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A Survey of Potential Jurors' Perceptions of Interrogations and Confessions

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Confessions represent one of the most influential types of evidence, and research has shown that mock jurors often fail to dismiss unreliable confession evidence. However, recent studies suggest that jurors might believe in the false confession phenomenon more than they once did. One possible reason for this could be increased publicity regarding false confession cases. To assess this possibility, we administered an extensive online survey to a sample of potential jurors in the United States from 11 universities and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Perceptions of confession behaviors (as related to others and oneself), Miranda waivers, interrogation methods, dispositional risk factors, and confession admissibility and evidentiary weight were assessed, in addition to respondents' self-reported crime-media activity and familiarity with disputed confession cases. Respondents' perceptions were generally consistent with empirical research findings. Respondents believed suspects do not understand their Miranda rights; gauged interrogation tactics usage relatively accurately; viewed psychologically coercive tactics as coercive and more likely to result in false, rather than true, confessions; and recognized that confessions elicited via coercive measures should be inadmissible as evidence in court. However, respondents' perceptions did not align with research on interrogation length, and respondents did not fully appreciate the risk youth poses in interrogations. Moreover, being familiar with disputed confession cases resulted in more negative views of interrogations and confessions. Overall, potential jurors are seemingly more cognizant of false confessions and the tactics that elicit them than in the past, and evidence suggests that media outlets can be used to promote interrogation and confession knowledge.

Keywords: interrogation, confession, juror, Miranda rights

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000182.supp

Of 125 known false confession cases, 37 cases were presented at trial (note: the remaining cases did not make it to trial for various reasons such as dismissals or guilty pleas; Drizin & Leo's, 2004). Consequently, 81% of these 37 cases resulted in a wrongful conviction, meaning 30 innocent people were wrongfully sentenced to serve time in prison on the basis of a confession that was factually false. These false confessions traveled unchecked throughout the investigative process from the interrogation room to the courtroom where a panel of jurors deemed the false confessors guilty. In these cases, all of the safeguards intended to either prevent false confessions in the first place or to minimize their influence failed.

Past research indicates that false confessions result from various situational and dispositional risk factors (for a review, see Kassin et al., 2010), and despite demonstrations of false confessions in case studies (e.g., Drizin & Leo, 2004) and laboratory research (e.g., Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), people have historically found it difficult to believe that innocent suspects would confess to crimes they did not commit (Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008). However, recent experimental studies indicate that potential jurors' confession knowledge may have improved (e.g., Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). Assessing these possibly shifting beliefs is the primary goal of the present study, in which we gathered current data regarding lay knowledge of a broad range of interrogations and confessions topics and assessed potential predictors of this knowledge (e.g., familiarity with actual disputed confession cases).

A Brief Background: Interrogations, Confessions, and Jurors

Miranda

Even before questioning begins, innocent suspects encounter risk, as they are more likely than guilty suspects to waive their Miranda rights and undergo police questioning (e.g., Kassin and Norwick, 2004, found that 81% of innocent suspects accused of a mock crime waived their rights, compared with a mere 36% of guilty suspects). This is presumably due to innocent suspects' naïve belief that "the power of their own innocence [will] set them free" (Kassin, 2005, p. 218). Although this innocence-waiving association is generally accepted in the field, jurors' perceptions of these Miranda-related decisions have not been extensively examined (only one study briefly examined potential jurors' Miranda perceptions; Chojnacki, Cicchini, & White, 2008). This is an important gap to address because even if jurors are not presented with attorney arguments centered on Miranda issues, they still may use their own perceptions of Miranda when making verdict decisions.

False Confession Risk Factors

Once inside the interrogation room, innocent suspects are at risk of falsely confessing because of the accusatory and psychologically coercive nature of the tactics typically used in U.S. interrogations (e.g., Leo, 1996)—a risk that jurors might not fully appreciate (e.g., Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Psychologically coercive tactics minimize suspects' perception of their freedom of choice and can increase the likelihood of false confessions, and such tactics are more likely to be used when investigators believe a suspect is guilty (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003; Narchet, Meissner, & Russano, 2011). Coercive tactics can be highly detrimental, as researchers have demonstrated that tactics such as false evidence ploys (i.e., fabricating incriminating evidence; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), bluffs (i.e., indicating that potentially incriminating evidence exists; Perillo & Kassin, 2011), and minimization (e.g., diminishing the severity of the crime; Russano et al., 2005) decrease the ratio of true to false confessions (i.e., diagnosticity). Fortunately, jurors appear in-tune with the coercive nature of such tactics; however, this is undermined by findings that demonstrate that jurors do not believe that these coercive tactics are likely to result in false confessions (e.g., Leo & Liu, 2009).

Additionally, dispositional risk factors that enhance susceptibility to coercive techniques can further increase the likelihood that suspects falsely confess, with juveniles emerging as a particularly vulnerable population (e.g., Drizin & Leo, 2004; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Other dispositional risk factors include low IQ, cognitive or developmental disabilities, and mental illness (see Kassin et al., 2010, for a review on situational and dispositional risk factors). Generally, jurors appear to understand that such risk factors have the propensity to result in false confessions (e.g., Henkel et al., 2008).

Jurors' Beliefs and Use of Confession Evidence

Once a confession is elicited, interrogators may mold the post-admission narrative into a script that fits their knowledge of the crime and the existing evidence (e.g., Appleby, Hasel, & Kassin, 2011; Garrett, 2010). This can ultimately help the prosecution build theories that address confession-evidence inconsistencies, which in turn prompts mock jurors to view confessors as more culpable and increases conviction rates (Appleby & Kassin, 2016). Furthermore, confessions can be legitimized via corroboration inflation, as other evidence (e.g., forensic and eyewitness evidence) can become biased by the presence of a confession, subsequently appearing to substantiate false confessions (Kassin, 2012). Such inflation can influence jurors' perceptions of confession evidence, as potential jurors have been shown to perceive high-pressure interrogations as less coercive when evidence corroborated the confession (Shaked-Schroer, Costanzo, & Berger, 2015).

Overall, research on jurors' perceptions of interrogations and confessions has indicated that confessions are extremely powerful pieces of evidence that increase the likelihood of conviction (e.g., Brimbal & Jones, 2018; Kassin & Neumann, 1997). High conviction rates in the presence of a confession persist regardless of whether the confession was elicited via coercive means or deemed inadmissible by a judge (e.g., Henkel, 2008; Kassin & Sukel, 1997)—alarming findings considering U.S. courts expect jurors to be able to accurately recognize and dismiss coerced confessions (*Arizona v. Fulminante*, 1991). Survey studies regarding potential jurors' perceptions of interrogations and confession evidence might shed some light on such trends. While potential jurors do acknowledge that false confessions can sometimes occur, they generally agree that a confession is a strong indicator of a person's guilt and that people who confess are probably guilty (Henkel et al., 2008). These beliefs may be driven by the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), whereby people are more likely to

attribute others' behaviors to dispositional factors (e.g., the suspect's internal feelings of guilt) at the expense of considering the influence of situational factors (e.g., psychologically coercive interrogation methods; Blandón-Gitlin, Sperry, & Leo, 2010). The fundamental attribution error helps explain why mock jurors were more likely to discount coerced confessions made by suspects who have characteristics/disorders beyond their control, such as juveniles (and especially juveniles with disabilities; Najdowski & Bottoms, 2012) and suspects with medical conditions (but not mental anxiety disorders, potentially due to the negative attributions people make about people with mental illnesses; Henkel, 2008). Overall, potential jurors have appeared unable to make the connection that psychologically coercive interrogation tactics can enhance the likelihood that an elicited confession is false. However, there are indications that this could be changing.

Are Jurors' Perceptions Changing?

Recent studies examining mock jurors' perceptions of confession evidence have suggested that jurors might be more cognizant of false confessions than they once were. Woestehoff and Meissner (2016) found that mock jurors were sensitive to false confession risk factors. Interestingly, reduced conviction rates stemmed from participants attributing confessions to situational influences when the interrogation was characterized by medium or high interrogative pressure. In contrast, participants attributed confessions to dispositional attributions (i.e., guilt) when there was low interrogative pressure to confess. Furthermore, it appears that jurors are also considering and incorporating the content of confession evidence into their decision making (e.g., Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer, Button, Barnett, & Brewer, 2016).

Although these findings are promising, they conflict with the majority of past research on mock juror evaluations of confession evidence (e.g., Kassin & Sukel, 1997) and with other recent studies. For example, one recent study found that mock jurors are still strongly swayed by confession evidence: participants were more likely to convict when presented with a confession, regardless of how the confession was elicited or whether expert testimony was presented (Jones & Penrod, 2016). Given these conflicts in the literature, potential jurors' perceptions of interrogations and confessions should be reassessed to clarify their core understanding of interrogation and confession phenomenon, which can help to better interpret experimental findings.

Why Might Have Juror Perceptions Changed?

As suggested by Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), jurors' knowledge may have improved as a function of exposure to high-profile disputed confession cases. Such cases have garnered substantial media attention in recent years. For example, the cases of Brendan Dassey, Amanda Knox, and the Central Park Five resulted in popular documentaries and substantial media coverage. Informing Woestehoff and Meissner's hypothesis, Henkel and colleagues (2008) found that exposure to false confession media was related to weaker beliefs that confessions are strong indicators of guilt. This relationship is not surprising, considering prior research on the relationship between jurors' attitudes and crime-related media. Specifically, research on the "CSI Effect" indicates that viewers of forensic science focused TV programs tend to be more critical of presented forensic evidence than nonviewers (i.e., find it less believable), yet this attitude difference does not appear to significantly affect verdict decisions (e.g., Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). It should be noted, however, that research on crime-related media is primarily correlational, and it is possible that those who hold certain legal beliefs are more likely to watch crime-related media.

This media-exposure hypothesis is also consistent with the availability heuristic, which posits that people tend to determine the probability of events based on how easily applicable instances come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Jurors exposed to greater amounts of crime-related media should more readily accept that some interrogation methods are coercive and believe that false confessions exist because cases supporting this belief should more easily come to mind. This effect could be even more apparent for those who are familiar with specific disputed confession cases and not just exposed to crime media in general.

The Present Study

In the decade since the publication of the general juror interrogation and confession knowledge surveys (i.e., Henkel et al., 2008; Leo & Liu, 2009), it appears that juror knowledge might have shifted. Although other survey data have been published since then (e.g., Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer, & Vinson, 2010; Jones & Brimbal, 2017), these surveys have been fairly narrow in scope, as opposed to more comprehensively evaluating general perceptions of interrogations and confessions. Thus, the present study aimed to examine potential jurors' perceptions of interrogations and confessions more generally in order to offer researchers and practitioners better (and updated) insight on potential jurors' core knowledge of these topics. Such an assessment is crucial for determining the effectiveness of juries as safeguards against conviction based on unreliable confession evidence. Furthermore, the present study sought to enhance the generalizability of results by systematically recruiting a large sample from across the United States. Note that this improves upon past studies' samples, which were regionally restricted (e.g., Henkel et al., 2008) or substantially smaller than the current sample (e.g., Costanzo et al., 2010).

In light of recent findings (e.g., Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016), we expected to see a shift in knowledge as compared with past surveys (e.g., Henkel et al., 2008; Leo & Liu, 2009). Additionally, we hypothesized that those familiar with popularized disputed confession cases would express different views regarding interrogations and confessions (e.g., belief that false confessions occur, that false evidence ploys are coercive), as compared with those unfamiliar with disputed confession cases.

Method

Participants

A total of 968 participants completed the study. The student subsample ($n = 768$) was collected from 11 university sites, with at least one site representing each of the U.S. Census Bureau defined regions (i.e., New England and Middle Atlantic subregions of the Northeast; the East North Central and West North Central subregions of the Midwest; the South Atlantic, East South Central,

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and West South Central subregions of the South; and the Mountain and Pacific subregions of the West). These participants were recruited via their respective institutions' mechanism of rewarding credit for research participation (e.g., Sona Systems), and each institution recruited between 63 and 79 participants. The community member subsample ($n = 200$) was collected via Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and participants earned $1 for participation. Ethics board approval was obtained at all data collection sites before commencement of the study.

Recruitment posts indicated that participants should meet jury eligibility requirements (i.e., U.S. citizens, be 18 years or older, speak fluent English) to participate. Participants who failed to meet these criteria, but participated regardless, were excluded (34 students and 10 community members were excluded). Exclusions were also made for failing more than one of 13 attention check questions (86 students and 13 community members were excluded). Thus, the final student subsample included 648 participants and the final community member subsample included 177 participants, for an overall sample size of 825 participants. Participant demographics are presented in Table 1.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed the survey online via Qualtrics.[1] After consenting to participate, respondents were asked questions regarding six topics: general perceptions of confessions (as related to others and oneself), Miranda waivers, perceptions of interrogation methods (including frequency of police use, coerciveness, and relation to true and false confessions), perceptions of the relationship between dispositional risk factors and false confessions, admissibility of confessions and weight of evidence in verdict decisions, and personal characteristics (e.g., crime media engagement and familiarity with disputed confession cases) and demographics. These groups of questions were always presented in the same order.

The survey consisted of a combination of questions derived from past surveys (i.e., Henkel et al., 2008; Leo & Liu, 2009) and new questions developed by the research team (see online supplemental material for the survey tool). Several key terms were explained for participants. The provided definition for *coerciveness* was

> something is coercive if it tends to remove an individual's perception of their freedom to make a meaningful choice. In other words, the less a suspect feels s/he has a choice as to whether or not to do what is being asked (i.e., confess) the more coercive an interrogation method is.

In addition, we described Miranda rights and the "waiving" of those rights to respondents as

> the set of constitutional rights to silence and counsel that a suspect in custody is entitled to (e.g., right to remain silent, right to an attorney). Police are supposed to inform suspects in custody about these rights before questioning them. If a suspect speaks to the police after they are informed of their Miranda rights that means they have waived their rights.

Question specifics are described with the results below and in tables. The majority of questions were scaled, with scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree* or *not at all*) to 5 (*strongly agree* or

extremely).[2] Other question types included slider responses (e.g., for percentages) and multiple choice. All questions, other than demographics, were forced response. Additionally, 13 attention check questions (e.g., "Select 2 for this question") were dispersed throughout the survey to ensure participants were not mindlessly responding.

Results

Given the large quantity of descriptive data, means and standard deviations are generally reported in tables only. Some results are summarized by noting the proportion of respondents who agreed, or disagreed, with a statement; *agreement* was defined as a 4 or 5 on the five-point scale, and *disagreement* was defined as 1 or 2 on the five-point scale. All findings discussed in the text pertain to the overall sample. Differentiations between the student subsample and the MTurk community member subsample for sets of related variables were assessed using Bonferroni-corrected independent samples *t* tests, and only significant differences are reported. These results are displayed in tables only because subsample differences were not the main focus of the present study. Additionally, Bonferroni corrections were applied whenever multiple analyses were conducted (e.g., a series of analysis of variance [ANOVAs] for a related set of variables). The critical alphas as determined by Bonferroni corrections are reported in each section. Note that we employed series of ANOVAs rather than using multivariate analyses of variance because although sets of variables were topically related, they did not conceptually form a single, cohesive measure (Field, 2009).

General Perceptions of Confessions

Four overarching perceptions of confessions were examined: confessions as an indicator of guilt, likelihood of false confessions, mental illness/physical torture as reasons for false confessions, and estimated false confession rates (see Table 2). Over half (58.1%) of respondents demonstrated agreement with the statement that suspects who have confessed are probably guilty. However, respondents also generally agreed that suspects might confess to crimes that they did not commit (i.e., falsely confess; 62.9% of respondents indicated agreement). Additionally, over half (57.1%) of respondents disagreed with the statement that the only reason for false confession, other than being mentally ill, is being physically tortured. Lastly, on average, respondents estimated that 30.25% ($SD = 19.34$) of innocent suspects who are interrogated end up falsely confessing.

Perceptions of reasons for falsely confessing. We examined participants' agreement that oneself and a criminal suspect (i.e., someone else) might falsely confess in general and might falsely confess for three specific reasons. The specific reasons were exemplars derived from three recognized false confessor categories: (1) to protect someone else (voluntary), (2) being pressured or manipulated by the police (coerced-compliant), and (3) internaliz-

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[1] At one site, consent was collected in person, but the survey was still administered via Qualtrics.
[2] Leo & Liu (2009) used five-point scales and Henkel et al. (2008) used a mix of five- and seven-point scales; we used five-point scales throughout the present survey for consistency.

Table 1

Demographic Characteristics of the Student and Community Member Subsamples, and of the Overall Sample

Characteristic	Students ($n = 648$)	Community members ($n = 177$)	Overall ($N = 825$)
Age			
M (SD)	20 (4)	37 (12)	23 (9)
Mdn	19	33	19
Range	18–65	20–72	18–72
Gender			
Male	22.8%	49.7%	28.6%
Female	77.2%	50.3%	71.4%
Ethnicity			
African American/Black (non-Hispanic)	6.6%	6.8%	6.7%
Asian	5.2%	4.5%	5.1%
Hispanic/Latino (White)	11.9%	8.5%	11.2%
Hispanic/Latino (non-White)	4.3%	4%	4.2%
Native American/Alaskan Native	.9%	.6%	.8%
White	65.1%	74.6%	67.2%
Multiracial	4.5%	.6%	3.6%
Other	1.4%	.6%	1.2%
Highest level of education			
Some high school	.5%	.6%	.5%
High school diploma/GED	35.5%	13%	30.7%
Some technical college	2.3%	8.5%	3.6%
Technical college degree	.9%	7.3%	2.3%
Some college	58.5%	20.9%	50.4%
Bachelor's degree	2.0%	34.5%	9.0%
Some graduate school		2.8%	.6%
Graduate school degree	.3%	12.4%	2.9%

Note. GED = graduate equivalency diploma.

ing guilt (coerced-internalized; Kassin, 1997; see Table 3 for descriptives and statistical results). Paired *t* tests comparing respondents' scores as related to themselves versus others confessing revealed that respondents agreed to a greater extent that someone else would falsely confess than they themselves would ($d = 1.25$).

This pattern emerged for all three reasons for false confession ($ds = 1.35, .90$, and $.84$, respectively).

Perceptions of Miranda waivers. Table 4 displays descriptives for questionnaire items regarding Miranda warnings. Respondents generally disagreed that suspects fully understand their Mi-

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Respondents' General Confession Perceptions

Questionnaire item by sample	M	SD	% say 1	% say 2	% say 3	% say 4	% say 5
If someone has confessed to a crime, they are probably guilty.							
Students	3.52	.88	2.8	8.6	32.3	46.9	9.4
Community members	3.69	.94	2.8	7.3	25.4	46.9	17.5
Overall	3.55	.90	2.8	8.4	30.8	46.9	11.2
Criminal suspects might confess to a crime they did not commit (i.e., falsely confess).							
Students	3.72	1.03	3.4	8.6	24.4	39.7	23.9
Community members	3.64	1.03	3.4	10.2	26.0	39.5	20.9
Overall	3.70	1.03	3.4	9.0	24.7	39.6	23.3
Other than being mentally ill, the only other reason for a suspect to falsely confess is if he/she is being physically tortured.							
Students	2.48	1.44	35.5	22.2	14.7	14.0	13.6
Community members	2.53	1.35	29.4	25.4	20.3	13.0	11.9
Overall	2.49	1.42	34.2	22.9	15.9	13.8	13.2
In your opinion, what percentage of all innocent people who are arrested and interrogated falsely confess?[*]							
Students	32.13%	18.83					
Community members	23.35%	19.68					
Overall	30.25%	19.34					

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).
[*] Students and community members' estimates differed (critical cut-off at $p = .0125$), $t(823) = 5.45, p < .001, d = .46$, 95% CI [$-.83, 1.76$].

Table 3

Descriptives and Comparison Statistics for Respondents' Perceptions of Reasons for Falsely Confessing

Questionnaire item by sample	Other				Self				Comparison statistic for other vs. self
	M	SD	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M	SD	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	
Might confess to a crime [they/you] did not commit (i.e., falsely confess)									
Students	3.72	1.03	12.0	63.6	2.10	1.12	64.7	13.0	$t(647) = 31.67$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.31$, 95% CI [1.19, 1.43]
Community members	3.64	1.03	13.6	60.5	2.14	1.22	61.6	15.3	$t(176) = 13.46$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.11$, 95% CI [.89, 1.33]
Overall	3.70	1.03	12.4	62.9	2.11	1.15	64.0	13.5	$t(824) = 34.10$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.25$, 95% CI [1.15, 1.36]
Might confess to crimes [they/you] know [they/you] did not commit to protect someone else (family member, fellow gang member)									
Students	4.26	.78	2.8	86.3	2.85	2.85	40.1	33.3	$t(647) = 26.31$, $p < .001$, $d = .93$, 95% CI [.82, 1.04]
Community members	4.17	.81	3.4	83.1	2.84	2.84	39.5	34.5	$t(176) = 12.42$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.27$, 95% CI [1.05, 1.50]
Overall	4.24	.79	2.9	85.6	2.85	2.85	40.0	33.6	$t(824) = 29.05$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.35$, 95% CI [1.24, 1.46]
Might confess to crimes [they/you] know [they/you] did not commit because [they/you] are pressured or manipulated by police*									
Students	3.61	1.15	18.2	58.6	2.52	1.33	52.2	27.6	$t(647) = 31.67$, $p < .001$, $d = .83$, 95% CI [.72, .95]
Community members	3.86	1.06	10.2	67.2	2.41	1.25	55.4	22.6	$t(176) = 14.25$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.17$, 95% CI [.95, 1.40]
Overall	3.67	1.13	16.5	60.5	2.50	1.32	52.8	26.5	$t(824) = 23.62$, $p < .001$, $d = .90$, 95% CI [.80, 1.00]
Might confess to crimes [they/you] did not commit because [they/you] come to believe (at least for a little while) that [they/you] actually did commit the crime									
Students	3.19	1.09	28.4	40.7	2.17	1.15	63.9	16.5	$t(647) = 31.67$, $p < .001$, $d = .85$, 95% CI [.74, .97]
Community members	3.22	1.13	29.4	46.3	2.19	1.27	61.0	20.3	$t(176) = 10.30$, $p < .001$, $d = .82$, 95% CI [.61, 1.04]
Overall	3.19	1.10	28.6	41.9	2.18	1.18	63.3	17.3	$t(824) = 23.33$, $p < .001$, $d = .84$, 95% CI [.74, .94]

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Given multiple comparisons between "other" and "self" scores, a corrected critical cut-off was implemented ($p = .0125$) for the paired t tests.
* Indicates a significant independent t test result (critical cut-off at $p = .006$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples for "other" score only, $t(298.76) = 2.77$, $p = .006$, $d = .22$, 95% CI [.15, .30].

randa rights, with just over half of the sample (54.7%) responding with a 1 or 2 on the scale. Additionally, over half of respondents believed that the police are likely to make use of manipulative techniques in order to get suspects to waive their rights (i.e., 59.6% of respondents indicated a 4 or 5 on the scale). Lastly, a significant paired samples t test revealed that respondents believed innocent suspects are more likely to waive their rights than are guilty suspects, $t(824) = 19.43$, $p < .001$, $d = .69$, 95% CI [0.59, 0.79].

We also examined respondents' perceptions that four reasons would contribute to guilty and innocent suspects waiving their Miranda rights (see Table 5 for descriptives). Specifically, we asked respondents to indicate how likely suspects would be to waive their rights due to: worrying that not doing so would make the police think they are guilty; worrying that not doing so would make the judge and jury think they are guilty; not understanding their rights; and thinking that by talking, they will convince the police of their innocence. Respondents generally believed that both guilty and innocent suspects are likely to waive their rights for these reasons. Specifically, between 46.2% to 75.0% of respondents indicated a 4 or 5 on the five-point scale, with the fewest

Table 4
Descriptives for Respondents' Perceptions of Miranda Waivers

Questionnaire item by sample	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2 (disagreement)	% say 4 or 5 (agreement)
Suspects fully understand their Miranda rights*			
Students	2.45 (1.04)	57.7	15.3
Community members	2.71 (1.13)	43.5	25.4
Overall	2.51 (1.07)	54.7	17.5
How likely are police to use manipulative techniques to get suspects to waive their Miranda rights?			
Students	3.63 (.99)	13.7	59.0
Community members	3.73 (1.10)	13.6	62.1
Overall	3.66 (1.02)	13.7	59.6
How likely are guilty suspects to waive their Miranda rights?			
Students	2.42 (1.05)	59.7	15.7
Community members	2.40 (1.08)	55.9	13.6
Overall	2.42 (1.06)	58.9	15.3
How likely are innocent suspects to waive their Miranda rights?			
Students	3.50 (1.12)	18.5	54.3
Community members	3.50 (1.11)	16.4	55.9
Overall	3.50 (1.12)	18.1	54.7

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree or not at all likely*) to 5 (*strongly agree or extremely likely*).
* Indicates a significant independent t test result (critical cut-off at $p = .0125$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples, $t(823) = 2.92$, $p = .004$, $d = .25$, 95% CI [.17, .32].

number of respondents agreeing that innocent suspects do not understand their rights and highest number of respondents agreeing that innocent suspects are worried that refusal to waive their rights would lead the police to think that they are guilty. Additionally, we used paired t tests to compare mean likelihood ratings for guilty versus innocent suspects (see Table 5 for results). Respondents offered significantly higher likelihood ratings for innocent than guilty suspects for the reasons of worrying that refusal to waive their rights would make the police think they are guilty ($d = .21$), as well as make the judge and jury think they are guilty ($d = .15$). Also, higher likelihood ratings emerged for innocent than guilty suspects for the reason of convincing the police of their innocence by talking ($d = .22$). Likelihood ratings were significantly higher for guilty than innocent suspects for the reason that suspects do not understand their rights ($d = .31$).

Interrogation Methods: Police Use, Coerciveness, and Relation to Confessions

For seven specific interrogation methods, perceptions of the likelihood of police use, coerciveness, and likelihood of eliciting true and false confessions were examined. These methods included: confronting the suspect with true evidence of guilt, confronting the suspect with false evidence of guilt, bluffs about evidence, rejecting the suspect's denials, promises of leniency (note, promises were defined as being implicit and/or explicit), threat and use of physical harm, and building rapport with the suspect (see the online supplemental material for how these tactics were explained to respondents).[3] Note that the questionnaire items and statistical analyses used in this section mirror those employed by Leo and Liu (2009) so that descriptive comparisons could be made directly between their sample and the present sample.

Police use of different interrogation methods. Respondents reported that, on average, 8.63 ($SD = 6.11$) hours are needed to obtain a confession, and that 8.69 ($SD = 6.38$) hours of interrogation should be allowed. Note that our respondents were re-

stricted to a 0- to 24-hr response range because Leo and Liu's (2009) participants reported up to 24 hr in their open-ended responses, after corrections for extreme outliers were applied. Additionally, when asked to rate the likelihood that police use certain interrogation tactics, the majority of respondents provided high likelihood scores (i.e., 4 or 5 on the five-point scale) for confrontation with true evidence (83.3%), evidence bluffs (77.8%), rejection of suspects' denials (63.7%), promises of leniency (74.1%), and rapport building (56.0%). Low likelihood scores (i.e., 1 or 2 on the scale) were typical for threats/use of harm (60.1%). Respondents were split regarding use of confrontation with false evidence, with 30.2% indicating unlikely use but 42.4% indicating use was likely. Overall, it appeared that respondents generally perceived the majority of the presented tactics as likely be used by police, as means exceeded the midpoint for all tactics other than threat and use of harm.

To compare respondents' ratings across the tactics, we conducted a single factor (seven levels of interrogation method) repeated measures ANOVA (see Table 6 for descriptives). A significant model emerged, Greenhouse-Geisser, $F(4.94, 4067.72) = 438.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.35$. Post hoc pairwise comparisons between all seven tactics (critical cut-off at $p = .002$) were then carried out, and the results are presented in Table 6. True evidence confrontation had the highest perceived usage ratings, while threats and use of physical harm was given the lowest ratings.

Perceived coerciveness of methods. Although mean ratings of perceived coerciveness did not substantially exceed the scale midpoint, a large proportion of respondents provided high coerciveness ratings (i.e., 4 or 5 on the scale) for false evidence

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[3] There are important legal distinctions between implicit and explicit promises. However, in the interest of being able to compare with past research (Leo & Liu, 2009), and given that research shows that jurors do not distinguish between these types of promises, we combined explicit and implicit promises.

Table 5

Descriptives for Respondents' Perceptions of Suspects' Reasons for Waiving Their Rights

Questionnaire item by sample	Guilty suspects			Innocent suspects			Comparison statistic for guilty vs. innocent suspects
	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	
Worried that refusal to waive their rights will make the police think they're guilty							
Students	3.75 (.91)	8.6	66.0	3.97 (1.03)	11.0	76.2	$t(647) = 5.45$, $p < .001$, $d = .23$, 95% CI [.12, .33]
Community members	3.85 (1.02)	10.2	68.4	4.03 (1.02)	7.9	70.6	$t(176) = 2.41$, $p = .017$, $d = .18$, 95% CI [−.03, .38]
Overall	3.77 (.94)	9.0	66.5	3.98 (1.03)	10.3	75.0	$t(824) = 5.95$, $p < .001$, $d = .21$, 95% CI [.12, .31]
Worried that refusal to waive their rights will make the judge and jury think they're guilty							
Students	3.60 (.97)	13.1	58.6	3.75 (1.11)	14.5	65.4	$t(647) = 3.63$, $p < .001$, $d = .16$, 95% CI [.05, .27]
Community members	3.58 (1.14)	18.6	54.8	3.72 (1.21)	17.5	61.0	$t(176) = 2.02$, $p = .045$, $d = .15$, 95% CI [−.06, .36]
Overall	3.60 (1.01)	14.3	57.8	3.74 (1.13)	15.2	64.5	$t(824) = 4.15$, $p < .001$, $d = .15$, 95% CI [.05, .24]
Don't understand their Miranda rights*							
Students	3.62 (1.06)	15.9	59.0	3.31 (1.15)	24.5	44.1	$t(647) = 8.31$, $p < .001$, $d = .34$, 95% CI [.23, .45]
Community members	3.79 (1.13)	15.8	64.4	3.60 (1.19)	18.6	53.7	$t(176) = 2.64$, $p = .009$, $d = .20$, 95% CI [.01, .41]
Overall	3.66 (1.08)	15.9	60.1	3.37 (1.16)	23.3	46.2	$t(824) = 8.58$, $p < .001$, $d = .31$, 95% CI [.22, .41]
Think that if they talk, they'll convince the police they are innocent*							
Students	3.66 (1.01)	14.0	61.6	3.93 (1.06)	11.3	69.6	$t(647) = 5.99$, $p < .001$, $d = .24$, 95% CI [.13, .35]
Community members	4.03 (.97)	7.3	72.9	4.17 (.99)	9.0	80.2	$t(176) = 1.86$, $p = .064$, $d = .14$, 95% CI [−.07, .35]
Overall	3.74 (1.01)	12.6	64.0	3.98 (1.05)	10.8	71.9	$t(824) = 6.22$, $p < .001$, $d = .22$, 95% CI [.12, .32]

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all likely*) to 5 (*extremely likely*). Critical cut-off for the comparison between guilty and innocent suspect ratings was $p = .0125$.
* Indicates a significant independent *t* test result ($p = .006$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples: think that talking will convince police of innocence (guilty suspects only), $t(823) = 4.32$, $p < .001$, $d = .37$, 95% CI [.30, .44], and don't understand their Miranda rights (innocent suspects only), $t(823) = 2.97$, $p = .003$, $d = .25$, 95% CI [.17, .33].

presentation (68.0%), evidence bluffs (69.0%), rejection of denials (52.5%), promises of leniency (63.5%), and threats/use of harm (65.9%). To examine differences in coerciveness ratings across the tactics, we again used a single-factor (seven levels of interrogation method) repeated-measures ANOVA (see Table 6 for descriptives. Coerciveness ratings did indeed vary across the tactics, Greenhouse-Geisser, $F(3.80, 3134.50) = 110.45$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.12$. Results from pairwise comparisons between all seven tactics (critical cut-off $p = .002$) are reported in Table 6. Coerciveness ratings were highest for confrontation with false evidence, evidence bluffs, promises of leniency, and threat/use of harm. The lowest ratings were for true evidence confrontation and rapport building. Ratings for rejections of denials fell between these two clusters.

Elicitation of true versus false confessions. More than half of respondents indicated that true confessions are likely (i.e., a 4 or 5 on the scale) to result from confronting suspects with true evidence of guilt (86.2%) and building rapport with suspects (51.4%). On the other hand, more than half of respondents indicated that false confessions are likely to result from: confronting suspects with false evidence of guilt (63.3%), bluffing about

evidence (58.4%), rejecting suspects' denials (53.3%), and threatening/using physical harm (68.1%). Similar proportions of respondents believed that promises of leniency were likely to result in true confessions (65.3%) and false confessions (53.5%).

Next, we compared the perceived likelihood that each of the seven tactics would elicit a true confession to the perceived likelihood of the tactics eliciting a false confession using a 2 (confession type: true, false) × 7 (interrogation method) repeated-measures ANOVA, with both factors varying within-participants (see Table 7 for descriptives; note that this analysis mirrored that of Leo and Liu, 2009). The main effect of confession type was not significant; however, both the main effect of interrogation method, Greenhouse-Geisser, $F(5.50, 4534.30) = 74.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.08$, and the interaction between confession type and interrogation method, Greenhouse-Geisser, $F(4.55, 3747.34) = 488.56$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.37$, were significant. Post hoc paired *t* tests (critical cut-off $p = .007$) indicated that, compared with their likelihood of true confession ratings, respondents' false confession likelihood ratings were higher for confrontation with false evidence, evidence bluffs, rejecting denials, and threats and use of harm.

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Likelihood of Use and Coerciveness Ratings for the Seven Interrogation Methods

Interrogation method	Students			Community members			Overall		
	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5
Likelihood of being used by police during interrogation									
1. Confronting the suspect with true evidence of guilt$_a$	4.35 (.88)	4.9	83.5	4.32 (.89)	4.0	82.5	4.35 (.88)	4.7	83.3
2. Confronting the suspect with false evidence of guilt$_d$	3.18 (1.19)	31.0	42.6	3.27 (1.19)	27.1	41.8	3.20 (1.19)	30.2	42.4
3. Bluffs about the evidence$_b$	4.08 (.91)	6.6	78.1	4.06 (.95)	7.9	76.8	4.08 (.92)	6.9	77.8
4. Rejecting the suspect's denials$_c$	3.73 (1.01)	12.2	62.3	3.86 (1.06)	11.9	68.9	3.76 (1.02)	12.1	63.7
5. Promises of leniency$_b$	4.10 (.96)	6.2	73.6	4.23 (.91)	4.0	75.7	4.13 (.95)	5.7	74.1
6. Threat and use of physical harm$_e$	2.30 (1.06)	61.6	12.3	2.54 (1.23)	54.8	21.5	2.35 (1.10)	60.1	14.3
7. Building rapport with the suspect$_c$^{a}	3.46 (1.06)	19.3	50.3	4.14 (.99)	7.9	76.8	3.60 (1.08)	16.8	56.0
Extent of coerciveness									
1. Confronting the suspect with true evidence of guilt$_c$	3.15 (1.54)	35.8	49.1	2.82 (1.49)	45.8	37.9	3.08 (1.54)	37.9	46.7
2. Confronting the suspect with false evidence of guilt$_a$*	3.85 (1.10)	13.0	66.4	4.16 (1.03)	7.3	74.0	3.91 (1.09)	11.8	68.0
3. Bluffs about the evidence$_a$	3.87 (.96)	8.2	69.1	3.98 (1.04)	9.0	68.4	3.89 (.97)	8.4	69.0
4. Rejecting the suspect's denials$_b$*	3.56 (1.11)	18.2	55.1	3.31 (1.16)	24.9	42.9	3.51 (1.12)	19.6	52.5
5. Promises of leniency$_a$*	3.78 (1.08)	14.5	64.0	3.81 (1.11)	12.4	61.6	3.79 (1.09)	14.1	63.5
6. Threat and use of physical harm$_a$*	3.82 (1.39)	21.9	63.6	4.21 (1.08)	9.6	74.6	3.91 (1.34)	19.3	65.9
7. Building rapport with the suspect$_c$	2.84 (1.26)	41.7	32.9	3.09 (1.28)	30.5	36.7	2.89 (1.27)	39.3	33.7

Note. Respondents rated likelihood of use on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely to be used) to 5 (very likely to be used) and coerciveness on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all coercive) to 5 (extremely coercive). Subscripts are used to depict the main effects of interrogation method with the highest score(s) marked with$_a$; shared letters indicate no significant difference between tactics ($p = .002$).
* Indicates a significant independent t test result ($p = .007$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples: rapport building being used, $t(296.86) = 7.99$, $p < .001$, $d = .65$, 95% CI [.58, .72], coerciveness of false evidence presentation, $t(823) = 3.47$, $p = .001$, $d = .29$, 95% CI [.21, .36], coerciveness of rejecting denials, $t(823) = 2.73$, $p = .007$, $d = .22$, 95% CI [.15, .30], and coerciveness of threat/use of harm, $t(352.29) = 3.93$, $p < .001$, $d = .29$, 95% CI [.20, .38].

Conversely, likelihood of true confession scores, compared with likelihood of false confession scores, were higher for: confrontation with true evidence, promises of leniency, and rapport building.

Perceptions of Dispositional Risk Factors Leading to False Confessions

We examined respondents' perceptions of the extent to which each of nine different dispositional risk factors (specifically: mental illness, low IQ, under 18 years old, poor memory of time of the crime, under the influence of alcohol, under the influence of marijuana, under the influence of illegal drugs, under the influence of powerful prescription drugs, and being sleep deprived) contribute to false confessions. For all factors, a majority of respondents indicated high contribution to false confessions (i.e., 4 or 5 on the scale). To determine which factors had the highest and lowest contribution ratings, we used a single-factor (nine levels of dispositional risk factor) repeated-measures ANOVA (descriptives are presented in Table 8). A significant main effect of dispositional risk factor emerged, Greenhouse-Geisser, $F(5.92, 4783.16) = 156.87$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.16$. Results from pairwise comparisons between all of the dispositional risk factors (critical cut-off $p = .001$) are indicated in Table 8. Mental illness received the highest contribution ratings. Conversely, being under the influence of marijuana, having a low IQ, being under 18 years old, and being sleep deprived received the lowest ratings (note: these four ratings did not significantly differ from each other).

Respondents also answered the following questions related specifically to age as a risk factor for false confessions (response options ranging from 0 to 25 years old): when does age no longer contribute to false confession risk, until which age should parents/guardians be present in an interrogation, until which age should a confession elicited after parental presence was denied be inadmissible, and starting at which age is it appropriate to employ interrogation tactics used on adults. On average, respondents indicated that the point at which a person's age no longer contributes to the risk of falsely confessing corresponds to the legal age of adulthood ($M = 18.03$, $SD = 5.92$); however, inspection of response frequencies showed that 31.9% of respondents indicated an age 17 years or younger, 23.8% indicated exactly 18 years old, and 44.4% indicated an age 19 years or older. Additionally, respondents indicated on average that this is the age until which suspects should have the right to have a parent or guardian in the interrogation room with them ($M = 17.87$, $SD = 3.13$), with 26.5% of respondents indicating a response of 17 years or younger, 49.9% indicating 18 years old, and 23.5% indicating 19 years or older.

On average, respondents believed that it is appropriate to employ interrogation tactics used on adults on suspects starting at 18 years old ($M = 17.94$, $SD = 2.79$; 30.5% of respondents indicated a response of 17 years or younger, 42.1% indicated 18 years old, and 27.4% indicated 19 years or older). However, respondents indicated on average that confessions should be admissible in court, despite a suspect's denied request for a parent to be present in the interrogation, starting at the age of 16.82 ($SD = 3.30$). Closer inspection of response frequencies to this question revealed that 42.8% of respondents indicated an age of 17 years or younger, 44.6% indicated 18 years old, and 12.6% indicated 19 years or older.

Table 7

Descriptives for Respondents' Perceptions of the Likelihood That a Specific Interrogation Method Will Result in a True or False Confession

Interrogation method by sample	True confessions M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	False confessions M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5
1. Confronting the suspect with true evidence of guilt						
Students	4.41 (.81)	3.4	88.3	2.35 (1.34)	62.7	22.1
Community members	4.23 (.97)	5.6	78.5	2.30 (1.25)	58.8	17.5
Overall	4.37 (.85)	3.9	86.2	2.34 (1.32)	61.8	21.1
2. Confronting the suspect with false evidence of guilt						
Students	2.77 (1.17)	41.4	27.3	3.71 (1.13)	15.4	64.4
Community members	2.83 (1.15)	40.7	29.4	3.61 (1.18)	16.9	59.3
Overall	2.78 (1.16)	41.2	27.8	3.69 (1.14)	15.8	63.3
3. Bluffs about the evidence						
Students	3.27 (1.02)	20.5	43.4	3.57 (1.12)	18.1	58.3
Community members	3.23 (1.12)	20.9	41.8	3.60 (1.19)	18.1	58.8
Overall	3.26 (1.04)	20.6	43.0	3.58 (1.13)	18.1	58.4
4. Rejecting the suspect's denials						
Students	2.66 (1.06)	47.7	21.5	3.49 (1.11)	19.6	53.9
Community members	2.74 (1.05)	41.2	22.6	3.48 (1.14)	18.6	51.4
Overall	2.67 (1.06)	46.3	21.7	3.49 (1.12)	19.4	53.3
5. Promises of leniency						
Students	3.74 (1.06)	13.6	66.0	3.44 (1.20)	24.2	52.6
Community members	3.69 (1.08)	13.6	62.7	3.64 (1.17)	15.3	56.5
Overall	3.73 (1.06)	13.6	65.3	3.48 (1.20)	22.3	53.5
6. Threat and use of physical harm*						
Students	2.42 (1.25)	57.4	22.1	3.83 (1.23)	15.9	66.8
Community members	2.73 (1.27)	43.5	28.2	4.06 (1.04)	6.8	72.9
Overall	2.49 (1.26)	54.4	23.4	3.88 (1.20)	13.9	68.1
7. Building rapport with the suspect*						
Students	3.36 (1.08)	20.5	48.8	2.49 (1.19)	52.8	20.5
Community members	3.65 (.97)	9.6	61.0	2.85 (1.20)	40.1	30.5
Overall	3.42 (1.06)	18.2	51.4	2.56 (1.20)	50.1	22.7

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all likely*) to 5 (*extremely likely*).
* Indicates a significant independent *t* test result ($p = .004$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples: physical harm eliciting true confessions, $t(823) = 2.90$, $p = .004$, $d = .25$, 95% CI [.16, .33], rapport building eliciting true confessions, $t(305.67) = 3.42$, $p = .001$, $d = .28$, 95% CI [.20, .35], and rapport building eliciting false confessions, $t(823) = 3.58$, $p < .001$, $d = .30$, 95% CI [.22, .38].

Confessions in the Courtroom

Opinions regarding disputed confession admissibility. We examined participants' beliefs regarding whether confessions elicited by different interrogation methods should be admitted into court when a defendant has claimed the confession was false (see Table 9 for descriptives). A large proportion of respondents (69.0%) indicated that a disputed confession elicited using presentation of true evidence should be admissible (i.e., 4 or 5 on the scale), and nearly half of respondents (47.9%) believed that a disputed confession elicited using rapport should be admissible. Conversely, over half of respondents believed that disputed confessions elicited after police threats (54.1%), police assault (64.0%), denial of food/water (65.0%), denial of an attorney (64.7%), and Miranda rights not being read (65.1%) should not be admissible in court (i.e., 1 or 2 on the scale).

To determine differences in admissibility ratings, we employed a single-factor (12 levels of interrogation method) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of admissibility ratings across interrogation methods, Greenhouse-Geisser $F(3.53, 2907.76) = 164.16$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.17$. To examine this main effect, pairwise comparisons (critical cut-off at $p < .001$) of admissibility ratings across all 12 methods were conducted; these results can be seen in Table 9. Confessions obtained via the presentation of true evidence received the highest admissibility ratings, while confessions obtained via physical assault, food/water denial, being denied an attorney, and failure to read Miranda rights received the lowest admissibility ratings (note: these latter four ratings did not significantly differ from each other).

Weight in verdict decision making. Means and standard deviations regarding how much weight respondents gave the 12 types of evidence are presented in Table 10. Given that confession evidence's influence is often compared with forensic evidence and eyewitness identification influences (e.g., Kassin & Neumann, 1997), a priori comparisons were made among the following six types of evidence: DNA, other forensic evidence, written confession, oral confession, retracted confession, and eyewitness identification. A single-factor repeated measures ANOVA indicated that respondents differentially weighed these types of evidence in their verdict decision making, Greenhouse-Geisser, $F(3.75, 3088.20) = 457.13$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.36$. Follow-up pairwise comparisons (critical cut-off at $p = .002$) revealed that DNA and other forensic evidence, which did not significantly differ from each other, both received the most weight, as compared with all three confession types and eyewitness identification. The three types of confessions differed from each other significantly, with a written confession most heavily weighted, followed by an oral confession, and a

Table 8

Means and Standard Deviations for the Perceived Extent to Which Dispositional Risk Factors Would Contribute to a Person Falsely Confessing to a Crime He or She Did Not in Fact Commit

	Students			Community members			Overall		
Risk factor	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5
1. Having a mental illness$_a$	4.41 (.80)	3.1	88.4	4.44 (.85)	4.0	84.2	4.42 (.81)	3.3	87.5
2. Having a low IQ$_{c,d}$*	3.49 (1.21)	23.5	53.7	4.01 (1.13)	11.3	71.8	3.60 (1.21)	20.8	57.6
3. Being under 18 years old$_d$	3.45 (1.23)	24.2	54.2	3.69 (1.19)	18.6	62.1	3.50 (1.22)	23.0	55.9
4. Having a poor memory of the time of the crime$_c$*	3.83 (1.04)	12.2	66.8	3.55 (1.14)	19.8	57.1	3.77 (1.07)	13.8	64.7
5. Being under the influence of alcohol$_b$	4.26 (.80)	3.2	84.9	4.12 (.94)	4.5	75.7	4.23 (.84)	3.5	82.9
6. Being under the influence of marijuana$_d$	3.49 (1.16)	21.1	53.5	3.34 (1.17)	23.7	47.5	3.46 (1.17)	21.7	52.2
7. Being under the influence of illegal drugs$_b$*	4.30 (.81)	3.7	86.4	4.07 (1.00)	7.3	76.8	4.25 (.86)	4.5	84.4
8. Being under the influence of powerful prescription drugs$_b$	4.18 (.90)	5.4	80.9	4.11 (.98)	6.8	77.4	4.16 (.92)	5.7	80.1
9. Being sleep deprived$_{c,d}$*	3.54 (1.13)	19.6	57.4	3.97 (1.06)	9.6	68.9	3.63 (1.13)	17.5	59.9

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*no contribution*) to 5 (*large contribution*). Subscripts are used to depict the main effects of interrogation method in the overall sample, with the highest score marked with$_a$; shared letters indicate no significant difference ($p = .001$).
* Indicates a significant independent *t* test result ($p = .006$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples: low IQ, $t(297.22) = 5.34$, $p < .001$, $d = .44$, 95% CI [.35, .52], poor memory of the crime time, $t(261.45) = 2.92$, $p = .004$, $d = .26$, 95% CI [.19, .34], being under the influence of illegal drugs, $t(823) = 3.16$, $p = .002$, $d = .27$, 95% CI [.21, .33], and sleep deprivation, $t(294.88) = 4.73$, $p < .001$, $d = .39$, 95% CI [.31, .46].

retracted confession weighted the least. An eyewitness identification was weighted more than an oral confession and a retracted confession, but not more than a written confession.

Expert testimony. Respondents generally agreed that expert testimony is useful. Specifically, 78.3% of the overall sample agreed with the following statement: having an expert testify about how and why false confessions occur would be useful for making a verdict decision in a disputed confession case ($M = 4.10$, $SD = .83$).

Crime-Media Engagement and Familiarity With Disputed Confession Cases

Crime-media engagement. Respondents reported the extent to which they watched/listened to each of four types of media (i.e., true crime series/documentaries, true crime podcasts, true crime TV series, and fictional crime shows) on a 1 (*never*) to 5 (*often*) scale. These four ratings were averaged into a crime-media en-

Table 9

Means and Standard Deviations for Responses to: A Suspect Signed a Written Confession During Interrogation but Later Claims they are Innocent and Their Confession was False. Under What Circumstances Do You Think the Confession Should be Allowed, or Not Allowed, as Evidence for the Jury to Hear?

	Students			Community members			Overall		
Interrogation method	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	M (SD)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5
1. Continual rejection of suspect's denials of guilt throughout the interrogation$_c$	2.96 (1.14)	33.6	31.2	2.92 (1.32)	36.7	35.6	2.95 (1.18)	34.3	32.1
2. Suspect confronted with true evidence indicative of guilt$_a$	3.89 (1.18)	14.0	70.1	3.86 (1.35)	19.8	65.0	3.89 (1.22)	15.3	69.0
3. Interrogators explicitly lied about having evidence indicative of the suspect's guilt$_{d,e}$	2.69 (1.36)	48.0	29.0	2.45 (1.31)	53.7	21.5	2.64 (1.36)	49.2	27.4
4. Interrogators used evidence bluffs$_{c,d}$	2.78 (1.26)	43.7	29.5	2.83 (1.31)	39.5	31.1	2.79 (1.27)	42.8	29.8
5. Interrogators made explicit statements of leniency$_c$*	3.11 (1.24)	33.0	40.4	2.77 (1.34)	42.9	28.8	3.04 (1.27)	35.2	37.9
6. Interrogators made implied statements of leniency$_c$	3.00 (1.09)	32.3	32.7	2.90 (1.23)	37.3	31.6	2.98 (1.12)	33.3	32.5
7. Police threatened and intimidated, but did not physically harm, the suspect during the interrogation$_e$	2.61 (1.35)	52.5	28.1	2.33 (1.39)	59.9	23.7	2.55 (1.36)	54.1	27.2
8. Suspect was physically assaulted/beaten$_f$	2.32 (1.68)	63.3	30.4	2.07 (1.49)	66.7	22.6	2.27 (1.65)	64.0	28.7
9. Interrogators built rapport with the suspect$_b$*	3.33 (1.21)	23.8	45.1	3.64 (1.25)	19.2	58.2	3.40 (1.22)	22.8	47.9
10. Suspect was denied food or water$_f$	2.32 (1.57)	64.7	27.6	2.12 (1.41)	66.1	22.0	2.28 (1.54)	65.0	26.4
11. Suspect's request for an attorney was denied during interrogation$_f$	2.31 (1.63)	64.0	28.2	2.07 (1.47)	67.2	21.5	2.26 (1.60)	64.7	26.8
12. The suspect was not read his or her Miranda rights$_f$	2.25 (1.66)	65.0	27.2	2.09 (1.46)	65.5	20.9	2.21 (1.62)	65.1	25.8

Note. The rating scale ranged from 1 (*definitely do not allow*) to 5 (*definitely allow*). Subscripts are used to depict the main effects of interrogation method with the highest score marked with$_a$; shared letters indicate no significant difference ($p < .001$).
* Indicates a significant independent *t* test result ($p = .004$) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples: explicit promises of leniency, $t(823) = 3.17$, $p = .002$, $d = .27$, 95% CI [.18, .37], and rapport building, $t(823) = 3.07$, $p = .002$, $d = .26$, 95% CI [.17, .34].

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations for Responses to "If You Were Trying to Determine the Guilt of a Suspect as a Juror in a Trial, How Much Would You Weigh the Following Types of Evidence When Coming to a Verdict Decision?"

Evidence type	Students			Community members			Overall		
	M (*SD*)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	*M* (*SD*)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5	*M* (*SD*)	% say 1 or 2	% say 4 or 5
1. Suspect's DNA at crime scene	4.48 (.70)	.8	90.1	4.33 (.93)	6.8	81.9	4.45 (.76)	2.1	88.4
2. Other forensic evidence at crime scene*	4.45 (.70)	1.4	91.4	4.21 (.95)	5.1	77.4	4.40 (.76)	2.2	88.4
3. Written confession	3.60 (.97)	12.7	54.0	3.50 (1.06)	15.8	52.0	3.58 (.99)	13.3	53.6
4. Oral confession	3.39 (1.03)	21.5	46.5	3.30 (1.09)	23.7	44.1	3.37 (1.04)	21.9	45.9
5. Retracted confession	2.95 (.97)	31.5	25.9	2.96 (1.17)	34.5	33.3	2.95 (1.02)	32.1	27.5
6. Eyewitness identifies the suspect	3.65 (.97)	12.8	59.7	3.77 (.90)	7.3	65.5	3.67 (.96)	11.6	61.0
7. Suspect's bad character or prior criminal record	3.19 (.97)	20.1	35.3	3.14 (1.01)	26.0	35.6	3.18 (.98)	21.3	35.4
8. Suspect claims to have no memory of the crime	2.89 (.94)	29.8	21.8	2.75 (1.04)	34.5	19.2	2.86 (.96)	30.8	21.2
9. Suspect was very anxious during interrogation	2.93 (1.02)	32.4	27.8	2.73 (1.14)	40.7	24.9	2.88 (1.05)	34.2	27.2
10. Suspect has no evidence to support their alibi	3.71 (.98)	10.2	62.0	3.52 (1.03)	16.9	53.7	3.67 (.99)	11.6	60.2
11. Suspect's good character*	2.93 (1.06)	32.4	28.9	3.19 (1.04)	23.7	37.3	2.99 (1.06)	30.5	30.7
12. Evidence of suspect having a motive	3.85 (.83)	5.2	68.7	3.82 (.91)	8.5	65.5	3.84 (.85)	5.9	68.0

Note. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*no weight at all*) to 5 (*weigh very heavily*).
* Indicates a significant independent *t* test result (*p* = .004) for the comparison between the student and community member subsamples: forensic evidence, *t*(230.77) = 3.15, *p* = .002, *d* = .32, 95% CI [.27, .37], and the suspect's good character, *t*(823) = 2.90, *p* = .004, *d* = .25, 95% CI [.17, .32].

gagement composite score (Cronbach's α = .75), where higher scores indicated more frequent engagement in crime media (*M* = 2.45, *SD* = 1.02). Correlations for the overall sample were examined between this crime-media engagement score (CMES) and four sets of variables of interest: general confession perceptions (including the following six variables: confession as indicator of guilt; percentage of innocent people who falsely confess; and likelihood that someone would falsely confess in general, to protect another, due to police manipulation, and due to internalization; critical *p* = .008), extent to which the aforementioned seven interrogation methods are perceived as coercive, and the likelihood that these methods result in true and false confessions (seven variables per set; critical *p*s = .007).

Higher CMES was positively correlated with the perceived percentage of innocent suspects that falsely confess, *r*(823) = .16, *p* < .001. However, CMES was not related to perceived coerciveness of any of the seven interrogation methods. Higher CMES was positively related to ratings of the likelihood that rapport-building would lead to false confessions, although the effect was very small, *r*(823) = .09, *p* = .007. Higher CMES was also positively related to ratings of the likelihood that evidence bluffs, *r*(823) = .15, *p* < .001, and rejection of denials, *r*(823) = .10, *p* = .003, would lead to true confessions.

Familiarity with disputed confessions. Respondents were divided into two categories based upon whether they indicated familiarity with at least one disputed/false confession case (i.e., Amanda Knox, Brendan Dassey, West Memphis Three, Central Park Five, or some other case; *n* = 523) or did not indicate familiarity with any such case (*n* = 302). A *t* test revealed that those familiar with at least one case had significantly higher CMES scores (*M* = 2.69, *SD* = 1.03) than did those who were not familiar with a case (*M* = 2.05, *SD* = .86), *t*(720.76) = 9.63, *p* < .001, *d* = .67, 95% CI [.60, 0.73]. We conducted independent samples *t* tests comparing responses from participants who were familiar versus unfamiliar with a disputed confession case for the same four sets of variables examined in relation to CMES. Specifically, we examined general confession perceptions (critical

value *p* = .008), coerciveness ratings of the seven interrogation methods, and likelihood ratings that the seven methods would result in true and false confessions (critical values *p* = .007; see Figure 1). Differences between the two groups emerged for the following general confession perceptions: confessions as an indicator of guilt, *t*(683.23) = 4.19, *p* < .001, *d* = .29, 95% CI [0.23, 0.35], propensity of suspects confessing to crimes they did not commit, *t*(592.05) = 4.01, *p* < .001, *d* = .30, 95% CI [0.23, 0.36], suspects falsely confessing due to police manipulation and pressure, *t*(562.34) = 6.38, *p* < .001, *d* = .48, 95% CI [0.41, 0.56], and suspects offering internalized false confessions, *t*(823) = 2.81, *p* = .005, *d* = .21, 95% CI [0.14, 0.29]. Specifically, when compared with respondents not familiar with a disputed/false confession case, respondents familiar with disputed/false confession cases agreed to a greater extent that criminal suspects might falsely confess, suspects might falsely confess due to police pressure/manipulation, and suspects might falsely confess because they internalized guilt. Additionally, familiar respondents agreed to a *lesser* extent that if someone confessed to a crime, they are probably guilty. There were no significant differences between the groups for confessing to protect another and perceived percentage of people who falsely confess.

With regard to the perceived coerciveness of interrogation methods, differences between the groups emerged only for promises of leniency, *t*(572.26) = 3.10, *p* = .002, *d* = .23, 95% CI [0.16, 0.31], and threat/use of physical harm, *t*(578.01) = 3.80, *p* < .001, *d* = .28, 95% CI [0.19, 0.37]. In both instances, participants familiar with specific disputed/false confession cases perceived these methods to be more coercive than did participants not familiar with any such cases. No differences emerged between the two groups in regards to the likelihood that the interrogation methods would result in true confessions; however, several differences emerged in regards to the methods' likelihood of eliciting false confessions. Specifically, those familiar with specific disputed/false confession cases offered higher likelihood ratings that the following three interrogation methods result in false confessions: confrontation with false evidence, *t*(586.76) = 3.63, *p* < .001, *d* =

Figure 1. Comparison of ratings between those familiar with and those not familiar with specific disputed/false confession cases for general confession perceptions, coerciveness of interrogation methods, and likelihood that methods would result in true, and false, confessions. Note, error bars represent standard error of the mean, and all measures were on a five-point scale. *Indicates a significant difference (*p* = .008 for Figure 1a, and *p* = .007 for all other figures) between the familiar group and the unfamiliar group. FC = false confession.

.27, 95% CI [0.20, 0.35], evidence bluffs, *t*(823) = 3.47, *p* = .001, *d* = .25, 95% CI [0.17, 0.33], and threats and use of physical harm, *t*(598.28) = 3.37, *p* = .001, *d* = .24, 95% CI [0.16, 0.33]. The two groups' perceptions did not differ on the other four interrogation methods.

Discussion

False confessions pose significant risks to innocent suspects, and jurors represent one of the final safeguards in preventing innocent defendants from wrongful conviction. Thus, it is important to understand potential jurors' perceptions and knowledge of confessions, and the interrogations that elicit them, to determine whether potential jurors really constitute "safeguards." This was the primary goal of the present study. An update on this knowledge was also needed, especially considering recent findings regarding jurors' sensitivity to confession evidence (e.g., Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016) that appear at odds with earlier findings (e.g., Kassin & Sukel, 1997).

Changing Perceptions of Confessions

It appears that potential jurors continue to view confessions as relatively strong indicators of guilt; however, potential jurors seem

to be more accepting than they once were of claims that suspects might falsely confess. More than 60% of the current sample endorsed this belief, compared with about 49% in Henkel et al.'s (2008) sample who were asked the same question. Furthermore, the perceived rate of false confessions has slightly increased, shifting from about 25% in Henkel et al.'s (2008) study to a little over 30% in the present study.

Despite these shifts, people still generally believe that they themselves are relatively unlikely to falsely confess. Specifically, respondents indicated that others were more likely to falsely confess in general, and for various specific reasons, than they themselves were (a finding consistent with past research; e.g., Horgan, Russano, Meissner, & Evans, 2012). The current data do not speak to the basis for this difference, but it could be rooted in the fundamental attribution error (e.g., Henkel et al., 2008) and people's belief that they are immune to the negative effects of coercive interrogations (Woody & Forrest, 2009).

A First Comprehensive Look at Juror Perceptions of Miranda Waivers

To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively examine potential jurors' perceptions of suspects' interactions with Miranda waivers. Past research has briefly examined

Miranda perceptions at a cursory level (Chojnacki et al., 2008); examined observers' perceptions of whether they themselves and whether suspects in videos would waive their rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004); or typically examines people's own Miranda knowledge (see, e.g., Rogers et al., 2010, 2013). Consideration of Miranda is relevant in the discussion of interrogations and confessions, as suspects' Miranda decisions (both waivers and invocations) typically correspond to their entrance into the interrogation room (for a review of Miranda, see Smalarz, Scherr, & Kassin, 2016).

In the current study, potential jurors typically believed that suspects do not understand their Miranda rights, were generally aware that police are likely to use manipulative tactics to get suspects to waive their rights, and believed that innocent suspects are generally more likely than guilty suspects to waive their rights. All three ideas have been supported by past research showing that people typically do not have a working understanding of their Miranda rights (e.g., Rogers et al., 2010, 2013), police sometimes use manipulative tactics to get suspects to waive their rights (Leo, 2008), and innocents are more likely than guilty individuals to waive their rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Scherr, Normile, Bierstetel, Franks, & Hawkins, 2018). Yet, it remains unclear what, if any, influence such juror knowledge would have during a trial.

A Better Understanding of Interrogation Methods

Police use of methods. Potential jurors believed that confrontation with true evidence is highly likely to be used by police officers during interrogations. This corresponds with what occurs in actual interrogation rooms (e.g., Leo, 1996, found that confrontation with true evidence occurred in 85% of 153 interrogations), and is in line with what police indicate in self-reports (i.e., confronting suspects with evidence of guilt is often used; Cleary & Warner, 2016; Kassin et al., 2007). Additionally, potential jurors accurately gauged the extent to which threat/use of harm and false evidence ploys are used, offering these the lowest and second lowest use ratings, respectively. Overall, these ratings generally coincide with police self-reports (e.g., false evidence ploys/bluffs are "sometimes" used and physical intimidation is "almost never" used; Kassin et al., 2007). Notably, the rapport building use ratings fell in the middle, which does not align with real world interrogations (e.g., rapport building emerged as the most prominent method employed in a sample of real interrogations; Kelly, Redlich, & Miller, 2015; see also Vallano, Evans, Schreiber Compo, & Kieckhaefer, 2015). Overall, in contradiction to Henkel et al.'s (2008) finding that potential jurors believed that police are likely to use coercive methods, contemporary potential jurors appear to have a better sense of what methods police actually do use.

One concerning finding is how long potential jurors think an interrogation should last. Respondents indicated that interrogations generally last more than eight hours, and that this amount of time is needed in order to elicit a confession. Our findings substantially differ from Leo and Liu's (2009) results, where respondents indicated that, on average, 4.09 hr of interrogation are necessary (range of 1 hr to 13 hr) and 7.63 hr should be permitted (range of 1 hr to 24 hr).[4] Thus, it is possible that some jurors might not question a confession's reliability if it resulted from a prolonged interrogation. This can be detrimental when jurors make decisions about a

confession's reliability, especially considering that over 80% of interrogations in a proven false confession sample exceeded six hours (Drizin & Leo, 2004). Note that these time estimates drastically differ from police self-reports, as police reported that typical interrogations last about 1.60 hr on average and that their own longest interrogation lasted an average of 4.95 hr (Kassin et al., 2007).

Coercion. Participants offered the highest coerciveness ratings for confrontation with false evidence, threat/use of harm, and, critically, evidence bluffs and promises of leniency. This recognition of the coercive nature of promises of leniency is new (cf. Leo & Liu, 2009) and encouraging, as promises of leniency have indeed been shown to increase the rate of false confessions (e.g., Russano et al., 2005). More encouragingly, our sample of potential jurors perceived the coercive nature of evidence bluffs as not different to that of false evidence confrontation. This perception is consistent with experimental evidence demonstrating that bluffs result in false confessions at a rate that does not differ from explicit false evidence ploys (Perillo & Kassin, 2011) and that mock jurors do not differentiate between these tactics (Woody, Forrest, & Yendra, 2014). Additionally, respondents reported the two least coercive methods to be true evidence confrontation and rapport building. This perception regarding true evidence confrontation is consistent with findings from Leo and Liu (2009; Leo & Liu did not examine rapport building).

Elicitation of true and false confessions. Overall, false evidence confrontation, evidence bluffs, rejecting denials, and threat/use of physical harm were perceived as more likely to lead to false confessions than to true confessions, thus hinting at potential jurors' ability to recognize the detrimental impact of these tactics on confession diagnosticity. Considering that courts generally allow the use of false evidence ploys to elicit confessions (*Frazier v. Cupp*, 1969), it is reassuring that potential jurors are able to recognize that such methods create an elevated risk for false confessions. However, these findings do not align with existing research that suggests that jurors might not be able to *apply* this knowledge when determining a confession's reliability. For example, Woody et al. (2014) found no differences in verdict decisions when an explicit, implicit (similar to an evidence bluff), or no false evidence ploy was used to elicit a confession. Similarly, mock jurors were unable to disregard coerced confessions, despite recognizing that the confessions were indeed coerced (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Yet, the trends in the present survey do indicate improved knowledge when compared with past participants, who seemingly were less aware that coercive tactics can increase false confession risk (e.g., past participants believed that confrontation with both true and false evidence and rejection of denials were more likely to lead to true confessions than false confessions, and that threats of harm were equally likely to lead to a true or false confession; Leo & Liu, 2009). Overall, the "jury's still out" on whether potential jurors can effectively apply this improved knowledge, especially since some more recent findings do indicate

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[4] Without deleting extreme outliers for average interrogation length (20 outliers included) and permitted interrogation length (30 outliers included), Leo and Liu's (2009) means were 7.88 hr (range = 1–72 hr) and 13.72 hr (range = 1–500 hr), respectively. Our data was not corrected and, given that we capped responses at 24 hr, are more comparable to Leo and Liu's (2009) corrected data given the closer similarity in response range.

a link between increased knowledge of false confession risk factors and reduced guilty verdicts (Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016)—a link not seen in past studies (e.g., Kassin & Sukel, 1997).

Of further interest, the present results revealed that true evidence confrontation and rapport building were deemed to likely elicit true, rather than false, confessions. This is in line with recent findings (e.g., Jones & Brimbal, 2017, found that potential jurors believe that strategic and information-gathering techniques are more effective in eliciting evidence that will help solve crimes than confession-oriented techniques). Thus, it seems that contemporary jurors harbor beliefs similar to those held by researchers, who recommend that psychologically coercive interrogation tactics be replaced with strategic and information-gathering methods that elicit more comprehensive suspect reports and diagnostic confession evidence (e.g., Alison & Alison, 2017; Meissner, Kelly, & Woestehoff, 2015; Meissner et al., 2014; Swanner, Meissner, Atkinson, & Dianiska, 2016; Vrij et al., 2017). In conclusion, it is possible that potential jurors have the ability to recognize when interrogation methods result in a more reliable or a less reliable confession, and as such, they might be able to make better decisions in light of confession evidence.

Recognizing the Effects of Dispositional Factors on Confessing

Respondents generally recognized the risk for false confession created by all nine of the dispositional factors noted, with average scores ranging from 3.5 to 4.4 on the five-point scale (1 = *no contribution* and 5 = *large contribution to false confession*). Having a mental illness received the highest mean score, a finding that also emerged in the Henkel et al. (2008) study. Being under the influence of alcohol, under the influence of illegal drugs, and under the influence of prescription drugs, all factors that have not been examined in past jury-confession research, were also rated as strong contributors to false confessions. Experimental interrogation research examining the impact of these factors on confession decision making is lacking and is unlikely to be conducted due to ethical constraints (with the exception of low-to-moderate alcohol intoxication). However, nonexperimental research has suggested that illicit substances might increase the risk for false confession. For example, an observational study revealed that consumption of an illicit substance within 24 hr of arrest was the top psychological predictor of providing a confession (Pearse, Gudjonsson, Clare, & Rutter, 1998), and in a separate study, 35% of self-reported juvenile false confessors indicated being intoxicated during interrogation (Malloy, Shulman, & Cauffman, 2014). Additionally, having a low IQ, a poor memory of the time of the crime, and being sleep deprived were perceived as contributors to false confessions, which is consistent with past research on contributing factors (e.g., Drizin & Leo, 2004; Frenda, Berkowitz, Loftus, & Fenn, 2016). Adolescence was viewed as one of the lowest contributors to false confessions. This is disconcerting, given that the developmental phase of adolescence renders teens more prone to falsely confessing (Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006) and that teens are overrepresented in known false confession samples (e.g., Drizin & Leo, 2004).

Despite failing to rate adolescence as a large contributor to false confession, further analyses revealed that potential jurors might have *some* insight into adolescents' susceptibility in the interroga-

tion room. For example, nearly 45% of our sample believed that age ceases to be a false confession risk factor at an age of 19 years or older. Furthermore, approximately half of our sample indicated that adolescent suspects should have the right to have a parent or guardian in the interrogation room with them until the age of 18 years old, and approximately 65% of respondents indicated that interrogation methods designed for adult suspects should not be used with adolescent suspects (even though self-reports from U.S. police officers suggest that interrogation tactic usage is highly similar for adult and juvenile suspects; Cleary & Warner, 2016). However, these findings are undermined by the fact that nearly one third of respondents indicated that it is appropriate to use adult suspect tactics on adolescents 17 or younger, and a little over 40% of respondents indicated that confessions elicited from adolescent suspects ages 17 or younger, despite such suspects' requests to have a parent or guardian present being denied, should be admissible in court. Overall, it seems that a considerable proportion of potential jurors do not recognize the full extent to which age is a risk factor for false confession.

Confessions in the Courtroom

Potential jurors in our sample perceived that they would place more weight on DNA and forensic evidence than they would on confession evidence when reaching a verdict. Eyewitness identification evidence similarly outweighed confession evidence, but only in relation to oral and retracted confessions, not written confessions (which itself outweighed oral and retracted confessions). Additionally, when asked whether confessions elicited using different interrogation methods should be admissible in court, potential jurors tended to report that confessions elicited using confrontation with true evidence and rapport building should be admissible. Conversely, they tended to believe that disputed confessions elicited by more overtly coercive methods (i.e., rejection of denials, evidence bluffs, implicit promises of leniency, threats, lies about the evidence, physical harm, lack of Miranda rights reading, and denial of food or an attorney) should not be admissible. As such, respondents seem to partially understand the law, given that confessions elicited using rapport building and confrontation with true evidence are indeed admissible, and confessions elicited from some coercive tactics are likely inadmissible (e.g., physical harm; but others are generally admissible, like those elicited using false evidence ploys). Overall, these trends mirror those from Henkel et al. (2008), and it appears that both past and contemporary potential jurors feel that confessions elicited via coercive methods should not be allowed in court (although this does not necessarily mean that they would reject the confession if it was presented as evidence in court).

These findings are comforting, considering that coerced (and hence, unreliable) confessions can ultimately be presented as evidence at trial, and judges might not be fully aware that false confessions have led to wrongful convictions (Drizin & Leo, 2004) or of the detrimental effects of coercive interrogation methods on confession reliability. Wallace and Kassin (2012) found that confessions sway judges to find confessors guilty (even when they recognize that the confession was elicited by a coercive interrogation and should not be admitted at trial). This can be problematic, as according to legal statute 18 U.S. Code § 3501, judges determine a confession's voluntariness and make the ultimate

decision as to whether the confession should be admitted into court. However, this statute also states that it is up to "the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances." Hence, given the present findings, there is hope that potential jurors can recognize the "circumstances" that can result in coerced, and possibly false, confessions, and thus place less weight on those confessions.

Jurors' Crime-Media Exposure

General crime-related media behavior did not emerge as a strong correlate for interrogation and confession perceptions. However, as hypothesized, we found that potential jurors familiar with a specific disputed/false confession case (e.g., Central Park Five) perceived several tactics as more coercive and more likely to result in false confessions relative to participants not familiar with such a case. Most importantly, compared with nonfamiliar respondents, familiar respondents were more pessimistic about interrogations and confession evidence on a host of measures (e.g., less likely to perceive confessions as indicators of guilt, more likely to believe that innocent people in general might falsely confess). Nonetheless, it is important to remember that these findings are correlational as it is possible that either familiarity informs beliefs or beliefs influence media engagement behaviors (e.g., disputed confession media viewing).

Overall, these findings can be explained by the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), as potential jurors who know about false confession cases might think that such instances occur more often than do potential jurors who do not, leaving them more open to the possibility that a given confession is false. Thus, knowledge of disputed/false confession cases should be considered as a covariate in the development of future mock juror confession studies, especially since such knowledge appears to be prevalent (i.e., over 60% of our sample indicated being familiar with a disputed confession case). If it is found that this covariate does influence verdicts, questions assessing potential jurors' familiarity might be considered during voir dire processes in cases involving confession evidence.

Students and Community Members as Participants

Although there were some differences between the subsamples (see Tables), the more striking finding was the extent of the agreement between students and community members. This similarity is consistent with a recent meta-analysis on mock juror studies, which found that student and nonstudent mock jurors generally offer comparable verdicts and trial-related judgments (Bornstein et al., 2017). Thus, findings derived from student samples are largely generalizable to potential juror populations, making participant recruitment easier for future studies, and suggesting that we can be more confident when basing policy decisions on research employing student samples.

Limitations and Future Directions

Although we sought to collect data from jury-eligible participants, it is possible that some of our respondents were not jury-eligible. Specifically, our eligibility exclusions were not comprehensive (e.g., we did not exclude participants for having been

convicted of a felony; 28 U.S. Code § 1865). Thus, caution must be exercised when generalizing the present results to all potential jurors, and future research could benefit from collecting data from potential jurors at courthouses who are serving jury duty (e.g., similar to Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2010). Furthermore, generalizability concerns are commonly expressed when data is collected via MTurk (e.g., Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014)—a method we employed in the present study. However, past research has indicated that the reliability of MTurk data is on par with reliability attained using traditional testing methods, and MTurk samples have the advantage of being more demographically diverse than university samples (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).

Additionally, we only assessed perceptions of general interrogation technique categories rather than individual tactics (e.g., we assessed true evidence confrontation, which can refer to a number of specific tactics such as early evidence disclosure or presenting crime scene photos). Our primary reason for doing so was to enable a direct comparison of the present results to past research (e.g., Leo & Liu, 2009). However, it would be interesting for future research to assess potential jurors' perceptions of individual interrogation tactics (see Kelly, Miller, Redlich, & Kleinman, 2013, for a comprehensive list of tactics). Future research could also assess jurors' perceptions of the cumulative effect of multiple tactics employed at once; for example, jurors' perceptions of an interrogation during which rapport building is used in conjunction with false evidence presentation. This latter example raises another issue currently prevalent in the literature—although rapport building is highly recommended, it is unclear as to how it might interact with more coercive methods (see Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2015).

Last, it is important to note that our results do not necessarily attest to jurors' sensitivity or skepticism regarding confession evidence. According to Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter (1989), jurors can demonstrate sensitivity to confession evidence in that they recognize which interrogation factors are relevant to confession quality (i.e., knowledge), and can appropriately use this knowledge to render a verdict (i.e., integration; e.g., render fewer guilty verdicts for confessions procured from coercive vs. noncoercive techniques). Alternatively, jurors can demonstrate skepticism towards confession evidence (e.g., find confessions unreliable regardless of how they were elicited). It is possible that media surrounding disputed confession cases, while increasing prospective jurors' knowledge of false confessions, simply could be making jurors skeptical of confession evidence. Future research should address this question.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Overall, our results suggest that contemporary jurors are aware that Miranda waivers may be uninformed or the result of manipulation. To the extent that triers-of-fact are able to appreciate these factors and weigh them accordingly, policy reform should mandate the video recording of Miranda administrations that could be presented and evaluated in court. However, it is also possible that jurors, despite being aware of reasons innocents would waive their rights (e.g., respondents reported that innocents may waive their rights to appear not guilty to police and triers-of-fact), would draw negative inferences when a suspect remained silent or otherwise invoked his rights. Indeed, recent court rulings have allowed

prosecutors to use a suspect's silence against him as inculpating evidence (*Salinas v. Texas*, 2013). Hence, a policy reform to better protect innocent suspects may be to reestablish the initial precedent of the Miranda ruling and not allow any negative inferences to be used against suspects who remain silent and invoke their rights.

Regarding false confessions, relative to potential jurors of the past, contemporary potential jurors generally appear to be more accepting of the possibility that false confessions can occur. Furthermore, they seem to possess insight as to the coercive nature of certain interrogation methods and the propensity of these methods to result in less diagnostic confessions. These updated findings should be considered in the development of future research hypotheses, as it seems that researchers should no longer assume that jurors automatically presume guilt in the presence of a confession. Specifically, our findings are consistent with recent research showing that jurors are making better decisions in light of disputed confession evidence (e.g., Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). Nonetheless, considering that discrepant findings have emerged (e.g., Jones & Penrod, 2016), further research on the topic is needed so that researchers can better assess what contemporary jurors know and how they apply their knowledge.

In addition, our potential jurors' belief that coercive tactics can result in false confessions and should not be admissible in court paves the way for possible policy change. Past empirical research has demonstrated that psychologically coercive tactics have the potential to increase false confession rates (see Kassin et al., 2010)—a problem that respondents in our survey recognized. As such, it is possible that jurors will be less likely to rely on confession evidence that was elicited using such tactics. This phenomenon can be detrimental to police and prosecutors, as it can result in an increase in acquittals. Thus, prosecutorial legal players should consider ceasing the use of especially detrimental tactics (i.e., nondiagnostic interrogation techniques) and instead proactively implement evidence-based interrogation trainings for police officers (e.g., information-gathering approaches; see Meissner, Surmon-Böhr, Oleszkiewicz, & Alison, 2017; Meissner et al., 2015; Meissner et al., 2014). This can ultimately result in the production of more reliable confession evidence that jurors might find more valuable when making their verdict decisions (e.g., Jones & Brimbal, 2017).

Furthermore, our findings have implications for policies regarding juvenile interrogations. As previously mentioned, juveniles are typically treated similarly to adult suspects in interrogative contexts (Cleary & Warner, 2016), despite being at greater risk for falsely confessing (Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006). This is particularly problematic because, as indicated by the present findings that potential jurors do not fully comprehend the detrimental impact youth can have on confession behaviors, jurors may not be effective safeguards against negative impacts of juvenile false confessions. In fact, having an incomplete understanding of the risk youth poses to falsely confessing might extend to other legal players (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined to hear Brendan Dassey's appeal; Domonoske, 2018; Kassin, 2018). Thus, policies at the interrogation-level should be assessed and modified to help protect juvenile suspects. Several potential protections have been proposed, including requiring a lawyer to be present during interrogations of juveniles, mandatory video recording of juvenile interrogations, and updating and application of research-based juvenile interrogation curricula (see Cleary, 2017, for a review of developmental considerations and a description of these proposed protections for juveniles).

Last, even though potential jurors are generally more knowledgeable than they once were, their knowledge is still far from perfect (e.g., even when the majority of respondents' beliefs were consistent with research findings, there was still a notable portion of respondents, often 40+%, whose beliefs contradicted research findings or whose responses were at the midpoint of the scale). Indeed, psycholegal researchers' work is far from done, as the present respondents indicated that they would like to hear expert testimony in disputed confession cases, and a large majority of confession researchers indicate that juries are "better off with a competent expert" (Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018). Additionally, our finding that media regarding false confession cases may influence potential jurors' perceptions of interrogations and confessions indicates that expert researchers could use media outlets as a way to promote better understanding of how the coercive nature of certain interrogation methods can result in false confessions. It is further important that researchers take on this task in order to ensure that the information presented in such outlets is accurate and empirically supported. By engaging in public awareness, researchers might eventually influence policy regarding coercive interrogation methods and confession admissibility from the bottom-up (Kassin, 2017). Ultimately, this promotion of knowledge may reduce wrongful convictions stemming from false confessions.

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