

**UCLA**

**UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations**

**Title**

Unintended Mediator: Jay Chou's China Wind, the PRC State, and PRC Consumers

**Permalink**

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/30p071s8>

**Author**

Li, Shenghan

**Publication Date**

2024

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Unintended Mediator:

Jay Chou's China Wind, the PRC State, and PRC Consumers

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts  
in East Asian Studies

by

Harry Li

2024

© Copyright by

Harry Li

2024

## ABSTRACT OF THESIS

Unintended Mediator:

Jay Chou's China Wind, the PRC State, and PRC Consumers

by

Harry Li

Master of Arts in East Asian Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2024

Professor Michael Sanford Berry, Chair

This thesis will examine the presence of Jay Chou's China Wind (Zhongguofeng), a term describing a style of Chinese popular music that incorporates Chinese elements, in the PRC during the first decade of the 21st century. Despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ceaselessly implemented strategies in attempts to subvert the fact that songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan dominated the mainland's popular music space at this time, Jay Chou, who is from Taiwan, surprisingly received their endorsement. This thesis will attempt to answer why the aforementioned phenomenon occurred and simultaneously answer why Jay Chou's China Wind is tremendously popular in the PRC. Rather than regarding the CCP's strategies as a complete failure against songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan, this thesis argues that Jay Chou's

China Wind style is fundamentally different from those songs in terms of ideology. From there, this thesis argues that Jay Chou's China Wind style is in accordance with both the CCP's ideological agenda and PRC consumers' tastes and desires from the perspectives of gender, nationalism, and modernization. Lastly, this thesis argues that Jay Chou's China Wind allows the PRC government and consumers to form a symbiotic, rather than antagonistic, relationship.

The thesis of Harry Li is approved.

Helen M. Rees

Yinghui Wu

Michael Sanford Berry, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2024

Dedicated to my late grandmother

Yu Wenlan

## Table of Contents

<b>Chapter 1: Introduction: From Teresa Teng to China Wind: The never-ending story of mediation between the PRC government and popular music.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>a. Popular Music in the Reform Era.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>b. Jay Chou and China Wind.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>c. Other Framework and Methodology.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Forget <i>Gangtai</i> Pop! The Construction of <i>Gangtai</i>-Ideology Pop.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>a. The Problem of <i>Gangtai</i>.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>b. The Construction of <i>Gangtai</i> Ideology.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>c. Recap of <i>Gangtai</i> Ideology.....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Chapter 3: <i>Wen</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind Songs.....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>a. The Notion of <i>Wen</i> and <i>Wu</i>.....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>b. Pre-Modern Chinese Culture in Modern and Contemporary China.....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>c. Lyrical <i>Wen</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind.....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>d. Musical and Performative <i>Wen</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>e. Recap: <i>Wen</i> Masculinity in Jay Chou’s China Wind and the PRC State.....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Chapter 4: <i>Wu</i> and Simultaneous Possession of <i>Wen</i> and <i>Wu</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind Songs.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>a. Lyrical <i>Wu</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>b. Musical and Performative <i>Wu</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind.....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>c. Simultaneous Possession of <i>Wen</i> and <i>Wu</i> in Jay Chou’s China Wind Songs.....</b>	<b>68</b>

d. Recap: <i>Wu and Simultaneous Possession of Wen and Wu</i> Masculinity in Jay Chou’s China Wind and the PRC State.....	72
Chapter 5: Jay Chou’s China Wind and PRC Consumers.....	75
a. Nationalism, National Humiliation, Modernization, and the <i>Bawuhou</i> Generation.....	76
b. Nationalism Plus Love, and the Idol Persona.....	90
Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks: Jay Chou’s China Wind, Mainland Chinese Consumers, and the PRC State.....	95
a. Future Studies.....	98
Bibliography.....	102
Discography.....	110

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Chrysanthemum Terrace</i> .....	48
Figure 2: Screenshot from the live performance of Jay Chou at the 2011 CCTV Chinese Year Year Gala.....	49
Figure 3: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	63
Figure 4: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	63
Figure 5: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	64
Figure 6: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	64
Figure 7: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	64
Figure 8: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	65
Figure 9: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	66
Figure 10: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	66
Figure 11: Screenshot of live performance of <i>Dragon Fist</i> .....	67
Figure 12: Screenshot of live performance of <i>Dragon Fist</i> .....	67
Figure 13: Screenshot of live performance of <i>Dragon Fist</i> .....	67
Figure 14: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	69
Figure 15: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Blue and White Porcelain</i> .....	70
Figure 16: Screenshot from the music video of <i>Fearless</i> .....	79
Figure 17: Screenshot from the short film of <i>Double Blade</i> .....	84
Figure 18: Screenshot from the MV <i>Dragon Fist</i> , showing the traditional scene of martial arts.....	89
Figure 19: Screenshot from the MV <i>Dragon Fist</i> , showing the Japanese manga influence..	89
Figure 20: Screenshot from the MV <i>Dragon Fist</i> .....	94

## **Acknowledgements**

I thought this thesis would mark my entry into academia, it could very well also be the ending point.....

First and foremost, I would like to thank Prof. Michael Berry for his patient guidance throughout my four years at UCLA. He opened up the world of Chinese studies to me and has forever changed my life. Without his generous invitation to his senior seminar on Taiwanese cinema in my freshman year, I would've walked on a completely different path. In these four years, he supported me unconditionally and made me realize my deficiencies without deterring me. He also deeply inspires me with his past stories and current rigorous commitment to academia as I view him as my role model, someone that I'd like to become in the future. I must also thank my two committee members—Prof. Helen Rees and Prof. Yinghui Wu. Even though I was unable to take classes with them due to scheduling issues, they nonetheless welcomed me to discuss my thesis with them and agreed to be my committee member. Both Prof. Rees and Prof. Wu provided detailed feedback and suggestions amidst their busy schedule. As expected, I learned a lot from their respective fields.

Next, I express my most sincere gratitude to the Head of the East Asian Library—Ms. Su Chen. When I was lost and faced hardship, it was she who patiently listened to me way beyond her working hours. For countless instances, she carves out her own time to discuss with me and listens to my research thoughts, news, frustrations, and hardships. Even though she is foreign to my field, she still shows her genuine interest and listens to me to provide her insights and suggestions which are certainly invaluable. Furthermore, she taught me how to fluently utilize the library search system and, without any hesitation, acquired the journal that I was interested

in. Speaking of acquisition, I must also thank the Chinese librarian Dr. Hong Cheng, who also promptly processed my requests for Chinese language books that are needed for my research.

Many other professors' classes at UCLA also shaped the writing process. In particular, I would like to thank Prof. Nina Duthie, Prof. Chris Hanscom, Prof. Jennifer Jung-Kim, and Prof. Anna Morcom. Their classes were thoroughly enjoyable and equipped me with ideas that I was able to utilize in this thesis. I also frequently visited their office hours, and every time I would walk away with new thoughts. During my brief visit to Washington University in St. Louis, the discussion with Prof. Jianqing Chen opened up endless possibilities and countless questions for me to ponder in future studies. Her thought-provoking questions and striking insights sparked my curiosity and made me realize my myopic vision and lack of knowledge. I truly realize that I am inept at fully comprehending and grasping her thoughts, but her visions nonetheless heavily shaped the writing process of this thesis.

Lastly, I would like to thank my *xuejie* and classmate Qingyi Sun. She patiently mentored me and recommended useful and interesting scholarly works with me. Not only that, she gave me countless suggestions and shared with me her personal experiences that benefited me tremendously. I must also thank my upperclassman, classmate, and teacher Eric Sinski. He gave me a chance to write my first-ever paper on Mandopop, and the long discussions related to China and anthropology—a discipline that I am fascinated with—are thoroughly enjoyable for me. Without them, this thesis would certainly not have been possible.

## **I. Introduction: From Teresa Teng to China Wind: The never-ending story of mediation between the PRC government and popular music**

### **Popular Music in the Reform Era**

During the Chinese socialist era between 1949 and 1979, the notion of popular music was, for the most part, absent. Since the Chinese society in this era only had limited contact with other socialist countries, combined with Mao Zedong's 1942 talk "On Art and Literature," in which he enforced the notion that art must serve the masses (i.e. the proletariat),<sup>1</sup> pop music from Europe, America, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan had been completely barred from the PRC. Instead, Chinese people only had access to revolutionary songs and operas such as "My Motherland" (我的祖國) and *The Red Detachment of Women* (紅色娘子軍), all of which highlights notion of collectivism and the praise of the communist party and Mao Zedong.

After the Cultural Revolution, yet before the official declaration of the Open Door Policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, previously banned popular music was already being smuggled into mainland China. With regard to this music that originated from the southeastern coast of China, across the Taiwan strait, as Xu points out, "people dubbed [the Taiwanese] radio programs onto their magnetic tapes,"<sup>2</sup> primarily songs by Teresa Teng (鄧麗君), a popular Taiwanese singer. Teng's songs not only resemble the epitome of Chinese popular music at that time, but her "soft, sweet, often whispery and restrained"<sup>3</sup> singing contrasts sharply with the revolutionary songs that

---

<sup>1</sup> De Bary, William Theodore, and Richard Lufrano. *Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 2: From 1600 through the Twentieth Century*. Columbia University Press, 2000. pp. 441-444.

<sup>2</sup> Xu, Chuan. "From sonic models to sonic hooligans: Magnetic tape and the unraveling of the Mao-era sound regime, 1958–1983." *East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2019, p. 404, <https://doi.org/10.1215/18752160-7755487>. This phenomenon occurred in the late 70s.

<sup>3</sup> Baranovitch, Nimrod. *China's New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender, and Politics, 1978-1997*. University of California Press, 2003. p. 11.

were “high, fast, hard, and loud” in the socialist era.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, compared to the void of personal desires and emotions in the socialist era, Teng overtly expresses such feelings in her apolitical songs, which focus on romance and individuality. Those characteristics quickly attracted mainland Chinese people, especially youths,<sup>5</sup> as Yan points out the popular saying in early 1980s China that “[people] listen to old Deng [i.e., Deng Xiaoping] during daytime, and [listen] to the young Deng during the evening.”<sup>6</sup>

Upon the formal enactment of the Open-Door Policy in 1979, foreign popular music, especially music from Hong Kong and Taiwan that had previously been banned, flooded mainland China. This also marks the beginning of the never-ending mediation between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and popular culture. First, the CCP adamantly opposed this phenomenon and attempted to denounce Teng, claiming her music was “yellow music” (黄色音乐), “decadent sound” (靡靡之音), and “spiritual pollution” (精神污染).<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, mainland Chinese singers whose singing bore any resemblance to Teresa Teng were also denounced by the CCP. For example, Li Guyi (李谷一), Zhu Fengbo (朱逢博), and Cheng Lin (程琳), all of whom were mainland Chinese female singers in the early 1980s, were extremely controversial due to their imitation of Teresa Teng and were often prohibited by the CCP from performing publicly.<sup>8</sup> From this, it is clear that the CCP in the early 1980s was intolerant of the ideological disparity

---

<sup>4</sup> Jones, Andrew F. *Circuit Listening: Chinese Popular Music in the Global 1960s*. University of Minnesota Press, 2020. p. 72.

<sup>5</sup> Gold, Thomas B. “Go with Your Feelings: Hong Kong and Taiwan Popular Culture in Greater China.” *The China Quarterly*, no. 136, 1993, pp. 907–925. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655596>. Accessed 5 Mar. 2024.

<sup>6</sup> Yan, Yunxiang. “The Chinese Path to Individualization.” *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, no. 3, 2010, p. 503, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01323.x>.

<sup>7</sup> Zhang, Jinhua et al. [张锦华等]. 中国当代流行音乐的传播与接受研究 [*Zhongguo Dangdai Liuxing Yinyue de Chuanbo yu Jieshou Yanjiu; The study of Chinese contemporary popular music's dissemination and perception*]. Zhongguo Chuanmei Daxue Chubanshe, 2016. p. 5. Xu, *From sonic models to sonic hooligans*, 2019, p. 392.

<sup>8</sup> Wang, Siqi [王思琪]. 中国当代城市流行音乐：音乐与社会文化环境互动研究 [*Zhongguo Dangdai Chengshi Liuxing Yinyue: Yinyue yu Shehui Wenhua Huanjing Hudong Yanjiu; Contemporary Chinese city popular music: The study of interaction between music and sociocultural environment*]. Shanghai Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2009. p. 12-16.

between the newly introduced popular music and their own ideological agenda, which was still filled with the legacy of the socialist era.

In order to combat the “bourgeois” popular culture coming mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, the CCP proposed multiple measures in attempts to reduce foreign cultural domination, on top of the denunciation of foreign pop culture and PRC artists who imitated foreign culture. On February 27th, 1982, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of the People’s Republic of China collectively announced a prohibition on “importing, copying, selling, and playing of reactionary, yellow, and vulgar audiovisual materials.”<sup>9</sup> More specifically, they claimed that there were numerous yellow, vulgar, and reactionary materials coming in from foreign countries (including Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao) that were “severely eroding the thoughts of the comrades, especially young folks, which is detrimental to the construction of our socialist morals. . . . Thus, [we] prohibit the sale of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and foreign countries’ audiovisual materials on the market.”<sup>10</sup> Besides legal measures, major Chinese media outlets, such as the China Central Television (CCTV), only broadcasted Mainland-produced songs that were in line with the state’s socialist “main melody.”<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the winning entries in the state-sponsored popular music competition were nothing but songs that evoked socialist ideals; pop songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan were nowhere to be seen.<sup>12</sup> However, the government’s attempt to hinder people’s consumption and dissemination of foreign audiovisual materials that contradicted socialist values was largely unsuccessful. In the

---

<sup>9</sup> Party Central Committee and State Council, 中共中央国务院关于严禁进口、复制、销售、播放反动黄色下流录音录像制品的规定 [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Yanjin Jinkou, Fuzhi, Xiaoshou, Bofang Fandong Huangse Xialiu Luyin Luxiang Zhipin de Guiding; The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council’s Regulation on the Prohibition of Importing, Copying, Selling, and Playing of Reactionary, Yellow, and Vulgar Audiovisual Materials*], News of the Communist Party of China, 1982.  
cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71590/4855264.html

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Wang, *Contemporary Chinese city popular music*, 2009, pp. 20-21.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.8.

late eighties and early nineties, pop songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan still represented about eighty percent of the mainland's market.<sup>13</sup> The development of new technologies certainly contributed to the futility of those governmental measures. As cassette players become increasingly common and record pirating (dubbing) was out of control, most consumers were able to not rely on state-controlled media outlets for pop music entertainment. Since record dubbing and listening can take place privately, the consumption of popular music became highly privatized, and consumers could enjoy whatever they desired, whenever they wished, largely beyond governmental surveillance and intervention. However, for the most part, the situation still points to consumers' sincere admiration for foreign popular music and their firm rejection of songs that embodied any socialist sentiments.<sup>14</sup> If consumers had been ambivalent towards foreign versus state-promoted songs, the governmental measures in limiting foreign pop songs would arguably have been more effective.

Aside from the clash between foreign popular music and the CCP, certain forms of domestic pop music were also contradictory with the state's ideology and were thus impeded by the government. The most prominent example would be Chinese rock music. Unlike music from Hong Kong and Taiwan, although also imported from the West as the result of the Open-Door Policy, rock music did not enjoy the same level of popularity. Furthermore, due to its often overt rebellious and vulgar sentiments as well as its presence of cultural opposition and insubordination towards the state, it always remained a subculture and underground culture.<sup>15</sup> Thus, in a sense, the government was even less tolerant towards rock and other "hard sounds,"

---

<sup>13</sup> Moskowitz, Marc L. *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow: Chinese Pop Music and Its Cultural Connotations*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2010, p. 9. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese city popular music*, 2009, p.65.

<sup>14</sup> At this point, "foreign" refers to non-mainland regions, which includes Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao, as well as foreign countries.

<sup>15</sup> Jones, Andrew F. *Like a Knife Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music*. East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992. p. 117.

such as punk and rap, due to their dissident nature.<sup>16</sup> One of the most popular rock artists was Cui Jian; his songs are mostly politically conscious, often revealing a rebellious attitude towards the regime. Their dissident nature has also been employed by Chinese human rights and democracy advocates, most notably in the June 4th incident, as Chinese literature and media studies professor Andrew Jones points out that student demonstrators used Cui Jian's songs to voice their advocacy because they shared almost identical rhetoric.<sup>17</sup>

This is not to say that the PRC government was entirely intolerant of popular music, in fact, as Chinese cultural studies scholar Nimrod Baranovitch points out, “the Chinese state indeed still aims at exerting tight control over the minds and spirits of the people, as well as over their bodies, and [it] utilizes popular music for this purpose.”<sup>18</sup> At the beginning of the reform era, the Chinese government was still ambivalent regarding the presence of popular music, largely due to the ideological disparity yet the tremendous popularity of foreign pop songs. However, *tongsu* (通俗) music, referring to popular music produced by mainland artists, lyricists, and composers, quickly emerged. It is crucial to note that the notion of *tongsu* ideologically differs from *liuxing* (流行), especially in the 1980s, despite the fact that they are both translated from and can be translated as “popular music.” Popular music as *liuxing* music can be traced all the way back to the Republican era. Back then, they had another name, *shidaiqu*, (時代曲) which captures the bourgeois lifestyle of middle and upper-class people in urban China. After the establishment of the PRC, *shidaiqu* was completely banned and denounced as “yellow music” and bourgeois, however, they continued to evolve in Hong Kong and Taiwan. After the reintroduction of pop music from Hong Kong and Taiwan into the PRC,

---

<sup>16</sup> De Kloet, Jeroen. *China with a Cut: Globalisation, Urban Youth and Popular Music*. Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

<sup>17</sup> Jones, *Like a Knife*, 1992, p. 122.

<sup>18</sup> Baranovitch, *China's New Voices*, 2003. p. 194.

those negative connotations from the socialist era nonetheless still carried over, and were once again denounced.<sup>19</sup> The aforementioned Teresa Teng can well represent this kind of music.

Due to the futility in limiting the consumption of *liuxing* music mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, the state invented a new way of singing in 1983—the *tongsu* method, which differs from the already established methods such as opera and folk.<sup>20</sup> This way of singing is very similar to the notion of popular music from the West, but the goal is to “focus on socialist ideals and praise the state.”<sup>21</sup> In order to promote this newly invented genre, the state-sponsored competitions and concerts also “promote official ideologies, such as the centrality of the state, unity, and integration.”<sup>22</sup> The competitions were the state’s attempts “to define standards for creativity and performance, and a whole discourse of what is good or bad and legitimate or illegitimate in popular music.”<sup>23</sup> As a result, Jones points out that many *tongsu* singers “reflected a sense of powerlessness and exploitation” due to a lack of agency and the state’s ideological restrictions.<sup>24</sup> The government’s measures only gained marginal success in moderating popular music that is against their ideology. Most notably, a body within the Chinese Central Television (CCTV) —Chinese MTV, “was put in charge of the production and presentation of video clips for popular songs to be broadcast on television,” which, as Baranovitch points out, functions as “a hybrid of popularized, sugarcoated political propaganda.”<sup>25</sup> This implementation was quite successful; thanks to this program, *tongsu* songs such as “Today is Your Birthday, China,” (今天 是你的生日, 中國) “The Great Wall is Long,” (長城長) and “I belong to China” (我屬於中國) gained decent popularity. However, they were never as popular as pop songs from Hong Kong

---

<sup>19</sup> Wang, *Contemporary Chinese city popular music*, 2009, pp. 230-235.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>21</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, p. 25.

<sup>22</sup> Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003. p. 207.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>24</sup> Jones, *Like a Knife*, 1992, pp. 74-75

<sup>25</sup> Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003. pp. 194-196.

and Taiwan in the sense that most Chinese people, especially the younger generation, consume much more pop songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan, despite the fact that the aforementioned *tongsu* songs were aired on CCTV and watched by millions of people. Thus, *tongsu* and *liuxing* were used to reference different pop music based on their differing ideology. It was until the early 2000s, that the term *tongsu* was refuted in publications, showing the government's "acceptance of 'pop music.'"<sup>26</sup>

Besides the distinction between *liuxing* and *tongsu*, it is also important to mention the differences between the other two terminologies—Mandopop and Cantopop. Unlike the ideological categorization, this categorization draws distinction on languages; Mandopop refers to Mandarin-language pop music, while Cantopop refers to Cantonese-language pop music. However, they are not completely different from the *liuxing* versus *tongsu* distinction. Since *tongsu* music is PRC-produced and reflects the State's ideology, the language used is undoubtedly Mandarin. Therefore, using Mandopop to include *tongsu* is not only unnecessary but also confusing because it categorizes two ideologically contradictory types into one umbrella term. Thus, Moskowitz positioned *tongsu* music outside of the categorization between Mandopop and Cantopop and only marked this distinction under *liuxing* music. This paper will adopt this framework for two reasons; first, the notion of *tongsu* is being phased out in the early 21st century and being replaced by *liuxing*, and secondly, when translating Mandopop or Cantopop (華語/粵語流行音樂), it is unambiguously translated as *liuxing*.

Although Chinese popular music is an understudied field, it has been examined by a few scholars. However, most works focus on Chinese rock music. Jones, in his pioneering work in Chinese popular music, argues that rock music is a form of resistance and "resulted in a situation

---

<sup>26</sup> Zhang, Yi [张焱]. "可否“流行”换“通俗” [Kefou "Liuxing" Huan "Tongsu;" Can "Liuxing" Replace "Tongsu"]." 音乐周报 [Music Weekly], 3 Oct 2003.

where students put rock music to direct, politically emancipatory use.”<sup>27</sup> Baranovitch, on the other hand, proposes a more complex framework for the relationship between popular music and the state. He rejects the rigid hegemony versus resistance framework adopted by Jones and other scholars, and instead points out that the relationship between the state and popular culture is often ambivalent and complex— “a site where many different forces and groups meet, and the state certainly participates in much of popular culture today in China.”<sup>28</sup> The most contemporary work of the three—Jeroen de Kloet—examines “rock mythology” and its inclusive and exclusive notions by positioning rock against the “subaltern sounds” —pop. He argues that rock is “deparadoxicalising,” in which the global and local images are complementary rather than contradictory, and their strive for authenticity vis-à-vis the genre of pop: “Whether it is folk, underground music, or pop-punk, rock musicians seem to agree on one thing: they are not making pop.”<sup>29</sup> Although placing pop as subaltern sounds may be ideologically plausible, from a popularity standpoint, it would make less sense because rock “never represented more than a small fraction of the Chinese-language music market.”<sup>30</sup> This paper will borrow the aforementioned scholars’ framework on examining the relationship between pop music and the state but contribute to the discussion using an under-examined form of text—pop. More specifically, this paper will focus on the China Wind style of Jay Chou. It is important to note that Jay Chou’s songs fall into the genre of pop but sometimes with hip-hop, rock, and R&B elements; more on the musical aspects as well as my proposed framework of Jay Chou’s China Wind songs will be detailedly discussed in chapters three and four.

---

<sup>27</sup> Jones, *Like a Knife*, 1992, pp. 146-147.

<sup>28</sup> Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003, p. 272.

<sup>29</sup> De Kloet, *China with a Cut*, 2010, pp. 193-195.

<sup>30</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, p. 25.

## Jay Chou and China Wind

In order to construct the notion of China Wind, it is necessary to examine what predates the birth of this style but has similar characteristics and analyze their usage and function of Chineseness. In the broadest sense, the three aforementioned *tongsu* songs can fall into this category—pop songs with Chinese characteristics. Their Chineseness was represented by the overt patriotic sentiment through either honoring the CCP (recognizing October 1 as the birthday) or national symbols. These national symbols not only include Tiananmen Square and Great Wall which are associated with Beijing, but also Chinese peripherals such as skyscrapers in Hong Kong and the Potala Palace, which reinforces the government’s unifying agenda, and functions as the PRC state’s propaganda and didactic tool.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, few songs outside of mainland China also openly reveal this patriotic sentiment, most notable examples include “My Chinese Heart” (我的中國心) by Hong Kong singer Ming-Man Cheung (張明敏) released in 1983, and “The Descendants of the Dragon” (龍的傳人) by Taiwanese singer-songwriter Te-Chien Hou (侯德健) released in 1978.

Another type of music with Chinese characteristics can be found in Chinese rock. One notable example is “Returning in Dream to the Tang Dynasty” (夢回唐朝) by mainland Chinese heavy-metal band Tang Dynasty (唐朝), released in 1992. Rather than honoring the party state or using national symbols, this song juxtaposes cultural elements from dynastic China, such as Peking Opera, classical Chinese poetry, Buddha statue, and Chinese historical architecture with heavy-metal band aesthetics and persona. Baranovitch argues that the use of those elements “articulates [the band’s] dissatisfaction with China’s present situation through the expression of a passionate nostalgia for one of the most glorious periods in Chinese history.”<sup>32</sup> On the other

---

<sup>31</sup> Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003. p. 197, 200.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263.

hand, de Kloet argues that such articulation of Chineseness is a form of localization of the “hard” sounds, “such as the rebellious sound of Cui Jian, the heavy metal of Tang Dynasty, the hardcore punk of 69, and the underground sound of Zu Zhou.”<sup>33</sup> Although they seem to be contradictory to each other, localization of the “hard” sounds does not necessarily entail localizing to be in line with the state’s ideology. Thus, it is important to recognize the two distinctive uses of Chineseness and how they can either serve as the state’s propaganda or function as a dissident voice. This thesis will look closely at Jay Chou’s China Wind style and serves as a comparison against the two aforementioned types of music with Chinese characteristics in the fourth chapter.

Before discussing China Wind, there is another notable style that coexisted along with China Wind and are stylistically very similar compared to China Wind—*Gufeng* (古風), literally means “ancient wind.” Ethnomusicologist Chen-Yu Lin characterizes *Gufeng* as a “new style of music influenced by China Wind pop music, composed mostly in the Chinese five-tone scale, with lyrics structured to imitate Chinese poetry.”<sup>34</sup> Also, the production is often done by amateur, rather than professional groups, and the dissemination is primarily through the internet.<sup>35</sup> Compared to China Wind songs, *Gufeng* songs tend to be more “strict” on the use of pre-modern Chinese cultural elements, especially the music. While traditional Chinese instruments can be entirely absent from China Wind songs (more on China Wind will be discussed in the next session), *Gufeng* songs will always incorporate traditional Chinese instruments, and often the pentatonic scales as well. Furthermore, *Gufeng* songs, perhaps due to the amateur production process, have always been a subculture and are often perceived as inferior compared to China Wind songs.

---

<sup>33</sup> De Kloet, *China with a Cut*, 2010, p. 194.

<sup>34</sup> Lin, Chen-Yu. *Questions of Chineseness: A Study of China Wind Pop Music and the Post-1990s Generation in the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the UK*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2018. p. 74.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

In 2000, the song “*Wife*” (娘子), composed and sung by Taiwanese Mandopop singer and songwriter Jay Chou was quietly released among nine other songs in his first album— “Jay.” Even though it did not attract tremendous popularity at the time, “*Wife*” was nonetheless generally regarded as the first ever China Wind (中國風) song. Fast forward about half a decade, China Wind, a Mandopop musical style, furiously swept over the PRC and other Sinophone communities until around the early to mid-2010s. Jay Chou is often regarded as the “father of China Wind,” because of his popularization of this musical style and the unprecedented composition of “*Wife*,” he also claimed that there would be at least one China Wind style song in each of his albums.<sup>36</sup> Despite the popularity, the definition of China Wind seems to be contested in both popular and scholarly discourses. Namely, the very definition and connotations behind the category “China Wind” have been vigorously debated and tie directly into contending definitions of “Chineseness.”

Although China Wind is critically understudied, few scholars were able to engage in some discussion regarding the topic of China Wind. Yung Chung’s 2011 master thesis is an analysis of Vincent Fang (方文山)’s lyrics. However, he adopts the translation of “Chinoiserie” to represent *Zhongguofeng* as opposed to “China Wind”.<sup>37</sup> Lin, in her doctoral dissertation, openly rejects this terminology; she argues that the differences in tangibility between *Zhongguofeng* music and Chinoiserie artifacts as well as the targeted audience between the two can be misleading and inappropriate.<sup>38</sup> Although few other scholars did not overtly reject “Chinoiserie,” they nonetheless uniformly used “China Wind” in their works as the English term to represent *Zhongguofeng*. Thus, this paper will also adopt China Wind for similar reasons as

---

<sup>36</sup> Huang, Lydia. *China Wind Music: Constructing an Imagined Cultural China*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2023. p. 2.

<sup>37</sup> Chung, Yung. *Hearing chinoiserie -- the discourse analysis of Chinese pop music during 2000-2010*.

<sup>38</sup> Lin, *Questions of Chineseness*, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2018. pp. 70-71.

Lin expressed, and as a more suitable, albeit literal, translation of *Zhongguofeng*, as well as the uniformity in scholarship.

One of the earliest mentions of China Wind in English scholarship is by Chinese media and cultural studies scholar Anthony Fung, in his short 2008 article examining Jay Chou as an artist, he claims that his “performance on stage connects with a sense of Chineseness” which “evokes the national culture of the PRC” and is also a “safe political icon.”<sup>39</sup> However, he did not openly recognize the China Wind style of Jay Chou. Although being one of the pioneering works of Mandopop and Jay Chou, Fung did not unpack the notion of Chineseness as well as the complexity of Jay Chou’s China Wind, which possibly renders confusion. A decade later, Lin precisely delved into this issue—the issue of Chineseness in China Wind music—in her doctoral dissertation, and utilized ethnomusicological methods in an attempt to understand the meaning of Chineseness associated with China Wind in different Sinophone communities—Taiwan, Hong Kong, the PRC, and overseas Chinese in the United Kingdom. In her fieldwork, the notion of Chineseness is interpreted drastically differently across communities, sometimes within a community.<sup>40</sup> On the one hand, the notion of China Wind becomes too broad and abstract which can become inefficient when examining it, but on the other hand, it certainly grants everyone the right to claim what constitutes China Wind based on their own understanding and interpretation without the need to confine within a single framework.

In order to mitigate the confusion on this term, professor and lyricist Yiu-Fai Chow and de Kloet urge scholars to precisely state “which China Wind.”<sup>41</sup> However, their framework only

---

<sup>39</sup> Fung, Anthony. “Western Style, Chinese Pop: Jay Chou’s Rap and Hip-Hop in China.” *Asian Music*, vol. 39, no. 1, 2008, pp. 69–80, <https://doi.org/10.1353/amu.2007.0047>.

<sup>40</sup> Lin, *Questions of Chineseness*, 2018.

<sup>41</sup> Chow, Yiu Fai, and Jeroen de Kloet. “Blowing in the China Wind: Engagements with Chineseness in Hong Kong’s Zhongguofeng Music Videos.” *Visual Anthropology (Journal)*, vol. 24, no. 1–2, 2011, p. 73, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08949468.2011.525492>.

considers the geographical aspect, such as “Hong Kong’s China Wind,” rather than critically confront what constitutes or does not constitute China Wind itself. Although they provide the definition as follows: “It can be defined musically by its juxtaposition of classical Chinese melody and/or instruments with trendy global pop styles, particularly R&B and hip-hop. It can also be defined lyrically by its mobilization of ‘traditional’ Chinese cultural elements such as legends, classics, and language, implicitly or explicitly in contemporary contexts,”<sup>42</sup> the lack of explanation of why or how they came up with such a definition is unsatisfying. Ironically, many problems surrounding it still render confusion; for example, will a song be considered as China Wind if only either lyrically or musically evokes a sense of Chineseness? Also, does this definition only apply to Hong Kong’s China Wind, or can it also apply to any China Wind songs in general? Furthermore, what even constitutes the sense of “Chineseness?”

The most contemporary work on China Wind partially addresses this problem as seen in both Chow and de Kloet as well as Lin. Musicologist Lydia Huang’s doctoral dissertation primarily adopts musicological methods to unpack the usage of Chinese instruments in connection with Chineseness. She spends a chapter in an attempt to construct China Wind in a less ambiguous way, in which she frames “China Wind music in the context of cultural nationalism and invented traditions” and refers to China Wind artists and enthusiasts as “cultural nationalists.”<sup>43</sup> Also, Huang uses pentatonic scales as the approach to China Wind music, in which she categorizes China Wind songs by the degree of pentatonic scales utilized. In her appendix, a complete list of China Wind songs can be found based on this approach.<sup>44</sup> However,

---

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>43</sup> Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023, p. 32, 35.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 204-207.

the dissertation proceeds to analyze the musical elements of Chineseness, which raises the question of whether China Wind music must include Chinese musical elements.

The problem all the above scholars confronted was the diversity and fluidity of the notion of China Wind. In other words, all were too ambitious to propose a “one-size-fits-all” framework to capture the nuances of China Wind. In other words, they oversimplified the notion of China Wind by treating it as a unified entity, rather than a diverse cultural phenomenon that is complex and can oftentimes be contradictory within itself. Lin’s research already points to the complexity and near-impossibility of capturing China Wind in its entirety due to different interpretations across different communities; thus, this paper advocates for a narrower approach to China Wind. Similar to Chow and De Kloet’s framework, but rather than adopting the ambiguous geographical answer to “which China Wind,” this paper aims to answer it by centering on a single artist—only analyzing Jay Chou’s China Wind. With this much narrower framework, it is unambiguous to propose what exactly is Jay Chou’s China Wind, rather than confronting China Wind as a whole.

Since Vincent Fang writes many lyrics for Jay Chou and is responsible for all of his China Wind songs, he is authoritative to define Jay Chou’s China Wind. According to Fang, China Wind songs, “if only from a narrow approach to only talk about lyrics, it means that the content of the lyrics must imitate classical Chinese poetry. However, generally speaking, the understanding of China Wind also focuses on the layer of composition. Thus, to broadly approach China Wind, as long as either the music has some form of incorporation of the pentatonic scale, and/or traditional Chinese instruments, or the lyrics include certain keywords that reminiscence classical Chinese poetry, regardless of the quantity or the ratio of each

category, they can also be regarded as “China Wind.”<sup>45</sup> Thus, as long as either lyrics or music has the elements of Chineseness mentioned by Fang, it can be considered as Jay Chou’s China Wind songs. Based on this framework, it is possible to compile all the China Wind songs by Jay Chou, as the chart below illustrates.

Song Title in English	Song Title in Chinese	Year	Album (in English)
Wife	娘子	2000	Jay
Nunchucks	雙節棍	2001	Fantasy
Shanghai 1943	上海1943	2001	Fantasy
Dragon Fist	龍拳	2002	Octave Space
Grandpa’s Tea	爺爺泡的茶	2002	Octave Space
East Wind Breaks	東風破	2003	Ye Hui Mei
Double Blade	雙刀	2003	Ye Hui Mei
Chaotic Dance	亂舞春秋	2004	Common Jasmine Orange
Hair Like Snow	髮如雪	2005	November’s Chopin
Fearless	霍元甲	2006	Fearless
Far Away	千里之外	2006	Still Fantasy
Chinese Herbal Manual	本草綱目	2006	Still Fantasy
Chrysanthemum Palace	菊花台	2006	Still Fantasy
Golden Armor	黃金甲	2006	Golden Armor
Blue and White Porcelain	青花瓷	2007	On the Run
Incomparable	無雙	2007	On the Run

<sup>45</sup> Fang, Wenshan [方文山]. 青花瓷: 隱藏在釉色裏的文字秘密 [*Qinghuaci: Yincang zai Youse de Wenzhi Mimi; The Blue and White Porcelain: The secret of the words hidden inside the glaze color*]. Zuoja chubanshe, 2008. p. 3.

Master Chou	周大俠	2008	Master Chou
Orchid Pavilion	蘭亭序	2008	Capricorn
Fade Away	煙花易冷	2010	The Era
Rain All Night	雨下一整晚	2010	The Era
Red Dust Inn	紅塵客棧	2012	Opus 12
Eunuch with a Headache	公公偏頭痛	2012	Opus 12
Passer-By	天涯過客	2014	Aiyo, Not Bad
Cold Hearted	紅顏如霜	2022	The Greatest Work of Art

Table 1: the list of Jay Chou’s China Wind songs.<sup>46</sup>

### Other Framework and Methodology

This thesis is fundamentally anchored in the field of cultural studies. Since cultural studies, according to comparative literature scholar Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek, is often “defined as a metadisciplinary idea across disciplines rather than as a unitary field of study” and “can also be described as inter-, multi-, and even counter- or anti-disciplinary,”<sup>47</sup> this paper will not strictly follow one established method but rather adopt a flexible boundary and diverse utilization of methods. To offer a more concrete idea of cultural studies, sociologist Nick Couldry proposed that “cultural studies thinks of culture in relation to issues of power: the power relations (whether driven by economics, politics or other forms of social discrimination) which affect who is represented and how, who speaks and who is silent, what counts as ‘culture’ and what does

<sup>46</sup> It is important to note that “*Golden Armor*” and “*Chrysanthemum Palace*” is part of the movie “*Curse of the Golden Flower*” (滿城盡帶黃金甲), Likewise, “*Master Chou*” is also part of the movie “*Big Dunk*” (大灌籃).

<sup>47</sup> Tötösy de Zepetnek, Steven, and Tutun Mukherjee, editors. *Companion to Comparative Literature, World Literatures, and Comparative Cultural Studies*. Cambridge University Press India, Foundation Books, 2013. p. 11.

not.”<sup>48</sup> Sociologist Chris Rojek, on the other hand, proposes a more holistic approach, which involves cultural genre, production, consumption, and politics, as cultural studies explore the interrelationship between those four aspects.<sup>49</sup> While it is unrealistic to thoroughly investigate all four aspects and their interrelationship in detail in the scope of this paper, Rojek’s approach nonetheless complements the seemingly over-simplified approach proposed by Couldry. Therefore, this thesis will primarily examine Jay Chou’s China Wind in relation to the state, but also factor in other aspects proposed by Rojek, especially consumption, to enrich the discussion.

In the early works of Chinese popular culture studies, the notion of popular culture was interpreted in two distinctive ways. Represented by Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul Pickowicz, they interpret popular culture as “nonofficial” that signifies “the tension between state and society” and is “distinct[ive] from official culture, that is, the official ideology of the Chinese state.”<sup>50</sup> Contrastingly, Bonnie McDougall, as cited in Baranovitch, interprets popular culture as “the most widespread.”<sup>51</sup> In the discussion of popular music, however, most seem to only adopt the first interpretation of “popular” —popular as a sense of subculture, anti-hegemony, resistance to the state, underground culture, anti-state, etc., while the concern on the popularity of those texts were often not as valued. This is most exemplified in the ubiquitous presence of scholarship on the study of rock music or other “rebellious sounds” in the field of popular music studies, and the field of Chinese popular music studies is no exception. This is perhaps due to the overlap of popularity and resistant ideology faced by scholars from the Birmingham School in examining underground (popular) culture in the United Kingdom that

---

<sup>48</sup> Couldry, Nick. *Inside Culture: Re-Imagining the Method of Cultural Studies*. SAGE, 2000. p. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Rojek, Chris. *Cultural Studies*. Polity Press, 2007. pp. 10-12.

<sup>50</sup> Link, Perry, et al. *Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People’s Republic*. Westview Press, 1989. pp. 5-6.

<sup>51</sup> McDougall, Bonnie S., and Paul Clark. *Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979*. University of California Press, 1984. Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003. p. 5.

heavily influenced the study of popular music.<sup>52</sup> However, Kassabian points out the different notions associated with “popular,” as cited in Lin, “[t]hese notions include ‘popular as folk’, ‘popular as counterculture,’ and ‘popular as mass.’”<sup>53</sup> While many others adopted the second notion, Jay Chou’s China Wind undoubtedly falls into the third category proposed by Kassabian— “popular as mass,” because not only Jay Chou is one of the most famous artists in the Sinophone community, the China Wind style is also widely adored by consumers in different communities, with many other artists started to incorporate this style. Therefore, this paper also contributes to the study of Chinese popular music from an under-utilized framework of popular music.

Through the above-proposed framework, this thesis examines Jay Chou’s China Wind songs in relation to the PRC state and mainland Chinese consumers in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Chapter II will first deconstruct and challenge the usage of *gangtai* (港臺) pop by instead constructing the concept of *gangtai* ideology in reference to songs that capture the stereotypical bourgeois sentiment. This thesis argues that employing this constructed ideology casts light on the possibility of breaking the geographical boundary of popular music production by instead examining the ideological alignment between various styles and genres of songs and the state. The next two chapters devote to close reading and analyzing selected Jay Chou’s China Wind songs in terms of their lyrics, music, and applicable music videos as well as live performances. Before doing so, this thesis first categorize Jay Chou’s China Wind songs into two categories—hard songs and soft songs in correspondence with the notion of *wen* (文) and *wu* (武). Chapter III focuses on “soft” songs and analyzes how they employ *wen* masculinity to

---

<sup>52</sup> For example, see Frith’s discussion on the study of popular music. Frith, Simon. “The Cultural Study of Popular Music.” *Cultural Studies*, Routledge, New York, NY, 1992, pp. 174–186.

<sup>53</sup> Kassabian, Anahid. “Popular.” *Key Terms in Popular Music and Culture*, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 113-123.

replace the feminine *wenrou* male figure, as well as decadent and melancholic sentiments that are associated with *gangtai*-ideology songs. Chapter IV focuses on “hard” songs and analyzes how they utilize *wu* masculinity to replace the sense of rebelliousness in rock and rap songs. Both chapters show how Jay Chou’s China Wind is accepted by the PRC state, which contrasts most artists from Hong Kong and Taiwan in the late twentieth century. Chapter V explains why Jay Chou’s China Wind attracted young mainland Chinese consumers in the early twenty-first Century and thus allowing them to form a symbiotic relationship with the state, as this was not seen since the Open-Door Policy. Through the analysis of selected China Wind songs by Jay Chou, this thesis argues that Jay Chou’s China Wind functions as a mediator between the state and the consumers of Jay Chou’s China Wind, in which they form a symbiotic relationship. He is able to do so by precisely locating the desires and hatred of both the state and the consumers while retaining the positives and eradicating the negatives in constructing his China Wind songs.

## II. Forget *Gangtai* Pop! The Construction of *Gangtai*-Ideology Pop

### The Problem of *Gangtai*

In the introduction, I have purposely been elusive in using the term “*gangtai* pop” to represent songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan. As Moskowitz already points out, the term *gangtai* refers to a PRC-centric point of view to pop songs, and the term had very little meaning to Hong Kong or Taiwan audiences. Furthermore, it eliminates Mandarin-language pop songs that are produced outside of Hong Kong and Taiwan such as Malaysia and Singapore.<sup>54</sup> However, I argue that the more crucial problem of this term, in academic discourse, is that it oversimplifies the diverse styles and features of popular music produced within those two geographical boundaries. As Lin points out, “[*gangtai* pop] does not emphasise the distinctive features of popular music in Hong Kong and Taiwan, while this specific label was formed in a very particular socio-economic context and fails to reflect all the music produced in Taiwan and Hong Kong.”<sup>55</sup> However, Lin continues to use this term because “this label can also be a useful concept when investigating the impact, reception, and dissemination of popular music in the PRC.”<sup>56</sup> Moskowitz does the same because “most of these performers enter the market through music companies based in Taiwan” and “the term Gang-Tai pop came up repeatedly in PRC scholarship, and exploring the striking divide between PRC pop and Gang-Tai pop is a central goal of this book.”<sup>57</sup> Their justification of the usage of the term is quite vague and even contradictory, perhaps due to the lack of a better solution. Therefore, this chapter aims to propose

---

<sup>54</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, pp. 3-4.

<sup>55</sup> Lin, *Questions of Chineseness*, 2018, p. 44.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>57</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, p. 4.

an alternative solution—the construction of *gangtai* ideology to replace the oversimplified, geographical-bounded term to represent popular music from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The most prominent issue with the usage of this term is its inability to properly analyze the relationship between the PRC and Chinese popular music (not just that from Hong Kong and Taiwan) since the reform era. First, the oversimplification of the term often results in scholars' speculation on whether the PRC state welcomes or rejects *gangtai* pop. However, both Teresa Teng and Te-Chien Ho are from Taiwan, and their songs fall into the category of *gangtai* pop, the state's attitude towards them could not be more different. While the former was denounced and restricted, the latter was praised, mainly for his song "Descendents of the Dragon," which contrasts sharply with Teresa Teng and other similar artists in terms of their "status" (地位) in mainland China.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, songs like "My Chinese Heart" by Ming-Man Cheung and "Born to Be Wild" (餓狼傳說) by Jacky Cheung (張學友) are both from Hong Kong. The former was again praised by the PRC state and was invited to the 1984 CCTV New Year's Gala, while the latter was deemed one of the ten "unhealthy" songs of China.<sup>59</sup> The contrast in attitude from the state is not only exemplified in songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan but can also be seen in mainland-produced songs. For example, *tongsu* singers are supported by the state, and their songs are easily disseminated which resulted in an early wave of famous mainland Chinese singers such as Liu Huan (劉歡). On the other hand, in the early reform era, a few mainland singers such as Li Guyi and Cheng Lin are denounced because their singing evokes the image of Teresa Teng. Likewise, the complicated relationship between the state and mainland Chinese rock artist Cui Jian need not be mentioned in detail. From all these examples, it is clear that the

---

<sup>58</sup> Wang, *Contemporary Chinese City Popular Music*, 2009, pp. 7-8.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. Wang, Siqu [王思琪]. 中国当代流行音乐史稿 [*Zhongguo Dangdai Liuxing Yinyue Shigao; The historical manuscript of contemporary Chinese popular music*]. Shanghai Sanlian Shudian, 2020. p. 4, 187.

state is not denouncing everything foreign, but rather, there are particular traits within the songs that the state adores and detests. Thus, using *gangtai* or any other geographical umbrella term to represent ideologies of pop songs is an oversimplification.

In PRC popular discourse, the geographical reference term *gangtai*, especially Taiwan, do not necessarily represent songs or singers that are bound to that particular area. Instead, it reveals the ideological categorization of pop songs in the PRC. For example, QQ Music, a PRC music streaming app and website (comparable to Spotify) has numerous ranking categories of songs documenting their popularity. They can be bound to genres, such as pop ranking or hip-hop ranking that do not consider language or geographical boundaries. There are also rankings based on languages, such as Mandopop ranking and Cantopop ranking—both of which are under the umbrella category of C-pop but still ranked separately. Notably, there are rankings based on geographical boundaries, such as pop songs from Europe and America (歐美), pop songs from the Taiwan region (台灣地區), and pop songs from the mainland region (內地地區).<sup>60</sup> This particular method of ranking reveals the problem of *gangtai* as a term referring to pop songs that are geographically bound to Hong Kong and Taiwan. On the Taiwan region ranking chart, it includes Mandopop artists such as Stefanie Sun (孫燕姿) and Andrew Tan (陳勢安). However, the former is from Singapore, the latter is from Malaysia. This shows the identity erasure of non-mainland artists and a general categorization of non-mainland Mandopop singers and songs as Taiwan. One may argue that the categorization is based on the debut place of the artists; this is not true either because even though Stefanie Sun debuted in Taiwan, Andrew Tan released his first album in Malaysia. To further consolidate this matter, mainland singer Faye Wong (王菲) debuted in Hong Kong, and sings many Cantopop songs; many of her songs are still categorized

---

<sup>60</sup> This should not be understood as Taiwanese pop or mainland Chinese pop, but should be translated and understood as pop songs coming from that particular region, regardless of the language of the songs.

under the ranking “pop songs from the mainland region.” Also, mainland Chinese singer and songwriter Hins Cheung (張敬軒)’s songs are on the ranking of “pop music from Hong Kong.” Although both Wong and Cheung were born in China and held permanent resident status in Hong Kong, their songs are ranked in different rankings based on different regions. This points to another problem of geographical categorization of singers and songs because many singers are quite cosmopolitan and their identities are often unclear or sometimes even ideological or political; categorizing them geographically can be arbitrary at times.

### **The Construction of *Gangtai* Ideology**

In order to solve this issue, this thesis proposes the notion of *gangtai* ideology to replace the generic term *gangtai* pop. Also, it is important to note that although the term “*gangtai*” still evokes the sense of geographical boundary, it should not be taken as so because this term refers to songs with certain traits of ideology and has nothing to do with the origin of production or the identity of the singers. There are a few reasons for choosing the name “*gangtai*” to represent such an ideology. First, as Lin points out, the term “*gangtai* pop” is indeed widely used in both official and popular discourse in the PRC; it would be counterintuitive to arbitrarily create another name to represent this already existing notion. Secondly, Moskowitz points out the “dog wags the tail” phenomenon when examining the cultural counter-invasion of the PRC from Taiwan. Such an invasion is an ideological invasion, thus retaining the “term” *gangtai* fundamentally posits itself against the PRC state ideology, which is crucial in the construction of the *gangtai* ideology. Lastly, the retention of the term can also simply be understood as assigning a new meaning to the term by destructing the geographical sense and transcending it to an

ideological level, as most songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan indeed possess this ideology, hence the birth of the term in popular discourse.

With the problems and frameworks settled, now we confront the composition of the *gangtai* ideology. First, it is important to examine how the term, without the ideological layer, is used in non-academic discourse. In 1982, the collection of essays titled *How to Distinguish Yellow Music* (怎樣鑒別黃色歌曲) was published by People's Music Publishing House (人民音樂出版社) in attempt to combat “foreign” yellow songs. One of the essays titled “Guide Accordingly, Influence with Pattern: A Discussion on the Penetration of Gangao Vulgar Popular Music” (因勢引導, 循循善誘---談港澳流行庸俗歌曲的滲入) by Zhou Dafeng (周大風) is particularly helpful in understanding the state's perception and position on pop music from Hong Kong and Taiwan. First, the usage of *gangao* (港澳) as opposed to *gangtai* is interesting, as it represents Hong Kong and Macau rather than Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since Macau in particular did not produce songs that strongly influenced the mainland, it is plausible to speculate that it is an imprudent or even partially mistaken usage of the term *gangtai*. However, it casts light on the government's position because the imprudence suggests the identity erasure of non-mainland territories. In other words, it precisely constructs an “us” versus “them” dichotomy and further consolidates the mainland's oppositional attitude toward non-mainland culture.

With the position of the term being the opposite of mainland, now it is necessary to analyze how the mainland describes the term in terms of its ideology. The first ideological layer of the term is exposed through the description—vulgar (庸俗). Next, in the essay, Zhou described the sound as “frivolous, fervent, quirky, despondent, decadent, and peculiar (轻佻、狂热、扭妮, 消沉、颓废、奇特)” and “a group of young people mesmerized and addicted to it.”<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> Zhou, Dafeng et al. [周大风等]. “因势利导, 循循善诱——谈港澳流行庸俗歌曲的渗入 [Yinshiyindao, Xunxunshanyou— Tan Gangao Liuxing Yongse Gequ de Shenru; Guide Accordingly, Influence with Pattern: A

From the list of adjectives above, although not all are derogatory when describing music, such as frivolous, fervent, quirky, and peculiar, they nonetheless sharply contrast the socialist ideals that the government embodied in the early reform era. Furthermore, mesmerization and addiction are also associated with bourgeois sentiments, again significantly deviating from socialist principles. When discussing the state's desire in terms of music, Zhou described that "we need many beautiful, healthy, bright, joyful, enthusiastic, and upward music."<sup>62</sup> These adjectives embody the socialist rhetoric, which contrast from the adjectives describing *gangao* music. Hence, the grand layer of this constructed *gangtai* ideology can be understood as the embrace of bourgeois sentiments that deviates from the state's socialist sentiments.

With the grand layer of *gangtai* ideology in place, it is important to connect to the oppositional position in relation to the state and analyze songs that are both opposed and endorsed by the state in order to reveal specific aspects of this ideology that are in line with the adjectives described by Zhou. First, Teresa Teng in the early reform era was widely discussed and criticized by the state. According to Chinese music critic Ju Qihong (居其宏), Teng was criticized because of "her performance of decadent sounds of the 1930s" and "her political stance is in line with the *Guomindang*."<sup>63</sup> From this comment, it shows that part of the *gangtai* ideology originates from the pop songs in the Republican era, and can transcend beyond the song itself and include the artist's political stance as well. Baranovitch flushes out more concrete descriptions of pop songs in the 1930s: "decadent and escapist..... distracting the attention of urbanites from the nationalistic cause. The sentimental, romantic content, and soft, sweet, slow delivery of the songs were blamed for softening people's hearts and weakening their will for

---

Discussion on the Penetration of *Gangao* Vulgar Popular Music]." 怎样鉴别黄色歌曲 [*Zenyang Jianbie Huangse Gequ; How to Distinguish Yellow Music*], Renmin Yinyue Chubanshe, 1982, p. 38.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>63</sup> Ju, Qihong [居其宏]. 新中國音樂史, 1949-2000 [*Xinzhongguo Yinyueshi, 1949-2000; New China's Music History, 1949-2000*]. Hunan Meishu Chubanshe, 2002. p. 144.

struggle and sacrifice.”<sup>64</sup> Most of Teresa Teng’s songs certainly capture the characteristics mentioned by Baranovitch, such as the songs “The Moon Represents My Heart” (月亮代表我的心) and “Sweet Like Honey” (甜蜜蜜), which is indeed apolitical and embodies the romantic sentiment, combined with “[t]he sweet flavor of her voice..... gentle vibratos, coquettish nasal slides, and a moderate, relaxed tempo.”<sup>65</sup> In connection with the official discourse represented by Zhou, the example of Teresa Teng fits into the description of “decadent,” “vulgar,” and “despondent.” To sum up, at the beginning of the reform era, the specifics of the *gangtai* ideology can be represented by Teresa Teng because her songs convey romantic sentiments and are apolitical with a combination of relaxed and soft vocal delivery.

Aside from the example from a Taiwanese female singer, it is equally important to consider a male singer from Hong Kong to get a more holistic picture of representing the *gangtai*-ideology. The aforementioned song “Born to be Wild” by Jacky Cheung is an ideal example, as it is by an extremely famous Hong Kong artist, one of the “Four Heavenly Kings” (四大天王) of Cantopop; the song itself is also very popular, and most importantly, the state openly and specifically denounced this song as “one of the ten unhealthy songs of China.” The lyrics capture a more overt expression of not only romance, but the representation of sex and sexual desire: “She leans on my shoulder, her breath echoing by my ear. High heat has emerged, her allure makes one dizzy. The gentleman tries to put out the fire, unable to blow away the warm smoke. She adds her lips, making me endure. Torrential love, desperately kissing and entwining me. Yet, I know, love leaves me with no tomorrow.”<sup>66</sup> However, Cheung’s vocal delivery somewhat contrasts the sentiments of the lyrics. Instead of using a wild, coarse, or

---

<sup>64</sup> Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003. p. 14.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>66</sup> Original Chinese lyrics are: 她倚著我肩, 呼吸响耳边。高温已产生, 色相令人乱。君子在扑火, 吹不走暖烟。她加上嘴巴, 给我做磨练。汹涌的爱, 扑著我尽力乱吻乱缠。偏偏知道, 爱令我无明天。

simply loud vocal, Cheung's timbre is thin and rather restrained. Also, the orchestration of the songs involves sound effects of wolves, chromaticism, syncopated rhythms, and guitar solos. On top of all that, the song is highly rhythmic, mainly achieved by the substantial presence of the drum set. In reference to the official discourse, this song not only captures vulgarity and decadence, but it is also in line with characteristics such as "frivolous," "fervent," "quirky," and "peculiar." Therefore, Cheung's example shows that the overt representation of sexual desire and playful orchestration also contribute to the construction of *gangtai* ideology. Furthermore, both examples show the sexualization of women, in which women become objects of pleasure and are submissive to men.

Beyond those two examples, it is possible to further unpack the *gangtai*-ideology away from the official discourse but instead from the perspective of gender. In particular, Moskowitz points out another type of common male figure that the song "Born to be Wild" did not capture—the tender/sensitive (溫柔) male.<sup>67</sup> Such a figure contrasts both from the socialist male figures such as Lei Feng and the hypermasculine male figures of Chinese rock. This is part of the "yin sheng yang shuai" (陰盛陽衰) phenomenon, meaning the feminine overpowers the masculine. According to Moskowitz, there are many songs written by male lyricists in the tone of a female for female singers that complain about men.<sup>68</sup> Also, many male singers present themselves as sensitive and tender, singing songs to convey laments and melancholy in regards to romance; this aspect resonated with many females and granted those singers the persona "wenrou" male.<sup>69</sup> However, this feminized male figure and the "yin sheng yang shuai" phenomenon is regarded as something negative by the PRC state. Thus, it can also be considered

---

<sup>67</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, p. 28.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

part of the *gangtai* ideology that the state is actively denouncing. In other words, part of the *gangtai* ideology is not only the sexualization of females but also the feminization of males and the overall feminine sentiment of the songs. This is contributed by male artists' overt projection of melancholy and male lyricists' dedication to the construction of female protagonists.

Since the construction of this ideology aims to serve the purpose of understanding the PRC state's attitude towards various pop songs in terms of ideology rather than geographical boundaries, it is necessary to reapply it to various songs across geographical boundaries. As shown above, songs such as "The Moon Represents My Heart," "Born to be Wild," and "Sweet like Honey" by Taiwanese singer Teresa Teng and Hong Kong singer Jacky Cheung strongly evoke the *gangtai* ideology and are thus opposed by the state. On the other hand, although Hong Kong singer Ming-Man Cheung's "My Chinese Heart" and Taiwanese singer Te-Chien Ho's "Descendants of the Dragon" are geographically *gangtai*, they do not evoke any *gangtai* ideology. First, both reveal strong patriotic sentiments and thus not apolitical. Secondly, they are not centered on romantic issues and do not involve melancholic sentiments. Thirdly, from the lens of gender, both do not evoke the sexualization of women and the feminine male figure. Lastly, even though their orchestration is entirely Western and the latter also contains a notable presence of electric guitar and drums, both do not contain "quirky" and "peculiar" orchestration in "Born to be Wild." Also, the other patriotic sentiments and the lack of *gangtai* ideology in other aspects are able to overcome this minor musical evocation of the *gangtai* ideology. As a result, despite their geographical *gangtai* status, they gained wide endorsement by the PRC state. On the other hand, although mainland Chinese singers Li Guyi, Zhu Fengbo, and Cheng Lin are not geographically *gangtai*, they nonetheless evoke *gangtai* ideology in their songs, and are thus denounced by the PRC government. All three singers were accused of imitating *gangtai* artists

such as Teresa Teng in their performances, in particular, the breathy way of singing and the use of vibratos and sliding notes are in line with the *gangtai* ideology, reminiscent of Teresa Teng.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, Li Guyi's "Homeland Romance" (鄉戀) utilized musical aspects of Tango,<sup>71</sup> which arguably fits into "frivolous," "quirky," and "peculiar" descriptions from the official discourse. On top of that, the song itself can certainly be interpreted as a romantic song because the second person pronoun in the lyrics can be interpreted as the reference to a romantic partner.

### **Recap of Gangtai Ideology**

In the construction of *gangtai* ideology, this thesis first examined the positioning of the term "*gangtai*" in relation to the PRC state, and argued that the official discourse places *gangtai* at the opposite of the ideological spectrum vis-à-vis the state, and is thus something negative that the government is actively trying to restrict and eradicate. With this backdrop of *gangtai* ideology in place, through the analysis of songs that the PRC government opposes, the specific characteristics of *gangtai* ideology can be understood as apolitical, often centering on the theme of romance, and sometimes overt sexual desire. Musically, it includes the distinctive and ubiquitous use of Western musical elements, such as Tango, guitar solo, significant presence of drumset, having a breathy timbre, and the use of vibratos and nasals. In terms of gender, it primarily consists of the sexualization of women, the absence of hypermasculinity, the presence of feminine or tender (*wenrou*) male, and the overall feminine sentiment of the song, regardless of the gender of the performer.

One may find some of the ideologies above contradictory, for example, if the presence of *wenrou* male is to resonate with female audiences, it will not involve the sexualization of women

---

<sup>70</sup> Wang, *Contemporary Chinese City Popular Music*, 2009, pp. 13-16.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

to please male audiences. Thus, it is important to note that the *gangtai* ideology is a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. In other words, a song that possesses more of the characteristics above is more *gangtai*-oriented than others. For example, although mainland singer Cheng Lin was denounced because of her song “Little Bugle” (小螺號) evokes the sense of “*gangtai*,” despite the fact that this song is apolitical, it does not evoke romantic sentiments like most Teresa Teng’s songs. Instead, it was denounced because Cheng imitated Teng in her vocal delivery that evoked the sense of “*gangtai*.”<sup>72</sup> Therefore, although both songs are denounced by the state, Teng’s songs can be understood as more *gangtai* compared to Cheng Lin’s “Little Bugle.” Likewise, to once again consolidate the disruption of the geographical boundary, Cheng Lin’s “Little Bugle” can be considered more *gangtai* than Ming-Man Cheung’s “My Chinese Heart.”

---

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., pp. 15-16.

### III. *Wen* in Jay Chou's China Wind Songs

With the construction of *gangtai* ideology in place, it is necessary to put Jay Chou's China Wind songs on this ideological spectrum. As mentioned in the introduction, Jay Chou's China Wind songs can be roughly categorized into two, based on traditional Chinese concepts of *wen*, which will be examined in this chapter, and *wu*, which will be discussed in the next. Through the analysis of selected Jay Chou's China Wind song lyrics, musical elements, music videos, and live performances, this chapter argues that Jay Chou's China Wind uses the notion of *wen* masculinity to replace the *wenrou* male figure that is associated with the *gangtai*-ideology. Also, the style is in line with the CCP's "main melody" ideological backdrop that concerns nationalism and spiritual civilization. Thus, Jay Chou's China Wind was widely accepted and endorsed by the PRC state in the first decade of the twenty-first Century.

#### The Notion of *Wen* and *Wu*

The notion of *wen* and *wu* are traditional Chinese concepts in reference to males regarding the different notions of masculinity, which can be traced all the way back to the Zhou Dynasty—King Wen and King Wu.<sup>73</sup> In particular, according to Sinologist Kam Louis and historian Louise Edwards, "[w]en is generally understood to refer to those genteel, refined qualities that were associated with the literary and artistic pursuits of classical scholars and can therefore be partly analyzed as a leisured-class masculine model. This type of masculinity is perhaps best typified by the image of groups of men writing poetry for mutual amusement or to mark a memorable occasion."<sup>74</sup> For example, Chinese male literati and calligraphers can

---

<sup>73</sup> Louie, Kam, and Louise Edwards. "Chinese Masculinity: Theorizing Wen and Wu." *East Asian History* (Canberra), 1994, p. 140.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

appropriately exemplify the notion of *wen* masculinity. On the other hand, “*wu* is a concept which embodies the power of military strength but also the wisdom to know when and when not to deploy this strength.”<sup>75</sup> Military soldiers and individuals who possess an abundance of physical strength and know when and when not to deploy them can represent the notion of *wu* masculinity. It is important to note that the notion of *wu* may be closer to the Western notion of masculinity, and hence Westerners may falsely assume that the notion of *wen* implies lesser masculinity, or even femininity; Louie and Edwards adamantly cautioned people not to fall into this false accusation, as “either was considered acceptably manly.”<sup>76</sup> For example, in ethnomusicologist Frederick Lau’s analysis of the notion of *wen* and *wu* in Chinese music, he incorrectly claimed *wen* pieces and songs to be more feminine and *wu* pieces to be more masculine;<sup>77</sup> this thesis will reject this model and follow Louie and Edwards’ masculinity construction of China.

However, their respective positions in Chinese history are not always equal. For example, sinologist Robert Hans van Gulik points out that in the Tang Dynasty, the beauty ideal for men was generally considered more in line with *wu* characteristics, such as a buffed physique and the presence of a mustache; also, *wu* hobbies such as riding and hunting, boxing, and archery were more popular.<sup>78</sup> However, in the Song Dynasty, “the tendency of admiring *wen* and disdaining *wu* became intensified and reached a new height” and “the institutions of the examination and the bureaucracy marked the overwhelming primacy of *wen*, which had significantly shaped the Chinese notion of masculinity.”<sup>79</sup> Despite the disparity from time to time, a man who possessed

---

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p.140.

<sup>77</sup> Lau, Frederick. *Music in China: Experiencing Music, Expressing Culture*. Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 53.

<sup>78</sup> Gulik, Robert Hans van. *Sexual Life in Ancient China: A Preliminary Survey of Chinese Sex and Society from ca. 1500 B.C. till 1644 A.D.* E.J. Brill, 1974. p. 188.

<sup>79</sup> Song, Geng. *The Fragile Scholar: Power and Masculinity in Chinese Culture*. Hong Kong University Press, 2004. pp. 81-82.

both *wen* and *wu* characteristics was generally considered preferable.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, at times, *wen* might be associated with the elite, and *wu* with non-elite, creating a hierarchy.<sup>81</sup>

### **Pre-Modern Chinese Culture in Modern and Contemporary China**

For the purpose of this paper, pre-modern China will be the equivalent of dynastic China, referring to the period of the Qing Dynasty and everything prior to that. Modern China refers to the Republican era (1912-1949), and contemporary China refers to the period since the establishment of the PRC (1949 to present). The attitude towards pre-modern Chinese culture in modern and contemporary times has been far from constant and uncontested. In the Republican era, Chinese intellectuals who embraced the West and denounced the East were quite influential. In particular, they were dissatisfied with China's backwardness and felt that China's pre-modern culture was the primary reason that led to this backwardness. For example, Confucianism, along with Buddhism and Taoism, were all denounced in favor of Western notions of science and democracy. Furthermore, a few notable intellectuals, such as Lu Xun (魯迅) and Hu Shi (胡適), carried out concrete measures to denounce pre-modern Chinese culture—the former produced striking literary works and associated pre-modern Chinese culture with cannibalism, while the latter abandoned the usage of literary Chinese even in the highest form of literature—poetry—and advocated for the usage of colloquial Chinese.

The hostility towards pre-modern China continued after the establishment of the PRC. Prior to the reform era, although science and democracy were largely replaced by socialism, Marxist-Leninism, and Maoism, the denunciation of pre-modern Chinese culture never stopped. The pre-modern Chinese society was considered “feudal”; manuscripts of classical Chinese

---

<sup>80</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, pp. 143-145.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

literature as well as cultural artifacts, including temples and shrines, were destroyed in various Maoist campaigns. Even in the 1970s, the Maoist campaign “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” (批林批孔) still highlighted the denunciation of pre-modern Chinese thoughts and culture, as the attack on “political dissident” Lin Biao was connected to the seemingly unconnected Confucius.

In the reform era, although previously banned pre-modern Chinese literature and culture were generally allowed to re-emerge, the primary concern of the regime did not involve the revival of such culture because they were focusing on the Four Modernizations (四個現代化) and the advancement of the Chinese economy. The governing ideological backdrop can be defined by Deng’s “Four Basic Principles” (四個基本原則), in which the society should still be guided by socialist, Maoist, and Marxist-Leninist ideologies. The capitalist mode of economics combined with the socialist mode of societal morality quickly proved to be unrealistic, as the voices of the dissidents became louder and louder. As a result, the CCP faced the “three belief crisis” (三信危機) coming from the people, which included people’s “crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the party.”<sup>82</sup> Although the government took measures to jail dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng (魏京生) and Fang Lizhi (方勵之) who supported pro-democracy movements in order to combat the dissident voices, the crisis eventually culminated in the 1989 student demonstration and the June Fourth Incident,<sup>83</sup> as Zhao points out that “[t]he Tiananmen Incident could be seen as a result of the bankruptcy of the official ideology.”<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> Wang, Zheng. *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. Columbia University Press, 2014. p. 92. Chen, Jie. “The Impact of Reform on the Party and Ideology in China.” *The Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 4, no. 9, 1995, p. 27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670569508724221>.

<sup>83</sup> Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 2014, p. 92.

<sup>84</sup> Zhao, Suisheng. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford University Press, 2004. p. 288.

With the bankruptcy of the official socialist and Maoist ideology, the state was in need to quickly construct an alternative ideology in order to grant them continued legitimacy. As a result, they adopted nationalism to replace socialism, though Zhao calls it “pragmatic nationalism,” referring to nationalism as being “essentially contextual, without a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content.”<sup>85</sup> However, this kind of nationalism precisely draws its pride in pre-modern Chinese society, tied to the term “rejuvenation” (復興) to (re)evolve “China’s history and historical memory” and to “restore China to that former position and glory.”<sup>86</sup> With this change in the government’s ideology, nearly one hundred years of denunciation of pre-modern Chinese culture and thoughts were finally re-recognized and valued. Before, the notion of *wen* and *wu* in describing masculinity was understandably not utilized, since it is associated with Confucius’ thoughts. However, with the reintroduction of Confucius’ thoughts, the notion of *wen* and *wu* can certainly be applied to Jay Chou’s China Wind, as it emerged at least a decade after the change in governing ideology.

### **Lyrical *Wen* in Jay Chou’s China Wind**

In terms of China Wind lyrics that evoke the sense of *wen*, the style is reminiscent of classical Chinese poetry, resulting in a very poetic sense. While the theme still often centers on romance, the poetic lyrics and the traditional Chinese characteristics eradicate the decadence and vulgarity associated with romance. First, all *wen* China Wind lyrics were written in quasi-classical Chinese style, meaning that it is not strictly classical Chinese but strongly evokes the sense of it. This constructs the notion of high-culture versus colloquial Chinese in most pop song lyrics by evoking the hierarchy of literature between vernacular literature and poetry.

---

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>86</sup> Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 2014, p. 129.

Another distinctive feature of China Wind *wen* lyrics is the imitation of classical Chinese poetry, especially the usage of certain keywords and rhetoric.<sup>87</sup> In the song “Fade Away” (煙花易冷), lyricist Vincent Fang points out that he used at least one rhetorical device for every single line except two.<sup>88</sup> Most other pop songs indeed contain the use of rhetorical devices, but not to the extent of Fang, and are generally limited to simile and metaphor.<sup>89</sup> In contrast, Fang uses a myriad of rhetorical devices; some are highly literary, evoking a highly poetic sense. For example, in “Hair Like Snow,” Fang used seven types of rhetorical devices: “imagery, hyperbole, rhetorical question, metaphor, personification/objectification, conversion, and synecdoche.”<sup>90</sup> For example, the usage of conversion (轉品) is highly literary and poetic, as it involves the modification of the parts of speech. In this song, many of such were utilized; in particular the adjective “淒美,” which can be translated as “the beauty of melancholy,” an already highly literary word is not used as an adjective but as a verb. Another example is the simultaneous use of personification and conversion. In the phrase “the bronze mirror reflects innocence” (銅鏡映無邪), “innocent” is an adjective and used as a noun—innocence,<sup>91</sup> and “innocence” is a concept that cannot be reflected in a mirror, hence the utilization of personification. From the examples of highly sophisticated rhetoric, it is clear that a portion of Jay Chou’s China Wind lyrics captures the image and sentiment of literary scholars, intellectuals, and poets in pre-modern China. All of these highly embody the notion of *wen* masculinity, replacing the image of feminine *wenrou* male in *gangtai* ideology.

---

<sup>87</sup> Fang, *The Blue and White Porcelain*, 2008, p. 3. Fang, Wenshan [方文山]. 天青色等煙雨 [*Tianqingse Dengyanyu; The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*]. Hunan Wenyi Chubanshe, 2019. p. 22

<sup>88</sup> Fang, *The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*, 2019, p. 33.

<sup>89</sup> For example, see non-China Wind lyrics mentioned in this paper, especially by Teresa Teng and Jacky Chung that are “*gangtai*” in terms of ideology.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>91</sup> Chinese lacks inflectional morphology unlike English, in which the adjective innocent can be changed to noun innocence. Thus, Chinese “無邪” is just an adjective and only has one spelling. Using it as is but as an adjective is considered a rhetorical device.

Besides the highly sophisticated use of rhetorical devices, the direct or indirect reference to classical Chinese poetry is also a significant part of *wen* lyrics in Jay Chou's China Wind. This aspect constructs an alternative imagery compared to non-China Wind songs that, as Lin points out, "focuses on an imagined past that is ancient and sophisticated,"<sup>92</sup> which adds to the poetic sense of the lyrics and the notion of *wen* masculinity. For example, the song titled "East Wind Breaks" (東風破) already had multiple references to classical Chinese literature. As lyricist Vincent Fang points out, the title was first inspired by Song Dynasty poet and lyricist Su Shi (蘇軾) and Tang Dynasty poet Li Shangyin (李商隱).<sup>93</sup> In particular, in the last line of Su's lyrics *Butterflies Love Flowers—Spring Farewell* (蝶戀花·送春), "the east wind blows and breaks thousands of strands of tears, and the second line of one of Li's untitled poems, "the east wind is listless, yet hundreds of flowers wither," left a deep impression on Fang, and thus influenced the title of the song.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, the three-character song title strongly evokes the sense of the Song Dynasty's "tune patterns" (詞牌), even though it is not a real one, but simply a popular music lyrics.<sup>95</sup> Diving into the lyrics, such evocation of classical Chinese literature and usage of keywords continues. In the same song, the line "after you leave, wine warms up memories and longing becomes thin" is also inspired by Song Dynasty lyricist Li Qingzhao (李清照)'s lyrics *Like a Dream* (如夢令), in which the context and imagery of the lyrics and the poem were similar—both protagonists are in a slightly drunk state and longing for someone.<sup>96</sup> The reminiscence of classical Chinese literature through direct and indirect reference again captures the notion of *wen*, specifically classical Chinese poets.

---

<sup>92</sup> Lin, *Questions of Chineseness*, 2018, p. 82.

<sup>93</sup> Fang, *The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*, 2019, pp. 7-8.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. Original Chinese are: "東風吹破千行淚" and "東風無力百花殘." The title of the poems referenced the translation of Owen, Stephen. *An Anthology of Chinese Literature: Beginnings to 1911*. W.W. Norton, 1997. The translation of the texts is the author's own translation, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Beyond the references to classical Chinese poetry, certain usage of keywords and objects functions semiotically to construct “an imagined past that is ancient and sophisticated” and “imagined cultural China.”<sup>97</sup> In this construction, the notion of *wen* is once again embodied and deviates from non-China-Wind pop songs that often favor a more direct and overt conveying of emotions. By utilizing semiotics as expression, the notion of *wen* replaces the decadent and vulgar aspects of the *gangtai*-ideology. Still in the song *East Wind Breaks*, the classical Chinese instrument *pipa* (琵琶) functions semiotically like this. First, Fang points out that the *pipa* is also used widely in classical Chinese poems, hence it conveys a temporally distant sentiment.<sup>98</sup> In other words, instead of using phrases such as “a long time ago,” Fang employed the *pipa* as a semiotic keyword to convey the sense of “a long time ago” plus all the sentiments associated with the distant past. Furthermore, although Fang did not explicitly mention it, Huang points out that *pipa* has diverse associations in the society of pre-modern China, one of which is literati elites.<sup>99</sup> Hence, besides conveying the distant temporal setting, it also conveys a sense of high culture, especially combined with the “pseudo-lyrics title” from the Song Dynasty. Examples like this are abundant and similar, in fact, lyricist Vincent Fang was able to write a book titled *China Wind: The Language Games within Lyrics* (中國風: 歌詞裏的文字遊戲) based on the usage of keywords and rhetoric, in which he annotated his own lyrics and pointed out all those usages.<sup>100</sup>

Approaching from a grander perspective, the utilization of certain themes also captures the notion of *wen* masculinity. For example, the song “Preface of the Orchid Pavilion” (蘭亭序) is homonymous with Chinese calligrapher Wang Xizhi (王羲之)’s work. Also, the song “Blue

---

<sup>97</sup> Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>99</sup> Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023, p. 113. Thrasher, Alan R and Gloria N Wong. *Yueqi: Chinese Musical Instruments in Performance*. British Columbia Chinese Music Association 2011.

<sup>100</sup> Fang, Wenshan [方文山]. 中國風: 歌詞裡的文字遊戲 [*Zhongguofeng: Gecili de Wenzi Youxi; China Wind: The Language Games within Lyrics*]. Jieli Chubanshe, 2008.

and White Porcelain” (青花瓷) had a significant portion of the lyrics dedicated to the description of the different scripts in Chinese calligraphy. Chinese calligraphy in pre-modern China has always been an important aspect of *wen*. However, Louie and Edwards point out that “[c]alligraphy, because it is part of *wen* power and closely linked to masculinity, supposedly lies beyond the grasp of non-men” as there is the perceived notion that “[w]omen are regarded as lacking the inner strength required to produce powerful calligraphic forms.”<sup>101</sup> Thus, Chinese calligraphy can be seen as an artistic form that is representative of *wen* masculinity. Although both songs are love songs, utilizing this representative *wen* masculine theme avoids the decadent, bourgeois, and vulgar sentiments associated with *gangtai*-ideology love songs.

Above I have showed the four ways—use of sophisticated rhetoric, referencing classical Chinese literature, use of keywords that function as semiotics, and selection of representative *wen* masculine themes—in which lyricist Vincent Fang employed the notion of *wen* masculinity in Jay Chou’s China Wind songs. Nonetheless, all the aspects echo Lin’s description of China Wind’s “imagined past that is ancient and sophisticated.” Precisely, the imagined nature lies in the fictitious nature of the lyrics as well as the pseudo-invocation of classical Chinese literary forms. However, the imagined nature allowed Fang to selectively capture and imitate aspects of pre-modern Chinese culture, rather than launching a historical inquiry into the truths of certain aspects. This selectivity granted the (re)construction and the (re)imagination of *wen* and contrasted the feminine *wenrou* male figures and other “negative” aspects in *gangtai*-ideology pop. Thus, it is important to concretely compare the aspects mentioned above against a song that epitomizes *gangtai* ideology. Taiwanese singer and songwriter Jonathan Lee (李宗盛) and most of his songs can fittingly represent this category, as he is known as “the prince of love songs.”<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, p. 144.

<sup>102</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, p. 73.

In particular, his song “Infatuated” (鬼迷心竅) released in 1992 is highly representative of the *gangtai*-ideology, which contrasts sharply with Jay Chou’s China Wind *wen* lyrics analyzed above. The lyrics are as follows:

Once truly believing life was just going to be like this, the calm heart refused to have any more waves, the emotional strands after cutting a thousand times still cannot be severed, surrounding me hundreds and thousands of times. People ask me what’s so good about you, after all these years I still cannot forget (about you). No matter how beautiful the spring breeze is, it’s incomparable to your smile, those who haven’t seen you won’t comprehend. Whether it’d be infatuation, whether it’d be the karmic fate from past life, none of those matters anymore, if you may return to my chest. Whether it’d be destiny’s arrangement, whether it’d be your deliberate tricks, well none of those matters anymore, I am willing to follow you to the edge of the world. Although time always rushes to age people, although romance always frustrates people, although unable to know the future, is it too early to say goodbye now?<sup>103</sup>

First, even though there is use of rhetorical devices, it is not nearly as extensive or varied as the China Wind examples shown above. Also, instead of using semiotics to create sentiments, this song favors a more direct expression of emotions. This is not to say that Lee’s lyrics are less sophisticated compared to Fang’s, but rather, they construct emotional sentiments and contexts differently. While the *wen* China Wind lyrics construct an unambiguous masculinity, Lee’s song *Infatuation* is rather ambiguous and androgynous. Since the singer is also Lee, the concept of “singer’s gender figuration” (歌手的性別賦形) —referring to the gender of the singer successfully translates to the song—gives the song a masculine presence.<sup>104</sup> However, if looking only at the lyrics, lines such as “I am willing to follow you to the edge of the world” gives it a feminine sense, since it is stereotypical in Chinese culture for females to follow males around the world and take care of domestic affairs. Paradoxically, other lines, such as “no matter how

---

<sup>103</sup> The original Chinese lyrics: 曾經真的以為人生就這樣了, 平靜的心拒絕再有浪潮, 斬了千次的情絲卻斷不了, 百轉千折它將我圍繞。有人問我你究竟是那裡好, 這麼多年我還忘不了, 春風再美也比不上你的笑, 沒見過你的人不會明瞭。是鬼迷了心竅也好, 是前世的因緣也好, 然而這一切已不再重要, 如果你能夠重回我懷抱。是命運的安排也好, 是你存心的捉弄也好, 然而這一切已不再重要, 我願意隨你到天涯海角。雖然歲月總是匆匆地催人老, 雖然情愛總是讓人煩惱, 雖然未來如何不能知道, 現在說再見會不會太早。

<sup>104</sup> Lu, Zhenglan 陆正兰. 歌曲与性别: 中国当代流行音乐研究 [*Gequ yu Xingbie: Zhongguo Dangdai Liuxing Yinyue Yanjiu; Song and gender: A study of popular music in China today*]. Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2013, pp. 138-143.

beautiful the spring breeze is, it's incomparable to your smile,” give it a distinctive masculine sense, comparing the beauty of a female figure to a spring flower. It is precisely this androgynous character that captures the *wenrou* male figure, in which the male projects his vulnerability such as being infatuated and unable to move on from a failed relationship in order to resonate with female audiences. Thus, it possesses many characteristics of the *gangtai* ideology that the government dislikes, such as the *yin sheng yang shuai* phenomenon, and most importantly, the bourgeois sentiment of romance and emotions that sharply contradicts the CCP’s first socialist and now nationalistic principles.

On the other hand, even though Jay Chou’s *wen* China Wind songs are still centered on romance, the projection of emotions is not as overt as in “Infatuated” and other similar *gangtai*-ideology songs through the usage of semiotics in connection with pre-modern Chinese culture. This is in line with the “Chinese cultural ideal,” which favors a more covert expression of emotional vulnerability of men, as it “idealizes stoic endurance and emphasizes indirectness as a means to maintaining social harmony.”<sup>105</sup> Also, in “Infatuated,” the narrative is very transparent and leaves little room for interpretation, but in the *wen* China Wind lyrics, rhetorical devices and symbolisms often render an ambiguous image and audiences may interpret it in many different ways. This notion of ambiguity also evokes a sense of poetry, and the references to classical Chinese poetry certainly echo this sentiment. In other words, the *wen* China Wind lyrics resemble the high culture associated with the highest forms of literature—poetry, but “Infatuated” and other similar *gangtai*-ideology songs cannot be said the same. Also, the notion of *wen* masculinity complements Lu’s discussion on gender and China Wind, in which she argues that the remedy of lack of masculinity is exemplified through the return of representative

---

<sup>105</sup> Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow*, 2010, p. 52.

traditional female figures.<sup>106</sup> However, through the analysis of *wen* masculinity, although it is indeed the remedy for lack of masculinity, it does not necessarily come from the exemplification of traditional female figures. After all, the (re)invocation of this “sophisticated and ancient imagined cultural China” legitimized and transformed melancholy, decadence, and vulgarity that is typically associated with bourgeois sentiments into a form of high culture and masculinity with traditional Chinese sentiments.

The eradication of bourgeois sentiments and *gangtai* ideology and elevation to high culture can be consolidated through the PRC government’s implementation of certain Jay Chou’s China Wind lyrics into the Chinese subject examinations in secondary education. In 2008, the lyrics of “Blue and White Porcelain” were directly quoted in the Chinese subject of Shandong and Jiangsu Province’s *gaokao* exam, a comprehensive university entrance exam for high school seniors. The two multiple-choice questions test the students’ understanding of Chinese porcelain as a cultural artifact, the quotes of the lyrics function as a hook to the question.<sup>107</sup> Although the hook can certainly be omitted or replaced without any effect on the questions themselves, the government still included it in an attempt to “resonate” with the students. Since it is clear that the government would not actively seek to implement materials that are against the state’s ideology into education, the appearance of China Wind in *gaokao* exams revealed the state’s acceptance and interpretation of China Wind as something positive and nationalistic. Furthermore, using the lyrics as quotes also shows the government’s acknowledgment of the sophistication of the lyrics, again echoes the high-culture sentiment. More on the government’s patriotic education campaign and how China Wind fits into that will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter five.

---

<sup>106</sup> Lu, *Song and Gender*, 2013, pp. 226-229.

<sup>107</sup> College Stuff 大学那点事儿, “与歌曲《青花瓷》有关的两道高考真题, 你肯定不会 [The Two Real Problems of Gaokao Associated with the Song ‘Blue and White Porcelain,’ You Will Not Know For Sure.” *Sohu*, 6 Aug. 2017, [www.sohu.com/a/162664928\\_684602#google\\_vignette](http://www.sohu.com/a/162664928_684602#google_vignette).

## Musical and Performative *Wen* in Jay Chou's China Wind

While the notion of *wen* masculinity is exemplified in lyrics, it works in conjunction with the music for further augmentation. Musical elements in China Wind have been explored by two very recent works of scholarship—by musicologist Ya-hui Cheng and Lydia Huang. Cheng analyzes in detail the use of traditional Chinese elements, including instrumentation, harmony, rhythm, and melody vis-à-vis Western musical elements; she also uses critical theories to discuss China Wind music's cultural identity.<sup>108</sup> She positions China Wind music in the postmodern soundscape and argues that “Chinese Wind music elevates the cultural visibility of China from its birthplace to the scale of global pop. This global Chinese identity is a north star on the map for a possible dichotomy of the West and the rest of the cosmopolitan pop world to show people across the globe the place where the story of the Chinese began.”<sup>109</sup> Huang explores the musical Chineseness in China Wind music. Centering on distinctive traditional Chinese instruments, opera, cultural elements, and the pentatonic scale, she argues that “China Wind music incorporates a mix of living traditions and invented traditions to evoke an ambiguous ‘ancient’ Chineseness that fosters a sense of belonging and connects audiences from various locales to an imagined cultural China.”<sup>110</sup> This section will point out that although all those aforementioned aspects can also evoke *wen* masculinity from time to time, the musical elements merely function as an augments of lyrical *wen*.

To concisely characterize and summarize musical aspects of Jay Chou's China Wind, this paper will first coin the term *elemental infusion*, a straightforward concept describing the utilization of various genres and styles of music in Jay Chou's China Wind; it does not only

---

<sup>108</sup> Cheng, Ya-Hui. *The Evolution of Chinese Popular Music: Modernization and Globalization, 1927 to the Present*. Routledge, 2023.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>110</sup> Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023, p. iii.

apply to the notion of *wen*, but to *wu* as well. Elemental infusion, as its name suggests, refers to the infusion of various musical elements in a single song. The purpose of this concept is to avoid implications of Jay Chou's China Wind songs being regarded musically as "pop plus X" but rather pop with elements of other musical genres infused in it. This fundamental distinguishing factor is less musically significant but more ideologically significant. Then, by applying this concept to Jay Chou's China Wind, this section will examine how the notion of *wen* masculinity is constructed musically.

The musical characteristics and definitions of "pop music" are particularly difficult to summarize, as it derived from "popular music," which differentiates itself from "classical or art music, on the one side, from folk music, on the other, but may otherwise include every sort of style."<sup>111</sup> However, in popular discourse, pop is usually distinguished from other musical genres, such as rock and hip-hop. To mitigate confusion, this paper will use popular music as the umbrella term and "pop" to refer to the specific music genre. Most scholars' discussions on popular musical genres have been rightfully centered on the ideological layer rather than musical distinctions. However, in order to have a discussion on the musical construction of Jay Chou's China Wind, it is important to have a looser framework. As Frith points out, "pop becomes not an inclusive category but a residual one: it is what's left when all the other forms of popular music are stripped away."<sup>112</sup> Thus, pop becomes the "neither-nor," which can be musically represented as a combination of instruments that one may find in other music genres such as guitar, keyboard, saxophone, drum set, strings, brass, etc. As a result, the mixture typically yields an uncharacteristic character, meaning it is not distinctively rock, hip-hop, jazz, or any other popular music genres.

---

<sup>111</sup> Frith, Simon, et al. *The Cambridge Companion to Pop and Rock*. Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 94.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

However, another kind of style (or genre) emerged as a bit ambiguous, as de Kloet calls them, the “hyphenated scenes,” for example, pop-rock and pop-punk, in Chinese popular music.<sup>113</sup> He points out that they are “eager to dissociate themselves from the rock mythology and its aesthetics..... and gear their focus towards the West,” and “[i]n their desire to join the West, they focus on the present and the future rather than the past.”<sup>114</sup> This ideological description of the “hyphenated scenes” translates to another kind of musical fusion; unlike stereotypical pop songs, their identity is rather ambiguous. That is to say, characteristics of other musical genres, such as rock and funk, are more clear and overtly projected. Furthermore, the hyphenated scenes share a similar sentiment compared to rock as they confirm their authenticity against the “fake, commercial sound of pop.”<sup>115</sup> Based on the proposed framework of elemental infusion, one may point out that the “hyphenated scenes” are rock or funk music infused with pop musical elements. However, as mentioned above, pop music is regarded as the “residual,” itself a mixture, in which elements of pop music would be nearly impossible to identify. Therefore, elemental infusion can only be applied to pop music, referring to pop music with a distinctive infusion of other musical genres such as rock, hip-hop, jazz, or even folk and classical.

Jay Chou’s *wen* China Wind songs indeed incorporated the concept of elemental infusion, in which the ubiquitous utilization of traditional Chinese instruments and vocals augments the already present *wen* masculinity in the lyrics. First, the utilization of pentatonic scales in the vocal melody evokes a distinctive Chineseness. Although Huang points out that the use of pentatonic scales in China Wind songs merely resembles the Western notion of pentatonic scales

---

<sup>113</sup> De Kloet, *China with a Cut*, 2010, pp. 75-101.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

rather than the full utilization of the Chinese *wusheng* (五聲) system, and hence the melodies “are not that ancient at all,”<sup>116</sup> it can nonetheless be traced back to the *gong* (宮) and *yu* (羽) modes of the traditional Chinese *wusheng* system—it is simply a parallel that the *gong* and *yu* mode and Western major and minor pentatonic modes are identical. Through the restrained and lyrical use of pentatonic vocal melodies, songs such as “Hair Like Snow,” “East Wind Breaks,” “Blue and White Porcelain,” and “Orchid Pavilion” all evoke the notion of *wen* masculinity. However, it is important to point out that they are only the augments or the lyrical *wen*. The reason why is that the aforementioned song “Infatuated” also employs a pentatonic vocal melody, sung in a similar restrained and lyrical way. However, since its lyrics are deemed to be bourgeois, decadent, and vulgar in the PRC government’s discourse, Lee’s elemental infusion of pentatonic vocal melody did not convey a similar sentiment as Jay Chou’s *wen* China Wind songs.

Aside from the lyrical and restrained use of pentatonic vocal melodies, the infusion of certain traditional Chinese instruments also evokes *wen* masculinity. In most cases, at least one of the following traditional Chinese instruments is infused into the orchestration of the songs: *pipa* (琵琶), *erhu* (二胡), *guzheng* (古箏), and *dizi* (笛子). The use of those instruments in a song is conspicuous, but not extensive, meaning that the whole song is by no means mostly constructed by a traditional Chinese instrument set. Rather, the basic orchestration of the song still remains pop—a combination of Western instruments, and the aforementioned instruments only function as part of the background accompaniment and interlude. The interlude is arguably the most noticeable infusion of traditional Chinese instruments, as one instrument usually plays the melody of the interlude. For example, in “East Wind Breaks,” *guzheng* and *pipa* function as

---

<sup>116</sup> Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023, pp. 49-50.

part of the background accompaniment, along with electric guitar and R&B style drum set.<sup>117</sup> In the interlude and the outro, erhu takes the longing and lyrical melody, highlighting the sentiment of “sorrow of parting” (離愁) but also a sense of grace and melodiousness.<sup>118</sup> This distinctive infusion of traditional Chinese instruments evokes the sense of Chinese literati musically and therefore embodies the *wen* masculinity. Furthermore, the usage of pipa echoes the lyrics “who’s using pipa to play the song East Wind Breaks (dong feng po),” again augments the lyrical *wen* sentiments. However, the infusion of traditional Chinese instruments, just like pentatonicism, also only functions as an augmentation. Baranovitch points out that many of Teresa Teng’s songs also employ pentatonicism and infusion of traditional Chinese instruments against other typical Western instruments in pop music.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, her songs may not be musically too distinctive from Jay Chou’s *wen* China Wind songs, as many of Teng’s songs also center on a lyrical melody and lament. However, since Teng’s songs are largely bourgeois in terms of the lyrics, the elemental infusion of traditional Chinese instruments is helpless in eliminating the bourgeois sentiment. On the other hand, the similar elemental infusion goes hand in hand with the lyrical *wen* and further augments such a notion. In the next chapter, the elemental infusion will be applied to the musical analysis of *wu* and show that it also functions as an augmentation.

The notion of *wen* masculinity does not only lie within the song but also carries over to the performer, Jay Chou, in certain music videos and live performances. For example, in the music video of the song “Chrysanthemum Terrace,” during the interlude, Jay Chou was playing *guzheng* in a room decorated based on traditional Chinese aesthetics, evoking a sense of the

---

<sup>117</sup> Fang, *The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*, 2019, pp. 5-6.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>119</sup> Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 2003. p. 11.

ancient past (figure 1). Unlike *erhu*, which had a humble origin, *guzheng* had an association with the imperial



Figure 1: Screenshot from the music video of *Chrysanthemum Terrace*

court,<sup>120</sup> and is thus reminiscent of Chinese literati in the pre-modern times. Furthermore, *guzheng*, which is a type of zither, also has an ancient association with Boya—a famous Chinese musician in the Spring and Autumn period, which again heightens the association with the notion of high culture and *wen* masculinity. Huang points out that although *guzheng* had a feminine connotation and often functions as an object of desire, the music video of “Chrysanthemum Terrace” instead shows Jay Chou’s “agency and music making process.”<sup>121</sup> While this is certainly one aspect, I argue that Jay Chou’s *guzheng* playing can also be understood as a modern interpretation and construction of a traditional Chinese musician-literatus since Jay Chou’s attire in the music video is rather modern, but the rest strongly evokes the sentiments of traditional China. Hence, Jay Chou’s *guzheng* playing in the music video indeed embodies *wen* masculinity.

Another example of performative *wen* is Jay Chou’s live performance of “Orchid Pavilion” at the 2011 CCTV New Year Gala. In the performance, Jay Chou was holding a

---

<sup>120</sup> Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023, p. 102.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

traditional Chinese folding hand fan (折扇) in his right hand, and the microphone was bound to his head next to his mouth, freeing his other hand (figure 2). This setup eliminates a major



Figure 2: Screenshot from the live performance of Jay Chou at the 2011 CCTV Chinese Year Year Gala.

technological symbol that is arguably somewhat contradictory in the otherwise traditional setting, such as the traditional Chinese folding screens in the background as well as the folding fan in his hand. Furthermore, Jay Chou's free hand allowed him to produce certain gestures that evoke the sense of a traditional Chinese literatus—especially so when combined with the folding hand fan. His attire is once again modern, and combined with all those traditional Chinese characteristics, his live performance can also be seen as a modern (re)interpretation of traditional Chinese literatus, evoking a sense of *wen* masculinity.

### **Recap: *Wen* Masculinity in Jay Chou's China Wind and the PRC State**

To sum up, certain songs of Jay Chou's China Wind draw elements from pre-modern Chinese culture in the lyrics, music, and performances, which evoke a sense of *wen* masculinity. While still centering on romance as the theme of those songs, this sense replaces the feminine *wenrou* male figure that is widely present in *gangtai*-ideology songs. Also, lyrical *wen* is more

significant than musical *wen*, as elements of musical *wen* are present in other *gangtai*-ideology songs. In particular, the utilization of sophisticated rhetoric, evocation of classical Chinese poetry, the use of keyword semiotics, and cultural symbolisms all contribute to the establishment of *wen* masculinity. The musical *wen*, which is exemplified through the conspicuous infusion of traditional Chinese musical elements functions as an augmentor of the lyrical *wen*. Since similar musical characteristics of musical *wen* are also present in pop songs that embody the *gangtai* ideology, the infusion of traditional Chinese musical elements is not enough to independently project and represent the *wen* masculinity. Lastly, Jay Chou's performances in music videos and at the Spring Festival Gala connote a modern (re)interpretation of Chinese literati.

Aside from the gender counter to pop songs with *gangtai* ideology, the modern (re)interpretation of *wen* masculinity is also befitting with the PRC government's ideological backdrop. In particular, with the tide of rising nationalism, the PRC state promoted the resurgence of pre-modern Chinese culture, which includes great Chinese historical figures, Confucianism, and other religions and thoughts associated with pre-modern China.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, the three dimensions (lyrical, musical, and performative) of *wen* present in certain of Jay Chou's China Wind songs precisely fit into the government's "main melody" ideological backdrop. All three dimensions embody pre-modern Chinese aesthetics, such as classical Chinese poetry, music, and literatus figures, which translate to the alignment and encapsulation of Confucianism. Furthermore, the modern (re)interpretation of *wen* masculinity can also be seen as the integration of the government's urge for modernization. Although elements of pre-modern Chinese culture in all three dimensions are conspicuous, it is not merely a reiteration but a reinterpretation and reconstruction. For example, the sophisticated orchestration, the combination of traditional

---

<sup>122</sup> Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 2004, p. 239. Sinski, Eric Andrew. *Imagined Communities: Patriotic Sentiment Among Chinese Students Abroad in the Era of Xi Jinping*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2020. p. 75.

Chinese instruments and distinctive Western instruments such as R&B-styled electric drum and electric guitar, the modern attire combined with traditional Chinese cultural objects, and the modern Chinese language lyrics but evoking the sense of classical Chinese poetry all resonate with the government's urge for modernization while but distinctively (traditional) Chinese. In other words, the combination of the West and pre-modern China fits into both principles of nationalism and modernization. Fung points out that Jay Chou is a politically safe icon in his study of Jay Chou.<sup>123</sup> I argue that while all of the aforementioned aspects of *wen* China Wind not only echo Fung's point, they can arguably be analyzed as not only politically safe, but politically conforming and befitting of the PRC government's ideological backdrop, and can function as the CCP's propaganda.

---

<sup>123</sup> Fung, *Western Style, Chinese Pop*, 2008.

#### **IV. *Wu* and Simultaneous Possession of *Wen* and *Wu* in Jay Chou's China Wind Songs**

The last chapter examined the notion of *wen* masculinity that is present in certain of Jay Chou's China Wind songs, this chapter will focus on the other category—the songs that capture the notion of *wu* masculinity. With the notion of *wu* masculinity, some of Jay Chou's China Wind songs also convey a simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*, which is the ideal of Chinese masculinity. Furthermore, through the analysis of lyrics, music, and relevant music videos and live performances, this chapter argues that Jay Chou's *wu* China Wind songs utilize the notion of *wu* masculinity to replace the rebellious sentiment in “hard scenes,” such as rock and rap, and project a more overt nationalistic sentiment. In conjunction with the *wen* songs, Jay Chou's China Wind songs altogether encapsulate the PRC government's desired aspects and eliminate the undesired ones. Thus, Jay Chou's China Wind further consolidates its position of being politically conforming and befitting of the PRC government's ideological backdrop, which functions as unintended propaganda.

#### **Lyrical *Wu* in Jay Chou's China Wind**

The concept of *wu* is briefly mentioned in the last chapter—“a concept which embodies the power of military strength but also the wisdom to know when and when not to deploy this strength.”<sup>124</sup> In other words, the notion of *wu* masculinity is often represented by males with a buff physique and are associated with great courage and heroic spirits, such as soldiers. The lyrics of Jay Chou's *wu* China Wind songs perfectly capture this notion, setting them apart from the effeminate *gangtai*-ideology pop that typically centers on break-ups and romantic

---

<sup>124</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, p. 141.

melancholy. Also, the lyrics are politically “correct” by its overt projection of nationalistic sentiments, thus avoiding the vulgarity and rebelliousness that are present in the “hard scenes.”

First, the notion of *wu* masculinity is exemplified through the conveyance of boldness, a sense of grandeur, and heroic spirits in the lyrics. For example, in the song “Dragon Fist” (龍拳), the lyrics evoked a sense of great heroes in Chinese mythology, who possess superpowers:

...Cross the Yellow River, East! Climb to the top of Mt. Tai. I’m heading west, direct the northern wind, tinted my whole body like bronze under the sun.....My right fist opened the sky, transformed into a dragon, rearranged the mountains and rivers, and filled all the cracks. Changed the sunrise in the East, and went back to chaotic primeval times to control and dominate. My right fist opened the sky and transformed into a dragon, that great Earth’s heart is turbulent, pounding uneasily. The facial expressions of the world are only left with one kind, waiting for heroes, I’m that dragon.....<sup>125</sup>

From the selected lyrics above, it is clear that the protagonist “I” has superpowers and a sense of mission with grandeur, through keywords such as cross, climb, direct, control, and dominate. This aspect is particularly reminiscent of Chinese mythology characters such as Yu (禹) and Houyi (后羿). Yu is known as a hero for his success in controlling the world flood, as well as the founding of the first Chinese dynasty—Xia.<sup>126</sup> During the process, Yu faced great difficulties but was able to use his mythical power and physical strength to defeat numerous evil monsters.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, from the document of classical Chinese philosopher Mozi, Yu also invented armor, which is deeply associated with the notion of *wu*.<sup>128</sup> Likewise, Houyi is an ancient archer who was responsible for shooting down nine suns in the sky and thus granted humans on Earth a livable environment.<sup>129</sup> Although both characters existed at a time before the

---

<sup>125</sup> The original Chinese lyrics: “.....跨越黃河東, 登上泰山頂峰, 我向西, 引北風, 曬成一身古銅..... 我右拳打開了天, 化身為龍, 把山河重新移動, 填平裂。將東方的日出調整了時空, 回到洪荒, 去支配, 去操縱。我右拳打開了天, 化身為龍, 那大地心髒洶湧, 不安跳動。全世界的表情隻剩下一種, 等待英雄, 我就是那條龍。

<sup>126</sup> Yang, Lihui., et al. *Handbook of Chinese Mythology*. Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 236-237.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 238-239.

<sup>128</sup> Ivanhoe, Philip J., and Bryan W. Van Norden. *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*. HACKETT, 2023. p. 106.

<sup>129</sup> Yang et al. *Handbook of Chinese Mythology*, 2008, pp. 232-233.

emergence of *wen* and *wu* masculinity, the notions can certainly be reapplied to both as both are Chinese men. Through their physical strength as well as objects such as armor and archer, they both highly embody the notion of *wu*. The protagonist of “Dragon Fist” presents a similar sentiment, who is situated in a similar historical time period, has mythical power in connection with dragons, and is capable of crossing difficult terrains and direct winds, mountains, and rivers. Furthermore, the body-tinting of bronze color under the sun embodies the *wu* masculine physique, which is usually dark-skinned rather than pale. Therefore, one aspect of lyrical *wu* in Jay Chou’s China Wind is to draw reference to great Chinese mythological figures who used their physical strength and mythical power to fight off threats to the Chinese civilization. It is also important to point out that the lyrics here are much more direct and convey a sense of grandeur, which embodies the notion of *wu* masculinity because it contrasts with the often restrained and poetic sentiment typically associated with *wen* masculinity. Furthermore, the transformation of the protagonist into the powerful mythical creature that symbolizes China’s ancestral origin—dragon—also contributes to the sense of grandeur.<sup>130</sup>

Aside from the conveyance of grandeur through evoking mythical figures and powers, lyrical *wu* is also exemplified through militaristic sentiments in pre-modern times. In other words, it portrays soldiers in pre-modern conflicts. The song “Golden Armor” (黄金甲) fittingly represents this aspect:

Banners flutter in a myriad of colors, mountains pile up like peaks, the army meandering like a dragon, the aura of slaughter is like wind, the color of the blood resembles the redness of the wine. I, the General, my pride rushes like a charge, my expression fierce and ferocious, the golden armor represents loyalty, the iron rides are mighty and formidable, I move like thunder..... Blood stained the armor, I slaughter with tears, the city full of chrysanthemum, whose world is this? Above the palace, there’s war smoke with winds and sands, life and death

---

<sup>130</sup> The Dragon image refers to both Dragon as a symbol of power in pre-modern China and to the Chinese’s projection of Dragon as a symbol of their ancestral origin, a misconception that was first marketed to the West and then re-imported into China.

are just a scar from a knife..... Knives stay horizontal, horses stand upright, and see who will fall. The dialogue between love and hate, history is left behind, who is carefree amid the flying arrows?<sup>131</sup>

In this song, the protagonist resembles a military general in a conflict from pre-modern times. Instead of having mythical powers, he displays courage, loyalty, physical strength, and military prowess; all of the above captures the notion of *wu* masculinity. There are numerous figures in pre-modern China that are similar and also fit the description of the lyrics. For example, Guan Yu (關羽), from the Three Kingdom period, is often regarded as the *wu* God.<sup>132</sup> Although interpretations of historical records suggest that he is likely illiterate, his physical strength, courage, and loyalty nonetheless capture the notion of *wu* masculinity.<sup>133</sup> Also, King Wu of Zhou, who resembles the origin of the notion of *wu*, also used militaristic forces to bring civilization and peace to China.<sup>134</sup> Again, the language and tone of the lyrics are direct and convey a sense of pride of the protagonist, which embodies the notion of *wu* and contrasts the restrained nature of *wen*. Furthermore, the protagonist is not only capable of fighting, he is also, in a sense, anti-war, which reveals his humane and sensitive side. Louie and Edwards point out that *wu* is not only the resemblance of militaristic sentiment and physical strength but also the knowledge of “when and when not to deploy this strength” combined with the embodiment of the seven virtues: “suppressed violence, gathered in arms, protected what was great, established merit, gave peace to the people, harmonised the masses and propagated wealth.”<sup>135</sup> Thus, Lü Bu (呂布), also from the three kingdom period, although arguably possessed an even higher physical

---

<sup>131</sup> The original lyrics are: “旌旗如虹，山堆壘如峰，這軍隊蜿蜒如龍，殺氣如風，血色如酒紅。將軍我傲氣如衝，神色悍如兇，黃金甲如忠，鐵騎剽悍我行如轟..... 血染盔甲，我揮淚殺，滿城菊花，誰的天下？宮廷之上，狼菸風沙，生死不過，一刀的疤..... 橫刀立馬，看誰倒下。愛恨對話，曆史留下，誰在亂箭之中瀟灑？”

<sup>132</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, p. 142.

<sup>133</sup> Louie, Kam. *Inheriting Tradition: Interpretations of the Classical Philosophers in Communist China, 1949-1966*. Oxford University Press, 1986. pp. 86-87.

<sup>134</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, p. 140.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p. 142. Pulleyblank, Edwin G. "The An Lu-shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in Late T'ang China". *Critical Readings on Tang China Volume 1*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2018. pp. 518-541. [https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004380158\\_018](https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004380158_018).

strength and ability to engage in combat, is often not considered a great representation of *wu* due to his lack of righteousness, loyalty, and the seven virtues. In the lyrics, however, lines such as “I slaughter with tears, the city full of chrysanthemum, whose world is this” juxtapose with his sense of pride showing his ambivalent attitude towards the war. On the one hand, he is the general and it is his duty to be loyal to the state and fierce towards the enemies, but on the other hand, he questions the slaughtering—whether they actually embody the seven virtues—hence his tears while fighting the enemies. In this sense, the ambivalence of the protagonist even further entails the notion of *wu* masculinity, eliminating the vulgarity and pure violence that are otherwise associated with people who are militaristic and exert a great deal of physical strength.

Another aspect of lyrical *wu* masculinity is revealed through the overt displaying of physical strength and altercations while referencing Chinese martial arts accompanied with onomatopoeia terms resembling the unleashing of strength; the song “Nunchucks” (雙節棍) perfectly captures this aspect. The selected lyrics are below:

.....As their son, I've been heavily influenced by them since a young age, every knife, spear, and stick I handle with ease. What weapon did I like the most? Nunchucks's flexibility and strength. I want to go to Mount Song in Henan to learn from Shaolin and Wudang..... One horse step forward, a left hook, a right hook, someone who annoys me will be in danger..... I've opened the two channels of Ren and Du, (what for what for), the signage of “sick men of Asia,” (what for what for), has already been kicked aside by me! Hurry and use the nunchucks, heng heng ha hei, hurry and use the nunchucks, heng heng ha hei. Those who practice martial arts must remember: that benevolent people are invincible, who's practicing Tai Chi? The wind rises and the water ripples. Hurry and use the nunchucks, heng heng ha hei, hurry and use the nunchucks, heng heng ha hei. If I have the lightness skill, I will leap over eaves and walk on walls, being straightforward and unyielding when dealing with people, full of righteousness, heng!<sup>136</sup>

To begin, the protagonist in the lyrics is clearly well-acquainted with numerous martial arts weapons, not only nunchucks. Beyond the weapons, key terms such as *Shaolin* and *Wudang*,

---

<sup>136</sup> The original lyrics are: “他們兒子我習慣，從小就耳濡目染，什麼刀槍跟棍棒，我都耍的有模有。什麼兵器最喜歡，雙截棍柔中帶剛，想要去河南嵩山，學少林跟武當.....一個馬步向前，一記左勾拳，右勾拳，一句惹毛我的人有危險.....我打開任督二脈，幹什麼，幹什麼，東亞病夫的招牌，幹什麼，幹什麼，已被我一腳踢開！快使用雙截棍，哼哼哈兮，快使用雙截棍，哼哼哈兮，習武之人切記，仁者無敵，是誰在練太極，風生水起。快使用雙截棍，哼哼哈兮，快使用雙截棍，哼哼哈兮。如果我有輕功，飛檐走壁，為人耿直不屈，一身正氣，哼！”

which signify the two Chinese schools of martial arts, the former under Buddhism while the latter represents Daoism.<sup>137</sup> Also, he clearly engages in physical altercations when encountering something dissatisfying, and the disruption “what for, what for” (幹什麼, 幹什麼) functions as the manifestation before the eruption of violent physical altercations. However, the dissatisfaction is not interpersonal, but rather, comes from the insult to China and Chinese culture. Thus, the protagonist used the notion of *wu* masculinity to defend China and Chinese culture, which projects a nationalistic sentiment. Furthermore, the action of kicking aside the sign of “sick men of Asia” in particular references a famous Hong Kong-American martial artist and actor—Bruce Lee (李小龍), who kicked and broke signs of “sick men of Asia” in numerous martial artist films. Rather than merely exerting physical force, the protagonist's principle of benevolence also echoes the seven virtues of *wu*. Combined with nationalism, they altogether eliminate the potential vulgarity and pure violence, and show the protagonist's sense of righteousness to fight for a good cause, which even more accurately embodies the notion of *wu* masculinity. Lastly, the usage of onomatopoeia such as “heng heng ha hei” further contributes to the sentiment of physical exertion and altercation. Such a usage is actually quite common, and can also be seen in other *wu* lyrics such as “Golden Armor” and “Fearless.”

The accurate embodiment of *wu* masculinity and the nationalistic sentiment also eliminate the rebellious attitude and vulgar sentiment that are often associated with rock and hip-hop. For example, Chinese hip-hop group In3 (阴三儿)'s song “Beijing Evening News Journal” (北京晚報) does not possess the feminine *wenrou* male image, instead, it can be seen as quite masculine. However, masculinity is revealed through patriarchal and misogynistic

---

<sup>137</sup> Lorge, Peter. *Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge University Press, 2011.

sentiments that involve the overt sexualization of women, not to mention the explicit language in the lyrics and the overall complaining and dissident attitude toward Chinese society:

.....Beijing Evening News Journal, some looking for marriage some advertise, but in actuality, it's just bragging and wanting to fuck. Beijing Evening News Journal, so many people act like a dumbass at home and cannot fall asleep, I don't want any of that. Beijing Evening News Journal, some drink alcohol, some take drugs to get high, like to have sex, and don't like to wear condoms..... Beijing Evening News Journal, some sleep in the underpass, some use funds to eat and drink, the state will write it off..... Beijing Evening News Journal, the bitch's ass is not high enough, wanting to become a celebrity must first be fucked by the director.<sup>138</sup>

Although this song may not render the feminine male figure and arguably situates very low on the *gangtai*-ideology spectrum, masculinity is projected through vulgar language and behavior with direct exposure to sex and controlled substances. Combined with the portrayal of a decadent, unjust, and rather chaotic society, the songwriter is clearly dissatisfied with the government. Therefore, such masculinity cannot possibly be supported by the state in attempts to mitigate the *gangtai wenrou* male figure. Jay Chou's *wu* China Wind songs, on the other hand, mitigate such vulgarity by referencing pre-modern Chinese heroes and soldiers, even mythical figures that present a sense of righteousness and grandeur. Also, the justification for violence is for nationalistic causes—against people who insult China—rather than for being drunk, high, or for the sake of girls as portrayed in In3's "Beijing Evening News Journal."<sup>139</sup> Thus, Jay Chou's *wu* China Wind songs not only counter the *gangtai wenrou* male figure but also substitutes vulgarity with righteousness and nationalistic sentiments to represent masculinity. Likewise, rock songs usually resemble masculinity; as De Kloet points out "[r]ock is a gendered domain. Its aesthetics—such as the leather jackets, motorcycles, screaming voices, and aggressive poses—

---

<sup>138</sup> The original lyrics are: 北京晚報, 有人徵婚有人打廣告, 其實就是吹牛逼和想操。北京晚報, 太多的人在家裏犯傻逼都睡不著, 我根本不要。北京晚報, 有人喝酒有人吃high藥, 喜歡散德行還不愛帶套..... 北京晚報, 有人睡地下通道, 有人公款吃喝, 國家給報銷..... 北京晚報, 妞的屁股不夠翹, 相當明星那都得先被導演操。

<sup>139</sup> The reasons for violence in Beijing Evening News Journal—drunk, high, or for the sake of girls—are not shown in the above selected lyrics due to space constraints, but are indeed revealed in other parts of the lyrics.

predominantly signifies the masculine.”<sup>140</sup> However, it is also “subcultural, rebellious and (counter) political.”<sup>141</sup> The righteousness and nationalistic sentiments in Jay Chou’s *wu* China Wind songs also eliminate those attitudes of rock.

### **Musical and Performative *Wu* in Jay Chou’s China Wind**

Besides the lyrics, musical elements can also evoke a sense of *wu* masculinity. First, the use of percussive instruments greatly enhances the sense of grandeur. In “Dragon Fist” and “Fearless,” the Chinese drum has a substantial presence in the intro before the formal introduction of other instruments. Since drums can typically produce a much louder sound compared to other instruments and can therefore be heard at a further distance, they are commonly employed in military battles, such as Chinese *zhangu* (war drums). The militaristic association of drums and the sense of grandeur are also echoed in popular discourse, in which the page on “Chinese drum culture” on *Baidu Baike* (the Chinese equivalent of Wikipedia) claims that Chinese drums can symbolize Chinese people’s heroic spirit (豪邁的氣概) and function as the spiritual power of unification and growth.<sup>142</sup> More specifically, in “Dragon Fist,” the opening of the song contains a two-bar drum solo with a combination of quarter notes, eighth notes, and sixteenth notes with syncopation. Then, another type of drum enters with another pitch instrument, the percussion forms a uniform sixteenth note ostinato with the first type of drum playing a crescendo tremolo leading to every emphasized first beat. Not only drums are

---

<sup>140</sup> De Kloet, *China with a Cut*, 2010, p. 104.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>142</sup> Baidu Baike contributors. “中國鼓文化 [The Culture of Chinese Drums].” *Baidu Baike*, Web. 10 Jun. 2024. The above statement from the *Baidu Baike* page did not cite any sources, which likely implies that it is the contributors' own associations and understandings with Chinese drums. Also, such associations and understandings are generally agreed upon by the masses, if they significantly deviate from the general understanding, it would have been revised by others. Furthermore, the associations with Chinese drums on the *Baidu Baike* page are approved by the PRC government, otherwise, it would not have been shown and remain. All of this points to the popular understanding and association of Chinese drums in connection with the notion of *wu* masculinity, which is also tied to the sense of grandeur and militaristic sentiments.

associated with the notion of *wu* masculinity, but the particular opening usage of the percussive instruments is reminiscent of a war scene in the pre-modern times, further projecting *wu* masculinity. The opening two bars of drums evoke the sense of war drums used on the battlefield, once the playing becomes more unitary with more drums incorporated, it musically portrays the scene of thousands of chariots participating in the war. Likewise, the opening of “Fearless” employs a similar formula, and it’s also more extended—the first twenty-five seconds of the song only contains a variety of drums with no other instruments. The first four bars contain two identical drum solo phrases, representing the beating of war drums, and then a variety of drums enter—grand yet uniformitarian—reminiscing highly of a war scene. Aside from the Chinese drum presence in the prelude of the two example songs above, the general usage of drum sets is more conspicuous and complex in other *wu* China Wind songs. In *wen* China Wind songs, the presence of drum sets usually only highlights the beats with few syncopated variations. In *wu* China Wind songs, they typically contain more complex rhythms such as more complicated and ubiquitous syncopation. For example, in “Nunchucks,” drum sets constitute a significant part of the song, rather than merely highlighting the beats, giving the song a more rhythmic feeling. This is especially noticeable in the chorus as the drum set arguably became the main instrument and the only other instrument present in the chorus—the electric guitar only plays an eighth note ostinato.

The concept of elemental infusion is also useful in discussing certain musical *wu* elements in Jay Chou’s China Wind. Instead of infusing traditional Chinese instruments as seen in *wen* songs, Jay Chou’s *wu* China Wind songs infuse elements from rock and hip-hop, two musical genres that are typically known for their masculine presence. For example, the aforementioned songs “Dragon Fist” and “Nunchucks” are entirely in rap style.

Instrumental-wise, both songs utilized distinctive hip-hop and rock elements, such as the aggressive presence of electric guitar and drum set seen in rock, as well as the disk-stretching sound of hip-hop. Hence, musically, Jay Chou's *wu* China Wind songs resemble the hyphenated scene—rap rock. However, while traditional Chinese instruments mentioned in the last chapter may evoke the sense of Chinese literati and therefore the notion of *wen* masculinity, hip-hop, rock, and the instruments or sound associated with them cannot be traced back to pre-modern Chinese society because they are neither Chinese nor pre-modern. Thus, hip-hop, rock, and the combination rap rock should be understood as a modern reinterpretation of *wu* masculinity. The masculinity associated with hip-hop and rock comes from a Western perspective, which Louie and Edwards summarized as the notion of “‘macho man’, whose power is made manifest in brute physical strength and unerring silence.”<sup>143</sup> This notion of Western masculinity can certainly be applied to rock and hip-hop, such as the harshness of the music, achieved by coerced vocal and loudness of electric guitars and drum sets in rock and the forceful vocal and highly rhythmic composition of hip-hop. Even though the notion of Western masculinity cannot be directly applied in the Chinese circumstance, the notion is nonetheless similar to *wu* masculinity because both share the emphasis on the sense of machismo.<sup>144</sup> In this sense, the infused elements of rock and hip-hop are a modern reinterpretation of *wu* masculinity, and more specifically, the harshness of electric guitar and drums can be understood as a representation of strength and buffed physique, while sounds such as hip-hop disk scratching reminisce the sound of swords and spears wielding and clashing in pre-modern warfare—all of which musically embodies the notion of *wu* masculinity.

---

<sup>143</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, p. 138.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

Just like musical *wen*, musical *wu* also functions as an augmentor of lyrical *wu* for the same reason as musical *wen* mentioned above—namely, the parallel of musical aspects found in *gangtai*-ideology songs. For example, the aforementioned song “Born to Be Wild” can also be analyzed musically as an elemental-infusion pop song—with the infusion of rock elements such as the significant presence of electric guitar and drum set. However, the song is deemed “unhealthy” to the Chinese population, which suggests that its usage of electric guitars and drum sets was not considered as musical *wu*, but rather, a sense of peculiarity and perhaps rebelliousness because of its lust-inciting lyrics. Therefore, musical *wu* is legitimized and recognized only with the presence of lyrical *wu*, which eliminates the vulgar and dissident sense that is typically associated with rock and hip-hop. In other words, lyrical *wu* in combination with nationalism in the lyrics transformed the ideology of rock and hip-hop—from vulgar and rebellious to the association of *wu* masculinity.

Aside from lyrical and musical *wu*, the notion of *wu* masculinity is also found visually in some of the music videos and live performances. One aspect of performative *wu* is the incorporation of martial arts as the theme of the music videos. For example, in the music video of “Fearless,” fight scenes highlighting Chinese martial arts and weapons are ubiquitous throughout the video. The setting of the music video is at the end of the Qing Dynasty, where China was bullied by Western imperial powers and was unable to fight back. In the music video, however, the Chinese hero used martial arts and defeated a white man, which showcased the superiority of *wu* masculinity and overtly projected Chinese nationalism. The whole MV contains two storylines—one represented by the Chinese hero in the Qing dynasty, and another by Jay Chou dressed in traditional Chinese clothes. Both realities evoke the sense of *wu* masculinity.

The MV opens with the Qing Dynasty storyline; the protagonist who bears a Manchu queue and wears distinctly Chinese clothes showcases the various Chinese martial arts movements and strokes (figure 3). Then, the storyline between the Qing Dynasty and Jay Chou,



Figure 3: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.

who represents a modern and reinterpreted *wu* masculinity, alternates throughout the MV. In the storyline of the Qing Dynasty, the protagonist mainly showcases his martial arts skills along with Chinese weapons against two types of enemies—one represented by a group of fellow Chinese people, another represented by a Westerner. On multiple occasions, the protagonist single-handedly defeats the group of Chinese people with bare hands (figure 4) as well as the Western opponent using Chinese weapons (figures 5 and 6).



Figure 4: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.



Figure 5: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.



Figure 6: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.



Figure 7: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.

Also, the protagonist very notably shows a polite attitude towards his Western opponent after defeating him, while the Westerner shows his dissatisfaction and frustration towards the protagonist (figure 7). Combined with the extensive showcasing of physical strength in combating enemies, the protagonist exemplifies the notion of *wu* masculinity not only through his ability to engage in physical combat but also through the sense of politeness and righteousness. These senses arguably eradicate the potential negative associations with *wu* such as vulgarity and unsophistication.

In the storyline of Jay Chou, he showcases *wu* masculinity through a combination of modern dance moves and hip-hop gestures, as well as martial arts, while wearing distinctively Chinese clothing, in black, with golden dragon printings. He has two types of presence in the

MV—one dancing with a group of men dressed identically, another appearing by himself in a room decorated with distinctive pre-modern Chinese cultural elements. Although he does not engage in physical combat, the movements of his dance are abrupt and harsh, and his hand gestures include holding fists and karate chops which evoke a sense of martial arts. Hence, the dance moves can be understood as a modern reinterpretation, rather than an accurate representation of Chinese martial arts that nonetheless evokes the notion of *wu* masculinity (figure 8).



Figure 8: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.

In solo appearances, he demonstrates *wu* masculinity through two aspects—hip-hop gestures and the use of Chinese weapons (Figures 9 and 10). As mentioned above, hip-hop can be seen as a musical representation of *wu* masculinity; likewise, hip-hop’s performative gestures are representative of performative *wu*. As opposed to *wen* masculinity, where hand gestures tend to be more subtle and smooth while avoiding direct pointing as seen in the live performance of “Orchid Pavilion,” hip-hop gestures are much more direct, abrupt, and pointy. Towards the end of the MV, Jay Chou starts to showcase the Chinese weapon *sanjiegun* (三節棍), the same weapon the other protagonist used to challenge his Western opponent. Thus, the MV of *Fearless* utilizes two distinct storylines to evoke *wu* masculinity. One involves the direct showcasing of

Chinese martial arts in the Qing Dynasty to defend China against imperial power, the other is a modern performance by Jay Chou drawing from elements of hip-hop and Chinese martial arts, as well as traditional Chinese cultural elements such as clothing and decor.



Figure 9: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*. Figure 10: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.

The formula combining hip-hop and Chinese martial arts is not unique to the MV of “Fearless,” as it is quite common in music videos and performances of other Jay Chou’s *wu* China Wind songs as well. For example, the MV of “Nunchucks” employs a similar formula to highlight *wu* masculinity. Although the setting is in contemporary times and Jay Chou is dressed in a tank top, he nonetheless uses nunchucks and defeats both a Westerner and a group of Chinese gang members to defend a female character. At other times, he stands in an enclosed room full of Chinese characters while performing and gestures in hip-hop style. Furthermore, the style and the theme of the MV as well as Jay Chou’s hairstyle directly reference Bruce Lee; with all the elements combined, the MV highly encapsulates the notion of *wu* masculinity. Likewise, in Jay Chou’s live performance of “Dragon Fist” at the 2004 CCTV New Year Gala, he also combined hip-hop dance moves and gestures with Chinese martial arts moves. In this performance, Jay Chou’s attire is completely contemporary, even reminiscent of hip-hop clothing. Most of his performances centered on hip-hop as well, through very distinctive gestures and movements (figure 11). However, during one of the interludes, he started to showcase martial arts movements, including a flip (Figures 12 and 13). The setting of the performance is

particularly crucial—a performance organized and fully controlled by the PRC state. Thus, the performances are extremely unlikely to contradict the ideology of the PRC government; in fact, they should be fully supported by the state. Hence, the hip-hop elements in Jay Chou’s performance demonstrate his sanitization of a rebellious music genre, and instead, shows his successful harnessing of the positive aspects. In this case, hip-hop masculinity has some parallel with the notion of *wu* masculinity; therefore, hip-hop in Jay Chou’s performances functions as a projection of *wu* masculinity rather than the representation of vulgarity and rebelliousness.



Figure 11: Screenshot of live performance of *Dragon Fist*.



Figure 12: Screenshot of live performance of *Dragon Fist*. Figure 13: Screenshot of live performance of *Dragon Fist*.

### Simultaneous Possession of *Wen* and *Wu* in Jay Chou's China Wind Songs

Aside from projecting the separate notion of *wen* and *wu*, Jay Chou can simultaneously possess *wen* and *wu*, which is the masculine ideal of China. To begin, his various *wen* and *wu* songs mentioned above can already be seen as the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu* because he is clearly capable of embodying both forms of masculinity. However, sometimes within a single song, the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu* can occur, which strongly represents the Chinese masculine ideal. For example, both the musical elements and the MV of “Fearless” embody the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*. Although the music is distinctly rap-rock, Jay Chou incorporates two passages in the pre-chorus imitating a female role of Peking opera (京劇) —dan (旦). One of the most representative traditional Chinese performing art genres, Peking opera originally prohibited female performers, and thus female roles were all performed by men in crossdress; Chinese historian Andrea Goldman calls them “boy actresses.”<sup>145</sup> However, even though the performers embody the notion of femininity, the genre itself and the culture surrounding it are unambiguously associated with arts and literature, as well as literati culture, and connoisseurship,<sup>146</sup> which clearly connect to the notion of *wen* masculinity. Therefore, rather than considering the incorporation of the dan role of Peking Opera in “Fearless” as a feminine gesture, one may also regard it as the projection of *wen* masculinity through the evocation of high culture. Considering the primarily martial arts-themed song, the incorporation of Peking Opera infused the notion of *wen* into the otherwise harsh and machismo song. This is especially prominent in the last chorus as the orchestration simultaneously

---

<sup>145</sup> Goldman, Andrea. *Opera and the City: The Politics of Culture in Beijing, 1770-1900*. Stanford University Press, 2012. p. 18. Xu, Chengbei, and Gengtao Chen. *Peking Opera*. China Intercontinental Press, 2003. p. 63.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

combines the rap in the chorus and the Peking opera passage, thus capturing the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*. To further consolidate this notion, during the Peking opera passage in the MV, Jay Chou transitions from dancing in a group to sitting in a distinctly Chinese room alone while holding a Chinese hand fan (figure 14). Although the singing undoubtedly references Peking opera, the MV does not do so. Instead, even though Jay Chou still wears the same attire as when he was dancing, he is transformed into a character who embodies the *wen* as he fans the



Figure 14: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.

hand fan, his hand gestures no longer pointy and direct. As a result, it is more appropriate to regard the incorporation of Peking opera as projecting *wen* masculinity rather than revealing femininity. Furthermore, later in the MV, the dance troupe as well as Jay Chou hold the Chinese hand fan while dancing. As a result, the singing combined with the MV exemplifies the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu* masculinity. Another example of the incorporation of Peking opera can be found in Jay Chou's live performance of "Dragon Fist" at the 2004 CCTV New Year Gala. The original song does not have any Peking opera elements, but for the arrangement of the live performance version, Jay Chou added four measures of Peking opera vocals at the end of the interlude, before the second chorus, which adds a sense of *wen* in this otherwise fully *wu* masculine song.

Music videos of some other songs also demonstrate the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*, even though the lyrical and musical aspects only embody one notion. For example, the MV of “Blue and White Porcelain” primarily themes physical combat, even though the song embodies *wen* masculinity in terms of lyrics and music. More specifically, the MV does not seem to fit the narrative of the songs because the song captures the romantic laments of a Chinese literatus against the background of pre-modern Chinese societies, yet the MV shows the protagonist engaging in altercations with a group of gang members to defend his female lover, which clearly evokes the notion of *wu* masculinity. Using musicologist Nicholas Cook’s framework, the relationship between the MV and the song itself can be categorized as either complementation or contest.<sup>147</sup> It is contested because of the disparity between the aforementioned *wen* and *wu*, but also because of certain emotional disparities. For example, the interlude after the first chorus contains a lyrical melody played by the strings and the flute, ending with a half cadence (V7/V→V) in preparation for the A Major tonic chord at the beginning of the second verse. Since the harmonic progression leads to a major cadence, the emotions associated with the interlude can be generally regarded as optimistic and positive. However, the MV during the interlude shows the heartbreaking moment of the protagonist as his enemy has just killed his lover in front of him (figure 15), which illustrates the contested relationship.

---

<sup>147</sup> Cook, Nicholas. *Analysing Musical Multimedia*. Clarendon Press, 1998. p. 99.



Figure 15: Screenshot from the music video of *Blue and White Porcelain*.

For the most part, the relationship between the MV and the song falls into the category of complementation. In the first half of the MV, the narrative primarily shows the protagonist's lover being abducted by a group of gang members, and he goes to the base of the gang in an attempt to save his lover. Although he manages to defeat the gang members using his physical strength, which captures the notion of *wu* masculinity, his lover is still murdered by the head of the gang. The first half of the MV can indeed be analyzed as a contest due to the disparity of *wen* and *wu*, but the narrative between the MV and the song is not contradictory, but rather distinctive. In other words, the MV and the song narrate two different stories but do not contradict each other. Likewise, the second half of the MV shows the reincarnated protagonist and his lover coincidentally meeting at a lavish porcelain auction site and re-invoking each others' memories of their previous life. However, the female's current partner finds out about this and instructs one of his subordinates to murder the protagonist in front of his lover. Again, the narrative of the second half of the MV is distinctive from the narrative of the song, which results in their relationship of complementation. It is precisely the combination of the contesting and complementing relationship between the song and the MV that allows the song as a whole (considering all aspects—lyrical, musical, and performative) to simultaneously possess the notions of *wen* and *wu* masculinity. In other words, the narrative of the MV offers an alternative reality, granting the representation of the Chinese masculine ideal.

The song “Red Dust Inn” (紅塵客棧) is another example of a song that simultaneously possesses both qualities, in which the lyrics evoke the notion of *wu* while it musically resembles the notion of *wen*. As lyricist Vincent Fang points out, in many instances, the lyrics attempt to paint a picture from *wuxia* (武俠) novels,<sup>148</sup> a type of Chinese fiction centered on battles, chivalry, martial arts, and outlaws. Also, to him, the lyrics are reminiscent of a *wuxia* novel but in the form of lyrics.<sup>149</sup> Hence, they capture the sense of lyrical *wu*. However, the music clearly embodies the notion of *wen* through the overall slow tempo and the use of traditional Chinese instruments such as *guzheng* and *erhu* in a lyrical way, combined with the mostly pentatonic melody and the lack of highly rhythmic motifs as well as rock or hip-hop elements. Using the *wuxia* example provided by Louie and Edwards, the lyrics of “Red Dust Inn” can be represented by the character Wu Song (武松) from the *wuxia* novel *Water Margins* (水滸傳), who’s “famed for his drunken slaughter of a tiger,” and the music can be represented by Wu Yong (吳用) from the same novel, known “for his strategic acumen.”<sup>150</sup> Combined together, the song exemplifies the Chinese masculine ideal—the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*, which can be represented by Song Jiang (宋江).<sup>151</sup>

### **Recap: *Wu and Simultaneous Possession of Wen and Wu Masculinity in Jay Chou’s China Wind and the PRC State***

This chapter has demonstrated how certain of Jay Chou’s China Wind songs represent the notion of *wu* masculinity to substitute for the Western rebellious masculinity associated with rock and hip-hop. The lyrics of *wu* China Wind songs primarily use keywords that are associated with

---

<sup>148</sup> Fang, *The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*, 2019, p. 143.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>150</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994, p. 138.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

pre-modern Chinese warfare, martial arts, and physical combat to show off the protagonist's physical strength. To mitigate vulgarity, a sense of righteousness, nationalism, and tender emotions is revealed to accompany physical strength for a more authentic representation of *wu* masculinity. Like *wen* China Wind songs, musical *wu* also functions as an augments of lyrical *wu*—the musical composition that evokes the sense of *wu* masculinity cannot function alone without lyrical *wu*. More specifically, the use of percussion, especially Chinese drums, is reminiscent of pre-modern Chinese warfare. Also, the infusion of rock and hip-hop elements projects the masculinity associated with those two genres, which is more in line with *wu* masculinity, albeit without the vulgarity and dissident sentiments as lyrical *wu* mitigated them. In addition, Jay Chou employs *wu* elements such as martial arts in MVs and live performances. Like the lyrics, they do not merely showcase the protagonist's unparalleled physical strength but are always tied to the bigger backdrop of nationalism and righteousness, such as defending China against foreign powers and defending females against gang members. Those aspects again heighten *wu* masculinity and mitigate vulgarity and unjustified violence.

The simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu* in certain of Jay Chou's China Wind songs embodies the Chinese masculine ideal. This aspect is the most prominent in the music videos, in which both *wen* and *wu* elements were utilized to convey the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*. Furthermore, some music videos have an alternative narrative that is complementary or sometimes even contests the narrative of the lyrics. In this case, some lyrical *wen* songs are accompanied by a protagonist who primarily embodies the notion of *wu* masculinity. Thus, the dual narrative of the song allows the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*. Lastly, although not common, lyrical and musical elements can each represent one kind of masculinity; combined together, they represent the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*.

While the *wen* China Wind songs are able to counter the feminine *wenrou* male figure of *gangtai*-ideology pop songs, *wu* China Wind songs eradicate the rebellious and vulgar sentiments that are typically associated with rock and hip-hop. Through lyrical *wu*'s emphasis on nationalism and the sense of righteousness, *wu* China Wind songs are able to construct *wu* masculinity to complement *wen* China Wind songs and thus function as a counter to the typical rock and hip-hop songs. In other words, nationalism and righteousness in the lyrics and the MVs sanitized rock and hip-hop thus allow prominent musical elements from rock and hip-hop to be infused into the songs without direct association with rock or hip-hop ideologies that the PRC state does not endorse. Instead, the infusion of musical elements from rock and hip-hop retains the aspect of masculinity associated with the two genres, and with the aid of lyrical *wu* and performative *wu*, augment the notion of *wu* masculinity. Furthermore, many *wu* elements combined with the sophisticated infusion of rock and hip-hop elements are also in line with the PRC state's ideological backdrop of nationalism and modernization. As a result, Jay Chou's China Wind songs solve the "masculinity crisis" faced by the PRC state by tracing back and aligning with traditional Chinese notions of masculinity and employing them to construct the Chinese masculine ideal.

## V. Jay Chou's China Wind and PRC Consumers

The two previous chapters have primarily analyzed Jay Chou's China Wind songs and how they represent traditional Chinese notions of masculinity and fit into the CCP's grand ideological discourse which gained endorsement from the state. This chapter, on the other hand, will analyze why Jay Chou's China Wind songs greatly appeal to the PRC audiences, and argue that Jay Chou's China Wind songs function as a mediator between the PRC state and the audiences, allowing them to form a symbiotic relationship.

In the reform era, popular music in the PRC has been, in a sense, beyond the control of the government. Although the leniency and lack of control could be deliberate, it nonetheless shows that popular music is largely contradictory with the government's ideology, and the songs endorsed by the government are not well received by the PRC audiences. On the one hand, the tremendously popular *gangtai*-ideology pop songs are deemed bourgeois; on the other hand, the other somewhat popular genre—rock—has been regarded as dissident. In other words, although *gangtai*-ideology pop is largely apolitical and will likely not trigger politically dissident movements, it cannot be endorsed by the state because it is largely contradictory with the socialist ideology. Likewise, even though rock embodies the masculine figure the *gangtai*-ideology pop typically lacks, it also could not be supported because of its rebellious and vulgar sentiments. The government endorsed *tongsu* music because it is in line with the government ideological backdrop; however, it is quite unpopular among the mass audience. There are two interconnected reasons for the disparity—one, Chinese audiences are tired of socialist control, especially the decade-long Cultural Revolution, hence their rebellious attitude towards songs that embody the socialist sentiment;<sup>152</sup> second, the rising individualism among the

---

<sup>152</sup> Zhang et al, *Chinese contemporary popular music's dissemination and perception*, 2016, p. 4.

people, especially youths, focuses more on the self while rejecting collectivist sentiments.<sup>153</sup> However, Jay Chou's China Wind songs break the disparity by precisely carving a boundary that themes on the state and the people's mutual interest while packaged in a way that appeals to young Chinese audiences and does not trigger the government's taboos.

### **Nationalism, National Humiliation, Modernization, and the *Bawuhou* Generation**

While the socialist discourse can no longer penetrate the people, the newly invented nationalism gained tremendous success, and Jay Chou's China Wind songs capture the nationalistic discourse that both the CCP and the people embrace in a sophisticated way. First, it is important to clarify that people's lack of faith and abandoning of socialism revealed through the consumption of popular music should not be regarded as people's dissatisfaction or rebellious attitude towards the CCP. Rather, it should be considered as only the ideological disparity with regard to socialism, since, as I have pointed out elsewhere, other aspects of government ideology such as modernization seem to align with the people, also seen through the popular music consumption in the reform era.<sup>154</sup> For example, the production process of Western and pop music from Hong Kong and Taiwan represents capitalism, such as the sophisticated and professionally trained personnel who are responsible for crafting every aspect of the artists and their songs—from photography and lyrics to composition and make-up, etc. This aspect is in line with Deng Xiaoping's governing ideology on developing the economy. Moreover, the more sophisticated production of songs outside of mainland China symbolizes modernity, which is also in line with Deng's Four Modernizations, especially in the sector of science and technology.

---

<sup>153</sup> Yan, *The Chinese Path to Individualization*, 2010. Also, I have examined this aspect in an unpublished paper titled *My Romantic Songs: Chinese Individualization Seen Through Mandopop*.

<sup>154</sup> In one of my unpublished papers titled *Gangtai Pop's Reflection of Deng's Ideological Principles in Reform Era China*.

Therefore, borrowing Baranovitch's framework again, the relationship between the people and the PRC government in the reform era, through the consumption of popular music, can be understood as ambivalent.

As mentioned above, the Tiananmen Incident led to the changing discourse from socialism to nationalism.<sup>155</sup> In order to carry out this transition, one of the most important methods is through the patriotic education campaign. As political scientist Zheng Wang points out, the patriotic education campaign positioned China as a victim of foreign powers, primarily centering on the century of humiliation, rather than hanging onto the Maoist victor narrative.<sup>156</sup> As a result, “‘education on national humiliation’ (*guochi jiaoyu*)—has become one of the most important subjects in the national education system.”<sup>157</sup> This campaign “officially started in 1991, it was not carried out full-scale until August 1994;”<sup>158</sup> thus, it really affected people who were born after 1985, since they were in elementary school when the campaign was carried out full-scale. In China, generations are usually divided by decades, such as the *balinghou* generation, literally meaning “after eighty,” which refers to people who are born after 1980. The generation divide usually occurs by the decade, so the generation after *balinghou* would be called *jiulinghou*, literally meaning “after ninety” and refers to people who were born after 1990. Hence, although people who were born in the 1990s are also born after 1980, they have their own designation; likewise, people who are born between 2000 and 2010 have their own as well—*linglinghou*. However, using this already constructed generational divide is less effective in attempting to decide the affected generation of the patriotic campaign. Thus, breaking this boundary and creating the label *bawuhou*, referring to the population born after 1985 is more

---

<sup>155</sup> Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 2014. Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 2004.

<sup>156</sup> Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 2014, pp. 95-104.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

useful and less arbitrary. Furthermore, for the purpose of this paper, the *bawuhou* generation will refer to the generation that is influenced by the full-scale patriotic education campaign and does not necessarily have a decade divide. Since Jay Chou's China Wind songs are primarily concentrated in the middle and later half of the first decade of the 21st century, it's also pointless to consider the population that was born after that. Hence, the *bawuhou* generation entails the generation that is influenced by the patriotic education campaign, and also consumers of Jay Chou's China Wind songs. Both the starting and ending of this generation do not have to be precise, but should function as a refutation for the *balinghou* or *jiulinghou* generation. The cut-off, based on the reasoning above, could be roughly identified as 2005, as the population born after that arguably already missed the China Wind craze.

All of Jay Chou's China Wind songs can arguably be identified as promoting the nationalistic discourse, but some go one step further and are directly in accordance with the education on national humiliation, even more precisely in line with the PRC government's ideological input. For example, in the music video of "Fearless," Chinese martial arts is highlighted through the defeat of the white man, which can be seen as revenge for the national humiliation. It is especially apparent since the setting of the MV is the end of the Qing Dynasty, the appearance and the defeat of the white man clearly reference national humiliation by Western imperial powers. There is a saying in Chinese that "before practicing *Wushu* (Chinese Martial Arts), [one must] acquire relevant etiquette first."<sup>159</sup> According to the etiquette, one must offer the appropriate salute in martial arts performances and competitions, in which the Chinese protagonist performed the stick-holding (持棍禮) and weapon-delivering salute (遞械禮), while the Westerner did not (figures 7 and 16).<sup>160</sup> Thus, the Westerner's arrogant and frustrated attitude

---

<sup>159</sup> Li, Yingkui [李英奎]. 《长拳》 [*Changquan; Long Fist*]. Beijing tiyu daxue chubanshe, 2022. p. 2.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8, 13.

not only portrayed him as lacking in rites and rituals but also simultaneously elevated the Chinese victor for being righteous and courteous, which aligns with the “courteous and righteous nation” (禮儀之邦) narrative of China. The defeat combined with the belittling of the Westerner arguably grants satisfaction to the *bawuhou* generation. Since the century of national humiliation education dichotomized China versus the others, especially Western imperial powers; defeating the Westerners both in terms of physical combat as well as rites and rituals can convey a sense of pride in connection with strong Chinese nationalism. Similarly, the song “Nunchucks” employs a similar narrative of showcasing Chinese pride while denouncing Westerners. Specifically, it did so by referencing Bruce Lee, who symbolizes the Chinese man who possesses a sense of righteousness and can defeat Westerners in physical combat and hence disapprove the label “sick man of Asia” created by the West to describe Chinese people— “the signage of ‘sick men of Asia,’ has already been kicked aside by me!”<sup>161</sup> Evoking Bruce Lee as a figure combined with the keywords related to martial arts as well as the song title—Nunchucks indeed fits into the narrative of national humiliation and China’s counter to that—using Chinese martial arts to defeat Westerners in physical combat to showcase superior physical strength of Chinese people.



Figure 16: Screenshot from the music video of *Fearless*.

---

<sup>161</sup> The original Chinese lyrics: “東亞病夫的招牌, 已被我一腳踢開!”

Another example is the song “Chinese Herbal Manual” (本草綱目); part of the lyrics specifically denounces the xenophilia phenomenon and advocates for traditional Chinese culture:

If Hua Tuo is still alive, idolizing foreign things will all be cured. Foreigners come to learn Chinese, evoking my national consciousness.....Look at me grabbing a handful of Chinese medicine, consuming a dose of pride.....Let me create a folk remedy, only to cure your internal wound of pandering to foreigners. The Han recipe that has been rooted for thousands of years, has the power that others don't know.<sup>162</sup>

Notably, Hua Tuo (華佗) is a Chinese physician from the Three Kingdoms period, known as “the first doctor to use systemic anesthesia in medical history” as well as the “surgical inventor.”<sup>163</sup>

This reference in the lyrics precisely captures China's glorious past and is especially powerful against the domination of Western medicine in contemporary times. Emphasizing China's past glory is in accordance with the government's ideology of rejuvenating (復興) China, which translates to “their determination to restore themselves to their former position and glory.”<sup>164</sup>

Likewise, the *bawuhou* generation is likely to embrace China's past glory because it offers a sense of pride against the backdrop of national humiliation education; they are also on board with China's rejuvenation and wish China “to be *fuqiang* (富強) —prosperous and strong.”<sup>165</sup>

The more overt line directly connecting Chinese medicine and the sense of pride once again captures the nationalistic discourse on emphasizing China's past glories. Also, the fictitious plot that “foreigners come to (China) to learn Chinese” again showcases the pride of being Chinese. It is important to note that foreigners in the lyrics are *waibang* (外邦), literally meaning “outside group” instead of *waiguo* (外國), literally meaning “outside nation/country”; the latter is used in contemporary times when referring to modern nation-states. Such a usage to indicate foreigners

---

<sup>162</sup> The original Chinese lyrics: 如果華陀再世, 崇洋都被醫治, 外邦來學漢字, 激發我民族意識..... 看我抓一把中藥, 服下一帖驕傲..... 讓我來調個偏方, 專治你媚外的內傷, 已扎根千年的漢方, 有別人不知道的力量。

<sup>163</sup> Zhang, Yuqi. “HUA Tuo: The First Neurosurgeon in the World.” *Brain and Neuroscience Advances*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, p. 71, [https://doi.org/10.18679/CN11-6030\\_R.2015.008](https://doi.org/10.18679/CN11-6030_R.2015.008).

<sup>164</sup> Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 2014, p. 237.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*

points out that the setting is in pre-modern China, as the concept of nation-state is not yet established. In pre-modern times, especially during the Tang Dynasty, China being one of the world's most advanced civilizations indeed had various tributary states. Evoking this glorious past contrasts sharply with the contemporary times in which English, rather than Chinese, is used as the lingua franca. Thus, having foreigners come to China and learn Chinese also reveals the discourse emphasizing China's past glory and hence "raises the protagonist's national consciousness."

Another interesting aspect of the song "Chinese Herbal Manual" is revealed through the reference to *hanfang* (漢方) and *pianfang* (偏方) in the lyrics. Han clearly refers to the Chinese majority ethnicity—the Han ethnicity, in which *hanfang* in the lyrics translates to the method, or the recipe of Han. On the other hand, *pianfang* literally means the "deviated method/recipe," and typically refers to folk remedies based on natural ingredients that are not clinically and scientifically verified. In other words, it is closely tied to Chinese medicine and contrasts with Western medicine. Taken together, the lyrics also disrupt the domination of Western medicine by showcasing the power of Chinese medicine: "it has the power that others do not know." The "others" (別人) in the lyrics reinforce the "China" versus "foreign" dichotomy while using Han to denote China calls for the unification of Chinese people by referencing the shared majority ethnicity. Furthermore, the lyrics claim that "pandering to foreigners" (媚外) is an internal wound (內傷), and can be cured by the *pianfang*. Although the song denounces this behavior, it nonetheless characterizes it as a kind of wound that can be cured by the Chinese folk remedy. Therefore, the lyrics are not blaming Chinese people who pander to foreigners but rather sympathetic about them by using the wound metaphor; it is also plausible to believe that the wound is given by the foreigners, and the Chinese people were infatuated by them—hence being

wounded by the foreigners. This is another instance where traditional Chinese culture comes to the rescue to combat contemporary Western domination. After all, the lyrics of the song “Chinese Herbal Manual” showcase certain aspects of pre-modern Chinese culture to evoke a sense of pride by highlighting the past glory of China. By doing so, the song simultaneously challenges contemporary Western domination such as Western language and medicine. Such utilization of Chinese nationalism not only fits the narratives of the PRC state but can also resonate with the *bawuhou* generation because of the patriotic education campaign.

While “Chinese Herbal Manual,” “Nunchucks,” and “Fearless” all showcase Chinese cultural pride in denouncing or defeating Westerners in the land of China, the lyrics and the music video of “Double Blade” (雙刀) bring Chinese nationalism to the Chinese overseas community. The narrative of the MV is similar to “Fearless” —the Chinese protagonist uses his superior fighting skills to defeat non-Chinese enemies; however, instead of defeating China from Western imperial powers as seen in “Fearless,” the Chinese protagonist (Jay Chou) in “Double Blade” is in the United States to fight against gang members who have bullied and kidnapped his younger brother. Though approaching from the grand narrative, the bullied and kidnapped young boy symbolizes the entire overseas Chinese community that faces bullying by non-Chinese communities. Lyrically, the song only paints an ambiguous image of a protagonist wielding a double blade to fight against enemies; certain keywords such as “Tang costume” (唐裝) are sprinkled in to convey a sense of Chineseness. However, a few crucial lines combined with the music video clearly convey the message that the song is about advocating and taking revenge for the Chinese overseas community that has been bullied: “the last generation’s solution is to smile

rather than fight back, the Tang costume dampened by rain, that sigh is very oriental, I cannot stand dignity being injured and the family in such a devastating state.”<sup>166</sup>

First, it is important to clarify that there are two videos associated with this song—one is the “official music video,” the other the “official movie version,” which is a short film. The MV features the entire song, and the shots were taken directly from the film, although with many deleted scenes and dialogues for the sake of brevity and emphasis on the actual song. On the other hand, the song functions more as background music in the film. For the purpose of comprehensiveness, this section will analyze the film rather than the MV. To begin, the plot and character choice denounce foreigners and foreignized Chinese people. The foreignized Chinese is the younger brother of the protagonist; the foreignized elements are seen through his use of English to the protagonist—Jay Chou until Jay Chou starts to speak Chinese to him. Also, his comment to a female friend of Jay Chou, “she has a nice ass,” signifies the sexualization of women in a capitalistic society, which translates to a bourgeois sentiment. After he runs off, he is beaten up and kidnapped by the Latino gang and remains powerless throughout the film without any reappearance after being rescued by Jay Chou. Such a plot shows that foreignized Chinese people are often bullied by the culture and community that they admire, and advocates that Chinese people should stay culturally “authentic,” like the protagonist Jay Chou. On the other hand, this plot simultaneously ridicules the foreigners—represented primarily by the Latino gang members. The gang members, mostly with buffed physiques, chose to bully and beat up a pre-adolescent boy who is less than half of their physical size (figure 17), which seems quite preposterous, despicable, and in a sense, cowardly; their act is also befits the Chinese idiom “bully the soft, afraid of the hard” (欺軟怕硬).

---

<sup>166</sup> The original lyrics: “上一代解決的答案是微笑不抵抗, 被雨淋濕的唐裝那股嘆息很東方, 我看不慣尊嚴受傷 家族如此不堪。”

The plot's featuring Latino gang members, rather than white gang members, also casts light on the Chinese nationalistic discourse. In "Fearless," as well as the national humiliation education, China primarily antagonized the Western and Japanese imperial powers that invaded



Figure 17: Screenshot from the short film of *Double Blade*.

and brought humiliation to China. The Latin Americans, on the other hand, seem to not have any close relationships with China. Thus, the selection of Latino gang members rather than white gang members underlines two things. First, it strengthens the "China versus others" dichotomy, in which China antagonizes not only past imperial powers but any other non-Chinese communities too. Second, it reinforces the racist stereotype—the heavy association between drugs and the Latino community. Racism, in this sense, is effective in bringing to the fore friction and conflicts among communities, which again strengthens the nationalistic discourse and the "China versus others" dichotomy. In addition, the selective representation of the United States can also be seen as a denunciation of the West. With rampant gang activities, trash-filled streets, lack of police presence, and the sexualization of women among the gang members, the film portrays all the negative aspects of a capitalistic bourgeois society. Such a representation is also for the sake of projecting Chinese nationalism, as it disrupts the image of the "developed world"

of the United States, and hence possibly alters the mindset of Chinese people who admire the “West.”

The main narrative—the protagonist’s possession of *wu* masculinity and his ability to defeat non-Chinese enemies to highlight Chinese nationalism, does not need to be stressed again, as it is nearly identical to “Fearless.” However, Chou’s selective usage of Chinese and English as well as the Chinese cultural elements in the plot also interestingly points to showcasing Chinese pride. As Ngugi proposes, “[e]very language has two aspects. One aspect is its role as an agent that enables us to communicate with one another in our struggle to find the means for survival. The other is its role as a carrier of the history and the culture built into the process of that communication over time.”<sup>167</sup> Also, language is “the collective memory bank of a people.”<sup>168</sup> Borrowing from this framework, Jay Chou’s use of English to communicate with his female American friend is for the purpose of intelligibility to carry on a conversation. Later, when his younger brother talks to him in English, he responds in Chinese. The use of Chinese emphasizes the fact that although he is in the “home base” of English, he still undoubtedly prefers his mother tongue; it can also be seen as a correction for his foreignized younger brother and an instruction for him to preserve his mother tongue. Even though the younger brother’s use of English is in the United States, Ngugi’s framework, especially the second role of language, can nonetheless still be borrowed for the little boy to represent the foreignized and repressed Chinese community in the United States. Therefore, the young boy’s use of English to Jay Chou is a form of cultural erasure and abandonment of native culture, and English can still be seen as the oppressor’s language. More interestingly, when Jay Chou later confronts an Asian member of the gang,

---

<sup>167</sup> Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. *Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms*. J. Currey, 1992. p. 30.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*. James Currey, 1986.

although his American friend is beside him, he speaks Chinese to demand the whereabouts of his younger brother, instead of English. In this instance, intelligibility is not prioritized, as it is uncertain whether the Asian member is Chinese or can understand Chinese. Rather, the use of Chinese shows Jay Chou's assertion of dominance combined with the projection of cultural pride and his non-conformist attitude towards oppression. The characterization between protagonists and antagonists once again reinforces the narrative of Chinese nationalism. In particular, the female American friend of Jay Chou is friendly and interested in Chinese culture—revealed through her suggestion to Jay Chou to go to the “Wudang concert.” As mentioned before, Wudang is one of the two most prominent Chinese martial arts schools, it undoubtedly carries Chinese cultural pride. On the other hand, all the antagonists, regardless of their race, expressed no interest in Chinese culture.

Musically, “Double Blade” also offers an interesting insight regarding Chinese nationalism, and specifically the PRC discourse on Chinese ethnic minorities. In the intro, the first twenty-five seconds of the song is part of a Tibetan folk song, sung in the Tibetan language. Afterward, the songs transformed to rock style with hip-hop elements in terms of the orchestration, which made up most of the song. The PRC government's narrative has always claimed that Tibet “is an inalienable part of China's territory” and that Tibetans are one of the fifty-five ethnic minorities of China.<sup>169</sup> Also, “[t]he CCP has claimed that China is a united nation with many nationalities due to the ‘outgrowth of the historical development of the past several thousand years,’ that China is a ‘big fraternal and cooperative family composed of all nationalities,’ and that the ethnic minorities ‘formed with Han Chinese a single, unbreakable

---

<sup>169</sup> “100 Questions Answered about China's Tibet.” *Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN*, 9 Apr. 2008, [un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/gyzg/xizang/200804/t20080409\\_8410884.htm](http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/gyzg/xizang/200804/t20080409_8410884.htm).

unit' due to historical, cultural and economic reasons."<sup>170</sup> Given the context and the message of the song regarding Chinese nationalism, the seemingly unrelated incorporation of this Tibetan folk song reveals that Tibetan culture is part of China's culture. In other words, since the song is about how the Chinese fight against bullies and oppressors in other countries, the incorporation of the Tibetan folk song suggests that the Tibetans are also part of the bullied and the oppressed since they are part of the PRC. This fits with the CCP's governing ideology with regard to ethnic minorities and consolidates the CCP's attitude towards the multi-ethnic construction of the "imagined community" of China.<sup>171</sup>

Referring back to the lyrics, it is clear that "the last generation's solution is to smile rather than fight back" refers to early Chinese immigrants in foreign countries who were oppressed and bullied. Since the film is set in the United States, examples such as the Chinese Exclusion Act, exploited Chinese railway workers, and the massacre of Chinese miners all appropriately capture the sentiment expressed in the lyrics. Therefore, if the story in the MV occurred in the "last generation," the protagonist would likely be humiliated to rescue his brother by begging. The next line, "the Tang costume dampened by rain, that sigh is very oriental," is crucial in capturing national humiliation sentiments. The Tang Dynasty arguably represents a high point in Chinese civilization, characterized by the developed society and the presence of numerous tributary states; thus the Tang costume connotes Chinese cultural pride. However, the dampened state of the costume diminishes such a connotation. Also, the use of "oriental" in this instance is arguably pejorative because it is used to describe a sigh. It can be connected both to the Western representation of the Orient and to insulting descriptors for China common in the West, such as

---

<sup>170</sup> Zang, Xiaowei. *Ethnicity in China: A Critical Introduction*. Wiley, 2015. p. 24. Hyer, Eric. "China's Policy towards Uighur Nationalism." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2006, pp. 76-77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000600738731>. Zang, Xiaowei. "Ethnic Minorities." *Understanding Chinese Society*, Routledge, 2016, p. 129, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315689043-15>.

<sup>171</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, 1983.

“the sick man of Asia.” After all, it represents the non-action and the inability to fight back when facing Western oppressors during the century of national humiliation. Combined with the wetted Tang costume, this line metaphorically and concisely captures the century of national humiliation. The last line, “I cannot stand dignity being injured and the family in such a devastating state,” signifies the rising Chinese nationalism and China’s ability to fight against enemies as a powerful nation-state in contemporary times. This is exemplified in the film, in which the protagonist defeats numerous foreign gang members in a foreign country by himself using superior combat skills. Therefore, the three lines of the lyrics combined with the film fully capture the nationalism and national humiliation narrative that both the PRC state and the *bawuhou* generation have embraced. As a result, Jay Chou’s China Wind songs such as “Double Blade” point to the forming of a symbiotic relationship between the PRC state and the *bawuhou* generation consumers.

Aside from the shared embrace of nationalism between the PRC state and the *bawuhou* generation consumers, modernization is also adored by both of them, and Jay Chou’s China Wind captures this aspect as well. For example, the music and music video production of Jay Chou’s China Wind songs directly reflect the call for the modernization of science and technology. The aforementioned concept—the elemental infusion of modern pop music genres from the West such as R&B combined with the the infusion of traditional Chinese instruments—successfully created a cutting-edge sonic experience that was unprecedented in C-pop history. Also, most of Jay Chou’s China Wind music videos break away from the karaoke style and instead offer a more sophisticated production combined with innovative characteristics. The music video of “Dragon Fist” published in 2002 is a good example, as it makes extensive reference to Japanese manga in combination with traditional Chinese martial arts. The

incorporation of Japanese manga adds a sense of modernity and cosmopolitanism to the otherwise archaic representation of Chinese martial arts (Figures 18 and 19). Besides that, many other music videos, such as “East Wind Breaks,” present Jay Chou in an alternative setting from the main pre-modern storyline, usually dressed in modern clothing while lip-synching the lyrics. As a result, modernity is revealed through the present reality—singing in the song—while the narrative is in the imagined distant past. In faster tempo songs (i.e., *wu* China Wind songs), such as “Fearless” and “Golden Armor,” the alternative reality of Jay Chou is presented through group dancing along with the music. A more prominent example similar to the one mentioned above is



Figure 18: Screenshot from the MV *Dragon Fist*, showing the traditional scene of martial arts.



Figure 19: Screenshot from the MV *Dragon Fist*, showing the Japanese manga influence.

the MV of “Blue and White Porcelain,” in which the concept of reincarnation comes to represent modernity. More specifically, instead of plotting the MV entirely in the distant past, the second half of the MV features the reincarnated protagonists in contemporary times. Lastly, Jay Chou’s incorporation of hip-hop gestures and movements is extensive in many China Wind music videos. His first China Wind song— “Wife”—published in 2000 is a perfect example. Although the scenes in the background are distinctively Chinese, Jay Chou’s attire and gestures evoke the sense of a hip-hop artist, which adds a sense of modernity and innovation. As a result, from the perspective of the mutual interests shared by the PRC government and the *bawuhou* generation, Jay Chou’s China Wind presents a product that captures these mutual interests—modernization and nationalism—allowing the consumers and the government to form a symbiotic relationship.

### **Nationalism Plus Love, and the Idol Persona**

While Jay Chou’s China Wind captures the shared interests of the PRC government and the *bawuhou* generation consumers, it still possesses characteristics that youthful consumers adore in popular music; namely, the theme of love in the songs and the idol persona. Scholar of Chinese literature Liu Jianmei, in her work *Revolution Plus Love*, examines the “revolution plus love” formula that was employed by numerous Chinese authors in the twentieth century.<sup>172</sup> In Jay Chou’s China Wind songs, especially *wen* songs, although revolution is replaced by nationalism, the same formula is carried over. With this formula, Jay Chou’s China Wind songs effectively resonated with the youthful audience on their individual romantic desires and fantasies. This aspect is crucial, as it is proven by the successful *gangtai*-ideology pop songs due to the rebellious attitudes towards the repressive socialist society prior to the Open-Door Policy. In

---

<sup>172</sup> Liu, Jianmei. *Revolution plus Love: Literary History, Women’s Bodies, and Thematic Repetition in Twentieth-Century Chinese Fiction*. University of Hawai’i Press, 2003.

other words, Jay Chou did not force the imagined cultural China and the collective nationalistic discourse onto the youthful consumers, but rather, consumers may still find individual desires in those songs. Love by itself is not a taboo, not even in the socialist era, since novels such as *Song of Youth* (青春之歌) by Yang Mo (楊沫), published in 1958, still employed the “revolution plus love” formula.<sup>173</sup> It is instead only the bourgeois notions of love such as intense and overt desires, including the sexualization of females, that contrast dramatically with CCP’s socialist discourse, hence their rejection of it. However, Jay Chou’s China Wind songs that contain romantic notions are first, not expressed in an overtly intense manner, and second, conveyed under the backdrop of “imagined-cultural China,” which is precisely the “nationalism plus love” formula. For example, the songs usually combine romantic sentiments with pre-modern Chinese cultural elements and sceneries, such as the lyrics of “Blue and White Porcelain”:

The plantain outside of the window attracted rain storm, the door knocker attracted verdigris. But when I passed the small town in the sunny south (Jiangnan) I annoyed you. In the painting of the splashed-ink landscape, you disappear from the dark ink. The sky light shade of blue waiting for misty rain, and I’m waiting for you.<sup>174</sup>

In this excerpt, the romantic desire is vaguely conveyed, as it even lacks romantic keywords such as love. Also, pronouns such as “me” and “you” are tightly combined with Chinese cultural elements such as the door knocker (門環), the sunny south (江南), and painting of the splashed-ink landscape (山水畫). As lyricist Vincent Fang points out, more than eighty percent of popular music is related to emotions, while love and romance feature in the majority of emotion-focused songs. Thus, an important aspect is to use personal pronouns in connection with depictions of scenery to convey clear emotions and narrative; lacking it would likewise lack

---

<sup>173</sup> For more detailed discussions regarding romance, desire, and sexuality related to this novel, see Liu, *Revolution plus Love*, 2003. And Wang, Ban. *The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth-Century China*. Stanford University Press, 1997.

<sup>174</sup> The original Chinese lyrics: 簾外芭蕉惹驟雨，門環惹銅綠。而我路過那江南小鎮惹了妳。在潑墨山水畫裡，妳從墨色深處被隱去。天青色等煙雨，而我在等妳。

the resonance from the audience.<sup>175</sup> Therefore, romance is utilized and sanitized by Chinese cultural elements to effectively bring those elements to consumers. As a result, it becomes a product that youthful and individualistic consumers in the early twenty-first century can resonate with, as well as an indirect propaganda for the CCP that is befitting of their ideological agenda.

Jay Chou's idol persona is another way to resonate with the youth consumers besides the utilization of romance; this idol persona eradicates the otherwise collective nationalistic discourse and instead promotes individualism, which the young consumers embrace. Rather than employing romance as seen in *wen* China Wind songs, the *wu* China Wind songs' lyrics and music videos portray Jay Chou as the main character with a sense of grandeur. First, the lyrics of *wu* songs prioritized the extensive use of the first-person pronoun "I." Furthermore, the "I" in the lyrics usually presents himself as a towering figure that is capable of many things, which evokes the idol and main character image as well as the protagonist's aura. For example, the lyrics of "Master Chou" perfectly capture this sentiment:

My one kick sends the clusters of red hawthorns with crystal sugar flying, my one punch punches away scenes of memories scattered in the moonlight..... I can give you an autograph for you to dream..... Standing in the horse stance I do not move, when it's boring, anxious, and tired I wear a kung fu suit. I do not sell tofu (tofu tofu tofu), the thing I learned in martial arts school is called kung fu (kung fu kung fu kung fu)..... I barely extend my fists and feet, you already rolled to the borders..... I am standing right on your shoulders.....<sup>176</sup>

In this selected passage of lyrics, the main character's aura is presented through Jay Chou's victorious stance and hyperbolic but magnificent physical capabilities in physical combat. Simultaneously, the sense of Chinese cultural pride—kung fu—functions as the backdrop of the sublime characterization of Jay Chou, making him the idol. Wang points out that

---

<sup>175</sup> Fang, *The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*, 2019, pp. 37-38.

<sup>176</sup> The original Chinese lyrics: 我一腳踢飛一串串紅紅的葫蘆冰糖, 我一拳打飛一幕幕的回憶散在月光..... 我可以給你們一張籤名照拿去想像..... 紮下馬步我不搖晃, 悶了慌了倦了我就穿上功夫裝。我不賣豆腐(豆腐) 豆腐(豆腐), 我在武功學校裡學的那叫功夫 功夫(功夫) 功夫(功夫)..... 我稍微伸展拳腳, 你就滾到邊疆..... 我就踩在你肩膀。

in the 1990s, the PRC state viewed youth worshipping celebrities as idols as an unhealthy phenomenon.<sup>177</sup> However, the idols that young consumers worship are primarily singers who embrace *gangtai* ideology. Hence, worshipping those idols presents a threat to the PRC state, as those consumers may listen to celebrities who greatly deviate from the CCP's governing ideology. Jay Chou, on the other hand, does not present the same threat, despite the similar idol characterization, because of the sense of Chinese cultural pride as the backdrop. Furthermore, it is perhaps even a positive phenomenon for the CCP if the young consumers worship Jay Chou as the idol, since Jay Chou can function as effective propaganda and translate boring political discourse into popular culture for consumers to absorb. Not only does "Master Chou"'s lyrics reflect Jay Chou's persona as a "healthy" idol, other examples such as the aforementioned "Dragon Fist," "Fearless," and "Golden Armor" also reflect a similar persona.

Certain music videos further consolidate this "healthy" idol characterization. For example, in the MV of "Dragon Fist," Jay Chou clearly differentiates himself from the rest of the martial arts practitioners through his different attire, as well as through showcasing his physical combat skills (figure 20). The standout characterization of the MV certainly deviates from the discourse of collectivity and presents Jay Chou as an idol. Likewise, other music videos, such as "Double Blade" and "Master Chou," present Jay Chou in a "solo versus multiple" setting and are distinctively victorious. His idol persona and main character aura once again echo Fung's claims of Jay Chou as a safe political icon as well as his embrace of cool culture.<sup>178</sup> But beyond that, those aspects also suggest that he is not only politically safe but also politically "correct," as they fit with the CCP's governing ideology. The coolness is employed to resonate with the youthful audience, which functions as indirect yet effective propaganda for the PRC state.

---

<sup>177</sup> Wang, *Contemporary Chinese city popular music*, 2009.

<sup>178</sup> Fung, *Western Style, Chinese Pop*, 2008. pp. 74-77.



Figure 20: Screenshot from the MV *Dragon Fist*.

## VI. Concluding Remarks: Jay Chou's China Wind, Mainland Chinese Consumers, and the PRC State

This thesis has examined the relationship between Jay Chou's China Wind songs in terms of their lyrics, music, music videos, and live performances vis-à-vis mainland Chinese consumers and the PRC state, all in an attempt to examine the change in the attitude of the CCP in regard to songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan and to explain why Jay Chou's China Wind songs are tremendously popular in mainland China. In the second chapter, this thesis interrogated the usage of the term *gangtai* in describing a style of C-pop songs. From the CCP's various attitudes towards different songs produced in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as Chinese music streaming platform ranking systems, it is clear that *gangtai* is represented ideologically rather than geographically. From there, state-produced literature and the flooding of yellow music in China positioned "*gangtai*" music as antagonistic towards the PRC state narrative and the CCP's governing ideology.<sup>179</sup> Through examinations of representative songs that are detested by the PRC state, this thesis constructed the *gangtai* ideology to be used in lieu of the generic term "*gangtai* music." This ideology is fundamentally antagonistic towards the CCP's governing ideology, and can be more specifically described as bourgeois, the sexualization of females, the feminine/*wenrou* male figure, overt expression of love and desire, among musical elements that are reminiscent of Shanghai during the Republican era. Lastly, *gangtai* ideology should be considered as a spectrum rather than a clear-cut boundary.

In the third chapter, this thesis addressed how a portion of Jay Chou's China Wind songs are able to combat the image of feminine/*wenrou* males by replacing it with *wen* masculinity through lyrical, musical, and performative aspects. More specifically, the lyrics of *wen* China

---

<sup>179</sup> Zhou et al., *How to Distinguish Yellow Music*, 1982.

Wind songs are highly literary and evoke the sense of traditional Chinese poetry and pre-modern Chinese cultural elements. Not only did those lyrical aspects construct the sense of Chinese literati to replace feminine *wenrou* male figures, they are also fit with the CCP's governing ideology in promoting China's past glory. Musically, identifiably Chinese musical elements such as traditional instruments and pentatonic musical modes are also employed to convey and construct the same sense and character. Importantly, those musical elements function as an augmentor for lyrical *wen* because similar musical elements can also be found in *gangtai*-ideology pop songs. Likewise, in music videos and live performances, extensive traditional Chinese cultural elements are utilized to present the modern (re)interpretation of a character that possesses the notion of *wen* masculinity. As a result, Jay Chou's *wen* China Wind songs are adored by the CCP as they not only contrast with the *gangtai*-ideology pop songs that are ideologically at odds with the CCP's governing ideology and narrative by constructing the *wen* masculine character vis-à-vis the feminine male figure, but they also suit the party's agenda on revitalization and modernization. Therefore, despite Jay Chou and his lyricist Vincent Fang being from Taiwan, his *wen* China Wind songs possess very few *gangtai*-ideology characteristics, hence the CCP's different attitude towards them.

In the fourth chapter, this thesis examined another category of Jay Chou's China Wind songs—the *wu* songs. The lyrical, musical, and performative aspects of *wu* China Wind songs construct the *wu* masculine figure—the other kind of masculinity in pre-modern Chinese culture, known for superiority in physical combat and military strategies. This figure not only contrasts with the feminine *wenrou* male figure but also combats the vulgarity and the dissident attitude associated with the hypermasculine rock and hip-hop artists that encapsulate Western (sub)culture. Both the lyrics and performative aspects of *wu* China Wind songs drew on

extensive references to martial arts and to Chinese-American actor Bruce Lee, both of which showcase Chinese cultural pride. More importantly, Chinese cultural pride in connection with Chinese nationalism is projected overtly through the defeat of non-Chinese people, regardless of their race and nationalities. The Chinese cultural pride in those songs presents a sense of righteousness; in other words, the Chinese are fighting to protect their homeland and against foreign humiliation, which eliminates vulgarity and violence. Musical aspects once again function as the augmentor of lyrical and performative *wu*. Although *wu* China Wind songs primarily infuse rock and hip-hop elements, lyrical and performative *wu* sanitized the negative associations of those musical genres. Instead, the aforementioned two genres are appropriated to evoke the sense of *wu* masculinity through a sense of harshness. Furthermore, the sophisticated infusion of those musical genres can also be seen as a sign of innovation and modernization of Chinese popular music. Thus, *wu* China Wind songs not only utilize the notion of *wu* masculinity to combat the Western hyper-masculine as well as the *wenrou* male figure, but their more overt representation of Chinese nationalism combined with the sophisticated infusion of elements from other musical genres are also befitting of the CCP's ideological backdrop of nationalism and modernization. Lastly, some of Jay Chou's China Wind songs represent the simultaneous possession of *wen* and *wu*, which is the Chinese masculine ideal.<sup>180</sup> Thus, unlike *gangtai*-ideology songs, the relationship between Jay Chou's China Wind songs and the CCP government is collaborative rather than antagonistic.

The fifth chapter put greater emphasis on the consumers and analyzed the relationship holistically between all three entities. First, I point out the significance of the *bawuhou* generation, which they are directly influenced by the state's patriotic education campaign, as

---

<sup>180</sup> Louie and Edwards, *Chinese Masculinity*, 1994.

well as their age alignment when Jay Chou rose to become a celebrity. Therefore, nationalism and modernization are the mutual interests between the *bawuhou* generation and the CCP, which contrasts with the early reform era. Both *wen* and *wu* songs of Jay Chou's China Wind also capture nationalism and modernization. While doing so, all aspects of the songs do not lose the appeal to attract youthful consumers. It is especially prominent that the rise in individualism is found in the songs, such as the use of romance combined with Chinese cultural pride, as well as the idol persona and the main character's aura, portraying Jay Chou as an idol. Although worshipping idols is against the CCP's ideological backdrop, since Jay Chou is not only a safe political icon<sup>181</sup> but also politically aligned with the CCP, the idol persona can be seen as an effective way to reach youthful consumers. As a result, Jay Chou's China Wind songs function as a mediator between the *bawuhou* consumers and the PRC state, allowing them to form a symbiotic relationship. In other words, Jay Chou's China Wind songs function as effective propaganda on Chinese cultural pride and nationalism that is adored by both the party and the consumers.

### **Future Studies**

While this thesis examined the relationship between Jay Chou's China Wind songs, mainland Chinese consumers, and the PRC state, there are still many related topics that are yet to be explored. For example, the same approach and categorization of China Wind—based on individual artists—can be adopted to examine other artists' China Wind repertoire and their similarities and the differences compared to Jay Chou's China Wind. For example, Taiwanese-American singer-song-writer Leehom Wang (王力宏) is also known as someone who

---

<sup>181</sup> Fung, *Western Style, Chinese Pop*, 2008. pp. 74-77.

has produced numerous “China Wind” songs. Though his songs have been discussed by various scholars, they are often discussed based on an ambiguous definition of China Wind and hence analyzed together with “China Wind” songs by other artists such as Jay Chou.<sup>182</sup> However, isolating a single artist to examine only their style of songs is necessary to promote a more precise analysis. Such is the case between Wang and Chou: the discussion combining them under the same umbrella definition of China Wind undoubtedly omitted the differences between the two; for example, the extensive use of English by Wang and the absence of such by Chou. In other words, the function of Chou’s China Wind versus Wang’s China Wind could very well be different; the fanbase, as well as consumers’ attitudes towards their “China Wind” repertoire, could very well be different as well.

The development and changes in pop songs with Chinese characteristics are also worth examining. Future studies may also approach the subject from a more holistic perspective by identifying certain Chinese social or cultural elements in C-pop and tracing them from the early reform era to contemporary times in an attempt to explain the trend and elucidate whether it will fail to reflect the changes in the politics and society of contemporary China. Such studies should also consider the style of *Gufeng*, which some scholars, such as Lin, consider as not constituting “China Wind” due to their less sophisticated production and differences in dissemination, as well as their different fan base.<sup>183</sup> While her claims are true, the core content in lyrical, musical, and performative aspects is all very similar compared to Jay Chou’s China Wind—evoking the imagined distant past of China. By doing so, such studies will trace and account for the diverse styles of pop songs with Chinese characteristics (rather than China Wind).

---

<sup>182</sup> For discussions of Leehom Wang, see, for example, Huang, *China Wind Music*, 2023. Lin, *Questions of Chineseness*, 2018. Wang, Grace. “The ABCs of Chinese Pop: Wang Leehom and the Marketing of a Global Chinese Celebrity.” *Journal of Transnational American Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2012, pp. 19-37, <https://doi.org/10.5070/T841012820>.

<sup>183</sup> Lin, *Questions of Chineseness*, 2018, pp. 74-76.

Beyond China Wind, Jay Chou as a figure also warrants more detailed examination, since, after all, China Wind songs only constitute a minor portion of his diverse repertoire. Future studies of Jay Chou may approach Jay Chou's repertoire holistically and account for every single style. After all, many songs by Jay Chou are unquestionably *gangtai*-ideology songs, yet the state permitted the coexistence of those songs and China Wind songs. A deep dive into Jay Chou's repertoire as well as the rhetoric of the CCP in the first decade of the twenty-first century may cast light on the dynamics between songs that are fit with the CCP's governing ideology (including but not limited to China Wind style) and songs that are contradictory to that ideology. From there, studies can approach the issue from an even more broad perspective, and analyze the dynamics between *gangtai*-ideology songs and songs that sit well with the CCP's governing ideology beyond Jay Chou, thus accounting for multiple styles or multiple artists.

Lastly, future studies can also take a comparative and transnational perspective. By "comparative," I mean that future studies may examine pop songs with nationalistic sentiments in other countries, and compare them against the Chinese case.. Also, they may dive into songs outside of Chinese-speaking countries and examine the similar senses in the respective country's pop songs. For example, the music video of "Lạc Trôi" by Vietnamese artist Sơn Tùng M-TP evokes many stereotypical cultural elements of East Asia. Due to my lack of knowledge of Vietnamese language and culture, it is impossible to distinguish whether there are any distinctive Vietnamese elements in the lyrics, music, and music video, but scholars who possess the aforementioned knowledge can certainly examine this song and compare it with Jay Chou's China Wind. By "transnational," I mean that future studies can examine the dissemination of Jay Chou's China Wind or other C-pop in non-Chinese speaking countries and analyze the relationship between the respective countries' consumers and Chinese or China Wind pop songs.

For example, based on my experience, there are numerous pop songs, especially songs with Chinese characteristics (including Jay Chou's China Wind), that are available in Vietnamese and Thai translation on Youtube. Future studies can take the approach of cyberanthropology and utilize the comment section combined with ethnography as qualitative data, to analyze pop songs with Chinese characteristics or, in general, C-pop's presence and its influence on Vietnamese and Thai consumers, as well as the relationship between the consumers, their respective state, their respective local pop music, and C-pop.

## Bibliography

- “100 Questions Answered about China’s Tibet.” *Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN*, 9 Apr. 2008,  
[un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/gyzg/xizang/200804/t20080409\\_8410884.htm](http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/gyzg/xizang/200804/t20080409_8410884.htm).
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, 1983.
- Baidu Baike contributors. “中國鼓文化 [The Culture of Chinese Drums].” *Baidu Baike*, Web. 10 Jun. 2024.
- Baranovitch, Nimrod. *China’s New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender, and Politics, 1978-1997*. University of California Press, 2003.
- Chen, Jie. “The Impact of Reform on the Party and Ideology in China.” *The Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 4, no. 9, 1995, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670569508724221>.
- Cheng, Ya-Hui. *The Evolution of Chinese Popular Music: Modernization and Globalization, 1927 to the Present*. Routledge, 2023.
- Chow, Yiu Fai, and Jeroen de Kloet. “Blowing in the China Wind: Engagements with Chineseness in Hong Kong’s Zhongguofeng Music Videos.” *Visual Anthropology (Journal)*, vol. 24, no. 1–2, 2011, pp. 59–76,  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/08949468.2011.525492>.
- Chung, Yung. *Hearing chinoiserie -- the discourse analysis of Chinese pop music during 2000-2010*.

College Stuff 大学那点事儿, “与歌曲《青花瓷》有关的两道高考真题, 你肯定不会 [The Two Real Problems of Gaokao Associated with the Song ‘Blue and White Porcelain,’ You Will Not Know For Sure].” *Sohu*, 6 Aug. 2017, [www.sohu.com/a/162664928\\_684602#google\\_vignette](http://www.sohu.com/a/162664928_684602#google_vignette).

Cook, Nicholas. *Analysing Musical Multimedia*. Clarendon Press, 1998.

Couldry, Nick. *Inside Culture: Re-Imagining the Method of Cultural Studies*. SAGE, 2000.

De Bary, William Theodore, and Richard Lufrano. *Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 2: From 1600 through the Twentieth Century*. Columbia University Press, 2000.

De Kloet, Jeroen. *China with a Cut: Globalisation, Urban Youth and Popular Music*. Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

Fang, Wenshan 方文山. 中國風: 歌詞裡的文字遊戲 [*China Wind: The Language Games within Lyrics*]. Jieli chubanshe, 2008a.

———. 青花瓷: 隱藏在釉色裏的文字秘密 [*The Blue and White Porcelain: The secret of the words hidden inside the glaze color*]. Zuojia chubanshe, 2008b.

———. 天青色等煙雨 [*The Azure Blue Sky Waiting for Misty Rain*]. Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 2019.

Frith, Simon. “The Cultural Study of Popular Music.” *Cultural Studies*, Routledge, New York, NY, 1992, pp. 174–186.

Frith, Simon, et al. *The Cambridge Companion to Pop and Rock*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Fung, Anthony. "Western Style, Chinese Pop: Jay Chou's Rap and Hip-Hop in China." *Asian Music*, vol. 39, no. 1, 2008, pp. 69–80, <https://doi.org/10.1353/amu.2007.0047>.
- Gold, Thomas B. "Go with Your Feelings: Hong Kong and Taiwan Popular Culture in Greater China." *The China Quarterly*, no. 136, 1993, pp. 907–925. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655596>.
- Goldman, Andrea. *Opera and the City: The Politics of Culture in Beijing, 1770-1900*. Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Gulik, Robert Hans van. *Sexual Life in Ancient China: A Preliminary Survey of Chinese Sex and Society from ca. 1500 B.C. till 1644 A.D.* E.J. Brill, 1974.
- Huang, Lydia. *China Wind Music: Constructing an Imagined Cultural China*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2023.
- Hyer, Eric. "China's Policy towards Uighur Nationalism." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2006, pp. 75–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000600738731>.
- Ivanhoe, Philip J., and Bryan W. Van Norden. *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*. HACKETT, 2023.
- Jones, Andrew F. *Like a Knife Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music*. East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992.
- . *Circuit Listening: Chinese Popular Music in the Global 1960s*. University of Minnesota Press, 2020.

- Ju, Qihong 居其宏. 新中國音樂史, 1949-2000 [*New China's Music History, 1949-2000*]. Hunan meishu chubanshe, 2002.
- Kassabian, Anahid. "Popular." *Key Terms in Popular Music and Culture*, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 113-123.
- Lau, Frederick. *Music in China: Experiencing Music, Expressing Culture*. Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Li, Yingkui 李英奎. 长拳 [*Long Fist*]. Beijing tiyu daxue chubanshe, 2022.
- Lin, Chen-Yu. *Questions of Chineseness: A Study of China Wind Pop Music and the Post-1990s Generation in the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the UK*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2018.
- Link, Perry, et al. *Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic*. Westview Press, 1989.
- Liu, Jianmei. *Revolution plus Love: Literary History, Women's Bodies, and Thematic Repetition in Twentieth-Century Chinese Fiction*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2003.
- Lorge, Peter. *Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Louie, Kam. *Inheriting Tradition: Interpretations of the Classical Philosophers in Communist China, 1949-1966*. Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Louie, Kam, and Louise Edwards. "Chinese Masculinity: Theorizing Wen and Wu." *East Asian History (Canberra)*, 1994.

- Lu, Zhenglan 陆正兰. 歌曲与性别: 中国当代流行音乐研究 [*Song and gender: A study of popular music in China today*]. Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2013.
- McDougall, Bonnie S., and Paul Clark. *Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979*. University of California Press, 1984.
- Moskowitz, Marc L. *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow: Chinese Pop Music and Its Cultural Connotations*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2010, p. 9. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese city popular music*, 2009.
- Ngũgĩ, wa Thiong'o. *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*. James Currey, 1986.
- . *Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms*. J. Currey, 1992.
- Owen, Stephen. *An Anthology of Chinese Literature: Beginnings to 1911*. W.W. Norton, 1997.
- Party Central Committee and State Council, 中共中央国务院关于严禁 进口、复制、销售、播放反动黄色下流录音录像制品的规定 [*The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council's Regulation on the Prohibition of Importing, Copying, Selling, and Playing of Reactionary, Yellow, and Vulgar Audiovisual Materials*], News of the Communist Party of China, 1982.  
[cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71590/4855264.html](http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71590/4855264.html).
- Pulleyblank, Edwin G. "The An Lu-shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in Late T'ang China". *Critical Readings on Tang China Volume 1*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2018. pp. 518-541. [https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004380158\\_018](https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004380158_018).

- Rojek, Chris. *Cultural Studies*. Polity Press, 2007.
- Sinski, Eric Andrew. *Imagined Communities: Patriotic Sentiment Among Chinese Students Abroad in the Era of Xi Jinping*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2020.
- Song, Geng. *The Fragile Scholar: Power and Masculinity in Chinese Culture*. Hong Kong University Press, 2004.
- Thrasher, Alan R and Gloria N Wong. *Yueqi: Chinese Musical Instruments in Performance*. British Columbia Chinese Music Association 2011.
- Tötösy de Zepetnek, Steven, and Tutun Mukherjee, editors. *Companion to Comparative Literature, World Literatures, and Comparative Cultural Studies*. Cambridge University Press India, Foundation Books, 2013.
- Wang, Ban. *The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth-Century China*. Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Wang, Grace. “The ABCs of Chinese Pop: Wang Leehom and the Marketing of a Global Chinese Celebrity.” *Journal of Transnational American Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2012, pp. 19-37, <https://doi.org/10.5070/T841012820>.
- Wang, Siqi 王思琪. 中国当代城市流行音乐：音乐与社会文化环境互动研究 [*Contemporary Chinese city popular music: The study of interaction between music and sociocultural environment*]. Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2009.
- . 中国当代流行音乐史稿 [*The historical manuscript of contemporary Chinese popular music*]. Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2020.

- Wang, Zheng. *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. Columbia University Press, 2014.
- Xu, Chengbei, and Gengtao Chen. *Peking Opera*. China Intercontinental Press, 2003.
- Xu, Chuan. “From Sonic Models to Sonic Hooligans: Magnetic Tape and the Unraveling of the Mao-Era Sound Regime, 1958–1983.” *East Asian Science, Technology and Society*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2019, pp. 391–412, <https://doi.org/10.1215/18752160-7755487>.
- Yan, Yunxiang. “The Chinese Path to Individualization.” *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, no. 3, 2010, pp. 489–512, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01323.x>.
- Yang, Lihui., et al. *Handbook of Chinese Mythology*. Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Zang, Xiaowei. *Ethnicity in China: A Critical Introduction*. Wiley, 2015.
- . “Ethnic Minorities.” *Understanding Chinese Society*, Routledge, 2016, pp. 126–42, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315689043-15>.
- Zhang, Jinhua et al. 张锦华等. 中国当代流行音乐的传播与接受研究 [*The study of Chinese contemporary popular music's dissemination and perception*]. Zhongguo chuanmei daxue chubanshe, 2016.
- Zhang, Yi [张燧]. “可否“流行”换“通俗” [Kefou “Liuxing” Huan “Tongsu;” Can “Liuxing” Replace “Tongsu”].” 音乐周报 [*Music Weekly*], 3 Oct 2003.
- Zhang, Yuqi. “HUA Tuo: The First Neurosurgeon in the World.” *Brain and Neuroscience Advances*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, pp. 71-72, [https://doi.org/10.18679/CN11-6030\\_R.2015.008](https://doi.org/10.18679/CN11-6030_R.2015.008).

Zhao, Suisheng. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*.

Stanford University Press, 2004.

Zhou, Dafeng et al. 周大风等. “因势利导, 循循善诱 ——谈港澳流行庸俗歌曲的渗入 [Guide

Accordingly, Influence with Pattern: A Discussion on the Penetration of *Gangao* Vulgar

Popular Music].” 怎样鉴别黄色歌曲 [*How to Distinguish Yellow Music*], renmin yinyue

chubanshe, 1982.

## Discography

- Cheng, Lin 程琳. “小螺號” [Little Bugle]. 小螺號 [*Little Bugle*]. 1980.
- Cheung, Jacky 張學友. “餓狼傳說” [Born to Be Wild]. 餓狼傳說 [*Born to Be Wild*]. Universal Music Ltd. 1994.
- Cheung, Ming-Man 張明敏. “我的中國心” [My Chinese Heart]. 流金歲月 —獻給共和國的同齡人 [*The Ongoing Prime Times—Dedicated to Peers of the Republic*]. China Record Corporation, 1999.
- Chou, Jay 周杰倫. “娘子” [Wife]. *Jay*. Alfa Music International, Inc, 2000.
- . “雙節棍” [Nunchucks]. 范特西 [*Fantasy*]. JVR Music, 2001a.
- . “上海1943” [Shanghai 1943]. 范特西 [*Fantasy*]. JVR Music, 2001b.
- . “龍拳” [Dragon Fist]. 八度空間 [*Octave Space*]. JVR Music, 2002a.
- . “爺爺泡的茶” [Grandpa’s Tea]. 八度空間 [*Octave Space*]. JVR Music, 2002b.
- . “雙刀” [Double Blade]. 葉惠美 [*Ye Hui Mei*]. JVR Music, 2003a.
- . “東風破” [East Wind Breaks]. 葉惠美 [*Ye Hui Mei*]. JVR Music, 2003b.
- . “亂舞春秋” [Chaotic Dance]. 七里香 [*Common Jasmine Orange*]. JVR Music, 2004.
- . “髮如雪” [Hair Like Snow]. 十一月的蕭邦 [*November’s Chopin*]. JVR Music, 2005.
- . “本草綱目” [Chinese Herbal Manual]. 依然范特西 [*Still Fantasy*]. JVR Music, 2006a.
- . “菊花台” [Chrysanthemum Palace]. 依然范特西 [*Still Fantasy*]. JVR Music, 2006b.

- . “千里之外” [Far Away]. 依然范特西 [*Still Fantasy*]. JVR Music, 2006c.
- . “霍元甲” [Fearless]. 霍元甲 [*Fearless*]. JVR Music, 2006d.
- . “黃金甲” [Golden Armor]. 黃金甲 [*Golden Armor*]. JVR Music, 2006e.
- . “青花瓷” [Blue and White Porcelain]. 我很忙 [*On the Run*]. JVR Music, 2007a.
- . “無雙” [Incomparable]. 我很忙 [*On the Run*]. JVR Music, 2007b.
- . “周大俠” [Master Chou]. 周大俠 [*Master Chou*]. JVR Music, 2008a.
- . “蘭亭序” [Orchid Pavilion]. 魔杰座 [*Capricorn*]. JVR Music, 2008b.
- . “煙花易冷” [Fade Away]. 跨時代 [*The Era*]. JVR Music, 2010a.
- . “雨下一整晚” [Rain All Night]. 跨時代 [*The Era*]. JVR Music, 2010b.
- . “公公偏頭痛” [Eunuch with a Headache]. 十二新作 [*Opus 12*]. JVR Music, 2012a.
- . “紅塵客棧” [Red Dust Inn]. 十二新作 [*Opus 12*]. JVR Music, 2012b.
- . “天涯過客” [Passer-By]. 哎呦 不錯哦 [*Aiyo, Not Bad*]. JVR Music, 2014.
- . “紅顏如霜” [Cold Hearted]. 最偉大的作品 [*The Greatest Work of Art*]. JVR Music, 2022.
- Dong, Wenhua 董文華. “長城長” [The Great Wall is Long]. 月光下的思念 [*The Longing under the Moon*]. Beijing Cili Guoji Chuanmei Youxian Gongsì, 1994.
- Guo, Lanying 郭蘭英. “我的祖國” [My Motherland]. 上甘嶺電影插曲 [*Film Song from The Battle of Shangganling*]. China Record Corporation, 1956.

- Hou, Te-Chien 侯德健. “龍的傳人” [The Descendents of the Dragon]. 龍的傳人 [*The Descendents of the Dragon*]. 1978.
- In3 陰三兒. “北京晚報” [Beijing’s Evening News]. 北京晚報 [*Beijing’s Evening News*]. 2008.
- Lee, Jonathan 李宗盛. “鬼迷心竅” [Infatuated]. 滾石九大天王之十二出好戲 [*The Nine Heavenly Kings’ Twelve Brilliant Shows of Rock Records*]. Rock Records, 1992.
- Li, Guyi 李谷一. “鄉戀” [Homeland Romance]. 鄉戀-李谷一影視歌曲 [*Homeland Romance—Film Song of Li Guyi*]. China Record Corporation, 1979.
- Peng, Liyuan 彭麗媛. “我屬於中國” [I belong to China]. 一帆風順 [*Smooth Sailing*]. Beijing Cili Guoji Chuanmei Youxian Gongsi, 1997.
- Teng Teresa 鄧麗君. “月亮代表我的心” [The Moon Represents My Heart]. 島國之情歌第四集 香港之戀 [*The Fourth Volume of the Island Country Love Songs, The Love of Hong Kong*]. Universal Music Ltd. 1977.
- . “甜蜜蜜” [Sweet Like Honey]. 甜蜜蜜 [*Sweet Like Honey*]. Universal Music Ltd. 1979
- The Tang Dynasty Band 唐朝. “夢回唐朝” [Returning in Dream to the Tang Dynasty]. 唐朝同名專輯 [*The Tang Dynasty, the Eponymous Album*]. Rock Records, 1992.
- Wei, Wei 韋唯. “今天是你的生日” [Today is Your Birthday, China]. China Record Corporation, 1989.