Severed Connections:
Political Parties and Democratic Responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa

by

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Abstract

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This dissertation investigates how political parties can undermine the representation of citizen interests in new democracies. Conventional wisdom has emphasized the centrality of parties in mediating the relationship between voters and politicians, and has often attributed the representational deficit observed across the developing world to the lack of stable partisan attachments or the ephemeral nature of political parties. I show that this may not be the case. To the contrary, under a political geography that enables political parties to repeatedly monopolize electoral support from voters in subnational elections, parties and the internal processes that govern their selection of candidates can function sever, rather than strengthen, the connection between voters and their representatives.

My theory focuses on how conditions typical of many new democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa—local one party dominance and centralized control over candidate selection—shape the incentives of politicians to serve the interests of their constituents. Despite the institutionalization of competitive multiparty elections at the national level in new democracies, political parties are often able to consistently dominate their competitors in subnational elections. Under conditions of local one party dominance, politicians who contest local office become beholden to the selectorate which decides who the party's nominee will be, without much regard to the electorate. Yet for the party leader, who controls the selection of candidates within their parties, local politicians who amass an independent support base by serving the interests of their constituents pose a significant threat towards maintaining her position in the party hierarchy. I argue that the party leader selects candidates in a way that minimizes the risk of politicians building such an independent support base, encouraging responsiveness to constituents only in select locales where they are electorally vulnerable. As a result, politicians are incentivized to divert their effort and resources away from serving their constituents towards other activities that benefit the party leader.

I support these claims using a multi-method research strategy that pieces together qualitative, quantitative, and experimental evidence based on 18 months of fieldwork in Kenya. I first combine insights from more than 70 politician interviews and analyses of nationally representative surveys and constituency-level electoral returns across six African democra-

cies to establish that African parties often hold a monopoly on local power. Moreover, using detailed inquiry into the organization of political parties in Kenya and a series of experiments conducted among Kenyan primary voters, I also show that party leaders possess both the institutional tools and the persuasive influence over partisans that enable them to command control over the candidate selection process. Finally, I use supervised machine-learning methods on a large data set collected through web-crawling to document the existence of a *nomination tournament*, in which party leaders select candidates that invest significantly in "party-oriented" rather than "constituency-oriented" behavior over their terms in office.

Substantively, the findings contribute to the emerging consensus that democratic elections are necessary but insufficient to foster better representation and responsiveness for the people. However, while the dominant narrative in the comparative politics has focused on structural-institutional factors such as ethnicity, clientelism, or electoral systems to understand this deficit, I shift the attention rightfully back to political parties. In fact, the conclusions of the dissertation suggest that ideal of "representative democracy" is likely to remain elusive unless democracy *within* political parties is realized. When power and authority over party institutions and decision-making processes accumulate to a single individual or a small group of elites, and without systematic checks to constrain their power, party leaders have the potential to effectively become autocrats within their domain; manipulating elected representatives who should primarily be interested in tending to their constituents to serve their political ambitions, thereby derailing democratic process that they should protect.

To my parents, Charan Min and Yangsik Choi

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Chapter 1

Introduction

"A key characteristic of democracy is the continued responsiveness
of the government to the preferences of the people."

– Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, 1971.

To the disappointment of many, democracy so far seems to have fallen short on its promise to deliver representation for its citizens. Stories of wayward politicians who do little to serve the interests of their constituents have become commonplace in day-to-day discourse in democracies, both old and new. While the *deficit* is frequently observed in well-established democracies, it is a particularly salient source of public discontent in young democracies of the developing world; after languishing under the rule of unelected and unaccountable leaders, citizens in new democracies were especially hopeful that the competitive pressures created by democratic elections would force politicians to finally carry out their mandate to serve their interests. Yet even with direct "electoral connection" forged between voters and politicians, the ideal of democratic responsiveness continues to be ever elusive.

The unfulfilled promise of representation is perhaps most apparent in the new democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Local media sources are replete with damning accounts of elected officials across the continent shirking their duties and abusing their powers whilst in office. In 2015 and 2016, the Auditor General's inquiries into the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Kenya—a monetary endowment reserved from the national budget for members of parliament (MPs) to take care of the local development needs of the constituency—revealed multimillion dollars worth of unsupported expenditures and irregular payments and procurement.[1] The offenses MPs were accused of ranged from laying idle projects that were in the process of construction, to siphoning off cash dedicated to the purpose of scholarships for in-need children in their constituency, to using these public funds to pay for dowries and funerals. Most recently in Ghana, multiple MPs in the opposition were accused of taking bribes

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[1]"MPs abusing CDF, says auditor general" Reported in *The Star*, retrieved from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/10/12/mps-abusing-cdf-says-auditor-general-c1221686, August 1, 2017.

in exchange for guaranteeing swift confirmation of an individual nominated to become a cabinet secretary.[2] In a similar scenario to Kenya, 20 Malawian MPs face the possibility of prosecution for the gross abuse of their local CDF funds.[3]

Figure 1.1: Perceptions of Representative Responsiveness, Afrobarometer Rounds 2–6

Note: Data is drawn from the Afrobarometer Survey, rounds 2 (2002/03) – 6 (2013/14). The Afrobarometer survey draws a nationally representative sample of voters from the country in each round. Countries included to generate this plot are Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia. The variable "MP Do Not Listen to What They Have to Say" was coded as 1 only when respondents responded "Only Sometimes" or "Never" to the question "How much of the time do you think MPs try their best to listen to what people like you have to say (Q59A)." Gray points indicate the country-survey round mean for the response. Red points indicate the overall survey round mean, with the red line representing the trend of survey round means over time.

Nor do MPs seem to be diligently tending to their representative functions in parliament; attendance at parliamentary sessions and committee hearings are notoriously poor, the number of bills initiated by parliamentarians low, and oversight of the executive branch mere nominal.[4] A study conducted by a transparency organization in Ghana revealed that 20 out of the 275 MPs in Ghana's 6th parliament did not speak once on the floor during the four year legislative term. 73 of them (26%) recorded absences without permission in clear violation

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[2] "Bribery Scandal hits Parliament; Ayariga fingers Agyarko." Reported in *Joy Online*, retrieved from http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2017/january-27th/bribery-scandal-hits-parliament-ayariga-fingers-agyarko.php, August 1, 2017.

[3] "ACB probes MPs over Constituency Development Fund abuse: 20 risk arrest", Reported in *The Nyasa Times*, retrieved from https://www.nyasatimes.com/acb-probes-mps-constituency-development-fund-abuse-20-risk-arrest/ on August 1, 2017.

[4] For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative activities of MPs across African legislatures, see Barkan (2009*b*) and chapters included therein.

of the constitution, and less than 20% of them contributed amendments to bills introduced during their entire four year term in office.[5] A similar audit of parliamentary activity conducted by a civil society organization in Kenya tells the story; around 10% of sitting members of the National Assembly in Kenya's 11th parliament (2013–2017) failed to speak even once in parliament during 2015.[6]

These accounts, albeit illustrative, conform to a broader pattern of unresponsiveness observed consistently across Africa. While directly comparable evidence on the extent of politician responsiveness across countries is hard to come by, public opinion surveys conducted by Afrobarometer, a regional survey implemented among tens of thousands of respondents across more than 30 African countries, provide valuable insights on how responsive citizens *perceive* their elected representatives to be. Since 2002, Afrobarometer respondents were consistently asked to rate how often they thought their MPs try to listen to what their constituents have to say, ranging from "always" to "never." Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of survey respondents who answered either "only sometimes" or "never" to this question. Across the eight electoral democracies included in the sample, more than 80% of all respondents said that their MPs "only sometimes" or "never" listen to what they have to say. There are also no clear patterns indicating an upward trajectory; in a majority of the countries, the mean rate hovers between 70–95% across each round of the survey period.

What accounts for the deficit of democratic responsiveness in new democracies? What are the factors that undermine the electoral connection between voters and politicians that should incentivize politicians to be responsive to the needs and interests of their constituents? By now, the optimistic and somewhat naïve vision of what democratic competition can accomplish in terms of representation—despite its rich intellectual tradition dating back to James Madison and *The Federalist Papers* and embodied in the opening quote of the chapter—has been increasingly challenged and fallen out of favor among scholars of representation. The recent but path-breaking work by Achen and Bartels (2016), has shown the ideals of responsive government can prove to be elusive even in contexts such as the United States where democracy and elections have been institutionalized as an integral part of the political system for the better part of a century. Indeed, many new democracies plagued by the deficit of democratic responsiveness meet the minimalist standard of polyarchy necessary for the logic of election-driven responsiveness to function (Dahl, 1973). While even the most cynical analysts would rarely disagree that democracy is a precondition, it is clear that it is *insufficient* to harness the representation of citizen interests.

In engaging the question of why responsiveness is yet to take root in new democracies, I take this revisionist critique to heart and join a group of scholars whose work eschewed the polyarchical conception of democracy for a more nuanced and expanded understanding: that democracies vary significantly in the extent to which they fulfill their diverse goals, including their representative ideals (O'Donnell, 1994; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; O'Donnell, 1998). My approach builds on this tradition that elections are often a necessary but not a sufficient condition for *representative democracy*, wherein politicians are first and foremost interested

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[5]"Report on the Sixth Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana", Odekro, December 1, 2016.

[6]"Beyond Talk: How Did the 11th Parliament Perform in 2015?", Mzalendo Trust, December 2016

in meeting the demands of citizens. I then proceed to identify the key factors that hinder the progress of nascent democracies from transitioning to a representative democracy, for which existing literature fails to provide a convincing explanation.

This dissertation engages such questions in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of Africa's third wave democracies have now held competitive multiparty elections for almost three decades, but the ideals of better representation are yet to be realized.[7] The account developed in this dissertation brings to the fore the role that political parties play in severing the connection between voters and politicians. I show that in Africa's new democracies, where parties often hold a monopoly on *local* electoral support, politicians contesting subnational office are beholden to serve the interests of the party leader who controls party nominations. The party leader's interests, however, do not necessarily align with those of voters, as she must *also* seek to use nominations as a means to eliminate potential rivals who could challenge her position within the party. It is the confluence of these two dynamics—politician incentives to serve the interests of the party leader who controls nominations, and the party leader's incentives to suppress the emergence of intraparty challengers—that results in the lack of responsiveness observed across African democracies.

The argument of the dissertation has important implications for how we understand the emergence of democratic representation in the developing world more broadly. In these countries, the weakness of political parties and the lack of stable partisan predispositions have been identified as underlying causes of chronic representation of citizen interests (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003; Mainwaring, 2006; Novaes, 2017). The implication is that as political parties are institutionalized and partisan identities are solidified, many argue that proper representation would emerge as a natural consequence. My argument, however, suggests that this may not be the case. Without concomitant changes in the way power and authority is configured within political parties, political parties have the potential to corrode the representational link between politicians and their constituents.

In the following pages, I review the some of the existing accounts that address the pattern of representative unresponsiveness, and point out where they fall short. I then summarize my theoretical argument in brief and discuss its implications for the study of representation in new democracies in Africa and beyond. I conclude by discussing the research design and structure of the dissertation.

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[7]This is despite the fact that increased democratic competition in much of Sub-Saharan Africa should create conditions conducive for democratic responsiveness to emerge. According to the Polity IV democracy index, not a single country in Sub-Saharan Africa met the criteria required to be classified as a full democracy in 1985. As of 2015, 10 countries—Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zambia—have joined the list of full democracies, with a significant number of countries just missing the mark to qualify as a democracy. Although not without problems, countries such as Benin, Ghana, and Zambia have successfully held more than six rounds of free and fair multiparty elections with significant turnover both in the presidency and the legislature. Kenya and Malawi have have completed their fifth, and many more have conducted multiple rounds of competitive elections.

1.1 Existing Explanations for Unresponsiveness

Before presenting my argument, I review in this section the most plausible explanations based on existing scholarship that may account for the deficit in democratic responsiveness. These hypotheses focus on the salience of ethnic voting, the role of clientelism and vote-buying, and the influence of electoral systems. I show that while these hypotheses certainly touch on important structural factors that have the possibility of affecting the representative behavior of politicians, I discuss how they fall short in important ways. The shortcomings highlight the need for a new theoretical approach to understanding politician unresponsiveness in new democracies.

Ethnic Voting?

Scholars might focus instead on ethnic or identity-based voting prevalent in new democracies to explain why politicians are unresponsive to voters. An extensive literature has demonstrated the centrality of ethnic cleavages in driving the preferences and behavior of voters in multi-ethnic democracies (Horowitz, 1985; Wantchekon, 2003; Madrid, 2012; Chandra, 2007). Two perspective highlight through logic through which voters become strongly inclined to vote for their coethnic. One approach argues that ethnic voting is related to the psycho-social benefits of that voters derive from voting for their coethnics (Tajfel, 2010; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Because an individual's perception of their own well-being and esteem is psychologically linked to their ethnic group in these societies, voters suffer a loss of utility when their group's representatives lose in elections and a gain in utility when their representatives do well. The second approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the material incentives of voters to rally behind coethnic politicians (Bates, 1974; Ekeh, 1975; Habyarimana et al., 2009; Arriola, Choi and Gichohi, N.d.). Viewing political competition in multiethnic societies as a zero sum contest to gain control of the state, analysts in this tradition have argued that voters consider the commitment to provide resources to be credible when it is issued by a coethnic. A non-coethnic politician's pledge to distribute resources to his non-coetnics, on the other hand, is considered cheap talk, because norms of reciprocity that induces compliance only exist within ethnic groups. When ethnic cleavages have been politicized, both theories predict that voters will almost invariably vote for coethnic politicians. And such patterns have been documented to exist widely across the developing world, including much of Africa (Wantchekon, 2003; Ferree, 2006; Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon, 2016), Latin America (Madrid, 2012), and South Asia (Chandra, 2007).

The prevalence of ethnic voting has the potential to weaken politician incentives to be responsive. The logic of ethnic voting suggests that politicians are aware that the threat of a coethnic voter to defect and support a non-coethnic candidate is not credible. If politicians believe that they can always count on the vote of their coethnics, incentives for politicians to invest effort to carry out their duties to provide local public goods, offer constituency service, and represent their interests in the legislature will be limited. Yet there are reasons to believe that the seemingly simplistic logic of ethnic voting is insufficient to account for the lack of responsiveness. First, this frame often supposes political competition between two or more

candidates *each representing a different ethnic group*. And this is a reasonable assumption for contests over executive office; in settings where a single ethnic group seldom constitutes a majority large enough to win when their votes are divided, politicians have a strong incentive to consolidate the vote of their ethnic group towards a single candidate (Arriola, 2012). However, these assumptions are rarely met in lower tier elections that are often much more ethnically homogeneous. Indeed, scholars have pointed out that voters are highly unlikely to face a non-coethnic candidate in local elections such as parliamentary elections because these smaller political units are often dominated by a single ethnic group (Carlson, 2015, 1). When voters have multiple coethnic candidates to choose from, politicians cannot differentiate themselves from other coethnic candidates by playing the ethnic card. In these contexts, politicians will have no option but to rely on other forms of mobilization, including carrying through their pledges to provide local public goods and being responsive to local demands for constituency service. For lower tier elections at least, the logic of ethnic voting does not hold, and cannot be tied to lessened incentives for responsiveness.

Furthermore, even if we take the logic of theories of ethnic voting on its face, they still tend to overpredict responsiveness in societies where ethnicity is not a salient political cleavage. Without ethnicity acting as a "straitjacket" that constrains voters from holding elected officials accountable, politicians face significant risk of being punished by their coethnics for their poor performance while in office. And while many countries in the developing world are multiethnic and have politicized ethnic cleavages, politics of many others are not organized around ethnic or racial identities (Miguel, 2004, 327). Yet the problem of underrepresentation and lack of responsiveness is a condition that afflicts societies regardless of whether ethnicity is politicized (Wimmer, 2016). Scholars have documented the challenges to representation in places such as Brazil where "accounts of racial democracy celebrate ethnic harmony, integration, and miscegenation (Bueno and Dunning, 2017, 327)." As Figure 1.1 highlighted, public perceptions of responsiveness are consistently low across many African countries, with respondents countries such as Tanzania where ethnicity is not a salient feature of politics unlikely to have a more favorable evaluation of politician responsiveness.

Collectively, these substantial objections cast doubt on whether the logic of ethnic voting, in its unnuanced form, is a sufficient explanation for the unresponsive nature of politicians. I therefore turn to another prominent explanation that focuses on the role of clientelism as a potential alternative.

Clientelism and Vote-buying?

Politician unresponsiveness could be attributed to the pervasive nature of clientelism and vote-buying in these political systems. Scholars have long identified the contingent exchange relations between political patrons and clients as a defining characteristic of politics in the developing world (Scott, 1972; Ekeh, 1975; Van de Walle, 2007). In these clientelistic systems, politicians determine who will be provided with benefits based on whether an indi-

vidual voted for the candidate or party.[8] Often rooted in historical antecedents in which the role of political leadership was considered to be to ensure the material and physical security of their followers, existing research has found that multiparty electoral competition has served to intensify the importance of these linkages of reciprocal exchange (Thachil, 2014; Harding, 2015). These linkages are especially pronounced African democracies, where more than 70% of nationally-representative survey respondents across 10 countries have reported that politicians frequently offer gifts during election campaigns.[9] Since politicians realize that voter expect of such "largesse" from their political leaders, they often have to respond to these expectations by handing out cash and other material goods (Ferree and Long, 2016; Kramon, 2016). It is only by acknowledging their obligations to engage in the distribution of material benefits that they are deemed politicians worthy of political support during the elections. Indeed, Arriola (2012, 13) argues that while "...these campaign handouts maybe trivial in value, but they have become part of a routinized practice that symbolizes the implicit contract between politician and voter."

Analysts have long recognized the pernicious consequences of clientelism on democratic accountability and responsiveness (Stokes, 2005, 316; Kochin and Kochin, 1998; Schaffer, 2007). The notion of democratic accountability entails voters having the wherewithal to evaluate how politicians have performed in office, and rewarding or punishing them at the ballot box based on these assessments. And this is the pressure that keeps politicians from misbehaving and provides the incentive to act in the best interests of citizens. Yet when politicians know that they can exploit the financial precarity of voters to "purchase" rather than "court" electoral support, their incentives to serve their constituents through constituency service, provision of public goods and services, and performing their duties in the legislature is attenuated. Indeed, it is this concern that prompted Stokes (2005, 316) to argue that clientelism "makes a mockery of democratic accountability." However, while it is difficult to rule out the role that clientelism plays all together, there are a number of reasons why it may not provide an comprehensive account of why politicians in Africa are unresponsive.

First, there is reason to believe that parties and politicians in Africa are often ill-equipped to achieve one of the core tenets for clientelism: the enforcement of clientelistic bargains by monitoring the vote (Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013). The logistical challenges of continuously collecting information and monitoring an individual's preferences, behavior, and vote intentions are so immense that scholars have often assumed that clientelism is an option only for only dominant parties or strong political machines that have organizational structures that reach down to the grassroots (Stokes et al., 2013).[10] Yet many political parties in the developing world (both ruling and opposition parties), including those found in Africa, have been documented to lack the organizational infrastructure to engage in such an information-gathering exercise (Ferree, 2010, 12; Novaes, 2017; Bratton, 2008; Kramon, 2016; Vicente

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[8]This contrasts with programmatic provision, where provision of benefits are not contingent on electoral support.

[9]Afrobarometer survey round 3, conducted between 2004 and 2005. The countries included in the sample are Botswana (52%), Ghana (68%), Kenya (94%), Malawi (69%), Nigeria (84%), Senegal (85%), South Arica (54%), Tanzania (48%), Uganda (84%), Zambia (94%).

[10]For a very recent rejoinder to this perspective, see Novaes (2017)

and Wantchekon, 2009). And when politicians are unable to monitor the vote (and are no longer able to make the provision of resources contingent on electoral support), clientelism quickly becomes an inefficient electoral strategy because *unconditionally* purchasing the loyalty of a plurality of voters is prohibitively costly to sustain.

Second, under new models of clientelism developed based on the African context which shows that it can operate without the need for monitoring and enforcement, clientelism no longer functions to undermine responsiveness and representation (Kramon, 2016). In these new accounts, vote-buying is an effective electoral strategy because it signals candidate credibility; offering upfront payments to voters demonstrates to voters that the candidate is willing and able to to deliver local development projects and help constituents with the personal problems once he or she is elected to office (Kramon, 2016, 465). Under this framework, voters take the electoral handout and vote for the candidate that has offered this payment exactly *because* they believe the candidate will be responsive to their needs. It also does not rid voters of the ability to credibly withdraw their support in the future based on the *observed* behavior of politicians; if politicians do not follow up on their commitment to be responsive while in office, voters can replace them with the many other politicians that credibly pledge responsiveness in office through handouts. In certain regards, clientelism strengthens incentives for politician responsiveness in low information environments.

Finally, theories of clientelism fail to adequately account for stylized electoral patterns observed across many parts of Africa as well as the developing world. Since clientelistic strategies are resource intensive, theories predict that incumbent parties or politicians are at an inherent advantage over their opponents. Especially in many countries where the public sector is the only real domain in which resources required to compete for office can be generated, incumbents who have at their disposal these resources can "outspend" their opponents.[11] This should result in a pattern of incumbent resilience, regardless of the level or tier of elected office. These predictions, however, find no support in the data, as incumbent politicians in Africa lose very often: reelection rates typically fall short of 40% in any given electoral cycle, which is much higher than their counterparts in consolidated democracies (Matland and Studlar, 2004; Öhman, 2004).

The above discussions leads us to raise the fundamental question of whether clientelism as described by the existing literature, is especially pervasive in Africa and beyond; core as-

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[11]Incumbents in Africa directly control substantial amounts of financial resources that they can disburse with limited oversight or accountability. For example, parliamentarians in many countries directly control and oversee the use of Local Development Funds such as the CDF, which are frequently appropriated to meet their political objectives (Arriola et al., N.d.; Harris and Posner, N.d.). Furthermore, these elected positions often are accompanied by lucrative salaries and benefits that are seldom observed even in the highest paying private sector positions in these countries (Barkan, 2009*b*). For example, MPs in Kenya earned yearly salaries in excess of USD 160,000 in addition to other allowances that combine to equal or even surpass their salaries. This was roughly around 90 times larger than the GDP per capita of Kenya (2013). The lucrative nature of compensation schemes for elected officials are frequently observed across Africa: MPs in Nigeria and South Africa earn yearly salaries of USD 189,600 and 194,900 respectively. Even in the relatively lower end of the spectrum, Ugandan and Tanzanian MPs earn around USD 104,000 and 87,000 yearly. This is not to mention the informal and often illicit opportunities that elected politicians have to extract rents that they can later on use to defray the costs of these distributive burdens.

sumptions remain satisfied, theoretical predictions unmet in the empirical data, and revisions to the theories no longer have clearly negative implications for representation.

Electoral Systems?

An extensive literature has focused on the impact that electoral systems have on shaping representation and political competition in democratic systems (Mayhew, 1974; Powell, 2004; King, 1990; Ames, 1995; Golden, 2003; Bawn and Thies, 2003; Crisp et al., 2004). This literature, by considering the electoral incentives created under each institutional setup (often majoritarian versus proportional representation), renders clear expectations about how political actors such as politicians and political parties will behave (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Norris, 2004). This includes predictions on how politicians will behave with respect to their constituents. In its crudest form, scholars have argued that under majoritarian systems where voters typically cast a vote for a candidate, politicians are considered to have a significant incentive to cultivate a personal vote that is independent of the party (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987). Politicians do so by performing "casework" or delivering local public goods and services based on the demands of the home constituency or district (Norris, 2004). At the other end of the extreme is a proportional representation (PR) system with closed party list ballots. Because voters cast a ballot for the whole party list and not any particular candidate on the list, politicians have very little electoral motivation to cultivate a personal vote by offering constituency service. Instead, they are more likely to engage in activities that strengthen the party's reputation and brand or sell the programmatic commitments of the party to voters.[12,13]

While the simple distinction between majoritarian versus PR electoral rules seems sufficient to generate divergent predictions, research has shown how other features of the electoral system may condition the relationship between voters and politicians. One such factor, for example, is district magnitude, or the number of candidates to be elected in an electoral unit (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 8; Pilet, Freire and Costa, 2012). Scholars have shown that a larger number of representatives elected in a district can dampen politician incentives to prioritize serving their constituents (Heitshusen, Young and Wood, 2005; Kerevel, 2015; Richardson Jr, Russell and Cooper, 2004). Even if politicians were to engage in activities that would bring resources and services to their home constituencies, claiming credit for them is more difficult when there are multiple elected officials (often) from the same party who can equally

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[12]To be precise, these predictions are generated based on the interaction of the electoral system and the nature of the ballot (or ballot structure) (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Norris, 2004; Pilet, Freire and Costa, 2012). However, electoral systems and the type of ballot empirically occur more frequently with each other; candidate-based ballots often go hand-in-hand with electoral systems with a majoritarian system, whereas party-lists are more closely associated with PR systems. However, as Norris (2004) points out, party list ballots are possible for majoritarian systems.

[13]In between these two extremes are open party list multi-member districts in which voters do vote for a party but can make explicit their preference over candidates and their position on the ballot. In comparison to closed list rules, politicians do have stronger incentive to engage in the same sort of constituency service to popularize themselves among the electorate, since voter preferences determine their position on the ballot, and ultimately whether they will be elected.

lay claim to these accomplishments. Given the difficulty of generating a personal vote that is independent of the party, politicians will be inclined to support and preserve their party's program and their collective reputation. On the other hand, in settings where a smaller number of representatives are elected in a district (at the extreme end, single member districts with only one representative), politicians can be assured that any constituency service they carry out is more likely to be attributed to them. And when constituency service likely to be rewarded by voters at their home constituencies, politicians are inclined to invest effort into these vote-seeking activities over others.[14]

Although the preceding discussion has shown that electoral rules are likely to have a profound influence on structuring the behavioral incentives of politicians, an explanation solely based on this perspective cannot account for the overall pattern of politician unresponsiveness in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to a wide variety of electoral systems ranging from majoritarian to PR, single member to multi member districts, and party or candidate-based ballots. And despite the varying predictions made by the existing literature across different configurations of electoral systems, the problem of unresponsiveness is a problem that afflicts many of these countries. Whereas the lack of politician responsiveness is expected in countries such as Benin—a closed party-list multi-member district proportional representation which undermines incentives to be responsive—it is also a pervasive problem in countries such as Kenya or Zambia, which have primarily adopted a first-past-the-post single member district system that scholars argue generate strong incentives to be responsive to their home constituencies. In this regard, theories of electoral systems seem to be overstating the expected variation in the level of responsiveness.

1.2 Argument of the Dissertation

This dissertation presents a party-based account of democratic responsiveness in African democracies. I argue that politicians are unresponsive to their constituents because parties and their leaders ultimately control the fate of politicians. Politicians who must rely on the candidacy of the locally-dominant political party to win in the general election are strongly inclined to serve the interests of party leaders, who control party nominations. Yet the party leaders' need to forestall the emergence of rivals *within* the party make them willing to forego the electoral advantage of nominating politicians who are responsive to their constituents. It is the combination of politician incentives to serve party leaders, and party leader interests to mitigate the possibility of within-party challengers that functions to sever the link between voters and their politicians.

Elected politicians in Africa, much like their counterparts in any democratic system, face the problem of the double mandate. On the one hand, they must represent the interests of the

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[14]It is worth noting that electoral systems empirically manifest as a specific configuration of majoritarian or proportional representation rules (or even a mixture of these two), combined with various levels of district magnitude, and ballot structure. While the preceding discussions have highlighted how *each* of these components affect politician responsiveness to constituents, it is necessary to consider the combined and interactive effects of these features to understand the overall effect of the specific configurations of electoral systems.

electorate who elected them to office, but on the other, are beholden to the selectorate of their political parties, as they must often rely on the party's nomination to contest in elections. Yet one important feature of the political geography of African democracies disproportionately amplifies the importance of the selectorate vis-à-vis the electorate: single party dominance in local elections. Despite high levels of interparty electoral competition for *national* office such as the presidency, political parties in Africa continue to monopolize electoral support in subnational elections. Since selection as the dominant party candidate all but *guarantees* reelection, politicians are incentivized to privilege the interests of the selectorate over that of their constituents. In many African political parties, the decision over who will receive the party nomination is ultimately made by the party leader: the single individual who sits at the apex of the party organization, and is commonly the party's presidential candidate in the presidential elections. It is therefore the interests of the party leader which will determine the behavior of the politicians that seek to contest elections under the party banner.

The party leader is motivated by two main objectives: first, to build external mass support for both the party as she seeks to contest high office (such as the presidency), and second, to maintain her position atop the party hierarchy. The party leader will use politicians within the party in pursuit of these two goals. For the purposes of generating mass support, the party leader can encourage politicians to be more responsive towards serving the needs of their constituents (or pursue a constituency-oriented strategy). By doing so, politicians will cultivate a virtuous image and brand for themselves, which is likely to have positive spillovers for party support. However, such constituency-oriented politicians can pose a problem for the party leader, as they can cultivate a strong *independent* electoral base (or a personal vote) which they can leverage to challenge the party leader from within the party's ranks.

Faced with this trade-off, I argue that the party leader will use their control over party nominations to pursue a two-pronged strategy. In a number of small competitive localities in which the party faces stiff competition from a different party, the party leader will select politicians who engage in constituency-oriented activities for the nomination, as the electoral benefits accrued as a result will be critical in the party's electoral success. However, in strongholds where the party faces limited competition from across the aisle—where the advantages of constituency-oriented politicians are likely to have little bearing on the party's electoral performance—the party leader will choose politicians who divert their effort away from constituency-oriented strategies towards "party-oriented strategies," a class of activities that contribute to party-building but does not generate a personal vote for themselves. The end result of this dynamic is the prevalence of unresponsive politicians driven by a large majority of localities where parties are dominant, with limited responsiveness emerging in localities where there is meaningful inter-party competition.

I develop this causal sequence in three parts. First, I show that strong partisan attachments underpin the local dominance of political parties in Africa, and explain how such dominance endows political parties with the ability to act as "gatekeepers" to politician survival. Second, I show how party leaders use their institutional authority over party organs and decision-making processes as well as their persuasive influence over the partisan mass selectorate to control the candidate selection process within their parties. Third, I establish how party leaders use their control over candidate selection to induce politicians to eschew constituency

service for activities that serve the interests of the leader. The succession of these causal sequences, I argue, culminates in a perverse equilibrium in which politicians in democratic Africa remain unresponsive to their constituents.

1.3 Implications of the Argument

Until recently, the topic of democratic responsiveness has evaded the attention of scholars interested in the study of democratic consolidation and representation in new democracies. While a wealth of theoretical and empirical literature on consolidated democracies exists on the conditions under which politicians are more or less inclined to serve their constituents (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984, 1987; King, 1991; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Griffin, 2006), our understanding of responsiveness in new democracies is mostly confined to whether occupants of executive office respond more to the demands of certain subgroups of voters or constituents who share their partisanship, race, or ethnicity (Miguel and Zaidi, 2003; Burgess et al., 2015; Kramon and Posner, 2016). Moreover, most of these studies fail to problematize and adopt as a subject of scrutiny the overall patterns of unresponsiveness that seems so pervasive in these countries.[15]

Studying the deficit of political responsiveness is ultimately about understanding the barriers that prevent democracy from fulfilling what is one of its most important *raisons d'être*. As the opening quote of this chapter highlighted, responsiveness to the will of the people is centrally featured in any discussion on the quality of democracy (Dahl, 1973, 1989; Powell, 2004). And to the extent that the persistence of unresponsiveness can undermine popular satisfaction and approval of democratic institutions and governance, research that traces its causes proffers important insights regarding the process of democratic consolidation in countries where the future of democracy remains in flux.

The dissertation suggests that the origins of politician unresponsiveness does not rest in any of the factors that are typically believed to have far-reaching consequences for politics in new democracies—ethnicity, clientelism, and electoral systems—but rather in political parties. The notion that political parties play a critical role in mediating the relationship between voters and their representatives is intuitive and certainly not novel. However, the existing literature on responsiveness has curiously tended to characterize the link between voter and representative as direct, and consequently underemphasized or largely neglected the analysis of how parties feature in this relationship (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 145-146). While the narrative presented here focuses on electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, it suggests that any study of responsiveness and representation in new democracies is likely to be incomplete without a close examination of parties and the extent to which they exercise influence over their elites.

Yet the logic by which I argue political parties mediate the link between voters and politicians runs counter to what conventional wisdom would expect; political parties have traditionally occupied a special position in theories of democratic politics and representation, to

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[15]For some rare exceptions, see Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999); Mainwaring (2006).

the extent that Schattschneider (1942, 36) famously stated that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties." Their role in aggregating and ensuring that popular interests are reflected in government has led to the expectation that strong parties are essential for the process of representation (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Katz, 1980). And in line with such expectations, most recent scholarship from new democracies have pointed out how weak parties, whose vulnerability stems from factors such as their inability to sustain a consistent brand or image for the party (Lupu, 2016), the lack of a stable organizational structure (Novaes, 2017), and failure to sufficiently finance their election campaigns (Arriola, 2012), are inadequate vehicles for representation. In stark contrast, this dissertation demonstrates that it is not because parties are not weak, but in a way, too strong, that politicians become unresponsive to constituent interests. Political parties in new democracies often command a highly loyal following from their supporters. Partisan attachments are strong and unwavering such that political parties are able to generate enclaves of electoral dominance in lower-tier local elections. And their dominance is what allows them to exercise a disproportionately large influence on the electoral success of party-affiliated politicians; I argue that when political parties are able to play such a gatekeeping role on their politicians, the first seed that give rise to other interests over those of their constituents are sown.

In the process of developing my argument, I also exposit how the inner-workings of a key process within political parties—candidate selection, which has seldom been the interest of scholars studying the developing world—critically shape the behavioral incentives of politicians.[16] Given that a substantial literature based on Western democracies and the United States has shown how characteristics of the candidate selection process affect the behavior of elected legislators both in terms of how they engage in representation both inside and outside the legislature, this lacuna is especially surprising (Bochel and Denver, 1983; Katz, 2001; Gerber and Morton, 1998; Wright and Schaffner, 2002; Bullock and Clinton, 2011).

Insights from the dissertation underscore that representation and responsiveness in new democracies is likely to remain elusive until democracy *within* parties is realized. In the spirit of Michels (1915)'s "Iron Law of Oligarchy," which highlighted the manifestation of anti-democratic tendencies in European socialist parties, I point out that when power and authority over party institutions and decision-making processes accumulate to a single individual or a select group of elites, politicians become vulnerable to capture and may be compelled to privilege their interests. Without systematic checks to constrain their power, party leaders effectively become autocrats within their domain; self-interested party leaders, who are subject to the same loyalty-competence trade-offs that many dictators face (Egorov and Sonin, 2011; Zakharov, 2016), can use their influence over the party, its organization, and elites in pursuit of their own political goals. In a way, my findings echo some of the skepticism already raised by scholars who have argued that political parties might be the problem rather than the solution to democratic delegation (Ostrogorsky, 1902; Stokes, 2005; Müller and Narud, 2013).

Yet this seemingly depressing perspective on the status of responsiveness in new democ-

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[16]See Ichino and Nathan (2012), Ichino and Nathan (2013*b*), Siavelis and Morgenstern (2012), and Izama and Raffler (N.d.) for some notable exceptions.

racies today need not lead to pessimism regarding the prospects for democratic consolidation. In fact, the implications of my argument are clear: in order for democracy to fulfill its most important goal of democratic representation, due attention must be directed towards political parties. Whereas the international community has primarily focused on harnessing procedural justice (such as free and fair elections, guarantee of civil and political liberties) as a means to obtain the normatively desirable qualities of democracy in the developing world (Kelley, 2012; Bermeo, 2016), I suggest that such efforts are unlikely to bear fruit without concomitant changes to the way power is structured within political parties. Only when political parties can internalize the values promoted by democracy themselves can they function as vehicles of democratic representation.

1.4 Empirical Strategy and Organization

This dissertation adopts a multi-method research strategy to study the factors underpinning the unresponsiveness of politicians in Africa: it combines an analysis of multi-country survey data and electoral returns, qualitative insights from hundreds of politician and voter interviews, in-depth case studies of major political parties in Kenya using qualitative and quantitative data, and results from a series of experiments conducted among partisan supporters across Kenya.

Although I conducted most of my 18 months of fieldwork in Kenya, my objective was to build on my focused understanding of Kenya to construct a narrative that would be applicable more broadly to many countries across Africa. The advantages of building outward from the Kenyan case are apparent. First, the sociopolitical characteristics of Kenya are considered fairly representative of non-Francophone Africa: high levels of ethnic diversity, medium-to-low levels of party system institutionalization, and competitive (albeit flawed) elections for both the executive and lower level offices. Furthermore, it presents a hard case for my argument in that the electoral system (predominantly majoritarian first-past-the-post system) for lower tier elections creates inherent pressures for politicians to pursue a strategy of constituency service. Second, one of the central challenges to studying the inner-workings of political parties is the difficulty in acquiring data. Focusing on Kenya allowed me to access rarely-available internal party documents, take part in important internal party meetings in which the rules of candidate selection were determined, and conduct a large number of interviews with national party leaders, high ranking party officials, and current and former elected representatives. Furthermore, I was able to draw on the meticulous coverage of party affairs in local newspapers that is seldom seen in other countries using novel data collection methods. The resulting data set offers a rare opportunity for scholars to examine the behavior of politicians that otherwise would have not have been possible.

Despite the careful nature of this study and the comprehensive data collection efforts, there are other parts of the dissertation which I approached with even more caution. For example, in studying the persuasive influence of party leaders over the partisan mass selectorate, I paid due attention to the possibility that social desirability would lead partisan voters to under-report their willingness to follow the opinion of their party leader. Instead of asking

them in a direct survey, I implemented an experiment in the field that randomized voter information about the party leader's position over candidates participating in the party primaries. These methods were intended to complement other qualitative and quantitative analyses. The conclusions of this dissertation are, therefore, the result of a triangulation of findings drawn from a wide variety of research methods and analyses.

I proceed in Chapter 2 by introducing the main theoretical framework of the dissertation. I pay close attention to the problem of the dual mandate faced by politicians, while elucidating in more detail how single party dominance in local elections affects the behavioral incentive structure of both party leaders and politicians. I also delve more deep into the logic by which party leaders use candidate selection to induce politicians to cater to their interests.

In Chapter 3, I attempt to more systematically document the nature of representation in Africa through a detailed case study of politician responsiveness in Kenya. I specifically investigate whether elected representatives serving in Kenyan parliament are responsive to the preferences of their local constituents. I do so by assessing the level of congruence between constituency-level issue priorities estimated via multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) techniques, and the sectoral allocation decisions made by Members of Parliament (MPs) regarding the Constituency Development Fund. My analyses yield two main insights. First, overall, evidence suggests a *disconnect* between constituent preferences and spending rather than congruence. Second, any evidence of congruence observed is driven primarily by swing constituencies, precisely those without the one-party dominance that is a crucial part of the political geography in the present argument.

In Chapter 4, I present evidence demonstrating the dominance of political parties in local elections and describe how it enables political parties to act as gatekeepers to politician survival. First, using analyses of multiple rounds of Afrobarometer surveys for six African democracies, I document the surprising strength and prevalence of ethno-partisan attachments in Africa, and the extent to which they influence voting behavior. Second, I then leverage constituency-level returns from 25 African legislative elections to show how these attachments underpin the dominance of political parties in subnational elections. Finally, I proceed to show that the electoral survival of politicians is almost singularly determined by whether they receive the dominant party's nomination. Under these conditions, I argue, politicians become beholden to the selectorate that decides who the party's nominee will be.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I show that the authority to select party candidates ultimately resides with the party leader. In chapter 5, I conduct an in-depth case study that combines data drawn from interviews with party leaders and politicians and archival data on the statutes, rules, and regulations governing intraparty decision-making in a major Kenyan political party to document the tools the party leaders can use to control the candidate selection process. In chapter 6, I draw on a series of experiments conducted among 2,400 partisan supporters in Kenya to show that party leaders can use tools of persuasion (endorsements) to induce partisan supporters to vote for their preferred aspirants in party primaries. I argue that these instruments of control establish the party leaders as the real sovereign of politicians who seek to compete under the party's banner.

In Chapter 7, I investigate how party leaders choose the party's candidates for elected office. I argue that party leaders subject politicians to a nomination tournament, in which

they renominate politicians who dedicate their effort towards activities that serves the party leader but does not cultivate a significant personal vote (leader service). I test these arguments by combining a data set of nomination outcomes in two Kenyan political parties with a data set of web-scraped media coverage of politicians. Using computational text analysis and natural language processing, I extract politician-level metrics of leader service and show that these metrics correlate with nomination outcomes much more strongly than measures of constituency service or other candidate level attributes.

Chapter 8 discusses the main findings of the dissertation and considers broader theoretical implications. It connects the dynamics of candidate selection to politician responsiveness in African democracies and proceeds to briefly reflect on the generalizability of the theory in other new democracies in Africa as well as other regions of the world.

Chapter 2

A Theory of Politician Responsiveness

"Everyone would like to believe that politicians are accountable to their constituents, but in reality, politician are accountable to one person: their party leader."[1]
– Sen. Hassan Omar, Secretary General, Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya

I present in this chapter an analytical framework for understanding the deficit in democratic responsiveness commonly observed in new democracies, despite the regularization of multiparty electoral competition. I argue that the ability of political parties to control the fate of politicians generates perverse incentives for politicians to place the interests of powerful party leaders over those of their constituents. It is important to note that I use the term "party leader" to refer to the single individual who occupies the highest position in the party hierarchy. Observationally, in parties that field candidates for the national executive (i.e. the presidency), the party leader often tend to be the presidential candidate (Lupu, 2016, 32).[2]

In this regard, my argument underscores an intuitive yet oft under-appreciated idea in the study of democratic politics; it stipulates to the crucial role that political parties play in *mediating* the relationship between voters and their elected representatives. Furthermore, the claim highlights the prominent role that *African* political parties — widely dismissed as weak institutions that have little to no bearing on substantive democratic representation — and the dynamics *internal* to them play in undermining the responsiveness of politicians to the voters whose interests they should serve.

In many electoral democracies across sub-Saharan Africa, the fate of elected politicians lies first and foremost in the hands of political parties. Due to the prevalence of local one party dominance in lower-tier subnational elections (legislative elections, for example), whether a rank-and-file politician[3] secures the nomination of the party often signifies the difference be-

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[1]From transcripts of in-person interview with author, Nairobi, Kenya, May 2015.

[2]This definition differs from Michels (1915) who uses the term "party leaders" to refer to elected parliamentarians in the party vis-à-vis regular party members.

[3]I use the term "rank-and-file politicians" to refer to individuals who seek to contest in subnational elections as a candidate of the party. This includes i) elected representatives who have already competed in elections under the party banner and plan to also compete in subsequent elections, as well as ii) aspirants who have not

tween almost assured victory and inevitable defeat in the elections. Since party nominations are decisive in shaping their future electoral success, politicians become primarily beholden to the selectorate: individuals or groups that control the candidate selection process within parties. In many African political parties, the power to select candidates ultimately resides with the party leader. Building on his ability to control the outcome of candidate selection, party leaders leverage what I refer to as "the nomination tournament", wherein party leaders induce a large majority of these rank-and-file politicians to dedicate their effort and resources towards serving the party leader's goals and interests, rather than their constituents. In short, politicians remain unresponsive to voter interests because politician survival is effectively determined by party leaders rather than voters.

Figure 2.1: A Theory of Politician Responsiveness

The argument presented in this chapter builds on the existing research on the politics of new democracies, which has shown that strategies parties often use to mobilize voters can weaken the system of representation that should take root as these fledgling democracies consolidate (Nichter, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2006; Scheiner, 2006; Tomsa, 2013). What is understudied are the consequences that structures and processes *internal* to the political parties themselves can have on representation in new democracies. While the study of party organization and its internal decision making processes have featured prominently in the literature on consolidated democracies, only recently have scholars of politics in the developing world paid due attention to this important topic. Most of these efforts have been directed towards documenting how political parties make the decision to adopt primary elections for candidate selection (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano, 2009; Serra, 2011), or evaluating the downstream effect of primary competition on candidate electoral performance in the general elections (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich, 2006). What remains lacking is a clear conception of whether and how such processes shape the strategic incentives of elected representatives to serve their constituents. This is an important oversight, as the answer to these

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yet competed but plan on contesting. The term does not refer to regular party members who have no intention of running for office as a party candidate. The term "rank-and-file" is used somewhat differently from the more common usage in the party politics literature, which refers to regular party members rather than politicians or candidates.

questions may offer valuable initial insights on the conditions necessary to harness politician responsiveness to voters in newly democratized states.

The lack of attention that scholars of African democratic politics have paid to these *intraparty* processes is attributable to the conventional wisdom regarding political parties in Africa; political scientists have been quick to generalize that African political parties are weak, ephemeral institutions that lack organization and discipline, struggle to establish durable linkages to the society they are supposed to represent, and consequently fail to acquire the level of electoral support they need to regularly contest the elections (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Elischer, 2013). However, recent scholarship on this topic suggest that these generalizations may have been too hasty. Basedau and Stroh (N.d.) and Riedl (2014, 41) both demonstrate the tremendous variation in the level institutionalization across political parties and party systems in Africa; many parties such as the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and National Patriotic Party (NPP) in Ghana, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, Botswana Demogratic Party (BDP) in Botswana have competed continuously in every election with high levels of success since the transition to multipartyism. Many more parties in Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi have contested successfully in multiple rounds of elections and have developed organizational structures that penetrate down to the grassroots.

The lack of research "looking inside" political parties in Africa has led scholars to overlook the potential that intraparty candidate selection processes have in determining the shape systems of representation will take in these countries. This is puzzling since prominent politicians who have successfully navigated the political sphere in Africa testify to the importance of these processes in determining the electoral success of politicians. Guy Scott, who ascended to the presidency of Zambia following the death of President Michael Sata in 2014, places great emphasis on the role of party nominations in determining the fate of politicians in Zambia: "The biggest challenge for MPs is to be re-adopted as the candidate for their party. Otherwise, it is highly unlikely they will survive the elections.[4]" Henry Mwanzi, who served as the Executive Secretary of the Kenya African National Union under President Daniel Arap Moi, echoes this sentiment, stating that "Party nominations can make or break a politician's career in a climate where loyalty to the party is the most important factor motivating voters.[5]" Given that politicians tend to react and be responsive to those who hold the key to their reelection (Fiorina, 1974, 122), the process of candidate selection within parties, and the logic through which they structure the incentives of for politicians to be responsive to their constituents, deserves further scrutiny.

I proceed in this chapter by first providing a review of the existing work that characterizes the relationship between parties and political representation in democratic societies. Building on these existing works, I present a theory of politician responsiveness in Africa that brings the role of intraparty institutions and actors — namely candidate selection processes and party leaders — to the fore. I conclude by introducing briefly the case study of Kenya, from which much of the empirical evidence in the dissertation is drawn.

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[4]From transcripts of in-person interview with author, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2016.

[5]From transcripts of in-person interview conducted February, 2015 at Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya

2.1 Political Parties and Democratic Representation

Political parties feature prominently in any account of representation in democratic systems. Even when democratic competition forges a direct "electoral connection" between voters and politicians—thereby creating strong incentives for politicians to remain responsive to their constituents (Mayhew, 1974; Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999, 29)—the seemingly indelible link between voters and their electoral representatives are in reality mediated by political parties (Schattschneider, 1942, 36). A long tradition of scholars engaged in the study of democratic politics have pointed out the important role that parties play in aggregating divergent interests, recruiting political candidates, integrating and mobilizing voters, and exercising influence over government policy, thereby ultimately bridging the gap between voters and government (King, 1969; Katz, 1980, 2; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000, 4). Such is the reverence and importance assigned to political parties in the democratic order that Giovanni Sartori has been led to say that "those parties that are parts have found their essential *raison d'eîre* and their non-replaceable role in implementing representative and responsive government (Sartori, 1976, 27)."

Yet the idea that political parties are but reliable vehicles in the pursuit of representation and responsiveness is certainly not uncontested. From as early as a century and a half ago, both theoretical and empirical students of democracy have reflected on the possibility that "political parties as the problem rather than the solution of democratic delegation (Müller and Narud, 2013, 2; Ostrogorsky, 1902, 713)." This concern is best presented by Robert Michels, who, in his theoretical treatise on political parties at the turn of the 20th century, highlighted the inevitable manifestation of anti-democratic tendencies in European socialist political parties (Michels, 1915, 13-21). More than a century later, the empirical analysis of Gilens and Page (2014, 566-567) makes a compelling case that political parties in the United States become one of the most important conduits through which economic elites and special interests are able to capture the policy-making process to be responsive to their interests.[6]

The skepticism regarding the representative role that parties play is increasingly being echoed in the literature on democratic politics in the developing world. Once heralded as the harbingers of transition from autocratic to democratic rule, parties recently have been blamed for using mobilization strategies—contingent distribution of clientelistic benefits (Wantchekon, 2003; Stokes et al., 2013), overt vote-buying (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Kramon, 2016), or direct appeals targeted to stir up parochial loyalties (Ferree, 2010; Madrid, 2012; Gadjanova, 2017)—that can inhibit voters' ability to reward or sanction elected officials for their performance in office. In contexts where the possibility of proper representation of public interests are constrained by the weakness of key democratic actors and institutions, the adoption of strategies by parties that compromise the "electoral connection" between voters and politicians have the potential to lead to a crisis of representation.

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[6]Gilens and Page (2014) makes this argument in the process of testing what they call the "theories of American politics." They find evidence economic elites and organized special interest groups have the most substantial impact on US government policy-making. Contrary to the logic of majoritarian electoral democracy or majoritarian pluralism, they find no evidence that policies are responsive to average citizens or mass-based interest groups.

Overall, the literature casts doubts on the facilitating role that political parties were largely assumed to play in the process of democratic representation. Motivated by this pessimistic view, I examine a question that has yet to be theoretically or empirically demonstrated: how the power dynamics within party organizations, and the decision making processes that are influenced by those dynamics, affect the nature of responsiveness and representation in new democracies. The theory I develop later in this chapter suggests that one such intraparty factor, the process of candidate selection (or party nominations), may create distortionary pressures that undermine responsiveness. Before I present the theory however, I review the literature upon which I derive this intuition.

2.2 Candidate Selection and Politician Behavior: A Simple Framework

Some recent theoretical and empirical work that shares Michels (1915)'s skepticism about parties have raised concerns that processes *internal to* the parties might have strong distortionary effects on the incentives for politicians to be responsive to their constituents (Clinton, 2006, 397; Gilens and Page, 2014, 567). At the core of these studies is the observation that political parties can control politician's access to the ballot through the candidate selection process (Kastellec et al., 2015, 788; Ichino and Nathan, 2012). Politicians, in their quest for public office, often must survive the competition to become the party's nominee for the office they are seeking. And this intraparty process presents a different set of challenges to aspiring politicians in that both the key actors that determine the outcome and the interests of these actors often distinct from that of the electorate.

Two factors regarding the candidate selection process are likely to have significant implications for how responsive politicians are to their constituents: the nature of the *selectorate* and the relative importance of candidate selection vis-à-vis the general election. The selectorate is "a body of individuals or groups that select the party's candidates for public office",[7] and can vary vastly in its size and membership; they can range from a single party leader to a select committee of individuals or even to the entire pool of registered voters that can participate in the general elections (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 33). In that they hold the authority to determine the list of candidates who can compete under the party banner in the general elections, it is their support that all aspiring politicians must court first even before they face the electorate.

The influence that the selectorate holds in shaping the behavior of politicians has been frequently discussed in earlier research (Bochel and Denver, 1983; Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 34). But how and why can the nature of the selectorate *undermine* politician responsiveness to constituents? The distortionary potential arises if the members of the selectorate and the interests they pursue systematically differ from those of the electorate. In order to clearly

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[7]This definition of the term selectorate differs starkly from the definition adopted by Siverson et al. (2003) who employ this term in the context of explaining the survival of a regime-level leader)." The notion of the selectorate for them is "the set of citizens that have a prospect of being in an incumbent's winning coalition."

elucidate the logic, we can invoke a simple spatial election model[8] that incorporates a candidate selection process in which the median selector's interests are represented by x_s and the median elector's interests are represented by x_e.[9] In a world of sincere voting and reelection minded candidates, the optimal position for candidate i is to adopt a convex combination of the two median positions where $x_i = \alpha x_s + (1 - \alpha)x_e$ and α denotes the relative importance of candidate selection versus general election in the reelection of politicians. In the extreme case where the selectorate is either identical to or closely matches the electorate, to represent the interests of the electorate is to serve that of the selectorate ($x_s = x_e$, and therefore $x_i = x_e$). However, as the make-up of the selectorate differs more and more from the electorate, the interests that the two groups pursue will likely differ ($x_s \neq x_e$) (Coleman, 1971; Aldrich, 1983; Cohen et al., 2009; Bawn et al., 2012). Under these circumstances, politicians face the challenging task of becoming the servant of two masters, whose interests are not always reconcilable (Duverger, 1959, 353).[10] Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the nature of the selectorate sways the behavior of elected representatives in consolidated democracies. These studies have found that as the membership in the selectorate is expanded to a broader part of the electorate (as x_s converges to x_e), representatives will tend to adopt the issue positions of the district's median voter (Gerber and Morton, 1998; Wright and Schaffner, 2002; Bullock and Clinton, 2011).

However, it is clear intuitively that a candidate's incentive to eschew their responsibility to represent their constituents (the electorate) is not solely determined by the nature of the selectorate. Even if the median selector's interests (x_s) diverges significantly from the median elector's interests (x_e), the candidate's position x_i is also influenced by α, or the relative importance of the candidate selection process versus the elections in a politician's electoral success. In situations where the relative weight of the candidate selection process is low (or α is low and $(1 - \alpha)$ is high), there is very little reason to expect that x_s will have any real impact in determining x_i. Politicians can simply choose to ignore x_s and focus on catering to x_e because the selection process is not a binding constraint for their survival.

The situation is different when α, or the importance of the selection process is non-negligible. When x_s and x_e diverge and α is meaningfully high, politicians now face a stark trade-off between taking their position x_i to be proximal to x_s or x_e. The optimal position that the candidate must take hinges on the how large the α parameter is; in extreme cases where α is equal to one (or when the selectorate effectively determines the fate of the candidate), politicians are incentivized to completely ignore the position of their general election voters (their constituents), and set x_i such that $x_i = x_s$ (or dedicate their full effort into serving the interests of the selectorate). An example of a situation in which the α parameter is equal or near to one can arise when a district or constituency is dominated by a single party. If

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[8]This is model is an adaptation of the simple framework presented by Bullock and Clinton (2011).

[9]The setup of the model does not require any assumptions about what x_s and x_e represents. It need not be the case that they denote positions on a single or bundle of policies, or even that they represent the position of the selectorate or electorate on any policy issue *per se*.

[10]Duverger (1959) calls this the problem of the "double mandate." His prediction is that while there is variation across party as to whose interests representatives are beholden to, "the party mandate" will carry more weight than the "electors' mandate."

the electorate of a certain district holds strong loyalties towards a single party and vote consistently for that party, the single most important consideration for the aspiring politician is to secure the party ticket for the party that is favored. Since the outcome of the candidate selection process effectively determines the outcome of the general election, the politician's incentive is to discount the interests of the electorate substantially in favor of the selectorate.

Taken together, the literature underlines two important conditions under which the candidate selection process might distort the incentive of politicians to be responsive to their constituents. First, the outcome of the candidate selection process must be a binding constraint for constituents; losing in the party candidate selection process must impose a significant cost in the politician's prospect for electoral victory. Second, the interests of the selectorate who determine the outcome of party nominations must diverge in meaningful ways from that of the constituents (or electorate) that politicians face in the general elections. In the discussion I present below, I argue that both of these conditions are fulfilled in the context of African electoral democracies. The implication is that politicians in Africa become beholden to and responsive to the interests of the party's selectorate—in many of the cases, the party leader—rather than that of their constituents.

2.3   The Problem of the Double Mandate

Politicians competing for elected office in African democracies are confronted with the ever challenging task of managing the "double mandate (Duverger, 1959, 353)." On the one hand, they must represent the interests of voters in their respective districts or constituencies, who, empowered by their rights as democratic sovereigns, are increasingly pressuring politicians to fulfill their individual or collective needs. But on the other, politicians are beholden to the selectorate of their political parties, as they must often rely on the party's nomination to contest in elections.

A problem when the demands of the constituents diverge from what the political parties want. In an ideal world, politicians will have infinite effort and resources to meet the demands of both the constituents and the party selectorate. In reality, however, politicians are constrained by the total stock of resources and effort they can dedicate across the divergent demands. In light of a stark trade-off and hard constraints, how do politicians allocate their effort and resources towards each of these objectives? I argue that some distinctive features of the nature of political competition in African democracies create conditions that force politicians to divest their effort away from constituents. Before I present the core logic of my theory, I first identify the divergent demands that politicians face from constituents and the selectorate. I then explain why party candidate selection acts as a binding constraint for politicians.[11]

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[11]To invoke the simple election model from the previous section, the following section outlines that $x_s \neq x_e$ *and* that α is large — i.e. that the two conditions which need to be met for the distortion of politician incentives to be responsive.

Accountability Demands of the Electorate

Political competition in much of the developing world, including Africa, is generally considered to not center around ideology or policy (Posner, 2005; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). Instead, African voters, especially when evaluating politicians contesting for subnational office such as parliament or local government (which is the focus of this project), are considered to privilege a politician's credentials in terms of constituency service (Barkan, 2009*b*; Lindberg, 2010). Political leadership in Africa has long entailed a personal responsibility to provide resources and relief to their followers (Ekeh, 1975), and this expectation has persisted into the era of multiparty politics (Arriola, 2012, 13; Lindberg, 2010).

Figure 2.2: Citizen Perceptions of Representative Responsibilities, Afrobarometer Round 4

Note: Data is drawn from the Afrobarometer Survey, Round 4. The Afrobarometer survey draws a nationally representative sample of voters from the country in each round. Countries included to generate this plot are Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia (N=11,915). Blue bars represent proportion of respondent responses to the question "Representatives to the National Assembly have different responsibilities. Which of the following do you think is the most important responsibility of your representative to the National Assembly?"

The notion of constituency service that these lower level politicians must provide to voters is broader than the notion of constituency service or "casework" in consolidated democracies (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984); it not only involves assistance in accessing benefits and services that the state provides, but also the actual *provision* of the services and benefits that the politician often has no legal obligation to provide. These activities can include covering

school fees, medical fees, and costs for weddings and funerals. In addition, politicians are held responsible for providing local public goods such as schools, health clinics, clean water, or even security (Arriola, Choi and Gichohi, 2016; Kramon, 2016). The collection of these responsibility creates an image of these lower level politicians as an extension of the state apparatus, filling in for the gaps left by an often weak and resource constrained government.

The weight voters place on constituency service and the provision of local development are born out in data from the Afrobarometer surveys, which asked respondents across African countries what among the many responsibilities of their representative to the National Assembly (Member of parliament) they perceived to be most important. Figure 2.2 presents the proportion of individuals who selected each of the five response categories; "deliver jobs or development", "listen to constituents and represent their needs", "make laws for the good of the country", "monitor the president and his/her government", and "none of these" in countries classified as democracies by Polity IV. Of the 11,915 subjects interviewed, around 31% of respondents said that the primary responsibility of their elected representative to the parliament was to deliver jobs or development. A slightly larger proportion of respondents— around 49%—reported that the representative to primarily focus on listening to constituents and representing their needs. These two constituency service-related categories combined accounted for 81% of total responses. By contrast, a meager 15% of respondents said that the primary responsibility of the representative was to make laws and statutes in parliament. An even smaller proportion of respondents (4%) chose the MP's obligations to monitor the presidency and keep her government in check as most important.

There is also increasing empirical research showing that voters do in fact demand constituency service from politicians, and reward and sanction politicians based on an evaluation of their performance. Lindberg (2003), for example, shows that members of parliament (MPs) in Ghana are flooded day-to-day by visits from constituents who request assistance from the MP in handling the collective issues of the constituency or even ask for personal favors in terms of employment or contracts. Ichino and Nathan (2013a) examines the electoral effect of these voter preferences, showing that voters in Ghana are more inclined to cross ethnic lines to vote for a candidate not of their ethnic party when they expect it will increase their chance of benefiting from local public goods and services. Conroy-Krutz (2013) conducts a survey experiment in Uganda to find that the voter's reliance on ethnic cues will decline as information regarding the performance of candidates are provided.

2.4 Local One Party Dominance and the Importance of Selection

The preceding subsection has demonstrated that rank-and-file politicians in African democracies face real accountability pressures from the electorate; voters seem to place strong emphasis on their elected representatives' ability to deliver "local development" and respond to their needs. In addition to these pressures, politicians who contest elections simultaneously face pressures to cater to the demands of the selectorate, which controls the candidate se-

lection process within political parties. From the perspective of politicians, the importance of catering to the party selectorate largely depends on the extent to which nomination as the party candidate affects the likelihood of victory in the elections; the greater the electoral advantage attached to party candidacy, the greater the incentive for politicians to direct their efforts towards tending to the demands of the selectorate.

Table 2.1: Party Reelection Rates in Parliamentary Elections across African Democracies

	Party Reelection Rates (%)	
	Nat'l Incumbent Party	Nat'l Opposition Party
Ghana	85.04	74.58
Kenya	80.90	84.26
Tanzania	92.53	100.00
Zambia	75.46	80.63
Botswana	94.91	50.00
Malawi	36.45	54.32

Note: Party reelection rates for parliamentary elections. Data includes all available constituency-level electoral returns between 1989 and 2016 in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia.

I argue that a distinctive feature of local political competition, commonly observed across African democracies, greatly increases the value of party candidacy for politicians: local one party dominance in subnational elections. Since political parties across Africa dominate lower-tier electoral contests in their respective strongholds, receiving the nomination from the locally dominant party becomes the single most important task for politicians seeking local elected office; in a large majority of local races, politicians with the dominant party's ticket in hand face little to no risk of defeat in the general elections. The centrality of *selection* in a politician's quest for electoral success therefore heightens the incentive of politicians to privilege the interests of the selectorate.

At first blush, the notion that competition over the locally-dominant party's nomination is more important than the general election in determining the electoral prospects of African politicians seems implausible. After all, the dominant narrative in the literature on African political parties is that they are little more than electoral vehicles for prominent ethnic politicians who represent the parochial interests of a single identity group or the coalition of groups. Political parties are considered too weak to establish organizational structures that penetrate down to the grassroots, vary little by way of ideology or programs, and are therefore unlikely to become the object of enduring attachments or identification amongst voters (Elischer, 2013). If one takes this conventional pers on African parties to be true, it will lead to the expectation that politicians will not be dependent on their success in securing a position on the ballot as a party candidate for victory in the general elections; politicians denied nomination by a particular party would easily be able to defect to and seek the nomination of a different political party, or decide to compete as an independent in the general election. If voters attach

very little meaning to political parties, the lack of any particular party's nomination will have little bearing on whether voters decide to vote for a politician.

However, my claim is that the conventional narrative on African parties is a misrepresentation of the electoral strength of political parties, especially in subnational elections. African voters, much like voters in consolidated democracies of the west, possess strong attachments to political parties. These partisan attachments are underpinned by a host of factors including but not limited to ascriptive identities such as ethnicity, race, or religion (Basedau et al., 2011; Ferree, 2010). Regardless of the sources of such partisan attachments, they play a decisive role in shaping how voters vote in elections. Political parties capitalize on these partisan predispositions, and are able to cultivate a electoral monopoly in local electoral districts for which the partisan demography favors them, often regardless of which particular candidate they field as their candidate.

While more systematic evidence will be presented in chapter 4, Table 2.1 presents simple descriptive patterns from six countries that provide the empirical foundation for these propositions. Contrary to popular belief, political parties in these countries are able to engineer reelection in their legislative elections at extraordinarily high rates; with perhaps the exception of Malawi, the two largest parties—the national incumbent party and the largest opposition party—in these countries are reeelcted in constituency level parliamentary races between 75% and 100% of the time, regardless of the candidate representing the party.

Local one-partyism raises the value of party candidacy and the stakes of candidate selection; nomination as the dominant party's candidate is invaluable for politicians as it signifies the difference between almost guaranteed victory versus near certain defeat in the general election. This critical advantage generates incentives for politicians to direct their efforts towards securing the party ticket. Doing so requires them to take seriously the preferences of the selectorate within these parties, whose authority to decide on party candidates establish them as gatekeepers to their electoral success. In essence, the interests of the selectorate overtake the electorate's as the *primary* concern of election-minded politicians.

2.5 Centralized Control over Candidate Selection

The previous section has outlined the logic by which one party dominance in subnational elections and the high value attached to the nomination of the locally-dominant party set the seed for politicians to place the interests of the selectorate over that of the electorate. Yet the exact manner in which politicians will behave is contingent on the question of who or what constitutes the selectorate in these parties, and what the interests that the selectorate is likely to pursue.

In political parties across Africa, the candidate selection process is ultimately controlled by a single individual who sits at the apex of the party organization: the party leader. Often coterminous with the presidential candidate of the political party, they derive their influence over party nominations based on i) their authority over party institutions that govern candidate selection, and in circumstances where the party has instituted mass-based primary elections as their method of candidate selections, ii) their persuasive influence over the voters who

participate in the primaries. Furthermore, as self-interested politicians with their own career ambitions, party leaders are inclined *use* such power to induce rank-and-file politicians to privilege serving their political objectives rather than the interest of voters.

Party Leaders as the Selectorate

The selectorate in political parties, or the individuals or groups that control politician access to party candidacy, can consist of a diverse set of individuals and groups, and typically varies greatly across different political parties. Scholars who study candidate selection in parties understand the concept of the selectorate as closely related to the institution or method used to select candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010); for example, in political parties that use a top-down method for candidate selection—such as the "nomination board or committee" system in which a small number of individuals chosen by the party's executive—the selectorate is formally the individuals who are constituent members of the board or committee. In parties that have adopted a more mass-based method of selection—such as closed or open primary elections—the selectorate is formally considered to be the registered party members or regular voters who participate in the voting process in the primaries.

This common approach to conceptualizing the selectorate, however, misleadingly equates *de-jure* authority with *de-facto* authority; even if nomination committees are nominally vested with the power to select candidates, it may be the case that real decisions are made by a different set of actors both inside and outside of the party. In parties that implement party primaries, primary voters maybe technically endowed with the ability to vote for the candidates they prefer. But in reality, party leaders and elites might be able to manipulate primary voters to have the final say in who is chosen. What is necessary is an understanding of the selectorate that accurately identifies the individuals or groups that exercise the prerogative to select party candidates *in reality*, and if they are not the same as those who have been entrusted with that power by party regulations or rules, how they come to acquire that authority.

Adopting this holistic approach, I argue that the true holder of the authority to select party candidates (i.e., the selectorate) in African parties is *the party leader*. By party leader, I refer to the single individual who sits at the top of the party hierarchy, and in many cases, is the party's standard bearer for higher level electoral contests such as the presidential elections. She also typically occupies a privileged position in the minds of partisan voters that very few other rank-and-file politicians within the party enjoy (Gichohi, 2016). In contexts where parties compete along salient social cleavages lines, the party leader is often the single most important individual whose electoral success determines whether the cleavage groups represented by the party will gain access to the spoils of holding executive power (Manning, 2005). And much like their counterparts in parties in the developing world, party leaders tend to enjoy a broad mandate in terms of decision making regarding party operations, free from any institutional checks from other actors within the party (Lupu, 2016, 32).

Party Leader Interests to Control Candidate Selection

Why are party leaders interested in ultimately reserving the ability to select party candidates for themselves? The answer to this question requires a clear conceptualization of the goals that motivate party leaders, and the incentive structure they face especially vis-à-vis rank-and-file politicians who seek party candidacy.

I argue that the primary motivation of party leaders is to fulfill their career ambitions to occupy high elected office, most typically the presidency. In much of Africa's executive dominant systems, contests for the presidency is a winner-take-all affair in which victory bestows unparalleled access to state resources and a wide range of agenda-setting power for the occupant and the occupant's political party (Manning, 2005; Arriola, 2012). A loss in the presidential elections not only undermines the party's ability to influence governance of the country in the immediate aftermath,[12] but also threatens the party leader's candidacy in subsequent presidential contests, and even the the very existence of the political party itself; without access to state revenue to finance the ever-increasing costs of party operations and electioneering in Africa (Kramon and Posner, 2016), party leaders without a significant amount of accumulated private wealth cannot reasonably expect to sustain the party and their candidature in the long-run. Much like in political parties in Latin America, the importance of the presidency induces party leaders to be motivated by their pursuit of executive office rather than any policy agenda (Lupu, 2016, 31).

Becoming a viable candidate for the presidency means that party leaders concentrate their energies towards intermediate goals; first, and perhaps most intuitively, party leaders must ensure that there is sufficient mass electoral support for both themselves and their parties. Without attracting a sizable portion of the electorate, party leaders are like to face an uphill battle in the highly competitive presidential elections that are typical of African democracies (Arriola, 2012). Doing so requires that they invest significantly in generating activities such as creating stable and enduring partisan attachments among core supporters (Poertner, N.d.), and generating valence for themselves as well as the party they represent among non-partisan swing voters, to whom positive valence is important (Lupu, 2016, 33). In addition to cultivating mass support, party leaders must consolidate power within the party organization. Party leaders are aware that their position as the party's flag bearer for the presidential race is likely to be contingent on their ability to retain their standing as leader of the party. It is therefore of paramount importance that party leaders attract and maintain a high level of support from influential party elites, and thwart any opposition from within their ranks that may challenge their leadership of the party.

Rank-and-file politicians who seek the party's candidacy for lower tier elections can critically affect the party leader's ability to obtain these two intermediate goals. Those who are eventually selected as the party's candidate will become the point person of the party during the general elections, tasked with connecting the party to the masses and generating support

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[12]Even if a political party were to engineer a majority in the legislature even after being defeated in the presidential elections, the limited powers that accrue to the majority party in the legislature (in comparison to the party that occupies the executive) significantly compromises the ability of the presidential election loser to participate in the business of governing

for the party in both the presidential and subnational elections. Once elected, they will become elected representatives in parliament, upon whom the party leader, if elected president, will rely on to pursue his government's policy agenda.[13] Furthermore, they will constitute the "party in public office" (Mair and Katz, 2002), which collectively will have a significant impact on the configuration of power within political parties; without the support of these elites, party leaders will be hard pressed to remain at the helm of the party organization, and retain his status as the party's presumptive presidential nominee in subsequent elections.

Given the importance of these rank-and-file politicians, it is incumbent on the party leader to induce (or even manipulate) them to behave in a manner that best contributes to the pursuit of the presidency, and the two intermediate goals of electoral mobilization and the consolidation of power within the party organization. What is the best way for party leaders utilize rank-and-file politicians? In terms of building mass support for the party, I argue that one of the most effective ways is to incentivize rank-and-file politicians to be responsive to the demands of the constituents (or pursue a constituency-oriented strategy). Given the widespread voter preference for local development and constituency service, making sure that party-affiliated politicians deliver important local public goods and provide personal assistance to needy constituents may seem like a winning strategy for both the party leader and the politicians themselves.

However effective, relying on a strategy of encouraging rank-and-file politicians to be responsive to constituents—a constituency-oriented strategy—is likely to present party leaders with a dilemma that leads them down a treacherous path. The problem with inducing rank-and-file politicians to provide constituency service is that their responsiveness will accrue a *personal vote*: "the portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984, 1987)." The accrual of a personal vote to the individual rank-and-file politician *independent of the party* poses a threat to the party leaders' tenure at the helm of the party. Party leaders enjoy their position at the top of the party organization by virtue of their electoral strength as politicians. While their electoral strength is therefore unlikely to be *easily* undermined, the accumulation of an independent electoral following among rank-and-file politicians increases the risk of the party leader being challenged, or worse still, deposed from her position; the emergence of powerful new politicians that command a significant block of votes can create fissures within the party, paving the way for a new alignment or consolidation of intraparty interests around these individuals. The consolidation of these interests around another strong politician other than the party leader can create factions that attempt to undermine the position of the party leader.

The risk posed by making politicians pursue a constituency-oriented strategy creates incentives for the party leader to direct, at least in part, the effort of rank-and-file politicians towards an alternative end, or what I term "party-oriented strategies." Politicians can be be induced to engage in a wide range of party-building activities including campaign activities

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[13]This is a generalization based on the notion that the most common form of lower-tier subnational elections are parliamentary. However, in devolved systems with multiple tiers of government, subnational elections to fill those offices are common as well.

for the party (e.g. organizing and attending political rallies across the country), vocally advocating for party positions on polarizing issues in the media, and defending the party and party leader against attacks from within and outside of the party. The common thread linking these activities is that while they serve to build up the brand of the party and strengthen the party leader's mass support across the country, they *do not* create direct ties between politicians and their constituents in ways that would accrue a personal vote for the politician.

In reality, party leaders cannot reasonably expect to achieve their dual goal—electoral mobilization and consolidation of power within their parties—by inducing politicians to invest in just one of these activities; having politicians engage in party-oriented strategies entirely without any effort directed towards serving their constituents, while greatly effective in diffusing potential threats against the party leadership, will undermine the ability of these politicians to generate mass support for the party. Party leaders must therefore be able to structure incentives such that politicians strike a delicate balance between constituency versus party-oriented strategies. The exact manner in which party leaders attempt to achieve this balance is discussed in latter parts of the chapter.

The preceding discussions elaborate why party leaders have incentives to control their party's candidate selection. The behavior of rank-and-file politicians have significant consequences for the party leader's pursuit of his own career aspirations. If the party leader is to have a realistic chance of succeeding in her pursuit of the presidency, she must be able to subordinate these politicians and elicit their compliance. The party leader's influence over party nominations can be an effective means through which such compliance can be achieved, as the centrality of receiving the party's candidacy in the electoral prospects of rank-and-file politicians creates pressures for them to serve the interests of selectors. The question that remains is how party leaders are able to project influence over candidate selection. What are the various mechanisms through which party leaders are able to dictate the decisions regarding party candidacy? Can they retain control when their *de-jure* authority to do so have been removed?

How Party Leaders Control Candidate Selection

The leader of political parties in the developing world typically wield considerable influence over the party organization they preside over. Seldom are institutional checks or formal restrictions placed on the scope of the party leaders authority (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Samuels and Shugart, 2003). Nor are the broad range of decisions that party leaders make regarding how the party is organized and operates subject to the approval of other party actors that comprise the party (Lupu, 2016). The autonomy party leaders enjoy finds no exception the domain of candidate selection.

I argue that one of the ways in which party leaders can take control over candidate selection is through the manipulation the rules and institutions that govern the nomination of party candidates; in the extreme, party leaders can theoretically institute nomination rules that reserve the authority to select party candidates in its entirety for themselves, without requiring either consultation or approval from other party actors or governing organizations for their decision to be final (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 38). But party leaders need not go to

such extremes and potentially face the risk of alienating party elites and partisan supporters for the lack of "internal democracy" within the party. In fact, even if they cede some of their authority by delegating the task of choosing party candidates to party organs (in which they may or may not directly participate) (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 36), there are a myriad of ways in which they can ensure that they can project their influence over the final outcome; for example, they can do so by creating provisions that allow them to appoint personnel to the party organ that has been charged with nominations, organizationally subordinate the organ to their direct supervision, and reserve ultimate veto power over the decisions reached by the organ.

These institutional mechanisms of control are expected to be especially effective in political parties that principally adhere to a top-down model of candidate selection, in which the codified *de-jure* authority to nominate candidates resides with the party leader or a group of elites within the party. But even in parties that have nominally handed over the right to select candidates to the broader masses (i.e. regular party members or even non-partisan voters), such institutional mechanisms of control can guarantee that the party leader will be able to influence the outcome of nominations in a manner that protects her interests.

Another way in which party leaders can control the outcomes of candidate selection is by shaping the field of candidates who will contest the party nominations. They do so by pledging the organization and financial resources available to the national party organization in favor of their preferred nominee. The resource intensive nature of political campaigns in new democracies makes such a pledge by party leaders an extremely valuable asset to politicians on the receiving end, and offers enough of an advantage to deter challengers from competing against the supported candidate. Party leaders can also offer financial inducements or promise alternative career options to candidates in exchange for retiring from the race. Realizing that refusing the demands of the party leader will result in an almost certain loss in the primaries and signal the end of their political careers, candidates are likely oblige and take this inducements, ultimately withdrawing their candidacy for the nomination.

Where as the two aforementioned strategies are crucial in creating favorable conditions for the party leader to take control of the nominations, there is a set of strategies that party leaders can rely on to consolidate or increase the extent of their influence. While there is a wide variety of strategies that fall into this category, all of them share a common characteristic, namely that they are intended to affect how the actual selection process, which happens shortly in advance of the general elections, is implemented. In parties with relatively more exclusive, elite-driven processes, party leaders can cash in on their institutionalized leverage over selection committees or exercise their authority to veto decisions made by these committees. But in parties where the masses hold the juridical authority to select candidates, party leaders must work in more subtle ways. Strategies available to party leaders under these settings include the ability to vet or screen candidates from contesting in the primaries, or selectively implement primary elections.

Finally and perhaps most indirectly, party leaders can use their persuasive influence over the mass selectorate to affect the outcome of nominations. Party leaders in Africa typically enjoy a privileged connection with their supporters. Furthermore, in low information environments where voters have limited information regarding the attributes of candidates and where often used cues such as party affiliation or ethnicity are rendered meaningless—as

they often are in primary elections—the party leader's evaluation of candidates are likely to be an especially valuable source of information which voters can rely on to exercise their vote. When voters are strongly motivated to "follow" the opinion of the party leader, the party leader's endorsement or denouncement of a candidate is likely to have a large influence over who is ultimately chosen by voters during the primaries.

The assortment of strategies described above constitute the "toolkit" at the disposal of party leaders in their bid to control the outcome of their party's candidate selection process. The next section discusses the logic by which party leaders puts these tools to use, and how, as a result, politicians become withdrawn from the interests of their constituents.

2.6 Paths to Unresponsiveness

By virtue of their "electoral connection," African politicians possess incentives to be responsive to the demands of the constituents they represent to provide constituency service. But they also face countervailing pressures to serve the interests of the party leader who controls the candidate selection process. In an ideal scenario, politicians would be able to cater to both of these demands. The problem is, however, that politicians face a hard constraint in the amount of time and resources they can dedicate (in total) towards these tasks; investing in one of these activities necessarily takes time away from the other.

Party leaders are aware that politicians are faced with this stark trade-off. They also realize that they stand to benefit greatly by putting politicians in service of their own goals; after all, these rank-and-file politicians within the party can be a valuable asset to the party leaders. By virtue of their own experience participating in elections, they often possess the knowledge and expertise in campaigning and voter mobilization that ordinary party members do not have. Party leaders must make sure that they are able to extract the maximal amount of effort from these politicians so that they are able to direct these sought-after "skills" towards strengthening the party brand, and ultimately cultivating a larger following for themselves as they look to the next election. At the same time, party leaders must also ensure that these politicians invest in the right mix or "portfolio" of these activities, in a manner that serves their aspirations to win higher elected office while minimizing the risk of losing their position within the party. In order to meet these two goals (eliciting both the maximum amount of effort from rank-and-politicians *and* direct the effort towards the "right mix" of activities), I argue that party leaders leverage their control over candidate selection to pit politicians to a tournament over the party ticket.

The Nomination Tournament

The logic of the nomination tournament is built on the insights of tournament theory, which was originally developed to explain how firms (or employers) can structure employee compensation or promotion in a manner that maximizes firm productivity whilst minimizing costly monitoring required to ascertain employees' individual effort (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Eriksson, 1999). The theory suggests that so long as the payoffs as-

sociated with the tournament are sufficiently large, employees will be incentivized to exert greater levels of effort. The aggregation of these efforts are likely to increase in productive output, which benefits the firm (and thereby the employer). Typically, the prize of the competition (e.g. promotions) is awarded to the employee who performs best on a *relative* scale vis-à-vis other contestants in the tournament. While tournament theory has been developed and broadly validated in the field of labor and human resource economics, there have been some innovative recent attempts to apply it beyond the boundary of the firm (Arriola and Johnson, 2017).[14] [15]

I argue that party leaders, whose control over the party apparatus allows them to influence (or effectively determine) the outcome of candidate selection, subject rank-and-file politicians to a "nomination tournament" over the party ticket. The reward offered to the victors of the tournament —selection as the party candidate to contest in the general election— is often a prerequisite for holding or returning to elected office, and is already therefore a significant inducement in itself. However, party leaders can deliberately increase the stakes of the tournament by engineering high levels of turnover during the nominations. The pressure of being evaluated against the effort of others, under the belief that only a certain fraction of party tickets will be awarded to them, will incentivize elected rank-and-file politicians to work strenuously to "outbid" their competitors. Indeed, the relative nature of the competition does not guarantee nomination to those that cross any absolute threshold of their performance. Even if individuals are high-performing, if they are ranked low on a relative scale *in comparison to* others, they are unlikely to receive the nomination given the limited number of "slots."

Party leaders are able to set the broad parameters of the tournament, including the relevant metric by which they will judge who the victors in this tournament will be. For party leaders, setting this metric correctly is important as politicians because it will determine the manner in which politicians will distribute their effort across different activities. In earlier sections, I highlighted the how a rank-and-file politician's pursuit of either a constituency-oriented strategy or party-oriented strategy can affect the achievement of the party leader's dual objectives: winning the presidency and retaining her position as the party leader. Taking these into consideration, I argue that the party leaders apply different metrics to judge politicians in the nomination tournament according to the *type of constituency* the politician is running for.

In competitive constituencies where the party faces significant competition from an op-

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[14]For example, Arriola and Johnson (2017) characterize executive cabinet appointments in African countries as tournaments in the process of explaining why women are under-represented or only occupy low-profile positions in African cabinets.

[15]Applying the analogy of the firm to political parties in Africa seems especially appropriate. Tournament theory is predicated on a fundamental characteristic of firms: employers have an asymmetric relationship with their employees. They do so by virtue of having hiring and firing prerogatives. They also often enjoy discretion in determining the organizational goals of the firm, and the framework for rewarding and punishing individuals who perform or underperform in terms of meeting those goals (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). These dynamics map well on to political parties: party leaders, due to their privileged connection with the voters they represent, enjoy broad mandates in deciding how the party operates. They often have the ability to set the party agenda, which they deliberately structure to align with their own political aspirations for higher office. They also effectively possess "firing and hiring" prerogatives through the candidate selection process.

posing party (or swing constituencies), I argue that the party leader will evaluate politicians primarily based on how successful they have been in terms of providing local development and constituency service to voters (or the extent to which politicians pursue a constituency-oriented strategy). In these constituencies, candidates who engage in these strategies are especially valuable, as they are able to accrue a personal vote, which may provide "reverse coattails" which the party can capitalize on to generate more votes for higher tier elections. In other words, party leaders will be willing to "stomach" the emergence of high-performing but potentially disloyal candidates because of their value in competitive constituencies.

Figure 2.3: The Nomination Tournament and Politician Behavior

On the other hand, party leaders are likely to leverage a different metric to judge politicians in party strongholds, where the party faces limited risk of losing. In these constituencies, party leaders have no incentive to allow candidates to pursue a constituency-oriented strategy as it does little to contribute to the party's dominance in the constituency, and only increases the possibility that a disloyal candidate will emerge. Therefore, party leaders will evaluate candidates based on how much they direct their effort towards in party-oriented strategies— activities that helps build the party brand but does not accrue a personal vote independent of the party. These activities broadly include attendance in party events and campaign rallies presided over by the party leader, advocacy and defense of the party and the party leader against across-the-aisle attacks, or significant contributions to party finances.

The preceding discussion does not intend to suggest that party leaders completely de-value how much the candidates in competitive constituencies engage in party-oriented strategies, and how much candidates in strongholds invest in constituency-oriented candidates. In fact, candidates who invest too little of the effort in serving constituents, and is therefore immensely unpopular among voters, can compromise their party's performance in higher tier elections by causing a downward "drag." Similarly, a candidate that exclusively pursues a constituency-oriented strategy is likely to send a warning to party leaders, because it signals

possible disloyalty. It rather highlights the relative weights that party leaders will place on each of the two criteria.

The importance of selection in their calculus for survival makes it extremely challenging for politicians to act in defiance of the criteria that party leaders set forth in the nomination tournament. I argue that politicians, depending on the type of constituency they decide to contest, will throughout their bid to be selected as the party's candidate, will primarily dedicate their efforts towards the type of activities that they will be evaluated on.

Implications for Politician Behavior

The logic of the nomination tournament determines the manner in which politicians will behave with respect to their constituents. Politicians who seek the party nomination for electorally competitive constituencies, will through the nomination tournament, be induced to dedicate a large majority of their limited effort and resources in the service of their constituents. On the other hand, candidates in stronghold constituencies in which the party holds a monopoly in electoral support will be discouraged from serving their constituents, and instead, directed to invest their effort and resources towards party-oriented activities. The implication of this dynamic is that politician responsiveness to constituents is likely to be confined to competitive districts. These dynamics are diagrammatically presented in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.4: Margin of Victory for Legislative Elections in Africa

This is a problem for overall levels of responsiveness, as the number of competitive constituencies in Sub-Saharan Africa are vastly outnumbered by the number of party strongholds. As shown in Figure 2.4, across six African democracies for which detailed electoral data for legislative elections are available since the introduction of mutliparty elections, the mean margin of victory in constituency elections is 31% points, and the median 25% points. In effect, the predictions of the theory, combined with the nature of local partisan political com-

petition in Africa, that a large majority of politicians will become uninterested to serve the interests of the constituents that elected them to office.

2.7 Summary

The theory developed in this chapter has presented an intuitive logic to understand why, when faced with competing pressures to be responsive to different sets of political actors, politicians are likely to choose one over the other. In the context of African parties where the outcome of candidate selection are likely to have a large impact on the fate of politicians, and party leaders maintain strong control over the process, a large majority politicians will be directed away from tending to the needs of their local constituents, and instead focus on party-oriented activities that benefit the party leader.

Yet the broader intuition underlying the theory need not apply only to the context of Africa. Many political parties beyond Africa (including those in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and East Asia) still afford broad powers to the party leader or a small group of individuals appointed by the leader to unilaterally screen and select the list of party candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 46-47). In these cases, so long as a politician's success or failure in the candidate selection process has consequences for a politician's fate at the ballot box, it is likely that we will see the emergence of politicians who are more responsive to the party leader or the small number of party elites that selected them than their constituents.

Chapter 3

Testing Responsiveness

3.1   Introduction

Irene Abongo, a market food vendor and a mother of three young children from Kisumu Town, Kenya, seemed visibly agitated when she was approached by my survey team to share her thoughts about her local member of parliament (MP). "Don't even bother!", she said loudly as she turned away to get back to her household chores. When the enumerator asked her to elaborate, however, she explained her frustration eloquently. "They are all the same. During elections they say they will do all these things if we vote for them, but nothing happens after it." She pointed out that as a candidate, the MP had pledged to tarmac the bumpy dirt road leading up to the estate where her family lived. Four years into a five year term, there had been no follow through. Nor had her eldest daughter been offered a bursary for her school fees, towards which the MP had pledged to invest a significant proportion of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). She even recounted that neighborhood leaders from her estate had tried to schedule an appointment at the MP's office in Nairobi to raise some of these issues, all in vain. "They never listen. They are busy living in Nairobi."

More than 450 kilometers way, Evan Mbugua, a middle-aged security guard living in a constituency outside of Embu town, was also very vocal in his frustration regarding the area MP. "Why is he handing out CDF money to useless projects that we don't need? He is pouring money into renovating classrooms that don't need renovation and making bus stops." In his opinion, the single most important challenge faced by residents of the constituency was not being sufficiently addressed.

> "Every year, we have a problem with drought. We were many days and months without clean water last year. So why is the MP not using the CDF money to dig more boreholes and wells? Where is the borehole he promised to build in my village? Nowhere."

The opinion of these ordinary citizens are shared by an overwhelming majority of the many local residents I interviewed during my 18 months of fieldwork in Kenya. Local politicians have earned a reputation for "promising everything and delivering nothing" to the con-

stituents they elected to office. Furthermore, as Figure 1.1 demonstrated in the introductory chapter, the perception that politicians have little regard for the interests of their constituents seems to be the norm rather than the exception across many of Africa's new democracies; the extraordinarily low proportion of people who believe that their politicians are attuned to what constituents want, even without referencing patterns in other parts of the world, are suggestive of negative evaluations regarding the responsiveness of their politicians. But are these negative evaluations reflective of actual unresponsiveness on the part of politicians, or more of a general disaffection or dissatisfaction with the political system? Could it be the case that voters are failing to acknowledge the efforts of politicians to be responsive?

Politicians certainly insist that they are undeserving of their bad reputation.[1] At a constituency townhall meeting to which I was personally extended an invitation as the "honorable guest," an incumbent MP from Embu County in Kenya proclaimed that his biggest priority was learning about their constituent's needs.

Figure 3.1: Image of Townhall Meeting Presided Over by a Sitting Member of Parliament

Note: An incumbent member of parliament belonging to the president's coalition in Kenya listens to a resident from his constituency voice the needs of their village at a townhall meeting at the MP's local residence.

> "Of course, I have important work as an national member of parliament I have to do in Nairobi. But I am elected by the people of my constituency. They are the ones that gave me my job. That is why I take time to invite people from the village to my home at [constituency X], and listen to what they need me to do. They will know that I am working for them."

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[1]Interview with sitting incumbent party member of parliament, Subject 2015-PI15, March 28, 2015

Another opposition MP elected to office in Western province claimed that all of his focus was directed towards listening to the voice of the people in his constituency. He claimed that he was confident of winning his second term in 2018, because unlike his predecessor, he was doing everything to make sure that his constituent's demands on local development were met.[2]

> "I know the reason why he lost. He let power and riches get to his head. And I will not make that mistake. People in my constituency are very sensitive about how I am performing as their MP. If I start ignoring them, I will be gone, like that. My work in parliament. My work in the constituency. How I allocate the constituency development fund. Everything I do is for my people."

Which of these two perspectives are closer to reality? Are politicians doing little to serve their constituents, as an overwhelming proportion of constituents seem to believe? Or are politicians unfairly being perceived as unresponsive, despite their best efforts to look after their constituents? The focus of this chapter is to empirically demonstrate the phenomenon that constitutes the core of the dissertation: the representative behavior (and specifically, the unresponsiveness) of politicians.

Providing a direct examination of the extent of responsiveness among politicians in new democracies, and especially those in Africa, has been fraught with significant challenges. Unlike in consolidated democracies where there is an abundance of data on *both* representative behavior *and* constituent preferences (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Lax and Phillips, 2009; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012), acquisition of such data in developing countries is, to this day, difficult. And because of the dearth of data, there has been virtually no empirical investigation as to whether there is a systematic relationship between what constituents want and how politicians behave.

In this chapter, I attempt to fill this void by exploiting novel sources of data on representative behavior (spending of the constituency development fund) and local constituent preferences (geocoded Afrobarometer surveys) in a single African democracy: Kenya. From this data, I apply methods traditionally used by scholars of representation to provide descriptive inference on the level of congruence between the priorities of local constituents, and the behavior of legislators with regard to the allocation of spending on local development. While this single-country case study approach falls short from the ideal of testing this relationship in a broader sample of countries, it should be considered an important first step towards understanding representation in Africa's new democracies.

The analysis reveals that the bad reputation of representatives might be well-deserved; the spending behavior of politicians regarding public funds over which they have discretionary power has little to no relationship to what are perceived by their constituents as priorities; in only a single issue area of the six (health, security, education, water, agriculture, and roads) under examination was any correlation between perceptions of priority observed. Additional analysis shows that the overall patterns of are driven by unresponsiveness in a large proportion of constituencies *without* interparty political competition outweighing a semblance of

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[2]Interview with member of parliament, Subject 2015-PO27, May 2, 2015

responsiveness in a small number of constituencies where there exists the possibility of alternation across parties. This is in line with the predictions proffered by the logic of the nomination tournament described in the previous chapter.

3.2 Research Design

The question of whether elected representatives are responsive to the needs and preferences of their constituents has been the "bread and butter" to scholars of representation for many decades. Especially well-developed in studies of US politics, many of these studies have time and time again found that there is strong concordance or "congruence" between the behavior of representatives serving in the US Congress and the preferences of their constituents (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erikson, 1978; Levitt, 1996; Brace et al., 2002; Clinton, 2006).

The "workhorse" approach to many of these studies typically draws on two critical sources of data. The first is data on the preferences of constituents. Scholars have progressed from using crude proxies based on the demographic characteristics or voting behavior of local residents to infer their aggregate preferences (Levitt, 1996; Stephen Ansolabehere, 2001), to the aggregation of survey items measured at the individual level to dervie constituency-level measures of public opinion and attitudes on various policy issues (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012). Second, it requires that there exist adequate data that captures the behavior of representatives. An overwhelming majority of scholars have used the richness of data on representative behavior in congress, such as the introduction and sponsorship of legislation and voting in roll-calls (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Levitt, 1996).[3] Armed with these two sources of data, scholars then use a wide variety of statistical methods to evaluate whether there is a systematic relationship or correlation between measures of constituent preferences and legislator behavior.

Adopting this dominant approach to investigating congruence therefore requires me to acquire the two different types of data. There are two notable hurdles. First, finding data that accurately captures constituent preferences in developing countries such as those in Africa is difficult. A large majority of surveys conducted in these countries have recruited nationally representative samples that therefore lack a significant number of observations in disaggregated electoral units such as the constituency. Many of them often lacked data on the exact locations of the respondents, making disaggregation even more challenging. Furthermore, many of these surveys have failed to field questions on constituent opinions on various social issues. Second, *appropriate* measures of legislator behavior have also been hard to come by. Unlike in consolidated democracies where the key functions of parliamentarians are tending to the business of the legislature, many scholars working on the developing world have claimed that the legislative functions of MPs in these countries are highly limited (Barkan, 2009c). Therefore, finding an alternate measure with which congruence can be examined has been a significant challenge.

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[3]The implicit assumption made by using this measure is that representatives are inclined to primarily serve their constituents through their legislative functions.

Fortunately, recent innovations in surveys conducted in developing countries, and especially Africa, provide me with an important opportunity to create accurate measures of constituent preferences. The regional barometers, which have collected nationally-representative cross-sectional surveys for multiple survey cycles, provides sufficient coverage in terms of the number of observations at lower disaggregated geographic units and survey items relevant to understand the preference of constituents on a number of limited but important issues regarding local public goods and services. Furthermore, recent research on citizen behavior in these countries provides us with the insight that the primary function of elected representatives, as perceived by constituents, is to deliver local development. The relevant metric by which to assess congruence between constituent interests and representative behavior seems to be their behavior regarding the provision of such goods and services.

The research design for the empirical analyses of this chapter draws on these novel sources of data, and apply the time-tested methods in the study of representation to assess the responsiveness of politicians. I first combine observations from multiple rounds of the Afrobarometer public opinion data to create an estimate of local issue priorities using a technique called multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP). I then merge this constituency-level measure of preferences with representative behavior in the allocation and expenditure of discretionary funds for public goods and services to investigate whether representatives address the issues deemed most important by their local constituents.

3.3   Data

Geocoded Afrobarometer Surveys

The data on on local public opinion is derived from the Afrobarometer survey rounds 2 (2003) and 3 (2005). The Afrobarometer surveys a nationally representative sample of respondents across multiple countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Kenya. Rounds 2 and 3 for Kenya sampled 2,398 and 1,278 respondents respectively, and includes questions pertaining to relevant sociopolitical issues in addition to standard demographic and personal characteristics. Using the geocoded version of the survey, combined with the shapefiles for Kenya's parliamentary constituency boundaries,[4] I am able to identify the constituency in which each survey respondent lives. A cartographic distribution of respondents are presented in Figure 3.2.

In both rounds 2 and 3, the Afrobarometer asked respondents to identify the three most important problems that government should address across a host of issue categories. For the purpose of my analysis, I focus on six categories that can be directly mapped on to the categories of expenditures for the constituency development fund: health, security, education, water, agriculture, and roads. I recode these survey responses into a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if the respondent named the issue as one of her top three choices.[5]

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[4]In 2013, Kenya's constitutional amendment that increased the number of parliamentary constituencies from 210 to 290 came into effect. The boundaries I use in this chapter are the older boundaries. These older constituencies were the basis upon which constituency development funds were distributed.

[5]For round 2, I consider an individual as having identified an issue as a priority if they choose the following

Figure 3.2: Location of Afrobarometer Respondents in Kenya, Rounds 2–3

Note: Blue and red points represent the sampling locations where Afrobarometer respondents for rounds 2 and 3 reside. Each sampling location may include multiple respondents. The blue and red points appear darker when there are multiple respondents in the sampling location. Respondents across both rounds cover 150 out of a total of 210 parliamentary constituencies.

Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics on the recoded dichotomous variables. By virtue of the nationally representative sampling strategy of the Afrobarometer, these summary statistics can be interpreted as the proportion of Kenyan adult population who identified each issue category as one of the top three priorities. Across both rounds, health is identified as the single most important issue, with around 35% of total respondents identifying it as one of the important priorities. Education is also considered of importance, with an average of around 25–27% of total respondents consistently rating it as one of their three issues. In contrast to these two categories, the proportion of individuals identifying water as a priority increased

responses to the survey questions q44pt1, 2, and 3. (1) For health, "health" or "AIDS." (2) For security, "crime and security." (3) For education "education." (4) For water "water supply" or "drought." (5) For agriculture "farming/agriculture." (6) For roads, "roads and infrastructure." For round 3, I consider an individual as having identified an issue as a priority if they choose the following responses to the survey questions q63pt1, 2, and, 3. (1) For health, "health", "AIDS" or "Sickness and disease." (2) For security, "crime and security." (3) For education "education." (4) For water "water supply" or "drought." (5) For agriculture "farming/agriculture." (6) For roads, "roads and infrastructure."

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics on Issue Priorities, Afrobarometer Rounds 2 & 3

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Afrobarometer Round2					
Health	2,398	0.367	0.482	0	1
Security	2,398	0.156	0.363	0	1
Education	2,398	0.271	0.445	0	1
Water	2,398	0.145	0.352	0	1
Agriculture	2,398	0.226	0.418	0	1
Roads	2,398	0.093	0.290	0	1
Afrobarometer Round3					
Health	1,278	0.308	0.462	0	1
Security	1,278	0.197	0.398	0	1
Education	1,278	0.254	0.435	0	1
Water	1,278	0.252	0.434	0	1
Agriculture	1,278	0.124	0.329	0	1
Roads	1,278	0.188	0.391	0	1

from 14.5% to 25.2%; this is likely to be a result of the serious drought experienced across Kenya in the year of data collection for round 3. A similarly significant increase is observed for roads, which increased from a mere 9.3% in round 2 to 18.8% in round 3. e

Discretionary Expenditures on Public Goods in Kenya

To test politician responsiveness, I rely on outcome data that has not been used by analyses of representation: public funds allocated to members of parliament for the purpose of meeting local demands for public goods and services, otherwise known more commonly as the constituency development fund (CDF). The CDF in Kenya devolves 2.5% of national revenues to parliamentary constituencies in accordance with a formula that distributes 75% of the total sum equitably, and the remaining 25% allocated based on a poverty index. The institutional structure of the CDF system allows members of parliament (MPs) to effectively control how the funds are disbursed; they are responsible for appointing members of the CDF committee who oversees project selection and funds allocation, and preside over the committee meetings as the chair (Cheeseman, 2006; Harris and Posner, 2017). The CDF should therefore be conceived as a "pot" of discretionary funds allocated to the local incumbent MP to serve the development needs of their constituents.

The decision to use this outcome, rather than measures of politician behavior in the legislature such as the introduction and sponsorship of bills or their roll coll activities and (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Truex, 2016), is based two observations: first, it is based on findings of earlier work that the electorate in the developing world, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, tend evaluate politicians based on their ability to deliver public goods and services to their

Figure 3.3: Proportion of CDF Spent Across Categories, Kenya 2005–2008

Note: Data is drawn Arriola et al. (N.d.). The bars represent the average proportion of the constituency development funds (CDF) used across each expenditure category between 2005 and 2008.

constituents (Harding, 2015; Conroy-Krutz, 2013). It is also a response to the conventional wisdom that African democracies are executive dominant systems in which the legislature and legislators who constitute them do little but to "rubber stamp" the activities of the dominant executive branch (the presidency) (Van de Walle, 2002; Barkan, 2009*a*).

The data set for CDF expenditures reports the allocation and disbursement of CDF funds at the constituency level across ten broad expenditure categories between the period of 2003 to 2010: public health, water, education, roads, agriculture, security, bursaries (scholarships for students), administration, emergency, and other (expenditure for projects that cannot be classified into one of the nine previous categories. These categories are based on project-level expenditure reports that are submitted yearly by the constituency CDF board to the national CDF board, and audited by the Auditor General's Office of Kenya.

From this data set, I take category expenditures for health, security, education, water, agriculture, and roads to serve as the outcome for the responsiveness analysis because as discussed earlier, these issues were available as the choice items in the Afrobarometer survey questions on respondent issue priorities. Figure 3.3 descriptively presents the mean cross-category expenditures for the time period between 2005 and 2008 which will be used as the outcome because they *follow* the collection of data for Afrobarometer rounds 2 and 3, which I use to generate estimates for local issue priorities. As is clear from the figure, the

Figure 3.4: CDF Category Expenditures over Time, Kenya 2005–2008

(a) Health (b) Security (c) Education

(d) Water (e) Agriculture (f) Roads

Note: Data is drawn Arriola et al. (N.d.). The bars represent the average proportion of the constituency development funds (CDF) used across each expenditure category over time.

single largest expenditure category for the CDF education, for which around 40.5% total CDF expenditures were allocated. This is striking, given that statutory regulations for the CDF in Kenya prohibits CDF committees to dedicate in excess of 15% of total expenditures to projects on education. The next largest category of expenditures is related to the provision of water, which mainly involves the construction of wells and boreholes for the local community. This account for 12.2% of the total sum. Spending on health and roads follow closely with between 7–9% of expenditures being used in each.

Interesting patterns emerge when I disaggregate the spending patterns over time. As presented in Figure 3.4, spending as a proportion of total expenditure for all categories with the exception for security sees a steady decline over time. This decline is indicative of a broader pattern in the data that reflects the CDF funds being diverted to more categories that are targetable (bursaries) and even fungible (administrative, other) from the public goods categories presented here, as pointed out by Arriola et al. (N.d.).

3.4 Estimating Constituency Level Issue Priorities

The first required component of testing congruence between local issue priorities and legislator behavior is to estimate valid measures of constituency-level issue priorities. The most intuitive way of doing this would be to disaggregate the nationally-representative public opinion data to the constituency level, taking in to account weights used in the sampling design of the Afrobarometer. However, this approach is likely to be problematic to implement with nationally representative surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, given that they seldom have enough survey observations to disaggregate, especially down to a lower level of aggregation such as the constituency (Warshaw and Rodden, 2012).[6] This can make the estimates highly imprecise (Hurley and Hill, 2003; Lax and Phillips, 2009).

Two solutions for this problem have been proposed; first, some scholars argue that the precision of the estimates can be improved by pooling responses from multiple surveys (Brace et al., 2002; Gibson, 1992). So long as there are a similar battery questions that can be compared across surveys, and one can plausibly assume that there is a certain level of temporal stability as to the preferences of the respondents, this is likely to boost the number of survey observations from which we can estimate local issue preferences. Whereas assuming temporal stability across surveys (or survey rounds) can be problematic if the surveys are too far apart, this concern is unlikely to be an issue for the purposes of this analysis; the data collection for the two rounds of the geocoded Afrobarometer surveys (round 2 and round 3) I use in the analyses happened within two years of each other in 2003 and 2005. Furthermore, both rounds included identical questions asking respondents to identify the their priority over local issues, with consistent wording for both the question itself and the response categories presented to respondents. I therefore capitalize on this solution and pool responses from both rounds.

The pooling of observations across survey rounds, however, is unable to completely resolve the issue of the limited number of observation per constituency. With a two-round combined total of 3,676 observations over a total of 210 constituencies in Kenya, there are on average 17.5 observations per constituency.[7] I therefore also implement a technique that scholars studying representation in the US context have used to derive local estimates of issue preferences or priorities called multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP, or more colloquially referred to as Mister P) (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Lax and Phillips, 2009; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012). MRP combines public opinion data and detailed census information reduce the uncertainty of local estimates.

The first step of implementing MRP is to develop a model of constituency-level issue priorities for an individual using demographic and geographic information from the Afrobarometer surveys. The Afrobarometer provides detailed information on respondent age, gender, level of education, and whether they reside in an urban or rural household, as well as the

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[6]The number of observations for a single round of the Afrobarometer ranges from between 1,200–2,400 depending on country-round.

[7]This is not to say that there are survey observations for every single constituency; across the survey rounds, there are observations for 150 out of 210, or 71% of constituencies.

geocoordinates of their residence. It also provides information on the top three issues (from a range of social issues) that respondents identify as the most pressing issue in need of resolution that can be matched to the sectoral allocation of the discretionary spending of Kenyan members of parliament. The five categories are public health, security, education, water, and agriculture. The decennial census of Kenya, implemented in 1999 and 2009, can be aggregated up to derive estimates on the constituencies, including the distribution of demographic categories in the constituency, levels of education, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, levels of poverty, as well as an assortment of other characteristics.

Using this data, I follow the convention in the MRP literature and estimate a varying intercept multilevel linear model of individual issue priorities Y_i, with indexes d, e, t, c, and r representing which age-gender combination category (demographic) each individual belongs to, level of education, ethnicity, constituency, and province respectively;

$$\Pr(y_i) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\beta_0 + \alpha_{d[i]}^{\text{dem}} + \alpha_{e[i]}^{\text{edu}} + \alpha_{u[i]}^{\text{urb}} + \alpha_{t[i]}^{\text{eth}} + \alpha_{c[i]}^{\text{cons}} + \alpha_{p[i]}^{\text{prov}}) \tag{3.1}$$

The the terms after the intercept are models for the various groups of respondents:

$$\alpha_d^{\text{dem}} \sim \text{N}(0, \sigma_{\text{dem}}^2), \quad \text{for} \quad d = 1, ..., 10 \tag{3.2}$$

$$\alpha_u^{\text{urb}} \sim \text{N}(0, \sigma_{\text{urb}}^2), \quad \text{for} \quad d = 1, 2 \tag{3.3}$$

$$\alpha_e^{\text{edu}} \sim \text{N}(0, \sigma_{\text{edu}}^2), \quad \text{for} \quad d = 1, ..., 4 \tag{3.4}$$

$$\alpha_t^{\text{eth}} \sim \text{N}(0, \sigma_{\text{eth}}^2), \quad \text{for} \quad d = 1, ..., 8 \tag{3.5}$$

That is, each is modeled as drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and some estimated variance. This means that each demographic category and education level type has its own intercept, but does not allow individual-level variables to vary geographically. The age-gender combination is an interaction between five age categories (<29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, >60) and gender, for a total of ten categories. There are four categories for the education variable (did not complete primary, completed primary, some secondary or high school completed, and graduated high school or above). The constituency effects are modeled as a function of the constituency level estimates of ethnic fractionalization (elf), and the proportion of individuals living in poverty (pov):[8]

$$\alpha_c^{\text{cons}} \sim \text{N}(\theta^{\text{elf}} \cdot \text{elf}_c + \gamma^{\text{pov}} \cdot \text{pov}_c, \sigma_{\text{cons}}^2), \quad \text{for} \quad d = 1, ..., 210 \tag{3.6}$$

The province variable is its own modeled effect as:

$$\alpha_p^{\text{prov}} \sim \text{N}(0, \sigma_{\text{prov}}^2), \quad \text{for} \quad d = 1, ..., 8 \tag{3.7}$$

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[8]These predictors not only maybe of theoretical interest, but can function to reduce any unexplained locality-level variation, helps for the purpose of improving precision on the estimates (Gelman and Hill, 2007)

From the coefficients from the multilevel models, I generate predicted values of $\widehat{Y}$ of issue priority for the 16,800 types (210 constituencies, ten gender×age demographic categories, four education level categories, and two urban/rural categories). For each constituency, I then weight the predicted value by its proportion in the population based on the 1999 10% census for Kenya, to post-stratify. The final issue priority measure M is the sum of the weighted predicted values for each of the types.

Figure 3.5: Proportion of residents identifying each issue area as a local priority

(a) Health

(b) Security

(c) Education

(d) Water

(e) Agriculture

(f) Roads

Note: Figure shows the issue priority scores (proportion of individuals estimated to identify each issue as one of the top 3 priorities) for each of the following areas: health, security, education, water, agriculture, and roads. Estimates are derived by combining round 2 and 3 of the Afrobarometer for Kenya and the 1999 Kenyan census, using multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP).

In order to verify that the MRP estimates that I derive from this setup do not rely excessively on the assumptions regarding the preference model, I also constructed estimates based on specifications with and without individual-level demographic categories, and urban-rural status, as well as the covariates at the constituency-level. The correlation across these different MRP scores for each constituency are very high, ranging from 0.852 to 0.937 across the five issue areas.

Figure 3.5 presents the distribution of the proportion of individuals who identify each issue as one of the three most important problems facing their locality. On average, respondents tend to identify health (35.6%) or education (27.2%) as an important local issue priority in comparison to issues such as agriculture (19.3%), water (18.1%), and security (16.6%). The small variance (or spread) for health and education also suggest that respondents point to each of this issues as an important issue at a high rate, consistently *across* constituencies. The spread of the security, water, and agriculture is larger, suggesting that the proportion of respondents who identify these issues as priorities vary significantly across constituencies. This is consistent with our expectations these three issues are more likely differentially affect localities based on the *type* of constituency; for example, agriculture is will be identified as a much more salient issue in rural areas where the primary source of income for constituents is based on agriculture and farming, in comparison to urban constituencies that rely more extensively on commerce or secondary or tertiary sector industries. Similarly, the high variance observed for security is likely to be symptomatic of the geography of security in Kenya, where northeastern regions bordering Somalia or pastoralist communities in the north have traditionally been vulnerable to more local / communal violence than others.

3.5 Investigating Congruence

With the local issue priority estimates in hand, I can proceed to examining whether these estimates are systematically related to the behavior of MPs in terms of CDF expenditures. The six scatterplots in Figure 3.6 shows the outcome, in-category expenditure as a proportion of total CDF spending in a given constituency (Y_c) against the issue priority score (P_c) at the constituency level estimated using MRP. To restrict the excessive influence of extreme values, I removed outliers in the 99th percentile of the issue priority score for each issue category. The scatterplots also includes a linear fit, based on the model $Y_c = \alpha + \beta \cdot P_c + \epsilon_c$ for each of the six issue categories. Congruence between the issue priority and in-category spending would require that the coefficient (β) for be greater than zero. A negative coefficient or a coefficient that is indistinguishable from zero would suggest that the spending decisions of MPs do not conform / align with the priorities of their constituents.

Figure 3.6: Bivariate Relationship between Issues and CDF Expenditures

(a) Health   (b) Security   (c) Education

(d) Water   (e) Agriculture   (f) Roads

Note: The scatterplots depict the bivariate relationship between issue priorities scores estimated via MRP and in-category spending as a proportion of total CDF expenditures for each constituency.

The scatterplots in Figure 3.6 shows limited evidence for congruence: with the exception for security and water, for which β is weakly positive and statistically distinguishable from zero at $p<0.01$, the correlation between issue priority scores and in-category spending are statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels in the four remaining categories.

While the bivariate correlations are suggestive of limited congruence, I subject this finding to a more systematic tests that controls for influence other potential confounding factors on the proportion of total expenditure spent for each issue category. Specifically, I estimate constituency-level multivariate regression model where I include control for a set of constituency-level covariates (D_c), as well as the attributes of the incumbent MP of the con-

stituency (I_c). [9]

$$Y_c = \alpha + \beta_1 P_c + \beta_2 D_c + \beta_3 I_c + \epsilon_c \tag{3.8}$$

Table 3.2: Congruence between Issue Priorities and CDF Expenditures

	Dependent variable: % CDF Expenditure Allocated to Sector					
	Health	Security	Education	Water	Agriculture	Roads
Issue Priority Score	0.098	0.192	0.056	0.299***	0.014	0.219
	(0.129)	(0.160)	(0.222)	(0.058)	(0.018)	(0.151)
Constituency Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislator Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	208	210	210	209	208	210

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

The results from the set of regressions are presented in Table 3.2. As is clear from the table, the multivariate analyses largely replicate the findings of the bivariate analyses; there seems to be a moderate amount of congruence for spending related to the provision of water, where the coefficient for the issue priority score remains positive and significant at conventional levels of statistical significance even after the inclusion of the extensive set of controls. However, the congruence observed for the security category in the bivariate relationship is no longer found in the multivariate analysis. In line with the bivariate analyses, the remaining four categories—health, education, agriculture, and roads—shows no evidence of congruence, as the coefficient for issue priority fails to be distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Overall, these analyses suggest that in Kenya, public perceptions of issue priorities have limited association with the behavior of politicians in Kenya.

3.6 The Moderating Influence of Political Competition

The theory of politician responsiveness outlined in the previous chapter also made clear predictions about the moderating influence that local electoral competition is likely to have on the responsiveness of politicians. In localities where parties hold a local monopoly on political competition, party leaders are able to leverage the "nomination tournament" to divert politician effort away from pursuing a constituency-oriented strategy towards a party-oriented strategy with minimal risk of losing the seat. On the other hand, party leaders are unable to

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[9]The constituency-level covariates included in the regression are constituency poverty rates, total amount of CDF disbursed to the constituency, proportion of constituency land area dedicated to agriculture, total conflict count and number of fatalities. The legislator attributes included were party affiliation, gender, and the number of terms served in office.

do so in localities in which the party faces a realistic chance of losing the seat to a viable challenger party; party leaders must instead allow their politicians to use of a constituency-oriented strategy so that they are able to cultivate a personal vote. The party then must capitalize on the personal vote accumulated by the politician, in addition to local support for the party itself, and hope that the combination of these two bases of support will propel them to victory come election day. According to this logic, politicians (in this case incumbent MPs) are likely to be more responsive to constituent preferences in competitive constituencies, and less likely to be responsive to them in party strongholds.

Figure 3.7: Incumbent Margin of Victory in Parliamentary Elections, Kenya 2002

Note: Data is drawn from the parliamentary electoral returns for the 2002 general elections announced by the Electoral Commission of Kenya. The dashed red line is the mean margin of victory (37.2% points) for the incumbent across all constituencies.

In order to test these predictions, I disaggregate the multivariate analysis from the preceding subsection by the level of interparty electoral competition at the constituency level. Specifically, I draw on constituency-level returns from the 2002 Kenyan parliamentary elections, and calculate the margin of victory for the incumbent MP (and therefore, the party), which I use as a measure to capture the effect of local interparty competition. The distribution of the margin of victory variable is presented in Figure 3.7. As is clear from the figure, Kenyan parliamentary elections, unlike presidential elections, are largely uncompetitive affairs, with a large majority of constituencies affording wide margins of victory for a single candidate over their competitors; the mean margin of victory for the elections stands at 37.5 percentage points, which means that on average, the winning candidate took the constituency with a 65-35 split.

Using the margin of victory, I create a dichotomous variable for competitive constituencies that takes a value of 1 if the margin of victory for the winning candidate was less than or equal to 15 percentage points and 0 otherwise. I choose to dichotomize the variable rather using the continuous margin of victory variable because the logic of the nomination tournament renders predictions regarding a *marginal* effect of local political competition. I then generate a variable that interacts this dichotomous "competitive" variable with the issue priority score so as to investigate association between IPS and CDF spending conditional on the level of local competition. I then estimate a variation of the regression equation 3.8 using linear regression:

$$Y_c = \alpha + \beta_1 P_c + \beta_2 L_c + \beta_3 P_c L_c + \beta_4 D_c + \beta_5 I_c + \epsilon_c \tag{3.9}$$

where L_c is the dummy for local competitiveness in the previous election, and $P_c L_c$ denotes the interaction term between IPS and local competition. The remainder of the specification remains unchanged from the base analysis. Results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Congruence by Level of Local Political Competition

	Dependent Variable: % CDF Spending Allocated to Sector					
	Health	Security	Education	Water	Agriculture	Roads
Issue Priority Score(IPS)	0.087	0.118	0.012	0.313***	0.002	0.271
	(0.160)	(0.181)	(0.237)	(0.060)	(0.017)	(0.169)
Competitive	−0.089	−0.050***	−0.532***	0.022	−0.012	0.042
	(0.109)	(0.018)	(0.194)	(0.042)	(0.010)	(0.057)
IPS × Competitive	0.220	0.242***	2.391***	0.048	0.099**	−0.379
	(0.305)	(0.090)	(0.788)	(0.357)	(0.032)	(0.448)
Constituency Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislator Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	208	210	210	209	208	210

Note: The variable for locally competitive constituency is dichotomous and takes on a value of 1 if the margin of victory in the prior election was less than 15% points. Results remain unchanged alternate cutoffs are applied for the competition variable (10%p, 20%p). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

The results partially corroborate the theoretical expectations regarding the spending behavior of parliamentarians. In categories such as health, and roads, disaggregating the effect by the level of local electoral competition fails to reveal a conditional effect of issue priorities. The coefficient for the interaction term for these categories are statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of significance, which is indicative of an unconditional pattern of unresponsiveness to constituent preferences.

Results regarding security, education, and agriculture, on the other hand, reveal some interesting insights. While the overall congruence between constituent perceptions of security as a priority and CDF spending in security correlated poorly in the main analysis, results in Table 3.3 suggest that there is congruence for the security concentrated in competitive constituencies; the coefficient for the interaction term (β_3) is positive, and is statistically significant at p<0.01. Similar findings emerge for the issue of education. Whereas the main analysis found little evidence of congruence, the interaction term for the issue priority score and competition is substantively large and statistically significant at p<0.01, indicating a congruence in competitive constituencies. These findings are replicated in the agriculture sector as well, where the interaction term is again positive and statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. The exception to this broad pattern of overall incongruence and limited congruence in competitive constituencies is found for the water sector, where the main analysis revealed congruence. The analysis in Figure 3.3 also shows that the congruence for water is unconditional, and that constituencies higher levels of electoral competition do not have higher levels of congruence in comparison to constituencies without.[10]

3.7 Summary

Perceptions that politicians are unresponsive to their constituents, despite the regularization of elections over time, are pervasive across many African democracies. Yet due to data restrictions, these perceptions have seldom been subject to empirical validation. This chapter has focused on investigating the extent to which these perception are warranted. Exploiting multiple rounds of public opinion data and panel data on the resource allocation behavior of incumbent parliamentarians in Kenya, I adopted methods widely used by scholars of representation in consolidated democracies to examine the levels of congruence between estimated local issue priorities and how incumbent parliamentarians allocate and spend a discretionary fund dedicated for local development. In the full sample, the analysis revealed that in line with widespread perceptions, that there is limited concordance between constituent preferences and politician behavior; with the exception of one of the six issue areas I investigate, the correlation between the proportion of constituents who identified a specific development issue exhibits no correlation with how much the incumbent parliamentarian allocates spending to the said category. Upon further scrutiny, the data also reveals some evidence of congruence concentrated in electoral units with higher levels of local interparty competition. Yet the congruence in a small subset of these competitive constituencies is overshadowed by the incongruence in a large majority of constituencies in which there is no such competition.

This chapter has attempted to empirically document the pattern of representation that motivates this dissertation. In subsequent chapters, I carefully trace the processes through which this pattern—the deficit in politician responsiveness–comes to manifest.

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[10]These results are substantively replicated when I use alternative cutoffs for the local competition variable, as well as different operationalizations based on whether there was inter-party switching in prior elections.

Chapter 4

Political Parties as Gatekeepers

> *"The biggest challenge for MPs is to be renominated as the candidate for their party. Otherwise, it is highly unlikely they will survive the elections."*[1]
> – Guy Scott, Former President of Zambia

The theory of politician (un)responsiveness to voters is built upon the premise that politicians are incentivized to privilege the interests of party leaders, and that these perverse incentives arise because political parties can effectively serve as gatekeepers to the electoral success of politicians. This chapter presents evidence in support of this premise, which has yet to be established in the context of African electoral politics. I argue that politicians seeking elected office at the local level face a key, understudied challenge: successfully obtaining the nomination of the locally-dominant party. A politician with the dominant party's ticket starts with almost an insurmountable lead by virtue of being the candidate of "the party of choice." On the other hand, candidates who attempt to contest elections without the locally favored party's nomination—either as an independent candidate or candidates of other parties—face the near impossible task of courting and winning the support of an electorate that remains strongly loyal to the party.

The argument and evidence presented in this chapter run counter to the prevailing narrative in political science literature regarding political parties in Africa. Existing research has typically characterized African parties as weak institutions that are hastily formed as electoral vehicles for dominant ethnic personalities, are unable to establish strong linkages with the electorate, and consequently fail to regularly contest elections (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Manning, 2005; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Elischer, 2013). Perhaps because of their seemingly ephemeral existence, parties have been considered to have little to no bearing on how politicians cultivate voter support, and whether they eventually emerge victorious come election time (Van de Walle, 2003, 300); Scholars have argued that rather than counting on

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[1]Transcripts of in-person interview with author, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2016.

the capricious loyalty of voters towards parties that may cease to exist after any given electoral cycle, politicians have instead focused on forging direct and personalized connections with voters *independent* of the party they are affiliated with (Lindberg, 2003;Kramon, 2016, 460-462). Such strategies decouple the fate of politicians from that of political parties, and allow politicians to survive the demise of any political party by virtue of their strength as a candidate.

Such a narrative is, however, likely to drastically underestimate the influence of political parties in African political systems and on political candidates, in particular. If party affiliation had little to no consequence on the success of politicians, independent candidates who contest elections without the help of political parties should be able to compete and win against party affiliated candidates without too much difficulty. Yet even a cursory glance at the results for recently concluded subnational elections across Africa suggest that this is hardly the case; political candidates who do not affiliate with parties rarely achieve success in elections. In the recently concluded 2016 Ghanaian elections, not a single independent candidate managed to secure a seat in the 275-member parliament. In Zambia, traditionally considered a country whose political parties and party systems have been chronically weak, less than 10% (or 14 out of the 156) of the unicameral national assembly is currently occupied by independent candidates. And in Kenya, only three independents were elected to positions in 2013 general elections to serve in the bicameral legislature, consisting of a total of 416 seats.[2] [3]

This chapter systematically presents evidence to support the claim that political parties function as gatekeepers to politician success. Using an analysis of nationally representative surveys and electoral returns from African legislative elections, I proceed by first demonstrating the surprising prevalence of partisan attachments across African democracies, and the extent to which they drive voting behavior. I then proceed to examine how such attachments underpin the resilience of political parties in subnational electoral districts such as constituencies for parliamentary elections. I then move on to show how these patterns substantively influence the electoral success of politicians who contest these local level offices. Analyses of electoral returns across six African democracies suggest that party nominations—even more so than the election themselves—are critical in determining whether politicians return to office: less than 10% of the incumbent politicians who fail to obtain renomination by their parties are reelected to office. This contrasts strongly with incumbent politicians who do manage to obtain the nomination of the party, who enjoy reelection rates that exceed 70%.

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[2]The rare exception is Malawi, where independents have consistently fared well in the parliamentary elections. Currently, 27% of the sitting members of the unicameral legislature (or 52 of the total of 196) are unaffiliated with a political party. This marks an increase from the 2009 elections, where 32 members were elected to parliament as independent candidates.

[3]In many African countries, independent candidates face institutional barriers to contesting elections. Countries that have adopted systems of proportional representation or variations thereof frequently mandate that political candidates must appear on party lists to contest in elections. While this does not completely preclude candidates from competing in elections, the fact that voting in these contexts involve voting for a party, rather than a candidate, constitutes a significant challenge. There are, some instances, countries that have in place election laws that legally bar independents from contesting all together: such is the case in Tanzania, and South Africa, and until prior to the 2010 constitutional amendment was also the case in Kenya.

I supplement this with analysis of interviews with current and former politicians who often seemed to be keenly aware of the gatekeeping role that parties play in their quest for electoral survival.

4.1 Myth or Reality? Partisan Attachments in Africa

The centrality of partisan attachments and party labels in the domain of democratic politics remains uncontested. A vast literature in political science, covering both consolidated as well as new democracies, has documented that partisanship functions as a "perceptual screen" through which democratic citizens views the political world (Campbell et al., 1966; Lewis-Beck, 2009; Brader and Tucker, 2001; Samuels, 2006; Achen and Bartels, 2016). Such is the importance of these partisan loyalties in determining the choice of voters that it has often been found to eclipse the effect of factors such as voter evaluations regarding the performance of government and politicians, their issue preferences, and other social identities such as race, ethnicity, and religion (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002, 210–211).

The enthusiasm for the study of mass partisanship, however, has not been met with equal verve amongst students of African politics. Far from it, Africanists have tended to largely dismiss the importance of partisanship, and instead focused on the overshadowing role that social identities such as ethnicity or religion play in driving the behavior of voters participating in electoral politics (Horowitz, 1985, 196; Wantchekon, 2003; Ferree, 2010). At first blush, the general skepticism towards the study of partisan attachments in Africa seems to be well-founded; if partisan loyalties require a semblance of party and party system stability in order to emerge (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002), African democracies hardly provide a hospitable environment for voters to develop these attachments. Scholars of African parties have long demonstrated the organizationally weak nature of political parties, and their inability to regularly and successfully contest in the electoral arena (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Arriola, 2012; Elischer, 2013). Furthermore, if it is the case that partisan loyalties are merely a manifestation of ethno-regional identities (Van de Walle, 2003, 305; Posner, 2005, 217), focusing on the antecedents and consequences of those identities, rather than the partisan attachments themselves, might indeed be a justifiable decision.

Yet there is nonetheless reason to be *skeptical* about the skepticism towards the emergence and stability of partisanship in African democracies. First, there is emerging body of macro-level evidence challenging the notion that parties in Africa are uniformly weak; in an path-breaking contribution, Riedl (2014, 41) demonstrates the immense variation in the level of party system stability across Africa, and argues that in certain countries, parties are "enduring entities that help shape individual partisan identities and structure national, regional, and local competition." Basedau and Stroh (N.d.) shows that political parties in Africa vary significantly in terms of the level of institutionalization, and that parties such as the CCM in Tanzania, BDP in Botswana, and NPP and NDC in Ghana are organizationally strong, enjoy stable ties to society, and act as united entities (Basedau and Stroh, N.d., 16). Second, there is also recent research that demonstrates that partisan attachments, much like partisan identities in consolidated democracies, functions as a perceptual screen that structures how voters

interact with others on a daily basis, as well as how they evaluate politics, economy, and the performance of government. Michelitch (2015) shows that partisans in Ghana demonstrate in-group favoritism towards co-partisans during day-to-day economic interactions: taxi drivers in Accra offer favorable pricing for fares for those who they perceive to fellow co-partisans. Even in the context of Uganda, where conventional wisdom suggests that partisanship is un-likely to be an important factor in politics, Carlson (2016) demonstrates that supporters of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) engage in partisan motivated reasoning in evaluating the quality of public services provided by the government.

Figure 4.1: Partisan Attachments Amongst African Voters, 2002–2014

Note: Data is drawn from the Afrobarometer Survey, rounds 2 (2002/03) – 6 (2013/14). The Afrobarometer survey draws a nationally representative sample of voters from the country in each round. The total number of respondents sampled varies by each country round, fluctuating from 1200 to 2400. The variable "Feel close to a political party" was coded as 1 only when respondents responded "yes" to the question "Do you feel close to any particular political party (Q90A)." Respondents who answered "no," "don't know," or refused to answer the question were coded as 0.

The totality of recent evidence attesting to the existence of conditions favorable to the de-velopment of partisan attachments, as well as the possibility of partisan-motivated reasoning amongst voters, provides the impetus for a possible re-evaluation of the conventional wisdom; do voters in African democracies demonstrate any signs of developing partisan attachments, and does partisanship affect voter behavior?

Figure 4.1 draws on Afrobarometer surveys Rounds 2 (2002/2003) through 6 (2013/2014) to show the level of partisan identification over time across the six African democracies we

considered in preceding chapters.[4] While there are obvious signs of some cross-temporal ebb and flows *within* countries, the overall pattern clearly indicates a surprisingly high level of partisan identification across the board. The average level of partisan identification across all country-survey rounds exceeds 60%, with a high of 69% in round 4 (2008/2009). This is roughly on par or even slightly higher than the proportion of individuals identifying with the Democratic or Republican Party in the United States according to the National Election Studies (NES), and is significantly higher than comparable measures for Latin American democracies reported in the *Latinobarómetro*.[5]

Zambia records the lowest level of partisan identification across all rounds, reaching a high of almost 60% in round 4 (2008/2009) but generally hovering around 50% otherwise. This falls very much in line with the existing work on parties and party systems in Zambia, which have tended to characterize them as the weakest even amongst the African cases (Basedau and Stroh, N.d.; Riedl, 2014). At the other extreme lies Tanzania, which shows extraordinarily high levels of partisan identification throughout the period covered by the Afrobarometer surveys; the average rate of partisan identification is around 75%, with a high of 84% recorded in round 5 (2011/2012). The high levels of identification in Tanzania seems to be primarily driven by strong voter attachment towards the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which consistently exceeds 50% and in some cases reaches close to 70% of the nationally representative samples surveyed. This again echoes the findings of research on the Tanzanian Party System and Tanzanian political parties, which has found the CCM, and to a lesser extent the opposition Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), to be strong parties with established party structures and a loyal partisan following (Weghorst, N.d.; Riedl, 2014; Basedau and Stroh, N.d.). Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, and Malawi fall somewhere in the middle, averaging 60% and 70% across the five survey rounds. The fact that Kenya and Malawi enjoy identification rates that are substantively not far apart from Botswana and Ghana defies our expectations somewhat, given that parties in the first two countries have been considered much weaker organizationally and from the perspective of voter support in comparison to parties in the latter two.

Empirical Analysis of Partisanship and Voting Behavior

The preceding descriptive analysis strongly suggests that partisan attachments in Africa might not be a myth but rather an "empirical reality." Yet the high rates of identification presented

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[4]The Afrobarometer surveys draws a nationally representative sample of individuals to track their opinion on various aspects of politics and governance, including their partisan orientations. The question regarding partisanship asks respondents whether they "feel close to *any* particular political party", regardless of *which* party they feel close to. The specific sample sizes for each country round for the partisanship question are as follows: Ghana (R2=1200, R3=1197, R4=1200, R5=2400, R6=2400), Kenya (R2=2400, R3=1278, R4=1107, R5=2400, R6=2400), Tanzania (R2=1200, R3=1248, R4=1208, R5=2400, R6=2386), Zambia (R2=1199, R3=1200, R4=1200, R5=1200, R6=1199), Botswana (R2=1200, R3=1200, R4=1200, R5=1200, R6=1200), Malawi (R2=1200, R3=1200, R4=1200, R5=2407, R6=2400).

[5]It is worth noting that the wording of the survey item used to measure partisan identification in the Afrobarometer survey differs somewhat from approaches taken by surveys in the United States, Europe, or Latin America. It is therefore necessary to exercise caution in conducting cross-regional comparisons.

in Figure 4.1 by themselves are meaningless unless such partisan loyalties have behavioral implications. Will these partisan attachments, for example, determine voting behavior to the extent that they do in other regional contexts? Do the effects of partisanship on vote choice in Africa remain substantively important even after accounting for other known determinants of vote choice such as co-ethnicity (Wantchekon, 2003; Ferree, 2010) and retrospective evaluations of government/politician performance (Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Carlson, 2015; Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon, 2016)?

Table 4.1: Vote Choice Amongst Partisan Voters in Africa, 2013–2014

Country	Incumbent Party (%)	Opposition Party (%)
Ghana	74.38 (23.75)	92.09 (27.42)
Kenya	95.27 (24.70)	92.74 (23.57)
Tanzania	93.07 (55.65)	89.84 (12.78)
Zambia	85.95 (25.52)	91.36 (13.51)
Botswana	93.71 (43.75)	90.31 (16.33)
Malawi	89.11 (16.46)	92.16 (24.46)

Note: Data is taken from Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 (2013/2014). Entries are the proportion of partisan supporters of the largest incumbent or opposition party who intend to vote for the corresponding party's presidential candidate, with the percentage of the voters identifying with the party in parentheses. The incumbent and opposition parties included for each country are as follows: Ghana (NDC, NPP), Kenya (TNA, ODM), Tanzania (CCM, CHADEMA), Zambia (PF, UPND), Botswana (BDP, BCP), Malawi (PP, DPP).

In order to answer these questions, I first present descriptive data showing the concordance of self-reported partisan identification and vote choice in the presidential elections. One of the most important ways in which partisan attachments can structure politics is to affect how partisans vote in elections. And given the salience and prominence of presidential elections in African democracies, observing the extent to which partisan loyalties affect presidential vote choice is likely to be a critical first test for demonstrating its broader influence.

Table 4.1 leverages round 6 of the Afrobarometer surveys to calculate the proportion of partisans of both the incumbent party and the largest opposition party that reported their intention to vote for the presidential candidate of their own party.[6] [7] The numbers presented suggest that partisan voters in African democracies are extremely loyal towards their

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[6]I define the incumbent party as the party occupying the presidency at the time the Afrobarometer survey Round 6 was administered in the country. The analysis is restricted to the two largest parties despite the existence of multiple political parties in all of the countries in the sample. This is both for the ease of exposition, but is also based on the fact that the two largest parties frequently obtain more than 70% of the presidential vote share across the countries considered.

[7]The incumbent and opposition parties included for each country are as follows: Ghana (National Democratic Congress, New Patriotic Party), Kenya (The National Alliance, Orange Democratic Movement),Tanzania

party. With the exception of partisans of Ghana's incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC), more than 85% of partisans report their intention to vote for their party's presidential candidates.[8] The concordance rates are no different across partisans of the incumbent and opposition parties. For example, supporters of Kenya's largest opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement, report their willingness to support the party's presidential candidate, Raila Odinga more than 92% of the time. Across the aisle, more than 95% of the incumbent The National Alliance's (TNA) partisans report their intention to vote for their party's presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta. There is also no evidence that countries typically associated with weak party systems and high electoral volatility have lower levels of concordance between partisan identification and vote choice: even in Zambia and Malawi, ranked by Riedl (2014, 41) as having the lowest level of party system institutionalization, have concordance rates that are no different from countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, and Botswana that are considered much better institutionalized party systems.

While the high rates of concordance are certainly suggestive of a strong effect, it is still unclear whether the correlation between partisanship and vote choice will remain unaltered after accounting for the effect of a host of factors that have been long established to be correlated with both partisanship and vote choice. I therefore subject the correlation between partisan identification and vote choice to a harder test by estimating vote choice models using the same data for the same incumbent and opposition parties with a full set of controls.[9] The controls include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is a part of the party's ethnic base (where applicable),[10] dummies for i) whether the respondent evaluated positively the performance of the incumbent president, ii) whether the country is headed in the right direction, iii) sociotropic evaluations of the national economy, iv) pocket evaluations of his/her own economic circumstances. I also include a set of controls for the respondent's individual characteristics, including level of education, gender, age, and urban/rural residential status. In light of the recent evidence that finds the ethnicity of the interviewer affects the answers that African survey respondents give, I also include enumerator fixed effects (Adida, Ferree, Posner and Robinson, 2016). The results are presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.

Findings from the analyses are clear: partisan identification is a strong predictor of vote choice even in a multivariate framework. Across all of the models estimated, the partisan identification variable is substantively large and statistically significant at $p<0.01$. The size of

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(Chama cha Mapinduzi, Chama cha Democrasia na Maendeleo), Zambia (Patriotic Front, United Party for National Development), Botswana (Botswana Democratic Party, Botswana Congress Party), Malawi (People's Party, Democratic Progressive Party)

[8]The figures reported in the table are high even compared to similar numbers reported by Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002, 17) for partisan voters in the United States between 1952–1996, who have rarely supported their own party's candidates at such rates. Given the wide-established centrality of partisanship in the United States, the extraordinarily high concordance rates in Africa is especially surprising.

[9]While the vote choice variable is a dichotomous variable, I use the linear probability model to estimate these vote choice models for ease of interpretation. The results presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 remain substantively unchanged when I estimate the vote choice model using logistic regression.

[10]I code this variable based on multiple sources of information, including the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011), Elischer (2013), Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) as well as a variety of media sources.

Table 4.2: Partisan Identification and Vote Choice in Kenya and Ghana, 2013–14

| | *Outcome: Presidential Vote Choice* | | | |
| | Kenya | | Ghana | |
	(1) Incumbent	(2) Opposition	(3) Incumbent	(4) Opposition
Party Identification	0.611***	0.796***	0.549***	0.710***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Party's Ethno-regional Base	0.215***	0.039*	0.017	0.078***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Performance and Evaluation				
Presidential Performance	0.136***	–0.075***	0.163***	–0.130***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Direction of the Country	0.079***	–0.006	0.055***	–0.025
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Sociotropic Econ. Evaluation	–0.035*	–0.011	0.056**	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Pocketbook Econ. Evaluation	0.015	–0.012	–0.001	–0.003
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Respondent Characteristics				
Education	0.013	0.002	–0.017	0.003
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Female	–0.004	–0.001	–0.016	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Age	–0.000	–0.000	–0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban	–0.013	0.016	–0.016	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Constant	0.047	0.111***	0.023	0.090*
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.047)
Observations	2,397	2,397	2,400	2,400
Adjusted R^2	0.593	0.705	0.541	0.567

Note: Data is drawn from Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 (2013/2014). The incumbent and opposition parties included for each country are as follows: Ghana (NDC, NPP), Kenya (TNA, ODM). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, *$p<0.1$.

the partisan identification variable ranges from 0.549 for Ghana's incumbent party in 2013/14 NDC and 0.833 for Tanzania's opposition party in 2013/14 CHADEMA after including the full set of controls. While factors such as the respondent's evaluation of presidential performance, perception of whether the country is headed in the right direction, as well as a respondent's sociotropic evaluation of the national economy are often statistically associated with vote choice, they do little to affect the correlation between party ID and vote choice.

Table 4.3: Partisan Identification and Vote Choice in Tanzania and Zambia, 2013–2014

	Outcome: Presidential Vote Choice			
	Tanzania		Zambia	
	(1) Incumbent	(2) Opposition	(3) Incumbent	(4) Opposition
Partisan Identification	0.705***	0.833***	0.596***	0.741***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Party's Ethno-regional Base			0.061**	0.059**
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Performance and Evaluation				
Presidential Performance	0.111***	–0.045***	0.179***	–0.070***
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Direction of the Country	0.045***	–0.015	0.034	–0.011
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Sociotropic Econ. Evaluation	0.057**	–0.001	0.033	0.032*
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Pocketbook Econ. Evaluation	–0.009	–0.001	–0.005	–0.016
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Respondent Characteristics				
Education	–0.058***	0.039***	–0.003	0.011
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Female	0.034***	0.010	–0.000	–0.012
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Age	–0.000**	–0.000	0.000	–0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban	–0.034**	0.016	–0.021	–0.032*
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Constant	0.118***	0.038	0.063	0.062
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.063)	(0.047)
Observations	2,386	2,386	1,199	1,199
Adjusted R^2	0.619	0.617	0.472	0.571

Note: Data is drawn from Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 (2013/2014). The incumbent and opposition parties included for each country are as follows: Tanzania (CCM, CHADEMA), Zambia (PF, UPND). The ethno-regional base variable is omitted for the parties in Tanzania as the literature suggests that the incumbent and opposition parties lack as clearly ethnic or regional basis of support. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 4.4: Partisan Identification and Vote Choice in Botswana and Malawi, 2013–2014

	Outcome: Presidential Vote Choice			
	Botswana		Malawi	
	(1) Incumbent	(2) Opposition	(3) Incumbent	(4) Opposition
Partisan Identification	0.677***	0.818***	0.705***	0.790***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Party's Ethno-regional Base			0.014	0.034**
			(0.018)	(0.017)
Performance and Evaluation				
Presidential Performance	0.119***	–0.017	0.129***	–0.054***
	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Direction of the Country	0.089***	–0.046***	0.033**	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Sociotropic Econ. Evaluation	–0.007	0.026	0.037**	–0.028
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Pocketbook Econ. Evaluation	0.044*	–0.008	–0.007	0.018
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Respondent Characteristics				
Education	–0.067***	0.043***	0.009	–0.000
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Female	0.019	0.001	0.005	0.022**
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	–0.000	–0.000	0.000	–0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban	–0.016	0.028	–0.024	–0.015
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	0.113*	0.078*	0.008	0.079**
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Observations	1,200	1,200	2,400	2,400
Adjusted R^2	0.573	0.611	0.625	0.688

Note: Data is drawn from Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 (2013/2014). The incumbent and opposition parties included for each country are as follows: Botswana (BDP, BCP), Malawi (PP, DPP). The ethno-regional base variable is omitted for the parties in Botswana as the consensus in the literature suggests that the incumbent and opposition parties lack as clearly ethnic or regional basis of support. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Most interestingly, the inclusion of ethnicity seems to have almost no substantive im-pact on the correlation between partisanship and vote choice. While the correlation between ethnicity and the vote is relatively robust across countries and specific parties, the size of the coefficients are much smaller in magnitude in comparison to the partisanship variable. Rather than interpret this as a demonstration that ethnicity has a small impact overall in determining

the behavior of voters in African democracies, I contend that this is evidence that showing that ethnicity's relationship with vote choice is primarily mediated through partisanship.[11]

The evidence presented in this section has documented the surprising prevalence of partisan attachments across African democracies. Using nationally representative public opinion data across six African countries, I have shown that on average, more than 65% of voters in identify with or feel close to a political party. Furthermore, these partisan attachments seem to be strongly predictive of voting behavior: on average, almost 90% of partisans report their intention to vote for the party's presidential candidate, and these intentions persist even after controlling for a number of important factors that have been established by prior research as having an impact on voting behavior. These attachments and their broader influence on shaping partisan attitudes and behavior are not restricted to the national political arena: in the following section, I proceed to discuss how such attachments shape electoral outcomes and voting patterns at the local level. The local manifestation of partisan attachments described below have significant implications for the extent to which political parties can serve as gatekeepers to the electoral success of politicians.

4.2   Dominant Parties in Subnational Elections

The analyses in the preceding section has focused on establishing the prevalence of partisan attachments and their implications for political competition on the national level. How do these partisan attachments structure political competition at the local level? While I have shown that partisan voters are highly loyal to their party's presidential candidate in the presidential elections, it remains to be seen whether their partisan attachments will lead them to value party labels and vote in *subnational* elections along party lines. On the one hand, there is ample reason to expect that the strong correlation between partisanship and vote choice at the national level will also be observed in subnational elections. Yet, without additional evidence, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that factors other than partisanship will feature more prominently in the calculus of voters when they face the task of choosing their local representatives.

While subnational elections in Africa have received limited attention among scholars of African poltiics, a few recent studies have lent credence to the idea that factors other than partisanship play an important role in structuring voter behavior in local elections. For example, Conroy-Krutz (2013) and Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon (2016) show that voters attach value to the performance of a political candidate in office. They demonstrate that when provided positive information regarding the performance of legislative candidates in terms of public service delivery or legislative activities while serving in parliament increases voter support for the candidate. Other studies such as Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster (N.d.) and Izama and Raffler (N.d.) demonstrate how factors such as candidate image and perceptions of candidate expertise and competence influences support for the candidates. Through novel

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[11]In separate regression models where partisanship is the dependent variable. While not reported here, I discovered a robust and statistically significant correlation between ethnicity and partisanship.

experimental interventions that feature the screening of debates among candidates contesting for parliamentary office, they show that candidates who are evaluated favorably during the debates experience a meaningful increase in voter support come election time. Baldwin (2013) focuses on the importance of local intermediaries in determining the support for political candidates; she shows that voters who believe the provision of local public goods to require cooperation between politicians and their local chiefs are more inclined to vote for candidates that are supported by their chiefs. Kramon (2016) shows that politician can successfully cultivate political support by offering electoral handouts (engaging in vote-buying) to signal their ability to deliver resources in the future.

All of the studies cited above compellingly established the influence that *non-partisan* factors have in shaping vote choice in subnational elections. These factors are non-partisan in that they pertain to either the latent attributes of a politician, or qualities that politicians can strategically acquire; None of these factors are *inherently* (or by definition) tied to politicians of a particular party. And if the impact of such non-partisan factors are substantively large enough to offset or overcome the importance of partisan identities, one would expect to see voters in subnational electoral districts or constituencies elect politicians who possess these desired attributes or qualities, regardless of their partisan affiliation. In these circumstances, even when national politics is strongly organized around partisanship, local politics has the potential to be decidedly less partisan in nature.

Empirically testing whether there is merit to this possibility, however, is notoriously difficult in the context of Africa. In an ideal situation, the same type of representative survey data that was used in the preceding section to examine partisanship at the national level would exist for subnational electoral districts, which would allow researchers to correlate the partisanship of voters to their vote choice in the local elections.[12] Yet the paucity of locally-representative survey data with coverage across a significant number of these subnational districts makes such an analysis difficult. Subject to these constraints, I instead present in this section evidence from a descriptive analysis of electoral data and qualitative interviews of the politicians competing in these local elections to examine whether partisanship exerts a large influence on subnational electoral competition.

If partisanship had limited influence in determining the outcome of local elections, partisan labels should not be a significant constraint on politicians contesting for lower level offices. Politicians should be able to campaign on the strength of their personal attributes and qualities, and rely on them to carry the day come election time. And if it is these non-partisan factors that are decisive, we should expect to see few electoral districts to consistently fall in the hands of any particular party. On the other hand, if party labels are important in local elections as they are in national elections, under the reasonable assumption that the partisan make-up of subnational electoral units do not shift dramatically from election cycle to

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[12]In so far as the objective is not to demonstrate the causal effect of partisanship but rather observe the empirical correlation between voter partisanship and vote choice in local elections, such survey data would suffice. If the objective was to establish the causal effect of partisanship, one would require either an experimental manipulation of partisanship (which is almost impossible) or the as-if random assignment of partisanship by way of a natural experiment (see Gerber, Huber and Washington (2010) and Poertner (N.d.) for research that uses experimental design to estimate the causal effect of partisan identification in other regional contexts.).

election cycle, our expectation would be to see electoral districts continuously electing candidates from a particular party across election cycles. Which perspective does the subnational electoral patterns in Africa support?

Figure 4.2: Party Reelection Rates at the District Level

Note: Data is drawn from publicly available constituency-level results for parliamentary elections in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. The elections included for each country are as follows: Ghana (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016), Kenya (1997, 2002, 2007), Tanzania (2005, 2010), Zambia (1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016), Botswana (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009), and Malawi (2004, 2009, 2014). Each country includes a different number of elections. I code a party as having been reelected at the district level when the party wins the largest number of votes in the district and is declared the winner, regardless of whether or not the same individual from the previous election ran again in the district. The party reelection rate averages across all of the political parties that have ever competed in elections at the constituency level.

In order to answer this question, I leverage all available parliamentary election returns since the introduction of multiparty competition in the same six African countries.The data covers a total of 25 parliamentary elections, and includes election results for almost 1400 parliamentary district-level contests.[13] I calculate the party reelection rate at the level of the parliamentary electoral district (or constituency), pooling across all the political parties that contested an election for any district in these countries. I code a party as having been reelected (or retained) by voters at the district level if the party wins the seat in the subsequent round

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[13]This is subject to the availability of the electoral returns. The following lists Tanzania no longer publicly shares the parliamentary elections results on their electoral commission website. The only available election results for Tanzania are 2005 and 2010.

of elections, regardless of whether or not the same individual from the previous election ran again as the party candidate in the district. The results from this basic descriptive exercise are presented in Figure 4.2.

Although the overall mean rate for the six countries is quite high at 67%, there seems to be significant variation in the average party reelection rate across individual countries. At one end of the spectrum, Tanzania, Botswana, Ghana have party reelection rates that are high, at 92% and 85% and 78% respectively. Kenya and Zambia form the middle group, each with party-level reelection rates that fall between 50–60% (59% and 54%). At the low end is Malawi, which has a reelection rate that is significantly lower than the mean, at 34%. While the low rates in Malawi and somewhat middling rates observed in Kenya and Zambia may not be the most compelling evidence in support of the importance of party labels, some caveats are in order; first, all of these figures include the reelection rates of minor political parties that gain some representation in one election cycle only to have their electoral support disintegrate in the next election. Second, included in the the reelection rates for Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi is the drastic decline in the electoral support for independence parties that governed through the single party authoritarian era and contested in multiparty elections in the 1990s and early 2000s. These two factors combined are likely to lead us to underestimate the resilience of parties at the local level.

I expand on the preceding analysis in two ways; first, in order to center the analyses around political parties that "matter", I restrict the sample to the largest current incumbent and opposition political parties. The two largest parties in each country together typically occupy more than 80% of the seats in the legislature and represent the most important players in the party system. Using this restricted sample, I disaggregate the results and present the rates by individual parties. This allows an investigation of whether the rates for each country are primarily driven by specific parties or whether they reflect a broader pattern commonly observed across parties. Second, in order to examine whether the party reelection rates display heterogeneity based on whether the electoral districts are traditional strongholds, I disaggregate rates by the party's margin of victory in the previous election at the district level. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.5.

The rates reported in columns (1) and (2) provide more convincing evidence of party strength at the local level: the party-level reelection rates of the largest incumbent and opposition parties are much higher than in the rates drawn from the full sample (as presented in Figure 4.2. With some rare exceptions (DPP and MCP in Malawi / BCP in Botswana), the reelection rates of the two largest parties range from 74% to 100%. Even in Kenya and Zambia, where reelection rates calculated across all of the parties stood between 50–60%, once narrowed down to a the two largest parties, the rates jump to 80–90%. This means that a party which controls the local parliamentary district typically only loses the same district in the subsequent election 10–20% of the time. The average margins of victory for the parties, reported in parentheses, further attest to the electoral strength of these parties. Not only do parties get reelected, they are reelected compellingly: most of the parties in the sample defeated it's closest competitor at the district on average by more than 25% points. In some cases such as the incumbent CCM for Tanzania, the average margin of victory at the constituency level is 46.74% points. In a district where there are two parties are competing for

office, a 46% point margin of victory would require that the vote would be split roughly 73-27 for the incumbent CCM. Even in Ghana, where presidential elections have been often decided with razon-thin margins of victory as close as 0.5% points (in 2008), the average margin of victory for political parties at the district level are around 25–30% points. There is moreover very little evidence to suggest that the reelection rates vary across political parties: with the exception of Botswana, in which the incumbent and opposition parties enjoy starkly different rates of reelection (95% versus 50%), reelection rates are largely similar across the largest incumbent and opposition parties.

Table 4.5: Party Reelection Rates at the District Level Disaggregated by Party

| | **Party Reelection Rates (%)** | | | |
| | Full Sample | | Party Strongholds (Margin $_{t-1}$ >20%p) | |
	Incumbent Party (1)	Opposition Party (2)	Incumbent Party (3)	Opposition Party (4)
Ghana	85.04	74.58	96.75	90.43
	(25.98)	(29.08)	(42.44)	(47.80)
Kenya	80.90	97.26	84.12	98.36
	(29.88)	(30.92)	(43.50)	(48.08)
Tanzania	92.53	100.00	95.06	100.00
	(46.74)	(53.44)	(54.19)	(61.94)
Zambia	88.46	83.63	90.27	82.53
	(31.22)	(37.04)	(40.11)	(49.71)
Botswana	94.91	50.00	98.67	50.00
	(31.21)	(13.12)	(45.70)	(30.67)
Malawi	36.45	54.32	42.86	52.94
	(14.15)	(33.52)	(32.28)	(41.99)

Note: Data is drawn from publicly available constituency-level results for parliamentary elections in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. Reelection rates with the average margin of party victory in the sample in parentheses. The sample of elections included in the analyses and the coding criteria applied to calculate reelection rates are identical to Figure 4.2.

The district-level reelection rates in party strongholds—districts in which the party won with a vote margin that is greater than 20 percentage points in the previous election—are presented in columns (3) and (4). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the party reelection rates strictly increase in the stronghold sample vis-à-vis the full sample in almost all of the cases. Yet it is also worth noting that the increases are relatively marginal. The only substantively large increase in the rates can be observed in Ghana; the reelection rate for the NPP increases around 10% points to almost 97% while the rate for NDC increases 15% points from 75% to 90%.[14] In most other countries, the gains in the reelection rates in the party strongholds,

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[14]The results remain qualitatively similar even when I employ alternate cutoffs (10%, 15%, and 25% point

which constitute between 50–100% of the full sample of election year-district level observations, rarely exceed 4% points. Overall, the relative consistency of figures across the full sample and the stronghold sample suggests that the strength of political parties at the local level are not reflective of a dynamic primarily driven by the party's strongholds.

To present these findings more graphically, I take the two most recent round of electoral data available for each country and plot the reelection status at the district level by party. I show the results for Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, and Botswana in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.[15] [16] The patterns presented strongly corroborate the descriptive analysis presented in Table 4.5.

Consistently across all of the countries, the number of electoral districts in which the party was reelected in the subsequent election vastly outnumber districts in which the party was defeated. In the 2007 Kenyan general elections, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) under Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga managed to retain more than 95% of the seats held by its predecessor, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was the party upon which the ODM alliance was formed prior to the elections. The Party of National Unity (PNU), headed by incumbent president Mwai Kibaki managed to retain most of their seats in their strongholds in Central and Northeastern Province. In the 2009 Botswana general elections, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) held on to all but one of the 43 constituencies they had won in the 2004 previous election, for a reelection rate of 97%. And in the 2016 Zambian general elections, driven by their strength in their strongholds of the Copperbelt and Southern Provinces respectively, both the incumbent Patriotic Front (PF) and the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) managed to retain a large majority of the seats they won in 2011 (83% and 91%).

The strength and resilience of parties at the local level, however, can be aptly demonstrated by the most recent Ghanaian parliamentary elections in 2016; The ailing national economy fomented a strong partisan swing against the National Democratic Congress that ultimately saw the opposition New Patriotic Party clinch the presidency by a margin of almost 10% points, the largest margin of victory since 2000. It is not surprising, given this strong tide against the NDC, that 90% of the seats held by the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) would reelect the NPP's candidate. Yet even in the midst of such a strong partisan tide against

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margins of victory in the previous elections) to classify party strongholds: reelection rates increase only slightly from the full sample.

[15]I do not include the plots for Tanzania and Malawi because a shapefile of the electoral boundaries at the constituency level are unavailable.

[16]I use the 2002 and 2007 election results Kenya even though the constituency-level electoral returns for the 2013 general elections are available in order to maintain comparability with the other countries. This is because between 2007 and 2013, Kenya approved a constitutional amendment which increased the number of electoral constituencies for the National Assembly from 210 to 290. The constituency boundaries were often significantly altered, and thus make tracking the reelection status at the party level more complicated than if the district boundaries remained unaltered. In addition, the two parties included the analysis—the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)—competed in the baseline election under a single electoral alliance but fragmented shortly after the elections were concluded. While candidates competed under the umbrella label of "National Rainbow Coalition" in the baseline year, the individual parties remained intact. I track the reelection status of the constituent parties (DP, which was the party upon which the PNU was founded, and LDP, which was the party upon which the ODM was founded) rather than the coalition.

Figure 4.3: Party Reelection Status in Zambia and Ghana

(a) Zambia: PF Reelection Status by District, 2016

(b) Zambia: UPND Reelection Status by District, 2016

(c) Ghana: NPP Reelection Status by District, 2016

(d) Ghana: NDC Reelection Status by District, 2016

Note: The reelection status of each party at the district level is created by combining the two most recent rounds of electoral returns for Zambia (2011, 2016) and Ghana (2012, 2016). The areas colored in the lightest shade of blue or red represent districts that the particular political party did not hold in the baseline election year. The areas colored in the middle shade show districts that the political party held in the baseline election year but failed to carry in the subsequent election. The areas colored in the darkest shade indicate districts that the political party held in the baseline year and successfully carried in the next election.

them, the NDC still managed to retain 65% of the seats they held in 2012, and more than 90% of the seats in what is commonly perceived as their traditional stronghold in the Volta Region.

Figure 4.4: Party Reelection Status in Kenya and Botswana

(a) Kenya: PNU Reelection Status by District, 2007   (b) Kenya: ODM Reelection Status by District, 2007

(c) Botswana: BDP Reelection Status by District, 2009 (d) Botswana: BNF Reelection Status by District, 2009

Note: The reelection status of each party at the district level is created by combining the two most recent rounds of electoral returns for Kenya (2002, 2007) and Botswana (2004, 2009). The areas colored in the lightest shade of blue or red represent districts that the particular political party did not hold in the baseline election year. The areas colored in the middle shade show districts that the political party held in the baseline election year but failed to carry in the subsequent election. The areas colored in the darkest shade indicate districts that the political party held in the baseline year and successfully carried in the next election.

The analyses presented in this section has examined whether the strength of political parties and the importance of party labels in the national political arena also travels to subnational politics. Patterns of party reelection in subnational electoral units show that parties are highly resilient at the local level: absent a massive loss in partisan support, parties rarely lose control of the districts they won in previous elections. These patterns are observed relatively consis-

tently across the sample of countries and election years analyzed, regardless of whether the parties are incumbent or opposition parties at the national level. While these findings cast doubt on the widely-held perception that partisanship and party labels have little substantive significance in Africa, they are far from patterns that are unique to the region: the local dominance of political parties has widely been documented in the context of the United States (Lee, 2008), Europe (Bawn, 1999), and Latin America (Gibson, 2005; Benton, 2012).

What has seldom been examined among scholars of comparative and African politics are the implications that these patterns of party strength have on the very politicians that contest in these subnational elections and their electoral success. The lacuna is puzzling given the large volume of literature in American politics has established the profound effects that partisan alignment at the local level have on the ideological orientation of the candidates that stand for election as party candidates, their electoral competitiveness in the elections, and their future behavior in office. In the following section, I elaborate on how parties can structure the candidature of these individuals.

4.3 Party Dominance and the Fate of African Politicians

How does the electoral dominance of political parties and the salience of party labels at the local level affect the electoral success of politicians who contest subnational elections? Two equally intuitive and feasible perspectives demonstrates how the strength of parties can be a double-edged sword for incumbent politicians who seek reelection; on the one hand, incumbent politicians may stand to greatly benefit from the local dominance of political parties. If political parties can continuously retain an electoral district with large electoral margins, politicians who contest under that party can, with near certainty, count on the popularity of the party to carry the day. In this sense, parties can be "guarantors" to the successful election and reelection of politicians. Yet on the other hand, the dominance of political parties has the potential to impose significant constraints on these politicians. Those who seek reelection in areas dominated by a single political party possess little option but to compete as the candidate of the dominant party, since running under any other party or as an independent will almost inevitably lead to defeat at the polls. The lack of viable alternative parties increases the reliance of candidates on the dominant party and its candidacy. And it is when the dominant party's candidacy is not guaranteed that a politician's prospects for electoral success is left on highly precarious footing. From this perspective, parties can be characterized as "gatekeepers" to candidate success.

Whether dominant parties primarily function as guarantors or gatekeepers to the electoral success of locally-elected politicians ultimately hinges on how political parties behave with respect to the nomination of party candidates for lower level elections. If political parties reliably renominate incumbent politicians at high rates, parties effectively *guarantee* the reelection of incumbent politicians. If parties more often than not exercise their prerogative to award or deny incumbent politicians the party ticket to recontest, they effectively control the electoral fate of politicians. Which of the two perspectives more accurately captures how parties behave with respect to the renomination of party candidates? In this section, I combine

Figure 4.5: Party Renomination Rates for Members of Parliament in Africa

Note: Data is drawn from publicly available district-level results for parliamentary elections in Ghana,Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. The elections included for each country are as follows: Ghana (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016), Kenya (1997, 2002, 2007), Tanzania (2005, 2010), Zambia(1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016), Botswana (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009), and Malawi (2004, 2009, 2014). I code an MP elected at election time t as having been renominated by the party if the incumbent reappears on ballot as the same party's candidate in the same district at election time (t + 1).

analyses of electoral data used in the previous sections with qualitative evidence from elite interviews to examine which perspective is empirically supported. The evidence lends strong support to latter perspective: parties seem to be acting as gatekeepers rather than guarantors to politician success.

Party Candidacy and the Plight of the African Incumbent

In order to adjudicate between two competing perspectives—parties as guarantors or parties as gatekeepers—it is necessary to examine the behavior of parties with regard to the nomination of party candidates. Fortunately, information included in the electoral returns and the official party nomination lists obtained from the parties themselves enables me to identify whether incumbent politicians were i) able to secure the renomination of the party for which they ran as a candidate in the previous election, ii) unable to secure the renomination of the

party but stood in the general elections as a candidate of a different party, and iii) unable to secure the renomination of the party and ultimately did not compete in the general elections. I use a strict definition of renomination: I code candidates as having been renominated by the party if they secure the party ticket for the same district they represented in the previous election.[17] In cases where redistricting divided or merged constituencies, I code incumbents as having been renominated if they apply for candidacy in the constituencies that were newly created from their original constituencies. I exclude candidates who switch constituencies even when their original constituencies are intact, but these instances are extremely rare ($<0.7\%$).

Figure 4.5 first presents the mean rate of renomination for incumbents for each election year across the six countries in the sample. As is clear consistently across all of the sub-figures, the party renomination of incumbent politicians in these countries is far from given; even in countries such as Ghana and Botswana which have the highest mean rates, incumbent politicians reappear on the ballot as the same party's candidate for the electoral district less than 60% of the time (56% and 54% respectively). At the lower bound is Zambia, where the mean incumbent renomination rate across the six election cycles included in the sample is a mere 33%. This means that on average, two thirds of the Zambian incumbents failed to reappear on the ballot in the subsequent elections as the candidate of the party they contested and won with in the previous election.

While the limited availability of comparative research on party renominations prevent a comprehensive comparison between these figures with those of other countries, the numbers reported here are significantly lower than the rate of renomination for incumbent politicians serving in the United States Congress, only 39 of which have lost their party's nomination from 2000 to 2016. These numbers far underwhelm equivalent figures reported by Farooqui and Sridharan (2014) for the Indian Lok Sabha incumbents between 1991–2009.

To present the results more graphically, I take the two most recent round of electoral data available for each country and plot whether the incumbent politician was renominated as the party's candidate at district level for the largest incumbent and opposition party. I show the results for Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, and Botswana in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Districts shaded in the middle shade of blue or red represent the places that was won by the party, but did not nominate the incumbent politician in the subsequent election. Areas colored in the darkest shade of blue or red denote districts that the party won in the baseline election year, and renominated the incumbent politician for the next elections. The plots largely corroborate the findings from Figure 4.5; both the largest incumbent and opposition parties in the four countries seem to be nominating roughly around half the incumbent politicians to compete in the next election as the party's candidate. The lowest rates of renomination are found in Zambia and Kenya. In the run-up to the 2016 Zambian general elections, both the ruling PF and the opposition UPND renominate their incumbent members of parliament (MP) as the party's candidate around 42%. In Kenya, the ruling PNU renominated around 47% of its incumbent parliamentarians while the opposition retained fewer MPs as their party's candidate at 39%.

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[17]This might be classified as a more restrictive notion of renomination as politicians can change electoral tiers to contest for different types of offices. However, the countries included in the sample of electoral returns, with the exception of Kenya, lacks a higher tier of elections for members of parliament to contest other than the presidency. It is therefore unlikely that politicians are competing for higher level offices.

Figure 4.6: Incumbent Renomination Status in Zambia and Ghana

(a) Zambia: Incumbent Renomination Status, PF

(b) Zambia: Incumbent Renomination Status, UPND

(c) Ghana: Incumbent Renomination Status, NPP

(d) Ghana: Incumbent Renomination Status, NDC

Note: The renomination status incumbent politicians in each party at the district level is created by combining the two most recent rounds of electoral returns for Zambia (2011, 2016) and Ghana (2012, 2016). The areas colored in the lightest shade of blue or red represent districts that the particular political party did not hold in the baseline election year. The areas colored in the middle shade show districts that the political party won in the baseline election year but did not renominate the incumbent in the subsequent election. The areas colored in the darkest shade indicate districts that the political party held in the baseline year and renominate the incumbent as the party's candidate.

On the other hand, the proportion of districts in which the parties renominated their incumbent politicians in Ghana and Botswana seem to be higher than the other two countries. Both the NPP and NDC in Ghana renominated their incumbent MPs as party candidates in more than 60% of the districts they won in 2012. The rates are similar for the BDP and BNF in Botswana, where both parties failed to renominate around 40% of the incumbent MPs in the 2009 general elections.

Figure 4.7: Incumbent Renomination Status in Kenya and Botswana

(a) Kenya: Incumbent Renomination Status, PNU

(b) Kenya: Incumbent Renomination Status, ODM

(c) Ghana: Incumbent Renomination Status, BDP

(d) Ghana: Incumbent Renomination Status, BNF

Note: The renomination status incumbent politicians in each party at the district level is created by combining the two most recent rounds of electoral returns for Kenya (2002, 2007) and Botswana (2004, 2009). The areas colored in the lightest shade of blue or red represent districts that the particular political party did not hold in the baseline election year. The areas colored in the middle shade show districts that the political party won in the baseline election year but did not renominate the incumbent in the subsequent election. The areas colored in the darkest shade indicate districts that the political party held in the baseline year and renominate the incumbent as the party's candidate.

It is also worth highlighting two additional insights that become apparent from the spatial presentation of the data: first, there appears to be no apparent spatial clustering of the districts in which incumbents were renominated. Incumbents are, for example, no more likely to be renominated in the party's traditional strongholds than in swing areas where the opposing party poses a viable threat. Second, there seems to be no systematic differences between incumbent and opposition parties in terms of the extent to which they tend to renominate their incumbent politicians; at most, renomination rates between incumbent and opposition

parties differ by no more than 7% points. This is surprising given the voluminous literature on political parties that highlights the systematic differences between incumbent and opposition parties in African democracies (Basedau and Stroh, N.d.;Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Arriola, 2012).

It is clear from the patterns presented above that incumbent politicians in Africa, unlike their counterparts in other parts of the world, cannot reliably count on their parties to renominate them as the party's candidate in their bid for reelection. Far from it, a significant proportion of incumbent politicians fail to reappear on the ballot as the party's candidate, and this phenomenon is commonly observed across countries and parties. This, I argue, sets up the conditions for parties to function as gatekeepers to politician success.

Electoral Gatekeepers

When asked about their views regarding political parties, politicians of all stripes—incumbents, new aspirants, current, and former—in Africa remain unequivocal and unanimous on one point: that parties possess the capacity to critically influence their political fortunes as locally-elected politicians. Such is the perception that parties can make or break a politician's career that even disgruntled former politicians who had no reservations voicing their hostility towards their former party and its leadership professed that parties were critical to their success. A former politician once aligned with the opposition party in Kenya stated the importance of political parties in particularly clear terms during an interview:

> I cannot deny that there are parties dominating the political scenery in most regions of Kenya. In Central it is Jubilee or TNA. In Nyanza and some parts of Western and the coast it is ODM, and so forth. Because they are so powerful and voters are with these parties, it is almost impossible to run on a different party's ticket and expect to win. [18]

A Deputy Governor elected as a running mate to a governor in an incumbent stronghold in Kenya echoed this sentiment, saying "TNA (The National Alliance) was the dominant party, and it was going to be hard for anyone to win against TNA in this county. APK (Alliance Party of Kenya) said they had a strong gubernatorial candidate but look what happened. We beat them fair and square and by a big margin. Look at the parliamentary seats. Except for one, all of them went to TNA."[19] A Zambian MP in the incumbent Patriotic Front went so far as to say that "running as the candidate of a party that is not popular in the area is like committing career suicide."[20]

Yet despite the widespread consensus regarding the importance of political parties for their success, many politicians were vocal in explaining how challenging it is to be granted the party's candidacy. Indeed, many incumbent politicians lamented the fact that they could

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[18]Interview with former opposition politician, Subject 2015-PO6, conducted February 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[19]Interview with sitting incumbent-aligned Deputy Governor, Subject 2015-PI16, conducted March 2015, Embu, Kenya.

[20]Interview with PF MP, Subject 2016-ZPI2, conducted January 2016, Lusaka, Zambia.

not count on the party to renominate them for the next election.[21] An incumbent MP in Kenya serving a second term attested to the level of anxiety that befalls most incumbent politicians as they approach the next round of elections because of the uncertainty of renomination:

> We have to start running for the next elections a day after the last election. You get to celebrate for one or two days. Do you know why?.... It is so hard to get the party ticket even for me as a sitting MP that I have to start worrying about it immediately.[22]

Some politicians openly admitted that the pressure to obtain the party ticket was so strong that it became their primary concern, sometimes even more so than cultivating support from voters. An opposition MP in Kenya, for example, emphatically stated "You can spend much time connecting with voters at the constituency. That is important because you should listen to the people. But that will all be wasted if you don't receive the party nomination. That is why you have MPs in the main parties focusing so much on ensuring that they can get the party ticket."[23] While this MP's statement is certainly not represent the modal opinion of the politicians interviewed, it does highlight the high stakes of the dominant party's candidacy. At a minimum, most politicians interviewed stressed the importance of balancing the task of obtaining the party's nod to contest and maintaining grassroots support. Another incumbent-aligned MP in Kenya lamented the difficulty of this task, saying "It is so hard. It is very difficult to know how much time to spend in the constituency and how much time to spend in Nairobi as an elected member of the party. It is very time intensive. But we cannot overlook either of them because we need both for reelection."[24]

Incumbent politicians seemed to also be fully aware that even with the amount of effort invested towards obtaining the party candidacy, the odds of being renominated were against them. While none of them were able to discuss specific figures or rates, many of them mentioned that historically a significant proportion of incumbent MPs were denied the party ticket and either forced to retire or seek the seat on a minor party.[25] A politician from an opposition stronghold aptly summarized this common perception as he discussed his peers in parliament, saying "Only a few of my colleagues who came to parliament with me are still my colleagues. Every election, many of us don't come back because the party goes with a different aspirant for their seat. Never underestimate the power of the party."[26]

In many cases, politicians seemed to suggest that their struggles were the manifestation of the political party's wilful actions to "police" or "gatekeep" which of their party-affiliated

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[21]Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO18 conducted April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya; Interview with ruling party incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PI31, conducted May 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[22]Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO18 conducted April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[23]Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO21, April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[24]Interview with ruling party incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PI33, conducted May 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[25]Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO21, April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya; Interview with ruling party incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PI31, conducted May 2015, Nairobi, Kenya; Interview with former opposition politician, Subject 2015-PO6, conducted February 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[26]Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO24, April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

politicians should be retained.[27] At the core of this idea is that parties have both the *will* and *ability* to influence who gets renominated. While many politicians did mention that the level of voter support for the candidate at the grassroots was important, it was considered important in so far as that it was a factor that parties take it into account as they exercised their prerogative in determining which candidate to nominate.[28] This is puzzling, given that many of the parties to which these politicians belonged had at least partially adopted mass-driven candidate selection methods such as primary elections to select their candidates.

Politicians occupying senior leadership positions in the political parties confirm this perception of politicians. Even as they face immense pressure to devolve the power of candidate selection to regular party members, members of the party leadership and nomination organs have both openly and in private stated that parties will actively intervene to confer or deny party nominations to specific candidates. In a much talked about interview, John Mbadi, the party chairman for Kenya's opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), went on the record to say that the party would take disciplinary action against MPs "who are not showing solidarity with the party's cause" and that such "rebels will not get party nominations for the 2017 elections."[29] In an interview, a senior leader of a major opposition party in Kenya also clearly indicated the party planned to exercise its influence to determine which candidate will remain standing after the party nominations.[30] This leader asserted that while the party planned on implementing party primaries in their strongholds, they were planning on reserving the right to screen candidates they deemed "fit" to contest as the party's candidate in the next election. Another senior politician serving as an opposition party secretary general commented that such active intervention of the party leadership in the process of candidate selection was the norm rather than the exception in Kenya. In an interview, he stated that his "....goal as party secretary general is to restructure the party nomination process so that the power to select candidates is put in the hands of individual party members rather than the party and its leaders" suggests that in the status quo, the power of candidate selection was in the hands of party leadership.[31]

Together these insights provides evidence that politicians perceive parties to be acting as gatekeepers rather than guarantors to their electoral success. The dominance of political parties at the local level endows the parties, through the conferral or denial of the party nomination to a party politician, the capacity to effectively makes or break the fortunes of a politician.

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[27]Interview with opposition-aligned former MP, Subject 2015-PO23, April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[28]Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO21, April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya; Interview with opposition-aligned incumbent MP, Subject 2015-PO24, April 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[29]Reported by Tuko.co.ke at https://www.tuko.co.ke/137126-raila-odinga-warns-odm-mps-fail-participate-anti-iebc-demos.html

[30]Interview with Senior opposition party secretary general, Subject 2015-PO34, May 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

[31]Interview with opposition senator and opposition party secretary general, Subject 2015-PO35, May 2015, Nairobi, Kenya.

Test of the Parties as Gatekeepers Thesis

While the qualitative evidence presented above makes a strong case for the parties at gatekeepers perspective, I examine whether the electoral data enables us to draw the same conclusions. I rely on the district-level electoral returns used throughout this chapter and code candidate level information on reelection. I code an incumbent as having been reelected if he/she wins the subsequent election. This means that an incumbent coded as "not reelected" include cases in which the incumbent either competed in the election and lost and did not compete in the elections as a candidate.[32] I then combine the reelection data with the party renomination data (presented in Figure 4.5). The objective of the subsequent empirical analysis is to test how influential winning the party ticket is on an incumbent politician winning in the elections. Before moving into the main analyses, I present the data for incumbent level reelection (the main outcome variable) descriptively in Figure 4.8.

The overall pattern that emerges is one of high levels of incumbent loss: the average rate of incumbent reelection for the whole sample stands at 36%. The mean reelection rate for the whole sample is 36%, which means that on average, almost two-thirds of all incumbent politicians failed to return to office. In Ghana, considered one of the most institutionalized party systems in Africa (Riedl, 2014), the mean reelection rate since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1996 falls short of 50%. The lowest rate of reelection was ironically observed in the 2004 general elections, when incumbent president John Kufuor became the first democratically elected president to secure a second term: only 40% of the incumbent members of parliament were reelected to serve a consecutive term in office. The picture is somewhat similar for Botswana, where the average rate of reelection is also slightly shy of 50%. The lowest rate of reelection came in the 2004 general elections, when the incumbent Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) took 44 out of the 57 seats to form the government for the ninth consecutive time. Only 27.5% of incumbent legislators were reelected in this clear victory for the party. Kenya and Tanzania consistently record reelection rates in the 30 to 40 percent range. Tanzania reelection rate marked a low of 38% in 2010, when incumbent president Jakaya Kikwete managed to secure reelection as president as a candidate of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).[33] Across the three electoral cycles for which data is available, Kenya records an average reelection rate of 36%. Reelection rates were especially low in 2007, when the umbrella National Rainbow Coalition that established the first opposition government in Kenya in 2002 fragmented into multiple smaller parties. Malawi and Zambia, typically characterized as countries with weak political parties and low party system institutionalization, record the lowest level of reelection among the six countries. The average reelection rates for the two countries are 24% and 27% (Elischer, 2013; Riedl, 2014). The 2009 Malawi general elections, which saw Bingu Wa Mutharika's Democratic Progressive Party take 114 seats out of 193, recorded the lowest level of reelection at 20%. The 2001 general elections in Zambia,

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[32]This means that incumbents who i) retired from the race after being defeated at the nominations or ii) retired voluntarily (strategically based their perceived chances of reelection) or involuntarily (e.g. health issues precluding them from running) are also both classified as losers (or not reelected).

[33]Data for the 2015 general elections have not been made available on the official website of the Tanzanian Electoral Commission.

Figure 4.8: Incumbent Reelection Rates

Note: Data is drawn from publicly available district-level results for parliamentary elections in Ghana,Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. The elections included for each country are as follows: Ghana (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016), Kenya (1997, 2002, 2007), Tanzania (2005, 2010), Zambia(1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016), Botswana (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009), and Malawi (2004, 2009, 2014). I code an MP elected at election time t as having been reelected if the incumbent receives the largest number of votes and is declared winner in the same district at election time (t + 1), regardless which party he/she ran under.

which saw the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)'s seats in the National Assembly shrink by half, posted the lowest level of reelection in this sample at 11%.

I begin the main analysis by presenting a simple cross tabulation of incumbent reelection status (the main outcome) by whether or not an incumbent MP was renominated by the same party. The cross tabulation is intended to present an initial set of descriptive analyses on the influence of an incumbent's party renomination on the probability of being reelected in the general election. The idea is that if parties are gatekeepers, politicians will have a hard time being reelected if the party does not renominate them: in this case, one would expect to see the reelection rates of renominated incumbents to be significantly higher than incumbents who are not renominated. If parties are not gatekeepers, politicians will have no problem being reelected even if the party does not renominate them: in this case, one would expect reelection rates not to systematically differ across renominated incumbents versus incumbents who are not. The cross tabulations are presented by country-election year in Figure 4.9.

Figure 4.9: Incumbent Reelection Rates by Renomination Status

Note: Data is drawn from publicly available district-level results for parliamentary elections in Ghana,Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. The elections included for each country are as follows: Ghana (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016), Kenya (1997, 2002, 2007), Tanzania (2005, 2010), Zambia(1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016), Botswana (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009), and Malawi (2004, 2009, 2014). I code an MP elected at election time t as having been renominated by the party if the incumbent reappears on ballot as the same party's candidate in the same district at election time (t + 1). I code an MP elected at election time t as having been reelected if the incumbent receives the largest number of votes and is declared winner in the same district at election time (t + 1), regardless which party he/she ran under.

The contrast in the reelection rates between renominated incumbents and incumbents who were not renominated are stark. With the exception of Malawi in the 2009 general elections, barely any of these incumbents were able to defend their seat. Even in Zambia or Kenya, where independent candidates are allowed to compete in elections, far less than 10% of incumbents who are not renominated by the party return to office. In Tanzania and Ghana, none of the incumbents who failed to receive the party nomination of their original parties managed to be reelected in any election. Incumbent politicians who do manage to be renominated by their original party fare much better: again, with the exception of Malawi, usually well more than 60% of incumbents who are renominated by the party are returned to office by the voters. In Ghana and Tanzania, for example, the mean reelection rate for renominated incumbents across all election years stands at 83% and 89% respectively, which even surpasses the rate

at which incumbents in consolidated democracies return to office. Although these figures are slightly smaller for other countries in the sample, in general, the reelection for this group on average exceeds 70%.

Building on this descriptive presentation, I proceed to test the relationship between incumbent renomination and reelection more systematically using regression analysis. The dependent variable in the models is an indicator variable denoting whether or not the incumbent politician was reelected ("Incumbent Reelection"). The independent variable of interest is also a binary variable denoting whether or not the incumbent politician was renominated by the party to contest the same seat in the run up to the election ("Renominated"). All the models are linear probability models, with standard errors clustered at the district level. Each model controls for the incumbent politician's vote share in the previous election and the number of candidates that competed in the election ("Electoral Controls"). It also includes dichotomous variables indicating the party that the incumbent contested under in the previous election cycle ("Party Fixed Effects"). I also exploit the time series cross sectional nature of the data and add constituency fixed effects in addition to the party controls and party fixed effects. This allows me, under certain assumptions, to control for time invariant observable and unobservable characteristics of the district or constituency that maybe correlated with the outcome and independent variable of interest.

Table 4.6 reports the main results from the linear probability models on the effect of incumbent renomination by the party on the incumbent's reelection. While the outcome is a dichotomous variable, I use a linear probability model rather than a logistic regression for two reasons; first, from a pragmatic perspective, the linear probability model generates estimates that are easier to interpret in comparison to logistic or probit regression. Second, I use the linear probability model because the data is grouped, and I intend to include group fixed effects at the constituency level. While there are econometric methods that allow the analysis of binary grouped data (for example, Chamberlain (1980) and McFadden et al. (1973)), these methods force researchers to omit groups that lack variation in the outcome variable. Given that there are a significant number of groups (district or constituency) in the electoral data for which there is no variation on the dependent variable, this is a non-trivial problem. The use of the linear probability model with fixed effects for groups allows me to exploit the entirety of the data.

Table 4.6: Effects of Incumbent Renomination on Reelection

	Incumbent Reelection			
	Ghana		Zambia	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Renominated	0.823***	0.834***	0.632***	0.660***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.036)
Electoral Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,126	1,126	734	734
Adjusted R^2	0.699	0.728	0.464	0.456
	Botswana		Kenya	
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Renominated	0.801***	0.846***	0.553***	0.529***
	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.088)
Electoral Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	169	169	418	418
Adjusted R^2	0.634	0.589	0.298	0.275
	Malawi		Tanzania	
	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Renominated	0.258***	0.429***	0.874***	
	(0.050)	(0.126)	(0.035)	
Electoral Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	
Observations	290	290	219	
Adjusted R^2	0.151	0.297	0.816	

Note: Table reports coefficients from linear probability models with robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Electoral controls include incumbent margin of victory in the previous election and number of candidates in the general election. Constituency fixed effects specification omitted for Tanzania due to only two cycles of electoral returns being available.

The results show that consistent with the qualitative interview evidence, the renomination

of the party has a decisive influence on the probability that an incumbent politician retains his office in the subsequent election. Models (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) present country results without the constituency fixed effects. Across all of the models, the coefficients for the binary variable denoting whether the incumbent received the renomination of the party remain positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, even after including the electoral controls and party fixed effects. Even in Malawi, where the effect of renomination on the probability of reelection is smallest, the party's renomination increases the probability of incumbent victory by almost 26% points. In countries such as Ghana and Tanzania, the renomination of the incumbent by the party increases the win probability in the general election by more than 80% points in comparison to incumbents that were not renominated. In these cases, the renomination of the party effectively *guarantees* incumbents victory.

Models (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) present country results with the district/constituency fixed effects included. By including the fixed effects, the analysis examines within-district variation in the outcome based on the renomination status of incumbents. Even after controlling for time invariant observed and unobserved factors of the districts, the findings remain substantively unchanged: in almost all cases, the renomination of the incumbent leads to a dramatic increase in the probability of the incumbent's victory. The size of the coefficients remain largely similar to the specifications without the fixed effects and are all statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. In the case of Malawi, which had the smallest effect size in the specification without fixed effects, the size of the coefficient increases from 0.258 to 0.429 when examining within constituency variation, which is an increase of more than 150%.

An important caveat is in order for the analyses presented in Figure 4.9 and Table 4.6. First, the electoral returns do not allow me to distinguish between whether candidates *voluntarily* chose not to be renominated (did not apply for renomination with their party) or were *involuntarily* not renominated (applied for renomination with their party but was denied). This means that the "not renominated" category of incumbents (or incumbents who are coded as "0" for the "renominated" variable) includes both types of incumbents. To the extent that the effect of renomination captured in the preceding analyses includes cases in which i) incumbents voluntarily exited from politics even before the candidate selection process or ii) incumbents voluntarily defected to and sought out the nomination from a new party, it has the potential to inflate the gatekeeping role the political parties play on incumbent reelection.

While these concerns are certainly warranted, they are unlikely to fundamentally alter the conclusion that party renomination is a critical hurdle for the survival of incumbent politicians. First, there is very little evidence to suggest that politicians in Africa often voluntarily choose to retire from seeking reelection. To the contrary, the conventional wisdom is that incumbent politicians are rarely willing to relinquish their seats; many of these parliamentary offices entail a substantial salary that is substantially overshadows that of any comparable public or private sector positions in these countries (Barkan, 2009*b*).[34] Furthermore, these positions offers the occupants significant power and influence that creates further op-

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[34]For example, MPs in Kenya earned yearly salaries in excess of USD 160,000 in addition to other allowances that combine to equal or even surpass their salaries. This was roughly around 90 times larger than the GDP per capita of Kenya (2013). The lucrative nature of compensation schemes for elected officials are frequently

portunities for personal enrichment. While no systematic evidence exists on the proportion of incumbent politicians that voluntarily exit from office, some earlier research on specific countries suggest that this number is as low as 3% (Öhman, 2004). Given these observations, it is unlikely that accounting for voluntary exits will substantively change the results presented in this section. Second, accounting for voluntary party defections is also unlikely to alter the results from the preceding analysis. If voluntary defectors were often successful in retaining their seats under a different party, the inclusion of these individuals into the "not renominated" category would work against finding an effect for renomination. The fact that the "renominated" variable remains large and statistically significant even with the inclusion of these individuals in the "not renominated" category is an indication that voluntary defections are not significantly improving defectors' chances of reelection.

4.4 Summary

This chapter has demonstrated the surprising role that African political parties play in determining the fate of politicians. Contrary to conventional accounts that emphasize the weak and under-institutionalized nature of African parties, I have shown that political parties in Africa command a loyal following from partisan supporters, who possess strong attachments towards the party and vote accordingly along partisan lines. These partisan loyalties give rise to the phenomenon of party dominance at the local level, where political parties demonstrate extraordinary resilience in terms of retaining hold of the electoral districts or constituencies they control across multiple election cycles. The electoral dominance of political parties at the local level is what enables political parties to function as gatekeepers to the electoral success of politicians who contest local office: because parties are electorally dominant, the success and failure of politicians in their quest for elected office hinges on whether or not they are able to obtain the dominant party's candidacy. Evidence presented in the chapter suggests that political parties exercise their prerogative to award and deny politicians the opportunity to recontest as the party's candidate—incumbent politicians are renominated by their parties only around 50% of the time—and that such a decision constitutes the difference between almost guaranteed victory and loss in the elections.

These findings constitute an important foundation upon which the theory of unresponsive politicians is built. When political parties are able to so critically structure the electoral survival of politicians through their candidate selection process, politicians are incentivized to cater to the interests of those who control the party's candidate selection process in an effort to obtain the party's nomination. The question that remains unanswered thus far is *who* within these political parties controls the candidate selection process, and through *what means* they manage to do so. The next chapter presents answers to these important questions.

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observed across Africa: MPs in Nigeria and South Africa earn yearly salaries of USD 189,600 and 194,900 respectively. Even in the relatively lower end of the spectrum, Ugandan and Tanzanian MPs earn around USD 104,000 and 87,000 yearly.

Chapter 5

Institutional Strategies of Control

The previous chapter has established that the electoral fortunes of politicians in African democracies are largely shaped by political parties rather than voters. When parties, by virtue of their ability select party candidates, can effectively determine whether politicians are re-elected, politicians have strong incentives to respond to the interests of the *selectorate* that decides who the party nominee will be. Yet an examination of what the selectorate's interests are requires an understanding the *nature of the selectorate* in these political parties; existing research has established that there is significant diversity in how the selectorate is consti-tuted, and the extent to which various political actors both within and outside of the codified boundaries of the selectorate exercise influence over the candidate selection process (Katz, 2001;Hazan and Rahat, 2010). The existing literature, however, has rarely scrutinized such questions in the context of political parties developing world.[1] In this chapter and the next, I turn to this important task; I demonstrate that candidate selection in African parties are largely under the overriding influence of a single individual at the apex of the party organization—the party leader. Their institutionalized influence over key intraparty candidate selection institu-tions and the broader party apparatus (this chapter), as well as their persuasive influence over partisan supporters (the next chapter) make party leaders the single most important member of the party selectorate.

In this chapter, I primarily focus on tracing the strategies party leaders can employ to control party nomination that derive from their institutional influence over the party organi-zation. I argue that African party leaders clearly understand the implications that selecting the right set of candidates has on the configuration of power within the party, and ultimately the security of their tenure as leader. The centrality of candidate selection in the party leader's calculus for survival will lead party leaders to impose control over the candidate selection process. In some parties, where the actions and decisions of the party leaders are uncon-

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[1]For some rare exceptions, see Ichino and Nathan (2012) and monographs in Siavelis and Morgenstern (2012).

strained either by intraparty institutions or other party elites, the imposition of such control may be simple as party leaders exclusively "dictating" the list of candidates to fly the party banner. In many cases, however, party leaders do not enjoy such complete autonomy, and must use their codified influence and authority as party leader to commandeer the candidate selection process more "indirectly." Party leaders achieve such indirect control by manipulating the institutional design or setup of the party organs charged with overseeing the candidate selection process, shaping the field of candidates eligible for selection, and overseeing how the selection procedure is implemented in practice.

It is worth noting that the strategies highlighted in this chapter present a more nuanced picture of the ways in which party leaders can attempt to impose their control over the candidate selection process. Most existing work on this topic typically focuses on when and how party leaders decide to adopt mass-based, bottom-up methods of candidate selection such as primary elections (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano, 2009; Ichino and Nathan, 2012). The implicit assumption made in these studies is that the party leader's decision to adopt mass-based methods signifies the willingness to relinquish control over the candidate selection process in pursuit of other objectives. To the contrary, my argument suggests that the party leader's ability to control candidate selection is not a deterministic function of the method of selection. While the choice over the method and how it is implemented is an important decision which may shape the level of control (Ichino and Nathan, 2012), it is but one of many strategies within the party leader's toolkit. In fact, my analysis shows that the process by which party leaders can attempt to exercise control over candidate selection can be *prior to and independent of* the decision to adopt any specific method to nominate candidates.

In the rest of the chapter, I begin by delineating the motivation for party leaders to control the outcome of party nominations. I follow by outlining the three broad categories of strategies that party leaders can use to exert their influence over the party nominations. Through an in-depth case study, I then proceed to provide a detailed account of how party leaders put these strategies into action in one of the major political parties in Kenya—the Opposition Orange Democratic Movement—during candidate selection for the 2017 parliamentary elections. The case study draw on a variety of sources of evidence, ranging from published party statutes and regulations, internal party documents, participant observation in internal party meetings, and interviews with candidates and party officials.

5.1 Why Party Leaders Want to Control Party Nominations

The selection of candidates for elected office is one of the most important functions of a modern political party, and possibly the defining characteristic that separates parties from other societal groups or organizations (Sartori, 1976). The manner in which parties decide to nominate candidates to represent them on the ballot critically affects who will eventually be elected to office. And given the ascendancy of the "party in public office" in modern day party organizations (Mair and Katz, 2002), the process of candidate selection has the potential to

"define" what the party looks like in the mind of voters, as well as the goals and objective it pursues (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 6–7).

Most intuitively, party leaders care about candidate selection because identifying the "right" pool of candidates can critically affect the overall electoral success of the party (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich, 2006; Ichino and Nathan, 2013*b*, 2017). As the head of political organizations with the expressed goals of contesting in elections, maximizing votes, and ultimately governing, the leaders of today's electorally-oriented parties must ensure that the pool of candidates they present to voters will contribute to the realization of these goals (Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Hazan and Rahat, 2010).[2] Putting candidates that are unpopular or considered "unelectable" up for election not only decreases the odds that the party will be able to win the particular seat, but may also have negative spillovers for other races that the party is contesting, including higher-up contests for national positions (such as the presidency) for which the party leaders themselves are often candidates (Ichino and Nathan, 2013*b*; Lupu, 2016, 32).

Yet the electoral success of the party is not the only reason, and in fact, may not even be the most important reason why party leaders care about candidate selection; party leaders realize that candidate selection is likely to have a strong impact on their position and authority within the party hierarchy. While party leaders in new democracies are highly visible public figures who wield considerable control over their parties (Lupu, 2016, 32), they cannot hope to maintain their position within the party by fiat; like the leader of any organizational hierarchy, they are required to build the support of party elites who support and will remain loyal to them. They must also ensure that they are able to discipline wayward elites who support their rivals for the party leadership or may emerge as rivals themselves. In this regard, the choice of party candidates, by affecting the composition of (elected) elites and the power dynamics within the party, have stark implications for party leaders and this second imperative.

Research by a long tradition of scholars who have scrutinized party organizations, including those dating back to the early twentieth century, has lent credence to the idea that candidate selection fundamentally shapes the configuration of power within political parties. In his seminal work, Robert Michels famously identified the centralized authority to select candidates as a means through which "old-guard leaders in the majority "attempt to thwart the threat posed by "new elements" that gain popularity among the masses and seek to challenge them for control over the party (Michels, 1915, 172–173). E. E. Schattschneider went so far as to forcefully argue that the candidate selection process was the best opportunity "to observe the distribution of power within the party", declaring that the "nature of the nominating process determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party (Schattschneider, 1942, 64)."

Indeed, an increasing volume of literature on political parties in both consolidated and new democracies has found empirical evidence that candidate selection can powerfully shape where the loyalty of party official will ultimately lie. Langston (2008) found that in the context

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[2]I move away from the dominant perspective in the literature on parties in western representative democracies that considers party leaders to be driven by the pursuit of policy along a left-right spectrum. Electoral competition in the new democracies that are under consideration in this dissertation are seldom organized along ideological or programmatic differences (Chandra, 2007; Madrid, 2012; Arriola, 2012).

of Mexico, and especially the ruling *Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)*, the national party leadership's control over party nominations and candidacy was an important mechanism through which the party exerted control over politician behavior and enforced party discipline in the lower Chamber of Deputies. Moraes (2008) argues that the institutionalized nature of intraparty factions and the authority vested in faction leaders in terms of selecting party candidates to act in the interest of the faction and the faction leader (or become *"faction loyalists"*) despite some incentives to cultivate a personal vote through constituency service.

5.2 Party Leader Strategies to Control Party Nominations

From an aerial viewpoint, the ability of the party leader to control the candidate selection process seems to have everything to do with the *method* of candidate selection; when candidates are chosen by an exclusive set of party elites whose allegiances lie with the party leader, party leaders are far more capable of manipulating these individuals to have their way over the outcome of nominations (Ichino and Nathan, 2012, 1). By contrast, if candidates are selected through mass participation—primary elections, for example—party leaders are expected lose much of their ability to control who is ultimately chosen (Ranney, 1975; Hassell, 2017, 7). From this perspective, the single most important task for party leaders who wish to project their power over nominations is to ensure that the selection process does not open its door to mass participation.

However, this simplistic view makes the critical error of equating the method of selection with the entirety of the candidate selection process; whereas the primary election or the nomination committee meeting is undeniably an important component of the candidate selection process, they are but some of many constituent sub-processes that ultimately culminate in the finalized list of candidates. Answering the question of how party leaders might exercise control over the outcome of party nominations therefore requires a thorough understanding of these sub-processes, and the manner in which party leaders can capture or manipulate them. Building on the literature on the candidate selection process in parties of the developed and developing world, I identify three important nodes at which the party leader is able to intervene: i) when the party determines the organization and setup of the intraparty institutions that oversee candidate selection, ii) when the field of candidates vying for selection are defined, and iii) when the procedures that determine actual selection—whether it be a committee meeting or some form of voting process—is implemented (Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Cohen et al., 2009; Hassell, 2017). The party leader's influence over the eventual outcome of party nominations, I argue, derives in large part from her ability to authoritatively insert herself into these three crucial nodes. In what follows, I discuss in greater detail in how they go about doing so.

Strategy 1: Manipulating Institutional Design

The party leader's strategy to influence party nominations starts early on in the electoral cycle. Coming off a fresh victory or a sore loss in the previous elections, party leaders are faced with

a period of generalized political inactivity and torpor during which they have the chance to determine the structure of their party organization, and the institutions within them.[3] This moment of political inactivity presents a valuable opportunity for party leaders to introduce, reinforce, or alter institutional mechanisms through which they will ultimately be able to exert influence over candidate selection.

One critical aspect of this institutional strategy is to determine the form, structure, and composition of the intraparty entity tasked with overseeing the entire candidate selection process (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 46). In parties with exclusive methods of selection, this entity can be the one empowered to make the final selection on the list of party candidates (Norris, 1997). But even in parties where there is some form of broader participation of regular party members or voters, these entities can enjoy a broad mandate, including the ability to make decisions on the specific rules and procedures that will guide the selection of candidates, vet candidates for eligibility to participate in the selection process, and retain veto power over the candidates chosen through mass voting (Ichino and Nathan, 2012).

The most intuitive way for party leaders to manipulate these institutions in her favor is to establish herself as an ex-officio chair or member, directly dictating the decisions made by these entities to suit their tastes. Yet party leaders can also choose to interfere less directly by subjecting these nomination-related entities to the oversight of traditional party structures over which they have control. For example, rather than granting complete autonomy or independence to the "nomination board," party leaders can place it under the direct supervision of traditional party leadership structures, such as the party executive (committees), and grant these supervising structures the right to partially or entirely alter or overrule the decisions made by the nomination board. By placing these candidate selection institutions under their direct supervision, party leaders are able to keep in check the decisions made, and retain the option to vacate any such decisions that compromise their ability to control the outcome of nominations.

Party leaders can also institute mechanisms establishing their authority to dictate how these selection institutions are "constituted" and "compensated." By reserving the ability to appoint individuals with limited to no approval from a broader set of elites or party members, for example, party leaders pave the way to fill these boards with their closest loyalists or allies. A nomination board that is biased in favor of the party leader can be counted on to make decisions that privilege their interests. Party leaders can also incentivize board members to do their bidding by setting out formal or informal guidelines as to how they will be rewarded or sanctioned based on their service on the board. This may include monetary compensation, the promise of a future appointment within the party organization, an unofficial guarantee of nomination to for an elective post, or even selection as a non-elected political position that is guaranteed by the party.

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[3]This is based on the assumption that the party leader is able to retain their position at the helm of the party organization following the elections. It is possible that a party leader who has just lost his bid for the presidency is more vulnerable to challenges from other elected leaders within the party against their position in the party. However, these losing leaders also have a strong incentive to attempt to maintain their stranglehold over the party apparatus, including control over the candidate selection process, since their future candidacy is likely to be contingent on their ability to maintain control over the party.

In the Orange Democratic Movement, the party leader's manipulation of the institutional design of candidate selection institutions is readily observable. The party leader, Raila Odinga, despite publicly made commitments to undertake sweeping reforms regarding the organization of the parties, in reality maintained candidate selection institutions under the direct supervision of more traditional intraparty decision making structures (such as the national executive committee), which were presided over by the party leader and a small number of members of the national party leadership, appointed by the party leaders. Furthermore, Odinga established in either the party constitution or associated governing documents their ability to make unilateral appointments to constitute the entirety of the nomination board. He then used this authority to constitute the nomination board with technocratic party officials or distinguished party members working in different professions, who were not yet elected officials but seemed to have held political aspirations. These individuals were considered by many to be the most vulnerable to the inducements the party leaders could offer as a reward for serving as their proxies on the nomination board. These institutional interventions established the foundation upon which the party leader could later capitalize on to assert their influence over candidate selection outcomes.

Strategy 2: Shaping the Field of Candidates

The previous subsection outlined how party leaders can manipulate the candidate selection institutions themselves to lay the groundwork to control the nomination process. And when parties have adopted exclusive, elite-driven method of selecting candidates, capturing the intraparty selection institutions may indeed the single most important step towards successfully controlling nomination outcomes. However, when party leaders find themselves facing a mass-based candidate selection method such as primary elections, the manipulation of candidate selection institutions of itself is likely to be an insufficient guarantee for party leader control; even with control over the institutions themselves, it is ultimately the mass vote that decides who is finally granted the candidacy.[4]

From this perspective, winnowing the field of candidates who would seek the party nomination can be an especially important means through which party leaders can move closer to the objective of controlling the list of nominated (Hassell, 2016). Party leaders can use this process to prevent competitive candidates (popular among primary voters) who have the potential to mount a serious challenge against their preferred candidates in the primaries from even appearing on the ballot. The benefits of this strategy are clear: first and foremost, the elimination of serious contenders as on option available to primary voters increases the likelihood that the party leader's preferred candidates will cruise, relatively unimpeded, to victory. It also reduces the need for a bitterly fought primary election that would strain the financial and organizational resources of candidates, resources that would be better preserve to compete against candidates from other parties in the general election. Furthermore, it mitigates

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[4]While the party leader can choose to overturn the outcome of the mass vote if her preferred candidate is not chosen by primary voters, doing so without just cause is likely to come at a cost of generating resentment and hostility among candidates and voters that participated in the primaries for "usurping" their will.

the potential for significant backlash if party leaders were to *overturn* the result of a primaries and install or impose their preferred candidate on the mass selectorate.

With the clear benefits associated with shaping the field, party leaders can employ a diverse array of strategies to pursue these goals. First, party leaders can pledge the organizational and financial resources at the disposal of the national party organization to mobilize in favor of their favored candidate. Given the well-documented resource intensiveness of campaigns in Africa, such a commitment from the party leader can afford a decisive advantage to candidates who would have otherwise had to provide the same campaign resources by themselves (Arriola, 2012; Koter, 2017). For candidates contemplating a bid for office, the support by the party leader, and thereby the party, is likely to be sufficient impetus to compete for the party candidacy. At the same time, the party leader's organizational and financial support of another candidate is likely to force other candidates to seriously reassess their prospects for the party's nomination; indeed, because of the huge relative disadvantage, these candidates might be effectively forced to withdraw from the race all together. Second, party leaders can offer financial incentives or promise alternative career paths in exchange for withdrawing their candidacy. Knowing that "bucking" the demands of the party is likely to lead to almost certain loss during the primaries and will eliminate any chance of success in their future political endeavors, candidates are incentivized to take these inducements and withdraw their candidacy for the party ticket (Hassell, 2017, 98).

These strategies were put to use by the leader of ODM, where candidates who had been "propped" up by party leaders to contest the nomination against disloyal "rebel" incumbent MPs seem to have been receiving the organizational and financial backing of the party leaders. Furthermore, the party leader paved the way for his preferred nominees by inducing other candidates to change the seats they would contest or withdrawing their candidacy all together.

Strategy 3: Implementation of Selection

The two broad sets of strategies discussed in the two previous subsections create favorable conditions for the party leader to take control over the outcome of nominations. They are likely to be pursued over the relative long-run, far in advance of the point in the electoral cycle that parties are required to finalize their list of candidates and submit it to the electoral management authorities for the registration of candidates. The set of strategies that I present in this subsection, on the hand, have to do with interventions undertaken by the party leader to directly manipulate selection outcomes in the focal period preceding the general elections in which parties officially engage in the act of selection.

The range of strategies that fall into this category is broad. However, all of these strategies are fundamentally related to how the selection process is implemented. Although extremely rare, for party leaders who have reserved the power to determine the list of candidates solely for themselves, control over the outcome is by default; they have but to appoint as they fit the candidate for each electoral unit.[5] Yet when this is not the case, and the *de-jure* authority

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[5]An example of such unilateral control can be found in the Kadima party of Israel, in which then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon dictated the party list by himself (Hazan, 2007).

select candidates is either shared with other party elites or even the masses, party leaders can nonetheless employ a range of strategies to have their way.

For parties with relatively more exclusive, elite-driven processes, party leaders can cash in, for example, on their leverage over the board members they appointed and use them as proxies to do their bidding during the decision-making process. More overtly, the party leader can also tap into their codified authority to impose oversight or even overrule the decisions made by the nomination boards and impose her preferred candidate.

The leaders of parties whose authority to select candidates have been outsourced to the masses through primaries, have more work to do to make sure that their will is reflected in the final list of candidates. But they also have a wider range of ways in which this objective can be met. One such way that has received the attention of scholars who study party nominations in the developing world is the use of vetting (or screening) to disqualify candidates eligible to participate in the primaries (Ichino and Nathan, 2012). If their preferred candidate is likely to lose against a candidate is popular among primary voters, the party leader can task the nomination board which determines candidate eligibility to disqualify the competitive candidate. With their principle rival's name off the ballot paper, the party leader's candidate is likely to have a much higher chance of capturing the mass selectorate's vote and win the nomination. Another way in which party leaders can effectively "install" their candidates is through the the selective implementation of primary elections (Ichino and Nathan, 2012, 2013*b*). It is easy to make the mistake of assuming that a party that has announced that it will conduct primaries to select candidates will uniformly and without exception hold primaries across all constituencies they plan to field a candidate. Party leaders can choose to hold primaries in some constituencies, and withhold the primaries in some others based on their strategic interests. For example, if they expect their favored candidate's prospect of winning in the primary election is limited, the party leaders can, either by fiat or through the nomination board, suspend the primary elections, and offer a direct nomination. In the extreme, party leaders can even choose to vacate the decision made by at the ballot box, and impose their candidate on the primary voters.

These strategies all inevitably come with risks. The potential for backlash among candidates who have unfairly removed from competing in the selection process in the last minute can lead to cross-the-aisle defections and even result in protracted legal fights. And depending on the ability of the excluded candidate to mobilize voters against the party, there might be significant consequences for the party's performance in the general elections. The potential costs are even larger when party leaders work against the outcome of primaries, as it is more likely to lead to direct voter disengagement over the fact that their "democratic" choice has been "undemocratically" overturned. In implementing these strategies, party leaders must therefore carefully weigh these risks against the benefits of controlling the outcome of nominations.

I show in the subsequent case study that the ODM employed a combination of these strategies during the one month period in which party primaries for legislative elections were held across the country in April of 2017. The ODM used vetting procedures and candidacy requirements to exclude candidates from contesting in their primaries. More frequently, they decided to selectively withhold legislative primaries in certain constituencies and instead

issue direct nominations to their preferred nominees. And only in extreme cases did they directly overturn the results of a primary election for which the winner had been announced. The somewhat muted use of the strategies is reflective of the fact that while they are highly effective in achieving the goal of controlling the final list of candidates, the party leader was cognizant of the potential ramifications.

5.3 Case Study: The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)

Kenya constitutes a particularly interesting case to study party control of the candidate selection process. As is the common perception of most new democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya in the aftermath of her democratic transition has been characterized by many as a weakly institutionalized party system (Riedl, 2014). Political parties, which compete based on ethno-regional interests rather than programmatic platforms, are formed or rebranded hastily in the run-up to each election (Elischer, 2013), and after enjoying a modicum of success, often rapidly loses its support in the very next election and is forced to dissolve.

While most of political parties in Kenya are deserving of this characterization—high electoral volatility and inability to create stable attachments among voters—some are certainly not, and have been able to successfully replicate their initial electoral success in parliamentary in subsequent electoral cycles. One such party is the Orange Democratic Movement (more commonly known by its acronym ODM), an opposition party which was formed during the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum campaign. After being removed from the umbrella National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) of taking an opposing stand against incumbent President Mwai Kibaki, some prominent members of the Kenyan African National Union, Liberal Democratic Party, and a number smaller parties came together to form the ODM in the run-up to the 2007 general elections. While Odinga lost the presidential race to President Kibaki under highly controversial circumstances, the ODM managed to become the largest party in the unicameral legislature, taking 99 of the 210 constituency seats, dwarfing the performance of Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) which only managed to win 43.

Since 2007, the ODM has been able to repeatedly renew their significant presence in the legislature, despite its party leader Raila Odinga suffering a succession of painful losses in the two subsequent presidential contests; in the 2013 general elections, ODM managed to retain its title as the largest party in the national assembly and senate,[6] taking 96 seats in the lower house over newly elected president Uhuru Kenyatta's The National Alliance (TNA) which won 88 seats, and deputy president William Ruto's United Republican Party (URP), which won 76 seats.[7] In the recently concluded 2017 general elections, the ODM was able

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[6]Kenya passed a constitutional amendment to turn the unicameral legislature into a bicameral one. In the process, the number of parliamentary constituencies (of the lower house) increased from 210 to 290. The newly formed senate created 47 directly elected seats, with an additional 20 members nominated by political parties).

[7]Despite being the largest political party in parliament, ODM formed the minority in the 11th parliament because the TNA and URP formed the Jubilee coalition, which combined surpassed the number of seats held by the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), in which the ODM was a member.

to hold its own against the Jubilee party (which was the result of a merger of TNA, URP, and a number of smaller parties that constituted the president Kenyatta's Jubilee Coalition) with some setbacks in a handful of constituencies, becoming the second largest party represented in both the Senate (20 out of 67) and National Assembly (76 out of 290).

Overview of ODM Party Nominations

Since its very first election in 2007, ODM's candidate selection process has been marred by controversy. At the heart of this controversy was the seeming contradiction between ODM's proclaimed devotion to letting the will of regular party members dictate which candidate would be chosen to fly the party banner and what eventually transpired during the party primaries. Whereas the party leadership, including the party leader Raila Odinga himself, on multiple occasions announced their commitment to uphold and respect the choice of primary voters at the ballot box in the run-up to the 2007 party nominations, there were widespread allegations that the chair of ODM's national election board colluded extensively with the party leadership and national party organs, which were stacked full with Raila Odinga's closest allies, in finalizing list of party candidates.[8] [9] Some of these accusations named Raila Odinga in person, claiming that he had himself instructed national party organs to selectively intervene in a subset of primary elections to be rigged in favor or against specific candidates.[10] Such was the public outcry against the sad state of the ODM party nominations in 2007 that Raila Odinga and the so called "Pentagon" of prominent party elites soon after decided to dismiss key individuals of the national election board, including the chair Richard Kwach, and convene an formal intraparty inquiry to investigate the "irregularities."

Having their dirty laundry laid out in public seems to have little effect in changing the nature of ODM nominations in the 2013 general elections. At the onset, Raila Odinga promised to radically overhaul the nomination process by implementing a series of intraparty reforms that would, for example, change the structure and organization of the nomination board, replace personnel within the important national election board, and even force senior party offials seeking elected office to resign their post prior to the nominations.[11]. The newly instituted national election board, in an seemingly resolute display of resolve to clean up the nominations, announced in a press statement under the name of the new national election board chair Muthee Kathurima:

> The Board is currently reviewing the roadmap for holding fair, transparent and democratic elections and nominations. The Board affirms that the nomination

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[8]"New ODM elections board seeks to overcome nomination challenges", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000067270/new-odm-elections-board-seeks-to-overcome-nomination- challenges, March 25, 2018

[9]"Sacred cows fuel unease in Raila party", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000074918/sacred-cows-fuel-unease-in-raila-party, March 25, 2018

[10]"Raila denies he rigged out candidates", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-218682-lumcbnz/index.html, March 25, 2018.

[11]"Raila: End wrangles in ODM", *Capital News*, Retrieved at https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/11/raila-end-wrangles-in-odm/, March 25, 2018

process will be fully transparent, inclusive and participatory. Every ODM member who wishes to run for any post will have the freedom to stand and every voter will have the right to vote for the candidate he/she wishes to nominate and elect. ... And pursuant to the provisions of our Party Election and Nomination rules, the Board hereby gives notice to all ODM officials holding positions in the Party Organs, at all levels and who are interested in vying for positions in the coming general elections to ensure they hand in their written resignation one month, before the nomination date. ... Finally, NEB assures candidates that there SHALL be no DIRECT NOMINATIONS. The playing ground will be even and non-compromised.[12]

These strong assurances seems to have done little to assuage the concerns among aspiring candidates and the would-be primary voters; indeed, the mood in the run-up to the party primaries to be held at the end of 2012 was that of apprehension of the inevitable rather than anticipation of better things to come. The apprehension was compounded by the lack of follow-up actions taken by the party after these assurances were issued. The chairperson who had been designated the guardian of the integrity of the candidate selection process abruptly fired at the end of 2012, soon to be mysteriously replaced by Franklin Bett, the former Roads Minister and long-time ally and confidante of the party leader Raila Odinga. Furthermore, the nomination rules submitted by ODM to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in fulfillment of a legal requirement directly contradicted what was claimed in many earlier statements; rather than eliminate any means through which the party leader and the leadership could intervene in the nomination process like they had promised, the party in section 3.3 of the ODM nomination rules, reserved the power for the party executive commitee to grand direct nomination to any aspirant they saw fit.[13]

When the party primaries for the 2013 general elections were finally held in January of 2013, it became clear that the party had no intention of relinquishing its control over the nominations, and was willing to go to extraordinary lengths to openly overturn decisions made by grassroots primary voters if it meant saving the party leader's closest allies. Professor Anyang' Nyong'o—a renowned political scientist and the ODM party secretary general who failed to follow the instructions of the national election board to resign his post prior to the elections—was mysteriously granted a direct nomination after the national election board reviewed and overturned the results of the party primaries for the Kisumu senetorial seat, which the prominent Raila-ally had lost.[14] Jared Jakoyo Midiwo, Raila Odinga's first cousin and chief whip of ODM in parliament also lost against a newcomer Elisha Odhiambo in the Gem ODM parliamentary primaries, but once again found himself officially announced the ODM candidate for the constituency after the national election board overturned the primary

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[12]Reported in *The Standard*, September 25, 2012

[13]"Sacred cows fuel unease in Raila party", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000074918/sacred-cows-fuel-unease-in-raila-party, March 25, 2018

[14]"Nyong'o's chances for Kisumu senate boosted", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/01/26/nyongos-chances-for-kisumu-senate-boosted_c730682, March 25, 2018

citing irregularities and handed Midiwo yet another direct nomination (Okoth and Omenya, 2014, 204).[15]

While most of these scenarios transpired in the ODM strongholds, perhaps the most jarring of nomination scandals happened in the primaries for the Nairobi senatorial seat. Elizabeth Ongoro, the incumbent Kasarani MP who was campaigning for the newly created Nairobi senate seat was prevented from running, and was instead encouraged by the party to run for the newly-created Ruaraka constituency. However, the nomination for Ruaraka constituency was eventually awarded to TJ Kajwang', the brother to yet another of Raila's staunch allies and soon to be senator for Homa Bay Otieno Kajwang'. The nomination for the Nairobi senatorial seat was ultimately offered to Margaret Wanjiru, who was disqualifed from running for the Nairobi *gubernatorial* race under ODM because she fell below the requisite educational qualifications to contest for the county executive.

After the 2013 elections ended in yet another defeat for Raila Odinga in the presidential elections, the party once again claimed that it would review the problems the party experienced during the nominations in preparation for Raila's fourth attempt at the presidency in 2017.[16] In a political rally in one of his strongholds in Western Kenya, Raila made the following reflective statement:

> Human is to error but it is stupid to repeat the same mistake and that is why the party has streamlined the nomination process to ensure the exercise is credible to reduce squabbles arising from the primaries... If the incumbents perform, they will be voted again. If you are not a favourite of the electorate and you lose, embrace the winner but don't defect.[17]

In the following subsection, I dig deep into a variety of primary and secondary sources, ranging from interviews with party officials and former and current candidates, participant observation in ODM's internal party meetings, and analysis of ODM's internal governing documents to examine the strategies that were employed by the party leader and the leadership of ODM to continue their control over party nominations. What I am able to show is that the party leader, in large part, retained the existing institutional setup that had enabled them to capture the nomination process in previous election cycles; the same institutional setup that had, in the mind of both candidates and voters, been at the heart of the controversy. However, they also adopted alternative strategies that would consolidate, rather than relinquish, his control of party nominations in a manner that would minimize the backlash that ensued after

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[15]Oburu Odinga, older brother to Raila Odinga 4 years later admitted that he and Raila conspired to rig Elisha Odhiambo out of the primaries for Jakoyo Midiwo. See "MP Midiwo 2013 win was a hoax, Oburu now says", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/06/22/mp-midiwo-2013-win-was-a-hoax-oburu-now-says_c1583746, March 25, 2018

[16]"I'm sorry, says Raila over bungled 2013 nominations", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/I-m-sorry--says-opposition-chief-over-botched-2013-nominations /1064-3303682-eg2lbbz/index.html, March 25, 2018

[17]"I'm sorry, says Raila over bungled 2013 nominations", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/I-m-sorry--says-opposition-chief-over-botched-2013-nominations /1064-3303682-eg2lbbz/index.html, March 25, 2018

the overt subversions of rules and procedure in favor of his preferred nominees in the past two elections.

Strategies of Control in ODM Party Nominations

Manipulating Institutions

After Raila Odinga lost yet another presidential election to Former Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, there were concerns raised by both party officials and political pundits that Odinga's poor showing was a result of the "bungled" party nominations. Many claimed that the low turnout in Raila Odinga and ODM's strongholds in Nyanza and Western Province was a direct result of the party's misguided insistence on awarding party nominations to the party leader's closest allies, who were unpopular at the grassroots. The forced imposition of unpopular candidates was thought to have generated voter apathy and suppressed turnout, which was a huge problem for Odinga since his ability to generate sufficient turnout in his stronghold was the most critical component to his path to victory.[18]

Having experienced firsthand the potential implications of a problematic nomination process, ODM seemed intent and eager to fix the wrongs of previous nominations.[19] On multiple occasions and across different parts of the country, both Odinga and his senior lieutenants publicly signalled his strong commitment to show previously unseen restraint in the candidate selection process.[20] [21] [22] At the heart of these public pledges was the party's plan to create new party rules governing party nominations that would prevent the hands of the party leader and other senior officials from actively intervening in the selections made by primary voters during the local primaries.[23] Furthermore, the party would layoff the sitting members of the party's National Elections Board (NEB) including its chairperson Judith Pareno and Nancy Abisai and reconstitute it entirely with fresh members who were not responsible for the so-called "nomination debacle" of 2013.

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[18]"Former Chair of ODM's Election Board Franklin Bett Reveals that Raila Odinga's Aides Cost Him Seat" , *Kenyans.co.ke*, Retrieved at https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/former-chair-odms-elections-board-franklin-bett-reveals-raila-odingas-aides-cost-him-seat-18719, March 25, 2018

[19]"Raila moves to assure free and fair nominations in ODM", *Citizen Digital*, Retrieved at https://citizentv.co.ke/news/raila-moves-to-assure-free-and-fair-nominations-in-odm-147424/, March 25, 2018

[20]"Raila promises free and fair primaries", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Raila-promises-free-and-fair-primaries/1064-3289144-hmhhrwz/index.html, March 25, 2018

[21]"Raila pledges free, fair Cord nominations", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/08/19/raila-pledges-free-fair-cord-nominations_c1406233, March 25, 2018

[22]"Mbadi says ODM primaries will be free and fair", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228488/no-discrimination-in-odm-nominations-raila-odinga-assures-aspirants, March 25, 2018

[23]"ODM outlines strict rules for aspirants before nominations", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/11/03/odm-outlines-strict-rules-for-aspirants-before-nominations_c1448716, March 25, 2018

(Not) Changing Institutions and Rules A closer examination of the "new" institutions and rules that were established in the run-up to the 2017 party nominations casts doubt as to whether the party and party leader's commitments to relinquish control over candidate selection were at all genuine. In fact, nothing about these "new" institutional arrangements were actually new; the very elements of the old nomination rules that allowed the party to interfere in the finalist of candidates were effectively maintained "as-is."

The ODM party constitution, which was amended and adopted by the National Governing Council (NGC) in December of 2014 (slightly less than 2 years after the 2013 general elections) betrays the unwillingness of the party leadership to cede their ability to control the nomination process. Given that one of the biggest critiques levied against the party during the last two candidate selection process was that national party organs (led by the party leader) colluded with the NEB to select their favored candidates, a logical institutional design that would prevent interference from the national leadership would be to i) remove the authority for these national party organs to "supervise" or "oversee" the activities of the NEB and establish the NEB as an independent entity, or ii) devolve the authority to announce the final winner of the party primaries to the county election boards (CEBs) that were to be setup in preparation for the 2017 nominations. However, there is no evidence that these types of changes were adopted in the amended party constitution.

The NEB's activities, according to the new constitution, was yet again to be under the direct supervision of the National Executive Committee (NEC), the third highest organ in the party and the primary decision making authority within the party, consisting of the party's national officials (a group of 42 individuals including the party leader, two deputy party leaders, the national chair and deputy chairpersons, treasurers, and departmental secretaries) and the party's executive director.[24] Specifically under Article 7.5.3: The National Executive Committee (NEC), which enumerates the functions and powers of the NEC, subsections i), n), o), and q) clearly outline the ascendancy of the NEC in the party nomination process.

> Article 7.5.3 The National Executive Committee shall have the following functions and powers:
>
> i) To receive reports, supervise the work of, and delegate such functions to the National Secretariat and National Elections Board as it considers necessary.
>
> n) To liaise with the Party National Election Board in order to ensure the coordination of elections of Party Officials at all levels and Party nominations for Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic elections.
>
> o) To make Elections and Nomination Rules and lay them before the National Governing Council for approval.
>
> q) To make Elections and Nomination Rules and/or Regulations as may be prescribed under this Constitution and lay them before the National Governing Council for ratification.

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[24]While the NEC was the primary decision making body, in reality, most party decisions were known to be made by the Central Committee of the NEC, consisting of a short list of 13 individuals drawn from the 42 individuals comprising the NEC.

Subsections i) and n) are the provisions that establishes the NEC and its Central Committee, which is charged with implementing the decisions made by the NEC, as the principal party organ charged with overseeing the NEB in matters related to candidate selection, and can potentially invoke to overrule the decisions made by the NEB. Subsections o) and q) also provides for the NEC to be the organ designated to formulate the statutory framework under which the party nominations will occur. Given that a large majority of the NEC's officials are effectively appointed by the party leader, the NEC's extensive role, as prescribed by the new constitutions, would do little to curb the party leader and the party leadership's ability to intervene in the candidate selection process.

Article 7.11 of the party constitution, which provides the statutory foundation upon which the NEB is established, seems to reify the authority that the NEC would command over the NEB. Specifically, Article 7.11.2 clearly states that "the National Elections Board will be appointed by the National Executive Committee upon a resolution made by two-thirds of members," giving the NEC the ability to unilaterally make appointments to the NEB without any approval process for those appointments by NGC or the National Delegates Conference (NDC).

It is clear from a reading of the party constitution, which was amended in 2014 and would be in effect during the 2017 elections, that the public commitments to reform the intraparty institutions that govern party nominations saw limited follow-through. But what about the specific election and nomination rules that would detail the exact procedures through which candidates would be selected? Would these nomination rules be drafted in a manner that would reduce the potential for intervention by the party leadership?

One of the most controversial provision in the old nominations rules for the 2013 party nominations was, as mentioned in the earlier analysis, section 3.3, which stated that the "The NEB may with the written approval of the National Executive Committee (NEC) grant a candidate an automatic nomination." This provision had been cited by the 2013 NEB, led by Fraklin Bett, as the justification for issuing direct nominations to candidates over the results of the primary elections. Given the controversy, it is reasonable to expect that this clause would be the target of either deletion or at least partial revision if the party was committed to relinquishing their ability to control. In the ODM's Election and Nomination Rules, also amended and adopted by the NGC in December, 2014, section 3.3 was carried over *verbatim* from the 2013 nomination rules.

Additional analyses of the nomination rules reveal the subtle ways in which the influence of the party leadership could affect the implementation of the nominations. For example, Rule 15 of the Election and Nomination Rules subject the NEB's decision regarding the vetting of candidates to be subject to the approval of the NEC. Subsections of Rule 16 also furnishes the NEC with the ability to waive or impose new candidacy requirements on all elective posts (governor, senator, member of parliament (MP), county woman representative, as well as members of county assembly (MCA)) as it deems fit, so long as the reasons are documented. In addition, under Rule 18, after laying out in extensive detail the timeline and method through which party primaries for the nomination of the five elective posts, again reserved the right of the NEC to overrule the principles and dictate how candidates are selected in any electoral unit in Rule 18.2: "The NEC shall by a resolution determine the mode of election in any

electoral area in the Republic of Kenya provide that NEB shall publish such resolutions not later than twenty one days to the date of party primaries."

Cultivating Loyal Agents   The above analysis of the party's governing documents and nomination rules demonstrates that despite rhetoric, no significant changes to self-impose significant restrictions on their ability to influence party nominations were implemented. I now turn towards examining the second institutional strategy that I argue party leaders can use to establish their authority over candidate selection institutions: by determining the composition of the election board, and how the members of the election board were incentivized.

Given that the missteps made in the 2013 party nominations were considered to be what could have cost Odinga the presidency, many anticipated that the reforms to rectify these issues would certainly be centered around holding individuals who had been responsible for overseeing the debacle would be held accountable. Yet rather than sanction these individuals for their mismanagement, the party nominated two members of the 2013 NEB to serve as a member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), a sub-organ and legislative arm of the East African Community (EAC). The EALA position is considered a "plum" position that presents the occupant with a monthly salary of 14,000 USD, and access to benefits such as an official vehicle and travel allowances.[25] Given that parties in the legislature are able to unilaterally nominate any individual to serve in the EALA, occupants are able to enjoy the privileges of holding public office without subjecting oneself to the rigors of an election campaign. By and large, the lucrative nature of an appointment makes it a highly sought after position, especially among party officials and bureaucrats who do not have aspirations to contest elected office. Therefore, the appointment of two individuals who had served in the 2013 NEB, came as a surprise to many observers and even officials in the party[26], and led to skepticism regarding the resolve of the party leader to punish individuals complicit in the bungled nominations.

However, the biggest shock that came as ODM started laying the groundwork for the 2017 party nominations was when the party announced to the public that a "new" National Elections Board was formed.[27] The party's national chairman John Mbadi announced that EALA Judith Pareno, who had been let go from the NEB only four months earlier for "their dismal performance while serving on the electoral board," was reinstated as the chairperson for the NEB.[28] [29] Judith Pareno, by being anointed the Chair of the new NEB, would be

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[25]"The Benefits of Working for the East African Legislative Assembly", *Kenyans.co.ke*, Retrieved at https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/benefits-working-east-african-legislative-assembly-eala-19030, March 25, 2018

[26]Interview with political journalist, Interview Subject 2016-EJ8, conducted in June, 2016

[27]"New ODM elections board made public", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/1064-3358124-uhspgpz/index.html, March 25, 2018

[28]"ODM to issue new nomination rules as elections team goes home", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/ODM-to-issue-new-nomination-rules-as-elections-team-goes-home /1064-3152858-aooc4t/index.html, March 25, 2018

[29]The party, when they fired her and one other commissioner from her position on the NEB, also claimed that she would also be stripped of her nomination to the EALA. Nothing came of this pledge, and Pareno served out the remainder of her term as an EALA member.

serving her *third* term on ODM's NEB, after she was initially appointed to the NEB in the run-up to the 2007 elections and served as one of the most visible and prominent commissioners on the 2013 NEB. Such was the surprise over the reinstatement that a political journalist that I interviewed after the decision claimed that he had lost all faith in ODM's commitment to limit the powers of the party in the nomination process.

> ... I don't believe it anymore. How can you claim to fire someone for gross incompetence, and then decide to not only just re-hire this person, but make her the chair. It can only mean one thing. They need her to be there because she is loyal, and will do as told. That to me is a tell-tale sign that Odinga isn't serious about keeping his hands off the nominations. He will use her to do what he has always been doing; meddling in his party nominations, favoring his cronies, and ignoring the will of the grassroots.[30]

The argument that Odinga wanted to retain Pareno to serve on the NEB *in spite of* her complicity in the 2007 and 2013 nominations because of her loyalty resonated with the observations I made in a brief interaction with her at ODM's Legal Committee Meeting, at which I was invited to give a short presentation regarding the status of party nomination reforms across the world on June 9, 2015. At the meeting, Judy Pareno was in attendance as the "likely" chairperson for the new NEB. At the end of my presentation, Honorable Pareno discussed at length the need to "do the nominations right this time" and repeatedly emphasized that the problem needed to be fixed because "it was vital to get this poor man [Raila Odinga], who was unfairly denied [the presidency] in 2007 and again in 2013, the presidency." She stated that "ODM and Kenya owed so much to this man," and "would do anything to get this man elected." The sense of conviction she conveyed in this brief encounter signaled that she had strong personal allegiances to Odinga, and was strongly motivated to keep his interests as the most important priority.

The party leader's willingness to select his staunch ally to serve on the NEB, despite significant opposition from both within and outside of the party, made apparent the high valuation he attached to the importance of placing a loyalist represent his interests on the NEB. The follow-up action to his public commitments once again seemed largely missing in the constitution of the NEB.[31]

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[30]Interview with political journalist, Interview Subject 2016-EJ8, conducted in August, 2016

[31]Armed with the power of hindsight, it is also possible to see what happened in the aftermath of yet another bungled party nomination exercise in the hands of 2017 NEB. Despite the open protest of prominent party elites, Raila Odinga nominated Hon. Pareno to serve as a nominated senator representing women in the Kenyan Senate, one of the highest non-elective offices that a party can reserve for an individual by virtue of their numbers in parliament. Pareno became one of only five individuals nominated to serve in this position, alongside former party secretary general Agnes Zani. This is largely considered a step up from nomination as a member of the EALA. She still retains her position as chair of the ODM NEB.

Shaping the Field

The capture of selection institutions constituted one of the vital means through which Raila Odinga and the party leadership retained their ability to control the outcome of party nominations. Yet another key scheme through which ODM has traditionally attempted to obtain these ends was by shaping the field of candidates who would contest the party nominations. This strategy across both the 2013 and 2017 nominations, were put into action as the race for the nomination begin heating up.

The unique nature of the 2013 general elections in Kenya almost necessitated the party to engage deeply in shaping the candidate field prior to the nominations. The 2013 elections would be the first to be held under the new constitution, which was enacted in 2010. The new constitution changed the structure of parliament from unicameral to bicameral, creating an additional elective senatorial seats for each county. Furthermore, the constitution included provisions for the first time a devolved system of government that would create 47 county executives (governors) in addition to 1450 members of county assembly (MCAs). The creation of these new positions—especially the gubernatorial and senatorial seats—created a mad dash among incumbent MPs and other prominent party elites to vie for the party nomination for what could possibly prove to be the more senior and powerful elective posts in the era of devolution.[32] [33] The jockeying of candidates to contest the limited number of higher-level seats generated concern among the party leadership, who feared that the party leader's allies would lose out in a full-blown nomination fight against other locally prominent politicians, or even between themselves.[34]

The 2013 Siaya Senatorial Nominations The party's hand could be observed in action in quite a significant number of important races in ODM's strongholds, where the competition for the party candidature was heating up far in advance of the party's timeline for the party nominations. One such example was found in the race for newly created Siaya county senatorial seat, which, due to the controversy surrounding it, became one of the most closely covered nomination fights across the country. More than a full year before the 2013 general elections, two prominent ODM stalwarts aligned closely with party leader Raila Odinga made public their interest to contest the seat.[35]. The first of these was Dr. Oburu Odinga, the older brother to Raila Odinga who had served as the incumbent MP for Bondo constituency, the hometown of the Odinga family for the past 19 years. The second candidate was the incumbent Ugenya MP James Orengo, who was appointed as the Minister of Lands in the Grand

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[32]"Oburu Odinga Steps Down for James Orengo in Siaya Senate Race", *Jambonewspot*, Retrieved at http://www.jambonewspot.com/new/oburu-odinga-steps-down-for-james-orengo-in-siaya-senate-race/, March 25, 2018

[33]"Raila advises Oburu and Orengo", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000069860/raila-advises-oburu-and-orengo, March 25, 2018

[34]"Orengo-Oburu Spat Reflecting Badly On The PM", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2012/10/19/orengo-oburu-spat-reflecting-badly-on-the-pm_c693766, March 25, 2018

[35]"Orengo and Oburu battle for Siaya seat", *The Daily Nation*, Retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Orengo+and+Oburu+battle+for+Siaya+seat/-/1064/1528530/-/1002j05/-/index.html, March 25, 2018

Coalition Government by Raila Odinga himself. He was known to serve in the capacity of primary counsel to the ODM party and Odinga's on all legal affairs.

The bitter rivalry between Odinga's blood relative and one of his closest allies in government quickly escalated, with both sides claiming that they were unwilling to step aside for each other. Whereas many speculated that Raila Odinga had a preference his older brother for the senatorial ticket, former MPs within ODM who hails from one of the opposition party's strongholds I interviewed that if Odinga had a preference, it was probably for his confidante Orengo:

> People who say that our party leader favored his brother for the senate seat is probably wrong. ... He never came out in support of anyone, but many within the party leader's inner circle understood that a fallout between Oburu and Orengo with Oburu winning would be perceived as Odinga family being too greedy. This would be a big problem for the PM (Prime Minister). This is why the party leadership was so active engaged in resolving this feud through negotiation before the primaries. And you already know what happened. Oburu stepped down for Orengo. [36]

The MP's statements seems to strongly suggest that despite the party leader's denial to the contrary, the party leadership might have played an important role in inducing Oburu Odinga to cancel his bid and instead endorse Orengo for the senate. The machinations that were orchestrated behind the scenes, with multiple members of parliament asked to mediate the negotiation between the two parties were unprecedented, as this quote from yet another senior party official suggests;

> There was immense manpower going into making sure that one would step down. You wouldn't believe how many people and hours had to be spent to get them to engage. It was difficult as the rivalry had become bitter. But Oburu realized that he would hurt his brother's chances for the presidency, and he could not be blamed for that.[37]

The 2013 Mombasa Senatorial Nominations As stated earlier, this was far from the only case in which the party wielded influence over the candidate field. Another such incidence was the contest for the newly created Mombasa senatorial seat, in the heart of the opposition stronghold of the Coast. Initially, the incumbent Changamwe MP and ODM National Vice Chairman Ramadhan Kajembe seemed to be running unopposed after Najib Balala, a former member of the ODM pentagon[38] and a cabinet minister in the Grand Coalition government under Odinga left the party after he was fired by the Prime Minister, and decided to contest the

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[36]Interview with an opposition MP, Interview Subject 2015-PO21, conducted in April 2015

[37]Interview with an ODM party official, Interview Subject 2015-PO22, conducted in April 2015

[38]The Pentagon was an informal party organ of ODM, comprised of senior politicians representing large ethnic groups. The five members of the Pentagon were Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto, Joe Nyagah, Charity Ngilu, and Najib Balala

Mombasa senatorial seat under his own party. Yet things changed when former Kenyan National Human Rights Commissioner Hassan Omar Sarai announced that he would be seeking the party's nomination for the Mombasa senatorial seat.

In an interview with the author, Omar said that he very quickly realized that his announcement to contest the Mombasa senate seat was not at all received as he had expected it to be, by the party and its leadership, including the party leader Raila Odinga. He recounted that he could could "'feel it in his bones" that the whole party apparatus, both national and local, were working against him:

> It became very apparent that Kajembe had the party organization in his pocket. He was using his position as national vice chairman to manipulating the party and the party leader so that he would become the favored candidate for nomination. He perhaps was aiming for a direct nomination from the party.

The level of coordination of the party organization around Kajembe's nomination was such that Omar could directly feel the whole ODM machinery being mobilized so as to thwart his bid. In fact, he specifically recalls that he was extremely frustrated with other prominent coastal politicians, during the process of their own campaigns for the party primaries, were attempting to mobilize in favor of Kajembe, while dismissing his bid. This included the incumbent MP for Kisauni Ali Hassan Joho, ODM's Organizing Secretary who also happened to be the presumptive nominee for the Mombasa gubernatorial elections. Joho's support for Kajembe was, for Omar, especially problematic because as National Organizaing Secretary, Joho was in charge of coordinating the mobilization efforts of ODM's national and local organizations. And he believed that Joho's behavior was reflective of the sentiment of the party's top leadership.

> I was extremely unhappy that he [Joho] would do this. But he wasn't necessarily doing this of his own accord. The orders were coming from the top.

Despite these overt pressures from the party apparatus, Omar persisted, putting up a valient effort to ride, what was in his perception, a favorable wave of support from the grassroots that he was sure would culminate in a victory in the scheduled primaries.[39] But his persistence did not go unnoticed, and Odinga was so adamant to put Kajembe in the Mombasa senate seat that he summoned Omar to a meeting while he was in the coast. This was when it became clear that the party simply would not let him fly the party banner, and was attempting to orchestrate his withdrawal from the race.

> It was a very odd meeting. He [Raila Odinga] is generally a cordial man and we have always enjoyed a favorable relationship. I have always respected this man a lot. He was the only reform-minded senior politician out there. And he knew he had my respect. But this time it was different. His body language, his words...

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[39]"Kajembe and Omar Clash Over Senate Job", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://allafrica.com/stories/201205020054.html, March 28, 2015

> I could immediately tell that he didn't want me, and that Kajembe would likely receive the nomination.

But Omar's realization of his pending fate was not based on a reading of Odinga's body language or demeanor alone.

> The he explicitly suggested that I step down for Kajembe. He said that the party could not afford a big nomination fight because Balala would also be in the race. In return for stepping down, he then offered me a cabinet position in his government if he were to win the presidential election. Obviously, I had no attention of accepting that offer. In fact, I asked him since the Cabinet position is senior to a senate seat and Kajembe was the senior politician, why not offer the cabinet post to Kajembe and have him support my candidacy?

The party leader's own words confirmed to Omar what was told to him by an insider in the ODM NEB. Omar was told under confidence that the party was not going to let him have the ticket, and that if need be, the party primaries that would "decide" the nominee would not be free and fair. With the whole ODM party pushing Kajembe, Omar had no option to leave the party and defect to the Wiper Democratic Movement, the party of the opposition coalition's deputy presidential candidate Kalonzo Musyoka, which gave him a direct nomination to contest the senatorial election. He eventually won the senate seat, beating out both Kajembe and Balala.[40]

Influencing Implementation

The mini case studies of two nominations contests above has described in detail how the party works to shape the candidate field so that it can ultimately control the outcome of nominations. The following proceeds to describe how parties can use their ability to influence the implementation of the nomination procedures to retain control.

While there is no systematic data collected on the implementation of nomination procedures for 2013, the extensive coverage in the media suggest that the party frequently subverted the its own rules and guidelines for the nominations by prempting the implementation of primaries, and even when the primaries had taken place, vacating or overturning results and issuing direct tickets if it meant being able to instating their preferred candidates.

Controversy afflicted Siaya county twice during a single nomination cycle. Immediately after dropping out of the senatorial contest and endorsing his rival James Orengo for the seat, Oburu Odinga announced that he would instead be running for the gubernatorial election, and would be seeking the ODM's nomination.[41] The entry of Raila's blood relative with

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[40]"ODM's scheming gave Omar the Mombasa senator seat – Kajembe", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/03/08/odms-scheming-gave-omar-the-mombasa-senator-seat-kajembe_c747723, March 25, 2018

[41]"Raila denies any hand in Siaya politics", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000073722&story_title=Politics:%20Raila%20denies%20any%20hand%20in%20Siaya%20politics, March 25, 2018

almost two decades of experience as an elected official, who was riding on the overwhelming support of party insiders, caused panic among the existing pool of candidates. In fact, such was the pressure from the party organization to support Oburu's candidacy, three candidates (JT Okinda, Gideon Ochanda and Joe Donde) withdrew from the race and opted endorsed his selection as the party candidate.[42] This left one candidate, William Oduol, who had a strong ground operation and who was enjoying significant mass support as a result of his steady engagement with Siaya voters that started more than three years prior to the elections.

On the day of the party primaries, early tallying suggested that Oburu would lose against Oduol; Oduol was racking up a seemingly unassailable lead in what were perceived to be Oburu's strongholds.[43] Despite overwhelming reports from election observers to the contrary, the county elections panel chairperson Monica Amolo eventually declared Oburu the winner with 62,232 votes against William Oduol's 35,198. The results were conspicuously missing results from Gem and Alego Usonga constituencies, believed to be Oduol's strongholds in the county.[44] These results were quickly acknowledged by the ODM NEB led by Franklin Bett, and until an official petition filed by Oduol saw the Obura nomination eventually nullified and a direct ticket issued to another candidate (Cornel Rasanga, who eventually went on to win the governorship in the general election), remained the officially recognized results of the ODM Siaya gubernatorial primary. The dramatic proclamation of Oburu's victory despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary signals the lengths to which the party leadership was willing to go in order to secure the victory for its favored candidate.

Similar incidents where the party attempted to overturn the results of the primaries were repeatedly observed across the party's strongholds in the former Nyanza province. For example, the party's NEB successfully overturned the defeat of Raila's chief whip in parliament, Jakoyo Midiwo, who suffered a humiliating defeat in the party primaries for Gem constituency. The party cited section 3.3 of the nomination rules in issuing the direct nomination to Midiwo, saying that it was within the parameters of the party rules for them to issue a direct ticket to a candidate.[45] As briefly discussed earlier in the overview, it also successfully vacated the primary results for the Kisumu senatorial primaries which saw the party secretary general Professor Anyang' Nyong'o suffered a resounding defeat.

In the party nominations for the 2017 elections, the same strategies of intervening in the implementation process were still very much alive, albeit on a significantly lesser scale. The party leadership, cognizant of the perils of brazenly overturning or fabricating the outcome of a contested primary election, instead seem to have intervened in earlier stages of the candidate selection process through the strategic use of endorsements. They however still exercised their prerogatives to preempt primaries from being held in a subset of their constituencies

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[42]"Oburu, Oduol disqualified", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000075 582/oburu-oduol-disqualified, March 25, 2018

[43]"Revolt Against Raila in Nyanza", *The Star*, Retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/ news/2013/01/19/revolt-against-raila-in-nyanza_c728051, March 26, 2018

[44]"Oburu won, not Oduol – ODM", *Capital News*, Retrieved at https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/ news/2013/01/oburu-won-not-oduol-odm/, March 26, 2018

[45]"ODM heavyweights risk losing tickets", *The Standard*, Retrieved at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke /article/2000076036/odm-heavyweights-risk-losing-tickets, March 26, 2018

and instead offer direct tickets to a single candidate.

Figure 5.1 provides descriptive evidence of regarding how frequently the party leader used the selective implementation of primary elections as a strategy to control the outcome of the 2017 nominations. To create the plots, I leveraged newspaper sources and official primary results announced by parties to code the constituencies in which the ODM held primary elections. I then merged the data with the official primary candidates list furnished by ODM to code the number of primary contests by constituency. I then use this data to code constituencies in which i) primaries were held in places with multiple primary candidates, ii) primaries were not held (and direct nomination offered) in places with only a single candidate, iii) no nominations were held because the party had no candidate, and iv) whether primaries were preempeted (and direct nomination offered) in places with multiple registered candidates. Out of the 184 constituencies in which ODM managed to field a candidate, the party preempted primaries in around 10% of them. This means that ODM held to their commitments to hold primaries in 90% of the constituencies for which they had multiple candidates.

Figure 5.1: ODM Party Nominations for National Assembly and Senate, 2017

Note: The plots is a cartographic presentation of mode of candidate selection employed by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) disaggregated by constituency.

Despite the relative infrequency at which the party preempted primaries with the purpose of nominating their preferred candidates, a few incidents of intervention by the party drew the attention of critics. Nominated Senator Elizabeth Ongoro, who four years ago in 2013 had been mysteriously been denied an opportunity to vie as the Senator for Nairobi, was once again on the receiving end of the party's bias, as the party disqualified Ongoro, preempted the primary elections in Ruaraka constituency, and awarded a direct nomination to the incumbent TJ Kajwang, despite protests by the Senator's supporters at the party headquarters.

Chapter 6

Controlling Nominations Through Primary Voters

The previous chapter has shown how party leaders can manipulate the party's institutional structures—key organizational bodies and decision-making processes—to control their party's candidate selection process. Especially when candidate selection remains intraparty affairs among party leaders and party elites, these strategies can place the candidate selection process under the direct control of party leader. Even with control over such institutional mechanisms, however, the story becomes decidedly more complicated when the *de-jure* authority to select party candidates has been transferred—either in part or in its entirety—out of the hands of the party leaders and into the hands of the masses. Typically these circumstances arise when parties use methods that involve mass voting on the part of party members or even the broader electorate to select their candidates, as is the case in a delegates system or closed or open primary elections often adopted by parties in consolidated democracies (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 35). This is a reality that party leaders in Africa increasingly face today, as many parties have either already adopted or is in the process of transitioning to such selection methods (Ichino and Nathan, 2017).

Because the outcome of candidate selection is determined through a formal voting process, the ways in which party leaders can influence nomination outcomes are significantly more restricted in comparison to when it is institutionally delegated to party leaders or elites. And the dominant narrative on candidate selection in parties of the developing world takes on the premise that once mass participation is adopted, the choice over party candidates is mostly determined by the preferences of the masses participating in the voting process (Izama and Raffler, N.d.; Ichino and Nathan, 2016). Yet such an approach places too much emphasis on "formal procedure" and underestimates the ability of party leaders to retain control over candidate selection even when the *de-jure* authority to do so no longer resides with them (Cohen et al., 2009; Hassell, 2017).

In this chapter, I show how party leaders adapt their strategies in response to primary elections, and choose to work "through" primary voters to retain control of candidate selection. I argue that the adoption of mass-driven candidate selection methods fails to function as a real constraint on the party leader's ability to control the outcome of candidate selec-

tion. I demonstrate that even when party leaders no longer possess the formal authority to select party candidates, they can tap into their privileged relationship with primary voters and manipulate them to retain control: building on the recent agenda-setting work on the electoral implication of elite endorsements in new democracies (Arriola, 2012; Baldwin, 2013; Koter, 2013), I argue that party leaders use endorsements and denouncements (or negative endorsements) to directly signal their preference over aspirants competing in candidate selection processes such as primary elections. The party leaders' endorsement critically affects how partisan primary voters vote because of their strong sense of attachment to the party leader, as well as their perception that the endorsement is a signal of superior candidate quality.

I test this argument by combining analyses of both observational and experimental data from Kenya. First, using a novel data set of endorsements and primary election outcomes in Kenya for the 2017 parliamentary elections, I show that parties are able to control the outcome of primary elections by issuing endorsements to their favored primary candidates, and that these candidates enjoy a decisive, if not insurmountable, advantage over their competitors in securing the party ticket. Second, using a series of experiments embedded in a survey of primary voters in two populous counties in Kenya, I rigorously demonstrate both the amount of influence that party leader endorsements have on partisan primary voters, as well as the mechanisms underpinning this influence.

6.1   Persuasion as an Instrument of Control

The transition to a bottom-up, mass participatory system of candidate selection constitutes a significant break from the top-down processes that are often associated with parties in the developing world. Under a top-down system, party leaders or a small number of party elites under their direct control typically make the choice as to which aspirant will receive the party nomination. The decision made by this small selectorate is relatively unconstrained by the preferences of the broader party base; they are subject to popular opinion in so far as they care about the competitiveness of the candidates they nominate in the general election, but the decision to factor in these considerations is not "mandatory." However, when bottom-up methods of candidate selection are adopted, the formal authority to select party candidates are transferred over to a much broader section of the party base, which often includes ordinary party members or even partisan supporters. On face value, this transition seems like a daunting obstacle for party leaders if they are to retain control of a process over which their *de-jure* influence has, in large part, been curtailed.

Losing formal authority, however, does not translate into the complete loss of influence. Far from it, party leaders can, and often will, make sure that they can retain their hold over the outcome of candidate selection processes even with diminished formal authority. Two broad sets of strategies are available to party leaders under these circumstances; the first involves party leaders "working *against* the selectorate" by manipulating or circumventing the decisions made through the bottom-up process. The second involves party leaders operating within the new system of candidate selection and using the tools of political persuasion to "work *through* the selectorate." As demonstrated in the previous chapter, while the amount

of influence that African party leaders often possess over their party organization would certainly make it feasible for party leaders to opt for the first strategy, they also understand that overruling formal procedure and imposing their decision on the selectorate is an undesirable option: much like when autocratic leaders try to actively bypass or undermine the electoral process through rigging and electoral fraud, hijacking the candidate selection process away from the masses will most certainly have pernicious downstream electoral consequences. Given these constraints, party leaders often benefit by working *through* the selectorate.

Working through the mass selectorate involves party leaders relying on the tools of political persuasion. In order to make sure that their favored aspirants are chosen as party candidates, party leaders must convince the selectorate voting in these bottom-up processes to exercise their vote in a manner that is consistent with their preferences. To inform the selectorate regarding their preferences over candidates, African party leaders turn to a tool of persuasion whose extensive use by political elites has been documented in both consolidated and new democracies: political endorsements (Cohen et al., 2009, 282; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Koter, 2013; Baldwin, 2013; Arriola, Choi and Gichohi, N.d.). It is through political endorsements that party leaders can retain their grip over the mass selectorate and candidate selection.

Why Do Party Endorsements Matter for the Mass Selectorate?

For the endorsements to function as effective instruments of control for the party leader, the mass selectorate must be willing to follow the leader's preferences when choosing among aspirants. But why would the selectorate be persuaded by the party leader's opinion? Does the evaluation of the mass selectorate regarding a candidate competing for the party nomination change as a result of the party leader's endorsement or denouncement? And if so, what aspect of candidate evaluation does the endorsement affect?

Before probing the effectiveness of party leader endorsements and the mechanisms through they operate, it is important to highlight how the distinctive context in which mass-based candidate selection is conducted creates conditions in which party leader endorsements will be effective in influencing the mass selectorate. First, voting in these processes can be characterized as "low-information" (Chandra, 2007; Ferree, 2010). When there is a dearth of information on attributes and qualities of the candidates upon which to anchor their choice, voters are often compelled to rely on heuristic shortcuts that allow them compensate for the lack of information (Lupia, 1994; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001).

Yet the nature of intraparty candidate selection limits the availability of heuristic shortcuts that voters can often rely on: first, party cues that traditionally act as powerful sources of information in elections with *interparty* competition is by definition rendered uninformative in the context of *intraparty* competition (Arceneaux, 2008; Sniderman and Stiglitz, 2012; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014). Furthermore, the usefulness of co-ethnicity, which has been found to be an important informational shortcut in multi-ethnic societies (Ferree, 2010; Arriola, Choi and Gichohi, 2016), is diminished in lower-tier elections such as legislative primaries because voters are seldom faced with a multi-ethnic aspirant pool with candidates who are members of ethnic outgroups (Carlson, 2015).

Under circumstances in which widely-used heuristics are of limited utility, primary voters are obliged to seek alternative cues that they can rely on to choose the party candidate. The party leader's endorsement (or denouncement) regarding primary aspirants becomes a highly persuasive alternative for primary voters in these contexts because of the privileged relationship forged between party leaders and their partisans in many patronage-based democracies (Chandra, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003). Political parties in these countries are seldom organized based on programmatic or ideological differences - rather, parties are often formed based on existing social cleavages across ascriptive identities such as race, ethnicity, or religion (Madrid, 2012; Elischer, 2013). When ascriptive loyalties become the basis of electoral mobilization in patronage democracies, elections, especially for national office such as the presidency, become a contest between these groups to secure future access to state resources. In this regard, party leaders often become synonymous with political representative of the identity groups, whose electoral success is likely the most important factor that structures the extent to which these groups will benefit from the spoils of holding the national seat of power (Van de Walle, 2003, 2007). The perception that the political fate of their party leader is intertwined with their own well-being will induce partisan supporters to generate affective and behavioral ties to the party leader, and place their trust in her opinion.

The favorable conditions outlined above, however, do not guarantee that the endorsement of party leaders will have a persuasive influence on their co-partisans who participate in the mass-driven candidate selection process (such as primary elections). Why and how might the party leader's preferences on party aspirants, delivered through endorsements or denouncements, affect the evaluations of their co-partisans? I identify below two potential mechanisms.

First, the party leader's endorsement can function as a source of information on the quality of the aspirant, especially in terms of what voters in Africa consider central to their material well-being: local development and the provision of public goods and services (Ichino and Nathan, 2013*a*; Conroy-Krutz, 2013). In a low information environment, partisan primary voters face significant constraints in terms of acquiring reliable information regarding the ability of party aspirants contesting primaries to deliver these crucial goods and services. Lacking the information necessary, voters may be inclined to follow the endorsement of the party leader, who they perceive to have superior inside information and expertise to accurately evaluate the party aspirants in terms of their competence (Lupia, 1994).

Second, the party leader's endorsement can shape the perception of how loyal the aspirant is to the party and the party leader. The loyalty of these potential party candidates need not matter to partisans because they harbor ascriptive or psychological attachments towards the party and the leader. Rather, it may very well be that partisans care because they believe that the loyalty of party candidates have consequences for their own well-being. If earlier observations that voters are aware of the material implications of holding executive office (the presidency) is correct, partisans may place weight on selecting party candidates that are party loyalists who are likely to actively contribute to the party leader's quest for higher office (Manning, 2005; Arriola, 2012, 11).

How the Mass Selectorate Views Party Endorsements

The preceding subsection has discussed the theoretical expectations regarding why party leader endorsements will critically shape how the mass selectorate evaluates and chooses between aspirants competing for the party's candidacy. I probe the plausibility of these arguments using an original survey of likely partisan primary voters across two research sites in Kenya, and in-depth follow-up interviews with a subsample of the survey respondents.

The main data presented in this section are drawn from a survey of self-identified partisan primary voters in Nakuru and Kisumu county in Kenya, conducted between July and August of 2016. Nakuru county is considered a stronghold of the incumbent Jubilee Party of Kenya (Jubilee) and the Jubilee alliance more broadly, whereas Kisumu county is considered a stronghold of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Respondents were recruited through door-to-door canvassing using a random-walk method modeled after the Afrobarometer protocol for household survey sampling. In each sampled household, enumerators followed the Kish grid method to determine which individual, over the age of 18, would be interviewed. Only those who were residents of the constituency, was either i) a registered party member or ii) reported that they had a close attachment towards either of the two parties, and iii) reported that they were likely to participate in the upcoming 2017 party primaries were eligible to participate in the survey. The sample drawn was intended to be a representative sample of voters in the constituencies who were likely participants in their respective party primaries. The resulting sample yields a total of around 2400 likely incumbent and opposition primary voters, evenly split between the two parties. In addition, I conducted open-ended follow-up interviews with a much smaller subsample of respondents in both Nakuru and Kisumu to shed light on some of the responses obtained in the main survey, and I draw on many of these interviews in the analysis that follows.

An overwhelming majority of likely partisan primary voters in Nakuru and Kisumu agrees that aspirants contesting in party primaries for Member of Parliament (MP) are likely to receive a significant boost by the endorsement of the party leader. Fully 83 percent of respondents in Nakuru and Kisumu agreed with the statement that "aspirants in party primaries are unlikely win if they do not have the support of the party leader." More than 64 percent of respondents also agreed with the statement that they would " ... personally value the opinion of the party leader in choosing between aspirants during the party primaries." These findings are not driven by the views of the supporters of a single party; the high rates of agreement are consistently observed amongst partisan supporters of both the incumbent Jubilee and opposition ODM parties. However, the survey results also reveal the diversity logic that leads partisan supporters to privilege the opinion of the party leader as they select the party candidate.

For example, the first set of respondents seem to vote with the party leader in party primaries because they believe that the party leader's endorsement signals the superior quality of the primary aspirant, and the extent to which the he or she would represent their interest once elected to office. In both research sites, more than a third of respondents reported that they would listen to the party leader because party leaders had superior information on how the candidate would perform in terms of bringing about much needed local development if

elected to office. A respondent in Nakuru who self-identified as a vocal and active supporter of the incumbent Jubilee expressed this perspective particularly well when he said, "We need performers, and the President and the party knows who will perform if they become MP."[1] Moreover, many respondents who were contacted for follow-up interviews highlighted how the party leader's endorsement—and the information regarding the potential performance of the candidate that is conveyed through it—is especially salient when there is a dearth of information on the quality and attributes on the party aspirants. One middle-aged female respondent in Kisumu, who was a registered party member of the opposition ODM, aptly summarized the lack of information on aspirants when she said, "We don't know these people very well. Some of them we know because they have been around. But most of them we don't know."[2] Another female respondent in Nakuru, who said she had previously participated in party primaries and was a staunch supporter of President Uhuru Kenyatta said, "... when he (Uhuru Kenyatta) says this candidate is the one to represent the party in the elections, we listen. We know if Uhuru supports a candidate, he will deliver for the people."[3]

The willingness of respondents to believe that the preferred candidate of the party leader would be superior in quality seems to be connected to the level of support that party leaders enjoy amongst their co-partisan supporters. In the survey, I employed two measures of party leader support: a job approval question that asked respondents rate whether they "approve or disapprove of the way your party leader is handling his job?" on a 7 point likert scale, and a feeling thermometer adapted from the American National Election Studies (ANES) to capture respondent affect towards the party leader. The survey responses to these two items consistently paint a picture of party leaders who enjoy high rates of approval and are greatly admired by their co-partisan followers. On average, respondents "strongly approved" of their party leader's job performance. Raila Odinga, the party leader of ODM, received an average rating of 6.08 on the 7 point likert scale amongst ODM supporters, which is slightly higher than Uhuru Kenyatta's approval amongst Jubilee supporters (5.70 on a 7 point likert scale). Respondents also demonstrate a high level of positive affect towards the party leaders; the mean feeling thermometer rating for the party leaders is 79.20 on a 100 point scale, which is higher than the mean rating for the party, which stands at 76.00. As was the case for the job approval, Raila Odinga receives a higher rating on the feeling thermometer from ODM supporters (82/100) than does Uhuru Kenyatta from Jubilee supporters (75/100).

Additional survey and interview evidence, however, suggest that positive attitudes towards party leaders are likely grounded in much more than short-term, snapshot evaluations of the party leader's performance. In discussing their party leaders, subjects of the follow-up interviews often went to great lengths to emphasize how their attitudes towards the party leader were formed through a process of repeated observation and evaluation of what the party leader had done. One elderly male ODM supporter in Kisumu Central constituency elaborated the reasons why he supported and respected his party leader, Raila Odinga.

" ... the party leader is not like anyone (else). He has fought for us for many

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[1]Follow-up interview with male respondent, Nakuru West constituency, Nakuru county, July 2016.

[2]Follow-up interview with female respondent, Kisumu East constituency, Kisumu county, August 2016.

[3]Follow-up interview with female respondent, Nakuru East constituency, Nakuru county, July 2016.

> many years. He has always tried to protect us and bring what we deserve from
> the government... Look at what he did for this area when he was Prime Minister
> in the Grand Coalition government. No one was able to bring what he brought
> to us... He is the only politician that cares about ordinary wananchi."[4]

The above quote is reflective of the broader set of responses gathered throughout the follow-up interviews. Partisan supporters from both sides of the aisle frequently emphasized that their support for the party leaders stemmed not from any social norm to be blindly deferential to the party leader or fear of punishment or sanctioning, but rather a genuine belief that the party leader had their best interests at heart.[5] And the idea that the party leader is a faithful protector of partisan interests seems to be one of the core reasons why partisan supporters would vote for the party leader's preferred candidate in party primaries. As a respondent who claimed to be a party activist in a follow-up interview stated, "He will take care of us. He would not say someone is right if he didn't believe it."[6] Survey responses provides corroboration of this idea; so strong is the notion that party leaders represent their interests and well-being that partisans consider their fate and well-being to be closely intertwined with the party leader. In the survey, we presented respondents a question adapted from the 'linked fate" questions in the ANES, which asked "Do you think what happens to your party leader will affect what happens in your life?" on a 4 point scale, ranging from 1 (None) and 4 (Yes, a lot). More than 55% of respondents answered that what happens to the party leader would have a "a lot" or "some" impact on their own lives.

A second set of respondents, however, suggested an different motivation that mirrors the second logic presented in the previous subsection. These individuals were equally unequivocal in their support and trust in their party leaders. What set them apart from the first group of respondents was their perception of what they wanted their party candidates to do. "We want team players." said a male Jubilee supporter interviewed on a late afternoon in Nakuru county. "We need these people to support Uhuru so that he can serve a second term."[7] Many said that party candidates must be loyal to the party leader, and support is bid for the presidency. Yet upon being probed for the reason behind this position, partisans suggested that it was not the result of blind loyalty or reverence but rather a conscious calculation of what they stood to gain or lose if the party leader occupied the presidency. A female respondent in Kisumu stated that " ... we can't have rebels running. Rebels can spoil the chance for Raila to win next year." When pressed for why it was so important for her party leader to win the presidency, she cited a logic that earlier scholars of African politics have highlighted: the importance of the presidency in an executive dominant system (Van de Walle, 2003). "If we want to see development in our region, we need him to be president. The current government

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[4]Follow-up male respondent, Kisumu East constituency, Kisumu county, July 2016.

[5]Follow-up interview with male respondent, Nakuru West constituency, Nakuru county, July 2016; Follow-up interview with female respondent, Nakuru East constituency, Nakuru county, July 2016; Follow-up interview with female respondent, Kisumu Central constituency, Kisumu county, August 2016.

[6]Follow-up interview with male respondent, Nakuru East consituency, Nakuru county, July 2016.

[7]Interview with male respondent, Nakuru East constituency, Nakuru county, July 2016.

has ignored us."[8] Such perspectives are widely shared by more than a majority of respondents in the survey. I specifically asked "How important is it for your own well-being that the party leader wins national office such as the presidency?", and recorded responses on a five point scale ranging from 1 (Unimportant) and 5 (Very important). More than 70% of respondents also answered that it is either "very important" or "somewhat important" for their personal well-being that the party leader wins national office.

The survey and interview evidence from Kenya prevents us from clearly adjudicating between the two mechanisms: endorsements as a signal of aspirant competence to deliver local development and public goods and endorsements as a signal of aspirant loyalty to the party and party leader. Indeed, it is seems very likely the case that both mechanisms are playing a role in establishing the persuasive role of party leader endorsements during mass-driven candidate selection processes. While caution is necessary in drawing conclusions from the evidence presented in this subsection, the analysis forms the foundation upon which the experimental research presented in the subsequent section is based.

6.2   Testing party influence in primary elections

In this section, I provide the initial piece of evidence in support of my argument that party leader can powerfully shape the outcome of primary elections by signalling their preferences over candidates using endorsements. The analysis draws on a novel data set I collected through web-crawling methods on party endorsements issued by both the incumbent party (Jubilee Party) and the largest opposition party (ODM) in Kenya towards candidates competing in their 2017 parliamentary primaries. The endorsements data were then combined with candidate-level biographical data provided by the political parties, as well as electoral data from previous elections, and data on the outcome of the party nominations.

The endorsement data is a candidate-level data set (nested in constituencies) that codes a primary candidate as having received an endorsement by the party if the top three print-based national newspapers as well as a number of web-based outlets carry a story of the endorsement during roughly a one year period prior to the start of the party nominations.[9] The scope of the search was restricted to endorsements that were specifically issued by the national party leader for each of the parties, as well as the national deputy party leaders. I include endorsements by the deputy party leaders because they were largely understood to have been also operating under the auspices of the party leader in issuing endorsements for primary candidates. [10]

While there are instances in which a single primary candidate was seemingly endorsed on multiple occasions, it is difficult to accurately and consistently code the *number* of times a candidate was endorsed. Therefore, the measure employed is a coarsened dichotomous

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[8]Interview with female respondent, Kisumu East constituency, Kisumu county, July 2016.

[9]The following are the media outlets from which the articles are extracted. *The Daily Nation, The Standard, The Star, tuko.co.ke, capitalfm.co.ke, Citizen TV, and KTN News.*

[10]Interview with incumbent party official, Subject 2017-PI46, February 20, 2017; Interview with opposition party official, Subject 2017-PO47, February 25, 2017.

variable (*Endorsed*), where the value "1" indicates a candidate that has been endorsed by the party at least once during the period covered. Out of the 1,498 candidates who applied to become a parliamentary candidate of Jubilee party and ODM, I observe endorsements being issued to slightly less than 10% of them.It is important to emphasize that the measure constructed here is likely to be an "underestimate" of total number of endorsements issued to candidates; although the search conducted to construct this data set was quite comprehensive, there undoubtedly a large number of cases in which an endorsement was not carried by the print media but rather by national and local radio or television stations or not covered at all. To the extent that endorsements are unlikely to *hurt* a candidate's prospects, the incompleteness of the data, however, is likely to understate the association between endorsements and primary election outcomes.

Table 6.1: Endorsements and primary election outcomes

Panel A	*Outcome: Won in Primaries*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Endorsed	0.645***	0.519***	0.709***	0.626***
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.063)
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full
Candidate controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Electoral controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,255	1,255	1,255	1,255
R^2	0.199	0.249	0.207	0.229
Panel B	*Outcome: Won in Primaries*			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Endorsed	0.422***	0.533***	0.634***	0.747***
	(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.070)	(0.084)
Sample	Jubilee	Jubilee	ODM	ODM
Candidate controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Electoral controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	905	905	350	350
R^2	0.232	0.204	0.312	0.300

Note: Models are estimated using linear regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$. The dependent variable is whether a candidate won in the primary elections.

The models in Table 6.1 analyze the relationship between endorsements issued by the party and candidate success in the party's parliamentary nominations. Since the focus of the analysis is the influence that parties have over primary elections, I subset the data to constituencies in which either the Jubilee or ODM party held primaries to select their candidates.[11] The outcome I use as a measure of candidate success is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of "1" if the candidate is declared the winner of the primaries. I use this more crude measure of candidate success because the official vote tallies for the primaries were available for only a small subset of constituencies. I use ordinary least squares regression with standard errors in the models clustered by constituency.[12]

Model (1), the baseline specification, presents the bivariate relationship between endorsements and candidate victory in primary elections. On average, primary candidates who are endorsed by the party are around 64 percentage points more likely to win in the primaries than candidates who are not. This coefficient is substantively large, and is statistically significant at the p<0.001 level. This is suggestive of the possibility that primary candidates who have the backing of the party enjoy a significant advantage in the primaries.

Model (2) shows that the bivariate relationship found in Model (1) are robust to the inclusion of other candidate and constituency-level variables; specifically, I include binary variables that code whether a primary candidate was the incumbent MP for the constituency, the gender of the candidate, and the political experience of the candidate (whether the candidate has ever held an elected position at the national level or held a cabinet level or sub-cabinet level appointment). Also added as controls were the number of candidates contesting in the primary, a set of constituency-level electoral variables such as the vote share of the political party in the previous parliamentary and presidential elections, and turnout. Even controlling for these covariates, the relationship between party endorsements and candidate success in primary elections remains large and precisely estimated.

Models (3) and (4) subject the findings to more robustness checks. Given that candidate-level data points are nested within constituencies, I now include constituency fixed effects, which should control for the influence of both observed and unobserved constituency-level characteristics that do not vary across candidates. The coefficients on the key variable of interest increase slightly from the specifications without constituency fixed effects, showing that on average, an endorsed candidate is between 63–71 percentage points more likely to win in the primaries than a candidate without an endorsement.

Models (5) through (8) in Panel B disaggregate the relationship between party endorsements and a candidate's success by political party. The results suggest that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in the association between party endorsements and primary election outcomes; although large and statistically significant, the coefficient on the party endorsement variable for the ODM sample is around 20% points higher than that of the Jubilee party.

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[11]The same analysis with the full set of constituencies (regardless of method of candidate selection used) is included in Appendix A, Table A1. While the coefficients from the specifications without constituency fixed effects are around 10%p less, they are large, positive, and retain statistical significance at the p<0.001 level.

[12]The substantive results of the analysis remain unchanged when (conditional) logistic regressions are used in lieu of OLS.

These differences are in line with qualitative accounts of both local political analysts[13] and politicians[14] themselves, who predicted that the ODM traditionally intervenes more heavy-handedly in its primaries than Jubilee.

To summarize, the results presented in this section provides the first piece evidence that political parties and their leaders can strongly influence the outcome of party primaries in Kenya through the use of endorsements; the effects of endorsements are large enough that candidates who receive them seem to be accruing a decisive advantage over their competitors in the primaries. However, the results have not shown is whether the effects of endorsements are the driven by the direct *persuasive* influence over how primary voters evaluate candidates, which is the principal mechanism stipulated in this article. The next section provides this crucial piece of evidence.

6.3 Experiments on the Influence of Party Endorsements

This section examines the persuasive influence that party endorsements have in shaping the opinion of primary voters. Isolating the direct persuasive effects of party endorsements with observational data poses obvious inferential challenges. To assess the causal effect that party leader endorsements have on how the mass selectorate evaluates and chooses between them, I randomly expose respondents to information about the party leader's endorsement or denouncement (negative endorsement). The first experiment examines the effect of the leader endorsement on how the mass selectorate evaluates a single candidate. The focus on a single candidate enables me to boost the reality of the information being conveyed, and probe the results for potential mechanisms. The second experiment examines the effect of the leader endorsement in a framework where the mass selectorate has to choose between two competing party aspirants. The two experimental designs embedded in the survey were chosen based on their respective strengths and weaknesses, and how the results from each would complement each other in drawing strong inferences regarding the overall effect of party leader endorsements.

Experiment 1: Candidate Evaluation Experiment

In testing the effect of party leader endorsements and denouncements, I begin by examining whether they influence voter evaluations of a single party aspirant or candidate: any attempt to connect party leader endorsements to potential changes in vote choice remains tenuous without establishing whether and how they change voter perceptions of candidates. I therefore conducted a simulated radio news experiment in which I experimentally manipulated the information provided to likely Jubilee and ODM primary voters regarding a fictitious aspirant seeking the party nomination for the parliamentary seat.[15]

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[13]Interview with political journalist, Subject 2016-EJ8, June, 2016

[14]Interview with member of parliament, Subject 2015-PI24, April, 2015; Subject 2015-PO27, May, 2015

[15]The decision to use a fictitious aspirant was made in response to two concerns: first, given the perceived influence of party leaders, providing partisans with information about the nature of the relationship between

The content of the audio news segment that delivered this information varied in terms of whether i) the aspirant received an endorsement from their respective party leaders (Raila Odinga for ODM and Uhuru Kenyatta for Jubilee), other elected local party elites (members of county assembly) or did not receive an endorsement at all and ii) the aspirant's performance on providing services to the constituency.[16] The addition of the second dimension manipulated in the treatment was in response to the emerging narrative in the recent literature in African voting behavior: that voters in African democracies are "performance voters" that privilege the candidate's credentials on her ability to deliver local public goods and particularistic benefits (Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013; Harding, 2015).[17]

Table 6.2: Treatment Assignment Matrix for Radio News Experiment

| | | Candidate Performance | |
		High	Low
	Party Leader Endorses	(1) N=227	(6) N=219
Endorsement	Local Elites Endorse	(2) N=220	(7) N=247
	Party Leader Denounces	(3) N=257	(8) N=255
	Local Elites Denounce	(4) N=262	(9) N=215
	No opinion	(5) N=239	(10) N=252

The experiment follows a 5 x 2 factorial design. For the leader endorsement/denouncement component of treatment, five different levels were assigned: first, where the party leader purportedly endorses the candidate, second, where party-affiliated local politicians (MCAs) endorse the candidate, third, where the party leader purportedly denounces the candidate, fourth, where party-affiliated local politicians (MCAs) denounce the candidate, and finally

party leaders and an *existing* aspirant raised concerns about provoking reactions from other aspirants, and ultimately influencing the outcome of party primaries that were pending in a few months time. Second, given that the relationship between incumbent politicians and the party leader are quite often discussed in the local media, partisans often hold priors about this relationship. Short of using outright deception, it would have been challenging to claim that the party leader has both endorsed and denounced the same aspirant. The use of fictitious aspirant (coupled with real party leaders) both addresses concerns over interfering in elections, and enables the clean manipulation of endorsement or denouncement status of the aspirant without the use of deception.

[16]In order to mitigate concerns of order effects, I randomized the order in which the two dimensions were presented in the audio file. The results presented hereafter are not vulnerable to the order in which the information was provided.

[17]While the *dominant* narrative in the African voting behavior literature is ethnic voting (see Adida (2015) for a recent experimental analysis on the effect of coethnicity), I do not compare the effect of leader endorsements against candidate coethnicity with the respondent because of the geographically clustered nature of ethnic groups in Africa. Carlson (2015) argues that voters in Africa are highly "unlikely to encounter non-coethnic candidates in races for subnational office." Given that the experiment is running in the context of a parliamentary primary contest in Nakuru and Kisumu, two towns inhabited by a majority of ethnic Kikuyus and Luos respectively, the aspirant portrayed in the audio clips are set to be Kikuyu and Luo respectively - i.e. the majority ethnic group of that region.

fifth, where there is no information on whether the candidate was endorsed.[18] The no endorsement condition was included as the reference category. For the performance arm of the treatment, two levels were assigned: one where the candidate has a positive development record (high candidate performance), or a negative development record (low candidate performance). Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the 10 treatment conditions until the target total sample size of 2,400 was reached across the two locations (1200 respondents in Nakuru, 1200 respondents in Kisumu). A tabular presentation of the treatment categories and the actual number of respondents assigned to each category is included in Table 6.2. Respondents were exposed to the experimental treatment on an electronic tablet device either in the language of their choice: Swahili or English. The subjects were then asked a battery of post-treatment questions measured on a 7 point scale, including our main outcome of interest "How likely are you to vote for the candidate in the Jubilee/ODM party primaries?".

The experimental design adopted for this study falls short of the full realism that is considered to be the defining characteristic of field experiments: the subjects were given information about a fictitious aspirant (albeit with an endorsement from powerful real world party leaders), and their responses were self-reported vote intentions. However, a number of precautions were taken to enhance the reality of the experimental intervention. Specifically, to mirror the way in which information about aspirant candidature is conveyed and presented to voters in everyday life, the news segment was modeled after typical news coverage of political candidates and campaigns by national and local radio news stations: this included a locally-hired actor narrating the news script, adopting the tone and accent of a local news anchor in-so-doing, as well as professional editing that added audio-acoustic effects to enhance the reality of the news segment.[19] In addition, respondents were only debriefed at the end of the survey as to the fictitious nature of the aspirant portrayed in the news segment. The precautions taken seem to have had the desired effect: enumerators report that respondents perceived the aspirant to be a real contender in the party primaries.[20]

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[18]I include this MCA level to the endorsement treatment to differentiate between the effect of party leader endorsement and an endorsement by other lower-level party politicians. Comparing the effect of party leader endorsements or denouncements to those issued by other political actors prevents us from conflating the effect of a *party leader* endorsement with the effect of *any* endorsement regardless of the identity of the endorser.

[19]Audio-visual treatments have recently been used with some success for experimental research in Africa (McCauley, 2014; McClendon and Riedl, 2015), including in my prior work with coauthors (Arriola, Choi and Gichohi, 2016). Post-survey reports from enumerators indicate that significant proportion of respondents perceived the candidates portrayed in the news segment to be real contestants in the upcoming party primaries. I opted for an audio rather than a video treatment to minimize the possibility that experimental results would be subject to heterogeneity induced by the perceived difference in the delivery of treatments.

[20]Prior to being debriefed, respondents frequently exhibited behavior during the interview that suggested that they were rendering judgements about an aspirant they perceived to be real. More than 10% of the respondents asked follow up questions about the aspirant, including additional background and contact information of the aspirant. In more than 50 occasions, respondents extended an invitation to the aspirant to attend the local ward / village meetings to address constituents.

Main Results: Intention-to-Treat Analysis

Do the endorsement and denouncement of party leaders affect the mass selectorate's evaluation of aspirants competing in party primaries? In accordance with the pre-registered analysis plan, I take an intention-to-treat analysis approach, where I simply compare the average responses among respondents assigned to each treatment and control condition. While this approach identifies the causal effect of treatment *assignment*, experimental non-compliance makes it highly likely that the results from this analysis is an underestimate of the treatment effect. I therefore also estimate the complier average causal effect (CACE) for the main results.

Leader Endorsement / Denouncement Effects

Table 6.3 presents the main findings for the first experiment. In columns (1)-(3), I present the estimated intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the party leader endorsement treatments on the main outcome (primary vote intention) vis-à-vis the pure control conditions for the pooled sample as well as the sample disaggregated by party (Jubilee and ODM). Columns (4)-(6) similarly presents the estimated ITTs of the party leader denouncement treatments. The first row of each panel in Table 6.3 presents the ITTs while the second presents estimated robust standard errors from linear regression.

I find robust evidence that party leader endorsements and denouncements have a strong effect on partisan evaluation of party aspirants. As seen in Column (1), the average primary vote intention for the aspirant who is *endorsed* by the party leader is almost a full point (0.953) larger than the average vote intention of an aspirant who has neither been endorsed nor denounced by the party leader. The primary vote intention of an aspirant who, on the other hand, has been *denounced* by the party leader is 0.64 points smaller than that of an aspirant who has neither been endorsed nor denounced. Both of these differences are statistically significant at p<0.001, and survive the Benjamini-Hochberg correction for multiple testing at an FDR of 0.05.[21]

One of the inferential concerns in the experiment is that subjects may not perceive themselves to be in the intended treatment condition to which they were randomly assigned. For example, even when a respondent was exposed to a radio news segment in which the primary aspirant was endorsed by the party leader, they might perceive the aspirant to be denounced by the party leader. Imperfect compliance is a cause for concern because I am interested in estimating the effect of respondents *perceiving* aspirants to be supported or denounced by the party leader on the primary vote intentions. In the post-treatment survey, I embedded manipulation check questions designed to probe whether respondents could correctly identify (or recall) the aspirant portrayed in the news segment was endorsed, denounced, or received

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[21]Since the main outcome is measured on a 7 point scale, I subject the findings on party leader endorsements to a series of robustness checks with non-parametric tests. While I do not include the results of that analysis here, both the two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test and the two-sample Komolgorov-Smirnov test, which is known to behave highly conservatively when used for discrete distributions (Conover 1972), replicate the results from the parametric tests.

Table 6.3: Party Leader Endorsements / Denouncements and Primary Vote Intentions

	Leader Endorsement Effects			Leader Denouncement Effects		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ITT[a]	0.953	1.115	0.817	-0.647	-0.808	-0.486
SE[b]	(0.105)	(0.127)	(0.163)	(0.114)	(0.144)	(0.177)
Control	4.334	4.312	4.356	4.334	4.312	4.356
Sample	Pooled	Jubilee	ODM	Pooled	Jubilee	ODM
N	937	449	488	1003	506	497
R^2	0.080	0.138	0.049	0.031	0.058	0.015
	Leader Endorsement Effects			Leader Denouncement Effects		
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
CACE[c]	1.110	1.269	0.970	-0.858	-1.029	-0.672
SE[d]	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.197)	(0.150)	(0.182)	(0.243)
Control	4.334	4.312	4.356	4.334	4.312	4.356
Sample	Pooled	Jubilee	ODM	Pooled	Jubilee	ODM
N	937	449	488	1003	506	497
R^2	0.054	0.130	0.018	0.052	0.072	0.036

[a] Estimated Average Intention-to-Treat Effects (ITTs) of the party leader endorsement / denouncement treatments on the main outcome (vote intention in primary elections), pooling across performance dimensions. ATEs are estimated against pure controls in which no endorsement information was provided.

[b] Robust standard errors (SEs) from linear regression analysis.

[c] Complier Average Causal Effects (CACEs) are estimated using Two-Stage least squares (2SLS) regression in which the first stage regresses the compliance status indicator variable against the treatment assignment indicator.

[d] Robust standard errors (SEs) from 2SLS regression analysis.

neither endorsement nor denouncement from either the party leader or local MCAs. While I do not present the detailed results for the manipulation checks, on average around 75-85% of respondents were able to correctly recall the information regarding the aspirant portrayed in the radio news segment.

Given that non-compliance tends to dilute the effects of treatment, I estimate the complier average causal effects (CACEs) using the standard instrumental variables approach in which I use the *assignment to treatment* status as an instrument for *actual treatment receipt*. Results from the Two-Stage least squares (2SLS) regression in which the first stage regresses the treatment receipt indicator against the assignment to treatment indicator are reported in columns (7)-(12) in Table 6.3. As expected, the size of the local average treatment effect of party leader endorsements amongst compliers are appreciably larger than the estimates of the intention-to-treat analysis: the CACE for the leader endorsement effect is 1.110 on a 7 point

scale, around 16% larger than the ITT estimate. The difference between the ITT and CACE estimates are larger for the denouncement effect: the CACE is 0.211 points larger, or 33% larger than the ITT.

Figure 6.1: Proportion of respondents very likely or certain to vote for the candidate in primaries

Note: Pooled sample with both Jubilee and ODM primary voters. The bar graphs plot proportion of individuals who report being "very likely" or "certain" that they will vote for the candidate across each experimental condition. The error bars are 99% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. The results survive the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR corrections atan FDR of 0.05. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

The magnitude of these effects are substantively large and important. To illustrate the substantive changes, Figure 6.1 plots the proportion of primary voters who say that they are either "very likely" or "certain" to vote for the candidate. Whereas around 28% of respondents assigned to the no endorsement condition said they were very likely or certain to vote for the candidate portrayed in the news segment played to them, more than 50% of respondents reported the same high propensity to vote for the candidate in the party endorsement condition. This represents an 85% increase in vote intentions, statistically significant at the p<0.001.[22] Similarly, only 20% of respondents assigned to hear a news segment about a

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[22]The result that party endorsements influences primary vote choice remains significant in a multiple-candidate setting in which a variety of candidate attitudes are randomly varied. Specifically, I find an 8 percent

candidate that has been denounced by the party report that they are "very likely" or "certain" to vote for the said candidate, which represents an 8% point (or 28%) decrease from the no endorsement condition. This decrease, while smaller than the effect of a party endorsement, still remain substantively large, and statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. The full force of the party's position on a candidate support in the primaries can be appreciated when we compare the denouncement and endorsement conditions directly; the proportion of individuals reporting that they have a high probability of voting for the candidate in the party endorsement condition is more than 2.5 times (or 32% points) higher than in the denouncement condition.

Are the endorsement effects outlined in the preceding paragraphs uniquely attributable to the party leader and his influence over his co-partisans? Without additional evidence, it is difficult to confirm whether or not the treatment effect observed here is attributable to the party leaders themselves or whether a generic endorsement from any other political or non-political actor would have had similar effects on aspirant evaluations. By virtue of the setup of the experiment, however, it is possible to get some traction into this important point: in the design, I also included a condition in which a locally-elected party elite (member of county assembly, hereafter MCA) also endorses/denounces the aspirant. Given the growing importance of local politicians such as MCAs in the context of Kenya (Arriola, Choi and Gichohi, 2016), comparing the effect of party leader endorsements effects to MCA endorsement effects constitutes an important first hurdle. Figure B1 in Appendix B overlays the MCA endorsement/denouncement conditions to Figure 6.1. As is clear from the results of the difference in means tests, the mean vote intention of the party leader endorsement condition is around 0.52 points higher than the MCA endorsement condition. Similar results hold for the denouncement conditions. Combined with baseline comparisons in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1, these findings suggest that party leaders have a substantively large influence over primary voters and how they evaluate candidates.

Potential Mechanisms: Aspirant Quality versus Loyalty

The preceding discussion has demonstrated the strong persuasive influence that the opinion of party leaders have on how their co-partisan supporters evaluate aspirants competing to become the party's candidate. What we do not yet understand are the mechanisms underpinning this effect. To answer this question, I leverage responses to the additional questions evaluating the party aspirant that were included in the post-treatment survey. While the design of this experiment itself does not give us full inferential leverage over causal mechanisms, it does present us with some strong clues. Specifically, I included two survey items for each of the hypothesized mechanisms for the endorsement effect. To examine whether the party leader's endorsement affects vote intentions by changing perceptions of candidate quality and competence, I asked "How do you expect the candidate to perform his duties as MP if elected to office." and "How likely is the candidate to do a good job in bringing development back to the constituency if he is elected MP?" To assess whether the leader endorsement changes percep-

increase in the likelihood of voting for the endorsed candidate (see Appendix).

Figure 6.2: Mechanisms - Party Leader Endorsement/Denouncement Effects

(a) Endorsement Effects: Leader Endorsed – No Endorsement

(b) Denouncement Effects: Leader Denounced – No Endorsement

Note: The thick and thin lines represent 95 and 99% confidence intervals for the difference in means. Estimated difference in means derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. Results of the analyses used to generate this figure are presented in Table B1, Appendix B. The results survive the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR corrections at an FDR of 0.05

tions of candidate loyalty, I asked "How loyal do you think the candidate is to the [PARTY NAME] party leader [LEADER NAME]? and "How dedicated do you think the candidate will be to campaigning for [PARTY NAME] to win in the presidential elections?" As was the case for the main outcome, responses were recorded on a 7 point likert scale, ranging from "1" (lowest) to "7" (highest).

Figure 6.2 first presents the results of difference in means across the party leader endorsement/denouncement conditions and the no endorsement control conditions for the four post-treatment evaluations of candidate competence and loyalty. Consistent with the survey and interview based results, there is evidence that both the competence and loyalty mechanisms mediate the relationship between party leader endorsements and aspirant evaluations. In support of the quality mechanism, a party aspirant who received the endorsement of the party leader is perceived by partisans as more likely to perform well (0.82 points) and bring about local development in the constituency (0.64 points) if he or she is elected to office. But there is also concordant movement in how loyal the aspirant will be to the party leader, which supports the loyalty mechanism; endorsed aspirants are considered to be significantly more loyal to the party leader (1.04 points), and much more likely to campaign for the party to take the presidency (0.86 points).

On the other hand, aspirants who are denounced by the party leader tend to be negatively regarded by partisan supporters, both in terms of aspirant quality and loyalty. Denounced aspirants are perceived to be significantly *less* likely to perform well (1.08 points) or to bring about local development in the constituency (0.56 points). They are also signifiantly less likely to be perceived as loyal to the party leader (1.47 points) or campaign for the party to take the presidency (1.06 points). While the changes in the loyalty mechanisms are consistently larger than that of the aspirant quality mechanisms, it is difficult to firmly adjudicate between the two mechanisms, given that the endorsement or denouncement of the leader resulted in a statistically distinguishable change in the aspirants quality and loyalty towards the party leader.

In order provide an additional test of mechanisms, I also implement a mediation analysis using methods developed by Imai and coauthors (Imai et al., 2010; Imai and Yamamoto, 2013). If one accepts the strong assumption that the mediating variable is orthogonal to other *unmeasured* post-treatment characteristics is accepted, mediation analysis allows for the estimation of average causal mediation effects (ACMEs) of mediators that may be confounded by other post-treatment factors. The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 6.3. Results from the analysis yet again suggest that both the quality and loyalty mechanisms account for the party leader endorsement effect. If we accept the strong assumption of sequential ignorability, the quality mechanism accounts for around 31% of relationship between the party leader endorsement and vote intentions. Similarly, the loyalty mechanism is responsible for slightly more than a quarter of the relationship. The AMCEs for these mediators are all statistically distinguishable from zero at $p<0.05$. These findings are largely replicated for the denouncement effects. The aspirant quality mechanisms accounts for up to 40% of the denouncement effect, whereas the loyalty mechanism accounts for up to 73% of the effect. It is interesting to note that for the denouncement effects, we are unable to reject the possibility that once the average causal mediation effect of the loyalty mechanism is accounted for,

Figure 6.3: Mediation Analysis of Mechanisms

Note: Pooled sample with both Jubilee and ODM primary voters. The error bars are 99% confidence intervals for the means.

the residual effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This means that the loyalty mechanism may account for almost the entirety of the denouncement effects.

Can Leader Endorsement Effects Counteract the Effects of Explicit Information on Aspirant Quality or Peformance?

So far, the analysis has focused on understanding whether the party leader is able to influence the mass selectorate through endorsements and denouncements, and the mechanisms through which the influence operate. What remains unanswered, however, is whether the strength of party leader endorsements will withstand the impact of other information that may have a counterveiling effect on vote intentions. To rigorously address this question, the experimental manipulation included information on the prior performance of the party aspirant with respect to local development alongside the endorsement dimensions. A large volume of existing research in the developing world has demonstrated that voters strongly respond to information on the prior performance of politicians with regard to local development, public service delivery, and malfeasance (Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Thachil, 2014; Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon, 2016; Arias et al., N.d.). By comparing the effect of endorsements against the prior performance on constituency service, I subject it to a hard test against a factor that has been repeatedly demonstrated to have a substantively large effect on voters. It is a particularly hard test if one of the primary mechanisms through which endorsements and denouncements function is by altering perceptions of candidate quality or competence. It remains to be seen

whether the mass selectorate would be willing to disregard explicitly provided information regarding the prior performance of a candidate and take instead take the implicit signal of future candidate performance conveyed through the party leader's endorsement or denouncement.

Table 6.4: Candidate performance and primary vote intentions

	Candidate performance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ATE[a]	0.893	0.787	1.003
SE[b]	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.109)
Control (Low performance)	3.984	3.986	3.982
RI p-value[c]	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001
Sample	Full	Jubilee	ODM
N	2,393	1,188	1,205
R^2	0.062	0.061	0.065

[a] Estimated average treatment effects (ATEs) of candidate performance treatments on vote intention in primary elections.
[b] Robust standard errors from linear regression.
[c] *P*-values are based on two-tailed tests using randomization inference.

Table 6.4 first presents the effect of the performance treatment, for which I pooled across all the endorsement dimensions. The findings replicate what existing literature has found: the mass selectorate rewards good performance. The mean primary vote intention for a high performance aspirant (4.88) is 0.9 points larger than that of a low performance aspirant (3.98). This difference is statistically significant at the p<0.001 level, robust to other non-parametric tests, and survives the Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment for multiple testing.

But how does the size of the performance effect compare with the effect of endorsements? The basic intuition behind the approach I take is that if the magnitude of party endorsements and denouncement are indeed large and significant, it should be able to "offset" the evaluation gap induced by the difference in candidate quality or performance. For example, if the impact of party endorsements is large enough, there should be little to no observed difference between a low performance candidate who has been endorsed by the party leader and a high performance candidate without an endorsement. Conversely, if the impact of party leader denouncements is sufficiently large, there should be little to no observable difference between the evaluation of a high performance candidate without and endorsement who has been denounced by the party leader and a low performance candidate.

The results presented in Figure 6.4, which plots the proportion of primary voters who say that they are either "very likely" or "certain" to vote for the candidate for each treatment condition, suggest that the effects of party endorsements and denouncements are indeed large enough to offset the effect that candidate performance. For example, the figure on the left

Figure 6.4: Party endorsement effects versus candidate performance effects

Note: The bar graphs plot represent the mean of each treatment condition. The error bars are 99% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

shows that there is no statistically significant difference between a high performance candidate without an endorsement and a low performance candidate who has the endorsement of the party; the proportion of voters who are either very likely or certain to vote for the candidate is 40%, whereas the proportion the latter is 41%. Similarly, the figure on the right shows that there are no real differences between a low performance candidate without an endorsement and a high performance candidate who has been denounced by the party leader; while the difference between the two candidates is around 5% points, points, these differences are statistically indistinguishable from zero at p<0.1. It is important to note that the evidence I presented here does not indicate that the effect of party endorsements are so large that it "trumps" the effect of candidate performance. Rather, it suggests that the magnitude of endorsement effects are sufficient to offset the effect of candidate performance, which is considered one of the most important factors determining vote choice in the developing world.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The results thus far have demonstrated that the effect of party leader endorsements and denouncements have a large impact on the vote intention of partisan primary voters, and that the size of the effects are sometimes large enough to offset the effect of aspirant performance. I have also found some suggestive evidence that the mechanisms through which the endorsement and denouncement effects are likely mediated: the change in the perception of the aspirant's quality as well as his loyalty. In this section, I assess whether the effect of party leader

endorsements and denouncements are moderated by certain respondent attributes and characteristics: are certain types of the partisan mass selectorate likely to respond more strongly to the opinion of their party leaders? For example, are partisans with a stronger sense of linked fate with the party leader more inclined to listen to the opinion of the party leader? Are the party leader's *coethnic* partisans primarily responsible for the endorsement and denouncement effects? Are the endorsement effects moderated by the respondent's prior evaluation of the party leader's job performance? Do low information voters in particular privilege the word of the party leader to caste their vote in the party primaries?

In order to test how the effect of leader endorsements and denouncements are moderated, I conduct a heterogeneous treatment effects analysis where I regress our main outcome against four moderators measured at the individual level, the treatment indicators, and the interactions of the moderators and treatment indicators. The four moderators, as specified in the pre-analysis plan are 1) level of linked fate with the party leader, 2) coethnicity with the party leader, 3) job approval of the party leader, and 4) level of respondent political knowledge. I also included a battery of respondent characteristics including gender, religion, ethnicity, and a self-assessment of their living conditions and location fixed effects as controls. The specific regression equation estimated was as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Moderator}_i + \beta_2 T_i + \beta_3 \text{Moderator}_i \times T_i + \beta_4 X_i + \delta_j + \epsilon_i \qquad (6.1)$$

where T_i denotes the treatment status of the respondent, X_i is a vector of individual-level covariates measured pre-treatment, and δ_j is a dummy for respondent location.

The results of the analyses are presented in graphical form in Figure 6.5.[23]. Panel (a) of Figure 6.5 shows whether the treatment effect for party leader endorsements and denouncements are moderated by respondent's perception of linked fate with the party leader. The evidence seems to be asymmetrical: individuals who report higher levels of linked fate with the party leader respond more strongly to the endorsement treatment, as observed in the left-side panel that shows a clear upward slope on the treatment effects across increasing levels of linked fate. The effect is statistically significant at $p<0.05$. The moderating effects of linked fate, however, are not observed in relation to the denouncement treatment: the coefficient for the interaction term between the linked fate measure and the treatment indicator is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The same asymmetry is observed for the coethnicity with the party leader. Whereas individuals who are coethnics of the party leader are more likely to be supportive of a party aspirant who has been endorsed by the party leader (marginally significant at $p<0.10$), no such moderating effects are observed for coethnicity regarding the denouncement treatments. Neither the prior levels of approval for the party leader nor the level of the respondent's political knowledge seem to be moderating the effect of party leader endorsements and denouncements.

Overall, the results of the exploratory analyses adds partial credence to the idea that the sense of shared interests and fate that underpins the effect of party leader endorsements. While we find very little evidence of further moderating effects with regard to respondent

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[23]The specific regression results used to generate 6.5 is presented in columns (1)–(8) of Appendix Table A2

Figure 6.5: Heterogeneous Effects of Party Leader Endorsements and Denouncements

(a) Endorsement and Denouncement Effects by Linked Fate with Party Leader

(b) Endorsement and Denouncement Effects by Coethnicity with Party Leader

(c) Endorsement and Denouncement Effects by Party Leader Approval

(d) Endorsement and Denouncement Effects by Level of Political Knowledge

Note: The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the difference in means. Estimated difference in means derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. Results of the analyses used to generate this figure are presented in Table A1, Appendix A.

evaluation of leaders and their level of political knowledge, this maybe due to the limited variation on these characteristics within our sample: almost 90% of respondents have a favorable evaluation of the party leader's job performance, while only 10% of respondents incorrectly stated both the name and the party of their current MP. It is also worth highlighting again that the analyses conducted here are exploratory, and any conclusions that can be drawn are tentative.

Experiment 2: Conjoint Analysis

The first experiment provides strong evidence that party leader endorsements and denouncements shape how partisan primary voters evaluate political aspirants. Does the effect of party leader endorsements and denouncements hold in a multiple candidate framework in which voters are presented with viable alternatives? For example, would a voter's preference for a leader endorsed aspirant hold when voters have an option to choose another aspirant who has a strong record of local development? In the second experiment, I move beyond the single candidate framework and test the effect of party leader endorsement on the intended *vote choice* of primary voters. I specifically employ conjoint analysis, which allows for the simultaneous estimation of multiple treatment components using a discrete choice task that mirrors the choice that voters face in the ballot box in a typical election: one in which voters cast their vote for a single candidate from a set of candidates that differ along multiple attributes and dimensions.

While only a handful of studies have examined the determinants of voter behavior specifically in the context of primary elections, I combine the insights from those studies with other candidate attributes that have been found in prior research to influence vote choice in *general election* settings across Africa. These attributes and attribute levels are presented in Table 6.5.

Profiles of fictitious aspirants for the Jubilee and ODM primaries were randomly generated using the attributes and attribute levels in Table 6.5. Though the total number of possible combination of attribute values is much larger than what would be actually observed in reality, the random assignment of attribute values[24] guarantees that profiles with a certain attribute-attribute level combination will have the same distribution for all other attributes on average as compared to profiles with the same attribute but a different attribute value level, allowing for a simple comparison means. Following a pre-treatment survey measuring standard demographic information, the experimental respondents were presented with two profiles and asked "*Which of these two candidates would you prefer to vote for in the Jubilee/ODM party*

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[24]For the candidate ethnic group attribute, we deviate from convention and do not assign with equal probability: instead, we use the population proportion of the ethnic groups based on the most recent census data on ethnic group distributions in Kenya. This is to mitigate concerns raised by enumerators and respondents during piloting that questioned the frequency with which candidate profiles with minority ethnic group membership were being generated. For constituencies in Nakuru county, the ethnicity of the candidate were assigned according to the following probability: Kikuyu 61%, Kalenin 15%, Kamba 6%, Luo 10%, Luhya 8%. For constituencies in Kisumu county, the probability was as follows: Kikuyu 1%, Kalenjin 2%, Kamba 1%, Luo 90%, Luhya 6%. These probabilities are accounted for in the analyses of the conjoint data.

Table 6.5: Conjoint Analysis - Candidate Attributes and Attribute Levels

Candidate Attributes	Attribute Levels
Current occuption	Member of parliament (MP)
	Business owner
	Professor at a university
	School teacher
Ethnic group	Kikuyu/Kalenjin/Kamba/Luo/Luhya
Gender	Male/Female
Previous government appointments	Cabinet Minister
	Deputy Minister
	None
Contribution to local development	Largest donation to the school renovation project
	Did not donate to the school renovation project
	Largest donation for new health clinics
	Did not donate to new health clinics
	Provided bursaries for 150 children in the constituency
	Did not provide bursaries for children in the constituency
	Paid the hospital fee for 150 sick people
	Did not pay the hospital fee for sick people
	None (unknown)
Record on corruption	Convicted of corruption for handing out cash to voters
	Under investigation for embezzling funds for personal use
	No record of corruption
Party leader's position	publicly stated that he strongly supports the candidate
	publicly stated that he does not support the candidate
	has not expressed his opinion about the candidate

primaries?".[25] Per common practice in conjoint experiments, this process was repeated 3 times per respondent, for a total of 7,176 aspirant profile pairs and 14,352 individual aspirant profiles rated across the two study locations.

Main Results

The quantity to be estimated is the average marginal component effect (AMCE). I use the fully non-parametric linear regression estimator presented in Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2013), and cluster the standard errors derived from the estimation at the respondent

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[25]To minimize the possibility that respondents privilege the first attribute they encounter in the party profiles (primacy effects) to guide their choice, I randomize the order of the attribute presented *across* respondents, but hold the order constant *within* the respondent.

level.[26] I also estimate the *conditional* AMCEs to detect heterogeneity in treatment effects across the two different party samples.

Figure 6.6: Effects of aspirant attributes on probability of being preferred in primary elections: Pooled sample - Jubilee and ODM

Note: Pooled sample with both Jubilee and ODM primary voters. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. The dots and lines represent point estimates for the AMCEs while the bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Rows without any estimates represent the reference categories within each attribute.

Figures 6.6 and B1 and B2 in Appendix B report the main findings of the conjoint analysis. The dots and lines in the plots represent the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the AMCEs of each attribute value on the probability that respondents chose the aspirant in the choice task. Rows without any estimates represent the reference categories within each attribute. The regression model that the plot was generated from is included in the online supplementary index.

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[26]For example, the estimation of the AMCEs for party leader endorsement attribute is conducted by running the following regression:

$$\text{choice}_{ijk} = \theta_1 + \theta_2[\text{support}_{ijk} = \text{yes}] + \theta_3[\text{support}_{ijk} = \text{no}] + \epsilon_{ijk} \tag{6.2}$$

where choice_{ijk} is the choice outcome, and $[\text{support}_{ijk} = \text{yes}]$, $[\text{support}_{ijk} = \text{no}]$ are dummy variables coded 1 if the respondents are assigned these attribute levels. The reference category is the candidate where the party leader has not expressed an opinion about the candidate.

In support of the main hypothesis, likely primary voters of the two parties seem to strongly prefer aspirants who have been endorsed by the party leader: as seen in Figure 6.6, compared to an aspirant for whom the party leader has not expressed an opinion, endorsed aspirants are 8.1 percentage points (SE=0.9) more likely to be preferred in the party primaries. In comparison to an aspirant that has been denounced, an endorsed aspirant is more than 10 percentage points more likely to be chosen as the preferred candidate. This finding retains statistical significance after correcting for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR correction at an alpha level of 0.05. The results from the samples disaggregated by political party tells a similar story: as presented in Figure B1 and B2 in Appendix B, endorsed aspirants are around 8 percentage points more likely to be preferred as the party candidate in comparison to the baseline category of aspirants for whom the party has not expressed his opinion. The size of these effects across the two parties are remarkably similar (Jubilee–8.4 percentage points, ODM–7.8 percentage points), providing assurance that the effect of party leader endorsements in the pooled sample are not being driven by any one of the two parties included).

Although I detect statistically significant effects for party leader endorsements, a few caveats are in order: first of all, the coefficient for the party leader endorsement attributes, while substantively large, is smaller than some of the other attributes included in the experimental design. For example, the AMCEs for the positive performance attribute levels in the "contribution to local development" attribute as well as the "record on corruption" attribute are much larger than the coefficient for party leader endorsements (the coefficient for these attribute levels range from 17–27 percentage points). There are two potential interpretation of this large size differential: first, it maybe that the large effects for these candidate quality attributes reflect the importance African voters place on the performance of their politicians (Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Carlson, 2015; Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon, 2016). A second explanation might be that the relatively smaller effects for the endorsement attributes are the result of the non-specificity of the wording included in the conjoint design. Whereas the wording for the candidate quality attribute were generally more specific (invoking specific initiative and projects that the aspirant contributed to), the attribute for party leader endorsements were less specific in that it did not invoke the name of the party leader, and did not describe in any detail the context of the endorsement. Anecdotal accounts by survey enumerators suggest that many respondents asked follow up questions about the endorsement attribute, including inquiries about when and where the endorsement was given, and the overall nature of the relationship between the candidate and the party leader.

Second, it is also worth noting that the effects of party leader endorsement and denouncements might be asymmetrical: consistently across the pooled sample and the disaggregated individual party samples, the size of the denouncement attribute level is significantly smaller than the endorsement attribute level, and is only marginally statistically significant at $p<0.1$. While the theoretical framework laid out in the previous section does not provide an a priori reason to expect this asymmetry, it might be reflective of the difference in how respond to positive versus negative information, and how that interacts with baseline expectations of politician behavior (Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Carlson, 2015; Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and Mc-

Clendon, 2016).[27]

6.4 Summary

Many political parties in African democracies have transitioned from top-down, elite-driven to bottom-up, mass-driven methods of intraparty candidate selection. While the logical assumption under mass-based candidate selection systems is that party leaders have, in part or its entirety, relinquished their influence over how their party candidates are selected, this chapter has demonstrated that this need not necessarily be the case. Using a combination of qualitative interviews, original surveys, and experiments conducted in the field, I have shown how party leaders can retain control over their parties' candidate selection processes. Their privileged connection with co-partisan supporters who constitute the mass selectorate allow party leaders to use tools of persuasion—endorsements and denouncements—to influence how their partisans choose between party aspirants. The profound influence of these endorsements and denouncements endows party leaders with "de-facto" control over the candidate selection process, even when they no longer posses the "de-jure" authority do so.

The findings of this chapter, together with chapter 5, establish the towering influence of party leaders over the candidate selection process in African political parties. While chapter 5 demonstrated the institutional foundations and mechanisms through which party leaders exercise control, this chapter has established that their influence transcends the formal authority endowed by party institutions. The dominance of party leaders, combined with the criticality of the party candidacy in subnational elections, constitute an important step towards understanding why politicians are beholden to their party leaders. Yet what has thus far not been addressed is to "what end" party leaders utilize their control over candidate selection. What type of party aspirants do party leaders favor in the candidate selection process, and for what reason? The answers to these questions constitute the next set of insights we need to ascertain why politicians in Africa are unresponsive to their constituents. I turn to these important questions in the next chapter.

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[27]It is interesting that the asymmetry is observed for the aspirant performance attributes. In comparison to the baseline category where no information was given regarding the performance of the aspirant, the AMCEs for the attribute levels with negative information on the aspirant's performance were not statistically distinguishable from zero. This also lends suggestive evidence in support of the idea that respondents are reacting to and processing positive versus negative information in different ways.

Chapter 7

The Nomination Tournament

"The fight for the party nomination starts early. In fact, it starts the day after you are elected. The party will observe you starting day one, and judge whether you are worthy. And let me tell you it is not easy. You are expected to do so much, and if you step out of line, be ready to pack your bags."[1]

– Former Member of Parliament Aligned with the Opposition, Kenya

This chapter examines how party leaders use their influence over party nominations to decide the pool of candidates who will fly the party banner in the general elections. Previous chapters have shown that party leaders can rely on their ability to manipulate party institutions (chapter 5) and persuade primary voters (chapter 6) to control the outcome of their party's candidate selection process. What has not been discussed so far, however, is to what end party leaders use their influence; what types of candidates they favor, and what motivates them to favor these candidates over others as party nominees. My argument is that party leaders use their powers to engineer representative behavior that serves their dual objective of mobilizing support for their bid for the presidency in subsequent elections, but that does not threaten their tenure as the leader of the party. In so doing, party leaders impose what I refer to as a "nomination tournament", wherein politicians (and subsequent candidates) who behave in a manner consistent with the party leader's preferences are rewarded with the party nomination for the next round of elections.

The logic by which the outcome of the nomination tournament is determined is contingent on the type of constituency the politician is seeking to run in. In the party's strongholds, where parties do not face a significant challenge from other challenger parties, party leaders privilege party loyalists who engage in "party-oriented" activities, which help parties mobilize voter support for the party's presidential candidate, but does not accrue a personal following for any lower-level politician who seeks the party candidacy. In more competitive constituencies,

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[1]From transcripts of interview conducted in Nairobi August, 2016

where the party faces a credible challenge from competitors, party leaders are unable to forego the benefit of candidates (performers) who invest more in constituency-oriented activities, whose connections with voters are central to the electoral performance of the party in the general elections, in both the presidential and subnational elections.

I argue that it is this very logic—whereby party leaders privilege party-oriented loyalists in a large majority of constituencies that are the party's strongholds—that underpins the unresponsive nature of representatives to constituent interests. Because politicians gain an important if not critical foothold in their quest for reelection by being "party-oriented" rather than constituency-oriented, politicians are incentivized to dedicate much of their limited resources and efforts to engaging in party-oriented strategies such as the attendance at party rallies and engagement in national partisan politics throughout their term in office, rather than focus on tending to the welfare of their constituents.

I illustrate this logic in action based on a multi-method approach that combines both qualitative evidence from interviews with politicians as well as quantitative analysis of data on politician behavior compiled from media sources in Kenya. The period in the run-up to the party nominations for both the Orange Democratic Movement and the Jubilee Party of Kenya in 2017 is the focus of the empirical analysis. First, the interview evidence reveals the immense pressure that elected politicians, especially from the party's strongholds, were under to engage in party-oriented activities, and how pervasive the expectation that these activities would critically affect their chances of reclaiming the party's nomination for the 2017 elections were. Politicians from both the opposition ODM and incumbent Jubilee party consistently report pressure to outperform their peers in terms of their service to the party. The immense burden of investing in party-oriented strategies—attending party rallies across the country and engaging in partisan—comes at the expense of time and effort dedicated towards engaging with their constituents and making sure that their needs are sufficiently looked after. Yet politicians report that they have no choice but to forsake their investment in the constituency because ultimately, what will determine their ability to reclaim elected office in the subsequent election will begin and end with whether they are able to secure the party nomination.

I supplement the qualitative evidence with quantitative analysis that applies a computational approach to collect and analyze data on the behavior of politicians throughout an entire electoral term, ending in the selection of candidate by parties. Specifically, I apply web-crawling methods to collect a data set for the activities of incumbent politicians in Kenya from key print and online media sources in Kenya. I then use supervised classification methods to categorize these news articles to to create measures that capture the extent to which politicians engage in party-oriented activities throughout their terms in elected office, between 2013 and 2017. I then examine whether these measure correlate with whether these incumbent politicians were offered the party ticket in the nominations conducted 3 months prior to the general elections in August 2017. The evidence shows that on average, candidates who demonstrate a higher level of engagement in party-oriented activities, as captured by the media, were significantly more likely to be renominated as a party candidate in the 2017 party nominations, controlling for a variety of candidate related attributes. Furthermore, consistently with the logic of the nomination tournament, the correlation between party-oriented

activities and renomination was almost entirely driven by politicians elected in and contesting elections in the party's stronghold constituencies.

In what follows, I first discuss in more detail the logic of the nomination tournament, highlighting the interaction between party leader's incentives and politician behavior. I then proceed to present both the qualitative and quantitative evidence that supports the core logic of the nomination tournament. The concluding section places these findings within the framework of the overall argument regarding the responsiveness of politicians.

7.1 The Logic of the Nomination Tournament

The ability of the party leader to take control of their party's nomination process constitutes an important device through which they can put lower-level politicians in service of their own goals. Because the party nomination so often has a decisive influence on whether a candidate will return to office, rank-and-file politicians have little option but to oblige the party leader's demands regarding the allocation of their effort and resources across different types of activities.

The exact manner in which party leaders put their party's politicians to use is determined by the dual objectives pursued by the leaders, as discussed in the study's theoretical chapter: electoral mobilization and consolidation of power within the party organization. Party leaders understand the value of inducing rank-and-file politicians to be responsive to the demands of their constituents (i.e. pursue a constituency-oriented strategy) for generating additional electoral support on behalf of the party. But they also understand that these politicians are likely to develop direct ties to their constituents, one that will ultimately result in the accrual of a personal vote that is independent from the support that the party enjoys (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987); after all, there are widespread preferences among voters for local development and constituency service (Conroy-Krutz, 2013). The emergence of rank-and-file politicians who enjoy a large independent following, however, can also function to undermine the party leader's grip over the party organization, and potentially compromise their tenure as the party leader. For example, these politicians can pave the path for a new alignment of political elites within the party, including the emergence of powerful opposing factions that can demand more concessions from the party, and even threaten to challenge the party leader for the party's presidential candidacy. Such risks generate incentives for party leaders to, at least in part, moderate the extent to which politicians engage in constituency-oriented activities. Party leaders can instead direct politician effort towards what I term party-oriented activities—a broad range of party-building activities that contribute towards strengthening the brand of the party and cultivating mass support for the party leader in preparation for the next elections, but prevent rank-and-file politicians from forging direct ties with their constituents in a manner that will accrue a personal vote.

The party leader must be cognizant of the implications of having their politicians invest in each of these two different types of activities. In competitive local constituencies where the party must capitalize on every opportunity to generate more electoral support for the party, party leaders cannot simply direct politicians to invest mostly on party-oriented activities;

the advantages of the additional support generated by rank-and-file politicians investing in constituency-oriented activities are too great to forego: in other words, party leaders will be willing to "stomach" the potential threat to their position within the party organization because the electoral benefits outweigh these risks. In party strongholds, however, where parties can afford to cede the benefits of a constituency-oriented strategy because they can rely on strong partisan attachments to carry the day, party leaders will induce politicians to primarily invest in party-oriented rather than constituency-oriented activities.

These party leader incentives structure the very manner in which they will use their control over the candidate selection process to reward and punish candidates in the party nominations. In fact, a politician's investment of effort and resources across these two activities, in accordance with the party leader's preferences, will constitute the *metric* by which party leaders will evaluate politicians in the *nomination tournament*. The nomination tournament is so named because the way in which party leaders use the granting and denial of nominations to engineer the behavior of politicians closely mirrors the logic of tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Arriola and Johnson, 2017), which was developed in labor and human resource economics to explain the how firms determine compensation or promotion in a manner that maximizes firm productivity. According to tournament theory, firm owners (or employers) are able to elicit maximal effort from their employees by first evaluating their performance on a relative scale or metric vis-à-vis other contests in the tournament, and second, making the reward made available to the victors of the tournament sufficiently large.

The metric by which party leaders evaluate whether a politician is deserving of the party's nomination for the upcoming elections diverges, in accordance to the logic described above, based on the type of electoral constituency the politician is competing for. In party strongholds, party leaders will award nominations primarily based on the extent to which politicians invest in party-oriented activities. On the other hand, in competitive constituencies where the party faces a credible risk of defeat in both the local and presidential election, the party leader will ease their demands for politicians to engage in party-oriented activities, and allow for their pursuit of other strategies, including constituency-oriented activities that aim to tend closely to the needs of local constituents.

Party leaders will furthermore ensure that politicians exert significant effort to satisfy their demands by deliberately increasing the stakes of the nomination tournament by i) evaluating the politicians *relatively* against each other rather than on an absolute scale, and ii) limiting the proportion of politicians being renominated by the party for an elective position. The relative evaluation of performance on the aforementioned metrics means that any absolute level of investment in terms of effort will not suffice for a politician to emerge as victors in the nomination contest; in fact, even if politicians dedicate a significant proportion of their time and effort on absolute terms, if their competitors (peer politicians) can outperform them by investing even more, politicians risk a realistic chance of losing out in their quest for renomination. Limiting the proportion of politicians offered renomination is also likely to bolster the need of politicians to endeavor to outbid their competitors as they will understand that there is a fixed proportion of individuals who *must* lose out in the nomination tournament.

Anticipating the fierce fight for the party nomination for the subsequent elections, politi-

cians have little to no choice but to placate the demands of their party leaders. The two subsequent sections demonstrate that incumbent politicians are aware of the expectations of the party leaders, and that their behavior between elections as elected representatives will factor critically in whether they are nominated by the party to recontest. Furthermore, they show that party leaders do reward nominations to politicians based on the logic of the nomination tournament.

7.2 Qualitative Evidence

The opening quote of this chapter—in which an incumbent MP comments that their road to renomination for the subsequent elections starts on the day after their victory—is an observation that resonates with many politicians who have further continuing aspirations for elected office. In more than 20 of the 60 semi-structured interviews with sitting and former parliamentarians in Kenya, politicians, unprompted by the author, responded to the question regarding the point at which the contest for the party nomination starts in a manner consistent with the quote. And to many of them, party nomination seemed to be the "be-all and end-all" of their bid to serve a subsequent term as an elected official.

> See, once you receive the party nomination from my party, you are sorted for the general election. There might be some possibility that someone can challenge you, but that is unlikely. This is a place where any candidate of my party receives more than 95% of the total vote.[2]

At the same time, the overwhelming perception was that the competition over the nomination would be fierce, and even as incumbents, they could not take it for granted. In this section, I present an account of party nominations, primarily as conveyed and understood by these incumbent politicians in Kenya, who had already accumulated an intricate knowledge on the process by virtue of their candidacy in the previous election cycle. The narratives offered by the politicians reveal that they were knowledgeable of the fact that they would be effectively be put through a competition for the party ticket by the party. They also reveal the politicians' understanding of what was expected of them by the party and the leadership if they were to have a chance of being renominated broadly falls in line with the predictions made in both the theoretical chapter and the preceding section on the logic of the nomination tournament. Finally, the accounts collectively points to the implications that being a part of the nomination tournament has on the politicians' allocation of their time and resources to the two different activities, as envisaged by the preceding section. In what follows, I turn to each of these points in turn.

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[2]Interview with an opposition politician, Interview Subject 2015-PO21, conducted in April 2015

Competitiveness and Party Control of Nominations

As briefly discussed in some of the interview excerpts presented in chapter 4, an overwhelming proportion of politicians interviewed acknowledged the travails they face in pursuit of the coveted party nominations. As one incumbent politician belonging to the Jubilee party[3] rather emphatically explained,

> Let me be truthful, it was so tough. In fact, it does not compare to the general election. Compared to nominations, the general elections felt much more simple. My party was popular, and no other party came close. But nominations... I was really worried that I might be defeated. It gave me many sleepless nights.[4]

A former opposition politician echoed this sentiment, describing his failure to secure the party's nomination in the last election he contested, which eventually began the process of his retirement from active politics. Yet his account reveals some more informative details about the nomination process.

> It was painful. After serving the people in my home constituency for such a long period of time [10 years], I was denied the party ticket. But this is the consequence of someone like me who is a servant of the people and trying to do good things for my people. ... It is really hard to keep up with everything they demand from you as an MP. They need you here there and everywhere, ... and we are required to pay significant amounts of money every month, every month, as party dues. The party keeps tabs on you during the whole term... and if you don't follow their wishes, they punish you during the nominations.[5]

The politician's lament about what triggered his defeat in the party nomination clearly suggests that it was the party, and not the people, which was responsible for his ill fate. This is despite the fact that the opposition had purportedly selected their candidates through a competitive primary election, rather than through an "appointment" system where the party could unilaterally dictate the winner of the nomination. While this narrative might easily be discounted as the bitter reflections of a candidate who had been defeated during the primaries, the fact that many others also stated that the parties had significant power over the nominations seem to corroborate, rather than undermine it. This is reflected in the reactions to a question I raised to a prominent opposition politician, who sneered when I asked him to describe how party primaries are implemented in Kenya.

> Primaries? What primaries? There are no primaries in Kenya! It's all an illusion. If there are, they are usually a sham, or at most a mere way to make

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[3]At the time of the interview, the Jubilee party had not yet formed, and instead existed in the form of a coalition of parties, including the The National Alliance, led by incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta, and the United Republican Party, led by deputy president William Ruto.

[4]Interview with incumbent party politician, Interview Subject 2015-PI31, conducted in May 2015.

[5]Interview with former opposition politician, Subject 2015-PO6, conducted in February 2015.

the people rubber stamp the decisions of the higher-ups to create the illusion of party democracy. But who the party decides they like will be the one on the list of candidates submitted to IEBC.[6]

Returning to the earlier quote by the retired politician, another important observation emerges; namely the belief that parties were not only engineering outcomes of the nominations, but constantly evaluating the behavior of incumbent politicians seeking the ticket throughout the length of their tenure in elected office. Yet another interview with a politician aligned with the ruling Jubilee coalition offered a similar perspective.

> There can be a number of reasons why the party deems you worthy of the ticket. I will tell you these things and others will mention different things. Sometimes, what they want is unclear, but more often it is made very explicit. They sometimes announce what they want in the news. Whatever they want, they will hold us accountable to their demands, and we as sitting MPs have to diligently see to it that we meet them. Otherwise, we put ourselves in a bad position. I would say that the party demands more from their elected officials than a new aspirants, as we have much more at their disposal.[7]

Even as many of the interviewed discussed the importance of maintaining close contact with the grassroots even for the party nominations, there seemed to be little to no disagreement as to who ultimately "called the shots." One incumbent MP, who "miraculously" managed to scrape a narrow victory on a minor party ticket against a dominant party candidate was so convinced of the party's control and influence over the nominations that he did not even bother to apply for the dominant party's nomination when he ran for MP during the 2013 elections in Kenya.

> ... there was no point. Jubilee had already made its mind up on who they wanted to nominate for the position. He was a party loyalist who had a generated a reputation in the party as going above and beyond for the party. They liked him enough that they had already discouraged anyone from contesting against that candidate. Why would I be applying for that party's nomination when I know that I would never have the chance to get it? That would be a waste of time.[8]

The collection of these accounts all point towards to the conclusion that politicians seeking the party nominations were cognizant of its competitive nature, as well as the influence the party would have other process, regardless of who was responsible for the decision on paper. Furthermore, there seems to be an understanding that the decision was likely to be based on a dynamic, rather than static, assessment of the behavior of aspiring candidates. These observations constitute the foundational understanding required to make the claim that politicians regarded the party nominations as a competition. The following subsection elucidates

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[6]Interview with opposition politician, Interview Subject 2015-PO34, conducted in May 2015.

[7]Interview with incumbent party politician, Subject 2015-PI33, conducted in May 2015.

[8]Interview with incumbent party-aligned politician, Subject 2015-PI17, March 2015.

that these politician perspectives identified key dimensions of the nomination tournament to be a part of their own nomination processes.

Understanding of the Party Nominations as a Tournament

(1) Party-Oriented Activities   Throughout the interviews conducted, politicians mentioned the metrics by which the parties would be evaluating them to determine whether they were deserving of renomination by the party. One of the factors raised extensively was loyalty to the party. This is perhaps unsurprising, since both the incumbent Jubilee Party and the opposition ODM had, on multiple occasions, announced that a politician's willingness to "stay in line" with the party would affect whether they would be nominated. For example, in a highly publicized press conference, the chairman of the ODM warned "rebel" MPs that their unwillingness to toe the party line would result in disciplinary action, including denial of nominations to recontest or even outright expulsion from the party.[9] The incumbent Jubilee party echoed these sentiments from the opposition by also having David Marathe, the party's deputy chairman, issue a statement to journalists, saying that the rebel MPs within their ranks should "toe the line or leave the party." In a terse statement, he announced that "Once a party has taken a certain position, you should abide by it. If you don't like it, then hit the road."[10]

Politicians clearly understood the message, and discussed at length how perceptions of outright disloyalty or dallying with the opposing party would affect their chances of nomination. This is reflected in a comment made by an opposition politician, who said,

> What happens to disloyal MPs? They are sent packing. They should forget about the next election, because the party will bury them. As soon as you are considered disloyal to the party and the party leader, they'll start looking for a different person. You stay in line or go into political oblivion.[11]

The statements made by political parties as well as many of the politician interviews regarding the pernicious implications of disloyalty were often in direct reference to *overt* exhibitions of such behavior. However, interviews also reveal that politicians believed there were many other ways in which the party would evaluate their suitability for party renomination. One such way, tied closely to perception of loyalty, was the willingness of politicians to engage in party-building activities. For example, many interview subjects mentioned the importance of diligently attending the party's political events, including rallies designed to mobilize or consolidate mass support in their home regions.

> We have many obligations, but being present during party rallies is especially important. These are very important events. The party leader is often there. The

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[9]"Toe the party line or leave, Mbadi to rebel ODM MPs", *Citizen TV*, Retrieved at https://citizentv.co.ke/news/toe-the-party-line-or-leave-mbadi-to-rebel-odm-mps-138906/, June 15, 2018

[10]"Toe the line or leave the party, Murathe tells rebel Jubilee MPs", *The Star*, retrieved at https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/01/25/toe-the-line-or-leave-the-party-murathe-tells-rebel-jubilee-mps_c1703927, June 15, 2018

[11]Interview with opposition politician, Interview Subject 2015-PO21, conducted in April 2015

governors are there. Senators as well as MPs and all the way down to the MCAs. As an MP, we are senior party members, we have an obligation to attend these events for the party. What happens if you fail to show up? You are going to be in trouble. The party notices, and it sends big signals.[12]

Yet some other politicians spoke of the fact that what the party expected in terms of their participation in these party events, especially political campaigns, extended far beyond the territorial confines of their home regions or constituencies. Attendance at political rallies in their home turf was considered a bare minimum. Many more felt obliged to attend events hundreds of kilometers away.

> ...so when the president [the party leader of the incumbent party] traveled to the coast for his "development tour" of the region, I had to go. Lots of people based in Nairobi, Narok, and even Nakuru were accompanying the president because they felt the pressure to go. The parties value participation our participation, and it would be considered disloyal if I decided to be elsewhere.[13]

> ...whenever you go to a rally, you will see the local politicians like the MP or senator sitting on the dais. But there are also visitors, or who people who do not have much relation to the place. They are there because they've been encouraged to attend, and they know that if they refuse, people will start talking.[14]

In addition to their presence in campaign or mobilization efforts such as political rallies, politicians also frequently cited other forms of activities that the parties expected them to participate in. Many of them mentioned, for example, that they needed to demonstrate their support for the party's position on important policy issues and and initiatives. One such comment was made by the same politician who has been quoted in the preceding pages that politicians have "many obligations to the party."

> When the party offers its view on an important issue, like for example on electoral reforms or theft in government, it is very important for us as party members to advocate for these positions to constituents. The media. We should come out strong to support the party... This is part of our jobs as MP.[15]

Another MP alerted me to a single event for which the consequences of non-participation would be received especially egregious, and the party was on the record of warning their senior members that there would be clear consequences for nomination.

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[12]Interview with opposition politician, Subject 2015-PO4, conducted in February 2015.

[13]Interview with incumbent party politician, Interview Subject 2015-PI31, conducted in May 2015.

[14]Interview with incumbent party politician, Interview Subject 2015-PO42, conducted in October 2015.

[15]Interview with opposition politician, Subject 2015-PO4, conducted in February 2015.

> Did you hear of the points raised by the national party chairman to the media a few months ago about the IEBC protests? [Author: No, I'm afraid I didn't. Do tell me.] It was quite the controversy. People who decided to skip the protests were warned that they would be in trouble. That's the type of thing that is important. Showing solidarity.[16]

He was then referring to ODM's national chairman John Mbadi's press conference during the height of the wave of opposition protests held all across the country against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), when a non-negligible number of MPs and Senators decided to "snub" the party leader's directives to prioritize the protests over all else. In the press conference, John Mbadi warned of the grave consequences of disobeying the party leader's urging, saying

> "As the party chairman, I have the authority and powers to instill discipline against errant members and forge unity between the officials and members hence will not hesitate to invoke some of the powers bestowed upon me... We cannot forge ahead in pushing for the IEBC disbandment if some of our members are pulling in different directions. As a party we have taken great exception at the conduct of such MPs, who should forget about the party ticket come 2017."[17]

Most of the quotes from the preceding sections suggest that politicians considered a vast range of party-oriented activities to be factor critically in the results of the party nominations. Yet these were not the only set of factors that politicians seemed to believe would affect their likelihood of reclaiming the party ticket

(2) Constituency-Oriented Activities   In addition to the many party-building activities that directly shaped the party's perception of MP loyalty, MPs also commonmly acknowledged the importance of engaging with voters at the constituency. These quote from incumbent MPs in the ruling party and the opposition succinctly capture some of these beliefs.

> Of course voters are important. They are the ones that put us into office. So we have to make sure that we are in dialogue with them. We have to listen. And we have to bring real improvements to their lives. We need to provide them with access to health clinics, clean water, and let them send their children to school. That is what we are here to do.[18]

> Serving the constituency is a minimum. You need grassroots support. [Author: How does one generate grassroots support?] By bringing local development to

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[16]Interview with opposition politician, Subject 2016-P51, conducted in August 2016.

[17]"ODM warns 'errant' members against snubbing anti-IEBC demos", *The Daily Nation*, retrieved at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Woe-unto-those-who-snub-demos-MPs-told/1064-3233952-n6kwd7/index.html, June 15, 2018.

[18]Interview with incumbent party politician, Interview Subject 2015-PI31, conducted in May 2015.

> your community. I did this by providing bursaries for needy children and youth to attend school, by digging new boreholes around the constituency for my people to access clean water, and offering agricultural assistance for farmers. Agriculture is important in my constituency.[19]

Many of the interviewees agreed that neglecting their duty to serve constituents would lead to voter disillusionment and a decline in popularity. And if they become unpopular, parties had no choice but to take that fact into consideration. If they failed to do so, politicians argued, they would face consequences at the ballot box.

> If you become too unpopular, the voters will reject you, full stop. The party will face huge backlash if they try to nominate someone who is too unpopular. There were a few instances where the party imposed someone who was not electable, and third party candidates who ran on Wiper or Ford Kenya managed to win in spite of the strength of ODM. As I told you before, it was clearly the case for my opponent as well. He just did not have the following from voters.[20]

Despite these categorical emphases on electability (driven investment in constituency-oriented activities), many politicians seemed to also suggest that the extent to which the party considers electability as a part of their decision would vary depending on the type of constituency, and partisan demographics. See, for example, the excerpt from this interview with an opposition politician who made comments exactly along these lines.

> ... truthfully, the strength of the individual candidate doesn't really matter in the party's strongholds. So long as the candidate is not really bad and the voters won't refuse to accept them, the party can choose whoever it wants, and rely on the strength of the party to carry the day.[21]

An incumbent politician also provides comments that support this idea. He specifically points to the fact that even if the party nominates a "subpar" candidate, there are a limited number of alternative candidates that could expect to fight against the party's popularity in its strongholds.

> There are some people who ruin it for themselves. They never show up at the constituency, and completely get enamored by glamorous Nairobi life. Those people will be discarded by the party because even the party ticket cannot carry them to victory. But for others who are doing a reasonable job, if the party grants the ticket, the people will vote for them.[22]

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[19]Interview with opposition politician, Interview Subject 2015-PO21, conducted in April 2015.

[20]Interview with opposition politician, Interview Subject 2015-PO34, conducted in May 2015

[21]Interview with opposition politician, Subject 2015-PO12, conducted in March 2015.

[22]Interview with incumbent party politician, Subject 2015-PI31, conducted in May 2015.

Another former politician cites the outcomes of the general elections in 2013 as evidence on how parties can forego their concerns regarding electability in their strongholds with little to no consequence.

> The media was busy talking about how ODM's nomination loyalists in Kisumu, Siaya, and Homa Bay caused them to suffer. But I don't think they really suffer? How can you say they suffered when they took 90 percent of seats in that region? If that number is 50% I might believe it. But it is not. It is the same story every time.[23]

The perspective, however, markedly changes when discussing the importance of candidate electability in local elections that are competitive. For these elections, politicians argue that parties must nominate electable candidates, or face the consequences at the general elections.

> If they don't have sufficient grassroots support, the parties have to be very careful in determining who they nominate. If they try to nominate someone who is unpopular, they will lose. In these places, candidates with a good track record of development who has the support voters will get the nod [for the party ticket].[24]

One politician from the opposition ODM clearly elucidated this logic when he voiced his concern regarding the party nominations for the Nairobi gubernatorial elections in 2017. He told me during the interview that he was concerned that the incumbent governor, Evans Kidero, who belonged to his party would likely lose against the likely Jubilee Party candidate Mike Sonko, who had accumulated a reputation as a constituency-oriented politician while serving as the senator for Nairobi.

> This is going to be a big problem for us. Kidero will probably get the ticket, because there are no alternatives yet. He has done a lot for Nairobi since 2013, but I am not sure this is enough. Sonko is so strong, and has a massive following from the wananchi. If we choose Kidero run against Sonko, I worry that Jubilee will take the governor position. That will be very bad.[25]

These discussions have demonstrated that politicians seemed to be keenly aware of the metrics by which they would be judged for the party nomination, very much in line with the arguments I presented with regard to the nature of the nominaton tournament. The interviews show that politicians emphasized the importance of investing in party-oriented activities, but that their importance would likely be conditioned on the partisan demographics in the electoral unit in question; in competitive constituencies, party leaders would be compelled to moderate their emphasis on loyalty and party-orientation and also factor in how constituency-minded the politician is.

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[23]Interview with incumbent party politician, Interview Subject 2015-PI30, conducted in May 2015

[24]Interview with incumbent party politician, Subject 2015-PI31, conducted in May 2015.

[25]Interview with opposition politician, Subject 2016-P51, conducted in August 2016.

7.3   Quantitative Evidence

The preceding section has presented qualitative, interview-based evidence that shows politicians perceived the candidate selection process to be deeply competitive. I also demonstrated that politicians understood that whether they would be awarded the party ticket would be largely controlled by parties which leverage two different types of criteria—participation in party-oriented activities and electability, which is closely related to the extent to which politicians engage in constituency-oriented activities—to evaluate who to grant the party nomination to—very much in line with the predictions of the nomination tournament. In this section, I provide further corroborating evidence of the nomination tournament using quantitative data on party nominations for two major Kenyan parties; the incumbent Jubilee party of Kenya and opposition Orange Democratic Movement. Specifically, I present a series of quantitative tests that show that a politician's investment in party-oriented activities is meaningful factor in whether they are chosen as the party's nominee for the subsequent elections. The primary data for testing these propositions are drawn from a data set of party nomination outcomes for the 2017 general elections, the biographical data of sitting members of parliament, and an original collection of articles from Kenyan media covering the activities of incumbent Kenyan parliamentarians from both sides of the aisle.

Extracting a measure of politician party orientation can be a highly time-intensive task that requires a close reading of the tens of thousands of new paper articles, which can become prohibitively difficult as the volume of these articles increase. The media data I rely on to extract these measures is comprised of more than 50,000 news paper articles spread across 356 sitting members of parliament. In order to make the analyses feasible, I make use of text-as-data methods which facilitates the efficient analysis of large collections of text (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Applying supervised classification methods, I measure how often politicians engage in party-oriented activities, including political campaign rallies, as well as a broader category of behavior that reflect investment in party-building endeavors revealed as relevant in the qualitative analysis.

It is important to note that despite the use of a variety of important politician-related attributes and characteristics as control variables, the analyses presented in this section lacks a strong identification strategy that would enable the assessment of whether there exists a *causal* effect of party orientation on party nomination outcomes. After all, the party-orientation measure and control variables are likely to be intimately related to each other, with some of causal relevance to others. It is therefore important to interpret the correlations of the analysis both cautiously and conservatively as corroborating evidence to the qualitative evidence.

Measuring Politicians' Party-Orientation

To measure the degree to which Kenyan politicians engage in party-oriented activities during their term in elected office, I use a novel data set of politician behavior as conveyed by prominent domestic media outlets, as extracted from AllAfrica.com. While media-based accounts of politician activities might not strike scholars as a natural source of data to measure party-orientation, the extensive and detailed documentation of the politician's where-

abouts and activities by the national media in Kenya provides a rare opportunity to understand how politicians allocate their behavior across party-oriented and non-party-oriented activities. However, the abundance of data (51,375 articles to be exact) happens to also pose a problem from the perspective of analysis, as because the volume of the relevant corpus highly time and effort intensive. With so many articles, manually reading and classifying them would require between 5,000–10,000 hours of coder labor, depending on the average rate of coding assumed to be feasible. In order to make this seemingly insurmountable more feasible, I adopt computational methods that ease the time and effort that must be invested towards these tasks.

Specifically, I employ supervised machine learning methods to efficiently classify the content of the newspaper articles (Hopkins and King, 2010; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). In order to begin the process, I drew a random sample of 500 articles to be classified by three human coders on whether the article documented a politician's party-oriented activities. After the individual classification by human coders were cross-validated against the other coders', I used these documents to train a random forest classifier to classify the remaining articles. This results in a set of labeled documents that allows for the analysis of the entire collection of newspaper articles as if they were categorized by hand, conditional on the accuracy of the statistical classification.

The human classifications adhered to a coding scheme that was developed based on the qualitative interviews with politicians. The first category in the coding scheme are politician attendance at the party's political or campaign rallies. I classified this as an important (or perhaps the *most* important) way in which politicians invested in party-oriented activities, as i) politicians frequently referred to it as one of their key obligations, and ii) the party often stressed that they expected politicians to actively participate in them. I defined a document as containing information on politician rally attendance if the newspaper article explicitly noted the MP being present at a rally which was presided over by the party leader of each of the two political parties, Uhuru Kenyatta (Jubilee Party) and Raila Odinga (ODM). The second category expanded the scope of party-orientation to include a larger set of different activities *exclusive* of rally or campaign attendance; these included i) press briefings and announcements that engaged in cross-partisan attacks or defended the party leader and the party against those attacks, ii) press briefings that advocated for a policy issue that were being pursued by the national party leadership, and iii) attendance at non-campaign or non-rally party events. The third category was the "residual", wherein articles that held no information regarding the two former categories were placed.

With this coding scheme, a team of three coders classified the random sample of 500 articles. The team of coders comprised of two coders were Kenyan college students majoring in political science, with the third coder being the author. The coding team displayed high levels of agreement in their classification of articles. Across all newspaper articles, at least two coders agreed on 93% of documents, and all three agreed 61% of the time. The agreement is significantly higher if we restrict to coding of rallies—with all three coders agreeing 89% of time regarding whether an article contains information on politician attendance at rallies or not. In cases where there was disagreement across coders, we relied on majority rule to determine category assignment, taking the classification by the two as correct. In a few cases

(3%) in which all the coders classified a newspaper article into different categories, the author's opinion took precedence. It is reassuring to note that the word one usually expects will be associated with each of these categories were much more likely to occur in articles the coding team labeled as such. I rely on the "mutual information" between a word and a category to examine how well a single word separates each category from each other. The words that have the highest mutual information with the rallies category, for example, are words like `rally`, `attendance`, `address`, `crowd`, `supporters`. For the second party-oriented activity category, these words are `press`, `announce`, `criticize`, `attack`, `defend`.

With the sample of coded documents, I trained a random forest classifier.[26] In order to validate the accuracy of the classifier, I reserve a part of the hand-coded articles and then use the classifier trained on the remainder to classifier the held out hand coded documents, an approach termed "cross validation" by Hastie, Friedman and Tibshirani (2001). The cross validation procedure thus allows me to test the performance of the random forest classifier against the hand-coded articles. The results show that the random forest classifier was able to accurately replicate the work of human coders. 86% of the out of sample classifications agreed with the opinion of the coding team. Conditional on a document being rally-related, for example, I am able to identify it at a high rate (62%), and given that the prediction was rally-related, it was highly likely that it was actually was (89%).

Then, I proceeded to train the random forest classifier on the full sample of documents coded by the coding team, and applied it to the collection of 51,375 articles. The outcome is that each article is assigned to each of these categories. This reveals that 6% of press articles on politicians is with regard to rally attendance, and that 29% of them are related to the broader set of party-oriented activities.

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 presents a graphical illustration of the outcome of the classification task; each of the figures present the raw count of the number of times an incumbent politician belonging to either the Jubilee party or ODM was mentioned by the media as having attended a party-organized rally. Each of the subfigures represent a different tier of politicians, ranging from members of parliament (lower parliamentary chamber), senators (upper parliamentary chamber), or governors (county executive). The green points in the figures denote incumbent politician whose rally attendance were above the mean for the party at the relevant tier of office, while red points in the figures indicate those who fall below the mean.

The figures show that incumbent politicians vary significantly in the extent to which they engage in party-oriented activities, and more specifically, the attendance at party campaign or political rallies. At the extreme, there are a large proportion of politicians who do not seem to be attending any major party rallies during their term in office. It is important to note that the period during which the newspaper articles were collected preceded the party nominations, and did not fall into any official campaigning period during which rallies become especially prevalent. However, this does not mean the parties did not hold rallies; in fact the data suggests the exact opposite.

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[26] I choose the random forest classifier because it demonstrated the highest level of accuracy vis-à-vis other commonly-used classifiers such as support vector machine (SVM), LASSO, and Kernel Regularized Least Squares (KRLS). The results of the subsequent analyses do not change substantively when employing different classifiers.

Figure 7.1: Count of Rally Attendance for Politicians in Jubilee Party (2013-2017)

(a) Jubilee: MPs

(b) Jubilee: MPs

(c) Jubilee: Senators and Woman Reps

(d) Jubilee: Governors

Note: Plot shows the count of the number of times each incumbent politician belonging to the Jubilee Party attended a party rally between 2013-2017. Green points indicate the politicians who fell above the mean in terms of rally attendance. Red points indicate politicians who fell below the mean.

Figure 7.2: Count of Rally Attendance for Politicians in ODM (2013-2017)

(a) ODM: MPs

(b) ODM: MPs

(c) ODM: Senators and Woman Reps

(d) ODM: Governors

Note: Note: Plot shows the count of the number of times each incumbent politician belonging to the ODM attended a party rally between 2013-2017. Green points indicate the politicians who fell above the mean in terms of rally attendance. Red points indicate politicians who fell below the mean.

Roughly around 10–33% of MPs, Senators, and Governors across both parties failed to attend a party rally. At the other extreme, there are incumbent politicians who seem to have invested a significant amount of effort towards diligently attending party rallies; MPs such as Junet Mohammed, John Mbadi and Senators James Orengo, Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, and Governor Ali Hassn Joho in the ODM attended more than 50 rallies during the time period under study. In the Jubilee party, MPs such as Aden Duale, Moses Kuria, Senators such as Kithure Kinduki or Kipchumba Murkomen, and Governors such as Jackson Mandago and William Kabogo also fall into the set of individuals who were extremely active. The fact that these individuals appear high on the list of rally attendance boosts confidence in the classification, as these individuals were also the individuals considered anecdotally most active in party affairs, including the mobilization efforts through political rallies.

Party-Orientation and Nomination Outcomes

The preceding subsection described the process through which I generated two different classes of party-orientation for each incumbent politician in the two largest parties in Kenya. In this part of the analysis, I now proceed to analyze whether there is a correlation between these measures of party-orientation and the candidate selection outcomes for the 2017 general elections, as the logic of the nomination tournament would predict. I do so by merging this data with a data set of nomination outcomes for both the Jubilee Party and ODM, electoral returns from the 2013 general elections, as well as incumbent-level biographical data, retrieved from the official Kenyan parliament website as well as the website for each county. These biographical data include the level of education, previous occupation, age, and gender.

The outcome to be used throughout the analysis is whether an incumbent politician, regardless of tier of office to which they were elected in the previous electoral cycle, was renominated by the party for any elective position in 2017. I take this approach because many incumbents occupying lower tier positions (constituency MPs, county woman representatives) contested elections for other elective offices (either a lateral constituency-based positions or higher tier offices such as senator or governor). In almost all of the cases in which lower tier office holders applied for nomination for an upper tier office, it was for the upper tier office that included the lower tier constituency within its bounds – for example, Funyula member of parliament Paul Otuoma applied for the party nomination from ODM to contest the Busia county gubernatorial election, which included within its boundaries Funyula constituency. I take this dichotomous measure of party renomination and assess its relationship with the party-orientation measures using both ordinary least squares and logistic regression. The ordinary least squares is the preferred method of estimation as it facilitates clear interpretations of the correlations, and is therefore presented hereafter. The findings, however, do not change substantively when logistic regressions are used. The specific equation estimated is

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 M_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_2 T_{cp,t-1} + \epsilon \qquad (7.1)$$

where M_i is the measure of party-orientation for politician *i*, X_i are a vector of incumbent-level attributes, and T is the tier of office occupied by politician *i* prior to the nomination,

depending on the specification.

Correlations Between Party-Orientation and Nomination

Rally Attendance The results from the ordinary least squares regressions where the key independent variable is the measure of rally attendance, presented across columns (1)-(8) in Table 7.1, provide strong support for the predictions of the nomination tournament framework; the raw count of an incumbent politician's rally attendance is positively correlated with whether the incumbent received a nomination from the same party to contest the subsequent election. These correlations are observed commonly across both the incumbent Jubilee party and the opposition ODM party, although the coefficient for the Jubilee party is more than double the opposition's. Attendance at one additional rally increases the probability that an incumbent receives the party nomination by around 0.09 percentage point for Jubilee politicians, and by roughly 0.07 percentage points for ODM politicians.

These results are robust to the inclusion of a battery of controls regarding the incumbent as well as the tier of office they held prior to the nominations; coefficients remain largely unaltered in columns (3) and (4).

At first blush, these correlations may seem small enough to lead many to dismiss the findings as inconsequential. However, they are much larger when one considers the range of values observed for the raw count of the rally attendance variable. The single largest number of rallies attended by an incumbent politician in the entire sample is James Orengo, Senator for Siaya County. His rally count stands at 154. In comparison to another ODM politician who did not attend a single rally during the period observed, he is likely to accrue more than a 10% point advantage in his quest for renomination. Jubilee's Aden Duale, who attended 119 rallies during this time period, accrues an 11.9% point advantage over a fellow Jubilee politician who has attended none.

In order to further verify that these findings are robust and not being driven by outliers in the data, I coarsen the count variable to a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 if the count of the rallies attended is above the mean for each party and each election tier, and 0 if otherwise. This variable is then used in lieu of the raw count variable in the regressions, with the remainder of the specifications remaining the same. The results corroborate the initial findings; for members of the Jubilee party, an above-mean attendance at party rallies are associated with an 28.7 percentage point increase in the probability of renomination. For ODM, the correlation is larger, with those with an above-average rate of attendance at party rallies experiencing a 34.4 percentage point increase in the probability of renomination. The results remain largely unaltered in specifications with an extensive set of control variables.

Other Party-Oriented Activities The results from the set of regressions in which I use the second category of party-oriented activities adds additional credence to the idea that parties use party-orientated activities as a metric to evaluate who is deserving of the party nomination. The findings from these regressions are presented in Table 7.2. The results are presented in a similar manner with Table 7.1. Columns (1) and (2) show the bivariate relationship between party-oriented activities and nominations. While the coefficients are significantly

Table 7.1: Correlation between Rally Attendance and Nomination Outcomes

	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rally Attendance	0.009***	0.007***	0.010***	0.006**
(Raw Count)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	0.484***	0.382***	0.435***	0.645***
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.113)	(0.131)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.052	0.090	0.098	0.151
	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rally Attendance	0.287***	0.344***	0.316***	0.289**
(Above Mean=1)	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.077)	(0.098)
Constant	0.463***	0.374***	0.360**	0.596***
	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.117)	(0.139)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.063	0.100	0.107	0.148

Note: The sample excludes incumbent politicians who did not apply for the nomination of the party for the following election cycle. The Rally Attendance variable for (5), (6), (7), (8) are coded dichotomously, with the cutoff set at the mean for each respective party. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.

Table 7.2: Correlation between Other Party-Oriented Activities and Nomination Outcomes

	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party-Oriented Activity	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001
(Raw Count)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.495***	0.411***	0.453***	0.710***
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.116)	(0.133)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.024	0.041	0.065	0.113
	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party-Oriented Activity	0.213**	0.234*	0.246**	0.170
(Above Mean)	(0.078)	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.098)
Constant	0.485***	0.407***	0.384**	0.696***
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.121)	(0.139)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.033	0.046	0.078	0.109

Note: The sample excludes incumbent politicians who did not apply for the nomination of the party for the following election cycle. The Party-Oriented Activity variable for (5), (6), (7), (8) are coded dichotomously, with the cutoff set at the mean for each respective party. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.

smaller than for rally attendance, they are positive and statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. These results are also relatively robust to the inclusion of a set of controls, although the coefficient for party-orientation is only marginally significant for the ODM sample at p<0.1.

I also proceed to create the coarsened version of the party-oriented activity variable at the means for each of the respective parties and replace the raw counts of the party-oriented activity variable with them. The results of regressions in which these coarsened variables are included as the main predictor largely corroborate the findings from columns (1)–(4) of Table 7.2. A politician who performs above average in terms of engaging in party-oriented activities are around 21% points more likely to receive the party nomination than others who fall below the mean for the Jubilee party, whereas they are 23% points more likely to receive the ticket in the ODM sample. These findings are statistically significant at p<0.05. When controls are included into the mix, however, the variable for party-orientation retains statistically significance at p<0.05 for the Jubilee sample, but falls out of significance among the sample of ODM politicians.[27]

These findings, combined, broadly provide support for the importance of a politician's investment in party-orientated activities in the party's calculus in determining the set of nominees for their next elections, as predicted by the logic of the nomination tournament. However, the nomination tournament also renders additional predictions regarding *heterogeneity* in the importance of party-orientation across different types of constituencies, namely, based the level of *interparty* competition the party faces in the general elections. I turn to whether these predictions are also confirmed by the data in the following.

Correlation Heterogeneity Across Stronghold and Swing Constituencies

In order to ascertain whether the correlation between party-orientation exhibits heterogeneity, I adjust the regression specification so that it now includes a term for a dichotomous constituency-type variable S_c denoting whether the constituency is considered a party stronghold or a swing district, and the interaction term between the constituency type and the party-orientation variable. The stronghold variable takes on a value of "1" when the party's vote share in the previous election was more than 65% of valid votes cast.[28] Specifically, the estimate ordinary least squares regression with the following specification.

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 M_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_2 T_{cp,t-1} + \beta_3 S_c + \beta_4 S_c \times M_i + \epsilon \qquad (7.2)$$

The logic of the nomination tournament suggests that parties and their leaders will rely much more on the party-orientation metric to decide nominations in their strongholds because they do not face any significant electoral risk by diverting the effort of politicians towards party-oriented activities. Conversely, this means that party-orientation is likely to be a less influential predictor of nominations in competitive districts where the party does risk losing

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[27] The effect is however marginally significant at p<0.1.

[28] Alternate codings of this variable, based on presidential vote share in the constituency or county-level vote shares do not change the substantive findings for these analyses.

the electoral advantage obtained by having incumbent politicians engage in constituency-oriented activities. This means that we expect the coefficient β_4 to be positive, and statistically distinguishable from zero, and the coefficeint for β_1 to be either smaller than β_4 or indistinguishable from zero, since the coefficient for β_1, in an interactive model in Equation 7.2 denotes the coefficient for party-orientation in non-strongholds.

Rally Attendance   The results of the interactive models in which the main independent variable is the interaction term between rally attendance and the party stronghold dummy are presented in Table 7.3. I follow the approach from the previous subsection regarding the order of presentation. Columns (1) through (4) report results from the models that were estimated with the raw counts of the rally attendance variable, and the interaction terms which were created by interacting the raw count with the stronghold dummy. Consistently with the prediction of the nomination tournament, party-orientation seems to be a much more important factor in shaping the nominations in stronghold constituencies; with the exception of the ODM sample without controls, the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant at $p<0.05$. It is important to highlight that the coefficients for rally attendance are not significant constituencies that are not classified as party strongholds.

Columns (5)–(8) supports these findings. Following previous analyses, I use a coarsened dichotomous variable for rally attendance. The interaction terms between the coarsened variable and stronghold dummy are positive and all statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level. These results on rally attendance collectively show strong support for the logic of the nomination tournament and the heterogeneity in the correlation between party-orientation and candidate selection outcomes.

Other Party-Oriented Activities   I proceed to the second part of the interactive analyses, where the main independent variable is the interaction term between party-oriented activities (exclusive of rally attendance) and the party stronghold dummy. The results are presented in Table 7.4. Unlike the rally attendance analyses, there seems to be very little evidence of effect heterogeneity in the relationship between other party-oriented activities and nomination outcomes by constituency type. None of the interactive terms, regardless of specification and how the activity variable is operationalized, reaches statistical significance at conventional levels.

Overall, the interactive analyses presents evidence in support of the anticipated heterogeneity in the metric applied to nominations across constituency types. Although there is no statistically significant heterogeneity for the broader category of party-oriented activities, the results are positive, strong, and robust for the rally attendance analyses. Given that the correlation with nominations for the rally analyses dwarf those of other party-related activities, these results *collectively* provide confidence that the data largely support the predictions of the nomination tournament.

Table 7.3: Correlation between Rally Attendance and Nomination by Constituency Type

	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rally Attendance (Raw Count)	0.004	0.002	0.005	−0.0003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Stronghold	−0.380***	−0.210*	−0.374***	−0.190
	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.071)	(0.104)
Rally×Stronghold	0.014**	0.007	0.015**	0.009*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	0.666***	0.488***	0.635***	0.758***
	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.115)	(0.138)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.170	0.125	0.206	0.187

	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rally Attendance (Above Mean)	0.120	0.154	0.143	0.075
	(0.107)	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.141)
Stronghold	−0.403***	−0.221*	−0.393***	−0.175
	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.073)	(0.103)
Rally×Stronghold	0.348*	0.378*	0.343*	0.407*
	(0.142)	(0.183)	(0.142)	(0.185)
Constant	0.663***	0.471***	0.575***	0.669***
	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.118)	(0.142)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.185	0.141	0.215	0.183

Note: The sample excludes incumbent politicians who did not apply for the nomination of the party for the following election cycle. The Rally Attendance variable for (5), (6), (7), (8) are coded dichotomously, with the cutoff set at the mean for each respective party. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.

Table 7.4: Correlation between Party-Oriented Activities and Nomination by Constituency Type

	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party-Oriented Activity	0.001	0.0003	0.001	−0.00005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Stronghold	−0.352****	−0.183*	−0.346****	−0.142
	(0.074)	(0.103)	(0.076)	(0.108)
Activity ×Stronghold	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.665****	0.496****	0.650****	0.766****
	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.120)	(0.137)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.121	0.066	0.152	0.133

	Dependent Variable: Nominated as Party Candidate			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party-Oriented Activity	0.133	0.119	0.161	0.039
	(0.109)	(0.144)	(0.110)	(0.147)
Stronghold	−0.341****	−0.173*	−0.330****	−0.116
	(0.073)	(0.104)	(0.075)	(0.107)
Activity ×Stronghold	0.170	0.240	0.161	0.252
	(0.149)	(0.192)	(0.149)	(0.193)
Constant	0.659****	0.481****	0.591****	0.735****
	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.125)	(0.142)
Sample (Party)	Jubilee	ODM	Jubilee	ODM
Incumbent Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election Tier Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	220	130	220	130
R^2	0.129	0.068	0.161	0.123

Note: The sample excludes incumbent politicians who did not apply for the nomination of the party for the following election cycle. The Party-Oriented Activity variable for (5), (6), (7), (8) are coded dichotomously, with the cutoff set at the mean for each respective party. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.

7.4 Summary

This chapter has leveraged rich qualitative evidence from interviews conducted with politicians and quantitative analyses of a large corpus of media coverage on the behavior of politicians to document the manner in which political parties use their control over party nominations to engineer their ideal set of party candidates. I argued that parties subject politicians to a "nomination tournament" wherein politicians who invest their effort and resources towards party-oriented activities, rather than constituency-oriented activities are privileged for the party ticket in the subsequent elections. I also posited that this tendency is likely to be amplified in the party's strongholds where the party is willing to forego the benefits of directing politician effort towards constituency-oriented activities because they face limited local political competition from other parties.

The interviews of politicians in the two largest parties in Kenya revealed that politicians understood the party nomination process broadly in the terms of the nomination tournament. Politicians recognized that the authority to select candidates still remained squarely in the hands of the party and the party leader. They also understood and anticipated that the party would heavily reward candidates primarily based on whether they engaged extensively with party events such as political/campaign rallies, advocacy of party positions on various policy issues, and shielding the party and the leader against partisan attacks from across the aisle, rather than their investment towards providing local development and assistance to their constituents. They astutely observed, however, that the party would carefully diversify their strategy across different types of constituencies, based on the level of interparty competition in the general elections.

I attempted to find corroborating evidence for the qualitative analyses by examining how the behavior of politicians, as documented by prominent media sources in Kenya, correlated with the candidate selection decisions made by the parties in the run-up to the 2017 general elections. I used supervised machine learning methods to classify these newspaper accounts into measures of party-orientation. I then examined the relationship between these measures and the nomination decisions made by the two major parties in Kenya. Results from these analyses provided strong support for the logic of the nomination tournament, showing that a politician's party-orientation exhibited a strong positive correlation with likelihood of selection. It further revealed that parties relied on the party-orientation of their candidates in making their nomination decisions much more in party strongholds.

The analyses presented here in support of the nomination tournament provide the final piece of evidence in the causal sequence required to understand how political parties and the candidate selection processes inside them becomes the source of politician unresponsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. The perverse pressures generated by the nomination tournament—to privilege party-oriented activities over other activities that could benefit constituents in a large majority of constituencies—forces politicians, who are at the mercy of political parties for their reelection, to divert their limited time and effort towards away from serving their constituents towards the party.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

"Voters and political parties are in a battle over who will have power over their elected representatives. Unfortunately for voters, parties will often win in this fight for supremacy."[1]

– Dorothy Nditi, Former Deputy Governor, Embu County, Kenya

8.1   Summry of the Argument

This study has sought to offer a new account of the logic that underpins the deficit of democratic responsiveness in new democracies. Why, despite decades of regular multiparty electoral competition, have elected representatives in new democracies failed to become more interested in tending to the needs of their constituents?

In answering these questions, I develop a theory that focuses on the role of political parties. While scholarship on third wave democracies have traditionally highlighted the instrumental role that political parties have played in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, my account emphasizes how parties can potentially sever the representational link forged between constituents and their elected representatives. In a way, political parties become the villains, rather than the heroes, of democratic representation.

The argument I presented here traces the origins of representative unresponsiveness first to the uncompetitive nature of subnational elections. Whereas elections to capture the presidency have progressively become more competitive, lower-tier elections for the legislature or local/municipal executives remain largely uncompetitive, with a single party often winning repeatedly with commanding margins of victory. Such local one party dominance means that politicians must secure the candidacy of the locally-dominant party if they are to stand any

[1]From transcripts of in-person interview conducted March 28, 2015 at Embu Town, Kenya

chance of winning in the general elections. This means that political parties can serve as the gatekeepers to success of local politicians.

Dependence on the dominant party's nomination for survival creates incentives among politicians to cater to the interests of the party's selectorate, which decides who the nominee will be. Despite the wide variation in the institutional setup of candidate selection processes across parties, the power to ultimately determine the list of party candidates squarely reside in the hands of the party leader. The party leader enjoys such power by virtue of their institutional authority over the party organization; they are able to manipulate the institutional design of the intraparty selection rules, mobilize the party's financial and organizational assets, and shape how the selection procedures are implemented, all in favor of their preferred candidates for the nomination. But at the same time, party leaders can utilize their persuasive influence over the masses who often participate in the selection process to shape its outcome.

The ability of the party leader to control the outcome of nominations allows her to put politicians seeking the party ticket to the service of her political goals, or what I referred to as the nomination tournament. As the likely presidential candidate of the party, the party leader benefits from constituency-oriented local candidates who establish strong connection with local voters through the provision of local public goods and services that are valued by constituents. These candidates are likely to cultivate a positive image as the party candidate in the elections, and provide "reverse coattails" upon which the party can capitalize in higher tier elections (such as the presidential elections). But at the same time, party leaders are also strongly motivated by their need to retain their position at the helm of the party. And from this perspective, candidates who pursue a constituency-oriented strategy pose significant risks to the party leader, as they can use the significant personal vote that they accrue as leverage to make demands on the party, or worse, potentially initiate a challenge against their leadership.

These trade-offs lead the party leader to pursue a bifurcated strategy for party nominations: in a smaller proportion of constituencies where the party is faced with serious competition from opposing parties, the party leader induces candidates to compete with each other in terms of pursuing a constituency-oriented strategy, with the party nomination being awarded to the candidate who does best in serving the needs of their constituents. However, in the vast majority of the party's constituencies in which there is little to risk of losing the seat, party leaders incentivize politicians to pursue a party-oriented strategy, one that requires them to invest their effort and resources to activities that builds the strength of the party, but that does not cultivate a personal vote for the politician.

These intraparty dynamics over the selection of candidates set politicians down the treacherous path of privileging the party leader's interests over that of their constituents. With selection as the party nominee being determined based on party-orientation rather than constituency-orientation in so many cases, politicians have little reason to invest their limited time and resources towards serving the interests of voters that elected them to office. With so few of the constituencies subjecting the locally-dominant party to meaningful interparty competition, the end result is the overall patterns unresponsiveness so commonly observed across African democracies today.

8.2 Summary of Empirical Findings

A large proportion of this study has been dedicated to empirically validating each component of the causal process at work, as well as the observable implications of the theory.

In chapter 3, brought novel data and methods to empirically demonstrate the pattern of democratic unresponsiveness that the study seeks to explain. Exploiting multiple rounds of valuable public opinion data that enables the measurement of local constituent preferences, I leverage quantitative methods used in the research on representation in consolidated democracies to derive estimates of local issue priorities across a number of key local development domains. I then used these measures of local issue priorities to examine whether they correlated with the behavior of elected representatives serving those constituencies; in particular, I focused on how incumbent MPs allocated the discretionary constituency developments they had their disposal to satisfy the constituency's local development needs. The analyses revealed that the estimated salience of a local development issue—regarding public health, security, education, water, agriculture, and roads—had limited bearing on how much was allocated to those respective categories. Furthermore, any evidence of congruence between local priorities and local spending by representatives is confined to constituencies with meaning interparty competition. Overall, these patterns were indicative of the limited level of democratic responsiveness that was predicted by the theory.

Then I proceeded to empirically document the first piece of the causal sequence, which runs counter to the prevailing narrative in the existing literature regarding political parties in Africa: the fact that parties are highly resilient in subnational elections, and how such resilience underpins the gatekeeping role that political parties are able to play in shaping the fate of politicians. Using public opinion data and electoral returns collected across Africa's new democracies, I was first able to demonstrate the surprising strength of partisan attachments across Africa, and the robust correlationship between party identification and vote choice. The strength of these partisan attachments, I argue, is the foundation to the extraordinary resilience of political parties in lower-tier elections: parties win reelection in these elections more than 80% of the time. The resilience of parties makes the nomination of the locally-dominant party extremely valuable, signifying the difference between almost guaranteed victory and near certain defeat in the general election. I show using electoral returns from six African democracies that the renomination of their original party offers a 50–90 percentage point increase in the probability that an incumbent representative is reelected.

In the next step, I showed how party leaders come to control the candidate selection process in their parties. Through case studies of the two largest political parties in Kenya, I found that party leaders relied on their institutional authority to manipulate candidate selection institutions, shape the field of candidates competing for the nominations, and directly intervene in the decisions made through the selection procedure. The result provided evidence that party leaders have the ability effectively dictate the outcome of candidate selection to ensure that the party is able to nominate their preferred candidates. The subsequent chapter then documented the influence that another strategy often employed by party leaders—persuasion of voters—to exert their influence over party nominations. Through a series of experiments

implemented among primary voters of two major parties in Kenya, I showed that the party leader's opinion regarding a candidate, as conveyed by endorsements, had a large impact on voter evaluation of primary candidates.

In the final empirical chapter, I provide evidence of the nomination tournament, which details how the party leader puts her control over candidate selection to use. Using a data set of media accounts of politician behavior collected through web-crawling methods, and employing supervised machine-learning methods to classify these documents, I am able to show that representatives that invest their effort and resources towards party-oriented activities, rather than constituency-oriented activities are rewarded in the nominations.

8.3 Understanding Democratic Responsiveness Elsewhere

The failure of democracy to deliver on its promise of better representation is a phenomenon that seems to be problem observed commonly in all corners of the developing world; from Sub-Saharan Africa to Eastern Europe to Latin America, scholars have pointed identified the persistent challenges of (Lijphart, 1994; Kajsiu, 2010; Mainwaring and Welna, 2003; Mainwaring, 2006; Domínguez, 1997). The near ubiquitous nature of this deficit in democratic representation raises the natural question of the extent to which the theoretical framework presented in this study can be leveraged to understand the causes of unresponsiveness observed in other parts of the world. The applicability of the theory beyond the context of the cases studied here is likely to rest on whether some important scope conditions are met. First, party labels must be meaningful in subnational elections to the extent that the nomination of parties can function as a binding constraint for politicians competing in the general elections. Second, the interests of the selectorate within parties that determines who will be nominated must diverge from that of electorate which participates in the general elections.

The first condition—that party labels and the nomination of these parties be meaningful and impose a binding constraint on politicians—is crucial because it determines whether politicians have any real incentive to cater to the interests of the party selectorate. If party labels mean little to nothing in the minds of voters, and they do not exercise their vote in subnational elections based their partisan attachments, politicians face limited consequences for losing out in the party nominations; all they need to win would be to either defect to a different and seek the candidacy of the other party, or even contest the elections as an independent candidate without a party affiliation. If voters discount the value of party labels, what will determine the survival of politicians is not the not any party's ticket, but rather the ability of a politician to attract support from voters in the general elections. In this is the case, it is the interests of the voters or constituents that will drive politician behavior, not parties.

Fortunately, it seems to be the case that party labels and partisan attachments, while perhaps in the process of overall decline (Seawright, 2012; Lupu, 2016), might still be an important part of politics in the developing world (Poertner, N.d.). Scholars working on new democracies have long documented the existence of geographic clusters where a single party enjoy unrivaled support from the population and is able to cultivate victories in the strongholds consistently(Gibson, 2005; Horiuchi and Lee, 2008; Gelman, 2010; Gervasoni,

2010; Hamayotsu, 2011). And in these places, the party's support for the candidacy is, very much like our cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, likely to be near deterministic of their success in the general elections. A relatively recent case from South Korea highlights the relevance of this theory: the 2014 legislative elections were the first to be held after Park Geun-hye, the leader of the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP) was elected to president two years earlier. The NFP party nominations in its strongholds in North Gyeongsang Province and Daegu city were tightly controlled by the party leadership, and president Park in particular. Many high-performing, popular incumbent parliamentarians were denied the party ticket, while party loyalists with little to record of service to their constituents but were nonetheless allied to the president's faction being overwhelmingly renominated. However, the NFP suffered very little consequence for removing the popular incumbents, as they could rely on high levels of partisan attachment in these stronghold areas to carry them to victory. In areas where they faced significant competition from opposite the aisle, however, the NFP made every effort nominate whoever was deemed popular among voters, and therefore more likely to retain their seats. This resulted in a fair number of unpopular incumbents who were allied with the president's faction losing out in the party primaries, or being excluded from even contesting in the primaries all together.

The second condition that must to be met for this theory to be relevant is that the interests of the selectorate and electorate must diverge in meaningful ways. As the theory in chapter 2 discussed, the mere fact that party nominations are likely to critically affect the ability of politicians to be elected need not *necessarily* generate distorted incentives for politicians to ignore the interests of their constituents; even if the composition of the selectorate and the electorate are different, if the selectorate decides the nominees with due consideration to what the electorate wants, the party will end up with a pool of candidates that would resemble the candidates that the electorate would have settled on, if given the opportunity. Yet instances in which the interests of the selectorate and electorate diverge is likely to be quite common. It is worth looking back to the case of the US where scholars have pointed out how the extremist ideological tendencies of primary voters of each of the two main political parties have resulted in the emergence of extremist candidates, and resulted in polarization in congress (Ansolabehere et al., 2010; Hall and Snyder, 2015). If party elites or activists who pursue a particular policy agenda or are interested in obtaining their own career goals are responsible for selecting candidates, they are likely to choose candidates who place their "esoteric" needs over that of their constituents.

8.4   Revisiting the Party-Representation Nexus

Political parties occupy a special position in democracies both old and new. Such is the reverence that political parties are afforded that E.E. Schattschneider famously stated that "political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties (Schattschneider, 1942)." In the new democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa, opposition political parties were often able to transcend narrowly-defined ethnic interests to play a critical

role in delivering their citizens from the iron grip of authoritarian despots that ruled over their country unhindered by the needs of their citizens (Arriola, 2012).

Unsurprisingly, the existing literature on political parties have highlighted the critical role that they play in the process of democratic representation, functioning as intermediaries that link the citizenry to government (Sartori, 1976, 57; Schattschneider, 1942). And due to its import, many scholars have attributed the crisis of representation observed in both consolidated and new democracies are likely attributable to the erosion of partisan attachments, decline of mass-based parties, and party system breakdown (Mair, 1994; Innes, 2002; Mainwaring, 2006; Hayward, 2012). In other words, representation falls apart in democracies when parties are weak, and they are unable to effectively perform their various functions.

Yet the ensemble of evidence presented in this study collectively presents an contrarian perspective on how political parties shape the quality of representation in new democracies. Although parties in these new democracies may be organizationally weak (Novaes, 2017; Basedau and Stroh, N.d.), financially constrained (Arriola, 2012), and be little more than personal electoral vehicle of charismatic politicians (Resnick, 2012), partisan attachments are strong, and parties tend to enjoy consistent and loyal support from their partisan supporters. And it is this *strength*, rather than the weakness, of political parties that my study identifies as one of the factors that sets off the process through which democratic representation fails.

The account developed in this study resonates closely with research in comparative politics that have highlighted how parties can actively undermine the process of representation in new democracies (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008; Stokes et al., 2013). In her seminal article, Stokes (2005) argued forcefully and compellingly that the strategies adopted by political parties to condition the provision of resources on what individual voters have done at the ballot box entirely turns representation on its head, and "makes a mockery" of the notion of democratic accountability. Other scholars have espoused similar perspectives. In analyzing the polarized racial voting patterns in South Africa, Ferree (2010) demonstrates that South African voters are actively prevented from crossing the racial line by the negative framing strategies employed by the incumbent party.

However, there is a fundamental difference between these earlier approaches and the one presented here; These studies look to the parties' need to efficiently mobilize and compete against opposing parties to understand why they may actively undermine representation. I point to a different direction, one that looks to the dynamics *internal* to political parties, and the interlocking interests of the actors within them, to understand why democratic accountability can be undermined. In fact, my framework suggests that these within-party dynamics, rather than dynamics surrounding interparty competition may be more crucial to understand the representative behavior of politicians.

The "inner workings" of political parties has traditionally been an area of research that has not attracted the attention of political scientists working on new democracies. Scholars working on parties in the developing world have been detracted away by the difficulties in the acquisition of data on intraparty dynamics and processes, as well as the volatility and instability of the parties that emerged in the aftermath of transitions to democracy. Indeed, it seems entirely justified the raise the question of why researchers should care about what transpires inside organizations that will most likely fail to exist in one or two election cycles.

The implication of this oversight, however, is that we have failed to recognize the influence that one important intraparty process will have on structuring how politicians will come to regard their constituents: candidate selection. Candidate selection has featured prominently in the study on representation in the United States, with scholars pointing to how the differences in the composition of the selectorate and the electorate can lead to the polarization of legislators serving in congress and increase the propensity to serve the interests of the individuals or groups constituting the selectorate instead of their electors at large (Gerber and Morton, 1998; Bullock and Clinton, 2011; Hall and Snyder, 2015). But the importance of candidate selection transcends context, and is just as likely to affect the survival of politicians in new democracies as it does in more mature democracies of the west; so long as there is a meaningful level of stability in party competition in local elections (i.e. there exist party strongholds), party nominations will always constitute an important hurdle for politicians to clear in their quest for reelection. And when candidate selection is relevant, politicians are faced with cross pressures that would make them the servant of two masters: the voters and the selectorate. The findings outlined in the previous section suggests that the same dynamics observed in the US is indeed very much relevant to understand representation in its much younger counterparts across the world (Crisp et al., 2004; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2012).

Before ending, it is also worth noting an important implication of the framework presented here. The politicians in my account of unresponsiveness substituted their mandate to serve their constituents with service to the objectives of the party, and in particular, the party leader who exercised broad influence over the candidate selection process. However, this is likely to be related to the distinctive feature of parties in Sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps new democracies, where the party leader enjoys a disproportionate level of influence over the party organization vis-à-vis other actors or groups (such as other party elites, interests groups, and societal organization) that comprise the party. It is therefore possible and quite likely that the allegiance of representatives in other country or regional contexts will ultimately be determined by the question of who within the party controls the nominations (Schattschneider, 1942, 64); this authority may lie in the hands of elite business/financial interests that effectively funds the party (Gilens and Page, 2014; Bartels, 2016) or societal organizations that form organic linkages with party leaders to ensure that they play a big part in the party's nomination process (Poertner, N.d.). Regardless, the lesson to draw is that when the importance of candidate selection dominates that of the general election, the end result is that the representation of constituent interests will become secondary to serving the interests of the selectorate.

8.5 Responsiveness, Internal Party Democracy, and Democratic Consolidation

Democracy can be fragile. Where democratic institutions have not yet taken root, and respect for the norms of democratic governance has yet to be internalized, democracies can quickly fall back into the grip of political leaders who are all too eager to revoke the sovereignty

that was placed in the hands of citizens through decades of struggle against authoritarian dictators: prominent recent examples abound across regions, ranging from Burundi, Mali, and Burkina Faso in Africa, Venezuela and Nicuaragua in Latin America, and Thailand and the Philippines in South East Asia. (Bermeo, 2016; Kim, 2000). The only hope against the authoritarian tendencies of self-interested elites is the high level of trust and confidence that citizens still hold towards the principles of democratic self rule (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015; Levitsky and Way, 2015).

However, such high levels of citizen trust in democratic governance does not exist in a vacuum, and is likely to conditioned by perceptions of how democratic institutions are performing to deliver on its many promises. Popular disillusionment with the lack of representative government and responsive politicians—which is perhaps one of the most important raisons d'être of democracy—have the real potential to undermine the pillar that sustains the progress towards democratic consolidation in these fragile democracies.

From this perspective, the findings of this study paints a rather pessimistic picture of democracy's prospects in the developing world. Perceptions that the institutions of democracy are falling far short in fulfilling representative functions seems to be prevalent. Furthermore, these perceptions are likely to persist when political parties, who should are designated with the role of connecting citizens to the state, are the ones actively fomenting pressures to sever the connection between elected representatives and voters. Indeed, political parties, which were so integral for the transition to democracy in these countries, might potentially be planting the seed towards the unraveling of democracy.

Fundamentally, at the center of these finding lies the problem of intraparty democracy; it is the party leader's control over party nominations, and her ability to manipulate it so that politicians who partake in the selection process are subservient to their goals and objectives. The lack of democracy *within* parties may seem to many disconnected and of little relevance to the representation of citizen interests. In reality, however, it can compromise the effectiveness of electoral mechanisms that should guarantee that citizens needs are tended to by politicians.

These observations have clear policy implications; they imply that protagonists of democracy should be concerned with making sure that establishing democracy within political parties is a priority. Domestic and international actors, both governmental and non-governmental that promote democracy across the developing world have traditionally focused on regularizing and institutionalizing free and fair multiparty elections at the national level. While establishing credible interparty competition over executive office is indeed important, I argue that it is likely to be insufficient. Equally important is engaging political parties so as to make candidate selection institutions more democratic, transparent, and resilient to the capture of a small number of elites. Reforms to introduce primary elections are certainly a step in the right direction, as they force party leaders to work through primary voters to control the selection of candidates. But these effort should transcend the simple reform of the *method* of candidate selection; from adopting institutionalized mechanisms for leadership selection to establishing channels through which other actors can impose checks on the decision making of the leadership, what is necessary is for political parties to espouse the principles and ideals embodied in democracy.

Appendix A

Appendix

## A.1 Auxiliary Figures for Chapter 6: Primary Elections Analysis

Table A1: Endorsements and party nomination outcomes

Panel A (Full Sample)	*Outcome: Candidate Was Nominated*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Endorsed by Party	0.592***	0.388***	0.716***	0.627***
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.061)
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full
Candidate Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Electoral Controls	No	Yes	No	No
Constituency FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,491	1,490	1,491	1,490
R^2	0.139	0.310	0.204	0.239
Panel B (By Party)	*Outcome: Candidate Was Nominated*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Endorsed by Party	0.311***	0.524***	0.481***	0.748***
	(0.061)	(0.087)	(0.058)	(0.080)
Sample	Jubilee	Jubilee	ODM	ODM
Candidate Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Electoral Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,037	1,037	453	453
R^2	0.320	0.211	0.393	0.307

Note: Models are linear probability models, with robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$. The dependent variable is whether a candidate won the nomination, regardless of the selection

A.2 Auxiliary Figures for Chapter 6: Candidate Evaluation Experiment

Figure A.1: Effects of Party Leader Endorsements/Denouncements

Note: Pooled sample with both Jubilee and ODM primary voters. The figure reports point estimates for the mean of each treatment condition. The thick and thin lines represent 95 and 99% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The results survive the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR corrections at an FDR of 0.05.

Table A2: Heterogeneous Effects of Leader Endorsements/Denouncements

	Leader Endorsement Effect				Leader Denouncement Effect			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Linked Fate[a]	-0.090				-0.147*			
	(0.084)				(0.084)			
Linked Fate x Tr	0.253**				0.159			
	(0.105)				(0.116)			
Coethnic[b]		-0.501*				-0.635***		
		(0.200)				(0.219)		
Coethnic x Tr		0.402*				0.294		
		(0.231)				(0.255)		
Leader Approval[c]			-0.008				-0.037	
			(0.075)				(0.077)	
Approval x Tr			0.055				0.033	
			(0.104)				(0.113)	
Political Knowledge[d]				-0.005				0.000
				(0.080)				(0.079)
Knowledge x Tr				-0.000				-0.044
				(0.107)				(0.121)
Treatment	0.944***	0.656***	0.955***	0.944***	-0.663***	-0.885***	-0.654***	-0.649***
	(0.104)	(0.194)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.113)	(0.216)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Location FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Pooled (Jubilee + ODM)				Pooled (Jubilee + ODM)			
N	936	937	937	932	1002	1003	1003	1002
R^2	0.093	0.093	0.088	0.087	0.045	0.050	0.042	0.042

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

All variables except for dichotomous variables are standardized for the analyses.

[a] Linked fate is measured using the question "Do you think what happens to your party leader will affect what happens in your life? If yes, how much will it affect you?" Responses were recorded on a 4 point scale ranging from 1 (None) to 4 (Yes, a lot).

[b] A dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent was a coethnic of the party leader.

[c] Leader approval is measured using the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the party leader of [insert party name here] is handling his job? Responses were recorded on a standard 7 point likert scale.

[d] Coded based on an open-ended question asking the respondent to name the current MP of her constituency, as well as the MP's party affiliation. Low knowledge is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the respondent failed to correctly identify *both* the name *and* the party affiliation of the MP.

A.3   Auxiliary Figures for Chapter 6. Conjoint Analysis

Figure A.2: Effects of aspirant attributes on being preferred in primary elections

Note: Results from ODM (opposition) primary voters. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. The dots represent point estimates for the AMCEs while the bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Rows without any estimates represent the reference categories within each attribute.

Figure A.3: Effects of aspirant attributes on being preferred in primary elections

Note: Results from Jubilee (incumbent) primary voters. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. The dots represent point estimates for the AMCEs while the bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Rows without any estimates represent the reference categories within each attribute.

A.4 News Script for Chapter 6. Candidate Evaluation Experiment

News script for Experimental Treatment

English script

Anchor: This is the news in Brief from KRN. I am Beatrice [Okelo/Njoroge]. Today, aspiring candidate for Member of Parliament, John [Oduor/Mwangi], addressed a gathering of constituents to officially announce his intention to seek the [ODM/Jubilee] nomination for the 2017 elections. During the rally, he spoke of his political qualifications and urged voters to support him during the [ODM/Jubilee] primaries scheduled for early next year.

Candidate: I am a proud member of this community and have served this community for many years. But our current leaders have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises and we have had enough. Today, I am announcing my intention to run for MP on an [ODM/Jubilee] party ticket. I ask party members and voters of [Kisumu/Nakuru] to support my candidacy in the [ODM/Jubilee] primaries as well as the general elections in 2017.

Anchor: By throwing his name into the mix, Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi] enters an already crowded field of candidates for the [ODM/Jubilee] ticket. Many see the [ODM/Jubilee]] ticket as guaranteeing the MP seat in an area dominated by [Jubilee/ODM].

Performance Dimension
(1) Candidate Performance High: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi] is well-known for his strong record of involvement in the constituency's development initiatives, including his major donations to the school and classroom renovation initiative as well as his financial assistance for constituents who cannot afford to pay for medical bills.

(2) Candidate Performance Low: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi], is a newcomer to the political scene, with only a limited record of involvement in the constituency's community-driven development initiatives, to which many constituents expect aspiring politicians to make significant donations.

Endorsement Dimension
(1) Leader Endorsement: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s campaign is hopeful that primary voters will choose him as the [ODM/Jubilee] candidate, given Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s strong relationship with [ODM party leader Raila Odinga/Jubilee party leader Uhuru Kenyatta]. [Raila Odinga/Uhuru Kenyatta] is known to be strongly supportive of Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s candidacy and his dedication to [ODM/Jubilee].

(2) MCA Endorsement: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s campaign is hopeful that primary voters will

choose him as the [ODM/Jubilee] candidate, given Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s strong relationship with local [ODM MCAs/Jubilee MCAs]. Many local MCAs are known to be strongly supportive of Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s candidacy, and his dedication to [ODM/Jubilee].

(3) Leader Denouncement: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s campaign dismissed concerns that he has had a falling out with party leader [Raila Odinga/Uhuru Kenyatta]. Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi] was noticeably missing from events attended by [Raila Odinga/Uhuru Kenyatta] during his recent visit to [Kisumu/Nakuru]. Mr. [Odinga/Kenyatta] is known to be highly skeptical of Mr. [Oduor/ Mwangi]'s candidacy and his dedication to [ODM/Jubilee].

(4) MCA Denouncement: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s campaign dismissed concerns that he has had a falling out with local [ODM MCAs/Jubilee MCAs]. Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi] was noticeably missing from [ODM/ Jubilee] county party events. Many [ODM MCAs/Jubilee MCAs] are known to be highly skeptical of Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s candidacy and his dedication to [ODM/Jubilee].

(5) No Endorsement/Denouncement: Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi]'s campaign commented that while the [ODM/Jubilee] primaries are very competitive, their candidate?s credentials will be most appealing to the voters.

Anchor: The early announcement of Mr. [Oduor/Mwangi] for the [ODM/Jubilee] party ticket highlights how competitive the party primaries are expected to be.

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