

UC Berkeley

UC Berkeley Previously Published Works

Title

The effect of agency budgets on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions from road rehabilitation policies

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/30q223hz>

Journal

Environmental Research Letters, 10(11)

ISSN

1748-9318

Authors

Reger, Darren
Madanat, Samer
Horvath, Arpad

Publication Date

2015-11-01

DOI

10.1088/1748-9326/10/11/114007

Peer reviewed

1 The Effect of Agency Budgets on Minimizing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Road
2 Rehabilitation Policies

3 Darren Reger*, Samer Madanat and Arpad Horvath Department of Civil and Environmental
4 Engineering, University of California, Berkeley

5 *Corresponding author email: reger@berkeley.edu

6 **Abstract**

7 Transportation agencies are being urged to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. One
8 possible solution within their scope is to alter their pavement management system to include
9 environmental impacts. Managing pavement assets is important because poor road conditions
10 lead to increased fuel consumption of vehicles. Rehabilitation activities improve pavement
11 condition, but require materials and construction equipment, which produce GHG emissions as
12 well. The agency's role is to decide when to rehabilitate the road segments in the network. In
13 previous work, we sought to minimize total societal costs (user and agency costs combined)
14 subject to an emissions constraint for a road network, and demonstrated that there exists a range
15 of potentially optimal solutions (a Pareto frontier) with tradeoffs between costs and GHG
16 emissions. However, we did not account for the case where the available financial budget to the
17 agency is binding. This letter considers an agency whose main goal is to reduce its carbon
18 footprint while operating under a constrained financial budget. A Lagrangian dual solution
19 methodology is applied, which selects the optimal timing and optimal action from a set of
20 alternatives for each segment. This formulation quantifies GHG emission savings per additional
21 dollar of agency budget spent, which can be used in a cap-and-trade system or to make budget
22 decisions. We discuss the importance of communication between agencies and their legislature
23 that sets the financial budgets to implement sustainable policies. We show that for a case study
24 of California roads, it is optimal to apply frequent, thin overlays as opposed to the less frequent,
25 thick overlays recommended in the literature if the objective is to minimize GHG emissions. A
26 promising new technology, warm-mix asphalt, will have a negligible effect on reducing GHG
27 emissions for road resurfacing under constrained budgets.

28 **Introduction**

29 The United States has recently set an ambitious target of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG)
30 emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025 (White House 2015), and similar or longer-
31 term goals are being adopted or discussed worldwide. Significant actions have been taken thus
32 far, such as investing in clean power and setting energy and fuel efficiency standards, but more
33 investments are needed. Reducing GHG emissions will require cooperation and willingness from
34 decision-makers across all economic sectors, especially those with the largest contributions. The
35 transportation sector accounts for large emissions worldwide; 28% of the total GHG emissions in
36 the United States, most of which comes from the tailpipes of vehicles (EPA 2014).

1 Transportation infrastructure is typically not included in the sector's account, therefore the
2 overall transportation sector's impact is even higher (Chester and Horvath 2009, Revi 2014).

3 In 2014, there were over 4.8 trillion vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) on 6.3 billion lane
4 kilometers of roads (FHWA 2014, Census Bureau 2014) in the United States. The agencies
5 responsible for the care and maintenance of the most traveled roads, state departments of
6 transportation (DOTs), are being urged to reduce their carbon footprints. This is driven by desire
7 to assist with reaching the national target, public pressure to be more sustainable, and state
8 emissions goals set into law (e.g., Assembly Bill 32 in California) (Air Resources Board 2014).
9 There is untapped potential within an agencies' scope, which could bring additional significant
10 reductions (Sathaye 2010, Horvath and Hendrickson 1998, Cicas 2007, Santero 2011a, Santero
11 2011b). In this letter, the focus is on the potential GHG emission reductions from new
12 rehabilitation policies.

13 Transportation agencies have two options for each road segment at any given point in time: they
14 can elect to do nothing, or they can perform a rehabilitation action. If they elect to do nothing,
15 the pavement condition worsens. Roughness has been identified as the most important indicator
16 of performance and will be used as the measure of pavement condition in this letter (FHWA
17 2012). It is a measure of the unevenness of the road along the longitudinal profile in the
18 wheelpath and is measured by the international roughness index (IRI) in m/km. As roughness
19 increases, fuel consumption also increases, resulting in greater emissions from the tailpipes of
20 vehicles (Watanatada 1987). To keep the user emissions down, agencies can perform a
21 rehabilitation action such as a resurfacing, which improves the condition of the road. While
22 effective in reducing user emissions, rehabilitation actions result in large quantities of GHG
23 emissions being released into the atmosphere from the manufacturing and transporting of the
24 materials and the construction stage (Santero and Horvath 2009). There is optimal timing to
25 perform rehabilitation where the combined user and agency emissions for that segment are
26 minimized (Reger 2014). In theory, an agency would always choose to rehabilitate at that timing,
27 but in practice, there are other factors that can interfere. The agency chooses the action and time,
28 but the total budget they have is beyond their control. A binding financial budget can force the
29 agency to rehabilitate the roads in the network with less frequency than would be optimal.

30 Multi-objective optimization has been identified as an effective technique for infrastructure
31 management problems (Wu 2012). In Reger et al. (2014), we solved a multi-facility, continuous
32 time, continuous state, infinite horizon problem for a heterogeneous pavement network. We
33 sought to minimize total societal costs (user and agency combined) subject to an emissions
34 constraint, giving a range of potentially optimal policies that could be applied by the agency. For
35 this range of potentially optimal solutions, an agency cannot reduce total costs without increasing
36 GHG emissions, nor reduce GHG emissions without increasing costs, creating a Pareto frontier.
37 Network-level Pareto-optimal solutions have been applied to pavement management previously,
38 but have focused on aspects such as cost, performance, condition, and work production (Bai
39 2011, Bai 2014, Bryce 2014, Fwa 2000, Sathaye and Madanat 2012). Wang et al. 2012 and

1 Wang et al. 2014 examined the case of optimizing with respect to environmental considerations
2 and energy at a network level. There has been research that has examined simultaneously
3 optimizing costs and greenhouse gas emissions but did not include Pareto optimality (Zhang
4 2010) or focused on material comparison (Zhang 2013). At a single project level, the Pareto
5 frontier between costs and GHG emissions was previously examined (Lidicker 2014). At a
6 network level, Pareto optimality was examined by Gosse et al. (2012), but did not include the
7 GHG effects from user vehicles caused by changes in pavement condition.

8 The potentially optimal policies from Reger et al. (2014) assumed unlimited financial resources
9 for the agency. This is not typically the case in practice. In this letter we take a different
10 perspective, examining the case of an agency which seeks to reduce its GHG emissions when the
11 budget that can be spent on rehabilitation in a given year is limited. We show that achieving a
12 financially sustainable and low-carbon pavement management system requires cooperation
13 between legislators and transportation agencies. It is the responsibility of the agency to properly
14 use the budget they are supplied with, but it is the responsibility of the legislation to provide the
15 agency with sufficient funding to apply a policy which reduces their global warming impacts.
16 There needs to be a combined effort to ensure that tax money is allocated properly to achieve the
17 largest reductions in GHG emissions.

18 The methodology used in Reger et al. (2014) is modified to become more applicable for real-life
19 scenarios. That paper considered a single type of rehabilitation activity, but state agencies have
20 many options at their disposal. We show how to compare these different rehabilitation options,
21 while still maintaining the Lagrangian dual formulation which allows for efficient solutions for
22 large-scale networks. Using this new approach, the optimal activity and the optimal timing are
23 chosen for each road segment in the network. We show that the results are robust to uncertainty
24 in the deterioration rate, best achievable roughness level, and effect of roughness on fuel
25 consumption. We also examine the potential effects of using warm-mix asphalt as a material in
26 pavement resurfacing.

27 **Problem Formulation**

28 As in Reger et al. (2014), we use a continuous time, continuous state, infinite-horizon
29 optimization formulation. The problem is formulated as an objective function subject to two
30 constraints, as shown in Equations 1-3. Equation 1, the objective function, is the sum of the total
31 yearly emissions, Q_{jk} , for all facilities $j=1, \dots, J$, choosing from potential rehabilitation actions,
32 $k=1, \dots, K$. Q_{jk} includes the user emissions, W_{jk} , and the agency emissions associated with
33 applying the rehabilitation action, A_{jk} . W_{jk} is an integral from 0 to τ and A_{jk} is a function of the
34 number of lanes of the roadway and the chosen action, k . τ_{jk} is the decision variable, and is the
35 interval of action k for segment j . Emissions are annualized by dividing by τ , since there is no
36 scientific consensus on a discount rate (Sedjo and Marland 2003). Equation 2 is the budget
37 constraint, where M_{jk} is the cost of action k for segment j and B is the annual budget. Budget
38 values are not discounted as this is meant to represent the necessary budget per time and also


1 helps to capture the idea of an agency having a multi-year budget. The final constraint bounds
 2 the potential solutions between 0 and τ_{jk}^e (the optimal timing where total emissions are
 3 minimized). Note that τ cannot equal 0, as it would render the objective function undefined.

$$4 \quad \min_{\tau_{jk}} \sum_{j=1}^J \{Q_{jk}(\tau_{jk})\} = \sum_{j=1}^J [W_{jk}(\tau_{jk}) + A_{jk}(\tau_{jk})] \left(\frac{1}{\tau_{jk}}\right) \quad \text{Eq(1)}$$

$$5 \quad \text{s. t. } \sum_{j=1}^J \left\{M_{jk}(\tau_{jk}) \left(\frac{1}{\tau_{jk}}\right)\right\} \leq B \quad \text{Eq(2)}$$

$$6 \quad \tau_{jk} \in (0, \tau_{jk}^e] \quad \text{Eq(3)}$$

7 The scope of roughness considered for user emissions is shown in Figure 1. The emissions
 8 associated with roughness below the best-achievable level after rehabilitation are beyond the
 9 control of the agency. Therefore, these emissions are not included in the optimization. However,
 10 different rehabilitation actions have different best-achievable levels of roughness. S_1^* is the best-
 11 achievable roughness level among all the potential actions. S_k^* is the best-achievable level after
 12 action k. Reaching S_1^* is still within the agency's control, so if they choose to apply action k, the
 13 emissions associated with the difference between S_1^* and S_k^* are included.



14
 15 **Figure 1: Scope of included user emissions**

16 **Solution Methodology**

17 In Reger et al. (2014), we used a similar Lagrangian duality solution methodology to that
 18 developed by Sathaye and Madanat (2012). Here we maintain a Lagrangian dual methodology,
 19 but solve it in a different manner to allow for the addition of multiple rehabilitation activities.
 20 For a given budget at optimality, all facilities in the network will have the same value of λ (the
 21 Lagrange multiplier), so the problem can be treated as separable. We solve for the optimal timing

1 τ of action k on segment j , for all actions $k=1, \dots, K$. The optimally timed action which has the
 2 lowest value of $D(\Lambda)$ is retained. The budget B is back-calculated by taking the sum of M_{jk} for
 3 all j .

$$4 \quad D(\Lambda) = \max_{\Lambda} \left\{ \inf_{\tau_{jk}} \sum_{j=1}^J Q_{jk}(\tau_{jk}) + \Lambda [\sum_{j=1}^J M_{jk}(\tau_{jk}) - B] : \tau_{jk} \in (0, \tau_j^e] \quad \forall j = 1 \dots J \right\} \quad \text{Eq(4)}$$

$$5 \quad \text{s. t. } \Lambda \geq 0 \quad \text{Eq(5)}$$

6 **Case Study**

7 The case study focuses on a 1,600 lane-km sample of asphalt pavement segments in California
 8 over an infinite time horizon. This 1600 lane-km sample is made up of 311 different segments
 9 including both urban and rural roads distributed across Northern California. The traffic data
 10 (AADT and AADTT) were obtained from the California Department of Transportation's
 11 (Caltrans) Division of Traffic Operations (Caltrans 2013). Data for rehabilitation actions were
 12 obtained from a study of Californian roads, which gives the best-achievable condition and the
 13 rate of deterioration after the activity is performed (Tseng 2012). The rehabilitation actions
 14 include 5 different thicknesses of overlays (3 cm, 4.5 cm, 7.5 cm, 10.5 cm, 15 cm). Although the
 15 only rehabilitation options shown for the case study are different resurfacing thicknesses, the
 16 methodology applies to other types of activities, such as seal coating or full-depth reconstruction.
 17 It is assumed that 80% of heavy vehicles will travel in the rightmost lane and that deterioration
 18 will primarily occur in this lane. Traffic is assumed to stay constant over time. Since
 19 rehabilitation is primarily performed overnight in California, the emissions from traffic delay are
 20 negligible.

21 User emissions take into account the additional fuel burned because of the change in fuel
 22 consumption due to roughness. The effect of roughness on fuel consumption was determined by
 23 Zaabar and Chatti (2015), who found that an additional 1 m/km of IRI increases fuel
 24 consumption by 2 to 3% for light vehicles and 1 to 2% for heavy vehicles at highway speeds. We
 25 use the midpoints, 2.5% and 1.5% respectively. The gasoline and diesel GHG emissions include
 26 emissions from combustion as well as supply chain emissions from extraction, refining,
 27 distribution, etc. Agency emissions are calculated using the PaLATE software (PaLATE 2013)
 28 and agency costs for resurfacing are taken from (Hand 1999). For agency actions, it is assumed
 29 that the agency will not deviate from their schedule if there are adjacent sections being
 30 rehabilitated in close timeframes.


31 **Case Study Results**

32 The methodology solves for the optimal action (and corresponding optimal timing) for each
 33 segment at each agency budget value. We find that the thinnest resurfacing option (3 cm) is
 34 always the optimal action for every 1.6km long segment at every potential budget value. This is a
 35 different result than found in the literature, which states that it is always optimal to resurface to

1 the best possible condition if the objective is to minimize total costs (Li and Madanat 2002,
2 Ouyang and Madanat 2006, Gu 2012). For the case study, the best possible condition after
3 resurfacing occurs after applying a 15 cm overlay, while the condition after applying a 3 cm
4 overlay is the worst among the potential options. The result happens to be consistent with the
5 practice of at least one U.S. agency, the Washington State Department of Transportation.

6 In the roughness progression model, the 15 cm overlay will deteriorate 22% slower and have a
7 0.1 m/km better condition after resurfacing, but will cost about twice as much and have 5 times
8 the amount of GHG emissions as the 3 cm overlay. In this case, an agency can perform a 3 cm
9 resurfacing on two segments for the same cost as a 15 cm resurfacing on one segment. This is
10 important when the budget is low because keeping more roads in good condition reduces user
11 emissions. When the budget is not binding, the 3 cm overlay remains optimal because now
12 actions are being performed very frequently and the agency emissions from overlays are the
13 controlling factor. Even going from a 3 cm overlay to a 4.5 cm overlay, costs per resurfacing
14 increase by 14% and emissions increase by 50%. The benefit from slower deterioration does not
15 offset these additional costs and emissions.

16 The results are shown in Figure 2, with the x-axis representing the agency budget in millions of
17 dollars and the y-axis representing the total GHG emissions in metric tons (mt). As the agency
18 budget increases, total emissions decrease until the emissions-minimizing point is reached. When
19 the budget is low, roads are allowed to deteriorate to poor condition, and the main contribution to
20 emissions comes from the additional fuel consumed by the vehicles. Where budget values are
21 high, the agency is rehabilitating frequently, so the majority of the emissions result from the
22 materials and construction. The slope of the curve is the amount of GHG emissions that could be
23 saved per additional dollar spent by the agency. The results exhibit diminishing returns. For
24 example, an additional \$1M/yr results in a reduction of 100,000 mtCO₂e/yr when going from
25 \$1M/yr to \$2M/yr, but only reduces the total emissions by 2,500 mtCO₂e/yr when going from
26 \$10M/yr to \$11M/yr. Considering that vehicles emit a majority of the GHG emissions in the
27 transportation sector and the roads which fall under Caltrans' jurisdiction carry over 80% of the
28 VKT in California, scaling up to the entire network would have a significant statewide impact.




1

2 **Figure 2: Case study results comparing agency budgets to total GHG emissions**

3 The agency is responsible for optimally using the budget it is allocated, but it does not control
 4 the size of that budget. A curve, like the one shown in Figure 2, can help the agency and
 5 legislation work together to make budget decisions. Each point on the curve corresponds to a set
 6 of optimal actions and action intervals which the agency would apply under a potential budget
 7 value. This means that the entity assigning the budget is also choosing the corresponding yearly
 8 GHG emissions. The graph gives the agency a way to visualize and quantify the GHG emissions
 9 under a given budget as well as determine the potential reductions if additional funds are
 10 provided. One way to determine an appropriate budget would be to look at the price of carbon. It
 11 is given in the figure by taking the inverse of the slope. For example, if the societal value of
 12 carbon was \$10/mt, the agency's budget should be \$1.3M/yr. Since the cost of carbon changes
 13 along the curve, a lower budget would force the agency to operate where the value of carbon was
 14 lower than the societal value, while a higher budget would result in spending more than \$10/mt
 15 for every dollar beyond \$1.3M.


16 Using this methodology, this agency would now have the potential to enter a modified cap-and-
 17 trade system. Another entity could purchase carbon credits by supplying the agency with the
 18 funds to use for rehabilitation. Standard cap-and-trade systems are typically for a one-time
 19 purchase, but what is proposed here is modified such that it could be sold as a contract to a
 20 particular entity or resold each year. As an example, if the agency currently has a budget of
 21 \$5M/yr, each year they would be able to sell 8,000 mtCO₂e worth of credits for \$1M since that
 22 would be the GHG reduction from increasing its budget to \$6M/yr.

1 Another benefit of this curve is that it allows for comparisons of investments in rehabilitation
 2 policy with other alternatives within the agency’s scope. As an example, if the agency received a
 3 grant for \$5M/yr that it could spend on any activity with the goal of reducing emissions, it could
 4 either invest in pavement rehabilitation or in an alternative project such as replacing
 5 conventional roadway lighting with LEDs, incentivizing switching to alternative fuels, etc. The
 6 arrows in Figure 3 are a graphical representation of an alternative project (in this case a project
 7 that would cost \$5M/yr and reduce GHG emissions by 50,000 mtCO₂e/yr). If the current
 8 rehabilitation budget was \$2M/yr (blue arrow), the arrowhead would fall above the curve, so
 9 using the money for pavement resurfacing would result in larger emissions reductions. However,
 10 if the budget was \$3M/yr (orange arrow), the arrowhead would fall below the curve, suggesting
 11 that the alternative project would be a better investment.



12
 13 **Figure 3: Comparing pavement rehabilitation policy to alternative projects**

14 In addition to GHG emissions, the agency would want to look at the effects of budget values on
 15 road condition. Figure 4 shows a “heat map” of the distribution of trigger roughness values for
 16 different agency budgets, where a trigger roughness is the level of roughness at which a
 17 rehabilitation action will be performed (i.e., the condition of segment j when exactly τ_{jk} years
 18 have passed). As the agency budget decreases, the trigger roughness values for the segments
 19 increase. At the point where emissions are minimized, there is still a range of optimal trigger
 20 roughness values. This confirms the result from Reger et al. (2014), which found that using a
 21 universal trigger roughness (i.e., applying the same trigger roughness value to every road in the
 22 network) is always suboptimal.



1


2 **Figure 4: Heat map of the effect of agency budget on pavement condition**

3 In this case study, there are road segments which should be rehabilitated with very little
 4 frequency (e.g., $\tau \approx 50$ years). However, the data collected to determine the rate of deterioration
 5 did not have a segment which was allowed to deteriorate for 50 years with no intervention.
 6 Weathering may prevent these long rehabilitation intervals from being feasible. More data are
 7 needed determine how pavements would deteriorate if left without rehabilitation for long time
 8 periods and if there are minor treatments which can work as placeholders until it is time for a
 9 rehabilitation activity. The issue of condition may also become a factor for these segments since
 10 the roughness will surpass what is typically seen on paved roads in rich countries. In this case,
 11 the agency may have to allocate some of the budget to these roads sub-optimally, but since only
 12 2% of the case study roads fall into this category, it will not greatly affect the yearly emissions.

13 **Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis**


14 The parameters tested for sensitivity analysis were the deterioration rate, best achievable
 15 roughness level, and percentage change in fuel consumption. To represent uncertainty with
 16 respect to the best achievable roughness level and deterioration rate, we assume that each is
 17 normally distributed, with the mean being the value used earlier in the case study and the
 18 standard deviation being 25% of the mean value (25% was used such that there was a wide range
 19 of deterioration rates while also making sure that there is never a negative value). We then
 20 assume that the agency will use a predetermined policy, where they always apply the action and
 21 timing specified by the model. This means that if they are supposed to resurface at an interval of
 22 10 years expecting the roughness to be 3.0 m/km, they will still resurface at 10-year intervals for
 23 that section even if the pavement condition is 2.0 m/km or 4.0 m/km at that time.

1 Figure 5 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis. The optimal policies are robust to the
2 deterioration rate and the best achievable roughness level. The black line represents the predicted
3 value of the GHG emissions, with the red lines representing the values of emissions for the
4 simulations. The uncertainty affects the optimal policies when the budgets are high. Figure 6
5 shows a zoomed-in portion of Figure 5 when the agency budget is between \$15M/yr and
6 \$23M/yr. An agency may not be guaranteed to see the reductions they expect from spending
7 more money in this range. For example, spending an additional \$4M/yr, from \$15M/yr to
8 \$19M/yr, would have an expected reduction of 1,000 mtCO₂e/yr, but the emissions from the
9 simulations at \$19M/yr had a range of 9,000 mtCO₂e/yr. Therefore, the increased spending may
10 lead to no reductions (or even increases) in GHG emissions.



11


12 **Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis for pavement deterioration rate and best achievable roughness level**



1

2 **Figure 6: Zoomed-in portion of Figure 5, focusing on where budgets are near the emissions optimizing point**

3 The Zaabar and Chatti (2014) study found that the effect of change in fuel consumption due to
 4 roughness is between 2-3% and 1-2% for light and heavy vehicles respectively, so for sensitivity
 5 analysis we assumed that the effect of roughness on fuel consumption is uniformly distributed in
 6 these ranges. Again, we assumed that the agency applies the predetermined intervals chosen by
 7 the model. The model is robust to fuel consumption as 95% of the simulations resulted in GHG
 8 emissions within 500 mtCO₂e/yr of the predicted value from the optimization.



1


2 **Figure 7: Potential effect of warm-mix asphalt technology on rehabilitation policy**

3 **Sensitivity to Changes in Pavement Technology**

4 New pavement technologies, such as warm-mix asphalt (WMA), could affect rehabilitation
 5 policy. WMA uses a lower mixing temperature than traditional hot-mix asphalt, and in a best
 6 case scenario has the potential to reduce GHG emissions from an asphalt mix by up to 20%
 7 (Rodriguez-Alloza 2015). Figure 7 shows the effect of using WMA for rehabilitation on the case
 8 results, assuming a 20% reduction in GHG emissions from asphalt and no change in pavement
 9 performance or unit price. There is almost no benefit until the agency budget is greater than
 10 \$10M/yr. This is because when the budget is low, there are few rehabilitations performed each
 11 year, so the user emissions are the main contributors to the total. Near the emissions minimizing
 12 point, using WMA can result in savings of up to 3,000 mtCO₂e/yr, since there will be a sufficient
 13 number of rehabilitations performed each year. However, it is unlikely that an agency will be
 14 operating at this point on the curve. Beyond an agency budget of \$10M/yr, the cost of saving an
 15 additional metric ton of carbon is upwards of \$700/mtCO₂e which is higher than carbon has ever
 16 been traded on the market. There may be other benefits to WMA, such as improved workability
 17 and laborer safety, but with respect to GHG reductions in pavement rehabilitation policies, it will
 18 provide little benefit unless it brings significant improvements in performance.

19 The cost of asphalt may change with the recent drop in oil prices. Bitumen is a product of
 20 petroleum refining and is also the most expensive part of the asphalt mix. Figure 8 shows the
 21 results assuming a 20% reduction in rehabilitation costs. The effect is significant for low budget

1 values, but is less noticeable as the agency budget increases. At a budget of \$1M/yr, the 20%
2 reduction in costs would reduce the GHG emissions by 50,000 mtCO₂e/yr. When the budget is
3 \$15M/yr or higher, the effect is negligible. This occurs because a reduction in costs stretches the
4 budget farther, allowing more roads to receive rehabilitation and overall reducing GHG
5 emissions. It is equivalent to increasing the budget.



6
7 **Figure 8: Effect of reducing rehabilitation costs by 20%**

8 **Conclusion**

9 This letter presents an approach that can be followed by a road agency to minimize its GHG
10 emissions from rehabilitation while operating under a constrained financial budget. A
11 Lagrangian dual solution methodology is used to efficiently solve for the optimal resurfacing
12 policies in a large-scale network. The results provide the optimal timing along with the optimal
13 actions for every road segment in the network. An agency can use these results to make the case
14 for a higher rehabilitation budget to achieve their emissions reduction target. It is also possible to
15 implement a system where the agency could sell carbon credits by quantifying the emissions
16 reductions from increasing its operating budget and price accordingly. This methodology also
17 allows the agency to compare spending money on pavement rehabilitation or another project
18 within its scope (e.g., roadway lighting) to determine which is a better investment.

19 A case study of Californian roads was examined and it was found that it is optimal to apply
20 frequent, thin resurfacings, which is contrary to the less frequent, thick overlays specified in the
21 literature for minimizing costs. Sensitivity analyses showed that the solutions are robust with
22 respect to the deterioration rate, best achievable roughness level, and effect of roughness on fuel

1 consumption. The effect of using WMA was determined to only be significant when agency
2 budgets are high since at low budget values rehabilitation is infrequent. However, if asphalt
3 prices fall or the agency finds a way to reduce costs, the potential savings in GHG emissions are
4 significant when the budget is low.

5 One assumption of this work is that pavements are perpetual. This implies that pavements are
6 designed such that the damage is mainly contained within the surface layer and does not
7 permeate to the underlying layers. While this may be the case in rich countries and for well-
8 constructed roads, it is unlikely to be true in poor countries where money for road building is
9 scarce or for locations with low construction quality. If the pavement is not sufficiently strong,
10 when a resurfacing is performed, the pavement's condition will improve but underlying damages
11 will remain. Therefore, the level of roughness after resurfacing would be higher and the rate of
12 deterioration faster. Future work should include both reconstruction and resurfacing as
13 alternatives so that the methodology is applicable more broadly.

14 Another extension should be to include other environmental metrics that an agency may be
15 interested in minimizing, such as particulate matter (PM). The effects of PM are local, so it will
16 be necessary to determine the population near roads and asphalt plants. This research assumed
17 that the agency will choose the asphalt plant that is the closest to a construction site, but this may
18 change when including PM. It may be better to use a plant that is farther away from the
19 construction site and also is in a sparsely populated area.

20 The idea of simultaneous optimization including costs and GHG emissions can be extended to
21 topics beyond pavement management. Within transportation, the idea has been applied to public
22 transportation systems (Griswold et al 2013, Griswold et al 2014). Outside of transportation,
23 researchers have examined tradeoffs with other technologies, such as water distribution systems
24 (Wu 2009) and cogeneration (Bamufleh 2013). We hope that some of the ideas in this paper
25 (e.g., using a Pareto curve to compare alternatives, selling carbon credits, etc.) can find use in the
26 aforementioned topics as well as new areas where these types of tradeoffs have yet to be
27 explored.

28 **Acknowledgments**

29 Funding for this research was provided by a University of California Transportation Center
30 (UCTC) faculty research grant.

31 **References**

32 Air Resources Board (2014). Assembly Bill 32 Overview. *California Environmental Protection*
33 *Agency*, <<http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm>>. (August 4, 2014)

34 Bai, Q., Labi, S., & Sinha, K. C. (2011). Trade-off analysis for multiobjective optimization in
35 transportation asset management by generating Pareto frontiers using Extreme Points

1 Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II. *Journal of Transportation Engineering*, 138(6),
2 798-808.

3 Bai, Q., Ahmed, A., Li, Z., & Labi, S. (2014). A Hybrid Pareto Frontier Generation Method for
4 Trade-Off Analysis in Transportation Asset Management. *Computer-Aided Civil and*
5 *Infrastructure Engineering*^[SMM1].
6

7 Bamufleh, H. S., Ponce-Ortega, J. M., & El-Halwagi, M. M. (2013). Multi-objective
8 optimization of process cogeneration systems with economic, environmental, and social
9 tradeoffs. *Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy*, 15(1), 185-197.

10 Bryce, J. M., Flintsch, G., & Hall, R. P. (2014). A multi criteria decision analysis technique for
11 including environmental impacts in sustainable infrastructure management business
12 practices. *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment*, 32, 435-445.

13 Caltrans (2014) Traffic Counts. *Caltrans Division of Traffic Operations*,
14 <<http://traffic-counts.dot.ca.gov/>> (August 26, 2015)

15 Census Bureau (2014). Highway Mileage by State. *U.S. Census Bureau*,
16 <<https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1089.pdf> >. (November 25, 2014)

17 Chester, M., and Horvath, A. (2009). Environmental assessment of passenger transportation
18 should include infrastructure and supply chains. *Environmental Research Letters*, 4(2), 024008.

19 Cicas, G., Hendrickson, C.T., Horvath, A., and Matthews, H.S. (2007). A regional version of a
20 U.S. economic input-output life-cycle assessment model. *International Journal of Life Cycle*
21 *Assessment*, 12(6), 365-372.

22 EPA (2014) Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions *United States Environmental Protection*
23 *Agency* <<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html>> (March 20, 2015)

24 Faghieh-Imani, A., & Amador-Jimenez, L. (2013). Toward Sustainable Pavement Management:
25 Incorporating Environmental Impacts of Pavement Treatments into a Performance-Based
26 Optimization. *Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board*,
27 (2366), 13-21.

28 Federal Highway Administration (2012). Smoothness. *U.S. Department of Transportation*,
29 <<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/Pavement/smoothness/index.cfm>>. (March 7, 2013)

30 Federal Highway Administration (2014). Traffic Volume Trends. *U.S. Department of*
31 *Transportation*,
32 <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/travel_monitoring/14novvtvt/14novvtvt.pdf >.
33 (November 20, 2014)

34 Fwa, T. F., Chan, W. T., and Hoque, K. Z. (2000). Multiobjective optimization for pavement
35 maintenance programming. *Journal of Transportation Engineering*, 126(5), 367-374.

- 1 Gosse, C. A., Smith, B. L., & Clarens, A. F. (2012). Environmentally preferable pavement
2 management systems. *Journal of Infrastructure Systems*, 19(3), 315-325.
- 3 Griswold, J. B., Madanat, S., & Horvath, A. (2013). Tradeoffs between costs and greenhouse gas
4 emissions in the design of urban transit systems. *Environmental Research Letters*, 8(4), 044046.
- 5 Griswold, J. B., Cheng, H., Madanat, S., & Horvath, A. (2014), Unintended Greenhouse Gas
6 Consequences of Lowering Level of Service in Urban Transit Systems. *Environmental Research
7 Letters*, 9(12), 124001.
- 8 Gu, W., Ouyang, Y., and Madanat, S. (2012). Joint optimization of pavement maintenance and
9 resurfacing planning. *Transportation Research Part B: Methodological*, 46(4), 511-519.
- 10 Hand, A. J., Sebaaly, P. E., and Epps, J. A. (1999). Development of performance models based
11 on department of transportation pavement management system data. *Transportation Research
12 Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board*, 1684, 215-222.
- 13 Horvath, A., and Hendrickson, C. (1998). Comparison of environmental implications of asphalt
14 and steel-reinforced concrete pavements. *Transportation Research Record: Journal of the
15 Transportation Research Board*, 1626(1), 105-113.
- 16 Li, Y., and Madanat, S. (2002). A steady-state solution for the optimal pavement resurfacing
17 problem. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 36(6), 525-535.
- 18 Li, J., Muench, S. T., Mahoney, J. P., Pierce, L., and Sivaneswaran, N. (2004). Application of
19 HDM-4 in the WSDOT highway system. *University of Washington, Report WA-RD 588.1*.
20 <<http://depts.washington.edu/trac/bulkdisk/pdf/588.1.pdf>> (March 7, 2013)
- 21 Lidicker, J., Sathaye, N., Madanat, S., and Horvath, A. (2013). Pavement resurfacing policy for
22 minimization of life-cycle costs and greenhouse gas emissions. *Journal of Infrastructure
23 Systems*, 19(2), 129-137.
- 24 Ouyang, Y., and Madanat, S. (2006). An analytical solution for the finite-horizon pavement
25 resurfacing planning problem. *Transportation Research Part B: Methodological*, 40(9), 767-778.
- 26 PaLATE (2013). Pavement Life-cycle Assesment Tool for Environmental and Economic Effects.
27 <<http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~horvath/palate.html>>. (March 24, 2014)
- 28 Paterson, W. D. (1987). *The Highway Design and Maintenance Standard Series-Road
29 Deterioration and Maintenance Effects*. A World Bank Publication, The John Hopkins
30 University Press, Baltimore, Maryland.
- 31 Reger, D., Madanat, S., and Horvath, A. (2014). Economically and environmentally informed
32 policy for road resurfacing: tradeoffs between costs and greenhouse gas emissions.
33 *Environmental Research Letters*, 9(10), 104020.

- 1 Revi, A., D.E. Satterthwaite, F. Aragón-Durand, J. Corfee-Morlot, R.B.R. Kiunsi, M. Pelling,
2 D.C. Roberts, and W. Solecki, (2014): Urban areas. In: *Climate Change 2014: Impacts,*
3 *Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working*
4 *Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*
5 [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee,
6 K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R.
7 Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
8 and New York, NY, USA, pp. 535-612.
- 9 Rodríguez-Alloza, A. M., Malik, A., Lenzen, M., & Gallego, J. (2015). Hybrid input–output life
10 cycle assessment of warm mix asphalt mixtures. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 90, 171-182.
- 11 Santero, N., Harvey, J., and Horvath A. (2011a). Environmental policy for long-life pavements.
12 *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment*, 16(2), 129-136.
- 13 Santero, N. J., and Horvath, A. (2009). Global warming potential of pavements. *Environmental*
14 *Research Letters*, 4(3), 034011.
- 15 Santero, N., Masanet, E., and Horvath A. (2011b). Life-cycle assessment of pavements. Part II:
16 Filling the research gaps. *Resources, Conservation and Recycling*, 55(9-10), 810-818.
- 17 Sathaye, N., and Madanat, S. (2012). A bottom-up optimal pavement resurfacing solution
18 approach for large-scale networks. *Transportation Research Part B: Methodological*, 46(4), 520-
19 528.
- 20 Sathaye, N., Horvath A., and Madanat, S. (2010). Unintended impacts of increased truck loads
21 on pavement supply-chain emissions. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*,
22 44(1), 1-15.
- 23 Sedjo, R. A., and Marland, G. (2003). Inter-trading permanent emissions credits and rented
24 temporary carbon emissions offsets: Some issues and alternatives. *Climate Policy*, 3(4), 435-444.
- 25 Tseng, E. *The Construction of Pavement Performance Models for the California Department of*
26 *Transportation New Pavement Management System*. M. Sc. Thesis. University of California,
27 Davis, 2012.
- 28 Wang, T., Lee, I. S., Kendall, A., Harvey, J., Lee, E. B. E., and Kim, C. (2012). Life cycle
29 energy consumption and GHG emission from pavement rehabilitation with different rolling
30 resistance. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 33, 86-96.
- 31 Wang, T., Harvey, J., and Kendall, A. (2014). Reducing greenhouse gas emissions through
32 strategic management of highway pavement roughness. *Environmental Research Letters*, 9(3),
33 034007.

- 1 Watanatada, T., Dhareshwar, A.M., and Lima, P.R.S.R. (1987). *Vehicle Speeds and Operating*
2 *Costs: Models for Road Planning and Management*. A World Bank Publication, The Johns
3 Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland.
- 4 White House (2014) Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean
5 Energy Cooperation, *Office of the Press Secretary* <[https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c)
6 [office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c)>
7 (Accessed March 26, 2015)
- 8 Wu, W., Simpson, A. R., & Maier, H. R. (2009). Accounting for greenhouse gas emissions in
9 multiobjective genetic algorithm optimization of water distribution systems. *Journal of Water*
10 *Resources Planning and Management*, 136(2), 146-155.
- 11
12 Zaabar, I., and Chatti, K. (2014). Estimating Vehicle Operating Costs Caused by Pavement
13 Surface Conditions. *Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research*
14 *Board*, 2455(1), 63-76.
- 15 Zhang, H., Keoleian, G. A., Lepech, M. D., and Kendall, A. (2010). Life-cycle optimization of
16 pavement overlay systems. *Journal of Infrastructure Systems*, 16(4), 310-322.
- 17 Zhang, H., Keoleian, G., and Lepech, M. (2013). "Network-Level Pavement Asset Management
18 System Integrated with Life-Cycle Analysis and Life-Cycle Optimization." *Journal of*
19 *Infrastructure Systems*, 19(1), 99–107.