate from UCAPAWA on the grounds that their union was, according to Mitchell, "an industrial union" and an "economic organization" of tenants, sharecroppers, and day laborers that did not "advance the interests of any political party." The ILWU achieved another major breakthrough for industrial unionists in New Orleans during the summer of 1939 when it won NLRB elections at four of five cotton-compress plants. UCAPAWA members in Houston were soon demanding "the California wage scale with a 60c minimum," and their successes included both winning Emancipation Day as a paid holiday and ending seasonal workers' fourteen-week exemption from the Fair Labor Standard Act's overtime-pay regulations.[125]

Workers at factories in the small cities and towns of southern Mississippi and southern Louisiana manufactured oil, lumber, chemical, rubber, rice milling, food packing, fishing, fur, service, clothing, textile, construction, and automobile products, and the IWA's activities among lumber workers was creating social bases for industrial unionism to grow in the lower Mississippi Valley by 1943. The IWA won an NLRB election in Vicksburg, Warren County, among employees of the Memphis-based Anderson Tully Lumber Company by a margin of 572 to forty-two during the spring. Although the city's police captain told the IWA's vice-president, William Botkin, that he "was not wanted" and "should catch the next train back to the West Coast and stay there," the union signed contracts with at least eight companies over the next year as flour, feed, and cotton-mill workers in that city as well as in Port Gibson, Claiborne County, and Greenville, Washington County, joined UCAPAWA locals. Yet some employers were intransigent. IWA members struck against Anderson Tully for several weeks during early 1945 to enforce a directive order from the WLB, and the C.M. Gooch Company closed its lumber mills in Fayette, Jefferson County, after the war while continuing operations in Natchez (Adams County), Jackson, and Memphis.[126]

Waterfront and sugar workers had a long history of union activity in Louisiana, and the SCU began contributing its "chapter" when it moved its office to New Orleans after the murders of three members in Lowndes County during the 1935 cotton pickers' strike. The union received support from a student at the Louisiana State University (LSU) and daughter of a prominent local family, Jane Wilkinson, before members organized a successful "sit-in strike" at an estate outside Opelousas, St. Landry Parish. A person from that parish soon requested an organizer, and Clinton Clark and Clyde Johnson responded by aiding residents in forming several locals and demonstrating for voting rights. The SCU concentrated its activity in New Orleans as the ILWU converged through its organizing campaign in Gulf cities.[127]

Johnson later recalled that he began "paying more attention" to the Alabama Farmers Union (AFU) when it supported a member of the KKK, Tom Heflin, over Hugh Black as the Democratic Party's senatorial nominee. The AFU formed in 1933 amidst a burst of union and farmers' activity as the leaders of the national organization was revoking the charter of their counterparts in Arkansas. The AFU soon claimed over 10,000 members (some of whom were also SPUSA members), and two of the state socialist party's officers found similarly that the state labor federation's president was "decidedly friendly." The STFU's refusal to approve a merger left the SCU with its leaders with few alternatives but to "turn over" its locals to farmers' unions in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia. The SCU's delegates to the AFU's 1936 annual convention proposed seeking closer cooperation with the TWUA to ensure that union labor transported cotton to the mills.[128]

The SCU's locals in Louisiana and Alabama merged with the each state's farmers' union with support from both state labor federations during October of 1937, and it also signed a legislative pact with the LNPL. UCAPAWA began contacting sugar workers in Louisiana, and both the AFU's president, Sartain, and its secretary, M.W. Gravely, lost their re-election bids at a convention two years later where delegates agreed to form a southern organizing committee. UCAPAWA held its first meeting in the state at a warehouse in LaPlace, St. John the Baptist Parish, on October 8, 1937, and approximately 150 black and white cane cutters attended. Organizers decided during the meeting that several truck farmers who formed the Truck Farmers' Association in 1921 and paid high piece-wages of five cents per dozen for cleaning shallots were potential allies. Members donated sweet potatoes to waterfront workers in New

Dorothea Lange, "Ex-Slave with a Long Memory" (1938).

Orleans during their strike, and landowners responded by breaking into Willie Scott's home in West Feliciana Parish and pistol-whipping his wife.[129]

The ILWU launched its campaign in the Gulf during the fall of 1937 by recruiting approximately 4,000 warehouse workers and longshoremen at the ports of Mobile and New Orleans, and this was a fraction of the 10,000 longshore workers who resided in the latter city. A wealthy lumber merchant, Colonel L. Kemper Williams, headed the city chamber of commerce's "Subversive Activities of the National Defense Committee," and local authorities arrested over 1,000 union members from June 22 through July 15 during a campaign in which vigilantes both killed an organizer, Philip Carey, and broke the back of the ILWU's vice-president, J.R. Robertson. Industrial unionists had a major setback when the ILWU lost NLRB elections among longshoremen in New Orleans and Mobile (and by a margin of almost four to one in New Orleans), although it did win elections for warehouse workers and negotiated United Transport Workers Local 806's new collective-bargaining agreement one year later. Its most impactful victory by far was Local 207's signing of a single agreement for the city's cotton-compress industry after it won NLRB elections during 1939 (including among over 300 employees of the Anderson-Clayton-owned New Orleans Company), because industry-wide bargaining had the potential to reduce regional wage differentials.[130]

Residents of Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and other southern states migrated to Los Angeles to work in war industries after Local 207's success in New Orleans. These migrations were partially an effect of the high cost of living in New Orleans during the war, and officials from the U.S. government's Bureau of Labor Statistics found that it was among the highest of any U.S. city during the winter of 1942-43. One WMC survey of over 100 residents from southern states in the Little Tokyo neighborhood of Los Angeles that it administered during late June and early July of 1943 found that eighty percent of respondents arrived the previous year and thirty-four percent were from Louisiana. Others respondents reported they fled white southerners infuriated by what "the colored papers up here" published, and a military veteran

from Shreveport, Louisiana, who received healthcare at an unsegregated army hospital in Mississippi stated that many white workers perceived that black workers procured "all the jobs" in southern states' war industries. ILWU Local 207's business agent, William C. Spooner, claimed at a meeting in San Francisco, in contrast, that many "skilled Negro workers" migrated due to employers' preference for hiring "unskilled white workers" in New Orleans, and the ILWU's newspaper, *The Dispatcher*, reported that "promoters of race hatred" propagated a "rumor campaign" in Louisiana of "a planned uprising of Negro workers that motivated sailors at Algiers naval station to beat a young father, Edward Williams, as he was leaving a church.[131]

The ILWU's first attempt to segregation in New Orleans failed, and a member-led trial committee concluded that its first organizer in the Gulf, Caleb Green, had attempted to establish a segregated local. The committee found Green's first contact and former Baptist minister, Willie Dorsey, guilty of financial mismanagement and misconduct for refusing to send per capita payments to the International's executive board, and the union was more successful as younger leaders emerged after the U.S. entered the war. Spooner was a steward and employee of the Matthews Feed Mill who joined the army after acting as chair of the New Orleans Council for a radical youth organization, the Southern Negro Youth Congress, and the local's future president, Andrew Nelson, first served as the union's fraternal delegate for the National Maritime Union's 1939 convention in New Orleans. Industrial unionists commenced political activity four years later as the CIO's total membership within the city was doubling from 15,000 to 30,000, and the industrial union council carried a motion during the winter of 1943-4 which demanded "the adoption of a real soldiers and sailors bill." Local 207's political action committee began registering voters through community-based councils, and the chapter of the League of Women's Voters led a "house-to-house" campaign to make international cooperation "the dominant issue" before the 1944 election.[132]

These and other activities made New Orleans essential for industrial unionists who sought to consolidate and expand their gains. "Practically every shop" that Local 207 represented struck after August of 1945, and CIO-affiliated maritime unions formed the New Orleans Joint Strike Committee the following April to prepare for both a national strike and contract negotiations with the state-owned Federal Barge Lines. Labor unions also received support from a favorable NLRB decision that ordered the Illinois-based Armour Fertilizer Company to "take certain affirmative action" to enforce employees' collective-bargaining rights. Both the chief engineer and three operating engineers on the waterfront joined the CIO, and members of the AFL-affiliated Operating Engineers Local 226 picketed and participated in joint negotiations with the Swift company towards the end of the summer of 1946. 200 white workers and members of construction and railroad workers' unions joined another two-month strike and "observed" Local 207's picket lines against the Massachusetts-based Flintkote Company (which owned a large chemical plant and signed a contract with the union during December of 1944), and union's veterans' committee negotiated a one-year agreement subsequently that included hourly wage increases of fifteen cents, overtime pay, shift differentials, and compulsory check-off before it began to pursue industry-wide negotiations by cooperating with packinghouse workers' unions in Chicago.[133]

The CIO's affiliates in New Orleans were preparing for a long campaign. There were representatives in the city's industrial union council from labor unions in textile, maritime, shipbuilding, automobile, communications, chemical, newspaper, furniture, sugar, brewery, and transport industries during 1946, and Local 207's office shared its address on Gravier Street at the end of the decade with a Communist-affiliated civil-rights organization, the Civil Rights


ILWU Local 207 Executive Board from left to right: William Spooner, Willie Chatman, Adolph White, James Thompson, Fred McGruder, Obey Young, Edmond Weber, Scott Spears, Levi Simms, Clarence Lewis, Rivers Cropper, Andy Nelson, Rock West, and Howard Goddard. *The Dispatcher*, July 31. 1943.

William Spooner and Walter Green, *The Dispatcher*, June 4, 1943.

Congress. The union's representatives held meetings with members of FTA-affiliated cotton-compress locals, adopted a new constitution, and formed a working committee to lead a joint cotton council, while a local chapter of the NAACP organized a boycott of four department stores that barred black customers from trying on clothing products. Yet industrial labor unions' strength waned after the elections of 1946 when the Truman administration adopted a new strategy to encircle the Soviet Union and Congress overrode President Truman's veto by passing the Taft-Hartley Act. Local 207 lost compulsory check-off and an NLRB election at the Flintkote factory, and it ceased winning elections entirely in 1951 after vying for several years with the gas, coke, and chemical workers' union's "secession movement" against Communist-affiliated unions in southern states.[134]

Industrial unionists already had to contend with an unjust legal system, intransigent employers, and a wave of vigilantism, and the problem was severe in Georgia before Anti-Communist labor leaders commenced raiding activities. The KKK located its national headquarters in Atlanta, and a 1938 citizens' committee report presented evidence of long-term decline in church attendances (especially among young Atlanta residents) since World War I. The state based elections on a "county unit system" that allocated representation to "small, 'tobacco road' counties" disproportionately, and jurists attempted to enforce the rule of law with at best mixed success. Sixteen-year old Thomas Maddox defended two young women and himself with a pen knife as a white man attacked them with a jack handle while they were sitting in an automobile, and a superior-court judge in Philadelphia, Clare G. Fenerty, refused to extradite him towards the end of 1942. The state's governor, Eugene Talmadge, lost the primary that year before winning re-election two years later, and an appellate court upheld three-year prison sentences for the sheriff of Baker County, M. Claude Screw, and two deputies who "beat to death Robert Hall, a Negro," whom they had charged with "stealing an auto tire."[135]

Employers sought to prevent labor unions from growing by ignoring their demands for industry-wide bargaining and labor boards' directives, and their strategy threatened to slow unions' gains regarding desegregation and equal pay. Lucy Randolph Mason found towards the end of the war that textile companies in southern states were both refusing to comply with directive orders and "stag[ed] their own sit-down strikes," and she reported that the city manager of Thomasville, North Carolina, invoked a nuisance ordinance to prevent CIO leaders from including black southerners during their meetings. The Cotton Trade & Warehouses Company in New Orleans refused to participate in joint negotiations, and three of the four cotton compress and warehouse companies with which Local 207 had contracts – with the Barclay Cotton Compress and Warehouse Company leading - attempted unsuccessfully to refuse compliance with the regional war labor board's directive order to raise wages. The Armour Fertilize Company also attempted to disobey regional and national war labor boards' directives by refusing to either participate in arbitration or offer equal pay to female employees at its plant in Shrewsbury, and the Swift, Armour, & Company was behaving similarly.[136]

Small numbers of black southerners voted in primaries in Florida and Arkansas during 1944, and elected officials responded by passing right-to-work laws and obstructing New Mexico senator Dennis Chavez's bill to make the FDR administration's wartime Fair Employment Practice Commission (FEPC) permanent. The main supporters of the right-to-work amendments that voters in Florida and Arkansas passed in 1944 was an "anti-New Deal" organization called the "Christian American Association," and North Carolina's legislature passed a similar bill suit three years later. Longstanding patterns of disfranchisement, voter intimidation, low voter participation, and vigilantism raised doubts regarding whether these

right-to-work laws represented the popular will in southern states. An editorialist in Birmingham, John Temple Graves, offered hints regarding what southerners wanted by writing that Mississippi senator Theodore Bilbo "assur[ed]" his reelection by taking "the right side" against Chavez's FEPC bill." He also questioned Bilbo intentions bluntly by suggesting that voters might elect another candidate "a million miles from Bilbo in manner, point of view, self-control, sincerity, and light."[137]

Industrial unionists sought to desegregate labor organizations as the tide of the war turned towards the Allied powers' favor, and this led the Southern Summer School for Workers and the Highlander Folk School to begin admitting black students. The former received an unusually-high number of requests from CIO- and AFL-affiliated tobacco workers' unions in Virginia for "interracial projects," and the Highlander Folk School's executive board met during early 1944 before the CIO's director of organization, Allan Haywood, approved the proposal of a labor organizer and board member, Paul Christopher, to conduct a one-month training for organizers. Christopher was originally from eastern Tennessee and had previously been a member of the Southern School's executive board before joining the Highlander School, and the Highlander School admitted black applicants during March of 1941 when it held a conference for students from the Carolinas and Virginia. Christopher led the CIO's process of planning to organize labor in southern states. Regional directors, international representatives, and industrial union councils convened a meeting in Atlanta, and Haywood requested that he work with the state director in Georgia, Charles Gillman, to compile a report regarding the statuses of locals and industrial union councils and demonstrated "the urgent need of more concentration and attention" both "organizationally and politically."[138]

The postwar strike wave was unprecedented due to the amount of workers who participated, and yet it was still "the beginning of the end" for industrial unionists' organizing campaign. The largest strikes were in the tobacco industry, and workers in Charleston and FTA Local 15 were the first to act. More research is needed on tobacco workers' activities in South Carolina. Furniture workers also struck in manufacturing-heavy city of Thomasville, which was in the heart of North Carolina's "industrial region." Steelworkers both with and without union representation requested "help in organizing" their strike the following spring, and 400 IWA members in Port Gibson, Mississippi, joined them during April by striking against two veneer companies after contract negotiations.[139]

The president of Local 15, Reuel Stanfield, was both originally from the Mid-west and one of "the leaders" in San Pedro during the west-coast maritime workers' strike in 1934, and he served a five-year sentence at San Quentin State Penitentiary in California (where he befriended the famous labor leader Tom Mooney) for allegedly carrying dynamite in his automobile when oil workers' strike struck unsuccessfully in Modesto the following spring. There were no textile factories in the vicinity of Charleston, and Local 15 cooperated with a NMU local to support FDR's 1944 reelection campaign through its political action committee. FTA organizers Karl Korstad and a student at New York University, Sidney Fishman, "work[ed] with the AFL's Trade Union Council" in the city after the war, and they organized a series of lectures at the African Methodist Episcopal church with speakers that included Charles S. Johnson, Reverend Kelley Barnett of Chapel Hill, and the former director of the National Youth Administration and editor of *The Southern Farmer*, Aubrey Williams. Postwar strikes commenced during October when employees of the American Tobacco Company in Philadelphia, Trenton, and Charleston launched a five-month strike and boycott for minimum hourly wages of sixty-five cents. The strikers in Charleston received hourly wage increases of just eight cents as opposed to the

twelve-cent increases that their counterparts in Trenton and Philadelphia won, and the local established new bargaining units over the next year for production and maintenance workers that the City Compress and Warehouse Company and Wholesale Grocery were both employing.[140]

"Underpaid workers" were living, according to Henderson, in "substandard wage areas and communities, and the CIO's executive board altered its strategy abruptly after vigilantes targeted black veterans during the strike wave. Terrorists gang raped Recy Taylor on September 3, 1944, in Henry County, Alabama, and lynched three young men (including two Afro-American veterans) in Florida and South Carolina during September and October of the following year, and others stabbed an FTA member and father to death near a picket line on December 26 in Little Rock. Prejudicial jury-selection practices that excluded black Americans enable vigilantes to violate strikers' civil and constitutional rights with impunity, and two all-white juries' decisions to acquit approximately twenty-five defendants in both Columbus, Maury County, Tennessee, and Greenville, Greenville County, South Carolina, charged with attacking strikers and lynching a twenty-four year old, Willie Earle, evidenced this. The Deputy Sheriff of Gretna, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, Augustin Marrero, paralyzed ILWU Local 207 member Nathan Taylor's arm when he shot him inside his home before arresting Taylor on charges of disturbing the peace, and *The Federated Press* reported the following summer that police officers in Aiken, Aiken County, South Carolina, gouged out the eyes of a World War II veteran who had fought in New Guinea and the Philippines, Isaac Woodward, Jr., as he returned home with an honorable discharge. "A lynch gang" murdered two more veterans and their wives during a notorious attack in Monroe, Georgia, shortly after Talmadge conferred with their landlord, Roger Malcolm, on July 29, 1946.[141]

Industrial unionists needed liberal and conservative allies to resist vigilantes, employers, and de jure discrimination simultaneously, and they began their work in Georgia. The newly-formed Georgia Veterans' Committee for Majority Rule (whose founding members included several college students) raised funds to file lawsuits against county and state voting laws in national courts shortly after a progressive organization, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW), launched a voter-registration campaign. Textile companies were making "outstanding advances" in Atlanta by introducing new machinery at mills and factories that had the potential, according to TWUA research director Soloman Barkin, to increase both competition and industrial unionists' divisions, and there remained what Mason described as a "pall of fear" within the state that progressives exacerbated by refusing to continue soliciting donations after Talmadge's re-election. Yet the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision to strike down an all-white jury's rape conviction for twenty-year old Willie McGee one year later also suggested that the "foundations" of the Jim Crow regime were weaker than they appeared. Mason concluded that the SCHW needed to seek donations from "liberal people outside."[142]

The U.S. government issued a fourteen-week exemption to predominantly-female leaf-house workers from the Fair Labor Standard Act's minimum-wage and overtime regulations that set minimum hourly wages of sixty-five cents on the grounds that they worked seasonally, and the FTA responded by initiating organizing campaign to terminate the exemption after members in Winston-Salem struck during the summer of 1946. Seventy-five percent of leaf-house workers were women, and the worked fifty-six or more hours per week. Their tasks included shaking, picking, stemming, and re-drying tobacco leaves before laborers transported the product to cigarette plants, and their hourly wages of forty-six and one-half cents were twenty-three cents less than male employees'. A municipal judge, W.S. Sams, sentenced three people to three and nine months of forced labor "on the County farm" and "on the County road" when Local 22

struck during July, and they won hourly wages of sixty-five cents. The strikers' success led the union to make ending the exemption for seasonal workers central to its campaign among other leaf-house workers in North Carolina and Kentucky.[143]

Local 22 became increasingly isolated after 1946, and its strength in Winston-Salem diminished as the CIO's executive board ceased tolerating both black nationalism and Communism. The North Carolina director of the CIO Organizing Committee, William Smith, was responsible assigning organizers during the union's campaign at a R.J. Reynolds plant in Greensboro, and he objected "strenuously" to the FTA's publication of a leaflet for its "negro nationalistic approach" by claiming that it could "be used by the AFL" to turn textile workers in the state "against us." Smith required that Robert Latham and Charles Black to continue their activities "if any colored organizers are to remain in the Area," and he ordered that William DeBerry either "be kept out of the eastern Area entirely or be confined to plants in towns where we are not working." The CIO's executive board opposed Local 22's proposal to establish a state CIO council in North Carolina based on the rationales that it would "divert attention" from its upcoming "all-out PAC program" and the TWUA would not support it. Karl Korstad protested to CIO president Phillip Murray one year later that Smith was assisting the CIO-affiliated United Transport Service Employees of America's (UTSEA) raid of the FTA.[144]

It was at this time that the SCHW's leaders searched quietly for support in Los Angeles County, California. An architect from Pasadena, Reginald Johnson, and his spouse hosted the SCHW's representative, Margaret Fisher, when she attempted to raise funds "completely behind the scene" during the late summer of 1946. Fisher had a full schedule that included delivering an address to the Pasadena League of Women Voters; attending a dinner that CIO-affiliated unions auto, steel, rubber, oil, and other industries hosted; and meeting with film producer Walter Wanger, although she reported that she "had one dickens of a time getting through to" Wanger due to recent "labor troubles" in his film studio. Fisher expressed hopes initially that she could raise up to $75,000 in Los Angeles and $200,000 in the entire west coast, but she soon indicated astonishment regarding "the relatively small amount of funds, net which have been raised in the North for the program in the South" before conceding towards the end of the year – while protesting the dismissal of SCHW Administrator James Dombrowski - that it was necessary to "retrench."[145]

The director of the CIO's southern organizing committee, Van Bittner, both "virtually excluded" black workers and Communists from leadership and ordered organizers to avoid taking stances on social and political issues after 1946, and this limited local political action committees' willingness to propose housing and labor reforms and demand better enforcement of voting laws. The primary target of "Operation Dixie" was the textile industry, and the TWUA's vice-president, George Baldanzi, worked under Bittner's direct supervision. The CIO's staff began advocating for segregated meetings, and FTA organizers and officers disagreed so vehemently regarding how to respond that "most of the tobacco workers" argued that the union should conduct its own leaf-house workers' campaign that would include demands both to end Afro-American's "second-class citizenship" and for housing reform. The president of the FTA, Donald Henderson, insisted that it "stand side by side" with the CIO's southern organizing committee. The CIO's executive board refused to allow minority reports at the infamous convention in Cleveland during November of 1949 where it began expelling eleven Communist-led unions.[146]

Both the AFL and the STFU had trouble adjusting to workers' increased demands for social and political rights until the CIO's executive expelled red unions. Wiley A. Hall reported

to Mason that AFL-affiliated unions remained segregated despite AFL organizer Dr. D.G. Garland's recent claims that *The Negro Digest* published that asserted the AFL had "decisively" halted even "the slightest intimation of discrimination in any central body of State Federation" by taking action against "racial discrimination" in Mobile and New Orleans. Norman Thomas had first proposed that the STFU affiliate with the AFL in 1935, and Mitchell informed Dubinksy during his subsequent appeal that "improved methods" in cotton production had caused "a decided shift to a daylabor [sic] basis on larger plantations" while asserting that their "problems" were increasingly "the problem of organized labor." J.R. Butler led another unsuccessful effort to affiliate with the AFL during 1940. The union's executive-council members applied successfully after World War II, and they collaborated with immigration agents immediately to remove foreign-born migrants in California and Florida.[147]

While the CIO's expulsions and raiding activities caused the FTA's defeat in southern states, the raiding activities of two AFL affiliates, the IBT and NFLU, eliminated its presence from California canneries. Local 7's Filipino founders opened membership to Mexican, Afro-American, Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiian, Puerto Rican, and white agricultural workers, and it earned a reputation as an inclusive union. Several thousand Filipino asparagus workers and members of the Filipino cannery and agricultural workers' union, FTA Local 7, struck for a closed shop twice in 1948 (when *The FTA News* reported that they won an arbitration procedure) and 1949. A pro-business Filipino newspaper, *The Bataan News*, reported during the second strike that "picket captains were all Negroes who never cut asparagus in their lives." They were competing with the NFLU to represent agricultural and food-processing workers in the state.[148]

Mitchell first interacted with Mexican laborers during July of 1939 when F.R. Betton (who was later one of the NFLU's vice-presidents) and he served as the STFU's delegates at a labor conference in the Mexican state of Coahuila, and Norman Thomas advised two years later that "any plan" should "take account of a possibility" of spreading "the name of the S.T.F.U." amongst farmworkers "in the West." Mitchell first noted the employment of Mexican contract workers with legal status, or "*braceros*," in a letter that he wrote to J.E. Clayton in 1942, and he claimed that government officials "could do for our folks the same things they are doing for the Mexicans" by offering the same hourly wages of thirty cents. The AFL issued a charter to the NFLU four years later when Mitchell and the IBT's secretary, Donald Tobin, agreed to grant the teamsters' union jurisdiction over Los Angeles County's lucrative dairy industry, and a Mexican-born and Columbia-educated intellectual and NFLU organizer from Sacramento, California, Ernesto Galarza, reported that the IBT was also recruiting "canneries, warehouses, and packing sheds, and dried fruit worker" during 1948. Members of the NFLU's executive council concentrated its efforts on growers' employment of foreign-born migrants immediately after it received an AFL, and they claimed that that a "state of peonage" existed in the Rio Grande Valley during January of 1947 among both undocumented migrants - whose "violations of the law" immigration authorities ignored supposedly when they crossed through 1948 - and unemployed "American citizens of Spanish descent." Mitchell recommended at summer's end re-establishing the USES' farm placement program, enacting a ban on "the importation of foreign workers during peacetime," and threatened to picket the employment of migrant workers in Florida.[149]

Migrants from Oklahoma who moved to California had previously established a farm labor organization, the United Agricultural Workers, and a member of the Oklahoma Farmers' Union requested an organizer from the NFLU. The NFLU's lead organizer, Hank Hasiwar, concentrated resources in Fresno, Tulare, and Kern counties, and 1,100 white, black, and Latino

packinghouse workers agreed to strike against the Earl Fruit Company's large estate in Kern County on October 1. The "Di Giorgio strike" began just days after the California Supreme Court ruled that the anti-picketing provisions of the "hot cargo act" the state legislature passed in 1941, were "too sweeping, vague, and uncertain" and violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Mexican workers did not cross picket lines until an official from the USDA in Bakersfield, Norman Lepper, violated the terms of the bracero agreement between Mexico and the U.S. by ordering them to return to work, and strikers continued collaborating with immigration agents' raids after the Mexican government repatriated them. The strikers received both $500 in monthly donations from the state labor federation and $5,000 from the Screen Actors' Guild for producing a film, *Poverty in the Valley of Plenty*, that portrayed the farmworkers' plight, and a representative of the Associated Farmers (which made its first "appearance" since 1940) contended that "American workers won't do the 'stoop labor.'[150]

Mitchell proposed that Galarza conduct a survey of migrant farm workers in the Southwest over the next two years during the late summer of 1947, and Galarza joined Hasiwar to organize the following spring. Mitchell recalled that Galarza preferred to work in research and education and "paid more attention" to training union leaders instead of "mass organization," and Galarza noted in a paper he wrote for the western farm economics association that the NFLU did not observe FTA Local 7's picket lines during the asparagus strike of 1948. Galarza continued recruiting U.S.-born farmworkers of Mexican descent as the NFLU published a Spanish-language newsletter, *El Porvenir*, after the Di Giorgio strike, and the Mexican and U.S. governments negotiated "an informal and oral understanding" to continue the bracero program on an interim basis during the first half of 1949. The state legislature deliberated transferring responsibilities for the state's labor camps to the National Housing Authority in Washington, D.C. as Congress prepared to pass its first major housing bill since 1937, and the president of the Council of Social Agencies in Bakersfield further evidenced the lack resolution regarding the social question in California by imploring the Kern County Board of Supervisors to offer relief to transients. [151]

Inequality remained severe in California by the end of the decade, and the negative impact the Truman administration's containment strategy on labor unions was immediately apparent. The number of NFLU locals in the state tripled from three to nine (including one in Delano) over the course of three months as unemployment increased sharply during the first half of 1949, and the number rose to twenty (including in Corcoran, Fresno, and five locals in the Imperial Valley) by the end of the year. Members of one local in the San Joaquin Valley passed a motion to act against "the entrance into agriculture by D.P.'s [displaced persons]," and Galarza both acknowledged that migrants from North America also crossed picket lines and expressed support as the NFLU's delegate to the National Proletarian Confederation's (*Confederación Nacional Proletaria*) in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, for "concerted common action of organization and protection for our compatriots." Galarza's testimony before a House committee during November of 1949 was emblematic of the new order:

Nixon: "I gather from inference from your statement that Mr. Truman's democratic Department of State is controlled by the Associated Farmers in this field?"

Galarza: "I take a little exception to that."

Nixon: "You don't think the Department of State is Democratic?"



U.S. Department of Agriculture, Extension Service, 1947, retrieved from "Children in the Crops," *Federal Aid Series*, No. 19, Nov. 1948.

Galarza: "I don't think the Department of State is necessarily, in its personnel, a reflection of the political nature of a given administration."

Nixon: "You are speaking of [the Republican Secretary of State] Mr. Acheson?"

Galarza: "No, I am speaking of the secondary personnel down the line, the people who write the memoranda and who are the passing on these agreements."[152]

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Day laborers, sharecroppers, and tenants in the SCU and the STFU struck in large numbers after sharecroppers in Alabama rebelled during the early 1930s, but they failed to spread the uprising. STFU members and the Socialist-allied executive council became increasingly divided over armed resistance, affiliation with UCAPAWA, and the establishment of state organizations, and this left the SCU with few alternatives but to merge with AFL-allied farmers' unions of Alabama and Louisiana. The recalcitrance of the STFU's executive council left farmworkers vulnerable, and it gave labor's opponents time to regroup, pass right-to-work laws, and target black leaders as the Allied powers defeated the Nazi-led government in Germany. Revolution remained necessary during the late 1940s, because the Truman administration's containment strategy made it impossible for workers to win industry-wide bargaining, desegregation, and equal pay through bourgeois reform. Both radical military officers' and labor leaders' refusal to take up arms and seize control of the most profitable industries at key junctures left them incapable of either resisting the CIO executive board's Anti-Communist raids or the impending colonial war against Korea, and this allowed the bourgeoisie and its allies within the international ruling class to halt industrial unionists' march towards freedom.

Chapter Five

Leaving Maravilla: Growth, Urban Politics, and the Third U.S. Empire, 1922-1952

O'Day Short was born in Mississippi during 1905 and began working at an oil-refrigerator and electrical service in Los Angeles two decades later, and he participated in civil-rights activities. "Returning Japanese families" after World War II caused his family from their home on South Wilton Place, and he purchased property in an area of the San Fernando Valley town of Fontana that white Angelenos' restrictive deed agreements covered. Some residents were actively seeking to enforce the deed agreements, and Short and his wife had "light complexions." Short received warnings from two sheriffs and real-estate developer J. Sutherland to leave (and may have noted that one local property owner, Him Erwing, Sr., owned a local newspaper called *The Neighborhood News* and was the president of the town's chamber of commerce), and he followed advice of that several FBI agents gave him in the city on December 5, 1945, by keeping his family in the house he built. White supremacists killed Short's wife and two children by bombing his house, and O'Day Short committed suicide after learning of his family's quietus.[153]

The bombing of Short's home was one of capitalists' first attacks in southern California after industrial unionists won desegregation of HACLA's public-housing projects, county juries, and naval divisions during World War II. Reactionaries wanted to curtail eliminate or add means-testing and sliding scales to wartime social programs such as child care and rent control, replace public-housing construction with market-based community-redevelopment corporations, and prevent the board of supervisors from passing fair-employment and housing ordinances, and industrial unionists led strikes, formed tenants committees, and attempted the extradition of black CIO members. Unemployment, police brutality in black and Latino neighborhoods, and the Democratic Party's support for right-wing dictatorship threatened to divide working-class people, and white people in the harbor district only accepted black Angelenos' presence on a tokenistic basis. The deportation of Luisa Moreno and the Korean War discouraged police officers from allying with internationalist workers, encouraged HACLA and the city's education board to dismiss public employees, and isolated Sinophiles within the military.

Poststructuralists argue that soldiers', sailors', and vigilantes' forcible "de-nuding" of young Latino men after the U.S. entered the war was part of their more general strategy of "feminizing" the zoot suiters, and they use the classifications of gender and sexuality to analyze how local newspapers portrayed young Mexican-American women as promiscuous. Historians

of U.S. foreign relations concentrate on intellectual exchange, Nelson D. Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), and the expansion of the FBI's police-training programs. Richard Cándida-Smith has suggested that the OIAA partnered with Brazilian artists and intellectuals to avoid working with Mexican muralists, and some have gone so far as to describe the Chilean government's as pro-Nazi. Academic investigations regarding the 1943 L.A. Riots, or "the Zoot Suit Riots," produced numerous questions regarding the pachucas' style; young Latino men and women's social relations; "white saviorism" in the Luis Valdez's controversial 1978 play, *Zoot Suit*; and community-police relations' impact on the U.S. foreign relations and FDR's administration Pan-American program in Latin America and the Caribbean. Soldiers' aggression against Latino youth and newspapers' propagation of hatred caused the riots.[154]

The term "race relations" subsumed community-police relations into a single category, and it presumed moral equivalence and permanent antagonism between civilians and law enforcement officers. It also conflated pressing questions about the nation's changing political economy with issues that pertain to international relations while obscuring their connections, and it left many ill-prepared for the Soviet Union's manufacturing of hydrogen bombs. "Race relations" exacerbated alienation and extremism by obviating the causes of sexism, homophobia, segregation, the oil industry, overproduction, and war, and it comported well with the Truman doctrine. The idea of "race relations" appealed to philanthropists and Catholic labor leaders, and the bourgeoisie depended on them. Zionists raped, killed, and expelled over 700,000 people from their homes and fired upon two U.S. naval destroyers after the United Nations (U.N.) partitioned India, and both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations rejected the advice of "Arabist" officials from the State Department by refusing to implement sanctions against Israel for its denial of the Palestinians' right of return and allying with Britain and France to attack Egypt during late 1956.[155]

The Korean War was very unpopular, and it was a journalist, I.F. Stone, who conducted the first comprehensive investigation, concluded that John Foster Dulles shifted from an "isolationist" to an "internationalist" position in 1943, and argued that Army general Douglas MacArthur was more adept at politics than war. Roy E. Appleman contended that relied heavily on bombs, heavy artillery, and tanks to overcome North Koreans' advantageous knowledge of the environment and that U.S. officials erred by refusing to accept "the superiority of the North Korean over the South Korean" military forces, and Henry J. Middleton found that it was a "limited war" while portraying MacArthur as a tragic leader. Clay Blair argued in his impactful 1987 study that the invasion of Korea strengthened the position of McCarthyites, Anti-Communists, and the Republican Party; gave credibility to a notion that capitalist countries could "contain" communism through limited wars that led to the U.S. invasion of Vietnam; caused hostilities between Marxist and capitalist governments to intensify through a massive nuclear and conventional arms race that transformed the U.S. into a more militaristic society; delayed the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations; and was the least recognized and most important war in U.S. history; and Bruce Cumings asserted that the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, ordered the invasion to stimulate industrial development in Japan and establish a "great crescent" of U.S. alliances across northeast Asia. Wada Haruki has emphasized the importance of South Korean army officers' previous training at Japanese military schools, Chinese-Koreans in Manchuria, and the unification of Korea, and others have concentrated more recently on either the war's "global impact" or the declining British Empire's "liberal democratic values."[156]

This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I analyzes reformers' activity and the effects of the judiciary's rulings regarding housing and property laws during World War II. Part II examines population growth, housing construction, the first postwar strike wave, the impact of the end of the war, and why the judiciary ruled that restrictive deed agreements were unconstitutional. Part III examines industrial unionists' activity in southern California; reformers' attempts to desegregate labor and housing markets and eliminate "blighted" housing; and the impact of Hawaiian sugar, pineapple, and longshore workers and ladies' auxiliary units on labor. The last section concludes by examining the experiences of one Korean War veteran, Daniel V. Renteria, who joined the marines and fought in Korea while his sister, Lydia Álvarez, worked as a riveter at an aircraft factory.

"so you can know what it is"

The U.S. entering into World War II coincided with industrial unionists' campaigns to demand equal pay, and both the proportion of women working in industrial occupations grew and working-class people adopted more positive attitudes towards industrial labor after employers in war industries began to offer childcare during the autumn of 1942. Regulators gave labor unions and employers tacit permission to exclude black workers from industrial and blue-collar occupations, and restrictive deeding and city and county housing authorities' exclusion of black Angelenos from most public-housing projects relegated most black migrants to the Bronzeville neighborhood in Little Tokyo. Black sailors', workers', and reformers' activity in California between 1942 and 1944 resulted in the desegregation of most of HACLA's public-housing projects and the navy's officer corps by 1947, and law-enforcement agencies in the state adopted new police-training programs after 1943 based on the Richmond Police Department's model that relied on the notion of "race relations." Communist leaders and reformers responded to county prosecutor's murder-conspiracy charges against twenty-two young Latino men by seeking criminal-justice reform through the Committee for the Defense of Mexican-American Youth, and newspapers in Cuba and El Salvador published reports regarding frequent fights during the riots between young Latinos and soldiers and sailors.

The Los Angeles municipal government's refusal to plan was evident during 1922 when it established an industrial zone in a "mostly negro" neighborhood in Bunker Hill bound by Pico Boulevard, 21st Street, and Central and Maple avenues. It responded to an outbreak of the bubonic plague that killed thirty-one people by studying housing shortages, and the Real Property Inventory and the U.S. Census conducted the city's most accurate surveys fifteen years later. The new mayor, Fletcher Bowron, appointed the city's first housing commission on June 7, 1938, and it used WPA funds to conduct a survey two years later the quality of housing was substandard for 58,709 of 250,000 dwelling units within the city's boundaries (which did not include unincorporated areas in neighborhoods like East L.A.), and 45,520 of those units were physically substandard, 6,191 were substandard from "an occupancy standpoint," and 6,998 were substandard in both categories. The report's authors found that the intrusion of "inharmonious land uses, such as industry and some types of business," into residential areas was "a very serious problem," and this "probably" diminished the quality of housing in both Wilmington and San Pedro. A random sample of 15,441 substandard units housing 20,294 families found that thirty-eight percent of Mexican households and thirty-three percent of renting households had zero members with employment. 65.1% of the occupants of substandard units were white, 21.2% were Latino, and 8.5% were black, so the problem of substandard-quality housing did not discriminate based on skin color.[157]



Courtesy: The University of Southern California.

There was a marked increase in union activities in Los Angeles during the mid-1930s, and the predecessor of ILWU Local 13's women's auxiliary recruited volunteers at membership meetings as early as November of 1934, and it remained active six months later when a representative from the studio carpenters' union, Durkin, spoke at a union meeting "for the Furniture Union now on strike." Members of passed ILA Local 38-82 a resolution during May of 1936 to fund an organizer to coordinate between its executive board and the truck drivers' union, and the city council appropriated $40,000 to police the harbor district six months later. The San Pedro local's executive board carried motions during late October of 1938 to send three delegates to "the Joint Union Committees to protest Police brutality in the Harbor Areas," commend Bowron's "stand on State Proposition No. 1" and his position "on labor," donate funds John Steinbeck's Committee to Aid Agricultural Organization, and contact UCAPAWA "regarding [the] present status of cotton pickers," and the union's meeting minutes indicate that members supported Bowron's candidacy during the recall election. The executive board noted the formation of the CIO-affiliated "Studio Union of Hollywood" during July of 1939 and heard reports from J.D. Rivera and E.G. Delgado regarding "the Mexican Congress Meeting [sic]," and members learned the Studio Technicians Guild Union formed "to take the place of the defunct IATSE." The San Pedro local executive board's "dirty dozen" faction both favored remaining within the AFL and excluded black workers, and some have argued that racism, prejudice, and issues pertaining to "local autonomy" – as well as its membership's Latino majority by the mid-1960s - made the San Pedro local more similar to AFL-affiliated craft unions and especially the building-trades council.[158]

Lydia Álvarez was in the main office of Memorial middle school in San Diego, California, when she heard from a radio report that Japan attacked a military base in Hawaii, and she recalled that students were too "shocked" and "stunned" to study that day (most marine transport on the California coast moved from San Pedro "virtually defunct" to the Bay Area for

the next six months). Her brother whom she had yet to meet, David Álvarez, was playing marbles further north on a sidewalk in the Central Valley town of Sanger when "a guy came running down" while yelling "they bombed Pearl Harbor! They bombed Pearl Harbor!" Alvarez lived close to an Army Air Force base and formed a study group with his friends that built model airplanes and used information from newspapers and radio broadcasts to study German and Russian generals, battles, and world events.[159]

Military authorities blared sirens as smoke emitted from a tubular structure to camouflage temporary housing camps for soldiers and sailors – including one near Point Loma - and factories that aircraft companies like Conveyer and Ryan owned. ILWU Local 13 members protested the employment of "military men" as longshore workers on the San Diego waterfront by sending telegrams to President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry Stinson, and CIO leaders Sidney Hillman and Phillip Murray shortly after Japan's attack. The Long Beach City Council approved $12 million in bond measures to establish "a modern harbor" from 1919 through 1939, and the national government provided additional funding for the development project after identifying oil deposits towards the end of the 1930s. The harbor district also housed offices for the U.S. government's Customs, Quarantine, and Engineering Department and ILWU Local 13's hiring hall in Wilmington, and it became a major center for marine transport soon after the U.S. entered the war. Mexican women saw many "white hats" whenever they ventured downtown, and they remained in Old Town most of the time. Residents of the "Old Town" neighborhood were close enough to the waterfront to observe military drills every Monday, and they did not have running water and electricity.[160]

Industrial unionists' campaign in southern California began during the west-coast maritime workers' strikes, and it gained momentum when an arbitrator ordered employers to pay longshore workers' round-trip fares from San Pedro to Long Beach towards the end of the summer of 1940. Local 13 members criticized the building-trades council's and defense project contractors' "unscrupulous practice" of excluding the CIO-affiliated United Construction Workers Organizing Committee (UCWOC), and the committee requested assistance for Local 209's strike against the Pacific Tile and Porcelain Company. The executive board carried another motion to establish a UCWOC local. ILWU members in the Hawaiian islands of Hanapepe, Kauai, and Hawaii strike had been striking for six months when Local 13's executive board donated thirty-five dollars. John Rivera served as ILWU Local 13's delegate to a conference held by the Congress of Spanish Speaking People, and the executive board soon granted permission for Bert Corona to speak on behalf of the congress after members nominated J. Rivera, I. Gonzáles, E. Gonzáles, F. Hernández, and J. Rivera to represent the union at a conference on "Spanish speaking problems."[161]

Luisa Moreno and an organizer from the furniture workers' union, Frank Lopez, directed UCAPAWA's campaign in southern California before the U.S. entered the war, and their goals were to recruit Cal-San's and the California Walnut Growers' Association's employees and amalgamate the city's canning and food-processing plants into a single local. 400 female Cal-San employees at the "biggest peach cannery in the world" worked as either fillers on the conveyer belt or "slicer girls" receiving hourly wages between forty-seven and one-half and fifty cents (which was five and ten cents less than their male counterparts that worked in the "front-end" or the warehouse), and Local 3 signed a contract during June of 1941 that included stipulated five-cent increases if two or more other southern California canning companies raised wages. Seventy-five percent of the 1,600 and 3,000 employees who worked at the Val-Vita Food Productions Company's largest cannery in Fullerton were Latino, and they reported that they

received low wages due to "stiff" competition and fainted frequently during ten- to twelve-hour shifts. Over half of employees in the preparation department quit due to long hours caused by the "speed-up," low wages, and daily commutes that lasted as long as two hours, and one organizer found that "race discrimination" caused much resentment among employees. Moreno led the Orange County Organizing Committee (OCOC), and one member, Amelia Salgado, sued the company for $1,000 when her former foreman, Sam Cava, beat her during July of 1942.[162]

Local 2 defeated the AFL in an NLRB election at Val Vita's plant by a margin of 262 to thirty-eight after the local teamsters' union "support[ed] the CIO position," and it demanded a union shop, minimum hourly wages of eighty cents, equal pay, paid vacations, a grievance procedure, seniority provisions, and the establishment of a transportation committee while petitioning for an NLRB election among warehouse workers when Val Vita sold its two canneries in Fullerton to the Hunt Brothers' and Continental Canning companies. Members of Local 3 elected female officers and demanded equal pay and better protection during their commutes, and the union won union recognition at Cal-San's and the Royal Packing and Glaser Nut companies' walnut-packing plants. Local 3 elected two female members as vice-president and recording secretary, five others to the executive board, and five more to the board of trustees during early 1943, and the walnut division selected another sixteen female members as shop stewards (including Lucille Swasey as the chief steward of Plant No. 1) for the Walnut Growers Association's two Diamond plants. The war labor board made Cal-San employees the highest-paid cannery workers in the region the following summer by ordering the Royal Packing Company and Cal-San increase Local 3 members' wages, and Moreno became state CIO council's vice-president and was the first officer in UCAPAWA to call for the enforcement of braceros' "full rights under the National Labor Relations Act." UCAPAWA and the ILWU filed a joint brief supporting the state industrial welfare commission's majority report that called for nearly doubling female employees' minimum hourly wages based on an eight-hour day from thirty-three and one-third cents to sixty-five cents; the elimination of wage differentials for leaners, minors, and "handicapped workers;" a minimum of four hours of call-in pay; ten-minute breaks for every two hours worked and an increase in lunch breaks from thirty to sixty minutes; the posting of both the unit price for piece-wages and "the job to which it applies;" that employers furnish all of employees' tools and uniforms; and that "a woman replacing a man receive a man's pay."[163]

Angelenos ascribed more dignity to industrial occupations, because the war forced the national government to use more resources to ameliorate workers' needs. The lack of childcare for mothers was a major problem for employers in war industries as the U.S. entered the war, and this led the Department of Labor's Children's Bureau to hold a national "Day Care Conference" during July of 1941. The Women's Bureau's advisory board asserted the following January that "mothers with young children… should not be actively recruited as a new source of labor for either training courses or employment until other sources of labor supply in the local community have been fully utilized," and the transport workers union's president, Michael J. Quill, soon implored the national government to "adopt an adequate program of child care so that mothers may be free to work in war industry." The national government began funding the Federal Works Agency's childcare programs for employers with war contracts after Congress passed the Lanham Act during August of 1942 (one writer in the ILWU's periodical called for the FDR administration to assign administrative responsibilities to the War Manpower Commission, or WMC), and the California state government tasked its Committee on Children in Wartime with creating supervisorial and care standards and coordinating health, welfare, and educational

agencies; authorized school districts to open childcare centers; and appropriated an additional $500,000 for childcare programs, and "Child Care committees" formed at approximately 1,000 settlement houses, public schools, churches, and community centers across the U.S. by June. A survey that the county's chapter of commerce conducted during the spring of 1945 found that the percentage of wanting to work in factories rose fourteen-fold from three to forty-two for women and fifteen to sixty-seven percent for men.[164]

General Electric (GE) and RCA were the only employers that responded to high turnover by hiring a greater percentage of black women, and almost every male-dominated union colluded with employers to exclude them from aircraft, shipping, boiler-making, rubber, and communications industries. The United Auto Workers' (UAW) regional director, Jack Montgomery, informed Clarence R. Johnson of the WMC's "Negro Manpower Services" office – which was responsible for investigating discrimination charges throughout California - during early May of 1942, that an aircraft company, Lockheed and Vega, refused to employ a "young Negro woman" that passed "the Lockheed test" despite the fact that hundreds of other women "received employment in the aircraft industry in this area." *The California Eagle* reported that company's employees planned to meet at the Young Men's Christian Association's address on 28th and Paloma streets to distribute information "concerning entrance" into IAM, and the North American Aviation Company's representative's rationale for refusing to employ black women was the company's failure to construct separate facilities. The state's employment office contacted Kathleen Warren on December 12, 1942, and she Kathleen Warren stated that the Western Union's Traffic Department refused to hire one woman to do "rush work" during the holiday season. The traffic manager, O.C. Scott, asserted that white applicants who received assignments were "seeking work of a type other than that applied for by her."[165]

One union that included black women was a boilermakers' local in Richmond, California. The union's "perennial question-mark" of whether to permit black boiler makers to join or relegate them to separate auxiliaries, and discussions regarding this matter "spread throughout the country" by the autumn of 1943. The secretary of the 4,000-member auxiliary unit in Los Angeles, Local A-35, believed that labor unions' purpose was "to protect and advance the economic welfare of their members" and addressing "social needs" occur "later," and he informed the Los Angeles Committee for Interracial Progress during late 1944 that he accepted a position as secretary – despite having misgivings regarding the "Auxiliary System of Unionism" - based to his commitment to an "approach" of "amicable adjustment" that was fundamentally "of an economic nature" instead of one that sought "to adjust the social phase of the problem." State CIO vice-president Revels Cayton, submitted affidavits to Johnson after several black women complained that the Goodyear rubber company refused to offer them employment one year after the U.S. entered the war. Johnson reached "an understanding" with Boiler Makers Union's (BMU) international representative after an unauthorized strike in Richmond, in contrast, that Local 681 would "continue to clear Negro welders to the shipyards." The Richmond Shipbuilding Company was offering welding tests at its laboratory to female workers, and it employed fifty-six female bolters, thirty-one grinders, four passers, and twenty-nine helpers (who were also members of the shipyard laborers' union) by September of 1942.[166]

The WMC's "minority specialists" did not typically any "problems" or evidence of "unadjusted claims" in the war industries that required them to file ES-510s, because they were too corrupt, incompetent, and irresponsible to protect black and Latino workers from employment discrimination during the war. The Voit Rubber and the Hydropack companies refused to explain why they refused to hire a qualified "Negro woman" and "Negro" applicants

more generally at their plants on East 25th Street and South Hoover Avenue during the spring of 1944, and C.W. Dessart reasoned that the state FEPC office was responsible for acting first while refusing to arrange a meeting until "several days after [the] required date for [a] 'Disposition Report.'" The FEPC's Examiner-in-Charge, R.E. Brown, Jr., reminded the WMC's state minority specialist, Charles Bratt, they had spoken regarding an WMC's officials " seeming reluctance" to discuss "the matter of ES-510s" after the Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Company's employees in San Diego reported that USES only assigned black applicants to menial jobs and clerical work, and Bratt's office issued charges against one hospital; twelve railroad, packing, aircraft tool, port, piping, and energy companies; and four aircraft companies during the month of March 1945 alone. The specialists' revised their manual shortly after the war ended to require "the use of a so-called ES 510 Report for every seemingly authentic case of discrimination [is] discovered" and that specialists file reports "even in those cases where it appears that the local office efforts at the elimination of the discriminatory specifications or practices have been successful." Carey McWilliams reported to the Congress of Spanish Speaking People six months after the U.S. entered the war that only 500 of 136,000 aircraft workers were Latinos. [167]

UCAPAWA and the IWLU's radical wing led workers' attempts to enforce black and Latino workers' rights in southern California, and ILWU Local 26 commenced a campaign "to establish equal pay for women" and recruit the city's 5,000 drug-store employees as part of a "struggle" that soon encompassed chemical and waste-management employees (including 800 workers at the Pioneer Flintkote Company's factory). ILWU Local 26 (which began representing cotton-oil workers in the state during 1941) planned for the union's new president, Bert Corona, to deliver a "series of educational talks" on "democracy, race equality, and anti-discrimination against minority groups" two weeks before Corona joined the Army Air Corps during February of 1943 after learning that that USES was marking black applicants' index cards with a colored pencil so that "only white help" would be sent when employers requested employees, and the ILWU aided OCOC's campaign among shed workers in the citrus industry during the last two years of the war. Local 26's new president, Charles Pfeiffer, called for the regional war labor board to establish a sub-regional office in Los Angeles "to relieve the backlog of cases on docket" during July, and the San Francisco-based ILWU Local 6 both allowed 100 stewards to observe its "methods" for organizing factories at its "steward's congress" and called for the international executive board to hold a regional conference for warehouse stewards later that year. Local 6 supported California senator Sheridan Downey's proposed bill, SB 1322, to allow undocumented residents to apply to live – and ban "Jim Crowism" - in public-housing projects, and the FTA won four of six NLRB elections in the citrus industry among packingshed workers in the Lindsay area, an election at the Huston & Baetz Company's cabbage dehydrating plant in Santa Ana (where they negotiated hourly wage increases of fifteen cents for female employees and twelve and one-half cents for their male counterparts), and thirteen more elections at citrus sheds in Tulare County during the winter of 1944-5. Luisa Moreno led UAW's successful campaign that recruited 10,000 Latino workers and 6,000 black workers among the Douglas Aircraft Company's 84,000 employees at its factories in Long Beach and Santa Monica, and FTA Locals 2, 64, 3, and 78 donated fifty dollars monthly to the state CIO council's minorities committee and $150 to a citrus workers' organizing committee that signed agreements for 1,200 employees at seventeen packinghouses.[168]

CIO-affiliated citrus workers lost momentum by early 1945 when they won NLRB elections at just thirteen of fifty citrus packingsheds in the Porterville area during early 1945, and FTA locals acted accordingly by amalgamating locals and demanding more concessions. One

organizer claimed that shipping companies convinced the labor board to delay the elections for several weeks on the grounds that large "sections" of packingshed workers were moving elsewhere. Locals 2 and 3 amalgamated into Local 25 later that fall, and Local 64 won paid vacations for seasonal workers in San Diego who completed 600 hours and work during ninety-five percent of the Van Camp company's operations (as well as one week of vacation time for "most of the male help" who worked 1,800 hours). The company also conceded compulsory checkoff. The FTA represented 5,000 shed workers at thirteen citrus packinghouses at "the world's largest navel orange district" in the Redlands-Riverside area. [169]

The Merchants and Manufacturers Association (which was the California branch of the National Association of Manufacturers' California branch and represented aircraft-parts companies, automobile traders, metal manufacturers, apartment house owners, and the Los Angeles Realty Board) by proposing a "right-to-work" amendment, and this did not impact the ILWU's campaign among predominantly-female civil-service workers in Ventura County after stewards from San Pedro, Wilmington, Long Beach, and Port Hueneme voted to recruit at army and naval depots. The ILWU defeated the teamsters' union in an NLRB election at Port Hueneme, Ventura County, on March 2, 1944, and issued a charter to Local 46, and it grew quickly to include marine clerks, splicers, carpenters, and "all other waterfront workers" and represent over half of the newly-formed Ventura County Industrial Union Council. The ILWU's treasurer, Louis Goldblatt, negotiated an agreement with the Pacific Advance Naval Base for Local 46A that included provisions for maintenance-of-membership, "strict seniority," paid vacations, overtime pay (the lack of which had constituted "one of the worst pre-contract conditions"), and a non-discrimination clause that eliminated "gross inequities of wage scale paid men and women." The president of Local 26, Charles Pfeiffer, protested the employment of Italian prisoners-of-war at warehouses and construction projects in Los Angeles to the FDR administration, and Local 13 assumed control of the campaign within two weeks. The Army transferred its air force depot in Wilmington to private contractors during the following January, and this prevented several hundred civil-service checkers earning hourly wages of seventy to eighty cents from joining the ILWU and receiving its hourly rate of one dollar to $1.10.[170]

Leaders of the ILWU Local 13's antecedent, ILA 38-82, began requiring the sponsorship of "ten good union men" for membership immediately after they seized control of the hiring hall during the mid-1930s, and their original purpose was to guarantee that only strikers who refused to cross picket lines could work on the waterfront. Local president Forest "Pete" Moore of Long Beach (who became a crew boss with only a warehouse book before 1942 and was president of the local during the 1950s) recalled working similarly alongside jitneys – or "those old Fordson tractors" – that the "guys from Arkansas" who had "plowed a lot" operated mostly, and "old-time seamen" with experience driving wenches on lumber schooners and freighters led the local's winch committee. Peter Grassi, whose father had been a member of the IWW, served as the union's business agent from 1949 through 1954, and he recalled similarly that crews of Okies and Arkies learned to drive winches before migrating to California. Grassi worked evenings when "a lot of blacks" were receiving night shifts, and the wench drivers refused to take assignments with black workers until they received orders from Grassi.[171]

One of black dockworkers' leaders, Walter E. Williams, was part of a family that migrated from Georgia to California, and he attended elementary school in San Pedro while "some people out in Hollywood" employed his mother as a domestic worker before he graduated from Jefferson High School in 1936. He avoided the harbor district due to "feelings of racism" in the area that were "so strong," and there were "plenty of guys around this town" who were "anti-

black" and "very strong racists." Williams completed one semester at Los Angeles Junior College, joined IBT Local 630, and organized with the CIO during the late 1930s, and he joined Local 13 in 1943 as a "temp" before becoming a "permit man" that received a gray plug from the dispatcher. He recalled the "Longies" reminded more recent hires of their temporary statuses within the union frequently by asking what "you [were] going to do after the war?" Thomas stated openly that his faction planned "to make this union lily white again!"[172]

Local 13's membership committee allowed non-members to both request permits for work assignments from dispatchers (who used a "plugboard system" to direct crews of up to 1,000 men) and work another member's "book" for up to six months before gaining eligibility for membership after the U.S. entered the war, and its sub-committee rejected five applications during on the grounds that they lacked "residency." The first black dockworkers in San Pedro received their assignments three months later, and they were Quincy Ross and a foreman, Rye Simms (who both came from the San Francisco local and worked the same pier). "Southern sailors" from Long Beach refused to work for Simms until Harry Bridges – who agreed to the WMC's request to cap longshore workers' wages for the duration of the war – visited one year later after the local announced new fines for "probationary members" who did not attend meetings or pay dues, and the labor-relations committee ruled that only members with five years of residency could work as bosses, winchers, carpenters, or jitney-drivers. One member of the ladies' auxiliary unit, Katie Quadres, recalled that "there was a lot of feeling" among white dockworkers that black workers' employment was less important than their own sons'. Quadres stated that executive-board member Bill Lawrence - whom Moore charged with "finking" during 1933 - "always went to bat for the girls."[173]

ILWU Local 13 continued to exclude women and relegate black laborers to low-paying occupations as membership grew substantially, and it did so by refusing to adjudicate black dockworkers' grievances, only hiring them for "cleaner and sweeper jobs" or as helpers, maintaining exclusive membership rules that required sponsorship from another member with three months standing, and violating the rules by giving preference to returning sailors and family members that did not have "seniority." There were "few White [sic] union members [who] expressed willingness to 'sponsor' Negro applicants" (and only two black households in the entire harbor district), and a dockworker, Junius Johnson, filed a complaint, *Junius Johnson vs. Longshoremen's Union – CIO, San Pedro*, with the WMC. Supervising hatch-tenders excluded black dock-workers from night shifts that offered overtime pay, and members passed a resolution that prohibited non-members receiving those assignments. Eleanor Roosevelt, Paul Robeson, and Harry Bridges attempted to persuade the union's corrupt leadership to change the union's membership rules during late 1943. The purpose of these practices was to prevent black dockworkers from remaining within the union in the harbor district long enough to find a sponsor and become members.[174]

The labor-relations committee reported to members that employers proposed "the women stay in the Army Area due to the sanitary conditions" during of 1942 and that "Mr. McGowen" requested the harbor commission conduct a survey to assess "the possibility of employing women on all the docks in the Harbor area." Returning sailors – some of whom had only been "Permit Men" before their enlistment – registered their male relatives as opposed to "Long Beach kids or San Pedro kids or Wilmington kids." One member, Alfred Langely, recalled "the vets comin' back" who "[took] the cream of the crop" were "the instigator[s] of the five hundred being laid off" and sponsored dockworkers who were "in the service" but had "no business being here," and some were union "officials" before they "went over there" and believed "those guys

shouldn't be here at all" such as executive-board member L.B. Thomas of Texas (who served in the Navy Construction Battalion) and Dewey Long. De-registered unemployed dockworkers (of whom many were warehouse workers that received brown plugs from dispatchers) responded by forming a committee, "the Unemployed 500," that filed several legal challenges after the war, and many white members of the group – of whom approximately eighty percent were Afro-American – benefitted from both association with returning veterans and having priority. Local 13 attempted to organize other workers in San Pedro (including waitresses and bartenders) occasionally.[175]

Local 13 differed from other ILWU locals in the harbor district due to its exclusion of both black workers through the 1950s and women through the late 1960s, and the other ILWU locals that did admit women failed to win equal pay. Members did reject a motion on April 7, 1949, to offer employment seniority and preference to "veterans, sons and brothers" who had the "most time previously worked on the waterfront," but they also concurred with the membership committee's recommendations two years later to both "segregate" 1,933 membership applications and require that "all members after sons and brothers come from [an] I.D. list on seniority basis sponsored by 1933 members." Whereas members also extended the residency requirement from seven to ten years. The ship scalers' union, Local 56, recruited women during the spring of 1944 to clean, condition, and load ship stores. Female and male members received hourly wages of between ninety-five cents and $1.25 "with absolutely no race or national discrimination."[176]

Other workers and CIO affiliates in Los Angeles attempted to end black laborers' exclusion from employment. Clarence Johnson reported that he made a verbal agreement with ship-builders' union secretary, Fred Sebbs, that the union would "cooperate in facilitating employment of Negro workers at Bethlehem and other ship building companies," shortly before the U.S. entered the war. A drill-press operator who resided on South Hope Street and was the Mohl-Richardson Company's employee refused to take the IAM's required oath that members would "propose no person for membership other than a competent white candidate," and IAM Local 1185 barred Alexander Lockwood of Beverly Hills from membership after he argued that the pledge contradicted "the principles [for which] we are fighting." The secretary of URW Local 100 informed a manager at a Firestone factory "pledged not to discriminate against any fellow-worker on account of creed, color, or nationality." URWA Local 131's president asserted similarly that both the rubber workers' union and an aircraft workers' union, UAW Local 887, were demanding non-discrimination.[177]

Employers in war industries did not hire black and Latino workers in large numbers until 1943, and they often trained "newly recruited white workers for promotion to more highly skilled jobs denied to themselves." A twenty-seven year-old shop steward at the San Francisco shipyards wrote to the governor, Earl Warren, during June of 1943 that black and Latino workers "feel they are treated unjust" and that he had been involved in three "riots between the White and Dark Americans [sic]" in the shipyards that "Poor Southern White People [sic] that didn't want to work beside a colored man or woman" instigated, and the FEPC found that a mere 1.4% of the wildcat strikes that occurred through 1944 pertained to "racial issues" (of which eighteen of forty "white workers against the employment and upgrading of Negroes" caused). The Los Angeles city-council member representing the ninth district, Parker Christensen, proposed guaranteeing collective-bargaining rights for both municipal employees and employees of companies with city contracts to resolve the problem of "public disturbances," but the city attorney ruled that only "the various boards of commissioners" had authority to enforce such a measure. The aircraft

industry employed 96,000 people during the war to assemble, rivet, supervisor, or inspect. The southern California shipyards offered some of the highest wages that were available to Latinos, and sixty percent of Latino employees in the shipyards worked in either semiskilled or skilled occupations as opposed to forty percent of Latinos who worked in the mines, mills, and smelters of Arizona and New Mexico.[178]

High unemployment left black and Latino youth with few alternatives than joining gangs before the gangs, and the pachucos, or zoot suiters, created a counter-culture that valorized fighting. Daniel Rentería recalled he went the city's metro lines with his friends to "steal people's noses" before he went to live in Simi Valley with his father's first wife's half-sister during the early 1940s. His adopted family instilled a strong work ethic by telling him to pick tomatoes, lemons, oranges, or walnuts during summers, and they informed him that "'we don't put you to work because we need you to help us. We put you to work so that you know what it is, so that you will go and study and not have to work like we do.'" Black and Latina girls fought more often at Memorial middle school, and Rentería observed pachucos fighting with each other frequently when he was a student at Brooklyn Grammar School in East L.A.[179]

HACLA sought to ameliorate the city's acute wartime housing shortages after Congress passed the Lanham Act by constructing 3,468 new units through a set of ten projects - most of which it located in the harbor area where "Negroes were never permitted to live before" - that included two located in predominantly-black neighborhoods, and a representative in the state's assembly reverted to "race prejudiced arguments" to "kill" an "urgently needed project" in West L.A. that another Los Angeles representative, Augustus Hawkins, supported. The William Mead Homes differed due to its location in an area that officials zoned primarily for railroad transportation and manufacturing. The inadequacy of HACLA's project was evident by early May of 1943 when the Urban League held a "Leadership Round Table" that urged the WMC to "use its full resources" for "the acute housing problem for war workers generally and for minority groups in particular." The leaders of the Council of Social Agencies' Special Committee on the 'Little Tokyo' Situation" compiled an agenda for its meeting on June 23 that offered the president of the League's Los Angeles chapter, Floyd Covington, time to speak. Between 3,500 and 5,000 migrants - some of whom came in response to the Southern Pacific Railroad Corporation's job advertisements - were arriving each month (including "a very heavy movement" from Shreveport, Louisiana), and younger males within the sub-group were finding employment in the shipyards.[180]

Southerners' migrations to a small number of neighborhoods caused the city's black population to increase from 15,000 to 150,000 between 1920 and 1947, and these migrations alone do not explain why severe housing shortages occurred, San Fernando Valley cities' chambers of commerce held a "well publicized meeting to covenant the whole valley" towards the end of the war, or why M.C. Friel and Associates did "this kind of job exclusively" while advertising "itself as a race restricting outfit." Private developers was responsible for seventy percent of the mere 65,000 housing units that construction workers built for "war workers," and ninety-nine percent of the 57,000 units that were complete by August of 1941 were only available to white residents. Black families lived in 3,202 of the other 8,000 war-housing units and in 2,800 of the city housing authority's 16,000 public-housing units, and only 14,000 of the approximately 104,000 households that rented were people of African descent by late 1944. Most black migrants lived during the war in garages, store fronts, and tents in Bronzeville, and this was where an army colonel, Henry A. Finch, reported that white workers "incited negroes against Japanese" on August 22, 1945. Rumors circulated during a crime wave two years later

that Japanese businessowners intended to evict black residents, and denizens in the neighborhood responded by organizing a meeting with a short-lived organization, the Los Angeles Council for Civic Unity.[181]

Bowron and Warren were among the most vehement supporters of Japanese internment in California. The county board of supervisors requested that the FDR administration "transfer Japanese aliens from coastal areas to inland points" on January 27, 1942, due to supposed concerns they were "potential source of danger" and that eighty percent "retained their Buddhist and Shinto religious affiliations." Bowron issued similar calls during several radio broadcasts two weeks before the FDR administration ordered "the removal of the entire Japanese population – alien and American born – inland for several hundred miles" where "they may be put to work raising food or other products of the soil." Bowron observed the county had "the greatest concentration of Japanese anywhere in America," opposed "intermarriage," asserted they are a "race apart," and implied that "some legal method may be worked out to deprive the native-born Japanese of citizenship" during a radio broadcast on May 19, 1943. A listener responded by cautioning the mayor to "consider that in the larger problem of reconstructing the world after the death and destruction" and that "we cannot be governed by those feelings of hatred which of necessity come with the heat and passion of conflict."[182]

The word "pachuco" was first a term that described migrants from El Paso, Texas, and the zoot suiters' style to comb their long hair back into "two black wings" that converged at the back of their head in a "little top-knot" and to wear broad-brimmed hats and draping coats (sometimes with a long chain) that fell below their knees. They also wore tight-fitting "peg-top bottoms," and they hitched their pants "up almost to their armpits." One zoot suiter that a jury convicted during the murder-conspiracy trial, Chepe Ruiz, himself speculated from San Quentin State Penitentiary whether "perhaps in the 25th anniversary someone may look at that suit and say, 'WHAT DON JUAN WORE THAT?'" Pachucas wore dark lipstick, dyed their hair, and had tattoos, and they wore skirts, cardigans, V-neck sweaters, fishnet stockings, baby socks, platform heels, saddle shoes, and huaraches. Others dressed more similarly to pachucos.[183]

Latino families differed regarding pachucos' behavior and environment. David Alvarez concluded that pachucos' "attitude" in the Fresno area "was not decent," and they were uneducated, disrespectful "bums." He also recalled that fought frequently, and he wondered why they were "like that." Lydia Martínez found that "they were always respectful" when she served tacos in Belvedere Park, in contrast, and she did not "remember anyone saying anything" to her. Her sister, Rebecca Martín del Campo, stated that her employers at a cannery in East L.A. evinced "complete racism" by refusing to hire zoot suiters, and they insisted that employees speak only English.[184]

Los Angeles law enforcement agencies acknowledged that young Latinos lived within a very unequal society and endured prejudice. A supervisor in the county's probation department found that Mexican convicts' average age of twenty-six was three years younger than the county's, eighty percent of 215 criminal cases against Mexican defendants were charges of property crimes (over half of which involved single males and thirty percent were for auto theft), 101 of 651 persons on probation or parole were Mexican residents, and they seldom committed sexual assault or rape. Thirty percent of the property-crime charges were for auto theft, and over half were against single males. The supervisor concluded that the primary causes of crime were economic. Black and Latino youth that law enforcement officers arrested during 1941 represented fourteen percent of the sixteen-percent increase in juvenile offenses, and they were more likely to charge them with robbery, assault, and grand theft auto.[185]

These data led statisticians and reformers to argue both that the prevalence of violent gang activities had "been greatly exaggerated" and that harsher punishments increased recidivism, and they proposed expanding recreational centers, civic education on U.S. citizenship, and establishing juvenile courts for misdemeanor charges. Wartime inequality explains why the director of the WMC's Minorities Division chief, Guy Nunn, asserted during October of 1942 that juvenile delinquency was not a policing but rather a sociological problem, and he recommended the "fullest use of Mexican youth" in war industries and the National Youth Administration's programs and easing the process for Latino youth to apply for birth certificates that they needed to apply for work permits. Police officers killed two youth and thirty-six year old Lemza Smith, and *The California Eagle* reported the following May that "both white and negro police" were increasingly violent towards black civilians. Carey McWilliams testified to a House committee on migration the previous year, for his part, that the removal of "aliens" created a false sense of security and noted that "experience in the various democracies throughout the world proved over and over again that spies, saboteurs, fifth columnists, are not limited to aliens." He cited the work of an anthropologist, Ruth Benedict, when he also argued to a grand jury that "the problem of Mexican youth in Los Angeles County" was "a problem of cultural conflict."[186]

There were reports of "serious riots" between soldiers and civilians in Vallejo, California, and Arizona and "light skirmishes" in Los Angeles and San Diego during late 1942, and a "strong alliance between Spanish-speaking youth and Negro youth" formed through multi-racial gatherings like "inter-racial gangs, dances, etc." Covington wrote to Johnson that black residents used "the voting privilege to greater advantage" during the elections that year and were "considering a Negro-Mexican bloc in areas where both races are concentrated," and one resident of East L.A. recalled later that the Mexican Chamber of Commerce's president called for putting "every one of those poor kids" before a "firing squad the way they do in Mexico" during the riots. The CIO remained a strong political force and was "most forward in admitting and championing the cause of the Negro." The "Negro Vice-President and organizer," Revels Cayton, had a "full-time job organizing inter-racial" alliances.[187]

One of the reasons conflicts between pachucos and law enforcement escalated into a riot was prosecutors' murder-conspiracy trial against twenty-two Mexican-American youth after they fought in a "rumble" at an unincorporated area that led to stabbings and probably caused the death of a Mexican citizen, John Diaz. The conflict occurred when the Downey boys' gang "crashed" the birthday party of Amelia Delgadillo, "picked up a chair in a menacing manner" when hosts refused to serve them alcoholic beverages, and attacked members of the thirty-eighth street gang at a ranch near Slauson and Atlantic Boulevards on August 2, 1942. Members of the thirty-eighth gang recruited allies from their neighborhood and returned to the Delgadillo home, and police officers arrived and arrested pachucos before isolating, denying council, and using "force and violence" against twenty-two year old Henry Levyas (whom a prominent city attorney, Ben Margolis, later described as "very bright" and a "natural leader" without "much [formal] education") during their interrogations in jail. His autopsy report concluded the cause of death was a "profuse subdural hemorrhage" based on indicated head contusions, swelling in the knuckles, and a blood-alcohol content of .12 percent, and one of the prosecution's witnesses stated that an automobile struck Diaz earlier that evening. Diaz left the ranch several minutes before members of the thirty-eighth street gang returned, so there was no evidence that he was present during the fight.[188]

A Communist artist, Guy Endore, wrote a popular – and somewhat controversial – pamphlet for a defense committee that formed to provide legal aid for the accused, and he began by arguing that Mexico's declaration of war against Germany on May 22, 1942; increased competition with workers in Mexico, and the Allied powers' invasion of France were important context. The publishers asserted that it was not only seventeen boys that faced judgment but also the FDR's administrations "Good Neighbor policy" in the Caribbean and Latin America and "the United Nations for which they fought." An employee of the sheriff department's "foreign relations bureau, Ed Duran Ayers, noted to a grand jury cited the Mexica Empire's human sacrifices at their "heathen alter" before the Spanish Conquest, and he observed that Mexicans were more similar to Filipinos than other Asian and Pacific-Island nationalities due to both Filipinos' gender-based migration strategies and the ancestry that "the Malayan people" shared with "the American Indian." He claimed "total disregard for human life has always been universal" among Native Americans, "this Mexican element… feels a desire to use a knife or other lethal weapon," and "the biological basis" was "the main basis" for explaining their "behaviors." Ayers asserted it was "just as essential to incarcerate every member of a particular gang, whether there be ten or fifty, as it is to incarcerate one or two of the ringleaders," and Endore contended this claim was evidence that Ayers adhered to a "Nazi policy" based on "collective guilt."[189]

Law enforcement charged twenty-two gang members (who received their initial legal representation from five attorneys) with counts of conspiracy both to commit murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder against after the grand jury voted to indict. Highway patrol, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in Los Angeles, Monterrey, Montebello, Alhambra launched a massive "gang sweep" that arrested approximately 600 suspects, and a periodical, *Sensation*, published an article during December that described the defendants as "baby molesters," "young wolves," "cruel young gangsters," and "a bloodthirsty mob." The county board of supervisors tasked religious leaders and penal reformers on the newly-created Citizens' Committee for Latin-American Youth with devising appropriate recommendations, and a jury convicted twelve defendants – of whom two were furniture workers, two enlisted in the Navy, and one worked in a war industry - for three homicide and nine second-degree murder charges and seven more for assault on January 12, 1943. An appellate court found law enforcement committee many errors during the trial included failure to identify a murder weapon; forcing and coercing confessions through "the use of force, threats, intimidation, and fear;" violating due-process rights through the denial of legal counsel, sanitary facilities, and combs; defense attorneys' refusal to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses; and jurist Charles Fricke's practice of "reframe[ing] [prosecutors'] questions in order to overcome objections." The appellate court also concluded that the word "gang" does not always connote sinister activities, a judge's inflections of voice and facial expressions could merely "reflect the manner and demeanor of the prosecutor, and the defendants guilty of disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, and battery.[190]

Communist Party leader LaRue McCormick chaired the defense committee briefly before the outspoken critic of internment and recently-dismissed intellectual, Carey McWilliams, assumed directorship, and the committee garnered support quickly from workers, liberals, and religious across North America. McWilliams found that Nazi officials broadcasted reports in Central and South America just hours after the arrests, and the tone of local newspapers' coverage regarding both Latino youth and youth delinquency changed considerably after the U.S. Budget Director informed the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs that there

were insufficient "funds for the improvement of Latin American relations inside the United States." It was then that the ILWU Local 13's executive board offered more aid to ladies' auxiliaries and began supporting reformers and anti-imperialists. Executive-board members voted on February 25 to send delegates to the defense committee's upcoming conference on March 11 and donate fifty dollars to the ladies' auxiliary, and they appropriated funds for both auxiliary members to send a delegate to the ILWU convention in San Francisco and to a citywide auxiliary council three months later. A person from India, Lal Singh, spoke to members regarding both his country's "problems" and "her part in the United Nations" on March 4, and the executive board voted to donate fifty dollars to *The India News* on July 8.[191]

The convicted Latino men's time in prison was difficult, and this was especially true for Leyvas, whom prison authorities transferred from San Quentin State Penitentiary to Folsom (where authorities relocated their jute mill while Manuel Reyes and Leyvas worked as spinners making string) after he won a boxing match through a second-round knockout on July 4. One of the convicted told Communist Party member Alice McGrath that "one some days we get the Blues and get home sick," and another requested for "that chick from UCLA" to write "a few consoling lines to a forlorn guy." Reyes – who enlisted in the Navy and was preparing to take "the pledge" at the station before his arrest - contributed by purchasing "Defense Stamps," volunteering, and reading *The People's World*, and he learned from that periodical that police officers not in Germany or Japan but rather "in the USA, a land of freedom" beat his two friends during the riots. Others played sports; worked as painters, in an office, or at a hospital; mailed ration books for the Office of Price Administration; and attend school or church, and one reported to McGrath that he was not getting sufficient sunlight and was at risk of contracting tuberculosis after authorities postponed their appeal hearing during March of 1944. Law enforcement paroled nine of the convicts that spring after transferring several to Chino State Penitentiary, and one complained that Earl Warren had "freed no one" six months since taking office while noting that Leyvas, Reyes, and Bobby Telles (who each received life sentences) remained ineligible for parole for seven years.[192]

Rioting commenced less than two weeks after the Negro Victory Committee and the local NAACP chapter met to devise their response to an LAPD officer's killing of a black war worker. The NAACP's Junior Council soon responded to Dorsey High School students' protest against the principal's statement that he did not "want any of that low zoot suit stuff from the Eastside on this campus" by arguing that the ongoing "daily press campaign" was "part of a drive to stigmatize minorities." Military employees entered "zooter-infested districts" on June 6, and the LAPD's headquarters received an anonymous phone call the next day that blamed "the police for the attacks by sailors, soldiers and marines" and informed they intended to organize a meeting of 500 Latino youth during the evening. 200 soldiers "roust[ed] zoot-suiters out of their seats" at a theater on Ford Street and Brooklyn Avenue, and fighting spread quickly throughout southern California (including suburban districts) during the next the twenty-four hours. Naval officers responded to 150 soldiers' raid in Watts on June 10 by threatening court martials, and *The Los Angeles Evening-Herald and Express* reported "mumblings among the feminine element on the eastside" which indicated "the possibility that girl 'auxiliaries' to masculine mobs" were "girding themselves to prolong the 'Battle of Gangland.'"[193]

Newspapers in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico, published reports of the riots, and the Los Angeles consul observed hundreds of marines, soldiers, and sailors punched, removed clothing forcibly, and mistreated Latinos during nightly raids at theaters, films screenings, restaurants, and bars in Mexican neighborhoods while police officers "protect[ed]"

the victims by arresting and jailing them after Sheridan Downey inquired on June 9 regarding "the probable reaction in Mexico when the news that soldiers of the American army have fought Mexican civilians." A Havana-based periodical, *El Crisol*, quoted an official from the War Production Board who claimed that zoot suiters' extensive use of fabric for clothing was "against the war effort," and it learned that twenty-seven year old Luis "el jefe" Vedusco - who had previously announced that he owned eight "chuchero [pachuco] suits" - visited a police station "wearing an ordinary suit" after law enforcement officers arrested him and told journalists that he "was finished" with the "raised, tubular pants [*los levitones y los pantalones atubados*]." One Salvadoran daily, *Diario de Hoy*, noted that twenty-five people went to the hospital after "the street fighting [*los combates callejeros*]" continued between "groups of troublesome young people accompanied by friends [*muchachas*] with short skirts and armed with razor blades" and "the armed forces," and *Diario Latino* observed the Army claimed it would punish any soldier "found guilty of disturbances" after officials announced fighting ceased between soldiers and "the rufians and rebellious female friends [revoltosas muchachas]." The foreign relations secretary of Mexican president Manuel Ávila Camacho's administration asked the ambassador in Washington, D.C. five days later to both inform U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the Mexican government possessed "complete, reliable reports" and request "North American functionaries condemn publicly," and he recommended a "complete and meticulous investigation" that would allow law enforcement to "punish the guilty and grant owed reparation for the harm caused." A Mexican daily, *La Prensa*, described pachucos as "tarzans" neither born in Mexico or nor of Mexican nationality, a "true affront for our country," "almost always Black and Mexican mestizos or Mexican and Chinese or Filipino," and seeking to appear both "like North Americans" and "like Mexicans" as they wished, and editors changed their tone considerably while reporting four soldiers dressed in "impeccable white uniforms" approached two "brown-skinned friends [*muchachas morenas*]" one week earlier and "insisted in their catcalls and invitations to meet each other alone with negative rotundas and demands in loud voices" on Figueroa Boulevard until zoot suiters "entered the scene violently."[194]

The number of people residing in the Logan Heights neighborhood of San Diego increased from 203,341 to 362,658 after approximately 13,000 and 16,000 Afro-American migrants moved there during the war, and many had "vivid recollections" of the "overt prejudice against Negro and Mexican juveniles" that "some police officers displayed" during the riots. The city's police department was notably also one of the few on the west coast which employed black workers (including a detective sergeant). One of the HACLA's managers in Los Angeles, Frank Wilkinson, lived in the Aliso Village public-housing project, and he later wrote that off-duty marines and soldiers both targeted Latino and black Angelenos "during the war years (1942-1945)" and "would come to Aliso Village to stir up trouble with the Latino residents." The chair of the Catholic Interracial Council's executive committee asserted to Alice McGrath during February of 1945 that newspapers published false and misleading reports regarding allegations that pachucos attacked two servicemen who attempted to "crash" a youth group's dance hall benefit that gathered funds for its a juvenile-delinquency prevention program. These attacks occurred as the number of unauthorized wildcat strikes increased (Table I presents information on the number of unauthorized strikes that occurred each year during the war).[195]

Warren appointed a "peace officers committee in civil disturbances" during August of 1943, and its interim conclusions were riots caused millions of dollars in property damages since 1917 and prevention required regular communication between police officers and companies' security guards, labor union officials, community welfare agencies, and "other sources



Data Retrieved from Nelson Lichtenstein, *Labor's War At Home: The CIO in World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg. 133.

acquainted with the feelings of significant groups of the local population." Rumors were important causative factors, and the authors of the report recommended that police departments recruit more police officers of African, Mexican, and Filipino descent. It further advised law enforcement to convince "over-zealous persons seeking to improve the conditions of minority groups who are inclined to go beyond the limits of wisdom" that "their activities" were "likely to lead to bloodshed" and read newspapers – including periodicals that members of national minorities published – to monitor social tensions, know "key elements concerned with maintaining order," and "cultivate responsible leaders among minority groups." There were three general principles for "mob control," and they were the immediate "mobilization" of large numbers of police officers, the elimination of riot leaders, and strict impartiality. Their proposed strategy was to both arrest all "ringleaders" and as many participants as possible after the first instance of property damage and assign plainclothes officers to "infiltrate into the assembly to ascertain the identity of leaders, lieutenants, prominent followers" and use tear gas as alternatives to deadly weapons.[196]

Reformers sought both better representation for national minorities and the elimination of prejudice, and the end of World War II offered a rare chance to demand appropriate changes. The publisher of *The California Eagle*, Charlotta Bass, lived in South Carolina through high school before moving to Little Compton, Rhode Island, and Fricke selected her during January of 1943 to become the first black person to serve on a county grand jury). She implored American writers to "take up the cudgels of his art" and "battle that contemptible cultural atmosphere in which a Martin Dies, a John Rankin, a Cotton Ed Smith, may exist as a leading political figure in a nation called the world's foremost democracy." They should scrutinize "the stereotype Negro character" for their initial "assault," because it was "the symbol of our surrender" before the deep South's "political structure," "erected upon the repulsive foundation" of "Negro oppression," "disarmed the American public," and left them vulnerable "prey to the hate-mongers of the Fifth column." She castigated the audience for their "paralysis" before "the task of rejecting the

stereotype" that empowered "the terrible reign of reaction throughout the South," and she insisted that it was necessary for "every writer [to] become acquainted with the real history of the Negro people in the saga of America." Historical interpretations that claimed slaves were "content" and that "an unfortunate period of Negro equality" and inept, "'Negro governments' forced the responsible citizens of the South to some terrorism" during Reconstruction were "entirely false," and they hindered "that unity of Negro and white which the truth would call into being" by obviating "the dynamic truths" about "the Negro's role in America."[197]

"The theory of Negro inferiority" was the "demagogic political base" of the "poll-tax dynasty," a threat "to the war effort[,] and a menace to our hope for a people's peace," because it "shield[ed]" southern states "from the gaze of a liberty-loving and democratic nation." Professional writers were responsible for refuting that theory and adopting a "new approach to the Negro" based on "his understanding of the nature of reconstruction" as "a period of unity between the masses of poor whites and Negroes in the South" and "of sweeping governmental reform, of honest elections, and of unrestricted warfare against the reactionary remnants of the southern ruling case." Reconstruction "drew the united fire of northern and southern reaction" due to its "progressive achievements," and the only contemporary analog for the "bloody terror which snatched from the common people of the South, white and black, their reconstruction governments" was "the barbarous Fascist hordes of Adolf Hitler." The loyalty of "the Negro" was "based firmly on the understanding of this struggle as an anti-Fascist war," and writers could not "interpret accurately the Negro of today" without "a correct appreciation of this historic background." The national and county governments required that undocumented laborers submit information regarding their identities through the Alien Registration Act that Congress passed during 1940 and exclude Latinos from juries, and ILWU Local 13 and the Los Angeles CIO Council both supported Bass's campaign when she campaigned for city council's seventh district during the spring of 1945 before she ran for the fourteenth district's House seat five years later.[198]

Housing attorney and journalist Loren Miller was born during 1903 near the boundary of the Omaha nation's reservation in Pender, Nebraska, and his neighbors were primarily first-generation German and Swedish immigrants, Omaha, and Winnebago people. His father was born a slave, and he moved their family to a small town in Kansas when Miller was in the fifth grade. Miller began to learn about segregation - and "that the Negro had a place, a subordinate place, in America" - as a student at the University of Kansas, and he reflected later that he "went to college an American" but "emerged a Negro." Miller earned a law degree from Washburn Law School in 1928, traveled to the Soviet Union with Langston Hughes in 1932, and co-founded a black newspaper, *The Sentinel*, two years later, and he commenced practicing law in California and litigated cases involving restrictive deeding during 1939. He ran for the fourteenth district's House seat five years later, and he headed a large committee with representatives from the city's local NAACP and Urban League chapters; various CIO and AFL affiliates; churches; civic, religious and fraternal organizations; and several black newspapers the following spring when the Compton and Long Beach chambers of commerce and property owners protested a public-housing project in Venice that the regional housing commission zoned for black war workers. His biographer contends that his "pink tint" during the 1930s - and the FBI's subsequent surveillance of his activities – limited his career to receiving a judicial appointment to governor Edmund "Pat" Brown's appointment to the Los Angeles Municipal Court twenty years later, and the committee failed to dissuade the National Housing Authority from canceling the project.[199]



Dorothea Lange, "Young Man At Manzanar Relocation Camp." July 3, 1942. The subject of the photograph is Karl Yoneda, and Lange took it shortly before Yoneda enlisted in the army.

1,431 naval enlistees of African descent, 231 civilian employees, 71 officers, and 106 marines worked at one of the Pacific fleet's primary ammunitions depots near Port Chicago, Contra Costa County, and their labor allowed 100 men to divide themselves into five crews of ten during each shift to transport 500-pound and 650-pound incendiary bombs on boxcars that arrived via train tracks into *Liberty* and *Victory* ships' five hatches. The employees used mattresses as cushions, and one laborer, Joe Small, recalled they used a net to handle five or six grease-covered bombs. The 650-pound bombs had fuses on their tips, and officers wagered which crews would load the most bombs into the hatches. San Francisco's maritime unions warned the navy that laborers' working conditions were very unsafe, and a detonator at the end of a 500-pound bomb caused two explosions in the *Quinault Victory* and a Liberty ship, the *E.A. Brian*, when it sparked at 10:18 on the evening of July 17, 1944. They killed 320 people (of whom 202 were Afro-American), injured over 400 others, and left remains for fifty-one of the deceased.[200]

Joe Small was born in Savannah, Georgia, during 1921, and his father, Albert W., was a farmer and part-time Baptist preacher who owned eighty acres, repaired his own farm machinery, and did carpentry and welding. The elder Small moved his family to New Jersey and purchased a truck farm in 1927, and this was how his son learned to operate tractors and tractor-drivers before his father died at the age of fifteen. Small's school expelled him after he had an altercation with another student, and he found employment briefly in the Civilian Conservation Corps from 1937-8 before working for a furniture company and as a truck driver. The navy drafted him into the fourth division during 1943, and he became a winch operator without any formal training. Small took petty officers' responsibilities that included resolving disputes and

waking crew members in the morning, and he called cadence shortly after an army lieutenant in Fort Hood, Texas, Jack Robinson, refused to sit at the rear of a bus.[201]

The explosion obliterated the pier, caused damage in Port Chicago, and broke windows thirty-five miles away in San Francisco, and it left a crater sixty feet deep, three hundred feet wide, and seven hundred feet long. and the blast radius's magnitude, two army air corps pilots' observation at high altitudes, and military and civilian researchers' and administrators' visits to blast site over the next few days led some to question whether the purpose of the explosion was to "provide an alternative delivery system of the atomic bomb." They were studying "port-busting," high-speed photographic equipment for evaluating weapons systems and materials, and how to improve naval divers' ability to sabotage shore defenses, and they included the director of the Manhattan Project's ordnance division who supervised the arming of *The Enola Gay*, captain William S. Parsons. The head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush (whose "Demolition of Obstacles to Landing Operations Committee," or DOLOC, was investigating how to use remote-controlled, mine-clearing technologies to reduce during land invasions) reviewed the report from the infamous nuclear laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and historians of the Port Chicago Munity have emphasized the strikers' youth as many were teenagers, Small's leadership, and sailors' experiences during basic training at the Great Lakes Training Center on Lake Michigan forty miles north of Chicago under the direction of the son of a co-founder of the Hampton Institute, Lieutenant Commander D.W. Armstrong. [202]

The navy forced 258 employees who struck against the first, fourth, and eighth divisions near the *U.S.S. Sam Gay* on August 9 into the prison barge "like sardines," and it court-martialed fifty leaders on munity charges before appointing officer James Frank Coakley – who served as Earl Warren's district attorney during the 1930s and was later Alameda County's district attorney through the 1960s - as lead investigator. Coakley was especially concerned with Small's activity when strikers were aboard the prison barge during the trial at a barracks on Treasure Island, and the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, arranged for the NAACP's chief counsel, Thurgood Marshall, to fly from New York three weeks after it began on September 14. Marshall argued that the navy was "on trial for its vicious treatment of the Negro" and inquired why it "disregarded official warnings by the San Francisco waterfront unions…that an explosion was inevitable if they persisted in using untrained seamen in the loading of ammunition," and continued asking "why the Navy disregarded an offer by those same unions to send experienced men to train Navy personnel in the handling of explosives." The tribunal found the defendants guilty on October 24, and they ordered dishonorable discharges and fifteen years of hard labor as punishment. Naval leaders reduced their sentences to less-than-dishonorable discharges, assigned them further duties in the south Pacific, and then released them quietly in January of 1946, and Small befriended a 260-pound enlistee from Alabama after they had a physical altercation in a mess hall.[203]

The navy desegregated its officer corps after the Port Chicago Mutiny, and Truman ordered every branch of the military to follow suit during 1948. The navy's personnel bureau began by both capping the number of black employees in ammunitions depots to thirty percent of the "general population" and assigning 500 black seamen to twenty-five auxiliary vessels during August of 1944. The navy ceased desegregated training programs the following June, and it then desegregated units during December of 1945. It terminated "all restrictions governing types of assignments for which Negroes are eligible" two months later. The first black naval officer graduated from its academy three years later.[204]

Divisions among Los Angeles reformers sharpened during 1936-8 due to conflicts

regarding vice, racketeering, and possibly Zionism. *The Herald Decency* reported that a "notorious Communist puppet," Don R. Healey, participated in a political campaign that intended to de-criminalize gambling and prostitution. A Methodist preacher, Dr. A.M. Wilkinson, joined CIVIC after the board of supervisors dismissed him from the county welfare commission, and CIVIC supported both Palmer's campaign for district attorney and the unsuccessful mayoral campaign of third-district supervisor and chair of the Los Angeles Democratic Party, John Anson Ford. Wilkinson's son, Frank, observed conditions in housing tenements in Europe, Algeria, and Palestine (where he met "an American-educated Arab radical," Said, and typed a Palestinian report to the British Commission which sought to "reconcile Arab and Jewish conflicting interest in the Holy Land"), and he worked briefly as a social worker with the State Relief Agency (SRA) as employees were "organizing a union to combat attempts of then California Governor Colbert Olsen to politicize this agency" before accepting a position in archbishopric charities director Thomas O'Dwyer's Citizens' Housing Council (CHC) when the city established a housing commission on June 2, 1938 (Ford established the county's housing commission that year). HACLA's first projects were Pueblo del Rio, Hacienda Village, and Avalon Gardens, and Wilkinson - who was forty-percent hearing impaired by 1944 – became the manager of Hacienda Village after the CHC protested with the League of Women Voters, the YWCA, and other civic groups for the "integration" of public-housing projects during early 1942 (some residents of the city's housing projects also began organizing tenants' committees towards the end of the war). Hacienda Village was the first unsegregated public-housing project west of the Mississippi River, and HACLA soon transferred Wilkinson first to the 610-unit Ramona Gardens project housing Jewish, Latino, Asian, and Afro-American residents and then Aliso Village with its "large contingent of Latinos."[205]

A federal court's ruling in *U.S. v. Certain Lands in Louisville, Kentucky* (1938) compelled it to "de-centralize" its public housing programs by following "community patterns and trends" while doubting whether the national government had the authority to construct public housing, and housing authorities segregated public housing by deferring to "community racial patterns" during the design stage. Public-housing administrators classified these patterns based on "insulated homogenous" (i.e. residing in different housing projects), "insulated bi-racial" (residing within separate units of the same project), "mixed token," "mixed equal" (as Aliso Village was), "mixed minority" (which consisted of white majorities and black minorities), and "insulated bi-racial token" (insulated bi-racial with no more than a few Afro-American families "mixed in with the whites"). Housing authorities', and Miller - who was the chair of the local NAACP chapter's legal committee - cited *Buchanan v. Warley* while arguing to HACLA's executive director, Howard Holtzendorff, during December of 1944 that the segregation of public housing was unconstitutional. Holtzendorff countered that "local housing" were responsible for ensuring that "federal laws concerning segregation of whites and negroes in public housing projects" and "racial occupancy policies" were "in accordance with local customs and desires." Tables II-VII present information on the degrees of segregation within both county and city housing projects as of February 1, 1947.[206]

The term "community patterns" implied tenants' assent, and the county housing authority used this perception to delay desegregating its public-housing projects (with the exception of the Maravilla project) until the early 1950s. The Los Angeles County Committee on Community Relations (LACCCR) called for the county housing commission to desegregate its projects on October 30, 1951, and the commission's executive director, Melville Dozier, denied that "the Authority" ever "adopted a policy with regard to this question" while claiming that no black

Frank Wilkinson in Jerusalem during the Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939. Courtesy: Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research.

Photo of management of the Hacienda Gardens Housing Project. In the photograph are rental clerk Nathaniel Harding, clerk typist Ethel Morrison, receptionist Mamie Payne, assistant manager Faustina Johnson, interviewer Neva Bartlett, interviewer Carmen Mora, maintenance crew member Vernon Crosswhite, and manager Frank Wilkinson. *The Sentinel*, April 30, 1942.


Table II: The Los Angeles City Housing Authority's Segregation of Its Housing Projects Located in Area I By Percentage of Population as of February 1, 1947
Ramona Gardens (599 Units)
Aliso Village (777 Units)
William Mead Homes (438 Units)
Rose Hill Courts (98 Units)
Rodger Young Village (1,498 Units)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Other
Black
Anglo


Table III: The Los Angeles City Housing Authority's Segregation of Its Housing Projects Located in Area II By Percentage of Population as of February 1, 1947
Corregidor Park Annex II & III (157 Units)
Corregidor Park & Annex I (153 Units)
Pueblo Del Rio Annex (87 Units)
Pueblo Del Rio (394 Units)
Estrada Annexes I & II (157 Units)
Estrada Courts (206 Units)
Pacific Park Annex II (99 Units)
Pacific Park Trailers (197 Units)
Pacific Park Annex (22 Units)
Pico Gardens (258 Units)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Other
Black
Anglo


Table IV: The Los Angeles City Housing Authority's Segregation of Its Housing Projects in Area III By Percentage of Population as of February 1, 1947
Banning Homes (1960 Units)
Normont Terrace (395 Units)
Lumina Park (117 Units)
Avalon Gardens (157 Units)
Imperial Courts Annexes I, II, & III (139…
Imperial Courts (97 Units)
Hacienda Village (180 Units)
Jordan Downs (506 Units)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Other Black Anglo


Table V: The Los Angeles City Housing Authority's Segregation of Its Housing Projects in Area IV By Percentage of Population as of February 1, 1947
Portsmouth Homes (124 Units)
Rancho San Pedro (283 Units)
Channel Heights (585 Units)
Western Terrace (993 Units)
Keppler Grove (84 Units)
Bataan Park (229 Units)
Wilmington Hall Cottages (14 Units)
Wilmington Hall Apartments (484 Units)
Wilmington Hall Dorms (260 Units)
Dana Strand Annex (258 Units)
Dana Strand Village (380 Units)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Other Black Anglo





Data compiled by the Los Angeles County Committee on Human Relations. Frank Wilkinson Papers. Courtesy: Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research.



Slim Connelly Collection. Courtesy: CSU Northridge.

Restrictive deeding relegated black Angelenos to Watts, and there agreements that prevented them from purchasing housing in the area bounded by Slauson Avenue and ninety- tenants

tenants applied to live in the Harbor Hills, Alondra, Lancaster Homes, and Belvedere projects and no white tenants applied to live in the Will Rogers and Palm Lane projects. Dozier asserted that black tenants applied to the housing project in Carmelitos and Donnie Beach only recently and one opted to instead live in Maravilla learning he was eligible. Dozier did not state how county housing authority classified the applicant "pool," and he cited no evidence that tenants wanted segregation. The board of supervisors passed a resolution during July which forbad public officials from discriminating based on "race, color, creed, national origin or ancestry" when using or administering publicly-owned lands, and they failed to specify whether the law covered redevelopment corporations.[207]

The Southwest Realty Board was responsible for filing lawsuits, and Garland Freers was the director. White residents filed over 100 lawsuits in the county superior court with the board's support between 1937 and 1948 to enforce restrictive deed agreements. Loren Miller found the KKK convinced the city government in 1926 (the year before the establishment of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California) to annex the neighborhood "to prevent its burgeoning Negro population from taking over governmental functions and power." South Gate, Lynwood, Bell, and Compton were "lily-white" communities during the early 1940s. Watts' population density exceeded the city's average fourfold by 1960.[208]

The county housing authority approved a 300-unit housing project on the Palm Lane tract between Watts and Compton as one of three proposed housing projects to construct a total of 1,000 units (the other 700 units were to be located within city limits) during early 1944, but white residents in Venice, Culver City, and "communities contiguous thereto" evinced what Covington described as a "strong reverse reaction," "became panicky," "developed committees of resistance and resentment," and deliberated "vigilantism and a revival of the Ku Klux Klan." Sam J. Cook of W.I. Hollingsworth and Company charged in a letter to Bowron that Afro-Americans threatened white opponents of the project with "stabbing and bodily assault" over telephone, and he beseeched the mayor to resolve "this negro problem" by "placing these people in areas other than established white residential districts." Mrs. V.M. Bagby of Willowbrook complained to the governor that over thirty per cent of students at the local middle school were "colored children" even though East 124th Street was "a restricted street where we couldn't sell to colored people," and she then inquired ominously "what will it be like with three hundred or more coming in the next school term" if the project between Wilmington and Compton avenues continued. The county housing authority canceled the project, and it returned the property that it purchased to a former owner that had used it for "agricultural purposes." A black mother of two veterans challenged an eviction order for her husband's and her home on East 92nd Street, and she informed wrote to the governor that "the white people don't want to live here" before requesting re-zoning for the new "Negro settlement."[209]

Although ILWU Local 13 executive board voted to renew its "standing donation" to the Ladies Auxiliary Council during early 1944, and it concurred with just one of the auxiliary's three proposals for achieving "greater cooperation" that were to purchase and distribute copies of ephemera entitled "Are You A One Arm Batter?" and distribute to auxiliary members, permit them to hold meetings at Wilmington Bowl (where the local also held meetings), and circulate petitions demanding that the national government continue price controls. The executive board complied with the army's request to move the hiring hall to Wilmington when the harbor commission in Long Beach agreed to underwrite the costs of construction, and the NLRB reversed its earlier ruling the following spring by permitting foremen to join labor unions such as the ILWU. The ILWU's southern California locals prepared to select "a gang steward" for each

work crew, amalgamate its two locals in San Diego, and commence a new campaign among civil-service and warehouse workers and clerks who worked for steamships companies, and former employee of the Los Angeles Drug Company, Dorothy Jackson, became Local 26's first female business agent. Sixty percent of new employees at an army air force base in Wilmington harbor were women, and Local 26-A was recruiting approximately fifty checkers, stencilers, and lift operators each month during mid-June.[210]

"it was the same"

The number of labor strikes in southern California grew as the war ended and were part of a larger and more concerted effort by CIO affiliates to consolidate their gains in North America and Hawaii. Yet although wartime rent-control laws remained highly popular, the state government's Department of Education introduced means-testing and a sliding scale to its child-care programs. The Bowron administration refused to prosecute terrorists who sought to exclude black residents from neighborhoods covered by restrictive deed agreements after the Nuremberg trials, moreover, and as the California state government, military leaders, and the United Nations each failed to challenge vigilantes' alliance with the imperialist wing of the international ruling class. Philanthropists from the Mid-West interjected within debates over how to improve community-police relations, meanwhile, by funding organizing projects that promoted the concept of "race relations" amidst continued housing shortages, rising property values, and intense competition for employment and housing that pushed many working-class residents towards Los Angeles County's southeastern areas where the cost of living was lower. Local and regional housing and labor markets remained extremely segregated as a result, which left CIO affiliates and Communist labor organizers with few alternatives than to strike and form more unions which demanded higher wages, better working conditions, equal pay, and tenants' rights.

The bombing of Short's home occurred as skepticism of the validity of restrictive deed agreements among county residents was growing after World War II, though the county's superior court affirmed their legality in two cases that involved restrictive deed agreements just one year earlier by citing the supreme and federal court cases of *Corrigan v. Buckley* (1926) and *Grady v. Garland* (1937). One of the deed agreements for the more recent case had excluded black Angelenos since 1929 from nearly 500 dwelling units bounded by 40th and 84th streets to the north and south, Main Street to the east, and the 900-block, but several black Angelenos were still able to buy homes between 49th and 57th streets after 1939. The defendants moved to a house on 50th Street during the fall of 1943, and the plaintiff soon complained on the grounds that their presence in the neighborhood – as opposed to local residents' refusal to sell to the highest bidders – caused his property values to decline by ten percent. Although a local school on Main Street had approximately the same number of Afro-American and white students, the judges on the county's superior court also cited Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in *Plessy v. Ferguson* to both advocate for "the realistic acceptance of the fact [sic] that we are two races, two strains of humanity who, although children of the same God, have come to this meeting place of the present by different roads that have left distinguishing marks upon us" and rule in favor of "the right to contract with one's neighbors to the end of preserving the character of the neighborhood."[211]

There were between approximately 225,000 and 235,000 Mexicans, 205,000 black Americans, 168,000 Jews, and 16,000 to 25,000 Japanese people living in the county by August of 1945, and increased displacement and dismissals soon ensued during economic reconversion as the percentages of Afro-American, Mexican-American, and Asian-American populations employed in the food industry and public sectors rose over the next seven months from 7.8% to

11% and 8.1% to 15.4%, respectively. Yet their employment in other industries also declined simultaneously from 10.8% to 6.8% in rubber, from 9.7% to 6.9% in iron and steel, from 17.8% to 14.4% in nonferrous metals, and from 3.5% to .15% in oil refining, and the latter set of layoffs occurred not long after Minority Specialist in Long Beach, George Toll, reported that the "Petroleum Industry" had objected to the "use of common sanitary facilities." Another WMC official, Charles Bratt, found soon after during the winter season, furthermore, that employers were "showing disinclination towards hiring" national minorities "except for common labor and service jobs" and that "more and more" were "effectively excluding minority groups" specifically through the practice of "pre-screening," which made "the task of matching the man and the job much more difficult." The total number of "nonwhite" employees working in the San Francisco Bay Area's fifty largest plants decreased similarly by thirty-five percent, meanwhile, as opposed to just twenty percent among white workers. It was also at that time, lastly, that the Los Angeles CIO Council's secretary, Slim Connelly, reported to Bowron that highway projects were displacing thousands of families and that there were increases in the "cases of suicide attributable to despair at inability to find housing" as well as of "delinquency, truancy, and disease" in "greatly congested areas of the city."[212]

The postwar strike wave began in Los Angeles during the spring of 1945 when a small union of screen-set designers voted to affiliate of the CSU, the International Brotherhood of Painters Local 1421, and went out on strike. The CSU had grown steadily under Herbert K. Sorrell's leadership since 1942 so that its membership then included carpenters, painters, electricians, screen writers, the actors' guild, story analysts, building service employees, and shed decorators who were also soon picketing the Warner Brothers' studios on October 5, 1945. The strike resulted from the CSU's jurisdictional dispute with the AFL-affiliated IATSE, which was the collective-bargaining representative for electricians, "property men," laboratory technicians, sound men, cameramen, makeup men, costumers, film editors, and first-aid attendants employed in the film industry. Picketing continued for a week despite police officers' use of "tear gas and water" and detentions of 700 people. Yet *The Hollywood Atom* also reported that four police officers employed by the company resigned in protest against "the assault on striking motion picture workers by hired thugs, assisted by uniformed men wearing badges from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's office, Glendale, Burbank and Los Angeles police," while *The Dispatcher* found that "numerous Burbank policemen" admitted to taking bribes from Warner Brothers as auto and steel workers' unions organized national strikes during the winter.[213]

As the Waterfront Employers Association introduced tractors and other machinery on the west-coast docks that pulled "four-wheelers," cranes, and lift trucks, members of ILWU Local 13 won vacation pay for the first time with a "short little strike" during October of 1945 shortly after the international executive board issued an order requiring locals to request strike authorization, which was not long before they voted on April 16, 1946, to de-register members of the Unemployed 500, "elevate" several warehouse workers, and limit the local's total membership to 2,765 persons. This was in stark contrast to 43,000 members of AFL-affiliated seamen's unions – including 700 in Long Beach – who struck during September of that year. Members of UAW Local 216, for their part, also went out on strike against General Motors the following spring. The extent of the spirit of solidarity was evident not long after members of ILWU Local 13 approved a three-month assessment to create a strike fund for CIO affiliates during February, since the local's executive board concurred with the Los Angeles Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy's statement which condemned both "our intervention in China" and "our conduct of administration" in Korea and the Philippines and called for

international recognition of Indonesia. The local's executive board also pledged $100 to IATSE Local 683 nine months later after it heard "a very good report on the strike" from Jeanne Lowry. IAM members in San Diego also won fifteen-percent wage increases and a maintenance-of-membership provision after striking against the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, meanwhile, but the lawyers' guild was soon litigating "mass arrests" shortly before two representatives of a local packinghouse workers' union, Marie Chavez and "Sister Harrison," discussed their strike with Local 13 members at their monthly meeting during May of 1948.[214]

The CIO was soon reporting that approximately 18,000 workers – including 12,000 steelworkers at thirty-seven plants – were participating in almost fifty strikes in Los Angeles County during January of 1946 as part of USA's "great national crusade" to raise wages "commensurate with increased living costs," while up to 193,000 members of the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) soon joined by striking against the "Big Four" meatpacking companies of Cudahy, Armour, Swift, and Wilson. Up to 2,000 members of UAW Local 216 and UE Local 1421 joined their pickets at U.S. Motors's plant on Slauson Avenue between Wall and Los Angeles streets in demand of two-dollar increases in their daily wages, meanwhile, as the House of Representatives passed the "Case Bill" which authorized the courts to issue anti-picketing injunctions. UPWA affiliates in Los Angeles confronted another setback, however, when members of AFL-affiliated meatpackers' and unions crossed picket lines at several "independent plants," as the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union also did after U.S. President Truman ordered the Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton P. Anderson, to seize strike-affected meatpacking plants. LAPD officers under the command of Lieutenant Clyde Tucker soon again reverted to the use of tear gas as they beat and arrested strikers – including several war veterans – in front of the U.S. Motors plant after superior court judge Henry M. Willis issued an injunction on January 15 that limited the number of strikers to four, which provided a rationale for Bowron, who soon faced up to 500 picketers after daring a CIO delegation to "go ahead and sweep me out of office," to claim that "this is not a question or pro-labor or anti-labor – it is a matter of law enforcement." The secretary of the Los Angeles CIO Council also reported to the state CIO's newspaper, *The Labor Herald*, from a jail cell in Lincoln Heights that Bowron's administration had "revived the red squad" in the form of a new "Metropolitan Squad" (which was a charge that police chief C.B. Horrall denied emphatically), although the cause of labor did also receive support from Deputy Police Chief Henry Eaton's resignation in protest as well as superior- and state-supreme court decisions in 1941, 1947, and 1949 which struck down bills passed by the state legislature regarding "hot cargo" and "jurisdictional strikes."[215]

2,000 cannery workers in San Diego represented by an AFL affiliate that included at least one fishermen's unit won hourly wage increases of seven to ten cents after a two-week strike during the late summer of 1946 not along after 600 employees of the Hunt Brothers' cannery in Fullerton struck with FTA Local 25 for minimum hourly wages of eighty-five cents for female employees and ninety-five cents for male employees and the same overtime scale as their counterparts in northern California canneries, while Harry Bridges soon met with leaders of Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar workers' unions in New Orleans to discuss a groundbreaking strike by 25,000 workers at thirty-three plantations on Maui, Hawaii, Kauai, and Oahu for minimum hourly wages of sixty-five cents (delegates from Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican sugar workers' unions also met with ILWU representatives twice in San Francisco and Havana the following year) amidst a wave of repression and assassinations in the Caribbean and elsewhere whose victims included Dominican labor organizer José Quezada and the Communist president of the Cuban Federation of Sugar Workers and deputy in the Cuban Congress, Jesus

The Labor Herald, January 18, 1946.

Menéndez. Officers of various CIO-affiliated maritime unions met in New York City, meanwhile, to discuss a possible "joint strike action" that never occurred, but ILWU members in Hawaii did still win hourly wage increases two years later from twenty-six to between forty-three and seventy-five and one-half cents, "the irrevocable check-off," and a non-discrimination clause that was a result, at least in part, of auxiliary members' "big contribution" that included organizing food distribution during a lockout at the Olaa plantation. The Hawaiian longshoremen's union also signed a contract during the winter with retroactive hourly wage increases of up to $1.30, a preferential hiring hall, and a forty-hour day, while 1,065 sugar workers employed by the Pioneer Mill Company ended their strike on February 24, 1947, after winning the reinstatement of ten discharged union members (and IBT members refused to cross striking pineapple workers' picket lines against the Hawaiian Pineapple and the Oahu Railway and Land companies) before the ILWU's various Hawaiian longshoremen's and sugar workers' unions formed Locals 136 and 142, respectively, on September 30 of that year. Though ILWU Local 26 claimed over 3,000 members by 1947 and the FTA won an NLRB election at Florida's largest citrus packinghouse plant in Dade City, the Truman administration helped the employers create an atmosphere of intimidation by discharging an assistant Attorney General, Tom Clark, for criticizing Americans for their "appalling lack of information," their "desperate need for education on the danger of fascism," and their unwillingness to "recognize a fascist if they heard him speak or if they read his propaganda – provided he didn't have a thick German accent and kept a swastika off his printed material." Yet a former national commander of the American Legion, Charles A. Veriall, also reported from San Diego, in contrast, that "the antilabor attitude" was "prevalent only among the top brass" and urged the organization's approximately 3.5 million members to organize "union labor posts" immediately.[216]

UAW members against the Bendix Aviation Corporation in North Hollywood during February of 1946 as part of that union's national strike for wage increases of thirty percent, as did members of the CIO-affiliated Utility Workers Union of America, a taxi drivers' union, and ILWU Local 26 employed by the Friedman Bag Company (most of whom were either working-class white women or "members of minority groups") later that spring and, in the case of Local 26, won a one-year contract with hourly wage increases of fifteen to twenty-and-one-half cents, equal pay, maternity leave, a minimum of two hours of call-in pay, two paid holidays, two ten-minute breaks, vacation time, a closed shop, and a non-discrimination clause before the Truman administration intervened and "settled the strike emergency" by preventing tram, bus, and railroad workers from joining the strike wave. Organized labor did also benefit, however, from Truman's veto of the Case Bill during that summer as Local 26 members voted by a margin of 521 to six to strike at nineteen of the city's scrap and waste-material plants for hourly wage increases of eighteen-and-one-half cents for female and male employees and were soon joined by 600 other members of the local employed by the city's drug and warehousing companies. LANG members also struck against *The Los Angeles Herald & Express*, while ten film companies locked out employees during a second strike by the CSU's (which had not signed a contract with employers for three years) affiliates of carpenters, painters, electricians, and film technicians in the fall that again resulted in arrests of over 700 picketers. One observer attributed the repression to collusion between the Motion Picture Producers Association, "the gangster-infested leadership of the IATSE," and the "storm-trooper tactics of the tax-supported Los Angeles police," though this did not stop ILWU Local 26 from continuing its organizing campaign by charging employers with "discriminating against women employees" before it won NLRB elections among employees of the Quaker Oats, the Hollywood Loancraft, the Gate Rubber, and Troll's Mint companies; establishing political-action committees at every plant under contract; increased hourly wages by sixteen and one-half cents (which raised their minimum hourly wages to $1.22 after employees completed ninety days of work) for 350 employees of the Owl Drug, Sontag, and Thrifty companies after a brief strike during December; and achieved further "correction of inequities" in pay for predominantly-female drug-store clerks by raising hourly wages again the following year by twenty and ten more cents, respectively, and thereby made their minimum wages of $1.32 the highest among all drug-store clerks living on the west coast.[217]

Demand for child care grew substantially during the war and led the state government to announce a "considerable reduction" of child-care fees on August 14, 1945 and later to appropriate $3.5 million on February 28, 1946, for child care centers over the next thirteen months in response to both the national government's unpopular decision to cease providing funding for child-care programs and a vociferous organizing campaign by working mothers in the Bay Area, but the state's department of education still introduced means-testing and a sliding scale during July of 1947 over numerous objections from working-class parents (including both single mothers and married veterans whose wives worked for wages as they attended school or other workers' training programs). Dorothy and Dwight Fiske lived on West Exposition Place and wrote to the governor, for example, that it was "a great hardship to parents" to charge $190.20 more each year when considering the fact that they earned weekly wages of thirty-three dollars and were already living under a leaky roof, while one Republican voter who lived on 91st Street, Myrtle Burton, cited similarly the "real need" of "mothers who through no fault of their own" were "the sole support of their children" and could only either work for wages "or become charity cases" when she also implored Warren to use his "influence" to establish "a permanent child care program" in the state. The California Business Women's Council's legislative chairs

also suggested purchasing, instead of renting, property for child-care centers as a means of lowering costs during May of 1948, but another Republican voter, M.F. Taylor of Hawthorne, argued, in contrast, that nurseries should not "be saddled on us, the tax payers," whose taxes already funded public schools; that parents who did "not want to raise or care for their own children" should pay for child care; that he was "sick of this New Deal, communistic CIO socialism, this unAmerican stuff;" and that it was "time to scrap it" and "return to Constitutional Government." Although World War II veterans who enrolled in school were exempt from the sliding scale, the new weekly income limit was $225 for single-parent families and $275 for two-parent families - parent fees contributed approximately one-third of the program's total revenue – while the number of children enrolled in either preschool nurseries or extended day care decreased between November of 1946 and March 30, 1947, before from 13,381 to 11,104 before fluctuating between 9,700 and 13,987 over the next two years. It is also notable that the state labor federation's secretary-treasurer, C.J. Haggerty, characterized the refusal of state assembly's public-health committee to vote on healthcare bills towards the end of the war as one of the legislature's "most disappointing performances" due to organized labor's recent "unity" in its advocacy of healthcare legislation and criticized state legislature further for rejecting other bills to establish a state fair employment practices commission introduced by assemblyman Augustus Hawkins which delineated "broad powers to regulate employment practices" and contained "penalty provisions for violation" (Warren favored establishing only an investigating commission) as well as others to guarantee equal pay and to "regulate hours, wages and working conditions in domestic service."[218]

Many local and state officials, civic groups, and philanthropists sought to address the social ills which led to wartime riots, meanwhile, but their reliance on the vague and malleable concept of "race relations" imposed substantial limitations on the efficacy of their proposed solutions to wartime riots by failing defined problems in community-police relations precisely or comprehensively, forcing community and labor leaders to depend on philanthropists (especially but not only from the Mid-West and the Northeast), and further obscuring both the processes and the impacts of market integration, the proliferation of new technologies, segregation, and a growing oil industry. The county board of supervisors tasked the newly-created the Los Angeles County Conference on Human Relations during January of 1944 with cooperating with other groups and agencies to identify, eliminate, and prevent "racial tension," and 114 civic organizations and government agencies soon used funding from west-coast office of the Chicago-based American Council on Race Relations' (ACRR) in San Francisco to launch an effort to win fair "employment for Negroes with the Los Angeles Railway Company" through the Los Angeles Committee on Civic Unity. Fletcher Bowron also appointed Floyd Covington as a city housing commissioner briefly just before the L.A. Riot, and the local Urban League chapter also lobbied successfully for the appointment of a former field circulation representative for *The Los Angeles Examiner* and Safeway store manager, Leon Thompson, as the manager of a housing project that white residents had recently sought to "prevent" from "being assigned chiefly to Negro war workers." Bowron also sought to improve community-police relations later that year by creating the Los Angeles Committee on Home Front Unity as part of his unsuccessful effort to "encourage the growing youth to cooperate with law enforcement agencies" with auxiliary police units, while the state's attorney general, Robert Kenny, became a major champion of a police "training model" based on the Richmond Police Department's program that sought to teach police officers "the reason for the cause of racial frustrations and difficulties out of which the riots come."[219]

When Kenny authorized the state's police and sheriffs' departments to replicate the Richmond department's police-training programs in 1946, he intended it to teach officers about "human relations" and the "detection of crime" by considering "the problems of race relations" not from "an academic standpoint" but rather from that of "the practical policeman" for whom it would instill a "professional attitude." The program's teaching manual noted that municipal governments were liable for property damage caused by riots and many psychologists' contention that prejudice is learned, and it also emphasized the importance of prevention through neutral, unbiased, and impartial inquiry that could avert adverse outcomes such as criminality and, indeed, totalitarianism. The authors then postulated that "Negroes and Mexican-American youth, as groups," were "more inclined to react aggressively to discrimination," live in communities that suffered from high crime rates, and pose a "serious problem" due to their fear and distrust of police, and it asserted further that, whereas Chinese communities tended supposedly to refrain from interacting with Euro-American residents of southern California, Jewish- and Japanese-Americans opted to compete aggressively with others to seek better social statuses. The authors then diverted their scrutiny towards black residents who had recently migrate from the South "expecting to be a free man" and tended, as a result, to "go too far" instead of accepting "the limits of his new freedom." The manual advised police departments to demonstrate "absolute impartiality" by avoiding the use of insulting terms and names, hiring members of "minority groups," improving relations with the "minority press," investigating and controlling the spread of rumors that were both "a symptom and a cause of trouble," and creating a Human Relations Detail that would "centralize responsibility" for improving community relations.[220]

Severe housing shortages were, like community-police relations, a major issue in southern California during the 1940s which affected both civilians and veterans and became a major impetus (though far from the only one) for veterans to become politically active upon their return. *The Federated Press* reported, for example, that several hundred veterans in South Gate marched on the town council during August of 1946 – which was a year when epidemics of polio and diphtheria struck the city – to protest delays in the construction of emergency housing. The American Veterans Committee (AVC) also argued at its first constitutional convention in Des Moines that year, furthermore, that "the Four Freedoms are inseparable" and that "domestic, economic, political and social problems" necessitated solutions for achieving peace that were indeed possible due to "our abundant resources, our manpower and our skill and our basically sound democratic system." The AVC's platform demanded the continuation of wartime price controls, government subsidies, a forty-hour week, and overtime pay; allocating at least fifty percent of public housing funds for low-cost rental units; increasing the hourly minimum wage to seventy-five cents and affirming "the principle of a guaranteed annual wage;" a healthcare program which included more hospital planning and construction, "an adequate mental health program," more national government aid for community-wide health services, "compulsory health insurance," and extending social-security protections to encompass health issues and especially disability compensation; and the abolition of "Jim-Crow laws, anti-Nisei restrictions, and all other forms of racial discrimination by individuals, by private businesses, by labor unions, government and other associations" through a national fair employment practices law that would prohibit discrimination based on "race, religion, color or sex" (including against Native Americans); and granting Puerto Ricans with "the deserved right to vote" with regard to their political status. The AVC also adopted principles and a strategy for U.S. foreign relations by calling for a civilian-, not military-led, government in Japan, opposing U.S. participation "in

any alliance or bloc against the United Kingdom or the U.S.S.R.," supporting "the endeavors of colonial peoples for independence," and demanding an "equal vote" in the United Nations for "liberated colonial peoples," and at least one of the eighteen AVC chapters in Los Angeles County was soon publishing their own proposals "based on the C.I.O.'s own housing program" by January of 1947.[221]

The first postwar assignment for the ACRR's field representative in southern California, which was none other than Fred Ross, was to lead a community response to white terrorists' bombing of O'Day Short's property in the San Fernando Valley during December of 1945, but instead organized chapters of the California Federation for Civic Unity, or "Unity Leagues," in southern California over the next several years with a $15,000 grant from the ACRR after finding that "the NAACP had their lawyers on the job" and everything "pretty well in hand" with regard to Short's assassination. Ross had studied sociology at the University of Chicago during the 1930s and claimed to have had "hands-on experience with Chicago's gangs" during those years, which was when he concluded that it was "social disintegration" that caused delinquency and that "social work, charity, and welfare" could not therefore "address the fundamental dynamics at work." These arguments were especially perplexing due to the facts that one of Ross's first organizational activities in Chicago involved supporting attempts by black residents of Woodlawn to challenge the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council's exclusionary housing practices and that a Spanish-language newspaper publisher, Ignacio "Nacho" Lopez, informed him shortly after the war ended of the need for "civic and legislative action" in Los Angeles County while he gathered information regarding both local residence's experiences during the 1936 citrus strike in Placencia and the presence of an active KKK chapter in San Bernardino County. Mexican-American residents also soon informed Ross that housing administrators in the citrus belt were excluding Mexican veterans from new veterans' housing projects and that police officers were "lining up the kids and frisking them" during "shake-downs all around the East Side," but the Los Angeles Council for Civic Unity's had little impact by the summer of 1947 as its more successful chapters in northern California did due to its inability to compete for philanthropic donations with more well-established civic organizations in Los Angeles like the LACCCR and Thomas O'Dwyer's CHC once "race relations activities" were "no longer as 'fashionable' as they once were." Yet Ross had already become the Industrial Areas Foundation's (IAF) field representative in East L.A., by then, and also co-founded, with approximately twenty-five other members and co-sponsorship by IAF co-founder Bernard J. Sheil's sponsorship the first CSO chapter in Boyle Heights (the first president of which was Edward Roybal), which the founding members had at first called "Our Own Organization" formed initially in response to the police killing of a young local resident, Raymundo Alessandro, before the organization both disassociated from the CIO and its executive committee refused to invite the Communist-affiliated Asociación Nacional de Mexicanos Americanos (ANMA) to participate in their planned housing program towards the end of the decade.[222]

The end of the war resulted in discharges for 83,800 war workers in Los Angeles County as well as 12,000 others in San Diego and another 3,475 in other areas of southern California in the first month after Truman ordered the use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which coincided with another attempt by white supremacists led by "a graduate of the Huey Long machine in Louisiana," Gerald L.K. Smith, during that summer to seize the state of California. Smith had lectured for the Silver Shirts in 1933 and soon received funds from Henry Ford, William Randolph Hearst, and most industrialists in the Detroit area, according to Hal Draper of the Workers Party's Los Angeles Section, when he, along with Tom

Coughlin and Charles Townsend, attempted to organize white supremacists into the America First Party three years later (Smith was also that party's presidential candidate in 1944 before becoming its national director). Smith "took over" Coughlin's radio broadcasts and held anti-CIO rallies across the state of Michigan with the "private army" under Ford Motor Company personnel manager Harry Bennett's direction during his 1936 campaign, but both his failure to reserve a hall at the United Nation's founding conference in San Francisco and the activities of white supremacists in southern California after the war soon led Smith to attempt to establish a new "beachhead" in Los Angeles. Smith found willing collaborators in the thirteenth district's city councilman, Meade McLanagan – to which 3,000 war workers and residents of a public housing project, Wilmington Hall, responded by revoking his invitation to their July 4 celebration – as well as in the "Ham 'n Egg" organization led by Willis and Lawrence Allen, which reserved halls at the Embassy, Philharmonic, and Shrine auditoria for his various speeches in the area during the summer of 1945. This was notably six months after Frank Sinatra requested that representatives from the Los Angeles CIO Council attend a meeting to discuss the "gangster message employed against those who oppose Smiths and McClanahan," while upwards of 15,000 people soon protested Smith's speech at Polytechnic High School on October 16.[223]

Local KKK members burned a cross in Big Bear Valley during late March of 1946, while Wesley Swift of the American Legion proclaimed soon after that Legionnaires planned "to form restrictive covenants here and elsewhere in order to hold the line of pure Americanism" and also denied the existence of any "anti-Catholic feeling" within the KKK. The state attorney general, Robert Kenny (whose office had also directed the prosecution for the Sleepy Lagoon appeals case), launched, in stark contrast, a new campaign after the war, the "Mobilization for Democracy," with support from both CIO and AFL affiliates and the NAACP. Kenny had recently announced his gubernatorial candidacy after returning from the Nuremberg trials in Germany after receiving an invitation to attend from Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson and soon both ordered a raid against a KKK meeting on South Grand Avenue on May 9 and revoked the KKK's charter in southern California, and white supremacists responded by burning crosses and painting swastikas on the house of H.G. Hickerson's (whose was amidst a "court battle" to keep his house) on May 13 as well as in Palm Springs, on Jewish fraternities' buildings on two different college campuses, and on the wall of the Temple Israel in Hollywood between May 19 and May 22. Fletcher Bowron criticized the "lawlessness and terrorism," for his part, but also refused to name the KKK specifically as culprits, and he dismissed Kenny's warning, furthermore, of "a serious effort" to "revive the Ku Klux Klan on a national scale" through "a capably organized, systematic campaign of Fascist violence and intimidation and horror" as mere Communist propaganda "directed against the police department." This was just weeks before Smith held a large rally in Los Angeles and soon returned for a "Christian National Conference" during the late summer, and yet the Council for Civic Unity still opted to disaffiliate with the Mobilization for Democracy shortly before the ACRR cut ties with the council one year later.[224]

Vigilantes continued targeting Afro-American residents of neighborhoods covered by

restrictive deed agreements, since the Los Angeles CIO Council reported one of the first instances in which "white hoodlums" trespassed onto Mr. and Mrs. Sidney King's property on November 10, 1947, for example, and threatened them with violent attacks if they refused to vacate their property on East 60th Street. CIO Political Action Director James Burford responded by meeting with a deputy sheriff, while the city's CIO Council began organizing community

defenses by issuing "an additional communication" to 150 CIO members and residents of the neighborhood bounded by Central and Alameda Avenues, Slauson, and Florence. June Buckles received similar support after vigilantes threatened her family and delivered an eviction notice when the Los Angeles CIO Council's president, William S. Lawrence, and representatives from electrical, machine, public-sector, and furniture workers' unions, as well as Judy Denks of the United Electrical and Machine Workers, visited her at her home on East 90th Street, whereas Sidney Moore of the United Public Workers offered "a pledge of support in her fight against a restrictive covenant eviction" and another committee member pledge to petition that the Veterans of Foreign Wars' county and state commanders repudiate the member who participated in the attack. The newly-formed Greater Los Angeles CIO Council's fair-practices committee (chaired by John Dial, Jr. of the American Clothing Workers of America) convened a meeting several years later in the city of Bell with steel and auto workers and "respectable leaders" during the winter of 1951-2 after local white residents attempted to "drive out" ILGWU member Zula Mae Payne from her new home, and Lydia Álvarez recalled similarly, for her part, that life in San Diego "was the same" and that she "did not see anything different" between World War II and when she worked as a riveter for the Consolidated Aircraft Company in San Diego during the Korean War.[225]

The national government had no economic or military rivals of comparable strength after World War II as it vied with the Soviet Union for alliances in the former colonies, while the Truman administration's reversion to Anti-Communism led the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC), and ERP administrators to establish what historian Martha Huggins has characterized as more "formal" programs for training police officers in Latin America than the FBI's previous collaborations with the "centralized" regimes of Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador during the 1930s. The then-Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, argued during a speech to the Delta Council in Cleveland, Mississippi, after a series of droughts, floods, and cold winters the U.S. had four central imperatives with regard to the reconstruction of Asia and Europe, which were to increase exports; provide assistance to Greece, Turkey, and the newly-independent Philippines (where Douglas MacArthur's chief aid and political adviser, admirer of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, and "fellow-traveler of fascism, Andrés Soriano, was supporting the regime of Manuel Roxa); finance the reconstruction of Germany and Japan, in particular; and "concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations." Acheson also informed the audience that the Truman administration was proposing to allocate half a billion dollars for relief and aid for reconstruction in the Philippines, an additional $1 billion for "relief in occupied areas," and $750 million for Greece and Turkey, and. He concluded by stating that "one of the principal aims of our foreign policy" was to "preserve our own freedoms and our own democratic institutions" by increasing "narrow economic margins." "It is necessary," Acheson asserted, "for our national security," and it was not long after that right-wing military juntas overthrew democratically-elected governments in Peru and Venezuela and the Truman administration began linking "development" explicitly with Anti-Communist regimes.[226]

As housing attorney Loren Miller studied the history of restrictive deed agreements, he found a report by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Jews in Europe and Palestine which both recommended rescinding the British Empire's Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 that only permitted land sales to Palestinians and Jewish people if they purchased property in

separate areas and the criticized Jewish National Fund's practice of leasing property in the Holy Land "to secure employment for Jewish immigrants on the land" as unjust. Miller also joined the executive board of a Zionist organization, the American League for a Free Palestine, briefly during February of 1947. Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas of L.A. lambasted the U.S. arms embargo on Palestine during the following March as "a severe blow to our prestige and moral integrity" and the U.N., and she contended the arms embargo abrogated both previous international agreements and the U.N.'s partition plan. Complaining that "we can send arms to every other place in the world" but not "to people in support of a United Nations decision" and that the U.S. was "abandoning the one democratic stronghold in the Middle East" despite "our talk of liberty and democracy," Douglas blamed "the violence" in Palestine on "the activities by a few nations to impose their will over the majority in violation of international agreements." She went on to argue - with no sense of irony - that "our backing down in the face of this violence is an invitation for others to ignore decisions by international authority."[227]

"that's what it is"

Divisions within the Los Angeles CIO Council became evident soon after U.S. officials began requiring that public employees sign loyalty oaths during the spring of 1947 and amidst debates over international issues regarding whether to support both the third-party presidential candidacy of Henry Wallace and the ERP during the next several years. There was little margin for error for industrial unionists on these and other questions such as ILWU 13's continued exclusion of black workers from union membership, officials' harassment of outspoken black postal workers, separatism within the CIO council, the CIO executive board's attempt to repress dissent within industrial union councils, municipal governments' appeals of wartime rent-control laws, businessowners' and some women's clubs' successful opposition to the county board of supervisors' proposed resolution to establish a fair-employment commission, and Earl Warren's extraditions of several black men (including one leader of ILWU Local 26) to southern states. The deportation of Luisa Moreno, the invasion of Korea, and the subsequent isolation of Sinophiles within the U.S. military occurred during both the CIO executive board's purges of Communist-affiliated unions and the CSO's sectarian activity, and it encouraged HACLA and the board of education to dismiss Communist employees and permit police brutality in black and Latino neighborhoods to worsen. Each of these factors discouraged police officers, in turn, from allying with other workers. Anti-Communists succeeded in preventing reform by eliminating leaders of the Communist-affiliated unions, and they continued to leave many workers in L.A. vulnerable due to the effects of corruption, segregation, and dangerous working and living conditions.

The county's total population had grown by thirty-five percent, or from 2,785,643 to 3,747,962 (along with a concomitant growth in the number of automobiles), between 1940 and 1947, which was five times the national average of seven percent during those years. There remained substantial limits on housing construction, however, since the city government had passed an ordinance in 1921 which forbad construction of two-family dwellings that the California Supreme Court upheld four years later in the case of *Miller vs. Board of Public Works*. The municipal government sought to curb corrupt and unethical zoning practices known as "zoning variances" in 1941, furthermore, by amending its charter to create a new position of zoning administrator within the city's planning commission. After the regional commission incorporated, or zoned, "an unusually large new section of the region" in East L.A. with a population of approximately 18,000 the following year under the leadership of chairwoman L.S. Baca, the Greater Los Angeles Citizens' Committee formed with private financing and



Courtesy: The Huntington Research Library.

sponsorship by "influential citizens" in 1943 and appointed an independent staff of "skilled planning technicians" to both review city and regional planning commissions' plans and devise a proposal for "the development of the beach with related parkways from Playa del Ray to Palos Verdes Estates." The regional planning commission had mostly only planned for constructing highways and recreational facilities until it began producing master plans shortly before the U.S. entered World War II for shoreline development, airports, and government administrative centers, while the city council imposed limits on construction according to population density and the board of supervisors passed the county's first comprehensive zoning regulations based on the principle of "density control" that limited the number of dwelling units per lot in "several residential and commercial zones" - and began preparing to rezone agricultural districts in the San Fernando Valley as industrial, commercial, or residential – amidst a spike in housing construction during 1946.[228]

99.8% of all subdivisions that the regional planning commission approved in 1944 were for plots of less than one acre, and, while 19% of the county's total population growth of 105,422 over the next year occurred in incorporated urban areas, 32% was in unincorporated areas such as the San Gabriel Valley. Homeowners constructed 147,222 new units in the two years after the county recorded 298,661 new deeds in the year 1946 alone, and HACLA soon estimated a deficit of 150,847 housing units towards the end of the decade. The total number of dwellings in the county increased between 1940 and 1947 from 961,541 to 1,197,398, and, when population growth had slowed by 1949 to a total number of 4,190,756 people (while still growing faster in unincorporated areas), the regional planning commission began diverting more resources towards approving subdivisions near the southeastern edges of the county such as Lakewood, Whittier, Rivera, Covina, and the Antelope Valley - as well as rather rapid school construction and rezoning – and also indicated in its annual report of 1951 that an incorporated area in Los Nietos-Santa Fe Springs which encompassed 7.09 square miles and contained a total population of 4,880 also included an oil field (the commission used the "development history" of the La

Brea oil field to rezone half of the industrial zone as residential). The "end game" for Communist labor leaders soon began, meanwhile, when county board of supervisors created the "Loyalty Check Committee" on August 26, 1947, which soon collected anti-Communist affidavits from county employees and produced a list of banned organizations that included the Abraham Lincoln Brigades, the California Labor School, MCS, and the Maritime Federation of the Pacific - but not, a supervisor John Anson Ford noted, the America First Party - as well as many other civil rights, student, and anti-war organizations. The U.S. Congress also passed an amendment for an appropriations bill, furthermore, which required that residents of public housing to also sign anti-Communist affidavits, barred admission for anyone "designated as subversive by the Attorney General," and led the Los Angeles chapter of the Communist-affiliated Civil Rights Congress to respond by arguing that "the Mexican and Negro people form a large part of those living in the projects" and would "be among the first to feel the effect of the regulation" and that "the workingman" was "the particular target of this attack" (the appellant department of the county superior court ruled finally in 1955 that housing authorities "lack the authority to make such a requirement a condition for tenants." Tables VIII-XII presents data on foreclosures, deeds in lieu of foreclosure, proposed tract maps, and subdivisions in Los Angeles County from 1931 through 1961.[229]

The postwar housing shortages were most acute for black Angelenos, but they were especially bitter due to many white Californians' longstanding support for and appeasement of housing segregationists which ignored their long history of U.S. military service with reckless abandon. The Afro-American community in the city had long been "more highly concentrated" than the Mexican (of whom approximately 13,232 had moved to the Harbor area and the San Fernando Valley by 1944), Asian, and Pacific-Islander communities, which left nearly eighty percent of black Angelenos with few other options but to live in one of two adjacent neighborhoods either near Central Avenue or directly southeast in Watts. Of all the 23,000 families that moved to the county between 1940 and 1945, 11,007 were Afro-Americans who were living in either private residences or public housing by the end of the war. Loren Miller opined to a colleague during June of 1945 that "many persons sign such [restrictive housing] agreements less out of belief in them" than "out of fear that their refusal to sign will offend their neighbors," but these restrictions still both infringed on Afro-American veterans' property rights and caused property values in black neighborhoods to increase beyond the G.I. Bill's appraisal standards. The county's superior court was considering approximately twenty lawsuits, by then, which sought to enforce restrictive deed agreements that covered over 150 parcels of property.[230]

Constitutional challenges to the practice of restrictive deed agreements increased considerably as Miller began filing briefs for pertinent lawsuits in southern California during the first winter after the war, and it is essential to note that California was the first state outside of the southern states of North America to approve restrictive deeding and even had the most pending cases when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its 1926 decision in *Corrigan v. Buckley* the nineteenth century. Miller - whose biographer, Amina Hassan, has suggested acted as a mediator between housing attorneys who favored appealing to the Fourteenth Amendment's partially by ruling in *Shelley v. Kramer* (1948) that it was unlawful for government agencies to enforce deed agreements. Housing attorneys appealed quickly and argued to the state supreme court that "there is no 'equal protection of the law' when race restrictive covenants are enforced against some groups and denied against others," while Loren Miller also filed the NAACP's brief for a school desegregation case that was in the midst of litigation, *Mendez v. Westminster School District*, shortly after county superior courts in both Orange (*Ashley V. Doss et al. v. Alex*


Table VIII: Foreclosures and Deeds in Lieu of Foreclosure
in Los Angeles, California, By Year (1931-1961)
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
Foreclosures
Deeds in Lieu of Foreclosure


Table IX: Total Acreage and Number of Lots Subdivided
By The Southern California Regional Planning
Commission By Fiscal Year, 1939-1952
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1939-40
1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50
1950-51
1951-52
Subdivision Lots Processed
Subdivision Acres Processed


Table X: Numbers of Units of Tracts Registered By The Southern California Regional Planning Commission By Fiscal Year, 1939-1952
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1939-40
1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50
1950-51
1951-52


Table XI: New Tract Maps and Percentage of Total Submitted to the Southern California Regional Housing Authority By Location, FY 1951-2
Miscellaneous Areas
Palos Verdes
San Gabriel Valley
Easterly County Area
South Easterly County Area
Antelope Valley
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Percentage of Total Number
New Tract Maps Filed



Data for Tables VIII-XII retrieved from the Southern California Regional Planning Commission's annual reports. Courtesy: The Huntington Research Library.

P. Bernal) and Los Angeles (*A.T. Collison et al. v. Nellie Garcia et al.*) ruled in two sets of consolidated cases that various restrictive deed agreements violated Mexican residents' rights under both the U.S. Constitution's first article and its Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. Several newspapers soon published Miller's statement, furthermore, which appealed to principles enshrined in the U.N. Americans - whom four restrictive deed agreements barred from living on 27th, 28th, and 29th streets between Budlond and Vermont Avenues – onto reservations during equal-protection clause and international law and those who opposed "trying to win too much at one time" - also learned notably that California's lower courts were refusing to enforce restrictive deed charter to protect Afro-American's property rights in California, and he also argued the following year in an influential article published by the *Lawyers Guild Review* that restrictive deed agreements were "but the most recent aspects of persistent attempts by dominant American groups to preempt desirable land" that had originated with the "confinement" of Native agreements against potential Mexican home buyers on the grounds that they were "contrary to Good Neighbor Policy." The state's supreme court refused to admit new evidence against defendants two years later in *Anderson vs. Auseth* - which included the famous *Sugar Hill* case involving tracts purchased by Afro-American "movie people" in West Adams Heights – on the grounds that the enforcement of "such covenants" violated their due-process and equal-protection rights, since "certainly there was no discrimination against the Negro race when it came to calling upon its members to die on the battle fields in defense of this country in the war just ended."[231]

The Los Angeles chapter of the Council for Civic Unity planned initially to "cooperate closely" on "long term measures" that would "develop a sound and undivided community" with both the "Board of Supervisor's Committee" and the mayor's Committee for Home Front Unity. The organization soon also passed resolutions in favor of national anti-poll tax legislation, reforming school curricula with respect to "the rights and achievements of all American racial groups in Southern California," state and national fair-employment practices laws (which the Los

Angeles Central Labor Council and the state labor federation both also supported), and for government officials to authorize the further construction of public and private housing. Yet the scope of these proposed solutions was limited, and this may have indeed been due to the fact that "a great many CIO and other labor individuals and leaders" were then living "in areas covered by these covenants" while the University of California at Los Angeles was also continuing to exclude "non-Caucasian students" from its dormitories. Nor did they address the disproportionate amount of economic and political power that white property owners possessed at that time, since the president of the Los Angeles Realty Board, Philip M. Rea, who was also a member of the city's Urban Redevelopment Commission during November of 1948, could appeal with support from the president of Culver City's realty board, and shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in *Shelley v. Kramer*, for the National Association of Real Estate Boards to lobby for a constitutional amendment that would have legalized restrictive deed agreements.[232]

The state's judiciary restated its refusal to enforce restrictive deed agreements when the state supreme court ruled in *Barrows v. Jackson* (1952) that residents could not file lawsuits against proprietors who violated the agreements by selling subdivisions to non-white residents, but extreme housing segregation continued due to the policies both the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) – which made black home-loan applicants eligible for only approximately 50,000 of the 2,761,000 units that it financed from 1934 through 1947 - and the Veterans' Administration (VA) which continued to privilege segregationists' contractual rights for much of the mid-twentieth century, and with support from a Home Builders Institute that represented seventy percent of the county's housing-construction companies by 1949, by insuring mortgages for properties in restricted areas and remaining "silent on the matter of sale" until U.S. President John F. Kennedy finally issued Executive Order No. 11,063 on November 20, 1962, against the FHA's lending practices (which was especially impactful due to the national government's insurance of between eighty to ninety-five percent of new housing developments). Segregationists also still had other means of enforcing the malign practice, furthermore, that included barring the sale of parcels both *from* an "undeveloped tract" without the original owner's consent (which was also known as the Von Swerigen Covenant) and *to* purchasers who were not a member of a particular club, ninety-nine year leases that required one year of residency, leasing through cooperatives that offered housing only to "Caucasians and Christians," various kinds of agreements between real-estate brokers either as individuals or through associations, deeds' reversion clauses which returned titles to grantors automatically in cases of sale to "proscribed minorities," and the use of "Escrow Agreements" that deposited a deed in escrow to a third-party holder who had the authority to determine whether a sale violated an agreement. Realty boards also could expel members who sold property to national minorities (as the El Monte Realty Board did on August 30, 1948, when a "prominent member" of the local Methodist Church sold to a Latino purchaser), and lenders could still "insure" that builders, developers, and real-estate brokers construct lily-white housing projects as the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company did with the infamous Stuyvesant Town redevelopment project in New York City during World War II. Housing segregationists could also file lawsuits and disseminate misinformation that caused prejudice and incited "extralegal acts" by property owners' associations like Citizens United, Inc., Neighborly Endeavor, Inc. (Leimert Park), Neighborhood Protective Association, Hancock Park Property Owners Association, Compton Park Veterans' Association, Lakeland Village, M.C. Friel Company Limited, and Wellington Square Neighbors Association. The continuation of these restrictive housing practices therefore explains, in part,





Earl Hanson, "Los Angeles County Population and Housing Data." Haynes Foundation, 1944.
Courtesy: The Huntington Research Library

why Miller concluded by 1959 that many white Angelenos who were against civil rights were "unwilling to oppose it openly," and they received additional support by redrawing voter lines in the district of the only Latino council member, Ed Roybal's district, so that it encompassed "almost as many Negro voters as Mexicans."[233]

As members of IBT locals crossed picket lines and petitioned for NLRB elections among packinghouse, furniture, food-processing, and warehouse workers during the spring of 1948, political divisions intensified quickly within the CIO when the Director of Industrial Union Councils, John Brophy (who had implored all industrial union councils to boycott Camel cigarettes and Prince Albert pipe tobacco during the Reynold Tobacco strike one year earlier), invoked "Rule #8" in a memorandum to prohibit both affiliates and industrial union councils from opposing the executive board's positions regarding the ERP and Wallace's third-party candidacy. Divisions within the Los Angeles CIO Council - which endorsed ten third-party candidates during the primaries that year - first became evident on February 6 when the president, Albert T. Lunceford of URWA, and vice-president, Robert R. Clark of USA, resigned at a council meeting in response to a majority vote to oppose the executive board's "policies," and the chief steward of United Furniture Workers of America Local 576 at the Brown-Saltman shop, which was in the midst of strikes against the L.A. Spring Bed Company, the D. & G. Manufacturing Company, and Fauclo Industries that were "directly caused by the Taft-Hartley Law" and whose delegates to the council meeting voted against supporting the ERP and the candidacies of both Wallace or Truman, responded by reporting that members were "greatly disturbed" by a prohibition which was emblematic, along with Harry Bridges' dismissal as northern California regional director, not of "democratic organization" but rather a "a rotten dictatorship" within the CIO of the kind that had initially compelled industrial workers to separate from the AFL during the 1930s. Each of ILWU Local 26's thirty-one delegates voted to support Wallace's candidacy and oppose the ERP, for their part, while UAW Local 809 opted to remain neutral on both questions but went "on record opposing any and all threats of [a] split, withdrawal or expulsions over the issues within the C.I.O." as well as "any move from the national C.I.O. officers which would interfere with the scheduled democratic election of local C.I.O." Brophy responded after also receiving similar complaints from the business agent of the International Fishermen's Allied Workers of America's – which soon merged with the ILWU – by asserting, in turn, that industrial union councils were "subsidiary organizations of the CIO," that he was acting on behalf of the executive board's "democratic majority," and that support for third-party candidates would "make possible the election of an even more reactionary Congress than ever" by "split[ting] the progressive vote in America." A majority of LANG's membership voted to endorse the executive board's policy, in contrast, and soon joined members of communications, steel, shipyard, oil, rubber, and auto workers' unions in forming the California CIO's Political Action Committee, though some steelworkers also reported that their district officers "helped and engineered the raiding of their local union" by initiating negotiations with the manager for a plant under contract with UE as four locals of the United Public Office Workers of America (UPOWA) moved their office to West 6th Street shortly before both officers and members of ILWU Local 13 voted during the following spring to restore its funding for the Los Angeles and state CIO councils, send twenty-seven delegates to the Los Angeles CIO Council's conference, and re-affiliated with the council during July.[234]

Various AFL affiliates in the film industry also became increasingly divided in the year after HUAC began investigating Communists in Hollywood - where a pro-Wallace committee had already formed - during late 1947, such as when delegates to the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)'s convention voted to refuse a seat for IATSE's international representative, Roy Brewer, by a margin of 395 to 186 and selected both screen actor and husband of congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas, Melvyn Douglas, as the convention's chair as well as playwright Emmet Lavery to the state executive committee (housing attorney Loren Miller later

testified to HUAC privately during the 1950s). The Screen Actors Guild's president, Ronald Reagan, declined to replace Brewer as nominee for convention chair, while thirty AFL delegates walked out of the convention when delegates rejected USA representative John Despol's motion to expel journalists from *Life* magazine and instead passed a competing motion that permitted them to keep their seats. The workers' movement soon gained momentum once again, moreover, when UPWA and UAW unions struck against meatpacking companies and Chrysler, for their part (with the meatpacking companies citing "the Review Board of the Taft-Hartley law" to argue that wage increases of nine cents were sufficient), and UAW members employed at GM plants also voted "overwhelming" to strike as the union notified the Ford Motor Company of its intent to demand life, health, and accident insurance. The Communist-affiliated auto workers' caucus cited both thirty-five percent price increases and increases of 155% in corporate profit-margins the following year, furthermore, in their publication printed from West 6th Street, *Spotlight*, in which they also criticized the UAW executive board's decision to propose different wage scales for employees of Ford (which included pension and social security provisions) and Chrysler (which was only "open for discussion" on wages) and argued instead for demanding hourly wage increases of thirty cents, a "30 hour week based on 40 hours pay," both the repeal of the Taft-Hartley act and the "restoration" of the Wagner Act, and a "fight for full rights for the Negro and Mexican-American people" before reporting on several strikes which occurred during the first half of 1949 by 62,000 Ford workers in Detroit against a "speed-up" and by UAW locals 406 (Long Beach), 923 (Merc-Lincoln), and three others "in the East" for wage increases, pension, vacations, and the reduction of probationary periods from six months to thirty days. Although FTA Local 25 lost NLRB elections at each of the California Walnut Growers Association's plants during the fall, ILWU Local 26 defeated the IBT in an NLRB election during August among employees of the Owl Drug Company (which was a subsidiary of Rexall Drug and successor of the Sontag Drug Company that soon demanded that the union's officers comply with the Taft-Hartley Act by signing anti-Communist affidavits) while FTA Local 64 also defeated "a raid attempt" led by the CIO's Director of Organization, Allan S. Haywood, during the spring of 1950 at the Van Camp Company's fish cannery in San Diego by a margin of 518-298.[235]

The governor received numerous letters during postwar economic reconversion, meanwhile, from tenants who faced imminent evictions and severe housing shortages, but the Office of Price Administration's (OPA) decision to prioritize World War II veterans' requests for building permits did little to address their needs. Seventy-nine year old Lillian Schroyer of Glendale had voted for Warren four years earlier, for example, but still found herself, along with her fifty-six year-old daughter, in "great trouble" after they received an eviction notice shortly after death of her son-in-law and since their mere $4,000 in savings were insufficient for a finding a home in a "dreadful" housing market. A mother of six, Mrs. H. Altman, also faced eviction when their landlord decided to sell her family's home on Turquoise Street, furthermore, after her husband lost his job after suffering from "blood poisoning," and this was not long after their landlord had refused two years earlier to compensate her husband for building a new roof. Hazel Akin and her children found themselves "stranded on the city streets" of Oakland without her husband who had formerly worked as a welder, meanwhile, due to the fact that their former landlord sold their home on South Flower Street "so they could fix it up for the young people to move in." Angela Simone asserted in her letter to Warren that "the poor" were the country's majority, and two widowed World War I veterans facing evictions in Oakland and Berkeley also

observed that “most of the GI’s here” who “howl[ed] about housing” and were also “new-comers in California” that refused to vote in local elections were still “getting priorities.”[236]

The owner of Villa Italia Apartments in Hollywood, Paul Seirsen (whom the chair of the Tenants Committee reported had already been fined for “repeated violations” of OPA rent regulations), was among the first to issue eviction orders when he displaced forty families, including wives and parents of servicemen, an expectant mother, and “elderly bedridden persons,” on December 1, 1945, though it was actually the OPA later that evicted 4,416 veterans during following summer. Earl Warren soon implored mayors and chairmen of boards of supervisors that the “state must take whatever action is necessary to safeguard the interests of renters” after receiving “many complaints of drastic rent increases” when wartime rent controls expired on June 30, 1946, while the Los Angeles Embassy Realty Associates’ chair, Edward S. Maddock, found similarly that there was “practically unanimous sentiment” in favor of rent control not long after the city council of Richmond voted unanimously to cap landlords’ and hotel owners’ rents at OPA levels with violations punishable by fines of up to $500 or sentences of up to six months. Although the Home Builders’ Institute’s argued that the 1,000 completed privately-funded housing projects were 5,700 fewer than the National Housing Authority’s estimated need for monthly housing construction was indicative high demand, Maddock still cited “unstable” construction costs to support his claim that rent decontrol would enable landlords to invest surplus capital in more housing construction. Noting that the city council of Los Angeles had already approved fifteen-percent rent increases, Maddock proposed first decontrolling residential and commercial properties built after June 30, while an “extensive property owner” and business manager for a “large number of people in the motion-picture and allied fields,” Christian Roos of the Beverly Management Corporation, complained that high rents for commercial properties which lawmakers had exempted from national rent control legislation had increased labor and maintenance costs and, according to him, thereby constrained his ability to pay for “maid service, gardening, linen supplies, utilities, and taxes” and argued further that decontrol would both “correct” conditions “in accordance with economic laws” like “during the boom days of the 1920s” and allow landlords to finance “extensive repairs, redecorating, and refurnishing.” The California Council of Architects’ chairman, Adrian Wilson, asserted similarly that rent control – which he characterized as a part of the “Veterans’ program” - was “un-American in principle,” while another owner of apartments and hotels in the city, J. Bruce Goddard, cited a recent rise in construction costs (which another landlord, Isabelle M. Mundell, echoed when she reported that the painting costs had increased from $260 to $585 over the previous several years) to request permission for twenty-percent rent increases - city and state real-estate associations proposed fifteen-percent rent increases above OPA levels, in contrast, in exchange for an agreement that lawmakers would refrain from establishing a rent-control agency or bureau - and the state apartment house association threatened the governor frankly that “we warn you, you had better not” before U.S. President Truman signed another national rent-control bill which authorized landlords to evict tenants either when they sold property or in retaliation for non-payment.[237]

Congress soon passed a housing and rents bill in 1949 which permitted municipalities to enact their own rent-decontrol ordinances and permit the sale of single-occupancy units that had been built before July 1, 1947, to if they submitted a “finding” to the Housing Expeditor that there was no existence of rental shortages and first offered the property “for sale exclusively to veterans or their families” for thirty days, and Portland and San Diego city councils both made their cities among those that refused to join sixteen of the largest ninety U.S. cities (seven of

which resulted from state-wide de-control measures) and 151 of 1,577 incorporated towns with at least 5,000 residents that enacted de-control measures six months after Congress passed the housing and rent bill, and cities and towns in Los Angeles that did pass such legislation included Riverside, Pomona, Beverly Hills, South Pasadena, Coronado, Alhambra, Pasadena, South Gate, Long Beach, Glendale, Santa Monica, Ontario, El Segundo, Redondo, Manhattan Beach, and Hermosa Beach did (in that order). The leader of the separatists that formed the "Greater" Los Angeles CIO Council, Albert T. Lunceford - whose faction failed to win the Los Angeles CIO Council's office building when superior court judge Clarence M. Hanson ruled that only local affiliates could file a lawsuit against the council – soon attempted to halt the subsequent onslaught when opponents of rent control then raced to produce such "a finding" shortly before asserting the following spring that "we have carried this fight against decontrol" while a group of "constituent organizations" which included the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council, the Los Angeles Central Labor Council, IAM, the NAACP, the CSO, the Jewish Labor Committee, and a blind retail clerks' union formed the 12,000-member strong Los Angeles Tenants Council during January of 1950 and sent witnesses to testify before Congress in favor of continuing rent control. The city's percentage of dwelling units inhabited by tenants as well as its total number of vacant units had declined from 61.8 percent to 49.8 percent and from 36,164 to 16,848, respectively, since 1940, while landlords withheld about half of the vacant units from the market, furthermore, and approximately forty-five percent from families with children, in particular. Both the Small Property Owners' Association and the Apartment House Association also disputed the results of the city government's "Peacock survey," meanwhile, which had found that the city's "vacancy factor" was 2.6% (and 5.5% in the harbor district) with their own findings that the vacancy rates were 5.28% and 4.18%, which they based on data from 1940 U.S. census after discounting units that were either already sold or available for sale. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals soon issued rulings for two cases which held that while city council members violated the city charter by failing to publish its rent de-control measure in English ten days before its enactment, the Peacock survey had actually provided evidence in favor of de-control, so, despite the fact that U.S. President Truman announced "the nation" was "in a state of emergency" due to housing shortages, Edward Roybal of the ninth precinct, who had voted for an "equal employment opportunities" ordinance the previous year, joined nine other council members who voted for rent de-control as the president of the Home Builders Institute, Spiros G. Ponty, proposed the "liberalization of credit" and the "modernization" of building codes and FHA requirements as an alternative "to permit the construction of cheaper housing."[238]

Albert T. "Blackie" Lunceford was born in Wilks County, Georgia, had worked in textile mills for a year during the early 1920s, and served in the Navy for six years before he gained employment at the Firestone and Rubber Company in Los Angeles. He first became active in employees' URWA local as the company was completing an agreement with an AFL affiliate, won election as a shop steward, and became Local 100's president and international representative by 1944. Lunceford later claimed in an address to the Democratic Luncheon Club that strikes during late July of 1949 by ILWU locals in Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Hawaii for higher wages, holiday pay, and sick leave were "purely economic" and charged his opponents "in the former CIO Council" with allowing the local CIO council to be "dictated by the foreign policy of the Soviet Union" before announcing that the new CIO council was launching a "broad program" based "strictly" on "trade union business." 700 URWA Local 43 members struck against the B.F Goodrich Company two months later for twenty-five percent wage increases, $100 monthly pension contributions by the company, health and social welfare

plans, an end to wage differentials "in different Goodrich plants," and the inclusion of Canadian Goodrich Local 73 in company-wide bargaining, while textile workers with the ACWA were also striking against the Zieman Clothing Company's plants on South Figueroa Boulevard, in Glendale, and in Long Beach.[239]

Although one ACWA member and former secretary of the local NAACP's Labor Committee, John Dial, Jr., suggested demanding a quota, or "a 10% employment ratio," in "basic industries" during the summer of 1948 (which was one year after National Council for a Permanent FEPC's local chapter began excluding the Los Angeles CIO Council from its activities) and nine state governments (including the state of Washington and of which seven had Republican governors or legislatures with Republican majorities) had already passed fair employment practices laws by the late summer of 1949, the city council voted on October 27, 1947, against an fair-employment practices ordinance by a margin of seven to six (including Christensen from the ninth precinct), which was an action that did not protect approximately 250,000 Angelenos, including 40,000 black Angelenos, from enduring unemployment by the following year. The CHC's Drafting Committee, of which Loren Miller was the chair, analyzed the language of municipal fair-employment ordinances passed by the city councils of Philadelphia and Minneapolis, the National Community Relations Advisory Council's model version, and the proposed ordinance that Los Angeles' city council was considering before selecting the "Philadelphia ordinance," which excluded domestic workers, as the "closest to the kind of ordinance we would like to have in this city." Yet the city council rejected the proposed ordinance again in 1949 by a margin of eight to six despite its support from the Los Angeles chapter of the League of Women Voters (for which the executive director of the CHC, Shirley A. Siegel, was a member and chair of the Legislation Action Committee) after it heard testimony from the former president of the city's Chamber of Commerce, Frank P. Doherty, as well as from representatives of a series of organizations which included the Federation of Women's Clubs, the Chamber of Commerce's Women's Division, Pro-America, corporations, Christian Nationalists, the Public Affairs Forum, Women of the Pacific, and the People's Lobby of California. The legislative priorities of the local chapter of the League of Women Voters were, by then, state and national reforms to improve education, public assistance, the "working of administrative agencies," health, civil service, housing, and "the status of women," as well as those that would achieve fairer employment practices. U.S. President Truman responded to calls for fair employment laws during the Korean War by issuing Executive Order 10210 on February 2, 1951, which called for the national government's war contracts to include non-discrimination clauses but Truman's order, like FDR's Executive Order 8802 that established the FEPC during World War II, lacked effective enforcement measures despite the fact that the California Poll and Field Research Company found in its 1950 survey that forty-five percent of respondents (including fifty-six percent of Democratic Party members and thirty-five percent of Republicans) favored national fair-employment legislation while just sixteen to twenty percent of Republicans and thirteen percent of Democrats supported state-level legislation.[240]

Since there was much popular support for fair-employment legislation, the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council's separation from the city's council occurred at a very inopportune time. Reports percolated during June of 1950, for example, that a manager for both the Allied Gardens Development and the Hirsh-Edmunds Building Company refused to sell properties at the housing development, in Lakewood, and in Downey to four Latino ACWA and UAW members. Yet both Lunceford - whom Connelly recommended as late as the spring of 1948 to liaise with the Committee for a Permanent FEPC - and Dial, Jr. could still inform the regional directors of

various CIO affiliates during late December of 1950 that the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council's fair-employment committee was advertising its programs through a variety of mediums that included motion pictures, film strips, posters, leaflets, literature, and speakers from the NAACP, the Urban League, the Jewish Labor Committee, the Japanese-American Citizens' League, the CSO, and LACCCR. Dial, Jr. admitted to Connelly soon afterward, however, that their fair-employment practices committee received most of its funding from AFL affiliates and USA. ILWU Local 26's president had complained during October of the previous year, for his part, that the committee did "not fully represent all forces within the Los Angeles" and that it was those regional directors who enjoyed "the right to select or appoint" its members. It was, hence, no small irony that Truman criticized CIO affiliates six months after he issued his executive order for their failure to make any "arrangements" to "implement" all of its provisions as stipulated in their war contracts.[241]

Angelenos in the harbor district fared litter better, if not worse, meanwhile, after members of ILWU Local 13 considered admitting "active unemployed men" into "a warehouse unit" during the summer of 1947 on the condition that they submit proof that they had already been "active" within the union. The ILWU executive board "sold out" the following year, according to former San Pedro dispatcher Alfred Langely, by signing its first waterfront "modernization agreement," and Walter E. Williams worked as a hod-carrier before the local's registration advisory committee permitted him to join during mid-1949, and, though the union continued to invoke a rule "requiring you to work in the hold" for five years that constrained black members' ability to "move up to the skilled and semiskilled categories," thereby allowed him to drive a lift-jitney, work as a winch operator, or alternatively as a carpenter. The Unemployed 500's – whose original leaders also included Joe Frances, Arthur Gatlin, and Ira Henderson - cooperated initially with the president of the local NAACP chapter, Thomas G. Newsome, during the late 1940s and 1950, but Newsome, according to one San Pedro dock worker and committee member, Willie McGee, "dribbled it around for about five years and got all the milk out of it he could" as other members opted instead to file unfair practices charges against the ILWU with the NLRB. The NLRB found the local guilty, whereas a third group led by Ralph Griffin, with whom Williams disagreed on the issue of "personal damages," also filed a lawsuit in county superior court. Williams later recalled that it was "a strain on a person to have to work in an atmosphere where he knows that people have these racist feelings" and to "control yourself" despite having "to listen to racist remarks from time to time," and he concluded by 1988 that it was "strains" such as these that was causing his body to produce "tests" which indicated he was "bordering" on high blood pressure.[242]

Williams was a leader of another group within the unemployed committee that also filed additional complaints during the early 1960s, and Harry Bridges "knocked the wind out of our sails" by informing him that he would not "upset Local 13 over the race question" while "L.B. and Bill" were "sitting up there" and "heard it all." "'Well, look,' he says, 'I guess you guys will go to the courts now,'" since "'that's what you usually do.'" Bridges's rationale for opposing their efforts remain open for debate, and some ILWU historians have argued that the union's local and international officers did not expect to receive such strong resistance from committee members. Williams retorted, for his part, that "the weight of the mistakes that we make is going to hang around your neck," because Bridges was "not doing anything to help." Historian Bruce Nelson has argued that the international president's motivation was to maintain effective communication - and good relations - with the ILWU's San Pedro local before the "mechanization and modernization" agreement of 1960 (which the union signed despite Local 13

members' vote to reject it by a substantial majority), that the union's officers failed to create a long-term strategy for including black members, and that the ILWU' commitment to de-centralized governance and local autonomy was more similar to AFL craft unions such as a building trades council than a typical CIO affiliate, though the extent to which the union's members were as culpable its officers in both the San Pedro local and the international executive board remains an open question.[243]

Committee leader Willie McGee was from New Orleans, Louisiana, completed the tenth grade, and was living briefly in Bakersfield when the U.S. entered World War II, and he worked technician in a "detached service" of the Army Air Corps that did not involve aircraft operations during the war until he received his discharge on November 19, 1945. McGee migrated to Kansas City, New York, and New Orleans at various moments – black men could not eat on trains in Texas, Alabama, or Mississippi during the war, which was why many of them ate their last meal in Louisiana before passing through the Gulf states or took another route entirely through Memphis – before he procured a job as a rivet heater in San Pedro, where he worked alongside a Mexican crew with whom some Okie employees had refused to work. McGee also worked at some point on the "compress side," for "sister locals," and picketed during the 1948 strike, though "some seamen" were still, according to former member and ILWU Local 13 historian Tony Salcido, even then, "very, very prejudiced" against Afro-American and Mexican-American workers. Local 13 later accepted McGee's membership application during the 1950s after he served one of three lead plaintiffs in *Frances, McGee, & Henderson v. the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union*, though McGee later claimed that two of Local 13's attorneys, Carl Walters and George Shibley (who was one of five attorneys that represented the Sleepy Lagoon defendants initially during World War II), collaborated with local president Forest Moore to "deep-six" their case. Both the alleged collusion against them and one attorney's failure to file a Stipulation of Readiness document led McGee to conclude that there had been "definitely a deal made," and the plaintiffs agreed, in the end, to accept awards of $11,000 apiece on behalf of approximately thirty black ILWU and MCS members when an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) hearing before Bridges finally eliminated the union's sponsorship clause during the 1960s.[244]

Teamsters had crossed picket lines in Ensenada during the 1930s when IWLU Local 13's predecessor, ILA Local 38-82, was picketing the harbor area in that city, but the formation of FTA Local 64 in San Diego soon created another militant "base" for industrial unionists after World War II hat was even closer to the border. Members of Local 64 published an open letter that protested the murders of twenty-five members of CTAL in Leon, México, at an inauguration ceremony for Mayor Ignacio Quiroz during January of 1946, for example, which asserted that "it was not conducive to a truly good neighbor policy to find American arms involved to foment Fascist uprisings within the borders of our friendly democratic neighbor" while urging both an investigation and punishment for the perpetrators. The local also donated one hour's worth of wages to ATC and CIO strike funds each week, furthermore, as well as an additional fifty dollars to both the ATC strike and the Southern Cotton Oil Strikers Defense Committee. State Department officials still denied the visa application of CTAL's executive secretary from México, Lombardo Toledano, three years later, however, which led Toledano to assert to Slim Connelly via telegram that "not even during the era of President Coolidge when relations between our two countries were difficult did North American authorities go so far as deny me the right of entering the U.S." Toledano stated further that the cause of "discrimination against all the patriots of México and Latin America" was "the simple reason that they struggle for the

independence of their nations and against the forces of imperialism, who are enemies of the well-being of our peoples and of our emancipation."[245]

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) first issued a deportation warrant for Luisa Moreno – whose citizenship application was still pending despite the fact that she had married a World War II veteran, Gray Bemis - on September 30, 1948, after she refused to state whether she was a member of the Communist Party during her testimony in San Diego (where she had been living since the end of the war) to the state senate's Un-American Activities Committee for which Jack Tenney of Inglewood was the chair, and the FTA's attorneys attempted to delay the deportation warrants against both Moreno and Ernie Mangoang of Local 7 – which was "fighting for its life against a raid from the AFL Seafarers" – one year later by questioning the warrant's legality under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (to which prosecutors responded by invoking the Smith Act of 1940) and as *The FTA News* reported that the deportation of Moreno "coincided" with a "general offensive against Spanish-speaking workers" through which "hundreds, including young children, have been rounded up and thrown into barbed wire concentration camps." Much of Luisa Moreno's deportation case revolved around the question of whether the Communist Party was "advocating" for insurrection, and one of the prosecution's own witnesses who had been a party member until October of 1934, Joseph Zack Kornfelder, himself admitted during the cross-examination that the party had no such intentions. The argument of Moreno's attorney and former state attorney general, Robert Kenny, was, in contrast, that there were "warring factions" within the party and that the prosecution failed link Moreno with the faction that they alleged was fomenting insurrection. The INS held a three-hour hearing in Los Angeles during January of 1950 as the CIO's Executive Board held its own "show trials" to expel the FTA and nine other Communist-affiliated unions, and immigration authorities arrested Moreno and two other women in San Diego on October 24, 1950, after Moreno's attorney agreed to refrain from contesting the warrant. Luisa Moreno Bemis and Gray Bemis crossed the border from El Paso into Cuidad Juárez on November 30 after customs agents there refused "politely" to allow them to bring a table model radio and continued traveling southward through Mexico City (where they soon returned four years later when the Eisenhower administration supported Carlos Castillo Armas's successful overthrow of a Popular Front government in Guatemala led by Jacobo Arbenz), and they then passed through Oaxaca and Chiapas before crossing the Guatemala-Mexico border between Tapachula and Quetzaltenango during the following evening.[246]

Moreno delivered her final speech as a resident of California in San Diego at the state CIO council's annual convention (from which she resigned as vice-president during March of 1947) on October 15, 1949, and she used her time to target anti-Communist politicians and trade unionists for her ire. Moreno told the audience that Tenney had threatened to ensure the denial of her citizenship application, and she then argued that the claim of the Smith Act for retroactive authority violated part two, section nine of the constitution. She proceeded, from there, to turn the audience's attention to "the memory of those right wing leaders that are blind to reason – who refuse to see that the interests of labor and the people are one" – before asserting that "the delegates in this hall" were "the same ones that fought with them shoulder to shoulder for the good of the entire membership." Moreno charged organized labor and male-dominated unions with ignoring the reality "that the attacks against some of us will later be extended to them and their unions," because they had already "forgotten the story of Germany, the story of Spain, the story of France." Moreno predicated accurately, in short, that anti-Communism would eventually cause the near-total destruction of organized labor in North America.[247]

Moreno argued further that HUAC's blacklisting of "the Hollywood Ten" was part of Anti-Communists' "triangle of pressure," which were terror, corruption, and propaganda, that together constituted ominous and "unmistakable signs" for those who "really love America." She called on those who "really love America" to therefore "sound the alarm for the workers and the people to hear and take notice." Moreno was calling for a popular movement to establish democracy in the workplace, and she questioned both "how long will the steelworkers, the mineworkers, any organized workers keep their gains after basic civil rights are destroyed" and how viable trade unions could endure when "harassed into company unionism or destroyed?" The Smith Act transformed fear into terror despite its veneer of a "legal cloak," which permitted "persecutions unheard of in America." Corruption exacerbated the problem, Moreno argued further, by dividing "labor leaders and rank and filers against each other" and causing "new cases and greater corruption" through the dissemination of propaganda regarding an "alien menace" that diverted people's attention from deportations of "grandmothers like me," and she concluded by quoting the long-time leader of the Socialist Party, Eugene V. Debs, while asserting that "the court of final resort is the people" and that they would "be heard from in due time."[248]

The deed was nearly done by the summer of 1951 despite the facts that four "Reds" eluded arrest – including J.E. Jackson, Jr. of Richmond, Virginia, who had received pharmacology doctorate from Howard University in 1937, served first in the Army from June of 1943 through February of 1946 and then briefly as the CPUSA's district organizer in Louisiana, worked in Michigan from 1947 through 1950, and had recently become the party's regional director in the South – and that another four jumped bail. Immigration authorities also arrested a textile worker and labor organizer from Santa Ana, California, Justo Cruz (who had migrated to North America in 1907), as well as three other Latino orange pickers from that town and the town of Orange during the autumn of 1951 before detaining them in Terminal Island, and the detentions led the author of a circular, Ladislao Cruz, to question both the justice of permitting four families to be "broken up" due to "some ideas they supposedly held some" ten or twenty years earlier and whether the real crimes were their demands of "decent wages," housing, and an end to "discrimination in schools" or the recent raids "made possible by the McCarran Act." The U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, Ernest Tolin, then announced "the first move in a program to destroy the Communist Party in the West" several weeks later - which was the "third round up of major Reds" since July of 1948 – as law enforcement authorities arrested a group of eight "of the most influential Communists" and members of the Civil Rights Congress that included Oleta O'Connor Yates, Mission section organizer Mary Bernadette Doyle, and William Schneiderman of San Francisco and Dorothy Ray Healey, Slim Connelly, county legislative director and former Army chaplain's assistant Henry Steinberg, and the executive secretary of the Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, Rose Chernin, in Los Angeles. The Alaska Cannery Workers Union re-affiliated with the ILWU after the FTA's collapse, meanwhile, and immigration authorities' subsequent detentions and deportations of nine Filipino leaders in 1952.[249]

Charlotta Bass left the Republican Party, for her part, over "civil rights and peace issues" shortly after the end of World War II before she co-founded the Independent Progressive Party (IPP) and became the national co-chair of the organization Women for Wallace's, and the IPP soon qualified for registration as a political party, according to Carey McWilliams, after it both received signatures from one-fourth of Los Angeles County voters and recruited Robert Kenny to lead a pro-Wallace delegation at the Democratic Party's national convention. It was not long after that black, public-sector workers in Los Angeles began enduring retaliation when the post

office dismissed an employee who was the president of the NAACP's chapter in Santa Monica and had led a recent picket against the Sears and Roebuck Company, and Bass also received two letters five months later, furthermore, from a black denizen who lived on 37th Street and worked at the Federal building, John H. Owens, after officials in Washington, D.C., issued "loyalty charges" against him and thereby forced him to attend an administrative hearing. Though they "had no loyalty or subversive case" against him, Owens argued that the officials were hostile to him due to their accordance with the demands of "the British and Dutch Legations" that resented his recent articles that he had published with *The California Eagle* which criticized "British imperialism in Africa and India and Dutch imperialism in Indonesia." Owen reported further that interrogators produced photostatic copies of various articles he had written for newspapers and magazines during the hearing and that they asked both whether he "thought that the case of the colored peoples of America was analogous to that of the colored races of Africa and Asia" and whether he served on Bass's election committee. "It appears," Owens concluded, "that they are trying to stamp out all liberal thought in America after so much blood has been spilled to insure, as I thought, 'the four freedoms.'"[250]

While acknowledging in his second letter that "the government has to do a thorough job of screening for the purpose of protecting the collective interests of us all," Owens still questioned why officials were "hounding colored personnel on a basis of about ten to one" despite the fact that his "race" had "never been disloyal," since those personnel acted "subserviently" and conservatively "when it would have been better policy to show a little militancy." Owens complained further that "not a single racist" among the "poor white workers" at the Federal building received any penalties for uttering statements which pertained to "the teachings of Gerald L.K. Smith" and "restrictive covenants" that "would have landed a colored man in jail." They "even had the blatant nerve to ask" whether he "read the 'California Eagle," and it was, for Owens, simply appalling that "such an invasion on the right of an individual to think as he pleases and secure information according to his own desire" was "not practiced even in the palmiest days of the Hitler regime in Germany." Owens further stated his observation that in "one post office 100 per cent colored personnel were cited (ostensibly for potential subversive activities) but actually because they were members of the N.A.A.C.P., as mild as its programme is…I told them the Merchant and Manufacturers and The Chamber of Commerce never invited me to any of their functions or social affairs."[251]

Industrial unionists also had to confront the governor's continued approval of extraditions of black refugees back to the South, since Bass received another letter during the spring of 1950 from an inmate at a Los Angeles jail, Nathan Scott, for example, who was originally from Arkansas and contacted her during his thirty-fourth day of incarceration (and after he had attempted unsuccessfully to reach the NAACP, *The Sentinel*, and *The Pittsburgh Courier*) by giving a letter to a fellow inmate who was soon due for release. Scott, who also went by the alias Eugene Bookstrom, was resisting Earl Warren's extradition order to Mississippi, where he claimed to have escaped "under rifle fire" on January 15, 1940, before he joined the Army's 93rd Infantry Division, earned an honorable discharge six years later due to his military service in the South Pacific, and resided on 2304 Raymond Street after the war. Both of Scott's parents died by the time he reached the age of six, and he moved to Chicago at the age of thirteen and lived as a transient with his friend, Sam, with whom soon he traveled to Belen, Mississippi. Law enforcement officers arrested both of them there after they broke into and slept in a local grocery store, and Scott reported that they whipped each of them repeatedly at a cotton field while interrogating them about their lives in Chicago and whether each had ever "had white girl

friends." An all-white jury and judge then convicted and sentenced them to seven years at the state penitentiary in Parchman, where there were fourteen labor camps located on a large farm which encompassed thousands of acres and was under the supervision of a sergeant and a driver who beat inmates frequently with straps that were approximately six to eight feet long, six to nine inches wide, and a half-inch thick.[252]

"We were doomed from the beginning," Scott asserted to Bass, "for across our record were the words northern niggers," and he claimed further that the sergeant even whipped his friend, Sam, to death for merely "not adjusting himself to say yes, sir, captain." Scott received his first beating after eleven months despite his having earned a reputation as "a good worker," because even "that didn't save you" from corporal punishment in the penitentiary. Scott escaped by evading the bloodhounds of prison guards who themselves were actually "life time prisoners" that received a pardon "if they kill[ed] a prisoner escaping," but authorities in Memphis arrested him at the railroad yards for charges of vagrancy and "cheating the railroads" and sentenced him to six months "on the chain gang" before they extradited him to Marshall County, Mississippi, for his conviction as an accessory to the crime of robbery. Scott claimed that the law enforcement authorities there forced him to sign a confession and returned him to the state penitentiary, which was where he planned his successful flight to Los Angeles. "I've fought the enemy," Scott argued indignantly, "so Americans would not end up in a concentration camp as bad as Mississippi."[253]

Mine-Mill Local 700 and ILWU Local 26 both launched unsuccessful campaigns during the winter to persuade the governor to halt the extraditions of Woodrow Green (who was originally from Louisiana) to Virginia and Local 26's shop steward, Joseph "Jack" Brooks to Alabama several months before the Mine-Mill local and other unions of auto, furniture, steel, food-processing workers' and Canadian sailors' unions launched a new wave of labor strikes, and both the opposition to extradition and the strikes occurred as the number of people in North America who registered as unemployed rose between 1948 and the spring of 1949 from 1.6 million to 2.2. million. Brooks reported that his ordeal began when his jailers beat him in Grove Hill until he agreed to sign a confession with no lawyer present that allowed a judge to sentence him to ten years in prison, and he then worked at a labor camp outside of the city of Birmingham from July through October of 1943 before he escaped through Mobile and Vicksburg and began working for the Friedman Bag Company in Los Angeles on December 29. Local law enforcement authorities arrested him for picketing with CSU affiliates at Columbia Studios during the strikes of 1946 and, after a federal judge denied his appeal for a writ of habeas corpus, extradited Brooks to Alabama on February 23, 1949. It was also at that time that approximately 2,600 members of the IWA in Laurel, Mississippi, received a message of support from the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council for their strike against the Masonite Corporation as furniture, shoe, and public-sector workers' unions in Los Angeles and Long Beach began to either expand or initiate new strikes. Employers signed a contract with IBT after a strike by ACWA spread to the Zeeman Clothing Store in San Diego, and the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council continued its quixotic advocacy of fairer housing by adopting a resolution at a conference that it hosted which called for the city's redevelopment agency to adopt a "basic policy prohibiting racial discrimination or segregation." The ACWA strike in San Diego continued through the spring and coincided with others in southern California by UAW Local 230 against Chrysler, ILWU Local 26 against the Kennedy Mineral Company, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Cleaners and Dyers Local 268 against the California Dyers and Cleaners Association, and a news vendors'

union against *The Mirror*, and yet, despite trade unions' increased activities, the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council still failed to reach quorum at its regular meeting on June 20.[254]

Bass campaigned for Sam Yorty's fourteenth district House seat in 1950, meanwhile, and received support over the next two years from the celebrated intellectual, singer, and athlete, Paul Robeson. She also attended the Los Angeles Unitarian Council's meeting just weeks after the election, where she encouraged "intermingling" among African, Mexican, Jewish, and Japanese residents of public-housing authority's projects in East L.A. and observed the paucity of camping facilities for Afro-American children in that area. Bass ran for Vice-President with Vincent Hallinan on the IPP's ticket two years later, which was when she asserted proudly as she accepted the nomination at the party's convention that her "people came before the Mayflower" and that she had "stood watch over a home to protect a Negro family against the outrages of the Ku Klux Klan," challenged housing agreements, compelled "the great corporations which extort huge profits from my people" to employ more Afro-Americans, and "stormed city councils and state legislatures and the halls of Congress demanding real representation for my people." Decrying that "fascism had been wiped out in World War II, only to take roots in my own country where it blossomed and bloomed and sent forth its fruits to poison the land my people had fought to preserve," Bass both proclaimed that "we fight so that all people shall live" and predicted that "colonialism for the colored peoples of the world" would soon expire "in Malan's South Africa, Churchill's Malaya, French Indo-China and the Middle East." Noting that neither "the party of Taft and Eisenhower and MacArthur and McCarthy" nor "the party of Truman, of Russell of Georgia, or Rankin of Mississippi, or Byrnes of South Carolina, of Acheson" had ever named "a Negro woman to lead the fight against enslavement," Bass announced that she was "impelled to accept this call" from "all my people and call to my people" and that "Frederick Douglass would rejoice, for he fought not only slavery but the oppression of women.

> "I make this pledge to my people, the dead and the living – to all Americans, black and white. I will not retire nor will I retreat, not one inch, so long as God gives me vision to see what is happening and strength to fight for the things I know are right. For I know that my kingdom, my people's kingdom, and the kingdom of all the peoples of the world, is not beyond the skies, the moon and the stars, but right here at our feet."[255]

Several of ILWU Local 13's first female members had previously been members of the Ladies' Auxiliary that first participated in trade union activities during its first "contract campaign" after World War II, which was also both when the Los Angeles CIO Council began planning strike activities through a centralized, coordinating council during June of 1948 and one year before the council's factions "reconciled" briefly based on an agreement that its officers would "rubber stamp all National CIO Policy" regardless of "the wishes and votes of delegates." Frances R. Grassi, whose husband, Peter, was a member of Local 13, worked at a fish cannery and had already joined a union before she found employment at a laundry service in Los Angeles shortly before the U.S. entered World War II, and she used a rivet gun as a carpenter helper during the war to build small "ARBs" before she became a waitress, married Moore in 1947, became a secretary first for the union's joint Culinary Board and then for the "government's supply department," and attended evening classes for twenty years until she graduated from Harbor College. Mrs. Grassi first worked in the ladies' auxiliary's food kitchen during the 1948 strike (which was also when the union's activities became increasingly connected with those of its locals in Hawaii), and she recalled that it was then some auxiliary members learned about the "chippy check" in which longshoremen paid "one or two cent or whatever it is" into a "special fund" that was "repaid to the men" who "never told their woman about it." She also reported that it was more difficult for employed women to participate in auxiliary activities, that the auxiliary

"didn't want any men in it," and that the auxiliary "didn't like women working on the waterfront anyway." After noting that cargo no longer arrived "loose" in the newer container ships as it had before the 1960s and that there were still no female members of the foremen's local by the 1980s, Grassi asserted nonetheless that longshore work "is not a job for women" who "physically" could not "handle it" based on her observation that "more women" were "out with injuries" at "a greater percentage" than their male counterparts, though she did also believe that working women could operate jitneys and forklifts, complete the tasks of checkers, and "things like that."[256]

Another auxiliary member, Lois L. Gray, moved to California from Chickashae, Oklahoma, while a railroad strike was occurring there during the 1930s. Her father worked as a crane operator on railroad tracks for Local 235A in the harbor district before the U.S. entered the war and soon received an assignment from the local (along with other members) to do longshore work at the Outer Harbor and Dock Wharf. Gray married her husband, whom she met as a high school student after he had received the privilege of having a sponsor for union membership, in 1938, and she recalled that the Communist labor organizer, Elaine Black, often "picketed with them" and "helped them every way she could." Gray first joined the local auxiliary in 1962, which was not long after Black began serving as its most recent president, and argued that "the real turning point" for auxiliary members was during the ILWU's 1971-2 strike, which was soon after the ILWU began admitting working women as longshore workers. Gray's grandson, who was also a longshore worker, then interrupted her interview to assert that male dock workers remained concerned for their safety when they worked alongside women.[257]

It was also during April of 1948 that the pineapple workers' union in Hawaii, ILWU Local 152, began signing up members with the "new checkoff cards required by the Taft Hartley law" before it launched a new "checkoff drive" in the summer, while CIO-affiliated maritime unions voted by an average margin of eighteen to one to defy the WEA's demand that they comply with the Taft-Hartley Act by signing anti-Communist affidavits - and entered negotiations anyway - as LAPD officers escorted the Sailors' Union of the Pacific's (SUP) non-strikers across picket lines in San Pedro. The longshore workers' union in Hawaii, ILWU Local 136, also held the three-month strike, as did east-coast ILA locals which rejected a proposed agreement negotiated by Joseph P. Ryan for hourly wage increases of ten cents and instead demanded hourly increases of twenty-five cents for their welfare plan, improved vacations and working conditions, and pensions. The ILWU soon signed a three-year agreement - without its officers having signed any anti-Communist affidavits – with provisions for hourly wage increases of fifteen cents, one week of vacation time annually for employees who had worked 800 hours and two weeks for those who had worked 1,344 hours, a hiring hall (as the west-coast marine engineers' union also did one year later) "unless a court decision or Congressional action makes them illegal," and a no-strike clause. The Matson Navigation Company had various types of agreements and associations with ninety-four corporations that owned a total of thirty-one sugar plantations on the Hawaiian islands as well as with the San Francisco Federal Reserve, the Crocker First National Bank of San Francisco, and both the Metropolitan Life and the Fireman's Fund insurance companies, and its board of directors included William W. Crocker - who was the president of the Crocker First National Bank and an officer or director for nineteen insurance, railroad, utility, real estate, investment, and manufacturing companies worth approximately $18.3 billion - and H.A Walker, who was the president, director, board chairman, or trustee of twenty-two companies which owned seven sugar plantations, the California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corporation (C & H), the Hawaiian Canneries Company (which canned pineapples),

three privately-owned water and electric companies, the Pacific Chemical and Fertilizer Company, the Oahu Cemetery Association, the Bank of Hawaii, the Hawaiian Trust Company, and American Factors, Ltd. Yet the three-member U.S. Circuit Court in Honolulu still struck down the territory's nearly-hundred year-old law which had prohibited assemblies of three or more people as unconstitutional in its rulings for two cases that involved sugar workers' strikes during 1946, and ILWU Local 152 signed a two-year contract three years later during January of 1949 that included provisions for hourly wage increases of between nine and four cents (which made a total of ninety-one cents for female cannery and agricultural workers and $1.01 for males), a joint-financed health-insurance program, and medical and accident insurance from the Prudential Insurance Company.[258]

Members of Local 13 voted during July of 1949 by a margin of 1,563 to 546 to join Local 136's strike, meanwhile, for hourly wage increases of thirty-two cents, or $1.72 per hour (which would have restored their wages to the previous differential of ten cents in relation to west-coast longshore workers' wages), but the union had already signed a two-and-a-half year contract with the WEA in February that was not to expire until June 15, 1951. Working-class women in Honolulu, Lihue, Kauai, Wailuku, Maui, and Olaa responded to the "Big Five" companies' recruitment of nurses employed at their hospitals to lead their organization, "We the Women," by organizing new auxiliary units, for their part, and it was this particular effort that, combined with west-coast ILWU members' refusal to haul "hot cargo" as well as a federal judge's order that the territorial government's attorney general and legislature cease prosecuting strikers for picketing activities, both forced C & H to halt operations at its plant in Crockett, California, and cease purchasing of sugar cane from Cuban and Puerto Rican growers and also enabled the strikers to overcome the territorial legislature's decisions to authorize the governor to "operate the longshore industry on behalf of employers," guarantee the "full profits" of stevedoring companies, and recruit non-strikers across picket lines. It was also then, incidentally, that Harry Bridges also won election as president of the World Federation of Trade Unions' (WFTU) newly-formed Seamen's, Dockers, Inland Water Ways, and Allied Workers Trade Unions International (also known as the "Maritime Federation of the World"), which demanded "equal pay for equal work regardless of race, color, or nationality" and "equal distribution of work opportunity and control over the number of workers in the industry." ILWU Local 26 also defeated IBT in an NLRB election among drug-store workers employed by Owl-Sontag - which was the largest drug store in the world and the first that the local organized in 1937 - by a margin of sixty-seven to thirty-three, and both ILWU Local 152 and the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association on Lanai struck again against the Isthmian Steamship Company's operations two years later during the summer (as Mine-Mill Local 700 and ILWU Local 13 also did briefly against steam-schooners companies in Los Angeles) while wartime wages stagnated and an unprecedent wave of labor strikes occurred in North America from 1951-2. The ILWU's foremen's union, Local 94, signed a two-year contract with the Master Contracting Stevedores Association which stipulated that the supervisorial workers' wages must remain twenty to thirty percent higher than those of longshore workers, and it was also at that time, lastly, that the officers of MCS's local in Wilmington warned members of the "blacklisting" that was "being practiced on the waterfront" through Coast Guard's "screening program."[259]

The CHC found in a housing survey that 162,000 families in Los Angeles were living in tents, garages, cabins, trailers, hotels, or had "doubled up" into single-family dwellings during the year 1947 (including three of every ten married World War II veterans who were parents of 66,000 families and were living in rented rooms, trailers, or tourist cabins), and it also cited

another survey by the National Housing Authority which found the same was also true half of all black, married veterans who were earning an average monthly wage of forty-five dollars. *The Army Times* reported, for its part, that veterans in southern California protested the lack of "affordable housing" during early 1947 and that a veterans' committee charged the Culver City Housing Corporation, furthermore, with violating its contracts by building "flimsy, second-rate structures" with "a much cheaper grade of wood" for ex-GIs than what building codes required. The U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, California Taxpayers' Association, the California Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission, the Southwest Building and Contractors, and housing economics compiled additional data which indicated that another 257,000 dwellings units were either already at or near substandard quality by late 1948 and that the average home price in Los Angeles of $13,500 was $2,500 more than in San Francisco and $3,500 more than the state's average as a whole. Municipal governments were racing to construct temporary housing for veterans as a delegate to a conference hosted by the CHC from Building and Construction Trades' Council delegate called for the state government to pay for ninety percent of construction costs for 5,521 of the 7,582 dwelling units that had yet to be completed. Voters in California rejected Proposition 14 one year later, however, which would have allocated $100 million from the state government's annual budget for unsegregated housing projects to be administered by both municipal housing authorities and non-profit housing associations, given veterans priority during the first five years, and guaranteed housing for families displaced by highway construction and community redevelopment projects, while the National Council of Negro Woman asserted in a flyer during the spring of 1949 that the purpose of the "Cain-Bricker anti-segregation amendment" was to "kill" the housing bill that congresspersons were deliberating and observed that the amendment's authors in Congress also aided "the Southerners' anti-civil rights filibuster" led by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond a few days later."[260]

Although the city's housing authority desegregated most of its housing projects after 1942, the county housing commission (whose executive director, Melville Dozier, had, like Carey McWilliams, been appointed to the state government's Division on Housing and Immigration in 1939) continued to practice segregation on both *de jure* and *de facto* bases until Dozier's direction throughout the early 1950s. Thomas J. O'Dwyer complained to the chair of the county board of supervisors, Raymond V. Darby, during June of 1947, for example, after an official in the county housing authority reported discreetly to the CHC that six of thirteen housing projects remained segregated, that Dozier, who had received his appointment as executive director just recently, did "not have the interest of housing at heart," was "not 'equipped' to handle the position of Executive Director," and was refusing to accept funds for public-housing construction from the national government. All of the county housing authority's projects with the exceptions of Carmelitos, Harbor Hills, and Maravilla - which each opened between October of 1940 and December of 1942 and the latter of which followed the "community pattern" by housing "primarily Mexican inhabitants" with legal status - were either temporary war housing or only available to veterans, and the county housing projects' demographic composition changed quickly between February of 1947 and April of 1948 whereby the percentage of Mexican residents increased from 60.5% to 80%, that of Afro-American residents remained between eight and nine percent, and the percentage of white residents lowered from 30.6% to between eleven and twelve percent (Dozier attributed this change to increased "mixing" that was resulting from vacancies). The county housing authority requested funds after Congress passed an amended housing act in 1949 for the construction of a



Courtesy: The Huntington Research Library

mere 1,500 additional public-housing units, furthermore, after a decade of rapid demographic growth in southern California, (which was even less than the housing authority's first housing projects that it began ten years earlier that constructed 1,541 dwelling units), and an impromptu committee that included representatives from the Los Angeles CIO Council, the Urban League, the Los Angeles Federation of Labor, the CSO, and the Building Trades Council responded by calling instead for the construction of 4,000 additional public-housing units. After a tenants' committee delegation persuaded the board of supervisors to pass a resolution to request a moratorium on evictions two years later by arguing that the county housing commission's refusal to hold meetings as required under the law constituted "proof of gross negligence of duty," the Los Angeles County Committee on Human Relations received another troubling report that Dozier had recently ordered employees of the county housing commission to withhold information and refrain from participating in the activities of the National Association of Housing Officials, while the board of supervisors voted against O'Dwyer and Siegel's request – with John Anson Ford dissenting – to grant a $300,000 loan to the county housing authority to fund a survey by the Census Bureau, administrative costs, and preliminary building expenses and to appoint a new county redevelopment commission that would "condemn" certain areas as blighted while leaving the prerogative to construct new housing to the realm of "private enterprise" alone.[261]

Efforts to desegregate public housing during the 1940s coincided with the decision by many state governments to enact a novel method of financing housing construction through municipal redevelopment agencies that received its funds in the form of capital from stockholders, and this was why the California legislature passed community-redevelopment and urban-redevelopment acts in 1945 that authorized redevelopment agencies to categorize "slum housing" as blighted, indemnify owners, prepare lots, and then "redevelop" the area by selling or leasing the properties to private corporations (which were responsible for constructing new housing units but only obligated to offer temporary housing with similar rents for up to three years to displaced residents who did not receive guarantees of admission to newer housing projects). Unlike the laws which the Pennsylvania state government enacted in 1945, 1947, and 1949 which barred discrimination by private developers in both public- and veterans' housing projects based on ancestry, creed, color, or nationality, the California state government's new housing laws permitted the omission of any "reference to race" within redevelopment agencies' contractual agreements. Planning commissions acted merely in an advisory capacity within the community-redevelopment model, since, although housing authorities did have the right of eminent domain, redevelopment agencies were not actually responsible for housing construction and could permit private contractors to charge whatever rents that they deemed necessary to ensure "an adequate return" for their investment. The first community-redevelopment project was the notorious $25-million Stuyvesant Town project in New York City during the early 1940s which the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company financed and excluded black working-class and "middle income groups" legally before it allocated a paltry $5 million for a separate Riverton project in Harlem in response to the subsequent outrage among supporters of fairer housing laws, and it was protests such as these that led the board of supervisors in San Francisco to pass a resolution on May 16, 1949, that forbad "discrimination or segregation" in community-redevelopment projects based on "race, color, creed, national origin or ancestry" after receiving testimony from an attorney and "housing expert," Charles Abrams, who reported that the implementation of fair-practice requirements did not "frighten away" investors in New York City. Though the Los Angeles Redevelopment Agency at first ignored the LACCCR's

recommendation that it enact similar legislation six months later, the city council did eventually pass an ordinance during the winter of 1950-1 (shortly after Siegel returned to New York) which prohibited "discrimination and segregation based on race, color, creed, national origin or ancestry in redevelopment plans," while the board of supervisors in San Francisco voted at that time by a margin of eight to three to ban segregation in public-housing projects and the state government's District Court of Appeal ruled in *Banks v. San Francisco* (1953) that segregation in public housing violated the fourteenth amendment.[262]

The Los Angeles city government's housing authority proposed eleven new projects with 8,758 units after Congress passed the amended housing act, meanwhile, that included projects for the construction of 3,360 new units in Elysian Heights, 1,110 new units in Imperial-Compton, and a 2,099-unit extension for the Rose Hill housing project, and it is worth noting that officials selected many of the locations based on their finding that sixty-seven percent of residents who were eligible to live in public-housing projects worked in the central business district of downtown L.A. The purpose of the Rose Hill extension – which, along with the proposed project in West L.A., received "a barrage of criticism" from "the Metropolitan press and many community newspapers" that O'Dwyer described as "particularly bitter" – was, furthermore, to house residents of a neighborhood that the city government had zoned mostly for industrial, civic-center, freeway, and commercial uses, whereas the intent for both the 910-unit extension at Aliso Village and the 700-unit project at Jordan Downs included halting the growth of industries from the Central Industrial Area that was reaching Boyle Heights and the city's southeastern area. The proposed project in an agricultural zone of West L.A. was the only one that local officials located outside of what they categorized as "slum areas" (the number of times per year that the regional planning commission had rezoned agricultural areas as commercial or residential has risen from twenty-six at the beginning of the decade to sixty-three in the fiscal year 1950-1), and the housing authority designed several other projects specifically for veterans displaced by the "deprogramming" of "temporary veterans emergency housing projects." The 194-unit extension in San Pedro was to "help eliminate the blighted scattered areas" and provide "an excellent location" for war industries, in contrast, while the city's planning commission, which had zoned the first urban oil-drilling district in Boyle Heights in 1947, began regulating units' the number of rooms in the households of residential zones based on square footage one year later as part of its "new density provisions." The total area that the municipal government categorized as blighted reached between twenty and twenty-five square miles as it also studied new proposals to eliminate and redevelop "blighted housing" by rezoning some residential areas as industrial towards the end of the decade, and this was after the total population living in the San Fernando Valley's had increased between 1946 and 1950, according to some estimates, from 176,000 to 310,000.[263]

Frank Wilkinson accepted a new position after the end of the second world war as the director of public relations for the city housing authority before he became the special assistant for the housing authority's executive director, Howard Holtzendorff, and his responsibilities included both selecting locations for public-housing projects and liaising with the mayor's office, the Catholic Church, veterans' organizations, labor unions, residents, and, since they had "good organizers" and Holtzendorff believed that "it would help if we had contact," the Los Angeles Communist Party. Wilkinson signed loyalty oaths each year, and Dorothy Ray Healey spoke to at least one CHC meeting during those years with little fanfare. Wilkinson argued in a booklet published during the late 1940s, "A Decent Home is an American Right," both that slums caused increased in both the prevalence of infectious diseases and crime (Charlotta Bass had asserted

similarly when she ran for city council after the war that replacing slums with recreational facilities would reduce “the major part of our juvenile delinquency”) and also that the residents of slum areas paid, on average, one-third less in taxes while consuming 232% more resources in direct services simultaneously, and, after the housing official also produced a film with students from University of Southern California which called for the construction of 10,000 low-rent public-housing units, the city council’s appropriation of $110 million for public-housing projects made Los Angeles the first city in North America to become eligible receive funds from the national government’s new housing law. Wilkinson planned to locate many of the new projects outside of the “downtown industrial triangle,” including outside “the densely crowded Negro ghetto,” and he reported soon after that LAPD Police Chief William H. Parker submitted erroneous data during late 1951 to a spokesman for real-estate lobbyists, Fritz Burns, which claimed falsely that juvenile-delinquency rates in public-housing projects were higher than the city-wide average.[264]

Wilkinson testified at the second of the state government’s Senate Un-American Activities Committee during September and October of 1952 after Parker produced a dossier which identified nine “leading employees” and him as Communists and while the city council was calling for HUAC to investigate the city’s housing authority, and he later reported that Holtzendorff had previously given “protection money” to the committee’s chair, Hugh Burns of Fresno, as well as to other politicians from Los Angeles to ensure they would “leave us along.” Holtzendorff’s proposal was initially for Wilkinson to fake a cough during his testimony if he “was ever asked the question,” which was to provide a signal to their attorney, Allan Carson of the law firm Faries and McDowell, to object that such a question as irrelevant. Wilkinson testified to a superior court judge during August in favor of invoking eminent domain and compensating three property owners to allow for the construction of a 3,500-unit public-housing project in Chavez Ravine, and the property owners’ attorney responded by submitting Parker’s dossier and asking Wilkinson to name the organizations, “political or otherwise,” to which he had belonged since 1931. The presiding judge then revoked Wilkinson’s right to request legal counsel from his attorney, and, recalling later that he was “sick and tired” of signing loyalty oaths which he considered demeaning and that one person, Eason Monroe, had already lost his position as a college instructor for refusing to sign a loyalty oath (and perhaps also aware that supervisor John A. Ford was supporting ordinances to require that members of the Los Angeles Communist Party “register” and to prevent their “participation in various key civic and government activities”), Wilkinson cited both his “personal conscience” and the Fifth Amendment to justify his refusal to answer the question. Though Holtzendorff warned him subsequently against appealing for aid from “a communist attorney” after the judge advised Wilkinson to seek legal representation, Wilkinson decided against requesting such aid from his college friend, Richard Rogan, who asked him whether he was a Communist while another attorney refused O’Dwyer’s offer of $14,000 in financial compensation and instead received legal counsel from Robert Kenny (who claimed that he had been “expecting” his request) as well as from his partners Robert Morris and Daniel Marshall in an effort to challenge the leading opponents of public housing in Los Angeles that included the Apartment House Owners Association, the Home Builders’ Association, the Mormon Church (of which some members were also members of the Home Builders’ Association), the Merchant and Manufacturing Association, the police chief, the county government, *The Los Angeles Times*, and several of the city’s housing commissioners (including Bank of America Vice-President John Fishburn, Lloyd Mashburn, corporate attorney Maurice Saeta, and Golden State Life Insurance Company board

chairman George Beavers, Jr). Holtzendorff called, meanwhile, for the Senate Un-American Activities Committee chaired by Burns – Jack Tenney also ran as the Christian Nationalist Party's vice-presidential candidate that year – to "investigate people who wrote the letters" in support of Wilkinson before he first suspended and then dismissed the official after his testimony on October 28, along with a group of five or six other employees of the city housing authority that included a painter, Jack Maidith, from North Hollywood, while the committee subpoenaed several teachers, including both the editor of *The Los Angeles Teacher*, Frances Evaberg, and the executive secretary of the California Legislative Conference, Eleanor Raymond, before the municipal government's Board of Education also dismissed Wilkinson's wife, Jean - who had participated in the efforts of the teachers' union to include "multicultural classes and world understanding as advocated by" UNESCO in school curricula - from her position at the East Los Angeles Girls Vocational High School on the grounds that the Los Angeles Communist Party had been recruiting employees of the city's housing authority on behalf of both the Federation of Teachers and United Public Workers.[265]

Police harassment and brutality continued unabated in southern California after the end of World War II, since deputy sheriff H.H. Hodges remained employed, for example, after he shot and killed a thirteen-year old boy, Eugene Montenegro, in 1946. A mail carrier who lived on 46th Street, Henry C. Coleman, reported to Charlotta Bass that two "white detectives" pulled "a lady" and him over on April 5, 1947, at the corner of Central Avenue and 46th Street, furthermore and that one of the police officers attempted to defend their actions by claiming that "two of his white mates" had been killed and two others hospitalized during the previous week. Coleman could not identify these police officers, and he complained further that "the newspapers are little informed of the brutality suffered by people of the Negro race on the east side of town by the white police." It was also during that spring that the NAACP's San Pedro chapter's president, Sidney Smith, complied with a local packinghouse-workers' union president's recommendation by telling the Los Angeles CIO Council's acting secretary that "police brutality in the San Pedro area" had become "a disturbing factor in the community" after officers Frederick Corozza and Bruce W. McGraw beat a civilian, Alfred Giles, with a blackjack and a pistol, and law enforcement authorities responded by filing assault and battery charges against the alleged victim, Giles, and then denying his appeal for another hearing upon his conviction. Frank Wilkinson, who was still the chair of the Housing Committee for the city's Council for Civic Unity, also spoke with the board of directors during June regarding police officers' practice of permitting "white occupants to move on" at "road blocks" while stopping and searching "Negro occupants."[266]

Community-police relations worsened to such an extent that the Civil Rights and Minorities panel at the Statewide California Legislative Council's meeting in Sacramento issued a statement during February that it "deplored the growth of police brutality, as directed largely against Mexican and Negro citizens, but ultimately against all" and proposed establishing both "impartial boards of review of such outrages" and an "'in-training" program of study for municipal police on "race relations" based on "the Richmond Plan." Yet the development prerogative – and all its corrupting influences - still disrupted both those efforts and further attempts by trade unionists and other reformers to support the interests of working people, since a coalition of CIO and AFL affiliates, the San Pedro Chamber of Commerce, and various civic and business organizations proposed to Fletcher Bowron – who had already vetoed the city council's $10,000 appropriation to investigate conditions on the waterfront – the "improvement and modernization" of the harbor district, meanwhile, through an expansion of its docking

facilities for "the world's largest and most costly fishing fleet," hospitals, and emergencies and the appointment of harbor commissioners who were "experienced in harbor problems and with proven interest in building a great port." This was not the first time, however, that such a coalition had lobbied Bowron to reform the harbor commission. The San Pedro Central Labor Council's secretary, ILWU Local 13's president, and representatives from both the Harbor Businessmen's Association and the Fishermen's Cooperative Association each signed a telegram to Bowron two years earlier which protested that Bowron's appointee to the commission, who was an attorney for the chamber of commerce, James C. Ingebretsen, was "unfamiliar" with "harbor affairs." The Los Angeles CIO Council charged Bowron's harbor commission, for their part, with "shocking misfeasance and incompetence."[267]

The connections between corruption, labor repression, and police brutality became increasingly evident towards the end of the decade, such as when LAPD officer William Keyes killed a seventeen-year old boy, Augustin Salcido, on Temple Street between Grand and Bunker Hill at one o'clock during the morning of March 10, 1948, and witnesses contradicted his claim that he only left the area for approximately twenty seconds to call an ambulance by reporting that he had actually left the scene for approximately twenty-five minutes. The president of the CSO, Edward Roybal, stated soon after that another police officer arrested a group of young children in Palos Verdes when leaders of the organization met to discuss Salcido's killing and plan a response, and yet Roybal refused the ACLU's offer of support relayed through representative from the ILGWU, Abe F. Levy, with the rationale that the CSO intended "to work on such matters independently." After a group of white and black LAPD officers then both broke the neck of and killed a twenty-eight year-old Herman Burns, who was father of two, a military veteran, and a member of an AFL-affiliated plasterers' union, and arrested his two brothers for charges of disturbing the peace on August 22, the Los Angeles CIO Council's Minorities Committee began cooperating, in contrast, not only with both with the Civil Rights Congress's Justice for Burns Citizens Committee and the local chapter of the NAACP to publish post cards which contained images of "the recent slaying" and criticized the department's regular "use of police blockades," curfews, "whole-sale frisking and interrogation of law-abiding citizens," the "intimidation of those daring to criticize the police department, and the failure of the department to hold its officers responsible to the law" but also a colonel from Fort MacArthur, which was their response to "the use of army personnel and facilities for the organization of a restrictive covenant group in Compton." James Richardson of the AFL-affiliated Carpenters Local 634 - which also had an "anti-Restrictive Covenant Committee" by 1947 - soon joined a delegation of CIO and religious leaders that met with a tight-lipped Bowron who countered with the argument that "criticism of the police department was communistic" and "undermined the foundations of government," to which members of the Minorities Committee responded by observing pointedly that Bowron and the police commissioners were the "same administration which organized the 'Metropolitan Squad' as a special strike-breaking organization for the big employers of Los Angeles" and charged the LAPD, furthermore, with copying "Jim Crow rules in southern cities" through its effort to establish a "'police curfew' for Negroes and Mexican-Americans." The Maravilla chapter of AMNA produced evidence two years later that county sheriffs deputies entered into Mrs. Natalia Gonzales's home on North McDonnell Street forcibly during a baby shower on February 4, 1950, beat and slapped both male and female attendees, stole "sandwiches and beer," and arrested approximately fifty people and portrayed their actions as typical of "the intimidation and discrimination on the part of law enforcement officials towards the Mexican people in Maravilla as well as in other areas of the country," and it was also then that the

executive board of ILWU Local 13 donated twenty-five dollars to the Civil Rights Congress and protested to the police chief when another police officer beat and broke three of the ribs of rank-and-file member Anderson Lark's ribs – and the local's members and executive board soon failed to agree whether to dis-affiliate from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WTFU) on the grounds that it was seeking to "pass resolutions, petition and take all possible action to defeat the United States and the United Nations actions in Korea" – and the LACCCR also complained of "a rash of unethical journalism" during April and early May that was "comparable to that of 1942 and 1943" in which newspapers published stories on alleged crimes by young Mexican-Americans that did not lead to law enforcement agencies pressing charges, inserted "Mexican names" into crime reports that "had nothing to do with Mexican-Americans," and presented "unnecessarily gory pictures" when the accused was a "minority group member."[268]

Bowron then recalled during a meeting with male CSO leaders that it was "the Communists" who had "made quite a thing of" the killing of Augustin Salcido and expressed surprise that "you folks would associate yourselves with a mess like that," and one CSO leader, Anthony Rios, responded, as Fred Ross wrote in his unpublished memoir, by stating emphatically, "You bet we would! You don't think we're gonna stay out of a fight against injustice and discrimination just because the Commies are in it do you?" The city's police chief resigned not long after "the Bowron-Roybal run-off," but reports of police officers' frequent "shake-downs" of civilians soon began percolating once again after a brief respite when the new police chief, William Parker, reassigned a popular captain, Stein, away from his previous position in the Boyle Heights Precinct. The CSO still claimed victory, however, when newspapers began printing less-propagandistic reports on "Rat-Pack" crimes after the East Side Citizens' Complaints Committee (to which Parker had appointed two CSO members) found that the actual number of such crimes were declining. Ross wrote in his memoir that the CSO leaders succeeded after following the advice of the managing editor of *The Los Angeles Daily News*, I.L. Smith, and finding "a good, solid case" of a "kid with no record" instead of "some jail-bird."[269]

Stories of police brutality still continued to proliferate through the spring of 1952, however, which was why the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council complained, for example, that police officers beat the face - and ruptured the intestines - of a member of United Shoe Service Employees Local 112 employed by the Zinke Rebottoming Shoe Company in Pasadena, Vincent Navarro on West Adams Avenue. Though the officers arrested Navarro on "a drunken charge," local CIO officials asserted that the alleged victim had not consumed any alcoholic drinks and called instead for "a thorough investigation." Lunceford, Dial, Jr., and the president of the Los Angeles CIO Council, Clarence H. Stinson, opted to meet with Parker to discuss "the question of police brutality and misunderstanding between the department and our members in the harbor area" and their impacts on "the Negro community in San Pedro and Wilmington." They also discussed the death of union member Sam Jones while in police custody and the public intoxication charges against his friend, Nathaniel Ray, who had allegedly stabbed an officer during a fight in the harbor district. Yet the CSO was incapable of challenging either police brutality or corruption effectively for a number of reasons which included that it was "in the midst of another financial crisis" despite its attempts to garner "wide-spread popular support" to "prevent police brutality against minority groups."[270]

The poor state of community-police relations, along with the widespread practice of "bookie rackets" in the harbor district, had led Bowron to hire a interim police chief to replace Clemence B. Horrall, Marine Major-General W.A. Worton, to whom he granted a "a free hand' to end the rackets while Bowron dismissed "any possibility of corruption" to state senators

during the spring of 1950. The LACCCR responded to the "mounting tension" that the "mass arrest of persons of Mexican ancestry" in Maravilla had caused, meanwhile, by reactivating its police relations committee which then requested an appointment with the county sheriff and the police chief after the committee's chairman, A.A. Heist, suggested that it "prepare a file on the type of in-service training courses given to police throughout the country" and "make sure information" was "available to all agencies." Yet a coalition of CIO leaders (including a representative from the ILWU's ladies' auxiliary), reformers, and black businessowners again still needed to complain "in general the use of violence against members of minority groups and Union members in the Harbor area" when three police officers "attacked" a member of ILWU Local 26 who had just applied to become the first Afro-American in San Pedro to receive a liquor license, Eugene Walker, "brutally" in the harbor district during June - after they had previously subjected Walker to frequent surveillance by shining their spotlights, disturbing customers, and "harassing Mr. Walker and his wife," Imogene, at their café – while both members of the Senate Club and local residents protested by "crowd[ing] the courtroom" after the Walkers' subsequent arrests. The executive board of ILWU Local 13 also called for a committee to investigate "police brutality in the harbor area" during January of 1951, furthermore, and recruit volunteers to attend future conferences on the problem, while the membership opted to target Anti-Communists, for their part, by voting in favor of one executive-board member's resolution "opposing red-baiting within the Union" against members of Hawaiian sugar workers' Local 142. Few reformers could change the fact, however, that the authority to review complaints of police misconduct remained vested solely in the Los Angeles Police Commission, nor could they respond effectively when terrorists bombed one black family's home on Dunsmuir Avenue later that year.[271]

The conflicts further escalated towards the end of the year with the infamous "bloody Christmas" affair in which approximately fifty police officers detained a young Latino man, Danny Rallela – who was, along with his brother, Elias, studying at a community college "on the G.I. Bill" – and six others at his residence in Lincoln Heights while calling Rallela, according to his account, "a [expletive] little cop-killing bastard." Officers seized Rallela from his jail cell soon after and took him near the top of Elysian Park, "beat him unconscious," and left him in Los Angeles General Hospital's prison ward, and it was not long after that two plain-clothes officers arrested Rios and another CSO member who witnessed the officers "roughing up" a customer at the Carioca Café. The subsequent protests led to a police lieutenant's participation in a televised meeting with Rios, George Thomas of the LACCCR, and Loren Miller (who represented the NAACP) where lieutenant asserted to Thomas that "this race relations program" which he suggested was "already in effect at the Police Academy" and Miller observed, for his part, that investigators from LAPD internal affairs' "police bureau" had "taken the side of the police officer every time." Rios then recounted how the bureau's investigator deployed "a car-load of cops" to his house and told the CSO leader to bear "in mind" that there were "4,100 of them in the City of Los Angeles." A superior court judge soon ordered jury members to disregard Rabella's testimony during a trial in March for the seven defendants from Lincoln Heights and ordered suspended sentences to six of the convicted and forty-eight hours of probation with the chance to enter a not guilty plea and expunge after the jury voted guilty for the charges of assault and battery and disturbing the peace against them, though a county judge did also sentence five of the approximately fifty officers who kidnapped them, according to Ross, to one to ten years for felonious assault.[272]

There were areas within city's environment that remained hazardous after the war due to



Southern California Regional Planning Commission (1952). Courtesy: The Research Huntington Library

years of a corrupt zoning practices which permitted the existence of “a dangerous industrial process” in “a highly congested district” and caused an explosion at the O’Connor Electro-Planting Company’s plant on February 20, 1947, for example, that killed seventeen and injured over 200 people, and it was this disaster that led Lunceford to inform city council members of the Los Angeles CIO Council’s intention to petition to improve safety regulations and inspections and indemnify those who “suffered personal injury or the destruction of their dwellings” before arguing further that their appropriations for the LAPD’s Metropolitan Squad would be better used to guarantee “genuine protection to the citizens of this community.” The Greater Los Angeles CIO Council continued to oppose the county government’s loyalty-oath requirement by as late as August of 1949, and an assistant director for the CIO’s organizing campaign with the United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Workers’ Union in the Salinas-Watsonville area admitted to Lunceford as early as September of the following year that “possibly we have been carried away with our fight” against Communists and “gotten off the wrong foot in our advocacy for the city and county wide registration of Communists” without “thinking through the possible complications and dangers to our Unions” before he requested “complete information” on additional proposed anti-Communist registration ordinances in Los Angeles County from Lunceford. LAPD officers, for their part, formed a union that affiliated with AFSCME during the spring of 1943, but, just fourteen months after Luisa Moreno informed Slim Connolly in a letter that Mexican newspapers were reporting “quite prominently” that the “Policeman’s Union” charged Bowron with “discrimination against Mexican and Spanish speaking people,” the mayor refused to sign an amendment to a city-council ordinance in March of 1946 to grant “formal, official and legal recognition” to Police Employees Union Local 665.

Slim Connelly Papers. Courtesy: CSU Northridge

The police department’s Head of Intelligence and future chief, Daryl F. Gates, supervised a unit with an office in its Wilshire division by the early 1950s which “dealt with Communism, Communists, and other subversives” and whose “top guy” was a lieutenant, Carl Abbott, that had previously worked as an undercover agent within the Communist Party “for years,” according to Gates’s memoir, and “actually spent time in the Soviet Union working as an undercover officer.” Abbott had also infiltrated unemployed demonstrations during the early 1930s and colluded with extremist growers to attack striking cotton pickers and kill three Mexican people during the strike wave of 1933-4.[273]

Rentería’s experience in the Korean War began he enlisted in the Marine Corps after receiving a letter from the Army that he never opened, and he completed basic training, like many other soldiers, at Camp Pendleton along the coast of southern California. His squadron in the marines’ first division prepared for frigid weather conditions in northern Korea by training in Idyllwild in the San Jacinto Mountains, and his sister, Lydia, watched him disembark with his battalion from San Diego’s harbor district. The marines’ voyage lasted two weeks due to poor weather conditions at sea, where there was a ““bunch of sharks [*montón de sharks*]” that “would bite on the boat” and led Rentería to joke to another soldier that they did not “need to hurry ourselves to go to the war.” Rentería postulated that perhaps they “had the tail end of a tornado or something.”[274]

The first division’s third platoon landed at the southern edge of the peninsula in the secured area of Busan during September of 1950 after they spent a week in Japan. The marines had “already fought to about a quarter of the Korean peninsula there,” by then, and the various battalions proceeded to split into different companies. “The service” provisioned soldiers with three cans of food per day, and they usually contained preserved meatloaf, hamburgers, or corned beef hash that was “hardly nothing” for their sustenance. Rentería “lost a lot of weight” after his year in Korea. “A lot of our friends got killed.”

The soldiers carried “a lot” of their wounded comrades “down off the mountains” during battles, and at least “some” died before they reached a safe location. “We didn’t even know them,” since they were from a different platoon. “The Koreans and the Chinese, they'd hit the guy in the knee instead of killing them, because, when they killed him, you just left them there, you know.” “The idea they had was pretty good,” according to Rentería, because “it would take four of us to go pick up the guy and everything else. That's the reason they hit the knees, so that it takes some of us to carry him down and we wouldn't be there.”

There were also “a lot of kids, a lot of little boys,” who were visible to the marines. Displaced children crawled into trees during the day, and they went “down where we threw our cans” and “lick the cans” at night. The reason they had no food was that “they killed their mother and father, you know, with the bombs and all that stuff. They killed the mother and father or whatever, so the kids are running around by themselves…Sometimes that we'd see them in the daytime,” though usually they would “come at nighttime.”

The marines fought and lived with an extreme sense of doubt during their entire time in Korea, since “you don't know if you're gonna be there one minute to the next.” Rentería always asked during each battle whether “it might be my last one,” and that was also true for many soldiers that had recently been “called up.” He recalled one nineteen-year old marine soldier who was about six feet tall that just died one day after he arrived during a “jump off” in which e they “had to go attack Chinese.” Their enemies “shot him in the knee, and he fell down and hit a mine” that “blew up his chest… We were all about the same age.”

Their enemies attempted to confuse and instill terror in them, meanwhile, by disguising themselves with the uniforms of fallen soldiers whom they had killed or captured. “There was one time that I saw a guy in front of me” whom Rentería “wasn’t going to shoot,” since he “thought it was one of the marines.” Another soldier then said to him, “You'd better get him, or he's gonna get you." He killed him, even though he “didn't want to shoot him” due to his masking himself as a marine. Rentería was, in other words, torn between his fear of killing one of his comrades friend accidentally through “friendly fire” and his fear that a Chinese or Korean soldier would kill him.

North Korean military units used raids as a tactic to lure their enemies further north towards the border and near the region of Manchuria as China entered the war during October and November, and they waited until the frigid winter weather arrived before they launched an offensive – Chinese Army units attacked their enemies in a V-formation with additional contingents prepared to engage with U.S. regiments that arrived to support the trapped unit – and forced U.S. soldiers into a situation that Rentería “wouldn’t want to have anybody live through.” His hands “were like pink,” and he “couldn't hardly even move.” The marines wore thermos boots and gloves, but “when it gets thirty below zero, man, that's cold. It doesn't make any difference how much clothes you got, it's still cold.” Their sweat froze as they hiked through the mountain range, and the water in their canteen also froze while it made a “clack-clack-clack” sound “before you could [even] drink it.”[275]

Although Rentería survived the war, the trauma that he experienced haunted him for the rest of his life. “It's been probably seventy some years or more that I was in the war,” he said in 2016, “and I still have nightmares.” His wife woke him often during the middle of the night, “because I'd be screaming or hollering or doing something, you know… That's why I don't watch wars or nothing like that on TV… If I watch it, I dream about it.

“That year in the war was a nightmare,” and yet he still wanted “to hear about the stuff that's going on over there in the Middle East” before he died in Guadalajara, México, during the morning of December 25, 2018. Rentería stated that he knew “what it's about,” since “we went through it, and it's hard. It's hard to cope with, because you feel sorry for the kids that are in there going through all this.” Many people who see them do not actually “understand,” but “we, the some that were there, we understand what they were going through. Little kids, you know… That's something you don't forget.”

When asked what people should know about war, Rentería alluded to those who would

leave children in the streets, "in the road, you know," to fend for themselves. "People, if they went through what we went through, they wouldn't do that … We feel for these kids" who are "almost bare naked and cold and barefooted," because "we've seen them suffer" while "going around" with "nothing to eat." When "they go around licking your cans where you ate, I mean all that stuff, it doesn't go away so easy…If they went through what we went through, they would "have love for their kids, you know."

Rentería wanted to "forget what I went through in Korea" after he returned to San Diego, which even led him to start "smoking marijuana one time when I came back." His memories of the war bothered him, since "it affects your mind. You can't even sleep, dream about it and all that stuff, and then you always dream about guys coming after you. Chinese, Koreans! You dream about everything, you know, nightmares, and so you hit the bottle.

"How can you get it out of your mind shooting people?" Although he had hunted animals before, "they take you over there" and order "you [to] start shooting guys" and "kill people," because the only alternative is for one's enemy to kill the subject in question. "That's bad," and "it haunts you." Rentería remembered an instance where a Chinese soldier countered his grenade that he threw by "shoot[ing] the wires off" his superior officer's phone while other Chinese soldiers returned fire with a kind of automatic rifle that he described as a "bert gun." "He did not know the wires had been cut until another soldier told him." That was "how close you came to getting shot," and it "bothers you when you come back."

While Rentería asserted that knew "what they're going through" based on his personal experience, he also cautioned those who have not experienced war firsthand who "see it" but do not "really know what they're going through." One never knows it unless "you went through it yourself," since that is how one can know and "understand what the other people are going through…Like those people that there are in Congress or whatever, the government… They don't understand what's going on over there," since "they've never been through it."
"This crazy guy here, Trump," who could never understand what the immigrants are doing or whatever, none of that stuff. Everything he says, it's just something that he wants to do, but he don't understand, you know. Crazy."

Harry Truman first threatened that his administration would take "all necessary steps" to "meet the military situation" just "as we always have" during a press conference on November 30, 1950 (although he also claimed that his administration had "always had been" considering the deployment of yet another atomic bomb), while the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, assured, in contrast, that the "use of the atomic bomb would be impractical in Korea." Truman's threat also caused disagreements amongst his administration's allies in western Europe, since, whereas two Conservative Party leaders in the U.K., Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, were "standing firmly" with the prime minister, Clement Attlee, *The World Telegram* found that there was widespread support within the British Labor Party, France, and other western European countries for Attlee to "force a showdown with President Truman on banning the use of the atom bomb in Asia and curbing Gen. of Army Douglas MacArthur." A number of Republicans led by a senator from New York, Irving M. Ives, expressed concerns, for their part, regarding Acheson's "handling of foreign affairs" and "especially in the Far East" and began calling for his ouster as Secretary of State, while former U.S. president Herbert Hoover proposed an alternative strategy based on "making the Western Hemisphere a 'Gibraltar' of defense" that echoed Republicans' emphasis on "hemispheric security" during the 1920s. There is evidence that support for the war within North America varied considerably by region, since *The Associated Press* conducted a survey of letters that newspapers published which indicated that support for "containment" was strongest – and support Hoover's proposal also the weakest -

among residents of northeastern and mid-Atlantic states, as well as among seventy percent of those authors of the letters that *The Nashville Tennessean* and *The Denver Post* each published and sixty percent of letters that *The Portland Journal* published. Between seventy and eighty-five percent of that letters that *The Louisville Courier-Journal*, *The Louisville Times*, and *The Los Angeles Times* published favored Hoover's proposal and opposed the containment strategy, in contrast, while Lydia Martínez recalled, for her part, that "people were protesting a lot" over the war and that she did not "think we had any business there."[276]

Evidence of Truman's conflict with MacArthur became apparent on August 28, 1950, when he ordered the general to retract a statement that he made to the Veterans of Foreign Wars which claimed that "Formosa" – or the island of Taiwan - was essential for U.S. strategy in southeast Asia, and MacArthur soon complained during late November that his lack of authority to order strikes across the border in the Chinese territory of Manchuria was "an enormous handicap" and "without precedent in military operations." Reports soon surfaced during the following February that MacArthur favored allying with exiled Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan to conduct joint operations in both Korea and China, and he predicted ominously one month later that "limitations upon our field of counter-offensive action" would result in a stale-mate. MacArthur then suggested that U.S. forces could defeat Chinese Communists through a combination of bombs and a proposed land invasion by Nationalists before he criticized Truman administration openly during early April by informing House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. of Massachusetts that he preferred concentrating resources "on Asia instead of Europe" through his proposal that the Truman administration support a Nationalist invasion from Taiwan and grant MacArthur the authority to bomb Communist bases in Manchuria (which was a proposal that the commander of the American Legion, Erle Cocke, Jr., also supported), while the Truman administration's Ambassador-at-Large in Japan, John Foster Dulles, "concluded a prompt peace" which aligned with MacArthur's strategy. Truman argued, in contrast, that the general's proposal "ran the 'very grave risk of starting a general war," and Republicans' responded by threatening to retaliate with "impeachment proceedings." A newspaper correspondent in Paris found that Truman's allies in western Europe favored the dismissal MacArthur due to their fears of both the general's proposals and "Mr. Truman's hint of using the atomic bomb," their opposition to "a showdown with the Soviet Union," and their disagreements with regard to "Far Eastern policy," while a Republican senator from Ohio, Robert A. Taft, soon denied that either MacArthur or he had supported deployment of U.S. military forces in "an attempt to conquer China" and asserted that the senator had only advocating only supplying the Nationalists in Taiwan.[277]

The questions regarding whether the U.S. should create a strategy based on collective security, continue supporting the exiled government of Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, the Kuomintang, from the island of Taiwan, or "Formosa," and deploy ground troops into Korea each caused much stronger disagreements that historians have acknowledged between Japanophiles in the Republican Party and Sinophiles within the military who cited a lack of sufficient Anti-Communist allies apart from Chinese Nationalists to argue in favor cooperation with Chinese Communists, and this division became increasingly apparent shortly after the end of the Chinese Revolution when the State Department "disseminated" a memorandum within the Truman administration on December 1, 1949, which questioned the "strategic significance" of Taiwan and that Acheson later attributed to the recommendations of an Army lieutenant general and former deputy chief of staff, Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had resigned less than three months earlier after requesting a transfer to lead the Sixth Army division in San Francisco. Wedemeyer,

who admitted during his testimony to the U.S. Senate's Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee that he had read the first two volumes of Karl Marx's *Capital* when he lived in Germany for several years shortly before the U.S. entered World War II and became acquainted personally with Communist military leaders in China while acting as Chiang Kai-Shek's chief of staff between 1944 and 1946, did not believe either that reconciliation between Communists and Nationalists in China was possible or that Taiwan was essential for national security, and he reported that he had "violent differences of opinion" with Chiang Kai-Shek. Wedemeyer opposed attempts to "restore democracy" in Korea and China, moreover, and asserted that Korea was far from most important among the various "potential power kegs" near the Soviet Union's borders which could create a power vacuum. The officer favored the use of economic and naval blockades - but not the deployment of soldiers - to Communist countries based on his conclusion that the "economic weapons" and not events on "the battlefield" were what enabled the Allied powers to defeat Germany during World War I, and he warned further that "there will be lots of Koreas" that would squander the "most precious commodity, American manhood," and "American materials." Congressional Republicans, such as the House Representative from Indiana, Charles A. Halleck, complained, for their part, that the war's outcome of a cease-fire at the thirty-eighth parallel was "a complete abandonment the announced objectives of both the United States and the United Nations when they entered the fighting," while a member of the Democratic Party from Tennessee, J. Percy Priest, claimed that he would "'not be fully satisfied' with any restoration of the pre-aggression status in Korea."[278]

Chinese officials soon announced their plans during late 1951 to launch a major infrastructure project that would further the integration of its northwestern region with Central Asia through the construction of a Turkestan-Siberia railway. The Nationalist government had undertaken similar projects to build an "inner arc system" between Tienshui-Lanchow and Chungking-Chengtu, but many politicians in North America were preoccupied with corruption allegations. *The New York Journal-American* published an editorial, for example, which argued that the possibility of re-election for ten Republican senators and losses for seven Democratic senators -- - including Dennis Chavez of New Mexico and Ernest McFarland of Arizona - had "suddenly boomed" due to "the crookedness and dishonesty unearthed in high places under the Truman Administration." Herbert Hoover also announced the conclusions from his Hoover Commission report during a radio broadcast on December 29, which included the assertion that U.S. had "been exposed in the past year to more dishonesty in officials and Government departments than at any time in history." Hoover provided evidence by citing the appointments or approval of tax collectors "mainly by political bosses" based on their "ability to get votes or rewards for doing so."[279]

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The Korean War is known to many as the "forgotten war," because it was an unpopular war fought largely by the sons of "the forgotten man." Both the invasion of Korea and the deportation of Luisa Moreno, along with the CIO executive board's purge of eleven Communist-affiliated unions, the factionalism of the CSO, and increased police brutality against black and Latino workers in the harbor district and East L.A., allowed HACLA and the Los Angeles Board of Education to dismiss radical employees and thereby discouraged police officers from allying with other workers, which delayed the passage of statewide fair-housing and fair-employment laws in California and caused the demise of industrial unionism in southern California. Yet the sacrifices that workers and soldiers made during World War II were not in vain. The world will soon forget this dissertation, its author, and the reader, but it cannot forget what the *pachucos* did

in L.A. It was through their actions, in part, that World War II became a war for freedom, although it took many years for its entire impact to take root in southern California due to Luisa Moreno's deportation and the colonial invasion of Korea.

Chapter Six

For the Good of All: Miners' Unions, the Empire Zinc Strike, and the End of Internationalism, 1933-1952

Striking members of Mine-Mill Amalgamated Local 890 and their wives met with other union members from Grant County at the Fierro Dance Hall on June 12, 1951, to decide whether members of the ladies' auxiliary should lead the union's picketing activities. The strike against the Empire Zinc Company's wage differentials had been underway for seven months by then, and the purpose of their meeting was to devise a response to a temporary anti-picketing injunction that District Judge A.W. Marshall issued shortly after picketers had physically carried a non-strikers' automobile fifty feet away from the mine entrance. The attendees knew the risks that it entailed, since there were already reports that non-strikers had begun running over picketers with their automobiles. Local 890 members agreed with little protest that strike should continue, but only a slight majority voted to permit auxiliary members to lead their activities. The auxiliary members' picketing activities that summer captivated the attention of people across North America and were essential for continuing a strike that lasted for fifteen months, though non-strikers coerced miners and auxiliary members into changing their tactics from regular to sit-down and wildcat strikes and sporadic picketing by resorting to violence from July through September.

The continued popularity of the miners' causes was due in large part to the picketing activities of auxiliary members during the Empire Zinc strike, since Mine-Mill locals were then struggling with "fratricidal" raids by the steelworkers' union in both southern and western states. The strike was the culmination of two decades of trade union activities by both coal and non-ferrous metal miners in the region that had long developed organizing traditions which valued antipathy against "scabs," and yet the Empire Zinc Strike, which many soon dubbed "the Salt of the Earth strike" based on Herbert Biberman's famous film, was also, in at least some ways, a harbinger for the wave of civil disobedience that began spreading throughout the South four years later. Although a young Latina woman from Hanover, Grant County, Chlorinda Kirker, became possibly the first women in North America to work in an underground mine during World War II, few, if any, Latina women in the county worked underground by the Empire Zinc strike. Discrimination against Latinos in housing, employment, and private businesses continued

after World War II, moreover, and mining companies retained a significant degree of control over law enforcement officers who reverted to repressive tactics during strikes and speed-ups towards the end of the decade.

Members of Local 890 reverted to older tactics when the auxiliary-led picketing activities ended abruptly with violence, but they also confronted a new terrain by the early 1950s due to long-term changes in demand for ore products between World Wars I and II. Mining companies attempted to suppress coal and non-ferrous metal miners' strikes by closing mining operations, evicting tenants, and colluding with immigration agents to target labor leaders in New Mexico for deportation soon after Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) during May of 1933, but coal miners were still able to win contracts with overtime pay and a grievance procedure before the U.S. entered World War II. Mine-Mill members began electing shop stewards during the late 1930s and soon sought to use the grievance procedure to both reduce workplace hazards and win concessions outside of regular contract negotiations, meanwhile, before the union consolidated its strength by sweeping NLRB elections for miners throughout the Southwest and winning further contract concessions during the early 1940s. Mine-Mill locals continued winning concessions after Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act by striking in large numbers, moreover, and remained a staunchly internationalist union when the U.S. invaded Korea. Among its most effective enemies was New Mexico's own senator, Dennis Chavez, however, since the senator collaborated with the imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class after the postwar strike waves by supporting the Truman administration's containment strategy, convincing officials of several governments in Latin America, including that of Mexico, to recognize the Zionist entity in Palestine, and argued for aiding Anti-Communist trade unionists and right-wing governments in Latin America.

Historical studies of the Empire Zinc strike have produced a variety of theoretical and methodological problems that are beyond the scope of this chapter, but it should be noted here that the strike, at first, seemed typical and only became controversial when auxiliary members took control of picketing activities. Vernon H. Jensen ignored the strike entirely in his early study of Mine-Mill, which attributed miners' unions' continued affiliation with Mine-Mill in the Southwest to "the prevailing psychology of the western miner" and argued that Mexican miners in Arizona, in particular, remained affiliated due to decisions made by the international executive board's representative for the union's second district, Orville Larson. Jack Cargill contended in an article published thirty years later that the Empire Zinc strike was the culmination of two decades of trade union activities amongst miners in New Mexico, in contrast, and asserted further that increased zinc demand during the Korean War was one of the strike's a major impetuses. Historians of twentieth-century New Mexico have concentrated increasingly in recent decades on local residents' experiences with FDR's "New Deal," the leadership of Mine-Mill organizer Clinton Jencks during the Empire Zinc Strike, and the 1954 film, *The Salt of the Earth*, that presented a fictional – and controversial – account of the strike that included many "cameos" by the strike's major leaders. Historians of both Mine-Mill Local 890 and the film have been especially concerned in recent decades with analyzing relations between members of the ladies' auxiliaries and union members, the union's impact on civil rights for Mexican-Americans and other Latinos, and the controversies surrounding both the production and distribution of the film.[280]

Cargill was correct to emphasize the importance of the war while taking a "long view" of miners' various organizing campaigns in the region, but one could also push even further by considering environmental factors, the region's history of radical populism, and Senator Dennis

Chavez's (D-NM) support for the Zionist movement after World War II. The mountains in the region contain a substantial amount of "porphyry coppers" that formed over eons as a result of a combination of geothermal energy from the earth's core, shifting tectonic plates, air, and water. The genesis of porphyry copper ore began as the supercontinent of Pangaea was forming during the late Paleozoic era approximately 700 million years ago when rocks within the earth's crust "broke through" limestone deposits. It was during the Mesozoic and Laramide ages between 208 million years ago and 54 million years B.C., however, that the epicenter of porphyry deposits shifted from British Columbia to contiguous areas that are now the U.S. Southwest and the Mexican state of Sonora. Copper deposits became increasingly concentrated at or near the earth's surface as sea levels lowered during the early Cretaceous era, and mountains then sprang from the earth's crust gradually through the process of orogeny during the era's last 30 million years.[281]

The term "porphyry" refers not to the rock's mineral composition solidified by magma but rather to its hard and crystal-like texture. Porphyry rocks fractured and shattered beneath the earth's surface as geothermal energy and air pressure pushed them upwards, and their subsequent exposure to hot, aqueous, and gaseous compounds through cracks and fissures caused primary deposition, or precipitation, that filled the ore deposits with iron-sulphide and copper-iron sulphide. Exposure to both the seawater and atmospheric oxygen caused chemical reactions within the deposits which created copper-sulphide, in turn, and it was the specific extent of these exposures to the element of oxygen, in particular, that most determined the concentration of copper within ore deposits during the subsequent chemical reactions. The resultant concentration usually ranged from one-half to one percent. The mountain terrain then formed an "oxidized zone" of secondary enrichment which extended several hundred feet below sea level and contained even higher concentrations of copper.[282]

Commercial investment and mining operations first commenced in Grant County in 1881 shortly after the killing of the Chiricahua Apache chief, Victorio, and this was just eight years after residents of San Miguel County in the northern New Mexico elected a committee to redistribute privately-owned plots of land ranging in size from forty to fifty acres based on an original land grant that the Mexican government issued in 1835. A "frenzy" of claims for un-surveyed tracts then ensued in 1879 which lasted for the next several years. Approximately 800 claimants soon led a "counter-movement" during the 1880s by selecting a committee of eighty persons that sought to distribute 500-acre tracts only amongst themselves and use the land for grazing, timber, and mining. The original group responded by arguing that unused lands were a part of the public domain and could be therefore be redistributed. The Secretary of the Interior sought to retain public lands for different reasons, however, before the Las Vegas Land Grant Board approved the first monetary compensation to a Mexican grantee, Eugenio Romero, in 1906.[283]

Both the railroad strike of 1885-6 and the introduction – or perhaps improved collection - of property taxes induced some land grantees to further concentrate wealth by selling their shares. Members of the Knights of Labor in the Las Vegas area responded by cutting down all of the barbed-wire fences, destroying railroad tracks, and cutting telegraph lines in the county during April 1889. The dissidents then formed a new organization, *Las Gorras Blancas* (which means "The White Caps" in English) and sang the Civil War-era song, "John Brown's Body," when local authorities released several of their leaders from jail. The radicals also made at least some efforts to appeal to Euro-American workers, such as when a local bank manager, Jefferson Raynolds, failed to form a "safety committee" at a meeting on August 17, 1890 after "'the poor

people' demanded that such a committee be elected." Members of the newly-formed Partido del Pueblo Unido, or the "People's Party," swept local elections in Las Vegas that year, and voters soon approved the state's first bond measure – which was $15,000 for the construction of Douglas school - and overcame fervent opposition from both the Archbishop of Santa Fe and many of the state's newspapers by marching on November 1, 1891, with thousands of members of a Catholic lay organization, *Los Hermanos Penitentes*.[284]

Oil became the state's major source of energy by the late 1940s, which caused industrial unionism's "center of gravity" in the region to move away from coal deposits further southward – though with plenty of overlapping areas - towards the porphyry mines. The Empire Zinc strike's undisputed leader was Ernesto Velázquez, who was also fighting a quiet power struggle with Local 890's president, Cipriano Montoya, during the summer of 1951. The director of *The Salt of the Earth*, Communist filmmaker Herbert Biberman, described Velazquez (who was, by then, Local 890's president) in his memoir as "quiet" and "firm" during a union meeting, and he recalled that "his tone though casual was clearly studied in its intention to communicate." Velázquez also made a statement in his speech to Mine-Mill's annual convention during the strike's eleventh month that has proven to be controversial for some historians, since he said that, while Velázquez was cleaning his family's house while his wife, Braulia, was picketing, he still refused to change his youngest child's diapers. One of this chapter's purposes is also to explain why Velázquez uttered such a statement that made him vulnerable to charges of sexism.[285]

The chapter is organized into three parts based mostly on chronology and region. Part I examines the struggles of coal and metal miners in New Mexico during the 1930s for wage work, relief, better housing, and collective-bargaining rights. Part II both investigates Mine-Mill's initial successes during the 1940s and places the Empire Zinc strike within the context of New Mexico Senator Dennis Chavez's support for a Zionist militia, the Irgun, as well as his advocacy among Latin American state leaders for the recognition of Israel during the infamous ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Part III studies the Empire Zinc strike in Grant County, which was where the connections between war, peace, and law enforcement during the Korean War were most evident. The section then concludes with a brief criticism of how the Empire Zinc's story has been told and retold ever since.

"for the good of your people"

Coal miners organized major strikes both within New Mexico and across the region during the FDR administration's first two years that pertained not only to employment issues but also housing and relief administration, and metal miners in Grant County engaged in similar activities during the entire decade. State and county relief administrators excluded Mexican families from its programs on both *de jure* and *de facto* bases, while mining companies and landlords resorted to typical tactics like dismissals and evicting union members in the mining districts' Chihuahitas and "Mexican towns." Miners, unemployed people, and tenants in the state needed to overcome this collusion between employers, landlords, lawmakers, and law enforcement officers, and it was originally the state's coal miners and their families who used tactics like throwing rocks, organizing "work holidays," and conducting various other kinds of wildcat and sit-down strikes. Industrial workers and impoverished farmers in northern New Mexico organized a radical, pro-labor organization, La Liga Obrera (The Workers' League), meanwhile, which had its origins among beet workers in Colorado and soon led the activities of trade unionists – including sit-down strikes - in local and state politics. Internal conflicts within La Liga Obrera sharpened towards the end of the decade during intense debates over its social

and fiscal platforms, however, while industrial unionists' social basis in the state switched quietly – and quickly - from coal to non-ferrous metal mining as the U.S. entered World War II.

One of the first miners' strikes that occurred after Congress passed NIRA began during August of 1933 when members of an ill-fated, Communist-affiliated dual union, the National Miners' Union (NMU), struck in Gallup, New Mexico, for a set of demands that included union recognition, ending pay deductions for producing less than 100 pounds of "dirty coal," overtime pay, and medical care, and they won a forty-hour week and daily wages of $4.70 - thirty cents more than the National Recovery Administration's (NRA) wage code - despite both the governor's declaration of martial law and large numbers of arrests. Although the mining companies responded initially by closing their mining operations, both the Gallup American Coal Company - of which the Kennecott Copper Company's (KCC) subsidiary, the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company (NCC), owned two-thirds, while ASR owned the other third - and the Diamond Coal Company re-opened their mines within a week before signing contracts with the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), which soon provided, according to one CIO historian, 600,000 "shock troops" for the CIO's separation from the AFL later that decade. The NCC's president, D.C. Jackling, agreed to participate in arbitration proceedings, but he also informed an attorney and former First National Bank employee from Albany, W.A. Kelcher, that he planned to close the Chino open-pit copper mine in Grant County if the Gallup American Coal Company's Gamerco mine remained closed further north in Gallup. NMU members at the Gamerco mine charged the general manager, Horace Moses, with refusing to rehire strikers, meanwhile, and continued to strike. They also dubbed UMW negotiator James Walker a "traitor" for assenting to both the removal of six arrested strikers from the state and employers' evictions of strikers from company housing.[286]

Though the Gallup strike's outcome was similar to the statewide coal strike in Colorado six years earlier, its participants also adjusted to martial law by introducing new strategies and tactics that targeted other areas like freeways and neighborhoods for picketing activities. A "Committee of 10," which included the president of the union's Ladies' Auxiliary's from Utah, Martha Roberts, protested the governor's refusal, for example, to allow them to picket on Highway 666. The strikers still continued picketing on highways, however, and they attempted to avoid detection and harassment by holding at least one meeting in Arizona. They also launched a new project, "house-to-house picketing," in both the Chihuahita neighborhood and the Black Canyon district. House-to-house picketing proved to be one of their more effective – and controversial – tactics, and this also proved true during the Empire Zinc strike.[287]

Corruption in both state and county governments presented another set of challenges for coal miners and other working-class New Mexicans in the Upper Rio Grande Valley as they responded to high unemployment with labor strikes and organizing to improve relief administration. NMU members employed by the Southwestern Coal Company struck for one day several months after the coal strike, for example, to protest pit boss Matt Plese's dismissal of Jose Corona for allegedly drawing a knife, while approximately 100 union members responded to the Diamond Coal Company's demotion of Joe de Foe to the position of digger the following spring by holding a weeklong "work holiday." State relief administrator Margaret Reeves appointed Gayle H. Knowlton of the state's child welfare bureau during March of 1933 to direct relief administration in Rio Arriba County, but hundreds of residents soon complained that the county relief committee was inactive and were organizing meetings (including one attended by senatorial candidate Bronson Cutting) within a year. Joe Chavez charged at one meeting during July of 1934, for example, that 98% of county relief administrators were Anglo-Americans - and

that the company store merchants who administered the program were practicing favoritism - before asking pointedly whether "Lea and Chavez County people" would "be willing to have their relief administered by Spanish-Americans," and the president of El Rito Normal, John Conway, asserted further that state and county relief administrators' estimate of ten needy families in the county ignored the fact that ninety-eight people registered on the first day alone. Yet the state relief administration refused to analyze the precise extent to which relief administrators were guilty of prejudice and discrimination, since its lead investigator only examined the administration of work-relief, but not direct-relief, programs.[288]

One of La Liga Obrera's first actions occurred when female and male employees of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration's (FERA) work-relief programs in several northern New Mexico towns struck in response to wage cuts from fifty to forty cents per hour, and female leadership soon proved crucial for an action that garnered supporters from the state's largest cities quickly. Five women engaged in "house-to-house picketing" by targeting homes where non-striking FERA employees continued manufacturing children's clothing, and the *Albuquerque Tribune* also reported that the picket committee on August 17 "included four women." Relief workers in Gallup demanded the replacement of Margaret Daniel as the county welfare association's executive secretary, meanwhile, with a person from the area who actually needed relief. The strikers held several meetings in Santa Fe and received support from the Albuquerque Common Labor Union which it declared its intention to join the strike, while Reeves responded to their complaints by prohibiting members of political parties' county central committees from accepting appointments as state or county relief administrators. Though strikers in Gallup won the restoration of their previous wage levels without backpay, they were soon petitioning against the exclusion of undocumented migrants from relief programs one month later, whereas relief administrators in the coal-mining district of Raton succeeded in replacing employees with non-strikers.[289]

The FERA strike was a major step that enabled the growth of La Liga Obrera. The organization's founders had worked previously in Colorado's beet industry before they migrated southward, and the FERA strike was one of their first actions since the beet thinners' strike two years earlier. One of La Liga Obrera's organizers, Julia Herrera, also was from Colorado and among the five FERA strikers arrested in Colfax County (where the organization claimed approximately 1,000 members), and he was one of three who received ninety-day jail sentences for convictions of rioting and unlawful assembly. *The Raton Rouge* reported that up to 300 *La Liga* members denied that they were members of the Communist Party, and one member who had resided in the county for forty years and worked previously in the beet fields of Colorado, Mort Martínez, asserted further the strikers wanted to work and not receive charity. The organization had probably grown beyond just workers in beet or coal-mining districts by then, since the governor, Ed Johnson, wrote to a state relief administrator, C.E. Mauldin, that Herrera had previously organized in New Mexico, Colorado, Texas, and Arizona.[290]

The coal miners' grievances included the evictions of leaders from the 1933 Gallup strike (which soon became a rallying cry with great political significance as half a million coal miners struck across the U.S. during the summer of 1935), but they could not protect hundreds of Chihuahita residents from removal. One FERA striker, Leandro Valverde, co-founded the Chihuahita Home Owners' Association to protest eviction orders from their landlord, state senator Clarence F. Vogel, who had recently purchased the tracts from the Gallup American Coal Company. A grand jury investigated Vogel one year earlier for allegedly complying with the request of a local cigar-store owner, Fred Cauggia, by ordering Gallup's police chief, Bill Smith,

to refrain from charging a group of sex workers with crimes. Local law enforcement arrested three leading opponents of Vogel's eviction orders, including Exquiro Navarro, who had also been arrested twice during the coal strike eighteen months earlier. An open letter by a member of the defense committee, George Kaplan, also reported that one of the three leaders had been assisting a tenant with replacing their furniture when authorities arrested him.[291]

The evictions escalating a conflict between miners, landlords, and employers that was already severe. Residents held a demonstration when local authorities were transferring the three prisoners to county jail in which law enforcement officers opted to use tear gas against then protestors. Shots were then fired that killed Ignacio Velarde, Soloman Esquibel, and Sheriff Carmichael and injured seven other people, and a reign of terror descended quickly onto the Chihuahita neighborhood in the aftermath of the riot. Local authorities held sixty-five women and men under "armed guard" at the county jail and district court, while 100 armed members of the American Legion and another organization, the United American Patriots (whose secretary was from Trinidad, Colorado), conducted "house-to-house searches" in Chihuahita. The editor of *La Voz del Río Grande* complained that though the violence could have been avoided, "we do not believe that this justifies Americans who want to take the law into their own hands."[292]

U.S. law enforcement authorities' attempts to remove Mexican and Mexican-American strikers necessitated a response from the Mexican consul, which vied with the Communist Party for strike leaders' support. The *Santa Fe New Mexican* reported that several NMU members dismissed the consul, Benito Rodríguez, as "bogus and a masquerader" after he conferred with general manager Horace Moses during the 1933 strike and that Moses' wife received information that law enforcement authorities had threatened some strikers with deportation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) district headquarters in El Paso assigned a squad of agents to join the raids despite the fact that an assistant inspector, L.M. Brody, found eighteen months later that only two of the 130 potential witnesses facing charges were actually "deportable," while a special agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) office in El Paso, R. H. Colvin, informed the bureau's director, J. Edgar Hoover, of an "increase being made in" the state government's police forces. The Mexican consul in El Paso, S. Baños Contreras, also related to the defense committee later that year that U.S. officials attempted to deport every member of La Liga Obrera.[293]

Chihuahita residents responded by demanding better accountability by judges, prosecutors, and the governor, though their efforts did not win either fair treatment or equal protection under the law during those years. A group of denizens assembled immediately after the removal of the corpses from the courthouse, and 100 members La Liga Obrera marched and held meetings in Santa Fe before receiving a pledge from the governor that "only the guilty" would "be punished." As authorities held thirty-two men and one woman at the state penitentiary in Santa Fe without bond, Judge M.A. Otero denied ACLU attorney A.L. Wirin's petition for writs of habeas corpus despite Wirin's charge that law enforcement officials were withholding the defendants' rights to postponement, council, and a hearing. Prosecutors at first charged fifty-four individuals with first-degree homicide by invoking a state statute for cases involving murders of justices of the peace, but they soon dropped charges against all ten defendants that included members of the FERA strike's grievance committee, Juan Ochoa, and executive committee, Leandro Velarde. Immigration agents also deported former defendant Doroteo Andrade and La Liga Obrera's district organizer, Jesús Pallares.[294]

As Chihuahita residents protested the raids, they also garnered support from both within and "without" the region despite ongoing harassment. One of the defense committee's first

members was a well-respected Santa Fe resident, Katherine Gay, though the ACLU soon quit the case after its formation. Members of *La Liga*, mutual-aid societies, unemployed councils, construction workers' and carpenters' unions, AFL affiliates, railroad brotherhoods, and the state federation of labor also attended a defense committee meeting in Denver, moreover, which called for, according to *The Western Worker*, a "United Front" of unions, religious organizations, and sympathetic groups. The committee even received a donation from an executive of the KCC! The defense committee also had to respond when two of its members were kidnapped. Though a Navajo man found them in the Tohatchi district's desert area shortly after they disappeared, the district attorney of Santa Fe, David Chavez, Jr., claimed to find no evidence of kidnapping.[295]

The defense committee's activities were among the first steps of what quickly became a national strike of bituminous coal miners. John Lewis ordered the UMW to cease working during late June of 1935 before postponing the strike immediately – but only briefly - upon the FDR administration's request before coal miners "went out" during September. Authorities arrested one defense committee member, Carl Howe, in Utah several weeks later, meanwhile, before charging him with both attempting to use fake "transfer cards" with the UMW's seal and "conspiracy to take money under false pretenses," and *The Gallup Independent* reported that Howe received legal assistance from a former U.S. attorney, William J. Donovan. Up to 500,000 bituminous coal miners - including employees of at least four coal companies in the Gallup area - struck three days later for ten-percent increases in hourly wages on the grounds that the price of coal had increased by 300%. All of the miners in New Mexico and Colorado, with the exception of the employees of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, won an eighteen-month contract based on the "Appalachian wage scale," which was an hourly minimum of fifty cents (including an hourly minimum of eighty cents for "inside wages"), as well as general wage increases of nine percent, a seven-hour day, eight holidays, and a grievance procedure.[296]

The WPA withheld funds for McKinley County's relief programs one month later as part of its $1,196,209 appropriation to the state in what some characterized as an attempt to coerce Mexican and Mexican-American residents into accepting removal, though Katherine Gay informed the defense committee that state relief administrators in Gallup had actually begun withholding relief during the previous summer. Defense attorneys also noted during the trial in Aztec that the district attorney, David Chavez, Jr., failed to present a murder weapon as evidence and argued that the protesters' dispersal after Roberts returned with a machine gun indicated that the defendants did not intend to start a riot, and three defense witnesses testified further that they observed Ochoa speaking with the justice of the peace at a time during the riot when prosecutors claimed he had struck Roberts with a hammer in a nearby alley. The jury found seven defendants not guilty (though immigration agents still removed five of them) and three defendants guilty of second-degree murder (including Velarde posthumously) before Judge James R. McGee sentenced both Ochoa and a machinist, Manuel Avitia (whose wife was a domestic worker and member of the NMU's Ladies' Auxiliary), to between forty-five and sixty years in prison. Vice-consul Joel S. Quiñones's monthly reports from the general consul's office in El Paso recorded the removals of eighty-nine potential witnesses from New Mexico between April and June and another 321 during the month of October alone.[297]

Though miners in Grant County did not have as many allies during the mid-1930s as their counterparts in the state's coal-mining districts did further north, they also attempted to unionize several lucrative mining industries that had grown steadily since the 1890s simultanously. The Burro Mountains contained two masses of pre-Cambrian granite separated by the Mangas

Valley, and it was the smaller, northeastern range which contained large deposits of chalcocite, or copper sulphate, that extended along major fault lines hundreds of feet below surface level. The most valuable zinc deposits were, in contrast, within both the limestone at Lake Valley and the Magdalena formation further south. Iron and zinc mining operations had commenced in the Fierro-Hanover area when the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad Company constructed a new railroad station near Hanover in 1891. The Empire Zinc Company acquired another parcel in the area which contained unoxidized zinc with concentrates that averaged between 0.46% and 0.7%, and both the United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining (USSRMCo) and the Black Hawk Mining companies followed suit soon after. The Black Hawk Mining Company established a flotation mill in 1928 and began processing ore from the adjacent mine of the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASR), and the county's metal miners were accounting for seventy percent of the state's annual metal production by July of 1933 (which amounted to 35,984 ounces of gold, 1,156,133 ounces of silver, 21,637,000 pounds of lead, 27,760,000 pounds of copper, and 67,729,000 pounds of zinc).[298]

One of Grant County's first work-relief programs began during July of the following year when the state highway commissioner approved six projects that included both highway construction at Cooper Street as well as extensions, oiling, or improvements of several other roads, while NCC's managers soon removed two homes in "Mexicantown" soon after to pave the San Lorenzo Road. The Peru Mining Company's employees in Hanover struck six months earlier against the company's "bonus system" that tied wages to production levels, but D.C. Jackling soon ordered the closure of the open-pit Chino mine after learning that miners and smelter workers in Santa Rita and Hurley had voted during March and September, respectively, to join the AFL-affiliated Chino Mine Workers Union Local 63. Yet miners continued cooperating with the AFL organizer from Bisbee, Arizona, F.L. White (who attended one meeting with a representative from the regional labor board in Los Angeles), and the NCC's general manager also reported that a "Spanish labor organizer from Pennsylvania" met with miners in Santa Rita and Hanover. Union members made "continual complaints" the following year that relief recipients were "under the company's control," which led the state government to investigate and then restrict the jurisdiction of the county relief administrator, R.A. John, to some of the agency's programs in Santa Rita, Hanover, and Fierro.[299]

The NCC's owners and managers responded to the unionization campaign by hatching a plan to dismiss and evict as many union leaders as possible. Jackling visited the county during November of 1935 before ordering R.B. Tempest to terminate the leases of residents who were either no longer employees of or "undesirable" to the company, which included all of the employees who did not work during the Chino mine's closure. Tempest then attempted to raze the Mexicantowns by both issuing eviction notices to sixty-eight tenants in Santa Rita and twenty-five others in Hurley and transporting company-owned houses from the "American section" to the area. They could not enforce mass evictions as quickly in Santa Rita, however, where they sought to evict twice as many tenants in the Mexican town while also accommodating "the possible future Mexican" housing requirements that their labor demands would necessitate.[300]

Many of the evictees moved to the area around Fort Bayard, which the Army had established as a base in 1863 to fight Warm Spring Apaches. The Army re-designated the fort as its first tuberculosis hospital during the early twentieth century before Herbert Hoover's administration tasked the Veterans' Administration with supervising the hospital's operations in 1930. The hospital's new management soon launched "a general plan of beautification and



Table II: Copper Prices during the 1930s. Courtesy Terry Humble Collection.

improvement of the hospital grounds" three years later, which was a new project that began with evictions of thirty families as well as the razing of fourteen houses and two apartments. The VA also paved several streets near the fort. One local resident, Thomas Foy, who later served as the county's district attorney during the Empire Zinc strike, purchased "all of the land that Bayard is now sitting on" as a homestead during the 1930s, according to local historian Terry Humble, before he proceeded to subdivide and sell the tracts in parcels.[301]

Jackling's decision to discharge the NCC's employees, close the Chino mine, and evict union members, combined with both problems with relief administration and the Mountain States Regional Labor Board's somewhat perplexing "disappearing act," each helps explains why there few strikes occurred in Grant County after 1934. The most important factor was undoubtedly the regional labor board's actions, which struck the union's charge of discrimination in relief administration from its records and ruled in favor of the company's "representation plan" during the spring of 1935 before the KCC reopened the Chino mine sixteen months later. The miners' fortunes in Grant County only began to change during their appeal to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) two years later when the trial examiner ruled in their favor and ordered the company to reinstate and give backpay to almost sixty employees. It was not until the U.S. entered World War II, however, that metal miners in both the county and other copper-mining districts won collective-bargaining rights. Table II presents information on changes in copper prices during the 1930s.[302]

New Mexico's most popular politician during the FDR administration's first several years was the Progressive Party candidate and former member of the Bull Moose Party, Bronson Cutting, who supported FDR's candidacy during the 1932 presidential election. Bronson's popularity is evidenced by the fact that both the state's Republican Party and the Democratic Party's "Committee of 15" (which included the chair of state party's central committee), as well as the governor, each favored "fusion" with his senatorial candidacy. The postmaster general, James A. Farley, refused to intervene in public, but officials in Washington, D.C. remained "more firmly seated in the driver's chair of the party" than ever before during the summer of

1934. This was also one year after the governor, Arthur Seligman, complained to Farley that Dennis Chavez was receiving "all post office patronage without any interference from [the] state organization." Amongst Chavez's early strategies that year was supporting the appointment of a wealthy inheritor of a large, Spanish-era land grant, Felipe Sanchez Y Baca, as U.S. Marshall.[303]

Though the Democratic Party's national leaders in Washington, D.C. endorsed Chavez, many county and state party leaders favored Cutting due to his appeal among Spanish-American voters from northern New Mexico who were especially vulnerable to diminished living standards. This appeal was undoubtedly a major contributor to Cutting's victory during the 1934 election. The progressive candidate's platform included public-works programs, a child-labor law, an eight-hour work day, vague support for an "adequate method" to tax personal and corporate incomes based on ability to pay, and "national planning" for "economic exigencies." Two Spanish-language newspapers, *La Voz del Río Grande* and *El Defensor del Pueblo*, both endorsed Cutting, furthermore, and the latter even described the progressive candidate as "the most formidable caudillo [boss]*"* in the race. Progressive members of the state Republican Party's central committee soon routed "Old Guarders" who opposed Cutting's candidacy during March by a margin of eighty-six to fifty-two, while representatives from both state parties agreed to support a "fusion" campaign four months later.[304]

There were few state laws that excluded working-class Spanish-speakers from participating in electoral politics on a de facto basis, but there is evidence that such misconduct did occur on a de jure basis and pushed some voters to support Progressive and Republican candidates. *La Voz del Río Grande* charged, for example, that "the elements that oppose the coalition are composed of those who have deeply rooted racial preoccupations" and wished "to eliminate half of New Mexico's electorate from politics and administration of the state's public affairs." Yet with this form of discrimination also came formal exclusion by local party members, since *El Defensor del Pueblo* reported that the Democratic Party's "Hamett electoral code" also barred non-English speakers from voting. A state senator from Tucumbari County, Taylor E. Julien, inquired of the governor "what should be done," furthermore, about the "agitation of farmers, stock men, oil men, those who are loaning money etc. etc. together with the 'race question.'" Julien went on to write cryptically that "soup too hot must be cooled" and that he was "ready at any time."[305]

Concerns about voter suppression were therefore one of the reasons why many voters in the state did not support the Democratic Party's candidates until the elections of 1936, and the festering problems with patronage and relief administration that permeated state and local politics throughout FDR's first term were certainly another. Though *La Voz del Pueblo*, *La Opinión de Río Arriba*, and the non-partisan "Club Político" each endorsed Roosevelt's re-election campaign during the autumn that year, some members of La Liga Obrera charged at their convention in Santa Fe that "the local WPA office led by Bob Miller and David Armijo" with "using the WPA to organize the maneuvers and political machinery of Tingley-Chavez." Despite the controversies over relief administration and miners' collective-bargaining rights, the Democrats still soon gained an unprecedented degree of power within the state. Yet with their victory also came a new compact with the state's people, however, who expected both just wages and a new kind of social citizenship for their numerous labors. The New Mexico Relief and Security Authority's assistant administrator responded to at least forty-two of Chavez's letters during November and December and another eight more over the next two months (including ten from San Miguel County alone) that Chavez wrote on behalf of residents from twenty-four

different counties regarding relief their cases and specifically their eligibility for work relief and social security.[306]

The available sources indicate overwhelmingly that the introduction of social security contributed more to the Democratic Party's victories in the state than either political patronage or relief administration. *La Voz del Río Grande* reported on the congressional debates over the proposed legislation, for example, while another Spanish-language newspaper informed readers one month after the election that foreign-born residents were eligible for the program. Emitirío Sapello López wrote to Chavez shortly before he won the senatorial election of 1936 that while he had "always been a radical republican," it had become necessary in recent years to "see who is the person or people that work for the people and are loyal servants for the people." Advising Chavez to "continue working for the good of your people," Sapello López declared that he "sympathize[d] wholeheartedly with you and with the Administration of President Roosevelt." Also telling was a letter from Jóvita Quintana of Española, who identified herself as "a little old lady alone in the world" that was dedicated to working "with my friends and family members" and proclaimed that her "heart had just filled with joy knowing that my name appears in the lists as a Democrat."[307]

Allegations of discrimination by relief administrators in Río Arriba County continued to surface in the months after the election, but there was only minority of Democrats who voiced such concerns in the state legislature. Though *El Defensor del Pueblo* described Rio Arriba's representative in the assembly, J. Urban Ortega, as a legislator who had "distinguished himself during the session as an exponent and lawyer of good legislature, representative projects that allow poor students to enroll in educational schools, road projects, and other benefits," his colleagues rejected his call for an investigation of relief administrators by a margin of thirty-four to nine after he charged the WPA and other agencies with misuse of public funds and withholding aid from eligible clients. All nine who voted in favor of the investigation had Spanish surnames. The legislature did pass bills to create old-age pensions, establish a welfare department, and a child labor law which prohibited the employment of children under the age of ten that opposing senators decried as "communism" and "socialism," but it still needed to consider 258 bills when there were just two weeks before the end of the legislative session. The bills they had passed that were then awaiting the governor's signature, moreover, included potential laws allowing for a gasoline tax, regulations of sales at ports-of-entry, an income tax, and the establishment of a state public-health office.[308]

Despite the enactment of social security legislation, the effects of the worsening inequality soon became evident almost immediately due to the state government's failure to implement more extensive social reforms. *La Liga* organized a sit-down strike at the governor's office in Santa Fe less than two weeks after the welfare department's director announced cuts to work relief programs, for example, and also that "employable men of twenty-one years of age or older" had become ineligible for direct relief. There were approximately 8,000 members of *La Liga* (which *La Opinión de Río Arriba* charged with "communist activities") by then, and its demands included funding for both work relief and direct relief programs; increased taxes on annual incomes over $5,000, owners of agricultural or grazing lands, and anyone else "who derive or profit from the labor of others;" food aid for strikers; "exposure of the wealthy tax evaders of Río Arriba County," and tax reassessments for large estates. In contrast with the governor of Ohio, Thomas E. Dewey (who offered food to the sit-down strikers in his office demanding relief), New Mexico governor Clyde Tingley ordered police officers to deploy tear gas and arrest a group of protesters that included a grocery store owner, José Romero, who

claimed that officials had cut his veterans' pension. Katherina Gay and Margaret Stoll paid the $1,000 bonds set by District Judge David Chavez, Jr., while many party members in Albuquerque criticized Tingley's "policy" as a "disgrace" for the Democratic Party. The opposition was strong enough to compel Tingley to invite the strikers to a meeting several days later in which he still labelled one attendee as "crazy" when member Federico Arrellano argued that communism was "the first form of Christianity."[309]

La Liga still claimed 5,000 members in Sandoval, Bernalillo, Valencia, and Socorro counties by mid-1937, which was a group that included farmers who owned lands that the Soil Conservancy Service had appraised based on their future potential profitability. *La Liga*'s members met with their counterparts in the Conservancy District several times during November and argued, along with the Bureau of Indian Affairs's director, John Collier, and Rabbi A.L. Krohn, that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo took precedence over any agreement regarding "water rights" between the states of Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico," but the number of New Mexicans on relief had already recently increased from 6,405 to 10,015 between the previous September and April of that year. *La Liga* soon issued new demands for a debt-cancellation plan for farmers, for Chavez to urge the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to purchase agricultural lands from the soil-conservancy district, a $2,000-homestead exemption for property taxes, and pardons for Ochoa and Avitia. *El Defensor del Pueblo* asserted, in contrast, that Roosevelt, the state's House representative, and the Senators "will not permit evicting the residents who cannot pay their bills" and that the district's residents should unionize "to organize proper plans and support the departments of our government." The RFC refused to provide tax relief, however, for the displaced farmers (many of whom moved subsequently to the Albuquerque suburb of San José), while increased scrutiny from east Texas congressman Martin Dies, Jr.'s (D-TX) House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) led the Congress of Spanish Speaking People's leaders to move the location of their first meeting in 1938 from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque to the city of Los Angeles.[310]

"only the first step"

While mining companies could no longer interfere with the CIO's participation in NLRB's elections after the U.S. entered World War II, Mine-Mill had scarce time to establish permanent organizing committees by the time the war was ending. The union's international executive board assigned a cadre of experienced organizers of the Southwest's copper-mining districts with the goal of both identifying potential stewards and aid local members' attempts by locals to establish safety and grievance committees. Divisions within the CIO worsened after the war, however, amidst intense debates between Internationalists and Anti-Colonialists and "Atlanticists" over whether to disaffiliate with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and to support the ERP, the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the nuclear arms race until the CIO's executive board expelled Mine-Mill, which led the union to seek closer ties with its counterpart in Mexico. All of this occurred as miners and smelter workers across the U.S. forced mining companies to continue negotiating after Congress passed the Tart-Hartley Act by striking in large numbers, which culminated with Amalgamated Local 890's fifteen-month strike against the Empire Zinc Company. These strikes were crucial for the efforts by miners' unions to consolidate and defend the concessions they had won since the early 1940s, but it was ultimately Dennis Chavez's decisions to collaborate with the imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class after the postwar strike waves by supporting the Truman administration's containment strategy, the Zionist entity in Palestine, and Anti-

Communist trade unionists and right-wing dictatorships in Latin America that most isolated Mine-Mill.

Industrial unionists in the mining industry had long struggled to protect union members from retaliation, so it was no coincidence that Mine-Mill won few NLRB elections in the Southwest until the Supreme Court ordered mining companies to respect their employees' labor rights shortly after the U.S. entered World War II. The "dominoes" fell only after the Court upheld previous NLRB decisions for two cases its heard in 1941 and 1942, *Phelps Dodge Company v. National Labor Relations Board* and *Nevada Consolidated Copper Company v. National Labor Relations Board*, respectively, which forced the employers to offer reinstatements and backpay to dozens of miners from Arizona (including sixteen Phelps Dodge employees at the Copper Queen mine at Bisbee) and Mine-Mill organizer Humberto Silex from El Paso. Mine-Mill Local 470 then won an NLRB election in Douglas, Arizona, but the union sustained a minor setback one year later when the AFL won a run-off election at the Copper Queen Mine. Mine-Mill affiliates coordinated through the Southwest Industrial Union Council for the rest of the war, and it achieved a major breakthrough during the summer and fall of 1942 by winning elections at the Phelps Dodge refinery in El Paso and among employees of the Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company in Miami, Arizona. Mine-Mill won the latter election by a margin of 547 to 459 and soon moved its headquarters to Denver, Colorado, where the War Manpower Commission (WMC) established the Non-Ferrous Metal Commission (NFMC).[311]

Mine-Mill first launched its organizing campaign in the Southwest at the Asarco smelter in Grant County, New Mexico, in 1940. It was there that a group of four organizers - Spanish Civil War veteran Harry Hafner, Leo Ortiz and Arturo Mata of Los Angeles, and Humberto Silex – launched another campaign to form independent trade unions in the union's second district and soon began recruiting volunteers from El Paso, Laredo, and Arizona. Santa Rita's location on company property forced members to first meet with Hafner in Hanover and then rotate meeting locations between several other towns before Hafner moved to Bisbee, Arizona, to observe the AFL's campaign in a district where the Phelps Dodge Company had dismissed ten union members before also visiting members in El Paso and Carlsbad, New Mexico. Local 63 had already organized a safety committee in the Bayard mining district when Asarco employees joined Local 530 during the spring, while their counterparts employed by Empire Zinc and USSRMCo in Hanover, Fierro, and Vanadium formed Locals 604 and 628 in the year that followed. 600 members of the AFL-affiliated Chino Metal Trades Council (CMTC) in Grant County struck with 180 members of Locals 63 and 69 three months before the U.S. declared war on Japan and Germany, but Mine-Mill still won an NLRB election for a production unit at the Chino mine during May of 1942 by a margin of 539 to 495.[312]

The war presented Mine-Mill with its first chance to win NLRB elections and win unprecedented concessions from employers in the copper-mining districts. Yet linked with those victories and subsequent contract negotiations were the entrances of working women into labor markets across the U.S., and this particular change also occurred within the copper-mining Industry and began in the town of Hanover, Grant County. Mine-Mill's newspaper, *The Union*, reported on January 18, 1943, that local resident Clorinda Kirker had recently become the first U.S. woman to work in an underground mine and joined Local 604 after she accepted an offer to work at ASR's Black Hawk mine in Hanover. Employees at the Black Hawk and Peru mines won paid vacations later that year, while ASR employees signed contracts with provisions for paid sick leave at 60% of the regular rate, and, along with Empire Zinc miners, grievance procedures which guaranteed the right to a hearing with arbitrators selected by the U.S.

KCC Employees at the Chino Mine During World War II. Courtesy Terry Humble Collection.

Conciliation Service as well as "improved" seniority and promotion clauses. Tables III and IV present information on women's employment patterns at the Chino mine and the smelter in Hurley, respectively.[313]

Though the employment of female miners and the introduction of both grievance procedures and corporate-welfare benefits were, in many ways, a major breakthrough for miners with seniority, the continued discrimination against Latino workers based on their ethnicity imposed unnecessary limitations on these changes. The term "Mexican wage," which had entered the lexicon by the early 1940s, could refer to either unfair labor practices related to workplace issues such as seniority rights, regional wage differentials, promotions, and employment training or alternatively to more political issues like community-police relations and the substandard quality of housing and recreational facilities. Both the National War Labor Board's refusal to certify the CIO's charges of racial discrimination at the Chino mine as a legitimate labor dispute and the FEPC's refusal to hold hearings on employment discrimination against black and Latino workers in the Southwest further constrained the ability of American Indian, Mexican, and Mexican-American miners, moreover, to redress their grievances outside of the arbitration process. There was also the problem of white Mine-Mill leaders' discrimination against Mexican workers, since the union's full-time organizer in New Mexico, Arturo Mata, resigned during March of 1944 after complaining that his fellow organizer, Arthur Ashby, "openly states that he do [sic] not like me" and was "anti every race [emphasis his] except the supreme race."[314]

Safety remained an important issue, and some miners argued that it shared a close association with employment discrimination. Employees at the Chino mine were among the first in the district to organize against workplace hazards before the war, but Local 530 members at the Asarco mine were undoubtedly the most successful. One union leader, Angel Bustos, later recalled that Anglo-American employees at the Asarco mine opposed the exclusion of Latino laborers from higher work classifications and joined the same local as them. Local 530's



Table III: KCC Employment of Miners at Santa Rita by Gender (1943). Courtesy Terry Humble Collection



Courtesy Terry Humble Collection

contracts by the end of the war also included formal provisions which established not only safety and grievance committees, furthermore, but also a stewards' council. Members of the safety committee and shop stewards inspected areas in mines that employees considered to be hazardous and could also threaten to strike, which almost certainly explains why Bustos reported that only three deaths occurred at the Asarco mine from 1939 until 1954.[315]

Organizers' primary task during and after the war was to institute the Asarco miners' effective committee system in Mine-Mill's other locals throughout the Southwest. This was also part of their strategy for winning NLRB elections by recruiting stewards and members at every shaft into a "unit system" in the six to eight weeks before an election. Organizers first tested the model in Morenci, Arizona, during the fall of 1942 before they implemented it more successfully in Bisbee. They identified at least one person at each worksite who agreed to recruit twenty-five percent of employees into the unit before assigning a chair and vice-chair who were responsible for recruiting new stewards, leading organizing committee meetings on Sundays, and signing up a majority of employees before each election. Though this strategy allowed Mine-Mill to sweep miners' elections throughout the region, the union's international executive also refused to approve Ortiz's proposal to assign four organizers (including one female member) to a new office in Phoenix that would consolidate the union's gains within non-ferrous metal industries.[316]

Miners and laborers in Grant County were among the first in the Southwest to win major concessions from mining companies, and Mine-Mill's contracts at Santa Rita and Hurley were soon "setting the pattern" for KCC's contracts with unions in other areas. Mine-Mill first signed a contract on July 7, 1942, with provisions for wage increases, seniority, equal pay, maintenance-of-membership, two weeks of paid vacation after five or more years of employment, and holiday pay based on the contract that the company had signed with the CMTC earlier during the spring. Railroad workers' unions in Grant County soon requested equivalent provisions for holidays and seniority, while machinists and operating engineers at the Chino mine opted to join Mine-Mill as the NLRB also ordered mining companies in Arizona to offer similar concessions. Inspectors from the Department of Labor also found one year later that KCC had erred in categorizing its employees as qualifying for exemptions from the Fair Labor Standards Act that had supposedly made them ineligible to receive overtime pay. The CMTC's affiliates were the first to sign a contract, in short, but it was the miners at Chino who set the region's highest standards for corporate-welfare benefits with their 1942 contract.[317]

Though Mine-Mill won NLRB elections in Arizona ostensibly through the same "unit system," the chief steward of the Morenci unit, Steve Avalos, had yet to organize a stewards' council by February of 1950 when USA representatives began petitioning for new NLRB elections. International representative Bob Hallowwa's initial reports several months earlier indicated that the number of stewards within the Miami local, Local 586, had tripled, in contrast, while the number of its auxiliary members had risen to twenty-five. Local 586 also joined a statewide Popular Front that coordinated with both FTA locals and AFL affiliates towards the end of the decade through both the Arizona Legislative League and the Arizona Mine-Mill Council to support new legislation for silicosis prevention, the repeal of the state's new "right-to-work" law, increasing weekly payments for unemployment insurance from twenty dollars for up to twenty-one weeks to twenty-five dollars for up to twenty-six weeks, the inclusion of farmworkers in said insurance program, the de-segregation of schools, and reforming "school taxes." USA then won an NLRB election of approximately 1,000 Magma Copper Company employees during the summer, however, at its mine in Superior. It was also then that Hallowwa

and the union's western vice-president, Orville Larson, signed a new contract which revoked female Local 586 members' seniority rights despite the "considerable discussion" which occurred "in the Miami local" regarding both "the question of women workers" and one Mine-Mill negotiators' recent defection to USA.[318]

Union members in Grant County prepared for postwar economic reconversion by creating a strike fund, meanwhile, by both pooling each union's respective resources and requesting aid from the union's international executive board. The various Mine-Mill locals united during October of 1945 to form the Bayard District Union, requested an organizer from the executive board per the suggestion of Angel Bustos (who began working underground at the Black Hawk mine in 1943 and resigned as Local 530 president after Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act), and petitioned for a charter for a new, amalgamated unit in Grant County. Members of Locals 393, 501, 509, 530, 604, 509, and 700 throughout the Southwest participated in strikes against Phelps Dodge and ASR during the following spring, which was also when strikers in Grant County implemented a rule requiring members who had abandoned their picketing duties by seeking wage work elsewhere to give twenty percent of their pay to the strike fund. ASR miners in Mexico also won a crucial victory in the form of uniform wage increases throughout the entire nation during the postwar strikes as Mine-Mill began to advocate for industry-wide bargaining, and the international executive board responded to the Bayard Union District's request by assigning a former Army Air Force navigator who served with distinction during World War II, Clinton Jencks, as lead organizer. Jencks soon sent a petition for amalgamation signed by each president of the district's five locals during December of 1947, though the executive board denied a similar request for amalgamation by copper refinery workers in El Paso due to their apparent failure to pay the requisite fifteen-dollar fee.[319]

While the CIO divided after 1949, internationalists and anti-colonialists in Mine-Mill achieved relative consensus over international issues before its expulsion from the CIO. Mine-Mill's internationalists supported solidarity with other miners in Mexico, Chile, Rhodesia, and South Africa, which were all countries where non-ferrous metal-mining companies had already purchased lands and commenced operations by the 1920s, primarily for economic reasons and specifically to improve wages and working conditions, and maintaining friendly relations with miners' unions in Mexico was especially crucial for internationalists' strategy. Mine-Mill's president, John Clark, reported to the annual convention in 1949, for example, on the "steps taken in the past year to bring about a better working relationship with the Mexican Miners Union," which was "a first, important step" but "only a first step. All you have to do is look at a world map of mineral deposits, and you will see that really effective unity means bringing together the miners and smeltermen of all of North and South America, Africa, Australia, Europe, and Asia."[320]

Though they did not disagree with the internationalists' strategy of appealing primarily to members' economic concerns, anti-colonialists in Mine-Mill also opposed the CIO executive board's new positions on U.S. foreign relations for other reasons. One of their best spokesman was the noted Afro-American intellectual, W.E.B. DuBois, who criticized labor unions strongly during a 1952 address to Mine-Mill's annual convention by arguing that "in the United States, millions of brown, yellow, and colored workers of colonial countries have had little effect on thought or policies." Few CIO members knew, according to DuBois, that their union leaders' decision to leave the WFTU was the result of the intention of "the white British unions" to "control and speak for the colored unions" and that "we joined Britain in rejecting this demand," while "the Africans [had] wanted independent voice and action." Local 890's officers were not

present at this particular convention, however, both because the New Mexico Supreme Court had denied their appeals for convictions of contempt of court and because Judge A.W. Marshall of the Sixth District Court had denied their petition to postpone their ninety-day sentences. The state supreme court's chief justice approved writs of habeas corpus for each officer several weeks later - with the notable exemption of Clinton Jencks - on the grounds that the defendants could not be jailed for violating an injunction that had been rescinded, while Jencks' sixteen months in solitary confinement ended five days later when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee."[321]

Despite their different emphases, internationalists and anti-colonialists disagreed much more stridently with the CIO's "Atlanticists" over whether to disaffiliate with the WFTU and to support the ERP, the establishment of NATO, and the nuclear arms race. Members of each "faction" debated these issues vociferously on the convention floors of both Mine-Mill and CIO meetings after 1946. Delegates to the CIO's constitutional convention in Boston passed a resolution during October of 1947 that called for "universal disarmament," support for the Good Neighbor policy, and continued affiliation with the WFTU, for example, while also rejecting both the ERP and the Truman Doctrine. Some in Mine-Mill also called further for peace negotiations with the Soviet Union to be mediated by the United Nations, and it was ultimately the CIO Executive Board's unilateral decision to disaffiliate with the WFTU. It was the executive board's subsequent expulsion of Mine-Mill and ten other Communist-led unions that left miners with few alternatives but to seek closer ties with their counterparts in Mexico.[322]

Nonferrous-metal miners' increased constraints in the Southwest during the late 1940s included not only strong disagreements with the CIO's Executive Board over international issues but also immigration agents' increased targeting and repression of Latino labor leaders. The El Paso-Juarez migration "corridor" between the states of Texas and Chihuahua was a crucial resource for Mine-Mill, since both many miners in Juarez were also union members and miners' and smelter workers' wage levels in El Paso were the lowest in the U.S. regardless of classification. Both El Paso's local sheriff and its county prosecutor first collaborated with a HUAC investigator, George Hurley, to target and arrest several CIO members as well as a member of the Mexican Confederation of Workers (CTM) from Juarez, Miguel Oaxaca, during the spring of 1940 as the union led a unionization campaign at the city's Phelps Dodge and ASR plants. Immigration agents then filed a deportation order against the Nicaraguan-born Humberto Silex in 1946 based on charges of "moral turpitude" for his alleged assault of a foremen during the previous year, while Orville Larson dismissed Silex from the union one year later on the grounds that he had both refused to attend a meeting in Ray, Arizona, on May 5, and had "consistently in the past refused to carry out instructions issued" by Larson and "Regional Director Knott." Though federal Judge R.E. Thomason granted Silex's petition for naturalization on December 16, 1947, the INS claimed to have found "new evidence" when it reversed course by denying his application the following June (which was also a year when immigration agents barred Canadian delegates from entering the U.S. to attend Mine-Mill's annual convention in Denver).[323]

The U.S. and Mexican governments also entered new negotiations during the early 1950s to extend the bracero program for fourteen years, which compelled a response, in turn, from Mine-Mill. These negotiations presented a major potential challenge for internationalists seeking closer ties with Mexican miners' union, because few would support such an alliance if braceros received blame for postwar recessions or, even worse, crossed picket lines. The president of a new Latino civil rights organization in the Southwest called the National Mexican-American

Association (*La Asociación Nacional Mexicano-Americana*, or ANMA), Alfredo Montoya, defined the bracero program as "the Achilles heel on the right flank of labor," for example, while also asserting that Mexican-Americans and migrant workers from Mexico shared the same interests and that "we have to help them find a solution" with support from organized labor. This was especially the responsibility, Montoya argued, of Mine-Mill. Local 890 leader Ernesto Velázquez argued, for his part, that "we cannot blame the Braceros for seeking a better life here in the United States," since their wages north of the border were "heaven compared to what they receive in Mexico."[324]

Though Mine-Mill's Latino delegates were increasingly preoccupied with the future of the bracero program during the early 1950s, the union remained strong after World War II due its members' continued willingness to strike. Locals in the St. Louis suburb of Fairmont City (Local 82), Columbus, and Metaline Falls launched a fourteen-month strike against the American Zinc Company during the late spring of 1948, for example, which was shortly after the company had relocated one of its plants in Dumas, Texas. Auxiliary members participated in picketing activities during a strike that ended when the union won the reinstatement of eight discharged employees and signed a two-year contract for Local 82 with hourly wage increases of thirteen cents. The strikers at Metaline Falls won, in contrast, hourly wage increases of four cents (which were the same wage levels as miners and smelter workers in Couer d'Alenes, Idaho) and six paid holidays. USA also dealt Mine-Mill a powerful blow, however, when they began petitioning for NLRB elections at Mine-Mill's plants in Alabama.[325]

The American Zinc strike impacted Grant County miners' collective-bargaining rights and civil rights as much as anywhere in the Southwest, since it occurred as the union's officers were not complying with the Taft-Hartley Act's provisions by refusing to sign the law's required non-Communist affidavits. Members at the Bayard Union District's KCC, USSRMCo, and ASR units first voted to strike by large margins during the summer of 1947 before Locals 63, 69, 530, 630, and 628 negotiated new contracts with each of those three companies and Empire Zinc. Amalgamated Local 890 also signed new contracts with Peru, Empire Zinc, and Phelps Dodge one year later, while its recent contract with KCC continued to set "the highest pattern yet established" in nonferrous-metals industries with hourly wage increases of twelve cents and six paid holidays. Members at the Chino mine began filing an increased number of grievances during the autumn and winter of 1948-9, moreover, over seniority rights and charges that employers' layoffs and personnel changes were causing unsafe working conditions at the mine, the mill, and the smelter, and they appealed several of those grievances (including one involving a foreman who received orders to issue discharges on their off-day) to "the manager level." Relations between the union and KCC "were confined entirely to the processing of grievances" by the following spring, and the union even appealed one grievance to arbitration. Members' willingness to both strike and file more grievances after amalgamation forced the companies, simply put, to enter negotiations.[326]

Local 890 members were consistently among the leaders of Latino residents' attempts to end segregation and police brutality in Grant County during the late 1940s. Angel Bustos recalled that "everything was segregated" in "this town" before the union "changed a lot of that" and made it so "minority people" could "buy homes wherever they wanted... through the union." The union leader also claimed that a local theater owner closed operations in 1948 after Juan Chacón (who later co-starred in the film *The Salt of the Earth* and became the local's president after Velázquez) and Bustos refused to sit on the "segregated" side. A "riot" soon occurred in Fierro during early May of the following year that resulted in law enforcement officers shooting



Photograph by Bill Edmundson of Potash Miners' Strike in Carlsbad (1949). Courtesy CU Boulder.

two people and arresting ten others when the sheriff beat several young men who were, according to Velázquez, "drunk enough not to do what the sheriff told them to do." Local 890 members responded by forming an ANMA chapter, electing war veteran Albert Muñoz as local president, and supporting former surveyor Leslie Goforth's campaign for county sheriff.[327]

Miners in Grant County were also increasingly willing to strike at the onset of the Korean War, because higher production quotas and "speed-ups" in production caused the number of workplace hazards to increase in turn. The riot at Fierro occurred just several weeks after a blasting explosion at Phelp Dodge's Burro chief mine near Tyrone had killed three miners, and Jencks was soon attributing a series of recent accidents to "speed-ups" in an open letter to the state mining inspector. Both these "speed-ups" and Phelps Dodge's decision to dismiss hundreds of employees in the Southwest were major discussion topics for delegates to the National Phelps Dodge Council's meeting in Douglas during June of 1949. Yet the deaths of miners continued unabated, since fifty-five year old Carmen Garcia and thirty-seven year old Florencio Eli Esquivel both died in the Kearney shaft of the Peru mine the following year and Jencks recalled in his autobiography that Pedro Peña died - also at Peru - when his foreman assigned him the task of cleaning pulleys on a trapper machine over ore bins while the conveyor belt was still in motion. A twenty-five year old naval veteran of World War II, Manuel C. Quevado, died towards the end of the Empire Zinc strike as well when he fell from the shaft cage in one of KCC's two underground mines, Oswaldo No. 1.[328]

Local 890 also had to contend with companies' dismissals and mine closures at USSRMCo, Empire Zinc, Peru, ASR, and KCC's underground Oswaldo mines during the summer of 1949, which was when employers responded to an economic recession – and revert to

the corporate-welfare system of the 1920s - by attempting to improve their bargaining power. Every union at the Chino mine signed agreements during the same weeks of February and November (as well as a retroactive five-cent increase on December 16), the second of which raised hourly wages by ten cents as a result of Phelps Dodge's "pattern" and included six days of sick leave and a third week of vacation time after twenty or more years of employment. Members in the ASR unit then launched a five-week strike on May 9 when the company offered to reopen the mine with wages tied to market prices, and they won hourly wage increases of five or seven cents, backpay, holiday pay, pensions, and insurance programs in exchange for withdrawing their unfair labor practices charges. Though Local 586's president in Miami informed the unit chair, Angel Bustos, that members could not donate to their strike fund due the recent steelworkers' raid, the unit still received aid from over twenty other locals, including $1,000 from Local 392.[329]

ASR's wage offer was telling, since it demonstrated that employers wanted to re-introduce and codify labor practices that they had previously imposed with impunity before the establishment a real collective-bargaining system during the early 1940s. Other companies soon also began offering wage increases based on sliding scales (which was what had prevailed in the mines of Arizona until the War Labor Board ordered Phelps Dodge to cease the practice in a case involving smelter workers at Douglas), and Local 586 members responded to the Miami Copper Company's sliding-scale offer by also voting to strike and filing more grievances. The result in Grant County was an uneven victory, at best, and especially for miners in Hanover, since miners at Peru and the limited workforce at USSRMCo. both began receiving the sliding scale when operations in Hanover resumed. Members at the USSRMCo.'s mine also opted to join the separatist Grant County Miners' Association led by Manuel Chacón, moreover, which then invoked the Taft-Hartley Act, according to Jencks, when it petitioned for an NLRB election.[330]

Mine-Mill's responded to the CIO's raids and anti-Communist expulsions not only through strikes and grievances but also by seeking closer alliances with Mexican miners. Delegates from Mine-Mill and the Industrial Union of Mining and Metallurgical Workers of the Republic of Mexico (Mexican Miners' Union, or MMU) first met in Mexico City during 1945 and agreed to cooperate by sharing information on their respective contracts, refusing to handle "hot cargo," and preventing laborers from crossing picket lines during a lead and zinc miners' strike in Patagonia, Arizona. The "cold war" was also well underway in Mexico, however, such as the decision by Mexico's president, Miguel de Alemán, to threaten Lombardo Toledano with expulsion from the CTM in 1951, which was two years after a group of miners and farm workers had separated from the CTM and formed a new union, *La Unión General Obreros y Campesinos* [The General Laborers and Farmworkers' Union] that had representation within both the WFTU and CTAL during June of 1949. It was, significantly, Cipriano Montoya - who, like Velazquez, often translated during meetings – who accepted a nomination to serve as Local 890's delegate to the Mexican Miners' Union convention several days before the ASR strike began. Local 890 members also voted to support a strike by the MMU's thirteenth section against the Sabines Coal and Mexicana Zinc companies in Chihuahua after hearing an appeal from Francisco Solis of Nueva Rosita, where zinc and coal miners had joined the two-month strike during January of 1950 with their counterparts in Palau, Coahuila, along with employees of the Fresnillo Copper, the Penotes Mine and Metal, and ASR companies. Jencks also recalled in his memoir that some Local 890 members had siblings who were MMU members, moreover, in both Santa Eulalia and Chihuahua City.[331]

As miners in the Southwest and Mexico fought to preserve the collective-bargaining

system, Senator Dennis Chavez was garnering increased "influence" among members of Congress and the Truman administration with regards to U.S. relations with Palestine, the "Middle East," and Latin America, after World War II. After reading a report in the Zionist Irgun militia's weekly periodical, *The Answer*, that a British naval ship had rammed a converted U.S. vessel carrying 4,500 Jewish refugees to prevent it from entering Palestine, Chavez prepared an address to Congress as the United Nations partitioned India and the Truman administration deliberated a new "containment" doctrine during July of 1947, "The Crime of Imperialism," which called for supporting "the Hebrew underground" by ending the U.S.'s arms embargo, implementing "the Mandate" with authority supposedly vested by a 1924 treaty with the U.K., and "reestablishing" Palestine "as the homeland of the Hebrew people." Chavez blamed British authorities - who complained, in turn, that the American League for a Free Palestine disseminated an edition of *The Answer* that was goading another Zionist militia, the Haganah, into participating in their expulsions of Palestinians - for recent violence in both Palestine and south Asia, while he charged the "Arab League states" with remaining silent during the "slaughter" of Muslims in Java and Sumatra. Yet he also criticized various foreign militaries' reliance on U.S. equipment, skills, tax dollars, and especially weapons procured originally by the U.K. and Holland through the U.S.'s wartime lend-lease program, since the "peoples of the world" in Palestine, Indonesia, India, and "Indo-China" were seeking to participate in the new "democratic order." What was necessary, for Chavez, was a "positive foreign policy" in which the U.S. did not act as "bondsmen" for "any criminal imperialism." The senator's bizarre rendition not only claimed that British imperialism and peace were mutually exclusive but also, more importantly, conflated the process of refugee resettlement and Zionist militias' ethnic cleaning of Palestine as both being part of the larger historical process of de-colonization, though the senator then shifted his energies increasingly after 1950 towards using economic development and trade to prevent the spread of Communism in Latin America and Europe while addressing wartime metal shortages.[332]

Chavez soon "summoned" an emergency conference in Washington, D.C., with Senators Charles Tobey (R-NH) and Wayne Morse (R-OR) one year after his first speech before delivering another address, "Oil, Guns and Honor," at Madison Square Garden in New York City on May 13, 1948, as the U.K. prepared to withdraw troops from Palestine, in which Chavez both declared his opposition to the Truman administration's proposed alternative to partition that would have established a temporary trusteeship and subsumed pro-Palestinian Arab nationalism – as well as "certain pro-Arab sympathies" within "our military"- into what he described vaguely as "oil interests." Chavez urged protecting "our national honor" from a threatening regime based on "guns and oil," in contrast, by establishing a rather mysterious "democratic beachhead" while continuing the FDR administration's "good-neighbor" strategy based on replaced the use of force with the principle of non-intervention and "Pan-Americanism." He also countered concerns regarding the future of Arab countries' petroleum reserves by noting the U.S. military supported increasing investment in the U.S. and Latin American oil production; the existence of alternative sources in Mexico, the "Dutch East Indies," Formosa, and Canada; and the U.S.'s substantial naval power in the Pacific Ocean, and yet Chavez also asserted with little evidence that the U.S. needed military bases in the U.K., Spain, North Africa, and the Middle East. Palestine would function better as a military base than the "trans-Jordan," Chavez argued, due to the presence of ports and its larger population, whereas Jordan was "land-locked," "poverty-stricken," and where military officer Abdullah al-Tall was beginning to recruit other officers in Jordan, Egypt, and Syria to the cause of pro-Palestinian Arab nationalism. Chavez

opposed to sending troops, by then, from the U.S., the U.N., or any other military or police force to Palestine, warned that partition was “the last chance for an Arab-Jewish truce” and to prevent “the spectre of a Middle East war from spreading beyond Palestine’s border,” and called for an investigation of the Department of State for its recent conduct with regards to Palestine.[333]

Chavez wrote a memorandum several years later in 1951 after a disagreement emerged with the Vatican regarding the status of Jerusalem in which he boasted of supporting both “numerous resolutions” to resettle Jewish refugees in 1943 and 1944 and “the campaign for a stateless Army of Palestinian Jews” after 1945 when he called for the British to remove all immigration restrictions to Palestine and argued that recognition of the Zionist entity in Palestine was the “complete solution” to “the so-called Jewish problem.” Denying that he feared that “the Arab world” could “rise in a holy war,” Chavez admitted that he had appealed successfully to Latin American countries (and particularly Mexico) for recognition and postulated that the countries where his “influence was so markedly effective” were among those that gave “major support.” The senator also compared Zionism favorably with U.S. social movements; defined sovereignty (which was presumably significant for his “democratic beachhead” theory) as “protecting the interests of all religious – Jews, Moslems and Christians;” and denounced proposals to “cut up the country,” “insincere” attempts to internationalize Jerusalem, and any other “dilution” of “the sovereignty of the new state” before Chavez pivoted towards his “energetic efforts” on “the domestic front” to eliminate segregation and any other barriers for “equal economic, educational, and political activity.” Asserting that he had only cited his “Catholic heritage” when the topic was “McCarthyism,” furthermore, Chavez condemned persons who were “technically Catholic” yet still supposedly sought to “use their religious affiliations as a springboard into political attacks on our foreign policy and our administration officers” and also to speak on “the issue of communism.” He concluded the memorandum by acknowledging his collaboration with “numerous non-sectarian organizations concerned with Palestine” such as Hadassah and B’Nai B’rith.[334]

Chavez applauded a local Hadassah chapter during a speech in Albuquerque later that year for its efforts to expand social-security benefits and public health programs as wages stagnated and an unprecedented number of industrial workers U.S. struck through 1952, and he proclaimed further that the organization was “unique” for its “dual program of activity.” Chavez then offered two new rationales for supporting “democracy’s beachhead in the Middle East,” which were that it was supposedly necessary for Jews to prove their loyalty in their countries of origin “as a matter of choice” by refraining from relating to Israel politically or territorially and that the Zionist entity could potentially “set the pattern for development of backward and impoverished areas the world over.” The Zionist entity was ready to “pull themselves up by their bootstraps,” Chavez stated, and only asked for the U.S. to “lend them bootstraps.” Chavez also cautioned that its respect for the principles of equal rights and the U.N. charter could “never perish.”[335]

Chavez soon argued to U.S. President Truman that the Monroe doctrine’s purpose was to close the “western hemisphere” to “further colonization” by France, Russia, and the U.K., and he accused both the U.K. and the U.S. of violating it during the nineteenth century through British colonial rule in Honduras and Belize, its occupation of the Falklands Islands, and the U.S. invasion of Mexico. Chavez even charged U.S. officials with betraying former Secretary of State James G. Blaine’s Pan-American Union – and especially its principle of non-aggression – that Benjamin Harrison’s presidential administration (1889-1893) had articulated by seizing Spain’s colonies during the Spanish-American War, supporting Panama’s secession from Colombia, and

pursuing "dollar diplomacy" in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua before the onset of the good-neighbor strategy, and he went on to criticize as "short-sighted" and "ill-advised" the Truman administration's recent agreement with British prime minister Winston Churchill to exchange 1.4 million tons of U.S. steel and iron in 1952 for 20,000 tons of price-controlled tin. U.S. officials' newest "clever trick" was to insert most-favored nation clauses, according to Chavez, in their trade agreements with the U.K. and Indonesia, which guaranteed automatic price increases if the U.S. purchased tin from other suppliers but still forced Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bolivia to ignore wartime increases in tin demand by accepting the U.K.'s price of $1.18 per pound. Chavez also pointed to Latin American countries' contributions to the U.S.'s war mobilization during World War II that included not only Venezuelan oil, Chilean copper and nitrates, and Bolivian tin but also its quartz deposits that the Army, Navy, and Air Force needed to manufacture radar and similar devices, Brazil's manganese, and Mexico's cadmium and mercury. Contending that "underdevelopment" in Latin America created a "fertile field" for "the seeds of Communism to flourish" alongside an "iron curtain" in Europe, the senator proposed furthering the containment strategy by increasing U.S. investment in both regions.[336]

The combination of the U.S.'s anti-Communist trade strategy and declines in living standards presented an especially acute problem in Bolivia, since, Chavez argued the following year, the country was emblematic of Latin America more generally due to its economic "dependence" on exporting primary materials and suspicions of "Yankee economic imperialism." Bolivia became, in contradistinction to Malaysia and Indonesia during times of peace, the U.S.'s major tin supplier during wartime and was exporting approximately 42,500 tons to the U.S. annually by the end of World War II, which was two years after employers at the largest mines had raised wages three times in 1943. The mines' high altitudes from 14,000 to 17,000 feet above sea level had, furthermore, always "been understood," according to a 1951 report by the Senate's Preparedness sub-committee led by Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX), as warranting as "premium price," while a U.N. commission found that Bolivian tin industry's growing needs for investment, scientific research, and technical assistance caused the quality of tin products to decline between 1943 and 1950 by forty percent. Bolivia could not entice creditors despite its possession of one-fourth of the world's tin deposits and the increase in the total value of its annual exports to the U.S. between 1951-2 from $19.6 million to $41 million, Chavez complained, due to miners' low wages that aided Communists' trade union activities, and Chavez also charged the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with causing poverty in Bolivia to worsen while exceeding its authority by purchasing tin directly from Malaysian and Indonesian suppliers.[337]

Tin shortages became evident when *The Atlantic* reported in its March 1952 issue that the U.S. had not purchased from Bolivian suppliers for ten months. Chavez, who assisted five Latin American ambassadors' protests against a "punitive tariff" on the tune during the previous year, blamed the Office of Price Administration's rationing program for the "artificial" shortages, and he argued that paying a "fair rate" to Bolivian suppliers would resolve the problem. Chavez also informed Truman that some Latin American and Caribbean leaders had inquired whether U.S. officials planned to extend their "Bymington Doctrine" to Cuban sugar, Venezuelan oil, and Argentinian beef. The term referred to an expert witness for Johnson's subcommittee, Stuart Bymington, who informed its members that inflation in the U.S. caused Bolivia's living standards to decline and argued that the country needed an infusion of U.S. dollars to compensate for price increases. Chavez expressed further concerns to Truman that the Korean War's "inconclusive nature" was diminishing U.S. "standing" in Asian and Pacific-Island

nations that it earned during World War II by defeating Japan during World War II while warning that "Russia" had the advantages, for its part, of both geographical proximity and a plentitude of time.[338]

This was Ernesto Velázquez's world before the Empire Zinc strike. Velázquez first joined the Hanover unit's grievance committee shortly after World War II and became a shop steward within eighteen months. He also joined, along with Feliciana Peña Montoya, Virginia Jencks, and Anita Torrez, Local 890's Veterans for Peace Committee after the strike began, and another union leader, Ray Armijo, soon proposed during May of 1951 that the veteran's committee cooperate with their counterparts in El Paso. Velázquez also led the union's "Goforth Committee" in support of a local candidate for county sheriff before the strike and argued for replacing their representative on Mine-Mill's executive board, C.D. Smotherman, with a Mexican-American individual towards the end of the strike's first year. This was just two years after the local proposed during the early summer of 1949, moreover, that Mine-Mill's second district hire a Mexican-American organizer.[339]

"¡No les dejan!"

Mine-Mill members defended their wartime gains by striking in large numbers and even won more concessions from their employers by delaying the Taft Hartley Act's enforcement long enough to sign new contracts. Miners in Grant County were again, as they had been during the early 1940s, among the first locals in the Southwest to act, though Local 890 also confronted a new set of challenges during the Empire Zinc strike. The strike expended much of the union's resources over its first eight months until mid-June of 1951 when strikers feared that "civil war" and martial law would result from both the local district court's anti-picketing injunction and employers' impending attempt to re-open the mine, which led them to permit their mothers, wives, and daughters to lead picketing activities over the next two months. Historians have debated both the Empire Zinc strike's purpose and its impact ever since that summer when the auxiliary units took control of the picket lines, and, though many have begun to acknowledge auxiliary members' essential leadership, few have connected them with Ernesto Velázquez's own exemplary leadership.

Underground miners and mill workers in Hanover filed an unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB against the Empire Zinc Company – which the New Jersey Zinc Company had recently acquired – for refusing to bargain in good faith and struck on October 17, 1950, for hourly wage increases of fifteen cents, paid lunchbreaks (or "collar-to-collar" pay) for miners, six paid holidays, an end to solitary work assignments, the deletion of the contract's no-strike clause, the elimination of wage differentials, and a "procedure for negotiations on newly-established jobs… aimed at stopping speedup." Despite having nine bargaining conferences with their employers over the previous three months, the Empire Zinc miners remained the only unit Local 890 without either collar-to-collar pay or paid holidays since NFMC first ordered mining companies to begin offering those provisions during World War II. Members prepared by electing Velazquez as the strike committee's chair and "digging in for a long strike." Miners received a small boost six days later when Phelps Dodge and other copper-mining companies offered supplementary hourly wage increases of ten cents in addition to the five-cent increases from their most recent contract.[340]

Apart from electing a new local president, Local 890's activities during the strike's first seven months seem to have been rather uneventful. The former president of Mine-Mill, Reid Robinson, informed Jencks before the strike of a report that he received from a "conservative guy" who was well-acquainted with local management. The informant stated that lead- and zinc-

mining companies were, with the exception of KCC, using the "Tri-State technique" in which they waited until employees exhausted their unemployment compensation and were "faced with hunger" before reopening mines at lower wages. It was also during those early months that Jencks suggested at a union meeting that a member should serve as local president before he received a new organizing assignment in Morenci. Though Velázquez had previously served as interim president, members elected Cipriano Montoya of Bayard during April of 1951 to replace Jencks as local president.[341]

Auxiliary members had already been participating in union activities, to be sure, before Judge A.W. Marshall issued a temporary anti-picketing injunction. Several attended a meeting during the previous September shortly after members carried Jencks's motion to permit a representative for the auxiliary on the local's executive board, and not a few had also spoken on the union's radio program, written leaflets, visited strikers' families, or organized parties by early June. Officials announced that the company intended to reopen the mines on June 8, while the new county sheriff, Leslie Goforth, commissioned sixteen additional deputies. Marshall then issued his temporary anti-picketing injunction just hours after picketers prevented William J. Atchley from driving around them by hanging onto his car, and the judge both made the injunction permanent and also extended it also including auxiliary members and children one month later. *The Silver City Daily Press* reported that authorities arrested Pete Murgia for running over one strike committee member, Lorenzo Torres, with his automobile, furthermore, while the justice of the peace, Andrew Haugland, dismissed similar charges against Grant Blaine for assaulting Mrs. Jesus Ramírez and *The Union* reported that another non-striker also struck picketer Henrietta Williams with his automobile that day.[342]

Members of the auxiliary, Local 890, and other unions (including railroad brotherhoods) in the county held a mass meeting that evening at the Fierro Night Club. It had been difficult, according to auxiliary member Braulia Velázquez, for "we the women" to persuade the union members to allow them to take over picketing duties, since they only agreed to do so after concluding that "they would have brought in martial law" and caused "a civil war." Ernesto Velázquez later testified to the NLRB that the strike committee dissolved on June 9 and "ran itself" afterward. The NLRB's trial examiner, Irving Rogosin, concluded that Lorenzo Torrez's statement that he did not know exactly when the committee had supposedly ceased meeting did not corroborate this. The company also filed its own unfair practice charge against the union with the NLRB two days later, which claimed that Local 890 had both disobeyed the injunction and held a "parade" of some forty automobiles through the South and North Roads four days earlier.[343]

Law enforcement officers deployed tear gas and arrested over fifty picketers on two different occasions during the first week after the meeting and even chartered a Greyhound bus, according to Ernesto Velazquez, to transport prisoners to jail. The jailed children included a future Vietnam veteran, Willie Anzadola, whose father worked at the Chino mine and whose mother was from Fierro. The arrests separated Anzadola from his mother, while his hot, crowded jail cell forced him "against the bars." Both *Time* and *Life* magazines assigned reporters to investigate during that first week, while Senator James E. Murray (D-MO) declared in a letter to Mine-Mill president John Clark that he was "greatly shocked by the newspaper accounts of the jailing of pickets, including women and children." Angel Bustos also observed that one of the company's security guard also needed hospital treatment, however, after female picketers beat him severely.[344]

The most noticeable and most oft-arrested leader of the women' pickets was Elvira

Courtesy: CU Boulder.

Espejo de Molano of Hanover, whose husband had worked as a miner for twenty years. Molano and Clinton Jencks' wife, Virginia, both began picketing on the first day after the meeting, and, the following Sunday at 6:29 in the morning, one striker called on the union's weekly bilingual broadcast, "Reporte a la Gente," on radio station KSIL (which had been airing the union's programs since 1948) for residents from all over the county to join picketing activities. Molano wrote in a letter to *The Silver City Daily Press* that her only son had died in France during World War II, and Molano's husband had apparently died of silicosis when film director Henry Biberman visited Grant County shortly after the strike. Anzadola also recalled that the picketers learned to protect their eyes from tear gas that summer by using a wet rag or handkerchief.[345]

It was, first and foremost, Molano's leadership as the auxiliary's picket captain that enabled the strike to continue. Molano woke up at four each morning before completing her daily chores over the next hour. Then, she would go out and recruit other picketers who usually arrived at the mine's entrances by six and were responsible for preventing the entry of not only non-strikers but also truckers transporting supplies and shipments. One young picketer, Rachel Juárez, recalled in a group interview that Molano "was the head lady" and "the strictest one, the one who kept us in line." One of the auxiliary's vice-captains was also the former miner, Chlorinda Alderete, who was working as a nurse, by then, and had apparently married.[346]

Miners remained present near the main roads as observers at all times when auxiliary members were picketing, and, by some accounts, they carried firearms as well. The picketers had to cover a large amount of territory, since they needed to prevent non-strikers from passing not only through two main roads but also several other roads and paths to the mine's entrance. Several off-roads led directly to the company's housing units, moreover, where a number of the strikers also resided. Child picketers on summer break also threw rocks at non-strikers attempting to cross picket lines in ways that were reminiscent of the 1933 Gallup strike. Willie

Protest of Auxiliary Members at Sheriff Leslie Goforth's Office. Courtesy CU Boulder.

Anzadola recalled that "we would make piles of rocks so we can throw them at the cars" filled with "scabs."[347]

Rachel Juárez's father worked at the Chino Mine and sent her to the picket lines in the place of her pregnant mother, and she soon became another active picketer during that summer. Local authorities arrested her on several occasions, and she was the youngest picketer that non-strikers targeted with their automobiles. Velázquez and Montoya charged specifically in a letter to state attorney general Joe Martinez during July, for example, that deputy Marvin Mosely had recently attempted to run her over and had dragged her as she clung to his automobile to keep from falling under for approximately 600 feet. Juárez recalled that "I was trying to claw myself on the hood to keep from going under, and so I got a hold of the emblem, but then he kept speeding up and speeding up, I guess trying to scare me." The picketer was able to extricate herself from the car by throwing herself to its side and escaped narrowly with only an arm injury.[348]

Auxiliary members found other ways to aid the strike and specifically by writing letters to *The Silver City Daily Press* that pertained largely to the themes of war, peace, and law enforcement. The Hanover auxiliary's treasurer, Anita Torrez, charged that company officials obfuscated non-strikers' nefarious activities, for example, as town residents "passed the night hourly in fear of these prowlers" before asking why the sheriff's department waited twenty-four hours to respond when a non-striker assaulted her husband with his automobile. Carmen L. Rios, whose son was in "the armed forces," wrote, meanwhile, that "I feel that if those boys in Korea are willing to give their lives for freedom, we at home will try our best to preserve here so that their sacrifices will not be in vain." Mrs. Ray Armijo of Central City also announced that her husband attended a peace conference in Chicago recently which called for a nuclear weapons ban and U.N.-mediated negotiations with the Soviet Union, since peace was "the main issue all over the world in these days." The Veterans of Foreign War Santa Rita Post's commander, Albert Muñoz, also met with state attorney general several days later to discuss non-strikers' violent actions towards picketers.[349]

Each writer related their individual analysis of the strike's purpose through their letters to

the newspaper that summer, and Velázquez went on to add pointedly during late July that "we do not need troops in Grant County any more than we needed the company gunmen. What Grant County needs is free collective bargaining - the American way of settling labor disputes. Company gunmen's pistols and national guardsmen's bayonets," he argued, "will never produce an ounce of ore. Only workers' hands can do that. And those hands will remain idle as long as Empire Zinc persists in its stubborn attempts to maintain working conditions inferior to other mining operations in the Bayard mining district."[350]

The strike entered another new phase soon after the auxiliary units took over the picket lines when the "balance of power" shifted in Grant County as the result of growing divisions among local business owners. Gertrude Gibney of the Central Hotel wrote a letter and submitted a resolution, for example, to *The Silver City Daily Press* signed by all but one of Central City's "business people" (which was a group that included managers and operators). The resolution called frankly for Empire Zinc to negotiate with the strikers and remove all "non-union men" from their payroll. Gibney also foregrounded her submission, however, by requesting that the paper print the full resolution and noting that the resolution had "already been sent to you." Gibney's letter provides stark evidence, in short, that many white-collar workers and members of Grant County's business community supported the strikers.[351]

Picketers forced Mosely to "let his car roll back around 50 feet" – as if emphasizing business owners' points - on the same day that the newspaper published the resolution. This was shortly after strikers "boycotted" a hearing for the union's contempt-of-court charges and its officers, moreover, by walking out of the courtroom and "storming" Goforth's office to demand the dismissal of deputies Marvin Mosely and Robert Capshaw, and it was these militant activities that compelled the strikers' opponents to action. Goforth and Foy requested assistance from the governor, Edwin Mechem, who indicated his desire, for his part, to avoid issuing a declaration of martial law. The Grant County Bar Association's president, C.C. Royall, met with district judge A.W. Marshall, meanwhile, and echoed calls for the state government to intervene on the grounds that "the law" was "being violated every day the picket line at Hanover blocks what has been ruled a public road." Marshall delivered a more explicit threat, in contrast, that "some means more drastic than anything that has been heretofore used for compelling order will have to be adopted."[352]

Along with attacks from without the union came deteriorating social conflicts within it by late July. The strikers' opponents began insinuating that auxiliary members' previous letters to *The Silver City Daily Press* had been "communist dictated" and that the protests were "communist led," while the problem of anti-Communism became intractably linked quite quickly with intimate-partner violence within the union due to the actions of the union's president, Cipriano Montoya. It was then that Montoya, motivated, according to one relative, by "both political hostility and machismo," beat his wife, Feliciana "Chana" Peña Montoya, with a rifle while threatening "to expose her and others as Communists if she did not go back to live with him." Though Pena remained married to her husband, at least in part, "for [the] sake of the strike," she also filed and promptly withdrew a criminal complaint one year later. Montoya shot her five times with a rifle ten years later in Los Angeles and killed her when Peña was working as nurse. His attorneys attempted to argue that Montoya's feminicide was justified, since Peña had allegedly taught their children "anti-religious and anti-American values."[353]

Picketing continued, and more negotiations commenced, as Mine-Mill's contracts with several other mining companies expired on July 31. The union's negotiating committee met with the Empire Zinc Company's representatives in El Paso during August shortly before Velázquez

traveled to central Colorado, which was where Leo Ortiz was organizing miners in Gilman and Leadville employed by Empire Zinc and ASR miners. It was also then, just four days after Velázquez departed for Colorado, that the NLRB announced its ruling that the Empire Zinc Company had refused to bargain on four occasions during the previous year. Perhaps drawing upon coal miners' older, militant traditions in the state, the local's executive board then voted to call for a "union holiday" on August 27 in Velázquez's absence after Jencks reported on an upcoming "strike in England" on that same date. Mine-Mill's National Wage Policy Committee, composed of representatives from its KCC, ASR, PD, Anaconda, and Miami units, recommended setting the strike date, in contrast, two days earlier.[354]

Law enforcement officers introduced a novel tactic to prosecute picketers, for their part, called "peace bonds," which were for charges of intent to harm persons or property that under the justice of the peace's jurisdiction, not subject to appeal, and resulted in fines of up to $500. The charges could only be stricken from the defendants' records, moreover, if they agreed to "keep the peace" by refraining from picketing, and Mine-Mill's attorney, E.C. Serna, soon convinced District Judge Charles A. Fowler of Socorro (Marshall was on vacation) to approve writs of habeas corpus for the first six peace-bonds defendants. This was after two days of hearings on August 21-22, however, when non-strikers met with Goforth and mill supervisors on the 22nd before they opted once again to "attempt to go work through the picket line." It was also then that NLRB trial examiner C.W. Wittemore was preparing to file a complaint against the company for refusing to bargain, while Mine-Mill's wage policy committee set their strike date for August 27.[355]

What next transpired on the picket lines was hardly surprising, since the strikers had long known the risks that picketing entailed. Five automobiles led by Homer Tibbs and Odell Hartless formed a convoy that ran over sixty-four year old Bérsube Yguado and Consuelo Martínez at approximately seven o'clock the next morning as they rammed through the picket line, while, in the fracas that ensued, another non-striker shot a Local 890 member, Augustin Martínez, who was a veteran of World War II and had also just returned, according to Jencks, from Korea. The number of picketers grew subsequently to 500 (including members employed at other mines in the district) by mid-day, and peaceful picketing even resumed after state police escorted non-strikers away from the mines at approximately 1:20 PM. Occurring as it did in the wake of a one-week strike by steelworkers in Utah three weeks earlier, CMTC and IAM members respected picket lines that manifested at the Chino mine as a second national miners' strike in five years spread throughout the U.S. West.[356]

Both U.S. officials and at least Mine-Mill officer moved quickly to contain the strike wave. U.S. President Truman invoked the Taft-Hartley Act's emergency provision before ordering an eighty-day injunction against the other strikes, and Tenth Circuit Court Judge Alfred P. Murrah soon also issued another anti-picketing injunction. Mine-Mill's chief negotiator, Orville Larson, agreed subsequently to a new contract with KCC, meanwhile, for general hourly wage increases of eight cents, additional raises of seven cents through reclassifications, and hourly pension contributions of four-and-one-half cents. Al Muñoz announced, in contrast, that Local 890 would continue striking for hourly wage increases of fifteen cents, though employees at Grant County's other mines returned to work before both Local 890 and the CMTC signed new contracts with KCC one month later. Yet it was then that the owner of KSIL's radio station, Carl Dunbar, decided to cancel "Reporte a la Gente" on the grounds that it was allegedly "un-American" and "contrary to the public interest."[357]

Local 890's Empire Zinc Negotiating Committee in El Paso. Elvira Molano is third from the left, and Ernesto Velázquez is second from the right. Courtesy: CU Boulder.

The union's annual convention in Nogales that year offered a brief reprieve from a strike that had escalated from a local affair led by approximately 150 Empire Zinc employees to a general strike by miners and steelworkers that also served as a pointed challenge to the CIO's raids against Mine-Mill. Local 890's delegates still needed to raise funds, however, since their union's coffers were diminishing. The union had received $4,837 from over thirty auxiliaries and local across the U.S. and Canada as well as $2,600 from Mine-Mill's Executive Board during the first six months of the strike, while it had expended $12,707.73 from its strike fund. Further constraining their budget was the state's welfare department refusal during May to certify the striking families, moreover, as eligible for relief. Ernesto Velázquez was, in other words, attempting to use humor and irony to elicit sympathy and financial support when he told the Nogales convention that he "hated" to call his spouse, Braulia, "a wife" when auxiliary members took over picketing activities after she "took over the household," became "the boss of the family," and ordered him to wash dishes and change their infant's diapers.[358]

Though both auxiliary and union members continued picketing intermittently after the injunctions, the violence of August 27 compelled the strikers to search for other tactical options. They also confronted a new set of obstacles towards the end of the strike, moreover, which included new attempts by vigilantes to intimidate them, a steelworkers' raid, and a libel suit against the union. Another violent conflict occurred on September 8 in Bayard when vigilantes attacked a group of individuals picketing a grocery store, Southwestern Food & Sales. David L. Gray grabbed fourteen-year old Linda Jencks by her hair and also "grasped" her mother, Virginia, before striking Virginia Jencks in her eye. Gray responded to Jenck's subsequent lawsuit with a counter-suit based on allegations that Jencks had ripped Gray's shirt, but local juries acquitted Gray while finding Jencks guilty.[359]

The union signed new two-year contracts with KCC, Peru, USSRMCo, and ASR as the

Empire Zinc strike completed its first year, though both a steelworkers' raid and employer tactics still forced Local 890 to expend more resources on litigation. The basis of the ASR agreement was the Tacoma unit's recent contract that entailed general wage increases, reclassifications, hourly pension contributions of four-and-a-half cents, and health and welfare insurance programs that included coverage for disability, death, and dismemberment, while Phelps Dodge's contracts with Mine-Mill locals contained stipulations for hourly wage increases of eight cents, an additional seven and three-fourths to nine and three-fourths cents through reclassifications, and the same pension benefits as ASR employees. These new contracts explain, in part, why the steelworkers' attempted raid that autumn failed, since they demonstrated that Local 890 remained miners' primary collective-bargaining representative in Grant County. The NLRB soon denied USA's petition for an election due to insufficient "interest among members," which led USA's staff representative, Bert Franz, to threaten a libel suit if any Local 890 member – with the notable exception of Cipriano Montoya – claimed that the steelworkers' union had acted dishonestly. The timing of Franz's threat was certainly curious, because he delivered it less than a month before the county bar association's president, C.C. Royall, Sr. and two other attorneys filed a $25,000 libel suit against Local 890.[360]

Facing multiple attacks, miners in Grant County reverted to yet another tactic from the 1930s. The union's first sit-down strike occurred at the Chino mine, lasted for over five hours, and was a protest by employees in the Powder Department against a foreman and former union leader, Felipe Huerta, who was leading blasting operations with explosions and had allegedly been taking notes on workers as part of the company's attempt to "speed-up" production. KCC and ASR employees organized more sit-down strikes against a foreman and a shift boss at the company store in Santa Rita and in the changing room and digging area in Vanadium, furthermore, and the latter action also pertained specifically to managers' blasting procedures as well. There were several more work stoppages during December at KCC's underground Oswaldo mines, where both a crew of carpenters refused to work for their assigned foreman and approximately 100 other miners refused to go underground in protest of a recent dismissal for alleged absenteeism. The strikes also coincided with another "flurry of dissent" at the smelter in Hurley, while the Chino mine's general manager reported several "minor" wildcat strikes as late as September of 1952.[361]

Both the union and the company entered three days of negotiations during January after the NLRB cited trial examiner rejected both decertification and certification petitions presented by "strikebreakers" and AFL representatives. Members voted to approve a new contract on January 24 that would expire on July 31, 1953, and increased hourly wage to $1.89 retroactively to October 1, 1951, which was fifteen cents more than the hourly wages of employees at other mines in Grant County. It is difficult to fully evaluate the strike's outcome, however, since the union's negotiators interpreted the agreement as also including not only wage increases but also additional corporate-welfare benefits. The union ended the strike, according to Jencks, based on negotiators' belief that the contract would contain provisions for collar-to-collar pay, increased hourly holiday pay from three to three-and-one-half cents, three weeks of vacation time for employees who had worked for at least twenty-five years (as well as monthly pension payments of $100 for employees with twenty-five years of experience who were over sixty-four years old), a $2,500 life-insurance policy for all employees, and twenty-six dollars of monthly sickness- and accident-insurance payments for up to twenty-six weeks. Whatever the agreement actually was, the union could not strike against that company again for another eighteen months after members voted to accept it.[362]

The strike ended amidst a slew of lawsuits against Local 890 members, its leaders, and the union as a whole. The company's attorney, John Simons, asked Ernesto Velázquez shortly before the last round of contract negotiations during the trial for Local 890 officers' contempt-of-court charges if he had ever been a member of the Communist Party before Judge Marshall sustained the objection of Mine-Mill's attorney, Nathan Witt, who invoked the Fifth Amendment. Yet Marshall still ordered the union to pay $75,580 for its appeal to the state supreme court and between $37,000 and $68,000 in fines to the company for its "lost profits," which were decisions that ignored, Jencks and Montoya complained, that the NLRB trial examiner's findings in August that had ruled against the company. Jury members and Judge Edwin Swope (who presided over the hearings for the libel case) also ordered the union to pay Conn Brown $12,500 in compensatory and punitive damages one month later for its supposed publication of a photograph which portrayed him as a non-striker. If there was any consolation for the strikers, perhaps it was that the Republican Sheriff, Leslie Goforth, lost his reelection campaign later that year.[363]

Both the Empire Zinc strike itself and the production and release of the film *The Salt of the Earth* remain controversial events, even today, in Grant County. Rachel Juárez argued although picketers were "united" during the strike, "some people became corrupted, some people became Communists," and she "will not have it." Recalling that she acted as a co-panelist with a person who was "using *The Salt of the Earth* to promote socialism and communism," Juárez asserted, "I will fight you tooth and nail. Because I am an American, and I will not trade socialism for what you made out of what we went through." The purpose of the strike was to "save workers' jobs" and "to get them safety precautions…That's not what the little people were about," though "maybe the elites were doing that."[364]

The film also affected changes in Local 890's leadership, and Ernesto Velázquez's subsequent disappearance (and his apparent move to Arizona) were merely the first steps towards the omission of his leadership of the strike from the historical record. The war veteran made a brief cameo in the film, but members soon elected one of the film's lead actors, Juan Chacón, as president instead. The painters who composed a mural on the old union hall in Bayard commemorating the strike during May of 2005 did not include Velázquez, moreover, in their work. Yet it was undoubtedly Velázquez who masterminded the strike, since Rachel Juarez recalled that "for the women, he was the strongest leader...I remember him quite a lot...He would advise the women, because they would ask him for advice."[365]

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Mine-Mill Local 890 waged a fifteen-month strike against the Empire Zinc Company in an essential war industry, and at the onset of the Korean War, despite the persistent efforts by the company's deputies, vigilantes, and law enforcement agencies to halt their strike activities. The strike continued during the summer of 1951 due to auxiliary members' leadership on the picket lines, which garnered popular support from workers and liberals both within and without of the region and explains, in part, why the strike became one of the longest in U.S. history. The fact that steelworkers' union could not win an NLRB election among miners in Grant County until 1967 provides further evidence, moreover, of the impact of the strike in the years that followed. Their continued loyalty to Mine-Mill did not force Empire Zinc to offer the same contract provisions that Local 890 had won from other mining companies in Grant County, however, because the Korean War provided both officials within the Truman administration and employers with the legal and political means to enforce the containment doctrine by isolating the union from its allies.

Although it remains a controversial event, the fact that the Empire Zinc strike occurred was neither incidental nor surprising. It was, on the contrary, the result of almost two decades of miners' trade union activities across the Southwest that first began after Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act. Despite the dismissals, evictions, and overall prejudice that employers and relief administrators alike evinced against both ladies' auxiliaries and miners' unions in New Mexico, coal miners struck in large numbers during the mid-1930s and won concessions both overtime pay and a grievance procedure. Mine-Mill's locals throughout the Southwest soon established safety, grievance, and stewards committees and grew in number after the U.S. entered World War II, and they continued winning major concessions from mining companies while challenging prejudicial discrimination by employers, landlords, businessowners, and law enforcement officers after Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act. Yet while the decision by the CIO's executive board to expel the union pushed its internationalist and anti-colonial leaders towards seeking stronger alliances with Mexican miners, the Empire Zinc strike in Grant County proved to be the union's "last stand" that failed to end Dennis Chavez's collaboration with the imperialist and anti-labor wings of the international ruling class by supporting the Truman administration's containment strategy, convincing Latin American governments and especially the Mexican government to recognize the Zionist entity in Palestine, and arguing in favor of aiding Anti-Communist trade-unionists and right-wing dictatorships in Latin America.

Conclusion

The executive secretary for the Committee to Organize the Mexican People in Denver, Isabel González, delivered a report on Latinos' status, "Step-Children of the Nation," to a panel on discrimination at the National Conference for the Protection of the Foreign Born in Cleveland, Ohio, during October 26-7, 1947, that proposed new strategies to win citizenship, and she based them on her knowledge of history. Employers "lure[d]" them only to "suppress and terrorize them once they are here," and their euphemistic use of the word "repatriation" allowed them to invent legal reasoning to kidnap and separate Mexican laborers from their families. Tuberculosis and infant mortality rates in Latino communities were "just appalling," and employers' collusion with immigration agents to recruit Mexican workers exacerbated their "depressed status." One-and-a-half-million Mexico-born residents without legal status in western states were the largest group of undocumented people in North America, and there was "no distinction" for the prejudice that their U.S.-born progeny experienced. The League's deportation-defense campaigns for Humberto Silex and Refugio Ramón Martínez of the United Packinghouse Workers of America in Chicago were ongoing.[366]

González acknowledged the argument of her contemporary, George Sánchez, who emphasized ignorance and educational inequality as factors in his book, *Forgotten People*, and she turned instead towards "the history of the development of the West and Southwest." The "Mexican problem" had uniquely "international aspects" due to northern industrialists' and southern slaveowners' "aggressive expansionist policy" after the Haitian Revolution, and they attempted to "arrest the wide abolitionist movement that had swept the newly-liberated Hispanic-American countries" by invading Mexico from 1846 through 1848. This historical "casting" of Mexican people's inferior status continued in California after 1849 when the state legislature passed the Foreign Miners' Tax – which targeted both Mexican and Chinese workers - before 2,000 vigilantes rioted, lynched, and expelled Mexican miners from their camp in "Sonora," and she argued the U.S. government both failed to fulfil its obligations to "the native people of the region it took from Mexico" and that Mexican workers' subsequent status as a "conquered people" was most similar to First Nations and "the Louisiana French." The Mexican population (including landowners) "lost control of the economy" and endured gradual economic, political, social, and legal subjugation through the early twentieth century. González noted Mexicans' and Mexican-Americans' previous military service and specifically that New Mexico contributed the

most soldiers per capita during World War I of all U.S. states, and she lamented that housing segregation, health, and sanitation problems were still "intimately related" – and the very word "Mexican" often "applied as a term of opprobrium" – by the late 1940s.[367]

Employers who "once encouraged immigration" collaborated with the Hoover administration during its mass deportations for the purpose of "intimidate[ing], oppress[ing], and forc[ing] the Mexican workers" into accepting a lower standard of living, and a newspaper reported that increased housing costs in Dallas during 1944 allowed owners of substandard housing units to reap tenants' "rental income" that was "beyond their value." The threat of removal made the process of applying for public assistance, employment, and citizenship "a recurring nightmare for him," and proving legal residence with documentation was especially difficult for people who crossed before 1924. Farmworkers labored in an industry that was both "excessively migrant" and based on "American greed for cheap labor," and the application process for citizenship was a "herculean undertaking" due to impermanent residency and attorneys' expensive fees. It required elderly non-citizens who wanted social-security benefits and U.S.-born children to forfeit the Mexican consulate's protection. González called for easing citizenship restrictions by placing the burden of proof on the Immigration and Naturalization Service, administering literacy tests in Spanish, offering translation services for all immigration-related hearings, imposing "strict regulations" on the employment of Mexican workers, proper enforcement of minimum-wage laws, and a congressional investigation that would receive testimony from "the true representatives of the Mexican people."

González delivered her address as a small group of Marxist-Leninist Latina women led numerous debates, and migration from southern Asia was increasing. Punjabi and Pakistani (including rice and peach farmers) people in the Sacramento Valley established the Muslim Mosque Association and the Pakistan National Association. Their activity extended as far south as Imperial County. The county government permitted black people to serve on grand juries during the winter of 1942-3. Pakistani migrants in Imperial County founded their first mosque in El Centro during 1952.[368]

Marxist-Leninist Latina women's political activities coincided with workers' increased demands for equal pay, equal rights (including the right to relief), and protection, and they learned invaluable lessons as CIO affiliates amalgamated locals, formed political action committees, and expanded their membership bases. The deportation of Luisa Moreno and the Korean War destroyed Latina leadership on the continent, and it was disastrous for working-class people. The people of Korea suffered the most from the U.S. invasion of Korea. Latina women could only fulfill their true vocation through participation in labor unions, and working-class men reified the gender-based international division of labor. The Latina Jacobins' leadership was essential for industrial unionism.

The Truman Doctrine's assumption was the bizarre and ahistorical notion that totalitarianism never existed in North America, and this distorted and ignorant conclusion protected corrupt union leaders from real accountability for decades. Anti-Communism encouraged corruption, deterred union activity, and distracted officials from resolving the problem of Zionist aggression, and the CIO's executive board's expulsion of Communist-led affiliates prevented working people from challenging Jim Crow in key economic sectors, forming alliances with white-collar and professional workers, and achieving industry-wide bargaining. The abuse of women is a crime against humanity, because it is the war crime from which all other war crimes originate. Historians will one day make similar conclusions about

Islamophobia, Arabophobia, and “the War on Terror” during the twentieth-first century. Working-class people did not benefit from the Korean War.

Communists in the southern states and California are a nation, and they should never recognize the Zionist entity in Palestine. Workers and liberals in southern California reified working women and black people, and southern workers and liberals reified the concepts of history and boss unionism. The NFLU collaborated with immigration agents, ignored Filipinos’ picket lines, and targeted foreign-born workers in California and Florida. The notion that Jewish people and black people are a nation is a tautology. The CIO executive board’s expulsions of red unions diminished industrial unionists’ strength in southern states. Working-class women are not a fetish.

Anti-Communist workers refused to disagree only within the realm of labor, and they did their bosses “dirty work” for them. Working people failed to hold labor leaders accountable, and this caused a “power vacuum” within labor’s world. The destruction of Latino nationalism within the CIO did not occur gradually but rather was the result of the CIO executive-board members’, employers’, and both political parties’ sudden collaboration with Zionists and capitalists. Employers resolved to prevented authenticity from growing within the labor movement, and the Democratic Party and the Truman administration aligned with imperialists within the Republican Party to encircle the Soviet Union. Industrial unionism was the vanguard of class struggle.

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Introduction

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[20] Paul Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado," pp. 114 and 175-7.

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[23] Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado," pp. 113 and 120-3; McLean, "Spanish and Mexican in Colorado," pg. 28; Chase, "Hispanic Migration to Northeastern Colorado during the Nineteen Twenties," pg. 38.

[24] Paul Taylor interview with George Smith, Crook, Colorado, 1929, Folder 8, Carton 11, pp. 17-18, PST; Mahony, "The Problem of the Mexican Wage Earner."

[25] Larson, "Beet Workers on Relief in Weld County," pg. 9; Roskelley, "Beet Labor Problems in Colorado," pg. 9; Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado," pp. 108-123; Paul Taylor interview with Paul Sidler, Walsenburg, Colorado, 1929, Folder 14, Carton 11, pg. 76, PST. For a brief summary of a debate between Paul Taylor and Thomas Mahony over off-season employment of Mexican beet workers, see Chase, "Hispanic Migration to Northeastern Colorado during the Nineteen Twenties," pg. 61.

[26] Paul Taylor interviews with Sheriff Harris, Larimer County, n.d., and T. Aragon, Ft. Collins, 1929, Folder 10, Carton 11, pp. 26-8, PST. It is not entirely certain what "bootlegging" actually was based on the available evidence. Robert McLean wrote in his report to the Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church that the Great Western Sugar Company reserved the right in their housing contracts to evict Mexican employees in order "to prevent bootlegging or the establishment of a bawdy house in the colonies." McLean, "Spanish and Mexican in Colorado," pg. 36.

[27] Paul Taylor interviews with Holmes, Iliff, Colorado, 1929, with John Vazquez, Brush, Colorado, 1929, and with George Smith, Crook, Colorado, 1929, Folder 8, pp. 4-5 & 17; Paul Taylor interview with Elizabeth Ochoa, Greeley, Colorado, 1929, Folder 10, pp, 31-2, all in Carton 11, PST.

[28] Letter from Thomas Mahony to Paul Taylor, Sept. 24, 1929, Paul Taylor Papers, Folder 3, Carton 10, PST; Brisette, "Mexicans in the United States," pg. 30.

[29] Paul Taylor interview with T. Aragon, Ft. Collins, 1929, Folder 10, pp. 27-8; Paul Taylor interview with Signera Torres, Ft. Morgan, 1929, Folder 8, pg. 3, both in Carton 11, PST; McLean, *Spanish and Mexican in Colorado*, pp. 37-51; Proceedings of the Colorado State Federation of Labor's Thirty-Third Annual Convention, Colorado Springs, June 5-8, 1928, pg. 51.

[30] Thomas Mahony speech to the Mexican Welfare Committee, Longmont, 1931; McLean, *Spanish and Mexican in Colorado*, pp. 36-7.

[31] Paul Taylor interviews with Frances Reed and W.D. Reed, Brighton, Colorado, 1929, Folder 10, pp. 32-3; interviews with Welch, Swink, Colorado, 1929, pp. 44-6 and with F.A. Ogle, Greeley, Colorado, 1929, both in Folder 16, pg. 45, all in Carton 11; Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado," pg. 206. The local chapter of the American Legion in Greeley also attempted to exclude Spanish-American veterans, though the organization eventually relented and admitted them. See Paul Taylor interviews with T. Aragon, Ft. Collins, 1929, Folder 10, pp. 27-8 and with an unnamed brick manufacturer, Ft. Collins, Colorado, 1929, Folder 16, pg. 91, both in Carton 11, PST.

[32] Paul Taylor interview with Holly Sugar Company Superintendent Draper, Grand Junction, Colorado, Folder 8, Carton 10, pp. 62; Paul Taylor interview with Guadalupe Cordero, Longmont, Colorado, Folder 10, Carton 11, pp. 23-4, all in PST; Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado," pp. 208-222; Roskelley, "Beet Labor Problems in Colorado," pp. 8-9.

[33] Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of South Platte, Colorado," pp. 190-1.

[34] Linna E. Brisette, "Mexicans in the United States," pg. 19.

[35] Paul Taylor interviews with Rocky Ford Elementary School Principal Mrs. McFarland, Rocky Ford, Colorado, 1929, and Weld County superintendent of schools Ross, Erie, Colorado, 1929, pp. 52-3 & 60-1, Folder 12; with Principal Trigo, Gill, Colorado, and unnamed principal of Greeley School, Eton, Colorado, 1929, pp. 92 & 102-4, Folder 16; and with Katie Martínez, 1928, Folder 10, all in Carton 11, PST. Paul Taylor also reported that already it children were calling their Spanish-American counterparts "greasers." Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado," pg. 205.

[36] Paul Taylor interviews with Spanish-American clerk, Berwind Canyon, Colorado, 1929, pg. 76, Folder 14; Juan Rodríguez, Washington County, Colorado, 1929, pp. 9-10, Folder 8; and with McBrayer, Walsen mine, Colorado, 1929, pp. 41-2, Folder 12, all in Carton 11, PST.

[37] Paul Taylor interviews with Felix Paglioni, Pueblo, Colorado, 1929, pp. 74-5, Folder 14; Juan Rodríguez, Washington County, Colorado, 1929, pg. 10, Folder 8; with García, Trinidad, Colorado, 1929, pp. 43-4, Folder 12, all in Carton 11, PST.

[38] *The Denver Post*, October 18, 19, & 20, 1927; *The Rocky Mountain News*, October 20, 1927.

[39] *The Rocky Mountain News*, November 2 & 3, 1927.

[40] *The Denver Post*, November 4 & 5, 1927; *The Rocky Mountain News*, November 5,6, & 7, 1927; Leigh Campbell-Hale, "Remembering Ludlow But Forgetting Columbine: The 1927-1928 Colorado Coal Strike," PhD Dissertation, University of Colorado Boulder, 2013, pg. 133; McClurg, "The Colorado Coal Strike of 1927: Tactical Leadership of the IWW," pp. 78-81.

[41] *The Rocky Mountain News*, November 8, 1927; Campbell-Hale, "Remembering Ludlow But Forgetting Columbine," pp. 125-129.

[42] *The Rocky Mountain News*, November 6, 8, & 14, 1927; *The Denver Post*, November 6 & 14, 1927; McClurg, "The Colorado Coal Strike of 1927: Tactical Leadership of the IWW," pg. 92.

[43] *The Rocky Mountain News*, November 22, 1927; Campbell-Hale, "Remembering Ludlow But Forgetting Columbine," pg. 133; Monica Isabel-Garcia, "A History of Mexican and Mexican Americans in the Coal Mining Regions of the Rocky Mountain West, 1880-1928," PhD Dissertation, UC Santa Barbara, 2012, pp. 128-129.

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[45] Delaney, "The Colorado Conquest;" McClurg, "The Colorado Strike of 1927," pg. 88.

[46] *The Rocky Mountain News*, April 2 & 13 and August 18, 1928; McClurg, "The Colorado Coal Strike of 1927," pg. 89.

[47] Clemente Idar, "The Beetworkers' Association: Report," 1928, Folder 10, Box 4, Clemente Idar Papers (CIP); letter from Francisco Carpio to Paul Taylor, June 20, 1930, Folder 13; Paul Taylor interview with Tom Mahony, Longmont, Colorado, 1929, Folder 12, all in Carton 11, PST; *The Rocky Mountain News*, March 3, 1934.

For a summary of earlier beet labor unions in Colorado, see Stuart Jamieson, "Labor Unionism in American Agriculture," PhD Dissertation, UC Berkeley (1943), pp. 28-31.

[48] *The Rocky Mountain News*, March 1, 1928; House Congressional Record, March 2,1928, pg. 4,010; Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, February 21 to April 5, 1928, pp. 607-8.

[49] *The Rocky Mountain News*, March 3 & 9, July 10, October 1, 1928 and June 12 & 15, 1930; *The Denver Post*, March 5, 1928; letter from unknown to John Gross, July 7, 1930, and Clemente Idar, "Of My Own Views," ca. 1930, Folder 7, Box 4, CIP.

[50] Official Proceedings of the Colorado Federation of Labor's Thirty-Third Annual Convention, Colorado Springs, June 5-8, 1928, pp. 21 & 51-52; Official Proceedings of the Colorado Federation of Labor's Thirty-Fourth Annual Convention, Denver, June 4-7, 1929.

[51] Memorandum from Clemente Idar to Beetworkers' Association, June 17, 1930, Folder 7, Box 4, CIP; *The Rocky Mountain News*, June 6, 1930.

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[26] Interviews with Solis Sager; Stanford, "In Memorium: Manuela S. Sager, 1912-1996;" "La clase trabajadora en Tejas, 1920-1940," pp. 247-250; Victor B. Nelson-Cisneros, "UCAPAWA Organizing Activities in Texas, 1935-1950." *Aztlán: A Journal of Chicano Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2 (1978), pp. 73-4; Jamieson, *Labor Unionism in American Agriculture*, pp. 273-75.

[27] Interviews with Solis Sager; Minutes from Texas Agricultural Worker Conference, January 23, 1937, Exp. 13, SRE. This folder also contains minutes from an Executive Board meeting five days later for planning a mass meeting on February 17 to organize another local of *La Asociación* in Corpus Christi.

[28] Ibid; memoranda from Laredo Consul Efraín G. Domínguez to San Antonio Consul, May 3, 1937, No. 1593, Exp. 73-26/660(73)15 and to Consular Department, SRE, Mexico City, August 25, 1937, No. 3343, Exp. 73-26/121.32:523, SRE; Silva, "Labor's Other Torch Bearer," pg. 1J.

[29] *The San Antonio Light*, February 16-19, 23-24, 26, 1937.

[30] *The San Antonio Light*, July 16, 1936; *The San Antonio Light*, June 29-30, 1937; "San Antonio, "The Cradle of Texas Liberty;'" Green Peyton, *San Antonio: City in the Sun*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946, pg. 170; Rips, "Living History," pp. 8-10; interview with Solis Sager.

[31] Rips, "Living History," pg. 9; Tenayuca address to the NACS; "San Antonio, "'The Cradle of Texas Liberty.'"

[32] Cynthia Orozco, *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement*. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2010, pp. 211-214; Croxdale, "Pecan Shellers," pg. 9; Bell, "The Pecan Strike," pg. 10.

[33] Manafee and Cassmore, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio," pp. 5-10; George Lambert to Donald Henderson, February 18, 1939, Folder 2, Box 6, GLL; Tenayuca address to NACS.

[34] Rips, "Living History," pg. 10; Tenayuca speech to NACS.

[35] Shapiro, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio, Texas," pg. 235; Walker, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio and Mechanization," pg. 52; Zaragoza Vargas, "Tejana Radical," pp. 570-572; Vicki Ruiz, "Una Mujer Sin Fronteras: Luisa Moreno and Latina Labor Activism," *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol., 73, No. 1 (February, 2004), pp. 1-20; Diane Telgen, E.M. Neito, and Jim Kamp, *Notable Hispanic American Women*. Detroit: Thomson Gale, 1993, pp. 398-9; Rips, "Living History," pp. 9-10: interview with Solis Sager; interview with Tenayuca.

[36] Manafee and Cassmore, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio," pp. 16-18; *San Antonio Light*, March 4, 1938.

[37] Publication No. 6, July 5, 1933, TRC Papers, Report of the Texas Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, September 20, 1933, Box 4-19/331; Letters from Adam Johnson to Harry Hopkins, November 2, 1934 and Maury Maverick, November 10, 1934, Folder: Outgoing Letters, Box 1989/165-1, Adam Johnson Papers (AJP).

[38] Letters from Adam Johnson to Harry Hopkins, Nov. 2, 1934, to Maury Maverick, November 10, 1934; to C.K. Quin, October 22, 1935, and to Maury Maverick, July 15, 1936, all located in Folder: Outgoing Letters, Box 1989/165-1, AJP.

[39] Memorandum from Juan Richer to Consular Department, March 17, 1936, SRE, Exp. 73-26/523/15, No. 541, SRE 1456, Exp. 13; *The Laredo Times*, March 15-16, 1936.

[40] Memorandum from Juan Richer to Consular Department, March 19, 1936, Exp. 73-26/523/15, No. 566; memorandum from Houston Consul Rafael Jimenez Castro to San Antonio Consul, March 28, 1936, Exp. 73-0/330(72:73), No. 415, both located in SRE 1456, Exp. 13; *La Prensa*, March 17, 1936; *The Washington Times*, March 24, 1936; *El Porvenir*, March 29, 1936; *The Houston Chronicle*, April 1, 1936.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Donald L. Zelman, "Alazan-Apache Courts: A New Deal Response to Mexican American Housing Conditions in San Antonio." *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (October, 1983), pp. 134-45; interview with Tenayuca.

[43] Letter from George Lambert to Donald Henderson, July 18, 1938, GLL Papers, Folder 9, Box 27, Manafee and Cassmore, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio," pp. 19-22.

[44] Letter from George Lambert to Donald Henderson, July 18, 1938, Folder 9, Box 27; letters from George Lambert to E.L. Oliver, May 10, 1939, to Santos Vazquez March 2, 1939, and from Kansas City ILGWU to George Lambert, June 16, 1938, Folder 2, Box 6, all in GLL.

[45] Letters from George Lambert to J.E. Clayton, July 23, 1938, and to Santos Vazquez, February 23, and March 2, 1939, Folder 2, Box 6; letter from George Lambert to Latane Lambert, May 10, 1939, Folder 5, Box 5; "San Antonio, the Cradle of Texas Liberty;" and Emma Tenayuca's Report to City Convention of San Antonio Communist Party, July 6, 1939, Folder 9, Box 27, all in GLL; Manafee and Cassmore, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio," pp. 50-51.

[46] Manafee and Cassmore, "The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio," pp. 50-51; Emma Tenayuca's Report to City Convention of San Antonio Communist Party, July 6, 1939, Box 27, Folder 9; letter from George to Latane Lambert, May 10, 1939, Folder 5, Folder 5, all in GLL.

[47] Vargas, "Tejana Radical," pg. 556.

[48] Tenayuca and Brooks, "The Mexican Question in the Southwest," pp. 261-2.

[49] "Program of the Communist Party for San Antonio," ca. July, 1939, Folder 11, Box 16, and "Report of Emma Tenayuca to the City Convention, Communist Party," July 6, 1939, Folder 9, Box 27, GLL. Though the program did not list Tenayuca as the official author, she did the provide her name as the Secretary of the Communist Party's Municipal Committee and left her P.O. Box for those who wanted to request more information.

[50] *The San Antonio Light*, August 20, 22, & 26, 1939; *The San Antonio Express*, August 26, 1939.

[51] *The San Antonio Light*, August 30, 1939; letter from Margaret to Latane Lambert, September 17, 1939, Folder 2, Box 6, GLL.

[52] Interview with Tenayuca.

[53] *The San Antonio Light*, August 20 & 26, 1939.

[54] Ibid, August 20 & 22, 1939.

[55] Ibid.

[56] *The San Antonio Light*, August 26, 1939; *The San Antonio Express*, August 26, 1939

[57] Ibid, August 20 & 26, 1939.

[58] Ibid, August 27, 1939; "Program of the Communist Party for San Antonio," Folder 11, Box 16, GLL.

[59] Letter from Latane Lambert to William E. Dodd, Jr., Folder 9, Box 27, GLL; Telgen et al., *Notable Hispanic American Women*, pg. 398.

[60] Letters from Telesforo Oviedo to Donald Henderson, January 22, 1942, and from Donald G. Koblar to Harold J. Lane, February 21, 1942, both in Folder 1, Box 1, Food, Tobacco, and Agricultural Allied Workers of America (FTAA) Papers; Rips, "Living History," pg. 7; interview with Tenayuca; Silva, "Labor's Other Torch Bearer," pp. 1J-4J; FBI FOIPA# 1135847-000, reports by C.W. Wall, July 12, 1941, File No. 100-1873 and by Bennet M. Hirsh, May 1, 1944, File No. 85294, and letter from R.J. Abbaticchio, Jr. to J. Edgar Hoover, July 21, 1943; Lori A. Flores, "An Unladylike Strike Fashionably Clothed: Mexican and Anglo Women Garment Workers Against Tex-Son, 1959-1963." *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (August, 2009), pp 367-402.

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[61] Letters from Lucy Randolph Mason to Ministers for Labor Day, August 25, 1937; from R.W. Johnson of Johnson & Johnson to Lucy Randolph Mason, June 27, 1938, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Sidney Hillman, January 21, 1938, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Robert C. Norman, January 21, 1938, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Eleanor Roosevelt, June 25, 1938, all in Folder 3, Box 1, Lucy Randolph Mason Papers (LRM); *Journal of Labor*, February 3, 1939; Louise Leonard McLaren, Report on the Southern Summer School for Women Workers in Industry Conference, October 10, 1937 – January 1, 1938, Folder 47, Howard Kester Papers (HKP); CIO Press Releases, November 16, 1938 & July 3, 1939.

[62] For early studies of the New Deal in the South, refer to David Eugene Conrad, *The Forgotten Farmers: The Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal*. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1965; Louis Cantor, *A Prologue to a Protest Movement: The Missouri Roadside Demonstration of 1939*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1969; Donald H. Grubbs, *Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and the New Deal*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971; Donald Holley, *Uncle Sam's Farmers: The New Deal Communities in the Lower Mississippi Valley*. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1975.

[63] Alice Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States* (20th ann. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Ruth Milkman, *Gender At Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation By Sex during World War II*. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1987; Alice Kessler-Harris, *A Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings and Social Consequences*. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1990; Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[64] "Suggested Program – Fellowship of Reconciliation Conference, October 15-18, 1931;" Minutes of Fellowship of Reconciliation Executive Committee Meeting, New York, November 15, 1931, both in Folder 5, HKP.

[65] Paco Martín del Campo, Debbie Trippet, and Trish Trippet interview with Patricia Murphy, September 3, 2019.

[66] Jack Temple Kirby, *Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920-1960*. Baton Rouge: The Louisiana State University Press, 1987, pp. 1-50; Eugene G. McKibben and R. Austin Griffin, "Change in Farm Power and Equipment: Tractors, Trucks, and Automobiles." WPA Report, Philadelphia, December, 1938, pp. 8-9; "A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the Executive Council Southern Tenant Farmers' Union," ca. 1936, Folder 4, Box 443; H.L. Mitchell, "The Source of the Grapes of Wrath," submitted to the Committee on Interstate Migration, Montgomery, Alabama, August 14-16, 1940, Folder 1, Box 444, both in Socialist Party records (SPUSA); Roman L. Horne and Eugene G. McKibben, "Mechanical Cotton Picker: Changes in Farm Power and Equipment." WPA Report, Philadelphia, August, 1937, pp. 8-15; Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, *American Congo: The African American Freedom Struggle in the Delta*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 154-155; letter from Paul H. Appleby to Paul Taylor, August 24, 1937, Folder 23, Carton 44, PST.

[67] The Presbyterian Church expelled Williams while he was living in Paris. Letter from Horace Bryan to the STFU, April 4, 1936, STFU Papers, Reel 2; William Mitch to Mason, December 23, 1947, LRM, Box 5, Folder 2; Ralph Hurst, "Graves' Actions Are Indicative of Labor Pact," *The Birmingham News*, April 21, 1938; Interview by H.L. Mitchell and Bob Dinwiddie with Clyde Johnson at Georgia State University, April 4, 1976, Box 16, Folder: Clyde Johnson Oral History Transcript, April 4, 1976; Williams to Harry and Grace Koger, June 22, 1975; Williams to Mitchell, February 19, 1979; Transcribed eulogy by Presbyterian Minister Richard Morford, who was Executive Director of the National Council of the American-Soviet Friendship Committee, delivered at Williams' funeral at Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, August 4, 1979; statement by Steve Vouse, ca. August 4, 1979, both in Box 12, Folder: Correspondence, Claude Williams, 1975-1979, all in CJP; report from Frank N. Trager on conference in Gillespie, Illinois, March 7, 1937, Folder 27, HKP.

[68] Letter from Al Jackson to J.R. Butler, July 4, 1935, Reel 1, STFU Papers; letter from Howard Kester to Francis P. Miller, March 19, 1939, Folder 69, HKP; letter from H.L. Mitchell to editor of *In These Times*, April 11-17, 1979, pg. 5, Folder: H.L. Mitchell, 1974-1979, Box 15; letter from Mary Jackson to Clyde Johnson, February," 8,1937, Folder 13, Box 18; Clyde Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the Southeast: History of the Share Croppers Union presented at a History Conference at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, April 1979, Folder 4, Box 19; Clyde Johnson, "Reply to Dale Rosen's questionnaire on the Share Croppers Union," January 15, 1969, "Clyde Johnson: Recollections of living in Montgomery, Alabama in 1935," recorded April 27, 1977; "Recollections of the Share Croppers Union, recorded February 21, 1978, both in Folder: Dale Rosen letters, Box 16; all in CJP; Theodore Rosengarten, *All God's Dangers: The Life of Nate Shaw*. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.

[69] *The People's World*, July 27, 1978; letter from Thomas Burke (Johnson's alias) to Howard Kester, January 7, 1935, Folder 14, HKP; letter from Donald Henderson to all Agricultural and Rural Workers, February 7, 1935, Reel 1, STFU Papers; Clyde Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the Southeast: History of the Share Croppers Union," presented at a History Conference at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, April 1979," Folder 4, Box 19; "Clyde Johnson: Recollections of living in Montgomery, Alabama in 1935," recorded April 27, 1977; Clyde Johnson, "Reply to Dale Rosen's questionnaire on the Share Croppers Union," January 15, 1969, both in Folder: Dale Rosen letters, Box 16, all in CJP.

[70] Recollections of the Share Croppers Union, recorded February 20, 1978; copy of letter from Johnson to the editor of *Social Policy*, Winter, 1992, both in Folder 12, Box 18, CJP. As a result of his involvement in the student

strikes, Columbia University also refused to rehire an economics professor, Donald Henderson, who began publishing *The Rural Worker* shortly after. Interview by H.L. Mitchell and Bob Dinwiddie with Clyde Johnson at Georgia State University, April 4, 1976, Folder: Clyde Johnson Oral History Transcript, Box 16; letter from Clyde Johnson to Mr. Davis of *The U.S. News*, September 7, 1945, Folder: Correspondence 1945-1946, Box 11; letter from Clyde Johnson to Donald Henderson, April 21, 1941, Folder 16, Box 19; all in CJP; Clive Knowles, "Passing Through." Unpublished manuscript, 1992, typescript, pp. 15-26.

[71] "Report of the N.E.C. to the National Convention," June 1-3, 1934, Detroit, Michigan and Proceedings of The Eighteenth Convention of the Socialist Party of America, Fort Wayne Hotel, Detroit, May 30 – June 3, 1934, both in Folder 6, Box 73, SPUSA records; lecture by H.L. Mitchell, "Race Relations in the Southern Tenant Farmers Union," Princeton University, April 4, 1973, Folder 7, Box 1, STFU Papers.

[72] Letter from Howard Kester to Tess Sinovich, July 21, 1934; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, August 8, 1934; letter from Ward Rodgers to Howard Kester, September 13, 1934, all in Folder 11; letter from Francis A. Hensen to Howard Kester, July 17, 1935, Folder 17; letter from Francis P. Henson to Howard Kester, December 9, 1935, Folder 19, all in HKP.

[73] "To All Members, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union," November 1, 1934, STFU Papers, Reel 1; ACLU Press Release, January 14, 1935; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Sir, November 25, 1934; telegram from Lucille Milner to Howard Kester, December 1, 1934, both in Folder 12; letter from Lucille Milner to Howard Kester, January 4, 1935; letter from Howard Kester to Roger Baldwin, January 16, 1935, both in Folder 14, all in HKP.

[74] Letter from Donald Henderson to Anderson, December 17, Reel 1, STFU Papers; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, January 4, 1935, Folder 14, HKP; Wiley I. Bell interview of H.L. Mitchell, n.d, Box 87, STFU Papers; H.L. Mitchell, "The Founding and Early History of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter, 1973), pg. 354; Mitchell, H.L., and Bob Dinwiddie interview with Clyde Johnson at Georgia State University, April 4, 1976, Folder: Clyde Johnson Oral History Transcript; Recollections of the Share Croppers Union, recorded February 21 & 22, 1978, Folder: Dale Rosen letters, both in Box 16; copy of Albert Jackson, "Death List Revealed as Murder Reign Breaks Cotton Strike," *The Daily Worker*, October 18, 1935, Folder 12, Box 18, all in CJP.

[75] *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, January 17, February 4, 1935; F. Raymond Daniell, "AAA Deals Misery to Sharecropper, Times' Man Finds," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1935; affidavit of Arthur Brookings, June, 1935, Reel 1, STFU Papers; Proceedings of the STFU's Third Annual Convention, Muskogee, Oklahoma, January 14-17, 1937, pg. 44; Carl Duncan interview with H.L. Mitchell, Montgomery, April 20, 1973, Box 82, STFU Papers.

[76] Minutes from the Executive Committee Meeting, Fellowship of Reconciliation, New York, January 20, 1933; letter from Howard Kester to George F. Jackson, February 9, 1933, letter from Clarence Senior to Howard Kester, February 14, 1933, Howard Kester, "A Brief Account of the Wildur Strike," August 1, 1933; Annual report of Howard Report, Southern Secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, all in Folder 9, HKP.

[77] Letters from Donald Henderson to H.L. Mitchell, December 18, 1934, and from Al Jackson to J.R. Butler, July 4, 1935, both in Reel 1, STFU Papers; *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, February 9, 1935; "United Front Agreement," Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas, 1935 and Commonwealth College Press Release, January 24, 1935, Folder 4, Box 286; Defense Committee, "Statement," February 6, 1935, Folder 4, Box 443, all in SPUSA records.

[78] Letter from Willie Sue Blagden to Howard Kester, December 7, 1935, letter from Myles Horton, Zilla Haves, James Dombrowski to Joe Kelley Stockton, January 3, 1936, Folder 20, HKP; *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (June, 1936), pg. 4.

[79] Letter from Ward Rodgers to Howard Kester and H.L. Mitchell, March 6, 1935, Folder 15; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Norman Thomas, August 4, 1935, and letter from Kester to Mitchell, ca. August, 1935, Folder 17, all in HKP; Federated Press Release, August 13, 1935.

[80] Letters from Norman Thomas to H.L. Mitchell, August 7, 1935, from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, August 22, 1935, from Howard Kester to J.R. Butler, August 8, 1935, all in Folder 17, letter from Howard Kester to Mary Van Kleeck, April 15, 1936, Folder 22, all in HKP.

[81] "The Charges Against H.L. Mitchell," April 28, 1935; minutes of the Executive Council of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, Memphis, April 29, 1935; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Norman Thomas, May 29, 1935, all in Folder 15; letter from Gardner Jackson to STFU Executive Council Members, June, 1937, Folder 263, all in HKP.

[82] *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, Volume 1, No. 1 (ca. April, 1935), pp. 1-2, and Vol. 1, No. 4, pg. 4; "Clyde Johnson: Recollections of living in Montgomery, Alabama in 1935;" Recollections of the Share Croppers Union, both in Folder: Dale Rosen letters, Box 16; Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the Southeast," all in CJP; Share Croppers Union Circular, July 4, 1935, Reel 1, STFU Papers.

[83] Letters from J.R. Butler to Howard Kester, July 29, 1935, and from Norman Thomas to Howard Kester, July 31, 1935, both in Folder 17, HKP; "Recollections of the Share Croppers Union;" Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the Southeast;" interview by Leah Wise, et al., with Mitchell, May 23, 1972; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Clarence Senior, October 4, 1935, and minutes of the National Executive Council Meeting, September 1, 1935, both in Reel 1, STFU Papers; *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, October, 1935; STFU Press Release, ca. September 30, 1935.

[84] Letters from Howard Kester to the Editor of *The Nation*, March, 1935, from J. Abner Sage to Marked Tree Community Council Secretary W.R. Timms, March 5, 1935, and from Marked Tree Local Secretary Opal Benton to Howard Kester, March 6, 1935, and telegrams from H.L. Mitchell and Howard Kester to Jack Herling, March 22, 1935, and to Norman Thomas, March 27, 1935, all in Folder 15; letter from J. Abner Sage to Glenn Hutchinson, June 10, 1935, Folder 16, all in HKP.

[85] *The New York World-Telegram*, February 22, 1935; Affidavit of William H. Stultz, June 27, 1935, Minutes of STFU National Executive Council Meeting, June 2, 1935, letter from J.R. Butler to W.R. Dyess, June 29, 1935, all in Reel 1, STFU Papers; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, June 13, 1935, and to Norman Thomas, Jack Herling, and Howard Kester, and letter from J.R. Butler to Howard Kester, June 27, 1935, all in Folder 16, HKP.

[86] Duncan interview with Mitchell; Affidavit by Poinsett County Clerk James A. Smith, July 19, 1935, Reel 1; letter from H.L. Mitchell to W.H. Stultz, April 6, 1936, Reel 2, both in STFU Papers; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, August 3, 1935, and from Howard Kester to Elizabeth Gilman, August 5, 1935, Folder 17, HKP; Steven Hahn, *A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 265-314.

[87] Mitchell, "The Founding and Early History of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union," pp. 364-5; lecture by H.L. Mitchell, "Race Relations in the Southern Tenant Farmers Union;" Proceedings of the STFU's Third Annual Convention, Muskogee, Oklahoma, January 14-17, 1937, pg. 57; interview by Leah Wise, et al. with Mitchell; letter from William B. Amberson to Howard Kester, February 17, 1936, and copy of telegram from William B. Amberson and H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, February 18, 1936, Folder 20; letter from Aubrey Williams to Floyd Shop, February 3, 1936, Folder 262, memorandum from Gardner Jackson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 12, 1936, Folder 21, all in HKP.

[88] Letters from G.E. Ferrelly to H.L. Mitchell, April 17, 1936, from E.B. McKinney to H.L. Mitchell, April 26, 1936, from H.L. Mitchell to Lester Robinson, May 1, 1936, from Maggie Howard to H.L. Mitchell, May 6, 1936, Reel 2, STFU Papers; letter from Howard Kester to L.S. Cottrell, Jr., April 4, 1936, Folder 22; letter from Evelyn Smith to Howard Kester, March 16, 1936, Folder 21, both in HKP; *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, May 18 & 27, 1936.

[89] Letter from Fred A. Ingrig to J.R. Butler, December 15, 1937, Folder 263, HKP; letters from Douglas Cobbs to H.L. Mitchell, April 7, 1936, from H.L. Mitchell to J.L. Woodhull, and to UMWA Local 2880 Secretary, April 9, 1936, all in Reel 2, STFU Papers.

[90] Letters from E.B. McKinney to H.L Mitchell, May 2, 1936, from H.L. Mitchell to Gardner Jackson, May 6, 1936, both in Reel 2, STFU Papers; Woodruff, *American Congo*, pg. 173.

[91] STFU Press Releases, May 20, October 26, 1936; *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 24, 1936; *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, November 27, 1936, *The Associated Press*, November 25, December 10, 1936; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Fred Ingrid, May 23,1936, from Fred Ingrid to H.L. Mitchell, May 25, 1936, State of the UMW International Executive Board, May 29, 1936, and telegram from Norman Thomas to H.L. Mitchell, June 16, 1936, all in Reel 2, STFU Papers; interview with Mitchell; Proceedings of the STFU's Third Annual Convention, Muskogee, Oklahoma, January 14-17, 1937, Mitchell, "The Founding and Early History of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union," pg. 359; Grubbs, *Cry from the Cotton*, pg. 103; Woodruff, *American Congo*, pp. 171-174.

[92] *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, May 28, June 1, 1936; *Southern Farm Leader*, June 1936; STFU Press Release, June 1, 1936; "Brief Digest of Trip to Arkansas by James Myers June 2-10 in Connection with Cotton Choppers Strike," June 10, 1936, Folder 23, HKP; *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (July, 1936), pg. 1.

[93] Letter from Howard Kester to Reverend James Myers, July 9, 1935, Folder 17; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, March 26, 1936, Folder 21; letter from Howard Kester to Gardner Jackson, February 3, 1937, Folder 27, all in HKP.

[94] Proceedings of the STFU's Third Annual Convention, Muskogee, Oklahoma, January 14-17, 1937, pg. 48; *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September, 1936), pg. 3; Gary Zellar, *African Creeks: Estelveste and the Creek Nation*. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2007, pp. 77, 110-1, 250-256; Grubbs, *Cry from the Cotton*, pp. 124-5

[95] *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September, 1936), pg. 3, & Vol. 1, No. 8, (November, 1935), pg. 2; Fred Matthews interview with Bob Davenport, O'Donnel, Texas, September 25, 1936, Folder 3, Box 1, STFU Papers at the University of Texas at Arlington (STFU-UTA).

[96] Fred Matthews interview with Charley Dyke, Tahoka, Texas, September 25, 1936, with sharecroppers & cotton pickers on road from Round Rock to Taylor, September 3, 1936, Charles Dyke interviews with J.J. Smelsor, ca. September 23, 1936, and with J.F. Freeland and Fred Matthews, September 23, 1936, all in Folder 3, Box 1, STFU-UTA.

[97] "Membership, SFTU, Texas," ca. September, 1936; Dykes interview with Charles Deo, September 23, 1936, both in Folder 3, Box 1, STFU-UTA.

[98] Minutes of Oklahoma State STFU Council Meeting, January 13, 1938, Folder 264; letter from Odis Sweeden to Howard Kester, May 1, 1937, Folder 28; letter from Odis Sweeden to Howard Kester, December 23, 1937, Folder 46; letters from H.L. Mitchell to J.R. Butler, August 10, 1938, and from Odis Sweeden to Howard Kester, August 11, 1938, Folder 61, all in HKP.

[99] Proceedings of the STFU's Third Annual Convention, Muskogee, Oklahoma, January 14-17, 1937, pp. 9, 23-29, 51; *The Muskogee Times-Democrat*, January 15, 1937; *The Foresman*, January 18, 1937; *The Sharecroppers' Voice*, Vol. 2, No. 7 (February, 1937), pg. 1.

[100] Letter from Alice Kester to Myrtle Lawrence, February 2, 1937, Folder 43; letter from Howard Kester to Adam Baldwin, January 28, 1937, Folder 26; letter from H.L. Mitchell to the SPUSA Executive Committee, February 2, 1937, Folder 27, all in HKP.

[101] Interview with Mitchell; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Norman Thomas, April 29, 1936, and from Marie Smith to H.L. Mitchell, April 10, 1936, both in Reel 2, STFU Papers; letter from William Amberson to STFU NEC Members, June 15 ,1937, and from H.L. Mitchell to STFU EC Members, June 10, 1937, all three in Folder 30; Minutes of a Committee to Consider a Temporary Organization for the Sharecroppers, Philadelphia, January 11, 1938, Folder 48; letters from Purnell Benson to Howard Kester, September 14, 1938, and from J.R. Butler to Howard Kester, September 3, 1938, Folder 62; all in HKP.

[102] Memorandum to C.I.O. on United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, July 19, 1937, Folder 36; letter from Howard Kester to Norman Thomas, August 18, 1937, Folder 263; letter from Roy E. Burt to National Executive Committee Members, September 30, 1937, Folder 38, all in HKP.

[103] Memorandum from J.R. Butler and H.L. Mitchell to STFU EC Members, August 21, 1937, Folder 36; letter from Howard Kester to Norman Thomas, September 27, 1937, Folder 38; Resolution, ca. September, 1937, Folder 46, Report of Evelyn Smith to the STFU Executive Council, November 20, 1937, Folder 42. A memorandum from J.R. Butler also pointed to Blackstone as "one of the main leaders" of a "group around Wynne" that had "been agitating for a state set up way before the September convention." Letter from J.R. Butler to EC Members, January 29, 1938, Folder 50; letter from Freeman Grautham and wife to Howard Kester, February 1, 1938, Folder 51, all in HKP.

[104] Memorandum from H.L. Mitchell, September 26, 1937; Original Resolution, September 26, 1937, both in Folder 38, letter from J.R. Butler and H.L. Mitchell to STFU EC Members, October 6, 1937, Folder 39; letter from J.R. Butler to Howard Kester, November 17, 1937, Folder 42; Minutes of Meeting of the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen, Jubilee Hall, Fisk University, May 17-19, 1937, Folder 29; letter from Ward Rodgers to Walter White, March 3, 1938, Folder 54, all in HKP; STFU Press Release, September 30, 1937.

[105] Letter from Howard Kester to Norman Thomas, September 27, 1937, Folder 38; letter from Gardner Jackson to Howard Kester, November 22, 1937, Folder 43; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, September 8, 1937, and from Howard Kester to Harry Hopkins, October 18, 1937, both in Folder 263, all in HKP; STFU Press Release, September 30, 1937.

[106] Minutes of STFU Executive Council Meeting, Memphis, November 20-21, Folder 42; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Donald Henderson, June 6, 1938, and from J.R. Butler and H.L. Mitchell to STFU Executive Council Members, October 26, 1938, Folder 265; all in HKP; *The S.T.F.U. News*, September, 1938.

[107] Wise, et al, interview with Mitchell; Minutes of Meeting of the Trustees of the Cooperative Farms, January 1, 1938, Folder 49; memorandum from John Brophy to All Local Industrial Unions, November 27, 1937, Folder 43; memorandum from John Brophy to All Regional Directors and Field Representatives, December 31, 1937, Folder 46; "Some Important Data and Information Given at Conference of Unemployment and Taxation, Washington, D.C., January 14-15, 1938, Folder 49, all in HKP; letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Eleanor Roosevelt, June 25, 1938, Folder 3, LRM.

[108] Letter from Norman Thomas to H.L. Mitchell and Howard Kester, February 8, 1938, Folder 264; letter from Roger Baldwin to Charlotte Moskowitz, February 18, 1937, Folder 27; letter from Norman Thomas to Howard Kester, October 30, 1937, Folder 40; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, November 10, 1937, and from

Howard Kester to Donald Kobler, November 4, 1937, both in Folder 41; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, February 15, 1938, Folder 53; letter from Norman Thomas to H.L. Mitchell, March 19, 1938, Folder 55, all in HKP.

[109] Summary of Minutes of the STFU Executive Council Meeting, Memphis, September 16-17, 1938, Folder 62; letters from J.R. Butler to STFU Executive Council Members, July 18, 1938, and August 27, 1938, both in Folder 265, all in HKP; letter from Claude Williams to H.L. Mitchell, February 19, 1979, Folder: Correspondence, Claude Williams, 1975-1979, Box 12, CJP; *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, December 31, 1938; interview with Mitchell, Columbia Oral History Project.

[110] STFU Releases, February 21, 1936; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Elizabeth Gilman, March 20, 1936, Folder 21; letter from H.L. Mitchell and J.R. Butler to all STFU Locals, September 25, 1938, Folder 62; and Minutes of Workers' Defense League Meeting, November 10, 1938, Folder 63, all in HKP; "S.T.F.U. Study Course: History of the S.T.F.U.," ca. 1939, Folder 4, Box 443, SPUSA records; Cantor, *Prologue to a Protest Movement*, pp. 43, 53-54, 64, 98.

[111] *The Associated Press*, January 10, 11, 14, 1939; *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 10, 1939; *The New York Times*, January 11, 1939; Jack Bryan, "U.S. Threatens Reprisals on Landlords Who Evict Tenants," *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, January 11, 1939; Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*. Penguin Books, 2012; Tim O'Brien, *The Things They Carried*. Boston: Marine Books: 2009; Jimmy, Carter, *An Hour Before Daylight: Memories of a Rural Boyhood*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.

[112] Letters from H.L. Mitchell to James Myers, February 10, 1939, from O.H. Whitfield to F.R. Betton, February 27, 1939, and from O.H. Whitfield to H.L. Mitchell, February 28, 1939; telegram from Sinclair Drake to J.R. Butler, January 23, 1939, all four in Reel 10, STFU Papers; telegram from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, January 23, 1939, Folder 66; letter from H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, February 26, 1939, Folder 67; letter from Evelyn Smith to Howard Kester, March 2, 1939, Folder 68, all in HKP; *UCAPAWA News*, July, 1939.

[113] Memorandum from J.R. Butler to STFU Presidents and Secretaries, August 14, 1939; letter from H.L. Mitchell to James E. Sidel, December 15, 1939, both in Folder 266; letter from H.L. Mitchell to J.R. Butler, May 14, 1940, Folder 267, all in HKP; "S.T.F.U. Study Course: History of the S.T.F.U." ca. 1939, Box 443, Folder 4, SPUSA; *The S.T.F.U. News*, March 21, 1939; STFU Press Release, April 2, 1939; *The Memphis Press-Scimitar*, April 3, 1939; *The UCAPAWA News*, December, 1939.

[114] Letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Robert La Follette, July 12, 1938, Folder 3, LRM; letter from Howard Kester to Gardner Jackson, November 5, 1937, Folder 41; letter from Howard Kester to Members of the Committee for Economic and Racial Justice, October 27, 1939, Folder 266; letters from Gordon McIntire to Walter White, October 14, 1938, from Gordon McIntire to Richard Thomas, October 14, 1938, and from Walter White to Judge Bennett C. Clark, November 15, 1938, all three in Folder 63, all in HKP; copy of *The Monroe Morning World*, October 18, 1938.

[115] William DeBerry, "The CIO in the South," *The UCAPAWA News*, July-August, 1940, October 15, 1942, December 1, 1944, pg. 10; letters from Lucy Randolph Mason to Haywood, March 6, 1943, and from Lucy Randolph Mason to Charles S. Johnson, April 14, 1943, both in Folder 1, Box 3; "Notes on CIO in the South by Lucy Randolph Mason, CIO southern public relations representative, October 25, 1944," Folder 1, Box 4, all three in LRM; letter from Van Bittner to Paul Christopher, August 26, 1946, Folder 1; letter from F.C. Pieper to Paul Christopher, July 7, 1942, Folder 5, both in Box 128; Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Executive Board of the Southern School for Workers, Fruitland Institute, Hendersonville, North Carolina, July 26-27, 1941, Folder 2, Box 191, all three in CIO-OD; letter from Claude Williams to Harry and Grace Koger, June 22, 1979, Folder: Correspondence, Claude Williams, 1975-1979, Box 12, CJP.

[116] Copy of letter from Odis Sweeden to H.L. Mitchell transcribed by Mitchell for Raley, Betton, Hynds, and Johnson, October 20, 1942, Reel 22, STFU Papers; interview by Bob Hall, Jacque Hall, Leah Wise, Neill Herring, and Bob Dinwoodie with H.L. Mitchell, Atlanta, Georgia, January 29, 1973, Folder 7, Box 1, STFU-UTA.

[117] Minutes from National Executive Council Meeting, Memphis, January 8, 1940, Folder 1, Box 444, SPUSA; letters from H.L. Mitchell to Roy E. Haley, F.R. Betton, and J.P. Rynds, September 25, 1942, from H.L. Mitchell to Jim Blessing, September 26, 1942, and from H.L. Mitchell to R.E. Boe, September 29, 1942, all three in Reel 21; telegram from J.O. Walker to H.L. Mitchell, November 11, 1942, Reel 22; letter from J.E. Clayton to H.L. Mitchell, January 4, 1943, Reel 23, all in STFU Papers.

[118] Zieger, *The C.I.O.*, pp. 146-7 &174; letters from Lucy Randolph Mason to Haywood, May 25, 1943, and from Lucy Randolph Mason to Mildred, September 10, 1943, both in Folder 2, Box 3, LRM.

[119] *The UCAPAWA News*, July, 1939, July-August, 1940, February 15, 1943; Donald Henderson, "UCAPAWA Builds Its Tobacco Division," *The UCAPAWA News*, August 25, 1941, pp. 1-2.

[120] Letters from Frank V. De Vyver of USA to Clinton S. Golden, August 15 & 20, 1942, Box 3, Folder 1; letter from Margaret A. Broadnax to Lucy Randolph Mason, August 18, 1943, Folder 2, Box 3, both in LRM; *The UCAPAWA News*, April 15, June 15, July 1, 1943; Frank Hargrove, "RJR Victory Rally Signs Up Members," *The UCAPAWA News*, June 15, 1943, pg. 3; letter from Claude Williams to Harry and Grace Koger, June 22, 1979, Folder: Correspondence, Claude Williams, 1975-1979, Box 12, CJP; Korstad, *Civil Rights Unionism*, pg. 152.

[121] Theodosia Simpson (Chair of Plant No. 65), *The UCAPAWA News*, "Shop Leader Tells of Historic Days at RJR," July 15, 1943, pg. 2; Frank Hargrove, "Reynolds in High Gear for Coming Elections," *The UCAPAWA News*, August 1, 1943, pg. 5; *The UCAPAWA News*, September 1, November 1, 1943, January 1, April 15, June 15, September 15, November 15, 1944, December 1, 1944; *FTA News*, July 15, 1947; letters from E.L. Sandefur to Lucy Randolph Mason, May 29, 1945, and from Boyd E. Payton to Lucy Randolph Mason, June 22, 1945, both in Folder 1, Box 4, LRM; Robert Korstad, *Civil Rights Unionism*, pp. 26-36.

[122] *The UCAPAWA News*, March 27, 1942, February 1, 1943; letter from Harold Lane to Lucy Randolph Mason, March 2, 1945, Folder 1, Box 4, LRM.

[123] Letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Jean Potter, May 5, 1943, Folder, 2, Box 3; "Notes on CIO in the South made by Lucy Randolph Mason, CIO southern public relations representative;" letter from Carey Haigler to Lucy Randolph Mason, May 22, 1945, Folder 1, Box 1, all in LRM.

[124] Paul Gardner, "Phoenix Lettuce Workers Stage Come-Back," *UCAPAWA News*, October 6, 1941, pg. 7; Robert MacKay, "Citrus Fruit Campaign Sweep Florida," *UCAPAWA News* , February 1, 1943, pg. 2; Robert MacKay, "Fruit and Veg. Packing Shed Local Chartered," March 15, 1943, pg. 1; Otis G. Nation, "Florida Pickers: 'We Want Jobs,' *UCAPAWA News*, May 15, 1943, pg. 8; *UCAPAWA News*, November 17, 1941, February 23, 1942, February 1, 1943, August 15, 1943, January 1, 1944, March 15, 1944; telegram from Gillman and Lucy Randolph Mason to Miami Police Chief, February 6, 1943, and letter from Gillman to Lucy Randolph Mason to Victor Rotnem, February 6, 1943, both in Folder 1, Box 3, LRM; letter from H.L. Mitchell to James E. Sidel, December 15, 1939, Folder 266, HKP.

[125] Mitchell and Dinwiddie interview with Johnson; UCAPAWA Press Release, December 16, 1941; Clyde Johnson, "Houston Compress Workers Join," *The UCAPAWA News*, November 17, 1941, pg. 8; *The UCAPAWA News*, March 27, 1942; letter from H.L. Mitchell to James E. Sidel, December 15, 1939, Folder 266; letters with H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester, May 14, 1938, and from the STFU Executive Committee to the Friends of Organized Labor, May, 1938, Folder 58, all in HKP.

[126] Letter from Fred Pieper to Paul Christopher, February 14, 1946, Folder 6, Box 184, CIO-OD; letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Jean Potter, May 5, 1943, Folder 2, box 3; letters from John Hawkins to Lucy Randolph Mason, May 4, 1944, and from William Botkin to George Brown, April 5, 1944, both in Folder 3, Box 3; and letters from Harold Lane to Lucy Randolph Mason, March 2, 1945, and from Lucy Randolph Mason to Victor Rotnem, May 12, 1945, both in Folder 1, Box 4; letter from C.W. Jenkins to Lucy Randolph Mason, July 7, 1947, Folder 1, Box 5, all in LRM.

[127] Mitchell and Dinwoodie interview with Johnson; Clyde Johnson, "Reply to Dale Rosen's questionnaires on the Share Croppers Union," January 15, 1969, Box 16, Folder: Dale Rosen letters; Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the South," all in CJP.

[128] Letter from Clyde Johnson to M.W Graylee, September 5, 1936, Folder 13, Box 18, CJP; Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the Southeast;" letters from Clyde Johnson to M.L. Mitchell, April 20, 1936, and from H.L. Mitchell to Clyde Johnson, April 20, 1936, both in Reel, 2, STFU Papers; Notes of Southern Tour of Paul Parker and Clarence Senior, May, 1935, Folder 16, HKP.

[129] For a history of dock workers in New Orleans after emancipation, refer to Eric Arneson, *Water Front Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863-1923*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Letter from "a white farmer" at "LaPlace," *The Southern Farm Leader*, January, 1937, pg. 3; *Southern Farm Leader*, February, April-May, 1937; *Birmingham Post*, April 9, 1937; Johnson, "Rural Revolt in the Southeast;" letter from Clyde Johnson to Dale Rosen, February 25, 1965, Folder: Dale Rosen letters. Box 16; letter from Gordon McIntire to Friends, ca. 1938, Folder 12; letters from Clyde Johnson to National and Alabama Farmers' Union Executive Board members, ca. April, 1937, and from Gordon McIntire to Miss La Budde, October 12, 1937, Folder 14, Box 18, all in CJP.

[130] For a study of the ILWU's campaign in New Orleans during the late-1930s, see Bruce Nelson, "Class and Race in the Crescent City: The ILWU, from San Francisco to New Orleans," in Rosswurm (ed.), *The Left-Led Unions*. Proceedings, Second Annual Convention of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, San Francisco, April 3-14, 1939, pp. 134-139; Evelyn Seeley, "Our Number One Fascists," *The Nation*, April 15, 1936, pg. 474; "Master Record, Longshoremen, New Orleans," 1938; "Banana Handlers, New Orleans, United Fruit Company," 1938, "National Labor Relations Board: Longshoremen Who Vote," 1938, all three in Folder: Local

202, Eligible Voters (New Orleans and Mobile), Box 4; letters from C.D. Green to Matt Meehen, April 25, 1939, and from Clarence A. Laws to J.R. Robertson, October 4, 1939, both in Folder: Local 207 Warehouse New Orleans), Box 5, all in ILWU-DL; *The Dispatcher*, February 26, 1943, June 5, 1980; ILWU Press Release, April 26, 1939.

[131] Memorandum, National War Labor Board Hearing, *Cotton Compress and Warehouse Companies & ILWU Local 207*, Case No. AR-237, February 12, 1943, Folder: Local 207 Warehouse New Orleans, Box 5, ILWU-DL; Henry O'Bryant, Jr. "Some Observations of Little 'Tokyo,'" July 6, 1943; "Negroes in Little Tokyo," ca. July, 1943, both in Folder 17, Box 1, Charles Bratt Collection (CBC); *The Dispatcher*, May 21, 1943; *The War Worker*, September, 1943.

[132] Proceedings of the National Maritime Union's Second National Convention, Jerusalem Temple, New Orleans, July 3-14, 1939, pp. xxvii & 587-588, Folder: NMU, Box 16, CJP; *The Dispatcher*, February 26, July 30, 1943; January 28, February 11, March 10, 1944, June 5, 1980; Notes on CIO in the South made by Lucy Randolph Mason, CIO southern public relations representatives, October 25, 1944," Folder 1, Box 4; address by Lucy Randolph Mason at 198 Whitehall Street, Atlanta, September 19, 1941, Folder 1, Box 9, both in LRM. According to Joseph's Curran address, Felix Siren led the NMU's campaign to organize locals of the Inland Boatman's Union along the Mississippi River which had contracts for over 3,000 workers by 1939. Curran also suggested in his speech that the main obstacle was both employers' dismissals and refusals to hire black workers and some work crews' exclusion of Afro-Americans (Proceedings, pp. 163-4). One of the NMU's "River locals" voted to transfer to the ILWU during the summer of 1944 as warehouse workers in Vicksburg were also requesting a charter. *The Dispatcher*, July 28, November 17, 1944.

[133] Chester J. Meske to Morris Watson, June 20, 1946; Andrew Nelson, "For Immediate Release Upon Receipt," July 15, 1946; letter from Morris Watson to Harry Bridges and Louis Goldblatt, July 31, 1946; ILWU Press Releases, August 6, 10, September 27, November 18, 1946, all four in Folder: Local 207, *Dispatcher*: Correspondence & Press Releases, Box 4, ILWU-DL; letter from Jean Bruce to Ernest Arena, April 2, 1948; ILWU-CIO Circular, "ILWU-CIO Members Demand Better Working Conditions," May 27, 1946, "Negotiations between Inland Waterways Corporation (Federal Barge Lines); Marine Engineers Beneficial Association; Masters, Mates & Pilots Organization, National Maritime Union, International Longshoremen's Association, and International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union," September 19, 1946, 516 New Federal Building, St. Louis, Missouri, Folder: Local 207 Warehouse New Orleans, Box 5, all in ILWU-DL; Paul M. Herzog, et al., *Armour Fertilizer Works vs. ILWU Local 207*, Case No. 15-C-1114, June 25, 1946, pp. 4-5; *The Dispatcher*, November 15, 1946; *The Organizer*, October 5, 1946.

[134] Minutes of Meetings of Greater New Orleans Industrial Union Council, December 17, 1946, and May 27, 1947; Louisiana Civil Rights Congress, November 29, 1949, Folder: Local 207 New Orleans (Warehouse), General; *The Dispatcher,* April 19, December 27, 1946, May 2, November 28, December 12, 1947, January 9, 1948, June 5, 1950; ILWU Press Release, February 25, 1946; letters from Andrew Nelson to J.R. Robertson, January 30, 1951, and from Leroy H. Feagler to Andrew Nelson, June 5, 1951, Box 4, Folder: Local 207 Correspondence, all in Box 4, ILWU-DL. Christopher also decried the supposed lack of cooperation between the TWUA and the CIO Regional District (letter from Paul Christopher to Fred Pieper, January 4, 1946, Folder 6, Box 184, CIO-OD.

[135] Interview with Lee Pressman, Columbia Oral History Project, January 14, 1957, Box 82, STFU; "Religious, Civic, and Social Forces in Georgia, prepared at the request of the Coordinating Committee of the Citizens' Fact Finding Movement," August, 1938, Folder 61, HKP; *The Dispatcher*, January 1, 1943, February 11, 1944, August 9, 1946; *The California Eagle*, September 24, 1942. The KKK also formed an agreement with the German-American Bund in Columbia towards the end of the 1930s. Address by Governor Burnet R. Maybank, Columbia, South Carolina, August, 1940, Folder 1, Box 9, LRM.

[136] Letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Sidney Hillman, August 31, 1945, Folder 2, Box 4; letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Turner L. Smith, June 14, 1947, Folder 1, Box 5, both in LRM, from Howard Goddard to Bjorne Halling, July 5, 1943, December 7, 1943, and February 2, 1944, and from Howard Goddard to Clifford W. Porter, January 5, 1944, Folder: Local 207 Warehouse New Orleans, Box 5, ILWU-DL;; *The Dispatcher*, February 8, 1946.

[137] *The Dispatcher*, November 17, 1944; letter from Lucy Randolph Mason to Victor Rotnem, May 4, 1944, Folder 3, Box 3, LRM; John Temple Graves, "This Morning," *Birmingham Age-Herald*, February 4, 1946; Korstad, *Civil Rights Unionism*, pp. 303-304.

[138] Letters from Lucy Randolph Mason to Haywood, February 3, 1944, and from Haywood to Lucy Randolph Mason, February 8, 1944, both in Folder 2, Box 3, LRM; letters from Paul Christopher to Charles Gillman, January 4, April 5, 1946, both in Folder 2, Box 143, CIO-OD; letter from Louise Leonard McLaren to Friend, July 29, 1938, Folder 265, HKP; Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Executive Board of the Southern School for Workers, July 26-27, 1941; *The Dispatcher*, September 7, 1945; Korstad, *Civil Rights Unionism*, pg. 229.

[139] Letters from Lucy Randolph Mason to Katherine P. Ellickson, April 4, 1946, and from George Bentley to Turner Smith, May 9, 1946, both in Folder 1, Box 4; Memorandum on strike relief needed in Thomasville, N.C., by local of United Furniture Workers, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Mr. Carey, August 22, 1946, Folder 3, Box 4, all in LRM.

[140] Letters from Reuel Stanfield to City Compress and Warehouse Company, August 14, 1946, Folder 16; letter from Reuel Stanfield to Van A. Bittner, August 13, 1946, Folder 19, both in Box 107, CIO-OD; *The FTA News*, November 15, 1944, December 1, 15, 1945, February 1, April 15, 1946; Karl Korstad, "Black and White Together: Organizing in the South with the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural & Allied Workers Union (FTA-CIO), 1946-1952," pp. 72-4, in Steve Rosswurm (ed.), *The CIO's Left-Led Unions*.

[141] McGuire, *The Dark End of the Street* , pp. 3-47 & 279-84; Reprint of Donald Henderson, "FTA-CIO Drive Helps Fight Against Racism," from *People's Voice*, reprinted in *The FTA News*, December 15, 1946, pg. 5; *The FTA News* , March 15, May 3, August 9, 23, 1946, May 30, 1947; *The Dispatcher*, November 30, 1945.

[142] Letters from Lucy Randolph Mason to Charlotte, September 5, 1946, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Eleanor Roosevelt, September 8, 1946, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Herbert Lehman, September 19, 1946, all three in Folder 3, Box 4; copy of letter from Soloman Barkin to Lucy Randolph Mason, September 26, 1947, Folder 3, Box 5, all in LRM; *The Dispatcher*, October 18, 1946.

[143] "A Report on the Fight for Freedom of FTA Victims in Winston-Salem Picket Line Cases," ca. September 1946, Folder 8, Box 56, CIO-NC; Chester S. Davis, "Local Strikes Pose Gordian Know – Who's Going to Cut It?" *The Winston-Salem Sentinel*, August 16, 1946, pg. 7; *The FTA News*, August 15, 1946.

[144] Letters from William Smith to Frank Green, October 3, 1946, from Clark Sheppard, Robert C. Black, and Ed McCrea to William Smith, August 6, 1947, from William Smith to Ed McCrea, August 8, 1947, from William Smith to Karl Korstad, November 25, 1947, and from Karl Korstad to Phillip Murray, September 29, 1948, all in Folder 8, Box 56, COC-NC.

[145] Letters from Margaret Fisher to Family, September 2, 1946, from Lucy Randolph Mason to Clark Foreman, December 8, 1946, and from Margaret Fisher to Clark Foreman, December 29, 1946, all in Folder 3, Box 4, LRM.

[146] Michael K. Honey, "Operation Dixie, the Red Scare, and the Defeat of Southern Labor Organizing," pp. 226-9, in Cherny, Robert W., William Issel, and Kieran Walsh Taylor (eds.), *American Labor and the Cold War*; Karl Korstad, "Black and White Together: Organizing in the South with the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural & Allied Workers Union (FTA-CIO), 1946-1952," pp. 77-9, in Steve Rosswurm (ed.), *The CIO's Left-Led Unions*; *The Union*, November 7, 1949

[147] Letter from Wiley A. Hall to Lucy Randolph Mason, June 6, 1945, Folder 1, Box 4, LRM; letters from Norman Thomas to H.L. Mitchell, September 4, 1935, and from H.L. Mitchell to David Dubinsky, October 6, 1935, both in Folder 18, HKP; telegram from H.L. Mitchell to John Lewis, March 3, 1939, Reel 10; Minutes of National Executive Council Meeting, August 31, 1940, and letter from J.R. Butler to NEC Members, October 9, 1940, both in Reel 15, all in STFU Papers.

[148] Vicki Ruiz, *Cannery Women, Cannery Lives*, pp. 103-24; "Bulletin: Local 7," 1949, Box: Trade Unions – By Union, Folder: Food, Tobacco, Agricultural Workers Union, ILWU Records; Testimony of H.L. Strobel before the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, First Session on H.R. 2032: A Bill to Repeal the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, to Re-Enact the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and for Other Purposes," pp. 258-259; *FTA News*, July, 1949; *The Bataan News*, February, April, 1949.

[149] "Land and Liberty for Mexican Farmers: Report of STFU Delegation to Laguna Conference, Torreón, Coahuila, Mexico," 1939, Folder 5, Box 6, EGP; *The United Press*, October 18, 1948; *The San Antonio Light*, October 20, 1948; *The El Paso Herald-Post*, October 25, 1948; letter from Norman Thomas to H.L. Mitchell and J.R. Butler, April 3, 1941, Folder 268, HKP; letter from H.L. Mitchell to J.E. Clayton, August 20, 1942, Reel 21; *The Farm Labor News*, September, 1946; Report of the Executive Council to the Thirteenth Annual Convention in Washington, D.C., January 13, 1947, and Copy of Statement of H.L. Mitchell to the House Committee on Agriculture, June 18, 1947, Reel 32, NFLU Press Release, August 16, 1947, all three in STFU Papers.

[150] Letter from R.A. Whatley to Hank Hasiwar, April 29, 1947, Folder 6, Box 7, EGP; NFLU Press Release, October 2, 6, 1947, November 12, 1947; *Associated Press*, October 4, 1947; *The Farm Labor News*, November, 1947; *The Kern County Union Labor Journal*, October 10, 1947.

[151] It is worth noting that John Lewis first proposed an organizing campaign with dairy farmers as the UMW separated from the CIO and rejoined the AFL during the war. Memorandum from the NFLU to the Robert Marshall Civil Liberties Trust, September 2, 1947, Reel 32, STFU Papers; letter from Walter Shoesmith to Kern County Board of Supervisors, February 21, 1949, Folder 6, Box 7, Ernesto Galarza, "Impact of Unionization of Farm Workers Upon Farm Organization and Management," Paper presented for the Western Farm Economics

Association, June 25, 1948, Davis, California, Folder 8, Box 9, both in EGP; Hall, et al, interview with Mitchell; Wise, et al, interview with Mitchell; Mitchell, "Race Relations in the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union," pg. 17; George Gallup, "70% of Farmers Oppose Lewis's Proposal to Organize Them, Gallup Poll Finds." *The New York Times*, May 6, 1942.

[152] Reports from Locals for March, May, and December, 1949, and March, 1950, Folder 4, Box 8; Minutes of Valley Organizing Council Meeting, Farmersville, June 19, 1949, Box 9, Folder 11; "Informe, Tercer Congreso General Ordinario, Confederación Proletaria Nacional, Noviembre 25-27, 1949," pg. 4, Box 19, Folder 6; Cleon O. Swayzee to Galarza, September 28, 1949, Folder 3, Box 23; Galarza, "Poverty in the Valley of Plenty: A Report on the Di Giorgio Strike." May 14, 1948, Folder 3, Box 35, all in EGP; U.S. House of Reps., Committee on Education and Labor, Special Investigation Sub-Committee No. 1, "Investigation of Labor Management," Nov. 12, 1949, pp. 608-609.

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[153] *The Los Angeles Sentinel*, December 20, 1945; Memorandum from Paul Murray to State Attorney General Robert Kenny, February 18, 1946, Folder 4, Box 6, LMP; Wands Riley, "Fontana Mystery," *Now*, January 1-15, 1946, Folder 3, Press Release, NAACP Los Angeles Branch, ca. January, 1946, Folder 4, both in Box 30, ACLU-SC; Davis, *City of Quartz*, pg. 399.

[154] Edward J. Escobar, *Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity: Mexican Americans and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1900-1945*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1999; Yolanda Broyles-González, *El Teatro Campesino: Theater in the Campesino Movement*. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1994, pp. 181-204; Eduardo Obregón Pagán, *Murder at the Sleepy Lagoon: Zoot Suits, Race, and Riot in Wartime L.A.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003; Luis Alvarez, *The Power of the Zoot: Youth Culture and Resistance during World War II*. University of California Press, 2008; Catherine S. Ramírez, *The Woman in the Zoot Suit: Gender, Nationalism, and the Cultural Politics of Memory*, Durham: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009; Elizabeth Escobedo, *From Coveralls to Zoot Suits: The Lives of Mexican American Women on the World War II Home Front*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013; Martha Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998; Darlene J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II*. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2012, pg. 5; Richard Cándida-Smith, *Improvised Continent: Pan-Americanism and Cultural Exchange*. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017.

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11, 1946, from Edward M. Gaffney to Earl Warren, May 27, 1946, Press Release, May 13, 1946, Folder 2367, letter from Lynn Hames to Earl Warren, April 1, 1946, Folder 2368, EWP.

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[226] Speech by Dean Acheson to Delta Council, "The Requirements of Reconstruction," Cleveland, Mississippi, May 8, 1947. The Department of State Bulletin, Volume XVII, Number 411, pp. 991-4. <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentid=8-8&pagenumber=4>. Accessed October 24, 2018; *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 177, No. 6 (June, 1946), pg. 3; Huggins, *Political Policing*, pp. 41-78; David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1999, pg. 145.

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[231] The Los Angeles Superior Court ruled in Opinion No. 500,075 on June 13, 1945, in the case of *Seth C. Swift & Laura D. Swift v. Charles L. Rodgers and Kathryn L. Rodgers* that the restrictive housing agreements against Native Americans was legal. Frederick Roberts ran against Douglas for Congress in 1946 and had first won election in 1934 as a Republican. He had authored the state's anti-lynching and anti-civil rights law as well as another law "preventing unjust suspension of school children on whim or prejudice," supported relief and unemployment acts, and was a founder of UCLA, which was shortly after "Communist agitators" had begun to "stir up trouble between the School Board and the colored citizens." One of those "agitators" was Loren Miller, whom John R. Williams debated at the Second Baptist Church. Respondents' Brief, L.A. No. 19759 in the Supreme Court of the State of California, Appeal from Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Judge Thurmond Clarke, pp. 22-24, Folder 2, Box 42, letters Paul P. O'Brien to Loren Miller, November 12, 1946, and from Herman E. Moore, Jr. to Loren Miller, Folder 1, and letters from Loren Miller to D.O. McGovney, July 30, 1946, from Eugene Kinckle Jones to Loren Miller, October 3 1946, Folder 2, letters from Sidney A. Jones, Jr. to Loren Miller, January 28, February 2, & February 21, 1946, Folder 4, all three folders located in Box 6, from Loren Miller to Robert C. Weaver, June 18, 1947, Folder 3, Box 7, letter from Loren Miller to Dr. Gerson, June 16, 1948, Folder 2, Box 8; "Motion and Brief for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as *Amicus Curiae*," No. 11,310 in the Ninth U.S. Circuit of Appeals, *Westminster School District of Orange County, et al. v. Gonzalo Mendez et al*." Folder 1, Box 42, Loren Miller, "Race Restrictions on Ownership or Occupancy of Land," *Lawyers Guild Review*, Vol VII, No. 3 (May-June, 1947), pp. 99, *The Los Angeles Daily Journal*, June 14, 1945, *The Los Angeles Age-Dispatch*, November 2, 1934, letter from John R. Williams to Frank A. Bouelle, October 8, 1934, and undated clipping of *The*

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[233] *The Pittsburgh Courier*, December 4, 1948; *The Los Angeles Evening Herald & Express*, December 2, 1949; Miller, "Relationship of Racial Residential Segregation to Los Angeles Riots;" letter from Loren Miller to James Q. Wilson, November 10, 1959, Folder 5, Box 41, Loren Miller and Stanley R. Malone, Jr. "Memorandum on Proposed Initiative Amendment in Reference to Sale or Rental of Housing," ca. 1964, Folder 2, Box 5, LMP; Minutes of the Housing Committee of the Los Angeles County Conference on Community Relations, August 28, 1950, Report of Sub-Committee to Study Discrimination in Private Housing Developments, September 6, 1950, California Teachers' Association in Los Angeles, "Facts About Segregation in Housing," Pamphlet prepared by the Housing Materials Subcommittee of the Los Angeles County Conference on Community Relations, ca. 1951, Folder 15, Box 1, SAS; Loren Miller, "Residential Segregation and Civil Rights;" *Barrows v. Jackson* (112 Cal. App. 2d 464 and 346 U.S. 249).

[234] The CIO's executive board sent notices of new rules As early as November 15, 1946, that state and local CIO councils must "confine their activities and statements to issues of local or state concern and to matters of general policy that have been passed upon by the national CIO" and authorized board president Phillip Murray of USA to "initiate proceedings upon the alleged violations" of these new rules. A press release from the Los Angeles CIO Council claimed that local unions of workers in clothing, electrical, farm equipment, fishing, food-processing, fur and leather, maritime, warehouse, oil, public-sector, shoe, transport service, and utilities industries all remained in the council. Both rank-and-file members and the executive board of ILWU Local 13 each refused a request from the CIO Women's Auxiliary, however, for financial assistance during the winter and spring of 1949, while international vice-president Robert Robertson told members at a meeting that "their local autonomy would not be interfered with in any way" and the executive board refused a different request from the state CIO council to contribute twenty-five dollars for a pamphlet "regarding the autonomy of each union of the CIO." *The FTA News*, May 15, 1947; *The Dispatcher*, March 5, April 2, 1948, January 7, 1949; Letters from E.S. Galvan to Phillip Murray, March 29, 1948, Louis R. Sherman to Phillip Murray, March 29, 1948, John Brophy to H.A. McKittrick, April 9, 1948, Folder 1, Resolution Passed by UAW Local 809 Executive Board on February 12, 1948, and by Membership on February 19, 1949, letter from Ernest Messinger and Slim Connolly to Brothers and Sisters, February 27, 1948, both in Folder 2, letters from Zula I. Ferguson to LANG Council Delegates, March 18, 1948, from Gus O. Brown to Brothers and Sisters, March 25, 1948, Ernest Messinger to USA Bethlehem Steel Local 1845 Grievance Committee, March 27, 1948, *The Local Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March, 1948), Folder 3, Minutes of the California National CIO-PAC Meeting, April 29, 1948, *The Guild Reporter*, May 14, 1948, *News from UOPWA*, July, 1948, Folder 4, Los Angeles CIO Council Press Release, ca. February, 1948, Folder 11, all in Box 4, SCP-UCLA; Minutes of ILWU Local 13 Executive Board Meetings, March 10, April 14, 28, May 12, July 14, 1949, Folder 1, Minutes of ILWU Local 13 Membership Meetings, January 6, March 17, April 7, 1949, May 19, 1949, Folder 2, Box 6, Series I, ILWU-13; Memorandum from Albert L. Lunceford to Regional Directors and Local Unions, September 19, 1949, Folder 16, Box 68, ATL; Leslie E. Claypool, "Central Labor Council Tells Candidate Endorsements," *The Los Angeles Daily News*, May 7, 1948; "Stop CIO-AFL Scabbing and Raiding NOW!" Flyer issued by the Los Angeles CIO Council, ca. 1948, Folder 17, Box 35, SCP.

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[236] Letters from Martha McMahan and J.E. MacFarland to Earl Warren, May 20, 1946, from Clarence H. Mickelson to Earl Warren, August 20, 1946, from Mrs. H. Altman to Earl Warren, September 24, 1946, from Lillian Schroyer to Earl Warren, September 26, 1946, from Hazel Akin to Earl Warren, October 1, 1946, from Angela Simone to Earl Warren, October 3, 1946, Folder 17412, EWP.

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[238] *The Dispatcher*, October 14, 1949; Letters from Beach Vasey to Michael J. McDonough, October 27, 29, November 2, 10, 22, 25, 29, December 2, 1949, Folder 2298, January 9, 12, February 9, 16, March 13, 15, 1950, Folder 2299, EWP; Memoranda from Albert T. Lunceford to Local Unions' Regional Directors and Council Delegates, November 29, 1950, Folder 18, Box 6, from the Greater Los Angeles CIO Council to Maywood, City Council, September 20, 1949, Alhambra City Council, October 3, 1949, "Comments on Results of Peacock Research Associates Housing Occupancy Survey, ca. 1950, Folder 16, Box 51, "A Brief History of the Los Angeles Tenants Council," 1950, Maxwell Miller, "Statement of the Los Angeles Tenants Council Before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee," 1950, Maxwell Miller, "Speaker's Manual," Los Angeles Tenants Council, ca. 1950, Folder 15, Box 61, "Summary of Findings of Peacock Survey," ca. 1950, Folder 4, Memorandum from B.C. Koepke to Donald A. Peters and Members of Los Angeles Area Rent Advisory Boards, March 23, 1950, Office of the Housing Expeditor Press Release, December 20, 1950, Folder 8, Box 63, all in ATL; "Attempt to Kill New 10,000 Public Housing Program in the Courts," Flyer issued by the Los Angeles Citizens Housing Council, ca. 1949, Folder 1, *California Housing*, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 15, 1948, Folder 7, Box 1, SAS; File No. 39092, September 27, 1949, "Resolution to Decontrol Rents in the City of Los Angeles," July 28, 1950, Folder 9, Box 28, SCP; *Tighe E. Woods v. Frank W. Babcock, et al.* (No. 10826) and *Maxwell Miller v. Frank W. Babcock, et al.* (No. 10827).

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Discloses State Support for FEPC Law," *The Los Angeles Times*, September 4, 1952; Memorandum from Albert T. Lunceford and John Dial, Jr. to Local Unions' Regional Directors, December 27, 1950, Folder 18, Box 42, ATL.

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248 Ibid.

249 *The New York Herald Tribune*, July 7, 1951; Milton Lewis, "U.S. Opening Drive on Reds on West Coast," *The New York Herald Tribune*, July 27, 1951, pg. 1; Memorandum from Betty Woodbury, November 7, 1951, Ladislao Cruz, "Arrests in Orange County," ca. October 17, 1951, Draft Resolution on the Cases of the Filipino-American Members of the Alaska Cannery Workers Union, Local 7-C, ILWU," ca. 1952, both in Folder 4, Box 69, ATL.

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[264] Wilkinson, "Redress of Grievances," Chapter Three, pp. 45-49; Wilkinson, "And Now the Bill Comes Due," pg. 11; Speech by Charlotta Bass, ca. 1945, Additional Box 1, CBP.

[265] Wilkinson, "Redress of Grievances," Chapter Three, pp. 49-61; Carlton E. Williams, *The Los Angeles Times*, October 29, 1952, pp. 1-2; Wilkinson, "And Now the Bill Comes Due," pg. 11, Public Statement by Eleanor Raymond, California Legislative Conference, October 28, 1952, Folder 13, Box 1; *Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles v. Mosier M. Meyer*, Los Angeles Superior Court, No.584,912, pp. 155-158, Folder 3, Box 2, both in Series III, letter from Frank Wilkinson to Charles Abrams, January 26, 1950, Folder 16, Box 1, Series IV, Subseries A, all in FWP; "Statement by Supervisor John Anson Ford, August 23, 1950, Folder 17, Box 68, ATL.

[266] "Report to the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Los Angeles County Conference on Community Relations, October 20, 1950, Folder 15, Box 1, SAS; Guy Endore, "'Justice for Salcido.'" Pamphlet published by the Civil Rights Congress of Los Angeles, July 1948, pg. 5, Folder 4, Box 5, CCCURIS; letter from Henry C. Coleman to Charlotta Bass, April 12, 1947, Additional Box 1, CBP; letter from Sidney Smith to James Burford, February 20, 1947, "The People vs Alfred Giles," circular issued by the NAACP San Pedro and Wilmington Branches, February 13, 1947, both in Folder 1, Box 25, SCP; Minutes of Meeting for the Board of Directors of the Council of Civic Unity, Hotel Mayan, June 30, 1947, Folder 12, Box 3, Series III, FWP.

[267] Proceedings of Statewide California Legislature Council, February 15-16, 1947, Sacramento, pp. 15-16, Folder 1, Box 1, SAS; Los Angeles CIO Council Press Release, May 6, 1947, Folder 29, Box 3, SCP; *The Dispatcher*, July 27, 1945.

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Chapter Six

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[298] *The Silver City Enterprise*, July 7, 28, September 15, 1933, June 19, 1934.

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[300] Reports from Tempest to Boyd, January 7 & February 7, 1936, THC.

[301] Kent Kludson interview with Angel Bustos, July 8, 1977, Folder 2, Box 27, Clinton Jencks Papers (CJP), Autobiography of Clinton Jencks, pp. 11-12; *The Silver City Enterprise*, June 16, August 11, 1933, November 9, 1934; interview with Terry Humble, April 30, 2017. For a study of mis-diagnosis of silicosis as “tuberculosis” among miners when Army turned Fort Bayard into a tuberculosis hospital, see Rosner, David and Gerald Markowitz, *Deadly Dust: Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease in Twentieth-Century America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

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[304] *La Voz del Río Grande*, February 23, May 18, July 24, 1934; *El Defensor del Pueblo*, March 8, 1935; *The Silver City Enterprise*, March 27, July 24, 1934; *The Gallup Independent*, July 21, 1934; *The Albuquerque Tribune*, July 22, 1934.

[305] *La Voz del Río Grande*, February 23 & December 29, 1934; *El Defensor del Pueblo*, August 2, 1935, April 3, 1936; letter from Taylor E. Julien to Arthur Seligman, April 29, 1933, Folder 156, Box 6, ASP.

[306] *La Opinión de Río Arriba County*, September 10, October 22, 1936; *El Defensor del Pueblo*, September 16, October 16, 1936. See letters from Laura Waggoner to Dennis Chavez, located in Folder 26, Box 84, DCP.

[307] *La Voz del Río Grande*, February 15, 1935; *El Defensor del Pueblo*, December 18, 1936; letters from Emitirio Sapello López to Dennis Chavez, October 19, 1936, and from Jóvita Quintana to Dennis Chavez, October 31, 1936, Folder 48, Box 1, DC

[308] *The Santa Fe New Mexican*, January 28 & March 4, 1937; *The Albuquerque Journal*, February 12, March 1, 4, 1937; *El Defensor del Pueblo*, February 26, April 8, 1937. *The Albuquerque Journal* reported that the legislature did not pass other bills that would limit interest rates to 2% (Salazar's bill), raise taxes on corporations, fund schools, establish a housing authority, and bonds for public courts, and address nepotism, while, according to *The Santa Fe New Mexican*, Representative Rudolfo Ortiz suggested that only the county relief administrator should be removed from their office. This debate also occurred shortly before another controversy over the water rights of NM and TX for the river in which Rio Arriba County state senator Delfin Salazar seized SB 234 to extend the ratification of the Rio Arriba compact bill until October. *The Albuquerque Journal*, February 12, 1937; *The Santa Fe New Mexican*, March 13, 1937.

[309] *The Santa Fe New Mexican*, March 22, April 6, 7, 13, 1937; *El Defensor del Pueblo*, March 26, April 9, 1937; *La Opinión de Río Arriba*, April 1 & 22, 1937; *The City Star*, April 8, 1937; *The Louisville Times*, April 7, 1937; *The Albuquerque Tribune*, April 8, 1937; Federico Arrellano, "A Petition for the Honorable Clyde Tingley," April 6, 1937; telegram from Albuquerque Democrats to Clyde Tingley, April 7, 1937, Folder 272, Box 13102, CTP.

[310] *El Defensor del Pueblo*, November 12, 26, December 10, 1937; *The Albuquerque Journal*, May 8 & 9, 1938; Forrest, *The Preservation of the Village*, pg. 153-155 & 167.

[311] *The CIO News*, January 29 & June 30, 1941; *The Union*, April 13, May 4, June 15, November 2 & 30, 1942; Dinwoodie, "The Rise of Mine-Mill Union in Southwestern Copper," pp. 5-6; letter from Harry Hafner to Ben Riskin, July 7, 1942, Box 166, Folder: Harry Hafner; telegram from Reid Robinson to Harry Hafner, June 29, 1942, Folder 16, Box 37, 890 Records. During the summer of 1943, the NLRB certified Local 485 as the bargaining representative for 11,000 employees of the Utah Copper Company's open-pit copper mine at Bingham Canyon. *The Union*, August 16, 1943.

[312] Baker, *On Strike and On Film*, pg. 55; Dinwoodie, "The Rise of Mine-Mill Union in Southwestern Copper," pg. 7; *The Silver City Daily Press*, April 17, 1941; letter from Harry Hafner to Reid Robinson, April 5, 1941, letters from Harry Hafner to Howard Goddard, September 2 & October 9, 1941, letters from Harry Hafner to Allan McNeil, March 31 & April 25, 1942, Folder 16, Box 37; letter from Arturo Mata to Howard Goddard, August 18, 1941, Folder 24, Box 35, all in 890 Records; *The Silver City Daily Press*, August 14, 1941; *The Silver City Daily Press*, May 27, 1942; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 1.

[313] *The Union*, January 18, December 6, 1943. Employees at the Peru mine also won paycheck deductions for life, death, and accident insurance.

[314] Horace Report to W.S. Boyd, April 11, 1944, THC; "Statement of Harry Hafner and Leo Ortiz to Forest G. Trimble, G. Jones Fleming, Barron B. Beshoar," El Paso, Texas, July 30, 1942, Folder 3, Box 41; Orville Larson to Jessica Rhine, May 24, 1943, Folder: Orville Larson; letters from Arturo Mata to Assistant to the President Allan D. McNeill, April 26, 1942, to Reid Robinson, August 16, 1943, and to Reid Robinson, March 8, 1944, Folder: Arturo Mata, Box 40, all in 890 Records; Baker, *On Strike and On Film*, pp. 59-63. For a study of workplace discrimination and the FEPC in the Southwest, refer to Emilio Zamora, *Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs: Mexican Workers and Job Politics during World War II*. College Station: The Texas A&M Press, 2009.

[315] Kludson interview with Angel Bustos; Horace Moses report to W.S. Boyd, February 7, 1944, THC.

[316] In a letter to Reid Robinson dated February 26, 1944, Leo Ortiz also reported that the AFL at Miami had refused to cooperate with the FEPC's investigations during the previous year. telegram from Allan D. McNeil to Leo Ortiz, September 18, 1942; letter from Leo Ortiz to Reid Robinson, February 26, 1943; Leo Ortiz, "Report on the

Bisbee Organizing Drive," July 1 & 28, 1943; Leo Ortiz, "Report on the Importance of the Miami Cases in Relation to the Organization and Consolidation of the Southwest," September 2, 1943; Leo Ortiz, "Report on Organization, October 4, 1943, Folder 3, Box 41, all in 890 Records.

[317] Reports from Moses to Boyd, March 22, July 13, & August 13, 1942, June 13, November 13, 1943, and to J.C. Kinnear, August, 1946; *The Silver City Daily Press*, July 9, 1942, April 14, 1944; *The Silver City Enterprise*, October 21, 1943, all in THC.

[318] *The Union*, July 31, 1950; letter from Arturo Mata to Dan Edwards, November 7, 1943, Folder: Arturo Mata, Box 40; letters from Robert Hallowwa to Graham Dolan, December 27, 1949, June 15, 1950, to Reid Robinson, February 7, 1950, to C.D. Smothermon and Orville Larson, May 18, 1950, and to C.D. Smothermon, July 15, 1950, and from Graham Dolan and Robert Hallowwa, June 12, 1950 & Report from Robert Hallowwa to Jim Clark on the Magma Copper Co. N.L.R.B. Election and Defeat of September 14, 1950, Folder: Robert Hallowwa, Box 76; letter from Bob Hallowwa to Nathan Witt, May 29, 1950, Folder: Local 586, Box 137, 890 Records.

[319] *The Union* reported on March 6, 1946, that the first joint strike of coal miners and steel workers in Alabama occurred in 1946. Kludson interview with Bustos; *The Union*, October 17, 1945, March 6, April 3, 1946; letter from Clinton Jencks to Morris Travis, December 6, 1947, Folder 10, Box 867; letter from Reid Robinson to Orville Larson, February 25, 1947, Folder 53, Box 43; "Facts Relative to Deportation Proceedings Brought Against Humberto Silex, ca. 1946, Folder 30, Box 54; letter from Clinton Jencks to M.E. Travis, February 18, 1951, Folder: Local 890 Correspondence 7-1-50 - 6-30-52, Box 147, all in 890 Records; *The People's World*, July 3, 1947; Jencks testimony to Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, October 8, 1952, pp. 163-4; Griffin Fariello, *Memories of an American Inquisition: An Oral History*, New York: Horton, 1995, pg. 381.

[320] Letter from John Clark to Augustin Guzman, July 21, 1948, Folder 46, Box 57; letters from Herbert Lerner to Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers Trade Union General Secretary Simon A. Kaluwa, September 24, 1952, Folder: African Miners' Union, Box 123; National Phelps Dodge Council Mine-Mill Bulletin, June 11, 1949, all in 890 Records; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Fifty Convention, Chicago, September 12-17, 1949, pg. 52. Eckert testified before Congress that Larson and Clark were not members of the Communist Party and that Clark had argued the union had been losing members due to officers' refusal to sign non-Comunist affidavits, Kenneth Eckert Testimony to Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, October 8, 1952, pp. 51-63.

[321] Local 890 Press Releases, September 9, 25, 1952; *The Union*, October 6, 1952; Christine Marin, "The Union, Community Organizing, and Civil Liberties: Clinton Jencks, *Salt of the Earth*, and Arizona Copper in the 1950s." *Seventh Annual Journal of the Mining History Association* (2000), pg. 6.

[322] Mine-Mill Secretary-Treasurer Jim Clark's Report to Mine-Mill's Executive Board at the CIO's Ninth Constitutional Convention in Boston from October 13-17, 1947, Chicago, November 3, 1947, Folder 4, Box 84, 890 records; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Fourth Annual Convention in San Francisco, September 13-17, 1948, pg. 11; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Fifth Annual Convention, pp. 261-2; Proceedings of the CIO's Convention in Portland, November 25, 1948, pg. 36; Federated Press release, November 2, 1949; *The Union*, July 18, September 12, 1949; open letter from Mine-Mill Local 890 E-Board to Dean Acheson, *The Silver City Enterprise*, July 5, 1951.

[323] "The Case Against Differentials," International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, June, 1952, pg. 4-5, Folder: Mine-Mill Facts, Box 872; letter from Ben Riskin to Ernesto Galarza, March 11, 1940, Folder: Ernesto Galarza, Box 166; letters from Humberto Silex to James J. Leary, July 12, 1946, Folder 11, Box 81; letters from Silex Defense Committee Chair Natalie Gross to Herman Clott, August 10 & September 20, 1947, Folder 31, Box 177; from Natalie Gross to Orville Larson, April 9, 1947, and from Orville Larson to Humberto Silex, May 12, 1947, Folder 53, Box 43, all in 890 records; *The CIO News*, March 18, 1940; *The Union*, April 11, 1949 & May 8, 1950; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Sixth Annual Convention in Denver, September 13-17, 1950, pg. 48.

[324] Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Sixth Annual Convention, pp. 82-3; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pg. 146.

[325] *The American Zinc Strike News*, May 14, July 29, September 27, 1949; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Fifth Annual Convention, pp. 22-3 & 84-8; *The Union*, September 12, 1949.

[326] Horace Moses report to W.S. Boyd, August 1947; reports from W.H. Goodrich to Kinnear, August 16, November 15, 1948 (the May 18 report indicated that at least one manager hired by the company was a manager), January 17, March 17, April 16, July 21, 1949; *The Silver City Daily Press*, June 18, July 7 & 9; August 12, 13, 20, and October 8, 1947; *The Silver City Daily Press*, August 13, October 13, November 1, 1949; letter from Clinton Jencks to Morris Travis, June 26, 1948, Folder 1, Box 867; letters from George Fyfe, Ramirez, and Campos to Frank Brown, December 31, 1949, from George Fyfe and Ramirez to Howard Winn, January 1, 1950, and from George Fyfe to Howard Winn, January 23, 1950, Folder: Kennecott Grievances; telegram from M.E. Travis to Paul B.

Saenz, August 1, 1947, Folder: Union Correspondence, both folders in Box 865, all in 890 Records. Herbert Biberman claimed Local 69 President Joe Morales was Native American. Biberman, *The Salt of the Earth*, pg. 65.

[327] These kinds of altercations at social events were not uncommon. Miners in El Paso moved their unsegregated dance to Juárez after law enforcement officers them with selling alcohol to minors and marijuana to Anglo-Americans. The father of ANMA's president, Alfredo Montoya, had been a smelter worker at Hurley and, according to his son, had received one-half the rate of pay as Anglo workers for the same position. Interview with Bustos; *The Silver City Daily Press*, May 5, 1949; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Convention, pg. 149; *Silver City Enterprise*, December 33, 1933; *The Union*, June 6, 1949; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Sixth Annual Convention, pp. 79 & 89.

[328] *The Silver City Daily Press*, April 18, 1949, February 21, 1950; *The Silver City Enterprise,* August 31, 1950, December 20, 1951; *The Union*, June 6, 1949, September 25, 1950; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 27.

[329] *The Silver City Daily Press*, June 23, 25, 27, 1949 and April 18, May 9, June 12, 1950; *Silver City Enterprise*, February 2, 8, 10, June 17, 1950; *The Union*, October 24, 1949, June 19, 1950; Reports from W.H. Goodrich to Louis Buchman, Dec. 11, 1950 & Jan. 6, 1951 (THC); letter from Carl B. Smith to A.S. & R. Strikers, May 26, 1950, and "Strike Settlement Agreement," June 16, 1950, Folder: AS&R Strike, Box 871, 890 Records; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Sixth Annual Convention, pg. 27. The local also had an unemployed committee, and at least one member, Arthur Flores, was a Navy veteran. See Minutes of Unemployed Committee, October 27, 1949, and Amalgamated Local 890, April 6, 1950, Books 8 & 9, Box 868, 890 Records.

[330] *The Union*, June 1, 29, 1942, November 7, 21, 1949; *The Silver City Daily Press*, May 17, 19, 22, 29, 1950; letter from John Clark, Orville Larson, and M.E. Travis to All A.S. & R. Locals, June 9, 1950, Folder: A.S. & R. Strike, Box 871, 890 Records; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 32.

[331] "Agreement of Friendship and Assistance," Hilton Hotel, Mexican City, December 12, 1945; letter from Juan Manuel Elizondo to Reid Robinson, December 19, 1945, letter from Reid Robinson to Juan Manuel Elizondo, May 16, 146, all in Folder: Mexican Miners Union, Box 152; "Agreement Made in the Meeting of Representatives of the IUMMS (CIO) and the Industrial Union of Mining and Metallurgical Workers of the Republic of Mexico," Mexico City, April 2, 1949, Folder 1, Box 867, letter from John Clark to Augustin Guzman, July 14, 1949, Folder 9, Box 264; "Report of Howard Goddard on the Political and Trade Union Situation in Mexico," November 12, 1952, Folder: Howard Goddard; letter from M.E. Travis to Silverio Alva, June 2, 1951, Folder: Silverio Alva, both in Box 92; Meeting Minutes for Local 890, May 4, June 25, 1950, ca. July/August, October 17 & 24, 1951, Book 9, Box 868; Sylvain Schnaittacher, "Report on Mexican Miners' Union," 1950, Folder 54, Box 48; H. Jordain, "Trade Unions International of Metal and Engineering Industries, Communication No. 4, October 14, 1950, Folder: World Federation of Trade Unions Correspondence, Box 123; and M.E. Travis, "Report to National Officers on Meeting with Augustin Guzman V. and Antonio Garcia Moreno, Mexico City, May 5, 1951, Folder: Mexican Miners Union (III), Box 122, all in 890 Records; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Fifth Annual Convention, pp. 52-4; *The Union*, July 3, 1950; Jencks, "Autobiography," pp. 52-3.

[332] Copy of Dennis Chavez speech to Congress, Washington, D.C., ca. July 17, 1947, Folder 32, Box 72; *The Answer*, July 25, 1947, pp. 1-3, Folder 16, Box 96, both in DCP.

[333] Dennis Chavez speech to Fighters for a Free Palestine at Madison Square Garden, New York City, May 13, 1948, Folder 50, Box 72, DCP; Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 168-74.

[334] Memorandum by Dennis Chavez, ca. spring, 1951, Folder 26, Box 74, DCP. For a comparative study on Israel's absorption of Palestinian Jews, see Ilan Pappé, "Zionism as Colonialism: A Comparative View of Diluted Colonialism in Asia and Africa." *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 107, No. 4 (2008), pp. 611-633.

[335] Address by Dennis Chavez to Hadassah's New Mexico Chapter, Albuquerque, New Mexico, May 6, 1951, Folder 23, Box 73, DCP; Zieger, *The C.I.O.*, pp. 294-5.

[336] Copy of Dennis Chavez address to U.S. President Truman, ca. 1951, Folder 26, Box 74, DCP; Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003; Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

[337] Copies of Dennis Chavez addresses to U.S. President Truman, ca. 1951, & April 4, 1952, Folder 26, Box 74, DCP.

[338] Ibid.

[339] Letter from C.D. Smotherman to Clinton Jencks, July 20, 1949, Folder 1, Box 867; Hanover Unit Meeting Minutes, December 17, 1948, Book 8; Amalgamated Bayard District Union (A.B.D.U.) Meeting Minutes, July 6, August 10, 1950, May 22, 24, October 17, 1951; Local 890 Executive Board Meeting Minutes, September 29, 1950, January, 1951, Book 9, Box 868, 890 Records. The local had already formed a peace committee during the summer

of 1950, and its first members included Art Flores, Albert Muñoz, and Joe Ramirez. 890 Membership Meeting Minutes, July 6 & September 21, 1950.

[340] *The Silver City Enterprise*, October 17, 1950; *The Union*, October 23, November 20, 1950; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pg. 65-6; Examiner Irving Rogisin, *Mine-Mill Local 890 v. the New Jersey Zinc Co.,* NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, Jan. 31, 1952, pp. 2-3 & 5, Folder 2, Box 30, CJP; Autobiography of Clinton Jencks, pg. 33. NLRB ordered KCC to pay employees for travel time in April of 1945. During contract negotiations on August 29, 1949, the Empire Zinc Company's representative, Francis, stated that the company's imperative was to lower costs, argued that wages do not need to comport with the cost of living, and denied the validity of the "purchasing power theory." Report from H. Moses to W.H. Boyd, Feb. 2, 1946; Minutes of Negotiating Meeting with Empire Zinc, August 29, 1949, Book 8, Box 868, 890 Records.

[341] Letter from Reid Robinson to Clinton Jencks, February 15, 1950, Folder 33, Box 48; 890 Membership Meeting Minutes, February 1, 1951, Book 9, Box 868, both in 890 Records; *Silver City Daily Press*, April 18, 1951; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 34; letter from C.D. Smothermon to Clinton Jencks, April 11, 1951, Folder 10, Box 27, CJP.

[342] Local 890 Meeting Minutes, May 5, September 28, 1950, Book 9, Box 868, 890 Records; *The Union Worker*, June, 1951; Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pg. 15; *The Silver City Daily Press*, June 7, 8, 12, 13, 1951; *The Silver City Enterprise*, July 5, 19, August 2, 1951; *The Union*, June 4, 18, July 16, 1951. New Jersey Zinc employees in Colorado and Michigan were already eligible for a pension plan. "Pension Plan: Highlights and Full Text," the New Jersey Zinc Company and Associated Companies," 1950, pg. 2, Folder 2, Box 30, CJP; *The Union*, January 29, 1951.

[343] Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pp. 64-6; Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pp. 2-3, 5-7, 9-10; *The Silver City Daily Press*, September 26, 1951. The union also argued to Rogosin that the company's refusal to negotiate nullified their right to invoke the NIRA. Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pg. 25.

[344] Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pp. 62-5; *The Silver City Daily Press*, June 13, 15, 16 1951; *The Silver City Enterprise*, June 14, 1951*;* *The Union*, July 2, 1951; Paco Martín del Campo group interview with Rachel Juárez, Willie Andazola, and Terry Humble, April 30, 2017.

[345] Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pp. 10, 16; Jencks, "Autobiography," pp. 38-41; *The Silver City Daily Press*, June 16, 19, 1951; interview with Juárez, Bustos, and Humble; Biberman, *The Salt of the Earth*, pp. 63-4.

[346] Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pg. 14, 19, 23; Biberman, *The Salt of the Earth*, pp. 63-64; group interview with Juarez, Andazola, and Humble.

[347] *The Silver City Enterprise*, June 15, 1951; *Gallup Independent*, Oct. 4, 1933, Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pp. 5-8; group interview with Juarez, Anzadola, and Humble.

[348] Letter from Cipriano Montoya and Ernesto Velázquez to New Mexico Attorney General Joe L. Martinez, September 15, 1951, Envelope 2, Box 873, 890 Records; Local 890 Press Release, August 23, 1951; *The Union*, August 27, 1951; group interview with Juárez, Anzadola, and Humble.

[349] *The Union*, June 4, 1951; 890 Membership Meeting Minutes, May 22, 1951, Book 9, Box 868; *The Silver City Daily Press*, June 16, July 11, 1951; *The Silver City Daily Press*, July 13, 1951; "Peace: Announcing the Greatest Crusade in the History of America, ca. 1951, Folder: Political Action, Box 870, all in 890 Records; Howard Fast, "Peace Congress - U.S.A.," *March of Labor*, No. 7 (August 1952), pg. 25; *Silver City Enterprise*, July 19, 1951.

[350] *The Silver City Daily Press*, July 14, 1951; Local 890 Radio and Press Release, July 24, 1951.

[351] *The Silver City Daily Press*, July 17, 1951; *The Union*, July 21, 195

[352] *The Silver City Daily Press*, July 21, 23, 24 1951; Local 890 Press Release, July 27, 1951; Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pg. 20.

[353] Letter from S.J. Parker to the *Silver City Daily Press*, August 2, 1951; Sonia Melitta Diaz Montoya, "Voicing Solidarity: The Ladies' Auxiliary and the Retelling of the Empire Zinc Strike," M.A. Thesis, UT Austin, 2006, pg. 2-3; Copy of "Criminal Complaint," *State of New Mexico vs. Cipriano Montoya*, Deposition, October 2, 1952, "Cipriano Montoya," ca. 1952; *The San Francisco Chronicle*, July 29, 1961; *The Silver City Daily Press*, July 26, 1961; newspaper clipping, all in Folder 30, Box 27, CJP.

[354] Bob Hallowwa, "Semi-Monthly Report of International Representatives," November 30, 1950, letter from Clinton Jencks to Leo Ortiz, January 6, 1951, Box 147, Folder: Local 890 Correspondence 7-1-50 - 6-30-52, Box 147; Local 890 Press Releases, August 17, 18, 1951; Local 890 E-Board Meeting Minutes, August 21, 21, 1951, Book 9, Box 868, all in 890 Records; Local 890 Press Releases, August 13, 23, 1951.

[355] *The Silver City Daily Press*, August 21, 22, 29, 1950; *The Union*, August 27, 1951; Local 890 Press Release, August 30, 1951; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pg. 67; Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pg. 11.

[356] Steelworkers at the Balmat & Edward Mines of New York owned by the St. Joseph Lead Company struck the following month. Local 890 Press Releases, August 23, 25, 31, 1951; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pg. 67; A.B.D.U. Meeting Minutes, October 24, 1951, Book 9, Box 868, 890 Records; Rogosin, NLRB Case No. 33-CB-21, pp. 9 & 25-7; *The Silver City Daily Press*, August 1, 8, 15, 16, 17, 23, 1951; *The Silver City Enterprise*, September 13, 1951; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 41; "Record of Strikes," ca. Winter of 1953-4, Folder 12, Box 105, CJP.

[357] Larson negotiated with KCC without other members of Mine-Mill's E-Board present as late as July of 1951. John Clark's testimony to Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, October 8, 1952, pg. 181; *Silver City Enterprise*, September 13, 1951; 890 Membership Meeting Minutes, July 19, 1951, Book 9, Box 868; NLFE, BRT, & IAM Request for Compensation Adjustment, ca. October/November, 1951, Envelope 2, Box 873, 890 records; *The Silver City Daily Press*, August 31, September 4, 5, 7, 13, 1951; *The Union*, September 24, 1951.

[358] Letter from G.S. Peissler to Dennis Chavez, May 7, 1951, Folder 3, Box 23, DCP; Proceedings of Mine-Mill's Forty-Seventh Annual Convention, pp. 63-4; Financial Report of the Empire Zinc Strike at Hanover, New Mexico, Period: October 17, 1950 to May 16, 1951, Folder 9, Box 27, CJP. Members of Local 890's E-Board had opposed holding the convention in Nogales due to the allegedly prevalence of vice, lack of industrial unions, bitterness over the loss of a miners' strike at Patagonia, and the increased number of border patrols at the border with the Mexican state of Sonora. Letter from Local 890 Executive Board Members to Mine-Mill National Officers, ca. 1950/1, Folder 1, Box 867, 890 Records.

[359] Local 890 Membership Meeting Minutes, October 17, 1951, Book 9, Box 868, 890 Records; *The Silver City Daily Press*, September 10, 13, 14, 18, 27, December 8, 10, 11, 1951; *The Silver City Enterprise*, September 20, October 4, December 13, 20, 27, 1951; *The Union*, September 24, 1951; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 46.

[360] *The Silver City Daily Press*, October 20, November 1, 2, 4, 6, 14, 18, 28, 1951; *The Union*, October 8, December 3, 1951. Empire Zinc miners at Gilman agreed to return to work during early December for wages of $1.45 for laborers and $1.75 for miners. Letter from Leo Ortiz to Clinton Jencks, December 8, 1951, Folder 75, Box 49, 890 Records.

[361] Local 890 Press Release, August 5, 1951; *The Union*, December 17, 1951; *The Silver City Daily Press*, August 6, September 27, December 6, 1951; *The Silver City Enterprise*, December 27, 1951, January 3, 1952; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 47; W.H. Goodrich report to Louis Buchman, October 13, 1952, THC.

[362] "Strike Settlement Agreement," 890 Records, Folder 2, Box 30, Folder 2, 890 Records; *The Silver City Daily Press*, January 24, 25, 1952; *The Union*, January 28, 1952; Jencks, "Autobiography," pg. 48.

[363] Local 890 Press Release, May 14, 1952; *The Silver City Enterprise*, March 20, April 17, 1952; *The Silver City Daily Press*, January 16, March 10, 11, April 18, 1952; *The Union*, March 24, June 2, December 1, 1952; Local 890 Press Release, November 15, 1952.

[364] Group interview with Juárez, Anzadola, and Humble.

[365] Ibid.

Conclusion

[366] Isabel González, "Step-Children of a Nation: The Status of Mexican Americans." Report to Panel on Discrimination of the National Conference for Protection of Foreign Born, Cleveland, Ohio, October 25-6, 1947, Folder 9, Box 5, CCCURIS.

[367] Ibid.

[368] Karen Isaksen Leonard, *Making Ethnic Choices: California's Punjabi Mexican Americans*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, pp. 168-9; *The California Eagle*, January 28, 1943.

Appendix A

District	President	Secretary
Colorado Locals		
Brighton	Quirino Pacheco	Juan Martínez
Longmont	N/A	N/A
Brush	José Cervantes	Juan García
Fort Morgan	Manuel Urquisa	Francisco L. García
Gill	Alfonso Mejía	Benito Flores
Hudson	Mike Martinez	Luis Mansanarez
Eaton	N/A	Pedro M. Rodríguez
Kersey	Agustín Gallegos	Antonio Fernández
Fort Collins	Manuel Dominguez	Jose B. Valdéz
Frederick	Rafael Herrejón	N/A
Platteville	Meregildo Colunga	José M. Velázquez
Avondale	Eugenio Romero	Fidencio Esquival
Johnstown	Pablo Mass	Magdalene L. García
Las Animas	Jesús María Aguilera	Refugio Alvarez
Lamar	Demetrio Bustes	Rafael Livas
Granada	Jesús Romo	Narciso Reyes
Ordway	J.E. Armendaris	Ismael Carrasco
Kennesburg	José M. García	N/A
East Lake	Pedro Márquez	Juan Nieto
LaSalle	Juan Olmedo	Maximino Rivera
Denver	Manuel Alvarado	Fructuoso Roel
Louisville	Luis Sumaran	Manuel García
Delta	Encarnación Méndez	Angel Rivas
Montrose	Felipe Negrete	Liberato Luján
Grand Junction	Leandro B. Guillén	Antonio García
Crook	P.A. Lucero	Alejo Cabrera
Sedgwick	Eusebio Velasco	Mariano Aguajo
Berthoud	Roque Vigil	N/A
Mead	Alejandro González	Anselmo Leal
Fort Lupton (headquarters)	Don González	Filemón Durán
Kansas		

Garden City	Dario Zaragoza	Manuel García
	Nebraska	
Scotts Bluff	José C. Quevedo	Agustín García
Minature	Luis W. Vera	Bartolo Aguilar
Lyman	Juvencio R. Aragón	M. Parada
Bayard	Geronimo Pérez	Aurelio Jaramillo
Mitchell	José M. Ramírez	N/A
	Wyoming	
Torrington	Agustín Gutiérrez	Federico Muñoz
Whitland	Baltazar Guillén	N/A