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Schools of Violence: Military Academies in the Fight for Modern China

By

Joseph Passman

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair
Professor Thomas Gold
Professor Peter Zinoman

Summer 2024

Schools of Violence: Military Academies in the Fight for Modern China

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Abstract

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Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair

"Schools of Violence" tells anew the story of "how China became modern" through the lens of military academies, a Western-style educational model adopted by the imperial state in the late nineteenth century that fundamentally transformed state-organized violence in China throughout the next century and to today. From the first military academy founded by the Qing dynasty in 1885 with German instructors, this novel institution then proliferated across the entire Empire and, even after the 1911 Revolution that ended dynastic rule, each successive contender for China's future—from Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong and others—reproduced and reinvented their own military academies as central components in their respective national projects. Despite its central importance in creating the China we see today, military academies remain understudied, making this dissertation one of the first in-depth studies on the subject in English.

This dissertation places the advent of the modern military academy in China within two interrelated vectors of change. The first is technological change. Whereas scholarship has long recognized the great disparity in military technology that confronted nineteenth century imperial China vis-à-vis the West, particularly in naval development, this dissertation highlights the unrecognized importance of a different technological invention: the breech-loading rifle. Supplanting muzzle-loading muskets, these new rifles exponentially increased the lethality of individual soldiers and had key battlefield ramifications: it replaced the tactical logic previously based on mass with dispersed unit formations, decentralized command structures, and gave lower-level, junior officers unprecedented independence and responsibility. The second vector is educational change: for the new-found importance of junior officers required the Chinese state to break from its existing system of military examinations, which merely tested officers in physical skills, and to offer its agents of violence comprehensive, resident education for the first time in history. But the new military academy structure did not merely impart technical skills. In one of the most exciting findings of this dissertation, I show that the first military academy adopted Confucian classical education, taken directly from the civil service examination curriculum, repurposing it to cultivate individual agency in the junior officers that had become critical on the modern battlefield. This novel incorporation of the Confucian classics also gave the military unprecedented moral and social legitimacy as a field of learning. Whereas the story of modern China is told largely as a rejection of Confucian tradition, I show how these classical texts took on renewed importance for modern war.

Using archival materials and newly discovered and underutilized sources to reconstruct Chinese military academy classrooms, as well as the battlefields where education was put into practice, I show how Confucian tradition, far from being universally discarded by the modernizing imperatives of industrialized warfare, directly engendered the key role ideology came to play in organizing state-directed violence for both China's Nationalist (KMT) and Communist (CCP) Parties that inherited and expanded the institution in their fight for China's future.

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Schools of Violence:
Military Academies in the Fight for Modern China



Figure 1 Photo from Tianjin Shangbao huakan 天津商報画刊 [The Tientsin Business Report Illustrated]. August 13, 1931. Depicts staff and graduates of a late Qing military academy in 1908. Original in author's collection.

Introduction

In 1885, reform officials serving the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) founded the Beiyang Military Academy (北洋武備學堂) in Tianjin, the first education institution for army officers in Chinese history. They hired German military instructors, hoping the Germans would teach Chinese junior officers the methods and tactics of ground warfare that had given the fledgling German state an emergent primacy on its native continent. In contrast to the stunning rise of Germany, the Great Qing Empire (1644-1911) had repeatedly suffered critical battlefield defeats to nations like Britain and France. This was because, though larger than all of Europe by indexes such as population, China was unable to match their superior military technology and weaponry. This military-technological disparity gave rise to China's famous Self-Strengthening Movement (1860-1895), which saw the founding of a series of new schools to capture Western technical knowledge and practices, particularly in weapons manufacturing and modern naval expertise. Despite the relatively late start of the Beiyang Military Academy—founded roughly two decades after China's first naval academy—it, too, was born out of the Qing dynasty's quest to secure "wealth and power" (富強) in the brave new world ushered in by Western imperialism and the industrialization of warfare.

Whereas scholarship has long recognized the great disparity in military technology and capabilities that confronted nineteenth century imperial China vis-à-vis the West, particularly in naval development, this dissertation highlights the unrecognized importance of a different technological invention: the breech-loading rifle. The breech-loading rifle arrived China in the 1880s, where it remained the mainstay of ground warfare into the 1950s. Supplanting muzzle-loading muskets, the new rifles exponentially increased the lethality of individual soldiers, which had key battlefield ramifications. Mass-based tactical logic became obsolete. Instead, dispersed unit formations and decentralized command structures gave lower-level junior officers unprecedented independence and responsibility. Particularly in Germany, this rifle technology had catalyzed a movement to revolutionize military education beyond mere technical training to become a broad, formative, and humanities-based education (Ger. *Ausbildung*) meant to cultivate individual agency. Beginning in 1885, German instructors brought (via translation) to China's first military academy new technical battlefield practices; yet they could not, at that time, impart their type of broader, formative education. But, in fact, the Chinese did not need them to. For I show that the first military academy adopted Confucian classical education, taken directly from China's civil examination curriculum, and repurposed it to apply to these new modes of military violence. From this point onward in Chinese history, military academies served as a vehicle for a unique, critical confluence of education and violence. The central argument of "Schools of Violence" is that the advent of China's regime of distinctly modern military education was about *more* than adopting the technical practices of industrial-era warfare from the West, as universally assumed; instead, it was inextricably linked to China's own Confucian traditions of classical education.

My argument also cuts to the heart of how scholars, students, and the general public currently understand Chinese modernity. Take the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The shocking defeat of Qing China by the upstart Japanese did more than shift the balance of power in Asia and set the stage for WWII. Coupled at this time with the first Chinese translations of Social Darwinist texts, it gave currency to an idea almost unthinkable to Chinese before: that Confucian tradition was China's biggest liability, not its core strength. In a "survival of the fittest" world governed by industrialized warfare, the ultimate Confucian value of "harmony" and stability, so it was argued, made it irredeemably antithetical to the "foreign" (Western) values of competition, struggle, and innovative change that made such power possible. From the "father of American Sinology," John Fairbank, to Benjamin Schwartz, Joseph Levenson, Jonathan Spence, and the scholarly consensus today, the fall of imperial China and rise of the revolutionary political parties that came to dominate Chinese life and society up to this day have been interpreted to be as much about Confucian tradition's gross inability to harness the latent powers of Chinese violence for modern conflict as it was about the intellectual merits of the Communist or Nationalist ideologies. Certainly, the China field has course-corrected aspects of cultural essentialism that these seminal scholars understandably brought to their analyses: for instance, we no longer believe that Confucian "values" somehow preclude market economies or representative politics. But the core consensus that Confucian tradition was an inherent contradiction to modern regimes of state-organized violence still stands.[1] "Schools of Violence" seeks to change that.

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[1] Exceptions to this include the identification of Neo-Confucianism in William Kirby's scholarship on the New Life Movement (1930s) and Frederic Wakeman's on "Confucian Fascism," both during the Republican era. Still, though both have military aspects to them, these are primarily about civil governance and, importantly, they are understood as a reinvention of a broken tradition. My work shows the Confucian classical tradition put directly to work in the service of organized military violence and direct rather than broken links to the Republican period. See William C. Kirby, *Germany and Republican China*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984); Frederic Wakeman, "A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism," *The China Quarterly*, 150 (1997): 395–432.

Using archival materials and newly discovered and underutilized sources to reconstruct Chinese military academy classrooms, as well as the battlefields where education was put into practice, I show how Confucian tradition, far from being universally discarded by the modernizing imperatives of industrialized warfare, directly engendered the key role that ideology came to play in organizing state-directed violence for both China's Nationalist (KMT) and Communist (CCP) Parties, who inherited and expanded this institution in their fight for China's future. In this way, "Schools of Violence" tells anew the story of "how China became modern" through the lens of military academies. I demonstrate how this Western-style educational model adopted by the imperial state in the late nineteenth century came to fundamentally transform state-organized violence in China throughout the next century through today. From the first military academy founded by the Qing dynasty in 1885 with German instructors, this novel institution then proliferated across the entire Empire. Even after the 1911 Revolution that ended dynastic rule, each successive contender for China's future—from Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong and others—reproduced and reinvented their own military academies as foundational components in their respective national projects. Despite its central importance in creating the China we see today, military academies remain understudied, making this dissertation one of the first in-depth studies on the subject in English.

Whereas the limited amount of scholarship on Chinese military academies has understandably assumed these sites primarily served for technological transfer of Western military modernity, I show that these schools were much more, particularly when understood in their Chinese contexts. This dissertation analyzes the military academy along three distinct but interrelated avenues of historical change in China: technological, socio-political, and educational. Technological change, as already discussed, came upon China with a vengeance in the mid nineteenth century from the First Opium War (1838-1842) onward. This technological change also sparked educational changes in China that came with the Self-Strengthening movement. The 1860s saw what Knight Biggerstaff has called the "earliest modern government schools in China," a series of new learning institutions designed to capture Western technical knowledge and practices, particularly in weapons manufacturing and modern naval expertise.[2] Let us look at this educational change more closely.

The new government schools of the Self-Strengthening movement stood out in two major ways. First was the content of the education these schools provided. Because these schools taught knowledge derived from non-Chinese foreigners, called "barbarians," the Self-Strengthening movement adopted the precept that later became known as "Chinese Essence, Western Methods" (中體西用). Under this rubric, Chinese reformers vowed to keep the internal cultural "Essence" pure, with its ancient and vibrant Confucian moral tradition, while only adopting external Western technological methods. Thus, the content taught at these new schools, "Western Studies" (西學), was separate from the hallowed Confucian educational tradition based on sacred or sagely texts.[3] Because of this distinction, scholarship has largely understood the Western-derived technological content taught in these new schools as something completely separate from old, traditional Chinese education. As we will see, this was not always the case.

Second, in addition to educational content, these new schools broke radically with the structure of the imperial examinations (*kuju* 科舉), a system that came into maturity during the early Song dynasty (960-1127) by which the state selected its officials. The examination system had two tracks. The civil track (文科) selected the Empire's civil officials based on rigorous testing of

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[2] Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961).

[3] As shown in Chapter 3, Qing military educators would even call the Classics "sacred texts" (聖經), which is the same Chinese translation for the Christian Bible.

candidates' mastery in the Confucian Classics.[4] The military track (武科) selected military officers primarily based on physical skills, with little attention paid to even basic writing (indeed, many army officers were illiterate). A defining feature of the examination system, for both tracks, was that the imperial state used it to merely "select" (選拔) the "human talent" (人才) it sought, leaving private society largely responsible for the individual candidate's preparatory education to attain the selection criteria. In contrast, the new system of schools or "academies" (學堂) meant that the state now took on the burden of "cultivating and educating" (培育) the human resources it sought.[5]

Thus, the move from the examination system to new academies was a fundamental structural difference in the state's role in education, not just the content of the education. Whereas society at large had conducted the education required for the civil examinations (though the many years of required Classical mastery meant that mainly sons of wealthy gentry could participate), the knowledge taught in these new academies, such the building and operation of weapons that required industrial manufacturing, was beyond the knowledge-production capacities for even the wealthy of local society. Thus, both the structure and the educational content of the new academy system required the extensive resources of the state, as well as intensive investment in the education of personnel. Though a massive sea-change, the older examination system coexisted alongside the new academies from 1860s until the first years of the twentieth century (the military exam was abolished in 1901, the civil exam in 1905).

Additionally, these technological and educational changes were also part of massive socio-political change in the state's relationship to society. In understanding this vector of change, I have found Patricia Crone's insights into pre-industrial societies very helpful. Crone says that the state apparatus for pre-industrial societies can be understood as a "capstone government" that exercised what she calls "extensive power" rather than intensive power. As capstones, she describes the government sitting "on top of society," but with minimal penetration, investing largely in "keeping [society's] various components in place, but incapable of stimulating further development."[6] She says that "imperial government was capstone government *par excellence*" because it addressed "the problem of organizing large numbers of people over large areas with inadequate resources." Thus, she adds, "It made emperors specialists in what has been called extensive power, that is the ability to organize large numbers over large distances for minimal co-operation."[7] This has some important implications for understanding the Qing state during the transitional nineteenth century.

Despite the historical consensus pioneered by John Fairbank, that the Qing Empire was "ill-prepared for Western contact,"[8] reevaluations of Qing dynasty history points to many of these rulers as masters of this form of extensive power *par excellence*, similar to what Crone theorized. Indeed, we now have a much better understanding of the High Qing's accomplishments, from expanding its

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[4] The curriculum included the Four Books and Five Classics. The Four Books included the "Great Learning" (Daxue 大學), the "Doctrine of the Mean" (*Zhongyong* 中庸), the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 論語); and the book ascribed to Mencius (*Mengzi* 孟子). See Daniel Gardner, *The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007). The "Five Classics" included the *Odes* (*Shijing* 詩經), the *Documents* (*Shangshu* 尚書), the *Record of Rites* (*Liji* 禮記), the *Changes* (*Yijing* 易經), and the *Annals* (*Chunqiu* 春秋). See Michael Nylan, *The Five "Confucian" Classics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

[5] For a good overview of this shift, see Sang Bing 桑兵 and Guan Xiaohong 关晓红, "*Teaching" and "Education" in the Past and Today: Modern Chinese Knowledge and Systemic Change* ("教"与"育"的古今中外: 近代中国的知识与制度转型), (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 2020), p. 67.

[6] Crone, Patricia, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World*, (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.

[7] Crone, Patricia, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World*, (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.

[8] John K. Fairbank, "Introduction: The Old Order," in *Cambridge History of China*, (Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol 10, part 1, pp. 5-6.

borders to roughly twice the size of their Ming predecessors (larger than any dynasty in Chinese history), to innovating a memorial system to communicate and organize across vast distances, and governing effectively over an empire of incredibly complex ethnic, linguistic, and even legal diversity.[9]

Though we have gained much more insight in recent decades on the High Qing's world-historical accomplishments in statecraft, we still run into the problem of answering what, specifically, caused this great empire to eventually buckle under the weight of Western imperialism and industrial modernity. One conclusion that we can draw out of the important work of scholars like Peter Perdue and Matthew Mosca is that the Qing were, in some important ways, victims of their own success, particularly in achieving governance over such vast, inland territory.[10] Here, again, Patricia Crone's theorization is helpful. Despite the achievements pre-industrial empires may attain through the deft exercise of "extensive power," Crone says, "it did not make emperors good at intensive organization, the ability to organize tightly and in depth…."[11] Indeed we see this in nineteenth century Qing China. Philip Kuhn, for instance, has long noted that the Qing was structured for "governing a huge society with a small bureaucracy," meaning that the state apparatus actually exerted a very light administrative footprint on society at large.[12] On the one hand, the Qing's small capstone footprint meant it relied on society for many state functions, like tax collecting, irrigation building, etc. On the other hand, Crone says, these structurally-limited pre-industrial states were prone to "mistrust, predatory behavior, arbitrariness and the constant need to suppress" the very society they so relied upon.[13] Because of this, she says, "political organization had a strong tendency to encourage power stand-off, that is a situation in which different kinds of power counteract and nullify each other instead of combining for joint effect."[14] We see this in the Qing with its forced rotations of civil and military officials and the Law of Avoidance that prevented civil officials from serving in their native places—all in order to prevent concentrations of local power and the possibility of rebellion. In fact, as discussed more in Chapter 2, when not engaged in wars of external territorial expansion, regular military Qing units (particularly the Green Standard armies of Han soldiers) were structured and organized as much to hamstring coordinated army revolt against the Qing state as for combat effectiveness. In fact, there was a repeated pattern in late imperial Chinese history: during a security crisis emerging from the collapse of ineffectual, state-organized armies, the state would turn to *locally*-organized military forces as a last resort. After the crisis subsided, the state would disband local forces generated by non-state leaders in society and return to the power standoff status quo. This pattern would be broken in the nineteenth century with the state's increasing need to raise and maintain standing armies that could be both militarily effective in the latest modes of warfare and loyal to the state, without hamstringing their structural ability to wage coordinated combat. As Crone says, "Pre-industrial states had considerable power to prevent

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[9] Joseph Fletcher was one of the first American sinologists to recognize the triumph of Qing China's Inner Asian traditions in governance. See Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in *Cambridge History of China*, (Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol 10, part 1, pp. 35-106. For the Qing's world-historical state capacity to organize across distance, see Peter Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For the memorial system, see Beatrice Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For legal plurality, see Pär Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[10] See Peter Perdue, *China Marches West,* p. 517. For the Qing's information-management failure that made them slow to accurately recognize the growing threat of Great Britian, see Matthew Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Origins of Modern China's Geopolitics, 1644-1860*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

[11] Patricia Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World*, (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.

[12] Philip Kuhn, *Origins of the Chinese State*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 21.

[13] Crone, Patricia, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World*, (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.

[14] Crone, Patricia, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World*, (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.

things from happening, but very little to make them happen: they were far better at suppressing than at generating energy."[15] Whereas structural weaknesses and power standoffs had been integral to the overall imperial security architecture, a more robust system to generate rather than suppress social energies would be needed.

In sum, the pre-industrial Qing state of the nineteenth century faced three sets of monumental change in the form of the introduction of new technologies of industrialized warfare, the need for new educational institutions to harness those technologies, and a seismic shift from a security architecture based on suppressing energies within society to one of "energy generation." It is within these three sets of changes that I place China's emergent military academies, which serve as unique windows into these processes.

But why does the specific institution of the military academy give us unique and special insight? After all, the first military academy founded in 1885 came after six naval academies had already been founded by the Qing. In comparison, attention to the education of army officers seems to be an afterthought rather than the potential for a penetrating historical lens. Indeed, scholars like Benjamin Elman have broken new ground in showing the hitherto unrecognized achievements of Qing naval academies and armories, particularly in the knowledge production needed for modern, industrialized military technology.[16] And yet, with the destruction of both the Qing's southern and northern fleets (by France in 1884 and by Japan in 1895), I submit that Chinese military modernization and the fight for the fate of modern China thereafter, at least until the 1950s, was primarily played out on the ground, rather than at sea. Thus, a genealogy of the Chinese military academy, from the Qing to the era of revolutionary political parties and regimes of the twentieth century, is both a critical piece of modern China's story, and one that has not yet been told from the beginning.




Figure 2: Diagram of the Chinese "Dingyuan" 定遠 Battleship. Print circa 1880s, original in author's collection.

[15] Crone, Patricia, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World*, (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.
[16] Benjamin Elman, "Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China's Self-Strengthening Reforms into Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 2004), p. 326.



Figure 3: "Bivouac of Chinese Soldiers," London Daily News, September 1894. Print made during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Portrays and officer surrounded by foot soldiers. Notice the rifles are German Dreyse breech-loaders. Original in author's possession.




Figure 4: "Archery Drill by Chinese Soldiers in the Streets of Pekin," drawn by Frank Dadd, R. I., from a sketch by Thomas Child of Pekin, in The Graphic: An Illustrated Weekly Newspaper (London), December 22, 1894, p. 701. The soldiers depicted are practicing archeryfor the military examinations. Original in author's collection.

Another reason the military academy provides a unique lens is that the perspective of education for ground warfare provides different ways of understanding the processes of modernity other than technological change. More so than with naval warfare, which requires multiple sets of highly technical expertise to operate modern warships, ground warfare lays a particular emphasis on human factors, such as troop morale and their social identification with the state. This is why Crone's understanding of the critical difference in the state's in either suppressing or generating social "energies" is so important. As we will see, Chinese military academy educators developed an entire repertoire for educating the very "spirit" (*jingshen* 精神) of its army officers and troops. In fact, this so-called "Spirit Education" (*jingshen jiaoyu* 精神教育) would become a hallmark of Nationalist and Communist army education, who emphasized the need for indoctrination in revolutionary political precepts as the key to combat effectiveness and military agency. And yet, this dissertation shows through meticulous excavation, that the concrete roots of Spirit Education go back to the military academies of the late Qing dynasty, a continuity largely suppressed and forgotten by the revolutionary parties that sought to differentiate themselves from the imperial past they inherited and built upon.

More than this, I show that Spirit Education began during the Qing with novel applications of state-provided education in the Confucian Classics for army officers. This role of the Confucian Classics is a critical finding of the dissertation. After all, one dominant mode of telling the story of modern China is about the supposed inability of the Confucian Classical tradition to adapt to the imperatives of interstate competition in the industrializing world of the nineteenth century. Particularly, Confucian tradition has been seen as inadequate to provide a moral basis for technological innovation, educational dynamism, and the generation of the necessary affective bonds to a national community for whom individuals carry out state-directed violence. By showing how the

Confucian Classics performed all these roles in the Qing military academy, this dissertation argues for the recognition of greater continuity across the imperial-republican divide that defines Chinese modernity today, as well as a rethinking of modern China primarily as the result of rejecting of tradition.

This dissertation is divided into four chapters and an epilogue. Chapter 1, "The Death of Student Yu," traces the path of a student from the China's first military academy from his time at school to action at the first battle of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). In addition to refocusing our attention to the end goal of military education (i.e., the battlefield), this chapter uses newly found source materials to show for the first time that a particular tactical mode of modern warfare taught at the Beiyang Military Academy, which relied on junior-officer initiative, was employed in actual combat. Chapter 2, "Technologies of the Spirit," explores some of the broader ramifications of the previous chapter, including a greater understanding of what it meant for the Qing state to transition to an institution of "cultivating and educating" (培育) army officers, as well as the hitherto unrecognized importance taken on by the Confucian Classics in the new education for modern modes of warfare. Chapter 3, "Slouching Towards Revolution?" examines military academy Spirit Education in the last decade of the Qing dynasty (1900-1911). Using underutilized and newly digitized sources, I show how late Qing military educators pioneered a vibrant discourse centered around the "spirit" (精神), a moral ethic of violence and a psychological state cultivated by education, that they upheld as the ultimate factor on the battlefield, even above (though not in negation to) material factors. I argue that this became the basis for later Spirit Education of Chinese revolutionary militaries, despite the subsequent erasure of its imperial and classical foundation. Chapter 5, "Ideology, Organization, and the Death of Student Cai," explores the renovation of the late Qing Spirit Education tradition by Sun Yat-sen, which sought to replace Confucian "sacred texts" as the moral basis of violence with novel political ideology or "doctrines" (主義) of his Nationalist Party (KMT). This effort culminated in the 1924 creation of the Whampoa Military Academy that placed great emphasis on Spirit Education and ideology, while its new Soviet instructors and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) partners brought Leninist forms of organization that would prove effective in the ultimate fight to secure the fate of the modern Chinese state in the coming decades. Using a reconstruction of one of the first Whampoa students killed on the battlefield, I demonstrate that Whampoa, for all of its undeniable innovations and subsequent impact on Chinese history, was as much or more a product of the late Qing Empire as it was of Sun's political doctrines or of Leninist influence brought by Soviet "missionaries." The "Epilogue: A Tale of Two Long Marches" summarizes these findings while touching on their development for the Chinese Communists who have come to govern most of China today.

Chapter 1: The Death of Student Yu

Introduction

On June 17, 1885, the famous reformer and governor-general of Zhili province, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823-1901), memorialized the Qing Throne "for the establishment of a school along the lines of Western military academies."[1] Li Hongzhang proposed that this new academy be "fully staffed with German army officers and select promising junior leaders from our own army who are physically tough, intelligent, and somewhat literate to come study at this school."[2] With German instructors over Chinese students, Li Hongzhang wrote, "Your subject estimates that in about a year's time, they will be thoroughly versed in all types of Western breech-loading firearms" and technical military skills, along with "combined and separated modes of attack and defense."[3] The Court ultimately approved Li Hongzhang's proposal, but it responded, in the vermillion ink reserved for the Throne, by cautioning the following: "Bravery is difficult to study… China itself has men brave enough to die, and this is something that cannot be taught by Foreigners."[4] The Court even amplified its reservation by issuing a separate edict months later: "To infantry officers of military talent: this Military Academy is your foundation. Aside from pursuing preparation for battle, simultaneously studying the Classics and Histories (經史) is extremely appropriate."[5] With this, Li Hongzhang's Military Academy (武備學堂) in Tianjin (of Zhili Province, the region also known as Beiyang) became the first state-run institution in Chinese history to provide army officers with a systematic education.

A tension is perceptible here in the Beiyang Military Academy's founding, a tension that is well known to all students of modern China: the apparently competing imperatives, on the one hand, to adopt methods of industrialized warfare, like breech-loading firearms mentioned by Li Hongzhang; and, on the other, the desire to safeguard tradition, like the venerated Chinese textual tradition of the Classics and Histories mentioned by the Court. Known by the phrase that Chinese Self-Strengtheners took up of "Chinese Essence, Western Application" (*Zhongti xiyong* 中體西用), it is a powerful and influential paradigm still used today to explain how cultural pride, even a pathology of tradition, ultimately inhibited China's ability in the nineteenth century to adequately adopt modes of Western technical modernity necessary to survive in an age of globalized industrial-military

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[1] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885,"〈直隸總督李鴻章為天津創設武備學堂擬由海防經費開支等事奏折〉 in *Li Hongzhang quanji* 李鸿章全集 [Complete Works of Li Hongzhang], (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2008), Vol. 11, pp. 98-99.

[2] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885," p. 98.

[3] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885," p. 98.「約計一年後於西洋後膛各種槍炮…分合攻守各法必能通曉」

[4] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885," p. 99. The Imperial rescript (硃批) on the memorial reads:「膽氣難學….中國自有敢死之士，非洋人所能教習也。」

[5] This was put into the Beiyang Military Academy Regulations of 1886 for all students to memorize. See "Beiyang wubei xuetang xuegui" 北洋武備學堂學規 [The Beiyang Military Academy School Regulations], *Historical Archives* (历史档案), 1990 (02), pp. 59-63. It was modified quote from an Imperial Decree 《皇太后懿旨》issued by Empress Dowager Cixi in 1886. In《清實錄》*juan 28, Guanxu Year 25* (光緒十二年五月一日) , paragraph 85817.

competition. Told in this way, China's so-called "Search for Modernity"[6] involves a two-fold script: first Chinese Tradition inhibited Modernity, then Modernity killed Chinese Tradition; leaving a post-1911 Revolution China largely bereft of both the modern means of state-power to protect its people, and bankrupt in the cultural resources needed to give *essential* definition and identity to itself as a "people." Thus it is common to talk of the Communist military seizure of full-state power by 1949 simultaneously filling a cultural-moral vacuum created by "Confucian China's Modern Fate."[7]

This chapter submits that the Beiyang Military Academy, as the first institution in Chinese history to provide its agents of violence with resident and systematic education, played a role in this larger drama of Chinese nation-hood and modernity that has not yet been considered. As we will see in the literature review below, the Beiyang Military Academy is interpreted within one of two failure narratives. One understanding is that the Military Academy ultimately failed in adopting precisely the Western military methods that Li Hongzhang listed in his proposal, which nineteenth century China desperately needed to withstand the existential threat of industrialized imperialism. Another sees the school as a moral failure, neglecting to instill adequate patriotism in its students, as apparently evidenced by the very "tough, intelligent, and somewhat literate" men Li Hongzhang selected for study that year in 1885—like Feng Guozhang, Duan Qirui, Wang Shizhen, Cao Kun, and others—who after 1911 quickly rose within the fractured Republic to play outsized, even infamous roles as so-called "warlords" well into the 1920s. In sum, while the Beiyang Military Academy is understood as an important institution, it is merely emblematic of the larger and broader failures of imperial China to navigate the tensions between tradition and modernity; that is, it antithetical to the "new" Chinese nation-state that solved the problems of harnessing modern modes of warfare and a moral ethic to control and direct that violence for the nation.

This chapter revises these understandings. I show that the first military academy brought together particular modes of state-organized violence and education that have not yet been recognized by historians, and that the resulting fusion achieved by this school has profoundly influenced modern China in ways left unconsidered to this day. I show this by excavating the story of one Military Academy student, name Yu Guangxin 于光炘 (d. 1894), whose name has been all but lost to history, unlike the more infamous "warlord" graduates listed above. Student Yu, as I generally refer to him, would die in the very first battle of the epoch-making First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). But by taking the story of China's first military academy to the actual battlefield, I go outside the bounds of existing historiography on the school to argue three things: First, I argue that we have largely overlooked the historically-specific characteristics of the military education that Li Hongzhang hired German instructors to bring to the Beiyang Military Academy in the 1880s. Called "mission tactics" or *Auftragstaktik*, it was quintessential element of German military principle and practice, which had been borne out of three distinct but interrelated socio-political, educational, and technological revolutions in Europe, and was codified in German army doctrine by the 1880s before their instructors brought it to China. Understanding the derivation and principles of "mission tactics," I demonstrate, is a missing puzzle piece in understanding the seemingly contradictory tensions in Beiyang Military Academy education, as touched on above. Second, I demonstrate evidence through the reconstruction of Student Yu's story that contradicts the main narratives of the Military Academy's failure to transfer any significant military knowledge from their German instructors. In showing "mission tactics" practiced on an actual battlefield, I argue something not considered by historians of the school: educational efficacy. Third, I introduce an argument here, which is carried forward in the next chapter, for a reevaluation of the traditional or non-technical side of the Military Academy's curriculum, in the "Classics and Histories" (mentioned above), long

[6] Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, (New York: Norton & Co., 1990).
[7] Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

considered either a fatal hindrance to military modernization or, at best, cultural window-dressing. I argue that the Classical curriculum actually played a critical role in cultivating the agency and personality in students that was needed for the modern battlefield characterized by dispersion and decentralization. Though the "Classics and Histories" were certainly traditional in content, the state organizing *any* education for its army officers, let alone teaching these venerated texts imbued with socio-moral capital, was nothing short of revolutionary, as we will see.

This chapter is composed of four sections and a conclusion. Section 1 defines the parameters of existing historiography while Section 2 offers a deep look at the modes of modern, state-organized violence that came to the Beiyang Miltiary Academy through its German instructors. Section 3 reconstructs Student Yu's participation in the Battle of Chenghuan (1894) and Section 4 traces how Student Yu's story was eventually recovered in China years later by a former Beiyang Miltiary Academy instructor, whose diary was only recovered in 2003. In the Conclusion I discuss ways in which the new perspectives and new sources involved in retelling Student Yu's story provide fresh insight for reshaping our understanding the China's relationship between Tradition and Modernity.

Section 1: School History and the First Sino-Japanese War

Our historical understanding of the Beiyang Military Academy was indelibly shaped by evaluations that followed from the Qing dynasty's epoch-making military disaster in the First Sino-Japanese War. This understanding follow one of two failure narratives. The first narrative sees the school as failing to import vital Western knowledge needed for self-strengthening, thus widening the military-technology gap between China and the West rather than closing it. The second failure narrative sees the school as equipping agents of organized violence without giving them a proper patriotic "spirit" to serve the greater good, thus leading contributing to the dark warlord period when so many of its graduates came to infamous prominence. But both failure narratives that we use today found their first full articulation by Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854-1921), who is "by common agreement the *key mediator* between the Chinese and Western ideas in the period immediately after 1895."[8]

Yan Fu's critique on the Beiyang Military Academy came as part of an essay called "A Critical Thesis on Salvation and Destruction" (救亡決論), published in parts through the week of May 1-8, 1895 in the *Zhili Bulletin* (直報).[9] Yan Fu says there that since the Self-Strengthening Movement began in the 1860s Beiyang had adopted a false image as the Empire's self-styled leader in adopting Western Methods (西法). He proclaims that it is "*self-evident for the eye to see* (自明眼觀) that Beiyang had not actually accomplished anything in teaching or implementing Western Methods."[10] The only people who still "prize it as a model to follow," Yan Fu says, are those who believe "what they are fed to consume" and "fail analyze the actual facts (實事)." And what are the self-evident facts that need to be analyzed? Yan Fu offers two such "facts" regarding the Beiyang

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[8] Theodore Huters, *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*, (Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2005), p. 45. Emphasis Added.

[9] Yan Fu 嚴復, "Jiuwang juelun" 救亡決論 [A Critical Thesis on Salvation and Destruction], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], May 1-8, 1895. The *Zhili Bulletin*《直報》was a Tianjin journal edited and run by a German, Constantin von Hanneken. In fact, Yan Fu was at this time was still an instructor at the Beiyang Naval Academy, also in Tianjin, roughly 8 kilometers from the Military Academy that he was criticizing here.

[10] Yan Fu 嚴復, "Jiuwang juelun" 救亡決論 [A Critical Thesis on Salvation and Destruction], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], May 1-8, 1895.

Military Academy. The first "fact" concerns the real circumstances behind the Military Academy's original founding back in 1885. Originally, Beiyang had hired German military instructors to serve as field advisors during the 1884-1885 war with France. But the war had ended by the time they arrived, so they were sent to teach directly in Beiyang's individual army camps (各營). When the German instructors "saw that our army was incompetent in many areas, and requested reforms," Yan Fu recounts, "each army leader slandered them for doing harm." After army leaders caused "such an uproar," "the Beiyang upper leadership sought to conciliate these few dozen Germans; and this is how the founding of the Military Academy came about."[11] Yan Fu's point is clear and it is quite subversive. Though the school had been hailed as a massive investment in Self-Strengthening, Yan Fu portrays the founding of the Military Academy as a way to cover up and hide the Beiyang establishment's true resistance to adopting Western methods.

The second damning "fact" follows from the first. Yan Fu says that in the almost decade since the school's founding, "students have come and gone, but I still *have not heard* (未聞) of them cultivating anyone of talent—much less have I head of anyone receiving any position of significance."[12] This, he submits, is the "*clear evidence* (明徵) that Beiyang's training of troops and commanders does not employ Western Methods."[13] Finally, Yan Fu closes by saying the empty reputation of Beiyang is a true "malfeasance" (弊) of governance in China, for "army training has absolutely no other alternative than to truly be based on Western Learning." Thus, Yan Fu rests his case against the Beiyang Military Academy and moves on with his essay.

Though this came as part of the 1895 essays that earned Yan Fu a key place in modern Chinese history, few scholars today remember his section on the Beiyang Military Academy as specially significant. Nevertheless, its ability to frame discourse of the Beiyang Military Academy today derives from two broader strains in Yan Fu's broader intellectual project. The first strain is deconstructive: Yan Fu advocated for the need to break down and remove China's culturally specific roadblocks to the technical transfer of requisite knowledge needed to survive in the new world of interstate competition waged by industrial means. The second strain is reconstructive: Yan Fu sought to building up new mentalities and cultural habits to replace old. Let us consider each briefly.

In terms of his deconstructive strain, Yan Fu saw an inordinate value placed on Chinese traditions, particularly *textual* traditions, as perhaps the biggest cultural barrier to adopting the necessary Western methods and technologies. Elsewhere in the essay above, Yan Fu calls for the "thoroughly getting rid of eight-legged essays [used to select officials in the civil examinations] and give full attention to Western learning."[14] In this call, Yan Fu pushing against the dominant Evidentialist School (考證), which, as Benjamin Schwartz says, required "a rigorous inductive study of the contents of the classical books, based on such sciences as semantics, etymology, phonology, epigraphy, textual collation, and the authentication of texts."[15] Now, despite its heavy emphasis text-based disciplines, the Evidentialist School did not negate the value real-world application. It upheld the ideal "statesmanship for practical use" (經世為用) as its pinnacle achievement, though it posited only "comprehensive knowledge of the whole history of Chinese culture and institutions" could

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[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Yan Fu 嚴復, "Jiuwang juelun" 救亡決論 [A Critical Thesis on Salvation and Destruction], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], May 1-8, 1895. Also quoted in Max Ko-wu Huang 黃克武, "Zouxiang fanyi zhi lu: Beiyang shuishi xuetang shiqi de Yan Fu" 走向翻譯之路: 北洋水師學堂時期的嚴復 [His Road to Translator: Yan Fu's Time at the Beiyang Naval Academy], in *Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jidai lishi suo jikan* 中央研究院近代歷史所集刊, Issue 49.
[15] Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 7.

attain it, that is, through texts.[16] Yan Fu had also immersed himself in this ideal, trying unsuccessfully to pass the civil exam four times (in 1884, 1888, 1889, and, finally, 1893). It was finally in the face of what he identified as an existential crisis in the face of Western technological and military dynamism that he publicly and forcefully spoke out against it. "Using eight-legged essays to select officials," he wrote, was more than just a "useless endeavor" or waste of time: for it kept adherents to a "state of ignorance," cultivated a "false pride" in the culture, "darkened the intellect," "destroyed human talent," and "lead the country towards poverty and weakness."[17]

Yan Fu's also applied his critique of Chinese textual culture, which was centered on the civil examinations, to the military sphere in general. The hallowed "Chinese historical tradition" (中國史傳), Yan Fu pointed out, contained fantastical events portrayed as facts, such as the mythical war-god Chi You's imperviousness to wounds and the giant Ju Wuba "driving an army of tigers and panthers." How could such texts that fail to warrant even basic credulity be at all useful, when "military strengths and weaknesses must be judged solely on the facts?" (顧實事何如耳), Yan Fu asked. He also writes, in apparent reference to the less fantastical ancient military strategy texts, like Sunzi's *Art of War*: "For those China's military men who could read, they've always relied totally on clever stratagems and never went beyond this."[18] Thus, it is "no wonder today we find within the army camps so many hired diviners and fortune tellers: because [these army men] cannot place their hopes for victory on anything factual (實事) they resort to such means." That Yan Fu moves rhetorically from "Classics and Histories" and "Military Classics" down to seedy corner of an army camp littered with charlatan fortune tellers is no coincidence; for this downward path of military men is the same as the highest echelon of Chinese elite society who compose "eight legged essays" and it is the veneration of texts over "facts" that "darkens their intellect." As Joseph Levenson has pointed out, Yan Fu after 1895 would not use Classical language (文言 or 古文) to compose exam essays to gain a place within the official-elite strata, rather he would use it as a mere means of reaching this very group.[19]

Yan Fu also discussed what "factual" studies should like in the military sphere. He wrote: "At present, it is not that China does not have soldiers, our infirmity lies in the absence of commanders; And China's commanders are all slavish lackeys (奴才), whose infirmity lies in their absence of technical proficiency (無術) because they do not **study** (不學)."[20] Here Yan Fu provides a litany of technical military skills based on "fact," such as ballistics, maximum effective ranges of

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[16] Ibid, p. 7.

[17] Yan Fu 嚴復, "Jiuwang juelun" 救亡決論 [A Critical Thesis on Salvation and Destruction], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], May 1-8, 1895.

[18] Ibid.

[19] On the instrumentality of Yan Fu's Classical language or "wenyan" (文言) that he writes in, see Joseph Levenson: "True, like the unalloyed Confucianists, Yan stressed the importance of an educated elite. But the new systems, not the old one (which had gallingly failed to waft him to a place in the councils of state), would provide the substance of education in the world that Yan projected, no matter what anticipations the old may have had of the new. And if classical style, the wen-yen, still supposed to convey the substance of education, this was because the elite had to be reached, and reached with a new *ti* 體 [or Cultural Essence]. The Confucian *ti*, or such a symbol of it as the literary language, was relegated to *yong* 用, its usefulness as a vehicle. Yan, with such Confucian predilections as he kept, was withdrawing them from the realm of value to the realm of fact. It was not that the *wenyan* 文言 must be honored and be the mark of an elite; the wen-yen, simply, was honored by an elite that must be won." See Joseph Levenson, Review of "*In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* by Benjamin Schwartz," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Vol. 85, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1965), pp. 437-441.

[20] Yan Fu 嚴復, "Jiuwang juelun" 救亡決論 [A Critical Thesis on Salvation and Destruction], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], May 1-8, 1895:「今夫中國非無兵也，患在無將帥。中國將帥皆奴才也，患在不學而無術。」

various types of firearms and cannon, engineering, etc. One particular aspect that he highlights, which will be important to our analysis later, involves the set of skills needed for "maneuvering an army." He likens the skill set to a type of "triangular geometry," by which no part can be missing, writing that it "(1) requires knowledge of the terrain (知地); and (2) knowledge of the terrain requires producing maps (圖繪); (3) producing maps requires mastery of surveying (測量)." If these fact-base skills are not studied, China could not survive as a people, he says. This is Yan Fu's first strain of breaking down cultural barriers, particularly the veneration of Classical texts, in order to open the door to adopting fact-based Western studies.

His second strain went beyond making smooth paths for the transfer of discrete fields of technical knowledge to reconstructing new cultural habits and mentalities, in what has been called a "public spirit."[21] Benjamin Schwartz writes that Yan Fu saw the "public spirit" as "the miracle of the West," for it constituted the "ability to promote the constructive self-interest of the individual, to release individual energies and yet harness these energies to collective goals."[22] The "public spirit" was thus a "wonderful paradox," for it reconstituted "public" (公) and "private" (私) into mutually reinforcing relationship from one of antagonism. Schwartz says that Yan Fu discovered that "the very institutions of liberty, equality, and democracy" caused a private individual "to identify his own interests of the social organism as a whole."[23] We see this in another Yan Fu essay of 1895, "The Origins of [National] Power" (原強). There he writes that it is because Western laws come from a collective legislature and rulers (from chancellor on down) were selected by the people, rather than foisted onto them, that people in the West felt affection for both ruler and country at a private (私) level.[24] Because of this also, Yan Fu says that Westerners "treat a general war (公戰, lit. a *public* war) as if it were a private (私) grievance…. and they will hazard death and kill the enemy as if they were protecting their own family."[25]

Though the "Origins of [National] Power" did not mention the Beiyang Military Academy specifically, its themes are part of a larger, interrelated project. After all, Beiyang had shouldered the burden of a great "public war" (公戰) but had been found wanting. Not just faltering on battlefields, but in the training and preparation to wage war using the necessary "Western methods" and technologies, had shown it to have a "hollow reputation." The Military Academy was indicative of this failure precisely because its creation had shown Beiyang's wiliness to put the "private" (私) interests of the "individual camps" (各營) ahead of the public security of the Empire it protected. Beiyang Military Academy was an instantiation of this "private" malady misaligned with the public good of the entire Imperium, and it posed an existential threat.

As I have said, Yan Fu's critique of the Beiyang Military Academy has, directly or as part of these two strains, laid the parameters for all subsequent historians who treat Beiyang Military Academy seriously. Let me describe two of the most prominent scholars writing in Chinese and

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[21] Benjamin Schwartz says that Yan Fu's idea of a "public spirit" (*gongxin* 公心) is a "theme running through all [his] writings which cannot be clearly traced to any element of Spencerianism and which probably rests squarely on his own observations of English life…." See Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 70. Though I use Schwartz's "public spirit" concept for Yan Fu, which he articulates in detail, so far I have unfortunately not been able to locate the precise term in any of the original writings.

[22] Schwartz, p. 70.

[23] Schwartz, p. 70.

[24] Yan Fu, "*Yuan qiang"* 原強 [Origins of (National) Power], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], March 4-9, 1895. Here and elsewhere I have consulted Theodore Huters on translation of some of Yan Fu's titles and terms. For his treatment of the "Origins of [National] Power," see Theodore Huters, *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*, (Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2005), p. 50-51.

[25]Yan Fu, "*Yuan qiang"* 原強 [Origins of (National) Power], in *Zhibao* 直報 [Zhili Bulletin], March 4-9, 1895.

Western languages today. Wang Jiajian 王家儉, a leading scholar on China's late Qing modernization efforts, whose work on the school is the most comprehensive piece of high-level Chinese scholarship on the topic and serves as the foundational secondary source for all other studies on the school. Wang's lens uses Yan Fu's "public spirit" strain. Wang writes that the state goal for founding the Beiyang Military Academy had been to produce "a group of high-level commanders that would be fluent in both Western and Chinese matters, adept in both martial and civil affairs, and thus able to safeguard the country and protect the people…."[26] However, Wang says that the school "…ended up actually producing a large number of the warlords (軍閥) that devastated the country and hurt the people," referring to its many graduates who came to national power in the 1910s and 1920s. Citing "unsound education" as the chief reason for this, Wang argues that the school's "biggest deficit was that they only paid attention to training Western skills and overlooked molding the individual's basic character and thinking."[27] In one sense this seems to fully contradict Yan Fu's 1895 assessment that Beiyang had actually been deficient in absorbing these technical skills. But Wang resonates with Yan Fu's "public spirit" strain when he refers to a key concept, called "Spirit Education" (精神教育), a term that in Wang's own context, referred to the type of patriotic and even political training given to soldiers and officers at famed institutions like the Whampoa Military Academy founded by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, with Communist support, in 1924. Because of this exclusive emphasis on technical training, Wang writes that "for the duration that Military Academy students attended the school Spirit Education (精神教育) was ignored."[28] Wang says, echoing Yan Fu's public-private paradigm, soldiers without Spirit Education "are cowardly in the face of the common enemy, but courageous in private disputes (私仇)." That Wang has Yan Fu in mind becomes even clearer: for he also notes that Yan Fu saw the "excessive clan mentality" that Beiyang Military Academy graduates displayed as they exercised power with great harm in the early Republic, adding that Yan Fu apparently denounced them as "disciples of unrighteousness and tools of murder" (操殺人之器).[29] It is with irony, then, that we saw Yan Fu in 1895 lament China's future because he had neither seen nor heard of a single Beiyang Military Academy graduate that had risen to any significant position, and two decades later he lamented that these men had indeed risen to significance, according to Wang.

While there are some historical problems with this reading of Yan Fu's own attitudes and relationships vis-à-vis Beiyang leaders tied to the Military Academy, which are addressed well by other historians, I address here a problem interpreting the educational content of the institution that Wang presents.[30] For though Wang asserts that Spirit Education was completely "ignored," at this

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[26] Wang Jiajian 王家儉, "Beiyang wubei xuetang de chuangshe ji yingxiang" 北洋武備學堂的創設及其影響 [The Creation of the Beiyang Military Academy and its Significance], in *Qingshi yanjiu lunsou* 清史研究論藪, (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1994), p. 387.

[27] Wang Jiajian, p. 387. In some sense there is an irony that Yan Fu primarily critiqued the Beiyang Military Academy for *not* truly absorbing Western methods, while Wang Jiajian says that they *only* absorbed them, to the exclusion of other things. Though perhaps contradictory, Yan Fu and Wang Jiajian agree about the moral underpinnings of military efficacy, as Wang discusses with Spirit Education, which is in line with Yan Fu's "public spirit."

[28] Wang Jiajian, p. 388.

[29] Wang Jiajian, pp. 389-390.

[30] Perhaps more than anyone, Max Ko-wu Huang has highlighted the complexities and paradoxes of Yan Fu's thought and life, which resist the easy and neat categorizations by historians. He writes: "Although some May Fourth scholars recognized their intellectual debt to Yan, this movement criticized him for opposing the Revolution of 1911, exalting Confucian ethics, supporting the attempts of Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859-1916) and Zhang Xun 張勳 (1854-1923) to reinstate in the monarchy, and supposedly turning his back on Westernization in his later years." Max Ko-wu Huang 黃克武, "Zouxiang fanyi zhi lu: Beiyang shuishi xuetang shiqi de Yan Fu" 走向翻譯之路：北洋水師學堂時期的嚴復

institution, Chapter 3 will prove unequivocally that from the moment the term "Spirit Education" (*jingshen jiaoyu* 精神教育) entered Chinese discourse during the early 1900-1911 period, the expanded Beiyang military academies became a powerhouse for producing precisely this type of educational curriculum, instilling morality and patriotism as the ultimate battlefield factor, and furthered by precisely the educators, especially Feng Guozhang, who Wang names in a list of graduates-turned degenerate warlords.[31] Moreover, this chapter and the next show how the foundation for precisely this type of moral, patriotic education (though not yet called "Spirit Education") first fused to the technical requirements of modern, industrialized warfare within the Beiyang Military Academy beginning in 1885. That our collective historiography recognizes the key importance of this "spirit"-minded education but has not yet recognized its glaring presence in this context shows there is ample room for further research.

Elisabeth Kaske follows Yan Fu's other focus, on the process of transferring Western knowledge and methods to China. As a result, she has given us the most detailed and well-researched Western language study of the Beiyang Military Academy to date. Kaske puts her lens on "sites of transfer," such as the Beiyang navy yard, military academy, arsenal, and rail roads, etc., where German military instructors, whom she calls "Bismarck's Missionaries," worked with Chinese counterparts to build up these new institutions.[32] Her meticulous work draws richly from the German archives and fills an important gap on the historiography of the Beiyang Military Academy, for which Chinese source material has been relatively scant and fragmentary (in large part due to the school's complete destruction during the Boxer Uprising in 1900). For instance, thanks to her archival work, we can now see a detailed version of a training syllabus created by the Academy's German instructors (see Table 1, where I have highlighted specific courses whose content will appear later in this chapter as well). Not only does this syllabus teach what appears, at least, to be general military studies in the form of "land warfare" and "tactics," there are also some of the technical subjects directly related to Yan Fu's critical evaluation of the school in 1895, like "chemistry" and "physics," but also mapping skills such as "terrain study" and "drafting":

Monday	*Tuesday*	*Wednesday*	*Thursday*	*Friday*	*Saturday*
Mornings					
Land Warfare	Tactics	Coastal Warfare	Land Warfare	Tactics	Fortification Warfare
Weapons Study	Mathematics	Fortifications	Weapons Study	Mathematics	Fortifications
Photography(?)	Physics	Terrain Study	Astronomy	Photography(?)	Chemistry
Afternoons					
Drafting	Wargames	Mathematics	Wargames	Wargames	Mathematics

Table 1: German Instructor Training Syllabus for Beiyang Military Academy (1889). Reproduced from Kaske, Bismarcks Missionäre: deutsche Militärinstrukteure in China 1884-1890*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002), 123; original at the Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfeld (BArch Berlin) R 901/29894 Feindel an Reichkanzler Nr. 38 18. 4. 1889.*

[His Road to Translator: Yan Fu's Time at the Beiyang Naval Academy], in *Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jidai lishi suo jikan* 中央研究院近代歷史所集刊, Issue 49, pp. 18-19.

[31] Wang Jiajian lists Feng Guozhang a former "opera musician" (*qingshi* 琴師) as he reviews the meagre origins of a series of Beiyang Military Academy graduates who later rose prominence, and often infamy. While I cannot yet find a source supporting Feng's association with the opera, in Chapter 3 of this dissertation we will see him become the architect of late Qing Spirit Education.

[32] Elisabeth Kaske, *Bismarcks Missionäre: deutsche Militärinstrukteure in China 1884-1890*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002).

Of course, this does not, by itself, refute Yan Fu's assertion that the Military Academy failed to impart some of these very subjects, just because they are listed on the syllabus. After all, Yan Fu argued that Beiyang indeed advertised its teaching of Western Methods while he offered "clear evidence" that it was merely a show; moreover, *battlefield* failures were the ultimate manifestation of this rejection of the "factual" knowledge that the Germans had brought to China.

But whereas Yan Fu had argued that China's existential survival as a people hung on the process of transferring Western Methods to China, somewhat understandably given the crisis of 1895, Kaske cautions us against overreading even the rich materials she presents on knowledge these German "missionaries" brought. Indeed, she calls them "missionaries" with some irony, writing that "Western authors are often too easily hopeful that these consultants and specialists could have been key players in the process of transforming China, whether as cultural bringer or agent of imperialism."[33] Kaske shows that there were indeed many disagreements between German instructors and Chinese counterparts, particularly through interpersonal rivalries and friction, documenting that the "cultural transfer" that occurred at this site was by no means smooth or consistent. Thus, in contrast to many foreigner's predilections "To Change China," Kaske writes that her study shows "that the protagonists of all successful reforms and modernizations were always the Chinese themselves—that is, the success of a cultural transfer process is largely determined by the level of effort on the part of the recipient."[34] In this way, both Kaske and Yan Fu present us with a Beiyang Military Academy as a site of transfer, and both recognize difficulties in the *process* of that transfer, though Yan Fu's cultural polemics (calling Chinese slavish "lackies," 奴才) are discarded in Kaske's "recipients" *qua* "protagonists," whose agency seems to be retained and thus their dignity despite being on the short end of the a gross asymmetry of power vis-à-vis Western imperialism at this moment.

This chapter builds also on Kaske's work, as it does on Wang Jiajian's. Despite the rich and meticulous detail Kaske has given us on the content of the military education brought by these German instructors to the Beiyang Military Academy, historians have not yet recognize that specific education's broader and deeper significance. In the next section, I demonstrate that, whereas scholars understand this discrete body military knowledge as either purely technical training or, more broadly, as disciplinary technologies of the body as theorized by the French philosopher-historian Michel Foucault, these were of secondary importance. What has remained unexplored and unrecognized is that the content of the education these Bismarckian "missionaries" brought to China's first military academy had itself been borne of three distinct but interrelated revolutions that were (1) socio-political, (2) educational, and (3) technological. Having demonstrated this in the next section, I will also show that the revolutionary content of this education was indeed transferred by doing something no other historian of the Beiyang Military Academy has done before: follow a student onto the actual battlefield. In the process we will see unequivocally that these potent "Western Methods" were actually absorbed to an extent we as historians have not yet understood, we will also understand that very nature of this military education defies tidy separation between recipient and agent, Chinese and Western.

Section 2: Revolutions in Drill

[33] Kaske, p. 18.
[34] Ibid.

I submit that we have gotten things wrong when it comes to some of the most essential content of the "Western Methods" transferred to China, especially transferred by the German military through the Beiyang Military Academy from the 1880s onward. This section presents a specific form of combat drill that arose in Europe during the 1800s, which ruptured decisively from previous battlefield practices as it was borne of three distinct but related revolutions—a socio-political, an educational, and a technological revolution, respectively. Though this specific battlefield mode has barely been considered by academic historians, much less by China scholars, it had become the central and core organizing principle of warfare for the German army by the 1870s. And as I will show in this chapter, not only was this mode brought by "Bismarck's missionaries" to the Beiyang Military Academy in the 1880s, it was put into real battlefield practice by *Chinese* students in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1894).

There is a historical consensus today that the Chinese military only began Western-style disciplines related to the physical body, such close-order drill (*caolian* 操練) and calisthenics (*ticao* 體操), after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Nicolas Schillinger uses this 1895 dating to argue that "*For the first time in history*, Chinese common soldiers began to march in lock step and conduct choreographed physical exercises in unison."[35] Also reinforcing this claim is Endymion Wilkinson's highly influential source for professional researchers, *Chinese History: A Manual*, which states that the "first detailed orders for marching in step" were published in 1897 by Qing General Nie Shicheng 聶士成 (incidentally, a general we will hear more from below).[36] A number of issues arise with this historical consensus, both in dating and conceptualization, when we consider more closely the specific historical circumstances that gave rise to these military phenomena.[37]

Closer scrutiny reveals that the above historical consensus has focused on one specific type of drill, known as close order drill. Schillinger writes that Chinese began adopting Western-style military drill after 1895 "to increase bodily performance, speed and precision of soldiers and turn them into effective *closed* formations."[38] Schillinger draws upon Michel Foucault, saying the drill he describes fits with what "Foucault calls the precise and meticulous micro-techniques used to form the bodies of individuals and create docile subjects *technologies of the body*."[39] From a Foucauldian conceptual framework, Schillinger links it to China vis-à-vis Germany, writing that China's "New Armies absorbed German drill doctrines, which, with Foucault, might be traced back to notions about institutionalized (military) discipline developing in Europe since the seventeenth century."[40] Indeed, Foucault is one of the most articulate theoreticians of the military developments that occurred during this period to leave an indelible influence on modern military cultures and practices across the globe today. Thus, he deserves our serious attention.

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[35] Nicolas Schillinger, *The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China: The Art of Governing Soldiers*, (Lexington Books, 2016), p. 83.

[36] Endymion Wilkinson, *Chinese History, Volume 1: A New Manual*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2022), p. 326. Wilkinson provides a brief excerpt from the manual for flavor: "At the command one, everyone starts with the left foot first, then the right foot second; then one, two…. Marching at 60 paces a minute."

[37] In Chapter 2, I present evidence there that we need to push the 1895 dating of close order drill in China back, over 30 years, to the early 1860s when Li Hongzhang's Huai Army fielded units fully armed with muzzle-loading muskets and were taught close order drill to employ their weapons effectively in combat. There is also evidence that Chinese drill manuals were produced at this time. For new research on this, see Peng Hechao 彭賀超, *Xinjun huicao: Zhongguo jindai junyan zaoqi xingtang yanjiu* 新軍會操: 中國近代軍演早期型態研究 [Joint Exercises of the New Armies: Research in the State of Early Stages of China's Modern Military Exercises], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018).

[38] Schillinger, p. 16. Emphasis added.

[39] Schillinger, p. 16. Emphasis Schillinger's.

[40] Schillinger, p. 83.

Foucault's *Discipline and Punishment* vividly describes a key change in Europe's eighteenth century, when this "classical age discovered the body as object and target of power…."[41] Opening up "the great book of Man-the-Machine," the discovery entailed a "technico-political register [which was] …constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body." Foucault was able to conceptually link the army, an organization of violence, to the public school, an institution organized for learning, by their similar need to discipline and control their respective members; for in both social venues, he says, there "reigns the notion of 'docility,' which joins the analysable body to the manipulable body." "A body is docile," he wrote, when it "may be subjected, used, transformed and improved." But unlike unruly school pupils, the practices of making soldiers into "docile bodies," of course, took different forms: forms specific to the unique conditions of the eighteenth century European battlefield.

The advent of hand-held firearms, after initial prevalence in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), culminated in the eighteenth century era of standing armies of mass conscripts armed with muskets. The musket gave the individual soldier greater lethality on the battlefield, relative to the previous era of edged weapons. But because the musket was relatively inaccurate, it was necessary to mass soldiers in order to maximize the effects of their combined fire on the enemy. Massing musket fire was thus the tactical and operational imperative for victory, and it necessitated new regimes of bodily discipline in two dimensions. First, it required massed formations of thousands of men to arrive in precise unison as a group to create a cleanly aligned frontage of maximum length, in order to allow the highest number to fire at once (as forward fire endangered one's own soldiers if the front was not perfectly aligned). Because these deadly geometries were based on the conflicting demands of mass and precision, units learned to march in lock-step, or "keeping together in time."[42] Second, if precise movement in unison created maximally effective geometry to begin firing, the next decisive factor became sustaining a relative higher volume of fire than the enemy could return. And this required a physical discipline different from marching together. Critical was not so much firing one's musket (the inaccuracy of which made taking careful aim largely irrelevant) but rather reloading, which required a series of muscle-movements performed quickly and precisely. Also, the discipline of reloading muzzle-loading muskets meant that the soldier could never lie down to take cover; he needed to remain standing upright in the face of incoming enemy shot and shell and amidst wounded comrades. From marching in unison to reloading a musket, all of these bodily disciplines of "docility," in Foucault's parlance, needed to be as ingrained as possible in each individual soldier in order to perform such movements reliably and repeatedly amidst the mortal danger of the battlefield.

One of the great masters of this form of warfare was Frederick the Great (1712-1786), who Foucault highlighted for his brilliant ability to grasp and manipulate the principles of this kind of battlefield. Foucault even calls Frederick the Great "the meticulous king of small machines," obsessed with "well-trained regiments and long exercises"—precisely because the potency of docile soldiers and the disciplinary technologies that transformed them into "celebrated automata," "political puppets," or "small-scale models of power."[43] In part because of Frederick the Great, Schillinger's link between Foucauldian technologies and Germany is quite apropos in a certain way. And, indeed, disciplinary practices that derived directly from the eighteenth century battlefield

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[41] Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison* (1975), (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 136.

[42] A less famous but classic work on this subject is William H. McNeill's *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). McNeill's wonderful book has also influenced Endymion Wilkinson and Nicolas Schillinger.

[43] Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*, p. 136.

fought by massed armies of musketmen, which Foucault so eloquently captured, have carried over to modern military cultures across the globe and to this today. However, by the very end of the eighteenth century, battlefield practices and principles had changed dramatically, precipitated by various revolutions.

The great socio-political revolution in France, begun in 1789, soon precipitated a military threat to the rest of aristocratic Europe, a threat that culminated for Prussia, the kingdom so recently built by Frederick the Great, with complete and shocking disaster at the hands of Napoleon's army at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt on October 14, 1806. This particular defeat had many far-reaching impacts. For some, like one University of Jena professor named G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), the Prussian defeat was welcome. That very morning Hegel had caught a glimpse of Napoleon and with giddy excitement wrote to an associate that he had just witnessed the "World Spirit" (*Weltgeist*), extraordinarily manifested in the single person of the Emperor, pass by in physical form.[44] Hegel had the "Spirit" on his mind at that time, for he was drafting bold new ideas of how to reconceptualize the progression and direction of human history, a work that would be called the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*), which would have profound influence of Karl Marx (1818-1883). Zooming out and forward briefly to China, we must note that few would dispute that Hegel had an impact on Chinese history, mediated through Marx, then Lenin, and to the Chinese Communist Party (est. 1921). But virtually no one recognizes the influence of two other individuals present that day: Prussian officers Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) and his more famous protégé, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who was captured there by the French and later released. As we will see, these two men responded to the comprehensive impact of the revolutionary France by initiating a military education revolution of their own, one that would have profound influence on China, mediated by "Bismarck's missionaries" to the Qing, but has neither been recognized nor appreciated to this day.

First, let us look at the military impact that the battles of Jena and Auerstadt had on Scharnhorst and Clausewitz in overturning the very battlefield principles developed in the previous century. Charles White tells us that when Prussia sent its armies to fight Napoleon in 1806, it did so still "clinging to the great traditions of its Frederician past" and a conviction "that an unthinking Spartan obedience was the key to success."[45] Jena and Auerstadt debunked this, when Napoleon's army, "imbued with the deadly national enthusiasm that comes from opening careers to talent, annihilated the Prussian army and left little doubt that a drastic overhauling of the *robot-like* Prussian war machine was necessary."[46] Because the defeat rattled to its core the very Fredrician principles (read Foucauldian disciplinary technology) Prussia had trusted in, we would do well to examine how Scharnhorst and Clausewitz grappled with this traumatic paradigm shift in their own day.

Scharnhorst had earlier founded a military discussion society in Berlin, in which Clausewitz participated, that was dedicated to understanding the rise of revolutionary France in 1793. Scharnhorst and his discussion society posited socio-political factors *behind* France's mounting battlefield victories. Particularly, they pinpointed notions of political liberty as increasing the French ability to achieve concerted operations and unit cohesion. One particular battlefield manifestation they fixated on was the prevalence of French light infantry (*tirallieurs*) to operate in loosely-bound,

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[44] G. W. F. Hegel to Niethammer: "I saw the Emperor – this World Spirit (*Weltgeist*) – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it." Jena, October 13, 1806. In Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, trans., *Hegel: The Letters*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). On the importance of Hegel in modern China: Jana Rosker, "From Hegel to Mao—The Long March of Sinicizing Marxism," *Asian Studies*, Special Issue, Vol. 7, No. 1.

[45] Charles White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the* Militärische Gesellschaft *in Berlin, 1801-1805,* (New York: Praeger, 1989), *ix.*

[46] White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, ix. Emphasis added.

open formations rather than strictly-regulated mass formations. Scharnhorst observed that it "the physical ability and high intelligence of the common man enables the French *tirallieurs* to profit from all the advantages offered by the terrain and the general situation, while the phlegmatic [soldiers on our own side] form on open ground and do nothing but what their officer orders them to do."[47] Thus, Scharhorst had linked the observed battlefield phenomena of dispersion, adaptability, and initiative from lower-levels, which gave the French infantry their edge, to deeper ideational and social factors in the form a revolutionary spirit and the notions of individual liberty that animated them. If Foucault rightly said that Frederick the Great had delighted in the innate power of his "small machines," the line of inquiry inaugurated by Scharnhorst represents a paradigm shift that quite literally flipped the script on what constituted battlefield efficacy in relation to individual human agency.

Clausewitz would carry forward and expand his mentor's inquiries, particularly through the writings that became his classic work, *On War* (*Vom Kriege*). There Clausewitz wrote that the rise of revolutionary France had been "a force…that beggared all imagination."[48] Because France was "a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens," he said that "the people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance."[49] There is an ambivalence in Clausewitz's writing, for on the one hand, as a military professional, he is in awe of the energies revolutionary France had unleashed, while on the other hand (unlike Hegel), he expresses grave alarm regarding not only defeat in discrete battles, but in the social upheaval this new kind of war was causing. "War untrammeled by any conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury," he wrote, and "This was due to the peoples' new share in these great affairs of state…."[50] For Clausewitz, as for Scharnhorst, first-hand observations on the battlefield, like the greater dispersion between French troops, were discrete epiphenomena linked to new political identities for the common people that had been harnessed by Napoleon to create what he called a "juggernaut of war, based on the strength of the entire people, [that] began its pulverizing course through Europe… with such confidence and certainty that whenever it was opposed by armies of the traditional type there could never be a moment's doubt as to the result."[51]

Clausewitz and Scharnhorst turned from the work of framing the problem of France's military prowess as indelibly linked to socio-political revolution to applying discrete solutions. Thus they initiated a transformational reform of Prussian military education. They rejected the entrenched notion that institutions like the Berlin War Academy served only to teach technical and scientific knowledge for specialists like artillery officer and engineers, and instituted the requirement that all junior-level officers, not just specialists, attend military academies. They also imitated the civilian university by adding courses in Enlightenment humanities and critical thinking to the former technical military curricula that had been standard. As Clausewitz expert, Peter Paret writes, these reforms transformed Prussian military education into "a real experience of higher education."[52]

To be sure, there was some pushback to these measures. As Paret notes:

> No one denied that gunners and engineers required technical professional training. But did their special needs apply to the infantry and cavalry? Indeed, the significance of mathematics,

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[47] Scharnhorst, quoted in Charles White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the* Militärische Gesellschaft *in Berlin, 1801-1805,* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 62.
[48] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Peter Paret, trans., (Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 592.
[49] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 592.
[50] Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 592-593. Emphasis added.
[51] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 592.
[52] Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 52.

> ballistics, or architecture to members of the technical corps, whose social status tended to be inferior to that of their comrades in the line [infantry], and whose opportunities to reach superior rank were more limited, formed an additional argument against serious professional training for aristocratic infantry and cavalry officers. And social considerations were reinforced by tactical and operational realities: as men's cohesion, movement, and uniformity of action under fire, it could at least be argued that education which would give him not only additional knowledge but a wider point of view and would develop his independent judgment, was unnecessary and quite possibly damage his fighting qualities.[53]

While any state-run military education (technically based or not) might be understood in one sense as inherently conservative, Paret reminds us that these Prussian military reformers also "shared common ideals" with progressive educators like Fichte, who delivered his important *Addresses to the German Nation* the year immediately following the defeats of Jena and Auerstadt. Paret says the educational reforms Scharnhorst and Clausewitz initiated after 1806 broke radically with the status quo, as they "aimed at enlarging men's understanding of their own strength, and at giving them and their institutions the courage to grow and become creative."[54] As a "successful innovator in military education," Paret says that Scharnhorst, along with Clausewitz, "introduced the same spirit of free inquiry and exact observation that his civilian colleagues were fostering in schools and universities."[55] Just as we see crystallized in Clausewitz's later canonical writings that probe the French Revolution and its impacts, Clausewitz also tried to reproduce this process of inquiry for military academy students, for he saw that the "individual and political education" of all military officers, junior officers especially, "needed the help of systematic inquiries into the nature of the great forces that dominate the existence of men and state."[56] In sum, this was a sea-change, a revolution if you will, in the way military education was understood in Europe—moving from something purely technical and ancillary to something primarily encompassing the spirit and intellect as primary—and this development in military education had been precipitated directly by social and political revolution.

An additional technological revolution would also accelerate these changes already underway. The 1860s saw the invention of the breech-loading rifle, which would come to dominate warfare in Europe and soon Asia (adopted by the Chinese beginning in the 1880s). This new weapon contrasted with muzzle-loading muskets and rifles in its greater accuracy and the vastly greater ease and speed of reloading, by which soldiers now inserted a premanufactured metal-encased cartridge into the rifle's rear chamber (breech) rather than the front of the barrel (muzzle). This meant that soldiers now could fire, but more importantly reload, from virtually any physical position, especially the prone. Now, Foucault also recognized the invention of the breech-loading rifle as a pivotal "technical transformation."[57] Whereas Foucault had articulated the eighteenth century's disciplinary regime of close-order drill as addressing the competing battlefield imperatives of concentrated mass and geometrical precision, he recognized that, by adding "greater value to the soldier's skill" of "reaching a particular target," the breech-loading rifle had created a new tension on the battlefield: on the one hand, it made it "possible to exploit fire-power at an individual level; and, conversely, it turned every soldier into a possible target, requiring by the same token greater

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[53] Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 52.
[54] Peter Paret, "Education, Politics, and War in the Life of Clausewitz," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1968), p. 408.
[55] Peter Paret, "Education, Politics, and War in the Life of Clausewitz," p. 405. Particularly Fichte's lecture titled: "What Force already in Existence should form the Basis for the new National Education of the Germans?"
[56] Peter Paret, "Education, Politics, and War in the Life of Clausewitz," p. 408.
[57] Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*, pp. 162-163.

mobility."[58] Thus, it precipitated "the disappearance of a technique of masses in favour of an art that *distributed* units and men along extended, relatively flexible, mobile lines."[59] Though Foucault is vastly more articulate and inquisitive when speaking about the type of close order drill Frederick used to create docile "machines," he importantly recognizes, though does not elaborate, on the new weapon creating "the need to *invent a machinery* whose principle would no longer be the mobile or immobile mass [of the eighteenth century], but a geometry of divisible segments whose basic unity was the mobile soldier with his rifle."[60] Put simply, Foucault did address the breech-loading rifle's impact as a move from concentration to dispersion, from mass to individual, and from machined-automata to flexible agents; but he did not elaborate further than this on what the "invented machinery" looked like, either in social practice or on the battlefield. Completely overlooked, however, is any recognition by Foucault that the trends toward battlefield dispersion began half a century *before* the breech-loading rifle, as discussed above with the Napoleonic wars and new ideals of political liberty (with armies using essentially the same weaponry as in the decades of Frederick the Great). Indeed, his extreme focus on the *technological*—from the human agent as "machine," to drill as a "technology of power," and the breech-loader as a "technical transformation"—is another reason that I am critical of Foucault's unqualified conceptual applicability to battlefields beyond the eighteenth century when all these factors came together.

In fact, it was the foundation laid by Scharnhost and Clausewitz in their military education revolution that left Prussia primed to capitalize on and then decisively exploit the breech-loading rifle technology that came into use in the 1860s. The resulting fusion of the Scharnhorst-Clausewitz educational foundation with the new technology of breech-loading rifles would become known as *Auftragstaktik* or "mission tactics." Though "mission tactics" has barely registered in more academic history disciplines, military historians attribute it Germany's dominance in ground warfare from 1870 to 1945, and in its consciously borrowed forms, it remains core doctrine for military professionals across the globe, including the U.S. military.[61] One exception is historian Isabel Hull, who uses "mission tactics" as a penetrating analytical lens. She writes that "mission tactics," as applied in multiple battles culminating in the stunning victories of Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), had provided the German army a "solution to the problem of swiftly maneuvering mass armies, together with the expectation that commanders would attack aggressively, [and] required that officers think and act independently without waiting for orders that inevitably would arrive too late."[62] Hull also gives us detailed clarity into both what this mode of warfare entailed and how it was to be cultivated:

> Mission tactics demanded thinking and initiative. The combat manual (*Felddienst-Ordnung*) for 1900 made the principle clear: "In every situation, even the most extraordinary, each officer should apply his entire personality, without shrinking from responsibility, to fulfill his mission, even without waiting for orders concerning all the details. Superiors must encourage this application of personality." A popular, unofficial handbook for officers glossed this rule: "The officer's obedience must be self-activating, voluntary and not slavish." It continued,

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[58] Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*, pp. 162-163.
[59] Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*, pp. 162-163.
[60] Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*, pp. 162-163.
[61] With conscious recognition of its German roots, *Auftragsktaktik*'s direct translation, as "mission tactics," is enshrined in current American ground warfare doctrine under the rubric of "maneuver warfare"
[62] Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 116.

> "The officer must early on fashion his own viewpoint and may express this tactfully and modestly to his superior."[63]

With its official incorporation into doctrine and military education, mission tactics were enshrined as an "institutional form" of battlefield command and leadership that "operated from the senior-most general to the junior-most lieutenant" and became the "hallmark of the German army."[64]

We have arrived now at German "mission tactics" of the 1870s and 1880s by coming through three distinct revolutions: a socio-political revolution whose threat was expanded by Napoleon's armies, a military education revolution when Prussia added civilian-type humanities to officer curricula, and a technological revolution caused by breech-loading rifles. Though it cannot be adequately addressed here, there is great potential for China scholars to do more comparative research by unpacking the ruptures, revolutions, and resistances to change that marked the development of Western military modernities such as this, rather than simply using one country, like Germany, as an unproblematic or one dimensional model for Chinese to adopt with simple docility. Moving forward, "mission tactics" was a tactical-operational orientation for actual battle that rested on robust officer education, not only constituted the "new machinery" Foucault pointed towards (but did not elaborate), it was also the core, guiding principle of the German army and the "missionaries" it sent to China in the 1880s. And yet, the effort we have expended on exploring the animating principles behind Germany army doctrine and practices seems like a moot point for a China study, that is, if we follow Yan Fu and others who believe, with differing levels of severity, that the Beiyang Military Academy was ultimately a failed experiment in precisely the process of *transfer*. What historians of the Beiyang Military Academy have not yet done, however, is follow an actual student onto the battlefield.[65]

Section 3: The Battle of Chenghuan

This section follows the chapter's protagonist, Yu Guangxin 于光炘 (d. 1894) into the first battle of the First Sino-Japanese War, located at Korean town called Chenghuan (成歡). As we've seen, Yan Fu argued in his now-famous 1895 essays that his never having heard of a significant Military Academy student was "clear evidence" of the school's failure. The particulars of Yan Fu's statement derive in part because of the chaotic and disjointed information flow from China's frontline armies during the war and immediately following it, as will be explained. But I take up Yan Fu's underlying assertion, that data concerning performance of these students in battle would be significant, a topic left curiously unexplored by other historians of the Beiyang Military Academy, despite Yan Fu's otherwise profound influence on the limited field. To be sure, telling Student Yu's story is a process of historical excavation and recovery, though a process well worth the effort. While this section provides the basic reconstruction of who Student Yu was and what he did in battle, the next section will pair it with newly recovered finds that give us unprecedented clarity into the meaning and larger historical processes at work, in both this student's actions, organization for

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[63] Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, p. 116.
[64] Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, p. 116.
[65] Wang Jiajian and Elisabeth Kaske do not mention the central figure in this chapter: Beiyang Military Academy Yu Guangxin 于光炘. Noted historian of the First Sino-Japanese War, Qi Qizhang does mention Student Yu in a footnote. See Qi Qizhang 戚其章, "Jiawu Chenghuan zhi zhanshulun" 甲午成欢之战述论 [An Account of the Battle Chenghuan], *Qiqiha'er shifan xueyuan bao* 齐齐哈尔师范学院学报, Issue 1 (1989), pp. 70-77.

the battle, and Beiyang Military Academy education. In sum, working through the fragments we will arrive at a clear picture of "mission tactics" practiced on a battlefield organized for dispersion, proving for the first time that the Chinese "recipients" of "Bismarck's missionaries" were both more influenced and more active than previously realized.

Let us begin the process of reconstruction. We know extremely little about Yu Guangxin's background, for he appears in only one country gazetteer record. This record merely states that came from "Nangong County's Shaiyi village" (南宮曬衣村), in Hebei Province, before studying 360 miles away at the Beiyang Military Academy.[66] Though this is all the information divulged on Yu Guangxin's origins, we can pair it with Li Hongzhang's 1885 memorial (see chapter introduction) to surmise that Yu must have first left home to become a soldier in a Beiyang army camp, before he was selected for the criteria of being "physically tough, intelligent, and somewhat literate."[67] Given the Military Academy's one-year term of study, we can also surmise that he entered the school around 1893, for gazetteer tells us that "during the 1894-1895 war between China and Japan, Yu Guangxin *was still a student* (尚為學員)."[68] It also tells us that while still a student, Yu "was deeply moved to declare: 'The survival or ruin of the country (*guojia* 國家) is the responsibility even of the commoner. When the country's people (*guomin* 國民) kill the enemy (*shadi* 殺敵), it is a call for all under heaven (*tianxia* 天下) to follow.'" Apparently, Student Yu's utterance inspired others, for it lists seven other "classmates" (同學), including one named Zhou Xianzhang 周憲章 (d. 1894), who "all desired to accompany him" and went to Korea to fight the Japanese.

This hometown gazetteer provides a rare and unique insight into Student Yu, but also poses some historiographical problems. The first Nangong county gazetteer edition to mention Student Yu, it is composed over forty years after his death and the compilers do not disclose their sources. Some of the information can be corroborated. For instance, the assertion that Yu was "still a student" when he went to war finds resonance with a December 1894 *North-China Daily News* report, which said: "There are now one hundred twenty cadets in the Tientsin [Beiyang] Military Academy. Of the senior classes nearly seventy graduates and *non-graduates* have joined the army since the war with Japan began."[69] Conversely, it is hard to corroborate the gazetteer's presentation of Student Yu's rousing speech, which we have not been able to find elsewhere recorded. Without sourcing or other corroboration, it remains unclear if the gazetteer presents us with Student Yu's words in 1894, more or less faithfully recorded, or if the speech is what the gazetteer compilers, writing in 1936 on the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War, thought a hometown student *should* have said in such a situation. This issue of reliability and dating is important if we are to draw from Student Yu's story insight into Beiyang Military Academy education at this pivotal juncture. We can, in short, confirm that many students like Student Yu entered battle for the first time while still in student status, even if the gazetteer may not be the most reliable source for telling us what they said and what they felt about the Empire they set out to defend.

A source composed with more evident proximity to Student Yu and the war is the surviving campaign diary of General Nie Shicheng 聶士成 (1836-1900), the commanding officer under whom

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[66] *Nangong xianzhi* 南宮縣志 [Nangong County Gazetteer (1936)], Huang Ronghui, 黃容惠, Jia Enfu 賈恩紱 eds., reprinted 1936 edition, (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1976).

[67] *Nangong xianzhi* 南宮縣志 [Nangong County Gazetteer (1936)].

[68] *Nangong xianzhi* 南宮縣志 [Nangong County Gazetteer (1936)].

[69] *North-China Daily News. Shanghai: North-China Herald, December 5, 1894*. Emphasis added.

Student Yu served after leaving the Academy and arriving in Korea.[70] General Nie was one of two commanding generals sent to Korea in 1894, originally at the request of the Korean king for assistance putting down a domestic rebellion. This rebellion was quickly snuffed out, but the arrival of Qing troops in Korea had set off intense diplomatic escalation by Meiji Japan, who sent its own troops to counter what they alleged to be Chinese violation of Korean sovereignty. During this period of diplomatic escalation, historian S.C.M. Paine argues that while Japan steadily and exponentially increased troop buildup in Korea, China's initial "policy of conflict avoidance" opposed sending commensurate numbers of troops until much later; and, "as a result of the delay, these reinforcements would not arrive in time for the first two battles."[71] This disparity would have important consequences on this epoch-making war in world history.

It is within this precise context of boiling tensions on the Korean peninsula that we find Student Yu's first appearance in General Nie's diary in late June, a month before the war. At this time, General Nie's army had been ordered to remain at a crossroads town called Chenghuan (成歡), located some 50 kilometers south of Seoul, in order to decrease chances of escalation with the Japanese around the Korean capital. There we find General Nie chomping at the bit for permission to move troops closer. On June 24, 1894, with another request to move his whole army north denied, General Nie writes of having a certain "[Commander] Cheng Yunhe 程允和 take the cartography student (測繪學生), Yu Guangxin, and others towards Seoul in order to survey the terrain and map strategic points."[72] Thus, Student Yu's first appearance in the diary shows him performing certain jobs, cartography (測繪) and the mapping strategic terrain. These exact skills, as already seen, were course subjects at Beiyang Military Academy. Whereas Yan Fu's 1895 critique of the school highlighted these map-making skills as something the Academy was deficient in teaching, we see here a student putting his teaching into real-world practice. Moreover, this was not the first time General Nie had specifically employed Beiyang Military Academy students in this manner. Just prior to this military deployment, General Nie had led a group of three Beiyang Military Academy students, including Feng Guozhang, on a mapping expedition to chart Qing borders with Romanov Russia that took them into Korean as far as Pyongyang.[73] All this tells us that General Nie frequently employed Beiyang Military Academy students, like Yu Guangxin and Feng Guozhang, for the useful skills they had acquired through their education. Indeed, archival records show that during the war provincial governors pleaded with the Court to have Li Hongzhang send them Military Academy students and graduates to impart their valuable skills to their own forces—requests Li Hongzhang told the Court he could not fulfill because all the trained students available had already been sent to the front.[74] To be sure, that students like Yu Guangxin had indeed been pulled out of their studies

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[70] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition], in Shao Xunzheng 邵循正 ed., *Zhongri zhanzheng* 中日戰爭 [First Sino-Japanese War], (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957), Vol. 6. This diary was first published in 1914 under the title the "Recovered Writings of Mr. Nie Shicheng" (聶忠節公拾遺).

[71] S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 120.

[72] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1895)], p. 3.

[73] The account of General Nie's mapping expedition, which lasted from October, 1893 to June, 1894, was published in 1895 as (東游紀程) *Eastern Travels: A Record of the Journey* (東游紀程). This account, like the campaign diary containing Student Yu, also describes the three "students" (學生) conducting the surveying (測繪). Of note, Feng Guozhang was also designated the editor (*zhushuo* 注說) of the final report. See Nie Shicheng *Dong you jicheng*東游紀程 [Records of Eastern Travels (1894)], (Zhonghua shuju, 2007), pp. 49, 107.

[74] Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, "Beiyang dachen fucheng wubei xuetang fanren yishi wu congxuan paiwang guichu jiaolian" 北洋大臣覆稱武備學堂乏人一時無從選派往貴處教練 [High Minister of Beiyang Responding to Requests to Select

early and, freshly landed in Korea, were immediately put into operational use on campaign says much about the relative lack of such skills amongst General Nie's other, non-Academy officers; but it also forms for us the beginnings of a very different picture of Military Academy education than Yan Fu had portrayed: for we see Military Academy students in high demand across the board for the recognized value and utility of their technical skills.

But what is most surprising about the case of Student Yu is that, just as the diplomatic and military tensions boil over into full-scale war, we will see this student's individual responsibilities and roles increase, moving beyond discrete technical skills of pencil and paper, like composing maps, even to leadership of troops in battle. On July 23, Japanese forces seized the Korean royal palace in Seoul, taking King Kojong hostage and forced him to rescind all treaties with the Qing empire.[75] On July 25, Japanese warships made a surprise attack on Qing transport ships, killing roughly 1,000 troops sent to Korea as reinforcements. On July 26, General Nie first received news of this attack at sea, along with reports that sizable Japanese ground forces had left Seoul, moving south towards him and already occupied the town of Zhenwei 振威, just 15 kilometers away. After so many weeks of waiting in position, war was finally upon them.

On July 27, General Nie writes that "dire reports keep coming in and reconnaissance elements from our side and the dwarfs have exchanged fire with each other."[76] On July 28, in the afternoon, General Nie records reconnaissance reports of "the sporadic appearance of enemy cavalry in the vicinity of Jishan (稷山)," followed a report from scouts of "a large force of infantry and cavalry at Zhenwei (振威)… that numbered between 20 and 30 thousand in total."[77] "With my army not quite numbering two thousand infantry and cavalry," General Nie writes, "the disparity in numbers is great and there is considerable apprehension: we are pulling out."[78] General Nie here offers a frank disclosure of the emotional state he and his troops understandably felt at the knowledge that vastly greater numbers of Japanese troops were barreling towards them on a collision course. But the decision to withdraw was a result of operational deliberation with Nie's senior counterpart, General Ye Zhichao, who commanded troops next to Chenghuan at the key port city of Yashan. Prior to this, the port had been their life line for resupply, reinforcement, and, if necessary, evacuation. But with the sea lanes completely cut by the Japanese navy, Generals Nie and Ye now found their backs to the sea in imminent danger of encirclement by numerically superior Japanese ground forces. Thus, their plan was to withdraw inland, to a place called Gongzhou 公州, where they could combine forces on more advantageous terrain that offered greater maneuverability.

But that same evening of July 28, Student Yu appears in the diary again, this time bringing even more alarming news. Nie's entry states: "At the time of evening mess, Yu Guangxin reported to me, saying that just this evening the dwarfs [*wo* 倭, pejorative for Japanese] had split their forces into two columns, one headed to attack our troops at Chenghuan, while the other had split off towards the road to Gongzhou."[79] By dividing into two attack columns, one headed directly towards General Nie's front and the other cutting off his escape route, the Japanese maneuver threatened to

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and Send Personnel from the Military Academy as Trainers]. April 28, 1895. Document No. 01-25-042-01-030. Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Republic of China.

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[75] Paine, p. 121.

[76] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)], p. 5.

[77] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)], p. 9.

[78] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)], p. 9.

[79] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)], p. 9:「晚餐，于光炘來謁，稱探得倭於今夜分兩股一來襲成歡官軍，一截往公州去路。」

annihilate his forces with his back to the sea. This put General Nie in an operational dilemma. If he continued his withdraw as planned, one or both Japanese columns at their present pace would likely catch up to him from the rear, on ground not of his choosing, and with little time to stop and organize an effective defense. Standing to fight, however, risked being enveloped by both Japanese attack columns and cut off from General Ye's forces, with his back to the sea. As we will see, General Nie would attempt to balance this two-sided dilemma with a plan to stand and fight in a flexible manner that would blunt the Japanese momentum long enough to egress without getting embroiled with encirclement. The plan would be, therefore, quite risky and the balance quite delicate.

But noteworthy for our study is that a mere "student" delivered such critical and timely information to the commander, indicating that Student Yu had graduated, so to speak, from pencil-and-paper skills of producing knowledge about static terrain, to gaining and communicating knowledge about the changing enemy situation, in an environment where troops have begun shooting at each other. The critical nature of the information Student Yu brings here is attested to in the dramatic pivot we see, as General Nie revises his original plan to simply "pull out" (馳歸) and now decides to give battle.


Indeed, just after receiving Student Yu's report, General Nie calls together his staff for what is called, in current military parlance, a "Combat Order" (or "Operations Order"), where a commander, either verbally or in writing, communicates his battle plan to the unit. At this Combat Order, General Nie first delineates the key pieces of terrain that his plan will utilize. He describes the area's various locations of high-ground and mountains, roads and pathways. It is not a stretch of the imagination that Student Yu, already employed for his cartography skills, may have been a key source of General Nie's terrain analysis here. But most notable is a small bridge over the nearby river, located 5 kilometers forward in the direction of the enemy, that General Nie surmises, "the Japanese would be required to use."[80] It will be this small bridge, noted here as a key component in General Nie's battleplan, that will soon become famous in Japanese media in the following weeks and months—and, much later (two years, to be exact), it would be known as the site of Student Yu's death.

General Nie moves to the next part of his Combat Order, giving specific missions or tasks to six different infantry unit leaders (see Figure 1 below). Though these tasks are detailed, two elements of General Nie's Combat Order are critical for us to observe. First, note that General Nie assigns units their specific missions in relation to key pieces of terrain that are dispersed across the battlespace; he does not tell them to form up next one another, leaving substantial space *between* units (Figure 1, Items 1-6). Second, Student Yu and a classmate named Zhou Xianzhang have been given a specific mission within the army's battleplan (Figure 1, Item 5). This mission now clearly goes beyond the previous tasks we have seen, such as creating knowledge of terrain or carrying critical information: these "students" (學生) now take leadership of troops in combat. And their mission is not abstract participation in battle, it is specific to conduct an ambush at given location, though somewhat ambiguous as recorded here, would have been clarified at the briefing, and appears to be pushed forward to catch Japanese attack column barreling toward them from Zhenwei.[81] "With matter of deployment of our forces complete," General Nie writes at the end of

[80] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)], p. 10.

[81] It is admittedly somewhat unclear precisely where Student Yu's ambush is ordered to take place, as the road or "way" linking Zhenwei to Jishan is linear rather than a point. But, given that Japanese troops had already reached Zhenwei at this time, it is certain that the ambush was well forward to intercept the enemy advance. Moreover, the ambush site presumably would have been pinpointed more clearly at the briefing and it would, assuredly, be done with the assistance of Student Yu's knowledge of the terrain.

his Combat Order, "we took an impassioned oath and the entire group was inspired, with everyone willing to fight to the death."[82]



General Nie's Combat Order

July 29, 1894

1. (令) **I ordered** Assistant Battalion Commander Feng Yihe to take 300 crack troops and set an ambush where the riverbank and forest met, and to open fire only once the enemy was halfway across.
2. (令) **I ordered** Company Officer Xu Zhaode to lead 100 men and lay in wait at the side of the mountain and also to watch from the mountaintop and raise lanterns to signal which side was under attack.
3. (令) **I ordered** Assistant Battalion Commander Nie Pengcheng to lead four companies into position along the embankment on the west side of the route, and Company officer Wei Jiaxun to lead five hundred men in support.
4. (令) **I ordered** Wing Commander Jiang Zikang to command the "Benevolence Battalion" and block the enemy from the Yashan road.
5. (令) **I ordered** **Military Academy students Zhou Xianzhang, Yu Guangxin,** and others to take a few dozen sturdy soldiers and set an ambush on the way from Zhenwei to Jishan.
6. ___ Battalion Officer Xu Zhaogui to serve as support with 400 men stationed at the east corner of Chenghuan.

Figure 5: General Nie's Combat Order at the Battle of Chenghuan, July 29, 1894. This is my translation of the original order, modified in numbered format for clarity. See Nie Shicheng 聶士成, Dongzheng Riji 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)],

Following this, General Nie records that around 4 o'clock in the morning, as it was still dark, the Japanese "lead element got onto the river bridge, as predicted" and his troops opened fire, surprising them and killing "a few dozen" outright while many fell from the small but congested bridge and drowned in the river.[83] This forced the Japanese back off the bridge. But as daylight arrived, the Japanese launched multiple strong counterattacks. Only when the Japanese managed to cross the river elsewhere, without the assistance of the bridge, did the enemy flank the Qing defenders on the bridge. From this, Japanese forces flooded the area's terrain and engaged in close combat with Nie's troops. General Nie says his troops fought ferociously against 10 to 1 odds from 4 to 7am, until ammunition gave out. At this point, "I had no choice but to order our troops to break away from the encircling enemy and leave," he writes. By evening they had effectively withdrawn to safety at a town enroute to their destination of Gongzhou; critically, the Japanese did not pursue.

That night General Nie made assessments of the battle. "The enemy casualties," he writes, "were over a thousand and, because of the damage we inflicted, they didn't dare pursue us." Thus, General Nie's plan seems to have worked, for he was simultaneously able to blunt the Japanese speed of advance that would have caught his army from the rear while moving while not fighting so

[82] Nie Shicheng 聶士成, *Dongzheng Riji* 東征日記 [Diary of the Eastern Expedition (1894-1895)], p. 10:「部署畢，慷慨誓師。眾感奮，皆願決一死戰。」

[83] Unfortunately, the diary account of the battle's actual conduct refrains from identifying the specific units and commanders, in contrast to his Combat Order specifying tasks. One exception is General Nie's artillery commander named within the battle account.

long that his outnumbered troops would be encircled and annihilated at Chenghuan. Nie attributes this ability to inflict damage so effectively on his opponent to his units' specific tactics: "In this engagement, our troops conducted many ambushes using the terrain to fire from concealed positions at the enemy in the open." He also attributes these tactics to the low casualties his army suffered: "As a result, we lost just over a hundred men, which included two platoon commanders, Wu Tianpei and Nie Rugui; two *students* (學生), Zhou Xianzhang and Yu Guangxin; and others who all sacrificed their lives fighting with all their might." Thus we have the death of Student Yu.

While General Nie's diary would not be published for another two decades, details of Student Yu's did emerge, but only over two years after the battle of Chenghuan. In contrast, the bridge where General Nie's dispersed troops ambushed the attacking enemy became instantly famous in Japan, thanks to news correspondents embedded with Japanese armies who fed the voracious Japanese public a steady supply of war information and stories of battlefield heroism.[84] Thus, the first major hero of the war became one Captain Matzuzaki 松崎直臣 (1856-1894), who died leading troops in a charge across the river to flank the Qing defenders next to the bridge. In addition to print stories of the battle, which were often paired with detailed maps of the area, woodblock prints depicting Captain Matsuzaki's charge sold to thousands of eager customers waiting in lines for the latest images to be available within weeks of the action (Figures 1 & 2), along with other Captain Matsuzaki memorabilia that caught fire (Figure 3).



Figure 6: Woodblock print, "Captain Matsuzaki Battles Bravely at the Ancheng River." Dated August, 1894, it was produced at most a month after the battle. Notice the bridge posts on left. Original in author's collection.

[84] Makito Saya, *The Sino-Japanese War and the Birth of Japanese Nationalism*, (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2011), p. 27.



Figure 7: Woodblock print, "The Bravery of Captain Matsuzaki during the Major Assault at Anseong Crossing" (安城渡大激戦松崎大尉 勇猛), August, 1894. Original in author's collection. A copy is also located in the British Museum, London at https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/A_1941-1010-0-1-1-3




Figure 8: Captain Matsuzaki Period Memorabilia, originals in author's collection. ***A****. Matsuzaki commemorative card.* ***B.*** *Matsuzaki Postcard with deceased portrait and memorial procession.* ***C.*** *Glass lantern slide of Matsuzaki's charge (he is often on horseback). D. 1895 Booklet illustration of Matsuzaki's charge and caption (left); maps of the Chenghuan area and the Yashan campaign (right).*

But Chinese-language war coverage was not only piecemeal, even official communication between the Beijing Court and its field armies had collapsed disastrously at the outbreak of the war, often leaving the Beijing with no idea what had occurred at a given battle or even where its armies were located on a map. In fact, Yu Guangxin's name did not arrive at the Beijing Court until January 24, 1895, a full five months after the battle of Chenghuan, with his name on a list of hundreds of

other officers killed in action.[85] Unlike the Meiji emperor who, just after the battle of Chenghuan, asked if the first woodblock printed battle-scene he laid eyes on depicted the Captain Matsuzaki he had already heard so much about, Student Yu's name of the casualty list arrived with no amplifying narrative, and it is doubtful anyone at the Court ever remarked his name.[86] Thus, this is the broader informational context in which Yan Fu would understandably proclaim to a reeling Chinese readership in June 1895 that he had "still not heard" (尚未聞) of any notable Beiyang Military Academy student: for it would not be for two years that anyone China would. By the time Student Yu's story was made available, as we will see in the next section, the narrative tracks had already been laid.

To be clear, I am not claiming for Student Yu's actions at Chenghuan a counterfactual measure of significance, i.e., I am not asking us to give historical weight to what might have been *had* Yan Fu heard of him before writing his essay. Neither am I asking us to further valorize Student Yu's discrete tactical role at the battle as if he were solely responsible for the survival of Nie's army, though it seems he did contribute. Rather, I am asserting Student Yu's story and actions represent larger developments that occurred *in fact* at China's first military academy but that our historiography have not yet considered since its parameters were laid in 1895. As the previous section showed, we have paid little attention to the essential elements of military education that German instructors would have been teaching in this period. In this section we have seen Student Yu put something very similar to those German principles of dispersion and lower-level initiative into efficacious practice on a real battlefield. This presents a possibility that previous lenses on the Beiyang Military Academy as a site of transfer have not considered: real efficacy. In the next section, we look at a newly recovered source that definitively links Student Yu's actions, Military Academy education, and German tactical principles.

Section 4: (Finding and) Telling Student Yu's Story

Student Yu's story took its first publicly available form in the winter of 1897 (over two years after his death), appearing in an lengthy account of the First Sino-Japanese War compiled by Yao Xiguang 姚錫光 (1857-1921), called *Military Affairs of the East: A Compendium*.[87] Yao's *Compendium*

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[85] Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, "Zhili zongdu Li Hongzhang zou qingyi xuyuan hu shangwang yuanbian zhe" 直隸總督李鴻章奏清議卹援護傷亡員弁摺 [Attachment 1: List of Names for Officers Killed and Wounded while Aiding Korea], in *Qing Guangxu chao Zhongri jiaoshe shiliao* 清光緒朝中日交涉史料 (Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1980), *juan* 27, pp. 9.

[86] Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan," in *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, Donald Shively, ed. (Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 144. Keene's quote from the Meiji Emperor comes from Shimbun Shusei Meiji Hennen Shi, ix, 164.

[87] Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, *Dongfang Bingshi jilüe liu juan* 東方兵事紀略 六卷 [Military Affairs of the East: A Compendium (1897)], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010). Of note that same year, Yu Guangxin's name is mentioned by the new Governor-general of Zhili province as he memorializes the Throne for permission to build a shrine at the Beiyang Military Academy to commemorate the students that fell in battle during the war. Still, I say that Yao Xiguang's is the first publicly available account of Student Yu because the 1897 is closed, official communication and, moreover, while it speaks of bi-yearly sacrifices offered to keep the students' memories alive, it does so within the confines of the school and no mention of a narrative that can be disseminated beyond it. The memorial is found in the National Palace Archives (國立故宮博物院) in Taipei: see Wang Wenshao 王文韶, "Zou wei Beiyang wubei xuetang xuesheng Yu Guangxin deng ba ming xianhou zai yashan pingrang lüshun deng zhenwang ni juanzi jianzao ciyu dengyou" 奏為北洋武備學堂學生于光炘等八名先後在牙山平壤旅順等陣亡擬捐資建造祠宇等由 [Memorial for Collection of Funds for a Memorial Shrine to Beiyang Military Academy Students Yu Guangxin and Eight Others Killed in Action at

covered the entire war, though it described Student Yu's specific involvement in the battle of Chenghuan with close correlation to General Nie's campaign diary (discussed above). Before the battle, Yao writes, "Military Academy student Yu Guangxin and other [students]… braved the rain in the dark to gain intelligence… and hurried back to Give General Nie the news to prepare for battle."[88] Yao also places them precisely at the famous bridge: "Yu Guangxin and the others positioned their ambush from a hamlet on the side of the bridge." "Yu Guangxin and the rest fired at [the Japanese] from concealed positions," Yao continues, "killing and wounding a considerable number of them, including a number of Japanese officers." Finally, Yao ends the episode with the following: "Yu Guangxin and the others were able to block the bridge for about an hour. But since reinforcements never arrived, the four students, including Yu Guangxin, all died there. And the Japanese came on." Clearly Yao's 1897 account correlates strongly with General Nie's diary (published 1914), though Yao makes a clear assertion that Student Yu fought at the key bridge and, moreover, his sentences showcase with greater emphasis the agency and initiative displayed by Yu Guangxin and other classmates that day.

As we have seen, detailed information of the war had been a hard commodity to come by in China. It begs the question: where did Yao Xiguang get this information? Yao explains in the *Compendium* preface that, after having "once been stationed in Tianjin," he then served in Shandong as a military advisor, in which capacity he participated in the war both on the Shandong Peninsula and in the Liaodong region (but *not* in Korea, importantly).[89] Yao tells his readers that, despite being on the frontlines, his experiences gave only "rough sights and sounds" (粗有見聞) of the entire war. He thus needed to supplement what he "originally saw and heard" (本所見聞), telling readers that he collected "many official documents, army telegrams, private letters from fellow officials, plus oral accounts from rotating army officers…"[90] This synthesis of first-hand experience and rigorous source work, Yao says, resulted in the *Compendium*. Knowing something about Yao's sources and methods is helpful for our investigation into Student Yu; but Yao Xiguang is a truly extraordinary source for other reasons.

First, a diary fragment belonging to Yao Xiguang was discovered inside the Beijing Library in 2003.[91] This diary fragment covers a one-year period (Nov. 28, 1895 to Nov. 26, 1896), but it is rich in detail and, importantly, it captures Yao in the process of compiling his *Compendium* as he gathers sources. Second, we know from the diary that Yao Xiguang he had actually been a Beiyang Military Academy instructor from about 1886 to 1893 (indicated in the *Compendium* Preface only with the vague reference to once being stationed in Tianjin). Thus, Teacher Yao, as I often refer to him, his account of the war, and his diary give us an unprecedented view of military academy education that

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Yanshan Pyongyang, Port Arthur, and Elsewhere]. August 29, 1897. Palace Memorial collection No. 140967. National Palace Archives, Taipei, Republic of China.

[88] Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, *Dongfang Bingshi jilüe liu juan* 東方兵事紀略 六卷 [Military Affairs of the East: A Compendium (1897)], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), p. 24.

[89] Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, *Dongfang Bingshi jilüe liu juan* 東方兵事紀略 六卷 [Military Affairs of the East: A Compendium (1897)], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), "Preface" (序), p. 2.

[90] Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, *Dongfang Bingshi jilüe liu juan* 東方兵事紀略 六卷 [Military Affairs of the East: A Compendium (1897)], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), "Preface" (序), p. 2.

[91] The hand-written diary fragment was recovered in Beijing Library in 2003. For the first photocopied edition, see《姚錫光日記》in 《中華歷史人物別傳集》, vol. 71, (北京 : 線裝書局, 2003). Another copy of the hand-written manuscript was printed in 2006: see《姚錫光日記》in 《歷代日記叢鈔》, vol. 41, (北京市 : 学苑出版社, 2006). It was not until 2010 that a type-set edition of the manuscript became available: see *Yao Xiguang Jiang'e riji* 姚锡光江鄂日记 [Diary of Yao Xiguang from Jiang'e], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010). I use the latter edition, hereafter, *Yao Xiguang Diary* (1895-1896).

has never been utilized by historians for this purpose. Third, though the diary records a period (1895-1896) which is, admittedly, after his time at the Beiyang Military Academy, we find that Yao has been hired by the Governor of Hubei province, Zhang Zhidong, specifically to assist with founding a new military academy in the Beiyang mold. This gives us insight into how the Beiyang Military Academy model began to spread across the Empire just after the First Sino-Japanese War. All three of these elements—Yao's behind-the-scenes work of compiling a history of the war (which includes Student Yu), his experience teaching at the Beiyang Military Academy, and his work expanding Chinese military education with founding the Hubei Military Academy (est. 1896)—not only give us greater insight into Student Yu's story, but reinvent our entire understanding of China's first military academies and the meaning of military education in the late Qing.

Let us dive in to his diary, where we find all three of the above elements come together. For instance, on December 22, 1895, Yao records that he "bumped into" former Beiyang Military Academy students whom the "Minister of Nanyang [Zhang Zhidong] had requested to come assist with training the army and translating German, [so] they were also staying at the Governor's compound."[92] The diary is full of these encounters of Teacher Yao with former students precisely because Zhang Zhidong had actively sought, not only teachers like Yao, but graduates of Beiyang Military Academy, to become "missionaries" and make Zhang's provincial seat at Wuchang a "site of transfer," to use Kaske's phrases, thereby bringing the valuable education and methods from Beiyang to Hubei. Yao also describes these encounters with palpable warmth, recording the "close emotional bond" (情頗依依) and the "student-teacher friendship" (師弟之誼) he still enjoys with them years after their mutual school experience together.[93] Yao additionally uses these close bonds forged at the Military Academy as an information network. And he gleans from former students not just new about the Beiyang Military Academy, but also to gain information for his ongoing *Compendium* project. For instance, on October 20, 1896 Yao meets with former student Shang Zhigao 尚志高, who had been an artillery battery commander during the war's Lushun campaign. He writes: "So I inquired about what happened before Lushun fell," Yao writes, and "This is what he said…."[94] After recording the details at length, Yao then says "Student Shang sketched a map to delineate the circumstances of the Japanese assault… [and] I compiled it into [my Liaodong chapter] which I had not yet finished writing." Moreover, that same day he runs into another former student with experience in the war, named Shang Dezheng 尚德正. Yao writes, "I had him make a very detailed record of everything he *saw and heard* (所見所聞)."[95] As Yao would write in his finished *Compendium* preface, he supplemented what he had personally "saw and heard" with various sources and interviews. Throughout the diary, we see Yao as a man moving through social space and acquiring information, from interviews to obtaining books and records from other friends and associates in Qing official circles. Here we see Teacher Yao using his former Beiyang Military Academy experience as a social network to gain information about the war, even as this network is working on expanding the education that had bounded them together into new locations like Hubei. But the diary also gives us insight that fundamentally alters our understanding of the Beiyang Military Academy education, along with giving us a solid interpretation of what we've seen with Student Yu's role in combat. We see this in his length entry for January 11, 1896, which begins with Yao, having hopped on a donkey to answer a summons to Zhang Zhidong's governor compound, is left waiting in the antechamber all day, until evening when the busy Governor finally cancels the

[92] Entry for December 22, 1895, *Yao Xiguang Diary* (1895-1896), p. 33.
[93] Entry for June 18, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary* (1895-1896), p. 116.
[94] Entry for October 20, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 170.
[95] Entry for October 20, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 170.

meeting altogether.[96] While waiting, however, Yao seems delighted to have the opportunity to talk with Cai Xiyong 蔡錫勇 (1847-1898), one of Governor Zhang's most trusted advisors. Yao records their conversation meticulously. At one point, Cai Xiyong asks Yao about the "the reasons for Beiyang's defeat last year," a burning question discussed across the Empire at this time, as we know from the case of Yan Fu above. In fact, part of Yao's answer is remarkably similar to Yan Fu's, particularly when Yao excoriates certain Beiyang military commanders, who are called "veteran commanders" (宿將). Despite the appellation for these men, Yao says, "in truth they took scoundrels and fit them with rank and title…. They are truly useless. As soon as there is trouble, they [their army] will collapse and break, an inevitable culmination of the circumstances."[97] Similar to Yan Fu as well, Yao calls it a "corruption" (弊) the employment of these so-called veteran commanders, and he walks Cai at length through the operational conduct of the war to prove his point.

But Yao offers fundamentally different insights to those brought up by Yan Fu. In fact, the very first part of Yao's answer to Cai Xiyong's question was this: "I told him, 'Beiyang founded its Military Academy over a decade ago [1885] and its training in German drill for dispersed formations (*decao sandui* 德操散隊) was quite impressive.'"[98] Yao here identifies something concrete, in this case "German drill for dispersed formations," as the hallmark achievement of Beiyang Military Academy education for the decade of its operation prior to the war. And in this, we have something fundamentally different than Yan Fu's thesis, which explicitly claimed the Military Academy had failed to impart Western Methods. Moreover, though Yao's interlocutor seems to implicitly understand what "German drill for dispersed formations" means, I argue that we have lost its meaning to history and, as I demonstrate here, it encapsulated the three-fold revolutions involved in German military education, which, as Yao claims here, was actually imparted at the Beiyang Military Academy.

I make this claim about the content of this term because Yao used it months earlier during the war in 1895. As a military advisor preparing for Japanese invasion, in January 1895 Yao composed a lengthy report for the governor of Shandong, Li Jiantang 李鑑堂, where he elucidates "Drill for Dispersed Formations" (*cao sandui* 操散隊).[99] There Yao tells the governor that "dispersed formations originated from German drill methods." He notes that these German drill formations "almost resemble" (差仿) some Chinese formations used by General Qi Jiguang during the Ming (1348-1644) and Hu Wenzhong during the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), who used some forms of troop dispersion. But Yao's point seems to be less about similarities with specific forms than it is about these revered Chinese commanders' willingness to discard "old formations" (舊陣) and adopt new innovations when the need arose. And the need had arisen again, Yao tells Governor Li: "*Now* both we and our opponents have breech-loading rifles, so a basic fundamental is that it's advantageous for units to branch out separately and avoiding bunching up into large rectangular formations."[100] Thus, breech-loading rifles require "new drill" (新操) that "is about taking all the old square castle formations and getting rid of them, replacing them with dispersed formations."

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[96] Entry for January 11, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 42-44.
[97] Entry for January 11, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 43.
[98] Entry for January 11, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 43.
[99] Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, "Shandong lianbing shiyi shuotie" 山東線兵事宜說帖 [Proposal on Shangdong Army Training], January 1895. In *Zhongri zhanzheng* 中日戰爭 [The First Sino-Japanese War], (Shanghai: Xinzhishi chubanshe, 1958), Vol. 5, p. 248-249.
[100] Yao Xiguang, "Shandong lianbing shiyi shuotie" 山東線兵事宜說帖 [Proposal on Shangdong Army Training], January 1895.

Furthermore, he says that, "in employing their [breechloading] rifles, soldiers must be able to fire from the sitting, kneeling, and prone positions, in order to steady their breathing [to aim], plus remaining in cover from enemy fire." By training to fire from all these physical positions, soldiers "won't fear incoming enemy fire… and it will maximize each individual soldier's fire on the enemy." And Yao also moves from the basics to elaborate how this regime of dispersion is to work in practical situations. In the attack, he continues, individual platoons (排) need to maintain dispersion between other platoons and between its soldiers within it, ensuring that they "wait to close ranks only at the moment they assault the enemy." This meant that "each platoon must be divided up so that it can be quick and nimble." In this way, Yao describes dispersion as a new way to organize for combat, derived from Germany and based on the new technology of breech-loading rifles.

Yao also adds further depth of analysis, telling the governor that "dispersed formations" is about more than changing the outward *form* or shape of the groups of troops. He writes:

> Operating with dispersion (散) between your soldiers is difficult, much more difficult than operating with ordered (整) formations. When units are dispersed, their *qi* 氣 (spirit/courage/energy) has to *order itself on its own* (自整) if it is going to go up against strong enemies. So it is essential to train this intensively.[101]

If the goal of massed formations had been to achieve geometric "order" (*zheng* 整) of outward form, Yao says the challenge with dispersion is of a different dimension entirely: for it becomes an internal problem of what he calls *qi* 氣, which can be translated as spirit, courage, or energy. Of course, with the previous formations Yao describes as square and rectangle blocks of "ordered" troops, a single supervising officer could see and correct signs of dis-"order" quite easily. But Yao says that when soldiers are "dispersed" unevenly across space, and comporting their bodies with the cover afforded by terrain rather than standing, the type of "order" that must be achieved is at once less about the physical body than it is of individuals' internal *qi* 氣 and it is less an external imposition than a "self-order" (自整). Strikingly, Yao articulates to the governor here follows almost to the letter the very insights Clausewitz sought to convince others of following the Napoleonic wars. [102]

Yao also describes concrete organization and procedures needed to achieve this mode. Given that dispersion and separation require a cohesion within units to be independently self-actualized, Yao says more *junior* officers are needed. He writes, "Each platoon must be supervised by a platoon commander,"[103] and even suggests adding assistants to platoon-level officers, precisely to increases the ability of each platoon to be able to operate with the greatest independence from other units. These extra levels of lower-level leadership seem to resemble what Foucault called the "new machinery" needed to govern the battlefield of dispersed warfare based on the primacy of the individual soldier carrying a breech-loading rifle. Still, Yao's suggestions themselves strongly imply that no such "machinery" exists in Qing forces in Shandong, for he says, "It must be by initiating

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[101] Yao Xiguang, "Shandong lianbing shiyi shuotie" 山東線兵事宜說帖 [Proposal on Shangdong Army Training], January 1895., p. 248:「兵間用散之難，更難於用整；隊散而氣自整；乃克當大敵； 是非精鍊不可。」

[102] Compare Yao here to Clausewitz's *On War*: "… separate units will more frequently have to fend for themselves. Where the troops can remain concentrated, however, the talents of the commander are given greater scope, and can make up for any lack of spirit among the troops. Generally speaking, the need for military virtues becomes greater the more… other factors tend to complicate the war and disperse the forces (p. 188; emphasis added)."

[103] Yao Xiguang, "Shandong lianbing shiyi shuotie" 山東線兵事宜說帖 [Proposal on Shangdong Army Training], January 1895, p. 248.

these types of measures that we can *start* training in distributed formations."[104] Indeed, Yao's detailed explanation to Governor Li seems to indicate a lack of familiarity with this mode and mechanics of dispersed combat formation.

But Yao tells Governor Li exactly where and with whom this valuable practical knowledge is prominent. He writes:

> Right now, General Nie occupies a large mountainous ridge and is following these principles. As such, half of the junior officers in Nie's army are students from the Military Academy. They are ingrained in this type of training and best suited for operating in dispersed formations. This is the reason they will stand firm and will not waver.[105]

Now, Yao's statement here is incredible for a number of reasons. First, his assertion means that Military Academy students knowing the principles of dispersed formations is about more than the technical knowledge of drill. He calls "dispersed formations" the *reason* that Beiyang Military Academy students fighting under General Nie will "will stand firm and will not waver." Yao has already said that crux of this mode of combat is about "self-ordering;" thus, Yao is making a claim Military Academy students' education specially equips them in the self-ordering of individual and unit *qi* 氣 in battle. Second, Yao's statement is a striking for its epistemological boldness. Recall Yao's *Compendium* preface, where he wrote that, precisely because "what he saw and heard" (所聞所間) of the war had been confined to a limited sector, he needed the aid of supplemental sources to make reliable statements about other fronts of the war. But Yao makes a claim, on the basis of prior knowledge of Beiyang Military Academy education, to reliably know what is occurring and what will occur in an entirely different front of the war that separates him by hundreds of miles and, as discussed above, a complete breakdown of Qing communications. Yao's claim is incredibly bold in epistemological depth (penetrating to an individual's *qi* 氣) and breadth (across physical space). What is even more incredible, perhaps, is that Yao's bold claim appears to have been borne out by events (if we can rely on General Nie's diary): for Student Yu and anywhere from one to three other classmates who had also just arrived from school to Korea took battlefield leadership responsibility at a key position relatively far from any other supporting units. Moreover, they seem to have stood firm and not wavered, as Teacher Yao claimed students like this would do, holding the bridge for a critical hour, blunting the momentum of the Japanese attack, and likely allowing General Nie's army to survive and fight another day. But the tactical and operational details of what happened at Chenghuan is only one meaning of Student Yu's death in battle, admittedly a smaller meaning.

What we find here in the excavation of Student Yu's story and Teacher Yao's diary, I argue, is an alternative grammar of Chinese modernity: a grammar because it contains logics and practices, not just new vocabulary; alternate because it differs from the logics and rules of the standard narrative of how China modern in antithetical opposition to Chinese tradition, a narrative which Yan Fu pioneered in his 1895 essays with such lasting influence.

We see this alternative grammar expressed by Yao Xiguang in the waiting room outside Governor Zhang Zhidong's chambers. Beyond evidence that *some* discrete Western-learned skills, like mapmaking or surveying (測繪), Yao's conversation goes beyond refuting Yan Fu's assertion

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[104] Yao Xiguang, "Shandong lianbing shiyi shuotie" 山東線兵事宜說帖 [Proposal on Shangdong Army Training], January 1895, p. 248. Emphasis added.

[105] Yao Xiguang, "Shandong lianbing shiyi shuotie" 山東線兵事宜說帖 [Proposal on Shangdong Army Training], January 1895, p. 249:「今直隸聶提督扼大高嶺，即循此法。蓋聶軍營哨官，半為武備學堂生徒，素所服習，最宜散隊，故屹然不動搖。」

that that the Beiyang Military Academy had completely failed in teaching "Western Methods"—it provides an alternative way of thinking about the problem of transfer between China and the West. For instance, Yao says the following when telling Cai Xiyong about the Military Academy's artillery training: "For now, we talk application (*yong* 用), we don't talk about substance (*ti* 體)."[106] Now, within the later register of Chinese modernity, initiated by Yan Fu and closely associated with Zhang Zhidong himself, the two terms, *ti* 體, denoting Chinese cultural "Essence," and *yong* 用, meaning Western technological "application," are in irreconcilable opposition toward one another, with the former inhibiting China's absorption of the latter. Indeed, Yan Fu's 1895 essay had attributed deep-seated cultural factors that prevented the Beiyang Military Academy from truly adopting Western Methods. But Yao does not mean this at all: Yao uses *both* terms to discuss the technology of artillery, with "application" (用) about merely how to operate an artillery piece and "substance" (體) about the broader scientific and technical knowledge behind why artillery works. He says the Academy taught "application" because China's desperate operational need for artillery officers with even the minimum requisite skill: "by teaching how it [artillery] works and not pressing on to the principles behind its workings, in just one or two years an academy student can already be sent to manage the guns at an artillery emplacement."[107] Whereas Yan Fu attributed any perceived deficiency of Western learning from the Military Academy had been attributed to the all-pervasive specter of Chinese cultural barriers and textual traditions that inhibited the necessary process of transfer, Yao Xiguang demystifies those perceived educational deficiencies, explaining them as calculated curriculum tradeoffs in the classroom that balanced limited resources of time with the urgent operational needs outside the school.

Like Yan Fu, Yao does blame parts of the Beiyang establishment for the difficulties in the transfer of Western methods. Recall that Yan Fu had told his readers that the Military Academy's founding in 1885 was a direct result of Beiyang's "corruption" (弊), wherein "individual commanders and officers" (*ge tongling* 各統領) "slandered and kicked out" (譟而逐之) the German military advisors that had entered their "individual camps" (*geying* 各營) and attempted reforms. Likewise Yao tells Cai that "Every year the Military Academy sent trained students from the school to the individual camps (*geying* 各營), but the commanders and officers of the individual camps (*geying tongling* 各營統領) either marginalized these students or ordered them to leave (排擠令去)."[108] Yao also calls this a "corruption" (弊), saying it was the reason Beiyang's army camps "could not absorb the effectiveness of this training." Incredibly, both Yan Fu and Yao Xiguang seem to be telling almost identical stories about the Military Academy. And yet, Yan Fu's story is framed as an inveterate hostility between Chinese and the West; Yao Xiguang's is a story of Chinese versus other Chinese. Yao even tells Cai that putting Military Academy students in with these corrupt camp soldiers was "the two were as incompatible as fire and water" (二者如水火不相入). And yet, was the discord between the two about Chinese cultural opposition toward Western methods? I submit that Yao's waiting room conversation his interlocutor complicates how we understand and categorize the problem of transfer here.

We see this elsewhere in Yao's diary. On January 30, 1896, Yao describes a meeting with another former student, named Yang Qichang 楊其昌, to tour artillery emplacements on the Yangtze River. He writes that "Student Yang had once been a destitute orphan, but possessed a

[106] Entry for January 11, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 41.
[107] Entry for January 11, 1896, in Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 41.
[108] Entry for January 11, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 42.

natural gifting of sincerity and intelligence."[109] Though these natural qualities allowed Student Yang to "become an outstanding student at the Military Academy," Yao also lists a panoply of skills this education had provided this young man of humble origins:

> He is now versed in mathematics, proficient in *surveying* (測繪), and is adept at *Classical writing* (能古文辭)…. he has mastered both *German drill methods* (德國操法) and marksmanship, is fluent in the spoken and written German language, and he even has a smattering of experience in railroad engineering.[110]

The particular combination of skills that Yao describes here is significant. The skilled of "surveying" (測繪), we have seen Student Yu put into practice as soon as he arrived in the Korean theater. We also see the "German drill methods" (德國操法) that Student Yu had put into practice in battle. But Yao also lists "ability in classical writing" (能古文辭). In fact, "Classical writing" and literature, the so-called "Classics and Histories" (經史), were a distinct part of the Beiyang Military Academy curriculum, as noted in this chapter's introduction and elaborated further in the following chapter. But in this same entry Teacher Yao speaks of his former student's Classical Chinese skills put to practice in writing exam-style essays: "Years ago, I had once read and corrected Student Yang's essay, 'Fan Wenzheng Takes Responsibility for the Entire Realm.' Student Yang still remembers it well and could recite to me all the main points of my corrections, even elaborating on each point in depth."[111] Now, this Classical curriculum has been almost completely overlooked as bearing any significance in the Beiyang Military Academy, except for possibly serving as the type of cultural barrier Yan Fu thought so decisive in derailing the transfer process. And yet, as I will argue in the next chapter, the presence of the Chinese Classical curriculum, was far from an impediment to learning modern methods of warfare. In fact, just as Clausewitz and Scharnhorst had borrowed from civilian universities as they decisively revolutionized Prussian military education to include humanities subjects for the first time, I will demonstrate that the Beiyang Military Academy also achieved a commensurate educational revolution when it appropriated content from civil examination and taught it to military officers. This was a decisive break with precedent and would have lasting impacts in the relationship between organized violence and education in Chinese history.

For the purposes of closing up our retelling of Student Yu's story, let us say that his Military Academy education gave his discrete skill sets like "surveying" (測繪) but also imparted an entire regime or tactical operational orientation, "German drill for dispersed formations" (德操散隊) where he was taught to be active agent in new modes of combat organization that had been precipitated by the breech-loading rifle, characterized by greater physical dispersion and decentralization of command. Finally, we can also surmise that Student Yu's Military Academy experience also included education in Classical Chinese (古文), a tradition that was understood as the well-spring of human agency and moral power, as will be discussed further. In the unique context of the Military Academy, Classical studies for military cadets was hardly the hindrance to achieving modern modes of warfare; it actually enabled it.

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[109] Entry for January 30, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 55.
[110] Entry for January 30, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 55. Emphasis added.
[111] Entry for January 30, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 55. Essay title: 〈范文正以天下為己任〉.

Conclusion

By reconstructing the story of Student Yu at the battle of Chenghuan (1894), this chapter gone beyond the boundaries of most historiography on the Beiyang Military Academy, which has been dominated by narratives of failure, by bringing our analysis of education to the battlefield. Whereas one failure paradigm sees the Military Academy as unable or unwilling transfer knowledge from German instructors to Chinese "recipients," I have shown that cutting-edge military practices of dispersed warfare, known as "mission tactics," were not only taught at the school, they were put into real operational practice as well. Whereas another failure paradigm has understood Chinese textual Tradition as a decisive inhibitor to efficacious methods of industrialized-warfare, I have also presented evidence to suggest that the Academy's Classical curriculum may have played a similar role as the humanities subject did in the Clausewitzian military education revolution at the Berlin War Academy. The next chapter will investigate this claim more thoroughly, showing how the revolutionary step of offering army officers education in the Classics was tied to the impact of breech-loading rifles, which arrived in China in the 1880s, to create a fusion between the technical practices of state-organized violence and the study of sacred texts. This fusion, as I will show, was borne in the Beiyang Military Academy of the 1880s and would become a decisive carry-over well into the next century.

Chapter 2
Technologies of Spirit: Origins of the First Military Academy

Introduction

The previous chapter approached China's first ever military academy by using new sources to excavate one story of an all but forgotten student, zooming in on the battlefield where he was killed in action. This approach challenged the failure narrative of the historiographical consensus by demonstrating that the Beiyang Military Academy (est. 1885) not only absorbed from its German instructors a central but little-understood tactical-operational orientation known as "mission tactics" (*Auftragstaktik*), which Chinese instructors called "dispersed formations" (散隊), but its students also applied this orientation in actual combat during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).

This chapter re-examines the founding and operation of the Beiyang Military Academy within its broader and deeper Chinese context. Recall that I showed how the specific German tactical regime of "mission tactics" was a product of three interrelated revolutions in Europe: socio-political (revolutionary France and Napoleon), educational (Clausewitz's renovation of the Berlin War Academy to include humanities curricula), and technological (advent of the breech-loading rifle). Here I put the Beiyang Military Academy in the context of similar Chinese developments: socio-political upheaval caused by the cataclysmic Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864); massive transfer of new technology in the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895); and, beginning in the 1860s, an educational transformation from the imperial exam system (科舉) to the first Chinese government "academies" (學堂), wherein the state shifted from merely "selecting talent" (選才) to actually "cultivating" it (培才). Placing the 1885 founding of the first academy for army officers in this broader Chinese context of development, I will show specifically that the Beiyang Military Academy's transfer and implementation of cutting-edge tactical-operational techniques and practices, as encompassed by German "mission tactics" or "dispersed formations," actually involved a Chinese education revolution with some similarity to Clausewitz's novel incorporation of humanities curricula to German military education. But the Beiyang Military Academy could not borrow from German humanities at this time. Nor did it need to, for it would appropriate China's own great traditions of human cultivation from its Confucian textual canon, particularly from the civil examination curriculum that had served as a firm socio-cultural barrier to the military profession before this. Throughout this dissertation, I submit that this critical reordering of the relationship between "sacred texts" and state-organized violence, which I demonstrate in this chapter as having occurred at the first military academy, actually constitutes the late Qing and Confucian origins of the paradigm of "ideology and organization" used by historians for interpreting the later Republican and Communist eras.

Below, I will outline how the body of this chapter makes this argument with three separate and intimate looks at the developments that led to the founding of the Beiyang Military Academy and its particular form of education, using more underutilized and new sources. Here, I introduce the aspects of China's examination system that form the key background context for the novel institution of the Beiyang Military Academy.

The imperial examination system came into its institutional maturity during the Tang and Song period as a state-run mechanism to "select officials" (取士) by, in theory, opening the path of office to all members of society that could pass the exam criteria. The examination system had two tracks, one civil and one military. Largely because the civil examinations carried exponentially greater prestige and opportunity as the so-called "ladder of success" in imperial society, very little

scholarship has been done on the parallel military examination track. In fact, what I consider the best English-language history of the military examination system comes in a wonderful anthropological study, by Stephen Selby, on Chinese archery.[1] This is because, whereas the civil examinations conferred official rank based on curricula criteria based on literary mastery of the sacred Confucian textual canon, the military exam primarily required physical skills: particularly archery (mounted and dismounted), along with halberd brandishing and weightlifting. Because of this, the military exams became known metonymically by the "bow, blade, and rock" (弓刀石) even as the civil exams became synonymous with the quite challenging, even infamous "eight-legged essay" (八股文). Thus we can see that, although both examination tracks led to imperial office, not only were civil and military offices of unequal social and economic value, their method of attainment was vastly different.

I call this the "text-*techne* divide," whereby mastery of the Chinese textual tradition was required for civil exam participation and the physical skills (*techne*) were needed for the military track. In many ways, this overlaps with the widely-used standard cultural binary, expressed as the "civil-military divide" (文武分途), which helps to explain the dominance of civil or non-military virtues in late imperial Chinese history. But the "text-*techne* divide" helps us zero in on concrete modes that created and reinforced this social cleavage, particularly in the superior prestige and value given to literary learning over physical skill. As Benjamin Elman writes, "Primacy was given to the social function of classical, literary, and calligraphy forms of cultural expression rather than to technical expertise as the measure of the educated man."[2] He adds that the "social differentiation in handling the tools of reading and writing required for the Confucian examinations precluded those who were not classically literate," thus excluding "families dependent on the productive labor of sons in agriculture, crafts, and trade."[3] Thus, the separate civil and military examination tracks instantiated the "text-*techne* divide" in Chinese culture, society, and institutions.

But, like all socially constructed divisions or conceptual binaries, the "text-*techne* divide" was not absolute or static, but was subject to change. One way the "text-*techne* divide" was negotiated through the military exams was by attempts to confer legitimacy directly onto this discrete set of skills or *techne*. For instance, Stephen Selby's anthropology of Chinese archery shows how archery manuals, published for exam candidates, linked the skill of archery to Confucius' famous Six Arts (六藝).[4] These manuals made pains to link the physical practice of archery to the "Way of the Gentleman" (君子之道) as portrayed in the Confucian classic, the *Record of Ritual* (禮記), that is, a lived instantiation of the moral economy of the hallowed Zhou-era (c. 1046-771 BC). In addition to reinforcing the skill's link to sacred texts of Confucianism, military exam manuals also sought to highlight archery's practical military utility. As one manual taught, self-cultivation in archery was a discipline for "bringing your mind under control" (治心), a key to the "Way of Generalship" (將之道) and the imperative for clear thinking amidst the pressures and chaos of the battlefield.[5]

A second way that the "text-*techn*e divide" was negotiated within the forum of the military exam was through text itself. For most of its history, the military examination actually had a written

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[1] Stephen Selby, *Chinese Archery* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000).
[2] Benjamin Elman, "Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), p. 22.
[3] Benjamin Elman, "Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), p. 19. Emphasis added.
[4] The Six Arts stipulated that those of the "Gentlemen" class must be proficient in archery (射) and charioteering (馭), in addition to the ritual (禮) and music (樂), and writing and reading (書) and arithmetic (數). Stephen Selby, *Chinese Archery* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000).
[5] A Ming dynasty archery manual in Selby, p. 293.

portion, including a "Policy Essay" (策) and a "Disquisition Essay" (論). But these essays did not carry the same scoring weight as the physical skills. Moreover, there was a much lower bar for a military examinee's compositional quality than for civil counterparts. Also, the essay questions and prompts were drawn solely from the so-called *Seven Military Classics* (武經七書).[6] These ancient military writings on strategy, most prominently Sunzi's *Art of War* (兵法), were still looked down upon as an entirely different moral category than the Confucian Classics, for these texts remained largely silent on human cultivation and were seen a manuals for technicians of violence.

But in what have been called "radical innovations" and an effort to "unify civil and military" (文武合一) the great Qing emperor Kangxi (1661-1722) introduced essay questions based on Confucius's *Analects* and Mencius.[7] For the first time in history, military exam candidates were required to display some level of adeptness in the Confucian canon. Based on my own examination of the archival records of actual military exam essays composed during the Qing period, I concur with Li Lin's excellent study where he opines that "high levels of Confucian education" (高度儒家化) were required from candidates to pass the essay portion.[8] Both Li Lin and S. R. Gilbert agree that Kangxi's purpose in adding Confucian Classics essays was to benefit military officers with the moral suasion of these texts and to narrow the gap between civil and military.[9]

Kangxi's innovations did not last, however. His grandson, Emperor Qianlong (1735-1796), rescinded the requirement for essays on Confucian texts due to urgent need of officers for his many expansion campaigns. Qianlong's son, Emperor Jiaqing (r. 1796-1820), then rescinded *all* essay composition requirements from the written portion in 1807. With this, the new written portion became called the "rote copying" (默寫) portion, and it merely required candidates to copy verbatim and from memory a portion from a Military Classic of roughly 100 characters in length. This "rote copying" requirement remained the sole written requirement for military candidates until the military exam system was abolished entirely in 1901. Thus, by the nineteenth century where our story picks up, the military examination instantiated a rather extreme form of the "text-*techne* divide," requiring neither any evidence of Confucian literary education and nor a requirement to compose one's own sentences or ideas.

The state of the "text-*techne* divide" is important to keep in mind as we consider nineteenth century China's massive turn from an examination system that merely "selected talent" as it grew organically from resources dispersed in society at large to an academy system wherein the state took on new-found responsibilities for "cultivating" the human resources it sought. Whereas this story of the shift from imperial exams to academies was generally told as abandoning classical Confucian education for technical training, this chapter charts a different trajectory. As we will see, within the unique context of the military academy, the moral resources of the Confucian textual tradition were

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[6] Formally compiled as grouping or canon during the Song, they included the following: 1) Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (孫子兵法); 2) Wu Qi's Wuzi (吳子); 3) *The Methods of the Sima* (司馬法); 4) Jiang Ziya (Taigong)'s *Six Secret Teachings* (六韜); 5) *Wei Liaozi* (尉繚子); 6) *Three Strategies of Huang Shigong* (黃石公三略); and 7) *Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong* (唐太宗李衛公問對).

[7] S. R. Gilbert, "Mengzi's Art of War: The Kangxi Emperor Reforms the Qing Military Examinations," in Nicola di Cosmo, ed., *Military Culture in Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) pp. 243-256; Li Lin 李林, "「干城之選」: 清代武舉制度之設計、運作及其功效" [Recruiting Military Talents, Fortifying the Manchu Empire: Institutional Designs, Actual Implementations, and Practical Functions of the Imperial Military Examination System in the Qing Dynasty] (PhD diss, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014), p. 102.

[8] Elsewhere I have analyzed and translated materials from the Grand Secretariat Archives (內閣大庫) of the Qing dynasty currently located in Taipei, which Li Lin also draws extensively upon. For quotation, see Li Lin, p. 102.

[9] See S. R. Gilbert and Li Lin citations above.

revitalized for the needs of modern warfare, particularly for battlefields governed by the breech-loading rifle and the specific social machinery that the tactical regime required.

By way of a roadmap, this chapter presents three sets of close-up, intimate views of actors in the midst of these massive transformations that came together in the founding of the first Chinese military academy. In the first section, "Zeng Guofan's Search for Spirit," I take a new look at a minor report he filed as a grader for the military examinations to uncover what I call "technologies of spirit," formal and informal methods available to the imperial state to find and obtain the human resources it sought for military violence. In the second section, "Li Hongzhang's Breech-loading Rifles," I show that, though scholars have long sought an explanation for the relatively late founding of China's first military academy, this must be understood in connection to the new rifle technology that only arrived in significant numbers to China in 1880s. Finally, in "Teacher Yao's Confidence," I show that the despite the critical role new technology played in precipitating the launch of the Beiyang Military Academy in 1885, the Classical curriculum played a major role from the start. It is in this tri-fold confluence of the imperial state's search for "spirit" amidst the new imperatives of the uniquely modern battlefield that Confucian Classics take on a new and important role, a role which would influence subsequent Chinese regimes well into the 20th century.

Zeng Guofan's Search for "Spirit"

At a pivotal point during the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), when the Dynasty seemed all but lost, an accomplished but otherwise unremarkable scholar-official named Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811-1872) began raising an army from scratch in his home province of Hunan. This turned the tide, saving the imperial state and, perhaps, Chinese Confucian civilization itself. This section begins years before that remarkable turn in his career, beginning in 1847 as Zeng fulfilled his bureaucratic duties as a Chief Grader (主校) for the metropolitan-level military examination. His grading duties also required Zeng to file a minor, routine report, similar to a cover letter for the exam results, to the Emperor.[10] Though this mundane report has garnered little to no notice from even historians specializing on Zeng, I argue that the critique of the military exams that he launches, in what was supposed to be a routine filing to the Son of Heaven, actually gives us a privileged window into an entire repertoire of techniques and methods that the Chinese imperial state had for locating and selecting agents of its military violence from the population. Because Zeng identifies something he calls "spirit" (精神) as the ultimate but intangible quality for military agency that the state needs to find, I refer to them as "technologies of the spirit." As we will see, Zeng's critique of the state-run military exam as a faulty "technology of the spirit" connects directly with the local militarization measures he would enact to build his own army in just a few years' time and, by the end of the chapter, these "technologies" will connect to the massive structural shift from military examination to military academy decades later.

Now, little from the report's opening suggests that it would also contain a scathing and penetrating critique. Zeng begins quite standardly, noting that as a Chief Grader (主校) from the Board of Ritual he was only responsible for supervising the exam's inner portion (內場, that is, the written portion), while Board of War officials did so for the outer portion (外圍, that is the physical

[10] Zeng Guofan, "Report of the Metropolitan Military Examinations in the Twenty Seventh Year of Daoguang (1847)" 《道光二十七年丁未科武會試錄》, Document Number 287451, Grand Secretariat Archives 內閣大庫檔案 of Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei. Unless otherwise noted in this section, quotations are from this source.

"bow, blade, rock" portion). His opening obsequiousness is also quite standard. Calling it a "a great responsibility" that gave him "great trepidation day and night" (夙夜兢惕), he says, "I have exerted *my entire mind* (悉心) towards grading the examination, thus selecting officers in accordance with the given quota." A contradictory hint of tension, however, comes to us from a document outside the archived report, for Zeng composed a poem while officiating the exam itself. Titled "Composition from Inside the Hall of the Metropolitan Military Exams" (武會試闈中作), the poem begins as follows:

> From the imperial hall the lotus clock divulges dead of night;
> The chilly moon peeks down on us, willing to approach.
> To this place I often come, following official documents;
> In my life, on what day will I reach those mountain groves [i.e., retirement]?[11]

Though Zeng would tell the Emperor he "exerted his entire mind towards grading" (悉心核閱), we find him here idly composing poetry and musing about retirement, all on government time, so to speak. Perhaps, the great Zeng Guofan had at this early and unremarkable stage in his career already mastered the bureaucratic art of faking productivity while doing whatever he wished. Or perhaps he resented having his immense, but as yet unrecognized, abilities wasted on proctoring a military examination. Indeed, the poem ends with this couplet: "The flame cold, the lantern blue—now nothing left to do; How lamentably idle, this heart that cherishes talent."[12] And yet, despite initial appearances, Zeng's *own* "talents" are not the only tragic misappropriation here.

The poem, I submit, is primarily about Zeng's severe frustration with the military examination as a mechanism, designed to find and uncover true "talent," but woefully inadequate for the task. As we will see, this meaning is borne out clearly in his report, though it remains in poetic language here. For instance, his poem describes looking out on the test-takers in this way: "Ferocious warriors [i.e., the candidates] shrouded in mist as the third watch grows still" (貔貅霧隱三更肅). Zeng describes the military candidates in front of him using an archaic term, *pixiu* 貔貅, which had come to denote "ferocious warriors," but originally meant two different types of ghastly mythical beasts. Allusions to "beasts" indicated deep and long-seated antipathies in Chinese culture over the moral standing of those expected to perform inhuman violence to protect society. Moreover, these "beasts" appear in Zeng's poem "shrouded in mist" (霧隱), a sign that Zeng wishes to but cannot peer into their nature—as the "third watch" (三更) signals the already small window of opportunity to do this is abruptly ending. Though Zeng's true meaning may seem shrouded in poetic language, the increasingly bold words in his report bear this meaning out quite clearly. At one point, Zeng has the audacity to tell the Emperor that although he certified the quota of 64 candidates, as required, he "dares not with self-confidence" (臣誠不敢以自信) say that true "human talent" (人才) had been selected under his watch as Chief Grader.

Let us return fully to the report to see how Zeng builds a decisive argument for why he has no confidence in the military exams. He first quotes a Song dynasty official who once said, "Since of old, selecting commanders to defend our borders was not necessarily just about attacking in battle, *it*

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[11] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works*, "Composition from Inside the Hall of the Metropolitan Military Exams"《武會試闈中作》:「禁闈蓮漏已宵深，涼月窺人肯一臨 / 此地頻來從案牘，吾生何日得山林？」

[12]「火冷燈青無個事，可憐閑殺愛才心。」

rested solely on their spirit (*jingshen* 精神) to thwart enemy assaults."[13] Zeng then elaborates with historical examples, starting with the Qin state's rise over the six other Chinese kingdoms leading up to the 221 B.C. conquest, stating that "if" (*ruo* 若) such and such renowned general had been in this or that state at the time, the Qin tide could have been stayed. Once the Han dynasty rose, he names generals whose mere presence "spread sheer awe and prestige to every corner" of the empire. The lesson Zeng draws for the Emperor is this: "It was the individual *spirit* of these renowned generals that was sufficient to make trembling and awe spread beyond ten-thousand *li*. So, when the rulers of men seek out competent commanders, indeed, they summon them by means of this *sense of spirit* (精神感)." Thus, Zeng lays out "spirit" (*jingshen* 精神) as the most essential quality in military officers the imperial state needs to obtain.

But a problem quickly emerges: if the "spirit" is the most essential element for state survival, how does the state obtain it? Zeng's presentation using the word "if" (*ruo* 若) a spirit-filled military man happened to be present indicates the contingent nature of the "spirit." In fact, it is precisely to create a reliable method for obtaining these qualities that the military exams were born: "Ever since the Tang-Song period, they sought to recruit talented commanders (將才) but could not obtain what they needed." "So they laid out a system for searching out the able and virtuous," Zeng says, "and thus we have the institution of the military exams.… [based on] answering to Policy Questions (*ce* 策)… with archery and horseback riding to determine individual rankings." Thus, we have an organizational innovation to create a method for reliably obtaining a specific type of human talent called "spirit"—what I am calling a "technology of the spirit."

But Zeng is emphatic that the invention of this "technology" was an abject failure. He shows this by carefully crafting two separate but parallel "cycles" of the military exam's operation, first from its institution during the Tang (AD 618-907) up through the Ming (1348-1644) and, second, from its reinstitution in the 1680s following the conquest of the Qing dynasty:

	Cycle #1: Exams Instituted (Tang-Ming)	**Cycle #2: Exams Reinstituted (Qing)**
1.	Military exams instituted: "talon and tooth men" (爪牙之士) come to the exams for the "path to salary and emoluments" (祿利之途).	Military exams reinstituted: "ferocious warriors of the mountains and marshes" (山澤猛士) come to the exams for "selection to man the defenses" (干城之選).
2.	A "cycle" (循) begins, drawing candidates who:	A "cycle" (循) begins, drawing candidates who:
3.	- have "crude skills of the market" (市井之粗材)	- are "marketplace bow-drawers" (市井挽強[者])
4.	- and can only "record some sentences from the miscellany of their worthless studies" (記錄章句， 瑣瑣無用之學)	- and "recorders of the worthless" (記錄無用者)

In Row 1, above, Zeng describes the types of men (*shi* 士) attracted by the institution of the military exams. But in each case (Row 2), the mechanism begins a "cycle" (循) that produces the same

[13] Zeng quotes Zhang Shumin 張舜民 (fl. 1060) from his Chapter on "Commanders' Responsibilities" in《大学衍义》.

unwanted results (Rows 3 & 4). Instead of drawing forth men of "spirit," we find men drawn from the "town market" (市井, see Row 3), a shorthand for the roving riffraff of urban centers that the later Zeng will reject for even lowly service, such as foot soldiers, as we will see below. Even the exam's written portion only evinces candidates whose writing talents are absolutely "worthless" (無用, see Row 4).

All this gives us a much clearer image of who Zeng thinks these military exam candidates are, rather than his poetic warrior/beasts (貔貅) "shrouded in mist." Most striking, Zeng calls them "talon and tooth men" (爪牙之士, see Row 1, first column). "Talon and teeth" (爪牙) is an explicit moniker for the infamous clerks and runners that assisted the county magistrate at his compound called the *yamen* (衙門).[14] Of these clerks and runners of the *yamen*, Bradly Ward Reed writes that they possessed a basic level of literacy and "performed such rudimentary yet critical tasks as the drafting, copying, and filing of documents and records…."[15] But this "narrowly defined technical expertise and skill" was categorically different from the "broad literary training in the Confucian canon" required for obtaining civil office.[16] As a result, Reed says, "an occupational as well as a social fissure developed between officials and members of the *yamen* staff…. [for] it was precisely this utilitarian function and narrowness of competence that disqualified yamen employees from consideration for higher office."[17] This is why we see Zeng say that the "talon and teeth men" do display some measure of writing skill at the exams but that they are merely "recorders of the worthless"—for they lack precisely the "broad literary training in the Confucian canon" that Ward refers to.

But lack of broad literary training did not earn these men the derogatory moniker of "talon and teeth." It was the clerks and runners' abuse of their embedded proximity to the county magistrate's *yamen*, located in a large town or city (i.e., 市井, the marketplace, lit. the "city well"), to elicit bribes, blackmail, and extortion that earned gave them this notorious reputation. It is not a small matter, Zeng argues, that a system invented to elicit men of "spirit" has created deleterious mechanism for rewarding "talon and claw men" from the dregs of society with official posts. Zeng concludes: "Therefore, the argument that the flourishing of human talent (人才) cannot come solely from this examination curriculum (科目) stands on solid reason."

Zeng moves abruptly from the double "cycle" history lesson to his current role as Chief Grader. He says, "And yet I was in charge of only evaluating their rote copying (默寫) of a few lines of Sunzi and Wuzi." In fact the report tells us that the "rote copying" portion in this case was a 110 character-length section from the "Weak and Strong Points" (虛實) chapter of Sunzi's *Art of War*. Thus, Zeng's responsibility as Chief Grader was to verify, 64 times, that each candidate copied the same 110 characters correctly without mistake. Hardly a difficult task for a top *jinshi* degree holder from the Hanlin Academy, but certainly a reason that Zeng's poem expressed a constriction of his heartfelt love for talent: he grieved not only a misuse of his own talents, but a misguided mechanism for the Empire he served.

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[14] The *Kongcongzi* 《孔叢子》from the Eastern Han period (AD 25-220) asserts the following: "For the ruler (君) in today's era of warring states, selecting (選) *talon and tooth men* (爪牙之士) means having the type of commanders who abandon the city walls as soon as a few eggs are thrown at them!"「今君處戰國之世，選爪牙之士，以三卵焉棄捍城之將！」

[15] Bradly Ward Reed, *Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 1. Also see the book's Chinese translation, 《爪牙 : 清代县衙的书吏与差役》, (Guilin: *Guilin Shifan daxue chubanshe*, 2021).

[16] Bradly Ward Reed, *Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty*, p. 2.

[17] Bradly Ward Reed, *Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty*, p. 2.

Zeng does add that, unlike his Board of War counterparts grading the physical skills of the outer portion, "I was not in a position to observe their 'inner willpower outwardly manifested' (其內志外體, ref. *Record of Ritual*) in their agility moving forward and backward, circling and dancing through the air."[18] Though he cites here Confucius's *Record of Ritual* (禮記), particularly a passage used by some to advocate archery as a window into the moral character of the practitioner, Zeng is certainly being sarcastic; for if it this skill had truly opened up the innermost character to outward observation, then his Board of War counterparts would have accurately identified the candidates for what Zeng says they are: "talon and teeth men" culled from the "marketplace," who have no business receiving imperial office. And this is why, after claiming fear and trembling at shouldering this "great responsibility" for passing the select quota of candidates, Zeng now tells the Emperor, "your subject honestly dares not do so with self-confidence" (臣誠不敢以自信).

Zeng then closes his report with the theme he began with. He says that the "martial spirit (神武) of our sacred Son of Heaven quakes in brilliant light; and we your subjects depend on the favor of that light, by which we find our vigor increased, and by means of that *spirit* (精神) we call forth many officers of similar inclination." Relisting the names of the spirit-filled commanders of pre-Han and Han renown that he mentioned in his introduction, he says "Though we cannot guarantee [we will definitely get these results], we must aspire towards it and nothing more."[19] In sum, the tone of Zeng's 1847 military exam report is bold and caustically critical of the mechanism wielded by the Empire for finding military talent. It is also cynical, even hopeless, for it calls into question the very ability of the state to ever reliably find the "spirit" its military so desperately needs for survival. Though this report is a very minor piece of bureaucratic paperwork that Zeng certainly did not enjoy penning, it also helps us understand the methods or "technologies" Zeng would use just a few years later as the Dynasty teetered on the brink of annihilation and Zeng searched for suitable recruits to build a new army from scratch.

As the Taiping rebellion spread like wildfire in 1851, Zeng memorialized the Throne in terms familiar to us from his military exam report: "As soon as the *spirit* (精神) of the Son of Heaven is roused, ferocious warriors from the mountains and marshes (山澤之猛士) will rise up like clouds."[20] Though the theme and terminology is similar, Zeng gives further concrete elaboration on the type of "ferocious warriors" he says would heed the "spirit's" call from outside the imperial Capital. "The humble opinion of this book-learner (書生)," Zeng says referring to himself, is that the crisis of "the present moment must include two methods derived from past exemplars."[21] Zeng's first example was "the Song official Pang Jie, who disbanded 80,000 troops [in the reforms] during the 1040s, and by this he comprehensively revived resources for border defense." By choosing this example, Zeng expresses intent for drastic cuts to the current Green Standard Armies, the regular government-organized troops that had been roundly and repeatedly routed by Taiping rebels. More than worthless on the battlefield, they were a massive drain on precious resources. Zeng's second example was "the Ming official Qi Jiguang, who trained up [just] 3,000 men from Yiwu County

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[18] Note the same Record of Ritual passage on archery as "inner willpower outwardly manifested" (其內志外體)" also has this phrase Zeng uses on movements being "forward and backward" (進退, or "advancing and withdrawing," "coming and going," etc.). In the original context, this refers to the movements of the archer on the demonstration field and these movements are minutely prescribed and regulated by ritual. Zeng's addition here of *xiangyu* 翔舞 (circling in the air) seems to refer to the "flying halberd" (舞刀) portion.

[19] 「雖不能必，志之而已。」

[20] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works,* 《議汰兵疏三月初九日》(April 10, 1851)

[21] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works,* 《議汰兵疏三月初九日》(April 10, 1851)

[Jinhua, Zhejiang], and by this he completely stamped out the Japanese pirates."[22] When the Ming dynasty's standard army forces repeatedly collapsed, much like the Qing's Green Standards at this time, General Qi Jiguang 戚繼光 (1528-1588) had decided not to use the standing army altogether. Instead, he recruited and trained peasants from a single locality to create an entirely new a force from scratch. Qi Jiguang's troops went on to crush their pirate opponents that had proved too much for government forces. More than this, Qi Jiguang left behind detailed training manuals, which would become the blueprint for Zeng's own local militarization efforts in his home province of Hunan.

And yet, as Zeng wrote this memorial he was nowhere near his home province, nor could he have been. The Law of Avoidance forbade officials from serving in their native places in order to prevent the formation of local power-bases. Similar to the Law of Avoidance and mandated rotations for civil officials, Qing government armies also systematically "avoided close and lasting contact between commanders and their troops…. and stressed the interchangeability of personnel…."[23] In this way, both the army and civil administrative organization represent what Patricia Crone calls the pre-industrial state's "strong tendency to encourage power stand-off," whereby different kinds of state power are organized to "counteract and nullify each other instead of combining for joint effect."[24] Crone adds that this gave pre-industrial states "considerable power to prevent things from happening, but very little to make them happen: they were far better at suppressing than at generating energy."[25] Of course, once the Taiping overwhelmed the Qing state's initial capacity to suppress it, the rebellion's growing momentum compounded detrimentally with the state's built-in power stand-offs to produce systemic collapse. Thus, Zeng's 1851 call for rousing of men of "spirit" from out in the "mountains and marshes" was a call for something the state security architecture was engineered to prevent, rather than foster.

But sheer contingency worked to overcome these structural barriers. In 1852, at just the time when the Taiping juggernaut northward towards his native Hunan, Zeng's mother died, requiring him to return home for the mandatory three-year period of mourning—a sanctioned loop-hole or exception to the Law of Avoidance. By this chance occurrence, Zeng found himself home at a juncture when the Imperial court had suddenly become willing (even desperate) to allow precisely the type of locally-based militarization in the style of Ming general Qi Jiguang that Zeng had proposed a year earlier. Qi Jiguang's technical manuals provided Zeng the model for raising his Xiang (Hunan) Army, which took the lead for other locally-raised forces, like Li Hongzhang's Huai (Anhui) Army, to turn the tide in a decade of some of the most horrific warfare in the global nineteenth century, before Zeng Guofan emerged victorious as a savior of the Qing dynasty and Confucian civilization.

Regarding this wonderfully layered irony, leading Taiping era historian Stephen Platt emphasizes the improbable contingency of this conjuncture by saying, "*If* his mother hadn't died in 1852…."[26] I call this layered irony because this is precisely the expressive mode Zeng himself used in 1847 to discuss pre-Han history, saying "if" (*ruo* 若) this or that spirit-filled commander had been at a given place or time then the Qin onslaught could have been stymied. But, to use the terms of his 1851 memorial, it was Zeng Guofan himself who emerged out from the "mountains and marshes"

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[22] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works,* 《議汰兵疏三月初九日》(April 10, 1851).
[23] Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 125.
[24] Patricia Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World.* (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.
[25] Patricia Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World.* (Oneworld Publications, 2015), p. 57.
[26] Stephen R. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), p. 116.

of Hunan as this man of "spirit," and though he proclaimed himself only a humble "book-learner" (書生) rather than a man of martial grit (猛士), he would be assisted by Qi Jiguang's technical manuals to save of the Empire.

In fact, our investigation into Zeng's little-remembered 1847 military examination report has primed us for new insight into his famous and pivotal local militarization efforts. Recall that Zeng told the Emperor in the report that the military exams merely attracted "talon and tooth men," that is, the clerks and runners of the county magistrate's *yamen*, and those from "town markets." We find these terms appear again as Zeng recruited his Xiang Army in the 1850s. His Army Regulations (營規) stipulated: "Those with glistening heads and shifty faces, who have the air/*qi* of the *town market* (市井氣) or the air/*qi* of the *yamen* (衙門氣): without exception, we shall not accept them for enlistment."[27] In retrospect, this means that when Zeng connected these two locations to military exam candidates, he was telling the Emperor that the 64 exam candidates he certified were actually unfit to serve as lowly foot soldiers, let alone as imperially appointed officers.

It also suggests that Zeng had been reading and internalizing Qi Jiguang's manuals from early on, for they directly echo Qi's manual on recruitment. Qi Jiguang's recruitment directives stated, "Foremost to avoid at all costs: employing men from the city (城市, lit. 'walled market')."[28] Moral unreliability was the reason these city men were to be rejected from recruitment, as Qi elaborated: "…they rove and are crafty…. Malicious, cunning, and an unstable temperament (神色不定), they look on government officials not with dread but with disdain." Qi also stipulated a method for recognizing these undesirables: "Just look to see if they have fair complexions on their faces… and you will find them"[29]—which matches Zeng's otherwise curious directive to reject men with certain facial features, for it indicated an internal *qi* 氣 tied to these unsavory venues of town market and *yamen*.

Zeng also shared Qi Jiguang's view that young peasant farmers made for the ideal recruits. Qi had said, "Foremost to be employed: …those who can be said to be *honest and truthful* (老實) men of the countryside."[30] Qi explained that such men would be "patient under suffering" and could be identified outwardly by their appearance: "dark [skinned] and large, raw and sturdy…hard and firm are their hands and face; they have the temperament of those who work the earth (土作之色)."[31] Likewise Zeng Guofan's regulations called for recruiting "those who are young and physically strong, *honest and upright* (樸實)—the best being peasant farmers who have the air/*qi* of the earth (土氣, read: 'salt of the earth')."[32] While the indebtedness of Zeng Guofan to Qi Jiguang is already well-known, I submit that there remains some misconceptions about what these programs actually say about the specifically *local* nature of local militarization.[33]

Especially in Zeng's case, historians have rightly noted that gentry-led militarization leveraged as great assets their native-place ties and knowledge of localities. Philip Kuhn writes that the reason that the newly-released "floodgates" of decentralized mobilization "did not mean

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[27] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works,* "Field Regulations: Two Regulations for Recruitment" (营规：招募之规二条), 1858.
[28] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), originally published 1561.
[29] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561.
[30] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561.
[31] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561. Whereas Qi Jiguang uses the term se 色 (神色不定; 土作之色), Zeng's choice term is *qi* 氣 (市井氣; 衙門氣; 土氣).
[32] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works,* "Field Regulations: Two Regulations for Recruitment" (营规：招募之规二条), 1858.
[33] For Qi Jiguang's influence on Zeng, see Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 124-126, 147

anarchy" was precisely because "the forms of local militarization tended to crystallize along axes of existing political and social organization."[34] This "crystallization" suggests close isomorphism between the agents doing local recruitment, the social organization of the given locality, and the novel military units formed from such recruitment. I suggest, however, that the details of these local militarization measures say as much about Zeng and Qi's social distance from these communities, even their blindness to "see" into the social details of a locality, as much as they speak to their privileged proximity and embeddedness.[35]

After all, if Zeng or Qi's recruiting officers were so embedded in or connected to target communities, why the great emphasis on looking to the outward physical appearance of potential recruits in order to discern or divine an individual's true social background? Qi Jiguang gives us key clues. He writes, "military skills (武藝) can be taught and trained, so the essentials we need to get are the combination of *spirit*, strength, and bearing (精神、力、貌)."[36] "In order get all three of these things," Qi continues:

> *nothing compares* (又不若) to receiving recommendations provided by their relatives, acquaintances, county elders or platoon commanders[37]; for each of these channels are from people that the individual has grown up with and has lived alongside, who have over time *observed that which is hidden* (觀其所忽), for in this we can't rely on *the selection officers' own eyes* (選者之目).[38]

While Qi Jiguang assumed that the "selection officers" he sent could at least communicate with locals, in no way did he assume they were embedded within that community; rather the community was a source of testimony or valuable data for locating "spirit" and other invisible or hidden qualities that needed to be extracted. In this way, his "selection officers" entered a locality blind and in need of assistance to "see" the community accurately. Likewise, Zeng Guofan's recruitment instructions stipulated the need for a "signed pledge from a guarantor" for each recruit, "along with the *compilation of a detailed list* (箕門清冊) of the individual's prefect and county, his district and village, his father and mother, elder and younger brothers, and his wife's given and familial name."[39] If we assume the embeddedness of Zeng's officers within the locality they recruit from, these written measures are merely a formalization of their more or less abundant and pre-existing knowledge of the community, as they "crystallize" existing social organization in ledger form. But the alternative reading I suggest here is that Zeng's officers are partially *blind*, that they must work to gain what James Scott called "legibility," and that these measures of information gathering are tool or

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[34] Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 10.

[35] James Scott says that "to see legibility as a central problem in statecraft," adding: "The premodern state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity. It lacked anything like a detailed "map" of its terrain and its people. It lacked, for the most part, a measure, a metric, that would allow it to "translate" what it knew into a common standard necessary for a synoptic view. As a result, its interventions were often crude and self-defeating." See *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 2.

[36] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561.

[37] "platoon commanders" 哨隊長: I believe this could possibly refer to a ranking individual from the recruit's service in the 保甲 system, possibly former military service in years past, or, from the existing remnants of government army units that had disintegrated in the face of the "Japanese pirates."

[38] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561.

[39] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works,* "Field Regulations: Two Regulations for Recruitment" (营规：招募之规二条), 1858.

technologies for ascertaining the presence and reliability of their recruits' internal or hidden dispositions, even "spirits."[40] Zeng's "compilation of a detailed list" (箕門清冊) is both an assistive technology to achieve legibility and an act of knowledge *creation*, of obtaining knowledge about the community that his recruiters did not know before.

It is also telling that Zeng's measures for compiling social data on recruits is paired directly next to his instructions on discerning a recruit's outward appearance in the recruitment regulations, discussed above. Qi Jiguang links the two as well. Whereas Qi said "nothing compares" (又不若) to compiling community testimony for making legible what the "selection officers' own eyes" cannot see, the next best thing, he says, is indeed using their own eyes. Qi writes that "there are a number of steps we can take to mitigate this [reliance on local testimony]," which means physically *looking* for qualities of "courage" (膽) and "spirit" (精神).[41] And yet he recognizes the problem: "But courage is contained inside a person's heart; we cannot see it. So how do we use it as a criterion for selection? And we really can't know a how person's spirit (精神) will seep through to the outside."[42] Despite the problem of human interiority, Qi does not give up. For "selecting of personnel on the basis of spirit," he says "the number one priority is to also use physiognomy (相法, i.e., the art of reading fortune from a person's face)." While Qi acknowledges that this physiognomy (相法)[43] indeed has a "mysterious" (妙) aspect, which purports to divine a person's future fate, he says it "most importantly" (最) involves simply rejecting those whose complexion and bodies indicate life in cities or the market, while accepting those who bear the marks of the countryside. Though not calling it physiognomy, Zeng Guofan took this directly technique into his own regulations, as discussed above. In sum, both Qi Jiguang and Zeng Guofan employ "technologies of spirit," methods and techniques for making "legible" not just quantitative knowledge of the surrounding population, but assisting them in locating and then obtaining the intangible human qualities they deem most militarily valuable.

We have seen in this section, moreover, Zeng operating his own "technologies" for seeing "spirit" in the population for his local militarization, but also manning the Chief Grader position in the military exams, which amounts to the formal state's "technology" for calling forth and seeing the human resource of military "spirit" that it sought after. Though these technologies vary with regard to the central state in terms of formalization, they also share an absolute commonality in their limitations: both sets can only assist in seeing "spirit" that already exists in society, unable to generate or produce it for itself.

We have seen in this section Zeng use these informal technologies to acquire good foot soldiers and critique the formal technology of the military exam as recruiting officers unfit to even

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[40] These data ledgers also served as a disciplinary tool to hold community members accountable should a recruit desert or violate some other army prohibition in the future.

[41] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561.

[42] Qi Jiguang,《紀效新書》(New Treatise on Military Efficiency), 1561.

[43] Livia Kohn notes that although the earliest extant texts dedicated to physiognomy are from the 10th Century, the art and practice continues today: "The *Shenxiang quanbian* 神相全編, 'Complete guide to spirit physiognomy,' is the leading standard textbook of the Chinese traditional way of reading a person's health, character, and-most of all-fate, in his physical appearance. Originally compiled by Yuan Zhongche 袁忠徹 …of the early Ming dynasty (1367- 1458), who was a well-known physiognomist in his days, the book is now extant in a late Ming edition preserved in the National Central Library in Taipei, Taiwan…. [which has] served as a basis for modern Taiwanese pocket-book editions such as the one prepared by Liang Xiang- run (Liang 1980). The fact that the Principles of the *Shenxiang quanbian* are still applied today is apparent in William Lessa's work on Chinese physiognomy, or rather 'body divination' or 'somatomancy,' as he prefers to call it (Lessa 1968)." Livia Kohn, "A Textbook of Physiognomy: The Tradition of the 'Shenxiang quanbian' (神相全編)," *Asian Folklore* Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1986), pp. 227-258.

serve as foot soldiers. Left out has been Zeng's criteria for selecting his own army officers, which he drew from the Classically educated gentry class. A favorite term Zeng used for himself and this educated class was the self-deprecatory term "book learners" (書生). This term was often used to denote a bookish naiveté about the realities and conduct of war. Zeng would later state, "[We] book-learners have become good at killing; but it is the exigencies of the times that have made us so and nothing more."[44] In some ways, Zeng and his fellow Classically educated gentry-turned military leaders had crossed the "text-*techne* divide," by coming down from the elevated world of sacred text, not just to learn a physical skill, but the most inhumane set of skills imaginable. But, unlike the "talon and tooth men" of the military exam whose "study was worthless," Zeng and his cohort, forced by the times, had stepped out with only their textual learning and amateur ideals and had spectacularly out-performed the military professionals whose vocation was this very *techne* of killing. In this sense, it was precisely the efficacious moral power and agency cultivated in the education these "book learners" had received that had allowed them to fall upon new *techne* and exert their wills on the battlefields. Of course, Zeng needed to find such Classically trained agents of violence fully formed with these decisive benefits of education. There was no external or formal technology for producing this fusion at the time.

To close, Zeng maintained his emphasis on human factors in war, even in the later stages of the Taiping, after 1860, when the flow of Western arms increased. He constantly reminded his commanders the following dictum: "The Way to achieving victory actually depends on people, not on weapons" (制勝知道，實在人不在器).[45] People *were* the technology for Zeng, though his ambitious protégé Li Hongzhang, in one case, merely responded to Zeng's admonition by doubling down on his ever-increasing fascination with the power of Western technology.[46] At any rate, after the Great Rebellions were suppressed, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and a host of other gentry-officials who had risen up as local military leaders would now turn their well-spring of Classically-cultivated agency and aptitude to step into another field of skill or *techne*—though less barbarous a skill than direct killing: for they would now supervise and sublimate the building the machines, technology, and schools needed for Self-Strengthening.

Li Hongzhang's Breech-loading Rifles

After the Taiping threat was crushed, beginning in the 1860s leaders like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and others who had risen by organizing their own local armies to protect the Dynasty inaugurated what has been called the Self-Strengthening Movement. This involved the first naval academy and shipyard, founded in Fuzhou in 1866, and other armories and learning institutions called "academies" (*xuetang* 學堂) that hired foreign instructors and became centers for technical knowledge production. Benjamin Elman has argued convincingly that "the view that Qing China was irrevocably weak and backward, in contrast to a powerful and industrialized Europe and a rapidly industrializing Japan, is an artifact of the impact of the Sino-Japanese War after 1895.…"[47] "The Jiangnan Arsenal and Fuzhou Shipyard," he writes, "had appeared superior in science and

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[44] Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works*, 《與江忠源》:「書生好殺，時勢使然耳 。」

[45] See throughout his campaign correspondence. This example from《致沅弟》in Zeng Guofan, *Complete Works*.

[46] Li Hongzhang, "Letter to Zeng Guofan"（上曾相 ）of February 12, 1863, in Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》.

[47] Benjamin Elman, "Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China's Self-Strengthening Reforms into Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 2004), p. 326.

technology to the Yokosuka Dockyard until the 1880s…."[48] Elman's intervention has been seconded by others who seek a reevaluation of the 1860s to the 1880s in terms of Qing naval and technological capabilities.[49] But many years ago, Knight Biggerstaff raised a question, still left unanswered about the curious and conspicuous late start for an army academy commensurate to those produced for the navy at this time. In what I call Biggerstaff's quandary, he writes that whereas the Qing founded a total of six naval academies, "no satisfactory contemporary explanation has been found for this neglect of thorough training of up-to-date army officers…."[50] Biggerstaff's quandary, moreover, goes beyond the common knowledge of Li Hongzhang's deeply held strategic preference for naval power and development, a preference he voiced systematically in the Great Policy Debate of 1874, arguing for a fundamental maritime re-orientation of the Empire's security architecture.[51] But left unanswered is the fundamental question of *why* an academy specifically for army officers took so long to come about in such a dynamic and charged milieu of technological advancement and knowledge production, institution building and reform.

This section presents Li Hongzhang in his search to acquire cutting-edge military technology and weapons in the lead up to his 1885 founding of the Beiyang Military Academy. I contend that the Academy's creation must be understood in large part as a result of the technology of the new breech-loading rifles that Li Honghzang was only able to begin acquiring in the 1880s. As discussed in the previous chapter, we cannot treat "Western technology" as a monolith; nor can we continue to overlook the impact that breech-loading rifles had when they superseded their muzzle-loading antecedents to drastically change the social architecture of battle, command, and education. Here I use new sources to shed greater light on this technology's role in precipitating the formation of China's first military academy. Let us look carefully at two episodes: one in 1875, where Li Hongzhang explicitly rejects a proposal for building an army academy; and one in 1884, where he critiques a proposal for drastic reform of the military examination system and, importantly, discloses his plan to finally found a military academy of his own.

In 1875, Li Hongzhang was propositioned by American army general and former superintendent of West Point Military Academy, Emory Upton (1839-1881). Upton had written, while on his steamship headed to China that February, that he hoped to bring to the "Celestials" "a national university, on the principle of West Point."[52] He added wistfully, "That dream, as I approach the Flowery Kingdom, loses none of its enchantment." Though he was granted an audience with Li Hongzhang, he was flatly rebuffed. Li himself provides the most detailed description of the meeting. Writing to the American consul a day or so later, Li expressed appreciation for Upton's detailed plans in "suggesting that China should establish a military college (*wu xueyuan* 武學院)."[53] Changing his tone considerably, Li then added: "And yet, General Upton's

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[48] Benjamin Elman, "Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China's Self-Strengthening Reforms into Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 2004), p. 326.

[49] Richard Horowitz, "Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911," in David Graff and Robin Higham, eds., *A Military History of China* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012) p. 154.

[50] Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China*, (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 57.

[51] The classic treatment of this debate is Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, "The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense Vs. Frontier Defense," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 25 (1964 - 1965), pp. 212- 228.

[52] Letter dated August 18, 1875 in Peter S. Michie, *The Life and Letters of Emory Upton, Colonel of the Fourth Regiment of Artillery, and Brevet Major-General, U.S. Army*, (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1885), pp. 309-310.

[53] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 31, p. 327. 1875 G1-11-003. 光緒元年十一月初七日. 西元 1875 年 12 月 4 日(星期六). This document is noted by Richard Smith, only to say that the idea of a military academy was introduced, "but nothing came of the discussion." See Richard Smith, "Li Hongzhang's Use of Foreign Military Talent: The Formative Period, 1862-1874," p. 133, in Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., *Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization* (Routledge, 1994).

proposal focuses exclusively on ground forces without even mentioning the navy. You would do well to tell him to search materials from other nations on naval leadership and training methods and get back to us at your convenience."[54] After all, Li says that not only would an army college would be extremely costly, obtaining "qualified personnel (人才) needed for ironclad ships *is much more pressing*." This is not surprising, for we already know about Li Hongzhang's strong preference for naval development. Moreover, by 1880 he achieved his pinnacle goal of founding his own Naval Academy (水師學堂) in Tianjin (hiring Yan Fu as an instructor).

While historian Richard Smith is correct to say that "nothing came of the discussion," what Li Hongzhang tells Upton about the current status of his *army* forces in 1875 is revealing and valuable. Li does not merely say that a naval academy is more pressing, he also says the following about his army forces: "they have employed Western methods (洋法) and weaponry (軍器) to repeatedly pacify major opponents [i.e. Taiping and Nian rebels], and their drill (操練) is still in *good-order and alignment* (*zhengqi* 整齊)."[55] Now three elements are important to understand. First, the "major opponents" that his armies have defeated refers to the Taiping and Nian rebels during the 1860s. The specific "weaponry" (軍器) Li is speaking of is muzzle-loading muskets, the type of weapons he acquired during the 1860s. And the type of "drill" (操練) he refers to here is *close-order* drill—drill based on in "*good-order and alignment*" (整齊)—which had been first taught to his armies during the Taiping rebellion by Western drill instructors (from 1860-1864) and also likely captured in provisional Chinese-language manuals.[56] Critical for us to understand here is that Li Hongzhang is rejecting the necessity of a military academy at this point in time in large part because he says his troops are well-trained in *close-order* drill.

In fact, if we understand the relationship between the specific weaponry of muzzle-loading muskets and the mechanism or technology of close-order drill—as Chapter 1 discusses in detail—we would recognize the logic in Li's assertion that such a battlefield regime did not, necessarily, require a formal education institution to create and maintain. Take for instance, George Washington's invitation to the Prussian Baron von Steuben, a true "missionary" of Frederick the Great's who shared his obsession with "small machines" (Foucault). Von Steuben arrived at Washington's camp at Valley Forge to teach his rag-tag famer-militia close-order drill so they could compete on the battlefield with the well-ordered British regulars. Washington's officers then took their foreign advisor's teaching, created a drill manual, and printed it from their camp to become the standard drill manual, called the "Blue Book," for the next 35 years until modification in 1812.[57] The specific mechanism required for knowledge production and reproduction of the technology of close-order drill *did not* require a formal learning institution: the American army did without a military academy, until 1802 (twenty-six years after independence was declared). When the West Point Military

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[54] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 31, p. 327. 1875 G1-11-003. 光緒元年十一月初七日. 西元 1875 年 12 月 4 日(星期六).

[55] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 31, p. 327. 1875 G1-11-003. 光緒元年十一月初七日. 西元 1875 年 12 月 4 日(星期六). Chinese:「仿用西法軍器屢平大敵，操練尚屬整齊。」

[56] Peng Hechao's research shows that Zeng Guofan, who relied on "traditional drill," was impressed by Li's Huai Army when he wrote: "Purely by using the Westerners' practices and also commands imitating the Westerners' tongue, their marching is at the utmost good-order and alignment (*bufa ji zhengqi* 步伐極整齊), their use of rifles and cannon is at the utmost proficiency and skill—the troops I see on a regular basis cannot compare to this." Peng also presents at least one piece of evidence that translated drill manuals were printed in Chinese during this time. See Peng Hechao 彭賀超,《新軍會操：中國近代軍演早期型態研究》(Joint Exercises of the New Armies: Research in the State of Early Stages of China's Modern Military Exercises), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018), p. 33n5.

[57] See *Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794*, (Dover Military History, 1985).

Academy was founded, it became primarily a center for teaching technical skills of artillery and engineering (the first engineering school in the country). The case is instructive for our China. Li Hongzhang is discussing the production and reproduction of close-order drill here, originally taught by foreigners but, he says, internalized and retained by his own forces. Moreover, the technical-heavy bodies of military knowledge were already based at their earliest naval academies, shipyards, and armories founded in the 1860s. (Of note, America's first national naval academy, at Annapolis, was not founded until 1848, just eighteen years before China's Naval Academy at Fuzhou in 1866.) It was precisely the overwhelming and conspicuous technical demands of naval and arms development that had led Chinese reformers since the 1860s to recognize that new, formal learning institutions outside the examination system, the "academies" (學堂), were required. But did infantry officers need their own institution? If we understand the mechanics of close-order drill and the infantry weaponry Li Hongzhang's forces possessed at this time—in addition to the coalescing of more technical-heavy disciplines around the earlier naval institutions—we too can begin to make better sense of Biggerstaff's quandary.

A pivotal change for Li Hongzhang came not only with the realization of his dream for the Tianjin Naval Academy founded in 1880, but also with Li's first acquisitions of breech-loading rifles at this time. Now, Li may have had some crude knowledge of the new technology as early as 1872 when he talked about Western "rifles which have their bullets fed from the rear opening."[58] But it is not until the 1880s that he speaks of them in detail and these writings show that he recognized breech-loading rifles as something quite new. For instance, in 1884, Li writes that during the Taiping rebellion "the foreigners and our army only had muzzle-loading muskets and cannon, no one had yet seen or heard of a breech-loading rifle."[59] "Nevertheless," Li adds, "[my] Huai Army pacified the Taiping and the Nian, all on the force of muzzle-loading muskets and cannon while other provincial forces [like Zeng Guofan's] were still carrying pedestal guns and flintlocks…."[60] This differentiation in weaponry is very important: what Li refers to here is a difference his Huai Army, based around Shanghai with access to funds and supplies of Western muskets, and Zeng Guofan's Xiang Army, whose soldiers, Peng Hechao's research tells us, only had roughly half armed with Chinese-manufactured firearms and the other half armed with edged weapons. Table 1 combines Peng's research on differing modes of drill between Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang's respective armies (top two rows), plus my own findings on "dispersed formations" presented in Chapter 1 (bottom row):

Table 2: Mode of Drill by Weaponry.

	Army Commander	Weaponry	Mode of Drill	Mode of Dissemination
1850s thru 1860s	Zeng Guofan	Chinese manufactured firearms (pedestal guns and flintlocks), edged weapons	"traditional drill" (傳統操法)	Ming manuals, esp. Qi Jiguang
1860s thru 1870s	Li Hongzhang	Western manufactured muzzle-loading muskets	Western close-order drill (操法整齊), English and French	Western instructors, translated and copied manuals

[58] Quoted in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 109.

[59] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 33, pp. 349-350. G9-12-026「復總署論購新式火器」光緒九年十二月二十六日 西元 1884 年 1 月 23 日(星期三)

[60] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 33, pp. 349-350. G9-12-026「復總署論購新式火器」光緒九年十二月二十六日 西元 1884 年 1 月 23 日(星期三)

1880s thru 1890s	Nie Shicheng	Western breech-loading rifles	German drill for dispersed formations (德操散隊)	Military Academy

As Table 1 shows, the type weaponry wielded by different forces required different regimes of drill and different modes of dissemination. As I have said, Western military technology was not a monolith, and needs to be considered by time and kind.

Thus, the 1880s saw the slow and uneven process of replacing muzzle-loading muskets. As Li writes, "Now [1884] every time I meet with a Western generals, diplomats, and other gentlemen, I stay to discuss these matters in depth, which… has allowed me to purchase [breech-loading rifles] little by little."[61] Though hard statistics on breech-loading rifle purchases would be helpful, apparently not until the 1880s was Li Hongzhang able to purchase the new technology in any sizable numbers.[62] For here he says "In the last few years each camp's drill employs cannon from Krupp and Armstrong and rifles from Winchester, Hotchkiss, and Mauser."[63]

This brings us to the second key episode in Li's road to founding the Military Academy. This takes place in 1884, when Li Hongzhang reviews a draft memorial composed by an outspoken, up-and-coming young official named Zhang Peilun 張佩綸 (1848-1903). Zhang Peilun (also Li's future son-in-law) composed his memorial to radically alter the empire-wide military examination system by getting rid of the "bow, blade, and rock" (弓刀石) and replacing it with Western breech-loading rifles.[64] Zhang argued that under the current system, a military exam graduate who invested years learning archery could attain top rank in the Imperial Guard, but "you could lay a cane to him every day (雖日撻) and yet not get him to learn Western-style rifles," for the skill, though militarily essential, offered no avenue for advancement.[65] Adjusting the powerful incentive structure of the military exams was necessary, Zhang stated, in order to attain the urgent goal "steadily increasing the numbers of both gentry-officials *and* commoners (士民) across the Empire that are taught in the use of Western-style rifles."[66] The problem that Zhang pinpointed, as others had recognized earlier, was that the exam system incentivized "practices" (習) that had no practical "application" (用) on the battlefield.

In two surviving letters that have recently come to light in 2018, Li Hongzhang writes of having read Zhang's draft memorial and offers mentorship and feedback on both the art of policy-crafting and the art of getting policy adopted on the imperial stage.[67] On one of Li's letters recently

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[61] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 33, pp. 349-350. G9-12-026「復總署論購新式火器」光緒九年十二月二十六日 西元 1884 年 1 月 23 日(星期三)

[62] In 1880, Li contracted for an order of German "needle guns," but the deal fell through over discrepancies over the effectiveness of this model. See Ricardo K. S. Mak, "Western Advisers and Late Qing Chinese Military Modernization: A Case Study of Constantin von Hanneken (1854-1925)," *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*, Volume 10 Number 2 (Winter 2013), 47-70.

[63] Li Hongzhang, *Complete Works*《李鴻章全集》, vol. 33, pp. 349-350. G9-12-026「復總署論購新式火器」光緒九年十二月二十六日 西元 1884 年 1 月 23 日(星期三)

[64] Zhang Peilun "Draft Request for the Military Examinations to Change to Testing on Western-style Firearms"《擬請武科改試洋槍摺》, in *Jianyu ji*《澗于集》，(豐潤: 澗于草堂張氏 [1921?]), pp. 475-482.

[65] Zhang Peilun "Draft Request for the Military Examinations to Change to Testing on Western-style Firearms"《擬請武科改試洋槍摺》, in *Jianyu ji*《澗于集》，(豐潤: 澗于草堂張氏 [1921?]), pp. 475-482.

[66] Zhang Peilun "Draft Request for the Military Examinations to Change to Testing on Western-style Firearms"《擬請武科改試洋槍摺》, in *Jianyu ji*《澗于集》，(豐潤: 澗于草堂張氏 [1921?]), pp. 475-482.

[67] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated February 20, 1884) and "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated March 3, 1884),〈李鸿章致张佩纶〉, in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 351-352; 354-358. A portion of one of these letters had been compiled in the 2008 *Complete Works of Li*

recovered from the Zhang family papers, we actually have comments scribbled from Zhang Peilun's own hand overtop Li's original letter, evidently preparatory notes for a full reply (which unfortunately has not survived). Nevertheless, with the draft memorial itself, their correspondence and these jottings, we have a privileged window into informal imperial policy-making and information flow.

In terms of the policy crafting, Li urges the young Zhang to pay closer attention to logistical issues and security implications of what he is proposing. First, Li is concerned with the logistics of supplying the necessary breech-loading rifles needed for the examinations. In order to preserve the sense of repartee, I've included each writer's initials as they alternate:

> [LHZ] In each of the provinces, there's no less than several million military exam prospects and no less than a hundred thousand or so actual military licentiates. Based on calculating these numbers in preparation for the tri-yearly examinations, it would then require these candidates be issued firearms [from the government] at least a year prior so that they can use them for drill and exercise and thus begin preparing to take the exam….
>
> > [ZPL] This concern is ridiculous. The civil exams are also run on a triennial basis, but I've never heard that outside of those years all the stores selling books and stationary, brushes and ink had closed in unison.
>
> [LHZ] If there are not enough rifles to provide everyone and thus there are military exam licentiates and others who are worthy but have no rifles, the situation will certainly be tense and lead to unrest.
>
> > [ZPL] With no rifles how then are they going to cause trouble? [68]

Here Li and Zhang argue, virtually, over the supply of breech-loading rifles. Bows and arrows for military exams were furnished by candidates themselves; but breech-loading rifles would have to be provided by the government. These rifles cost ten times as much as muzzle-loading muskets, and Chinese armories were not yet able to manufacture the more precise machinery required. But another concern over the supply of these weapons is the issue of civil unrest. Whereas Li expresses concern that candidates would riot if they did not receive a breech-loading rifle from the government, he is actually *more* troubled by the prospect of distributing these weapons altogether:

> Military exam candidates and licentiates are absolutely everywhere, and it's hard to fully guarantee that they are upright people (難保盡為善類) or that they won't be robbed by bandits. Once something like this happens, it's very difficult to take care of it. I've experienced calamities [such as this] for a very long time, so I dare not remain silent…. In a little while I will again offer my humble opinion to provide you with comments.[69]

Li even says that Zhang's proposal would amount to "disbursing advanced weapons (i.e., breech-loading rifles) amongst the people" (利器散於民間), saying it "will actually become an enormous

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Hongzhang (李鴻章全集), but the Zhang Peilun family estate finds added to these correspondences and has Zhang's handwritten notes on one of them.

[68] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated March 3, 1884),〈李鸿章致张佩纶〉, in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 354-358.

[69] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated February 20, 1884) in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 351-352.

hazard" as "cases of homicide and robbery will become rampant…."[70] More than rampant crime, Li says that "in the end it could lead to an actual rebellion or even using their advanced weaponry to intimidate and control government troops, which would be an even greater calamity."[71] He reminds Zhang to consider that the Taiping rebels of former days originally "had relatively few foreign rifles," but when they invaded Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, "they linked up with barbarian [Western] merchants and gradually obtained more foreign rifles." The reason the rebels did not prevail, Li says, was "only that they couldn't get hold of the same quantity and quality of [foreign] rifles and cannon that our armies could—that was it."[72] (Of note, this statement is quite the opposite of Zeng Guofan's repeated dictum he tried to impart to Li Hongzhang, that "victory rests on people, not on weaponry.")

Li tells his mentee that, given the grave risks, "you have to think carefully and consider every aspect"[73] of policy like this, and he even provides Zhang with a suggestion that would be more gradual and more secure. As Li writes, we can feel the young Zhang's frustration build:

> [LHZ] I humbly suggest that if you want to reform an entire system, there's no better way than to do it than gradually….
>
> [ZPL] Stop complaining! You still think you are right about being gradual.
>
> [LHZ] … and test both military licentiates and candidates in the *practice of muzzle-loading muskets* (習前膛槍). This is how you can "let the wind blow and bend the grass."[74]
>
> [ZPL] Having military candidates and licentiates *practice muzzle-loading muskets* but having military provincial candidates and above change to breech-loaders and have them go on to the army camps—how does that work?
>
> [LHZ] Since trade relations with the nations began, muzzle-loading foreign muskets have been relatively cheap and economical; how will they not be sold privately to the populace? In each province across the empire, officials and private individuals all have stockpiles [of muzzle-loading firearms]. Once the system you've proposed gets implemented, surely military licentiates will try any means to find and purchase these weapons….
>
> [ZPL] This far surpasses bows and arrows, but then why not change to breech-loaders? Perhaps it is because you don't believe China will be able to produce breech-loading rifles in the future.
>
> [LHZ] …. and this will make it so that *advanced weapons* (利器, i.e. breech-loading rifles) will not become hidden stores for gangsters and bandits but will rather become the accoutrement of upstanding officers (良士), thus virtually eliminating [their potential use in domestic] military disturbances. This is the first benefit. The accuracy of muzzle-loading muskets makes it much harder to hit targets than with breech-loading rifles.
>
> [ZPL] Hitting targets with our locally-produced muskets (土槍) is even harder. This would be like saying that since [the Song dynasty (960-1279) literati] Ouyang Xiu and

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[70] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated February 20, 1884) in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 351-352.

[71] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated February 20, 1884) in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 351-352.

[72] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated February 20, 1884) in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 351-352.

[73] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated February 20, 1884) in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 351-352.

[74] This is a citation from the *Analects*.

Zhao Gai[75] are quite popular today, then we should have candidates write their exams on the stone steles used during the Six Dynasties (AD 222-589). How would it be worth the trouble to make such a change?

[ZPL] And that still wouldn't be as terrible an idea as studying on our locally produced muskets (土槍).

[LHZ] As for the defense forces stationed in each coastal province, the rifles and cannon in their employ must absolutely "discard the old and take up the new,"[76] that is, discard muzzle-loaders and employ breech-loaders. This is the strategy of "preventing threats from ever sprouting by building up martial awe."[77] It would be quite inappropriate to have these powerful weapons dispersed amongst the population (若令利器散在民间，则非所宜).

[ZPL] It's dispersing them to gentry/officers (士), not to the people (民). My last letter specifically emended this, that's simply what it says there![78]

Now, I cannot find where Zhang Peilun made the emendation he asserts above. In fact, when Zhang's papers were published after his death, "officers *and* people" 士民 would remain in the draft of this memorial. Apparently, neither could Li Hongzhang find the emendation, because he repeatedly pinpoints the chief flaw in using the up-to-date breech-loading rifles on the military exams is that it means giving open access to the population (民間).

While Li Hongzhang reiterates this concern about access to the population many times in both letters, in the second letter Li presents to Zhang another alternative: he discloses the nascent plans for building his own military academy. Li states that he has "attached for you to consider" a rough outline, which, most unfortunately, no longer survives. But his letter says the "The content of it is to have warriors establish an academy (武士令立書院), to run on fixed schedules/semesters and prohibit them from deciding when to return to their families."[79] It is no coincidence that Li quickly adds to this disclosure of planning to build a military academy that he immediately reiterates, yet again, that "my humble view is that only government troops should be trained on breech-loaders, and allowing the common folk to have these weapons would not be advantageous, moreover, it's inappropriate."[80] Li says this precisely because the environment of a military academy would offer a discrete space in which these advanced breech-loading rifles could be controlled and kept away from the broader civilian populace, unlike the examination system that *required* society to produce the skills and qualities it sought. It is not an understatement to say that breech-loading rifles, unlike bows and arrows and even muzzle-loading muskets, finally broke the capability of an examination format to properly handle.

Zhang Peilun would never submit his draft memorial, either because his mentor convinced him of the inability or inappropriateness for the military examination, as a system, to handle the new

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[75] I believe that "歐、趙" refers to the Song dynasty literati Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072) and Zhao Gai 趙概 (996-1083). Another possibility is that it refers to two famous calligraphers: Ouyang Xun 歐陽詢 (AD 557-641) and Zhou Mengfu 趙孟頫 (1254-1322).

[76] Citing *Zuozhuan*《左專》.

[77] Citing *Book of the Later Han*《後漢書》.

[78] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated March 3, 1884),〈李鸿章致张佩纶〉, in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 354-358.

[79] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated March 3, 1884),〈李鸿章致张佩纶〉, in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 354-358.

[80] "Li Hongzhang Letter to Zhang Peilun" (dated March 3, 1884),〈李鸿章致张佩纶〉, in Jiang Ming 姜鳴, ed.,《李鴻章張佩綸往來信札》, (上海：人民出版社, 2018), pp. 354-358.

technology of the breech-loading rifle or, more likely, because Zhang suffered a grave and humiliating defeat to the French at the head of the Qing's southern naval fleet in the 1884-1885 war. Over a year later, however, Li Hongzhang would submit his official memorial for the founding of the Beiyang Military Academy. Contrary to Yan Fu's account of a 1885 diplomatic flub that led to the academy's founding, these letters tell us that Li Hongzhang had been considering this issue for some time. In particular, he was grappling with the new potentialities offered by breech-loading rifles. And yet, unlike naval education and weapons manufacturing, the techniques of firing breech-loading rifles accurately at targets did not surpass the *capabilities* of society to cultivate without government assistance. In fact, the relative increase lethality of this new hand-held technology was precisely the problem. And these letters show Li Hongzhang deeply concerned with controlling breech-loading rifles in a way that the open format of the examinations and their reliance on society could never properly contain. Thus, there is a critical subtext in Li Hongzhang's memorial of June 17, 1885, when he explains his plan for a Military Academy to the Throne: "I've heard that their military academies' buildings are erected like forests on a massive scale… and at the very beginning of their studies, students live on-site in the dorms…."[81] Li seems to be describing an alien civilization, despite the fact that Chinese naval students had been doing this for two decades, precisely because it was a relatively new imperative that *army* officer education required such an infrastructure. Though Li's letters to Zhang tell us that these facilities were part of his new understanding of the exponentially greater potency of breech-loading rifles, which needed to be kept out of the hands of the populace, it is harder to determine whether or when Li grasped the new tactical-operational orientation of "mission tactics" and "dispersed formations." Still, Li's founding memorial tells the Throne that not only will the resident education provide students with knowledge of how to employ breech-loading firearms, he says they will also learn "troop formations that are ordered (整齊) and agile (靈便)."[82] Though Li Hongzhang's understanding of the tactical-operational implications of the new technology may be incomplete and partial, we have moved beyond the assertion he made a decade earlier that his troops' combat effectiveness was measured primarily by "ordered" formations: for he appears to recognize the need for a new-found "agility." As we will see in the next section, this had more than technological and security implications, it would require also renovation of the educational approach as well.

Teacher Yao's Confidence

Despite the critical role new technology played in precipitating the launch of the Beiyang Military Academy in 1885, from its start, the Classical curriculum played a major role. When Court approved Li Hongzhang's 1885 proposal for the Beiyang Military Academy, it also offered not-so-subtle criticism. In lecturing Li Hongzhang that "while skills can be learned, bravery (膽氣) is difficult to teach,"[83] the Court was echoing something we've seen clearly above, which I have called the "technologies of spirit" used by Qi Jiguang and Zeng Guofan. The Throne even went further in its critique to say, "Your establishment of this Military Academy only trains skills and nothing

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[81] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885,"〈直隸總督李鴻章為天津創設武備學堂擬由海防經費開支等事奏折〉(光绪十一年五月初五日) , in《李鸿章全集》(2008), vol. 11, pp. 98-99.

[82] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885,"〈直隸總督李鴻章為天津創設武備學堂擬由海防經費開支等事奏折〉(光绪十一年五月初五日) , in《李鸿章全集》(2008), vol. 11, pp. 98-99.

[83] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885," in《李鸿章全集》, vol. 11, pp. 98-99. Imperial rescript (硃批):「技藝可學而膽氣難學。」

more…. In your task of selecting talented commanders, do not only use Western methods."[84] Soon it issued an edict calling it "extremely appropriate" (甚為合宜) that Military Academy students study China's Classics and Histories (經史) in addition to Western military knowledge. It is unclear whether it was primarily from outside pressure from the Court or the original program of the Beiyang Military Academy, but the Classics and Histories would become a very important part of the curriculum. Historiography of the school has largely ignored this aspect. Perhaps the presence of Classical education at the Military Academy appears, on the surface, as yet another example of cultural nativism generally attributed to the failure of Traditional China to adapt to modernity. But I will show that the view of sacred texts as a critical ingredient to efficaciously organized violence was a key innovation with tactical-operational import, as well as a long-term influence in the world of industrialized warfare.

One source that seems to have been disregarded is Prince Chun 醇奕譞 (1840–1891), father of the Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875-1908), who left a detailed account of his visit to the Beiyang Military Academy in 1886. Prince Chun's emphasis in his account on the Classical curriculum is seen by some as revealing nothing supposedly "modern" about this school, but he gives us a wonderfully articulate portrait of the school, as well as the tensions and controversies surrounding it. He writes that he "had heard rumors that the Military Academy solely teaches skills from foreign lands."[85] Though the Imperial rescript had chided Li Hongzhang's original proposal for precisely this fault (see above), Prince Chun says here that these "rumors" came from a "group of men well-read in books who hold up the school for scrutiny, condemnation, and slander."[86] "That is why," he says, "I came from afar to take a look for myself at this place." Prince Chun describes his tour of the school as witnessing three phases or transformations. In the first phase, he enters "a tall, multi-story building with rows of windows" to find "a group of hand-selected, intelligent boys who are capped [i.e. age of 20]" pouring over maps and calculating instruments as they study geography. The second phase begins "at precisely noon [when] the order comes to change, and the seated [students] fly up like birds, replacing their scholar robes for military uniforms (儒服易戎衣)," wherein they initiate artillery and calvary exercises with "fierce vigor" (猛氣).[87] The third phase then begins "with a shout," at which "they take up their writing implements to plumb the Classics and Histories (經史)." He adds, "At the Academy they work with both the Five [Confucian] Classics (五經) and Western books." Thus, Prince Chun describes what he witnessed there as these three distinct educational phases or modes, moving from technical knowledge to military practices to Chinese Classical studies.

And Prince Chun's observations left a deep impression on him, which, in turn, are meant to persuade the "slanderers" he mentioned above. Interestingly, Prince Chun modifies the original and quite famous Art of War dictum by adding the word "requires" (須), emphasizing the reciprocal, interdependent nature of "knowing thyself" (i.e. through Chinese Classics) and "knowing the enemy" (i.e. through Western books). He writes, "There is an important saying in the Art of War: 'To know thyself requires (須) knowing thy enemy.' The trends of time silently engender

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[84] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885," in《李鴻章全集》, vol. 11, pp. 98-99. Imperial rescript (硃批):「武備學堂之設，不過練習技藝而已…. 該督務當挑選將才，毋得專用西法。」

[85] Prince Chun,《九思堂思稿續編》(1886), (故宫博物院, 2000). There is also a wonderful translation and commentary to this collection in French published in 1900. See A. Vissière, "L'odyssée d'un prince chinois. 航海吟草, Hang hai yin ts'ao. Essais poétiques sur un voyage en mer, par le septième prince, père de l'empereur kouang-siu, traduits et annotés," *T'oung Pao*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, (1900), pp. 33-62, 125-148, 189-218.

[86] Prince Chun,《九思堂思稿續編》(1886), (故宫博物院, 2000).

[87] Prince Chun,《九思堂思稿續編》(1886), (故宫博物院, 2000).

transformations, so governance and rule must follow these trends by either encompassing them or being abolished."[88] By this he even suggests a sort of fusion between the Chinese learning and new Western learning. "When I actually came to observe" Military Academy education, Prince Chun writes, "it cause me to question what is actually new and what is merely changing." In other words, Chinese cultural essence was not being erased by new studies within the Military Academy, it was merely changing forms, like the phases he observed. Finally, Prince Chun praises Li Hongzhang for realizing a means for "this harmonious adaptation" (此調燮理) that others have only given lip service to before. Though he says the difficulties in implementing something like this "had laid a roadblock on my mind for the last ten years," he says, "within fifteen minutes, it had been washed away clean."[89] We cannot discount that Prince Chun writes explicitly to give Beiyang Military Academy a clean bill of health in the eyes of the unnamed ultra-conservative slanderers he mentions. Neither can we discount the historical importance of the Classical education given to military men that so enthralled him.

Now, it is admittedly difficult to reconstruct any Beiyang Military Academy curriculum, partially due to its complete destruction in 1900; but even more so for reconstructing this Classical aspect (which German instructors apparently did not document and, understandably, could not contribute to). But massive digitization of Chinese primary sources in recent decades has given us some critical, though piecemeal findings that have not been analyzed until now. For instance, one Tianjin newspaper published in 1887 a series of Beiyang Military Academy examination questions. In addition to a majority of technical questions related to mathematics, physics, terrain analysis, tactics,

Compose an____ :	based on this "[text]":	Text Source
Essay 文:	"…cherish the young" 「少者懷之」	Confucius' Analects 5.26
Disquisition 論:	"…the will of the common man cannot be wrested" 「匹夫不奪志也」	Confucius' Analects 9.26
Poem 詩:	"From the line 'With a single sword he once countered a thousand legions,' take the character "legions" for rhyme to make a composition in pentasyllabic hexameter." 賦得「一劍曾當百萬師」得「師」字，五言六韻。	"Ballad of the Old General" 《老將行》 by Tang dynasty poet Wang Wei 王維 (AD 701-761).

and fortifications, there was also a Classical portion. As shown in Figure 1 below, this exam required Military Academy students to compose essays based on Classical texts precisely in the manner of the civil examination test format.

Now, inserting essay prompts based on the Confucian Classics into military curriculum, as we see here, had not been attempted since the reign of Kangxi (1661-1722). Prince Chun's account of his tour of the Military Academy, moreover, resonates strongly with the stated purposes of Kangxi's radical innovations, that is, to "unify civil and military" (文武合一). But a critical difference lay between what Prince Chun witnessed at the Military Academy and Kangxi's military

Figure 9: June 14, 1887, "Tianjin Military Academy Test Questions Continued"〈天津武備學堂續考題〉，《字林滬報》

exam reforms: the vehicle by which Confucian curriculum was delivered was much different. Unlike

[88] Prince Chun,《九思堂思稿續編》(1886), (故宫博物院, 2000).

[89] Prince Chun,《九思堂思稿續編》(1886), (故宫博物院, 2000).

the examination system that placed the responsibility for the requisite education on the individual (i.e., his family, or society at large), this responsibility had been taken up by the military academy (i.e., the state). And, the Academy broke with the exams by more than having "students live on-site in the dorms," though this novel feature was so prominent in Li's description of his plan to both Zhang Peilun and to the Court.[90] The Academy had much more powerful mechanisms than the exams.

From the Academy's 1886 "School Regulations" (學規) we see two types of teachers, the German "foreign instructors" (yang jiaoxi 洋教習) and "Chinese instructors" (Han jiaoxi 漢教習).[91] These Chinese instructors took up an essential mediary role in the knowledge transfer process, for they were responsible for ensuring all teaching by foreign instructors was translated for students, and in charge of all classroom review and testing. But Chinese instructors were more than mere conduits for the foreign instructors. As Regulation #5 stated: "Each day the Chinese instructors will write a selected excerpt from the Classics and Histories (經史) for all students to copy down…."[92] "When finished copying an assignment," it then required students "to request a Chinese instructor to look at its punctuation and highlights, speak to the essay's content (文義講解)…."[93] Moreover, the prescribed interactions with students over their Classics assignments was to have a distinct goal in mind: for Chinese instructors were to "explain the [texts'] meaning thoroughly in order to inspire a heart of righteous loyalty (感發忠義之心)."[94] In sum, the Chinese instructors, as described in the 1886 Regulations, constitute an infrastructure of learning, though they have remained a virtually unconsidered part of the Beiyang Military Academy.

But the Regulations provide even more insight when we pair them with Yao Xiguang's diary, for he was one of the "Chinese instructors" it speaks of. Recall from Chapter 1 Teacher Yao's palpable elation that his former student, Yang Qichang 楊其昌, remembered an essay he had written in class "years ago" on the Song dynasty official, Fan Wenzheng (AD 989-1042).[95] That Student Yang was still able to discuss "all the main points of my corrections and even elaborate on each point in depth," makes more sense given that the School Regulations required Chinese instructors "discuss to the content of student essays" (文義講解).[96] Based on the Regulations, moreover, Yao Xiguang not only would have played a critical role in mediating the course content taught by German instructors, like "surveying" (測繪) and the all-important "German drill methods" (德國操法) that he says Student Yang had "mastered" during his studies. Teacher Yao would have also played an instrumental role in teaching Student Yang his "ability in Classical writing" (能古文辭).[97] I also emphasize the instrumental nature of Yao's role because the diary record notes Student Yang's background as a once "destitute orphan" (少孤貧), indicating that he had not had the privilege of education provided by his family, only arriving at the Military Academy

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[90] Li Hongzhang, "Memorial of June 17, 1885," in《李鴻章全集》(2008), vol. 11, pp. 98-99.

[91] Du Chunhe 杜春和, "The Beiyang Military Academy School Regulations" (北洋武備學堂學規), *Historical Archives* (历史档案), 1990 (02), pp. 59-63.

[92] Du Chunhe 杜春和, "The Beiyang Military Academy School Regulations" (北洋武備學堂學規), *Historical Archives* (历史档案), 1990 (02), pp. 59-63.

[93] Du Chunhe 杜春和, "The Beiyang Military Academy School Regulations" (北洋武備學堂學規), *Historical Archives* (历史档案), 1990 (02), pp. 59-63.

[94] Du Chunhe 杜春和, "The Beiyang Military Academy School Regulations" (北洋武備學堂學規), *Historical Archives* (历史档案), 1990 (02), pp. 59-63.

[95] Entry for January 30, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 55.

[96] Du Chunhe 杜春和, "The Beiyang Military Academy School Regulations" (北洋武備學堂學規), *Historical Archives* (历史档案), 1990 (02), pp. 59-63.

[97] Entry for January 30, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 55.

with a "natural disposition of loyalty and sincerity" (天性忠厚樸實) that allowed him to flourish under teachers at the school. Indeed, this particular entry ends with Yao saying of Student Yang, "This year he is 25 years old and I have every expectation for his success."[98]

Yao Xiguang's intuition was not misplaced in Student Yang's case. According to my research, Student Yang Qichang went on to publish as a translator of German, serving in military schools and also railroad bureaus. At the age of 52 (1932), he held a teaching position at the Beiping National University's Women's College of Arts and Sciences.[99] Though not quite the career path to positions of highest power and authority of other so-called "warlord" graduates, this was still quite respectable for a former orphan and, more importantly, a testimony to the genuine educational experience Student Yang received at the Beiyang Military Academy.

Student Yang Qichang's story is, in fact, indicative to the formative nature of Beiyang Military Academy education, which has seldom been recognized, especially by scholars searching for the root causes of China's tragic fall into warlordism. Let us take one more single entry where Yao says he met together with a total of four former students (including Yang Qichang): "June 18, 1896. Clear day. Rose early. Students Yang Shoushan and Wu Junqing came to say their goodbyes before leaving…. Along with Students Wang Yadong and Yang Qichang, they were all students at the Tianjin Military Academy when I had arrived as an instructor there."[100] Yao adds: "We shared a teacher-to-student friendship, a sentiment that made it quite difficult to part with one another." In this way, Yao points to another aspect of Military Academy education: its ability for forge relationships, the "student-teacher friendship" (師弟之誼) he mentions here and a "close emotional bond" (情頗依依). Given that Yao speaks of a bonded network here, let us briefly glean what we can about the other three students mentioned in the entry. For Wu Junqing 吳俊卿, the most information I can find says that in 1920 he served as a division commander (師長) under the then governor of Shandong, Tian Zhongyu 田中玉 (1869-1935), another fellow Beiyang Military Academy graduate.[101] Tian Zhongyu, later known as the "Anhui Warlord," left family papers that have recently been published in which we find a similar background to Yang Youzhi (above). Tian wrote that his father died when he was very young, and, in the 1880s, his mother, over objections of family and neighbors that she was wasting her only son on the army, "ordered" (令) Tian to take the Military Academy entrance exam in order to, in her words, "requite the country" (報國).[102] Tian would recall that the Military Academy made up for the lack of schools and opportunities in his backwater county: "I think back on… the self-discipline, skills, and learning I received when I was there, which have stayed with me up to this day."[103]

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[98] Entry for January 30, 1896, in *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 55.

[99] Yang Qichang's pieces were published in the translation journal《譯書公會報》. For Yang's position at Beiping National University's Women's College of Arts and Sciences, see《國立北平大學一覽》, edited by the office of the School President 國立北平大學校長辦公處, published in 1932. The entry also tells us that Student Yang was from Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, as well as that after graduating from the Beiyang Military Academy, he became a German language at the Army's Number One Preparatory School 陸軍第一預備學校 and then at the Railroad Departments of the Beijing-Hankou and Beijing-Liaoning Lines 京漢京綏路局.

[100] Entry for June 18, 1896, *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 116.

[101] Wu Junqing 吳俊卿, 字殿英. See《國民日報》, May 3, 1920, p. 3. Incidentally, the same page has a piece on students in Beiping commemorating the May Fourth incident by singing songs and holding vigils: see《京學生紀念「五四」》.

[102] 田中玉纂，《田氏家譜 六卷》，Series: 清代民國名人家譜選刊, (北京 : 北京燕山出版社, 2006), vol. 8, p. 60.

[103] 田中玉纂，《田氏家譜 六卷》，Series: 清代民國名人家譜選刊, (北京 : 北京燕山出版社, 2006), vol. 8, p. 191.

A second student in Yao's entry is Yang Shoushan 楊壽山, about whom, outside Yao's diary, I unfortunately cannot find any information. But in another diary entry, Yao has Yang exchange telegrams with a former classmate just returned from study in Germany, named Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 (1865-1936, misspelled in Yao's diary as 段起瑞).[104] Well known for having attained presidency of the Republic, Duan Qirui was fortunate enough to attend traditional-style private school (sishu 私塾) before the Military Academy. Still, recent scholarship by Chen Weishun notes that Duan's daily study in the Classics and Histories (經史) in the Military Academy "laid a firm foundation for Duan Qirui's later civil administration (文治)."[105] To be sure, Chen's voice seems virtually alone in recognizing Beiyang Military Academy education as formative or productive—but this is a clear pattern revealed when we take a closer look into these newer sources.

The last student in the entry we have not yet mentioned is Wang Yadong 王雅東.[106] According to a county gazetteer, Wang Yadong's father also died when he was an infant, and, since the uncle who raised him was impoverished, he received no education before entry into the Military Academy. Wang Yadong would rise to the rank of major-general (中將) and help establish new military academies in Hunan and Shandong and, after 1911, he served under fellow Academy graduate Feng Guozhang in various national posts. Feng Guozhang, who would also attain the presidency of the Republic, is described by historian Wang Jiajian as being a former "opera musician" (師琴) when he lists the humble origins of many of these Beiyang Military Academy students.[107] Of course, Wang Jiajian's highly influential thesis (noted in Chapter 1) is that China fell into warlordism precisely because these men of humble origins were miseducated at the Academy, where they received only technical military training but not so-called "spirit education" (精神教育). A more complete education would have given them a larger sense of patriotism to use violence for the greater good, as he says the later Yan Fu apparently so lamented. But it is ironic that none of the literature I have read on both Feng Guozhang and Yan Fu notes that they would have been in the same examination hall for the exam in 1889. Having passed the county-level civil examinations at his home in Hejian while on New Year's break in February 1888, Feng Guozhang went to the Zhili provincial exams held in Shuntian that following year, the same time as Yan Fu's third exam attempt.[108] That a supposedly miseducated former opera musician (a story for which I can find no supporting source)[109] would sit in the same provincial examination hall as the great Yan Fu and put his Classical mastery to the test is a juxtaposition incongruous with our historiography thus far. Such is the misconception that remains today of the nature of Beiyang Military Academy education.

It is true that many, even most Beiyang Military Academy students came from humble origins as described in above. This is not at all surprising, given that Li Hongzhang's founding memorial stipulated that intelligent junior leaders would be selected from the ranks of the army. Teacher Yao even voiced strong preference for this mode of selection. In Hubei, Yao tried unsuccessfully to lobby Zhang Zhidong to desist from trying to recruit degree-holding gentry for the

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[104] Entry for February 1, 1896, *Yao Xiguang Diary*, pp. 56-57.

[105] 陳煒舜, ed., 《段祺瑞正道居詩文註解》, (臺北市 : 萬卷樓圖書股份有限公司, 2020).

[106] *Cang County Gazetteer* [Hebei Province]《滄縣志 十六卷》(Tianjin: 1933), p. 614 (第八卷). Accessed in 北京爱如生数字化技术研究中心. Note: 王雅東 （字者化）.

[107] Wang Jiajian 王家儉, 《北洋武備學堂的創設及其影響》(The Creation of the Beiyang Military Academy and its Significance) in *Qingshi yanjiu lunsou* 清史研究論藪 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1994), p. 388.

[108] According to one of Feng Guozhang's early biographies, though with little corroborating evidence, when Li Hongzhang heard that a Military Academy student had passed the exams, he exclaimed, "A military school has produced a scholar!" (武校出文生). See 张一麐，《故代理大總統馮公事狀》.

[109] Peng Xiuliang 彭秀良, 《冯国璋传》(*Biography of Feng Guozhang*), (北京 : 中华书局, 2015).

upcoming entrance exams at Hubei Military Academy's opening. Yao stated that he offered Zhang and others his "humble opinion" that "civil officials and licentiates have deeply ingrained bad habits (習氣甚深) that make them inherently unsuited for the military, and certainly unable to be students. Likewise, military officers and licentiates are, in the main, a vulgar assortment, unwilling to be cultivated (不堪造就)."[110] By this, Yao posited that the resources it took for a young man to study for the exams, either military or civil, created a habitus of privilege with little compatibility for the transformative and uncomfortable process of military "cultivation," even a process not meant to create robotic Foucauldian "docility."[111] As Zhang Peilun had noted, military exam graduates could be "beaten daily with a rod" but could not be forced to learn Western rifles if they had no interest. From this we discern yet another layer of meaning within Yao's diary entries that exude praise for the former Academy students that came from humble origins and yet flourished at the school. Indeed, he said of Student Yang that he came to the Academy with a "natural disposition" (天性) of "sincerity" (樸實). Incidentally, this is the same quality Zeng Guofan had sought while scouring the localities. But whereas Zeng attributed this quality to unmolded commoner peasant boys that could become good and obedient foot soldiers, he had recruited his officers, fully-formed, from the gentry-elite class by virtue of their education in the civil exam curriculum. In this, Zeng and Zhang Zhidong's vision for gentry elite students at his Military Academy are in agreement. But in some ways the, the vision Yao articulates has much higher aspirations for the technology he wields than Zeng did, for Yao's teaching brings both Western military training and Classical education to young, unformed commoners with basic "sincerity," making them into military officers from scratch.

Yao lost his argument with Zhang Zhidong on this matter, however. His entry for October 22, 1896 reads: "Went back to the Academy. For the Military Academy's opening, the Governor General's office had posted notices for the entrance examination and over 2,000 men have already signed up for it."[112] Yao says that this number included seven graduates of the provincial-level civil exams and four from the military exams, plus 400 students of the civil exams, a few dozen military exam students, and others of various exam-track related attainments. Indeed, both the number and social composition the massive turnout was widely celebrated at the time and, in the few cases it is cited by historians, it is recognized as the beginnings of a major cultural shift after the First Sino-Japanese War, wherein the educated gentry-class first began considering the military as a respectable and patriotic professional calling.[113] Yao too writes, "That this many have registered for the entrance

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[110] Entry for August 8, 1896, *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 141.「竊謂中國文武分途已久，其文員文生，習氣甚深，本不宜於武備，尤不能當學生; 而武弁武生，大率粗鄙者流，不堪造就。」

[111] In his earlier conversation with Cai Xiyong, Yao had said that Beiyang's so-called "veteran commanders" had lost all "vitality" (朝氣, literally "positive *qi*" through the material privileges of their position, leaving them with pure "apathy" (暮氣, literally "negative *qi*"). See entry for January 11, 1896, Yao Xiguang Diary, p. 43. This lack of "vitality" due to privilege seems to be in view here when discussing whether to recruit military officers and exam graduates. Here on August 8, he adds, "Zi Chan praised harshness, Zhuge Liang applied strictness, and *it's exactly the medicine we need today* (正今日良藥)." Despite Yao's advocacy of strict discipline, he is certainly not talking about classic Foucauldian "docility," for he has "vitality" and "cultivation" in mind, describing a formative and transformative military education experience much more akin to the Clausewitzian-Scharnhorst mold. If there is a Foucauldian equivalent to "docility" for Yao it is the trait of "loyalty and sincerity" (樸實), which makes one pliable to molding (either toward an automaton or an agent).

[112] Entry for October 22, 1896, *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 171.

[113] For example, Edward McCord cites Zhang Zhidong's Hubei Military Academy in 1896 as an example of the following: "Recognizing that the best-qualified students would come from the educated classes, proponents of modern military education made elite recruitment for military schools a deliberate social policy (p. 49)." He also writes, "…this meant that military students, and thus China's future army officers, would largely be drawn from among the better-educated scions of elite families (pp. 48-49)." See McCord, *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

exam is really surprising." But we know from earlier in his diary that Yao already had expressed deep reservations about such recruits. At seeing them all gathered, Yao records himself asking the following questions:

> Could these provincial and county exam graduates, licentiates, and students really be compelled by current events (果激於時局) and truly want to strive towards Self-Strengthening? Or were they envious of the stipend of four gold pieces per-month and thought they might as well give it a try? I can't be sure either way (皆未可知).[114]

Yao's questions are quite amazing to consider, as is his answer.

After all, we saw in Chapter 1 what I called Yao's epistemological boldness when he claimed with great certainty that General Nie's Military Academy students would "stand firm and not waver," for he was making a claim to know the inner state of these students (being able to "self-order" their internal qi 氣) and, moreover, to know this across the vast geographical and informational barriers separating him from them (hundreds of miles from what he could personally "see or hear" 所聞所見). But in the opening day entry above, Yao probes the internal state of the mass of applicants directly in front of him, asking if either noble or venal motivations had compelled them to register. And yet, Yao seems to have found an epistemological modesty when he claims in this case that he cannot actually know what drives them internally. Indeed, he echoes precisely Zeng Guofan's statement that though he personally certified the military exam candidates, he "dared not with self-confidence" (不敢以自信) tell the Emperor they were men of talent, let alone men of "spirit" (精神). It seems that Zeng and Yao share a similar desire, even anxiety, to know the interior motives of the young men before them, mixed with a distinct self-conscious recognition of their inability to do so.

It is fascinating, however, that recognizing his inability to peer into the exam candidates left Zeng composing poetry while the clock tolled the "third watch" (三更). Thus closed this brief window of opportunity for him to acquire this knowledge of their spirits. Though Teacher Yao also takes to his diary with these penetrating questions, a major difference is that the Academy entrance exam was one single day within what would become a three year resident course. Yao's window for knowing was not closing, but opening. But, unlike Zeng's languid poem, Yao's entry abruptly leaves his probing questions unanswered, turning seamlessly to something more active, though mundane in nature:

> But since the amount of registrations was already so many, and with the opening day so near… I made decisions with former Student Wang Yadong [mentioned above] about getting blackboards to write assignments on, blackboard hangers, paper notebooks for each student to write their assigned work, and attendance rosters in multiple formats, along with pencils, slates, slate-chalk, triangles [for calculating angles], drafting boards, and chalk for writing on the blackboards….. Student Wang and I consulted with each other on all the pertinent measurements for tables and benches for all the students in the lecture hall. We continue to work on it the exercise outfits and other items.[115]

What we find in this laundry list of teaching supplies is not the abandonment of Teacher Yao's penetrating query into the hearts and minds of these prospective students, but rather a turning

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[114] Entry for October 22, 1896, *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 171.
[115] Entry for October 22, 1896, *Yao Xiguang Diary*, p. 171.

toward the material means or "technology" of reaching them. It is, in fact, Yao Xiguang's confidence in the military academy as a "technology of the spirit," and it is much more powerful than anything Zeng Guofan had at his disposal. Put differently, in the face of doubts and questions about the motivations of the host of new students, we see Yao Xiguang act on a pedagogical optimism that he has the tools and techniques he needs to reach them.

Conclusion

This chapter showed China in three distinct transformations in (1) the socio-political cataclysm of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), which became the precipitating catalyst for (2) a new drive to adopt aspects of Western technical and military modernity in the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895), which, in turn, saw (3) an educational revolution in the new institution of the "academy" (學堂) that, not only sat outside the institutional bounds of the imperial examination system, it entailed an entirely different mechanism based on knowledge production and "cultivating" human talent, rather than merely "selecting" it from society.

I've shown in the three sections of this chapter, that both the state's formalized mechanism for selecting military officers, the examination system, but also the informal or exceptional modes of local militarization, employed by Zeng Guofan and others to counter the Taiping threat, sought desperately to attain "see" or make legible within populations the human quality they saw as essential for military efficacy, the "spirit" (精神)—a process I have called "technologies of the spirit." Contrary to the image that see's Zeng and his recruiting officers as insiders already embedded within the local communities they mobilized for war, I've shown that their reliance on these assistive technologies to make communities militarily legible in terms of "spirit," betrays a distinct social distance, even "blindness," that has not been considered previously. Ultimately, the imperial state's "technologies of spirit," whether formalized in institutions or informal methods of practice (sometimes recorded in manuals), where all based on a fundamental inability to *produce* or "cultivate" the very "spirit" they sought—for this the state, even Zeng, relied on society at large to perform.

After the Taiping wars, the same gentry-officials that had led local militarization for the battlefield turned to the Self-Strengthening Movement, building institutions like academies devoted to producing new knowledge in technical military fields as well as "cultivating talent" (培才), the human resources needed for strengthening the feeble Qing to withstand the impact of industrialized warfare on the global stage. Though many, like Knight Biggerstaff, have been puzzled by China's enthusiasm for building naval institutions onward from its first academy in 1866 and comparative disinterest in commensurate learning institutions for army officers, I've shown evidence that it was not until the technology of breech-loading rifles came to China in significant numbers that the stage was set for the Beiyang Military Academy. Admittedly, the evidence I've shown does not indicate that Li Hongzhang fully articulated something like the revolutionary tactical-operational regime of German "mission tactics" or "dispersed formations" (the way teacher Yao Xiguang certainly did in 1895), which I am saying was precipitated by breech-loading rifles in the Chinese case. But I've shown new evidence that Li Hongzhang saw breech-loading rifles as a new technology that was so powerful (and man-portable) that extra safeguards needed to be taken to ensure it did not bleed into society. This, as he tells Zhang Peilun a year before the Military Academy's founding, was a fundamental reason why the military examination system could not contain breech-loading rifles, for it relied on society to cultivate the requisite skills and talents, which given the "advanced weaponry" (利器) constituted a clear threat of social violence and state instability. It is admittedly unclear whether the sources from the Zhang family estate, that I present showing Li engaged in heated

debate over this new technology and the capacities of various institutional vehicles to channel it, show Li's full mind on the matter as he finally decide to move forward on a military academy . But it does show how reformers like Li and others were balancing the potential of new technologies to increase state power, on the one hand, with their social implications and their often anxious recognition that the *humans*, in all their complexity, were the ultimate "technology" they sought to master.

The final section demonstrated the significance that Classical studies took in the Beiyang Military Academy curriculum immediately after its founding. Though I have called this inclusion of Classics something revolutionary, even paralleling Clausewitz and Scharnhorst's move to add humanities course to the Berlin War Academy for the express purpose of cultivating agency in junior officers to operate effectively on the dispersed battlefield. An legitimate objection can be raised here that it seems evident that, rather than expressions of a new tactical-operational outlook, Court pressure on Li Hongzhang was a precipitating factor for inserting Classical studies into the curriculum, reinforced by Prince Chun's disclosure of the critiques and slanders of the school on precisely its lack of such study. In other words, whereas scholars like Peter Paret emphasize the progressive elements of the reforms Scharnhorst and Clausewitz initiated for Prussian military education, we seem to run into the very opposite: regressive, ultra-conservative pressures that seem to pit "sacred text" in irreconcilable opposition to "Western methods" of technical military modernity—just as Yan Fu posited in 1895. I address these objections in two ways. First, we cannot assume either a clean development of the European cases we consider, like that of Clausewitz's reforms: for they too were subject to contingencies and contradictions, setbacks and negotiations, and the entire host of messy, non-linear trajectories of history. Second, neither should we assume clean development or reception in China of these "lessons" or technologies derived from European cases and intermediaries. Third, whatever certain actors thought at the moment about the new developments they were part of initiating (and I am interested in what they thought), once new institutions, technologies, and practices were instituted, developments had the capacity of taking on new meanings and trajectories than what was originally intended or imagined.

Thus, while the Military Academy model was indeed a European transplant, as was tactical-operational orientation of "mission tactics" and the technology of the breech-loading rifle, this chapter has shown precisely that the Chinese context that these things entered were undergoing their own transformations that must be considered "on their own terms," as it has been said. I have roughly traced three of these transformations in the socio-political, technological, and educational landscape in China, let us also remember that more broad social-construct of the "text-*techne* divide" that I began the chapter with. Though this divide was a moving and changing construct, it created massive social cleavage between those privileged from birth to receive Classical education, along with the doors such education opened in society and state, and was also maintained in structural form through the separated dual tracks of the civil and military examinations. As I have shown here with new research, in this context, it was incredibly progressive for the state to provide Classical education to Military Academy students, like those I've detailed above. Whether or not Li Hongzhang or Prince Chun intended all of these outcomes, they had immediate impact, as displayed with unprecedented historical clarity in new sources like Teacher Yao's diary. Moreover, the novel fusion of Classical education to training for the imperatives of state-organized violence in an age of industrialized warfare would only grow in importance, as we will see in the next chapter, and into the later Republican and Communist eras of "ideology and organization."

Chapter 3:
Slouching Towards Revolution?

Introduction: The Military Academy as a Late Qing *Problem*

This chapter covers the Qing dynasty's expansion of its military academy system, which had begun in 1885, to become empire-wide through the 1900-1911 decade, while focusing on a new and cornerstone element of military curricula called Spirit Education (精神教育). Before focusing on the specific problems that this institutional expansion posed for the Qing (and poses for us historiographically), let us briefly review.

The previous chapters have explored the recovered diary fragment of Yao Xiguang , who had taught at the Beiyang Military Academy in the 1880s and, after seeing action in the First Sino-Japanese War, in 1896 was recruited by Zhang Zhidong to help found the Hubei Military Academy based on the Beiyang model. There we saw clearly articulated, and supported by outside material, that the Beiyang Military Academy taught something called "drill for dispersed formations" (操散隊). This tactical and operational orientation, carried to China through German military instructors and by the imperative of the new breech-loading rifles, forced greater dispersion between units and even individual soldiers and required a decentralized, bottom-heavy command system based on junior-officer initiative. Chapter 1 also demonstrated Chinese forces applying "dispersed formations" in combat during the first land battle of the First Sino-Japanese War. In Chapter 2, we went back to the 1885 founding of China's first military academy in Beiyang, tracing its similarities to the Clausewitzian military education revolution at the Berlin War Academy. Responding to the imperatives of the decentralizing forces of the new battlefield, which required more independent agency and decision-making in battle, this model expanded junior officer education by going beyond the technical to include a rigorous humanities curriculum like those in civilian universities. There I showed for the first time that, while China borrowed the technical and tactical-operational knowledge, it was this humanities element of knowledge that could not be translated from German. Nor was this required, for the Beiyang Military Academy borrowed from the rich curriculum of China's civil examinations, providing its military officers with Classical education for the first time in history through degree-holding "Chinese Instructors" (漢教習), like Yao Xiguang.

I have argued that this fusion of technical military training and Classical education was extremely important, and Yao's 1896 diary fragment shows him meeting with former Beiyang Military students years after their graduation, discussing in-class essays Yao graded, reveling in the "Classical Chinese" (古文) skills one former orphan had acquired at the military academy, and over all speaking of the "close emotional bond" (情頗依依) of the "student-teacher friendship" (師弟之誼) Teacher Yao continued to enjoy with them.[1] At the end of Chapter 2, I claimed that all this experience gave Teacher Yao a pedagogical optimism in the historically new form of education he had helped pioneer in China during the 1880s. Thus, on October 22, 1896, when Yao records looking out on the unexpected influx of 2,000 prospective students that had arrived for the entrance exams of Hubei Military Academy's first class (though Yao wrote to himself that he could not be sure whether

[1] 姚錫光,《姚錫光日記》: entry for June 18, 1896, p. 116; entry for January 30, p. 55:「可见其诚笃好学为不可及。 杨生，少孤贫，而天性忠厚朴实，迥出侪辈，为武备学生中高材生。现通算术、精测绘、能 古文辞；而于德国操法、枪法均谙练，通德国语言文字，且粗习铁路工程，今年方二十五岁，其成就颇有可望 。 余为勤勉者久之。」

patriotism or the school stipend had attracted them), it was this pedagogical optimism that caused him to trade hypothetical inquiries into their hearts and minds for the practicalities of acquiring the extra blackboards, writing utensils, notebooks, and other tried and tested instruments that would reach to his new students' core.

This chapter is very much about the expansion of this mode of military education in which Yao placed so much optimism. When Yao's surviving diary fragment ends shortly after that opening day in 1896, the Qing Empire had just achieved three military academies: in Beiyang (Tianjin/Baoding), Hubei (Wuchang), and Jiangnan (Nanjing). By 1906 there were thirty-five academies, and by 1908 the total estimated officer graduates per year doubled from 3,500 to 7,000, not to mention layers of military primary and secondary schools that fed into those regular officer schools.[2] But with this proliferation also came problems.

Ironically, it was students from that very first Hubei Military Academy class that Yao gazed upon that would be central to the first major incident where former students used the military training they received by the Qing state to organize against the state. On September 1, 1900 the *Shenbao* newspaper provided new details on an emerging of an uprising in Hankou that had been foiled in its nascent stages the week prior. It reported that "amongst those arrested from the rebel faction (逆黨) are many from the [military] academy, including one named Fu Cixiang 傅慈祥, who had graduated from the Military Academy of Hubei Province."[3] Upon graduating, *Shenbao* noted, Fu Cixiang had been selected and sent for study in Japan, the report continued, but had "returned on his own" (私行) to Hubei as a conspirator in the plot. Though Fu Cixiang is the only name of the Hubei Military Academy students that *Shenbao* knew of, it was correct that more were involved. Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞 (1880-1911) entered the academy's first class alongside Fu Cixiang in 1896 and had also been selected with Fu for further military study in Japan before returning with him in secret for the Hankou plot. After the plot was broken up, Wu Luzhen had managed to escape back to Japan undetected. Meanwhile, Fu Cixiang and thirty other co-conspirators were executed within 48 hours of their apprehension.

News of the execution of Student Fu would have been quite troubling at the time, and indeed, the story is in many ways indicative of the problems the Qing would face with increasing intensity throughout this turbulent decade of reform and revolution. The increasing exchange to and from Japan at this time, as *Shenbao* mentioned above, also exemplifies a new dimension to the contradictory pulls of the day. Both Fu Cixiang and Wu Luzhen had been selected upon graduation to continue their military studies. In another layer of irony, Yao Xiguang was also dispatched to Japan at this very time, returning in 1899 to give Zhang Zhidong a full report on Meiji military education institutions.[4] Fu Cixiang and Wu Luzhen, however, seem to have both met Sun Yat-sen there and, it is said, they both joined his revolutionary Revive China Society (興中會) before returning secretively to China to conduct the Hankou uprising in August 1900. Despite the pedagogical optimism that I attributed to Yao Xiguang, it would seem that forces outside his control as a teacher, and beyond the capacity of both the Hubei Military Academy and the Qing state itself, were set in inexorable motion. Indeed, the admittedly small case of Students Fu and Wu and the

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[2] Anita O'Brien, "Military Academies in China, 1885-1915," in Joshua Fogel and William T. Rowe, eds., *Perspectives On A Changing China: Essays In Honor Of Professor C. Martin Wilbur*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 180.

[3] 〈鄂中誅亂記五〉,《申报》,1900 年 09 月 01 日　第 1 版 第 9834 期:「茲又得武昌友人來函云此次所獲逆黨多係學堂中人內有傅慈祥一名係鄂省武備學堂卒業生夙為提調徐□生觀察所賞識派往東瀛肄業不知何時私行回鄂自蹈刑章。」

[4] 姚錫光撰,《東瀛學校舉概》(1899), (杭州市 : 杭州大学出版社, 1999). Yao's report captures the three-tiered system of military primary and secondary schools that fed into regular, operational service academies for officers. The Qing would soon begin adopting the three-tiered model as well.

1900 Hankou uprising seem indicative of the entire decade to come, a phenomenon scholars of this period often call the "boomerang effect," meaning that the very reforms the Qing state enacted by necessity often unleashed the very countervailing and contradictory forces that would overwhelm it in revolution by 1911.

But this "boomerang effect" can be read in one of two ways. One way is like a Sophoclean tragedy where Confucian China's 2,000 year-old Imperial system heads towards its "Modern Fate" as an unavoidable *telos*. But another reading emphasizes some of the paradoxes and continuities, despite the demise of the House of Qing in 1911. As some historians have noted, unlike all other "dynastic cycles" in previous Chinese history, where a ruling house's governing capacity drastically declined before its fall, the Qing stands alone in that it was objectively increasing state capacities, especially in the decade preceding its end.[5] This introduction asserts that, while the historiography of the Chinese military academy been largely confined to the parameters of the former teleological reading, it still needs to be brought squarely in the latter mode that recognizes the paradox of increased state capacity, on the one hand, and the long persistence of Confucian Classical traditions and the Imperial political order well after the dynasty's end, on the other.

The 1900 Hankou plot was vastly more complex than just another step towards the *telos* of Revolution. In fact, Sun Yat-sen's organization was not the only contact with subversive elements that Student Fu and Wu had made during their sojourn in Japan. The Hankou plot's leader, a scholar-official named Tang Caichang 唐才長 (1867-1900), was actually supported by the exiled reformers, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and their Protect the Emperor Society (保皇會). In preparation for the uprising, the conspirators had drafted a proclamation that, while castigating the "Manchu Government" in general as unfit to rule, presented their central goal "to reinstate H. M. Kuang Hsü as emperor, and to construct a constitutional Empire…. [and thereby] to secure the people civil freedom and constitutional liberty."[6] While this type of militarily-backed uprising animated by aspirations for freedom and liberty was certainly revolutionary in a real sense, this was hardly the type of anti-dynastic, republican Revolution that Sun Yat-sen and his organization were committed to. Thus, in the first instance that we have of military academy students organizing against the Qing regime in power, we also find them tangled in monarchical goals. This deserves further unpacking before examining military academy historiography.

The direct tie between the plot involving Students Fu and Wu and the original 1898 Reform movement of Kang and Liang has broad importance. As Peter Zarrow says, "for the reformers 'political modernity' did include the institution of the monarchy."[7] By drawing upon both New Text Confucianism and "the Chinese notion of kingship [which] represented *a lever for change*,"[8] Kang and Liang had constructed a moral and cultural basis for legitimate compatibility with Western practices involved with the "the nation-state, mass citizenship, a constitutional monarchy and representative government (local self-government and national parliaments), and commercial development."[9] Thus, understanding the Hankou plot of 1900 as an attempt to reassert those reform ideas and policies through military intervention not only fits the call by Zarrow and others to "discard the narrow

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[5] For example, see Stephen MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-Kai in Beijing and Tianhun*, 1901-1908, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 223-224.

[6] See the〈自立會對外宣言〉drafted on August 24, 1900 in 杜迈之, 刘泱泱, 李龙如编,《自立会史料》, (长沙市 : 岳麓书社, 2009), pp. 388-390. This draft is in English in order to promulgate through the foreign concessions at Hankou who would immediately be wary of their own safety in the event of any uprising. The draft also ensured them that foreign property and persons would be protected.

[7] Rebecca E. Karl & Peter Zarrow, eds., *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 20.

[8] *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period*, p. 45.

[9] *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period*, p. 20.

'eventness' of 1898" (that is, to see it as a process rather than merely a definitive failure of or missed chance for this type of Chinese modernity). It also challenges our categories of "reformers" and "revolutionaries" having fundamentally different orientations toward the use of violence to further their idea.

After 1900, though debates intensified between Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao, it is important that *both* revolutionary and reform parties backed violent military action to achieve their political goals. Also at this time, though virtually unknown by historians today, Kang Youwei began establishing so-called "Western Military Academies" (干城學堂) abroad, with sites around Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other parts of the United States, which trained and drill overseas Chinese to form a so-called "Chinese Imperial Army" (C.I.A.) that would restore the Guangxu Emperor by force.[10] Though Zarrow has justifiably noted that "no notion of imperial charisma could survive 1898," Kang's military academies mimicked the Meiji practice of emblazoning the image of the Guangxu Emperor on their paraphernalia, a tangible reminder of the unifying symbols and mobilizing energies that the post-1898 Qing regime could not tap into, so long as their Son of Heaven remained in house arrest.[11]

The repression of Kang and Liang's reforms in 1898 and the continued confinement of the Guangxu Emperor did mean that the Qing emperor system followed, by necessity, a depersonalized model of monarchy in practice. However, the willingness of monarchist reformers to use violence reinforces Zarrow's important "rethinking" of this pivotal 1898 period, particularly in cautioning us that

> the very judgement-laden binary structure of reform versus revolution… is now clearly impossible to maintain, [along with] the other dichotomies customarily used to encapsulate either the period or its primary actors and ethos, such as "conservative" versus "reformer," "traditional" versus "modern," "essence" versus "function," "Chinese" versus "Western" (or "Japanese"), and so on.[12]

Moreover, the problematization of these categories does not just apply to the few years immediately following 1898; it also applies up through 1911, despite the intensification and expansion of real revolutionary sentiment. Take, for instance, Student Fu's classmate and partner in the 1900 Hankou plot, Wu Luzhen. Wu Luzhen had soon returned to China and, with his secret dealings unknown to authorities, he took command of Qing army troops to begin a decade of rising the ranks to become a general, all the while maintaining involvement in subversive activities. Though Sun Yat-sen would later claim Wu Luzhen as a revolutionary after his own heart, Wu's record remains ambiguous with regard to revolution, shrouded in part because he was assassinated in late November 1911. But we know that Wu Luzhen in 1911 was also plotting with Liang Qichao for constitutional monarchy, and even held secret talks with the Manchu Prince Zaitao 載濤 (1887-1970), all complicating Sun's claim. Moreover, as Ernest Young points out, the most convincing example that Wu Luzhen was a true revolutionary comes in the month following the October Wuchang Revolution, when he disobeyed orders, and supported rather than suppressed a mutiny in Lanzhou. But even in this, Wu Luzhen never called for the end of the dynasty and, moreover, he seems to have been aligned with other military commanders of the moment, like Lan Tianwei (also a Hubei Military Academy

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[10] For the best treatment of these Chinese military academies in the U.S., see Lawrence M. Kaplan, *Homer Lea: American Soldier of Fortune*, (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010).

[11] For a Foucauldian reading of the omnipresent image of the Meiji emperor as all-seeing over Japan's citizen-subjects, see Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

[12] Zarrow, et. al., 9-10.

graduate of a later class), who used their military authority to call for constitutional monarchy, much like Liang Qichao. In fact, Wu Luzhen's "true" allegiances have been an enigma for virtually every historian who deals with him.[13] Echoing Zarrow on 1898, Young says of 1911, "we must not be trapped by any verbal system of antonyms, in which he [one] is either reactionary or radical, conservative or liberal, reformer or revolutionary."[14] Young adds that, for historians, "the two groups seem to have inhabited different universes, and it would be incredible that they could share aims and programs or engage in similar sorts of political action."[15] This chapter merges the two "universes" of reforms strengthening the Qing, on the one hand, and organized violence, on the other.

By problematizing our categories of reform and revolution, particularly in practices like education meant to perpetuate organized violence, and extending our view of the possibility of a Chinese polity that could be modern as well as Confucian and Imperial, this chapter revives a nascent but ultimately abortive scholarly inquiry into the course content of imperial Chinese military academies during this tumultuous decade. And, while short-lived institutions like Kang Youwei's boutique military academies in the United States for restoring the Guangxu Emperor provide avenues for virtually unexplored research in the future, this chapter address serious gaps in our understandings of the imperial military academies that remained in the Chinese Empire at this pivotal time.

Readers of this chapter may be surprised that there is not even a historical consensus that late Qing military academy education was historically significant. For instance, Ralph Powell's 1955 work, which remains highly influential, notes that military academy students were often "*surreptitiously* taught Western political ideas" and that "inevitably this type of training bred discontent with the old order."[16] This is in line with Yoshihiro Hatano, writing in 1968 that Qing troops "responded readily to revolutionary propaganda and sympathized with the developing nationalism of enlightened literati, rich merchants, and modern intellectuals."[17] Both Powell and Hatano, with slightly different emphases, conceive of the late Qing military academy as virtually empty vessels waiting to be filled with irrepressible subversive and revolutionary ideas from the outside.[18] While education occurred within military academy walls, it is assumed, its content was largely irrelevant to other developments occurring in and originating from other sectors of the Empire.

And yet, two important works published in 1980, by Edmund Fung and Stephen MacKinnon, separately presented new theses that posited Qing military academy education as productive and meaningful.[19] However, as we will see, their respective arguments generated little

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[13] As Ernest Young (p. 254) writes, "Until some means for a more intimate glimpse into Wu's attitude at this time is discovered, it is best to assume that Wu, like many others at this juncture, was neither fixed in his aims, nor certain of the proper means to effect them." With equal ambiguity, Wu Luzhen appears throughout Edmund Fung's *Military Dimension of the 1911 Revolution* (see index for over a dozen references) and Edward McCord's *Power of the Gun*, pp. 57-58.

[14] Ernest P. Young, "The Reformer as Conspirator: Liang Ch'i-chao and the 1911 Revolution," in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey, Mary C. Wright, eds., *Approaches to Modern Chinese History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 240.

[15] Ernest P. Young, "The Reformer as Conspirator: Liang Ch'i-chao and the 1911 Revolution," in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey, Mary C. Wright, eds., *Approaches to Modern Chinese History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 254.

[16] Ralph Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 160. Emphasis added.

[17] Yoshihiro Hatano, "The New Armies," in *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913*, ed. Mary Clabaugh Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 382.

[18] Powell talks directly of "Western political ideas," while Hatano mentions the Chinese conduits by which they came.

[19] Stephen MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-Kai in Beijing and Tianhun, 1901-1908*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) and Edmund Fung, *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1980).

scholarly interest in the subject; the idea of Qing military education as actually relevant amidst an age of revolution proved fleeting, leaving the ground they broke preliminary and impressionistic. Because this chapter seeks to revive, revise, and reapply the foundation they laid, let us discuss Fung and MacKinnon's points here.

Both Fung and MacKinnon argued that military academy education needed to be seen as productive. In his chapter devoted to military education, Fung states that "By 1911 there had emerged, in a professional sense, a *new* class of young, modem-educated scholar-officers, a good many of whom were from good socio-economic backgrounds and held a traditional degree."[20] Fung, while never going into great detail on course content, notes that students read "books on the geography and history of foreign nations, on the expansionism of the imperialist powers and their encroachments on weak countries, including China," in addition to practicing both the technological skills and military drill used by the powers of imperialism.[21] In this way, military academy education made the student "more informed of what was going on in the outside world as well as in China," which "proved important in changing the outlook of the soldier" and "could hardly fail to instill a sense of patriotism."[22] Thus we have with Fung an outline, faint as it may be, connecting military academy education to historical significance: for these educational experiences "constituted a *new* military elite," which, in turn, "represented a new political force in China and quickly assumed an importance out of all proportion to their numbers."[23]

Likewise, MacKinnon's study, which focused on the Beiyang army of this period, says that because of military education "the Beiyang officer was a *new* breed of Chinese military man."[24] MacKinnon adds: "Typically he was from the literate classes and thus unusually well-educated for a soldier. Many, like Feng Guozhang and Wu Peifu, could boast a solid classical education. But *more* important were their professional qualifications."[25] These professional qualifications were acquired from military academies (what he calls the "promise of military schooling") and they constituted the main criteria for advancement over previous Classical education or personal connections.[26] Indeed, this educational and professional aspect is a core component of MacKinnon's broader argument against what he calls the "prevailing view that the Beiyang Army originated as a regionally-based, private army of Yuan Shi-kai [and thus] grouped with the Huai and Xiang Armies of the mid-nineteenth century as precursors of the warlord armies of the 1920s."[27] In addition to showing that Beijing held substantial financial and administrative control over the Beiyang Army, MacKinnon presents evidence that the "the personal loyalties of the Beiyang officers to Yuan varied a great deal *because* of Yuan's emphasis on education and professional military training in the recruiting of officers."[28] Thus, MacKinnon concludes that officer loyalty to Yuan was "tenuous," "more professional and political than strictly personal—and thus were subject to change."[29] Similar to Fung, MacKinnon's military academies, though not described in much detail, were key in producing this new professionalism that, in turn, formed both the new "breed" of officer and a new military organization in Beiyang that, he explicitly says, should be seen as a "national" and not a personal army. To be sure, these two scholars had different emphases, Fung's on producing "patriotism" and

[20] Fung, 76. Emphasis added.
[21] Fung, p. 77.
[22] Fung, p. 77.
[23] Fung, p. 85-86.
[24] MacKinnon, p. 120.
[25] MacKinnon, p. 120. Emphasis added.
[26] MacKinnon, p. 117.
[27] MacKinnon, p. 91.
[28] MacKinnon, p. 136. Emphasis added.
[29] MacKinnon, pp. 91, 129.

MacKinnon's on a depersonalized "professionalism;" but both saw late Qing military education as important in generating new forces and social entities.

And yet, despite the wide influence left by Fung's and MacKinnon's 1980 books in other areas, the important theses they advanced positing the late Qing military academy as historically productive failed to generate much scholarly inquiry. The reason for this in part, I submit, was that Fung and MacKinnon's respective formulations of this proposition also laid the seeds for undermining it as well. For instance, though MacKinnon argues forcefully that the Beiyang Army should be understood not as a personal or regional army because of the emphasis on depersonalized "professionalism" that left loyalties "subject to change," there is a contradiction in his final verdict that Beiyang must be understood as explicitly as a "national" army.[30] But a "national" army implies more than professional military skills and a financing from a political center, it also implies affective bonds similar to those Anderson posits in his imagined community. As mentioned in previous chapters, historians like Wang Jiajian had long identified precisely this contradiction, arguing that it precisely the Beiyang Army's sole emphasis on technical skills and, importantly for our study, its total neglect of "spirit training" (精神訓練) that made it the seedbed for personalistic warlord armies with clan-based, non-national mentalities.[31] This chapter will demonstrate with new sources that, contrary to MacKinnon and Wang Jiajian, Beiyang's Baoding Military Academy was a central powerhouse for producing Spirit Education curriculum that influenced the entire Empire and that this education performed functions not considered by either scholar.

In contrast to MacKinnon, Fung's differing emphasis on "patriotism" does share some affinity to the imagined community; but he too seems to have laid the groundwork for this productive aspect of late Qing military education to be considered irrelevant by subsequent scholars. In emphasizing the educated backgrounds of military academy students of this decade, Fung also posited that this "new military elite… [was] in terms of social origin… an extension of the lower gentry class."[32] Edward McCord, in arguably the most important work to date on warlordism, cites Fung's "extension" of the gentry class comment when arguing that, in terms of broader social science theories understand military education as an inherently politicizing process in itself, the "Chinese case" does not apply. Because of their gentry origins, McCord says that "the politicization of many military students *preceded* their enrollment in military schools."[33] He concludes: "The politicization of military students thus had *less to do with their military studies* than with the conditions responsible for the general politicization of China's modern educated students."[34] McCord's conclusion, vis-à-vis Fung's gentry extension comment, returns us to earlier assertions (Powell and Hatano) that the real driving influences of the day were coming into the military academy from gentry intellectuals producing ideas outside the academy, or by gentry sons entering it. With a certain irony, whereas Fung and MacKinnon had highlighted the productive importance of *both* the gentry background of students *and* the content of their new military education, McCord cites the former as a negation of the latter's significance. Either way, the current understanding posits nothing significantly productive coming out of military education itself, for the content was either derivative or irrelevant.[35]

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[30] MacKinnon, p. 214.

[31] See Wang Jiajian 王家儉, "北洋武備學堂的創設及其影響" [The Creation of the Beiyang Military Academy and its Significance] in *Qingshi yanjiu lunsou* 清史研究論藪 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1994), 387.

[32] Fung, 76.

[33] McCord, 56.

[34] Edward McCord, *Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 56.

[35] It must be noted here that Nicolas Schillinger has made significant contributions in what I consider the best-sourced book of late Qing military to date, offering compelling analysis of Foucauldian bio-power and gender identity in the

Left unanswered today, then, remain fundamental questions of precisely how late Qing military education produced agents for state-organized violence, how these agents were taught to relate to the state, to the polity, and to each other, and how this education influenced subsequent Chinese states after the Qing was no more.

This chapter explores a now little-known but cornerstone component of Qing military academy curricula during this decade, called Spirit Education 精神教育. I argue that Spirit Education laid critical foundations in three key areas. First, it conjured an imagined community bounded territorially to the Great Qing Empire. Second, it cultivated a specific form of modern warfare that emphasized multiple actors exercising "freedom" (自由) in concert on the battlefield. Third, Spirit Education introduced specific social practices, primarily but not limited to practices through education, of turning military units into "real," face-to-face communities with affective ties both between soldiers of various ranks, for the primary purpose of successfully operating with "freedom" on the battlefield. In demonstrating this, we will see that Spirit Education extended and deepened developments already underway in China, that is, within its unique institution of the military academy since 1885. Key innovations in its three areas would carry over from this last imperial decade directly into the Republican era, especially to the Whampoa Military Academy founded in 1924 by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, where a Spirit Education by the same name remained a pillar, though its imperial roots were scrubbed and largely forgotten.

To do this, I bring together a body of sources that have not yet been part of the scholarly discussion, particularly from main three areas. The first is from China's first professional military education journal, called *Military Magazine* (武備雜誌), published 1904-1906 out of Baoding Military Academy.[36] The second set are the writings and lectures of Luo Changqi 羅長祺 (1864-1911), a *jinshi* of the 1894 class (ranked 24th ahead of Kang Youwei at 46), who became director of Jiangnan Army Academy (江南陸師學堂) during a turbulent tenure from 1904-1905.[37]

military context: Nicolas Schillinger, *The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China*, (Lexington Books, 2016). Still, Schillinger's focus on bio-power and gender understandably eschews some of the broader narratives of the period, like reform and revolution. My focus, particularly is in this chapter, is different, looking primarily at the "spirit" rather than the body, along with the "spirit's" role in social organization for actual combat on battlefields where the fate of Empire, along with the competing republics that vied to replace it, would be decided.

[36] Only 17 extant issues remain and are housed in Peking University special collections but have not yet been digitized. These issues were finally published in《辛亥革命時期期刊匯編》, (北京 : 首都师范大学出版社, 2011), volumes 19-23.

[37] Luo's writings from his tenure as academy director are found in 羅長祺著, 《江南陸師學堂學案 》(1904-1905), (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, undated).



Figure 10: Luo Changqi 羅長祺, 1894 jinshi and director of Jiangnan Army Academy 1904-1905. Killed while serving a post in Tibet in the wake of the 1911 Revolution.[38]

A third set comes from the Spirt Education curriculum of Guangdong Officer Academy (廣東將弁學堂).[39] These rich sources have yet to be tapped and, put together, they give us unprecedented insight into the Spirit Education that became a central pillar in military academies across the Empire throughout this decade and beyond.

Military Magazine: Defining the Spirit, and Spreading it

Here we begin exploring what the "spirit" in Spirit Education meant, and a new way by which these meanings were produced and disseminated. Contrary to the widely held belief that the Beiyang Army willfully ignored "spirit training," the Baoding Military Academy was a central site of producing knowledge and practices about the military "spirit." One major way we know this is through *Military Magazine* 《武備雜誌》, China's first professional military journal, published from 1904-1906 by Baoding's Military Research Center (武備研究所), which was staffed by Baoding Military Academy instructors and led by the Academy's director, Feng Guozhang 馮國璋 (1859-1919). Thus, this journal and its Research Center were components of Baoding Military Academy. Due to limited accessibility to *Military Magazine*'s extant copies housed in Peking University's special collections, it has not been used in even some of the best sourced scholarship in recent years, despite its seminal importance.[40] It significance was not lost on contemporaries. Editors launching the *Nanyang Military Affairs Magazine* (南洋兵事雜誌) in 1906 attest that their explicit model is Beiyang's *Military Magazine*, which "spreads knowledge and rouses the spirit (發揚精神)….[and]

[38] Photo Source: 羅長祺撰, 《泣血輯存 四卷》, (上海 : 上海古籍出版社, 2010).

[39] (清)廣東將弁學堂編，《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》in 《廣州大典: 第三十七輯, 史部政書類 ; 第 27 冊》, (廣州 : 廣州出版社, 2015), vol. 332.

[40] The 17 extant copies in Peking University special collections have not yet been digitized and were only published in 2011 in a rather hard-to-obtain series: 《辛亥革命時期期刊匯編》, (北京 : 首都师范大学出版社, 2011), volumes 19-23 [Stanford has them, but I couldn't get them in Taiwan!]. Until this 2011 series, knowledge of *Military Magazine* was largely mediated by a 15-page article contained in the following: 丁守和主编, 《辛亥革命时期期刊介绍》, (北京: 人民出版社, 1982-1987), Volume 2, pp.

there's not a soldier in Beiyang not willing to purchase it and read."[41] Given that the Beiyang Army numbered roughly 60,000 men in six divisions, his claim carries some hyperbole. Still, when we look at *Military Magazine* itself, we find in one volume a list of 836 individual "sponsors" (贊助人), including Feng Guozhang, Duan Qirui, and Wang Shizhen (the "Three Worthies" of the original Beiyang Military); Xu Shichang 徐世昌, minister on the Imperial Military Training Department and member on the Grand Council; Yuan Keding 袁克定, son of Yuan Shikai; and Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞, already mentioned in the introduction above; plus hundreds of other names listed as regimental, battalion, company, and platoon-level commanders in various Beiyang Army units and staff at military education institutions. In sum, the influence of China's first professional military journal was both wide and deep in its day, but is virtually unknown by scholars today.

In terms of "spreading knowledge," *Military Magazine* brought together various fields of news, information, "research" (研究), and opinion tailored for the rising idea of the Chinese military professional, a place for whom it sought to carve out. It content was divided into sections: Imperial Edicts (諭牘), Editorials (論說), Study of Skills (學術), Narrative Accounts (敘事), Collected Updates (彙錄), and administrative-related Notifications (廣告). In this way, *Military Magazine* transmitted military-specific information from the central Court in a manner similar to the Peking Gazette (邸報),[42] but also from each of the Provinces and from around the world, particularly from the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which was unfolding at this time and particularly captured the editors' imaginations and energies.

More than transmitting knowledge, the publication presented itself as a knowledge producer. In the Notifications section, *Military Magazine* gives readers a list 102 titles of textbooks (教課書), divided into 15 military categories, printed by the Beiyang Military Research Institute and available for purchase and pickup at their office.[43] But, especially in its Editorials and Study of Skills sections, *Military Magazine* saw itself as producing knowledge through "research" (研究). This term had specific meaning in this context. In one article contributed by a Baoding "student" (學員) named Yang Jiantang 楊鑑堂, he wrote that, in the previous iterations of earlier Chinese military academies, teachers had only adhered to the syllabus "without engaging in the research (研究)… [that] sought to grasp how things worked."[44] They had only been concerned with absorbing and copying important knowledge from the West, whereas "research," Student Yang averred, meant "weeding out the old and bringing in the new, in order to be the cutting edge of positive progress."[45] Here we see *Military Magazine* contributors self-consciously asserting themselves as more than derivative transmitters in producing knowledge. We also see one of these many voices coming, in this case, from a "student," and, as we will see vividly, *Military Magazine* and the form of military education it forwarded was not merely compiling "research;" it was building community.

Whereas MacKinnon associated the importance of Beiyang military education with a professionalism based on knowledge of skill, *Military Magazine* offered "research" that produced

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[41] See《兩江督練公所兵事雜志章程》in Chen Jianhua 陳建華, Cao Chunliang 曹淳亮, eds.,《廣州大典》, 史部, (廣州 : 廣州出版社, 2015), vol. 332, p. 717.

[42] Emily Mokros, *The Peking Gazette in Late Imperial China: State News and Political Authority*, (University of Washington Press, 2021).

[43] 《武備雜誌》地 9 期, vol. 20, pp. 529-536.

[44] 學員楊鑑堂，〈論學生宜重研究〉，《武備雜誌》: Volume 20, 245-246.「今日之學生即異日師資將領設所學僅遵課程不務研究，僅知當然，不求其所以然...。」

[45] 學員楊鑑堂，〈論學生宜重研究〉，《武備雜誌》: Volume 20, 245-246.「推陳出新而為改良進步之嚆矢矣。」

knowledge of the "spirit," and it prided itself and the mode of professionalism on this fact. Importantly, one of *Military Magazine*'s the biggest producers of knowledge about the spirit, and how it should be educated, was a Japanese army major named, Taga Muneyuki 多賀宗之 (1872－1935), who wrote under the pen-name He Zhongliang 賀忠良 and is said to have attached a fake queue to his cap to avoid undue attention to his Japanese identity.[46] Major Taga was both a veteran of the First Sino-Japanese War and a product of the Meiji multi-tiered military education system, of which men like Yao Xiguang and also Feng Guozhang were some of the first Chinese military hands to bring back detailed knowledge in the last years of the 1890s.[47] Hired by Yuan Shikai as an advisor in 1902, Major Taga had become a chief instructor at Baoding by 1904 and one of the most prolific contributors to *Military Magazine*.

Within the pages of *Military Magazine*, a clear definition of the "spirit" took form. As Major Taga wrote:

> The combat power of a nation's army is neither measured in the number of its troops or the length of their training, nor in the refinement of its weaponry or in the physical strength of its soldiers—these can be measured, but [its real combat power] will still be unknown. *Of the utmost and greatest importance is an army's spirit* (精神). [48]

Similarly, Liao Yuchun 廖宇春, another major *Military Magazine* contributor who had studied in Japan before teaching at Baoding, addressed the victory over Russia by calling it "this tiny island country neighboring us to the east." Asking readers if the victory was because the Japanese outnumbered the Russians or had better weapons, Liao answers, "No… I can say this definitively: Japan beating Russia was no other [cause] than spirit (精神)."[49] In sum, "spirit" was defined not just as a *real* military factor, but as the ultimate factor, standing distinctly above other calculable material and physical factors.

As a military factor, the "spirit" governed human agency, and thus the army. "With no spirit," Major Taga contends, soldiers "are just sheep cloaked in tiger skins (羊質虎皮), or funerary statue figurines (芻靈木偶) and nothing more."[50] Likewise, Liao Yuchun wrote that Spirit Education was about giving soldiers "self-agency over their heart" (有自治之心), that is, a self-directed willingness to "offer sacrifice for the nation" (供犧牲於國家).[51] The topic of "obedience"

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[46] For easier identification, I will general refer to Major Taga's Japanese name, though his articles were under the Chinese name. Despite the Chinese pseudonym, his articles usually listed him as author alongside a Chinese "editor" (修), perhaps making it less difficult for readers to ascertain his non-Chinese identity.

[47] Major Taga had first studied at the military preparatory institution, called the Seijo Academy (成城学校), before entering the Army Youth Academy (陸軍幼年学校, Rikugun Yōnen Gakkō) and finally graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Officer Academy (陸軍士官学校, Rikugun Shikan Gakkō) in 1893. See 张磊，《孙中山辞典》，（广东人民出版社, 1994）, pp. 304-5.

[48] He Zhonglian 賀忠良著, Dong Hongzhao 董鸿照編,〈論精神教育〉,《武備雜誌》, 1904 年 [第 7 期] :「一國軍隊之戰力，鮮不以兵數之多寡，訓練之久暫，槍械之利頓，及軍人體力之強弱，計之而不知，尤以軍隊之精神為最重極要也。」

[49]〈論精神教育之基礎〉廖宇春 in《武備雜誌》 vol. 21, pp. 163-166.「反蹶於東鄰蕞爾之島國，謂日本軍之數多於俄乎？非也。謂日軍之器械精於俄，孟於俄乎？非也。然則，俄敗而日勝者，此何故歟？此何故歟？說者謂日軍勇於戰，而不畏死。顧日本何以能勇於戰不畏死乎？吾可以一言決之曰：日本戰勝於俄者，無他精神也。」

[50]〈論精神教育〉:「不有精神，則羊質虎皮，芻靈木偶而已甚矣。」

[51] 廖宇春，〈論精神教育之基礎〉，《武備雜誌》，1905 年 [第 13 期]. vol. 21, pp. 163-166.

(服從) also appeared in *Military Magazine*, but it was always described as self-actualizing, an execution of orders animated by internal "spirit."[52]

These contributors also forwarded the conviction that the "spirit" could and must be produced and reproduced, as the term Spirit Education indicated. Liao Yuchun wrote that "Spirit is the life of a military man; education is the method by which this life is cultivated…. But spirit is not produced by Nature (天然); it is generated by the grinding action of education."[53] By shifting emphasis on the notion of "spirit" from Nature to nurture, that is, to something socially reproducible, Liao Yuchun makes one of the clearest self-conscious articulations we have of the military academy fostering what I have termed a "*technology* of the spirit." This move is subtle but important. The original Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s-1870s can be characterized by a willingness not only to adopt new material and technological innovations, but to actively eschew anything that might taint the so-called immaterial and immaculate Chinese "essence." In contrast, the appropriation of the "spirit" by late Qing men like Liao constituted a way to advocate for deep and penetrating renovation, even of the individual's heart, while upholding a firmly moral and cultural ethic. This is why Liao can write that Westerners like Napoleon previously and the Japanese armies of his present day were each worthy of Chinese emulation in their grasp of the importance of "spirit" and then, in the same breath, quote the great Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (AD 1130-1200) offering a way to attain this: "The release of positive energy (陽氣) can penetrate both metal and stone; With the spirit (精神) present, nothing is impossible."[54] Whether called *qi* 氣 or *jingshen* 精神, Liao points to a long, native tradition of understanding the inherent power derived from the immaterial and spiritual realm, even as those hollowed understandings get reinvigorated by new manifestations of this power around the world. The "spirit" as a native tradition is explicitly taught elsewhere:

> What type of thing is this "spirit"? It is something that was not invented by Westerners as new field of study or new knowledge. It's actually our China's innate national essence (國粹) that has been around for thousands of years. And it's the sacred texts and the accounts of the sages (聖經、賢傳) that our students speak of…. all our teachers are fulling practiced in lecturing on these.[55]

Finally, the "spirit" was both moral power and moral yardstick. Often Spirit Education was synonymous with "moral education" (德育), as we see in the Guangdong Officer Academy's *Spirit Education Curriculum* (1909). There the instructor criticizes the Beiyang Military Academy (Baoding's immediate predecessor) as representative of the problem with military academies across the Empire: that is, only emphasizes "drill" (操法) and "physical education" (體育) while ignoring "knowledge about morality" (德行知識) and "moral education" (德育).[56] Conversely, Liao Yuchun back at his

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[52] For reasons described later, this is tied to German military academy understandings of discipline and obedience, on the one hand, and individual agency and self-actualization, on the other.

[53] 「蓋精神者，軍人之生命；教育者，以養成此生命之方法也…。 然精神非天然而成，由教育磨礪而生；」

[54] 《朱子語類: 學二》〈總論為學之方〉：「陽氣發處，金石亦透。精神一到，何事不成!」

[55] 保定陸軍幼年學堂總辦,〈武備精神教育大義〉,《武備雜誌》, 第 19 期, 1906.「此精神為何物乎？是物也，非西人所發明之新學問、新智識，乃吾中國千百年來所固有之國粹也。亦諸生平時所談聖經、賢傳…. 皆師所習講耳。」

[56] 《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》, p. 350, 351.

perch at Baoding observes: "Looking across China's [military] academies and army camps, they frequently advance education focused on the outward form (形式) while overlooking education of the spirit."[57] With each seem to be looking past the other, the contradictory accusations of *other* academies ignoring "spirit" or "moral education" is quite instructive for us. It means that spirit education was a moral yardstick for judgment, and though almost always used negatively, its use across the Empire tells us much about the "spirit" as a shared standard and ethic, even as schools wrestled with the process of defining it. Likewise, when eminent historians like Wang Jiajian (see chapter introduction) in the 1990s use the supposedly complete absence of "spirit training" in Beiyang military education as a moral yardstick, not only does this echo the same problematic accusations made ninety years earlier, it is important to understand that this wasn't true: Spirit Education was actually central.[58]

Restoring our understanding of Spirit Education as something central to these late Qing actors is not an easy task, and the difficulty lies not merely in paucity of sources like *Military Magazine*. There is an emotional embeddedness to our received conviction that the late Qing Empire lacked the spiritual resources to rise to the existential competition of industrial modernity. Lu Xun 魯迅 (1881-1936), one of the greatest writers of the twentieth century, left this image indelibly with his autobiographical anecdote of leaving medical school in Japan to become a full-time writer when he was struck that China needed not a doctor of the body, but of the "spirit."[59] I argue that teachers and instructors within these military academies represent, in a real sense, doctors of the "spirit," not only in their conviction that it was the ultimate moral power over and above physical and material factors, but a new conviction that they could, and indeed must, produce new knowledge and practices about it. This deserves further inquiry into their craft and, in the next section, we will see how the "spirit" bound imagined communities together and prompted violence on its behalf.

Imagined Imperial Community

This section demonstrates a key function, even a moral function, of Spirit Education in binding military academy students to an imagined imperial community. Sharp dichotomies between Qing and Republican eras continue to be drawn along this very fault line. Robert Culp says that Republican era textbooks, particularly maps, cultivated a new sense of "imagined community" that differed from former "Qing patterns of sovereignty as negotiated hierarchical relations between Qing rulers and a 'multitude of lords' rather than uniform territory."[60] He also writes, "These texts encouraged students to conceive of China as a nation of horizontally connected and sovereign citizens (*guomin* 國民) rather than as a collection of disparate peoples in random far-flung territories joined together under the Qing empire."[61] Meanwhile, MacKinnon posited, with some contradiction, a Beiyang Army that was, on the one hand, supposedly "national," and was, on the other, bounded

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[57] 〈論精神教育之基礎〉 廖宇春 in 《武備雜誌》 vol. 21, pp. 163-166. 「曠觀中國之學堂、軍營，往往走尚形式之教育而忽於精神之教育。」Liao juxtaposes technical and spirit knowledge, saying the "spirit" part of education could not be minimized, "along with the study of skills (學術), it must be implemented in kind, without placing undue emphasize on one over the other."

[58] See Wang Jiajian 王家儉, "北洋武備學堂的創設及其影響"[The Creation of the Beiyang Military Academy and its Significance] in *Qingshi yanjiu lunsou* 清史研究論藪 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1994), 387.

[59] See Lu Xun's Preface to *Call to Arms* (吶喊), 1922.

[60] Robert Culp, *Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern China, 1912–1940*, (Harvard, 2007), p. 73n51, paraphrasing James Hevia. This also corresponds with Pär Cassel's conception of Qing sovereignty.

[61] Culp, *Articulating Citizenship*, pp. 55-56.

by a technical and impersonal professionalism of changing loyalties. Investigating Spirit Education shows how the rising military professionalism explicitly sought to reach subjects of its teaching individually and emotionally with notions of belonging to a broader imagined community. This imagined community was, in one sense, homogeneous, horizontal, affective, and bounded within the borders of the Qing empire and, in another sense, was structured, differentiated, and disciplined. Thus imagined, the imperial community bestowed this rising profession of violence its moral legitimacy and, in turn, the protection bestowed by these armed professionals gave it a unique and valuable social function.

Let us first look at ways Spirit Education sought to form a homogeneous, horizontal, and affective identity in students. Recognizing that such sentiment was not entirely new, Liao Yuchun dutifully quotes some of the regular exhortations: Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (AD 989-1052) on "taking on oneself the responsibility of the whole Ream (天下)" and Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613-1682) on the lowly "commoner" (匹夫) shouldering the same. But Liao Yuchun does two noteworthy things: he makes it personal and incorporates newer concepts. He writes:

> I, Yuchun, say this: My life as a Chinese *person* (中國之人) is nothing other than being a Chinese *citizen* (中國之國民). I also say this: As a citizen, the relationship between [we as] a people and the county is extremely close. If separated, we have [multiple] peoples; if put together we have a country. As one New Studies scholar said, "The people are the particles (質點) of the nation,"…. Like piling dirt to make a mountain with united strength of every minute particle (微塵之愛力), so too with a nation and the massed multitude of its people: if everyone possesses national thought (國家思想), this nation will logically rise.[62]

Liao's self-identification as a citizen of this national-imperium, as one "particle" bound closely together with others through "thought," is an invitation for *Military Magazine* readers and classroom students to do the same.

Indeed, Spirit Educaiton was typified by the personal and emotive invitation to its audience to join the imaginarium built by the instructor's words. For instance, we find this in an otherwise dry and technical training manual for entry level officers in 1909, so dry, perhaps, that Feng Guozhang adds a preface instructing readers to pay their attention to the author's Spirit Education chapter.[63] There Jin Yongyan 金永炎[64] (b. 1880) presents a feverish litany of ever-constricting threats from the imperialist powers, with the "invigoration of the people's spirit" as the only answer. "If no one rises out of this with a will to fight," Jin says, "we will sink down underneath an ocean of pain, and in an instant we will become slaves, like oxen or horses…." He continues:

> We people cannot live out their lives in quiet indulgence and dissipation [sheltering] in our heated room atop a multi-storied house. Moreover, when a man enters this world, we spend

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[62] 廖宇春,〈論軍人當知有直接保國之義務〉,《武備雜誌》. I believe Yan Fu may be the unnamed "New Studies scholar" (新學家) Liao references here. Though I cannot find a direct citation, Yan Fu does use both the term 質點 and 愛力 in the following essay: 严复 《有如三保》:「以智侵愚, 以强暴弱, 民爲質點, 愛力全無, 所謂自侮而後人侮, 自伐而後人伐。」References cite this passage for defining the term 愛力 as "the power of solidarity/unity" (團結力).

[63] 金永炎,《初級指揮官勤務教科書》 (1909).

[64] Jin Yongyan 金永炎 graduated from the 日本陸軍士官學校 during the Qing and, by 1912, he becomes Director of the Nanjing Infantry Officer Academy 陸軍軍官學校.

> only a short time as men, but a long time as ghosts. Given this, how can we bury our heads under the window, breathing feebly as we wait for our end, and die without making a name for ourselves? Wouldn't it be better to risk it all on the battlefield, amidst shot and shell falling like rain, killing the enemy for our country (為國殺敵) ? The life I live is as a Chinese person, after death I will be a Chinese ghost. In the boom and the blaze I'm found worthy of the man I was born into this world to be. In this, what I set my gaze upon are my four-hundred million compatriots (同胞, lit. blood relations) and who are themselves conscious (自省) that they are older and younger brothers to me, as in one family. Military men must absolutely be cognizant of this.[65]

Like Liao's identification of his own life as that of a "Chinese citizen," Jin puts his life into the form of an immortal "Chinese ghost" (中國鬼) who is linked by "self-consciousness" (自省) to a close family of "four hundred million" relations both spatially and eternally. This is what Anderson calls a terminal community, for whom individuals would sacrifice their own lives and fight for. Certainly, Jin's image of complacency in the "heated room atop a multi-storied house" (煖閣重樓) cannot match the literary prowess of Lu Xun's famous "iron house" (鐵屋) in *A Call to Arms*. Still, even in this dry training manual, Jin's tone is desperate, the stakes are existential, and his call is to action: "…today we hear people say 'love our country' (愛國), and tomorrow they say 'protect our race(s)' (保種). But it is so clear that the best way [to do this] is none other than to pick up arms in defense of the sacred altars of our land and to die fighting on a distant field."[66]

Spirit Education could also take visual form to make these personal and emotive connections. For example, one surviving transcript of a Spirit Education lecture from Guangdong Officers Academy begins to telling students to look at a world map, presumably on the wall or in their textbooks, before the instructor embarks on a guided global tour.[67] Moving across the map, the instructor stops periodically, for instance on India, Turkey, Togo, and other countries, discussing their colonization and other lessons linking national fate to a people's "spirit." He describes Korea, Vietnam, and Burma as "small countries that used to be controlled by China," only recently to have fallen prey to imperial powers. "Not only have we completely lost our dependent countries," he continues, "but parts of our provinces as well," including Taiwan, parts of the Three Eastern Provinces, and many port cities and trade arteries of China occupied by foreign powers. Similarly, the instructor discusses railroads traversing China and tells students that "the day the rail lines in the Provinces are completed, the day of China's tribulation is at hand."[68]

As we should be accustomed to by now, this Spirit Education by visual tour would not be complete without personal and emotive engagement. Thus, the instructor pauses geographic movement, to say this: "You are Chinese army officers. Look at this map: is your heart well or not well? Are you enraged or not? Later, if you don't want to sleep soundly or if you don't want to concentrate on studying, just take this map out and look at it…."[69] Likewise, before moving to the next continent, he ends his tour of Asia with the Russian seizure of the Qing Imperial tombs in Manchuria, asking, "how can we not be so terribly ashamed? Those serving as army officers and

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[65] 金永炎,《初級指揮官勤務教科書》 (1909).
[66] 金永炎,《初級指揮官勤務教科書》 (1909).
[67] (清)廣東將弁學堂編，《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》in 《廣州大典: 第三十七輯, 史部政書類 ; 第 27 冊》, (廣州 : 廣州出版社, 2015), vol. 332, pp. 355-398.
[68] 《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》, (廣州 : 廣州出版社, 2015), vol. 332, p. 393.
[69] 《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》, p. 363.

soldiers, how can it not be better to take a knife and commit suicide? This ends our Asia outline section."[70] This is quite a topical transition. But in this way, the instructor's goal is to reach student "spirits" by placing the Empire in relation to the world, but with particular attention to delineating the boundaries (including the perceived transgressions of those boundaries) of the Chinese people and their shared imperium.[71]

Having looked at this consistent trend of Spirit Education conjuring a shared imperial community in the hearts and minds of Chinese military students, even Japanese Major Taga participates. In *Military Magazine* he calls for "organizing one billion compatriots (同胞) into an army and turn them into crack troops, this rests on the invisible (無形) suasion of educating [army] leaders."[72] Whether or not readers knew Major Taga's real identity behind the Chinese pseudonym, he shares with others a common conviction in the constructive power of the "spirit" to build community across social distance.[73] Still, it is admittedly unclear how the imagined community was received by the hearts and minds of students themselves. Even so, we can no longer continue to posit absolute breaks between Qing and Republican notions of political identity, or the violence organized to further those identities.

While described a homogeneous imperial community composed of a brotherhood of active citizens bound together like "particles" of dirt forming a mountain, this community was also imagined as having differentiations, particularly differentiations that were important to the rising military professional. Perhaps the most succinct articulation of the differentiation that military men imagined within the imperial community was the phrase "loyalty to the Ruler, love for the Country" (忠君愛國), which became something of a call word for Spirit Education across the Empire and with great frequency throughout *Military Magazine*. This phrase comes from the mouth of Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (AD 131-234) in the famous Ming novel, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (三國演義). In context, it highlighted the gifted military leader's practical utility and moral quality, of loyalty the Ruler above and the love for the people below, in gross contrast to venal civil officials who hide their duplicity behind ornate literary skills. More than just a catchphrase, we see a conscious efforts by Qing military men to carve out a distinct identity along two vectors: vertically, with the Lord above and the Country below; and laterally, as loyal, effective guarantors of Imperial security in contrast with the untrustworthy and feckless officials.

On this vertical aspect, Liao Yuchun writes that "Military men receive orders from the temple [i.e., imperial Court] and their livelihood from the people: this is the Son of Heaven and the commoners all expecting them to protect the country."[74] This distinctive position of military men between Ruler above and Country below was important. Of course, Liao identified himself as a "Chinese citizen" and as one of many "particles" and he argues that every "citizen's righteous duty"

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[70] 《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》, p. 366.「當武官、當兵的想想，豈不更該一刀自殺了嗎？亞洲的大略講完了。」

[71] *Military Magazine* likewise shows the great attention paid to geography as a subject (see the textbook volumes its Military Research Center printed), as well as articles on the importance of military men to read maps outside those of immediate practical use.

[72] 賀忠良編、吳宗煌修，〈論軍隊當重頭目之教育〉,《武備雜誌》:「億萬同胞組織軍隊，使成勁旅，是在頭目教育之無形感化，其可忽乎哉？」

[73] *Military Magazine* readers probably knew that, despite his Chinese pseudonym, Major Taga was a foreigner, given that most of his articles named an "editor" alongside his authorship (as in this case). Still, at one point he seems to break persona when he wishes all the best for the future of the Chinese military:「僕為中國軍隊不勝希望之深也，敢述鄙見以供讀者之討論焉。」

[74] 廖宇春,〈論軍人當知有直接保國之義務〉,《武備雜誌》vol. 19, pp. 26-28.「軍人受命於廟，資生於民，是天子、庶人皆望其保國。」

was to cultivate their bodies, morals, and wisdom for the greater good—and indeed, rhetoric across the Empire increasingly referred to all people as soldiers. But when it comes to the actual protection of the Empire, Liao says a citizen's "is indirect, not direct" (間接也，非直接也), whereas the military man's is "direct, not indirect" (直接也，非間接也). This distinction meant disciplined boundaries. It would be a "crime," Liao says, for ordinary citizens to usurp official military duties, just was it would be for soldiers to assume prerogatives of the Ruler: "If one says, 'The county's peril is the fault of the poor policies of the Court,' [then] this is military men not taking on their [own] responsibility, and not understanding that the Court has its own righteous duties." After all, Liao reminds his readers, even "the general is posted *outside* the threshold [of the capital]," meaning that no matter high the military man rises, boundaries to authority remain circumscribed to the differentiated responsibilities, even amongst the imagined community's otherwise homogenous and affectively bonded "particles" within the Imperium.

"Freedom" and the Community

The differentiation of functional responsibility was also important within the broader imagined community conjured by Qing military educators because it formed the basis for a critical and controversial topic: "freedom" (自由). In one sense, "freedom" was normative within the Imperial community. In his *Military Magazine* article, "On Freedom" (自由論), Major Taga writes, that "freedom is the benefit of authority (權利) meant for the purpose of furthering the Realm (天下), and it is *possessed by all people therein*."[75] Likewise, the director of the Jiangnan Army Academy, Luo Changqi 羅長祺, gives a 1904 lecture on "The Explanation of the Core Principles of Freedom" (解釋自由原理示) telling students that "freedom is the source of knowledge."[76] As we can see, Qing military educators did not hide from the potentially explosive idea of freedom (though it frequently did become explosive); instead, they dealt with it directly and dealt with it as something normative.

But freedom had to be differentiated. In precisely the way Liao Yuchun distinguished a military man's "responsibility" from that of ordinary citizens, Major Taga applies highlights various vocations, such as government officials, businessmen, and soldiers, each with their distinct "responsibility" (責任) and derivative sphere of "authority" (權利). Freedom, Major Taga says, is action by members of a given responsible parties performed within the sphere of their legitimate authority. "With everything in the Realm, where there is responsibility, there is authority," Major Taga says. Conversely, "without responsibility, there is no authority," in which case such action "is not freedom, it is wantonness (放肆), a wantonness that harms authority and turns order to chaos."[77] Director Luo also conceived of responsibility-derived freedom as critical to the order of the larger community. Likening the Ruler (君主) to a ship helmsman or a train conductor each with

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[75] 賀忠良,〈自由論〉,《武備雜誌》, vol. 22, pp. 232-234.「夫自由者，權利因以發展天下，人皆有焉。」

[76] 羅長祺,〈解釋自由原理示〉,《江南陸師學堂學案》(1904-1905). In this lecture Director Luo says that the〈大學堂章程〉states:「自由為智識發達之本原。」 Luo's reference seems to come from a 1904 set of regulations, the《學務綱要》which were part of《奏定學堂章程》, initiated by Zhang Baixi 張百熙, Rongqing 榮慶, and Zhang Zhidong 張之洞. The regulations address *both* civilian and military academies (京外大小文武各學堂) and it sought to bring military training into the civilian schools (各堂兼習兵學) and visa-versa.

[77] 賀忠良,〈自由論〉,《武備雜誌》, vol. 22, pp. 232-234.「夫既無權利而欲置喙，是非自由而放肆也。而放肆者，害權利而亂秩序者也。如在上者，以壓力侵逼權利，而箝制自由」

millions of passengers aboard. Were each passenger to forcibly demand their individual right to steer, Luo asks students, "what's the probability" that such a ship will not find itself "buried with the fishes" or the train avoid "crashing into smithereens"?[78] Such were the stakes the imagined community when freedom was usurped without proper responsibility and authority.

Director Luo, moreover, moved beyond a generalized and abstract notions of freedom to directly engage his students using Western political theories. Indeed, his classroom discussions of Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Huxley, Rudolf von Jehrring, and others, undermine the image we have of Qing military educators as ostriches with heads in the sand trying to avoid controversial Western ideas that only enter "surreptitiously" into their schools.[79] (And, as we will see below, Luo's syllabus required students to perform such engagement as well). For example, Director Luo devotes a whole lecture to Rousseau's "social contract theory" (民約論). Not surprisingly, Luo critiques what he says is Rousseau's central kernel, that "every person is free and every person has equal rights," as a detrimental failure to differentiate between legitimate responsibility and authority a(s Luo illustrated with the ship and train images).[80] With a glimmer of sophistication, however, Luo does say that Rousseau even recognized this critique of his theory and thus imported "the idea of public opinion (公意主義) to save it."[81] "Public opinion," Luo explains, allowed for "every person to follow their individual intentions" in spheres freely entering and upholding contracts, making laws and obeying laws, etc.[82] Interestingly, we find then that the main weight of Director Luo's critique is less focused on these tenets than it is on the *social direction* by which wider freedoms and rights are obtained. Luo claims a major contradiction in that Rousseau, along with Voltaire, borrowed heavily from English legal tradition in order "to incite their countrymen" for "regime change" (革政) in France; but England's legal precedents had been laid by King Alfred (AD 848-899), that is, an enlightened monarch. [83] "From this we can see," he says, "speaking for equal rights in England led to stable rule, but in France it led to chaos."[84] Whether rights come from above rather than below seems less important to Luo than that they come from a formal monarch. Apparently forgetting George Washington's role in an anti-monarchical revolution, Luo gives even something as radical as American "democracy" (民主) an implied legitimacy precisely because, in Luo's telling, it was bestowed on the people when Washington voluntarily gave up office to live as a farmer at Mount Vernon.[85]

Having argued the importance of top-down legitimacy for rights and freedom, Luo turns students' attention to China. Moving from the King Yu of deep antiquity to Qianlong of the present dynasty, Luo catalogues a series of instances where Chinese monarchs condescended to bestow

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[78] 羅長裿,〈平權辨〉,《江南陸師學堂學案》(1904-1905).「其車之不觸為齏粉者，幾何？….其舟之不葬於魚腹者，幾何？」

[79] Ralph Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 160.

[80] 羅長裿，〈平權辨〉，《江南陸師學堂學案》:「人人自由，人人平權，倡於法儒盧梭之《民約論》。」

[81] 「盧梭知其說之有弊也，復立公意主義以救之。」On this topic more broadly, see Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Case of Late Ch'ing China," in *Approaches to Modern Chinese History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 216-238.

[82] 「公意云者，人人各從其意之自由，自定約而自守之；自立法而自遵之也。夫既遵既守，即不得謂之自由，即不得謂之平權。」

[83] Never does Luo use the term "revolution" (革命); "regime change" (革政) here is the closest he gets.

[84] 〈平權辨〉「與盧梭同時又有福祿特爾者，亦好引英國之政法以煽動其國民。二人者皆法國革政之嚆矢也。由此觀之，言平權者，在英國則治，在法國則亂。」

[85] Of course, Luo leaves out Washington role in a revolutionary war that demanded rights from their king.〈平權辨〉「美國華盛頓既與英人盟認十三省獨立建國，遂解兵柄，隻身歸農，及被推為民主，任滿辭職，隱於望德洼嫩之別墅。」

favor and grace, that is, the supposed equivalent to "rights," on their subjects. In the last paragraph of his lecture, he turns to a compressed litany of Classical citations, like Confucius's famous *Analects* line, "At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired (從心所欲)," but also from *Mencius*, the *Book of Document*s, and the *Book of Changes*—all highlighting that true "freedom," in both personal and political spheres, is attained from disciplined cultivation of human "desire" (欲). In the very last line of the lecture, Director Luo brings it to a personal level for his audience: "Each one of you students here, do you really aspire to be free? It begins by restraining oneself, but ends with full realization of your potential (始於克己、終於盡性)."[86]

Now, when Director Luo asks students if they "really aspire to be free" (有志自由乎), he has also turned from a topic of abstract problems of freedom in an imagined community, to real problems of freedom in the face-to-face environment of the school community. And real problems there were. In 1903, Director Luo's predecessor had been removed following the highly publicized Subao Incident, when students left the Jiangnan Military Academy in protest and published their grievances with the help of the newspaper *Subao* 蘇報, located within the protection of Shanghai's foreign concession. In addition to some flagrant anti-Manchu sentiments, the student grievances centered on their instructor's allegedly "barbaric" (野蠻) treatment of them as "slaves" (奴隸), demanding more "free" (自由) and "democratic" (民主) school administration.[87] Thus, when Director Luo lectured to students face-to-face on Rousseau, Washington's granting of "democracy," and a Classical tradition of cultivating and restraining individual "desire" (欲), he was addressing real issues facing the school community. Though, as we will see, even worse student unrest would erupt for Director Luo and disrupt his tenure, his was not the only military school in the Empire with such problems at this moment.[88]

In fact, Major Taga's article "On Freedom" explicitly addressed school problems. "Lately we hear that Academy students have verbally advocated for freedom," he writes, "but their actions indulge selfish desire (私慾), some defying their instructors, some despising Academy Regulations."[89] Applying the broader conceptual triangle linking responsibility, authority, and freedom directly to his students, Major Taga writes: "Students possess the *authority* to study (學習之權利): as such, if they do not do their assignments or if they are lax [attending] instruction, they can inform [their instructors] of these matters, thus they receive *freedom* in their class studies (學課之自由)."[90] Outside of this, Major Taga tells students, "you have not yet understood the *true* aim (真旨) of freedom."[91] Now, it is unclear how effective Major Taga's words were in soothing the tensions, though it does not appear that unrest at Baoding ever reached levels confronted by Luo at Jiangnan Army Academy.

Two decades later, Chiang Kai-shek, as director of Whampoa Military Academy, gives us a remarkable glimpse into Baoding's student-instructor problems. In a talk to Whampoa's first class of

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[86] 「以上所論，為自由之門經。若推致其極，吐詞為經、舉足為法，乃箇人之自由也；「所過者化，所存者神」，乃政治之自由也。舜舉十六相，而自由。《書》云，「俾余從欲」是也。孔子卒以學《易》，而自由。《魯論》曰：「七十而從心所欲」是也。諸生果有志自由乎？始於克己、終於盡性。

[87] See《蘇報》May 6, 1903:〈學界風潮: 江南陸師學堂罷學始末記〉.

[88] See *Shenbao*《申報》coverage:《江督欲殺學生未成》1905-04-19) Note that the governor wanted to execute students!;《陸師學生之衝突》(1905-04-07) ;《陸師學生仍求入學》(1905-04-27), etc.

[89] 賀忠良,〈自由論〉:「近聞學堂學生往有口倡自由而行逞私慾。或違抗教習，或藐視堂規。」

[90] 賀忠良,〈自由論〉:「蓋學生有學習之權利。故學堂如有溢廢功課，或弛懈教授，則有稟明此事而受學課之自由。」

[91] 賀忠良,〈自由論〉:「若輩未解自由真旨….」

students on July 24, 1924, Chiang tells them that as an eighteen year-old at Baoding, "I really didn't have regard for [our instructors] and, in secret, I made what they taught and their lectures the butt of my jokes."[92] Ironically, Chiang designed this particular talk to soothe tensions from disquieted and discontented students (over lack of student choices in KMT Party committee elections at Whampoa). Chiang must have remembered student "defiance of instructors" that Major Taga addressed at Baoding, for he discloses what he portrays as youthful and foolish disrespect in an effort to convince Whampoa students to do the opposite, to cherish the "student-teacher bond" (師生關係), saying "Now that I look back and think about, those [Baoding] men actually had a lot of experience in many areas that I could have learned a great deal from."[93] And yet, in another layer of irony, Chiang seems to have actually learned a great deal, despite what he says here, when we compare how Chiang addresses student discontent compared to his late Qing counterparts, as above. Like Major Taga in 1904, Chiang makes the case to Whampoa students during this controversy that substantial "student management *responsibility*" (管理學生的責任) and "management *authority*" (管理權) had already been given over to the student body, with the hopes of fostering their own "obedience and autonomy" (服從與自治) without undue instructor supervision.[94] Like Director Luo, Chiang also appeals to his students by lecturing them on the "*true* meaning of Freedom and Equality" (自由平等之真義), arguing that freedom within the military school, by necessity, operated differently; thus students should not "nit-pick on how school-internal elections [for Party oversight] differ from elections on the outside."[95]

I submit that these convergences and parallels between late Qing military academies and Whampoa are important. But it is not because the Director Luo or Major Taga's engagement with the concept of freedom will spur scholars to rewrite the intellectual history of the late Qing. Their writing on the subject cannot compare to luminaries like Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei. They approached freedom in ways fundamentally different but significant, for they were negotiating a top-down revolution in the way the Empire produced agents of military violence. In this new way, they were holding real authority and responsibility whilst embedded in the face-to-face communities of their schools. At the same time, they sought to negotiate a balance between cultivating greater agency and "freedom" in their students while setting boundaries and limits to the same. Though such negotiations within these late Qing military academies are all but forgotten, and despite Chiang Kai-shek's pretension that he learned almost nothing from such education, Chiang's own words betray the deep-seated, long-lasting, and foundational influence exerted by the kind of work done by Director Luo, Major Taga, and other military educators in this decade.

Finally, and most importantly, one other factor marks the critical significance of freedom in late Qing military academy. It is a question of whether what we have seen here is either reactive and derivative or if it is generative and original. After all, even Director Luo's marshalling of Chinese historical anecdotes and Classical citations is explicitly a response to new and foreign ideas of freedom, like those of Rousseau and others. Likewise, Major Taga's article even says of the student unrest in the name of freedom, "This trend that has started is not limited to the corruption of the

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[92] July 24, 1924, 對軍校第一學期講：〈自由平等之真義與團體生活的重要〉,《蔣中正先生年譜長編》, (台北: 國史館, 2014), vol. 1, p. 262.

[93] July 24, 1924,〈自由平等之真義與團體生活的重要〉:「但到現在回頭想一想，他們也有 許多地方是有經驗的， 是可以拿來做很好的研究材料的。 」《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, vol. 1, p. 262.

[94] July 4, 1924,〈對軍校第一期學生講評本校特別區黨部的選舉會〉,《蔣中正先生年譜長編》, (台北: 國史館, 2014), vol. 1, p. 259. Chiang had been addressing student discontent on this issue all July.

[95] July 24, 1924, 對軍校第一學期講：〈自由平等之真義與團體生活的重要〉,《蔣中正先生年譜長編》, (台北: 國史館, 2014), vol. 1, p. 262.

Academy, it is an affliction of the Nation (國家)."[96] Taken by themselves, these instances appear to reinforce the standard narrative of Qing military academies as empty vessels subverted by outside influences, hardly warranting serious inquiry into our hapless Qing educators or the content they taught. But when we read Major Taga's argument further, we find him open up a different level of freedom altogether, one that lies embedded *between* the imagined imperial community ("the affliction of the Nation") and the face-to-face community of the military academy ("the corruption of the academy"). In what follows, he describes freedom in the tactical and operational of actual military responsibilities. I outline these three levels as follows:

[1] imagined community (Empire) – responsibility to Lord and Country (君國)
[2] tactical and operational tasks (military)– responsibility for orders
[3] real community (school) – responsibility for study

I have indicated these three levels as they appear in one paragraph of Major Taga's article on freedom:

[1] In service, you have already offered yourselves to Lord and Country (一身奉君國). Your life is for Lord and Country, and your death is for Lord and Country: so how could you possible waver or prevaricate in this?
[2] Thus, it is within our official service and responsibilities that we have autonomous freedom (自行之自由). In this way, as soon as you *receive an order* (一有命令), you do not retain [unlimited] freedom in executing it. This is what makes a military man a military man, for he cannot have equal freedom in official and private.
[3] However, students, without official authority, rashly advocate for freedoms, condemning the pressure [they feel at school]. This means they do not yet understand the great responsibility of a military man and have thus made themselves like those many city miscreants (市井無賴).[97] What an incredible tragedy![98]

Though a military thread runs through all three levels above, it is the middle level [2] which is unique. After all, entities like Hatano's "enlightened literati, rich merchants, and modern intellectuals"[99] were also conceiving of versions of imagined community like [1] with various forms Rulership over the Country; and "student disturbances" (學潮) at schools [3] were hardly unique to military academies. And yet, unique to the military context is the receipt of binding orders (命令) the specific variables of freedom involved in their execution. It is the production of freedom at this specific level of tactical and operational missions that makes the military academy unlike all other imperial entities at this time, and it would be this type of battlefield "freedom" that would decide the battles that would make modern China for the next half-century.

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[96] 賀忠良,〈自由論〉:「此風一啟，則不唯為學堂之蠹弊，為國家之荼毒。」
[97] "City miscreants" (市井無賴), as discussed in Chapter 2, were the unreliable about whom both Qi Jiguang and Zeng Guofan gave explicit instructions to not allow into their ranks even as lowly foot soldiers.
[98] 〈論自由〉《武備雜誌》:「夫軍人範圍乎軍紀業已以一身奉君國，其生亦為君國，死亦為君國，況其一進一退，一舉一動乎？故有公務責任中有自行之自由。然一有命令，即不得仍行其自由。此軍人所以為軍人，而不能公私均有自由者也。然其無公權學生而妄倡自由，誹謗壓力，是未知軍人重任而自將其身比諸於市井無賴也，豈不大可悲哉！」Emphasis added.
[99] Yoshihiro Hatano, "The New Armies," in *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913*, ed. Mary Clabaugh Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 382.

Battlefield Freedom

Since Qing armies would not fight major engagements until the 1911 Revolution, we find the clearest expression of what I term battlefield freedom in military drill. Drill was not only an important concern of *Military Magazine*; when Major Taga was hired by Yuan Shikai in 1902, he had just published a drill manual translated into Chinese (in Tokyo). Major Taga's manual, *Regulations for Infantry Field Drill*《步兵野操規例》, would become widespread during this decade well beyond Beiyang, with colloquial (白話) versions of it used as far as Guangdong and its military academies.[100] In fact, according to sources, the massive student unrest at Jiangnan Army Academy in late 1905, which would lead to Director Luo's reassignment, was driven in part not just by demands for school freedom, but also anger that the school refused to replace their German-based drill manuals with the new Japanese versions that had become the rage.[101] Incidentally, Japanese drill explicitly presented "freedom" as a critical component of the modern battlefield.

We see freedom embedded in Major Taga's *Field Drill* manual, particularly for "dispersed combat" (散開戰鬥). Calling it "a mode of command that operates on *special* values," Major Taga says dispersed troops "must be given freedom (自由) to allow them to fulfill their roles" and maximize the "independent deployment of their weapons."[102] He makes clear that when training and teaching this mode to soldiers, an officer must have his troops "understand that their connected roles are even more important when fighting with dispersion than fighting in dense formations." In sum, the officer's job is to "Stringently imprint it on [troops'] hearts that the entire orientation of dispersed troops always follows freedom (自由).[103]" Thus, the tactical and operational principle of the battlefield is "freedom," the mode is "dispersion" between individual soldiers, and the intermediary step for achieving this is an officer reaching his soldiers' individual "hearts" (and "spirit" elsewhere throughout the manual), not just disciplining their bodies.

Before expounding further how such a mode of warfare was to be achieved practically, we must deal with the question of novelty and continuity. It is hard to underestimate the effect of the Russo-Japanese War in capturing the imagination of Chinese reformers and students and giving a palpable and emotional sense of the great possibilities Japan offered at this time, especially in terms of military modernization (by some accounts, Japanese military academy instructors were treated like celebrities at these schools). For instance, when the famous Japanese educator and judo pioneer, Kanō Jigorō 嘉納治五郎, came to Nanjing and toured Jiangnan Army Academy in 1903, the poet Chen Sanli 陳三立 (1853-1937) gifted a parting poem to him, writing, "as you stepped deeper into the vast hall, each step bringing our school into view… I stared unable to speak, sweat of shame

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[100] 多賀宗之, *Regulations for Infantry Field Drill*《步兵野操規例》, (東京 : 泰東同文局, Meiji 35.7/July 1902). The Guangdong Officer's Academy translated Major Taga's manual into a more colloquial version, though they remain quite similar: 廣東將弁學堂 譯,《步兵操典白話》in《廣州大典》v. 332（史部政書類，第27冊）, 763ff.

[101] The German vs. Japanese drill controversy component of the student protests is attested to by the oral history of one student, Chen Bingzhi: 諶秉直 ,〈江南陸師學堂回憶〉(June, 1964), in《文史資料存稿選編》, v. 16 軍事機構（下）, pp. 195-199. Students were apparently concerned that the German manual taught by the school meant they had to learn new commands and procedures from the Japanese upon assignment to operational army units after graduation. Director Luo's writings do address some of the student concerns about drill format, though there's no indication there that issue would blew up into a school lockdown.

[102] 多賀宗之, *Regulations for Infantry Field Drill*《步兵野操規例》, (東京 : 泰東同文局, Meiji 35.7/July 1902). p. 42-43.

[103] 多賀宗之, *Regulations for Infantry Field Drill*《步兵野操規例》, (東京 : 泰東同文局, Meiji 35.7/July 1902). p. 42-43.

poured out as though I was drunk."[104] Chen's quite dark poem says, "Across a sea of death you arose, coming to aid your China Problem (支那病)."[105] Similarly, one late Qing novel portrays students discussing Japanese schools, saying "everything [there] is taught at the spiritual level, unlike China where we focus only on the outward form."[106] This emotional current cannot be discounted and perhaps helps explain the student protest at Jiangnan Army Academy over refusal to adopt Japanese drill manuals like Major Taga's.[107]

However, the previous chapters have uncovered, for the first time with the help of Teacher Yao Xiguang's diary, that "German drill for dispersed formations" (德操散隊) had been the hallmark of Beiyang Military Academy education and training since it opened with German instructors in 1885, and was used in combat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Moreover, based on our investigation (Chapter 1) into how Yao Xiguang articulates how "dispersed formations" (散隊) operate, we find great similarities with Major Taga's "dispersed combat" (散開戰鬥). Though Major Taga's newer lexicon uses "spirit" (精神) and "freedom" (自由), Yao Xiguang's 1895 language uses "energy" (*qi* 氣) that must be "self-regulated" (自整).[108] Both note the greater challenges when space is elongated between soldiers and units, and both highlight the need for greater individual agency from commanders down to riflemen to achieve this mode.

These similarities are not coincidence. German military instructors had not only been hired for China's Beiyang Military Academy in the 1880s, they formed a bedrock of military reform in Meiji Japan as well. This German connection is why we see similarities in the tactical-operational lexicon of China and Japan dating to before the massive post-1895 exchange between the two; moreover, the similarity has not been previously recognized. Highly influenced by Ernst L. Presseisen's study on German military instructors in Meiji Japan, Stephen MacKinnon notes that German orientations "fit rather well the *bushido* military tradition," concluding that the resulting German-Japanese military interchange "offers a picture of the tactics, training techniques, and organization that Yuan was trying to instill into the Beiyang Army" in the 1900-1911 period.[109] This conception is problematic on two levels. The first problem is that *Bushido* (武士道) was not only an invented tradition, it was still being invented as this pivotal decade started.[110] Still, whatever its

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[104] Chen Sanli 陳三立,《日本嘉納治五郎以考察中國學務來江南既宴集陸師學堂感而有贈》:「深堂步寥夐；歷觀我黌舍 ，根柢析究竟；瞠目不能答，頭汗羞瞀聵」

[105] 陳三立:「起死海外方，撫汝支那病。」

[106] 鐘心青著,《新茶花》, published in Shanghai, 1907:「事事在精神上讲究，不像中国专门的讲形式….」Note: I looked at this novel because one character attends the Hubei Military Academy, though I have not yet incorporated that part.

[107] Director Luo actually addresses the German vs. Japanese drill controversy at points in his writing, addressing student complaints that teaching the German manual at school meant they had to learn new commands and procedures upon assignment to operational army units after graduation. Thus, there was a practical professional component to this discontent as well.

[108] As noted in Chapter 2, "Technologies of the Spirit," the term *jingshen* 精神 for "spirit" was hardly a Japanese neologism, though its usage gains greater popularity from Japan from 1900 on and replacing *qi* 氣 as the most common term. Still, the two can be interchangeable, as seen in the Zhu Xi quotation above: "The release of positive energy (陽氣) can penetrate both metal and stone; With the spirit (精神) present, nothing is impossible."

[109] Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-Kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p. 102n34. Here MacKinnon references Ernst L. Presseisen, *Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army* (Tucson, 1965), esp. Chapter 5, as the authoritative source on German military influence on Meiji Japan.

[110] See Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan*, (New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014). Much of this invented tradition derives from an English book published in 1899

construction, *Bushido* was highly influential, including for late Qing military educators.[111] But the second, more serious problem is not about the Bushido "tradition" itself as it is that its perceived compatibility with Western military modernity has short circuited the inquiry into how China's traditions influence this modernization process in any way other than impediment or obstacle. As I've argued in the previous chapters on the 1885-1900 period, warfare in "dispersed formations" led the first military academies to draw upon existing traditions of Classical education and examination essay writing to procure and produce the individual agency needed for the modern battlefield. This dissertation recovered this dynamic reinvention of Chinese tradition for modern warfare during the 1880s and 1890s; but we also need to recover it for the 1900-1911 decade. In sum, we will come to understand that, however enamored late Qing military reformers became of their Meiji counterparts--and enamored they indeed were--the adoption of Japanese ideas did not happen *de novo*; as profound and far reaching as they were, there was a foundation onto which they were laid.

Indeed, the prime importance and perceived utility of Major Taga's work lay in the ways it attached concrete practices to the tactical and operational principles of this mode of warfare, as already understood by Chinese military academy teachers. We see this dual set of novelty and continuity even in one of Major Taga's serious critiques of the Beiyang Army. He writes in *Military Magazine* that a problem he witnessed as a combatant in the Sino-Japanese War was that Chinese forces almost exclusively employed defensive tactics.[112] This actually matches the study I presented in Chapter 1 of General Nie Shicheng's tactical employment at the Battle of Chenghuan (June 1894), which was a defensive action, though I have shown through multiple sources of evidence that this was indeed a "dispersed formation" plan of battle. Major Taga calls for the Beiyang Army to cultivate instead an "offensive spirit" (攻擊之精神). He says that in recent interactions with Beiyang foot soldiers, when he asked them what their rifles were for, he had received answers like, "for self-protection" (護身之器) and "for defending against the enemy" (防敵之器也). The correct answer, Major Taga says, is that one's "rifle is a tool for killing the enemy" (槍乃殺敵之器也), and he prescribes more Spirit Education and more bayonet training for foot soldiers as a remedy.[113] Note that Major Taga's diagnosis of a lack of "offensive spirit" and his practical prescriptions actually presupposes an existing basis in "dispersed combat," even while honing and refining its orientation.

It is Major Taga's detailed practical prescriptions for achieving a dispersed mode of combat, moreover, that we first need to understand in order to see how Chinese traditions and practices contributed to this process. For instance, his manual required leaders and educators to "Cultivate in troops the strength of judgment (判斷) and a spirit (精神) of self-confidence," "quickening their eyes and ears, enabling them make judgements (判斷) in the blink of an eye, so that when they encounter a situation they can operate independently (獨斷)."[114] This relatively autonomous

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Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸 稲造 (1862-1933), called *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, long after the samurai class had been abolished in 1876.

[111] For example, *Military Magazine* translates a German article on *Bushido*:〈德國兵事報論日本武士道為強國富之本〉《武備雜誌》.

[112] 賀忠良(著)，吳宗煌(修)，〈論兵丁之精神教育〉，《武備雜誌》: pp. 135-139.

[113] For the psychology of the bayonet, especially its actual use in combat, see David Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, (Little Brown, 1995). This book is read and assigned widely in American professional military education.

[114] 多賀宗之,《步兵野操規例》, (東京 : 泰東同文局, Meiji 35.7/July 1902). p. 42-43. On "Translingual Practice": the colloquial 白話 version of Major Taga's manual retained key language about "freedom" (自由) and "spirit" (精神), while other terms remained quite close. For instance: "strength of judgement" (判斷之識力) was transposed as "to determine on one's own" (自己決斷); "dense units" (密集隊) transposed as "massed formations" (靠攏陣). For the 白

battlefield authority meant that "small unit leaders (小隊長) must judge to determine (判斷) the enemy's weak point and assess the terrain, and then exploit them, [thus] his method of attack derives from this determination." Because higher level commanders would be too far away to make the determination on behalf of the "small unit leaders" on the ground, "his method of attack is completely based upon the contingencies encountered…. which [the leader] can be done freely (自由)."[115] Again, Major Taga describes more than *what* this mode of warfare is supposed to look like, he outlines *how* to cultivate this individual judgment and "freedom." In a *Military Magazine* article, "On Cultivating Commanders' Strength of Judgment" (論官長須養成判斷力), he says that while classroom lectures and the memorization of tactical principles is foundational, "wargames" and "field exercises" are necessary wherein "notional enemies" (假設敵) create fluid problem-solving situations. This gives students opportunity to put these principles into *active* practice, making real tactical judgments in an environment where they can receive teacher feedback.[116]

In addition to independent judgement and initiative, the skill of communication becomes even more important with a decentralized command structure spread across elongated physical space between units. In this environment, Major Taga highlights the added difficulty of the Sunzi's famous *Art of War* principle of "knowing the enemy" (知彼):

> After a reconnaissance is made, a commanding officer receives a report that is nothing more than a piece of the enemy situation, or it is only an observation of the general situation outside. But the enemy's overall deployment is incredibly difficult to know in full. Such is the sheer difficulty of "knowing the enemy" (知彼). And, because it is difficult, some do not think through methods for knowing [the enemy situation], thus making calculations for victory ever more hard to ascertain.[117]

Thus, in addition to practicing tactical decision-making in forums like wargames, students also studied the orders and the report writing process itself—for they would not merely be consumers of the orders and reports from their superiors, they were to become producers and movers in the vital communication flow holding the dispersed battlefield together. Precise information on this aspect of education is hard to come by for this period. But we know that *Military Magazine's* Research Center published its own book devoted to this: *Regulations for Army Letters and Documents*《軍用函牘規則》, grouped under its Chinese Language Textbooks (漢文教課書). Likewise, a surviving syllabus from Jiangnan Army Academy reveals that two hours a week were devoted to "Chinese Literary Studies" (中國文學), which included "study and practice in the formulae of memorials and official documents" (學習奏議、公牘體式).[118] While I have not been able to obtain those specific textbooks, we know that, like drill, Chinese military academies at this time borrowed heavily on Japanese formats, which would be used by Chinese armies well into the

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話 version of this passage, see 廣東將弁學堂 譯,《步兵操典白話》in《廣州大典》v. 332（史部政書類，第 27 冊）, 763ff.

[115] 多賀宗之,《步兵野操規例》, (東京 : 泰東同文局, Meiji 35.7/July 1902). p. 47.

[116] 賀忠良，〈論官長須養成判斷力〉《武備雜誌》volume 21, pp. 25-27. Nicolas Schillinger also writes on "wargames": "Playing Soldiers: The War Game in Late Qing and Republican China," *Journal of Chinese Military History*, 9 (2020), pp. 38-64.

[117] 〈論官長須養成判斷力〉《武備雜誌》volume 21, pp. 25-27.「在偵探後之指揮官縱得報告一不過一部之敵情，或惟察外面之概況，而敵人全般之佈置究難洞悉也。知彼之事既如此難。因其難而不思設法以知之，則勝算愈不可期矣。」

[118] This was during the third and final year of studies.

Republican era.[119] For example, the format for "Combat Orders" (作戰命令) was always divided into four sets of sequential information:

1. Enemy Situation: The current enemy situation (plus other urgent matters in the situation that those receiving the order should know).
2. Mission: The larger mission of the commander's unit (plus important information about other friendly units).
3. Tasks: A task or mission given to each subordinate unit involved the operation to perform (plus delineating unit distributions and/or zones of responsibility).
4. Signal & Commander's Location: The mode by which the action will initiate; and the location of the commander during the operation.[120]

In addition to orders, student officers would be expected to write field reports. Reports (報告), the manual says, "provide objective assistance to judge the situation in combat; as such, the reports from units engaged in the battle are of extraordinary value to higher level commanding officers."[121] The manual provides formats for battle reports:




Figure 11: Figure 15: Blank format for reports and orders. Photo from National Diet Library, Japan, https://www.ndl.go.jp. Accessed June 10, 2024. [122]

[119] For instance, a 1905 textbook, *Field Logistics* (野外勤務書), printed for the Anhui Infantry Primary School (安徽陸軍小學堂), has sections devoted to "Combat Orders" (戰鬥命令) and "Combat Reports" (戰鬥報告), plus formats for practical use. This matches the Japanese *Soldier Training Methods*《兵式教練法》of 1902.
[120] 留守袈裟吉 編，*Soldier Training Methods*《兵式教練法》（森岡栄文堂，明治 33-34）, pp. 717-718.
[121] Photo 留守袈裟吉 編，《兵式教練法》（森岡栄文堂，明治 33-34）, p. 719-720.「戰鬥ハ情況判斷ノ為メ確實ノ補助ヌ與フスモノナリ故ニ交戰中ノ部隊ヨリ報告ヌ得ルハ高等指揮官ノ殊ニ貴重スル所トス」
[122] 留守袈裟吉 編，《兵式教練法》（森岡栄文堂，明治 33-34）, p. 816.




Figure 13: Blank map-sketch (略圖) format. Photo from National Diet Library, Japan, https://www.ndl.go.jp. Accessed June 10, 2024




Figure 12: Blank envelope (書簡袋) format. Photo from National Diet Library, Japan, https://www.ndl.go.jp. Accessed June 10, 2024

In addition to the need for such communication to be written with accuracy and precise economy, speed and timeliness were critical for the battlefield. The standardized envelope (書簡袋, Figure Z) required notations for the precise time, place, and actor from which the communication originated, and prompted the originator to assign a prescribed "speed" (速度) for the courier by circling one of three speeds (in ascending order: "十, 十十, 十十十"). Thus, it required the originator to use "independent judgement," not only in calculating the physical distance and terrain over which a courier needed to travel to reach the recipient (the reason why a commander's location was always included in Item #4 of the Combat Order). He also needed to estimate the urgency and value of the information contained in the report or order he produced, generally by considering his commander's overall mission (as stipulated in Item #2 of the Combat Order above). In short, these constituted a scaffolding of communication and skills needed for a battlefield "freedom" characterized by "lower-level commanding officers' ability to act independently, and their ability to take advantages of opportunities and adapt to situations."[123]

Of note, in Chapter One, at the Battle of Chenghuan, (Sino-Japanese War, 1894), we saw Student Yu producing maps for General Nie using the cartography training he had received at Beiyang Military Academy, as well as delivering critical and timely reconnaissance reports to the general on the changing enemy situation. In turn, we saw General Nie respond to this information by issuing his own "combat order" on the eve of the battle. What we have outlined above is a standardization and expansion of all these combat functions, designed to ensure efficiency, interoperability, and communication between a wide range of junior and senior battlefield actors. In Chapter 5, I will reconstruct the first battle campaign of Whampoa Military Academy's "School Army" at Danshui in February 1925. For this we have hundreds of orders and reports, all following the format and structure described above from Qing military academies, sharing information

123 「下級指揮官之如何獨斷，如何隨機、應變….」,〈德國兵事報論日本武士道為強國富之本〉,《武備雜誌》.

attenuated by physical distance in the fog of war, just like Major Taga described. Moreover, Chiang's combat order on the eve of the School Army's first battle tells his commanders to exercise "freedom" (自由) in the attack.

It is here, in this late Qing context, that this type of battlefield "freedom" derives. And it is not merely a generalized political freedom for citizens in an imagined empire, or a practical freedom for students attending a school. As we can see, this type of battlefield freedom is unique, not necessarily derivative of or overlapping with other productive segments of Qing society, whether gentry class or not. Suffice it to say here that the unique form of "freedom" cultivated and developed within late Qing military academies outlived the Empire to exert an influence that was anything but irrelevant. How Qing military academies applied this concept to create "real" face-to-face communities which could collectively exercise such freedom on a battlefield is the subject of the next section.

Inventing "Real" Communities

Given that regime of battlefield "freedom" called for individual actors to work independently but in concert with each other across increased physical distance, it is not surprising that a specific type of community was required. On the one hand, Stephen MacKinnon rightly emphasizes that Beiyang Army cohesion was based on particularistic, personalistic ties, like the gentry-recruited *tuanlian* armies of the Taiping era. On the other hand, in emphasizing the explicitly *depersonalized* professionalism created by the all-important factor of education in the Beiyang Army, we are left wondering what held the unit together, not just as together as the type of "national" army McKinnon claims, but also as units cohesive enough to operate in dispersion on the modern battlefield. As we will see, "spirit" was the glue for forming this unit cohesion, and education was its application.

Through Spirit Education, officers and student officers learned how to create new communities out of the Regiment (標), the cornerstone operational unit of the army. In some ways, the Regiment mirrored both the imagined imperial community and the "real" face-to-face community of the family. For instance, Major Taga writes that Regiments should begin compiling their own unit histories.[124] The reason, he says, is that just as a "nation" (國) is not a nation without its own history, so too will a Regiment become a real entity when it has a unit history. Through the teaching of it, members will become like sons and brothers of a single "family" (家).

Major Taga used *Military Magazine* as a platform to urge for other practical means of producing "unit cohesion" (團結) and give expression to making each Regiment "as tight-knit as a family" (如一家之親切焉).[125] He taught that Regimental officers, ideally, would "regard superior commanders as their father (家長); to treat lower ranking officers as sons and younger brothers; and, amongst fellow officers (同僚, of same rank) to be like brothers."[126] He also supplied a practical means: "If you want to make each regiment like this, you must first set up a meeting hall (集會所) for officers in each regiment."[127] This "meeting hall" was meant to provide Regimental officers a

[124] 賀忠良,〈望編纂每標歷史〉,《武備雜誌》, volume 20, pp. 242-244.
[125] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 48.
[126] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 48.
[127] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 48.

forum to interact with each other "*regardless of how high or low their rank*" (無論階級之上下). He explains:

> In their free time outside of official duties, they can all come to this place, sit at the same table and eat together, sit around a fire and drink together, and laugh and talk at ease with each other. Superior officers can thus learn their subordinates' personalities and capabilities. Subordinates can thus learn their superiors' intentions. Fellow officers (同僚) [of the same rank] will gain mutual affinity (親愛) for each other…. Is this not the root of unit cohesion (團結)?[128]

This practice of the officer meeting hall (or at least the perceived need for it) reinforces MacKinnon's argument that the Beiyang Army was not based primarily on pre-existing local and personalistic ties between its officers, even while challenging his conception of Beiyang professionalism. For here, we see an attempt at forging personal bonds where none apparently existed, in a professionalism that is meant to have a personal, face-to-face aspect.

And while the goal of creating one happy family out of a Regiment is certainly idealistic, its intent is not necessarily naïve. As soon as Major Taga proclaims that the meeting hall gets to the "root of unit cohesion," he immediately says, "But alas! Humans are, after all, creatures possessing emotions. Each person has his own different intentions (意旨)."[129] In fact, we find that Major Taga's talk about either sharing each other's "intentions" (意旨) or having different, misaligned "intentions" has less to do with building a convivial social atmosphere in the "meeting hall" than it does with building a battlefield community that will optimally share communications and orders between members. "In commanding an entire regiment, as soon as orders are issued (一出命令), it should be like the body directing the arms, and the arms then directing the fingers—a movement like shadow following form, from top arriving to the bottom…."[130] But unlike a healthy body, such flow of command does not come naturally or effortlessly:

> Superiors misunderstand their subordinates' intent and [vice versa]. Superiors and subordinates become estranged and their intentions are not communicated. The actions subordinates do will not be in accord with their superior's intent (上級官之意), and the actions ordered by a superior are not comprehended by their subordinates.[131]

It is this level of responsibility, where orders are issue and communications exchanged on the battlefield, that is being considered here. It is the problem of overcoming distance—physical distance caused by operational dispersion, social distance caused by rank hierarchy, and human distance caused by natural "emotions"—that that the practice of the meeting hall is meant to

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[128] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 48.「無論階級之上下值共務之餘暇者，均到此所，或同桌共食，或圍爐共飲，談笑自若。上官能知下官之性質技能，下官又能知上官之意旨。同僚則互相親愛因皆生相依相賴相勵相勉之心也。是非團結之本哉。」

[129] 嗚呼！人者有感情之動物也。各人有各人相異之意旨，豈得以刑驅勢迫以及命令章程之公事而遂可使之劃一哉。

[130] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 47.「以統轄全標，一出命令，則如身之使臂，臂之使之指，一動如形影相隨，自上至下，情意貫通萬眾一心。即是全標之團結。」

[131] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 47.「如不然，上級官誤下級官之意旨，又下級官誤上級官之意旨，上下疏絕而意旨不相通。下級官所為之事不合於上級官之意，上級官所命之事，下級官未領悟之。」

address. As Major Taga says, it is a recognition that "goodwill (情意) fuses the massed host with one heart and mind and this cohesion for an entire regiment." Likewise, if forging new affective bonds is key to deriving tactical and operational benefits for dispersed combat, he writes, "how could we possibly use punishments or power to force through our orders and programs…."[132] In sum, we see the imperatives of tactical and operational considerations driving new practices and forms of face-to-face community.

Similar to the exhortation of the meeting hall, that is, for officers to form bonds amongst each other "regardless of high or low rank," Beiyang officers were also taught explicitly to cross social barriers between themselves and their foot soldiers. In *Military Magazine*, Li Shirui 李士鋭 advocated the need for "officers and enlisted leaders to know their soldiers' personal character" (官弁應知兵丁之性質).[133] But without a designated forum like the meeting hall, he required officers to take advantage of opportunities, like breaks in drill, "to try and get close to them (以求與之親接)." "Whether [the opportunity is] planned or impromptu," Li Shirui instructs officers, "inquire into their thoughts and intentions/hopes (意圖), find out what kinds of feelings (感念) they have about being in the army, who amongst their peers are they friends with or close to (友愛)."[134] Knowing not just a foot soldier's technical skill levels (技能) individually, but their individual "character," Li Shirui says, gives the commander confidence in employing them during combat according to their strengths and capabilities.

Beyond getting to know one's troops personally, an officer was to be their teacher, imparting them with Spirit Education. In teaching his troops, officers needed to adjust their methods to reach them, advocated Liu Hengsheng 劉恆盛 in *Military Magazine*. Liu gave the analogy of an opera performance on the stage, with actors displaying ingenious skill and communicating in ways that connect with their audience, "first capturing the hearts of the audience" (傾心觀劇之人), then "unveiling their spirits" (精神流露), and "sparking their imagination" (令人想像).[135] Liu lists practical steps officers need to take when teaching troops: from speaking with a lively voice to engage their listeners to ensuring that the content was presented in a way that could be "appreciated by refined and base [soldiers] alike" (雅俗共賞). For instance, when talking about the Chinese Classics and Histories (中國經史), the officer should highlight that which would be most accessible to the audience's disposition (指出最易開人心性). "Avoid at all costs," Liu said, "teaching by holding a book and reading aloud from it." Just as the "meeting hall" meant that officers should attenuate rank hierarchies when communing together, when teaching troops, no matter how educated a junior officer was privileged to be, he was explicitly not supposed to take the role of a traditional private school (私塾) teacher.

Major Taga was more explicit with regard to shedding scholarly pretension. When teaching Spirit Education to troops, he said, officers needed to dispense with the idea that they were "donning a scholar's gown [?]" (官長者更不待一編長抱[sic.? or my mistranslation?]).[136] "By what skill do we bring our troops' spirits to their full effect?" he asks. "Telling them stories about loyalty

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[132] 嗚呼！人者有感情之動物也。各人有各人相異之意旨，豈得以刑驅勢迫以及命令章程之公事而遂可使之劃一哉。

[133] 李士鋭，〈論官弁應知兵丁之性質〉，《武備雜誌》: vol. 19, p. 140.

[134] 李士鋭，〈論官弁應知兵丁之性質〉，《武備雜誌》: vol. 19, p. 140.「即於有意無意中，探究其意圖，其對軍有何等之感念，其處同人有何等之友愛種種情形，即不難的其梗概矣。」

[135] 劉恆盛,〈論教育時當先鼓其受教之精神〉《武備雜誌》 vol. 20, 237-238.

[136] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈官長當注意教育兵丁之學課〉《武備雜誌》vol 19, pp. 481-482.

to the Lord and love for Country (忠君愛國), or speaking about the exploits of ingenious ministers and fierce generals—these are not sufficient to move and inspire them."[137] Similar to Li Shirui above, Major Taga exhorted officers to find venues for face-to-face interaction with foot soldiers, such as the drill and field exercises to inspire their hearts and strengthen their wills. This, he said was the "application of this mystery" of Spirit Education, requiring modes of "instruction and enlightenment that go beyond the ordinary" (非尋常訓迪).[138]

In summary, Spirit Education and the imperatives of dispersed combat led to practices "inventing" new face-to-face communities within schools and Regiments based on notions of battlefield freedom, while even attenuating (though not ignoring completely) the differentiations of rank hierarchies. Once again, these forces were not only productive within the late Qing context; they would carry over beyond. Chiang Kai-shek, teaching the first designated student Party Representative officers at Whampoa in 1924, echoes some of the above while explaining their duty to educate their foot soldiers. He told the student Representatives that they would need to mix with the troops and study their colloquialisms, rather than "acting all high and mighty and putting a barrier between you and the troops." Otherwise, he said, "when they listen to you talk, your words will land on them like some hefty official document, and none [of your teaching of Doctrine] will sink in."[139] In Major Taga's terms, pretending to "don the scholar's gown" precluded the application of education's mystery. Whampoa is also noted for pioneering radical experiments in military-social bonding and organizational command. For instance, the school practiced "small group meetings" (小組會), where students could criticize their ranking instructors and "express their opinions (意見) in complete freedom."[140] Its organizational innovation of Party Representatives, adopted from the Soviet Red Army, added a layer of command, control, and political education to tactical and operational units. By 1927 the KMT disbanded its Party Representative system when it purged the CCP from the United Front. Aside from inter-party rivalry, however, the field assessment from the actual campaign stated that the dual leadership system of shared "authorities and responsibilities" between commanders and Representatives led to *"clashes of emotion"* (感情上之衝突): that is, not doctrinal differences, but something very similar to problems the late Qing writers were talking about here.[141] When historians look to the social origins of these innovations, as well as the perceived military justification for such practices, we generally end our inquiry at revolutionary Chinese nationalism or Leninist Soviet importations. But it is noteworthy that two decades earlier, within late Qing military academies, officers were also trained to draw close to the foot soldiers for the purpose of Spirit Education, and that they implemented experimental community-building forums where they were explicitly to bond "without regard to how high or low rank" (無論階級之上下), with the expressed goal of sharing each other's "intent" (意旨) and of overcoming the very natural social barriers ("humans are, after all, creatures possessing emotions" 有感情之動物), like those that that complicated the boldly conceived Party Representative system. I submit that these late Qing imperial precedents are important on their own terms, even as they complicate our understanding of later developments.

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[137] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論兵丁之精神教育〉 vol 19, pp. 135-139. Quote from p. 135.
[138] 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論兵丁之精神教育〉 vol 19, pp. 135-139.
[139] 蔣介石，「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in《精神教育》，《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 260.
[140] On Whampoa "small group meetings" see 李翔，《革命的播种者：黄埔军校的政工群体（1924-1925）》（廣東人民出版社，2016）, p. 106.「完全自由發表其意見。」Wang Boling said these groups were Whampoa's "soul."
[141] 劉秉粹编，《革命軍第一次東征實戰記》(上海：中華書局, 1928).




Figure 14: "Baoding Military Research Center's Second Marksmanship Competition" (1905) was another community building exercise, with 100 contestants from various ranks and across Beiyang Army units and military schools. Results published in Military Magazine *include those of Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 (A) and Major Taga 賀忠良 (B). Photo from《武備雜誌》volume 21, p. 518.*

Textual Bonding

While officers were enjoined to not let a fixation on books get in the way of reaching their foot soldiers, officers themselves were expected, and required as students, to engage in reading, writing, and discussion of texts, in community with each other. One salient instance of this comes from Director Feng Guozhang, who extends the call in *Military Magazine* for "all gentlemen of like aspiration" (同志諸君子, or "all comrade gentlemen") to come regularly to the Baoding Military Academy library "to hold meetings… and in-depth discussions together (相與悉心討論)."[142] Feng's article provides a research syllabus (研究課程), presumably enabling *Military Magazine* readers across the Beiyang sphere to participate virtually, so to speak, or serve as a model for other Beiyang officers to conduct within their Regiments.[143] Feng emphasizes that the readings must be done together: participants should not "read the books at random" from the list, rather they "must follow in order with the steps." The reading process itself, Feng says, will require readers "place themselves in the perspectives" (設身處地) that the books offer them. The goal of their discussions "must be to

[142] 馮國璋，〈勸研究所員閱書增長學識說〉，《武備雜誌》: volume 19, pp. 285-287. 「國璋殖荒落愧不知兵謬膺總理所務之責，才疏任重/童懼弗克勝乃於開辦之後，急築圖書室數楹購置中東書藉約二百種庋閣其中凡我同人倘能於會集之日，相與悉心討論，日積月累，學愈富而識愈高….」

[143] There are nine topics in the main syllabus: 1) Art of War 兵法, 2) Military Organization 軍制, 3) Terrain 地形, 4) Fortifications 築壘, 5) Rifles and Artillery 槍砲, 6) Ammunition 彈藥, 7) Geography 地輿, 8) Mathematics 算學, 9) Surveying 圖繪. A supplemental syllabus contains three additional topics: 1) Drill 操法, 2) Fires 擊放學, 3) Modes of Battle 戰法. Of note, the final topic includes "all regulations for Combat Orders" (戰鬥命令一切規矩).

discard the old and bring for the new," and he adds if one aspires to become a renowned military theorist, "how on earth can we merely copy Western methods?"[144] Thus, the explicit goal of Feng's reading group is to go beyond knowledge acquisition and to produce new knowledge, that is, "research" (研究).

The particularly communal aspect of Feng's reading group is also meant to extend beyond the physical library space, thanks to the medium of *Military Magazine*. "If you get something from reading these books that you want to speak about, there's no harm in putting your ideas down and sending it up [to *Military Magazine*]," Feng writes, "As long as it has fair opinions about military matters, it can be published." As seen above, even Baoding students (學員), like Yang Jiantang, had articles published.[145] Importantly, Feng adds, "If your views are incorrect or if they *violate current taboos* (觸犯時忌), our [Military Research] Institute will immediately correct it on your behalf, with absolutely no punishment for the member's frank speech."[146] Thus, opening this forum to publish military knowledge to the *Military Magazine* readership, which we know was extensive, directly involved the protection of the greater Empire, and, importantly offered some level of protection for "frank speech" that might violate sensitive political "taboos." Feng's reading group bears some elements of the so-called "public sphere" of Western theories—though, of course, Feng and his co-readers are embedded within the State apparatus and their discussions center on organized violence, not art. Still, their stated aim is to produce new, non-derivative knowledge that will benefit the larger imagined imperial community, and their means is community reading, done face-to-face and through this printed, periodical medium.

But technical military books were not the only focus. Within the military academy, we also see Classical texts gain new kinds of attention and approaches. This should not be surprising, given that Spirit Education explicitly forwarded a vision of military efficacy as ultimately moral and ideational, above technical and physical considerations (though not necessarily in negation to them). Indeed, the Classical tradition emerged with added possibility and potency, serving as a locus for producing both new knowledge and building real community in the military sphere. A striking example comes via an Guangdong Officers Academy instructor lecturing on Spirit Education. Referring to Confucius' famous statement to Duke Ling of Wei that he had "never studied" warfare, asks students, the instructor asks students "But did you not know?" that Confucius *actually* held great insight into the "art of war" (兵法). The Sage only feigned ignorance because he knew fully well that Duke Ling was "an immoral and uneducated person" who "supremely loved war and killing people," and did not think it moral to share his knowledge.[147] Confucius thus exemplified both morality and martiality, along with a deft political wiliness. And yet, the instructor says that Confucius' statement was misconstrued and used by subsequent scholars, fearing the propagation of martial skills in the realm, to delegitimize the military as a subject the Sage had deemed unworthy of study. Thus, China's current malady of "revering the literary but despising the military" (重文輕武), the instructor says, comes from those who claim eminence as "great literary men" by dint of studying Confucius but in their scholarly duplicity are like one who has "just smoked opium and

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[144] 馮國璋，〈勸研究所員閱書增長學識說〉，《武備雜誌》: volume 19, pp. 285-287.「相與悉心討論，日積月累，學愈富而識愈高，必有推陳出新，以兵學名家者，豈特墨守西法而已耶！？」

[145] 學員楊鑑堂，〈論學生宜重研究〉，《武備雜誌》: Volume 20, 245-246.」

[146] 馮國璋，〈勸研究所員閱書增長學識說〉，《武備雜誌》: volume 19, pp. 285-287.「倘讀書得間欲有所言不妨條陳己見送高來所果其持論平允於武備有關，即可代為出報，如所見非是，或觸犯時忌，本所立即代為更正斷，不使該員獲直言之咎也。」

[147] (清)廣東將弁學堂編，《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》in 《廣州大典: 第三十七輯, 史部政書類 ; 第 27 冊》, (廣州 : 廣州出版社, 2015), vol. 332, p. 380.「專愛打仗殺人…無德行無學問的人。」

now see ghosts." "What do you think? Are they not despicable?" he asks students, adding: "On the day that Confucius uttered that one sentence, how could he have known that later generations echo such distortions?"[148] Despite his apparent anti-scholarly vitriol, the instructor has not rejected the "literary" (文) altogether; in fact, by asking students to re-imagine a moral and martial Confucius outside of the scholarly misrepresentations that have accreted over the millennia, he re-opens the Sage as a site of productive inquiry into the moral and the "spirit," as the aspects of warfare of ultimate efficacy. Indeed, up to and beyond 1919, we find this recovered or rebalanced martial Confucius used explicitly in Spirit Education curricula.[149] Even Sun Yat-sen's important 1921 speech called the "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育) would appeal to the officers and men of his audience that "Confucius' ideal world of Great Unity *can be realized*," though only if they enshrined Sun's Party "Doctrine" (主義) in a place of spiritual primacy, as discussed in Chapter 4.[150] Though intellectual historians of modern China may have some cause to proclaim the death of museumifcation of Confucius in the minds of certain key thinkers, within the specific context of the military academy—not merely Qing but even Republican—such statements would fail to capture the productive activity around the Sage we see here.

We see this reordering and renewing of the Classical tradition for modern warfare in even greater detail at the Jiangnan Military Academy (though, unsurprisingly, given the regional characteristics, with a decidedly less vituperative tone against scholarly traditions than the above example). One example is a rare surviving booklet from 1900 called the *Jiangnan Army Academy Class Works*《江南學堂課藝》, which contains a collection of 37 exemplary "disquisition" essays (*lun* 論) written by students as in-class assignments. Writing the booklet's lead preface was the renowned Zhang Jian 張謇 (1853-1926), the Empire's *zhuangyuan* (狀元, i.e., ranked first place) on the 1894 civil examinations who would go on to fame as a gifted innovator, advisor, and educator (and supporter of Yuan Shikai's rehabilitation to power in 1911 and his assumption of the presidency thereafter). Aside from general comments—tying the essays to a reversal of the trend after great Chinese Antiquity which held that "generals did not actually need to read books" (將果不必讀書) and literary men did not need to know warfare—Zhang Jian's presence on the page seems to be there to lend scholarly sheen not just to the booklet but to the school. Recall that Lu Xun had written that, before entering the geology school (apparently attached administratively to the Jiangnan Army Academy) "Anyone who studied 'foreign subjects' was looked down upon as a fellow good for nothing, who, out of desperation, was forced to sell his soul to foreign devils."[151] Though Lu Xun's impressionistic account only notes encountering those technical Western studies at the geology institute, the essays in this booklet, along with Zhang Jian's preface, show that another side of the curriculum was very important to the Jiangnan Army Academy. As the then-director, Qian Depei 錢德培, writes in the booklet's second preface, the essays were part of the academy curriculum that included both Western learning and proficiency in the Chinese Classics and Histories (經史)—a duality Direct Qian likens to Sunzi's famous line "knowing the enemy and knowing oneself" (知彼知己). Unfortunately, for us, however, the essays in this booklet are limited in scope to the latter portion, the Chinese Classics and Histories, and do not merge the two, though

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148 (清)廣東將弁學堂編，《廣東將弁學堂精神教育課目》in 《廣州大典: 第三十七輯, 史部政書類 ; 第 27 冊》, (廣州 : 廣州出版社, 2015), vol. 332, p. 181.

149 袁鈞武,《軍人精神講話匯編》(北京: 講武書局, 1919).

150 孫中山,《軍人精神教育》： 民國十年（一九二一年）十二月十日在桂林對滇贛粵軍演講:「孔子之理想的大同世界，真能實現，造成莊嚴華麗之新中華民國….」

151 Lu Xun, "Preface" to *A Call to Arms* (1922).

there is indication that a "second volume" (二冊) of "Class Works" (課藝) of student essays on more contemporary topics may have been published as well.

But we know more about Jiangnan Army Academy's emphasis on the Classics, and its conscious merging with Western ideas, from a later Syllabus (學堂教程表) from Director Luo Changqi's 1904-1905 tenure. Though the full syllabus includes many technical military subjects, including drill for "dispersed formations," below I have highlighted the progression of two subjects, Ethics and Morality (人倫道德) and Chinese Literary Study (中國文學), as they progress through the Acadmy's two-year preparatory course and the three-year regular curriculum: [152]

Prep Course

	Ethics and Morality	Chinese Literary Study
Year One	○ Discussion and Interpretation of the Classics 講解經書 ○ Book:《五種遺規》 (陳宏謀) ○ Book:《冰言藥言》 (沈家本)	○ Reading Classical Chinese 讀古文 ○ Essay Writing 作論
Year Two	○ Discussion and Interpretation of *Record of Words and Deeds of Prominent Officials through the Dynasties* 講解《歷代名臣言行錄》 ○ Reading *History's Mirror of Antiquity* 讀《史鏡古編》	○ Discuss standards of interpretation for Classical Chinese, taking the Tongcheng School as the model of elegance and fluency 講古文義法，以桐城派雅潔暢達為宗

Main Course

	Ethics and Morality	Chinese Literary Study
Year One	○ Origin and Development of Neo-Confucianism 理學源流 ○ Select discussions on the *Scholarly Life and Thought of the Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties* 摘講《宋、元、明國朝諸儒學案》	○ Reading anthologies of prominent Classical Chinese scholars 讀古文名家之專集
Year Two	○ Research the tangible achievements of Neo-Confucian scholars—in terms of words and action, along with government service—and use this to critically understand the relationship between study of skills [on the one hand] and national power and popular mores [on the other]. 研究理學諸儒言	○ Patterns based on collected essays and wise sayings of prominent scholars 集古今名家論文要言為程式 ○ Practice writing one's own compositions 練習自作

[152] 〈江南陸師學堂教程表〉in 羅長祺,《江南陸師學堂學案》(1904-1905).

	行政事之實績，因以考知學術與國勢、民風之關係	
Year Three	○ Research [Western] philosophy, sociology, and evolution [in order to] determine the extent to which Chinese and Western Studies are more or less compatible 研究哲學、羣學、天演學，論定西學與中學交通之損益	○ Study and practice the form of memorials and official documents 學習奏議、公牘體式 ○ Correcting the form of translated books 訂正譯書體式

From this syllabus, we can see that students were to learn Classical traditions, both in moral content and literary form, and then produce their own writing (練習自作). While the elevated scholarly content of the curriculum, in some ways, reinforces the powerful image of "gentry class" origins of military academy students during this decade, that the syllabus reveals to us the pedagogical scaffolding at work behind the type of student essay compositions presented in the *Class Works* booklet, paradoxically, complicates the idea that these "gentry sons" entered these schools pre-formed with nothing to learn from their instructors. More than this, the syllabus shows us at least two fusions of curriculum content that are key.

First, notice that from Second Year "self-composition" (自作), the final year of Chinese Literary Study culminates in the "study and practice the form of memorials and official documents" (學習奏議、公牘體式). Similarly, Baoding's "Chinese Language" (漢學) curriculum also taught a "Regulations for Military Correspondence and Documents" (軍用函牘規則) textbook, as noted earlier. That military documentary production were fused into in their respective Chinese literary curricula strongly suggests that both schools in Beiyang and Jiangnan understood this important process of writing military orders and reports for the battlefield as part of this larger, grander tradition of Classical Chinese essay composition.

Second, the "Ethics and Morality" curriculum from year two to year three also follows an important progression. Though both involve the key word "research" (研究), year two involves investigated the sources of Chinese national-imperial power (國勢) in relation to distinctly native, Neo-Confucian traditions (理學諸儒). The final year asks students to research the distinctly non-native ideas of Western "philosophy, sociology, and evolution" (哲學、羣學、天演學) and then critically evaluate the "compatibility" (交通, literally "exchange and communication") between the two. As I've said, it is quite unfortunate that we don't have surviving student essays on this particular subject.

We do have, however, Director Luo's lectures, which both engage students and model for them the type of critical inquiry the syllabus was intended to guide them in making for themselves. Though we have already seen Director Luo engage Rousseau, let us look briefly at his lectures on evolution, where he reads directly from Yan Fu's translation of Thomas Huxley while merging his discussion with Neo-Confucian traditions. One lecture focuses on Confucius's central notion of "forbearance" (恕, sometimes translated as "reciprocity"), a term that Yan Fu used extensively in his Thomas Huxley translation. Director Luo notes that Western theorist have acknowledged that "fit social groups (善羣) could not come together as a polity for even a single day" without this human quality of forbearance. Such acts of forbearance included "turning the other cheek" and forgoing revenge if robbed; and their willingness to forgo retribution and vengeance derive from the empathy produced by "putting oneself in the positions of others" (設身處地, the same phrase used by Feng

Guozhang for his reading group, above), even in the position of a perpetrating law-breaker. However, when such "self-negating and yielding behavior flourishes," it degrades society's overall fitness. Huxley (via Yan Fu) calls this "failure of forbearance" (恕敗), and, as paraphrased by Director Luo: "the Way of reciprocity means there will be no self-survival" (是恕之道：將無以自存也). Of course, as Yan Fu well-articulated in his translations and writing, it was precisely these harmonious Confucian values at the bedrock of Chinese civilization that hindered its future survival in modern world interstate competition governed by industrialized warfare.

Of course, Director Luo had something to say about this. On the one hand, he again cobbles together historical anecdotes. Note the case of Lou Shide 婁師德 (630-699), a military commander and court official who instructed his followers that it was wrong to even wipe the spit from detractors off one's own face, but whose deft maneuvering left him and his followers standing intact amidst an evil and murderous court. "How then has 'forbearance *failed*'?" Director Luo asks students, arguing that "whereas Huxley advocated violent contest for social power, they have not been able to comprehend the benefit of we Confucians [follow the *Analects'* injunction to] 'require much of ourselves and little responsibility on the part of others."[153] Though Yan Fu's Huxley had shown the fallacy of "putting oneself in another's position" (設身處地), Director Luo invites his students to reverse the gaze, so to speak, to see the fallacy of conceiving the world truncated into only "material conflict" (物爭) where the "aim of competition for power" (權利競爭之恉) is all there is. After all, moral power's dominance over material and physical factors was a central tenet of Spirit Education.

Beyond isolated anecdotes, Director Luo mounts a philosophical genealogy of Chinese forbearance beginning from Confucius's teaching to his disciples and from them to Mengzi, then moving through multiple philosophers the Han and post-Han to the greats of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism (Zhu Xi, the Cheng brothers, Wang Yangming). Director Luo's sprawling genealogy finally lands, with what he calls a "direct line of transmission," on the late Ming thinker, Lu Kun 呂坤 (1536-1618), and his central idea of "*strong* forbearance" (強恕). Even claiming that embedded in Lu Kun's work was a kind of "sociology" (羣學), the meaning of his move from the "failure of forbearance" to "*strong* forbearance" is clear: whereas China's spiritual heritage is said to inevitably lead to weakness and extinction, there is another path that involves re-engagement with these ideas to rekindle China's inherent moral and secular strength.

In this way, both *jinshi*-ranked Director Luo and the above Guangdong instructor, vitriolic as he was against certain scholars, are alike in seeing the Classical moral tradition as a site of new exploration for the resources needed to compete in modern warfare. And, as this discussion touches on Yan Fu, we can recall that Benjamin Schwartz's biography of him gives single mention of a so-called "muscular Confucianism," one which manifested briefly in the ultraconservative "Pure View" (清議) faction that violently opposed adoption of all "barbarian technology" during the 1860s and 1870s.[154] Schwartz merely notes that this "strain has been little studied so far in the West," never mentioning it again. But with Director Luo and others like him, we see something both similar and different from the "muscular Confucianism" Schwartz merely touched upon: similar in that a distinctly Confucian morality, as opposed to more Legalist strains, here informed a vision of state power in the world; different because Director Luo, like others, was not only active in adopting

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[153] 《學生袁魯字說》「由此觀之，恕亦安有失敗乎？赫胥黎之言，蓋猶權利競爭之恉，而於儒者之「躬自厚，薄責於人」，尚未能體驗有得也。」

[154] Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 15.

foreign technology and military techniques, he allowed the foreign ideas undergirding the West's so-called "Wealth and Power" to engage the Chinese moral "Essence" at its very foundations—in fact, he made this engagement a formal learning objective for his students. Now, this is not to say that the intellectual weight of Luo's arguments (or lack thereof), as recovered in these writings, should necessarily change the trajectory of Chinese intellectual history, whose arc understandably follows Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and others. To Director Luo, student engagement was central. In fact, only one of Director Luo's two lectures cited above was formally about the topic evolution, the other was a less formal talk devoted primarily to explicating the rich Confucian meanings behind a new "style name" (字) he had just bestowed on a *student* (named Yuan Lu 袁魯).[155] Thus we can see that these textual explorations, particularly into the Classical tradition, were not merely performed *in the context* of face-to-face community; they were generating new forms of it as well.

Student Wu's Essay

Finally, let us look closely at one example of a student essay, which was published in *Military Magazine* in 1904. Like those Jiangnang Army Academy *Class Works* booklet, this essay was a classroom product, of Baoding's "Chinese language exams" (漢文考試). But this essay prompt asked students explicitly to engage Western concepts using Chinese Classical tradition. The prompt gives students a single line from Mencius regarding of three concepts, "Heaven's timing" (天時), "Earth's advantageous terrain" (地利), and "human unity" (人和) and asked to draw "comparisons and contrasts" (異同) with "Western countries, who, though they do not disregard studying terrain and the strategic use of terrain, above all put the most emphasis and value on *concerted entities* (團體)."[156] In response, student Wu Zhongying 吳中英 writes that "Western military theorists, politicians, and philosophers, all see *accordance with the masses* (合羣) as a means to safeguard their county (保國), safeguard their teachings (保教, i.e., religion), and safeguard their race (保種)."[157] By deciding matters through "public opinion" (公議), rather than by forcing decisions, they tap into the "energies of the people" (民氣), thus making an entire nation into one powerful "concerted entity" (團體).[158] Despite these achievements, Student Wu claims that "…we know that what Westerners have researched is derivative of the *Principles* (理) of the ancients."[159] After all, he points out, "During the Three Dynasties there was consultation and deliberation that led to overwhelming accord; and this deliberation reached [down] to the common people (庶人)."[160] He argues that Mencius'

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[155] 羅長祺,〈學生袁魯字說〉,《江南陸師學堂學案》; the other lecture, 〈原恕〉, also addresses students personally, saying that he presents the dizzying genealogy of "strong forbearance" with the hopes that "every student can gain coherence of your thinking through the introspection."

[156] The full prompt reads: 「論說：孟子曰天時不如地利地利不如人和天時.一說泰西家所不廢地形地勢等學亦亟所講求而又最重團體與孟子所謂天時地利人和者異同所在試詳言之。」一名學生 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in 《武備雜誌》 1904 年 [第 7 期].

[157] This three-fold formulation was forwarded by 張之洞《勸學篇》1898： 吾聞欲救今日之世變者，其說有三：一曰保國家，一曰保聖教，一曰保華種，夫三事一貫而已矣。保國、保教、保種，合為一心，是謂同心。

[158] I'm translating *tuanti* 團體 as a "concerted entities" or "unified organizations," i.e., social bodies at the sub-governmental level that come together for a common purpose.

[159] 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in 《武備雜誌》 1904 年 [第 7 期].「 抑知西人所研者，猶是古人之理，或研之既久，真理愈出，其大原固同範一摸乎。」

[160] 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in 《武備雜誌》 1904 年 [第 7 期].「三代詢謀僉同，謀及庶人。」

tripartite formulation (from the prompt's passage) represents true and timeless *Principles* (理) of warfare that, "whether ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign… none have been able to surpass."[161] Student Wu blames the gross disparity between China and the West in the present on Chinese commentators on the Classics, who later "erroneously attached absurd theories to astrological divinations and fortune telling (孤虛旺相)" to what the *Principles* found in "sacred texts" (聖經) like Mencius.[162] For instance, though Taoist mystical concepts like "*yin* and *yang*" (陰陽) had crept into Chinese writings on environmental factors in warfare, neither was this not in those found in the West, Student Wu emphasizes, it had never been present in Mencius' "heaven's timing" or earth's "advantages." Student Wu argues that these accreted contaminations must be removed from China's "sacred texts" of the last 2,000 years. "As I've said," Student Wu concludes, "integrating matters that occurred over many thousands of years across tens of thousands of miles requires a perspective that looks at the larger significance (大義) that is there. *The only thing under Heaven that doesn't change, there is but one* Principle (天下不變者，只有一理)."[163] It is noteworthy that Student Wu's argument, about the ancient Chinese origins for Western prowess, was what Yan Fu had attacked so vehemently in 1895 (see Chapter 1).[164] However, both Yan Fu and Student Wu highlight mystical perversions within Chinese textual traditions. The difference is that whereas Yan Fu had concluded that the old traditions needed to be largely abandoned for the new, Student Wu followed those that called for recovery and renewal of the timeless *Principles* the old sacred texts had always carried.

A Baoding instructor (unnamed) offers critical comments to Student Wu's essay. While saying that Student Wu's thread on commentarial contamination at times "verged on the arbitrary," he affirms the essay's general orientation of finding similarities between Mencius's "human harmony" and Western "concerted entities." Still, the instructor redirects focus away from using deep Chinese antiquity as the positive model of comparison, and sharpens that focus to the military academy itself. He says that actually implementing the Western model of "forming the people of the whole state to become one large, concerted entity (團體)," "must begin with the Academy (學堂)" [i.e., not necessarily on nostalgic notions of the Three Dynasties].[165] Moreover, he says that "communication" (通) is required for "human harmony to be effective" (人和之效); and that "communication is derived from study" (通由於學). Most importantly, the instructor pinpoints the battlefield and the communication of information and orders:

> There are times when a military situation is totally fluid, and when a commander's *orders* (命令) are not implemented. Whether or not his orders are received by subordinates who either

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161 「古今中外，靡不公認，而我孟子天時數語，固統數千年兵家，所莫能外者也。」

162 Student Wu uses "yin and yang" as an example of such Taoist mysticism, which is one of the few differences between other Chinese writings on environmental factors in warfare and those found in the West. He points out that the spurious concept is not found in Mencius, reinforcing his argument about later commentarial contaminations of China's military mind.

163 「吾嘗謂，合數千年、數萬里之事，論之當觀其大義之所在，天下不變者，只有一理。」 I confess I do not understand whether this "one Principle" (一理) is something specific that I am missing from the essay or if it refers to Zhu Xi's overall Principle. My best guess at this point is the latter.

164 See Theodore Huters, *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005).

165 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in《武備雜誌》1904 年 [第 7 期].「今日歐美各國所行者，皆是此舉國之人結成一大團體，所謂人和也。然行之必自學堂始。」

> implement them in their own fashion or implement them in full accord with the commander's intent, there is no other factor than study [that leads to] communication.[166]

Whereas Student Wu had focused on the issue of fluidity and change across more abstracted time (ancient and modern) and space (the tens of thousands of miles separating China from the West), the instructor has redirected the student to the compressed fluidity within the time and space of a battlefield, reasserting the primacy of both interpersonal communication and the independent execution of orders in accordance with a commander's intent.

This type of Mencian "human unity" in battlefield communication had two aspects: technical and socio-moral. Such communication was technical: "the *methods* by which such communication occurs must take place in the Academy" (通之之法，必在學堂), writes the instructor. In fact, the methods for this form of operational and tactical communication are being tested and refined here, in Student Wu's essay on Mencius. After all, Baoding's "Chinese Language" curriculum textbooks included titles like *Essentials of Classical Language* (古文擇要) and *Regulations for Military Correspondence and Documents* (軍用函牘規則), as it did for Jiangnan Army Academy where students were similarly asked to "research" the "compatibility" (交通) between Chinese Classical traditions and Western theories about sociology and evolution (though no such essays seem to survive in the Jiangnan case).

But this battlefield communication was not merely technical, it was also a socio-moral issue as well. Here the instructor echoes Major Taga's discussion of the "meeting halls" (集會所) as mitigating the fact that "humans are emotional creatures each with their own different intentions (相異之意旨)" by bringing together officers with their superiors, peers and subordinates "regardless of rank."[167] Similarly, the instructor says that because men are of "different hearts and minds" (人格異心), "*lack of study* is the only reason that there would be no mutual communication (相通) between commanders themselves, between commanders and their soldiers, and between soldiers themselves."[168] Remarkably, when we consider (immediately below) that Director Feng Guozhang also inserts himself into this conversation, this three-fold strata is reproduced here around Student Wu's essay: for we have student, instructor, and director dialoguing with each other on the pages of *Military Magazine*, which is reaching a maximum potential of 60,000 Beiyang military men. This is another example where participation in producing essays and discussing texts, both Western and Classical, not only describes ideas about real and imagined communities, but is producing them as well.

Feng Guozhang writes that while Mencius's "human unity and [Western] concerted entities seem similar, they are actually different."[169] In Mencius's "human unity," Feng says, is about "mutual affections between higher and lower" (上與下相感) with the explicit purpose of those in higher positions "*quieting* [social] energies" of the lower (以上感下者，其氣靜). In contrast, he says "concerted entities bind together lower with lower" (上與下相感) with the explicit purpose of

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166 「即有時軍情萬變，長官命令不及施，而承其下者，自為佈置，亦與長官之意適合。無他，學之通也。」Emphasis added.

167 賀忠良編，吳宗煌修，〈論一標之團結〉，《武備雜誌》volume 20, p. 47.「人者有感情之動物也；各人有各人相異之意旨。」

168 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in 《武備雜誌》 1904 年 [第 7 期].「試以營務而論：將與將不相通，將與兵不相通，兵與兵不相通無他：有學有不學。」

169 馮國璋 in 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in 《武備雜誌》 1904 年 [第 7 期].「此人和與團體又似同而實異也。」

"*spurring* [social] energies" (氣動).[170] Feng adds that in past military theory, "advantages in terrain" (地利) were purely physically "bounded" (有定) features, such as mountains, rivers, etc.; but in the current day it now also included "human strengths (人力) as a resource" and, as such, was of "limitless" (無定) potential.[171] The United States, Germany, and Japan understood this, Feng says, for "without exception, they drew their resources from the strength of their masses (羣力), and this is the theory behind all 'concerted entities (團體)."[172] Offering incredible insight into his own conception of the nature of society, Feng says that those countries had essentially molded themselves into concerted entities from scratch: "For the energies of the people (民氣) are pure and simple: they are without local leadership associations (社會), without parliaments (議院), without new parties or old parties (黨), even without a sense of self interests."[173]

While we will return to Feng's imagining of society in the conclusion, here we focus on the startling conclusion he draws:

> Now, putting it all together, we can say: [Mencius'] "human unity" and the current situation of the world are daily transforming and renewing, [making] our modes of warfare become increasingly remarkable even as the people's hearts are increasingly roused. *I surmise that if our Mencius were placed in this* [our] *context* (度我孟子處此) *he would certainly have passed down other opinions.*[174]

I call this a startling conclusion, because Feng at least seems to say here that Mencius's actual work (what Student Wu termed a "sacred text") has no relevance to the urgent, even existential need China faces of turning the Empire into a "concerted entity." After all, Feng seems to have countered Student Wu's assertion about the Three Dynasties when he acknowledges that "since antiquity the Emperor-Kings all have based [their rule] on human unity."[175] By saying that something new and different was needed in the present age, Feng Guozhang seems to be publicly stripping "sacred texts" of their value and relegating them to a history and cultural nostalgia. However, context is needed to understand the importance of what Feng is actually saying here.

One key context comes from a preface Feng writes the very next year to an edition of Sunzi's *Art of War* (兵法) for military students.[176] There Feng tackles the same issue Student Wu's Mencius essay deals with, the problem of continuity and change with regards to applicability Chinese ancient texts. In terms of the "arts" or "methods" of warfare (兵法), Feng notes that obviously battles are no longer fought with chariots as when Sunzi wrote. But in terms of warfare's *Princples* (理), Feng says that what Sunzi laid out so long ago, "no one can go beyond them today."[177]

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[170] 馮國璋:「然人和者，上與下相感。團體者，下與下相結。以上感下者，其氣靜。以下結下者，其氣動。」

[171] 馮國璋:「蓋古之地利也，有定。今之地利也，無定。古之地利也，無不成乎天然。今之地利也，兼可資人力。」

[172] 馮國璋:「推之歐亞各國之興，亦莫不取資於群力，則皆團體之説。」

[173] 馮國璋:「而民氣純樸，無社會、無議院、無新黨、無舊黨，亦無自為風氣之事。」

[174] 馮國璋:「故渾而言之，曰：人和、今世局，日變而日新，戰法之奇，人心之動。度我孟子處此亦必有別存其說者矣。」Emphasis added.

[175] 馮國璋 in 吳中英，〈詳言之〉in《武備雜誌》:「自古帝王之起，莫不由於人和。」

[176] 〈馮國璋序〉in《趙註孫子兵法》, (廣東軍事研究社, 1905).

[177] Feng mentions Sunzi's delineation of *Principles* like special standard operations (奇正), hitting surfaces and gaps (虛實), strength of terrain (地勢), the importance of planning, etc.

Surprisingly, this is not at all dissimilar from the sentiments in Student Wu's essay, it directly echoes the latter's statement Westerners could not go beyond Mencius's "Way of employing troops." Likewise, in this context Feng Guozhang treats *Principle* in the same way as his student, here Likewise, as Student Wu had treated *Principle* as a constant, which remains "unchanged within the Realm" (天子不變), Feng Guozhang also says of *Principle* that "Though there are a myriad of changes, it cannot be departed from."[178] At this point it may be hard to find difference between Feng Guozhang's stance on the ancient text of Sunzi and Student Wu's stance on Mencius. But here Feng Guozhang presents *Principle* (理) as a constant and "application" (用) as variable.[179]

It is within this delineation that we find the true crux of Director Feng's intervention. Despite extolling the apparent timelessness of Sunzi, Feng says "he is detailed on *Principles* (理), and sparse on application (用)." But this feature identified in Sunzi's work is indicative, Feng says: "Western military men expend their hearts and minds on inquiries in order to apprehend *Principle* derived from application," while "Chinese men are excellent at articulating *Principle* but deficient in putting it into application." Because of this, Feng's Sunzi preface ends with a warning: he reiterates a story told by the great Su Shi 蘇軾 (AD 1037-1101) of a blind man who, unable to see the sun, is handed a copper plate and told that the sun is like it, leaving him to go on to believe, erroneously, that *all* the metal objects he encountered were sun-like as well. Feng's warning to students reading Sunzi's *Art of War* is about the erroneous *application* (用) of *Principle* (理), particularly in a facile assumption of similarity where a more rigorous investigation of diversity is necessary. Likewise, Feng's response to Student Wu's essay says, "though they *seem* alike, they are actually different" (似同而實異) with regards to Mencius's "human unity" and Western "concerted entities." I argue that Feng Guozhang is not devaluing either Sunzi or Mencius; rather he is pushing students beyond a complacent and facile assumption of similarity at that step of applying of those brilliant *Principles* to diverse and changing situations. This is both a challenge to students to exercise greater critical rigor as well as an invitation. Recall that Feng's invitation to join library discussion group assumed value of the military texts they would read together, but still stated that they should not be shackled by them ("how on earth can we merely copy Western methods?"), setting the communal reading goal as "discarding the old and bringing forth the new." Not only is Feng doing something similar here, his prompting for readers to "put themselves in the position" (設身處地) of the library groups military texts is actually mirrored here in the line appears, at first glance, to dismiss Mencius's current value: "*I surmise that if our Mencius were placed in this* [our] *context* (度我孟子處此), he would certainly have passed down other opinions":

Library Readings:	設＿處地	"Put [yourself] in that position…"
Mencius Essay:	度＿處此	"Surmise [someone] were in this position…"[180]

Rather than dismissing Mencius to the dustbin of history, Feng wants his student to *re-insert* the Sage in the context of their own day in order to think more rigorously *how* he would apply (用) his *Principles* to the transformed situation in the world. Neither a facile dismissal nor complacent affirmation will do; for Feng's is an invitation to individual agency, as it is also an invitation to

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178 〈冯国璋序〉in《赵注孙子兵法》:「雖千變萬化，不能離其宗」

179 〈冯国璋序〉in《赵注孙子兵法》:「用不同而理則同，理同則著綱在綱，雖千變萬化，不能離其宗」

180 For a history of civil examination questions asking candidates to not only imagine the perspective of another historical figure but also to speak in their voice and grammar, see Shoufu Yin, "The China That Could Have Been: A Transcultural History of Rhetoric and Political Thought, 1100–1600," (PhD Dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2021).

exercise that agency in community, a community without inordinate fear of rank hierarchies, of violating taboos against the political order, or, in this case, of allowing the very sacredness of texts like Mencius to inhibit critical thinking. This is also why Feng's response to Student Wu's essay, though a challenge, is not a public shaming or dismissive rebuke. Afterall, Feng had just argued against the efficacy of "top-down" (上與下) "quieting of energy" and the need of "horizontal" (下與下) "spurring of energy." Like the "meeting hall," Director Feng interacts on the page here with Student Wu "not on the basis of high or low rank." Indeed, what all these writings have centered on is "putting a student-turned junior officer in the position" of "receiving of an order" (一有命令) on the battlefield, requiring his ability to discern the commander's intent from afar and the critical strength of judgment to execute it adaptively, independently, even "freely." This was the type of community Feng Guozhang and others were trying to build through their military academy curricula. In this, the Classics retained great importance.

Conclusion

This chapter on Spirit Education has demonstrated that late Qing military academies in the Dynasty's final decade were productive in three distinct, interrelated areas. First, I have shown that they instilled in students a strong sense of belonging to an imagined imperial community that was, on the one hand, homogeneous in its composition of citizens bounded together like "particles" in a giant family and, on the other hand, differentiated and disciplined, especially when it came to *direct* "responsibility" for the community's armed and organized defense. Second, I've shown how concepts of "freedom" were worked out within the military academy. On the one hand, the military academy taught "freedom" as a normative concept, applicative across the Empire, and based on a citizen's direct responsibilities toward the broader community, though more explosive and disruptive discourses of freedom also came from outside sources to threaten harmony within the academy. On the other hand, a different, unique form of freedom was consciously cultivated within military curricula based on the specific requirements of military leadership within the dispersed command structure required by modern battlefields since the advent of the breech-loading rifle. This form of battlefield freedom, as I have called it, was not derivative of outside discourses of freedom: it was unique to the military academy and would continue long after the Dynasty was over, even to Whampoa Military Academy of the 1920s. Third, I've demonstrated that battlefield freedom required the creation of new forms of military community, designed for successful operation in combat. This means that while Spirit Education involved skill acquisition and the cultivation of agency in the individual, it also meant bonding individual "spirits" together as a team. In building military communities, bonding over the shared consumption of texts and producing essays was key for officers, and the Classical tradition remained important, though in new, transformed ways that supported the junior officer's expanding functional role as a key agent on the battlefield. In all these ways, the "spirit" was the glue that bound together both dispersed individual actors and their diverse, interdependent military functions; and education was the means for applying all this to real community.

These findings are historically significant in two ways. First, they show continuity across the Imperial-Republican divide. When Sun Yat-sen gave his cornerstone speech on Spirit Education in 1921, even as he sought ensconce his own Party "Doctrine" (主義) as the moral compass driving the all-powerful "spirit," as we will see in the next chapter, pitching his plan as a "realization… of Confucius' ideal world" was not a mere nod to cultural nostalgia: he *needed* to do so precisely because of the deep foundations laid in the 1900-1911 decade that so defined and spread the imperial

"spirit," and remained in the lived military practices of his audience.[181] And, as I have demonstrated throughout, other revolutionary actors like Chiang Kai-shek, especially in his revolutionary military academy at Whampoa, bear distinct imprints of the late Qing in terms of upholding the moral power of Spirit Education as the ultimate decisive factor in warfare, cultivating battlefield freedom, and community-building practices that sought to bond revolutionary "comrades" together through dialogue on sacred texts and in social interactions meant to transcend rank (if not completely eliminate it). Indeed, this dissertation's broader claim is that even Communist practices of ideology and organization, generally attributed wholly to Soviet Leninist influences, also have roots to concrete Confucian and Imperial practices located specifically to the late Qing military academy's practice of bonding over sacred texts, and more.

But what about further relevance of these findings to the 1911 Revolution itself? After all, Spirit Education did not, in the end, achieve its explicit goal of safeguarding the Dynasty. Two of the interlocutors covered in this chapter would die within a month or two of the October Revolution: former director Luo Changqi was killed at his post in Tibet in some of the rippling upheavals caused by the Revolution; while Wu Luzhen, after supporting the Lanzhou mutiny in November, would be gruesomely assassinated, presumably at the orders of Yuan Shikai.[182] Feng Guozhang, however, took command of the Beiyang Army dispatched to suppress the Wuchang Uprising after Yuan Shikai had been brought back from his forced reclusion (since 1908) at his home in Xiancheng, Hebei Province. Feng Guozhang led the Beiyang Army in incredibly brutal and bloody battles that retook Hankou and then Hanyang. Ready to assault Wuchang, however, Yuan Shikai suddenly recalled Feng Guozhang to Beijing for reassignment as commander of the Imperial Guard. It is generally accepted that the reason for Feng's sudden reassignment was that Yuan Shikai had, at this moment, begun serious negotiations with the revolutionaries for the abdication of the Qing from power. Knowing Feng's loyalty to the Dynasty and his apparent zeal to fight the rebels, Yuan replaced him with Duan Qirui, another Beiyang Military Academy graduate but with less warm emotions toward the Court, who took command to essentially wait for negotiations to conclude.[183]

When negotiations formally concluded, in February 1912, Feng called his Palace Guard force to together in formation within in the Forbidden City and spoke before them to announce the abdication of the Imperial Family to shocked and flustered soldiers, a majority of whom were Manchu and Mongol Bannermen. In an effort to assuage their fear and consternation, Feng read to them the specific articles of "special treatment" (優待條件) protecting the royal persons and iterated that both he and Yuan Shikai had always advocated "constitutional monarchy," but there had been too many provinces declaring independence, too few troops, and not enough money to remedy the situation in full; thus, it was an achievement that the Imperial family had been granted very favorable terms. Tears could be seen men's faces and ranks broke into commotion as disturbed troops anxiously debated their possible fates. Seeing that more was needed to assuage them, Feng then raised his voice over the commotion and announced, "*regardless of whether you're an officer or solider* (不論官長士兵), if you have something to say you can tell me. You can *select a few representatives* (推選幾個代表), have them stand five paces forward and, through them, everyone can express their

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[181] 孫中山, 《軍人精神教育》： 民國十年（一九二一年）十二月十日在桂林對滇贛粵軍演講:「孔子之理想的大同世界，真能實現，造成莊嚴華麗之新中華民國….」

[182] This gave rise to Wu Luzhen being called the "headless general," though the reliability of the actual details is questionable.

[183] For disagreements and Feng's anger over Duan Qirui's early and vocal support of imperial abdication, see 彭秀良, 《冯国璋传》, (北京 : 中华书局, 2015), p. 76.

opinion in full."[184] Now, where did an Imperial Guard force, intensively disciplined and organized solely for the protection of the lives of rulers and located at the very the seat of the Empire's authoritarian power, so matter-of-factly turn to something as seemingly *democratic* as "selecting representatives" without regard to military hierarchy of rank, and for the purpose of expressing individual opinions of its members to authority?

I suggest here that both Feng's impromptu suggestion and his troops quick response are indicative of the findings in this chapter; for Feng himself had previously built an educational infrastructure designed to cultivate "freedom," mediated by Spirit Education and applied to face-to-face military unit communities like this one. I also suggest that the modes of military "freedom" cultivated by Spirit Education actually attenuated the imaginative leap that avowedly "constitutional monarchists" like Feng and others needed to make when suddenly confronted with the end of Empire and the reality of a republic that had been thrust upon them, despite their immediate tears. As noted in the introduction, historians have noted that we have long treated "reformers," "conservatives," and "revolutionaries" as if they "inhabited different universes, and it would be incredible that they could share aims and programs or engage in similar sorts of political action."[185] Because of the study of military education I have presented in this chapter, I am able to show how even Feng Guozhang's Imperial Guard force, compartmentalized in the confines of micro-verse of the Forbidden City, indeed shared more commonalities in thought and practice with the revolutionaries outside the gate than we have ever realized.

This may have broader application when we consider Yuan Shikai's role at this transitional period as well. Traditional historiography has, with some undeniable justification, treated Yuan Shikai's name as synonymous with treachery: first for betraying the Dynasty he was sworn to protect and then for destroying the Republic he assured Sun Yat-sen that he would actively support. Revisionist historians, like Partrick Fuliang Shan, have taken advantage of more sources to paint a more complex picture, however. For instance, Shan argues that when Yuan returned from home reclusion to service in October 1911, he most likely did so with genuine intent to put down the rebellion and safeguard the Dynasty. It was only when the deluge of Provinces sided with the rebels that Yuan realized the Dynasty had not real path forward for retaining power, and that he set his efforts to negotiating a peaceful transfer of power that would retain both the safety and even the honor of the imperial family (allowing them to continue residence in the Forbidden Palace, for instance). In addition to the tears Yuan shed at his meeting with the Empress Dowager Long Yu informing her of this new political reality, Shan reminds us that Yuan was celebrated in early 1912, not just by Chinese republicans, but even by many revolutionaries and Manchu monarchists alike for having averted a cataclysmic civil war, guaranteeing a peaceful transfer of power, and retaining life and dignity to the imperial family. Days after abdication (and Feng's address to his Imperial Guard troops) the Nanjing Senate unanimously elected Yuan Shikai president, proclaiming that, while he was the world's second George Washington, but "to our Republic of China, you are the first."[186] Even Manchu Banner troops at the time called Yuan their George Washington.[187] And, as we have seen, Qing military academies like Jiangnan Army Academy presented a George Washington whose record of anti-monarchical rebellious activity had been selectively removed, making him a champion,

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[184] 彭秀良, 《冯国璋传》, (北京 : 中华书局, 2015), p. 78. "我剛才所說的事情，不論官長士兵，有什麼話都可以跟我說，你們大家可以推選幾個代表，請代表上前五步，由他們代大家申述意見。"

[185] Ernest P. Young, "The Reformer as Conspirator: Liang Ch'i-chao and the 1911 Revolution," in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey, Mary C. Wright, eds., *Approaches to Modern Chinese History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 254.

[186] Quoted in Patrick Fuliang Shan, *Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), p. 161.

[187] Patrick Fuliang Shan, *Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), p. 161.

instead, of top-down, peaceful reform—precisely what Yuan was celebrated for achieving in halting the bloody rebellion from below and convincing the Qing Throne to benevolently bestow the Republic from on high. Certainly, though not without duress, the top-down nature of the sudden political turn made the republican pill easier to swallow for men like Feng Guozhang. Of course, for serious republicans and certainly for revolutionaries, Yuan's likeness to George Washington that they celebrated in early 1912 carried the expectation that Yuan too would shortly return to his "Mount Vernon" in Xiancheng. However, as we know, Yuan and Sun Yat-sen's republican honeymoon period was short-lived and civil war would soon return with both vengeance and persistence.

Shan's revisionist view, while portraying Yuan as genuine in his original aspirations for the new Chinese Republic he had agreed to usher in, explains that he was naïve or mistaken about precisely what republican politics would actually mean in practice, especially for the chief executive position occupied he occupied provisionally in 1912. On Yuan's supposed naïveté in these regard, Shan points to the fact that, as provisional president in 1912, he never translated his massive support in Beiyang into a unified political party (*dang* 黨), even explicitly prohibiting the Beiyang Army officers from involvement in politics. Thus, Shan says, the results of the first parliamentary elections left Yuan quite troubled, even shocked, to see how Sun's skillful garnering of mass support for his Party through the ballot box had effectively seized great ruling power.

I am tentatively suggest here that if the type of practices of military "freedom" prescribed in Beiyang Regiments indeed made the idea of a republic more palatable, in its propositional form, to constitutional monarchists like Feng and Yuan in early 1912, then the opposite effect is also possible once republican politics were put into messy practice thereafter. After all, as military educators tried to drive home to their students throughout this decade, the notion of battlefield freedom was distinct from other forms; for it concerned the receipt of orders from an executive commander, requiring all members of the unit *qua* community, bound by a common "spirit," to exercise their "freedom" of independent agency to accomplish the commanders' intent across physical and geographic distance. If men like Feng and Yuan thought a Chinese republic might exercise individuated "freedom" the way their Regiments were supposed to, then they were bound for disappointment within the messy *praxis* of distinctly republican politics.

But this was not necessarily sheer naiveté when we consider that Sun Yat-sen arrived, only through a series of rude awakenings, to the need to militarize his undisciplined political party and then make a party-army from scratch. None of these measures were obvious to any actors present in 1912, though thereafter all concerned would need to deal with the building blocks laid by Feng Guozhang, Yuan Shikai, and other Qing military educators. For the next decade and a half, the overwhelming majority of military men inhabiting the former Qing empire would be taught explicitly—by moral injunction, statutory prohibition, and even by their oaths of office—that the solemn and powerful military Spirit was absolutely antithetical with membership in something as divisive to the imagined community as a political "party."[188] Sun Yat-sen would need to work for over a decade to find moral, institutional, and political answers to this critical military problem.

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[188] The Beiyang officer's oath of 1915, explicitly forbade ties to political parties (黨). For Republican Spirit Education teaching that military men cannot enter political parties or societies, see 〈軍人勿結黨入會〉in 袁鈞武,《軍人精神講話匯編》(北京: 講武書局, 1919), p. 159. Recall also Feng's response to Student Wu's essay in 1904: "For the energies of the people (民氣) are pure and simple: they are without local leadership associations (社會), without parliaments (議院), without new parties or old parties (黨), even without a sense of self interests."

Chapter 4
Ideology, Organization, and the Death of Student Cai

Introduction

On February 19, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek sat in his field headquarters by the walled town of Danshui, in Guangdong province. Just days earlier at this place, Chiang's so-called "Student Army," composed of the first class of Whampoa Military Academy graduates, achieved their first major battlefield victory. Though the campaign was far from over, telegrams from KMT luminaries, including Sun Yat-sen and Hu Hanmin in Beijing, poured in congratulating Chiang on a triumph that seemed to validate the innovative education they had poured into their Whampoa students. This validation also promised a turn in the tide against the so-called "warlords" who dominated a fractured Chinese nation.

Later that day, a telegram arrived from Whampoa's Party Representative, Liao Zhongkai, stating that Whampoa student, Cai Guangju 蔡光舉 (1901-1925), who had been rushed from the battle with severe wounds to a hospital 180 kilometers away in Guangzhou, had died. That night, Chiang Kai-shek released a general notice to inform all School Army units:

> Alas! ...Guangju nobly sacrificed his life: like returning home from a long journey, he unflinchingly went to his death. "Having sought benevolence, he attained it" (求仁得仁, from Confucius's *Analects*), and in resolve he had no regrets. Now, School comrades, how much more should you rise up in utmost bravery (奮勇)? Let us realize Guangju's own unfulfilled aspirations…. by fulfilling the responsibility of we who yet live and so allow him to rest his eyes in the underworld. How can we, comrades, ever forget the comrades who gave their lives in action here at Danshui?[1]

Though Cai Guangju's name is little remembered today, as Chiang's emotional notice indicates, he was important at the time as one of the first Whampoa students to lose his life in the very combat that the school's education was designed for.

Indeed, less than two weeks later, and while the campaign was still underway, a fellow classmate, named Jiang Xianyun 蔣先雲 (d. 1927), published an eyewitness story in a Whampoa newspaper about coming to Cai's aid on the battlefield. He wrote that despite the stomach wound, "Cai only said, 'Xianyun! Give me medical treatment quick, the rebel bandits are waiting for me to die in agony!'"[2] From Cai's gritty, defiant utterance in the face of the enemy, this classmate concluded the following: "This type of spirit (精神), was nothing less than the crystallization of our daily training in Doctrine (主義)."[3] Within a month's time, other Whampoa publications were printing letters that Cai Guangju had sent from the front to other classmates at the school, all to exhort students with Cai's heroic example.

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[1] Chiang Kai-shek, "Notice of Morning for Cai Guangju" (追悼蔡光舉通告), dated February 19, 1925, in *A Chronicle of Chiang Kai-shek* (蔣中正先生年譜長編) (Taipei: Academia Historia, 2014), p. 316.

[2] Jiang Xianyun 蔣先雲, "Return From the Frontline Enemy" 〈由前敵歸來〉, *Chinese Soldier*《中國軍人》, Issue 2, March 2, 1925; reprinted in 中共惠州市委统战部，《国民革命军东征史料选编 》，（广东人民出版社，1992）, pp. 44-46.

[3] Jiang Xianyun 蔣先雲, "Return From the Frontline Enemy" 〈由前敵歸來〉, *Chinese Soldier*《中國軍人》, Issue 2, March 2, 1925; reprinted in 中共惠州市委统战部，《国民革命军东征史料选编 》，（广东人民出版社，1992）, pp. 44-46.

Though Cai Guangju was one of the first killed in combat, his name soon faded from collective memory, as more and more Whampoa students fell in combat in this campaign and, in exponentially greater numbers, during the coming years. Thus, on top of Student Cai's initial name, a growing pile of such hero narratives proved ample resources for the school's constructed history. Likewise, the Battle of Danshui, where Student Cai fell, was only the first of many battlefield victories that would culminate in 1928 with the substantial, though partial, unification of China under a central government in Nanjing. By this time, the so-called Whampoa Spirit (黃埔精神) had also emerged as a powerful concept that explained *how* the outnumbered and outgunned revolutionary forces of the KMT and CCP's United Front had overcome greater numbers and material superiority of warlord armies.

This Whampoa Spirit had particular texture and contour. As Jiang Xianyun's battlefield account stated, "*this type* of spirit" (這種精神) emanated from daily military training in political "Doctrine" (主義). As this chapter explores, this was about the renovation of the late Qing Spirit Education tradition, for it replaced Confucian "sacred texts" (聖經) as is moral basis with novelly-constructed political Doctrines from Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist Party (KMT), and to some extent, from the latter's new United Front partner, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Now, Timothy Cheek writes, "Ideological politics in China *began* with the Sunism of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles (*sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義)…."[4] If Cheek is correct, then *ideological warfare* in China began with Whampoa, for it made the ideology of Sun's Three People's Doctrine the cornerstone of its renovated Spirit Education program, which then found its first practical application in battle at Danshui in 1925. As one of the more recent pieces of serious Whampoa scholarship argues, Chiang Kai-shek's "spiritual training program that emphasized a strict code of ethics…. would serve to distinguish the revolutionary soldiers from the warlord rabble in the eyes of a skeptical public and restore popular trust in the military."[5] Thus, for many period actors Whampoa differentiated itself from what came before and what existed contemporaneously in "warlord" China was its paring of organized violence to ideology, which crystallized a moral or ethic of the greater national good in Doctrinal form.

But more than ideological construction alone, contemporaries understood at the time, as historians do today, that Whampoa brought critical new organizational innovations as well. With Sun's decision to form the United front with the CCP in 1923, advisors from the Soviet Union introduced Leninist organizational models that revamped the KMT as a political party. But Whampoa served as the hub of these "missionaries of revolution," as the Soviet military advisors have been called, and they set about making the school a conduit for the recent military lessons of the Russian Revolution and Civil War (1917-1922).[6] In fact, when Student Cai fell at Danshui, he was serving in a particular role called a Party Representative (黨代表), a Soviet innovation in dual-command organization made to enhanced the spiritual power of ideology by taking it from education to the battlefield. The Party Representative system that began here would have deep and complex impact on Chinese military organization to this day.

It was this fusion of ideology and organization that Whampoa Military Academy brought to bear on the stage at this time, with profound and lasting impact on the development of the modern

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[4] Timothy Cheek, "Making Maoism: Ideology and Organization in the Yan'an Rectification Movement, 1942–1944," in Robert Culp, Eddy U, and Wen-hsin Yeh, eds., *Knowledge Acts in Modern China: Ideas, Institutions, and Identities*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), p. 308. Emphasis added.

[5] Colin Green, "Turning Bad Iron into Polished Steel: Whampoa and the Rehabilitation of the Chinese Soldier," *Beyond Suffering: Recounting War in Modern China*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), p. 155.

[6] Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

Chinese state we see today. Though scholars generally use the paradigm of "ideology and organization" to explain later periods in Republican and Communist history, its roots undeniably trace back to Whampoa.[7]

But the vaunted Whampoa Spirit, moreover, serves as a deeply-ingrained and still widely accepted "genesis story" of how military violence in China first emerged as both moral and modern. Moral because Whampoa first made the practice of violence explicitly *ideological* and nationally minded; modern because it finally *organized* Chinese practitioners of violence in such a way that both captured the ultimate moral factors decisive in warfare and produced unprecedently efficacious battlefield results in the world of industrialized warfare. This chapter challenges that creation narrative by going to the very roots of Whampoa's genesis story by excavating the how its ideology, organization, first came together on the battlefield, particularly in the person of Student Cai. Using Student Cai's story, in conjunction with previous chapters, this chapter argues that Whampoa actually represents deep continuity with military academies of the late Qing, both in the conviction that the moral power of "spirit" was the ultimate battlefield factor that such education was critical for battlefields organized on unit dispersion and decentralized command. As such, I demonstrate that Whampoa, for all of its undeniable innovations and subsequent impact on Chinese history, was as much or more a product of the late Qing Empire as it was of Sun's political Doctrines or of Leninist influence brought by Soviet "missionaries."

Making this argument involves five sections. Section 1, "Sun Yat-sen's *New* Spirit Education," examines Sun's initial efforts to renovate the late Qing Spirit Education tradition by enshrining his political Doctrines over Confucian texts as the ultimate moral authority over the practice of violence. Section 2, "Whampoa and Student Cai," shows how Sun's earlier aspirations took on institutional realization in the Whampoa Military Academy, whose 1924 founding would ultimately change the life course of a listless college student, Cai Guangju. This section also shows that many of the organizational innovations introduced to the school itself, actually lay bare strikingly similar dynamics and problems faced by late Qing military educators before. Section 3, "Two Weeks to Danshui," reconstructs the initial phase of Whampoa's first military campaign using a treasury of field documents saved from one Regiment's Unit Diary.[8] Whereas school historiography emphasizes the Whampoa army's ability to successfully win over hearts and minds of local population, I show that this understanding is problematic at this historical juncture. What we do see is the general inexperience of Whampoa student officers that compound the challenge of

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[7] While Franz Schurmann has used the paradigm of ideology and organization powerfully to explain post 1949 Communist China, Timothy Cheek points earlier to its key development in the Yan'an period (1935-1945). One intended implication of this chapter is to plant that paradigm more firmly in its original Whampoa context, and even earlier. See Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Timothy Cheek, "Making Maoism: Ideology and Organization in the Yan'an Rectification Movement, 1942–1944," in Robert Culp, Eddy U, and Wen-hsin Yeh, eds., *Knowledge Acts in Modern China: Ideas, Institutions, and Identities*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016). Cheek does say that "ideological politics in China began with the Sunism," and that "Mao followed suit" with "the Yan'an political model… [that was] pedagogical (p. 308)." But he makes no mention of the Whampoa model.

[8] This relatively untapped source offers unprecedented detail for the study of Whampoa's earliest military operations. It was the "Campaign Diary" (陣中日記) containing over 400 pages of field communications and reports that went through the Chief of Staff Office (參謀處) headed by Liu Bingcui 劉秉粹, Party Representative for the First Teaching Regiment (教導第一團) of the Whampoa School Army during the First Eastern Campaign. In his preface, Liu says that these documents "sat for years in a bamboo chest before being printed" (脫稿有年，藏諸篋衍，比謀付印), until 1928 when they published it for Whampoa students at the new school location in Nanjing. He says, "The orders, reports, communications, and other materials contained in this book are all copied from the originals, to which we dared not add or detract a single word." Liu Bingcui 劉秉粹, ed., *Actual Battle Records of the Revolutionary Army's First Eastern Campaign* (革命軍第一次東征實戰記), (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928).

their units dispersed widely across the campaign space, desperate for provisions as they cross incredibly complex, and often hostile, human terrain, and with written communication and reports the only means by which commanders can piece together an accurate picture of their situation and surroundings. Section 4, "Utmost Bravery" lays out important details of the conduct of battle at Danshui, while Section 5, "Post Mortem" argues that Chiang Kai-shek's debrief to troops immediately after the battle offers important problematization and qualification to our understanding of the emergence of the Whampoa Spirit as a force in Chinese history.

Sun Yat-sen's *New* Spirit Education

In 1912, Sun's aspirations for republican governance over a new China quickly devolved as Yuan Shikai thwarted the KMT's first electoral victories. The next decade saw a series of interminable wars between factions and so-called "warlords," leaving Republican China fractured. Speaking in 1921 to a large audience comprised of officers and soldiers of KMT-aligned armies from Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong, Sun addressed this decade of setbacks in a key speech called "Spirit Education for Military Men."[9] "Since the Wuchang Revolution," he told them, "our so-called Chinese Republic is so in name only, not in reality, for all of its political power… has been usurped by the hands of militarists (武人)." Sun also claimed that redemption of China rested on the education of the "military men" (軍人) in front of him. But no ordinary military education would do: it needed to be "extra ordinary" (非常), a break from the past and a break from their rivals. Sun called this "*Revolutionary* Spirit Education" (革命精神教育). Whereas all previous "revolutions" or "changes of Heaven's mandate" (革命) had only ushered in the next dynastic house for the last two thousand years, "*this type* of revolution" had Doctrine (主義). Particularly, it was Sun's own Three People's Doctrine: Nationalism (*minzu* 民族, lit. "clan/race of the People"), the People's Rights (*minquan* 民權), and People's Livelihood (*minsheng* 民生). Thus, the speech was an explication of the Three People's Doctrine as applied to military men. As such, it was also a call to place that Doctrine as the ultimate moral authority governing organized violence in China.

This speech was seminal for many reasons. For instance, Chiang Kai-shek's later re-presented Sun's speech in full text at the beginning of his important compilation, *Spirit Education* (精神教育), that he published at Whampoa after Sun's death in 1925. In Chiang's commentary he stated that Sun's 1921 "Spirit Education for Military Men" was the KMT's cornerstone. Thus, together with Whampoa and Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's speech was an important development in making ideology not just a political force but a military one.

Moreover, in hindsight the speech telegraphs Sun's later move toward the Soviet Union, which inaugurated fundamental Party and military reorganization on top of ideological indoctrination. There Sun military audience that "Russia's Revolution fought against political inequality and property inequality simultaneously;" and that Russian military men were to this. He says, "Their military men all have Doctrine and they all have direction. Therefore [military men] united with the workers and peasants to form a new nation."[10] He concludes that "If the military men of our country today had both Doctrine and direction, and resolved to form a New China, the

[9] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), speech delivered on December 10, 1921 at Guilin to KMT-aligned combined armies drawn from Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces. Located in 《國父全集》(*Father of the Nation Complete Works*), (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989), volume 3, pp. 281-306.
[10] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921.

outcome would certainly surpass Russia."[11] In these ways, Sun's Spirit Education speech, as understood today, is significant for signaling later developments of ideology and organization.

Read in this way, however, we largely take for granted the propositions Sun makes for the novelty of his Revolutionary Spirit Education, that is, as a break from the imperial past and a break from contemporary "warlord" rivals. This assumption has been made easier by the historical consensus that late Qing military academies had completely ignored Spirit Education. But as my research in previous chapters has shown, late Qing military educators paid explicit attention to Spirit Education, which they upheld as the ultimate determinative factor on the battlefield. This perspective gives us a new lens to read artifacts like Sun's Spirit Education speech, not merely for what it presages in the future, but hitherto unrecognized problems and complexities with Sun's stated goal of making his program stand apart from *other* Spirit Educations of China's imperial past and Sun's immediate present.

First, Sun attempts to enshrine his political Doctrine as the ultimate guiding moral authority for violence, not merely by explicating his Doctrine and applying it to China's current crisis, but by engaging the Confucian Classical tradition throughout the speech as well. For instance, he cites in the speech Confucius's saying, "All Under Heaven belongs to the public" (天下為公), that is still inextricably linked with Sun's legacy today. Moreover, Sun tells these military men that "Confucius's ideal world of Great Unity truly can be realized to create a proud and radiant New Chinese Republic, one that can surpass Europe and America."[12] Elsewhere Sun states the "next revolution" will help unlock the unrealized potential embedded in "the treasury our ancestors have passed down for thousands of years." But this is more than an appeal to cultural nostalgia for a sense of pride. Only when we understand that Chinese Spirit Education since the late Qing was grounded on the "sacred texts" (聖經) of the Classics, as detailed extensively in Chapter 3, can we then see that Sun *needs* to engage, rather than discard, that tradition if he hopes to enshrine his Doctrine as its moral fulfillment. This is because the Classics were still a living and breathing tradition embedded in the Spirit Education that Sun and his military audience implicitly understood, but we have collectively forgotten.

And this is more than window dressing. If part of his speech is an exposition of his Three People's Doctrine, another aspect is that it is structured around explicating Confucian cardinal virtues. For instance, "benevolence" (*ren* 仁) takes center stage. Sun defines the Confucian virtue of benevolence as "not taking to account either personal profit or loss (利害)." Sun also quotes Confucius's *Analects* directly, which explains that the "man of ideals" (志士之仁) "will even sacrifice his life to preserve his benevolence complete; he will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their benevolence; *he seeks benevolence and having attained it* (求仁得仁) he permits *no regret* therein (斯無怨矣)."[13] Readers will recall that the last lines (italics) are precisely the verbiage Chiang Kai-shek used to mourn Cai Guangju's death. As will become clearer throughout this chapter, these connections are not merely coincidental, for they form webs of meaning to these actors.

Furthermore, Sun makes other connections between the Confucian virtue of benevolence, particularly to religion. Sun tells them that Christians in the Roman era and Chinese Buddhists in the

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[11] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「彼俄國之新政府，名為勞農政府，實即農、工、兵政府。其軍人皆有主義，有目的，故能與農、工聯合而改造新國家。吾國今日之軍人，倘亦具有主義及目的，決心改造新中國，其效果必在俄國上。」

[12] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「孔子之理想的大同世界，真能實現，造成莊嚴華麗之新中華民國，且將駕歐、美而上之。」

[13] Confucius citation from *Analects* 9:1, modified James Legge translation. Sun's original text:「仁則不問利害如何，〈有殺身以成仁，無求生以害仁。〉求仁得仁，斯無怨矣。」

Medieval era all faced persecution, but they not only survived, they flourished. This was because "Buddhists and Christians all sacrificed for their Doctrines (主義) in order to save others." And by their brave perseverance, Sun says, we see the "*benevolence* of religious practitioners" (宗教家之仁).[14]

Continuing to expand his web of associations around the core concept of benevolence, Sun affirms that the "man of ideals" (志士) has the same "calculations of the heart" (心術) as religious practitioners and philanthropists, but with is one major difference: "he exerts himself unto death *solely for the nation*, for which he sacrifices his life without considering the costs."[15] It is this particular quality of "love for country" (愛國) that determines national strength or weakness. Moreover, Sun says that no better example of a people's love for their country exists than Japan, who defeated Russian to become a world power. Sun says that visible manifestation encapsulating that love came at the Port Arthur campaign in 1904, the details of which will become very important to our story of Cai Guangju later. As Sun recounts the episode, because Japanese commanders knew a direct assault on the strong Russian fortifications guaranteed casualties of such great enormity, instead of choosing one designated unit to make the assault, they asked for a few hundred volunteers from "those who dared to die" (敢死之士). When the amount of men who "submitted their names" (報名) reached the thousands they "had to draw lots to determine was selected and who was rejected (乃用拈籌之法，以定取捨)." In fact, two of the rejected volunteers immediately committed suicide by drowning themselves in the ocean, which Sun says, caused "the heart of the Japanese army to be so moved that they went on to achieve victory." "This," Sun concluded, "is giving up one's life to save the country, and it is benevolence of a man of ideals (志士之仁)."



Figure 15 Stereoview Slide 1905 "Japanese of the First Division ready to move into the fighting lines- siege of Port Arthur". The commentary on the reverse speaks of a "certain death party," which is the group Sun Yat-sen refers to in his 1921 speech. Original in author's collection.

[14] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「即宗教家之仁，如佛教，如耶穌教、皆以犧牲為主義，救濟眾生。」

[15] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「即志士愛國之仁，與宗教家、慈善家同其心術，而異其目的；專為國家出死力，犧牲生命，在所不計。」




Figure 16 Stereoview Slide 1905 "The horrors of modern war - a trench filled with Japanese dead - in Russian fort, Port Arthur." Original in author's collection.

Sun marks a critical delineation between a military man's moral responsibility within autocratic and republican polities respectively. Sun says, "Since military men have been around [in human history], every one of them would say they give all their strength to serve the country." However, "in an autocracy (專制國), the country is the private property (私產) of the single person of the Ruler (君主), and it is acknowledged that the Ruler *is* the country." For this reason, Sun says, "military men in this type of autocracy can only proclaim themselves loyal to one person, one [ruling] family; and they are to expend their strength to death for the Ruler, *not* sacrifice themselves for the people."[16] This contrasts with a "republic" (共和國), where "the country belongs to the entire people" and a military man's "sacrifice [for the people] is simultaneously giving one's all to the country."[17] Thus, Sun claims that the ethic of violence for military men is fundamentally different depending on the type of government that they serve. Not only does Sun say his delineation here of a distinctly *republican* ethic of violence necessarily derives from his newer political Doctrines, it also defines the properly realized "benevolence of the military man" (軍人之仁) of Classical tradition.

In this way, Sun fuses his Doctrine to virtues of the deep Confucian Classical tradition to make two important temporal breaks: one with the former Qing Empire of the recent past (diachronic) and another break with the lived present of "warlord" dominance (synchronic). Both the late Qing and the warlords appear throughout the lengthy speech tied to autocracy, repression, and self-interest as opposed to his republican Doctrines. While historians have largely reproduced both the diachronic and synchronic distinctions Sun draws here, there are some problems.

Take, for instance, Sun's multi-tiered approach to explicating the Confucian virtue of "benevolence," which moves it from its original context to explore new meanings in various religious and nationalistic salvation programs, culminating in his *revolutionary republican* nationalist project. But in doing this, Sun not only takes the Classical tradition seriously, his mode of thinking also strongly resembles practices we have seen in late Qing military academies. For instance, Feng

[16] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「專制國家乃君主個人之私產，認定君主即為國家，故在此專制國之軍人，只可謂忠於一人一姓，為君主出死力，非為人民而犧牲也。」
[17] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「若在共和國，則國家屬於全體人民，而犧牲者，即同時為國家盡力也。專制國與共和國之軍人，相異之點若此。」

Guozhang repeatedly exhorted Baoding students, not merely "to put oneself in different perspectives" (設身處地), but to put sages like Mencius in their own times and surmise what they would say (Chapter 3). Sun's explication of these Confucian virtues for the sake of national salvation fits this mode. Likewise, we saw Director Luo Changqi present a genealogy of the Confucian virtue of "reciprocity" (恕) that landed on the concept of a "*strong* reciprocity" (強恕), which could provide the strong moral resources to engage the nihilistic world of "material competition" (物爭) posited by Western Social Darwinism. Through undeniable differences exist between Sun's Spirit Education ant that of the late Qing predecessors he seeks to differentiate himself from, they share a core conviction that the Confucian Classical tradition remained a creative resource for creating moral and efficacious violence in the modern world.

Perhaps the most trenchant difference Sun draws is the distinction between military morality or "benevolence" as it applies within a "republic" and an "autocracy," respectively. The latter Sun claims is a moral obligation solely to the "private interests" (私) one Ruler (君主), which is a reference both to the late Qing and the "warlords" of his present day. And yet, as we saw previously, late Qing Spirit Education went to great pains to invite students to identify themselves with an Empire full of 400 million family members bound as one, even like "participles" (質點), and as "citizens" (國民) linked through "thought" (思想). Also, Sun tells officers and men that they have a special role as part of "one large society (社會) formed out of the combined and varied organizations of peasants, workers, merchants, and others."[18] Out of this he says, "you gentlemen are military men, though you are merely a part of the functional division (分功) of society, in their specific roles as peasants, workers, and merchants, they do not possess ability to draw bows and wield weapons: so they all rely on military men for protection."[19] And yet, late Qing military educators similarly spoke of the entire Imperial community as a single "concerted entity" (團體), with different functional roles that determined "responsibility," "authority," and "freedom." Moreover, the military man took a special responsibility for protection of the whole, with the Emperor (君) relying on them from above, and the entire Country (國) below. Indeed, if late Qing Spirit Education had a single call word for their ethos it was "Loyalty to Lord, Love for Country" (忠君愛國). Sun's critique truncates this ethos, leaving the former and erasing the latter. While Sun's rhetoric is understandable given the goals he sets forth, historians need to recognize more space between this trope and more complex realities.

And what of the synchronic break Sun claims between his Spirit Education project and his current rivals? We cannot forget that while revolutionary parties played an insurgent role from 1912-1928, Chinese militaries continued Spirit Education that constructed moralities of violence that also posited service and sacrifice for the nation. Even the 1915 oath instituted by President Yuan Shikai for all military personnel, including officers, enlisted men, and military students was explicit about this. Within the eight part oath, military men swear to "Display Utmost Loyalty in Protecting the Country" (晝忠保國), "Sincerely Protect the People" (誠意衛民), and "Not Begrudge My Life" (不惜性命). The ceremony for the oath taking usually took place in a temple, with some form of accompanying music, and in front of "spirit tablets" of two historically-based demi-gods of war Guan Yu 關羽 (AD 160-220) and Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103-1142). In addition to the eight-part vows,

[18] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921.

[19] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「合農工商等之各種組織，而始成一大社會。故社會之事業，愈分愈多，則愈形活動。諸君之為軍人，亦不過為社會分功之一而已。彼為農、為工、為商者，因各有所事，不能躬執干戈，故有待於軍人之保護。」

respondents then verbally acknowledged their adherence on penalty of "Heavenly judgment" and legal culpability, signed a copy of the oath and were required to keep it on their person. For this oath, said one military journal in 1915, encapsulated both the military man's "technical education" (技術教育) and his "Spirit Education" (精神教育). In sum, these Republican oaths remind us that Sun Yat-sen's was neither the only Spirit Education or codified ethic for violence in service to the common good that was around—despite Sun's rhetoric and the profound influence that rhetoric has had on historiography.

In fact, one particular part of the 1915 oath highlights an entirely alternative republican military ethic to Sun's. Part eight of the oath required soldiers to swear to "Never Join [Political] Parties or [Secret] Societies" (不入黨會). Of course, this was diametrically opposed to (even directed towards) Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party (KMT, 國民黨), and their emphasis that their party organization as a vehicle for both revolutionary change and republican governance. Not unreasonably, this ban on military men joining political parties has been interpreted very much like Sun Yat-sen presents here: as Yuan Shikai's "totalitarian" effort to crush rival KMT influence and make himself an imperial "lord" (君主) over China. But this has also missed the a rival and not illegitimate ethic at work. In a 1919 booklet published in Beijing, called *Collected Lectures on the Spirit of Military Men* (軍人精神講話匯編), two authors explicate the restriction on soldiers joining parties, as laid down by Yuan Shikai and upheld by President Li Hongyuan. They write:

> We say that a nation (國家) can have political parties (政黨), but the military sphere (軍界) cannot; the people (人民) can have clan associations (社會), but not the military sphere. For military men expend their effort in fighting wars, and this is done to rescue the people of the nation from calamity; it is not so that military men can scheme for *private gain* (私利).[20]

They also note that throughout imperial history "factions" (黨, modern translation for "parties") had riven central efforts for forwarding the common good. In this way the authors make a moral case based on "public" (公) versus "private" (私) that recalls what we saw earlier in Feng Guozhang's *Military Magazine* and provides alternative Sun's moral construction.[21]

To be sure, despite these thorny historical complications to his argumentation, Sun is doing exactly what a leader needs to do for a military: reassure soldiers of the absolute morality of their cause and draw a clear moral distinction between them and their enemies, all in order to enhance their ability and willingness to inflict violence on others and to suffer it, even fatally. Sun asserted laid bare a moral differentiation between the army before him and their rivals. Thus, he tells these soldiers from Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong "…the South [of China] has Doctrine (主義), but the North has no Doctrine; the South acts for the public (為公), the North acts only for private

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[20] Tao Zonggui 陶忠淮, Hua Shijin 華式金, "Military Men Must Not Join Parties or Enter Societies" (軍人勿結黨入會) in Yuan Junwu 袁鈞武,《軍人精神講話匯編》(Collected Lectures on the Spirit of Military Men), (Beijing: Jiangwu shuju, 1919), p. 160-161.

[21] Feng Guozhang wrote in 1904: "For the energies of the people (民氣) are pure and simple: they are without local leadership associations (社會), without parliaments (議院), without new parties or old parties (黨), even without a sense of self entitlement (自為風氣)."「而民氣純樸，無社會、無議院、無新黨、無舊黨，亦無自為風氣之事。」 See Feng Guozhang in Wu Zhongjing 吳中英,〈詳言之〉, *Military Magazine* (武備雜誌), 1904 issue 7.

interest (為私)."[22] Because of this, Sun assures them, "this is a war between those who have Doctrine and those that don't, a war between public interests and private interests."[23]

The reason it is important for historians to understand the problems with the clean dichotomies Sun draws here is certainly about greater understanding of the larger context. But it also lays bare the contingent and even contradictory nature of Sun's effort to enshrine his Doctrine to ultimate moral authority over Chinese violence, which later took on the air of moral inevitability. More than argumentation, Sun's Spirit Education proposal became much more problematic in June of 1922 when his erstwhile backer Chen Jiongming 陳炯明 (1878-1933) suddenly turned on Sun and very nearly eliminated him altogether. This setback was a pivotal factor in Sun's turn to the Soviet Union for aid and his receptivity to Leninist forms of organization.[24]

Whampoa and Student Cai

In tracing certain Republican youths from their backwater localities to school, and then to membership in the early Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Wen-hsin Yeh writes that their personal journeys are "intelligible more in terms of life's twists and turns, disjunctions, ruptures, unintended consequences, and unfulfilled wishes than in terms of development and continuity."[25] Cai Guangju's path from his 1901 birth in the small city of Zunyi, Guizhou Province, to his entry in the inaugural class of the new revolutionary military academy on Whampoa island in Canton in mid 1924, also followed this type of non-linear progression.

When Cai filled out his "Student Survey" forms sometime after arriving at Whampoa, he wrote that his "Cai family residence" (蔡宅) located along the dyke of Old Town Zunyi's West Gate, but their family had "no set occupation," "meeting our expenses through our meagre property" of a 13 acre field (80 畝).[26] That is to say, Cai's family were small-scale landlords. Still, interviews of surviving members conducted by Zunyi local historians repeatedly emphasized the family's meager means and status, along with the death of Cai Guangju's father.[27] Nevertheless, the education Cai noted on his Whampoa survey indicated some level of privilege: for he graduated

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[22] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「只須同負革命責任，發揚革命精神，以此制敵，何敵不摧？以此攻城，何城不克？此則由於南方有主義，北方無主義；南方為公，北方為私故也。」

[23] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921:「以有主義與無主義戰，以為公者與為私者戰。」

[24] Cheng Hsiao-shih also notes that because Sun turned to the Soviets only after England, the U.S., and Japan "shut the door on him," the Leninist organizational models adopted by China were indeed a contingent development. See Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 33-34n9.

[25] Yeh Wen-hsin, *Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[26] Infantry Officer Academy (陸軍軍官學校), ed., *Detailed Student Survey for the Infantry Officer School*《陸軍軍官學校第三隊學生詳細調查表》 (July 1924), (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1990), pp. 639-640..

[27] Conducted in the 1980s, interviewees remembered needing to destroy all memories of Cai Guangju during the Cultural Revolution. Though the 1980s saw a great thawing of taboos, they still may have been pressure to emphasize Cai's more humble origins. *Zunyi Local History*《遵义文史资料》 (1989), volume 14, p. 22.

Guizhou Model Middle School and then studied for a bachelors in humanities at Xiamen University in Fujian, where he majored in Chinese and English.[28]




Figure 17: Cai Guangju's handwritten Student Survey Form. *Infantry Officer Academy (陸軍軍官學校), ed., Detailed Student Survey for the Infantry Officer School《陸軍軍官學校第三隊學生詳細調查表》 (July 1924), (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1990), pp. 639-640.*

The "Student Survey" form also captures one of Cai's twists and turns, which the work of local historians seem to have missed entirely. Curiously, between Cai's departure from his home in Guizhou to go to Xiamen for higher education, he wrote that he had "joined the KMT party in 1922 in Sichuan," and even had "clerked" (編修) for a Sichuan army unit (the Second Mixed Army Battalion) at this time.[29] While his encounter with the army only appears to have been hired clerical work, not enlistment, his actual "entry" (入) into the KMT is striking for its apparent lack of immediate impact on his life's trajectory. After joining the Party, he goes to university, where the local history accounts, if reliable, paint a picture of a listless and frustrated young man. One hometown compatriot would later recall that he began Xiamen University with the hope to find his calling through "saving the nation through economic development" (實業救國), but later switched to the humanities department, and soon expressed real disillusionment with his studies altogether. Cai apparently wrote this friend around 1923 or early 1924 that he had determined to leave school to "requite the nation" (報國) by joining the military. But Cai also stated one caveat about to *when* he would depart school: "as soon as there's a call from a true Revolutionary organization (真正革命組

[28] Infantry Officer Academy (陸軍軍官學校), ed., *Detailed Student Survey for the Infantry Officer School*《陸軍軍官學校第三隊學生詳細調查表》 (July 1924), (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1990), pp. 639-640.「貴州模範中學畢業，廈門大學文科休業。」.

[29] Infantry Officer Academy (陸軍軍官學校), ed., *Detailed Student Survey for the Infantry Officer School*《陸軍軍官學校第三隊學生詳細調查表》 (July 1924), (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1990), pp. 639-640.

織)…."[30] This is a striking statement from someone who, just a year prior, had just joined the KMT. Was the KMT not a *true* revolutionary organization?

It is hard to pinpoint the precise turning point that made Cai finally leave school. But one indication comes, again, from his *Student Survey* form. There Cai wrote one of his KMT member "sponsors" (介绍人), required for Whampoa admission, was Jin Jingwei 靳經緯. We know that Jin Jingwei was also a Guizhou native, like Cai, and worked in the French Consession of Shanghai as editor of the journal *New Construction* (新建設).[31] Other than sharing provincial roots with Cai, we don't know what formed the bond between the two, if any. But Jin Jingwei's journal articles at this time map closely onto what we know of Cai's disillusionment at this time, with regards to losing faith in pursuing "economic development" (實業) studies and his apparent search for "a true Revolutionary organization." For instance, one of Jin Jingwei's articles catalogued a list various "groups" (派) who claimed they could save the nation, including an "economic development group" (實業派), but only amounted to "just empty talk" due to China's dire need for "political revolution."[32] Jin argued that "masses of the people want a party that has *organization* (組織), has *doctrine* (主義), and has powerful strength—that is, a Revolutionary Party…. with spirit of struggle (奮鬥的精神).[33] Jin acknowledged that though the KMT was recognized for having Doctrine and a fighting spirit, it was criticized for "their *organization is not tight enough*" (組織太不嚴整), which manifested in lack of discipline and lack of training: "Ask them about the Three People's Doctrine," Jin said, "and they don't know how to respond."[34] Despite the reasons for skepticism, Jin's article concluded with optimism: "This round of KMT *reorganization* (改組) targeting party member discipline and training is especially worth paying attention to."[35] Whether or not Cai read the writings of his future Whampoa sponsor, its content follows Cai's path. The lack of party organization Jin Jingwei speaks of helps explain Cai's oddly insignificant entry as a KMT member in 1922 that apparently left him still searching for "a true Revolutionary organization" afterward. But here, in the midst of the 1923-1924 "round of reorganization," which we know is part of Sun's alliance with the Soviet Union and adoption of Leninist party models, we see Cai being drawn back into the fold of a party that will be indelibly different from this point onward.

Thus, Cai also wrote on his "Student Survey" form that he later traveled to Shanghai's Party Office "re-registered" (重新登記) his KMT membership on March 1st, 1924.[36] This office was located in Shanghai's French Concession on Number 44, Huanlong Street (very close to the office of Jin Jingwei's journal office at 186 Rue de Lafayette 辣斐德路), and served as a regional hub for

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[30] Cai's letter to Liu Dianpeng 劉甸蓬, quoted in *Zunyi Local History*《遵义文史资料》 (1989), volume 14, p. 22. As with most *wenshiziliao* quotations, the location or physical holding of the letter not specified, thus the quotation is probably a recollection recounted in an interview.

[31] Jin Jjingwei 靳經緯 was from Guizhou's Anshun country. He served as sponsor for four other Guizhou candidates for Whampoa: 伍文濤, 宋思一, 劉漢珍, and 陳泰運. See data collected on sponsors and candidates in Chen Yuhuan 陳予歡，《軍中驕子：黃埔一期縱橫論》，（台北市 : 秀威資訊科技股份有限公司, 2012）.

[32] Jin Jingwei 靳經緯 , "Order of the Times" (時局的收拾)，*New Construction*《新建设》, 1924, *juan* 1, issue 5, p. 38.

[33] Jin Jingwei 靳經緯 , "Order of the Times" (時局的收拾)，*New Construction*《新建设》, 1924, *juan* 1, issue 5, p. 38.

[34] Jin Jingwei 靳經緯 , "Order of the Times" (時局的收拾)，*New Construction*《新建设》, 1924, *juan* 1, issue 5, p. 38.

[35] Jin Jingwei 靳經緯 , "Order of the Times" (時局的收拾)，*New Construction*《新建设》, 1924, *juan* 1, issue 5, p. 38.

[36] Infantry Officer Academy (陸軍軍官學校), ed., *Detailed Student Survey for the Infantry Officer School*《陸軍軍官學校第三隊學生詳細調查表》(July 1924), (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1990), pp. 639-640. 陳予歡，《軍中驕子：黃埔一期縱橫論》，（台北市 : 秀威資訊科技股份有限公司, 2012）, p. 57.「1924.3.1 在上海第三區第四區國民黨分部重新登記」

Whampoa recruitment and admission testing. For instance, Mao Zedong also worked there during this time, sponsoring and testing at least six prospective students from Hunan, including Jiang Xianyun 蔣先雲 (whose path, as we saw in the introduction, would cross with Cai Guangju's not just at Whampoa but on the battlefield).[37] At the Huanlong office, the KMT ensured that applicants between 18 and 25 years of age held KMT membership and had at least one KMT sponsor. Those meeting the requirements were then "tested" (試驗) in three areas:

1) Physical fitness (身體)—a health exam.
2) Education (學歷)—candidates needed to answer, in *writing*, questions commensurate with a middle school difficulty level.
3) Thought (思想)—a "character examination" (性格), administered *orally*, "to observe (觀察) the extent and quality of understanding of the Thee People's Doctrine; to deduce one's aspirations, moral fiber, and common sense, as well as potential for growth."[38]

Of note, an applicant's writing was only evaluated for basic education, while the political "thought" (思想) was only subject to oral evaluation.

While the first Whampoa class would be hailed as a breakthrough achievement in drawing to the school the raw human and "spiritual" material the KMT so desperately needed at that moment, not all opinions were so sanguine.[39] For instance, the archives show one senior KMT member who wrote a scathing report on the Whampoa recruitment going on the 44 Huanlong Street office, just a month after Cai Guangju was there to "re-register." He wrote that his personal "observations" (觀察) of those who made it to the second round of tests were that these recruits had never thoroughly investigated KMT platform (黨綱) or Doctrine (主義). Without solid doctrinal moorings, he said, these recruits merely "'bragged big' about entering our Party" (吹大炮加該__吾黨), but "as soon as they encounter hardship or face complications, they will falter." Thus, the report asserted, "The students we are now recruiting, though they are KMT in name, they are all nothing more than provisional 'new brides' (新媳婦) and that's it!"[40]

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[37] In the 1950s, Mao Zedong would say: "At that time I had been in Shanghai to take in the first class of students for Whampoa, the address was Shanghai's Huanlong Street, number 44." The official Mao Zedong *Nianpu* also says that on March 13 (just twelve days after Cai reregistered) Mao attended Party meetings there that covered the testing and registration process. See Hang Yuanxiang 杭元祥, "Mao Zedong Examines Incoming Students for Whampoa"「毛泽东为黄埔军校招生考」, *Whampoa*《黄埔》, 2013, (06): 54-56. Quoting from 《毛澤東年譜》. On Mao listed as "recommender" for six incoming Hunan students— Jiang Xianyun 蔣先雲. Wu Wensheng 伍文生, Li Hanfan 李漢蕃, Zhang Jichun 張際春, Zhao Nan 趙柟, and Li Kun 李焜(1903-?)-- see 《軍中驕子》, p. 122.

[38] Jia Xiaoming 贾晓明,「1925 年 12 月 1 日《赤心评论》刊登《军官学校考选学生简章》」, *Huangpu*《黄埔》, 2015 (3), pp. 77-79.

[39] On the provincial distribution for the 645 students of the First Class, the largest number came from Hunan (197, 31%) and Guangdong (108, 17%). Only 15 students (2%) were from Guizhou. 86 students (13%) were recruited from Jiangsu (24), Zhejiang (37), and Anhui (25). One important recruitment coordinator for the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui region was Chen Guofu 陳果夫, but he does yet not appear to have been involved in this activity for the First Class. For chart of Whampoa recruits by province for the first five class, see 广东革命历史博物館编,《黄埔军校史料, 1924-1927》, (广东人民出版社 : 广东省新華書店发行, 1982), p. 93. On Chen Guofu's participation, see Hung-mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937, (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 48.

[40] Hoover Archives, HUAN REEL 17 02579 恒生致季恂 等函 報告考黃埔軍校情形 1924/04/05.「雖名為國民黨，但都不過是臨時的『新媳婦』罷了！」

The report was scathing, in part, because it had a point about the recruits. Cai Guangju's KMT membership, for example, was indeed nominal at best when he "re-joined" in 1924. The archival records of communications from KMT examiners also frequently noted they could not provide the required "Party membership identification number" (黨證號) for certain recruits, stating that they "still hadn't" (尚未) been registered.[41] Based on my calculations from the prosopographical data we have on the 516 students of the first Whampoa class who took the "Student Survey," the average time they had spent as KMT members prior to point that Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek addressed them at opening ceremonies on June 16, 1924 was just under eight months, at the very most.[42] In many cases, their KMT membership and entry into Whampoa happened simultaneously. Though polemic, even misogynistic, the above report was not entirely off the mark in calling these recruits "new brides" to the KMT.

But the report was also scathing not just for what it said about prospective students. After all, the KMT examiners in charge of testing were under explicit directives "to *observe* (觀察) the extent and quality of understanding of the Thee People's Doctrine."[43] Here the report claims to "observe" (觀察) precisely the opposite. Despite its over-the-top polemics, I submit that this report exposes some of the same anxieties and limitations attempted "see" qualities of "spirit" in prospective agents of violence. Indeed, the sentiment expressed in the report on 44 Huanlong Street resonates with Zeng Guofan's scathing critique of the military exams and its candidates, as well as to the deep concerns Yao Xiguang's diary recorded over the recruits for the incoming military academy class in 1896 (both in Chapter 2).[44] But the recruiters for Whampoa Military Academy would have taken some confidence in the fact that, whatever the quality of the raw human materials they had acquired, they were sending them to an institution that proclaimed it would be the ultimate "technology of spirit," the likes of which China had never seen before.

And so, having passed his entrance examinations at 44 Huanlong Street, Cai Guangju received a "boat fee" (船費) and made the journey from Shanghai to Canton, and then on to Whampoa island. The education Cai Guangju received there placed great emphasis on the "spirit" aspect of military education, following late Qing precedent as I've shown, but heavily imbued with political Doctrine and ideology as well. But Whampoa education also incorporated other innovations beyond merely adding Doctrine to its Spirit Education curriculum. The rest of this section discusses three such innovations: Whampoa's Special Party Branch Office, its Small Group Meetings, and its expansion of the Party Representative system. Though these novel practices were all direct results of

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[41] "Shanghai First District Executive Committee to Whampoa Military Academy" (上海市第一區執行委員會致黃埔軍校), October 5, 1923, Zhongguo guo min dang [Kuomintang] Records, Huan Reel 79, no. 11850, Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Originals in Kuomintang Archives (Taipei, Taiwan).

[42] Eight months is very generous calculation. Most of the entries for membership that occurred before 1924 only give the year of entry, not the precise month, in which case I included all 365 days of the year into the calculation. Many students were first inducted into the KMT up to and through the June 16 convocation ceremony. For information on the initial entry to Whampoa in May and the group induction procedures for KMT membership held there, see the following two sources: 徐向前,《历史的回顾》，解放军出版社 1987 年版，第 27 页 ; 宋希濂,《鹰犬将军-宋希濂自述》，中国文史出版社 1986 年版，第 10 页.

[43] Jia Xiaoming 贾晓明,「1925 年 12 月 1 日《赤心评论》刊登《军官学校考选学生简章》」, *Huangpu*《黄埔》, 2015 (3), pp. 77-79.

[44] Based on the paltry written portion he presided over, Zeng "dared not" (不敢) tell the Emperor he certified men of talent. As I claimed, he had not faith in the exam as an adequate "technology of spirit." It may be surprising that written portion of the recruitment testing criteria for Whampoa did not include ideological or political content. The report's critique, I suggest, carries the same anxiety over inadequate means to properly "see" into the prospective agents of military violence.

Soviet organizational borrowings at Whampoa, as we will see, they also caused problems and tensions that mirrored those experienced in late Qing military academies, revealing points of continuity amidst change.

The KMT exerted unprecedented central political oversight and formalized control over Whampoa Military Academy. Though Chiang Kai-shek was appointed School Director (校長), holding a supervisory role directly over him was the office of School Party Representative (黨代表), filled by KMT luminary Liao Zhongkai 廖仲愷 (1877-1925). Though technically Chiang's superior, Liao Zhongkai's myriad Party duties left him relatively hands-off, leaving Chiang with relatively free reign over the school. Thus, the most salient measure of the Party's central oversight was the formation of a Special Party Office (特別區黨部) for Whampoa. On July 3, 1924 shortly after Sun's induction ceremony, "elections" (選舉) were held for the Special Party Office's five posts, which went to Chiang and other senior KMT officials. Trouble with this election soon arose, however. According to Chiang, because students did not have a say in the candidates presented them, "some students advocated open nominations (公推)… and discontent ensued."[45] The following day, July 4, Chiang addressed the entire First Class. Chiang sought to drive home that although this election did not offer students a full range of choices, they had not been robbed of all authority. He noted that "responsibility for managing students" had been largely delegated to the students themselves, "with the hope that you will come to understand real, practical obedience and autonomy (服從與自治)."[46] He also made the following appeal:

> You need to understand that the Party members at our School put their complete faith in Doctrine, which doesn't just unite our emotions (感情), it unites our spirit (精神). Inside our school, beyond our relationship as comrades, there is also the relationships between classmates and student-teacher relationship (師生關係).[47]

Given all this, Chiang concluded, there was no need to "nit-pick on how school-internal elections differ from those on the outside."

It seems that rumblings of discontent continued, however, for Chiang was addressing similar issues with the Party Branch Office in his speech to the class on July 24. Chiang spoke about "Freedom and Equality" (自由平等), arguing that the "*true* meaning" (真義) within the unique context of the military academy was different than outside of it.[48] This is where Chiang even admitted to Whampoa students that, as an eighteen year-old, he too had mocked and despised his Baoding Military Academy instructors during the late Qing (noted in Chapter 3). "But looking back on it," he told students, "those men actually had a lot of experience in many areas that I could have

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[45] Chiang Kai-shek, "Unity of Spirit Must Make Doctrine our Center" (精神團結必以主義為中心), July 4, 1924, in《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, vol. 1, p 259.

[46] Chiang Kai-shek, "Unity of Spirit Must Make Doctrine our Center" (精神團結必以主義為中心), July 4, 1924, in《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, vol. 1, p 259.

[47] Chiang Kai-shek, "Unity of Spirit Must Make Doctrine our Center" (精神團結必以主義為中心), July 4, 1924, in《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, vol. 1, p 259.「除了同志關係以外，還有同學與師生的關係。」

[48] Chiang Kai-shek, "The True Meaning of Freedom and Equality and the Importance of Living as a Team" (自由平等之真義與團體生活的重要), July 24, 1924, in《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, vol. 1, pp. 261-262. Full text in《先總統蔣公思想言論總集》*juan* 10, pp. 73-78.

learned a great deal from."[49] This was an appeal to respect the "student-teacher relationship" (師生關係) and the military "spirit" that uniquely fused that bond together.

Though Whampoa's Party Branch Office was an unprecedented measure for political control over a Chinese military academy, both Chiang's appeals and the student discontent bear striking resemblances to what we've seen in late Qing military schools previously (Chapter 3). There we saw Qing military educators seeking explicitly to cultivate a balance between obedience and autonomy. They also discussed notions of broader political "freedom" and "equality," presenting similar conclusions that a unique, alternate form of "freedom" was necessary both in the military school and for the modern battlefield. They also based these appeals similarly to the emotional and spirit-informed bonds of the "student-teacher relationship," as a direct correlation to relationship between commander and junior officer.

One aspect that seems to have truly broke precedent was what Whampoa called "small group meetings" (小組會議). Though these meetings emanated from the Special Party Office (discussed above) down to individual student companies for purpose of discussing of Party Doctrine and policies, their methodology was anything but hierarchical. These "small group meetings" primarily used free "criticism" (批評) as the mode of discussion. Now, because this type of criticism meeting is universally understood as an importation from the Soviet Union and, particularly, a Chinese Communist Party practice, very little research on their presence at the very beginning of Whampoa has been done. But newer research has noted, for instance, that Chiang Kai-shek in 1925 exhorted Zhou Enlai that these "small group meetings" "should have *complete freedom* (完全自由) to express their opinions and report their hardships; and ranking officers must not harbor resentment or take revenge."[50] Moreover, a vivid description of these meetings comes from Wang Boling 王柏齡 (1889-1942), a chief instructor and later Regimental Commander in the Whampoa Student Army. Calling these meetings the "soul" (靈魂) of Whampoa education, he writes: "From the time a Party-run meeting started, ranking officers and students were comrades, they were equal, like beloved older and younger brothers; and, within the small group meeting, students could criticize anything about the ranking officers."[51] He also called this an "enlightenment mode of education" (啟發式的教育), it was the "ablest means of leading student thought." This, he said, was fundamentally unlike "the warlords who use heavy-handed pressure on students as if they were slaves (奴隸)."[52] Most importantly, Wang stated that this critical, dialogic, and even transgressive mode of education, actually *increased* military efficacy. These meetings, he wrote, "absolutely did not hurt military discipline, …they actually enhanced [a commander's] authority…." Because of the bonds these meetings forged relationships, particularly between officers of different ranks, Wang argued that "orders issued on the drill field or on the battlefield have greater force than orders coming from

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[49] Chiang Kai-shek, "The True Meaning of Freedom and Equality and the Importance of Living as a Team" (自由平等之真義與團體生活的重要), July 24, 1924, in《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, vol. 1, p. 262.

[50] Li Xiang 李翔, *Sowers of Revolution: Political Work at Whampoa Military Academy 1924-1925*《革命的播种者：黄埔军校的政工群体（1924-1925）》（廣東人民出版社，2016）, p. 106.「使士兵開小組會議時，完全自由發表其意見，報告其痛苦，官長不得懷恨報復.」Li Xiang cites quotation from the〈蔣介石 1925 年 11 月 21 日致周恩來函〉printed in《廣州民國日報》 1925 年 12 月 11 日 . See also《小组会议条例》，《党军·党军特别党部之组织》，(中华书局 1928 年版), p. 11.

[51] Wang Boling 王柏齡, "Recollections of the School's Founding" (創校回憶), in 李開編《黃埔建軍史話》(青年軍出版社, 1946), p. 84.

[52] Wang Boling 王柏齡, "Recollections of the School's Founding" (創校回憶), in 李開編《黃埔建軍史話》(青年軍出版社, 1946), p. 84.

warlords… it's something imperialist armies could never even dream of."[53] He added, "The reason our revolutionary army can win against numbers ten times (以一當十) our own is simply because of this: our knowledge is self-actuating (自動), and our efforts are self-actuating (自動)."[54]

While we need more information on how these "small group meetings" operated at Whampoa, we must also square the assumption that it was an entirely Soviet-inspired innovation with the new findings I've presented on the late Qing in the previous chapter. There we saw, over a decade before the Soviet Union ever came into being, the Beiyang Army establishing "meeting halls" (集會所) for officers to bond "regardless of rank" (無論階級上下) for the same explicit reasons: to develop mutual emotional bonds (感情) that would facilitate the smooth social flow of "orders" (命令), the greater understanding of the commander's intent (上級官之意), and the self-actuating, creative execution of those orders by subordinates. Though Whampoa's "small group meetings" undeniably allowed for much greater transgression of rank hierarchies, the logic and goal of these meetings was strikingly similar. This dissertation contributes a reevaluation the profound changes military education brought to China, and that China brought to military education. Too often, however, we have readily accepted the sheer novelty of a certain Chinese innovation or of a foreign import that was brought by so-called "missionaries" (Bismarck's of the 1880s-1890s, Japan's in the 1900s, and the Soviet Union's in the 1920s), without adequate understanding of the shifting and changing context in which it was introduced.[55] Whether we interpret something like these "small group meetings" as primarily a *Chinese* break from warlords and the imperial past (as Wang Boling contends) and/or as a *foreign* importation from the Soviets, we can no longer disregard that these new practices came as part of an ongoing series of innovations that began in the late Qing.

Another major Whampoa innovation came with the extension of the new Party Representative (黨代表) system. This was a dual-track military command system originally implemented by the Soviet Red Army in 1917. When the Bolsheviks needed to rely on former Tsarist officers, who were skilled and experienced but politically suspect, they mitigated the risk by appointing reliable Party Representatives (Commissars) over them that needed to countersign all orders.[56] The system's importation to China at this time would have long-lasting impact.[57]

By 1924, the KMT had already adopted the Party Representative system in certain contexts: for instance, appointing Liao Zhongkai as the School's Party Representative nominally over Chiang as School Director. But the KMT vastly expanded its implementation right after the first Whampoa class graduated in November 1924 and it formed the new "School Army" (校軍). At the bottom, the School Army comprised of foot soldiers recruited by KMT agents in the Shanghai-Anhui region. At the top sat Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Zhongkai as the School Army Commander and its Party Representative, respectively. The School Army also extended this dual system of commander and Party Representative to down the regimental, battalion, and company levels. Two chief Whampoa instructors, He Yingqin 何應欽 (1890-1970) and Wang Boling (discussed above), took command of

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[53] Wang Boling 王柏齡, "Recollections of the School's Founding" (創校回憶), in 李開編《黃埔建軍史話》(青年軍出版社, 1946), p. 84.

[54] Wang Boling 王柏齡, "Recollections of the School's Founding" (創校回憶), in 李開編《黃埔建軍史話》(青年軍出版社, 1946), p. 84.

[55] Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

[56] For the classic treatment of its origins in the Russian case, see D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).

[57] The most robust treatment of its impact in China is Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

the School Army's two "Teaching Regiments" (教導團), and each had a Party Representative counterpart that also came from the senior School staff. New graduates of Whampoa's first class filled most of the platoon and company-level unit commander billets, and most company and even some battalion-level Party Representative posts also went to students as well.

Cai Guangju was one such student who was selected for the role of battalion-level Party Representative. The criteria used by the School to deciding which students received unit commander (部長) or Party Representative posts is hard to ascertain. It also seemed partially unclear to one company-level Party Representative of the First Class, who wrote decades later that "*maybe* (也许) the higher-ups at the time regarded me as having somewhat advanced thought (思想進步些)…."[58] But it seems that Cai Guangju got his battalion-level post also by standing out from his peers. His surviving relatives later claimed to have once possessed letters Cai Guangju exchanged as a student with Chiang Kai-shek himself.[59] Given that these letters were supposedly destroyed in the 1960s, it is hard to corroborate a relationship between the two from any original documentary evidence. However, an obscure 1925 newspaper article actually says: "After studying [at Whampoa], the School Director, Chiang Kai-shek, saw that [Cai] had much talent and retained him for duties in the [School's] Political Department."[60] Thus, it seems that it was an honor for students like Cai and others to be selected for Party Representative at this time.

Let us look more into the way the Party Representative was supposed to operate. Even before implementing it in China, Chiang's first contact with the Party Representative system had sparked his genuine enthusiasm. During his 1923 visit to the Soviet Union, he wrote: "I discovered that unit commanders could only handle matters of command (指揮); but political and spirit training (政治及精神訓練)… was completely directed by the Party Representative."[61] Chiang concluded then that the system worked very well because of the respective "responsibilities and authorities for officers and Representatives were all clearly demarcated (都有明白區分)." But even from this first encounter with the system, we can see that Chiang Kai-shek understood the separation of responsibilities less as a means of preventing counter-revolutionary rebellion and more as a synergistic division of labor between tactical and "spirit" work. This discrepancy in function would have important consequences down the road.

In late 1924, as the graduating First Class began taking up their School Army posts, Chiang would personally lecture to Party Representatives on their duties. In these talks, which are included in Chiang's 1925 *Spirit Education* publication, he explicitly minimized their office's authority *over* the unit commander. For instance, in December 1925, he told Party Representatives that they "must not engage in interference-ism (干涉主義)" and must "assume an stance of supervision (監督)."[62] Even their all-important function of "countersigning" (呈報) the unit commander's orders, Chiang told

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[58] Zheng Dongguo 鄭洞國, *My Military Career: Reminiscences of Zheng Dongguo*《我的戎馬生涯：鄭洞國回憶錄》, 郑建邦, 胡耀平, eds., (北京市 : 团结出版社, 2008), p. 30.

[59] Cai Zili 蔡自勵, "Remembering Martyr Cai Guangju"「回憶蔡光舉烈士」,《遵义文史资料》 (Zunyi Local History)， 第 9 辑, p. 13.

[60] *Peacock Pictorial Post* (孔雀畫報), (Shanghai: Kongque huabao she, 1925), issue 13.

[61] Chiang Kai-shek quoted in Li Xiang 李翔, *Sowers of Revolution: Political Work at Whampoa Military Academy 1924-1925* 《革命的播种者：黄埔军校的政工群体（1924-1925）》（廣東人民出版社，2016）.

[62] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石，《精神教育》，《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 185.

them, "must be done with extreme prudence."[63] In other words, Chiang warned them not to let their authority go to their heads.

But what then was their primary responsibility as Party Representatives? Two things, Chiang told them: "teaching and cultivation" (教養二字).[64] Regarding the teaching role, he told them that "Party Representatives must educate their troops if we are to see our Doctrine take effect," which included teaching soldiers both spoken Mandarin and recognition of written characters. Conversely, Party Representatives also needed to mix with their soldiers and study their colloquialisms rather than "acting all high and mighty and putting a barrier between you and the troops." Otherwise, Chiang said, "when they listen to you talk, your words will land on them like some hefty official document, and none [of your teaching of Doctrine] will sink in."[65] Of note, the Party Representative duties laid out by Chiang here bear striking resemblance to directives given to late Qing officers in the Beiyang Army with regard to teaching and mixing with foot soldiers (Chapter 3).

Chiang also stated that Party Representative needed to shoulder other administrative duties. A Party Representative needed to "check roll call each day to know the [accurate] number of personnel," as well as record "how many men in the company are sick and how many are absent without leave."[66] Chiang even noted that "right now two or three out of every ten troops are sick," and, "as Party Representatives you should be going to visit them frequently and regularly, as well as comforting them frequently and regularly."[67] Moreover, he added that "at all times Party Representatives must inspect what the soldiers are being paid, what they are eating, and what clothes they are wearing…."[68] With all these responsibilities for teaching, administration, troop welfare, Chiang asked them where they could possibly have the time to ask for more authority.

This helps us understand a deep-seated ambivalence in Chiang regarding the function and authority of this novel role. On the one hand, he continued to hold to his initial 1923 assessment that the Party Representative provided an efficacious division of military labor in its focus on "political and spirit training," while commanders focused on tactical command. Speaking to the whole School in 1924, Chiang even uplifted the role's functional utility for combat:

> The cohesive force of the Revolutionary Spirit will rest on the Party Representatives in each company. The life and health of every soldier is handled entirely under the purview of the

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[63] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石，「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in《精神教育》，《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 259.

[64] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, "School Director Makes a Short Lecture to Party Representatives"「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in *Spirit Education* (精神教育), 1925, published in《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 260.

[65] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, "School Director Makes a Short Lecture to Party Representatives"「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in *Spirit Education* (精神教育), 1925, published in《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 260.

[66] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, "School Director Makes a Short Lecture to Party Representatives"「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in *Spirit Education* (精神教育), 1925, published in《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 260.

[67] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, "School Director Makes a Short Lecture to Party Representatives"「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in *Spirit Education* (精神教育), 1925, published in《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 259-261.

[68] Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, "School Director Makes a Short Lecture to Party Representatives"「校長對黨代表短時間講演詞」, Dec 12, 1924, in *Spirit Education* (精神教育), 1925, published in《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 260.

> Party Representative… On the battlefield, wherever we have a Party Representative, we can increase combat power. [69]

Thus, in addition to shouldering practical administrative labor, Chiang tied this new organizational role to the belief that the "spirit" was the ultimate factor in battlefield efficacy.[70] Indeed, the newly graduated Cai Guangju would very soon be called to play an important combat role as a Party Representative, as we will see.

On the other hand, the concerns that background Chiang's lectures here over the defining the boundaries of the Party Representatives authority, also emerge sharply in his personal diary. In one entry, Chiang writes that during a School Army field exercise a dispute arose over "questions of rank and the limitations of authority" (階級及權限問題).[71] Though Chiang's first encounter with the system in the Soviet Union had identified "clear demarcation" of authority, here it was causing tension. Moreover, his diary notes that the dispute involved "a company-level Party Representative who was a probationary officer (見習官) and had been a student (學生) of the Regimental Commander."[72] Thus, it was not only tension between commander and Party representative, but also between teacher and student; and, moreover, the tension had leapt beyond classroom, even beyond the more raucous forum of the "small group meeting," to impinge on operational field exercises. The following day Chiang writes in his diary that he wasted a full three hours with the parties "debating what was right and wrong and clarifying things explicitly" with regards to "limitations of authority" (權限).[73] Chiang called the day "exceedingly irritating," for it showed he needed to treat his subordinates like "kid brothers" (子弟) or "childish little boys" (孩氣之童子).[74] "Such is the difficulty of implementing the [Party Representative] system," Chiang also wrote, "and I'm not sure what's going to happen in the future."[75]

The Party Representative system emanating from Whampoa would indeed become central in the KMT-CCP split in 1927, by which time Chiang and others perceived the system, along with the School's Political Department run by Zhou Enlai, as overrun by Communists bent on subversion. This 1927 rupture in the Party Representative system will have critical importance in the divergent structural developments of the KMT and CCP, as discussed in the conclusion. But at this time in late 1924-early 1925 there are few indications, even in Chiang's personal diary, that the problems he begins to perceive in the Party Representative system directly follow party fault-lines. Even when staunchly anti-communist KMT members composed lessons in 1928 from the School Army's first combat operation in the First Eastern Campaign (1925), their critique of the Party Representative system was merely that it was prone to "clashes of emotion (感情上之衝突)" between commanders

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[69] Chiang Kai-shek, 蔣介石, *Spirit Education* (精神教育)，《中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校叢書（第一輯）》，（黃埔陸軍軍官學校 1925 出版）, p. 185.

[70] Cheng Hsiao-shih writes on the Chinese introduction of these organizational practices: "The political work system… is a centralized organization for handling human-related affairs concerning military effectiveness. It is a concrete manifestation of the idea that human factors, in addition to the weapons and other material factors, are important to war. The military is viewed as more than a war *machine*. It is first of all a human organization. As such, the military men's will to fight cannot be taken for granted. The translation of the sovereign's will to the officer corps and then to the rank and file need *intensive* care…. By taking into account the sociological aspects, the political work system has broadened the conventional idea of military "professionalism." Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 147-148. Emphasis added.

[71] Entry for January 19, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

[72] Entry for January 19, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

[73] Entry for January 20, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

[74] Entry for January 20, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

[75] Entry for January 19, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

and Representatives over "authorities and responsibilities."[76] Again, though the introduction of party politics into the military was certainly a new development with Whampoa, late Qing military educations had long sought to hone similar "technologies of spirit" that foster emotional bonds (感情) and facilitated battlefield command.

Two Weeks to Danshui

Lasting from February 1 to late March 1925, the First Eastern Campaign would be the Whampoa Student Army's first test in battle. With Sun Yat-sen away in Beijing for diplomatic negotiations, Chen Jiongming's "Save Guangdong Army" (救粵軍) had begun threatening the KMT's base again. KMT leadership devised plan for an "offense-minded defense" to strike Chen's forces first. To do this, it cobbled together a so-called "United Army" (聯軍), comprised of the KMT's standing Guangdong Army, the two allied armies of Yunnan and Guangxi troops, and Whampoa's School Army, all under the nominal command of Chiang Kai-shek. According to preface material in the School Army's First Training Regiment Unit diary, the School Army was not originally put in the order of battle because some KMT leaders thought it was too new and too inexperienced to fight in any capacity beyond a supporting role for the Guangdong Army.[77] Events in February and March would radically change that underassessment, and an outside recognition of a so-called "Whampoa Spirit" as a force to be reconned with began to grow from here.

But the first two weeks of the campaign were a rocky start for the School Army. From the first day of the campaign, it showed signs of inexperience. As briefed in Chiang's operations order the night before, on February 1, 1925, the School Army would launch a phased movement from Whampoa by boat downriver to Shajiao, then move inland and link up together at Humen. By the end of that first day, the Unit Diary recorded that after landing "troop order had been thrown into chaos… with some units moving out arbitrarily without reorganizing, causing some troops to fall behind their units and many other breaches of discipline for military movement." "This is all because of the inexperience of junior-level cadres," the Unit Diary stated.[78] Additionally, a break down in getting the Regiment fed that first day led He Yingqin to decide that "provisioning (給養)… will follow the custom (習慣) of Chinese armies [in the past], with Regimental and Battalion headquarters each handling it independently (自辦)."[79] As we see throughout the meticulous detail of the Unit Diary, "independent handling" of provisions meant that troop commanders needed to purchase both grain and labor (porters for hauling supplies and equipment) directly from the populations they moved through. Donald Jordan has long pointed out Zeng Guofan's influence on Chiang Kai-shek and even Mao Zedong, particularly on regulating his army's interactions with and

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[76] 劉秉粹编，《革命軍第一次東征實戰記》(上海：中華書局, 1928).

[77] Liu Bingcui 劉秉粹, ed., *Actual Battle Records of the Revolutionary Army's First Eastern Campaign* (革命軍第一次東征實戰記), (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928), hereafter: Unit Diary (DZSZJ). For original assessment of School Army's fighting ability, see Unit Diary (DZSZJ) Chapter 1 〈聯軍作戰〉, p. 9. That the School Army was underestimated at this point is supported by Qang Qihong's research: Wang Qihong 王肇宏, *Whampoa Military Academy Before the Northern Expedition* (北伐前的黃埔軍校), Taipei: Dongda tushu, 1987), pp. 75, 76n13.

[78] Entry for February 1, 1925, Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 11. 「此皆下級幹部無經驗之故也。」

[79] Entry for February 1, 1925, Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 11. 「故此後，團營部給養擬仍按中國軍隊習慣，由團營部自辦。」

reliance on the local population.[80] I submit that this is "the custom of Chinese armies" that He Yingqin invokes here. At any rate, that the School Army had such massive difficulty moving from point A to point B and feeding itself in the first 24 hours of the campaign did not bode well, and the frustration was palpable in the Unit Diary.

The Unit Diary shows us the inexperience of students in the School Army as they navigate their way through a battlespace characterized by physical distance between units and social distance between them and the civilian population on whom they depended on for sustenance. On the second day, February 2, it reports that when the locals saw that the army did not already have "long-distance porters" (長伕), "most of the residents hid" for fear of being forcibly pressed into service. This caused "significant difficulties" for the troops that had to carry their supplies and equipment. That evening at 1900, the Regimental received a report from First Battalion commander, Shen Yingshi 沈應時, stating that he was negotiating terms with "local gentry" (本地紳董). Meanwhile, the Second Battalion was already down to eating only course rice; thus, grain would have to be purchased from the local population soon. Luckily, the Unit Diary noted, when the locals had seen that School Army troops paid for goods rather than seizing them, they received a slightly warmer welcome. Still, the Diary noted under its daily "Provisions" (給養) entry: "Because residents are impoverished, though there are not a few honest and good people, a good many have fallen in with bandits. Thus, we must maintain the utmost vigilance here."[81] As the Regiment's individual units move through different localities, they encounter various economic conditions and levels of trust or hostilities from the people, from whom they must try to obtain much-needed supplies.

In addition to noting social terrain of the localities, the Unit Diary paints a picture of School Army units dispersed from each other. For instance, the forward reconnaissance unit commander sent the Regiment a report on February 3, on information on enemy brigades some 20 kilometers away. He had received this information when his men "linked up" (聯絡) with a unit of the Guangdong Army as it moved through the campaign space. This term for "link up" is used throughout the Unit Diary for dispersed units maintaining some communication across the boundaries of space separating them. In this instance, however, the recon commander also noted that the Regiment hadn't "established any symbols, banners, or signaling for linking up (聯絡) between us and other friendly units," apparently making misidentification and friendly fire incidents more likely.

The next day, February 4 at 1900, forward sentries reported possible enemy sighting towards the nearby village of Shibian and He Yingqin ordered a platoon from the reconnaissance unit to investigate. He Yingqin seems to have sensed that the officers and soldiers on the perimeter might be jumpy, so at 1930 he sent the following written directive to the forward sentry commander (I've added bullets to this and other quotations to indicate breaks in the original):

- The Reconnaissance Unit has already been dispatched towards the area of Shibian village. Do not mistake [and shoot them when they return].
- Though imperative that you maintain heightened vigilance, also remain calm: don't let harassment by bandits draw us into an unprofitable fight.[82]

[80] Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), p. 240.
[81] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 19.
[82] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 27.

At 2200, however, the forward sentry commander (unnamed in the Diary) sent a frantic message back to Regimental headquarters:

- The company commander of our Seventh Company reports that 400-500 enemy troops advanced directly towards them…
- …it possible to receive reinforcements?[83]

But not only were no reinforcements sent in response to the junior officer's plea, the Unit Diary records the incident as a sham. The final entry for the day states: "During the night local bandits harassed us and, again, because our troops have *little experience* (少經驗), they often mistake the civilians they encounter for enemy or bandits. Seventh Company's report of bandits turned out to be all civilians, whom they rashly fired upon."[84] In what had become something of a refrain, it finally added, "This makes it completely evident that our troops simply have no combat experience whatsoever."[85]

While the frustration over student inexperience is again explicit in the Unit Diary, these mistakes and misunderstanding were also compounded by the complexity of the human terrain and the distance between units. In fact, a report came much later in the night from the reconnaissance unit commander, Sun Changjun 孫常鈞 (a Whampoa graduate selected for this very role because of his extensive prior military service). Sun stated that at 2210, just ten minutes after the student commander's frantic plea, what it identified as "armed militia" (民團) had stopped them, and the confrontation was only deescalated when they found a Cantonese speaker to translate. The next morning (February 5), Sun Changjun reported that a group of 100 men, some carrying weapons, began advancing directly towards his recon unit. "Because they wore no military uniforms," Sun added, "*we don't know* (不知) if it they were civilian militia or linked to enemy forces."[86] The armed group dispersed thanks again to the recon commander Sun's quick thinking, this time not by finding a translator to talk it out, but by firing shots in the air above their heads. Though the green and inexperienced student commander of Seventh Company was said to have "fired rashly" out of sheer inexperience, we see that even the seasoned recon commander Sun Changjun, who had graduated Whampoa with much prior military service, also faced such uncertainly over the perceived threat posed by the civilian population, even ordering his men to fire, though perhaps less rashly. We have here a vivid picture of a campaign space characterized by great uncertainty, with junior commanders dispersed across that space, acting with independent judgement, and sending their written reports back to Regimental headquarters, where the fragmentary bits of information must be integrated to gain an idea of the overall situation.

A hostile locality posed more than security challenges. The Unit Diary's Provisions entry for February 4 notes that "We cannot purchase rice in this area, so all the grain we're consuming is from what we carry."[87] Indeed, the School Army needed the population for both grain and labor, so it sought to mitigate the local population's general tendency of towards distrust of soldiers, regardless of which army they belonged to. The Regiment had two primary means to achieve this: 1) maintaining strict discipline in the behavior of its soldiers vis-à-vis the populace and 2) propaganda

[83] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 31-32.
[84] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 34.
[85] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 34.「此亦可見官兵無戰鬥經驗也。」
[86] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), pp. 41-42. Feb 5 0820 Recon Unit Report.
[87] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 35. The entry for "Population" (住民): "This population are all mountain people, by nature arrogant and dimwitted, stubborn. Moreover, most of them have links to cliques of Chen Jiongming's army or are partnered with local bandits. Thus, we must be on the strictest guard."

work. In terms of discipline, the Unit Diary entries generally praise their soldiers' interactions with locals. Still, Chiang found it necessary on February 5 from Dongguan 東莞 to issue a directive to the School Army that addressed this issue. Because "urban residents have been repeatedly plundered by enemy armies [in the past] that have left their markets desolate," Chiang said, the School Army needed to build trust.[88] To do this, Chiang ordered his School Headquarters to put "a unit on patrol to find cases of any degenerate soldiers out there harassing [civilians]." The order also stipulated that unit commanders could not pardon these types of offenses and need to deliver officers and soldiers "discovered in *any* breach of discipline" to "death by firing squad."[89] While Chiang said this directive was "in order to maintain itself as a *true* Revolutionary Army," we don't know if a specific incident precipitated its timing.[90]

But a breach of discipline in First Regiment was discovered three days later on February 8. The Unit diary says that its own officers (官長) had "gone gambling and visiting prostitutes" near the Changping dike. When Regimental command initiated an investigation, however, it was unable to apprehend them in the act. Still, the allegations were credible enough to record in the Unit Diary. From this we can see that maintaining this moral position as a "*true* Revolutionary Army" vis-à-vis the populace was a tenuous and not always successful work of military discipline in the School Army.

Aside from discipline, propaganda was another method the Student Army used to enhance relations with the local populace. Donald Jordan's important study argued on the later the Northern Expedition (1926-1928) has argued against CCP historiography that claims the most decisive element of the campaign was the mass mobilization work by Communist operatives who went *ahead* of the army. In contrast, that troops of the KMT's National Revolutionary Army did a great deal of mobilizing and propaganda work with civilian populations themselves, drawing on the indoctrination they received at Whampoa on the renovation of the soldier-civilian relationship.[91] However, while the Unit Diary tracks "Discipline" (紀律) closely (indeed, it is a daily entry category), "propaganda" (宣傳) is harder to find in the entries. On February 9, however, the Unit Diary entry from its location at Changping 常平 says this: "Our soldiers are maintain quite strict discipline and have become very intimate with the population. They are even able to *conduct propaganda* (宣傳) [towards people] on Party Doctrine and the reasons behind the Eastern Campaign."[92] Now, if we read the Unit Diary in light of the type of reputation Donald Jordan describes for Whampoa armies, as marked by active civilian interface through propaganda work, this entry seems unremarkable. However, within the Diary's own context, the appearance of "conducting propaganda" (宣傳) on February 9 is an extremely rare occurrence barely found elsewhere in the diary. Why is this?

A period document form outside the Unit Diary gives insight into why propaganda work suddenly appears on this date. Published in a KMT military publication that year, the document is a "First Regiment Logistics Unit's Propaganda Detachment" (第一團輜重隊宣傳團). The report states that on February 9 a "Propaganda Detachment was *organized* (組織) at Changping" out of the

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[88] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 40. Chiang's secretarial diary titles this order as 「飭各官長嚴束所部令」: see《蔣介石長編》, p. 316; and《民國十五年以前之蔣介石先生》，卷 2 ，頁 516.

[89] February 5, 1925,《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, p. 316.

[90] February 5, 1925,《蔣中正先生年譜長編》（台北：國史館，2014）, p. 316.

[91] Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), p. 293.

[92] Entry for February 9, Unit Diary (DZSZJ):「官兵頗嚴守紀律，與百姓甚親暱，且能對百姓宣傳本黨主義及東征之用意。」

First Regiments Logistics Unit (輜重隊).[93] The report's author, the logistics officers in charge of the new Propaganda Detachment, says that, from that date on, "while marching with the army we disseminated handbills to the pedestrians we saw… and whenever the porters stopped to rest or children would come out and surround us, we would teach them to them songs; whenever we encountered peasants we would impart to them a sense of our Doctrine."[94] It is clear from the Diary that First Regiment did not have any other unit under its command that was dedicated to propaganda before, and it begs the question *why*, nine days into the campaign, it suddenly decided to "organize" (組織) this kind of unit *ad hoc*.

Perhaps it was Chiang's strict orders on February 5 to maintain discipline vis-à-vis the populace or the apparent violation of that discipline discovered on February 8, also at Changping. But the Unit Diary offers another clue on February 9: it contains an order to the Logistics Unit to put their heavy baggage on railcars at Changping. Thus, it may very well be that the Propaganda Detachment was "organized" on this date less because of a pre-meditated need for a unit dedicated to propaganda work, and more because the Logistics Unit found itself unburdened by some of its responsibilities with the aid of the rail station. Even though the Unit Diary's own postface material, added years later in 1928, would retrospectively extol First Regiment's "strict adherence to discipline and *propagating* (傳) its Doctrine," the actual campaign entries paint a different picture: one with real breaches of discipline and propagandizing that is organized as an *ad hoc* after thought.[95]

But the field report of the Propaganda Detachment is helpful to compare with the Unit Diary. For instance, the Propaganda Detachment report's entry for February 9 states that it "conducted a little propagandizing at Changping" (在常平略事宣傳), matching the Unit Diary's first mention of "propaganda" work on that same date and place. The Propaganda Detachment report is also replete with stories of how it elicited outpourings of support in the localities they entered. For instance, at one point the report says that their successful rally "made it enough to see how *easy* it is to awaken the people of Dongjiang."[96] Also, on February 12 at Longgang 龍崗, the Propaganda Detachment reports of a crowd of 200 people that braved to hear them speak, noting "this was enough to show that the people's mindset of love and trust in us."[97] The Propaganda Detachment's report paints quite a rosy picture of a populace, just waiting for an honest broker to reach out to them. And yet, the Unit Diary's entry for the same day and place (February 12 at Longgang) is diametrically different:

> Population: The people in this area are not only obstinate, they have repeatedly suffered depravations at the hands of armies. Thus, they look on armies with particular hostility. Years back a Henan Army was defeated [because] they were hoodwinked by these locals, who

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[93] "First Regiment Logistics Unit's Propaganda Detachment, Report One" (第一團輜重隊宣傳團報告) in *Young Soldier* (青年軍人), 1925, in《黃埔軍校史料匯編》, (广东省档案馆, 2020), vol. 1, pp. 137-141.

[94] "First Regiment Logistics Unit's Propaganda Detachment, Report One" (第一團輜重隊宣傳團報告) in *Young Soldier* (青年軍人), 1925, in《黃埔軍校史料匯編》, (广东省档案馆, 2020), vol. 1, pp. 137-141. This first report is authored by 第十十四組副組長馬西藩 (I believe he's CCP, double check).

[95] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 336.

[96] "First Regiment Logistics Unit's Propaganda Detachment, Report One" (第一團輜重隊宣傳團報告) in *Young Soldier* (青年軍人), 1925, in《黃埔軍校史料匯編》, (广东省档案馆, 2020), vol. 1, p. 138.「足見東江人民覺悟亦頗易也。」

[97] "First Regiment Logistics Unit's Propaganda Detachment, Report One" (第一團輜重隊宣傳團報告) in *Young Soldier* (青年軍人), 1925, in《黃埔軍校史料匯編》, (广东省档案馆, 2020), vol. 1, p. 138.

had coordinated with Chen Jionming's forces to conduct a night attack… and surrounded them. Therefore, our Regiment's guard must be on the utmost alert.

Discipline: Our officers and soldiers all upheld their discipline, even making very strong expressions of affection to the people. But, in the end, the population harbors great fear, and dares not approach.[98]

It is quite difficult, if not impossible to marry the two reports, for they seem to describe two completely different universes, despite being collocated by space and time.

Still, the discrepencies, I believe, highlight both two key factors. First is the sheer complexity of the human terrain within the campaign space: urban centers were clearly to be much more reliably receptive than rural villages, but individual villages could be more or less hostile for a number of factors, including poverty. Second are the divisions in military labor, here troops dedicated to combat versus logistics and propaganda. These divisions of military labor can lead to different experiences within the same campaign space. In fact, although the major operational event to occur would be the Student Army's first major battle on February 15 at the town of Danshui 淡水 (described in the next section), we would never know that reading Propaganda Detachment's report alone. Its daily entries move seamlessly from rallies in various villages and towns prior to February 15 and then merely says it entered Danshui to do propaganda work February 17, with almost no indication that a major battle had occurred there just two days earlier. Of course, the Propaganda Detachment leaders were not covering up the occurrence of the battle; rather, they were "organized" or re-organized for a division in military labor other than battle, and this can drastically alter what is and is not reported. Likewise for the First Regiment as unit organized primarily for combat, we would never be able to discern from the hundreds of pages of meticulous operational detail in the Unit Diary that it had organized unit for propaganda at all.

But what about the role of Party Representatives, like Cai Guangju, who were embedded in each company and battalion in the Regiments? The work of local historians asserts that Cai indeed played a propaganda role at this precise time: "On the road during the Eastern Campaign, Cai Guangju was together with political workers of every level, and, in addition to political work… within the army, they deeply penetrated the masses (深入到群眾), amongst whom they conducted political propaganda."[99] Now, I contend that nothing the sources speak of warrant a description of "penetrating" any of the localities that the Student Army passed through. While propaganda and good behavior certainly demonstrated good will towards an anxious and jaded populous, the Student Army hardly inserted itself into local power structures to change them. They hoped to garner reciprocal good will from locals, and, if possible, purchase grain but then moved on. Even the Propaganda Detachment report's description of enthusiastic rallies are discrete events lasting at most hours and end with troops leaving the village.

Still, we cannot fully discount the possibility asserted by the local historians that Cai and other Party Representatives may have played a propaganda role in the local communities they passed through. After all, the Party Representative role itself was premised on a division of military labor, as Chiang saw it, between tactical command and "spirit" work—though he said the Party Representative's contribution would indeed manifest itself directly "on the battlefield" (戰場上).

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[98] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 89.

[99] *Zunyi Local History*《遵义文史资料》 (1989), volume 14, p. 28.

While Cai Guangju might have been doing propaganda work at this time, we actually have two letters he sent during the campaign to classmates still back at Whampoa.[100] Unfortunately, the letters are full of inquiries about his friends' well-being and disclose very little about the campaign and Cai's precise duties at this time. The most he says about the military operation is a single complaint echoed in both letters: "I've been on this campaign going on two weeks now and the only hardship is that we haven't yet seen the enemy, so we hate having no target to shoot at!"[101] Fatefully for Cai, he also mentions their approach towards the town of Danshui, the site of their first real battle. It will be on this particularly battlefield, moreover, that Student Cai's role as a Party Representative will come into play.

Utmost Bravery

On February 14, Cai Guangju and the Student Army found themselves outside the small city-town of Danshui. Chiang's initial estimated between one and three thousand defenders, well-fortified behind the massive wall that ringed the town, which was replete with three levels of firing holes for defenders to fend off attackers. Other reports stated that enemy reinforcements from surrounding areas had already begun rushing towards Danshui.

At 1930, Chiang Kai-shek called his two Regimental Commanders, He Yingqin and Zhang Boling, to his School Headquarters set up at Jade Hollow Temple (玉虛宮) nearby. By 2330, a finalized Operations Order for the attack was issued. The order stated: "Your School Director [Chiang] and Party Representative [Liao]… we shall specially select an *Utmost Bravery Unit* (奮勇隊, i.e., an assault force), which shall take an *oath* (誓) to attack and break though the Danshui city wall *at the earliest juncture* (最短期)."[102] Three parts of this are notable. First, note that despite the mention of Liao Zhongkai, as if he were there to "countersign" the order, he is actually 180 kilometers away at this time. Second is timing. We see a recognition here of the impending arrival enemy reinforcements (which would indeed arrive just hours after the School Army's assault), thus calling for an attack "at the earliest juncture." Chiang had presented a similar though hypothetical tactical scenario to both He Yingqin and Wang Boling a year prior at Whampoa. There Wang's notional plan called for attacking the enemy by a long, winding flanking maneuver to reduce casualties, while He chose an immediate, quick, and direct frontal assault despite risk of tremendous casualties.[103] It is noteworthy that the latter proclivity for speed and directness prevailed again at Jade Hollow Temple as the three discussed the tactical challenge before them here—for it also came with great risk. Third, because of this great risk the order stipulated a peculiar method for this frontal assault on a fortified position: something it calls an Utmost Bravery Unit (奮勇隊). This peculiar term, Utmost

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[100] "Two Remaining Letters from Comrade Cai Guangju" (蔡光舉同志遺書二通) in *Young Soldier* (青年軍人), (第五期, April 15, 1925), in《黃埔軍校史料匯編》, (广东省档案馆, 2020), vol. 1, p. 121. This issue of *Young Soldier* indicates *how* these personal letters came to be published. The issue begins with a request by the Party Office of *Young Soldier* for "every comrade" to do the following: "if you are aware of any writings left by any of the fallen officer or soldiers or anecdotes or information on their death, please give look for them and send everything along to the *Young Soldier* publishers who are looking forward to receiving them." See page 82.

[101] Only one letter is dated (February 13, 1925), though both state that he's been on campaign for two weeks.

[102] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 119.

[103] See *General He Yingqin: The Complete Edition of 95 Accounts*,《何應欽将軍九五紀事長編》, (Taipei: 1984), vol. 1, p. 51.

Bravery Unit, appears interchangeably in period writings and for this battle as a so-called Dare-to-Die Unit (敢死隊), and requires further explanation.

In fact, Chiang's Operations Order takes the bulk of its space explaining to commanders and troops how the Utmost Bravery Unit will work. This is quite irregular, given that Operations Orders (discussed more in Chapter 3) was pre-formatted, pre-determined format for communicating a battle plan with speed, relying on both informational and procedural standardization. And yet, Chiang's order conveys not merely a plan of attack, but an entirely different unit *organization* for the attack. His order states, "For the Utmost Bravery Unit, *select* (挑選) from each Regiment the names of 105 officers and men of utmost bravery to make seven groups of fifteen members each, to which will be added one ladder."[104] Whereas the School Army Regiments are already divided into distinct unit organizations (from battalions to companies to platoons) for battle, the Operations Order here directs an impromptu *selection* process (挑選) to achieve a *re*-organization of two new units, *ad hoc*, and on the very eve of battle.

Though we will return to this striking re-organization again below, the order also addresses other practical considerations for the Utmost Bravery Unit. For instance, "assault ladders (攻城梯)… for each Regiment are now being made and will be available for pick-up (領取) from School Headquarters at Jade Hollow Temple."[105] Also, the order assigns each Regiment's respective Utmost Bravery Unit with separate "points of attack" (攻城地點), namely the northeast part of the Danshui wall for First Regiment, the southwest part of the wall for Second Regiment. It adds, "Each Regimental commander must *freely select* (自由擇定) the precise point at each area that is most conducive for ascending the wall." By inserting the tactical element of "freedom," the order recognizes that some of the specifics will need to be worked out "freely" by actors on the ground and in real-time. Readers will also recall that this type of "freedom" (自由) has been used in the Chinese tactical lexicon for decades by this point in 1925, with practical applicability in the descending scale of military responsibility from the regimental commander down to the individual foot soldier.[106]

In addition to other coordinating instructions, such as when to begin the assault and the signals used between units, the Operations Order adds another non-standard element: "awards" (獎勵). It says, that "After the successful attack on the city, each and every officer and soldier in the Utmost Bravery Unit, will be submitted to the Generalissimo [Sun Yat-sen] for the Golden Medal of Utmost Bravery (奮勇金牌) as a motivation."[107] In order to make sure participants received their medals, Chiang's Operations Order also mandated that Regiments "shall compile a list of all officer and soldier names (名冊) in the Utmost Bravery Unit for later use in this purpose." Unfortunately, this list no longer exists. Finally, this otherwise quite unconventional piece of order writing ends with the standard format for Operations Orders at this time, and as had been used since the late Qing, with the last item always identifies the precise location of the commander during the battle: "I [Chiang Kai-shek] will be located in a cleft on high ground with the artillery."[108]

Once this order was issued at 2330, the Unit Diary tells us that He Yingqin returned and "immediately gathered the Battalion Commanders to brief them face-to-face on the plan, in addition

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[104] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), pp. 119-121.
[105] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 120.
[106] As the 1905 Drill Manual stated, "Dispersed formations operate on the principle of *freedom* (自由)…." See 廣東將弁學堂 譯,《步兵操典白話》in《廣州大典》v. 332（史部政書類，第 27 冊）, 763.
[107] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 121.
[108] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 121.

to ordering the selection of the Utmost Bravery Unit and to preparation all details for the attack on the town."[109] Now, because the stipulated "list" of members in the Utmost Bravery Unit no longer exists, we are forced us to piece together the identities for those selected that night. But we do know Cai Guangju was a principle member. An official KMT bulletin issued just over 48 hours after the battle would state that "as *Party Representative* for the Third Battalion of the Second Training Regiment, Cai Guangju, *led* (督率) the Dare-to-Die Detachment (敢死隊) in the attack on the walls of Danshui."[110] A popular newspaper released that month would also state that Cai "appointed as a Party Representative in the Teaching Regiment," Cai Guangju "received orders to *organize* (組織) an Utmost Bravery Unit and serve personally as its unit leader."[111] Though not published until 1990, Zheng Dongguo's reminiscences of that night state that "the fighting morale in the army was at a crest, and everyone, fearing being left out, rushed to put their names in (報名) for participation in the Utmost Bravery Unit."[112] Zheng says that of the ten officers "the higher-ups selected," he, Cai Guangju, and at least two other Party Representatives were included, plus "one hundred names of strong soldiers (精壯士兵)."[113] While the Unit Diary entry for that night curiously only divulges one of the selected names—First Battalion Commander, Shen Yingshi 沈應時 (1895-1926)—it odes confirm the rush of volunteers: "The amount of men selected for the Utmost Bravery Unit from each battalion exceeded the quota… all ample evidence of the bravery of [both] our officers and men."[114] But in his 1928 appended Preface to the Unit Diary, First Regiment's Party Representative, Miao Bin 繆斌, provides other details of that night:

> I remember on the Danshui campaign, when we were selecting the Utmost Bravery Unit for the attack on the city, regardless of whether they were officers or soldiers, so many came to submit their names (報名), along with handing us their last wills and testaments that they had drafted. And when the quota was full, men begged to be let in with tears running down their faces. The example of such passion—tragic and heroic, swift and fierce—was unprecedented, certainly not inferior to the former 72 Martyrs [of 1911 fame].[115]

More than painting a more detailed picture of that night, I submit that Mao Bin's description ties the selection of the Utmost Bravery Unit to a broader context of Spirit Education at Whampoa.

Recall that Sun Yat-sen's seminal 1921 speech on "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), which Chiang upheld as a cornerstone of his Whampoa curriculum, had described in detail as pinnacle example of martial "spirit" in action the Japanese ground assault on Port Arthur in 1904.[116] Sun Yat-sen had said that Japanese commanders at Port Arthur knew a direct assault on

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[109] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 121.

[110] "Central Committee General Announcement Number 187" (中執會通告(第一零七號), February 17, 1925, Zhongguo guo min dang [Kuomintang] Records, Wubu Reel 125, no. 13484, Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Originals in Kuomintang Archives (Taipei, Taiwan).

[111] *Peacock Pictorial Post* (孔雀畫報), (Shanghai: Kongque huabao she, 1925), issue 13.「君被委為教導團黨代表，黨軍攻淡水多日未克，君乃奉命組織奮勇隊，親任隊長。」

[112] Zheng Dongguo 鄭洞國, *My Military Career: Reminiscences of Zheng Dongguo*《我的戎馬生涯：鄭洞國回憶錄》, 郑建邦, 胡耀平, eds., (北京市 : 团结出版社, 2008), p. 32.

[113] Zheng Dongguo 鄭洞國, *My Military Career: Reminiscences of Zheng Dongguo*《我的戎馬生涯：鄭洞國回憶錄》, 郑建邦, 胡耀平, eds., (北京市 : 团结出版社, 2008), p. 32.

[114] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 123.

[115] Miao Bin 繆斌, "Preface Two"〈序二〉, of Unit Diary (DZSZJ), pp. 1-2.

[116] Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, "Spirit Education for Military Men" (軍人精神教育), 1921.

Russian fortifications guaranteed casualties of such enormity that, instead of ordering a single unit to make the assault, they asked for a few hundred volunteers from "those who dared to die" (敢死之士). Because the amount of men who "submitted their names" (報名) exceeded the amount needed, commanders "had to draw lots to determine would be selected and who would be rejected (乃用拈籌之法，以定取捨)." From the outpouring of volunteers to the performative suicide by two officers rejected from participation, Sun had concluded, "This is giving up one's life to save the country, and it is benevolence of the man of ideals (志士之仁)." I submit that it is almost impossible that the scenes described in Chiang's Regimental camps outside of Danshui on the night of February 14, 1925 were not influenced, directly or indirectly, by Sun's Port Arthur story. After all, the Student Army accounts speak with striking similarity of organizing a special *ad hoc* unit that "dared to die" (敢死隊), with men "fearing" being left out, the "submission of names" (報名) exceeding all quotas, the sheer pathos of "men begging to be let in with tears running down their faces" (以額滿而涕泣要求加入), and the many "last wills and testaments" (遺囑) these volunteers composed should they fall. Indeed, Miao Bin equates these men to the 72 Martyrs of 1911, for it is a manifestation of the Spirit Education that Sun Yat-sen had prophesied now realized by these Whampoa students.

And Cai Guangju also appears to have composed something like a "last wills and testaments" (遺囑), as Mao Bin described in the camp that night. In the month after the battle, a newspaper published a letter he wrote to his bother on the eve of the battle. Now this letter is also mentioned in the local historian's work with surviving members of Cai's family in the 1980s. But these members could only recall the letter from memory, for they had been forced to destroy it and all such keepsakes during the Cultural Revolution. But thanks to massive digitization in recent years, I believe I've found a reliably authentic copy of the letter published in the obscure Shanghai tabloid, *Peacock Pictorial Post* (孔雀畫報), which provides credible provinence of the letter being given to them by Cai's older brother in 1925.[117] This letter reads:

> Big Brother,
>
> Your little brother [Guangju] fears that, after this, we will be parted forever. But there is joy in the parting, and I do so without any regret! …ever since coming to know the Revolution's "Three Doctrines of the People," since engaging in the work of realizing the Three Doctrines and following the advance of our Revolution, my mind has been wrapped up… in these Doctrines…. In this moment, all my concerns revolve on this—nothing but this.
>
> Should our Doctrine succeed, then our family, along with the common people, will all eat their fill in peace; if it does not succeed, then our country will not survive. Today, I am giving up my life for these Doctrines, so that I may repay my country, my family, and those who love me—and that is all there is to say about it.

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[117] Issue 13 (1925) of *Peacock Pictorial Post* (孔雀畫報) provides provenance for its source, writing that "Guangju's elder brother, Mr. Jianxun, recently came from Guangzhou to Shanghai carrying a final letter written by his younger brother the night before he was wounded. The text reads….:"Another account of Cai's last letter recalled slightly different content. But this was only a recollection compiled by local historians in the 1980s and, in their interview with Cai Guangju's surviving nephew, he explicitly stated that these letters were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. See *Zunyi Local History*《遵义文史资料》 (1989), volume 14, p. 29.「我現在已擔任攻打淡水城的敢死隊長。倘不幸犧牲，乞兄善事雙親，弟媳亦請多加照顧。」

> We've always demanded honesty in everything, leaving not an ounce of discrepancy between our words and actions. But there are many of our relatives (近親) who talk Revolution but personally lack any courage—and that really pains me.[118]

Though the last two lines cryptically express some sort of dissatisfaction within their family (addressed more below), the letter seems to affirm the efficacy of Whampoa education. After all, outside sources corroborate that sometime as an aimless college student during period of the KMT reorganization in 1923-1924, Cai came to the type of pivotal personal awakening to ideological Doctrine, that his letter describes. Cai Guangju's letter, if it is authentic, offers insight into the deeply personal experience of the formative nature of Whampoa education, not just generally, but at the very liminal point between classroom education in Doctrine and its practical application on the battlefield.

But amidst the work of selection and personal soul-searching that went with it, School Army Regiments also took care of other logistical considerations as well. In the early morning hours, the Regimental Commander ordered its Medic Unit to set up a Bandage Station (繃帶所) at Stone Bell Gorge (石鼓坳) behind the forward line. He also gave the Logistics Unit "the primary task (務先) of getting work tools, knives, axes, etc., and sending them over,"[119] presumably to construct the ladders needed to scale Danshui's walls in the coming hours. At any rate, by 0330 on the morning of February 15, the Unit Diary says that First Regiment's preparations for the attack were complete.[120] For Chiang, his secretarial diary records: "Once the selection of the Utmost Bravery Unit was complete, [he] bedded down at Jade Hollow Temple on the front."[121]

Sunrise around 0500 on February 15 began a day of clear weather with no wind.[122] At 0600, Chiang, co-located at his artillery position, ordered his guns to begin the bombardment, followed by the Regiment's machine gun positions. By 0625, the Unit Diary records that their artillery shells were on target and effective, noticeably suppressing the enemy fires coming from the wall. The First Regiment's Utmost Bravery Unit then stepped out of their covered positions and "ventured into enemy fire" (冒敵火) towards Danshui's southeast gate. Split into three columns, their Utmost Bravery Unit used was the "forward bounding of *dispersed* troops" (散兵躍進), as they alternated rushes and "multiple meters of space in between" themselves in order to "decreases time stopping and minimize losses to enemy fire."[123] After the right-most group of the Utmost Bravery Unit, consisting of over 10 men, had bounded forward, they utilized a dirt mound close to the foot of the wall that provided them cover. But problems began mounting from here. Amazingly, the Unit Diary says "they did not have a ladder (they had not taken one) so they couldn't get up the wall."[124] Without a ladder, this group stalled in place. The middle group had bounded through heavy fire to get to an irrigation ditch, just 20 meters from the wall, where they were forced to take cover. The left-most group could find no cover for that last 50 meter stretch, and so they huddled up at the

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[118] *Peacock Pictorial Post* (孔雀畫報), (Shanghai: Kongque huabao she, 1925), issue 13.
[119] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 122.
[120] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 123.
[121] 《蔣中正先生年譜長編》vol. 1, p. 310.「挑選奮勇隊畢，臥於陣地玉虛宮。」
[122] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 123.
[123] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 140.「散兵躍進：至最近距離敵火猛烈之際，各個躍進用數米達之距離，減少停止時間則損害最小，以此次攻城之奮勇隊知之。」Elsewhere it calls this a "bounding and crawling method" (躍進法及匍匐前進法), see Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 124.
[124] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 124. Parenthesis in the original!「但以無梯（梯未領到）不得入城。」It is unclear whose fault was the failure to have the assault ladders. Elsewhere it says, "the ladders *had been prepared* the night before, but not brought" (昨夜準備登城之梯未領到).

building, unable to move. From his position about 700 meters from the wall, Regimental Commander He Yingqin was "able to observe the whole situation" and saw the predicament: "because the enemy's fire [could hit] the Utmost Bravery Unit whether they advanced or retreated, many men simply did not dare to get up and move forward."[125]

As the attack's momentum abruptly stalled, casualties mounted. Ten meters from the wall, the most senior member of the Utmost Bravery Unit, Shen Yingshi, was shot through the foot, rendering him out of action.[126] It seems that Cai Guangju was also wounded at this time. Jiang Xuanyun's account, written just two weeks later, says that he was with Chiang Kai-shek at the artillery position, from which Chiang apparently saw Cai Guangju wounded and ordered Jiang to go to his aid. "Classmate Cai Guangju had been shot through the stomach…But he only said, 'Xianyun! Give me medical treatment quick, the rebel bandits are waiting for me to die in agony!' This type of spirit (精神), was nothing less than the crystallization of our daily training in Doctrine (主義).[127] In contrast to Jiang Xianyun's published account, another Whampoa classmate who came to Cai's aid, in this case a Zunyi native, would later disclose to Cai's family that he "found him with a stomach wound with blood gushing like a fountain, the intestines were completely torn and coming out" (發現腹部受傷，血流如注，腸子都被打斷溢出).[128] What was actually seen and heard in this moment—either "crystallization" of commitment to Doctrine and defiant quips in the face of death or something more flatly gory—is hard for a historian to discern for many reasons.[129]

But it does tell us two things. First, despite the surprising low numbers of casualties the Student Army as whole would suffer in this battle, and despite the initial enthusiasm that animated the flood of volunteers for the Utmost Bravery Unity, it illustrates the real and compounding psychological strain on the actors in making the assault, especially as momentum stalls *in medias res*.[130] Second, this psychological strain produces structural and spatial effects on the battlefield. The Unit Diary says that "as the Regimental Commander observed this situation, he knew that there was no other option but to scale the wall as soon as possible; for, if they remained under this heavy fire for long, and even if the Utmost Bravery Unit did crumble in fear, it would be difficult to avoid needing to retreat."[131] To make this happen, He Yingqin, from 700 meters away, first tries to reinforce the

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[125] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 125.

[126] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 126.

[127] Jiang Xianyun 蔣先雲, "Return From the Frontline Enemy" 〈由前敵歸來〉, *Chinese Soldier*《中國軍人》, Issue 2, March 2, 1925; reprinted in 中共惠州市委统战部，《国民革命军东征史料选编 》，（广东人民出版社，1992）, pp. 44-46. The account also says student Li Qing (mentioned in footnote above) heroically continued the assault after bandaging his own head wound, but it never mentions Li Qing's death.

[128] Cai Zili 蔡自勵, "Recollections of Martyr Cai Guangju"〈回憶蔡光舉烈士〉,《*Zunyi Local History*《遵义文史资料》 (1989), volume 9, p. 11.「續而在攻打淡水時，先父身先士卒，揮戈進擊，身中槍彈，掩腹指揮戰鬥直至昏迷。由敢死隊員陳鐵（曾任貴州省政協副主席，已故）搶救下來，發現腹部受傷，血流如注，腸子都被打斷溢出，因後方醫療條件較差，未能搶救成功，於一九二五年十四日光榮為國捐軀，享年二十一歲。」

[129] The problem of verifying actors' testimony is a problem facing historians generally, but especially when writing about warfare. But this challenge is also compounded in writing about modern Chinese warfare, where the development of a distinctly "moral" form of violence is a critical discourse by period actors. In a famous chapter from his Vietnam War memoir, titled "How to Tell a True War Story," Tim O'Brien writes, "A true war story is never moral…. If a story seems moral, do not believe it…." He adds: "In a true war story, if there's a moral at all, it's like the thread that makes the cloth. You can't tease it out. You can't extract the meaning without unraveling the deeper meaning.… For the common soldier, at least, war has the feel—the spiritual texture—of a great ghostly fog, thick and permanent. There is no clarity. Everything swirls." See Tim Obrien, *The Things They Carried*, pp. 65, 74, and 78. I submit that in Cai Guangju's case we have a cloth of testimony and it is hard to tease out the "moral."

[130] The Unit Diary records the cost of this battle as "more than 10 (十餘) men killed in action, plus six officers wounded, including Battalion Commander Shen Yingshi, and 20-30 soldiers wounded." See Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 139.

[131] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 125.

Utmost Bravery Unit, sending a reserve platoon forward, but immediately they get "pinned down and dared not advance further" (又伏臥，不敢再進矣). Two higher-ranking officers (deputy Regimental Commander, Wang Jun 王俊, and Whampoa Teaching Officer, Liu Yaochen 劉堯宸) see this happen, and together they leave their own overwatch positions to try and spur the platoon forward.[132] He Yingqin then also moves his entire headquarters unit closer to the action. The picture portrayed here is one of a dispersed command structure *in contraction*, with battlefield authorities that had been spread out spatially beginning to coalesce around a discrete point of friction.

Even as dispersed command contracts structurally and spatially, physical distance itself becomes elongated and compartmentalized by the physical and psychological experience of chaos. It is incredible that when He Yingqin moves his Regimental command forward, he suddenly is about to observe that the Second Regiment's Utmost Bravery Unit appeared to have actually scaled the wall. But none of the men in the forward pockets of his Utmost Bravery Units, like those stuck in the irrigation ditch, could not see this. Trying to get his own Utmost Bravery Units to seize the moment by ordering them forward, He Yingqin employed "incessant with signals and loud yelling." But the volume and intensity of the battle made communication impossible and the Utmost Bravery Units remained stuck and unaware of what was going on. Such is the so-called "swirl" of the battlefield, as actors experience vastly different perceptions of unfolding situations even in close spatial proximity to one another.

It is at this point, when First Teaching Regiment's assault seems doomed, that the Unit Diary breaks with its more or less clinical tone of operational reporting and adopts a narrative style similar to the propaganda accounts, like Jiang Xianyun's, replete with heroes and gritty quotations. Whereas the Regiment's highest rung of officers had already come down to the scene, but proved ineffectual amidst the sound and fury, the Diary says another actor arrived *deus ex machina*: "Just as the advance was on the verge of flagging, suddenly came the flag-bearer from First Battalion, Third Company [in reserve]…."[133] This flag-bear, an enlisted soldier, not an officer, had been enraged when his student company commander seemed frozen in place, saying "I don't think there's many enemy up on the wall, I'll dare to go towards it!"[134] Thus he left his hapless student commander and sprang forward, stopping only periodically to take cover, and reached the town wall. When the other pinned down elements of the Utmost Bravery Units saw him and his flag, they too rushed forward. With their momentum rekindled, even the Utmost Bravery Unit's lack of ladders could not stop them. One group used a "human ladder method to scale the wall" (用人梯法登城), while another used their bayonets to expand a hole left by an artillery shell to penetrate and enter the wall. Chiang's personal diary corroborates this chain of events: "Each of the Utmost Bravery Units went forward. There was a flag-bearer who scaled the wall… [unreadable text] …waiving. It emboldened the officers and men to breach the wall and in a short period of time the Teaching Regiments were in the city fighting in the streets."[135] But by 0730, the city had been essentially taken, with no enemy allowed to flee. It had taken roughly one and a half hours since the beginning of the artillery salvos.

By 0800 First Teaching Regiment had completed a search of their sector of the town and counted the capture 590 enemy rifles, 5 machineguns, tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, and over 700 prisoners, with the amount of enemy killed left "uncounted" (無算). By 0830 "troop consolidation was completed" (隊伍整頓完畢) and perimeter defenses were established to prepare for enemy counterattack, which did come with ferocity that afternoon. Whampoa students that had

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[132] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 126.
[133] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 126.
[134] Unit Diary (DZSZJ), p. 126.
[135] Entry for February 15, 1924, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

yearned for their first taste of battle the night before, now received it twice that day. Though the attack was eventually repulsed, a tactical blunder by Second Teaching Regiment commander Wang Boling allowed enemy troops to raid the School Army's rear area, including the location the Medic Unit's Bandage Aid Station had been set up.[136]

Chiang's personal diary records during the counterattack, the Yunnan and Guangxi forces of the so-called United Army had "stood on the sidelines and watched, breaking their agreement to enter [the battle], and causing the full strength of the enemy to come down on us."[137] In fact, Chiang notes that they waited until the enemy forces were defeated and then swooped into their rear areas to take the abandoned weapons that should have been taken by Chiang's Guangdong and Student Armies. Recording a sigh of lament at the duplicity of such allies, Chiang writes "I wish Heaven would grant it that my 5,000 *kid brothers* (子弟,i.e. the Student Army) could exterminate the bandit rebels… independently, on our own strength, not relying on anyone else. Then I'd know happiness."[138] Though just a month prior Chiang's diary had recorded overflowing exasperation that Whampoa students, especially student Party Representatives, needed to be treated like "kid brothers" (子弟), their performance in their first battle had earned them some credit. Still, there was still much to improve on, and Chiang would tell them this directly after the battle, as we will see in the following section.

Meanwhile, either because of the seriousness of Cai Guangju's wounds or the sacking of the Regimental Aid Station during the enemy counter attack, or both, Cai was transported at this time to a hospital in Guangzhou city, 180 miles away.

Post Mortem

In current professional military idiom a "post mortem" generally refers to an after-action debrief, wherein a commander gathers the unit as soon as possible following an enemy engagement to discuss what went right and, most importantly, what went wrong. Given that the chaos of combat is experienced as a swirl of disjointed perspectives, it is an opportunity both of organizational improvement and collective sense-making. The rather macabre euphemism to an autopsy is also apropos because the analytic retrospective is done in close temporal and spatial proximity to the dead. Thus, when Chiang Kai-shek gathered each of his Teaching Regiments separately on February 17 at Danshui to talk lessons learned, his diary tells us that "*after* exhorting" (訓誡後) them, he "led them in a ceremony for the comrades killed in battle" (主祭陣亡同志).[139] Of note, though Cai Guangju passed away at the Guangzhou hospital on the 17th, his name would not be mentioned in Chiang's ceremony for the dead, for that news would not reach Chiang until the 19th.

Let us look at Chiang's debrief, which he opened with a congratulatory note. By "defeating an opponent of between 5,000 and 6,000," Chiang told them, the 2,000-strong School Army had "put the Three People's Doctrine into practice, acting on behalf of both the country and the people, showing themselves the *true* Revolutionary Army, and could now be counted as the *true disciples* (真

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136 Wang Boling's mistake led to his relief as Second Regimental Commander, for reasons of "illness," as Chiang would tell the Student Army. Shen Yingshi, the wounded Battalion Commander from the First Regiment, replaced him.
137 Entry for February 17, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.
138 Entry for February 17, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 6], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.
139 February 17, 1925, Chiang Kai-shek diaries, [Box no. 4, Folder no. 7], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

正的信徒) of Generalissimo Sun."[140] He remarked that Sun Yat-sen, who was very sick at the time, had been greatly heartened by the victory, and also added a personal note: "As your School Director, I am extremely satisfied with each officer and soldier here on the conduct of this battle; moreover, I'm very honored." But Chiang shifts his tone: "Right now, I have a few words to share with everyone."[141] What follows is a series of critiques of increasing severity, which have been largely omitted from documents like the Unit Diary and other accounts of the battle.

First, Chiang critiques the formation Utmost Bravery Unit. Though Chiang himself had ordered its formation, now he tells them, "But this is not what should have happened."[142] Chiang says that he only ordered it because this was "the first time you Teaching Regiments had fought in battle" and they may have lacked the "the skills and the courage needed in attacking a walled town." This is why he says, "we selected (挑選) men with experience, with courage, and with the ability to sacrifice for Country and Party to come out and form the Utmost Bravery Unit, and provide a model for all to see."[143] Of note, we can be sure that Cai Guangju's selection was not for his experience, for he had no real military experience. The crux of his critique of the practice, therefore is this: "As Revolutionary Soldiers, whether you are officers or enlisted, *every single one* (人人) of you should be of *utmost bravery* (奮勇)…."[144] After all, the entire Whampoa project was what I've called the "technology of spirit," methods and practices for ensuring that the necessary human qualities for warfare can be reliably found when needed.

Whereas accounts of the School Army on the night of February 14 extolled the outpouring of volunteers, just as Sun Yat-sen had praised the Japanese case at Port Arthur, Chiang's critique flips the script. The need for Chiang to pause his School Army and re-organize an *ad hoc* Utmost Bravery Unit right before the battle reveals his ambivalence, even doubt, about the reliability of the Whampoa education all these student officers received to carry the battle. There is also an ironic reading of Cai's last letter to his brother, where he cites some sort of ongoing family matter between their "*relatives* (近親) who talk Revolution but personally lack any courage." After all, one would expect that members of an organic family unit would have differing levels of so-called "Revolutionary courage." The irony is that at the time he was writing the letter, Chiang Kai-shek was similarly doubting the mettle of "every single" (人人) member of the School Army, despite their having undergone such rigorous "technologies of spirit" at Whampoa. Cai, who had once longed to find a "*true* Revolutionary organization," would then some of his last ambulatory hours trying to make an *ad hoc* organization on the fly.

The unevenness of Whampoa-educated student officers is also the theme when Chiang brings up the heroic flag-bearer at the debrief. "From the artillery position five to six hundred

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[140] Chiang Kai-shek, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), given Feb 17, 1925 outside Danshui's Changshanzai, from *School Director Chiang's Eastern Campaign Collected Admonitions* (蔣校長東征訓話集), in *Whampoa Military Academy Historical Source Collection* (黃埔軍校史料匯編), (Guangzhou: Guangdong Archives, 2020), vol. 13, p. 5.

[141] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 4.

[142] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of Second Teaching Regiment" (對教導第二團官兵訓話), given Feb 17, 1925 at Danshui's East Gate, from *School Director Chiang's Eastern Campaign Collected Admonitions* (蔣校長東征訓話集), in *Whampoa Military Academy Historical Source Collection* (黃埔軍校史料匯編), (Guangzhou: Guangdong Archives, 2020), vol. 13, p. 9.

[143] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of Second Teaching Regiment" (對教導第二團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 9.

[144] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of Second Teaching Regiment" (對教導第二團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 9.

meters from the wall I witnessed with my own eyes (親眼看見) one brother from your Utmost Bravery Unit, who had advanced the furthest. And now I have selected him to bear the School Flag…."[145] As mentioned in the Unit Diary, the flag bearer had been infuriated at his student commander's reluctance to advance. Chiang also echoes this sentiment here: "At the artillery position I also heard (聽見) a soldier there say, 'The soldiers want to move forward, but the officers are against it and won't let us advance.'"[146] "As an officer myself," Chiang continued, "this sentence was hard to hear," because "officers must be able to advance straight forward without hesitation and without fear of death." The example officers set, he reminds them, were critical: "If an officer retreats one step, his men will retreat ten." But one officer in particular had done more than hesitate. Chiang told them of the Company Commander of Seventh Company, Sun Liang 孫良, retreated in violation of "Mutual Punishment Law" (連坐法) and had been sentenced to death—a sentence that was carried out three days later.[147] The lesson of Sun Liang, Chiang told them, was that "from now on, when you encounter an enemy, no matter how formidable… you are only allowed to move forward, never backward (只許前，不許後退)."[148] Needless to say, was an important addendum to the military concept of "freedom."

And Chiang continued exhorting them about the need to face death. He said, "If you unfortunately die in battle, it means becoming a glorious and honorable Revolutionary ghost (革命鬼)…. And we will still send their families annual bereavement payments (撫卹金)."[149] From the archives we know that a "bereavement payment" system had been set up by Chiang and Liao Zhongkai just before the campaign, and it indeed was meant to embolden their men to sacrifice bravely on the battlefield knowing that loved ones would be taken care of.[150] We could also see such bereavement payments (撫卹金) even as form of "technology" for reliably eliciting battlefield "spirit." This is also the reason why, on the day after this debrief (Feb 18), the archives show Chiang contacting the Central Executive Committee to check on the reliability of these payments.[151]

But Chiang's debrief also reveals a much cruder use of money as an incentive for battlefield "spirit," one that he had been not authorized. Chiang expresses his displeasure says that volunteers for the Utmost Bravery Unit were actually promised payment. However, he says, "Because in this

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145 Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 7.

146 「對校全體官長訓話」（二月十九日下午五時於淡水崇稚學校校部行營），〈蔣校長東征訓話集〉 in 《黃埔軍校史料匯編》vol. 13, p. 13.

147 Chiang was not bluffing: as his diary records just three days later, "Sun Liang, the officer who fled, was executed—thinking of it pains my heart." See Chiang Diary, Feb 20, 1925, Hoover. Immediately after, the entry says he continued "drafting more exhortations" for the men.

148 Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of Second Teaching Regiment" (對教導第二團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 9.

149 Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of Second Teaching Regiment" (對教導第二團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 9.

150 On January 8, 1925, Chiang and Liao Zhongkai are involved in drafting set "Regulations for Bereavement Compensation" (卹賞簡章): See "Military Academy School Director Chiang Kai-shek Report to the Central Executive Committee" [軍官學校校長蔣中正呈中執會文], January 8, 1925, Zhongguo guo min dang [Kuomintang] Records, Hankou Reel 13, no. 1450.1, Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Originals in Kuomintang Archives (Taipei, Taiwan). For the entirety of the corresponding files, see Hankou Reel 13, no. 1450.1 through no. 1450.8.

151 "Army Officer Academy School Director Chiang Kai-shek Report to the Central Executive Committee" [軍官學校校長蔣中正呈中執會文], Feb 18, 1925, Zhongguo guo min dang [Kuomintang] Records, Hankou Reel 13, no. 1452.1, Hoover Institution Library & Archives. **It says, "Please examine the rough draft General Regulations for the Revolutionary Army's Provisional Bereavement Compensations [of Jan. 8, 1925]."**

instant each of your Regimental Commanders had already given the order for monetary rewards (賞錢), I have no alternative but to grant it to you in the amounts they stipulated."[152] Now, Chiang's mention of these promised monetary awards are a revelation, for they are omitted from the Regimental Unit Diary, despite its meticulous documentation of directives and orders.[153] Though Chiang admits he acquiesced on the issue after the fact, he raises quite a few critiques here. "Fighting in war," he says, "is our duty; and it's about rescuing the Country, rescuing the people, even rescuing our own families, not asking your superiors for rewards and compensation."[154] Again Chiang says, "The Revolutionary Army gives its all to sacrifice always for the sake of its own Doctrine, not to ask for some monetary reward—at most there should be a medal (勳章)."[155] Indeed, recall that Chiang's original order for the attack on Danshui had discussed "awards" (獎勵) for the Utmost Bravery Unit, but in the form of a "golden medal from Generalissimo Sun" (大元帥所賞的金牌勳章), not money. At the debrief, Chiang now tells (surviving) members of the Utmost Bravery Unit, they need to make a choice between the money or the medal: "Whatever you want more, make your own choices, I don't care. But if you take the money, it's your required duty to send it home to provide support for your mothers and fathers, wives and children." After all, with all that money on campaign Chiang says, "You certainly don't want it jingling around your pocket and then spending it haphazardly here and there" (切不要袋在袋裏來亂化亂用).[156] To be sure, unspoken here is a more precise concern over the use of money on campaign: prostitution and gambling, the very activities First Teaching Regiment's officers had been engaged in (on February 8, before extra reward money was in circulation).[157] Chiang sums up the lesson: "In the future, regardless of whether we're attacking some high mountain or some fortified town, you cannot demand monetary reward—this time was an exception. Otherwise, you can't call yourself a Revolutionary Army, for you're no different than an army of thieving robbers."[158] Nevertheless, the next day (February 18), when Chiang also checked on bereavement payments, his personal and secretarial diaries record that each member of the Utmost Bravery Unit received 30 *yuan*, as he had grudgingly promised.[159]

Though Mao Bin still lauded the Utmost Bravery Unit volunteers who "submitted their names" (報名) on the night of February 14, equating them to the 72 Martyrs of 1911 fame, I submit that issue of monetary rewards is a likely reason the "list of names" (名冊), as required in Chiang's order to compile, no longer exists. After all, the order stated that the list was for reward of Sun's medal. But the dishonorable addition of monetary rewards—which apparently many members decided to take instead of the medal—sullied that list of names, certainly in Chiang's eyes. Following these debriefs, Chiang then led the Student Army in ceremonies for the dead.

Meanwhile, at 1800 that evening 180 kilometers away in Guangzhou, "Executive Committee General Announcement Number 107" announced that Cai Guangju, "who led the led the Dare-to-

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[152] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 6.
[153] I cannot find mention of these monetary rewards in any other source on Danshui.
[154] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of Second Teaching Regiment" (對教導第二團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 9.
[155] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 6.
[156] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 6.
[157] See entry for Feb 8, 1925, in vicinity of Changping Dyke, DZSJ p. 62.
[158] Chiang, "Admonitions to the Officers and Men of First Teaching Regiment" (對教導第一團官兵訓話), Feb 17, 1925, p. 6.
[159] Chiang Personal Diary, Hoover, February 18, 1925. Also in 年譜長編, p. 314.

Die Detachment (敢死隊)… and was one of the first to scale the walls" at Danshui, had died after unsuccessful surgery. It added that a funeral ceremony would be held the following morning (Feb 18) at 10am at Dongshan's Guangdong Public Hospital. The only surviving photograph I have located comes again from *Peacock Pictorial Post*, showing Liao Zhongkai, School Party Representative in attendance. According to the interviews done by local historians in the 1980s, relatives remembered once having this or a similar photo in their family possession before it was destroyed.[160] They also stated that they were told that Liao Zhongkai had personally seen to Cai funeral arrangements at the hospital and even ensured that his body received a fresh uniform for the ceremony. We can recall here that two months earlier Cai Guangju had sat under Chiang's teaching for freshly minted Party Representatives at Whampoa, where he learned that it was his duty to visit troops in the hospital and set to all aspects of their material welfare, including clothing. Ironically, this is precisely what he would have done for him by the top Party Representative, Liao Zhongkai.




Figure 18: "The Scene Moving the Body for Interment" printed in Peacock Pictorial Post (孔雀畫報), (Shanghai: Kongque huabao she, 1925), issue 13. Photo from Minguo shiqi qikan quanwen shujuku *民国时期期刊全文数据库 [Chinese Periodicals Full-text (1911-1949)], https://www.cnbksy.com/. Accessed June 10, 2024.*

Chiang Kai-shek would not get the above notification about Cai Guangju's death until the evening of February 19. It was quite fitting, then that Chiang's emotional notice pushed to all Student Army units that evening associated Student Cai with both the Confucian virtue of benevolence and the martial quality of "utmost bravery": "'Having sought benevolence, he attained it' (求仁得仁) and in resolve he had no regrets. Now, School comrades, how much more should you rise up in utmost bravery (奮勇)?" After all Sun Yat-sen had directly linked these qualities together in the type of Spirit Education that he promised would win battles and rescue the nation.

Conclusion

[160] Cai Guangju's nephew, Cai Zili, states that the funeral photos included "the casket flanked on either side by Mr. Liao Zhongkai and Regimental Commander He Yingqin along with twenty or so representatives from the School and Guangzhou revolutionary government." See: Cai Zili 蔡自勵, "Remembering Martyr Cai Guangju" (回憶蔡光舉烈士), *Zunyi Local History*《遵义文史资料》(1984), volume 9, p. 11.

This chapter has reconstructed the story of Cai Guangju, one of the first students to fall in battle from the Whampoa Military Academy. I have used Student Cai's story as a vehicle to closely examine how this Whampoa first earned its reputation as both a moral *and* military force to be reckoned with on China's political stage of the 1920s. Tracing Cai's story has shown both real achievements and innovations, not to mention human courage; but its up-close gaze has also revealed some of the failures, contingencies, contradictions, and even human frailty that went into producing Whampoa's first battlefield victory. From the triumph at Danshui, and especially the successful battles of even greater scale in the First Eastern Campaign, emerged not only a claim to a moral monopoly of violence in China, but the ability to back up that claim with increasingly effective force.

From Sun Yat-sen's early formulation of his own revolutionary brand of Spirit Education, our analysis showed convenient elisions and deep continuities between the both the imperial past and Sun's "warlord" present that he sought to distinguish himself from. Indeed, Sun and Whampoa posited a revolutionary originality in its Spirit Education by placing Doctrine as the ultimate moral authority over violence, a claim that has been so effective that the memory of such military education curriculum by that name during the Qing is all but forgotten, even by historians. But the Spirit Education of the late Qing and that of Sun's Whampoa both asserted that the ultimate decisive factor on the battlefield was the non-material power of moral human agency, achieved through a robust, text-based ethics education. In this way, Sun's very ability to append his text-based Doctrines onto the late Qing tradition of Spirit Education was made possible by the Classics themselves. This is why Sun was sure to engage Confucian tradition rather than reject it as he made his bid to overhaul Spirit Education with his Doctrine. In other words, the Classics and their novel application to Spirit Education in late Qing military academy provided the very moral architecture by which KMT and CCP military educators would build and, especially in the latter case, reject.

More than mere *Analects* quotations and nods to the values of the Confucian past, my study shows deep structural vectors of continuity between the Imperial-Republican divide. Indeed, Student Cai's story should have layered resonance for readers of the first chapter, which was about Yu Guangxin, a Beiyang Military Academy students who died in the first battle of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Both Student Yu and Student Cai had been students at schools that emphasized moral agency acquired through texts: Confucian Classics and political Doctrine, respectively. Both students learned the special principles of dispersed warfare: called "dispersed formations" (散隊) in the 1880s-1890s and "dispersed troops" (散兵) in the entries of the Unit Diary. On the eve of battle, both were issued an operations order in which their commanders selected them for special assignments, despite their lack of experience, to lead a group of "sturdy soldiers"[161] at a critical and perilous location on the battlefield: Student Yu at the key bridge near Chenghuan; Student Cai with his Utmost Bravery Unit's assault at the northeast part of the Danshui's wall. Both Student Yu at the 1894 battle of Chenghuan and Student Cai at the 1925 battle of Danshui share these structural connections, even as their deaths marked new testing phases of the "technologies of spirit" employed by their respective schools.

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[161] General Nie Shicheng's 1894 operations order before battle at Chenghuan stated: "I ordered Military Academy students Zhou Xianzhang, Yu Guangxin, and others to take a few dozen *sturdy soldiers* (健卒數十) and set an ambush on the way from Zhenwei to Jishan." Zheng Dongguo's account of Utmost Bravery Unit selection at Danshui says: "Higher-ups finally selected from the lot one hundred names of *strong soldiers* (精壯士兵) and ten names of officers." See Nie Shicheng 聶士成 (d. 1900),《東遊紀程》, (1914) and Zheng Dongguo 鄭洞國, *My Military Career: Reminiscences of Zheng Dongguo*《我的戎馬生涯：鄭洞國回憶錄》, 郑建邦, 胡耀平, eds., (北京市 : 团结出版社, 2008), p. 32.

Continuity and connection does not mean stasis. The introduction of Confucian Classical education at the Beiyang Military Academy in 1885 was a new application of "sacred texts" for the purposes of organized violence; and it was as monumental as Sun's novel insertion of his political Doctrines to Spirit Education. Moreover, Whampoa's innovations on the late Qing Spirit Education tradition have had far reaching effects.

So apparently successful was the ideological indoctrination of Whampoa students, and so successful were these students on the battlefield, the so-called "Whampoa Spirit" (黃埔精神) has left indelible and long-lasting influence on the memory and practices of both the CCP and KMT. For the CCP, after spectacular failures at armed urban uprisings following the 1927 purge, and as soon as the Communists established their base-area in Jiangxi in 1931, they established their own Red Army University (紅軍大學) based directly on the Whampoa model. And, even after the famous Long March (1934-1935) brought this school, renamed Resistance University (抗日大學), to be reconstituted at Yan'an, Mao Zedong's keynote speech claimed the school as proof the CCP were the *true* inheritors of the "Whampoa Spirit."[162] Yan'an's Resistance University and its branch campuses that proliferated to Communist guerrilla bases behind enemy lines, which Mao claimed carried the Whampoa DNA, so to speak, would play a pivotal role in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the subsequent political fate of China immediately thereafter. While Franz Schurmann has used the paradigm of ideology and organization powerfully to explain post 1949 Communist China, and Timothy Cheek points to its key development in the Yan'an period (1935-1945), one intended implication of this chapter has been to plant that paradigm more firmly in its original Whampoa context, and even earlier to late Qing roots.[163] That is to say, we should take Mao's claim to be an inheritor of "Whampoa Spirit" more literally, not less.

For the KMT, Whampoa's spiritual legacy is equally complex and far-reaching. Indeed, Chiang's 1927 purge had profound effects not just on the CCP but on the very nature of the KMT's military apparatus as well. By 1927, because the strongest CCP influence within the National Revolutionary Army was through Whampoa's Political Department and the Party Representative system, discussed at length in this chapter, Chiang's purge had the result of gutting many of the novel political-military organizations that Whampoa had spearheaded. But, according to Chang Jui-te, a leading scholar of Chinese military history, Chiang himself later regretted eliminating political work organizations in his army, if not the many Communists that staffed those same organs. Chang Jui-te writes:

> Chiang believed that the basic reason for his defeat lay with the Guomindang's failure to maintain party bureaus and *political officers in all units of the army*. He felt that the success of his own army in the 1920s and 1930s, and the Communist success in 1949, were all due to the presence of a sound party structure within the army. Determined to reassert party control over the army and to breathe some new life into political work among the troops, Chiang ordered his son Chiang Ching-kuo, himself a graduate of the Soviet Red Army's Central

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[162] Li Zhimin 李志民. *Geming ronglu* 革命熔炉 (The Revolutionary Crucible), (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party's Party Historical Documents Publishing, 1986).

[163] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Timothy Cheek, "Making Maoism: Ideology and Organization in the Yan'an Rectification Movement, 1942–1944," in Robert Culp, Eddy U, and Wen-hsin Yeh, eds., *Knowledge Acts in Modern China: Ideas, Institutions, and Identities*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016). Admittedly, Cheek does say that "ideological politics in China began with the Sunism of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles (*sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義)," that "Mao followed suit," and that "the Yan'an political model… is pedagogical (p. 308)." But he makes no mention of the Whampoa model.

> Political Academy, to spearhead the effort. In effect, Chiang tried to pick up where he had left off….[164]

Other scholars agree that Chiang Kai-shek spent the 1950s on Taiwan rethinking the relationship of the political to the military spirit.[165] In sum, when we take the KMT and CCP together, Whampoa Military Academy marks a decisive turning point in the relationship between political ideology and military organization, from which we can trace two respective lines of developments or genealogies that played decisive roles in forming the modern Chinese nation that we see today. As I have argued, this genealogy must also be extended backward in time to the imperial era.

[164] Chang Jui-te, "The National Army, from Whampoa to 1949," in David A. Graff, Robin Higham, eds., *A Military History of China*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2012), p. 207. Emphasis added.

[165] For Chiang's turn toward Clausewitz to rethink the political nature of warfare, see 蘇聖雄，2023，〈戰爭論：蔣中正與西方兵學在臺灣的發展〉，《漢學研究》，第 41 卷 2 期，頁 209-256。

Epilogue:
A Tale of Two Long Marches

The KMT purge of the CCP in 1927 dealt a severe blow to the Communists. Though reeling, some CCP groups struck back by trying to seize small urban centers. But these uprisings were haphazardly organized and ended in spectacular failures.[1] Though the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927 is the commemorative date celebrated as the founding of the People's Liberation Army (解放軍, then called the Red Army), the operation was a failure. The lesson of 1927 were that CCP did not yet have an adequate military organization of its own. Political leadership by the central Party and decentralized Party Representatives embedded within army units had proven insufficient. Thus, unable to harness or instigate a massive revolutionary tide from the citizenry and unable to seize cities on its own, the Chinese Communist apparatus was forced underground and to the countryside.

By 1931, the CCP had formed a substantial rural base area, the now-famous Jiangxi Soviet. There it founded its own military academy, called the Red Army University (紅軍大學).[2] Though the CCP was deeply and directly involved in military education at Whampoa before the KMT purge, Red University was the CCP's first institution of its own. Red University began producing trained military cadres for the CCP. However, due to the KMT's four encirclement campaigns from 1931-1935, which threatened Soviet's annihilation, Red University education appears to have been provisional, and documentary sources are relatively sparce.[3]

In 1934, when CCP forces broke out of the Jiangxi Soviet to begin their now-famous Long March (1934-1935), Red University instructors and staff also made the trek. Once arrived at Yan'an, which became the most important CCP base area for the next pivotal decade, they reconstituted Red University. December 1936 saw the inauguration of the Second United Front between CCP and KMT for purpose of resisting Japan. To reflect their common cause, the CCP renamed Red Army University to "Resist Japan University" (抗日大學, Resistance University).[4]

Some historians have recognized Resistance University as the CCP's "most important training institute for the military and its cadres" during the Second Sino-Japanese War.[5] Indeed, the institution's ability to produce new cadres helps explain how the CCP changed from a tattered organization on the brink of extinction when it arrived in 1935 from the Long March in Yan'an to a viable contender for national power by 1945.[6] In Jane L. Price's 1976 study of Resistance University, which remains the best to date, she estimates that Resistance University produced over 100,000

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[1] To this day, People's Liberation Army red stars carry the mark "8-1" (八一), signifying the August 1, 1927 founding date of the Red Army.

[2] Full name: Chinese Workers and Peasants' Red Army University (中國工農紅軍大學), abbreviated Red University (紅大).

[3] For information on Red University and other Communist military education institutions, see Jane L. Price, *Cadres, Commanders and Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920-1945*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976). Peter J. Seybolt, "Yen'an Education and the Chinese Revolution, 1937-1945," 1969, Harvard University, PhD dissertation.

[4] Full name: Chinese People's Resist Japan Military and Political University (中國人民抗日軍事政治大學), abbreviated Resistance University (抗大).

[5] David Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 235; Price, p. 137.

[6] Joseph Passman, "Forsaking the Pen: Chinese Intellectuals, Resistance University, and the Communists' Guerrilla War Against Japan, 1937-1945," 2015, University of California, Berkeley, MA thesis.

trained cadres.[7] She tells us that "the bulk of united front workers and lower-level cadres attached to military units were Resistance University alumni…. [and] their input into the Chinese Communist Party's leadership resources proved decisive…."[8] This factor, she says, allowed the CCP "to develop an infrastructure more powerful and effective than that of any of its challengers."[9] Despite this recognition of Resistance University's importance during the 1937-1945 period, along with its place as the institutional forbearer of the National Defense University (國防大學) of the People's Republic of China today, little scholarship since Jane L. Price's wonderful work has found it worth exploring much further. Indeed, this is indicative of general lack of scholarly interest in Chinese military academies today— and my hope is that this dissertation sparks new avenues of inquiry into this subject.

Previous scholarship on Resistance University was forced to rely heavily on CCP propaganda for descriptions of the school and its workings. But as we have seen in earlier chapters of this dissertation, the material produced by Chinese military academies themselves often presented what I have shown to be skewed portrayals of other commensurate institutions. For instance, instructors at late Qing academies often claimed their own school as the only one teaching Spirit Education (see Chapter 3); and Whampoa Military Academy branded itself as something entirely different from what came before and what was present at the time in China (see Chapter 4). The CCP's Resistance University was no different; that is, no different in the claims its leaders made championing it as different from all other commensurate institutions, past and present. These claims have been harder to evaluate critically because Resistance University's founding in the 1935-1936 period is precisely the point at which the fortunes of the CCP surge towards triumph in 1949.

Building on my earlier research (that was informed by Price), I argue in this dissertation that the approach towards military academies I have laid out from the institution's inception in China onward helps us gain a critical foothold for evaluating the Communist learning institutions that rose out of this period so decisively. My dissertation's approach has done this with two distinct, but interrelated approaches. The first approach was to understand military academies not merely as conduits for technical knowledge, but as "technologies of spirit," that is, a collection of pedagogical techniques and practices used to cultivate and enhance individual agency needed for warfare. In the process of recovering the late Qing academies as "technologies of spirit," this dissertation has allowed us to see commensurate techniques and practices that we can compare and contrast to newer, revolutionary institutions like Whampoa and Resistance University, in order to place them in their proper genealogical context in relation to one another. The second approach identified the particular forms of warfare and battlefield organization for which such "technologies of spirit" were employed. As I have said, the breech-loading rifle that entered China in the 1880s, which greatly decentralized battlefield organization, remained the prevalent weapon used by Chinese forces into the 1950s. Moreover, the CCP's guerrilla warfare campaign from 1937-1945 exponentially increased these decentralizing and dispersive forces. Let me briefly outline some of the ways Resistance University and the later Chinese Communist Schools of Violence expand the thesis built in the previous four chapters.

First, Resistance University must be placed in its genealogical context as a Chinese "technology of spirit." In fact, the CCP founders of Resistance University articulated an understanding that they were part of a larger story, even as they claimed to break with precedent. When Mao Zedong delivered a speech at Resistance University's opening ceremonies, he claimed the school as proof that the CCP were the *true* inheritors of the hallowed "Whampoa Spirit" (黃埔

[7] Price, p. 137.
[8] Price, p. 149.
[9] Price, p. 149.

精神).[10] Also, telegrams intercepted by the KMT in 1936 record that "former Whampoa Political Department Director… Zhou Enlai" delivered a speech to "former student Lin Biao" and all Whampoa graduates in China, calling them to "restore the Whampoa Spirit" (恢復黃埔精神) by laying aside their differences for the common cause of fighting Japan.[11] Though these cases clearly show Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai using the idea of "Whampoa Spirit" tactically, that is, to garner support and legitimacy, we should not discount the connections they drew. After all, Lin Biao (later Mao Zedong's number two before his precipitous fall in 1971) had not only been a graduate of Whampoa Military Academy's Fourth Class in 1925, he would become the director of Resistance University during the war as well. More than this, there we deep connections between their precise "technologies of spirit" as well. These include such as the "enlightenment education method" (啟發式的教育) and criticism sessions, specific practices that Resistance University propaganda at the time claimed as its own pedagogical innovations and which would later come typify the CCP's unique application of Leninist practices from this period and into the 1970s.[12] But these practices actually began at Whampoa with full KMT participation and sanction, as we have seen in the previous chapter.[13] Moreover, I have shown how late Qing military academies also developed innovative practices of classroom engagement of students and social bonding across rank hierarchies. Examining the specific techniques and practices at a given school at a given time gives us tools of comparison and critique that do not always follow the rhetoric of the period actors and their agendas.

Another notable carry-over between Resistance University and Whampoa was the conviction that ideology was critical to training military leaders, along with the related use of the school as a platform for leadership to make their impact on the Party through speeches. In the Whampoa case, not only had it crystallized Spirit Education around Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Doctrine, Chiang Kai-shek's frequent speeches to students soon became important collections of writings. Likewise, the ascendant Mao Zedong used Resistance University to give a number of lectures to students that later became part of the Maoist canon. These included "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" in 1936, "On Practice" in July 1937, and "On Contradiction" in August 1937. More than just Mao's speeches, David Apter and Tony Saich say that Resistance University's "list of lecturers reads like a Who's Who of the Communist leadership."[14] Thus, Resistance University not only shared a conviction with Whampoa that ideology was central to forming effective agents of violence, it also served as a key forum for CCP leadership to mold and hone that core ideology.

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[10] Li Zhimin 李志民, *Geming ronglu* 革命熔炉 [The Revolutionary Crucible], (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party's Party Historical Documents Publishing, 1986).

[11] *Hongse Zhonghua she* 紅色中華社. Telegram discussing Zhou Enlai's Speech Delivered to Lin Biao and other Red Army and Whampoa Students (周恩來對徐向前林彪等紅軍黃浦學生發表談話). December 29, 1936. Document #116-010108-0986-014. Archives of Academia Historica, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

[12] For these touted as Resistance University innovations, see *Kangda dongtai* 抗大動態 [*The Situation at Resistance University*], (Yan'an: Dongyuan she jiti, 1938), reprinted Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1974. Scholars like Peter Seybolt drew heavily from this piece to reconstruct Resistance University.

[13] For these same items as early Whampoa innovations used by the KMT, see previous chapter and Wang Boling 王柏齡, "Chuangxiao huiyi" 創校回憶 [Recollections of the School's Founding]. *Huangpu Jianjun shihua* 黃埔建軍史話 [Historical Events in the Founding of the Whampoa Army]. Edited by Li Kai 李開, Qingnianjun chubanshe, 1946.

[14] David Apter and Tony Saich, p. 237-238. In addition to Mao, they note Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Lin Biao, Ai Siqi, Zhang Wentian, etc.

This continuity has broader implications as well. Hans van de Ven has argued persuasively for the Leninist roots of what he calls the CCP's "emergence as a text-centered party."[15] By text-centered party, van de Ven means that the CCP was unique in the degree to which "a substantial part of the activities of party members was consumed by the writing, reading, discussion, and dissemination of texts."[16] For van de Ven, the type of texts are also critical to his analysis: "Involvement with a specific genre of texts, those of Marxism-Leninism, helped set CCP members apart from the rest of Chinese society and fostered a sense of privileged insight and participation in a special mission." The phenomenon van de Ven describes here regarding Marxist-Leninist texts also has resonance, to say the least, with the role of Confucian classical texts. After all, in imperial China, those few with the privilege of education in the difficult classical Chinese register placed themselves in the running to attain a "special mission," whether it was to lead society from the local level or to enter the imperial apparatus. In some ways Van de Ven seems to highlight this connection: "Even if CCP texts asserted a radical secularity, in some ways the CCP was like a religious sect founded on sacred texts."[17] To this notion of the CCP texts performing the function of sacred and religious texts, we should add Sun Yat-sen's 1921 speech of "The Spirit Education of Military Men," discussed in Chapter 4. There Sun had made the connection between the Doctrine (主義) of salvific religions, like Buddhism and Christianity, the ideological Doctrine of his political program, and, importantly, with the Confucian classics themselves.

Despite his recognition of some of these resonances, van de Ven still emphasizes the unique nature of the CCP's relationship to text—and with some justification. After all, Franz Schurmann had juxtaposed what he called the Confucian "ethos" with Leninist ideology. The Confucian "ethos," Schurmann said, was "a belief system that expressed basic social and human values," but with no real program, for it would later be "replaced by an ideology that expresses values and goals of sociopolitical action and achievement."[18] Thus, Shurmann posited that ideology differed from ethos in this: "However abstract these [ideas] may be, they must have *action consequences*, for the purpose of organization is action."[19] Van de Ven likewise highlights what Schurmann called "action consequences," writing that CCP textual practices in the 1920s allowed the organization's membership to "to be cohesive as well as willing to sacrifice much, travel far, and follow central directives." It also "helped *create the sense of community*, the practices, and the language that enabled members from different areas and social backgrounds to cooperate and formulate shared attitudes and goals."[20] Indeed, Van de Ven's notion of community building over texts was soon taken up powerfully by David Apter and Tony Saich's study of the Yan'an base area. Apter and Saich introduced concepts like "exegetical bonding" and a "logocentric model," arguing that their framework for examining Yan'an "can apply to religious, ethnic, and other movements where people pore over texts in search of truths that take the form of binding obligations."[21] All these scholars have recognized the unique and pervasive function of text in the organizational and communal life of the CCP.

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[15] Hans van de Ven, "The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party," in Tony Saich, Hans van de Ven, David Apter, eds., *New Perspectives on the Chinese Revolution*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 54-118.
[16] Hans van de Ven, "The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party," p. 54.
[17] Hans van de Ven, "The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party," p. 54.
[18] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 8. Citing Levenson, Schurmann also writes, "There are lingering vestiges of Confucian humanism, but Confucius' 'museumification' by the Chinese Communists testifies to its present-day impotence as a living ethos (p. 7)."
[19] Schurmann, *Ideology and* Organization, p. 18. Emphasis added.
[20] Hans van de Ven, "The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party," p. 55. Emphasis added.
[21] David Apter and Tony Saich, p. ix.

But despite the accepted relegation of Confucian texts to the inconsequential ethos of inaction, this dissertation has uncovered critical points of continuity between the imperial period and Republican and Communist history, especially in the military application or "action consequences" of classical texts. Indeed, as I've shown in previous chapters, the founding of the Beiyang Military Academy in 1885 introduced classical education for military officers for the first time in Chinese history. This created a discrete bridge across what I have termed the "text-*techne* divide," a social cleavage between those who mastered "sacred texts" or those who were defined by their technical skills. Whereas the imperial military had been vastly skewed toward the *techne* side of this divide, the novel introduction of classical education to the profession also initiated what I've termed "textual bonding" to build new military communities capable of operating on modern battlefields characterized by physical dispersion and the need for junior level initiative. It is, therefore, significant that within late Qing, Republican, *and* Communist settings, texts played central roles both in forming new agents of organized violence and in integrating those agents into new operational communities. For late Qing military academies, Confucian texts mattered, they had action consequences, and they laid the groundwork by which all other sets of texts—whether Nationalist and Communist—took on their central importance.

And this continuity in text is more than mere resonance between otherwise disconnected phenomena that happen to "rhyme" historically. Indeed, the second approach is to see these "technologies of spirit" as inextricably linked and consciously engineer for specific sets of battlefield requirements. Similar to the decentralizing forces of battlefield organization that reached China in the 1880s, the CCP's guerrilla warfare from 1937-1945 was also a mode of fighting characterized by extreme physical dispersion between actors across space and greatly decentralized command structure. In his groundbreaking work on the CCP's guerrilla warfare, Chen Yung-fa has emphasized these characteristics, noting that even Mao himself "left the details to his subordinates," for he "felt it better to leave actual investigation of contradictions to local cadres" on the ground.[22] In fact, Chen's recognition of the dispersed nature of the operations provided him analytical leverage to critique the dominant understandings of CCP success at this time. These included the "peasant nationalism" thesis, which believed the CCP merely harnessed pre-existing anti-Japanese sentiment in the Chinese countryside to garner support, and the "organizational weapon" thesis, which posited the CCP's efficient use of organized coercion as key to obtaining the material support they needed from the peasantry to sustain their guerrilla campaign. Calling them monocausal explanations, Chen argued that these theses were marred by a "failure to differentiate peasant support by place, time, and kind, and their failure to examine in each case the concrete strategy by which the Party mobilized peasants into compliance."[23] Instead, Chen presented a cadre-centric (that is, actor-level) analysis, arguing that "in each rural community, the challenge cadres faced was to make a correct assessment of its power balance vis-à-vis the agrarian elite and to escalate the struggle against the latter according to the accumulation of strength through peasant mobilization."[24] By "returning cadres to center stage, where they belong," Chen's work shows the "finesse and sophistication" individual CCP actors on the ground made.[25]

But Chen's groundbreaking work did not peal back a next layer to ask where these cadres acquired such "finesse and sophistication" to operate relatively independently under the decentralized conditions of guerrilla warfare. As Mao wrote during the war: "The initiative is not an

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[22] Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p 39.
[23] Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, p. 8.
[24] Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, p. 19
[25] Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, p. 19.

innate attribute of genius, but is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through the correct military and political dispositions."[26] In other words, such capabilities needed to be nurtured through study and education. My work elsewhere has connected Chen Yung-fa to Jane L. Price: for Chen Yung-fa had not delved into the critical education infrastructure that allowed his cadre actors to act the way they did; Jane L. Price had described education institutions like Resistance University, and posited their importance to the CCP's growth, but did not go into greater detail into the specific ways this education equipped individual actors to conduct dispersed guerrilla operations.[27] This is about reconnecting education and combat, which are mutually constitutive, and the primary make up of these schools.

More than just Resistance University's educational content, my research has also shown that the institution's structure was critical to CCP success. Whereas virtually all scholarship on Resistance University has focused on the school's years at Yan'an—where its prominent lecturers gave it the most sheen—I've shown that by 1939 Resistance University actually left Yan'an to form 12 branch campuses located at every major CCP guerrilla base area behind Japanese lines. In what participants later called their "Little Long March" (小長征), Resistance University staff and instructors formed a column with 5,000 untrained students and began a trek that would cover 1,250 kilometers through three provinces (Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Hebei) and involved exfiltration through both KMT and Japanese lines, in addition to crossing rivers and mountains. For Resistance University instructors, like Li Zhimin 李志民 (1906-1987), who had participated in the original Long March (1934-1935), the nickname given this movement was charged with dynamic meaning.[28] The first Long March, though composed of hardened revolutionary fighters, had been a retreat under duress and bid at mere organizational survival. This "Little Long March," though composed of untrained students, was a movement toward the enemy and an act of organizational expansion. Indeed, as Mao and other Resistance University staff had planned, moving behind enemy lines to establish branch campuses would give each guerrilla base area a mechanism by which it could recruit, train, and educate intelligent youth living at or near those respective geographic spheres. Base areas close to Shanghai, for instance, regularly smuggled in well-educated urban youth and trained them to become guerrilla cadres at their Resistance University branch campuses.[29] As I've also shown, the proximity of these decentralized schools to respective guerilla fronts made Resistance University branch campuses centers for collecting intelligence, tactics, techniques, and procedures that they not only taught to students, but disseminated to operational units in the area and with other campuses at other bases. In sum, Resistance University branch campuses not only trained a large number of new cadres for the CCP's pressing human resource needs. The content of its education was also critical for cultivating actors that could operate under the highly decentralized command structure and in the variable environments of guerrilla warfare at this time.

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[26] Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 87.

[27] Joseph Passman, "Forsaking the Pen: Chinese Intellectuals, Resistance University, and the Communists' Guerrilla War Against Japan, 1937-1945," 2015, University of California, Berkeley, MA thesis.

[28] Li Zhimin 李志民, *Geming ronglu* 革命熔炉 [The Revolutionary Crucible], (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party's Party Historical Documents Publishing, 1986).

[29] For the smuggling networks from Shanghai to the base areas of the CCP's New Fourth Army, see: Allison Rottmann, "Resistance, Urban Style: The New Fourth Army and Shanghai 1937-1945" (PhD dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 2007). My research shows how Resistance University's Fourth Branch Campus integrated these smuggled urban youth and trained them into guerrilla fighters. See *Kangda si fenxiao xiaoshi shiliao xuanbian* 抗大四分校校史资料选编 [Selected Documents of School History for Resistance University Fourth Branch Campus] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Publishing, 1990).

After the end of WWII in 1945, military education continued to play a major role for the CCP. Harold Tanner has noted the critical importance of the CCP as a "learning organization" in its ability to transition from diffuse guerrilla warfare to the more precise and technically demanding combined arms operations it used to successfully defeat Chiang Kai-shek's best American-trained forces in the Civil War (1946-1949).[30] Immediately after seizing national power, the CCP exported its military knowledge to its neighbors. Beginning in 1950, Mao sent military advisors to assist Ho Chi Minh's flagging anti-colonial effort in the First Indochina War (1946-1954).[31] In what became known as Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG, 中國援越抗法軍事顧問團), they trained Vietnamese Communists first in the lessons of dispersed guerrilla warfare and then in conventional combined arms operations. It's role in Vietnam, in addition to the People Republic's full entry in the Korean War (1950-1954), constitutes the first exportation of Chinese Schools of Violence abroad—and it had decisive impact.

Mao's military interventions in Vietnam and Korea in 1950 have been understood as a reassertion of the broader Qing-era security arrangements that had collapsed with China's defeat in Vietnam in the Sino-French War (1884-1885) and their defeat in Korea in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).[32] But it was also the capacity to educate and propagate modern military violence, made possible by the new institutions born out of these earlier wars, that allowed Mao's CCP regime to seize a monopoly of violence and then export it outside of China's borders at this time.

But the origins of China's Schools of Violence have largely been obscured. Take, for instance, how staff today at China's premier military education institution, National Defense University 國防大學 in Beijing, talk about "mission command" or "mission tactics" (Ger. *Auftragstaktik*; Ch. *renwushi zhihui* 任務式指揮).[33] In a recent article in *PLA Daily*, by Major General Huang Changjian and other staff, they write that mission command originated from Prussia's Berlin War Academy "before the American army drew lessons from it," whence it took prime place in American and international military doctrine today.[34] They also articulate the concept as follows:

> The fundamental element of mission-style command is that, in accordance with mission-style orders and the superior officer's authorization, commanders at every level will take on the *spirit* (精神) of proactive initiative in the *dispersed* (分散) execution of military actions…. The crux of this is delegating command authority downward in order to maximize the *subjective initiative* (主觀能動性) of commanders at every level, to adapt to every complex

[30] Harold M. Tanner, "Learning Through Practice: Lin Biao and the Transition to Conventional Combined Operations in China's Northeast, 1946-1948," *Journal of Chinese Military History*, Vol. 3 (2014), pp. 3-46.
[31] See Xiaobing Li, Building Ho's Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam, (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2019); Qiang Zhai, "Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950-1954," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 689-715; Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950–54," *The China Quarterly*, No. 133 (March 1993), 85-110; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–69," *The China Quarterly*, No. 142 (June 1995), 356-387.
[32] Henry Kissinger, *On China*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).
[33] For two excellent articles see: Zhao Xiangang 赵先刚, Wang Quan 王权, and Lu Cong 吕聪, "Zhongshi renwushi zhihui beihoude 'ruanshili'" 重视任务式指挥背后的"软实力" [Focus on the 'Soft Power' Behind Mission Command], *Jiefangjun bao* 解放军报 [PLA Daily], May 25, 2023, p. 7; Huang Changjian 黄昌建, Shi Fuxiang 师福祥, and Liu Xiaoliang 刘孝良, "Zai chuanchengzhong chuangxin renwushi zhihui" 在传承中创新任务式指挥 [From our Inheritance, Blaze New Trails in Mission-style Command], *Jiefangjun bao* 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 18, 2022.
[34] Though American military doctrine does speak of "mission command" and "mission tactics," along with acknowledgement of its Prussian origins, it has enshrined these concepts under the rubric of "maneuver warfare."

> circumstance on the battlefield, and to facilitate commanders making timely decisions on the ground to seize fleeting opportunities in battle.[35]

Readers will note how strikingly and succinctly close the above description is to late Qing articulations of the battlefield governed by dispersion and delegation of authority, and the critical need for spirit and initiative (see Chapter 3).

But these authors also claim that while the People's Liberation Army (PLA) operates something very analogous to mission command in practice, its animating "spirit" is different: it is the principles of Marxist Democratic Centralism and its efficacious battlefield practice by Mao Zedong's revolutionary warfare. While it is true that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong played truly profound roles in shaping modern Chinese violence today, this dissertation has argued that Confucian sacred texts and late Qing dynasty military practices have played an equally profound part in the very origins and structure of this story. Though this story has been largely obscured, what has made the PLA of today both an efficaciously *modern* and a distinctly *Chinese* force of state-organized violence owes much to the Confucian and imperial legacy.

[35] Huang Changjian 黄昌建, Shi Fuxiang 师福祥, and Liu Xiaoliang 刘孝良, "Zai chuanchengzhong chuangxin renwushi zhihui" 在传承中创新任务式指挥 [From our Inheritance, Blaze New Trails in Mission-style Command], *Jiefangjun bao* 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 18, 2022. Emphasis added.

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