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Author

Soja, Ed

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Ed Soja

School of Urban Planning
UCLA

**"Los Angeles 1965-1992:
The Six Geographies of Urban Restructuring"**

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LOS ANGELES 1965-1992:THE SIX

GEOGRAPHIES OF URBAN RESTRUCTURING

Between 1965 and 1992, the metropolis of Los Angeles experienced a dramatic transformation. Often at the forefront of new urbanization trends ever since its rapid growth in the late nineteenth century, Los Angeles again came to exemplify the dynamics of yet another round of accelerated urban restructuring that has been reshaping the American city in the closing decades of the twentieth century. At least six new urban geographies took form in the aftermath of the Watts rebellion of 1965; they developed together with impressive synergy over nearly thirty years of rapid economic growth; and at the very point when the restructured Los Angeles was comfortably consolidated as one of the paradigmatic metropolises of the late twentieth-century, the "new" Los Angeles exploded in the most violent urban insurrection in American history.

Within the spatio-temporal brackets of this period and place a remarkable story is compressed, one which has implications far beyond the local context. Through its telling can be seen a symptomatic history and geography of the contemporary world, a revealing glimpse of what it has meant to be alive over the past three decades not only in Los Angeles but nearly everywhere on earth. Many places provide similarly revealing viewpoints from which to make theoretical and practical sense of the contemporary world, but few offer such a vivid and variegated panorama of insights as that provided by the Los Angeles experience, from the crisis generated restructuring that followed the events of 1965 to what I will describe as the restructuring generated crisis that surfaced in 1992.

LOOKING BACK: LOS ANGELES IN 1965

To outsiders and many of its own inhabitants, the Los Angeles that erupted in the Watts rebellion of 1965 was a virtually unknown city hidden behind the thick sheathing of a hyperactivated American imaginary. The academic world of urban studies, still being swayed by the appealing orderliness of Chicago and the indescribable density of power and culture in New York, steered clear of Southern California, leaving all hope of accurate understanding to other observers more comfortable with the region's seemingly bizarre exceptionalism. What was more generally known about Los Angeles in both the academic and popular literatures

was vicarious and impressionistic, built on a collection of heavily mediated images passing, almost by default, for the real thing.

Every city generates such imagery, internally and externally, but Los Angeles was (and is) more specialized in image production and more prone to be understood through its imagery than any other urban region. On location here since the 1920s are the "dream factories" of what is still called "the industry," mass producing moving pictures of Los Angeles that insistently substitute reel stories for real histories and geographies. Camera crews "shooting" scenes depicting practically every place on earth (and often off-earth) are a familiar sight on the streets of the city, and a constant local reminder of the confusing interplay between fantasy and reality that pervades everyday urban life, especially in the City of Angels. By 1965, ten years after its opening, Disneyland had added new layers to this landscape of vicarious unreality. Its imagineered proto-geography of America reconfigured the mental maps of the national subconscious to fit the familiar artifice deposited in a tiny corner of Orange County. A cleverly concocted Main Street centered the map and led the all-consuming visitor to separate worlds of fantasy, the future, the frontier, the "happiest places" on earth. With the addition of mass audience television, the blanket of consciousness-shaping imagery was not only thicker than anywhere else, it was more creatively heterogeneous and diverting in Los Angeles, the place where urban imagineering was invented, commodified, mass produced, and projected to a worldwide scale and scope.

Behind these broadcast scenes, however, was another Los Angeles that is only now coming into focus through an almost archeological process of excavation, a digging process that Mike Davis describes in his City of Quartz as "excavating the future". Amidst the imagic runes of this extendable past, a clearer picture of the "actually existing" Los Angeles of 1965 is beginning to take shape. What it depicts can be seen as both the darkest side of the American Dream and a crowning moment of twentieth century urban modernity, a particularly vivid presentation of the simultaneously utopian and dystopian urbanization that has been shaping the development of Los Angeles since its origins.

More than a century of obsessive Anglofication (posing as Americanization) had increasingly "purified" the population of El Pueblo de Nuestra Senora la Reina de Los Angeles to the point that, in 1960, more than 80% of the population were non-Hispanic whites or "Anglos" (to use a term deeply and defiantly rooted in the recolonization of formerly Spanish America). Although the statisticians might quibble, this Anglo population was almost entirely suburban in lifestyle, not unlike the situation comedies of television, constructing places where city and countryside blended together in a new experiential synthesis. This synthesis was definitively WASPish, for Los Angeles had for decades contained the highest percentage of native-born Protestants of all the largest US cities. With a substantial dose of irony, Los Angeles in 1965 could be described quite figuratively as "The First American City" (see Weinstein, Chapter ?). An almost

crusade-like mentality pervaded this white, often anti-papist, and racially proud Christian majority, supremely confident in its successful inhabitation and preservation of an earthly and preternaturally American paradise.

Few areas of Los Angeles contained the conventional densities of urban life, even among the poor and working class communities of every color, for the city's ghettos and barrios were more suburban than anywhere else in America. "Sixty Suburbs in Search of a City" became the catchall description of life in Los Angeles in the 1960s and many of those suburbs wore blue collars. Built into this homogeneously city-less sprawl of American Dream-like communities was what two of the best academic treatments of Los Angeles at the time called a "fragmented metropolis" and a "non-place urban realm," the former reflecting the mass production of suburban municipalities (what a later observer would call "cities by contract"), the latter tapping the rootlessness and artificiality of place-named identities and "proximate" community.¹ Having escaped the claustrophobic tightness of small town America and the imperfect urbanity of the big cities, well-off Angelenos atomistically constructed far-flung networks of contacts and activities centered around increasingly protected homespaces rather than in well-defined neighborhood communities. The unlisted telephone number and the gated and walled-in residence symbolized this most privatized of urban landscapes. Truly public spaces were few and far between, as what the social theorists call "civil society" seemed to melt into the airwaves and freeways and other circuitries of the sprawling urban scene.

Mass suburbanization and other centrifugal forces had emptied the gridlocked downtown of the 1920s, leaving only a decaying financial and retail center, a few hotels, and the still imposing Civic Center, which had been recently philanthropically revived by the the opening in December, 1964, of the Music Center, a product of a fantastically successful effort by the Anglo elite to put their acropolitan culture high up on the map of the city. Still towering over downtown, however, was City Hall, which by 1965 had become a global symbol of the American justice system after being portrayed each week on *Dragnet*, whose Sgt. Joe Friday curtly epitomized modernist justice for white America by always insisting on "just the facts, ma'am" in scripts that were checked for verisimilitude by then police chief William H. Parker of the LAPD. No fluffy imagery here, for there was a threatening dark side to life in the brightness of the simulated city of angels, a tough counterpoint landscape that teemed with stygian dangers, never very far from the glittering surface.

Downtown Los Angeles has been the dystopian Main Street of the world's most visible Noir City at least since the 1920s, a lineage that traces easily from the gritty Bunker Hill of Raymond Chandler to the acid-rain swept streets of Ridley

¹References for Fogleson and Webber.

Scott's only slightly futuristic "Blade Runner" (see Davis, Chapter ?). And by 1965, the contrapuntal dark side of the Southern California dreamscape seemed to be particularly rife with what many upholders of the peace were convinced was their greatest threat ever, nothing short of a global alliance of evil forces bent on planetary domination, echoing the many villainous scripts shot on Los Angeles' meaner streets. When Watts exploded in the summer of 1965, the unfolding events immediately appeared to many as the products of a maniacal noir-Disney staging an evil spectacular in Negroland, the darkest and most secretive annex to Noir City. Police Chief Parker, whose name now enshrines the riot-damaged downtown headquarters of LAPD that was a primary target in the 1992 uprising, not unexpectedly saw everything in black and white, with a little red thrown in for good measure. The revolutionary "monkeys" in the "zoo" of Negroland were running amok, he said, stirred by the "Communists" and their hordes of Hollywood sympathizers. With little accurate knowledge and understanding to distinguish the difference between the two, the real Los Angeles once again seemed to collapse into the vivid Los Angeles imaginary. How else could one understand the latest event staged in this dystopic utopia, this place where the unique and the paradoxical are somehow universalized for all to see?

Only well after the rioting, burning, and looting spread to other cities, did a different picture begin to develop of late modern Los Angeles and the deeper--and wider--meaning of the Watts rebellion. Spurred by its increasing role as America's military arsenal for three successive Pacific wars, the Los Angeles region had experienced the most rapid industrial growth of any region in the country after the Great Depression. Federally subsidized suburbanization combined with federally fostered industrial growth to create an exceedingly efficient urban machine for simultaneously stimulating both mass production and mass consumption, one of the crown jewels of the Fordist-Keynesian "social contract" that allowed Big business, Big labor, and Big government to lead the great American post-war boom.

After 1942, when Executive Order 8802 forced war contractors to stop their racist hiring practices, another federally-induced ingredient was added to the local mix.² One of the largest internal migration streams in American history brought

²1942 was an especially interesting year for Los Angeles. The first concentration camps were created to remove Japanese-Americans from their property and businesses in the city, a Japanese submarine shelled an oil field near Santa Barbara, and a purely imaginary air raid led to a crazed scenario in which a "hostile aircraft" was reported to have been shot down on Vermont Avenue. Five citizens died in this imaginary invasion, three from car crashes and two from heart attacks. In the same year, Camp Pendleton Marine corps base was founded and the "Sleepy Lagoon" murder triggered another racist-enhanced

nearly 600,000 African-Americans into Los Angeles County alone between 1942 and 1965. They carried with them the cutting edge of national black politics, enhanced by the growing power of the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, the dreams of Martin Luther King, and the raised fist of black nationalism. A second large migration stream, similarly attracted to the hyperactive Los Angeles job machine ever since the Great Depression, added almost equal numbers of relatively poor white southerners to the cultural mix of the city once called "Iowa's seaport".³

Not surprisingly perhaps, both groups concentrated around the huge urban industrial zone (then probably the second largest in the world, after the Ruhr) stretching from downtown to the twin ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, a zone bounded on its western edge by Alameda Avenue, which in 1965 had become one of the most pronounced racial divides in any American city. On one side of this so-called Cotton Curtain were the factories and jobs and such exemplary white working-class suburbs as South Gate; immediately on the other was a string of equally exemplary African American sub-urban communities, many on unincorporated county land and all strikingly bereft of major industrial establishments as well as basic social services: Florence, Watts, Willowbrook, Compton. Despite a tantalizing physical proximity to one of the largest pools of high-wage, unionized, blue collar jobs in the country, nearly one-third of the African American workforce was unemployed and almost sixty percent lived on welfare. This southside racial geography provided the immediate backdrop to the urban "civil war" that was part of the events of 1965, once again illustrating how race divides America in ways that often cut across powerful class divisions.

Although concentrated in the Watts district of the City of Los Angeles, the rebellion peaked along the entire corridor just west of Alameda, an area which had become one of the major local, national, and global centers of radical black consciousness in the 1960s. Perhaps nowhere else were conditions more ripe for rebellion. Los Angeles, after a long history of racist administration, zoning, and violence, had become one of the most segregated cities in the country; its mayor, police chief, and dominant newspaper had given sufficient indications that this

frenzy in which as many as 150 Mexican-American "boy gang" members (as they were then called) were arrested for the death of one youth at a party in East Los Angeles.

³Significant changes in U.S. immigration laws were made in 1965, following the end of bracero program in the previous year. The continuing hunger for cheap foreign labor to feed industrial growth and assist in disciplining the burgeoning domestic workforce would stimulate the extraordinary immigration from Mexico, Central America, and Asia in the succeeding decades.

tradition of recalcitrant racism was still flourishing in the centers of political power; and another obsessive tradition, of McCarthyesque anti-communism, fed by the vicious trials of Hollywood "sympathizers" and the defeat of a vigorous "socialist" public housing movement in the 1950s,⁴ had excitedly centered its attention on uppity blacks as the great revolutionary threat to the American dream. The mood of the time was captured one month before the August insurrection. In an attempt to stem what seemed to be a rising tide of police brutality, then LAPD lieutenant Tom Bradley formally protested against the widespread posting of John Birch Society literature on LAPD bulletin boards, literature that labelled Martin Luther King and other Black leaders as dangerous communists and implicitly promoted white and thin-blue-line terrorism against the enemy within.

At the national level, urban blacks had assumed, both by default and by active choice, the leadership of American social movement politics and were thus the most powerful voice of resistance against the status quo and racially uneven development of the Fordist/Keynesian economic boom. Although African-Americans in Los Angeles had probably benefitted from the boom more than those of any other major urban region, the segregated social geography of the larger metropolis all too visibly presented itself as an extraordinarily polarized mosaic of extreme and conspicuous wealth and poverty, a consciousness-raising tableau of racially-intensified relative deprivation. That the worst civil disturbance of the century would occur where and when it did was therefore as predictable as the immediate reaction to it. Thirty-four people were killed (31 by police gunfire), 1,032 were injured, and 3,952 were arrested (the vast majority African-American). Property damage topped \$40 million and 6000 buildings were damaged, most heavily along 103rd Street, which came to be called Charcoal Alley.

Looked at myopically, the riots, burning, and looting appeared to be a self-inflicted local wound instigated by the particular frustrations and impatience of a long impoverished and racially isolated population. In retrospect, however, the events were of more global significance. They can be seen today as a violent announcement that "business as usual" in urban and industrial America could no longer continue without explosive resistance, even in the most successful boomtown of the twentieth century. The Watts rebellion and the series of urban uprisings which followed it in the late 1960s all over the world (and again in Los Angeles in August, 1970, with the Chicano Moratorium, the largest mass protest of Mexican-Americans in US history) marked one of the beginnings of the end of the post-war economic boom and the social contract and Fordist/Keynesian state planning that underpinned its propulsiveness. As occurred a century earlier, the peculiar articulations of race and class in the US ruptured the booming space economy at about the time it was reaching its peak performance. The worldwide

⁴See Don Parson references.

recession of the early 1970s, the worst since the Great Depression, helped to confirm the turning-pointedness of the preceding decade, but even more convincing confirmation can be derived from the dramatic restructuring process that has been far-reaching in transforming the urban landscape and the very nature of urban modernity over the past two decades. As seen from the present, the urban worlds of 1965 have not only been "deconstructed," they have also become increasingly "reconstituted" in many different ways. How this crisis-generated deconstruction and reconstitution took place in Los Angeles provides a particularly revealing story.

URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS

Until the early 1980s, Los Angeles remained as understudied and theoretically incomprehensible as it was in 1965. The little wave of attention that followed the Watts rebellion had passed into the forgetful busyness of a national economy trying to deal with stagflation, industrial decline, and the broadly felt downturn in real income that would later be described as the "Great U-Turn."⁵ As another severe recession hit urban America (1979-1982) and Reaganomics began to take hold, Los Angeles was "discovered" by a group of local urban analysts who sought to construct in their studies not only a deeper understanding of what was happening in Los Angeles but also a picture of how these local developments might provide insight into the changes taking place in the regional, national, and global economies. Urban restructuring was the central theme of this new literature on the greater Los Angeles region. In the decade from 1982 to 1992, it would generate more significant scholarly writings on Los Angeles than had been produced in the preceding two centuries.

The most influential discovery shaping this new literature came from the realization that the urban region of Los Angeles had developed from the 1920s as one of the world's largest industrial growth poles, that those distracting dream factories of Hollywood stood amidst what was becoming the largest manufacturing city in North America. That this industrial expansion was continuing apace during a period of extensive deindustrialization elsewhere intensified the challenge of making practical and theoretical sense of the apparently anomalous Los Angeles experience. Between 1970 and 1980, the entire country experienced a net addition of less than a million manufacturing jobs and New York lost well over 300,000, triggering descriptions of wholesale industrial decline and the rise of "postindustrial" society. In the same decade, however, the far from post-industrial Los Angeles region added 225,000 new manufacturing jobs, as well as 1,300,000

⁵Harrison and Bluestone

people and an even larger number of total jobs in all categories of employment. How could this extraordinary countercurrent be explained? Why had it been so invisible for so long? What impact was it having on the local economy? Was this industrialization in Los Angeles merely a continuation of post-war trends or was it taking new forms and directions? How could this aggregate picture of a booming regional economy be reconciled with increasing local indications of intensifying poverty, unemployment, and homelessness?

These and other questions initiated an empirical and theoretical exploration of the dynamics of urban restructuring in Los Angeles that was attuned to the particularities of the regional context and, at the same time, connected to more general debates on the changing organization of the national and global political economies. Reflecting the spatial perspective that has informed much of this urban restructuring research, its findings can be summarized around six "geographies," each representing an important dimension of accelerated urban change as well as a particular approach to interpreting the "new" Los Angeles that took shape in the period between 1965 and 1992. As will become evident here and in other chapters to follow, the study of urban restructuring has expanded well beyond the initial focus on industrial change to raise issues of much broader local and global significance.

I. EXOPOLIS: THE RESTRUCTURING OF URBAN FORM

Los Angeles has been participating in the redefinition of urban form throughout the twentieth century. The classic model of urban form, built primarily around the nineteenth century industrial capitalist city, presented a monocentric picture of increasing geographical regularity patterned by the dynamics of employment and residential agglomeration. Everything revolved around the singular city center. From its peak densities of population, jobs, and fixed capital investment rippled concentric zonations of residential land use, household composition, and family life. Stretching these concentricities outward were radial sectors that developed particular cross-cutting specializations: zones of industry and commerce, usually one high income residential area extending from the center to the suburban fringe, and one or more working class zones, typically associated with tightly segregated communities of racial and ethnic minorities. Cities that had grown large before the nineteenth century surge in urban industrialization displayed much less regularity, but even in these cases regularities could be found by those who assiduously searched for them.

From its first major urban boom in the late nineteenth century, Los Angeles seemed to have a morphological mind of its own. The classic urban forms were never entirely absent and glimmerings of them are discoverable even today, but from the beginning the Los Angeles urban fabric took on a very different texture.

Although the centrality of downtown Los Angeles has been recognizable for more than two hundred years, the surrounding urban region grew as a fragmented and decentered metropolis, a patchwork quilt of low density suburban communities stretching over an extraordinarily irregular terrain of mountains, valleys, beaches, and deserts. Both tying the fabric together and giving it its unusual elasticity was first a remarkable network of inter-urban electric railways and then an even more remarkable freeway system, each visibly focussed on the downtown node but spinally tapping a multiplicity of increasingly outlying centers and peripheries. (see Wachs, Chapter ?)

This more flexible and resilient urban ecology seemed to stimulate eccentric specializations and segregations. By 1965, the patchwork of Los Angeles contained a tightly circumscribed African American ghetto and Mexican American barrio, and, as previously noted, a vast urban industrial zone and a well-defined area of poor whites from the southern states. There were also mini-ghettoes and mini-barrios scattered over the landscape, as well as smaller but still significant clusters of industrial production and other specialized land uses, often enshrined in the names of particular municipalities: City of Industry, City of Commerce, Studio City.

By 1965, Los Angeles had become simultaneously eccentric and paradigmatic, a peculiar place yet one that seemed to be symptomatic of the newest trends in American urbanization and modernity. In the 1950s, it was the only one of the fifteen largest cities in the country to grow in population and even its fiercely ghettoed African American community was named by the Urban League in 1964 as the best among 68 cities for blacks to live. What then has happened since 1965? The answer, as will be true for all the geographies of urban restructuring, involves both significant continuities and pronounced changes in the urbanization process and attendant patternings of urban life and experience. First of all, the population continued to grow at an unusually rapid rate, matched only by other western and LA-like cities such as Houston and Phoenix. By 1992, the sprawling regional metropolis had filled in most of a sixty-mile circle drawn around the downtown Civic Center, encompassing the built-up area of five counties and a constellation of more than 150 cities and municipalities. With a population approaching 15 million, Los Angeles today has become one of the world's largest "megacities" (another of the many new terms devised to capture contemporary urbanization trends) and was rapidly catching up to the three other megacities of the so-called First World: Tokyo, New York, and London.

This growth was marked by continued decentralization of residential population, industrial establishments, corporate offices, and retail activities into the outer reaches of the sixty-mile circle, following trends established in nearly all North American cities since the end of the nineteenth century. But between 1965 and 1992, this decentralization seemed to break out from its conventional metropolitan boundaries. As before, manufacturing and office development in

particular moved outward through the concentric rings and along sectoral zones into satellite cities and suburban green spaces. But increasingly, they burst out even further to fuel what, after the 1980 census, was called (somewhat prematurely, it now seems) the "great non-metropolitan turnaround," when for the first time in U.S. history, small towns and non-metropolitan counties grew more rapidly than either the central cities or the suburban rings. The suburbs at least were able to rebound in the 1980s (more on this in a moment), but what became clearer was that the scale and scope of decentralization was becoming increasingly globalized, that American manufacturing was not only leaving its metropolitan concentrations, it was leaving the country entirely. This meant that the dynamics shaping urban form could no longer be seen as confined within the metropolitan space, even when expanded to include the larger national system of cities. The local was becoming global more than ever before, and this was demanding new ways of understanding the "specificity" of the urban.

The restructuring of Los Angeles exemplified all of these decentralization trends. At the same time as decentralization was occurring, however, there was another major development that was reshaping urban form in Los Angeles and many other metropolitan regions even more dramatically, a recentralization process that would place much greater stress on the traditional conceptual frameworks of urban analysis. The primary form of this recentralization can be described most simply as peripheral urbanization, but within this slightly oxymoronic phrase is contained what some contemporary observers claim is one of the most radical transformations of urban life and landscape ever seen, a virtual deconstruction and reconstitution of urban form. By 1990, the population census would show another historical turn. For the first time, the majority of Americans were living in megacities, sprawling metropolitan regions of more than one million inhabitants.

At the simplest descriptive level, peripheral urbanization refers to the growth of cities in suburbia, the increasing concentration of jobs, factories, offices, shopping centers, entertainment and cultural activities, heterogeneous populations, new immigrants, gangs, crime, and a host of other attributes once thought to be specifically urban in areas that never before had experienced such intensive agglomeration. In recent years, this urbanization of suburbia has triggered a burst of descriptive invention to provide a vocabulary commensurable with the new forms taking shape, with what some have described as "the city turned inside out." Counterurbanization and the growth of Outer Cities are perhaps now the most widely used terms, but the list of alternatives is expanding: postsuburbia, edge cities, urban villages, metroplex, technopoles, technoburbs, technopolis.

Drawing particularly on the Los Angeles experience, I have added another summative term, Exopolis, literally the city "without" in the double sense of the expanding Outer (vs. the Inner) City as well as the city that no longer is, the ex-

city. This double meaning signals an explicit attack on our conventional usage of the terms urban, suburban, and ex-urban to describe divisions within contemporary metropolitan areas. As geographical restructuring works increasingly to blur these distinctions, we must not only revamp our vocabulary but also reconceptualize the very nature of urban studies, to see urban form more as a complex and polycentric regional mosaic of geographically uneven development affecting and affected by local, national, and global forces and influences. Studying Los Angeles (or Tokyo, or Sao Paulo, or Little Rock) thus becomes a window on to a wider panorama of subject matter than has traditionally been treated in the field of urban studies. This theme and this challenge runs through every chapter of this book.

Four major Outer Cities can be identified in the Los Angeles regional exopolis. None of the four have conventional urban place names or identities and they do not appear clearly in official statistical tabulations, but each has been among the fastest growing "urban" areas in the country over the past thirty years. If identified as distinct cities, each would rank among the fifteen largest in the country. The largest and perhaps most paradigmatic of all Outer Cities is multiply centered in Orange County, an agglomeration of about 50 incorporated cities (none much over 300,000 in size) with a total population of more than two and a half million. Orange County has been an especially significant focus of restructuring research in all its dimensions (see Scott, Soja, Kling et al) and has become a model of sorts for comparative urban studies throughout the world.

Of similar size and even more expansive in recent years is what might be called the "Greater Valley," stretching from Glendale and Burbank through the San Fernando Valley, once the epitomization of American suburbia, to Chatsworth-Canoga Park (administratively part of the City of Los Angeles) and beyond into adjacent Ventura County, with another extension northward into the high desert and canyon country of northern Los Angeles County. In Chapter 7, Allen Scott vividly traces the evolution of the high-technology industrial complex that has played a central role in the development of this Outer City, replicating the growth of Orange County that he had described in earlier publications.

A third Outer City has grown along the Pacific shores of Los Angeles County from Malibu to Long Beach, which, with its twin port of San Pedro, has risen to challenge the Randstad and Tokyo-Yokohama as the world largest port complex. At the center of this Outer City region is Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and the large agglomeration of office buildings, hotels, and high technology research and manufacturing establishments that surround it. Sometimes called "Aerospace Alley," this region contains what is probably the country's largest concentration of the American military-industrial complex and has been the seedbed of US weapons and warfare research from the development of the DC-3 to Star Wars.

The fourth Outer City extends from the eastern edge of Los Angeles County to the most developed parts of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. Called the Inland Empire after its wartime industrial expansion in the 1940s and 50s, this subregion of Exopolis is the least developed of the four in terms of industrial employment and office growth, having suffered significantly from the deindustrialization process over the past thirty years. Its rapid population growth, fed by the sprawling development of relatively cheap housing, has created some of the cruelest repercussions of the restructuring of urban form, especially in terms of what the policy-makers call the "jobs-housing balance." Lured by the success stories of other Outer Cities, hundreds of thousands of people have moved to planned new communities in anticipation of soon finding local employment opportunities. All too often, however, the promised jobs do not arrive, leaving huge populations stranded up to sixty miles from their places of employment.

To take perhaps the extreme example, the city of Moreno Valley, located in the far eastern edge of the sixty-mile circle of greater Los Angeles, has reached national attention as an exemplar of the new problems arising in the housing-rich job-poor areas of the Outer City. The 1990 census listed Moreno Valley as the fastest growing city over 100,000 in the entire country (of the top ten, seven were in Southern California). With local employment growth far below what was promised by the community developers, large numbers of residents are forced to rise well before dawn to drive or be taken by vans and buses, often for more than two hours, to the places of employment they held before moving to Moreno Valley. Without a large commercial or industrial tax base, public services are poor, schools are overcrowded, freeways are gridlocked, and family life is deeply stressed as residents contend with the psychological and financial costs of living in a new "Edge City" of more than 120,000 inhabitants that is becoming what might be called a new exopolitan slum.

The four Outer Cities of the re-regionalized Exopolis of Los Angeles box in a residual Inner City that has been experiencing a dramatic recentralization of its own. Reversing decades of suburban drain (but not the "white flight" that has been an important part of the formation of Outer Cities), downtown Los Angeles and its surrounding Inner City ring has probably doubled in population since 1965 to more than five million. This reversal of fortune, like the transformation of suburbia, has been geographically uneven and the highs and lows of development have been changing rapidly over the past thirty years. With seeming irony, while many Inner Cities further east have experienced continued reductions in population and job densities, that paragon of low-density urbanization has been packing them in. Many sections of the Inner City of Los Angeles now have population densities higher than Chicago or St. Louis, often without significant changes in the built form of housing, creating severe problems of residential overcrowding. But to gain better insight into the changing exopolitan Inner City, as well as to understand better the shifting regional mosaic of geographically

uneven development in the Outer Cities, we must turn to other restructuring processes.

II. FLEXCITIES: THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION

Accompanying the changing urban morphology of Los Angeles have been substantial shifts in the social division of labor and in the corporate organization and technology of industrial production. This important link between industrial restructuring and the restructuring of urban form has been a key focus for much of the new literature on Los Angeles. It has also contributed to a changing emphasis within urban studies more generally and in the practices of urban and regional planning. For most of this century, urban analysis and urban planning have given primary attention to matters of collective consumption: housing, the provision of social services, public welfare policies and anti-poverty programs, the development of mass transit systems, land-use regulation, and the emergence of urban social movements around these issues. Today, more and more attention (in money, time, and effort) is being given to the production side of the urban economy and to such questions as how to attract new businesses to stem economic decline and contend with the larger forces of global economic restructuring.

Academic analyses of this powerful relation between industrial and urban restructuring have hinged around a pronounced shift in industrial organization and technology from the Fordist-Keynesian practices of mass production and mass consumption that dominated the post-war economic boom in the US, to what is increasingly described today as a Post-Fordist system of flexible production and corporate development that has been at the forefront of urban economic restructuring since at least 1965. Fordist mass production was rooted in dedicated assembly lines and vertically integrated production systems feeding off increasing internal economies of scale that were sustainable only by huge oligopolistic corporations engaged in a relatively stable social contract with the largest trade unions and a federal government dedicated to priming the consumption pump of the national economy through Keynesian practices of demand stimulation and social welfare provision. Under these conditions, it was no great exaggeration to claim that as General Motors or Ford goes, so would go the American economy, for in the automobile industry the entire gamut of Fordist and Keynesian practices were most characteristically manifested.

Fordism continues to be important in the national economy, but the crisis-generated restructuring of the past thirty years has led to the emergence of new leading sectors and new technological and organizational innovations that have coalesced in what some have called a new regime of accumulation, more capable of competing successfully in a restructured national and increasingly global

economy. This new regime is characterized by more flexible (vs. hierarchical) production systems located in transactions-intensive clusterings of predominantly small and middle size firms intertwined to achieve increasing "external" economies of scope through complex subcontracting arrangements, improved inventory control, the use of numerically controlled (i.e., computerized) machinery, and other techniques that allow for easier responses to market signals, especially in times of economic recession and intensified global competition. With the increasing disintegration of the post-war social contract through union-busting, wage give-backs, corporate restructuring, government withdrawal from most sectors of the economy (with the major exception of the defense industry), and the weakening of the federally sustained welfare safety net (signalling what some have described as a shift from the welfare state to the warfare state), traditional Fordism was no longer sustainable at its former level.

The result of all this was a complex process of unprecedented deindustrialization linked to an initially experimental but increasingly focused reindustrialization that has had significant repercussions on the regional economic geography of America. Sunrise industries and the growing Sunbelt contrasted with the setting sun of heavy industrial Fordism in the Frostbelt, signalled one of the most dramatic regional role reversals in US history, although these metaphors captured only part of the story. What lay behind the shifting regional geography came into clearer focus in Southern California. Still primed by the federal munificence of military Keynesianism and the Cold-Warfare state that peaked in the Reagan-Bush years, the greater Los Angeles region traced a particularly revealing and apparently economically successful pathway through this profound industrial restructuring. Since 1965, Los Angeles has experienced an almost complete destruction of its Fordist industries, once the largest cluster west of the Mississippi, in a smaller scale version of what was happening in Detroit, Cleveland, and other centers in the American Manufacturing Belt. At the same time, the resilient regional space economy, built upon a few large "systems houses" (as in aerospace and film studios) and many thousands of small and middle size, often craft based, industrial firms, flexibly retuned its space economy to emerge as one of the world's prototypical Post-Fordist industrial metropolises.

Reflecting national trends, the more characteristically Fordist industrial sectors in Los Angeles, including what were once the second largest concentrations of automobile assembly and tire manufacturing in the country, were wiped out entirely between 1965 and 1992, as was much of the large steel and consumer durables industries. Industrial unions were decimated and tens of thousands of well-paid, often quite senior, and to a significant extent minority and women blue-collar workers, lost their jobs in widespread layoffs and plant closures. Particularly hard hit was the domestic working class (Anglo, Chicano, and Black) in the Inner City and in the Outer Cities of the Inland Empire and the

eastern Greater Valley. Massive white flight from the Inner City, begun in the aftermath of the Watts rebellion, accelerated to near total abandonment in certain working class neighborhoods, while large numbers of African Americans who could afford to do so left the region entirely, triggering in the 1990 census the first decline ever in the Black population of Los Angeles County.

The African American communities left behind in the old riot zone suffered even deeper immiseration than existed at the time of the Watts rebellion, sinking into what came to be described nationally as the formation of a permanent and predominantly black urban underclass -- a sad symbol of the degree to which industrial restructuring worked to discipline and punish the main instigators of urban unrest in the late 1960s. More locally, the descriptions were less benign. Urban restructuring in all its forms was correlated closely with "The Killing of South Central" and "The Making of an American Bantustan," an impounded enclave left to its own subsistence and survival economy of racially defined separate development. Some even equated this abandonment and implosion with a new form of indirect genocide, as mortality rates increased dramatically for almost every African American age-group, especially infants and young male adults. Whatever its deeper causes, deindustrialization and the attendant decline of the welfare state had particularly devastating effects on African Americans in Los Angeles whose major channels of upward economic mobility had been heavily concentrated in manufacturing and government employment.

Meanwhile, the great Los Angeles job machine continued to churn out new employment opportunities at an almost record pace, oblivious to the decimation of African American and to a lesser extent Mexican American communities. For most of the period between 1965 and 1992, job generation was even greater than net population growth. The vast majority of these jobs were in non-unionized occupations and most paid much lower wages (with fewer or nonexistent benefits) than those lost through Fordist deindustrialization, creating, among many other effects, a health care crisis of unprecedented proportions as more than a third of the population was left without health insurance. But something else was going on as well, a process of Post-Fordist industrial development that was rapidly reconstituting the regional economy in at least three different ways. Receiving the most analytical and popular attention was the development of the "technopoles" of Southern California, the high-technology based complexes of industrial estates, research and development offices, and supportive business services that propelled the growth of the Outer Cities and clustered around them what is reputed to be the world's largest urban concentration of engineers, physical scientists, mathematicians, computer technicians, and military weapons specialists. It is no surprise that Los Angeles became one of the "textbook" cases for studying the new pathways of Post-Fordist industrialization and regional development.

While the technopoles have spun their eddies of industrial growth primarily in the Outer (Flex) Cities, two other forms of flexible specialization have sustained

the redevelopment of the Inner City and especially downtown Los Angeles. The first revolves around craft-based production networks and the dense clustering of many small and middle sized firms highly adaptive to national and global market signals and changes in style and consumer preferences; while the second is built primarily on the provision of specialized financial services and technologically advanced communications and information processing. For each, the Inner City of Los Angeles has been particularly receptive. The garment industry more than matched the aerospace industry (another craft-centered rather than mass production sector) in the volume of job growth and is now probably the largest in the country, having recently passed New York City. Significantly, the Los Angeles garment industry is highly specialized in sportswear and other clothing that is particularly fad and fashion sensitive and also less susceptible to easy mechanization. Major specializations also exist in furniture, jewelry, printing, industrial design, and the array of services connected to the entertainment industry, where Los Angeles leadership has been established since the 1930s but has grown even more intense since 1965 (Storper and Christopherson; see also Molotch, chapter ?).

Growth in the FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and real estate) has fueled the emergence of Los Angeles as a major challenger to the triumvirate of Tokyo, London, and New York atop the global hierarchy of the "capitals of capital." While extending the region's global reach, this growth has become localized in a dense web of consumer banking, mortgage lending, business accounting, credit checking, information processing, personnel management, building maintenance, and legal services that pulse through the regional economy in ways that probably have greater positive impact than the more cocooned and externally oriented financial districts of New York and London. At the heart of this web is the downtown financial district, but, as might be expected, the FIRE stations are broadly dispersed, with major subcenters in Century City (along the Wilshire Corridor) and Newport Beach, in Orange County.

Helping to sustain these flexibly specialized districts is a teeming underground economy and an immigrant-fed pool of low wage labor that makes the crackhouse and the sweatshop, the pirate video store and the swap meet, as well as a vast reservoir of underpaid janitors, gardeners, dishwashers, street vendors, homeworking chipboard polishers, and household servants as much a part of the Post-Fordist Flexcities of Los Angeles as anything else I have described. Understanding more about this double-side industrial geography leads us to another key dimension of urban restructuring.

III. COSMOPOLIS: GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD CITY FORMATION

Central to the transformation of Los Angeles has been an expansive internationalization process that accelerated after the major changes in federal immigration policy that took place in that turning point year of 1965. It has compressed within the region the most culturally heterogeneous population of investors, entrepreneurs, workers, and families any city has ever seen. Perhaps as many as four million migrants have moved to Los Angeles since 1965, with the vast majority coming from the Latin American and Asian countries of the Pacific Rim. Accompanying this immigration has been an equally global and heterogeneous inflow of capital investment, especially from Japan, Canada, the European Economic Community, the East Asian NICs (newly developing countries), and the oil-rich states of the Middle East. Together these flows of labor and capital have probably been more responsible than any other restructuring process for the continued economic growth of the region and the radical changes that have taken place in the regional built environment and the character of everyday urban life.

If the industrially restructured Exopolis has turned the city inside-out, the new Cosmopolis has turned it outside-in again in a far-reaching globalization of the local, a process that has given birth to a new term: "glocalization". After years of relatively unsuccessful local promotion, the development of downtown Los Angeles accelerated dramatically in the 1970s with the influx of foreign capital and the availability of a cheap, unorganized, and seemingly limitless supply of immigrant workers. For the first time, a high profile central city appeared that was almost commensurable with the size and complexity of the regional economy. Although still far from the heights and densities of Manhattan or Chicago's Loop, downtown development in Los Angeles more directly reflected the effects of economic and cultural globalization. Its specific geography was split in two, with a half-city of First World skyscrapers and financial power standing starkly above a half-city of Third World cultures and streetscenes.

Capping this divisive moiety and holding it together is the governing domestic "Citadel-LA" (see Soja, 1990), a band of social control and surveillance that contains, in addition to the so-called cultural acropolis (the Music Center, Museum of Contemporary Art, and the soon to be built Gehry-designed Disney Concert Hall) and the adjacent headquarters of the LAPD, the Times-Mirror Company, and the country's largest Catholic archdiocese, what has become the second heaviest concentration of local, state, and federal government employment in the country, after Washington, D.C. (the center of the east coast's most expansive Exopolis). Here, the impact of globalization on domestic governance and planning is most direct, as local decision-making is increasingly affected by global constraints and opportunities. To illustrate, the City of Los Angeles several years ago obtained a loan from the government of Japan to meet its budget

shortfall, the first time any local government unit in the country ever turned to a foreign source for financial assistance.

Most studies of world city formation have emphasized the concentration of global financial control functions. For the exceedingly heterogeneous world city of Los Angeles, this focus must be expanded to include not only the huge industrial base (eliciting comparisons with Tokyo more than any other major world city), but even more emphatically the extraordinarily global labor force, especially in the corona of diverse ethnic communities that surrounds and sustains the downtown financial, commercial, and government complex. This inner ring is the heartland of the Los Angeles Cosmopolis, a special type of world city where the very nature of urban cosmopolitanism, glocalization, and modern world cityness is currently being redefined.

In this ring of ethni-cities is a dazzling constellation of global cultures that simultaneously reaches out to every corner of the world and draws into Los Angeles an amazing array of "foreign" influences. It also provides an unusually rich testing ground for urban multiculturalism and what can be described as the new cultural politics of identity and difference, far removed from the imagic melting pot of Anglofying Americanization. Reproduced on the streets and in its neighborhoods are microcosms of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines, Bombay and Beirut, Sao Paulo and Medellin. There is a Little Tokyo and a vast Koreatown, a huge long-established Mexican barrio and a new barrio filled by a dense mix of Central American migrants representing every faction of the politics of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. An old (from the former Soviet Union) and a new (from Lebanon, Iran, and elsewhere) Armenian community splits its animosities between Turks and Azerbaijanis. Jewish diasporan settlers from Iran, Russia, and New York City debate Middle East politics, while African marketplaces teem with discussions of current events in Cape Town and Addis Ababa, and the construction of Afrocentric school curricula.

The list of separate cultural worlds microcosmed in Los Angeles seems endless, but there is still another dimension to this complex panorama of urban multiculturalism, a growing cultural syncretism that may prove to be the most important new development arising from the contemporary Cosmopolis. Multiculturalism is usually described in two ways, first as the formation of segregated ethnic spaces (ghettoes, barrios, Koreatown, Chinatown, etc.) and second as a proliferation of conflictful edges and turfs where different cultural worlds frequently collide in struggles to maintain cultural identity and cohesion. But something else is also happening in the urban borderlands. Multiform "composite" cultures are slowly taking shape and expressing their admixture on the local landscape and daily life: in the creation of new cuisines, designs, clothing, and styles of popular art and music; and in the development of new cultural and political identities. Los Angeles, for example, has been a major center for the assertion of Latino identity (vs. such imposed categories as Hispanic or

Spanish-speaking) as a means of uniting the diverse populations whose homelands stretch from Cape Horn to the Rio Grande. Even greater heterogeneity is being synthesized in the growth of Asian American identity, with Los Angeles again taking a leading role. Many other forms of cross-cultural fusion and coalition building are taking place in the schools and neighborhoods, in community organizations and housing projects, in local government and cultural festivals, in ways that we are only beginning to recognize and understand.

Making sense of the Cosmopolis, the place where the local is being globalized at the same time as the global is being localized, is a challenging task. Contemplating this challenge again, I recall the words of Jorge Luis Borges, whose short story, "The Aleph," I used once before to characterize contemporary Los Angeles.

"The Aleph?" I repeated.

Yes, the only place on earth where all places are -- seen from every angle, each standing clear, without any confusion or blending...

How, then, can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass?...Really, what I want to do is impossible, for any listing of an endless series is doomed to be infinitesimal. In that single gigantic instant I saw millions of acts both delightful and awful; not one of them amazed me more than the fact that all of them occupied the same point in space, without overlapping or transparency. What my eyes beheld was simultaneous, but what I shall now write down will be successive...

I saw a small iridescent sphere of almost unbearable brilliance. At first I thought it was revolving; then I realized that this movement was an illusion created by the dizzying world it bounded....I saw the teeming sea; I saw daybreak and nightfall; I saw the multitudes of America; I saw a silvery cobweb in the center of a black pyramid; I saw a splintered labyrinth...I saw, close up, unending eyes watching themselves in me as in a mirror....

IV. SPLINTERED LABYRINTH: THE REPOLARIZED METROPOLIS

The first three geographies of urban restructuring are tightly interwoven and, taken together, present the most powerful explanatory arguments outlining the causes of the new urbanization processes that have been reshaping Los Angeles and, to varying degrees, other metropolitan regions of the world. The next three geographies can be seen primarily as consequences of or reactions to metropolitan transformation, although they too are marked by the same restructuring dynamic of deconstruction (the breaking down of an older order) and reconstitution (the creation of new or significantly different forms of urban modernity). We begin with the changing social order and, in particular, the increasing and many-sided socio-economic inequalities that have been so integrally associated with the crisis-generated restructuring of the past thirty years.

Paralleling the spatial structure of the globalized Post-Fordist Exopolis of Los Angeles is a social and economic structure that has become increasingly fluid, fragmented, decentered, and rearranged in ways that differ significantly from the old class-divided city of the bourgeoisie and proletariat; the neatly apportioned hierarchical city of the wealthy, the middle class, and the poor; and the "two Americas" city of Black vs. White that was described in the aftermath of the 1960s urban insurrections. This polychotomous segmentation and repolarization has begun to reconstitute the extremes of wealth and poverty and derigidify the social boundaries of class, race, and income grouping, challenging our old ways of understanding the sociology of urbanism.

There are now, for example, more millionaires than ever before in Los Angeles, many constituting a reserve army of the wealthy that includes rock stars and baseball players, computer software specialists and real estate agents, hairdressers and employment headhunters, drugdealers and dentists, as well as thousands of homeowners who were lucky enough to buy at the right time in the right place. Never before has the top ten percent of the income ladder been so heterogeneous, so segmented, and so politically unpredictable. And in many ways, the same can be said for the bottom twenty percent, which now contains representatives from the same occupations and backgrounds as the millionaires and displays much the same political unpredictability.

As is by now clear, urban restructuring in Los Angeles deepened poverty even under conditions of rapid regional economic growth and job generation. As many as 80,000 people are now homeless on any given night in the region and perhaps three times as many are homeless at some point in the average year. But this is only the most visible tip of an iceberg of extreme poverty that broadens into a population of well more than half a million living precariously in housing conditions little better than those of the worst Third World squatter settlements and shantytowns, a situation that has created what is arguably the most severe urban housing crisis in America (see Wolch, Ch ?). Many of the more than 1.3

million living below the poverty line in L.A. County in 1989 (the numbers have increased dramatically since then; see Ong and Blumenberg, Chapter ?) are unemployed and welfare dependent, an unquestionable core of what urban sociologists and policy makers have recently begun to call the "permanent urban underclass". But just as many, perhaps more, are part of the rapidly growing and primarily Latino contingent of the working poor, often laboring for well more than forty hours a week on more than one job for wages that are insufficient to feed and clothe a family.

A perverse symbiosis has developed between the extremes of wealth and poverty in Los Angeles, each feeding the growth of the other. Occasionally, the perversity is exposed in startling ways, as in several clear cases of what can only be called slavery. Immigrants from Indonesia, China, and Central America have been imported (in one case as "entertainers" with cultural visas) and sold to wealthy households as live-in domestic servants. Their passports are kept by their "owners" who provide limited room and board for their services. This new slavery, however, is just one step below what is present in the sweatshops and many other businesses (and households), where undocumented workers are paid sub-minimal wages at often hazardous worksites and under the constant threat of deportation. The bottom of the poverty iceberg and the new urban social division of labor is indeed broad and deep.

As is clearly shown in other chapters, the great Los Angeles job machine has had a "missing middle," bifurcating instead into a small stream of high-paying jobs feeding the new technocracy and a raging torrent of low wage work (much also involved in feeding the new technocracy) that barely deserves the adjective subsistence. This multivalent polarization is no longer easily definable by simple racial, ethnic, occupational, class, or immigrant status categories and binary oppositions. A recent national survey has shown, for example, that Los Angeles contains both the richest and the poorest predominantly African American communities in urban America and my guess would be that similar results would be found if such a study were done for Mexican-Americans and Asian-Americans. There are also some indications from unpublished comparative studies of US, Canadian, and Australian cities that the polarization and inequality measured among recent immigrant populations extends from the Inner to the Outer Cities, with Los Angeles-Long Beach, Orange County, and San Bernardino-Riverside ranking as the three highest of all metropolitan areas surveyed.

The impact of repolarization also extends deeply into the middle classes which, as in most of the country, have been increasingly destabilized in their class position over the past thirty years, splitting away from the once robust middleground of the income ladder in two directions, some upwardly mobile or at least maintaining their comfortable living standards in increasingly multiple job households, while many more, especially women and children, slide downward toward the working poor, the new underclass, and the homeless. The

reconstitution of the American middle class has spawned a new vocabulary for urban sociology, with yuppies, guppies (groups of young urban professionals), dinks (double income-no kids couples), woopies (well-off older people), infomerchants and the high technocracy, hyperghettoization and gentrification, glass ceilings and the feminization of poverty. A growing population of "new orphans" fill the streets with children abandoned by their parents and the elderly abandoned by their children. Workers are "K-Marted" or "Burger Kinged" as their income is cut in half in the shift from manufacturing to the burgeoning services economy.

With the socio-economic landscape becoming more fluid and kaleidoscopic, there has been an accompanying statistical decline in major indices of racial and ethnic segregation, as Latinos and Asians in particular increase rapidly in numbers and move out from their older staging settlements into new grounds and different lifestyles. The City of Cerritos, for example, near the border of Los Angeles and Orange counties has recently been named the most racially mixed city in America, with a population in 1990 that was 44% Asian, 36% Anglo, 13% Latino, and 7% Black. In Gardena, also a city of around 50,000, the four groups are almost equal in size, approaching a racial balancing that may never before have been achieved for any city in history: 32% Asian (mainly Japanese), 23% for Blacks and Latinos, and 21% Anglo. Asians have been the fastest growing segment in nearly all of the wealthiest (and still more than 80% Anglo) areas of LA County and have become the largest ethnic group in several cities and the majority in Monterrey Park, which has received national attention for its interethnic struggles over language use, with Latinos and Anglos often combining to stop the exclusive use of Chinese and to declare English the "official language." (ref. Horton)

Equally indicative has been a rapid "recycling" of cities and communities, as one majority is replaced by another. Southeast of downtown, municipalities such as Huntington Park and Maywood have seen their population shift from almost 80% Anglo in 1965 to more than 90% Latino in a demographic wave that has flowed even further, into South Central, where Latinos will very soon form the majority of the more than 250,000 inhabitants of this once overwhelmingly African American section of the City of Los Angeles. (See Rocco, chapter ?) The broad spread of the Latinos has been so extensive that nearly all the 163 communities listed in a report on the 1990 census, including Beverly Hills, Bel Air, and Brentwood, had populations that were at least 5% Latino. The exceptions were all on the far western flanks of the county, near the border with Ventura County, in some of the stubbornly Anglo beach communities and Black elite Ladera Heights, and in the gated communities of the Palos Verdes peninsula.

The number of cities and communities with more than 60% Black population has shrunk to five: the large (169,000) West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert district within the City of Los Angeles and four small pockets of

unincorporated county land (Westmont, West Compton, West Athens, and View Park-Windsor Hills), with a total population of about 55,000. The very names of these areas signal the pronounced westward shift, as well as overall shrinkage, of the core of Black Los Angeles. With the growth of Koreatown and Anglo gentrification pushing from the north, and Latinoization obliterating the old Cotton Curtain and spreading through the Watts-Willowbrook-Florence-Compton corridor from the east, Black LA has not only been compacted, it has become increasingly polarized, with the richest and poorest African American communities more visibly locked together in their inequalities than ever before. (see Anderson, chapter ?) And still further west, across the San Diego Freeway, a new racial barrier looms in the great Anglo redoubt that runs along the Pacific shores south of Los Angeles International Airport. In this prime stretch of surfurbia, as Reyner Banham once called it, 1603 African Americans were counted in the 1990 census in five cities with a total population of nearly 140,000.⁹

V. UNENDING EYES: REVAMPING THE CARCERAL CITY

The new topography of race, class, gender, age, income, and ethnicity has produced an incendiary urban geography in Los Angeles, a landscape filled with violent edges, colliding turfs, unstable boundaries, peculiarly juxtaposed lifespaces, and enclaves of outrageous wealth and despair. How this immanently conflagratory metropolis was kept from socially exploding until 1992 is wound up in the development of the Carceral City, a geography of war-like fortification and enclosure, of ever-watchful surveillance and creative means of social and spatial control, a place where police has become an insistent substitute for polis. Provocative descriptions of the Carceral City feature prominently in Mike Davis' City of Quartz, probably the best and most widely read of all the books to have been written about contemporary Los Angeles. (see also, Davis, chapter ?) Merely listing some of the chapter headings and topic outlines of City of Quartz provides a telling synopsis of the history and geography of the Carceral City.

Most direct is Chapter Four, "Fortress L.A.," a tour de force through the built environment of security-obsessed urbanism. Its headings include "The Destruction of Public Space" (described as a "security offensive" to meet "the middle-class demand for increased spatial and social insulation"); "The Forbidden City" ("taking the form of a brutal architectural edge or glaxis that defines the new

⁹The number of census tracts in Los Angeles County with no African American residents has dropped, however, from nearly 400 in 1960 to as few as four in 1990, a mark of the success of anti-racist legal struggles in the Los Angeles housing market. See Sanders, 1993.

Downtown as a citadel"); "Sadistic Street Environments" ("hardening the city surface against the poor," with bum-proof bus benches, absent public lavatories, razor-wire protected trash bins, and overhead sprinkler systems that work randomly through the night to discourage sidewalk sleepers); "Frank Gehry as Dirty Harry" (on the fortress-like "stealth houses" of this leading LA architect); "The Panopticon Mall" (from the "mall-as-panopticon-prison" to the "housing-project-as-strategic-hamlet"); "From Rentacop to Robocop" (the "frenetic effort" of affluent neighborhoods to "insulate home values and lifestyles" in gated communities, "high-tech castles," "belligerent lawns," and the "voracious consumption of private security services"); "The LAPD as Space Police" (the LAPD's Star Wars-like "metamorphosis into a techno-police"); "The Carceral City" (honing in on the prisons around downtown that contain "the largest incarcerated population in the nation"); and finally, "The Fear of Crowds" (on the increasing attempts to control or prevent all public gatherings and to erase the last vestiges of public space).

Another dimension of the Carceral City is the "sunbelt bolshevism" Davis explores in Chapter Three. These "revolutionary" homeowner-backed slow-growth insurgencies have created "white walls" of zoning regulations, agile NIMBY protest movements, increasing "suburban separatism," and new "homeowner's soviets" in the attempt to turn back the tide (and the clock) of urban restructuring. In what has been called "the Watts riots of the middle classes," in part to commemorate the victorious tax revolts of the 1970s but also evoking images of the gang power and turf wars of wealthy white adults, there has been what Davis calls "a reassertion of social privilege" by the Anglo middle classes just in the nick of time, given their diminishing numbers and increasingly confusing class identities.

In Chapter Five, "The Hammer and the Rock," Davis takes on the police state and the secret and not so secret LAPD-FBI-CIA wars on crime, gangs, drugs, "expendable youth," and the "revolutionary lumpenproletariat." Here one finds one of the most flagrant continuities in the history and geography of Los Angeles between 1965 and 1992, a persistent streak of racism, police brutality, right-wing conspiracy theories, secret spy networks, and Blue Knight crusades to save the world from imminent god-forsaken destruction, a streak that spans the chiefly generations from William Parker to Ed Davis to Daryl Gates. Los Angeles remains less densely foot-policed than any other major US city, but it has continued to build on its military defense, space surveillance, and weapons production tradition to produce the most technologically advanced urban armed forces, on the ground and in the air, another vital organ of the mighty militarized technopolis of Southern California.

The policed metropolis is augmented by the quieter presence of what may be the most extensive network of military installations around any major city, a global strike force allegedly prepared to take on any challenge anywhere in the universe. Several military enclosures are scheduled to close down in the 1990s, but their abundance and versatility guarantees a continued impact even if

converted to peacetime functions. To illustrate, troops were able to prepare for the Persian Gulf War in the deserts of Southern California, replicating conditions so faithfully that there were special manoeuvres around the desert hamlet of Bagdad. At a more intimate scale, lethal weapons are also kept in most households and in many automobiles, creating a heterogeneous, fragmented, and highly mobile militia that also patrols the turfs and edges of the Carceral City, attempting with violence to keep everyone in their place and, increasingly along the freeways, in their proper lane and going at appropriate speeds. In restructured Los Angeles, the potential for violence has been raised to new heights, triggering often fatal attractions to a disciplinary technology of security and surveillance that patrols the region with endless eyes.

An important and all too easily neglected side effect of these intensified locality struggles has been to focus grassroots political consciousness and energy on what Michel Foucault, who first used the term Carceral City, described as "the little tactics of the habitat," or what contemporary urban scholars call "the politics of place." This recharging of locale and spatial location with active political attachment and identity has spread to the poorest neighborhoods and kindled what have been the most powerful forms of social resistance to the Carceral City and to the other oppressive effects of urban restructuring. Some of these micropolitical struggles have consciously crossed racial, ethnic, class, and gender boundaries to engage in a new multicultural politics of space and place that is significantly different from the polarized politics of binary opposition (black vs. white, labor vs. capital, women vs. men) that formed the basis for most earlier urban social movements. Perhaps never before have the people of Los Angeles, once the quintessential non-place urban realm, been so politically involved in their immediate neighborhoods and localities, another of the major changes that have occurred between 1965 and 1992 and one which, like the cultural syncretisms of Cosmopolis, must be recognized and built upon by all those who retain some optimism about the future of the region.

VI. SIMCITIES: RESTRUCTURING THE URBAN IMAGINARY

A sixth restructuring helps to complete the picture of urban transformation. In many ways, it is a deeper behavioral, cultural, and ideological restructuring and is accordingly more difficult to capture in quick descriptions. What it represents is a radical change in the urban imaginary, in the ways we relate our images of the real to empirical reality itself. It is thus at its roots an inherently epistemological restructuring, one that affects our everyday life and how we make practical sense of the contemporary world, what it means to be alive here and now, in a particular place and at a particular time. Rooted in this changing collective and individual consciousness of the contemporary, its new perils and

possibilities, the sixth restructuring more directly than any other links the urban transformations of Los Angeles to the broader current debates on modernity and postmodernity.

The simplest way to exemplify this connection is to reassert what I have been saying throughout this chapter, that the restructuring of Los Angeles between 1965 and 1992 provides an unusually clear window onto the contemporary world and that what can be seen through this window is forcefully telling us that traditional ways of looking at and understanding the modern metropolis, following the established epistemologies of urban studies, seem no longer to be as powerful and effective as they once may have been. Taking the argument one step further, I suggest that the Los Angeles experience can be used effectively to illustrate and illuminate the postmodern transition, a pronounced shift that has been taking place in the late twentieth century in secular worldviews (what has been called our "discourses" about reality) and in the material conditions and contexts of our lives (i.e., the presumably "real" world itself). In other words, what can be seen through the localized processes of urban restructuring is a more global restructuring of the nature and meaning of modernity, modernism, and modernization as they have been historically comprehended in western industrialized societies.

The transition to postmodernity, like the five other urban restructuring processes I have outlined, should not be interpreted as a total break with the past. Just as Fordism remains important in the US and world economies even with the rise of Post-Fordist practices and flexible production systems, and the lineaments and lineages of older urban forms continue to be visible in the reconstituted Exopolis, postmodernity has developed through a deep restructuring of a previous "order" of modernity, another process of selective deconstruction and reconstitution that increasingly empowers the new over the old in a context of persistent historical continuities. What defines the postmodern condition then is the relative weight given to change vs. continuity, to new vs. old strategies and structures, in responding to the fundamental question of how we should act upon our knowledge of the world we live in.

What's new and what is to be done about what we have newly discovered are the invocative questions that have defined a long succession of changing modernities and modernisms since the Enlightenment (Berman, 1982). Over the past several decades, those most comfortable being labelled postmodern in their viewpoints have argued that another new modernity, constituted by significantly different ways of responding to the old questions, has been taking shape from the processes of societal restructuring, from the ongoing deconstruction and reconstitution of the geo-history of the contemporary world. Under these changed conditions, long-established epistemologies and strategies of action and behavior become increasingly problematic and open to question. Their old hegemony is challenged at all scales, from the local to the global, as more immediately adaptive

new ways of acting take hold, for better or for worse, in the economy, in politics, in popular culture, and in everyday life. Whether or not one personally adopts an explicitly postmodern stance, one fact seems to be clear: in both positive and negative ways, the contemporary world is becoming increasingly postmodern.

I have elaborated these arguments more fully elsewhere (Soja, 1989, 1992, 1993). I will illustrate them here only briefly by examining the impact on Los Angeles of a particularly pervasive and influential postmodernization process: the restructuring of the urban imaginary that arises from what the French theorist of postmodernity, Jean Baudrillard, called "the precession of simulacra," the increasingly widespread diffusion of "hypersimulations" of reality into everyday life and throughout the stretched fabric of the LA Exopolis. These hypersimulations or simulacra (exact copies of originals that no longer exist – or perhaps never existed in the first place) have always existed in all world religions and in many other forms of cultural symbolism. In the late modern world of Los Angeles, specialized entertainment centers such as Disneyland and Hollywood actively provided consumers with technologically more advanced hypersimulations and fantasy worlds. Over the past thirty years, however, these "real fakes" have escaped from their formerly circumscribed territories and manufactories to infiltrate more deeply than ever before into the intimate everyday life of postmodern urban society, economy, polity, and culture. In these new secular sites and situations, the hypersimulations of urban reality have been blurring, more than ever before, the older distinctions between our images of the real and the reality itself, inserting into the confusion a hyperreality that is increasingly affecting where we choose to live and work, what we wear and eat, how we relate to others, who we vote for, how we shape our built environment, how we fill our leisure time, in other words, all the activities that together constitute the social construction of urban life.

The increasing scale and scope of hyperreality is perhaps the most important product of the New Information Society, another of the many alternative ways of describing "what's new" in the restructured contemporary world. The popular media and expanding networks of communications technology have put the "hype" into hyperreality and helped to promote its pervasive diffusion, to create a new electronically enhanced "cyberspace" filled with "spin doctors," "sound bites," "artificial intelligence," and "virtual reality". The degree to which this diffusion of hyperreality has affected national politics, American foreign policy, popular views of the state of the US and world economies and the role of the federal government in our daily lives, opens up a discussion that cannot be completed here. Recognizing these connections is important, however, for it helps to complete the story of urban transformation and brings us closer to understanding why the most violent urban insurrection in U.S. history took place in Los Angeles in 1992.

Los Angeles continues to be the world's most productive and influential center for the manufacturing and marketing of hyperreality. In an increasingly

postmodern world, this has not only extended and amplified its global reach and the power of its creative imagineers and spin doctors, it has also had a profound effect on the local urban landscape. At least two new postmodern urban geographies have formed in the dense layers of hyperreality that blanket Southern California, one giving rise to an increasingly comprehensive "theme parking" of urban life and experience, the other creating a spreading "scamscape," a duplicitous spatial terrain in which fraud is practiced with the ultimate in hypersimulated honesty.

To echo the title of a recent book (Sorkin, 1992), the New American City can be seen as increasingly recomposed into "variations on a theme park," divertingly organized as a hyperreal world of simulated cultures, lifestyles, and consumer preferences. In the theme-parked city, one chooses to live not only based on old standards of affordability, proximity to work, or access to good public facilities. One chooses, if such a choice is available, a symbolic site that simulates a particular theme, that recreates one's own fantasyland or frontierland or experimental community of tomorrow. The patchwork of specialized residential communities this produces is much more fine-grained in its territoriality than the race and class segregated cities of the past, for it contains not only the older segregations but many more new ones as well.

Today in Los Angeles there are specialized Leisure Worlds and Sun Cities for different groupings of the elderly, apartment-blocked marinas for the swinging singles set, gay and lesbian cities such as West Hollywood, an engineers ghetto in the beach cities south of the international airport, and special places and spaces for families committing their children to Olympic competition (Mission Viejo youth won more gold medals in 1984 than all but six or seven countries), or an ecotopian environment, or the California Promise. There are residential developments and urban villages for those who may wish to live in replicas of Cervantes' Spain or a Greek island ("Welcome to Mykonos!" one advertisement proclaims), of Nashville or New Orleans, Little Tokyo or Little Saigon, old-time white suburbia or old New England. These very real and compulsively attractive SimCities, to borrow the name of a popular video game, are available nearly everywhere in Los Angeles but are particularly dense in the new towns and planned communities of Orange County, home to the original Disneyland but now virtually covered with the most advanced residential complex of hyperreality factories in the world. (Soja, 1992)

In the Inner City, another seedbed of hyperreality can be found. Located here are the creative reproductions and tableaux vivants of all the world's cultures available together for the vicarious experience of millions of itinerant visitors, the "original" models for the most popular (and most postmodern) of all traditional theme parks, Florida's Disney World. Just as one can visit Thailand or Germany in Disney World without having to travel long distances, so too can one taste the food, observe the people, hear the language, and sense the traditions of nearly

every nation on earth without leaving Los Angeles County. It takes only a little flight of fancy to imagine the day when visitors to the LA Cosmopolis-cum-Carceral City of the future will be able to purchase books of tickets to visit Korealand, Blackworld, Little Tijuana, Olympic Village, Redneck Country, Funky Venice, Off-Earth suburbia, and a technopole or two, tearing off stubs for a restaurant meal, a cultural encounter, or an entertaining night on the town.

In what may be the extreme case of hypersimulation, Disney World's immensely popular recreation of Hollywood Boulevard is now being authentically copied in Orange County's older Disneyland, with no look back to the long forgotten and now seedy original, itself being restored along different lines just thirty miles away.⁷ But then again, perhaps this is not the extreme case. Currently under construction in the so aptly named Universal City, up on a hill above the Hollywood Freeway, is CityWalk, described by its developers as an "idealized reality, LA style," an attempt to "deliver the unkept promise of Los Angeles." A \$100 million addition to MCA's "Entertainment City," the project aims to capture the "real" feel of an LA street with boutique facades borrowed from Melrose Avenue, 3D billboards (with moving parts) copied from the Sunset Strip, and a faux Venice Beach, complete with sand and strolling troubadours. Even history will be prefabricated, with buildings painted "as if they had been occupied before" and candy wrappers embedded into the terrazzo flooring to give "a simulated patina of use." A "new and improved Los Angeles" is needed, so say the project's market researchers, because "reality has become too much of a hassle." (LAT, Feb 29, 1992)

A less entertaining but equally evocative product of this encompassing recomposition of urban reality is the world's most fulsome "scamscape," a highly creative milieu of deception that has taken fraud to new heights of accomplishment. The Los Angeles region, and Orange County in particular, leads the country in practically every kind of legal and illegal fraud: in real estate (always a local specialty), in stocktrading (junk bonds were invented in Beverly Hills), in automobile insurance (with carefully scripted and staged "paper accidents" taking place everywhere), in telemarketing (with phone swindlers in "boiler rooms" bilking billions a year), in the defense industry (from faking safety reports on nuclear missile firing devices to charging \$1200 for screwdrivers), in occupational safety and welfare payments (an army of "capper" lawyers is always ready to script fake claims), in politics (with another army of duplicitous "spin doctors" prepared to

⁷The "real" Hollywood Boulevard still retains a powerful hold on at least one segment of the American urban imaginary. It is the main axis for the country's largest community of runaway and homeless youth. For an analysis of the struggles between runaway youth, their institutional providers of services, and the redevelopment planners (both public and private), see Ruddick, 1992.

smear any candidate with whatever "facts" necessary), and in perhaps its most crowning moment of fraudulent specialization, the savings and loan industry, peaking in Keating's Lincoln Savings headquarters in Orange County, the symbolic nervecenter of the largest banking scandal in US history. In one of the more than 300 telemarketing boiler rooms in Los Angeles and Orange counties, a sign at the desk captures the genuine sincerity and public commitment that feeds the hyperreal scamscape. It proudly states: "We Cheat the Other Guy and Pass the Savings on to You!"

How we might explain the growth of this fulsome urban scamscape brings us back to the national scale and to the highly specialized production of hyperreality that was practiced in the Reagan-Bush years. Without resorting to any conspiracy theory or demeaning the patriotic intent of its primary leaders, it can be argued that a neoconservative postmodern politics, already in motion in the late 1960s, accelerated rapidly after the election of a Hollywood actor and ex-California governor as president in 1980. The Republican majority had already been constructed around a "southern strategy" that thinly veiled an appeal to white racism in the Sunbelt and in the suburbs that boomed with a fearful population fleeing the darker recesses of the inner cities after the urban riots of the late 1960s. In power, the Reagan regime acted boldly to consolidate its support from the "silent majority," one of a dazzling array of hypersimulations used to sell neoconservatism to the American public. It is useful here to remember the difference between simulation and dissimulation. To dissimulate is to pretend that you do not have what you really do have -- to lie or to cover up. Watergate was good old dissimulation. In contrast, to simulate is to pretend to have something that you really do not have. When such simulation becomes so intense that you no longer can tell the difference between the simulated and the real, then you have genuinely edged into hypersimulation.

Among the most convincing hypersimulations of the Reagan years was the crusade against "Big Government," a political simulacrum that restructured the national ideology and along with it what I have called the urban imaginary. It was used as an ideological weapon to attack the Keynesian welfare state, to dismantle many anti-poverty programs under the continuing guise of a New Federalism, to resimulate the civil rights movement through a recomposed imagery of "reverse racism" and "political correctness," to explain the origins of recession and the need for a new austerity, and to virtually deconstruct and reconstitute the meaning of liberal democracy and representative government. Family values (during a period when the number of traditional American households of one breadwinner, a wife, and two children declined more rapidly than ever before), Sunbelt and suburban virtues (including the open shop, new industrial growth, and aggressive whiteness), and above all the mythic power of the free market and American entrepreneurial skills combined into the hyperreal substitute for Big Government. Backed by hyperfrauds even larger than the Savings and Loan scandal, such as

trickle down economics, deregulation, and the privatization of the public sector, one of the most undertaxed of all industrial nations rationalized one of the biggest government programs to subsidize the wealthy in recent history. That this could occur during a decade of deepening poverty, devastating deindustrialization, and a gargantuan national debt is testimony to the real power of simulacra.

Behind the simulated retreat from Big Government was increased federal and local intervention into the economy and everyday life, a scam of such proportions that it had to be imagineered by another, more global, hypersimulation. During the Reagan years, a growing tide of factual "disinformation" reconstructed the Cold War threat into what would eventually be named a New World Order, with the U.S. as its postmodern RoboCop and the mass media as its primary battlefield. This very American hypersimulation, punctuated by events in Granada, Libya, Panama, Nicaragua, and that most postmodern of military spectacles, Operation Desert Storm, legitimated the domestic reorganization of the welfare state into the more highly specialized warfare state. Military Keynesianism fueled the economy with many billions of dollars for defense, with Southern California continuing to receive the lion's share of all strategic defense initiatives. Continuing to feed off the fears of its majority constituencies, the hypersimulation-addicted neoconservative regime opened an offensive against the inner cities, which were perceived to hold the most serious domestic threats to the new world order. The war on poverty became a war against the urban poor, a promulgation of law and order that militarized the local (and federal) police in a struggle against drugs, gangs, crime, illegal immigrants, and other inner city targets.

As hypersimulations, these powerful images were, and to many still are, genuinely believed to be real and true. Simply stripping away the imagery to expose the supposed reality hidden behind it, however, is no longer a sufficient challenge or an effective critical response. To use a phrase that captures the meaning of both the postmodern condition and the effects of the restructuring processes operating over the past thirty years, reality isn't what it used to be! But while we may not be able to resolve here the political issues emanating from the precession of simulacra and the power of hypersimulations, we can begin to use some of the insights derivable from a postmodern perspective to understand better the urban restructuring of Los Angeles and what happened there in the spring of 1992.

CODA FOR 1992

The preceding descriptions of the Los Angeles experience over the past thirty years have been bracketed between two key turning points. The first is more confidently and hindsightfully defined by the Watts rebellion in 1965, one of

the most portentous sparks for the concatenation of crises that marked the end of the post-war economic boom and the beginning of the search for new strategies to restore robust economic growth and avoid even greater social unrest. The six geographies of restructuring can be locally traced back to Watts, and through the window of the Los Angeles experience after 1965 can be seen many comparable crisis-generated restructurings affecting many other areas of the world. This is not to say that Watts in itself was the cause of urban restructuring or that restructuring would not have happened without it. What can be said, however, is that for Los Angeles 1965 was a significant turning point and that, for the rest of the world, what happened after 1965 in Southern California provides a particularly interesting and revealing case study in urban restructuring.

The second turning point, 1992, is more tentatively proclaimed, for its sighting is immediate and not subject to the same degree of retrospective understanding. Nevertheless, the events which took place in Los Angeles just before and just after May 1, 1992, seem to be signalling another beginning of the end of an era, a forceful local disruption of (restructured) business as usual that may be a precursor to a more widespread crisis of postmodernity and Post-Fordism, just as Watts exemplified the crisis of modernity that marked the end of the Fordist post-war economic boom. This new crisis can be seen emerging from the very practices and strategies that have proved most successful in restoring robust economic growth and effectively controlling social unrest over the past thirty years: in the restructuring of urban form into the stretched fabric of Exopolis; in the flexibly specialized and productive industrial landscapes of Post-Fordism; in the formation of a globalized multicultural Cosmopolis; in the widening income gaps and mixed-up class boundaries of the new socio-economic (dis)order; in the protective fortresses and violent edges of the Carceral City; and in the rise of a neoconservative urban imaginary of enchanting and duplicitous hypersimulations. What all this portrays, I contend, can be summarized as a movement from crisis-generated restructuring to restructuring-generated crisis.

Up to the first years of the 1990s, the bright side of the new Los Angeles increasingly stood out to define one of the great success stories of the late twentieth century. By April, 1992, however, the mood had already shifted as all that was so compellingly bright seemed to be self-destructing. Perestroika (that potent Russian word for restructuring) and the end of the Cold War simultaneously pulled the propulsive rug from underneath the Post-Fordist regional economy and removed one of the key ideological pillars that had supported the tightening of social control by local and federal keepers of the peace. As the technopolis went into crisis, so too did its supportive FIRE sector, a coalescence of economic stress that spun into a recessionary spiral that seemed to go deeper in Southern California than in any other region of the country. Massive job losses hit especially hard at the upper "bubble" of the bimodal labor market: bankers and

brokers, highly paid aerospace workers and the new technocracy, lawyers and real estate agents, yuppies and beamers.

Meanwhile, the Cosmopolis became increasingly unsettled. For every new multicultural achievement in the arts, in business, and in local politics, there appeared new kinds of inter-ethnic violence and conflict as scores of different cultural worlds collided without mixing. More and more poor immigrants were added to the population, but the inflow of foreign capital slowed down and even Japanese owned hotels, office buildings, and businesses went into bankruptcy. Homelessness dramatically widened its scope and visibility, turning once sympathetic observers into edgy not-in-my-back-yard antagonists. Bulging prisons began releasing thousands of allegedly non-threatening criminals, and even the most enchanting urban villages seemed to be not far enough away to escape from the growing cosmopolitan violence. In 1992, a record number of violent crimes were committed in Los Angeles County, including 2,589 homicides and more than 800 gang-related killings. There were forewarnings of what might occur, especially in the domestic music of the streets, but the "rap" was incomprehensible to most or was reduced to a mixture of noise and entertainment.

On April 29, Los Angeles exploded in what appeared to many as a stubborn continuity with the past: police brutality, racism, and social injustice provoking an equally brutal, racially-motivated, and Watts-like riot of burning and looting marauders. The more things change, as some would say, the more they seemed to remain the same. Yet there was another dimension to the specific events of 1992 that challenged these appeals to historical continuity left, right, and center. It was difficult to identify and label, but seemed to be coming from another side of postmodernity, from a postmodernism of resistance that had been bred in the new multicultural politics of place, space, and regional identity; in a deepened awareness of the surveillant webs controlling the geography the Carceral City and how to defend against them; in a more sophisticated understanding of the racially and locationally uneven impact of deindustrialization and reindustrialization; in the slowly growing empowerment of a "minority majority" in local politics; and, not least, from the tactical use of media-transported hypersimulations as a means of countering and encountering the neoconservative scamscape. What I am suggesting is that the largest urban insurrection in U.S. history differed significantly from the second largest in being both a consequence and a strategic political expression of the postmodern transition.

Stated differently, whereas Watts marked the first major rebellion against the late modernism of post-war America, the civil disturbances of 1992 may represent the first explosion of resistance to neoconservative American postmodernity. Both took place in the urban region that was in the developmental vanguard of their respective eras, and each reflected the specific political and economic conditions of their time and place. In 1965, the insurrection was concentrated in the African-American community and emanated directly from the

modernist politics of the civil rights movement and black nationalism. In 1992, although initially concentrated in nearly the same areas and led again by young Black men, the insurrection was decidedly more global and cosmopolitan, and was fought more like Operation Desert Storm than like the Vietnam War. As the word of the Rodney King verdict spread from the courthouse in Simi Valley (the primarily Anglo working-class Edge City in Ventura County that had become a favorite place for policemen and white families escaping the now foreign Inner City) to the symbolic corner of Florence (the name of one of the major communities affected by the burning and looting of 1965, now primarily Latino) and Normandie (a street running north into the heart of the new Koreatown), two series of events conjoined, one local and immediate, the other global and hypersimulated, with news networks broadcasting to the world more and lengthier images of Los Angeles than had ever been seen before.

The most memorable pictures, involving the beating of Reginald Denny, were characteristically ambiguous. To most, they conveyed clear visual evidence of violent frustration and anarchy, the absence of order and the lack of concern for human life. To others, there was another reality here, one arising from the enactment of resistance and rage to a long history of unpunished police brutality brought to a head when the visual "truth" of the all-seeing video camera had been denied in a Simi Valley courthouse. As if to reassert the power of one visual hypersimulation against another, Police Chief Gates donned the war apparel of his SWAT teams to arrest the presumed gang-bangers so visible on everyone's TV screens. This gave rise to disturbing question. If the videotape of many white men kicking and beating up a lone black man could be dismissed as a misleading picture of reality, would it be possible for the same result to occur with a videotape of many black men kicking and beating up a lone white man. For many, this was an irrelevant question. For some, it was and is crucial.⁹

The local events and images spread well beyond South Central Los Angeles. With less well reported details, Long Beach, the region's second largest city, exploded as violently as anywhere else. The Salvadoran barrio in Pico-Union was also particularly active, drawing in a small army of immigration officials who, against established local policies, quickly deported hundreds of undocumented workers. More than 50% of those arrested at the peak of the riots were Latino vs. 36% Black, and it was not only Blacks and Latinos that participated in the looting.

⁹Two compilations of commentaries appeared soon after the events of 1992, each providing very different interpretations. The first, produced by the staff of the Los Angeles Times, was called Understanding the Riots: Los Angeles Before and After the Rodney King Case. The second, published by the Institute for Alternative Journalism, was entitled Inside the L.A. Riots: What Really Happened and Why It Will Happen Again.

Anglo yuppies with carphones raided computer stores and camera shops, while others gathered into vigilante groups to defend their neighborhoods against all intruders. In another symbolic act, an especially ecumenical group immediately struck deep into the Citadel-LA, attacking the Parker Center headquarters of the LAPD as well as City Hall and other institutional centers of power and surveillance. The flames fanned outward into the San Fernando Valley, the beach communities, and other parts of the Outer City and leapfrogged to the region's outermost satellite, Las Vegas. Sympathetic rebellions were sparked in the Bay Area, Atlanta, Omaha, Minneapolis, Toronto. Moment by moment, the local events became regional, national, and global at the same time and at an unheard of speed and intensity.

Again, there is much more to tell as Los Angeles rebuilds, or perhaps more accurately and hopefully, begins another round of restructuring, for if there is one general conclusion to be derived from the events of 1992 it is that the restructuring processes of the past thirty years, especially where they appear to have been most advanced and successful as in Los Angeles, produce new conditions for economic decline and new forms of social unrest. This dialectic of extremes, of utopian dreams and dystopian nightmares, of paradigmatic successes and exemplary failures, has always characterized the history and geography of Los Angeles, giving pause to any categorical predictions about its future. All that can be said in closing is that Los Angeles, as always, is worth watching.

