UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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“WHAT DO YOU SUPPOSE THIS RAIN IS WORTH?”: GERMAN COLONIALISM, POLITICAL ECOLOGY, AND THE FOUNDING OF MODERN TURKEY

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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In

HISTORY

By

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ABSTRACT

"What Do You Suppose This Rain is Worth?": German colonialism, political ecology, and the founding of modern Turkey

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Over the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire lost its most agriculturally fertile territory to political upheaval in southeastern Europe (the Balkans), a devastating blow to state revenues and food production. To compensate for the lost tithe income of Balkan districts, Ottoman administrators turned their attention to Anatolia. Through tax policy, immigration policy, and other channels of state power, Ottoman governors familiar with Balkan environments imported to central Anatolia *en masse* varieties of flora and fauna native to Balkan landscapes; they implemented agricultural techniques practiced in the Balkans; adopted labor-saving machinery; organized Balkan-style forms of agricultural credit; and developed large-scale irrigation plans to imitate patterns of precipitation typical to southeastern Europe. Administrators aimed to transform fallow Anatolian steppe lands into facsimiles of lost Balkan landscapes. In other words, late Ottoman development was a specific and altogether novel form of *environmental* policy. Ottoman attempts to remake Anatolia in the image of southeastern Europe depended on economic entanglements with European business networks. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman government had found a chief partner in efforts at large-scale environmental reengineering. In 1903, led by managing director Arthur Gwinner, Deutsche Bank

began negotiations to radically alter the geography of water on the Konya plain in central Anatolia. Guaranteeing profit from Anatolia's fertile soils meant Deutsche Bank would lay claim to the agricultural tithes from lands crossed by the bank's planned network of railways. However, maintaining these reengineered rural environments meant relying on continual injections of foreign credit and foreign expertise. As Deutsche Bank navigated this new kind of extra-territorial state-capital alliance, it unwittingly set a precedent that multinational financial firms would later use to profit from development policies of ostensibly sovereign postcolonial states.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following list corresponds to the most common abbreviations used throughout this dissertation:

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office)
AA-PA	Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (Political Archive of German Foreign Office)
ARC	Anatolian Railway Company (Chemins de Fer Ottomans d'Anatolie)
BA	Bundesarchiv (German National Archive, Berlin)
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministerial Archives of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul)
BEO	Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası (Prime Ministerial Papers of the Sublime Porte
A.MKT	Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Evrakı (Grand Vizerate, Correspondences Department)
A.MKT.MVL	Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Meclis-i Vala Evrakı (Grand Vizerate, Council of State)
A.MKT. NZD	Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Nezaret ve Deva'ir Evrakı (Grand Vizirate, Overseer and Offices)

	A.MKT.UM	Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Umum Vilayat Evrakı (Grand Vizierate, Correspondences Department for the Main Provinces)
	HR.ŞFR.(03)	Hariciye Nezareti Belgrat Sefareti (Foreign Ministry, Belgrade Consulate)
	HR.İM	Hariciye Nezareti İstanbul Murahhaslığı (Istanbul Delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
	I.DH	İrade Dahiliye (Edicts, Internal Affairs)
	DH.MKT	Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Correspondences)
	DH.ŞFR	Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Evrak (Cipher Office of the Interior Ministry)
	Y.PRK.ŞH	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Şehremaneti Maruzatı (Yıldız Palace, Municipal Inquiries)
	Y.PRK.UM	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Umumi (Yıldız Palace, Municipal Records)
	ZB	Zabtiye Nezareti Evrakı (Ministry of Police Documents)
BNA		British Newspaper Archive
CA		Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Prime Ministerial Archives of the Turkish Republic, Ankara)
CHP		Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
CUP		Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki

	Cemiyeti)
HGDB	Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank (Historical Association of Deutsche Bank)
OPDA	Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa İdaresi
TNA	The National Archive (Britain).

TRANSLITERATION

Where names of individuals and places have commonly used renditions in English, these conventional forms are used.

All Ottoman words are transliterated using their spellings in modern Turkish, as in the system used by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Non-English letters and their approximate modern Turkish pronunciations are as follows:

c – "j" as in "jelly"

ç – "ch" as in "chess"

ğ – silent, lengthens vowel or transition between vowels

ı – unstressed "e" as the first e in "eleven"

ö – "eu" as in French "beurre"

ş – "sh" as in "shook"

ü – "u" as in French "sucre"

In sources where German diacritics are written with English spellings, these English spellings have been retained. German diacritical conversions are as follows:

ä – ae

ö – oe

ü – ue

ß – ss (or SZ)

PREFACE

In the Spring of 2012, I had the unique opportunity to travel to the plains around Şanliurfa in southeastern Turkey where a small plateau overlooks the Herran Plain. The hilltop, a Tel known as Göbeklitepe ("Potbelly Hill"), is the site of a megalithic complex dated to the pre-pottery neolithic. It is one of Earth's oldest known sites of sacred monumental architecture. I was part of a study group from Brandenburg Technical University I was working toward a M.A. degree in UNESCO World Heritage Studies. Ostensibly, my colleagues and I were there to help craft a management plan in service of Göbeklitepe's nomination to UNESCO's World Heritage List. In practice, we did our best to stay out from underfoot of the real experts – Turkish government officials, UNESCO employees, and archaeologists – whose work we were there to support.

At the time, I specialized in the public-facing side of conservation and management of what are called *cultural landscapes*, or the intersections of cultural and natural heritage. Because my eye was always toward the landscape rather than the site itself, I noticed the ways that local stakeholders interacted with these – primarily German – experts. The local farmers and shepherds – people who depended on the landscape for their livelihoods – seemed to exercise very little control over how Göbeklitepe and its buffer zone were going to be managed. The groups in charge of managing the site were not the same people whose lives would be immediately impacted. This observation changed my perception of international institutions as they are experienced in local, especially rural, contexts.

While the expansion of agronomical infrastructure is often referenced by Ottoman and Turkish historians as one of the key technological developments that ushered in Turkish modernity– alongside railways, telegraph lines, and agricultural machinery– detailed studies of this process are notably scarce. Accordingly, much remains to be gleaned about the impact of modernizing approaches to land tenure, labor and migration patterns, social relations, and the extension of political rule into the Anatolian hinterland from the late Ottoman period to the early Turkish Republic. Further, the role of foreign capital in these schemes gestures to the importance of Anatolia's landscapes beyond local contexts. Because it was an elite class of international businessmen who stood to profit most from increased agricultural productivity, the role of transnational institutions in shaping Anatolia's rural landscapes cannot be ignored.

Rural voices are rarely preserved in transnational studies. Even those agents of nations or empire who venture into rural hinterlands are, for the most part, creatures of the metropole. Banks and treasuries are among those organizations whose records reach into rural spaces because taxation and finance penetrate the agricultural sectors of the economy. However, these records contain mainly what is of interest to banks and treasurers. They are written in the language of finance. They consist of figures, accounts, balance sheets, profits and losses, and correspondences about profit or loss in the future.

Using an environmental lens to read these sources makes it possible to extract something tangible from these economic abstractions about the diffusion of power in

rural spaces. Centering on the materiality of environments forces us to also reckon with the materiality of taxes, credits, and payments. Suddenly, inches of rain or bushels of wheat cease to be figures on a balance sheet and become substantive phenomena. A change in precipitation or the price of grains is not experienced as a mere number to farmers on the ground but as a brute fact with immediate, sometimes dire, consequences.

As I discovered while researching this project, many of the phenomena we think of as unique to world of late capitalism world have roots dating back much further. The relationship between Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman government was symbiotic. They reinforced each other at the expense of farmers and pastoralists. It is the same form of domination that multi-national firms apply to rural people today.

Sean Lawrence
Bad Reichenhall, Germany (9 May 2022)

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I could not have carried out this study without language training supported by the Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) program, and the instruction I received from the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish Language Institute (APTLI) at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. My teachers, Nâlân Erbil and Nurettin Erkan, shared not only their language skills but also their experiences and familiarity with contemporary Turkey. The Mengütaş Language Training Center in Ankara expanded

my facility with modern and Ottoman Turkish. The Fulbright Scholar Program funded my research in Turkish and Ottoman archives. The American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT) offered institutional support during my time there. Mevlüde Bakır of the Turkish Fulbright Commission deserves special recognition for her support. A generous fellowship from the Gerda-Henkel Stiftung supported my research in Germany, France, and the U.K. for two years. The Humboldt-Yale History Network funded my return to the Ottoman Bank archives in Istanbul to follow up on several strands of inquiry I had left unfinished. The Institute for Turkish Studies offered further language training in Ottoman Turkish and supported me during the writing phase of this dissertation. Fatih Çalışır and the faculty of Ibn Haldun University deserve credit for my ability to conduct research in Ottoman with even the slightest facility. I am also in debt to the generosity of Deutsche Bank's archivist, Reinhard Frost, who repeatedly helped me wade through an unreasonable number of files.

Muriam Davis has been extraordinarily supportive and conversations with her never fail to generate new ideas. Alma Heckman introduced me to innovative ways of integrating European and Middle Eastern studies. Thanks also go to Julie Peteet and Edhem Eldem for showing me the ropes of foreign research. I thank Camille Cole and Onur Inal, for their conversations and for including me on some first-rate conference panels. I could never have advanced to candidacy without the help of three fellow graduate students, Daniel Joesten, Marc Johnston, and Andrei Tcacenco. All three are friends and colleagues without whom the chaos of the pre-dissertation phase would

have been overwhelming. With a heavy heart I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the wonderful Maya Peterson, whose warmth and sincerity with me never faltered, and whose tragic passing was devastating to me as it was to everyone who had the good fortune of knowing her.

No one, myself included, deserves more credit for this dissertation than my wonderful spouse, Alexandra, whose brilliance, work ethic, and endless patience are inspirations to me every day. My father has earned many plaudits for finding ways to explain to friends and relatives that I am going on my sixteenth year in college. My mother deserves a special award for the fact that, even after thirty years in school, she still reads my essays. Finally, I owe thanks to my children, Heidi and Jack, who came into existence alongside this dissertation and who, despite their sincerest efforts to keep me from ever finishing, have been the best teachers I could ever ask for.

For Sandy

INTRODUCTION

Modernity and Empire in Nineteenth Century Europe

One damp July day in 1893, two acquaintances – both men of middle age – skimmed their newspapers in the reading room of Germany's elite Berlin Club. Torrential rain flooded the city streets and battered the clubhouse windows. The unexpected deluge followed Germany's worst drought in a decade. Georg Siemens raised his eyes from his journal. "What do you suppose this rain is worth?" he asked. The other man, Arthur Gwinner, responded after a moment of thought: "about five-hundred million." Shortly after their exchange, impressed by Gwinner's sober reckoning, Siemens offered him a spot on his company's Board of Managing Directors. The company was Deutsche Bank, then the world's largest financial institution and the razor tip of Germany's economic arrow aimed at the heart of Ottoman Anatolia.[1]

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire attempted to compensate for its steady territorial losses – particularly in the Balkan provinces of southeastern Europe – by partnering with Deutsche Bank and other firms to reengineer the environment of their last territorial bastion in Anatolia. Yet despite reliance on western capital to carry out this project, Anatolian development was predicated not on some conception of western European productive space, but rather

[1] Arthur von Gwinner *Lebenserinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp Verlag, 1992).

on nostalgic ideas of the Empire*'s lost spaces*. From this perspective, the Ottoman reform era of the nineteenth century was not just aiming at something called modernity, but also used the technologies of modernity to reclaim an environmental legacy. Late Ottoman reformers sought to recreate the productive landscapes of the lost Balkan provinces in Anatolia.

This dissertation examines the relationship between networks of foreign capital and the physical landscapes of late Ottoman and early Turkish republican rule. It makes two historiographical interventions. On the one hand, this project is an attempt to acknowledge the role of environment and environmental discourses in structuring nineteenth-century Ottoman administrative reforms collectively known as *Tanzimāt* (reordering). The second intervention is to recognize that the activities of European firms in Anatolia in this period are best understood as inventing a new playbook of capital intervention that more closely resembles the patterns of the mid-twentieth century "development" of post-colonial states than it resembles the colonial patterns of nineteenth-century colonial empires. This dissertation elucidates at the sub-state level the early relationship between Germany and Turkey, a relationship that has quietly shaped much of central Europe's economic, labor, migration, and diplomatic histories for the last century.

The process by which Deutsche Bank's managers and late Ottoman administrators came to answer the fateful question posed by Siemens to Gwinner – "what is this rain worth?" – shaped the structure of quasi-colonial business entanglements between European and Ottoman institutions for decades. At the same

time, answering this question established for posterity the image of what an economically “productive” Anatolian landscape should look like as well as the structures of transnational, public/private relationships that would characterize patterns of natural resource extraction in the era after decolonization.

The mid-twentieth-century era of global decolonization brought the expansionist impulses of European foreign offices to heel. However, it did not materially diminish the power of the many capital interests that were recessed within post-colonial political economies. Within webs of economic interdependence, the asymmetric relationships of colonial power endured well past political independence. It is because of these patterns of transimperial and transcolonial investment that, for businesses, there was no real moment of decolonization.

Ottoman “development” on the margins of the colonial world order

Changes occurring in the nineteenth century sparked a global sprint toward something contemporaneously described as "modernity." The era that followed the Napoleonic Wars, from the 1820s to the 1930s, was one in which webs of political, social, and economic entanglements expanded globally. European elites understood this emergent globalization through the lens of political rivalries among colonial empires and aspiring nation-states. In Europe, in response to the economic shocks of the Napoleonic Wars, elites grew increasingly concerned with guarding access to raw materials and cornering trading markets in regions beyond their immediate political borders. Colonial empires, notably in France and Britain, swiftly pressed competitive

advantages in using violence to control large swaths of the earth's natural resources via colonial networks.[2] However, the intricate systems of capital, finance, and trade that developed from this colonial order reached well beyond the political control of any single state. Colonial systems stimulated the vertical integration of specific industries in imperial metropoles, but they did not preclude the involvement of firms *outside* these colonial networks.[3]

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[2] See, Stephen Topik and Allen Wells, "Commodity Chains in a Global Economy," in Emily Rosenberg (ed.), *A World Connecting, 1870–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2012), 685–814.

[3] The comparability of colonial and metropolitan histories vis-à-vis the quest of the state to render disciplined subjects out of disparate communities has been taken to its logical conclusion with works such as Alexander Etkind's *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience* (New York: Polity, 2011). Also focusing on Russia, Barbara Engel associated peasant migration from rural to urban areas with the contested social domination of women from the late nineteenth-century until World War One. See Barbara Engel, *Between the Fields and the City: Women, Work, and Family in Russia, 1861-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996). Recently Elizabeth Heath used wine and sugar production as a lens to see the ways that liberal governance used its colonies in a process of coopting French farmers to the national cause by shifting the economic and social costs of its regulatory, industrializing policies to the colonies and thus buying off the peasantry of the metropole. See, Elizabeth Heath, *Wine, Sugar, and the Making of Modern France: Global Economic Crisis and the Racialization of French Citizenship, 1870-1910* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2014). Similar arguments have been made by Patrick Wolfe and Jennifer Pitts. See, Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race*, (London: Verso, 2016). Jennifer Pitts examined the transition of liberal thinkers, drawing on the Enlightenment tradition set in stone by Enlightenment and liberal thinkers (including Smith, Bentham, Burke, Kant, Diderot, and Condorcet), from outspoken critics of empire to its staunchest advocates. It is no small irony that liberalism has been mobilized by modern thinkers as both the foundation of anti-imperialist thought and as the principle discourse through which the "logic" of imperial aspiration was expressed. Pitts seeks to problematize the concept of liberalism, arguing that it is both anachronistic and needlessly reductive to paint all strands of what became "liberal thought" and liberal thinkers with the same brush vis-à-vis the relationship between liberalism and empire. This puts Pitts in contrast to thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and certainly most Marxian historians who argue forcefully that the "logic" of liberal expansion is at the heart of the emergent

Capital firms outside of these colonial networks had to adapt to compete. In this condition are found the roots of recognizable modes of state-capital alliance that allowed political actors and industrialists to vie with and even subvert the economic advantages of sprawling colonial empires.[4] In the Ottoman empire, political pressures at home and abroad led policymakers to seek out economic arrangements aimed at large-scale social and environmental engineering projects. The kinds of alliances that evolved would later fall under the twentieth-century headings of "development theory" and "modernization theory."

The standard narrative of "development theory" is that it arose from Anglo-American economic-imperialist strategies situated in post-colonial and Cold War politics.[5] American-led organizations like the World Bank and the International

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nineteenth-century bourgeoisie and, by extension, the state structures that this class invented to further its constitutive internal logic of unbridled material expansion. Pitts seeks to examined "the articulation of liberalism as practice" and wrestles with the "historical fact that the creation and consolidation of empire was central to that process." See, Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2006). Pitt's argument is in direct contrast to that of Sankar Muthu, whose *Enlightenment Against Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2003) made the case that, despite the charge of much postcolonial scholarship inspired by Foucault's branding of the Enlightenment as "blackmail," thinkers such as Diderot, Kant, and Herder had used Enlightenment rationalism to espouse forceful anti-imperial positions.

[4] For examples of this process in the German context, see Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914–18,* (Berlin, 1961). See, Eckert Kehr, *Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, (Taschenbuchausgabe Ullstein: Berlin, 1976).; Wolfgang Mommsen, "The Debate on German War Aims," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (1966): 47–74.; Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, (Cologne, 1969)

[5] See, Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017); Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political*

Monetary Fund adopted theories from Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Kurt Mandelbaum, and Arthur Lewis to increase productivity and capital accumulation – especially in the agricultural sector – of states outside of the eastern bloc.[6] Based on these theories, massive debt-backed investments in environmental engineering projects became sites of foreign investment in "third world" economies beginning in the 1950s. However, as Stephen Gross observes, the roots of Anglo-American development theory owe largely to interwar German discourses about "developing" southeastern Europe so as to fold that region into a resurgent German economic sphere.[7]

Neo-colonial "development" is today often associated with a late twentieth century retreat from statist paradigms of economic expansion. These forms of neo-liberal development were responses to the perceived failures of state-funded development schemes that characterized post-1945 "development theory."[8] Privatization of largescale infrastructure projects in non-western states as well as increasing reliance on complex debt instruments characterized the neo-liberal trend in economic development from the 1970's onwards. This dissertation demonstrates that

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Economy of American Empire (Verso: New York, 2012); Stephen Wertheim, *Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of US Global Supremacy* (Belknap: Cambridge, MA, 2020).

[6] Stephen G Gross, "Global Moments and the Rise of Area Studies and Development Theory in Germany, 1914–1945," *German History*, 39:3, 2021, 400–416,

[7] E. Wagemann, *Der neue Balkan: altes Land—junge Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, 1939); See also, Grenzebach, *Germany's Informal Empire*; B.-J. Wendt, 'Nationalsozialistische Grossraumwirtschaft zwischen Utopie und Wirklichkeit—zum Scheitern einer Konzeption 1938/1939', in F. Knipping and K.-J. Müller (eds), *Machtbewusstsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Paderborn, 1984), pp. 223–45

[8] See, Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018)

the genealogies of *both* statist "development theory" and the neoliberal response to it have shared roots in the discourses and experiences of quasi-colonial firms operating in foreign contexts around the turn of the twentieth century.

German firms' interest in interwar investment in southeastern Europe grew out of prior attempts to develop lands under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. A core argument of this dissertation is that many of the strategies associated with post-colonial "development" are rooted in the techniques advanced by multinational firms operating not within but *on the margins of* imperial colonial networks in the decades before World War One.

In Britain, metropole of the nineteenth century's largest colonial empire, the march to economic modernity meant applying scientific rigor to the practical obstacles impeding movement of private capital. This was capital typically owned by the same class of elites who held the levers of state power.[9] Rapid advances in engineering techniques, labor organization, and financial instruments were applied to building roads, railways, mines, manufacturing, and improving agriculture, sanitation, and communication networks. Widespread application of these new technical practices produced an image of modernity predicated on what Michael Mann calls "infrastructural power," or the capacity of modern states to implement decisions uniformly throughout their territory.[10] In France, similar pressures produced similar

[9] See also, Jo Guldi, *Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012).; Patrick Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City* (New York: Verso, 2003).
[10] Mann, Michael. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, 2 (1984): 185–213.

worldviews. The Saint-Simonian movement, for example, was inspired by the ideas of Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon and pushed the notion of civilizational progress toward ever greater prosperity. The Saint-Simoneans contended that this progress would be achieved through rationalist technocratic governance and reliance on the seemingly limitless capacity of scientific engineering to increase the efficiency and abundance of industrial production.[11]

Several historians see a particular kind of parallel transformation occurring in the Ottoman Empire. This was the advent of a totalizing, rationalist, "new kind of state."[12] However, in the Ottoman context, this shift to expansive, technocratic governance reliant on infrastructural power was not the result of territorial expansion, but contraction. For centuries, the Ottoman empire was built on territorial expansion and taxation. This was a pattern typical of premodern land-based empires. But

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[11] Osama Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).; Norman Cigar, "Socio-Economic Structure and the Development of an Urban Bourgeoisie in the Pre-colonial Morocco," *The Maghreb Review*, 6, 3-4: 55-76, 1981; Julia Clancy-Smith. *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900*. 1:15. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

[12] The term is taken from Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); A "liberal" version of this argument can be found in Baki Tezcan's work, which is focused on processes of democratization while attributing Marxian causes –like monetization of tax collection and markets –to elite class formation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet Tezcan is less rigid in his application of Marx than are, for example, Batatu or el-Haj; Tezcan being more concerned with the structure of what he calls "proto-democratic" institutions that resulted from accumulation of wealth and social capital by the *ulema*. See Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010).; Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840* (Syracuse University: New York, 1998); Kenneth Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858* (Cambridge University: Cambridge, 1992).

throughout nineteenth century, the territory under Ottoman control shrank immensely because of foreign wars and domestic insurrections. Thus, expansionist imperial project had to be reimagined as a project of territorial reshaping, stewardship, and consolidation.

The mid-to-late nineteenth century period of Ottoman reform is known as *Tanzimāt* (reordering). The reform-era in the Ottoman empire has been called variously a period of industrialization, modernization, and most recently, defensive "development". That is, Tanzimāt has typically been treated by historians as a period in which the Ottoman government tried to streamline and strengthen its fiscal-military capacity to compete with its imperial rivals in Europe and Eurasia. Many authors writing in the postcolonial tradition interpret infrastructure projects, Tanzimāt reforms, and Young Ottoman political literature as mechanisms through which a "new kind of State" reconfigured its relationship to its subjects. These interpretations of late Ottoman governance suggest that impersonal, rationalist forms of governing that spread through Western states and colonies had corollary in the Ottoman reform era.[13]

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[13] Timothy Mitchel, *Colonizing Egypt*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1991).; James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1998). As elsewhere, the direction of this exchange is unclear. Scholars including James Gelvin and Timothy Mitchell argue that the adoption of rationalist governance was a defensive attempt to duplicate European success, inadvertently bringing Ottoman Egypt into the colonial fold. Others suggest that the Ottoman state incorporated European techniques of rule but did so primarily to consolidate the margins of its sovereignty. See, Mostafa Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz*, (Palo Alto: Stanford, 2016).; Eugene Rogan, F*rontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University,

Some combination of Tanzimāt reform, internal strife, and pressures from foreign capital investments molded the late Ottoman Empire into a "new kind of state," one that maintained imperial aspirations while accommodating the ascendant gravity of the nation-state form. Both political typologies fulfilled Max Weber's definition of a "state" as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory." In Weber's formulation, territory is the fundamental unit of state power. As James Anderson notes, "[states] are not simply located in geographic space—which is the case with all social organizations—rather they explicitly claim particular territories and derive distinctiveness for them."[14] Behlül Özkan criticizes doctrinaire applications of Weber's definition for continuing to fall into what he calls the "territorial trap." Followers of Weber, Özkan argues, have failed to problematize territoriality as their unit of analysis.[15] The *will to territory* is an outgrowth of state-making political projects rather than their basis.[16]

1999); What unites this set of scholars is an interest in the parameters of group identity that were redrawn by innovations in transportation, mass communication, and the law during the nineteenth century. Whether adopted from Europe or organically produced by Ottoman legacies, these new constellations of identity were necessary, if insufficient, conditions for the transition from an imperial politics of difference to national politics of sameness. See, Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2008).

[14] James Anderson, "Nationalist Ideology and Territory," in *Nationalism, Self Determination and Political Geography*, ed. R. J. Johnston, David B. Knight, and Eleanor Kofman (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), 18.

[15] "The concept of homeland, the essential part of the nation-state paradigm, establishing the link between the people and the territory," Özkan writes, "territorializes the national identity by creating the sense of belonging to the sacred soil and turning the imagined boundaries into physical ones." Behlül Özkan, *From the*

Many historians have assumed that late Ottoman development schemes, and the Empire's *Tanzimāt* reforms more broadly, were attempts to transplant spaces of European modernity onto Ottoman lands. Most studies of late Ottoman modernization have focused on Ottoman elites' anxieties about catching up to a rapidly industrializing Europe.[17] The approach adopted by Ottoman reformers to modernize

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Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of National Homeland in Turkey, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 1-2.

[16] Ottoman loss of territory and the gradual erosion of financial independence during the nineteenth century led scholars to conclude that the Ottomans had been outmaneuvered by their rivals. Works by Ottoman historians like Mehmet Genc, Halil Inalicik, Sevket Pamuk, Norman Itzkowitz, Kemal Karpat, and Donald Quataert challenged narratives of Ottoman economic "modernization" as top-down processes, suggesting that archival bias had caused a generation of historians to see the state as omnipresent. The expansion of the Ottoman administrative state was reinterpreted to reflect a combination of European imperial pressure and capital expansion. These historians worked from a variety of theoretical approaches. However, many were inspired by New Social Historians like E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm to write "histories from below," adopting broad economic approaches as a way to get at non-elite experience for which archival sources were wanting. Many had been trained or heavily influenced by Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, scholars who were themselves influenced by the Annales school. See, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler I* (The Agrarian Question in Turkey, Collected Works, Vol.1), (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1980); See also, M. Fuad Köprülü, *'Toprak Meselesi'* (The Land Question), Ülkü, 10, 58 (1937). See, Mehmet Genc, "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics, and Main Trends," in *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany, 1994), 59-8; Mehmet Genc, "A study of the feasibility of using eighteenth-century Ottoman financial records as an indicator of economic activity," in Huri Islamoglu-Inan, ed., *The Ottoman Empire in the World Economy*, (Cambridge University: Cambridge, 1987); Sevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*, (New York: Cambridge University, 1987).

[17] Here it is important to distinguish that the concept of modernity, and especially James Scott's important political-ideological formulation, high-modernism, is really a description of two linked but discrete phenomena. One is modernity as a hypothetical end point. Often dressed in some form of utopianism, the work of "development" of peripheral, hinterland, or colonial spaces was aimed at an imagined temporal target called "modernity." The second aspect is modernity as technique. Through scientific rationalism, capital accumulation, the language of mathematical rigor, the limitless

social, administrative, and economic practices has been called "defensive developmentalism."[18]

Notably, defensive developmentalism did not begin in earnest in the Ottoman Empire until large pieces of territory began to peel away from Ottoman control. The act of state-making in the nineteenth century was as much about establishing symbols of geographic legitimation as it was about securing power over social practice. When the Ottomans began turning to foreign capital to develop the Sultan's remaining lands, the vision of modernity they aimed at was not some as-yet unexperienced industrial utopia, nor a rote imitation of their rivals, but rather an image of those lands that had been lost.

Competition with western Europe was undoubtedly an animating principle of many Ottoman policies. However, in focusing on the bird's-eye-view of geopolitics, we should not lose sight of what Ottoman administrators imagined themselves doing at the time. The Ottomans' modernist project of defensive development was not conceived to create a future society *ex nihlo*. Instead, as with modernizing projects elsewhere in Europe, Ottoman reform was s*patial as much as it was temporal*. In the sphere of agricultural development, Ottoman development projects were less about emulating European rivals, and more about recreating in Anatolia the former

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scalability of human enterprise, and faith in the practice of expertise, "modern" technologies, practices, and systems of communication were applied to problems of ever-increasing size and complexity. See, James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven: Yale University, 1999)

[18] See, Timothy Mitchel, *Colonizing Egypt*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1991).; James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1998).

breadbasket of the Empire, the Balkans. Thus, projects of modernization were about building spaces which represented economic modernity in the image of spaces that existed outside of the state's geographical limits.

Henri Lefebvre's concept of tripartite space is useful in conceptualizing late Ottoman development in the context of policymakers' geographic origins. Lefebvre articulated social space as comprising: 1) *perceived space*, or spatial practices like "rhythms of work, residential, and leisure activities"; 2) *conceived space*, or spaces as they are constructed and represented by "planners, architects, and other specialists who divide space into separate elements that can be recombined at will" for the sake of "legitimating the modes of operation of state and capital"; and 3) *lived space* or space at it is encountered phenomenologically.[19] By reengineering environmental features of Anatolia, Ottoman administrators collapsed production of *conceived space*, or state and capital endeavors of infrastructural modernity, with the *perceived spaces*, or spatial practices, of Balkan communities.[20]

Relative to most other Ottoman domains the Balkan provinces were prosperous, agriculturally productive, and relatively urbanized. Moreover, the diversity of peoples and landscapes embedded in Rumelia, later derided as a source of

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[19] Quotations from Stefan Kipfer and Neil Brenner (trans.), Ronneberger, "Henri Lefebve and urban everyday life: In search of the possible," in Kanishka Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, and Christian Schmid (eds.), *Space, Difference, Everyday Life* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 137; Henri Lefebvre, The *Production of Space* (Oxford, England: Blackwell), 1991.

[20] I use the terms "Balkan/Balkans/Balkan Peninsula" and "Rumeli/Rumelia" interchangeably to refer to the formerly Ottoman provinces in southeastern Europe wherefrom much of Republican Turkey's early leadership came. This is in keeping with the terminologies current in the latter nineteenth century and with which the historical actors discussed here would have been familiar.

friction, was for the Ottomans not a bug but a feature of their political value. Of course, spatial reproduction of these Balkan practices was only conceivable insofar as they were a part of the *lived space* of a specific class of Ottoman political elites– that is, these spaces had been directly encountered and remembered. Erik Jan Zürcher argues that late Ottoman political elites – intellectuals, parliamentarians, and high-ranking bureaucrats – were "children of the borderlands."[21] These officials hailed mainly from Rumelia and Turkey's Aegean coast, socially and culturally distinct spaces from inner Anatolia. Thus, "developing" Anatolia in the image of the Balkans was a process that collapsed perceived, conceived, and lived space in service of an acutely governmental goal of the Ottoman state.

Tanzimāt as Environmental Policy

An essential feature of Ottoman "modernization" was that administrators endeavored to superstruct Balkan ecosystems on the Anatolian steppe. The results of these efforts were uneven. Administrators modified agricultural ecologies, landforms, labor systems, and financial networks along lines drawn by predominantly European scientists, technocrats, and bankers. This set of environmental projects began under Sultan Abdulmecid in the 1830s. It continued through the Tanzimāt era, reaching an apex under the neo-absolutism of Abdülhamid II and continuing in some limited respects through the first years of the Turkish Republic.

[21] Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turks – Children of the Borderlands?* (Leiden, 2002).

"Modernization" in the Ottoman Empire took the form of *Tanzimāt* (reorganization), a process of social, cultural, administrative, and political reformation begun with the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif* (Rose Garden Decree) of 1839 and the foreign trade regime established by the 1838 Treaty of Balta Limani. Tanzimāt is conventionally dated until the promulgation of the short-lived Ottoman Constitution of 1876 (*Kanûn-ı Esâsî; "*Basic Law") and the Second Sultan Abdülhamid's neo-absolutist rule. Tanzimāt is characterized by attempts to strengthen the Empire's borders and preempt wayward nationalist movements by promulgating *Ottomanism* as a unifying identity for its diverse subjects. Notable reforms included establishing formal legal equality for Muslim and non-muslim subjects, centralizing and regularizing tax collection, and extending conscription beyond traditionally Muslim communities. Over time, Tanzimāt reforms also interceded to reconfigure financial and banking networks; natural resource extraction and provisioning; planning, financing, and building of large infrastructure projects; settlement and labor administration; and urban planning. In theory, Tanzimāt was intended to open a path for the Ottoman Empire to reconstruct itself as a semi-secular, semi-federalized Ottoman nation-state.[22]

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[22] See, Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1878-1909*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).; Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997).; Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).; Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine*, (Stanford: Stanford University, 2011).; Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A stud in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas,* (New York: Syracuse

As a social and cultural project, Abdülhamid's reign (31 August 1876 - 27 April 1909) was a repudiation of Tanzimāt. Abdülhamid increasingly relied on Turkish-Islamic identity to counter sectarians within the Empire. However, in material terms – economic, technological, and ecological – the policies of both Abdülhamid II and his successors, the Committee for Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Fırkası*; CUP, 1908-1918) were fulfillments of the promises of Tanzimāt rather than abrogations of it. By the time Mustafa Kemal and his supporters set up the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923, Tanzimāt was so thoroughly embedded in Anatolia's ecological and economic landscape that some features of Kemal's *étatist* (statist) program were functionally rebrandings of Tanzimāt policies.[23]

Tanzimāt established discourses about Anatolia's resource economy as being discreetly situated in spaces and environments. This conception evolved with time,

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University, 2000); Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*, (Berkeley, University of California, 2000).; Julia Phillips Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era*, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2014).

[23] Etatism (statism; Turkish: *devletçilik*) describes an economic policy embraced under Mustafa Kemal from 1932 and lasting through the first years of multi-party rule in the late 1940s. It was a direct response to the world economic depression of 1929. Under this model, the Turkish state established and operated various types of enterprises. The state's growing role as a direct economic actor created a center of gravity around which private commerce had to revolve. Comparatively, liberal economic policies of the 1920s had followed from Young Turk orientations toward decentralizing markets and raising a "native Muslim bourgeoisie" as a counterpoint to local Christian and foreign European capitalists in their midst. See Caroline Arnold, "In the Service of Industrialization: Etatism, Social Services and the Construction of Industrial Labour Forces in Turkey (1930-50)," *Middle Eastern studies* 48, 3 (2012): 363–385; Kus Basak, "Weak States, Unruly Capitalists, and the Rise of Étatism in Late Developers: The Case of Turkey," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, 3 (2015): 358–374. Barlas Dilek, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939* (Leiden: Brill, 1998).

but it fundamentally and consistently disciplined the modes and methods through which reformers imagined their project. Taking Tanzimāt seriously as a material and environmental phenomenon rather than merely a political-cultural period forces us to redraw the lines of constancy and rupture from Abdulmecid to Mustafa Kemal.[24]

Concomitant with the development and application of infrastructural power in Ottoman Anatolia was an increasing concern with quickly *monetizing*, and then *financializing*, natural resources. By contacting its first foreign loan in 1854, administrators wagered that the Ottoman treasury, which relied on tithes on first-order resources like grains, fruits, minerals, lumber, and animal products, could convert its resources to cash efficiently enough to meet its debt obligations.

In 1800, in both Ottoman and western European circles, it was axiomatic that agriculture was the fundamental basis of economics while finance was, at best, superfluous rent-seeking. This taxonomy of value-adding social activity had flipped by 1900. Over the nineteenth century, following the ideas of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, European and Ottoman administrators alike began to embrace both financial capital and the organization of labor, especially in manufacturing, as the basis of economic life.[25]

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[24] Yonca Köksal, Özyasar, *The Ottoman Empire in the Tanzimāt Era: Provincial Perspectives from Ankara to Edirne,* (New York: Routledge, 2019); Ringer, Monica M., and Etienne Charrière. "Ottoman Culture and the Project of Modernity: Reform and Translation in the Tanzimāt Novel" (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2020).

[25] Mariana Mazzucato, *The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy* (New York: Public Affairs, 2018), 36.; Fatih Ermiş, *A History of Ottoman Economic Thought. Developments Before the Nineteenth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).; Deniz T. Kılınçoğlu, *The Political Economy of Ottoman*

Influenced by Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein's neo-Marxist models were enormously significant for later narratives of late Ottoman history.[26] Wallerstein's "world-systems theory" offered scholars from various fields a way to conceive of global inequality without projecting blame on the "backwardness" of impoverished societies. The Wallerstinian paradigm laid the tracks for a broader rethinking of Ottoman society and economy, mainly as it developed from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries.

Edward Clark, Charles Issawi, Gabriel Baer, H.A.R. Gibb, and Harold Bowen argued that the Ottoman state was the main driver of industrial and agricultural production well into the nineteenth century. Its policy was designed to depress exports and encourage production for domestic markets, and its *millet* system had created strict economic divisions along ethnic lines. These policies discouraged the kinds of capital partnerships between state and merchants that might have spurred industrialization.[27] Niyazi Berkes, Ahmad Feroz, and Halil Inalcik questioned the

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Modernity: Ottoman Economic Thought During the Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) (Ph.D. Dissertation Princeton University, June 2012)

[26] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (New York: Academic, 1974); see also, Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, (Tr.) Brian Pearce, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).; Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," *Catalyst* (1967): 20–73.

[27] Edward Clark, "The Ottoman Industrial Revolution*," International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *5,1, (1975):* 66-76; Charles Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa, (New York: Columbia University, 1982); Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1969).; Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, (London: Oxford University, 1957).

rigidity of confessional divisions of labor but concurred that political mismanagement inhibited economic growth, emphasizing the state's choice between imperial conquest and industrial expansion.[28]

Coloniality and German influence in Ottoman Lands

In reshaping Anatolia as an ersatz Balkans, Imperial Germany's largest firm, Deutsche Bank, was one of the late Ottoman Empire's most consequential partners.

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[28] Niyazi Berkes and Ahmad Feroz, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (London: McGill University, 1998).; Halil Inalcik, "Bursa and the commerce of the Levant*," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 3,2 (1960): 131-147. Alternative renditions of economic transformation were subsequently offered by Donald Quataert, Suraiya Faroqhi, Sherry Vatter, and Yavuz Karakisla. They criticized earlier works for fetishizing the Ottoman state and failing to account for the growth of private industrialists, guilds, and rural artisans in social and economic transformation. Faroqhi and Vatter were influential in placing the peasant at the center of industrial transformation through artisan crafts. See, Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993).; Suraiya Faroqhi, "In Search of Ottoman History," The Journal of Peasant Studies, 18, 3 (1991): 211-241.; Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006).; Sherry Vatter, "Militant Textile Weavers in Damascus: Waged Artisans and the Ottoman Labor Movement, 1850-1914" in Quataert and Zürcher (eds.), *Workers and Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic: 1839-1950* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).; Yavuz Karakışla, "The Emergence of the Ottoman Working Class, 1839-1923," in *ibid*. Recent works by Sandra Sufian, Michael Low, and Alan Mikhail have used post-structural techniques to argue for the significance of non-human factors in Ottoman economic development. Alan Mikhail spearheaded a generation of scholars who incorporated techniques of environmental history into Ottoman studies. His work established irrigation and animal labor as systems of mediation between peasants, markets, and the Egyptian state. See, Sandra Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920-1947,* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007).; Michael Low, "Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and PanIslam under British Surveillance, 1865-1926" (PhD diss, Georgia State University, 2007).; Alan Mikhail, *The Animal in Ottoman Egypt* (Oxford University Press, 2014) and *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

The relationship between Ottoman administrators and Deutsche Bank's managing directors has intrigued historians and commentators since it began in 1888. However, this relationship is typically assessed in terms of foreign diplomacy, imperial politics, or antebellum "Great Game" strategy.[29] Little recognition has yet been given to how this relationship materially altered the environment of Anatolia and shifted the physical substrate of Ottoman infrastructural power. In the late nineteenth century, Deutsche Bank's ability to invest in Ottoman Anatolia relied on discourses related to *modernization* and *defensive developmentalism*, which offered the contracting empire a return path to imperial prestige. These discourses implicitly relied on partnerships between state institutions and highly capitalized business networks, most of which were domiciled in the foreign capitals of Europe.

Germany's part in the colonial world order is often shunted to the side in broader conversations about coloniality and colonial empire. Germany acquired few colonies, did so late in the century, never traded with them very much, and lost them following defeat in World War One. Indeed, Germany's colonial footprint was so small that Edward Said deliberately excluded Germany from his analysis of European orientalism. Germany, he reasoned, had no political need to subjugate Muslim

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[29] See, Peter Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways: Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, (New Haven: Yale, 2017).; Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2015).; Naci Yorulmaz, *Arming the Sultan: German Arms Trade and Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire Before World War I*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014).; Murat Özyüksel, *The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016).; Jonathan McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway*, (New York: Praeger, 2001).

populations. German scholarship prior to German Unification, Said writes, could not have "developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained national interest in the Orient." He explains:

> There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the Levant, North Africa.... Moreover, the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, Disraeli or Nerval."[30]

Reinforcing Said's point is the reality that Germany conducted little trade with its protectorates in Africa and the Pacific.[31] By 1910, Germany's colonies amounted to just 0.54% and 0.73% of its total imports and exports, respectively. German trade with British-occupied Egypt amounted to more than that with all its own colonies combined.[32] Germany's colonial empire is typically narrated in the context of

[30] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978), 17-19; See also: Jennifer Jenkins, "German Orientalism: Introduction," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 24, (2004), 97-100.; Kris Manjapra, Age of Entanglement. German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 2014); Thoralf Klein, "The Other German Colonialism: Power, Conflict and Resistance in a German-speaking Mission in China, ca. 1850-1920" in Nina Berman, Klaus Mühlhahn and Patrice Nganang, (eds.), German Colonialism Revisited: African, Asian, and Oceanic Experiences. (University of Michigan Press, Anne Arbor, 2014); Todd Kontje, *German Orientalisms*, (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 2004); Suzanne L Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship*. (German Historical InstituteWashington, D.C.: 2009).

[31] W. O. Henderson, "Germany's Trade with Her Colonies, 1884-1914." The Economic History Review 9, 1 (1938): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2589963.

[32] Rosa Luxemburg, "Brauchen Wir Kolonien?" ["Does Germany Need Colonies?"], *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, December 4, (1899).

dramatic spasms of violence against indigenous populations and what these episodes portend for the later emergence of the Third Reich.[33]

The fact that Germany's colonies were relatively small and economically marginal does not mean that *colonialism* was any less integral to the formation of modern Germany than it was to the formation of France or Britain. From its union in 1871, the German economy marched rapidly upward at a pace envied across Europe.[34] By 1914 in Britain, the German Kaiser was derided as "managing director of Germany Ltd."[35] The globalized export market that allowed Germany to capitalize on its growing manufacturing sector had been stitched together with the needle of colonization. By the outbreak of World War One, Germany's trade with Asia, Latin America, and Africa eclipsed its trade within Europe. By 1911, Germany transacted more than an eighth of all trade in the world.[36] That Germany's economic expansion owed so much to the colonies of its rivals demonstrates that Germany was *more* essential to maintaining the colonial order, not less. The trade relations of colonial

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[33] For examples of these arguments, see, Elizabeth Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*, (Ithaca, Cornell, 2006); Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, (London: Cambridge University, 2010).; John Phillip Short, *Magic Lantern Empire: Colonialism and Society in Germany*, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2012).; Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, *German Colonialism in a Global Age*, (Durham: Duke University, 2015).; Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama, *German Colonialism: Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany*, (New York: Columbia University, 2011).

[34] Edgar Crammond, "The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 77, 8 (1914): 777–824. https://doi.org/10.2307/2340924.

[35] Frederic William Wile, *Men Around the Kaiser: The Makers of Modern Germany*, (London: Bobbs, Merrill, 1914), 6.

[36] Crammond, "Economic Relations," 777

economies were not just bilateral, between colony and metropole, but multilateral, consisting of webs of business interests domiciled in many different political contexts.

German firms developed innovative instruments to profit from the kinds of high-risk, large-scale, capital-intensive infrastructure projects that Anatolia and other "underdeveloped" non-European areas were thought to need. These financial technologies welded together Ottoman and European business networks. Free trade treaties signed first with Britain in 1832 and followed by other states led to European institutions' penetration of the Ottoman financial system. The Istanbul Stock Exchange, opened in 1863 broadened the availability of Ottoman capital assets. The Imperial Ottoman Bank, also founded in 1863, possessed exclusive currency-issuing authority within the Empire and was founded by French and British investors. The hot, humid climate and relatively predictable rainfall of central and southeastern Anatolia favored grains and cotton.

Deutsche Bank's involvement in Anatolia came about during the earliest phase of twentieth century *financialization* and *foreign direct investment* as significant facets of the global economy. *Financialization* is typically associated with rising debt-to-equity ratios and the growing share of national economies comprising financial capital. It is broadly defined as a process by which economic exchange is intermediated through financial instruments. These features are more commonly associated with post-colonial and neo-liberal transitions in late twentieth-century political economies. Fasianos, Guevara, and Pierros are among the few authors to

investigate the deeper genealogy of the concept of financialization. Postcolonial-era financialization, they find, has a long evolution stretching to the nineteenth century. In considering financialization in this way, the authors demonstrate that the era from 1900 to 1933 was characterized by key structures of financialization: the dominance of the financial sector in economic activity, financial deregulation, shareholder value orientation, and household indebtedness. This first phase preceded forty-one years of "definancialization," These traits retarded before a steep increase in financialization since 1974.[37]

Anatolia's sparse population meant land could be purchased cheaply if restrictions on land sales to foreigners could be circumvented. However, the cheap land was a chimera. Low population meant a tight and expensive labor market. Expensive labor was a barrier for small firms. Only highly capitalized organizations could afford to import labor-saving machinery or cajole the remaining semi-nomadic (*yörük*) communities into entering the fields. Deutsche Bank became the chief financial partner of the last Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II in the Porte's efforts to augment Anatolia's political economy.

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[37] Some scholars use a narrower meaning of the term such that it refers to a specific model of corporate governance in which shareholder value is paramount. See, Jason Moore, *Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (*London: Verso, 2015). See also, Gerald A. Epstein, ed. *Financialization and the World Economy*, 2005. Others take a broader view of the financialization process, and it is that broader view that I follow here. Greta Krippner takes financialization to refer to a "pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production." Greta Krippner, "The Financialization of the American Economy," *Socio-economic Review* 3, 2 (2005): 173–208.

The account in Chapter Four of Germany's push to irrigate the Konya plain conveys how novel logics of capital expansion operated mostly independently of German expansionist politics. In this limited sense, the structure of economic entanglements by which Deutsche Bank operated in Anatolia was not dissimilar to the concept of "salvage" envisaged by Anna Tsing. Salvage here refers to the process by which large firms accrue the profits of excess production over which the firms have no oversight or direct engagement. This early form of salvage was essential for the establishment of economic complexes in colonial or semi-colonial contexts.[38] In this way, the projection of German colonial power operated somewhat differently than its French or British counterparts.[39]

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[38] Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *The Mushroom at the End of the World: on the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

[39] Émigré historians forced to flee the Nazis before and during World War II became prominent as critics of the German Empire that had preceded the Third Reich. Liberals like Erich Eyck offered a negative redux of "Great Man" histories. They were especially critical of Wilhelm I and Otto von Bismarck for their likenesses to the man whom many saw as the sole cause of World War Two, the "lone villain" Adolf Hitler. Revisionist histories thus came less from East or West Germany than from Anglo-American scholars like Hans Rosenberg, George Mosse, and Fritz Stern, who concerned themselves with what has since been a central theme: what structural factors allowed Nazism to arise in the first place? As it happened, there already existed the broad strokes of an answer that could satisfy the social historians of the 1960s: Sonderweg. Rosenberg, for example, examined the responses of Prussian agrarian society to the economic shocks of the mid-nineteenth century to explain Germany's supposed truncated development and "special path" to totalitarianism. Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, aristocracy, and autocracy: the Prussian experience, 1660-1815,* (Cambridge: Beacon, 1958). Other scholars suggested that German capitalist development had stalled and produced a society uniquely amenable to authoritarianism. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, few historians were willing to integrate the Third Reich into German historical narratives, traditionally stressing continuity over disjuncture. Some conservative scholars like Gerhard Ritter even attempted to tie National Socialism to Weimer democracy, arguing that an excess of democratic participation in Germany allowed a demagogue

Historical approaches that emphasize the global connections of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have recently found ready advocates.[40] In Germany, the influx of guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) from Turkey during the latter half of the twentieth century is like postcolonial immigration to other imperial metropoles of Europe. The fact that Turkey was never a German colony suggests that our definitions of "formal" colonialism may be too rigid if we are interested in explaining the structures of postcolonial capital entanglements.[41] Germany's

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like Hitler to come to power. See, George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*, (Berlin: Howard Fertig, 1975); Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study In The Rise Of The Germanic Ideology*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1961). The negative-*Sonderweg* thesis partly emerged from Allied propaganda during war time which equated Adolf Hitler with prior German demagogues including Martin Luther and Frederick the Great. See, for example, J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945).

[40] Mark Mazower situated German history in the broader framework of European colonialism.Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, (New York: Vintage, 2000). Stephen Ihrig demonstrated the degree to which Nazi thought and political strategy during the 1920s drew on news reports of the Turkish War of Independence and the leadership style of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Stephen Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, (Cambridge: Belknap, 2014). Eve Rosenhaft and Robbie Aitken's *Black Germany* attempts to reincorporate the stories – indeed the existence – of Afro-Germans into the history of the German diaspora between 1884 and 1960. Eve Rosenhaft and Robbie Aitken, *Black Germany: The Making and Unmaking of a Diaspora Community, 1884-1960,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2015). Elizabeth Hull's *Absolute Destruction* situated the development of German militarism in the experience of colonialism in Namibia. Elizabeth Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*, (Ithaca, Cornell, 2006).

[41] Peter Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways: Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). Peter Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways: Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, (New Haven: Yale, 2017).; Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2015).; Naci Yorulmaz, *Arming the Sultan: German Arms Trade and Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire Before World War I*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014).; Murat Özyüksel,

antebellum relations with Ottoman and Republican Turkey were cast in a mold so like other European colonial empires that the distinction becomes almost arbitrary. Colonization as a political policy does not always encompass the impacts of colonialism as a business strategy.

Formal territorial claims are not required for either *colonialism* or *imperialism* to exist. Nineteenth century imperialism proved highly flexible on the issue of colonies. Some of the nineteenth century's most enduring colonial legacies are rooted in spaces that were never formally annexed or colonized.[42] German settler colonialists rejected totalizing and essentialist national identities in favor of a "Germanness" rooted in their local circumstances and outside the bounds of continental Germany. These settler-colonists derived a German identity that was supposedly absent in the effete liberalism of continental Europe and existed only on the exotic, masculinized margins of European modernity – that is, in the colonies.[43]

Many histories of the German empire emphasize the Prussian-militarism that underpinned the German imperial experiment. Colonial agents of this violent

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The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016).; Jonathan McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway*, (New York: Praeger, 2001). Authors including Sebastian Conrad, John Phillip Short, Bradley Naranch, Geoff Eley, Volker Langbehn, and Mohammad Salama have, over the last decade, similarly begun the work of integrating Germany's short-lived colonial empire into its national history.

[42] Niles Stefan Illich, *German Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Study*. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: Texas A&M University, 2007), 2

[43] Sean Andrew Wempe uses the idea of the "Heimat abroad" to argue that the German colonialists constructed for themselves "opportunistic" forms of "frontier" identity. Sean Andrew Wempe, *Revenants of the German Empire : Colonial Germans, Imperialism, and the League of Nations,* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019).

predisposition in German Southwest Africa, Togoland, and German East Africa found themselves perpetrating escalating forms of brutality. Each new tactic of subjugation seemed designed to outdo the last in scale and barbarity. From beatings of everyday laborers in Togoland to the starvation of the Herero in West Africa in 1904 to scorched-earth tactics used against the Maji Maji uprising in East Africa in 1905, violence begat resistance, which begat violence on a still grander scale. Without diminishing the savagery of these colonial experiences, it is worth noting that most colonial or quasi-colonial activities of Germans abroad in the colonial era was less dramatic, though no less consequential.

This dissertation is concerned with violence in the form of coerced movement and labor, in epistemic flattening of identity and space, and the actions and inactions of state agents which drove out or killed Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and other communities in the pursuit of a discernible "national" homeland in Anatolia. At the same time, this dissertation seeks to examine how empire operates beyond overt violence. The mundane functions of taxation, public finance, infrastructure, and the discourses of geographical paradigms; how do these functions construct an empire and discipline the imperial imagination?

Dissertation Structure

This project draws on sources from the Deutsche Bank's historical archive housed at the Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank (The Deutsche Bank Historical Society) in Frankfurt am Main. Turkish and Ottoman sources come mainly

from digitized records of the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (The Ottoman Archives), accessed remotely via Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Turkish Republican Archives) in Ankara. In addition, evidence and documents from the Ottoman Bank Archives housed at SALT Galata in Istanbul and contemporary publications pulled from the holdings of the Institut français d'études anatoliennes and the Orient-Institut in Istanbul have proved invaluable. Sources from the archives of the Foreign Offices of Germany, France, and Britain also contribute to the narrative presented here. Files from Germany's Auswärtiges Amt - Politisches Archiv in Bonn, and the Bundesarchiv Abteilungen in Potsdam and Freiburg, as well as digitized records from the British Foreign Office curated by the Britain's National Archive and files from the Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères at the Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes all contributed to this project.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one examines how late Ottoman administrators sought to compensate for the loss of Balkan territories by reengineering Anatolian environments in the image of southeastern Europe. The chapter first considers the place of Balkan landscapes in Ottoman imperial thought in terms of their economic and symbolic significance. From its earliest days, the Ottoman axis of power was in southeastern Europe, having established a foothold in Thrace in 1321 and conquering north and westward through the Balkans for the next two centuries. By settling Turkish-speaking tribes in Balkan regions, the Ottomans established the Balkans as the economic heart of their Empire. These territories

represented cultural and social links to western European states. They were also unique biomes with few ecological analogs in the Empire's other territories.

As uprisings peeled off many of these districts in the nineteenth century, the Ottomans experienced a loss of political prestige and a severe contraction of the resource base of their fiscal state. To compensate for these losses, administrators adopted Tanzimāt discourses about state centralization and novel ideas about environmental and economic geography to transpose features of Balkan environments onto the Empire's remaining Anatolian territory. Beginning in the 1850s, administrators implemented a project of reconstructing Balkan environments on the Anatolian steppe. The result was a modification of social ecologies, landscapes, labor, and financial networks in styles advocated by European scientists, technocrats, and bankers. This set of projects reached its apex under Abdülhamid II and was the basis for the speculative attention of European capitalists who became entangled with Ottoman policymakers.

Chapter two considers one subset of these European speculators pursuing capital interests in Anatolia: The German financial sector. The discussion broadly considers the nature of German business interests in Anatolia and examines the degree to which German firms' pursuit of capital expansion into Ottoman lands should be considered "colonial," "imperial," or something else altogether.

This chapter focuses on the founding of Deutsche Bank's subsidiary, the German-Levantine Cotton Company (Delebage), which was explicitly intended to serve as a bridgehead to German interventions in Anatolia. The Delebage's travails in

establishing widespread plantation-style cotton agriculture in eastern Anatolia are instructive in considering the reach and impact of highly capitalized firms nudging peripheral economies into financialized relationships. The Delebage worked intermittently as an agent of and a foil to the designs of the German Colonial Office. It pursued, in general, its own financial interests over and above the political machinations of the German government. At the same time, Delebage was constrained by the extant social networks in Adana as well as its environmental barriers.

Chapter three follows the founding of Deutsche Bank's other subsidiary, the Konya Irrigation Company, which brought water to the central Anatolian Konya plain to realize the Bank's goal of improving Anatolian grain production for export. In 1903, led by managing director Arthur Gwinner, Deutsche Bank began negotiations to radically alter the geography of water on the Konya plain in central Anatolia. Guaranteeing profit from Anatolia's fertile soils meant Deutsche Bank would lay claim to the agricultural tithes from lands crossed by the bank's planned network of railways. However, maintaining these reengineered rural environments meant relying on continual injections of foreign credit and foreign expertise. As part of the irrigation scheme, Deutsche Bank collaborated with Ottoman authorities to coerce the cultivation of newly irrigated lands.

Chapter four observes the transition in Anatolia from the Ottoman periphery to the heartland of the modern Turkish Republic. The construction of Turkey’s capital in Ankara as an architecturally modernist national city serves as a synecdoche for the

early Turkish political project writ large. The nationalist project hinged on collectively *forgetting* the Ottoman past while imbuing the Anatolian interior with memories of the Balkan environments where most early Turkish elites grew up. This chapter examines the design and expansion of Ankara as a projection of national state power and a manifestation of urban-environmental nostalgia.

During the 1920s, the new Turkish nation-state, faced with a matrix of ecological, economic, and political constraints, imbued the building of Ankara with immense symbolic and material significance. At the same time, the collective memories, cultural attitudes, and shared environmental imaginaries of Turkey's ruling elites, most of whom held in common the experience of exile from the lands of Rumelia, effected the city's every feature. The capital city of Ankara was a feat of urban design that mirrored the Turkish national project of the 1920s and 1930s. It was centrally planned, self-consciously avant-garde, and concerned with incorporating the aesthetics of rural environments. Yet, Ankara's construction was, like in the Tanzimāt and Hamidian periods before, an explicit transposition of certain Balkan environmental forms – in this case, urban environments – onto Anatolia.

CHAPTER ONE: A NEW RUMELIA

Lost imperial landscapes and Tanzimāt approaches to environmental engineering

Introduction

Ottoman control of the Empire's most agriculturally productive, "core" Balkan territories (*Eyālet-i Rūm-ėli*; Rumelia) eroded throughout the nineteenth century, devastating state revenues that depended on the agricultural tithe collected from these regions.[44] As dominion over Rumelia eroded, Ottoman administrators turned attention to compensating for the material environments and political prestige that was lost.[45] The interests of Ottoman administrators drifted eastward to Anatolia. For Ottomans, especially Ottoman Turkish and Muslim refugees (*muhacir*) fleeing Balkan splinter-states, Anatolia was a space both old and new. It was an ancestral homeland about which little factual information was known. Anatolia was a frontier ripe for financial speculation. Bringing Anatolia into the European fold meant rendering its landscapes legible, negotiable, and productive. To these ends, Ottoman administrators and

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[44] See, Suraiya Faroqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quataert, and Şevket Pamuk, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. 2: 1600-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade, and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For an overview of the Ottoman provisioning system in environmental context, see Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011).

[45] Bruce McGowen, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, trade, and the struggle for land: 1600-1800* (Paris: Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme), 1981.

European firms formed fateful partnerships not just to compensate for the lost Balkan lands; but to *recreate* the Balkans in Anatolia.

What did it mean to "recreate" the Balkans in Anatolia?[46] It meant inscribing the Anatolian steppe with facsimile social and natural ecologies of the lost Balkan lands. As the Sublime Porte lost its grip on Rumelia, the Ottoman imperial project was refocused on Anatolia. This process transposed bureaucratic administration, political prestige, and environmental function from the wayward *Rumeli* provinces onto the governable Anatolian landmass. Striving to erase environmental differences between these regions only made their particularities more glaring. Ultimately, administrative units, *Eyālet-i Rūm-ėli* (Rumelia) and *Eyālet-i Anaṭolı* (Anatolia) became political boundaries and disarticulated geographies. They became "southeastern Europe" and "Turkey," respectively.

Central Anatolia was cast as the true Ottoman heartland once it became the last viable site of the Porte's dominion. Yet it was previously an opaque and threatening hinterland. Mostafa Minawi and Eugene Rogan suggest that the Ottoman state incorporated European techniques of rule through Tanzimāt to consolidate the margins of its sovereignty in Anatolia, Iraq, and Syria. Accordingly, Ottoman

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[46] The terms “Balkan” and “Rumelia” are used here very broadly and, for the most part, interchangeably. In this context, these refer to Ottoman territory situated in continental Europe. The islands of the Aegean do not figure prominently in the texts and sources explored here, but neither are they explicitly excluded from my use of the term. For more on the evolution of the administrative and colloquial designations in Ottoman Europe, see Henrik Birnbaum and Vryonis, Speros, Jr., eds. *Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972); and Halil Inalcik, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, (Bloomington: Indiana Turkish University Studies, 1993).

Tanzimāt was not merely a top-down, high-modernist process of expanding state capacity.[47] Tanzimāt was state expansion by consolidation, a new kind of imperial project.

By redefining the relationship between state and environment, imperial power dug deeper into extant territories rather than dispersing into new ones. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire was built on territorial expansion and taxation. However, throughout the nineteenth century, the expansionist imperial project had to be reimagined as a project of territorial reshaping, stewardship, and consolidation.

This chapter argues that Ottoman administrators, enmeshed in modernist discourses about the manipulation of natural environments, attempted to compensate for territorial losses in southeastern Europe, by attempting to reengineer the landscapes of Anatolia in the Balkans' image. Henceforth, the Porte was a permanent intermediary of rural production. Canals, railroads, telegraph lines; steam threshers, plows, locomobiles; securities exchanges, joint-stock companies, paper land deeds, and debt-backed currency (*kaime*); all were technologies of intermediation between the producer and the state. Over time, to be a rural farmer came to mean interfacing daily with state-built infrastructure, financial systems, and administrative strata. In this way, the Porte developed *infrastructural power;* the technological capacity to implement decisions uniformly throughout the state's territory.[48]

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[47] James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have*
Failed (New Haven: Yale University, 1999).
[48] Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State" (1984): 185–213.

Losing Balkan Landscapes

Before 1800, the Balkans were the seat of Ottoman prestige and the heart of the imperial economy. From the Empire's original center in Söğüt, Ottoman armies expanded to the north and west, establishing a foothold in Thrace in 1321 and conquering through the Balkans for the next two centuries. By settling Anatolian nomadic tribes (*yörük*) in Balkan regions, the Ottomans established the Balkans as the economic heart of the Empire, laying claim to its superabundant natural resources. The rich soils and diversity in flora, fauna, and landscapes were tangible assets.

European travelers exaggerated and disseminated accounts of limitless – and underutilized – Ottoman resources throughout the Balkan peninsula. One correspondent for *The Times of London* wrote in 1873 that "the natural wealth of [European] Turkey is left unproductive. Thousands of acres of most fertile soil are untilled, virgin forests abound, and its mines are practically unworked."[49] John MacGregor wrote of the Balkans in glowing economic terms in 1847. "Turkey in Europe," he wrote, was possessed of:

> soil in most parts remarkably fertile, a highly favored climate, which ripens in perfection the vine, olive, maize, wheat, and rice; most culinary vegetables; delicious fruits; tobacco, flax, hemp; the mulberry; the *Cistus Creticus* (which produces the gum ladanum); the *Astragulus Tragacantha* and *Astragalus Creticus* (both which yield the gum tragacanth of commerce); the *Pistacia Lentiscus* and the *Pistacia Terebinthus*, yielding the gum resins, mastic, and terebinth of commerce; and, in the southern provinces, the sugar-cane and cotton-

[49] "Turkish Financial Reform," *The Times*, 24 October 1873, Issue 27829, quoted in Selçuk Dursun, "Forest and the State: History of Forestry and Forest Administration in the Ottoman Empire," (PhD diss., Sabancı University, 2007), 103.

> tree. Excellent durable timber for shipbuilding, and other wood for useful and ornamental purposes, are also abundant. Add to which, rich pasturages for horses, horned cattle, and sheep; plenty of fish abounding along the coasts and in the rivers, game in the forests, and the abundance, from the little trouble in rearing bees, of honey; with the mineral riches (little however explored); then, the excellent harbors and admirable position of European Turkey, and we may have a general idea of her great natural resources.[50]

As Ottoman hold on these lands diminished, the landscapes themselves – deep forests, sweeping hills, golden fields, and abundance of flowing freshwater – took on arcadian significance, the loss of which was more than just economic. Balkan territories represented cultural and social links to the wealthier western European states and unique biomes. There were few apparent corollaries in the Empire's other domains. These biomes benefited from the tripartite "edge effect" that resulted from the intersection of three distinct biogeographical zones: temperate deciduous forests to the north, chaparral to the west and south, and temperate grasslands east.[51] "Edge effect" is the phenomenon by which the intersection of two biomes exhibits greater biological diversity than does either biome individually or in sum. This effect played a vital role in maintaining nutrients for agriculture and supplying human communities

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[50] John MacGregor, *Commercial Statistics: A Digest of the Productive Resources, Commercial Legislation, Custom Tariffs, Navigation, Port, and Quarantine Laws, and Charges, Shipping, Import and Exports, the Monies, Weights, and Measures of All Nations; Including All British Commercial Treaties with Foreign States. Vol. 2,* (London, 1847), quoted in Dursun, "Forest and the State," 104.

[51] L. Erdős, D. Krstonošić, P.J. Kiss, et al. "Plant composition and diversity at edges in a semi-natural forest–grassland mosaic," *Plant Ecology* 220 (2019): 279.

with diverse biotic resources.[52] Edward Lear wrote wistfully of this landed abundance in 1851:

> You have the simple and exquisite mountain-forms of Greece, so perfect in outline and proportion–the lake, the river, and the wide plain.... you have that which is found neither in Greece nor in Italy, a profusion everywhere of the most magnificent foliage recalling the greenness of our own island [Britain]–clustering plane and chestnut, growth abundant of forest oak and beech, and dark tracts of pine. You have….mountain passes such as you encounter in the snowy regions of Switzerland; deep bays and blue seas with bright, calm isles resting on the horizon; meadows and grassy knolls; convents and villages; olive-clothed slopes and snow-capped mountain peaks;–and with all this a crowded variety of costume and pictorial incident as bewilders and delights an artist at each step he takes.[53]

However, decades before Lear wrote had seen almost uninterrupted conflict in many of the Ottoman Balkan provinces. Fresh scars from those struggles were everywhere apparent. Nationalist and revanchist movements took root around the Mediterranean over the last decades of the eighteenth century.[54] A new politics of ethnic atomization fed the flames of anti-Ottoman uprisings from the eighteenth century onward. Many

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[52] Anna Grichting, Michele Zebich-Knos (eds), *The Social Ecology of Border Landscapes*, (New York: Anthem Press, 2017).

[53] Edward Lear, *Journals of a Landscape painter in Albania etc.*, (London: Richard Bentley, 1851), 3.

[54] See, Kemal Karpat, "The transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3:3, (1972) 243–281.; Peter F. Sugar, *Nationality and Society in Habsburg and Ottoman Europe*. (Hampshire, U.K.: Variorum, 1997).; Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354-1804, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).; Dimitris Livanios, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 2, No. 2 (2002): 165-176.; Halil Inalcık, *Turkey and Europe in History*, (Istanbul:, Eren, 2006).; Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered*, (I.B. Taurus: Istanbul, 2007).

of these rebellions began as localized tax revolts.[55] They later snowballed into liberation struggles of aggrieved Christian communities supported by the Empire's European rivals.

For Ottoman administrators, the threat of these increasingly frequent uprisings was not merely a loss of prestige for the Sultan but the forfeiture of valuable natures available for the Porte's provisioning. The Balkan districts held tangible economic importance rivaling and sometimes surpassing Anatolia. Grand Vizier Mehmed Said Paşa, (1830–1914) claimed as much to Abdülhamid II. "The survival of the [Ottoman] state depends on the continuation of our rule in the Rumelia region," Mehmed contended.[56]

When the final blow came, it struck deep. Following the Balkan Wars in 1912, Halil Bey implored his fellow parliamentarians: "Do not forget! Do not forget the beloved Salonica, the cradle of the torch of freedom and constitutionalism, green Monastir, Kosova, Shkoder, Ioannina, and all of the beautiful Rumelia."[57] These environments were suffused with myths of verdancy, the dispossession of which was unthinkable to many elites.

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[55] E. Atilla Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During the Tanzimāt Period (1839–1876) and Before the Young Turk Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Policy History*, 25:3 (2013), 308-332

[56] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 3:130, quoted In Behlül Özkan. *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of National Homeland in Turkey*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

[57] Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, 3:562–563.

The physical landscape comprising the Balkan territories took on complex and contested meanings. Balkan nationalists of Greek, Slavic, and Albanian heritage imbued their relationship to their home soils with autochthonic and even mystical qualities. Irredentists credited these territorial landscapes with producing the unique social character from which groups fashioned a national identity. For the Porte, it was essential to somehow sever Balkan environments from the seemingly disloyal communities cultivating the state's resources. Thus, administrators, abetted by European stakeholders, made efforts to reassemble the components of Balkan verdure in governable Anatolian space. "For Turkey, the real problem of yesterday, today, and tomorrow is the question of Anatolia, which is the matter of life and death," wrote İsmail Gasprinski in 1912. "The Anatolian question has to do with reviving Anatolia.... During the [last] sixty years, if [the Istanbul government] had made any effort to revive Anatolia, things would have been quite different today."[58]

The term *Balkan* was first an environmental rather than political designation. According to nineteenth century Ottoman dictionaries, *Balkan* refers to any steep, forested chain of mountains. Colloquially, *Balkan* was associated with hideouts of bandits and criminals who threatened Ottoman sovereignty to the west.[59] By contrast, *Rumelia* referenced the political and administrative unit of Ottoman Europe. Under Sultan Murat I (1362–1389), the growing Empire was administratively split into two

[58] İsmail Gasprinski, "İmparatorluk Haricindeki Türkler Ne Diyorlar?" *Türk Yurdu* 20 (1912): 336–337

[59] Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered*, (I.B. Taurus: Istanbul, 2007), 30.

regions divided by the Sea of Marmara: Rumelia to the west and Anatolia (*Anadolu*) to the east.[60] Conquest pushed both territories' borders outward over the next three centuries. However, this broad bifurcation continued to hold sway in the imaginations and official ledgers of administrators. With palpable and growing unrest in Albania and Macedonia on the eve of 1900, the loss of these territories to bandit enclaves grew more conceivable with each passing year. Sowing the seeds of an imperial resurgence in the Anatolian periphery meant the Sublime Porte and its emissaries were poised to lash out at perceived threats to its eastern frontier to avoid the same losses they had experienced to the west.

Before its nineteenth-century contraction, the Ottoman "core" had operated as an extension of Istanbul, conquered in 1453. Direct government appointees administered areas surrounding the capital, and these lands bore the lion's share of taxation. Central Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Bulgaria formed the core's boundary to the east, south, and north, respectively. The inner "periphery" of the Empire, encompassing the northern Balkans, Egypt, and Crimea, made up the Empire's breadbasket. For many essential goods, the Empire depended on these regions' rich soils, diverse topographies, and amenable climates. The Sultan could count on grains, rice, and flax from Egypt; grains, wood, mutton, wool, and honey from the northern Balkans; and animal products like tallow, butter, lard, and hides from Crimea.[61] An

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[60] The Turkish name for Asia Minor, *Anadolu* (Anatolia), derives from the Greek *anatole* meaning “east” or “sunrise.”

[61] Sam White, *Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2011), 24.

outer periphery also existed for the Empire comprised mainly of symbolic tribute from nomads, emirates, and other rulers in the Armenian Highlands, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Arabia.[62]

In peripheral territories, the government traditionally accommodated regional practices in land tenure and political administration. In the Danube and Crimea's Tatar Khan, this meant embracing vassalage over direct rule. Balkan territories north of Thrace were only loosely administered because the Porte's main interest was their fertile plains' substantial tithe revenues (*âşâr*). Rich chernozem soil, expansive grasslands, steady rainfall, dependable labor, and large river basins made much of the Ottoman Balkans a breadbasket and later a cash cow for the imperial treasury.[63] Thus, Balkan losses and subsequent attempts to replace them were not just reactions to a

[62] "Anatolia" here refers approximately to the area otherwise termed Asia Minor, comprising all but the eastern third of the landmass of modern Turkey and excluding Turkey's "European" lands west of the Bosporus. The north-south arc of the Gulf of Alexandretta, the Armenian Highland, and Mesopotamia traditionally mark Anatolia's eastern border. In practice, the term "Anatolia" is now synonymous with Asiatic Turkey. The region now called Eastern Anatolia was referenced as Armenia (*Ermenistan*) or the Armenian Highland (*Ermeni Yaylası*). In 1880 use of Armenia as a geographic designation was excised from official papers and the definition of Anatolia was informally expanded to encompass the anti-Taurus highland regions (the Armenian Highland). This epistemic violence continued well into the twentieth century. Under Mustafa Kemal's government this definition was codified, and Eastern Anatolia became an official designation. In his *Cihânnümâ* ("View of the World"), Ottoman chronicler Kâtip Çelebi, published in 1632, the author includes a chapter on the "Country Called Armenia" in reference to this highland region. Kâtip Çelebi, *Kitab-ı Cihannüma li-Kâtip Çelebi (Constantinople: İbrahim Müteferrika, 1732).*

[63] Suraiya Faroqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quataert, and Şevket Pamuk, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. 2: 1600-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

loss of prestige. Losing these people and spaces meant toppling a central pillar of the Empire's wealth and ecology. The loss was material in every sense.

When unrest or foreign wars threatened supply of these resources, the Sublime Porte responded by restructuring tax and land distribution systems and reorganizing provincial administration. Tax strikes often followed attempted changes. With each wave of attempted reform, disaffection led to backlash, pushing many of the Empire's agriculturally fecund provinces further into open revolt. When these revolts succeeded in peeling off territory from the Porte's control, imperial revenues suffered immensely. The resulting shortfall prompted new rounds of reform so that a vicious cycle of unrest, reform, revolt, and suppression plagued the Empire's periphery throughout the nineteenth century.

By 1817, the Second Serbian uprising cleaved much of Serbia's 3 million hectares of arable land from Ottoman control.[64] The Porte lost the bountiful farms and temperate deciduous forests in Moldavia and Wallachia following the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople. The treaty also ceded most of the Black Sea's eastern shore and the Danube delta to Russia. One year later, the London Protocol recognized Greece as an independent state. The Porte held on to Thessaly, Thrace, and Macedon. However, even these slipped through the Sultan's fingers after the 1878 Ottoman debt default. Romanov and Habsburg interventions in these regions further eroded Ottoman political control, and Ottoman traders' oligopsony privileges dwindled until World

[64] Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, 2007

War One. These lands' varied and plentiful biomes had no ready corollary in the Ottomans' remaining territories.[65]

Successful revolts in Balkan states inspired similar unrest in Anatolia. Control over Anatolia took on life-or-death significance as the Empire's last bastion of natural resources. In Eastern Anatolia in 1840, accusations of corruption against Akdağ's chief *muhassil* inflamed a tax strike that had already been percolating because of general discontent over new tax obligations.[66] Tax collectors knowingly used inaccurate devices for calculating land and used technicalities to artificially boost tithe collection. As rural cultivators took up the strike, open revolt against the officials ensued. The skirmish was put down only with considerable military effort. In the same year, two hundred kilometers to the north and west, in Tokat, similar circumstances led villagers to lynch their chief *muhassil* and drag his corpse to the local courthouse.

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[65] Agricultural land was not the only resource slipping from the Sultan's grasp in the Balkans. As Bruce McGowan noted, the shallow, marshy, and undulating middle Danube, west of the Iron Gate (near Orsova in present-day Romania) was virtually unnavigable until the mid-nineteenth century. This river segment therefore acted as a kind of natural barrier to North-South trade, insulating Ottoman markets from the products of the fertile Hungarian plains and allowed Ottoman merchants to keep prices high and the Sublime Porte to dictate terms. Between 1890-96 a new canal was constructed allowing passage of ships up to 650 tons. These improvements combined with the extension of rail transport into the Hungarian interior opened the Ottoman grain market to Austro-Hungarian competition while at the same time weaving Anatolian producers into an increasingly global tapestry of agronomic interests while reducing the Sublime Porte's influence over the terms of production. See, Bruce McGowen, "The Middle Danube cul-de-sac," in *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 175-176.

[66] E. Atille Aytekin. "Cultivators, Creditors and the State: Rural Indebtedness in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 35:2 (2008), 293.

Meanwhile, in Çarşamba (Macedonia), subjects petitioned their governor for reprieve from new taxes by questioning the new system's legal legitimacy. "Not only don't we have the means to pay this amount," they wrote, "there is no edict for its collection either." [67] Essentially the same story was repeated in Amasya and Zile. While the corruption of local *muhassil* spurred revolts, it was fundamentally aggrievement over increased taxation that left subjects feeling slighted. Whether overt corruption underpinned tax collection or not, the new system appeared arbitrary to average farmers.[68]

In the following year, 1841, similar circumstances led to a significant uprising in Niš, a trading crossroad between Serb and Bulgar provinces that sat amid bountiful plains. There, Muslims and resident foreigners were incensed to learn they would be subject to head taxes for the first time in memory. In a notable act of solidarity, Christian congregations joined the movement, suspecting foul play in the city's tax registers. Protest and revolt quickly spread as rural subjects not yet affected by the reforms joined the chorus against taxation. Strikers left their villages (*Kaza)* before taxes could be collected and congregated around bridges and other topographical choke points. They then impeded trade and the movement of officials, employing violence in some cases. Authorities put down the revolt by razing 225 villages, driving some 8,000 refugees into the new Principality of Serbia. Despite these apparent failures, tax strikes continued to plague Tanzimāt implementation through

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[67] Ibid

[68] Ahmet Uzun, *Tanzimāt ve Sosyal Direnişler* (İstanbul, 2002), 23. See also, Aytekin, *Tax Revolts*, 2013.

the 1860s. By then, civil associations had begun to form to oppose many of the tax reforms, seeking to annul them through regular political channels.[69]

When Abdülhamid II ascended the sultanate, territorial losses and foreign debts had prompted many to support his neo-absolutist inclinations. Nevertheless, it was clear that Ottoman hegemony in the Balkans would not recover. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897–1976) described in his memoirs, completed in 1959, the shock to Ottoman psyches dispensed by the Balkan losses:

> When the Balkan War broke out and the imperial armies lost all the Ottoman territories in Europe . . . everything became clear. This collapse was not simply a defeat of a state. It was the end of a groundless dream. It was a complete downfall of a spirit and mentality. A tale, an imperial tale was coming to an end. Apparently, what we considered as grandeur was just a sleep of negligence.[70]

Süreyya concludes his autobiography with an eastward turn, much like the Ottoman administration writ large. "My life story," he writes, "ended with a turn to the soil of the Central Anatolian steppe."[71]

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[69] Atille Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimāt Reforms," *International Review of Social History,* 57 (2012), pp. 198

[70] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976), 48-49. quoted in Behlül Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of National Homeland in Turkey*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 65

[71] Ibid

Pushing the Empire East: Environmental Anxiety and the Anatolian Turn

By the nineteenth century, the myth of inexhaustible Ottoman *nature* was a trope in European orientalist literature. Accordingly, the economic liberalization pledged by Tanzimāt reformers made European capitalists giddy as the speculated on the wealth that could be found behind the Ottoman veil. The frenzy of interest in Ottoman resources saw thousands of industrialists, diplomats, missionaries, colonists, engineers, and scientists enter the Ottoman fold. When expectations of paradise-on-earth inevitably fell short, these sojourners lashed out at Ottoman governance, accusing "the Turks" of squandering the environmental riches bequeathed to them. In 1909, Scottish traveler David Fraser wrote of the classically vibrant city of Cilicia (Adana) in nostalgic terms:

> On the Pyramus lay the port city of Cilicia, a centre [*sic*] of Greek trade and influence; the Sarus [Seyhan river] gave rise to a great scheme of land reclamation and harbor construction. But these glories belong to a period 2000 years old. To-day [sic] the three rivers whose banks were once lined with quays and wharfs flow unconstrainedly toward the sea, their waters roll over muddy flats or are lost in swampy wastes, their navigable channels have become impassable ditches.[72]

Over time, Ottoman administrators came to believe these accounts of their lands.[73] Osman Ragıb, for example, wrote in 1862 of the need to embrace French scientific forestry and make a detailed assessment of the extent of Ottoman forests, which he

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[72] David Fraser, *A Short-cut to India* (London: William Blackwood & Sons 1909), 75.

[73] Osman Ragıb, "[Untitled]," in *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 25, S 1279/21 August 1862.; For an example of the European travel literature on which this perception of vast natural resources was based, see Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Les Six Voyages de Turquie et de Perse*, (Paris: Maspero, 1981). For further discussion of these sources and their impact on Ottoman forestry, see Dursun, "Forest and State," 102-103.

estimated to be much more extensive than the available woodland in France. Many Anatolian inhabitants agreed. One Turkish villager lamented the unexploited mineral wealth of Anatolia:

> "It is a great pity.... With proper machinery it would be easy to pump out the water, and these mines abound in silver."
> "We have got nothing but paper money in Anatolia," he added sorrowfully, "all this rich metal lies buried beneath our feet."[74]

In 1823, François- René de Chateaubriand complained that once-fertile fields in Anatolia, Greece, Egypt, and Palestine had been "transformed into deserts." He wrote that Anatolia in this period comprised “a mountainous region that would be covered with an admirable forest . . . if the Turks let anything grow. But they set fire to the young plants and mutilate the trees. These people destroy everything. They are a veritable scourge.”[75] These accounts influenced Ottoman administrators who came to see themselves as saviors of imperial prestige. As historian Andrea Duffy notes, these European encounters with Ottoman nature "heighten[ed] environmental anxieties at home while spreading new environmental awareness and concern to members of the Ottoman elite."[76]

In its golden age, the abundance of Ottoman timber was the envy of Europe. Woodlands had been especially integral to Balkan environments. As the Empire's

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[74] Quoted in Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor*, Vol. 1, (London: Gilbert and Rivington, 1877), 168
[75] Chateaubriand, *Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem*, 195 quoted in Andrea E. Duffy, *Nomad's Land: Pastoralism and French Environmental Policy in the Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean World*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2019), 53
[76] Ibid

primary source of timber for centuries, Balkan forests presented an essential resource for shipbuilding, charcoal, firewood, and domestic construction. As these lands receded from the Porte's grasp, the importance of Anatolian forests increased. Their management became a fulcrum of the Empire's survival. The loss of dense woodlands in Wallachia, Moldavia, Serbia, and Bulgaria increased pressure on Anatolian supplies. The region's forests had to meet domestic needs and export to high-demand markets like France and Britain.

Fortunately, Anatolia was well-supplied with timber. The accounts of famed traveler Evliya Çelebi told of the "sea of trees" (*ağaç denizi*) just southeast of Istanbul.[77] Unfortunately, the central government possessed little empirical information about the extent, location, and management of woodland resources. Administrators drew on the expertise of scientific foresters from France to develop management systems overseen from Istanbul. Surveys commissioned in 1868 calculated the total forested area in Anatolia, the remaining Balkan vilayets, and the islands of Lesbos and Rhodes at 4,434,000 hectares. Nearly two-thirds of this total was in Anatolia. About half of Anatolia's forests lay in just three provinces: Kastamonu, Trabzon, and Samsun. Meanwhile, even after losing the vast majority of

[77] *Türkiye'de Botanik Tarihi Araştırmaları* (Ankara: Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknik Araştırma Kurumu, 2003).

its well-wooded Balkan provinces, one-third of the total remained in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina.[78]

Foresters in France were especially interested in the Anatolian woodlands. However, investors and administrators lacked reliable information about the Anatolian interior. The journal *Annales Forestières* spoke admiringly of Anatolia's forests. The journal cautioned of the effort they required: "improvements can and must be attempted," as one author wrote, "[but] not without excessive prudence will we succeed in planting in Turkish forests the seeds of European forest science."[79]

After the Crimean War, and under pressure from European states seeking to exploit the Empire's timber, the Council of Public Works (*Meclis-i Me'abir; Conseil des Travaux Publics)* was formed on 31 October 1857 and given purview over forestry, among other responsibilities like transportation infrastructure, waterways, land reclamation, prisons, mining, and industry. Its portfolio was extensive and evidenced the Porte's resolve to centralize control over the Empire's remaining natural resources. The Ottoman readership of the *Annales Forestières* apparently internalized the view that French scientific forestry was the apex of woodland management because every foreign advisor of the Council of Public Works was French. Louis François Victorin Tassy (1816-1895) and Alexandre Stheme (1814-1887) were chief among these early foresters. They urged the Council to preserve Anatolia's forests by establishing an official Forestry School (*Orman Mektebi*) and drew up a single set of

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[78] Dursun*, Forest and the State*, 195. Based on figures in Louis Bricogne, "Les forêts de l'empire Ottoman." *Revue des Eaux et Fôrets Annales forestières* 16 (Août 1877): 321-335.
[79] Quoted in Duffy, *Nomad's Land*, 98

forest regulations that could be applied uniformly in Anatolia and the remaining Balkan districts. Heeding this advice, the Ministry of Trade founded the first Ottoman Forest School in 1857. This school sought to replace Anatolia's mosaic of received local knowledge with modern scientific principles. Forest Science (*orman fenni*) came to rule the administration's relationship to its trees.[80]

Throughout the reform era, inspectors and civil servants were sent into the provinces to gather information on these peripheries' people, resources, production, and politics. These reports formed the basis of Tanzimāt conceptions of nature, which hinged on the state's capacity to demonstrate its sovereignty by cataloging, classifying, and appraising natural space.[81] Bureaucrats incentivized landowners to extend cultivation into the hinterlands. Decrees from 1862 stated that uncultivated land could be transferred and re-registered untaxed.[82] Entrepreneurial cultivators could claim and register any fallow public *miri* (state-owned) lands that they could bring under the plow.[83] Traditionally, *rakabe* (eminent domain) of these *miri* lands'

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[80] Ibid

[81] For information about the experiences of these inspectors, see: Yonca Köksal, "Tanzimāt Döneminde Bulgaristan: Osmanlı Merkezî Devletinin Oluşumu, 1839-1878," *Toplum ve Bilim* 83 (1999/2000); Mahir Aydın, "Ahmed Ârif Hikmet Beyefendi'nin Rumeli Tanzimāt Müfettişliği ve Teftiş Defteri, (Nisan 1992), 69-165," *Belleten* LVI, no. 215 (1992)

[82] "The grant of *khali* (waste) and *kirach* (stony) land to persons intending to break it up in pursuance of Article 103 of the Land Code is made gratuitously and without fee. A new title deed is issued to them on payment of three piastres for the price of paper, and they are exempted from payment of tithes for one year, or for two years if the land is stony," quoted in R. C. Tute, *The Ottoman Land Laws: with a Commentary on the Ottoman Land Code of 7th Ramadan 1274*, (Jerusalem, Greek Conv. Press, 1927), 130.

[83] See, Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimāt ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi," in *Tanzimāt* (İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı

arable fields, pastures, meadows, and forests was granted as usufruct to *kazas* (villages) or nomads within the confines of their *il-rah* (traditional migration routes). Before the 1858 Land Code, *miri* lands could be officially possessed by transfer of a title deed (*tapus*) as transfer deeds (*temessük*) or escheat (*mahlul mülk*) by the local *sahib-i arz* (landholder). This individual had been the *tımarlı* or *zaim* (fief-holder) in prior eras and after the seventeenth century was more commonly a *mültezim* or *muhassıl* (salaried tax collector).[84] This process of change commoditized title deeds of land. It removed land acquistion from the immediate social context of the land itself or the material act of cultivation. The state inserted itself further into the semi-

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Yayınları, 1999 [c. 1940]); Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler I* (The Agrarian Question in Turkey, Collected Works, Vol.1), (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1980); See also, M. Fuad Köprülü, 'Toprak Meselesi' (The Land Question), *Ülkü*, 10, 58 (1937).

[84] The 1858 Ottoman Land Code (*Arazi Kanunnamesi*) codified a framework for administrators to adjudicate many issues of rural production, agriculture, and property as they related to state revenues. While it did not restructure rural property relations as profoundly as some authors have claimed, its impacts were real, if uneven, in Anatolia. See, D. Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948); G. Baer, 'The Evolution of Private Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent', *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); D. Jorgens, 'A Comparative Examination of the Provisions of the Ottoman Land Code and Khedive Said's Law of 1858', in Roger Owen (ed.), *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); H. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq : A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978) Sir Stanley Fisher, *Ottoman Land Laws: Containing the Ottoman Land Code and Later Legislation Affecting Land with Notes and an Appendix of Cyprus Laws and Rules Relating to Land* (London and New York: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1919); M. Belin, "Etude sur la propriété foncière en pays musulmans et spécialement en turquie (rite hanéfite). Part 2," *Journal Asiatique* XIX (April-May 1862).; For the land code, see "Arazi Kanunname-i Hümayunu," *Düstûr* 1. Tertib, vol. I (7 N 1274/21 April 1858).

formal social landscape of agricultural production. It also encouraged privatization of agricultural development by incentivizing financial speculation in the future productive potential of fallow lands. These changes helped to dismantle the traditional protections offered to transhumant uses of public lands, obliquely coercing nomadic settlement of fertile spaces, and ensuring these communities could be more easily counted, governed, and taxed.

Administrators attempted to centralize the management of environmental resources by establishing overlapping directorates. Tanzimāt reformers established the General Directorate of Forests (*Orman Müdüriyet-i Umumiyyesi*) in August 1840. However, it dissolved the following year, leaving the Council of Navy (*Meclis-i Bahriye*) to exert primary influence on timber production for the next two decades. The government was also prodded by British commercial interests hoping to capitalize on the global cotton famine during the American Civil War. Governors offered free cottonseed, exempted yields of these lands from taxation for five years, and rescinded duties on machinery imported for this purpose.[85]

Personnel and Environment: Balkan elites in provincial administration

The Porte took pains to appoint capable administrators to Anatolian districts, spaces that were once backwaters but now carried the Empire's fate. Natives of some Balkan provinces had knowledge and experience dealing with the communities and

[85] Güran, Tevfik, "Tanzimāt Döneminde Tarım Politikası (1839-1876)," in *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920)*, (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1980) 271-277.

the fertile environments from which they came. As such, civil servants who had experience in Balkan districts were tapped to oversee the transformation of the Anatolian steppe.[86] Bureaucrats hailing from the Balkan districts were now eagerly appointed for service in Anatolia. Administrative experience, the thinking went, could be transposed from one periphery to another. Balkan officials would be well-suited to settle transhumant and refugee populations in Anatolia while tapping the storied agricultural potential of Asia Minor's rich soil.[87] In addition to Balkan natives, the regime of Abdelhamid II prized those with experience serving west of the Bosporus and found ways to repurpose their experience in Anatolian offices. Often, this provided valuable intelligence and useful comparisons between Anatolian and Balkan environments. In some cases, these insights led to large scale, lasting reforms.

Ideas derived from the work of Charles Darwin shaped the approaches of many Ottoman administrators toward managing populations and their environments. First, many took Darwin's evolutionary reasoning to support racialist ideas about ethnicity.[88] Educator and Arab nationalist intellectual Sati' al-Husri went so far as to read humans as undifferentiated from other intelligent species. In his article, "Societies and Organs," al-Husri argued that societies follow organic patterns of

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[86] David Fraser, *A Short-cut to India* (London: William Blackwood & Sons 1909), 29.

[87] Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course: Ferid Pasha, Governor and Grand Vizier (1851 - 1914)," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 40. Jahrg., H. 1, Imperiale Biographien (Januar –März 2014): 42-66.

[88] Ülker Öktem, "Effects of Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution in Tanzimāt", *Kaygı*, S.19, (Güz 2012): 11-26

generation, growth, and decay and that societies are organisms in themselves.[89] This assertion erased any clear distinction between social and natural worlds and denied humans any divinely ordained sovereignty over the places in which they lived.

Taking these ideas a step further, Asaf Nefi's article, "Struggle for Life and The Perfection of Societies," published in *Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye* (Journal of Social and Economic Sciences), argued that living organisms, including humans, are composites of two interacting generative systems: 1) the system of their local environment and 2) the broader system of "nature." This latter use of "nature" encompassed the entire material cosmos and its laws. Even the slightest environmental change was a change to the organism itself.[90]

Nefi championed the view of French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck that organisms are inextricable from their local environments. Nefi emphasized the need to incorporate "environmental factors, such as the living conditions of plants, animals and human beings, to Darwin's theory."[91] Individual organisms were inextricable from the environment that shaped them. The direction of causality between individuals and environments was unknowable. Therefore, transposing favorable qualities from one space to another should be achievable by merely transferring those classes of people, plants, and livestock native in one environment to another. With the

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[89] Sati' al-Husri H.1325, "Cemiyetler ve Uzviyetler," *Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye* 2(8): 433- 454.

[90] Ülker Öktem, "Effects of Charles Darwin's Theory," 17

[91] Asaf Nef'i. H.1325. "Mücadele-i Hayat ve Tekamül-i Cemiyet," *Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye* 2 (8): 445-480, İstanbul, Hilal Matbaası.

Empire on its back foot, Nefi's ideas about infusing space with the individuals' qualities took on grave and immediate relevance.

In this context, the government of Abdülhamid II instated a meticulous census from 1881-93. In part, this census had the aim of taxonomizing Ottoman subjects into one of eleven recognized ethnic classes (*millets*): Muslim, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, Catholic, Jew, Protestant, Latin (Roman Catholic), Monophysite (Syriac), Gypsy, non-Muslim and Foreign Citizen. This taxonomy broke from earlier classification systems, which had recognized only three or four millets: Muslim, Christian, and Jew. Conspicuously, the first category, "Muslim," is vast, conspicuously so. It elided non-Turkish Muslim identities – Kurd, Arab, Albanian, etc. – while atomizing Christian communities.

This elision of Muslim diversity was not always the norm. Subcategories of Muslims were recorded in sixteenth-century detailed tax registers *mufassal defters* alongside some non-Muslim subcategories: Rumiyan (Romans), Arnavudan (Albanian), Türk (Turk), Ekrad (Kurds), Bulgar, Yahudiyan (Jews), Çingeneyan (Gypsies), Kıbtiyan (Copts), Arab and Ermeniyan (Armenians). These distinct Muslim communities were seen mainly as nomadic or semi-nomadic and therefore suspect. It was essential to deny these groups communal authority because official policy aimed to dismantle and sedentarize them. The follow-up Ottoman census (1906-7) listed nine additional ethnicities: Cossack, Wallachian, Maronite, Syriac, Samaritan, Jacobite, Armenian Catholic, Yezidi, and Catholic. Notably, both censuses were careful to mark the environs in which these identity classes resided. These

registers record the order of information as *population–place* rather than *place–population* as in the Ottoman Classical period.[92] For the first time, geography was recorded as a *feature of each community* rather than the reverse. This inversion reveals a new way that administrators understood individuals, communities, and environments. In subsequent Ottoman staffing and settlement policies, administrators adopted this understanding of space. They scrambled to move specific "useful" (usually Muslim) populations out of the secessionist Balkan states and into the Empire's abiding stronghold in Anatolia.

Perturbed by the cycles of nationalist uprisings in the Balkan districts, many Ottoman bureaucrats started to understand the Balkan peoples through the kinds of discourses championed by Nefi and al-Husri. They came to see these revolts as indicative of the essentially untamable character of certain ethnic groups. Greek merchants, for example, controlled much Anatolian trade before 1800. They were valued as dragomans (*tercüman*) by government officials and European traders. Following the Greek Revolt of 1821 and independence in 1830, these Greek notables lost their privileged positions. Ottoman administrators sought out other groups to fill what had once been the Greek population's niche as European intermediaries. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Albanians (*Arnaut*) became especially well-represented in bureaucratic ranks. Albanian representation was not new in the Ottoman court. The famed Köprülü dynasty of seventeenth-century grand viziers was

[92]Fuat Dundar, "Empire of Taxonomy: Ethnic and Religious Identities in the Ottoman Surveys and Censuses," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51:1, (2015), 136-158.

Albanian. However, in the nineteenth century, the Ottomans began to seek Albanian officials to replace Greek bureaucrats. Often multilingual and generally ill-disposed toward the new Kingdom of Greece, Albanians were long prized as capable soldiers in Ottoman ranks. They were the most prominent non-Turkish Muslim group in the Balkans.[93]

Few individuals exemplified the project of seeding Anatolia with Balkan officials better than Avlonyalı Mehmet Ferit Paşa (Ferid Paşa). He was born in Vlora, Southern Albania, to a prominent family of landholders. While working in Istanbul as a young bureaucrat, Ferid traveled to his home in Vlora several times and remained engaged in his brothers' agricultural business there. The Sultan appointed Ferid to serve as governor of several important vilayets, including Diyarbakir. Ferid was then appointed governor of Konya in March 1898 and remained there until 1902, when he became Grand Vizier. Ferid's time as governor of Konya, Anatolia's most promising untapped agricultural region, was among his most consequential. Ferid brought to Konya's fields familiarity with the cultivation techniques likely to thrive there, as well as his family's experience introducing scientific agriculture to their estates. When he arrived in Konya, he immediately set out to circumvent the area's labor shortage and

[93] See, George Gawrych, *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913*, (Istanbul: I. B. Tauris, 2006). Questions about the loyalties and nationalist sympathies of any individual Albanian were raised at high levels and the default was to view them with suspicion. While Albanians' Balkan pedigree was valued, it simultaneously rendered them objects of distrust. Abduhamid II had to note that, in Ferid's case, "his being Albanian" could not overshadow the many good deeds he had done for the Empire. Quoted in Kırmızı, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course," 48.

introduce mechanization to its fields. He agitated for the rights of cultivators and attempted to better enshrine these rights in law. He also sought to build higher education institutions in the provinces to encourage young professionals to remain and develop these rural economies rather than emigrating to Istanbul or continental Europe.[94] Finally, Ferid is credited with introducing the idea of a large scale irrigation project to the Konya plain. German Ambassador Freiherr von Marschall noted Ferid's "energetic personality." He described Ferid as having "an upright stance against those above him, and he, as a native Albanian, could allow himself things that would be dangerous if done by others."[95]

To develop agriculture around Adana, Abdülhamid II first sent an experienced Anatolian there, Ziya Paşa (1825-1880). The Sultan wanted to rid himself of Ziya, an outspoken Young Ottoman constitutionalist. Having served in many other posts around Anatolia, Ziya had a keen sense of agricultural variation in Asia Minor's various climes. In 1878, drought struck Eastern Anatolia. The recent memory of famine in Central Anatolia was still vivid. Ziya Paşa sought to quell his subjects' creeping anxiety by announcing a plan to irrigate the Adana plain and free its denizens from the capricious tyranny of rainfall. Adana survived the winter without great calamity, but provinces farther east, including Diyarbekir, Erzurum, and Van, were not so lucky. Those cities and their surrounding countryside suffered devastating famines that year. Ziya Paşa and his subordinates resolved to water the Adana plain

[94] BOA, Y.PRK.UM 59/6, 1320 Ra 16, 22.6.1902

[95] Kırmızı, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course," 48.

and render it a reliably fertile breadbasket for the Empire.[96] To do this, Ziya Paşa planned to regulate the Seyhan River, which bifurcates the city of Adana. He planned to dig a parallel channel north of the city as a collection basin and flood control. His plan proved unsuccessful as a flood control measure. However, it did pave the way for the broader adoption of perennial irrigation. Still, discontent grew over Ziya's expensive liberalizing projects. He found himself politically isolated at the time of his death in 1880 when he succumbed to his malarial environs. While used with increasing regularity in the following decades, hydroengineering of this kind solved only half of Anatolia's agriculture problem. Dependable water was necessary but insufficient for replacing the food output or tithe revenues from the Empire's lost Balkans. The other ingredient was human labor, which Anatolia lacked.

An Albanian, Abidin Paşa (1843-1906), replaced Ziya in Adana. Abidin agitated to modernize agriculture as governor of Adana. Born in Preveza to the wealthy Dino family, Abidin Paşa was a large landholder in the mountainous, rain-soaked, and predominantly pastoral Epirus region. Abidin's birthplace was the coastal segment of Epirus known to its Albanian-speaking communities as Chameria, a division of the Vilayet of Yanina. Chameria reaches from the Acheron plain to Butrint and extends inland to Mount Olytsikas. Its main feature is the Thyamis River Basin, a perennial freshwater source. Abidin's father, Ahmed Dino Bey (1785–1849), was an Albanian military commander and politician who had served Muhammed Ali

[96] Quoted in Chris Gratien, “The Mountains are Ours: Ecology and Settlement in Late Ottoman and Early Republican Cilicia, 1856-1956.” (PhD. Diss. Georgetown University, 2015), 215.

in his conquest of Egypt.[97] In 1847 Ahmed participated in the unsuccessful Albanian uprising against Tanzimāt taxation. Ahmed was exiled to Konya for his disloyalty, dying there two years later. Ahmed's fervent belief in the Albanian national cause passed to his children. Abidin became a powerful voice for an autonomous Albania within a reformed, federalized Ottoman Empire. His nationalist sympathies led Abdelhamid II to keep him at arm's length. Nevertheless, the Sultan was impelled to use Abidin's capability and national background for the Porte's ends.

Abidin held several bureaucratic positions in the capital before being appointed to the Istanbul Bourse Commission in 1873. Following the Empire's sovereign debt default in 1875 and the series of uprisings in the Balkans, Abidin Dino became entangled in negotiations over the Empire's future border with Greece. Abidin sent a letter to Chancellor Bismarck and Count Andrassy just before the 1878 Congress of Berlin demanding Albania remain a recognized Ottoman province following any settlement with Greece. This gambit raised his profile in Ottoman circles. It even led to his appointment as a commissioner in the negotiations with

[97] Ahmed had served under Muhammed Ali of Egypt during his seizure of power from 1803 to 1807. That conflict had been partially instigated when Koca Hüsrev Mehmed Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Egypt, had tried extricate himself from financial debt by disbanding his corps of Albanian mercenaries (Arnauts or bashi-bazouks) so as to afford to pay his regular Turkish-speaking troops. The Albanians responded by surrounding the house of the Egyptian finance minister (*defterdar*), igniting a chaotic civil war during which Ahmed and the bulk of his Albanian comrades sided with the victorious Muhammed Ali in his conquest of Egypt. These events solidified Ahemd's sense of Albanian ethnic identity and aggrievement against the arbitrary whims of the Sublime Porte, both of which he would pass on to his children. See, Ahmet Nadir Isisag, *Abidinpaşa: Bir Adana Valisi*, (Istanbul, Akademisyen Kitabevi, 2019).

Greece over the border issue. His star rose further, and Sultan Abdülhamid II appointed him to serve as Foreign Minister from 10 June - 12 September 1880. The appointment was a hardball negotiating tactic and a means of delaying the talks with Greece. Abidin focused on maintaining Albania's territorial integrity. This middle-road approach to Albanian independence gained him allies in the halls of Topkapi Palace. There, consternation over the loss of Greece both overshadowed and informed responses to Albanian demands for autonomy. Having served his purpose, Abidin, now Abidin Paşa, was appointed governor of Adana.

Questions over Abidin's true loyalties likely played a role in sending him to distant Adana once he had fulfilled his role as a hawk in the Greek border talks. The choice of Adana was not arbitrary, nor was it traditionally a desirable post. Adana was a soft exile for unreliable or overly ambitious courtiers, far from the power centers. In Abidin's case, the appointment was not exactly – or not entirely – punitive. Instead, it was a recognition of Albanian officials' perceived usefulness in the Anatolian landscape. Adana served as a gateway to the Empire's hinterlands in Armenia, Iraq, and Syria. Before the 1870s it had slim transportation infrastructure and little contact with the rest of the Empire. The climate oscillated between biting cold and oppressive heat. The whole region was prone to drought in summer. Its plains turned malarial during wet spells in the spring and fall. It was also vulnerable to Russian aggression and the eastern steppe's unruly pastoralists. Abidin, the Palace hoped, might bring fresh eyes to the sparse Anatolian steppe. Abidin himself had come of age managing his family's estate in Epirus, where the rugged mountain

terrain was ill-suited to most agriculture. Experience managing pastoral communities and migrant labor characterized Abidin's methods. At the same time, Abidin brought an enthusiasm for Adana's potential cornucopia of crop types rare in his home country.

Social networks without people: Machines, credit, and patterns of labor

Under Abdülhamid II, resettlement and land registration became a primary driver of agricultural output growth. There was a perennial labor shortage in central and eastern Anatolia, especially relative to the comparative density of agricultural settlement in the Balkans. Therefore, the extension of agriculture into new areas required either reliance on labor-saving machinery or the mass settlement of human labor on the newly arable lands.[98] Managing immigration devolved to provincial Ottoman administrators. This work became increasingly centralized as mass migration followed the mid-nineteenth century Balkan and Crimean wars. In 1857, to compensate for eroding tithe revenues linked to population declines from famine, war, and lost territory, the Ottoman High Council of Tanzimāt instituted a set of generous terms for immigrating to Anatolia in hopes of settling uncultivated lands. On 5 January 1860, the Ottoman Migration Commission (*Muhacirin Komisyonu*) was created.[99] The OMC was responsible for assisting the millions of refugees who

[98] Quoted in Meltem Toksoz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Making of the Adana-Mersin Region 1850-1908*, (Boston: Brill, 2010). 161

[99] Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, 170

entered Anatolia between 1857 and 1914. After 1878, the body was renamed and expanded as the Commission for the General Administration of Refugee Affairs (*İdare-İ Umumiye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu*).[100] The commission accepted and distributed state funding and public donations for refugees and other settlers. When immigrants arrived in-country, dwellings were organized while the commission located suitable land for them to settle on.

In 1876, British Consular officer Skene reported that the Çukurova was on the cusp of "[rising] to a high place among the cotton-growing shores of the Levant."[101] In the Adana-Tarsus sub-region, some 40% of the area's "marvelously productive" land was under cultivation when title deeds began to be registered in large numbers. By 1880, nearly every parcel of registered arable land was under cultivation. However, the total area under cultivation continued to expand.[102] Most of these gains came from the newly settled groups whose only possibility for livelihood was to bring unclaimed soil under the plow.[103]

Some farmers would rent new threshers, plows, and other steam-powered machines from larger estates or share the costs of machines among their communities. Small farmers could also hire steam threshing crews. These were iterations of

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[100] R. Kasaba, 'Do States Always Favour Statis? The Changing Status of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire', in J.S. Migdal (ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37.

[101] Ibid

[102] Ibid, 182-184

[103] Ibid, 168

already-existing threshing teams that would move from community to community depending on the harvest season of the predominant crops there. These new crews sped up the threshing process by several weeks, lowering the grain's susceptibility to losses from environmental disturbance. These crews could save up to a quarter of the harvest, and the machines also boosted yields because they threshed more cleanly than manual labor. Steam threshing crews worked in exchange for between a fifth and a third of the output they produced, making them about twice as expensive as manual labor. However, they took less time to complete their work and comprised fewer workers, so the farmer was on the hook for lodging and feeding the teams for much less time, saving additional costs.[104] The fact that these crews found a steady customer base despite the large topline price discrepancy suggests that their services improved yields sufficiently to make the trade-offs worth it.[105] By 1907, a German trade report counted 66 steam threshers and 3000 reaping machines in operation.[106]

Having experienced labor shortages similar to those plaguing Adana while managing his estates in Epirus, Abidin Paşa, who replaced Ziya Paşa as governor of Adana in 1881, was especially stirred by the prospect of mechanizing Adana's agriculture. Abidin did not believe Adana to be a backwater, as did many in Istanbul.

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[104] Werner Friedrich Bruck, "Türkische Baumwollwirtschaft: Eine kolonialwirtschaftliche und politische Untersuchung," *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft* (Gustav Fischer: Jena, 1919), 67.

[105] BA-Potsdam AA-Abt. II Türkei 38/Mersin 15514, Christmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Mersin, 17 May 1906

[106] *Berichte über handel und industrie*: *Band 10*, Reichsministerium des Innern, 1 January 1907

Instead, he saw the potential for vast wealth in the region. He was eager to experiment with mechanization to overcome the region's labor shortage, a possibility not available to him in the steep and rocky landscape of his home. He also embraced the stitching together of Anatolia's provinces by railways. As negotiations with European financiers got underway to extend rail transport between Adana and Mersin, Abidin eagerly embraced the new economic potential he was in place to oversee.[107]

Upon his appointment in Adana, Abidin bought a large marshy tract that he planned to drain, imagining his expanding estate would serve as a kind of exhibition for mechanized agriculture's benefits. He immediately entered negotiations with Britannia Iron Works, a British firm, to import a steam plow for his new fields. He soon purchased two more farms and gave them to his associates to manage. He was especially interested in the highly fertile lands around Cerid. According to British Vice-Consul in Adana, Lt. Ferdinando Bennet, Abidin "rubbed his hands in glee as he talked of the possibility of working all night by the light of the moon."[108] He also encouraged villagers to register previously common or wasteland tracts around their Kazas to expand the area under cultivation. What was once a relative backwater had already become a hub of cotton cash-cropping. Abidin hoped that his tenure as governor would see Adana rise to become one of the most industrious parts of the

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[107] "The Mersina, Tarsus and Adana Railway: reprinted from the Times, May 19th, 1884," *Bristol Selected Pamphlets* (1884): 4.

[108] BNA, FO 222/8/2, 1881 No. 24, Bennet to Dufferin (6 December 1881), quoted in Kaiser, “Baghdad Railway Politics”, 56.

Empire. Finally, he offered numerous concessions to foreign firms to construct roads, harbors, and railroads to stimulate Adana's export market.[109]

By 1882, Abidin Paşa possessed more than 4000 hectares of arable land around Adana.[110] With high hopes, he ordered three steam engines, a steam plow, and a threshing machine from England paid in part from the municipal coffers. Later, Abidin personally purchased and imported four additional locomotives and two more threshers. Despite his aspirations, these machines proved disappointing. Having brought to Adana his close associates with experience managing his old estates, Abidin found the people running his farms had no knowledge of the local climate and soil.[111] Rough terrain and poor roads made it difficult to move his products to the nearest harbor. These deficiencies could not be easily remedied since the labor to do so was preoccupied with growing and harvesting during the workable seasons. Finally, Abidin's machines often broke down, and no experienced mechanics could be found to repair them. Failure to account for a matrix of ecological and infrastructural prerequisites meant mechanization would be limited until steam engines were so widely adopted as to make investments in transportation networks and training mechanics worthwhile. Making wide adoption of these machines a reality was not easy. British and American firms began marketing equipment to smaller landholders directly. However, as Vice-Consul Bennet noted, smaller farmers' capacity to finance

[109] BOA, HR.ŞFR (3) 282/31.

[110] BNA FO 222/8/3, Bennet to Dufferin, 5 May 1882.

[111] BOA, HR.ŞFR (3) 282/31.

machinery imports continued to dampen demand.[112] Many farmers chose to use what capital was available to expand their land holdings rather than boost yields through mechanization. Incorporating heavy machinery into Anatolia's agricultural landscape required restructuring the credit systems in Anatolia in ways that entrenched rural elites and weaved Anatolia's agro-ecological features into the web of global securities markets.[113]

Sedentarization and resettlement were much more widespread solutions to the labor problem than was mechanization until the 1930s. In the wake of Balkan secessionist conflicts and the Crimean War, many refugees were settled in Anatolian lands. However, the extent of forests, farmland, and water in Anatolia relative to the Balkan districts from which these immigrants hailed was a limiting factor and object of much consternation among Ottoman administrators. The administration made efforts to settle many of these communities near forests to alleviate the financial burden these people put on the state by giving them easy access to firewood and construction materials. In this way, officials actively recreated the sylvan landscapes they had lost by settling Balkan refugees near ersatz Balkan woodlands.

Nevertheless, while resettlement was taken to be the most economical solution, it was by no means taken for granted. Administrators and foreign engineers vacillated between resettlement policies and "the American model," wherein "labor is costly and scarce, and irrigation and reclamation schemes were carried out by

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[112] *Bundesarchiv Auswärtiges Amt*, Potsdam, Abteilung II (BA-Potsdam AA-Abt. II) Türkei 38/Mersin 13503, Christmann to Auswärtiges Amt, Mersin, 16 May 1897.

[113] BNA FO No.42 222/8/1, Bennet to Dufferin, Adana December 31, 1881

machinery." With imported American machinery for digging, plowing, leveling, sowing, and harvesting, British irrigation engineers wrote excitedly that their projects could be "independent of labor."[114]

British, French, German, and American firms aggressively marketed labor-saving machines to Anatolian farmers. These firms offered credit directly to purchasers of their machinery. In general, though, this still meant large landholders who could spare the initial capital outlays. British firms developed systems of leasing their machines to be paid with the value of the surplus of their production, usually after 6, 12, or 18 months. Wheat reapers were comparatively inexpensive and simple to operate, so even medium-sized farms could purchase them. These mechanical reapers also sped up cutting grain. They increased farmers' ability to finish the seasonal work before summer heat could threaten their yields. Still, the lack of affordable credit slowed the widespread adoption of these machines by the broad base of smallholding farmers.[115]

Systems of credit are representations of social networks. Where informal, localized economies are the norm, lending networks are typically informal and kin-based. Likewise, where large capital firms control markets, large formal banks flourish. In general, local lenders in Konya and Adana would offer individual farmers credit at around 15% interest for six-month terms. The recently established Imperial Ottoman Bank offered lower interest rates, but these were inaccessible to most

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[114] Ibid

[115] British National Archive [BNA], Foreign Office [FO] No. 10 424/132 Bennet to Dufferin, Adana May 5, 1882

farmers. Foreign firms were eager to access international credit markets to depress interest rates and entice buyers. However, they found it challenging to navigate the Ottoman financial landscape. Large merchant houses controlled much of the foreign trade and prevented British and American firms from directly dealing with farmers.[116]

This gatekeeping produced a situation where merchants purchased large stocks of machinery from foreign firms using credit extended to them by those same firms. If the machines were defective or broke down before they could be resold to farmers, the foreign firms had little recourse to collect on the machines they had sold. This position as translators of capital from one socio-spatial context proved extraordinarily advantageous for the large merchant houses. They provided credit services to farmers to purchase machinery at higher interest rates. At the same time, they bound farmers to contracts that would entitle merchants to purchase the farmers' harvest at pre-arranged prices. Merchants with existing links to foreign firms could control entrance into their local markets and maintain an asymmetric advantage over the farmers who needed their services.[117]

Statesman Midhat Paşa was the prime mover in establishing Turkey's Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankısı*). Midhat served as governor of the Balkan provinces of Niš and the Danube, where he observed the efficiency of communal systems of credit. In Niš, he expanded and systematized these practices by organizing

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[116] Hilmar Kaiser, "Baghdad-railway politics and the socio-economic transformation of Çurkurova" (Unpublished PhD diss.: European University Institute, 2007), 64-68.

[117] BNA FO 424/132 No.92, Bennet to Dufferin, Adana, 5 May 1882; BNA FO 222/8/1 No.42 Bennet to Dufferin, Adana, December 31, 1881.

the first Homeland Coffers (*memleket sandığı*) in 1863 on an experimental basis in Pirot Town (Şarköy or Şehirköy). The intention was to give farmers access to low-interest credit in the form of seed and animal stock.[118] Unlike the dominant system in most parts of the Empire, capital for the Homeland Coffers came from peasant contributions.[119] At first, five percent of cereal production – wheat, barley, maize, and rye – was set aside for these funds. Finding this capital insufficient, Midhat Paşa added the area's fallow and unclaimed land to the cooperative's balance sheet. Land to be cultivated was assigned as one half-dönüm per household per village, taking fallows needed for crop rotation into account.[120] If all lands were already under cultivation, the same half-dönüm per household was applied. Whatever shortfall might exist in the village's capital requirement was made up by renting the necessary portion of these lands to the Fund.[121] Upon his return to Istanbul, Paşa was instrumental in importing this agricultural credit system to Anatolia as well as Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. As the system spread, it was consolidated as the Ottoman Agricultural Bank.[122]

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[118] Sertac¸ Dokuzlu, "The Agricultural Credit System in the Ottoman Empire between 1863 and 1888," *Rural History* 28:2 (2017), 180.

[119] Mehmet Çelik, "Tanzimāt in the Balkans: Midhat Pasha's Governorship in the Danube Province (Tuna Vilayeti), 1864–1868" (Master's thesis, Bilkent University, 2007), 127.

[120] 1 donum ~ 1 acre ~ 0.1 hectare

[121] Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia," (PhD. Diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1973).

[122] Ibid

As mechanization gained steam in Anatolia, consolidation of farmland into large estates – a trend already well underway – accelerated further. While this land consolidation had lasting consequences, its immediate effect was on the lived experience of cultivators. Most arable lands continued to be controlled by smallholding peasants even as a larger share of profits accumulated to a shrinking coterie of elites.[123] Rural lenders found the agricultural credit market to be highly elastic. High-interest rates drove cultivators ever farther into debt, but these farmers had few other options. In addition, tax policies also played a key role.[124] Throughout the nineteenth century, Anatolia's rural economy grew increasingly monetized. Monetization owed in part to the State's Tanzimāt attempts to collect most taxes in cash to bolster the currency. Cultivators found themselves in immediate need of hard currency at those points in the calendar when taxes came due, an annual cycle that was previously tied to the cultivation season. While the tithe continued to be collected

[123] See, Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).; Gilles Veinstein, 'On the Çiftlik Debate', in Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991.; Fikret Adanır, 'Tradition and rural change in Southeastern Europe during Ottoman rule', in Daniel Chirot (ed.), *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989.; Lampe, John R., 'Imperial Borderlands or Capitalist Periphery? Redefining Balkan Backwardness', in Daniel Chirot (ed.), *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[124] For explication of this causal chain on a wider scale, see Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1995) and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (New York: Academic, 1974).

in kind in many provinces, more and more taxes faced by farmers were monetary. Commercialization was thus obligatory for an ever-larger share of cultivators. As Witold Kula notes, the need to monetize and thus commercialize crop production subjects the smallholding farmer to a paradox of capital incenti[125] Cultivation practice changes slowly so that a single farmer's costs are more or less fixed in a given season. Price fluctuations for commodity crops were increasingly tied to regional, continental, and even global weather events as much as local market conditions. Given this price uncertainty, a single bad harvest could break ground on a well of indebtedness.

Conclusion

The standard view of Tanzimāt stresses political reforms and changes in discourse, suggesting that the Ottomans were engaged in a project of becoming more like western European states. Yet when we focus on the actual material impacts of many Tanzimāt policies, it becomes clear that Ottoman elites in Anatolia were not engaged in a project of imitating western Europe so much as trying to imitate other parts of their own empire. Contrary to much of the scholarship of Ottoman Tanzimāt, Ottoman policy makers were more concerned with adapting their remaining territories to an ongoing imperial project, than with adapting their political project to fit their territory.

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[125] See, Witold Kula and Lawrence Garner (trans.), *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy 1500-1800,* (New York, NY: Verso Books, 1986).

In the process of reconstructing the Anatolian environment as an ersatz Rumelia during the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the Sublime Porte under both Abdelaziz and Abdülhamid II opened Anatolia's floodgates to an array of European capital interests. Anatolia became a site of overlapping imperial imaginaries for Ottoman and European elites. Replete with large tracts of fertile soils that encouraged investments in agricultural machinery, transportation networks, and irrigation, the Çukurova was ground zero for this matrix of imperial, colonial, and business interests. This set of policies was predicated on new modernist ideas about the fungibility of natural environments as well as a boundless faith in the possibilities of rationalist governance and the capacity of science and engineering to reshape natural landscapes for political ends. Through this process of deliberately changing the nature of imperial territory, the very meaning of "Empire" as a political form was likewise changed.

Ottoman administrators in Istanbul eagerly sought these forms of infrastructural power to curtail the autonomy of hinterland populations like the Armenians of Çukurova. Meanwhile, German colonial circles pursued a stridently assertive form of capitalism in which direct investment could fold Anatolia into an expansionist imperial sphere. The following chapter examines in greater detail German capital entanglements that arose from the Ottoman project of remaking the Balkans in Anatolia. As described in Chapter Two, the interests and approaches of Deutsche Bank and its subsidiary, the German-Levantine Baumwolle Gesellschaft

sometimes clashed with and sometimes reinforced Ottoman environmental engineering efforts.

CHAPTER TWO: GERMANY'S MARGINS

Deutsche Bank and German colonial empire in Ottoman Anatolia

Introduction

During the late nineteenth century, the process of globalization rendered much of the colonial activities of the early modern era redundant by folding state-sponsored projects such as settler colonies predicated on large-scale plantation agriculture into decentralized networks of international capital firms. In this context, the German Empire was a leader of the first genuinely globalized age. Globalization refers to the rapid, large-scale movement of goods, people, biota, ideas, and capital between regions and continents. Powerful bourgeois elites, including bankers and merchants in Europe, spearheaded these transregional processes. Deutsche Bank's factories, railroads, and offices proved to be fertile ground for developing Germany's *Kolonialfreunde* (colonialist) discourses around Anatolia. Despite the bank managers' apparent disinterest in the politics of the German empire, Deutsche Bank functioned as an extension of an expansionist German policy and the primary handmaiden of the Ottomans' attempted imperial revival on the Anatolian plains.

Germany's *Kolonialfreunde* comprised individuals who traversed and intersected multiple kinds of institutional circles. Colonial ventures are usually directed in conjunction with a Foreign Office at the behest of political elites. Quasi-colonial relationships develop through predatory economic pursuits of sub-national institutions – capital firms, missionary groups, learned societies, and other interest

groups – that establish an unbalanced relationship of power between groups claimed as subjects of competing state governments.

The Deutsche-Levantinische Baumwoll Gesellschaft (Delebage), a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank, partially succeeded in reorganizing agricultural production and trade in the Çukurova according to colonial designs. While elites in the various foreign offices of Europe debated endlessly – and in the end idly – about the possibility of colonizing the weakened Ottoman Empire, this small German firm came closer than any other in establishing Germany as a recognizable colonial power in Anatolia. Conceived initially as an alliance between the German Colonial Office, a consortium of textile manufacturers, and the World Zionist Organization, the Delebage began as an instrument to establish Jewish colonies in the Levant. This chapter argues that Deutsche Bank set itself up as a de facto German colonial organ in eastern Anatolia, producing far-reaching changes to the social organization of capital, agriculture, and industry on the low plains of Çukurova.

Origins of Deutsche Bank

Few private corporations are as tied to the rise and fall of the German Empire as Deutsche Bank.[126] It came into being in 1870 in anticipation of German unification the following year. The Bank formed amid the *Grüderzeit* (Founder's Era), a period

[126]On the eve of World War One, journalist Frederic Wiles described Deutsche Bank as the institution which "pioneers and finances German enterprise overseas. At home its power is comparable only to that of the Government itself." See Frederic William Wiles. *Men Around the Kaiser: The Makers of Modern Germany*. (London: Bobbs, Merrill, 1914)., 22.

of sustained demographic and economic growth in Germany in the 1860s. Until 1870, every joint-stock bank under Prussian authority required a license from the Kaiser to operate. Only two such licenses were awarded. The first was awarded to the A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein in 1848, and the second to Deutsche Bank in 1870. The founders of Deutsche Bank, private banker Adelbert Delbrück (1822-1890) and liberal politician Ludwig Bamberger (1823-1899), sought to profit from the thriving German export market.[127] Between 1835 and 1873, the volume of German exports had risen some 420 percent for an annualized return of eleven percent per year.[128] However, German firms lacked the networks and personal connections of British, French, and American bankers who had long-cultivated ties to international markets and market-actors. By contrast, German bankers lacked practice on the world stage.

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[127]Otto Jeidels, proprietor of the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft wrote at the height of the German Empire in 1905: "Banks are driven to operate abroad not as a result of national enthusiasm but through the need, which at a certain stage of modern capitalist development becomes increasingly pronounced, to create a favorable foreign location for the exploitation of free German capital." See, Otto Jeidels. *Das Verhaeltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Eisenindustrie*. (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1905). The nationalist mission of Deutsche Bank should not be overstated. The evidence suggesting Deutsche Bank was primarily a nationalist enterprise is highly circumstantial. For instance, Gall et al make special note of a memorandum sent by Bamberger to Bismarck on February 8, 1870 which stated that the Deutsche Bank had "taken as its starting point the restructuring of the national circumstances and drawn its deeper meaning from the founding of a Germany standing united and strong on the world stage under the protection of the North German Confederation and the Customs Union." This document was sent with the express purpose of strengthening Deutsche Bank's application for a license to incorporate. See Lothar Gall; Gerald D. Feldman; Harold James; Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich; Hans E. Büschgen, *The Deutsche Bank, 1870-1995* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995).. See Harold James. *The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also, Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War. (New York: Norton, 1967)*.

[128] Gall et al, *Deutsche Bank*, 7

Fortunately for Deutsche Bank, a generation of capable officers, including Georg Siemens and Arthur Gwinner, had spent many years working abroad for the same companies that Deutsche Bank now sought to supplant. Indeed, it was the presence of these Germans that had allowed French and British firms to mediate German trade so efficiently. According to its articles of association, Deutsche Bank would perform "every kind of banking transaction" but would devote itself mainly to "promoting and facilitating commercial relations between Germany, the other European countries, and markets overseas."[129] Shares of Deutsche Bank were floated on March 24 and 25, 1870. Deutsche Bank was Germany's first bank to specialize in foreign trade and the first joint-stock bank formed in Germany in more than two decades. It comes as no surprise that Deutsche Bank became a figurehead of the economic dominance of the nascent German empire. That German people could buy shares *en masse* meant that every German could have a stake in the country's penetration of foreign markets. Deutsche Bank's public status removed Germany's economic future from the hands of Prussia's graying agrarian *Junker* aristocracy. Instead, capital expansion depended on the vigorous, *neureich* bourgeoisie.

Deutsche Bank took industrial financing to a new scale in Germany with the most consequential innovation of the nineteenth century in German finance. At the instigation of Georg Siemens, Deutsche Bank became the first private credit

[129] Ibid

institution in Germany to solicit public deposits to refinance prior obligations.[130] Before this policy, deposit banking had been the exclusive province of Germany's various *Sparkassen* (public savings banks). Deutsche Bank's move into deposit banking blurred the lines between industrial capitalism and personal banking. As such, emerging bourgeois society began to participate – directly, *en masse*, and anonymously – in financing Germany's rapid industrial growth at home and its economic extension abroad.[131]

No one can be credited with Deutsche Bank's expansion, especially into infrastructure projects overseas and in the Ottoman Empire, more than its first two managing directors, Georg Siemens and Arthur Gwinner.[132] A lawyer by trade, Siemens had developed a reputation conducting negotiations on behalf of his father's

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[130] Marco Becht and Carlos D. Ramirez. "Does Banking Affiliation Mitigate Liquidity Constraints? Evidence from Germany's Universal Banks in the Pre-World War I Period." *Southern Economic Journal*. 20, 2 (2003):254-272.

[131] Gall et al, *Deutsche Bank*, 26

[132] Siemens had no knowledge of banking when he was hired. As he put it self-effacingly in a letter to his family shortly after being hired: "Though I understand little of American and Indian banking, I nevertheless try to look very erudite, give the occasional shrug . . . and secretly refer, when I get home, to my encyclopedia or dictionary or 'how to become a banker in twenty-four hours.'' Despite his being a neophyte in the world of banking, it was under Siemens that Deutsche Bank became one of the world's premier financial institutions. The bank's transacting of foreign infrastructure projects and setting up new subsidiaries abroad fueled its meteoric rise. This included financing the Northern Pacific Railway in North America, establishing the Zurich-based Bank für elektrische Unternehmungen, the Banca Commerciale Italiana in Milan, and the Deutsch-Überseeische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft in Buenos Aires, as well as the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways. See, Siemens to Elisa Goertz, 9 March 1872, as quoted in Karl Helfferich, Georg von Siemens: Ein Lebensbild aus Deutschlands großer Zeit, 3 vols. (Berlin: Salzwasser-Verlag, 1921-1923), 269.

cousin Werner von Siemens to construct the Indo-European telegraph line.[133] Arthur Gwinner was born to a prominent political family in Frankfurt where he began his career in banking. After several posts abroad in Spain and France, Gwinner gained a reputation as a "banker-diplomat" and he focused his energies on foreign investments. After becoming acquainted through membership of the elite Berlin Club, Siemens Arthur and Gwinner became friends and, after Siemens offered Gwinner a job on Deutsche Bank's board of directors, close colleagues. Such was their relationship that, until Siemens left Deutsche Bank in 1900, he and Gwinner shared an office, desks facing one another. Each had a wry sense of humor that was rare in the world of banking.[134] Both were ennobled before the end of their lives.[135] Gwinner and Siemens held the world of banking to be the summit of ambition. In a letter to his then-fiancé written when he accepted the position at Deutsche Bank, Siemens describes being

[133]The Siemens family had a hand in several of the most monumental industrial projects of 19th and 20th century Europe. Werner von Siemens was co-founder of Telegraphen-Bauanstalt von Siemens & Halske, later just Siemens & Halske and, after several other iterations, simply Siemens AG, today one of the world's largest corporations. The company started as an electrical and engineering concern specializing in long-distance telegraph lines. In 1848, Siemens and his partner built what was Europe's longest telegraph (from Berlin to Frankfurt am Main, some 500km). Siemens' company built many of the first long-distance telegraph networks in Russia. The Indo-European telegraph line, which ran from Calcutta to London, was one of his most renowned accomplishments. See, Gall et al, *Deutsche Bank*, 14 and Hellfereich, Georg von *Siemens*.

[134] An aging Siemens once remarked to his bemused colleagues that "bank directors should be killed off in their fiftieth year." (Gall et al, *Deutsche Bank*, 15)

[135] The actual construction of the Railway had not even begun at that point and would not begin until 1903. However, Siemens was instrumental in securing the cooperation of the various parties that would be involved.

"consumed by a burning sense of achieving something truly beautiful and important."[136]

Likely invisible to either Gwinner or Siemens in their youth were the myriad ways Germany's *Bürgertum* (bourgeois) transformation paved the way for his future rise. Despite its failure, the Revolution of 1848-9 had a lasting impact on the country he would inherit as an adult. L*aissez-faire* trade flourished in the expanding German Customs Union, founded in 1834. By 1860, the Cobden–Chevalier Treaty created a west European free-trade zone with Britain and France. At the same time, Prussia relaxed laws governing the formation of joint-stock companies. Rapid industrialization spread eastward from Britain and France while the increasingly liberal economic policies of Imperial Prussia spurred commercial exports. Finally, a political alliance formed in 1866 between the mighty Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and his erstwhile enemies, the National Liberals, helped produce a unified German nation in the throes of rapid economic expansion and the rising prominence of the bourgeois class.

In 1866, during the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck sent Prussian troops to occupy and annex Frankfurt, an ordeal that Gwinner recounts in his memoirs.[137] Gwinner remained skeptical of Prussian hegemony throughout his life. Gwinner's account of the Prussian occupation centers on one feature specifically, Frankfurt's bank. The wealth contained therein was "more money than the Prussians had ever

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[136] Helfferich, *Siemens vol. 1*, 217
[137] Arthur von Gwinner and Manfred Pohl (ed.), *Lebenserinnerungen*, (Knapp, 1975), 17-23

seen," and more – much more – remained for the taking.[138] This limitless wealth, a power that could deter invading armies and change the minds of kings, was the object of fantasy not just for Gwinner but for his liberal *Bürgertum* in general. In Gwinner's youth, it became unthinkable that great wealth was to be had in Germany without some involvement of the banking houses. At the very least, middle-class professionals expected some deposit with the various public savings banks (*Sparkassen*). *Junkers* had their land, but bourgeois "public men" had their banks. For Gwinner, it was banks that secured Frankfurt's prominence in the new Prussia hegemony, and it was the bankers who sat atop the hegemon.

Financial entanglement as responses to environmental crises in Anatolia

The first railway concession in Anatolia, given to the Ottoman Railway company for its İzmir–Aydın line, was granted on 22 September 1856. Running over cost and over time, the first stretch of the railway, from İzmir to Seydiköy and Torbalı, finally opened to much fanfare in 1860. In 1871, the Ottoman government broke ground on a vital rail line from Haydarpaşa to Pendik on the Anatolian side of Istanbul. The line opened the following year, and extensions were built over several years, first to Gebze and then Izmit. The construction of these early railways was a response to increased interest among foreign speculators in bringing Ottoman agricultural products to European markets. This pattern of rail building was typical of colonial infrastructure, wherein a central port was linked to hinterland producers of

[138] Gwinner, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 18

agricultural or other primary goods. It was contrary to the intentions of the Sublime Porte, which had sought to stitch the significant cities of Anatolia together to facilitate the movement of labor and manufactured goods. When European firms began competing for railway concessions in Anatolia during this period, they sought to corner the markets of these larger urban centers like Izmir and Konya. Instead of linking Anatolian cities, European investors from Britain, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy proved far more interested in the transport of cultivated products from the fertile countryside to ports for export.[139]

This interest in Anatolia's agriculture followed new conceptions of how weather patterns, local climates, and cultivation interact. Telegraph lines allowed for rapid transmission of local data globally, while barometric measurements became widely used to predict the weather. These communication and measurement technologies presented an opportunity to European financial interests to involve themselves in affairs once reserved for Ottoman treasury officials. As Mike Davis notes, the advent of a global network of weather measurement and reporting technologies "provided numerous examples of a new vicious circle (Stanley Jevons was the first economist to recognize) linking weather and price perturbations through the medium of an international grain market. Suddenly the price of wheat in Liverpool and the rainfall in Madras were variables in the same vast equation of

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[139] Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism*, (1987); See also, Donald Quataert, "Main Problems of the Economy During the Tanzimāt Period," in Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (ed.), *150. Yılında Tanzimāt* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1992), 212-213

human survival."[140] Already inclined to expand its modest rail network by 1870, massive famine in Anatolia – rooted, in part, in the inability to move grain efficiently into rural towns – spurred the Ottomans to build ports and railways even more rapidly.

Between 1872 and 1874, drought struck Anatolia following a La Nina event. It was "one of the worst famines known to this region from modern history," according to E. Neumann, an engineer for the Anatolian Railway Company who traveled to Konya on a surveying mission.[141] He reported on the devastation that had befallen the people there. Following the Autumn 1873 round of taxation, grain stores consisted mainly of seed corn reserved for planting next years' crop. Özge Ertem summarized the underlying causes of these famines: "climate, socio-spatial geographies of vulnerability, regional political-economic dynamics, political inaction and infrastructural problems combined with the international political-economic context that imposed its harsh conditions on the Ottoman government."[142] Taxes had been collected at usual rates despite farmers' pleas of alarm about the expected poor

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[140] Mike Davis. *Late Victorian holocausts: El Niño famines and the making of the Third World*. (New York: Verso, 2001).
[141] Edmund Naumann, *Vom Goldenen Horn zu den quellen des Euphrat. Reisebriefe, tagebuchblätter und studien über die Asiatische Türkei und die Anatolische bahn* (München and Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg, 1893) cited in. Friedrich Christiansen-Weniger, „Gefährdung Anatoliens durch Trockenjahre und Dürrekatastrophen," *Zeitschrift für Ausländische Landwirtschaft* 3 (1964): 133–147.
[142] Özge Ertem, "Considering Famine in the Late Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire" in Andrew G. Newby (ed.), *"The Enormous Failure of Nature": Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 22. Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies: 151–17.); see also Özge Ertem, "Eating the last seed: famine, empire, survival and order in Ottoman Anatolia in the late 19th century." *European University Institute*, 2012.

harvest. Severe drought in the summer of 1873 brought crop failure. Flooding from November to December caused by torrential rain preceded extraordinary snowfall in January and February 1874. Already having given over the bulk of their harvest to tax collectors, villagers were ill-prepared for the abnormally harsh winter of 1873-74.[143] Since the summer had seen a massive die-off in staple crops, the food reserves of now snowed-in villages were soon exhausted.[144]

The extreme winter had disrupted most paths of movement and communication, isolating many villages. Death at a horrific scale followed close on the heels of these environmental calamities. Some 150,000 people and 100,000 cattle died between 1874 and 1875, and 40% of the livestock was lost in Konya.[145] The famine profoundly affected Kastamuni [Kastamonu], Angora [Ankara], and Kaiseri [Kayseri]. According to one missionary observer writing in the pages of the *Levant Herald*, the famine had affected at least 40,000 square miles of Anatolian farmland with Ankara at its epicenter.[146] Villagers burned their homes for heat during the dismal winter months. The bodies of emaciated cattle, sheep, goats, men, women, and children littered the barren fields. Those who could travel sought refuge in nearby villages but found only the same awful scene they had endeavored to leave behind.[147]

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[143] E.W. (Ed.) "Preface" in *The Famine in Asia-Minor: Its history, compiled from the pages of the "Levant herald,"* reprint of 1875 original, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1989), 4.
[144] Letter from Ankara, *The Levant Herald*, 8 April 1874 in *The Famine in Asia-Minor,* 1875
[145] Naumann, *Vom Goldenen Horn,* 1893.
[146] *The Levant Herald*, 30 April 1874 printed in *The Famine in Asia-Minor*, 1875
[147] *The Levant Herald*, 29 July 1874, printed in *The Famine in Asia-Minor*, 1875, 57

Starving refugees began streaming into cities on foot. The streets of Istanbul and its satellites swelled with new arrivals. Corpses littered the roads between inner Anatolia and Istanbul, a grim reminder that many never completed the journey. On the heels of calamity, famine bit again following the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878), when drought preceded an especially harsh winter in 1879-1880, depleting already strained food supplies. This time, the ensuing famine centered on the Eastern Anatolian towns of Diyarbekir, Erzurum, and Van, a region that had been a theater in the conflict with Russia. The subsequent resettlement of Circassian and Muslim refugees from the Russian Empire in Eastern Anatolia left local administrators struggling to provision the swelling population.[148] Add the payment of war indemnities to these ills, and the stage was set once again for famine.

The Ottoman government used many of its customary provisioning tools to combat the famines between 1873 and 1881. Through a series of decrees, agricultural exports were banned, and black-market sales of food were aggressively prosecuted.[149] Public funds and personnel were used to set up relief centers that supplemented the efforts of religious endowments (*waqf*).[150] Recognizing the role of yearly taxation in depleting grain supplies, the government abrogated or reduced tax liabilities until better yields could be produced in future seasons. These policies took time to implement and varied enormously by geography and the power of intermediaries.

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[148] At least 35,000 people died according to official tallies. BOA DH.MKT, 1331/42, 9 May 1880.
[149] BOA I.DH 783/63655–17, 17 Mar. 1879; BOA.Y.PRK. ŞH. 1–14, 17 Apr. 1879; BOA. Y. PRK. ŞH 1–15, 22 Apr. 1879; See also, Ertem, "Considering Famine" (2012).
[150] BOA. I.DH 802–65028, 8 April 1880.

Moreover, they were often insufficient to offset disaster. British diplomats and missionaries, conditioned by the British colonial press, blamed Ottoman corruption, state interventionism, a lack of scientific reason, and the absence of railways. *The Levant Herald* castigated the Ottomans for "ignoring the inexorable laws of supply and demand [by requiring] the importers to sell their grain at unremunerative rates.... The laws of economy triumphed, the door was opened to famine, and starvation stalked in."[151]

Famines happened because the climate betrayed Anatolia during a period of exceptional social precarity. In Rumelia, Serbs and Greeks had peeled away from Istanbul in the preceding decades. Egypt, too, gained broader autonomy in 1873. Unrest plagued Herzegovina in 1874 and 1876, and the Young Ottoman constitutionalists undermined the absolutist regime of Sultan Abdülaziz. The La Nina event left Ottoman coffers low while sovereign debt accumulated. Between 1854, when the Ottomans took their first official foreign loan, and 1874, Ottoman public debt increased twenty-eight times over. By 1875, more than half of total state revenues were committed to servicing the debt. On October 30, 1875, with the Decree of Ramadan (*Ramazan Kararnamesi*), the Porte declared a sovereign default.[152] On October 15, 1881, following the second great famine to strike Anatolia in a decade, the Decree of Muharrem (*Muharrem Kararnamesi*) established the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*; OPDA). The OPDA recast the Empire's

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[151] *The Levant Herald*, 23 April 1874, printed in *The Famine in Asia Minor*, 1989, 8.
[152] Murat Birdal, *The Political Economy of the Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*, (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2010), 6

European creditors as bondholders and assigned the OPDA rights to collect certain taxes and customs revenues and administer several state-owned commodity monopolies. In 1876, in the middle of these political and climatic disasters, Sultan Abdülaziz was deposed.

While passenger and freight receipts were plentiful throughout the well-populated territories along the Marmara Sea, under Sultan Abdülaziz, the Porte was eager to extend the rail into the heart of Anatolia, first to Ankara and then eventually to Baghdad. This infrastructure, it appeared, was the only way to mitigate supply chain problems that could lead to famine, economic catastrophe, and default. In 1880, amid the Ottoman sovereign debt crisis, a sixty percent stake in the line was ceded to British investors. However, they could not finance the Ankara line. An attempt was made to involve American investors in the syndicate, but this too fell through. Georg Siemens, managing director of the Deutsche Bank, was tipped off about the project by his associate Alfred von Kaulla, Managing Director of the Württembergische Vereinsbank. Acting as an intermediary, Kaulla helped secure the Izmit-Ankara line for Deutsche Bank.[153]

Shortly before signing the railway concession, Deutsche Bank incorporated a subsidiary in Zürich, the Bank für Orientalischen Eisenbahnen (Bank for the Oriental Railway). This subsidiary subsequently organized funds for Deutsch Bank's other daughter company, Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie (CFOA; Anatolia Railway Company, ARC). In addition to Deutsche Bank, German investors included

[153] See, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2010).

the Württembergische Vereinsbank and the Deutsche Vereinsbank, represented by Alfred Kaulla; Maurice Bauer, Director of the Wiener Bankverein, also represented Dresdner Bank and the Banque Internationale de Paris. Other shares went to British and French interests. This structure nevertheless raised eyebrows in London. The advent of the CFOA led one analyst of the British Foreign Office to fret about a new "Franco-German entente on Turkish finance."[154] Deutsche Bank's managers believed that as many foreign investors should hold CFOA shares as possible to gain broad support from Europe's many Foreign Offices. The CFOA contracted Philipp Holzmann AG, an engineering company, to build the railway, beginning in May 1889.[155] The 99-year concession to build and operate the railway guaranteed Frcs. Fifteen thousand per kilometer of rail operated per year to Deutsche Bank. If normal operating receipts did not meet these revenues, the government would make up the difference. These guarantees were predicated on fisheries tax revenues managed by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. On October 3, Alfred Kaulla, on behalf of the Deutsche Bank, contracted the fisheries loan of £ stg. 1,500,000 at 5% interest. This arrangement came to be called "the Fisheries Loan."[156]

The loan was secured on the fisheries revenues collected by the OPDA. Before that contract, Germans had purchased Ottoman stock, or public debt floated on

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[154] A. Block, “Enclosure 1 in No. 147, Memorandıım respecting Franco-German Economic Penetration, (1906),” in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898-1914), vol. V, 175-184.
[155] Kurt Zander, “Das Eisenbahnwesen der Türkei, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Bagdadbahn”, in *Das Türkische Reich* (Berlin, 1918), 58.
[156] Block, “Memorandıım respecting Franco-German Economic Penetration,” (1906).

European exchanges. German Houses had never acted as principals in loan contracts with the Ottoman Porte.[157] Initially, the concession covered only the fish market in Istanbul. While proceeds varied because of fluctuations in fish populations, receipts were reasonably consistent. The OPDA sponsored European ichthyologists to visit Istanbul to document the fish species and recommend improvements to fishing techniques. Public lectures were organized, and books were published aimed at boosting fishermen's productivity. These efforts paid off as these revenues increased steadily under the OPDA administration.[158] As part of the loan agreement with Deutsche Bank, the total area covered by the fisheries tax was expanded to include other lakes, seas, and rivers outside of Istanbul.[159] The Fisheries Loan gave Deutsche Bank and its partners an opening to Ottoman Anatolia. They wasted no time entering negotiations for a much larger loan, one that would knit together German and Ottoman interests for decades to come. On March 13, 1894, the German banks

[157] Large loans and the printing of banknotes had been the near exclusive domain of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, a joint venture between British investors, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and the Ottoman government. The Ottoman fisheries tax was ceded to the OPDA in 1881. After that, an OPDA officer supervised the auction of all fish brought to market. The OPDA officer then collected a twenty percent tax for the OPDA plus an additional three percent fee for expenses. OPDA administrators especially prized this revenue because it was straightforward to collect. See Birdal, *Ottoman Debt Administration*, 124.

[158] Ibid

[159] The contract with Deutsche Bank only included revenues collected by the OPDA while excluding fishery revenues collected by the *Hazine-i Hassa* (Treasury of the Sultan).

secured their position as the Sublime Porte's preeminent creditor, contracting at 4 % interest Railway loan for Frcs. 40.000,000 for railway construction.[160]

Rail building was not new to Deutsche Bank. Arthur Gwinner had spent time in the United States attempting to restructure the ailing Northern Pacific Railway Company, of which Deutsche Bank was a primary shareholder.[161] The Bank had a hand in developing a series of rail extensions to the Anatolian Railway to link Vienna and Constantinople, known colloquially as the Orient Express. These successes begat requests directly from the Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II, to continue the line past Ankara to the agriculturally prosperous Konya *vilayet* located on Anatolia's central plain. Deutsche Bank's managers were intrigued by the potential of Konya's grain filling the wagons of the Anatolian railway. In 1893, Deutsche Bank won the concession to branch the Anatolian railway from Eskişehir to Konya, including a spur to Kütahya.[162]

Delebage and *Kolonialfreunde* in Ottoman Adana

The Konya branch became the starting point for the rail extension through eastern Anatolia via Adana and on to Mesopotamia. It came to be known as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Siemens resisted this and several other proposed

[160] Worried about German competition, the Ottoman Bank contracted a series of consolidation loans beginning in 1890, totaling approximately £ stg. 12,000,000. Block, "Memorandum respecting Franco-German Economic Penetration," (1906).
[161] Gwinner, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 88
[162] HGDB OR 0788: Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene, Vorverhandlungen vol. 1, 1 January 1903 to 31 December 1906 and HGDB OR 0866: Bewässerung Adana vol. 2, 1 January 1904 to 31 December 1928. See HGDB OR719, Riese to Gwinner, Frankfurt a.M. 29 August 1910

extensions, believing that the risks of this venture far outweighed its expected profitability. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II's trip to Istanbul in 1889 and his increasing insistence on the Middle East as the primary target of German economic expansion imbued the project with political significance for large segments of the German public.[163]

The railway catapulted Germany onto the stage of Great Powers. As attention to the project grew in Germany, so did British, French, and Russian objections to German penetration of the Ottoman Empire. Britain saw the line as cleaving its path to India in two. Foreign opposition only stoked the flame of German nationalism, wrapping the comparatively insignificant railway plan in a cloak of do-or-die jingoism. Notably, the railway was not financed with a majority of German capital and was never intended to be. British, French, Italian, and Austrian interests were also represented among the shareholders of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway Company. For the *Auswärtiges Amt*, it ensured that Russia, France, and Britain could not operate in the Middle East without consulting German interests. Deutsche Bank found itself unhappily at the center of these political developments.[164] "Thus," wrote Siemens, "the Deutsche Bank was pushed into its most spectacular foreign venture, a venture in which it had not actually wished to be involved."[165] Siemens was an internationalist, a

[163] Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express* (2010)
[164] Gall et al, *Deutsche Bank*, 71
[165] Quoted in Karl Erich Born, *International Banking in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), 142.

liberal, and an antagonist of the Prussian nobility.[166] It is no small irony that shortly before his death, he was ennobled for services to a Kaiser he did not respect, securing the concession for a project he did not support, to help an imperial agenda in which he did not believe.[167]

With Siemen's death in 1901, Gwinner inherited the Berlin-Baghdad Railway project. While Siemens' diplomatic efforts had paved the way for the project, Gwinner found himself tasked with making it a material reality. Gwinner started looking into numerous other projects that might benefit from a rail line through Anatolia's central provinces to derive as much advantage from the situation as possible. Gwinner set himself at the forefront of European investment in the Ottoman Empire by exploring these possibilities. German experts were sent to southern Anatolia to inspect the economic viability of various cash-cropping schemes on the Adana plain. These scientists, economists, and agronomists set up several test farms along the proposed route of the railway. In Konya and Adana, Deutsche Bank formed

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[166] As a leader of the Commercial Treaty Organization, founded in 1900 on his initiative, Siemens proudly declared that his organization included "members of a wide variety of parties. We count among our members…friends from the right to the extreme left. We are not a political party. . . let the parties argue amongst themselves over the relationship between the monarchy and parliament and between state and church and over censorship of the theatre and questions of tolerance! Here we are concerned only about the growth of material prosperity and the central question of filling the nation's stomach." Quoted in Gall et al, *The Deutsche Bank*, 87).

[167] The relationship between Siemens' liberalism and Germany's expansion should not be oversimplified. Internationalism for Siemens and Gwinner alike meant cooperation within European spheres. On his last speech to the Reichstag in 1901, Siemens declared his devotion to the colonial cause even while denigrating the militarism of the conservative right: "When all other nations are hurrying to occupy the remaining uncivilized parts of the world, it would be clumsiness on our part to wish to hang back" (Gall et al, *The Deutsche Bank*, 86).

daughter companies involved in agricultural and irrigation schemes to take advantage of the region's fertile soil and comparatively cheap land.[168] The Deutsche-Levantinische Baumwoll Gesellschaft (Delebage), a company meant to penetrate the Ottoman cotton market, was among the more successful of these ventures.[169]

In 1896, the German Colonial Economic Committee was founded to coordinate with and advise other colonial organizations in economic and business matters. The Committee quickly recognized that German textile manufacturers depended on Egyptian and American cotton supplies.[170] While it was assumed Germany's colony in Togo would eventually supplant these sources, Anatolia was routinely cited as an intermediate solution to Germany's perceived supply problem. A leading member of the Committee was Otto Warburg, a renowned botanist from a prominent Jewish family. He founded the journal *Der Tropenpflanzer,* which acted as the mouthpiece of the Committee.[171] In 1901, Otto Warburg solicited prominent agronomist Max Fesca to publish an article in *Der Tropenpflanzer* answering whether German farmers should settle in Anatolia. While Fresca was agnostic on the question,

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[168] HGDB OR 0788: *Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene, Vorverhandlungen vol. 1*, 1 January 1903 to 31 December 1906 and HGDB OR 0866: *Bewaesserung Adana vol. 2*, 1 January 1904 to 31 December 1928. See HGDB OR719, *Riese to Gwinner*, Frankfurt a.M. 29 August 1910.

[169] For the most in-depth study to date of Delebage's role in southern Anatolia, see Hilmar Kaiser, "Baghdad-railway politics and the socio-economic transformation of Çukurova," (Unpublished PhD dissertation: European University Institute, 2007).

[170] See Sevinç Mıhcı and Hakan Mıhcı, "Reflections on the Ottoman Raw Cotton Production and Export during the 1850-1913 Period," *H.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 20, 2, (2002): 43-71.

[171] Derek J. Pensler, *Zionism and Technocracy. The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine,*
1870-1918, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 60-79.

he contended that sufficiently capital-rich German companies could exert the same economic influence over Anatolian production as settlement.[172] The German Colonial Economic Committee followed up Fresca's article with several more in *Der Tropenpflanzer* that assessed the potential for establishing large cotton plantations in Anatolia. Some of these pieces argued that sites along the Aegean would be best suited to cotton-growing.[173] Others contended that the vast plains of Çukurova would be an obvious choice. For Warburg, increasing Çukurova's cotton production was necessary for reasons beyond mere finance. Concerned with the growing hostility toward Jews in Europe, Warburg became involved with the Zionist movement.[174] He also promoted scientific research and agricultural test farms to expand the scope of German colonial initiatives.

Under Tanzimāt, Ottoman administrators turned their attention to augmenting Anatolia's landed economy. However, the land itself – its sparse and undulating plateaus, meager rainfall, and disconnected patchwork of seasonally-impassable roads – were obstacles to the Ottomans' new imperial strategy. The Çukurova plain on

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[172] Max Fesca, "Über dıe landwirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse," *Der Tropenpflanzer*, 1902 (Beihefte zum Tropenpflanzer, No. 1).
[173] Otto Warburg, "Jüdische Ackerbau-Kolonien in Anatolien," *Asien* 1 (1901/1902), 53-57.
[174] HGDB OR 707, Warburg to Gwinner, Berlin, July 10, 1904. Between 1903 and 1907, Warburg he created and led the World Zionist Organization's Palestine Commission. He was a member and then chair of the WZO's Smaller Action Committee from 1905 to 1920. Warburg struggled to convince the World Zionist Organization to focus on Jewish resettlement in Northern Syria, Mesopotamia, and Cilicia rather than in Palestine, arguing that the latter was not large enough to accommodate a large influx of Russian and Eastern European Jewish settlers. Warburg helped organize and fund the establishment of three Jewish émigré villages along the Anatolian Railway near Eskişehir.

Anatolia's southeastern coast was among the most promising areas for Ottoman development in Anatolia. Ottoman rule over the Çukurova began in 1516 when Selim I incorporated the sanjak of Adana into his empire as a vassal state. The sanjak was administered directly from Constantinople beginning in 1608. Armenian merchants and farmers thrived in the area, over time linking their business networks to those of sympathetic European Christian communities. Situated on a low, sloping plain abutting Anatolia's southern coast and approximating an isosceles triangle pointing south, the Çukurova held many advantages for agricultural expansion. Urban Adana rested at the center. The eastern terminus of the Taurus mountains ranged along the triangle's northern hypotenuse. Mersin's bustling port city marked the triangle's western vertex. The north-south Nur Dağları (Mountains of Light) closed the triangle's eastern flank.[175] Flat and linked to the Mediterranean, Çukurova produced crops that could be feasibly shipped to the Aegean cities or exported to central and western Europe.[176]

The German Colonial Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft) provided a forum and umbrella organization for the interest and strategies of Germany's business and Zionist circles. Between 1904 and 1907, Warburg developed a plan for a large

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[175] See Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean: the making of the Adana-Mersin region 1850-1908* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 19; Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1987), 87. See also Nurettin C¸elmeoglu, "The Historical Anthroscape of Adana and the Fertile Lands," in S. Kapur et al. (eds.), *Sustainable Land Management*, (Berlin:Springer-Verlag, 2011).

[176] Later, Turkish agronomists went so far as to travel to the southern United States to gather information on cotton cultivation in hopes of applying their findings in the Çukurova. See BOA, HR.İM 95/62 (23 January 1924).

settlement of Jews in Syria and Çukurova. Warburg, a pragmatist technocrat, believed that a vertically integrated company should oversee plantation-style cotton production and export. If situated in Çukurova, the sparse population would necessitate the import of laborers, which Warburg believed would provide the perfect impetus for large-scale Jewish settlement.[177] Through his associate, Selig Soskin, an agronomist and Crimean-born Jew whom Warburg met as a student in Berlin, Warburg and the Colonial Society developed a series of careful plans to turn eastern Anatolia into a secure and profitable hub for European Jewish emigres.[178] Soskin's studies provided the basis for Warburg's 1904 article, in which he laid out a systematic plan for Jewish colonization of Northern Syria through cotton cultivation. Based on the prevailing climate, Warburg guessed that turning the area northwest of Aleppo into a network of cotton plantations could be economically advantageous to the Ottoman State and the Anatolian Railway Company. Both institutions would have to cooperate to bring the plan to fruition. Warburg proposed that the Ottoman state could put up the capital for the cotton plantations out of the tithe income from the region. In exchange, the Porte would be relieved of its per-kilometer obligations to the ARC. The railway, in turn, would profit from the increased freight on its eastern line. Zionist organizations would collaborate to put up money for the emigres to travel from Russia to Syria, who would contract for three years of labor cultivating cotton in exchange for

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[177] Otto Warburg, "Die jüdische Kolonisation in Nordsyrien auf Grundlage der Baumwollkultur im Gebiet der Bagdadbahn," *Altneuland* 1 (1904): 232-278.
[178] Selig Soskin, *"Die Baumwollkultur in der Kilikischen Ebene und ihre Ausdehnungsmöglichkeit hier*
Sowie in Nordsyrien," Der Tropenpflanzer 19 (1916): 334-345

passage. After that, the immigrants could continue as sharecroppers. The plan depended on establishing a local cotton company that could manage production and export as well as educate the immigrant farmers.

In a 1901 article in *Der Tropenpflanzer*, Rudolph Fitzner argued that the failure of European cotton firms to take root in Asia Minor during the preceding decade was owed to the usurious interest rates charged by Greek trading houses.[179] He also blamed the unwillingness of local traders to collaborate with producers to guarantee the quality of their products. A dedicated cotton company would provide the market power necessary to break these social impediments to expanding cotton production in Northern Syria. Fitzner recommended Çukurova as an ideal location for a cotton company because landholding was already quite consolidated, and the cultivable plain lay close to the port of Mersin. Fitzner suggested this might be of double benefit because the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway would rely on construction materials shipped through Mersin to connect with the line in Adana. Cargo ships would want freight to carry back to Europe on their return journeys, a disadvantageous position that Fitzner hoped would lead to favorable shipping rates for cotton during the period of railway construction.

Why Çukurovan cotton? The systematic studies conducted by Selig Soskin assessed the Çukurovan plains as being comparable to the floodplains and delta of the northern Egyptian Nile. Cyclical inundation provided water to the densely nutritious soils, which local farmers classed as either black, white, or red. Unlike Egypt, in

[179] Rudolf Fitzner, "Einiges Ober den Baumwollanbau in Kleinasien," *Der Tropenpflanzer,* 5 (1901): 530-537

Çukurova, precipitation came in abundance during the winter rains that arrived in November and stretched through May.[180] Moreover, few areas of Anatolia were as coveted as the Çukurova, the expansive plain situated in the Çukurova region on the southern coast of Asia Minor, which was a site of colonial envy because of its imagined economic potential. Spanning segments of the provinces of Mersin, Adana, Osmaniye, and Hatay, the fertile "black soils" of the *Çukurova* (low plain) had been the stuff of legend for more than a century. It attracted travelers from western Europe as the gateway to Syria and Persia. French travelers Alexandre and Leon Laborde visited Mersin in 1820 and likened their accommodations in Adana to the "Garden of Eden."[181] The Ottoman rulers of Egypt even coveted the region; Mehmed Ali Pasha's troops occupied it during his campaign to conquer Syria in the 1830s and brought the area under his administration's rule until 1841. Many foreigners in the Pasha's employ visited the region during this period. They conducted the first widely circulated European studies of its potential as a hub of cotton production. While the Egyptian administration tried to encourage cotton as a cash crop, livestock breeding continued to be the leading regional industry. Few agricultural goods were produced in large enough excess for export. The Levantine merchants who dominated local trade proffered mainly fruits, tobacco, olive oil, honey, and wool products.[182]

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[180] Kaiser, *Baghdad Railway Politics*, 47
[181] Leon de Laborde (ed.), *Voyage de L'Asie Mineure par Mrs. Alexandre Laborde Becker, HaII et Leon Laborde* (Paris: Finnin Didot, 1838), 135-139
[182] Taha Toros, *Çukurova ve Toroslarda Köy İktisadiyatı [Village Economies in Çukurova and Taurus Mountains]* (Adana: Yeni Adana Basımevi, 1939).

During the American Civil War, the world saw a global cotton famine and related price boom as confederate cotton faced naval blockades and exports slowed to a trickle. Planters in Anatolia as elsewhere rushed to take advantage of the supply-constrained prices, and production flourished briefly. Peace in America and a glut of new supply brought prices once again crashing down to earth after 1865. Cultivators in Anatolia turned to other crops. By 1902, Anatolian cotton production hovered at less than half of its peak during the American Civil War.[183] Still, cotton prices crept back up over the following decades. Speculative fears of a new cotton famine were born out as prices peaked in 1903 and 1904.[184] Seizing the opportunity, the German Colonial Society published an onslaught of books, pamphlets, newspaper columns, and journal articles promoting Mesopotamia and Northern Syria as ripe for takeover by German cotton companies. German textile manufacturers were among the leading advocates of colonial expansion because they faced stiff competition from Britain and its colonial supply chains.[185]

This ancillary position changed as the prospect of a direct rail link between Germany and the Levant appeared imminent with the concession for a line from Konya to Baghdad going to the Anatolian Railway Company. Wheat-growing Prussian aristocrats got behind the cotton schemes of the *Kolonıalfreunde*. Many saw

[183] Orhan Kurmuş, "The Cotton Famine and its Effects on the Ottoman Empire," in Huri Islamoğlu-Inan, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, (London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987), 160-189
[184] Sevinç Mıhçı and Hakan Mıhcı, "Reflections on the Ottoman Raw Cotton Production and Export during the 1850-1913 Period," *H.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 20, 2, (2002): 43-71.
[185] See August Etienne, *Die Baumwollnzucht im Wirtschaftsprogramm der deutschen Übersee-Politik*, (Berlin: Paetel 1902).

cotton in Anatolia as a bulwark against the influx of additional wheat from that region, thus keeping supply low and prices high.[186] To seek out the much-needed supply for German industrialists, botanist Rudolph Endlich traveled to Smyrna to determine the feasibility of establishing German cotton companies there. He published his findings in *Der Tropenpflanzer* between 1901 and 1902, concluding that if companies could provide cheap credit to cultivators and locate climate-appropriate seed-grain, tremendous profits awaited them on the plains around Smyrna. Success could serve as a model for further German development of cotton in Northern Syria and Mesopotamia.[187]

Converging Interests: The WZO, Deutsche Bank and Delebage

On November 12, 1902, Gwinner was approached by entrepreneur and member of the German-Asiatic Society Max Bendix. Bendix and other members of the Society sought Deutsche Bank's investment of M. 150,000 to monopolize the cotton-export market in Adana for the benefit of Bremer textile firms. German vice-consul in Mersin, Herr Christmann, had already agreed to represent the venture in Adana. Gwinner did not bite, not wanting to antagonize the Ottomans in any way during the tenuous negotiations for the railway.[188] Just one month later, an Augsburg-based company tried to persuade Gwinner to finance schemes in Anatolian cotton by playing up the desperate situation faced by textile manufacturers in Germany. As four-fifths of cotton imports currently came from America, the Bavarians fretted that

[186] Kaiser, ”Baghdad Railway Politics,“ 133-135
[187] Rudolf Endlich, “Die Baumwoll-Expertise nach Smyrna,” *Der Tropenpflanzer*, 3, 4, (1902).
[188] HGDB OR 707, Gwinner, Benin, November 29, 1902.

rising domestic demand in the U.S.A. would leave German textiles without any affordable cotton supply. The Colonial Economic Committee (*Koloniales Wirtschaftskomitee*), founded by a Saxonian textile entrepreneur, established cotton plantations in Togo to stave off this catastrophe. However, the Augsburg company believed it would take too long for those plantations to become viable and sought Deutsche Bank's help in getting a foothold in Anatolia.[189] Again, Gwinner demurred.[190] Nevertheless, the various settlement and cotton-planting schemes percolating across Germany's colonial societies were converging on the opportunities brought by the proposed Berlin-Baghdad line. These efforts drew Deutsche Bank deeper into a web of colonial ambitions in which it had, initially, little interest.

In 1904, Gwinner warmed to the cotton scheme. The intricate negotiations over the railway were over. Deutsche Bank had won the concession for the Baghdad line. He contacted his friend in the Bremen cotton market, Platte, but warned that the Bank did not want any "patriotic publicity."[191] As in the plans of Otto Wartburg, Gwinner wanted a German merchant to travel to Adana, enter the cotton market, and learn as much as possible about the local situation. Gwinner clarified that he had no immediate interests in Çukurova but asked Platte to name a good candidate for the mission.[192] Instead, Platte advised against getting into bed with German textile industrialists as their commitment to the Anatolian cotton scheme waxed and waned

[189] HGDB OR 707, Bischoff to DB, Augsburg, April 19, 1903.
[190] HGDB OR 707, Gwinner to Bischoff, Berlin, April 29, 1903.
[191] HGDB OR 707, Gwinner to Platte, Berlin, March 18, 1904.
[192] Ibid

with cotton prices.[193] Now leery of the reliability of the textile investors, Gwinner was intrigued when a new investor promoting an altogether different agenda for Çukurovan cotton crossed his desk in July 1904. The WZO had entered Gwinner's orbit with a letter from Otto Warburg.

In 1905, Warburg was introduced to the proposed Berlin-Baghdad Railway project while attending a lecture. He was immediately enthusiastic about what he saw as a convergence between the interests of Deutsche Bank and the WZO. Partnering with Deutsche Bank would ensure that Warburg's plan 1) would reach the highest levels of the Ottoman administration, 2) would have buy-in from the Bank's subsidiary, the Anatolian Railway Company, whose network and cooperation were essential, and 3) certify that any settler colony would have access to an ample supply of cheap credit for partner-cultivators. Moreover, Arthur Gwinner was married to the Jewish banking heiress Anna Speyer, which Warburg believed made him an ally. In Deutsche Bank, Warburg believed he had found the perfect partner for his cotton company.

Pressing the urgency of his proposal, with the fall planting season fast approaching, Warburg sought Deutsche Bank's backing to establish a series of test farms in Çukurova. Warburg was candid about his intentions, recommending that the test farms establish the viability of colonization along the Baghdad railway, pending the Sublime Porte's cooperation. To Gwinner's shock, he learned that Warburg had already been in talks with ARC officials and pursued settlement programs along the

[193] HGDB OR 707, Platte to Gwinner, Bremen March 24, 1904

Eskişehir-Konya line. [194] With the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden* (German-Jewish Charitable Society), Warburg had settled 96 Jewish-Romanian families in three villages along the route.[195]

Gwinner contacted Anatolian railway Director Kurt Zander at once. He could not hide his skepticism toward Warburg's proposal. Gwinner found it conceptually sound, but he was deeply concerned that cooperation with Warburg or the WZO could be disastrous for the Bank's relations with Ottoman authorities. Any collaboration must therefore remain secret.[196] Zander, loath to get involved with cotton in the first place, informed Warburg brusquely that the bank would take his suggestions under consideration.[197]

Gwinner moved forward with the project while he and Zander tried to keep Warburg and the Zionists at arm's length. Gwinner organized a group of Saxonian textile manufacturers and Austrian investors to help fund the project. By October 1904, the consortium settled on Franz J. Günther to head the new company, a former cotton merchant with experience in Central Asia. With little direct knowledge of the Çukurova, the company's investors assumed the region to be more-or-less identical to the prevailing conditions in Central Asia, making Günther an ideal candidate. The investors planned to transport their cotton to Austria through the port of Trieste,

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[194] HGDB OR 707, Warburg to Gwinner, Berlin, July 10, 1904
[195] HGDB OR 793, Wolffsohn to Schrader, Cologne, March 10, 1903; See also, Kaiser, "Baghdad Railway Politics," 2001, pp. 140
[196] HGDB OR 707, Zander to Gwinner, Constantinople, August 4, 1904 Nr. 1810; Gwinner to Zander, Berlin, July 30 1904 Nr. 1361.; HGDB OR 707, Gwinner to Zander, Berlin, August 11, 1904 Nr. 1810
[197] HGDB OR 707, Warburg to Zander, Bad Kissingen, September 20, 1904.

where the investors would take possession of pre-purchased cotton at a guaranteed price from the Delebage.[198]

The company was chartered with a founding capital of M. 150,000, of which Warburg personally contributed M. 10,000 while the WZO purchased shares worth M. 20,000. At the Bank's urging, the WZO shares were registered in the name of the organization's head, H. Wolffsohn, rather than the group itself. The bankers leaned on Austrian investors to contribute at least the same amount as Wolffsohn and Warburg to counter the WZO's influence. They also relied on the WZO to advocate a Jewish colonial policy.[199] Warburg agitated to give representatives of the WZO seats on the supervisory board and give the organization the rights to take over all the agricultural tools and machinery if the Delebage were dissolved. Deutsche Bank categorically rebuffed these amendments to the company charter.[200] Warburg grew increasingly vocal about treating the Delebage as primarily a settler colony rather than a financial venture. As a result, Günther recommended that the Zionists be excluded from the project altogether, and the conflict between Warburg and Günther grew heated. When the company was officially founded in Dresden on November 17, 1904, Warburg was the only WZO representative on the eight-member supervisory board. It became clear to the WZO that Deutsche Bank's Directors would oppose the Zionist policy goals at every turn. Dejected, the WZO's shares were eventually transferred to Warburg, who,

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[198] HGDB OR 707, DB-branch Dresden to Gwinner, Dresden, October 6, 1904; HGDB OR 707, Kuntze to Gwinner,
Dresden, October7, 1904.
[199] HGDB OR 707, Kuntze to DB, Dresden, November 7,1904.
[200] HGDB OR 707, Warburg to Kuntze, Berlin, November 9, 1904; ·KHGDB OR 707, Kuntze to OB, Dresden, November 11, 1904.

although he maintained a financial stake and supervisory role in the company, became despondent that the settlement scheme had failed. [201]

Günther and Gwinner agreed that the Delebage's success depended on increasing cotton production in Çukurova, which depended, in turn, on the existence of a more robust labor force and the expansion of the area of productive land. The land issue could be solved through large-scale irrigation projects of the kind Deutsche Bank was already pursuing in Konya. To provide labor, a settlement scheme of the kind proposed by the Zionists held tantalizing advantages. While the Zionist project was anathema to Günther, he was won over to settlement as an economic priority. The company had been advised that the local population in Çukurova would oppose, perhaps violently, any Jewish immigration. However, the question remained whether other kinds of labor immigration would be welcomed. Günther came around to Warburg's colonization scheme with surprising enthusiasm – so long as Jewish immigrants were replaced with ethnic "Germans" instead. In 1906, a group of Swabian settlers in Palestine contacted the Delegate.[202] They offered to send some of their numbers to Çukurova as settlers under the company's patronage. Günther determined that this settlement program might be prohibitively expensive because the company would have to pay for all transportation and maintenance costs for the

[201] HGDB OR 707, Leon Toeplitz, Dresden, November 17, 1904 G. A. 330, 1904; Gesellschaftsvertrag der Deutsch-Levantinischen Baumwoll-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Dresden 1904.; See also, Kaiser, Baghdad Railway Politics, 145

[202] HGDB OR 708, February Report, Günther to supervisory board, Dresden, February 28, 1906; HGDB OR 708, Günther to AA, Dresden, March 3, 1906.

settlers.[203] Still, Günther became increasingly enamored of the Swabian idea. He found it an excellent solution to the labor issue. It would provide a dependable workforce entirely under Delebage's control.

Günther believed that only by expanding the area available for cotton could settlement work. This expansion, Günther estimated, could increase cotton output by up to one thousand percent. Edouard Huguenin, General Director of the CFOA, had been in talks with the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works to organize an irrigation project for the Adana plain. Recurrent drought and flooding of the Seyhan River was a thorn in the side of Adana's administrators for decades.[204]Parallel to these talks, famed British civil engineer William Willcocks turned his attention to the Seyhan after his career-making success building the Aswan Low Dam in Egypt from 1898 to 1902.[205]

Willcocks and Axel Preyre, an associate of Otto Warburg, crafted a scheme to dam the Seyhan River. Up to 63,000 hectares of reclaimed land could be brought under cultivation with the waters retained by such a dam. The irrigation project would need additional work to regularize the myriad drainage issues around the irrigated area, reclaim swampland in some places, and irrigate others. Of the drained

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[203] HGDB OR 708, Gwinner to Anatolian Railway Company, Berlin, March 6, 1906 No. 670,

[204] See, for example, the description of Adana's irrigation works in Theodor Kotschy, *Reise in den cilicischen Taurus über Tarsus, (Gotha Justus Perthes*, 1858), 22-39, 278-290.

[205] AA-PA Konstantinopel, G. Galland, G. Aslan, A. Leclerq, Vilayet d'Adana. Projet d'irrigation de la plaine d'Adana. Rapport sur l'ensemble des travaux il exécuter, Constantinople, January 8, 1307 enclosure in Günther to Gies, Dresden, May 2, 1906 J. No. 1409, 259

swampland, Willcocks and Preyre intended to claim about 6,000 hectares as the exclusive property of the irrigation company.[206] Günther met with Preyre in Beirut to discuss the scheme. Günther and the supervisory board found that the pressing and ginning facilities they had set up would need to expand to accommodate additional cotton production. Doing so would allow the Delebage to control every stage of cotton production, from the workforce to cultivation to pressing and ginning. Even the artificial body of water produced by irrigation would come under their purview. Moreover, the Delebage could rely on transportation to a guaranteed oligopoly of buyer-investors in Europe once the ARC line was completed.[207]

Capital and irrigation infrastructure on the Ottoman Periphery

With control of production within view, the aperture of colonial entanglement grew steadily wider. In April 1905, Willcocks published the first of a series of reports meant to drum up support for his plans to irrigate Mesopotamia and Çukurova perennially in the *Egyptian Gazette*. The Mesopotamia plan would redirect portions of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. After drumming up attention for the project, Willcocks was invited by Sultan Abdülhamid II to design what later became the Hindiyya Barrage on the western Euphrates. Major work on the barrage ended in

[206] Ibid
[207] HGDB OR 708, Zander, Berlin, May 8, 1906; HGDB OR 708Günther to Gwinner, Dresden, June 5, 1906 ibid.

1911. This was just one piece of Willcock's ambitious plan to make Asia Minor "once more flower like a rose."[208]

Debate over labor raged among the investors in Delebage and the Mesopotamia scheme. Some shareholders believed native groups could be coerced to build the irrigation systems and operate the cotton fields. On August 21, 1905, Willcocks sent a memorandum to Carton de Wiart detailing the estimated expenses for an initial viability study of the Mesopotamia Project. According to the document, the Baghdad merchants, "who were best qualified by long experience to form an opinion," insisted that the supply of labor available in the Saleymania district and the foothills of Kurdistan was "inexhaustible." Further, "they all advised the employment of Kurds rather than Arabs for the excavation of canals and drains," because the Arabs would "come in well with the Kurds" only once the "development and settlement of the country began." While the Kurds were preferred as laborers, local Arab populations also figured into the Mesopotamia scheme. "Where the Tigris and Euphrates floods generally cover the low lands," Willcocks wrote, "there is a very considerable number of settled Arab agriculturalists who sow rice and wheat." These agriculturalists, "would be immediately attracted to the healthier and drier tracts of northern Mesopotamia near Bagdad if irrigation were assured."[209]

Others favored the "American model" wherein "labor is extraordinarily expensive and scarce and irrigation and reclamation schemes were carried out by machinery." With American machinery – for digging, plowing, leveling, sowing and

[208] William Willcocks, *Sixty Years in the East*, (London: W. Blackwood, 1935), 8
[209] HGDB OR 872-11, Willcocks to Speyer, 22 August 1905

harvesting – Willcocks wrote excitedly that their project could be "independent of labor." However, his ambitions were tempered by the local merchants who "laugh at the idea." These merchants convinced Willcocks that bodies for labor would be abundant "if money for wages and continuous work were available, especially if the work were followed by land settlement." Willocks lists the estimated labor costs of such a survey, citing the cost of primary engineers at £1,500 per head (of which he estimates two would be needed) and the cost of draughtsman forty of them at £250 per head. Thus, the value of one Kurdish laborer was one-tenth that of a European engineer. Willcocks was cautious about including in his analysis a recommendation that machinery "would always be kept in good order and be a standby . . . to ensure . . . cultivated acres against boycott."[210]

The scheme was brought to Arthur Gwinner's attention by his in-law Edgar Speyer, who sought joint German-British cooperation in pursuing the plan. Weary of the political obstacles that British-German cooperation seemed everywhere to engender, Speyer and Gwinner agreed "that before [they were] a little clearer about the scheme, [they did] not wish too much to talk about it." As Speyer goes on to explain, to a like-minded Gwinner: "I am not sure that it would be wise that we should encourage public discussion of the scheme at this stage; in fact, I think it would be better if the initiative in this Mesopotamia Scheme came from England, and not from Berlin. The present relations – especially Press relations – are such, that. . . the English press might take it up, and distort it, and it might do more harm than

[210] Ibid

good." Instead, as Speyer writes, "the first thing is to know whether we could march together and to sound the Foreign Offices in England and Germany with regard to this matter."[211] Gwinner agreed with Speyer on these points, and for a good reason. Once Willcocks met with the British Foreign Office, Gwinner and Speyer's hopes of pursuing the irrigation project were dashed. Britain refused to allow the irrigation plan to move forward unless the hypothetical Mesopotamian Irrigation Company would have the same right to put steamships on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as the Baghdad Railway Co. The AA predictably resisted this, and Speyer and Gwinner had to put their plans on hold.[212]

It became clear that opposition to settlement would impede Delebage's total control of the cotton supply chain from seed to textile. Therefore, Fitzner made the case that control of the farmers was crucial for the Delebage's success. Achieving this level of control meant breaking the Greek merchant's control of the credit market. Doing so would also help the company ensure standardized quality control of its products. However, the company's investors felt this would require too much capital because for the plan to work would mean the Delebage must become an agricultural bank for the entire region. Instead, Fitzner pointed out that supplying farmers with cottonseed instead of credit could serve essentially the same function. It would bind suppliers to the company and ensure that the Delebage could control the cotton harvest even before cultivation began.[213]

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[211] HGDB OR 872, Speyer to Gwinner, 28 August 1905.
[212] HGDB OR 872 Wilcox to Speyer, 1 September 1905.
[213] HGDB OR 708, Lutz to Delebage, Mersina, May 27, 1905.

Despite some success throughout the decade, having established irrigation works along the plain that would benefit the company, settlement schemes of every flavor proved largely fruitless. The local administration, large merchant houses, and peasants almost uniformly and forcefully opposed settlement by Europeans.[214] A few individuals saw profit in convincing the Delebage to finance German immigration. Consul Christmann, at first an eager supporter of the company, turned eventually sour when he discovered that the Delebage would be a competitor to his existing business interests in Adana. Without Christmann as a dependable ally, the Delebage attempted to ingratiate themselves to the local business communities. The Germans understood these communities to split along ethnic lines. Greek merchant houses controlled the credit market around Adana. Cooperation with them would free the Delebage from the obligation to provide cotton producer's credit, which the risk-averse bankers were loath to do. Still, the inherent competition posed by the Delebage meant that most overtures to the Greek, Armenian, and Arab merchant communities in Çukurova met with little success. One Greek merchant, Lykiardopoulos, a rival of Christmann's, contacted the German embassy to aid him in bringing immigrants from Germany to settle and work on his estates. Little came of it, but the increasing complexity of navigating the social and political landscape from afar convinced both the Delebage and the *Auswärtiges Amt* to establish a consulate in Adana in large part to serve the

[214] Kaiser, “Baghdad Railway Politics”, 186

interests of Deutsche Bank. It was thereafter officially recognized that the province Adana now fell within Germany's "sphere of interest."[215]

Delebage made steady progress in growing its cotton exports over the next few years. Its demise as a player in Çukurova began with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. The Young Turk Revolution forced Sultan Abdülhamid II to embrace again the short-lived constitution he had abrogated in 1878 and transfer more power to the generally elected Chamber of Deputies. After several rounds of elections, the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*; CUP) came to dominate parliament. All this was received most unhappily in Deutsche Bank's headquarters, where Gwinner worried the Bank's close relationship to the Sultan had suddenly become a liability and the CUP might force the Bank to renegotiate some of its many projects in Asia minor. Fortunately, the worst of these concerns proved unfounded as work continued unabated. What CUP's sweep into power did bring was a double-edged sword for Deutsche Bank. It inspired a brief but consequential burst of confidence in the Empire's nascent labor movement, halting construction on the railways amid a bitter dispute with its workers. At the same time, the CUP actively promoted the forming of new corporations in Anatolia – Konya especially – creating an economic powerhouse there in much the way Deutsche Bank had envisioned.[216]

The Delebage's sister company, the Anatolian Railway Company, faced the first and most consequential labor movement of Anatolia's twentieth century.

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[215] Kaiser, "Berlin Baghdad Politics," 173-174.
[216] Ahmet Atalay, *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Konya'da Kurulan Milli Şirketler ve Bankalar*, (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2011)

Emboldened by the Unionists' success in 1908, the Anatolian Railway Company workers began to demand raises and better working conditions from their foreign employer and equal treatment for local and foreign laborers. Ottoman and temporary (*muvakkat*) workers were told their tastes were not as refined as their foreign-born colleagues, and their skills were likewise inferior. They, therefore, did not merit the same wages as European workers.[217] The workers sent a list of demands to Deutsche Bank, the Minister of Public Works, the German Embassy, and the Sublime Porte.[218] Their demands included recognition of the Employees' Union, paid holiday, hospital expenses, overtime, limits to working hours, cession of discrimination against local works in favor of foreigners, and the right to work for other rail companies besides the CFOA. When their demands were rejected, the workers of Hayderpasha went on strike at midnight on September 13, 1908, followed shortly by workers from Konya and other regions.[219]

With Huguenin's agreement, the state offered a modest salary raise which the workers rejected.[220] Article 12 of the CFOA charter allowed the government to take control of the railways in an emergency – a contingency Deutsche Bank was eager to avoid. [221] It conceded fully to the workers' salary demands on September 16. However, the CUP viewed labor strikes as a significant threat to public order. It

[217] Zafer Toprak, "İlan-ı Hürriyet ve Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu Memurin ve Müstahdemini Cemiyeti Uhuvvetkârânesi" *Tarih ve Toplum*, 57, 10, (1988): 45-50
[218] Zafer Toprak. "Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu Grevi", *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: TC Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı Ortak Yayını, 1993).
[219] BOA, BEO, 3394/254550. 17 Ş 1326. 14 September 1908.
[220] BOA, ZB. 622/4. 1 Eylül 1324. 14 September 1908; BOA, ZB. 622/9. 1 Eylül 1324. 14 September 1908.
[221] Toprak, "Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu Grevi", 255.

promulgated a Strike Law (*Tatil-i Eşgaal Kanunu*) on 10 October 1908. The law curtailed the rights of most workers to strike in the Empire.[222] Newly bolstered by the government's hardline against the labor, Huguenin reneged and rescinded his concessions to the CFOA employees. While the workers collected over 900 signatures on a petition complaining of the company's duplicity, the government clarified that it was squarely on the side of the CFOA and that any strikers would be arrested and prosecuted per the Strike Law.[223]

In Adana, the Delebage sustained the first of many political shocks that would lead to its de facto dissolution during the First World War. The company had to contend with the first spasms of the Armenian genocide. Following the secular nationalist Committee for Union and Progress's success in sojourning the reign of Abdülhamid, whose persecution of Armenians had been felt widely for decades in the eastern parts of Anatolia, Armenian groups enthusiastically organized to defend the CUP. The new government styled itself a friend of minorities within the Empire and even promised legal equality between Armenian Christians and Muslim Turks. Armenians gained the rights to arm themselves and demonstrated publicly against the Sultan, much to the consternation of Abdülhamid's loyalists in Çukurova. Military leaders in Constantinople instigated a countercoup on April 13, 1909, briefly abrogating the Young Turk government and restoring Abdülhamid II's authority. When news reached Adana that an insurrection was imminent, rumors swirled that

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[222] Yavuz Selim Karakışla, "The 1908 Strike Wave in the Ottoman Empire" *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1992): 153-177
[223] Toprak, "Anadolu Osmanlı Demiryolu Grevi", 255.

Armenians were conspiring with foreign agents to annihilate their Muslim neighbors. Skirmishes broke out between Armenian Christian and Muslim groups, spiraling into riots that drove more than 4,500 Armenians from their homes. Over the next several weeks, battalions of Ottoman troops arrived via the Anatolian railway to keep the peace. However, these troops either ignored or participated in the carnage. Hundreds of Armenian refugees crowded into churches for safety, some even finding shelter in the Delebage's offices. By July 1909, when the violence had mostly abated, the massacres had resulted in 3,521 casualties in the city of Adana. The dead included 2,093 Armenians, 646 other Christians, and 782 Muslims. Another 4,000 Armenians were killed in Adana, Tarsus, and Mersin.[224]

In the years that followed, the Delebage, in coordination with Gwinner himself, sought indemnities from the Ottoman government for damages sustained during the massacres. Little came of it despite much time and money spent seeking these reparations. Deutsche Bank found little aid in the halls of the *Auswärtiges Amt*. While the Delebage continued its operations in Adana through World War One, the increasingly hostile political situation in Anatolia dashed its investors' hopes of cornering the cotton market in Çukurova. Likewise, settler-colonial schemes proved untenable in the plains around Adana.

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[224] See Charles Woods, "The Armenian Massacres of April, 1909," in *The Danger Zone of Europe: Changes and Problems in the Near East*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1911), 127.; Raymond H. Kévorkian, "The Cilician Massacres, April 1909" in Armenian Cilicia, eds. Richard G. Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian. (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2008), 339–69.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the quasi-colonial entanglements that developed as Deutsche Bank attempted to coordinate the overlapping demands of its investors, colonial interest groups, and Ottoman elites through its investments in Anatolian agriculture. Deutsche Bank was at the forefront of Germany's capital penetration of foreign markets, even though its aims were not always aligned with those of the German Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*; AA).

With all of its political and institutional baggage, the AA was a source of consternation for companies that, like Delebage, were actively doing business in quasi-colonial or *colonizable* spaces. At stock exchanges, banks, and merchant houses, new financial instruments and loan structures for funding significant public works integrated Anatolian rural economies into global webs of capital centered in Europe, but not always subject to European political pressure. In the Çukurova, as elsewhere in Anatolia, whole agro-ecologies like that of widespread cotton plantations were grafted onto the landscape, bringing changes in water use, human patterns of travel, and relationships to climate events. In the case of the Anatolian Railway Company and the Delebage, labor was transplanted from Europe or sedentarized to service these refashioned rural economies.

In navigating this new kind of extra-territorial state-capital alliance, Deutsche Bank established a model that multinational firms would later use to coerce and profit from the economic expansion of ostensibly sovereign post-colonial states. The term "neocolonialism" describes the transnational legal and economic regime whereby

western firms may coerce post-colonial or non-western states to extract asymmetric benefits from highly financialized commodities markets.[225] The roots of "neocolonialism" can be excavated in the relationship Deutsche Bank cultivated with its Ottoman clients in Adana and elsewhere in Anatolia. This relationship established the primacy of European financial networks over sovereign non-European states.

[225] See, Agrippah Mugomba, "Multinational Corporations and the Political Economy of Neo-Colonial Dependency in Africa," *Africa Today*, 26, 1 (1979): 57–60; Mark Langan, *Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of "Development" in Africa*, (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017); Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism*, (New York: International Publishers, 1965); Gregory Mann, *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

CHAPTER THREE: THE VALUE OF RAIN

Deutsche Bank and the Konya Irrigation Project

Introduction

In 1903, led by Arthur Gwinner, Deutsche Bank and its subsidiary, the *Chemins de Fer Ottomans d'Anatolie* (Anatolian Railway Company; ARC), began negotiations to radically alter the geography of water on the Konya plain in central Anatolia. The goal was to rapidly develop the region's grain agriculture to benefit the ARC rail line's arrival between Eskişehir and Konya.[226] This project marked a transformation of Ottoman Anatolia's agricultural economies from spaces defined by perceived unexploited *fertility* to spaces defined by measurable *production*. Grains varied in Konya, and many varieties grew famously well there. Wheat, barley, rye, oats, and opium poppy could all be found in some measure according to the Konya Province Yearbook for 1876.[227] Guaranteeing profit from Anatolia's fertile soils meant Deutsche Bank would lay claim to the agricultural tithes (*öşür*, pl. *âşâr*) of lands crossed by the ARC railways. To this end, Deutsche Bank invested in parallel

[226] These rail lines were the first and least contentious sections of the infamous Berlin-Baghdad Railway which became a major point of diplomatic tension between Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire leading up to World War One. See, Murat Özyüksel, The *Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire, Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016).; Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).; Jonathan McMurray, *Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
[227] Konya Vilayeti Salnamesi [Konya Province Yearbook], 1294 H, no. 10, 110, cited in Emrah Yilmaz, "Railways and Urban Transformation: The Case of Konya," *Athens: ATINER'S Conference Paper Series*, No: TUR2016-1947, 2016.

projects elsewhere in Anatolia that pushed the Ottoman state to mortgage various productive niches of its environment to secure the continued drip of German financing. The first and most ambitious of these projects was the irrigation of the Konya plain. At the time of building, the 1907 Konya Plain Irrigation project was one of the world's largest infrastructure ventures, using the waters of Lake Beyşehir to render some 53,000 hectares of highland steppe arable. It was also the first modern, large-scale irrigation system in Anatolia.

Despite their pretensions to doing so, Europeans did not simply impose their vision on the landscape and its inhabitants but in fact proceeded by appropriating, repackaging, and redirecting indigenous knowledge and desires to their own benefit. This chapter argues that the Konya irrigation project imported and cemented in Anatolia a rationalist, reductive conception of the natural environment, one that could be quantified, extracted, and marketed according to careful risk-reward calculations of large foreign firms. Through these efforts, Deutsche Bank established a protean agriculture-industrial complex in central Anatolia, one dependent on a model of commodifying, quantifying, and profiting from environmental resources over which large firms like Deutsche Bank had neither direct control nor a priori knowledge.

Inception of the Irrigation Idea among Konya's farmers

Irrigation systems had long been of interest to the Ottoman state and its subjects. However, sprawling financial firms' involvement pushed these projects to adopt new approaches to land, fertility, and the valuation of natural systems that

served these globalized firms ahead of local desires. Over the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire mortgaged its natural resources to these European firms as concessions. The late Ottoman tax structures that made these concessions possible meant that firms could purchase the right to re-engineer whole ecosystems and render them legible to global financial markets. Deutsche Bank's scheme to irrigate the plains of Konya co-opted the demands of locally-minded Konya peasants.

The waters of the Konya Basin in central Anatolia resisted cooperation with farmers for as far back as Ottoman records go. The greater Konya Closed Basin comprises two smaller basins known as Tuz Lake Basin and Konya Basin. These sub-basins contain a large lake, Tuz Gölü (Salt Lake) and Beyşehir Gölü, respectively. Beyşehir, located about 80km west of Konya, is fed by rivers emanating from snowmelt and rainfall on the mountain range south of the basin. The Konya plain rests at 1000 to 1200 meters flanked by two once-volcanic mountain chains, the Bozdağ and the Karadağ. Clay-lime alluvium that has washed from those mountains blanketed the plain. The arable soil was shallow, no more than 40cm in some places, and the clay-lime composition was well disposed to support wheat such that wheat cultivation accounted for almost all agriculture in the region.

The variability of rainfall is one impediment to the lifecycle of cultivated wheat. In Konya, the plant's success depends on rain in autumn to soften the ground for cultivators to plow and again in spring for the crops to mature. In general, wheat prefers around 30 to 40 cm of rainfall annually to thrive, about twice what Konya receives in a typical year. Notably, these averages are not the whole story. Most years

in Konya are not precisely "typical." For example, in 1911, as Deutsche Bank's irrigation project was underway, severe winter brought more than 60 cm of snowfall to the area. Wide swings in both timing and quantity of rainfall meant that some years saw bumper crops of wheat while others were dire. Thus, irrigation flattened yields from year to year, boosting average productivity. All told, these conditions resulted in about 3,000 wagons of cereal crops – wheat mainly – being shipped from Konya and the nearby depots of Kachin Han and Cumra each year before Deutsche Bank's modern irrigation system. It was estimated that once the plain was irrigated, these stations would see ten times that number, around 30,000 wagons *per annum*.[228]

A consistent pattern and coherent ideology animated the Ottoman system of resource provisioning for nearly three centuries before nineteenth century *Tanzimāt* reforms. Provisioning aimed at general welfare for Ottoman subjects using careful price controls. This regulation of prices sought to prevent shortages of raw materials needed for manufacturing and guard against the threat of profiteering – a serious concern for a government in a near-continuous state of war from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Cultivation of foodstuffs in the Empire's rural peripheries was of paramount importance. The Empire routinely encouraged or coerced the settlement of fertile spaces to maintain steady food supplies throughout the domain. While the state did, in some cases, oversee direct transfers of goods either between

[228] R.I. Money, "The Irrigation of the Konia Plain," The Geographical Journal, 54:5 (1919), 302

manufacturers or government requisitioning, the primary means of intervention was through price setting, export restrictions and granting oligopsony to various guilds.[229]

The irrigation system built between 1903 and 1913 was a joint venture of the Anatolian Railroad Company and the Ottoman State. The initial steps to convert Konya's agricultural cycle from seasonal to perennial irrigation were taken as far back as the eighteenth century. Smaller, localized irrigation systems had been active for centuries. The Konya estates of Sultan Selim II (reigned 1566-1574) were irrigated. However, perennial irrigation was a secondary concern for the farmers of that era. For these villagers, inundation was the more significant threat. Petitions from villages from this period tended to plead for flood control rather than digging channels to bring lake water to their fields. Of course, pre-modern and early modern farmers were not likely to settle in unirrigated areas in the first place. Instead, villages clustered near naturally occurring bodies of water. It was not until the nineteenth century that the Ottoman Empire began settling its subjects in spaces that would require artificial irrigation to be made viable. This policy responded to a swelling population of refugees packed into a shrinking imperial landmass following decades of war and territorial losses. Simultaneously, climatic events proved dire for many of Anatolia's farmers as severe weather fluctuations intersected with increasing orientation to exports, cash cropping, and monoculture. Frequent droughts led to mass crop losses, and many villages demanded irrigation systems to protect their lives and livelihoods.

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[229] Kate Fleet, "Ottoman Grain Exports from Western Anatolia at the End of the Fourteenth Century*," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40 (1997): 283–94.

Lake Beyşehir had a long-documented tendency to overflow its banks and ruin nearby villages. Records from 1501-1504 indicate Lake Beyşehir flooded nearby villagers out of their homes in those years.[230] More problematic for the Treasury, flooding left roads impassable and prevented grain transport. Flooding occurred again in 1731.[231] Indeed, the Ottoman archives are replete with court documents from villages seeking aid or recompense after Beyşehir's flooding. Meadows, too, were inundated, preventing livestock from feeding and leading to tremendous capital losses for farmers and pastoralists. Periodic droughts also plagued cultivators around the lake. Summer snowmelt added injury by creating marshlands around the lake where malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases were in constant circulation.[232]

Çelik Mehmet Paşa, named governor of Konya in 1745, is usually cited as the first to attempt the Konya plain's irrigation. Reportedly, his plan would have linked the Çarşamba river with the Beyşehir and Suğla lakes while closing sinkholes to raise the water level of Suğla (also called Lake Karaviran) so that its waters could reach the plain.[233] This sinkhole plan was carried out during Çelik's tenure or shortly after. However, it did not elevate Suğla's waters enough to irrigate the plain. Instead, closing the sinkholes only accumulated water around the lake without drainage,

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[230] Hoca Sadeddin, *Tacüttevarih*, (Çev. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu), III. Ankara 1992, 347.
[231] Hüseyin Muşmal, "Konya Ovası Sulama Projes Fikrinin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Projeyle İlgili İlk Çalışmalar," *International Journal of Social Science*, 33, 2015, 6
[232] Charles Texier, *Asie Mineure : description géographique, historique et archéologique des provinces et des villes de la chersonèse d'Asie,* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1862)
[233] Çelik Mehmet Paşa died in Konya in 1765 but subsequent governors may have proposed similar plans that were later conflated with Çelik's idea. This makes it difficult to assess what his plan precisely entailed, and sources vary widely as to the dates of construction.

creating malarial swampland. Villages around Suğla asked Governor Izzet Paşa to reopen the sinkhole to end this insalubrious situation.[234]

Villagers in Bozkır and Seydişehir sent petitions to Istanbul requesting irrigation systems for the Konya plain in 1853, 1866, and 1880.[235] In an 1854 petition, villagers argued that a canal carrying water from Lakes Suğla and Beyşehir to the Konya plain would ameliorate swampland in those lakes' floodplains. Such a canal would expand the cultivable area for the villagers' benefit and add to the tithe revenues sent to the Treasury. The village council asserted that reclaiming the swampland alone would increase output by 30 to 40-fold, producing 200,000 *akçe* in additional revenue from 40,000 *dönüm s* of new land from which the Treasury could expect 10,000 *akçe* annually as tithe.[236]

Intrigued, officials in Istanbul appointed engineer Yusuf Hüsnü Bey to assess the region.[237] The resulting report found favorable conditions for the proposed project, concluding it was feasible and potentially profitable. The villagers pleaded that the work should be carried out before autumn flooding began, but no action was taken.[238] Following the Crimean War, the Immigration Commissioner, Hafız Paşa again advocated channeling Lake Beyşehir's waters to the Konya plain to expand the

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[234] Muşmal, "Konya," *Social Science*, 2003, 19
[235] Ibid, 17
[236] BOA, A.MKT. Nr, 141/50, 27 Za 1269/ 1 Eylül 1853.
[237] BOA, A.MKT. UM, Nr. 185/35, 19 C 71- 9 Mart 1855.
[238] BOA, A.MKT. NZD, Nr. 153/91, 22/L /1271, 8 Temmuz 1855.; BOA, A.MKT. NZD, Nr. 145/ 94, 07/Ş /1271, 25 Nisan 1855.; BOA, A.MKT. UM, Nr. 530/1, 02/B /1278.

resettlement area.[239] Again, an engineer was hired to carry out preliminary studies for the project, and nothing came of it. The same pattern repeated with the appointment of engineer Hadi Efendi to fill the role of surveying engineer in 1866, again with no follow-up from Istanbul. In 1880, provincial administrators suggested that merely carving a channel from Beyşehir to the plain would be insufficient; embankments on Lake Suğla could control flooding while forests should also be planted to absorb some of the river's runoff and diversify the products available to the villagers.[240]

Frustrated by the government's inaction, a local notable organized the first attempted irrigation scheme in Konya in the 1880s. Kurukafa Mehmed Efendi from Hayıroğlu village rallied his community behind a plan to dig a canal from Lake Beyşehir to irrigate the Konya plain after the devastating 1873-74 famine. In addition to the threat of famine, seasonal flooding turned much of the plain into marshland and sent villagers into the highlands. Kurukafa sought to end this annual migration and called meetings with local notables, farmers, and landowners to discuss options to simultaneously drain the basin's swampland and irrigate the arid fields of the Konya plain. At the point where the Çarşamba river divides into three streams, the assembled villagers decided to build a dam and a series of small canals to distribute the retained water to the various villages according to their population and land area. Kurukafa undertook an expedition to the Çarşamba's source and determined the stream was too meager to serve the irrigation needs of the villages but that it met another river, the

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[239] Mehmet Yılmaz, *Konya Vilayeti'nde Muhacir Yerleşmeleri 1854–1914*, (SÜSBE, Yayımlanmamış Doktora Tezi), Konya 1996, 13.
[240] BOA, Y. PRK. UM. Nr. 3-30, Konya Vilâyetince hazırlanmıs 1880 tarihli lâyiha, 3. Bent, 2.

Mavi Boğaz, before reaching Lake Suğla and then Lake Beyşehir. Inspired, Kurukafa Mehmet Efendi now proposed construction of a new channel that would connect the waters of Lake Beyşehir directly to the Mavi Boğaz, bypassing Lake Suğla entirely and ensuring a more generous flow into the Çarşamba.[241] Hundreds of villagers helped dig the connecting channel, and a grand ceremony accompanied the canal's opening. Tragically, this collective effort ended bitterly. The canal could not handle the waters it was meant to tame and collapsed.[242]

Kurukafa Mehmet Efendi died shortly after the failure of his canal. According to Kurukafa's son, Ferit Paşa, governor of Konya from March 1898 to November 1902, was impressed by Kurukafa's efforts. Ferit Paşa was approached by Kurukafa's son, Ali, who brought with him the surveying work and research already carried out. He asked for Ferit's support in building an irrigation system based on his father's design. Ferit agreed that an irrigation project would be of enormous benefit, not only to the villagers but also to the Empire. He raised the issue in negotiations with Deutsche Bank to build a rail line between Eskişehir and Konya.[243]

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[241] BOA, A.MKT. MVL. Nr. 146/84, 25 Ca 1278-28 Kasım 1861; A.MKT. MVL, Nr. 139/20, 5 B 1278/7 OCAK 1862; A.MKT. MHM, Nr. 220/91, 20 Za 1277/30 Mayıs 1861; A.MKT. MHM, Nr. 226/27, 8 M 1278-16 Temmuz 1861; A.MKT. UM, Nr. 530/1, 02/B /1278- 3 OCAK 1862; A.MKT. MVL. Nr. 146/31, 13 Za 1278-12 Mayıs 1862; Yarcı, "Beyşehir", 258.

[242] M. Ekin, "Kurukafa Kimdir?", *Konya, Halkevi Aylık Kültür Dergisi*, 51, Konya 1943, 14-16; Ali Altintaş, "Konya-Çumra Ovasının Sulanmasının Tarihçesi ve Kuru Kafa Mehmet Efendi", I. Uluslararası Çatalhöyük'ten Günümüze Çumra Kongresi, Bildiriler," (15-16 Eylül), 2000.

[243] "Bir Zamanlar DSİ", *Su Dünyası Dergisi*, S.15, Ekim 2004; Altıntaş, "Konya", 153; *Bildirici*, Konya, 89.; Apostolos Fasianos, Diego Guevara, Christos Pierros, "Have We Been Here Before? Phases of Financialization within the 20th Century in

By 1895, the Anatolian Railway Company had reached the bustling city of Konya, initially intended as the terminus of the original Anatolian railway project. For strategic and symbolic reasons, the Ottoman Emperor Abdülhamid II and the German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II wanted Deutsche Bank to extend this line over the inhospitable Taurus mountains to the east and terminate in far distant Baghdad. Deutsche Bank was reluctant to take on such an enormous project, fearing it would prove unfeasible and worse, unprofitable. Under intense political pressure, Deutsche Bank began casting about for ways to squeeze all excess profit from its existing rail lines in anticipation of the risky Baghdad project. Such was Deutsche Bank's predicament when Ferit Paşa, now Grand Vizier, approached the Bank about the Konya scheme in 1902.

Deutsche Bank's Irrigation Scheme

The late Ottoman Empire was simultaneously too mighty and too weak for European investors to extend it credit without onerous conditions. On the one hand, it was too large and well-established to be coerced by European firms, while it was also perceived as too weak to protect the interests of direct investors. Nevertheless, the Ottoman appetite for capital was vast, especially for the funding of railways that Ottoman administrators saw as central to reviving the Empire's status among Europe's elite nations. The unfavorable loans secured by the Empire only further weakened the state’s position and led to the Ottoman sovereign default in 1881. The Decree of

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the United States,” Working Paper no. 869, *Levy Economics Institute of Bard College*, 2016.

Muharrem formed the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa İdaresi*; OPDA) in 1881 in response to the debt default. As stipulated in the decree, government revenues from various natural and organic commodities were ceded to the OPDA. These include the state's salt and tobacco monopolies, the silk tithe of some districts, the fish tax, and tithe revenues from Bulgaria tribute, Eastern Rumelia and Cyprus, plus the stamp and spirits tax. Since foreign bondholders of the OPDA continued to extend loans to the Ottoman government, the OPDA's leverage over the Ottoman resource base stretched well beyond the decree's official terms. With these resources in its portfolio, the OPDA functioned as a "state within the state," overseeing nearly one-third of state revenues.[244]

For firms like Deutsche Bank, the perceived security provided by the OPDA mitigated the danger of getting involved with the Ottomans. Yet risks remained. On the topic of investing in Anatolia, Otto von Bismarck, German Chancellor and Foreign Minister, wrote on 2 September 1888:

> German companies are indeed assuming a risk which, first of all, lies in the difficulties of obtaining judicial recourse in the Orient, but can also be intensified by warlike and other embroilments. The risks this harbors for German capital will be borne solely by the companies, and the latter cannot rely on the German Empire protecting them against the vicissitudes connected with risky enterprises abroad.[245]

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[244] Birdal, Murat, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the late Nineteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 7.
[245] HGDB, *A Century of Deutsche Bank in Turkey*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutsche Bank A.fi., 2008), 22.

In the case of financing, building, and operating railways, this was a set of risks Deutsche Bank was prepared to take. On 4 October 1888, Alfred Kaulla signed the concession agreements for Deutsche Bank to build and operate a railway from Haydarpaşa station in Istanbul to Ankara. Deutsche Bank purchased the existing track from Haydarpaşa to Izmit and extended that line to Ankara as part of the concession. During construction, the Bank won the further concession to extend the Anatolian Railroad to Eskişehir and then from Eskişehir to Konya. Against the better judgment of its board of managing directors, the Bank was then cajoled by Kaiser Wilhelm II to build out the line to Baghdad in a costly show of Germany's imperial strength. The Bank was willing to take on such a quixotic scheme as the Baghdad line because the Ottomans were willing to accept very lucrative terms for the Bank. The government promised the Bank per-kilometer guarantees as a backstop for the loans. The government would guarantee a specified minimum return that the Bank would earn from each kilometer of track laid. Even if, on completion, freight receipts for each section of the line failed to exceed that line's per-kilometer guarantee, the government would continue to make up the difference. To secure this guarantee, the Ottoman government pledged portions of the tithe revenues (*âşâr*) from those regions traversed by the rail line. With this system in place, Deutsche Bank and a consortium of minority shareholders established the *Chemins de Fer Ottomans d'Anatolie* (Anatolian Railway Company; ARC) on 4 March 1889 as a Turkish joint-stock company headquartered in Istanbul.[246]

[246] Ibid, 23

While work on the Eskişehir-Konya line was underway, Kurt Zander, future general director of the ARC, published his first analysis of the Anatolian railways.[247] Zander calculated the increase in *öşür* revenues in those districts crossed by the ARC's tracks. He reported that production markedly increased in these areas based on the observation that tithe revenues had gone up. His study assumed a simplistic understanding of the tithe as a direct tax on production. However, his analysis was a bargaining chip in future negotiations with the Ottomans.[248] The real picture was a bit more complicated, as the railways' arrival corresponded to more efficient and extensive tax collection by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in the regions surveyed.

Rising cereal prices bolstered the tithe, as did extensive resettlement policies whose roots were as much in the Empire's growing refugee population as in the availability of rail transport.[249] On 29 July 1896, the ARC rail line from Eskişehir reached its intended terminus in Konya. Instead of a week or more, travel from Haydarpaşa to Konya could now be accomplished in under two days.[250] With the Eskişehir-Konya line, the ARC's railway portfolio exceeded a thousand kilometers, and its investors began looking for creative ways to grow returns on these assets.[251]

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[247] Kurt Zander, "Einwirkungen der kleinasiatischen Eisenbahnen", 944, 945.
[248] See, Rud Staab, *Die Unternehmertätigkeit Deutscher Banken in Auslände* (Lörrach, 1912), 31.; Carl Anton Schaefer, *Deutsch-türkische Freundschaft* (Berlin, 1914), 19.
[249] Donald Quataert, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Avrupa İktisadi Yayılımı ve Direniş* (1881–1908) (Ankara, 1987), 69.
[250] Schlagintweit, *Reise in Kleinasien*, 29.
[251] Murat Özyüksel, "The Berlin-Baghdad Railway," 37

The city of Konya sits at 1026 meters above sea level, with a population in 1911 of about 45,000. The fields around Konya and in the hinterland of the plateau were fertile but scarcely inhabited. An 1890 issue of *The Economist* described Konya as "splendidly fertile, whilst the prevailing climate is magnificent; but the means of communication are so defective that crops cannot be brought to the sea, and a great reservoir of cereals is thus left untapped."

Once the seat of the Seljuk empire, Konya's cultural significance had long outstripped its economic or strategic import because it was the seat of the Mevlevi Order or Mawlawiyah. The Mevlevi lodge was established by the devotees of Jalaluddin Muhammad Balkhi Rumi, a thirteenth-century Persian poet, and Sufi mystic. The Order became the largest and most influential religious establishment of the Ottoman Empire. However, European accounts of the area dwelt on the region's degradation, a shadow of a once-thriving metropolis. This view of Konya was a synecdoche for a familiar orientalist perspective on the Ottoman Empire, in which the Ottoman sultan was an undeserving steward of once verdant lands. Under the Ottomans, according to R.I. Money's 1919 article in the *Geographic Journal*,

> Konia [*sic*] degenerated and its population dwindled, until a large part of the former town had become like a city of the dead. Such was its condition when in 1895 the arrival of the Anatolian Railway began to restore its prosperity, and its importance has been further increased by the construction of the Baghdad Railway.[252]

Conservative and profit-driven, Deutsche Bank sought to render Konya's agricultural surplus both lucrative and predictable to defend the Bank's finances from

[252] R.I. Money, "The Irrigation of the Konia Plain," *The Geographical Journal*, 54:5 (Nov, 1919), 298

the vicissitudes of the capricious global grain trade. It used the irrigation project to produce a kind of agro-industrial complex within the Konya district. Deutsche Bank was a primary investor at every level in the cascading ecological changes it brought about. From credit to water to land to labor to fertilizer to field tools to transportation, the Bank understood the complex web of interlocking processes that one piece of environmental engineering would create and positioned itself astride them all.

Intrigued by the possibility of the Konya plain's irrigation to solve the perennial problem of profitably financing the pet project of two emperors – Wilhelm II and Abdülhamid II – preliminary efforts to assess the feasibility of such a project were commissioned almost immediately. Two Dutch engineers, A. and H. Waldorp, whom Deutsche Bank had contracted to build the harbor at Haydarpaşa, were hired to oversee the project. The Waldorp report begins by estimating the contents of Lake Beyşehir as containing 58000ha of potable water with a maximum depth of 16m at an altitude of 1122m, about 75km east of Konya. The lake, fed by melting snowfall in spring and heavy rain in autumn, was connected to Suğla, 60km away, Beyşehir Çay (Beyşehir Stream).[253] The chasm around Lake Suğla absorbed most of the excess water throughout the lake area, while the rest unites with the inundated area comprising about 7400ha around lake Beyşehir. Waldorp calculated the slope of the course of Beyşehir to Konya and worked out a schematic for the irrigation structure. He concluded that two problems prevented the uncooperative lake from properly irrigating the Konya plain. First, the lake's mouth was so firm that its waters could not

[253] HGDB, OR788 *Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene Vorhandlungen* Vol.1 1.1.1903-31.12.1906, H. Waldorp to Gwinner, Haidar-Pacha, 3 August 1903

connect with the Suğla. Second, the Suğla's shape intercepts and retains much of the river. Thus, the project should focus on "correcting" the natural course of the river to establish a meeting of the waters of Beyşehir with the bed of the river. This correction should be made at a sufficient slope that Beyşehir's waters would not be too low and to isolate the Suğla lake by a canal. This canal would prevent the river of Beyşehir from terminating at Suğla's maw and instead pass over the Balcova Valley.

The Waldorp Report distinguishes itself from prior attempts at designing an irrigation scheme in Konya with its top-to-bottom reliance on mathematical precision. To redirect sufficient water to irrigate the Konya plain, Waldorp offered the following calculation:

> The Konya plain that needs to be irrigated comprises 500,000 *dönüm* s or 46,000ha. Assuming we want to plant cereals, we can expect to need about ½ liter of water per second per hectare and this for about 100 days (the months of April, May and June). It is therefore necessary to plan, to be able to have a quantity of water of 46,000ha x ½ L ~ = 23,000 liters ~ 23 m^3 per second; and a total quantity of around 100 x 24 x 60 x 23 m^3 = 200,000,000 m^3.

Waldorp performed similar calculations for the plains around lake Suğla and to determine the amount of water needed for cereal production given the expected snowfall, the soil's evaporation rate, and even the rough probability of experiencing drought in a set timeframe. The necessary canals' depth and dimensions are then considered and calculated according to the water volume to be transported, assuming a flow of 3m^3 p/s. Smaller canals would also be needed to bring water directly to fields. In addition to the digging of the primary and tributary canals, the work must include: a weir to regulate the water introduced into the river from the Beyşehir and

retain the height of the water in the lake up to the desired level; a sluice to on the side from the canal passing from the side of the Suğla lake, serving to obtain the necessary amount of water (3m3 p/s) for the irrigation of the lands to the east of the basin; two sluices for the Konya plain, one for the capacity of $12m^3$ and one for the excess water from the other sluice; and a sluice between the lands to be irrigated in Konya and those around Suğla.[254]

The report concludes by making some estimations regarding the costs and profitability of the project. Waldorp's estimation includes: the canal; the connection of the canal; the slope of the Beyşehir; the cost of widening the rivers and canals to obtain desired flow; 2 irrigation canals for the Konya plain; 1 irrigation canal for Suğla; secondary conduits of water for irrigating Konya and Suğla; tertiary conduits for both areas; 2 communal canals for drainage in Konya; additional construction (sluices, bridges, roads) in Konya and Suğla; 2 inlets for Konya; 2 sluices for Suğla; fortifications and modifications; as well as miscellaneous expenses and the cost of general scientific studies; all totaling the conspicuously round number of Frcs. 10,000,000. Waldorp guesses that they can count on tithe revenue of 5 pilasters (Frc. 1) per irrigated *dönüm* for the 500,000 *dönüm* in Konya plus the 80,000 in Suğla – subtracting 1/20th of the land which would be used for water conduits and roads – leaving an annual revenue for the Bank of Frcs. 430,000 or 4.3% return on capital.[255]

[254] HGDB, OR788 Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene Vorhandlungen Vol.1 1.1.1903-31.12.1906, H. Waldorp to Gwinner, Haidar-Pacha, 3 August 1903
[255] Ibid

Economist Karl Helfferich, who had served as assistant secretary of Germany's Colonial Department, was named assistant general manager of the Anatolian Railway Company in 1906. A year later, he became a managing director of Deutsche Bank. His appointment to both boards gave renewed confidence in the Berlin-Baghdad project to skittish investors and foreign policy circles.[256] Bent on establishing Deutsche Bank as the central node of an agro-industrial complex centered in Konya, Helfferich began negotiating various matters impacting Germany's Ottoman policy well beyond the Railway's scope. These matters included setting up a branch in Istanbul's Galata district, which served the Bank's expanding portfolio of interests in the Empire.[257] Above all, though, Helfferich wanted to see the Konya plain blossom. On just the second day after he arrived in Istanbul, Helfferich brought the issue to his Ottoman interlocutors.[258]

Creating an agro-industrial complex in Konya

Konya's untapped grain potential was not the fault of environmental deficiency. Increasing production by irrigation necessitated cascading measures of vast social and ecological consequences. It was scarce human labor – and access to labor-reducing technology – that kept the entirety of Konya's wheat plants from being

[256] Arthur P. Maloney, *The Berlin–Baghdad Railway as a Cause of World War I* (New York University, 1959), 2. Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, The Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway, A Study in Imperialism (New York, 1923), 97-98.
[257] "German Methods in Turkey", *The Quarterly Review*, No. 453 (October 1917), 299.
[258] Helfferich, "Tagebuchaufzeichnungen", 24 May 1906, 15.

exploited for export.[259] Before irrigation, the cultivable area was more than adequate for local farmers to service their consumption and export needs. With irrigation, the abundance of wheat growth would increase per square kilometer, but this was functionally meaningless from a financial standpoint until the redirection of water was coupled with resettlement. This import of human capital for more comprehensive cultivation would, in turn, shrink the area available for cultivation by any individual farmer, depressing her ability to rotate crops yearly to accommodate the shallow and quickly depleted soil. Therefore, unit areas needed to be farmed more intensively to raise total yield, which meant artificial fertilizer would need to be introduced into local practice. Deutsche Bank created in 1908 the *Bayerische Stickstoff Werke* (Bavarian Nitrogen Works) and set up a factory for producing cyanamide in Trostberg, just outside of Munich, using in-house hydroelectric power. At that time, cyanamide's 20% nitrogen content made it the leading contender to be the world's premier artificial fertilizer. By 1911, the Trostberg factory was producing 6,000 tons of cyanamide annually. Thus, while it was developing new revenue sources from

[259] As R.I. Money noted, "after harvesting one season's worth of wheat, the cultivator ploughs the land, leaves for one year, and then sows it afresh with wheat. As manure is costly, and as the peasants never burn their fields, a fatal impoverishment of the soil takes place, which goes on at an increasing rate, quantity and quality of the crop deteriorates more and more. Cultivation is carried on by very primitive implements, as is also the threshing, to such an extent that in plentiful years it is necessary to stack the harvest and wait until the following year to finish the threshing. Consequently, a large part of the harvests are damaged, and further, the time occasioned by the primitive methods of threshing prevents peasants from cultivating and sowing as large an area as they might. " R.I. Money, "The Irrigation of the Konia Plain," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 5 (Nov., 1919), 298

Konya's agriculture, Deutsche Bank was poised to become the world's indispensable source of artificial fertilizer.[260]

Salt is another resource tied to the Railway that Deutsche Bank's parallel investments were set to exploit. The hydrography of central Anatolia is defined by two great lakes: Beyşehir Lake and Tuz (Salt) Lake. Since the sixteenth century, the Beyşehir was targeted for irrigation schemes. Tuz Lake, meanwhile, played an outsized role in the regional economy because of its namesake salinity.[261] When the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was created, the state's monopoly on salt was the largest single revenue concession given to the OPDA bondholders. Monopolies on salt and tobacco had been created in 1862 as the security requirement to contract a loan with British banks. While the Salt Lake and its satellite marshes were by no means the only source of salt production in the Empire, it was by far the largest single source of that commodity, producing more than 60% of domestically consumed salt.[262]

The OPDA actively encouraged plans to ease salt transportation for export to maximize revenue from this monopoly. The OPDA arranged to have salt delivered at below-market rates – a plan made easier because bondholders of the OPDA also

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[260] In the end, it was not cyanamide but the competing Haber-Bosch process – invented in 1909 and developed at scale in 1913 – that became the industry standard.
[261] Burçin Erdoğu, Mihriban Özbaşaran, Rabia Erdoğu and John Chapman, "Prehistoric salt exploitation in Tuz Gölü, Central Anatolia: Preliminary investigations" *Anatolia Antiqua/Eski Anadolu*, 2003, 11: 11-19
[262] I. Ozkan, A. Ozarslan, M. Genis, H. Ozsen, "Assessment of scale effects on uniaxial compressive strength in rock salt," Environ Eng Geosci, 15 (2) (2009), pp. 91-100; Ahmet Özarslan, "Large-scale hydrogen energy storage in salt caverns," Bulent Ecevit University, Department of Mining Engineering, *67100 Zonguldak*, Turkey

tended to be heavily invested in the Railways or directly involved in their management. The Debt Administration also sought to develop other sectors where the demand for salt was high, specifically fisheries and olive oil. It is no coincidence that Deutsche Bank's initial entry into the Ottoman debt market was with its so-called Fisheries Loan of 1888. This loan used revenues from issuing fishery licenses as collateral, thus tying Deutsche Bank's profits to the sustainability of Ottoman fisheries. Indeed, the loan provided for the extension of the OPDA's rights of taxation in the fishing industry – once limited to Istanbul and certain other districts – such that fishing in nearly all water bodies within the Empire fell under taxation. Only fishery revenues overseen by the *Hazine-i Hassa* (Treasury of the Sultan) were exempted from OPDA control.[263] The extension of these claims on fishery revenues were contracted as part of the negotiations over the concession to create the Anatolian Railway Company that would lay tracks past Tuz Lake.[264]

Beyond these secondary markets, Deutsche Bank saw several lucrative opportunities in the irrigation of the Konya plain that could result from 1) claims to the agricultural tithes of the region, 2) the per-kilometer guarantees it would receive from the Ottoman state for extending the Anatolian railway from Eskişehir to Konya, 3) freight receipts for the movement of cereals, 4) shares in the profits from cereals

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[263]Birdal, Murat, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the late Nineteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010).; R. Önsoy, *Mali Tutsaklığa Giden Yol: Osmanlı Borçları*, *1854–1914* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1999).

[264] Birdal, Murat, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the late Nineteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

exported to Germany, and 5) potential returns from investments in the increasing number of industrial corporations established in Konya as a result of its improving economic outlook.

As negotiations over the irrigation project commenced, the Bank was leery of the massive railway project into which it had been drawn. The Bank's managers hoped gains from the Konya irrigation project could offset the risk of building a rail line to Baghdad. Much back-and-forth occurred between Arthur Gwinner, Karl Helfferich, and Edouard Huguenin, who served from 1890 as deputy general manager and then from 1908-1917 as general manager of the Anatolian Railway Company.[265] The Sultan insisted that the project be underwritten not by the Ottoman State treasury (and thus the Public Debt Administration) but by the Liste Civile, responsible for managing the Sultan's private estates, as he did not want the Empire's debt woes exacerbated by the irrigation project. Likewise, the Sultan wanted the per-kilometer guarantee already pledged to the Anatolian Railway to exclude transport costs related to the irrigation project's work. Otherwise, the Bank would get paid to transport its own materials to construct an irrigation system from which it would also profit.[266]

Weary of providing such a large loan to the Liste Civile without the Public Debt Administration's security, Gwinner, Huguenin, and Helfferich tried a new approach. These managers conceived a complex system of financing mechanisms that would ensure the Bank could recoup its outlays no matter how the personal finances of the Sultan developed. Rather than tying repayment of the loan directly to the

[265] HGDB, OR788, Gwinner to Huguenin, Berlin 2 March 1906
[266] HGDB OR 788, Huguenin to Gwinner, Constantinople, 2 May 1906

financial solvency of the Empire, the Bank would instead rely on the tithe revenue of the agricultural products of the irrigated area.[267] If this revenue proved less than anticipated, the Bank could draw on already-conceded revenues from the state's fisheries and investments in local industry that could be expected to profit if local demand were increased through immigration or resettlement.

Gwinner mostly agreed with Helfferich's opinion but with some caveats. Gwinner understood that the *Liste Civile* wanted to be *Herr des Geschäfts* (head of the company) and required the ARC to lead the construction and raise the capital. The need for capital, Gwinner suggested, opened the opportunity for the ARC to raise its interest share in the irrigation scheme by purchasing additional shares cheaply, as was its right per the Irrigation Company Charter. The additional interest share was not limited to the irrigation concession but included other projects that might follow from it. The company had to be prepared to cover expenses up to Frcs 20 million for unforeseen circumstances. Gwinner suggested lowering the interest on its loan for the irrigation company from 7% to 6% if the sum were paid back within 25 years. However, raising this capital would require firm guarantees, perhaps in the form of an additional clause in the charter that up to half of the project's revenue should be earmarked to repay the loan.[268]

The Bankers saw the potential productive capacity of Anatolian farmland as collateral against which hard currency guarantees could be made. The direct profits from agricultural surplus were of secondary concern, consequential only as a basis for

[267] HGDB OR788, Hilfereich to Gwinner, Berlin, 8 February 1906
[268] Ibid

the Ottoman government to pledge receipts from its Treasury. In May 1906, Huguenin reported to Gwinner that the Porte found the conditions they set out to be too onerous. The Sultan was personally adamant that the offer did not account for the government's difficulties in ceding so much revenue to the company. Article 19 of the proposed Charter was a sticking point. The Sultan wanted to establish a fixed sum payment for each of the four years that the work should take. The Sultan desperately wanted to keep the Public Debt Administration out of the agreement entirely, therefore seeking an amendment to Article 20 of the charter. The Sultan preferred that the irrigation be paid for by the scheme's profits rather than a government guarantee.[269]

Chastened, Huguenin suggested they try to find a way to assure the annuity payment without adding – on paper at least – to the sovereign's debt woes. He thought the terms could be acceptable if the surplus fishery revenues already conceded to the Bank could pay any outstanding balance. He offered revisions to Article 20 to appease the Porte. The annual sum of Ltqs. 72,650 could be provided by a tax on the use of new transport infrastructure, including roads, rail lines, and bridges built for the irrigation project. This tax would be assessed on a rolling basis and could supplement the per-kilometer guarantee already tied to the rail line. This tax revenue would then be supplemented by proceeds from the irrigated areas' agricultural surplus if repayment of the annuity into the sum already allotted for the per-km guarantee.

[269] HGDB, OR788, Huguenin to Gwinner, 2 May 1906

The receipts of the line would be used to cover any shortfall. The system was imperfect, Huguenin admitted, but he thought it would be acceptable to the Porte.[270]

Huguenin calculated that the 580,000 *dönüm* s to be irrigated would produce either 25,520 wagons of wheat, 38,280 wagons of barley, or 34,600 wagons of corn annually. He guessed that farmers would mainly plant barley and wheat in keeping with local preference. Therefore, Huguenin estimated the Bank could count on 32,000 wagons of cereal freight annually, more than enough to exceed local consumption, making it available for export on the Company's Haydarpaşa line, which received per-kilometer guarantees for the freight it carried. The Bank's exposure in the event of a sub-optimal yield of only 25% (8000 wagons) would yield Ltqs. 156,600 or Frcs. 3,557,952 worth of freight. This figure equates to Frcs. 4,744 per kilometer from Konya to Haydarpaşa. Deutsche Bank's calculators were tasked with assessing the monetary value of building artificial rain into the landscape. The Bank's managers were much more accustomed to relying on governments' tax revenues or the managerial efficiencies of other banks or large firms than on the projected output of peasant farmers over whom the Bank had no direct control. It was a novel situation, but the bespectacled Bankers were cautiously optimistic. As Huguenin wrote, "It seems then that the figures above are quite attainable (8000 wagons, with only ¼ the production potential of the irrigated lands) and the *Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie* may well have a period of great prosperity ahead."[271]

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[270] Ibid

[271] HGDB, OR788, Huguenin to Gwinner, 2 May 1906

To achieve the desired population density, the Bank insisted on inserting clauses into the Irrigation Company's charter that ensured the Porte would settle refugees around Konya. The settlement policy was of particular interest to Huguenin, who wanted the entire irrigation scheme to be contingent on the Ottoman government's ability to populate the area. "Some of the Tartar immigrants and others would want the use of the water," he wrote, "and it is thus an invariably good and profitable investment. Thus, it would be beneficial to insert a clause that the Ministry should install a minimum number of immigrants to [the region]."[272]

The guaranteed settlement would ensure inexpensive labor for construction and hands for subsequent cultivation while stabilizing local demand for cereals. The arrangement would keep the business of grain transport operating no matter how vicissitudes in the international market played out. The large-scale resettlement of refugees in the Konya region would also solve the perennial labor shortage on which the Ottoman failure to exploit Konya's fertility was routinely blamed. To this end, various plans were put forward by the German Colonial Society and its Colonial Economic Committee to settle areas around the Anatolian Railway. As discussed in the previous chapter Otto Warburg, advocated Jewish settlement in Anatolia and Northern Syria. He contacted Gwinner to help facilitate Jewish emigres' transfer to Anatolia to service the growing grain and cotton markets. Gwinner, evincing both his penchant for secrecy and his apathy to the Zionist cause, counseled his associates to

[272] Ibid

avoid much cooperation with Warburg and, at the very least, to keep any associations secret.[273]

Helfferich carefully considered Huegenin's letter and transmitted his thoughts to Gwinner. Huegenin's calculations, he noted, depended on the assumption that the increase in cereal production resulting from irrigation would be made available for transport on the Konya line. He also assumed that a tenth of the project's security advance could be taken from these expected revenues. The loan was not directly secured with collateral because of the Sultan's demand that the government debt not be involved. Instead, it was a collateralized guarantee against the Railway's revenue from additional production.[274]

Any shortfall in expected profit from irrigation would come from the existing kilometer guarantee of Ltq. 307.69 = Frcs. 7,000 per-kilometer for the Konya line. Security on the Bank's loan could come from a combination of the projected revenues from the increase in cereal production plus the per-km guarantee allotted to transporting additional freight from Konya. In 1903, the gross income from the Konya line in the to-be irrigated region was Frcs. 4,945.23 per kilometer. Additional revenue from irrigation must therefore exceed Frcs. 2,054.77 per kilometer to match the guaranteed revenue the Bank would forgo by acquiescing to the Sultan's demands. As Helfferich observed, this arrangement held advantages for the Railway with no obvious downside so long as the additional tax revenues from irrigation would inflate

[273] HGDB OR 707, Warburg to Gwinner, 10 July 1904.; HGDB OR707, Gwinner to Zander, Berlin, 30 July 1904.
[274] HGDB OR 788, Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene Vorhandlungen Vol.1 1.1.1903-31.12.1906, Helfferich to Gwinner, 8 February 1906

the Treasury's coffers enough to cover the original per-kilometer guarantee of Frcs. 7,000. Moreover, the Bank could still count on direct revenues from the additional freight on the order of Ltqs. 604 per kilometer should the government default on its obligations.[275]

Helfferich continued his calculations to substantiate Huegenin's proposal under various conditions. The suggestion of using the fisheries concession to cover any shortfall satisfied Helfferich since that plan offered all necessary security and might even exceed the potential profits of a safer plan in which the company depended entirely on the kilometer guarantees of the government. The Bank had made the numbers work. On 27 November 1907, the ARC won the concession for the irrigation of the Konya plain. The first work started that summer, in July 1908. Progress reports were prepared every six months during the six years of construction. This concession meant that, in Konya, cereal plants seeding 53,000 hectares of clay-lime soil would no longer depend on natural rain to initiate their yearly life cycle. Instead, hundreds of human laborers would now bid freshwater from Beyşehir to answer gravity's downward allure, sustaining annual flowering in perpetuity. The ARC would supply the Ottoman government with all necessary capital at 5% interest. With Frankfurt-based Philipp Holzmann Company, which had carried out most of the ARC's railway construction, the ARC formed the *Gesellschaft für die Bewässerung*

[275] Ibid

der Konia Ebene (Konya Plain Irrigation Company) with a founding capital of 500,000 marks.[276]

The region to be irrigated extended southeast from Konya and straddled either side of the Railway 50-60 kilometers on an east-west axis. The irrigation system worked from three main canals and a series of secondary and tertiary canals whose banks could be cut by cultivators to deliver water to their lands. An already-existing irrigation system on the Charşembe River was modified with regulating sluices to prevent flooding. A masonry dam with fifteen regulating sluices was constructed to discharge excess water into the Beyşehir River. Finally, a junction canal around the north shore of Lake Suğla would also convey excess water from the marshes around Lake Suğla and discharge it into the canal.[277]

To certify that the once-fertile Konya plain could be rendered productive, Deutsche Bank established several agricultural test colonies along the Eskişehir-Konya line. Given prevailing climatic conditions, the goal was to determine the optimal crops to be pursued in Konya. The Bankers' presumption of monoculture's primacy contrasted with the dominant practice in Konya, where subsistence cultivators would focus on small quantities of widely diverse food crops. For Deutsche Bank's managers, this practice attested to the area's fertility, but its unpredictability meant revenues could not be extrapolated into the future. Of course, the inherent unpredictability of agriculture was precisely the problem this crop

[276] Project on the irrigation of the Konya Plain, B.O.A., Y.PRK.TNF, 3/85.; Reibel, 48. B.O.A, MV, 174/48.; Murat Özyüksel, 96
[277] R.I. Money, "The Irrigation of the Konia Plain," (1919): 298-303

variation solved. However, it was not attractive to investors. These test colonies were to standardize agriculture according to optimized productive space. It was taken as self-evident that any given spatial-ecological unit – comprising soil, climate, water, population, topography, and prominent biota – would lend itself to a single, maximizable crop type if all pertinent factors could be accounted for. In this way, the Bank became directly invested in Anatolia's food production through claims on the tithe revenues of a dwindling assortment of agricultural products.

During construction, the amelioration of seasonal malarial swampland was of paramount concern. However, the work itself reshaped landscapes and inserted working crews into marshy areas such that "other districts suffered which were previously immune." It was unclear whether these new hotbeds of malaria would be relieved after construction ended. The swamplands around Lake Beyşehir, filled in by excavated materials from elsewhere, had been ameliorated. However, this was at the expense of other districts now perennially inundated because of the project. The amelioration effort only exported the problem of malaria to less economically advantageous areas rather than eliminating it.[278]

The Konya Irrigation Project was finished in 1913, on schedule, after expending some Frcs. 19,500,000. The government gave the Konya Irrigation Company the right to operate the facility for five years, and in May 1918, the operation was handed over to the government. With it, Konya became the epicenter of the CUP's "nationalist" economic policy agenda and its stated goal of elevating a

[278] R.I. Money, *Konya*, 302

"Muslim bourgeoise" to replace the old elite. Despite powerful conservative factions based in Konya, the city became an outlier in Anatolia in its support for the Unionists, who managed to quickly consolidate power in 1908 on the back of discontent fanned by a terrible harvest that year. CUP groups within the city and foreign investors like Deutsche Bank actively promoted entrepreneurial activities in the area, which were encouraged by an agricultural sector invigorated by the railways and irrigation. While commerce and manufacturing accounted for most corporate activities, agricultural ventures represented a significant minority of all business activity. By 1914, agriculture was booming, and the CUP turned to the Konya plains for provisioning Istanbul during wartime. Introduced in 1916, the *Mükellefiyet-i Ziraiye Kanunu* decreed that 42 corporations and many collective and commandite firms in Konya must claim unused land and bring it under cultivation. The amount of land these firms were forced to cultivate depended on each firm's capitalization.[279]

Settling the new Konya Plain

The Ottomans had long employed irrigation to boost crop yields and hedge against drought. In Anatolia, irrigation systems' presence depended on population densities, topography, and the types of crops suited to its various microbiomes. The central Anatolian plateau was sparsely populated relative to the coasts. Moreover, transhumant groups traversed central Anatolia, following seasonal patterns of inundation. These pastoralists often resisted settled agriculture along their migration

[279] Zafer Toprak, *İttihad-Terakki ve Cihan Harbi Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye'de devletçilik*, *1914-1918* Vol. 15. (Istanbul: Homer, 2003).

routes. In doing so, they incurred the ire of a central government already disposed to view transhumance with suspicion.[280]

Rather than parceling the newly irrigated lands among the extant villages, they were sold to the highest bidder or offered to nomads and refugees who were settled there to work the newly cultivable fields. Because the irrigation of fields was tied to the railroads, agricultural products were intended not for local consumption, nor as insurance against another famine, but as freight to be marked up for export. The self-organizing villagers who toiled for months at the direction of Kurukafa Mehmed Efendi to survey, design, and arduously dig the area's first irrigation thus became little more than workers for the agricultural subsidiary of a foreign railway firm undergirded by Ottoman police.

The Konya irrigation scheme covered a 500km^2 area straddling the Anatolian railway for 50-60 kilometers on an east-west axis. Within that area, roughly 2200 working people lived. It was estimated that this was only enough people to cultivate about a third of the plain's arable space. Deutsche Bank was eager for the government to make good on its promise to sow human labor in Konya's fields per the terms of the concession. The strategy had seen success elsewhere. In Rumelia, Bosnian refugees were settled along sections of Deutsche Bank's railways. This policy significantly increased the agricultural output of that region and even contributed to

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[280] Yonca Koksal, "Coercion and Mediation: Centralization and Sedentarization of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire." *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (2006): 469–491.; Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean: the Making of the Adana-Mersin Region 1850-1908*, (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

rising land prices. Success there became a model for various districts in Anatolia touched by the railways. According to one account, "the Konia [*sic*] plain is peculiarly adapted for the production of cereals, and where very little grew before the arrival of the railway, there is a large harvest which finds a market at the coast."[281] In Anatolia, wheat yields doubled or even tripled where the railways crossed, and grains could be much more easily sold in distant markets. Even the Ottoman army was now sustained by bread from Anatolian wheat.[282]

Rumelian immigrants (*muhācir*) in Anatolia brought innovations to the landed economy. The Ottomans had long depended on Rumelia's fertile fields as the Empire's breadbasket. Rumelian immigrants were assumed to be capable, efficient, and technologically savvy farmers relative to the Anatolian plateau peasants. As such, these immigrants were deliberately settled in up-and-coming agricultural hotspots in Anatolia, especially on the Konya plain, just as Deutsche Bank's irrigation project got underway. The government made a point of settling experienced Rumelian farmers in the soon-to-be-irrigated Konya basin.[283] The Commission for the General Administration of Refugee Affairs (*İdare-İ Umumiye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu*) took responsibility for transporting, housing, providing seed, and sometimes monthly stipends and heating fuel. It also mediated disputes between new arrivals and their

[281] Cited in Yaqub Karkar, *Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Vantage Press, 1972)
[282] J. A. Zahm, *From Berlin to Baghdad and Babylon* (New York, London, 1922), 157. See also, "Central Anatolia and the Baghdad Railway", *The Economist* (15 November 1913), 1079.
[283] Ulrich Frey, "Das Hochland von Anatolien mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des abflusslosen Gebietes," *Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft,* (1925), 203-278.

host communities. As the number of refugees grew, the government's financial and logistical support for immigrants waned.[284]

Some 4000 to 5000 cultivators would be needed to bring the irrigated region into full fruition. The Porte set out to recruit colonists from the Caucasus and Rumelia. At the behest of Deutsche Bank, refugees from the Caucuses and Rumelia were "promised land, houses, seed-corn, etc., and all the facilities for making a new start in life."[285] As one observer wrote:

> The Railway has done so much for Konia [*sic*] undoubtedly, but not unaided. Konia [*sic*] and the neighborhood has been the scene of a considerable immigration experiment which has cost the government a lot of money, and conferred no great gain on the immigrants, for the bulk of them would give their ears to return to the country whence they came…There has further been a considerable gravitation of Anatolian peasantry to the railway country, a process that merely enriches one district at the expense of others.[286]

Another traveler wrote of the plight of Konya's new arrivals in 1908:

> Numbers of unfortunate families are dumped upon communities whose officials would rather not have them…. Within the last ten years some 2000 families have been brought into Konia [*sic*] district. Terrible mortality occurs among the children and old people, and when at last something is done it is often after the sufferers are broken in health and spirit. I saw in Konia [*sic*] long rows of miserable huts in which were a remnant of people who had arrived two years before, many of whom had died of starvation, and some of whom were kept alive only

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[284] Başak Kale, "Transforming an Empire: The Ottoman Empire's Immigration and Settlement Policies in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 50:2, 2014. 252-271

[285] Fraser, David. *The short cut to India: The record of a journey along the route of the Baghdad railway*, (William Blackwood & Sons, 1909), 29

[286] Cited in Yaqub Karkar, Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Vantage Press, 1972)

> by charity. Apparently, most of the promises made to them … had been broken.[287]

Many immigrants from Rumelia had lifelong practice in agriculture and brought knowledge and technologies to Anatolia.[288] Similarly, Tartars fleeing the Crimean War were credited with improving wheat production in areas traversed by the Ankara-Eskişehir-Konya line.[289] Tartars had begun emigrating to Ottoman lands *en masse* following the Turco-Russian War of 1774, after which around 300,000 settled in Bessarabia and Dobridje. Further conflicts pushed waves of Tartar immigrants totaling around 1.8 million into Ottoman lands by 1922. After the 1877-78 Turko-Russian war, most of the Tartars settled in Rumelia resettled in Izmir, Izmit, Bandırma, Inegöl and in the villages of the Konya basin.[290] However, these Balkan immigrants usually fled their homes and had no time to sell their properties under favorable conditions before emigrating. When they arrived in Anatolia, they were mostly without wealth. Therefore, the quality of the parcel an immigrant received was based on a lottery that would affect a family's situation for generations. Under the 1858 Land Code (*Arazi Kanunnamesi*), immigrants were promised 70 *dönüm* (about 7 hectares) of very fertile land, 100 *dönüm* (10 hectares) of moderately productive land,

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[287] Fraser, David. *The short cut to India: The record of a journey along the route of the Baghdad railway*, (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1909), 29
[288] T. de Meester, *Soils of the Great Konya Basin, Turkey: Büyük Konya Havzasının Toprakları, Türkiye*, Agricultural Research Reports 740 (Wageningen: Centre for Agricultural Publishing and Documentation, 1970)
[289] Kale, "Transforming an Empire," 261
[290] Ibid

and 130 *dönüm* (13 hectares) of low-quality land.[291] The land could not be sold for ten to fifteen years, depending on the location and the era of enforcement. A sale would mean ownership would return to the state. As immigrants flowed into Anatolia in greater numbers, the store of available land dwindled, and the Ottomans began relying on a clause in the Land Code allowing disposition and redistribution of land that had laid fallow for three or more years.[292]

The workers recruited to work for the Konya Irrigation project were primarily recruited from the Anatolian Railway Company's laborers. These workers were disproportionately European, mostly Italian. Many of these workers settled in and around Konya, changing the local consumption patterns and importing new goods from Europe.[293] Of course, other factors impacted the state's resettlement policy beyond agriculture. The state sought to equalize the proportions of different groups in new communities, ostensibly to avoid intergroup conflict. For example, Circassians were thought to have a martial character and be prone to fighting, so efforts were made to settle Circassians only in small groups.[294]

In the decade between the completion of the Konya irrigation project and the advent of the Turkish Republic, the Ottomans experienced the Balkan Wars, World

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[291] K.H. Karpat, 'Ottoman Immigration Policies and Settlement in Palestine', in K.H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (New York: Brill, 2002), 785.
[292] Ibid
[293] Donald Quataert, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Avrupa İktisadi Yayılımı ve Direniş (1881–1908)* [Reactions to European Economic Penetration in the Ottoman Empire 1881–1908] (Ankara: Yurt Publications, 1987), 70.
[294] Faruk Kocacık, "Balkanlar'dan Anadolu'ya Yönelik Göçler (1878-1890)," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 1, 1, 1980: 189

War I, and the Turkish War of Independence. These chaotic years saw Anatolia's population decrease by thirty percent, from 17.5 million to 12 million. In these apocalyptic circumstances, administrators tried new strategies for dealing with refugees. In the midst of World War I, under CUP control, government ideology turned increasingly irredentist, and the "Turkification " of Anatolia took center stage as a policy objective. As large refugee populations moved across Anatolia due to localized conflicts and territorial incursions on the Russian front, the Empire's settlement policies emphasized breaking up non-Turkish ethnic groups in majority-Turkish areas. In addition, the crisis was an opportunity to disband, "Turkify," and sedentarize pastoral communities on once-fallow agricultural lands. Kurdish pastoralists from the east found themselves caught in this web of interlocking policy priorities. A secret telegram sent on 4 May 1916, signed by Minister of Interior Affairs Talat Paşa, reads as follows:

> If there are Kurdish refugees . . . it is required for them to be settled in separate groups…in order to guarantee that they abandon their nomadic life, language and tradition, and to transform them into a beneficial element. Sheikhs, imams, leaders and members of nomads shall be settled as separated, and continuous interaction between leaders, sheikhs and nomads shall not be allowed. As Kurdish refugees are not to be returned to their home regions, like migrants, they are to be managed by being provided houses that are abandoned property and by being given land, and, as the previous articles dictate, to be supported equally by the public Treasury for the expenses of migrants.[295]

[295] BOA.DH.ŞFR. 63–187. See: Dündar, Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi, 502–3.; "Kürtler ile İlgili Belgeler" [Documents concerning the Kurds], in Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, 494–511. See also, Serhat Bozkurt, "The Kurds and Settlement Policies from the Late Ottoman Empire to Early Republican Turkey: Continuities and Discontinuities, 1916–34," *Iranian Studies*, 47:5, (2014), 823-837

Specifically, the settlement zones for Kurdish nomads were in the newly arable and perennially under-populated interior regions of "Ankara, Konya, and Kastamonu provinces along with the sub-provinces of Kayseri, Kütahya, Eskişehir, Amasya and Tokat."[296] Another telegram from Talat Paşa sent on 6 May 1916 reiterates the sedentarization policy with specific reference to the Konya basin as the locus of settlement:

> In order that the Kurdish refugees will not be able to continue their tribal life and defend their nationality in the places to which they are sent, tribal chiefs must be separated, come what may, from the tribesmen, and . . . whatever influential individuals and leaders there are, they will be sent separately from the tribesmen one by one to the provinces of Konya and Kastamonu and the sub-provinces of Niğde and Kayseri.[297]

The Konya Irrigation Project punctuates a process that animated the beginnings of civilization itself: the conflict between settled agricultural states and nomadic communities. As part of the concession to irrigate the Konya plain with the waters of Lake Beyşehir, Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman government agreed to make settlement in the newly irrigated areas a vital feature of the agro-industrial complex they endeavored to create.

Pastoral communities followed traditional migration routes (*il-rah*) that depended mainly on variability among and precise water locations from year to year. Sixteenth-century cadaster records include large "barbell" or "kidney" shaped circuits of the various nomadic communities (*yürük*) around the Tuz and Konya basins,

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[296] BOA.DH.ŞFR. 63/188.
[297] BOA.DH.ŞFR. 63/172.; See Dündar, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918)," 271-273.

precisely across the unsettled lands that Deutsche Bank would later irrigate.[298] These traditional routes were enforced by fines levied against nomads who strayed from them because of climatic variation from year to year. Thus, while the state could not yet dictate the course of water, it could dictate the course of nomadic populations who followed the water. This policy ensured the transhumant communities of Anatolia could be predictably found, governed, and taxed at any point in the year, a significant step toward permanent sedentarization.

Before controlling the geography of water was technologically feasible, nomads were regulated through the "sheep tax" (*agnam resmi*), levied in spring on every head of livestock, and the "sheepfold tax" (*ağıl resmi*) assessed in the fall. These taxes combined to place an outsized burden on pastoralists. As a result, the minimum viable flock size in Anatolia was much larger than in other comparable areas. This burden limited the number of pastoralists that could sustain a livelihood, contributing to sedentarization over the centuries. In 1904, German orientalist Friedrich Giese wrote of sedentarization in the Sultan Mountains, whose west slopes form part of the Lake Beyşehir drainage basin:

> From the real nomad, who only owns herds and breaks down his tent depending on the presence of food and sets it up elsewhere, one can observe the transition to sedentary life in various forms among them in an extremely instructive manner. Some start with a little agriculture, others do horticulture and beekeeping, living in the tents is limited to the summer, while for the winter they prefer a solid mud hut, called dam or damja; with others, this has already taken the place of the tent for summer time. The latter does not really differ from the resident Turk except the custom that the women go uncovered. However, they

[298] Rudi Paul Linder, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, (Bloomington, ID: Research institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1984), 78

> are aware of their lineage and are proud to be Jürüken [sic] and not to be confused with the Turks. Perhaps this difference has also disappeared in the next generation.[299]

The Ottoman state tolerated transhumance because the Empire relied on animal products that they alone could provide. But because of their mobility, nomads were notoriously difficult to tax and their existence was always in tension with the projected sovereignty of the Ottoman fiscal-territorial state. With the Konya irrigation project, the Ottomans demonstrated the ability to engineer water flows' location, availability, and quantity. By managing water at a large scale, agriculture could be practiced on previously non-arable wastelands (*mewat*), traditionally defined as commons and essential for pastoralism's viability. Once the Ottoman government could muster the capital, technology, and expertise to re-engineer waterways on such a large scale, the supply of land available for grazing of pastoral flocks contracted considerably, remaining in some places only at the pleasure of the state. The eons-old contest between settled and transhumant societies was, for all practical purposes, ended.

Conclusion

The Konya Plain Irrigation Project was designed to spare certain villages around Lake Beyşehir from the scourge of seasonal flooding while supplying artificial rain to the Konya steppe. The projected *value* of this artificial rain then

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[299] Friedrich Giese, *Materialien zur Kenntnis des anatolischen Türkisch, Teil I, Erzählungen und Lieder aus dem Vilajet Qonjah*, (Halle: Rudolf Haupt, 1907). Beiträge zum Studien der Türkischen Sprache und Literatur, no. 1., 4-6

formed the basis for a systematic restructuring of the rural political economy in central Anatolia according to one foreign firm's designs and interests. Negotiations over the Konya Irrigation Project illuminate the many discursive steps necessary to make *rain*fall a financialized commodity. The commodification of rain begins with the brute fact that organisms need water. Agricultural products are parts of the remains of certain classes of organisms killed at the appropriate point in their lifecycle.

To derive monetary value from the biological needs that rain satisfies requires defining a specific type of agricultural organism priced according to the many cost-factors deriving from rain's scarcity. Grains – especially, wheat – were the candidates of choice for Deutsche Bank's speculators. Next, the amount of rain needed to produce wheat must be valued within the context of a defined spatial unit, in this case, the 580,000 *dönüm* of the Konya plain to which gravity can bring the waters of Lake Beyşehir. Moreover, Deutsche Bank was not the wholesaler of grain, so each load's value was not its market rate but rather the fees charged to wholesalers and the government for the work of transportation. Estimating that 32,000 wagons of cereal freight annually could result from irrigation, Deutsche Bank's managers calculated Frcs. 14,231,808 of additional revenue for their company.

Grain was valuable in this estimate not because it could bring sustenance to Deutsche Bank's many employees or the local producers, but because its consumption anywhere *outside* of Konya demanded the use of the Bank's railways. Thus, the grain produced through irrigation was not counted in seed pods, stocks, or bushels but train

cars. Deutsche Bank's managers thus made an extraordinary leap that even they seem not to have realized: they had invented the value of rain in Konya.

It was insufficient for Deutsche Bank's investment project to merely render the Konya plain agriculturally *usable* through irrigation and rail transport. Instead, to minimize perceived capital risk and maximize returns, the region's natural and human ecologies would need to be rigorously planned and welded to one another in modernist, systematic configurations. The Bank sought to fold nearly all measurable human and environmental features of this space into a predictable, rationally organized supply chain. The various revenue streams on which the Ottoman Government and its German creditors relied were mostly claims on cultivated plant life. So too were the water resources – rivers, lakes, private dams and canals, rainfall patterns, and snow melts – abstracted, commodified, and removed from their social contexts. In effect and by design, the spoils of an agricultural system predicated on imported technologies produced a protean agricultural-industrial complex within which relations of space, labor and local environments were reconfigured in self-reinforcing and self-replicating ways. Through the totalizing project of European finance, the "splendidly fertile" Konya plain had been rendered *productive*.

CHAPTER FOUR: A RUMELI CITY IN ANATOLIA

Kemalist urbanism and environmental nostalgia in the design of Ankara

Introduction

Turks of Rumelia enjoyed a status of symbolic prestige in the Balkans – a privileged status that was absent from the experience of "native" Turks in Anatolia. These Balkan Turks were the descendants of soldiers and settlers who had subdued the Balkans for Ottoman rule beginning in the fourteenth century. However, in the late 1800s, economic and military pressure from Austrian, British, French, Russian, and German interests eroded Ottoman patronage of Turkish communities in Rumelia. By 1900, many nominally Ottoman districts in Rumelia were under Habsburg suzerainty or heavily influenced by large European firms. In general, this new landscape of power was hostile to Muslim Turks who were viewed suspiciously as potential agents of the Sublime Porte. As perceived by Muslim Turks in Rumelia, Ottoman fecklessness was confirmed in Macedon following the 1903 Mürzsteg agreement, whereby the gendarmerie was subsumed under a joint European commission commanded by Italians.

Turks were excluded from the most vibrant sectors of the economy. In Bosnia and eastern Rumelia, Muslim Turks could not participate in tobacco processing, rail transport, finance, brewing and distilling, tourism, or work in large urban department stores. In Anatolia, where Turks predominated, these Rumeli Turks expected to end their exclusion. However, their symbolic prestige and the pride it engendered were likewise lost. "The loss of Roumelia [sic]," Falih Rıfkı Atay wrote, "inflicted a severe

wound in our midst. It opened wounds of national pride . . . Turks from the coasts of the Adriatic to the coasts of Maritsza…were homesick in Anatolia and Istanbul."[300] However, in Anatolia, Balkan Turks could fashion the strong state so lacking in the preceding decades. Indeed, these efforts were so successful at creating a new homeland that poet Nazim Hikmet, born and raised in Selanik, could open his work "Vasiyet" with the lines: "Comrades, if I don't live to see the day/—I mean, if I die before freedom comes—/take me away/and bury me in a village cemetery in Anatolia."[301] To make a homeland, the edifice of pride lost in southeastern Europe had to be rebuilt in Anatolia.

At the same time, the collective memories, cultural attitudes, and shared environmental imaginaries of Turkey's ruling elites, most of whom had in common the experience of exile from the lands of Rumelia, affected the city's every feature. Narrating the role of Rumelian *muhācir* (Muslim migrants) in Anatolia emphasizes how many Turkish elites shared an experience of Anatolia as profoundly unfamiliar. How, then, did Ankara's design reflect the set of assumptions and concerns dominant in a group of administrators seeking not just a new national home but the solace of a supposed ancient homeland in an otherwise foreign space? How did the southeast-

[300] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Batış Yılları* (Istanbul: Dünya Yayınları, 1963), 59, quoted Doğan Gürpinar, "From the Bare and Arid Hills to Anatolia, the Loveable and Beautiful: Kemalist Project of 'National Modernity' in the Anatolian Countryside," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48:6, (2012), 904

[301] "Yoldaşlar, nasip olmazsa görmek o günü, ölürsem kurtuluştan önce yani, alıp götürün Anadolu'da bir köy mezarlığına gömün beni," Nazim Hikamet, "Vasiyet" (1953). Translate in Nazim Hikmet, Randy Blasing (translator), and Mutlu Konuk (translator), *Poems of Nazim Hikamet*, (Persea Books: 2002).

European origins of these elites impact attitudes toward urban environments and help discursively break "Turkey" and "Europe" into discrete spaces?

This chapter examines the design and expansion of Ankara as a projection of national state-making and a manifestation of urban-environmental nostalgia. During the 1920s, the new Turkish nation-state, faced with a matrix of ecological, economic, and political constraints, imbued the building of Ankara with immense symbolic and material significance. Ankara's design and rapid expansion resulted from a combination of factors. First, ecological constraints endemic to the city's central Anatolian geography limited the city's viability as a national and economic center. It lacked access to ports and its climate, malarial in some seasons and arid in others, was ill-disposed to perennial agriculture without substantial feats of environmental engineering. The surrounding environment constrained the horizons of possibility of Ankara's aesthetic design, its settlement patterns, and its sustainability as the prime entrepôt for an increasingly statist political project.

"Kemal the Macedonian": Young Turks and the founding of Turkey

Mustafa Kemal, who would eventually bear the honorific Ataturk (Father of the Turks), was born into the urban metropolis of Selanik (Thessaloniki), a city rambling over hills and along the Aegean, through which much commerce flowed. He grew up watching the city's many Jewish, Greek, Turk, Spanish, French, Albanian, and Macedonian traders move commerce through the city's bustling ports. At sixteen, he enrolled in the Monastir Military High School in northern Macedon. While still in

school, Kemal, his friend Ali Fuat, and a few friends began publishing a handwritten magazine critical of Ottoman policies. For the magazine, Kemal and Fuat were arrested after their graduation and tried at Yildiz Palace for allegedly supporting a plot to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamid II. Both were acquitted, and Kemal was assigned to the Ottoman Fifth Army as a Staff Captain in Damascus. Within a year, Kemal traveled in secret to his home country of Selanik to set up a local branch of the political society he had helped found, the *Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti* (Homeland and Freedom Society). This group was later annexed by the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee for Union and Progress; CUP).[302]

On June 20, 1907, Kemal was appointed Senior Captain (Kolağası). On October 13, 1907, he was assigned to the Third Army in Monastır, in the district of Macedon, where Kemal had spent his adolescence. The Third Army was the epicenter of Unionist activities within the Ottoman military. Moreover, the CUP was incredibly successful at recruitment in Macedon. Rivalries organized along ethnic and confessional lines plagued Macedon. Decades of internecine conflicts had spiraled into a near-constant state of unrest in the region.

By 1908, the Macedonian Struggle (*Makedonya Mücadelesi*) had grown so intractable that it threatened to sever what remained of the Sultan's treasured Rumeli territory. Macedon and Albania were the northernmost Balkan territories under *de*

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[302] For Mustafa Kemal's early years, see, Ryan Gingeras, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: Heir to the Empire*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Patrick Balfour Kinross, *Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Morrow, 1965); Temel Dündar, *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*. (Ankara: Desen Matbaasĭ, 1954).

facto Ottoman control. The other territories, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novi Pazar, though nominally Ottoman, had been administered by Austria-Hungary for thirty years, per agreements of the 1878 Berlin Congress. Fearing the imminent partition of Macedon by British and Russian powers, the CUP-backed Third Army defected from Ottoman command and organized a guerrilla resistance in the Rumeli highlands. The Second Army, stationed at Edirne, caught wind of the insurrection and threw in with the Unionists. On June 12, 1908, the Third Army began marching on Constantinople from Macedonia. Ten days later, Mustafa Kemal was appointed inspector of the Ottoman Railways in Eastern Rumelia (*Doğu Rumeli Bölgesi Demiryolları Müfettişi*). On July 24, 1908, the Sultan saw the writing on the wall and acceded to CUP demands to reinstate the Constitution of 1876.[303]

CUP commanders, now in government, sent Kemal to Albania to suppress the nationalist uprisings there. He then went to Libya to prosecute the Italo-Turkish War

[303] So as not to waste the Ottoman crisis, on 5 October 1908, Bulgaria declared full independence from Ottoman suzerainty. It was widely understood that the political ambitions of Bulgaria's leaders extended to the Bulgur-speaking populations of Macedonia and Thrace, presenting a direct challenge to the last bastions of Ottoman sovereignty in Rumelia. The following day, the Kingdom of Greece announced its intention to annex the semi-autonomous island of Crete (Girid Devleti) and the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary announced formal Habsburg annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The resulting Bosnian Crisis was a tumult of diplomacy and saber rattling that lasted into 1909. On February 26, 1909, in a deal that Arthur Gwinner personally helped broker, Austria-Hungary agreed to compensate the Ottomans with 2.2 million Ottoman lira for public lands taken in the annexation. John Zametica, *Folly and Malice : the Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One*, (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Publishers Ltd, 2017). For his efforts, Gwinner was ennobled by Kaiser Wilhelm II, becoming, henceforth, Arthur von Gwinner. At Arthur Gwinner's request, the hereditary title was given to his father, Wilhelm Gwinner, whom Arthur believed would appreciate the honor more. Gwinner. *Lebenserinnerungen*, 120

(1911-12). He participated in the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-13). In 1913 he was appointed military attaché to the Balkans, where he oversaw Ottoman interests from his office in Sofia, Bulgaria. He gained wider fame during the First World War when, in 1915, as Commander of the Ottoman Fifth Army, he successfully held the Gallipoli Peninsula against Allied attacks. A shrewd military strategist and political organizer, Kemal eventually parlayed his fame into a leadership position among his fellow anti-monarchist commanders in Anatolia.[304]

Kemal led the winning party in the last Ottoman parliamentary election held in December 1919. After the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the victorious Allies attempted to partition Anatolia. Above all, Kemal and his allies were determined to thwart their ambition. The name of his party, the "Association for Defense of Rights for Anatolia and Rumelia" (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*), speaks to the spatial imaginary of the nationalist project. Later, the party was renamed *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party; CHP).[305] Kemal's victory prompted the British army to dissolve the parliament three months later. On April 23, 1920, Kemal and his allies established an alternate government in Ankara to contest the rump Ottoman administration in Istanbul. Funded by Bolshevik gold smuggled in

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[304] See, Edward Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War,* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001).

[305] The party was referred to by Kemal by the shorthand, *Halk Fırkası* (the People's Faction). The word "Cumhuriyet" (republican) was added to the name of the party "officially" refounded on November 10, 1924 after Kemal took power. In 1935, the word *Fırkası* (faction) was replaced with *Partısı* (party) to give the party the name its modern title, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP). Although it is anachronistic in parts of this chapter dealing with events prior to 1935, I use the abbreviation CHP throughout for the sake of consistency and because this is the generally accepted terminology used to refer to the party Kemal founded.

from Russia, Atatürk waged a war of defiance against what he depicted as imperialist interlopers in Turkish lands. His victory secured Anatolia as a national homeland (*vaṭan*) of the modern Republic of Turkey.[306]

For decades, educated Ottoman and European circles agreed that Anatolia was the geographic origin of the Turkish people. Nevertheless, Anatolian space itself was very distant – irrelevant even – to Balkan Turks' lived experience and identity. That a "Turk" or "Albanian" could be born in Selanik and be no less "Turk" or "Albanian" because of it, was normal in 1881, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was born. The ferocity with which Kemal prosecuted his war for Anatolia obfuscates that he was a foreigner there. His friend and biographer, Falih Rıfkı Atay, would later write of "Mustafa Kemal, the Macedonian."[307] Like most of his contemporaries among Ankara's political elite, Atatürk was a stranger to the land that Turkey inherited.

Rural Anatolia and Turkish Etatatism: Revival of Tanzimāt agriculture policy?

In 1923, Ataturk convened an economic Congress in Izmir. He emphasized the importance of industrial equipment to increase agricultural and industrial production while also voicing skepticism of foreign capital to finance infrastructure

[306] Noémı Lévy, *The Young Turk Revolution and the Ottoman Empire: the Aftermath of 1908*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2017); M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).; Hasan Ünal, "Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-9." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (1996): 30–44.
[307] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya; Atatürk'ün doğumundan ölümüne kadar* [Cankaya; From the birth of Atatürk until his death], (İstanbul, Dogan Kardes, 1969).

projects.[308] Liberal, if nativist, economic policies were easy to countenance in the roaring twenties. Real national income was rising fast. Turkey's tax receipts increased by more than sixty percent during these first years of its existence.[309] The global depression that began in 1929 changed that. Supply shocks and high-interest rates on importing foreign goods severed Turkey's supply of many products. Worse, Turkey's private capital supply was inadequate to revive its economic momentum. Thus, CHP leaders abandoned the liberal economic model they had inherited from their immediate anti-monarchist predecessors, the Young Turks. Interest drifted toward models of top-down industrialization.[310]

As in many parts of the world, Soviet systems of organizing political economy partially influenced the model of étatism that Kemalist administrators eventually landed on. After acknowledging this link, however, few historians have noted the many ways in which Kemalist statism was far more influenced by Ottoman *provisionism* than by Soviet communism.[311] The lacuna is unsurprising given the

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[308] Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri [Atatürk's Collected Speeches], (Ankara, 1959), 2: 99-112.
[309] Osman Okyar, "The Concept of Etatism," *The Economic Journal*, 75:297, 1 (1965), 98
[310] See, Michael Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, 3 (1981): 375–392.
[311] See, Caroline Arnold, "In the Service of Industrialization: Etatism, Social Services and the Construction of Industrial Labour Forces in Turkey (1930-50)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, 3 (2012): 363–385.; Adnan Türegün, "Policy Response to the Great Depression of the 1930s: Turkish Neomercantilism in the Balkan Context," *Turkish Studies* 17, 4 (2016): 666–690.; Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, "Turkish Transformation and the Soviet Union: Navigating through the Soviet Historiography on Kemalism," *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, 2 (2017): 281–296.; Basak Kus, "Weak States, Unruly Capitalists, and the Rise of Étatism in Late Developers: The Case of

lengths Kemalist propaganda went to break with the Ottoman past. However, outward hostility to the sultanic legacy could not hide the fact that many of Turkey's most assertive statist policies were, in essence, reinstatements of Tanzimāt policies meant to update and centralize the Empire's *provisionist* political economy.[312]

The term "provisionism," as defined by Mehmet Genç, refers to the State's aim and capacity to "provide goods as cheap, high quality, and plentiful as possible."[313] White takes this definition a step further to include "Ottoman concern for the continuous, centrally directed provisioning of key commodities."[314] While this sometimes entailed claims of direct ownership by the State, it more often operated by structuring the web of socio-economic relations among its human subjects. Directing the vast resources of varied geographies toward the needs of the State meant developing an extensive system of provisioning. Among other concerns, a key aim of Ottoman administrators was to prevent shortages that would result should a commodity be allowed to grow too expensive.[315] By the advent of Tanzimāt, the state

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Turkey," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, 3 (2015): 358–374.; Kıvanç Coş and Pinar Bilgin, "Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the 'Soviet Other' in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919-1945*," Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, 1 (2010): 43–60.

[312] For a discussion of Ottoman *provisionism*, see the Introduction of this dissertation (pgs 22-23)

[313] Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011), 23. See also, Mehmet Genc, "Osmanlı Iktısâdi Dünya Görüşünün İlkeleri," in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2003), 45. See also, Cemal Kafadar, "When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers into Robbers of Shadows: The Boundaries of the Ottoman Economic Imagination" (PhD diss., McGill University, 1988).

[314] White, *The Climate of Rebellion* (2011), 23.

[315] Ibid

had many centuries of experience modulating the flow of raw materials between economic and social interests.

Resettlements, transfers, and violent expulsions of Balkan *muhacır* as well as Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds who ended up on the "wrong" side of the new national boundaries repeatedly occurred from 1915 through the 1930s. In Anatolia, this often resulted in the expropriation of large rural estates that had previously belonged to merchants or Ottoman notables. Forceful seizures of land were most common in theatres of open conflict. These rural estates were usually intended to be apportioned among new *muhacır* settlers. Often they ended up in the hands of urban dignitaries who could exploit CHP connections to acquire and hold on to these lands.[316] Outside of war zones, it was more common for local elites to purchase land from those preparing to flee. As a result, by the time the question of land reform arose, many of the largest estates were already privately held by well-connected urban Turks. Often, consolidation of these large estates in the hands of Turkish elites was widespread even among local peasants who resented the influx of Balkan or Kurdish settlers in their areas.[317] The structure of these rural estates, their output, and the share of the population engaged in their productivity were matters of fiscal survival when Kemal took power. Ottoman dependence on agriculture was one legacy that could not be abrogated overnight.

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[316] See, Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Orada bir köy var uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde köycü söylem. 1. Baskı [There is a village far away: peasant discourse in the early republican period] (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2006).
[317] Safiye Yelda Kaya*, Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey, 1923-1945* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2014), pp. 84

As described in Chapter 2, the Ottoman agricultural tithe (*aşar*) had been the core imperial fiscal policy for centuries. The 12.5% tax on agricultural products remained when the new government took over in 1923.[318] It accounted for at least a quarter of state revenues. However, it became the subject of debate almost immediately. At the Izmir Economic Congress in 1923, representatives were selected based on proportional representation of regional occupations. Therefore, agricultural delegates outnumbered other groups by a wide margin. Abolition of the tithe was chief among their concerns. CHP officers were nervous that the political project they envisioned, which involved giving *muhacır* Turks of Rumelia and the Caucasus roughly equal rights to Anatolian land, could lead to discontent among the native Anatolian peasantry.[319]

An act of parliament in 1925 eliminated the tithe.[320] Eliminating the tithe was a way to buy rural support for the nationalist project. It also helped spur rural capital accumulation since in-kind tithe payments were replaced with taxes in cash while encouraging farmers to maximize and monetize a surplus for the first time in centuries. The shortfall in state revenues was partially compensated for by a revamping of the Ottoman sheep tax (*agnam resmi*) levied in spring on every head of livestock and the "sheepfold tax" (*resmi-i ağıl*) assessed in the fall. This tax

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[318] Okyar, Osman, "The Concept of Étatism." The Economic journal (London) 75, 297 (1965): 98–111.
[319] See, Asim Karaömerlioğlu, "Elite Perceptions of Land Reform in Early Republican Turkey," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 27, 3 (2000): 115–141.; Tim Jacoby, "Agriculture, the State and Class Formation in Turkey's First Republic (1923-60)," The Journal of Peasant Studies 33, 1 (2006): 34–60.
[320] Ayşe Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey: a Comparative Study*, (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1994), 99.

accounted for around 6% of annual revenues after 1925. However, as a replacement for the tithe, it presented problems. The intention was to place the burden of taxation on predominantly wealthy peasants who owned large herds, but it failed to account that for the vast majority of peasants, steam power remained rare before 1940. Animal power continued to be the primary form of productive energy in the countryside. While the abolition of the tithe meant agricultural outputs were not taxed, one of the most significant *inputs* of agricultural production became more expensive. The sheep tax was reduced repeatedly beginning in the 1930s until it was abolished entirely in 1961.[321]

Other taxes were implemented to make up for the lost tithe revenue. Various direct taxes such as poll, head, and land taxes were implemented with little success. The fiscal state compensated for the *aşar* through commercial transactions and consumption levies. By 1926, these taxes accounted for the same proportion of treasury revenues as had the tithe in 1920. Because most buying and selling occurred in urban settings, the CHP had effectively shifted the fiscal burden from rural to urban economies. Ziya Gökalp Mülayim estimates that in 1903, 42% of taxes came from agriculture. By 1953, agriculture accounted for just 3%.[322] State solvency depended on cities more than farms for the first time in Anatolia.

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[321] Safiye Yelda Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey, 1923-1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2014), 88

[322] Ergüder, Üstün, "Politics of Agricultural Taxation in Turkey: 1945-1965" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1970).

Large estates that import and maintain mechanized production were mostly confined to the Aegean and Mediterranean littorals.[323] CHP policy encouraged large estates to expand cultivation, much like late Ottoman schemes. Owners of large estates and some of their workers were granted a reprieve from military service. A small collection of wealthy farmers owned these estates, and they focused almost exclusively on products for export. Most Anatolian farmers had just endured a decade of war and could practice little beyond subsistence farming through the 1920s. Although 2000 tractors were imported to Anatolia during the 1920s, few found their way to central or eastern Anatolian smallholders. As such, the land under cultivation expanded at a lethargic pace in the first decades of Republican rule.[324]

A consistent pattern had animated the Ottoman provisioning system for nearly three centuries before the Empire's reorganization as a Turkish nation-state. Provisioning aimed at general welfare for Ottoman subjects using careful price controls. This regulation of prices sought to prevent shortages of raw materials needed for manufacturing and to guard against the threat of profiteering – a serious concern for a government in a near-continuous state of war from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Cultivation of foodstuffs in the Empire's rural peripheries was of paramount importance. The Empire routinely encouraged or coerced settlement in fertile spaces to maintain steady nutrition supplies throughout the

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[323] Oya Silier, *Türkiye'de tarımsal yapının gelişimi 1923-1938,* [Development of the Agricultural Sector in Turkey, 1923-1938], (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1981).

[324] Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, "Agrarian Change: 1923-70" İrvin Cemil Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.) *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

domain. While the state did oversee direct transfers of goods either between manufacturers or government requisitioning, the primary means of the intervention was through price setting and export restrictions and granting of oligopsony to various guilds.

With the global recession of 1929, agricultural prices plummeted. Because early CHP policy had relied on commercialized, export-oriented agriculture, it had moved away from the provisionist Ottoman practice of price-setting in the agricultural sector. As a result, agricultural goods fetched comparable prices in domestic and international markets. When prices collapsed in 1929, rural peasants suffered dramatically. The CHP quickly shifted its economic policy away from laissez-faire commercialization toward the statist centralization of many economic sectors. In practice, statist policies of the 1930s relied heavily on the earlier Ottoman provisionist model.[325] This was not a facsimile of sixteenth-century provisionism. CHP étatism did not set prices or requisitioning quotas for the purpose of feeding the capital and the army.

Unlike Ottoman provisionism, raw materials were not requisitioned for state purposes so much as the state became a partner and stakeholder in the major sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing. And the purpose of the CHP's economic project was more expansive and facially political than in Ottoman times, where provisionist systems were grounded on the Sultan's dual mandate to maintain social

[325] Kemalist literature sometimes uses the French *étatisme* and sometimes the Turkish *devletçilik.* See, Jacob Landau, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

stability by distributing resources fairly and to protect the realm by maintaining the military. Still, these aims and the use of interlocking, centrally-directed systems of price-setting, production quotas, and strict tariffs on imports were all features of the CHP economic model that drew on previous Ottoman tradition. Ataturk articulated his étatist vision in 1932:

> The principle of *étatism* that we have chosen to follow is not in any way the same as in collectivism or in communism which aims at removing all instruments of production and distribution from individuals, thus organizing society on a completely different basis and leaving no room for private and individual enterprise and action in the economic field. The end of étatist policy, while it recognizes private initiative and action as the main basis of the economy, is to bring the nation in the shortest time possible to an adequate level of prosperity and material welfare, and in order to achieve this, to ask the state to concern itself with those affairs where this is required by the high interests of the nation, especially in the economic field.[326]

Promulgation of the Wheat Protection Law in 1932 initiated a government wheat purchase program under the auspices of the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası). The government inserted itself into the domestic wheat market as a monopolistic purchaser. Unlike Ottoman procurement systems, which were concerned with keeping prices low to ensure food supplies, the Wheat Protection Law (Buğday Koruma Kanunu no. 1932/2056) aimed at propping prices up to ensure rural producers continued to have ready access to cash. The law would stabilize prices and allow urban industries to find buyers in rural markets when foreign purchasing declined. The wheat-purchase scheme helped small Anatolian farmers, but the

[326] Quoted in Tamer Çetin and Fuat. Oğuz, *The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey 1st ed,* (New York, NY: Springer New York, 2011).; See also, Osman Okyar, "The Concept of Etatism," *The Economic Journal*, 75, 1 (1965), 98–111.

benefits were eroded because the scheme was pursued in conjunction with the price-setting for consumer products. This raised prices of most goods that peasants bought.[327]

By 1933, Turkey's government regulated nearly all the country's major industries. Import and export controls, commercial licensing, manufacturing regulations, and taxation created a new kind of patronage system. The easiest route to profits for many local industrialists was to secure exemptions from taxes or restrictions via government partnerships. A request from Turkey's National Airline Institute sent to a cotton cooperative in Eastern Anatolia in 1939 to provide cotton as a service to the airlines is one such example. The request appeals to national solidarity and a strong airline industry's importance to complete Turkey's modernization.[328] Cotton traders in Eastern Anatolia sought workarounds to provide cotton supplies for sectors essential to the nationalist-modernist project. Mustafa Kemal himself approved repeated exceptions to quotas on imports, such as additional materials and machinery for significant infrastructure projects.[329] These kinds of exceptions continued to receive approval throughout the 1930s, mainly to advance the

[327] Tülay Yıldırım, Hartley Furtan, Alper Güzel, "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Wheat Policy in Turkey," in Tülay Yıldırım, Hartley Furtan, Andrew Schmitz, *World Agricultural Trade*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
[328] C.A. 30-10-0-0/80-503-1
[329] For example, in 1937, the import of additional materials from Germany to finish construction was approved and totaled 425,000 Lira. C.A. 30-10-0-0/157-106-19; C.A. 30-18-1-2/38-60-10

keystone of Turkey's statist political project, the construction of a national capital at Ankara.[330]

Like Tanzimāt policies, centralization led to the sorts of patrimonial relationships that modern bureaucratic nation-states were ostensibly designed to avoid. The all-consuming project of early Republican Turkey was to modernize and "Turkify" Anatolia with hopes of fashioning from it not just a viable nation-state but a national *vaṭan.* Within this framework, Turkey's embrace of étatist models to govern the economies of rural Anatolia was part and parcel of the same political project that drove the construction of Ankara as an answer to the sultanic past represented by Istanbul. CHP elites yearned to shape Anatolian space as a way of making the physical, social, and economic landscape legible to a generation of Rumelian transplants for whom the Ottoman core-periphery relationship was the lived experience of political power.

"Refugees in their own homeland": CHP visions of an Anatolian *vatan*

Like Kemalist étatism, the construction of Ankara was outwardly and explicitly a rejection of the Ottoman past. Its design was meant to evade comparison to Istanbul in every way. However, like Kemalist étatism, features of the *ancien regime* filtered into Ankara's design. To fully understand how the Ottoman legacy, and the legacy of Ottoman environmental imaginaries, found their way into the design of Ankara, it is necessary to examine the origins of the group of CHP elites

[330] C.A. 30-18-1-2/39-66-12; C.A. 30-18-1-2/40-72-3

who were tasked with bringing the national capital into being. The unfamiliar quality of the Anatolian interior mimicked contemporary literary discourses of Turkish origins as being clannish, animist, indomitable, and above all, shrouded in ancient mystery. Accordingly, whatever the state built in Anatolia was the material apotheosis of an imagined Turkish *vatan*.

As noted above, the cadre of political elites tasked with implementing the Turkish nationalist and statist project in Anatolia were strangers in that land. Most CHP leaders were transplants from southeastern Europe. Roughly twenty percent of modern-day Turks descend from non-Turkish-speaking Muslim migrants from Rumelia or the Caucuses who entered Anatolia after 1800.[331] Rumelian immigrants made up an even larger share of Turkey's early political elite. Most CHP functionaries, including Mustafa Kemal himself, were Rumelian. In the words of Doğan Gürpinar, they were literally refugees in their own homeland.[332]

From the urban centers of Rumelia, Anatolia held little attraction. Turkish intellectual Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, born in Bulgaria and raised in Edirne, wrote that as a young man, he associated Anatolia with "famines, poverty, and brigands." None believed that Anatolia "could satisfy the dreams of the sons of Rumelia." In

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[331] Justin Mccarthy, *Death and Exile: the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922,* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995); See also, Justin McCarthy, "Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change." *Middle Eastern Studies* 19, 2, 1983:139–51.

[332] Doğan Gürpinar, *From the Bare and Arid Hills to Anatolia, the Loveable and Beautiful: Kemalist Project of 'National Modernity' in the Anatolian Countryside*, Middle Eastern Studies, 48:6, 2012: 903-926

1914, when comparing his first impression of Anatolia to his youth in Edirne,Aydemir wrote:

> The steppes did not resemble the soil I had known and been accustomed to.... The aridity swelled. Bare hills, a burning sun, and barren and infertile soil were ubiquitous.... There was not one single green branch. This was Anatolia. We were encountering the reality of Anatolia. Unfortunately, this Anatolia did not resemble the Anatolia I had learned about in school, in poems, in school songs we sang.[333]

For all its associations as a fiercely identarian nation-state, Turkey is a nation of immigrants. Erik Jan Zürcher offers a compelling thesis regarding the makeup of the late Ottoman political elite. This group was, in his words, "children of the borderlands."[334] Both Unionist (CUP) and Republican (CHP) leadership was composed of individuals whose origins and worldviews derive not from the ancestral heartland of Anatolia but the "borderlands" of southeastern Europe – that is, Rumelia. When these Rumelian immigrants entered Anatolia and embarked on shaping it as a national space, they were acutely aware that they had begun life as Turks on the outermost boundaries of any territory that could be reasonably defined as "Turkey."

What made these Turks *Turkish*? Even within the secular framework of Kemalist Turkishness, confessional identity circumscribed the possibility of integration into the Turkish *vaṭan*. During violent population exchanges that reified Greco-Turkish national borders, communities were forced to relocate based on religious rather than linguistic affinity. In many cases, Anatolia's varied Christian

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[333] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1958), 78–9. quoted in Doğan Gürpina, “From the Bare and Arid Hills,” (2012): 904.
[334] Zürcher, *The Young Turks,* 2002.

communities faced violent expulsion, much as Muslim refugees (*muhacır*) from the Caucuses or Balkan districts had in years prior. By 1915, more than 25% of all Anatolians were *muhacır* or first-generation progeny. Pan-Turkism intersected with ghosts of Balkan violence haunting the memories of Young Turk and CHP leadership.[335]

Turkish-Greek population exchanges compounded the origins of an even larger, typically non-elite, segment of the Turkish Republic's newly settled "Turks." After most surviving Greek Orthodox residents of Anatolia, Thrace, and the Caucuses had fled massacres carried out during the Turkish War of Independence, the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, proposed population exchanges between Greece and the newly formed Turkish Republic as a step toward normalizing relations. On 30 January 1923, the Turkish and Greek governments recognized the geographic borders of each state and signed the "Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations." This treaty amounted to a legalized form of ethnic cleansing by establishing the goal of homogenous ethnic composition of the respective countries as a legitimate state interest that should be carried out by force, if necessary. These population exchanges (Mübâdele) began the forced resettlement of at least 1.6 million people (1.2 million Greek Orthodox from and around 400,000 Muslims from Greece). As early as March 1922, Ataturk had expressed support for compulsory exchanges as a way to resettled rural segments of Anatolia that had been depopulated as result of driving out Greek and Armenian

[335] Zürcher, *The Young Turks*, 2002

communities as well as the steep death toll Anatolian Muslims had suffered during a decade of war.

Mustafa Kemal's CHP inherited, adapted, and advanced the political project of the Young Turks (CUP) from which CHP leadership predominantly drew. Most of these political elites hailed from the urbanized Ottoman provinces of Rumelia and Istanbul. Professionally they tended to be civil servants or the children of civil servants. As noted in Chapter Two, the expansion of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the late nineteenth century had drawn predominantly from Balkan districts. Of the three CUP leaders who took the reins of government from Abdülhamid II, the Pashas Talat, Enver, and Cemal, none was Anatolian. Cemal Pasha was born on Lesbos, Talat in Bulgaria, and Enver in Constantinople to an Albanian mother and a Guagaz father.[336]

Other luminaries of the Young Turk cause were likewise eclectic in origin but seldom "true" Anatolian Turks. One, Cavit Bey, who became finance minister for the CUP, was from a Sabbatean Jewish family (*dönme*).[337] In Zürcher's estimation, of the pre-1918 administrative leaders of the CUP for whom origins are known, 44-48% were from Rumelia, 21-26% from Istanbul, 11-12% from the Aegean coast and islands, 1-7% were Caucasian, and just 13-15% hailed from all other Ottoman territories, including Anatolia.[338] More than half of military officers in CUP

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[336] *Gagauz* refers to the Turkic-speaking minority, typically Eastern Orthodox Christians, living in former Bessarabia (Bucak), today in southeastern Ukraine and Moldova.
[337] Muslim converts who maintained certain Jewish traditions and communal ties. See, Cf: Leskovikli Mehmet Rauf, *İttihat ve Terakki ne idi*? [What was Union and Progress?] (İstanbul, 1991; originally published 1911), 81.
[338] Ibid, 6

leadership came from the Western Balkans, while just one was from Anatolia.[339] Among intellectuals most prominently associated with Young Turk nationalism, "not one of them hails from an area with a solid Ottoman Turkish majority."[340] Most were Turkic speakers of the Russian Empire, one a Macedonian Jew and one from Kurdistan.

While CHP and Young Turk membership were not identical, Republican Turkish leaders hailed from much the same social, political, and geographical milieu. The Sivas Congress of September 1919, which convened to chart a path of resistance against Allied occupation of Anatolia, included Ahmet Muzaffer Kılıç (born in Istanbul), Rauf Orbay (born in Istanbul to Abkhazian family), Bekir Sami Kunduh (born in Saniba, Ossetia), Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın (born in Istanbul), Cemil Cahit Toydemir (born in Istanbul), Cevat Abbas Gürer (born in Niš, Kosovo).[341] Of the one-hundred highest-ranking Turkish military commanders during the Turkish War of Independence: 33 were from Istanbul, 25 from Southeast Europe (including one from Edirne, two from Western Greece, two from Serbia, three from Albania, four from

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[339] Of the group's twenty original founders, Zürcher records the following figures: 2 from Istanbul, 7 from Rumelia, 1 from Rhodes, 1 from Smyrna, 1 from Crete, 4 from eastern Kurdish and Arab provinces, 4 from the Russian Caucuses and none at all from Anatolia. In other words, not one of these charter Young Turks was an *Ottoman Turk*.

[340] In this group, Zurchner includes Mehmet Ziya Gök Alp (1876-1924), Tekin Alp (real name: Moise Cohen, 1883-1961), Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933), Hüseyinzade Ali Turan (1864-1941), Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869-1939)and Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944).

[341] The Congress predated establishment of the *Anadolu ve Rūm-ėli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Association for Defense of Rights for Anatolia and Rumelia), later renamed Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party, CHP), but was retroactively identified as the CHP's first Congress.

Bulgaria, and 13 from Northern Greece or Macedonia), 22 were from Anatolia (including five from the Black Sea Region), 13 from the Aegean Coast (including one from Crete), two from the Caucuses, and two from Damascus.[342] Thus, two-thirds of Turkey's founding military leaders were from regions historically linked far more to Mediterranean Europe than to the Anatolian interior.[343]

Those that remained were predominantly from the borderlands of the Russian Empire. After Istanbul, the second-largest plurality of leaders was Rumelian. The same holds for the early leaders of the Republic itself. In a follow-up to "Children of the Borderlands," Zürcher established that CHP leadership, too, hailed predominantly from Balkan districts. Among the 37 persons "who can reasonably be described as the core leadership of the Turkish republic": 13 (35%) were Balkan emigres, 7 (19%) came from the Aegean coast or islands, 7 (19%) from Istanbul, 4 (11%) from the "Marmara basin" and only 5 (13.5%) came from the Turkish heartlands in either Central or Eastern Anatolia. In other words, 84% of the leadership came from either Rumelia or its integrated Aegean coastline, and a majority (62%) of all Turkish republican leaders came from continental Europe.[344] These leaders brought the experiences, memories, and worldviews from their home countries to the new national vaṭan in Anatolia.

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[342] See Fig 1. Based on information provided in T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Yayınları, T*ürk İstiklâl Harbine Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri,* (Ankara: Genkurmay Başkanlığı Basımevi, 1972).
[343] Zürcher, The Young Turks, 2002
[344] Zürcher, 2005, 383

Many future CHP leaders experienced Anatolia for the first time while literally under fire, fleeing Istanbul to evade the British Occupation and then shedding blood defending what they perceived as the last "Turkish" citadel on the Anatolian steppe. When the fighting ended, Kemal's CHP was firmly in control of Anatolia. Turkey's new capital of Ankara sat squarely at the young country's geographic center. It became the focal point of a unique kind of development effort. The victorious Turks, so many of whom were *muhacır* in their adopted homeland, set out to build a new capital that could be a model for the nation.

Nationalist Balkan urbanism: Ankara as a *Rumeli* capital in central Anatolia

The design and construction of Ankara followed a pattern of political-urban development common to emergent nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The contours of this process were perhaps epitomized by the development of Paris under the Second Empire, chronicled, and critiqued, by David Harvey in *Paris: Capital of Modernity*.[345] Parisian urban space developed out of webs of economic production, the agents of which were each in their own way striving towards the talisman of "modernity" through iterative processes of "creative destruction." The Paris of the Second Empire became, not just for Parisians but for "modernist" urban planners globally, a tactile confluence of both the real and the imagined. By the turn of the twentieth century, a new lingua franca of modernist

[345] David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity*, (New York: Routledge, 2003).

urban space had taken hold of the imaginations of political elites among Balkan Turks.[346]

While no generalization is without exception, Balkan cities followed characteristic patterns not dissimilar to other Ottoman regions. These commonalities included: organic and unregulated development such that rural areas were inserted within municipal limits; the presence of ancient fortifications; complex narrow streets that segregated polyethnic populations into homogenous quarters; sections of the city unofficially reserved for particular wares, workshops, and markets; an absence of civic buildings; low building densities; abundant private gardens; and an absence of infrastructure for communication, transport, and sanitation.[347]

As happened elsewhere around the globe and throughout the Ottoman world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Balkan cities followed a familiar pattern of urban "modernization" that would be as recognizable in Brazil or Cairo as in Sarajevo. In the Balkans, this global phenomenon was implemented through top-down urban regulations that followed Tanzimāt precedents even after Balkan states gained independence from Ottoman rule. The primacy of secular-civic space, municipal administration, planning, and legislative regulation of buildings followed this blueprint. Through schismogenesis, nationalist groups embraced urban rejuvenation as an anti-Ottoman symbol of futurity, sovereignty, and national vigor. At the same time, the impacts of fiscalist Tanzimāt taxation and aggressive Euro-

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[346] Barbara K Walker, Filiz Erol, and Mine Erol. *To Set Them Free: The Early Years of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.* (Grantham, N.H: Tompson & Rutter, 1981).
[347] Rosemary Watekin, *A Modern History of European Cities*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2020),

American investments reconfigured urban hierarchies along railway lines and near ports. In some cases, this siphoned political power away from inland cultural hubs and toward better-networked cities elsewhere.[348]

Adrianople, for example, was once the administrative and economic center of Rumelia and, for half a millennium, the jewel of Ottoman Europe. However, following the loss of Bulgaria, Adrianople became a frontier city rather than a regional hub. Replacing this inland metropolis were Edirne's maritime towns, Dedeağaç, Selanik, and Kavala, whose ports remained networked to the other coastal cities of the Aegean.[349] From this, those future leaders of Turkey took several lessons. First, frontier cities were vulnerable. As the administrative heart of a nation, the new capital should be the heart of her territory. While Ankara lacked maritime access, Abdülhamid II's extensive rail building had made transportation concerns less relevant. By the founding of the Turkish Republic, the village of Ankara was already linked to its many peripheries and coasts in ways that Adrianople, with its too-little-

[348] For analyses of the spatial evolution of Balkan nationalisms in the late Ottoman period, see Milena Methodieva, *Between Empire and Nation: Muslim Reform in the Balkans*, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2021).; Denis Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism: Imperial Russia and Ottoman Christians, 1856-1914*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).; Regis Darques*, Mapping Versatile Boundaries: Understanding the Balkans*, (Cham: Springer International Publishing, n.d.).; Duško Kuzović, "The Courtyard of Boroughs of Western Serbia in the 19th Century," *Zbornik radova* (Univerzitet u Beogradu. Geografski fakultet), no. 66-2 (2018): 23–40.

[349] See, Watekin, *A Modern History of European Cities*, (2020).

too-late frenzy of rail construction, had not been. Thus, Ankara's design was partly informed by Rumelia's coastal metropoles despite its inland location.[350]

As railways stitched the continent's metropoles together, European elites grew captivated by the forward march of industrial technologies, progress narratives, and bourgeois aesthetics. These visions of modernity were distinctly urban in their orientation. In southeastern Europe and Rumelia, nationalist elites saw urban symbols of progress as essential to their future-facing political projects. These elites believed that the validity of their political aspirations should be demonstrated through urban renewal. As Rosemary Watekin describes Rumelia:

> [the modern city represented] 'progress and civilization' for what was generally belittled as an unruly backward territory. Modern towns and cities would weave together each new realm taking its place among the nations of Europe. The creation of new capital cities, the reconstruction of cities damaged by war, the remodeling and expansion of existing settlements were opportunities to showcase the future.[351]

Even by 1900, relative to western Europe, the Balkans were much more rural and population sparse. Fewer than 15% of residents lived in anything like a town. Most were encamped in small rural villages.[352] The small professional class that

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[350] See, Kaloyan Stanev, "Railways, Regions and the Urban Network in the Balkans During a Century of Political Transformations 1900-2000," *Etudes Balkaniques XLVII*, no. 1 (2011): 5–37.
[351] Watekin, *A Modern History of European Cities*, (2020), 215
[352] Ahmet Erdem Tozoğlu and Seda Nehir Gümüşlü Akgün, "Settling down the Crisis: Planning and Implementation of the Immigrant Settlements in the Balkans During the Late Ottoman Period," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 48, 2 (2021): 215–240.

thrived in cities did not wield the same political clout that the middle classes of France, Britain, or Germany commanded. The legacies of the Ottoman millet system encouraged organic patterns of sequestered ethnic enclaves in urban space rather than the wide public boulevards of western Europe. With railroads, these patterns began to change.

Although Ottoman reformers had initiated investments in urban infrastructure in Rumelia, newly independent nation-states redoubled efforts at urban revitalization beginning in earnest in the 1870s. Centrally planned, rationally organized cities overtook the Ottoman urban landscape in Rumelia. By 1900, railroads connected the urban centers of Istanbul, Sofia, Zagreb, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Skopje, Sarajevo, and Bucharest with one another and with the western European powers. With the railways came the bold modernist aesthetic of sumptuous train stations. The railways also brought electric light. By the outbreak of World War One, most cities and large towns in the Balkans boasted electric lighting in the city centers. Old ethnic enclaves where residents had emigrated or been expelled were leveled and replaced with commercial or manufacturing districts. The streets were widened. Department stores stood up. "The capitals of southeastern Europe were reshaped into vanguards of modernization with a new sense of belonging to Europe."[353]

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[353] *Watekin, A Modern History of European Cities, (2020), 215.* See also, *See Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait, eds., Urbanism, Imported or Exported? (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003) as well as Alexandra Yerolympos, "Domesticating Modernity through City Building: New Plans for Balkan Cities, 1900-1922," in Andreas Lyberatos, ed., Social Transformation and Mass Mobilisation in the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean Cities, 1900-1923 (Crete: Crete University Press, 2013).*

In the newly independent Principality of Bulgaria, Sofia was redesigned as a western-facing national capital. The Turkish and Jewish populations fled their historic quarters following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and left unoccupied urban fabric reconfigured for civic ends. Muslim houses, mosques, and other cultural symbols were replaced with civic or commercial buildings. Jewish and Muslim quarters were erased from street names. The new Bulgarian elite hired French experts to strip away the "oriental" qualities of the city and design instead an avant-garde tribute to the Bulgarian nation-state. The extravagant Viennese architecture of the National Assembly Building, the Royal Vrana Palace, and St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral heralded the new regime. A Parisian-style market hall replaced the old bazaar. Large public squares, parks, and wide boulevards characterized what had been a typical Ottoman town just a few decades earlier.[354]

In Ljubljana, rebuilding after the 1895 earthquake offered much the same opportunity. Streets widened, brick masonry replaced stone, department stores, cultural buildings, and hotels stood up. In Serbia, the newly anointed capital of Belgrade followed an identical pattern beginning in 1882. By 1906, the city's Ottoman vestiges had been razed and replaced with wide boulevards, white brick facades, eclectic and historicist civic buildings, display-windowed shops, bars,

[354] See, Raina Gavrilova, *Bulgarian Urban Culture in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1999).

theatres, cafes, museums, industrial and commercial districts, and even electric light and trams.[355]

These symbols confirmed that Balkan nations had thrown off their Ottoman yoke and taken their place among "modern" nation-states. However, they were also distinctively *not* Balkan in crucial ways. "I would not wish Belgrade to be representative of Serbian culture," cautioned urban critic Miloš Cosić, "for whoever comes to Serbia in order to see her culture will not find it in Belgrade: he is much more like to find a foreign culture in Belgrade, as Belgrade gladly accepts foreign culture."[356] The generation of Turkish elites who watched these futurist, western-facing cities grow brought to Anatolia a clear image of westernized and nationalized cityscapes.

Building Ankara as a national political project

Ankara supplanted Istanbul as the new national capital because Mustafa Kemal Atatürk chose it as his base of operations in 1920. To pursue the Turkish War of Independence, Ankara was an alternative to what Kemal's entourage saw as an illegitimate government in Istanbul. In 1919 Ankara's population numbered just 20,000 inhabitants. By 1928, with its designation as Turkey's capital and the influx of

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[355] See, Maria Todorova, "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," in Carl L. Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
[356] *Watekin, A Modern History of European Cities, (2020), 220.;* See also, Breda Mihelić, "From Provincial to National Center: Ljubljana," in n Eve Blau and Monika Platzer, eds., Shaping the Great City: Modern Architecture in Central Europe 1890–1937 (Munich: Prestel, 1999), 173–75.

bureaucrats and the commerce they brought with them, 107,641 people lived there.[357] The new capital of Ankara was a modernist antithesis to Istanbul and the Ottoman past it represented. Having witnessed firsthand the process of foreign investment, civil infrastructure, and new forms of urban design that remade urban environments in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Macedon, Turkey's political elite set out to recreate this process in the heartland of the Turkish *vatan*.[358]

Amid the Turkish independence struggle, one of the parliament's first official acts following its creation on April 23, 1920, was to form a Capital Committee to choose the location of Turkey's new capital.[359] The committee established seven criteria for the site: access to a seashore; railway connections to every part of Anatolia; proximity to waterfalls for hydroelectricity; proximity to coal mines; proximity to forests; sufficient access to water; and the potential to become a "civilized" city. In short, the Capital Committee set out to find a *Rumelian* city somewhere in Anatolia. Despite fulfilling almost none of these criteria, Ankara was selected at the behest of Atatürk himself, who found Ankara's villagers to be consistently loyal to the Republican cause, unlike many municipalities in other parts

[357] Ali Cengizkan, *Ankara'nın İlk Planı: 1924-25 Lörcher Planı* (Ankara, Turkey: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 2018)
[358] See also, Duygu Kacar, "Ankara, a Small Town, Transformed to a Nation's Capital." Journal of planning history 9,1 (2010): 43–65.; Bozdoğan, Sibel. "Reading Ottoman Architecture through Modernist Lenses: Nationalist Historiography and the 'New Architecture' in the Early Republic." Muqarnas 24 (2007): 199–221
[359] Kacar, "Ankara," 44

of Anatolia. On October 13, 1923, Ankara formally supplanted Istanbul as the new Republic's capital.[360]

Ankara's eventual design leaned neither on the old Ottoman capital nor on the model of "Turkish" Anatolian cities but on the urban environments with which Turkey's new ruling class were most intimately familiar, that of the urban centers of northern Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia. Over the nineteenth century, these places underwent what Sofoklis Kotsopoulos calls "an unprecedented urbanization."[361] Importantly, these developments largely left Istanbul untouched. Turks of the Balkans had witnessed the establishment of multiple national capitals in former Ottoman territories – Athens in 1832, Belgrade in 1841, Bucharest in 1862, Sofia in 1879 – and the enthusiastic development of Sarajevo under Habsburg suzerainty. In each case, architecturally modernist city planning combined with novel infrastructural technologies to produce dazzling cityscapes out of comparatively remote townships.

Foreign observers scoffed at the choice. In 1924, one New York Times correspondent wrote:

> Angora [sic] is more than twenty-six hours of uncomfortable travel away from Constantinople. It is on another continent, in a separate world. It has nothing to contemplate across the sterile plains whereon

[360] Ibid
[361] Kotsopoulos Sofoklis, "Beginnings of Modern Urbanity and Architectural Expression: The Balkan Tale of Northern Greece," *Cultural and religious studies* 5, 9 (2017), 544

> it broods but the distorted shadows of events and the monstrous image of the abdicated capital, unwieldy, alien, swarming with plots.[362]

In 1926, special correspondent for the New York Times Ernest Marshall lamented the new capital's environs, describing it as sitting in "a country which is removed from being a desert only by the fact that here and there it is under cultivation – the sort of cultivation that man was capable of giving to the land a thousand years ago."[363] Barrenness, backwardness, and aridity were repeatedly associated with Ankara. As Falih Rıfkı Atay wondered: "If even trees cannot grow, how would it be possible to raise men?"[364] Still, the resolve and sheer force of personality brought by Mustafa Kemal in his determination to forge a new nation out of Anatolia's landscape was the object of admiration for even these circumspect foreign accounts. As Marshall wrote:

> In the Arabian Nights there is no more fantastic story than that of Angora, the new capital of the New Turkey. As a political conception it deserves to rank among the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the world. If it succeeds it will be sublime; if it fails it will at least be entitled to attention as an example of a great effort to uplift a people.[365]

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[362] Anne O'Hare McCormick, "The Self-Determined Turk: From His Mud Village of Angora He Has Declared His
Independence of East and West," *The New York Times*, 4 May 1924.
[363] Ernest Marshall, "Kemal Had Vision in Building Angora: But Turkish Engineers, Halted by Funds, Fail to Get Water to New Capital; City Rebuilt in Desert; Location Was Chosen Far From Stamboul to Avoid the Old Influences of the Sultana," *The New York Times*, 19 December 1926
[364] Atay, *Çankaya,* 1969
[365] Ibid

While European observers saw aridity as an impediment to flourishing, locals were often more concerned with the opposite – swamplands, flooding, and malaria. Rarely are these concerns mutually exclusive since the same drainage features, soil type, and cyclical rainfall is prone to cause both drought and deluge depending on the season. The national-modernist project in Turkey, as elsewhere, relied on the metaphor of the health of a national "body" to describe the state's obligations to the whole. Wetlands near the old city of Ankara were of grave concern for the modernist Turkish government and a longstanding complaint of the city's locals. Turkey inherited a corpus of scientific knowledge from the Ottomans about vector-borne illnesses that complicated and supplanted older notions of "conquering" nature through cultivation, forestry, or other integrations of natural space. By the advent of Kemal's rule, the link between disease and environment had been firmly established. So much so that the *Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekaleti* (Ministry of Health and Social Assistance), operating since 1920, published a "medical geography" of Anatolia in a series of reports collectively titled the *Türkiye'nin Sıhhî-i İçtimaî Coğrafyası* (Medical Social Geography of Turkey) between 1922 and 1932.[366]

The *Coğrafyası* reveals a conception of living environments inherited from Ottoman predecessors, including the notion of relocating the qualities of one vicinity to another. This fungibility of natural space became axiomatic for technocrats and politicians in Turkey. Many had been involved in the project of bringing Anatolia to resemble the Balkans under Abdülhamid II. The modernist vision of an industrialized,

[366] Kyle Evered, "Draining an Anatolian Desert: Overcoming Water, Wetlands, and Malaria in Early Republican Ankara." *Cultural geographies* 21, 3 (2014): 482.

urbanized Turkish *vaṭan* centered on Ankara applied the same discourses. Ankara would be a new Istanbul, a *Turkish* Istanbul, one stripped of the weight of tradition or the baggage of European cosmopolitanism.[367]

Greening Ankara: The disarticulation of architecture and Ottoman landscapes

CHP officials were so committed to building a capital as a rejection of Ottomanism that Ottoman-Turkish architects were not even considered for high-ranking positions in urban planning. Initially, in 1924, Ataturk commissioned German urbanist Carl Christoph Lorcher to design a city to accommodate just 25,000 public employees. Lorcher's plan was found to lean too heavily on the historical Ankara, intending both an "old" city centered on Ankara Kalesi (Castle) and a "new" city around Kızılay-Yenişehir.[368] Aspects of this plan made their way into the final design, including Ankara's still-central Kızılay-Yenişehir district. However, his interest in preserving a traditionalist "old" city quarter was rejected. In 1927, the government commissioned an international contest to select the design of the new

[367] For studies of the architectural culture of early republican Turkey, see Sibel Bozdoğan*, Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). For an insightful consideration of the importance of Istanbul in the construction of Ankara's green spaces, see Fatma Aslıhan Demirtaş, "Artificial Nature: Water Infrastructure and Its Experience as Natural Space," (Unpublished graduate thesis [S.M.], Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Deptartment of Architecture, 2000).
[368] Ali Cengizkan, "Ankara 1924-25 Lörcher Planı: Bir Başkenti Tasarlamak ve Sonrası [Ankara 1924-25 Lörcher Plan: Designing a Capital and Beyond]," *Arredamento Mimarlık*,10 (2002), 220.

capital.[369] Submissions had to meet three criteria: the city had to accommodate 300,000 residents by 1980; plans had to build a new city rather than adapt the existing historical layout; the city had to have broad, easily trafficked roadways.[370]

German architect Hermann Jansen's design became the blueprint for the new capital. His plan was legally accepted on July 23, 1932, and its implementation was approved on June 9, 1934.[371] The core of Jansen's design was the fusion of green and urban space. If the new capital lacked natural foliage, gardens, streams, and parks, these features would have to be implanted into the urban space. The city was designed to grow bi-directionally from the central Kızılay Square. In Jansen's original plan, an industrial district would be set next to the Central Railway's Terminal not far from the planned site of Ankara University and an airport. The seat of government would overlook the ancient citadel, Ankara Kalesi. An Austrian, Clemens Holzmeister, designed a three-sided government complex funneling toward the magisterial Grand National Assembly building. Up to three-thousand government officials would be housed in apartment buildings in Kizilay. The Kizilay neighborhood was ultimately designed by German architect Paul Bonatz and built between 1944 and 1947.[372]

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[369] T. C. Ankara Şehremaneti, Ankara Şehrinin Profesör M. Jausseley, *Jansen ve Brix Tarafından Yapılan Plan ve Projelerine Ait İzahnameler* [Prospects of Plans and Projects Made by Jansen and Brix] (Ankara, 1929).
[370] Duygu Kacar, "Ankara, a Small Town, Transformed to a Nation's Capital," *Journal of Planning History*, 9, 1: 46
[371] Atay, Çankaya, 489.
[372] Kacar, "Ankara," 50

Mastery of water took on a political valence. Technologies of irrigation could be called upon not only to water otherwise fallow expanses of productive land or to alleviate the risks of flooding. Providing clean drinking water to urbanites and eradicating vector-borne pathogens were essential for modern states to ensure a healthy body politic.[373] Additionally, the potential of hydroelectric power was rapidly gaining esteem in scientific, engineering, and policy circles. In sum, watering Ankara was seen as an indispensable statement of the new state's superiority over the *ancien regime*. Istanbul is a city defined by water, straddling the Bosphorus, replete with gardens, and bordered since the days of Süleyman by sloping woodlands. The natural environment gave Istanbul much of its character. To supplant the old capital as the seat of national prestige, Ankara would need to manufacture environments equally lush and equally vital.

Established in 1925, the Gazi Forest Farm was the first afforested green space inflecting the urban center with a rural facade. The Forest Farm comprised nearly 150 km2 of carefully afforested land that would serve as a testament to the grit and cunning of a Turkish people able to coax even the most barren steppe to blossom. The farm was, in many ways, the culmination of scientific forestry in late Ottoman policy and the opus of a generation of foresters trained in the country's forestry schools. The farm would be a recreation site close to Ankara's center and directly adjacent to the

[373] See, Burçak Evren, *20'li yılların bozkır kasabası Ankara* [Ankara, Steppe Town of the 20's], (Bağcılar, İstanbul: AD Kitapçılık, 1998).

city's western rail line. Planners included a zoo, swimming pools, pathways, and cafes for residents to fraternize on its grounds.[374]

Two reservoirs within the farm – unsubtly deemed the "Marmara" and the "Black Sea" pools, respectively – were hailed by newspapers as marvels of urban design, bringing coastlines to the inland capital. With their inclusion, "the pleasures of the capital" now include "sun and Black Sea bathing."[375] These reservoirs were irrigation basins for fields inside the Forest Farm. They held groundwater mechanically pumped from below. Importantly, these structures were unique in their design. Most reservoirs are simple, functional concrete holding tanks for dispensation of water. The Marmara and Black Sea pools, on the other hand, were devised to mimic their namesake Rumelian waterscapes.

Both reservoirs' shapes replicated the shorelines of the natural bodies of water that inspired them. So meticulous was this project that even small islands in the Marmara Sea were copied proportionally and erected inside the reservoir. Existing coves and isthmuses were copied and faithfully named within the reservoir. "Kapidag Peninsula (Kapidagi Yarimadasi)" and "Gemlik Bay (Gemlik Koyu)" can both be found within the Marmara pool. The true-to-life inner sea that sits east of Crimea was accurately reconstructed as a separately connected basin within the Black Sea reservoir, dubbed the "Azak Sea (*Azak Denizi*)."[376] These flourishes could only be accomplished at considerable expense and with a good deal of engineering because

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[374] See, *Ataturk Orman Ciftligi*, (Ankara: Ataturk Orman Ciftligi Mudurlugu, 1953).
[375] "Ciftlikte Yaz," *Ulus*, Ankara, 28 June 1938
[376] Demirtaş, "Artificial Nature," (2000).

the functional elements of each reservoir had to be concealed within the quixotic designs.

The conspicuous greening of Ankara and especially the abundance of water infrastructure – artificial lakes, streams, and fountains confront visitors at every turn – came into being via three major projects: the Gazi Test Farm, the Çubuk Dam, and the Youth Park. Each of these green spaces was designed to take advantage of the streams adjacent to the city.[377] The Çubuk Creek flows from northern Ankara. Its waters were supplemented by the redirected Hatip creek flowing from the eastern Idris Mountains to water the Youth Park. When, in 1936, the government succeeded in constructing Ankara's Çubuk Dam to water the new capital, the resulting lake was dubbed by the press the "Bosphorus of Ankara."[378] The Bosphorus of Ankara reservoir became a recreation space, complete with a restaurant-casino attesting the vivacious secularity at work in Turkey's modernist jewel of a capital.

In some cases, artificial nature transpositions eliminated contact points between people and their ecological environs. *Bag eviler* (orchard houses) were prominent features of Ankara's landscape in Ottoman times. The annual production/consumption cycle of viticulture, Ankara's only agricultural product, revolved around seasonal migrations to a *Bag evi* situated just outside the village's market district. As was typical in many Anatolian cities, Ankara's wealthier residents

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[377] See, Zeynep Kezer, "The Making of a Nationalist Capital: Socio-Spatial Practices in Early Republican Ankara," *Built environment* 22, 2 (1996): 124–137.
[378] "Ankara'nin Bogazici'si", *Ulus*, Ankara, 26 July 1937; See also, Mehmed Gökhan Polatoğlu, "Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nde su davası kapsamında kurulan ilk baraj: Çubuk Barajı," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi,* 65, (2019) 343-380.

migrated to the hills just outside the city to tend orchards and vineyards in high summer. The higher elevations where grapes were grown offered a respite from the summer heat for both wealthier landowners and laborers. *Bag eviler* served as summer homes for many residents for whom this yearly rhythm structured social and economic life. Orchard houses dotted the hillsides in Çankaya, Dikmen, Esat, Etlik, and Keçiören. "In Ankara, there was a summer home tradition," writes Vehbi Koç in *My Life Story*,

> Whether they were poor or rich, every family would move to the orchard for the summer.... Depending on their wealth, the families owned single or double horse carriages. We also had an orchard. We would move to our orchard, which was located in the area called Çoraklık, near Keçiören. Çoraklık was mostly home to Muslims such as us. Mostly Catholics and Armenians lived in the nearby Keçiören. Their orchards were very well kept, and their beautiful buildings and gardens were noticeable. Wealthy Christians would go to their summer homes in Keçiören, Etlik, and Çankaya. Only the Jews did not have an orchard tradition.[379]

The orchard houses followed recognizable patterns, usually two to three stories with rooms surrounding a central hall. Simplified comfort and decorative austerity characterized their interiors. Water was essential. Each orchard estate would maintain its own well, fountain, and basin, as well as quarters for livestock, a bar, and smaller vegetable gardens in addition to the orchard.[380] The seasonal migration dictated parts of Ankara's economy as provisions had to be prepared in fall and spring to move from urban to exurban space. As Ankara expanded from the 1930s to the

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[379] Vehbi Koç, *My Life Story: The Autobiography of a Turkish Businessman*, (Vehbi Koc Foundation, 1977)
[380] "Cultural and Natural Heritage," *VEKAM*, Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research Center, (n.d.)

1950s, the wooded hillsides were subsumed into the city's fabric. Low-density spaces like orchard houses were supplanted by multi-family units and eventually high-rise apartment complexes. Instead of this seasonal migration, small parks were placed at district borders along Çankaya's boulevards. In Jansen's design, the Çankaya–Telsizler district, which once comprised sloping orchards and gardens beyond the municipal center, would be an axis for future growth.

Under the CHP, a bold vision of Turkish national modernity would be inscribed on Anatolia in the form of an avant-garde urban capital designed, partially and paradoxically, as an act of nostalgia. As described in previous chapters of this dissertation, Ottoman elites, based in Istanbul and preoccupied with developments in the Balkans, had attempted to reshape Anatolian environments in the waning years of the Sublime Porte's authority. They used sovereign debt, steam engines, settlement programs, hydroengineering, and tax policies to work rural Anatolia into an imagined ideal of Balkan fertility. As the Sublime Porte toiled to spread Rumelia's rural-economic structures to Anatolia throughout the nineteenth century, those very structures changed drastically within Rumelia itself. Thus, CHP leaders' nostalgia was not for some bucolic imaginary of fertile pastoral landscapes but for the western leaning, urbanized environments in which the younger generation of these Balkan emigres grew up.

Thus, green space and a preponderance of water in fountains, ponds, and artificial lakes were inscribed into Ankara's steppe landscape as part of Jansen's design. Fully nine percent of Jansen's Ankara would consist of urban parks. These

parks created a facsimile of the entwined urban-rural fabric of the Balkan cities in which Ankara's new elite had grown up, while transforming inhabitants' patterns of interaction with the local ecology. In compressing the rural space that once separated villages from one another, these afforested parks were planned as boundaries between districts and neighborhoods such that passing from one city segment to the other necessitated movement through these replica "natures."

Conclusion

Creating a modern city was not equivalent to striding headlong into an opaque future. CHP functionaries knew exactly how their vision of modernity should look because many of them had experienced a version of it already. "Modern" urban environments were imagined along the lines of the rapid development of Balkan cities that Republican Turkey's elites observed in their youth. Constructing Ankara as an avant-garde capital in the heart of Anatolia was also an act of *reconstructing* the built environments of Rumelia, where Ataturk and his CHP cohort came of age.

Like the capitals of newly independent Balkan states, Ankara was conceived as an anti-Istanbul. Istanbul was antiquated and stratified. It was a palimpsest of twenty centuries of syncretic accretion. By contrast, Ankara was forward-looking, fastidiously planned, and declaratively *Turkish*. Ankara's planners designed the city in opposition to the Ottoman capital. Every architectural feature was striving away from the Sultanic past. While the new capital rejected the Ottomans' political, cultural, and built aesthetic, the landscapes and natural and organic environments of Istanbul and

Rumelia inspired many of Ankara's most prominent features. Administrators understood urban/rural or urban/natural dichotomies to be metaphors for new/old or, more pointedly, European/Turkish. The planning and construction of Ankara is a case in point. For this generation of Turkish elites, notionally, modern urban environments were not generated *ex nihlo* or snatched from the ether.

Elites of the nascent Republic of Turkey, commanded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, possessed a nearly cultish devotion to the "modern." While much attention has been paid to the conceptualization, ideation, and application of this preoccupation in literary, artistic, and political spheres, little attention has gone to the *material* instantiations of modernist ideas in early republican Turkey. For Ataturk and those around him, modernity and urbanity were linked. Indeed, the "modern" production was only thinkable within the context of avant-garde urban environments. Creating these kinds of environments was top of mind for CHP administrators. Newly fabricated, centrally planned cityscapes were the environments in which the future-leaning nationalist political project could flourish.

The capital city of Ankara was a feat of urban design that mirrored the Turkish national project of the 1920s and 1930s. It was centrally planned, self-consciously avant-garde, and concerned with incorporating the aesthetics of rural environments. At the same time, Ankara's construction was, like in the Tanzimāt and Hamidian periods before, an explicit transposition of certain Balkan environmental

forms – in this case, urban environments – onto Anatolia.[381] Kemalists spent decades loudly disavowing the Ottoman political past. However, the performative statism behind Ankara's construction is in many ways contiguous with late Ottoman governance rather than an abrogation of it.

[381] For analysis of post-Ottoman urban development in the former metropole, see: Murat Gül, *Architecture and the Turkish City: An Urban History of Istanbul Since the Ottomans*, (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017).

CONCLUSION

Legacies of Modernity: Balkan landscapes and the pursuit of productive space

Imperial projects extend beyond the great game politics or expansionist ambitions of fiscal military states. Indeed, in some circumstances, environment-making is empire-making, and vice versa. It is insufficient to interpret Ottoman reforms merely as ill-fated attempts to westernize the Empire's political institutions. Rather, this set of policies needs to be understood as comprising a peculiar but coherent and deliberate kind of environmental policy, one rooted in the territorial legacy of the Empire.

Discourses around projects of environmental reshaping stopped using the language of domination of nature. The work was not about subduing or taming the environment but "nurturing," bringing to "blossom," "building a new Eden," and bringing "her to flower like a rose." Yet these seemingly gentler conceptions of territorial manipulation produced new forms of coercion and violence, including forced settlement, workers' exposure to zoonotic disease, and the denial of actionable agency to rural producers in terms of determining the types of products that could be financially sustained.

The reshaping of Anatolia in the image of "productive" Balkan landscapes was a project of modernization carried out by Ottoman elites whose conception of "modern" space was informed by their own experiences in southeastern Europe. In places like Britain and France, the self-conscious march toward something perceived as "modernity" is inextricable from the position of those states atop bourgeoning

colonial empires. But government administrators and managers of capital firms could not really imagine a “modern” future without some existing reference point. Imagination is circumscribed by the limits of experience. From British liberals to French Saint-Simonians, contemporary discourses of "modernity" reified perceptions of differences between metropole and colony more than they offered a practicable roadmap to future utopia for the metropole itself.[382] In other words, the goal of “modernization” was necessarily an image of some “modern” space that already existed elsewhere on earth. Thus "development" from premodernity to modernity was not only temporal but also *spatial*.

The loss of the Balkans enabled and instigated many of the processes that allowed Anatolia to become the modern Turkish Republic. By recreating in Anatolia forms of agriculture that made the Balkans valuable to the state, the late Ottoman government opened Anatolia's physical environment to modifications and social arrangements that were legible and enticing to foreign investors. This process did not exist independent of external economic and colonial pressures that characterized infrastructure development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In restructuring the state’s relationship to the natural landscapes of its territory, late Ottoman and early Turkish Republican elites entwined the fiscal capacities of their state with the extractive motivations of twentieth-century multinational financial firms.

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[382] For discussion of futurity and modernity as these discourses pertain to colonial entanglement, see Manu Goswami, “Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms,” Histories of the Future, *American Historical Review Forum*, 2012; David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, (Duke University Press: Durham, NC, 2004); Jenny Anderson, “The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World,” *Histories of the Future*, American Historical Review Forum, (2012).

Nineteenth-century modernity relied on imagery of productive space: bustling electrified cities, rail networks, factory floors, managed forests, and organized farmland. Typically, for Europeans and non-Europeans alike, the "modern" future was one in which those features that distinguished European metropoles from their colonies were even more exaggerated. In colonial spaces, discourses about the "civilizing mission" of modern western European states led these governments to exact great violence and commit large shares of their national economies to render colonies "modern" – by which was meant, more like the spaces of western Europe. Bringing modernity to backward regions meant reinscribing those lands with artifices of modernity that already existed elsewhere on earth. In other words, colonial modernity was about transposing an image contemporaneous to western European space rather than aiming at a novel future.

New Geographies: Salvaging "Balkan" and "Anatolian" from the Ottoman past

"Balkan" today often codes as pejorative, suggesting inter-ethnic violence and political fracturing. These associations typically segregate the Balkans from the rest of "Europe."[383] And yet, from the late Ottoman perspective, the apt regional comparison is not "Europe" but "the rest of the Empire." By the time of the Empire's collapse most political leaders' worldviews and identities derived not from the Turkish "homeland" of Anatolia but the cross-pressured "borderlands" of southeastern

[383] Riki van Boeschoten, Hans Vermeulen, and Martin Baldwin-Edwards, *Migration in The Southern Balkans: From Ottoman Territory to Globalized Nation States* (Cham: Springer Open, 2015).

Europe. Yet this reality of the composition of late Ottoman elites partially elides how "southeastern Europe," "the Balkans," and "Anatolia" are geographic categories *created* through the selfsame process by which Turks from Rumelia came to dominate the politics of Asia-Minor. The late Empire's struggle to compensate for the loss of Balkan territories led administrators to intentionally settle Rumeli natives in Anatolia to imbue that landmass with the features of Balkan environments.[384]

As the Balkans receded, a few subregions of the intact Empire stood out as apparent loci of potential development. The plains of the Central Anatolian Plateau, the slightly more eastern Çukurova, and the Amouk Plain in Syria and Lower Mesopotamia became epicenters of these efforts. These once-peripheral regions were comparatively close to Istanbul and, since antiquity, famous for their fecund soils. In the nineteenth century, agricultural scarcity relative to, for example, the Danubian plains in the Balkans derived from low precipitation, paucity of labor, and unintegrated credit networks. Ottoman administrators and foreign investors alike zeroed in on these eastern regions as potential spaces of compensatory development.

Ottoman policymakers turned their attention to their immediate eastern periphery in Central Anatolia to compensate for lost resources and inhabitants of the Balkan vilayets. Officials from or with experience in the remaining Balkan provinces were sent to key posts in the Anatolian interior to modernize and increase production. The Porte compelled immigration to develop uncultivated land in this dry and

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[384] For background on Ottoman discourses about the Balkans, see: Nikolay Antov, *The Ottoman Wild West: The Balkan Frontier in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Pál Fodor and Pál Ács, *Identity and Culture in Ottoman Hungary*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2017).

sparsely populated region. These officials' efforts involved significant investments in infrastructure and mechanized farming techniques, which meant developing new financing systems through European capital markets. Nostalgia for the lost Edenic productivity of the Balkans found a strange balm in the ideology of modernization that swept the Empire in the nineteenth century.

Monetizing Nature: the fiscal-environmental consequences of Tanzimāt

Tanzimāt brought new perceptions of the malleability of natural and social space. Reformers opened new horizons of possibility for those Ottoman administrators willing to adapt the imperial project to the Empire's waning spatial opportunities. It was imagined that the realities of Anatolian geography could be reconciled with precisely the modernist toolkit available to western European financiers. Western European firms were happy to capitalize on Ottoman administrators' ecological nostalgia. Bankers and engineers from Britain, France, Austria, Switzerland, and Germany imagined the gears of science and financial capital working in tandem to render a "second Eden" out of the Anatolian hinterlands. The promise of modern technologies of governance and engineering was an analgesic for anxious Ottoman administrators who saw in these advances the opportunity to remake the Empire's remaining realms in the image of what was lost.

The conceit of European finance entering the twentieth century was that eliminating subjectivity in finance was possible. Financial institutions aimed to make rent-seeking a literal science, as reliant on immutable mathematics as the physical

sciences. Their estimates were not unveiling some intrinsic value but instead creating a value assessment system in the particular interests and social contexts of the managers of Deutsche Bank. Thus, the worldview through which Deutsche Bank understood the natural world's value came to be carved into Anatolia's agricultural landscape with the canals of Lake Beyşehir.

Few authors consider financialization a process with roots extended backward before electronic computing facilitated financial transactions.[385] However, the Konya Irrigation Project demonstrates that these late-capitalist features existed before the First World War. Deutsche Bank's investment in Turkey's agriculture sits in the epicenter of this early period of financialization.[386] The rising power of private financial institutions in moving capital around the globe meant that rent-seeking firms could increasingly dictate the terms by which market prices of first-order commodities were set. Under the auspices of its many Ottoman subsidiaries, Deutsche Bank was one arm of this transformation in assigning a monetary value to Ottoman nature.[387] Further, as Deutsche Bank became more entangled in the sphere

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[385] The recent literature on the atlantic slave trade is a notable exception. See, for example, Ian Baucom, *Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Peter James Hudson, *Bankers and Empire: How Wall Street Colonized the Caribbean*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

[386] Apostolos Fasianos, Diego Guevara, Christos Pierros, "Have We Been Here Before? Phases of Financialization within the 20th Century in the United States," Working Paper no. 869, *Levy Economics Institute of Bard College*, June 2016.

[387] "Nature" is here used to denote all non-human processes that enter into the system of economic production. In this formulation, agriculture as practiced in the nineteenth century, though not in itself a *natural* process, nevertheless depends on natural – that is, non-human – processes to take place. For example, animal husbandry is not a "natural" process in this formulation either, but the specific animals involved would

of agriculture, it sought to "de-nature" the act of cultivation by suffusing agriculture in Anatolia with increasingly complex mechanical implements, chemical fertilizers, and large-scale perennial irrigation.

Conclusion

Because the complex and adaptive systems of capital created in this period were not beholden to the territory of any one state or government, large firms at the forefront of these developments – firms like Deutsche Bank – had an outsized impact on the evolution of "modern" states. Business networks operating abroad achieved many of the goals of imperial governments, but often more efficiently and without the domestic political reverberations that foreign adventurism provoked. Therefore, the presence of these firms affected the very meanings of territory, space, land, resources, production, and nature in the societies in which they operated.

The forms of power that structured postcolonial economies remain vastly asymmetrical not because of the threat of state violence against the fledgling post-colonial states but because networks of businesses, banks, and bureaucracies remained as entangled in the socio-political-economic fabrics of the new states as in the old ones. The systems of financial capital that continued to dictate the horizons of

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be considered "natural." The same is true of crop types, even though in both cases the species involved are the result of many generations of human-directed selective breeding. Thus, climate, weather, landscape, and other environmental features are included as are organic processes of any living organisms or byproducts of those organisms (honey, wool, fertilizer, etc.) up until to the moment the organism or its byproduct are harvested for the purpose of economic exchange.

social and political possibilities in decolonized states were, from the late nineteenth century onwards, increasingly inured to territorial limits on their economic reach.

There are many reasons for the increasingly long reach of western firms. Steamships, railways, and telegraphs compressed the space and time of communications, allowing financial information to travel globally at an accelerated rate. Widespread adoption of formalized mathematical principles came to dictate the decision-making of both firms and states while allowing each to borrow from successful insights of the other readily. Adopting the gold standard also made specificities of finance in different territories less relevant. A banker from Britain could do business in Germany with relative satisfaction that the terms of any financial arrangements would be legible to both parties with comparatively low counterparty risk. For these reasons, the movements of capital underpinning the "new imperialism" of the early twentieth century depended less and less on the conceit of political empire or the accretion of territory under the metropole's political influence.

The capital patterns and transimperial relationships that formed in pursuit of this policy were the basis for later typologies of business practice that were not really “colonial” in orientation, but more closely resemble later practices, often popularly called “neo-colonial.” The entanglements between Ottoman policymakers and Deutsche Bank’s managers, laid the groundwork for many of the structures and semi-coercive practices that characterized post-colonial business relationships in the mid-twentieth century. In this way, the story of Deutsche Bank’s environmental engineering in late Ottoman Anatolia represents a pre-history of the post-colony.

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