

UC Irvine
CSD Working Papers

Title

Inequality in Political Participation: Contemporary Patterns in European Countries

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3545w14v>

Author

Gallego, Aina

Publication Date

2007-01-08

CSD Center for the Study of Democracy

An Organized Research Unit
University of California, Irvine
www.democ.uci.edu

Various different aspects related to the social position of individuals, such as education, gender, or age, are elements present in any standard model to explain political participation. The fact that those from advantaged backgrounds participate to a larger extent in politics is indeed one of the most consistent findings of empirical research (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2002; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Norris 2002; Parry, Moyser and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). However, the differences attributable to social stratification factors can vary between countries, over time, or depending on the political activity we focus on. Recent literature has argued in different ways that some of the classical patterns of inequality in political participation are changing. This has been examined for demonstrations (Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001), emerging repertoires of political action (Stolle and Hooghe 2005) or turnout (Caul 2005).

Hence, it is the central aim of this paper to examine which characteristics related to the social position of individuals influence the levels of political participation in Europe nowadays, in the light of the debate about societal change. Beyond offering a broad picture of that question, the second aim is to assess critically whether the differences are widespread and consistent enough to be considered inequalities in political participation. Thirdly, it is necessary to distinguish between different political activities in order to establish if the differences follow general patterns or are mode specific.

Inequality in Political Participation and its Main Sources

In comparison with the more frequent concept of political inequality, the terms participatory inequality (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1999) or inequality in political participation are more specific and limited. Political inequality may comprise such phenomena as legal discrimination and limitation of citizenship rights, but the latter refers more precisely to the fact that, while in legal and formal terms political equality is a widespread fact, the effective use of the political right to take part in politics is stratified in a way that closely corresponds to lines of social stratification such as gender, income, or education. In addition, the concept of participatory distortion (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), which focuses on the representativity of the activists, has a similar sense.

Systematic inequalities in political participation might in turn bias the political process in favour of the better situated creating a vicious circle where political and social inequalities reinforce each other (Verba 2004). This is why the fact that the least advantaged take part less in politics also has normative implications. While formal political equality is considered one of the main characteristics of a democratic system, this democratic ideal may be systematically infringed in substantial terms (Dahl 1989; Pateman 1970; Phillips 1999; Young 2002). Because it is heavily loaded, inequality is a

term which needs to be used carefully to point out that the differences in the level of participation are widespread, operate systematically to the detriment of the same group and are not merely a sporadic or inconsistent finding.

Many dimensions related to the social position of individuals that are frequent in the literature on participation can be considered sources of inequality. Indeed, patterns of social and participatory inequality tend to overlap. Among the most frequently analyzed are education, income, social class, gender, and age. The common logic underpinning many explanations of their effect is a resource and costs based one: socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics affect the acquisition of resources which lower the costs of taking part in politics (Parry, Moyser and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). This explanation is consistent with both the sociological and the individual rationality frameworks to explain political participation (Clarke et al. 2004). In addition, these individual characteristics determine the level of other relevant factors such as political attitudes or network centrality and in general shape the citizens' life experiences and opportunities. Importantly, the causal relations between structural factors and participation are shaped not only in a direct, but also in indirect and reciprocal ways (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

While inequality in political participation is a classical question in political science, there are reasons to claim that it is necessary to examine carefully actual patterns in advanced societies. Indeed, it is a recurrent argument in recent literature in social science that we are in a period of change –economic, social and political. The main features and causes cited for these changes are the shift into service and knowledge oriented economies characterized by their global scope and the growing importance of new technologies (Castells 1996), the detraditionalization of life styles and the changing role of women (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), the restructuring of the welfare state, the flexibilization of the labour market (Carnoy 2001; Sennett 1998) or the growing importance of international migrations (Bauman 2004; Sassen 1999).

These transformations have had an impact on the social stratification structure. On the one hand, they have affected the classical patterns of inequality typical of industrial societies, reducing or reshaping gender inequalities, profoundly altering the class structure or increasing the critical importance of education for social mobility. On the other hand, the stratification patterns are becoming more complex and disadvantage is ever more understood as a multidimensional phenomenon (Atkinson 2003; Begg and Berghman 2002; Byrne 1999; Percy-Smith 2000).

In fact, a number of recent studies point out that parallel to societal transformations, much has changed since seminal studies such as those of Verba, Kim and Nie (1978) or Barnes and Kaase (1979) established that in Europe the socio-economic biases for turnout and conventional participation were limited because of the mobilization exerted by left-wing parties and trade unions over the working class, but important with regard to gender, or that participation in protest activities was mainly biased by gender, age, and education.

Firstly, it has been repeatedly found that the gender gap has been closing or even reversing for most political activities, including turnout, protest, or new forms of participation such as political consumerism (Dalton 2002; Micheletti, Follesdal and Stolle 2004; Norris 2002). However, this does not clearly hold for conventional activities. Secondly, educational attainment is the most widespread socio-economic source of inequality in participation. Even though in the past the educational biases in turnout have been limited or inexistent in Europe (Norris 2002; Oppenhuis 1983; Topf 1995a), recent research has shown that they are becoming relevant for this form of

participation, which has been traditionally considered as the most egalitarian (Caul 2005). Thirdly, in recent decades some authors have claimed that class no longer retains its capacity to shape politics (Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001).

Another line of research has focused on differences among the modes of participation, stating that there are divergent patterns depending on the activity we focus on. On the one hand, it has recently been shown that demonstrators today are more representative of the population than they used to be, even if education and age still play a role in this respect (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). New forms of political participation, which typically imply lower costs and more options to shift in and out, have also shown potential to include previously excluded groups such as women or young people (Stolle and Hooghe 2005). Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between different forms of participation, which can be expected to follow dissimilar patterns.

On the other side, there are other factors that have not been widely studied in Europe because their importance has become more visible only in recent years. Two of them are multiculturalism and the end of the full-employment society which are thus included in the analysis.

On the one hand, being a member of an ethnic minority and/or not having the citizenship of one's country of residence might have an impact on participation¹. There are several reasons why we can expect these characteristics to affect the level of political participation. Beyond legal barriers to voting, in some countries migrants in an irregular situation are also excluded from other political activities. Additionally, we can expect both positive and negative effects on non electoral political participation: on the one hand, small groups might face the risk of political marginalisation because of their low levels of political interest, identification with political institutions, language proficiency, social capital, and socio-economic status (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Jacobs and Tillie 2004). However, ethnicity is also potentially a mobilizable political resource (Crowley 2001) which might foster participation: for example, since the study of Verba and Nie (1972) much research in the US has shown that organization and mobilization efforts on an ethnic basis are even able to counteract the effects on political participation of socio-economic inequalities embedded in ethnicity.

On the other hand, economic changes, deregulation of the labour market, and the loss of power of the trade unions have led to increasing unemployment and the growing importance of forms of employment contracts that differ from the unlimited contract. The situation of the labour market stands in sharp contrast to that of the so-called full-employment society, characterised by linear and predictable contractual relations, which functioned as the basis of social inclusion (Castel 2003). Instead, the growing flexibility of the labour market leads to substantial transformations at the individual and societal level and especially a strong sense of uncertainty towards the future (Sennett 1998). Additionally, job temporality creates a horizontal segmentation of the labour market, with dissimilar working and wage conditions for similar jobs, and is thus a new form of

¹ Being a member of an ethnic minority or not being a citizen of one's country of residence are different situations which are not directly comparable. However, the frequency of these characteristics in the population varies markedly across countries, as well as the specific characteristics of ethnic minorities and immigrants, which makes cross-national analysis difficult. It is here understood that the fact of being a minority -because of ethnicity or because of migration- implies similar kinds of disadvantages which can be politically relevant. For the analysis of turnout, only members of ethnic minorities who are eligible to vote are included.

inequality (Polavieja 2003). We can find three different hypotheses with respect to the possible effects of these situations on the individual level of political participation: on the one hand dissatisfaction with one's own employment situation can lead either to political radicalisation and an increased protest potential or a withdrawal of political activity due to political frustration and apathy as well as a low sense of political efficacy (Polavieja 2003). Both effects are generally consistent with relative deprivation approaches (Gurr 1970). A third hypothesis is that the relationship may be spurious and that different participation levels are attributable to classical structural factors such as age, gender or income, intertwined with employment situations.

Data and Methods

The second wave of the European Social Survey² undertaken in 2004 covers 24 countries and assures high quality in terms of the data collection as well as good standards of comparability (Stoop, Jowell and Mohler 2002). For various reasons two of the countries were excluded. France had to be left out of the analysis because of measurement problems in the occupational scale, while the number of observations for Iceland (579) is insufficient to apply logistic regression. Thus, 22 countries have been included in the analysis. Logistic regression has been applied with special attention to the frequency and direction of significant coefficients.

Summary measures in each table indicate whether the relationships between the dependent and independent variables are widespread and consistent enough to be considered sources of participatory inequality. Firstly, the overall number of countries with significant coefficients is given as a measure of frequency. The second column gives the percentage of significant coefficients that are in the expected direction.

Political participation

Following the logic underpinning much research on political participation, this paper relies on the hypothesis that there are underlying modes of political participation (Parry, Moyser and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Four political activities will be analysed which are commonly considered as representative of four different modes of participation. The reason for observing single activities instead of additive indexes is that there are limited indicators about political participation in the second wave of the European Social Survey and that the underlying patterns observed among them vary between countries. The latter is particularly true in Eastern countries. Beyond voting the three non-electoral activities chosen are the following: working for a political party or a citizen action group is taken as a typical, conventional activity; attending peaceful demonstrations as a proxy for political protest; and having boycotted products for ethical, political, or environmental reasons is taken as an act of political consumerism. Voting is measured as having voted in the last general elections while respondents were asked about participation in the other actions within the last twelve months prior to the interview.

The following table makes it clear that there are very important differences in the level of participation in the countries examined. Measurement problems arise due to the fact that, in some countries, the non-electoral activities are rare events, and that

² The European Social Survey is distributed by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. For a full description of the data set, see www.europeansocialsurvey.org

makes logistic regression results unreliable (King and Zeng 2001). It has been chosen not to include those countries where less than 3% of the population has participated in the observed activities. That is, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, and Portugal were excluded from the analysis for work in political parties and action groups, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia for demonstrations and Slovenia, Portugal, and Ukraine for boycotts³.

Table 1: Valid % of the population who reported participating

	Vote*	Work party	Demonstration	Boycott
Austria	81,4	10,6	6,6	19,6
Belgium	91,5	3,9	6,5	9,9
Czech Rep	55,8	3,1	3,4	6,9
Switzerland	67,0	7,0	8,8	24,9
Germany	81,1	3,2	8,5	21,9
Denmark	91,6	4,6	5,4	28,3
Estonia	59,4	2,4	2,0	4,2
Spain	81,8	7,4	34,0	14,0
Finland	79,1	4,3	2,0	29,3
Great Britain	68,1	2,2	3,7	20,6
Greece	90,4	6,1	5,0	5,1
Hungary	77,7	0,9	1,6	5,2
Ireland	80,5	4,7	5,9	10,9
Luxembourg	72,3	4,5	14,8	14,2
Netherlands	82,4	3,8	4,4	8,3
Norway	85,6	8,5	10,6	23,5
Poland	64,6	2,7	1,6	5,0
Portugal	71,6	1,7	3,5	2,1
Sweden	89,1	3,3	7,5	34,8
Slovenia	68,7	3,0	1,6	2,2
Slovakia	74,3	2,9	3,7	11,5
Ukraine	84,9	3,6	21,7	1,8

*Valid % of those allowed to vote in last general election

Source: European Social Survey 04

Inequalities in Turnout

As was pointed out, it has been long assumed that unlike in the US, socio-economic factors and especially education have little or no effect on turnout in Europe (Norris 2002; Oppenhuis 1983; Topf 1995a), probably as Verba, Kim, and Junn noted (1978) due to the class-based group mobilization exerted by left-wing parties and trade unions. However, recent evidence has shown that some European democracies are approaching the sharp biases found in the US (Caul 2005), which may be partly attributable to the lower turnout of those working class citizens who are not members of organizations. This is the first important question to examine. The data show that in most European countries –16 out of 22- education has a significant positive effect on the probability of voting even while controlling for other status variables, while for income this occurs in 13 of them⁴. In all cases the direction of the coefficient is consistent.

³ Additionally, rare event logistic regressions software (Tomz, King, and Zeng 1999) has been applied to check the validity of the results for logistic regressions in those countries with less than 5% of positive answers. In all cases, the direction of the coefficients and the levels of significance remained unchanged.

⁴ The operationalization of the structural indicators is detailed in appendix 1.

Table 2: Inequalities in turnout. 22 European countries

	AUST	BELG	SWITZER	GERM	LUXEM	NETHL	DENMK	FINLAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	GB	IRELAND	SPAIN
<i>Woman</i>	-0,103	0,075	-0,297	-0,471**	-0,12	0,113	-0,408	0,276*	-0,427*	-0,004	0,17	0,159	-0,226
<i>Age (10)</i>	1,223**	1,530**	0,746**	0,340**	0,283**	0,254**	1,974**	0,315	1,304**	-0,258	0,580**	1,672**	0,209**
<i>Age squared</i>	-0,103**	-0,130**	-0,045*	0,001**	-0,000**	-0,000**	-0,158**	0,015	-0,086**	0,055	0,001**	-0,108**	-0,000**
<i>Years edu</i>	1,785**	0,784	0,767*	2,458**	0,907*	2,130**	1,630*	1,947**	2,103**	1,700**	-0,176	1,126*	0,218
<i>Income</i>	0,811*	0,627	1,173**	1,332**	1,712**	0,717*	0,079	0,797**	0,802*	1,158**	0,852**	0,873*	0,678
<i>Owner</i>	0,138	-0,385	0,353	0,02	0,129	0,804*	0,65	0,026	0,055	-0,179	0,743**	0,785*	0,033
<i>Service</i>	-0,09	-0,31	0,292	1,036**	0,696*	0,431*	1,066**	0,324	0,172	0,269	0,778**	0,459*	0,865**
<i>Non manual</i>	-0,32	-0,042	-0,337	0,529*	1,293**	0,237	0,498	0,137	0,218	0,268	0,115	0,058	0,372
<i>Man qualif</i>	-0,269	-0,463	-0,682**	0,068	0,068	0,294	-0,045	0,349	-0,237	-0,487	0,207	0,189	-0,015
<i>Minority</i>	-0,535	-1,751**	-0,537	-0,064	-1,021*	-0,750*	-2,225**	-0,069	-0,751	-0,655	0,047	-0,72	-1,179*
<i>Temporary</i>	-0,511	0,623	-0,594	-0,396	0,922*	-0,24	0,421	-0,514*	-0,258	-0,316	-0,204	-0,556	-0,166
<i>Unemployed</i>	-0,477	-0,327	-0,439	-0,620**	0,625	-0,877**	-0,549	-0,127	-1,241**	-0,555	-0,306	-0,910*	-0,454
<i>Inactive</i>	-0,285	-0,783*	0,289	0,117	0,475*	-0,094	-0,295	0,073	-0,466*	-0,401	-0,293	-0,364	-0,198
<i>N</i>	1104	1291	1448	2007	779	1576	1218	1757	1571	1673	1410	1636	958
<i>Nagelk. R2</i>	0,11	0,129	0,167	0,229	0,18	0,122	0,25	0,144	0,189	0,084	0,215	0,272	0,078

	GREECE	PORTUG	CZECH	ESTONIA	HUNGAR	POLAND	SLOVENIA	SLOVAKIA	UKRAINE	ALL	Frequency	Direction
<i>Woman</i>	0,146	-0,236	-0,087	0,081	0,570**	-0,331*	-0,141	-0,390*	0,191	-0,059	6	67
<i>Age (10)</i>	2,466**	1,673**	0,353**	0,581**	1,053**	1,340**	0,401**	0,331**	1,964**	0,253**	20	100
<i>Age squared</i>	-0,235**	-0,133**	-0,000**	-0,036	-0,066*	-0,100**	0,001**	0,001**	-0,154**	0,000**	-	-
<i>Years edu</i>	-0,635	1,747**	1,965**	1,771**	1,290*	1,602**	1,665**	0,151	0,736	0,716**	16	100
<i>Income</i>	-0,161	0,36	-0,192	2,043**	1,366*	0,52	1,265**	-0,086	-2,306	0,196**	13	100
<i>Owner</i>	1,082**	0,205	0,417	0,534	19,504	0,478*	0,034	-0,047	-0,285	0,311**	5	100
<i>Service</i>	1,296**	0,512	0,476**	0,515*	0,477	0,36	-0,037	0,907**	0,142	0,687**	11	100
<i>Non manual</i>	0,713*	0,176	0,596**	0,588**	-0,304	0,385	-0,206	0,202	-0,549*	0,211**	6	83
<i>Man qualif</i>	0,471	0,342	0,328*	0,205	-0,237	0,259	-0,188	0,074	-0,463	0,091	2	50
<i>Minority</i>	-2,637**	-0,925	0,105	-0,837**	0,158	0,024	0,282	-0,079	-0,825*	-0,637**	8	100
<i>Temporary</i>	-0,284	-0,912**	-0,04	0,345	-0,286	0,099	-0,244	0,121	-1,475**	-0,352**	4	75
<i>Unemployed</i>	-0,072	-0,286	-0,182	-0,211	-0,653*	0,072	-0,49	0,071	0,166	-0,589**	5	100
<i>Inactive</i>	-0,589	0,016	-0,027	0,026	-0,696	-0,158	0,094	-0,071	-0,767**	-0,209**	4	75
<i>N</i>	1511	1061	1827	1353	1163	1272	1000	842	1362	31616		
<i>Nagelk. R2</i>	0,232	0,153	0,13	0,158	0,206	0,164	0,163	0,125	0,259	0,089		

* Significant at the 0,05 level, ** Significant at the 0,005 level. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients

Source: European Social Survey 2004-2005

Additionally, their effects tend to overlap and in most cases when income is significant so is education. On the contrary, neither is significant in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Slovakia, and Ukraine. On the other hand, in comparison with unskilled manual workers, members of service class households are noticeably more likely to vote, but the pattern does not hold so clearly for other social class categories.

Much research has shown that age has the most important impact on electoral turnout. Young people vote substantially less even after controlling for other factors (Anduiza 1999; Dalton 2002; Caul 2005; Norris 2002; Oppenhuis 1983; Topf 1995a). The results effectively confirm the generalized importance of age. The significance of the age squared variable means that the predominant pattern has a curvilinear shape, i.e. middle-aged persons vote at the highest rates. The sole exceptions are Sweden and Finland where the relationship is not significant.

Additionally, we find once more that the gender gap has nearly vanished in most European countries. Moreover, where being a woman alters the probability of voting this happens in a contradictory direction: positive for Finland and Hungary and negative for Germany, Norway, Poland, and Slovakia.

Belonging to an ethnic minority reduces the probability of voting in eight countries. This fact cannot be attributed to their lack of voting rights because only eligible voters are included in the analysis. The strength of the effect varies across countries. Finally, research has shown that the unemployed are less likely to vote (Rosenstone 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). However, according to our data the effect of these factors in Europe is only limited, and holds in approximately one quarter of the countries. Unemployed citizens vote at substantially lower rates in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, and Hungary. The direction of the coefficients goes however in the expected directions with those who are in situations differing from work with an unlimited contract, voting generally at lower rates. The only exception is Luxembourg, where temporarily employed workers work more frequently than those with unlimited contract.

In general, age, high education, high income, and being member of service class households emerge as the most widespread predictors of turnout. On the other side, the strength of the coefficients for all countries taken together is bigger for age, education, service class, being member of an ethnic minority and being unemployed. Interestingly, gender is not even significant at the aggregate level.

Inequalities in Work with Parties or Action Groups

This section analyses the effect of the structural variables on the probability to work for a political party or an action group, which is considered as a typical conventional activity. Conventional non-electoral participation has been repeatedly found to be a political activity which shows gender and age differences (Marsh and Kaase 1979; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) and there is no clear evidence towards a reduction (Morales 2004). The results only partially confirm the persistence of a gender gap in respect of working for parties or action groups. In 8 out of 22 countries, the coefficients are negative and significant. Similarly, age is a significant predictor in only half of the countries and its effect has a curvilinear shape except in the Netherlands and Finland.

Previous research has shown that education also fosters activity, while income has more limited effects. This is only approximately confirmed according to our data. All else being constant, in 7 countries education increases the probability of working for political parties or action groups.

Table 3: Inequalities in work for political parties or action groups. 17 European countries

PARTY	AUST	BELG	SWITZ	GERM	LUXEM	NETHER	DENM	FINLAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN
<i>Woman</i>	-0,663**	-0,222	-0,202	-0,763**	-0,302	-0,735*	-0,574	-0,200	-0,400*	-0,603*
<i>Age (10)</i>	1,098**	2,463**	1,008*	0,013	-0,018	0,408**	2,292**	0,944*	0,478	-0,022
<i>Age squared</i>	-0,112**	-0,252**	-0,085*	0,000	0,000	0,001	-0,218**	-0,079	-0,046	0,010
<i>Years edu</i>	-0,021	0,799	0,564	1,086	-0,037	2,586**	1,331*	0,743	1,530**	0,278
<i>Income</i>	-0,328	0,879	-0,285	0,280	0,843	1,392*	-0,531	-0,615	0,037	-0,121
<i>Owner</i>	0,704	-0,465	1,741**	-0,196	0,370	0,036	0,462	0,103	0,067	-0,062
<i>Service</i>	0,919**	0,123	1,086*	0,874*	0,661	-0,747	0,773	0,525	-0,137	0,539
<i>Non manual</i>	0,422	-0,917	0,147	0,286	-0,083	-0,799	0,175	0,232	-0,196	-0,378
<i>Man qualif</i>	0,504	-0,237	0,266	-0,043	1,117*	-1,680	-1,484	0,207	-0,547	-0,813
<i>Minority</i>	-0,086	0,782	-0,441	-0,286	0,371	-18,046	0,674	0,947	0,128	0,524
<i>Temporary</i>	0,696	0,975	-0,390	0,616	0,469	0,324	1,118*	-0,006	0,160	-0,032
<i>Unemployed</i>	0,200	-0,144	0,551	0,790	-1,840	0,547	1,433**	-0,222	-0,150	0,246
<i>Inactive</i>	0,320	0,033	-0,222	0,543	0,093	-1,339**	0,793*	-0,017	-0,154	0,068
<i>N</i>	1227	1361	1671	2153	951	1625	1281	1845	1704	1803
<i>Nagelk. R2</i>	0,074	0,095	0,088	0,069	0,052	0,166	0,131	0,030	0,045	0,044

	GREECE	IRELAND	SPAIN	CZECH	SLOVENIA	SLOVAKIA	UKRAINE	ALL	Frequency	Direction
<i>Woman</i>	-0,728**	-0,308	-0,684*	-0,795**	-0,568	-0,439	-0,596	-0,603**	8	100
<i>Age (10)</i>	2,005**	0,361	0,093	0,145	0,722	0,402**	-0,304	0,005	8	100
<i>agesq</i>	-0,184**	-0,020	0,000	-0,001	-0,060	0,001**	0,034	0,000		
<i>Years edu</i>	-0,301	0,622	0,988*	2,039*	2,098**	3,537**	2,957**	0,953**	7	100
<i>Income</i>	-0,188	-0,118	0,302	-0,651	-0,367	-0,180	115,912	0,102	1	100
<i>Owner</i>	0,368	1,093*	0,214	0,300	1,336*	-0,996	-1,545	0,377**	3	100
<i>Service</i>	1,104*	0,631	-0,044	0,266	0,275	-0,609	0,845	0,592**	4	100
<i>Non manual</i>	1,094**	0,970*	-0,559	0,037	-0,150	-1,832	1,259*	0,234*	3	100
<i>Man qualif</i>	0,795*	-0,589	-0,354	-0,417	0,109	-0,036	0,387	-0,001	2	100
<i>Minority</i>	-1,138	-1,925	-0,417	0,457	-17,797	0,186	-0,405	-0,311	0	
<i>Temporary</i>	-0,617	0,470	0,356	0,471	0,765	-0,924	-1,340	0,139	1	0
<i>Unemployed</i>	-0,953	-0,805	-0,607	-17,508	0,552	-0,389	-0,647	-0,272	1	0
<i>Inactive</i>	-0,133	-0,185	-0,239	0,103	0,961*	-0,456	-0,750	-0,002	3	33
<i>N</i>	1582	1638	1016	1881	1035	872	1413	33704		
<i>Nagelk. R2</i>	0,100	0,051	0,060	0,075	0,106	0,159	0,128	0,041		

* Significant at the 0,05 level, ** Significant at the 0,005 level. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients

Source: European Social Survey 2004-2005

Importantly, the effects are more visible in Eastern countries whereas apart from them education is only significant in Spain, the Netherlands, and Norway. Hence, education is not the most widespread source of participatory inequality. In turn, we find that income has a significant effect in only one country which is the Netherlands.

For these activities, social class has a very limited influence. The country where this influence is most visible is Greece. There, being a member of the service, non manual, or skilled manual class, increases the likelihood of working for a party when compared to unskilled manual workers' households.

Finally, being a member of an ethnic minority or a non-citizen and being unemployed or employed precariously have practically no significant effect. In Denmark however, both unemployed citizens and those who have a limited contract are more prone to work for parties.

When all the countries are analysed together it can be seen that women still participate at lower rates even if the coefficient is not large. On the contrary, age does not pose a significant difference, whereas education is the most powerful single predictor. On the other side, while members of manual workers' households participate less frequently than members of other social classes, there are no important differences related to the income level, belonging to minorities, and employment status. These results confirm the patterns found in the single countries. It can be thus ruled out that those results are due to an insufficient number of cases in each analysis. They seem to point out that the inequalities in this form of participation are less important and widespread than could be expected. However, when differences are present they are consistent with the hypothesized direction of the disadvantage.

Inequalities in Demonstrations

In the seminal study by Barnes and Kaase (1979) it was established that several socio-economic and socio demographic factors do affect participation in protest activities. Young people, highly educated, and well-off citizens were more prone to be active, while in some but not all of the countries, women were less likely to take part. In recent decades however, according to some authors these differences are not large (Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005; Topf 1995b; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001) even if important differences due to age and educational attainment do persist. Therefore, these recent studies have claimed that protest has not only become a legitimised tool of political action, but its social diffusion has implied a normalization of the demonstrators' characteristics.

In fact, the data confirm that gender inequalities in demonstrations have almost vanished, and are only significant in Belgium and Portugal. Age only matters in seven of the observed countries, with young citizens having higher probabilities of taking part. In turn, education continues to be a relevant factor in 10 of the 18 observed countries. It is therefore, the variable which has the most generalized explanatory capacity on participation in this activity. On the contrary, while income has a significant impact in almost half of the countries, it does so in a contradictory way. In four of them, the coefficient is positive (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, and Portugal) while also in four cases it is negative (Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Slovakia). Social class variables have an even more limited impact and in contrary directions. That is, taking unskilled manual workers' households as a reference category, when there are significant differences due to class they are country specific and not generalised.

Table 4: Inequalities in demonstrations. 18 European countries

	AUST	BELG	SWITZ	GERM	LUXEM	NETHERL	DENM	NORWAY	SWEDEN	GB	IRELAND
Woman	-0,061	-0,802**	-0,162	-0,271	-0,155	-0,078	0,169	0,143	0,315	0,024	-0,272
Age (10)	-0,341**	-0,216*	-0,176**	0,002	-0,001	0,204*	-0,282**	-0,08	0,05	0,002	-0,08
Years edu	3,362**	0,792	1,714**	2,150**	0,993*	1,350*	0,314	1,761**	0,932	1,474	0,918
Income	-1,157*	1,421**	0,012	-1,215**	1,410*	0,976	-0,074	-0,129	-0,881*	0,854	0,046
Owner	-0,428	-1,431	-0,234	-0,361	1,151*	-0,973	-1,348	0,308	-1,036	1,179	-0,489
Service	-1,162**	0,034	0,01	-0,106	0,251	-0,793*	-0,179	0,352	-0,319	1,124	-0,267
Non manual	-0,831*	0,362	-0,222	-0,028	0,568	-0,998*	0,479	0,483	0,069	1,546*	-0,518
Man qualif	-2,136*	-0,608	-0,538	-0,368	1,102**	-0,663	-0,841	0,536	-0,027	0,562	-1,014*
Minority	0,072	1,153**	-0,037	-0,661	-1,418*	0,321	0,888	0,971**	0,977*	0,232	-0,123
Temporary	0,524	-0,709	0,426	0,296	0,107	0,239	0,67	0,194	0,091	0,194	-2,91
Unemployed	-0,292	-0,042	0,654	0,148	-0,547	-0,603	0,666	-0,099	0,078	-1,053	-2,385
Inactive	0,397	0,131	-0,201	-0,04	-0,228	-1,279**	0,253	-0,248	-0,543*	0,459	-0,321
N	1228	1361	1670	2152	950	1625	1281	1704	1803	1470	1634
Nagelk. R2	0,175	0,113	0,079	0,06	0,09	0,081	0,078	0,072	0,048	0,067	0,051

	SPAIN	GREECE	PORT	CZECH	ESTONIA	SLOVAK	UKRAINE	ALL	Frequency	Direction
Woman	0,268	0,478	-1,483*	0,053	0,213	-0,636	-0,064	-0,084*	2	100
Age (10)	0,004	-0,09	-0,522**	0	0,022	0,005	-0,290**	0,001	7	86
Years edu	1,742**	1,090*	1,987	2,119*	1,086	0,445	0,827*	1,567**	10	100
Income	0,327	1,477**	2,422*	0,008	-1,191	-4,577*	-2,241	-0,304**	8	50
Owner	-0,325	-0,519	0,321	0,853	0,36	-0,184	-0,279	-0,497**	1	100
Service	0,08	0,598	0,615	-0,586	0,6	0,03	0,065	-0,264**	2	0
Non manual	-0,016	0,37	1,224	-0,181	-0,83	0,561	-0,254	-0,317**	3	33
Man qualif	0,002	0,751	1,452	0,754*	0,671	0,036	-0,500*	-0,486**	4	50
Minority	-1,206**	-1,229	-17,876	1,287**	0,249	-17,868	-0,898*	-0,371**	7	43
Temporary	-0,238	-0,558	-0,161	-1,393	1,303*	-0,268	0,05	0,064	1	0
Unemployed	0,047	-0,603	0,464	-0,178	0,174	-1,185	-0,246	-0,179*	0	-
Inactive	-0,341	-0,426	2,014**	-0,541	-0,281	-1,142*	-0,025	-0,101*	4	75
N	1015	1583	1117	1866	1538	870	1408	33680		
Nagelk. R2	0,165	0,13	0,268	0,055	0,058	0,09	0,094	0,033		

* Significant at the 0,05 level, ** Significant at the 0,005 level. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients

Source: European Social Survey 2004-2005

Members of ethnic minorities and non-citizens have divergent probabilities of participating in seven of the observed countries: the coefficient is positive and significant in Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and the Czech Republic, while negative in Luxemburg, Spain, and Ukraine, suggesting some kind of ethnic specific mobilization process in the former countries. On the contrary, temporary and unemployed workers do not differ significantly in the probability of their demonstrating compared with those who have an unlimited contract. Inactive citizens are more prone to protest in Portugal, but less prone to do so in the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovakia.

Finally, when we look at the aggregate results, gender has a significant but very small effect, and age and precarious employment are not significant. Education is the single strongest predictor. The variables that are related to occupation show a complicated overall pattern: on the one hand, all else constant, citizens with lower income and of non-qualified manual worker's households participate more often in demonstrations. At the same time, unemployed and inactive citizens participate less often.

Inequalities in Boycotts

Research on politically motivated consumption activities has a shorter tradition than that on the other modes of political activity. Indeed, in recent decades these activities have gone from being marginal to being a fairly widespread practice (Norris 2002). As to the individual determinants of such activities, it has been found that they are fostered mostly by the level of education. Another major finding is that these are the only activities in which the gender gap has reversed its sign in many European countries (Micheletti 2003). The last fact poses a theoretically relevant question about how to interpret gender differences. If they favour women in some cases, these differences are not to be considered as gender inequalities, but are better understood as gender specific patterns of behaviours.

These aspects are only partially confirmed in our analysis on engagement in boycotts. On the one hand, higher levels of education increase the probability of consuming for political reasons in all observed European countries but Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland. Women however take part more frequently only in three Scandinavian countries and Germany, while in Greece they are less likely to do so. It seems that the gender gap has only reversed in some northern European countries. In addition, income has restricted effects as it is only influential in Belgium and Great Britain. Age is a significant variable in only six of the observed countries.

In about one third of the countries being a member of a service class or a non-manual household is also a factor that increases the probability of taking part compared to belonging to an unskilled manual class. However, the importance of social class is clearly concentrated in a few countries: Switzerland, Germany, and Luxemburg.

On the other hand, where the relationship is significant for ethnic minorities – only in two countries-, it has a contradictory sign. Similarly, being in other situations than a worker with an unlimited contract affects participation in boycotts in a limited and undefined way.

Overall, it can be stated that educational level is the only really widespread determinant of participation in boycott activities. However, when we look at the aggregate level it is striking that the coefficient for income is even bigger than that of education. On the other side, manual workers are in general less prone to join in boycotts than members of other social classes, and service class members have the

Table 5: Inequalities in boycotts. 19 European countries

	AUST	BELG	SWITZ	GERM	LUXEM	NETHER	DENM	FINLAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	GB
<i>Woman</i>	-0,093	-0,197	-0,114	0,238*	0,117	0,127	0,359*	0,574**	-0,046	0,373**	0,011
<i>Age (10)</i>	0,371	-0,068	0,464*	-0,039	0,002	-0,023	0,460	-0,301	0,186	0,595**	0,223**
<i>Age squared</i>	-0,044	0,001	-0,046*	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,054*	0,013	-0,034	-0,072**	0,000**
<i>Years edu</i>	1,851**	0,472	1,820**	1,440**	0,728	1,000*	1,683**	1,544**	2,071**	0,873**	2,004**
<i>Income</i>	0,154	1,006*	0,039	0,284	0,561	-0,331	0,292	0,161	0,098	-0,356	0,910**
<i>Owner</i>	-0,116	0,473	0,975**	1,034**	1,859**	0,663	0,112	0,088	-0,035	0,037	0,317
<i>Service</i>	0,218	1,582**	1,033**	0,778**	1,701**	0,550	0,213	-0,036	-0,016	0,241	0,328
<i>Non manual</i>	0,121	0,650	0,745**	0,400*	1,259**	0,712*	-0,226	-0,250	-0,091	-0,014	0,642**
<i>Man qualif</i>	-1,068*	0,291	0,463	0,424*	0,527	0,222	0,397	0,077	-0,271	-0,221	-0,119
<i>Minority</i>	0,257	0,686	0,096	-1,010**	-0,137	-0,139	-0,442	-0,877	-0,338	-0,393	-0,226
<i>Temporary</i>	0,470	-0,138	0,323	0,014	0,367	-0,657	0,036	-0,216	-0,052	0,133	-0,399
<i>Unemployed</i>	-0,016	0,728	0,672*	-0,544*	1,142*	0,082	0,273	-0,158	0,003	0,223	0,368
<i>Inactive</i>	0,336	0,352	0,169	-0,101	-0,067	-0,030	0,251	0,075	0,131	0,209	0,240
<i>N</i>	1218	1360	1668	2149	942	1618	1276	1845	1703	1803	1466
<i>Nagelk. R2</i>	0,081	0,114	0,110	0,102	0,132	0,027	0,087	0,106	0,090	0,064	0,097

	IRELAND	SPAIN	GREECE	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	CZECH	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	ALL	Frequency	Direction
<i>Woman</i>	-0,252	0,237	-0,547*	0,370	0,461	0,137	-0,443	-0,287	0,053	5	20
<i>Age (10)</i>	0,863*	0,023	1,347*	0,553	0,298	0,044	0,001	-0,017*	0,001	6	83
<i>Age squared</i>	-0,100*	0,000	-0,140*	-0,084	-0,012	0,000	-0,001	0,000	0,000		
<i>Years edu</i>	0,836	1,718**	1,252*	1,798*	2,002*	2,358**	2,994**	1,900**	1,329**	16	100
<i>Income</i>	0,716	-0,023	0,460	1,325	-1,986	0,008	1,041	-0,453	1,568**	2	100
<i>Owner</i>	0,670*	-0,200	-0,308	-0,961	-17,546	0,366	0,470	-0,174	0,188*	4	100
<i>Service</i>	0,596*	0,392	0,288	0,613	0,649	0,467	0,163	0,237	0,528**	5	100
<i>Non manual</i>	0,059	0,196	0,436	0,472	0,791	0,714*	0,440	-0,067	0,467**	6	100
<i>Man qualif</i>	-0,389	0,334	0,086	0,152	1,287*	-0,109	0,899*	-0,056	0,11	4	60
<i>Minority</i>	0,570	-0,679	-0,001	0,041	1,245*	-1,994	-17,960	0,461	-0,204**	2	50
<i>Temporary</i>	0,372	-0,652*	-0,617	0,731	-4,614	-0,148	-0,242	-0,607	-0,158	1	100
<i>Unemployed</i>	-0,738	0,701	0,270	0,754	-18,847	0,078	-0,439	0,023	0,263**	3	33
<i>Inactive</i>	-0,373	-0,535*	-0,398	0,622	-0,651*	-0,083	0,072	-0,143	0,345**	2	100
<i>N</i>	1630	1014	1581	1535	1192	1850	1368	857	33589		
<i>Nagelk. R2</i>	0,104	0,151	0,101	0,100	0,118	0,068	0,098	0,063	0,131		

* Significant at the 0,05 level, ** Significant at the 0,005 level. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients

Source: European Social Survey 2004-2005

largest probabilities. While minority members participate slightly less, the contrary pattern is true for unemployed and inactive citizens.

Conclusions

The questions addressed in this paper were threefold: a) what are the most frequent sources of differences in participation in advanced societies, b) which of them are widespread and consistent enough to be considered inequalities, and c) whether there are mode specific patterns. The following table summarises the results with regard to these dimensions.

Table 6: Summary findings

	VOTE		PARTY / GROUP		DEMONSTRATION		BOYCOTT	
	Significant coefficient (%)	Expected direction (%)	Significant coefficient (%)	Expected direction (%)	Significant coefficient (%)	Expected direction (%)	Significant coefficient (%)	Expected direction (%)
Woman	27	67	47	100	11	100	26	20
Age (10)	91	100	47	100	39	86	32	83
Years edu	73	100	41	100	56	100	84	100
Income	59	100	6	100	44	50	11	100
Owners	23	100	18	100	6	100	21	100
Service	50	100	24	100	11	0	26	100
Non manual	27	83	18	100	17	33	32	100
Manual qualif	9	50	12	100	22	50	21	60
Minority	36	100	0	-	39	43	11	50
Temporary	18	75	6	0	6	0	5	100
Unemployed	23	100	6	0	0	-	16	33
Inactive	18	75	18	33	22	75	11	100

Source: Own elaboration

Seen from a global perspective, age and education appear as the most widespread structural determinants of political participation. Moreover, education is the only variable observed in which the direction of the significant coefficients is absolutely consistent, i.e., when differences do exist due to this characteristic it is always the poorly educated who have lower probabilities of taking part, regardless of the activity we focus on. Therefore, this dimension can be unambiguously considered as a source of inequality in political participation. On the contrary, age has been modelled curvilinearly for voting, work for parties, and participation in boycotts, while linearly for demonstrations. The results confirm the existence of dissimilar patterns between age groups, with a specialization of young people in protest activities, and of the middle-aged in the remaining activities. In this case it is not obvious that age can be considered a source of inequality according to the criteria used. Rather, we can only state that there are differences among age groups depending on the political activity we focus on.

A similar conclusion is valid for gender, which was once a classical source of inequality and which has only a limited importance today. Firstly, important differences are appreciable in only a minority of the analyses run. Moreover it is doubtful whether these differences can be considered inequalities because women are only consistently disadvantaged for work in political parties and action groups. Even if there is evidence that women are participating in political consumerism at higher rates than men this does not imply that this fact can be considered an inequality.

The other dimensions observed appear as secondary sources of inequality. All else being constant, citizens with higher income vote more frequently in most European countries. However, in non-electoral activities this pattern is not widespread and in the case of demonstrations it even has contrary directions. A very similar situation is true for members of service class households. The effect of the other variables is very restricted and in many cases the condition of consistency is not met. When variables like being a member of a certain social class, a minority or not being indefinitely employed are significant it often happens in contradictory ways.

On the other side, mode differences do exist with regard to the determinants of participation. As was stated, some of the variables observed, such as gender or age respond to mode specific patterns of influence. Apart from this fact, the most notable discrepancy is that for turnout and conventional participation in general the significant coefficients go in the expected direction, i.e., when differences do exist socially advantaged citizens are those who are more prone to participate. Differences in participation in demonstrations are on the contrary less predictable. Depending on the country we focus on we might find certain social groups taking part both more and less frequently. For example, in some countries minorities and low-income citizens demonstrate less frequently than their more privileged fellow citizens but in others they do so more frequently. Therefore, in the case of demonstrations the relationship between structural characteristics and activity is not homogeneous but varies across different contexts. This finding can be interpreted as giving some support to the “normalization” hypothesis (Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005) with the important exception that education is a very solid predictor. The same logic is not so clearly applicable to political consumerism where differences are more consistent even if in regard to this activity the gender gap has clearly vanished.

As a concluding remark, one important question is worth raising. It has been found that European countries may be closer to the educational bias in turnout found in the US than is usually thought. In three quarters of the countries observed the highly educated are voting to a greater extent than less educated citizens. This stands in sharp contrast with recent statements such as “In Western Europe, then, there is no significant correlation between educational attainment and electoral turnout” (Topf 1995a: 48) or “education failed to predict turnout throughout most of Western Europe” (Norris 2002:93). Because voting is the most central form of participating in politics, these kinds of inequalities are of special concern.

References

- Anduiza Perea, E. (1999). *¿Individuos o sistemas? Las razones de la abstención en Europa Occidental*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Siglo Veintiuno de España Editores.
- Atkinson, A.B.T. (2003). "Multidimensional Deprivation: Contrasting Social Welfare and Counting Approaches". *Journal of Economic Inequality*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 51-65.
- Barnes, S.H. and Kaase, M. (1979). *Political action: Mass Participation in five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Bauman, Z. (2004). *Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). *Individualization*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE.
- Begg, I.G. and Berghman, J. (2002). "Introduction: EU social (exclusion) policy revisited?". *Journal of European Social Policy*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 179-194.
- Burns, N., Schlozman, K.L. and Verba, S. (2001). *The Private Roots of Public Action : Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Byrne, D. (1999). *Social exclusion*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Carnoy, M. (2001). *El trabajo flexible en la era de la información*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Castel, R. (2003). *From manual workers to wage laborers: Transformation of the social question*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The Rise of the Network Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
- Clark, T.N. and Lipset, S.M. (2001). *The Breakdown of Class Politics: A debate on post-industrial stratification*. London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press .
- Clark, T.N. and Lipset, S.M. (1991). "Are Social Classes Dying?". *International Sociology*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 397-410.
- Clarke, H.D., Sanders, D., Stewart, M.C. and Whiteley, P. (2004). *Political Choice in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crowley, J. (2001). "The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities". *International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 99-121.
- Dahl, R.A. (1989). *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press.
- Dalton, R.J. (2002). *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 3rd edn. New York ; London: Chatham House Publishers/Seven Bridges Press.
- Diehl, C. and Blohm, M. (2001). "Apathy, Adaptation or Ethnic Mobilisation? On the political attitudes of an excluded group". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 401-20.
- Gurr, T.R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jacobs, D. and Tillie, J. (2004). "Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration of Migrants". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 419-427.
- Jowell, R. and the Central Co-ordinating Team (2005). *European Social Survey 2004/2005: Technical Report*. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University (2005)
- King, G. and Zeng, L. (2001). "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data". *Political Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 137-163.
- Caul, M.C. (2005). *Rising Political Inequality in Established Democracies: Mobilization, Socio-Economic Status and Voter Turnout, 1960s to 2000*. Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Marsh, A. and Kaase, M. (1979). "Background of Political Action" in *Political Action: Mass Participation in five Western Democracies*, eds. S.H. Barnes & M. Kaase, Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications.
- Michael, Tomz, M., King, G., and Zeng, L. (1999). "RELOGIT: Rare Events Logistic Regression, Version 1.1". vol. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, October 1, <http://gking.harvard.edu/>.
- Micheletti, M. (2003). *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action*. New York ; Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Micheletti, M., Follesdal, A. and Stolle, D. (2004). *Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring political consumerism past and present*. New Brunswick, N.J. ; London: Transaction Publishers.
- Milbrath, L.W. and Goel, M.L. (1977). *Political Participation: How and Why do People get involved in Politics?* 2nd edn. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Morales, Laura (2004). *Institutions, Mobilization and Political Participation: Political Membership in Western Countries*. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.
- Nie, N.H., Junn, J. and Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P., Walgrave, S., and Van Aelst, P. (2005). *Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional*

Participants, or Everyone?

- Oppenheim, E. (1983). *Voting Behavior in Europe: A comparative analysis of electoral participation and party choice*. Amsterdam; Hingham, MA: Het Spinhuis; Distribution for the U.S., Martinus Nijhoff International.
- Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. (1992). *Political Participation and Democracy in Britain*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pateman, C. (1970). *Participation and Democratic Theory*. London: Cambridge U.P.
- Percy-Smith, J. (Ed.). (2000). *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Phillips, A. (1999). *Which Equalities Matter?* Oxford: Polity.
- Polavieja, J. (2003). *Estables y precarios: Desregularización laboral y estratificación social en España*. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Rosenstone, S.J. (1982). "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout". *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 25-46.
- Rosenstone, S.J. and Hansen, J.M. (1993). *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan Pub. Co : Maxwell Macmillan Canada : Maxwell Macmillan International.
- Sassen, S. (1999). *Guests and Aliens*. New York: New Press.
- Schlozman, K.L., Verba, S., and Brady, H.E. (1999). "Civic Participation and the Equality Problem" in *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, ed. Skocpol, Theda and Fiorina, Morris (Eds.), Washington, D.C.: Brookings, pp. 427-459.
- Sennett, R. (1998). *The Corrosion of Character: The personal consequences of work in the new capitalism*. London: Norton.
- Stolle, D. and Hooghe, M. (2005). "Shifting Inequalities? Patterns of Exclusion and Inclusion in Emerging Forms of Political Participation", *Prepared for Presentation at the 101 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*.
- Stoop, I., Jowell, R., and Mohler, P. (2002). "The European Social Survey: One Survey in Two Dozen Countries". *International Conference on Improving Surveys, Copenhagen*, , pp. 25-28.
- Topf, R. (1995b). "Beyond Electoral Participation" in *Citizens and the State*, Klingemann, H. & Fuchs, D. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52-91.
- Topf, R. (1995a). "Electoral participation" in *Citizens and the State*. Klingemann, H. and Fuchs, D. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27-51.
- Van Aelst, P. and Walgrave, S. (2001). "Who Is That (Wo)man in the Street? From the Normalisation of Protest to the Normalisation of the Protester". *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 461-486.
- Verba, S. (2004). "Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?". *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 1, no. 04, pp. 663-679.
- Verba, S. and Nie, N.H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Verba, S., Nie, N.H. and Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and Political Equality: A seven-nation comparison*. Cambridge, Eng. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L. and Brady, H.E. (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Wolfinger, R.E. and Rosenstone, S.J. (1980). *Who votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Young, I.M. (2002). *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Annex 1: Codes for stratification factors

The dimensions of social inequality observed are:

Women	Gender with men as the reference category
Age	In bands of 10 years and 1 is 20 or more years.
Age squared	A variable age squared is introduced to model the predominant curvilinear pattern in participation except in the case of demonstration where a declining linear pattern is the most widespread.
Education	Years of full-time education as interval variable coded 0 to 1, where 0 is 6 or less years
Income	In seven bands of 500 euros and coded 0 to 1.
Social class	The Goldthorpe class schema was applied and reduced to five dummy variables: owners, service class, non-manual workers, skilled manual workers and manual unskilled (as a reference category). The operationalisation of social class elaborated by Håkon Leiulfsrud is available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org
Minority	Those who declare their belonging to an ethnic minority and/or are not citizens of the country, excluding those who are citizens of other Western democracies.
Employment situation	Four dummy variables that correspond to workers who have an unlimited contract (as a reference category), a limited contract, are unemployed, or in any other situation.

