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ECONOMIC HOTSPOTS, SOCIETAL COALITIONS, AND STATE
TERRITORIAL REACH IN COLOMBIA

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CONTENTS

Contents	iii
Figures	vii
Maps	vii
Tables	vii
Abstract	viii
Acknowledgments	x
 1. Economic Hotspots, Societal Coalitions, and State Territorial Reach: An Introduction	 1
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. Why Sustained State Service Provision (SSSP) Matters and How to Make It Happen	6
1.3. Research Design	11
1.4. Plan of the Chapters	18
 2. When Does the State Follow the Money? Explaining Sustained State Service Provision in Rural Economic Hotspots	 20
2.1. Introduction	20
2.2. Conceptualizing Sustained State Service Provision	21
From State Capacity to Sustained State Service Provision	22
Public Goods Aimed at Improving Socioeconomic Well-Being	25
Service Delivery Concentrated Within A Given Locality	26
Provision by Agents of the State with Formal Authority	27
Sustained Provision Understood as Lasting Five Years or More	29
2.3. The Determinants of Sustained State Service Provision in Distant Economic Hotspots: What We Know	30
2.4. Making the State Work: A New Theory of Sustained State Service Provision in Economic Hotspots	38
2.5. Who Can Develop Local Ownership of State Power?	40
A Statist Framing	41
Organizational Structures for Collective Action	43
Stable Access to State Elites	45

The Mechanism: Offsetting Local Capacity Deficits through Coproduction or Contention	48
2.6. Alternative Explanations: Complementary, Not Competing	52
A (National) State Autonomy Perspective	52
The Role of Sectors: Stationary Bandits, Structural Power, and Materiality	54
The Bellicist Approach	56
3. The Booms and Busts of Oil and State Service Provision in Barrancabermeja	59
3.1. Introduction	59
3.2. A Mostly Absentee State (from Colonial Times to the Mid-20 th Century)	66
The Onset of Oil Production, the Formation of the Troco's Enclave, and an Era of Mostly Private Service Provision	69
Explaining the Absence of State Service Provision	72
3.3. A New Wave of Economic Change under Ecopetrol, A Slow Increase in State Service Provision, and a Growing Civil Society (1951-1975)	78
A Period of Expanding (But Still Mostly Episodic) Services	80
From Forced Quiescence to Incipient Local Ownership of State Power: Barranca's Growing and Increasingly Diverse Civil Society	84
3.4. The Rise of SSSP Driven by Contentious Local Ownership of State Power (1975-1986)	90
The Development of Local Ownership of State Power by Contentious Claimants	90
SSSP in Barranca: Expanding Access to Water and Neighborhood Formalization	96
Collapsing Local Ownership and Declining State Service Provision	101
3.5. Conclusion	106
4. With and Against the Grain: State Service Provision in Huila's Rice Region	109
4.1. Introduction	109
4.2. Huila's Political Economy and the Rise of Agribusiness	117
From Rural Periphery to a Hotspot of Agricultural Modernization	118
The Role of the State in the Huila Flatlands in the Early 20 th -Century	125
4.3. First Phase of SSSP: Coproduced Land Improvement under Minimal State Capacity (1936-1943)	131

The State Comes to Campoalegre: Land Parcellation, Irrigation, and Then Some	132
Explaining the Onset and Collapse of SSSP around the Llanogrande Parcellation	142
4.4. A Period of Private Initiative and No Local Ownership of State Power (1943-1961)	147
4.5. Second Phase of SSSP: Coproduction with Grains of Contention and the Many Faces of Service Provision (1961-1985)	151
The Return of Producers' Statist Framing and the Consolidation of State Support for Rice Production in Huila	153
Agrarian Reform (This Time for Real)	155
Explaining the Second Phase of SSSP in Campoalegre and Palermo	163
4.6. By Way of Conclusion	177
5. The Ebbs and Flows of State Service Provision in Eastern Antioquia	180
5.1. Introduction	180
5.2. Eastern Antioquia's Political Economy and the Advent of Hydropower	185
From Agrarian Crossroads to Colombia's Powerhouse	186
Hydropower's Socioeconomic Impact	190
5.3. State (and Non-State) Provision in Eastern Antioquia before CORNARE	192
The Colombian State's Episodic Provision in Eastern Antioquia before the 1980s	194
State-Owned Enterprises Substituting for the State	195
An Uneven Rural Development Program	206
5.4. A Regional Pocket of Effectiveness: CORNARE	215
Electrifying Eastern Antioquia	219
Environmental Protection through Service Provision: The PRISER Model	225
5.5. Explaining CORNARE's SSSP in Eastern Antioquia	230
The Slow Development of Regional Elites' Reluctant Statism	231
From Localized, Company-Centered Protests to the Formation of a Statist Regional Movement	238
5.6. Conclusion	253
6. Conclusion	255
6.1. Summary of the Argument	256

Statist Ideational Framing	258
Strong Organizational Structures for Collective Action	260
Stable Access to and Influence with State Elites	261
6.2. Further Implications and Directions for Future Research	262
6.3. Local Ownership of State Power and Other Forms of State Action	264
6.4. On the Politics of this Study	268
7. Appendix: Inventory of New Subnational Economies in 20th Century Colombia	270
7.1. Introduction	270
7.2. Inventory	272
7.3. Excluded cases	287
8. References	288
8.1. Works Cited in the Core Chapters	288
8.2. Works Cited in the Appendix	339

FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Research Design.....	14
Figure 2.1. Local Ownership of State Power: An Illustration of the Argument.....	40
Figure 2.2. Procuring Basic Resources for Sustained State Service Provision: Four Hypothetical Scenarios.....	49
Figure 3.1. Estimated Population of Barrancabermeja (available years, 1864-1938) .	70
Figure 3.2. Population of Barrancabermeja (census years, 1938-1985)	80
Figure 3.3. Water Service Coverage in Barrancabermeja's Urban Area (census years, 1964-1993).....	97
Figure 5.1. Access to the Public Electricity Grid in Rural Areas (census years, 1951-1985).....	204
Figure 5.2. Access to the Public Electricity Grid in Rural Areas (census years, 1985-2005).....	224

MAPS

Map 1.1. Case Study Regions in Continental Colombia	13
Map 3.1. Municipality of Barrancabermeja in Santander, Colombia	60
Map 3.2. Urban Area of Barrancabermeja	86
Map 4.1. Municipalities of Campoalegre and Palermo in Huila	111
Map 5.1. Localities Under Study in Eastern Antioquia	182

TABLES

Table 3.1. Dimensions of Local Ownership of State Power and the Evolution of State Service Provision in Barrancabermeja	63
Table 4.1. Evolution of State Service Provision in Campoalegre and Palermo (Huila)	114
Table 4.2. SSSP and Local Ownership Dynamics in Campoalegre and Palermo since 1961	152
Table 5.1. Evolution of State Service Provision in the Reservoirs Subregion of Eastern Antioquia	184
Table 5.2. Number of Homes Electrified by CORNARE's Rural Electrification Program (1986-1993).....	223
Table 7.1. Inventory of New Subnational Economies in 20th Century Colombia...	272

ABSTRACT

Large-scale investment projects in extractives, industrial agriculture, and power generation continue to be an integral part of most governments' economic strategies, especially in the global south. Yet such projects—most of which are located in rural areas far from countries' urban centers of power—are being met with increasing skepticism and opposition by local communities. In response, researchers and policymakers have mostly focused on shorter-term consultation, regulation, and impact mitigation strategies. All of these solutions presuppose the existence of relatively well-functioning local governance structures—but this is rarely the case. What does it take for the state to function effectively around subnational economic hubs?

My research tackles this question by focusing on state service provision, and it emphasizes the decisive role played by local non-state actors. I argue that the sustained provision of services by the state is most likely to occur when societal coalitions not only demand it but also actively contribute to their production and delivery—when they develop what I call *local ownership of state power*. I show, moreover, that local ownership can be either coproductive or contentious. While others have focused only on relatively harmonious forms of “state-society synergy,” I also emphasize the importance of more conflictive relationships. What, then, makes it possible for non-state claimants to establish local ownership of state power? I identify three crucial conditions: 1) a statist ideational framing, 2) strong organizational structures for collective action, and 3) stable access to state elites.

My theoretical argument is drawn from an inductive comparative-historical analysis of the evolution of three regional economies in Colombia over the 20th century. Each case study revolves around a different economic sector: oil production in Barrancabermeja (Santander department), rice monocrops in Campoalegre and Palermo (Huila), and hydroelectric dams in the Eastern region of Antioquia. Regional histories for each case were constructed based on two years of archival and interview research.

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1. ECONOMIC HOTSPOTS, SOCIETAL COALITIONS, AND STATE TERRITORIAL REACH: AN INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Large-scale investment projects in oil, gas, and mining, industrial agriculture and forestry, and power generation are an integral part of most governments' development strategies, especially in the global south. "Extractivist" projects, as critics have labeled them, continue to be crucial sources of foreign exchange, private investment, and fiscal revenues, as well as industrial inputs, food, and energy, and politicians of all ideological stripes still tout their significance for national development and progress.¹ At the same time, such projects—most of which are located in rural areas and small towns far from countries' urban centers of power—are also being met with increasing skepticism and opposition by local communities, often turning those economic hotspots into zones of social tension and conflict (Bebbington 2012; Borras and Franco 2013; Conde 2017; R. Hall et al. 2015; Khagram 2004; Oliver-Smith 2010).

While the reasons for these conflicts are diverse, the distribution of projects' costs and benefits is almost always at the center of community grievances. Project supporters claim that the general population stands to benefit from macroeconomic growth, new employment opportunities, corporate social responsibility programs, and increased public spending made possible by new fiscal revenues. Detractors retort that

¹ The term "extractivism" is broadly used to refer to the growth- and usually export-oriented extraction and commoditization of natural resources, ranging from extractive industries (fossil fuels, minerals, and metals) to agribusiness, the timber industry, and large dams (see, e.g., Acosta 2013; Gudynas 2012; Svampa 2015; Willow 2019).

the actual benefits that stay in the localities where projects are located seldom make up for their negative social and environmental impacts. They argue that much of the wealth that is produced goes to private investors who live far away, and even when fiscal revenues are high, only a small part (if anything at all) makes its way back to projects' surroundings. By contrast, negative impacts are heavily concentrated in those localities. Although the specific impacts of different activities vary, common environmental and social costs from oil and mining, industrial agriculture, and large dams include air and water pollution and damage to local ecosystems (which in turn tends to affect people's livelihoods and health) as well as rising cost of living, increased pressure on local infrastructure and services, and a wide range of unwelcome social dislocations historically associated with boomtowns and economic enclaves (higher levels of crime and conflict, drug and alcohol abuse, and changing values and social mores).² In light of their broadly common local impacts, as well as their similarly strategic role in countries' development models, it makes sense to bring these different economic activities together for analysis, which few existing works in comparative political economy have attempted.³

² The literature on the social and environmental impacts of “extractivist” projects is vast, and it is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Each of the empirical chapters also discusses some of the impacts associated with the sector in question.

³ Aside from the critical literature on extractivism—which does put oil and mining, agribusiness, and large dams together under the same umbrella, but does not explore variation in political outcomes (e.g., Svampa 2015; Willow 2019)—an important exception is Saylor's (2014) comparison of extractive and agricultural booms in African and Latin American countries. Earlier works on regional (i.e., subnational) economic development (discussing linkage effects and growth poles) did consider different sectors together (Hirschman 1958, 2013 [1976]; Perroux 1988 [2018]; for a review of this literature, see Ciccantell and Smith 2005).

Efforts by the academic, policy, and advocacy communities have been mainly focused on mitigating projects' negative impacts by promoting environmental impact assessments, transparency and accountability mechanisms, and community consultation and participation processes (Bebbington et al. 2018; Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Natural Resource Governance Institute 2014; World Bank 1996, 2004). However, our knowledge of how to go beyond regulation and impact mitigation and develop more systematic strategies for translating economic hotspots into tangible welfare dividends for their surrounding communities remains limited.

State authorities are usually expected to play a central role in pursuit of this goal. The most common policy recommendation is for fiscal revenues to be invested in new public goods and services for impacted localities (Barma et al. 2012; Cernea 2008; Deininger and Byerlee 2011; M.L. Ross, Lujala, and Rustad 2012; World Bank 1996). In line with this logic, several countries have established decentralized revenue sharing schemes, especially in connection to extractives and hydropower generation.⁴ But attempts to transform government revenue into new local public goods often come up short when faced with the fact that state capacity in those areas—usually located far from the centers of power—tends to be highly precarious.

⁴ Such schemes are most common in the extractive sector (Bauer et al. 2016), but they are increasingly used to distribute revenue from hydroelectric energy as well (Scheumann, Dombrowsky, and Hensengerth 2014; Skinner, Krauss, and Newborne 2014). They are not as common in connection to large agribusiness projects. Local government revenue from industrial agriculture usually comes through property or corporate taxes paid to subnational governments, though there are exceptions. In Brazil, rural property taxes are paid to the federal government, which then shares half with municipalities where the taxes are collected (Ministério da Fazenda 2018). Argentina's now-defunct Solidary Federal Fund (better known as "*Fondo Sojero*," or Soy Fund, in place between 2009 and 2018) shared revenues from export taxes on soybeans with provinces and municipalities, but instead of privileging soy-producing ones, it redistributed them to all subnational governments (Murillo and Mangonnet 2013).

Making matters worse, booming economies can sometimes have a damaging effect on the quality of government, as the “rentier state” literature has noted (T.L. Karl 1997). The windfall profits associated with economic hotspots (especially but not exclusively in the extractive sector) can provoke rent-seeking and corruption in subnational governments, further complicating the implementation of well-intentioned policy initiatives (Arellano Yanguas 2011; Boamah and Williams 2017; Borge, Parmer, and Torvik 2015; Brollo et al. 2013; Cust and Viale 2016; Manzano and Gutiérrez 2019; Knutsen et al. 2017). Furthermore, studies that have looked at impacted communities’ perceptions of the state in economic hotspots indicate that it is rarely seen as a compensatory or developmental force. Instead, it is much more commonly experienced in the form of military or police activity providing security for private actors (Borras and Franco 2013; Del Bene, Scheidel, and Temper 2018; Lapegna 2016; Moran et al. 2018; Porter and Watts 2017; Rettberg and Prieto 2018).

So, when government agents do take on an active service provision role around extractive, agribusiness, or power generation projects (by investing to improve access to water, electricity, or social programs, for instance), it can be a highly surprising, even puzzling outcome. Yet it can—and does—happen: the development of economic hotspots can help to induce new state investment in public infrastructure, services, and social programs in subnational contexts marked by limited state capacity, even if success stories appear to be few and far between. What does it take for the state to function effectively in these contexts? Under what conditions can

sustained state service provision emerge around economic hotspots? So far, we lack a clear answer to these questions.

As presented later in this chapter—and further detailed in Chapter 2—this study’s findings underscore the decisive role played by local non-state actors in shaping the relationship between economic hotspots and the role of state authorities in distant parts of the territory. Sustained state service provision (SSSP) is made possible when societal claimants touched by a changing local economy establish *local ownership of state power*—when they not only demand increased state intervention but also take an active role in supporting the production and delivery of public goods by the state. By identifying the conditions that make such local ownership possible, it offers a new theoretical framework for making sense of those seemingly exceptional cases in which localized investment projects foster durable improvements in state service provision.

The rest of this introduction proceeds as follows. The second section explains how the state and, more specifically, its ability to deliver services across territory matter for regional development around economic hotspots, followed by a preview of the dissertation’s argument. The third section discusses the study’s methodology and research design, and the fifth section concludes with an outline of the next chapters, which elaborate the dissertation’s argument and present the evidence on which it is based.

1.2. Why Sustained State Service Provision (SSSP) Matters and How to Make It Happen

Economic growth is usually expected to improve well-being around it. But this expectation is not always met. Disappointing results are often due to the lack of a minimally competent public authority with some ability to enforce basic norms and provide some goods and services both to economic actors and to the population at large. The vibrancy of recent research on the state reflects a broad consensus around this understanding even while recognizing the limits and shortcomings of really existing states. It is undeniable that states sometimes engage in corrupt or predatory behavior (Bates 1981; Evans 1995). It is also true that non-state actors can and often do perform functions that are usually expected of states, from service delivery to law and regulation, and sometimes they do so more effectively (Brass 2016; Cammett and MacLean 2014; M. Lee, Walter-Drop, and Wiesel 2014; Massoud 2013; Risse 2011). Yet the state remains critical. While globalization and neoliberal reforms changed the scope of state intervention by downscaling governments' economic role, reducing public expenditures, and cutting welfare programs, the total "eclipse" of the state did not come to pass. States redefined and reoriented their roles, even taking on new responsibilities and activities (Gingrich 2011; Lange 2015; Levy 2006; Schmidt 2009; Snyder 2006). Some measure of state action continues to be necessary for the basic functioning of markets and for channeling economic development toward broader human development (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015; Besley and Persson 2011; M.A. Centeno et al. 2017).

When it comes to promoting welfare around “extractivist” projects, states have a central role to play. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs aimed at obtaining a “social license to operate,” limiting conflict and maintaining good relations with local communities, or compensating them for projects’ negative externalities have been shown, under certain conditions, to deliver some benefits to those living in a project’s vicinity (Franks et al. 2014; Luhmann and Theuvsen 2016; Tilt, Braun, and He 2009). Oil and mining companies regularly invest in local infrastructure, make gifts and donations, and sometimes offer some education, healthcare, and other public services in the areas where they operate (Amengual 2018; Jones Luong 2014; Kapelus 2002; Sagebien and Lindsay 2011). “Local content” practices—in which companies prioritize the use of locally-sourced materials and workforce—have also grown in popularity (Ovadia 2016). Many agribusiness firms also make donations and offer some public assistance initiatives, and they often invest in technical assistance and food security projects, often in conjunction with agricultural research centers and philanthropic foundations (Brooks 2015; Glover 2007; Guereña 2013). Companies involved in hydropower development are best known for their role in providing compensations for involuntary displacement and administering resettlement processes (which usually go beyond physical relocation and include broader rural development initiatives), but larger “benefit sharing” models featuring irrigation and electrification projects and social assistance programs have also become common (Cernea 2007; Lebel et al. 2014; Scudder 2005; Tortajada, Altinbilek, and Biswas 2012). However, while corporate social expenditures can

sometimes help to improve local living conditions, they also have significant limitations. The positive impacts of CSR programs tend to be relatively short-lived, their benefits are not always made available on an equal basis to the general population (instead privileging those with political connections or disruptive capability), and they often offer limited room for community voice or accountability (Frederiksen 2019; Frynas 2005; Glover 2007; Moran et al. 2018). It has also been established that CSR programs usually work best as a complement to rather than a substitute for effective government action (Lister 2011; Yankson et al. 2018). In short, while CSR can make some positive contributions, it is no substitute for systematic, broad-based state service provision.

This study therefore aims to establish under what conditions subnational economic change—understood as the onset of a new productive activity or a major transformation of local modes of production—can spur sustained state service provision (SSSP). I define SSSP as the delivery of public goods or services within a given locality aimed at improving social welfare by state agents with formal authority that lasts five years or more.⁵ I operationalize it as public investment to produce and deliver new welfare-oriented public goods such as public education, healthcare, utilities (water, sanitation, electricity, or garbage collection, among others), infrastructure (such as roads, electrical grids, irrigation systems, and

⁵ The five-year benchmark is theoretically appropriate and informative based on the empirical setting from which the argument is derived because it spans more than a single executive and legislative period both at the national and subnational levels in Colombia.

telecommunications), or social programs (providing access to housing or land, monetary transfers, subsidies, or credit).⁶

My argument, which I elaborate in the next chapter, is that the effect of economic hotspots on SSSP around them depends on the role of local non-state actors. More specifically, I argue that SSSP requires the development of *local ownership of state power* by non-state actors. Local ownership refers to societal actors' demanding the state's local intervention and then actively contributing to making it happen. I borrow the concept from the post-conflict peacebuilding literature, which uses it to refer to societal actors' effective influence and participation in program design and implementation (Donais 2009). Just as that literature has established that "peace cannot be imposed by external forces, military or otherwise" because any arrangement "that is not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail" (Donais 2012, 1), I argue that something similar can be said for sustained state service provision in contexts of limited state capacity.

On its own, the mere existence of an investment project does not have any automatic implications for state service provision. However, such projects and the risks and opportunities they bring can reshape the preferences of local societal forces—business actors as well as popular sectors—about the role that the state ought to play in their locality. But it is usually not enough for such actors to merely issue demands for state authorities to take on a more active local role. In contexts of low

⁶ Like most of the literature on service provision, which goes beyond the consideration of pure public goods (fully non-excludable and non-rivalrous), my analysis includes "impure" public goods, "whose benefits are partially rival and/or partially excludable" (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 9).

state capacity—the kinds of places where extractive, agribusiness, and power generation projects tend to be located—societal claimants must also step in to help offset existing local state capacity deficits.

How can non-state actors support state performance when state capacity is limited? Several works have stressed the crucial role of non-state actors in enhancing state performance through cooperative, “coproductive” relationships (Abers and Keck 2009; Amengual 2016; Augusto, Dargent, and Rousseau 2017; Ostrom 1996; Rich 2019; Tandler 1997). I build on these contributions and go one step further by also paying attention to less harmonious, more conflictive forms of state-society synergy. I thus show that there are two pathways for societal actors to induce sustained state service provision in areas of limited statehood. The *coproductive* pathway is one of them, but there is also a *contentious* pathway. Coproduction of public services involves capacity transfers from societal actors endowed with a certain level of material or cognitive resources to bureaucrats to make their jobs easier (or even at all possible). In the contentious scenario, the non-state actors involved lack significant resources aside from their capacity for continuous organized claim-making. The mechanism by which such claimants can induce SSSP is by pressuring public officials to procure additional resources from other levels of government or even from other non-state actors in order to offset existing deficits in local state capacity.

Local non-state claimants can thus establish local ownership of state power by coproductive or contentious means. What makes it possible for non-state claimants to

succeed in developing local ownership of state power? I identify three conditions, which are further elaborated in Chapter 2:

- 1. A statist ideational framing:** Societal claimants must hold a collective belief that the state—and not other actors—can and ought to play an active role at the local level in the provision of public goods.
- 2. A strong organizational structure for collective action:** Effective coproduction and contention both demand considerable coordination and communication, which in turn require durable associational forms.
- 3. Stable access to and influence with national state elites:** Claimants must establish channels for routine communication with higher levels of government by developing alliances inside the state apparatus, either with reform-minded bureaucrats or with electorally motivated politicians.

1.3. Research Design

This theoretical argument is drawn from an inductive comparative-historical analysis of subnational economic change in Colombia. An exhaustive inventory of Colombia's new regional economies over the 20th century, based on secondary sources and some archival work, revealed that sustained improvements in state service provision in their surrounding areas were few and far between. (This inventory is included in the dissertation's Appendix.) Seeking to identify what made SSSP possible in those rare cases, I selected three economic hotspots for in-depth study, following a most-different systems design: oil production in Barrancabermeja in the Magdalena Medio region of Santander department; commercial rice crops in the municipalities

of Campoalegre and Palermo (Huila); and hydroelectric dams in the Eastern region of Antioquia (see Map 1.1).⁷

Regional histories for each case were constructed based on 20 months of archival and interview research in Colombia, with multiple research trips to the localities under study. A distinctive advantage of comparative-historical analysis is that it goes beyond the coding of cases in terms of their scores on dependent and independent variables, and instead seeks to identify common patterns across more complex and detailed historical narratives, which may be broken down into more general sequences of causally significant events (T. Falleti and Mahoney 2015). Inductive research in this vein offers valuable opportunities for dialogue between theory and data and a “constant refinement of causal arguments during data analysis” (Yom 2015, 627).

⁷ Departments are Colombia’s second tier of government, between the national and municipal levels.

Map 1.1. Case Study Regions in Continental Colombia




Made by the author on QGIS with map data from GADM (<https://gadm.org>) and with map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0 (data by OpenStreetMap, under Open Data Commons Open Database License).

Despite their differences in terms of geographic location and the type of economic activity involved, all of the localities under study experienced considerable expansions in local state service provision at some point in their history.⁸ The study of these “most-different” cases broadens the scope of the analysis and makes it possible to identify what drives their similar outcomes despite variation along sectoral and regional lines (in contrast to most of the existing literature, most of which focuses either on a single economic activity or resource or on a single locality).

Building on this cross-case design, I also carry out within-case historical analyses in order to trace how periods of SSSP came about—why they occurred when they did (and not before or after) and what explains their onset and termination.

Figure 1.1 illustrates the research design and the purpose of each of its component parts.

Figure 1.1. Research Design



“T_n” refers to different moments in time.

“Y” refers to the dependent variable (sustained state service provision, SSSP): a score of 1 denotes its presence while 0 denotes its absence.

⁸ My research design thus decidedly violated King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994) directive not to select on the dependent variable (see also Geddes 2003). This decision was justified by the fact that the study did not seek to test an existing theory but instead was motivated by a puzzling observation that was not adequately explained by existing theory, thus demanding close investigation to develop one inductively starting from the cases—what Goertz and Mahoney (2012) call a “causes-of-effects” approach (see also Goertz 2017, 61-63). The resulting theory does not aim to establish or test average causal effects across cases but to explain the causes of outcomes in particular cases and uncover the causal mechanisms at work.

The units of analysis for the study are economic regions—understood in socio-geographical terms as units of space whose boundaries are determined by the influence of an economic activity—rather than formally recognized administrative units. Only after having identified the area of influence of an economic change did the analysis focus on the municipalities encompassed by it for purposes of data collection and analysis. While the exact delimitation of non-jurisdictional boundaries is more open to debate than pre-established administrative subdivisions (Soifer 2019, forthcoming), the choice of this type of unit was dictated by the research question itself. The area impacted by the economic changes under consideration is almost always larger than a single municipality and smaller than a whole department (and in some cases—though not in the ones selected for this study—it crosses borders between departments). A single department often contains many unrelated instances of economic change occurring simultaneously.⁹ Thus I treat “cases” as theoretical constructs to be used for the purposes of answering a specific question instead of viewing them as being predefined by external criteria such as formal administrative jurisdictions.¹⁰

In addition to their sectoral and regional variation, the regions under study hold an important place in Colombian economic history: Barrancabermeja was the

⁹ Consider, for example, the case of the Antioquia department in the 1960s: the northwestern region of Urabá was experiencing the growth of banana production at the same time as hydroelectric development was taking place in the Eastern region.

¹⁰ For a thorough discussion of what constitutes a “case” depending on different kinds of research designs, see Ragin (1992).

country's first oil-producing region, the Huila flatlands were among the earliest sites of commercial agricultural mechanization in Colombia, and Eastern Antioquia contains two of the most important hydroelectric power stations in the country.¹¹

The empirical focus on Colombia is motivated by a theoretical interest in state service provision under conditions of limited state capacity. Colombia is often seen as having a comparatively weak state in the international context (A.M. Bejarano and Pizarro 2004; Kurtz 2013; Saylor 2014; Soifer 2015).¹² Unlike many of their South American counterparts, Colombian post-independence rulers never launched a systematic program to achieve full control over the country's territory (F.E. González 2014; Saylor 2014; Soifer 2015).¹³ Still, the Colombian state's reach has varied dramatically across the country's territory, and it continues to do so to this day (M. García and Revelo 2018; F.E. González 2014; C. López 2016). In some parts of the country, state service provision indicators are on par with national-level figures for the Central African Republic, while in others they are better than national indicators for the United States (Otero Bahamón 2016). Colombia thus offers a privileged setting for studying what makes SSSP possible in a national context of low state capacity.

¹¹ Still, given the variation observed over time within each region, it is clear that their economic importance on its own does not adequately explain the periods of SSSP that they experienced.

¹² In the early 2000s, it was sometimes even categorized as a "failed" state. See "Fragile States Index: Country Dashboard – Colombia," *Fund for Peace*, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/country-data>.

¹³ In the second half of the twentieth century, Colombian rulers implemented some programs to "bring the state" to regions affected by armed conflict (C. López 2016). These programs yielded limited results and left large swaths of the country's territory—institutionally precarious regions without significant conflict activity—outside of their scope.

The focus on Colombia was also driven by substantive policy concerns. The study tackles a major quandary facing peacebuilding and development practitioners in Colombia today. After the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016, an oft-stated goal has been to “deploy the state across the territory” through service provision in addition to military force.¹⁴ But success on this front has been slow to come. A massive body of literature deals with the complex determinants of successful state-building, and the scholarly consensus is that it is contingent on long-term, path-dependent, slow-moving causes (Boix 2015; F.E. González 2014; Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2015; Tilly 1990). It is therefore no surprise that bringing about thicker state action in formerly rebel-held areas is such a challenging task. As robust an understanding of state formation as this literature provides, however, practitioners seeking to draw lessons from it may be led to think that there is little to be done if the contexts in which they operate do not have the right colonial legacies, did not follow the right path after independence, or did not experience the right kind of wars long ago. Focusing on shorter-term dynamics of state service provision across territory and investigating their determinants can provide an alternative to immobilizing structuralism without falling prey to excessive voluntarism. This dissertation charts a path for bridging this gap.

¹⁴ See, e.g., S. Jaramillo (2014); also, “Oscar Naranjo: ‘El Estado colombiano se atrincheró en las ciudades, hay que desplegarlo en los territorios,’” *El País*, October 23, 2017, https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/10/22/colombia/1508631860_037396.html.

1.4. Plan of the Chapters

Having provided a summary of the argument and methodology and introduced the importance of SSSP in this chapter, Chapter 2 elaborates my theory as the best explanation for why economic change produces SSSP in some places and times but not in others. It fleshes out the dissertation's arguments, situates them and puts them in dialogue with the existing literature—mainly in political science and sociology but also drawing from geography and anthropology—and considers several alternative explanations.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide the empirical substance from which the theory was derived. First, Chapter 3 examines the case of oil production in Barrancabermeja. After documenting several decades of irregular (when at all present) state service provision following the onset of oil activity, I explain how a popular-sector coalition was able to bring about a period of SSSP between 1975 and 1986 through contentious mobilization. In this case, SSSP consisted of a major expansion in public water coverage and a slum formalization and integration process. Chapter 4 then looks at the development of mechanized rice production in the Huila flatlands. It discusses how different forms of coproductive local ownership of state power made two periods of SSSP possible around land redistribution and irrigation projects, first between the 1930s and 1940s and then, much more extensively, between the 1960s and 1980s. Finally, Chapter 5 studies the formation of a hydroelectric complex in the Eastern region of Antioquia department. It traces how contentious mobilization in reaction to the impact of dam development created the conditions for a coproductive

alignment of interests between urban industrialists, activist bureaucrats, social movements, and community organizations. This loose coalition helped to bring about a significant and sustained increase in local state service provision between 1986 and 1994, including a novel participatory environmental management and community development scheme and a rural electrification program.

To conclude, Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation's main findings and discusses their theoretical implications and raises some questions that merit further research. It focuses in particular on whether the theory may illuminate the determinants of other forms of state action in economic hotspots, namely security provision, by discussing some preliminary evidence from Barranca. The chapter then closes with a discussion of the politics of studying subnational economic hotspots with a focus on their connection to state service provision.

2. WHEN DOES THE STATE FOLLOW THE MONEY? Explaining Sustained State Service Provision in Rural Economic Hotspots

2.1. Introduction

Large-scale investment projects in extractives, agribusiness, or power generation do not have a strong record when it comes to promoting inclusive social development in the rural areas and small towns where they tend to be located. Yet these projects continue to be at the center of most countries' economic strategies. Despite widespread opposition and discontent by local communities, and despite many scholars' and activists' warnings about the adverse social and environmental consequences of the "extractivist" model they represent, governments' reliance on them as sources of foreign exchange, private investment, and fiscal revenues endures (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington 2010; Bebbington et al. 2018; Everard 2013; Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Mosley 2017; Scudder 2005; Svampa 2015). Put crudely, there is no indication that such projects will be going away anytime soon.

Can the communities that are impacted by these economic hotspots benefit from them? As discussed in Chapter 1, significant progress has been made in the study of impact mitigation strategies through environmental impact assessments, transparency and accountability mechanisms, and community consultation and participation processes (Bebbington et al. 2018; Cotula et al. 2009; Deininger and Byerlee 2011; T.G. Falleti and Riofrancos 2018; Jaskoski 2014; Natural Resource Governance Institute 2014; Phélinas and Choumert 2017; World Bank 1996, 2004). The promise and pitfalls of corporate social responsibility programs and other

company-led initiatives have also been amply discussed (Amengual 2018; Jones Luong 2014; Perla 2012). The challenges involved with the implementation of decentralized revenue sharing schemes are increasingly well understood (Aragón and Rud 2013; Arellano Yanguas 2011; Bauer et al. 2016; Brollo et al. 2013; Gallego, Maldonado, and Trujillo 2018; Ponce and McClintock 2014; Skinner, Krauss, and Newborne 2014; Scheumann, Dombrowsky, and Hensengerth 2014). Yet the literature has failed to ask a more fundamental question: what does it take for state service provision to function effectively around economic hotspots, which tend to be located in areas of limited state capacity?

In this chapter I elaborate a novel theoretical framework—developed inductively based on the case study design explained in the introduction—that identifies the conditions under which localized investment projects can foster durable improvements in state service provision. Section 2.2 begins by defining and fleshing out the concept of sustained state service provision in the context of the existing literature on state territorial reach and public goods provision. Section 2.3 locates the research problem within a broad array of relevant literatures. Section 2.4 then fleshes out the dissertation’s theoretical contribution, and Section 2.5 closes with a consideration of some alternative explanations.

2.2. Conceptualizing Sustained State Service Provision

States’ ability to broadcast their authority across territory and deliver public goods to areas located far from urban centers varies widely, both across and within countries (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015; Giraudy and Luna 2017;

Harbers 2015; Herbst 2000; O'Donnell 1993; Saylor 2014; Soifer 2008, 2015; Ziblatt 2008). Most of the extant literature attributes variation in governance outcomes to differences in levels of state capacity. Best understood as a stock of “institutional, organizational, and bureaucratic” resources (M.A. Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017a, 410; see also Kurtz and Schrank 2012; Mazzuca 2012), state capacity enables rulers and governments to “to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1984, 189). However, the causal relationship between state capacity and what states actually do—which M.A. Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar (2017b) and Clough (2017) refer to as “state performance”—is not always so straightforward. This section introduces the concept of sustained state service provision (SSSP for short—the specific form of state performance that this study focuses on and aims to explain) and discusses its relationship to state capacity.

From State Capacity to Sustained State Service Provision

Having large stocks of institutional, organizational, and bureaucratic resources undoubtedly facilitates actual state performance. However, having those stocks of capacity does not guarantee that those resources will be put to good use by the political agents that control them. A lower-capacity state led by politicians with more interventionist agendas, or even ones who are more committed and motivated to act (Kyle and Resnick 2019), may conceivably be more active within its territory than a high-capacity state with leaders that are less active. Likewise, a high-capacity state may choose not to act as mandated or expected for political reasons (Holland 2017),

or it may simply devote its capacity to engage in predation (Reno 2015). Indeed, some have found little statistical correlation between measures of state capacity and actual service delivery in country-level comparisons (M. Lee, Walter-Drop, and Wiesel 2014).¹

A careful consideration of the relationship between state capacity and performance is especially relevant when one scales down to the subnational level of analysis to analyze states' territorial reach. Independently of its national-level capacity, a state may intervene more or less in different parts of its territory, or it may behave differently toward certain areas (or sectors of society) than others. It may, for example, privilege security in some parts of its territory and social provision in others, while at the same time remaining largely absent elsewhere. It also cannot be assumed that rulers always want to control as much territory as possible. Political interests, and even certain policy goals, may be better served by the contrary: by incomplete enforcement of formal norms, minimal intervention, and various forms of “mediated rule” through local power structures (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013; Boone 2003; Gerring et al. 2011; Koss 2017; Naseemullah and Staniland 2016; Slater and Kim 2015).

Furthermore, just as state capacity may not be sufficient for explaining actual state performance, I contend that it is also not necessary in the way it is usually assumed to be. I do not dispute the obvious fact that the performance of a task

¹ These authors jump to the conclusion that this indicates that states do not play as important a role in public goods provision as previously thought. I agree with Peters and Pierre (2015) that this is the wrong conclusion to draw from that finding.

presupposes the ability to execute it. My claim is that it does not require that the performer already possess all the means necessary for that performance. In order to provide public goods in a given place, state agents need not rely solely on state resources already available in that locality. What a state can do in a given part of its territory is certainly determined in part by the stock of resources already-available locally—subnational government capacity certainly matters (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015; Garfias 2018; Harbers 2015; Ziblatt 2008). But in the absence of sufficient resources at the local level, additional resources can be procured in an *ad hoc* manner from elsewhere, whether to carry out a discrete task or even to accomplish medium-term policy goals. My argument, which I flesh out in Section 4, is that those supplementary resources may come in the form of “portable state capacity” from other parts of a country’s territory or in the form of capacity transfers from non-state actors.

Impactful state action can happen even in so-called “stateless” regions such as Zomia, the Southeast Asian highland area made most famous by James Scott (2009). According to Scott, for centuries this region eluded surrounding states’ territorial control through its inhabitants’ efforts to elude taxation, conscription, and other forms of political domination. Yet, as other scholars of the region have shown by documenting colonial and postcolonial (Chinese, Burmese, Thai, Laotian, and Vietnamese) states’ creation of ethnic identities and hierarchies, influence over economic activity, and spatial structuring (not least through road construction) (Formoso 2010; Jonsson 2005; M.N.M. Lee 2015), the lack of total territorial control

and local capacity by states does not preclude all forms of state activity. In conclusion, states may impact and transform a locality's living conditions in very consequential ways even in the absence of locally based state personnel, agencies, and infrastructure.

I therefore suggest that state territorial reach should not be seen only through the lens of local-level state capacity but also, and more importantly, through what it actually does on the ground: its security-oriented (military and police) activity, its pursuit of revenue, its regulatory action, its provision of goods and services, and so on. The existing stock of state capacity that is available locally is an enabling and constraining feature for all of these endeavors, but these endeavors are not exclusively a product (much less a mere observable implication) of that local stock of state capacity.

In this study, I focus on the state's provision of welfare-oriented services in localities impacted by economic hotspots. More specifically, I seek to explain state service provision that takes place in a sustained manner (as opposed to episodically). I define sustained state service provision (SSSP) as the delivery of public goods aimed at improving socioeconomic well-being within a given locality and is carried out by agents of the state with formal authority for an uninterrupted period of five years or more. Let us now unpack each of these definitional elements.

Public Goods Aimed at Improving Socioeconomic Well-Being

Like most of the literature on service provision, which goes beyond the consideration of pure public goods (fully non-excludable and non-rivalrous), my analysis includes "impure" public goods, "whose benefits are partially rival and/or

partially excludable” (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 9). In fact, my analysis excludes the provision of such public goods as security and defense, clean air, public media, or official statistics. It focuses more narrowly on services and programs directed at improving the socioeconomic conditions of those residing in a given locality. I operationalize the concept as encompassing services such as public education, healthcare, utilities (water, sanitation, electricity, or garbage collection, among others), infrastructure (such as roads, electrical systems, irrigation systems, and telecommunications), or social programs (providing access to housing or land, monetary transfers, subsidies, or credit).²

Service Delivery Concentrated Within A Given Locality

My definition focuses on services that are provided within the confines of a certain locality (an economic hotspot’s area of influence under study) and whose benefits accrue primarily to the local population. It excludes government programs that benefit the population of a given locality merely in form or only in a marginal sense. For example, the mere creation of a national social security program of which all citizens of the country are nominal beneficiaries would not be included unless new material benefits are verifiably delivered to the local population of an area under study. Likewise, an increase in funds allocated for public education in the national

² I thus mostly follow the (implicit) definition and operationalization of public services used in the literature on service delivery, which usually does not provide an explicit definition but usually focuses on basic services such as education, water, electricity, and health care (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Wibbels 2018; Cammett and MacLean 2014; Lieberman 2018; Post, Bronsoler, and Salman 2017). I also include forms of social welfare that are particularly important in rural contexts such as land distribution and titling, agricultural extension services, and public irrigation (Albertus 2015, 2; Kyle and Resnick 2019).

budget may eventually trickle down in some way to every government-run school in the country, but its benefits might be so diffuse that its local impact might be almost negligible, so it would be excluded as well. As explained in Chapter 1, the units of analysis for the study were economic regions as demarcated by the influence of a productive activity. In order to meet the definition's criteria for inclusion, service provision had to take place physically inside of each of the economic regions under study.

Provision by Agents of the State with Formal Authority

The definition focuses on SSSP that is done by state agents who are formally responsible for it. The focus on state service provision obviously excludes services delivered by non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, for-profit firms, international development organizations, ethnic or religious organizations, or informal networks of reciprocity acting independently of formal government actors (Cammett and MacLean 2014). However, it does not necessarily exclude non-governmental entities that deliver services as agents of the state, such as privately-owned utilities or government contractors (Brass 2016; Morgan and Campbell 2011; Post 2014; Post, Bronsoler, and Salman 2017)—but only if this is done within the framework of formal, explicit institutional arrangements.³

On the other hand, not every actor that may be construed as a state agent fits the definition's requirements. A government official who donates groceries or clothing

³ By contrast, informal delegation arrangements, under which “states deliberately choose not to provide services and turn a blind eye when non-state providers emerge to cater to citizen needs” (Post, Bronsoler, and Salman 2017, 954) would fall outside the definition.

to a poor family or a group of electricians employed by the local utility who volunteer to fix some power cables, if they perform these endeavors as private citizens, would not be doing so as agents of the state. Their actions would therefore not constitute state service provision. These examples are fairly straightforward. But what if a state-owned enterprise (SOE) builds a road, develops a housing program for its employees, or pays the salaries of the local public school teachers? SOEs are, by definition, part of the state apparatus. Would their provision of these kinds of goods constitute state service provision?

My definition of SSSP, with its focus on actors' formal authority over service provision, makes a conceptual distinction between services that are delivered by actors who are part of the state apparatus (and are thus referred to in common parlance as "state agents") but lack a service provision mandate, and those that are provided by actors serving formally as *agents of the state*. The first scenario—non-mandated service provision by an actor that just happens to be part of the state apparatus—more closely resembles the examples of the charitable public official and the helpful electricians mentioned above. By contrast, the second scenario involves a state authority (usually the executive or the legislature), which acts as the principal, officially delegating the provision of a public service (or a set thereof) to an agent. That agent might be a dedicated state agency, a subnational government (for example, through administrative decentralization), a non-state actor (through subcontracting, privatization, or a public-private partnership), or any other entity—including an SOE. Only the second scenario would fit this study's definition of SSSP.

These conceptual clarifications are important for the purposes of this research because two of my case studies involve extensive service provision by public firms with no formal authority over it, a previously untheorized phenomenon.⁴ The national oil company Ecopetrol in Barrancabermeja and the public utility Empresas Públicas de Medellín in Eastern Antioquia were the main purveyors of public services in their areas of influence for many years. However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively, both companies went far beyond their institutional mandates in connection to local service provision. In fact, far from delivering services in a delegative manner as agents of the state, these SOEs chronically substituted for—and sometimes even hindered—the work of the state agencies with official responsibility for local service provision.

Sustained Provision Understood as Lasting Five Years or More

I focus on *sustained* provision because the welfare impact of episodic surges in service provision—such as a one-off infrastructure project, a short-term investment in local schools or health posts, or a social program that only lasts a few months—is usually minimal. In addition, short-lived episodes of service provision can be brought on by an indeterminate number of factors, such as increased media attention,

⁴ Discretionary, non-institutional service provision by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) appears to have fallen outside the purview of studies of state-run social policy as well as the newer scholarship on non-state service provision (e.g., Cammett and MacLean 2014). In their study of the implications of oil companies' ownership structure, Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) pay close attention to companies' service provision through CSR but only in connection to private and foreign oil companies (presumably because the SOEs under study did not engage in CSR within their own countries). A small number of studies have addressed SOEs' CSR activities, but they have focused on different dimensions of CSR outside of service provision, such as transparency, business ethics, and quality standards (Garde-Sanchez, López-Pérez, and López-Hernández 2018; Jingchen 2014; Roper and Barker 2011).

momentary electoral motivations, or even an individual official's mere whim. The five-year benchmark is theoretically appropriate and informative based on the empirical setting from which the argument is derived because it spans more than a single executive and legislative period both at the national and subnational levels in Colombia. Five years is also likely to be a sufficient amount of time for service provision to have a meaningful effect on local living conditions. At the same time, it enables us to capture and explain periods of heightened state performance regardless of whether they lead to the consolidation of state capacity in the longer term. SSSP is a middle-range concept that goes beyond episodic, short-lived spurts of state intervention but is not as demanding and rare as the full consolidation of state territorial reach in less integrated regions.

2.3. The Determinants of Sustained State Service Provision in Distant Economic Hotspots: What We Know

Delivering services to rural areas and small towns which are distant from a country's urban centers of power is no easy task. Dispersed populations, rough terrain, deficient transportation and communications infrastructure tend to make service provision costlier in those areas than in larger and denser urban agglomerations by increasing logistical costs and impeding the development of economies of scale (Birner and von Braun 2009; Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Wibbels 2018; Otero Bahamón 2016). These areas are also generally poorer, tax bases are smaller, and overall levels of education and technical expertise are lower, so the availability of adequate material and bureaucratic resources on the ground is

usually more limited (Lieberman 2018; Liu and Waibel 2009). The entrenched power of local elites also frequently conspires against broad-based service provision (Bhavnani and Lee 2017; Soifer 2015). These obstacles are not insurmountable, however. As discussed above, and as demonstrated by a growing number of studies (Kyle and Resnick 2019; Otero Bahamón 2016), effective state service provision is still possible even in highly unfavorable contexts.

How can an extractive, agricultural, or power generation project help to address—or, on the contrary, exacerbate—these obstacles to state service provision? The relationship between such economic hotspots and the state’s role on the ground is not well understood. Historical studies as well as contemporary works on boomtowns and economic enclaves have shown that the state often remains largely absent from those localities, as corporate actors take on many of its usual functions—or even seek actively to keep it at bay (Bucheli 2005; Dargent, Feldmann, and Luna 2017; Eaton 2015; Gallo 1991; Jones Luong 2014; Steinberg 2016; Watts 2004). Perhaps the most frequently-seen facet of the state in such contexts is its security apparatus, brought forth to provide protection for business actors (Borras and Franco 2013; De Echave et al. 2009; Del Bene, Scheidel, and Temper 2018; Hidalgo-Bastidas, Boelens, and Isch 2018; Lapegna 2016; Moran et al. 2018; McCully 2001; Porter and Watts 2017; Rettberg and Prieto 2018). But other kinds of state action often appear as well—from tax collecting agents to agencies in charge of providing infrastructure, credit, and other goods and services for business actors (Bunker 1985; Hirschman 2013 [1976]; Huber and Safford 1995; Saylor 2014).

Some scholars have identified positive relationships between booming local economies and various new forms of local public goods provision by the state, including education, healthcare, roads, and services like water or electricity (Hajkowicz, Heyenga, and Moffat 2011; B. Smith and Wills 2018; Perry, Olivera, and Restrepo 2012). Projects can become focal points for popular claim-making vis-à-vis the state, which can lead to increased attention and investment (Córdoba et al. 2018; Mitchell 2011; Riofrancos 2017; Rosenthal 2012). The availability of taxable wealth can, at least in theory, attract state elites' attention to a previously disregarded region, and, following a "stationary bandit" logic, prompt them to set up an administrative structure to capture a portion of the riches and provide some public goods in return (Boix 2015; Olson 1993). Business actors seeking communities' approval or "social license" can also make contributions to local public schools or healthcare facilities, or become involved in public-private partnerships to develop local infrastructure, thereby supporting the state's own service provision activities (Bury 2004; Turzi 2017).⁵ On the other hand, many of these points have been called into question. Far from being strengthened, public healthcare and education systems in economic hotspots often find themselves overstrained and under-resourced due to rapid population growth, leading to declining quality (England and Albrecht 1984; Sobolik

⁵ For examples from Peru, India, and South Africa, see Sociedad Nacional de Minería, Petróleo y Energía (2012); "NGO and Government Bodies Associated with VL Development," *Vedanta Limited*, <http://www.vedantaaluminium.com/ngos-govt-bodies.htm>; "Enhancing livelihoods through partnerships across the value chain," *Unilever*, <https://www.unilever.co.za/sustainable-living/global-partnerships/enhancing-livelihoods-through-partnerships-across-the-value-chain>.

2016).⁶ As for companies' social responsibility programs, they can be a double-edged sword because they often disincentivize government involvement and investment (Chinigò 2017; Eaton 2015; Jones Luong 2014; Kapelus 2002).

More broadly, a vast literature the political economy of state formation also speaks to the multifaceted effects of productive activity on state power. Seminal works pointed to coalitional arrangements in response to changing modes of production and commercial dynamics as the main driver of territorial state formation (Anderson 1974). Others have similarly argued that changing patterns of trade, along with the rise of cities as hubs of economic life, gave rise to several new states across Europe from the decline of feudalism until the late eighteenth century (Abramson 2017; Rokkan 1975; Spruyt 1996). On the other hand, the influential resource curse research program—specifically its “rentier state” strand⁷—can also offer some valuable insights. Rentier state theory posits that the availability of large rents originating from the resource sector leads to pernicious patterns of public revenue generation and spending and therefore to diminished bureaucratic and fiscal capacity (Beblawi 1987; Chaudhry 1997; T.L. Karl 1997).⁸

The literature thus points in many different directions: to put it bluntly, an

⁶ Improved education outcomes can sometimes be more attributable to the influx of better-educated laborers from elsewhere than to improvements in local public schools (Loayza and Rigolini 2016).

⁷ When considering this literature, it is important to draw careful distinctions between arguments that connect resource wealth and state capacity (or lack thereof) with ones that deal with other outcomes, such as economic performance, regime type, or civil wars. For recent reviews of the “resource curse” literature, see Gochberg and Menaldo (2016) and M. Ross (2015).

⁸ Of course, this literature has been criticized for being too deterministic in positing that the effect of resource-based development strategies on political institutions is always negative, which overlooks many countries' positive experiences (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010; Kurtz 2013; Menaldo 2016; Saylor 2014; B.B. Smith 2007).

economic hotspot can be either good or bad for state performance. But what determines the outcome? The type of economic activity involved may play a role. For example, resource-extractive projects may be seen as antithetical to positive outcomes (Bunker 1985; T.L. Karl 1997; Shafer 1994). Capital- versus labor-intensive activities might also produce different results (Coronil 1997; Mitchell 2011). I return to the potential relevance of sectoral arguments in the next section, but for now let it suffice to say that there is enough variation *within* sectors to question the impulse to explain everything on this basis (Ciccantell and Smith 2005; Hirschman 2013 [1976]; Menaldo 2016; Waldner and Smith 2015; Saylor 2014).

We therefore need a more dynamic, less structuralist approach. Giraudy and Luna's (2017) work on state territorial reach provides a useful framework for analysis.⁹ The authors argue that state territorial reach is "an intrinsically political and distributive outcome that results from confrontations and compromises between national state officials," who may or may not seek (or be able) to expand state authority, and local actors, who may or may not seek (or be able) to resist that expansion (97). The authors propose a typology of state territorial reach with four categories: 1) unrestricted, 2) contested, 3) restricted, and 4) unprojected. The "unrestricted" category covers cases of even state reach; here, national officials have an interest in projecting state authority over distance and enough resources to do so, and they encounter no resistance from local actors. In "unprojected" situations, local

⁹ The scope of the authors' argument is broader than my focus on service provision; it refers more generally to the state's ability "to implement and enforce established rules and procedures" (following Mann's concept of infrastructural power) (Giraudy and Luna 2017, 95-96).

actors cannot (or do not want to) resist the state's reach, but national actors cannot (or will not) expand it. The other two categories involve more conflictive relationships between national and local actors. The contested form involves some parity between the two parties and may lead either to open conflict or to some kind of collusion that nonetheless results in limited reach. Finally, the restricted form occurs when local actors have the upper hand, and they either have high control of an area to the detriment of central state officials¹⁰ or, on the contrary, perform functions of indirect rule on the latter's behalf. By emphasizing the agency of national and local actors, Giraudy and Luna (2017) avoid the excessive structuralism that characterizes much of the state formation literature and recognizes the possibility of short-term variation in state territorial reach. As the authors explain, state reach "can expand or retrench depending on state officials' and [local] challengers' relative access to resources and (...) the relative prevalence of state officials' and challengers' incentives" (116).

The appearance of an economic hotspot, or changes related to an existing one, can be a significant source of variation for both national and local actors' access to resources and therefore their ability to realize their preferences in connection to state territorial reach. But, as the literature reviewed above indicates, they can also *transform* those preferences, either by changing the interest structures facing existing local actors or by empowering new groups within the local society. Local business actors can benefit greatly from the provision of certain goods or services by the state,

¹⁰ This is exemplified by cases of rebel governance (Arjona 2016; Mampilly 2011) or subnational authoritarianism (Behrend and Whitehead 2016; Eaton and Prieto 2017; Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015).

such as infrastructure, security, property rights, or access to credit (Bunker 1985; Hirschman 2013 [1976]; Saylor 2014). The success of their endeavors may completely depend on it. So, if local economic elites were previously resistant to state intervention, they may now be compelled to use it to their advantage (or even if traditional elites maintain remain defiant, emerging business actors may have a different, more welcoming stance). In addition, economic change often entails significant social and environmental externalities, and those affected by them—usually subordinate sectors—often react by turning to the state (Mitchell 2011; more generally, see Polanyi 2001 [1944]). Popular sectors that were previously indifferent or standoffish toward the state may now seek to use it as a means of protection.

Still, even when relevant actors' preferences are aligned in such a way as to enable the expansion of the state's reach, the resources required to actually make it happen may still be insufficient. As noted before, the kinds of economic hotspots under study are located in areas where local-level state capacity is limited. How might those interested local actors help to offset local state capacity deficits in order to make SSSP possible?

A wide array of literatures speaks to non-state actors' ability to assist the state in attain goals that it would not be able to reach on its own. The developmental state literature emphasized government bureaucracies' reliance on coordination and collaboration with non-state business actors as a powerful explanation for the success of state-led development strategies first in Japan and then in South Korea and Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century (Evans 1995). Non-state support was also

instrumental for enabling the Brazilian state's "pockets of efficiency" at the sectoral and subnational level (Evans 1995; Tandler 1997). These findings were complemented by research that identified a strong relationship between robust social capital (civic engagement, solidarity and trust, and associational networks) and strong, effective, and responsive institutions (Putnam 1993). Connecting the developmental state and social capital literatures, Evans and other scholars developed the concept of "state-society synergy" and noted that "[e]ngaged citizens are a source of discipline and information for public agencies, as well as on-the-ground assistance in the implementation of public projects" (Evans 1997, 3; see also Evans, Huber, and Stephens 2017). As Ostrom (1996, 1073) explains, "citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them," and often do so in collaboration with the public sector—what she called "coproduction." Joshi and Moore (2004, 40) further specify the concept: "Institutionalised co-production is the provision of public services (...) through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions." Similar arguments about non-state actors' contributions to effective state performance and overall good governance have been made by Abers and Keck (2009), Ackerman (2004), Amengual (2016), and Augusto, Dargent, and Rousseau (2017).

Less harmonious, more conflictive processes can also enhance state performance, though the literature has not paid as much attention to this contentious pathway (which I develop in the next section). Contentious political action can not

only influence agenda-setting and policy design but also have a positive impact on its implementation on the ground. This is made clear by studies on issues as varied as welfare state development and specific social programs (Andrews 2004; Huber and Stephens 2001; Rich 2019), agrarian reform and other state programs for the countryside (Grindle 1986; Zamosc 1986), market governance and regulation (Snyder 2001), human rights and humanitarian issues (Brysk 2013; Rettberg 2015), and indigenous rights (Augusto, Dargent, and Rousseau 2017; Yashar 2005), among others (see also Amenta et al. 2002).

Despite the valuable insights provided by these works, however, their specific implications for the challenges of state service provision in economic hotspots located far from urban centers of power are not clear. I now turn to the task of elaborating an original theoretical framework that will advance our understanding of what drives all this observed variation.

2.4. Making the State Work: A New Theory of Sustained State Service Provision in Economic Hotspots


Existing works indicate that the effect of “extractivist” investment projects on the role of the state in their neighboring localities is a multilayered one and that state service provision is likely to depend on strategic interactions—both collaborative and conflictive—between national state elites and local actors. Building on these insights, in this section I offer a new theory of the determinants of sustained state service provision (SSSP) in subnational economic hotspots.

My theory emphasizes the central role played by local *non-state* actors in reaction to the risks and opportunities brought on by changes in the economic landscape around them. Although politicians and bureaucrats may sometimes take the initiative to support the new local economy, these efforts are likely to be short-lived in the absence of societal buy-in. Only when non-state actors call on the state to take on a more active local role in protecting them or helping them to profit from the changing economy will state authorities be compelled to do so for the long haul. Furthermore, in contexts of low state capacity, non-state claimants must not only issue demands but also actively contribute to the production and delivery of services that the state cannot provide on its own. I refer to this arrangement as *local ownership of state power* by non-state actors: state power is not just deployed and directed from the center but is embedded in, exercised in conjunction with, and thus “co-owned” by the local society. The development of local ownership is what makes SSSP possible in economic hotspots marked by limited state capacity.

But how exactly and under what conditions does this happen? I begin this section by identifying the conditions that enable non-state actors to induce SSSP through local ownership of state power. I argue that non-state actors should have a statist ideational framing, strong organizational structures for collective action, and stable access to state elites. Then I turn to explaining the two mechanisms by which such claimants can take “co-ownership” of state power and induce SSSP. Their basic task is to procure additional material or human resources to supplement locally-available state capacity. This can be done through either coproductive or contentious

means. The following subsections flesh out the argument (also summarized in Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Local Ownership of State Power: An Illustration of the Argument



2.5. Who Can Develop Local Ownership of State Power?

Civil society’s potential contributions to development are well established. But the mere existence of organized non-state actors with an interest in better service provision does not guarantee that SSSP will emerge in an economic hotspot. Not just anyone can develop local ownership of state power—and not everyone is interested in doing so. My theory identifies those claimants that are most likely to succeed in: those with a statist ideational framing, strong organizational structures for collective action, and stable access to state elites. I argue that these three conditions are jointly required for inducing SSSP through local ownership of state power—in other words, the outcome is highly unlikely to occur in the absence of any one of them.¹¹

¹¹ While expressed in the language of necessary conditions, my claim is probabilistic rather than deterministic (see Goertz 2003).

A Statist Framing

The first condition for local ownership of state power is the adoption of a statist ideational framing by local non-state actors. Social movements theory recognized that the existence of “objective” reasons for mobilization (such as poverty, inequality, or discrimination) does not automatically prompt collective action. As McAdam (1999, x) explains, people must subjectively “feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can address the problem.” McAdam argues that such “cognitive liberation”—a concept which, other scholars have emphasized, is inseparable from emotional and affective content (Gould 2009)—is necessary for any collective action to emerge and endure. Attention to the ideational dimension of societal groups’ collective and political action is not exclusive to the study of social movements. A rich literature in comparative political economy has analyzed variation in business actors’ preferences in connection to state economic intervention (Mares 2003; Swenson 2002), and several authors have underscored the causal importance of ideas—as opposed to predefined interests alone—in explaining said variation (Blyth 2002; P.A. Hall 1989; Sikkink 1991; Soifer 2015).

Developing these insights, I argue that if collective action is to be conducive to the development of local ownership of state power, not just any collective action frame will do. Non-state actors must hold a *statist* frame, that is, a collective belief that the state—and not other actors—can and ought to play an active role in the locality in question and become involved in the provision of local public goods, accompanied by an expectation that it will be receptive to societal demands.

As obvious as this may sound, it cannot be taken for granted. Among popular sector claimants, non-statist and anti-state forms of collective action are not a historical rarity (Scott 2009), nor are they uncommon today (Zibechi 2010). Many of the classical works on so-called “new” social movements highlighted how such movements often sought to “bypass” the state and focused instead on attaining social, economic, or cultural change outside of traditional institutional channels (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Offe 1985). Movements such as the *zapatistas* in Mexico and Argentina’s *piqueteros* have displayed a preference for civil resistance, political autonomy, and self-management over interacting with the state. Likewise, business actors who hold strong non-statist (anti-interventionist, *laissez faire*) ideas are not likely to play a significant role in the coproduction of state services. Such actors may even become what Eaton (2012, 647) has called “territorial challengers,” which contest the state’s territorial control or “seek to prevent or escape the implementation of its laws and policies” (see also Giraudy and Luna 2017), as has been the case historically with extractive and agribusiness firms in different parts of the world (Bucheli 2005; Dargent, Feldmann, and Luna 2017; Eaton 2015; Watts 2004; Wiley 2008).¹²

Non-statist frames in connection to local service provision need not be premised on a strong anti-state ideology, however. Societal actors may simply not conceive of the state as a local provider (Kruks-Wisner 2018). A firm may still petition the state for its preferred macroeconomic policies or even for local military protection

¹² In Chapter 5, I document how a hydropower development firm (and, remarkably, one which is state-owned) also exhibits this kind of behavior.

and still not support (or actively reject) the state's provision of services in its area of influence. A movement might still use the state's judicial system to try to change the behavior of a private company but continue to direct its service provision demands to that company instead of state authorities; this happened repeatedly in the context of labor disputes in mining boomtowns in Chile and Peru (Helfgott 2013; Vergara 2008), as well as in one of my cases, the oil town of Barrancabermeja (see Chapter 3). Conversely, while collective action frames need to be statist, claimants need not be supportive of or even sympathetic toward the state, let alone the government. Non-state actors may very well radically disagree with the government's policies, and even wish to see incumbent leaders out of office, and still hold the belief that those leaders can and should direct resources toward public goods provision in their locality. A movement may even have anarchist tendencies and still harbor a statist frame in relation to the state as local provider. For example, Araujo (2017) shows how some *piquetero* groups in Argentina use direct action to demand effective provision of government workfare programs, which they oppose for their neoliberal bent but still take advantage of as a bulwark for their larger struggle for autonomy and self-management.

Organizational Structures for Collective Action

The second condition for the development of local ownership of state power involves claimants' forms of organization. As I explain in the next subsection, both the coproductive and the contentious forms of local ownership demand significant investment in time, effort, and resources: making up for state capacity shortcomings is

no small feat and requires high levels of capacity on the part of non-state claimants. My argument echoes the social movements literature's emphasis on mobilizing structures—the “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”—as a central determinant of movements' potential for success (McAdam 1999, ix). While informal interactions (such as interpersonal connections) can play useful roles, I emphasize the importance of formal, well-coordinated, well-resourced, and durable organizations. Not only social movements theory but also the literature on business politics and organizational studies underscore structural factors such as strong and representative leadership, clear internal rules and procedures, sound financial management (even when budgets are small), and stable and committed membership (Andrews 2004; Cox et al. 2018; Fredericksen and London 2000; Haggard, Maxfield, and Schneider 1997; Kriesi 1996). Organizations' broader networks and embeddedness in informal associative forms can strengthen their coordination, increase the resources at their disposal, and make them more enduring, but strong organizational structures come first. These organizational structures need not preexist the onset of claim-making; they can be built and refashioned along the way. Importantly, there does not need to be a single, centralized organization; claimants can have various organizations which perform different tasks. What matters is that they need to remain active for as long as local ownership lasts.

Specific requirements for successful coproduction and contention vary.

Organizations following the coproductive route must not only formulate demands but

also help to meet them by providing material resources and know-how. Accordingly, they need to have considerable administrative and logistical capacity for program design, implementation, and oversight. Those following the contentious pathway need a different kind of logistical capacity. They need to maintain pressure on authorities for extended periods of time beyond isolated outbursts of mobilization. They must be able to launch disruptive protests but also to engage in less confrontational ways with institutional actors and building bridges with broader audiences (Tarrow 2011).

Stable Access to State Elites

Even the most organizationally robust claimant will have limited impact if its target audience does not notice it or is able to ignore it. Citizens' and interest groups' access to and influence with the formal political system is determined not only by their own organizational characteristics (such as the ones discussed above). External factors such as regime type, the structure of party systems (as well as the specific parties in power at a given time and their ideological orientation), and other features of the institutional context play an important role. Informal channels—partisan networks, religious organizations, personal or group connections, legacy and digital media, and similar conduits—also matter greatly.

What does the literature tell us about different societal groups' access to the state? Business relations with the state, in particular, are shaped by the characteristics of a country's political economy and by the structure of the political system and the bureaucracy (such as the rules that govern inter-firm relations and firms' direct political participation through lobbying, campaign contributions, and the like, as well

as public officials' degree of insulation from particularistic pressures and influence) (see, e.g., Coen, Grant, and Wilson 2010; Maxfield and Schneider 1997). Variation in access between different business actors can be driven by their instrumental and structural power: the former refers to their capacity for deliberate political activity (such as lobbying, campaign contributions, participation in policymaking, media influence, and associational activity), while the latter is a function of government's dependence on business in general or on a particular sector or company for growth, employment, and overall economic performance (Fairfield 2015; see also Lindblom 1977).

Social movements and other popular-sector organizations' access to state elites is in large part a function of available political opportunities, the most important elements of which are the political system's relative openness, the degree of elite cohesion (whether major divisions exist and whether some elite factions can be considered movement allies), and the likelihood of repression (whether by the state or by counter-movements) (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 2011). But "political opportunities" are not just a given structural constraint but are subject to change as a result of movements' own strategic action (Goodwin and Jasper 2012).

Beyond these general factors discussed by the literature, I find that a crucial determinant of success in the development of local ownership of state power is the availability of channels for routine communication between the local level and higher levels of government. As Krishna (2011) has shown, the voices of individuals and communities in rural and distant areas rarely reach the ears of state officials directly

but through different kinds of intermediaries, which can be “chains of [formal] institutions” as well as a wide array of informal conduits. Dealing with the Colombian case, F.E. González (2014) has argued that the “differentiated presence of the state” across territory has been determined in large part by the role played by political parties as articulators between national state elites and local power structures.

I find that informal alliances inside the state apparatus can offer claimants stable access to and influence with the state elites with authority to activate the supply side of SSSP. These alliances can involve either activist or reform-minded bureaucrats with power over policy implementation, as discussed by Fox (2015). But openly political, electorally motivated actors, even ones with little or no formal but a good deal of informal authority over state service provision (such as national or regional legislators or party bosses), can play a pivotal brokerage role as well. Especially when it comes to contention-driven SSSP, partisan politicians can use party networks to transmit local demands and procure additional resources (both material and human) to satisfy local needs and demands, in a way reminiscent of Valenzuela’s (1977) pioneering work on political brokerage in Chile (see also Álvarez Rivadulla 2012).¹³ In contexts of limited state capacity, particularism and even patronage are not necessarily incompatible with service provision but are in fact often inexorably tied to it.

¹³ While the current usage of “brokerage” in the literature on clientelism refers to ground-level intermediaries between political parties and voters, Valenzuela’s usage focused on center-local linkages, involving mayors and members of Congress. Small-town mayors would travel to Santiago and connect with legislators who would then transmit local public goods requests to the executive.

The Mechanism: Offsetting Local Capacity Deficits through Coproduction or Contention


How are these attributes—a statist framing, strong organizational structures for collective action, and stable access to state elites—connected to state provision of public goods in contexts of limited state capacity? The territorial unevenness of state capacity is obviously a major obstacle for SSSP in economic hotspots located far from a country’s urban centers of power. As I have been emphasizing, however, it is not an insurmountable obstacle. Nor is the complete consolidation of state capacity in a given locality an entirely necessary condition for SSSP. Local capacity gaps can be “patched” through the development of local ownership of state power by non-state support coalitions.¹⁴ I argue, moreover, that these support coalitions can be either coproductive or contentious in character. Coproductive local ownership involves direct capacity transfers from non-state actors to the local state apparatus. Contentious local ownership functions indirectly by pressuring local agents of the state to seek out additional resources from other levels of government, other parts of the territory, or even from other non-state actors.

To illustrate the argument’s logic, suppose that the provision of a given public service—a water system, for instance—requires a certain amount of resources. Among other things, it calls for pipes, pumps, tanks, meters, construction equipment, and a steady supply of disinfectants and corrosion inhibitors, as well as qualified plumbers, water technicians, and administrators (and funding to pay their wages).

¹⁴ I am grateful to Emily Clough for suggesting the idea of “state patching.”

Service provision thus entails a basic minimum requirement of material and human resources. Figure 2.2 illustrates the different ways in which this requirement may (or may not) be met.

Figure 2.2. Procuring Basic Resources for Sustained State Service Provision: Four Hypothetical Scenarios



Fully Resourced State

In this scenario, all the material and human resources required for the state to provide a public good in a given locality are already present in that area in the form of a strong, effective, and well-funded local government in combination with equally strong, effective, and well-funded locally stationed national and regional government agencies. SSSP is made possible by locally-sourced state capacity alone. While always theoretically possible, however, this scenario is rare in the contexts of limited state capacity where extractive, agribusiness, or hydropower development projects take place.

Patched State

Under these scenarios, locally-sourced capacity may be incomplete, but relevant state actors still manage to garner sufficient resources from other sources to meet the minimum capacity requirement. Such resources may be provided by non-

state actors (as in the *Patched State I* scenario), or they may come from other government entities (in the form of “portable” state capacity, as in the *Patched State II* scenario). In practice, portable state capacity marshalled to a particular locality from other levels of government or other parts of the territory can take the form of intergovernmental transfers or loans, a commission of experts from the national government, officials from other regions serving as consultants to the local government, or something as simple as loaning vehicles or equipment. Capacity transfers from non-state actors can similarly include donations or loans from private firms or non-governmental organizations and even immaterial contributions such as labor or expertise.

Returning to the water system example, a private company might donate some pipes and pumps, a community group might put in some labor, and the local government might connect the new infrastructure to the local water source. Or the national government might provide an extraordinary earmark and send a delegation to oversee the project’s construction, a nearby city government might send a commission of water technicians, and the municipal government might then take responsibility for administering the local utility.¹⁵ In both cases, SSSP takes place despite the fact that overall state capacity in this particular locality remains meager.

The more commonly studied coproductive forms of local ownership work through capacity transfers from non-state actors to local agents of the state. Non-state

¹⁵ For simplicity’s sake, I have presented each form of “state patching” individually, but a combination of the two—where locally-sourced capacity is complemented simultaneously by portable state capacity as well as non-state resources—is certainly possible.

actors actively contribute to the production and delivery of services that are of interest to them, and they do so in coordination with state actors (Evans 1997; Joshi and Moore 2004; Ostrom 1996). The previously untheorized contentious forms of local ownership, by contrast, operate indirectly by pressuring government authorities who are present locally or who have any kind of stake in the locality to seek out additional resources to offset the local capacity deficit, whether from other levels or units of government (in the form of “portable state capacity” transfers) or from other non-state actors (in a sort of contention-driven coproduction dynamic). Contentious pressure is usually exerted through direct confrontational action (usually involving disruptions to the local economic hotspot’s normal operations), by challenging local powerholders’ grip on power (threatening personal or factional reelection bids), or through a combination of both tactics.

In either case, a minimum level of locally-sourced state capacity remains necessary. At the very least, local authorities must be able, first, to receive and process societal demands. Then, depending on whether coproductive or contentious dynamics are in play, they must be able either to play a minimal role in accepting non-state resource transfers and converting those resources into public services, or to seek out additional resources from other sources in order to provide the services demanded by contentious claimants. These are not very demanding standards, theoretically speaking. However, the smaller the local capacity stock, the more demanding will be the task of making up for it, and therefore the more difficult it will be for non-state actors to develop local ownership of state power. Practically speaking,

I do not expect my argument to be very relevant in context where locally-sourced capacity is so precarious that it would have to be almost completely supplemented by external resources.

Under-Resourced Local State

Finally, it may be the case that there is simply not enough capacity to provide a given service even after additional resources from other sources have been procured. Under this scenario, the combination of locally-sourced state resources, supplementary state resources imported from elsewhere, and non-state contributions is still insufficient for enabling SSSP. This is the only scenario in which SSSP in contexts of limited state capacity is a theoretical impossibility.

2.6. Alternative Explanations: Complementary, Not Competing

There are at least three important alternative explanations that might account for variation in state service provision in the context of subnational economic change: 1) a (national) state autonomy account, 2) a sectoral approach, and 3) a “bellicist” perspective. Far from fully dismissing these explanations, I find them (with some qualifications) complementary to the theory of local ownership. However, I maintain that none of them can effectively explain observed variation in SSSP.

A (National) State Autonomy Perspective

My theory of local ownership might seem to contradict some well accepted “statist” approaches to the study of the state. Identified with scholars such as Skocpol (1985, 9), such theories conceive of states as actors in their own right and as

autonomous organizations that “may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.” These approaches were formulated in response to both pluralist and Marxist theories that conceived of the state as either an arena in which political action takes place or an instrument that merely does the bidding of dominant classes. For pluralism, the state-as-arena is a neutral playing ground on which interest groups contended (or collaborated) with each other to shape public policy. For Marxists, it is an arena for class struggle or a vehicle for class domination (see, e.g., Barrow 1993).

Far from following a neo-pluralist or neo-Marxist approach, both of which deny any meaningful autonomy to the state, my argument is informed instead by the work of authors such as Mann (1984) and Migdal (2001). These authors conceive of state power as a relational attribute—one that pertains not only to the state itself but also to its relationship with the society in which it is embedded—and yet they do not deny that state officials can and do formulate preferences and policies and act to realize them or enforce them. My theory of local ownership of state action focuses on the ways in which social forces persuade or pressure state elites to act locally and then provide assistance in the implementation of policies and programs.

These theoretical considerations aside, to what extent is SSSP merely a function of programs formulated and implemented by the central government? My theory does not deny that state elites can design and execute programs autonomously even in areas where state capacity is limited, especially if such programs occupy an important place in a government’s policy agenda. However, the durability and overall

success on the ground of a national initiative is likely to be very fragile in the absence of a local non-state support coalition.

The Role of Sectors: Stationary Bandits, Structural Power, and Materiality

Another alternative explanation would posit that not all types of economic change are alike and therefore their impact on local-level state action should be expected to vary according to the economic activity involved. One strand of research focuses on the rents produced by the new economic activity and the varying incentives they can create for politicians (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006). Applied to this study's specific question, new taxable wealth made available by economic change is likely to capture the attention of national authorities and prompt them, following a "stationary bandit" logic, to deploy state agents to the region in question in order to seize a share of the wealth. In exchange, it would be in the authorities' interest to invest a share of the revenue in providing some goods or services that might help to maximize tax revenues (Olson 1993; Sánchez de la Sierra forthcoming). Because different economic sectors and activities produce varying levels of taxable profits (for instance, agriculture is usually less lucrative than oil, while power generation might occupy a middle position), more lucrative activities should be expected to spur more extensive state action around them.

A different sectoral argument might build on Fairfield's (2015) analysis about economic sectors' potential for generating structural power. Economic actors in "a sector that constitutes a large proportion of GDP, serves as a growth engine, drives job creation, or plays a critical role in ensuring that the broader economy functions

smoothly” (43-44) could develop more leverage over national government elites than their counterparts in other sectors, and their demands for local-level SSSP could have a better chance of eliciting compliance. Thus we ought to see increased state action around economic activities that command more structural power.

A third sectoral explanation might focus not on rents or on structural power but on the specific production and distribution processes involved—what Mitchell (2011) has called the “materiality” of different economic activities. Different activities depend on varying levels and kinds of government support: some might call mainly for security and social control, while others may prompt demands for more active intervention in credit provision, infrastructure development, or market building (see also Gallo 1991; Hirschman 2013 [1976]; Le Billon 2012). Different activities can cause different social or environmental externalities (for example, a hydroelectric dam may immediately cause massive displacement, while the impacts of monocrop agriculture may only be felt in the longer term). They may also vary in terms of how much they enable or hinder collective action (e.g., labor- vs. capital-intensive activities), thus inciting more (or fewer demands) for state action from below.

All three variants of the sectoral approach provide important insights. However, they cannot on their own account for the observed variation in SSSP around localized investment projects. Such variation simply does not occur along sectoral lines. The three main cases analyzed in this dissertation—each one impacted respectively by oil, mechanized commercial agriculture, and hydroelectric dams—all experienced SSSP (as well as its absence) at different points in time. For example, the

Barrancabermeja oil case went from experiencing no SSSP for several decades, then saw significant expansions of it at a later time—and then it collapsed. That case also suggests that “stationary bandit” arguments can be overly functionalist and need a clear specification of causal mechanisms and rigorous empirical verification. As discussed in Chapter 3, the sudden availability of rents did not automatically attract voracious tax collectors followed by other state agencies prepared to provide public goods to support economic activity and thus maximize the size of the loot to be captured by the state. As for the structural power and materiality arguments, they also cannot account for variation on its own. A sector’s importance for a country’s economy or the material characteristics and impacts of a particular kind of project do not predetermine the preferences of economic actors within that sector in terms of the role that the state should play at the local level. Nor do they mechanically predispose impacted popular sectors to demand goods from the state (they may simply direct claims to a private actor) or endow them with all the resources they need to petition the state for increased intervention.

The Bellicist Approach

A third alternative explanation, drawing from the bellicist tradition in the state formation literature, would emphasize that SSSP should be impacted by war, armed conflict, and other threats to sovereignty and security. Focusing on European state formation, Tilly (1990, 20) noted that war requires funding and organization, which compels rulers to seek revenue, an effort that in turn calls for developing “an infrastructure of taxation, supply, and administration” to extract resources. Some of

these insights on the connection between coercion and institutional development have been extended beyond interstate war to interstate rivalry, certain kinds of internal armed conflict, and other threats facing incumbent powerholders (López Alves 2000; Rodríguez Franco 2016; Slater 2010; Thies 2005). At the same time, it has also been shown that war can also have highly destructive effects on the state (M.A. Centeno 2002; Cárdenas, Eslava, and Ramírez 2014). In addition to weakening the central state, war often impedes states' ability to reach parts of their countries' territory through the formation of areas effectively ruled by non-state armed groups (Arjona 2016; Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Mampilly 2011; Risse 2011).

Considering the duration and intensity of internal strife in Colombia over the twentieth century, as well as the complex imbrication of conflict dynamics with the country's regional economies (Rettberg et al. 2018), it stands to reason that the country's armed conflict should have some effect on local-level state action. This is undeniable. And yet the effects of internal war on local-level state action are so heterogeneous—sometimes serving as a motivating factor for it and sometimes impeding it, while being an irrelevant variable in other cases—that it fails to explain the phenomenon of interest on its own. My contention, instead, is that the theory of local ownership of state action enables us to make sense of the varied effects of war dynamics. For example, war can conspire against claimants' ability to develop a strong organizational structure for collective action by reducing associational space and increase the risks of acting together in a giving locality. Conversely, it can provide incentives for the development of civilian organizations aimed at resisting war.

Depending on the state's role in the conflict dynamics, it can foster or undermine a statist ideational framing. Finally, it can diminish claimants' access to state elites if non-state armed groups come to control territory, thereby limiting state agents' physical presence. Or, on the contrary, it can create incentives for state elites to try to win "hearts and minds" by attending to local claimants' demands. In short, the impact of war dynamics is mediated by their impact on non-state actors' ability to develop local ownership of state power.


3. THE BOOMS AND BUSTS OF OIL AND STATE SERVICE PROVISION IN BARRANCABERMEJA

3.1. Introduction

Oil still runs the world. It continues to be the world's main source of energy, it is used in manufacturing a wide array of intermediate and consumer goods, it is one of the main drivers of international trade, and it is a crucial source of income for more than half of the world's countries.¹ Within those countries, the specific localities where oil is located and extracted from are usually highly dependent on it as a direct source of income and even as an engine for other economic activities. Yet oil also tends to have problematic consequences. It tends to be associated with rent-seeking, corruption, authoritarianism, and a wide array of other negative sociopolitical—not to mention economic and environmental—outcomes (Bridge and Le Billon 2013; T.L. Karl 1997; M. Ross 2012). In short, the mix of oil and governance seems to be like oil and water. The Colombian municipality of Barrancabermeja has certainly not been immune from oil's traditional ills. Yet there is more than the usual resource curse narrative to the story of oil and governance (and, incidentally, water) in this locality.

¹ “Key World Energy Statistics,” *International Energy Agency*, <https://www.iea.org/statistics/kwes/supply>; “Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil Comes From,” *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=oil_where. See also Bridge and Le Billon (2013).

Map 3.1.1. Municipality of Barrancabermeja in Santander, Colombia



Made by the author using QGIS, with shapefiles by IGAC (2018), DANE (2017), and OpenStreetMap (2019), approximate coordinates for the De Mares Concession from Aprile-Gnisset (1997), and map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0 (data by OpenStreetMap, under Open Data Commons Open Database License).

Located in the department of Santander, in the Middle Magdalena River Valley (Magdalena Medio) region (see Map 3.1), Barrancabermeja is an area with historically limited institutional capacity at the local level. In Barranca (as most people call it), the Colombian state is associated by most of its residents—and by much of the existing literature—almost exclusively with security forces and the national oil company, Ecopetrol. Other facets of government policy have rarely been felt, and the municipal administration has been historically weak. But between 1975 and 1986, that government, under pressure from a popular movement, carried out a sustained effort to expand public water coverage and a process of formalization and integration of informal urban settlements, along with other improvements in service provision.

This chapter traces the history of the Colombian state's role in service provision in Barranca, starting with the establishment of permanent government posts in the late 19th century. It goes on to detail the state's virtually nonexistent service provision activities in the first half of the 20th century, during which the area was almost entirely under the control of a foreign oil firm, the U.S.-based Tropical Oil Company. During this time, the oil company was the main purveyor of public goods in Barranca, while the Colombian state's role was largely limited to police and military action. In 1951, control of extractive operations was transferred from the private Tropical Oil Company to the newly-created national oil company Ecopetrol. The state-owned firm presented a new face of the Colombian state in Barranca, and some new public works projects were completed. However, with the sole exception of a vocational training program aimed at developing a local workforce for Ecopetrol,

state service provision in Barranca remained limited and episodic. Sustained state service provision (SSSP) only materialized starting in 1975, in the form of a major upgrade and expansion of public water infrastructure and a formalization and integration process for informal urban settlements. This period of SSSP came to an end in 1986.

I argue that variation in state service provision in Barranca was a function of changing state-society relations. Specifically, SSSP only took place when local corporate actors or popular sectors stepped in to actively contribute to the production and delivery of public goods that the state could not provide on its own—i.e., when they developed local ownership of state power. This was made possible by the alignment of strong organizational structures, a statist ideational framing, and stable access to state elites. Local ownership explains both this specific vocational training program and the larger wave of urban development programs of the 1970s and 80s. While the training program was coproduced by Ecopetrol and the central government's National Learning Service (SENA), the improvements to the city's water infrastructure and formalization of squatter settlements resulted from contentious pressure from below, which triggered extraordinary deployments of state resources and personnel from other parts of the territory to supplement the limited capacity of the local state. Table 3.1 illustrates the connection between the conditions that enable local ownership of state power and state service provision in Barranca. SSSP only occurs when the same actor develops all three conditions at the same time (the only exception being the SENA training program, which resulted from

Ecopetrol's development of a partial statist framing and a narrow type of local ownership which was circumscribed solely to that particular program).

Table 3.1. Dimensions of Local Ownership of State Power and the Evolution of State Service Provision in Barrancabermeja

Actor	Strong Organizational Structure		Statist Ideational Framing		Stable Access and Influence w/ State Elites		State Service Provision Outcome
	CS	Corp.	CS	Corp.	CS	Corp.	
Pre-1924	No	No	No	No	No	No	Episodic
1924-1951	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Episodic
1951-1958	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Episodic
1958-1975	Yes	Yes	Yes	No*	No	Yes	Episodic*
1975-1986	Yes	Yes	Yes	No*	Yes	Yes	Sustained
Post-1986	No	Yes	No	No*	No	Yes	Episodic*

* Overall, Ecopetrol never developed a statist framing in connection to local state service provision, with the sole exception of the SENA vocational training program. This program's creation and continued operation was made possible by a narrow form of local ownership of state power by Ecopetrol, which was circumscribed to the operation of this particular program.

I show in this chapter that SSSP in Barranca cannot be explained without reference to local ownership processes, even if factors such as variation in state capacity, the oil sector's unique characteristics, and armed conflict dynamics all play important roles as enabling or constraining conditions. Higher levels of state capacity—whether they pertain to the national, departmental, or municipal level—widen the range of activities that state actors are able perform, and they may reduce the burden on local actors in terms of what they must contribute in order to support the production of public goods. But, as the case of Barranca demonstrates, capacity alone cannot explain what state elites do with it. Sectoral characteristics matter, but

they cannot account for variation in state action over time. The fact that economic change in Barranca is driven by the oil sector, whose successful performance is expected to yield large amounts of wealth, specifically in the form of sizeable government revenues, raises the region's potential for national salience and endows producers with privileged access to state elites. However, this alone does not automatically prompt SSSP, nor does it guarantee its duration over time. Finally, armed conflict dynamics can have a wide variety of effects. They can have a crippling effect on local-level state capacity, but they can also create incentives for portable state capacity to be brought to bear on a given locality. I argue that the effect of war dynamics on state action in the context of economic change can be best discerned by assessing their effect on local actors' organizational structures, statist (or anti-statist) framing, and their access and influence vis-à-vis government elites.

This chapter also aims to contribute to a more precise understanding of the role of the state in Barranca's history. Most scholars, commentators, and activists have emphasized that the Colombian state's role in Barranca has largely—some would say exclusively—been limited to the coercive aspect (see, e.g., Gill 2016). It is undeniable that security forces have been the most visible agent of the state for Barranca's population. The state's role as a perpetrator of all sorts of abuses cannot be minimized—from the extermination of the Yariguí indigenous people to the violent repression of workers' demands for decent livelihoods and its complicity (and sometimes direct participation) in paramilitary groups' gross human rights violations (Aprile-Gnisset 1997; M.C. García 2006; Van Isschot 2015; G. Vargas 2009; Vega,

Núñez, and Pereira 2009; R.A. Velásquez and Castillo 2006). However, Barranca's population has not been passive in the face of violence and injustice. It has always fought back and bounced back—and beyond that, it has at times forced those same state authorities to behave differently, in the interest of social welfare and not merely order and quiescence. Countless studies of Barranca's popular movements provide detailed accounts of their origins, their grievances and political agendas, their strategies and tactics, and their remarkable endurance and resilience in the face of state repression and paramilitary violence; others emphasize the movements' importance in terms of building and sustaining a radical political culture and transforming social and cultural norms. But few recognize the extent to which these civil society forces were also able to compel the Colombian state to act to improve the population's living conditions—let alone explain *how* they succeeded in doing so.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief history of Barrancabermeja and the onset of oil production and documents the local role of the Colombian state during the first half of the 20th century. Section 3.3 looks at the evolution of state service provision between 1951 and 1975, after the departure of the Tropical Oil Company and creation of the state-owned Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (Ecopetrol). During this period, Barranca experienced a relative increase in state service provision, but, with the exception of the SENA training program, it was largely episodic. Section 3.4 discusses the period of SSSP that took place in Barranca from 1975 until 1986 and shows that it was made possible by the full emergence of local ownership of state power by a contentious popular coalition. It

also highlights that the decline in state service provision was due to the collapse of such local ownership. Section 3.5 concludes.

3.2. A Mostly Absentee State (from Colonial Times to the Mid-20th Century)

Barrancabermeja's oil was discovered in precolonial times by the Yariguí indigenous people who inhabited large swaths of the region now known as the Magdalena Medio (the middle Magdalena River Valley). Oil was said to seep out of the earth, and the Yariguíes are believed to have used it for medicinal purposes. The Yariguíes' resistance, as well as the region's thick forests and its warm and humid climate, impeded the formation of Spanish settlements and limited the reach of colonial administration in the area (M.T. Arcila 1994; A. Vargas 1992). By the mid-1800s, the region was becoming a hub for the extraction of chinchona bark (used to make quinine), rubber, tagua, timber, and other forest products. Traders established several settlements and bridle paths connecting the departmental capital city of Bucaramanga and other colonial towns to small ports along the Magdalena River. The hamlet of Barrancabermeja—back then also known at times as Puerto Santander—became one of such ports, but it was too small to be an independent municipality,² so it was designated as a *corregimiento* (an incorporated area formally under the jurisdiction of a larger municipality).³ Throughout the nineteenth century,

² In 1864, according to a government census, the town only had 85 residents (Aprile-Gnisset 1997, 51). By 1901, according to a widely cited anecdotal account by a local resident, there were 33 homes (Galvis 1997 [1965], 47), with an estimated population around 250 (Mosseri et al. 1969, vol. 2, 9).

³ At different points in time, Barranca was part of the municipalities of San Vicente de Chucurí, Lebrija, Puerto Wilches, and again San Vicente de Chucurí.

state action around this part of Magdalena Medio was intermittent and mostly limited to titling lands (which was usually done from a distance, either in Bogotá or Bucaramanga, often without ever setting foot on the lands in question), sporadic investment in road construction (mostly through private concessions), and occasional (though usually deadly) military incursions against the Yariguíes, carried out for the benefit of forest traders, which included various high-profile politicians (LeGrand 2016; A. Vargas 1992; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1; R.A. Velásquez and Castillo 2006). Overall, however, this region was not an exception to the Colombian state's chronic weakness in the countryside throughout the nineteenth century (Oquist 1978; Safford and Palacios 2002; Soifer 2015).

The first permanent government offices in Barrancabermeja were established around 1880: a police quarters and an office of a civil servant—the *corregidor*—who reported to the municipal mayor, stationed a three-day journey away (Aprile-Gnisset 1997, 49). *Corregidores* lacked budgetary autonomy, and their role was essentially limited to transmitting local residents' requests to the municipal or departmental governments, which most of the time were unwilling or unable to take action. For example, repeated requests for a public school, dating back to the 1870s and repeatedly voiced by the *corregidor* in the 1900s were only attended to in 1911, when the departmental government agreed to rent a cabin and pay one teacher's salary (Galvis 1997 [1965]; M. Valbuena 1997 [1947], 168). In 1906, a volunteer police unit was formed, made up of seven local residents (Galvis 1997 [1965], 51). Births, deaths, and marriages began to be recorded officially in 1908. At the national level, the turn

of the century was a sort of transitional period for state capacity, “from an invertebrate economy and a weak state to the beginnings of a more vital economy and a more energetic state” (Safford 1995, 115; see also F.E. González 2014), but actual state control of Magdalena Medio remained limited well into the twentieth century.⁴

In 1906, the Colombian government and a private citizen, Roberto de Mares, signed a contract that gave the latter the right to prospect for and extract oil from a large swath of land in the department of Santander, spanning between 1,200 and 2,000 square miles, which came to be known as the De Mares Concession. Yet the government’s territorial control in the region remained precarious, as illustrated by its inability to even determine conclusively the actual size of the concession area and to monitor De Mares’ oil operations—or, rather, the lack thereof. Although the contract stipulated that productive activity should begin within 18 months of its signing, no actual drilling for oil took place until 1917. De Mares first blamed the lack of progress on the region’s rainy climate, tropical diseases, and unsubstantiated attacks by indigenous people—which the government does not appear to have ever verified—and was granted four extensions between 1907 and 1915.⁵ Finally, in 1916, De Mares offered his concession rights to the Tropical Oil Company, a firm that was formally

⁴ This is illustrated by the fact that it served as a safe haven for Liberal guerrillas fighting the Conservative government during the Thousand Days’ War (1899-1902), an internal war between Liberal and Conservative that began with a Liberal revolt against the Conservative government (Bergquist 1978; A. Vargas 1992). The Liberal revolt failed, and once again Barranca and its surroundings served as a refuge for Liberal insurgents escaping government reprisals.


⁵ The initial contract was extended three times between 1907 and 1909, then it was cancelled that same year, and then the cancellation was rescinded in 1915, giving De Mares another one-year extension. According to Aprile-Gnisset (1997), De Mares spent most of these years as a forest trader while his agents sought out potential investors interested in taking over the oil concession in the United States. The first national government official fully dedicated to inspecting oil activities was appointed in 1922 (Decree 935).

based in Canada but later was found to be a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

The Onset of Oil Production, the Formation of the Troco's Enclave, and an Era of Mostly Private Service Provision

The De Mares concession was officially transferred over to the Troco (as the company came to be known colloquially) in 1919. A commission of oil entrepreneurs and geologists from the United States visited the region for the first time in early 1916. The Tropical Oil Company was officially founded in May of that year, and preliminary activities—clearing forests, dredging river beds, and bringing machinery, vehicles, and even portable homes—began within months. Commercial oil production did not start until 1921; production for export only began in 1926 (Galán 1947, 470). Still, prospecting and other preparatory activities had already had a transformative impact on the town by producing a demographic explosion (see Figure 3.1). Barrancabermeja's population grew almost sixfold between 1908 and 1922, creating increased demand for local public goods. But the actual supply thereof remained meager. Barranca-native writer Simón Galvis (1997 [1965], 65-66)—whose testimonial history of the town's early years remains the most widely cited account of those times—recalls that local officials repeatedly had to raise funds among the town's residents for all sorts of expenses, such as monthly rent for the schoolhouse and the one teacher's salary. They also began to turn to the Troco for support as early as 1918; that year, local residents dug a public artesian well, and the Troco donated a pump for it.

Figure 3.1. Estimated Population of Barrancabermeja (available years, 1864-1938)



Sources: Aprile-Gnisset (1997, 212); Contraloría General de la República (1942); Galvis (1997 [1965], 55, 67)

Even after Barranca became an independent municipality in 1922, service provision by the state remained limited, despite the fact that the town now had its own local government, budgetary autonomy, and increasing revenue from oil royalties. In addition to these “unearned” revenues, the local government was also developing a nontrivial level of fiscal capacity; it proved capable of assessing and collecting taxes from property owners and businesses, including those engaging in “forbidden games” (unregulated gambling and prostitution) (Aprile-Gnisset 1997). Yet this budding fiscal capacity and the growing availability of oil rents had little effect on actual state service provision. Although the municipal council issued several resolutions that stipulated the construction of new public works and the provision of various services, few projects came to fruition without the Troco’s direct involvement. Contrary to the expectation that the availability of taxable profits should attract increased state attention to (and action in) the region from which they may be extracted, the Colombian state did not even need to increase its local presence—let alone provide any goods or services—to capture rents when oil extraction began and royalty payments became due. The reason was simple: those transactions did not take

place in Barrancabermeja but in Bogotá or in the port city of Cartagena, where the oil was shipped off to international markets. At most, all that was needed locally was a government inspector to verify the accuracy of production figures reported by the company.

Even after the Colombian Congress allocated funding for a water supply system in 1927,⁶ it was not the government but the Troco which set up a system of artesian wells, pipes, pumps, and a complementary intake in a small river channel (Galvis 1997 [1965]). This took place in 1930, in the context of local protests—aimed at the Troco, not government authorities—due to a water shortage (Almario 1984). By mid-century, the only project that had been developed without the Troco’s direct involvement was a small water treatment plant built in 1945, with funding from the national government and the departmental government of Santander, though the town continued to depend on the distribution system built by the Troco.

Virtually all other public goods and services in Barranca were provided by the oil company and other non-state actors such as community groups and the oil workers’ union. The company built and maintained city streets and highways, erected several churches, set up street lighting, and developed the town’s electric grid, and telegraph lines (Galvis 1997 [1965]; Serrano 2013). Although the company provided some public works and services at no charge, others were eventually repaid by the municipal government or discounted from royalty payments (Aprile-Gnisset 1997, 232; Galán 1947, 563). In the case of household electricity, the company acted as a

⁶ See Law 96 (1927).

utility and charged individual users (Galvis 1997 [1965], 195). However, the Troco's provision was not at all systematic or inclusive, and it appears to have also been subject to political considerations. For example, Aprile-Gnisset (1997, 231) found a draft contract for the provision of electricity that listed "sedition or other circumstances that may affect the normal operations of the company" as a reason for service suspension. The Colombian state also did little in the way of providing any goods or services, whether public or private, to support the Troco's operations (with the exception of security provision).⁷

Explaining the Absence of State Service Provision

The Troco was self-sufficient when it came to procuring all the public goods it needed to support its own economic activity, such as roads and telegraph lines, but also public buildings, which made it possible for the company to do most government business locally instead of traveling to other municipalities, all of which were located more than a day's journey away. The Troco even provided an office for a government inspector in charge of overseeing company's activities and preparing periodic reports to the government (Galvis 1997 [1965], 151). It also procured most of the *private* goods it required, such as a railroad connecting the town to the oil fields (located about 23 km apart), a small refinery, homes for its foreign managers and engineers, accommodations for other foreign workers (most of them brought from Caribbean

⁷ When it came to dealing with popular unrest, the Troco did call on the Colombian state to provide police and military support. I briefly discuss the security dimension of local state performance in the dissertation's conclusion (Chapter 6).

islands), communal barracks for Colombian workers,⁸ and a private hospital. It also developed water and sewage systems as well as electric power for the fields, the refinery, and private residential areas, and ran its own fleet of oil tankers (Ministerio de Obras Públicas 1922, 106-108; Ordóñez 2012 [1928]; Santiago 1986, 36).⁹ This was said to have created a clear separation between “Colombian Barrancabermeja and *Gringa* Barrancabermeja” (Buenahora 1997 [1970], 21). Even the mayor of Barranca could not enter the Troco’s domain without permission.¹⁰ In other words, the Troco obviously had a robust organizational structure for the coproduction of services. It also enjoyed privileged access to state elites, not only as a function of the structural power it drew from controlling most of the country’s oil, but also thanks to its connections with powerful (Liberal as well as Conservative) politicians (De la Pedraja 1985; J. Villegas 1999). Yet it had no statist ideational framing in connection to local service provision; the only role it accorded to the state inside its enclave was limited exclusively to security provision.

What about popular sectors? There was no shortage of social conflict in Barranca throughout this time. Working and living conditions in the Troco’s camps

⁸ No Colombians, regardless of their rank or skill level, were allowed to live in the staff sites, only in workers’ encampments (Larson, Knowlton, and Popple 1971, 116).

⁹ The Colombian government did contract the construction of a pipeline from Barranca to the Caribbean port of Cartagena separately through a concession awarded to the Andian National Corporation—which turned out to be another Standard Oil subsidiary, though this connection was concealed during contract negotiations (Durán 2015, 199). Legal particulars aside, then, all the work on the ground was done by the same private actor.

¹⁰ Another anecdote by Buenahora is often cited to illustrate this fact. One day, the mayor went to the Troco to speak with company management, and he was stopped outside the fence. The guard explained that he could not enter without providing written documentation that the manager was expecting him, regardless of his being mayor: “It doesn’t matter. This is the Tropical’s property. This is the Concession. This isn’t Barranca” (Archila 1978, 62).

were the main source of grievances. Housing was precarious, health conditions were dismal,¹¹ and access to basic necessities was highly limited (Archila 1978; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, Vol. 1). Popular mobilization exploded in Barranca in 1924, with the first-ever oil workers' strike. The year before, socialist activists had opened a small store that sold food, clothing, and various supplies to workers and local campesinos¹² at lower prices than the Troco's store, against the company's attempt to ban such competition. The store was used to recruit locals into an association called the Unión Obrera (Workers' Union), which would later become the Unión Sindical Obrera (Workers' Syndical Union, USO).¹³ The Workers' Union advocated not only for oil workers but also for local campesinos whose land and homes were inside the De Mares concession area, which the oil company claimed as its own. Many of these *campesino* settlers (usually referred to as *colonos*, or colonizers) had been living for generations in public lands, and others arrived later, seeking opportunities in the context of the oil rush (Aprile-Gnisset 1997). In most cases the settlers had no legal title deeds, but in others the Colombian state had granted land plots to campesinos despite the fact that they were inside the De Mares Concession area, or, conversely, it had included lands that had been previously titled to *colonos* in

¹¹ In 1923, according to Urrutia (2016, 94), 40.8% of the Troco's Colombian workforce fell ill. For a more detailed account of the precarious health conditions, see the Troco's doctor's own account (Schoenleber 1950).

¹² Since the English word "peasant" usually connotes ownership (or some other form of tenure) of a smallholding, I follow Wood's (2003, 5) untranslated usage of *campesina* or *campesino* (someone from the countryside, *campo*) throughout the text. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines "campesino" as "a native of a Latin American rural area."

¹³ Before becoming the USO in 1934, the Workers' Union interchangeably referred to in its own documents as Sociedad Unión Obrera, Sociedad Unión Obreros, Unión Obrera, Unión Obreros, and Unión de Obreros (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1, 133-136).

the Concession area. Solidarity between oil workers, campesinos, and other residents of Barranca was fundamental for supporting mobilization, not only for increasing turnout but also for procuring food and supplies when the town's ordinary activities were paralyzed during strikes and other demonstrations (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1, 196-197).

The Workers' Union was formed in 1923 under the leadership of Raúl Eduardo Mahecha, an organizer who had been promoting and supporting workers' and peasants' mobilizations among banana and transportation workers in other Colombian regions (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1, 133-136). Along with Mahecha, the workers' movement also received support from other nationally salient workers' rights activists such as María Cano and Ignacio Torres Giraldo, members of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, which also led or supported multiple workers' and *campesino* movements across the country (G. Sánchez 1984b). These networks enabled Barranca's grievances to "shift scales" and become salient at the national level,¹⁴ as indicated in 1927 by the national government's view of that year's oil workers' strike as one of many uprisings that took place that year (Gobierno Nacional 1927). The union finally gained official recognition in 1934, in the context of the 1931 legalization of labor unions by the first Liberal government that held national power since the 1880s. The USO's formal recognition enabled it to forge linkages with some nationally influential Liberal politicians, in addition to its existing alliances with leftist

¹⁴ On "scale shift," the dynamic by which local contention is linked to other contentious processes taking place at the national or even transnational level, see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 331-336).

groups.¹⁵

The key missing element was a statist ideational framing. The bulk of oil workers' demands were addressed directly to the Troco, rather than to government authorities. The government was seen by oil workers as a mediator or, at most, an enforcer that might reprimand the Troco and induce it to change its behavior, not as an entity that might intervene directly to improve the population's living conditions.¹⁶ At times, workers even rejected the idea of mediation by the state: in the lead up to the 1935 strike, the USO stated that they were "all against conciliation or arbitration" and would "only accept a direct arrangement between workers and the *yanqui* [Yankee] businessmen" (workers' written declaration cited in Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1, 189).¹⁷ Although the union later became more open to government mediation and arbitration mechanisms, its agenda during this period still did not include any direct demands for state-led social provision in Barranca. Even demands for state authorities to enforce formal norms at the local level were rare. For instance, during a 1946 strike, the USO's claims emphasized the Troco's infringement of labor laws or violation of private contracts and agreements, and demands on the government were limited to calling for favorable rulings in national-

¹⁵ On the other hand, former USO vice-president Pedro Chaparro laments the fact that the union's formal recognition weakened its linkages with Barranca's popular sectors outside of Troco oil workers. Author interview with Pedro Chaparro, former president of the USO's Barrancabermeja directorate and former vice-president of the USO's national board of directors, Bucaramanga, April 20, 2016.

¹⁶ A similar attitude was shared by *colonos* (Bucheli 1995, 38).

¹⁷ The Troco, for its part, almost always opposed government intervention, even as a mediator. In 1924, leaders of the Workers' Union sent a telegram to Bogotá to communicate the grievances that had motivated that year's strike. The government expressed some support for its demands, and the company eventually agreed to meet some of them. However, it stated in private that it would not bind itself to these commitments as a matter of principle because it rejected the fact that the government had involved itself in company affairs (Archila and González 1986).

level arbitration mechanisms (E. Garzón 2014). After that strike, some hints of a more state-centered sentiment on the part of the USO began to appear. Formally, the strike only involved work-related grievances, but public debates surrounding it were colored by a recent decision by the Colombian Supreme Court, which ruled in 1944 that the De Mares Concession should not expire until 1951 rather than 1946 as the government had argued.¹⁸ After the 1946 strike, USO legal advisor Diego Montaña Cuéllar declared that the strike had raised awareness of “the concern for the Colombian state to administer its own oil companies when the terms of the concessions run out” (E. Garzón 2014, 113). Two years later, the USO launched another strike against the Troco’s decision to ramp down production and reduce its workforce by dismissing 107 workers in advance of the Concession’s 1951 expiration. The union was now explicitly defending two different agendas (which it nonetheless saw as being inseparable): forcing the Troco to rehire the workers it had let go and to resume normal oil production, while at the same time pushing for state control of the oil sector (Caro 2013; E. Garzón 2014; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1).

Yet even after the union began to call in the 1940s for more statist economic

¹⁸ The government’s allegation, backed by the USO and most analysts, was based on the fact that the Concession contract stipulated that it should last 30 years after the start of production and on De Mares’s and the Troco’s initial claims that production had begun in 1916. However, in 1941 the company’s lawyers claimed that the concession should not end until 1951 because actual production did not really start until 1921. Most analysts and activists argued then—and have argued ever since—that if production did not actually begin in 1916, then the whole concession contract should be void, since the deadline for commencing extractive operations was not met (Almario 1984; De la Pedraja 1993; Montaña 1976; J. Villegas 1999). Still, the Supreme Court decided in the company’s favor, allegedly as a result of a series of bribes and inducements offered by the Troco to various political figures.

policies, specifically oil nationalization,¹⁹ its demands for improvements in local living conditions on the union's part were all directed at the Troco, not government authorities. Ordinary citizens' petitions regarding public utilities or access to education for the general population were not part of the USO's platform, as the union's mission was focused on demanding improvements to its members' (i.e., oil workers') living and working conditions from the Troco.

3.3. A New Wave of Economic Change under Ecopetrol, A Slow Increase in State Service Provision, and a Growing Civil Society (1951-1975)

In late 1948, the Colombian Congress passed a law that provided for the creation of a national oil company, allowing for private investors to own up to 49% of its shares (Law 165, 1948).²⁰ However, government attempts to woo either foreign and domestic capital for a joint venture failed.²¹ As a result, the fully state-owned

¹⁹ At this point, it was unclear at first whether the De Mares Concession would be renewed on behalf of the Troco, granted to another foreign company, or if a new domestic venture—private, state-owned, or mixed—would be created. Inspired by the Mexican experience with oil expropriation in 1938, nationalist sentiment around oil was running high among some members of the government, especially in Congress, and it was put at the center of the USO's agenda for the 1948 strike (Almarino 1984; E. Garzón 2014; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1).

²⁰ The extent to which the 1948 USO strike contributed to the creation of Ecopetrol is a matter of dispute. The USO sees itself as “the mother of Ecopetrol” (Montaña 1976, 104; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1, 294). Others argue that the decision to create Ecopetrol was much more elite-driven, considering the repression that followed the assassination of Gaitán, which severely weakened the USO and allowed the government and economic elites to shut the union out of the decision-making process (Sáenz Rovner 2002). Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009, vol. 1) concede this point but emphasize that the political climate in which elites decided the future of the oil sector had been so profoundly shaped by the USO's campaign for nationalization that the possibility of renewing the De Mares Concession or putting another foreign company in charge of the oil sector was essentially foreclosed.


²¹ The Standard Oil Company—the Troco's parent company—refused to participate in a joint venture unless it owned at least 50% of the company's shares and had full control of management; after attempting unsuccessfully to change the terms of the law, it announced in 1949 that it would not participate in the new company (Sáenz Rovner 2002). The Colombian government then turned to domestic investors, but they were unable to come up with enough capital for a joint venture.

Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (Ecopetrol) was created in January 1951, and it took over the De Mares concession later that year. A separate contract was signed with the International Oil Corporation (Intercol, another Standard Oil subsidiary) for the operation of the Barranca refinery for ten years.

Ecopetrol's arrival brought about a new period of economic transformation in Barranca. The social changes were not as profound as when oil activity began in the 1910s in an area that was almost entirely disconnected from domestic and global markets, but they were still consequential. Oil operations underwent a significant revitalization with Ecopetrol's takeover of extractive activity in 1951. The refinery was modernized and expanded between 1952 and 1954, and again in 1961 (De la Pedraja 1993, 135; Ecopetrol 1958). It went from processing an average of 17,502.2 barrels per day in 1948 to 33,772 in 1960 and 71,423 in 1969, and became capable of producing a wider array of products (Del Hierro 1949, 26; Arrieta 1971, 154). These upgrades brought on another large wave of population growth (see Figure 3.2), and they meant that population growth would now be concentrated in the town's urban center (as opposed to before, when most of the oil workforce lived and worked in El Centro, where the oil fields are located; see Map 3.1). As a former member of Barrancabermeja's municipal council who lived through those times explains, "what really awoke Barranca was the first expansion of the refinery starting in 1952."²²

²² Author interview with Eutimio Hernández Gamarra, Bogotá, April 27, 2016.

Figure 3.2. Population of Barrancabermeja (census years, 1938-1985)



Sources: Contraloría General de la República (1942); DANE (1955b, 1980, 1986)

Still, the situation in terms of service provision in Barranca did not change much throughout the 1950s, save for some scattered public works projects, almost all of them carried out directly by Ecopetrol. Public investment increased somewhat in the 1960s, starting with a job training program launched in 1962 by the National Learning Service (SENA), the Colombian government's agency for vocational and technical training, which was aimed at educating a local workforce for Ecopetrol. Additional public investments came on the heels of a mass "civic" strike in 1963, which signaled the rise of a growing and increasingly diverse local civil society. However, state service provision remained largely episodic, in the form of scattered public works projects, and, with the exception of the SENA program, it faltered at the turn of the decade.

A Period of Expanding (But Still Mostly Episodic) Services

The main provider of services during this period was Ecopetrol, either directly or through the financial assistance it provided to the municipal government for public works projects. This raises an important conceptual question. Does Ecopetrol's service provision constitute the kind of state service provision under analysis? As a national oil company, Ecopetrol is a Colombian state entity, so its activity in Barranca could, at

first glance, be considered the state’s own activity. However, Ecopetrol’s formal independence from executive and legislative control, its “administrative and patrimonial autonomy,” and its mandate to operate as a self-governing “commercial enterprise”²³ mean that it cannot be considered a mere extension of the Colombian state.²⁴ More importantly for the purposes of this study—which defines SSSP as the kind that is carried out *by agents of the state with formal authority*—Ecopetrol’s mandate has always been limited to “activities proper to the industry and trade of petroleum and related goods”²⁵ and has never included any provision related to social policy or service delivery. Thus, services rendered by Ecopetrol cannot be considered instances of state service provision as defined in this study merely on account of the company’s status as a state-owned firm. The only exception would be if Ecopetrol were formally and explicitly tasked by the government to deliver services as its agent.

Starting especially in the 1960s, Ecopetrol made significant investments in Barranca, though the bulk of them were only for the benefit of company personnel. Just as the Troco had done before, Ecopetrol ran several schools for workers’ children and, starting in 1959, granted a number of high-school and university scholarships to

²³ The company’s organizational, administrative, patrimonial, and commercial autonomy was stipulated in various executive decrees, first establishing and then reforming the company’s legal statutes (Decree 30, 1951; Decree 2039, 1956, Decree 3211, 1959, Decree 62, 1970). Subsequent statutory reforms either upheld or expanded the company’s autonomy, culminating in the 2003 reform.

²⁴ The company’s autonomy from the government was constrained for most of its history—until a 2003 reform—by the inclusion of its finances in national accounts, thereby limiting its capacity for independent borrowing and liquidity (Caballero Argáez and Bitar 2016). Its independence was also limited, at least on paper, by the fact that its board members and general manager were all appointed by the President. However, government officials have sometimes intervened in Ecopetrol’s investment plans and decisions (De la Pedraja 1993, ch. 6; A. Martínez 2011), but they have never enjoyed direct control over the company.

²⁵ This language—taken from Decree 62 (1970)—is repeated with minimal variations in every statutory reform.

employees and their relatives (Ecopetrol 1962). Ecopetrol also provided treated water to the USO free of charge, and the union then made it available to the general public through public taps outside one of its buildings—what came to be known as “the USO’s water” (“*el agua de la USO*”) and is still in place to this day. It also renovated the Troco’s hospital in El Centro (the oil fields area) to provide medical services to its personnel, and it admitted some residents of that locality who were unaffiliated with the company. In 1962, Ecopetrol launched a cooperative housing program (Cavipetrol) for a select number of its workers, a product of the 1959 union contract negotiations with the resurgent USO (Flórez and Castañeda 1997; Múnera 2004). Ecopetrol funded the construction of homes and matched workers’ savings toward mortgage payments.

Ecopetrol also provided funding to the municipal government of Barranca for public works and social development programs, first through an agreement known as the Pilot Plan (*Plan Piloto*), which began in 1952, and later on through yearly grants from 1968 to 1978 under the terms of the so-called “Law of One Hundred Million” (described below). Funding from the 1952 Pilot Plan—a strictly voluntary agreement between the company and the municipality—was provided to the local administration through advance royalty payments (Galvis 1997 [1965], 155-156; Mosseri et al. 1969). Through this scheme, Ecopetrol contributed to the provision of some public goods in Barranca, but this did not take place in a sustained, systematic way. The expectation was that this investment would enable Barranca to have “very comprehensive services in terms of energy, water, sewage, education, paved roads, housing, and a hospital”

by 1958 (Dirección Nacional de Planeación Económica y Fiscal 1955, 65). But such expectations were never realized. Despite the nominal existence of a “plan,” investments were carried out in a disjointed, piecemeal way: a sewage system in 1954, a public school in 1955, and a public telephone system in 1959, and some upgrades to the water supply network in 1962, as well as renovations to some public and private buildings (such as the mayor’s office, a stadium, and a hotel) (Galvis 1997 [1965], 155-156; Pardo Parra 1964).

Only one initiative implemented during this period falls within this study’s definition of state service provision, namely the opening in 1962 of a local branch of the National Service for Learning (SENA), the national government’s agency for vocational training. Supported by a donation from Ecopetrol (Pardo Parra 1964, 309), SENA’s Barranca branch began to operate in 1965 and offered training programs in welding, electrical systems, carpentry, small business management, and other trades (Mosseri et al. 1969, vol. 2; SENA–Ecopetrol 1976; SENA 1978, 78). In 1970, the agency signed an agreement with Ecopetrol and started to receive funding from the oil company to establish a National Center for Refining and Petrochemicals, intended to train future workers for Ecopetrol’s drilling, refining, and chemical engineering operations (SENA 1978, 78). Under the agreement, SENA would lend its facilities and provide personnel and equipment, and Ecopetrol would provide additional funding for building upgrades and pay the salaries of seven new instructors (SENA–Ecopetrol 1976, 103).

SENA acknowledged in a report that the Barranca center depended “almost completely” on Ecopetrol, which even determined each year how many trainees the program would admit based on its personnel needs (SENA 1978, 78). According to the late former bishop of Barranca Jaime Prieto Amaya, SENA’s presence and programs in the city were designed almost exclusively to meet Ecopetrol’s needs; only in the mid-2000s did the agency start receiving more funding from the national government to develop new programs.²⁶ The SENA program therefore lends support for my argument about the centrality of local ownership of state power in enabling SSSP in contexts of limited state capacity. It is an exception that proves the rule: Ecopetrol clearly had a solid organizational structure for engaging in coproduction with other elements of the state apparatus as well as stable access to state elites. But this alone did not spur the provision of new services by the state in Barranca, save for the aforementioned scattered investments. Despite being a state entity, Ecopetrol had a very narrow statist framing when it came to local service provision in Barranca. The only service that was provided in a sustained fashion was the one for which the company did conceive of the state playing an active role in providing.

From Forced Quiescence to Incipient Local Ownership of State Power: Barranca’s Growing and Increasingly Diverse Civil Society

The years between 1951 and 1958 were a time of little to no mobilization in Barranca. This was partly due to a crackdown on local activists by partisan police forces, the Colombian military, and private armed squads which started in 1948, after

²⁶ Interview conducted by Sergio Guillermo and Angelika Rettberg, Barrancabermeja, May 15, 2008.

the killing of radical liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.²⁷ Later, when Ecopetrol took control of extractive operations from the Troco in 1951, the weakened USO was dissolved and replaced by two confessional and pro-government unions. On the night of the reversion ceremony, two groups of workers founded two new labor unions, one for Ecopetrol and another one for Intercol. The new unions were the Colombian Oil Company Union (Sincopetrol) for extractive operations under Ecopetrol, and the Intercol Workers Union (Sintranal) for refinery workers. These unions were promptly recognized two days later by the Ministry of Labor, so when USO representatives requested recognition afterwards, the government denied their request on the basis of a ban on parallel labor unions (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1, 343). Although Barranca's national salience was at its highest point with the creation of Ecopetrol—which, on the face of it, would have provided local actors with significant leverage with state elites—the new unions were comparatively weak, avowedly apolitical (save for their strong anti-communism), and strictly focused on workplace-related demands.²⁸ All the enabling conditions for contention-driven social provision were absent during this period.


The USO returned to the fray at the end of 1957, defeating the confessional unions in a vote among Barranca's soil workers (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 2, 205). Its comeback was soon followed by the rise of new collective actors in

²⁷ On April 9, 1948, the news of Gaitán's death led to massive and deadly uprisings throughout the country (Braun 1985). In Barranca, liberals and communists took over the city, including the oil infrastructure, in a matter of hours. The uprising lasted ten days. After reclaiming control of the city, government forces went on the offensive against local activists (Díaz Callejas 1988; A. Vargas 1992).

²⁸ Author interview with Eutimio Hernández Gamarra, former councilmember of Barrancabermeja (1960-1964) and former Sintranal union organizer, Bogotá, April 27, 2016.

Barranca: neighborhood associations demanding improved public services, alongside a growing middle class made up of Ecopetrol staff and local merchants and professionals, with support from local party leaders (Havens and Romieux 1966; S.M. Rodríguez 1992). Deficient public services (especially water) and a major housing deficit were the main points of contention. Squatter settlements proliferated, especially in the so-called northeastern zone of the city (see Map 3.2), as did demands for their formalization, legal recognition, and provision of basic amenities.

Map 3.2. Urban Area of Barrancabermeja



Made by the author based on map design by DANE (n.d.)

An activist who took part in the 1963 civic strike summarized the claimants' grievances:

Water here has always been nasty [*maluca*]. But in '63 it was a time of muddy waters (...) There was almost no electricity, and doctors used candles during surgery. The streets were unpaved and shoddy. There were two hospitals: the new one, which was empty, and the old one, which was so old it was falling apart and was almost useless. (Chaparro 1991, 10)

The first USO strike against Ecopetrol and the first-ever citizen-led "civic strike" (*paro cívico*)²⁹ both took place in 1963 (Havens and Romieux 1966). The more diverse composition of contentious groups was instrumental in producing another important change, namely an increasingly statist ideational frame. Complaints and demands were not only aimed at Ecopetrol but at the government, "the local one, the one from Santander, the national one, all of them."³⁰

In response to the 1963 strikes, national and subnational governments moved to conduct numerous studies and drafted plans to expand the city's water works. A new hospital was opened and some major streets were paved. A Liberal congressman from Barrancabermeja, José Giordanelli Carrasquilla, drafted a bill to provide funding from the national government for the oil city (Senado de la República 1980: 256-269). Law 13—better known as the "Law of One Hundred Million"—was finally passed in 1968, with support from then-President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (also a

²⁹ The "civic" label, employed by movement leaders, has been used repeatedly in Colombia by multiple movements in an effort to emphasize their respect for the law and their non-subversive character as well as signal that they are not motivated by partisan interests but by a sense of community.

³⁰ Interview with Eutimio Hernández Gamarra, Bogotá, April 27, 2016.

Liberal).³¹ Under its terms, Barranca would receive a yearly grant from the national government over a ten-year period to improve public service infrastructure, including water and sewage systems, street paving and repair, and improvement of informal settlements.³² A study was commissioned to determine the city's most urgent needs and propose a detailed investment plan, and a municipal planning office was created to coordinate and oversee the plan's execution (Mosseri et al. 1969). Although popular sectors had become somewhat disengaged, a group of mostly middle-class citizens led by Ecopetrol staff, local merchants, and political leaders (the self-styled Private Committee for Development), with close connections to department- and national-level Liberal Party networks, was formed to monitor the funds' investment (Castilla 1989, 70; M.C. García 2006, 272; Mosseri et al. 1969, vol. 1, 7).

Soon after, however, the Private Committee's influence and the party-brokered connection between the local civil society and the national government took a major hit after the 1970 elections, when an outsider party, ANAPO, won a majority of the seats in the municipal council and became the largest block in the departmental assembly of Santander (Báez 2006).³³ Once in office, the new majority blocked the mayor's investment plans and spurned the Private Committee.³⁴ Although the Private Committee held some meetings with national government representatives over the

³¹ Carlos Lleras Restrepo, "Barrancabermeja," *Nueva Frontera* No. 56, June 28, 1975, p. 2.

³² The specific projects were stipulated in Presidential Decree 3030 of 1968.

³³ In the context of a wave of victories in subnational legislative bodies and a highly contested presidential election, the former military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) won 11 of 15 seats in Barranca's municipal council and a plurality of seats in the departmental assembly (Báez 2006).

³⁴ Phone communication with Jorge Eduardo Núñez, historian, longtime resident of Barranca, and participant in most civic strikes, May 4, 2018.

following years (Pinilla 2002, 189), these were few and far between. Overall, little pressure was exerted when progress was slow to come with regard to project implementation, either by the Private Committee or from below. The USO and the town's rising civil society (left-leaning Catholic activists, women's neighborhood groups, and *campesino* organizations), having been sidelined by the Private Committee after the 1963 strikes, largely sided with ANAPO and did not mobilize to call for the continued implementation of the One Hundred Million Law. By the mid-1970s, despite the fact that nearly 65 million pesos had been spent,³⁵ the only major investment goal that was reached was the construction of a new water treatment plant in 1974—but even this project did not become operational until two years later (Garzón 1990). In short, while civil society's organizational structures, statist framing, and access to state elites were on the rise, they were too incipient and short-lived to induce sustained state provision beyond Ecopetrol's narrow commitment to the SENA training program.

³⁵ Carlos Lleras Restrepo, "Barrancabermeja," p. 2.

3.4. The Rise of SSSP Driven by Contentious Local Ownership of State Power (1975-1986)

“We would mobilize, and that way we would force the government to make good on its commitments”
—Ramón Rangel, union leader and community organizer in Barrancabermeja since the 1970s³⁶

The Development of Local Ownership of State Power by Contentious Claimants

In the first half of the 1970s, the struggles of the Private Committee, the USO, and other popular organizations were largely disjointed. In 1971, the USO held a two-day strike, but for the most part it acted alone (Chaparro 1991; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 2). Meanwhile, different political factions along with left-leaning Catholic leaders from the Diocese of Barranca’s social program (Pastoral Social) were leading land occupations and building informal settlements in privately owned open lands in the northeast of the city (Barba 2012; Equipo de Trabajo Popular 1986; Flórez and Castañeda 1997). Poor neighborhoods all across the city were witnessing the formation of “homemaker clubs,” women’s mutual aid groups supported by the Catholic Church, which later on came together to create the Popular Feminine Organization (OFP) (Bernal 2014; Organización Femenina Popular 1979).

The turning point came in 1975. The different actors whose grievances and organizational strength had been growing so rapidly coalesced around public services and housing issues, especially the quality of the Barranca’s drinking water, and

³⁶ Interview, Barrancabermeja, April 21, 2016.

formed the Comité Cívico Popular (Civic Popular Committee). In late 1974, the quality of the city's tap water became intolerably bad—it was described as “sewage water mixed with sandy water” (Chaparro 1991, 13)—and the new water treatment plant that had been officially inaugurated that year was still not operational. The Comité Cívico Popular built on the associational experience of the 1963 civic strike, but now it was much stronger and better organized. Not only did it enjoy much larger numbers; it also benefited from a revitalized USO and enjoyed considerable support from the local Catholic church (Briceño 1993; Castilla 1989; J.J. Londoño et al. 1991; S.M. Rodríguez 1992).

In early January 1975, activists from different sectors of Barranca's civil society held several meetings in the USO's headquarters to prepare a series of civic strikes. Days before the strike, the Private Committee for Development and some local political figures withdrew their support after departmental and national government authorities refused to recognize the social movement as a valid interlocutor. All other participants—the USO, other unionized workers, women's and student groups, neighborhood organizations, Catholic activists, campesinos, and others—stayed on board. The Comité had a sophisticated organizational structure, with networks of activists based in almost all of the city's neighborhoods, and it was guided by basic principles of “broad and equal representation” and “effective popular leadership” (which, incidentally, was made possible by the Private Committee's exit from the coalition) (Castilla 1989, 77-80). The movement had a “general popular assembly,” intended as an open decision-making forum for all Barranca residents; a

“civic committee” with a representative from every participating organization (business groups from the Private Committee, political parties, the OFP and other neighborhood associations, *campesino* organizations, the local Catholic church, and others), which in turn elected a “central executive committee” in charge of everyday tactics and logistics. Most importantly, “neighborhood committees” in charge of mobilizing city residents through door-to-door organizing were the movement’s contentious muscle (J.J. Londoño et al. 1991, 138-145).

In addition to the main theme of clean water, the movement demanded improvements in the sewage system, electricity, roads, schools, and health care, and greater attention to the living conditions of campesinos in the surrounding rural areas (Equipo de Trabajo Popular 1986, 82). Demands were addressed at government authorities, not Ecopetrol executives. While they appealed to authorities on all levels of government, people directed much of their anger to the departmental government of Santander, which ran the local water company.³⁷

Two civic strikes and multiple demonstrations were held in January and February 1975, thus marking the start of a period of constant organization and frequent mobilization to pressure state authorities to provide services to the population, not only in a piecemeal fashion but more continuously and systematically. Some weeks after the strikes, civic activists carried out a massive land occupation and almost immediate construction of a new informal settlement.³⁸ Land occupations

³⁷ Phone communication with Jorge Eduardo Núñez, May 4, 2018.

³⁸ Author interview with Eduardo Díaz, former director of Pastoral Social in the Catholic Diocese of Barrancabermeja and member of the Private Committee for Development, the Comité Cívico Popular,

followed by forceful demands for legalization, titling, and access to services became a recurring reality during this period (the local press called it a *Barranca* tradition³⁹).

The land occupation boom was due in large part to another wave of population growth resulting from a new expansion and upgrade of the refinery, which started in 1975 and was completed in 1979 (Ávila 1980).

Although it had previously refused to treat the movement as a valid interlocutor, after the strikes the national government vowed to improve water provision, expand public schools, and make other investments. A movement delegation led by local Catholic Church activists met with President Alfonso López Michelsen in Bogotá. Still, the movement did not take the government's promises at its word. Instead, it kept up the organizing efforts: a committee was established to oversee the government's efforts and publish monthly progress reports, and special efforts were made to keep neighborhood committees active (Castilla 1989).

Contentious pressure was not an everyday occurrence—nor did it need to be. But the movement's disruptive power did not fizzle out after 1975. After 1975, there were two other major civic protest episodes. First came two days of action in 1977 in solidarity with a major USO strike and against government repression of striking oil workers (Chaparro 1991, 23). Between that strike and the next one, the OFP—with backing from the Catholic Pastoral Social—took the lead in organizing neighborhood groups

and the Coordinadora Popular, April 21, 2016. See also Toro (2004, 192-193).

³⁹ In particular, May Day was associated with yearly land “invasions” (see Sandino 1997 [1977], 142). Barrancabermeja went on to have the largest number of urban land occupations for the development of informal settlements among all Colombian cities between 1975 and 2000 (M.C. García 2006), despite its considerably smaller population than major cities like Bogotá, Medellín, or Cali.

from different parts of the city (especially the northeast neighborhoods) and coordinating, along with the USO, smaller acts of protest short of a strike (M.C. García 2006; S.M. Rodríguez 1992).

In 1982, the civic coalition was restructured under a new organization, the *Coordinadora Popular* (Popular Coordination Committee), whose objective was to serve as a permanent organizational vehicle to maintain and strengthen the ties between labor activists, the OFP, neighborhood groups (of which there were at about 48 by the mid-1980s), church leaders, and campesinos that were developed in earlier years (M.C. García 2006; Equipo de Trabajo Popular 1986). The *Coordinadora* also sought to establish more permanent and effective dialogue with political parties and local government officials as well as build bridges with movements in other parts of Magdalena Medio. But it also maintained the recourse to mass protest. In 1983, the *Coordinadora Popular* organized another civic strike mainly to maintain pressure on authorities around water issues—since coverage had improved but water quality was still deficient, due in large part to deficient waste management by Ecopetrol—but also to push for other improvements in public services, education, and land titling for campesinos (J.J. Londoño et al. 1991, Appendix 7).

The popular coalition changed over time, with some actors becoming disengaged and others growing in strength at different moments (Castilla 1989; M.C. García 2006). Relationships between different actors were not always harmonious. For example, there were some tensions between the USO and other actors, who sometimes saw the union as an unreliable ally that sought out Barranca's broader civil

society whenever it was in the middle of contract negotiations with Ecopetrol and in the context of labor strikes but did not always accompany broader civic mobilizations.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the coalition was able to maintain significant pressure on authorities for more than a decade.

In addition to its internal organization, the movement developed key alliances with local politicians, cooperatives, and, most importantly, the local Catholic Church. Not only were several priests directly involved in the movement, but also the Church's local hierarchy openly supported it. The Church's support for the movement led the national government to accuse the priests of being subversives seeking to "make a revolution with a mix of vodka and holy water," to which the bishop of Barranca retorted that the city's water was too polluted and could not be sanctified.⁴¹ The mention of vodka was meant as an accusation of communist (Soviet) infiltration. The Church contributed to the movement both by supporting its organizational structures for collective action and by facilitating its access to state elites. It did the latter by lending legitimacy to the movement's cause through its public declarations of support but also through the role of priests such as Eduardo Díaz as a movement representative before the national government. Support for the movement's organizational structures was provided through the direct participation of several priests as movement leaders but also through logistical support for contentious activities. According to Pedro Chaparro, a former president of the USO's Barranca

⁴⁰ Author interviews with Eduardo Díaz, April 21, 2016; and Santiago Camargo, deputy director of the Magdalena Medio Peace and Development Program, Barrancabermeja, April 18, 2016. See also Briceño (1993).

⁴¹ Author interview with Father Eduardo Díaz, Barrancabermeja, April 21, 2016.

directorate, during the 1977 union strike, the USO had four mimeographs, three of which were confiscated. The fourth one was brought to the offices of the Barranca Catholic diocese to be hidden, and printed bulletins were carried out inside priests' dirty laundry baskets to be distributed to the union's affiliates and sympathizers.⁴²


SSSP in Barranca: Expanding Access to Water and Neighborhood Formalization

During this time, the Colombian state was compelled to take on a more welfare-oriented role than it ever had before in Barranca. State provision of public goods became significant and sustained during this period. The most important issues that were addressed involved water provision and housing, though other improvements were also made in terms of other public utilities, some education programs, and public works, especially in poorer neighborhoods. Thanks to local residents' continued demand for improved water provision, the new treatment plant inaugurated in 1974 finally became operational in 1976. The source was switched from the river channel from which the city's water had been drawn since the 1940s, where water levels were often too low to provide enough water for the city and to which much of the city's sewage was drained, to the much less polluted San Silvestre marshes, east of the city (F. Garzón 1990; see Map 3.2). In addition, the water supply coverage in Barrancabermeja's urban area grew from 63.6% in 1973 to 85.1% in 1985 (see Figure 3.3), funded in part with loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) guaranteed by the national government (Banco

⁴² Author interview with Pedro Chaparro, Bucaramanga, April 20, 2016.

Interamericano de Desarrollo 1989; World Bank 1988). The decision to include Barranca in the funding package requested from the IADB came after the 1975 strikes and the meeting between movement representatives and President López Michelsen.⁴³

Figure 3.3. Water Service Coverage in Barrancabermeja’s Urban Area (census years, 1964-1993)



Sources: DANE (1970) for 1964, DANE (1986) for 1985, CEDE (2014) for 1973 and 1993.

Barranca’s rate of expansion in coverage between the 1973 and 1985 censuses outperformed almost all comparable cities in Colombia (including others that also received World Bank and IADB funding) as well as the national average and all but two departmental averages (Cuervo 1991).⁴⁴ This jump in coverage is especially striking when one considers the rapid growth of informal neighborhoods following land occupations during this period, which required entirely new infrastructure. Most comparable cities, including many department capitals, suffered decreases in coverage as their populations grew during this same period. Some progress was also made in terms of water quality thanks to investments in treatment facilities in the early 1980s.

⁴³ Carlos Lleras Restrepo, “Barrancabermeja,” p. 2.

⁴⁴ “Comparable” cities are those that had a similar population and similar coverage rates in 1973, such as Popayán, Valledupar, and Sincelejo (CEDE 2014). In the two previous intercensal periods (1951-1964 and 1964-1973), Barranca’s performance was comparatively weak, ranking 22nd and 30th among Colombia’s 35 largest municipalities (Cuervo 1991).

A 1988 physiochemical study found that the city's water fell within "permissible" standards by most measures and showed considerable improvements relative to a similar analysis conducted in 1978 (Caicedo 1993, 68).

The effect of Barranca's civic movements on service provision can be observed more directly by scaling down from aggregate municipal measures to neighborhood-level processes. At this level, it is also possible to appreciate the active role played by the state in the formalization and provisioning of new neighborhoods (starting in the northeastern part of Barranca and expanding southward). The development of this area of the city proceeded, first, through land occupations, followed by pressure on the municipal government to legalize them, formalize title deeds for people's homes, and equip them with access to public services. Once a piece of land was occupied and plots were divided and distributed among poor and migrant families—an effort that authorities often delegated to movement leaders—a carefully-organized campaign would usually begin for the government to pave streets, connect the new neighborhood to water, sewage, and electricity infrastructure, and build public schools and health posts.⁴⁵ The campaign would usually consist of pressuring government authorities to invest in these projects while also sometimes offering to contribute the movement's labor for their construction (Flórez and Castañeda 1997). The municipal government—and sometimes Ecopetrol as well—would at times provide construction materials and machinery to support community-led public works. Land occupations also generated pressure for public investment in formal

⁴⁵ Interview with Eduardo Díaz, April 21, 2016.

housing through the Territorial Credit Institute (ICT) in the 1970s and 80s, though this paled in comparison to urban growth through informal occupations.

Land occupation efforts, and the subsequent process to formalize and equip the settlements with public services, were aided by a locally based, left-leaning faction of the Liberal Party, the Authentic Leftist Liberal Front (*Frente de Izquierda Liberal Auténtico*, FILA), which sought to woo potential voters among the city's growing informal sector (Flórez and Castañeda 1997; M.C. García 2006; Toro 2004). As an anonymous interviewee in Barranca explained to M.C. García (2006, 261):

Those emergencies that people had in terms of basic service equipment, which is to say, water and sewage systems, electricity, roads (...) it was the FILA that attended to them (...) and not just from the viewpoint of agitation but also from an institutional one, because they made sure that public resources were redirected, for example, toward self-paving programs, or so that the electric company would install the electric and street lighting grid.

In addition to facilitating people's access to municipal and departmental authorities, the FILA—and especially its leader, congressman Horacio Serpa, who would later go on to occupy various high-level posts in the national government—frequently brought local grievances about water before state elites in Bogotá, thus helping to turn their attention toward Barranca (Chaparro 1991; M.C. García 2006). At first, as Serpa himself related to A. Vargas (1992, 161-162), national government officials were reticent to bring social programs to Barranca, seeing its people as “rebellious, nonconformist scoundrels [*vergajos rebeldes, inconformes*]” who would not allow anything to get done because “all they do is go on strikes,” which made it “worthless to invest there at all.” But eventually Serpa and the FILA, working

through the Liberal Party, became a crucial broker between local claimants and the Colombian state.

Still, clientelistic practices only went so far. A resident explained:

Invasions always happen here through politicking [*politiquería*] (...) Then you start to fight for public services, and politicians only worry about leaving some water pipes installed and they're done. So, direct action! (...) In order to get them to dig up a street and throw in a smear [of pavement], we had to burn a tire and throw it out there, block the roads so that the next day the machine would show up to build the street. (M.C. García 2006, 260)

Clientelism thus provided access to state authorities, but recourse to contentious pressure was often still necessary to take full advantage of that access. In addition, according to a resident from another informal neighborhood interviewed by Toro (2004), protest also functioned as a way to prevent or curb politicians' abuses of power in the context of the clientelistic relationship. "They didn't let demagogues in—or I should say 'we' didn't let them [into the neighborhoods] because I was there too (...) I didn't know what [one particular politician] was doing there, maybe trying to win people over (...) but we ran him out by throwing rocks at him" (Toro 2004, 191).

Although the east-side neighborhoods are still physically and socially isolated from the center of Barranca and from the city's more traditional areas, sustained contentious pressure mediated through political brokers in the 1970s and 80s was instrumental for legalizing them, formalizing residents' ownership of their homes, and delivering basic services.

Collapsing Local Ownership and Declining State Service Provision

By continuing to spend funds from the 1978 foreign loans, as well as another round of domestic grants and loans in the 1990s (DNP 1993), the municipal government was able to continue expanding the city's water supply system, and coverage increased to 87.9% in 1993 and 97.8% in 2005 (DANE 2006). However, this indicator only tells part of the story, partly because it was largely due to slowed urban growth starting in the late 1980s: while 89 new neighborhoods emerged between 1970 and 1990, between 1990 and 2001 there were only 17 new ones (Concejo Municipal de Barrancabermeja 2001; Flórez 2003). More importantly, the supply system's expansion in the 1990s was hardly accompanied by any maintenance of the existing infrastructure, which resulted in frequent service outages that lasted days or even weeks.⁴⁶ Improvements in water quality were short-lived, and pollution levels skyrocketed in the early 2000s. The municipal utility had to be liquidated in 2005; its financial woes had been such that, between 2001 and 2002, it had to ration the use of water pumps because it could not afford the electricity needed for their operation.⁴⁷ A 1988 sewage system modernization and expansion plan that was fully funded by the national, departmental, and municipal governments was started in 1990 but never completed.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ See, e.g., "Sin agua Barrancabermeja," *El Tiempo*, May 28, 1992; "Sed en Barranca por obra," *El Tiempo*, June 29, 2004.

⁴⁷ "Se acaba sequía en Barranca," *El Tiempo*, May 9, 2002.

⁴⁸ Law 68 (1988). "Dinero para alcantarillado," *El Tiempo*, September 2, 1992; "Se dilata solución a las aguas negras de Barrancabermeja," *El Tiempo*, November 22, 2005.

Clientelism continued to play an important role in developing informal settlements and connecting them to services, but now it did so in a less structured way, as the FILA lost its monopoly—in large part due to internal divisions—and other political figures attempted to follow its example (M.C. García 2006, 260; Núñez 1997; Toro 2004).⁴⁹ While land occupations did not slow down, their provisioning with public services became less efficient. Clientelistic brokerage as a means to induce state service provision was also hindered by the fact that many of the new land occupations during this period were promoted by guerrilla groups, which usually did not allow politicians to campaign in neighborhoods they sought to control. Other mechanisms for sustained social provision, such as the collaborative public works schemes (whereby the municipal government or Ecopetrol provided funding for materials and machinery, and community groups put in their labor), also continued past 1986 but only for a few more years (Núñez 1997, 60-62). Although social provision by the state did not end completely, Barranca returned to a dynamic of piecemeal social investments.⁵⁰

What happened? The most obvious change in Barranca in the 1980s was a steady escalation of the Colombian armed conflict. But the decline in state provision cannot be fully explained by the onset of armed conflict or its intensity. Guerrilla

⁴⁹ See also “Lío político por invasiones,” *El Tiempo*, April 21, 1993.

⁵⁰ In addition to the irregular investments in water and sewage infrastructure mentioned above, other major examples of social provision by the state during this period were Barranca’s first fully public university (the University Institute for Peace, which admitted its first cohort in 1988), some new public primary and secondary schools, and some renovations to the public hospital, which were completed in 1990 but remained out of service at least until 1994. “De infarto, crisis del San Rafael de Barranca,” *El Tiempo*, September 26, 1994.

groups had entered the oil city in the 1970s, and right-wing paramilitaries' growing influence in the region was felt in Barranca since the early 1980s (Van Isschot 2015; A. Vargas 1992). Government officials and traditional party leaders were not systematically targeted until the 1990s. Open clashes in city streets between guerrillas and paramilitaries only began then as well, and the large-scale paramilitary takeover of the city took place between 1998 and 2001. Yet service provision's decay happened in the mid-1980s.

The armed conflict's effect on state provision was mediated by its impact on Barranca's popular movements. The direct paramilitary threat to the city's movements became clearest between 1985 and 1986 (Van Isschot 2015). In 1986, leftist congressman Leonardo Posada—a community organizer in Barranca's northeastern neighborhoods, member of the Coordinadora Popular's board of directors, and a major figure in the 1983 civic strike—was murdered. After Posada's killing, many other Barranca civic leaders, political activists, and members of USO were murdered, and countless others received threats, survived attempts on their lives, or were forced into exile.⁵¹ Meanwhile, leftist guerrilla groups escalated their efforts to infiltrate civilian activist groups, as an activist explained to Toro (2004, 203):

We started to feel like our plans [for activism and claim-making] were getting out of our hands. Groups would show up that we didn't know where they came from, but one could maybe identify them: well, this group is from the FARC, this one's from the M-19, this one's with the ELN (...) So you start feeling like you don't have control over the things that you have coordinated.

⁵¹ Seventeen members of the USO, many of whom had also been active with Barranca's civic struggles, were murdered over the 1980s, and several more followed in the 1990s and early 2000s (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 2).

The increasing presence of armed groups undermined trust among Barranca's activists. The neighborhood organizations that had been the backbone of the Coordinadora became more and more disengaged and many of them were dissolved. Due to armed conflict's escalation, and in particular the paramilitary targeting of civilian activists, the chief focus of Barranca's movements turned almost exclusively toward a defense of life and human rights (Van Isschot 2015).

The Coordinadora Popular showed considerable resilience in the face of the dirty war. In 1988, for example, after an activist's killing, the USO shut down Ecopetrol's refinery and Coordinadora leaders practically took control of the municipal government for four days, even forcing the armed forces to stay off the streets (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 2). State forces were seen by many as responsible for the killing of civilians and attacks against activists.⁵² This was a time of deep indignation toward the Colombian state on the part of most activists in Barranca (Van Isschot 2015). Other than demanding that it protect its citizens and make perpetrators of abuses accountable, claim-making to the state became less about

⁵² This perception was largely justified. In Magdalena Medio, paramilitary forces were mainly funded by drug traffickers and landowners but they also enjoyed considerable support from the Colombian military. Especially after 1987, members of the army encouraged the region's paramilitary leaders to go on the offensive and "do what the army could not legally do" (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2011a, 129). The region's paramilitarization would not have been possible without state security forces' support, in part through active collaboration and partly through negligence and inaction. The military also committed atrocities against civilians on its own. For example, assassins hired by a secret navy intelligence network ("Red de Inteligencia 07 de la Armada") are believed to have been responsible for at least 68 killings in Barranca between 1991 and 1993 (Van Isschot 2015, 164). In 2013, the Council of State (one of Colombia's high courts, with jurisdiction over administrative issues) found the Colombian navy and the Colombian state responsible for a number of the killings attributed to this intelligence network. (Consejo de Estado, Sección Tercera, Sentencia no. 68001231500019940978001, March 20, 2013, <http://181.57.206.10/SENTPROC/F68001231500019940978001S3ADJUNTASENTENCIA20130417160813.doc>).

specific demands and more about denouncing injustice and expressing indignation (A. Vargas 1992, 238; Wills 1989). State agents' role in connection to the paramilitary takeover of the city—negligent at best, deeply complicit at worst—made Barranca's activists distrustful of and even hostile toward the state, and thus highly disinclined to embrace a statist political agenda. To top things off, the brokerage structure that had facilitated local claimants' access to state elites was also undermined by the escalation of violence: two FILA leaders were killed in 1992, and many of the new land occupations during this period were promoted by guerrilla groups, which usually did not allow politicians to campaign in neighborhoods they sought to control.⁵³ The constant pressure that had moved state officials to keep delivering welfare-oriented public goods in the city was no more.

As for Ecopetrol, it continued to support specific government programs (such as the SENA training center) and to make *ad hoc* contributions to local schools, the public hospital, public transportation, and even a fish farming project, many of which were the result of contract negotiations with USO (Á. Delgado 2006, 133). The royalties it paid to the municipal government also helped to fund local services. But the company's statist ideational framing continued to be very limited. In the face of Barranca's humanitarian crisis in the 1990s, Ecopetrol's social responsibility efforts were not channeled through the local administration but instead prioritized the Magdalena Medio Peace and Development Program (PDPMM), a civil society

⁵³ The FILA was also weakened by the national-level political opening brought on by the 1991 Constitution, which led to the fragmentation of the Liberal and Conservative parties (Toro 2004).

initiative the company helped to develop along with the Catholic Diocese of Barrancabermeja, the nongovernmental organization CINEP, and the USO.⁵⁴

3.5. Conclusion

What emerged in Barrancabermeja in 1975 and endured until 1986 was, in the words of Father Eduardo Díaz, a Catholic priest who accompanied and supported multiple land occupations as director of the Barranca Diocese's social work program, "a happy conjunction between unions, campesinos, and people from all neighborhoods that was able to build a force for organization and participation (...) capable of winning many benefits in terms of public services."⁵⁵

Popular claims were directed squarely at state authorities on all levels of government. In addition to developing a broad coalition featuring a wide variety of actors for the purposes of that year's massive civic strike, Barranca's popular forces were able to keep the movement going beyond individual demonstrations. Movement members took part in multiple land occupations and in the subsequent struggles for connecting the new neighborhoods to the city's public service infrastructure. A decentralized but permanently engaged network of neighborhood committees was maintained around different movement organizations (the Comité Cívico Popular and the Coordinadora Popular being the most renowned ones) even when there were no large protest actions. But when state action in terms of social provision showed

⁵⁴ Author interviews with Mauricio Katz, former deputy director of the PDPMM, Bogotá, April 13, 2016, and Santiago Camargo, deputy director of the PDPMM, Barrancabermeja, April 18, 2016. The PDPMM seeks to promote peace and community-led social development in Barranca and the broader Magdalena Medio region.

⁵⁵ Author interview with Eduardo Díaz, April 21, 2016.

signs of faltering, the movement was capable of launching additional strikes to ramp up the pressure and push government authorities to make good on prior commitments. To bridge the gap between Barranca and national power circles, the movement leveraged Barranca's structural importance for the national economy (often making credible threats of disruption), it enjoyed the legitimizing support of the Catholic Church, and it counted on the political brokerage provided by the local Liberal Party faction known as the FILA.

Contention-driven state service provision in Barranca was facilitated in part—though by no means determined—by the level of state capacity at the disposal of state officials at this point in Barranca's (and Colombian) history. Popular pressure compelled state officials to put locally available capacity to work toward increasing local public goods provision and supplement it with additional resources “imported” from Bucaramanga, Bogotá, and even international actors like the World Bank and IADB. In short, state capacity is not all-determining, and capacity deficits can be partially offset by contentious collective action. Of course, this mechanism may be prohibitively difficult to activate under a certain threshold of locally sourced capacity. By a similar logic, delivering different kinds of public goods may require more than contention and may not be feasible without more substantive “capacity transfers” from society, as suggested in this case by the issue of water: contention-driven state provision was successful in expanding coverage, but improvements in water quality

were limited and short-lived.⁵⁶ The latter would have required much more complex technical solutions that contentious pressure alone could not induce. Still, the new state-provided public goods that were obtained in Barranca through contentious mobilization—aided by politicized intermediation—were no small feat and signified considerable improvements in the population’s living conditions.

⁵⁶ Phone communication with Jorge Eduardo Núñez, May 4, 2018. Water quality continues to be a problem in Barranca, even to this day. Visitors are invariably warned not to drink the city’s tap water, and in 2017 regulators warned that Barranca’s water was not suitable for drinking. “‘Agua que se consume en Barrancabermeja no es potable’: Superservicios,” *Vanguardia*, October 4, 2017.

4. WITH AND AGAINST THE GRAIN: STATE SERVICE PROVISION IN HUILA'S RICE REGION

4.1. Introduction

“A meal without rice is no meal”—so says a common Colombian catch phrase.¹ Colombia is estimated to be the second-largest rice consumer in South America.² Alongside wheat and corn, rice is one of the most widely consumed staple foods in the world, providing nearly one-fifth of global human per capita energy and about 13% of per capita protein.³ These crops’ importance today, both in Colombia and on a global scale, is due in large part to technological changes that took place in the mid-20th century in the context of what has become known as the “green revolution.” The green revolution involved a set of new agricultural technologies aimed at increasing agricultural productivity (Davies 2003; Glaeser 1987; on the development of agricultural technology in Colombia, see J.A. Bejarano 2011 [1986]; Kalmanovitz and López 2006). Seed selection in search of high-yielding varieties, increased use of agrochemicals and machinery, and complex irrigation systems—all of it usually linked to the advance of commercial agriculture—led to significant increases in production, which were followed in turn by greater availability and lower consumer prices.


¹ The saying in Spanish is “*comida sin arroz no es comida*.”

² This assessment is based on calculations by the Colombian Federation of Rice Producers (Fedearroz); Peru is believed to be in first place. “El consumo per cápita de arroz en Colombia es de 39 kilos,” *La República*, June 2, 2017.

³ “The global staple,” *Ricepedia: A Project of CGIAR Research Program on Rice*, <http://ricepedia.org/rice-as-commodity/international-rice-market-trade>.

In addition to these macro-level contributions, new agricultural technologies also led to higher returns to land, which boosted farmers' incomes and had positive linkage effects on local rural economies (Hazell and Ramasamy 1991). The green revolution is credited with helping to reduce poverty and hunger around the world (Pingali 2012), but at the same time these changes in agricultural production have also had some major side effects on local communities. Green revolution practices can impact the livelihoods of small-scale producers and landless peasants, often excluded from access to agricultural technologies. Overuse of agrochemicals can have negative consequences for human health, water quality, soil fertility, and biodiversity, and unregulated irrigation systems can deplete or damage groundwater sources (Kloppenburg 2004; Matson et al. 1997; Pingali 2012). Concerns about the negative socioeconomic, environmental, and political impacts of technology-intensive agribusiness are still alive today, especially in light of the rapid growth of genetically modified crops (Lapegna 2016; Scoones 2008). More generally, changing modes of production in the countryside can also cause economic, social, and cultural shocks in affected localities, as well as alter political behavior and shake up local power structures (Huber and Safford 1995; Mangonnet, Murillo, and Rubio 2018; Turzi 2017; more generally, see Moore 1993 [1966]).

Map 4.1.1. Municipalities of Campoalegre and Palermo in Huila



Made by the author using QGIS, with shapefiles by IGAC (2018), DANE (2017), UPRA (2017), and OpenStreetMap (2019) and map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0 (data by OpenStreetMap, under Open Data Commons Open Database License).

In Colombia, one of the main crops transformed by the green revolution was rice (Montes, Candelo, and Muñoz 1980). This chapter studies the slow but steady development of mechanized commercial rice production in the flatlands of Huila department, specifically the municipalities of Campoalegre and Palermo, between the early 20th century and the 1980s (see Map 4.1). These two towns were the epicenter of agricultural modernization in a region that started out the 20th century as a rural periphery and finished it as one of the country's most dynamic and prosperous farming regions. Changing modes of production had considerable environmental impacts, especially in terms of soil degradation and water contamination,⁴ and they may have also led to some population displacement, especially in the 1940s, as rice cultivation became more capital- and less labor-intensive (González 1996a).⁵ But in addition to these impacts, the growth of the rice economy also created unprecedented conditions for the expansion of state service provision in a region where government activity had been historically limited and irregular.

The new, intensive forms of production involved in rice cash crops—as opposed to the extensive, low-productivity practices that characterized the region's previously dominant cattle-raising sector—created incentives for the development of local ownership of state power by different actors at different points in time, leading to

⁴ On soil degradation, see Leurquin (1967) and Ministerio de Agricultura (1962a, 35); on water contamination, see Jonathan de la Sierra, “Campoalegre: capital de la contaminación,” *Campoalegre: Órgano del Centro Municipal de la Historia y la Cultura* 1, no. 4 (1984), 45.

⁵ Many landless *campesinos* migrated either to urban areas or became part of internal colonization waves in less populated areas on the hillsides of the Central and Eastern Cordilleras or further south, toward the Amazonian region. According to González (1996a), many of these *campesinos* went on to engross the ranks of guerrilla groups during the partisan conflict known as *La Violencia* (1946-1958) and then, in some cases, during the contemporary armed conflict as well.

two periods of sustained state service provision (SSSP). First, between 1936 and 1943, a rising middle class of agricultural producers in association with a family of landowners supported the parcellation of a large estate in Campoalegre by the national government's Banco Agrícola Hipotecario (Agricultural Mortgage Bank, BAH) as well as the subsequent development of an irrigation system and agricultural extension services. This was also accompanied by some investment in infrastructure, both there and in Palermo (though SSSP during this period was concentrated in Campoalegre). State service provision in both towns declined in the 1940s and 50s, which I attribute above all to the absence of a statist framing around service provision on the part of Campoalegre rice producers. Even when a new, powerful organizational structure, with significant linkages to state elites, emerged in 1948 with the creation of the National Federation of Rice Growers (*Federación Nacional de Arroceros*, Fedearroz), a statist framing did not return until the 1960s. State service provision picked up again in 1961, first in a narrow way through a supervised credit scheme and some technical support activities coproduced with Fedearroz, and then much more intensively starting in 1965 through a new wave of land parcellation and titling to landless campesinos, along with the development of an irrigation district for *campesino* smallholders, in the context of an agrarian reform program. This period of heightened SSSP, which lasted until 1978, was made possible by the development of coproductive local ownership of state power by Huila's rice producers (big and small) associated under Fedearroz as well as by organized *campesino* beneficiaries of government programs. After 1978, support for rice growers continued, but on a

narrower scale, in the form of access to credit and technical extension and only sporadic state assistance for campesinos. Table 4.1 summarizes the evolution of state service provision in Campoalegre and Palermo across different periods and scores each period in terms of the theory's explanatory variables.

Table 4.1. Evolution of State Service Provision in Campoalegre and Palermo (Huila)

	Strong Organizational Structure	Statist Ideational Framing	Access to and Influence w/ State Elites	State Service Provision Outcome
Pre-1936	No	No	No	Episodic
1936-1943	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sustained
1943-1961	Yes	No	Yes	Episodic
Post-1961*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sustained

* See Table 4.2 in Section 4.5 for a more detailed breakdown of the dynamics of local ownership during this period.

Although other parts of Huila also experienced similar patterns of intensive agribusiness development over the 20th century, I focus specifically on Campoalegre and Palermo for several reasons. Campoalegre is the most obvious choice, since it has been Huila's leading rice producer since the start of the crop's expansion (see, e.g., Comisión de Cultura Aldeana 1935, 71; Ministerio de Agricultura y Comercio 1934, vol. 2, Anexo, 25). Although Palermo started out later, by mid-century it was already a close second, and the two municipalities accounted for 66.1% of Huila's rice production in 1948 (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 158). Neiva was also an important player in Huila's agricultural modernization and the expansion of the rice industry from early on, but rice has never been a dominant economic activity for the city as a whole—only in the municipality's large rural area (R. Centeno and Quintero 2012;

González 2013; Salas Vargas 2012). The town of Yaguará is also known as an important rice producer, but it only became so after the 1970s. Neighboring localities such as Aipe, Baraya, El Hobo, Rivera, Tello, and Villavieja all produce rice, but they have all remained comparatively minor players. Timewise, the period under analysis for this case study ends in 1985. To this day, Campoalegre and Palermo continue to be Huila's top-two rice producers (UPRA 2018), and rice remains an important part of both towns' economies (especially in Campoalegre, "the rice capital of Huila," according to its municipal motto⁶). However, the onset of oil production in Palermo in 1985⁷ and the completion of the Betania hydroelectric dam and power station (chiefly located in Yaguará but covering part of Campoalegre) in 1986 brought major transformations to both towns' local economies and would merit separate studies. Here I focus exclusively on the local political economy of agricultural modernization.

In addition to its contribution to theory development on the determinants of SSSP in contexts of highly limited state capacity, this case study also sheds new light on the unfolding of agricultural modernization in Huila and, in particular, on an important episode in the history of land policy in Colombia, namely the parcellation and irrigation of Llanogrande in Campoalegre and the role played by the Colombian state in it.⁸ Although a rich literature—to which this chapter is heavily indebted—has gone a long way in documenting and analyzing the development of mechanized

⁶ See <http://www.campoalegre-huila.gov.co>.

⁷ Oil-related activity (prospecting) had already taken place before in Palermo (as well as Campoalegre), but this was the first time the resource was extracted commercially in the study area.

⁸ However, for the purposes of this dissertation, a more thorough and conscientious historiographic analysis, with careful consideration of available sources and the limitations of those used for this study, remains pending.

commercial agriculture in Huila (e.g., Ducuara and Manrique 2008; Tovar Zambrano 1996; J. Valenzuela 1978; Zabaleta 2001), there remain important gaps and some misinterpretations. This chapter challenges the narrative of rice growers as self-reliant mavericks who built an industry from scratch.⁹ While recognizing the contribution of their (largely self-taught) entrepreneurial prowess to the region's economy, it also highlights the centrality of coproductive processes between private actors and a weak but resourceful state. In addition, the chapter aims to correct the widespread but erroneous view of the parcellation of Llanogrande as a centerpiece of the agrarian reform package of Alfonso López Pumarejo's "Revolution on the March." Without minimizing its ultimately redistributive impact, not to mention its overall modernizing effect for the local economy, the story—as I hope to show in what follows—is more complicated.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 traces the development of mechanized commercial agriculture in the context of a historical overview of the local political economy and an assessment of the local role of the Colombian state prior to the first period of SSSP. Section 4.3 analyzes the first period of SSSP, from 1936 to 1943, in a context of extremely limited state capacity. It traces the development of local ownership of state power by emergent rice farmers in association with traditional landowners—whose most significant outcome was the implementation of a land parcellation, irrigation, and agricultural extension project—

⁹ For starters, several works incorrectly claim that the Llanogrande irrigation was a private project, when in reality it was a government project. See, for example, G. Calderón (2007, 12); Vargas Motta (1957, 34).

as well as its collapse after about six years. After a consideration in Section 4.4 of the intermediate phase on little to no local service provision by the state between 1943 and 1961, Section 4.5 takes up the second period of SSSP. It emphasizes how shifting dynamics at the national level impacted the ability of different actors to develop local ownership of state power, which in turn determined the content of service provision during this period. Section 4.6 concludes.

4.2. Huila's Political Economy and the Rise of Agribusiness

The municipalities of Campoalegre and Palermo are located on the flatlands of the upper Magdalena River basin, in the department of Huila (see Map 4.1). They are both part of the so-called inter-Andean valley of Huila, which serves as a crossroads between the center of the country (including Bogotá) and the Amazonian region to the south. They are bordered to the north by Neiva and are flanked by the Eastern and Central Cordilleras of the Andes mountain range. Since colonial times, the area had been dominated by extensive, low-productivity cattle ranching. The presence of rice crops is also documented from the 16th century onwards (Ducuara and Manrique 2008; García Borrero 1935, 172; Zabaleta 2001), but production as a cash crop did not start until the late 1800s, and the application of technological advances only began in the 1910s. Rice did not come to dominate the local economy as much as oil did in Barrancabermeja, but it did transform local economic relations—the local class structure as well as labor relations—as well as local attitudes toward the state. This section provides a historical overview of the development of mechanized commercial agriculture, its place in the region's political economy, and

its social, economic, and political impacts. Then it examines the local role of the Colombian state prior to the first period of SSSP.

From Rural Periphery to a Hotspot of Agricultural Modernization

In the 19th century, the main economic activities in the region that would later become the department of Huila were cattle raising, cacao bean and coffee farming, quinine and natural rubber harvesting, manufacturing of straw hats for foreign export, and some small-scale placer gold mining (H.J. Martínez and Martínez 1996; Monsalve 1927). By the start of the 20th century, coffee was becoming Huila's most important cash crop (Tovar Zambrano 1996).¹⁰ The variety of coffee grown in Huila (arabica) grows best at higher altitudes, so most of the department's production takes place on the slopes of the Eastern and Central Cordilleras. In the flatland areas, where most of Campoalegre and Palermo are located,¹¹ cattle raising was dominant since the colony. The colonial province of Neiva—of which the two towns were part—was one of the main providers of beef for Bogotá and other major villas, and it remained so well into the 19th century (H.J. Martínez and Martínez 1996). Livestock was raised in extensive estates which relied heavily on labor service tenancy. Despite the introduction of some artificial grasses in some estates in the late 1800s, ranching was largely marked by absenteeism and a lack of technological improvements, even as

¹⁰ Today, coffee continues to be Huila's most economically important agricultural product, followed by rice (M. Delgado and Ulloa 2015). Since the early 2010s, Huila is Colombia's top coffee-producing department (Noelia Cigüenza, "Huila es el departamento líder cafetero con 16% del área cultivada," *La República*, March 18, 2019, <https://www.larepublica.co/especiales/ruta-del-cafe/huila-es-el-departamento-lider-cafetero-con-16-del-area-cultivada-2840686>).

¹¹ As shown in Map 1, part of Palermo's rural areas, and a small portion of Campoalegre's, are located on the hillsides of the Eastern and Central Cordilleras, respectively. Farms in these areas do grow coffee and cacao.

late as the 1930s (H.J. Martínez and Martínez 1996; Tovar Zambrano 1996). Sometimes estates also had small portions planted with cacao trees, food crops, or (in the case of Palermo) anise crops, which involved sharecropping arrangements and were also farmed without much recourse to agronomic best practices. The scarcity of technical advances was not exclusive to peripheral areas such as Huila but fairly common throughout the Colombian countryside until the 1930s (J.A. Bejarano 2011 [1986]).

The arrival of technical advances in Huila came hand-in-hand with the development of commercial agriculture, especially rice and coffee. Production of rice as a cash crop in the region likely started in the 1880s.¹² Selected rice seeds began to be introduced in the late 1910s (Salas 1995, cited in Ducuara and Manrique 2008, 62), but they did not become widely used until the early 1930s (Ministerio de Agricultura y Comercio 1934, 156). The possibility of developing irrigation systems in the region to promote commercial crops was discussed as early as 1919.¹³ Still, the use of machinery was almost nonexistent at this point. Fields were often tilled using hand tools, or cattle were used either to plow the fields or simply to stir up the soil; harvesting was done by hand; dehulling was done using wooden pounders or stone

¹² Various sources claim that the first commercial plantation was established in 1910 in the cacao bean and cattle-raising estate of Piravante, in Campoalegre (see Ducuara and Manrique 2008, 39). However, data from the 1880s show that rice was already being traded within the region (H.J. Martínez and Martínez 1996, 76), though it is unclear to what extent this refers to local production or imports. Camacho Roldán, reporting on his late 19th century travels across the country, noted that rice was traded in Neiva “at twenty cents a pound” (cited in Zambrano 2015, 104). The earliest-available trade statistics published by the government of Huila, from 1906, also indicate that rice was already being produced as a cash crop, though in relatively small quantities (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 91).

¹³ “En el suplicio de Tántalo,” *Cromos* (1919), 174.

grinders (known as *batanes*), or even using cattle to trample on the seeds to loosen the husks.¹⁴ Still, an incipient market system grew rapidly around different steps of the production process. Day labor exploded, including migrant workers from Valle del Cauca, one of Colombia's first commercial rice producing regions, and open-market rentals also became steadily widespread, replacing the service tenancy arrangements of old (Zabaleta 2001). As early as the 1910s, commercial establishments began to offer manual dehulling services (Ducuara and Manrique 2008; Zabaleta 2001). Trading companies involved in the quinine and animal fur business added rice to their portfolios (Salas Vargas 1988, 39). By the time of the 1912 national census, rice was already becoming one of Huila's main agricultural products (Ministerio de Gobierno 1912, 211).

Increasing numbers of cattle ranchers moved to diversify their investments by entering the rice business.¹⁵ One of the first shops that offered dehulling services was located in the Las Mercedes estate, in Campoalegre (Zabaleta 2001, 24), property of Cantalicio Ferro, cattle rancher and quinine trader.¹⁶ Campoalegre's first recorded mechanical huller is said to have been imported in 1929 by Manuel Durán (Zabaleta 2001), member of one of Campoalegre's traditional landowning and cattle ranching families going as far back as the 1820s (J.M. Restrepo 1941, 464). Mechanization continued advancing steadily over the course of the 1930s, aided significantly by the

¹⁴ Author interview with Aminta Puentes and Sael Puentes, Campoalegre rice farmers, Neiva, May 19, 2016; see also Ducuara and Manrique (2008), J. Valenzuela (1978), and Zabaleta (2001).

¹⁵ This discussion is based almost exclusively on the case of Campoalegre, as the historical record on the development of mechanized agriculture in Palermo is scarce.

¹⁶ Author interview with Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, grandson of Cantalicio Ferro, former congressman for Huila, and former executive director of Fedearroz, Bogotá, June 7, 2016.

construction of a road that traversed the department from north to south passing through Campoalegre in the context of the 1932-33 war between Colombia and Peru (Salas Vargas 1988; Tovar Zambrano 1996).

It was also in the 1930s that some new family names began to appear in the historical record—names that cannot as easily be traced back to local landowning families and which indicate a changing local class structure. These included rice entrepreneurs arriving from other parts of the country, such as Efraín López, who inaugurated the first mechanical rice mill run on electrical power (1934) (Zabaleta 2001, 26), but also a new stratum of local capitalist agriculturalists, exemplified by the Manrique brothers.¹⁷ Luciano and Milciades Manrique were the sons of a small landowner from the nearby town of El Hobo who moved to Campoalegre at a young age to work in the Ferro family's Las Vueltas estate, where they also set up a small rice plot (R. Centeno and Quintero 2012, 89-90). The Manrique brothers are said to have been among the first in Campoalegre to plant selected seeds, and they popularized the use of ox-driven plows (Ducudara and Manrique 2008, 62-63, 80). The Manrique brothers also founded in 1934 one of the first mechanical rice mills. They did so in association with Carlos Richard (Cantalicio Ferro's son-in-law), which points to yet another transformation: the transformation of some (though not all) traditional *hacendados* into agrarian capitalists, a growing phenomenon in various parts

¹⁷ This emerging class also included the Fierro, Puentes, and Ortiz families, many of whose descendants are still in the rice business (author interview with Sael Puentes and Aminta Puentes, Campoalegre rice farmers, Neiva, May 19, 2016; see also Ducudara and Manrique 2008, 63). Also worthy of note is a new class of carpenters, technicians, and craftspeople who devised artisanal machines for processing rice or provided repair services for existing machinery (Ducudara and Manrique 2008, 124).

of the country (F.E. González 2014). Some years later, the Manrique brothers also imported one of the first tractors that operated in Huila's rice fields (Ducuara and Manrique 2008, 81, 237).

By the 1930s, there were about one hundred commercial rice farmers in Campoalegre (Zabaleta 2001, 94). Yet, according to Zabaleta (2001, 95), as of 1930 three families—Ferro, Durán, and Perdomo, all of them historically involved in livestock raising—still owned most of Campoalegre flatlands.¹⁸ This was a time of growing conflict over land across the country, and Huila was no exception (LeGrand 2016; Osorio 1996; Palacios 2011; G. Sánchez 1984a). Land property concentration had already prompted sharp conflict in the early 1920s. Fearing an occupation of one of his estates, a landowner from Neiva—Ricardo Perdomo—directed an attack by departmental police on an indigenous community in the hamlet of Los Limpios, on the flatlands south of Neiva, massacring several families (González 1996b; Salas Vargas 2012).¹⁹ Starting around 1931, land conflicts flared up again—including a number of occupations of privately-held estates—in different parts of Huila. Although most land conflicts involved hillside estates away from the flatlands under study, two

¹⁸ Zabaleta's claim—more specifically, that these families owned about 80% of the Campoalegre plains—is based on several interviews with longtime residents of the town, many of whom were direct participants and witnesses of these processes. The specific figure he provides seems to be a rough estimate. Still, the broader point about the concentration of land ownership in the early 1930s is corroborated by Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, based on his family's own oral histories, with the qualification that all of the Ferro land did not belong to a single household but had previously been divided amongst Cantalicio Ferro and his five children and their respective families (author interview, June 7, 2016). This was likely the case with the Durán and Perdomo families as well, since a 1921 magazine lists several different people with those family names as prominent Campoalegre cattle ranchers. See "Directory of Colombia Cattle Raisers," *The Colombia Review* 1, no. 6 (1921), 146.

¹⁹ The community had been visited by indigenous activist Quintín Lame—known nationally for his advocacy on behalf of indigenous peoples—and Perdomo is said to have feared an attack on his property.

disputes between *campesino* settlers (so-called “*colonos*”) and landowners were recorded in Campoalegre (but none in Palermo) (LeGrand 2016, 298-299). Some of the Ferro family’s estates were involved in unresolved legal disputes with *colonos* (Zabaleta 2001, 48), as were properties owned by other Campoalegre landowners on the Eastern Cordillera under the jurisdiction of Caquetá bordering Campoalegre (Ministerio de Industrias 1933, vol. 1, 388-400).

As discussed in the next section, rising agrarian conflict was an important factor in the passage of modest national and departmental legislation dealing with land distribution, which provided a legal framework for the land parcellation project that served as a catalyst for the period of SSSP that took place in Campoalegre between the 1930s and 40s. But the threat to landed elites’ interests posed by *campesino* unrest was not the only motivation for landowners’ support for increased state intervention in Campoalegre and in Huila’s agricultural economy. There was an important ideational element as well. A growing movement of intellectuals in Neiva (though many of them had roots or connections to the department’s countryside) was starting to question the contribution of extensive cattle ranching to Huila’s development prospects. For example, Joaquín García Borrero, a public intellectual and Liberal politician, saw extensive cattle ranching as a source of poverty, backwardness, and idleness (Tovar Zambrano 1996). According to García, the use of Huila’s valleys for cattle ranching confined agriculture to the slopes of the Cordilleras, thus limiting the development of more advanced, mechanized farming (García Borrero 1935, 312), and it prevented “the working masses” from having

fertile lands of their own (310). In addition, García argued, the fixation on “expanding or creating feudal holdings” inspired complacency and led to the atrophy of personal motivation for self-improvement through education (311). Instead, García called for developing agriculture—“but scientific agriculture in parcels [*agricultura parcelaria*], where the climate and the soil’s natural wealth are well utilized, spread out as an immense spiderweb over the department’s vast plains, which are endowed with good inclination for irrigation and drainage” (311).

This modernizing attitude was shared even by some landowners, such as Oliverio Lara Borrero, whose family owned thousands of hectares²⁰ of land but in the 1930s also ventured into the rice business.²¹ Lara is quoted as once saying that “there should not be any landowners [*terratenientes*]” (Salas Vargas 1996, 218). Success in the rice business simply did not require large extensions of land; instead, it required liquid capital. The prospect of parcellation, rather than a threat, represented an opportunity for landowners to diversify their investments—either by renting land plots to campesinos or by getting involved directly in rice production (usually in association with the emerging class of agricultural entrepreneurs epitomized by the Manrique brothers). The landowners of 1930s Campoalegre appear quite different from the

²⁰ One hectare is equivalent to 10,000 m², or 2.47 acres, roughly the area of a soccer field.

²¹ In 1934, the Lara family started a rice mill in Neiva (Ducura and Manrique 2008, 237), and they ventured into the retail market (their “Arroz Lara-Neiva Excelso” brand was trademarked in 1936; “Certificado de registro de marca de fábrica. Número 9988—Expediente número 10243,” *Diario Oficial* 23120, February 26, 1936, 453). They also owned rice farms in Neiva and Campoalegre. See “Oliverio Lara Borrero y el progreso de Neiva,” *Sábado* 61, September 3, 1944, 10; author interview with Eduardo Medina, rice farmer and former municipal councilman of Campoalegre, Campoalegre, May 18, 2016.

kind that directed the massacre of Los Limpios in 1922. The case of rice in Huila calls to mind Moore's (1993 [1966], 10) analysis of the development of commercial agriculture in Europe, which "meant a change from the feudal seigneur who was at worst a lawless tyrant and at best a despotic parent to an overlord who was closer to an acute man of business exploiting the material resources of the estate with an eye to profit and efficiency."²² It was this transformation of the local political economy which, as I show in the next section, made possible the development of local ownership of state power.

The Role of the State in the Huila Flatlands in the Early 20th-Century

Unlike Barrancabermeja, Campoalegre and Palermo do not owe their origin to the rise of the new local economy. Palermo was founded as the parish of Guagua as early as 1690 or as late as 1774 (Díaz Jordán 1960, 134; Vargas Motta 1957, 164).²³ A local government officially headed by a mayor seems to have been established in the 1780s. Campoalegre's foundation is usually dated back to 1809, when a number of landowning *criollo* families donated plots of land to the colonial government for the establishment of "a *pueblo* or *parroquia* (parish)" (C.F. Salas, Cortés, and Rojas 1975; Vargas Motta 1957). A vice-parish was established the following year, and it was elevated to the status of parish in 1821.²⁴ By 1857, the population of Campoalegre

²² Of course, the analogy needs serious qualification. Not all local landowners were mass murderers like Ricardo Perdomo, and, as discussed above, labor relations in Huila's cattle-ranching estates were not as feudal as it is often imagined (service tenancy, while not always fully free in practice, does not necessarily imply a fully servile relation).

²³ The exact date is unknown. The town's name was changed from Guagua to Palermo—after the Italian hometown of its patron saint, Saint Rosalia—in 1906 (J.A. Pérez 2006, 23).

²⁴ Incidentally, most Huila historians claim that the town was granted the status of "*aldea*" (village) in

was 3,365 and that of Guagua was 2,842 (Asamblea Constituyente del Estado de Cundinamarca 1857, 33)—comparable to Barranca’s population of around 3,000 by 1922. Until 1863, both Campoalegre and Guagua were part of Cundinamarca; then they were moved under the jurisdiction of the sovereign state of Tolima.

Although both towns had functioning municipal governments (at least on paper), state service provision there, as in most of rural Colombia, was scarce. As parishes (and then as districts starting in 1863), they were supposed to have at least one public school.²⁵ Starting in 1870, this requirement was tightened by the sovereign state of Tolima: every town was required to have at least one public school and ensure that it remained open; otherwise, they would be subject to “elimination” as autonomous administrative units under the Code of Public Instruction (Estado Soberano del Tolima 1879, 332). Yet over the second half of the 19th century public schools in the region only functioned intermittently (Ramírez Bahamón 1999; Zabaleta 2001). The Liberal leaders that promulgated the 1863 Constitution and held power until the 1880s had made free public education a top priority, but the

1840, but Campoalegre was still classified as a “*parroquia*” in official documents from the Sovereign State of Cundinamarca as late as 1857 (Asamblea Constituyente del Estado de Cundinamarca 1857, 33). By law, the local governments of *parroquias* had greater authority than those of *aldeas*; *parroquias* were all supposed to have

²⁵ See Estado Federal de Cundinamarca, *Código Político i Municipal*, Art. 298 (Confederación Granadina 1859, 64) and Estado Soberano del Tolima, “Lei de 27 de enero de 1868, adicional i reformatoria del Código de Instrucción Pública,” Art. 18 (Estado Soberano del Tolima 1879, 332). Most Huila historians claim that the town was granted the status of “*aldea*” (village) in 1840 and elevated to *distrito municipal* (municipal district) in 1860, but Campoalegre was still classified as a “*parroquia*” in official documents from the federal state of Cundinamarca as late as 1857 (Asamblea Constituyente del Estado de Cundinamarca 1857, 33), and *aldeas* were not distinct from *distritos* but one among various kinds of *distritos* (“*distritos municipales*” did not exist as a separate category) (Confederación Granadina 1859). After 1863, the sovereign state of Tolima did make *aldeas* and *distritos* separate administrative units, and it granted both Campoalegre and Guagua the rank of *distritos* (Estado Soberano del Tolima 1879, 61).

implementation of this project was extremely limited (Ramírez and Salazar 2010).

The reforms faced significant opposition from the Catholic Church and the Conservative Party, and Tolima was no exception (Ramírez Bahamón 1999). There is no indication that any locality faced any actual administrative consequences for failing to maintain a public school as required by law. It was not until 1895—long after Liberals had been swept from office both nationally and in Tolima—that the first permanent public schools were opened in Campoalegre and Palermo (one for boys and one for girls in each town) (Barrero 2016, 91).

The department of Huila was established as an independent administrative unit in 1905. As such, the departmental government started out the 20th century needing to build a new administrative apparatus virtually from scratch, starting with public buildings and basic government entities such as a statistics board, an official printing press, and agencies in charge of coordinating the work of municipal and provincial²⁶ governments (Barrero 2012; Tovar Zambrano 1996). By 1916, most departmental government agencies were located in rented buildings and offices (Barrero 2012, 27). In the absence of a fully constituted departmental police force, landowners were granted authority as “Agents of Police to investigate the crimes of theft and robbery of livestock and persecute and apprehend the offenders” (Departmental Decree 211, 1906, cited in Tovar Zambrano 1996, 87). As late as 1935, Huila’s public finances were the most precarious of all Colombian departments;

²⁶ Provinces were deconcentrated administrative units between departments and municipalities and were governed by a prefect who was appointed by the governor.

it was ranked last among all Colombian departments in terms of public revenues and expenditures (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 199).²⁷ Public spending in service provision (education, healthcare, and the like) was limited. In 1935, the bulk of public spending in Huila was spent on basic operational and functioning costs (48%) and “economic promotion” expenditures (24.1%, mostly focused on building inter-municipal roads), while “social expenditures” amounted to 27.8% (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 206). That same year, as the year before, Huila received no transfers from the central government, and overall received little in the way of contributions from the national treasury over the 1930s (Departamento de Contraloría 1936, 331). The most notable investment by the national government in Huila over the first half of the 20th century was a railroad from Neiva to the town of El Espinal (Tolima department), where it followed the existing line all the way to Bogotá. This line was started in 1924 and completed in 1938 (Arias de Greiff 1986; Tovar Zambrano 1996).

Scaling down from the departmental to the municipal level, in 1935 Campoalegre had three schools within its urban perimeter and five spread across its rural areas, but funding for public education was meager (amounting to 2.3% of the municipal budget) (Comisión de Cultura Aldeana 1935, 223, 234). It did not have public street lighting or a sewage system, and the water provision system only reached “the homes of the wealthiest families” (Comisión de Cultura Aldeana 1935, 153; Monsalve 1927, 435). The municipal tax collection office was located in a building

²⁷ Only the so-called “national territories” (the administrative units that used to span the country’s sparsely populated Amazonian and Orinoquian areas) were in worse shape

that was rented from Cantalicio Ferro.²⁸ Other services were delivered only sporadically. Although an agricultural extension program was created for Huila in 1932 in order to promote agronomic best practices in livestock raising and rice and cacao farming, its efforts were mostly concentrated in Neiva, where a demonstration farm was to be established (Ministerio de Agricultura y Comercio 1934, vol. 1, 156-157). The only services that were rendered in Campoalegre between then and 1936—at least according to the detailed reports to Congress offered by the Ministries in charge of such programs²⁹—were a demonstration on the use of selected cotton seeds and the construction of a cattle wash rack in one of Cantalicio Ferro's farms as part of a tick eradication campaign (Ministerio de Industrias 1933, vol. 2, 70).

Such was the state of state service provision in Huila before the first period of SSSP under analysis. Much of it can be rightly attributed to the overall lack of state capacity available in the area. Yet, as next section will show, levels of state capacity did not suddenly increase from one moment to the next so as to enable SSSP in Campoalegre. The crucial change had to do with the development of local ownership of state power, which had previously been wholly absent. Before the mid-1930s, there was little organization among rice producers (and, based on the extant historical record, virtually none among popular sectors³⁰). According to the Ministry of

²⁸ “Contrato de arrendamiento del local para la colecturía de Campoalegre,” *Gaceta del Huila* No. 1386, February 28, 1935, 51.

²⁹ The Ministry of Agriculture was first created in 1913, but it was eliminated in 1923, and agricultural policy was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industries until 1934, when the Ministry of Agriculture was reinstated.

³⁰ The Colombian Communist Party, founded nationally in 1930, won one seat in the Campoalegre municipal council in 1935 (González 1996b, 313), which suggests some measure of organization, but there is no record of any *campesino* organization in Campoalegre before 1942 (Osorio 1996).

Agriculture, in 1932 “there did not exist, aside from the coffee farmers’ committee, any agricultural entity that served the interests of farmers and ranchers” (Ministerio de Agricultura y Comercio 1934, vol. 1, 156). With Ministry support, an Agriculturalists Society of Huila (*Sociedad de Agricultores del Huila*) was created in 1933. It advocated on behalf of agricultural modernization,³¹ but its activities were spread across the entire department and focused on supporting not just rice but also cacao and coffee farmers as well as (and perhaps mainly) cattle ranchers; it does not appear to have served as a vehicle for collective action for Campoalegre landowners and rice growers.³² In terms of access to and influence with state elites, Campoalegre landowners appear to have had important connections in Bogotá (which emerging rice producers appear to have lacked until the mid-1930s). For example, the Durán dynasty was closely connected to the Liberal Party since the mid-19th century. Yet such connections with the Liberal Party appear to have done more harm than good during the period of the so-called Conservative Hegemony (1886-1930), judging from the constant extraordinary taxes and compulsory loans to which the Durán family was subject by Conservative governments during the early 1900s (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 81-82). It was likely only after 1930, when Liberals returned to power at the national level and Huila had its first Liberal governor since its creation, that local landowners’

³¹ In 1935, the Society’s magazine lamented that Huila’s agriculture was still marked by farming systems “from our colonial era” (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 126).

³² Farmers societies were first established in 1926 in the context of a national agricultural development plan (under Law 74) and were intended as “consultative bodies” made up of private farmers and ranchers in every department. They were to be appointed by governors and were entitled to a small subsidy. Brief references to the Agriculturalists’ Society of Huila appear in several of the annual reports by the Ministries of Agriculture, Industry, and Economy from 1933 to the mid-1940s.

party connections might have provided them with access and influence with decisionmakers inside the state apparatus. Finally, it does not seem as though emerging rice farmers looked much to the state for assistance before the mid-1930s. Although the traditional narrative about rice growers' self-made trajectory as private entrepreneurs is somewhat exaggerated (as will become obvious in the next section), no one seems to dispute the fact during their early years they mostly relied on assistance from local landowners and agricultural entrepreneurs from other parts of the country rather than the government.

4.3. First Phase of SSSP: Coproduced Land Improvement under Minimal State Capacity (1936-1943)

By the mid-1930s, the expansion of rice farming was having a transformational effect on Campoalegre, but its effect on the local role of the state was still meager. In 1935, the national Conservative Party decided to abstain from that year's subnational elections.³³ As a result, Conservatives' tight grip on the departmental assembly—which they had maintained despite losing the governorship—was interrupted for the first time. This allowed Huila's traditionally weak Liberals to control the departmental assembly for the first time since the department's creation. On the one hand, Liberal control of the departmental government afforded Campoalegre's Liberal landowners and emerging rice producers increased influence with government decisionmakers. On the other, Liberals' rise

³³ The Conservative Party alleged fraud during the 1933 subnational elections and accused Liberals of using violence against Conservative voters as an electoral strategy, and it abstained from the 1934 Presidential election and again in the 1935 subnational elections (Henderson 2001).

brought to the fore new ideas about how best to foster “progress” and economic prosperity for Huila, as well as on the role that the government should play in this enterprise. These ideational changes—embraced by Campoalegre’s emerging rice producers but also by the town’s Liberal landowners, many of whom were also benefiting from the new economy—created an opening for Campoalegre to become a testing ground for a land parcellation and irrigation experiment led by the national government. But this experiment could have been merely a one-off government investment. Instead, it marked the start of a period of SSSP for Campoalegre which featured an agricultural extension program, new country roads, transportation subsidies, access to credit, and some investments in public education and basic services for the broader population. I argue that this was made possible in large part by the creation of a cooperative for the program’s beneficiaries, which enabled them to coproduce many of the services that the state provided during this period. The following subsections unpack this argument.

The State Comes to Campoalegre: Land Parcellation, Irrigation, and Then Some

The 1930s were marked by conflict over land—legal disputes, land occupations, and violent retaliations by landowners—throughout the country (Hirschman 1965, 140-148; LeGrand 2016; Palacios 2011; G. Sánchez 1984a). One of the main tools at the government’s disposal during the moderate Liberal administration of Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-1934) was a parcellation model based

on a law that dated back to 1926 (Law 74).³⁴ Under this model, a large hacienda (or sections thereof) would be purchased by the government and subdivided into medium or small holdings, and these parcels would be transferred to informal squatters. In 1933, the government used the parcellation model to address land conflicts in Cauca and Cundinamarca (LeGrand 2016, 215). However, this transaction came at a high price for the national treasury, so the government determined that all future parcellations should be paid in full by their beneficiaries. Under the new system, “once the value of the property had been set by land appraisers the owner was to be paid in cash while the new occupants had, of course, to be granted long-term credit through agricultural credit banks” (Hirschman 1965, 159). In 1933, this responsibility was assigned to the Banco Agrícola Hipotecario (Agricultural Mortgage Bank, BAH), created years early to provide agricultural credit (the bulk of which went to wealthy landowners) (LeGrand 2016).

In 1934, an agronomist from the Ministry of Industry tasked with assessing the state of agriculture in Huila suggested that food crops could offer a profitable alternative to cattle ranching and recommended using the parcellation system under Law 74 to develop “some lands which, given their location, topography, fertility, and

³⁴ According to Palacios (2011), the motivation behind the enactment of Law 74 (1926) during the Conservative government of Miguel Abadía Méndez was a Supreme Court decision from earlier that same year which required claimants of contested lands to demonstrate ownership by providing the original title by which the state had transferred the property to them (the so-called “diabolical proof,” or *prueba diabólica*); otherwise, the property would be considered unoccupied public land (*baldíos*) and should be surrendered to the state. Since such disputes usually had their origin in claims by *campesino* squatters, parcellation was seen as providing landowners, *colonos*, and the state a mutually beneficial solution. In the long run, moreover, parcellation should serve to strengthen private property institutions and contribute to the formation of a rural middle class while at the same time preventing conflict in the countryside (LeGrand 2016, 214).

easy irrigation, are called upon to play an important role in the agricultural development of [Huila]” (Mejía 1935, 41). This document was reprinted in 1935 in the May edition of *El Agricultor Huilense*, published by the Agriculturalists Society of Huila (Tovar Zambrano 1996, 126). The following month, the departmental assembly of Huila deliberated on how to modernize the department’s economy. The president of the assembly at the time was Julio César Losada, from Campoalegre (C.F. Salas, Cortés, and Rojas 1975, 98-99). In addition, with the Liberal Party now in control, the ideas of Liberal intellectuals such as the aforementioned Joaquín García Borrero on the failings of cattle-ranching and the promise of “scientific” agriculture became more mainstream than ever. This was best exemplified by a document that was presented to the assembly by Luis Felipe Cabrera, head of the Departmental Economic Council (a consultative body appointed by the governor’s office), which is worth quoting at length:

It is true that cattle ranching has been and is one of our main industries, and that we owe it a lot; but it is no less true that if the rich extensions that are sowed with grass, near the cities and the roads, were planted with other agricultural elements, not only would we have occupations for many arms, we wouldn’t need to knock on the doors of our neighbors’ cupboards [to import goods that could have been produced locally] [...] but also our income would have increased by more than 400%. (cited in Salas Vargas 1996, 213)

Cabrera then offers a “comparison between the revenue generated by the fattening of 75 steers in fifty hectares covered in grass, and what they would have yielded if they had been planted with rice” and concludes that, on average, rice produces more than five times as much wealth as cattle. He closes by arguing, “it is not possible to get the owners of our rich and extensive regions that are best suited for

agriculture [...] to work them themselves or allow farmers to supply us with corn, plantain, beans, etc., as they would rather their stud bulls [...] be the only ones working their privileged lands” (cited in Salas Vargas 1996, 214).

The departmental assembly then went on to pass Ordinance 3, which authorized the departmental or national governments “to purchase extensions of land larger than five-hundred (500) hectares located near centers of consumption to then sell them at cost, either in lump sum or in installments of up to twenty years, in small lots which will not exceed fifty hectares,” prioritizing “those adjacent or closer to roads for easy and cheap transportation of agricultural products” (Asamblea del Huila 1935, 18, Art. 1 & Parágrafo). It authorized the government to expropriate unproductive lands as well as those under production by renters if their owner demands too high a price for them (Art. 2). In order to become a beneficiary of a parcellation scheme, the only requirement was for applicants to be “capable of carrying out agricultural work” (Art. 5). The ordinance also stipulated that the government should take measures “to prevent the resurgence of latifundia” (Art. 19).

However, funding to implement the ordinance was in short supply. The government of Huila determined that it could not invest its limited fiscal resources “in enterprises that would not turn a profit for the department’s treasury,” so it turned to the national government’s BAH for assistance (Velasco 1936, 22). In its 1936 address to the departmental assembly, the governor of Huila reported that negotiations had concluded between the Ferro family and the BAH for the parcellation of one of the family’s estates in Campoalegre (Velasco 1936, 22). According to Jorge Eugenio Ferro

(Cantalicio Ferro's grandson), the Ferro family was happy to welcome the deal.³⁵

Rather than appraising the family's Llanogrande estate—which had an area of 2,050 hectares—for a cash payment, the Bank offered a property swap: in exchange for Llanogrande, the Bank would give the Ferro family a nearby estate in Palermo which the bank had acquired through a foreclosure on the previous owners, who had defaulted on agricultural loans from the bank. The Palermo property, located in the area known as El Juncal, was at least three times larger than Llanogrande. In addition, the Ferro family kept several smaller estates in the vicinity of the parceled Llanogrande property, and some of them were left with access to the new irrigation system.

The parcellation project went beyond drawing up boundaries for land plots; it was a carefully planned project based on the location of the Neiva River (the irrigation system's water source) and the road that connected Campoalegre with Neiva, as well as the area's topography (Malagón 1937). The parceled section of Llanogrande was divided into 79 plots of 25 hectares on average, with none smaller than 10 and none larger than 50 hectares (Zabaleta 2001, 54), divided by a network of carefully planned country roads. The irrigation system—funded by the departmental government³⁶—was gravity-fed and consisted of eight channels

³⁵ Author interview with Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, June 7, 2016. See also Zabaleta (2001, 49-51), whose discussion of the process is also based on an interview with Ferro Triana.

³⁶ Proyecto de ley por la cual se provee a la irrigación en el Departamento del Huila," *Anales de la Cámara de Representantes* No. 91, November 24, 1941, 1231.

designed mainly for rice crops, and also featured a drainage system.³⁷ The project also included an arborization component around the channels for flood control.

Parcel allocation began in October 1936 (Malagón 1937, 797), and the project was officially inaugurated in 1937, with President Alfonso López Pumarejo in attendance.³⁸ López's presence at the event at a time when his administration was beginning to implement incipient agrarian reform legislation has led to the misconception that the parcellation of Llanogrande was part of this reform package, when in fact the project had been in full swing long before the passage of Law 200 (enacted in December 1936).³⁹ In fact, Law 200 was partly motivated by the view that parcellations, though a valuable tool, were not an integral solution to “the great agrarian question” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016b, 68).⁴⁰

The parcellation's beneficiaries were a mixed crowd. They were not all, as Luciano Manrique seems to have told Leurquin (1967, 266, fn 27), “landless peasants.” They included some local rice growers who previously worked as sharecroppers—and some even as day laborers—in local rice fields, but also large landowners like Luciano Perdomo (Zabaleta 2001, 56), a cattle rancher whose family owned several thousands of hectares of land in the region (and a relative of Ricardo

³⁷ Ernesto Corrales, “Una gran obra social en el Huila.”

³⁸ Ernesto Corrales, “Una gran obra social en el Huila.”

³⁹ The association of the Llanogrande parcellation with Law 200 and the Liberal agrarian reform of 1936 is repeated in almost every work that discusses it (Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola 1966; Ducuara and Manrique 2008; Zabaleta 2001). Some authors even claim that this project was “the first parcellation carried out through the application of this norm [Law 200]” (C.F. Salas 2011, 45).

⁴⁰ Known as the “land regime law,” Law 200 sought to place land tenure rights on a more secure legal footing and provide greater rights to *campesino* squatters in the interest of defusing rural conflict but also, as López himself once claimed, of “encouraging capitalist transformation of rural Colombia through the freeing of resources immobilized in latifundia” (Henderson 2001, 245).

Perdomo, perpetrator of the Los Limpios massacre in 1922). Also among the buyers was Milciades Manrique, who by that time was already running Campoalegre's second mechanical rice mill, Molino Inglés, alongside his brother Luciano (Ducurara and Manrique 2008, 237). The engineer who designed the parcellation and irrigation project, Julio V. Manrique, also purchased a plot (Zabaleta 2001, 56). Parcels were sold by the BAH at commercial value, and the Bank required a 50% down payment (Banco Agrícola Hipotecario 1937).

Although there were no government subsidies for the purchase of plots, the payment plan offered by the government made the land affordable to a nascent rural middle class which otherwise would not have had any financing options, given the almost complete lack of credit available to anyone who was not a large landowner. A few poorer farmers who worked in the Ferro and Durán families' estates were also able to take advantage of the parcellation and irrigation project by obtaining private loans from the landowners (Zabaleta 2001, 55-56). Farmers' success was also conditioned by the Bank's policy not to make credit available to farmers for crops and inputs until they had paid off their debt or refinanced it through equity loans on land improvements (Banco Agrícola Hipotecario 1937, 7). This parcellation was therefore out of the reach of most poor campesinos, so its redistributive effects were limited—but considering the extreme concentration of land and wealth that was in place before the parcellation, those effects were not insignificant. Furthermore, beneficiaries' access to the public irrigation system in the context of the booming rice economy meant that many of them were able to quickly pay off their mortgages. As Zabaleta (2001, 54)

explains based on interviews with relatives of the original parcel holders, a single rice harvest may have sufficed to pay off a mortgage. In addition, land values in the parcellation soared after the first few harvests: whereas the Bank sold the parcels at \$50 pesos per hectare, by 1941 the price per hectare exceeded \$200 pesos.⁴¹ Over the 1940s years, about 70% of the parcellation's beneficiaries sold their original parcels (Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola 1966, 102), though many of these sellers (including the Manrique brothers) remained in the rice business, investing in the milling industry.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the parcellation of Llanogrande was categorically not a case of *campesino*-centered agrarian reform (as the 1936 agrarian reform spearheaded by López Pumarejo was intended to be). Still, it boosted the ascent of the new class of rice growers that had been slowly emerging in previous years. There is broad consensus on the fact that the parcellation and irrigation of Llanogrande was as a turning point for agricultural modernization in Huila—and not only for large rice farmers but also for smaller-scale producers (see, e.g., DANE 1953; Gómez Picón 1983 [1944]; González 1996a). Although some large properties remained, the latifundia-based land property structure of old declined significantly, productivity levels soared, and many locals who were previously sharecroppers or day laborers in large estates now enjoyed much more economic independence, even if they were not among the most privileged stratum of parcel owners.

⁴¹ “Proyecto de ley por la cual se provee a la irrigación en el Departamento del Huila,” *Anales de la Cámara de Representantes* No. 91, November 24, 1941, 1232.

But state service provision did not end with the inauguration of the parcellation and irrigation project. Although each parcel owner was responsible for the construction of homes and barns to equip each land plots, technical assistance was provided by the BAH.⁴² A plot was set aside to build a public school, and the municipal, departmental, and national governments allocated funding for its construction.⁴³ This funding was supplemented by donations from the parcellation's residents (Malagón 1939, 153).

In 1940, the national government selected Campoalegre, as well as Palermo and Neiva, as priority areas for the development of rice production (Decree 1413, 1940), and it stepped up the provision of technical extension services to farmers in the area during the 1938-1942 period (Leurquin 1967, 248). The government was particularly interested in promoting the use of selected seeds and installed a rice sorting machine in Neiva for the region's farmers. Other significant investments for rice producers were a bridge over the Neiva River, which connected Campoalegre with Palermo, and another one crossing the Magdalena River between Palermo and Neiva (Law 255, 1938; see also H. Calderón 1981).⁴⁴ The bridges contributed significantly to the development of the rice business in Palermo by facilitating transportation from rice fields to processing mills, most of which were located in Campoalegre and Neiva.

⁴² Ernesto Corrales, "Una gran obra social en el Huila."

⁴³ "Ordenanza Número 35 de 1937 (junio 16) por la cual se decretan unos auxilios," *Gaceta del Huila* No. 1501, 144; "Contrato con el Gobernador del Huila, sobre construcción de edificios escolares en varios Municipios de ese Departamento," *Diario Oficial* No. 24527, December 2, 1940, 600.

⁴⁴ The Santander bridge was inaugurated by then-President Eduardo Santos. *Anales de la Cámara de Representantes* No. 60, October 8, 1940, 700.

In 1939, the national government appropriated funds for a study to expand the Llanogrande irrigation system (Decreto 1900, 1939). The study was completed in 1941, and it recommended the development of a sophisticated system which included a small hydroelectric plant (400 Kw) to power the supply of water across larger extensions, along with other irrigation projects for other parts of Huila (Malagón 1940). The national government even secured funding for the project in the amount of \$350,000 USD as part of a loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Decree 1038, 1942b; U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency 1954, Credit No. 296), and an engineer was appointed to direct the Huila irrigation projects (Decree 165, 1942a). President Alfonso López Pumarejo highlighted the project in his 1942 address to Congress as an example of his government's commitment to the agricultural sector,⁴⁵ and construction was scheduled to start in 1943.

However, in early 1943, the project was abruptly cancelled. In his yearly report to Congress, the Minister of the Economy explained the project's cancellation:

This irrigation plan, for which studies and plans were completed in 1941, should be in execution thanks to a special appropriation. Systematic opposition from some landowners from that important agricultural and cattle-ranching region allowed the government to desist from this irrigation plan (...) In light of this failure, the government asked the lending entity to transfer the funding (...) that had been allocated to this project for others whose studies are about to be completed. (Rivas 1943, 209)

The government's request to reallocate the funding was approved by the Export-Import Bank, and it was redirected to other irrigation projects, most of them

⁴⁵ "Mensaje del Señor Presidente de la República al Congreso Nacional en sus sesiones de 1942," *Diario Oficial* No. 25015, July 25, 1942, 296.

in the rice-producing region of Tolima,⁴⁶ which went on to become Colombia's top rice producer in the 1950s in large part thanks to the Saldaña, Espinal, and Purificación irrigation districts (Balcázar et al. 1980; Leurquin 1967; Zambrano 2015). The project's cancellation marked the end of this period of SSSP in the Huila flatlands.

Explaining the Onset and Collapse of SSSP around the Llanogrande Parcellation

The period of SSSP that took place in Campoalegre between 1936 and 1943 was especially noteworthy considering the temporal and spatial context of highly limited state capacity in which it took place. This was admittedly a time of increased government activism, under the so-called Liberal Republic (four successive Liberal administrations between 1930 and 1946; see Safford and Palacios 2002; Henderson 2001), but the actual reach of the Colombian state across territory remained weak; and, although its regulatory power was growing, its role in active welfare provision overall was still highly limited (A.M. Bejarano and Segura 1996; Oquist 1978). Despite becoming slowly more integrated with the rest of the country, Huila continued to be a fairly peripheral region by mid-century. How did SSSP become possible against these odds?

The case of Llanogrande supports my theory of local ownership of state power. The sequencing here, however, was different from the experience of Barrancabermeja (Chapter 3). In Campoalegre, the alignment between strong

⁴⁶ See Decree 1976 (1943).

organizational structures for collective action, a statist ideational framing, and access to and influence with state elites did not precede the onset of state intervention. When the departmental assembly passed the ordinance that allowed for government involvement in land parcellations, the Campoalegre non-state actors that would come to develop local ownership of state power did not have strong organizational structures or a statist framing, though they had come to enjoy much more access to decisionmakers than they had before thanks to the Liberal Party's rise to power and the presence of Julio César Losada, a Campoalegre native. The parcellation initiative first came from above—from Liberal politicians bent on promoting Huila's progress through agricultural modernization. But this initiative could have simply produced a one-off government project. As I argued in Chapter 2, short-lived episodes of state service provision can happen for any number of reasons, and they happen all the time even in contexts of low state capacity. By contrast, *sustained* state service provision is much more difficult to achieve, and it requires the involvement of non-state support coalitions. I argue that the continuation of state service provision in Campoalegre for six years was only made possible when local non-state actors bought into the parcellation and irrigation project and, with support from activist bureaucrats, developed local ownership of state power.

The Liberal Party's rise to power both nationally (in 1930) and in traditionally Conservative Huila (1935) gave emerging rice producers—as well as Campoalegre's traditional landowners, predominantly Liberal—a powerful voice in the governor's office and the departmental assembly, as exemplified vividly by the discussions that

preceded the passage of Ordinance 3. But at this point were still largely atomized, and they did not seem to expect much support from the state. Although some broad calls for government support for agriculture were made in the magazine published by the Agriculturalists' Society, a firmer belief that the state could play a more substantive role in promoting new economic opportunities only seems to have appeared when the possibility of the Llanogrande parcellation project presented itself. Jorge Eugenio Ferro expresses that his family saw this project as a hugely beneficial opportunity and got fully behind it.⁴⁷ His father, Eugenio Ferro Falla, even went on to serve as a consultant to the Huila branch of the BAH.⁴⁸ Emerging rice producers' participation in the parcellation scheme—as in the case of the Manrique brothers—is arguably indicative of a positive attitude toward the state's local intervention, in the absence of more direct evidence.

Still, by the time parcels began to be allocated, these various actors did not have an organizational structure for collective action. At most, there were individual business partnerships between rice growers and large landowners, such as the one between the Manrique brothers and Carlos Richard (married into the Ferro family). This changed in 1937, with the creation of the Rice Growers' Cooperative of Campoalegre (*Cooperativa Arroceros de Campoalegre*). The initiative for the cooperative's creation seems to have come from the BAH in the interest of organizing parcel owners for the collective management of the irrigation system. It received start-up

⁴⁷ Author interview with Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, June 7, 2016.

⁴⁸ "Copia de posesión," *Gaceta del Huila* No. 1386, June 2, 1939, 874.

financial support from the national and departmental governments,⁴⁹ as well as additional subsidies over the years.⁵⁰ In addition to its administrative functions, the cooperative also served as an organizational vehicle to coordinate parcel owners' access to a variety of government services, including credit for crops, inputs, machinery, and other expenses, technical assistance (including demonstration activities and pest control), and transportation subsidies for getting products out to markets (Malagón 1939). The cooperative also administered funds provided by the government for repairs and upgrades, often complementing them with members' contributions.⁵¹ For example, according to Malagón, it was the cooperative which completed the construction of the local public school. Although initially intended for the Llanogrande parcellation, the cooperative outgrew its original design and went on to support the activities of rice farmers in the rest of Campoalegre. According to C.F. Salas, Cortés, and Rojas (1975, 100), the Cooperative was an important predecessor to the National Federation of Rice Growers (Fedearroz) insofar as it provided an organizational structure for collective action. It continued to function well into the 1950s and even went on to administer one of Campoalegre's rice mills.⁵² In the absence of sufficient locally-sourced resources at the state's disposal, the cooperative

⁴⁹ "Resolución Número 434 de 1937 (octubre 25)," *Diario Oficial* No. 23765, April 30, 1938, 363; "Ordenanza Número 41 de 1937 (junio 21) por la cual se fomenta la industria arrocera," reprinted in *Asamblea del Huila* (1937, 60-61). See also R. Salas (1938, 21).

⁵⁰ In 1940, the cooperative received a grant from the Ministry of Labor to support its continued operations. "Resolución Número 11 de 1940 (enero 11) por la cual se concede un auxilio," *Diario Oficial* No. 24269, January 18, 1940.

⁵¹ Ordinance 29, 1938, Art. 5, reprinted in *Asamblea del Huila* (1938, 36-37).

⁵² "Cantidad de semillas," *Arroz* 7, no. 79 (September 1958), 12.

served to coordinate the deployment of the state's contributions and supplement it with non-state actors' own inputs.

Meanwhile, Campoalegre rice growers' influence with state elites continued to improve, with the Liberal Party as a conduit between the local and national levels. In 1938, Luciano Manrique became a deputy in the departmental assembly, running with the Liberal Party (Ministerio de Gobierno 1938a). Huila's Liberal establishment's view of rice development as the key to the region's economic modernization remained strong. This alliance was crucial in obtaining support at the national level for the expansion of irrigation systems in Campoalegre (as well as other parts of Huila). In 1940, then-governor José Domingo Liévano emphasized that Huila's "primary, most imperative, and most economically promising" need was an irrigation program.⁵³ In 1941, Huila congressman César García Álvarez introduced the bill that provided for the national government's role in conducting feasibility studies for irrigation in in Huila, including the Neiva River.⁵⁴ Another key ally at the national level was Luis Felipe Cabrera—remembered for his fiery declaration of support for rice growers in 1935—who was now a senator.⁵⁵

⁵³ "La situación económica de los Departamentos y sus principales necesidades: Encuesta a los gobernadores," *El Mes Financiero y Económico* 41 (October), 31.

⁵⁴ "Proyecto de ley por la cual se provee a la irrigación en el Departamento del Huila," *Anales de la Cámara de Representantes* No. 91, November 24, 1941, 1231. Law 58 was finally passed in December 1942.

⁵⁵ "Lista de los ciudadanos elegidos Senadores de la República, principales y suplentes, para el cuatrienio que principia el 20 de julio de 1939, según comunicaciones de los gobernadores y de las Aambleas Departamentales," *Diario Oficial* No. 24124, July 20, 1939.

It is not at all clear what led local landowners to clash with the national government in 1943 over the planned expansion of irrigation for Campoalegre so as to bring about the project's cancellation.⁵⁶ In any case, this disagreement seems to have undermined local actors' statist ideational framing. Over the next two decades, the development of Huila's rice economy took place without much state involvement. To this day, the region's rice producers' version of history remains that the state had little to nothing to do with the development of the rice business in Huila.⁵⁷ Discussing the absence even to this day of a government irrigation program for Campoalegre, an expert on irrigation systems suggested, "Demand is always an important factor, it's not always about the government's supply (...) So [government bureaucrats] would say, no, why should we go and beg them, if over there they're begging *us* to do the project there, let's go over there."⁵⁸

4.4. A Period of Private Initiative and No Local Ownership of State Power (1943-1961)

Commercial rice production experienced a major upsurge in Colombia starting in 1945 (Kalmanovitz and López 2006, 115). Huila's takeoff followed suit in the 1950s (Tirado 1984). Despite the cancellation of the irrigation project planned for

⁵⁶ My informants were not aware of this episode, and I was not able to find any historical documentation on local landowners' side of the story.

⁵⁷ Author interview with Eduardo Medina, Campoalegre, May 18, 2016; Jesús María Garzón, manager of San Isidro rice mill, Campoalegre, May 18, 2016.

⁵⁸ Author interview with Jorge Valenzuela Ramírez, Armenia, June 4, 2016. Valenzuela is an expert on community management of irrigation projects and someone who closely accompanied the development of community enterprises in Campoalegre and authored a seminal study on the political economy of rice in Huila (J. Valenzuela 1978).

Campoalegre in 1943, the rice economy grew steadily over the 1940s. Rice farmers built several private irrigation systems in Campoalegre throughout the decade, including major ones which required government authorization,⁵⁹ imported a number of tractors, combine harvesters, threshing machines, and other machinery (Leurquin 1967, 266; Tovar Zambrano 1996, 213; Zabaleta 2001, 39), and built four new rice mills (Ducuara and Manrique 2008). A major boost to rice production took place in 1948, with the creation of the National Federation of Rice Growers (Fedearroz).⁶⁰

The new federation promptly established strong relationships with the national government in the interest of influencing agricultural policy.⁶¹ Fedearroz pushed for protectionist measures, such as lifting price maximums (and at other times imposing minimums) and restricting rice imports (Fedearroz 1992; Gilhodes 1974),⁶² and it voiced strong support for the government's research efforts (which, starting in the 1950s, began to be supported by the Rockefeller foundation—see Tally 2012).⁶³

⁵⁹ See, e.g., “Resolución Número 32, Ministerio de la Economía Nacional,” *Diario Oficial* No. 25526, April 22, 1944, 220.

⁶⁰ The association was created in May 1947 as the Federation of Rice Growers of Tolima. It was then joined in August of that same year by rice producers from Huila (including Luciano Manrique). In 1948 it became the National Federation of Rice Growers and was expanded to the rest of the country's rice growing regions. “Jornadas estelares de la Industria Arrocera en Colombia,” *Arroz* 2, no. 16, May 1953, 104.

⁶¹ In 1950, the Federation moved its headquarters from Ibagué (capital of Tolima) to Bogotá. “Ministerio de Justicia. Resolución Número 122 de 1950 (octubre 14) por la cual se aprueban las reformas introducidas a los Estatutos de una Federación,” *Diario Oficial* No. 27517, January 26, 1951, 327.

⁶² Most of the time, the national government was highly receptive. On price floors, see “Noticiero de julio 16 de 1948—El Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos y el problema del arroz,” *Diario Oficial* No. 26778, July 27, 1948, p. 483. See also “Jornadas estelares de la Industria Arrocera en Colombia,” *Arroz*, 105.

⁶³ “Aspectos principales de la Agricultura y de la producción arroceras en el país,” *Arroz* 2, no. 17, July 1953, 141. The Rockefeller Foundation's Colombian Agricultural Program (CAP) had a rice research program which was considered one of its most successful initiatives.

In 1950, the Federation signed a contract to assist the government in its efforts to promote rice production,⁶⁴ and it began to receive a yearly subvention the following year.⁶⁵ But this national-level agenda was, for the most part, not matched by demands for active government support for rice growers on the ground, other than some complaints about the fees rice growers in Tolima had to pay to use the public irrigation systems the government had built in that department.⁶⁶ The director of Fedearroz, Tolima-based rice producer Gildardo Armel, called on the government to run public irrigation as a “public service,” rather than being guided by “speculation criteria.”⁶⁷ Far from embracing a statist ideational framing around local service provision for its affiliates, Fedearroz saw itself—not the government—as that kind of provider. This attitude is exemplified by the response of the Neiva branch of Fedearroz to a reporter’s question about the needs of Huila rice producers after production in 1948 and 1949 had flooded the market, forcing producers to leave thousands of sacks of unprocessed rice in storage:

If the government had let private actors (*particulares*) be in charge of rice exports, the problem would be solved. The decongestion of production centers would be fast and beneficial to producers, if the government allowed the Federation of Rice Growers to be the entity in charge of regulating the market. The only solution: effective exports, and the only entity capable of it: the Federation.”⁶⁸

⁶⁴ “Decreto Número 2144 de 1950,” *Diario Oficial* No. 27360, July 13, 1950, 164.

⁶⁵ “Se abren unos créditos adicionales —suplementales y extraordinarios— al Presupuesto vigente,” *Diario Oficial* No. 27720, October 4, 1951, 49.

⁶⁶ “Debate sobre el arroz,” *Semana*, March 12, 1949, 24.

⁶⁷ “Debate sobre el arroz,” *Semana*, 25. In a letter to Fedearroz paraphrased in the *Semana* article, the director of the responsible government agency wrote, “if farmers are claiming that in order to promote agriculture the irrigation works should be given to them for free, they should also ask that machinery and land be given to them as gifts, and for workers to work for free.”

⁶⁸ “Debate sobre el arroz,” 25. The discussion of exports refers to domestic sales, as Colombia only began exporting rice to foreign markets in 1952. “Jornadas estelares de la Industria Arrocera en

Private irrigations also continued throughout the 1950s, including a highly celebrated project that consisted of a network of pumps and channels (including an underground channel) developed by Luciano Manrique and inaugurated in 1959.⁶⁹

During this period, the government made some piecemeal investments in Campoalegre and Palermo, including some upgrades to both towns' sewerage systems and to the Campoalegre water system in the 1940s, through the Fund for Municipal Development (*Fondo de Fomento Municipal*).⁷⁰ Some services were also made available to rice producers, but they were mostly based in Neiva, such as an agronomist from the Ministry of the Economy with jurisdiction over Campoalegre, Palermo, and three other towns (Ministerio de la Economía Nacional 1946, 404), and an agricultural extension and machinery rental facility, established in Neiva in 1955 (STACA 1955).⁷¹ One exception to this pattern was a 1952 agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and Fedearroz wherein the former provided the Federation with rice sorting machines, one of which was to be delivered to the Federation's Campoalegre branch.⁷² These scattered examples do not, however, rise to the level of SSSP.

Colombia," *Arroz*, 106.

⁶⁹ Author interview with Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, June 7, 2016; "Irigaciones [letter to the editor from Neiva businessman Gabriel Perdomo Buendía]," *Semana*, May 26, 1959; "En nuestra portada," *El Bronce* 7, August 1, 1965, 30. See also Ducuara and Manrique (2008, 72).

⁷⁰ "El municipio de Campoalegre contratará un empréstito: Resolución Ejecutiva No. 204 de 1944 (diciembre 5)," *Diario Oficial* No. 25730, December 30, 1944, 877; "Resolución Ejecutiva 11 de 1945 (febrero 9)," *Diario Oficial* No. 25775, February 24, 1945, 707.

⁷¹ This was a branch of the Colombian-American Agricultural Technical Service (STACA), an extension agency that was partly funded by the US government.

⁷² "Contrato con la Federación Nacional de Arroceros sobre incremento de la producción de arroz," *Diario Oficial* No. 27898, May 10, 1952, p. 486.

4.5. Second Phase of SSSP: Coproduction with Grains of Contention and the Many Faces of Service Provision (1961-1985)

Between 1954 and 1963, Colombian rice production nearly doubled (Leurquin 1967, 263). In Huila it grew by a factor of 2.15, making it the third-largest rice producing department in the country in 1963 (moving up from sixth place in 1954). This growth was driven chiefly by technical advances rather than spatial expansion. In 1962, Huila had the highest yields per hectare in the country, and it was considered to produce some of “Colombia's best rice, using the most elaborate tools and methods of cultivation” (265). Yet there were some serious obstacles to continued growth which prompted rice growers in Campoalegre, Palermo, and most of the country’s rice-producing regions, to look again to the state for assistance, both in terms of macro-level policy and at the local level—always in association with Fedearroz. Thanks in large part to this collaboration between producers and the state, Huila’s rice economy continued to grow (Ducura and Manrique 2008, 73). Meanwhile, the Colombian government’s renewed push for agrarian reform in the 1960s brought new kinds of state intervention to the rice-growing flatlands of Huila. This, in turn, engendered new forms of claim-making.

This second period of SSSP displays dynamics that are considerably more complex than every other case addressed in the dissertation. To be sure, I maintain that SSSP in all its forms can be explained by the development of local ownership of state power. However, variation over time in the provision of specific services is explained by changing forms of local ownership—specifically, by which actors are

able to develop and maintain it and they do with it. Credit, technological extension, and marketing services for all of the region's rice growers, both large and small, were (and are largely still) coproduced by the Colombian state and Fedearroz and were provided constantly starting in 1961. On the other hand, programs aimed specifically for small, poorer, *campesino* farmers were only provided in a sustained fashion from 1965 to 1978. They started out as a result of the Colombian state's own initiative, but their continuation and expansion can only be understood through the lens of local ownership of state power. The limited explanatory potential of central government initiative and the importance of local factors becomes especially clear when one considers the timing of SSSP for campesinos.

Despite the decline of national government commitment to agrarian reform after 1970, some of the most expansive and redistributive forms of state service provision in Campoalegre and Palermo took place in the 1970s. SSSP for campesinos resulted from coproductive processes involving different actors at different points in time, and it was aided by a few outbursts of contentious mobilization. Table 4.2 provides a preview of the argument regarding this second period of SSSP, and the following subsections elaborate it in detail.

Table 4.2. SSSP and Local Ownership Dynamics in Campoalegre and Palermo since 1961

	SSSP for All Rice Growers	SSSP for Campesino Smallholders
Timespan	1961-Present	1965-1978
Services Rendered	Supervised credit, agronomic research, technical assistance, marketing support	Public irrigation system (El Juncal), land redistribution, preferential credit, marketing support, technical assistance

Local Ownership of State Power	Coproduction of services by Fedearroz and government agencies (Agrarian Bank, ICA)	• Coproduction of services by INCORA and Coagrohuila (starting in 1967) and community enterprises (starting in 1969) • Occasional contention: catalyzing effect of ANUC land occupations (1971, 1975-1978)

The Return of Producers' Statist Framing and the Consolidation of State Support for Rice Production in Huila

Huila's rice economy thrived in the 1950s. At the same time, however, the limits of green revolution technologies were becoming clear. In Campoalegre, excessive use of agrochemicals and widespread monocropping were degrading the soil, which in turn required heavier use of fertilizers to maintain crop yields: "Our lands are very exhausted due to continuous cultivation, therefore the use of fertilizers becomes imperative," explained Reinaldo Manrique (son of Milciades Manrique) in a 1955 interview.⁷³ "If farmers continue producing rice as most of them have been doing it, we are undoubtedly headed for true failure," Manrique warned. As land prices soared in the late 1950s, farmers saw the need to increase yields even more, which in turn led to even greater use of fertilizers (Leurquin 1967, 266).⁷⁴ As production became increasingly capital-intensive and more dependent on advanced agronomic solutions (Leurquin 1967, 266-269; Montes, Candelo, and Muñoz 1980, 74), local producers' need for increased external assistance seemed to be growing beyond what Fedearroz could offer on its own.

⁷³ "Una encuesta sobre el futuro de la industria del arroz en el Huila," *Sábado* 571, January 29, 1955, 8.

⁷⁴ See also "Análisis y comentarios—Apéndice: Panorama del arroz en Colombia," *Arroz* 9, no. 97, March 1960, 28.

A key priority had to do with access to credit for producers. In 1961, Fedearroz signed an agreement with the government's Agrarian Bank to provide services jointly in rice-producing regions.⁷⁵ The Federation's selected seeds and instructive materials would become available in the Agrarian Bank's regional offices, and the Bank's services—including farm credit—would now be available in Fedearroz's regional branches in areas where the Bank did not have a permanent presence. Later that same year, Fedearroz and the Agrarian Bank launched a supervised credit pilot project which began in Campoalegre, Palermo, and Neiva (as well as parts of Tolima) (Leurquin 1967, 253). The program was run locally by Fedearroz and included various forms of technical assistance for its beneficiaries.

Fedearroz also began to work closely with the Colombian Agriculture and Livestock Institute (*Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario*, ICA), the government's agricultural research agency, which was created in 1962, on seed research and distribution to farmers. The Federation's research and extension activities in collaboration with the government received a major boost in 1963 due to a new agreement that gave Fedearroz the authority to charge and administer a fee on rice producers to fund these activities (Balcázar et al. 1980; Fedearroz 1992; Gilhodes 1974; S. Ruiz 1973).⁷⁶ Over the next several years, joint research activities between ICA and Fedearroz

⁷⁵ "La Federacion de Arroceros y la Caja Agraria firmaron contrato de Coordinación," *Arroz* 10, no. 113, July-August, 1961, 10. The *Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero*, more commonly known as *Caja Agraria*, was now in charge of the services previously offered by now-defunct BAH.

⁷⁶ Known as the rice development fee (*cuota de fomento arroceros*), the fee is collected by millers from producers and is then turned over to Fedearroz, which administers it with oversight from the Ministry of Agriculture. Author interview with Francisco García, May 17, 2016;

included pest control and seed trials in Campoalegre and Palermo rice farms.⁷⁷ This collaborative relationship then went a step further after the creation of the non-profit International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in 1967. In partnership with CIAT, ICA and Fedearroz developed several new high-yielding rice varieties, including the so-called Cica varieties, which are still seen by many Huila's rice growers as the government's most important contribution to the development of the local rice economy.⁷⁸

Though limited in scope, these credit, research, and extension services coproduced by Fedearroz and the government's agricultural development agencies became essential for the local rice economy. As a side note, it is worth noting that although these services were nominally available to all rice growers, poorer farmers' access to them was in practice quite limited, since availability still entailed payment for access. With some minor changes along the way, these services continue to be provided to this day under the same collaborative model.

Agrarian Reform (This Time for Real)

In 1961, Congress passed a new agrarian reform law (Law 135, 1961). The implementation of Law 200 had been mostly limited to land titling in public property (so-called *baldíos*, roughly translated as unused land) (Centro Nacional de Memoria

⁷⁷ "Satisfactorios resultados con el diagnóstico foliar en arroz," *Arroz* 14, no. 148, March 1965, 15; "'Pruebas regionales' y 'días de campo,'" *Arroz* 17, no. 180, 16-17; "Pruebas regionales de demostración 1968," *Arroz* 18, no. 186, March 1969, 8.

⁷⁸ Author interviews with Francisco García, director of the Neiva branch of Fedearroz, Neiva, May 17, 2016; Aminta Puentes and Sael Puentes, rice farmers in Campoalegre, Neiva, May 19, 2016; Daniel Francisco Godoy, agronomist with Florhuila rice mill, May 19, 2016.

Histórica 2016b, 69). Not much changed over the 1950s in the context of La Violencia—the bloody armed conflict between Liberals and Conservatives that swept large swaths of the country (see Safford and Palacios 2002, Ch. 14)⁷⁹—or during the subsequent “rehabilitation” efforts of the military government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, which mostly privileged planned colonization of sparsely populated areas of the country (Hirschman 1965; R.A. Karl 2017). Soon after the return to civilian rule in 1958, heralded by the bipartisan National Front pact, the issue of land conflict returned to the fore. In the 1960 congressional elections, the left-leaning Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) faction of the Liberal Party, including a number of Communist candidates, performed better than expected. With the Cuban Revolution in many politicians’ minds, moreover, there were some scattered reports of land occupations by campesinos. Even some Conservative leaders warned that failure to carry out agrarian reform would inevitably lead to revolution (Hirschman 1965, 193). Law 135 thus passed with relative ease. It sought to eliminate latifundia as well as overly small holdings and offer access to land to renters, sharecroppers, and landless campesinos. In addition to the law’s provisions for paid expropriation of idle or underexploited land, it called, among other things, for strengthening existing colonization and *baldío* titling programs, providing credit, technical assistance, marketing programs, and water management (irrigation, flood control, and drainage)

⁷⁹ Periodization of La Violencia is a highly controversial subject. Focusing on the dynamics and impact of La Violencia in Huila, González (1996a) discusses four phases of La Violencia (1946-1950, 1950-1953, 1953-1957, 1958-1966). Other authors argue that 1964 marks a breaking point between the partisan Violence and the contemporary armed conflict.

projects, and supporting rural cooperatives.⁸⁰ The law also established the Colombian Institute for Land Reform (INCORA) as the agency in charge of implementing every aspect of the law.

Overall, INCORA's implementation of agrarian reform in the 1960s is usually said to have been slow and timid, insofar as there was little action to address idle latifundia (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016b; Zamosc 1986). Still, as early as 1962, the agency began to slowly exercise some of the less controversial parts of its mandate, including public land titling as well as planning the development of public irrigation systems in various parts of the country. In the localities under study, the first plot of public land was titled by INCORA to campesinos in Campoalegre in 1963,⁸¹ A few other similar plot allocations took place both there and in Palermo over the following years.⁸² Also in 1963, INCORA announced that it would develop two "land improvement" districts in Huila, one in the northern towns of Baraya, Tello, and Aipe (Huila No. 1 Project) and another one in the Llanos del Juncal zone of Palermo (Huila No. 2 Project) (INCORA 1972a, vol. 3, 3).⁸³ The concept of land improvement (*adecuación de tierras*) included irrigation, drainage, and flood control

⁸⁰ For more detailed accounts of the law and the various decrees that regulated it, see Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016b, 123-144), Hirschman (1965, 200-205).

⁸¹ See, e.g., Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria, "Resolución Número 6, 17 de enero de 1963," *Diario Oficial* No. 31321, March 17, 1964, 762; "Resolución Número 122, 7 de junio de 1963," *Diario Oficial* No. 31337, April 9, 1964, 149.

⁸² For example, issue no. 31321 of *Diario Oficial* (1965) contains eight resolutions issued by INCORA involving the titling of *baldíos* in Palermo (p. 343); issue 31802 (1965) contains nine (pp. 311-312). Similar resolutions involving both towns appear in several issues of the same government gazette throughout the decade.

⁸³ Along with the two Huila projects, there were 14 other land improvement projects throughout the country (INCORA 1972a). The Huila districts were among the smaller ones. In the Caribbean region there were two irrigation systems that covered areas of up to 60,000 hectares.

efforts. Unlike the 1930s Llanogrande project, INCORA's schemes were directed exclusively at campesino smallholders.

These projects were first recommended in a study conducted by engineer and former Fedearroz general manager Carlos Boshell Manrique (INSFOPAL 1962).⁸⁴ Spanning 12,962 hectares, the area of El Juncal had high-quality soils, and its location just 16 km south of Neiva, with good transportation infrastructure, made it a promising site for agricultural development. However, productivity in the area was limited by irregular rains (Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo Económico 1968, 333). As a result, the area used to be devoted almost entirely to extensive, mostly absentee cattle raising (with about one cow for every 2.5 hectares), with the exception of about 200 hectares planted with rice and subsistence crops (INCORA 1972a, vol. 3, L-10). There used to be only 23 properties, three of which occupied more than 9,000 hectares (about 75% of the land) (J. Valbuena et al. 1968, 3).

The area's strategic location near the Magdalena River (see Map 4.1) made it an ideal site for a land improvement project. Preparatory works for the Project Huila No. 2 in El Juncal began in 1964. In 1965, INCORA began to acquire private estates in the area and divide them into smaller parcels to be distributed to campesinos. Nearly all the local landowners negotiated the sale of their properties with INCORA; only one property, the 673-hectare Opia estate, was expropriated (with payment).⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Boshell, who was also involved in the design of the Saldaña irrigation project in Tolima, was manager of Fedearroz from 1956 to 1958 and continued to be part of the organization's board of directors until 1960.

⁸⁵ "Resolución Ejecutiva Número 356 de 1967," *Diario Oficial* No. 32412, January 24, 1968, 132. Expropriation was a rare occurrence. For context, between the start of INCORA's operations in 1961

Previous owners were allowed to keep plots of up to 100 hectares in the district and were granted access to the irrigation system.⁸⁶ El Juncal district was inaugurated in October 1968 by President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (Lleras Restrepo 1970, 344). The project had 132 beneficiary households. The irrigation system pumped water from the Magdalena River into two small reservoirs and then distributed it using two main channels of 8.1 and 6.5 km in length and a network of smaller channels and ditches (INCORA 1972a).⁸⁷ INCORA also provided funding for a town center for the Juncal area (INCORA 1972a, L-4). INCORA provided the design and the materials, and project beneficiaries provided much of the labor for its construction (H. Calderón and Perdomo 2015, 82). Over the course of the 1970s, the town was equipped with water and sewage systems, electricity service, a public school, and a health post (H. Calderón 1981, 153-154).

Converting the land from the kind of rudimentary cattle raising practiced in 1963 (the year the project was first devised) to more technologically advanced rice crops was estimated to have increased the land's productivity by a factor of 15 (Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo Económico 1968, 338). By 1972, 1,220 hectares of the district were planted with rice, an additional 235 were used for sorghum crops, and only 152 were used for cattle grazing. (INCORA 1972a, L-11).

and 1987, only 262 properties were expropriated in the entire country, which amounts to 5.4% of all the properties that INCORA acquired for titling among *campesinos* and indigenous people (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016b, 150).

⁸⁶ Author interview with Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, June 7, 2016. In 1972, private owners not affiliated with the INCORA program controlled 41.7% of the district area, in which they held 12 farms.

⁸⁷ See also Óscar Jaramillo, "Los distritos de riego (VI): los proyectos menores," *Nueva Frontera* No. 34, June 14, 1975, 9.

Living conditions in the area before the land improvement project were dismal (excepting the living quarters of the largest estates): most homes were built with improvised materials, preventable diseases were endemic, access roads were in poor condition, and there were no schools (J. Valbuena et al. 1968). INCORA and the departmental government made several investments throughout the 1970s to make repairs and upgrades to the irrigation system (Gobernación del Huila 1977, 137-140). In 1976, INCORA turned management of most irrigation districts to the newly created Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology, and Land Improvement (HIMAT). Before doing so, it contracted an additional round of upgrades and repairs.⁸⁸ Under HIMAT administration, the system suffered from recurrent malfunctions, reportedly due to a lack of adequate maintenance. In 1982, the government obtained funding from the World Bank to renovate the country's irrigation systems, including this one (World Bank 1982). Repairs and renovations for El Juncal began in 1984 (Castro 1984, 59).

Parallel to the development of the Juncal project, INCORA started a Huila No. 3 Project in Campoalegre, El Hobo, Rivera, and Neiva, and the national government established a "rural action unit" in the same area (Decree 2207, 1966; see also Ministerio de Agricultura 1967).⁸⁹ Under the agrarian reform law of 1961, rural action units (*unidades de acción rural*) were intended to serve as focal points to bring together the work of every government agency involved in agricultural policy in a

⁸⁸ See "Contrato Número 148" and "Contrato Número 155," *Diario Oficial* 34547, May 10, 1976, 411-412, 418-420.

⁸⁹ The area of the Huila No. 3 project appears to have changed later, excluding El Hobo and adding Algeciras (Duque Palma 1968).

given locality. As Lleras Restrepo explained, the idea was for campesinos “to only have to deal with one office that offers them all the pertinent technical instruction, gives them the credit they need, provides them (...) with seeds [and] machinery” (Ministerio de Agricultura 1962b, CCCLXXIII). The Huila unit in particular was meant to coordinate the work of INCORA, the Agrarian Bank, ICA, and other agencies. Its mandate was to inventory, regulate, and expand the existing irrigation systems in the area in order to establish a third irrigation district (in addition to Huila Nos. 1 and 2), acquire and parcel large estates, and provide credit to beneficiaries, among other things (Ministerio de Agricultura 1967). However, as of 1968, progress in the Huila No. 3 area was limited. Only one property (the Ferro family’s La Vuelta estate, in Campoalegre) had been acquired for parcellation and redistribution, in 1967. In 1970, an evaluation of agrarian reform implementation even stated that the Huila No. 3 project had been terminated (Centro Interamericano de Desarrollo Rural y Reforma Agraria 1970, 109).⁹⁰

In 1970, President Lleras Restrepo—top promoter of the 1961 reform and deeply committed to its implementation during his administration—ended his term and was replaced by Conservative Misael Pastrana. Under Pastrana, the Colombian establishment closed ranks in opposition to land reform. Policy changes were made explicit in January 1972 with the Chicoral Pact—so-named after a meeting involving Conservative and Liberal politicians and private-sector representatives in the town of

⁹⁰ The project does not actually appear to have been formally cancelled, as references to it continued to appear in government documents (see, e.g., INCORA 1972b, 9), but those references are rare. Most documents after 1970 simply mention La Vuelta estate (see, e.g., Gobernación del Huila 1977, 138).

Chicoral (Tolima)—and then signed into law the following year (Law 4, 1973).⁹¹ Under the new law, requirements for expropriation were highly restrictive, which made redistribution nearly impossible (Arango 1987; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016b; Zamosc 1986). Yet it was during Pastrana’s administration that service provision for campesinos ramped up in Huila, especially in Campoalegre. In 1971 alone, there were six property acquisitions by INCORA in Campoalegre (B. Sánchez 1990, 314).⁹² The following years (except for 1973 and 1976) there were several more, both there and in Palermo; the last one was in 1978. These estates had some of the most fertile lands that were titled to *parceleros* (parcel holders, as agrarian reform beneficiaries came to be known) in Huila, especially in comparison to parcels created out of public lands (Entralgo, Martínez, and Alarcón 1980; A. Londoño et al. 1975).

In addition to land acquisitions and parcellations, government agencies (especially but not exclusively INCORA) continued to provide preferential credit,

⁹¹ The changes are best explained by Zamosc (1986, 98): “In exchange for the payment of taxes that would be determined by the census value of their estates, the landowners were assured of both restricted agrarian reform and unlimited support for large-scale agricultural production. The criteria used to define the estates as liable to expropriation and redistribution were tightened. In the cases of expropriation, Law 135 of 1961 was modified so that compensation would depend on the commercial value of the land and not its census value, a greater proportion would be paid in cash, and high interest would be paid on the remaining debt.” These provisions effectively foreclosed the possibility of redistributive land reform.

⁹² Municipally disaggregated data on INCORA land acquisitions are hard to come by, as others have also noted (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016b). It was even more so during the time of this research due to the elimination in 2015 of INCODER (the agency that replaced INCORA in 2003 and also maintained its archives). INCODER’s mandate (and archives) were taken over by the newly created Rural Development Agency (ADR). As of early 2019, ADR was reportedly still in the process of organizing INCODER’s archives, and this documentation was not accessible to the public (written communication from ADR to the author, February 13, 2019). I have relied primarily on official INCORA documents scattered across various public libraries as well as on data reprinted in secondary sources such as B. Sánchez (1990).

technical assistance, and marketing support to *parceleros* in both towns throughout that decade. Some of these services—which were offered to *parceleros* on top of the aforementioned services available to rice growers in general—continued to be available after 1978, but INCORA’s programs gradually declined by the end of the decade.⁹³ According to official from INCORA’s Huila office interviewed by Zamosc (1986) in 1979, by that time there were still a few occasional land occupations, but “it’s barely a publicity thing, occupations that last one or two days, until the authorities show up, surround the area and stop food from coming in (...), they give [squatters] a deadline to leave, and they generally accept (...) Invasions don’t lead to much.”⁹⁴ In 1988 there was another wave of acquisitions and parcellations in the context of a short-lived period of agrarian reform reactivation (B. Sánchez 1990, 314),⁹⁵ but it did not spur another period of SSSP in Campoalegre or Palermo.

Explaining the Second Phase of SSSP in Campoalegre and Palermo

Between the 1940s and the 1960s the situation in Huila (and Colombia more generally) in terms of state capacity had changed a great deal. However, it was not exactly a linear progression from a weak state to a stronger one. In the 1960s, the Colombian state found itself seriously debilitated by the partisan confrontation of La

⁹³ Jonathan de la Sierra, “Reforma agraria integral y democrática,” *Campoalegre: Órgano del Centro Municipal de la Historia y la Cultura* 1, no. 4 (1984), 117-118.

⁹⁴ Notes by León Zamosc from interview with Juan Ramírez, INCORA official in charge of land acquisitions for Huila, Neiva, March 1979 (CINEP 2018, 220). The cited document is a compilation of interview and field notes by Zamosc. Since each document has its own separate pagination (and several do not have page numbers), cited page numbers correspond to the PDF file available on the CINEP website.

⁹⁵ At the national level, INCORA experienced a revival of sorts during the administration of Liberal President Virgilio Barco, with the passage of Law 30 (1988), which then came to an end in 1994 due to legislation that sought to replace the state’s direct action with the development of a market for land (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013).

Violencia, especially in terms of its ability to broadcast its authority across territory (A.M. Bejarano and Segura 1996; Oquist 1978). Although the flatlands of Campoalegre and Palermo were not as intensely impacted by La Violencia as more mountainous areas, they were still shaken by the conflict (González 1996a). On the other hand, National Front governments made institutional recovery and strengthening a priority, and state capacity improved considerably—if unevenly, both across territory and policy areas (A.M. Bejarano and Segura 1996)—during this time. This was not the same incipient state of the 1930s, though its territorial reach remained limited.

In terms of the specific kinds of state service provision under study, INCORA was a well-funded and professionally staffed agency, and it had a clear formal mandate to carry out the 1961 agrarian reform law (Hirschman 1965).⁹⁶ Furthermore, even though INCORA's land acquisition and redistribution mission faced severe opposition from landowners and many politicians, the development of irrigation districts was largely uncontroversial and faced little political pushback. In Huila, the Juncal irrigation project was generally well received by larger rice producers and millers.⁹⁷ Infrastructure projects were also the top priority for the agency's first director, Enrique Peñalosa Camargo (Arango 1987). Land improvement

⁹⁶ INCORA's budget amounted to about 4% of the Colombian government's total fiscal revenue (Hirschman 1965, 200).

⁹⁷ For example, the proceedings from a 1965 meeting in Neiva of the Colombian Agriculturalists' Society (SAC)—generally opposed to agrarian reform measures—included an article which celebrates INCORA's irrigation programs for Huila, including the Juncal project, which the commentator argued would generate “strong growth” for the department's agricultural sector. Alberto Serrano Perdomo, “Bosquejo general de la industrialización del Huila,” *Acción Huila: XIII Congreso Nacional Agrario*, *Noviembre 25 a 28 de 1965*, Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia – Comité Seccional del Huila, 30.

projects accounted for around 50% of the INCORA's project expenditures in the 1960s (Vélez 1967).

This combination of increased state capacity, strong political will, and the absence of opposition goes a long way in explaining the initial construction of the Juncal irrigation district, as well as the similarly uncontroversial titling of public lands. However, the period of SSSP under study went well beyond a one-off infrastructure project and scattered allocations of public lands. State capacity, political will, and a lack of opposition cannot adequately account for the dynamics of SSSP in Campoalegre and Palermo during this period. As mentioned above, the expansion of SSSP—going far beyond the irrigation project and entering the realm of enforced redistribution—took place in the 1970s, at a time when political will for agrarian reform implementation was almost nonexistent and opposition by the rural private sector to these measures was at a high point. Empirically speaking, moreover, the alignment of state capacity, political will, and lack of opposition does not even explain the development of campesino rice production in the Juncal district, which, despite those auspicious background conditions, was in fact coproduced by INCORA and project beneficiaries, as explained below. I therefore argue that state capacity, political will, and the absence of opposition should be seen as enabling conditions rather than direct drivers of SSSP. Specifically, what matters most is the extent to which they help to improve interested non-state actors' access to and influence with state elites, incentivize the development of a statist ideational framing, and facilitate the

development of strong organizational structures for collective action. The following subsections explain how this played out in Campoalegre and Palermo.

Coproducing (Narrow) SSSP for Rice Growers

The collaborative provision of services to rice farmers by government agencies and the local branch of Fedearroz is a straightforward example of coproductive local ownership of state power—particularly at a time when agricultural modernization (intensive rather than extensive production systems, increased use of green revolution technologies, etc.) was a high priority for state elites (Kalmanovitz and López 2006; Zambrano 2015).

Fedearroz served as a robust organizational vehicle for rice growers to collectively assist the state in providing credit, research, and extension services. Fedearroz also developed and maintained a shared belief that the state could and ought to provide these specific services to local producers. In contrast to the 1940s-1950s period, their statist framing now went beyond earlier demands for favorable macro-level policies (such as import restrictions or price controls) and focused on the delivery of services on the ground.

Finally, Fedearroz maintained stable access to state elites throughout the period through key allies in both the Liberal and Conservative parties—both nationally and in Huila. The Federation used honorary and executive positions on its board of directors to keep political allies close. Former Liberal President Alfonso López Pumarejo was made honorary president of the Federation in 1958 and

remained so until his death the following year.⁹⁸ His son and future President Alfonso López Michelsen later held a seat on the board of Fedearroz in the mid-1960s, as did future Conservative President Misael Pastrana.⁹⁹ Fedearroz also had several regional politicians it could reliably count on inside the halls of government. For Huila, it had Pastrana (who was originally from Neiva) as well as Liberal Party boss and congressman Alberto Galindo (Gilhodes 1974, 151).

Contention-Enhanced Coproduction of (Broader) SSSP for Poorer Campesinos

The local ownership dynamics behind state services targeted specifically for poorer campesinos were far more complex. They involved three different organizational structures for campesino collective action: the Agricultural Cooperative of Huila (Coagrohuila), community enterprises (*empresas comunitarias*), and the National Association of Campesino Users (*Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos*, ANUC). Although these organizations were run autonomously by campesinos, all three of them were initially created by INCORA and other government entities, so they all had a statist ideational framing in connection with different forms of local service provision at the time of their creation. In addition, their inherent connection with the state also facilitated their access to and influence with state elites. The issue of access, however, calls for more in-depth treatment, so I return to it later.

As part of its mandate under Law 135, in 1966 INCORA promoted the creation of Coagrohuila, which began to operate in 1967. All *parceleros* in Huila were

⁹⁸ “Grande éxito tuvo el VII Congreso Nal. de Arroceros,” *Arroz* 6, no. 72, February 1958, 3-4.

⁹⁹ See the front matter of just about any issue of the Federation’s *Arroz* magazine from 1964 to 1968.

required to become members of the cooperative. Coagrohuila was tasked with distributing farming equipment and inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) at preferential prices, developing marketing schemes in coordination with the government, and administering government credit for *parceleros* (IICA 1979). Although INCORA provided some financial support for Coagrohuila, its contribution only amounted to 3% of its budget, while the rest was provided by its members (INCORA 1972b, 54). Despite receiving operational assistance and being supervised by INCORA, Coagrohuila had administrative independence (thanks in large part by its financial autonomy), and *parceleros* were in charge of staffing the local branch of the co-op.¹⁰⁰ Coagrohuila was (and is still) viewed as the most important provider of credit as well as technological extension and marketing services by *parceleros* in Campoalegre¹⁰¹—but a large portion of these benefits did not originate with the co-op but with state agencies. In El Juncal, Coagrohuila provided marketing assistance and administered INCORA’s supervised credit program for *parceleros* (INCORA 1972a, L-14, L-19). In 1970, for example, it provided funding for about 1,600 hectares of rice and for some sorghum, sesame, and corn crops in the irrigation district (ICA 1974, 165). As such, while INCORA was directly in charge of the irrigation system’s technical aspects and was in charge of the irrigation system’s operation and maintenance through the deployment of an administrative staff made up of 98 bureaucrats (administrators, agronomists, engineers, and attorneys), the overall

¹⁰⁰ Informal conversation between the author and a group of four *parceleros* on the Campoalegre town square, May 18, 2016.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

functioning of the land improvement district as a broader agricultural development project depended on coproductive processes involving both the state and Coagrohuila.

A similar coproductive dynamic was at work with community enterprises. These were campesino farming collectives—associations of *parceleros*—created as a result of a 1969 administrative decision by INCORA to prioritize communal rather than individual land titling (A. Londoño et al. 1975; Liboreiro, Balcázar, and Castellanos 1977; Suárez and Sánchez 1972; Zamosc 1986). The government believed that collective land allocation would help to accelerate reform implementation, contribute to beneficiaries’ economic success, and increase campesino cohesion. INCORA issued collective titles, which “stipulated that the land of the *empresa comunitaria* would remain indivisible for a number of years, that individual parcels could be assigned for family subsistence crops, and that cash incomes should be derived mainly from commercial production undertaken collectively” (Zamosc 1986, 156). Community enterprises received financial assistance from INCORA (mainly for operational expenses), but they enjoyed administrative autonomy (Entralgo, Martínez, and Alarcón 1980; Liboreiro, Balcázar, and Castellanos 1977).

While cooperatives like Coagrohuila were created to provide assistance to farmers, community enterprises’ purpose was directly to run the farms—manage finances, coordinate farm labor amongst *parceleros*, hire seasonal help, and so on. They allowed *parceleros* to take advantage of economies of scale in procuring farm inputs,

setting up communal storage facilities, and marketing their products at harvest time.¹⁰² In addition, they served as vehicles for *parceleros* to coordinate their interactions with INCORA and other government agencies, and to do so from a position of relative strength. Importantly, they also made it possible for *parceleros* to develop strategic relationships with rice millers and with Fedearroz. According to A. Londoño et al. (1975), “millers understood that the creation of community enterprises led to more organized and concentrated product supply, representing higher volumes and fewer sellers.” For Fedearroz, community enterprises also cut transaction costs in the implementation of government-funded rice promotion campaigns.¹⁰³ As of 1977, there were 30 agricultural community enterprises in Campoalegre and 8 in Palermo (Prieto, Zubieta, and Cáceres 1977, 21). That same year, community enterprises accounted for about 35% of Huila’s rice output (51). Community enterprises faced many financial, collective-action, and productivity problems, and, as discussed below, they generally proved to be an unsuccessful solution to the broader problems facing Colombia’s agrarian reform, not only in Huila but in the rest of the country as well (see Zamosc 1986, 165-178). Still, according to Zamosc, Huila was one of the few places in the country where the model was not a complete failure. Either way, during the 1970s they served as a strong organizational vehicle for enabling campesinos’ access to state-provided services.

¹⁰² Author interview with Jorge Valenzuela Ramírez, Armenia, June 4, 2016.

¹⁰³ The Federation often publicized the fact that it counted many INCORA beneficiaries organized in community enterprises among its members. *Arroz* 35, no. 345 (1986), 14.

Finally, ANUC was created nationally in 1967 by President Carlos Lleras Restrepo's initiative.¹⁰⁴ Lleras envisioned ANUC as a corporatist formation to mediate campesinos' relationships with the government while also creating a base of support for the implementation of agrarian reform. According to Zamosc (1986, 50), "[i]f the peasants could be organized and mobilized on a national scale, it would be possible to force the landowners to compromise on land redistribution in the latifundia areas"—such was the underlying logic behind the creation of ANUC. The government played an active role in forming the organization. It launched a public campaign to promote ANUC, featuring several fiery speeches by Lleras about the importance of campesino participation and "co-government" on land reform. At the inauguration of the Juncal irrigation district, for example, Lleras called on *parceleros* to establish a local "association of rural service users" (Lleras Restrepo 1970, 345). He argued that campesino associations would eventually become cooperatives for production, sales, and distribution, but "they will also have to provide support to other aspects of the agrarian reform which are still met with resistance from privileged circles." To support the development of ANUC nationwide, the government also provided funding and training to a team of "promoters" aimed at establishing municipal chapters of ANUC throughout the country (Zamosc 1986, 54-60). By 1971, nearly a million campesinos had been registered as "users" of agrarian reform throughout the country (61).¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Lleras formally established ANUC by Decree 755 (1967), later reinforced by Law 1 (1968).

¹⁰⁵ For perspective, Colombia's rural population in 1973 was 6.7 million (CEDE 2014).

ANUC was indeed intended to play an active role in service provision in coordination with the government. ANUC representatives were to have a seat on the board of INCORA, the Agrarian Bank, ICA, and other government agencies involved in agricultural policy (Zamosc 1986, 64). After the start of the Conservative Misael Pastrana administration in 1970, however, ANUC soon became an almost exclusively contentious organization—and the rice-producing flatlands of Huila were among the main hotspots of ANUC activity. The Pastrana administration was closely aligned with landowners' interests, and it became clear that it did not intend to keep up the pace of its predecessor in terms of agrarian reform implementation. Government officials and allies also frequently expressed disdain and suspicion toward ANUC and even INCORA.

In response, ANUC went on the offensive. Starting at the end of 1970, the organization carried out several demonstrations, including a mass rally in Neiva which involved about 500 campesinos from Campoalegre, Palermo, and other nearby towns and culminated in the occupation of the gubernatorial palace to submit “a list of the estates that should be taken over by INCORA” (Zamosc 1986, 70). This was followed some days later by demonstrations in Palermo. In early 1971, the ANUC leadership officially declared the organization's autonomy from the state. In February, ANUC carried out a coordinated wave of land occupations throughout the country. By the end of the year, there had been 645 occupations, 69 of which took place in Huila (75). “The main focus” of mobilization in that department, Zamosc explains,

“was Campoalegre” (81).¹⁰⁶ As mentioned earlier, 1971 was the year with the highest number of property acquisitions by INCORA in Campoalegre; the agency took possession of six estates totaling almost 5,000 hectares, and distributed them among 185 households (B. Sánchez 1990, 314).

This wave of land “invasions” was a major catalyst for the Chicoral Pact, which marked the end of the national government’s commitment to land reform. Recall, however, that Campoalegre had multiple cases of land redistribution over the 1970s, even after. This was made possible by continued campesino pressure through land occupations and other contentious tactics. Mobilization by ANUC pushed many Campoalegre landowners to take up INCORA’s offers to buy their estates—sometimes they even actively sought out INCORA’s intervention. This was the case with the Ferro family, many of whose estates were occupied and later sold by them to INCORA. According to Jorge Eugenio Ferro, these land sales were “forced, totally forced,” but “the family didn’t resist it (...), we had no interest in fighting it.”¹⁰⁷ Activists associated with ANUC carried out several land invasions in Campoalegre over the 1970s, and several of them led to land acquisitions by INCORA. In turn, most of the parceled properties were then allocated to new community enterprises (Entralgo, Martínez, and Alarcón 1980).

¹⁰⁶ For a non-exhaustive but informative accounting of land occupations in Huila in the 1970s, see Osorio (1996, 357).

¹⁰⁷ Author interview with Jorge Eugenio Ferro Triana, Bogotá, June 7, 2016. The Ferro family willingly negotiated the sale of four estates in Campoalegre between the 1960s and 1970s. Ferro claims that the family saw the sale of these lands in part as “a service to the people.” Years later, ANUC leader Álvaro Durán publicly thanked the Ferro family for their contribution to agrarian reform (Osorio 1996, 353).

Despite its ability to carry out coordinated occupations and force land acquisitions by INCORA, ANUC was marred by serious problems which prevented it from going further and developing contentious local ownership of state power along the lines of Barrancabermeja's popular movement. The organization was weighed down by internal divisions which dated back to the Chicoral Pact in 1972, when ANUC was split into two factions: the radical Sincelejo line and the moderate, pro-government Armenia line (Zamosc 1986). While the Sincelejo line prevailed in most of the country, the Armenia line was organizationally weaker but maintained representation in the government's agricultural agencies. Huila was one of the Armenia faction's national strongholds, though the Sincelejo line retained considerable influence in Campoalegre.¹⁰⁸ These divisions likely limited the organization's potential for inducing even more substantial state intervention on behalf of local campesinos (not to mention for achieving deeper political and social change). Still, local ANUC activists played an important part in supporting SSSP in the localities under study. While Coagrohuila and community enterprises coproduced preferential support for campesino producers in the form of credit, extension services, and marketing assistance, and the development and operation of the Juncal land improvement project, ANUC's frequent mobilization and—equally important—its constant threat of direct action was instrumental in making those services as well as fertile farmland available to a much larger number of beneficiaries.

¹⁰⁸ Notes by León Zamosc from interview with Silvio Hernán Serna, director of campesino organization within INCORA, October 1981 (CINEP 2018, 520).

In terms of access to and influence with state elites, the case of Huila's rice-producing region highlights how such access and influence are largely determined by the interplay between national- and local-level factors and between the government, claimants, and third parties (especially opponents of state service provision). During the 1960s and early 70s, local INCORA bureaucrats in Campoalegre and Palermo often served as points of contact between campesinos and national-level INCORA decision-makers (Zabaleta 2001). During this period, and especially between during the 1966-1970 Lleras administration, state elites were largely committed to the implementation of the 1961 agrarian reform law, so access for campesinos—especially those that were beginning to form users' associations, as was the case in Campoalegre and Palermo (Osorio 1996, 355)—was relatively easy. At this point in time, local landowners did not significantly oppose the implementation of the ongoing agrarian reform. In 1968, Fedearroz general manager, Jorge Ruiz Quiroga (who was also at the time president of the Colombian Agriculturalists' Society, SAC) even expressed “full cooperation” with the campesino organization initiative and celebrated campesino associations' work “to improve living conditions and production methods through technical assistance, provision of inputs at adequate prices, and cooperation to commercialize their products.”¹⁰⁹

The national political climate started to change under President Misael Pastrana and especially after the 1972 Chicoral Pact. As the central government's

¹⁰⁹ “Co-gobierno campesino para los organismos estatales rurales,” *Arroz* 17, no. 175, January-February-March 1968, 8. See also Gilhodes (1974, 41-42).

political will to deploy resources across territory to continue providing agrarian reform services diminished, the burden on local non-state claimants to offset local capacity deficits and induce state service provision became greater. Further threatening campesinos' access and influence vis-à-vis the state, the early 1970s also saw the rise of third-party challengers to their local ownership of state power—namely local landowners intent on preventing campesino invasions of their estates, usually with support from state security forces. In 1974, 50 campesinos were reportedly arrested under accusations of “wanting to invade” an hacienda whose owner, Ramón Alfonso Tovar (son of Sixto Tovar, beneficiary of the Llanogrande parcellation), provided the police with trucks to transport the accused to be arraigned in Neiva (J. Villegas and Rivas 1980, 181). The following year, according to a report submitted by ANUC to Congress, the army had deployed a battalion of 500 soldiers to Campoalegre to put an end to land occupations.¹¹⁰

On the other hand, institutional legacies from the Lleras administration buffered the impact of policy change on the ground and provided some protection from repression to campesinos. Although INCORA's mandate was severely restricted and its budget significantly cut, much of its personnel on the ground remained committed to supporting campesinos. INCORA personnel insisted on serving as mediators during land invasions, which helped to channel local demands to higher-level decisionmakers and buffered campesinos to some extent from repression)

¹¹⁰ “Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos – ANUC: Informe de denuncia...,” *Anales del Congreso* 56, September 29, 1975, 854.

(Zamosc 1986, 103). More specifically in Campoalegre and Palermo, local INCORA bureaucrats sought to make up for the agency's dwindling capacity by bolstering campesinos' own organizations. "It was clear that the reform didn't have a lot of political support, and we were expecting more restrictions to come soon (...) This led us to strengthen the Coagrohuila cooperative, to channel INCORA's services through that organization, and to facilitate *parceleros*' access to its executive board," a former INCORA agronomist explained to Zabaleta (2001, 71). This helped to ensure the continuation of financial, technical, and marketing support for *parceleros* despite the weakening of INCORA's regional offices. In other words, campesinos' access to and influence with state decisionmakers remained significant despite the fact that state elites had made it structurally more difficult.

4.6. By Way of Conclusion

What, then, prompted the decline of these broader forms of SSSP benefiting campesinos in the late 1970s? The main factor was the weakening of campesinos' organizational structures for collective action. While Coagrohuila continued to function effectively (and still does so today), community enterprises and ANUC were all but extinct by the end of the decade. By 1980, there remained only 10 active community enterprises in all of Huila.¹¹¹ While in 1975 about 70% of *parceleros* in Huila were part of community enterprises, by 1988 this figure had dropped to about 20% (Amézquita 1996, 273). The decline of community enterprises is often attributed

¹¹¹ Notes by León Zamosc on interview with Antonio Castillo, INCORA bureaucrat in Huila, October 1981 (CINEP 2018, 520).

to *parceleros*' individualism and lack of collective spirit (Entralgo, Martínez, and Alarcón 1980; Zabaleta 2001). Collective action problems appear to have been common within community enterprises, especially when they faced financial problems. Anecdotes of their members asking INCORA to dissolve them and issue individual titles instead abound, but starting in the late 1970s they were often accused of having links with leftist guerrilla groups and their members were frequently harassed and persecuted by state authorities.¹¹² According to Jorge Valenzuela, a sociologist and former Catholic priest who worked with community enterprises in Campoalegre, the FARC's presence in the neighboring town of Algeciras (on the foothills of the Eastern Cordillera) was growing, and "all things 'communitarian,' anything that sounded like 'collective' caused discomfort among large landowners, they saw it as a threat to their property."¹¹³

Local landowners' opposition to land reform in the early and mid-1970s mostly consisted of individual landowners whose properties were occupied. In 1977, they created the Association of Rural Proprietors, a well-organized, well-funded body which strongly opposed land redistribution and soon developed close ties with Huila's political establishment as well as with national-level rural associations (J.J. González 2014; Osorio 1996, 357-359).¹¹⁴ Landowners' accusations against community enterprises as well as ANUC (which found itself highly debilitated by its internal divisions) led to criminal proceedings and the imprisonment of scores of campesinos.

¹¹² Jonathan de la Sierra, "Reforma agraria integral y democrática."

¹¹³ Author interview with Jorge Valenzuela Ramírez, Armenia, June 4, 2016

¹¹⁴ See León Zamosc's notes from his interviews with four ANUC activists, March 1979 (CINEP 2018, 223).

To make things worse, repression against campesino activists escalated even more after 1978, with the enactment of President Julio César Turbay's "Security Statute," which curtailed civil rights and liberties and increased criminal penalties for offenses such as "unlawful association" or "alteration of public order" (Zamosc 1986, 250). All of this had the double effect of debilitating campesinos' organizational structures for collective action while at the same time undermining their access to and influence with state elites. In a political climate in which the implementation of agrarian reform processes was essentially absent from the government's policy priorities, the threshold for developing local ownership of state power was now completely out of reach for campesino farmers in Campoalegre and Palermo. They were left only with the services channeled through Coagrohuila and with those offered nominally to all rice growers through Fedearroz.

5. THE EBBS AND FLOWS OF STATE SERVICE PROVISION IN EASTERN ANTIOQUIA

5.1. Introduction


Hydroelectric dams are the world's largest source of renewable energy and are seen as being significantly more environmentally friendly than fossil fuels and other non-renewables. Still, they are often associated with involuntary displacement, disrupted livelihoods, and adverse impacts on ecosystems (Khagram 2004; McCully 2001). This chapter studies the development of a hydroelectric complex from the 1960s to the 1980s in the eastern region of the department of Antioquia (see Map 5.1). It focuses on the municipalities of El Peñol, Guatapé, San Carlos, and San Rafael, impacted by the so-called hydroelectric complex of Eastern Antioquia. The Nare/El Peñol-Guatapé, San Carlos, Playas, Jaguas, and Calderas hydropower projects had significant adverse effects on the area that came to be known as the “reservoirs subregion” of Eastern Antioquia,¹ the most dramatic of which was the complete flooding of El Peñol and the forced resettlement of its population. At the same time, the dams and their socioeconomic consequences also contributed to the development of local ownership of state power through an alignment of interests between business elites, activist bureaucrats, and community organizations. This loose coalition helped to bring about a period of sustained state service provision (SSSP)

¹ The reservoirs (*embalses*) subregion also includes the municipalities of Alejandría, Concepción, and Granada (see Map 5.1), but these are not included in the study. Although part of their territory was flooded by hydroelectric reservoirs, they were not transformed as significantly as El Peñol, Guatapé, San Carlos, and San Rafael. Flooded areas were relatively small, population displacement was low, and socioeconomic effects were comparatively minor.

between 1986 and 1994, including a rural electrification program and a novel participatory environmental management and community development scheme.

The rise of local ownership of state power in the reservoirs subregion of Eastern Antioquia was not immediate or automatic, however. At first, neither the company that owned the Nare/El Peñol Guatapé hydroelectric project—Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM), the departmental capital's municipal utility—nor the communities impacted by them called on state authorities to play a more active role in the area. Impacted communities addressed their grievances over the projects' impacts directly to EPM. For its part, EPM called on state authorities to provide police and sometimes military intervention when protests escalated, and it contracted some government agencies to carry out housing and other public works projects, but it resisted any further state involvement in negotiations with affected communities or in regulating their compensation and relocation. Although national and departmental state authorities were not as absent and inactive here as they were in Barranca (Chapter 3), they still adopted a hands-off attitude to the dams' construction and its ensuing conflicts. With few exceptions, EPM and, later on, Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA, which built the San Carlos, Jaguas, and Calderas projects) were the main purveyors of public goods in the area.

Map 5.1.1. Localities Under Study in Eastern Antioquia



Made by the author using QGIS, with shapefiles by IGAC (2018), DANE (2017), and OpenStreetMap (2019) and map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0 (data by OpenStreetMap, under Open Data Commons Open Database License).

The only significant exception was a rural development program run by the national government, which had positive results in some parts of Eastern Antioquia but not in El Peñol or Guatapé (the two municipalities under study that were included in the program). The contrast between El Peñol and Guatapé and the towns where the program was implemented systematically and successfully lends additional support for my argument about the importance of non-state support coalitions for state provision of public goods in contexts of limited state capacity.

As protest movements in the dam-impacted towns grew and developed connections with each other and with social movements from the broader Eastern Antioquia region, thus increasing pressure on the political and economic establishment, the energy companies—along with other business elites in the region—began to favor a more substantive role for the state in local public goods provision. In 1983, a new national government agency tasked with promoting social and economic development and managing natural resources in the region—the Rionegro Nare Regional Autonomous Corporation (CORNARE)—was created. CORNARE, which might be characterized as a “pocket of effectiveness” (Geddes 1994; Roll 2014), brought about an unprecedented groundswell of state activism in the region and generated significant improvements in the local population’s living conditions.

I show that these programs’ effective implementation from 1986 to 1994 is attributable to the rise of demands for local public goods by non-state actors endowed with a *strong organizational structure* who also espoused a *statist ideational framing* and whose demands were supported by a small cadre of activist bureaucrats with significant *access*

to and influence with national state elites—i.e., what I have termed *local ownership of state power*. In this case, such local ownership was mostly coproductive in character, but it was also supported indirectly by contentious mobilization in two important ways. CORNARE’s programs, led by a team of young regional development experts, relied on the active participation of grassroots-level civil society organizations, but they also enjoyed support from influential business elites. Both of these elements were owed in part to a long wave of contentious mobilization that culminated in the rise of the Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia (hereafter, CMEA). Such mobilization not only pressured business elites to support increased state action in the region but also contributed to the development of a thicker, more autonomous civil society with significant organizational capacity for the coproduction of public goods. State service provision declined after 1994, mainly as a result of institutional reforms at the national level. Still, some of it endured largely thanks to some continued local elite support. Table 5.1 summarizes the evolution of state service provision in the reservoirs subregion of Eastern Antioquia across different periods and scores each period in terms of the theory’s explanatory variables.

Table 5.1. Evolution of State Service Provision in the Reservoirs Subregion of Eastern Antioquia

	<u>Strong Organizational Structure</u>	<u>Statist Ideational Framing</u>	<u>Access and Influence with State Elites</u>	<u>State Service Provision Outcome</u>
Pre-1970	No	No	No	Episodic
1970-1978	Yes	No	No	Episodic
1978-1986	Yes	Yes	No	Episodic
1986-1994	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sustained
Post-1994	No	Yes	No	Episodic

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides some background on Eastern Antioquia and its place in the national and departmental political economies, and a historical overview of the region's hydroelectric dam development and its socioeconomic impact. Section 5.3 details the historical role of the state in the region. It shows that, until the mid-1980s, the Colombian state mostly left public goods provision in the hands of energy companies. The only significant exception was a rural development program coordinated by the national government; however, the program was short-lived and its results for the area under study were mixed. Section 5.4 then describes the design and implementation of CORNARE's rural electrification and environmental management activities and their welfare impact in the region. Section 5.5 then explains what made this period of sustained state provision possible. It documents CORNARE's creation and program implementation and argues that it was explained by the alignment of elite and grassroots interests, which were in turn set in motion by two decades of contentious mobilization in reaction to hydropower's impact. Section 5.6 concludes.

5.2. Eastern Antioquia's Political Economy and the Advent of Hydropower

The eastern region of Antioquia department is located on the foothills of the Central Cordillera, between Medellín (the departmental capital) and the Magdalena Medio region. It is made up of 23 municipalities which can be clustered into four

large subsections.² One is the so-called *altiplano* (“high plateau”) area, also known as *oriente cercano*, or “near east,” which contains two mid-size urban centers: Rionegro and Marinilla, located about 50 km east of Medellín. The near east has a long history of economic and institutional integration; both Rionegro and Marinilla were important urban centers during colonial times and remained so after independence. Eastern Antioquia also has two large rural clusters: one to the south, known as the *páramos* subregion (associated with the town of Sonsón), and another one to the east, colloquially referred to as *oriente lejano*, or “far east.” The “far-eastern” cluster in turn has two separate subregions, the *bosques* (forests) area and the *embalses* (reservoirs) subregion. El Peñol, Guatapé, San Carlos, and San Rafael—the municipalities under study—are part of the latter. This section provides a historical overview of the region’s political economy and the origins and impacts of the hydroelectric complex.

From Agrarian Crossroads to Colombia’s Powerhouse

Until the 1960s, the area known today as the reservoirs subregion of Eastern Antioquia was a predominantly rural area, made up of scattered small towns, mostly dependent on small-scale peasant agriculture, and only weakly connected to national markets (Codesarrollo 1966; C.I. García and Aramburo 2011; L. Villegas 1988). Like Campoalegre and Palermo in Huila, El Peñol, Guatapé, San Carlos, and San Rafael were founded long before the development of the new economy under study. The foundation of El Peñol and San Carlos dates back to the colonial period, while

² These four subdivisions were initially proposed as part of CORNARE’s regional development plan and have since entered common usage.

Guatapé and San Rafael were founded in the 19th century.³ Still, when plans for hydropower development were announced in the 1960s, the area remained relatively insulated, reliant on small-scale peasant agriculture, and it had never experienced any major economic booms. Though some of its small-scale agricultural production was traded locally or in Medellín, most of it was for local consumption (Codesarrollo 1966; J.G. Uribe 1989). Until the early 20th century, the region's place in the departmental and national economies was mostly defined by its location along the Juntas and Isalitas bridle roads which connected the capital of Antioquia (first Santa Fe and then, after independence, Medellín) to the Magdalena River, the main link between the Colombian interior and global markets via the Caribbean Sea (A.E. Giraldo 1996; F. Gómez 1989; Parsons 1997). Then the region experienced a major economic decline when the Antioquia Railroad, which ran through the northeastern region of the department and was completed in 1929, replaced the Isalitas road as the most efficient link between Medellín and the Magdalena River. This downturn drove many to migrate away from the area and served to consolidate its insularity until the 1960s (F. Gómez 1989, 22).

The towns under study were thus not as “new” as Barrancabermeja, and not as distant from national centers of power as Huila, but they have been part of what

³ El Peñol, located nearest to the colonial villa of Marinilla, was the site of an indigenous reservation until 1821, so the colonial state's agents routinely visited the town to collect tributes (Aramburo et al. 1990a, 22-23). San Carlos was one of four outposts established by the Spanish Crown in the less populated parts of the province of Antioquia in the late eighteenth century in the context of a push to expand the agrarian frontier and advance internal colonization (Aramburo et al. 1990c, 23-24). Guatapé had been part of El Peñol and was established as a separate municipality in 1867 (Aramburo et al. 1990b). San Rafael was founded in 1871 near a gold mining settlement and moved about one kilometer to its current location in 1905 (Aramburo et al. 1990d).

Clara Inés García (2013, 41) calls “a center’s periphery”—a relatively isolated area within one of the country’s most economically and politically powerful regions. Being part of Antioquia and its proximity to Medellín has placed the region in a relatively more advantageous position compared to rural peripheries in other parts of the country. At the same time, the “far east” of Eastern Antioquia has functioned—and is commonly perceived by its own population—as a kind of extractive periphery for Medellín, a producer of electricity and food for the city, fueling its growth but also bearing the brunt of its negative externalities (C.I. García and Aramburo 2011).⁴

Medellín’s industrialization and urban growth over the first half of the 20th century, compounded by forced displacement from rural to urban areas in the context of La Violencia, led to skyrocketing demand for electricity by the middle of the 20th century. The hydroelectric potential of the Negro and Nare rivers in Eastern Antioquia had been documented since the 1920s, but it was not until the 1950s that actual prospecting began (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1989, 61-63).⁵ In 1960, EPM announced its plans for the Nare hydroelectric project (later renamed Guatapé project), which would require the flooding of large swaths of land in the municipalities

⁴ In addition to the hydroelectric projects that affected the municipalities under study, other parts of Eastern Antioquia were also impacted by major infrastructure projects in the second half of the 20th century. A new highway from Medellín to the Magdalena River (known as the Medellín-Bogotá highway) was built between 1966 and 1982 through Guarne, Marinilla, El Santuario, Cocorná, San Luis, and Puerto Triunfo, south of the reservoirs subregion. Rionegro was the site of a new international airport and export-processing zone designed to serve Medellín. These projects are often cited alongside hydropower development as examples of exogenous forces that have transformed the region without local input and with little consideration about their negative externalities (R.E. Arcila 1986; C.I. García and Aramburo 2011).

⁵ Medellín’s municipal utility and the industrialists pushing for hydroelectric power generation in the earlier part of the century chose to develop other hydropower projects in northern Antioquia instead of the Negro and Nare Rivers basin (Ospina 1966; see also L.A. Gómez and Espinal 2010).

of El Peñol and Guatapé (Ospina 1966, 555; Sáenz 1988, 108). The entire municipal center of El Peñol and about one-third of Guatapé's would be completely submerged, along with considerable parts of both municipalities' rural areas, to make room for the Guatapé reservoir. The announcement was followed by a loan application to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1963, which was approved with the Colombian government as guarantor (IBRD 1964).⁶ Preparatory works began that same year. The dam gates were closed in 1970, and the first stage of the project became operational in 1972 (IBRD 1974); its second and final stage was completed in 1980 (World Bank 1981).

Further studies were commissioned in the 1970s to assess the viability of additional dams and power stations downstream from the Guatapé project outlet. Civil works for the San Carlos hydropower project, designed to take advantage of the currents from the Guatapé River as well as the nearby San Carlos River, began in 1978, also with World Bank funding (World Bank 1979). This new project—which would come to produce three times as much energy as the Guatapé facility—was intended to provide energy not only to Medellín but to the country as a whole and was owned and run by the public corporation Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA).⁷ The first and second stages of the San Carlos project were completed in 1984 and 1987, respectively. ISA also built two smaller dams and powerhouses (Jaguas, between

⁶ Additional funding was obtained from the National Financial Corporation (*Corporación Financiera Nacional*), a private entity owned by Medellín-based industrialists (Ospina 1966, 568), as well as part of a loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to the Colombian government's agency for hydropower generation (Committee on Foreign Relations 1969, 690).

⁷ ISA was created in 1967 and its shareholders were the national government (through the Colombian Institute of Electrical Energy) and various regional energy companies, including EPM.

San Rafael and Alejandría, and Calderas, between San Carlos and Granada) and EPM built the Playas project on the Guatapé River between San Rafael and San Carlos, all of which became operational in 1988 (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1989).⁸ Together, these projects make up the so-called hydroelectric complex of eastern Antioquia, which has a generating capacity of almost 2,177 MW.⁹ When the complex was completed, this represented more than 26% of the country's total hydroelectric generating capacity (Ministerio de Minas y Energía 1990, 9); as of 2018, it still amounted to 19.9% (Ministerio de Minas y Energía 2018, 79).

Hydropower's Socioeconomic Impact

In addition to the flooding of El Peñol and parts of Guatapé, the Guatapé hydroelectric project also caused boomtown-like sociodemographic shocks such as high inflation, a spike in floating population, clashes between locals and newcomers, and increased prostitution in both towns (Cardona 2007; F. Gómez 1989; Tarazona 2016). Construction work often resulted in damaged buildings and infrastructure. Land purchases in impacted zones also stirred up tensions. A major source of conflict involved the intermediaries hired by EPM to acquire rural properties, who were repeatedly accused of defrauding local smallholders (Hoyos 1994; A. López 2014). The use of coercion to pressure residents to sell was also common.¹⁰ In both towns,

⁸ The Calderas and Playas projects were partially financed by the World Bank (World Bank 1991, 1993). The Jaguas project was funded by the Inter-American Development Bank.

⁹ The San Carlos station generates 1,240 MW, El Peñol-Guatapé 560 MW, Las Playas 200 MW, Jaguas 170 MW, and Calderas 7.4 MW (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1989, 88).

¹⁰ "Engineers working with *Empresas Públicas* showed up with policemen and a bulldozer at my dad's farm and offered him about 10% of what the land was worth," recalled José Nevardo García, coordinator of the Historical Museum of El Peñol (interview, El Peñol, March 2, 2017).

some of the most fertile lands were flooded or otherwise occupied by EPM, which led to a decline in agricultural production and limited the kinds of products that could be grown in the area, all of which severely impacted the population's livelihoods. In El Peñol, commercial coffee crops and small-scale livestock raising disappeared almost entirely, and the locality went on to become highly dependent on abundant but not always profitable tomato monocrops (Oliveros and Palacio 1989).¹¹ Property tax revenues also decreased in both municipalities because the flooded terrains and the properties occupied by the hydropower infrastructure, unlike homes, private businesses, and farmlands, were not taxable (Codesarrollo 1971; Ramos and Ruiz 1986).

The San Carlos, Playas, and Jaguas projects had similar impacts on San Carlos and San Rafael (Aramburo et al. 1990c, 1990d; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016a; B. Giraldo 1986; Olaya 2012). Although none of these projects required the flooding of entire municipal centers as was the case in El Peñol, they still represented major sociodemographic and economic shocks that upended these towns' traditional agrarian and artisanal mining communities. Land acquisitions were also highly contentious. The projects' construction forced at least 2,853 residents of both towns to relocate (Ministerio de Minas y Energía and ISA 1994, Table 3.1-1). At the same time, thousands of construction workers hired by the energy companies arrived (about 7,000 in San Carlos and at least 1,000 in San Rafael) and were followed by an

¹¹ Coffee crops returned to El Peñol in 1990, with support from the National Federation of Coffee Growers (Forero 1993).

even greater number of migrants seeking economic opportunities in both towns. As a result, the population of San Carlos grew by 45% (from 18,356 to 26,616) between 1973 and 1985; in San Rafael, the population jumped from 12,479 to 18,866 (51% growth) during the same period (CEDE 2014; DANE 1986). The cost of living also skyrocketed, the existing infrastructure proved insufficient for the population boom, and both towns experienced rapid cultural changes—from changing gender and other social norms to increased drug use and prostitution—that were unwelcome by many (B. Giraldo 1986; Olaya 2012; Pimienta and Villegas 1985). In San Rafael, whose population was historically dependent on riverbed gold mining, dam construction impacted the livelihoods of many and was a major source of conflict (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016a). On the one hand, construction work forced some miners to abandon their usual worksites, but, on the other, it also exposed previously untapped veins, thereby attracting further mining activity in restricted areas, which in turn led ISA to call for police and military intervention. As Section 4 will discuss, all of these impacts motivated the emergence of a regional civic movement which contributed indirectly (and to some extent unintentionally) to the enhancement of state public goods provision in the reservoirs subregion of Eastern Antioquia between the 1980s and 1990s.

5.3. State (and Non-State) Provision in Eastern Antioquia before CORNARE

When hydroelectric projects were first announced in Eastern Antioquia, the Colombian state was not as absent and inactive in the area as it was in Barranca

before the start of oil production. However, as I show in the first part of this section, its role in local public goods provision was limited and episodic until the mid-20th century. The impact of hydropower development prompted increased attention to the region by state elites, but the Colombian state's actual role in terms of provision on the ground remained limited and sporadic, paling in comparison to energy companies' involvement. I discuss the role played by EPM and ISA in the second part of this section. I show that, despite their formal status as part of the state apparatus (insofar as both companies were public enterprises), their role in public goods provision was substitutive of the state rather than delegative. I highlight that this displacement of the state by entities that were formally its agents was due largely to the absence of a statist framing surrounding local public goods provision among all relevant parties (state elites, energy companies, and local communities). Finally, in the third and last subsection, I go over the only considerable (but still partial) case of state service provision in Eastern Antioquia before the time of CORNARE: a rural development program known as DRI, which was launched by the national government in part of the region (including El Peñol and Guatapé) in the late 1970s. Through the DRI program, some local farmers had access to some support to develop commercial crops, and a number of infrastructure projects were carried out. However, the implementation of the program's various components was irregular and unsystematic—public works were few and far between, technical assistance and training were limited, and marketing support was virtually nonexistent. The only significant form of sustained state provision through the DRI program was access to

credit in El Peñol. I argue that the DRI program's uneven implementation in the municipalities under study was largely due to the absence of a strong local non-state support coalition.

The Colombian State's Episodic Provision in Eastern Antioquia before the 1980s

By the 1960s, when hydropower development began, El Peñol, Guatapé, San Carlos, and San Rafael all had their own municipal governments as well as operational public schools, some public health facilities, and some public services infrastructure (though the quality of these amenities was questionable) (Codesarrollo 1966; Díaz 1972; B. Giraldo 1986; OFISEL 1976; Reye et al. 1969; Urrea 1986). These services were gradually developed over the course of several decades, in some cases going as far back as the mid-19th century. Investments would be made to provide discrete welfare-oriented public goods (for example, a health clinic or a library), often complemented by private contributions or community fundraisers, and at times public funds were allocated for their continued operation (Zapata 1941). Community support for government projects continued to be essential well into the 1970s, as exemplified in 1976 by the construction of the first rural water system in El Peñol, in the rural hamlet of Guamito: the departmental government provided technical assistance and most of the construction materials, and the community put in the labor and some additional materials.¹² Alternatively, state authorities would agree to provide funds to maintain or expand a project that had originally been developed

¹² See J.N. García (1997), which reprints an article originally published in *Horizontes* magazine (no. 9, April, 1976).

by the community or private actors. For example, the first public school of El Peñol was built thanks to a fundraiser organized by the town's mayor in 1838 and maintained through local residents' donations for several decades, until the departmental government agreed to fund it (Díaz 1972, 109-110).

Maintenance of these public goods was uneven. Complaints about the quality of education, healthcare, and public services were frequent. The public schools of El Peñol were overcrowded and understaffed, whereas the town's private schools were in significantly better condition (Codesarrollo 1966).¹³ In 1964, the public water system only reached 14.8% of households, and public sewage coverage was 13.3% (DANE 1969, 84-85). Residents of Guatapé complained about the inadequacy of the local health clinic and called for a larger hospital, the town's schools were overcrowded, and the electricity, water, and sewage systems had limited coverage and functioned poorly (Comité del Nare 1966; Reye et al. 1969). The situation in San Carlos and San Rafael was comparable (B. Giraldo 1986; OFISEL 1976).

State-Owned Enterprises Substituting for the State

Hydropower development brought many new public goods to these localities, in large part as a result of affected communities' contentious mobilization (as discussed in Section 4). But the public goods that served as compensation for the impact of hydroelectric development were provided directly by EPM and ISA. The role of the Colombian state's service delivery agencies was secondary and, with few

¹³ This report emphasizes that the schools were located in inadequate buildings, as one used to be a jail and the other one was part of a cemetery.

exceptions, always mediated by the energy companies. This was largely due to the fact that neither the companies nor the local communities regarded the state as responsible for (and perhaps not even capable of) the provision of new local public goods to address the impacts of hydropower development (i.e., a statist framing was absent on both sides).

In El Peñol, where the old town center was completely destroyed and its population was forced to relocate, EPM funded the construction of a new town outfitted with homes, government buildings, a school, a medical care unit, a church, parks and sports venues, a marketplace, a slaughterhouse, roads, and other infrastructure (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1979; see also Aramburo et al. 1990a; Aramburo et al. 1990b; L.A. Gómez and Espinal 2010). In Guatapé, which was also partially flooded, the company built some homes, roads, a water system for the town center, and other public works (Codesarrollo 1982; Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1979). In both of these towns, the company also funded new agricultural, fish farming, and tourism projects and provided vocational training to the local population.¹⁴ EPM also made significant investments in rural electrification in El Peñol, Guatapé, and San Rafael. In San Rafael, EPM also paid compensations to gold miners whose livelihoods were disrupted by the dam and provided funds for the construction of new schools, local and inter-municipal roads, and various other public works projects,¹⁵ while ISA also invested in rural electrification, schools, and other public works, both

¹⁴ The company's expenditures in these towns are listed on leaflets published by EPM titled "Presencia en el Oriente Antioqueño: Nuevo Peñol" and "Presencia en el Oriente Antioqueño: Guatapé" (undated, on file with the author).

¹⁵ EPM, "Presencia en el Oriente Antioqueño: San Rafael" (undated, on file with the author).

there and in San Carlos (ISA 1985, 48). As discussed below, rural electrification investments by EPM and ISA in dam-impacted areas were required by a law passed by the Colombian Congress in 1981 (Law 56).

Since both EPM and ISA were state-owned enterprises, the Colombian state might be said to have contributed to the provision of these public goods through its ownership of the companies. Yet its involvement in this sense was merely formal. Like Ecopetrol, both companies were “autonomous commercial entities,” and their involvement in public goods provision in the region is best interpreted as substitutive of the state rather than delegative, as discussed in Chapter 2. EPM was (and continues to be) the publicly owned municipal utility of Medellín, and it had no formal jurisdiction over public goods provision outside that city.¹⁶ Despite its official status as a public company, in practice EPM has been a more complex and ambiguous kind of entity, with deep roots in as well as enduring informal connections with Medellín’s private sector.¹⁷ As for ISA, it was created as a “state industrial and commercial enterprise” jointly owned by the national government’s Colombian Institute of

¹⁶ This point is only qualified by the fact that EPM was *permitted* by law to enter into contracts with municipalities outside Medellín to provide electricity, telephone, water, and sewerage services (Decree 1816, 1955), and the company signed electrification and energy provision agreements with a number of municipalities (most of which were either in the immediate vicinity of Medellín or located near the company’s power generation plants). In these cases, EPM coordinated with Electricadora de Antioquia, the departmental energy utility, to ensure that neither company would duplicate the other’s activities (F. Botero and Villegas 2000, 48).

¹⁷ Its status as a public but autonomous commercial entity was a product of industrialists’ lobbying efforts, backed by international financial institutions’ suggestion that the company would be more likely to secure international funding for its projects as an independent corporation, free from government intervention (F. Botero and Villegas 2000; J.C. López 2003; Ocampo and Dover 2006). Furthermore, throughout EPM’s existence as an autonomous commercial entity, there has been a clear revolving door between its executive positions and Medellín’s industrial and financial sectors; the same can be said of ISA.

Electrical Energy (ICEL) and various public (but also autonomous) regional energy companies, including EPM. ISA's mission was to interconnect regional electrical systems and develop new hydropower infrastructure, and its involvement in other kinds of public goods provision was strictly conceived of as a matter of "community relations" (ISA 1977, 4; 1985, 48).

The only way in which state agencies other than the energy companies were directly involved in providing compensation for dam-impacted localities was, paradoxically, not as agents of the national or departmental governments but as a sort of contractors to the energy companies. For example, the Colombian state's housing agency—the Institute for Territorial Credit (ICT)—played a central role in the construction of the new El Peñol. It built 419 homes and provided mortgages to enable the old town's residents to acquire them (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1979, 49). But it did not do so as part of an independent government housing program but as a contractor for EPM, not unlike the private architecture and urban design firms that planned the new town's layout or the construction firms that built roads, a water supply system, and other public works. The homes were built through an ICT program known as *plan de trabajadores* (workers plan), designed for companies to partner with the ICT to build homes for their workers (INURBE 1995, 194). The Colombian state's direct contribution was limited to providing partial subsidies through the ICT's budget for beneficiaries' mortgages, which were also partially defrayed by EPM. Similar but smaller schemes in which EPM paid state agencies to provide specific services in El Peñol also involved the national government's Institute

for School Buildings and the Antioquia department's public health, education, and agriculture agencies, among others (Tobón Villegas 2007; see also Cardona 2007, 186-187).

Government agencies, for their part, did not always accept such arrangements with energy companies. In the context of El Peñol's relocation, EPM sought assistance from the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA), the agency in charge of parceling out and titling public lands and supporting campesino agriculture, with land distribution for the town's rural population. Juan Fernando Mesa, a lawyer and sociologist who served as advisor to the municipality of El Peñol in negotiations with EPM, recalls a meeting with the director of INCORA, which was attended by representatives from EPM and El Peñol: "After a very long meeting, [the director of INCORA] said, addressing the Empresas Públicas commission, 'You created the problem, you fix it.' And he didn't want to intervene."¹⁸

Overall, authorities at both the national and departmental levels of government adopted a hands-off attitude toward dam-related conflicts and compensations. This did not mean they were neutral, however. Declarations of support from governors of Antioquia and national government authorities for the hydroelectric projects were frequent (see, e.g., A. López 2014, 73, 141), and they gave the energy companies significant leeway in handling conflicts with communities (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 1977, 5). The governor of Antioquia from 1976 to 1978, Jaime Sierra García, illustrates this point: "I told him, 'Look, Dr. Calle, you can

¹⁸ Author interview, Medellín, March 23, 2018.

name whomever you want as mayor of El Peñol. If you want a military mayor, or if you want a calm guy, you just name him according to your needs” (López de Calle 1995, 75). Since mayors were not directly elected but appointed by the governor of Antioquia, they were not accountable to the local population but to higher levels of government. Far from serving as advocates for local communities, they are mostly remembered for their role in persecuting activists and repressing protests.¹⁹

Despite being formally part of the state apparatus, state-owned energy companies lacked a statist framing in connection to local public goods provision. Far from it, they kept the rest of the Colombian state at arm’s length from areas impacted by hydroelectric projects—sometimes as an unintended consequence of their local influence, but at other times deliberately. An example of the former was the fact that dam-affected municipalities were excluded from government rural electrification programs in the 1970s because their electrical service was not provided by the department of Antioquia’s electric utility but by EPM.²⁰ But sometimes EPM would also actively block or delay certain government projects in its area of influence, as was the case with a project to repair and pave the road that connected Guatapé, El Peñol, and Marinilla in the late 1970s, which EPM opposed for “reasons of national interest” (Codesarrollo 1982, 21).²¹

¹⁹ Author interview with Father Francisco Ocampo, Marinilla, March 1, 2017. See also R.E. Arcila (1986); C.I. García (1992); Olaya (2012).

²⁰ El Peñol, Guatapé, and San Rafael were not included in the national government’s rural electrification program in the 1970s or in the electrification component of the DRI rural development program (discussed in the next subsection).

²¹ The road would only be completed in the late 1980s in an effort led by CORNARE. EPM funded part of the project through betterment levies (*tasas de valorización*). “Pavimentarán carretera Marinilla-El Peñol-Guatapé,” *Enfoque Regional: Publicación de la Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare* 1, no. 1, p. 9.

The company also resisted institutionalized government regulation of its hydroelectric projects. In the 1960s, some members of the Colombian Congress sought to pass legislation regulating dam development and companies' responsibility for compensating and relocating affected communities. The existing regulatory framework, which dated back to a 1928 law, was vague and full of loopholes and ambiguities.²² In addition to the nascent tensions in El Peñol and Guatapé, hydroelectric projects in Guatavita (near Bogotá) and in the department of Valle del Cauca had prompted discussions on the subject. EPM banded together with two other state entities—Bogotá's municipal utility and the Regional Autonomous Corporation of Valle del Cauca (which was developing several hydroelectric projects in that department)—to oppose a bill which would have required companies to relocate impacted communities without exception, barring the possibility of compensating individual households without playing an active role in their relocation (J.C. Rodríguez et al. 2000, 246-247). The bill failed to pass, and hydroelectric development and its socioeconomic impacts remained without a clear, comprehensive regulatory framework until the 1980s.

But even when a comprehensive regulatory framework was finally established with the enactment of Law 56 of 1981, energy companies continued to be the main

²² Law 113 of 1928 gave "the Nation" (the state) ownership and usage rights over rivers, waterfalls, and other currents that may be exploited for hydropower generation; authorized it to confer licenses or permits to subnational governments or to third parties (Articles 4 and 5); and established that the state, or hydropower developers licensed by the state, must "make arrangements" with "the owners of riverside properties" and "persons who are using the water" (Articles 6 and 7). It did not contain any provisions about compensations for, let alone relocation of, other impacted individuals or communities. I thank Juan Fernando Mesa for calling my attention to this legislation.

providers of public goods in dam-impacted localities. According to C.I. García (1992, I-36-37), the most important catalyst for the bill's passage was the World Bank's issuing of new policies regarding the impacts of bank-funded development projects.²³ In 1980, the Bank published its Operational Manual Statement on Social Issues Associated with Involuntary Resettlement (World Bank 1980). The guidelines called on governments to prevent involuntary displacement as much as possible, develop a clear and systematic resettlement plan, and ensure that impacted communities were sufficiently compensated. Accordingly, Law 56 included detailed provisions about the compensations owed to impacted local residents.²⁴ But the responsibility for providing these compensations rested with energy companies, not with state agencies formally in charge of social provision. Law 56 led to an increase in municipal governments' revenues by requiring energy companies to pay local property and corporate (*industria y comercio*) taxes as well as a compensatory fee for property tax revenue losses, but this did not lead to a significant increase in public goods provision by the local governments of the towns under study.

Law 56 also required energy companies to invest a 4% share of all gross electricity revenues in rural electrification (2%) and conservation projects (2%) in the municipalities impacted by their power generation and transmission projects (Law 56, 1981, Art. 12). The most notable result of this measure was an increase in rural electricity coverage in the towns under study, especially El Peñol and Guatapé. As


²³ Recall that nearly all of EPM's and ISA's hydroelectric projects were financed by the World Bank.

²⁴ "Proyecto de Ley Número 60 de 1980," *Anales del Congreso*, No. 66, October 9, 1980, pp. 912-915.

shown in Figure 5.1, levels of access to the public electricity grid in these towns jumped from 3.7% and 7.6% (respectively) in 1973 to 88.1% and 71.4% in 1985. But the investment and infrastructure development that made this possible was done almost exclusively by EPM. Under Law 56 and the presidential decree that regulated it, firms such as EPM and ISA had broad discretion about how to invest the obligatory 4% share of electricity revenues. They were simply required to develop an investment plan which had to be submitted to (but not necessarily approved by) the Ministry of Mining and Energy, and the plan's execution was to be supervised (but once again not necessarily approved) by the departmental government.²⁵ EPM's discretion was reflected in its prioritization of El Peñol and Guatapé over San Rafael—where the company faced significantly less contentious pressure—when it came to its rural electrification investments (also reflected in Figure 5.1). As discussed in Section 5.4, San Rafael's electricity coverage would only be leveled with that of its neighbors when rural electrification responsibilities were transferred from energy companies to CORNARE.

²⁵ Decree 2024 of 1982.

**Figure 5.1. Access to the Public Electricity Grid in Rural Areas
(census years, 1951-1985)**



Sources: DANE (1955a, 1969); CEDE (2014)

Earlier iterations of the bill that would later become Law 56—proposed by congressmen Gilberto Salazar Ramírez (originally from El Santuario) and Gustavo Duque Ramírez (who started his political career as a Marinilla councilman)—stipulated that companies must pay the electricity revenues fee directly to municipalities.²⁶ One version specified that municipalities ought to invest 70% of these revenues in education, healthcare, housing, public works, or industrial projects.²⁷ However, none of these bills were ever brought up for a vote, and these provisions were ultimately replaced by the scheme that gave companies the authority to invest these funds at will. The statist framing espoused by congressmen Salazar and Duque had little resonance at this time. These lawmakers also played an important role as access and influence brokers for local demands before national state elites. In addition to the World Bank's pressure, the enactment of Law 56 was also facilitated

²⁶ See, e.g., *Anales del Congreso*, No. 11, August 4, 1978, p. 168; No. 75, November 21, 1978, p. 1129; No. 124, December 3, 1979, p. 1845.

²⁷ *Anales del Congreso*, No. 75, November 21, 1978, p. 1129.

by the support it received starting in 1980 from a new Minister of Mining and Energy—Humberto Ávila Mora, a native of Tenza, Boyacá, a town impacted by ISA's Chivor hydroelectric project, and personal friend of Gilberto Salazar Ramírez.²⁸ However, the local demands these lawmakers transmitted to national state elites were not aimed at attracting increased state service provision. Local communities were not particularly interested in government agencies taking on a more active role in public goods provision. Instead, companies were expected to provide goods and services directly, and, if anything, the Colombian state should compel them to do so. A letter from community leaders of El Peñol to the governor of Antioquia from September 1978 is illustrative of this attitude and is thus worth quoting at length:

We are simply demanding that the Colombian state meet its obligations toward us, citizens of this very same state. Our rights have been violated, we are suffering from harm and injustice, and it falls upon the state to remedy this situation. The government has been instituted to protect the lives, honor, and property of its citizens (...) We know well that the harm that we have suffered, and which we will continue to endure in the future, in this specific case, derives from erroneous policies of Empresas Públicas de Medellín. But that entity is not the government, nor does it have authority or jurisdiction, even if it has occasionally usurped them. (A. López 2014, 177-178)

The missive then includes three appendices which detail various ways in which the local population has been impacted by dam development and put forth multiple demands in connection to rural schools and country roads (repairs, relocation, and new constructions). Yet the letter continues:

²⁸ Author interview with Father Francisco Ocampo, Nare project chaplain and former parish priest of Guatapé and El Peñol, Marinilla, March 1, 2017.

It is true that the large majority of the solutions to our problems will have to come from Empresas, and this must be demanded of them. But let the state be the one that imposes its sovereignty and orders the remedies. (178)

A former manager of EPM noted in his report to the company's board of directors that the involvement of state service delivery agencies caused tensions with the community of El Peñol (Tobón Villegas 2007). When EPM announced that the ICT would be in charge of home construction, many locals protested because they associated this agency with low-income housing projects—"houses for poor people, tiny houses that were far from what they wanted."²⁹

An Uneven Rural Development Program

Starting in 1976, two of the localities under study (El Peñol and Guatapé) were included as beneficiaries of the first stage of the Integrated Rural Development (DRI) program. This program was the mainstay of the national government's agricultural policy following the end of land reform processes in the early 1970s (Grindle 1986; A. Martínez 1986). Coordinated by the national government and partially funded by the World Bank, the DRI program sought to improve living conditions in the countryside by providing small-scale agricultural producers access to technical assistance and training in the use of green revolution technologies,³⁰ credit, and marketing support while simultaneously investing in local infrastructure and social services (Arango et al. 1987; Grindle 1986; Vargas del Valle 1994; World Bank 1987). However, state

²⁹ Interview by Paula Andrea Cardona with Jaime Tobón Villegas, May 17, 2007 (Cardona 2007, 90).

³⁰ The green revolution refers to the adoption (starting in the 1940s-50s) of new technologies to increase agricultural production, including the introduction of high-yielding crop varieties and the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation systems, and machinery (see Grindle 1986, 60-61).

service provision under the DRI program in Eastern Antioquia was highly uneven across time and space—and, in the towns under study, it was especially irregular. Due to funding constraints, Guatapé's inclusion was only partial: the DRI program coordinated the construction of some rural water systems and provided some farm credit, but the municipality was not included in the program's technical assistance program (Arias et al. 1991, 85; Codesarrollo 1982, 47). In El Peñol, the program provided significant farm credit, but the implementation of other program components such as technology transfers and training, commercialization support, physical infrastructure, and health and education programming was highly intermittent. The program's mixed results indicate that national government interventions in contexts of limited local state capacity are clearly possible in the presence of resources and political will, and they can have some meaningful impact. However, they also suggest that the absence of local ownership of state power complicates their sustained implementation and limits their overall potential, thus lending additional support for my argument.

By “rescuing” smallholders from “backwardness,” “making them productive,” and “incorporating them to the national market,” the DRI program aimed to slow down rural migration to urban areas by “creating jobs in the countryside, where it is easier and less costly to do so” (DNP 1978, 1, 7-8). It was launched as the flagship development strategy for the Colombian countryside by the administration of Alfonso López Michelsen following the interruption of the country's incipient land reform efforts. The program did not carry out projects and investments directly but instead

was responsible for channeling resources and coordinating the work of different national- and department-level agencies.

The Rionegro or Eastern Antioquia district—of which El Peñol and Guatapé were part—was one of 26 DRI districts in different parts of the country.³¹ It was considered the most successful case of DRI implementation in the country (Arango et al. 1987; Fajardo, Errázuriz, and Balcázar 1991; World Bank 1987, 13). The project area was made up of the near-eastern high plateau municipalities of Eastern Antioquia plus a small number of towns in more distant parts of the region.³² The localities selected for inclusion district were traditional small-scale food producers which were deemed promising in terms of the potential for productivity improvements through technology transfers and new marketing schemes (considering, especially, their proximity to Medellín as a strategic market for food products) (Piedrahita 1981).³³

³¹ These districts were part of five larger program areas encompassing nine departments and 338 municipalities (M. Uribe and Donoso 1978, 53). DRI regions were selected based on “the concentration of farms of 20 hectares or less and low productivity, but with the potential to expand through the introduction of appropriate technology” (Grindle 1986, 216). In addition to the World Bank, other DRI regions received funding from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency.

³² Officially, the Rionegro district encompassed 18 municipalities: all of the near-eastern ones plus El Peñol, Guatapé, Concepción, Cocorná, Granada, and Sonsón (Piedrahita 1981; M. Uribe and Donoso 1978, 55). However, funding constraints meant that the program was only fully implemented in a subset of them, most of them in the near east (Arias et al. 1991; M. Uribe and Donoso 1978, 78). San Carlos and San Rafael were initially considered for inclusion in the district but were ultimately excluded (Echavarría, Niño, and García 1978). Years later, in the 1990s, San Rafael was included as a DRI beneficiary, but actual service delivery through the program was meager. Although it was not officially a DRI beneficiary, San Carlos benefited from a fish farming project co-managed by CORNARE (discussed later).

³³ The high plateau municipalities had already been targeted in the early 1970s by the national government for an agricultural promotion plan (the Eastern Antioquia Program, *Programa del Oriente Antioqueño*, POA) through the Colombian Agriculture and Livestock Institute (ICA), aimed at increasing productivity through the use of new technologies (ICA 1972). ICA carried out some hybrid corn seed

Although some national-level evaluations showed that DRI beneficiaries had, on average, higher yields and higher incomes than the national average (Vargas del Valle 1994), and the program helped to bring investment in infrastructure and social programs to DRI districts, its ultimate achievements in terms of raising rural productivity and addressing poverty in the Colombian countryside were limited (Grindle 1986; Urrutia, Durán, and Baquero 2017). Arango et al. (1987, 16) found that the DRI program's systematic implementation was limited to a five-year period between 1976 and 1981 (though in Eastern Antioquia it only began in earnest in 1977).³⁴ Funding for the original DRI districts, including Eastern Antioquia, began to dwindle in the early 1980s due to government-wide budget cuts as well as the program's expansion to several new regions (Arango et al. 1987, 263-264; A. Martínez 1989). The DRI program was also weakened in 1983 by its administrative transfer from the National Planning Department (a well-known pocket of effectiveness within the Colombian state apparatus) to the Ministry of Agriculture (a comparatively weaker and politicized entity) (Barón, Ferro, and Osorio 1996; Kalmanovitz and López 2006, 178; Urrutia, Durán, and Baquero 2017; Vargas del Valle 1994). Although the program recovered partially after it was granted some autonomy from the minister in the mid-1980s, additional reforms further reduced the program's impact in the original districts over the following years by continuing to stretch its

research in El Peñol in the early 1970s, but the municipality was not part of the POA area (Tobón 1974). The DRI program was envisioned as a continuation and expansion of that earlier effort (Fajardo, Errázuriz, and Balcázar 1991).

³⁴ This was due to coordination problems between the different agencies involved, many of which did not request DRI funds for the first year of operations (Echavarría, Niño, and García 1978).

limited budget thinner across the country's territory and then, in the late 1980s, by transferring most of the responsibility for the DRI program's execution to municipal governments.³⁵ In addition to subjecting the program to clientelistic influences, the program's decentralization impacted smaller, poorer, and more distant municipalities the most (Barón, Ferro, and Osorio 1996, 90; Blanquer and Fajardo 1991)—and that included those in the Eastern Antioquia district farthest from Medellín, such as El Peñol.

The DRI program represented an increase in local state intervention in Eastern Antioquia in the form of support for small-scale agriculture through farm credit and extension services and new public infrastructure, especially small country roads and rural electrification. However, the program also had some shortcomings. The agricultural extension component had a mixed record. In addition to being unavailable to more than half of the district's municipalities, the high and volatile prices of fertilizers and pesticides (most of which had to be imported from abroad) meant that systematic adoption in the region was limited. Evaluations also found no significant productivity gains linked to technology adoption (Arango et al. 1987).

More importantly for the purposes of this study, benefits from the DRI program in Eastern Antioquia were mostly concentrated in the comparatively

³⁵ Various reforms were passed between 1985 and 1987. Direct assistance to producers was prioritized over more broadly targeted public goods (Urrutia, Durán, and Baquero 2017). Then, starting in 1988, municipalities now had authority to design and implement their own programs, while the national-level DRI Fund co-financed local investments and provided technical and administrative assistance (Barón, Ferro, and Osorio 1996). Regional DRI offices were shut down in 1992, and the program was effectively dismantled in 1996 (Urrutia, Durán, and Baquero 2017, 20), though it continued to exist formally until 2003.

wealthier, more integrated near-eastern high plateau and spread comparatively thin in the rest of the district (including El Peñol). Technical assistance activities to promote the proper use of high-yielding seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides only began in El Peñol in 1980 (Arias et al. 1991, 101). Throughout the period, they were mostly concentrated in the near east. For example, 91.7% of the program's group training sessions in Eastern Antioquia were held in three high-plateau municipalities: Marinilla, El Santuario, and Rionegro (Arango et al. 1987, 276). The availability of agrochemicals in the absence of sufficient training programs seems to have been problematic in El Peñol, where many farmers used them excessively and inefficiently, and several cases of poisoning due to pesticide misuse were reported (Oliveros and Palacio 1989, 82-83). Towns like El Peñol also found themselves at a disadvantage because they did not have any government stores offering subsidized prices on inputs (A. Martínez 1989; Oliveros and Palacio 1989; Tobón 1981, 270).

Both El Peñol and Guatapé benefited from the construction of a number of rural water systems, but these were few and far between, and the program's infrastructure projects were not always in line with local priorities. For instance, the DRI program had planned to build a water system in the rural hamlets of La Meseta, Concordia and La Héliida in El Peñol, but community leaders rejected it; their priority was access to electricity and country roads and believed these would not be developed if the water system was built (Forero 1993). Meanwhile, the DRI program's involvement in rural electrification in El Peñol and Guatapé was virtually nonexistent because these towns were not served by the department of Antioquia's electric utility

but by EPM, which was not involved with the DRI program in Eastern Antioquia.³⁶

Marketing support—the DRI program’s weakest component nationwide (Fajardo, Errázuriz, and Balcázar 1991; World Bank 1987)—only functioned effectively in connection to dairy products, the production of which was concentrated in high-plateau towns such as Rionegro, La Ceja, and La Unión (Arango et al. 1987). Outside of this, attempts to rationalize transportation and commercialization of agricultural products through government coordination failed, and producers continued to rely on a long and costly chain of intermediaries (especially in more distant areas like El Peñol), which had a significant impact on farmers’ finances, often cancelling out the benefits that had resulted from other program components (Oliveros and Palacio 1989).

Finally, the more rural and administratively weak towns—like El Peñol—were especially impacted by the program’s decentralizing reforms in the mid-1980s. According to a former director of the regional DRI office in Antioquia, the bulk of the program’s benefits in the region were attributable to the local intervention of national-level government agencies and, to some extent, the government of Antioquia’s department of agriculture.³⁷ With few exceptions, municipal governments had little or no capacity to administer the DRI program’s various components.

The only DRI component that was delivered consistently in El Peñol throughout the 1980s was agricultural credit, which did not demand as much

³⁶ Author e-mail communication with Jaime Piedrahita Yepes, former director of the regional DRI office for Antioquia, November 30.

³⁷ Author e-mail communication with Jaime Piedrahita Yepes, December 1, 2018.

administrative capacity as technology transfers, training, or marketing. DRI credit contributed to the expansion of commercial tomato crops (which became the town's main cash crop after its relocation)³⁸ and some other products. Even so, DRI credit was restricted to title-holding landowners, so renters, sharecroppers, and those without formal land deeds—altogether a significant share of farmers in El Peñol—were not eligible.³⁹ Credit provision through DRI ended in 1988 (Machado 1993).

What explains the DRI program's uneven record in El Peñol and similar municipalities? The absence of a strong non-state support coalition in a context of limited state capacity arguably complicated the sustained and systematic implementation of the program's multiple components, especially the most logistically and bureaucratically challenging ones, such as agricultural extension and training and marketing support, and even public works and health and education services. The government's implementation of these program components in El Peñol was not completely inconsequential, but it came and went intermittently, which limited their transformative potential—and it also diluted the effect of farm credit (the only part of the program that was delivered consistently).

³⁸ DRI work on tomato promotion received a boost in the late 1980s through a joint project between ICA and CORNARE (J.E. Jaramillo 1988).

³⁹ Holding a land title was not required for access to credit in other parts of the country, but the Caja Agraria (the agency in charge of administering DRI credit) had the authority to set specific requirements at the municipal level (Machado 1993, 122). In El Peñol, land titles were required (Oliveros and Palacio 1989, 96). At least 30% of the town's farmers were renters or sharecroppers, and many of those who claimed to own their land lacked formal titles (Arango et al. 1987, 280; Oliveros and Palacio 1989, 81, 96). By contrast, rental, sharecropping, and other forms of tenancy were much rarer in high-plateau municipalities; in El Santuario, for example, it was merely 2% (Duque et al. 1984, 254). Overall, according to a former director of the regional DRI office for Antioquia, the main beneficiaries of DRI agricultural programming were not the poorest *campesino* producers but the wealthier program users (e-mail communication, November 30-December 1, 2018).

By contrast, in high-plateau municipalities like Rionegro, Marinilla, El Santuario, Guarne, El Carmen de Viboral, or La Ceja, the DRI program's implementation was much more constant and systematic. It was largely thanks to the program's success in this part of Eastern Antioquia that this district is seen as the most successful DRI experience. Some of these towns (such as Rionegro or Marinilla) enjoyed higher levels of local state capacity than those located farther away from Medellín, but this alone cannot explain the program's success in more distant towns like El Carmen de Viboral or La Ceja. A crucial factor was the fact that high-plateau towns also had thicker non-state support coalitions backing the program's various components, largely as a function of the organizational strength of program beneficiaries in the that subregion as compared to El Peñol. Industrial food companies based in Medellín, Rionegro, and nearby towns supported research and technology transfer activities and commercialization efforts in high-plateau towns.⁴⁰ By contrast, the DRI program in El Peñol received no contribution of any kind from EPM. Program beneficiary associations were also much more numerous and robust in the near east than in more distant municipalities. In 1985, the national government promoted the creation of the National Association of DRI Program Beneficiaries (ANDRI). As of 1991, however, El Peñol and Guatapé did not have any local ANDRI presence, while all but one near-eastern municipality (Rionegro) did (Fondo DRI & DANE 1993, 277).⁴¹

⁴⁰ These included the snack company Noel and the dairy companies Colanta, Proleche, and Pakita (Arango et al. 1987; Ríos et al. 1993).

⁴¹ Earlier on, the DRI program had a community strengthening component aimed at promoting

Eastern Antioquia's experience with the DRI program underscores the fact that state elites are far from powerless when it comes to designing and implementing social programs for areas where state capacity is limited. A strong combination of resource allocation and political will can go far. However, exactly how far it can go is determined significantly by the availability of local non-state support coalitions. In particular, systematic and sustained public goods provision by the state in the absence of both state capacity *and* non-state local ownership of state power is likely to be short-lived.

5.4. A Regional Pocket of Effectiveness: CORNARE

In 1983, the Colombian Congress created the Rionegro Nare Regional Autonomous Corporation (*Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare*, CORNARE), an agency tasked with promoting social and economic development and managing the natural environment in Eastern Antioquia.⁴² CORNARE was put in charge of administering the 4% share of gross electricity sales that energy companies must invest in rural electrification and environmental protection within its jurisdiction,

stakeholder participation and organization. Through hamlet committees (*comités veredales*) and municipal committees, DRI beneficiaries were consulted about local needs in terms of infrastructure and social services and were expected to oversee the program's execution (Arango et al. 1987; Blanquer and Fajardo 1991). Although Arango et al. (1987) report that there were many of these committees in Eastern Antioquia, they were not evenly distributed across the region (Lopera et al. 1988, 183). Historical evidence from El Peñol and Guatapé also suggests that in these towns they were not very active or influential; local *campesino* organizations were mainly dedicated to dealing with the impact of hydropower development (C.I. García 1992). Hamlet committees were reformed in 1979 to remove the requirement that their members be DRI program beneficiaries, which was aimed at addressing *campesinos'* organizational fragmentation, but it also meant that such committees were no longer exclusively devoted to accompanying, overseeing, or supporting the program's implementation (Arango et al. 1987, 262).

⁴² Law 60 of 1983. CORNARE has jurisdiction over the 23 municipalities that make up Eastern Antioquia, plus three additional municipalities (Puerto Triunfo, San Roque, and Santo Domingo).

which consisted of the 23 municipalities that make up Eastern Antioquia, plus three other municipalities located on the Negro and Nare Rivers basin (Puerto Triunfo, San Roque, and Santo Domingo) (Law 60 of 1983, Art. 11). This meant that EPM and ISA thus could no longer spend these monies at their own discretion but had to pay them to CORNARE.

CORNARE was modeled after the Regional Autonomous Corporation of Valle del Cauca (CVC), itself fashioned after the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and inspired by developmentalist regional planning ideas (see Orihuela 2018). In addition to its rural electrification and environmental protection mandates, the agency's duties as part of its broad regional development mandate were manifold (Art. 4). It was tasked with leading a regional planning exercise (aimed at diagnosing the region's biophysical, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics and laying out plans for long-term sustainable development). It was in charge of carrying out irrigation, drainage, flood control, and land rehabilitation projects and, in coordination with other government agencies, contributing to the improvement of the local communications and transportation infrastructure. It was also responsible for supporting the implementation of the DRI program in the region and for providing technical support to local governments in the drafting of their own development plans.

CORNARE can be characterized as a "pocket of effectiveness" within the Colombian state apparatus: in an environment in which very few other public organizations function well, this agency was comparatively very effective at providing

the goods and services it was mandated to provide (Geddes 1994; Roll 2014), especially between 1986 and 1994. As part of its mandate, CORNARE prepared a regional development plan for Eastern Antioquia and each of its four subregions through a multi-year participatory process and provided technical assistance to municipal governments aimed at modernizing the local state apparatus. It made major investments in the region's transportation, communications, and public services infrastructure,⁴³ and it developed partnerships with other state agencies to support and often coordinate their work in the region. In San Carlos, for example, CORNARE partnered with the DRI Fund to support and develop a fish farming research and production center.⁴⁴ In El Peñol, it supported a research project on tomato pest and disease control led by the Colombian Agriculture and Livestock Institute (ICA), which contributed to the rise of tomatoes as El Peñol's top agricultural product (J.E. Jaramillo 1988). In addition to its role in development promotion, CORNARE also acted as the region's environmental agency, and it went on to be recognized as one of the country's strongest and most effective environmental agencies.⁴⁵

⁴³ "Esta es nuestra presencia en la Región," *Enfoque Regional: Publicación de la Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare*, Year 1, No. 4 (1987), pp. 11. See also CORNARE (1993).

⁴⁴ The project had been started by the DRI Fund and the National Institute for Renewable Natural Resources and the Environment (INDERENA)—the national government environmental agency prior to the creation of the Ministry of the Environment—in 1978, but it soon languished due to lack of central government funding (Orrego and Isaza 1994). CORNARE signed an agreement with the DRI Fund, and the program was resumed in 1986.

⁴⁵ According to Manuel Rodríguez, former head of INDERENA and the country's first Minister of the Environment, CORNARE (along with three other regional autonomous corporations) developed environmental management programs that were far more effective than the INDERENA's own programs (M. Rodríguez 1994, 26). CORNARE was also cited as a model for the development of environmental institutions in Latin America in a World Bank research note (Tlaiye and Biller 1994).

In this chapter, I focus on two of CORNARE's most transformative accomplishments: its rural electrification program and its environmental management through service exchange scheme, known as PRISER. Through CORNARE's electrification program, rural areas in the towns under study reached near-universal electrical coverage rates. On the environmental side, CORNARE's natural resource management scheme not only had significant results in terms of environmental restoration and conservation but also resulted in the construction of rural public works projects and community-level through an innovative "service exchange program" (Programa de Intercambio de Servicios, PRISER). This program functioned as a precursor to today's widespread payment for ecosystem services schemes while also emphasizing grassroots participation and community development. From the start of its operations, the agency made community participation a pivotal component of all its programming (CORNARE 1986, 50-55).

At the end of 1993, a law was passed to create a Ministry of the Environment and a new National Environmental System (Law 99, 1993). CORNARE's innovative experience administering payments from energy companies and investing them in electrification and environmental protection served as a model for the new law (M. Rodríguez and Uribe 1995), which now required all companies nationwide (not only those in CORNARE's jurisdiction) to pay compensatory fees to the government rather than investing them directly and at will. But this same law also reformed regional autonomous corporations and stripped them of their regional development mandates. It left them only with their environmental protection and oversight

functions and changed their status from national government agencies to subnational entities under the control of departmental and municipal authorities. CORNARE remained a strong environmental agency, and the PRISER program continued, but the agency's service provision activities were significantly cut back starting in 1994. The next two subsections describe CORNARE's rural electrification and environmental management activities and their welfare impact.

Electrifying Eastern Antioquia

Electrifying the countryside is no easy feat. The socioeconomic benefits of electricity—ranging from new economic opportunities and considerable productivity growth to improvements in public health, safety, and overall quality of life—cannot be overstated. Still, almost 23% of the world's rural population remains without access to electricity today (World Bank Open Data 2018). Extending grids to distant areas with dispersed populations is costly and logistically challenging, and it is often further hindered by political considerations—clientelism, special interests, and corruption (Kale 2014; Min 2015). These considerations underscore the significance of the expansion in electricity coverage that took place between 1986 and 1994 through CORNARE's rural electrification program in the rural areas of El Peñol, Guatapé, and especially San Carlos and San Rafael, where coverage rates rose from 33% and 23% to almost 90%.

In Colombia, the earliest systematic rural electrification programs began in the 1950s in the hinterlands of Bogotá, followed in the 1960s by electrification campaigns aimed at preventing revolutionary movements in other regions (De la

Pedraja 1993). In 1951, only 4.2% of all rural homes were connected to the public electrical supply system (DANE 1957). By 1973, this figure had only gone up to 13.7% (CEDE 2014). The first national government-run rural electrification plan was designed that same year and executed starting in 1976, funded with loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (Instituto Colombiano de Energía Eléctrica 1975, 1980).

In Eastern Antioquia, the departmental government's electric utility (Electrificadora de Antioquia) and its subsidiary firm Circuito Eléctrico de Oriente were responsible for the implementation of the national rural electrification plan in most of the region (with the exception of El Peñol, Guatapé, and San Rafael, whose electrical services were provided by EPM, as discussed in Section 5.3). However, by the Minister of Mining and Energy's own admission in 1980, these programs' full implementation had limited results in the aggregate.⁴⁶ Rural electricity coverage at the national level only grew to 38.3% in 1985 and 53.5% in 1993 (CEDE 2014).

As required by Law 60 (1983), which gave birth to CORNARE, 2% of all gross electricity sales originating in the region had to be paid to this new agency to fund rural electrification projects (the remaining 2% paid to CORNARE was earmarked for environmental conservation). CORNARE was thus responsible for developing and executing a long-term investment plan aimed at achieving universal electrical coverage. However, the law and the executive decrees that regulated CORNARE's duties only stipulated that electrification efforts should prioritize the

⁴⁶ *Anales del Congreso*, No. 66, October 9, 1980, p. 915.

municipalities impacted by hydropower development. They did not specify how exactly electrification projects ought to be implemented—which technical criteria ought to govern which specific localities would benefit, how funds should be invested, and so on (CORNARE 1985). In other parts of the country, this lack of regulation and oversight made it possible for local politicians to capture electrification funds and use them strategically for clientelistic purposes and resulted in unsystematic infrastructure development and meager improvements in coverage (see, e.g., De la Pedraja 1993, Ch. 13). In Eastern Antioquia, politicians were also eager to take advantage of electrification funds for electoral purposes.⁴⁷ Yet CORNARE limited their ability to do so.

The agency adopted a much more technical and systematic approach to its rural electrification mandate than EPM and ISA had done before. It began by commissioning studies with four Medellín-based engineering firms to conduct a study of its jurisdiction in order to map the existing power infrastructure and identify all the areas without electrical service (CORNARE 1989). Based on this assessment as well as on a consultation process across every municipality within the agency's jurisdiction,⁴⁸ a team of engineers from the Water Resources graduate program at the School of Mines of the National University's Medellín campus developed a detailed

⁴⁷ Author interviews with Juan Felipe Sánchez, former director of CORNARE (1989-1990), Bogotá, March 15, 2017; and Humberto Díez, former director of the social area at CORNARE, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

⁴⁸ “We did participatory electrification plans (...) We tried to empower people about electrical energy. Just like they provided electricity to the rest of the country, they should at least have a say about which part of their homes they wanted power to go through” (author interview with Humberto Díez, former director of the social area at CORNARE, Rionegro, March 24, 2018).

investment plan consisting of 956 specific infrastructure projects itemized at the submunicipal (*vereda*, or hamlet) level (Manjarrés, Smith, and Valencia 1990). These projects would ensure full electrical coverage in the agency's rural jurisdiction, and their development was scheduled to last until 1996 (CORNARE 1989).

CORNARE's electrification efforts, which were funded by half of the 4% fees paid to the agency by energy companies, closely followed this plan.⁴⁹ The plan came to be known as the Global Plan for Rural Electrification. As a former director of CORNARE explains, the plan was instrumental in helping the agency to manage attempts at political interference:

This or that politician would show up at the office and asked to meet with [the agency's director], and the reason was that he wanted to say that the [power] line should go through this or that hamlet. Whenever that happened (...), we had a map of the entire region, which had the entire electrification plan, from year X until ten years later. So when a politician showed up and told us, "I need this or that," and tried to pressure the director, they or I would tell them, "Which hamlet, again? Oh, look, it's marked in red: in three years from now. Or it's in green: it's planned for this year."⁵⁰

A few investments that were not part of the technical plan were carried out. A former CORNARE official admits that the electrification program was not altogether immune to political influence: "We had a rule that I called the 90-10 rule: 90% [had to be] well planned but leave me 10% in case I need to maneuver and ensure the Corporation's survival. There was always some pressure."⁵¹ According to the

⁴⁹ In addition to the fees paid by energy companies, some projects were also funded by their direct beneficiaries. "Plan global de electrificación rural: avances y proyectos," *Enfoque Regional*.

⁵⁰ Author interview with Juan Felipe Sánchez, Bogotá, March 15, 2017.

⁵¹ Author interview with anonymous former CORNARE official, date and location withheld to maintain anonymity.

engineers that prepared the electrification plan, projects that were developed “for political reasons” were very few (Manjarrés, Smith, and Valencia 1990, 88).

Between 1986 and 1993, CORNARE carried out 310 electrification projects in the 26 municipalities under its jurisdiction, reaching an estimated 12,446 homes (CORNARE 1993, 35). Nearly half of these homes (48.87%) were located in the four municipalities under study (see Table 5.2). Special efforts were directed at San Carlos and San Rafael,⁵² which had seen few coverage improvements under the energy companies’ electrification activities before the creation of CORNARE (as discussed in Section 3). As shown in Figure 5.2, rural electrical coverage in San Carlos went up from 33% to almost 90% between 1985 and 1993. In San Rafael, it grew from 23% to 87.8%. The program also built on EPM’s earlier investments in El Peñol and Guatapé: by 1993, 97.1% of all rural homes in El Peñol and almost 90% in Guatapé had access to electricity.


Table 5.2. Number of Homes Electrified by CORNARE's Rural Electrification Program (1986-1993)

Municipality	Newly electrified homes
El Peñol	329
Guatapé	307
San Carlos	3,474
San Rafael	1,972
TOTAL	6,082

Source: CORNARE (1993, 35)

⁵² “En marcha programa de electrificación rural,” *Enfoque Regional: Publicación de la Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare* 1, no. 1, p. 11.

**Figure 5.2. Access to the Public Electricity Grid in Rural Areas
(census years, 1985-2005)**



Source: CEDE (2014)

EPM played a pivotal role in the implementation of the Global Plan, specifically in the construction of power infrastructure to electrify the rural parts of El Peñol, Guatapé, and San Rafael (the towns impacted by its El Peñol-Guatapé and Playas hydropower projects).⁵³ However, it now did so as a contractor for CORNARE and in the context of this government agency’s systematic service provision plans. This came in sharp contrast to the earlier schemes in which EPM employed Colombian state agencies to carry out its compensatory and community relations investments, as discussed in Section 3. CORNARE also contracted with the Department of Antioquia’s electrical utility, Empresa Antioqueña de Energía (EADE)—formerly known as Electrificadora de Antioquia—to build power infrastructure for San Carlos and other towns.

CORNARE’s electrification activities came to an end after Law 99 (1993) took away regional autonomous corporations’ regional development mandate and

⁵³ “En marcha programa de electrificación rural,” *Enfoque Regional*, p. 11.

transformed them into environmental regulatory authorities. The law transferred almost all service provision responsibilities to municipal governments.⁵⁴ As a result, CORNARE was not able to finish implementing its Global Plan for Rural Electrification. The agency's last rural electrification projects were completed in 1994.⁵⁵ Subsequent electrification efforts were uneven. As shown in Figure 5.2, rural coverage rates continued to improve in El Peñol, Guatapé, and San Rafael, but they suffered a decline in San Carlos despite the fact that this town actually experienced negative population growth between 1993 and 2005 due to a forced displacement crisis (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2011b).

Environmental Protection through Service Provision: The PRISER Model

The second pillar of CORNARE's mandate had to do with environmental conservation, restoration, and management, with funding from the fee paid by energy companies (the remaining half of 4% of gross electricity sales generated in the region). When CORNARE representatives set out to investigate communities' environmental needs as part of the agency's conservation mandate, they found that environmental issues were not seen as a priority: "We the technicians needed to plant trees, but the community didn't want trees."⁵⁶ Community leaders were calling for schools, roads, crop collection centers, and similar needs that were seen as more pressing than conservation. Despite its broad regional development mandate, CORNARE's

⁵⁴ Corporations retained some responsibility for developing infrastructure required for the purposes of environmental conservation or decontamination (Blackman, Morgenstern, and Topping 2006, 53).

⁵⁵ Although the agency's electrification mandate ended as of January 1, 1994, some projects that had already been funded were completed during that year. "Hechos y balance del ambiente – CORNARE 1994," *Enfoque Regional: Publicación de la Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare* 8, no. 18, p. 7.

⁵⁶ Author interview with Humberto Díez, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

authority over service provision in the region was narrow. In addition to rural electrification, it was charged with helping to improve the region's communications and transportation infrastructure and carrying out public works for irrigation, flood control, and the like (Law 60, 1983, Art. 4). When it came to other policy areas such as education, healthcare, access to water, and social programs, responsibilities continued to fall upon municipal governments. Yet the actual implementation of these responsibilities by traditional subnational authorities was highly uneven and inadequate, especially in rural communities. CORNARE thus faced a tension between its future-facing mandate and communities' immediate needs. In the words of a former CORNARE official, "We faced two questions: How could we turn the future into something that was present? And how could we turn environmental projects into something like a universal currency? (...) That's how we came up with PRISER."⁵⁷

PRISER—which stands for *Programa de Intercambio de Servicios*, or Service Exchange Program—consists of environmental restoration and conservation activities carried out by community groups in exchange for CORNARE funding for local development projects (Díez et al. 1989; Prada and Álvarez 1988). The model can be seen as a precursor to payment for environmental (or ecosystem) service (PES) schemes, which grew in popularity around the world in the mid-1990s.⁵⁸ PES models are market-based mechanisms designed to translate “non-market values of the

⁵⁷ Author interview with Humberto Díez, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

⁵⁸ In the Latin American context, the earliest implementer of formal PES schemes was Costa Rica, which developed a countrywide PES program in 1997, building on earlier market-based reforestation schemes dating back to 1986 (Pagiola 2008).

environment into real financial incentives for local actors” to perform environmental conservation or restoration activities (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). First implemented in 1987, PRISER was one of the first economic instruments for environmental management in Colombia,⁵⁹ and it continues to function to this day.

CORNARE’s institutional emphasis on grassroots participation and community development was at the center of the PRISER scheme. The program’s participatory emphasis was inspired by a belief that “the failure of environmental management in Colombia” was due to an approach that was “technocratic,” “paternalistic,” and solely focused on biophysical considerations, as opposed to a more social and human-centered approach (Díez et al. 1989, 19, 22). Both the environmental services performed by the community and the local development projects funded in return by CORNARE were to be selected through participatory processes, and the implementation of local projects also required active community involvement, usually in the form of labor. CORNARE provided technical support and training for community groups on both ends of the process (environmental management as well as development projects). According to one of the designers of the PRISER scheme, this was part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening local organizations: “PRISER was designed for environmental management as well as

⁵⁹ The only comparable scheme that existed before PRISER was the Integrated Watershed Recovery Program (*Proyecto Integrado de Recuperación de Cuencas*, PRIDECU), developed by INDERENA in 1976. Under PRIDECU, INDERENA paid cash incentives to individuals in certain parts of the country for reforestation and fish farming projects (M. Rodríguez and Uribe 1995).

social capital development.”⁶⁰

Community-run environmental activities included reforestation, tree care, and forest ranger programs, seed and seedling management, river and stream cleanup, small construction projects (such as protective fencing around water sources, riverbank protection structures, septic tanks, or sanitary landfills), garbage collection, recycling, composting, and sanitation programs (CORNARE 1993; Díez et al. 1989). Community conservation and restoration activities involved technical training programs as well as environmental education campaigns. Some of them also created new income-generation opportunities for communities, such as demonstration farms, agroforestry, forest grazing, and fish farming projects. Local development projects supported by CORNARE in exchange for communities’ environmental activities were all highly local in scope and included rural water and sewerage systems, country roads, upgrades and repairs to local school buildings, crop storage facilities, parks, community centers, and public sports venues. Project execution often relied on significant community involvement, mainly through labor. In addition to funding projects with revenue from the fees paid by energy companies for environmental management, CORNARE provided technical assistance with support from more specialized government agencies.⁶¹

Rural communities in El Peñol were among the first adopters of the PRISER model. In September 1987, community associations from the hamlets of

⁶⁰ Author interview with Humberto Díez, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

⁶¹ “Intercambio de servicios: Apoyo a proyectos de la comunidad,” *Enfoque Regional: Publicación de la Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare*, Year 1, No. 4 (1987), pp. 1, 8.

Chiquinquirá, La Meseta, and El Chilco signed a PRISER contract with CORNARE for an environmental project involving reforestation, cleaning up roadside drainage ditches, and building septic tanks in exchange for funding for a rural water system covering all three localities (Forero 1993, 82). The project was completed in 1989. Community groups planted 29,000 trees, cleaned up 3 km of roadside ditches, and built 132 septic tanks. The water system that was funded through this scheme—with additional support from the departmental and municipal government⁶²—served 315 homes and continues to function as of this writing as a community-run service. Between 1987 and 1993, there were 140 PRISER projects across CORNARE's jurisdiction.

PRISER was scaled down in 1994 after CORNARE was stripped of its regional development duties and its mandate was focused more narrowly on environmental management and regulation. It was replaced as the agency's flagship program with a celebrated pollution fee system, a market-based scheme for reducing waste discharges to the Negro River: instead of imposing fines, businesses were charged a fee for their emissions, and the program has had positive results (Blackman 2009). Still, the PRISER scheme continues to exist to this day. In addition, it served as inspiration for a public-private partnership with Bancolombia bank, BanCO2, in which businesses offset their ecological footprint by paying communities for forest restoration and conservation activities (CORNARE 2016).⁶³

⁶² In 1991, the water system received additional funding from the National Federation of Coffee Growers. These hamlets had begun growing coffee in 1990.

⁶³ See <http://www.banco2.com>.

5.5. Explaining CORNARE's SSSP in Eastern Antioquia

What made CORNARE's rural electrification and PRISER programs possible? The agency was structured as a "decentralized entity," a national-level body with subnational authority rather than a municipal or departmental agency. It was affiliated with and overseen by the National Planning Department, though it enjoyed budgetary and administrative autonomy. This institutional design, which combined central oversight with subnational autonomy, made it possible for the agency to be created in the face of regional politicians' reticence to national encroachment while also helping to protect it from capture by those same politicians. But the agency's autonomy was also made possible by a network of grassroots organizations which bought into and supported CORNARE's programs.

This section explains how the development over the course of several years of a loose statist coalition involving urban industrialists, activist bureaucrats, social movements, and community organizations enabled both the creation of this new agency and the effective implementation of the programs under analysis, in turn bringing about a period of SSSP in El Peñol, Guatapé, San Carlos, and San Rafael. It first addresses the evolution of regional elites' preferences about the role of the Colombian state in the region from the 1960s until the creation of CORNARE in 1983. Then it deals with the dual role played by popular sectors: first as a disruptive, contentious force that paved the way for more substantive state intervention by loosening regional elites' long-established anti-statism, and then as a coproductive ally that played a major role in the implementation of CORNARE's programs.

The Slow Development of Regional Elites' Reluctant Statism

As discussed in Section 3, energy companies' attitude toward the state's involvement in their area of influence in Eastern Antioquia was a reticent one, especially on the part of EPM. This position was generally shared by Antioquia's broader political and economic establishment, whose anti-statism dated back to the 19th century (Soifer 2015). Antioquia's elites' historical antipathy toward the national government had been tempered over the 20th century with the development and consolidation of EPM and Medellín's rapid industrial growth, which was owed to a large extent to protectionist measures enacted at the national level (F. Botero 1996; N. Restrepo 2011). Their resistance to state intervention was challenged even further by a strong preoccupation with migration from rural to urban areas (Franco 2006), which motivated some departmental government regional development initiatives and inspired some receptiveness toward the DRI program.⁶⁴ Still, resistance to direct central government intervention in Antioquia endured.

What, then, led Antioquia elites to not only embrace the creation of a central government agency like CORNARE in Eastern Antioquia but also to accept its authority to collect, administer, and invest the funds paid by EPM and ISA for rural electrification and environmental conservation? The institutional design put forth by

⁶⁴ An example of the former was the CASER project promoted by the regional Conservative boss Álvaro Villegas Moreno in 1980. Based on growth pole theory, the plan consisted in establishing Regional Centers for Administration and Services (*Centros Administrativos y de Servicios Regionales*, CASER) in strategic localities across the department to improve public service delivery and promote the development of intermediate cities as a way to hold back rural-to-urban migration (Villegas Moreno 2016 [1980]), but the program's implementation only lasted a few years (essentially during the times that Villegas was governor).

Law 60 meant not only that the energy companies—in which Medellín’s business elite had considerable vested interests, as discussed earlier—surrendered their discretion over the distribution of these funds, but also that the funds would not be transferred to the departmental or municipal governments.

Unsurprisingly, the creation of CORNARE was a long and controversial process. Plans for a regional development agency for Eastern Antioquia were first proposed in the early 1970s. Some versions of a bill that was introduced in Congress provided for the new agency to be funded in part by “the obligatory contributions of the natural persons or legal entities that exploit the region’s natural resources.”⁶⁵ The bill’s sponsor in the Chamber of Representatives made it clear that this referred specifically to EPM.⁶⁶ This legislative effort failed in 1975. Among the legislators who raised objections to the bill was businessman (and then-senator) Diego Calle Restrepo, who went on to become EPM’s general manager the following year.⁶⁷

When the idea gained traction again in 1981, the proposed agency’s status as a national-level agency under the authority of the National Planning Department and its control over energy company payments created significant tensions within Antioquia’s political establishment. The plan’s advocates, most visibly represented by Conservative congressman Gilberto Salazar Ramírez, argued that CORNARE would be “the region’s response to the hydroelectric projects that were being developed in

⁶⁵ Said contribution would have been no less than 5% and no more than 20% of the entity’s net profits (*Anales del Congreso*, No. 70, December 4, 1974, p. 1097).

⁶⁶ *Anales del Congreso*, No. 74, December 10, 1974, p. 1159.

⁶⁷ *Anales del Congreso*, No. 65, October 16, 1975, p. 964.

it” and a mechanism “for the owners of the hydrological wealth to get a share of its exploitation.”⁶⁸ Its institutional design, far from limiting local autonomy, would signify a step toward greater administrative decentralization at a time of high political centralization (Senado de la República 1984, 291-293).⁶⁹ The logic was that CORNARE, as an autonomous entity under the National Planning Department (as opposed to a subunit within a Ministry), would be endowed with administrative and financial independence, and its executive board would be made up of a majority of departmental and municipal representatives to be appointed by municipal councils. While governors at the time were appointed by the President and mayors were in turn appointed by the governor, municipal councils were elected by popular vote. The agency would therefore be less subject to discretionary intervention from the central government than subnational levels of government, and the Antioquian political establishment could exercise influence over the agency’s activities through municipal councilmembers on its executive board.

In addition to convincing the political establishment, the proposed legislation was designed to win support from Antioquia’s private sector. Notably, it did not establish any new obligatory contributions to be paid by energy companies. Possibly seeking to prevent their opposition, early versions of the bill even gave EPM’s general manager a seat on the new agency’s executive board, though later iterations of the bill

⁶⁸ “Ellos opinan sobre el PRISER,” *Enfoque Regional: Publicación de la Corporación Autónoma Regional Rionegro Nare*, Year 1, No. 4 (1987), p. 10.

⁶⁹ Political decentralization reforms did not take place until 1986.

removed this provision.⁷⁰ An initiative to extend the new agency's reach to Medellín and its neighboring municipalities on the Aburrá Valley and to levy a property tax surcharge there to fund the agency's operations in Eastern Antioquia was vocally opposed by Medellín's press and its business community, and it was easily defeated.⁷¹ The amended bill became much more business-friendly and picked up support from ProAntioquia, a research and advocacy foundation established and funded by Medellín's business elites, which lobbied the national government and members of Congress on behalf of the new agency.⁷² Eventually, Salazar's proposal won widespread support from the Antioquia congressional delegation, which made possible the law's enactment in 1983.

Soon after the law's passing, however, when CORNARE was being organized and staffed, some sectors of Antioquia's political establishment began to express dissatisfaction with the process, and the issue of central government influence came up once again. The most vocal critiques came from the *Villeguista* faction of the

⁷⁰ All versions of the bill introduced in 1981 provided for EPM's inclusion on the executive board (see, e.g., *Anales del Congreso*, No. 5, January 23, 1981, p. 51; No. 170, December 14, 1981, p. 2346). When discussions were resumed in 1983 and a new bill was introduced by the ministers of Finance, Economic Development, Mining and Energy, and Agriculture, EPM's seat on the board of the new corporation was reassigned to the Antioquian private sector more broadly: the board member in question was to be selected collectively by nine different business groups, excluding energy companies (*Anales del Congreso*, No. 5, September 21, 1983, p. 1408). This provision was eventually scrapped from the text of the bill that was brought up for a vote in the Senate (*Anales del Congreso*, No. 111, October 18, 1983).

⁷¹ Tellingly, the motion to scrap the proposal to include Medellín and the Aburrá Valley in the agency's jurisdiction was introduced by businessman-turned-congressman John Gómez Restrepo, founder of the Familia and Cartones de Colombia paper companies, who called for changes to the original bill such as this one to be consulted with "interested sectors" in Antioquia (*Anales del Congreso*, No. 89, August 10, 1981, pp. 1171-1173).

⁷² *Anales del Congreso*, No. 139, November 25, 1983, p. 1995; see also Proantioquia (2015, 49). ProAntioquia's affiliates included business leaders from the textiles, banking, insurance, construction, food, and mining industries.

Conservative Party, led by the former Antioquia governor Álvaro Villegas Moreno. Although Villegas had initially supported the agency's creation during his time as governor,⁷³ he was now decrying the fact that the national government chose to fill the new agency's leadership posts with technocrats rather than politicians. At a political meeting in San Rafael, Villegas declared: "I was truly hurt by the fact that the government made it a requirement for the director of CORNARE to be a man who is not part of the political class" (Foro Regional del Oriente Lejano de Antioquia 1984, 5). Villegas also condemned the fact that the "manageriocracy" that the government was privileging over traditional politicians was not as familiar with local realities as the latter.⁷⁴ Other regional leaders tried to limit national government control over CORNARE by introducing a bill in Congress that would have taken some regional autonomous corporations (including CORNARE) out of the National Planning Department and placed them under the control of departmental governments.⁷⁵

Still, these attempts to open up the new agency to greater regional political control failed. Although the Conservative *Villeguista* faction had long been dominant in Eastern Antioquia and highly influential in departmental politics (Uribe de Hincapié, García, and Villegas 1989), after CORNARE was created it found itself in a position of relative weakness due to Villegas's rivalry with fellow Conservative

⁷³ See *Anales del Congreso*, No. 169, December 10, 1981, p. 2341.

⁷⁴ In his speech, Villegas used the neologism "*gerentocracia*," from "*gerente*," which means "manager." The rally took place in San Rafael on September 15, 1984.

⁷⁵ Senate Bill No. 84 (1985) was introduced by Liberal senator Federico Estrada Vélez. See *Anales del Congreso*, No. 120, September 6, 1985, pp. 8-9.

President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) (Jiménez 2013). Betancur, also from Antioquia, was closer to a different regional faction of the Conservative Party, the “Progressive” wing led by J. Emilio Valderrama, which Gilberto Salazar Ramírez and other CORNARE promoters also belonged to.⁷⁶ Once he became President, Betancur replaced Villegas with Nicanor Restrepo Santamaría as governor of Antioquia. Restrepo—an insurance and banking businessman who would later on become president of the Antioquia Business Group (*Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño*, GEA, a conglomerate of that department’s largest private companies)—championed the creation of CORNARE, both as governor and as a business leader.⁷⁷ In addition, under the National Planning Department—an island of technocratic autonomy inside the Colombian state apparatus (Dargent 2015)—CORNARE would be shielded from political control by the *Villeguista* power structure, while Betancur, as President, would still have the authority to appoint the agency’s director. During Betancur’s tenure, this post was always filled by someone close to Medellín’s business elite.

Over the years, Medellín’s business elite had developed a significant stake in the development of Eastern Antioquia, which motivated their active involvement in the design (and, later on, the operations) of CORNARE. Not only did Medellín’s electrical service, along with the profits of EPM and ISA, depend heavily on the

⁷⁶ For more on Antioquia’s Conservative factions, see Franco (2006) and Uribe de Hincapié, García, and Villegas (1989). Regarding Salazar’s affiliation with the Progressive faction, see Eugenia Salazar, Rosario Gómez, and Juan Carlos Salazar, “Reseña sobre el Dr. Gilberto Salazar Ramírez,” *Fundación Manuel Tiberio Salazar*, <https://fundacionmanueltiberosalazar.org/nuestro-fundador>.

⁷⁷ Author interview with Juan Fernando Mesa, Medellín, March 23, 2018. Restrepo is listed on CORNARE’s website as one of the organization’s founders (<http://www.cornare.gov.co/corporacion/institucional/fundadores>).

proper functioning of Eastern Antioquia's hydroelectric complex. In addition, since the mid-1960s, Medellín-based industrialists had started to move their operations to the high-plateau subregion (especially in Rionegro and Guarne but going as far as La Ceja and El Santuario) and started new businesses in that area (C.I. García and Aramburo 2011; Henao et al. 1993; L. Villegas 1988). Eastern Antioquia had also experienced a proliferation of vacation properties owned by wealthy families from Medellín. At first, these were concentrated in the high plateau, but they then spread further east after the partial flooding of El Peñol and Guatapé brought about the formation of picturesque landscapes in that area (Aramburo et al. 1990a, 1990b).

Back in the 1960s, when the Nare hydroelectric project was first in the works, Medellín industrialists and politicians were largely able to make decisions about the fate of their city's surrounding rural areas with little say from the population of impacted localities or their representatives. This was no longer the case two decades later. As discussed in the following subsection, social mobilization had grown massively across Eastern Antioquia since the flooding of El Peñol in 1970. According to a former director of CORNARE, by the 1980s it had become clear to Antioquia's economic and political elites that they could not simply impose their will on Eastern Antioquia: "The demands emanating from the region called for a different kind of institutional response. There was growing recognition of this."⁷⁸ As another former CORNARE official explained, Antioquia's business elites, "including EPM, thought

⁷⁸ Author interview with Juan Felipe Sánchez, Bogotá, March 15, 2017.

that they would now be able to unload all social problems onto CORNARE (...), that we would be like a placebo for this region's social cramps (*cólicos sociales*)."⁷⁹

From Localized, Company-Centered Protests to the Formation of a Statist Regional Movement

To a large extent, the creation of CORNARE was an elite-driven process. Yet the region's popular movements also claim credit for it: "The creation of CORNARE is ours," argues Carlos Ruiz, general coordinator (1981-1984) of the Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia (CMEA), a network of contentious claimants from different towns across the region.⁸⁰ Another former member of the CMEA refers to CORNARE as "the Civic Movement's elder son."⁸¹ This claim has some validity: this subsection develops the argument that the changing elite dynamics that gave rise to CORNARE cannot be understood without reference to the development over time of a contentious and increasingly autonomous regional civil society in Eastern Antioquia. The CMEA lacked significant allies within the political establishment. As such, unlike Barrancabermeja's popular movement, the CMEA was not able to induce sustained state provision of public goods through contentious mobilization on its own. Still, it did contribute to the formation of a broader constituency—featuring economic elites as well as grassroots organizations—for greater state activism in the region. It did so by pressuring regional elites to adopt a more welcoming stance toward state intervention while at the same time aiding the formation of a more

⁷⁹ Author interview with Humberto Díez, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

⁸⁰ Author interview with Carlos Ruiz, Medellín, March 1, 2017.

⁸¹ Author interview with Joaquín Duque Gómez, manager of COOMUN (a cooperative created by Civic Movement members) and director of El Marinillo newspaper, Medellín, February 28, 2017.

robust and independent civil society which was instrumental for the effective implementation of CORNARE programs. I first provide a historical overview of contentious mobilization in Eastern Antioquia, highlighting how the absence of allies prevented the activation of the contentious pathway for SSSP. Then I discuss how the contentious element still contributed to the success of the coproductive pathway.

Contentious Mobilization in Eastern Antioquia: A Strong, Statist Claimant but with Limited Access to State Elites

When plans for the Nare hydroelectric project first became public, the people of El Peñol and Guatapé initially reacted with indifference and skepticism about the project's feasibility.⁸² Only after a land price freeze was decreed in 1960 for the areas that would be impacted by the project did local authorities write to EPM to request information about it (Sáenz 1988, 108). In response, EPM officially announced the flooding of El Peñol and part of Guatapé. The company claimed that the project would be a boon for Eastern Antioquia's development. However, the question of where the impacted population (between 6,000 and 8,000 in El Peñol and 1,200 in Guatapé⁸³) would go remained unanswered. At that time, the kinds of social and environmental impact considerations and assessments which are omnipresent around large development projects today were either nonexistent or at best inchoate. Even the terms of the World Bank loan did not provide for a systematic relocation or

⁸² Author interview with Juan Fernando Mesa, lawyer, sociologist, and advisor to the municipality of El Peñol from the 1960s to the 1980s, Medellín, March 23, 2018. See also Díaz (1972, 233).

⁸³ The estimates come from Codesarrollo (1966, 100-101; 1970, 1).

compensation plan.⁸⁴ Moreover, EPM failed to consider the project's social consequences.⁸⁵ Livardo Ospina, author of an official history of EPM, captured the company's attitude toward the project's social impact in his statement that El Peñol was simply "condemned to disappear under the waters to give way to progress" (Ospina 1966, 556).

Many local residents opposed their community's flooding and relocation, but such discontent did not immediately lead to protest in these historically conservative localities.⁸⁶ Instead, grievances were mostly channeled through the Catholic parishes of El Peñol and Guatapé and each town's municipal council (C.I. García 1992; Sáenz 1988). At this point, as discussed in Section 3, claim-making was almost always aimed at EPM rather than state authorities, who were mostly seen by the town's representatives as little more than mediators.⁸⁷

After EPM funded an independent socioeconomic study to assess the project's likely impacts on El Peñol and determine the site to which the town should be relocated (Codesarrollo 1966), the town's representatives announced that they would

⁸⁴ Funds for the relocation of El Peñol were included (under the rubric of "miscellaneous expenses") in another loan request for the project's second stage (IBRD 1972, 9). The Bank's earliest official policies on involuntary resettlement due to development projects were formulated in 1980 (World Bank 1980).

⁸⁵ According to Juan Fernando Mesa, "they [EPM] were very meticulous about the project's engineering and economic feasibility, but as far as the social aspect was concerned, they underestimated it, they didn't understand it." Author interview, Medellín, March 23, 2018.

⁸⁶ In Eastern Antioquia, the Conservative Party has been dominant since the middle of the 19th century, and the Catholic Church has been highly influential (F. Gómez 1989; L. Villegas 1988). The only exception is Rionegro, a historical bastion of the Liberal Party, but it is often said that there is hardly a more exemplary Conservative than a Liberal from Rionegro ("*Para godos, los liberales de Rionegro*").

⁸⁷ When the Nare Project was first announced and El Peñol's representatives requested to be briefed by EPM on the project and its impact, the governor of Antioquia created a committee made up of representatives from EPM, El Peñol, and the departmental government to assess the matter (Comité del Peñol 1962). Two years later, Guatapé's representatives asked the governor to be included in the committee as well (Comité del Nare 1966).

be willing to accept the town's relocation on the condition that EPM sign a formal agreement with the municipality stipulating the company's responsibility for building the new town, relocating the population, and funding a development plan. Contract negotiations began in 1967. The municipality of El Peñol was represented by the local Catholic parish and members of the municipal council. Throughout the negotiations, residents of El Peñol mobilized to pressure EPM to give in to the demands put forward by the town's delegation (Sáenz 1988). The resulting "Master Contract" (*Contrato Maestro*), a legally binding agreement signed in 1969 between the municipality of El Peñol and EPM, is seen by local activists and analysts alike as a turning point not only for El Peñol but also for other towns impacted by dam development (Cardona 2007; C.I. García 1992; L.A. Gómez and Espinal 2010; A. López 2014; Sáenz 1988). The contract obligated EPM to prevent avoidable harms resulting from dam construction, pay compensations to El Peñol residents, build a new urban center, and carry out long-term development projects in the town (Empresas Públicas de Medellín y Municipio de El Peñol 1976 [1969]).⁸⁸

EPM repeatedly breached the contract's provisions as the project moved forward. The first alleged violation was EPM's decision to close the dam gates in 1970, beginning the first stage of planned flooding while no tangible progress had been made toward the construction of the new town.⁸⁹ This partial flood did not yet

⁸⁸ The contract also required the company to avoid coercive or exploitative practices in land acquisitions and created an Advising Committee for Negotiations (funded by EPM) tasked with counseling and supporting local residents in their dealings with EPM.

⁸⁹ Only later that year were proposals by four private architecture and urban design firms completed (D. Pérez and Uribe 1971), and construction of the new town did not begin until 1975 (Sáenz 1988, 134).

destroy the entire town but did engulf a considerable portion of El Peñol's rural area, including lands that EPM had not yet acquired (Sáenz 1988). In 1975, the company's leadership attempted to persuade the residents of the old El Peñol to accept individual compensation and relocation payments in exchange for their consent to cancel the construction of the new town (Hernández 2004, 66; Sáenz 1988, 133). An EPM manager even boasted that the company's attitude toward the contract was to follow the traditional dictum of "obedience in act but not in fact" ("*se obedece pero no se cumple*") (López de Calle 1995, 78).

These breaches of the Master Contract became the focal point for social mobilization in El Peñol from that point on. The closing of the gates prompted the formation of new Committees for the Defense of El Peñol and Guatapé—but this time they took on a much more contentious character than earlier ones. These committees were also much more broad-based than before: they now featured various campesino organizations and associations of urban residents in addition to church representatives and council members (Sáenz 1988, 127). In response to the sudden flooding of lands whose owners still had not been compensated, a civic strike (a suspension of normal activities by all sectors of the local society) was called; most businesses, schools, and government offices closed, and large protests were held against EPM. A similar three-day strike had taken place a few months earlier in Guatapé (Aramburo et al. 1990b),⁹⁰ which stood out because of the support it

⁹⁰ C.I. García (1992, II, 17-18) documents three civic strikes and four major demonstrations in El Peñol and Guatapé between 1970 and 1980.

received from peasants, union activists, and teachers in Rionegro, who shut down the highway connecting Medellín to El Peñol and Guatapé to block EPM vehicles from reaching their worksites (Aramburo et al. 1990b, 42; Serna et al. 1989, 28). This was the first time that movements from nearby towns became directly involved in the dam-related conflicts. Such linkages were steadily strengthened over the 1970s through regional forums of multiple municipalities' councilmembers, joint declarations by different towns' priests, and occasional exchanges between civic and campesino organizations from different parts of the region (C.I. García 1992, III-8; Sáenz 1988; Sáenz et al. 1989).

The next milestone for the growth of popular mobilization in Eastern Antioquia was the rise of discontent with dam construction in San Carlos as early as 1976 (two years before the start of civil works for the San Carlos hydroelectric project). Reacting mainly to land acquisitions and to the loss of municipal property tax revenues, community leaders in San Carlos displayed many of the same traits that movements from El Peñol and Guatapé had been developing: a broad social base (featuring campesino activists as well as middle-class political leaders from the municipal center), a combative inclination, and, perhaps most importantly, an increasingly strong statist orientation. At first this statist framing was mostly limited to calling for mediation and regulation but soon grew to encompass demands for public goods provision. Grievances were not only being aimed at ISA but also at the departmental government of Antioquia (O. García 1988; Olaya 2012; G.I. Restrepo

2010).⁹¹ The impact of dam construction on local schools became the catalyst for mass mobilization only two years later. As newcomers arrived in large numbers, and as locals living in impacted rural areas were forced to move to the population centers,⁹² public schools became severely overcrowded and understaffed. In January 1978, 120 families were notified that the school would not be able to allow their children to return to classes, so teachers, students, and parents mobilized to shut down the school (Aramburo et al. 1990c; C.I. García 1992; Olaya 2012). Their protests were joined by local shop owners, campesinos, and the parish priest, and a general strike was called for the following month. The list of grievances to the local administration and the departmental government quickly grew to include complaints about the quality and price of public services (especially electricity), the rising cost of living, and the precariousness of public health facilities and road infrastructure. This strike marked the start of a wave of others like it, as well as demonstrations and other forms of claim-making—directed at the state and consisting of demands for public goods provision—in San Carlos.

In 1982, the San Carlos movement joined the Regional Coordinating Committee of Civic Movements (*Coordinadora Regional de Movimientos Cívicos*), an organization created the year before by civic leaders from Marinilla, Rionegro, and other high-plateau towns to protest energy rate hikes (C.I. García 1992; Olaya

⁹¹ San Carlos activists had already clashed with the government of Antioquia in 1974, even threatening a civic strike, over delays in the installation of power infrastructure (Olaya 2012, 64).

⁹² The municipality of San Carlos has two major population centers: the municipal center (*cabecera municipal*) and the *corregimiento* of El Jordán.

2012).⁹³ In earlier years, those towns had been developing a number of self-styled “civic committees” which staged multiple demonstrations around this issue over the 1970s, some of them with coordinated actions across different towns. But in 1982 this movement sought to bring local movements from different parts of the region together under the banner of the Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia by articulating popular dissatisfaction about public services with grievances about the impact of hydroelectric dams. It accused the Colombian state and the departmental government of Antioquia of exploiting its resources without adequate compensation while at the same time treating its people as second-class citizens in connection to service provision.⁹⁴ In addition to calling for preferential electricity rates, debt restructuring in connection to unpaid bills and late fees, and the liquidation of Electrificadora de Antioquia (the departmental public electrical utility),⁹⁵ the CMEA’s list of demands in advance of its first civic strike in 1982 also demanded that EPM and the government of Antioquia meet their commitments in terms of resettlement and compensation to El Peñol and Guatapé (C.A. Ruiz 2014, 52-53). Each town’s

⁹³ Other participating towns were La Unión, El Santuario, El Retiro, La Ceja, and Guarne (C.I. García 1992, 19).

⁹⁴ Author interview with Carlos Ruiz, general coordinator of the Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia from 1981 to 1984, Medellín, March 1, 2017. See also C.I. García (1992, III-15) and C.I. García and Aramburo (2011, 53). One of the CMEA’s best-known leaders, Ramón Emilio Arcila, would later argue that “the energy generated in the region is most expensive in the towns that have suffered the most from the ecological and social impact of the establishment of hydroelectric power plants” (R.E. Arcila 1986, 53).

⁹⁵ Electrical service in most of Eastern Antioquia—with the exception of El Peñol, Guatapé, San Rafael, and Alejandría (Departamento Administrativo de Planeación 1973, 13)—was provided by Electrificadora de Antioquia, a public company owned by the departmental government. Electrificadora purchased energy from EPM and distributed it to the rest of the department at an additional cost, which in some cases meant that rates in the countryside were more than twice as high as in Medellín (R.E. Arcila 1986). The CMEA demanded the liquidation of Electrificadora and called for EPM to provide electrical service to the region directly.

movements also made additional demands related to local education, healthcare, and infrastructure. That first civic strike took place across 13 municipalities of Eastern Antioquia, from Marinilla and Rionegro to El Peñol and San Carlos (Olaya 2012, 101), and was followed by two more strikes, many local demonstrations, and as many as 60 meetings and forums over the next two years (R.E. Arcila 1986; C.I. García 1992).

What the CMEA lacked was stable access to and influence with state elites at higher levels of government. Congressmen like Gilberto Salazar Ramírez and Gustavo Duque Ramírez championed legislation that benefited Eastern Antioquia such as Law 56 on compensations to dam-affected areas and the creation of CORNARE. Salazar once called a hearing in Congress to publicize a formal complaint by the parish and municipal council of El Peñol against EPM on the company's violations of the Master Contract,⁹⁶ but neither he nor other national-level politicians were active supporters of the CMEA. Other major national leaders hailing from Antioquia were highly antagonistic to the movement, the most salient example of which was the Conservative boss Álvaro Villegas Moreno, who referred to its leaders as terrorists and saboteurs (Jiménez 2013, 48). In turn, the CMEA's leaders positioned the movement as an independent, "pluralistic and polyclassist" force which welcomed members of all different political parties⁹⁷ but also as an alternative to

⁹⁶ The complaint was lodged before the the Procuraduría General de la Nación (Office of the Inspector General). The Procuraduría, a nominally independent state agency, was tasked with overseeing the conduct of public officials and employees. Since EPM was a public company, this included EPM's personnel. The hearing was documented in *Anales del Congreso*, No. 79, October 25, 1977, p. 1118-1119.

⁹⁷ Some CMEA activists even ran for municipal office as Liberal and Conservative party candidates.

traditional party structures and elites (R.E. Arcila 1986, 59; see also R.E. Arcila 1990). As such, they did not seek to use them as conduits to gain access to higher levels of government.

The Indirect Effects of Popular Mobilization in Eastern Antioquia on SSSP

At first glance, the CMEA's achievements may appear meager. Many movement leaders would agree with this assessment—and some would go even further: “I think the Civic Movement didn't achieve anything (...) Of all the demands that people had, nothing at all has been accomplished (...) The only product of mobilization was violence,” reflects Carlos Olaya, a movement activist and historian from San Carlos.⁹⁸ There were some rate reductions, and Electrificadora de Antioquia was formally liquidated, though it was replaced by a new company that performed its same duties and did not resolve the movement's complaints about high rates and low quality (R.E. Arcila 1986; C.A. Ruiz 2014). Movement members were violently persecuted. Not only were leaders routinely imprisoned and many demonstrations repressed by state security forces, but also dozens of activists were killed or forced into exile by paramilitary groups.

Yet these very attacks against the CMEA shed light on what is arguably the movement's most notable and consequential achievement: the displacement of traditional political party structures, the development of new forms of collective action

Still, this was limited to the local sphere; they did not attempt to gain access to higher levels of government.

⁹⁸ Author interview with Carlos Olaya, historian and movement activist from San Carlos, Medellín, February 27, 2017.

which were independent from the former, and, overall, a “thickening” of the regional civil society (see, e.g., Fox 1996). Violence against the CMEA escalated the most when civic leaders entered electoral politics, mounting a significant challenge against traditional parties. In 1980, civic movement leaders in San Carlos won three out of ten seats in the municipal council under the banner of the Movimiento de Acción Sancarlitana (later renamed Unión Cívica Municipal, or Municipal Civic Union, UCM) (Olaya 2012, 94). The town’s traditional Conservative political elite reacted by seeking to discredit the new political force, and its members began to receive death threats (O. García 1988). Although a local civic committee leader was murdered in 1983 and many others were forced out of town, the UCM won another three council seats in the 1984 election. The killing spree restarted, and more than 30 people linked to the movement were killed between 1984 and 1985. Attacks against civic leaders intensified even more after the 1986 political decentralization reform that established popular mayoral elections in Colombia.⁹⁹ As civic groups across different Eastern Antioquia towns prepared to run for local mayoral posts, many candidates (including Ramón Emilio Arcila in Marinilla) were killed. In El Peñol, movement leaders won the first three popular elections for mayor starting in 1988, but all three were killed.¹⁰⁰

Perhaps most importantly, however, civic movements not only challenged traditional power structures in the electoral arena but also at the grassroots level,

⁹⁹ Author interviews with Carlos Ruiz, March 1, 2017; Carlos Olaya, February 27, 2017; José Luis Duque, activist in the Civic Movement and former mayor of Marinilla (1998-2000, 2004-2007), Marinilla, March 2, 2017; and Pastora Mira, leader of war victims organizations in San Carlos, San Carlos, March 4, 2017. See also Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011b, 59).

¹⁰⁰ Author interview with Father Francisco Ocampo, Nare Project chaplain, former parish priest of Guatapé and El Peñol, and civic movement leader, Marinilla, March 1, 2017.

specifically in the realm of so-called communal action boards (*juntas de acción comunal*, JACs). JACs are mostly rural organizations for village-level participation, consultation, representation, and interaction with politicians and government agencies (R. Londoño 1997; M. Velásquez 2016). They have been the most widespread form of association in the Colombian countryside since the 1950s, and in many parts of the country they have been the only mechanism for rural communities' routine interactions with the state. Formally nonpartisan, they soon became an emblematic mechanism for clientelism and cooptation (Safford and Palacios 2002, 327). In Eastern Antioquia—where one of the earliest JACs in the country was formed¹⁰¹—these organizations were historically linked to the Conservative Party, whose representatives in Congress used them as an instrument to transfer discretionary government budget allocations to their electoral strongholds in the region (L.M. Botero and Uribe 1998; Sáenz et al. 1989, 284; Uribe de Hincapié, García, and Villegas 1989, 44). With the rise of the CMEA, many JACs became actively involved in the movement, adopted a more contentious toward traditional elites' paternalism, and sought to become more self-reliant without forsaking constant claim-making (Forero 1993; C.I. García 1992, III-24; Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2011b; L. Tabares and Marín 1989). Although the influence of clientelistic networks did not entirely disappear, rural communities became much more independent: a JAC might continue receiving pork barrel transfers from members of Congress, but their leaders

¹⁰¹ In 1955, the departmental government of Antioquia created a Board for Social and *Campesino* Cooperation in Guatapé (A. Gómez 1971). JACs were institutionally recognized by the Colombian state in 1958 by Law 19.

might now run against their anointed candidate in municipal elections.

Alongside traditional JACs, civic movements also fostered the development of other kinds of grassroots forms of association—campesino organizations, cooperatives, and mutual help groups, as well as the aforementioned civic committees—fittingly in line with the CMEA’s slogan: “from protesting to proposing, without abandoning protest” (R.E. Arcila 1990). In El Peñol, for example, relocation to the new town center was followed by a wave of organizing to push for public services and housing (Galeano 1991; Rivera 2014; L. Tabares and Marín 1989; B.N. Tabares and Rueda 1988; Wolff 1991). Some residents had not received compensation from EPM because they did not live in the old town but in nearby rural hamlets which were not destroyed by the flood, even if their livelihoods were otherwise impacted by it. The target of their grievances shifted from EPM to the departmental government, and JACs became their main organizational vehicle.

In 1982, the JACs of the El Morro and Uvital hamlets of El Peñol mobilized to demand funds for the construction of a water system (L. Tabares and Marín 1989). The public health agency of the department of Antioquia gave its approval the following year. Although traditional politicians attempted to act as intermediaries for the disbursement and administration of the funds, the JACs rejected their involvement and demanded that the funds be provided directly to the community. As argued by B.N. Tabares and Rueda (1988, 33, 47), local leaders were now rejecting the notion that they needed to work through clientelistic networks in order to issue claims and negotiate with state authorities. This was further exemplified in 1985 by

the occupation of a tract of land owned by EPM. Activists created the Development Corporation of El Peñol, a grassroots self-management organization, and demanded that the occupied land be subdivided among 400 campesino families and requested funding from the national government to run the housing project (Rivera 2014; L. Tabares and Marín 1989; B.N. Tabares and Rueda 1988). About three months later, the government gave in and agreed to disburse a loan for this purpose through the Territorial Credit Institute (the same agency that EPM had hired years earlier to build the new town center). The only intermediary the community accepted was the local parish, which was tasked with overseeing the housing project and the Development Corporation's management of public funds (Wolff 1991).

The civic movement infrastructure—from the CMEA to local civic committees and grassroots organizations—enabled communities in Eastern Antioquia to engage directly with state actors without necessarily relying on the intermediation of clientelistic party structures (C.I. García 1992; Galeano 1991; Uribe de Hincapié, García, and Villegas 1989). This new infrastructure would later prove to be instrumental for the success of the CORNARE programs, especially the PRISER model.

PRISER was designed with JACs in mind as the main vehicle for community participation. However, PRISER was also seen as a threat to the interests of politicians who controlled JACs and benefited from their role as vehicles for clientelistic practices. A former CORNARE official who was in charge of the program explained that some members of municipal councils on the agency's

executive board tried to either end the PRISER scheme or co-opt it for electoral purposes: “A councilwoman once called me and said, ‘I’m at the executive board meeting, and I’m going to put your job on the line (...). Either that, or I have a proposal for you: work with Dr. Villegas, who is my boss (...) We’ll tell Dr. Villegas, and he’ll support you, you’ll become an important political leader.”¹⁰² She was referring to the Conservative boss Álvaro Villegas Moreno, and the proposal was to use PRISER as a clientelistic tool for the *Villeguista* faction’s electoral benefit.

Two factors shielded PRISER, and CORNARE more generally, from political capture. One was the agency’s design as part of the National Planning Department, which limited politicians’ influence from above over CORNARE’s activities and staffing, as discussed in the previous subsection. On the other hand, CORNARE officials saw community engagement not only as necessary for the success of programs such as PRISER, which were designed around it, but also as a shield against politicization: “all of that starts to create a sort of armor plating (...) we ourselves were accountable to communities, there was a lot of social pressure (...) from communities, from community action boards,” which limited politicians’ ability to interfere with the agency’s programming.¹⁰³ According to a former CORNARE official, a politician once complained in a meeting with the agency’s director, “You and your PRISER are ruining politics for us.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Author interview with Humberto Díez, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

¹⁰³ Author interview with Juan Felipe Sánchez, Bogotá, March 15, 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Author interview with Humberto Díez, Rionegro, March 24, 2018.

5.6. Conclusion

The case of hydropower development in the reservoirs subregion of Eastern Antioquia is a case of coproductive local ownership of state power inducing SSSP in a context of limited state capacity. At the same time, it also highlights the potential of contentious processes which fall short of achieving local ownership for contributing indirectly to that purpose. In this case, the formation of the loose coalition featuring business elites, activist bureaucrats, and community organizations that led to the formation of CORNARE and to the successful implementation of its rural electrification and PRISER programs may not have been realized in the absence of the Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia's pressure and its contribution to the thickening of the region's civil society.

State service provision in this region declined after 1994 chiefly as a result of national-level institutional reforms which scaled back CORNARE's mandate, highlighting the causal importance of the supply side of SSSP. If a service provider cuts off its provision, there is not much local support coalitions can do to keep it going. Still, the decline of state service provision in Eastern Antioquia was not as swift and extensive as it was in 1980s Barrancabermeja. Some of it, a scaled-back version of the PRISER scheme, endured largely thanks to some continued local elite support. More generally, the endurance of CORNARE's comparatively effective environmental regulation activities, including its new discharge fee model, highlights the importance non-state support for the success of state action beyond service provision. On the other hand, the fact that CORNARE's service provision programs

were never systematically replaced by other state agencies indicates that the violent persecution and dissolution of the CMEA may have relieved the pressure on state authorities to invest in new public goods for the region.

The importance of local non-state support coalitions for SSSP is further underscored by the results of the DRI program's implementation across Eastern Antioquia. In areas where non-state actors developed local ownership of state power—namely, the high-plateau subregion—the DRI program was much more successful than in El Peñol or Guatapé, where non-state support for the program was limited.

6. CONCLUSION

Large-scale resource extraction, industrial agriculture, and power generation projects in regions located far from countries' centers of power are still viewed by governments and international development organizations as engines of growth, sources of fiscal revenue, and potential drivers of social development. Yet the problem of diffuse benefits and concentrated harm—in the form of social and environmental impacts for local communities—remains largely unsolved, and it continues to provoke frequent and forceful social protest, both around existing projects and in opposition to planned ones. Such projects have also become targets of strong condemnation from critics of “extractivist” development models (see, e.g., Acosta 2013; Gudynas 2012; Svampa 2015; Willow 2019). In response to the growing controversy, interested parties have developed a broad array of compensatory institutional innovations such as decentralized revenue sharing schemes as well as initiatives to increase local participation in decision-making and promote transparency and accountability. Yet, as I argued in the introduction, many of these schemes often fall short of achieving their intended purposes, and one of the reasons this happens has to do with a failure to consider the obstacles to effective implementation in localities marked by limited institutional capacity. I therefore argued that it is crucial to address a fundamental set of questions: What does it take for the state to function effectively in these contexts? Under what conditions can sustained state service provision (SSSP) emerge around economic hotspots?

This dissertation has tackled these questions through a comparative-historical perspective, using case studies of the long-term evolution of three subnational economies in Colombia. Its research design made it possible to identify how SSSP is produced in three specific localities impacted by very different kinds of economic hotspots in order to build a theoretical framework

that holds across different regions as well as different economic sectors and therefore provides a useful point of departure for future research.

This chapter starts out by revisiting the dissertation's argument and central findings, this time with several illustrative references to the case study evidence. The next section discusses some additional themes which come out of the study and some of the questions that emerge for future research. One of these issues—the extent to which the theory of local ownership of state power may also further our understanding of other dimensions of state action across territory, focusing specifically on security provision—is then explored in closer detail based on some preliminary data from the case of Barrancabermeja. The chapter closes with a consideration of the politics of studying subnational economic hotspots with a focus on their connection to state service provision.

6.1. Summary of the Argument

I have argued that the mere existence of an economic hotspot has an indeterminate—and, more often than not, a null—effect on the state's provision of services to the local population. The commonplace assumption that the availability of revenue will attract tax collectors and service providers will be riding their coattails in order to perform the stationary bandit dance number (and the larger the loot, the greater the state's penchant for stepping in) is just that: an assumption which requires careful conceptual specification and empirical verification. The fact that we only observe a dynamic of this sort in Huila (where politicians' support for agricultural modernization could conceivably be interpreted in retrospect as a case of state betting on the possibility of future taxable profits) and not in Barrancabermeja (where rents became available without any significant state contribution *and* they were quite larger than what

Huila's rice could have ever yielded) calls for serious reconsideration of the stationary bandit logic.

My argument places local non-state actors centerstage. Although I do not deny the possibility of politicians or bureaucrats taking the lead in offering services around economic hotspots which are distant from a country's centers of power, I do maintain that in the absence of preexisting state capacity on the ground such well-intentioned efforts are likely to be short-lived in the absence of buy-in from local stakeholders. In Huila, for instance, politicians' plans for developing an irrigation system were implemented successfully while Campoalegre farmers were on board. When the latter's support for those plans went missing, not even the availability of funds was enough to carry them out; the national government chose instead to redirect those resources to projects in other parts of the country. In order to be *sustained*, state service provision in these contexts thus requires more than resources and political will on the supply side.

As for the demand side, SSSP requires more than demands alone. It calls for claimants to build an active support coalition capable of developing what I have termed *local ownership of state power*—an arrangement whereby state power is not just deployed and administered from the center but is instead embedded in, exercised in conjunction with, and therefore “co-owned” by local societal actors. This “co-ownership,” moreover, can be either coproductive or contentious in character. In Barranca, local residents had been calling for a water system since the early 1960s. Those demands were actually successful insofar as they prompted the passage by Congress of the so-called Law of One Hundred Million, which included funding for that purpose, among others. Still, it was only when the local population developed contentious local ownership of state power that sustained investment to expand the city's water system actually took place (and continued to do so for more than a decade).

The function of these non-state support coalitions is to offset the existing state capacity deficit which constitutes a material impediment to service provision. Existing resources can be supplemented either coproductively (whereby non-state actors directly perform auxiliary capacity transfers to the state) or by contentious means (which entail pressuring local state agents to seek out additional resources from other levels of government, other parts of the territory, or even from other non-state actors). Either way, non-state actors' job is a difficult one. Therefore, in order to succeed in inducing SSSP through local ownership of state power—whether coproductive or contentious—they must fulfill three conditions: they must have a statist ideational framing, a strong organizational structure for collective action, and stable access to and influence with state elites.

Statist Ideational Framing

The importance of a statist ideational framing in connection to local service provision—that is, a collective belief that the state, rather than other actors, should be responsible for delivering services in a given locality—is underscored by the cases of Huila and Barranca. Each one of these cases shows that a statist framing is equally important for inducing SSSP through coproduction as well as contention.

After a notable period of SSSP between the 1930s and 40s, at a time when the Colombian state's capacity was rather inchoate, Campoalegre rice producers' refusal to accept the development of a larger public irrigation system marked the start of a period of merely episodic service provision by the state, despite the simultaneous formation of the National Rice Growers Federation (Fedearroz), a strong organizational structure with significant influence with national and departmental state elites. Fedearroz leaders even questioned the state's role in marketing their product, claiming that they could do it better. Only as the need for costly

agronomic research and technological extension grew did they call on the state again to provide assistance, and then leveraged the Federation's own organizational capacity and influence with decisionmakers to begin coproducing services with state agencies for Huila rice farmers, starting in the 1960s.

Meanwhile, in Barranca, despite the USO oil workers union's strong capacity for mobilization and disruption and their significant national connections through radical Liberal and Communist activists, its demands to the Colombian state throughout the first half of the 20th century dealt mainly with workplace issues, with the Troco's arbitrary treatment of local residents, and (early on) with conflicts over land. Even when the USO embraced a statist framing in connection to oil nationalization, a statist framing around local service provision did not ensue. Demands for improved living conditions in the oil town were directed almost exclusively at the Tropical Oil Company, while the government was seen at most as a mediator or enforcer which might admonish the Troco and compel it to change its behavior.

This very case raises an important question which allows me to make an important conceptual clarification: should the USO be faulted for failing to embrace a thicker statist framing that encompassed local service provision? It is important to emphasize that I do not view the adoption of ideational framings through a voluntaristic lens. To assign causal weight to ideas does not entail assuming that they come out of thin air or that any number of ideas can arise and take hold in any given context. The USO's failure to adopt a statist framing around local service provision in Barranca is likely explained in large part by the reality that the Troco was the *de facto* ruler of Barranca and was probably even better equipped than the Colombian state to provide services. More generally, the government was not at the time known to be a significant service provider. It therefore made sense for the USO to prioritize demands related to its members' working conditions and its campaign for oil nationalization. Even so, I maintain that the absence

of a statist ideational framing around local service provision on the part of the USO helps us explain the fact that Barranca experienced no SSSP during the first half of the 20th century despite the union's significant strength.

Strong Organizational Structures for Collective Action

Not just anyone can make up for state capacity deficits. Effective coproduction and contention both demand considerable coordination and communication, which in turn require durable associational forms. I emphasized, however, that organizational structures need not preexist the onset of claim-making. Barrancabermeja's movement evolved significantly in terms of its membership, its tactics, and even the name of its umbrella organization. Claimants also do not need to be organized under a single centralized structure. Campesino organizations in Campoalegre and Palermo (Huila) illustrate this point: three separate non-state entities supported state service provision, and they each did so in different ways. Campesinos ran their farms through community enterprises, the Coagrohuila cooperative served to expand the reach of government services to campesinos throughout the region, and ANUC added a contentious element which made it possible to increase the number of agrarian reform beneficiaries. These organizations also raise another important consideration: organizational structures for collective action need not be completely separate from the state. They might even have their origin as state creations, as was the case with all three of these organizations, as well as the community action boards (JACs) that enabled the implementation of CORNARE's programs in Eastern Antioquia. In short, local ownership of state power need not be exogenous from the state.¹

Still, non-state actors' independence matters, as the case of the Eastern Antioquia JACs makes clear. These bodies were state-sponsored and never stopped functioning as conduits for

¹ I thank Marcus Kurtz for suggesting this language.

the distribution of clientelistic benefits. However, through their involvement in the Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia, many of them developed a considerable measure of independence from the state and from traditional party networks, and they went from being mere passive recipients of pork barrel transfers to taking on an active role in designing community projects to be funded through CORNARE's PRISER scheme.

Stable Access to and Influence with State Elites

In addition to adopting a statist ideational framing and developing strong organizational structures, claimants must establish channels for routine communication with higher levels of government by developing alliances inside the state apparatus. These alliances can involve activist or reformist bureaucrats with power over policy implementation, who can also find themselves empowered by non-state support on the ground (Fox 2015). Such was the case with CORNARE and INCORA bureaucrats in Eastern Antioquia and Huila, respectively. These functionaries served as conduits for local-level demands inside the state apparatus and provided non-state claimants with access to public resources. Especially in Campoalegre, INCORA personnel provided a measure of protection to campesinos from attacks by other state agents (namely security forces) as well as landowners. Meanwhile, campesinos were also important allies to INCORA as well as CORNARE activist bureaucrats. In the latter case, CORNARE bureaucrats leveraged the success of participatory processes to defend the agency from capture by traditional politicians.

But access and influence can also be attained through purely partisan, electorally-minded politicians, as demonstrated by the case of Horacio Serpa and his FILA political group in Barrancabermeja. There, patronage was instrumental for achieving the formalization of squatter settlements and their subsequent connection to the city's water system. In return, the city's new

neighborhoods became reliable sources of support for FILA. At the same time, clientelistic dynamics were also kept partially in check through contentious pressure, so neighborhood groups retained considerable autonomy from their political patrons.

6.2. Further Implications and Directions for Future Research

This section discusses some additional themes and questions raised by the study. These issues all call for further investigation, but the case study evidence provides valuable insights which may inform future research. First, I discuss the relationship between SSSP and state capacity, which also helps to shed light on some of the different implications of coproductive and contentious local ownership of state power. The next section of the chapter then takes up in greater detail the question of what this study tells us about other forms of state action, with a focus on the provision of security.

I have insisted throughout this dissertation that state capacity should be seen as an enabling (or constraining) condition for SSSP. A question I have not yet addressed has to do with the opposite relationship: how does SSSP affect the capacity of the state that performs it? The case studies offer some clues in this regard. Consider for example the case of Barranca's water system. Despite receiving funding from the national government in 1968, part of which was earmarked for an expansion of the water supply network, the percentage of homes in the city with access to water remained virtually unchanged between the 1964 and 1973 censuses. Then, as I showed, came the period of SSSP between 1975 and 1986 driven by contentious local ownership of state power. By the time of the 1985 census, the water coverage rate had gone up significantly. Partly in response to popular mobilization, the national government secured loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to expand Barranca's (along with other cities') water supply system. Even after the city's popular movement was weakened by

paramilitary violence in the mid-1980s and local ownership of state power came to an end, the municipal administration still had part of those funds from foreign loans. Upgrades had been made to the city's water treatment plant. Administrative and technical personnel for the water company had also been hired. In other words, the municipal government's stock of resources for service provision (i.e., its capacity) had been expanded. It was largely thanks to these resources that the city was able to continue expanding the water supply network into the 1990s and 2000s—though this was done at a much slower pace than before, and then the municipal water company collapsed. SSSP thus had a net positive effect on state capacity, though this effect was not very large and does not seem to have lasted long.

On the other hand, the experience of CORNARE in Eastern Antioquia paints a different picture. The agency was created from scratch in 1983 and started to function in 1986. As I argued in Chapter 5, it quickly became a “pocket of effectiveness” within the Colombian state apparatus. Its highly successful rural electrification and environmental management through service exchange (PRISER) programs were made possible by an alignment of interests between business elites, activist bureaucrats, and community organizations. Unlike Barranca's contention-driven period of SSSP, this was a case of coproduction, with buy-in from a broad array of actors. In 1994, Congress stripped CORNARE of its development promotion mandate, turned it into an environmental regulatory agency, and passed it down to subnational government control (it used to be a national-level entity). The rural electrification program was terminated, and PRISER was significantly scaled back. According to some of its former officials, it became increasingly politicized after its status changed to a subnational government agency. In spite of this, however, CORNARE still became one of the country's most effective regional environmental regulators. While the period of SSSP lasted, CORNARE developed into a highly professionalized bureaucracy, while also cultivating strong private-sector relationships (thanks in

large part to the fact that the local business sector played an important role in the agency's creation). Thus, the coproductive processes that gave origin to CORNARE and supported its role in service provision in Eastern Antioquia seem to have contributed to more long-lasting institutional development within the agency. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that SSSP driven by coproductive local ownership of state power is likely to be more conducive to longer-term state capacity building than the contentious variety.

Turning now to a different question, this study has focused on the determinants of state service provision in rural or distant localities impacted by large-scale investment projects. What about other forms of state action, such as regulation, tax collection, conflict mediation, adjudication, and administration of justice, or the provision of security? What are their determinants in economic hotspots marked by limited state capacity? How relevant is the theory of local ownership of state power for explaining variation along those dimensions? The next section attempts a preliminary extension of the theory by focusing on the issue of security.

6.3. Local Ownership of State Power and Other Forms of State Action

It is well known that the most salient dimension of state action in economic hotspots is often not service delivery but the provision of security (Borras and Franco 2013; Del Bene, Scheidel, and Temper 2018; Lapegna 2016; Moran et al. 2018; Porter and Watts 2017; Rettberg and Prieto 2018). To what extent can my focus on local ownership of state power contribute to our understanding of the role played by state security forces around major investment hotspots in localities far from a country's centers of power? While tracing the evolution of state service provision in the regions under study, I gathered some (cursory yet informative) original data that sheds some light on the determinants of sustained state *security* provision in economic hotspots marked by limited state capacity.

My findings suggest that while the provision of military or police force at specific moments in time requires little more than political will, deployable personnel and equipment, and basic logistical capacity (such as access routes and vehicles), the *sustained* provision of security often requires significant inputs from local non-state actors. The case of Barrancabermeja, where the local population's experience of the Colombian state has overwhelmingly involved its security apparatus, is especially illustrative.

From the 19th century until the start of oil activity there were frequent calls by forest traders for the state to subdue the Yariguí indigenous people, who resisted traders' activities in their territory. (LeGrand 2016; A. Vargas 1992; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, vol. 1; R.A. Velásquez and Castillo 2006). In advance of the Tropical Oil Company's start of operations in Barranca, the departmental government of Santander created a new police unit for the Magdalena River banks (Galvis 1997 [1965], 64). Aprile-Gnisset (1997, 163) claims that that this detachment—made up of 22 agents under the command of a special commissioner—was purposefully formed for the company's benefit. However, outside of anecdotal evidence that the unit “provided some services” to the Troco when the first oil wells were drilled in 1918 (Galvis 1997 [1965], 67), there is no indication that it provided security to the company on a constant basis; in fact, what little evidence is available indicates that the unit's agents were stationed across different settlements along the Magdalena River at least until 1922.² It was only after the Troco began to face constant popular unrest due to the dismal living and working conditions faced by workers, around 1922, that state provision of security became more sustained in Barranca. That

² The unit's jurisdiction went far beyond Barranca and the limits of the De Mares Concession; its 22 agents were responsible for patrolling the length of the Magdalena River from the Sogamoso River in the north to the *corregimiento* of Ermitaño in the municipality of Bolívar in the south, a length of approximately 150 kilometers (see Map 3.1). See “Ordenanza No. 25, sobre aumento del Cuerpo de Policía Departamental y otras providencias relacionadas con él,” in Asamblea del Departamento de Santander (1917, 227-228). See also Ordinance No. 7 of 1921 in Asamblea del Departamento de Santander (1921, 7-8).

year, Troco executives appealed to different government authorities calling for stronger police protection inside the concession area (Aprile-Gniset 1997, 164; Galvis 1997 [1965], 160; Vega 2002, 120). But they did not just ask for assistance; they actively provided for the creation of dedicated police force for the area:

Bearing in mind how costly it is for the Government to sustain a large Police corps that has to be created solely because of the company's work, I must advise Mr. Governor that I in the name of the Tropical Oil Company am willing to facilitate all means necessary for the creation of said Corps which the Government deems to be temporarily or indefinitely necessary. (Vega 2002, 120)

The departmental police unit was soon moved to new quarters built by the Troco. Also in 1922, the Colombian Congress created a special section of the national police for Barranca.³ Although the government established a formal prohibition against accepting “gifts of any kind from private individuals or the petroleum companies located [in Barrancabermeja],” including “lodging facilities,”⁴ in 1923 the Troco built a new station in the Infantas oil field for the national police and provided officers with food, mosquito nets (a rare sight in Barranca at the time), and various other supplies (Galvis 1997 [1965], vol. 1, 145; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009, 114). In other words, sustained state security provision in Barranca in the early years of oil operations was coproduced by the Troco.

As late as 1938, the contrast between the police quarters maintained with the Troco's contributions in El Centro (the area where the oil fields are located) and the facility in the center of town which relied on public funding was quite illustrative: “It is possible that the quarters in

³ See Law 118 of 1922 and presidential Decree 540 of the same year. At this point in time, the National Police was only present in a few select parts of the country outside of Bogotá (Llorente 1999). In addition to having “gendarmerie” contingents in some department capitals, the National Police only had border police units in some towns located near international borders and nine additional sections, most of which were located in economically strategic regions (such as Barranca, the oil region of Catatumbo, the emerald-producing locality of Muzo in Boyacá department, or the Sincerín sugar mill in Bolívar) (Policía Nacional de Colombia 1922). Many of these police divisions involved similar coproduction arrangements as the one described here.

⁴ The notice is reproduced in Aprile-Gniset (1997) in an unnumbered page between pages 168 and 169.

Barrancabermeja might not exhibit totally hygienic conditions, but the one in El Centro cannot be criticized in any way” (Ministerio de Gobierno 1938b). Yet another striking illustration of the importance of coproduction for security provision in economic hotspots where locally sourced state capacity is limited can be seen in the government’s actions in Barranca after the killing of radical leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. When news of Gaitán’s killing reached Barranca, riots erupted and a “revolutionary junta” took over the city, disarmed local security forces, organized popular militias, and confined foreign Troco employees inside company property; the national government only regained control several days later (Díaz Callejas 1988). When it did, Barranca was heavily militarized. And yet, despite Barranca’s explicitly stated strategic importance for national state elites during this time of turmoil, state security forces continued to depend on the Troco’s contributions. From the moment it recaptured the city from the revolutionary junta, the national army battalion assigned to Barranca was quartered in the Troco’s youth center (López Ortiz 1997, 87). An army general warned that if oil companies “were to suspend their support for the army, for whatever reason, the troops would be left in a desperate situation” (cited in Sáenz Rovner 2007, 169).⁵

More research is needed to develop a more robust and clearly-specified theory of sustained state provision of security around economic hotspots in localities where state capacity is limited. The extent to which local ownership of state power as defined in connection to the state’s provision of services—with the focus on non-state actors’ organizational structures for collective action, statist ideational framing, and access to and influence with state elites—matters when it comes to coproducing security-oriented state action remains to be explored. Important questions about the interactions, contradictions, and complementarities between different types of state

⁵ The officer refers to the Troco and to the Shell oil company, which ran another oil operation in Yondó, across the Magdalena River from Barranca.

action also call for further investigation: for example, does sustained provision of security make sustained service provision less likely to occur? It is also safe to assume that armed conflict dynamics play a more direct, less indeterminate role in bringing about sustained state security provision than they do in inducing service provision. These questions are ripe for further investigation.

Still, a few tentative conclusions seem warranted. First, the state's deployment of security—much like the provision of services—is not an automatic ramification of the emergence of new economic hotspots. Instead, the extent to which the state's security apparatus is brought to bear on a given locality is likely to be driven in large part by local actors' interests, demands, and active contributions—in conjunction, of course, with state capacity and government actors' own interests and political will. As some geographers have already suggested, the specific form and content of state coercion in oil regions (and agricultural boomtowns and areas impacted by large dams) is likely to be co-constituted (coproduced, one could say) by the encounters between politicians, economic actors, and other societal forces (see, e.g., Watts 2004). Future comparative research may be able to explore and explain more specific variation across and within cases.

6.4. On the Politics of this Study

To conclude, a word on the potential political implications of this study is in order. State service provision, even at its most effective, is no panacea when dealing with the negative consequences of large-scale investment projects. Even if oil production, agribusiness, or large dam construction can be harnessed to induce the provision of new services such as clean water provision, support for the local population's independent livelihoods, or new social programs, the environmental sustainability of the economic hotspot, its impact on cultural well-being and survival, and other crucial considerations may continue to pose serious problems and even render

the benefits of SSSP meaningless in comparison. If toxic residue from a large mine or chemical runoff from an industrial plantation poison a community's water source, or a large dam dries it up, the construction of new water system by the state will not be a cause for celebration. Many would also argue that the state's effective provision of services may serve to legitimize and perpetuate growth-centric, extractivist, and unsustainable practices and ideologies, and this may have disastrous consequences far beyond the compensated locality.

My decision to focus on state service provision is categorically not intended to dismiss the validity of more radical engagements (practical and intellectual) with the problem. I do not even seek to find a middle ground between extractivism and communities' opposition to it. I have, however, sought to avoid the increasingly common practice, not only in advocacy but also in academia, of condemning (special) interests, ignoring institutions, and only focusing on ideas. I view this study as a pursuit of harm reduction in a world in which the kinds of extractive, agribusiness, and power generation projects under study are still happening, and, as I have already noted, there is no indication that they will be going away anytime soon. Communities impacted by them can certainly use the scholarly community's solidarity and support in building up their own power and autonomy. But they also require practical, tangible policy solutions to pressing problems that can potentially be addressed—at least partially—through effective state action.

7. APPENDIX: Inventory of New Subnational Economies in 20th Century Colombia

7.1. Introduction

This appendix presents an inventory of new regional economies in Colombia over the course of the 20th century. This dataset had two purposes. It was chiefly meant to inform case selection for the dissertation's inductive comparative-historical analysis of subnational economic hotspots in Colombia. In addition, it is also intended to serve as a point of departure for future theory-testing endeavors. The identification of this "universe of cases" to which a theory of SSSP in rural economic hubs should apply was based on secondary sources and documents from the Colombian government, international organizations, and non-governmental entities, complemented in some cases by cursory archival research.

Although the inventory is meant to be exhaustive, it should nonetheless be viewed as a work in progress and as a starting point for further research. It is possible that some less well-researched cases may be missing, so feedback from case experts is anticipated and most welcome. The suggested bibliography for each case is admittedly incomplete; recently published sources and, especially, sources that are accessible online are likely to be overrepresented. The inventory's inclusion as an appendix to this dissertation—and subsequent publication as an open-access online document—is intended to prompt a collaborative, crowdsourcing-style exercise aimed at mapping out Colombia's subnational economic history, starting with the 20th century. The online version of this document will be updated with additions and corrections as frequently as possible. For future versions, the inventory could also be expanded to cover the 19th and 21st centuries.

The cases included in this inventory consist of economic regions that were formed or experienced major expansions between 1901 and 2000 in rural areas—i.e., not inside urban agglomerations or in their immediate vicinity.¹ As discussed in the dissertation’s Introduction and Chapter 2, I define “economic regions” in socio-geographical terms as units of space whose boundaries are determined by the influence of an economic activity, rather than formally recognized administrative units. Only after having identified the area of influence of an economic change did I seek to identify the municipalities impacted by it. Activities that began prior to the 20th century are only included if they expanded to new areas or experienced major changes in modes of production during the 20th century (as in the case of subsistence crops that are transformed into mechanized commercial crops or artisanal mining that gives way to industrial processes).² Productive activities that are circumscribed to a relatively small locality are also excluded, unless they harbored considerable economic importance beyond that particular locality. Nevertheless, most of these excluded local economies are listed at the end of the main inventory, and I remain open to including them if my initial assessment proves to have been mistaken.

¹ This rule is loosened when dealing with major changes to existing subnational economies where cities subsequently emerged, such as Barrancabermeja (a small river port hamlet which became an important city between 1918 and the 1950s).

² This means, for example, that traditional placer mining areas that became industrialized in the 1900s (such as the Bajo Cauca region in Antioquia) are included, but mines where extraction processes remained largely unchanged since the 19th century (such as the lode mines of Segovia, also in Antioquia) are not included.

7.2. Inventory

Table 7.1. Inventory of New Subnational Economies in 20th Century Colombia

	Key dates	Economic activity	Department(s)	Subregion or key site	Relevant sources
1	c. 1880s (c. 1910 boom)	Coffee plantations	Tolima	Foothills of Eastern and Central Cordilleras	Beyer (1947); Clavijo (1993); Henderson (1985); Machado (1988); Palacios (2009); Ramirez Bacca (2008); Rincón (2007)
2	1883 (1909-1914 boom)	Platinum and gold mining	Chocó	San Juan and Condoto Rivers	Bonet (2008); A.M. Castillo and Varela (2012); Escalante (1975); García Márquez (1954b); Leal (2004, 2009)
3	c. 1890s (c. 1910 boom)	Coffee plantations	Antioquia	Southwestern region (then Centro Province); Northeastern region (North of Porce/Nus valleys)	Arango (1977); Beyer (1947); Brew (1977); Palacios (1980, 2009); Parsons (1997)
4	c. 1890s (c. 1910 boom)	Coffee plantations	Antioquia, then Caldas (1905)	Present-day Caldas and Risaralda	Arango (1977); Beyer (1947); Lopera (1986); Palacios (2009)
5	c. 1900s (c. 1910 boom)	Coffee plantations	Antioquia, then Caldas (1905)	Present-day Quindío	Arango (1977); Beyer (1947); Lopera (1986); Palacios (2009)
6	c. late 1890s-early 1900s (1930s collapse)	Coffee plantations	Magdalena	Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta	Viloria de la Hoz (2014)
7	1896	Emerald mining	Boyacá and Cundinamarca	Guavio-Guateque district	Safford and Palacios (2002); S. Uribe (1960); Weldon, Ortiz, and Ottaway (2016)

8	1899 (major upgrades: 1903, 1920s)	Timber extraction, sugar plantation and mill	Chocó	Sautatá	Bonet (2008); L.F. González (1997); Leal (2004, 161); Leal and Restrepo (2003); Ripoll de Lemaitre (1997)
9	1900 (1932 collapse)	Natural rubber extraction	Intendencia of Putumayo (now Amazonas)	El Encanto and La Chorrera	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2014b); Meisel, Bonilla, and Sánchez (2013); Pineda (2000, 2003)
10	1901	Banana plantations	Magdalena	Aracataca, Ciénaga, Sevilla (present-day Zona Bananera, then <i>corregimiento</i> of Ciénaga), El Retén	Bergquist (1978); Bucheli (2005); Corso (1997); Gilhodes (1967); LeGrand (1983); Meisel (2011); Palacios (2003); Urrutia (2016); Vega (2002); Viloria de la Hoz (2009); White (1978)
11	1901 (industrialization c. 1920s)	Sugar plantations and mills	Valle del Cauca	Flatlands of Cauca River valley	Arroyo (2014); Bejarano (2011 [1988]); Blasier (1966); Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2014a); Delgadillo (2014); Kalmanovitz and López (2006); Kruijt, Maiguashca, and Vellinga (1982); LeGrand (2016); Mejía and Moncayo (1987); A. Perafán (2012); Santos and Sánchez (2010); M. Taussig (1978); J.C. Zuluaga (2009)
12	1905	Timber extraction	Santander	Carare-Opón	Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011a); Moncada (2013); Silva (2006)
13	1907 (collapse c. 1928)	Gold mining	Cauca	Timbiquí River Basin	Castro (2011); de Friedemann (1989); Leal (2004, 2008); M.T. Taussig (2004); Tirado Mejía (1976)
14	1905	Timber extraction	Chocó	Lower and Middle Atrato River Basin	Leal and Restrepo (2003)

15	1908	Sugar plantations and mill	Bolívar	Sincerín (present-day Arjona municipality)	Bejarano (2011 [1988]); Guardo (2014); Kalmanovitz and López (2006); Ripoll de Lemaître (1997)
16	1909 (evidence of first steam dredger, but evidence of activity since 16 th century)	Gold mining	Antioquia	Bajo Cauca	Brew (1977); Parsons (1997); Poveda (2015); Singewald (1949)
17	1909	Emerald mining	Boyacá and Cundinamarca	Vásquez-Yacopí district	Amaya (2006); Baquero (2017); Mendoza (1965); Leiteritz and Riaño (2018); Pogue (1917); Poveda (2015); Singewald (1949); S. Uribe (1960); M.V. Uribe (1992)
18	1918 Concession first granted: 1905 Nationalization: 1951 (fields) & 1961 (refinery) Refinery upgrades: 1970s	Oil extraction	Santander	Barrancabermeja (De Mares Concession)	Almario (1984); Aprile-Gnisset (1997); Archila (1978); Archila and González (1986); Arcila (1994); Buenahora (1997 [1970]); De la Pedraja (1985, 1993); M.C. García (2006); Ordóñez (2012 [1928]); Sáenz Rovner (2002); Van Isschot (2015); Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009); see also Chapter 3 of this dissertation
19	c. 1920s	Coffee plantations	Valle del Cauca	Central Cordillera foothills	Arango (1977); Machado (1988); A. Perafán (2012); Santos and Sánchez (2010)
20	1920	Salt flats	La Guajira	Manaure	Aguilera (2006b); León (2011)

21	c. mid-1920s	Rice crops	Meta	Llanos piedmont	Díez (1990); García Bustamante (2003); N.F. Gutiérrez, Rodríguez, and Delvasto (1989); Leurquin (1967); Rausch (1999) ¹
22	1927	Coffee plantations	Huila	Central and Eastern Cordillera foothills	Arango (1977); Chalarca (2000); Machado (1988); Palacios (1980); Tovar Zambrano (1996)
23	1927	Guadalupe hydroelectric project	Antioquia	Guadalupe and Carolina del Príncipe	Empresas Públicas de Medellín (1989); E.L. Ospina (1966); Valencia (1999).
24	1927	Oil extraction	Boyacá (but also small parts of Antioquia and Santander)	Territorio Vásquez (Boyacá), Puerto Berrio, Puerto Nare, Puerto Triunfo (Antioquia), San Luis (Santander)	Alonso (1997); Avellaneda (2004); Fals Borda (1957); Medina Gallego (1990); H. Vásquez (1994)
25	1928 (but sugar plantations date back to late 19 th century)	Sugar, cotton, and rice crops	Bolívar, then Córdoba	Lower and Middle Sinú River (early on, especially Hacienda Berástegui)	Fals Borda (2002, Vol. 4); Flórez Malagón (2008); Leurquin (1966); Ojeda (2004); Posada Carbó (1986); Ripoll de Lemaître (1997); Van Ausdal (2009); Viloria de la Hoz (2007b)
26	1929 (collapse c. 1960)	Banana plantations	Chocó	Urabá	Aramburo (2003); Cepeda (2010); Parsons (1996)
27	1931 (concession first granted in 1905)	Oil extraction	Norte de Santander	Catatumbo (Barco Concession)	Concha (1981); Vega and Aguilera (1995); Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009)
28	1933	Mechanized commercial agriculture (especially rice)	Tolima	Inter-Andean valley	Campos (2004); Clavijo (1993); Jennings (1961); Leurquin (1967); Neira (2007)

¹ See also Peter Jennings, "Historia del cultivo de arroz en Colombia," *Arroz* 10, no. 118 (1961), 19-23.

29	c. 1930s	Mechanized commercial agriculture (especially rice)	Bolívar, then Bolívar, Córdoba, and Sucre	La Mojana	Aguilera (2006a); Leurquin (1967); Posada Carbó (1998)
30	c. mid-1930s (commercial crops date back to 1880s, first selected seeds introduced in late 1910s)	Mechanized commercial agriculture (especially rice)	Huila	Inter-Andean valley	Ducuara and Manrique (2008); Leurquin (1967); Salas Vargas (1988); Tovar Zambrano (1996); Valenzuela (1978); Zabaleta (2001); see also Chapter 4 of this dissertation
31	1935	Cattle ranching	Caquetá	Amazonian piedmont	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2017); Giro (2016); J.J. González (1996); Melo (2016); R. Ramirez (2004); T. Vásquez (2015)
32	1939 (facilities built in 1923 for failed meatpacking house)	Oil port and facilities	Bolívar, then Sucre	Tolú	Avella (2011); J.D. Gutiérrez (2018); Isaza and Salcedo (1991); Vega and Aguilera (1995); Vilorio de la Hoz (2002)
33	1939 (collapse: c. 1945)	Natural rubber extraction	Vaupés, then Guaviare	Calamar	Molano (1989); Rausch (1999)
34	1940	Riogrande hydroelectric project	Antioquia	Don Matías and Santa Rosa de Osos, then Barbosa and Bello	DANE (1981); Empresas Públicas de Medellín (1989); E.L. Ospina (1966); World Bank (1995)
35	1941 (production for export started in 1945)	Oil extraction	Antioquia	Yondó	S.A. Giraldo (1996); Griess (1946); H. Vásquez (1994); Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009, vol. 1)

36	1943	Oil extraction	Antioquia, Bolívar, Magdalena (then Cesar), and Santander	Northern Magdalena Medio (Cantagallo, San Pablo, Lebrija, Aguachica, and La Cristalina concessions)	Angarita (1953); Avella (2011); S.A. Giraldo (1996); H. Vásquez (1994); Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009, vol. 2)
37	1943 (Gas production started c. 1960s)	Oil and gas extraction	Magdalena	Plato, then Ariguaní (El Difícil concession)	Griess (1946); Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009, vol. 2)
38	1945 (First station began to operate in 1955; second one in 1974)	Anchicayá hydroelectric project	Valle del Cauca	Dagua	IBRD (1951a); De la Pedraja (1993); Inter-American Development Bank (1979, 1); Orihuela (2018); A. Perafán (2012)
39	1946 (First station began to operate in 1951; additional ones in 1963 and 1969)	Caldas hydroelectric project	Caldas	Chinchiná	De la Pedraja (1993); L.F. Giraldo (2001); IBRD (1951a, 1959)
40	1946	Lebrija hydroelectric project	Santander	Lebrija	De la Pedraja (1993); Galán (1947); IBRD (1951b)
41	1949 (expansion in 1986)	Oil and gas extraction	Tolima	Ortega, expanded to Piedras	Angarita (1953); Avella (2011, 184); Belding (1952); H. Vásquez (1994)
42	1949 (first expansion c. 1963, second expansion: 1978-1985)	African oil palm plantations	Magdalena, then Cesar	Algarrobo and Central Cesar	Aguilera (2002); Bastidas, Peña, and Reyes (2003); M.L. Ospina (1998)

43	1950 (collapse c. 1981)	Cotton plantations	Magdalena, then Cesar	Cesar River valley	Barrera (2014); Bonet (1998); Leurquin (1966); Helmsing (1986); Wagner (2011)
44	1950 (Extraction dates back to 1870s, export boom 1950s)	Timber extraction	Nariño	Pacific coastline	Leal and Restrepo (2003); J.D. Rodriguez (2015)
45	1951	Acerías Paz del Río integrated iron and steel mill and iron mining	Boyacá	Sugamuxi, Tundama, and Valderrama provinces	Acerías Paz del Río (1976, 1960); Barreto (2014); Chaparro (2013); García Márquez (1954a); Hirschman (1957); IBRD (1963); Oficina de Información y Prensa (1954); Pérez (2012); Rangel (1965); O. Rodríguez (2008); Sandilands (1990); Wiesner (1963)
46	1953 end: c. late 1970s	State-directed internal colonization	Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Santander	Puerto Boyacá (Boyacá), Cimitarra and part of Vélez (Santander), Puerto Salgar and Yacopí (Cundinamarca), La Dorada, Samaná and Victoria (Caldas), and Puerto Berrio and La Magdalena-Puerto Nare (Antioquia)	Alonso (1997); INCORA (1973); A. Vargas (1992)
47	1956	Oil and gas extraction	Bolívar	Depresión momposina (Cicuco-Violo concession)	Avella (2011); Avellaneda (2004); T. Roa (2003); Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009, vol. 2)
48	1956	Oil and gas extraction	Nariño, then Putumayo	Orito	Avellaneda (2004); Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2015c); De la Pedraja (1993); Devia (2004); M.C. Ramirez (2011); Torres (2011)

49	1956 (expansions in 1970, 1979, 1985)	Oil extraction	Huila	Neiva, Aipe, Villavieja, Tello, Palermo, and Yaguará	Amézquita (1996); H. Rubiano (2012); World Bank (1991a) ²
50	1959 (expansion in 1963; end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Caquetá	First, La Mono, Valparaíso y Maguaré; then, almost the rest of Caquetá	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016b); INCORA (1973); T. Vásquez (2015)
51	1959 (expansion in 1964; end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Meta	Ariari River Valley	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016b); J.J. González (1992); D. Giraldo and Ladrón de Guevara (1980); INCORA (1973); Molano (1989)
52	1959 (expansion: 1964, end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Arauca and Boyacá	Sarare region (Araucaita, Saravena corregimiento, part of Arauca and Tame, Cubará, and part of Güicán)	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016b); INCORA (1973); Zamosc (1986)
53	1959	Prado hydroelectric project	Tolima	Prado	Hernández (1968) ³
54	1959	Timber extraction	Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura and Lower Calima River Basin	Broderick (1998); Leal and Restrepo (2003); Lozano and González Candil (2011)
55	1959	African oil palm plantations	Nariño	Tunaco	M.L. Ospina (1998); Vilorio de la Hoz (2007a)

² See also “Historia de Hocol”, *Hocol*, <https://www.hocol.com.co/nosotros/historia>.

³ See also “Centrales hidroeléctricas”, *CELSIA*, <http://www.celsia.com/centrales-hidroelectricas>.

56	1959 (expansion: 1980)	African oil palm plantations	Bolívar, Magdalena (then Cesar), and Santander	Northern Magdalena Medio region	Fedepalma (2017); M.L. Ospina (1998)
57	1959 (slow expansion of rice crops dates back to 1950s; collapse of oil palm: 1974)	African oil palm and rice plantations	Norte de Santander	Zulia Valley	Leurquin (1967); M.L. Ospina (1998)
58	1959 (first exports and expansion: 1964)	Banana plantations	Antioquia	Urabá	F. Botero (1990); Bucheli (2005); C.I. García and Aramburo (2011); Nasi (2018); C.M. Ortiz (2007); Parsons (1996); Steiner (2000)
59	c. late 1950s	Sugar plantations	Cauca	Upper Cauca River Valley	L.C. Castillo et al. (2010); Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2015b) ⁴
60	1960 (start of operations: 1966)	Calima hydroelectric project	Valle del Cauca	Calima	De la Pedraja (1993); IBRD (1960); Neuse (1992); Posada and Posada (1966) ⁵
61	1961 (first expansion c. 1970s; second expansion c. 1990s)	African oil palm plantations	Meta	Llanos piedmont (later expansion to farther Eastern plains)	Fedepalma (2017); H. González (2005); M.L. Ospina (1998); Rausch (2013)

⁴ See also “Historia de Incauca, S.A.”, *Incauca S.A.S.*, <http://www.incauca.com/es/nosotros/historia>.

⁵ See also “Centrales hidroeléctricas”, *CELSIA*, <http://www.celsia.com/centrales-hidroelectricas>.

62	1963	El Peñol-Guatapé hydroelectric project	Antioquia	El Peñol, Guatapé, and San Rafael	Aramburo et al. (1990a, 1990c, 1990e); Codesarrollo (1966); Empresas Públicas de Medellín (1989, 1979); C.I. García (1992); Gómez and Espinal (2010); J.C. López (2009); A. López (2014); E.L. Ospina (1966); Sáenz (1985); see also Chapter 3 of this dissertation
63	1963 (end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Chocó and Antioquia	Riosucio and Urabá (Antioquia #1, 2, and 3, Chocó #1 Projects)	Aramburo (2003); Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016b); INCORA (1973)
64	1964 (end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Cauca and Nariño	Guapi, Timbiquí, and López de Micay (Cauca), Iscuandé, El Charco, and Mosquera (Nariño)	Grueso and Escobar 1996, cited in Castro (2010, 16); INCORA (1973).
65	1964 (end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Putumayo	Sibundoy Valley, Alto Putumayo	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2015c); INCORA (1973)
66	1964 (end: c. late 1970s)	State-directed internal colonization	Boyacá	Casanare	INCORA (1973); Rausch (2013)
67	1965 (crops date back to 1920s; export boom: 1970; decline: 1985)	Marijuana crops	Magdalena, Cesar, and La Guajira	Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta	Henderson (2012); C. Ramírez (1998); H. Ruiz (1979); Thoumi (2003); Viloria de la Hoz (2006)
68	1969 (start of operations: 1976; expansion: 1983)	Chivor hydroelectric project	Boyacá	Santa María, Almeida, Chivor (founded in 1990), and Macanal	ISA (1977); Sanclemente (1999); Tobar (1977)

69	Late 1960s (rice) 1978 (oil palm)	Rice and African oil palm plantations	Boyacá (then Casanare)	Yopal, Aguazul, Maní, Sabanalarga (then Villanueva)	D. Giraldo and Ladrón de Guevara (1980); N.F. Gutiérrez, Rodríguez, and Delvasto (1989); M.L. Ospina (1998) ⁶
70	1975 (coca expansion: 1980-1986)	Marijuana and coca crops	Meta	Ariari	O.J. Gutiérrez (2012b); Molano (1989, 300); Rausch (2013); Reyes (1990)
71	1976	Coca crops	Caquetá	Middle and Lower Caguán	Ciro (2016); Mora (1989, 135); T. Vásquez (2015)
72	1977 (descubrimiento: 1973)	Natural gas extraction	La Guajira	Manaure	Sánchez (2011) ⁷
73	1977	Coca crops	Putumayo	Bajo Putumayo	F.E. González, Bolívar, and Vásquez (2002); R. Ramírez (2004); M.C. Ramírez (2001); Torres (2011)
74	1969 (new fields: 1976, 1981, 1985, 1992; refinery built in 1990)	Oil extraction	Meta	Acacías, Castilla la Nueva, Puerto Gaitán, Villavicencio	(Aguilar, Galeano, and Pérez 1998; Céspedes 2011); J.I. González et al. (2011); Rausch (2013); H. Vásquez (1994) ⁸
75	Late 1970s	Coca crops	Guaviare	Calamar, Miraflores	Henderson (2012); Molano (2006); C. Ramírez (1998)

⁶ See also Wilson Moreno, “Asistencia técnica a cultivadores,” *Arroz* 17, no. (176), 23-34.

⁷ See also “The Chuchupa Field”, *The Oil & Gas Year, Colombia*, 2011, “Campo Ballena”, *BN Americas*, <https://www.bnamericas.com/project-profile/es/campo-ballena-campo-ballena>.

⁸ See also “Cuenca Llanos Orientales. Estudio Integrado – Crudos Pesados”, *Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos*, afiches presentados en la Ronda Colombia 2008, <http://www.anh.gov.co/Informacion-Geologica-y-Geofisica/Estudios-Integrados-y-Modelamientos/Presentaciones/%20y-%20Poster/%20Tecnico/Campos.pdf>; “PETROLEO - REFINACION - Cargas a Refinerías (BPDC)”, *Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética*, http://www.upme.gov.co/generadorconsultas/Consulta_Series.aspx?idModulo=3&tipoSerie=31.

76	1977	Marijuana, coca, and poppy crops	Cesar	Serranía del Perijá	Henderson (2012); Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (2017); C. Ramírez (1998); R. Vargas and Barragán (1994)
77	1978	Drug trafficking and coca crops	Antioquia, Bolívar, Santander, and Boyacá	Magdalena Medio	Alonso (1997); Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011a); Medina Gallego (1990); Murillo (1994); Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH (2001)
78	1978	Salvajina hydroelectric project	Cauca	Suárez	Kruijt, Maiguashca, and Vellinga (1982); V. Martínez and Castillo (2016); A. Perafán (2012); Tanchev (2014) ⁹
79	1978	San Carlos, Calderas, Playas, and Jaguas hydroelectric projects	Antioquia	San Carlos, San Rafael, Alejandría, and Granada	Aramburo et al. (1990b, 1990d); L.M. Botero and Uribe (1998); C.I. García (1992); C.I. García and Aramburo (2011); Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011c); Olaya (2012); Pimienta and Villegas (1985); World Bank (1979, 1978; 1991b, 17); see also Chapter 5 of this dissertation
80	1979	Ferronickel mining	Córdoba	Montelíbano	Bernal (2018); C. Serrano (2016); Viloria de la Hoz (2007b, 322)
81	Early 1980s (onset of coca crops: early 1990s; expansion: 1998)	Drug trafficking and (later) coca crops	Antioquia	Northeastern and Bajo Cauca regions	Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011d); Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH (2006b); Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (2017)

⁹ See also “Centrales hidroeléctricas”, *CELSIA*, <http://www.celsia.com/centrales-hidroelectricas>; “Represa La Salvajina, Colombia”, *Environmental Justice Atlas*, <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/represa-la-salvajina-colombia>.

82	1980 (production for export started in 1982; expansion: 1985)	Coal mining	La Guajira	Albania, Hatonuevo, Maicao, Barrancas, and Uribia (port)	Archila (2015); De la Pedraja (1993); Kline (1987); Meisel (2007); Quiroga (2018); Viloria de la Hoz (1998)
83	1980 (first major discovery) second major discovery: 1983 start of commercial production: 1986	Oil extraction	Arauca	Saravena, Arauca, Arauquita	Avella (2011); O.J. Gutiérrez (2012a); Eaton (2006); Peñate (1999); Perrone (1991); Rettberg and Prieto (2018); H. Roa (1987); H. Vásquez (1994)
84	1981 (start of operations: 1986)	Betania hydroelectric project	Huila	Yaguará, Campoalegre, El Hobo, and Gigante	Chacón and Parra (2014, 63); Muñoz and Ramírez (2016); H. Roa and Blanco (1986); C.D. Ramirez (2005)
85	1981 (start of operations: 1992)	Guavio hydroelectric project	Cundinamarca	Gama, Gachalá, Ubalá, Guasca, Guatavita, Gachetá, and Junín	De la Pedraja (1993); DNP (1983); Flórez and Barreto (2007); H. Roa and Blanco (1986); J.C. Rodríguez et al. (2000); World Bank (1996)
86	1983	Drug trafficking and coca crops	Córdoba	Upper Sinú and San Jorge Rivers Basin	Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH (2007); Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (2017) ¹⁰
87	1984	Poppy crops	Tolima	Foothills of Central Cordillera: Ortega, Coyaima, Chaparral, Ataco, Rioblanco, and Planadas	Tokatian (1993); R. Vargas and Barragán (1994)

¹⁰ See also “Cómo Fidel Castaño despojó la finca Las Tangas”, *Verdad Abierta*, 3 de septiembre de 2012, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/80-versiones/4191-la-historia-detras-de-la-finca-las-tangas>; “Bloque Sinú y San Jorge”, *Verdad Abierta*, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimarios/422-bloque-sinu-y-san-jorge>.

88	1985	Gold mining	Vaupés	Taraira	S. Rubiano (2014); Salazar, Gutiérrez, and Franco (2006); G. Zuluaga (2009)
89	1985	Coal mining	César	La Loma and La Jagua de Ibirico areas (Chiriguaná, Becerril, El Paso, and La Jagua de Ibirico)	Barrera (2014); Bonet (2007); Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016a); Departamento Nacional de Planeación (1995); Gamarra (2007a); Ingeominas (2004); Oñate (1992); Pardo, Rudas, and Roa (2014); Poveda (1988); Viloria de la Hoz (1998) ¹¹
90	1985 (expansion: c. mid-1990s)	Coca crops	Norte de Santander	Catatumbo	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2015a); P. Martínez (2012); Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (2017); Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH (2006a, 13); M. Serrano (2009)
91	1989 (expansion: 1992)	Poppy and coca crops	Cauca	Colombian Massif and Cauca and Patía River Valleys	C. Ortiz (2004); C.C. Perafán (1999); C.A. Ruiz (2001); R. Vargas and Barragán (1994)
92	1990 (Central Cordillera) (expansion to Eastern Cordillera: mid-1990s)	Poppy and coca crops	Huila	Colombian Massif and foothills of Central and Eastern Cordilleras (Íquira and La Argentina, later Gigante, Colombia, and Algeciras)	IGAC (1995); Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (2017); C. Ortiz (2004); R. Vargas and Barragán (1994)

¹¹ See also “Moñona de Samper”, *Semana*, September 27, 1982, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/moona-de-samper/808-3>; Lore Croghan, “Colombia Sues Marathon Company”, *Multinational Monitor*, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 1982, <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1982/11/croghan.html>; “Arreglo de la Drummond”, *Semana*, September 26, 1988, <http://www.semana.com/confidenciales/articulo/arreglo-de-la-drummond/10761-3>; “Timeline”, *Drummond Company, Inc.*, <http://www.drummondco.com/about/timeline>.

93	1991	Oil extraction	Casanare	Yopal, Aguazul, Tauramena	Avellaneda (2004); Davy, McPhail, and Sandoval (1999); De'Ath (1997); Dureau and Flórez (2000); McCollough (1990); Segovia (2011); Rausch (2013)
94	1992	Natural gas extraction	Sucre	San Pedro	Aguilera (2007) ¹²
95	1993 (start of operations: 2000)	Urrá hydroelectric project	Córdoba	Tierralta	Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011b); Leguizamón (2015); Morales Ruiz and Pachón Ariza (2010); Viloria de la Hoz (2007b, 283) ¹³
96	1997 (start of operations: 2002)	Miel hydroelectric project	Caldas	Norcasia	M.F. Martínez (2014) ¹⁴
97	1998	Coca crops	Nariño	Pacific coast (especially Tumaco)	J.D. Rodríguez (2015); Viloria de la Hoz (2007a)
98	1998 (expansion: 2001)	African oil palm plantations	Bolívar	Montes de María and Dique Canal area	Aguilera (2014); Fedepalma (2017)
99	2000	African oil palm plantations	Chocó	Riosucio	Fedepalma (2017); Franco and Restrepo (2011)

¹² See also “Solana Petroleum to purchase Colombian gas field from Petrobras”, *Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections: An Institute for Global Energy Research*, October 17, 2002, <http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2002/11/cnl24674>.

¹³ “Cronología”, *Empresa Unirá S.A., E.S.P.*, <http://urra.com.co/cronologia>.

¹⁴ “Hidroeléctrica Miel I entrará en operación en el 2002”, *El Tiempo*, 15 de agosto de 2000, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1230794>.

7.3. Excluded cases

Economic Activities that Began Before 1901 and Remained Largely Unchanged in the 20th Century

- Natural rubber extraction in Caquetá (T. Vásquez 2015)
- Tobacco in Tolima (Clavijo 1993; Jiménez and Sideri 1985; McGreevey 2015 [1975]) and Montes de María (Aguilera 2014)
- Coffee in Norte de Santander and Santander and Cundinamarca (Arango 1977; Bergquist 1978; Beyer 1947; Machado 1988; Palacios 1980; Zambrano 1977)
- Tagua extraction in the Pacific coast (Leal 2004, 2006)
- Cattle ranching in the Andean region, the Caribbean plains and coast, the Magdalena and Cauca River valleys, and the Eastern Plains (Van Ausdal 2008; McGreevey 2015 [1975]; Ocampo 2007; Parsons 1997)
- Rice in Bolívar (Posada Carbó 1998)
- Cacao in Huila (Ducuara, Manrique, and Ortiz 2012)
- Gold mining in Caldas and Antioquia (Marmato, Supía, Segovia, Remedios, Amalfi, Anorí, Titiribí, Yarumal) (M.M. Botero 2007; Singewald 1949; Parsons 1997; Restrepo 1908)
- Gold mining in Nariño (Leal 2004; Singewald 1949; Restrepo 1908)
- Gold mining in Santander (Restrepo 1908)
- Coal mining in Amagá (Antioquia), Boyacá, Cundinamarca, and Valle del Cauca (Bell 1921, 276; De la Pedraja 1985; Molina 1998; Pereira 1901)
- Upín saltworks (Restrepo, Meta), Zipaquirá and Nemocón saltworks (Cundinamarca), and Chita saltworks (Boyacá) (León 2011; Rosenthal 2012)
- Timber extraction in Upper Sinú (Bolívar, then Córdoba) (Parsons 1952; Viloría de la Hoz 2007b)
- Trade and contraband in La Guajira (González Plazas 2008)

Economic Activities Circumscribed to Small Localities

- Coffee crops in Cauca and Nariño (Gamarra 2007b; Viloría de la Hoz 2007a)
- Gold mining in Buenos Aires (Cauca) (Singewald 1949)
- Corradine steel mill in Pacho (Cundinamarca) (Corradine 2011; Poveda 1988)
- Coal mining in Upper San Jorge River Basin (Córdoba) (Viloría de la Hoz 2007b; Ingeominas 2004)
- Commercial reforestation and timber extraction in Zambrano (Bolívar), Luruaco (Atlántico), and Puerto Gaitán (Meta) (Rettberg 2006)

8. REFERENCES

Note: The bibliography is divided into two separate sections: one for the dissertation's core chapters and a second one for the appendix.

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