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## **The Impact of Political Engagement on Social and Political Tolerance towards Immigrants in Southern Europe**

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# The Impact of Political Engagement on Social and Political Tolerance Towards Immigrants in Southern Europe

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## Abstract

Research in the area of attitudes towards immigration could benefit from a more thorough discussion of the relationship between degrees of political engagement and trust towards specific social institutions and the variance of political and social tolerance towards immigrants. Drawing upon three general theories: realistic group conflict theory, social identification theory, and institutional theory, I further refine a theory of ethnic competition and xenophobia in the Southern European context. I argue that popular attitudes towards immigration are correlated with a set of individual level factors (e.g. perceptions of personal and collective threat, as well as measures of political socialization), which are shaped and determined by the contextual characteristics (e.g. economic conditions and demographic characteristics) as well as the type of institutional environment (e.g. the presence or absence of support towards civic institutions) in which inter-group relations are embedded. The characterization of these institutional environments determine the type of ingroup-outgroup social relations. I first, empirically characterize the type of “civic communities” existing in 50 Southern European regions and then, empirically test its significance in preventing inter-group hostility and the fostering of tolerance towards minority groups. Results show that there is a strong significant effect between trust in institutions (such as NGOs and voluntary organizations) and decreased levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and intergroup conflict in Southern Europe. This paper provides evidence for the widespread effects that local minority group size and types of institutional trust have on political and social tolerance towards immigrants. Furthermore, evidence is provided that anti-immigrant sentiment has an extensive impact in Southern Europeans’ policy opinions. I explore thus the richness of civil society as a definitive characteristic of places and if/how it relates to people’s hostility towards immigrants and immigration policy.

## *Introduction*

- *In February 2000, rioting broke out in El Ejido, Almeria, a small town in the Southern region of Spain. The violent protests were levied against foreign owned commercial establishments and mosques as local resident vented their rage after the assassination of a young local girl allegedly by a Moroccan immigrant. Little or no police intervention ensued. While these events took place the offices of the NGO “Mujeres Progresistas”, advocates for immigrants social and labor rights, were burned and its members expelled from El Ejido.*
- *In March 1991, thousands of Albanian migrants were confined to football camps as the Italian government tried to find a humanitarian solution to the migrants seeking asylum in the country.*
- *In 1999, Greece launched “operation broom”; in which foreigners (with or without residence documents) were rounded up by the police, brought to the police station and finger printed for possible identification with pending criminal cases.*

The above vignettes reflect a few of the recent expressions of institutional racism and xenophobia that have emerged in Europe at the local and national levels. They also illustrate the institutional difficulties faced in trying to cope with the immigration phenomena in the last several decades in Southern Europe. While historically, Southern Europe has been a major exporter of labor to other regions of the globe, in the past twenty years this situation has changed dramatically (Vasta 1993; Melotti 1993; Corkill 2000). A combination of “push” and “pull” factors including famine, overpopulation in developing countries, and the demand for cheap labor has transformed Southern Europe into a port of destination for people from North Africa, the horn of Africa, Equatorial North Africa, the middle East, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe (EUMC Annual Report 2002).

Many scholars interested in this phenomenon have begun to question whether countries with past experience of mass emigration are better equipped to deal with becoming receptors of immigrants (See Vasta 1993; Del Olmo Vicen 1996; Corkill 2000). Recent events such as those cited above seem to suggest they have not. Numerous episodes fueled by racism and xenophobia throughout southern Europe suggest that a process of identity reconfiguration (or

Europeanization as a result of membership in the EU) and has helped “erase” the historical memory of its citizens and policy-makers as they themselves become perpetrators of discriminatory practices towards immigrants. In Greece, for example the annual human rights report of the United States State Department (February 1991) referred to a “pattern of economic and social discrimination against Albanians [migrants] and Turkish in Greece” (Christides 1996: 154). This discrimination has manifested itself systematically in the denial of construction permits, driving licenses and other documents and point to the necessity to link the debates of racism with broader themes of ideology, racial attitudes and political issues on repatriation and exclusion. As in Spain, Italy and Greece, in Portugal the employment market is clearly polarized with EU nationals working in more highly qualified professions and members of ethnic minorities working in the domestic help and construction industries (EUMC Annual Report 2002: 63).

In 1997 –“the European year against racism<sup>1</sup>”– the Eurobarometer survey showed a ‘worrying level’ of negative attitudes towards immigration in the 15 EU member states (Beate Winkler, Director of the EUMC in Thalhammer et. al., 2002).<sup>2</sup> However, three years later the results from the 2000 Eurobarometer survey showed some stability and even some improvement in different dimensions aimed to measure attitudes towards minorities. Interestingly, positive changes in attitudes towards minorities in the EU as a whole, contrasted with a predominance of negative attitudes for specific countries (Thalhammer, Zucha, Enzenhofer, Salfinger, and Ogris 2002: 49). For example, the overall support of European Union countries for statements such as ‘the presence of people from these minority groups is a cause of insecurity’ increased by 5% between 1997 and 2000; for individual countries such as Italy (10%), and Greece (11%), the

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<sup>1</sup> Slogan adopted by the EU.

<sup>2</sup> EUMC stands for European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia. <http://www.eumc.at>.

increase is even more substantial (Thalhammer, Zucha, Enzenhofer, Salfinger, and Ogris 2002: 51).

The literature on anti-immigrant sentiment and European Union reports on the rising levels of racism have mainly addressed this phenomena by looking at cross-national differences using the nation-state as the unit of analysis (Pettigrew 2000, Quillian 1995, Scheepers et al 2002). One important dimension lacking in these studies however is the heterogeneity *within* countries of these patterns of ethnic intolerance. The uneven economic growth, distinct institutional and social histories between European's Southern regions raise the question of whether different patterns of social exclusion towards immigrants may emerge depending on these local economic, institutional and social structures (Tondl 1999). For example, the type of responses of residents in regions such as Catalonia (Spain) with a large tradition of civic involvement in NGOs and voluntary organizations may differ from other regions without such a tradition. Or anti-immigrant sentiment may vary in the Italian regions of Puglia and Basilicata where despite a small immigrant population, experienced the arrival of massive numbers of Albanian immigrants in the nineties influencing overall attitudes. Acknowledging the importance of context can lead us to pose the question whether residents of regions with large urban metropolis experience greater or lesser degrees of anti-immigrant sentiments (such as Athens or Lisbon)? Thus the first question guiding this paper is whether significant differences exist between the European Union regions of Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain in their levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. A second question can be formulated as follows: to what extent can differences between and within regions in Southern Europe be explained by individual characteristics (such as SES, age, education), contextual characteristics and the interaction between the two?

To investigate public opinions towards immigrants and immigration policy several assumptions will be considered: 1) anti-immigrant sentiment is not only an individual level phenomena but a group level one; 2) national contexts (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) are inherently heterogeneous; 3) public opinion and attitudes are inspirations for policy makers but at the same time, policies and the institutional environments in which these policies are being promoted have an effect on attitudes towards immigration, thus triggering social change.

In order to address the above questions I further refine four ways to examine context: (1) I test the relationship between political engagement and attitudes towards immigration (as a form of racial prejudice) in the Southern European context; (2) I test whether prejudice is a function of group threat rather than self economic interest that dominant groups face; (3) I test whether contextual measures such as the ‘ethnic composition’ of places, ‘economic structure’ of regions and ‘trust in institutions’ have an effect on ethnic intolerance; and finally (4) I examine whether individual level effects are more salient in local cultural-institutional environments where less trust towards civic institutions and less resources to fight racism are promoted.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> There are at least three types of organizations involved in promoting pro-immigration social rights as well as fighting racism and xenophobia in Southern Europe: labor unions, pro immigrant NGOs and voluntary organizations. 1) Labor unions have exposed immigration exploitation and rallied against it in their campaigns and programmatic goals; they have focused on supporting pro-immigration legislation especially regarding issues of denouncing the abuse of employers of undocumented immigrants. They have also been particularly concerned with restrictive immigration laws as they relate to the proliferation of unregulated jobs in the informal economy. Labor unions tend not to make distinctions between immigrants and national workers regarding the defense of worker’s social and labor rights. Pro-immigrant associations defined as local nonprofit (mainly centered in providing services) explicitly organize to mobilize, and promote the fight against racism. Within this nonprofit group a distinction needs to be made between two groups: those formed by immigrants with the same nationality organized upon the arrival to the host country whom are centered on defending their particular national interests, versus those formed by nationals advocating pro-immigration issues more generally without any specific preference in terms of the immigrant’s nationality. Finally, religious and charitable organizations are frequently connected to local churches providing primarily aid and highly dependant on government funding and private endowments.

### *Ethnic intolerance towards immigration*

In a recent review on prejudice, policy, and public opinion, Maria Krysan identifies several existing methodological and theoretical gaps in the literature, one of which is the effect of contextual factors (Krysan 2000: 136). Scholars examining racism in Europe have also argued that the literatures on race relations have not been fully successful at examining contextual backgrounds of particular national settings and the relationships to trends in European societies more generally, to explain and describe the new forms of racism (Solomos and Wrench 1993: 8). Some researchers have focused on the role of individual level negative attitudes (see Pettigrew and Meeterens 1995, Jackson et. al 2000), as well as a combination between individual level and contextual country level variables (see McLaren 2003, Scheepers et. al 2002, Coenders et al 1998, Quillian 1995) to explain anti-immigrant sentiment and racial exclusionism in the European context but their focus has been primarily on economic and demographic composition of spaces with little attention to the types of institutional environments present in these localities.<sup>4</sup>

There is a common agreement within the epistemic community that the manifestation of racism and xenophobia is linked to the increasing numbers of foreigners, especially in European regions that had once perceived themselves as mono-ethnic or having a low degree of ethnic diversity (See Corkill 2000, Togeby 1998, Stephan et al., 1998, Del Olmo Vicen 1996, Allievi

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<sup>4</sup> The research on anti-immigrant sentiment and opposition to immigration policy will benefit from the extensive literature on prejudice and general beliefs and attitudes. This literature has measured traditional anti-black prejudice based on scales that evaluate stereotypes based on black's intelligence, work orientation, opinions of denial of racial discrimination, opposition to equal opportunity, and opposition to race-targeting policies (e. g. opposition to welfare programs). I have categorized this approach as "subjective" discrimination. Relevant work in this area has been conducted by: Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Farley, Krysan, Jackson, and Reeves 1994; Kluegel 2001; Pettigrew 2000; Quillian 1996; 1995; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman, 1997; Taylor 2000, 1998, 1995). I differentiate this approach from more "objective" studies focused on measurable variables such as potential sources of inequality across groups, such as gender and racial income differentials and occupational inequality (Beggs, Villemez and Arnold 1997; Burr, Galle, and Fosset 1991; Cohen, 2001; McCall, 2001; Tigges & Tootle 1993). What unifies these two approaches however is that both take into account *contextual characteristics* (such as minority group size) as one of the main predictors in accounting for discrimination (subjective and objective).



1996, Miles 1993, Small 1993, Barker 1981). There isn't however a persuasive theoretical model to explain the complexities and manifestations of the new forms of racism in Southern Europe. The model that I propose examines ethnic competition, social identification processes, and institutional environments and links them to the attitudes towards immigration and immigration policy. My theoretical point of departure assumes that social context structurally determines the opportunities, benefits and constraints of certain groups who interact in competition with others for scarce resources. The economic competition model assumes that economically depressed areas provide the social scenario where group strategies and negative beliefs take form, and by extension how these beliefs and structural conditions impact attitudes towards policies aimed to reduce inequality among different groups. Following Bobo and Hutchins (1993), and more generally Blumer (1954), I draw upon a theory of prejudice defined as a group position that sees itself threatened resulting in particular attitudes and use Southern Europe as my empirical setting.

#### Theoretical approaches

This paper articulates together two main theoretical influences: the “realistic group conflict theory” and “social identification theory”. Realistic group conflict theory focuses on the fact that “mere perceptions of group deprivation may be sufficient to trigger out-group antagonism, real conflicts of interest may not be necessary” (Sears et. al 2000:23). Social identity theory further reinforces this idea that the tendencies to favor in-group members and discriminate against out-group occurs even between groups without histories of conflict or competition over limited resources, or indeed any prior interaction (Sears et al 2000). For the theoretical specification of my analysis, I employ these theories on racial and ethnic prejudice that have been used in studies of Black-White discrimination, anti-immigration sentiment and opposition

to immigration policies predominantly in the U.S and Western Europe (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; see also Kluegel and Smith 1982; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Taylor 1998; 2000; Sidaneus et al 2000; Bobo 2000). I examine stances towards policies focusing on how individual *conditions*, individual *perceptions* and *contextual* factors affect specific attitudes to the granting of civil rights as well as intolerance towards immigrants. Individual conditions might refer to, for example, how people with fewer years of education are more likely to have anti-immigrant sentiments. I also control for theories of individual perceptions (for example perceptions towards collective economic threat or ideas of multiculturalism) and finally how contextual characteristics are mediating factors in explaining ethnic exclusionism. Racial prejudice is measured through the subtle and blatant forms of racism through individual opinions towards immigrants and immigration policy. Following these literatures I take into account measures that are theorized as key correlates of policy behavior related to social rights and immigration restriction; such as categories of self interest (based on perceived resource competition, beliefs and stereotypes) and perceived group threat feelings of prejudice (Jackson et al., 2001:433, see also Esses et al., 1998). Quillian's (1995) separates the individual correlates of racial prejudice (such as education, SES, and age); and 'self-interest theories' (such as competition perception, and personal conflict). Other theories taken into account in this paper look at strong local and regional identification processes (see Hjerm 1998; Pettigrew 2000, Sears et. Al., 1997; Quillian 1995 and for an extensive review Krysan 2000).

Another key approach to explain prejudice is the role political ideology plays (Sears et al 2000). Political ideology is a crucial element to understand "conservative" and "liberal" policy preferences in issues such as immigration policy. Theorists of new forms of racism traditionally relate racial prejudice to conservative ideological leanings, but both dimensions are two

independent factors that predict specific political attitudes (Sears et al 2000). Focusing on group threat in relation to immigrant's settlements and racial composition of places has been proven to be an effective way to test whether "racial sentiment" and political ideology have an extensive impact or not on American's policy opinions (See Taylor 2000, 1998). Taylor (2000) for example, examined the effects that concentration of sizeable minorities in particular places had on American white's hostility and by extension on their public opinions. Building upon this idea that "context" matters (in forms of racial settlements and ethnic composition of places) to examine the connection between prejudice and public policy opinions, this paper introduces trust towards particular types of organizations, as a potentially significant contextual factor that influence processes of public opinion formation.

As argued by Pettigrew (2000) the type of political engagement (such as vote intention or political interest) is correlated with decreasing forms of blatant racism (See Pettigrew 2000: 293). While Pettigrew's measures of political engagement are captured at the individual level, I argue that political engagement can be also a characteristic of communities that shape the inter-group relations. Following Quillian (1995), Scheepers' et al. (2002) work has further refined the study of ethnic exclusion in Europe by combining processes characterized by in-group identification, and competition over scarce resources. Using the Eurobarometer 1997 Scheepers et al. (2002), combine in-group identification (SIT) and realistic conflict theory (RCT) in a model that these authors call 'ethnic competition theory' (ECT). This ECT model is summarized in the proposition: "competition, at the individual level as well as at the contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism" (Scheepers et al., 2002: 18). My work builds upon the models proposed by Scheepers et al (2002) but further refines the specification model by separating

ethnic exclusionism from individual level political engagement and the institutional characteristics in which self interest and collective perceptions of threat processes are embedded. In the following pages, I will argue that forms of ‘trust towards specific social institutions’ such as NGOs or voluntary organizations’ or ‘police, army and church’ are important ‘contextual’ dimensions to understand immigration policy orientations. Trust towards specific institutions in relation with the immigrant composition of Southern European regions can inform us of the nature of prejudice and the role of institutions at the community level. If places with high concentration of minorities also have a population that displays less trust towards civic community type of institutions I will be able to further reinforce the claim that racial/ethnic prejudice has an extensive impact on European’s policy orientations in Southern Europe.

#### Political engagement, institutions and social capital

Building upon Scheeper’s et al (2002) ethnic competition model, this paper incorporates the larger issue of how particular forms of public opinion and institutions are interrelated and are to a certain extent mutually constituted (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). I argue that the system of beliefs and attitudes (e.g. perceived threat of immigrants’ impact on social welfare or crime) is constituted in specific environments in which different types of ‘civic communities’ (Putnam 1993) are considered to be mechanisms of public opinion formation; creating thus a circular reinforcing relationship.

This paper utilizes the variance of generalized trust towards an array of social institutions (such as national and regional governments, political parties, NGOs, church associations, police, army, civil service, charitable organizations, unions, UN, EU parliament etc) across different regions within Southern European countries, as a way to characterize regional forms of social

capital which result in different types of civic engagement and ultimately with the immigration phenomena. Following Barber (1983), the notion of trust is defined as:

“socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of associations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders, that set the fundamental understandings for their lives” (Barber 1983: 165).

As pointed out by Paxon (1999) “individuals can also hold opinions about the trustworthiness of abstract systems, such as institutions, which are aggregations of individuals embedded in particular social structures” (Paxon 1999: 99). Following the work of Putnam (1995) and Fukuyama (1995) I utilize social capital as a macrosociological framework, a feature of a community, measured at the aggregate level, with the expected social benefit of producing positive inter-group relations or in other words, for the purposes of the paper, positive attitudes towards immigrants.

In the literature on anti-immigrant exclusion in Europe, little attention has been paid to the role that “political engagement” (with the exception of looking at individual’s political interest and party identification, see Pettigrew 2000), the role of institutions at the community level, and aggregate levels of social capital (e.g. trust in the political system) have in explaining particular individual orientations towards immigration policy such as the endorsement of pro-immigration policies and overall tolerance towards immigrants. I argue that the issue of political engagement needs to be extended to include local institutions and civil communities to understand new forms of ethnic exclusionism in Southern Europe (see also Portes 1993, Beggs 1995, Bowles 1999, Durlauf 1999). My use of “institutional environment” encompasses institutions as a contextual mediating exogenous factor that affects how the social fabric and public opinion is constituted. Several scholars have explored the relationship between the institutions and broader notions of the social fabric (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and

Powell 1983, Tolbert and Zucker 1983, Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer and Scott 1994, and Beggs 1995). Meyer and Rowan (1977) emphasizes for example how the force of public opinion, the views of important constituencies, the knowledge legitimated through education, social prestige, laws and definitions of prudence and negligence are mechanisms that encourage organizations to respond to societal pressures (Meyer et al.1973: 343). This literature emphasizes how organizations in different social settings respond to their specific environments adapting their structures to legitimated practices and actions dictated by the social fabric.<sup>5</sup> Other scholars have focused on how governmental policies and non-governmental pressures (e.g. through civic community action) reproduce different inequality structures (Beggs 1995). My focus is not only on how institutionalized rules and norms of society (which is one of the main focuses of organizational theory) influence organizations but also how these norms are also *a product* of the type of environments in which institutions and organizations operate.

Institutional theory thus focuses on the beliefs and shared social reality as well as processes by which institutions and organizations tend to “become instilled with value and social meaning” (Oliver 1991: 145). As such, this theoretical approach seeks to shed light on how institutions are external forces that are collectively constituted or interconnected to the expectations of the society as a whole. These expectations include not only the norms, regulatory laws of the state, but also the expectations of interest groups and public opinion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1991, Scott 1984). I propose an analytical model that examines the relationship between institutions and the actual relationship that these institutional environments have on popular perceptions towards immigration and immigration policy. NGOs for example can be seen as organizations that deploy active resistance to social policies that negatively affect

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<sup>5</sup> Adaptation processes follow what in institutional theory is called isomorphic adaptation. These isomorphic processes are the result of coercive, normative and cognitive pressures (for a further discussion of this processes, see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mizruchi and Fein 1999) ;

marginalized populations including immigrants. In this sense, they explicitly *challenge* the requirements and ‘rationality’ of what constitutes effective immigration policy, by negotiating action within the parameters of explicit rules (current ‘anti-immigration’ laws) and through the formulation of ‘alternative’ views of the immigration phenomena and the formulation of adequate policy. In contrast, governmental organizations in efforts to balance the expectations of multiple constituencies seek to promote social stability and a *conflict-free* environment in which immigration policies adapt to the expectations of the local constituencies. NGOs therefore are explicitly hoping to change or at very least influence governmental laws, and one way to do that, is by mobilizing external constituencies (public opinion) reinforcing the need for more permissive policies. NGOs have come to portray themselves as active agents of change in trying to influence the environment in which they are embedded. However, it remains to be seen whether this goal is actually attained.

I separate the role of NGOs as a mediating factor in ethnic inter-group relations. State and non-state actors actively develop resources and participate in networks aimed to fight racism and prejudice. These networks of support are quantifiable resources spread throughout the regions of Southern Europe. NGO and voluntary associations are key actors in preventing and reacting towards social inequality. Therefore, my research defines a set of *cultural-institutional environment* factors that capture the degree to which state and non-state actors have influenced or engaged with constituencies in contexts where immigration might be perceived more or less positively. While local contextual characteristics are central to my argument it is important to note other mediating factors as well. These include individual’s participation and trust in democracy and trust in the political system as a measure of ‘civicness’ which I hypothesize affects individual’s orientations toward immigration policy. I thus link the literature on racial

prejudice and public opinion formation to the literature on institutional theory and social capital. Contextual analysis permits me to combine these different literatures to understand the different dimensions and units of analysis in which racial and anti-immigrant prejudice is occurring. In the next section of the paper the main hypotheses are laid out:

*Defining hypotheses: Testing intolerance towards immigration: Individual self interest versus collective conditions of perceived threat*

Objective individual conditions

The literature divides realistic conflict versus perceived threat as two different conceptualizations that assume the analytical distinction between self and group threat. Realistic threat is related to a respondent's objective economic condition. Realistic threat refers to the perceived impact that immigrants have on one's personal circumstances. Past studies suggest that the objective economic position or general financial deprivation is related to overall xenophobia and the tendency to agree with statements such as sending back of legal immigrants no matter what their social or political circumstances are. The objective economic conditions are tested with a measure based on a respondent's employment risk situation. As empirically shown in Fetzer's (2000) study on public attitudes towards immigration in the United States, Germany and France; "the available empirical evidence suggests that being unemployed, being rich or poor, or suffering from declining or improving personal finances has no direct influence on American's immigration-related attitudes (Fetzer 2000: 103). Similarly, for the French case, "working as a professional or manager, being poor, suffering from declining finances, being unemployed or working as a manual laborer had no effect" (p.117). Different results were obtained in Scheepers et al (2000) where being a manual worker, routine non-manual, petty bourgeois versus a "service class" worker yielded significant levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. In order to test this for the



case of the Southern European regions, I created a dichotomous measure of unemployment risk after leaving out students, and retired people and compared it with low skilled workers and highly skilled workers. Previous studies based on self economic interest theory demonstrate that the objective economic condition is predicted to have an effect on the level of attitudes towards immigration. From self economic interest the hypothesis assumes that being poor, underprivileged or unemployed fuels anti-immigrant sentiment. Contrarily, as previously demonstrated from the perspective of marginality theory a non significant effect can be also expected. My study undertakes these same questions.

Four additional control variables were included in the analysis below. These include: education, life satisfaction, marital status, having an immigrant as relative. Education has been shown to contribute to processes of democratization and reduces the out-group hostility (see Nie et al 1996). A measure of anxiety status is also related to how life is perceived in general. Life satisfaction is correlated with economic optimism and has a direct effect in reducing people's perception of the impacts that immigrant's have in their lives. Marital status was included as a dichotomous variable, as it is predicted that married versus unmarried people may perceive immigrants more negatively as having an impact on their families' overall economic interests. Finally, a measure of out-group relative was included to control for inter-group contact through kin relationships. Respondents with an out-group relative are predicted to endorse less restrictive immigration policy and will have more positive attitudes towards immigration. Hence, the following hypotheses can be formulated as follow:

*Hypothesis 1: Prejudice (measured as ethnic intolerance and opposition to immigration policies) will be stronger among (1a) low educated people; (1b) people with stronger anxiety status (negative perception of life), (1c) unemployed people, (1d) married people, (1e) people without out-group relative.*

## Individual's political engagement

I measure 'political engagement' at the individual level by examining citizens' participation and subjective perception of how democracy and the political system work. I argue that "political engagement" at the individual level exists and will vary in accordance with different experiences of political socialization. As pointed out by Pettigrew (2000), using 1988 data on 15 European countries, 'political engagement' correlates negatively with measures of prejudice (p. 287). One standard measure of political engagement previously utilized in the literature is individual's response concerning his/her "intention to vote or not" (Putnam 1993). Other studies have shown the interrelation between ideological identification and political attitudes (see Pettigrew 2000, Sniderman et al 2000, Evans et al., 1996; Freishman 1986). Political party positions on issues of immigration policy will be correlated with public opinion and perceptions towards immigrants (this is explored in chapter 4). Putnam also argued that Tocqueville stressed the connection in modern society between civic vitality and local newspapers. Newspaper readers are better informed than nonreaders and thus better equipped to participate in civic deliberations (Putnam 1993). National pride is utilized in the analysis as an indicator of strong in-group identification and out-group hostility. These are all variables that I can explore through data available in the Eurobarometer. Regarding political engagement the following hypotheses are formulated:

*Hypothesis 2: Prejudice (measured as ethnic exclusionism and opposition to immigration policies) will be stronger if respondent's (2a) scores are lower with regard to satisfaction with democracy and political system; (2b) are ideologically more conservative; (2c) show lower levels of media use index; (2d) display more pride in national identity.*

Mediating factors: Individual's perceptions of threat

Perceived threat refers to individuals' perception of the negative effects of immigration on the community as a whole. This perceived threat refers to Blumer's group position or collective threat model. The application of Blumer's group position model assumes that individuals perception of immigration works better as a collective threat rather than as an individual threat. Following Jackson's et al (2001) methodological approach using factor analysis I created a set of indicators of threat combining 22 items.

For this analysis a set of factors were created to measure the perceived group threat (see Table 5.1). The factor "perceived economic and political threat" encapsulates people's fears towards: the impact that immigration has on the educational standards, immigrant's abuse of the system of social benefits, the preferential treatment by the authorities, the threats that religious practices may cause to a way of life, immigrant's causing insecurity, and immigrant's increasing unemployment. A second factor was created to measure people's "limits of assimilation". This "limits of assimilation" factor refers to peoples' perceptions of the limits and conditions that receiving societies should impose on newcomers. Increasing social and economic problems are associated with the increase and origin of immigrants and a successful integration is conditioned upon immigrants to giving up parts of their culture, religion and law, particularly those that may conflict with the principles prevalent in receiving societies.

Two additional factor solutions resulted from the factor analysis that measured individual's awareness of discrimination in: practices conducted by the government (authorities), and hiring practices conducted by employers. Items signaling respondent's awareness towards discriminatory practices in terms of housing, and education were also included. Acknowledgement of the existence of these discriminatory practices and circumstances is correlated with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Finally, a fourth measure called

“multiculturalism” measures respondents’ willingness to accept other people’s cultures, and religious practices. These factors measured respondent’s willingness to accept other people’s culture in their own country, and acknowledged the enrichment provided to society by cultural differences. Using the five mediating factors, the following hypotheses can be tested:

*Hypothesis 3: Prejudice (measured as opposition to immigration) will be stronger among (3a) respondent’s who have higher levels of perceptions of economic and political threat (for example perception that immigration produces unemployment); (3b) respondent’s accepting inter-group incompatibilities; (3c) respondent’s with lesser awareness of discrimination; (3d) respondent’s with lesser acceptance of multiculturalism. (3e) respondents who perceive minority groups are too large.*

#### Contextual conditions

Many scholars suggest that situating context at the center of social scientific research is a key defining claim of the sociological perspective (DiPetre and Forrissal 1994). Blalock (1984) defines contextual analysis as follows: “the essential feature of all contextual effects models is an allowance for macro processes that are presumed to have an impact on the individual actor over and above the effects of any individual-level variables that may be operating” (Blalock 1984: 354). Nevertheless, the notion of context remains vague. As DiPetre et. al., acknowledge, multiple contexts can have porous and overlapping boundaries that, not surprisingly, can introduce high degrees of complexity to statistical modeling (DiPetre and Forrissal 1994: 331). To analyze the anti-immigrant and anti-immigration policy sentiments in Southern Europe I assume Mary Jackman’s position that racial policy attitudes are not only a direct consequence of personal prejudice but are related to institutions and inequalities in our society (Jackman 1994).

Economic competition has also been a key emphasis among group threat theorists who emphasize the importance of contextual factors. The notion of competition used by Quillian (1995), Taylor (1998, 2000) and Scheepers et al., (2002) is summarized in Blalock’s proposition

that these actual competitive conditions affect majority group's perceptions, that is, the subjective perceived socioeconomic threat. I build on theories of economic interest and group conflict theories that assume that social groups are more likely to blame others for the increasing competition for scarce resources. This perception is likely to engender negative attitudes towards immigrants (Blalock 1967, Lieberson 1980, Giles and Evans 1985, Jackman 1994). I draw from Allport's (1954) classic hypothesis on 'visibility-discrimination' that uses the size of a minority group as a determinant for racism and prejudice. Le Vine and Campbell (1972) further propose that competition over resources in contexts with proximity and contact between the dominant and subordinate groups increases hostility (Le Vine et al., 1972; in Esses et al 1998: 701). The empirical literature has also captured this distinction between *actual* and *perceived* competition with the notion of *contextual characteristics*, which is frequently limited to minority group size and the economic condition of the dominant group (Quillian 1995, see also Espenshade and Hempstead 1996 for the relationship between US unemployment rates and American's attitudes towards immigration in the United States). Quillian (1995) and Taylor's (1998, 2000) major results show that the average prejudices across different places are strongly related to the threat perceived by the dominant group, and as such contextual characteristics including relative size of the subordinate group and economic context are strongly associated with the degree of prejudice expressed by the dominant group (Quillian 1995: 606, Taylor 1998). Likewise, I look at other relevant measures such as concentration of minority groups (African residents per a thousand local residents) and economic indicators (GDP per head of the family, regional unemployment rates) throughout different Southern European regions (Lubbers et. al., 2002; Taylor 2000, 1998; Beggs 1995). Using additional contextual demographic measures, I also test the significance of regional interior immigration demographic patterns (tested in chapter 5 BUT NOT INCLUDED

IN THIS PAPER). I hypothesize that anti-immigrant sentiment will be correlated with emigration experiences in southern European regions.

This research takes into account the growing body of literature on the effects of ‘networks of support’ on processes of adaptation and integration of ‘new migrants’ into new settings (see Falcon and Melendez 2001; Nee and Sanders 1994; Portes et. al., 1992, 1980). Robert Putnam argues that *civil associations* “contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government... because of their “internal” effects on individual members and because of their “external” effects on their wider polity (Putnam 1993: 89). Furthermore, participation and membership in civic organizations fosters cooperation and tends to ease negative attitudes as a result of greater group interaction (Putnam 1993:90). I utilize the concept of institutional environment to examine how different environments characterized by the support of and involvement in associations of civil society can reproduce environments with less inter-group hostility.

In localities with more liberal attitudes (norms and rules) towards immigration policies and immigrants, I expect to find an institutional environment that will be more proactive in organizing campaigns and programs that reinforce these types of values. In contrast, I expect to find that in localities characterized by more trust in conservative institutions such as (the police, the army, and church) there will be an increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. In these conservative environments, the presence of NGOs working on anti-racism and multicultural programs will be weaker and their potential positive impact will be less salient. I intend to capture the ‘civic-ness’ of southern European regions at the macro level by assessing the trust of NGOs and civil service type of organizations. Finally I also take into account “strong

local attachment” using respondent’s degree of attachment to their city/town as an indicator of strong in-group identification. The following hypotheses are thus developed and tested as follow:

*Hypothesis 4: Prejudice (measured as ethnic exclusionism and opposition to immigration policies) will be stronger in regions with high ethnic competition measured as: (4a) higher proportion of African residents, (4b) higher levels of unemployment. (4c) in regions less economically developed (4d) in regions with lower levels of union membership. (4d) in regions with higher mean levels of local attachment to the city/town.*

*Cross level interactions:*

*Hypothesis 5: If economic and political threat is the driving force in Southern European regions that explains the support for policies to restrict immigration, then the negative relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and multiculturalism will be stronger in regions with (5a) higher levels of trust towards NGOs, (5b) with higher levels of African residents.*

*Hypothesis 6: (6a) In regions with higher support for civic society organizations (such as NGO and civil society organizations) destined to create bridges between dominant and subordinate groups, the effect of political stance on anti-immigrant sentiment will be weaker. (6b) In regions with higher concentration of minorities the effects of political stance on anti-immigrant sentiment will be stronger.*

Data and operationalization of variables:

Since 1988 a unit called NUTS, (administrative regional units) have been utilized to establish a standardized division of the territorial units of the EU to conduct and collect regional statistical information. The standard sample design of the Eurobarometers cover the 50 regional territorial units, covering the population aged 15 and over, resident in each European Union member state. The individual level sample for the four countries examined in this paper is N=7,656 cases. I selected out those respondents that consider themselves as belonging to a minority group from the final sample. The basic sample design in all member states is a multistage, random (probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points were drawn

with probability proportional to population size (of total coverage of the country) and to population density. For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the “administrative regional units”, after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT-NUTS II (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective EU-nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. The dependent and independent variables were operationalized as follow:

“Anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-immigrant policy”

The main theoretical influence of this paper is Blumer’s conceptualization of group level variables differentiated from the individual level (self interest effects) as intervening effects on attitudes towards immigration. The dependent variable thus measures prejudice towards immigrants using a similar measure of ‘sending back immigrants’ (also utilized in Quillian (1995), Jackson et al (2001) and McLaren (2003)). As in previous studies, anti-immigrant prejudice is measured as the negative attitudes towards out-group members and the favoring of immigration policies aiming to expel or send back immigrants to their country of origin (see McLaren 2003, Jackson et al 2001, Quillian 1995).

Table 5.2 shows the regional means and standard deviation of the variable utilized in this paper to measure anti-immigrant sentiment. I use a five point scale in which respondents agreed or disagreed with questions regarding legal immigrants only living in European Union countries. In this scale 5 refers to the respondents favoring that “legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be send back to their country of origin”, 4 refers to favoring that “legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be send back to their country of origin if they are unemployed”; 3 “legally established immigrants from outside



the European Union should be send back to their country of origin if they have been convicted of a serious offense”; 2 “all legal immigrants should be granted the same social rights than the rest of EU citizens”; and 1 refers to favoring that “legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their family in (OUR COUNTRY) and legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become naturalized easily”. As in McLaren (2003) the scale combines three items that express prejudice with two items that express favoring the social integration of legal immigrants.

“Self Interest variables”:

Five variables capture individual level self economic interest. “Unemployment” refers to whether respondents are currently unemployed. “Low skill occupation” refers to respondents with occupations in farming, fishing, owners of a shop, or drivers as defined by the Eurobarometer. “Highly skilled occupation” refers to those respondents with highly skilled occupations in the professional sector (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architects), business proprietors of a company, managing directors, middle management, and technicians. These three variables are dichotomous, where 1 refers to respondents belonging to such category and 0 if otherwise. The “anxiety status” variable measures the respondent’s happiness of how things are going in their life. “Out-group relative” is a dichotomous control variable that accounts for a respondent’s family ties with minority group members.

Political engagement measures:

Four measures of political socialization are included in the model of anti-immigration sentiment: “Satisfaction with democracy” is a four point scale, where 4 refers to “very satisfied” respondents and 1 “not at all satisfied” with how democracy works. The “media use index” was computed using frequency of different media usage (TV, radio and press). 1 refers to high levels of media use and 0 low levels of media usage. “Political stance” was measured using the 10 point scale variable left-right self placement provided by the Eurobarometer survey. To capture the distribution of this variable, this scale was recoded to a 5 point scale, where the left-right, equals the liberal-conservative political beliefs scale. Individual level “national pride” aims to capture strong “in-group” versus “out-group” identification through the respondent’s degree of national pride. It is hypothesized that individuals with stronger identification with their nationality would be more likely to perceive immigration as a national threat.

Mediating “group threat” variables:

The model for anti-immigrant sentiment and endorsement of anti-immigration policies includes a set of mediating variables related to collective perceived threat. Some scholarship has assumed that these mediating factors need to be included in a measure of blatant prejudice (see Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), however using factor analysis techniques as demonstrated by Scheepers et al (2002) they show how the perceived threat indicator constitutes an independent factor distinct from their measure of “ethnic exclusionism” (Scheepers et al 2002: 22). These scholars (2002), measure “ethnic exclusionism” similarly, utilizing the Eurobarometer 47.1 questions on respondents’ reasons to “send back immigration” which I also use to create my dependent variable on “anti-immigrant sentiment” (see also Jackson et. al, 2000, Quillian 1995, and McLaren 2003 for different scales using the “sending back questions”). By also using data reduction techniques my work supports Scheepers’ et al claims that perceived threat measures

constitute an independent factor that therefore has the explanatory power to the measure anti-immigrant sentiment. The collective perceived threat measures of “perceptions of minority group size”, “perceived economic and political threat”, “incompatibility and limits of assimilation”, “awareness of discrimination” and “multiculturalism’ are thus treated as mediating variables that explain the individual’s orientation towards immigration policy. Table 5.2 shows the regional mean levels and standard deviation for the five indicators of threat in the 50 Southern European regions. The variable “perceived economic/political threat” shows less dispersion in the mean levels of threat across regions and also across countries.

#### Contextual characteristics:

The national statistical offices for Italy, Greece and Spain and the Ministerio del Interior in Portugal were used to capture the “minority group size” for specific African (including North African and Sub-Saharan Africans) immigrants residents in the four countries. An additional variable was created “International immigration flows” which refers to the annual movement involving crossing national borders. This data on immigration flows is available from the Eurostat Regio data set computed at the NUTS II level. The problem with this variable is that includes national and non-national residents that moved to Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Therefore the “international immigration flows” variable refers to the number of immigrants (nationals and non-nationals) coming from outside of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain as a percentage of the total population at the regional level.<sup>6</sup> This variable is thus a proxy to a true indicator of movement of non-nationals to the Southern European regions. This measure was only used to test the validity of the minority group size variable. The correlation between the

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<sup>6</sup> For this variable the only year with complete information for all the NUTS II level variables is 1996. The relationship between regional immigrant composition and anti-immigrant sentiment is a more conservative estimate, since immigration has been increasing regularly.

measure of “international immigration” and the “size of minority group” (African residents) extracted from the national statistical offices (at the NUTS II regional level) was significantly correlated at .634 ( $p < .000$ ) using the 50 regions for Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. For the analysis for the four countries sample (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) I utilized the “minority group size” accounting for bias due to the lack of accountability for undocumented immigrants (for example, such as in the cases of Albanians in Greece, and Africans in Portugal) which are two major groups of immigrants in these two countries. Therefore the analysis for the four countries regarding the hypothesis of ethnic composition of places is less precise regarding the hypothesis on ethnic composition and its effects on anti-immigrant sentiment. Table 5.3 shows the regional mean and standard deviations for the main demographic variables utilized in the analysis. Regions are presented in this table from North to South in the four countries. In Italy the Northern and Central regions (such as Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna) show higher levels of African residents compared to the regions of the South (such as Puglia, Basilicata, Sicily). For Greece the highest levels of immigrant concentration occurs in the region of “East Stera and Evia” which includes high concentrations of immigrants in Athens. In Portugal, Lisbon, Alentejo, and Algarve show also the highest concentration of African residents. Spain has the highest levels of African immigrant residency in Cataluña, Madrid, Andalucía, Murcia and the Canary Islands. In the first three regions immigrants are concentrated in the cities of Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia, while in Andalucía and Murcia immigrants are more spread through the region, where agriculture is the main economic activity.

Regarding the hypotheses on regional economic development two measures are defined using regional NUTS II level. The literature on economic development that cross-examines regional nuts II regions in Southern Europe suggest that GDP/PPP (purchasing power parity of

the head of the family) is the best measure of economic development. Using the standardized data provided by Eurostat, regional “unemployment rates” were also utilized. Northern Italy has the highest levels of economic development of the four countries. Some regions of Southern Italy jointly with Spain show the highest levels of unemployment rates in some of its regions. In Greece, Portugal and Spain the economic development is more evenly distributed.

I define local *institutional environments* as the resulting matrix of support for state and non-state institutions actively involved in developing networks, and resources to fight for social justice at the regional level. These networks of support are quantifiable resources spread throughout the regions of Southern Europe. A set of institutional environment factors were produced attempting to capture the degree to which state and non-state actors have fostered a context where immigration might be perceived more positively. The results in Table 5.4 show a principal components analysis after a varimax rotation using a pooled sample from four additional Eurobarometers covering the time frame 1997-2000 (with factor loadings of less than .30 removed from the analysis). I use this technique to characterize and create four contextual dimensions regarding the institutional environment of the 50 Southern European regions. Factor I refers to “trust in the political system and democracy”. This factor combines trust towards the following social institutions (national government, national parliament, trust towards European Union, trust towards political parties, trust towards civil service, and trust towards United Nations). Factor II refers to “trust towards conservative institutions” such as trust in the police, army, and the church). Factor III refers to trust towards media institutions (trust towards TV, radio, and press). Factor IV refers to trust towards civic type institutions such as civil service, NGOs and voluntary organizations. Factor II and IV correlate negatively (-.153), while Factor I

and IV correlate positively (.619). The four factor solution using data reduction techniques accounts for 54% of the total variance.

Unfortunately the Eurobarometer 53.0 does not ask questions regarding organization membership with the exception of union membership. A measure of “union density” was created measured as union members minus retired workers, students, and unemployed as a percentage of the dependent labor force (as reported by Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000). Portugal and Spain show higher levels of union membership compared to Greece and Italy. Unions have incorporated denouncements of immigration exploitation into their campaigns and programmatic goals. Unions have also incorporated pro-immigration legislation especially regarding issues of abuses of undocumented immigrants by construction companies, domestic service and agriculture sectors. Labor unions are particularly concerned with the restrictive immigration laws as they relate to the proliferation of unregulated jobs in the informal economy. Labor unions tend not to make distinctions between immigrants and national workers regarding the defense of worker’s social and labor rights. The “Strong attachment towards City/Town” was measured as a 4 point scale where 4 refers to “strong local attachment” to 1” little local attachment”. This variable was further measured as an aggregate mean regional level of local attachment for the NUTS II level units. This variable aims to capture whether strong local identification is related to stronger out-group hostility.

#### Modeling heterogeneity and contextuality

In order to test the heterogeneity and contextuality of anti-immigrant sentiment in the Southern European regions I apply a hierarchical linear model framework (HLM). HLM allows me to model individual level and contextual characteristics simultaneously. I first ran a contextual model for the four countries under study (see results in Table 5.5 for descriptive

statistics and correlations for the individual level variables), using the size of minority group (African residents) as the proxy on “international immigration” provided by the national statistical offices. I also have tested for the cross level interactions to examine the effects of multiculturalism and trust of institutions, and minority group size and political stance on the levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Using HLM, I tested the individual level variation in terms of anti-immigrant prejudice considering the effects of regional variability in terms of economic conditions, demographic composition and types of institutional environments of these regions. This model improves significantly the OLS regression model estimates because HLM assumes that individuals are nested within larger structures and the observations are not independent (regions in Southern Europe in this case). HLM produces better estimates and better standard errors of the parameters. Building upon Quillian (1995) and Scheepers et al’s (2002) previous analysis, I tested multiple models that allowed random effects at the regional level to better statistically capture individual level variation and produce unbiased estimates.

I began the analysis specifying the random intercept model including not only individual-level variation but also incorporating regional level variation without specifying any effects at the individual and contextual level (see model 1). Model 1 is a test for the existence of random effects at the regional level. The equations 1 and 2 represent the individual and contextual level without including any predictor for the dependent variable:

Micro model:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j}X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

Macro model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + \mu_{0j} \tag{2}$$

In this model  $Y_{ij}$  refers to the dependent variable level of anti-immigrant sentiment for individual  $i$  and region  $j$ . In model 1 I have specified the random term at the individual level  $\varepsilon_{ij}$ .  $\beta_{0j}$  is a function of the intercept for the micro level  $\beta_0$  model which is allowed to vary at the regional level  $\mu_{0j}$ . In model 1, neither individual level nor regional level effects are specified in order to explain anti-immigrant sentiment. Model 2 included a set of individual level effects regarding the socio-demographic variables (age, education, and sex) self-interest variables (unemployment, life satisfaction and marital status, out-group relative) and political engagement (national pride, media use index, satisfaction with democracy, political stance). These sets of effects measure how the individual's social background, socio-political socialization and economic objective self interest explain the his/hers orientations towards immigration. Equations 3 show these new set of effects. All these variables (except the dichotomous ones) are centered at the grand mean which refers to the overall mean across all the regions in our sample. The following equation includes the set of independent variables:

Micro level model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{Antimmig\ ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{Age\ ij} + \beta_{educ\ ij} + \beta_{sex\ ij} + \beta_{married\ ij} + \beta_{outgroup\ ij} \\
 & \beta_{lifesati\ ij} + \beta_{unemplo\ ij} + \beta_{Lowskill\ ij} + \beta_{natpride\ ij} + \beta_{media\ ij} + \beta_{satdemocr\ ij} + \quad (3) \\
 & \beta_{polstac\ ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}
 \end{aligned}$$

The macro level part of the random intercept model 2 is still specified as in model 1, equation 2. Model 3 includes the intervening effects regarding group threat perception: “perceived minority group size”, “perception of economic and political threat”, “limits of assimilation”, “discrimination awareness” and “multiculturalism”. Model 3 corresponds to equation 4. In model 3 the random intercept model is still specified as in equation 2 without entering any contextual variable into the macro level part of the model (equation 2). The focus



here is modeling the size of the individual level effects (regarding socio-demographic background, self interest, and political engagement) assuming that there is variation across regions at the intercept level.

Micro level model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{Antimmig\ ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{Age\ ij} + \beta_{educ\ ij} + \beta_{sex\ ij} + \beta_{married\ ij} + \beta_{Outgroup\ ij} + \\
 & \beta_{lifesati\ ij} + \beta_{unemplo\ ij} + \beta_{Lowskill\ ij} + \beta_{natpride\ ij} + \beta_{media\ ij} + \beta_{satdemocr\ ij} + \\
 & \beta_{polstac\ ij} + \beta_{persize\ ij} + \beta_{Econthreat\ ij} + \beta_{Limits\ ij} + \beta_{awareness\ ij} + \beta_{Multicul\ ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}
 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

In model 4, the contextual level variables are included for the intercept only model. The micro level part of the model remains as in equation 4, but the contextual level variables are introduced in the macro level part of the model. Equation 5 shows a set of macro level contextual variables that are allowed to vary at the level of the intercept. By introducing a set of contextual variables the results show the variance of intercepts between regions, or in other words, I show how the level of anti-immigrant sentiment (at the intercept level) is different depending on the type of regional environments measured through a set of contextual variables. Equation 5 shows the contextual variables introduced in the macro part of the random intercept model. The contextual variables are: “minority group size”, “regional GDP”, “regional unemployment rates”, “union density”, “Trust in conservative institutions”, “Trust in NGOs” and “Strong local attachment”. The model specified below includes all the macro level variables utilized for capturing the three contextual hypothesis regarding demographic composition, economic regional inequality, and institutional environment.

Macro level model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + \alpha \text{Groupsiz}_j + \alpha \text{regionalGDP}_j + \alpha \text{unemplo}_j + \alpha_1 \text{TrustConse } r_j + \alpha_1 \text{TrustNGO}_j + \alpha \text{Union}_j + \alpha \text{LocalAttac } h_j + \mu_{0j} \quad (5)$$

Finally, I tested a set of cross level interactions. Model 6 assumes that not only the mean level of anti-immigrant sentiment varies across regions but also the mean effects of particular independent variables may vary across regions. I was interested in testing if the different measures of perceived group threat varied across different regions. For example a special emphasis is given in testing for changes in the effect of multiculturalism on anti-immigrant sentiment as a function of the regional minority group size and degree of trust towards civic organizations. The resulting equation for a random-slope model including contextual effects for the slopes would add an additional equation (equation 6) to the equations 5 and 4. An additional cross level interaction was tested using individual level political ideology and minority group size and trust towards NGOs (as regional level variables) resulting in an additional equation (not shown). The resulting overall model including all the effects estimated:

Micro level model:

$$Y_{Antimmig \ ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta \text{Age}_{ij} + \beta \text{educ}_{ij} + \beta \text{sex}_{ij} + \beta \text{married}_{ij} + \beta \text{Outgroup}_{ij} + \beta \text{blifesati}_{ij} + \beta \text{unemplo}_{ij} + \beta \text{Lowskill}_{ij} + \beta \text{natpride}_{ij} + \beta \text{media}_{ij} + \beta \text{satdemocr}_{ij} + \beta \text{polstac}_{ij} + \beta \text{persize}_{ij} + \beta \text{Econthreat}_{ij} + \beta \text{Limits}_{ij} + \beta \text{awareness}_{ij} + \beta \text{Multicul}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (4)$$

Macro level model:

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + \alpha \text{Groupsiz}_j + \alpha \text{regionalGDP}_j + \alpha \text{unemplo}_j + \alpha_1 \text{TrustConse } r_j + \alpha_1 \text{TrustNGO}_j + \alpha \text{Union}_j + \alpha \text{LocalAttac } h_j + \mu_{0j} \quad (5)$$

$$\beta_{MULTICULj} = \beta_1 + \alpha \text{Groupsiz}_j + \alpha_1 \text{TrustNGO}_j + \mu_{0j} \quad (6)$$

## Results

Effects of individual level political engagement and self economic interest on political and social tolerance towards immigrants.

Table 5.7 shows the results for the hierarchical linear model (HLM) separating the individual level from the contextual effects. Model 2 shows how education reduces intolerance towards immigrants. The more educated individuals thus have more positive attitudes towards immigrants (hypothesis 1a). Although this effect corroborates previous research in the US and European context, the effect of education disappears after controlling for political engagement and the intermediate variable regarding group threat. The variable “life satisfaction” that relates to individual’s anxiety status regarding economic condition or life situation in general is a strong predictor of anti-immigrant intolerance (hypothesis 1b). Contrary to previous findings reported by Scheepers et. al (2002) regarding the significance of objective economic conditions, no significant results were found between unemployed workers compared to low skilled workers and highly skilled workers. For the sample utilized it seems the effects of marginalized economic exclusion of unemployed and low skilled workers were captured by the effects of education and anxiety status. Two additional hypotheses regarding the immigrant intolerance were also tested regarding the effects of married respondents (hypothesis 1d). In model 2 results show that married respondents indeed show higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiments but this significant result disappears after controlling for group political, economic and cultural threat. Having an out-group member as a relative also did not yield significant expected results towards endorsing tougher anti-immigrant views (hypothesis 1e). In model 2 the hypotheses regarding individual’s “political engagement” show that “democracy satisfaction” and “political stance” are significantly related to respondents political orientations towards immigration. Greater

satisfaction in how democracy works yielded lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, although the effect is barely significant at (.10). Contrarily, the effect of political stance is strong and highly significant. More conservative individuals show a consistently positive tendency towards endorsing tougher anti-immigrant policies (hypothesis 2b) even after controlling for the intermediate effects of collective group threat. Lower levels of use of media aiming to capture whether media exposure is correlated to specific or as an indicator of socio-political behavior did not yield any significant results (hypothesis 2c). “National pride” (as an indicator of strong national sentiment) did not yield any significant result towards anti-immigrant sentiment (hypothesis 2d). However, the potential effects of having greater local identification were captured at the context level with the measure of strong local attachment (see below). Compared to previous results, it seems that the role of individual economic social positions has less of an important role than the political engagement measures and perceptions of threat at the group level. Model 2 shows that the variance between regions (.080) is smaller than the variance between individuals within regions (.856). Model 2 also shows that by including the self interest and political engagement variables the variance between individuals dropped from (.886) to (.856). The variance between regions did not significantly decrease.

Model 3 introduces a set of control mediating variables aiming to capture the effects of group threat and “conservatism” at the level of collective perceptions of political, economic and cultural threat. After controlling for these sets of variables, the effects of “anxiety status” and “political stance” remained significant. The remaining of significant variables in model 2 (age, education, marital status etc) lost their significance after controlling for the mediating group threat variables. This implies that the group threat variables capture the differences between different social positions in terms of ethnic intolerance. Hypotheses (3a to 3d) were all confirmed

as expected. Those respondents that showed higher levels of “perceived impact that immigrants have on the public social system, unemployment rates and crime” were significantly (.000) correlated to endorsing anti-immigrant sentiment. Those whom perceived higher levels of immigration as related to problems with processes of social integration and assimilation were also highly significantly correlated with endorsing tougher anti-immigrant policies. The effects of perceived minority group size however were also correlated with anti-immigrant tolerance at (.10). The actual size of minority group size captures anti-immigrant sentiment, although as we will see below the size of the coefficient is very small. As expected, the two measures of “awareness towards discrimination” and “multiculturalism” were also correlated with reducing anti-immigrant sentiment. Data shows that group threat is manifested as an economic and political threat, which explains most of the variance of anti-immigrant sentiment (.401). As shown in the literature on the individual’s support of affirmative action policies in the US, the European case corroborates the importance of investing resources in programs that promote the benefits of legal procedures to reduce social inequality as well as the role of ‘multicultural’ programs in promoting the beneficial effects of diversity as an enriching force for the host countries.

The effects of contextual characteristics on anti-immigrant tolerance.

The civil society types of institutions such as NGOs and voluntary associations were tested to account for the benefits of investing in these organizations as they work to fight animosity towards migrants and the role that these types of organizations have in regions with high levels of social conflict. The potential relationship between trusting social institutions such as NGOs and voluntary organizations and pro-immigrant sentiment is due also on other type of contextual variables such as the economic conditions of the regions and the role of the ethnic and

demographic composition of the communities in which the inter-group relations takes place. The relationship between the type of institutional environment and public opinion sheds light on the connection between social conflict (measured as animosity towards migrants) and the intermediate role that civil society organizations have. Levels of anti-immigrant sentiment as well as the effects of multiculturalism vary depending on the social capital levels of particular communities.

Model 4 introduces a set of contextual variables at the regional level. I first tested the effects of the minority group size (as number of African residents per thousand local residents) as well as the economic conditions of the regions (measured as purchasing power parity of the head of the family, and unemployment regional rates). The contextual variables show that without controlling for the type of institutional environment both yielded significant results. In contexts with larger proportions of African residents the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiment increases (hypothesis 4a). There is also a positive relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and regions whose heads of households have high levels of purchasing power. This relationship contradicts the literature on the effects of context with high levels of economic inequality. As showed by Van der Gaag et al (1999) non EU migrants chose to relocate to urban areas and areas with low levels of unemployment. That would explain why in economically developed areas (measured as GDP/head) such as the Northern regions of Italy (Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, and Lombardia) or urban areas such as Lisbon o Vale do Tejo, Porto (Portugal), East Sterea and Evia (Greece), or Madrid, Comunidad Valenciana and Cataluna (Spain) the contextual coefficient is positively related to endorsing anti-immigrant policies. These areas show higher concentration of African residents which would prove the visibility discrimination

hypothesis (4a). Regions with higher levels of unemployment rates however did not yield significant results.

In model 5 the institutional environmental measures such as “union density”, “trust in NGOs or voluntary organizations”, and “conservative institutions” and “strong local attachment” were introduced into the analysis. Results show a moderate negative contextual effect (-.010) of trusting NGOs in relation to anti-immigrant sentiment. There is thus a connection between immigrant animosity and the type of response towards NGOs in particular communities. Support and trust towards NGOs may be influenced by the country specific general levels of engagement towards NGOs. The mean levels of support towards NGOs are higher in Portuguese and Spanish compared to Greek and Italian regions where anti-immigrant sentiment is also higher. As represented in figure 1, rather than capturing variability within countries in terms of North and South, the relationship between trust in institutions and anti-immigrant sentiment may be capturing variability across regions more precisely depending on the minority group size.

While “union density” and “conservative institutions” did not yield any significant contextual effects, “trust in NGOs” showed that there is a positive relationship between civic involvement and trust in civil society type of organizations and endorsing more positive attitudes towards immigrants. One potential explanation for this effect is that in those regions with higher concentration of African residents the levels of inter-group social conflict may be higher than in those regions smaller immigrant populations. This may produce a lower level of support towards institutions involved in the fight against racism. A second possible explanation would emphasize a reverse causality situation. Those regions with populations more involved in civic community organizations are intrinsically more inclined to have positive pro-immigrant sentiments.

Model 5 shows therefore how trust towards particular institutional environments (‘trust in NGOs’) yielded significant results explaining immigrant intolerance. Model 6 tests for the hypothesis regarding cross level interactions. The interaction effect tries to capture whether in places with more support for NGOs the effects of multiculturalism on preventing anti-immigrant sentiment are reduced. Table 5.8 shows that there are no significant interaction effects across levels, regarding “trust in NGOs” and the effects of “multiculturalism” on anti-immigrant sentiment (hypothesis 5a). Also, no significant cross level interaction effects were found using the variable ‘trust in NGOs’ and political stance (hypothesis 6a) on anti-immigrant sentiment. This suggests that conservatism is an independent factor from the type of regional levels of trust. Contrarily, it seems that the ethnic composition of places in terms of African residents increases the effect of political stance in explaining immigrant intolerance (hypothesis 6b). This further reinforces the findings that prejudice towards immigrants further increases in regions with larger minority groups. Minority group size also reduced the effect of multiculturalism on immigrant intolerance. In those places with larger numbers of African residents the effect of multiculturalism preventing prejudice is reduced, therefore the visibility of minority groups not only increases the mean regional levels of anti-immigrant sentiment but also reduces the positive effects such as those of multiculturalism.


Figure 1 shows the distribution of mean predicted prejudice as it relates to the “trust of NGOs and voluntary organizations” and “ethnic composition” of the 50 Southern European regions. The distribution shows how in regions with high levels of social conflict trust in NGOs tends to be lower. In these regions, the concentration of minority groups also tend to be also larger. Cases 38 and 39 correspond to the Italian regions of Puglia and Basilicata where Albanians migrated in the early nineties. In these regions despite relatively low levels of



minority group density show high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Region 9 (Catalonia) shows the opposite effect, where despite the high concentration of minorities in this region, there is a strong tradition of involvement in voluntary organizations. It seems that a relationship exists between social conflict, support for civic society type of organizations and the concentration of African residents.

## Intolerance across regions

### By trust in NGOs and minority group size



## Conclusion

This paper shows evidence that regions within countries in the Southern European are an appropriate unit of analysis for capturing the heterogeneity of experiences that local and foreign residents have when it comes to inter-group relationships. This paper also sheds light on the driving forces that influence anti-immigrant sentiment in four Southern European countries taking into account the role of self economic interest (economic situation), group threat (cultural, economic and political) and political engagement variables (political ideology and other measures of political socialization) at the individual level. In addition, contextual institutional measures are introduced to capture the structural dimensions, and the embedded nature of inter-group relations processes. Of all these dimensions, three main causes emerged from the data as the strongest individual predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment. Political stance and satisfaction with how democracy works (as measured by conservatism and trust in the political system) are positively and negatively correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment respectively. High levels of “anxiety status” are also correlated with higher levels of animosity towards immigrants. These effects remain strong after controlling for the mediating variables regarding group threat. As in previous work, the group threat variables explain most of the individual level variance and have stronger effects in explaining levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, emphasizing thus that prejudice emerges more strongly at the level of group perception rather than at the level of individual objective economic positions. However, as showed by the strong effect of self perception of life situation (anxiety status), economic well being is also indeed a source of opposition towards immigrants. This effect is competing with the individual’s policy orientations in terms of political ideology. Adhering to a conservative political ideology is demonstrated to be stronger in regions with higher concentration of minorities. If in fact racial prejudice did not influence

attitudes towards immigrants conservative political ideology would be constant across regions. The significant variability demonstrated however supports the idea that prejudice is what is fueling Southern conservative positions towards immigration. This data suggests that public opinion towards immigration is determined by a combination of an individual's social position, and his/hers perceptions of group economic threat, cultural incompatibility and lack of awareness of the benefits of becoming a multicultural society and the discrimination that immigrants face in the labor market.

The contextual conditions in which these processes occur are powerful mediating forces explaining the relationship between intolerance and threat. The fact that in those regions with higher concentration of African residents the mean levels of hostility towards minorities yielded a significantly positive effect (although the coefficient is small) proves that Southern Europeans policy orientations are conditioned by the concentration of minorities in particular spaces. A second effect shows that regions with even higher levels of economic growth yielded more anti-immigrant sentiment than those with poorer economic conditions (although the effect is small). Therefore, anti-immigrant sentiment is not necessarily larger in the Southern poorest regions of Europe but rather is explained by the fact that urban cities and rich regions are mostly chosen for their economic opportunities by immigrants to settle in. A potential explanation for this relationship is that in urban areas populations may experience heightened feelings of threat and hostility because of contact and proximity. A third contextual effect is the involvement of NGOs as measured by the mean regional level of trust towards NGOs. Although the relationship between low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and high levels of trust in these types of organizations is clear, regions may present low levels of trust because these type of organizations support immigrant's political agenda rather than those of the local population. This may create a

disassociation between communities and the NGOs involved in these activities. This effect leaves a remaining question: are higher levels of social capital and trust in the organizations aiming to prevent or fight racism really effective in preventing it? Better measures of the type of civic engagement in these types of organizations may explain the nature of this relationship. The lack of available data of the actual resources invested in creating multicultural programs and number and type of involvement of associations by state and non state agencies may produce evidence of the effectiveness of resources in preventing racism.

Lastly, this paper shows evidence that strong local attachment is related to out-group hostility, proving that behind anti-immigrant sentiment there is a link to an individuals self identification with a specific national/regional/local geography. For the Southern European regions anti-immigrant sentiment is explain by group level threat further reinforcing “realistic group threat theory” that occurs in places with higher concentration of immigrants. In these environments the effects of NGOs dedicated to fight racism may be overshadowed by strong cultural, political, and social fears towards the threat of immigrants. Further analysis is required to capture the multidimensionality of political culture.

Table 5.1 Attitudes Correlated with *high* and *low* Tolerance for Immigration in Southern Europe

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*Low Tolerance:*

Perceived economic, political and cultural threat posed by immigrants:

- “People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits”.
- “People from these minority groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities”.
- “In schools where there are too many children from these minority groups, the quality of education suffers”.
- “The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life”.
- “The presence of people from these minority groups is cause of insecurity”
- “The presence of these minority groups increases unemployment”

Limits of Assimilation (incompatibility with host society):

- “There is a limit to how many people of the other races, religions or cultures a society can accept”.
- “(OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems”.
- “Whether people belonging to these minority groups can be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society depends on which group they belong to”.
- “In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion and culture which may be in conflict with (NATIONALITY) law”.

*High Tolerance*

Awareness of discrimination:

- “The authorities should make efforts to improve the situation of people from these minority groups”
- “People from these minorities do jobs which others do not want to do”
- “People from these minority groups are being discriminated against in the job market”
- “People from these minorities are getting poorer housing, largely because of discrimination”
- “when hiring personnel, employers should only take account of qualifications, regardless of the person’s race, religion, culture” .
- “Discrimination on the job market on grounds of a person’s race, religion, or culture should be outlawed”

Multiculturalism:

- “Where schools make the necessary efforts, the education of all children can be enriched by the presence of children from minority groups”
  - It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions and cultures”
  - (COUNTRY)’s diversity in terms of race, religion, or culture adds to its strengths”
  - “(COUNTRY) has always consisted of various cultural or religious groups”
  - “People from these minority groups are enriching the cultural life of (COUNTRY)”
  - “In two or three generations’ time, people belonging to these minority groups will be like all other members of society”
-

Table 5.2. Mean and standard deviation for anti-immigrant sentiment and intervening variables: Perceived group size, perceived political threat, limits of assimilation, multiculturalism.

Regions:	Anti-immigrant sentiment		Perceived group size		Perceived political threat		Limits of assimilation		Awareness of discrimination		Multi-culturalism	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<i>Italy:</i>	3.64	0.92	2.44	0.77	2.55	0.42	2.22	0.56	2.14	0.63	1.78	0.54
Piamonete and Valle d'Aosta	3.82	0.88	2.47	0.65	2.45	0.40	2.14	0.56	2.28	0.53	1.90	0.56
Liguria	3.55	1.06	2.44	0.79	2.47	0.45	2.26	0.52	1.87	0.64	1.69	0.52
Lombardia (including Milano)	3.65	0.92	2.34	0.72	2.59	0.38	2.26	0.54	2.10	0.67	1.63	0.49
Trentino-Alto Adige	3.63	0.61	2.25	0.92	2.59	0.39	2.27	0.62	2.16	0.71	1.70	0.51
Veneto	3.75	2.30	0.75	2.44	0.52	2.19	0.59	2.04	0.60	1.79	0.55	
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	3.88	0.85	2.35	0.72	2.66	0.39	2.14	0.55	2.19	0.64	1.91	0.50
Emilia Romagna	3.64	0.83	2.46	0.69	2.59	0.39	2.17	0.55	2.33	0.60	1.79	0.54
Toscana	3.60	0.98	2.56	0.72	2.50	0.45	2.14	0.58	2.01	0.69	1.88	0.60
Marche	3.68	0.94	2.35	0.71	2.47	0.48	2.20	0.54	2.27	0.65	1.75	0.54
Umbria	3.55	0.81	2.42	0.66	2.70	0.34	2.14	0.67	2.36	0.44	1.77	0.48
Lazio	3.64	0.88	2.50	0.67	2.53	0.44	2.19	0.56	2.22	0.61	1.78	0.52
Abruzzi-Molise	3.55	1.21	2.61	0.80	2.52	0.47	2.24	0.53	2.17	0.62	1.87	0.60
Campania	3.63	0.99	2.30	0.72	2.52	0.43	2.28	0.59	2.05	0.64	1.75	0.55
Puglia	3.64	0.88	2.39	0.91	2.58	0.41	2.34	0.53	2.19	0.62	1.74	0.57
Basilicata	3.95	1.00	2.48	0.87	2.63	0.34	2.46	0.61	2.03	0.89	1.95	0.66
Calabria	3.67	0.73	2.68	0.73	2.60	0.40	2.09	0.56	2.03	0.65	1.74	0.55
Sardegna	3.41	1.07	2.55	1.05	2.51	0.36	2.32	0.50	2.02	0.53	1.65	0.41
Sicilia	3.73	0.97	2.50	0.81	2.51	0.46	2.12	0.50	2.18	0.57	1.83	0.48
<i>Greece:</i>	3.61	0.95	2.36	0.72	2.55	0.40	1.93	0.53	2.50	0.50	2.08	0.44
Thraki	3.45	1.25	2.30	0.70	2.55	0.33	1.86	0.58	2.45	0.50	2.29	0.37
Macedonia	3.54	1.03	2.40	0.69	2.54	0.44	1.90	0.57	2.48	0.58	2.12	0.51
Thessalia	3.67	1.17	2.11	0.62	2.38	0.57	2.17	0.53	2.50	0.60	2.02	0.41
Epirus	3.36	0.66	2.42	0.72	2.53	0.36	2.11	0.40	2.26	0.45	1.79	0.39
East Sterea and Evia	3.61	0.89	2.38	0.73	2.60	0.39	1.83	0.54	2.60	0.48	2.11	0.45
Pelopon-nisos kay dytiki sterea	4.00	0.96	2.28	0.73	2.71	0.32	1.91	0.57	2.55	0.58	2.15	0.49
Islands (Aegean and Ioian is.)	3.74	0.80	2.54	0.84	2.44	0.42	1.71	0.54	2.77	0.36	2.12	0.45
Kriti	3.54	0.83	2.45	0.72	2.65	0.39	1.93	0.49	2.35	0.49	2.06	0.42
<i>Portugal:</i>	3.39	1.00	2.30	0.84	2.55	0.44	2.36	0.55	2.21	0.57	1.88	0.52
Norte	3.49	1.08	2.34	0.92	2.45	0.49	2.31	0.54	2.12	0.61	1.97	0.52
Centro	3.50	0.90	2.53	0.92	2.52	0.43	2.30	0.49	2.16	0.54	1.95	0.49
Lisboa et Valle do Tejo	3.56	0.89	2.39	0.81	2.63	0.39	2.22	0.60	2.37	0.57	2.00	0.51
Alentejo	3.57	0.98	2.41	0.78	2.61	0.37	2.42	0.54	2.26	0.59	1.79	0.48
Algarve	3.33	1.12	2.61	0.87	2.35	0.46	2.32	0.55	2.21	0.60	1.75	0.46
Acores	3.09	1.25	1.82	0.95	2.47	0.63	2.27	0.66	2.25	0.54	1.93	0.71
Madeira	3.18	0.78	1.98	0.61	2.82	0.29	2.71	0.45	2.09	0.56	1.80	0.49
<i>Spain:</i>	3.05	0.96	2.17	0.88	2.57	0.42	2.34	0.53	1.88	0.60	1.73	0.518
Galicia	2.98	1.00	1.92	0.87	2.77	0.31	2.52	0.50	1.99	0.67	1.65	0.59
Asturias	3.06	0.77	2.11	1.15	2.54	0.40	2.28	0.50	2.07	0.51	2.12	0.5
Cantabria	2.15	0.36	1.81	0.68	2.75	0.26	2.78	0.30	1.72	0.47	1.43	0.31
Castilla y Leon	2.84	1.00	1.96	0.90	2.64	0.37	2.40	0.54	1.86	0.62	1.76	0.49
Pais Vasco	2.79	0.97	2.27	0.90	2.75	0.31	2.33	0.54	1.94	0.61	1.64	0.51
C. F. de Navarra	3.72	1.24	2.31	1.09	2.44	0.57	2.37	0.53	1.85	0.67	1.90	0.63
La Rioja	3.09	0.94	2.00	1.04	1.96	0.75	2.06	0.58	1.60	0.56	1.73	0.58
Aragon	2.78	0.92	2.33	0.89	2.71	0.32	2.32	0.49	1.75	0.46	1.78	0.56
Cataluña	3.25	1.00	2.24	0.78	2.62	0.43	2.31	0.55	2.02	0.64	1.79	0.52
Extremadura	3.06	1.16	2.19	0.9	2.53	0.41	2.25	0.55	1.99	0.52	1.67	0.54
Comunidad de Madrid	3.23	1.04	2.30	0.82	2.55	0.44	2.41	0.50	1.90	0.61	1.84	0.53
Castilla la Mancha	3.01	1.01	2.03	0.76	2.63	0.36	2.39	0.52	1.85	0.62	1.74	0.49
Comunidad Valenciana	3.36	0.96	1.97	0.82	2.68	0.38	2.26	0.58	1.90	0.61	1.75	0.49
Andalucia	2.85	0.96	2.09	0.94	2.69	0.37	2.48	0.45	1.75	0.56	1.58	0.46
Region de Murcia	3.40	0.99	2.55	0.77	2.53	0.56	2.41	0.59	1.89	0.56	1.81	0.52
Islas Baleares	3.14	0.99	2.64	0.83	2.64	0.4	1.99	0.73	1.95	0.69	1.60	0.56
Islas Canarias	3.22	1.10	2.15	0.73	2.26	0.51	2.25	0.54	1.85	0.78	1.69	0.54

Source: Eurobarometer 47.1 and 53.0.

Notes: In order to make the Eurostat data set compatible with the coding of the Eurobarometer surveys, the Greek regions were grouped as follow: "Anatoliki Makedonia, Thaki"="Thaki"; "Kentriki Makedonia" and "Dytiki Makedonia"="Makedonia", "Attiki" (Athens) was included in the "East Sterea and Evia".

Table 5.3. Total international immigration flows and minority group size (African residents) in Southern European regions (2000).

Regions:	Total Immigration flows	Immigration Flows (Per thousands of population 1996)	Total minority group size (Africans) <sup>(b)</sup>	Minority group size (Africans). (Per thousands (of total population))	Total population (2000)
<i>Italy:</i>	171,967	2.980	462,975	8.036	57,679,895
Piamonete and V. d'Aosta	16,225	3.681	44024	9.987	4,407,808
Liguria	5,617	3.441	9828	6.020	1,625,870
Lombardia	29,350	3.251	118222	13.094	9,065,440
Trentino-Alto Adige	3,254	3.500	5954	6.405	936,256
Veneto	15,706	3.500	50325	11.214	4,511,714
Friuli-Venezia-Giula	3,677	3.106	5202	4.394	1,185,172
Emilia Romagna	13,798	3.485	56284	14.214	3,981,146
Toscana	12,006	3.402	23490	6.657	3,536,392
Marche	4,599	3.160	11937	8.202	1,460,989
Umbria	3,587	4.308	7589	9.114	835,488
Lazio	19,359	3.684	45038	8.571	5,264,077
Abruzzi-Molise	4,268	2.657	4149	2.583	1,607,003
Campania	10,169	1.756	21839	3.770	5,780,958
Puglia	8,846	2.165	9791	2.396	4,085,239
Basilicata	1,119	1.841	1108	1.823	606,183
Calabria	4,935	2.390	8498	4.116	2,050,478
Sardegna	2,691	1.626	4847	2.930	1,651,888
Sicilia	12,761	2.503	34850	6.836	5,087,794
<i>Greece:</i>	13,196	1.290	108,184	10.600	10,206,539
Thraki	1,286	3.481	3,520	9.529	369,383
Macedonia	2,940	1.270	21,850	9.437	2,315,280
Thessalia	748	0.939	852	1.070	796,174
Epirus	151	0.381	307	0.774	396,732
East Sterea (Athens region)	1,101	0.284	67,980	17.547	3,874,212
Pelopon-nisos	1,502	1.278	5,333	4.539	1,174,916
Islands	940	1.340	3,994	5.693	701,591
Kriti	4,528	7.831	4,348	7.519	578,251
<i>Portugal:</i>	3,721	0.360	106,075	10.240	10,356,117
Norte	619	0.168	3,665	0.994	3,687,293
Centro	587	0.250	3,234	1.377	2,348,397
Lisboa et Valle do Tejo	1,141	0.429	23,195	8.714	2,661,850
Alentejo	170	0.219	68,107	87.701	776,585
Algarve	816	2.065	7,321	18.524	395,218
Acores	148	0.612	319	1.319	241,763
Madeira	240	0.980	234	0.955	245,011
<i>Spain:</i>	29,824	0.757	256,477	6.510	40,709,455
Galicia	3,204	1.183	2,720	1.005	2,695,880
Asturias	617	0.583	816	0.771	1,062,998
Cantabria	165	0.313	684	1.299	535,131
Castilla y Leon	698	0.281	4,446	1.792	2,456,474
Pais Vasco	816	0.396	3,493	1.694	2,082,587
C. F. de Navarra	441	0.827	3,471	6.511	555,829
La Rioja	86	0.329	2,738	10.474	276,702
Aragon	169	0.144	8,276	7.063	1,204,215
Cataluña	6,509	1.064	90,633	14.820	6,343,110
Extremadura	285	0.266	6,305	5.887	1,058,503
Comunidad de Madrid	5,989	1.183	33,138	6.545	5,423,384
Castilla la Mancha	386	0.227	6,768	3.979	1,760,516
Comunidad Valenciana	3,045	0.768	17,141	4.323	4,162,776
Andalucia	2,837	0.396	46,684	6.509	7,357,558
Region de Murcia	1,133	1.026	13,320	12.059	1,197,646
Islas Baleares	812	1.068	5,266	6.925	841,669
Islas Canarias	2,632	1.616	10,578	6.495	1,694,477

Sources: (a) "Total immigration flows" corresponds to the number of movements involving the crossing of national borders in 1996 (last year in which, data is available for the four countries). Data was provided by Eurostat, General Statistics, Regional Statistics, International Migration.

(b) "Minority group" refers to African residents (year 2000). Data was provided by National Statistical Office of Italy (ISTAT); National Statistical Office of Greece, Ministerio del Interior (Portugal); and National Statistical office of Spain (INE). For Greece data includes Africans and Asians (2000).

(c) For Spain the colonial North African cities of Melilla and Ceuta are not included. In the year 2000, 1,798 African residents lived in Ceuta and 2,806 in Melilla.

Table 5.4 Factor loadings for the 'institutional environment' contextual measures: Principal component analysis for a pooled sample in the Southern European countries 1997-2001.

Social Institutions	Trust in political system	Trust in public media	Trust in Conservative institutions	Trust in NGOs
Trust national government	.831			
Trust national parliament	.830			
Trust European Union	.649			
Trust political parties	.596			
Trust civil service	.501			
Trust United National	.481			
Trust radio		.858		
Trust TV		.817		
Trust press		.757		
Trust army			.793	
Trust church			.735	
Trust police			.644	
Trust NGO				.812
Trust voluntary organizations				.800

Note: Factor loadings were produced after removing from the analysis "Trust in Unions" and "trust in big companies". Both items reported loadings smaller than .40. N=48281. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  $X^2 = 159524.3$  df=136 sig=.000. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling= .863. Source: Eurobarometer 48, 50.1, 51.0, 55.0.



Table 5.5. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the dependent and independent variables.

Variables:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Mean	3.46	43.4	2.64	.48	.30	3.36	3.48	2.43	3.33	.04	2.75	.02	.78	2.20	1.89	2.20	2.57	2.19
S.D	.98	18.2	2.95	.50	.46	.70	.91	.80	1.24	.20	.72	.12	.41	.70	.53	.63	.43	.58
1. Anti-immigrant sentiment	1.00	0.10	-0.09	0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.05	-0.10	0.14	-0.02	-0.12	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.36	0.33	-0.20	-0.25
2. Age		1.00	-0.34	-0.06	0.25	0.07	-0.05	-0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.14	-0.04	0.19	0.09	0.13	0.10	-0.09	-0.09
3. Education			1.00	0.06	0.10	-0.11	0.10	-0.04	-0.15	0.05	0.12	0.08	-0.01	-0.15	-0.15	-0.08	0.09	0.07
4. Sex				1.00	0.00	-0.01	0.20	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.05	-0.08	-0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.03
5. Marital status (married=1)					1.00	-0.04	0.01	-0.07	-0.14	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.00	0.04	0.01	-0.04
6. National pride						1.00	-0.03	0.20	0.07	-0.03	0.10	-0.01	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.02	-0.07
7. Use media index							1.00	0.08	-0.06	0.02	0.12	0.09	-0.12	-0.07	-0.12	-0.08	0.06	0.11
8. Satisfaction with democracy								1.00	-0.06	-0.02	0.24	-0.01	-0.01	-0.14	-0.05	-0.06	0.06	0.10
9. Political stance									1.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.14	0.15	0.11	-0.11	-0.14
10. Out-group relative										1.00	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06	0.02	0.08
11. Anxiety status											1.00	0.04	-0.04	-0.13	-0.12	-0.10	0.06	0.11
12. Currently unemployed												1.00	-0.24	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	0.02	0.02
13. Low skilled workers													1.00	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.03
14. Perceived minority group size														1.00	0.30	0.29	-0.17	-0.29
15. Perceived economic/political threat															1.00	0.43	-0.21	-0.39
16. Limits of assimilation																1.00	-0.08	-0.32
17. Awareness of discrimination																	1.00	0.32
18. Multi-culturalism																		1.00

Note: Correlations in bold are significant at the  $p < .05$  level (2-tailed).

Table 5.6 Hierarchical linear model estimates on anti-immigrant sentiment in Southern European countries (N=7677).

		Anti-immigrant sentiment:									
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Independent variables:		Estimates	S.E	Estimates	S.E	Estimates	S.E	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E
Intercept		3.416***	(.046)	3.420***	(.042)	3.460***	(.033)	3.461***	(.030)	3.458***	(.024)
<i>Socio-demographics:</i>											
Age				.003***	(.000)	.000	(.000)	.000	(.000)	.000	(.000)
Education				-.016**	(.005)	-.005	(.004)	-.005	(.000)	-.005	(.005)
Male (=1)				.039*	(.020)	.008	(.020)	.009	(.020)	.009	(.005)
Marital status				.053*	(.027)	.049	(.031)	.050	(.030)	.050	(.030)
<i>Self Interest:</i>											
Out-group relative				-.046	(.044)	.023	(.048)	.023	(.048)	.023	(.048)
Life satisfaction				-.084***	(.016)	-.056***	(.014)	-.057***	(.014)	-.056***	(.014)
Unemployed				-.007	(.091)	.086	(.073)	.084	(.074)	.083	(.074)
Low skilled worker				-.026	(.034)	-.013	(.033)	-.013	(.033)	-.012	(.033)
High skilled worker (reference)				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Political culture:</i>											
National pride				-.013	(.023)	-.018	(.019)	-.020	(.019)	-.018	(.020)
Media use index				-.013	(.021)	.018	(.021)	.016	(.021)	.015	(.021)
Democracy satisfaction				-.049†	(.026)	-.023	(.021)	-.021	(.021)	-.020	(.021)
Political stance				.096***	(.010)	.051***	(.007)	.051***	(.000)	.050***	(.006)
<i>Perceived Group Threat:</i>											
Perceive minority group size						.039†	(.021)	.037†	(.021)	.036†	(.020)
Perceived political/economic threat						.400***	(.030)	.401***	(.022)	.402***	(.030)
Limits of assimilation						.271***	(.022)	.272***	(.022)	.269***	(.022)
Awareness of discrimination						-.240***	(.035)	-.240***	(.034)	-.240***	(.034)
Multiculturalism						-.075**	(.032)	-.075**	(.032)	-.073**	(.032)
<i>Regional contextual characteristics:</i>											
Minority group size (African)								.005*	(.002)	.003*	(.000)
GDP/head								.002†	(.001)	.003*	(.000)
Unemployment rate								.004	(.005)	.005	(.003)
Union density										-.001	(.003)
Trust NGOs										-.010***	(.002)
Trust conservative institutions										.204	(.345)
Strong local attachment										.549*	(.238)
<i>Variance Components:</i>											
Individual		.886		.856		.737		.737		.737	
(% explained compared to intercept)				(3.4%)		(17%)		(17%)		(17%)	
Contextual		.097		.080		.047		.039		.023	
(% explained compared to intercept)				(17%)		(52%)		(60%)		(78%)	

p> † .10 \* .05 \*\* .010 \*\*\* .001

Table 5.7 Interaction Effects. Hierarchical linear model estimates on anti-immigrant sentiment on Southern European countries (N=7677).

Independent variables:	Model 6	
	Estimates	S.E
Intercept	3.459	(.024)
<i>Socio-demographics:</i>		
Age	.000	(.000)
Education	-.005	(.005)
Male (=1)	.009	(.005)
Marital status	.050†	(.030)
<i>Self Interest:</i>		
Out-group relative	.013	(.046)
Life satisfaction	-.056***†	(.014)
Unemployed	.087	(.074)
Low skilled worker	-.009	(.032)
High skilled worker (reference)	-	-
<i>Political culture:</i>		
National pride	-.019	(.020)
Media use index	.017	(.021)
Democracy satisfaction	-.021	(.021)
Political stance	.051***	(.006)
<i>Group position:</i>		
Perceive minority group size	.037†	(.020)
Perceived political/economic threat	.397***	(.029)
Limits of assimilation	.269***	(.022)
Awareness of discrimination	-.237***	(.034)
Multiculturalism	-.102***	(.032)
<i>Regional characteristics</i>		
Minority group size (African)	.002†	(.002)
GDP/head	.002**	(.000)
Unemployment rate	.004	(.003)
Union density	-.001	(.003)
Trust NGOs	-.010***	(.249)
Trust conservative	-.002	(.251)
Strong local attachment	.453*	(.237)
<i>Interaction terms:</i>		
Trust NGOs * Multiculturalism (5a)	-.004	(.002)
Trust NGOs * political stance (6a)	.000	(.060)
Minority group size * Multiculturalism (5b)	.005**	(.001)
Minority group size * political stance (6b)	.001**	(.000)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
Individual	.728	
(% explained compared to intercept)	(14%)	
Contextual	.019	
(% explained compared to intercept)	(78%)	

p> † .10 \* .05 \*\* .010 \*\*\* .001

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