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American Feeling: Political Passions and Affective Identity in the Revolutionary Era, 1754-1815

By

Russell L. Weber

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

Professor Mark A. Peterson, Chair
Professor Victoria Frede-Montemayor
Professor Kathleen Donegan
Professor Brian DeLay

Summer 2024

Abstract

American Feeling: Political Passions and Affective Identity
in the Revolutionary Era, 1754-1815

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This dissertation explores the relationship between emotions and politics in the early-modern Atlantic world, specifically interrogating the relationship between affective rhetoric, popular violence, and political identity in British America throughout its long revolutionary era. Emotions, it demonstrates, were essential political tools by which the inhabitants of British America forged bonds of fellow-feeling, and thereby coalesced into shared identities, both imperial and national. Further, it explores the ways in which these affective, often violent rhetorics distilled into an exclusionary, patriotic ethos. Revolutionary America's affective rhetorics facilitated the transformation of French colonists, Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, British regulars, radical insurgents, imperial loyalists, antifederalists, federalists, and republicans into political others, who often were denied the rights of subjecthood within the British empire and the rights of citizenship within the United States. This dissertation excavates a new political history of America's revolutionary era, one which prioritizes the power of feelings.

The first two chapters explore how the subjects of George II, and then George III, transposed those affects traditionally reserved for their imperial enemies – French soldiers and Indigenous peoples – onto British regulars and the agents of Parliament. This affective transference intensified the diversity of sentiment that already had existed among British Americans since the earliest years of colonization, and thereby destabilized their transatlantic imperial identity. The third and fourth chapters illustrate the role of treason, betrayal, and patriotism in severing the tethers of imperial affection between the subjects of the British empire. British America's civil war for independence further marginalized Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, and imperial loyalists, and thereby birthed the United States. The final two chapters examine the difficulty that America's revolutionaries had in forging a coherent, national identity. The ratification of a new, federal constitution and the contested policies of the Washington administration divided, rather than united, the citizens of America's early republic. By 1797, the United States had succumbed to intense partisan discord. America's burgeoning disunity arose not simply from ideological disagreements, but rather from the impassioned discourse with which its citizens refuted, rebuked, and condemned their political opponents. The conclusion demonstrates that the United States did not reforge a cohesive national identity until its impassioned, patriotic victory in the War of 1812. This dissertation searches for the origins of America's emotional republic and finds it within the bonds of affection that tethered British America to its once beloved constitution, empire, and king.

To Natalie, to Auri:
For your unconditional love. For the home you've built with me.
For the family you've given me. For the heart you've made whole.

"…From the first kiss, to the last."
- Tom King, "Some of These Days," *Batman Annual #2* (2017)

"…With flakes of garlic, and petals from a rose.
If it's small enough to carry, you and I can call it home…"
- Darlingside, "The God of Loss," *Birds Say* (2015)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The writing of acknowledgements is an inherently emotional act. As a historian of emotions, I have resigned myself to a simple, undeniable truth: my acknowledgments might be too sentimental. If that is the case, I offer no apology.

To begin, I want to thank those archives who opened their doors (both physical and electronic) to me as I began the laborious work of researching sixty years of political and cultural history across Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia. These archives include the American Antiquarian Society, the Beinecke Library, the Boston University Library, the Columbia University Library, the Filson Historical Society, the Gilder Lehrman Institute, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Houghton Library, the Huntington Library, the John Carter Brown Library, the Leventhal Map Center at the Boston Public Library, the Lewis Walpole Library, the Library Company of Philadelphia, the Library of Congress, the Library of Virginia, the Maryland Historical Society, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association of the Union, the New York Historical Society, the New York Public Library, the Philadelphia History Museum, the Royal Trust Collection of the Royal Archives, the Sterling Memorial Library, the University of Pittsburgh, the Viginia Historical Society, the William L. Clements Library, and the Yale Center for British Art. As I child, I never imagined I would leave the Bay Area, let alone California, and I cannot properly express the sheer joy I felt researching the past in the footsteps and shadows of where it had occurred.

Additionally, I want to express my generous thanks to those institutions which funded my research for this dissertation: the American Historical Association, the Lewis Walpole Library, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the University of California, Berkeley, and the Virginia Historical Society. Of particular note, I would like to express my gratitude to Kanisorn Wongsrichanalai, whose kindness and friendship transformed the Massachusetts Historical Society into a second intellectual home, one much closer to the Atlantic world than the halls of Berkeley.

The development of intellectual ideas never happens in a vacuum, and I am thankful that I have had the opportunity to test the merits and metal of my theories and arguments at rigorous, yet welcoming academic conferences hosted by the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, the Institute for Thomas Paine Studies at Iona College, Sacramento State University, San Francisco State University, the University of Adelaide, the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Ottawa, and Yale University. To all who sat in attendance, listened with enthusiasm, or asked me questions that compelled me to think more deeply or in new ways about my work, I thank you.

Next, I want to acknowledge briefly three authors and four artists whose work profoundly shaped my life, and in turn informed the worldviews with which I have approached this dissertation. As a teenager, Geoff Johns taught me the power of emotions, a lesson which provided dividends beyond my wildest imagination. In my early-twenties, Matt Fraction taught me that the struggles of addiction did not need to define one's life and, despite all evidence to the contrary, such hardships prove fertile grounds for love. In my late-twenties, Tom King taught me to fight – fiercely and without abandon – for the people I love, as it is my responsibility to make their lives, and the world they live in, a better place. Finally, throughout my graduate career, Don Mitchell, Auyon Mukharji, Harris Paseltiner, and David Enft – more popularly known as the quartet Darlingside – taught me that passion for work, passion for relationships, and passion for living is most the basic, yet most necessary requirement to be a good person. I hope that I have lived up to their lofty standards.

The genesis of my desire to earn a doctorate in history may be traced back to my time as an undergraduate at San Francisco State. To begin, I would like to thank Mark Caulkins, Gillian McIntosh, and Michael Anderson – each of whom taught me the importance of storytelling and myth-making. Next, Mark Sigmon, who helped me understand the power of lectern and how a

historian's greatest tool is the ability to engage one's audience. Richard Hoffman, a man whose giddy love for the practice of history remained ever-contagious, was the first person who told me I had what it took to earn a doctorate. Despite the difficulties I have faced earning this degree, I will be eternally grateful for that confidence. Jarbel Rodrigeuz taught me both the fun and importance of cultural history, including sense history. Without Jarbel's encouragement my dissertation would not exist. Eva Sheppard-Wolf, my first mentor of revolutionary America, pushed me harder than any professor I had during my time at San Francisco State, but did so with a gentleness, optimism, and faith that I would rise to the challenge. I cannot thank her enough. Lastly, I must acknowledge my profound debt and gratitude to Sarah Crabtree. When I knocked on her door to ask if she would serve on my Master of Arts qualifying exams (as I wanted to complete a field in Atlantic world history), she generously said yes. Little did either of us know that this simple favor would bloom into a decade long relationship, one that evolved from mentor and mentee to colleagues, and now friends. Without Sarah's guidance, I would not have been accepted at Berkeley and I would not be the socially-minded scholar that I am today. I will never be able to repay the time and energy which Sarah has put into my career, so my admiration and heartfelt appreciation must suffice.

When I arrived at Berkeley, I met some of the most creative academics, and kindest people I have ever known. I now have the privilege of calling them friends. I owe not an insubstantial debt to the members of Berkeley's Interdisciplinary Working Group on the Early U.S., the first intellectual community of which I truly considered myself a member. Charlotte Hull, J.T. Jaimeson, Derek O'Leary, and Franklin Sammons – thank you for helping to coax a fairly shy, imposter-syndrome ridden nerd out of his shell. I will be forever grateful. The feedback, support, and comradery which I received from the Misfits Dissertation Writing Group has been invaluable as I transformed my stray thoughts and ideas into a cohesive (and now complete) dissertation. To John Daukas, Mahel Hamroun, and Sara Friedman – whose intellectual curiosity, personal generosity, compassion, courage, and kindness have been, and remain still, an inspiration – I hope each of you know how much I value your friendship.

Beyond the lifelong friendships I have made at Berkeley, I have been blessed with an embarrassment of riches in advisors and mentors. To begin, I must thank the amazing Berkeley History Department Staff, in particular Erin Leigh Inama, Todd Kubler, Julie Aranda, Davis Harris, Laura Marostica, Gaberielle Nichols, and Ricky Vides, all of whom made the difficult labor of completing this graduate degree possible. Next, I want to thank Hidetaka Hirota, whom I had the pleasure of meeting two years ago when he arrived at Berkeley. Hide's kindness and steadfast advice, both on my dissertation and navigating the perilous waters of the academic job market, have proven invaluable. Both Carlos Noreña and Waldo Martin's patience helped me to survive my first two years of coursework at Berkeley, and their enthusiasm made the strenuous chore of passing my qualifying exams a truly enjoyable experience. Finally, I want to express my sincerest gratitude to David Henkin, who gave me the confidence to experiment within the classroom. Without David's guidance, I would not be the educator I am today.

Four mentors in particular, whose names adorn this dissertation's title page, deserve special recognition, as their insight, feedback, and tireless hours of line-editing have made this project more than I had ever hoped it to be. Brian DeLay taught me how to be fearless in my research, relentless in my academic endeavors, and unwavering in my principles. Thanks to Brian, I have found the courage to research and write on topics that truly matter to me. Kathleen Donegan taught me not to shy away from my humanizing, narrative approach to emotions history, but rather to embrace it, and let it guide how I both saw the past and see the world today. Thanks to Kathleen, I have found both joy in the act of writing, a task which I once hated, and hope that my prose may inspire those who read it. Victoria Frede-Montemayor taught me to value the power of emotions, both as a field of academic study and in one's daily life. Further, Victoria took it upon herself to remind me – more

times than I can count – that kindness must be offered not only to others, but to oneself. Thanks to Victoria, I learned the importance and necessity of sympathy in all its forms – a lesson which I will carry with me for the rest of my life. Finally, Mark Peterson, who taught me the importance of taking risks and making mistakes, of embracing the hard questions because those are the most worthwhile to answer, of never taking oneself too seriously, and of never forgetting the responsibilities I now hold as a caretaker of the past. Thanks to Mark, I am ready to call myself a historian. I hope that each of you know that your fingerprints – like those of Adam Smith – litter the pages of this dissertation. It is as much your accomplishment as it is mine.

The most important acknowledgements are those for my family; none born of blood. Allison Mallett showed me a kindness and curiosity that I never expected – from the copious amounts of home-cooked dinners, to reading every piece of academic work I have ever written and published in my time at Berkeley. In Allison, I found an affection parent – something that I had been missing my entire life. Morgan Komure is the epitome of dedication and discipline, and a man whom I respect greatly. As a high school teacher, he has kept me apprised of the most pressing concerns and difficulties facing those students whom I have the honor and responsibility of teaching. More importantly, Morgan's willingness to wrestle me from my work to shoot archery, play guitar, or grab dinner is a kindness that I will never forget. Over the past twenty-years, I have had the privilege of calling Alexander Maggi my friend and my brother. I know that my reclusive tendencies have not always been easy for him to navigate. At first, our shared love of comic books served as the foundations of our friendship, but as months turned to years, and then decades, I came to rely on his presence more than he knows. From our regular weekly chats to our intermittent cross-country visits, Alex has been one of the few constants in my life. The affection that I have received from Alex in no small part made this dissertation possible.

In summer 2017, my therapist recommend that I get an emotional support cat to help me manage my anxiety. This single decision changed my life. Auri has taught me a patience and a serenity that I never thought possible. The joy she finds from chasing a toy mouse, the tranquility she finds during an afternoon sun nap, the love she shows me every time I come home – these have become precious, priceless activities that guide the rhythm of my days and provide a stability I never had. One other note: it is only fair that I acknowledge Auri's role as ghostwriter of this dissertation – as her furry paws have written and deleted as many words on this computer as I have.

The most important, yet most inadequate thanks I now write are for my best friend, the love of my life, and my Dead Sea. Natalie: all I know of love – truly selfless, unconditional love – I learned from you. You gave me the confidence, that cool July night in Pacifica, to take a gamble and apply to doctorate programs in history. For the past twelve-years, you have been my fiercest ally and my greatest advocate. It is you who taught me how to harness my rage at the inequities of society and convert it into hope for the future – a hope which now permeates the pages of this dissertation. You have spent thousands of hours listening to me work through the minutiae of this dissertation, all with the patience of a saint. Your affection, kindness, and love for me often burdened you with the unfair responsibility of reminding me to step away from my work and to enjoy our life. In my first days at Berkeley, you bought me a plaque that still hangs above my desk – a quote from Samuel Beckett's *Worstward Ho* – "Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better." This dissertation is the culmination of a decade's worth of trying to fail better. I hope you are proud of me, Natalie; I hope you know how much I love you and adore you; and I hope you know that I will be forever grateful for all that you sacrificed to help make my dream – this doctorate – a reality.

Words are woefully inadequate, but from the bottom of my heart, thank you all.

Berkeley, CA
June 5, 2024

INTRODUCTION:

To Join or to Die: British America, 1754

The Albany Congress convened in June 1754 with a near-impossible objective: to stem the rising discord within and political division among the British American colonies. In the summer of 1753, New York's frontier colonial-settlers had begun encroaching upon ancestral Mohawk lands – an act for which the Mohawk people declared their Covenant Chain with the colony now "broken."[1] Simultaneous to this seismic disruption in British-Indigenous relations, Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie learned that a "hostile" contingent of French regulars had arrived near the Ohio River with the likely goal of "invad[ing] His Majesty's Territories."[2] To deter such incursions, Dinwiddie sought to cultivate a "firm, strong and lasting alliance" with both the Catawba and Cherokee peoples.[3] Presented with these dual crises, the Board of Trade ordered New York Governor James DeLancey to hold a conference to repair the empire's "friendship and alliance" with not simply the Mohawk, but all members of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy.[4] As a further precaution, the Lords of Trade and Parliament expected its British America's governors to render "mutual assistance" against all hostile foreign powers.[5] Under such pretext, Massachusetts Governor William Shirley implored Parliament to authorize a formal "Union among [the North American] Colonies for their mutual Defence."[6]

Mustering support within British America for an intercolonial union, however, proved difficult.[7] To aid in this political endeavor, Boston expatriate Benjamin Franklin printed "Join, or Die" (see Figure 0.1).[8] Franklin's simple political cartoon depicts a snake segmented into eight pieces, each one representing a colonial region of British America.[9] Albeit maimed, the snake's

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[1] "Conference between Governor Clinton and the Indians," in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed., Edmund B. O'Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1855) 6:788; Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 38-39; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 81-82; Robert C. Newbold, *The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 1754* (New York: Vintage Press, 1955), 22-23.

[2] Governor Robert Dinwiddie to the House of Burgesses, 1753, in *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758*, ed., R.A. Brock (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883) 1:37; hereafter *Official Records of Dinwiddie*.

[3] Ibid; for an example of Dinwiddie's respective letters soliciting alliances with the Catawba and the Cherokee, see *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 1:131-133.

[4] Lords of Trade to Sir Danvers Osborne, September 18, 1753, in *Documents Relative to Colonial New York*, 6:800-801; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 38-39; Newbold, *Albany Congress,* 22-23.

[5] Robert Darcy, the Earl of Holderness, to the Governors of America, August 26, 1753, in in *Documents Relative to Colonial New York*, 6:794-795.

[6] William Shirley to the Lord Commissioners, January 1754 in the *Correspondences of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760*, ed., Charles Henry Lincoln (New York: Macmillan Company, 1912), 2:26-27. Newbold, *Albany Congress*, 22-23.

[7] British America's first intercolonial union was the Dominion of New England, to which Charles II and the Lords of Trade subjected British colonists from Maine to New Jersey in the lead up to the Glorious Revolution, see Owen Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 53-57.

[8] Benjamin Franklin, "Join, or Die," in the *Philadelphia Gazette*, May 9, 1754. Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

[9] Ibid. For the purposes of Franklin's cartoon, the snake's New England segment contained Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, and its Pennsylvania and South Carolina segments respectively subsumed Delaware and Georgia. For a detailed analysis of the "Join, or Die," cartoon and its impact during the Seven Years' War, see Lester C. Olson, *Emblems of American Community in the Revolutionary Era: A Study in Rhetorical Iconology*

tongue still slithers, invoking the popular belief that the "joint snake" had the ability to "be broken" into multiple pieces, yet still survive "if the parts [came] together again."[10] To contextualize the intent of "Join, or Die," Franklin penned a complimentary essay for the *Philadelphia Gazette*, arguing that "the Present disunited State of the British Colonies" encouraged the French and their Indigenous allies to "kill, seize, and imprison [British] Traders…..murder and scalp [British] Farmers, with their Wives and Children, and take an easy possession of such Parts of the British Territory as they find most convenient."[11] Stoking terror among British colonists, Franklin warned that such continued disunity would result in "the Destruction of the British Interest, Trade, and Plantation in America."[12] To save themselves and their status as subjects of the British empire, Franklin implored his fellow colonists to embrace their fears of violent invasion, elevate imperial affection above regional differences, and, like the joint snake, reunify into a powerful, and even dangerous, political entity.

Figure 0.1: Benjamin Franklin, "Join, or Die," *Philadelphia Gazette*,
May 9, 1754. Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia.

Despite its impassioned rhetoric, "Join, or Die" failed to spark a spirit of unity among British Americans. Believing the Albany Congress inconsequential to Virginia's safety or success,

(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 22-29; Lester C. Olson, *Benjamin Franklin's Vision of American Community: A Study in Rhetorical Iconology* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 27-53.

[10] "The First American Cartoon," in *Benjamin Franklin's Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Carl van Doren (New York: Viking Press, 1945), 87; Olson, *Emblems of Community*, 26-27. Jedidiah Morse describes the properties of a joint snake as follows: "It is so stiff, and has so few joints and those so unyielding, that it can hardly bend itself into the form of a hoop. When it is struck, it breaks like a pipe stem; and you may, with a whip, break It from the tail to the bowels into pieces not an inch long, and not produce the least tincture of blood"; Jedidiah Morse, *The American Universal Geography* (Boston: Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. Andrews, 1793), 1:201; American Antiquarian Society.

[11] *Philadelphia Gazette*, May 9, 1754.

[12] Ibid.

Dinwiddie scheduled an independent conference with the Catawba and Cherokee for May 20.[13] In Albany, DeLancey diligently worked to salvage the empire's friendship with the Haudenosaunee, whose representatives seemed not only "well pleased" with the governor's overtures, but also eager to cooperate "against the designs of the French."[14] Amid such diplomatic progress, the Albany Congress's efforts toward intercolonial alliance stalled, as only the Massachusetts delegation had the gubernatorial authority to enter "into articles of Union and Confederation."[15] Unable to proceed any further, the delegates reluctantly submitted their "Plan of Union" to their individual colonial legislatures for approval.[16]

Upon returning home to Boston, Thomas Hutchinson – the "least self-interested delegate" of the Albany Congress – argued that a "Union of the Colonies was absolutely necessary…to defeat" the mounting "Schemes of the French."[17] Unwilling to relinquish its political autonomy, Massachusetts's legislature rejected the Albany Plan of Union.[18] To the southeast, both the *New York Gazette* and *New York Mercury* enthusiastically endorsed the congress's proposal, concurring that a unified defense provided the best option to resist "the faithless, usurping, insolent" French.[19] As in Massachusetts, however, New York's legislature refused to surrender any autonomy, specifically its right to negotiate independently with the Haudenosaunee, and thus declined the alliance.[20] Fearful that a powerful intercolonial union would inhibit his designs for Virginia's own westward expansion, Dinwiddie never submitted the proposed union to the House of Burgesses for review, and thus unilaterally vetoed it.[21]

Despondent at such unabashed self-interest, Benjamin Franklin bemoaned that, in times of peril, "Every Body cries, a Union is absolutely necessary," yet when asked to compromise or sacrifice for that union, they immediately abandon the path.[22] "[I]f ever there be an Union" among the colonies of British America, Franklin somberly concluded, "it must be form'd at home by the Ministry and Parliament" and then imposed upon the colonies.[23] Contrary to its original purpose, "Join, or Die" served not as an aspirational beacon for intercolonial alliance, but rather as a prophetic text, foreshadowing the profound inability of British Americans to forge perpetual bonds of political affection throughout their revolutionary era.

* * *

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[13] Robert Dinwiddie to James DeLancey, January 29, 1754, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 1:66.

[14] William Smith, *The History of the Provence of New-York*, ed. Michael Kammen (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972) 2:158.

[15] William Shirley to Massachusetts Commissioners, April 19, 1754, in *Shirley Correspondences* 2:60-61. In a subsequent letter to Shirley, Thomas Hutchinson lamented that "the insufficiency of the powers from several of the Governments rendered it impracticable for [the delegates] to come into any conclusive union," see Thomas Hutchinson to William Shirley, October 25, 1754, in *The Correspondence of Thomas Hutchinson*, ed., John W. Tyler (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2014), 1:117. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 81, 84; Newbold, *Albany Congress*, 47.

[16] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 84; for a detailed analysis of the multifaceted rationales of colonial legislature's rejection, see Newbold, *Albany Congress*, 135-171.

[17] *Boston News-Letter*, July 18, 1754; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 80.

[18] For the Massachusetts General Court's Revised Plan of Union, see "A Plan of Union" in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:119-121; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 84; Newbold, *Albany Congress*, 141-155.

[19] *New York Gazette*, September 23, 1754; *New York Mercury*, September 23, 1754.

[20] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 84; Newbold, *Albany Congress*, 168.

[21] Robert Dinwiddie to James DeLancey, July 31, 1754, Robert Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, August 15, 1754, Robert Dinwiddie to George Montagu-Dunk, Earl of Halifax, February 12, 1755, see *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 1:259-260, 284-287, 495-496. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 84; Newbold, *Albany Congress*, 168-170.

[22] Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson, December 29, 1754, in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed., Leonard W. Labarre (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) 5:453-454.

[23] Ibid.

The creation of the American republic is one of the most thoroughly researched periods of United States history, and its basic narrative contours are well known. Shortly after the Seven Years' War, the inhabitants of British North America perceived themselves as the victims of Parliament's aggressive, fiscal-military agenda. Thirteen colonies in particular began a coordinated resistance against the empire's seemingly arbitrary and tyrannical endeavors, and eventually made the difficult decision to declare themselves politically independent. After surviving civil war and negotiating peace, these newly *united* states established a federative government to protect their political, economic, and social interests throughout the Atlantic world and across the North American continent. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the early republic had solidified a coherent national identity – albeit one with racial, ethnic, and gendered exclusions. The macro-events of America's revolutionary era had achieved the objectives first put forward in Benjamin Franklin's "Join, or Die."

This dissertation tells a very different story: both of the emotions which allowed British American colonists to build temporary coalitions against kings, parliaments, armies, and ethnic others, and of the spirit of internal disunity that plagued these uneasy alliances at nearly every political turn. *American Feeling*, therefore, interrogates what other historians, and much of the American populace, have taken for granted: that a revolutionary, ideological union against a common set of enemies created sentiments strong enough to overcome political divisions, and thereby forge a stable, shared identity among Britain's insurgent colonists. To provide a broad, yet pointed examination of revolutionary America, my research engages with both the rhetoric and the actions of the young and the old; of men and women; and of the settler-colonists, native inhabitants, enslaved laborers, and foreign denizens who lived in Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia. Through such analyses, I reveal how the volatile, exclusionary sentiments of America's nation-making project were inherently destructive to the early republic, even once its political independence had been won.

To this end, I argue that the traditional, near-teleological narrative of revolutionary British America's political unification is fundamentally incorrect. Both building upon and diverging from the tenants of revolutionary America's ideological history – specifically that of the republican synthesis – my research illustrates that the bonds of political affection which tethered American citizens to their early republic echoed, and thus remained as fragile as, those which had tethered British colonists to their once beloved empire.[24] Such a radical reinterpretation of the evolution, and ultimate instability, of the early republic's national identity emerges only by analyzing the ways in which affective rhetorics, print discourse, and popular violence worked in tandem to shape revolutionary America.[25]

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[24] For the origins of the republican synthesis, see Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

[25] For print discourse, see Joseph M. Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks: The Business and Politics of Printing the News, 1763-1783* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2019), Russ Castronovo, *Propaganda 1776: Secrets, Leaks, and Revolutionary Communications in Early America.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Konstantin Dierks, *In My Power: Letter Writing and Communications in Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), Jay Fliegelman, *Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of Performance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), Sandra M. Gustafson, *Eloquence is Power: Oratory & Performance in Early America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Uriel Heyd, *Reading Newspapers: Press and Public in Eighteenth-Century Britain and America* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2012), Thomas C. Leonard, *The Power of the Press: The Birth of American Political Reporting* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Trish Loughran, *The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), Jeffrey L. Pasley, *The Tyranny of Printers: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2001), Sarah M. Pearsall, *Atlantic Families: Lives and Letters in the Later Eighteenth-Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Colin Wells, *Poetry Wars: Verse and Politics in the American Revolution and Early Republic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018); for popular violence, see Patrick

Throughout the second-half of the eighteenth century, British colonists increasingly engaged with rhetorics of hatred, terror, horror, anger, avarice, betrayal, sorrow, grief, hope, love, and joy, which they then used to encourage violent cultures of political marginalization; instigate insurgent atrocities against French colonists, Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, British regulars, imperial loyalists, and partisan dissidents; and birth a national identity based on exclusionary patriotism. By evaluating the revolutionary era through the analytical lens of emotions studies, I reveal that the United States cohered not solely through hopeful approbations of the *us*, but also through systematic condemnations of the *them*. The power of such violent convictions to foster political attachments, however, remained effective only as long as there was a dangerous political other whom the citizens of the early republic might collectively oppose. In the absence of such an enemy, regional and ideological interests triumphed over collective need, intra- and interstate bonds of fellow-feeling gradually eroded, and the American people found it impossible to sustain the coherent, perpetual national identity which they had worked so tirelessly to build. Thus, *American Feeling* provides a new political history of America's revolutionary era – one which, for the first time, takes emotions as seriously as the founding generation itself did.

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The study of emotions – as a methodological framework for historical analysis – first emerged in the early-1940s. In response to the rise of fascism throughout western Europe, historian Lucien Febvre pleaded for his fellow historians to learn, to write, and to teach the "history of hate, history of fear, history of cruelty, and history of love."[26] Three decades later, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild took up Febvre's scholarly appeal. Socially constructed "feeling rules," or the accepted behavioral norms for managing and expressing emotions, Hochschild argued, comprise the "underside of ideology," and therefore remained inseparable from the study of history and culture.[27] After another, albeit briefer, stagnation within the field, a new cohort of social and cultural historians, including Peter N. Stearns, William M. Reddy, and Barbara H. Rosenwein, developed the first wave of theoretical tools designed to grapple with the nuance and uncertainty that arose when analyzing the ephemeral nature of emotions.[28] By the late-2010s, the research of these scholars, in

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Griffin, et al., eds. *Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015), Holger Hoock, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth* (New York: Crown Publishing, 2017), Paul A Gilje, *Rioting in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), Paul A. Gilje, *The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); for political identity, see Saul Cornell, *The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Jeremy Engels, *Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), Gerald Leonard and Saul Cornell, *The Partisan Republic: Democracy, Exclusion, and the Fall of the Founders' Constitution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), Edmund S. Morgan. *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), Benjamin E. Park, *American Nationalisms: Imagining Union in the Age of Revolutions, 1783-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[26] Lucien Febvre, "Sensibility and History" in *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, ed. Peter Burke, trans. K. Floca (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 26.

[27] Arlie Russell Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology* 85 no.3 (1979): 551-575, specifically 556-557. For the best application of Hochschild's theories, see Arlie Russel Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[28] Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," *American Historical Review* 90, no. 4 (1985):813-836; William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially 63-112; Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): 821-845.

conjunction with the groundbreaking work of Sara Ahmed, Monique Scheer, and Rob Boddice, had transformed the history of emotions into a small, yet burgeoning academic field.[29]

The emergence of emotions studies as a reputable avenue of scholarly analysis, however, failed to generate an affective turn as impactful as that of the cultural turn in the late-1980s and 1990s. As a result, North American and United States historians have engaged only sporadically with the methodologies of emotions studies. A chronological, emotions historiography of United States, therefore, might begin with Abram C. Van Engen's *Sympathetic Puritans*, which interrogates the centrality of Calvinist fellow-feeling to the political, social, and religious lives of seventeenth-century New Englanders.[30] Ramesh Mallipeddi's *Spectacular Suffering* shifts southward, tracing the subtle, yet complex relationship between the suffering which enslaved bodies endured and the ability of that horrific spectacle to engender voyeuristic sympathy for, and on rare occasions political opposition to, the transatlantic slave trade.[31] Next, Mary Beth Norton, Peter Silver, and Jason T. Sharples each explore the power of fear and hatred – of witchcraft, of Indigenous peoples, and of enslaved conspiracies and revolts – to transform the social and political norms of late-seventeenth and eighteenth century British American and the British Caribbean.[32]

The works Mitchell Breitwieser, Cari M. Carpenter, Andrew Clayton, Michael Millner, and Kevin Pelletier collectively demonstrate the complex, and often contradictory, influence that anger, fear, melancholy, and love had on the evolution of sentimentality in American literature across the long-nineteenth century.[33] Apt companions to these studies, Michael E. Woods's *Emotional and Sectional Conflict in the Antebellum United States* and Drew Gilpin's *The Republic of Suffering* reveal the profound cultural power of fear, anger, jealously, hope, and grief to contextualize the unspeakable violence and suffering that arose from the United States's Civil War.[34] Two of the most influential emotions historians of the past decade, Erin Austin Dwyer and Paula Ioanide, build upon their predecessor's methodological dexterity and present piercing analyses into the ways in which enslaved peoples and ethnic minorities have suffered under, and resisted against, the emotional political regimes of nineteenth-century chattel slavery and twentieth-century institutional racism.[35] Lastly, Jeremy Engels, Arlie Russell Hochschild, and Carol and Peter Stearns have undertaken the labor of

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[29] Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotions* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Monique Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them Have A History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion) *History and Theory 51* 2 (May 2002): 193-220; Rob Boddice, *The History of Emotions* (Manchester: Manchester Press, 2018); Rob Boddice, *The History of Feeling* (London: Reaktion Books, 2019).

[30] Abram C. Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans: Calvinist Fellow Feeling in Early New England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2-4.

[31] Ramesh Mallipeddi, *Spectacular Suffering: Witnessing Slavery in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016).

[32] Mary Beth Norton, *In The Devil's Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003); Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008); Jason T. Sharples, *The World That Fear Made: Salve Revolts and Conspiracy Scares in Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020).

[33] Mitchell Breitwieser, *National Melancholy: Mourning and Opportunity in Classic American Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Cari M. Carpenter, *Seeing Red: Anger, Sentimentality, and American Indians* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2008), Andrew Clayton, *Love in the Time of Revolution: Transatlantic Literary Radicalism and Historical Change, 1793-1818* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Michael Millner, *Fever Reading: Affect and Reading Badly in the Early American Public Sphere* (Lebanon: University of New Hampshire Press, 2012); Kevin Pelletier, *Apocalyptic Sentimentalism: Love in U.S. Antebellum Literature* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015)

[34] Michael E. Woods, *Emotional and Sectional Conflict in the Antebellum United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Drew Gilpin Faust, *The Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).

[35] Erin Austin Dwyer, *Mastering Emotions: Feelings, Power, and Slavery in the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2021); Paula Ioanide, *The Emotional Politics of Racism: How Feelings Trump Facts in an Era of Colorblindness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

answering one of the most vital questions currently plaguing the United States: how resentment and anger came to dominate late-twentieth and twenty-first century political discourse.[36]

Remarkably, historians of revolutionary America have ignored, with few exceptions, the untapped theoretical potential of emotions studies. In her groundbreaking work *Passion is the Gale*, Nicole Eustace analyzes the role of "emotional language" in mid-eighteenth century Pennsylvania, arguing that the colony's creole elites employed a rhetoric "of patriotic love, just anger, communal sympathy, and political grief" to foster rebellion against the perceived tyranny of the British empire.[37] *Sensibility in the American Revolution*, Sarah Knott's intellectual sequel to *Passion is the Gale*, expands upon Eustace's arguments, exploring how Philadelphians used sensibility, which "eschewed traditional dichotomies of reason and feeling" to redefine "who held the reigns of political power" in the early republic.[38] When read in tandem, these works provide a cohesive emotions analysis of the social and political changes which Pennsylvania underwent from the mid-eighteenth to early-nineteenth century, and thus reveal the intellectual rewards that historians may reap from affective interrogations of America's revolutionary era.

The absence of a robust emotions historiography of revolutionary America is still puzzling, particularly because of the increased political importance which eighteenth-century Atlantic world commentators attached to affect and affection.[39] Approximately two years before Franklin sketched "Join, or Die," Scottish philosopher Adam Smith received an appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in Scotland.[40] For the next eight years, Smith composed his lesser known, but equally important, predecessor to *The Wealth of Nations*. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Smith contemplates, explores, and evaluates the power of human passions to foster social, cultural, and political attachments.[41] A revolutionary text for its time, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* posits that sympathy, or the "quality of being affected by the affection of another," is the pivotal emotion by which humans not only construct bonds of fellow-feeling, but also impose moral judgment upon one another.[42] Smith's reconceptualization of moral sentiment was so radical that it spurred Britain's intellectual elite to hypothesize that *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* "should be finally damned to Oblivion, or should be registered in the Temple of Immorality."[43] Within weeks of its publication, David Hume reported it an instantaneous success, as the British public "applaud[ed]" it "extremely," while the "Mob of Literati" were "very loud in its Praises."[44] It is unsurprising, therefore, that Smith's philosophical fingerprints cover the British empire's mid-century discourse on emotions and their acute political power.

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[36] Jeremy Engels, *The Politics of Resentment: A Genealogy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Arlie Russel Hochschild, *Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* (New York: The New Press, 2016); Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America's History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

[37] Nicole Eustace, *Passion is the Gale* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 387-388.

[38] Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 2-5.

[39] For a detailed analysis of this preoccupation of early-modern Atlantic world theorists and philosophers with the relationship between politics, affect, and political affection, see Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1977], 2013)

[40] D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, "Introduction," in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 1.

[41] Raphael and Macfie, "Introduction," in *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 3.

[42] For this definition of "sympathy," see Samuel Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language* (London, W. Stranham, 1755); Massachusetts Historical Society. Michael L. Frazer, *The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 97-102

[43] David Hume to Adam Smith, April 12, 1759, in *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, ed., Ernest Campbell Messner and Ian Simpson Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 33.

[44] Ibid, 35.

With *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* as a guide to eighteenth century affective ideologies, *American Feeling* sets out to explore how volatile passions and gentler sentiments alternately engender and undermined the creation of a shared political identity among the people of British America. To achieve this objective, I employ four distinct, yet intertwined emotions studies methodologies. First, I make extensive use of Sara Ahmed's concept of *affective economies* to analyze how the circulation of texts and ideas foster specific emotions. According to Ahmed, members of a society invest specific concepts, objects, events, and even individuals with affective meanings, or an "affective value."[45] When circulated, these affectively imbued items stir specific emotions within an economy's constituent members.[46] The strength and longevity of an affective economy, therefore, arises from both the intensity of the emotions attributed to such items and ideas, and the ability of those affectively imbued objects to resonate with the larger community, and thereby elicit a sense of cultural solidarity or shared identity. Like any economy, however, these affective values may become unstable, resulting in an often-unreliable basis for the establishment of political communities.

Next, I turn to Barbara H. Rosenwein's concept of *emotional communities* to demonstrate the power, prevalence, and instability of political emotions. Unlike social communities, emotional communities rely upon "systems of feeling" to "define and assess" not only "the affective bonds" of membership, but also the "modes of emotional expression" which these communities "expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore."[47] As with social communities, individuals may move "from one [emotional] community to another," maintain membership in several emotional communities at once, or join a community of "deviant individuals" whose "values and models" of emotional expression defy societal norms.[48] Albeit stronger and more effective when confined to smaller geographic spaces, emotional communities – like political communities – may acquire an "imagined" characteristic, through which its members fabricate "linkage[s]" of cultural sameness, despite their profound, and often irreconcilable, differences.[49] It is the nebulous and volatile nature of these cultural "linkage[s]," however, that make sustaining a cohesive emotional community, and thereby a shared, national affective identity, so difficult.

My third methodological lens prioritizes the emotional valences and exclusionary tendencies of early-modern patriotism. As Adams Smith so eloquently summarizes, patriotism relies on a strong emotional attachment to, and profound "love of[,] one's country."[50] Contemporary political scientists Charles Jones and Richard Vernon agree, and argue that to be a patriot of either an empire or a nation-state, one must express loyalty to at least one of the following: the political "institutions of power, including the state and its constitutional framework"; the "current government, as in the people who now hold power"; or one's "compatriots," usually through a shared "sense of nationality."[51] My conceptualization of *exclusionary patriotism*, therefore, refers to an emotional community in which one demonstrates loyalty to one's compatriots by refuting or violently assaulting those political others who, by self-imposed exile or forced expulsion, live outside the boundaries of that community.

Lastly, I apply an affectively-minded approach to the responsibilities of *political action citizenship*. Elizabeth F. Cohen and Cyril Ghosh argue that citizenship to a nation-state may be

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[45] Sara Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 44-45.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," 842.
[48] Ibid, 842-843.
[49] Benedict Anderson argues that a modern nation-state is an "imagined political community" that employs language and print culture to create "imagined linkage[s]" of cultural sameness among its members; see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983), 6, 33-36.
[50] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 231; Samuel Johnson concurs with this definition, see *Dictionary of the English Language.*
[51] Ibid; Charles Jones and Richard Vernon, *Patriotism* (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 26.

divided into two distinct categories: citizenship "defined primarily by rights," which provides legal "substance" to this "abstract notion," or citizenship defined through "specific forms of political action" and the "fulfillment of specific responsibilities" to one's fellow citizens or nation-state.[52] To date, much of the historiography of early American citizenship has focused its analysis upon the former.[53] Citizenship, Cohen and Ghosh further posit, is "not coterminous with social and class-based identities," for these "are not, after all, either necessarily or completely enforced by the state."[54] While such distinctions might be apparent within modern nation-states, such demarcations were much fuzzier in colonial British America, as the term "citizen" simultaneously referred to "a freeman of a city; not a foreigner; not a slave," a "townsman," or a "inhabitant" and "dweller in any place."[55] With this complexity in mind, I interrogate the interdependence of fellow-feeling and political action citizenship in revolutionary America. Through such analysis, I conclude that citizenship in the early republic demanded conformity to the rules and boundaries of revolutionary America's affective economies, emotional communities, and ethos of exclusionary patriotism.

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To assess properly the affective transformation of British America's imperial fidelity and subjecthood into that of republican nationalism and citizenship, I neither begin nor end my historical account in the oft-tempting years of 1776 or 1787. Rather, *American Feeling* is the first emotions history to trace the evolution of America's political identity over the long revolutionary era: from the beginning of the Seven Years' War through the War of 1812.[56] By adopting this capacious chronological framework, my research establishes an imperial origin for the early republic's affective practices of exclusionary patriotism and political action citizenship. To nuance the ideological disagreements that emerged during the formation of revolutionary America's fragile national identity, I do not limit my analysis to a single region. Rather, I trace these monumental upheavals through the lived experiences of the people of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia – three colonies, and then states, whose "strategic geographic position" and "significant leadership roles" proved invaluable to forging an independent American republic. Further, this diverse geographic net serves as a means to demonstrate both the importance and ubiquity of political emotions to revolutionary America's emergent public sphere.[57]

Beyond their cultural, economic, and political influence, I argue that Massachusetts, New York, and Virgnia were particularly instrumental in developing America's violent, national culture of political othering. By interrogating both the independent and interdependent acts of violence which members of these three states perpetrated, *American Feeling* reorients the academic discourse

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[52] Elizabeth F. Cohen and Cyril Ghosh, *Citizenship* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 21.

[53] For examples of such important works on early American citizenship, see Douglas Bradburn, *The Citizenship Revolution: Politics & the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

[54] Cohen and Ghosh, *Citizenship*, 21.

[55] For these definitions of citizen, see Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language*; Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans*, 3.

[56] This periodization arose from many detailed and generous conversations with my advisor, Mark A. Peterson. For an excellent distillation of Peterson's advocacy for this longer periodization of British America's Revolutionary Era – from the 1740s to the 1810s, see "The Revolution in British America: General Overview," in *The Cambridge History of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 1:161-188.

[57] I borrowed this tripartite analytical approach from Benjamin E. Park, whose exploration of American nationalism compared Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, see Park, *American Nationalisms*, 6. I remain in particular debate to Jack P. Greene, Richard L. Bushman, and Michael Kammen, whose collected McClellan lectures provided some of the earliest inspirations for this protect; see Richard Jellison, ed. *Society, Freedom, and Conscience: The Coming of the Revolution in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1976), 6. The political public sphere is one in which "public discussion deals with the objects connected to the activity of the state"; see Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)" *New German Critique*, 3 (Autumn, 1974), 49.

surrounding early-modern power.[58] Scholars of revolutionary America have often analyzed the different types of violence committed against Indigenous communities, enslaved peoples, imperial enemies, and political dissidents within regional or historiographic silos.[59] My research, however, demonstrates that the affective rhetorics which both incited and justified acts of popular violence against these marginalized cohorts were near-identical throughout British America, and therefore constituted a defining characteristic of the early republic's exclusionary national identity.

Further, I intend to communicate my findings to a non-specialist, public audience. Over the past generation, an intellectual chasm has opened up between scholarly and popular interpretations of America's rebellion against the British empire. Despite academic historians concentrating on the revolution's darker, more complicated themes, celebratory, founders' chic histories have enjoyed a near-total dominance over the public imagination.[60] Even more disconcerting, some scholars and

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[58] john a. powell and Stephen Menendian define othering as "a set of dynamics, processes, and structures that engender marginality and persistent inequality across any of the full range of human differences based on group identities." The "[d]imensions of othering," according to powell and Menendian, "include, but are not limited to, religion, sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status (class), disability, sexual orientation, and skin tone." For the purposes of this dissertation, "political othering" refers to the application of othering to achieve a political objective, such as victory in a war, the passage or repeal of legislation, or the election of individuals to civic office. Furthermore, as othering inherently affirms and emphasizes an "us-against-them" identity, political othering inevitably coalesces around the constructs of either nationality or partisan ideologies; see john a. powell and Stephen Menendian, "The Problems of Othering: Towards Inclusiveness and Belonging" *Othering & Belonging* 1 (2016): 17. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *The Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

[59] For violence against Indigenous communities, see Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*; Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003); for violence against enslaved communities, see Douglas R. Egerton, *Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Gerald Horne, *The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America* (New York: New York University Press, 2016); for violence against loyalists, see Ruma Chopra, *Unnatural Rebellion: Loyalists in New York City during the Revolution* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012). Jim Piecuch's *Three People, One King* places the wartime experiences of three groups into conversation, but only focuses on the revolutionary south; Robert Parkinson's *Common Cause* does look at the intentional, violent political othering of Indigenous and enslaved peoples throughout the entirety of British America, but neglects the violence committed against British loyalists. Only Hoock's *Scars of Independence* thoroughly examines the violence committed against all three of these communities, but he does so without providing any substantive, analytical claims as to how similarities between the impassioned acts violence committed against these disparate groups subsequently informed both patriotism and national identity following America's revolution; see Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008); Robert G. Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

[60] For an excellent analysis of the contemporary effects of both academic and popular debates regarding the founders' legacies, see Andrew M. Schocket, *Fighting over the Founders: How We Remember the American Revolution* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 17-85. Danelle Allen and C. Bradley Thompson's academic and popular press circuit for their most recent respective works, *Our Declaration* and *America's Revolutionary Mind*, provide a salient illustration to the intellectual chasm between academic and popular understandings of revolutionary America, specifically the *Declaration of Independence*. On January 22, 2020, Danielle Allen appeared before the Library of Congress to engage in a discussion on the complexities and intricacies of the *Declaration of Independence*, pulling substantially from her monograph *Our Declaration*. When Allen's talk was subsequently uploaded to the Library of Congress's YouTube account (305,000 subscribers), received 11,300 views (all view counts are as of May 7, 2024). On April 27, 2021, Thompson appeared as a guest speaker at the Bill of Rights Institute to discuss *America's Revolutionary Mind* and, when this interview was uploaded to the Bill of Rights Institute's YouTube account (25,000 subscribers), the interview received 4,257 views. Non-academic audiences, however, had a much different engagement with this text. On July 3, 2014, Allen provided a seven-minute interview on the PBS NewsHour, in which she discussed the major conclusions put forward in *Our Declaration* and, when uploaded to their YouTube account (4 million subscribers), it received 9,216 views. When Thompson appeared as a guest interviewee on "The Rubin Report," as conservative talk show hosted by Dave Rubin, he received a fifty-minute slot to discuss the intricacies of *America's Revolutionary Mind*. When The Rubin Report uploaded this view to their YouTube page (with 2.27 million subscribers), the interview has received 281,901 views. While it is impossible to factor in those who watched

political theorists have deployed the methodologies of emotions studies not only to depict the founders' as practitioners of an irreproachable political ethics, but also to encourage contemporary Americans to revitalize their patriotic attachment to the early republic's founding principles and civic institutions.[61] Through such arguments, proponents of revolutionary America's "new moral history" have begun to undermine over three-decades of historical consensus which, they assert, over-emphasizes the original sins of the founding era. The result, intended or not, is a dangerous minimalization of revolutionary America's white supremacist and settler-colonial cultures for non-specialist audiences. Albeit outliers within academic historiography, these texts have begun to disproportionately dominate the lessons and conclusions which the general populace learn and draw from the revolutionary era.

The first of such scholars, C. Bradley Thompson, posits that the *Declaration of Independence* serves as the "noblest symbol" of both the "American mind" and the "*moral* revolution" that birthed the early republic.[62] To justify this positive evaluation, Thompson argues that contemporary Americans must judge the founding generation's political ethics not through modern notions of morality, but rather through the founders' ability to further the "moral order" which they perceived to govern their world.[63] This methodological framework becomes untenable when Thompson examines the founders' refusal to address chattel slavery in the *Declaration of Independence*. Most of the founders believed slavery to be a moral evil, Thompson explains, but the pragmatic reality of British America's economic dependence on enslaved labor silenced their better inclinations.[64] This analysis, however, draws an unrealistic conclusion: that the founders, and the people of British America more generally, thought it easier to win political independence from the most powerful empire in the Atlantic world than to end chattel slavery within their individual colonies or their confederated republic. Massachusetts Reverend Samuel Sewall and Virginian jurist St. George Tucker serve as but two examples of British colonists who defy Thompson's depiction of an of eighteenth-century moral world order, as both men rhetorically opposed, and actively worked to end, chattel slavery within their respective colonies.[65] By ignoring the sparks of early- and late-eighteenth century

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Allen's interview live on PBS or have downloaded Thompson's interview in podcast form, one conclusion may be drawn: Thompson's public-facing interview, which was seven-times the length of Allen's, received over thirty-times the number of views. See Danielle Allen, *Our Declaration: A Reading of the Declaration of Independence in Defense of Equality* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2014); Danielle Allen, "Our Declaration: A Reading of the Declaration of Independence in Defense of Equality," January 22, 2020, YouTube Video, 1:00:57, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj_kTHa3Ggk; Danielle Allen, "Finding Empowerment in the Words of Our Founding Fathers," July 3, 2014, YouTube Video, 6:52, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkWxgr5b808. C. Bradley Thompson, *America's Revolutionary Mind: A Moral History of America's Revolution and the Declaration that Defined It* (New York: Encounter Books, 2019); C. Bradley Thomspon, "America's Revolutionary mind with C. Bradley Thomspon, BRI Scholar Talks," April 27, 2021, YouTube Video, 27:09, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ObHty5_5YQ; C. Bradley Thomspon, "Historian: Correcting Myths of the Founding Fathers, C. Bradley Thompson, ACADEMIA, Rubin Report," August 29, 2020, YouTube Video, 49:24, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-VPeg2VbT8.

[61] Thompson, *America's Revolutionary Mind*, 6; Emily Pears, *Cords of Affection: Constructing Constitutional union in Early American History* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2021), 137.

[62] Thompson, *America's Revolutionary Mind*, 1, 4.

[63] Ibid, 6-8.

[64] Ibid, 124-128; 163.

[65] In 1700, Samuel Sewall composed and published *The Selling of Joseph*, an impassioned plea to end the morally evil institution of African slavery. Throughout the text, Sewall aptly disarms traditional religious defenses for enslavement, proving that not even the Bible could defend the horrors perpetrated upon British American soil in the name of profit and power. Ninety-five-years later, St. George Tucker engaged in a length correspondence with printer Jeremy Belknap, inquiring as to the nuanced details of how Massachusetts – finally heading Sewall's pleas – had emancipated their enslaved population and successfully ended the practice of slavery within their borders. While Tucker composed and proposed a similar plan to end the institution of slavery within his own state, his fellow Virginians balked at the impracticality of the idea. Albeit both unsuccessful, Sewall and Tucker's actions demonstrate the complexity of early

abolitionism, Thompson overemphasizes the altruism of both the *Declaration of Independence* and America's revolutionary mind.

To complicate matters further, the *Declaration of Independence* provides a full-throated condemnation of political slavery, which British colonists understood as "the inability to maintain one's just property in [those] material things and abstract rights…which a proper constitution [had] guaranteed."[66] This fierce rebuke of political enslavement, when coupled with its profound silence on chattel slavery, reveals the *Declaration of Independence* to be an ideologically incongruent text. Dissonant and uncomprehensive, the *Declaration of Independence* proved itself a woefully inept at representing the complex moral worldviews that governed eighteenth-century British America. By interrogating such incongruities from an emotions studies perspective, I argue that revolutionary America's political ideology and affective discourse – including those present within the *Declaration of Independence* – inspired, with intent, violent acts of political othering against the most vulnerable and disenfranchised inhabitants of British America. The founders' motivations first to rebel, and then to commit treason against the British empire, I conclude, were not purely ethical decisions, but rather were principled *and* unscrupulous, prudent *and* irrational, disinterested *and* passionate.

Shifting from independence to federalism, Emily Pears applies the methodologies of emotions studies to argue that America's revolutionary elite "designed [their] constitutional republic" to derive its "legitimacy" from its "citizens' political attachments."[67] For it is "[w]ithout an instinctual love of country and passionate devotion to the Constitution and the institutions that uphold it," Pears continues, that "American democracy weakens."[68] Despite such a compelling proposition, a significant portion of Pears's analytical labor explores the decades following the War of 1812, which results in her overestimating the revolutionary elite's success at fostering immediate popular attachment to the republic's constitutional institutions. These assumptions prove more problematic, however, as Pears proposes renewed civic attachment as a remedy for America's current constitutional crisis. Through protracted disaffection for their republican institutions – brought on by historians' disproportionate emphasis on the violent abuses and civic exclusions which Indigenous peoples, Black Americans, immigrants, and women suffered since the early republic's founding – modern Americans "have all but lost their shared sense of national identity."[69] To restore the nation's civic bonds of attachment, Pears implores historians to craft new narratives, which depict the United States' "flaws, without dwelling on them, alongside [its] triumphs," so as to stir "feelings of pride and affection" for America's constitutional republic.[70] Contrary to Pears's conclusions, America's violent, affective rhetorics did not dissipate after 1787, but rather stoked internal political division. Instead of instilling profound sentiments of national attachment, I demonstrate that the ratification of the federal constitution first destabilized, and then threatened to dissolve entirely, the American people's nascent bonds of national fellow-feeling.

Lastly, my dissertation seeks to illuminate the origins of contemporary America's own emotional republic. Since its inception, the citizens of the United States have told and retold themselves a profoundly damaging national myth: that the political, social, and moral values upon which they erected their republic arose from disinterested, rational, enlightenment philosophy. To

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America's moral culture regarding slavery, and how even those who understood the difficulty of such a task, still worked to end the unquestionably immoral institution. Samuel Sewall, *The Selling of Joseph* (Boston: Green and Allen, 1700); Massachusetts Historical Society; St. George Tucker and Jeremy Belknap, "The Tucker-Belknap Exchange," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society.

[66] Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 233.

[67] Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 258.

[68] Ibid, 137.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

this very day, the American people continue to express dismay when their elected officials and fellow citizens make political decisions solely based on the persuasive power of affective rhetoric. Popular shock only intensifies when such emotionally motivated decisions directly oppose the interests of the deciding individual, or the constituents that individual represents. Less than eight months before the United States' contentious 2020 presidential election, Susan B. Glasser published a piece in the *New Yorker* entitled "The Trials of a Never Trump Republican."[71] Within this piece, Glasser tells an anecdotal story of Richard Berman, a "legendary Republican lobbyist turned P.R. man" who specialized "in helping food and beverage companies…fight regulatory efforts."[72] Berman distilled his rhetorical tactics for "'managing' public opinion" and "discredit[ing] the opposition before it discredits you," into a single patriotic word: FLAGS. The meaning of this aptly titled acronym: Fear, Love, Anger, Greed, and Sympathy. The political emotions and affective discourse which Berman, his fellow strategists, and contemporary politicians use in modern discourse, I argue, is nothing new to the political culture of the United States. Rather, it is the inherently divisive and erratic passions that comprise FLAGS (with the addition of horror, hatred, grief, sorrow, hope, and joy) upon which an insurgent band of British revolutionaries erected America's independent republic.

* * *

The first chapter, "God is Forgotten, and the Soldier Slighted, 1754-1774," explores the profound political changes which occurred within British America's regional affective economies of violence. Throughout the Seven Years' War, British colonists readily deployed rhetorics of hatred, terror, and horror to reaffirm French colonists and Indigenous peoples as villainous political others, whose existence inherently threatened British America's safety and prosperity. To create a universal enemy whom all British Americans might oppose, colonial pamphleteers, politicians, and reverends equated the evils of Catholic popery with those of Indigenous savagery. This systematic, rhetorical elision subsequently forged bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling among the subjects of George II. Simultaneously, these colonists began to sympathize with the sorrow, grief, and even joy which imperial regulars and colonial provincials felt as they fought and died to vanquish their empire's dangerous enemies. By engaging in acts of imperial and intercolonial fellow-feeling, British Americans now perceived themselves as both royal subjects and colonial compatriots, united under a single, shared affective identity. When Parliament reasoned it necessary to station a peacetime standing army within North America, however, colonists throughout Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia swiftly responded. Repurposing their wartime rhetorics of hatred, terror, and horror, these disgruntled colonists now branded the once beloved imperial regular as an agent of tyranny, who abandoned his honor, his duty, and his imperial identity for the promise of power and profit.

The next chapter, "I Pray God Gives Us Better Hearts, 1763-1766," demonstrates how the British empire's taxation crisis provided a rare opportunity for British Americans to forge an emotional community of resistance. Aghast at Parliament's oppressive levies first upon molasses, and then stamped paper, colonial elites deployed an anti-taxation rhetoric of hatred and fear to encourage popular defiance against economic exploitation. Simultaneous to this affective assault against Parliament, colonial elites sought to engender popular imperial love, hopeful that rhetorics of royal devotion would convince the newly coronated George III to intercede on their behalf and compel his so-called corrupted ministers to repeal these taxes. Impassioned rhetoric – to the shock of many – proved effective, as it incited violent, anti-taxation riots throughout British America's urban centers, which in turn soured Parliament towards enforcing its unpopular excise. Ironically, Parliament's reluctant repeal of the stamp tax immediately killed British America's emotional

[71] Susan B. Glasser, "The Trials of a Never Trump Republican," in *The New Yorker* (March 30, 2020).
[72] Ibid.

community of resistance. For without a common enemy to oppose, intercolonial bonds of fellow-feeling proved woefully unsustainable in the face of British Americans' more pressing, regional concerns.

The third chapter, "Their Business is to Engage the Passions, 1767-1776," details the ideological schism which erupted between imperial loyalists and radical insurgents amid British America's imperial crisis and political rebellion. Aware of the influence that anti-Parliament colonists now held within British America's public sphere, imperial loyalists engaged in a concerted effort to reaffirm their devotion to king and empire. Co-opting the radicals' well-tested affective rhetorics, loyalists stoked terror of and hatred for those defiant demagogues whose jeopardized the colonies' once favored status within the empire. The tea tax, followed in rapid secession by both Boston's tea riot and Parliament's Coercive Acts, effectively nullified any ideological advances that imperial loyalists had made within British America's public sphere. As disaffected rebellion transformed into violent revolution, the Second Continental Congress – to the shock of imperial loyalists – committed symbolic regicide. By branding George III a tyrant, and then declaring their political independence from his empire, America's extralegal congress instantaneously transformed the king's most loyal subjects into traitors, forced to survive in a treasonous land.

The fourth chapter, "A Brother's Sword has been Sheathed in a Brother's Breast, 1775-1783," recounts the violent civil war for independence which cleaved the United States from the British empire. To foment popular support, British America's revolutionary insurgents fashioned their undeniable acts of treason as patriotic, and therefore irreproachable. No longer beholden to their sovereign, British America's treasonous elite accused George III of inciting Indigenous and enslaved peoples, as well as imperial loyalists, to suppress the colonists' just struggle for political independence. To instigate wartime atrocities and to secure martial victory against the British empire, revolutionaries deployed a fierce rhetoric of hatred, terror, and horror against all three of these marginalized, anti-independence cohorts. Through such violent acts of political othering, the United States secured its political independence while wedding its national identity to the affective principles of exclusionary patriotism.

The penultimate chapter, "To Make Us Feel Our Need of Union, 1783-1788," refutes the argument that the United States became a more cohesive republic upon the ratification of its federal constitution. Despite the political and economic weaknesses of the *Articles of Confederation*, the United States did not teeter above an abyss of chaos and disunion. Small rebellions throughout America's western backcountries, however, provided an unprecedented opportunity for the proponents of a stronger national government to seize power. Depicting themselves as selfless patriots who sought only to protect America's fragile independence, these fervent nationalists inflamed popular rage for, and terror of, both anarchical mobs and the ineffectual confederation which permitted their violent rebellions. The creation of America's new, significantly empowered national government, however, failed to stifle the animosities that had emerged both within and among the individual states. Rather, popular opposition to America's federal constitution inadvertently unearthed the precarious affective foundations upon which stood the early republic's national identity.

The final chapter, "Instead of Feeling as a Nation, a State is our Country, 1789-1797," reveals the profound disunity that plagued the United States during the Washington administration. Policy disagreements within both the federal congress and the executive cabinet swiftly exposed the glaring affective incompatibilities and political incongruencies that flourished within the early republic. The vitriolic, antagonist discourse with which political elites debated foreign and domestic crises exemplified the violent responsibilities of America's political action citizenship, and then slowly eroded popular devotion to disinterested patriotism. This ideological discordance became so pronounced among the American people that, by 1797, affective exclusionary rhetorics had become

the primary tool by which both federalists and republicans branded one another traitors to their revolutionary ideals, and thereby cultivated regional loyalties and partisan allegiances.

The conclusion posits that George Washington understood well the dangers of imminent political discord, and thus sought to avoid it. Tragically, Washington's *Farewell Address* had the exact opposite effect upon the American people. Although an active participant in, and crucial leader of British America's revolution, Washington failed to comprehend that Americans had forged a shared, cohesive identity only when there was a discernable other against whom they could direct their affective rhetorics and political violence. Washington's decision, therefore, to encourage the United States to avoid entanglements in European wars all but ensured that these intense passions would continue to turn inward, and thereby doom the early republic to almost two decades of partisan infighting. The affective reunification that Washington sought for his fledging nation would not be achieved in his lifetime, for it was another war with the British empire that finally dissolved America's first party system and ushered in the (somewhat misappropriately titled) "Era of Good Feelings."

PART I:

"A Diversity of Sentiment": British Subjects, 1754-1774

George Washington embarked for Fort Duquesne in mid-April 1754. Virginia's governor, Robert Dinwiddie, had ordered the lieutenant colonel to conduct a military expedition into the Ohio backcountry with a two-fold purpose: coerce the occupying French regulars first to withdraw from the recently constructed Fort Duquesne, and then abandon the region entirely.[73] The governor instructed the inexperienced, twenty-two-year-old officer to act only "in the Defensive," but also authorized him to "make Prisoners of or kill and destroy" any French or Indigenous person who obstructed his mission.[74] Unbeknownst to Washington, Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecœur, the commander of Fort Duquesne, already had the Virginian expedition under close surveillance. The morning of May 23, de Contrecœur deployed Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville on a reconnaissance mission to determine if Washington's forces had entered French territory. [75] If they had, de Jumonville was to instruct the Virginians to leave immediately.[76]

de Jumonville, however, failed to keep his movements a secret. Mingo leader Tanaghrisson learned of the French ensign's forthcoming approach and urged Washington to prepare for combat, as he believed the French would "strik ye forist English they see."[77] Washington acted upon the Mingo leader's council. At sunrise the morning of May 28, Washington's combined Virginia-Mingo forces ambushed Jumonville's reconnaissance mission, killed ten French regulars, which included Ensign de Jumonville, and took another twenty-one prisoner.[78] In his private diary and official reports to Governor Dinwiddie, Washington detailed how Tanaghrisson meticulously took the scalps of the dead French soldiers and sent them, "with a Hatchet, to all the Nations of Indians in union with [him]," so as to recruit more warriors to reinforce their tenuously held position on the Ohio River.[79] Such ritual violence, however, created significant problems for the Virginian officer, as Tanaghrisson had killed Ensign de Jumonville after he had surrendered to, and received quarter from, Washington.[80] Walking amongst the captured French soldiers, Tanaghrisson stopped in front of de Jumonville and, after exchanging a few words, "took his Tomahawk and split [his] Head," and then "took out [de Jumonville's] Brains and Washed his Hands with them[,] and then scalped him."[81] Horrified at Tanaghrisson's viciousness, which violated all proper decorum of European warfare, Washington intentionally omitted de Jumonville's murder from all accounts of the battle. While this minor victory against the French kept Dinwiddie's land speculation dreams alive, Washington's grievous errors spelt political disaster for British-French relations.[82] The fight for the Ohio backcountry was far from over.

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[73] Robert Dinwiddie, "Instructions to Major George Washington" in *Official Records of Dinwiddie,* 1:59; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 41.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 51-52.
[76] Ibid.
[77] George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 27, 1754, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 1:174.
[78] Ibid; George Washington, May 27, 1754, in *The Dairies of George Washington*, ed. Donald Jackson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1976) 1:196; George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 29, 1754, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 1:180. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 52-53.
[79] George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, May 29, 1754, in *Official Records of Dinwiddle*,1:181-182.
[80] "Affidavit of John Shaw," in *Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, 1754-1765*, ed. William L. McDowell Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1970), 4-5; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 55-56.
[81] Ibid.
[82] David A. Bell notes that de Jumonville's death in the Ohio backcountry galvanized the people of France to rally in support of a North American war against the British and *their* Indigenous allies. Washington's foolishness at best and cruelty at worst in his mismanagement of de Jumonville's surrender instigated a profound xenophobic moment, in which

One month after de Jumonville's death, a sizable retaliatory force deployed from Fort Duquesne to assault the hastily constructed and woefully undermanned British Fort Necessity.[83] French soldiers, with support from Mingo, Lenape, and Shawnee allies, laid siege to the outpost on July 3, injuring at least seventy Virginia militiamen and killing another thirty.[84] Reluctantly, Washington acquiesced that evening, and signed the French's terms of capitulation, which forbade any British subject from entering the Ohio backcountry for one year.[85] Distraught upon learning of France's unquestionable victory, delegates to the Albany Congress hoped that Washington's humiliating defeat might stir popular support for, and thereby secure an official endorsement of, their proposed North American defensive union.[86] To the delegates' dismay, the defeat at Fort Necessity had the inverse affective impact, as it significantly weakened the colonial legislatures' support for the Albany Congress's Plan of Union. The people of British America, New York delegate William Smith observed, had let "jealousies" and "horror" divide, rather than unite, their political interests.[87] Unable to parse fully this surprising turn of events, Smith matter-of-factly remarked that popular "dread of the French [had] excited the people only to speculate" as to the forthcoming dangers that might threaten their individual colonies and their lives.[88] Anti-French dread, Smith astutely concluded, had not yet "rise[n] high enough to curb a diversity of sentiment" that had been present, since the earliest moments of colonization, among the people of British America.[89]

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the people of Franceh demonized the Britain as an empire of barbarians; see *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism: 1680-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 79-91.

[83] George Washington, June 16-21, 1754, in *Diaries of Washington* 1:202-207; "Minutes of a Council of War, June 28, 1754" in *The Papers of George Washington: Colonial Series*, ed., W.W. Abbot (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983) 1:155-157; hereafter referred to as *GW Papers: CS*. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 59-62.

[84] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 64-65.

[85] "Account by George Washington and James Mackay of the Capitulation of Fort Necessity," July 19, 1754, in *GW Papers: CS*, 1:159-164.

[86] William Smith recounts that news of "the repulse of the Virginians under Colonel Washington on 3d of July" arrived in Albany while the delegates "were still assembled," see *History of New-York*, 2:161.

[87] Smith, *History of New-York*, 2:161.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid.

CHAPTER ONE:

"God is Forgotten, and the Soldier Slighted": The Rise and Fall of Imperial Regulars within British America's Affective Economies of Violence, 1755-1774

Introduction:

Winter's chill clutched New York City the morning of January 19, 1770.[90] Icy winds whistled down soggy alleyways, and such unwelcoming weather might have persuaded some New Yorkers to rebuff the cold, huddle close to their iron stoves, and delay their trip to the market. The soldiers of the 16th Regiment, however, ignored January's harsh bite. As these regulars made the half-mile walk from their barracks to Fly Market, their boiling blood kept them warm.[91] Several days prior, one of New York's Sons of Liberty had slandered the soldiers of George III, proclaiming that Parliament had stationed them within the city to "enslave" its inhabitants and that New York's assembly now squandered the colony's tax revenue on food and shelter for the soldiers' "Whores and Bastards."[92]

Enraged and saddened by these accusations, the 16th Regiment authored a rebuttal. "God and a Solider all Men doth adore,/In Time of War, and not before," their broadside began, "When the War is over, and all Things righted,/God is forgotten, and the Soldier slighted."[93] Thousands of miles from home, earning barely enough to support themselves and their families, and subjected to cruel words from the very civilians whom king and Parliament had demanded they protect, the 16th Regiment humbly petitioned the people of New York to treat them with the respect they merited as soldiers, if not the kindness they deserved as fellow Britons. The impassioned pleas of the 16th Regiment, however, fell upon frozen hearts. The circulation of *God and a Soldier* ignited one of the most profound episodes of anti-regular violence that occurred in eighteenth century British America.[94]

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By 1770, the honorable reputation of the imperial regular had fallen into disrepute among many British Americans. Once lauded as the heroes of the Seven Years' War, imperial regulars quartered throughout British America now endured the stigma of both moral and political corruption. A mere ten years after one of the British empire's greatest military victories, the character of its imperial soldier had become tarnished by popular accusations of wanton cruelty and tyrannical ambition. To understand how this rapid ideological shift occurred, we must examine the

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[90] Frank Freeman, *Freeman's New-York Almanack for the Year of our Lord, 1770* (New York: John Holt, 1769), 9; American Antiquarian Society.

[91] "New York City, c. 1770" in *Atlas of Early American History: The Revolutionary Era, 1760-1790*, eds. Lester J. Cappon, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 10.

[92] Brutus, *Whoever Seriously Considers the Impoverished State of this City* (New York, 1770); New York Historical Society. The Sons of Liberty have a unique origin for each colony. For New York, they arose primarily from the discarded, older Whig Club of the early-eighteenth-century, the congregation of the Dutch Reformed Church, and members of Albany's all volunteer fire company. For detailed analysis of each colony's Sons of Liberty demographic, see Pauline Maier, *Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 83-88.

[93] Soldiers of the 16th Regiment, *God and a Soldier* (New York, 1770); New York Public Library.

[94] I would like to express my gratitude to the Gotham Center for New York History, which provided me the opportunity to publish a very preliminary version of both this opening anecdote and my subsequent analysis of the Golden Hill and Nassau Street riots, on *Gotham: A Blog for Scholars of New York City*. For my original blog post, see Russell L. Weber, "God is Forgotten, and the Soldier Slighted: New York City's Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots and the Affective Rhetorics of Crowd Violence" in *Gotham: A Blog for Scholars of New York City*, published by the City University of New York's Gotham Center for New York History. January 28, 2021. https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/god-is-forgotten-and-the-soldier-slighted-new-york-citys-golden-hill-and-nassau-street-riots-and-the-affective-rhetorics-of-crowd-violence.

substantial transformations which British America's affective economies of violence underwent in the twenty years following George Washington's disastrous expedition into the Ohio backcountry.[95]

An "affective economy," as defined by Sara Ahmed, is an environment in which "the objects of emotions circulate or are distributed across a social as well as a psychic field."[96] Objects that travel through such an economy – such as commodities, belief systems, or even individuals – acquire or accumulate an "affective value," which then stirs specific emotions among participants within that economy.[97] Like any socio-economic system, affective economies have an inherent regionality, and their formation and longevity rely upon participants collectively and habitually associating objects with their previously acquired values. Like ideologies, however, popular rhetoric and print media may act in tandem with preexisting affective economies to circulate and disseminate such sentiments beyond the communities in which they originated. Defined by and able to supersede regional limitations, affective economies provide an excellent methodology for analyzing the relationship between print discourse, popular violence, and political identity in British America's mid-eighteenth century public sphere.

In the decades before the Seven Years' War, Parliament had struggled to create "a common British imperial identity."[98] While British Americans felt "real affection" for George II, they "lacked a sufficient bond of union" – a sense of imperial fellow-feeling – amongst themselves.[99] Fellow-feeling – or sympathy – requires an observer "either to conceive or to be affected" by what the observed "feels."[100] Royal officials in North America found fostering this affection near impossible, as each British colony had its own political and cultural identities that inevitably hindered the development of intercolonial sympathy. In fact, colonists from Massachusetts to South Carolina readily expressed tepid affection, if not antipathy, towards the desires, plights, and anxieties of their colonial neighbors. This disunity inadvertently threatened the political stability of the British empire.

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith posits that sympathy holds the power to transform the political landscape of the early-modern Atlantic world. If an observer feels "pity or compassion" for another, then the observer has entered into a state of "fellow-feeling with the sorrow" felt by the observed.[101] To achieve such a state of fellow-feeling, the observer must allow herself to "either conceive [or] be affected" by what the observed "feels."[102] Unlike compassion or pity – which are inherently connected to the sentiment of sorrow – Smith argues that sympathy permits an observer "to denote" a sense of "fellow-feeling with any passion whatever."[103] With sympathy, an observer may develop the tethers of fellow-feeling through fear, hatred, horror, or even love and joy.

Despite sympathy's near-universal affective reach, Smith places an important caveat on its power to engender fellow-feeling: an observer may only engage in sympathy "by the imagination."[104] The emotions which the observer experiences on behalf of the observed, therefore, are inherently

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[95] Hochschild argues that emotions, specifically "feeling rules," function as the underside of ideology; see "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," 557.
[96] Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotions*, 44-45.
[97] Ibid, 44-45, 218.
[98] McConville, *King's Three Faces*, 71; Brad A. Jones, *Resisting Independence: Popular Loyalism in the Revolutionary British Atlantic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021), 5.
[99] Jonathan Mayhew, *A Sermon Preach'd in the Audience of his Excellency* (Boston: Kneeland, 1754), 34-35; American Antiquarian Society. Richard L. Bushman, *King and People in Provincial Massachusetts* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 89; McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, 66, 76.
[100] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10-12. McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, 71.
[101] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10.
[102] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10-12; McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, 71.
[103] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10.
[104] Ibid, 22.

weaker than those of the observed, and thereby unavoidably transformed through the act of observation itself.[105] Notwithstanding these limitations, Smith concludes that if "two sentiments," such as the fear felt by the observed and his observer, achieve "a correspondence with one another," then it is "sufficient for the harmony of society."[106] Even though the respective emotions of the observed and observer "will never be unisons," they "may be concords," which is "all that is wanted or required" to enter into a state of fellow-feeling.[107]

Unbeknownst to Parliament, the Seven Years' War would provide an unforeseen solution to British America's affective disunity. Victory demanded that the subjects of George II lay aside their interpersonal differences, stay (at least temporarily) their less pressing regional conflicts and concerns, and collectively resist the territorial encroachments and political ambitions of both the French empire and their Indigenous allies. Due to the war's global nature, British Americans from every colony both perpetrated and endured the brutality of combat – and those who did not enlist in provincial units learned of such violence, often in gruesome detail, from the increasing number of newspapers and pamphlets circulated throughout the colonies.[108] To the northeast, Massachusetts engaged in the systematic deportation of the Acadians, a community of French neutrals living in Nova Scotia who had cohabitated peacefully with Britons throughout much of the eighteenth century.[109] To the south and west, Virginians and New Yorkers fought to secure their frontier borders, but ultimately incurred great losses at the battles of Monongahela and Fort Oswego.[110]

Regional interests and objectives initially seemed to inhibit intercolonial wartime sympathy. No other colonies embraced anti-Catholic hatred quite like the people of New England, and while all British Americans feared Indigenous violence, no backcountry Virgnia waited with dreadful anticipation for the Mi'kmaq peoples to traverse almost twelve hundred miles of difficult terrain to lay waste to the city of Richmond. When George II finally issued a formal declaration of war against the French empire in May 1756, however, the regional, combat-oriented affective economies of Massachusetts, Virgnia, and New York already had demonstrated their latent, and still untapped, compatibility. As unintentional as surprising, British American provincials and printers had catalyzed this implicit affective congruity by revitalizing, amplifying, and intertwining long-standing cultural stereotypes of the popish, slavish French solider and his savage, barbaric Indigenous ally.[111]

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[105] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 22.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] F.W. Grubb notes that by 1760, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia collectively boasted literacy rates of eighty-percent among urban males and sixty-percent among rural one. While Grubb acknowledges the limitations of this data, due to both source bias and inconsistent sample sizes, but argues that the overall conclusion – literacy remained high in British-America, and holistically higher than in Britain itself – remain valid; see F.W. Grubb, "Growth of Literacy in Colonial America: Longitudinal Patterns, Economic Models, and the Direction of Future Research," *Social Science History* 14, no. 4 (1990): 451, 455, 448. Following the Seven Years' War, British America had approximately fifty-six active printers, which would near-double by 1790; see Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks*, 23; Richard D. Brown, *Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-1865* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 110-111. Furthermore, public consumption of print media allowed for a multiplication factor of ten to forty for each copy of a newspaper or pamphlet printed in British America; see Heyd, *Reading Newspapers*, 20, 22, 47-48.

[109] John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 282-284; Mark. A Peterson, *The City-State of Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic Power, 1630-1865* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 278-290.

[110] David L. Preston, *Braddock's Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 261-266.

[111] For the origins of British Americans' anti-Catholic hatred, see Evan Haefeli, "Protestant Empire? Anti-Popery and British-American Patriotism, 1558-1776" in *Against Popery, Britain, Empire and Anti-Catholicism*, ed., Evan Haefeli, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2020), 201-233; for their anti-Indigenous fear, see Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, xviii-xxvi, 39-71; for the cohesiveness of this British ideology, see Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 34-36.

Although acutely present throughout the Seven Years' War, popular representations of French and Indigenous peoples as villainous, dangerous political others worthy only of exile, cruelty and retribution was not a new phenomenon for British colonists.[112] From the earliest moments of settler-colonial contact, Britons viewed Indigenous peoples with suspicion and inferiority, which in turn bred contempt.[113] Episodes of British-Indigenous violence in the North American backcountry, however, remained limited during the first six-decades of colonization.[114] All that changed in 1675, when the eruption of Metacom's War in New England and Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia birthed an "era of terrors," which then "poisoned intercultural relations in both New England and the Chesapeake."[115] This vicious outbreak of British-Indigenous violence, however, did not remain confined to these two regions. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy – powerful peacemakers who controlled much of New York and Pennsylvania's backcountry – found themselves embroiled within the dangerous cycle of British-Indigenous hatred and violence.[116]

Unlike the anti-Indigenous fears and hatred born from colonizing North America, British colonists carried profound anti-Catholic, anti-French sentiments with them across the Atlantic. Hatred of Louis XIV's subjects flourished greatly throughout Britain's colonies, specifically among the devout Protestants of New England, who saw French colonists as a danger to their religious and political mission in North America.[117] By the 1680s, small alcoves of Catholicism had emerged in Maryland and, most importantly, New York.[118] In the immediate aftermath of Britain's Glorious Revolution, New York Protestant Jacob Leisler launched an initially popular anti-Catholic rebellion within the colony.[119] Leisler's indiscriminate assault against anyone whom he deemed a threat to New York's religious and political security, which included the widely unpopular yet unquestionably *Protestant* Dominion of New England, doomed his anti-Catholic crusade and condemned himself to the hangman's noose.[120] A failure, Leisler's rebellion demonstrated the latent mobilizing power of anti-Catholic, and thereby anti-French, hatred throughout British America.

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[112] Carroll Smith-Rosenberg argues that the "fabricated" political other, through its "overshadowing otherness," is "designed to render insignificant the differences and contradictions that divide [people] as national subjects." Political otherness, therefore, "mark the boundaries" of "belonging" within a nation or political identity; see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *The Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 21.

[113] For an excellent overview of British-Indigenous and French-Indigenous relations in the long-seventeenth-century, see Pekka Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent: The Epic Contest for North America*, (New York: Liverright Publishing Corporation, 2022), 97-192.

[114] Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 46.

[115] Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*, 46-47. For detailed analysis of Metacom's War and Bacon's Rebellion, respectively, see Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philips' War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998); James D. Rice, *Tales from a Revolution: Bacon's Rebllion and the Transformation of Early America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[116] Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*, 46-47, 63-66; for an analysis of the Haudenosaunee's role as both peacemakers and warriors in seventeenth-century North America, see Matthew Dennis, *Cultivating A Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Matthew Kruer, *Times of Anarchy: Indigenous Power and the Crisis of Colonialism in Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021).

[117] For detailed analyses of anti-Catholic, anti-French sentiments in seventeenth century England, see Tim Harris, "Anti-Catholicsm and Anti-Popery in Seventeenth-Century England," in *Against Popery*, 25-51; and for its presence in British America, see Haefeli, "Protestant Empire? Anti-Popery and British-American Patriotism, 1558-1776," in *Against Popery,* 201-233.

[118] Maura Jane Farrelly, *Anti-Catholicism in America, 1620-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 36-43.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Ibid, 39-40.

From 1754-1756, French and Indigenous peoples had, once again, suffered under British America's anti-Catholic, anti-savage axis of loathing. Unlike the preceding century, however, the fervent, negative affective valences which French and Indigenous peoples acquired during the Seven Years' War did not simply stir sentiments of hatred, terror, and horror within the hearts of British Americans. Rather, they provided a catalyst for uniting the subjects of George II into a single affective economy of violence. The unification of Britain's disparate colonies into a harmonious state of fellow-feeling, however, required an atrocity so horrible, so ubiquitous in its terror, that the need for continental security and intercolonial sympathy would overshadow any regional difference.

The siege of Fort William Henry provided such a political flashpoint, midwifing the rhetorical realignment and unification of British America's regional affective economies.[121] Perceived as either permitting, or worse yet instigating, the brutal murders which occurred in Fort William Henry, Lieutenant General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm and the French regulars under his command had proven themselves worthy of the most passionate hatred, terror, and horror. Furthermore, the assault on Fort William Henry birth a new political conspiracy: that the wicked ambitions of Louis XV, executed by his imperial regulars, had incited the atrocities which Indigenous peoples – be they Mi'kmaq, Huron, or Cherokee – had committed during the preliminary skirmishes of the Seven Years' War. Popular discourse now argued that the French had both the power to forge multi-polity Indigenous coalitions and the necessary guile to dupe their naïve allies into serving as blunt instruments for the merciless butchering of British colonists. By sympathetically engaging with anti-French and anti-Indigenous hatred, terror, and horror, British Americans reinforced their bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling. Further, these colonists had reinvigorated popular devotion to, and self-identification with, their imperial identity.

The collective sorrow and grief which British Americans felt for both soldiers and civilians who died during the Seven Years' War only intensified these sentiments of fellow-feeling.[122] When Britain won a triumphant victory at the battle of Québec in 1759, popular affection for the empire reached its zenith. The irradiating joy that British Americans felt towards France's demoralizing loss was comparable only to the inconsolable grief that they felt upon learning of the death of General James Wolfe, the hero of Québec.[123] Together, the bittersweet emotions of "[j]oy, grief, curiosity, [and] astonishment" sparked an outpouring of patriotic texts throughout British America, crystalizing colonial affection for General Wolfe and the imperial regulars who fought for the defense of their empire.[124]

The horrors of war and the joys of victory had overshadowed the moral and political distaste that many colonial provincials had developed towards British soldiers.[125] Admiration for the imperial regular's courage and sacrifice, however, proved fleeting. With the Seven Years' War over and France's formal surrender codified in the 1763 *Treaty of Paris*, most British Americans anticipated that Parliament's soldiers would pack their bags and leave the colonies with haste. To preserve Britain's newfound dominance over North America's Atlantic coast, however, Parliament made a radical decision and authorized the maintenance of a peacetime standing army within its colonies. To Parliament's chagrin, the presence of imperial regulars neither elicited universal gratitude from, nor

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[121] Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the "Massacre"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 111-119.

[122] For a detailed analysis of the effects of grief on combat soldiers, see Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Scribner, 2003), 39-69.

[123] For the ability of both grief and joy, when "strong expressed," to "affect" a spectator with "some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion like emotions," see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10-11; Stephen Brumwell, *Paths of Glory: The Life and Death of General James Wolfe* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 283-288.

[124] Horace Walpole, *Memoirs of King George II*, ed., John Brooke (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 3:74-75.

[125] For such apprehensions, see Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 111-120.

engendered a universal sense of security among, British Americans. Rather, the presence of these professional soldiers reignited an ingrained cultural fear that standing armies – particularly those kept during peacetime – were the harbingers of corruption and tyranny.[126]

Contrary to the near-universal hatred, terror, and horror that British Americans felt for their imperial enemies during the Seven Years' War, affective responses to Parliament's peacetime standing army varied in both sentiment and intensity. For New York and Massachusetts, the specter of arbitrary power loomed greatly, as their cities endured the socio-economic burden of quartering a significant proportion of the regulars stationed in North America.[127] To encourage popular resistance, anti-Parliament radicals in New York City and Boston asserted that the true purpose of these unwelcomed soldiers was to deprive the colonists of their natural-born British rights. These arguments acquired political credibility when incidents of violence erupted between civilians and soldiers. The Golden Hill and Nassau Street riots and Boston's King Street riot not only validated radical depictions of *British* regulars as bloodthirsty butchers, but also created an affective "rippling," as these soldiers began to stir the sentiments of hatred, terror, and horror previously reserved for French and Indigenous peoples.[128]

Unlike the anti-Parliament radicals of New York and Massachusetts, Virginians did not aggressively bristle against the presence of a peacetime standing army. Lacking a comparable coastal urban center in which to quarter British soldiers, Virginia suffered neither the economic costs nor the popular violence that plagued New York City or Boston.[129] Rather, Virginia remained preoccupied with the dangers posed by their western Indigenous neighbors. To Virginians' chagrin, British regulars not only inhibited colonial expansion into the Ohio territory, but also refused to eliminate those Indigenous raiders who targeted their backcountry settlements. Bitterness and resentment festered, as Virginia's militias engaged in an extensive frontier war against the Shawnee in 1774, defeating their Indigenous opponents without the support of a single imperial regular.[130] Victory against the Shawnee inadvertently stoked a familiar fear among Virginia's anti-Parliament radicals, one which was already ablaze in the northern colonies: if British Americans did not need

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[126] For a detailed analysis of the how Britain's fears of standing armies coalesced into an anti-army political ideology during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), see Lois G. Schwoerer, *"No Standing Armies!": The Antiarmy Ideology of Seventeenth-Century England* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 19-32.

[127] Serena Zabin, *The Boston Massacre: A Family History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2020) 68-74.

[128] Christine Mattley argues that an individual's "stream of emotional experience" is "never absolutely abrupt," but rather "arises in the specious present, cushioned by the immediate past and immediate future," and thus emotions are both "experiences and thought…feelings and reflects about feelings." The temporality of emotions, therefore, permits past affect to inform both present and future sentiment. Ahmed refers to the ability of affective values to move from one object to another across both time and space, based upon a perceived sameness between the two objects, as the "'rippling' effect of emotions." Christine Mattley, "The Temporality of Emotion: Constructing Past Emotion" *Symbolic Interaction* 25 no. 3 (2002): 369-371; Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotions*, 44-45. For a comparative overview of the Golden Hill and Nassau Street riots and Boston's massacre, see John Gilbert McCurdy, *Quarters: The Accommodation of the British Army and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 193-199.

[129] In 1770, New York City had a population of approximately 21,000 inhabitants, and Boston a population of approximately 15,000 inhabitants. Richmond, the capital of Virginia, had a population of approximately six hundred inhabitants by 1770 and Norfolk, the colony's largest seaport, had only a population of 6,000 by 1775, as urbanization efforts did not begin in earnest until the 1720s. For New York City and Boston's respective populations, see Benjamin L. Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 225; for Richmond's population, see Allan Kulikoff, *Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680-1800* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 124; for Norfolk's population, see "Population, 1760-1790" in Cappon, *Atlas of Early American History*, 97; for the urbanization of the Chesapeake, see Paul Musselwhite, *Urban Dreams, Rural Commonwealth: The Rise of Plantation Society in the Chesapeake* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 220-221.

[130] Rueben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg note that "no regular troops or officers [were] in the campaign," and this was a "distinctly colonial" frontier war; *The Documentary History of Lord Dunmore's War*, ed., Rueben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), xxv., hereafter cited as *DHDW*.

the assistance of imperial regulars to defeat their Indigenous enemies, then the purpose of Parliament's peacetime standing army must be to deprive British colonists' of their constitutional rights.

Despite their drastically different interactions with imperial regulars following the Seven Years' War, British colonists began to perceive these former comrades-in-arms as dangerous thugs, not beholden to a shared sense of imperial fellow-feeling, but rather subservient to a corrupted Parliament. While the hatred, terror, and horror that the people of New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia associated with British soldiers varied in intensity, all three colonies had cultivated new affective economies, ones in which imperial regulars were an enemy – a political other – who waited patiently to betray them to the arbitrary whims of tyranny.[131]

The Foundations of Provincial Fellow-Feeling:

News of Lieutenant Colonel Washington's embarrassing defeat reverberated throughout Whitehall. By late-September 1754, prime minister Thomas Pelham-Holles, the duke of Newcastle, and Prince William Augustus, the duke of Cumberland and son of George II, had secured the appointment of General Edward Braddock to lead a decisive assault against these French interlopers.[132] When Braddock arrived in Virginia in late-February 1755, he learned that France's capture of Fort Necessity had not deterred British merchants in Boston, New York City, or Philadelphia from continuing to trade with their counterparts in Louisbourg and Montréal.[133] Appalled by the colonies' flagrant self-interest, Braddock organized a conference with the governors of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to "instruct them" on how to expel their French enemy.[134] An imperial officer with an imperial objective, Braddock remained either oblivious or indifferent to Indigenous peoples' authority throughout British America's western backcountries, and rather myopically directed his energies toward defeating Louis's subjects.[135]

Once the governors arrived at Alexandria in mid-April, Braddock outlined his ambitious strategy: they would capture or destroy Fort Beauséjour in Nova Scotia, Fort Duquesne in the Ohio territory, and forts St. Frédéric and Niagara in northern and western New York.[136] If successful, Braddock's campaign would strike a devastating blow to France's military might in North America, depriving it of the primary avenues by which it launched incursions into Britain's colonial settlements.[137] For this three-pronged assault to succeed, however, Braddock needed to supplement his four regiments of British regulars with thousands of colonial farmers and artisans.[138] If unable to recruit enough volunteers to meet their quotas, colonial governors reluctantly authorized their provincial officers to impress those "idle elements" of society into their regiments.[139] Stereotyped as

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131 For variance within and throughout affective economies, see Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotions*, 218-219.
132 Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 67-68.
133 Ibid, 86.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid, 68-69.
137 The three regions which General Braddock targeted were those borderlands which he believed most vulnerable to perpetual French incursion: Nova Scotia, the loss of which (Britons absurdly believed) would make Massachusetts liable to attacks from the French Acadians; the Ohio territory, which shared western borders with Virginia and Pennsylvania; and New York's western frontier, which posed an acute danger if the French persuaded the Haudenosaunee to abandon their alliance with Britain; see William Clarke, *Observations on the Late and Present Conduct of the French* (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1755), 24-33; American Antiquarian Society.
138 Anderson, *A People's Army*, 37-39.
139 For Massachusetts, the average age of enlistment in the Seven Years' War was twenty-five to twenty-nine years old. While some of Massachusetts's militiamen had served in both the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War,

"hopelessly disorganized, badly disciplined, and prone to desertion or mutiny," provincials endured the contempt of their professional counterparts.[140] The near complete absence of drills from colonial militias daily routine had prevented many of British America's newly recruited soldiers from developing martial comradery through repetitious "muscular bonding," as did imperial regulars.[141] Rather, colonial provincials formed bonds of loyalty and friendship through the lived experiences of combat itself.[142] For provincials, performing the same chores, eating meals in one another's company, and surviving the horrors of war stirred an acute sense of regimental fellow-feeling; sentiments which eventually would extend beyond colonial borders to include any colonist who fought for the British empire during the Seven Years' War.

Regardless of which colony they called home, the diaries and journals of British American provincials were full of simple, repetitive, daily entries of "Nothing Remarkable."[143] If not marching, "fatigue duty" – digging trenches, maintaining roads, cleaning weapons, preparing meals – consumed most provincials' waking hours.[144] Occasionally, provincials would break the monotony of both their labor and their diary entries to highlight one of their greatest joys: a good meal. Samuel Greenleaf's entry for August 19, 1756, recounted how he and his fellow provincials "had a Very good huckleberry Pye of which [he] eat harty…"[145] Struggling to reconcile his incessant boredom with the chronic fear of impending combat, Greenleaf experienced not only physical gratification, but rather delightful comradery by devouring such a tasty dessert. The pleasure that provincials shared while feasting on fresh bread, meat, or sweet treats counterbalanced one of their greatest anxieties: scarcity of supplies.[146] To avoid starvation in the winter of 1758, Rufus Putnam and seventy other

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the relatively young age of Massachusetts's provincials during the Seven Years' War suggests that many had not previously served alongside British regulars. As Virginians and New Yorkers' participation in the War of Austrian Succession was significantly less when compared to Massachusetts, the number of provincials from those colonies who previously served with British regulars would be even smaller; Anderson, *A People's Army*, 3, 41-42, 55; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 230.

[140] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 61; Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 33.

[141] British American militias, Anderson explains, seldom functioned in offensive roles and thus, served as an "all-purpose military infrastructure" within each colony, providing "a combination of home guard, draft board, and rear-echelon supply network." Conversely, most of the combat engagement between British colonists and either French soldiers or Indigenous peoples fell to provincial armies, comprised of "men recruited for single campaigns and sent to the field under leaders who held their rank independently of the militia command structure." As militia units served as prime loci of recruitment for provincial armies, any weaknesses or flaws within individual colonies' standard militia training would be reflected within their provincial armies; see Anderson, *A People's Army*, 26-27; 75-77. William H. McNeill argues that "muscular bonding," such as community dances or marching-in-time, has the ability not only to create a "euphoric fellow feeling," but also to "strengthen emotional bonds among those who take part" in such activities. McNeill's theory, however, does not apply to British American provincials, who did not regularly drill before entering combat. Unlike the professional soldier, provincials often developed such bonds amid combat. William H. McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 8; 27.

[142] Brian Sandberg argues that the "daily skirmishes, sorties, bombardments, and combats" of siege warfare, for example, have the ability to produce "intense emotional experiences for combatants," as it heightens the "monotonous routines and horrific brutality" of the soldiers' daily-life Sandberg, "'His Courage Produced more Fear in His Enemies than Shame in His Soldiers': Siege Combat and Emotional Display in the French Wars of Religion" in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800: Practices, Experiences, Imagination*, ed., Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 128-129.

[143] Samuel Greenleaf, July 10, 1756, in "The Journal of Samuel Greenleaf," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society.

[144] For a detailed analysis of militia marching, see Anderson, *A People's Army*, 66-74; for fatigue duty, see Anderson, *A People's Army*, 80-83.

[145] Greenleaf, August 19, 1765, "Journal of Greenleaf."

[146] Carla Cevasco notes that soldiers on fatigue duty during the Seven Years' War "received only somewhere between 2,300 and 3,000 calories in rations per day. The modern U.S. army recommends up to 4,500 calories per day for soldiers engaged in this kind of work." While making contemporary and early-modern parallels like this are risky, Cevasco aptly concludes that "the underfed soldiers of the Seven Years' War would have been very hungry, and food would have been

provincials reluctantly slaughtered a "large dog."[147] "None can tell what a sweet morsel this dog's guts and feet were," Putnam observed, "but those that eat them as I did…"[148] For only those provincials who felt the desperation of hunger, and then the subsequent relief of its abatement, Putnam believed, might truly comprehend the deliciousness of a dog's feet.

After starvation, the absence of clothing and alcohol inflicted the greatest daily harm to provincial morale. In the months after his surrender of Fort Necessity, Washington urged Governor Robert Dinwiddie to persuade Virginia's House of Burgesses to furnish its soldiers with suitable clothing, for although they were "not Naked," the enlisted "teas[ed]" their "officers every Day to furnish them with these and other necessities."[149] Such repetitive harassment, Washington knew, indicated a bubbling resentment that easily could boil-over into insubordination. Surgeon's-mate John Thomas observed one such "Disturbance" in the summer of 1755, when several Massachusetts provincials, having not received their "allowance of Rum" for several days, expressed their ill-will in "words tending to muteny."[150] As powerful as huckleberry pie, the absence of provisions could cultivate comradery, in the form of discontent and disobedience, among British provincials.

Misgivings towards their material stability, however, paled in comparison to the suspicion and distain that many provincials felt towards British regulars, whom they perceived as "lewd and vicious outcasts from society," not least of all due to of the large number of convicts in their ranks.[151] Provincials specifically detested British officers, who readily administered "justice, terror, and mercy" through corporal punishment.[152] British officers believed that violence had the power to disabuse soldiers of the misconception that they were "not obliged to obey Orders" if they were "not fed with Bread, and paid with money."[153] Sleeping at the sentry post, drunkenness, theft, and dereliction of duty all received fifty to one hundred lashes with a cat-o'-nine-tails, resulting in horrendous scenes of men being "whipt" until "Blood Came out at the knee of [their] Breeches."[154] By abusing British bodies to ensure martial discipline, royal officers proved themselves worthy of not only the popular epithet "bloody back," but also provincials' disdain and fear.[155]

Despite such brutal discipline, the greatest threat to provincials' physical health was disease – an invisible enemy that could devastate entire regiments.[156] The bloody flux rampantly spread throughout British camps for the duration of the Seven Years' War, subjecting soldiers to dysentery,

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on their minds all the time"; see, Cevasco, *Violent Appetites: Hunger in the Early Northeast* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022), 165.

147 Rufus Putnam, February 8, 1758, in *Journal of Rufus Putnam: Kept in Northern New York during Four Campaigns of the Old French and Indian War, 1757-1760* (Albany: Jouel Munsell's Sons, 1886), 56.

148 Ibid.

149 George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, August 20, 1754, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 1:287-88.

150 John Thomas, July 5, 1755, "The Dairy of John Thomas," in *The Journals of Beausejour*, ed., John Clarence Webster (Sackville, New Brunswick: Tribune Press, 1937), 19.

151 Jennings, *Fortune of War*, 299.

152 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 122.

153 "Letter III" in *The Expedition of Major General Braddock to Virginia: with the two regiments of Hacket and Dunbar* (London: H. Carpenter, 1755), 14; Virginia Historical Society.

154 Luke Gridley, June 21 – July 2, 1757, *Luke Gridley's Diary of 1757 while in Service in the French and Indian War* (Hartford: Case, Lockwood & Brainard Company, 1906), 37-41; Elisha Hawley, August 6, 1755, in "Joseph Hawley Papers," MSS; New York Public Library. Seth Metcalf, July 22, 1757, *Diary and Journal of Seth Metcalf* (Boston: The Historical Records Survey, 1939), 7. Both the British army and the British navy regularly used the cat-o'-nine-tails, a multitailed whip which swiftly lacerated one's back and left painful, humiliating scars; see Anderson, *A People's Army*, 125-126.

155 Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldiers and War in the Americas, 1755-1763* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 100; for a detailed analysis of the British army's policies and procedures of discipline, see Brumwell, *Redcoats*, 100-112.

156 Nathaniel Dwight, October 20, 1755, *The Journal of Capt. Nathaniel Dwight* (New York: Tobias A. Wright, 1902), 11-12.

dehydration, and often death.[157] More dangerous, however, was the highly contagious and fatal smallpox, which regularly decimated military forces in North America.[158] Nurse Charlotte Browne observed that provincials had such a palpable "fear" of smallpox that rumors of an outbreak alone would incite mass hysteria and spur soldiers to flee from their encampments.[159]

Fears of both imperial cruelty and epidemiological suffering had the power to provoke desertion, a crime so offensive that it elicited the animosity of one's fellow soldiers and bore the most violent of corporal punishments.[160] When five deserters were caught in the winter of 1755, Charles Lewis of Virginia watched as they each received "one thousand lashes," describing their mutilated backs as "the most horrid, shocking sight" he had "ever yet beheld."[161] More often than not, however, deserters were executed, which served as both a cathartic form of communal retribution and a deterrent against such self-interested actions.[162] While British Americans understood the importance of both discipline and commitment to one's provincial regiment, witnessing these callous punishments often left affective scars. The emergent bonds of fellow-feeling that British American provincials had begun to develop, however, only strengthened as they faced the horrors of combat and the "king of terrors" itself – death.[163]

The Acadian Removal and Diaspora:

Anti-Catholic hatred, against the subjects of both the French and Spanish empires, had taken firm root in British America following the Glorious Revolution.[164] Anti-French sentiment reached a fevered pitch in 1745, when imperial regulars and New England provincials captured Louisbourg, a victory which they took as proof of the moral and martial superiority of the Protestant faith and the British empire.[165] When news of Washington's skirmish in the Ohio territory reached Philadelphia

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[157] Gridley, July 14-15, 1757, *Luke Gridley's Diary*, 42; Melancthon Taylor Woolsey to Benjamin Woolsey, June 23, 1758, in *Letters of Melancthon Taylor Woolsey, Colonel, New York Provincial Troops in the French and Indian War* (Champlain: Moorsfield Press, 1927), 10. Anderson, *A People's Army*, 104-107.

[158] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 166.

[159] Charlotte Browne observed that after smallpox arrived in Albany, all of the "New England men" left because of their "fear"; see Charlotte Browne, October 23, 1756, in "Charlotte Browne's Journal." in "Charlotte Browne's Journal, 1754-1757: with the British Army in North America," New York Historical Society.

[160] For a detailed analysis of the relationship between cowardice, shame, and the act of desertion, see Berkovich, "Fear, Honour, and Emotional Control," 97-102; Anderson, *A People's Army*, 123-125.

[161] Charles Lewis, December 6, 1755, "Journal of Captain Charles Lewis of the Virginia Regiment," in *Virginia Historical Society Collections*, Ser. 3 (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1892) 11:215.

[162] Metcalf, July 21, 1757, *Diary of Metcalf*, 7; Gridley, July 21, 1757, "Luke Gridley's Diary," 42; Putnam, September 5 and October 20, 1757, *Journal of Rufus Putnam*, 45, 47. Discussing corporal punishment, Adam Smith argues that its function, along with all forms of military discipline, are to deter other soldiers from "carelessness" that may "endanger" the safety or success of the "whole army." The "natural atrocity" of a soldier's crimes, however, is often "so little, and the punishment so great," that "it is with great difficulty that [one's] heart can reconcile itself" to such violence, see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 90.

[163] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 239; Jill Lepore aptly describes war not only as "a contest of injuries and interpretations," but also a "perversion" that "twice cultivates language: [as] it requires justification, [and] it demands description." Elaine Scarry argues that war itself serves as a "huge structure for the derealization of cultural constructs and, simultaneously, for their eventual reconstitution." To validate the actions that are necessary to reconstitute a cultural reality, political leaders and soldiers not only committed violence against the body, but also use language to justify that violence by "separating [their] opponents from the human community of shared verbal meaning" or by "repeat[ing] a wholly false tale of enemy atrocity." The affective rhetoric of political othering that British America's print media deployed against both French and Indigenous peoples during the Seven Years' War derived itself from, and subsequently reinforced, the descriptions and misrepresentations of cruelty and savagery that provincials recorded in their diaries, journals, and correspondences. Lepore, *Name of War*, x; Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 136-137.

[164] Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 213-216.

[165] Ibid.

almost a decade later, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* readily engaged in traditional Francophobic rhetoric. If losses on the frontier continued, the newspaper warned, then British colonists would be subjected to "the mercy of 'bigoted Priests' who would banish or execute" the English "Hereticks."[166] The Francophobic rhetoric expressed within the pages of the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, however, paled in comparison to the anti-Catholic hatred that simmered within New Englanders' breasts.[167] Fervent anti-popery, coupled with a robust tradition of militia service, made New Englanders, especially those from Massachusetts, the ideal fighting force to capture Fort Beauséjour.

To incentivize recruitment for the expedition to Nova Scotia, Massachusetts Governor William Shirley guaranteed each provincial not only a salary of "Twenty-six shillings and eight Pence per Month," but also a generous "exempt[ion] from Impress for Three Years after his Discharge."[168] In the eighteenth century, British naval officers had conducted routine impressment raids throughout the empire's port cities and towns to fill crew vacancies upon their ships, specifically targeting "the most skilled Atlantic seafarers."[169] These raids exponentially increased in British America during the War of the Austrian Succession, and colonial sailors and dock workers vehemently, and often violently, opposed royal press-gangs. Nowhere was this opposition more acute than Boston, whose mariners rioted for three days against the impressment activities of Admiral Charles Knowles in November 1747.[170] The promises, therefore, of both economic advancement and relief from future naval impressment proved an enticing offer, and nearly two thousand men from Massachusetts and greater New England enlisted.[171] Under the command of British Colonel Robert Monckton, these provincials disembarked from Boston on May 22, 1755.[172]

Of the British colonists who first laid siege to Fort Beauséjour, and then participated in the forceful removal of the French Acadians from Nova Scotia, Massachusetts Captain Abijah Willard provides the most intimate, affecting account.[173] It was the atrocities which Massachusetts's provincials perpetrated in Nova Scotia, under Willard's command, that fostered an affective economy of violence in which the kind, gentle, and politically neutral French colonist became a popish, deceptive, hateworthy person who deserved to be expelled from his ancestral home.

The monotony of day-to-day life consumed the pages of Willard's journal until the morning of June 4, when the Massachusetts captain began a diligent record of Britain's twelve-day siege against Fort Beauséjour.[174] After the French surrendered, Monckton initiated the expedition's

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[166] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 5, 1754; Chris Beneke, *Beyond Toleration: The Religious Origins of American Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 111-112; Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 217.

[167] Haefeli notes that, by the eighteenth century, the inhabitants of New England had become "the most enthusiastic celebrants of Pope's Day" throughout all of British America, whereas throughout the Seven Years' War, for example, "violent anti-Catholic aggression was fairly limited in the middle colonies"; see Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 209, 217.

[168] William Shirley, *Proclamation March 26, 1755* (Boston: John Draper, 1755); Massachusetts Historical Society.

[169] Denver Brunsman, *The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 2, 123-129.

[170] For a more detailed analyses of the Knowles Riot, see Brunsman, *Evil Necessity*, 228-233; Denver Brunsman, "The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s" *Early American Studies* 5, no. 2 (Fall 2007), 348-364.

[171] Enlistment in colonial militias provided young men, specifically those in Massachusetts, an opportunity to expedite their economic advancement and independence, see Anderson, *A People's Army*, 37-39.

[172] William Shirley to Charles Lawrence, May 31, 1755 in *Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia*, ed. Thomas B. Atkins, (Halifax: Charles Annand, 1869) 405-406; Abijah Willard, "The Journal of Abijah Willard" in *The Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society*, (St. John, New Brunswick: Barnes & Co., Limited, 1930), 13:16. Note: there is a minor dispute in the date of departure, as Shirley states that Monckton disembarked on May 23, but Willard records their departure as occurring on May 22.

[173] Peterson provides an exceptional analysis of Willard's journal and is an invaluable source for teasing out the nuanced rhetoric with which Willard recorded his experiences in Nova Scotia; see Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 278-290.

[174] For such monotony, see Willard, April 9 to June 3, 1755, in "Journal of Abijah Willard," 12-18; for accounts of the siege of Fort Beauséjour, see Willard, June 4, 1755, in "Journal of Abijah Willard," 19; John Winslow, June 4, 1755, and

second phase: the deportation of the Acadians to British America. While some "women and gorls" voluntarily "[d]elivered themselves up as prisoners," many of the Acadian men fled from New England's provincials, seeking refuge with their Mi'kmaq allies.[175] After a month of inadequate progress, Monckton ordered Captain Willard to assemble his men and rendezvous with Captain Lewis near Cobequid Bay, at which time he was to open and execute a set of confidential orders.[176]

For decades, New Englanders had been subjected to anti-French religious propaganda, which depicted the Acadians as "half-savage devils" who served "the Kingdom of the Antichrist."[177] These "harsh, jarring, and convulsive" anti-Catholic sentiments had festered within New Englanders' breasts for over a century and formed a powerful political weapon – hatred: an emotion which Adam Smith describes as capable of "harden[ing men] against all sympathy" and encouraging "a malicious pleasure in the misfortune" of those "who excite such a painful passion."[178] During their march to Cobequid Bay, however, Willard and his men encountered not devil worshiping pagans, but rather dozens of noncombatants who "Kindly Entertained" them, provided them with "milk and Buter…good Beefe & mutton," and quartered them within their homes.[179] This generosity evoked neither the moral suspicion nor the hatred that New Englanders had been condition to feel towards the antichrist's faithful servants.

Arriving at Tagmagoush on August 13, Willard opened, and for the first time read, his confidential and "surprising" orders: "to burn all the houses that [he] found on the Road to the Bay of verts against the Island of Saint Johns."[180] Two-days later, Willard somberly instructed the Tagmagoush Acadians to follow him to Fort Cumberland, as his men would soon "Burn all their Buildings."[181] Dismayed, an older Acadian approached Willard and begged the captain to spare his village, for "he Never had Taken up arms against the English" since the battle at Minas and had "swor[n] by the bible that he Never would."[182]A compassionate soldier who had witnessed firsthand the political neutrality and personal generosity of the French Acadians, Willard struggled to execute his orders. Imperial duty, however, ultimately triumphed over person doubt. On August 16, New England's provincials razed not only twelve buildings full of rum, wine, molasses, and iron wares, but also the Tagmagoush Acadians' homes.[183] This devastation, Willard "Confess[ed]," was "sumthing shoking."[184] Albeit easily glossed over, these three words reveal the profound affective turmoil that Willard experienced immediately following the destruction of this settlement. By labeling his own orders and actions as "sumthing shoking," Willard exhibits dismay at his capability to inflict such violence upon a peaceful village of noncombatants. By "Confess[ing]" such

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June 16, 1755, in "Journal of Colonel John Winslow of the Provincial Troops, while Engaged in the Siege of Fort Beauséjour" in *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society* (Halifax, W.M. Macnab, 1885) 4:146-147, 157-158. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 113. For a detailed account of the siege of Fort Beauséjour, see Faragher, *Great and Noble Scheme*, 301-311.

[175] Willard, June 20, 1755, and July 2, 1755, in "Journal of Willard," 26, 28; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 283.

[176] Willard, August 5, 1755, and August 6, 1775, in "Journal of Willard," 32-33.

[177] Jonathan Edwards, "God's People Tried by a Battle Lost," in *Works of Jonathan Edwards*, Wilson H. Kimnach (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 25:696. Faragher, *Great and Noble Cause*, 286-287; Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 214-218; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 282. For a detailed analysis of Boston's Pope Day celebrations as a tool of British America's anti-Catholic propaganda, see Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 204-233, for Massachusetts specifically, see McConville, *King's Three Faces*, 56-63.

[178] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 37, 68.

[179] Willard, August 10 and 12, 1755, in "Journal of Willard," 35-36.

[180] Willard, August 13, 1755, in "Journal of Willard," 37; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 284-285.

[181] Willard, August 15, 1755, in Journal of Willard, 39-40.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Willard, August 16, 1755, in "Journal of Willard," 41-42; Geoffrey Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2001), 148-149.

[184] Willard, August 16, 1755, in "Journal of Willard," 41-42.

introspection within his journal, Willard depicts himself as a sinner, consumed with personal shame and disgust for repaying the Acadians' kindness with hatred and cruelty.

A loyal subject of the British crown and a devoted son of Massachusetts, Willard continued his work displacing Nova Scotia's Acadians. As days became weeks, and then months, Willard never again recorded the hesitation that he had felt on August 16. Simultaneously, the destruction of the Acadians' settlements increased exponentially, as New Englanders razed 255 houses and 276 barns around the Minas Basin in the first week of November alone.[185] The final act of violence that Willard committed against the Acadians occurred on November 20, when his provincials "sott fire to the vilege [of westcok,] which was aboute 100 Buildings."[186] Willard's increasingly violent displacement of the Acadians suggests that he, along with most Massachusetts provincials, had embraced their colony's affective economy of violence, viewed the French Acadians as hateworthy political others, and now relied on anti-Catholic sentiments to justify the "Scheen of Sorrow" that they had inflicted across Nova Scotia.[187]

By December 1755, seven thousand displaced Acadians had passed through Fort Cumberland, where New England provincials ushered them on renovated slave ships and deported them to British America.[188] Upon their arrival in the colonies, these French neutrals faced a difficult choice: endure the unabating "Suspicions and Fear" that they, like all "slaves of Lewis," would incite both Indigenous violence and enslaved rebellion throughout Britain's colonies, or abandon their Catholic faith and swear an oath of fidelity to George II.[189] Terrified that their allegiance to the British empire may require them to "plunge [their] Swords in the Breasts of [their] Friends and Relations," the Acadians reaffirmed their status as political neutrals, reluctantly appealed to British mercy, and now "live[d] by Charity in a strange land."[190]

The humanitarian crisis that emerged from the Acadian removal significantly disrupted social norms and economic stability throughout British America. Boston, having received one thousand Acadians in the winter of 1755, felt this disruption most acutely.[191] The Massachusetts Assembly had enacted laws that required Acadian families to remain intact and to receive fiscal support under each town's existing poor laws at least through the spring of 1756.[192] Legal obligations of support and intense proximity to the Acadians, however, only intensified Bostonians' inherent distrust of the Catholic refugees.[193] One colonist sought to ignite such suspicions into palpable fear. The people of Boston currently endured the presence of "about Seventy" Acadians living "together in one house," this anonymous Briton wrote in the *Boston Gazette*, who "go where they please" during the day and are "without any Guard over them" at night.[194] Comparing the Acadians to vindictive prisoners of

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[185] John Winslow, November 13, 1755, in "Journal of Colonel John Winslow of the Provincial Troops, while Engaged in Removing the Acadian French Inhabitants from Grand Pre" in *Report and Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society* (Halifax: Morning Herald Office, 1883) 3:185.

[186] Willard, November 20, 1755, in "Journal of Willard," 69.

[187] Winslow, September 10, 1755, in "Journal of Winslow, Removing Acadians," 3:109-110.

[188] For anecdotes of deportation, see Thomas, September 10, 1755, and October 13, 1755, in "Diary of Thomas," 24, 26. The majority of Acadian refugees were deported to Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, and the Carolinas. For a detailed analysis of the distribution of Acadians across the North American colonies, see Faragher, *Great and Noble Scheme*, 355-364; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 286-287; Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 149-151.

[189] John Baptiste Galerm, *A Relation of the Misfortunes of the French Neutrals* (Philadelphia, 1756); Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Mayhew, *A Sermon Preach'd*, 37. For the southern colonies fear that Acadians may incite indigenous violence or enslaved rebellion, see Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 183-184.

[190] Ibid.

[191] This massive influx of Acadian refugees increased the city's population by approximately seven percent; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 287.

[192] Faragher, *Great and Noble Scheme*, 374-375.

[193] Faragher, *Great and Noble Scheme*, 378-380.

[194] *Boston Gazette*, August 26, 1756; Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest,* 145-146.

war, the author argued that these French Catholics would find a "a high Degree of Happiness" in "setting Fire to the Town" or "blow[ing] up its Powder House."[195] Adam Smith observes that fear of physical harm, unlike other passions, is "derived altogether from the imagination," and represents not what people "really feel," but rather what they "may hereafter possibly suffer."[196] Moreso, when fear is felt too intensely, it "is often difficult to restrain even for a single moment."[197] Exploiting the intensity of Boston's anti-Catholic fears, the author concluded that, in order to protect their city from such threats of "Popish Zeal," its magistrates must station a permanent sentry outside the Acadians' home.[198] While colonial officials took none of these proposed actions, the *Boston Gazette* had provided a platform both to inflame the city's historic hatred for French Catholics and to nurture a burgeoning fear: that these refugees, without proper surveillance, would exact retribution for their burnt barns, imitated families, and ruined lives.

For the inhabitants of Massachusetts, the invasion of Nova Scotia and the subsequent displacement of the French Acadians proved crucial in the formation of their affective economy of violence. Despite the Acadians' undeniable kindness and political neutrality, Colonel Monckton's scorched-earth policy forced New England's provincials to perpetrate unprovoked cruelties against noncombatant civilians, and thereby reaffirm and enact their cultural hatred for and distrust of French Catholics. The subsequent presence of Acadian refugees throughout British America, especially within Boston, further encouraged noncombatant civilians to adopt the provincials' affective economy of violence and concede that French Catholics – solider and civilian alike – were dangerous political others who must be hated and feared.

Massachusetts's historic hatred and nascent fears of the Acadians, however, seeped beyond its colonial borders, resonating particularly with those living in Charlestown, South Carolina.[199] When a fire consumed Beale's Wharf on June 17, French arsonists were the primary suspects.[200] Five days later, South Carolina Governor William Lyttelton urged the colonial legislature to take action "to prevent" Charleston's twelve hundred Acadians from becoming "burthensome or dangerous to the good People of this Province."[201] Fears of the unmitigated danger that these Catholic refugees posed to the entirety of British America only intensified when reports circulated latter that August that some of the Acadians who had fled into the Mi'kmaq's forests now operated out of Louisbourg, had laid siege to Fort Pisguit, and planned to capture the entire Halifax region.[202] Unsurprisingly, the only thing that terrified British colonists more than a French civilian was a French soldier, especially one who fought alongside an Indigenous warrior.

The Battle at Monongahela:

Unlike the predominantly volunteer New England provincial army that executed the Acadian removal, General Braddock commanded a volatile mixture of British regulars, provincial volunteers, and disgruntled, impressed Virginians and Marylanders as he began the back-breaking and disease-ridden march to Fort Duquesne.[203] Shortly after disembarking from Alexandria, Braddock received

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[195] *Boston Gazette*, August 26, 1756; Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest,* 145-146.
[196] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 30.
[197] Ibid, 238.
[198] *Boston Gazette*, August 26, 1756.
[199] Daniel J. Tortora, *Carolinas in Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists, and Slaves in the American Southeast, 1756-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 34-36.
[200] Tortora, *Carolinas in Crisis*, 34-36; *South Carolina Gazette*, June 24, 1756.
[201] Ibid.
[202] *South Carolina Gazette*, August 18, 1756.
[203] Daniel Dulany, "Military and Political Affairs in the Middle Colonies in 1755," in *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 3:1 (1879): 14. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 230; Braddock, *Preston's Defeat*, 83-87. Tobacco planters, such as Daniel Dulany, believed that Braddock's impressment policy was of "great injury and oppression" to the "many poor

news that French officers had begun to court Indigenous allies throughout the Ohio backcountry with promises that Louis "intend[ed] no War" with them.[204] Despite the tactical advantage of these alliances, Braddock remained firm both in his "unwillingness to trust" Indigenous peoples and his commitment to use only British-born sweat and blood to conquer the French.[205]

The evening of July 8, Braddock's forces camped at Sugar Creek and, early the next morning, crossed the Monongahela River to lay siege to Fort Duquesne.[206] When the last British soldier reached shore, a "very heavy and quick Fire" rang throughout the valley, as nine hundred French, Canasatauga, Lenape, Mingo, Mississaurga, Ottawa, Potawatomi, Shawnee, and Wyandot ambushed Braddock's fourteen hundred men.[207]After repealing the French regulars' initial assault, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage's advanced guard was routed by Indigenous warriors.[208] Seized by a "visible Terror and Confusion," British regulars and Chesapeake provincials alike became "extremely deaf to the Exhortations of the General, and the officers."[209] The Monongahela Valley then succumbed to chaos.

British regulars fired into the trees, "killing many of [their] own men and officers," and when they found it impossible to "charge the enemy with bayonet[s,]" they broke ranks and abandoned their "Artillery, Ammunitions, Provisions, and Baggage" to the French.[210] Both "gloom & horror" plagued the British retreat, as "[t]he dead – the dying – the groans – lamentation – and crys…of the wounded for help…were enough to pierce a heart of adamant."[211] The defeat at Monongahela proved acutely "shameful" for Parliament, as Braddock's forces suffered fifty-percent fatalities, which included a ninety-percent fatality rate among Virginia's provincials.[212]

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people" of the Chesapeake, as their "livelihood[s] depended in great measure" on the efforts of their enslaved laborers and indentured servants; see Dulany, "Military and Political Affairs," 14. For a detailed analysis of the difficulties that plagued the march to Fort Cumberland, see Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 87-107; 167. For an account of Lieutenant Colonel George Washington's own bout of illness, see George Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 28-July 2, 1755, in *GW Papers: CS*, ed., W.W. Abbot (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983) 1:319. Colonel Thomas Dunbar and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage argued that the first and most decisive reason for the British's poor, undisciplined performance at the battle of Monongahela was that Braddock's soldiers "were greatly Harrass'd by dutys unequal to their Numbers, and Dispirited by Want of Sufficient Provisions…", see Thomas Dunbar and Thomas Gage to William Shirley, October 21, 1755, in *Shirley Correspondence*, 2:313.

[204] "Letter V" in *The Expedition of Major General Braddock*, 26-27.

[205] Ibid; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 41-42. For a detailed analysis of France's inclination to integrate Indigenous peoples into and accept their cultures within their colonial societies and Britain's inclination either to exclude or to attempt to Anglicize or "civilize" Indigenous peoples, see James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonia North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[206] George Washington, "Memorandum," July 8-9, 1755, in *GW Papers: CS*, 1:331; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 31, 1755. Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 213-214.

[207] Ibid; James Smith, *An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Colonel James Smith, during his Captivity with Indians* (Philadelphia: J. Grigg, 1831), 19-20; Virginia Historical Society. Smith had been captured near the Allegheny Mountains by Canasatauga and Delaware warriors in May 1755, who then brought him to Fort Duquesne, see Smith, *An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences*, 15; for the French's remaining Indigenous allies, see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 99. George Washington "Memorandum," July 8-9, 1755, in *GW Papers: CS*, 1:332, n.3; Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 222.

[208] Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 233-234, 238.

[209] Thomas Gage to George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle, July 24, 1755, in "The Papers of Thomas Gage," American Series, MSS, Clements Library. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 31, 1755. Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 238-239.

[210] Thomas Gage to George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle, July 24, 1755, in "The Papers of Thomas Gage"; Roger Lamb, *An Original and Authentic Journal of occurrences during the Late American War, from Its Commencement to the Year 1783* (Dublin: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809), 39, Virginia Historical Society; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 31, 1755.

[211] George Washington Biographical Memorandum, 1786, MSS; Mount Vernon Ladies' Association of the Union.

[212] Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, August 28, 1755, in *Horace Walpole's Correspondences*, ed., W.S. Lewis, et al (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) 20:495; Robert Hale reports that 738 men died at the battle of Monongahela, see Robert Hale, July 9, 1755, in "Robert Hale's Chronicle," MSS; American Antiquarian Society. Of the approximately three

In the wake of Braddock's defeat, terror cast its shadow over the Chesapeake. Unlike the hypothetical dangers and imagined pains of fear, terror emerges from the lived-experienced of danger and harm.[213] At Fort Duquesne, British prisoners of war felt dread in the presence of France's Indigenous allies, who carried one hundred "bloody scalps" in their hands and "joy and triumph" in their hearts.[214] For those British regulars and families quartered within the nearby Fort Cumberland, news of Braddock's defeat not only amplified their terror of forthcoming Indigenous raids, which they expected "every hour," but also evoked profound sorrow from the "poor Women" within the fort, who grieved for the injured and dead soldiers of Monongahela.[215] Like hatred or terror, grief had the profound ability to evoke sentiments of fellow-feeling, as it often elicits a "like painful emotion" from those who witness or learn of another's grief.[216] It is unsurprising, therefore, that Britons throughout the empire collectively grieved upon learning of the death of the "exceedingly brave" General Braddock, who stood "heroically" with his officers as they "were massacred" on the bank of the Monongahela River.[217]

Martha Brewster's heart-wrenching elegy "Braddock's Defeat" – likely written in the immediate wake of the general's death but first published in 1757 – emphasizes the intense, lasting anguish that British American civilians felt upon learning of Braddock's "valiant" sacrifice; an anguish which transformed the "Streams of proud Monongahela" into "British Tears."[218]Although hundreds of miles from the gruesome scene, Braddock's death stirred not only grief, but also hatred within northern hearts: "New England Boys shall pledge their Cup,/And drink the Dregs of Fury up,/'Till both the Pagan and the Pope/Shall stagger at the Blow." [219] The bereaved and enraged people of New England, Brewster argues, must submit themselves to God. It is through their pious devotion to the Lord, and by His will alone, that the armor of New England's soldiers shall become "Drunk with Gallic Blood."[220] By admonishing the French and mourning Braddock, Brewster encouraged New Englanders to grieve for those Britons who had died at Monongahela and to hate their popish executioners, now worthy of divine revenge.

Like their New England cousins, southern colonists sought to understand their defeat at Monongahela through an affective, yet spiritual lens. Preaching only days after Braddock's defeat, Virginian Presbyterian minister Samuel Davies worked to elicit intracolonial sympathy and to evoke

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hundred Virginian provincials who fought at Monongahela only thirty survived the battle, see George Washington to Mary Ball Washington, July 18, 1755, in *GW Paper: CS*, 1:336.

[213] For the linguistic ad affective difference of fear and terror, see the entries for both in Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language*.

[214] Smith, *An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences*, 19-20.

[215] Browne, July 11, 1755, and July 15, 1755, in "Charlotte Browne Journal." Furthermore, Browne observed that Fort Cumberland had already become "greatly alarm'd" of forthcoming Indigenous raids, as one week earlier a seven-year-old boy arrived at the fort "with his Scalp" partially intact and his skull fractured; see Browne, July 4, 1755, in "Charlotte Browne's Journal. Preston, *Braddock's Defeat*, 198. For further detail on how women served in the Seven Years' War as nurses, laundresses, and occasionally soldiers in the British army, see Brumwell, *Redcoats,* 123-125.

[216] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10-11.

[217] Titus King, *Narrative of Titus King of Northampton, Massachusetts: A Prisoner of the Indians in Canada, 1755-1758* (Hartford: Connecticut Historical Society, 1938), 12; Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, August 28, 1755, in *Walpole Correspondences*, 20:495.

[218] Martha Wadsworth Brewster, "Braddock's Defeat" in *Poems on Diverse Subjects* (New-London: John Green, 1757), 25; American Antiquarian Society. Martha Brewster was one of the first British American women to publish her writings without the use of a pseudonym, see Gary D. Schmidt, *A Passionate Usefulness: The Life and Literary Labors of Hannah Adams* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 9.

[219] Brewster, "Braddock's Defeat," 25.

[220] Ibid, 25-26.

hatred for and terror of *all* Indigenous peoples.[221] *Virginia's Danger and Remedy*, the printed form of Davies' sermon (which rapidly circulated throughout the Chesapeake), begins by reiterating the harsh economic conditions of Virginia's frontier, where "poor Families" are placed in the "Jaws of Famine."[222] This burden is only exacerbated, Davies explains, by the "undisciplined, cowardly, insidious Savages," who raid these settlements and subject Virginians to both "mournful passions" and "indignant Mortification."[223]

To emphasize such Indigenous brutality, Davies implores his congregants to imagine the banks of the Monongahela River, where the "mighty Dead [are] rolling in their own Blood! scalped by merciless Indians…[and] the wounded [are] writhing with Pain, surrounded with all the Terrors of Death…"[224] For those who survived the initial violence, Indigenous warriors either seized them as prisoners or left them "mangled and half-rotten, with all the Marks of Barbarity and leisurely Torture…scalped or beheaded."[225] In the most extreme instances, Davies continued, Indigenous warriors would rape and mutilate defenseless British women, leaving them in "a posture too monstrous to be expressed, [with] even their Blood drank."[226] This "rhetoric of cannibalism," historian Carla Cevasco argues, proved a "powerful" tool to stir anti-Indigenous sentiments within the "colonial imagination," for it "offered" British Americans the "ultimate means for dehumanizing [their] enemies."[227] By hurling indefensible accusations of murder, torture, sexual violence, and even cannibalism not at any singular polity allied with the French, but rather at all Chesapeake "Indians," Davies intentionally encouraged Virginia's backcountry settlers and provincial soldiers to feel hatred for and terror toward any Indigenous person whom they might encounter.

The perpetual frontier raids that followed the battle at Monongahela only intensified anti-Indigenous hatred and terror.[228] Contemporaneouos to the battle at Monongahela, Indigenous raiders had committed several "barbarous Murders" in Augusta County, Virginia, which "greatly intimidated the Settlers."[229] Governor Dinwiddie had hoped that Braddock's untimely defeat would "raise a just resentm't in the Heart of every British subject" and motivate them to defend their families.[230] Augusta's settlers, however, had been "seiz'd with a Panick" and, when they were unable

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[221] George William Pilcher argues that "[i]f Davies' preaching on death and zealous Christian living was relevant to his frontier congregations, then certainly his fiery sermons on the theme of defense were pertinent and probably accounted for much of his ultimate success in Virginia." Davies' most influential sermons from the Seven Years' War (*Virginia's Danger and Remedy* and *Religion and Patriotism: The Constituents of a Good Soldier*, and *The Curse of Cowardice*), "equated patriotism with Christianity," and through such preaching, Davies became the "colony's best recruiting officer." For Davis, and for most Virginians, this notion of Christian patriotism inherently relied on the political othering of Indigenous peoples; see George William Pilcher, *Samuel Davies: Apostle of Dissent in Colonial Virginia* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971), 76.

[222] Davies, *Virginia's Danger and Remedy*, 6-7.

[223] Ibid, 7.

[224] Ibid, 8.

[225] Ibid, 9.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Cevasco, *Violent Appetites*, 130-131, 133. Cevasco further argues that the inhabitants of northeastern British America's borderlands witnessed and engaged in two types of cannibalism: "survival cannibalism and ritual cannibalism." For survival cannibalism, the "consumption of human flesh" occurs simply "to avoid starvation," whereas ritual cannibalism refers to either the "literal or metaphorical consumption of human flesh to fulfill specific ceremonial purposes." Upon the rare instances of witnessing Indigenous acts of cannibalism, both British and French colonists had great difficulty determining whether the Indigenous participants actions were for survival or ritualistic, and such lack of cultural knowledge made it that much easier to other them into a sub-human socio-political category; see Cevasco, *Violent Appetites*, 113-114; 130-133.

[228] Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 34-35.

[229] Robert Dinwiddie to Captain Lewis, July 8, 1755, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 2:91; Ward, *Breaking the Back Country*, 61.

[230] Robert Dinwiddie to Thomas Dunbar, July 26, 1755, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 2:118.

to muster enough courageous volunteers to repel these raiders, Dinwiddie reluctantly dispatched a company of rangers for their protection.[231]

Desperate to encourage Virginian provincials to exact vengeance against Indigenous raiders, Davies preached *Religion and Patriotism: The Constituents of a Good Soldier* in August 1755.[232] Unlike *Virginia's Danger and Remedy*, which encouraged hatred and terror solely toward Indigenous peoples, *Religion and Patriotism* extends these sentiments to the French, aligning Virginia's affective economy of violence more closely with that of Massachusetts. Virginia's frontiers settlers, Davies began, continue to be "ravaged by merciless Savages" and "murdered with the horrid Arts of Indian and Popish Torture."[233] Chastising Virginians' inaction, Davies then questioned whether Virginia shall endure these raids, and thus "incur…the everlasting shame" of submission to "Gallic Power" and "Popish Slavery."[234] No – Davies answered – for Virginians must oppose the "hellish Barbarities" enacted upon "[their] Fellow-Men, [their] Fellow-Subjects, [and their] Brethren" by standing with "Courage" against their imperial enemy.[235] By evoking hatred and terror, Davies implores Virginia's provincials to repel the "Blood-thirsty Savages" who threaten their frontier neighbors and to protect "British Liberty" from the "Chains of French Slavery."[236]

Despite Davies's calls for provincial bravery and violent retribution against both "the savage Indian, and the more faithless French," frontier raids continued.[237] These scenes of "barbarous inhuman murders" stirred horror and grief even within the hearts of Virginia's most stoic of officers.[238] When Captain Charles Lewis passed a cluster of deserted houses near Patterson's Creek in late-October 1755, he was "much shocked at the havoc made by the barbarous, cruel Indians."[239] Indigenous raiders had not only burnt the family's house and corn-field, but also murdered "the master of the family," whose corpse was strewn across the forest and "eaten by the wolves."[240] Later that winter, Lewis again stumbled upon another Virginian settler family, whom Indigenous raiders had murdered and scalped.[241] Aghast, Lewis described the "horrid, shocking sight" of not only burnt

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[231] Robert Dinwiddie to Colonel Patton, July 16, 1755, and to William Byrd, July 22, 1755, in *Official Records of Dinwiddie*, 2:101, 110. Colonel James Smith, whom the French captured at Monongahela and then gave to Tontileaugo, a Caughnewaga warrior, provides an account of the ineffectiveness of Dinwiddie's rangers and subsequent, perpetual raids which Indigenous peoples enacted upon the settlers of Augusta County. In June 1756, the Caughnewaga, likely accompanied by some of their Delaware allies, executed a massive, coordinated assault on the entirety of Augusta County, "hoping to drive all the Virginians," from the region. Albeit unsuccessful at expelling all Virginians from the region, the Caughnewaga took "a considerable number of scalps, prisoners, horses, and other plunder," and sowed terror among the colony's frontier settlers; see Smith, *An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences*, 17, 27, 33, 53-56. Ward argues that neither Virginia nor Pennsylvania developed the martial capability to repel, either effectively or continuously, Indigenous raids on their western borders until late-1757, as by that point they had gained significant experience by serving with British regulars; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 121-122; for a detailed analysis of the Indigenous raids that occurred in the Ohio territory from July 1755 to the end of 1757 and their socio-political ramifications, see Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 59-90.

[232] Samuel Davies, *Religion and Patriotism: The Constituents of a Good Solider* (Philadelphia: James Chattin, 1755), American Antiquarian Society.

[233] Davies, *Religion and Patriotism*, 2.

[234] Ibid, 4-5.

[235] Ibid, 3-4, 8.

[236] Ibid, 3, 19.

[237] Robert Stobo, *The Memoirs of Major Robert Stobo of the Virginia Regiment* (London: J. Skiven, 1800) 17; Virginia Historical Society.

[238] Stobo, *Memoirs of Major Robert Stobo*,17.

[239] Charles Lewis, "Journal of Captain Charles Lewis of the Virginia Regiment, Commanded by Colonel George Washington in the Expedition Against the French, October 10-December 27, 1755" in the *Virginia Historical Society Collections* (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1892), Ser. 3, 11:208.

[240] Lewis, "Journal of Captain Lewis," 11:208.

[241] Ibid.

flesh, but also of the farmer's "brains[, which were] sticking" to his shredded clothing.[242] In Winchester, the "supplicating tears of the women" and the "moving petitions from the men" had "melt[ed]" Lieutenant Colonel Washington's heart into a state of "deadly sorrow," as he offered himself as "a willing Sacrifice to the butchering Enemy, provided that [it] would contribute to the peoples ease."[243] For even the most battle hardened Virginians, incessant warfare against their "inhuman enemy" had taken a noticeable toll.[244]

The viciousness of war, and the relentless attribution of hatred and terror to both Indigenous and French peoples, had transformed Virginia and Massachusetts's respective imperial enemies from cruel to immoral to inhuman. Until the summer of 1757, however, British colonists had understood the barbarity of Indigenous warriors and the immorality of French Catholics as two separate, equally detestable dangers, which only allied themselves with one another to achieve temporary, mutually beneficial goals – such as destroying the homes and taking the lives of George II's loyal subjects. The horrors perpetrated on the shores of Lake George both reaffirmed and profoundly altered these accepted, affective truths.

The Siege of Fort William Henry:

The final component of Braddock's North American strategy was the simultaneous seizure of forts Niagara and St. Frédéric, which would disrupt France's influence over the Great Lakes region.[245] To lead these twin assaults, Braddock respectively appointed Governor Shirley and William Johnson, New York's former Indian Commissioner.[246] Commanding an expedition of provincials from New England and New York, as well as Mohawk warriors whose loyalty the commissioner had first secured during the War of Austrian Succession, Johnson embarked for Fort St. Frédéric in early-July 1755.[247] Less than one month into their expedition, Johnson received sobering news: the Fort Duquesne campaign had failed.[248] With winter fast approaching, and Braddock's three-pronged strategy in ruins, Johnson made the decision to abandon his march to Fort St. Frédéric and ordered his men to fortify their encampment upon the southwestern bank of Lake George.[249] Amid haphazard construction efforts, a coalition of three thousand French, Abenaki, and Caughnewaga ambushed Johnson's expedition.[250] Outnumbered three to one, the allied British-Mohawk forces repelled the assault, and then swiftly completed their fort.[251]

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[242] Lewis, "Journal of Captain Lewis," 11:208.
[243] George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, April 22, 1756, in *GW Papers: CS*, 3:33-34.
[244] Lewis, "Journal of Captain Lewis," 11:208.
[245] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 88-90; Steele, *Betrayals*, 28-30.
[246] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 87; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 277-278; Steele, Betrayals, 31.
[247] William Johnson to James DeLancey, September 4, 1755; William Johnson to Spencer Phips, October 10, 1755, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, ed., James Sullivan (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1922), 2:6, 163-164. Johnson not only persuaded Mohawk warriors to support the British during the War of Austrian Succession, but also fought alongside them in their raids against Montreal in 1748; see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 34-35. Brumwell, *Redcoats*, 123-125; Steele, Betrayals, 37-40.
[248] Steele, Betrayals, 35-36.
[249] William Johnson to James DeLancey, September 4, 1755, in *Johnson Papers*, 2:6; Daniel Claus, *Daniel Claus's Narrative of his Relations with Sir William Johnson and Experiences in the Lake George Fight* (New York: New York Historical Society, 1904), 18.
[250] Dwight, *Journal of Dwight*, 7; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 118-119; Fort Edward is approximately fifteen miles south of Fort William Henry.
[251] Claus, *Narrative with Johnson*, 18-19; Dwight, *Journal of Dwight*, 7. Johnson's men began the construction of Fort William Henry on September 29, 1755, and completed it on November 13; see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 118-119, 123; Steele, *Betrayals*, 62. For the ill-fated Fort Niagara campaign, and its ramifications on the assaults against both Fort Beauséjour and Fort St. Frédéric, see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 110-123. England "Rejoic[ed]" upon learning of the victory at Lake George, and Johnson himself received a £5,000 gift from Parliament and the title of baron from King

Unbeknownst to Johnson, the humble Fort William Henry would change the trajectory of the Seven Years' War, and thereby initiate a monumental shift within British America's affective identity.

Less than a year after Alijah Willard had burned his first Acadian home, Samuel Davies had condemned the twin evils of savagery and popery, and William Johnson had ordered the construction of Fort William Henry, George II formally declared war against France.[252] In response, France initiated "its most successful recruiting drive" in the *pays d'en haut*, enlisting approximately two thousand Abenaki, Caughnewaga, Huron, Mississauga, Nipissing, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi to their cause by the end of July 1756.[253] The Catholic empire's aggressive encroachment into the *pays d'en haut* unexpectedly transformed Fort William Henry into a pivotal British stronghold that regularly repelled raids from France's Indigenous allies.[254] By summer 1757, the fort's garrison – now under command of Lieutenant Colonel George Monro – comprised barely fifteen hundred soldiers, mostly underexperienced provincials from New York, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.[255]

When Lieutenant General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm learned that the majority of Britain's northern forces had been routed away from Lake George toward Louisbourg, he seized upon the tactical error. After promising great plunder to his Indigenous coalition, de Montcalm made haste to Fort William Henry.[256] Upon reaching the fort on August 3, de Montcalm implored Monro to avoid the unnecessary slaughter of his men and "surrender."[257] Over the past eighteenth months, French soldiers and civilians alike had learned first-hand of the "implacable hatred" that their Indigenous allies felt for Britain's colonists.[258] Gradually, rumors and reports emerged from French strongholds, such as Québec, that Indigenous warriors had begun to "inflict unheard of cruelties" upon their British prisoners of war, which included butchering their bodies, "boil[ing]" their flesh in "their kettles," and then "eat[ing] them."[259] The only method to deter such cannibalistic inclinations, Augustinian sister Marie-André Duplessis observed, was for "French officers…to put themselves between [these] savages and the English."[260] Anxious that a prolonged siege at Fort William Henry might devolve into an Indigenous-executed slaughter, and compelled by the "Humanity" that he felt for a fellow officer, de Montcalm cautioned Monro that even though he currently held the necessary "power to restrain the Savages" under his command, he could not ensure any future protection.[261]

George II; see Thomas Sammons, "A Narrative of Thomas Sammons during the Revolutionary War," MSS; New York Historical Society.

[252] George II declared war against Louis XV on May 17, 1756; see George II, "His Majesty's Declaration of War against the French King," (London: Thomas Baskett, 1756); Gilder Lehrman Institute; *Virginia Gazette* (Hunter), August 26, 1756.

[253] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 187; Steele*, Betrayals*, 73.

[254] Ibid; Michael Kammen, *Colonial New York: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 319.

[255] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 189; "two hundred regulars of the Royal Americans and eight hundred Massachusetts provincials" would reinforce Monro's garrison before the siege began, see William Johnson, August 1-2, 1757, "Journal of Indian Affairs" in *Johnson Papers*, 9:809-810; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 190-191; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 312-313.

[256] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 189; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 312-313. Cevasco recounts how this expeditionary force had within it the warriors of at least thirty-one Indigenous polities; see Cevasco, *Violent Appetites*, 71.

[257] Joseph Fry, August 3, 1757, in "Dairy of Col. Joseph Fry," MSS, Massachusetts Historical Society; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 192.

[258] Marie-Andrée Duplessis, "Lettres de Mère Marie-Andrée Duplessis de Sainte-Hélène, supérieure des hospitaliéres de l'Hôtel-Die de Québec," ed. A.-L. Leymaire. *Nova Francia* 4: 114; translations of Duplessis's quotes provided in Thomas M. Carr, *A Touch of Fire: Marie-André Duplessis the Hôtel-Dieu of Québec and the Writing of New France* (Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press, 2022), 220.

[259] Ibid.

[260] Ibid.

[261] Fry, August 3, 1757, in "Dairy of Col. Joseph Fry"; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 1, 1757; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 192.

Despite being outnumbered six to one, Monro refused de Montcalm's terms of capitulation.[262] Later that evening, the siege of Fort William Henry began.

After two days of unproductive perimeter skirmishes, and three days of incessant French artillery fire and intermittent Indigenous raids, Monro learned that he would receive no reinforcements.[263] By the evening of August 8, Monro's soldiers exhibited signs of severe mental and psychological fatigue, as many "had been without rest" for five nights and were left "almost Stupefied" by the violence which they had endured.[264] Although its physical defenses had held, Monro reluctantly surrendered Fort William Henry the morning of August 9, only after first securing three guarantees from de Montcalm: that every British soldiers would march out of the fort with the "usual Honours of War"; that the fort's inhabitants would receive a French escort to the nearby Fort Edward; and that any "sick and wounded not in a condition to be Transported to Fort Edward" may remain within Fort William Henry, "under [de Montcalm's] protection," with an explicit promise that he would "return them" to a British stronghold "as soon as [they] recovered."[265]

"[L]ike a true Frenchman," one British soldier bitterly observed, de Montcalm immediately "broke his word and the Articles of Capitulation."[266] After finding only a minimal amount of plunder – much less than the lieutenant general had promised – de Montcalm's Indigenous allies began to harass the seventy infirmed and wounded Britons within the fort, several of whom became victims to their "cruelty" and "avidity for blood."[267] Père Roubaud, a French missionary to the Abenaki, witnessed one such "barbarian" – likely a Catholic Wabanaki – emerge from Fort William Henry with "a human head, from which trickled streams of blood, and which he displayed as the most splendid prize that he could have secured."[268] Much like the Indigenous hostilities that Duplessis had witnessed in Québec, only the swift intervention of French regulars and missionaries prevented a massacre within the fort.[269]

Denied the trophies of their victory, de Montcalm's Indigenous allies awoke the next morning in a "worse temper," and each warrior tensely held their "tomahawk, hatchett, or some

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[262] When Montcalm arrived at Fort William Henry on August 3, it housed one hundred-fifty British American non-combatants, including women and children, yet of the 2,372 fighting men within the fort, only 1,100 were fit for combat. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 190-191; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 316.

[263] Webb informed Monro that, to avoid jeopardizing both Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, he would not send reinforcements until New England and New York's provincials had reinforced For Edward; see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 194.

[264] "Transactions at Fort William Henry," 346; Steele, *Betrayals*, 106-108. Sandberg argues that the "daily skirmishes, sorties, bombardments, and combats" of siege warfare have the ability to produce "intense emotional experiences for combatants," as it heightens the "monotonous routines and horrific brutality" of the soldiers' daily-life; see Sandberg, "'His Courage Produced more Fear in His Enemies," 128-129.

[265] "Articles of Capitulation, August 9, 1757" in "Transactions at Fort William Henry during its Siege, in August 1757," ed., Ian K. Steele, *Hunting Library Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (1992): 346-348; Steele, *Betrayals*, 108.

[266] "A Journal Kept during the Siege of Fort William Henry," August 5, 1757, ed., I. Minis Hayes, in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 37 no. 157 (1898): 148.

[267] Letter from Father Père Roubaud, Missionary to the Abenaki, October 21, 1757, in *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791*, ed., Reuben Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: Burrows Company, 1899) 70:177-179; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 197. Ian K. Steele argues that Montcalm's promise of plunder laid the foundations for the "massacre" that occurred at Fort William Henry on August 10. As Montcalm conducted the siege of Fort William Henry primarily though artillery fire and calculated skirmishes, his Indigenous allies had minimal opportunities to seize the plunder he had promised them. Disgruntled and betrayed, Steele rightfully concludes that the Indigenous warriors' assault on the infirmed and imprisoned British soldiers and non-combatants was a "foreseeable collision of attitudes about prisoners of war" as a type of earned plunder, not the product of a "drunken or 'homicidal' rage,'" as both Montcalm and historians have argued; Steele, *Betrayals*, vii, 111.

[268] Letter from Father Père Roubaud, October 21, 1757, 70:177-179; Carr notes that "Catholic Wabanakis had begun the killing at Fort William Henry"; see Carr, *Touch of Fire*, 220.

[269] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 197.

other instrument of death."[270] As the two thousand British men, women, and children under Monro's protection prepared to march to Fort Edward, de Montcalm's Indigenous warriors began to seize the officers' belongings.[271] Plunder quickly transformed into murder, as some began "to cure the sick and wounded" with their "tomahawks."[272] Once the "war-hoop was given," the fort descended into anarchy.[273] Indigenous warriors scalped and killed men, women, and children "in the most wanton and cruel manner," and then seized "all the Indians and negroes" who served with the British as either prisoners or victims to be scalped and burnt alive.[274] The most suspect (and likely fabricated) accounts even asserted that de Montcalm's "savages drank the blood of their victims, as it flowed warm from [their] fatal wound[s]."[275] Without their French escort, and surrounded by Indigenous warriors who "raged with unabated fury," the inhabitants of Fort William Henry fled into the woods.[276] Of the two thousand Britons that assembled the morning of August 10, Indigenous warriors killed approximately 185 and took another three to five hundred captive, as the remaining escapees sought refuge either with the French or, if lucky, in Fort Edward.[277] Three months after "the loss of so many brave fellows, murdered in cold blood," Lieutenant Monro died of "a broken heart" – the final fatality of the siege of Fort William Henry.[278]

The brutal violence that erupted within Fort William Henry bore a striking resemblance to the sack of Fort Oswego, which de Montcalm had overseen one year earlier. When British Lieutenant Colonel John Littlehales ceded Fort Oswego to de Montcalm in mid-August 1756, the terms of capitulation required all Britons to surrender themselves as French prisoners of war, yet

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[270] Fry, August 10, 1757, in "Diary of Fry."

[271] Jonathan Carver, *Travels through the Interior Parts of North America* (London: J. Walter, 1778), 316-317; New York Historical Society; Fry, August 10, 1757, in "Diary of Fry"; "Journal Kept during the Siege," 150.

[272] Ibid.

[273] Carver, *Travel through North America*, 319.

[274] The primary characteristic of a siege narrative, Sandberg argues, to "provoke a range of powerful emotional responses among readers: anger, outrage, fear, terror, disgust, sympathy or sadness." Carver provokes such intense emotions in his account of the siege of For William Henry, Steele argues, to achieve two purposes: "to exonerate himself from any suspicion that he had fled" the impending slaughter "in cowardice," and "to demonstrate the savage ferocity of the Indians," which the French "tacitly permitted." Albeit Carver was successful at absolving himself from the shame of cowardice, Steele correctly argues that the hyperbolic and exaggerated rhetoric with which Carver depicts Indigenous warriors' actions promotes an inaccurate and stereotypical belief that "Indian savagery [was] uncontrollable." For a more accurate narrative, Steele recommends the account of Colonel Joseph Fry; see Carver, *Travel through North America,* 319-320; Fry, August 10, 1757, in "Diary of Fry"; ""Journal Kept during the Siege," 150. Sandberg, "His Courage Produce More Fear," 132; Steele, *Betrayals*, 158-160, 167-170. With all of this mind, the *Maryland Gazette* does posit that Indigenous warriors killed or took captive at least seventy of the eighty British women and children within the fort; *Maryland Gazette*, August 25, 1757.

[275] Carver*, Travel through North America*, 319; Letter from Father Père Roubaud, October 21, 1757, in *Jesuit Relations*, 70:124-127, Cevasco argues that although Roubaud and Carver "certainly exaggerated their descriptions of Indigenous ritual cannibalism" in their accounts of the siege of Fort William Henry, their "accounts echoed those of earlier times," specifically accounts of the ritual cannibalism of the Wendat and Haudenosaunee, which seem to have been "based to some degree on actual practices." Such complexity and confusion become only more acute as Cevasco notes that white settler-colonists had a difficultly discerning, with any degree of accuracy or consistency, the difference between ritual cannibalism and survival cannibals among Indigenous communities; see Cevasco, *Violent Appetites*, 113-114; 129.

[276] Fry, August 10, 1757, in "Diary of Fry"; Hale, August 9, 1757, in "Robert Hale's Chronicles"; "Journal Kept during the Siege," 150; Carver, *Travel through North America*, 324.

[277] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 198

[278] Carver, *Travel through North America*, 325. Carver's claim that Monro died of a "broken heart" acknowledges the traumatic effect of survivor's guilt, which often consumes veterans' daily lives and, in the most extreme examples, could strip them of the will to live; see Jonathan Shay, *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Home Coming* (New York: Scribner, 2002), 76-81.

with the right to retain their personal belongings while held captive at Montréal.[279] As de Montcalm's captives began their relocation to Fort Ontario, an unknown number of "Intoxicated" British soldiers made such a ruckus that they attracted the ire of the French's Abenaki, Algonquin, Haudenosaunee, and Nipissing allies.[280] Already displeased that de Montcalm's negotiated a surrender which had deprived them the their duly earned spoils, these Indigenous warriors began to loot, and in some instances murder, not only the drunken British soldiers, but also some infirmed civilians who had evacuated the fort.[281] Although reports approximated thirty to one hundred fatalities, British officers formally acknowledged the effort of French regulars to protect their prisoners, even at risk of their own lives.[282] de Montcalm himself reluctantly confessed that it all but impossible not to "tolerate a little plunder" from Indigenous allies, as it was their "custom."[283] Despite such grim pragmatism, de Montcalm earnestly worked to save the lives of as many British prisoners as possible after capturing Fort Oswego, even purchasing some of those whom his Indigenous allies had claimed as captives.[284]

Fascinatingly, the siege of Fort Oswego had the affective potential to elicit a massive outpouring of intercolonial sympathy. "A Journal of the Siege of Oswego" lambasted de Montcalm, accusing the French general of offering at least twenty New Jersey colonists to his Indigenous allies as a reward for their service.[285] These accusations of corruption, guile, and deception against de Montcalm's failed to reach most of North America, however, as the journal circulated primarily throughout London's public sphere. Pennsylvanian Robert Eastburn corroborated much of the journal's anti-French vilification, yet he did not boast an eye-witness perspective, for he was already a prisoner in Montréal when Fort Oswego fell.[286] Limited by either geography or authority, these anti-French narratives had minimal impact on British America's affective discourse.

Echoing reports from the fall of Fort Oswego, de Montcalm argued that he had worked fervently to prevent the slaughter of Britons in Fort William Henry.[287] Privately, de Montcalm remarked that the "detestable situation" at the fort had made France's "victory sorrowful to the victorious."[288] Despite such compassionate rhetoric, de Montcalm publicly absolved himself of any responsibility for the bloodshed, blaming the massacre on Indigenous intoxication, the disobedience

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[279] Timothy J. Shannon, "French and Indian Cruelty?: The Fate of the Oswego Prisoners of War, 1756-1758," *New York History* 95 no. 3 (2014): 386-387; Steele, Betrayals, 109-110.

[280] Stephen Cross, "Journal of Stephen Cross of Newbury Port, Entitled 'Up to Ontario,' The Activities of Newburyport Shipbuilders in Canada in 1756," August 14, 1756, ed. Sarah E. Mulliken, *Essex Institute Historical Collection* 76 (1940):16-17; Shannon, "French and Indian Cruelty?", 388.

[281] Ibid.

[282] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 295-296; Steele, *Betrayals*, 79; Shannon, "French and Indian Cruelty?", 389

[283] Louis-Joseph de Montcalm to Count d'Argenson, August 25, 1756, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History* 10:464. Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 295-296; Steele, *Betrayals*, 79; Shannon, "French and Indian Cruelty?", 389

[284] Steele, *Betrayals*, 79.

[285] "Journal of the Siege of Oswego," in *Military History of Great Britain, for 1756, 1757* (London: J. Millain, 1757), 41-42, Beinecke Library, Yale University; Shannon, "French and Indian Cruelty?", 389-390.

[286] Robert Eastburn tells the same narrative as the British officer, but recounts that Montcalm offered fifteen boys, rather than twenty men, in his reward to his Indigenous allies; see Eastburn, *A Faithful Narrative of the many Dangers and Sufferings, as well as wonderful Deliverances of Robert Eastburn, during his Captivity among the Indians* (Philadelphia: William Dunlap, 1758), 31; American Antiquarian Society; Shannon, "French and Indian Cruelty?", 389-390.

[287] Louis-Joseph de Montcalm to Daniel Webb, August 14, 1757, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed., Edmund B. O'Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1855), 10:618.

[288] Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, *Journal du marquis de Montcalm durant ses campagnes au Canada de 1756 à 1760. In Collection des manuscrits du maréchal de Lévis,* vol. 7, ed. Henri-Raymond Casgrain (Montreal: Imprimerie de L.-J. Demers et Frère, 1895) 7:292-293; translation provided by Carr, *Touch of Fire*, 220. Montcalm even argued that those Indigenous peoples who died from smallpox (supposedly caught from the infirmed within Fort William Henry) brought such disease upon themselves for not abiding to *his* terms of capitulation. Albeit a historical fallacy, it reflects the degree to which Montcalm personally opposed to his Indigenous allies' actions; see Dowd, *Groundless*, 49-57, 290-291.

of Monro's soldiers, and an Abenaki grudge held against a group of Massachusetts provincials.[289] Although French regulars and Catholic missionaries likely saved hundreds of British lives within Fort William Henry, the witnessed malice of Indigenous warriors, when coupled with de Montcalm's perceived betrayal, unleashed a profound, anti-French horror throughout British America.

Individuals may acquire the sentiment of horror, Adam Smith explains, when their "disposition" to the "odious" passions – "anger, hatred, envy, malice, and revenge" – become so excessive that they "break the bands of human society."[290] The "heart[s]" of those who witness such acts of "perfidy and cruelty" then will oppose those "detestable sentiments…and renounces with horror and abomination all fellow-feeling" with any who partook in these detestable actions. [291] For an individual or group to acquire as unforgivable a sentiment as horror, they first must acquire the designation of political other. Indigenous and French peoples already had inhabited that status, to varying degrees, within British America's regional affective economies of violence.

Newspapers in both New York City and Boston dripped with visceral, horror-attributing rhetoric that paralleled the journals and diary entries of those who had survived this alliance of "the antichrist and the Heathen."[292] The *New York Gazette* argued that French officers had loosed "their Indian Blood-Hounds" upon the British people with intentionality at Lake George.[293] Furthermore, the article drew parallels between the violence suffered at Fort William Henry and the "horrible massacre" of Braddock's men at the Monongahela, implying that most, if not all, Indigenous atrocities committed during the current war occurred at the behest of the French.[294] To dehumanize these Indigenous warriors even further, the *New York Gazette* emphasized the violence perpetrated against both women, who had their throats slit, "their Bellies ript open, their Bowels torn out and thrown upon the Faces of their dead and dying Bodies," and children, who had their "their Brains beat out against Trees or Stones."[295] Only inhuman, horrible savages, the *New York Gazette* concluded, could commit such atrocities against defenseless noncombatants.

Like the sermons of Samuel Davies, the *New York Gazette* not only presented Indigenous warriors as gleeful perpetrators of barbaric violence, but also vilified the French, whose officers had made "the present War as bloody and destructive as possible."[296] "To what a Pitch of Perfidy and Cruelty [has] the French Nation arrived," the newspaper argued, that even "ancient Heathens [would] shudder with Horror" upon learning of the atrocities incited at Fort William Henry.[297] While it is difficult for the honorable Briton to "to kill [an] Enemy" who "lies at his Feet begging for life," the *New York Gazette* reluctantly conceded that British provincials, in order to "prevent the further shedding of Innocent blood," must develop an unflinching willingness to make "severe Examples"

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[289] Carr, *Touch of Fire*, 220; Montcalm observed that the Abenaki sought revenge against the Massachusetts provincials, as several colonists had murdered one of their leaders earlier that year.

[290] For detailed examples of how horror breaks the bonds of fellow-feeling, see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 75-76, 243, 323.

[291] Ibid, 75-76.

[292] Remarkably, this quote comes from the private diary of Rhode Island colonists Sarah Osborn, only days after the siege of Fort William Henry, reaffirming the general atmosphere of British America's political culture to encourage and reinforce the duality, and mutually reinforcing nature of, French and Indigenous evils; see Sarah Osborn, "Diary, May 9 to November 6, 1757," August 13 and August 19, 1757, MSS; Beinecke Library, Yale University; Catherine A. Brekus, *Sarah Osborn's World: The Rise of Evangelical Christianity in Early America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 232; Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?", 218. *New York Gazette*, *or Weekly Post-Boy*, August 22, 1757; *New York Mercury*, August 22, 1757; *Boston Gazette*, August 29, 1757, *Boston Post-Boy*, August 29, 1757.

[293] *New York Gazette*, *or Weekly Post-Boy*, August 22, 1757.

[294] Ibid.

[295] Ibid.

[296] Ibid.

[297] Ibid.

of their "inhuman Enemies"[298] Unworthy of sympathy and now striped of their humanity, the French and their Indigenous allies – at least in New York City – stirred sentiments of horror.

As the *New York Gazette*'s "A Pitch of Perfidy and Cruelty" circulated throughout British America, anti-Catholic, anti-Indigenous sentiments heightened in both New England and throughout the Chesapeake.[299] On April 24, 1758, the *New York Mercury* reprinted a letter sent to the editors of the *Boston Gazette*, which rebuked the French for using "their Pretensions to superior Politeness and Humanity" to obfuscate their true passion: refining the "Barbarism" of their ancestors.[300] French colonists had a unique "Advantage" in their immoral mission, this Bostonian argued, as they could convince "the poor Indians, whom they have cheated and abused, and seduced," to serve as "their Butchers."[301] The slaughter at Fort William Henry occurred only because the French had "persuade[d] a poor ignorant People that they shall be largely rewarded in heaven" for enacting the horrid, soul-damning crimes of a popish king.[302] These Indigenous peoples, the *Boston Gazette* concluded, had become nothing more than unthinking puppets who executed France's devilish desires.[303] Anti-French hatred had grown so potent in Massachusetts that, in accordance with the *New York Gazette*, its colonists had begun to blame the French for inciting the horrors that Indigenous peoples had perpetrated not simply at Fort William Henry, but rather during the entire Seven Years' War.

Unlike their urban cousins, the Chesapeake's western settlers lived in daily terror of Indigenous violence, as thus responded to the siege of Fort Willaim Henry with an untampered, unequaled vitriol. To encourage, yet again, Virginians to take up arms in defense of their colony, Samuel Davies preached *The Curse of Cowardice* in May 1758. When hostile enemies "invade our Country… ravage our Frontiers, butcher our Fellow-Subjects, or confine them in a barbarous Captivity in the Dens of Savages," Davies proclaimed, then "the Sword" becomes "consecrated to God" and "the Art of War becomes a part of our Religion.[304] The "Barbarities and Depredations" that "a mongrel Race of Indian Savages and French Papists have perpetrated" upon Virginia's western frontier, Davies continued, had forced countless Britons to endure the "painful Ruptures of Heart from Heart."[305] Sympathetic hatred and grief, Davies argued, must awaken within the people of Virginia a renewed devotion to fight, and to die if necessary, to protect not only their neighbors, but every British colonist loyal to their beloved empire.

The need for proper frontier defenses remained immediate, Davies continued, as French instigated "horrors" may be happening contemporaneously to this sermon: "savage Shouts and Whoops of Indians" may be mixing with "the Screams and Groans of some butchered

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[298] *New York Gazette*, *or Weekly Post-Boy*, August 22, 1757; a "betrayal" of what soldiers perceive to be morally "right," and the rage or grief that accompanies such betrayal, often instigates revenge killings; see Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, 5-14.
[299] The *New York Gazette*'s "Pitch of Perfidy and Cruelty" article was reprinted in the following: *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 25, 1757; *Boston Gazette*, August 29, 1757; *Boston Post-Boy and Weekly Advertiser*, August 29, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, September 1, 1757; *New Hampshire Gazette*, September 21, 1757; *London General Evening Post*, October 11, 1757.
[300] *New York Mercury*, April 24, 1758.
[301] Ibid; despite its offensive infantilization of Indigenous peoples, there is some truth in this observation. As Jennings argues, the supposed "'war-loving Indian savages' most earnestly desired to keep out" of the Seven Years' War, and reluctantly joined only after intense pressure from both French and British officials; Jennings, *Fortune of Empire*, 171-172.
[302] Ibid.
[303] Indigenous peoples, as David L. Preston argues, "were not subservient auxiliaries" to either the British or the French's military strategies or political ambitions, "but rather autonomous warriors fighting for their own goals"; a reality of which most provincial soldiers and imperial regulars would have been keenly aware after only a few months of military service; see David L. Preston, "'Make Indians of Whie Men': British Soldiers and Indian Warriors from Braddock's to Forbes's Campaigns, 1755-1758," *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 74, no. 3 (2007): 295; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 43.
[304] Samuel Davies, *The Curse of Cowardice* (Boston: Z. Fowel and S. Draper, 1759), 6; American Antiquarian Society, 3.
[305] Davies, *Curse of Cowardice*, 8-9.

family…perhaps some tender delicate Creature may be suffering an involuntary Prostitution to savage Lust"; perhaps some "miserable Briton or Virginia" may be subjected to an Indigenous warrior's "infernal Art of Torture"; or maybe "some helpless Children" are now "torn from the Arms of their murdered Parents" and will "receive their Education among Barbarians."[306] It is imperative, Davies concluded, that Virginians follow New England's example, for only a robust colonial military force – willing to follow the *New York Gazette's* plea and make "severe Examples" of their "inhuman Enemies" – might curb the Indigenous warrior's horror-inducing "Thirst for Blood," now unleashed by France's "Ambition and Avarice."[307]

Perhaps the most galvanizing, affective text that intertwined anti-Indigenous and anti-French horror was John Maylem's autobiographic poem, *Gallic Perfidy* (1758).[308] A native son of Rhode Island, Maylem found himself overwhelmed with a sense of both colonial patriotism and imperial pride following the British empire's conquest of Fort Beauséjour in June 1755.[309] When Britain formally declared war against France, Maylem traveled to Boston to enlist in its provincial army.[310] A likely participant in Governor Shirley's expedition to Crown Point, Maylem eventually found himself attached to Colonel Joseph Fry's Massachusetts regiment, which had been stationed at Fort William Henry when de Montcalm laid siege to, and razed, the British stronghold.

Unsurprisingly, the majority of *Gallic Perfidy* recounts the brutalization that British colonists suffered from the "Savage Foe" who had made de Montcalm's victory possible: "Now behold Hell's swarthy Allies dire,/Visage foul, and horrid awful Grin'/Red, Black, and green besmear'd their mighty Fronts;/With snaky Braids, and dreadful Ornament,/And pitchy Feathers platted on their Hair;/Obscene and naked, daub'd with various Paints."[311] Half-naked, covered in war paint, and adorned with "snaky" braids and "Feathers," Maylem dehumanizing description of these Indigenous warriors foreshadows the "*Canadian* Rage,/And murd'rous Shafts" that these "Fiends of Hell" let loose upon their "unforewarn'd defenceless Prey."[312] Fervently aligned with British America's anti-Indigenous sentiments of hatred and terror, the ensign's poem unflinchingly depicted a merciless "Scene of Horror," as a "Flood of streaming Gore/and vital Carnage" consumed the fort.[313]

As imperial regulars and British civilians alike became "hapless Victims" to such "Savage Furies," a sorrowful, cacophonous melody arose, comprised of "Mother's Shrieks, and Father's manlier Grief,/And Childrens Screams, and Soldiers dying Groans."[314] Desperately seeking "Asylum," some terrified Britons then fled into the "Woods and miry Swamps," while others sought alcoves and nooks throughout the fort itself, hopeful that they would remain unnoticed amongst the havoc.[315] For those lucky enough to survive as captives of the French, imprisonment at Montréal brought its own horrors. Maylem recounts, with graphic detail, how one of de Montcalm's Indigenous "inhuman Banditti" eagerly "Ript up the Bowls" of a British colonist and, in view of his fellow prisoners, "varacious sawllow'd" his "beating Heart/(Yet warm with parting Life)."[316] Even the poem's cover, emblazoned with a woodcut of a battle-ready Indigenous warrior, visually reinforced British America's anti-Indigenous hatred, terror, and horror (see Figure 1.1).

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306 Davies, *Curse of Cowardice*, 8-9.
307 Ibid, 10.
308 John Maylem, *Gallic Perfidy: A Poem* (Boston: Benjamin Mecon, 1758), 1; American Antiquarian Society.
309 Lawrence Counselman Wroth, "John Maylem: Poet and Warrior," in *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, ed. Allyn Bailey Forbes, (Boston: D.B. Updike, Merrymount Press, 1937), 32:87, 95, 98-99
310 Wroth, "Maylem: Poet and Warrior," 32:98-99.
311 Maylem, *Gallic Perfidy*, 9.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid, 10
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid, 15.



Figure 1.1: John Maylem. *Gallic Perfidy: A Poem*. Boston: Benjamin Mecon, 1758.
Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

The cover of *Gallic Perfidy*, however, simultaneously complicates Maylem's anti-Indigenous affective arguments. The juxtaposition of the Indigenous warrior to the poem's title, "Gallic Perfidy," implicitly prepares its reader for the central, yet briefly discussed, argument of the text: that General de Montcalm, not the Abenaki, Huron, and Potawatomi who fought on his behalf, bears the foremost guilt for inciting the slaughter within Fort William Henry. For it was de Montcalm's "Breach of plighted Faith" and shameless violation of proper martial decorum that had condemned scores of Britons to deaths at the cruel hands of France's obedient, Indigenous allies.[317] Desperate to survive the "fearful Horror" that engulfed the fort, Maylem watched as his fellow Britons supplicated themselves to their mortal enemies and, upon "bended Knees," begged for "Gallic Aid."[318] According to Maylem, such humble pleas for mercy were in "vain," as French regulars passively watched the bloodshed unfold, neither staying the violence nor shielding their British prisoners from Indigenous arrows and hatchets.[319] Providing an affecting crescendo to his poignant, anti-Catholic rhetoric, Maylem declared that the horrors unleashed within the walls of Fort William

[317] Maylem, *Gallic Perfidy*,, 7-8. Although Maylem never mentions Montcalm by name within *Gallic Perfidy*, as a solider himself, he understood that any accusations of inaction, or worse yet deception, against French soldiers would result in fierce condemnations from the British people of the French force's commanding officer.
[318] Ibid, 11.
[319] Ibid, 11.

Henry arose not from the Indigenous warriors' inherit barbarity, to which so many British Americans had become accustomed, but from the "Amazing Perfidy" of the French empire.[320]

Maylem's depiction of the siege at Fort William Henry in *Gallic Perfidy*, more so than any other contemporary political text, transformed the soldiers of Louis XV into undeniable political others, whose unparalleled cruelty now elicited intercolonial sympathy from every British colonist. Furthermore, Maylem's rebuke of the French regulars at Fort William Henry tacitly discredited the martial honor and respectability of General de Montcalm. Albeit not mentioned once by name within his poem, Maylem knew – as a soldier himself – that any accusations of impropriety or deception against French regulars at Fort William Henry inevitably would fall upon their commanding officer. Through this implicit, yet impassioned, condemnation, *Gallic Perfidy* cast de Montcalm not simply as the embodiment of anti-French horror, terror, and hatred, but rather as the paramount villain of the Seven Years' War, against whose wickedness British Americans would forge their strongest bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling.

By mid-1758, the French and their Indigenous allies had acquired, to varying degrees, the affective values of hatred, terror, and horror throughout New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts. The inherent compatibility of these regional affective economies of violence resulted in a rhetorical homogeneity across British America, in which publicly disseminated text had the discursive power to depict, and then encourage the popular characterization of, both French and Indigenous peoples as inhuman, political others. Albeit unintentional, these experiences laid the foundations for British Americans to view one another not simply as neighbors or strategic allies, but rather as brethren, beholden to one another through their imperial affection and devotion. To solidify this emergent sense of both intercolonial and imperial fellow-feeling, British Americans needed to share in not only the suffering and grief of combat, but also the bittersweet fruits of victory. Such orchards soon bloomed upon the Plains of Abraham.

The Apotheosis of James Wolfe, the Savior of British America:

By the publication of *Gallic Perfidy*, the British empire had fallen to its martial nadir. The conflict that had "raged with great violence" across British America for the past three-and-a-half years had incurred considerable "losses and disgraces" for the empire.[321] To reverse the tides of war, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, William Pitt, enacted an unorthodox military strategy: transform the Seven Years' War into a truly global conflict.[322] Through "vigorous effort" and meticulous planning, Pitt disrupted France's transatlantic supply chains while executing calculated strikes against its colonies in both the West Indies and West Africa.[323] By overextending France's forces, Pitt secured crucial North American victories at Louisbourg, Fort Duquesne, and Fort Frontenac, which sparked a "general flame" of patriotism throughout the empire.[324]

Patriotism, Adam Smith observed, is a peculiar sentiment, as "love of [one's] own country seems not to be derived from the love of mankind.[325] Rather, the patriot loves their empire or nation "for its own sake," independent of any consideration for the good of humanity, as such love often emerges from "[n]ational prejudices and hatred," as well as "the most malignant jealousy and envy"

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[320] Maylem, *Gallic Perfidy*, 7-8; for the long history of anti-Catholic rhetoric in British American political poems, specifically the term "Gallic Perfidy," see Shields, *Oracle of Empire*, 195-220.
[321] Marinus Willett, *A Narrative of the Military Action of Colonel Marinus Willett* (New York: G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1831), 10.
[322] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 212-214.
[323] Ibid.
[324] Willett, *Narrative of Military Actions*, 10; *On the Landing of Troops in Boston, 1758* (Boston, 1758); American Antiquarian Society. For detailed accounts of the Britain's victories at Louisbourg, Fort Duquesne, and Fort Frontenac, see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 250-257, 259-286.
[325] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228-229.

of one's neighbors.[326] Patriotic fervor, however, holds within it the power to soften even the deepest of internal prejudices, as even the people of Boston – who had remained apprehensive of the immorality of imperial regulars – now welcomed them into their city with "merry heart[s]."[327] The intense horror now associated with both French and Indigenous peoples had overshadowed any previous reservations held for Britain's professional soldiers: "No Brauls or Fighting was there seen,/None wish'd his Brother ill:/Their Swords were made the French to cut,/And not each other Kill."[328] Devastating violence and glorious victories had stirred, unintentionally, newfound fraternal affection among all Britons – be they regular or provincial, soldier or civilian.

No British regular, however, would epitomize this burgeoning affection more than the relatively unknown James Wolfe. A young brigadier general who displayed notable courage at the battle of Louisbourg in 1758, Wolfe had a reputation for "[a]mbition, activity, industry, [and a] passion for service."[329] By prioritizing the "direct, practical care" of his soldiers, Wolfe had fostered an unwavering *espirt de corps* among the "humble" and "hard-bitten" imperial regulars who fought under his command.[330] After fighting alongside provincials at Louisbourg, Wolfe concluded that his colonial cousins may have been "tinged with the vices and bad qualities of the mother country" but, even with such "disadvantages," they had the potential to overcome "the treachery of their neighbours the French" and "the cruelty of their neighbours the Indians" to become "a vast empire" and "the seat of power and learning" in the Atlantic world.[331] Optimism aside, Wolfe's personal aspirations extended beyond the colonies, and he begged Pitt to "dispose of [his] slight carcass as he pleases," so long he received a command outside of North America.[332] Unable to spare any competent, experienced officers, Pitt denied Wolfe's request and subsequently assigned him to Britain's forthcoming expedition against Québec.[333] Coincidently, the commander of this French stronghold was none other than the betrayer and butcher of Fort William Henry – de Montcalm.[334]

When Wolfe's forces reached Québec in late-August 1759, the young general had begun to doubt his ability to capture the city without reinforcements from Crown Point and Fort Oswego.[335] Following two weeks of planning and procrastination, Wolfe convened his officers the afternoon of September 12 and ordered them to prepare to engage de Montcalm's forces on the Plains of Abraham the following morning.[336] After outlining the logistics of their assault, Wolfe reminded his soldiers – regular and provincial alike – to "remember what their country expects from them" and not to lose sight of "what a determined body of soldiers, inured to war, are capable of doing against five weak French battalions, mingled with disorderly Peasantry."[337] As Wolfe watched his men

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326 Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228-229.
327 *On the Landing of Troops in Boston, 1758*.
328 Ibid.
329 Walpole, *Memoirs of King George II*, 3:50-51; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 232-234; Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 161.
330 Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 170-171, 191.
331 James Wolfe to Henrietta Wolfe, his mother, August 11, 1758, in *Life and Letters of Wolfe,* ed., Beckles Willson (London: W. Heinemann, 1909), 395.
332 James Wolfe to William Rickson, December 1, 1758, in *Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 403; Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 173.
333 Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 175-176.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid, 178; Anderson, *Crucible of* War, 340-343; Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 256-257.
336 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 354-355; Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 264-266.
337 *Boston Evening-Post*, December 3, 1759.

deploy under the cover of darkness, he felt the weight of the battle rest heavy upon his conscience and whispered a foreboding, yet poetic remark: "[t]he paths of glory lead but to the grave."[338]

Nine thousand soldiers, divided almost evenly between British and French, stood at dawn on the Plains of Abraham.[339] Unable to circumvent the British line, de Montcalm reluctantly engaged in a direct firefight.[340] Exhibiting an "uncommon steadiness" and "paying the strictest obedience to [their] Officers," British regulars and provincials endured at least three volleys from the French before retaliating.[341] The precise marksmanship of Wolfe's disciplined soldiers, coupled with the artillery's deadly grape-shot, inflicted a "terrible slaughter."[342] Amid the smoke and chaos, French soldiers began to retreat, only to suffer pursuit from the British, who exact further casualties.[343]

General de Montcalm, however, refused to concede the battle and, while rallying his men, received a mortal wound, likely from grape-shot shrapnel.[344] With victory now unattainable, de Montcalm's senior officers approached the British "most piteously (with hats off)" and "sued for quarter."[345] Terror of retribution consumed the French, as every soldier "repeatedly declar[ed] they were not at Fort William Henry" when de Montcalm loosed his Indigenous warriors upon Britain's wounded soldiers and infirmed civilians.[346] Even amid the chaos of combat, the French soldiers stationed at Québec had the wherewithal to know that if the victorious British colonists believed them present for the slaughter at Lake George, then their lives stood forfeit as reciprocal sacrifices upon the alter of revenge. The Plains of Abraham had become an auspicious battlefield for British America's provincials, as they had captured the stronghold of Québec, slayed their sworn enemy de Montcalm, and avenged all who had been slaughtered at the siege of Fort William Henry.

The sympathetic joy that now emanated from the Plains of Abraham, however, was "inexpressibly dampened" by the tragic death of General Wolfe.[347] After receiving wounds to both his wrist and stomach, the young officer continued to fight alongside his men until he received a third musket ball "near the breast" and collapsed.[348] Newspapers in Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Williamsburg, Annapolis, and Charleston rapidly disseminated soldiers' accounts of Wolfe's final moments, which emphasized how he had "died gloriously, rather envied than pitied," and had refused to breath his last until he knew, with certainty, that his men and empire were victorious.[349] Some newspapers even reported that Wolfe's victory had cleaved apart the French-

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[338] Wolfe quotes a line from Thomas Gray's famous poem, "An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard"; see Thomas Gray, "An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard, (London: R. Dodsley & M. Cooper, 1751), 7; Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 359.

[339] John Knox, *A Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America* (London: W. Jonston and J. Dodsley, 1769) 2: 70-71; *Virginia Historical Society*; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 359.

[340] Ibid.

[341] Knox, *Historical Journal*, 70-71; Walpole, *Memoirs of King George II*, 3:76; *Boston Gazette*, October 15, 1759; *Boston Post-Boy*, October 15, 1759; *Boston News-Letter*, October 18, 1759.

[342] Ibid.

[343] Ibid; *New York Gazette*, October 15, 1759.

[344] *Virginia Gazette* (Hunter), November 30, 1759; Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 285-286.

[345] Knox, *Historical Journal*, 72.

[346] Ibid.

[347] The *London Chronicle*, October 20, 1759; *Boston Evening-Post*, October 15, 1759; *Boston Post-Boy*, October 15, 1759; *New York Gazette*, October 15, 1759. Brumwell, *Paths of Glory*, 283-285.

[348] The *London Chronicle* provides a thorough account of Wolfe's death, describing how "he first received a shot a little above his wrist, and immediately took out his handkerchief, wrapped it about his arm, and continued the action. He then received another shot in his belly; after which he also continued the fight, but receiving another shot near the breast, he fell backwards" and died shortly thereafter, *London Chronicle*, October 20, 1759.

[349] *Boston Evening-Post*, October 15, 1759; *Boston Post-Boy*, October 15, 1759; *New York Gazette*, October 15, 1759; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 18, 1759; *Maryland Gazette*, October 18, 1759, November 1, 1759; *South Carolina Gazette*, October 27, 1759, November 17, 1759; *Virginia Gazette* (Hunter), November 30, 1759.

Indigenous alliance, as "most of the Indians [were now leaving] the French army."[350] As news reached England it "excite[d] the passions of a whole people," who "despaired," "triumphed," and even wept" for Wolfe.[351] Minster of Parliament Horace Walpole observed that every Briton who "inquired" about Wolfe's death made it all the more "heroic and affecting.[352] For Wolfe's noble sacrifice had roused the British people into a profound state of imperial fellow-feeling.[353]

The embers of both joy and grief that had sparked on the Plains of Abraham erupted into a blaze of intercolonial fellow-feeling, as eulogies sanctified General Wolfe as the savoir of British America.[354] In Virginia, one eulogist argued that Wolfe's sacrifice should "melt each Briton's Heart," but also "Rage and Grief alternately impart."[355] In Boston and New York City, the author Americanus urged British Americans to make time to express their "griefs o'er Wolfe's untimely urn," even though their war with France still "rage[d] with impetuous roar."[356] Massachusetts preacher Johnathan Mayhew echoed Americanus's admiration for Wolfe, praising the general's courage which, "like a Phoenix, appears but once in an age."[357] Not simply all of "New-England," but rather "all the British American plantations" had "never so much cause for general joy" than they now did.[358] It is the responsibility of every British colonist, Mayhew concluded, to embody Wolfe's selfless patriotism, live as "fellow-subjects" guided by both "fear of God, and brotherly-love," and work to erect "a mighty empire" unrivaled in "felicity."[359]

Through his death on the Plains of Abraham, Wolfe became not simply an imperial hero, but rather British America's guardian angel, immortalized in colonial print culture as a courageous *imperial regular* who sacrificed himself to defeat the French, their Indigenous allies, and the horrifying designs which they had planned for the subjects of George II.[360] Furthermore, by smiting British America's greatest enemy – the perfidious General de Montcalm – Wolfe had provided his colonial cousins an affective catalyst to forge nascent, yet intense bonds of both intercolonial and imperial fellow-feeling. Neither the horrifying actions of French soldiers and Indigenous warriors, nor the death of General James Wolfe, however, completely erased British Americans' apprehensions towards imperial regulars. Once the Seven Years' War had ended, colonists' latent anxieties toward Britain's professional soldiers reemerged with a vengeance.

The (Mis)Quartering of Imperial Regulars in British America:

The bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling which British America's anti-French, anti-Indigenous affective economies of violence had forged began to deteriorate almost immediately following Wolfe's victory. No event best exemplifies this rapid affective erosion than the siege of Fort Loudoun. Erected on the banks of the Little Tennessee River, Fort Loudon served as a crucial defensive outpost for South Carolina's western settlements.[361] By late-summer 1758, transgressions

[350] *Maryland Gazette*, November 15, 1759; *South Carolina Gazette*, November 17, 1759.
[351] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George II*, 3:74-75.
[352] Ibid.
[353] For the characteristics of patriotic sacrifice, see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228-229.
[354] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 10-11.
[355] "On the Death of the much Lamented General Wolfe," in the *Virginia Gazette* (Hunter), November 30, 1759.
[356] Americanus's "On the Death of General Wolfe"; see *Boston Evening-Post*, October 22, 1759; *New York Gazette* October 29, 1759.
[357] Jonathan Mayhew, *Two Discourses Delivered October 25, 1759* (Boston: Richard Draper, Edes & Gill, Thomas & John Fleet, 1759), 27; American Antiquarian Society.
[358] Mayhew, *Two Discourses*, 57.
[359] Ibid, 60.
[360] Americanus's "On the Death of General Wolfe"; see *Boston Evening-Post*, October 22, 1759; *New York Gazette* October 29, 1759.
[361] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 34-38.

and hostilities between Virginia's frontier settlers and the Cherokee had destabilized South Carolina's Indigenous diplomatic relations and, by January 1759, tensions had heated to a boil.[362] False diplomatic starts, limited communication between frontier outposts and Charleston, and intermittent Anglo-Indigenous conflict set the stage for a violent winter and spring. These preambles of conflict finally erupted in August 1760, when the Overland Cherokee, likely under the command of Oconostota, laid siege to Fort Loudon.[363] When the violence had ended, the Overhill Cherokee had killed at least thirty-two British subjects and took at least another hundred as prisoners.[364]

The "Indian Cruelty" which concluded the siege of Fort Loudoun received negligible coverage within British America's print media and affective public sphere.[365] The earliest reports that reached New York City and Boston lacked the spirited rhetoric that had become common to describe Indigenous violence during the Seven Years' War. These dispassionate accounts simply observed that those Britons within Fort Loudoun "were most treacherously surprised" by the Overhill Cherokee, who had "killed" – not murdered, not butchered, not slaughtered –at least twenty-five imperial officers.[366] A subsequent, and slightly more affective, letter from Fort Bedford, Pennsylvania, detailed how the Cherokee had abandoned both "Sincerity and Humanity" during their assault, as they "butchered" Colonel Demere "in the most cruel Manner," killed the rest of his officers, and took the remaining Britons as either "Slaves or Sacrifices."[367] Despite deploying traditional, anti-Indigenous rhetoric to describe Demere's death, specifically through words such as "butchered" and "cruel," the letter presents a succinct, matter-of-fact narrative of the Cherokee's assault, and thereby conveys neither the graphic details nor the impassioned pleas necessary to arouse intense hatred or terror, let alone horror, within the hearts of its colonial readers.

A satisfying explanation for British Americans' tepid condemnation of the Overhill Cherokee may be found in their alliance, or lack thereof, with the French. Of the Overhill Cherokee who led the ambush against Fort Loudoun, Oconostota had cultivated the strongest political alliance with the French.[368] Despite such ties, French officer Antoine Adhémar de Lantagnac had failed to persuade Oconostota to abandon his crusade against Virginia's backcountry settlers.[369] Even if de Lantagnac's overtures had been successful, most British Americans would have viewed this partnership between the French and the Overhill Cherokee as a purely regional concern. Unlike de Montcalm, de Lantagnac did not seek to forge a multi-polity Indigenous coalition, but rather courted the military might of a single Indigenous nation with the objective of destabilizing a small region of North America. The inhabitants of Pennsylvania, New York, or New England, therefore, felt no terror that Oconostota and his fellow Cherokee might serve as part of a larger French strategy of continental conquest. As the Cherokee posed no intercolonial danger, British colonists accepted that the frontier conflict which erupted at Fort Loudoun was a problem for the Carolinas (and perhaps Virginia) to solve alone.[370] By 1760, with victory over the French all but inevitable, British America's bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling already had begun to dissolve. The siege of Fort Loudoun, therefore, punctuates the unique, yet profoundly unstainable affective moment of unity which

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[362] Jonathan Mercantini, *Who Shall Rule at Home?: The Evolution of South Carolina Political Culture, 1748-1776* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 141-142.
[363] Ibid, 145-149, 154; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 102-134.
[364] *New York Gazette*, October 6, 1760; *Boston Evening-Post*, October 13, 1760; *New Hampshire Gazette*, October 17, 1760
[365] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 30, 1760.
[366] *New York Gazette*, October 6, 1760; *Boston Evening-Post*, October 13, 1760.
[367] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 9, 1760; *New York Mercury*, October 13, 1760; *Maryland Gazette*, October 16, 1760; *New-London Summary, or Weekly Advertiser*, October 17, 1760; *Boston Evening-Post*, October 20, 1760; *Boston Gazette*, October 20, 1760; *Boston Post-Boy*, October 20, 1760; *New Hampshire Gazette*, October 24, 1760.
[368] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 175.
[369] Ibid, 137.
[370] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 148; 166.

British Americans had experienced from the fall of Fort William Henry to the apotheosis of General Wolfe.

Parliament, however, understood that their victory over the French empire neither secured Britain's claim to the Ohio territory, nor did it resolve the ever-present Indigenous-colonial tensions that eradiated from the region.[371] To bolster the British empire's transatlantic authority and to administer the terms of the peace outlined in the *Treaty of Paris*, Parliament enacted two radical policies that irreparably transformed its relationship with its North American colonies. First, to deter future Indigenous raids along colonial frontiers, Parliament approved the maintenance of a North American peacetime standing army, whose regulars would serve under the command of General Thomas Gage.[372] British American land speculators supported this initiative, as they believed that only a professional army had the discipline and skill necessary to repel Indigenous raiders and to spare them the "cruel Necessity of deserting" their western settlements.[373] By early-1763, however, Indigenous warriors of the "Upper Ohio Valley, Wabash River, and Great Lakes nation" already forged an alliance, under the leadership of Pontiac, to prevent British America's further westward expansion.[374] While Pontiac had won early victories at Fort Detroit and throughout the Great Lakes region, British regulars gradually overpowered and defeated his burgeoning, pan-Indian confederacy.[375]

Parliament abhorred the idea of perpetual frontier warfare.[376] To avoid the fate that Pontiac's revolt had foreshadowed, the newly coronated George III, with Parliament's support, prohibited British colonists from settling west of the Appalachian Mountains.[377] After fighting for almost two years to restore relative stability throughout the *pays d'en haut*, Gage ordered a speedy withdrawal of British regulars from a majority of North America's frontier outposts, intending to quarter them throughout colonial coastal towns, with New York City as his headquarters.[378] British Americans were dismayed, to say the least.

Privately, Gage argued that this withdrawal of British regulars not only better served the interests of the empire, but also punished the colonies' "scandalous behavior and ingratitude" by forcing them to "manage their trade, counteract the French, and defend their frontiers" at their "own risqué and expence."[379] Parliament's prohibition of settlement beyond the Royal Proclamation Line, coupled with Gage's removal of regulars from the empire's western outpost, initiated a gradual erosion of the affection that British Americans had recently developed for imperial regulars. As imperial fellow-feeling succumbed to both suspicion and resentment, colonists began to perceive

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371 Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 284-286.
372 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 633-634; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 76-77.
373 Robert Beverley to Landon Carter, August 1, 1763, in ""Letters of Robert Beverley of Blandfield in Essex County, Virginia to his Father-in-Law, Landon Carter, Esq. of Sabine Hall in Richmond County, VA, 1763-1774", MSS. Virginia Historical Society.
374 Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, & the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 7.
375 For Pontiac's initial victories, such as the siege of Fort Detroit, see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 535-550.
376 Holton, *Forced Founders*, 7-8.
377 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 568-569.
378 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 617-621; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 464; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 76.
379 Thomas Gage to Lord William Barrington, December 18, 1765, in John Shy, ed., "Confronting Rebellion: Private Correspondence of Lord Barrington with General Gage, 1765-1775," *Sources of American Independence: Selected Manuscripts from the Collections of the William L. Clements Library*, ed. Howard H. Peckham (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 1:14-15.

British regulars no longer as allies, but rather as political weapons whom Parliament would deploy with vigor to exercise various "controls" over the people of British America.[380]

British colonists' reemergent apprehension of imperial regulars arose from their cultural fears of *peacetime* standing armies. Throughout the mid-eighteenth century, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon's *Cato's Letters* had taught British Americans that standing armies were a central tool of political corruption and tyranny.[381] The arguments put forth in *Cato's Letters*, however, built upon the British empire's fraught history with standing armies, which Trenchard's lesser-known pamphlet, *A Short History of Standing Armies in England* (1698), expertly detailed. This deep-seated fear first emerged during the reign of Richard II, whose peacetime standing army was comprised of soldiers known to "beat, wound, ravish, and kill wherever they went."[382] Denouncing the violence of his predecessor, Henry IV initiated a new tradition, in which England's monarchs would risk usurpation rather than "certainly inslave their country" by maintaining a peacetime standing army. [383] Two hundred fifty-years later, James II's desire to raise another peacetime standing army earned him the stern rebuke of Parliament, whose ministers still believed that "a King's truest Strength [was] the Love of his People."[384] While the Glorious Revolution forced James II to abdicate the throne, Trenchard bemoaned the actions of William III, who chose to maintain a peacetime standing army within England "for Fear of War."[385] To inhibit corrupt ambitions, Parliament required the annual renewal of the Mutiny Act, which allocated funds for the army's expenses.[386] Dismayed, Trenchard bemoaned that even a limited peacetime standing army was a dangerous misstep towards tyranny.[387]

To enact Parliament's plans – tyrannical or otherwise – Gage first had to secure necessary provisions and quarters for his army within British America's coastal towns. The traditional language of the Mutiny Act, however, provided only limited oversight for soldiers stationed in North America, forcing regulars to rely upon the expediency, duty, and goodwill of colonial legislatures.[388] To avoid such instability, Gage petitioned Parliament to overhaul the Mutiny Act and grant him the authority "to maintain order in the settled regions" of British America.[389] The *American Munity Act of 1765*, popularly known as the *Quartering Act*, granted Gage only minimal powers to requisition

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[380] Such tensions were exacerbated when British Americans learned that only veteran imperial regulars, not provincials, would receive Parliamentary promised western land grants for service in the Seven Years' War; see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 568-569; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 464; Glenn F. Williams, *Dunmore's War: The Last Conflict of America's Colonial Era* (Yardley: Westholme, 2017), 28.

[381] For a detailed analysis of the reception of Trenchard and Gordon's *Cato's Letters* in British America, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 35 ff. Schwoerer argues that *Cato's Letters* specifically stressed the "menace of standing armies to liberty and a free government, whether established by a king or government"; see Schwoerer, *"No Standing Armies!"*, 190.

[382] John Trenchard, *A Short History of Standing Armies in England. Written by that eminent patriot, Thomas Trenchard, Esq.* (London, 1698; Reprinted and Sold by W. France, 1731), 12; Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

[383] Trenchard, *A Short History of Standing Armies*, 13.

[384] Ibid, 35.

[385] Ibid, 42; Schwoerer argues that William's decision to maintain a standing army in England after 1697 is the primary event that spurred Trenchard to author *A Short History of Standing Armies*; Schwoerer, *"No Standing Armies!"*, 160-164.

[386] Eric Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017), 81-84.

[387] Between November 25 and December 31, 1698, *A Short History of Standing Armies in England* "went through three editions"; Schwoerer, *"No Standing Armies!"*, 169. Even after Trenchard's death in 1721, printers in London published new editions of his pamphlet, such as the 1731 edition published by W. France.

[388] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 648-649.

[389] Ibid; for an account of the difficulties British soldiers faced acquiring quarters during the Seven Years' War, see Jennings, *Fortune of Empire*, 298-305.

supplies and to quarter British regulars in public houses, as it forbade any imperial soldier from commandeering private homes for quarters.[390]

To Gage's chagrin, the *American Mutiny Act* only complicated his relationship with, and dependence on, colonial legislatures. Perceiving this law as another tool of Parliamentary oppression, New York's assembly refused to allocate any funds for British soldiers within its colony.[391] When Gage pressured the assembly to comply, a mob formed and burned the general in effigy.[392] The presence of British regulars had excited greater suspicion and resentment, one merchant astutely observed, than Parliament's contemporaneous tax on stamps, as many colonists would "rather part with their money, though rather unconstitutionally" than suffer a "parcel of military masters" sharing a home, or worse "a bed," with "their wives and daughters."[393] By mid-August 1766, New York City's Sons of Liberty had demanded that all "market people…not sell any provisions to any of the officers or Soldiers" quartered within the city.[394] The following spring, Massachusetts's House of Representatives declared solidarity with New York's assembly and "flatly refused" to allocate any revenue for the support of British soldiers.[395] News of colonial legislatures' opposition "raised a spirit in Parliament" previously unseen, as its ministers believed that such open enmity "indicated a throwing off' of British colonists' "dependence on the Mother Country."[396]

To reprimand New York's egregious disrespect of imperial authority, Parliament passed *An Act for Restraining and Prohibiting the Governor, Council, and House of Representatives, of the Province of New York* (1767), which prohibited Governor Henry Moore from consenting "to any statute" until the colonial assembly had "complied with the *Quartering Act*."[397] Parliament's coercive law incurred not colonial compliance, but rather imperial opposition. In London, colonial agent William Bollan reminded all Britons that "without due preventive care," standing armies had "never failed to destroy every free state" which they had "infected."[398] In both Massachusetts and Virginia, anti-Parliament radicals argued that this violation of New York's legislative autonomy had placed a "flaming sword" above British America which, if unaddressed, would ensure its "political death and annihilation."[399]

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[390] *An Act to Amend and Render more Effectual, in his Majesty's Dominions in America, An act Passed in this Present session of Parliament, intituled, An act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the Better Payment of the Army and their Quarters* (Boston: Draper and Green and Russell, 1765) 281-282; American Antiquarian Society; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 3.

[391] Thomas Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, December 21, 1765, in *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, 1763-1775*, ed., Clarence Edwin Carter. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 1:77; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 696, 720.

[392] *New York Gazette,* December 23, 1765; John Montresor, *The Montresor Journals*, ed., G.D Scull (New York: New York Historical Society Collections, 1881), 344; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 112.

[393] John Watts to James Napier, June 1, 1765, in *The Letter Books of John Watts, Merchant and Councillor of New York, January 1, 1762-December 1765* (New York: New York Historical Society, 1928), 354-355; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 100.

[394] John Montresor, *The Montresor Journals*, 373, 383.

[395] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), May 21, 1767, August 6, 1767.

[396] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), July 2, 1767; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), May 7, 1767.

[397] *An Act for Restraining and Prohibiting the Governor, Council, and House of Representatives, of the Province of New York* (London: Mark Baskett, 1767), New York Historical Society; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), November 5, 1767. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the* Atlantic *World, 1664-1830* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 140.

[398] Bernard Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1974), 58-59; William Bollan, *Continued Corruption, Standing Armies and Popular Discontents Considered; and the Establishment of the English Colonies in America* (London: J. Almon, 1768), 3; American Antiquarian Society.

[399] Massachusetts's House of Representatives to Dennis de Berdt, January 12, 1768, in *The True Sentiments of America: Contain'd in a Collection of Letters sent from the House of Representatives of the Province of Massachusetts Bay to Several Persons of High Rank in this Kingdom* (London: J. Almon, 1768), 75-76, Massachusetts Historical Society; RHL to ------(in London), March 27, 1768, in *The Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, ed., James Curtis Ballagh. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1911), 1:27.

Parliament's legislative Sword of Damocles inched closer and closer to both Massachusetts and Virginia in the months that followed. To the north, respectable merchants and notorious smugglers alike continued to violate Parliament's most recent revenue taxes by running contraband "Wines into Boston."[400] When John Hancock's sloop *Liberty* arrived in the city's harbor the morning of June 9, 1768 with multitude of smuggled goods, royal customs officials intervened.[401] A "great riot ensued" and "a mob burnt a barge belonging to the [tax c]ollector."[402] Boston's customs officials then seized the *Liberty*, which only excited further violence from the "people of the town," who retook the sloop and "scut[t]led and burned" it, lest it serve as a trophy of Parliamentary tyranny.[403]

The timing of the *Liberty* riot proved inauspicious for Boston. The morning of June 8, Wills Hill, the Earl of Hillsborough and Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent a letter to Gage authorizing him to "strengthen the hands of government" in Massachusetts by "order[ing] one regiment, or such Force as necessary to Boston," to provide "legal assistance to the civil magistrate," quell colonial resistance to Parliament's taxes, and ensure "the preservation of the public peace."[404] Upon learning of the destruction of the *Liberty*, Gage authorized the deployment of not one, but two regiments from New York City to Boston, whose arrival Paul Revere depicted in his famous *Landing of the Troops!* (see Figure 1.2).[405] Contemporaneous to their deployment, Governor Francis Bernard disbanded Massachusetts's House of Representatives for its support of an incendiary "Circulatory Letter," which argued that Parliament had enacted punitive taxes against British Americans only because their "enemies" had misrepresented the colonies as "factious, disloyal," and desirous of making themselves "independent of the mother country."[406] Without a legislative assembly and

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[400] Henry Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings of the People in New England from the Establishment of a Board of Customs in America, to the breaking out of the Rebellion in 1775" in *Henry Hulton and the American Revolution* ed., Neil Longley York, (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2010), 126-127. Parliament passed *An Act for Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America*, popularly known as the Revenue Act or Townshend Duties, in June 1767, which levied duties on items imported to and purchased within Britain's North American colonies, such as lead, paper, glass, paint, and tea; see *An Act for Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America* (Boston, 1767), 536; American Antiquarian Society. Peter D.G. Thomas, *The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 1767-1773* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 31.

[401] Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings," 128.

[402] Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the *Liberty* fiasco, see Richard Archer, *As If An Enemy's Country: The British Occupation of Boston and the Origins of Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 89-91; Hiller B. Zobel, *The Boston Massacre*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970), 74-77; Robert A. Gross, *The Minutemen and their World, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition* (New York: Wang and Hill, 2001), 31-32.

[403] Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings," 128; Hulton argued that such brazen illegality compelled the deployment of "two Regiments of foot and a detachment from a third…from Halifax" and "two other [regiments]…from Ireland" to Boston to ensure "the execution of the laws and to protect the Servants of the Crown." Hulton is partially correct, for the Earl of Hillsborough ordered the deployment of only the 64th and 65th Regiments from Ireland after the *Liberty* fiasco, but they only remained in Boston through June 1769, when Gage redeployed them to Halifax; Earl of Hillsborough to Thomas Gage, June 30, 1768 in *Gage Correspondence*, 2:79; Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country*, 91, 113-115, 140; Carp, *Rebels Rising*, 45-47.

[404] "The Earl of Hillsborough to General Thomas Gage," June 8, 1768, in *English Historical Documents Vol. 9: American Colonia Documents to 1776* ed., Merrill Jensen, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 717. The Earl of Hillsborough also explicitly ordered the troops to "be quartered in [Boston]" proper.

[405] Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings" 125; Paul Revere, *A View of Part of the Town of Boston in New England and British Ships of War Landing their Troops!, 1768* (Boston: Paul Revere, 1770), American Antiquarian Society. Thomas, *Townshend Duties Crisis*, 83.

[406] "A Circulatory Letter, February 11, 1768" in *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts* (Boston: Green and Russell, 1768), 22-23; Massachusetts Historical Society. Upon learning of the "Circulatory Letter," Hillsborough had ordered Massachusetts's House of Representatives either to rescind the letter or be dissolved. When the House of Representatives voted 92 to 17 to reject Hillsborough's demand, Bernard dissolved the assembly. For an account of

subjected to the oversight of two thousand British regulars quartered in abandoned commercial buildings and sugarhouses, Boston had transformed overnight into a garrisoned city.[407]

Figure 1.2: Paul Revere, *A View of Part of the Town of Boston in New England and British Ships of War Landing their Troops!, 1768*. Boston: Paul Revere, 1770.
Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

Despite Boston's profound fears, the recently quartered imperial regulars neither deprived them of their liberty nor subjected them to wanton depravity. Rather, imperial regulars proved woefully unable to deter both merchant smuggling and urban protest in either Boston or New York City.[408] On October 31, Gage lamented that Boston's custom agents and civic officers remained hesitant to act "contrary to the general Sentiments of their Fellow Citizens."[409] Despite assuring Hillsborough that "the violent Temper of the People would abate," Gage privately worried that if Boston's "Demagogues" and "Democratical Despotism" continued to flourish within the city's popular politics, then the fears of colonial corruption and political anarchy that grew among Britain's loyal subjects might never be "annihilated."[410]

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these events, see Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings," 125-126; Maier, *Resistance to Revolution*, 169-170; Thomas, *Townshend Duties Crisis*, 83.

[407] After receiving the Earl of Hillsborough's letter, Gage petitioned Massachusetts's Governor Francis Bernard, to request troops be stationed in Boston. Unwilling to accept the responsibility for action, Bernard forwarded Gage's request to Halifax, passively authorizing the deployment of 14th and 29th Regiments.; Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country*, 91-95, 103, 113-115. 140; Zobel, *Boston's Massacre*, 98-99. Paul Revere, *A View of Part of the Town of Boston in New England and British Ships of War Landing their Troops!, 1768*. (Boston: Paul Revere, 1770); American Antiquarian Society. Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings," 129; Peter Oliver, *Origin and Progress of the American Rebellion: A Tory View*, ed., Douglas Adair and John A. Schutz (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1963), 70-72.

[408] *New York Journal*, December 22, 1768; Thomas Gage to Wills Hill, Lord of Hillsborough, October 10, 1768, in *Gage Correspondences*, 1:201. Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 70

[409] Thomas Gage to Wills Hill, Lord of Hillsborough, October 31, 1768, in *Gage Correspondences*, 1:202-205.

[410] Ibid.

Unlike the "merry heart[s]" which had greeted the arrival British soldiers to Boston in 1758, resentment towards imperial regulars only continued to fester. Throughout the fall of 1768, sporadic reports emerged that Gage's soldiers were often in "raptures at the cheapness of spirituous liquors" and "insolent" towards British colonists.[411] The overwhelming influx of imperial regulars stirred a particularly intense fear that the young women of Boston would suffer "ruin and infamy" at the hands of these violent, lewd, sexually unrestrained soldiers.[412] Contrary to popular rhetoric, romantic relationships between regulars and civilians swiftly formed, resulting in marriage, children, or both.[413] The integration of imperial soldiers into Boston's familial networks, however, failed to dispel suspicions of impropriety and immorality, especially when Boston's newspapers emphasized the most violent of interactions between British regulars and Boston's women. In the summer of 1769, the *Boston Evening-Post* reported that Ensign William Fitzpatrick threatened to rape Susannah Dalton and kill her husband Peter, yelling at their window: "…I'll have her in spite of all the men in the country; if you are her husband, by G—D you won't keep her long, and if you don't put your head into the window immediately, I'll be d—d if I don't blow your brains out."[414] Such reprehensible actions reinforced emergent, popular resentment and fear of British regulars, which in turn overshadowed any amicable, pleasurable, or even loving relationships that had formed within the city.

Unlike its northern urban neighbors, Virginia did not suffer from the interpersonal, financial, or political turmoil of quartering British soldiers.[415] Rather, Virginians directed their attention toward westward settlement. Weeks after the 14th and 29th Regiments had landed in Boston, Royal Indian Agent John Stuart's signed the Treaty of Hard Labour, by which the Cherokee relinquished control over all territory between the Appalachian Mountains and the Ohio territory.[416] The Treaty of Hard Labour, however, simultaneously negated colonial access to much of the western land acquired from the Haudenosaunee in the legally dubious Treaty of Fort Stanwix.[417] Stuart's actions suggested to many Virginians that the "present Ministry" had prioritized Indigenous land claims over those of their own colonists, and thus was "truly antiamerican." [418] Frustrated, Virginia's radicals agreed with their counterparts in Boston and New York City that Parliament would be "satisfied with nothing less than the deprivation of American freedom."[419] According to Virginian Arthur Lee, Parliament's new colonial taxation regime and its involuntary quartering of soldiers were the first steps to force "the bitter cup of slavery" upon British Americans.[420] It is preposterous, Lee concluded in the eighth epistle of *The Monitor*, for his fellow colonists to enter into this "state of slavery" in exchange for imperial "protection from the Indians," as Virginia itself had the capabilities to defend its frontier settlements from Indigenous assault.[421]

411Andrew Elliot to Thomas Hollis, January 29, 1769, in "Letters from Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis," *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society* Ser. 4 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1858), 4:437; *On the Landing of Troops in Boston, 1758*.

412 *Boston Evening-Post*, January 30, 1769; Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 89.

413 For a detailed analysis of British regulars' relationships with Boston's population of young women, see Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 79-108.

414 *Boston Evening-Post*, August 21, 1769; Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 91.

415 Musselwhite, *Urban Dreams*, 220-221.

416 Holton, *Forced Founders,* 9; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 16-18.

417 Ibid.

418 Arthur Lee to Richard Parker and Richard Henry Lee, December 23, 1768, in Paul P. Hoffman, ed. *The Lee Family Papers, 1742-1795* (Charlottesville, 1966); University of California, Berkeley. Holton, *Forced Founders*, 9.

419 George Washington to George Mason, April 5, 1769, in *GW Papers: CS*, 8:178-179.

420 Arthur Lee, "Monitor III" in *The Farmer's and Monitor's Letters* (William Rind: Williamsburg, 1769), 69-70, American Antiquarian Society. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 256-258

421 Arthur Lee, "Monitor VII," in *Monitor's Letters*, 88; Holton, *Forced Founders*, 15-16, 21-22.

While Virginia must remain vigilant of western Indigenous threats, Lee believed that the greater danger lay in tyrants to the east. To resist political enslavement, British Americans must join together, like "a band of brothers," who are "indissolubly firm in defending the sacred fire of freedom from being extinguished" by Parliament's "arbitrary measures."[422] Virginia's House of Burgesses supported Lee's call for intercolonial fellow-feeling when it endorsed New York and Massachusetts's boycott of all imported British goods in May 1769. Aghast at its provocative resolution, Virginia Governor Norborne Berkeley swiftly dissolved the assembly.[423] Without active legislatures to protect their interests, the people of Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York now believed themselves at the mercy of Parliament's oppressive policies and the imperial regulars who enforced them.

The escalation of political tension within British America raised alarm throughout the empire, including the British Isles. Internal strife has placed "King and Country" in the "most imminent danger," John Erskine proclaimed in *Shall I Go to War with My American Brethren* (1769), and it is the responsibility of every Briton to "sooth and soften" the colonists' "inflamed minds" and persuade them that it would be "madness" to separate from the empire.[424] "One who has the least feeling of humanity" Erskine declared, "cannot reflect, without pain, on the desolation, oppression, and cruelty" that an imperial civil war would inflict upon every British subject.[425] For the inhabitants of England "cannot hurt" the American colonists "without hurting [them]selves."[426]

To prevent such violence, Erskine continued, every British subject must heed the "whispers" of "natural affection," which begs the "mother-country" not "forget her children," nor "the children tear in pieces the bowels of the mother."[427] If Parliament suppressed a rebellion by force, then "the blood of every individual" who died in the "American cause" would foster "new enemies," filled with "hatred or envy" for England, who then would help Britain's spurned colonists "throw off their allegiance" to the empire.[428] Only by "gaining the heart" of British America and reigniting its bonds of imperial fellow-feeling might Parliament prevent such a revolt.[429] It would be near impossible, Erskine concluded, to engender colonial affection through "a standing army, and the terror of their vengeance."[430] Despite emphatic pleas such as Erskine's, Hillsborough and Gage remained resolute that martial force, and the "terror of [its] vengeance," eventually would compel the submission, if not the loyalty, of British America.

<u>The Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots:</u>

Unable to protest outside the halls of Westminster or on the streets of London, anti-Parliament radicals throughout North America directed their impassioned, increasingly violent inclinations towards imperial regulars – the corporal manifestation of the empire's arbitrary, tyrannical authority. Efforts to intensify New Yorker's fear of and hatred for British soldiers began on December 16, 1769, with Alexander McDougall's *To the Betrayed Inhabitants of the City and Colony of New-York*.[431] If the "Minions of Tyranny and Despotism" committed "their malevolent and corrupt

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[422] Arthur Lee, "Monitor X," in *Monitor Letters*, 96-97.
[423] *Resolves of the House of Burgesses, Passed the 16th of May, 1769* (Williamsburg: Rind, 1769), Library of Virginia. Lucile Griffith, *The Virginia House of Burgesses, 1750-1774*. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1968), 41-42.
[424] John Erskine, *Shall I Go to War with my American Brethren* (London: G. Kearsly, 1769), 3-4; Huntington Library.
[425] Erskine, *Shall I Go to War*, 7.
[426] Ibid, 10.
[427] Ibid.
[428] Ibid.
[429] Ibid.
[430] Ibid
[431] Alexander McDougall, *To the Betrayed Inhabitants of the City and Colony of New-York*. (New York, 1769); New York Public Library. Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 55.

Hearts…to enslave a free People," McDougall began, then it falls to the civic representatives of that free people to resist such corruption.[432] New York's assembly, however, had abdicated that responsibility by willingly submitting to the "tyrannical Conduct of the British Parliament" and appropriating £2,000 to feed, clothe, and quarter those "Troops kept here, not to protect, but to enslave."[433] Stoking not only fear of the newly provisioned regulars' true objectives, but also "just indignation" at the assembly's perceived betrayal, McDougall called for a meeting on December 18, to determine the best course of action to obstruct this "Design of Tyrants." [434] McDougall's rhetoric of betrayal resonated not simply in New York City, but throughout British America, as both the *Boston Gazette* and *Virginia Gazette* published incendiary excerpts from his broadside.[435]

Unfortunately, no extant record exists of the December 18 meeting. In the weeks that followed, however, political tensions erupted into popular violence, as brawls between civilians and soldiers consumed the streets of New York City.[436] The evening of January 13, 1770, several soldiers of the 16th Regiment attempted first to cut down, and then to blow up, the city's Liberty Pole.[437] Upon hearing the explosion, patrons of the nearby De La Mountayne's tavern rushed outside to confront the soldiers.[438] As a sizeable crowd formed before them, the frustrated regulars fixed bayonets and chased the inebriated civilians back into De La Mountayne's, "destroyed" the tavern's "Front Windows," and wounded at least one patron.[439] Despite appearances as an inconsequential brawl, this episode of crowd violence initiated a significant shift in New York's regional affective economy of violence, one in which those sentiments traditionally associated with French and Indigenous political others – those of terror and hatred – rippled onto Britain's imperial regulars.

The cultural significance of the 16th Regiment's assault on New York's Liberty Pole arose from the city's legacy of crowd-soldier violence. After Parliament had repealed its stamp tax in March 1766, New Yorkers erected a Liberty Pole in their city's commons, "a liminal zone, neither

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[432] McDougall, *To the Betrayed Inhabitants*; Joseph S. Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries: New York City and the Road to Independence, 1763-1776* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 143.
[433] McDougall, *To the Betrayed Inhabitants*; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 193.
[434] McDougall, *To the Betrayed Inhabitants*; for the ability of just anger and moderated resentment to motivate action, see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 240. Smith even notes that it is possible to feel "equally grieved and enraged at [a] wrong that is done," even when it is "all together out of [one's] power to redress it"; see *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 169.
[435] The *Boston Gazette* and *Virginia Gazette* circulated these excerpts likely to encourage, or project an image of, colonial solidarity; see *Boston Gazette*, January 8, 1770; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), February 22, 1770. Michael Hattem argues that the emergence of such tyrannical narratives is not surprising. Prior to British America's civil war for independence, colonists were often more acutely versed in the history of the British empire than their respective colonies. Through such histories, British Americans had developed a sensitivity to "revolutions, civil wars, and tyrannical monarchs" – the dominant themes of these imperial narratives, and thus were prepared to find them within their own life experiences; see Michael D. Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 34, 40-41. Michael Warner observes that the emergence of republicanism and a dominant political language in eighteenth-century British America transformed the "ground rules of discourse" within its public sphere. Specifically, the shift of printed texts as being read as "normally impersonal" allowed readers to incorporate "*into the meaning of the printed object* an awareness of the potentially limitless others who may also be reading," and thus allowed British American readers to begin "to imagine [themselves], in the act of reading, becoming part of an arena of the national people that cannot be realized except through such mediating imaginings." Michael Warner, *The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), xii-xiii; 34-73. For increased circulation rates of texts in British America during the mid-eighteenth-century, see above 23, n.109.
[436] Tiedeman, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 147.
[437] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post- Boy*, January 15, 1770, February 5, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, February 19, 1770; *New York Journal*, March 1, 1770.
[438] Ibid.
[439] Ibid.

wholly civilian nor martial," due to its close proximity to the soldiers' barracks.[440] When New York's assembly initially refused to comply with the *American Mutiny Act*, several regulars exacted retribution by destroying the Liberty Pole on August 10, 1766.[441] The next day, a group of two to three thousand civilians, led by Isaac Sears and his fellow Sons of Liberty, demanded an apology from the soldiers, which quickly devolved into a brawl.[442] Undeterred, the Sons of Liberty erected another Liberty Pole and continued to antagonize Britain's soldiers.[443] Skirmishes intermittently occurred for the next seven-months, culminating on the first anniversary of the Stamp Act's repeal. Imperial regulars quartered in New York yet again demolished the Liberty Pole, only for the Sons of Liberty to raise it once again, this time with a volunteer guard to prevent further molestation.[444] By March 22, 1767, Britain's regulars had abandoned their futile siege on New York City's Liberty Pole.[445]

The 16th Regiment's decision to desecrate the Liberty Pole the night of January 13, therefore, gestures toward not only the tremendous abuse they had suffered from, but also the intense anger they that felt toward, New York City's anti-Parliament radicals. Attacking the Liberty Pole yet again on January 15, the 16th Regiment exposed themselves to further vilification, as seen in Brutus's *Whoever Seriously Considers the Impoverished State of this City*.[446] Furthering the rhetorical objectives of McDougal's *To the Betrayed Inhabitants*, Brutus urges New Yorkers to stay vigilant, as the regulars stationed within their city are "not kept here to protect, but enslave."[447] Kindling the ever-present fear of political enslavement, Brutus then invoked popular resentment for the appropriation of colonial tax-revenue to support these soldiers' "Whores and Bastards."[448] For Brutus, fear of political enslavement and resentment towards fiscal misappropriation proved an effective rhetoric. Despite royalist arguments that New York's "Rage and Resentment" toward British regulars arose from a "pretended…Love of Liberty," approximately three thousand men, a majority of the city's voting population, attended the Sons of Liberty's meeting on January 17.[449] Under the leadership of both Isaac Sears and John Lamb, the attendees agreed not only to deny all forms of employment to British regulars – the "Enemies" of New York's "happy Constitution" – but also to submit a petition to the New York City Council to demolish the northern barracks, an intolerable symbol of civic tyranny.[450]

Distraught at the slanders, libel, and popular violence that they had endured for almost four years, the soldiers of the 16th Regiment finally retaliated against the Sons of Liberty in New York's public sphere. The morning of January 19, the 16th Regiment distributed *God and a Solider*, in which

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[440] Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 53-54; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 169.

[441] John Lamb, *Memoir of the Life and Times of General John Lamb*, ed. Isaac Q. Leake (New York: De Capo Press, 1971), 32-33; Montresor, *Montresor Journals*, 382-383; *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, August 21, 1766; *New York Post-Boy*, August 21, 1766.

[442] John Lamb, *Lamb Memoirs*, 32-33; John Montresor, *Montresor Journals*, 382-383; *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, August 21, 1766; *New York Post-Boy*, August 21, 1766.

[443] John Lamb, *Lamb Memoirs*, 32-33; John Montresor, *Montresor Journals*, 382-383; *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, August 21, 1766; *New York Post-Boy*, August 21, 1766; Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 54.

[444] Lamb, *Lamb Memoir*, 37; Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 54-55.

[445] Ibid.

[446] Brutus, *Who Seriously Considers the Impoverished State of this City*; Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 147.

[447] Ibid.

[448] Ibid.

[449] A Merchant, *The Times* (New York: John Holt, 1770), 4; New York Historical Society. *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, January 22, 1770; *New York Journal*, January 25, 1770. Lee Reese Boyer observes that, in 1771, the voting population of New York City (white men ages sixteen to sixty) was approximately one-quarter of the city's population, approximately 5,250 inhabitants. If three-thousand men attended the January 17 meeting, then approximately sixty percent of the city's eligible voters heard, and more than likely, assented to the petition; see Boyer, *The Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, Diss.), 103-104, 110-112.

[450] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, January 22, 1770; *New York Journal*, January 25, 1770; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 55-57.

they presented themselves as the victims of a malicious and unjust vendetta.[451] "God and a Solider all Men doth adore,/In Time of War, and not before," the broadside proclaimed, for "When the War is over, and all Things righted,/God is forgotten, and the Soldiers slighted.[452] Civilians' respect for soldiers only exists amid the blood and death of combat, the 16th Regiment argued, for once the war ends, soldiers must suffer neglect, or worse yet, contempt from the very people whom they had risked their lives to defend. The "real enemies" to the peace and prosperity of New York, these regulars continued, were those Sons of Liberty, like Brutus, who ignited an "uncommon and riottous disturbance" by representing George III's loyal soldiers in "a heinous light."[453] The 16th Regiment then concluded with a desperate plea: that "every honest heart…support the soldiers wives and children," whom the rabble "maliciously, falsely, and audaciously" labeled "whores and bastards."[454]

Unfortunately for the 16th Regiment, Isaac Sears and Walter Quakenbros witnessed the distribution of *God and a Soldier* at Fly-Market the morning of January 19 (see Figure 1.3, Blue Dot).[455] After skimming the broadside, Sears seized one of the soldiers and demanded to know "what business he had to put up libel against the [city's] inhabitants."[456] When another soldier attempted to fix his bayonet, Sears struck him unconscious.[457] As the remaining members of the 16th Regiment fled, Sears and Quackenbros brought the two detained soldiers before Mayor Whitehead Hicks and charged them with libel.[458] Within minutes a crowd of civilians, armed with sleighs and rungs, and a group of approximately twenty soldiers, armed with "Cutlasses and Bayonets," had descended upon Fly Market.[459] To avoid bloodshed, Hicks ordered the soldiers to return to their barracks, for which the crowd provided an unsolicited escort (see Figure 1.3, Red Dot).[460]

After turning onto Golden Hill Street, reinforcements from the 16th Regiment arrived (see Figure 1.3, Green Dot).[461] Amid a furious exchange of insults, a man dressed in "Silk Stockings, and neat Buckskin Breaches," whom the *New York Gazette* identified as a "Officer in Disguise," gave the order to fix bayonets.[462] Consumed with fury, the soldiers of the 16th Regiment descended upon their escort "with great violence" and even began to harass innocent bystanders, such as a Quaker, a young woman, and an boy running to Fly Market "for sugar."[463] Eventually, the city's magistrates and one Captain Richardson forcibly ended the quarrel.[464] Another riot, however, occurred the following day on Nassau Street between a few civilian-sailors and fifteen soldiers of the 16th Regiment, the latter of whom attacked New York's civilians "with the greatest rage," and "would have killed them," if a crowd had not forced their retreat.[465] Likely a hyperbolic narrative – as every

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[451] Soldiers of the 16th Regiment, *God and a Soldier*.

[452] Ibid.

[453] Ibid.

[454] Ibid.

[455] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, February 5, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, February 19, 1770; *New York Journal*, March 1, 1770; for a detailed narrative the Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots, see Boyer, *Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots*, 124-162.

[456] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, February 5, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, February 19, 1770; *New York Journal*, March 1, 1770; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 194-195; Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 148.

[457] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, February 5, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, February 19, 1770; *New York Journal*, March 1, 1770; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 194-195.

[458] Ibid.

[459] Ibid.

[460] Ibid; Bernard Ratzer, *This Plan of the City of New York* (1769); Library of Congress.

[461] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, February 5, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, February 19, 1770; *New York Journal*, March 1, 1770.

[462] Ibid.

[463] Ibid.

[464] Ibid.

[465] Normand MacLeod to William Johnson, January 24, 1770, in *Johnson Papers*, 7:351-352.

soldier in the army of George III understood the horrid punishments that awaited those who unlawfully abused or killed the king's subjects – the incendiary rhetoric of New York and Boston's radical, anti-Parliament newspapers had begun to stoke the flames of anti-regular terror and hatred.

Figure 1.3: Bernard Ratzer, *This Plan of the City of New York*, 1769. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
16th Regiment's Barracks [Red Dot]; Fly-Market [Blue Dot]; Golden Hill Riot [Green Dot].

Miraculously, no one died during the Golden Hill and Nassau Street riots and, to prevent future violence, Gage immediately confined all British regulars in the city to barracks.[466] New York's Sons of Liberty immediately jeopardized this uneasy peace by petitioning the city's council to "erect another LIBERTY POLE, as a Memorial of the Repeal of the Stamp Act."[467] When New York's City Council reject their proposal, the Sons of Liberty "procure[d]" a patch of land, closer to the military barracks than New York's Commons, upon which they erected their symbol of defiance.[468] The *New York Journal* reported that several thousand inhabitants attended the Liberty Pole's dedication on February 6 and, while some British soldiers were in attendance, they "neither gave nor received any Affront."[469] Despite intentional provocations, peace had returned to New York.

In the weeks that followed, acting Governor Cadwallader Colden charged Alexander McDougall with libel for the publication of *To the Betrayed Inhabitants* and ordered his arrest.[470] Ironically, Colden's accusation gave McDougall a platform to intensify popular terror and hatred of

[466] Normand MacLeod to William Johnson, January 24, 1770, in *Johnson Papers*, 7:351-352; Boyer, *Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots*, 166; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 196.
[467] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, February 5, 1770.
[468] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, February 5, 1770; *New York Journal*, February 8, 1770.
[469] Ibid; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 94.
[470] William Smith, February 7, 1770, in *Historical Memoirs of William Smith: 16 March 1763 to 9 July 1776*, ed., William H. W. Sabine. (New York: Colburn & Tegg, 1956), 74.; Tiedeman, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 150.

Britain's imperial regulars. Denying the charge of libel in the *New York Journal*, McDougall reasserted both his belief that submission to Parliament's *Quartering Act* condemned the people of New York to live in "perpetual TERROR," and his commitment to "RISK ALL," including "the Destruction of [his] Family, and the Loss even of [his] Life," to oppose these forces of corruption and tyranny.[471] The threat of imperial violence within the city, however, had dissipated. British regulars launched one final, albeit unenthusiastic, assault against New York City's Liberty Pole in late-March, which the Sons of Liberty easily repelled.[472] This uneventful instance of popular violence, when coupled with McDougall's subsequent release from prison, effectively tempered much of New York's anti-regular sentiment.[473]

Historians often classify the Golden Hill and Nassau Street riots as simply another example of how British Americans engaged in crowd violence both to exercise their political rights and to protect their economic autonomy.[474] These riots, however, have a much deeper significance, as they provided New York's Sons of Liberty with an opportunity to associate British regulars with those sentiments previously felt toward French and Indigenous peoples. Unlike the French soldiers and Indigenous raiders whom New Yorker's had fought against during the Seven Years' War, the soldiers of the 16th Regiment had not killed any British subjects during these public altercations. Furthermore, the destruction of public property and the injuries that these regulars had inflicted upon people of New York City proved so minor that neither Governor Colden nor General Gage deemed it necessary to remove the 16th Regiment from the city itself. Without prolonged episodes of soldier-civilian violence to draw upon, the terror and hatred that radicals New Yorkers had elicited against British soldiers slowly began to dissipate. By the riots' one year anniversary, it was the "wickedness" of the colonial assembly, not of the imperial regulars quartered within their city, that threatened New Yorker with "[E]gyptian Bondage."[475] To the northeast, however, Boston's Sons of Liberty faced no such difficulties fomenting sustainable anti-regular terror, hatred, and even horror.

The King Street Riot:

The suspicion of and resentment for British regulars that had simmered in Boston since fall 1768 finally boiled over on February 22, 1770, "three days after" the city had learned of the Golden Hill Street riot.[476] Unable to exact revenge upon the soldiers of the 16th Regiment, a crowd of Boston radicals targeted the home of Theophilus Lillie, a merchant who had violated the city's nonimportation agreement.[477] As the "the rage of the people increased," one of Lillie's friends, known customs informant Ebenezer Richardson, panicked, "fired into the crowd," and

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[471] *New York Journal*, February 15, 1770.

[472] *New York Journal*, March 29, 1770.

[473] Tiedeman, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 152-153. While McDougall published *To the Freeholders and Freemen of the City and Colony of New-York, and to all the Friends of LIBERTY in the British Empire* to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the Golden Hill and Nassau Street riots, it failed to revitalize New York's popular fear of or resentment for British regulars, let alone imbue them with either terror or hatred; see Alexander McDougall, *To the Freeholders and Freemen of the City and Colony of New-York, and to all the Friends of LIBERTY in the British Empire* (New York, 1771); Library of Congress.

[474] For such narratives of the Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots, see Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 54-60, McCurdy, *Quarters*, 193-196, and, Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 148-150. For the most extensive analysis these events Boyer, *Golden Hill and Nassau Street Riots*, 197ff.

[475] Melancton Smith to Henry Livingston, February 2, 1771, in *The Anti-Federalist Writings of the Melancton Smith Circle*, ed. Michael P. Zuckert, and Derek A. Webb (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2009), 14.

[476] Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country*, 177-178; Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 181.

[477] Adam Smith argues that the "mob [becomes] enraged to see any man submit patiently to affronts and ill usage" and will "desire to see this insolence resented, and resented by the person who suffers from it," for they will "cry to [the sufferer] with fury, to defend, or to revenge himself" and if such "indignation rouses" within the sufferer, "they heartily applaud, and sympathize with it"; see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 35. *Boston Gazette*, February 26, 1770. Carp, *Rebels Rising*, 52; Maier, *Resistance to Revolution* 193-194; Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 173.

inadvertently killed eleven-year-old Christopher Sneider.[478] News of Sneider's death swiftly enveloped the city. Parliamentary apologists sought to blame Boston's radical "[d]emagogues," who "raised the passions of the people" and fostered "acts of outrage and violence" throughout the city.[479] The *Boston Gazette* refuted such claims, arguing that the "Rage and Malice of an old Offeder" – tyranny – had worked through Richardson to kill Sneider.[480] Eight days later, a minor skirmish occurred between British regulars and several ropemakers on the Boston docks.[481] Intermittent brawls continued throughout the first weekend of March, and rumors began to circulate that imperial regulars had planned "to commit some outrage upon the inhabitants of the town indiscriminately."[482] Popular violence and the whispers of forthcoming atrocities inched Boston's tenuous peace to the precipice of bloodshed. The final push would occur the night of March 5.[483]

Both the *Boston Gazette* and *Boston Evening-Post* reported that minor conflicts between British soldiers and Boston civilians began around 7:00 p.m., and by 9:00 p.m. several soldiers of the 29th Regiment had abused four unarmed boys.[484] Simultaneously, a group initially reported as "[t]hirty to forty persons, mostly lads," but was actually closer to one hundred adult men, had gathered on King Street.[485] As the crowd formed, Captain Thomas Preston of the 29th Regiment brought "six grenadiers," with bayonets fixed, to the front of the Customs House to defend the evening's sentry, Private Hugh White (see Figure 1.4).[486] As the crowd began taunting the "Redcoats" and pummeling them with snowballs, icicles, and oyster shells, a cry emerged from the chaos – initially and incorrectly attributed to Preston: "Damn you, Fire, be the consequences what it will!"[487] Regardless

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[478] *Boston Gazette*, February 26, 1770; Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings," 141-142. Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country*, 178-181; Carp, *Rebels Rising*, 52; Maier, *Resistance to Revolution*, 194-195; Zobel, *Boston Massacre* 174-179.

[479] Hulton, "Some Account of the Proceedings," 141-142.

[480] *Boston Gazette*, February 26, 1770.

[481] For the various accounts of the skirmishes at John Gray's ropewalk, see John Bowdoin, et al., *A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre in Boston* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1770), 16-17, Massachusetts Historical Society; Francis Maseres, *A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbance at Boston in New England* (London: B. White, 1770), 8-12, Massachusetts Historical Society; Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country* 182-185; Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre* 181-182; Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 182-183. Such historians have argued, in accordance with Bowdoin that such violence arose from labor competition between civilians and "moonlighting soldiers" for "low-paying work," see Bowdoin, *A Short Narrative*, 41, 51. Zabin, however, refutes the established historiography, arguing that animosity and violence between soldiers and civilians in Boston initially arose not from labor competition, but rather from the difficulty of acquiring proper barracks for soldiers and their families, specifically quarters far enough away from civilian housing; see Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 74.

[482] Bowdoin, *A Short Narrative*, 16-17; Zobel, *Boston's Massacre*, 182-183.

[483] Boston's Massacre is the most confusing and complex episode of British America's Quartering Crisis, with over two hundred eye-witness accounts and a multitude of newspaper articles, pamphlets, letters, and diary entries recounting the conflict. For the immediate periodical accounts of Boston's Massacre, see *Boston Chronicle*, March 8, 1770; *Boston Evening-Post*, March 12, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770; *Boston Weekly News-Letter*, March 8, 1770; *Massachusetts Gazette and Boston-Post Boy*, March 12, 1770. For pamphlet narratives of Boston's Massacre, see Bowdoin, *A Short Narrative*, 17-31; Maseres, *A Fair Account*, 12-26. For more substantial analyses of the complexity and contradictory natures of these narratives, of which I relied upon greatly, see Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country* 185-206; Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre*, 15-34; McCurdy, *Quarters*, 196-199, Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 152-157, and Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 184-205.

[484] *Boston Evening-Post*, March 12, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770; Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country*, 185-191; Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre*, 17-19; Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 184 ff.

[485] *Boston Evening-Post*, March 12, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770. John Adams, *The Legal Papers of John Adams*, ed., L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), 3:53; hereafter cited as *LPJA*; Peter Oliver argues that the mob reached between four and five hundred individuals prior to the soldiers firing their muskets; Oliver, *Origin and Progress of the American Revolution*, 89. It is safe, however, to assume that the Boston crowd, which gathered before the Customs House, outnumbered Preston and his soldiers by at least tenfold. Archer, *As If an Enemy's Country*, 185-191; Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre*, 17-19.

[486] Ibid.

[487] Richard Palmes, a Boston Son of Liberty who testified at both *Rex v. Preston* and *Rex v. Wemms*, *et al.*, confirmed that the order to fire did not come from Preston, as he stood in front of his soldiers, attempting to defuse the riot, when the

of intent, eight enlisted soldiers fired between seven and eleven shots, immediately killing Samuel Gray, Crispus Attucks, James Caldwell, and Samuel Maverick, while wounding at least seven others.[488]



Figure 1.4: William Price, *A New Plan for the Great Town of Boston in New England in America*, 1769.
Courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center, Boston Public Library.
The 29th Regiment assembled at the Customs House on the corner of King Street and Shrimpton's Lane [Red Dot]

The subsequently titled "cruel and inhuman massacre" exemplified the "destructive Consequences of quartering Troops among citizens in a Time of Peace."[489] The following morning, several hundred men, women, and children had gathered in front of the State House and demanded that Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson remove all regulars from Boston, as it would "restore peace" to the city and "prevent further blood and carnage."[490] Royal officials, such as Henry Hulton, feared that a hasty removal of British regulars from the city would exacerbate his "life of trial, combat, and anxiety," for without military protection he would be made vulnerable to the people's "vengeance."[491] Despite pragmatic fears, Hutchinson reluctantly consented to popular demands and, by March 16, both the 14th and 29th Regiments had relocated to Castle Island.[492]

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order was given. Jane Crothers corroborated Palmes's testimony, attributing the shout to an unknown instigator hidden behind the soldiers. Furthermore, Matthew Murray testified that that that Grenadier Hugh Montgomery fired his musket, the first shot of Boston's Massacre, only after "a stick or piece of [i]ce [struck] him upon his right side," with "no order given" yet from Preston; see Adams, *LPJA*, 3:69-70, 75-76; Zabin, *Boston's Massacre*, 154-155.

[488] *Boston Chronicle*, March 8, 1770; *Boston Evening-Post*, March 12, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770; *Boston Weekly News-Letter*, March 8, 1770; *Massachusetts Gazette and Boston-Post Boy*, March 12, 1770.

[489] *A Particular Account of the Most Barbarous and Horrid Massacre* (Boston, 1770); American Antiquarian Society; *Boston Chronicle*, March 12, 1770.

[490] *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770.

[491] Henry Hulton to Thomas Bradshaw Esq., March 12, 1770, in *Henry Hulton and the American Revolution*, 232.

[492] Andrew Oliver Jr. to Benjamin Lynde Jr., March 6, 1770, in Benjamin Lynde, *The Diaries of Benjamin Lynde and Benjamin Lynde Jr.; with Appendix.* (Boston, 1880), Massachusetts Historical Society; Dalrymple to Earl of Hillsborough, March 13,

The *Boston Gazette*'s editors, Sons of Liberty Benjamin Edes and John Gills, launched a swift rhetoric assault upon the soldiers of the 29th Regiment, associating them with not simply terror and hatred, but also horror.[493] Erroneously arguing that these soldiers had continued to "fire upon" those Bostonians "who undertook to remove the slain and wounded" from King Street, Edes and Gill imbued the 29th Regiment with a terrifying rage, "insolence[,] and brutality" – the "most detestable" and hateworthy of human qualities.[494] Imperial "cruelty" wrought a truly affecting, horrifying scene, as the "Blood of [their] Fellow Citizens [ran] like Water thro' King-Street."[495] After attributing terror, hatred, and horror to these British regulars, Edes and Gill invited their audience to grieve for the "unfortunate Sufferers" and "unhappy victims" of Boston's "bloody Massacre."[496]

The soldiers of the 14th and 29th regiments inadvertently bolstered the Sons of Liberty's affective rhetoric by composing their "Castle Island Song."[497] "You Bostonians, I'd have you beware,/Of your Liberty Tree, I would have you take care," the ballad opens, "For if that we change to return to the town,/Your houses and stores will come tumbling down…"[498] While it is unclear as to how much knowledge the 14th and 29th Regiments had of the 16th Regiment's assault upon New York City's Liberty Pole, these threats against Boston's Liberty Tree reinforced the city's popular terror of both arbitrary violence and tyrannical designs from British regulars. The song ends, however, with a more ominous threat: if Boston continues to resist Parliament's authority, then "In every house, [they] shall have three or four [soldiers],/And if that will not please [them], [they] shall have half a score."[499] Beyond physical intimidation, the soldiers of the 14th and 29th Regiments now promised to violate the *Quartering Act* and invade private homes, which in turn reinforced Bostonians' popular fear that this brutal military occupation was likely to end in further death or political enslavement. Likely sardonic in tone, the "Castle Island Song" only provided additional evidence that British regualrs were "the most destable" of "villains" to the people of Boston.[500]

The consumption of print and popular media is an "extremely import emotional practice," as it permits individuals to solidify shared cultural norms of affective response.[501] The dissemination of such media, however, is also an affective practice itself, which may spread "emotional contagions" throughout an affective economy or political community.[502] The most iconic and emotionally contagious text of the King Street riot was none other than Paul Revere and Christian

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1770, in K.G. Davies, ed. *Documents of the American Revolution* (Shanon: Irish University Press, 1972) 2:61-63; Commissioners of Boston, *A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777*, Vol. 18 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill City Printers, 1887), 2-4; *Boston News Letter*, March 8, 1770; *Boston Evening-Post*, March, 12, 1770; *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770; Archer, *As if an Enemy's Country*, 205-207.

493 Clyde Augustus Duniway, *The Development of Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1906, 1969), 124-129; Leonard, *The Power of the Press*, 40-51; Pasley, *"Tyranny of Printers"*, 36-38.

494 *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770; this account was also reprinted in New York as a broadside entitled *An Account of the Late Military Massacre at Boston*, March 18, 1770 (New York: John Holt); American Antiquarian Society; variations of these account also appeared in both Purdie and Dixon, and Rind's *Virginia Gazette* on April 5, 1770. For this theory of the brutality of anger, see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 24.

495 *Boston Gazette*, March 12, 1770; *An Account of the Late Military Massacre at Boston*.

496 Ibid.

497 "Castle Island Song," in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*, ed. Frank Moore (New York: D. Appleton, 1865), 51-52.

498 "Castle Island Song," in *Songs and Ballads*, 51-52.

499 Ibid.

500 Smith argues that one who "fancies he can promote his own little interest by betraying to the public enemy that of his native country" will appear "to be of all villains the most detestable"; see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228.

501 Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice," 210-211.

502 Ibid.

Remick's *The Bloody Massacre Perpetrated in King Street, Boston on March 5, 1770* (see Figure 1.5).[503] In *The Bloody Massacre*, Captain Preston stands behind seven soldiers of the 29th Regiment, whom he orders to fire into a crowd of near twenty-five shocked, defenseless Bostonians. Emerging from a haze of musket smoke, the furthest soldier from Preston leers forward, fiendishly smiling as he fires, overjoyed at the cruelties he has inflicted. Remick's colors accentuate these emotional tones. Adorned in scarlet uniforms, the British regulars engage in a spiteful onslaught against the faithful, honest subjects of George III. Dressed in muted browns and navy-blues, Boston's civilians fall before the viciousness of the 29th Regiment, as blood gushes from their wounds. Horror for the regulars' unfettered brutality saturates Revere's engraving as richly as Remick's poignant, affecting colors.[504]

The Bloody Massacre reinforced its impassioned political imagery with an accompanying poem, printed on the bottom third of the broadside.[505] The "hallow'd walks" of Boston are now "besmear'd with guiltless Gore," as "faithless Preston, and his savage Bands/With murd'rous Rancour stretch their bloody Hands." Invoking the affective values of horror and terror, the poet depicts British regulars as "fierce Barbarians" who not only "grin" over their "Prey," but also delight in the "Carnage of the Day." The soldiers' hateworthy brutality, the poem continues, should elicit "scalding Drops" of "Rage" and "Anguish" from the people of Boston, who now suffer "speechless Sorrows" and shed "copious Tears" for their unjustly slaughtered neighbors and kin.[506]

Selling at least two hundred copies in its first printing, *The Bloody Massacre* not only associates terror, hatred, and horror with British regulars, but also served as a catalyst for fellow-feeling among the enraged, aggrieved, and betrayed people of Boston.[507] Writing to her brother James, Mercy Otis Warren embraces the sentiments depicted in Revere's engraving. It is "detestable," Warren began, that British soldiers, with the complicit support of the colony's government, had "spilt the blood of

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[503] For other examples of emotional contagions for Boston's massacre, see the following: *A Poem, in Memory of the (never to be forgotten) Fifth of March, 1770*, which argued that the victims, who now rest "in the[ir] dark and silent graves," demanded Boston exact "vengeance" upon these "wicked treach'rous men"; *A Poem, in Memory of the (never to be forgotten) Fifth of March, 1770* (Boston: Printed and sold next to the Writing School, in Queen-Street. 1770), 4-6. *A Verse Occasioned by the Late Horrid Massacre in King-Street* (Boston, 1770), which reminded its readers of the bravery of the inhabitants of Boston, "every man kept his station they say,/And scorn'd from the Soldiers for to run away," even after the fired into the crowd. *On the Death of Five Young Men who was Murthered, March 5th 1770. By the 29th Regiment* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1770), which emphasizes not only how the "cruel soldiers" mercilessly slain the people of Boston, but also how the author's own "streaming Eyes guth plenteous o'ver their hearse" during their subsequent funeral. *A Poem* and *A Verse* are held at the Massachusetts Historical Society, and *On the Death* is held at the American Antiquarian Society. Clarence S. Bringham, *Paul Revere's Engravings* (Atheneum, New York: American Antiquarian Society, 1969), 4-5; Esther Forbes argues that Paul Revere, when producing both *Landing of the Troops, 1768* and *The Bloody Massacre*, "was primarily interested in the political aspects of his print, not in its art nor accuracy"; see Forbes, *Paul Revere & the World He Lived In* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), 159-161.

[504] Paul Revere, *The Bloody Massacre Perpetrated in King Street, Boston on March 5, 1770 by a party of the 29th Regiment* (Boston, 1770).

[505] Lester C. Olson argues that after the Seven Years' War, British Americans began to create "emblematic devices," which consisted of two parts, the "body," the graphic or image, and the "mind," a motto or phrase, often in Latin. The inclusion of a poem at the bottom of *The Bloody Massacre*, as well as the lack of a motto, either in English or in Latin, prohibits this print from the classification of "emblematic device." *The Bloody Massacre*, however, does maintain some of the "emblematic" attributes expected from eighteenth-century political images; see Lester C. Olson, *Benjamin Franklin's Vision of American Community: A Study in Rhetorical Iconology* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 3-5.

[506] The poem included in *The Bloody Massacre* is identical to the poem that accompanied Henry Pelham's engraving entitled *The Fruits of Arbitrary Power. The Fruits of Arbitrary Power: or The Bloody Massacre* (Boston: W Bingley, 1770), Massachusetts Historical Society; Revere, *The Bloody Massacre.*

[507] Bringham, *Paul Revere's Engravings*, 52-53.

[its] citizens."[508] Horrified at such cruelty, Warren expressed profound intracolonial fellow-feeling for those Bostonians who lost loved ones the night of March 5; for she herself had imagined James's own murder, and saw before her "[his] wife a widow, [his] children orphans, [his] friends weeping round [him], and [his] country in tears."[509] The grief, horror, hatred, and terror that Edes, Gill, Remick, and Revere had stoked, and that Warren now exhibited, had come to dominate Boston's affective economy of violence.

Figure 1.5: Paul Revere, *The Bloody Massacre Perpetrated in King Street, Boston on March 5, 1770 by a party of the 29th Regiment*. Boston: Paul Revere, 1770. Courtesy of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

[508] Mercy Otis Warren to James Otis Jr., 1770, in the "Mercy Otis Warren Letter Books, 1770-1800" within "The Mercy Otis Warren Papers," MSS. Massachusetts Historical Society.
[509] Ibid.

Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson – now popularly depicted as a "venal Sycophant" to Parliamentary tyranny – worried that the unrestrained passions of this "government of the mob" had subjected Boston to a "spirit of anarchy," and now threatened to sink the city into "perfect barbarism."[510] Like Hutchinson, Gage firmly believed that if Boston's Sons of Liberty's continued to "inflame" the "temper of the people" toward "Revenge," then Preston and his soldiers would not receive "a fair and impartial Tryal," and their conviction would plunge the city into chaos.[511] Despite the Sons of Liberty's best efforts, Hutchinson successfully delayed *Rex v. Preston* until October 24, which mollified some of the people's fiercest passions.[512] To the benefit of Captain Preston and the soldiers of the 29th Regiment, both Josiah Quincy Jr., the Boston Son of Liberty who had defended both Ebenezer Richardson and Ensign William Fitzpatrick, and John Adams had agreed to serve as defense counselors.[513] Anti-Parliament politics aside, Adams firmly believed that a "Judgment of Death" against the soldiers of the 29th Regiment "would have been as foul a Stain" upon Massachusetts "as the Execution of the Quakers or Witches" in the seventeenth century.[514] While it is difficult to assess whether Adams or Quincy Jr. accepted their positions under personal risk, their combined affective and legal prowess ensured the acquittal of Preston and his soldiers.[515]

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[510] *The New Massachusetts Liberty Song* (Boston, 1770). Philip Gould traces the origin of British American radicals' literary representation of loyalists as traitors to the stamp tax crisis, specifically James Otis, Jr.'s creation of the "American Scriblerus" archetype, a man who was of "aware of his own imbecility" yet still attacked colonial liberties to achieve personal gain; Philip Gould, *Writing the Rebellion: Loyalists and the Literature of Politics in British-America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-55. Thomas Hutchinson to John Pownall, March 21, 1770, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 3:140-142. Hutchinson's fear of the Boston crowd persisted through August, when Hutchinson informed Pownall that its "[t]yranny" successfully had produced "terror" in all those who still supported the royal government, see Thomas Hutchinson to John Pownall, August 29, 1770, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 3:355.

[511] Lieutenant General Thomas Gage to Earl of Hillsborough, in Davies, *Documents of the American Revolution*, 2:70-73; Lieutenant General Thomas Gage to Thomas Hutchinson, April 30, 1770, in "Miscellaneous Bound Manuscripts," Massachusetts Historical Society. Gage's concerns likely arose from such texts as *On the Trial of the Inhuman Murderers, of the 5th of March, 1770* (Boston, 1770), Massachusetts Historical Society. Published in the weeks leading up to Preston's trial, *On the Trial* implored Bostonians to take "Vengeance" against the "Barbarians" who "laid them in a Flood,/Of Crimson Dye," observing that that, if these soldiers escaped justice and "Impartial Trials," they would endure "Another Greater Trial" at which God would damn them to Hell.

[512] Under Hillsborough's orders, Hutchinson orchestrated a seven-month delay to provided Gage time to secure a royal pardon in the event of Preston's conviction. Earl of Hillsborough to Thomas Hutchinson, July 31, 1770, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 3:325-326. Gregory Townsend, writing to his brother days after Boston's Massacre, observed that "Poor Preston will stand a very bad chance if his trial comes on speedily before the Passions of people are a little Subsided," Gregory Townsend to Jonathan Townsend, March 15, 1770, in "Townsend Family Papers"; Massachusetts Historical Society; Thomas Gage to Thomas Hutchinson, April 30, 1770, in *Collection of Papers Relating to Massachusetts History*. In a letter to John Pownall, Hutchinson affirmed that Boston was so eager to ensure that "Guilty Blood might not remain upon the land" that he had become worried it would be impossible for Preston or the soldiers to receive a fair trial; see Thomas Hutchinson to John Pownall, June 8, 1770, *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 3:260-261.

[513] Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre*, 215; Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 219-220. The senior counselor for the defense in *Rex v. Preston* was Robert Auchmuty Jr., who ruled against John Hancock in the *Liberty* case. Auchmuty's argumentative role, however, was minimal, and he did not serve as defense counsel in *Rex v. Wemms, et al.* Albeit a radical, Quincy, Jr. believed in the absolute fairness in the law. Writing to his father weeks after Boston's Massacre, Quincy, Jr., declared it his duty to represent the soldiers who, although "charged with murder, are not yet legally proved guilty, and therefore…are entitled, by the laws of God and man, to all legal counsel and aid." Josiah Quincy, Jr. to Josiah Quincy, Esq., March 26, 1770, in *Memoirs of the Life of Josiah Quincy, Jr. of Massachusetts Bay: 1744-1775, by his Son, Josiah Quincy, 3rd Edition*, ed., Eliza Susan Quincy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1875), 27-28.

[514] John Adams, March 5, 1773, in *Diary of John Adams*, ed. L.H. Butterfield (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962) 2:79

[515] John Adams, in his *Autobiography*, affirms that Preston's soldiers acted in self-defense the night of Boston's Massacre and, "if Truth was respected and the Law prevailed," the soldiers "must be acquitted." Adams also claimed that he was informed that Auchmuty and Quincy, Jr. would not accept their positions unless he agreed to serve with them, which

Throughout the trial, the prosecution relied significantly on the anti-regular horror, hatred, and terrors that Boston's press had promulgated throughout the city, which included depicting Preston as a "perversely wicked" man, capable of "worse than savage Cruelty [for] Butchering his fellow subjects." [516] To combat this inflammatory rhetoric, Adams argued that the jury must avoid the "Contagious" nature of passion and arrive at the morally correct and factually supported verdict: Preston never gave the order to fire, and therefore was innocent.[517] By discrediting the legal merit of Boston's affective economy of violence, Adams secured Preston's acquittal and laid the argumentative foundation for his defense in *Rex v. Wemms, et al.* – that passions corrupt the law.

No one denied that that the collective actions of William Wemms, James Hartegan, William McCauley, Hugh White, Matthew Kilroy, William Warren, John Carrol, and Hugh Montgomery resulted in the deaths of five Bostonians.[518] The job of the prosecution, therefore, was simply to prove that these soldiers had committed murder, not manslaughter. The 29th Regiment, the prosecution argued, had harbored "hatred" towards the people of Boston – citing Kilroy's promise to "never miss an opportunity to fire on the people of the town," which thereby indicated these killings' premediated nature and murderous intent.[519] The defense, however, rebutted this claim, arguing that English law is one "of mercy," and it places "Bias…in favour of the Prisoner" whenever doubt is present.[520] The "brutal rage, [and] wanton rashness" with which Boston's civilians attacked Private White, Quincy, Jr. argued, illustrated that neither "justice [n]or humanity" had governed the people that night.[521] To reinforce the immorality of the riot, Adams argued that "saucy boys, negroes and molatoes, Irish teagues, and outlandish jack tars," not the *respectable* inhabitants of Boston, had constituted the King Street mob.[522] The 29th Regiment acted only in self-defense, Quincy Jr. concluded, and therefore the jury must acquit them of murder, lest Boston be "borne away by a torrent of passions" and make a "shipwreck of [its] conscience."[523] The defense's decision to scapegoat the social outcasts of Boston succeeded. The jury acquitted six soldiers of all charges and convicted only Kilroy and Montgomery of manslaughter, to which they pleaded "the clergy" and received a brand on their right hand, designating themselves as convicted killers.[524]

The acquittals of the 29th Regiment, however, hindered neither the memory nor the affective potency of the King Street riot. To commemorate its first anniversary, Edes and Gill distributed *Innocent Blood Crying to God*, a sermon that Reverend John Lathrop preached on March 11, 1770.[525]

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historians such as Zobel doubt; Adams, 1770, in *Diary*, 3:290-296. Regarding Quincy Jr. and Adam's rhetorical prowess, see Fliegelman, *Declaring Independence*, 2, 15, 24-27, 43-54. Gustafson, *Eloquence is Power*, 150, 177-181.

[516] Adams, *LPJA* 3:61. The prosecution defined murder as the "unlawfully kill[ing of] any reasonable creature" living "under the king's peace…with malice aforethought, either express[ed] or implied;" see Adams, *LPJA* 3:61, 91-92.

[517] Adams, *LPJA*, 3:87-88.

[518] John Hodgson, *The Trial of Wemms, et al.* (Boston: J. Fleeming, 1770), 1; Massachusetts Historical Society.

[519] Adams, *LPJA*, 3:142-143; Hodgson, *Trial of Wemms*, 42, 58, 63; Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre*, 237-238.

[520] Adams, *LPJA*, 3:157; Hodgson, *Trial of Wemms*,71.

[521] Hodgson, *Trial of Wemms*,75.

[522] Adams, *LPJA* 3:266; Hodgson, 174; Zabin, *The Boston Massacre*, 217.

[523] Adams, *LPJA*, 3:167; Hodgson, *Trial of Wemms*, 77-78.

[524] Adams, *LPJA*, 3:312-314; Hodgson, *Trial of Wemms*, 207-209; Zobel, *Boston Massacre*, 298. The "benefit of clergy," which originally afforded British subjects the right to the lesser sentence of transportation after their first conviction of the capital offense of grand larceny, extended in application throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The expansive of reach of this right encouraged the passage of new statues in the eighteenth-century to prevent criminals from escaping the death penalty for the empire's most horrendous crimes; see Douglas Hay, et al., *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 22 n. 2. By 1770, however, manslaughter, however, remained one of the crimes for which first-time convicts could still apply the benefit of clergy.

[525] Edes and Gill's *Innocent Blood Crying to God* was first published and sold in London in May, 1770, and then in Boston in March, 1771. *The Massachusetts Gazette and Evening Post-Boy*, October 1, 1770; John Sainsbury, *Disaffected Patriots,* 40-41; John Lathrop, *Innocent Blood Crying to God* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1771); American Antiquarian Society.

"Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce," began Lathrop, quoting the *Book of Genesis*, "and their wrath, for it was cruel."[526] The 29th Regiment had proven their horrific intentions, Lathrop argued, through the "unparalleled barbarity" that they enacted upon the people of Boston.[527] After expressing "sorrow for the dead," who had suffered the "merciless rage of wicked men," Lathrop ended his sermon with a solemn warning, one which likely elicited greater terror on the riot's anniversary than when he first preached it: the "cry" of Boston's "innocent blood" will be "allayed…by the death of the guilty," but if the people ignore those cries and absolve the soldiers of their righteous punishment, then these victims will demand from their graves "vengeance," not only from "the murderer[s]" themselves, but from those who "divert[ed] the course of justice."[528] Through this anniversary edition of *Innocent Blood*, Edes and Gill reminded the people of Boston of the horror, terror, and grief they felt immediately after March 5, while encouraging them to renew their guard against the tyrannical machinations of Parliament's sycophants and soldiers.

Unlike New York City, Boston's affective economy of violence sustained itself upon, and thus perpetuated the memory of, the King Street riot; not least of all because of the grief induced fellow-feeling that Bostonians shared both immediately after, and upon their yearly commemorations of, the March 5 killings. A small ideological crack had emerged, however, within the city's affective economy of violence, as John Adams had demonstrated at least one rhetorical path for mediating Boston's anti-regular sentiments. While Boston's Sons of Liberty had failed to convict the soldiers of the 29th Regiment, they successfully imbued British regulars with the horror, hatred and terror once reserved for French soldiers and Indigenous raiders, and thereby transformed their former comrades-in-arms into dangerous political others, subservient to Parliament's whims. The relative stability of Boston's affective economy of violence proved invaluable, as it took Virginia's anti-Parliament radicals much longer to align with their northern brethren and rebuke British America's peacetime standing army.

The Battle of Point Pleasant:

After quelling riots in New York and suffering the indignation of Boston's mob, Gage had become disgusted with British America's "insolence" – of which Virginia was no exception.[529] Incapable of promoting amicable Anglo-Indigenous relations, several frontier settlers had killed three Mingo near the Potomac River in August 1769.[530] While Virginia's civic officials worked to "bring the perpetrators of this Act of Villainy to Justice," the murders had fostered "discontent," exciting fears of reciprocal "Acts of open Hostility."[531] To Gage's perpetual amazement, neither self-

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[526] Lathrop, *Innocent Blood*, 1.

[527] Ibid, 5-6.; Christopher Grasso argues that, during the late-eighteenth century, British American preachers not only deployed a "passionate rhetoric [that] stoked the emotional fires for the cause of liberty," but also "wished they could direct some of the zeal for liberty towards more specifically religious purposes." Lathrop's *Innocent Blood Crying to God* provides a unique example, prior to the outbreak of America's revolution, of a preacher employing an emotions rhetoric to promote both a political and spiritual agenda. Christopher Grasso, *A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming Public Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 79.

[528] Lathrop, *Innocent Blood*, 5-6, 12.

[529] Thomas Gage to Lord William Barrington, December 18, 1765, in *Sources of American Independence,* 1:14-15. I particularly would like to thank and give credit to Brian DeLay, one of my dissertation advisor's, who shared his forthcoming manuscript with me, entitled *Aim at Empire*. DeLay's analysis provided an invaluable resource for bettering my understanding the nuanced political relations between Virginia's settler-colonists and their Indigenous, western neighbors from 1771-144. Furthermore, *Aim at Empire* helped me arrive at some of my most important conclusions regarding Dunmore's governorship and the ramifications of the battle at Point Pleasant; see Brian DeLay, *Aim at Empire* (manuscript in author's possession).

[530] George Washington to John Armstrong, August 24, 1769, in *GW Papers: CS* 8:242.

[531] Ibid.

preservation nor Parliamentary law prevented Virginians from continuing to traverse the Allegheny mountains and settle "so near to the Indians as to occasion frequent quarrels."[532] No longer willing to risk the blood of his soldiers or the coin of his empire for America's ungrateful, reckless colonists, Gage ordered the evacuation of Fort Pitt, Britain's final stronghold the Ohio territory, in October 1772.[533] "If the Colonies will afterward force the Savages into Quarrels by using them ill," Gage confessed to William Barrington, then "let them feel the Consequences, we shall be out of the Scrape."[534] Unlike their northern neighbors, Virginia's affective economy of violence would be shaped by the glaring absence, not the insufferable presence, of imperial regulars.

The power vacuum which arose from Gage's evacuation of Fort Pitt brough on a rush of settler-colonial land speculation from Chesapeake and Pennsylvanian colonists.[535] By late-1772, Virginia's royal governor, John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, had appointed Thomas Bullitt to begin surveying land in both the Ohio territory and the Kentucky region. Personal interest and political ambition aligned for Dunmore, who not only coveted a "one-hundred-thousand-acre western estate," but also wished to expel both Indigenous peoples and poor whites from the western territories.[536] Popular desire among colonists for western land proved so strong, the *Virginia Gazette* wryly remarked, that "not eve a second Chinese Wall," outfitted with "a million soldiers," would deter their settlement of the Ohio territory.[537]

As Gage refocused his energies to maintain order in British America's riotous cities, Virginians' extralegal westward expansion incurred Indigenous resentment and animosity. The "Indians in general [grew] more Jealous, as the Settlers extend themselves more into their Country," Gage reported to the William Legge, the Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of State for the Colonies, yet they did not engage in war, for they "see and dread [Britain's] Power" and knew that they needed to rely on the empire for convenient access to "the Articles [which] they are in need."[538] Neither the might of the British empire nor the best efforts of Indigenous leaders, however, prevented perpetual frontier skirmishes.[539] Yet again undeterred, Virginians persisted westward and further angered the Shawnee, Lenape, and Mingo peoples. After almost eighteen months of contentious cohabitation, one Virginian remarked that the colony's frontier settlements had become "much more fearful of the Indians" than he had "expected to find them."[540] The *Virginia Gazette* reinforced such fears, publishing one colonist's theory that Virginia's "treacherous and clandestine foes, the Indians[,] ever greedily embraced all opportunities of manifesting their inimical affection toward us."[541]

Unwilling to acknowledge their own role in festering hostility throughout the Ohio territory, Virginia's western settlers embraced and stoked popular paranoia of Indigenous raids. By late-spring 1774 – despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary – frontier and coastal Virginians alike were terrified that the Indigenous peoples of the Ohio territory "intended war."[542] These sentiments only

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[532] Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, December 4, 1771, in Davies, *Documents of the American Revolution*, 3:25-26; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 25.

[533] John Stuart had informed Gage that if the British empire became entrenched in a geographically dispersed war against an anti-British Indigenous confederacy, it would likely be the empire more expensive Indigenous war; see John Stuart to Thomas Gage, January 27, 1770, "Papers of Thomas Gage."; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 25.

[534] Thomas Gage to William Barrington, March 4, 1772, in *Correspondence of Gage*, 2:600-601; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 25.

[535] Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 304.

[536] Ibid; Rob Harper, *Unsettling the West: Violence and State Building in the Ohio Valley* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 46-49.

[537] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), January 14, 1773; Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 304; Holton, *Forced Founders*, 7-8

[538] Thomas Gage to William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, October 7, 1772, in *Correspondence of Gage*, 1:336.

[539] Ibid; Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 49.

[540] Daniel Smith to William Preston, March 22, 1774, in *DHDW*, 3; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 7, 51-52.

[541] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), March 24, 1774; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 52.

[542] "Hanson's Journal," April 17, 1774, in *DHDW*, 114.

intensified as rumors circulated that a group of Mingo warriors planned to raid a settlement near Yellow Creek in retaliation for the recent killing of several Shawnee.[543] While most settlers evacuated, a group of Virginians, led by notorious Indian-hater Daniel Greenhouse, waited for these Mingo raiders.[544] The morning of April 30, seven Mingo crossed the Ohio River to visit and trade with their neighboring British settlers. Despite their unquestionably peaceful intentions, Greenhouse's men slaughtered the traders, after which Greenhouse himself removed "the scalps of the warriors he killed and attach[ed] the bloody trophies to his belt."[545] Among those killed were Kooney, Taylayne, and Molnah – the sister, brother, and nephew of powerful Mingo leader Logan.[546] Kooney's story proved especially tragic, as she had warned the Yellow Creek settlers to prepare for a retaliation raid, and if they had not evacuated, her life may have been spared.

The Yellow Creek murders became an immediate problem for Dunmore, as the once pacific Logan had "rais[ed] the hatchet" and declared that he would not "Ground it, until he [had] taken ten" British lives for each Mingo slain.[547] The "dreadful scalp-yell," the Indigenous warrior's expression of "triumph and terror," spread throughout Virginia's frontier.[548] While Mingo and Shawnee leaders – like Cornstalk – sought mediation, the "revenge-driven" Logan raided British settlements and indiscriminately killed any Virginian who crossed his path.[549] The severity of Logan's rage became clear in June, when his raiding party murdered and scalped William Spicer, his wife Lydia, and at least four of their six children.[550] The devastation which Logan wrought upon Virginia's frontier settlements proved so extensive that within just a few short weeks many believed he had fulfilled his promise and taken, in retribution, at least "thirty scalps and prisoners."[551]

Logan's unrelenting assault ensured that the people of Virginia felt terror and horror toward all Indigenous peoples, regardless of their kinship networks or political alliances. Even without the support of British regulars, Virginians had become "desirous" to wage war against the Shawnee and Mingo.[552] As skirmishes continued from Augusta County to Greenbriar, Dunmore encouraged his militia captains to do all that was necessary to prevent "further cruelties" from Indigenous raiders, hoping that the colony's forces would "repel and effectually Chastize" their "restless and inveterate Enemys."[553] Colonel William Preston concurred with the governor's assessment and argued that the

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543 "Reminiscences of Judge Henry Jolly" in *DHDW*, 9-14. For narratives of the massacre at Yellow Creek, see Colin G. Calloway, *The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, the First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 207-209; Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 54-58; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 357-359, Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 70-71.

544 Ibid.

545 "Reminiscences of Judge Henry Jolly" in *DHDW*, 9-14. Calloway, *Indian World*, 207-209; Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 54-58; Richard White, *Middle Ground*, 357-359, Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 70-71.

546 Ibid.

547 "Reminiscences of Judge Henry Jolly" in *DHDW*, 13.

548 John Heckwelder, *History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations* (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1876), 217; White, *Middle Ground*, 361-362 Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 94-97, 132. White argues that while Logan and the Mingo raiders who rode with him made every attempt "to kill Virginians and spare Pennsylvanians," their actions "enveloped" the entire frontier with "terror," see White, *Middle Ground*, 362.

549 Ibid.

550 "Extract of a Letter from Fort Pitt," June 12, 1774, in *DHDW*, 36; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), June 23, 1774; White, *Middle Ground*, 362; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 94-97.

551 "Reminiscences of Judge Henry Jolly" in *DHDW*, 13.

552 William Christian to William Preston, June 22, 1774, in *DHDW*, 43.

553 For the assault on Augusta County, see Lord Dunmore to Captain John Conolly, June 20, 1774, in *American Archives, Fourth Series: Containing a Documentary History of the English Colonies in North America, From the King's Message to Parliament, of March 7, 1774, to the Declaration of Independence by the United States*, ed., Peter Force (Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and P. Force, 1837), 1:473; for Greenbriar, see William Christian to Joseph Cloyd, June 29, 1774, in *DHDW*, 56-57. Lord Dunmore to William Preston, July 3, 1774, in *DHDW*, 61-62; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 136.

only path to ensure a "lasting peace" in the Ohio territory, specifically from the now hostile Shawnee, was to have their towns "plundered & Burned" and their "Cornfields Destroyed" until they are "Distressed in such a manner as will prevent them from giving" the people of Virginia "any future Trouble."[554] Unsurprisingly, Gage contradicted Preston and Dunmore's assessment, and blamed the current conflict on the "Frontier People, of Virginia Particularly," who had "taken so much Pains to bring on an Indian war."[555]

To punish those Indigenous peoples who had "killed, scalped, and most cruelly murdered, a great many men, women, and children" under the crown's protection, Dunmore mustered an official provincial army of approximately two thousand men – the largest British military force to enter the Ohio territory since the end of the Seven Years' War.[556] More remarkable, Dunmore had composed his volunteer army solely with Virginian colonists, as Gage refused to send a single imperial regular to aid the governor.[557] To deploy British soldiers to the Ohio territory would have sent a clear message to the Mingo, the Shawnee, and their allies: Parliament had legitimized Virginia's illegal war. Unwilling to jeopardize further the peaceful Indigenous relations which the Royal Proclamation Line had been made to protect, Gage left Virginia to fight Dunmore's war alone. To the chagrin and shock of Parliament, Gage's just refusal to attach imperial regulars to Dunmore's army brought forth grave, unforeseen consequences for the future stability of the British empire.

For almost two months, Dunmore's army (absent their royal governor) quelled minor Indigenous assaults and raids throughout the Ohio backcountry, which ultimately culminated in a battle at Point Pleasant on October 10, 1774.[558] Between eight hundred and one thousand Shawnee, Mingo, Lenape, Miami, Ottawa, and Wyandot warriors, under the command of the once peaceful Shawnee leader Cornstalk, stood ready to repel Virginia's hostile colonists.[559] While Dunmore's army overpowered their Indigenous opponent, Cornstalk's forces had "inflicted more casualties than they sustained," as the horrid cries of "many a brave [Virginian] fellow Walterring in his[own] Gore" engulfed the brisk night air.[560] A bloody conflict, Virginia's victory had secured Logan's surrender. Several days after Cornstalk's defeat, the Mingo leader shed an "abundance of tears," announced that he had "fully glutted [his] vengeance" for the unjust murder of his family, and "rejoice[d] at the beams of peace" that now shined upon his "country."[561]

In the weeks that followed, Dunmore marched from Pittsburgh to a small forest near Chillicothe, where he intended to accept the formal surrender of the Shawnee.[562] Simultaneously, reports began to emerge throughout Virginia that Dunmore already had crossed the Ohio River and would soon "destroy the Indian Towns, and drive off and disperse the Barbarians" from the entire

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554 Circular Letter of William Preston, July 20, 1774, in *DHDW*, 91-92.
555 Thomas Gage to Lord Dartmouth, July 18, 1774, in *Gage Correspondence*, 1:360.
556 Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 59-60.
557 Lord Dunmore to Lord Dartmouth, August 14, 1774, *DHDW*, 149-150; for the British regulars' absence, see *DHDW*, xxv.
558 For a narrative of the battle of Point Pleasant, see Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 281-293.
559 Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in *DHDW*, 273-274; *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), November 10, 1774; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 268-269.
560 William Ingles to William Preston, October 14, 1774, in *DHDW*, 259; Calloway, *Indian World*, 210; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 291-292. The Shawnee inflicted at least casualties of at least four to one, with some reports suggesting that over two hundred Virginians died at the battle, compared to only dozens of Shawnee; see Harper, *Unsettling the West,* 63-64.
561 "Deposition of John Gibson, April 4, 1800," in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed., (Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 31:479-480; Thomas Jefferson, "Query VI" in *Notes on the State of Virginia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 67-68, Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 295-297.
562 Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 64.

region.[563] The *Virginia Gazette*, however, had reported a half-truth: Dunmore intended to commit such atrocities against the defeated Shawnee *only* if they did not acquiesce to his demands and accept a peace treaty which favored Virginia's designs for the Ohio territory. When Dunmore finally met with Indigenous leaders at Camp Charlotte, the Shawnee not only recognized the formal land secessions that Cherokee and Haudenosaunee leaders had made to Britain almost a decade earlier, but also agreed neither to hunt on territories east of the Ohio River nor to attack any British vessels sailing within the region.[564] Finally, Cornstalk himself promised Dunmore that the Shawnee would "never go to war with [him] again."[565] With peace talks concluded, and Dunmore's forces occupying Fort Pitt (now renamed Fort Dunmore), the governor returned a celebrated, conquering hero.[566]

Parliament, however, felt no such joy toward Dunmore's foolhardy, dangerous, and illegal war with the Shawnee. A prime instigator of Virginia's concerted, aggressive push into western lands, Dunmore asserted that neither law nor policy might suppress the "emigrating Spirit of the Americans," who found no reason to respect the land claims and treaty rights of those Indigenous people whom they believed to be "little removed from the brute Creation."[567] No longer confident in the stability and security of the Ohio territory, Parliament ceased all land grants to the region – an act which "many [British Americans] saw as a betrayal and punishment."[568] This perceived theft of colonial land further intensified popular suspicions that Parliament truly had succumbed to the corrupted allure of ambition and tyranny.

Beyond eliciting Parliament's ire, Dunmore's victory at Point Pleasant validated an emergent, increasingly popular, and politically dangerous belief: that through their combat experiences in the Seven Years' War, the people of Virginia had acquired the martial prowess necessary to protect themselves from Indigenous threats without the aid of imperial regulars. An inconsequential poem composed in Ensign James Newall's private orderly book reveals the swiftness with which Virginians embraced this newfound belief.[569] Much of Newall's poem confirms the people of Virginia's commitment to "fight" and "conquer" the Shawnee, which in turn would protect their western settlements and "extend the Dominion of George [their] Great King."[570] Further, Newall urges his fellow soldiers to "lay aside all cowardly fear," for if they follow their "courageous & Brave" officers, they will seize the Ohio territory for Virginia and soon "live at ease."[571]

The simple metered scrawling of a soldier grateful to have survived combat, Newall's poem reveals an important truth: that Virginians, despite their anti-Indigenous horror, hatred, and terror, no longer found themselves dependent on the protection of Parliament's intrusive, and quite possibly depraved, soldiers. If imperial regulars were no longer necessary to defend the colonies' western frontiers, as Arthur Lee had prophesied only five-years earlier, then the purpose of Parliament's peacetime standing army must be to choke British colonists on "the bitter cup of slavery."[572] Lee's conspiratorial logic not simply dovetailed with Boston and New York City's anti-

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563 *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), November 10, 1774.
564 Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 300-301.
565 "The Shawanese Speech Delivered by Corn stalk to Big Knife, or Lord Dunmore, at Camp Charlotte," in "Chalmers Collection," MSS; New York Public Library; Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 300-301.
566 Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 305.
567 *DHDW*, 371; Calloway, *Indian World*, 207; Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 65.
568 Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 305.
569 James Newell, October 17, 1774, in "The Orderly Book and Journal of James Newell," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 11 no. 3 (1904): 248-249; William's analysis of this poem focuses on the "respect and loyalty" shown to both "Lord Dunmore and King George III," but it significantly overlooks the martial empowerment that Virginians now expressed, see Williams, *Dunmore's War*, 298.
570 Newell, October 17, 1774, in "The Orderly Book and Journal of James Newell," 248-249.
571 Ibid.
572 Lee, "Monitor III," in *Monitor's Letters*, 69-70.

regular affective economies of violence, but also helped to explain Parliament's recent closure and military occupation of the port of Boston in June 1774 – an act which shocked and horrified even the most pessimistic of anti-Parliament radicals.[573] Boston's liberation from the dangerous imperial regulars who prowled its streets, George Washington astutely observed, "now is and forever will be the cause of America."[574]

Conclusion:

When the Seven Years' War began, British Americans readily embraced anti-French and anti-Indigenous terror, hatred, and horror. The formation of these affective economies were intuitive, as French and Indigenous peoples were the traditional enemies of both the British empire and its North American colonies. The people of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York, however, never imagined that suffering the brutalities of combat would foster sentiments of intercolonial sympathy. Equally unpredictable was the newfound affection that these colonists felt towards imperial regulars, especially following General James Wolfe's joyous victory and grievous death on the Plains of Abraham. By contemporaneously sharing moments of pain and elation, British Americans had forged bonds of both intercolonial and imperial fellow-feeling. These attachments, however, remained short-lived and, by 1763, regional affective economies once again dominated British America's political and public spheres.

Parliament's decision, however, to quarter a peacetime standing army throughout British America jeopardized the colonies' newfound devotion to their imperial identity. Despite significantly different interactions with British soldiers, colonists in New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia gradually felt, to varying degrees, anti-regular terror, hatred, and horror – the same sentiments which they previously had reserved for enemies of the British empire. Unlike the battle of Québec, British Americans had no singular event which unified and aligned their anti-regular affective economies of violence. Rather, through piecemeal episodes of regional conflict, anti-Parliament radicals perceived imperial regulars as dangerous political others, whose cruelty mirrored Parliament's own indefensible corruption and tyranny. These conspiratorial accusations, however, surprised neither Britain's military officers, nor its royal officials. Allegations of legislative tyranny already had served as the ideological and affective foundations for not only British America's opposition to Parliament's loathed stamp tax, but also the formation of its first intercolonial emotional community.

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[573] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, December 5, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), December 29, 1774. Hinderaker, *Boston's Massacre*, 238-240.

[574] George Washington to George William Fairfax, June 10, 1774, in *Papers of GW: CS*, 10:96.

CHAPTER TWO:

"I Pray God Give Us Better Hearts!": The Imperial Taxation Crisis and the Rise of British America's Emotional Community of Resistance, 1763-1766

Introduction:

Sorrow overwhelmed Thomas Hutchinson the morning of August 27, 1765.[575] Standing before his fellow justices of the Massachusetts Superior Court, cloaked in his sole surviving garments, and unable to hide the "Anguish of his Soul," the chief justice "excited compassion" from every person assembled in Boston's State House.[576] All in attendance knew that a "Rage-intoxicated Rabble" had besieged Hutchinson's home the previous evening and, through their purposeful acts of destruction, had left him "Destitute of every Thing."[577] Weary and "with tears starting from his eyes," Hutchinson avowed to "every lawless Person" within the city that he "never in New-England or Old, in Great Britain or America, neither directly or indirectly, was aiding, assisting, or supporting, in the least promoting or incourageing, what is commonly call'd the STAMP ACT."[578] Rather, he "did all in [his] Power…to prevent it."[579]

Speaking neither for self-preservation nor from "Timidity," Hutchinson asserted that the mob now held only the power to "take away [his] Life," which was "of but little Value, when depriv'd of all its Comforts" and plagued by this "most piercing Distress."[580] Despite such misery, Hutchinson conveyed "hope" that the mob's inexcusable assault upon his home, his family, and his personal character might open "the Eyes of the People" to "how easy it is for some designing, wicked Man to spread false Reports, raise Suspicions & Jealousies in the Minds of the Populace, & inrage them against the innocent."[581] Exhausted, despondent, and bereft of any other option, the chief justice uttered a final, desperate plea: "I pray GOD give Us better Hearts!"[582] Thomas Hutchinson's prayer, however, went unanswered. Impassioned, violent, and perpetual acts of resistance against Parliament's new taxation regime had prompted a consequential, yet brief, transformation to British America's imperial identity.

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By January 1766, Parliament's aggressive, post-war financial agenda had fractured the political harmony of the British empire. Most Britons accepted, without objection, that the success of the empire relied intrinsically upon "fair taxes, overseas trade, and well-governed colonies."[583] The aversion that many British Americans felt towards the empire's new taxation regime, however, arose from a growing belief that Parliament had circumvented the political authority and fiscal autonomy of their colonial legislatures.[584] Ideological opposition to this perceived authoritarianism,

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[575] Josiah Quincy Jr., "Note: August 27, 1765" in *Portrait of a Patriot: The Major Political and Legal Papers of Josiah Quincy Jr.*, ed., Daniel R. Coquillette and Neil Longley York (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2009), 5:448; 450.

[576] Ibid; Thomas Hutchinson, "Speech to the Superior Court" in *Correspondence of Hutchinson* 1:287. Note: this version of Hutchinson's speech was recorded by Josiah Quincy Jr., see "Memorandum of August 27, 1765," in *Portrait of a Patriot*, 5:452-456.

[577] Quincy Jr., "Note: August 27, 1765," in *Portrait of a Patriot*, 5:448, 450; Hutchinson, "Speech to the Superior Court," *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:287. For Bailyn's account of August 26, 1765, see *Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson*, 35-38.

[578] Ibid.

[579] Ibid.

[580] Hutchinson, "Speech to the Superior Court," *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:287.

[581] Ibid.

[582] Ibid.

[583] Justin du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire: Taxes, Politics, and the Origins of American Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 11.

[584] John Brewer, *Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), xx; du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 109; Morgan. *Inventing the People*, 239.

however, fails to provide a satisfying explanation as to how British Americans successfully encouraged one another to overlook conflicting self-interests and unite in defiance of Parliament. To account for this seismic shift in British America's political topography, we must explore the power of affective economies to cultivate emotional communities.

According to Barbara H. Rosenwein, emotional communities rely upon "systems of feeling" to "define and assess" both "the affective bonds" of membership and the "modes of emotional expression" required of and expected from its members.[585] While emotional communities facilitate stronger bonds of affection when geographically limited, they may fabricate "linkage[s]" of cultural sameness across multiple regions, despite glaring, often irreconcilable differences among its wide-ranging members.[586] It is through such imagined, affective linkages that British Americans gradually cohered into an intercolonial emotional community to resist the fiscal authority of Parliament.

Britain's victory in the Seven Years' War came at a heavy financial cost and, by 1764, the imperial debt had reached approximately £129 million.[587] To stem, and hopefully lessen, this unprecedented economic burden, Parliament enacted a robust assortment of imperial reforms, which included levying taxes first on the distillation of apples and pears into cider and perry, then the importation of foreign molasses, and finally the procurement of officially stamped paper goods.[588] Colonial opposition to the stamp tax, therefore, was not a peripheral episode of political defiance, but rather a pivotal event within the British empire's larger, post-war taxation crisis. This important, yet often minimalized contextualization helps to demonstrate how British America's inflamed affective rhetorics and impassioned, violent opposition to the stamp tax arose from traditional modes of political resistance inherent to, not divergence from, imperial culture.[589]

Upon learning of their newfound financial responsibilities to the empire, the inhabitants of western England, Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York swiftly rebuked Parliament's intrusive taxes. Regional sensibilities, however, promised to impede the intercolonial and imperial alliances that were necessary to secure legislative repeal – as the most pressing daily struggles of a Virginian enslaver rarely aligned with those of a New York merchant or a Massachusetts smuggler, let alone a Bristol farmer or a minister of Parliament residing in London. Nevertheless, the power of affective economies to perpetuate precise emotional responses to ideas, objects, and individuals provided a path for bypassing the self-interested divisions that dominated the British people.

Two important methodological caveats, however, must be addressed to understand the powerful, yet fickle relationship between affective economies and emotional communities. First, multi-regional or interdependent affective economies often suffer from fluctuations of intensity. While it is possible for the dominant sentiments of an affective economy to disseminate beyond their region of origin, it remains acutely difficult for such sentiments to sustain equal affective potency within the multiple regions in which they circulate. Second, multi-regional or multi-cultural emotional communities are inherently unstable. It is fairly easy for individuals from different regions, or with different world views, to cultivate fellow-feeling through affective economies, as all it requires is an agreement that something elicits fear or hatred or joy. It is much more difficult, however, to convince those same individuals that those shared sentiments – those bonds of fellow-feeling – grant them membership into an exclusive community, and thereby a shared affective

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585 Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," 842.
586 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6, 33-36.
587 Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan. *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995; 1953), 21.
588 For a detailed analysis of Parliament's post-war imperial taxation regime, including the enactment of taxes upon cider, molasses, and stamps, see du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 101-146.
589 For an example of such minimalization see Moran, *Stamp Act Crisis* and, for an example of placing the stamp tax within its proper imperial context, see duRivage, *Revolution Against Empire.*

identity. For an emotional community to function properly, these bonds of fellow-feeling must foster a cohesive idea of an *us*. Forging an intercolonial emotional community of resistance, therefore, was no easy task for the people of British America.[590]

The difficulties of forming such an emotional community first became apparent immediately upon Parliament's passage of the cider tax in spring 1763. Despite deploying an affecting rhetoric of hatred, fear, and patriotic love to rebuke the duty laid upon both cider and perry, England's western farmers struggled to gain support from London's urban elite. A minority of Britons' economic prosperity relied on the farming and distillation of apples and pears, so even the most sympathetic ministers of Parliament failed to rally enough support for the tax's repeal. Rather, London's urban elite and whiggish ideologues coopted western farmers' anti-taxation affective rhetoric and repurposed it to censure the ministry of John Stuart, the Earl of Bute. According to these radical Whigs, Lord Bute had championed the cider tax and now schemed to corrupt the reign of George III with his tyrannical, popish counsel. While Parliament's Whig ministers succeeded in tarnishing both the political and popular image of Bute, the excise on cider and perry remained unaltered. Similar false starts occurred in British America, as some colonies felt the economic burdens of the molasses duty more acutely than others. Unable to secure its repeal, the most outspoken critics of the molasses excise gradually adopted a similar rhetoric to that of England's apple and pear farmers, gesturing towards the potential political power of this affective, anti-taxation script.

Unlike its predecessors, Parliament's stamp tax catalyzed a rare political moment in which anti-taxation rhetorics not only emerged, disseminated, and flourished throughout the British empire, but also synchronized regional interests and objectives.[591] Contrary to cider, perry, and molasses, Parliament's duty upon stamped paper was inherently universal, as every British subject, at some point in their lives, needed to acquire officially stamped paper. Tapping into the empire's well-trodden anti-taxation scripts, British Americans propagated a rhetoric of hatred, fear, and filial love to advocate for the stamp tax's repeal. The ubiquitous economic impact of the stamp tax, however, allowed British Americans to add two new, politically potent emotions to their rhetorical arsenal – fraternal love, which they expressed towards all suffering under this unjust fiscal burden, and political hope, as they earnestly believed that their unified resistance would secure a swift repeal.

The effective propagation of impassioned, anti-taxation rhetoric relied upon the symbiotic relationship of oratory and print media within British America's public sphere.[592] In the mid-

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[590] It is possible to argue that British Americans briefly formed an emotional community in the aftermath of the battle of Québec. This conclusion, however, is problematic for two temporal reasons: first, the bonds of intercolonial and imperial fellow-feeling which British Americans had forged gradually during the Seven Years' War began to decay almost immediately following their victory Québec, and second, the rapidity of this affective decayed deterred British colonists from taking any political, social, of cultural actions to enforce any boundaries of membership for their already dissolving emotional community.

[591] Nicole Eustace argues that, during the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvania's anti-Parliament political leaders encouraged the display of "spirit, a vehement brand of emotion that burnished the power of passion with the luster of classic virtue," which the public then readily adopted, as the "language of feeling was widely spoken in the Atlantic world confronted by colonists opposed to the Stamp Act." This spirit, Eustace notes, relied on four emotions: "patriotic love, just anger, communal sympathy, and political grief." Building upon Eustace's argument, I propose that Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia's anti-Parliament political elites relied as much, if not more, on the political power of hatred, fear, and hope as they did on anger, grief, and love; see Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 387-389

[592] Philip Davidson defines propaganda as "the attempt to control the actions of people indirectly by controlling their attitudes." As a rhetorical technique, propaganda is not inherently evil, and its moral valuation arises from the "interested motives" of the propagandist. Philip Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1941), xi, 31. Building upon Davidson's work, Castronovo, argues that historians of Revolutionary America's political rhetoric and ideology must understand propaganda not as a "false message," but rather as a "neutral" concept that describes not only the message, but also the "networks, formal as well as informal, that propelled texts and

eighteenth century, British America underwent an elocutionary revolution, in which the "emotional credibility" or sincerity of an orator determined the rhetorical persuasiveness of his arguments.[593] These metrics of affective evaluation bled into British America's burgeoning "infrastructure of political communication," as emotional credibility became a prerequisite for persuasive, publicly consumed texts.[594] Simultaneously, the cost of printing these texts had reduced significantly throughout the eighteenth century, which permitted British colonists to acquire, and then redistribute, newspapers, broadsides, and pamphlets without significant financial hardship.[595] Beyond the public sphere, personal correspondence reinforced British America's cultural prioritization of affective sincerity, as epistolary discourse carved out a "space of familiarity" for correspondents to display their "feeling heart[s]" without hesitation or concern of political condemnation.[596]

The persistent circulation of public and semi-private anti-taxation texts eventually codified three rhetorical "feeling rules" to which all British Americans felt political pressure to conform: first, express hatred for and fear of every Briton who either supported or enforced the stamp tax; second, reaffirm filial love for George III; and finally, take-up the neglected standard of British patriotism and defend both their imperial constitution and their fellow Britons from the corrupted designs of Parliament.[597] Public compliance with these feeling rules, therefore, granted white male colonists implicit membership in British America's burgeoning emotional community of resistance.[598]

As anti-taxation ideology became a defining feature of this emotional community, and thereby entrenched itself within the population centers of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York, colonists began to engage in the emotional practice of mobilization. Emotional mobilization, as defined by Monique Scheer, is the social performance of those "habits, rituals, and everyday pastimes" that help participants achieve "a certain emotional state."[599] Political activism – one of the most common forms of emotional mobilization – relies upon "the practice of negative feelings" to achieve a collective, antagonistic mentality.[600] When British Americans congregated in public spaces to demonstrate their committed resistance to Parliament's fiscal abuses, they did not simply vocalize the core sentiments of their anti-taxation rhetoric. Rather, their discursive fears stoked fierce

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ideas across public and private spaces." Propaganda relies so centrally on emotions that in its most successful forms "the circulation of the message is indistinguishable from its emotional appeal"; see Castronovo, *Propaganda 1776*, 10, 23.

[593] Fliegelman, *Declaring Independence*, 2; Gustafson, *Eloquence is Power*, 142, 147.

[594] Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks*, 23; Gustafson, *Eloquence is Power*, 147-150.

[595] Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 2. The "egalitarian tempers" of British America's taverns and coffeehouses served as a central venue for the circulation of print tracts as well as for illiterate British Americans to remain informed of the current political developments within the empire; see David W. Conroy, *In Public Houses: Drink and the Revolution of Authority in Colonial Massachusetts* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 234-238, 251; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 15-16; 29-30. For a detailed analysis of the "genteel" print and political cultures that emerged within coffeehouses in both Halifax and Québec, see Michael Eamon, *Imprinting Britain: Newspapers, Sociability, and Shaping of British North America* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 164-186.

[596] Dierks, *In My Power*, xii-xiii, 4; Pearsall, *Atlantic Families*, 24. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between emotions expressed and emotions elicited in epistolary rhetoric, see G. J. Barker-Benfield, *Abigail and John Adams: The Americanization of Sensibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 62 ff.

[597] For a definition of "feeling rules," see Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," 557-559; for a definition of patriotism, see Jones and Vernon, *Patriotism*, 26.

[598] Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 170. Before the 1760s, "political discussion, like direct political participation, fell outside the feminine sphere" in British America. Norton argues that the socio-economic turmoil of Britain's taxation crisis not only compelled "male politicians…to focus on the realm of the household," but also prevented women themselves from "remain[ing] aloof from the events of the 1760s and early 1770s, even had they so desired." Female out-of-doors political action, however, neither publicly emerged nor significantly influenced politics in British America until after the passage enactment of the Townshend Duties in 1767; Norton, *Liberty's Daughters*, 155-156, ff.

[599] Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice," 209-211.

[600] Ibid, 211.

political anger which, when combined with British Americans' simmering hatred and desperation, often erupted into intense political violence – specifically popular riots – which targeted those royal subjects who submitted to, or freely enforced, Parliament's tyrannical whims.[601] To the chagrin of royal officials and Parliamentary apologists, anti-taxation colonial elites lauded such destruction and mob cruelty as the loving and hopeful pleas of the king's ignored subjects and slighted patriots. By December 1765, participation in, or the explicit endorsement of, anti-stamp tax riots demarcated the affective boundaries of membership within British America's emotional community of resistance.

British America's unrelenting hostility towards both the stamp tax and those Britons who enforced it eventually produced tangible political results. Parliament, now facing pressure from London's political elite, repealed the detested act in March 1766. The palpable joy that the people of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York felt upon the realization of their collective political hope not only extinguished their inflamed hatred, fear, and anger, but also reignited a profound sense of imperial devotion and fellow-feeling. Ironically, the stamp tax's repeal had doomed British Americans' emotional community of resistance. Without a shared threat or political enemy against whom to unite in opposition, British Americans' bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling yet again began to erode. Despite the tenuous restoration of imperial harmony, popular colonial resistance to Parliamentary authority had evinced a dangerous truth: that British Americans had the capability of forming a new, affective identity, one devoid of any political connections to their beloved empire.

Cider, Molasses, and Stamps – A Trinity of Taxes:

Prime Minister Bute began Parliament's new, aggressive taxation regime not with levies on molasses or stamped paper imported to British America, but rather with duties upon cider and perry distilled in England. Francis Dashwood, Bute's Chancellor of the Exchequer, argued that the absence of a royal excise upon the "nearly twenty million gallons of cider…produced in small quantities in private residences" throughout England had cost the crown approximately £170,000 per annum in revenue.[602] To correct this gross fiscal error, Parliament amended its four-shilling per hogshead tax on cider and perry to include those batches brewed for private consumption, which specifically targeted small-scale apple and pear farmers in western England.[603] Parliament further bestowed "extraordinary prerogative powers" upon England's excise commissioners, including the "right to search," without warrant, "any property suspected of brewing or hoarding" these drinks.[604]

The "Land of Apples," *Felix Farley's Bristol Journal* reported in early-April, had begun "to mourn" its newfound oppression, as western farmers feared that Parliament's repressive taxes would force them to labor "under the sultry sun, without enjoying liberty or reaping the fruits of [their] wretched Toil."[605] *Berrow's Worcester Journal* rebuked this grave injustice, declaring it immoral that the "common, healthful Drink" of cider and perry receive a higher duty from Parliament than that of luxury imports, such as French wine.[606] The regional "flame" of fear and distain that the cider tax had sparked among apple and pear farmers gradually spread to London, as Parliament's western

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[601] Collective political violence refers to a political action that "immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects; involves at least two perpetrators of damage; and results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts," see Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3; 84-85. This is different than rioting, which Gilje defines as "a group of twelve or more people attempting to assert their will immediately through the use of force outside the normal bounds of law"; see Gilje, *Rioting in America*, 6.

[602] Du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 94.

[603] David Walsh, et al, "The Cider Tax, Popular Symbolism and Opposition in Mid-Hanoverian England" in *Markets, Market Culture, and Popular Protest in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland*, ed. Adrian Randall and Andrew Charlesworth (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996), 70.

[604] Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution*, 101; Walsh, "The Cider Tax," 70.

[605] *Felix Farley's Bristol Journal*, April 2, 1763.

[606] *Berrow's Worcester Journal*, April 7, 1763.

ministers "ardently fought" for the "interests of their constituents."[607] Lambasting the tax's dangerous, corrupt nature, the minister of Worcester, William Dowdeswell, argued that Parliament had placed "the makers of Cyder and Perry at the Mercy of the Exciseman."[608] Worse yet, these government agents had a new, unrestrained, "horrible Power [to] Search" the premises of any distiller without the least "Suspicion of Offence."[609] Appealing to the patriotic love that all Britons felt for their constitutional liberties, Dowdeswell implored his fellow ministers to repeal the cider tax with haste, lest they provoke the "Rank of Men who love their Liberty as well as their Superiors love theirs," but have not "yet been inured" to legislative or constitutional "Oppression."[610]

Parliament, however, never seriously entertained repealing the duties they had placed upon cider and perry. Rather, its radical Whig contingent engaged a parallel affective rhetoric of hatred and fear to turn the British populace against Prime Minister Bute.[611] Months before Dowdeswell addressed Parliament, John Wilkes of Aylesbury warned his fellow ministers that the royal court of George III, as well as the current ministry of Parliament, had fallen "under the control of a corrupt cabal of Scots," whose leader had "manipulate[ed] the king into imposing policies that opposed the people's interests," such as the maligned cider tax.[612] The Aylesbury minister characterized Bute as a politician deserving of the same hatred and fear which British farmers felt toward the unpopular duties on cider and perry. Through such arguments, Wilkes had recalibrated popular political action within England's "cider counties," as enraged crowds of apple and pear farmers assaulted effigies adorned in "Scotch plaid," which often led a "royally crowned ass" by "the nose" – a not so subtle censure of the Bute's inappropriate sway over the king.[613] Overwhelmed by the abuses which he suffered from his fellow ministers, the whiggish political press, and now the British populace, Bute resigned as prime minister on April 8, 1763.[614]

Resignation, however, did not absolve Bute of his political sins, nor did it spare him from the people's hatred or fear. Rather, it intensified the impassioned assaults which the former Prime Minister now suffered. "Wilkes's pen," Horace Walpole of King's Lynn remarked, "was never idle," and on April 23 he composed *North Briton No. 45*, which accused the now *retired* Bute of ghostwriting the king's most recent speeches to Parliament.[615] With such "terrors of Parliament [laid] before their eyes," Wilkes argued, "every friend of his country must lament" that George III, who

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[607] Horace Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, ed. Derek Jarrett (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 1:164-165; Walsh, "Cider Tax," 73.

[608] William Dowdeswell, *An Address to such of the Electors of Great-Britain, as are Not Makers of Cyder and Perry*, (London: W. Nicoll, 1763) 5-6, 40; Beinecke Library, Yale University.

[609] Dowdeswell, *An Address,* 25.

[610] Ibid, 44. Walsh, "Cider Tax," 75-76.

[611] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 1:164-165; John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 120.

[612] Wells, *Poetry Wars*, 40. John Brewer notes that approximately 9.4 million "newspapers with stamps were issued" in England in the 1760s, an increase of 2.4 million issues from the 1750s. While Brewer notes that it is "difficult to gauge the precise significance or scale of the growth" of the British press due to "scattered and fragmentary" evidence, he argues that the Wilkite political phenomena of the 1760s "would not have been possible without a strong provincial press and thriving indigenous political culture"; Brewer, *Party Ideology*, 142-143, 160.

[613] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 1:185. Robert B. Shoemaker argues that public punishment "was a characteristic feature of metropolitan life," in which crowds of Londoners gathered to witness or "participate in the destruction" of a "convict's reputation" by representatives of judicial authority. These punishments and acts of shaming, however, were often imitated by crowds and mobs to legitimize their own extralegal political actions. Robert B. Shoemaker, *The London Mob: Violence and Disorder in Eighteenth-Century England* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2004), 80.

[614] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 1:167. Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, April 10, 1763, in *Walpole Correspondence*, 22:129. Brewer, *Party Ideology*, 126-128.

[615] John Wilkes, *North Briton No. 45* in *The North Briton, from No. I to No. XLVI,* Inclusive (London: W. Bingley, 1769), 156.

had "so many great and amiable qualities," had given the "sanction of his sacred name to the most odious measures, and the most unjustifiable public declarations."[616] These hate-fueled accusations of tyrannical ambition further tarnished Bute's deteriorating reputation, but not without cost, as Wilkes suffered imprisonment for committing seditious libel against the king. [617]

Despite his incarceration, Wilkes's characterization of Lord Bute dominated whiggish print culture. The political cartoon "Liberty Protected" (see Figure 2.1) depicts Bute's treacherous attempt to murder of Britannia, who proclaims that her "only hope" for survival rests in the "Protection" provided by Britain's selfless patriots.[618] Armed with a sword and a shield labeled "North Briton," Wilkes declared that not even royal prosecution would "deter" him from his duty, "so long as Britannia's Glory require[d his] help." With the aid of Richard Grenville and William Pitt, Wilkes successfully rebuffs Bute's vicious assault.[619] Accusations of libel notwithstanding, London's print culture deployed Wilkes as the embodiment of patriotic love, for he, along with his fellow Whigs, were willing to sacrifice their lives to defend the British empire from the ambitions of popish men.



Figure 2.1: *Liberty Protected*. London: 1763.
Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

616 Wilkes, *North Briton No. 45* in *The North Briton*, 156.
617 For a detailed account of the events surrounding the publication of *North Briton No. 45* and Wilkes's subsequent imprisonment, see Arthur H. Cash, *John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty* (New Have: Yale University Press, 2006), 96-120.
618 "Liberty Protected," (London, 1763); Lewis Walpole Library, Prints & Photographs Collection, Yale University.
619 By the publication of *North Briton No. 45*, the *North Briton* had become a popular staple in London's anti-Bute print culture, and thus it easily persuaded its readership that the accusations of "seditious libel" against Wilkes were another example of Bute's "Scottish tyranny," see du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 95-97; Maier, *Resistance to Revolution*, 163.

London's populace so greedily devoured "Liberty Protected" that it received a second printing, entitled "Wilkes, and Liberty," which included a ballad that both commemorated the liberation of Wilkes from prison and further berated the ruined Bute.[620] "When *Scottish* Oppression rear'd up its d[am]n'd Head,/And *Old English* Liberty almost dead," the song began, "Brave Wilkes, like a true English Member arose,/And thunder'd Defiance against England's Foes."[621] After a brief and unjust imprisonment in the Tower of London, Wilkes was "discharg'd without Guilt or Disgrace," and his new freedom stirred "Joy" in those "true English voices" who sung Britannia's praises.[622] The liberation of Wilkes, whiggish Britons now hoped, signaled the irredeemable demise of Lord Bute's corrupting influence over their empire.

In the weeks that followed Wilkes's release, crowds gathered in Worcester not simply to share their profound "Joy" for the ratification of the *Treaty of Paris*, which formally ended the Seven Years' War, but rather to express "their great sorrow and concern" for "the late woeful tax on cider."[623] The most unapologetic depiction of western Briton's perpetual suffering, as well as the intense hatred and fear which they felt towards Bute, was "The Roasted Exciseman, or the Jack Boots Exit" (see Figure 2.2).[624] At the center of this political cartoon dangled the hated, lifeless Lord Bute – whom the British people first convicted of treason for stabbing " Liberty" with his cider and perry taxes, then adorned in a devil's mask to signify his popish corruption, and finally executed upon the gallows above an inflamed "boot," a pun derived from the minister's royal title. To the left of this makeshift execution, Liberty weeps tears of joy at her freedom from the villainous Scotsman. Now freed, she rests a hand upon her namesake cap and an issue of Wilkes's *North Briton*. Behind Liberty, a crowd of Britons wave flags emblazoned with "Liberty, Property, & No Excise," "Magna Charta," and St. George's Cross – intentionally omitting St. Andrew's Cross from the Union Jack, as it served as yet another emblem of Bute's Scottish corruption. To the right of the prime minister's corpse, a British patriot seizes a barrel labeled "Excis'd Cyder" from a Tory politician, who bemoaned that all of his "aspiring hopes" had died at the gallows with former patron. Through this skillful amalgamation of both urban and agrarian anti-taxation affective rhetorics, "The Roasted Exciseman" blames Bute for the cruelty and suffering brought forth by his cider tax, and thus justifies the hatred and fear that all Britons must now ostensibly feel toward *only* the Scottish minister and his allies – not *all* of Parliament.

Opposition to the cider and perry tax remained a constant topic within British presses and among England's western farmers for the remainder of 1763. The geographic limits of the excise's fiscal impact, however, proved fatal to securing its repeal, as most of Parliament believed it impossible for a perpetual "union" to form between London and "two or three distant counties" preoccupied with a tax on their apples and pears.[625] To phrase another way, Parliament did not believe that anti-taxation affective rhetorics had the power to coalesce disparate socio-economic regions into a perpetual emotional community of resistance, especially one that was willing to engage

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[620] "Wilkes, and Liberty. A New Song." (London: E. Sumpter, 1763); Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. For a complete record of this political cartoon, see Frederic George Stephens and Edward Hawkins, *Catalogue of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum: Division I. Political and Personal Satires* (London: British Museum Trustees, 1883) 4:252-253. "Wilkes, and Liberty" derives its title from the rallying cry with which the crowd Londoners greeted Wilkes after Chief Justice Pratt released him from prison on May 6, 1763. George Rudé, *The Crowd in History* (London: Serif, 2005), 55; Brewer, *Party Ideology*, 156-157; Cash, *John Wilkes*, 116.

[621] "Wilkes, and Liberty"

[622] Ibid.

[623] *Berrow's Worcester Journal*, May 12, 1763; June 30, 1763.

[624] In "The Roasted Exciseman" the British crowd "claims legitimacy" for its extralegal actions by "mimicking official punishments," such as hanging Lord Bute as a traitor to the British empire; Shoemaker, *London Mob*, 131.

[625] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 1:167.

in acts of violent, public protest to achieve its objectives. This reasonable, albeit flawed assumption, guided the taxation policies which Prime Minister George Grenville enacted upon Britain's colonists.

Figure 2.2: *The Roasted Exciseman, or the Jack Boots Exit*. London: E. Sumpter, 1763.
Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

Grenville's decision to impose an array of new taxes upon British America emerged from a desire not to offset the empire's war debt, but rather to "defray" the cost of the nearly ten thousand British regulars now stationed throughout the colonies.[626] Some ministers denounced this plan as too radical, as it bypassed the fiscal authority of both the Privy Council and British America's colonial legislatures, yet Grenville deemed these extreme measures necessary to ensure that the colonies upheld their "unavoidable political obligation" to the empire.[627] "We have expended much in America," the prime minister remarked, "let us now avail ourselves of the fruits of that expence."[628]

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[626] The *American Duties Act* – popularly known in North America as the Sugar Act – defined its purpose as "defraying the expences of defending, protecting, and securing the said colonies and plantations," see "An Act for Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America" in *Two Acts of Parliament* (Boston: Draper, 1764), 464, hereafter referred to as the "American Duties Act 1764." Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 22-23; Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 110.

[627] "The Parliamentary Diaries of Nathaniel Ryder, 1764-1767" ed., P.D.G. Thomas in *Camden Miscellany Vol. XXIII*, 4th Series, Volume 7 (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1969), 234. Gould, *Persistence of Empire*, 110, 116.

[628] Ibid.

The first stage of Grenville's fiscal reforms in British America – the *American Duties Act* (1764) – not only revised the duties placed upon imported wine, pimentos, and coffee, but also reduced the excise on foreign molasses from six to three pence per gallon.[629] To enforce these taxes, Grenville proposed granting customs officers and vice-admiralty courts the power to detain and prosecute colonial smugglers who did not pay their excise.[630] *Considerations upon the Act of Parliament*, first printed in Boston, argued that the true "mischief" of these forthcoming fiscal reforms was not the value of taxes themselves, but rather the "prejudice" that they placed upon the cod-fishers and whalers of the "northern colonies," whose trade with the West Indies would become unprofitable under the new, and more aggressively enforced, molasses duty.[631] Appealing to Parliament's mercy, *Considerations* concluded with an unoffensive plea: discontinue these punitive economic measures.[632]

Like Bute's tax on cider and perry, a majority of colonial opposition to Grenville's duty on foreign molasses arose from its perceived violation of English liberties. William Smith, Jr. of New York advised Governor Robert Monckton that his fellow colonists were "Anxious to maintain their Privileges" as British subjects and held "fearful apprehensions of being soon burdened by [these] internal Taxes."[633] Massachusetts pamphleteer Oxenbridge Thatcher argued that even though Parliament held "no design" to "enslave" British America, nonconsensual taxes overlooked how its colonists had "greatly increased" the empire's "wealth and grandeur" while "impoverish[ing] themselves" during the Seven Years' War.[634] Worried that Grenville's taxes may encourage the "alienation" of British America's "affection," Thatcher implored England to "never forget her parental affection," to reaffirm the "bands of love and interest" that united the entire British empire, and to deliver, with haste, the colonies from this economic burden.[635]

Affective moderation, however, did not characterize every British American response to the *American Duties Act*. Readily embracing the impassioned, anti-taxation script of western England's apple and pear farmers, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia expressed disgust for the House of Commons. Parliament now oppressed "North America with the iron hand of power," Lee spat, for the sole purpose of their taxes were to raise the necessary funds to sustain their immoral peacetime standing army.[636] "[N]o reasonable being," Lee posited, would "quit liberty for slavery," even at the "apparent hazard of his life."[637] Rejecting Thatcher's naïve belief in Parliament's inherent benevolence, Lee argued that voluntary submission to such "tyrannical usurpations" would transform British Americans into the "slaves of five hundred masters instead of one," and thereby birth within their breasts a "fatal resentment" for their empire.[638] Both Thatcher and Lee held grave

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[629] "American Duties Act, 1764," 466. Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 24.

[630] du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire,* 103; Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 24.

[631] *Considerations Upon the Act of Parliament* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1764), 8, 11-12; American Antiquarian Society. T.H. Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11.

[632] *Considerations Upon the Act of Parliament*, 29.

[633] William Smith, Jr. to Robert Monckton, November 4, 1764, in *Smith Memoirs*, 27.

[634] Oxenbridge Thatcher, *The Sentiments of a British America* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1764), 5, 12.

[635] Ibid, 16.

[636] Richard Henry Lee to Anonymous, May 31, 1764, in *RHL Letters*, 1:5.

[637] Ibid, 1:5-6.

[638] Richard Henry Lee to Anonymous, May 31, 1764, in *RHL Letters*, 1:5-6. Thatcher and Lee's use of "slavery" refers to slavery as a political concept. For a detailed analysis of the ideological tension of political slavery and African chattel slavery during Britain's taxation crisis, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 232-246. Eustace, however, argues that this distinction between political slavery and chattel slavery rests more in emotion than ideology, as British Americans, following the Aristotelian connection of *thumos* (spirit) with that of civic liberty, believed that Africans "innate lack of emotional spirit made them inherently slavish"; see Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 386. Lee's rhetorical elision of political slavery and chattel slavery in this letter serves the rhetoric purpose of exacerbating Virginian tobacco planters' fears of Parliamentary enslavement by relating it to a tangible, horrid condition they already intimately understood.

concerns for the undue strain that Grenville's taxes now placed upon British America. Only Lee, however, explicitly imbued Parliament with the hatred and fear that anyone who suppressed the rights of a fellow Brition, or willfully subjected them to political enslavement, so rightfully deserved.

The most shocking observation on the *American Duties Act* came from Massachusetts governor Francis Bernard. The "publication of orders for the strict execution" of the molasses tax, the governor lamented, "has caused a greater alarm" in Massachusetts "than the taking of Fort William Henry did in 1757."[639] This was a staggering claim. The people of Boston, and all of British America, had wept, had raged, and had enacted bloody revenge for the horrors that General de Montcalm and his Indigenous allies had committed within Fort William Henry. Bernard's warning that the potential enforcement of Parliament's molasses tax stirred "greater alarm" among the people of Massachusetts than did one of the worst atrocities which the British empire had suffered during the Seven Years' War was incredibly hyperbolic, yet nearly prophetic.

Despite Bernard's worst fears, British America's rhetorical opposition to the *American Duties Act* neither intensified nor cohered into an effective, intercolonial call for repeal. As New Englanders condemned the molasses excise, Virginians worried more about the rising cost of Madeira wine, New Yorkers suffered a devastating postwar recession, and all British Americans endured smuggling crackdowns and bans on printing their own colonial currency.[640] British colonists' "befuddled, erratic, and…apathetic response" to the *American Duties Act* gave Grenville and his allies in Parliament a false sense of security that their forthcoming tax upon stamped paper would face a similarly disjointed, and woefully ineffectual, opposition throughout British America.[641]

Enacted on March 22, 1765, and enforceable beginning November 1, the *Stamp Act* mandated that printers throughout British America use paper marked with the Treasury Office's official stamp for all documentation, including court records, newspapers, and even playing cards.[642] The stamp tax, however, was graduated relative to both the size and importance of the document: three pence per sheet for simple legal documents, four times that – a shilling – for a newspapers less than twenty folio sheets, and forty times that – two pounds – for an academic degree.[643] Despite its moderate, reasonable scaling, the stamp tax disproportionately impacted, and thereby placed an "intolerable burden" upon, poorer British colonists, as the duty had to be paid in sterling coins, not paper currency.[644] Most troubling, the *Stamp Act* ordered that any British subject "who shall forge, counterfeit, erase, or alter" officially stamped paper "shall suffer Death as in Cases of Felony

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[639] Francis Bernard to Richard Jackson, January 7, 1764, in *The Papers of Francis Bernard*, ed., Colin Nicolson (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2015), 2:29.

[640] The Hovering Act of 1763 "encouraged customs officials to seize vessels suspected of smuggling and to sell their contents to the highest bidder" and the Currency Act of 1764 "barred the colonies from issuing new paper money," du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 103, 112.

[641] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 613-614. It is important to note that not all ministers in Parliament supported the tax on stamped paper. Colonel Isaac Barré, an Irish veteran of the Seven Years' War and minister for Chipping Wycombe, lambasted the proposed stamp tax, for placing yet another hardship upon those British colonists who had "fled from [Parliament's] tyranny to a then uncultivated and unhospitable country," and already had "suffered" greatly "from the hands of those who should have been their friends"; see Jared Ingerson to Thomas Fitch, February 11, 1765 in *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1754-1783*, ed., P. D. G. Thomas and R.C. Simmons (Millwood: Kraus International Publisher, 1982), 2:16; Hattem, *Past and Prologue*, 71.

[642] *An Act for granting and applying certain Stamp Duties, and other Duties, in the British Colonies and Plantations in America* (Boston, Richard and Samuel Draper: 1765), 499; hereafter referred to as the "Stamp Act, 1765." Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 72.

[643] "Stamp Act, 1765", 505.

[644] In 1765, five shillings and six pence in British currency equated to one ounce of silver; see du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 113; 122.

without the Benefit of Clergy."[645] Imperial regulars who killed British civilians, if found guilty of manslaughter, had the right to plead the benefit of clergy, and therefore received greater judicial mercy than would colonial counterfeiters who violated the *Stamp Act*.

Parliament had consented to these extreme provisions because it had removed the "burthen" of taxation "to distant shoulders."[646] Andrew Eliot of New York, however, believed such punishments unnecessary, as British colonists would readily comply with the stamp tax due to their sense of imperial fairness. British Americans had grown "wealthy" and "long enjoyed their Estates Free of all taxes," Eliot observed, while "the Mother Country had been taxt to the utmost of late to support" its colonies.[647] Horace Walpole disagreed. After careful reflection, Walpole concluded that Parliament had "neglected, or overlooked" its managerial responsibility to the North American colonies for decades, which permitted them to grow in both "power and opulence."[648] British America's *de facto* autonomy had hindered Parliament's ability to enforce the "necessary limits of dependence."[649] Unbeknownst to Grenville, the passage of the stamp tax would instigate a spirited, political resistance against these necessary limits of dependence, as well as Parliament's own imperial authority; a resistance not seen in British America since the days of the Glorious Revolution.

The Affective Rhetoric of Stamp Tax Resistance:

If the *American Duties Act* signaled to some British Americans that they "indeed [were] becoming second-class subjects of the crown," then the *Stamp Act* demonstrated Parliament's willingness to complete this economic subjugation.[650] Troubling reports gradually circulated throughout British America in early-spring that Parliament had infringed, with malicious intent, upon the colonists' right to petition, holistically dismissing all appeals for relief from both the forthcoming stamp tax and the already enforced *American Duties Act*.[651] By late-May, one New Yorker pessimistically observed that Parliament's neglect seemed to have "lost Great Britain the Affection of all her Colonies."[652]

From late-May through the new year, political elites in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York opposed the stamp tax with a rhetoric strikingly similar to England's anti-taxation affective script – not only imbuing Parliament with the values of both hatred and fear, but also reaffirming their own filial love for George III, whose sympathies they believed imperative for guaranteeing the excise's repeal. Keenly aware of the universality of the stamp tax, colonial elites additionally stoked both fraternal love and political hope among British Americans, arguing that if they acted in

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[645] "Stamp Act, 1765," 509. The brutality of punishment for counterfeiters arises from historic British legal culture, as counterfeiting itself is one of the seven categories of crimes label as treason in the 1351 Statute of Treason; see Carlton F. W. Larson, *The Trials of Allegiance: Treason, Juries, and the American Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 14.

[646] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 2:92

[647] Andrew Elliot to his Father, February 2, 1765, in "Andrew Elliott Letters, 1747-1777," MSS, New York Historical Society.

[648] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 2:92.

[649] Ibid.

[650] Breen, *Marketplace of Revolution*, 217-218.

[651] For a detailed analysis of British Americans' right to petition, see Bushman, *King and People*, 46-54. Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia all submitted individual petitions to the House of Commons seeking relief from Parliament's wave of new taxes. For "Petition from the Massachusetts House of Representatives to the House of Commons," November 3, 1764, see *Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts from 1765 to 1775; and the Answers of the House of Representatives to the Same*, ed., Alden Bradford (Boston: Russell and Gardner, 1818), 21-24; for "New York Petition to the House of Commons," October 18, 1764, and the "Petition of the Virginia House of Burgesses to the House of Commons", December 18, 1764, see *Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766*, ed., Edmund S. Morgan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 8-14, 16-17.

[652] William Smith, Jr. to Robert Monckton, May 30, 1765, *Smith Memoirs*, 29.

concerted, unwavering resistance, then they would elicit the king's mercy and, through his royal intercession, save themselves from Parliament's tyrannical yoke. The antithesis of fear, Adam Smith observes that hope requires one "live in the expectation of some good" or "place confidence in futurity."[653] Without a pragmatic hope for success, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for British America's anti-stamp tax elite to forge an effective emotional community of resistance.

British America's intercolonial resistance to the stamp tax began in Williamsburg – the seat of Virginia's colonial government. When the House of Burgesses learned on May 28 that Parliament had enacted the dreaded stamp excise, only thirty-nine burgesses – just over one-third of its members – still resided within the city.[654] Unconcerned with the House's nearly empty status, a first-term, twenty-nine-year-old burgess from Louisa motioned that the remaining members "consider" adopting an official response to Parliament's legislative affront.[655] For the next two days, the House of Burgesses debated Patrick Henry's proposed stamp tax resolutions.

An anonymous French spectator provides the only contemporaneous account of the debates which occurred on May 30.[656] Shortly after entering the lobby, this traveler observed Patrick Henry proclaim that "in former times [T]arquin and Julus had their Brutus, Charles had his Cromwell," and none should "Doubt" that "some good american would stand up, in favour of his Country."[657] Aghast at the implication of regicide – as Lucius Junius Brutus, Marcus Junius Brutus, and Oliver Cromwell had each orchestrated the executions of their respective, tyrannical kings – the House of Burgesses' Speaker, John Robinson, halted Henry's oration. Robinson then chastised the young Virginian for discussing "trasion," and condemned the other burgesses, as not one of them was "loyal Enough" to England to silence Henry "before he had gone so far."[658] Aware of the dangerous political threshold that he had breached, Henry begged his fellow burgesses' "pardon," vowing that he would "shew his loyalty" to George III, if so demanded, "at the Expence of the last Drop of his blood."[659] The "heat of passion," Henry concluded, had led him to say "more than he intended."[660] The greater the passion in mid-eighteenth century British American oratory, the more sincere the speaker. Henry's fellow burgesses, therefore, believed that his fervent rhetoric arose from a "heart" which yearned to defend its "Country[']s Dying Liberty," and thus his appeal to their compassion was both affecting and effective.[661]

Henry's fiery "Caesar-Brutus" oration provides an affective template for British America's political condemnation of the stamp tax. By arguing that an "American" must be willing to accept the mantle of Brutus and Cromwell, Henry implores his fellow burgesses to feel both murderous hatred for and tyrannical fear of not George III – a misunderstanding by Robinson – but rather towards England's despots seated in Parliament. To disarm Robinson's accusations of treason, Henry reaffirmed his love for their king, a fealty which he would honor even if it cost him "the last Drop of his Blood." The hatred, fear, and filial love that Henry exhibited within this oration then works to instigate a pragmatic, yet hopeful call-to-action among its listeners – for if the people of

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653 As he had done with joy and sorrow, Smith regularly pairs hope with fear, emphasizing their dichotomous nature within the emotional landscape of eighteenth century British culture; for such examples, see *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 164, 169, 292-293. For these definitions of hope, see the entry in Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language.*

654 Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 92-93; Griffith, *The Virginia House of Burgesses*, 18.

655 *Journal of the Virginia House of Burgesses* (Williamsburg, Joseph Royale, 1765), 147-148; Virginia Historical Society.

656 Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 93-94.

657 Patrick Henry, "French Traveller's Version of Henry's "Caesar-Brutus" Stamp Act Speech," in *Patrick Henry: The Orator*, ed., David. A McCantis (Greenwood Press: New York, 1990), 121-122; hereafter cited as Patrick Henry, "Caesar-Brutus Speech."

658 Patrick Henry, "Caesar-Brutus Speech," 121-122; Griffith, *Virginia House of Burgesses*, 36-37.

659 Ibid.

660 Ibid.

661 Patrick Henry, "Caesar-Brutus Speech," 122.

Virginia resist Parliament with one voice, then they may succeed at resuscitating those liberties now perishing throughout their colony and all of British America.

Despite opposition from some of Virginia's most powerful burgesses, including Richard Bland, Robert Carter Nicholas, Peyton Randolph, and George Wythe, the House passed four of Henry's proposed resolutions. The first two reaffirmed that the people of Virginia, since the founding of their colony, have "enjoyed, and possessed" the same "Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities" as the "People of Great-Britain," and thereby remain, for "all Intents and Purposes," equal to those subjects "abiding and born within the Realm of England."[662] The third resolution stated that Britain's "ancient Constitution cannot exist" if taxes are laid on its subjects by anyone other than themselves or their chosen representatives.[663] The fourth then argued that Virginians had "never…forfeited or yielded up" taxes in violation of the previous principle.[664]

By adopting these resolutions, Virginia's House of Burgesses asserted its belief that Parliament's duty upon stamped paper had sacrificed British liberty for a quick, unconstitutional shilling. Without additional documentation of the May 30 debates, it is impossible to know whether Henry's "Caesar-Brutus" speech was the decisive factor in persuading his fellow burgesses to endorse these anti-stamp tax resolves. Further, *Virginia Gazette* editor Joseph Royle refused to print both Herny's radical oration and the House of Burgesses' moderate "Resolves," fearful that either text might incite discord, disobedience, and violence throughout the colony.[665] Henry's decision to perform such an impassioned oration, and its immediately silencing within Virginia's public sphere, demonstrate two trends within Britain America's mid-century political discourse: first, that fervent oration was a common tool of elite political performance, if not persuasion, and second, that the dissemination of oratory throughout print media had the power to transform popular opinion.

The affective impact of both Henry's "Caesar-Brutus" oration and the House of Burgesses' "Resolves" immediately became apparent in the affective scripts with which Virginia's political elite rebuked – both privately and publicly – Parliament's stamp tax. In early-July, Richard Henry Lee informed his younger brother Arthur that that "[e]very man in America hath much reason to lament" Parliament's new tax, as it had brought forth "the loss of American liberty."[666] Now subjected to a state "[a]s bad indeed as Egyptian bondage," Lee warned his brother to remain cautious of the people of England, as Parliament had "converted" the "mother country" into "an arbitrary, cruel, and oppressive stepdame."[667] British Americans, Richard told Arthur, also must guard against "barbarous ignorance," as it would make them "fit subject[s]" for "arbitrary and injurious acts."[668] With the metaphorical wolves at the door, Lee declared that British Americans must "strain" their "every mental, every corporeal faculty" to defend their "failing rights" against the "tyrannic power" of Parliament.[669]

To resist political ignorance and protect their constitutional liberties, the people of Virginia needed to know how and why the *Stamp Act* violated their rights as British subjects. To answer this question, Daniel Dulany composed *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies,*

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[662] *Journal of the Virginia House of Burgesses*, *1765*, 149-150. An important note: Virginia's second stamp tax resolution pulls from Adam Smith's observation that sympathy, and thereby the bonds of fellow-feeling, may be felt between individuals of different political or social classes. Smith, however, does note that it is often easier for an individual of less political power or lower social status to feel sympathy with one of greater political power or higher social status; see *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 50-51.

[663] *Journal of the Virginia House of Burgesses*, *1765*, 149-150.

[664] Ibid.

[665] Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 102.

[666] Richard Henry Lee to Arthur Lee, July 4, 1765, in *RHL Letters*, 1:10.

[667] Richard Henry Lee to Arthur Lee, July 4, 1765, in *RHL Letters*, 1:10-11.

[668] Ibid.

[669] Ibid, 1:8.

for the Purpose of raising Revenue, by Act of Parliament.[670] Written and circulate in Virginia in August 1765, Dulany's pamphlet explores the "Propriety, not [the] Power," of Parliament to enact the stamp tax.[671] This recent legislation, Dulany began, granted Parliament the inappropriate "Character of Representatives of the Colonies."[672] *Considerations on Imposing Taxes* then stoked colonial fears of political disenfranchisement. Without the ability to vote in Parliamentary elections, Dulany observed, British colonists will suffer oppressions in "a Thousand Shapes," the most common of which would be perpetual, nonconsensual taxation.[673] Further, British Americans would endure these acts of arbitrary power "without any Sympathy" from the people of England.[674] The villainy of the stamp tax, Dulany concluded, likely would fail to forge any transatlantic bonds of imperial fellow-feeling.

Building upon these fears, Dulany argued that British colonists must feel hatred for Parliament's exploitative fiscal policies. The outbreak of the Seven Years' War had transformed British America into a "House of Flames," Dulany recounted, and thus it fell to its "next Neighbour" – England – to help extinguish the inferno, lest it "consume" the entire empire.[675] It is morally abhorrent, therefore, that Parliament now "claim[ed] the Right to the Furniture of the House which [it] had assisted in Saving."[676] By passing the stamp tax, which demanded a hero's reward for an imperial act of self-preservation, Parliament had confirmed its corrupted inclinations.

Despite his unrelenting attack upon Parliament, Dulany never dismissed the central truth of every British colonist: that they are "dependent upon Great-Britain and the supreme Authority vested in the King, Lords, and Commons."[677] Betrayed by Parliament, British Americans had to trust that their sovereign would spare his loving subjects from these economic hardships and political abuses. Dulany, however, encouraged his fellow colonists not to wait passively for royal mercy. "Instead of mopping, and puling and whining to excite Compassion," British Americans must "bid Defiance to Tyranny by exposing its Impotence" with "Spirit, and Vigour, and Alacrity."[678] This aggressive opposition to Parliament must be both political and economic, as Dulany advocated that every British American embrace a "spirit of Patriotism" by abstaining from all frivolous goods manufactured in Britain until the stamp tax's repeal.[679] If British Americans collectively rebuked Parliament's fiscal abuses, then every colonist may "acknowledge [their] Dependence on Great-Britain" without submitting to the yoke of political "Slavery."[680]

To achieve this political solidarity, however, Henry and Dulany's affective, anti-stamp tax rhetoric had to extend beyond the confines of Virginia. Fortuitously, the *Boston Gazette* had initiated this process approximately six weeks before the completion of Dulany's *Considerations on Imposing Taxes*.[681] On July 1, the *Boston Gazette* printed the "Resolves of the Virginia Assembly, on debating the Stamp Act," which included an ominous warning: because of the radical nature of Virginia's

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[670] Daniel Dulany, *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, for the Purpose of raising Revenue, by Act of Parliament.* (Annapolis: Jonas Green, 1765), John Carter Brown Library. Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 241.
[671] Dulany, *Considerations on Imposing Taxes*, 5-7.
[672] Ibid, 5-7.
[673] Ibid, 7-8, 10.
[674] Ibid, 7-8, 10.
[675] Ibid, 18
[676] Ibid, 18-19.
[677] Ibid, 15.
[678] Ibid, 46-47.
[679] Ibid, 47-48.
[680] Ibid, 47-48.
[681] The earliest version of Dulany's *Considerations on Imposing Taxes* was printed in Annapolis in 1765 by Jonas Green, who then printed a second edition that same year. In 1765 John Holt of New York printed his own edition of *Consideration on Imposing Taxes*, and in 1766 J. Almon of London and William M'Apline of Boston did the same. All versions of this pamphlet (with the exception of the first edition printed by Green) are held at the American Antiquarian Society.

"Resolves," Governor Francis Farquier had dissolved the House of Burgesses.[682] The Boston newspaper then intentionally misreported that the House had ratified six resolves: the first, second, and fourth resolve, as well as three additional resolves, conspicuously absent from the Burgesses' journal.

The first new resolve printed in the *Boston Gazette* declared it "illegal, unconstitutional and unjust" for Parliament to exercise the right to tax the people of Virginia, as it would "have a manifest tendency to destroy British as well as American liberty."[683] The House of Burgesses had narrowly ratified this resolve in a twenty to nineteen vote, yet immediately "struck" it from the official record for being too "offensive."[684] The fifth and sixth resolves, however, represent a radical departure from the House of Burgesses' anti-stamp tax rhetoric. Even Patrick Henry, the author of these resolves, withheld them in his "pocket," as they were too "virulent and inflammatory" for official endorsement.[685] Virginians, the first unratified resolve stated, "are not bound to yield obedience to any law or ordinance" passed without proper representation. The people of Virginia thereby granted themselves a constitutional justification for defying any current or future law passed without colonial assent.[686] The final resolution then flirted with sedition. Any British subject who acknowledged the power of a legislative entity, other than the House of Burgesses, to tax the people of Virginia would now be considered "an enemy to this his Majesty's colony."[687] Virginia's burgesses, therefore, had branded every minister of Parliament who voted in favor of the *Stamp Act* – who engaged in their constitutionally protected right to legislate for the empire – as an enemy of Virginia and, worse yet, a traitor to the British crown. The *Boston Gazette*'s irresponsible act of journalism illuminates how editors Benjamin Edes and John Gill libelously infused Henry's most impassioned, anti-stamp tax rhetoric with the unacquired political legitimacy of a colonial legislature.[688]

John Singleton Copley's "The Deplorable State of America, or Sc[otc]h Government" (see Figure 2.3) serves as an excellent visual companion to the impassioned arguments presented within the *Boston Gazette*. Britannia, depicted as gliding next to the shredded remains of the Magna Charta, extends her hand to an Indigenous princess – British America – and offers her "Pandora's Box," which contains the "Horror" and "Ruin" now brought forth by the *Stamp Act*.[689] Adjacent to this

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[682] *Boston Gazette*, July 1, 1765. Richard L. Merritt argues that, "not until the years after 1764" did the "distinctions between 'His Majesty's subjects,' or 'British colonists' and Americans [become] a real one in the colonial newspapers," specifically noting that, during the Stamp Act Crisis, the *Boston Gazette*, *New-York Gazette*, and *Virginia Gazette* referred to their colonies' respective inhabitants with rhetorical identification symbols that emphasized them as "American"; Richard L Merritt, *Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 133-135.

[683] *Boston Gazette*, July 1, 1765.

[684] Francis Farquier to the Board of Trade, June 5, 1765, in *Prologue to Revolution*, 47. Edmund Morgan explains that this is the only record which acknowledges that the House of Burgesses ratified Henry's fifth resolution, see Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 96-97.

[685] Francis Farquier to the Board of Trade, June 5, 1765, in *Prologue to Revolution*, 47.

[686] *Boston Gazette*, July 1, 1765.

[687] Ibid.

[688] Benjamin Edes and John Gill's *Boston Gazette* was one of the most influential newspapers printed in Massachusetts and distributed throughout British America. Edes, as a member of the "Loyal Nine," employed the *Boston Gazette* to promote his radical political ideology beginning with the stamp tax crisis, transforming it into the standard "radical" newspaper of British America. Duniway, *The Development of Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts*, 124-129; Benjamin V. Franklin, *Boston Printers, Publishers and Booksellers: 1640-1800* (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1980), 125-126; Leonard, *Power of the Press*, 40-51; Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 128; Pasley, *Tyranny of Printers*, 38. For Patrick Henry's authorship of the sixth and seventh unratified resolves, see Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 100.

[689] John Singleton Copley, "The Deplorable State of America, or Sc---h Government" (Boston, 1765); Library Company of Philadelphia; Lester C. Olsen, *Emblems of American Community in the Revolutionary Era: A Study in Rhetorical Iconology* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 105. For a detailed analysis of symbolism in "The Deplorable

scene lies pitiful Liberty who, bitten by a viper slithering from a Scotch thistle, agonizes under the branches of her namesake tree. In the far background, Bostonians threaten tax collectors with the gallows, a proper punishment for betraying their colony's constitutional liberties upon the altar of avarice. Like the Boston press, Mercury soars across the sky, swiftly disseminating accounts of the crimes committed against the king's honest subjects. The visual rhetoric of "The Deplorable State of America" reaffirms both the hatred and fear that all Bostonians must feel for Lord Bute, the venomous Scottish viper who poisoned Parliament and whose adherents still intend to murder British liberty. Finally, the graphic depicts the Indigenous princess's heart-wrenching appeal to Minerva – the personification of wisdom – for protection from England's wicked Parliament. Like its princess, British American must hold nurture a resilient, political hope that their fellow Britons will awaken to Grenville's designs and, with George III's blessing, demand the stamp tax's repeal.

Figure 2.3: John Singleton Copley, *The Deplorable State of America or Sc---h Government*. Boston, 1765. Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia.

Throughout late-summer and early-autumn, the *Boston Gazette* worked tirelessly to foster the affective, anti-stamp tax rhetoric that Henry, Dulany, and Copley had established. To achieve this objective, Edes and Gill circulated the entirety of John Adams's *Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law*. Printed as four unsigned essays from August 12 to October 21, Adams's *Dissertation* explored the historical threats that Catholicism and feudal hierarchy – the twin agents of "ecclesiastical and

State of America," see Olsen, *Emblems of American Community,* 105-109. For a comprehensive analysis of presence of anger, hatred, and grief in the London and Philadelphia editions of "The Deplorable State," both which differ from Copley's Boston edition, see Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 399-407.

civil tyranny" – had presented to British liberty.[690] In his fourth and final essay, Adams shifts his attention from history to current politics to rebuke the stamp tax. The "spirit of liberty," Adams argued, is "as ardent as ever among the body of the nation," and even "through a few individuals may be corrupted," it is still possible for the British people to oppose Parliament's unjust excise.[691] The stamp tax, Adams explained, is an attempt by the hated sycophants of canon and feudal law "to strip" British Americans "from the means of knowledge," as it loads "the Press, the Colleges, and even an Almanack and a News-Paper, with restraints and duties."[692] Further, Parliament's duty on stamped paper will facilitate "the inequalities and dependances of the feudal system, by taking from the poorer sort of people all their little sustenance, and conferring it on a set of stamp officers, distributors and their deputies."[693] By denying equitable access to the means of education, civic participation, and material sustenance, Parliament's agents of popish tyranny will condemn British Americans first to the "barbarous ignorance" that Richard Henry Lee already forewarned, and then to the economic shackles of political enslavement.

Both enraged on behalf of and afraid for his fellow colonists, Adams hoped that all of British America would embrace fraternal love and resist the villainy of Parliament. To succumb to the whims of popish men, Adams explained, would be a "sacrilegious breach of trust, as offensive in the sight of God as it is derogatory from [their] own honor or interest or happiness."[694] Finally, Adams admitted that the brazen, and potentially treasonous opposition for which he now advocated was "the emanation of a heart that burns for its country's welfare."[695] "No one of any feeling," Adams concluded, may "consider the numerous distresses, the gross indignities, the barbarous ignorance, the haughty usurpations" that British Americans "have reason to fear… without the utmost agonies of heart, and many tears."[696] Through *Dissertation*, Adams validates the hatred and fear that British Americans felt towards Parliament, and then implores his fellow colonists to accept that these fierce emotions emerge from moral, righteous hearts; hearts which emit both fraternal love, and a sincere hope that they may purge their cherished empire of canon and feudal corruption.

Contemporaneous to the publication of Adams's *Dissertation* and Dulany's *Considerations on Imposing Taxes*, New York's literati deployed scathing political satire to disseminate British America's anti-stamp tax rhetoric. In early-September, the *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy* published an account of the recent decision of John Bull – a caricature of the British people and, by proxy, the British sovereign – to wed his daughter, Lady North American Liberty, to Toleration.[697] Shortly after this marriage, the obstinate Mrs. Bull – the personification of Parliament, and thus Grenville's ministry – conspired with Commerce to "destroy her Daughter, disavow her Son-in-Law, [and] make Slaves of all their Children and Servants."[698] Unlike Boston and Williamsburg's anti-stamp tax

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690 "Editorial Note: A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law," in *The Papers of John Adams*, ed., Robert T. Taylor, et al (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), 1:103. John Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, No.1," August 12, 1765, in *Adams Papers*, 1:113.
691 John Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, No. 4," October 21, 1765, in *Adams Papers*, 1:125.
692 Ibid, 1:128.
693 Ibid, 1:128.
694 Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, No. 4," in *Adams Papers*, 1:126.
695 Ibid, 1:128.
696 Ibid, 1:128.
697 *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, September 5, 1765; During King George III's reign, the caricature of John Bull was the "most popular symbol" of the British nation, with Mrs. Bull often representing Parliament; for a detailed analysis of the John Bull caricature in Britain during both the Imperial Crisis and British America's revolution, see Tamara L. Hunt, *Defining John Bull: Political Caricature and National Identity in Late Georgian England* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 23 ff.
698 *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, September 5, 1765.

texts, the *New York Gazette* attributed a misogynistic quality to its hatred for and fear of Parliament, depicting Grenville as a meddlesome, conniving wife who succumbed to her own selfish desires.[699]

To carry out her scheme, Mrs. Bull commanded her servants to take North American Liberty "and Stamp her in so barbarous a Manner that she should not survive the Wounds."[700] While John Bull never actively participated "in the ruin of his Daughter," he was "made to acquiesce, thro' the tyrannical Disposition of his Wife, and the Mildness of his own natural Temper."[701] Although North American Liberty died at the hands of Mrs. Bull, this satire boldly asserted that she was survived by a son, Independence, on whom "the Hopes of all her disconsolate Servants are placed for relief under their Afflictions."[702] Despite its hatred for Grenville and looming fear of political enslavement, the *New York Gazette* fostered hope that British Americans' filial love for George III may yet secure their economic independence from Parliament. If British America reconstituted and preserved its bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling, the *New York Gazette* concluded, then the British people still may still avert the destruction of both their constitutional liberties and imperial family.

"Oppression. A Poem by an American," serves as a fitting culmination of British America's anti-stamp tax rhetoric. Advertised for sale in both Boston and New York City, "Oppression" declares that if Parliament forces its colonists to pay "a savage Ex[ci]se," one which will "Destroy [their] liberty, and rob [their] gold," then British America's condemnation of that tax must "bite with all its rage."[703] To that end, "Oppression" castigates both Bute and Grenville for both "oppress[ing] AMERICA" and for causing the British empire's current "sorrows" and "pain."[704] Both men, the poem proclaims, are fools for believing that their tyrannical legislation would instill both fear and love in the hearts of the British people. "Fear it may cause, in coward slavish soul," the poet opines, "But love is free, disdaining" of Parliament's "servile rules."[705]

Political rebellions, the poem continues, occur only in those empires where tyrants have "chain'd" every "right" and "liberty," and thereby stirred a "righteous rage" within the people.[706] Echoing Adams, "Oppression" asserts that it would be "unjust" for the British empire to be "curs'd" to suffer political enslavement because of "the crime of one" corrupted minister.[707] Despite the seemingly insurmountable odds – for when "'Hell assists, what mortals can contend" – "Oppression" concludes with the hope that the British people, motivated by fraternal love, will work

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[699] Linda Colley argues that in late-eighteenth century a "female Briton could be punished for plotting against the state, but – in law – she could never play the part of an active patriot within it." By casting Grenville and his ministry in the guise of Mrs. Bull, the author of this satire aligns the supposed dangers of a woman engaging in the male political sphere with those of Grenville's ministry overstepping their constitutional authority by passing their stamp tax; Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) see 238-239; and for a more detailed analysis of female Britons political power from 1770s-1810s, see 237-282.

[700] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, September 5, 1765.

[701] Ibid.

[702] Ibid.

[703] "Oppression. A Poem by an American" (Boston, 1765); American Antiquarian Society, 2; note that the *Boston Gazette* and the *New York Mercury* both advertised the sale of this poem on October 21, 1765; see. Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks*, 62; for an examination of British America's anti-Bute rhetoric during the Stamp Act crisis, which includes detailed analyses of both Copley's "Deplorable States" and the anonymous "Oppression," see Vincent Carretta, *George III and the Satirists from Hogarth to Byron* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 104-125.

[704] "Oppression," 4, 10; for a detailed analysis of the transatlantic poetic style employed in "Oppression," see Wells, *Poetry Wars*, 33-45.

[705] "Oppression," 12.

[706] Ibid.

[707] Ibid, 12, 19.

together to purge Parliament of Grenville and Bute's corrupting influence, at which time British America and "high Heaven [will] adore/That falsehood, pride, [and] oppression are no more."[708]

British America's anti-stamp tax rhetoric, however, failed to elicit vehement, anti-Parliament condemnations from every colonist. The Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern Colonies, William Johnson, expressed profound concern at the "licentious spirit" with which New Yorkers rebuked the excise.[709] While Johnson stood to reap significant economic benefits from the tax itself, he firmly believed that popular opposition to the law "flow[ed] from a disinterested and generous heart."[710] An official representative of royal government, Johnson exhibited a notably nuanced perspective regarding New York's condemnation of the stamp tax. Although he sympathized with the hatred and fear that New Yorkers felt, Johnson could not endorse the fervor with which they had begun to display their grievances.

Massachusetts's Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson echoed Johnson's concerns as early as June 1765. Hutchinson himself personally objective to the excise, as it "deprived" Massachusetts of its historic "privilege" of self-taxation.[711] The lieutenant governor, however, worried that a "boulefeus" (or firebrand) might emerge within Massachusetts to "inflame the people" against the stamp tax and any royal official who, like himself, begrudgingly enforced it.[712] Two months later, the proliferation of British America's anti-stamp tax rhetoric and the emergence of several such firebrands had aroused further anxiety within Hutchinson, who cautiously "hope[d]" that Boston's civic leadership might "keep peace in the execution of the stamp act."[713] Keenly aware of the hatred simmering not simply in Boston, but throughout all of British America, Hutchinson rightfully feared that this anti-taxation rhetoric might incite impassioned popular violence. It took only days for Hutchinson's nightmares to become a reality.

Popular Violence and the Affective Bonds of Political Resistance:

Anti-stamp tax rhetorics of hatred, fear, filial and fraternal love, and pragmatic hope had begun to unite British Americans towards a singular objective. To fortify these emergent bonds of political affection and intercolonial fellow-feeling, anti-stamp tax cohorts in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York engaged in contemporaneous acts of impassioned popular violence. Through anti-stamp tax protests, British America's radical elite publicly demarcated the boundaries of membership to their emergent, emotional community of resistance. To partake in such dangerous protests, anti-stamp tax colonists had to conquer – at least temporarily – their profound fears of Parliament's political might. As Adam Smith acknowledges, fear's imaginary nature and "uncertainty" makes it a difficult emotion to control, let alone overcome.[714] To complicate matters further, fear serves as the emotional "contrary" to anger, because it has the power to prevent actions, and thereby may "restrain" the more volatile of passions.[715] Smith, however, makes a crucial observation: "a man whose anger is restrained by fear, does not always lay [it] aside," but rather may nurture it within his "breast," with all its "original fury," and "reserves its gratification for a more safe opportunity."[716] Enraged at the inevitable arrival of stamped paper in their ports, the imminent extraction of shillings

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[708] Ibid, 21.
[709] William Johnson to Thomas Moncrieffe, June 22, 1765, in *Johnson Papers*, 4:775.
[710] Ibid.
[711] Thomas Hutchinson to Ebenzer Silliman, November 9, 1764; Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, June 4, 1765 [unsent] and June 5, 1765, all in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:238, 271, 273.
[712] Ibid.
[713] Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, August 6, 1765, *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:277.
[714] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 30.
[715] Ibid, 240.
[716] Ibid, 263.

from their pockets, and Parliament's continued disregard for their economic freedoms, British colonists began to believe that public displays of impassioned violence might be the only path to force the stamp tax's repeal. This political hope paved the way for British Americans to express, without fear of retribution or punishment, their hatred for Parliament and their festering anger for those colonists who voluntarily submitted to the will of England's legislative tyrants.[717]

The morning of August 8, the people of Boston learned that Andrew Oliver, Thomas Hutchinson's brother-in-law, had accepted an appointment as Massachusetts's Distributor of Stamps.[718] Unbeknownst to Hutchinson, Oliver's controversial appointment made him an ideal target for Boston's anti-stamp tax leadership, popularly referred to as the "Loyal Nine."[719] After setting their sights on Oliver, the Loyal Nine enlisted Ebenezer McIntosh to spearhead their out-of-doors protest.[720] The leader of Boston's South End gang, McIntosh held the popular influence necessary to gin-up support for violent political action. McIntosh, however, held a deeper cultural influence among the people of Boston, as the South End gang had won the previous year's Pope Day celebrations.[721] A staple of "England's anti-Catholic political culture," Pope Day commemorated Guy Fawkes failed assassination of Parliament on November 5, 1605.[722] By the mid-eighteenth century, New Englanders had become Pope Day's "most enthusiastic celebrants," not least of all because of the anti-Catholic sentiments revitalized during the Seven Years' War.[723] By transposing the violent rituals of Pope Day onto their anti-stamp tax protests, the people of Boston transformed Andrew Oliver into Massachusetts's own Guy Fawkes. Furthermore, this Catholic association foreshadowed the arguments of John Adams's *Dissertation*: that British colonists who enforced Parliament's unjust excise had become the dreaded agents of canon law.[724]

Just after dawn on August 14 an effigy of Andrew Oliver "was found hanging on a Tree in the most public Part of [Boston]," adorned "with a Boot" (another not-so-sly reference to Lord Bute), and within it hid "a young Imp," representing the Devil.[725] Nailed to Oliver's chest was an ominous warning – one which derived inspiration from Henry's speech to his fellow burgesses less than three month earlier – that anyone who "TAKES THIS [EFFIGY] DOWN IS AN ENEMY TO HIS COUNTRY."[726] When Deacon Eliot, the owner of the land upon which the effigy hung, attempted to remove this horrid sight, the assembled crowd "advis'd to the contrary…lest it should occasion the Demolition of his Windows," a fitting punishment for a colonial traitor.[727] As morning gave way to afternoon, the crowd removed Oliver's effigy from Boston's newly sanctified Liberty

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[717] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 292-293.
[718] Philip Davidson, "Sons of Liberty and Stamp Men," in *North Carolina Historical Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1932): 38.
[719] Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 127-129.
[720] Gilje, *Rioting in America*; 38.
[721] For a contemporaneous account of Boston's Pope Day celebrations, see *Boston Gazette*, November 11, 1765. Regarding the popular political action of Pope Day, Dirk Hoerder argues that this anti-Catholic celebrations provided Boston "a training ground for direct action and violence, and an occasion for expression of 'ill-defined feelings of class and defiance of authorities.'" Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780* (Cambridge: Academic Press Inc., 1977), 73. For more detailed analysis of Pope Day as a foundational celebration for fostering anti-Catholic sentiment throughout British America, see Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 204-233; McConville, *King's Three Face*, 56-63; for a more detailed analysis on how these types of celebrations fostered British Americans' national bonds of affection, specifically their patriotic love for the British monarch and empire, see McConville, *King's Three Faces*, 105-128.
[722] Haefeli, "Protestant Empire?," 209
[723] Ibid, 209, 217.
[724] Ibid, 220-221.
[725] *Boston Gazette*, August 19, 1765; *New York Mercury*, August 19, 1765; John Rowe, August 14, 1765, in "Diary of John Rowe" in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2nd Series (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1896), 10:61.
[726] Ibid.
[727] *Boston Gazette*, August 19, 1765; *New York Mercury*, August 19, 1765; John Rowe, August 14, 1765, in "Diary of John Rowe," 10:61.

Tree and marched it throughout the city. Upon passing the Boston docks, the increasingly rowdy crowd began "demolishing" the newly finished Stamp Office, "which they thoroughly effected in about half an Hour."[728] To conclude their parade, the crowd marched to Fort Hill, where they beheaded and "burn[t] the Effigy," declaring their pyre an offering for "those Sins of the People" that brought fourth so "heavy [a] Judgment as the Stamp Act."[729]

Minutes before the bonfire began, Hutchinson arrived at Oliver's home, found him and his "family in terror[,] and advised them immediately to quit the house[,] which they did." [730] As the pyre smoldered, some of the crowd took it upon themselves to approach Oliver's home and lob stones at its windows. Most of the crown, however, gradually dispersed.[731] Terrified for his family's safety, Andrew Oliver resigned his commissions as Massachusetts's Distributor of Stamps the next morning, which greatly "satisfied" the "Minds of the People."[732] The "hoarse, boisterous, and discordant voice of anger" had empowered the Boston mob to "shew a sort of courage and superiority" to their fears of Parliament.[733] This popular, intimidating anger further "inspire[d]" a terror so profound within Andrew Oliver that he abandoned his civic duty without hesitation.[734] The hopes of Boston's anti-stamp tax elite now seemed achievable, as Oliver's resignation demonstrated the power of enraged, popular violence to spur seismic political change.

Eager to assess the limits of their anger-fueled politic action, another crowd formed at dusk on August 15 to besiege Hutchinson's home. Fearful of the tendencies of this "mob," Hutchinson "sent [his] daughters & young son to lodge abroad," fastened his "doors & windows in the best manner [he] could," and patiently waited.[735] When the crowd arrived, they violently banged upon Hutchinson's door, and shouted that if he would "declare to them [that he] had never wrote to [England] in favor of the stamp act they would not hurt a hair of [his] head."[736] The lieutenant governor could make this a declaration, yet he refused to dignify their riotous behavior with a response. Further enraged, the crowd dispersed only after a neighbor emerged from his home and swore to them that Hutchinson "was in favor of no act that would hurt the country" of Massachusetts.[737] A compromised victory, the Boston crowd now believed itself capable of influencing the highest levels of colonial government through enraged acts of political violence.

Within a mere thirty-six hours, the people of Boston had transformed both Andrew Oliver and Thomas Hutchinson into affective proxies for Parliament.[738] By shrouding their enraged, terror eliciting violence under the guise of defending British liberties, Boston's anti-stamp tax cohort had demonstrated the political influence which the House of Burgesses' seventh, unratified resolve now exerted upon the people of British America.

Affective justifications for the violence perpetrated against Andrew Oliver swiftly emerged outside of Massachusetts. An anonymous letter printed in the *New York Gazette* "congratulate[d]…all friends to liberty, upon the noble spirit that [had] appeared in most of the British colonies in North America."[739] For "no people upon earth," the letter continued, "were ever more loyal to their King,

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[728] Ibid; Hoerder, *Crowd Action*, 98-99.
[729] *Boston Gazette*, August 19, 1765; *New York Mercury*, August 19, 1765; Hoerder, *Crowd Action*, 99-101.
[730] Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, August 16, 1765, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 279.
[731] *Boston Gazette*, August 19, 1765; Hoerder, 99-101.
[732] *New York Mercury*, August 19, 1765.
[733] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 36, 240.
[734] Ibid.
[735] Thomas Hutchinson to Jackson, August 16, 1765, n *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 280.
[736] Ibid.
[737] Ibid.
[738] For a brief analysis of the political power and potential danger of popular anger during the stamp tax crisis, see Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 391-392.
[739] *New York Gazette*, August 29, 1765; reprinted in *Boston Evening-Post*, September 9, 1765.

or ready to risk their lives and fortunes in defence of his person and government" than the people of British America.[740] This letter then praised Boston in particular for persuading Andrew Oliver, with both "love of justice" and "fear of consequence," to resign his commission[741] Through their commitment to British liberties, the people of Boston had "in dea'rd themselves more than ever to all the colonies in America" and had set a "noble example" that must be "unanimously follow'd."[742]

In Massachusetts, Governor Francis Bernard worked swiftly to identify and prosecute the ringleaders of Boston's anti-tax cohort.[743] By Saturday, August 24, Bernard had made no arrests and it seemed that tempers within the city had begun to calm. The next morning, however, Johnathan Mayhew, minister of Boston's West Church, preached a sermon on Galatians 5:12-13, which reignited Boston's simmering passions.[744] "If a nation is governed according to laws made by a single person, only for his own interest or pleasure, and one whom [the people] do not chuse or appoint to govern them," Mayhew argued, "such nation is in a state of slavery."[745] Unmistakable in his rebuke of Grenville's corrupted ministry, Mayhew concluded that absent the right to elect their own representatives to the House of Commons, the people of British America remain in "a real state" of political enslavement to Parliament's arbitrary laws.[746]

Unsurprisingly, some of Mayhew's congregants interpreted this sermon as a justification to abuse further those responsible for enforcing Parliament's arbitrary taxes, which included Thomas Hutchinson.[747] Mayhew, however, does not bare sole responsibility for inciting the August 26 riot that razed the lieutenant governor's home. That very morning, the *Boston Post-Boy* apologized for its minimal coverage of Oliver's resignation and tantalized its readers with a promise: they would "diffuse among his Majesty's American Subjects a general joy, equal to the Resignation of a Stamp-Officer, or even the Repeal of the STAMP ACT itself" in the days to come.[748] Andrew Eliot cast further doubt upon the religious spontaneity of August 26 riot, questioning "whether one of the rioters [had] even heard" Mayhew's sermon.[749] Distraught at his own potential culpability, Mayhew privately wrote to Hutchinson and expressed his "deep sympathy" for the "unparallel'd outrages" that he and his family had suffered.[750] Both "[e]mbarrassed and perplexed" at the crowd's actions, Hutchinson later admitted to William Bollan that this instance of popular cruelty had taught him that it is "impossible to judge" where the "the popular rage in the colonies will end"[751]

Hutchinson's speech before the Massachusetts Superior Court the morning of August 27, however, lacked any such embarrassment. Rather, it was a calculated effort to rebuke Boston's anti-stamp tax cohort with their own affective rhetoric. It is tragic, Hutchinson observed, that "some

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[740] *New York Gazette*, August 29, 1765.
[741] Ibid.
[742] Ibid.
[743] Hoerder, *Crowd Action*, 101-109.
[744] Peter Oliver argues that Mayhew's sermon encouraged the "Temper of Riot" to grow in Boston, inadvertently supporting not only the attacks against Oliver and Hutchinson, but also the "Hydra" that was "roused" in Massachusetts and Virginia during the crisis; see Oliver, *Origin and Progress*, 51-54.
[745] Johnathan Mayhew, "Memorandum," Document No. 91 in "Johnathan Mayhew Papers," Bortmann Collection. MSS, Boston University.
[746] Mayhew, "Memorandum," Document No. 91 in "Johnathan Mayhew Papers,"
[747] Thomas Whatley, the minister of Lugershall and a political supporter of Grenville, believed that Mayhew's sermon, "inveighed with the utmost vehemence of expression and gesture against the Stamp Act," had "so irritated his heated audience" that on August 26 they "burst forth into all the violence" of that day; see Thomas Whatley to George Grenville, November 8, 1765, in *The Grenville Papers: Being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville Earl Temple, K.G., and The Right Hon: George Grenville, Their Friends and Contemporaries.* ed. William James Smith, (London: John Murray, 1852), 3:108.
[748] *Boston Post-Boy*, August 26, 1765.
[749] Andrew Elliot to Thomas Hollis, August 27, 1767, in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Ser. 4, 4:406-407.
[750] John Mayhew to Thomas Hutchinson, August 27, 1765, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:285
[751] Thomas Hutchinson to William Bollan, September 1, 1765, in in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 297.

designing, wicked Man" was able to "inrage" the Boston populace against him.[752] Even in the face of such cruelty, Hutchinson firmly attested that he had "Nothing to fear," as he had never encouraged nor endorsed the passage of the *Stamp Act*.[753] Placing the needs of Massachusetts before his own personal suffering, Hutchinson proclaimed his "hope [that] the Eyes of the People [would] be open'd" to those who "destroyi[ed] all Peace & Order" within the colony, and then pleaded to heaven for "GOD to give [them] better Hearts!"[754] Through his masterful oration, Hutchinson blamed the "insolence and brutality of anger" for the rioters' assault upon his home, boasted their inability to terrify him into silence, and expressed his unyielding optimism that fraternal love and peace, not hatred, would fill the hearts of the people of Boston.[755] Much like Henry's oration before the House of Burgesses, Hutchinson's speech spread like wildfire across British America. Those colonists who learned of it through hearsay, such as Jane Mecom, observed that Hutchinson had endured a pain "never equalled in any nation" and, like Christ himself, nobly "bore it [while] praying for his enemies at the instant they were persecuting him."[756]

The assault upon Hutchinson's home – the home of an appointee of George III -– elicited concern among royal officials currently stationed throughout British America.[757] William Johnson firmly believed that the riots which plagued Boston were only the "Clamer[ous] Conduct of a few pretended patriots."[758] Ill-founded anger, however, still held potent political power. If Parliament tolerated such impassioned violence, Johnson feared, then it would become contagious, spread rapidly "through the Whole" of British America, and establish "so dangerous a precedent for the Independency of the Colonies."[759] General Thomas Gage, currently quartered in New York City, concurred with Johnson. The "Enemys" of the British empire, Gage bemoaned, "sow Dissention and create Animositys between Great Britain and the Colonys."[760] To achieve this deplorable purpose, Gage observed, anti-Parliament radicals had filled their newspapers with talk of "Treason," which in turn encouraged the "Minds of the People" to "revolt against the Government, to subvert the Constitution, and [to] trample upon the Laws."[761] Both Gage and Johnson knew, all too well, that political rabble-rousers, armed with rage-fueled words, might incite the masses to violence.

Treasonous ideologies, however, did not manifest spontaneously, and Gage traced their origins to Virginia's House of Burgess. Opposition to Parliament in British America, Gage informed Henry Seymour Conway, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, began with the "Resolves of the Assembly of Virginia," which falsely framed the colony's anti-stamp tax idealogues

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[752] Thomas Hutchinson, "Speech to the Superior Court," *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:287.
[753] Ibid.
[754] Ibid.
[755] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 24.
[756] Jane Mecon to Benjamin Franklin, December 30, 1765, in *Letters of Benjamin Franklin and Jane Mecom*, ed. Carl van Doren (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 86-87.
[757] Thomas Hutchinson to Lord Halifax, August 30, 1765; Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, August 30, 1765, both in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:290-291; Thomas Hutchinson, "The Furniture Destroyed or Carried Away from My House and Lost the Night after the 26 of August 1765" in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:332. Hutchinson accounts that Boston's "hellish crew" of "devils" wrought £2,218 of damages to his property, which he diligently itemized, see *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:318-332. Note: using Eric Nye's "Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency" algorithm, it is estimated that Hutchinson lost $497,826 in 2022 American dollars; https://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm
[758] William Johnson to Thomas Gage, September 12, 1765; William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, September 13, 1765, both in *Johnson Papers* 4:842-844.
[759] Ibid.
[760] Thomas Gage to Cadwallader Colden, August 31, 1765, in *The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden* (New York: Collections of the New York Historical Society, 1921), 8:58.
[761] Thomas Gage to Cadwallader Colden, August 31, 1765, *Colden Papers*, 8:58.

as "Protectors and Assertors of American Liberty."[762] Inspired by Virginia's affective rhetoric and so-called appeal to imperial patriotism, British Americans developed a "General Scheme" to compel "the Stamp Officers to resign their Employment," and, if necessary, to "destroy the Stamp Papers upon their Arrival."[763] Boston had proven the effectiveness of this strategy, as every stamp tax supporter within the city now "feared he might be the next Victim to their Repacity."[764] These "same Fears," Gage concluded, now "spread thro the other Provinces," and although he worked tirelessly "to prevent Insurrection," he commanded too few regulars to guarantee the king's peace.[765]

Unsurprisingly, Boston's print media served as a vector for anti-stamp tax violence. On September 9, the *Boston Evening-Post* published an opinion piece addressed "To the Stamp-Officers who have not yet Resigned."[766] British America's stamp distributors "now have an opportunity," this Bostonian explained, to show "whether [they] are friends or enemies to [their respective] country."[767] If British America is "enslaved" by Parliament, then "it will be thro' [their] helping hand," but if they honor their "duty" to their "country by a refusal" of their commissions, then the colonies "shall undoubtedly preserve their rights and liberties."[768] Implicit intimidation through the colonial press proved effective. In New York, James McEvers informed Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden that "[s]ince the Late Riott at Boston, & the Inflamatory papers lately printed in the Colonies, [the] People of this City are so Incense'd against [him] a Distributor of Stamps" that it would be "impossible" to "execute the Office" while avoiding "the same Cruel Fate [that] Mr. Oliver met with at Boston."[769] McEvers's "effects were threatened in such Manner," Lieutenant Governor Colden reported, that he had no choice but to refuse his appointment.[770]

To the south, news of Boston's anti-stamp tax riots and Andrew Oliver's subsequent resignation incited further episodes of popular violence. The morning of September 24, the people of Westmoreland, Virginia congregated to abuse the effigies of both Prime Minster Grenville and George Mercer, the appointed Distributor of Stamps for Virginia and Maryland. Upon Grenville the crowd inscribed "the infamous Projector of AMERICAN SLAVERY," and upon Mercer they hung two plaques: "MONEY is my GOD" and "SLAVERY I LOVE."[771] After processing throughout the town, Westmoreland's anti-stamp tax cohort "publickly hanged" both effigies, a spectacle which received "the Acclamations and Applause of a large Concourse of People, of all Ranks and Denominations."[772]

The next day, the crowd gathered again – this time to listen to the "dying Speech" of Mercer's effigy.[773] The stamp distributor admitted that, to satisfy his "Love of Gold," he had "endavoured" to "fasten Chains of Slavery" upon the people of Virginia with "Parricidal Hands."[774] This glaring hypocrisy cannot be overlooked. Virginians, as practitioners of chattel slavery, as the abusers of enslaved bodies, and as the violators of Black Americans natural rights, now had the

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[762] Thomas Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, September 21, 1765, in *Gage Correspondence*, 1:67.
[763] Ibid.
[764] Ibid, 1:67-68; Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 408.
[765] Thomas Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, September 21, 1765, in *Gage Correspondence*, 1:67-68; Alden, *General Gage in America*, 113-117.
[766] *Boston Evening-Post*, September 9, 1765; Maier, *Resistance to Rebellion*, 53 ff.
[767] Ibid.
[768] Ibid.
[769] James McEvers to Cadwallader Colden, August 1765 in *Colden Papers*, 7:565-57; Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 158.
[770] Cadwallader Colden, "The Conduct of Cadwallader Colden, Esquire, Lieutenant-Governor of New York" MSS. New York Historical Society, (New York, 1767), 49.
[771] *New York Gazette or Weekly Post-Boy*, October 31, 1765.
[772] Ibid.
[773] Ibid.
[774] Ibid.

audacity to bemoan the harm they *might* endure under Parliament's yoke of *political enslavement*. Abhorrent in its willful ignorance and dismissal of the lived-suffering that white British colonists inflicted daily upon Black Americans, the rhetoric of political enslavement proved effective. Mercer's fictious speech ended with a plea that his "Fate will instruct Tyranny and Avarice, that Virginia is determined to be Free."[775] Despite his confession, the court of public opinion convicted Mercer of "Traitorously aiding and assisting in the Destruction of his Country's Liberty," for which the people of Westmoreland "first Hanged, and then Burnt" his effigy.[776]

An act of political theater, Mercer's confession reinforced Henry's warning to the House of Burgesses that, without proper protection, Virginia's "Dying Liberty" would fall victim to the corrupt ambitions of Parliament and its colonial sycophants.[777] Through acts of ritualized violence, the people of Westmoreland – like their cousins in Boston – had manifested their hatred of Parliament, their fear of political enslavement, and their fraternal love for each other's constitutional liberties. The true political power of this ceremony, however, manifested a month later when an anti-stamp tax mob "accosted" George Mercer upon his arrival in Virginia, and subsequently coerced him to resign his "odious" office.[778] As with Oliver in Boston and McEvers in New York City, Mercer had become the proxy for Virginia's anti-Parliament hatred and anti-stamp tax anger.

By November 1, 1765 – the date on which the *Stamp Act* went into effect – enraged, popular violence in Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts had secured the resignations of each colony's distributor of stamps, nullifying the tax's enforceability. Parliament, however, had no intention of indulging British America's defiance, and demanded that its colonial governments enforce the rule of law. When ships carrying stamped paper disembarked from England in early-October, British Americans became "anxiously concerned for, and observant of the conduct of the people of New York," as it "was the place of most immediate intercourse with the English ministry" and one "of considerable military force."[779] Rising fears of a military enforced stamp tax only escalated as Colden, in preparation for the stamped papers' arrival, outfitted Fort George with "mortars, guns, ammunition, and all the necessaries for the regular attack of an enemy." [780] To make matters worse, Colden brazenly declared that the one hundred thirty British regulars within the fort would "fire" upon New York City "if the stamps were molested."[781]

Tensions escalated the morning of October 23 – two-days after the *Boston Gazette* published the final essay of Adams's *Dissertation* and eight-days before George Mercer resigned his commissions as stamp distributor – as Parliament's stamped paper finally docked in New York City. To avoid conflict with the two-thousand-person crowd protesting its landing, Colden ordered the ship's crew to wait for nightfall to deposit the cargo in Fort George.[782] While Gage worried that the colony's anti-stamp tax elite might "cajole the Populace with Crys of Liberty and publick welfare," he still believed that any New Yorker, with "but little knowledge of Mankind" would "perceive the villainy" of this treasonous, anti-stamp tax rhetoric.[783]

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[775] *New York Gazette or Weekly Post-Boy*, October 31, 1765.
[776] Ibid.
[777] Patrick Henry, "Caesar-Brutus Speech," 121-122.
[778] Richard Corbin to Robert Dinwiddie, November 1, 1765, in "Letterbooks 1758-1768, of Colonel Richard Corbin," MSS; Virginia Historical Society; *Pennsylvania Journal*, November 14, 1765; Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 161-162.
[779] *Boston Post-Boy*, November 18, 1765.
[780] *New York Gazette*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Post-Boy*, November 18, 1765. John Richard Alden, *General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His Role in the American Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 113-117.
[781] Ibid.
[782] John Montresor, October 23, 1765, in *Montresor Journals*, 336.
[783] Thomas Gage to William Johnson in *Johnson Papers*, 4:860-861.

Gage's unfounded optimism, however, proved a grave tactical error. In the days to come, New York City's anti-stamp tax cohort ignited an impassioned riot against those Britons who stood ready to execute Parliament's laws.[784] Lieutenant John Montresor awoke the morning of October 31 to witness several New Yorkers, dressed in "mourning" clothes, lamenting both "the stamps and the Interment of their liberty."[785] It is possible, Adam Smith observes, for people to be "equally grieved and enraged" at a "wrong" committed against them.[786] As the people of New York bemoaned their loss of liberty, their profound grief fueled their popular rage. That evening, a mob prowled New York's streets shouting "Liberty," breaking "some thousand windows," and taunting commanding officer Major Thomas James with threats of being "buried alive" for guarding the stamped paper.[787] This cacophony, however, served only as a dress rehearsal for the largest and most dangerous act of political resistance committed during British America's stamp tax crisis.

The evening of November 1, approximately two thousand of New York City's "Rabble, or rather Rebels" engaged in a riot that lasted until four o'clock the following morning.[788] First, the mob erected "moveable gallows," from which it hung an effigy of Lieutenant Governor Colden.[789] Mirroring the ritualized violence committed in Westmoreland and Boston against both George Mercer and Andrew Oliver, the rioters adorned Colden with both the reviled "stamped paper" and a caricature of the Devil who, with a "boot in his hand," encouraged "perseverance in the cause of slavery."[790] Simultaneously, a detachment of mob paraded a second effigy of Colden throughout the city, "without doing the least Injury to any house or person," and reconvened with the first mob at Fort George.[791] Now at full strength, New York's anti-stamp tax mob "knocked at the gate, placed their hands on top of the Ramparts, called out to the guards to fire, [and] threw bricks and stone against the Fort."[792] When the soldiers returned "not a word" to the mob's "most opprobrious language," the rioters marched to the Bowling Green and concluded their ceremony.[793] Using wood from the Lieutenant Governor's newly destroyed coaches, the mob started a bonfire and, having "kindled [it] to a great flame," then "reduced the coach, gallows, man, devil, and all to ashes."[794]

After incinerating Colden's effigy, the mob turned their attention to New York's peacetime standing army. The regulars quartered within New York City served as a constant reminder of Parliament's power to enforce its unjust laws upon a civilian populace. To deter British soldiers from participating in martial tyranny, the mob besieged the lavish rental home of Major James. After breaking "all the glasses, china, tables, chairs, desks, trunks, [and] chests" within James's dwellings, the disgruntled New Yorkers made "a large fire," threw in it "every thing that would burn," and then consumed or disposed of "all the liquor."[795] As they disembarked from the razed building, rioters

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784 For a detailed analysis of the political conflicts that simultaneously occurred in the New York assembly, see Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 73-82.
785 John Montresor, October 31, 1765, *Montresor Journals*, 336.
786 Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 169.
787 Ibid.
788 John Montresor, November 1, 1765, *Montresor Journals*, 337; *New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 18, 1765.
789 *New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 18, 1765; Lamb, *Original and Authentic Journal*, 11-12. Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 45.
790 Ibid.
791 *New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 18, 1765.
792 Robert R. Livingston to Robert Monckton, November 8, 1765, in "Aspinwall Papers," *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 4th Series (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1871), 10:559-567.
793 Ibid.
794 *New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765; *New York Mercury*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 18, 1765.
795 Ibid.

carried James's "military trophies, [and] even the colours of the royal regiment," proclaiming such destruction a "sacrifice to liberty" – one that cost James approximately £1,500.[796] To New York's anti-stamp tax cohort, James had become the scapegoat for every tyrannical power which they hated and feared. It is unsurprising, therefore, that these rioters believed that their wanton destruction served as a noble "sacrifice" to safeguard those liberties which all *true* Britons loved more dearly than either property or life itself.

This brutality, coupled with the mob's promise to seize the lieutenant governor "Ded or Alive," had convinced Colden to relinquish all stamped paper into the care of the Corporation of the City of New York until the colony's newly appointed governor, Sir Henry Moore, arrived.[797] Colden's acquiescence secured the "general satisfaction of the people," who immediately became "intirely quiet and peaceable."[798] To prevent New York City from descending into utter chaos, Colden had undermined Parliament's authority, and in doing so, made it nearly "impossible" for Governor More to "put the Stamps in force."[799] Exploiting such political vulnerability, the *New York Gazette* blatantly proclaimed that it would "continue [its] weekly Publications, as usual, upon unstamp'd paper," and promised the people of New York that "in a few days, all sorts of business [would] be carried on in all public offices as usual, without stamps."[800] More successful than either Boston or Williamsburg, New York City's anti-stamp tax cohort had prevented the distribution of stamped paper while demonstrating the *de facto* power of impassioned, popular violence to nullify Parliament's legislative authority and its military might within British America.

The success of New York's rebels, Gage lamented to Secretary of State Conway, established a dangerous precedence for the other colonies: for a "positive refusal to take the Stamps, and threatening those who shall take them [with] plunder and murder[,]" had invalidated colonial rule of law.[801] To remedy Colden's political misstep, Gage built a "very considerable Military force" in New York City by mid-December, comprised of almost five hundred regulars, whose dual purpose was to enforce compliance with the stamp tax and deter the rest of British America from embracing these rebellious tactics.[802] Others, such as Robert R. Livingston, worried that the arrival of more soldiers validated popular fears that a tyrannical Parliament had subjected the people of New York to the "utmost danger."[803] As news of New York's riot spread throughout British America, William Smith reaffirmed his belief that, through the passage of the stamp tax, "Great Britain [had] indeed lost the Affection of all the Colonists."[804] The people of British America now "looked upon themselves as

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[796] *New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765; *New York Mercury*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 18, 1765; John Montresor, November 1, 1765, *The Montresor Journals*, 337.

[797] E. Carther, November 2, 1765, in *New York City during the American Revolution* (New York: Mercantile Library Association of the City of New York, 1861), 48-49; "The Lieutenant Governor Declares," November 4, 1765 (New York: Council Chamber, 1765); New York Historical Society; *New-York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 18, 1765; Gilje, *Road to Mobocracy*, 47-48.

[798] Ibid.

[799] Thomas Ellison to Colonel Thomas Ellison, November 6, 1765, in the "Ellison Family Papers," MSS, held by the New York Historical Society.

[800] *New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, November 7, 1765.

[801] Thomas Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, November 4, 1765, in *Gage Correspondences*, 1:71.

[802] Ibid; Alden, *General Gage in America*, 116-118.

[803] Robert R. Livingston to Robert Monckton, November 8, 1765, in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 4th Series (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1871), 10:559-567; Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire*, 140; Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 205-206. Tiedemann argues that from November 1, 1765, until the repeal of the Stamp Act in March 1766, the "crown officials, military officers, patricians, and merchants" incorrectly believed that New York rested on the precipice on anarchy. This incorrect assessment, Tiedemann explains, emerged from overwhelming political resolve of the radicals who opposed, through violence, the enforcement of the Stamp Act. For a more detailed analysis, see Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries,* 83, ff.

[804] William Smith to Robert Monckton, November 8, 1765, in *Smith Memoirs*, 30-31.

absolute Slaves," Smith explained, and believing themselves in such a destitute state, now readily inflicted their "Rage….upon the real or suspected Friends" of Parliament.[805]

Instances of popular disaffection and fury were visible throughout the entirety of British America by early-November. While New York remained "in the most melancholy States of Anarchy under the Government of a mob," reports emerged that Virginia's anti-stamp tax cohort had "burnt or pulled down all the jails" within their colony.[806] Simultaneously, the people of Boston had adorned their Liberty Tree with an effigy of Grenville, which they had paraded throughout town, tore to pieces, and "flung [its] Limbs with Indignation into the Air" whilst singing: "Tis Gr[envil]le calls, and sink or swim/You'd go to H[el]l to follow him."[807] Both the *Boston Gazette* and *Boston Evening-Post* reported that the mob's "heated Temper" had stirred "Fears" of forthcoming riots throughout the entire city. [808] These contemporaneous acts of political violence further convinced Smith that the only path to restore imperial peace rested in Parliament's willingness to admit their grave "Error" in enacting the hated stamp duty and relinquish the "Supremacy of Great Britain" in all matters of taxation.[809] Without such concessions, Smith feared that a "general Civil War" would "light up and rage" across colonies, pitting Parliamentary apologists against the members of British America's fierce emotional community of resistance.[810]

"I Rejoice that America has Resisted" – The Stamp Tax's Repeal:

Despite the impressive influence which British America's emotional community of resistance began to wield, Parliament still refused to repeal the stamp tax. Despite countless episodes of impassioned violence against the administrators of this so-called unjust excise, Parliament still refused to repeal the stamp tax. Despite the conciliatory supplications of British America's short-lived, politically moderate, and effectually impotent Stamp Act Congress, Parliament *still* refused to repeal the stamp tax.[811] Unwilling to acknowledge the deliberative nature of legislative government

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[805] William Smith to Robert Monckton, November 8, 1765, in *Smith Memoirs*, 30-31.

[806] Ibid.

[807] *Boston Evening-Post*, November 4, 1765; *Boston Gazette*, November 4, 1765; a modified version of this article was reprinted in the *New York Gazette and Weekly Post-Boy* on November 14, 1765.

[808] Ibid.

[809] William Smith to Robert Monckton, November 8, 1765, in *Smith Memoirs*, 30-31.

[810] Ibid.

[811] The Stamp Act Congress convened in October 1765 with representatives from Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, with Virginia notably absent due to Governor Francis Fauquier's refusal to call the House of Burgesses into session for the purpose of appointing delegates. Much like the Albany Congress, the Stamp Act Congress proved ineffectual, as only six delegations had the authority to approve the petitions and memorials drafted for King George III and both houses of Parliament. While all three texts detailed the hardships which British Americans would endure, the rhetoric was noticeably moderate. Only the Stamp Act Congress's petition to King George III aligned with the affective rhetoric of British America's emotional community of resistance, as it not only confirmed that they were "Unanimously devoted, with the warmest Sentiments of Affection and Duty to his Majesty's Person and Government," but also begged that King George III take, "into [his] Royal consideration, the Distresses of your faithful Subjects" in North America and "afford them such Relief," as in accordance with his "Royal Wisdom." Within the memorial to the House of Lords, the Stamp Act Congress presented British Americans' opposition to the tax as "animated with warmest Sentiments of filial Affection for their Mother Country," whereas the Petition to the House of Commons, in glaring contrast to British America's emotional community of resistance, presented British America's interests as "earnest Supplications for Relief." Affectively toothless, the political rhetoric of the Stamp Act Congress made an insignificant impact upon British America's emotional community of resistance and left even less of an impression in England, as Prime Minister Charles Watson-Wentworth, the Marquees of Rockingham, found a technical error within the petitions, through which he prevented them from being heard in Parliament. Stamp Act Congress, *Proceedings of the Stamp Act Congress* (Annapolis, 1766) 17-21; John Carter Brown Library. Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 285-286; C. A. Weslager, *The Stamp Act Congress* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1976), 99, 107-108, 148.

or the inevitable delays that occur when an ocean separates an empire, British America's anti-stamp tax colonists maintained that Parliament's continued obstinance was irrefutable proof that they intended to condemn the king's devoted subjects to the cruel yoke of tyranny.

British America's pervasive, anti-stamp tax rhetoric of hatred, terror, and filial love now took center stage at the colonies' New Year celebrations. Lawrence Swinney's "New Year's Ode for the Year 1766" reaffirmed the popularity of this affective trinity in its glib, sing-song poem: "Dong Ding./Dong Ding./Long Live the KING,/The KING live long,/But the Devil may Shoot,/Wicked G[renvil]l and B[ute]."[812] Implicit hope, however, also radiated from the final stanza of Swinney's "Ode," for if the hated and feared agents of the Devil were killed – or striped of their political influence – then Britain's beloved sovereign might finally force Parliament to repeal its stamp tax, and thereby restore his colonists' endangered rights and liberties.

The New Year also brought forth a renewed commitment to enraged, hopeful acts of political violence from British America's anti-stamp tax cohorts. In New York, riots persisted into mid-January, as members of the colonial government hesitated to "use Force to restore Tranquility," lest they suffer "Impeachments and Reproaches from the people, of having excited them to Insurrection."[813] When Massachusetts's received a shipment of stamped paper in late-February, Boston's anti-stamp tax cohort confiscated the cargo and held a subsequent mock trial of both Grenville and Bute.[814] Upon being found guilty of "a Design to subvert the British Constitution" and "to alienate the Affections of His Majesty's most loyal and dutiful Subjects in America from his Person and Government," the effigies of Grenville and Bute, along with a copy of the *Stamp Act* – British America's "Badge of Slavery" – were "committed to the Flames" before a crowd of two thousand Bostonians.[815] In Norfolk, Virginia, the Sons of Liberty publicly proclaimed that they would subject every Brition who employed "the detestable papers called the Stamps" to the "intents and purposes" fitting "an enemy to his country."[816] This "Opposition to the Stamp Act Continue[d] with Unabating Violence" into early-April, as Virginia's "Courts of Justice" refused to hear any new business until they received official confirmation that a "Resolution of Parliament" had repealed the tax.[817] The continued debilitation of Virginia's government, Richard Corbin remarked, was "as great an evil as can happen to [a] Society."[818]

Fears of civic instability plagued those colonists who did not retain memberships in British America's emotional community of resistance. These anxieties, however, also laid the affective, proto-foundations for an emotional community of imperial loyalty. Afraid of the violent specter which now haunted his home, Thomas Hutchinson warned that the people of British America "shall never be easy again until the relation between the parent state & its colonies is ascertained."[819] Reconciliation, Hutchinson observed, had become increasingly difficult. The members of British America's anti-stamp tax cohorts, through "their inflammatory writings," continued "to instill principles destructive of all government" and "stir up the rage of the people against all who [did] not avow" their beliefs.[820] "Patricide," Hutchinson gravely remarked, was "too soft a term for the crime" of these men.[821] Minister Horace Walpole even believed that the seeds of discord had rooted

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[812] Lawrence Swinney, *New Year's ode for the Year 1766* (New York, 1766), Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
[813] Thomas Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, January 16, 1766, in *Gage Correspondences*, 1:82.
[814] *Boston Gazette*, February 24, 1766.
[815] Ibid.
[816] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 16, 1766; Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 39.
[817] Richard Corbin to Robert Cary, April 1, 1766, in the "Richard Corbin Letterbooks."
[818] Ibid.
[819] Thomas Hutchinson to Benjamin Franklin, January 1, 1766, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:377.
[820] Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, February 26, 1776, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 1:395.
[821] Ibid.

themselves so deeply in British America that compliance to the stamp tax "could only be done by the sword," which "would risk lighting up a rebellion in the Colonies."[822]

New Yorker Nicholas Ray echoed such fears in *The Importance of the Colonies of North America*. The true "Interest of Britain," Ray argued, was "to acquire and retain, not to alienate, the Affection of her Colonies."[823] Parliament's stamp tax, however, conflicted with this objective, as it not only aroused "Hatred and Desperation" within the people of New York, but also threatened to reduce them, like the Israelites before them, to "Egyptian slavery."[824] To remedy the deplorable state of the British empire, Ray implored Parliament to "acquire and retain by Acts of Lenity and Mildness, the Affections of [its] Colonies," and not resort to the "Iron Rod of Power."[825] Imperial violence, Ray observed, was likely to ignite both a "Fire of Resistance" and the "Desire of Independence" in British America, as few would "long bear even imaginary Grievances, with the Means in their Hands, however desperate, of shaking them off."[826] Without decisive action, Ray concluded, Parliament risked losing the affection and political fidelity of its colonies forever.

Ray, Hutchinson, and their fellow proto-imperial loyalists' political opposition, however, failed to coalesce into a rival emotional community. Most British colonists – whether they harbored violent, anti-Parliament sentiments or advocated complete imperial fidelity – disagreed with either the principle or the implementation of Parliament's stamp tax. When compared to members of British America's emotional community of resistance, proto-imperial loyalists appeared as advocates for law, order, and stability. Simultaneously, no anti-stamp tax radical would self-identify as an agent of arbitrary violence or political anarchy. Rather, these colonists perceived themselves as doing what was necessary, albeit regrettable, to protect British liberty and save their empire from the grip of tyranny. It became near impossible, therefore, to police the affective boundaries of an emotional community of imperial loyalism in 1766, as every British colonist believed themselves its member.

To encourage and expedite imperial reconciliation, London's pamphleteers engineered a concerted campaign against the *Stamp Act* in 1766, which in turn helped to secure its repeal. *A Short History of the Conduct of the Present Ministry, with Regard to the American Stamp Act* argued that the disunity which currently plagued the British empire arose solely from the "timidity, incapacity, and neglect" of the "present administration" in Parliament.[827] *The Crisis, or a Full Defence of the Colonies* concurred, arguing that the people of British America "never disputed the just authority of the Mother Country," but rather "opposed the tyranny of an injudicious minister," whose machinations had "injured" the entire empire.[828] The "indignation" that the British people currently felt, therefore, must be directed not towards British Americans, but rather toward former Prime Minister Grenville, as he had "violently broke in upon their peace," and "arrogantly called upon" them "to maintain the infringement of [their] own Constitution."[829] Hatred of Grenville's ministry – the rhetorical center of British America's anti-stamp tax rhetoric and emotional community of resistance – finally had gained a foothold in London.

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[822] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 2:179.
[823] Nicholas Ray, *The Importance of the Colonies of North America* (New York: John Holt, 1766), 4-5, New York Historical Society.
[824] Ray, *The Importance of the Colonies of North America*, 7-8.
[825] Ibid, 9.
[826] Ibid.
[827] *A Short History of the Conduct of the Present Ministry, with Regard to the American Stamp Act* (London: J. Almon), 1766, 19-20; Harvard University, Houghton Library.
[828] *The Crisis, or, a Full Defence of the Colonies*. (London: W. Griffin, 1766), 23; American Antiquarian Society. Purdie and Dixon's *Virginia Gazette* also published excerpts of this pamphlet on April 4, 1766.
[829] *The Crisis*, 23, 25.

Amid riots and whispers of civil war, Parliament began to debate whether it should repeal the *Stamp Act*.[830] Armed with the "tongue of the wicked," Grenville rebuked those ministers who entertained submission to the popular will of British America.[831] Grenville, however, fought a losing battle. Secretary of State Conway believed that the stamp tax intrinsically "breathed oppression," and its maintenance might soon incite an armed conflict that stood to "ruin" both England and British America.[832] Even if Grenville had the stomach for civil war, Conway reminded him that Parliament had a mere "five thousand men" across "three thousand miles of territory," whereas "the Americans [had] an hundred and fifty thousand fighting men" immediately at their disposal.[833] If pushed too far, Conway warned, the people of British America might readily engage in a war for their independence.

Conway's pragmatic opposition to the stamp tax, however, paled in comparison to William Pitt's defense of British America. "The Americans are the sons, not the bastards, of England," Pitt proclaimed, and as such they must maintain the "constitutional Right of Giving and granting their own Money," for without it, they "would have been Slaves."[834] Rebuking Grenville's complete mismanagement of Parliament, Pitt acknowledged the profound debt that England now owed the people of British America: "I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty, as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest" of the British empire.[835] Pitt had "shone with greater lustre than ever" in his condemnation of both Grenville and the *Stamp Act*, Walpole observed, and such an impassioned speech all but ensured that "he [had] all the Americans with him."[836]

In the weeks that followed, Pitt advised his fellow ministers to appreciate the crucial political decision now laid before them. Parliament's formal response to British America's anti-stamp tax resistance would determine the future security and stability of the British empire. If Parliament conceded to the colonists' demands, then the torrent of hatred and fear that consumed British America would "subside not only into peace," but also "into perfect harmony, duty, and gratitude."[837] Parliament, however, should neither balk at nor dismiss the political power of the colonies, for there "never was an instance" in which all of England had united so completely "in a revolt" as that which was "the case of America." [838] Unlike the apple and pear farmers of western England, the people of British America had mobilized and united to achieve a singular political purpose, and only by repealing the stamp tax would that "sober part of America" resubmit to imperial authority.[839] If Parliament resisted the popular will of the British people and forced colonial compliance to *Stamp Act*, Pitt concluded, then the "union" between England and America would shatter, and thereby "produce the ruin" of the British empire.[840]

Pitt's near-apocalyptic political fears played no small part in persuading Prime Minister Charles Watson-Wentworth, the Marquees of Rockingham, to advocate for an absolute repeal of the

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[830] Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 276-277.
[831] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), July 11, 1766; Bruce Ingham Granger, *Political Satire in the American Revolution, 1763-1783* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 45.
[832] Walpole, *Memoir of King George III*, 3:28.
[833] Ibid.
[834] *Boston Post-Boy*, May 12, 1766.
[835] William Pitt's Speech to Parliament in *Prologue to Revolution*, 135, 139.
[836] Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, February 9, 1766, in *Walpole Correspondence*, 22:395-396; Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, March 21, 1766, in *Walpole Correspondence* 22:410.
[837] Nathaniel Ryder, "The Parliamentary Diaries of Nathaniel Ryder" in *Camden Miscellany Vol. XXIII*, 309.
[838] Ibid.
[839] Ibid.
[840] Ibid.

Stamp Act.[841] To ensure expeditious action, Rockingham simultaneously endorsed the *Declaratory Act*, which reaffirmed Parliament's "full power and authority to make laws and statues of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever."[842] Riding the political momentum and spying a unique opportunity to rid Parliament of the tarnish it had received under Grenville and Bute's leadership, Rockingham also reduced the foreign molasses's duty and lessened the tax put upon small-scale cider and perry distillers in England.[843] Immediately upon their passage, Conway sent both the *Act Repealing the Stamp Act* and the *Declaratory Act* to British America's colonial governments, hopeful that these symbols of Parliamentary affection would encourage "chearful obedience to the Laws & Legislative Authority" of Britain, as well as "Sentiments of respectful Gratitude" throughout the empire.[844]

It took approximately two months for news of the stamp tax's repeal to reach the shores of North America. Upon learning of their unprecedented political victory, the members of British America's emotional community of resistance abandoned their rhetoric of hatred and fear in favor of an overwhelming imperial joy, expressed for both their beloved sovereign and their true friends in Parliament, who had rescued them (somewhat circuitously) from jaws of economic corruption and political enslavement.[845] The "joyfull news" of the *Stamp Act*'s repeal reached Boston on May 19 and, to commemorate a day already "crowned with glory and honor," the city's inhabitants held dinner parties, drank toasts, and witnessed "very grand illuminations" and "fireworks."[846] The people of Norfolk County, Virginia held a celebration on May 20, at which they drank toasts to "The King and Queen…The True Patriots in the Present Ministry," and to the "Perpetual concord and unanimity between Great Britain and all her colonies."[847] Pamphlets announcing the "Glorious" repeal of the stamp tax littered the streets of New York City on May 21, and its inhabitants "rejoic[ed]" and celebrated with drinking, dining, and a parade in honor of their British liberties.[848]

Beyond such popular celebrations, the clergy of Boston devoted an entire week's worth of sermons to the topic of political and religious thanksgiving, which reaffirmed the near-immediate breakdown of the colonies' hostile, emotional community of resistance. The repeal of the *Stamp Act*, Samuel Stillman preached to Boston's First Baptist Church, "spread gladness through Britain," began "warming every true American's heart," and proved that George III was "the best of earthly Monarchs."[849] Joseph Emerson agreed, as Britons' rebuke of the stamp tax had protected the people of Boston from becoming a "tributary to the See of Rome."[850] Reverend Nathaniel Appleton echoed these sentiments, demanding that his congregants, as well as all Britons, praise God, as well as those noble ministers of Parliament, who worked to ensure that "love and affection between the mother country and [British America]" returned "with its wonted ardor."[851] Jonathan Mayhew's *The Snare Broken*, the most affectively nuanced of Boston's sermons, declared that the repeal of the stamp tax

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[841] Henry Seymour Conway's Diplomatic Correspondence, 9:13-14, MSS, Lewis Walpole Library; Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 279.
[842] Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 290-291; *The Declaratory Act*, March 18, 1766, in *Prologue to Revolution*, 155.
[843] du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 142.
[844] Henry Seymour Conway's Diplomatic Correspondence, 9:13-14.
[845] duRivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 143-145.
[846] John Rowe, May 19, 1766, in "Diary of John Rowe" in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2nd Series, 10:62.
[847] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), June 13, 1766.
[848] John Montresor, May 20-21, 1766, *The Montresor Journals*, 367-368.
[849] Samuel Stillman, *A Sermon Preached at Boston, May 17, 1766. Upon the Arrival of the Important News of the Repeal of the Stamp-Act.* (Boston: Kneeland and Adams, 1766), 31-32; American Antiquarian Society.
[850] Joseph Emerson, *A Thanksgiving-Sermon Preach'd at Pepperrell, July 24th, 1766* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1766), 12; American Antiquarian Society.
[851] Nathaniel Appleton, *A Thanksgiving Sermon on the Total Repeal of the Stamp-Act* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1766), 17; American Antiquarian Society.

demonstrated Parliament's commitment to "cultivate harmony and brotherly love between our fellow subjects in Britain and our selves."[852] While this single legislative act spread "joy…through the bosoms and veins of the people in general," Mayhew remained cautiously optimistic, reminding his audience that British America had freed itself from "that ugly Hag Slavery, the deformed child of Satan," only by "struggling in [its] snare," and proving itself worthy of God's divine protection.[853] It is the responsibility of all Britons, Mayhew concluded, to rekindle both their piety and patriotism, so that they may "honor all men, love the brotherhood, fear God, [and] honor the King."[854]

Even the people of London exhibited joy at the *Stamp Act*'s repeal – the most extreme example of which was "The Repeal, or the Funeral Procession of Miss Americ-Stamp" (see Figure 2.4).[855] In this scathing political cartoon, former Prime Minister Grenville carries a child-sized coffin inscribed "Miss Stamp" and weeps with Lord Bute over the death of their beloved tax. Above the tax's tomb is an inscription, which declares that this holds those things that "tended to Alienate the Affections of Englishmen to their Country," and which the British people "hoped never [to] rise again." Through its sardonic depiction of grief, "The Repeal" mocks and delegitimizes any regret or sorrow that Grenville and his pro-stamp tax allies felt towards their inability to exert their economic (or tyrannical) will over the people of British America. Strikingly, "The Repeal," sold approximately 18,000 copies, demonstrating that the inhabitants of London shared not only British America's hatred for those ministers who concocted the stamp tax, but also their joy at its repeal.[856]

In particular, British Americans expressed joy, devotion, gratitude, and praise for the selfless actions of their hero, William Pitt.[857] Mayhew's *The Snare Broken* opened with a dedication to Pitt, whose actions not only had prevented a "fatal rupture between Britain and her Colonies," but also had restored British America's "liberties and privileges."[858] The *Virginia Gazette* declared that "all Rejoicings and Exhibitions of Joy" throughout British America must be done with "Respect, Love, and Gratitude to his patriotic Ministry, and in Honour of the immortal Pitt."[859] The people of North Hampton, Virginia even composed a song praising Pitt's unrelenting patriotism, which was second only to that of George III: "To thee, the best of parents and of friends,/American with grateful homage bends,/Her thanks, her love, unable to express,/To thee, great patron of her happiness."[860] The people of New York City followed Virginia's lead, for when they celebrated the *Stamp Act*'s repeal on May 21, they engraved their processional flagstaff with "George 3rd, Pitt, - and Liberty"[861] Like General James Wolfe before him, William Pitt had exemplified the selflessness fraternal love

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[852] Jonathan Mayhew, *The Snare Broken. A Thanksgiving-Discourse Preached at the Desire of the West Church in Boston, N.E., Friday May 23, 1766. Occasioned by the Repeal of the Stamp Act.* 2nd ed. (Boston: R. & S. Drapper, et al, 1766), 37; American Antiquarian Society.

[853] Mayhew, *The Snare Broken*, 16-18, 44.

[854] Mayhew, *The Snare Broken*, 52.

[855] "The Repeal, or the Funeral Procession of Miss Americ-Stamp" (London, 1766); Lewis Walpole Library, Prints & Photographs Collection, Yale University.

[856] Brewer, *Party Ideology*, 147; M.D. George, *English Political Caricature: A Study of Opinion and Propaganda* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1:135; George explains that Benjamin Wilson, the London printer who claimed to have created "The Repeal," sold 2,000 copies of his the original version from March 8 to March 12, 1766 for one shilling per print, yet he was unable to "keep pace with the demand" and on March 12 "two pirated copies came out at half the price." Wilson learned from "credible persons" that Londoners had bought approximately 16,000 copies of these forgeries; George, 1:135.

[857] Jeremy Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 255-257.

[858] Mayhew, *The Snare Broken*, iv-v. Mayhew's dedication to Pitt gained continental popularity as newspapers throughout British-American reprinted it, see *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), August 15, 1766.

[859] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), May 16, 1766.

[860] "Repeal" in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*, 26.

[861] John Montresor, May 20-21, 1766, *The Montresor Journals*, 367-368.

required not simply of every true British patriot, but of every true "Guardian of AMERICA."[862] The stamp tax, to British America's relief, was finally dead.

Figure 2.4: *The Repeal, or the Funeral of Miss Americ-Stamp*. London, 1766.
Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

Conclusion:

Thomas Hutchinson questioned whether the repeal of the stamp tax had the power to absolve all sins and heal all wounds. If Parliament liberated the colonies from the *Stamp Act*, Hutchinson confessed in an unsent letter to Thomas Pownall in March 1766, then British America would remain in its current, "deplorable state," as its anti-stamp tax elites held "authority in every colony."[863] Despondent, Hutchinson still "wish[ed]" for a return to imperial normalcy, in which Parliament "expressi[ed] tenderness & indulgence" towards British America and, in return, its colonists ceased those behaviors which resulted in the "alienation" of England's "affection."[864] The aftermath of the *Stamp Act*'s repeal, however, revealed to Hutchinson a truth that few other Britons understood: imperial reconciliation was a sentimental veneer, one which concealed profound scars of political and affective trauma that had yet to be acknowledged, let alone healed. When Massachusetts's House of Representatives finally provided Hutchinson with fiscal compensation for the losses that he had sustained the night of August 26, 1765, they did so while granting amnesty to

862 *New York Gazette*, June 9, 1766; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 67.
863 Thomas Hutchinson to Thomas Pownall, March 8, 1766 (unsent), in *Correspondences of Hutchinson*, 1:410.
864 Ibid.

every colonist who participated in the illegal assault upon his family and home.[865] Although spared from financial ruin, Hutchinson never received justice for the crimes committed against him on the basis of passion and rumor. Unsurprisingly, Thomas Hutchinson felt little joy at the stamp tax's repeal.

The imperial joy which eluded Thomas Hutchinson signified the rapid dissolution of British America's emotional community of resistance. The unification of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia's anti-stamp tax cohorts relied on three components: a shared rhetoric of hatred, fear, and both filial and fraternal love; the participation in contemporaneous acts of enraged, popular violence; and the hope that such discourse and destruction would secure their singular objective – the repeal of Parliament's stamp tax. Once these anti-stamp tax colonists won their desired legislative repeal, two seismic political shifts occurred: joy reinvigorated British Americans' sentiments of imperial fellow-feeling and, more important, intercolonial political consensus began to dissipate. To put another way, the inhabitants of British America returned to a pre-1763 status quo, in which they felt greater affection for their imperial identity than with their intercolonial emotional community. The people of New York now turned their attention to the forced quartering of British regulars within their colony, Virginians refocused their energy on defending their western borders and settling land beyond the Royal Proclamation Line, and the people of Massachusetts watched in dismay as Parliament's fiscal-military might encroached further and further into their daily lives. Dissonance – among British America's individual colonies and between the patriotic rebels and imperial loyalists who inhabited them – only intensified. By 1767, British America already had ignited its next hostile debate, one which grappled with, and profoundly redefined, the principles and the sentiments of *true* imperial loyalty.

[865] Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, December 7, 1766, in *Correspondences of Hutchinson*, 1:484; Bailyn, *Ordeal of Hutchinson*, 114.

PART II:

"Seduced from My Bosom": American Traitors, 1767-1783

The specter of Thomas Hutchinson haunted the rustic halls of a small house in Qunicy, Massachusetts the morning of November 16, 1816.[866] The culprit: a letter received five days earlier from William Tudor, which had stirred "many Ghosts" in the "Imagination" of retired president John Adams.[867] For decades, the Massachusetts statesman had "Seriously endeavoured to Strip from [his] Mind every prejudice, and from [his] heart every Feeling, unfavorable to Mr. Hutchinson."[868] The former Massachusetts governor, John Adams had observed, was "a memorable, and an awful Example of Disappointment in the Career of Ambition."[869] Despite his profound contempt for Thomas Hutchinson, Adams expressed "no Animosity against" the governor's "Memory."[870]

Recollection and memory had plagued John Adams's retirement from public life. After losing the presidential election of 1800 to Thomas Jefferson – a close friend, political ally, and fierce enemy (depending on the decade) – Adams found himself consumed with a single question: "what shall I do with myself?"[871] Beyond tending to his marriage with Abigail, to his growing family, and to his farm in Quincy, the former president found himself consumed with bouts of contemplation and self-reflection. Time and time again, John Adams returned to a single topic: the bloody, passionate civil war which had secured the independence of the United States from the British empire.

The "American Revolution," Adams believed, was neither "a trifling nor common Event," as its "Effects and Consequences" still rippled throughout the Atlantic world.[872] As lawyer, John Adams had defended the soldiers of the 29th Regiment who perpetrated Boston's infamous massacre. The trial, however, failed to shake Adams's firm belief that shared customs, culture, and constitutional law might have preserved Britain's transatlantic empire. This once unwavering devotion to king and empire likely spurred Adams's personal obsession to understand by "what means" the "People of thirteen Colonies, all distinct, unconnected and independent" had banned together in an act of political treason and radical revolution.[873] Unsurprisingly, the Massachusetts statesman traced the origin of British America's collective transformation to Boston, circa 1761; to "AN AWAKENING and a REVIVAL of American Principles and Feelings, with an Enthusiasm which went on increasing till in 1775 it burst out in open Violence, Hostility and Fury."[874] Political passions, as they spread across British America through newspapers, pamphlets, letters, and graphics, created a "Singular Example in the History of Mankind," in which "Thirteen Clocks were made to Strike together; a perfection of Mechanism which no Artist had ever before effected."[875]

The fated unity which John Adams lauded in his affectionate reminiscence, however, overshadowed the profound pain, grief, and sadness that dominated the interpersonal lives of every British American who lived during this civil war for independence. Adams himself knew this suffering all too well. British America's civil war had driven a permanent wedge between himself and Jonathan Sewall, Samuel Qunicy, and Daniel Leonard.[876] Each of these men, Adams lamented, were

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[866] John Adams to William Tudor Sr., November 16, 1816, in "Adams Papers," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society.
[867] Ibid.
[868] Ibid.
[869] Ibid.
[870] Ibid.
[871] John Adams to Cotton Tufts, December 26, 1800, in "Adams Papers."
[872] John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, February 13, 1818, in "Adams Papers."
[873] Ibid
[874] Ibid.
[875] Ibid.
[876] John Adams to William Tudor Sr., November 16, 1816, in "Adams Papers."

"ardent and explicit Patriots" whom Thomas Hutchinson had coaxed "from the cause of their Country to their own Ruin."[877] Whether one identified as an imperial loyalist or a patriotic rebel, all believed themselves to be fighting against American traitors. It is telling that forty years after the United States had declared its independence, neither the unspeakable violence of civil war, nor ardent passions of political victory, had ceased to gnaw at the retired president. Despite his claim that he harbored no ill-will toward the former governor, John Adams found himself unable to forgive Thomas Hutchinson: for he had "Seduced from my Boston, three of the most intimate Friend I ever had in my life."[878]

[877] John Adams to William Tudor Sr., November 16, 1816, in "Adams Papers."
[878] Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE:

"Their Business is to Engage the Passions": Imperial Betrayal, Colonial Deception, and the Affective Schism of British American Independence, 1767-1776

Introduction:

Three thousand five hundred miles, as the crow flies, separated the taverns of Philadelphia from the chambers of Whitehall. Neither such an arduous distance, nor the pungent breeze of the Atlantic Ocean, prevented the stench of colonial treachery from wafting to the shores of Great Britain. By late-summer 1776, the people of London had learned that British America's delusional, self-appointed congress had asserted that the thirteen colonies which it represented were now "Free and Independent States," forever "Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown."[879] The arrogance, obstinance, and criminality of the fifty-six British colonists who signed this declaration of independence swiftly became the object of Parliament's political ire.[880]

This so-called Continental Congress, Scottish philosopher and Baron of the Exchequer John Dalrymple argued, had propagated "facts" that were "either willfully or ignorantly misrepresented" and, through such dishonesty, fabricated a "rebellion" against the imagined threat of tyranny.[881] Unable to defend themselves during the Seven Years' War, Dalrymple explained, the North American colonies had relied upon "Great Britain, like a Guardian Angel," to save them "not only from danger, but the very fear of danger" itself.[882] By eliminating the ever-present threat of French incursions, however, Parliament inadvertently emboldened British America's political malcontents to abandon "their pretend affection" for the empire and selfishly cultivate their own influence and wealth.[883] The gilded "Patriotism" of these "motely Juntos," Dalrymple continued, gradually enticed peaceable yet naïve British Americans to "refuse obedience to the laws" of Parliament and "draw their swords" against those who defended, and remained faithful to, the British empire.[884] Through their provocative rhetoric, British America's disloyal congress had convinced their fellow colonists to abandon, *en masse*, the rights, privileges, and protections guaranteed to them as subjects of George III. Deceptions aside, Dalrymple expressed no surprise at the persuasive power of the Continental Congress, as it was "their business to engage the passions, where they [could] make no impression with their arguments."[885] The political schism that now consumed British America, Dalrymple observed, arose from this rhetorical interplay of deception and affection.

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Loyalty, as a political virtue, underwent a profound rhetorical metamorphosis in British America in the decade preceding the signing of the *Declaration of Independence*.[886] Unquestioning fealty to Britain and George III – the litmus test of imperial patriotism – fell under increasing scrutiny and suspicion as British America's rebellious elites intensified their passionate, anti-Parliament propaganda. The potency of these affective rhetorics linger to this very day, as many inhabitants of

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[879] Thomas Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence* in *The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1790*, ed., Paul Leicester Ford (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 41-42.

[880] Richard R. Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes and Our Sacred Honor: The Forging of American Independence, 1774-1776* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 8.

[881] John Dalrymple, *The Rights of Great Britain Asserted against the Claims of America: Being an Answer to the Declaration of the General Congress* (London: T. Cadell, 1776), 2, 55; New York Historical Society. Dalrymple's pamphlet swiftly crossed the Atlantic and, before year's end, received a second printing in Philadelphia by R. Bell, held at the American Antiquarian Society.

[882] Dalrymple, *Rights of Great Britain Asserted*, 11-12.

[883] Ibid, 15.

[884] Ibid, 2-3, 19.

[885] Ibid, 60.

[886] Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 2-3.

the United States still refer to those who committed treason against the British empire not by the more accurate titles of "rebels" or "traitors," but rather as "patriots." Further, the epithet of "loyalist" still elicits subtle sentiments of disgust and betrayal from contemporary Americans. To comprehend how anti-Parliament malcontents simultaneously vilified imperial allegiance and valorized colonial defiance, we must examine how the political rhetorics of betrayal and deception demarcated the boundaries of British America's emotional communities of rebellion and of loyalism.

Beginning with the passage of the *Revenue Act* (1767), rebellious colonists and imperial loyalists alike deployed combinations of hatred, fear, sorrow, rage, and love to legitimize their fidelity, or lack thereof, toward the British empire. Through such rhetorics, the people of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia solidified into two sets of regional emotional communities – one which demanded it members commit patriotic, and often violent acts of resistance, and then rebellion, against the authority of Parliament, and one which required its members to work tirelessly to secure the *legal* and *peaceful* restoration of British America's favored status within the empire. Both emotional communities relied heavily on expression of paternal affection and love, keenly aware that the good-will of George III might make the difference between oppression and reconciliation. It is important to note, that despite their similar feeling rules, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia's parallel emotional communities of patriotic resistance, just like their parallel emotional communities of imperial fidelity, often oscillated in and out of affective alignment.

Rebellious colonists forged their anti-Parliament rhetoric around the concept of political betrayal, arguing that Parliament's legislative "treachery" had violated the "trust" of the British people and surrendered their empire "into the hands" of its oldest "enem[y]" – tyranny.[887] Unlike the red-coated British regular, the Indigenous warrior, or the French Catholic, imperial loyalists had no outward signifier or unmistakable cultural practices which differentiated them from their rebellious neighbors – as they all were colonial civilians. As this rhetoric of betrayal intensified, it encouraged anti-Parliament mobs to remedy this problem of identification by subjecting imperial loyalists to the vicious, humiliating, and visually scarring punishment of tarring and feathering.[888] Out-of-doors politics and popular acts of violence, however, gradually discredited the rebellious elite's contemporaneous pleas for royal mercy and reconciliation. Conversely, imperial loyalists accused British America's anti-Parliament elite of political insincerity and deception. By masking their own selfish ambitions and lust for power under the guise of defending British liberty, these colonial rebels had "delude[d]" loyal British Americans into violating the Parliament's just authority, thereby jeopardizing the security and benefits promised to them as subjects of the British crown.[889]

Following both the repeal of the *Revenue Act* and the end of British America's quartering crisis, Parliamentary apologists found it near impossible to disassociate themselves from allegations of corruption and tyranny. When Parliament placed a new tax upon British tea imported to the North American colonies, these accusations only intensified. Popular resistance to the tea tax, unsurprisingly, first erupted in Boston, but then spread quickly to rebellious hotbeds such as New York City and Norfolk. Unwilling to entertain yet another political tantrum from British America, Parliament made the fateful decision to reprimand the disobedient people of Boston by closing their port, revoking their colonial charter, yet again placing their city under military occupation, and worst of all, appointing General Thomas Gage as their new royal governor.[890]

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[887] "To betray," as defined by Samuel Johnson, is to "to give into the hands of the enemies by treachery, or breach of trust"; see Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language*.

[888] For a detailed analysis of the practice of tar and feathering in British America, see Benjamin H. Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies of American Liberties, 1768-1776" *New England Quarterly* 76, no. 2 (2003):197-238.

[889] "To deceive," as defined by Samuel Johnson, is to "delude by stratagem"; see Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language*.

[890] Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 27-29.

This egregious assault upon the political liberty and economic livelihood of the people of Massachusetts revitalized intercolonial fellow-feeling among British America's anti-Parliament contingents. It also authorized rebellious colonists to feel hatred for and fear of those royal officials and imperial loyalists who now enforced Parliament's legislative cruelty. The influence of British America's rhetoric of betrayal only intensified as representatives from twelve colonies convened an extralegal congress in September 1774. Its controversial purpose: to mount a unified opposition to Parliament's unconstitutional encroachments against, and tyrannical abuses of, the king's dutiful subjects.[891] In a feat of rhetorical gymnastics, this Continental Congress even recast imperial loyalists as political traitors, decrying them as enemies of British America who had forsaken their fellow colonists to the cruel yoke of tyranny and had abandoned the British empire's sacred, constitutional principles.[892]

Fraudulent political arguments from the Continental Congress, however, spurred imperial loyalists to action. For the past decade, these faithful subjects had watched as disgruntled colonists worked to discredit the authority of Parliament and to destabilize the common people's affection for their empire. Unwilling to wait idly as this illegal legislature further eroded British America's decaying bonds of imperial fellow-feeling, loyal Britons fiercely rebuked the congress's political subterfuge. To increase the persuasive power of their rhetoric of deception, imperial loyalists co-opted the incendiary tools of colonial rebels. By reaffirming their adoration for George III, their fraternal love for all faithful Britons, and their hatred for and fear of those colonists who fabricated discord and sowed ressentiment, British America's loyalists laid the foundations for their own common cause – one which elevated the safety of imperial unity above the freedoms of colonial autonomy. Even with the help of English pamphleteers, however, these imperial loyalists struggled to invalidate the political influence of British America's insurgent congress.

The imprecise, fluctuating criteria for membership in British America's emotional communities of rebellion and of loyalism gradually crystalized from May 1775 to July 1776, as the Continental Congress grappled with the outbreak of civil war and debated the potential benefits of political independence from Britain. To break the lingering bonds of affection that many rebellious colonists still felt for their empire, the Continental Congress actively tarnished the reputation of their once beloved king. By fictitiously revealing that their beloved king had conspired with Parliament to persecute and abuse his subjects, the Continental Congress had cast George III not as the last refuge of imperial mercy, but rather as a corrupted despot, whose unforgivable betrayal justified British Americans' reluctant separation from their empire. Imperial loyalists, however, passionately argued that this seditious libel and rhetoric of symbolic regicide constituted treason.[893] From the perspective of those colonists who still held fealty to the British empire, this congress of rebellious demagogues had committed their own unforgivable crime, one which now imperiled the survival of British America. As feared, the *Declaration of Independence* begot an irreparable affective schism, one which transformed the boundaries of political loyalty, and thereby governed British America's civil war for independence.

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[891] Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 79-80, 115-116.

[892] Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 129-133.

[893] Such accusations align with traditions of the British empire's legal culture. Larson notes that the 1351 Statute of Treason identified seven categories of political, or imperial, treason. Both "levying war against the king in his realm" and "adhering to the king's enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere" are unsurprising, and align with more common notions of treason. Perhaps more surprising, however, is the very first form of treason within the statute: "compassing or imagining the death of the king" or his family. The symbolic (and soon to be wished for death) of King George III, therefore, was as great a crime as British America's imperial loyalists believed it to be; see Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 14.

Resistance to the *Revenue Act* – A Rehearsal for 1773:

Less than eighteen months after Parliament repealed its loathed excise upon stamped paper, British Americans found themselves embroiled a second taxation crisis. Parliament's *Revenue Act*, passed in June 1767, levied duties on a wide range of commodities imported to and sold within British America, including paper, glass, paint, lead, and tea.[894] Still embittered at Parliament's perceived weakness following the repeal of the stamp tax, George Grenville believed that the *Revenue Act* represented the "wisdom, justice, moderation, and firmness" necessary to "extinguish the flame" of disobedience that burned "so weakly and so wickedly" in British America.[895] Not all in Parliament, however, agreed with Grenville's assessment. Horace Walpole worried that these new taxes would exacerbate animosity towards Parliament precisely because the "flame" which Grenville's administration "had kindled…still blazed [within] the Colonies."[896]

Unsurprisingly, Walpole's prediction proved accurate. Tobacco planters in Virginia, already facing financial hardships due to poor market prices, decried the egregious debt that they now would incur.[897] Perpetual fiscal burdens, Richard Henry Lee warned, would reduce not simply the people of Virginia, but rather all British colonists, "to a state of slavish subjection."[898] Massachusetts's House of Representatives worried that the "unnecessary increase of crown officers" required to enforce these taxes would become "as dangerous to [their] liberties" as "an army of soldiers," and thereby would present British Americans with a "reason to fear" Parliament yet again.[899] If such "despotic, arbitrary, corrupt, and dangerous" whims remained unopposed, one New Yorker observed, then a "determined resistance" soon would erupt throughout all of British America.[900]

Despite the growing fear and distrust that British Americans felt towards the "generation of vipers" and "sons of tyranny" who now controlled Parliament, for the moment they remained "ardently affectionate to their King, their constitution, and country," and labored to protect the "mutual affection" of all royal subjects.[901] Proclaiming the "warmest sentiments of loyalty, duty, and affection" for their sovereign, British America's legislatures petitioned George III to rescue his "distressed" colonists from the "unhappy fate [of] having only the name left of free subjects."[902] Albeit an impassioned appeal to their monarch's mercy and "paternal care," the king chose not infringe upon Parliament's legislative autonomy and took no direct actions to alleviate British America's fiscal obligations to his empire.[903]

Receiving neither economic relief nor royal mercy, British Americans engaged in large scale boycotts to oppose Parliament's new taxation regime.[904] By late-1767, anti-Parliament cohorts throughout British America entered into public nonconsumption pacts while, in the domestic

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894 *An Act for Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America*, 536; Thomas, *Townshend Duties*, 31.
895 George Grenville to Thomas Pownall, July 17, 1767, in *Grenville Papers*, 4:318.
896 Walpole, *Memoirs of King George III*, 4:69.
897 T.H. Breen argues that the *Revenue Act* "unwittingly roused the great Tidewater planters into transforming private fears over indebtedness into a public commitment to austerity," as they believed a collective boycott of refined goods would help them "regain their economic independence" from Parliamentary influence; see T.H. Breen, *Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve of Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 190-191. For examples of such growing debt and financial insecurity, see George Washington to John Posey, June 24, 1767; George Washington to Capel and Osgood Hanbury, May 5, 1768, in *GW Papers: CS*, 8:1-2, 85.
898 RHL to ------(in London), March 27, 1768, in *RHL Letters*, 1:27.
899 Massachusetts House of Representatives to Dennis de Berdt, January 12, 1768, *True Sentiments*, 64; Massachusetts House of Representatives to Lord Rockingham, January 22, 1768, in *True Sentiments*, 28-29.
900 *New York Journal, or General Advertiser*, October 22, 1767.
901 Ibid.
902 "Petition to King George III from the Massachusetts House of Representatives, January 20, 1768" in *True Sentiments*, 5, 8-9.
903 "Petition to King George III," 9-10.
904 Norton, *Liberty's Daughters*, 156-163; Gilje, *Rioting in America*, 25.

sphere, women "made spinning their only employment" and "drank nothing…but *New England Rum*," thereby boycotting British textiles and imported tea.[905] By late-1769, anti-Parliament merchants and politicians in Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia had enacted nonimportation boycotts, unequivocally rejecting Parliament's fiscal authority within their colonies.[906]

Peaceable economic protest, however, did not deter popular hatred for those who enforced Parliament's new taxes and, in the summer of 1768, British America's forewarned "resistance" against the *Revenue Act* finally erupted in Boston. Anne Hulton, the sister of British customs officer Henry Hulton, observed that Massachusetts's anti-Parliament elite "irritate[d] and inflame[d]" the wrath of the common people through outlandish falsehoods, such as the fiction that Parliament had empowered its customs officers "to tax even [colonists'] Lands" for the purpose of raising unconstitutional revenue for the crown.[907] The Boston "Mobs" then harassed and intimidated royal officials with near impunity, as none had the either fortitude or foolishness to "suppress their Outrages, or to punish the most notorious Offenders for any Crimes whatever."[908] With law and good government "extirpated" from the colony, Hulton concluded, the people of Massachusetts had descended into a "State of Anarchy" whilst simultaneously "advancing toward a State of Independency."[909]

As popular resistance to the duty on stamped paper had shown, danger to both livelihood and life lay in enforcing Parliament's taxation regimes. Those customs officers who courageously performed their royal duty and enforced the *Revenue Act* often suffered "very cruel" treatment from the Boston crowd, which included "Stripping them naked, tarring and feathering them, [and] beating them with Clubs."[910]An act of intimate violence, tarring and feathering consisted of three steps: brushing or "bedawbeding" hot tar or pine pitch onto the victim's bare skin, applying feathers to the congealing tar (stuck into the skin like darts if possible), and then parading the victim throughout the town or city's "principle streets," so that a "great concourse of people" might celebrate this scene of humiliation and pain.[911] To incite, commit and validate these personal, rage-fueled actions against their fellow Britons, colonial rebels argued that their victims had shattered their affective tethers to human kind, specifically through their self-interested submission to legislative tyranny.[912]

Despite its long history in British culture as form of socio-political correction, no extant accounts exist of British Americans tarring and feathering fellow colonists until the mid-eighteenth century, when they used to deter popular vices, such as prostitution.[913] Tarring and feathering first

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[905] *Massachusetts Gazette*, December 24, 1767.

[906] For detailed analyses of the formation, evolution, and execution of these nonconsumption and nonimportation alliances, see Maier, *Resistance to Rebellion*, 114-138; Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 354-378; Griffith, *Virginia House of Burgesses*, 41-42; Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries:* 154-166.

[907] Anne Hulton to Elizabeth Lightbody, June 30, 1768, in *Henry Hulton and the American Revolution*, 220

[908] Ibid.

[909] Ibid.

[910] Ibid, 126-127. Dirk Hoerder argues that Boston's elite, upon agreeing to combat the Revenue Act through nonconsumption and nonimportation, implored the city's populace to refrain from attacking or intimidating any customs officials performing the duties of their position; for a more detailed analysis see Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Massachusetts*, 150-160.

[911] *Boston Post-Boy*, November 5, 1764; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 5, 1769. Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 204-206.

[912] For the power of horror to destroy or inhibit the bonds of fellow-feeling, see Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 75-76, 243, 323.

[913] Benjamin H. Irvin notes the history of tarring and feathering in British culture dates back to the twelfth century. The first extant account of tarring and feathering in British America occurred when a New York captain "tarred and feathered a prostitute in attempting to board his ship." Paul A Gilje notes that "it was only after a tarring and feathering

transitioned into an act of political violence in spring 1766, when a crowd of Norfolk sailors seized William Smith, a captain accused of "alerting royal officials to the presence of contraband" stowed abroad one of the ships docked in the city's harbor.[914] In response, the people of Norfolk tarred and feathered him, and then threw him into the harbor, where he almost drowned, "being able to swim no longer" due to the congealed pitch covering his body.[915] While Virginians did not embrace tarring and feathering, the people of Massachusetts and New York – elite politicians and common townsfolk alike – subjected at least sixteen customs officials and loyalists informants to this cruel punishment between summer 1768 and fall 1770.[916]

Intimidation and political violence, however, had failed to foster intercolonial solidarity against the *Revenue Act*, likely due to the non-universal impact of the duties levied. In fact, only the people of New York fully adhered to intercolonial nonimportation agreements.[917] By March 1770, New York had reduced its imported British goods, in pounds sterling, by eighty-five percent, whereas New England had reduced it by only fifty-percent and the Chesapeake region a by embarrassing three-precent. [918] Amid such ineffectual resistance, and only weeks after the Golden Hill and King Street riots, Parliament – to the shock of all Britons –voluntarily repealed their *Revenue Act*, except the tax on tea.[919] The advocates of colonial autonomy, it seemed, had secured a happenstance victory in British America's second taxation crisis.

Loyalty, Rebellion, and Parliament's "Bitter Drought" – The Tea Tax of 1773:

With the most glaring symbols of Parliament's fiscal-military might now weakened throughout British America, the colonies entered into an uneasy détente. Instances of popular violence against both British soldiers and royal officials plummeted to near non-existent numbers from winter 1770 to summer 1773.[920] The sporadic publication of political tracts, such as commemorations of the King Street riot or Mercy Otis Warren's *The Adulateur* – a fiery, *ad hominem* assault on Governor Thomas Hutchinson – rekindled anti-Parliament sentiments of hatred and fear, but only briefly.[921] For even Hutchinson himself, despite his vigilance against the "virulence" and

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of a minor customs official on September 7, 1768, in Salem, Massachusetts, that the practice spread and became recognized as a specialty of American crowds." Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 200; Gilje, *Rioting in America*, 47.

914 Captain William Smith to J. Morgan, April 3, 1766, "Letters of Governor Francis Fauquier," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 1st Ser., 21 (January 1913): 167-168; Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 200.

915 Ibid

916 Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," for a detailed chart of instances of tar and feathering that occurred in British America from 1766 to 1784, see Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 230-238.

917Thomas Gage to Wills Hill, Lord of Hillsborough, December 4, 1769, *Gage Correspondences*, 1:242.

918 New York, in 1768, imported £482,000, whereas in 1769 it imported £74,000; New England, comprised of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, imported £419,000 in 1768 and £207,000 in 1769; and Virginia and Maryland collectively imported £475,000 in 1768 and £488,000 in 1769. Due to the cumulative nature of these figures, it is impossible to demonstrate the individual roles of Massachusetts and Virginia in these boycott statistics; see William Samuel Johnson to Jonathan Trumbull, March 6, 1770, in *The Trumbull Papers*, in *Collections of the Society of Massachusetts*, 5th Ser. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1885), 9:424; Thomas, *Townshend Duties Crisis*, 152.

919 du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 94.

920 For the decline of civilian-soldier violence following the Golden Hill and King Street Riots, see McCurdy, *Quarters*, 199-200; for the decline of tar and feathering against royal officials and customs officers, see Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 209.

921 Small selections of "The Adulateur" was first printed in the *Massachusetts Spy* on March 26, 1772, and April 23, 1772; Rosemarie Zagarri, *A Woman's Dilemma: Mercy Otis Warren and the American Revolution, 2nd Edition* (Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2015), 57. Zagarri argues that the five-act play version of *The Adulateur*, published in 1773, "expanded the cast and broadened the plot of [Warren's] first play" and, therefore, was a plagiarized text. Nancy Rubin Stuart supports Zagarri's argument of plagiarism in *The Muse of Revolution: The Secret Pen of Mercy Otis Warren and the Founding of a Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2008), 48-49. Mercy Otis Warren, *The Adulateur* (Boston: New Printing-Office Near Concert-Hall, 1773), 6-15; American Antiquarian Society. For annual commemorations of the King Street riot during this political interlude,

"wickedness" of Massachusetts's own "Incendiaries" and "Enemies of Government," reluctantly admitted that the rest of British America seemed content to "to let the controversy with the Kingdom subside."[922]

Amid this uneasy yet palpable calmness, some colonists sought to mend the ruptured bonds of imperial fellow-feeling between British America and England. Bostonian poet Phillis Wheatly encouraged William Legge, the Earl of Dartmouth and newly appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies, to help restore "friendly relations between the Crown and colonies."[923] Wheatly trusted Dartmouth to rebuff those corrupted Englishmen who still desired to "enslave" the people of British America with the "iron chain" that "wanton Tyranny with lawless hands/Had made."[924] This an appeal is striking, as Wheatley – an enslaved African woman – rhetorically concurred that the political enslavement of British American to tyrannical ministers in Parliament might be equal in both its horror and immorality the "iron chain" of chattel slavery.

Building upon her deft rhetoric parallel of political enslavement and chattel slavery, Wheatley then issued a heart-wrenching plea to Dartmouth: ensure that no Briton ever suffered the barbarity of enslavement that she had endured as a child. "I, young in life, by seeming cruel fate," Wheatley recounted, "Was snatch'd from Afric's fancy'd happy seat:/What pangs excruciating must molest,/ What sorrows labour in my parent's breast?"[925] By invoking both hatred for and terror of political enslavement, and then appealing to Dartmouth's compassion for the horrors of chattel slavery, Wheatly masterfully advocated on behalf of imperial loyalists' political objective: the peaceful renewal of imperial fellow-feeing. Wheatley's poem further illustrates a profound ideological awareness as to the hypocrisy with which white British colonists discussed chattel slavery. Wheatley's elision of political enslavement and chattel slavery only carried such affective power and rhetorical effectiveness because British Americans understood, in their moral core, that it was a barbaric, inhuman act to hold another person in political, economic, or worse yet, physical bondage.

Neither Wheatley's persuasive rhetoric nor Dartmouth's potential advocacy, however, prevented Prime Minister Fredrick North from revising Parliament's tax on imported tea in late-spring 1773. Desperate to infuse the failing East India Company with a reliable revenue stream, Parliament not only granted them a monopoly over tea imported to British America, but also retained the preexisting three pence tax on the imported tea itself.[926] To the offense of many British Americans, Parliament still believed that it held supreme political and economic authority over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever."[927] News of the *Tea Act*, however, "kindl[ed]" a "New Flame" of opposition in British America's port cities. By mid-October 1773, merchants in both New York City and Boston had refused to transport the East India Company's tea, boycotting the "unconstitutional revenue" which Parliament now sought to acquire.[928]

Imperial loyalists in New York City, fearful that their fellow colonists would "repeat all the Confusions of 1765 & 1766," implored "Every good citizen," worthy of the "honourable title of

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see James Lovell, *An Oration Delivered April 2d, 1771* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1771); Joseph Warren, *An Oration Delivered Marth 5th, 1772* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1772); Benjamin Church, *An Oration Delivered March Fifth, 1773* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1773); all three are held at the Massachusetts Historical Society.

922 Thomas Hutchinson to Thomas Pownall, October 14, 1771, in *Correspondence of Hutchinson*, 4:268

923 Phillis Wheatley, "To the Right Honorable WILLIAM, Earl of DARTMOUTH" in *Poems on Various Subjects, Religious and Moral* (Boston: Cox and Berry, 1773) 73-75. Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 309-310.

924 Wheatley, "To the Earl of Dartmouth," 74.

925 Ibid.

926 Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 22-25 du Rivage, *Revolution Against Empire*, 167-169.

927 *The Declaratory Act*, March 18, 1766, in *Prologue to Revolution*, 155.

928 William Smith, October 13, 1773, in *Smith Memoirs*, 156; Hannah Winthrop to Mercy Otis Warren, November 10, 1773, in "Correspondence of Mercy Otis Warren," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society.

patriot" to "love his country" and obey Parliament's lawful *Tea Act.*[929] Fears of violent defiance, however, intensified with the publication of New York's "Alarm" broadsides, which rebuked this new instance of ministerial "Tyranny" and "Barbarity," and then proclaimed that the tea tax was the next step in Parliament's scheme to subjugate British America to political "slavery."[930] Punctuating such arguments, New York's anti-Parliament elite declared that any colonist who complied with the tea tax would be considered "an Enemy to the Liberties of America."[931] Like the stamp tax before it, the tea tax spurred British American radicals to defend their economic autonomy from the dreaded internal enemy of royalist sycophants.

Despite her horror at the "thought of Sheding Humane Blood, more especially the Blood of [her] Countrymen," Abigail Adams confessed her fear that the enforcement of the tea tax in Boston might instigate a "civil war."[932] The potential for such all-encompassing violence escalated on November 28, when the *Dartmouth* docked in Boston's harbor with the first shipment of East India tea.[933] Tensions rose to such in Boston that Adams's "Heart" fluttered at "every Whistle" she heard, fearful that it might be either a fired musket ball or the mob's call to arms.[934] Living each day in terror and dread, Adams wished "Eternal Reproach and Ignominy" upon each and every Briton who had been "instrumental" in revising the tea tax and "bringing these fears upon [her]."[935] Amid her hatred for Parliament, her terror of urban violence, and her sorrow for those colonists whom imperial regulars would slaughter upon the outbreak of civil war, Abigail Adams saw no hope for a peaceful future under this tyrannical law.

Immediately upon the *Dartmouth*'s arrival, Boston's anti-Parliament elite decried the unloading of the East India Company's chests.[936] These efforts intensified when the *Eleanor* and the *Beaver* both docked the city's harbor loaded with more unwelcomed tea. Although Hutchinson worried that Boston's malcontents had spread their violent, hateful ideologies like an "Infection" throughout the city, he still insisted that the *Dartmouth,* the *Eleanor*, and the *Beaver* obey Parliament and unload their cargo.[937] The evening of December 16, a crowd of fifty Bostonians, disguised as "Savages,…applied themselves to the destruction" of the "pestilential Teas" that plagued their harbor, breaking "342 chests and discharg[ing] their contents into the sea."[938] Unlike the stamp tax or King Street riots, the Boston crowd only assaulted property, not people.[939] The next morning, the city erupted with "Joy" as it learned of both the "Destruction of the Tea" and the "Quietness with

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[929] William Smith, October 13, 1773, in *Smith Memoirs*, 156. Smith's observation aligned with the political arguments of radical British American "printers and protesters, [who] explicitly cited the Stamp Act crisis as a precedent for the opposition to the landing of dutied tea,"; John Vardill, *To the Worthy Inhabitants of the City of New-York* (New York, 1773); Library of Congress. Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 70-71. Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks*, 101-102.

[930] Hampden, "Alarm No. I", October 6, 1773 (New York, 1773); New York Public Library; Hampden, "The Alarm, No. II", October 9, 1773 (New York, 1773); Hampden, "The Alarm No. V," October 27, 1773 (New York, 1773); all held at the New York Historical Society.

[931] *Association of the Sons of Liberty, of New York* (New York, 1773), Library of Congress.

[932] Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, December 5, 1773, in *The Warren-Adams Letters, being chief a Correspondence among John Adams, Samuel Adams, and James Warren, 1743-1777*. (Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, 1917), 1:18.

[933] *Boston Evening Post*, December 20, 1773; *Boston Gazette*, December 20, 1773.

[934] Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, December 5, 1773, in *Warren-Adams Letters*, 1:18.

[935] Ibid.

[936] *Boston Evening Post*, December 20, 1773; *Boston Gazette*, December 20, 1773; *Boston Post-Boy*, December 23, 1773; Peterson, *City-State of Boston,* 322.

[937] Ibid; *Rivington's New York Gazetteer*, December 23, 1773; Thomas Hutchinson to Anonymous, November 24, 1773; Thomas Hutchinson to the Directors of the Ear Indian Company, December 19, 1773, both in *Massachusetts State Archives Vol. 27, Thomas Hutchinson's Letter Books*, 1083, 1138-1139.

[938] *Boston Evening Post*, December 20, 1773; *Boston Gazette*, December 20, 1773; *Boston Post-Boy*, December 23, 1773; *Rivington's New York Gazetteer*, December 23, 1773.

[939] Ibid.

which it was effected."[940] The people of Boston still believed that impassioned, material violence would deliver them from arbitrary taxes, as it had done twice before.

Boston's tea riot shocked royal officials. In "times of Anarchy," Hutchinson bemused, there "is no kind of outrage which is not to be feared" and "no Tyranny so great" than that which arises when the people "take the Government from the hands" of its constitutional appointees.[941] For Hutchinson, Boston's tea riot had confirmed that anti-Parliament rebels - those insolent, violent colonists who had harassed the "Stamp masters" into submission in 1765 – now believed themselves capable of opposing all of Parliament's laws with impunity.[942] Anarchical fears became only more acute as, in the days following the tea riot, a Boston mob tarred and feathered at least one loyalist informant who had reported on the riot.[943] In New York, William Johnson lamented that "[i]f some effectual method is not taken to curb these Unruly people" in Boston, then "all Government [will be] at an end."[944] Virginia's loyalist press agreed, circulating near identical warnings that without "some very effectual Measures" against "the Rabble at Boston, their Insolence may be expected to increase" and spread throughout British America.[945] To imperial loyalists' horror, these rebellious contagions had already escaped the city of Boston.

On November 29, New York's anti-Parliament cohort publicly praised "the patriotic inhabitants" of Boston, who had "determined that no Tea…should be landed" in their own harbor.[946] Three days later, a group of so-called "Mohawks" placed an announcement in the *New-York Gazetteer*, which declared that they refused "to be enslaved" by Parliament's "fetters" and threatened an "unwelcome visit" to any New Yorker who helped to land, store, or sell the "infernal chains" of British tea.[947] Like their Bostonian cousins, New York rebel's appropriation of Indigenous identities – the act of "playing Indian" – allowed them to repurpose the inherent of otherness of the Indigenous warrior as a symbol of British *America's* distinct political and cultural identity.[948]

After learning of the destructive riot in Boston, New York Governor William Tryon finally succumbed to his "Fear of the Multitude" and secretly prohibited the unloading of Parliament's "detestable weed" from the city's harbor.[949] Unaware of Tyron's prohibition, a small band of New Yorkers assaulted the governor's home the evening of December 29.[950] The *New York Gazette* reported that "a most dreadful Fire broke out" around 11pm and that it "was so sudden and raged with such amazing Rapidity and Violence" that Tyron and his family narrowly escaped the blaze.[951] Unlike Boston, property was not the only casualty of New York City's tea riot. The inferno which

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[940] *Boston Post-Boy*, December 23, 1773.
[941] Thomas Hutchinson to Israel Mauduit, December 1773; Thomas Hutchinson to Anonymous, December 30, 1773, in *Massachusetts State Archives Vol. 27, Thomas Hutchinson's Letter Books*, 1150, 1158.
[942] Ibid.
[943] Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 210
[944] James Stevenson to William Johnson, December 25, 1773, in *Johnson Papers*, 8:974-975.
[945] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), April 4, 1774.
[946] *Proceedings at a Numerous Meeting of the Citizens of New-York, December 17, 1773* (New York: 1773); New York Historical Society.
[947] *Rivington's New York Gazetteer*, December 2, 1773.
[948] For a detailed analysis of the relationship between British Americans playing Indian and popular riots against the tea tax, see Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998), 1-9.
[949] William Smith, December 22, 1773, in *Smith Memoirs*, 163-164; *Boston Gazette*, January 3, 1774; *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury,* January 3, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), January 27, 1774; Mercy Otis Warren to Hannah Winthrop, January 1, 1774, in "Correspondence of Mercy Otis Warren." Tiedemann, *Reluctant Revolutionaries*, 182.
[950] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury,* January 3, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), January 27, 1774; Mercy Otis Warren to Hannah Winthrop, January 1, 1774, in "Correspondence of Mercy Otis Warren."
[951] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury,* January 3, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), January 27, 1774.

consumed Tryon's home tragically took the life of Elizabeth Garret, a sixteen-year-old servant who "perished in the Flames."[952]

Four weeks after Elizabeth Garret's tragic death, customs official John Malcom nearly murdered Boston shoemaker George Robert Twelves Hewes, who had intervened when Malcom accosted a young boy who accidentally had struck the official with his sled.[953] Boston's rebellious mob already despised Malcom for his loyalty to Parliament, and his attempted murder of Hewes gave them the moral justification necessary to seek violent recompense. The night of January 25, the Boston mob seized Malcom from his home and drug him to King Street, where they stripped him to the "buff" and adorned him with a "modern jacket" of tar and feathers.[954] The mob then processed Malcom through the streets of Boston, ending at the city's Liberty Tree, where they demanded he resign his commission.[955] Malcom, however, refused. Unwilling to let such obstinance stand, the Boston mob then flogged him, forced him to drink tea until he vomited, hung a noose around his neck, and finally threated to maim him.[956] Unable to endure such punishments, Malcom finally conceded to resign, at which point the mob returned him to his home, likely as near to death as he had left Hewes.[957]

Despite the popularity of the mob's assault on Malcom, Boston's anti-Parliament elite feared that such egregious acts of interpersonal cruelty might tarnish the civility and rhetorical message that they had intended to convey through Boston's peaceful tea riot.[958] In fact, the "Fury of the ungoverned Mob" had become too frequent in Massachusetts, and the legislature had begun the process of developing new legal protections against it.[959] Filled with both reverence for and fear of the "tumult of the people," Samuel Adams compared their power to "the raging of the sea." [960] When people's "passions" had "become headstrong," Adams observed, "direct opposition only tend[ed] to increase them."[961] The unmatched political power of the enraged crowd had served Adams well in the past, yet he remained vigilant, as every purposeful mob had the potential to devolve into lawless, ineffectual anarchy.

Fears of popular anarchy did not deter the people of Virginia from "applaud[ing] & honour[ing] the "Northern Colonies" for their "manly & patriotic Resistance" to Parliament's unjust tax.[962] One woman, known to be a "model of patriotism worthy [of] emulation," composed "Virginia Banishing Tea," a ballad which commemorated Boston and New York City's courageous defiance of ministerial tyranny, and thereby reaffirmed her rebellious allegiances.[963] It is the duty of all British Americans to disobey Parliament's "bloody acts…made in hell" and either return or destroy the "pernicious, baneful tea" now residing upon their coasts.[964] "Our king we love, but [Lord] North we hate," the ballad continued, "nor will to him submission own;/If death's our

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[952] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury,* January 3, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), January 27, 1774.
[953] *Massachusetts Gazette & Boston Weekly News-Letter*, January 27, 1774; Alfred E. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), 46-51; Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 209-210.
[954] Ibid.
[955] Ibid.
[956] Ibid.
[957] Ibid.
[958] Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 211.
[959] Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, March 25, 1774; Gilder Lehrman Institute Collection #GLC01213; Elizabeth Fenn, *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 38.
[960] Ibid.
[961] Ibid.
[962] Phillip Vickers Fithian, *Journal & Letters of Philip Vickers Fithian, 1773-1774: A Plantation Tutor of the Old Dominion*, ed., Hunter Dickinson Farish (Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, 1943) 79.
[963] "Virginia Banishing Tea" in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*, 59-61.
[964] Ibid, 59-60.

doom, we'll brave out fate,/But pay allegiance to the throne."[965] By displaying their loyalty to and filial love for George III while simultaneously casting North's corrupt administration as worthy of both hatred and fear, this Virginian ballad further rekindled the affective discourses with which British America had achieved political victory in its previous two taxation crises.

The "Union of the Colonies" and the "firm & sedate resolution of [their] People" against the tea tax, Mercy Otis Warren observed, was "an Omen for good" across British America.[966] Through their dissemination of affective discourses, their destruction of royal property, and their violent ostracization of those who enforced, supported, or defended ministerial tyranny, the people of British America once again performed a harmonious and impassioned political melody, one which they all knew by heart. These rebellious colonists now waited, as they had twice before, for Parliament to groan out its contrite coda, submit to popular demands, and conclude the symphony of British America's third taxation crisis. The people of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, however, had no idea that Parliament had begun playing a new tune – one which would transform the affective boundaries of both loyalism and rebellion throughout the British American colonies.

Parliament's Coercive Acts and the Affective Rhetoric of Betrayal:

Infuriated and unwilling to suffer blatant insubordination, Parliament swiftly chastised the ungrateful subjects of British America. As the only colony to destroy East India Company tea, Massachusetts suffered the "whole weight" of Parliament's "ministerial vengeance," beginning with the *Port Bill*, which closed Boston's port to all modes of commerce effective June 1774.[967] Parliament's unnaturally aggressive rebuke of Boston's "brave, worthy men" immediately aroused imperial fellow-feeling among subjects of the British Isles, as many concurred the *Port Bill*'s true purpose was to "divide" the people of British America.[968] Naval officer John Cartwright praised those "destroyers" of British tea – those "virtuous patriots" of Boston – who understood that "passive obedience to an unjust act of parliament" was tantamount to committing "treason" against their king.[969] One veteran of the Seven Years' War went even further, and proclaimed that it would be better for all imperial regulars to deny the authority of Parliament and "become Americans" than to "comply" with "drawing a trigger" to enforce the *Port Bill*.[970] All British Americans, one Londoner observed, must unite "like a Bundle of tender Rods," lest they "be separately broken into Pieces" by Parliament's burdensome punishments.[971] For only the "Wisdom and Firmness of the united Continent of America" may prevent the subjects of the British empire from becoming the "early Victims of Tyranny" and "the most abject Slaves of the Earth."[972]

Although English hatred for Parliament's *Port Bill* fomented in early-spring, a complete copy of the text did not circulate throughout British America until mid-May.[973] At first blush, the people of New York now hesitated to align themselves with the reproved city of Boston. As the nexus of

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965 "Virginia Banishing Tea" in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*,.59-60.
966 Mercy Otis Warren to Hannah Winthrop, January 1, 1774, in "Correspondence of Mercy Otis Warren."
967 John Andrews to William Barrell, December 18, 1773, in "John Andrews Correspondences," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society; *Boston Evening Post*, May 16, 1774; *Massachusetts Spy*, May 12, 1774.
968 *New York Journal*, May 19, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), August 25, 1774.
969 John Cartwright, "Letter IX" in *American Independence: The Interest and Glory of Great Britain* (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1776), 103; American Antiquarian Society. Cartwright's "Letter IX" was first printed in London on April 9, 1774, and the section discussing Boston's tea party was reprinted in the *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), February 16, 1775.
970 *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), August 25, 1774.
971 *New York Journal*, May 19, 1774.
972 Ibid.
973 *Massachusetts Spy*, May 12, 1774; *New-York Gazette*, May 16, 1774; the Boston *Port Bill* was also summarized in the *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie & Dixon), May 19, 1774; Mary Beth Norton, *1774: The Long Year of Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 78.

ministerial activity in British America and the headquarters for Parliament's North American peacetime standing army, New York City had fostered a thriving culture of imperial loyalism; one which the city's presses, such as James Rivington's *New York Gazetteer*, actively reinforced.[974] Upon learning of the passage of the *Port Bill*, one New Yorker – a self-described "lover of peace" and "hater of every species of tyranny" – implored the people of Boston to provide financial recompense for the "estimated value of the Drowned Teas."[975] Two days later, however, the city's malcontented newspapers editors began spreading sentiments of imperial "Disaffection" and "Contempt of Government."[976] If unopposed, loyalists "fear[ed]" that these hostile rebels might convince all of New York to abandon their "Attach[ment]" for their "Parent Country."[977]

Impassioned opposition to ministerial authority continued as New York City's merchants and politicians formed a "Committee to correspond with [their] sister Colonies."[978] Isaac Low urged his fellow committee members to "banish" from their "hearts" all "party distinctions, feuds and animosities" and to prevent their current "[z]eal" against Parliament from transporting their political actions "beyond the bounds of reason."[979] Pleas for moderation and prudence secured Low the position of committee chairman and, with the assistance of Alexander McDougall, John Jay, and James Duane, he drafted a formal condemnation of the *Port Bill*.[980] Feeling "inexpressible concern" for Boston's "suffering," New York's Committee of Correspondence declared that the town's "injuries" were "a common cause" for all of British America.[981] New York's committee, however, somberly acknowledged that "no remedy" may "avail" Boston's suffering, unless "it proceed[ed] from the joint act and approbation" of a "virtuous and spirited union" of *all* British Americans.[982] The "feeble efforts" of only a few colonies, the committee continued, only would ensure "disappointment" and grant their "adversaries" a "triumph" over their "liberties."[983] Opposed to the *Port Bill* and eager to express their sorrow for the inhabitants of Boston, New York City's anti-Parliament contingent refused to engage in any overt, violent acts of political resistance without continental unanimity, lest they receive a similar punishment to that of their northern brethren.

As the people of Massachusetts learned of New York's tepid support, Richard Henry Lee proposed a set of resolutions to Virginia's House of Burgesses, which unequivocally condemned Parliament's economic sanctions against Boston. Printed just ten days after the conciliatory pleas of New York's "lover of liberty," Virginia's resolutions rebuked the cruelty of the *Port Bill*, proclaiming that Parliament's legislative betrayal truly exposed the people of British Americans to "the Evils of civil War."[984] To defeat such treachery, the House of Burgess beseeched God to grant them "one Heart, and one Mind," with which they might "firmly…oppose, by all just and proper Means, every Injury to American Rights."[985] Aghast at such unapologetic extremism, Governor James Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, declared these resolutions an affront to both Parliament and the king, and

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974 Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 25, 72; furthermore, approximately one-fifth to one-third of white colonists remained loyal to the empire during British America's civil war for independence, and in New York City that ratio, Jones argued, doubled; see Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*, 364-365 n.16; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 112.
975 *New-York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, May 16, 1774; *New-York Journal*, June 9, 1774.
976 Smith, May 18, 1774, in *Historical Memoirs*, 186.
977 Ibid.
978 New York Committee of Correspondence, May 16, 1774, in *American Archives*, 4, 1:293-294. Norton, *1774*, 90-92.
979 Ibid.
980 New York Committee of Correspondence, May 16, 1774, in *American Archives*, 4, 1:295-296.
981 Isaac Low, "Chairman of New York's Committee of Correspondence to Massachusetts's Committee of Correspondence, May 23, 1774"; Massachusetts Historical Society.
982 Low to Massachusetts's Committee, May 23, 1774.
983 Ibid.
984 *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie & Dixon), May 26, 1774; *New-York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, June 13, 1774.
985 Ibid.

immediately dissolved the House.[986] Overwhelmed with "much grief" at Dunmore's abuse of power, Virginia's burgesses published a second, unofficial political tract, in which they confirmed their commitment to the restoration of British America's "just, antient, and constitutional rights."[987] Unlike the moderated, half-hearted promises of the people of New York, Virginia's colonial leaders conveyed unwavering solidarity with the people of Boston, who unjustly "suffer[ed]" such "ministerial vengeance" for "common cause of all British America."[988]

To foster Virginia's sentiments of intercolonial fellow-feeling throughout the rest of the British empire, Boston engraver Paul Revere composed *The Able Doctor*, a graphic condemnation of the immorality of Parliament's tea tax and *Port Bill* (see Figure 3.1).[989] At the center of Revere's political cartoon lay an Indigenous woman, representing British America, whom several ministers of Parliament had restrained. Prime Minister North then forcibly poured East India Company tea – England's "bitter drought" – down British America's throat, who struggled to spit out the fowl brew. Even under duress, British America remained committed to resisting ministerial tyranny through material nonconsumption. Like Boston's "Savages" and New York's "Mohawks," Revere had embraced the imagery of "playing Indian" to portray a cohesive, uniquely *American*, affective identity.

Through such provocative imagery, Revere evoked popular hatred for the unjust economic constraints that Parliament had placed not simply upon Boston, but rather upon *all* of British America. By depicting British America as a woman, whom Lord North forced to "swallow" his "bitter draught" and under whose dress his fellow ministers lustfully peered, Revere further equated Parliament's violation of British America's economic liberty to that of sexual assault and rape. *The Able Doctor* then elicited further rage and fear by depicting Lord Bute – the progenitor of British America's current misery and subjugation – as armed with the emblazoned sword of "Military Law." Punctuating this profound act of betrayal is Britannia who, although armed with shield and spear, refused to save her colonies from such cruelty and rather averts her gaze, ashamed of the men whom she permitted to govern in her name.

Revere's nuanced depiction of Parliamentary betrayal, however, extend beyond economic assault, as he argued that the revised tea tax was part of Bute's decade-long conspiracy to strip British America of its civic liberties. While North violated the physical and economic autonomy of British America in *The Able Doctor*, the *Port Bill* hangs from his coat pocket and, in the background of the cartoon, the city of Boston endures an unrelenting cannonade from Gage's imperial regulars. Through the engraving's visual simultaneity, Revere declared that Parliament's revisions to the tea tax was nothing more than a political gambit to incite popular rebellion in Boston. Through such schemes, North facilitated the necessary justifications for blocking the city's port and subjecting its inhabitants to martial tyranny. By imbuing North's ministry with hatred, terror, and rage, Revere elicits sorrow for, and thereby intercolonial fellow-feeling with, the people of Boston – the first casualties of Parliament's nefarious plot to enslave all of British America. Any Briton who submitted to the unjust authority of either the tea tax or *Port Bill*, Revere concluded, would betray not simply the principles of the English constitution, but rather their fellow colonists, who already suffered under the cruel yoke of ministerial tyranny.

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[986] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie & Dixon), May 26, 1774; *New-York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, June 13, 1774; Norton, *1774*, 96.
[987] Ibid.
[988] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), August 4, 1774; George Washington to George William Fairfax, June 10, 1774, in *Papers of GW: CS*, 10:96.
[989] Paul Revere, *The Able Doctor, or America Swallowing the Bitter Draught* in *Royal American Magazine* 1, no. 10 (Boston: Isiah Thomas, June 1774); American Antiquarian Society.

Figure 3.1: Paul Revere, *The Able Doctor, or America Swallowing the Bitter Draught*
Royal American Magazine 1, no. 10. Boston: Isaiah Thomas, 1774.
Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

The conspiratorial rhetoric deployed in *The Able Doctor* gained further traction as Parliament enacted four additional laws to restrict British America's rights of political and religious self-government. First, the *Massachusetts Government Act* revoked the colony's ancestral charter and prevented its House of Representatives from enacting any legislation without first obtaining royal approval.[990] Next, the *Administration of Justice Act* stipulated that "any royal official accused" of committing a "capital crime" against any inhabitant of Massachusetts must stand trial in England.[991] Third, Parliament passed a new quartering act, which increased the power of Governor Gage to billet imperial regulars throughout the colony.[992] Finally, the *Québec Act* authorized the appointment of Catholic ministers to the provincial government of British Québec.[993] Through these acts, the historic, cultural threats of both despotism and popery had arrived, yet again, to the shores British America. This time, however, they had cloaked their depravity in the regalia of Parliamentary power.

Weeks before royal officials began to enforce Parliament's acts of colonial coercion, Josiah Quincy, Jr. refuted their unacceptable and intolerable premises in a fitting companion to *The Able*

990 Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 341-342.
991 Ibid.
992 Ibid
993 Ibid.

Doctor.[994] The "sentiments of all Americans relative to the Tea act are no secret," Quincy, Jr.'s *Observations on the Act of Parliament Commonly Called the Boston-Port Bill* began, and "their fervor in the Common Cause" – its repeal – is "equally known" throughout the empire.[995] While the *Port Bill* may have weakened the "dangerous commotions and insurrections….fomented and raised in Boston," it inevitably will fail.[996] It will prove impossible, Quincy, Jr. continued, for Parliament to validate their "unexampled treatment" of the king's dutiful subjects.[997] The *Massachusetts Government Act* perpetuated Parliament's abhorrent violation of colonial rights, as it subjected the people of Boston to the mercy and whims of those customs officials who, now protected by the *Administration of Justice Act*, may succumb to their "intoxicating" political power and enjoy "every *latent* vice" – every inclination to avarice, jealousy, and lust – that they once had repressed.[998] The power of Gage's imperial regulars to intimidate and suppress political resistance from the people of Boston only embolden inclinations towards civic corruption.[999] Like all cities under military occupation, Boston would suffer unspeakable, "brutal debauchery" at the hands of Parliament's soldiers.[1000]

Although Quincy, Jr. stoked both righteous hatred for and pragmatic terror of Parliament's betrayal, he did offer a solution: that the security of Boston and all of British America must arise from, and be entrusted to, those colonists who will fight for "the safety of their community," their Protestant "religion," and the prosperity of their "offspring."[1001] British America's political resistance to Parliament must emerge, therefore, from "one pulse of the veins – one emotion of the heart."[1002] Those British Americans who truly love their liberties, their fellow colonists, and their empire must now forge a "BAND OF BROTHERS" whose political "courage" will "inflame their ardent bosoms, till their hands cleave to their swords," and they pierce the "hearts" of "their Enemies."[1003] By appealing to intercolonial fellow-feeling, Quincy, Jr. urged his fellow British Americans to channel their sorrow, their rage, their terror, and their hatred into vanquishing those venal ministerial sycophants who had betrayed their empire for political favor and personal wealth. For Josiah Qunicy, Jr. – as for many British Americans in 1774 – politics could not be separated from the popular passions of the day.

The military reoccupation of Boston only exacerbated British Americans' fears of the impassioned violence and imperial civil war which Quincy, Jr. had described. When New York City received false reports that General Gage had fired upon the city Boston, William Smith watched in horror as the city's rebels roused the "Spirit of the lower Classes" to the brink of riot.[1004] The "Affairs of this Country grow very serious," Smith lamented, for British Americans now found themselves "in the most eminent Danger of Civil War."[1005] Fictious reports of imperial warfare

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994 Josiah Quincy Jr., *Observations on the Act of Parliament Commonly Called the Boston-Port Bill; with Thoughts on Civil Society and Standing Armies* (Boston: Edes and Gill, 1774); American Antiquarian Society; Quincy Jr.'s *Observations on the Boston Port-Bill* was first published on May 14, 1774, see Norton, *1774*, 82-83.
995 Quincy Jr. *Observations on the Boston-Port Bill*, 6.
996 Ibid, 5, 8.
997 Ibid, 5, 8.
998 Ibid, 11-12.
999 Ibid, 33; At the onset of British America's civil war, Governor Gage had approximately 49,000 British regulars under his command, stationed throughout the British American colonies; Sylvia R. Frey, *The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 9.
1000 Quincy Jr. *Observations on the Boston-Port Bill*, 33.
1001 Ibid, 11, 41.
1002 Ibid, 11.
1003 Ibid, 82.
1004 William Smith, September 7, 1774, in *Historical Memoirs*, 192.
1005 Ibid.

notwithstanding, it seemed that the "greatest Harmony subsist[ed] between the King's Troops" and the people of Boston.[1006] No one, it seemed, was eager to court yet again the horrors of war.

News of such civility in Boston did not surprise Virginian Charles Lee, for despite his "abhorrence" for Parliament's "diabolical measures" against British America, he trusted Governor Gage, alongside whom he fought at the battle of Monongahela and for whom he still maintained "real affection."[1007] Lee and fellow Seven Years' War veteran Horatio Gates refused to accept that "a man so humane, so Honourable" as Thomas Gage would serve as an "instrument" of Parliament's tyranny – a "business fit only for an abandoned Desperado, or a Monster in Human Shape."[1008] Abigail Adams, however, professed no such faith in Gage's personal morality, and remained steadfast that his regulars stood ready to subject Massachusetts to "all the Horrours of a civil war" and "chains of Slavery [al]ready forged."[1009] To the rebellious inhabitants of Massachusetts, Governor Gage, like Governor Hutchinson before him, already had proven himself worthy of the moniker of traitor.[1010]

While the presence Governor Gage's standing army aroused fears of civil war, the passage of the *Québec Bill* confirmed British America's most profound terror – that Parliament had succumbed to ecclesiastical, popish tyranny.[1011] One New Yorker declared that this Catholic sympathizing law not only brought British "Popery and Tyranny" to North America, but also established a "nursery of arbitrary power" that threatened the safety and security of every British colonists.[1012] To convey the unfathomable betrayal which British Americans now felt, Paul Revere's engraved *The Mitred Minuet*, which depicted four Anglican bishops encircling a copy of the *Québec Bill* while dancing to the tune of Scottish bagpipes (see Figure 3.2).[1013] To the left of this spectacle stood Lord Bute and Lord North, above whom floated a devil, who whispered corrupted, popish advice into the prime minister's ear. The *New York Journal* reaffirmed the Catholic seduction of Lord North in a popular "lullaby" dedicated to the "Popish Québec Bill."[1014] This article then detailed the prime minister's plan to use each Anglican "church" and "chapel" to "cherish and foster [his] sweeting" – the Catholic faith.[1015] By early-spring 1775, reports emerged from New York of rebels carrying flags throughout the streets, emblazoned with "*George III. Rex, and the Liberties of America; No Popery.*"[1016] Rekindling the terror of cannon law that John Adams had stoked in opposition to Bute's loathed stamp tax, these anti-Catholic texts implored British Americans to resist the festering plague of immorality that had consumed Parliament, and now threatened to engulf all of British America.

[1006] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), August 18, 1774

[1007] Charles Lee to General Thomas Gage, 1774, in "The Lee Papers," 1:134.

[1008] Horatio Gages to Charles Lee, July 1, 1774, in the "The Lee Papers," *The Collections of the New York Historical Society* (New York: Historical Society, 1875) 1:123-124.

[1009] Abigail Adams to Catharine Sawbridge Macaulay, 1774, in *Adams Family Correspondences*, ed., L.H. Butterfield (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 1:177.

[1010] Connecticut Gazette, June 3, 1774; Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 39.

[1011] King George III did not sign the Québec Act until June 22, 1774, approximately one month after the Massachusetts Government Act and Administration of Justice Act, and approximately three weeks after the Quartering Act; Norton, *1774*, 130.

[1012] *New York Journal*, October 13, 1774; Brendan McConville, "A Deal with the Devil: Revolutionary Anti-Popery, Francophobic, and the Dilemmas of Diplomacy," in *Against Popery*, 239.

[1013] Paul Revere, *The Mitred Minuet* in the *Royal American Magazine* (Boston: Isiah Thomas, October 1774); American Antiquarian Society.

[1014] "A New Song. Supposed to have been Sung by Bloody N--h by way of Lullaby to the fondling brat, the Popish Québec Bill," *New York Journal*, October 13, 1774.

[1015] Ibid.

[1016] *Pennsylvania Evening Post,* March 11, 1775; Hattem, *Past and Prologue*, 118-119.

Figure 3.2: Paul Revere, *The Mitred Minuet.*
Boston: Isaiah Thomas, 1774.
Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

To combat Parliament's political betrayal and prevent their own destruction and moral ruin, British Americans continued to foster sentiments of intercolonial fellow-feeling. Newspapers from New York City to Williamsburg reported that Parliament's recent legislations had "inflamed" the "zeal" of all British subjects, who feared that such "injustice and cruelty" would "unsheathe" the "sword of civil war."[1017] In New York, Charity Clarke assured her cousin in London that the "title of North" shall become "as odious to Englishmen as it is to Americans," for the British empire would suffer "more by the Loss of [America's] affection than could be gained by her submission."[1018] The only truth path toward reconciliation, British America's rebels argued, was for Parliament to abandon its colonial conquest, restore their economic autonomy and political rights, and thereby rekindle the bonds of imperial fellow-feeling that had once flourished during the Seven Years' War.

To the south, one colonist hoped, with a "heart" full of affection, that his "beloved brethren in Boston and Massachusetts Bay" might receive "a glimpse of joy" upon learning of the profound "sympathy" that he and his fellow Virginians felt for them.[1019] Amid this resurgence of intercolonial fellow-feeling in late-autumn 1774, reports emerged that New Englanders' "rage for war" only had "increased," as "every town" formed "companies of cadets" to spill not tea, but the "the Blood of Tyrants."[1020] Having weathered storms of colonial disobedience since 1765, even Gage conceded

[1017] *New York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury*, December 5, 1774; *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), December 29, 1774.
[1018] Charity Clarke to Joseph Jekyll, September 10, 1774, in *In the Words of Women: The Revolutionary War and the Birth of the Nation, 1765-1799*, ed., Louise V. North, et al. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), 26.
[1019] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), September 1, 1774.
[1020] Charles Lee to Sir Charles Danvers, September 28, 1774, in "The Lee Papers," 1:136; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), October 13, 1774.

that the colonies' anti-Parliament demagogues were "determined for a Civil War" and had reduced British America to a "worse" state of political discord than he had ever seen.[1021]

By December 1774, John Adams feared that the next violent engagement between imperial regulars and British colonists would result not only in a decisive, insurmountable rift between England and America, but also the murder of thousands of British subjects.[1022] More pessimistic than her husband, Abigail remained terrified that every colonist would have to choose, in the weeks and months to come, whether they shall "die [as] the last British freemen" or "live [as] the first of British slaves."[1023] For imperial loyalists, these fears of civil war and political enslavement became all the more acute as British America's rebellious demagogues– which included John Adams – seized political power through an unlawful intercolonial legislature.

America's Congressional Cabal and the Affective Rhetoric of Deception:

As British America's rhetoric of betrayal inflamed popular passions throughout the empire, twelve colonial legislatures appointed representatives to attend a general congress in Philadelphia in autumn 1774.[1024] These delegations, imperial loyalists lamented, gathered not the greatest political minds of British America, but rather "spirited, obstinate countrymen, who have very little patience to boast" and were likely to "adopt measures that may impeded the adjustment" of "differences" between the colonies and Parliament.[1025] When the Continental Congress – a calculated misnomer intended to amplify the minimal political authority with which they acted – convened on September 5, its members immediately realized that their respective legislatures had issued almost identical instructions, and thereby reflected the compatibility of British America's regional, emotional communities of rebellion: forge an intercolonial alliance that had the power to restore British colonists' "just rights & liberties," as well as their "union" to and "harmony" with the British empire.[1026]

Despite their shared, political purpose – to avert the "Horrors of a civil War" – these congressional delegates were "strangers in a strange city," whose political prejudices unavoidably favored the local needs of their individual colonies.[1027] "[M]ost men," John Adams bemused weeks before embarking to Philadelphia, were at least "conscious that they aim at their own interest only."[1028] Whether pragmatic or pessimistic, Adams's ponderings over human nature foreshadowed the greatest obstacle for British America's insurgent congress: to develop a common, American identity – one which fostered intercolonial fellow-feeling and encouraged the sacrifice of regional interest and personal well-being in defiance of Parliament's tyranny.

[1021] General Thomas Gage to William Barrington, September 25, 1774, *Gage Correspondence*, 2:655.
[1022] John Adams to James Burgh, December 28, 1774, *Papers of John Adams*, 2:206.
[1023] Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, February 3, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondences*, 1:183-184.
[1024] Of the thirteen North American colonies that declared independence from the British empire in July 1776, only Georgia refused to send delegates to the first Continental Congress; see Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 38-40.
[1025] John Andrews to William Barrell, October 29, 1774, "John Andrews Correspondence."
[1026] For the delegation instructions "For the Province of Massachusetts-Bay," see in in *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789*, ed., C. Ford Worthington, et al. (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), 1:15; hereafter cited as *JCC*. Richard R. Beeman notes that the instructions given to each of the eleven delegations in attendance on September 5 were "strikingly similar." It is important to note, however, that while the intent of Virginia's instructions mirror those for Massachusetts ("to procure redress for the much injured province of Massachusetts-Bay, to secure British America from the ravage and ruin of arbitrary taxes, and speedily as possible to procure the return of that harmony and Union, so beneficial to the whole Empire, and so ardently desired by all British America"), the instructions for New York's delegation simply ordered their attendance, without any indication of a political purpose; see Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 87-91; "For Virginia," see *JCC* 1:23; "For New York," see *JCC* 1:19.
[1027] The Continental Congress to General Thomas Gage, October 1774, in *The Writings of Samuel Adams*, ed., Harry Alonzo Cushing (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 3:161; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 135.
[1028] John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 7, 1774, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 1:130-131.

For its first two days in session, British America's upstart congress engaged in a spirited debate regarding the procedures for voting on proposed resolutions, finally concurring that "each Colony or Province shall have one Vote."[1029] Patrick Henry, however, vehemently opposed this allocation of voting power. Hailing from the most populous colony in British America, the Virginian firebrand demanded that the value of each colony's vote be proportional to its respective population of freemen, excluding all enslaved peoples.[1030] "Will not People complain," Henry asked his fellow delegates, if "10,000 People, Virginians, have not outweighed 1,000 others?" [1031] It is "known in my Province," Henry continued, that "some other Colonies are not so numerous or rich" as Virginia, alluding to the righteous distain that his constituents would feel upon the devaluation of their political influence.[1032] "The Distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders, are no more," Henry proclaimed, for "I am not a Virginia, but an American."[1033] If every colonist represented at this congress now shared the same political identity, Henry inferred, then the political voice of each *American* must have equal representation within their congress.

An ostensible declaration of altruistic comradery and disinterested patriotism, Henry's renunciation of his Virginia identity provided rhetorical cover to further the purpose of his oration: ensuring that British America's most populous colonies determined its political trajectory. Through this deceptive rhetoric, Henry performed a not-so-subtle slight-of-hand: for if "Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders" also abandoned their regional identities and endorsed a population scaled voting system, then they – along with the people of Virginia – would monopolize the congress's political power and be able to prioritize the needs and wants of their own colonies.[1034] Henry's rhetorical prowess and impassioned plea proved quite affective, and his proposal only failed on practical grounds, as the congress lacked the necessary census data to determine the proper allotment of votes based upon each colony's population.[1035]

Despite his unapologetic advocation for Virginia's interests, Henry had uttered into existence an idea that festered for the next twenty-two months among his fellow delegates: regional loyalties and identities, in moments of unparalleled crisis, must defer to, or must be subsumed by, a collective, intercolonial one. Unsurprisingly, delegates from Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia did not awaken the next morning and refer to one another as Americans, for one cannot change personal loyalties or political identities overnight. Henry's speech, however, provided an ideological touchstone for a self-evident *American* identity; one which both was distinct from, but still subsumed within, a larger British culture. Herny's recommendation that his fellow delegates imbue this *de facto* American identity with both political and legal power subsequently informed the rhetorical duality

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[1029] September 6, 1774, in *JCC* 1:25.

[1030] John Adams, September 6, 1774, in *The Adams Diary*, 2:124-125; based on population estimates, Virginia was the most populus colony, with approximately 447,016 free and enslaved inhabitants, circa 1770. If assessing population based on white inhabitants alone, Virginia is the second most populous colony, with estimates at approximately 259,411. Estimates for Massachusetts white population circa 1770 are 261,336, beating Virginia by a mere 2,000 inhabitants. For these detailed estimates, see Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, ed., William Lemer (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1975), 2:1168. For a more detailed analysis of the trends of population growth of the British American colonies from the early-17th century through the revolutionary era, see John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America*, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, Press, 1985), 211-235.

[1031] John Adams, September 6, 1774, in *The Adams Diary*, 2:124-125.

[1032] Adams, September 6, 1774, in *The Adams Diary*, 2:124-125.

[1033] Ibid.

[1034] Assuming that Patrick Henry's use of "New Englanders" primarily refers to the inhabitants of Massachusetts, then the shared population of these four colonies represents approximately fifty-three percent of the inhabitants represented at the Continental Congress. This estimate marginally increases to fifty-five percent if only using the white populations of these twelve colonies; see Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:1168.

[1035] September 6, 1774, in *JCC* 1:25.

with which the Continental Congress first petitioned for, and then eventually demanded, the restoration of their economic autonomy and political liberty from both Parliament and king.

After seven weeks of debate, the Continental Congress made two paramount decisions: first, adopt an eleven article plan for economic nonimportation and nonexportation – popularly known as the Association, and second, convey their grievances directly to the British people and George III.[1036] To begin, John Jay drafted an *Address to the People of Great Britain*, which condemned the viciousness with which Parliament, and its apologists, had "oppressed" and "abused" the inhabitants of British America.[1037] Embracing the rhetorical power of Henry's shared colonial identity, Jay's *Address* began with a decisive and divisive proclamation: the "cause" not of the British empire, but rather of "America," was "now the object of universal attention."[1038] After reminding the British people of the "loyalty and attachment" that his fellow colonists exhibited during the Seven Years' War, Jay admonished the "system of slavery" that Parliament had inflicted upon British America, emphasizing the immorality of the stamp tax, the "exactions" of which Parliament "lavishly squandered" upon "court favorites and ministerial dependents."[1039] Jay's caustic tone intensified as he rebuked the hated *Port Bill*, which required the "thirty thousand souls" living in Boston either to beg for "charity" or to "submit" themselves to the cruel "yoke" of ministerial tyranny.[1040] To stir both fear and fellow-feeling within the hearts of the British people, Jay then described the likely devastation that would result from these immense acts of imperial corruption: if Parliament succeeded at subduing the people of British America, and then decided to "inslave" all royal subjects, no inhabitant of England should expect the newly enslaved colonists to "refuse to assist" Parliament in "reducing" the entire empire to the "same abject state" that they now suffered.[1041]

After evoking anti-Parliament hatred and eliciting a unique strain of fear-induced fellow-feeling, Jay concluded his *Address* with an appeal that every British subject labor towards imperial reconciliation. It is the "hope" of every British colonist, Jay proclaimed, that the "British Nation" – specifically those who vote in ministerial elections – may "furnish a Parliament" that will "save the violated rights of the whole empire" and "restore…harmony, friendship, and fraternal affection between all the Inhabitants of his Majesty's kingdoms and territories."[1042] It is this restoration of peace, prosperity and affective unity to the British empire, Jay concluded, for which "every true and honest American" now "ardently wish[es]."[1043] The conclusion of Jay's *Address* intentionally harkens back to the sentiments of fraternal love and imperial fellow-feeling that all Britons had shared in the twilight of the Seven Years' War. Jay's decision, however, to present himself as speaking on behalf of "every true and honest American," not those dishonest Parliamentary agents and violent imperial regulars, reaffirmed the isolation and neglect which many colonists now felt from England.

Despite Jay's emphasis of an emergent *American* identity, Richard Henry Lee and John Dickinson's *Petition of Congress to King George III* professed the colonists' unwavering attachment to both their sovereign and the *British* identity.[1044] The formation of the Continental Congress, Lee and

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[1036] October 20, 1774, in *JCC* 1:75-80; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 155-159; Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 214.

[1037] John Jay, *Address to the People of Great Britain*, in *JCC* 1:82.

[1038] Jay, *Address to the People of Great Britain*, in *JCC* 1:82.

[1039] Ibid, 1:84

[1040] Ibid, 1:86-87

[1041] Ibid, 1:88.

[1042] Ibid, 1:89-90.

[1043] Ibid.

[1044] The *Petition of Congress to King George III* had three primary authors. First, the Continental Congress dismissed Patrick Henry's version, possibly due to its "language of asperity," albeit some of the Virginian's flourishes survived to the *Petition*'s final draft. Next, Richard Henry Lee composed a draft of the *Petition* which John Dickinson of Pennsylvania

Dickinson argued, arose from British Americans' fear of "being degraded into a state of servitude" by Parliament's corrupted legislation.[1045] Laying their "grievances before the throne" of George III, this congress begged their monarch to unleash his anger – his "royal indignation" – upon those ministers whose "desperate and irritating projects of oppression" now threatened the peace and unity of the British empire.[1046] After beseeching the king's righteous rage for his subjects' perpetual suffering, Lee and Dickinson echoed the rhetoric of Patrick Henry's anti-stamp tax oration, and declared that the "hearts" of every British American felt "affectionate attachment" for their sovereign, in whose "service" they would "bleed."[1047] Embracing the rhetoric of filial adoration and imperial supplication, Lee and Dickinson concluded their *Petition* with a plea for George III to "redress" the crimes committed against his colonists, whose political desperation arose from "no other motive, than a dread of impending destruction."[1048] When read in tandem, *Address to the People of Great Britain* and the *Petition of Congress to King George III* demonstrate the rhetorical duality of British America's current, affective identity – as the Continental Congress deftly advocated for fiscal and civic rights of those rebellious *Americans* whom they represented, while simultaneously reaffirming their sincere devotion to the *British* empire.[1049]

With their business completed, the Continental Congress adjourned on October 26, 1774 – the same day which they endorsed their *Petition to King George III* and five days after they approved their *Address to the People of Great Britain*. Within weeks, political tracts flooded colonial presses, as British America's rebellious colonists further propagated their affective rhetorics of Parliamentary betrayal and ministerial tyranny. Imperial loyalists, however, began their own impassioned, rhetorical campaign, which condemned the Continental Congress as an entity of political deception that had led astray the naïve inhabitants of British America. For the next six-months, the people of Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts fiercely debated whether this *ad hoc* congress truly represented the economic interests, political loyalties, and sincere affection of "every true and honest American."

When Thomas Jefferson's *A Summary View of the Rights of British America* began to circulate throughout the colonies in early-autumn 1774, rebels and loyalists alike misconstrued the intentions of the Continental Congress.[1050] Despite its affecting, eloquent prose, Virginia's extralegal legislature had refused to endorse either the "bold assertion of American rights" or the "bold denial of the rights of the king and Parliament" presented within *A Summary View*.[1051] Although Jefferson never submitted his tract to the assembly in Philadelphia, several Virginians anonymously published it, conflating, and thereby intentionally misrepresenting, its inflammatory, extremist rhetoric with the pragmatic, conciliatory objectives of America's rebellious congress.

A Summary View began with a thorough account of the "unwarrantable encroachments and usurpations" that the king's colonists had suffered under Parliament's "deliberate and systematic plan" to "reduc[e]" British America to a state of "slavery."[1052] After eliciting fear of ministerial

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then revised. It is the Lee-Dickinson collaborative version of the *Petition* that the Congress finally ratified and approved for submission to King George III, see Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 165-168.

[1045] Lee and Dickinson, *Petition of Congress to King George III*, *JCC* 1:118.

[1046] Ibid, *JCC*, 1:116, 118

[1047] Ibid, 1:119.

[1048] Ibid, 1:120.

[1049] Brendan McConville argues that "the imperial crisis between 1764 and 1774 can be understood as a flight to the king's love and justice." The *Petition of Congress to King George III*, therefore, should be understood as one of the last earnest attempts of rebellious British Americans to beseech royal intervention and mercy; see McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, 251.

[1050] Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 88-90.

[1051] Ibid.

[1052] Thomas Jefferson, *A Summary View of the Rights of British America* (Williamsburg: Rind, 1774), 5, 11; Library Company of Pennsylvania

tyranny, Jefferson stoked "just anger" towards the *Restraining Act*, which temporarily suspended New York's legislature and, through obedience to it, had required the colony's inhabitants to abandon their "principles of common sense.[1053] British Americans should be enraged, Jefferson argued, at the prospect that their colonial "governments [may] be dissolved, [and] their property annihilated…[by] the imperious breath of a body of men, whom they never saw, in whom they never confided, and over whom they [held] no powers of punishment or removal."[1054] The subsequent dissolutions of both Massachusetts and Virginia's legislatures only reaffirmed Jefferson's belief that submission to arbitrary laws would result in every British America waking up one-day to "suddenly" discover themselves "slaves" of a despotic parliament.[1055] Penned by a wealthy enslaver who understood the profound horrors of chattel slavery, *A Summary View* illustrates, yet again, that the rhetorical siren-song of political enslavement proved too affective, and therefore effective, to be ignored.

Although *A Summary View* never explicitly encouraged British Americans to participate in popular violence against royal officials or imperial loyalists, Jefferson worked to elicit sorrow for the suffering people of Boston. Parliament's tea tax, Jefferson argued, greatly harmed the financial stability of Boston's merchants, who now "found themselves and their families" dependent upon the "charities" of the "world" for "subsistence."[1056] Boston's tea riot, therefore, arose not from animosity, but rather desperation – as the city's inhabitants hoped that their materially destructive protest might rescue their economic self-sufficiency, restore their civic liberty, and prevent their own starvation. Though its masterful application of British America's rhetoric of betrayal, *A Summary View* not only refuted imperial loyalists' depiction of Boston's tea riot as a symptom of colonial anarchy, but rather blamed Parliament's hatred for British liberties and lust for political power as the inciting causes for Boston's most recent episode of impassioned, popular violence.

Entrenched in the rhetorics of fear, hatred, rage, sorrow, and betrayal, *A Summary View* concluded with a plea for the king to intercede on his colonies' behalf. "Let not the Name of George the third," Jefferson proclaimed, "be a blot in the page of history."[1057] The king's "felicity and future fame," Jefferson continued, shall rely upon whether he prevents *his* Parliament from "sacrificing the rights of one part of the empire to the inordinate desires of another."[1058] If their sovereign listened to the "fervent prayer of all British America" and "establish[ed] fraternal love and harmony through the whole empire," then he would "restore the stability of his colonies and secure the loyalty of his subjects" to the "latest ages of time."[1059] By appealing to the paternal mercy and love of George III, *A Summary View* sought to emphasize the colonies' integral value to the king's empire while ensuring that every British colonist receive the royal protections due to them as faithful subjects of the crown.

British American loyalists concurred with *A Summary View's* seemingly sincere desire to facilitate imperial reconciliation, but Jefferson's justifications for Boston's multiple riots proved a bridge to far to cross. Pride in the laws and orderly governance of the British empire was a central characteristic of imperial loyalists' emotional community, and many refused to forgive, let alone condone, the impassioned violence which their rebellious neighbors had committed, and still

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[1053] Jefferson, *A Summary View*, 12; for a more detailed analysis of the role of "just anger" in British America's affective discourse, see Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 385 ff; for a detailed analysis of Jefferson's use of anger as both a teenager and a young adult, see Kenneth A. Lockridge's *On the Sources of Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace Books of William Byrd and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 47-74.
[1054] Jefferson, *A Summary View*, 12.
[1055] Ibid.
[1056] Ibid, 13-14.
[1057] Ibid, 22.
[1058] Ibid, 23.
[1059] Ibid.

threatened to commit, in defiance of Parliament. The Virginia Council, under the leadership of imperial loyalist John Blair, declared that true, faithful subjects of the British empire "can no longer forbear to express [their] Abhorrence and Detestation of that licentious and ungovernable Spirit" that now "misleads the once happy People of this Country."[1060] Blair conceded that Parliament must address the just "Grievances" of British America, but cautioned his fellow colonists that they would not achieve any legislative "Redress" through the Continental Congress, as it "tend[ed] to exasperate and inflame rather than to reconcile the Differences that so unhappily subsist[ed]."[1061] Endorsing British America's insurgent congress, Blair concluded, would result only in further discord, suffering, and bloodshed.

A Dialogue, Between a Southern Delegate and His Spouse reaffirmed the popularity of such loyalist anxieties. First published in New York, this fictious discourse depicts a southern wife – likely from Virginia – rebuking her husband's misguided participation in the deceptive Continental Congress.[1062] The rebels who comprised this congress, this Virginian wife bemoaned, did not beg for Parliament's "Justice, or Pity," in the aftermath of their destructive tea riots, but rather threatened its ministers "like a Pack, of Banditti" while "breath[ing] nothing, but Insult, Rebellion, and Treason."[1063] Despondent that her husband might be "ruin'd, or taken, or killed in a War" for serving in this legislative "Cabal," this loving wife implored him to tender his resignation.[1064] Whether "prompted by Truth, or by Lies," the congress's actions were but a "little short, of High Treason."[1065] If British Americans continued "to hate" and refused to make "peace" with the British empire, whose power they should "fear," then they shall be "forever, forever undone" by a conflict that will "at last end in blood."[1066] Chastising the anti-Parliament hate which British America's rebellious demagogues had nurtured over the past decade, this Virginian loyalist forewarned that Britain's faithful subjects must rebuke their insurgent congress, reaffirm their obedience to the laws of Parliament, and beg for the mercy of George III, lest they suffer the full might of their sovereign's righteous wrath.

A greater threat, however, awaited imperial loyalists than the king's fierce justice. By late-September, "enrag'd" rebels had begun to accost those imperial loyalists who provided supplies to British regulars stationed throughout the colonies, declaring that these soldiers' deaths would "do God service."[1067] Words swiftly transformed into action, as vigilante committees in Alexandria, Virginia, Duchess County, New York, and Falmouth, Massachusetts began to tar and feather both the property and the body of those imperial loyalists who either refused to sign, or violated the terms of, the Continental Congress's Association.[1068] Previously, the punishment of tarring and feathering had been restricted primarily to visible agents of Parliament, who opposed the political objectives of British America's rebellious colonists. By late-spring 1775, however, this brutal punishment had become a tool of political degradation, applied to even the most passive of imperial loyalists, with the intent of coercing their political submission.[1069]

[1060] Virginia Council, *To all the Good People of Virginia* (Williamsburg, 1775); Library Company of Philadelphia.
[1061] Ibid.
[1062] Mary V.V., *A Dialogue, Between a Southern Delegate and His Spouse, on His Return from the Grand Continental Congress: A Fragment, Inscribed to the Married Ladies of America by their Most Sincere, and Affectionate Friend, and Servant, Mary V.V.* (New York: Rivington, 1774); Massachusetts Historical Society.
[1063] Mary V.V., *A Dialogue, Between a Southern Delegate and His Spouse,* 11-12.
[1064] Ibid, 10.
[1065] Ibid.
[1066] Ibid, 11-14.
[1067] John Andrews to William Barrell, September 28, 1774, "John Andrews Correspondence."
[1068] Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 214.
[1069] Ibid, 216-217. Virginians had "tarred and feathers" and imperial loyalists in March 1775 for simply "disrespecting" one of the members of the colony's committees of safety. Flippantly, Madison further observed that the people of New York should employ this punishment more regularly, for if they did they would not have to suffer imperial loyalists who

Figure 3.3: Philip Dawe, *The Bostonian's Paying the Excise-Man, or Tarring & Feathering*. London: R. Ayer and J. Bennett, 1775. Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Despite its effectiveness as a tool of public intimidation, such visceral acts of symbolic and corporal violence stunted English sympathy for the plight of British America. In October 1774 and February 1775, London cartoonist Philip Dawe illustrated the repulsive cruelty of British American rebels in *The Bostonian's Paying the Excise-Man, or Tarring & Feathering* (see Figure 3.3), and *The Alternative of Williams-Burg* (see Figure 3.4).[1070] The first of these engravings – *The Bostonian's Paying the Excise-Man* – portrayed the tarring and feathering of customs officer John Malcom.[1071] Not an isolated incident, Dawe interpreted Boston's assault of Malcom as the culmination of a decade's long plot to incite rebellion against Parliament. To render such conspiratorial politics through his

"insult the whole colony and Continent with impunity!" James Madison to William Bradford, March 1775, the *Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series*, ed., J.C.A. Stagg (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 1:141.

[1070] Philip Dawe, *The Bostonian's Paying the Excise-Man, or Tarring & Feathering* (London: R Sayer and J. Bennett, 1775); Philip Dawe, *The Alternative of Williams-Burg* (London: R Sayer and J. Bennett, 1775); both held at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

[1071] Dawe, *The Bostonian's Paying the Excise-Man, or Tarring & Feathering.*

engraving, Dawe – like Revere – deployed visual simultaneity, and represented Boston's tea riot as contemporaneous to the tarring and feathering of Malcom. To accentuate the corrupted, premediated nature of these actions, Dawe adorned Boston's Liberty Tree with both the noose that the enraged mob had tightened around Malcom's neck and an inverted copy of the stamp tax – the law which first instigated Boston's hateful defiance of imperial authority.[1072]

Figure 3.4: Philip Dawe, *The Alternative of Williams-Burg*
London: R. Ayer and J. Bennett, 1775.
Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Dawe then intensified his condemnation of British America's rebellious colonists in *The Alternative of Williams-Burg*, which portrayed Virginia's so-called "Sons of Liberty" as forcing the king's loyal subjects to sign – under the duress of knifepoint – the Association.[1073] To deter imperial loyalists from violating these economic prohibitions and exporting their tobacco to England, Virginia's rebels had erected a gibbet, from which they hung "A Cure for the Refractory" – a barrel of pitch and a bag of goose-feathers.[1074] Impairing the affective appeals of Jay's *Address to the People of*

[1072] Dawe, *The Bostonian's Paying the Excise-Man, or Tarring & Feathering.*
[1073] Dawe, *The Alternative of Williams-Burg.*
[1074] Ibid.

Great Britain, Dawe's *Alternative of Williams-Burg* reaffirmed a foundational argument of imperial loyalism – that the Continental Congress represented not the popular will of British America, but rather the immoral desires of a few fear-mongering demagogues, whose impassioned rhetoric had cajoled many of George III's loyal subjects into committing egregious acts of political intimidation.

The same "Virginia and Massachusetts madmen" who had incited such popular violence, New York loyalists believed, had sown the seeds of discontent which now blossomed and threatened to "render" their own legislature "useless."[1075] To stave off such insurgency, a group Anglican ministers – including Thomas Bradbury Chandler, Charles Inglis, and Samuel Seabury – formed "The Club," which reviewed "all publications" in New York City to "obviate the evil influence" of British America's rebellious discourse.[1076] "All reasonable Americans," Chandler argued in *A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans*, must reject those "obstinate, hot-headed Zealots" in the Continental Congress who falsely proclaimed that Boston "suffer[ed] in the common cause of American liberty" and now foolishly encouraged all British Americans to rush headlong towards their "ruin and destruction."[1077] Unlike Henry's self-evident American identity, Chander's conceptualization of "reasonable Americans" functions to reinforce British colonists' imperial identity, subtly decrying the rebellious rhetoric of distinction. Echoing the arguments put forth in *A Dialogue, Between a Southern Delegate and His Spouse*, Chandler concluded that the only sensible path forward for British America was to abandon its futile defiance and submit, voluntary, to Parliament's lawful authority.[1078]

Samuel Seabury continued this line of argumentation in *Free Thoughts, on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress* – a scathing condemnation of the extralegal legislature's inept political maneuvering and "deep scheme of Rebellion."[1079] Far from addressing the systemic origins of British America's current "confusion and discord," the Continental Congress had "taken not one step that tended to peace" with Britain.[1080] Even worse, Seabury accused the congress of impropriety and deception, as it had "either ignorantly misunderstood, carelessly neglected, or basely betrayed the interests of all the Colonies" by implementing the Association.[1081] This act of political and economic defiance, Seabury argued, would only "alienate the affections of the people of Great Britain" and subject colonial merchants to the same fiscal hardships that now plagued the people of Boston.[1082] To protect their rights and liberties, British Americans must rely entirely upon Parliamentary law and "due administration of justice" in royal courts, not the will of a hateworthy congress which had seized power by exploiting colonial suffering.[1083]

[1075] Samuel Seabury, *A View of the Controversy Between great-Britain and her Colonies* (New York: James Rivington, 1774), 17; American Antiquarian Society.

[1076] Samuel Seabury, "Petition to the Loyalist Claims Commission," October 20, 1783, in "American Loyalist Collection" MMS, 41:560; New York Public Library. Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution*, 250; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 113. For the Club's response to the *Québec Bill*, see Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 104-113. It is worth nothing that Seabury argues that New York began publishing these political tracts, which "corrupt the principles of the people with regard to Government, and to weaken their attachment to the Constitution of this Country both in Church and State" contemporaneous to his ordination in 1753; see Seabury, "Petition to the Loyalist Claims Commission," 41:559.

[1077] Thomas Bradbury Chandler, *A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans* (New York: Rivington, 1774), 18-19, 47-48; American Antiquarian Society.

[1078] Ibid, 45, 75.

[1079] Samuel Seabury, *Free Thoughts, on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress* (New York: John Rivington, 1774); American Antiquarian Society. Seabury argues that the first congress at Philadelphia endorsed political rebellion through their adoption of the "Suffolk Resolves"; see Seabury, "Petition to the Loyalist Claims Commission," 41:563.

[1080] Seabury, *Free Thoughts*, 3.

[1081] Ibid, 3, 5-6

[1082] Ibid.

[1083] Ibid 16.

After chastising such gross abuses of intercolonial fellow-feeling, Seabury expressed his fears that British America's rebellious demagogues might persuade the people of New York to bring "the most abject slavery [up]on [them]selves."[1084] Enraged at the congress's willingness to incite both "Anarchy and Violence" to fortify its own *de facto* power, Seabury summoned a "plague" upon all the "Delegates, Congresses, Committees, Riots, Mobs, Insurrections, [and] Associations" that had arisen within the colonies.[1085] "If I must be enslaved," Seabury lamented, then "let it be by a King at least, and not by a parcel of upstart lawless Committee-men."[1086] It is better to be "devoured by the jaws of a lion" than to be "gnawed to death by rats and vermin."[1087] Despite his impassioned degradation of New York's irresponsible and self-interested rebels, Seabury concluded *Free Thoughts* with a genuine plea that every British subject reject the lies of this insurgent congress and seek justice and amelioration from the ministers of Parliament, who would "press [the colonists] to their bosoms, to their hearts," if only given the opportunity.[1088]

Well received among imperial loyalists, *Free Thoughts* suffered a stern rebuke from one of New York's youngest and most adept rhetorical agitators. If British Americans ignored the warnings of the Continental Congress and accepted their status as "vassals of their fellow-subjects in Great Britain," Alexander Hamilton argued in *A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress*, then such voluntarily submission would ensure a "yoke…peculiarly grievous and intolerable."[1089] Challenging Seabury's characterization of the Association, Hamilton suggested that this agreement was more reasonable than Parliament's *Port Bill*, which arbitrarily "inflicted punishment upon the whole province" of Massachusetts instead of "discover[ing]" and discipling "the perpetrators" of Boston's tea riot.[1090] Parliament's sanctions against Boston, Hamilton dryly remarked, "may be justice, but it looks so much like cruelty," that any "man of a human heart would be more apt to call it the latter."[1091] Berating both the inhumanity and callousness of those imperial loyalists who defended Parliament, Hamilton implored his fellow New Yorkers to join "with the rest of America" in their rebellion against ministerial tyranny.[1092] If the inhabitants of every colony united under the Continental Congress, Hamilton concluded, then it shall "preserve" British America's "liberties inviolate."[1093] If each colony seeks "redress" from Parliament "alone," Hamilton warned, then they shall "fall a prey to [their] enemies" and "repent [their] folly for as long as [they] live."[1094]

Like their brethren in New York, Massachusetts's imperial loyalists firmly rejected Hamilton's premise that Parliament had become the enemy of British America. Presbyterian minister Samuel William's *A Discourse on the Love of Country* reiterated Chandler's argument that the Continental Congress had exaggerated the abuses which British America had suffered since in the end of the Seven Years' War.[1095] In a "despotic government," William argued, the only method by which a "Tyrant" may "regulate and manage the people" is "Fear" – specifically the populace's

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[1084] Seabury, *Free Thoughts*, 18, 21-22.
[1085] Ibid, 18.
[1086] Ibid, 19.
[1087] Ibid.
[1088] Ibid, 23.
[1089] Alexander Hamilton, *A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress* (New York: James Rivington, 1774), 7, 11-12; American Antiquarian Society.
[1090] Hamilton, *Full Vindication,* 25-26.
[1091] Ibid*,* 25-26.
[1092] Ibid, 35.
[1093] Ibid.
[1094] Ibid.
[1095] Samuel William, *A Discourse on the Love of our Country* (Salem: Samuel and Eben Hall, 1775), 13; American Antiquarian Society.

"servile dread of his power."[1096] Contrary to the hyperbolic arguments of Massachusetts's rebels, all British subjects stilled lived under "a free government," which they empowered through "Love of [their] country."[1097] After reminding his readers of the "mutual affection, friendship, and confidence" that once "united" Britain and her colonies, William urged every British American to reject the "fears, murmurs, and unusual commotions [that] now prevail" and rather defend the "interest and welfare" of their "country" by fighting for reconciliation.[1098]

As William sought to rekindle Massachusetts's sentiments of imperial fellow-feeling, Daniel Leonard and Jonathan Sewall stoked animosity for and fear of the Continental Congress's arbitrary political powers. [1099] Between December 12, 1774 and April 3, 1775, Leonard and Sewall published seventeen epistles in the *Massachusetts Gazette and Boston Post-Boy* – under the pseudonym Massachusettensis – in which they lambasted the dangerous insurgency which Massachusetts's rebels had fomented over the past decade, as well as the deceitful rhetoric of British America's unlawful congress.[1100] Rebellion against the sovereign or his government, Massachusettensis explained, was the "most atrocious offence that can be perpetrated by man," excepting those sins committed directly against God.[1101] Refusal to pay taxes, assaulting imperial regulars, destroying royal tea – these smaller acts of rebellion, despite their illegality, now paled in comparison to the people's support of the Continental Congress. To enrich their own purses and aggrandize their political power, Massachusettensis argued, these treasonous delegates enacted harmful economic embargos against Britain and duped their fellow colonists into believing that Parliament had rejected their "humble and reasonable petitions" for redress with the utmost "contempt."[1102] Every loyal British subject in Massachusetts, Leonard and Sewall proclaimed, must feel hatred for and fear of the Continental Congress's unbound authority. If these "popular demagogues" continued to wield the *vox populi* to condemn Britain as an "alien enemy," then all of Massachusetts would suffer, as "rebels and traitors," in unjust "proportion to the aggravated crime" of a few self-interested insurrectionists.[1103]

To defend the Continental Congress and to rebuke the "wicked policy of the Tories," John Adams published twelve rebuttal epistles in the *Boston Gazette.*[1104] Under the pseudonym Novanglus, Adams argued that Massachusettensis intentionally misrepresented British America's rightful "defence" of its "liberties" as acts of "treason and rebellion.[1105] Defiance of arbitrary laws constituted neither treason nor rebellion, Adams explained, for the "fealty and allegiance of Americans" were "undoubtedly due to the person of king George the third," not to England's "laws[,] parliaments, lords or commons."[1106] Further, the delegates of the Continental Congress never once had denounced their loyalty to, nor their affection for, George III. By invoking the

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[1096] William, *Love of our Country*, 13

[1097] Ibid.

[1098] Ibid, 25-27.

[1099] Both Leonard and Sewall had proven themselves loyal supporters of General Thomas Gage's governorship by September 1774. Under the Massachusetts Government Act, Parliament authorized Gage to bypass the colony's legislature and appoint his own governor's council – a position in which Leonard eagerly accepted. As for Sewall, he served as the colony's Attorney General under the governorships of both Thomas Hutchinson and Thomas Gage, cementing his image as an imperial loyalist; see Norton, *1774*, 101, 164, 181-182.

[1100] Norton, *1774*, 301.

[1101] Daniel Leonard and Jonathan Sewall, "Massachusettensis IX" in *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Post-Boy*, February 6, 1775.

[1102] Leonard and Sewall, "Massachusettensis XVI," in *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Post-Boy*, March 27, 1775.

[1103] Ibid, "Massachusettensis IX," in *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Post-Boy*, February 6, 1775; "Massachusettensis XVI," in *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Post-Boy*, March 27, 1775; "Massachusettensis XVII," in *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Post-Boy*, April 3, 1775.

[1104] John Adams, "Novanglus I," in *Boston Gazette*, January 23, 1775.

[1105] John Adams, "Novanglus III," in *Boston Gazette*, February 6, 1775.

[1106] John Adams, "Novanglus IX," in *Boston Gazette*, March 27, 1775.

adoration and obedience that every British American felt for their sovereign, Adams circumvented Massachusettensis accusation of political treason.

The hypothetical affective schism which imperial loyalists and colonial rebels had debated in Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia seemed all but inevitable after April 19, 1775, as British blood soaked the fields of Concord, Massachusetts. When the Continental Congress reconvened in Philadelphia three weeks later, its delegates faced their most dangerous dilemma: how to remain loyal to George III while defending themselves, in armed combat, from Parliament's standing army. On May 29, John Adams wrote to Abigail in "good spirit," overjoyed to report that congress voted to "support Massachusetts" in its armed resistance of ministerial tyranny.[1107] Abigail, however, did not share her husband's optimism: while he debated legislation in Pennsylvania, she saw the fruits of distrust and division finally ripen, and then rot, in Massachusetts. When Governor Gage decreed martial law in Boston, Abigail watched in terror as imperial regulars exhibited an unprecedented "Spirit of Malice and revenge" towards the civilians whom they now oversaw.[1108] With Boston yet again a garrisoned town – seemingly days away from civil war – Abigail's somber reply to John's optimistic letter conveyed a horrifying question, one which likely plagued the thoughts of most British American rebels: how long might they suffer, without recompense, as subjects of George III's decaying, corrupted empire?

Independence, Symbolic Regicide, and the Affective Schism of British America:

British America now rested upon a political powder keg. In the days before the skirmish at Concord, reports had emerged that a group of New Englanders had pressured an imperial loyalist to "damn the King" – an unheard-of provocation – and when he refused, these colonial rebels "interrogated [him] after the manner of the *Spanish* and *Portugal* inquisitions."[1109] Violent intimidation, coupled with the continued popularity of tarring and feathering throughout British America, had exacerbated imperial loyalists' fears that the "influence of King-Killing Republicans" now actively encouraged the pursuit of "American liberty."[1110] Trapped in an inescapable quagmire, the Continental Congress had to oversee an armed campaign to expel Gage's regulars from Boston while simultaneously refuting the all-the-more believable allegation of imperial treason.
To achieve these conflicting objectives, congress first authorized the creation of an "American continental army" – comprised of militiamen from Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.[1111] By endorsing this insurgent military force, the Continental Congress had reinforced the growing belief that it desired to "forge a truly *American* national identity" and establish itself as independent legislative government.[1112] To refute accusations of independency, justify their martial self-defense, and reaffirm their desire to reconcile with the British empire, the Continental Congress then commissioned two political tracts: a *Declaration Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of their Taking Up Arms*, written by Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, and an *Olive Branch Petition*, which the congress sent directly to George III.[1113]

[1107] John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 29, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondences*, 1:207.
[1108] Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 16, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondences*, 1:247-248.
[1109] Anonymous to James Rivington, April 1, 1775, in *American Archives, 4th Series*, 2:252-253; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 130.
[1110] Ibid; Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and Enemies," 217-221.
[1111] Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 226-227.
[1112] Ibid.
[1113] John Dickinson and Thomas Jefferson, *Declaration Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms*, (Philadelphia: Bradfords, 1775); American Antiquarian Society. For a detailed analysis of Dickinson and Jefferson's respective roles in drafting this declaration, see Beeman, *Our Lives, Or Fortunes*, 247-250; Jane E. Calvert, *Quaker Constitutionalism and the Political Thought of John Dickinson*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 233-234; for the *Olive Branch Petition*, see *JCC* 2:158-162.

The relentless abuses that British America had suffered since the end of the Seven Years' War, a *Declaration of Taking Up Arms* argued, emerged from Parliament's "inordinate passion" for "unjustifiable" legislative authority.[1114] Parliament sought such arbitrary power, Jefferson and Dickinson further explained, for the "cruel and impolitic purpose of enslaving" the people of British America.[1115] The "intemperate rage" which Britain's corrupted ministers felt towards its colonies, coupled with their newfound comfort in the shedding of British blood, had forced the Continental Congress to escalate from "reason to arms."[1116] Rather than protecting the king's peace, Gage's imperial regulars now separated "wives…from their husbands[, and] children from their parents," "butchered" their fellow Britons, and "reduced" Boston to a state of "deplorable distress."[1117] There was no doubt, Jefferson and Dickinson proclaimed, that Parliament desired the "destruction and devastation" of not simply Boston, but all of British America.[1118]

Parliament's unrestrained brutality, Jefferson and Dickinson continued, ensured that every British colonist soon would "feel" the torment of ministerial "vengeance."[1119] When subjected to the "calamities of fire, sword, and famine," every British American must choose either "submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers, or resistance by force."[1120] With "hearts fortified" and a "union [that] is perfect," British Americans had "taken up arms" for their collective self-defense, resolving, "with one mind," to "dye Free-men rather than live as slaves."[1121] Tapping into the well-trodden rhetorics of justified hatred, pragmatic fear, visceral suffering, and fraternal love, Jefferson and Dickinson implored every British American to embrace the bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling and affirm their active membership in their emotional community of rebellion. Despite its appeals for intercolonial affection and armed rebellion, a *Declaration of Taking Up Arms* reassured all British subjects that this opposition to both ministerial and martial tyranny was not intended to "dissolve" their "Union" with the British empire, which every colonist still "sincerely wish[ed] to see restored."[1122] Rather, the Continental Congress promised to "relieve the empire from the calamities of civil war," and "lay [their arms] down," once Parliament had abandoned its vile efforts.[1123]

To further temper the bellicose rhetoric of a *Declaration of Taking Up Arms*, congress approved a pacific, heart-felt plea to George III. This humble *Olive Branch Petition* invoked not only righteous hatred for Parliament, the "fatal source" of the "unhappy differences between Great Britain and [its] colonies," but also filial love for the king.[1124] Beseeching their sovereign to ease "the suffering of [his] loyal colonists," these rebellious delegates fiercely proclaimed that their "breasts retain[ed] too tender a regard" for the British empire than to "request" any "reconciliation" that would be "inconsistent with her dignity or her welfare."[1125] Bemoaning Parliament's most recent transgressions in Boston, which had "oppress[ed]" the "hearts" of every British colonist with "unspeakable grief," the Continental Congress laid their hopes for royal intercession and mercy before the throne of George III.[1126] A renewed appeal for imperial reconciliation, congress's *Olive Branch Petition*, in conjunction with its *Declaration of Taking Up Arms*, had announced – without

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[1114] Dickinson and Jefferson, *Declaration of Taking Up Arms*, 3-4.
[1115] Ibid, 3-4.
[1116] Ibid.
[1117] Ibid, 10.
[1118] Ibid.
[1119] Ibid.
[1120] Ibid, 10-11.
[1121] Ibid, 12-13
[1122] Ibid, 11-12.
[1123] Ibid, 13.
[1124] *Olive Branch Petition*, in *JCC* 2:158-159; Beeman, 251-253.
[1125] Ibid.
[1126] Ibid, 2:160.

hesitancy – the unwavering requirements for belonging to British America's emotional community of rebellion: take up arms against the agents of ministerial tyranny, but remain steadfast in their devotion to their beloved king.

Beginning with the stamp tax of 1765, British America's rebellious orchestra played an intentional, affective melody: hatred for and fear of ministerial tyranny, visceral displays of colonial suffering, sorrow, and grief, justified expressions of political rage, profound sentiments of imperial and intercolonial fellow-feeling, and unwavering adoration for and hope in the royal mercy of George III, who had defended his colonists from the dangers of political enslavement. For a decade, the printing presses hummed, the rhetoric disseminated, and the symphony continued. When Parliament conceived of a new, dissonant coda with which to end British America's third taxation crisis, it temporarily disrupted the rebellious orchestra's affective harmony. Despite such set-backs, British Americans improvised a new overture of ministerial betrayal, through which they now demanded the contradictory right to dictate the terms of their imperial loyalty. British America's new affective concert, however, struck a sour note and, to the shock of every royal subject, Britain's revered monarch finally decreed that the music must stop.

The inhabitants of British America, the George III proclaimed on August 23, 1775, had been "misled by dangerous and ill designing Men," had "forget[en]" their "Allegiance" to the British empire, and worst of all, had engaged in "an open and avowed Rebellion."[1127] The king then ordered his "obedient and loyal Subjects" to assist his royal officers in "suppress[ing]" such sedition and declared that the "Authors, Perpetrators, and Abettors of such traitorous designs," once apprehended, would suffer just "Punishment" for the distress they had inflicted upon the British empire.[1128] Neither ambiguous nor hesitant, George III had declared the delegates of the Continental Congress, and all who supported them, traitors to the British crown.

The king's accusation of imperial sedition did not immediately dissolve the bonds of loyalty and affection that British American rebels felt toward their sovereign. The "Enemies" of British America, John Jay remarked in early-December 1775, had worked diligently both to "sow the Seeds of Dissension" and to "weaken" the sentiments of imperial fellow-feeling upon which the colonies' "Salvation from Tyranny" now "depended."[1129] Although Jay previously had acknowledged the emergence of a uniquely American affective identity within his *Address to the People of Great Britain*, he refuted the "ungenerous & groundless Charge" that he and his fellow congressional delegates desired either "Independence, or a total Separation" from Britain.[1130] The impact of such fervent denials, however, quickly dissipated within British America's public sphere, as a revolutionary polemics proposed not simply the feasibility, but rather the necessity, of colonial independence.

First published in January 1776, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* unequivocally argued that the British empire, by laying its colonies "desolate with Fire and Sword," had transformed the "cause of America" into the "cause of all mankind."[1131] "No truly natural or religious reason" existed, Paine argued, for "the distinction of men into Kings and Subjects," and the British empire – through its "eight civil wars and nineteen rebellions" under thirty-two different sovereigns – had exemplified the irrational and volatile nature of monarchy.[1132] *Common Sense* further posited that British America

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[1127] King George III, *A Proclamation, For Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition* (Boston: John Howe, 1775); Massachusetts Historical Society; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 276-278.
[1128] King George III, *A Proclamation, For Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition*.
[1129] John Jay, "Proof That the Colonies Do Not Aim at Independence," December 9, 1775, in *The Selected Papers of John Jay*, ed., Elizabeth M. Nuxoll (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 1:174-175.
[1130] Ibid.
[1131] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense: An Address to the Inhabitants of America* in *Thomas Paine: Common Sense, the Crisis & Other Writings from the American Revolution*, ed., Eric Foner. (New York: Library of American Classics, 2015), 5-6.
[1132] Paine, *Common Sense*, 12; 18-19.

"would have flourished as much, and probably much more," if the powers of Europe had nothing "to do with her" and the burden of arbitrary government never had descended upon its lands.[1133]

Despite its unrelenting condemnations of monarchy, Paine deeply grieved the loss of the empire into which he was born: "No man was a warmer wisher for reconciliation than myself, before the fatal nineteenth of April 1775…[yet afterwards] I rejected the hardened, sullen tempered Pharaoh of England for ever."[1134] Love and adoration had transformed into "disdain" for this "wretch," who with the "pretended title of FATHER OF HIS PEOPLE, [could] unfeelingly hear of their slaughter, and composedly sleep with their blood upon his soul."[1135] It was not the cruelties of Parliament's corrupted ministers, Paine concluded, but rather the betrayal of George III – the beloved king who finally revealed himself to be a hateworthy tyrant – that necessitated British Americans to commit symbolic regicide and declare themselves a free, independent nation-state. *Common Sense*, however, concluded with a pragmatic warning to all of British America: sever their bonds of imperial fellow-feeling and royal adoration quickly, for "the longer it is delayed, the harder it will be to accomplish."[1136]

Within weeks of its publication, *Common Sense*'s extreme rhetoric had informed the political discourse with which the Continental Congress, and therefore British America, debated independence.[1137] British Americans "must either be independent, or be reduced to the most abject state of slavery," one devotee of *Common Sense* argued in the *New York Journal*, for Parliament and the king *himself* had provided indisputable, "glaring proofs" of their "barbarous cruelty."[1138] The ever-cautious John Adams critiqued *Common Sense*'s excessive "attempts upon the Passions" of the British people, yet conceded that, once the hyperbolic rhetoric had been set aside, Paine's pamphlet accurately described both the "Abilities of America" and "the Difficulty of a Reconciliation" with its empire.[1139] Not all, however, agreed with Paine's logic. *Common Sense* had caused "a great noise" throughout Virginia, Nicholas Cresswell observed, and its "Lies, Calumny, and Treason" were "[o]ne of the vilest things that ever [had been] published in the world."[1140] For much of British America, James Warren observed, "Independency" remained a "Hobgoblin," which "fright[ened] more people than raw head and Blood Bones."[1141] Even the most optimistic of imperial loyalists now "dreaded a declaration of Independence" more "than death" itself.[1142]

In the wake of *Common Sense*'s publication, these popular fears of British America's independence took a more prominent role in loyalist pamphleteers' affective rhetoric. In *The Deceiver Unmasked; or Loyalty and Interested United*, New York's Charles Inglis scorned the "artful, insidious and

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[1133] Paine, *Common Sense*, 12; 18-19.
[1134] Ibid, 28-29.
[1135] Ibid, 29.
[1136] Ibid, 49.
[1137] Trish Loughran, in *The Republic in Print*, persuasively argues that both the contemporary and scholarly estimations of *Common Sense*'s initial print circulation, approximately 100,000 to 150,000 copies, are gross overestimations. Printed, and reprinted, in Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, *Common Sense* did not receive universal distribution, and relied either on newspapers printing excerpts of the pamphlet or interpersonal circulation. The locality of publication, however, ensured that all delegates of the Continental Congress had access to *Common Sense*, but hindered those living in the western and southern regions of North America from engaging immediately, or fully, in this rhetorical debate. For further analysis, see Loughran, *Republic in Print*, 40-43; 47-48.
[1138] *New York Journal*, February 22, 1776.
[1139] John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 19, 1776, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 1:363.
[1140] Nicolas Cresswell, January 17, 1776, in *A Man Apart: The Journal of Nicolas Cresswell, 1774-1781*, ed. By Harold B. Gill Jr. and George M. Curtis III (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 104.
[1141] James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, April 15, 1776, in *A Study in Dissent: The Warren-Gerry Correspondence, 1776-1792*, ed., C. Harvey Gardiner (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1968), 18.
[1142] Joseph Hawley to Elbridge Gerry, May 1, 1776, in "Elbridge Gerry Letters," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society.

pernicious" rhetoric with which *Common Sense* inflamed the "passions of the populace."[1143] To "realize his beloved scheme of independent republicanism," Inglis argued, Paine had to "persuade" British Americans not only "to renounce their allegiance" to their "true and lawful liege sovereign King George III," but also to "risque their lives, liberties, and property" in a "tedious, bloody, and most expensive war with Great-Britain."[1144] If successful, *Common Sense* would create a republic of "wickedness," as no agent of the British empire would have the power to restrain these rebels' worst inclinations.[1145] British America, therefore, would become "a scene of blood and slaughter," in which its political leaders would inflict heretofore unimagined "wretchedness and misery on millions yet unborn."[1146] For Inglis, *Common Sense* had confirmed the deceptive, treasonous, and regicidal ambitions that now dictated the popular politics of British America's insurgent congress.

Fears of the affective, treasonous Pandora's Box which Paine had shattered were not restricted to North America. Less than three weeks after *Common Sense*'s publication in Philadelphia, London's *Public Advertiser* published "The Pausing American Loyalist," a poem stylized after Hamlet's famous "To Be, or Not To Be" soliloquy, which described the intensifying fears, specifically of bodily harm, which plagued imperial loyalists.[1147] "To sign, or not to sign" British America's illegal Association, the imperial loyalist began, "[t]hat is the question.[1148] The dutiful subject of George III contemplates whether it is better to "fly" from the clutches of rebellious colonists, and thus "escape/Feathers and tar, and thousand other ills/That loyalty is here to."[1149] If he refused to join this club of traitors and demagogues, then this loyalist may "starve" or suffer unspeakable harm.[1150] The power of *Common Sense* to stir fervent, violent participation in British America's rebellion, this poet concludes, is perhaps its most dangerous effect of Paine's pamphlet, as it is the "dread of want" that may make "rebels of us all."[1151]

London's *Independency, the Object of Congress in America*, echoed Inglis's affective arguments. The "rebellious Demagogues" of the Continental Congress had "harangu[ed]" the people of British America with "the most seditious Language," this Londoner argued, and through such harassment had persuaded the empire's loyal subjects to "resist the Authority of Parliament."[1152] Despite suffering such treason, Britain's ministers had not succumb to wrath, but rather remained "anxious to prevent" both "the shedding of the Blood of Subjects" and "the evil Effects of civil War."[1153] Popular hatred and fear, *Independency* argued, must be directed towards British America's congress, as its lust for both power and political independence now exposed the entire empire to "Tyranny, to Bloodshed, and to Ruin."[1154] To be a true "Friend of the Liberties of America," every British subject must reaffirm their bonds of *imperial* fellow-feeling and the "Supremacy of Great-Britain in King, Lords, and Commons."[1155] The survival of British America, *Independency* concluded, relied not upon colonial independence, but rather upon voluntary submission to the will of the empire.

[1143] Charles Inglis, *The Deceiver Unmasked; or Loyalty and Interest United* (New York: Samuel Loudon, 1776), iii; New York Historical Society.
[1144] Inglis, *The Deceiver Unmasked*, 10.
[1145] Ibid, 14; 87.
[1146] Ibid, 14; 87.
[1147] *Public Advertiser*, January 20, 1776; Loughran, *Republic in Print*, 44-45.
[1148] *Public Advertiser*, January 20, 1776.
[1149] Ibid.
[1150] Ibid.
[1151] *Public Advertiser*, January 20, 1776.
[1152] *Independency, the Object of the Congress in America, or an Appeal to Facts* (London: John Francis and Charles Rivington, 1776), 5; Franklin Collection, Yale University.
[1153] *Independency*, 23.
[1154] Ibid, 42.
[1155] Ibid, 70.

In addition to its reproach of the Continental Congress, the London press rebuked those royal ministers who had coddled, or worse yet sympathized with, British America's rebellion. *The Parricide: A Sketch of Modern Patriotism* (see Figure 3.5) depicts a naked and vulnerable Britannia, forcibly restrained by several ministers who had endorsed British America's earliest desires for economic and legislative autonomy.[1156] To the right, a lion – signifying the might of Britain's royal government – lunges to Britannia's defense, but is forcibly restrained. To the left, an Indigenous woman, armed with both dagger and tomahawk, prepares to strike a fatal blow to Britannia's heart, freeing herself and all of British America from the benevolent tethers of imperial subjecthood. In the background, colonial sympathizers William Pitt and George James Fox (the latter depicted as a literal fox), watch in passive approval. By labeling this murder "A Sketch of Modern Patriotism," *The Parricide* censures both the deceptive rhetoric of colonial rebels, who presented their hateful crimes of imperial betrayal as disinterested acts of intercolonial affection, and those ministers of Parliament who had permitted and encouraged British America's selfish ambition and political independence.

Figure 3.5: *The Parricide: A Sketch of Modern Patriotism*
Westminster Magazine. London, 1776.
Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

As British royalists, imperial loyalists, and colonial rebels clashed over the merits of and deceptions within *Common Sense*, the Continental Congress stood at an impasse, as its delegates refused to debate the question of political independence without an explicit endorsement from at least one colonial legislature. If such a proposal came from Massachusetts – the zealous rebel – it

[1156] *The Parricide: A Sketch of Modern Patriotism*, in the *Westminster Magazine* (London, 1776); Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

would be dismissed as self-interested and vengeful. No such proposal would emerge from New York, the center of imperial loyalism.[1157] As with British America's opposition to the stamp tax, Virginia's rebellious legislature overcame intercolonial inertia and declared that "these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."[1158] When Richard Henry Lee formally presented this resolution to the Continental Congress on June 7, he demanded that every delegate answer the most anticipated and dreaded political question they faced: would they dissolve British America's bonds of affection with, and loyalty to, the empire of George III?

To the chagrin of Massachusetts and Virginia's coalition for independence, Robert Livingston of New York, John Dickinson and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina vehemently opposed this resolution.[1159] After two days of intense deliberation, in which "few minds were changed," the delegates postponed any further discussion of independence until July 1, during the interim of which a five-man committee – comprised of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Robert Livingston, Benjamin Franklin, and Roger Sherman of Connecticut – would prepare an address detailing the Continental Congress's rationale for spurning their once cherished status as subjects of the British empire.[1160] Saddled with crafting this declaration, Jefferson understood the profound importance of the task laid before him: proclaim British America's political independence while simultaneously depicting America's thirteen rebellious colonies as a stable confederation, worthy of both fiscal and martial support from Britain's imperial enemies.[1161]

"Prudence," began Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence*, "dictate[s] that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes."[1162] As ardent followers of this paradigm, British Americans were "more disposed to suffer while evils [were] sufferable," than to seek recompense by "abolishing" their "accustomed" forms of imperial government.[1163] This predisposition to rationalize suffering as an imperial duty, however, became untenable when the British empire sought to "reduce" its colonies to a state of "absolute despotism."[1164] Only when confronted with the hated chains of tyranny did British America embraced its "right" and "duty" to "throw off such a government and provide new guards for [its] future freedom and security."[1165]

To ensure that the *Declaration of Independence* elicited both righteous rage and sorrow for the plight of British America, Jefferson briskly catalogued the "long train of abuses" which George III had inflicted upon his colonies. First, Jefferson recounted how their corrupted king had "dissolved

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[1157] John Adams firmly believed that the "number of the Tories, the weakness and credulity of some people, and the treachery of others" in New York had prevented the "Colony from exerting herself" in British America's "might struggle" for independence. Keenly aware that "now perhaps [is] the most critical moment that America ever saw, Adams encouraged William Heath to "endeavour to convince the citizens of New York and the inhabitants of the Province" not simply to support the ongoing war against the British army, but rather endorse independency from the British empire; John Adams told William Heath; see John Adams to William Heath, April 15, 1775, *Papers of John Adams*, 4:119-120.

[1158] Virginia Convention, "Resolutions, May 15, 1776; Virginia Historical Society. Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 351-352.

[1159] Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on the Proceedings," in *Papers of Jefferson*, 1:309-313; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 351-353.

[1160] Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 254.

[1161] Pauline Maier, *American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 129-130; Annette Gordon-Reed and Peter S. Onuf, *"Most Blessed of the Patriarchs": Thomas Jefferson and the Empire of Imagination* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 79.

[1162] Thomas Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence*, in *Autobiography*, 35-36.

[1163] Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence*, in *Autobiography*, 35-36.

[1164] Ibid.

[1165] Ibid.

representative houses repeatedly," made colonial "judges dependent on his will alone," and "erected a multitude of new offices….to harass [his] people and eat out their substance."[1166] To enforce these royal abuses, the king not only stationed peacetime "standing armies and ships of war" throughout the colonies, "without the consent of [their] legislatures," but also "affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power."[1167] Executing the wishes of their despot, Britain's royal army and navy "plundered" British America's "seas, ravaged [its] coasts, burnt [its] towns, and destroyed the lives of [its] people," with neither hesitance nor remorse.[1168] Further, the king had "excited domestic insurrection" among British America's enslaved peoples and imperial loyalists, just as had encouraged "merciless Indians savages" to raid their frontier settlements.[1169] Through his relentless assault against the personal safety and political liberties of his colonists, Jefferson argued, George III had become a tyrant and betrayed the adoration of his loyal British subjects.

Albeit oppressed by the yoke of imperial tyranny and bound together through the sentiments of intercolonial fellow-feeling, British Americans still refused to rebel against their empire, and rather "appealed" one final time, through their Olive Branch Petition, to the king's "justice and magnality."[1170] Only after accepting that both their sovereign and their "brethren" in England had become "deaf" to their cries for "justice" and "consanguinity" did British America's rebellious colonies declare themselves "free and independent states," and through such declaration pledge to one another "[their] lives, [their] fortunes, and [their] sacred honor."[1171] The people of British America, Jefferson's *Declaration* concluded, embraced independence only with profound reluctance – for it was political survival, not selfish ambition, that had demanded they abandon their once privileged status as subjects of the British empire.

When the Continental Congress assembled on July 1, John Dickinson led the attack against independence.[1172] A staunch advocate for British America's economic and legislative autonomy, Dickinson knew that his passionate opposition to independence would strike "the finishing Blow" to his now "dimish'd Popularity."[1173] Despite such personal fears, Dickinson proclaimed his willingness to endure the "hate" of his fellow delegates rather than foolishly "vote away…the Blood and Happiness of [his] Countrymen."[1174] It would be reckless, Dickinson continued, to commit to "Destroying a House before" they had built "another" as its replacement.[1175] If the Continental Congress declared independence now – lacking a disciplined army, foreign alliances, or an internally recognized federative government – then it would force the people of British America to "brave the

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[1166] Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence*, in *Autobiography*, 36-38; please note that underlined words or phrases within quotations of the *Declaration of Independence* reflects those which Jefferson included in his final draft but subsequently removed by Congress during the revision process, see Jefferson, *Autobiography*, 34.

[1167] Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence*, in *Autobiography*, 37.

[1168] Ibid, 37.

[1169] Ibid, 37-38; note that Jefferson initially included a long passage chastising the king for "wag[ing] a cruel war against human nature itself" by participating in, and forcing his colonists to participate in, the transatlantic slave trade. While the Continental Congress would eventually remove this paragraph, they subsequently included the clause "excited domestic insurrection" to blame the king for instances of enslaved violence and revolt that occurred since 1775; see Maier, *American Scripture*, 146-147.

[1170] Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence*, in *Autobiography*, 40-42.

[1171] Ibid.

[1172] For a narrative of the chronology of the debate between John Dickinson and John Adams, see *JCC* 4:358-360; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 369-382.

[1173] John Dickinson, "Speech against the Independence of these Colonies," July 1, 1776, in *JCC*, 4:351; for a thorough analysis of the political thought that motivated Dickinson's views of independence, see Calvert, *Quaker Constitutionalism and John Dickinson*, 207-246, especially 241-246.

[1174] Dickinson, "Argument against Independence," *JCC*, 4:351-352.

[1175] Ibid, *JCC*, 4:352-354.

Storm" of civil war in nothing more than "a Skiff made of Paper." [1176] Prideful haste, Dickinson concluded, all but guaranteed the political enslavement and complete ruin of British America.

Unsurprisingly, John Adams rose to refute Dickinson's impassioned oration and to defend, once more, the cause of independence.[1177] Dickinson's profound fears of the political instability had proved incapable of negating almost fifteen years of incremental ideological extremism, as British America's rebellious delegates now believed themselves free of any obligations of loyalty – be they political, economic, moral, or sentimental – to the empire of George III. While no record exists of Adams's speech, his rhetoric proved effective, as twelve congressional delegations declared political independence from the British empire, with only New York abstaining.[1178] Despite its personal misgivings and pragmatic fears, the Continental Congress had symbolically slayed its king. Not a single delegate, however, described political independence – which now committed the entirety of British America to a horrific and bloody civil war – as a symbolic act of either regicide or patricide. Rather, the leaders of America's emotional community of rebellion understood their *Declaration of Independence* as a regrettable, necessary, and pure expression of their natural right to self-governance.

Philosophical rationalization notwithstanding, declaring independence proved a deeply intimate act. Ruminating to his wife Abigail on July 3, Adams expressed his shock at "the Suddenness, as well as the Greatness" of the "Revolution" now taking place in British America.[1179] Surprise gave way to joy, as Adams believed that the *American* people would celebrate their independence with a "great anniversary Festival…solemnized with Pomp and Parade, with Shews, Games, Sports, Guns, Bells, Bonfires and Illuminations from one End of this Continent to the other from this Time forward forever more."[1180] Joy, Adams assured his wife, would be tempered with the solemn knowledge of the "Toil and Blood and Treasure" that the American people would have to sacrifice to "defend" their "Declaration" and their independent "States"[1181] Joy, sorrow, and fear then intertwined into somber optimism, as Adams concluded his letter with a humble declaration: that this "End" – America's political independence – is more than worth all the Means."[1182]

The joyous celebrations which Adams had predicted erupted almost immediately among those colonists who had "suffer[ed]" from both the "cruel hands" and the "adamant," unfeeling "hearts" of British America's "tyrants, and merciless oppressors."[1183] After reading the *Declaration of Independence* from the balcony of the Massachusetts States House – mere feet from the site of the King Street riot – a cry emerged from the audience: "God Save our American States!"[1184] In New York City, soldiers of the Continental Army gave "thrice Chears" to the *Declaration*, overjoyed that their sufferings in this current civil war would not be in vain.[1185] To the south, a gathering of one thousand inhabitants in Richmond cheered for the *Declaration*, drank "many patriotic toasts," and

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[1176] Dickinson, "Argument against Independence," in *JCC*, 4:352-354.
[1177] John Adams, *Diary and Autobiography*, 3:396-397.
[1178] The New York legislature did not empower its delegation to vote for independence until July 9. Upon receiving its new instructions, the New York delegation assented to the *Declaration of Independence* on July 19; for the New York Congress's new instructions to its delegation see *Letters of the Delegates of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789*, ed., Paul H. Smith, et al (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress) 4:371-372; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 415.
[1179] John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 2:28.
[1180] Ibid, 2:30.
[1181] Ibid, 2:31.
[1182] Ibid.
[1183] Peter Whitney, *American Independence Vindicated* (Boston: E. Draper, 1776), 30; American Antiquarian Society.
[1184] Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 21, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 2:56.
[1185] Solomon Nash, July 9, 1776, in "Solomon Nash Diary, January 1776-January 1777," MSS. New York Historical Society.

professed their "determination" to support America's newfound independence with "their lives and fortunes."[1186]

These pure expressions of communal joy, however, swiftly oscillated into popular rage. In Boston, a crowd tore down the "kings arms" from the state house and, after gathering every royal "vestage" within the city, "burnt" them in a large bonfire on King Street.[1187] Eager to manifest the symbolic regicide committed in congress's *Declaration*, a New York mob – likely comprised of both soldiers and civilians – razed and decapitated the "equestrian statue of George the Third," which only further "inflame[ed] the public valor."[1188] This frenzied mob then took the remains of their fallen sovereign and smelted him into bullets, with which they then planned to make "deep impressions [into] the Bodies" of the king's "red Coated and Torie Subjects."[1189] Many of New York City's rebels, however, perceived this proxy murder of Britain's sovereign "with extreme coldness and indifference," as they had only just begun to "grown angry" with their former king and "had not yet acquired the true taste for cutting throats."[1190] The members of America's emotional community of rebellion, it seemed, felt different degrees of squeamishness towards the violent regicide – symbolic or otherwise – that their independence now required.

Conversely, imperial loyalists swiftly rebuked the deceptive rhetoric with which the *Declaration of Independence* justified British America's horrific imperial treason. Thomas Hutchinson – living as a political exile in London – berated British America's malcontents and demagogues who, with threats of "imaginary evils," had beguiled their fellow colonists into abandoning a "hundred years" of happiness for the "most cruel oppression of fifty or sixty Despots."[1191] Be wary of the news emerging from these rebellious presses, Hutchinson cautioned the people of London, for the Continental Congress did not speak for all of British America.[1192] "Discerning men [had] concealed their sentiments," Hutchinson explained, "because under the present *free* government in America, no man may, by writing or speaking, contradict any part of this Declaration, without being deemed an enemy to his country, and exposed to the rage and fury of the populace."[1193] Imperial loyalism, shunned from the public sphere, still persisted in secrecy throughout much of British America.

Despite Hutchinson's reassurances, English royalists feared the affective sway which the Continental Congress held over the people of British America. By "inflaim[ing] the ignorant multitude," observed Scottish philosopher Alexander Carlyle, a small band of unscrupulous demagogues had transformed both the "mildest execution" of Parliament's laws into "tyranny," and the "just" operations of imperial regulars into "the most barbarous murder."[1194] It is unforgivable Carlyle continued, that these deceitful rebels had misrepresented their "mild and gracious Sovereign" as the "most cruel, vindictive, and despotic tyrant."[1195] The immoral ambitions of the Continental Congress, not the popular sentiments of the people, had motivated British America's "unjust and

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[1186] *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), August 10, 1776.
[1187] Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 21, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 2:56.
[1188] Alexander Graydon, *Memoirs of a Life, Chiefly Passed in Pennsylvania Within the Last Sixty years* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and T. Cadell, 1822), 157-158; New York Historical Society; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 150.
[1189] *New York Journal; or the General Advertiser,* July 11, 1776; Isaac Bangs, July 10, 1776, in "Journal of Isaac Bangs, 1776," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society. Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 150; Judith L. Van Buskirk, *Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 18-19.
[1190] Graydon, *Memoirs of a Life*, 157-158.
[1191] Thomas Hutchinson, *Strictures Upon the Declaration of the Congress at Philadelphia: In a Letter to a Noble Lord* (London, 1776), 4, 8; Massachusetts Historical Society.
[1192] Hutchinson, *Strictures Upon the Declaration*, 31-32.
[1193] Ibid, 32.
[1194] Alexander Carlyle, *The Justice and Necessity of the War with our American Colonies Examined: A Sermon* (Edinburgh: J. Dickinson, 1777), 14; New York Historical Society.
[1195] Carlyle, *The Justice of Necessity of War*, 27.

unprovoked rebellion against the parent-state."[1196] Carlyle still hoped, somewhat naively, that after reaping the sour fruits of civil war, America's rebellious colonists might revitalize the "affections that lay dormant" within their hearts and embrace, once more, the most "zealous loyalty" for their empire.[1197] Through this immutable connection to their *imperial* identity, Carlyle optimistically concluded, Britain's misguided yet faithful colonists might repent, leaving only the deceivers and true rebels to suffer the just punishment of the beloved and merciful George III.

John Dalrymple, however, provided the most insightful condemnation of the *Declaration of Independence*'s affective deceptions. The true power and danger of those colonial rebels who authored this *Declaration*, Dalrymple explained, was their innate ability to elicit popular, and often violent, emotions. Disgusted with the fictious propaganda of these "motely Juntos" and horrified at the false accusations which they had levied against Britain's sovereign, Dalrymple arrived at an astute, somber conclusion: Congress's "business is to engage the passions, where they [could] make no impression with their arguments."[1198] If America's rebellious – now independent – congress had obscured logic with affect, then it might hold the rhetorical power necessary to eradicate the sentiments of imperial fellow-feeling that had united, less than two decades ago, every subject of the British empire.

Conclusion:

British America's second and third taxation crises reformulated, intensified, and entrenched the affective divisions that first emerged during its resistance to Parliament's loathed stamp tax. As ministerial critics and apologists debated the civic and economic autonomy of British America, they sought to validate their political arguments with rhetorical appeals to hatred, fear, sorrow, anger, and love. When imperial tensions escalated, and Parliament actively punished the violent insurgency of Massachusetts, resistance gradually transformed into rebellion. The *de facto* power imbued into, and therefore claimed by, the Continental Congress only expedited the fracturing of British America into two emotional communities: one of colonial rebellion and another of imperial loyalism. Affective discord inevitably bred political disunity, and by July 1776, the passage of the *Declaration of Independence* had demarcated the rigid, wartime boundaries of othering and belonging to which American rebels and British loyalist now found themselves beholden.

The Continental Congress had proven, without a doubt, that their right to political power had derived from their ability to "engage the passions." Ardent rebellion, however, rapidly devolved into impassioned violence and political chaos. In early-December 1776, reports circulated of a mob from Charleston, South Carolina, tarring and feathering Reverend John Roberts, whom they had accused of being a "king-worshipper" and had branded an "enemy to the rights of America."[1199] The ferocity of these rebels, however, was startling. Despite humiliating Roberts with a jacket of tar and feathers, the mob's "fury could not be appeased," as they then "erected a gibbet on which they hanged him, and afterwards made a bonfire, in which Roberts, together with the gibbet, was consumed to ashes."[1200] The Continental Congress had inflamed the popular passions of British America's rebels so thoroughly that civilians now eagerly executed, and then set ablaze, the still-warm body of their neighbor and countryman based solely upon a rumor of his imperial loyalty. With non-combatants committing such atrocities, no one – neither parliamentary minister nor congressional delegate, neither soldier nor civilian, neither imperial loyalist nor colonial rebel – could predict the patriotic brutality with which British America would fight its civil war for independence.

[1196] Carlyle, *The Justice of Necessity of War*, 27.
[1197] Ibid, 48.
[1198] Dalrymple, *The Rights of Great Britain Asserted*, 19, 60.
[1199] Frank Moore, ed. *Diary of the American Revolution: From Newspapers and Original Documents* (New York: Scribner, 1860): 2:359. Irvin, "Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies," 218-219, 222-223.
[1200] Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR:

"A Brother's Sword has been Sheathed in a Brother's Breast" – The Violent Passions of Exclusionary Patriotism in British America's Civil War for Independence, 1775-1783

Introduction:

Tobacco should have dominated the thoughts of George Washington the morning of May 31, 1775.[1201] By late-April, Chesapeake planters had begun the second phase of tobacco cultivation: "transplanting seedlings" from their small beds of animal manure and wood ash to the main fields of the plantation.[1202] Anxieties abounded during this delicate process, as nutrient depleted soil, poor weather conditions, or mistakes made by even the "most skillful" of enslaved laborers might ruin the seedlings' ability to take root and mature throughout the summer.[1203] Planters strove to finish this process by late-May, yet the precision required for successful transplantation, coupled with inevitable, unforeseen obstacles, often delayed its completion until mid-June.[1204] Washington's status as a Virginian delegate to the Second Continental Congress, currently convened in Philadelphia, prevented him from overseeing the transplantation of his seedlings. When coupled with the perpetual instability of the transatlantic tobacco market, Washington's absence from Mount Vernon should have intensified his fears for the viability of the year's forthcoming harvest.

Washington, however, mentioned neither tobacco nor the fields of Mount Vernon to confidant George William Fairfax on May 31. Rather, the Virginian conveyed his shock that General Thomas Gage, a man whom he had fought alongside at the battle of Monongahela two decades earlier, had ordered British regulars to seize and destroy the "private property" – the provisions, weapons, and gunpowder – of Massachusetts's royal subjects.[1205] The subsequent "engagement" between Concord's militiamen and Gage's "Ministerial Troops" profoundly affected the combat-seasoned Washington.[1206] Channeling a decade-long hatred for Parliament's economic exploitation and political abuses, as well as a new, more immediate fear of Gage's foolhardy inclination towards armed combat, Washington forewarned that the "once happy and peaceful plains of America" shall become either "drenched with Blood, or Inhabited by Slaves."[1207] Washington was confident that all "virtuous" colonists indeed would choose the horrors of imperial civil war over those of political enslavement.[1208] Still, like many colonists, Washington lamented that "a Brother's Sword had been sheathed in a Brother's breast."[1209] The Virginian himself felt the lingering bonds of imperial fellow-feeling. To achieve independence from Britain, America's insurgent elite began the difficult, nuanced work of eradicating these enduring political sentiments and, in the process, fostered a new, revolutionary ethos rooted in the principles of exclusionary patriotism.

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For over a decade, anti-Parliament colonial elites had argued – through rhetorics of hatred terror, horror, rage, and sorrow – that British regulars, royal officials, and imperial loyalists served as

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[1201] George Washington to George William Fairfax, May 31, 1775, in *Papers of GW: CS*, 10:367-371.
[1202] Breen, *Tobacco Culture*, 46-47.
[1203] John Mitchell, *American Husbandry* (London: J. Bew, 1775) 1: 222-224; Virginia Historical Society; William Tatham, *An Historical and Practical Essay on the Culture and Commerce of Tobacco* (London: T. Bensley, 1800), 14-15; Massachusetts Historical Society. Breen, *Tobacco Culture*, 47-48; Kulikoff, *Tobacco and Slaves*, 47-48.
[1204] Ibid.
[1205] George Washington to George William Fairfax, May 31, 1775, in *Papers of GW: CS*, 10:367-371; Ray Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 195-198.
[1206] Ibid.
[1207] Ibid.
[1208] Ibid.
[1209] Ibid.

the agents of ministerial tyranny, and therefore had stripped themselves of the rights and protections guaranteed to George III's faithful subjects. After the passage of Parliament's Coercive Acts, anti-loyalist sentiments of anger and betrayal only intensified. Simultaneously, rebellious colonists began to view both Indigenous and enslaved peoples with greater suspicion, as their liminality within British American society situated them as potential "internal enemies," who might take up the weapons of tyranny and political enslavement on Parliament's behalf.[1210] By 1775, distrust, bordering on acute paranoia, had become common throughout British America's affective economies.

When intra-imperial violence finally erupted in late-Spring, rebellious rhetorics drew from the past-two decades of turmoil to create a false-dichotomy of political allegiance, one in which all British regulars, enslaved Africans, Indigenous peoples, and imperial loyalists were enemies who prevented British America's just quest to restore its civic liberties.[1211] Othering rhetorics then fomented the popular passions necessary to incite extreme, retributive violence against *any* and *all* members of these marginalized communities, regardless of an individual's actual participation in Parliament's war-effort. For the people of Massachusetts, imperial regulars were the primary target. Throughout Virginia, enslaved and Indigenous peoples suffered greatly at the hands of anti-imperial malcontents, who stressed the improbability that any non-white person might fight with them against the British empire. Finally, in New York, it was imperial loyalists who suffered the brunt of animosity, outrage, and cruelty. Though the targets differed by region, all three rebellious states deployed complimentary rhetorics of horror, terror, and rage against their respective political others. Impassioned discourse, when coupled with the sorrow felt for the collective suffering of America's insurgent populations, forged new, hatred-based bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling.

The application of near-identical affective rhetorics to the perceived enemies of American independence achieved two necessary political objectives: first, it obscured the inherent political and regional differences between those colonists who fought against the British empire, thereby creating the illusion of a shared political identity; and second, it made public, visceral displays of impassioned, anti-imperial violence a prerequisite for acquiring, and then maintaining, membership within British America's emotional community of revolution.[1212] To succeed in its political

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[1210] My understanding of both the hazards which the liminality of Indigenous and enslaved peoples to revolutionary America's war effort takes inspiration from Alan Taylor's conceptualization of the "internal enemy." Although analyzing the role of enslaved and free Blacks living in Virginia during the War of 1812, Taylor's observes that white Virginians "imagined a dreaded 'internal enemy' who might, at any moment, rebel in a midnight massacre to butcher white men, women, and children in their beds." Albeit occurring forty-years prior, I argue that the designation of "internal enemies" applies to *both* enslaved and Indigenous peoples during British America's civil war for independence; Alan Taylor, *The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia 1772-1832* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), 7; for Taylor's analysis of 1775-1783, see 13-52.

[1211] Samuel Johnson defines *insurrection* as "a seditious rising; a rebellious commotion" and *revolution* (in its civic context), as a "[c]hange in the state of a government or country" see, Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language*.

[1212] Holger Hoock's *Scars of Independence* does an excellent job of illustrate the universality of physical and psychological violence committed against all enemies of American independence, across political, racial, ethnic, and gender lines, thereby refuting the "romanticized notions" of America's birth. My project builds upon Hoock's by illustrating how affective discourse served as the fulcrum for justifying British America's brutal wartime atrocities, regardless of against whom such acts were committed; see Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, xi-xii, 15-16. Robert G. Parkinson argues that America's revolutionaries, to develop a "common cause" in their war for independence, propagated the destruction of imperial affection by depicting enslaved Africans, Indigenous peoples, and German mercenaries as proxies for King George III, as they willingly committed acts of tyranny and violence in the monarch's name. Through this aggressive political rhetoric, British American revolutionaries defined a "true patriot" as one who "was not simply anti-British, but anti-slave, anti-savage, and anti-mercenary," permitting British American insurgents to express their anti-British sentiments against their respective regional "other" while still promoting the "common cause" of political independence. Albeit correct, Parkinson overlooks the important degree to which British regulars and imperial loyalists – the revolutionaries' former colleagues, neighbors, and friends –found themselves subjected not only to revolutionaries' exclusionary affective rhetoric, but also their impassioned acts of wartime cruelty. Furthermore, only by politically and

objectives, this emotional community of revolution required the consistent use of a particular, resonant vocabulary of affects, one powerful enough to bind participants into a sense of mutual recognition, trust, and self-identification as *Americans*.

To justify their war for political independence, with all of its brutality, America's insurgent elite filtered their historic anti-regular, anti-enslaved, anti-Indigenous, and anti-loyalist rhetoric through the prism of exclusionary patriotism. At its core, patriotism relies on a strong emotional attachment to, and profound "love of[,] one's country."[1213] Feelings of patriotism, Adam Smith explains, arise from the lived practice of "two different principles": first, "a certain respect and reverence for the constitution or form of government which is actually established" in one's country, nation, or empire; and second, "an earnest desire to render the conditions" of one's "fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy," even at the cost of one's own prosperity.[1214] British American revolutionaries, too, expressed a patriotic wish to protect the political liberty, communal safety, and personal happiness of their fellow colonists. This ethos of *exclusionary patriotism* consisted in the claim that such protections may only be achieved through the fierce othering and systematic removal of those individuals and groups whom America's elite revolutionaries deemed a threat to the body politic. By propagating and circulating such rhetoric, America's insurgents masked their differences, and cloaked their violent acts of imperial treason in the robes of disinterested patriotism.[1215]

The profound impact that America's ethos of exclusionary patriotism had upon its revolutionary political culture is exemplified best through the vilification of General Benedict Arnold. An officer in the Continental army who fought bravely for independence, Arnold gradually began to question the leadership of America's insurgent congress, specifically their willingness to ally the United States with their mortal enemy: France.[1216] These ideological currents finally compelled Arnold to defect to – or rather redeem his status of as a loyal subject of – the British empire (though the opportunity for profit and political power in George III's army also informed his decision). Arnold's defection, therefore, became the focal point around which America's insurgents solidified their emotional community of revolution. Its members depicted Benedict Arnold not simply as the embodiment of the corrupt vices common to British regulars, enslaved Africans, Indigenous peoples, and imperial loyalists, but rather as America's first political traitor.[1217] The Continental

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culturally denigrating Britons to the status of immoral traitors did British American revolutionaries develop the rhetorical capability to represent the French empire – the historic mortal enemy – as a politically disinterested ally, whose primary concern was to help Britain's former colonists establish an independent republic; see Parkinson, *The Common Cause*, 4-9, 17-24.

[1213] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 231. For a modern theoretical analysis of the functions of patriotism in relation to community, citizenry, and loyalty, see Jones and Vernon, *Patriotism*, 15-34.

[1214] Ibid. The affection one feels towards the needs of a fellow citizen aligns with the virtue of disinterest – the prioritization of the public good over "private profit," which had become an integral part of both British and British American political culture in the early-eighteenth century. Samuel Johnson defines "disinterest" as a thing that is either "contrary to one's wishes or prosperity" or "an indifference to profit," whereas "interest" may refer to a "concern," an "influence over others," or (and most applicable here) a "regard for private profit"; see Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language*. For a broader contextualization of both the danger of interest and the perception of disinterest as inherently supporting the public good within British America's revolutionary ideologies and political discourse, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 94-143; Warner, *Letters of the Republic*, 64-65; 76.

[1215] For perhaps the first reference to American insurgents' abuse of the "cloak of patriotism," see Israel Mauduit, *Considerations on the American War: Addressed to the People of England* (London: T. Beckett, 1776), 35; Franklin Collection, Yale University.

[1216] Benedict Arnold, *To the Inhabitants of America* (New York, 1780); New York Public Library. Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 157-158.

[1217] Adam Smith defines a traitor as one "who, in some peculiar situation, fancies he can promote his own little interest by betraying to the public enemy that of his native country" and, through such a selfish betrayal, "appears to be of all villains the most detestable"; Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228. Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 157-158.

army's decisive victory at York, Virginia, just over one year after Arnold's affecting betrayal, reaffirmed the power of America's impassioned rhetoric to delineate the boundaries of political identity. Its victory also enshrined the violent practice of exclusionary patriotism as an inherent characteristic of America's emergent national identity.

The military conflict which occurred in North America against the British empire was a *civil war for independence.*[1218] My choice in terminology here is important. Historians and political theorists alike have argued that the primary distinction between a political revolution and a civil war is that the former "is driven by high ideals and transformative hopes," while the latter is animated by "base motives and senseless violence.[1219] Historian Brad A. Jones notes that "[w]ars, especially civil wars, are about making enemies of our friends," which requires intimate combat with both "pens" and "swords."[1220] "The animosity of hostile factions" within a single empire or nation-state, Adam Smtih observes, "is often still more furious than that of hostile nations, and their conduct towards one another is often still more atrocious."[1221] It is undisputed that the nature of civil wars consistently incite the most violent of political and personal cruelties. By dismissing civil war as solely a "base" conflict, and thereby insisting that America's war for independence was a political revolution alone, historians risk misinterpreting or overlooking one of the war's fundamental, most violent characteristics.

Many of America's insurgent elite acted on the basis of loyalty to the traditional principles of England's constitutional government. These so-called revolutionaries wished to save and preserve these political, inherently *British* ideologies, from the corrupting influence of legislative tyranny and despotism. By adopting the term *civil war for independence*, I intend neither to minimize nor reject a rich and insightful historiography of America's revolution as an imperial war with profound, global implications.[1222] Rather, I wish to emphasize the formative role that acute acts of violence had in shaping the emotional unity which emerged between America's rebellious colonies once they declared their political independence from the British empire.[1223]

[1218] Virginian and imperial loyalist Anthony Walke concurs that British America's war for independence should be considered a civil war: "In all civil Broils both Parties are in Fault. Each has some favourite Object in View which it cannot lose Sight of, & often Things of inestimable Value are sacrificed to obtain what is trifling, if not injurious, in itself. This certainly was the Case in the unhappy Dispute between Great Britain & her Colonies." See Anthony Walke, "Remarkable Occurrences during the unhappy American War, & a Concise and Imparital Account of the Causes of its Origin and Progress" MSS, (1786), 1; Filson Historical Society.

[1219] David Armitage, *Civil Wars: A History in Ideas* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 121. Stathis N. Kalyvas defines civil war as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parities subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities"; see Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.

[1220] Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 153.

[1221] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 155.

[1222] For examples of such historical works which prioritize the global implications of America's revolution, see David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Caitlin Fitz, *Our Sister Republics: The United States in the Age of American Revolutions* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2016); Patrick Griffin, *The Age of Atlantic Revolution: The Fall and Rise of a Connected World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023); Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Janet Polasky, *Revolutions without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

[1223] Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 15-20. In addition to Holger Hoock, Carlton F.W. Larson comes closest to aligning with my own view of British America's war for independence, arguing that it was not a "genteel, intellectual rebellion," but rather was "a violent and bloody civil war, in which brothers fought against brothers and fathers fought against sons." Larson, however, still refers to the war as the "American Revolution," even within the title of his monograph; see Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 3. The encompassing brutality of British America's *civil war for independence* is best summarized in John Shy's observation that "in proportion to population, almost as many [British] Americans were engaged in fighting other [British] Americans during the Revolution as [those U.S. citizens who fought] during the Civil War"; see

Massachusetts Goes to War – The Demonization of Imperial Regulars in Garrisoned Boston:

By Christmas 1774, the Coercive Acts had transformed "all North America" into "a flame."[1224] The most astute of Parliament's ministers, Horace Walpole, feared that any further attempts to curtail the civic and fiscal autonomy of the North American colonies would provide but "new barrels of oil" to feed the already growing blaze.[1225] Different parts of a flame, however, burn at different temperatures, and as all five Coercive Acts directly impacted the people of Massachusetts, it is unsurprising that anti-Parliament passions burned the hottest in Boston. Critically, impassioned popular rhetoric would join with new imperial legislation to fuel this this fire into the inferno of imperial civil war.

Thomas Paine poured the first barrel of rhetoric oil on January 4, 1775, when he published "A Dialogue Between General Wolfe and General Gage" in the *Pennsylvania Journal*.[1226] In this fictious, incendiary text, Paine described how the specter of General James Wolfe – the hero of Québec and guardian angel of British America – visited Governor Thomas Gage to dissuade him from betraying the civic values of the British empire. A soldier's first duty, Wolfe began, is to defend both "their King and their COUNTRY," the latter of which was not simply a piece of land, but rather the subjects who comprised it.[1227] The people of North America, Wolfe reminded his former subordinate, "are entitled to all the privileges of British subjects," which include protection from the whims of tyrants.[1228] To illustrate the corrupting power that now festered within the British empire, Wolfe turned his attention to Parliament. By permitting Catholics to serve in British American governments, the Québec Act had paved a path for "popery" and "despotism" to consume both "liberty and the protestant religion."[1229] To his "horror," Wolfe now confessed that, because of this repulsive law, he had "shed" the "blood of those brave Frenchmen" upon "the plains of Abraham" for nothing.[1230]

Unwilling to listen to reason, Gage rejected Wolfe's argument, declaring that Massachusetts, "disaffected with the British crown," deserved all hardships it now suffered.[1231] In reply, Wolfe uttered one final, desperate plea: "If you value the sweets of peace and liberty,—if you have any regard to the glory of the British name…I conjure you immediately to resign your commission."[1232] Only selfless, disinterested patriotism, Paine argued through Wolfe, would "restore perpetual harmony between Britain and her colonies."[1233] Gage did not reply, and as Paine suggested, British America's political freedom, economic prosperity, and martial peace now rested on a personal choice: between commitment to the British empire's constitution and people, or submission to its corrupted ministers.

Despite the subtle hope presented within Paine's "Dialogue," some British Americans readily embraced the growing potential of armed rebellion and civil war. Patrick Henry, for one, was despondent at the repetitive, circular arguments that dominated Virginia's rebellious legislators. The people of Virginia, Henry reminded his fellow delegates, all have "petitioned…remonstrated…

John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 183.

[1224] Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, December 23, 1774, in *Walpole Correspondence*, 24:67.

[1225] Ibid.

[1226] Thomas Paine, "A Dialogue Between Genera Wolfe and General Gage in a Wood Near Boston," *Pennsylvania Journal*, January 4, 1775.

[1227] Ibid.

[1228] Ibid.

[1229] Ibid.

[1230] Ibid.

[1231] Ibid.

[1232] Ibid.

[1233] Ibid.

supplicated… [and] prostrated [them]selves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and parliament."[1234] The result of their pleas: "additional violence and insult."[1235] It is "vain," Henry argued, for British Americans to "indulge" further the "fond hope of peace and reconciliation," when it is clear that the only path forward to protect their civic freedoms is to "fight!"[1236] Henry's political rage reached its crescendo in his final, treasonous call to arms: "There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged. Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston!... Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but for me...give me liberty, or give me death!"[1237] Here, Henry invoked the rage, terror, and horror that his contemporaries associated with the rhetoric of political enslavement, and thereby exemplified an emergent paradigm throughout British America: that taking up arms against one's empire, if done to protect the liberties and freedoms of oneself and one's fellow subjects, amounted not to treason, but rather to the noblest act of patriotic self-sacrifice.

Less than four weeks after Henry's speech in Virginia, Governor Gage received a letter from William Legge, the Earl of Dartmouth. The people of Massachusetts seemed willing to "commit themselves at all Events in open Rebellion," Dartmouth noted.[1238] The new, royal orders he conveyed to Gage were to arrest the leaders of Massachusetts's extralegal congress and suppress the colony's "rude rabble" by whatever means necessary.[1239] Gage obeyed his orders, yet he never intended to succeed at the fool's errand of hunting down and capturing Samuel Adams and John Hancock. Rather, his interest lay in the colony's munitions. To this end, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith of the 10th Regiment of Foot received orders to "seize and destroy all the Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, Tents, Small Arms, and all Military stores" located in Concord, and to do so with the utmost "secrecy."[1240] Through this targeted assault, Gage hoped to strip the "rude rabble" of their tools of combat and strike a fatal blow to the growing influence of Massachusetts's provincial congress.[1241] The governor, however, explicitly ordered Smith to "take care that the soldiers [did] not plunder the inhabitants, or hurt private property," for he remained keenly aware that one misstep might unleash a "wild and ungovernable" rebellion in Massachusetts.[1242]

Lieutenant Colonel Smith and the eight hundred British regulars under his command arrived at Lexington, a small town six-and-a-half miles east of Concord, just before dawn the morning of April 19, 1775.[1243] Despite the early-hour, the Lexington militia had already mustered on the town commons.[1244] Outnumbered at least two-to-one, Captain John Parker of the Lexington militia

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[1234] Patrick Henry, "Speech in the Virginia Convention, March 23, 1775" in *Patrick Henry: Orator*, ed., Davd A. McCants (Greenwood Press: New York, 1990), 124-125.
[1235] Henry, "Speech in the Virginia Convention, March 23, 1775," 124-125.
[1236] Ibid.
[1237] Ibid.
[1238] William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth to General Thomas Gage, January 27, 1775, in *Gage Correspondence* 2:179-183. Gage received this letter on April 14, 1775; Gross, *The Minutemen and their World*, 113-114.
[1239] Ibid.
[1240] Thomas Gage to Dartmouth, March 4, 1775; Bancroft Collections; New York Public Library; Frederick Mackenzie, *Diary of Frederick Mackenzie*, April 18-20, 1775 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), 23-29; David Hackett Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 85-86.
[1241] Throughout 1774, Massachusetts's provincial congress had encouraged sympathizers in Boston to flee the city and take refuge in the eastern countryside, away from Gage's standing army. By April 1775, at least five thousand radical Bostonians had followed the congress's advice; see John D. Roche, "'Where the power of law ceases, there war begins': The British Army's Implementation of Martial Law" in *Justifying the Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War for Independence*, ed., Glenn A. Moots and Philip Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), 113.
[1242] Ibid; Thomas Gage to Dartmouth, March 4, 1775.
[1243] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 184-186; Gross, *Minutemen and their World*, 116.
[1244] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 187-189; Gross, *Minutemen and their World*, 116-117. The people of Lexington received a notice the evening of April 18 from the Provincial Committee of Safety that British officers had been spotted on the

ordered his men not to "molest" the British regulars "without [being molested] first."[1245] As tensions mounted, British Major John Pitcairn ordered his own soldiers not to fire unless fired upon and yelled at the Lexington militia to "Lay down your arms, you damned rebels!"[1246] Aware that violence might erupt at any moment, Parker ordered his militiamen to "disperse and not fire."[1247] Amid the cacophony of shouts, a single-musket discharged across the Lexington Commons.[1248] This single shot was likely an accident, given the palpable tension and the unreliability of eighteenth-century muskets – a melancholic refrain of the accidental first-shot that ignited Boston's King Street riot.[1249] Much like that freezing night of March 5, 1770, the Lexington Commons succumbed to chaos.

Britons fired upon Britons through a smoke-filled haze of terror and adrenaline. As the Lexington militia scattered, "very few" fired upon the king's troops, and the resultant skirmish ended with seventeen casualties, of which eight were fatal.[1250] Reports, however, swiftly amplified these events. Several British regulars, "[n]ot contented with this effusion of blood," had fired upon the retreating militiamen, as if "malice occupied their whole soul."[1251] Another (likely apocryphal) account described how a "brave woman" had fired upon the British regulars from her home and, when ordered to "withdraw," retorted with "Insults from her own Mouth" and "Balls from the Mouths of her Muskets," before she was killed.[1252] These reports spoke to the terror and rage which British colonists felt for Parliament's immoral redcoats. Further, these accounts fulfilled the horrible promise made by Captain Preston's 29th Regiment of Foot just five years earlier – that Parliament's peacetime standing army would conquer the people of Massachusetts and subjugate them to the yoke of tyranny.

Desperate to prevent the "further slaughter" of Lexington's "deluded" militiaman and civilian bystanders, Smith reorganized his ranks, extracted them from the town, and continued their march toward Concord.[1253] Upon their arrival, Smith's regulars secured both the northern and southern bridges into Concord and began to search for the hidden munitions and insurgent leaders. Despite still heated-passions from their engagement at Lexington and the discovery of very few armaments to confiscate, Smith's regulars neither molested Concord's inhabitants nor destroyed their property – apart from the town's liberty pole, which they cut down and set ablaze.[1254] Amid this mostly peaceful search, Colonel James Barret organized five hundred militiamen from Concord and several neighboring towns near the North Bridge. Spurred by the zeal of his younger officers, one of whom brazenly asked the colonel if he intended to let the redcoats "burn the town down," Barrett

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move, likely heading towards the town in the hopes of capturing Adams and Hancock. The advance notice gave the Lexington militia ample time to muster and prepare to intercept the British regulars under Smith's command, Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 89-91.

[1245] Paul Rever, "Deposition, ca. April 24, 1775," Revere Family Papers; Massachusetts Historical Society. Estimates place the Lexington militia at approximately sixty-to-seventy men, with Lieutenant Colonel Smith's forces at approximately two-hundred-fifty men. Both the British regulars and the Lexington militia, however, believed themselves outnumber by the opposing force; see Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 188-189; Gross, *Minutemen and their World*, 116-117.

[1246] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 190-191. John Warren, "John Warren's Revolutionary War Diary, 19 April 1775-11 May 1776," April 19, 1775; Massachusetts Historical Society. *A Narrative, of the Excursion and Ravages of the King's Troops Under the Command of General Gage, on the nineteenth of April, 1775: Together with the Depositions* (Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1775), 6-7; Massachusetts Historical Society.

[1247] Ibid.

[1248] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 188-189; Gross, *Minutemen and their World*, 116-117.

[1249] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 194.

[1250] *A Narrative, of the Excursion and Ravages of the King's Troops*, 4; *Virginia Gazette* (Pickney), May 4, 1775.

[1251] Ibid.

[1252] Oliver, *Origins and Progress of the American Revolution*, 120.

[1253] Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith to Major Robert Donkin, October 8, 1775, in "Gage Papers."

[1254] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 206-208.

ordered his men to load their muskets (some of which had been deliberately double-shotted).[1255] Barrett reminded his men to fire only if fired upon, and then gave the order to advance.

The regulars of the 4th, 10th, and 43rd Regiments of Foot stationed at the North Bridge were shocked to see, for the second time that day, farmers and artisans oppose the king's army.[1256] As regulars scrambled to disperse the militias, 43rd Regiment Captain Walter Lauire watched, in horror, as one of his soldiers "fired without orders," initiating a staggering, undisciplined volley of British musket shot.[1257] Now permitted to return fire, the Massachusetts militiamen responded with deadly aim and composure, not only downing four British officers in their first volley, but swiftly forcing the regulars to flee.[1258] Amid their slow, haphazard retreat to Charlestown, Smith's regulars sustained heavy casualties from the perpetual fire of Concord's pursuant militiamen as well as those stationed in other towns – like Lexington – who assaulted the regulars "under the cover of a stone wall, from behind a tree, or out of a house" as they fled.[1259] Unable to lay down proper covering fire, British regulars resorted to razing homes on their path of retreat, hopeful that the fire and smoke might delay, if not entirely dissuade, their colonial attackers.[1260]

When British muskets had fired their final round the evening of April 19, approximately 115 British subjects had died in Massachusetts.[1261] As the *Pennsylvania Journal* reported, the 47th Regiment of Foot, known as "Wolfe's Own" for their valor in the battle at Québec, suffered significant casualties carrying out Governor Gage's orders, a twist of irony not lost on its faithful readers.[1262] Gage was shocked by the formal reports he received from officers who returned to Charlestown, as he had "no conception [that] the Rebels would have opposed the King's troops in the manner they did" or that they might have achieved such an unrivaled victory.[1263] The violence committed against body and property, by British regular and Massachusetts militiamen alike, is illustrated well by Amos Doolittle and Ralph Earl's *A View of the South Part of Lexington* (see Figure 4.1). The haunting engraving conveyed a terrible truth that few, either within or outside of eastern Massachusetts, now knew: that war had set its sights, once again, upon North America.[1264]

The skirmish at Concord, one colonist observed, has "electrified all classes of people" throughout British America, stoking sentiments of sorrow, rage, and most important, an "enthusiasm in the love of country."[1265] The hearts of all Massachusetts's insurgents, John Adams observed, "bleed" for "the poor People of Boston" living under Gage's despotic, violent rule.[1266]

[1255] Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 208-210.
[1256] Ibid, 211-212.
[1257] Ibid.
[1258] Ibid, 213-215.
[1259] For a detailed, first-person account of the British regulars' retreat, see Mackenzie, April 19, 1775, *Diary of Machenzie*, 1:18-27, specifically, 1:21-22.
[1260] For a detailed analysis of the British regulars retreat from Concord to Boston, see Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 217-260; Gross, *Minutemen and their World*, 118-130.
[1261] For the casualties suffered on April 19, 1775, see The Massachusetts Milias suffered ninety-four casualties, with fifty fatalities, whereas the British regulars suffered 272 casualties, with sixty fatalities; Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, "Appendix P" and "Appendix Q," 320-321.
[1262] The 43rd Regiment of Foot suffered twenty-eight casualties, third only to the 4th and 23rd Regiments; see Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 239; "Appendix R," 322.
[1263] Mackenzie, April 21, 1775, *Diary of Mackenzie* 1:29; Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 263-264.
[1264] Amos Doolittle and Ralph Earl, *Plate IV: A View from the South Part of Lexington* (Boston, 1775); New York Public Library.
[1265] Mackenzie, *Diary of Mackenzie*, 1:26-27; General Thomas Gage to William Legge, the Earl of Dartmouth, April 22, 1775, in *Gage Correspondences*, 1:396; Thacher, *Military Journal*, 16-17; Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, June 5, 1775, in *Walpole Correspondence*, 24:110 *Virginia Gazette* (Pickney), April 28, 1775; *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), April 29, 1775
[1266] John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 2, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 1:191-192.

Despite his sincere sorrow, Adams believed that the "present dreadfull Calamity" at Concord might now "bind the Colonies together in more indissoluble Bands" of intercolonial fellow-feeling.[1267] Enraged at the violence that befell their northern brethren, New York City's Sons of Liberty seized the key to their Custom House, "unloaded and destroyed the cargoes of two ships bound with provisions" for Gage's regulars, and closed the city's port.[1268] As far south as Virginia, Richard Henry Lee praised the "virtuous patriotism" of New York's compatriots and Gage's "shameful defeat" in Massachusetts, as these actions "revitted such union, roused such an universal Military Spirit throut all the Colonies, and excited such universal resentment against this Savage Ministry and their detestable Agents."[1269] For the most radical of colonial insurgents, the horrors which transpired at Concord revitalized a persistent hope: that all of British America might unite in their rebellion against Parliament and its imperial regulars.



Figure 4.1: Amos Doolittle and Ralph Earl.
Plate IV: A View from the South Part of Lexington.
Boston, 1775. Courtesy of the New York Public Library.

Anti-Parliament fervor did not, however, destroy the affection and concerns that some British Americans rebels still felt for their loyalist neighbors, friends, and family members. "My

[1267] John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 2, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 1:191-192.
[1268] Smith, *Historical Memoirs*, 222; Horace Walpole to Lord Camden, June 12, 1775, in *Walpole Correspondence*, 41:303.
[1269] Richard Henry Lee to William Lee, May 10, 1775, in *RH Lee Letters*, 1:134-135.

sympathetic heart will not suffer me to be silent," Mercy Otis Warren conveyed to her "real friend," and the suspected imperial loyalist Harriet Shirley Temple, on the "painful anxiety and distress" which Temple and her family endured in the weeks following Concord.[1270] Warren was grief-stricken. "I cannot but weep," she wrote, "that the political state of this unhappy country has raised such a tumult of passion." [1271] It had "eradicated those ideas of general benevolence" that once extended to all British subjects.[1272] It was in this context that George Washington lamented that a "Brother's Sword has been sheathed in a Brother's breast."[1273] Acts of intra-imperial brutality had all but ensured that "the once happy and peaceful plains of America" shall become either "drenched with Blood, or Inhabited by Slaves."[1274] Echoing his fellow Virginian, Thomas Jefferson feared that Gage's expedition to Concord had "cut off [the] last hope of reconciliation," as a "phrenzy of revenge" now "seized" the people of British America.[1275]

Imperial loyalists were all too aware that they might join imperial regulars as political scapegoats, destined to be sacrificed on the altars of rebellion and revenge. Months before the skirmish at Concord, and in the weeks immediately following it, thousands of Massachusetts's imperial loyalists fled to Boston, seeking refuge and protection.[1276] James Murray implored his sister, Elizabeth Inman, to flee from Cambridge, Massachusetts, as he believed the "[e]lated pride" and "despairing rage" of the colony's insurgents would not spare any "Tory houses" from their wrath.[1277] James's fears were justified, as one of Elizabeth's friends, a Mrs. Barnes, suffered such an assault less than one week after the skirmish at Concord. A man broke into her home with a "loaded musket" and demanded dinner and a horse, threatening to "blow [her] brains out."[1278] Despite the internal turmoil that had arisen over the past decade from the peacetime quartering of British regulars, Massachusetts's imperial loyalists had come to rely on these soldiers to suppress, or at least guard against, the worst inclinations of their rebellious countrymen.

To manage the logistical burden of Boston's sudden population influx and to protect the lives of those soldiers under his command, Gage issued a proclamation on June 12 which placed the colony under martial law.[1279] The "infatuated multitude" of Massachusetts, Gage began, had "suffered to be conducted by certain well know incendiaries and traitors. [1280] These rebels had engaged "in a fatal progression of crimes against the constitutional authority of the State, [and] have at length proceeded to avowed Rebellion."[1281] Setting aside his disgust, Gage shifted to a more forgiving, compassionate tone, as he blamed the popularity of this "unnatural revolt" upon the

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[1270] Mercy Otis Warren to Harriet Shirley Temple, June 2, 1775, in *Selected Letters*, 49-50.
[1271] Ibid.
[1272] Ibid.
[1273] George Washington to George William Fairfax, May 31, 1775, in *Papers of GW: CS*, 10:368.
[1274] Ibid.
[1275] Thomas Jefferson to William Small, May 7, 1775, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 1:165-166.
[1276] Mark A. Peterson, "The War in the Cities," in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, ed., Edward G. Gray and Jane Kamensky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 198.
[1277] James Murray to Elizabeth Inman, May 17, 1775, in *Letters of James Murray, Loyalist*, ed., Nina Moore Tiffany and Susan I. Lesley (Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), 195.
[1278] Mrs. Barnes to Elizabeth Inman, April 29, 1775, in *Letters of James Murray*, 187-188. Mrs. Barnes provides no evidence that this man's political loyalty aligned with the Massachusetts insurgents. Barnes, however, furnishes this anecdote in response to a letter from Elizabeth Inman, in which Inman praises the British "troops landing near [them]," from whom they "had nothing to fear." This correlation indicates that Barnes likely believed, even if she had no proof, that her assailant was an insurgent, see Elizabeth Inman to her Friends in Boston, April 22, 1775, in *Letters of James Murray*, 185, 187-188.
[1279] Thomas Gage, *A Proclamation*, *June 12, 1775* (Boston, 1775); Massachusetts Historical Society.
[1280] Ibid.
[1281] Ibid.

insurgent elite's "suppression of truth."[1282] For only acts of deception, Gage continued, could have instigated the people of Massachusetts to commit such "wantonness of cruelty" against their fellow Britons on April 19.[1283] To "subdue" the "Rebels and Traitors" that now plagued Massachusetts, and to "spare" the colony "the effusion of blood" that would result from a prolonged conflict, Gage offered a "pardon" to all colonists in open rebellion.[1284] There were, however, two caveats, one – the pardons excluded Samuel Adams and John Hancock, and the second, more profound – that "no person within the limits of this offered mercy may plead ignorance of the consequences of refusing it."[1285] By declaring martial law, Gage forced every Massachusetts colonist to affirm, either through words or actions, their status as either an imperial loyalist or a treasonous rebel.

Governor Gage's political ultimatum did nothing to ease the rage and terror that festered within and around Boston. A peaceful resolution to Massachusetts's rebellion all but disappeared five days later, when British Major General William Howe launched a surprising assault against Charlestown.[1286] Awoken by an unrelenting barrage from Howe's naval artillery, Colonel William Prescott's militiamen swiftly fortified their moderate defenses on Breed's Hill.[1287] After peppering the rebels with further ground artillery stationed on the neighboring Bunker Hill, two thousand British troops "ascended [Breed's] hill," enduring a "torrent" of insurgent cannon and musket fire.[1288] Well-disciplined, Prescott's militiamen "reserved their fire till the enemy had advanced very near" and "made such a terrible slaughter" that they "obliged the enemy twice to give way."[1289] Combat prowess, however, succumbed to sheer numbers. Imperial regulars flanked the militiamen on their third advance and, armed with "bayonets, cutlasses, and hand grenades," forced the colonists retreat.[1290] By day's end, Howe's regulars had captured Breed's Hill and "burnt" Charlestown "to ashes," acts which incurred almost £118,000 of property damage, killed at least one hundred British colonists, and left another three hundred wounded.[1291] Even Howe's forces suffered forty-percent casualties, of which at least half of the regulars killed in action "were shot by their own friends" amid the chaos.[1292]

The "carnage" and "sacrifice of precious life" that now drenched Breed's Hill stirred expressions of profound sorrow and intense hatred among the people of Massachusetts.[1293] The

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[1282] Thomas Gage, *A Proclamation*, *June 12, 1775* (Boston, 1775); Massachusetts Historical Society.; Anthony Walke echoes this sentiment, observing that those "who inhabited New-England were the Men, by whose Means a small Spark was kindled into a Flame, & Fuel was daily supplied, lest it should expire"; and through such malicious intent, convinced a "Majority of Freemen" throughout British America to abandon their "Opinion" in favor of imperial "Reconciliation"; Walke, *Remarkable Occurrences*, 1, 7-8.

[1283] Thomas Gage, *A Proclamation*, *June 12, 1775*

[1284] Ibid.

[1285] Ibid.

[1286] Donald F. Johnson, *Occupied America: British Military Rule and the Experience of Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020), 20-25.

[1287] Ibid.

[1288] An Officer of the Army, *The History of the Civil War in America: Comprehending the Campaigns of 1775, 1776, 1777* (London: T. Payne and J. Sewell, 1870) 1: 80; Virginia Historical Society. Roger Lamb, *Journal of the Late American War*, 31; Johnson, *Occupied America*, 21.

[1289] Major General William Heath, "Account of Breed's Hill" in *History of the Battle of Breed's Hill*, ed., Charles Coffin (Saco: William J. Condon, 1831), 3-4; American Antiquarian Society, Virginia *Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), July 15, 1775.

[1290] Virginia *Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), July 15, 1775; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), July 13, 1775.

[1291] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 24; Benjamin L. Carp, "'Disreputable among Civilized Nations': Destroying Homes during the Revolutionary War" in *the Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War for Independence*, ed., Glenn A. Moots and Philip Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), 171.

[1292] Walpole, *Journal of the Reign of King George the Third*, 1:498. Hoock notes that "more than one-eight of the British officers killed in [America's Revolution] indeed died at Bunker Hill or as a result of injuries received that day"; Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 75; Johnson, *Occupied America,* 24.

[1293] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 32.

popular ballad, "The Burning of Charlestown," perfectly encapsulates both passions. The song lamented that George III no longer "fear[ed] nor mind[ed]" the rights enshrined within the British constitution, and it prayed that God will curse and punish the British "Cain" – the imperial regular – who "madly spilt [his] brother's blood."[1294] Stoking anti-regular hatred, the song ends by condemning Governor Gage, that "dire torments [may now] gnaw upon his soul."[1295] "The Burning of Charlestown" reflected and amplified Boston's contemporaneous, lived-feelings of sorrow and hatred, and thereby guaranteed that the city's "butchered, expiring relatives and friends" still drew "fresh anguish" from American "heart[s]" in the weeks, months, and decades following their deaths.[1296]

Even imperial loyalists felt varying degrees of sorrow, horror, and hatred following Howe's destruction of Charlestown. From Boston, Phillis Wheatley proclaimed "Columbia mourns, the haughty Foes deride,/Her Treasures plunder'd, and her Towns destroy'd:/Witness how Charlestown's curling Smoaks arise,/In sable Columns to the clouded Skies!/The ample Dome, high-wrought with curious Toil,/In one sad Hour the savage Troops despoil."[1297] Beyond sorrow for the suffering of Charlestown and her fellow colonists, Wheatly invoked hatred for Howe's "savage Troops."[1298] Yet the Boston poet then forced her readers to acknowledge that the greater tragedy had occurred on Breed's Hill, where "fraternal Arms" had dealt "mutual Deaths" with "mutual Rage."[1299] Massachusetts rebel and surgeon John Warren, however, rejected Wheatley's belief that Massachusetts's colonists held equal blame for the violence of June 17. Warren did, however, concur that the violence upon Breed's Hill had doomed British America to suffer the greatest of all terrors: the "horrors of a civil war."[1300]

John Warren's extreme pessimism is understandable, as his older brother, General Joseph Warren, had died upon Breed's Hill while covering his militia's retreat. Beloved throughout Boston, Warren's death – an ominous prologue to the "horrors" of imperial civil war – ignited a wave of "universal grief and sorrow" that engulfed Massachusetts's public sphere.[1301] The suffering felt at the death of such "distinguished patriot and hero" and a true "martyr of liberty" were only intensified by Warren's inspirational last words: that it is "better to die honourable in the field than ignominiously hang upon the Gallows."[1302] Public, unapologetic, "grief sincere" had consumed the people of Boston, not simply for the death of General Warren, but rather the collective deaths wrought at Lexington, Concord, Breed's Hill, and Charlestown.[1303]

[1294] "The Burning of Charlestown" in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*, ed., Frank Moore (New York: D. Appleton, 1856), 97.

[1295] Ibid, 98; Charles Lee, no longer able to defend the actions of his comrade, echoed the ballad's rebuke of Gage, condemning him "to the hell of his own conscience and the infamy which must inevitably attend him!"; see Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, October 10, 1775, in the *Lee Papers*, 221.

[1296] Deborah Sampson Gannett, *Address, delivered with Applause, at the Feder-Street Theatre, Boston* (Dedham: Horace Mann, 1802), 16-17; Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.

[1297] Phillis Wheatly, *Liberty and Peace* (Boston: Warden and Russell, 1784); American Antiquarian Society.

[1298] Ibid.

[1299] Ibid.

[1300] John Warren, June 17, 1775, "Revolutionary War Diary."

[1301] Abigail Adams to John Adams, June 18, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 1:222; Thacher, *Military Journal*, 24, 31; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), July 13, 1775.

[1302] Ibid; Daniel George, *George's Cambridge Almanack* (Salem: Russell, 1775), ii; American Antiquarian Society. Sarah J. Purcell, *Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 13, 19.

[1303] Purcell, *Sealed with Blood*, 37; Purcell details how such episodes of public mourning were often led by the widows of colonial militiamen killed in combat, a tradition that continued throughout the entirety of British America's civil war for independence. For a comprehensive analysis of such public actions of mourning and grief, see Purcell, *Sealed with Blood*, 11-48.

Massachusetts rebels further stirred the "Tumultuous grief" within the "feeling Breast" of every British American with *An Elegy Occasion'd by the Death of Major-General Joseph Warren*.[1304] By encouraging its readers to "emulate" Warren's "Great Example" as a "Faithful, Gentle, and Sincere" patriot, *An Elegy* stoked communal sorrow and strengthened emergent bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling.[1305] The poem then encourages its readers to lay down their lives to protect the liberties of all British Americans, if necessary. Even though Warren's actions, by all civic and legal parameters, amounted to treason against his king, British America's rebels believed that he had died with as much "Glory as Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham."[1306] Through such rhetorical comparisons, Massachusetts's rebels had cast General Joseph Warren in the image of the virtuous General Wolfe. Furthermore, their explicit comparison laid the foundations for an implicit, and much more affectively powerful, comparison between Governor Gage (the commanding officer of Parliament's villainous regulars) and General de Montcalm (the French villain and betrayer of Fort William Henry, whom Wolfe had defeated at Québec).

As Boston's imperial loyalists prepared to spend the winter of 1775 under royal protection, a newfound "fear of bombardment" from British artillery drove New York's rebels from their homes.[1307] Those who remained were expected to suffer both Governor Gage's "Wrath" and "a bloody Campaign next Summer."[1308] The fear of New York's rebels was unsubstantiated, but actually aligned with a startling secret revealed in Gage's correspondence with Lord William Barrington. Days before the assault on Breed's Hill, Gage had urged Parliament to raise "all the Canadians and Indians," and even the "Negroes, in [the empire's] cause" to suppressing insurrections throughout all of North America.[1309] Unbeknownst to British America's rebels, Gage declared his willingness to manifest their darkest fear: that Parliament, to protect its arbitrary power, would "let loose" the "blood Hounds" of British America "to scalp men and to butcher Women and Children."[1310] Gage's private advocacy for total war cohered with one of British America's most popular, conspiratorial beliefs: that the governor, and likely all of Parliament's agents within the colonies, sought to unleash both Indigenous warriors and enslaved peoples against America's so-called *treasonous* rebels.[1311] Unlike Gage, Parliament understood that if it were possible, such an indiscriminate, brutal assault would create too much volatility among Britain's colonists to ever secure imperial reconciliation. Despite the governor's urging, Parliament neither condoned nor authorized the employment of Indigenous or enslaved peoples to squash Massachusetts's upstart rebellion.

By mid-August, however, the "Wickedness" of Massachusetts's rebels had become too much for imperial loyalists, some of whom chose to flee to London, lest they suffer further abuse or even death.[1312] The remainder fled to Governor Gage's protection. Gage insisted that Boston – a garrisoned city under martial law – would remain a sanctuary only for those royal subjects who truly were *loyal* to the British empire. As the governor lamented, "There is no kind of Tyranny and Cruelty

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[1304] *An Elegy Occasion'd by the Death of Major-General Joseph Warren* (Watertown, 1775); American Antiquarian Society.
[1305] Ibid
[1306] James Warren to John Adams, June 20, 1775, in *Adams Papers*, 3:37.
[1307] John Morin Scott to Colonel Richard Varick, November 15, 1775, in *Correspondences in 1775-76 in New York City during the American Revolution* (New York: Mercantile Library Association, 1861), 85.
[1308] Ibid.
[1309] Thomas Gage to Lord William Barrington, June 12, 1775, in *Gage Correspondence*, 2:684; Parkinson, *The Common Cause*, 98-99; Piecuch, *Three Kings*, 35, 40.
[1310] Ibid.
[1311] For a detailed analysis of British America's intellectual relationship with conspiracy theories in the decades preceding British America's civil war, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 144-159.
[1312] Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 144-159; Johnathan Sewall to Thomas Robbie, August 12, 1775 in "The Robbie-Sewall Papers"; Massachusetts Historical Society.

that these Pretenders to Freedom and Liberty don't exercise over those in Power who oppose their Schemes."[1313] Dismissing their rhetoric of disinterested patriotism, Gage depicted Massachusetts's rebels as nothing more than impetuous and immoral traitors, whose disobedience revealed their own despotic urges. Meanwhile, America's insurgent congress tasked the urgent liberation of Boston to the "Commander and Chief of the American Force," General George Washington.[1314] Much farther from his tobacco fields than he had ever intended, Washington arrived in Boston in July 1775. As the general soon discovered, the city had become but a cruel "stage," fit for "setting all the passions of the Human mind in motion."[1315]

Two days after the British's victory at Breed's Hill, naval impressment officers charged Peter Edes, the son of *Boston Gazette* editor Benjamin Edes, an outspoken Son of Liberty, with espionage.[1316] Imprisoned until October 3, Edes's journal provides a harrowing account of the turmoil and trauma which British American rebels experienced within garrisoned Boston.[1317] One evening, a "poor labouring man" was "brought to [the] goal."[1318] Though British soldiers did not suspect him of any wrongdoing, he was cruelly beat, and put in the dungeon" solely for their amusement.[1319] Such actions were commonplace, Edes recounted. In one evening, regulars "unmercifully beat" both "Old Mr. Howe, a poor insane man" whom they failed to convict of theft, and an unnamed enslaved man, whom the brutalized simply to "gratify" the immoral desires of "a certain young woman."[1320] For rebels like Edes, the willingness of British regulars to abuse their martial authority proved that they had betrayed their constitutional duty. Likewise, Edes was unconvinced by imperial loyalists' argument that Massachusetts's insurgents had become "the destroyers and murderers of those very people who protected them from the French and Indians of Canada."[1321] Rebels remained unwilling to acknowledge any validity to these accusations of imperial betrayal. Instead, colonial insurgents relentlessly condemned imperial regulars' brutalization of British civilians and their unabashed subservience to Parliament's corrupted ministry. Boston's rebellious rhetoric of horror and anger systematically severed the bonds of fellow-feeling that once tethered the heroic British soldier to all of George III's subjects, and thereby identified and affectively branded the imperial regular as the first political other to be excluded from America's emotional community of revolution.

Amid Boston's occupation by British soldiers, bonds of fellow-feeling strengthened between colonial rebels. "[M]y heart bleeds for the people of Boston," wrote Hannah Winthrop from Andover, Massachusetts, and "my Blood boils with resentment at the Treatment" they endured from British soldiers.[1322] Nothing, Winthrop declared, may equal either "the distress of parents Separated from their Children" or that of a "tender husband detained in Cruel Captivity from [his] Wife," who falls prey to the "fearfull looking for and expectation of Vengeance from the obdurate heart of a Tyrant."[1323] Upon his arrival in Boston, General Washington echoed Winthrop's

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[1313] Thomas Gage to William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth in *Gage Papers*, 1:411.
[1314] George Washington, "Address to the Continental Congress," June 16, 1775, in *Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series*, ed., W.W. Abott (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985), 1:1; here after cited as *Papers of GW*: *RW*; George Washington to Martha Washington, June 18, 1775, in *Papers of GW: RW*, 1:3-5.
[1315] Jonathan Sewall to Thomas Robbie, June 5, 1775, in "The Robbie-Sewall Papers."
[1316] Peter Edes, June 19, 1775, July 19, 1775; in "Peter Edes Diary, June-October 1775," 1-3, 6; Massachusetts Historical Society. Johnson, *Occupied America*, 24-25.
[1317] Johnson, *Occupied America*, 23, 59-60.
[1318] Edes, August 3, 1775, in "Peter Edes Diary," 8.
[1319] Ibid.
[1320] Edes, September 25, 1775, in "Peter Edes Diary," 20-21.
[1321] Edes, September 17, 1775, in "Peter Edes Diary," 19-20.
[1322] Hannah Winthrop to Mercy Otis Warren, August 17, 1775, in *Warren-Adams Letter*, 1:102.
[1323] Ibid.

sentiments. Washington protested to Gage "on the unworthy Treatment shewn to the Officers, and Citizens of America," including Peter Edes, still trapped within Boston. [1324] The "virtuous Citizens" of British America had been forced by "the Hand of Tyranny…into Arms to defend their Wives, their Children, & their Property." [1325] The struggle to free Boston, Washington continued, would decide whether they, or "the mercenary Instruments of lawless Domination, Avarice, and Revenge" shall "best deserve the Appellation of Rebels."[1326] By condemning Gage's treatment of the people of Boston, Washington reaffirmed the ideological paradigm first framed by Paine and then brought to life upon the blood-soaked fields of Concord and Breed's Hill: that British America's rebels were the empire's selfless patriots, fighting to protect the same freedoms for which General Wolfe gave his life. By the same token, Governor Gage and his traitorous imperial regulars became the cruel weapon of despotism, having betrayed their people, their constitution, and their empire.

Insurgent hatred for Governor Gage and sorrow for the people of Boston had forged bonds of intercolonial fellow-feeling. Yet these bonds were neither unbreakable nor above reproach. In late-November 1775, several "horsemen from New England" rode into New York City, assaulted imperial loyalist printer James Rivington, and seized his "types."[1327] To Alexander Hamilton, the unprovoked assault against Rivington mirrored the unjust accusations which Peter Edes suffered in Boston, and therefore were likely to produce great animosity and danger.[1328] The "chastise[ment of] the notorious friends of the ministry," Hamilton feared, might fabricate a perception that the people of New York "are totally, or a majority of them, disaffected to the American cause."[1329] If such intemperance persisted, New Yorkers would begin "quarrelling among [them]selves," develop "secret jealousy and ill blood," and become ineffectual in their rebellion against Parliament.[1330] Only nineteen-years-old, Hamilton understood a crucial characteristic of America's emotional community of revolution: that its members must subordinate their regional passions, personal interests, and private vendetta to the greater, patriotic mission of securing liberty for all of British America.

Washington knew that he needed to sustain British America's cohesive patriotic union to emerge victorious against Parliament. To achieve such unity, the general first had to prove his army capable of liberating Boston. In early-March 1776, the general ordered his troops to fortify Dorchester Point and prepared for combat.[1331] After several days of prolonged skirmishes, General Howe sent a "Flag of truce" to Washington, informing him that he would evacuate Boston and spare the city.[1332] Howe warned, however, that if any British regular was "mollisted [during] there Imbarkation," then Boston "would be Exposed To utter Destruction."[1333] Whether an idle threat or a genuine promise, Howe's standing order to raze the city of Boston left its terrified inhabitants holding their breath, waiting for the Continental army's response. Washington resolved to wait, unwilling to risk the urban heart of British America's rebellion to the horrid fate of Charlestown or Fort William Herny. Howe's forces evacuated without delay.

[1324] George Washington to Thomas Gage, August 19, 1775, in *Papers of GW: RW,* 1:326-327.

[1325] Ibid.

[1326] Ibid.

[1327] Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, November 26, 1775, in *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed., Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1:176. Governor Gage had received orders from Parliament to return to London on September 26, 1775, and General William Howe relieved Gage of his command on October 10; Alden, *General Gage in America*, 278, 283; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 224-225.

[1328] Ibid.

[1329] Hamilton to Jay, November 26, 1775, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 1:177.

[1330] Ibid.

[1331] Nash, March 4, 1776, in "Nash's Diary."

[1332] Ibid.

[1333] Ibid.

When dawn broke the morning of March 17, the British general had evacuated the eight thousand regulars under his command, as well as over one thousand Massachusetts imperial loyalists who had "had thrown themselves under the protection of the army."[1334] When Washington entered Boston three days later, the city's remaining insurgents and civilians, who had endured "unparalleled wickedness, profanity, debauchery, and cruelty," exhibited not only a "melancholy gloom which ten tedious months' siege had spread over their countenances," but also "a lively joy on being liberated from a long imprisonment."[1335] To distinguish the Continental army from Parliament's imperial regulars, Washington immediately publicized a decree: "If any officer or soldier [presumed] to strike, imprison, or otherwise ill-treat any of the inhabitant[s]" of Boston, then he will be "punished with the utmost severity."[1336] Through this singular order, Washington cast himself as a magnanimous liberator, whose unwavering kindness toward all Bostonians now echoed the patriotic virtue of British America's "heroic and affecting" protector, General Wolfe.[1337]

Boston's liberation stirred profound sentiments of sorrow and joy throughout Massachusetts, which occasionally mixed with hatred. James Warren solemnly remarked that the occupation of Boston would "leave a Stain on the British arms," for one day "Impartial Historians" shall record it as one of the many events that led to the "Eternal disgrace of Britain and her administration."[1338] For Hannah Winthrop, the "destruction in Boston, the devastation in Charlestown & Cambridge, [and] the ruin brought on many Families" cannot but "Excite [the] commiseration" of all British Americans, who now must appeal to "Heaven" for the "redress" of their "suffering."[1339] Despite such sorrow, Winthrop reminded her dear friend Mercy Otis Warren – the wife of James and sister-in-law to Joseph – that it is "truly marvellous" that Washington had expelled "those pestiferous barbarians" from Boston, and so all must "dilate" their "hearts with gratitude."[1340] Even Abigail Adams embraced the "ela[tion]" that arose from Britain's "quitting [of] Boston," even though she herself held a deep anxiety for Howe's next target, New York City.[1341]

Beyond Massachusetts, tempered expressions of patriotic joy at Boston's liberation stirred fellow-feeling among British America's rebels. Abraham Varick felt such "Joy" when he learned that Howe's regulars had fled Boston that he optimistically predicted that his "well fortified" home, New York City, was ready to give the British forces "a Scrag they will not Relish very well."[1342] For Richard Henry Lee, joy did not overcome the hatred and sorrow he still felt. Howe's "shameful flight from Boston" revealed the general's cruelty, as he "took time to remove…all the American prisoners (they had made) in chains," and inexcusably left "to the resentment of an injured country, many Tories, to whom [his administration] had promised protection."[1343] The vindictiveness of imperial regulars and the wanton misery they had inflicted upon *all* British colonists punctuated Lee's belief that Parliament, not America, had "already put [their] two Countries asunder."[1344] To

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[1334] Officer in the Army, *History of Civil War in America*, 1:110; George Washington to John Hancock, March 19, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW*, 3:489-491; Roche, "Where the power of law ceases," 113.
[1335] Timothy Newell, "A Journal kept during the Time that Boston was Shut Up in 1775-76," in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Ser. 4* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1852), 1:275-276; Thacher, *Military Journal*, 50.
[1336] George Washington, "Proclamation upon Occupying Boston, March 21, 1776" in *Papers of GW: RW*, 3:501-502.
[1337] Walpole, *Memoirs of King George II*, 3:74-75.
[1338] James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, April 15, 1776, in *A Study in Dissent*, 16.
[1339] Hannah Winthrop to Mercy Otis Warre, April 2, 1776, in "Warren Correspondence."
[1340] Ibid.
[1341] Abigail Adams to John Adams, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 1:359.
[1342] Abraham Varick to Richard Varick, March 28, 1776, in *Correspondences in 1775-76*, 88-89.
[1343] Richard Henry Lee to Landon Carter, April 1, 1776, in *Letters of RH Lee*, 1:173.
[1344] Ibid.

Lee's dismay, even Parliament "extensively hostile" actions in Boston did not persuade America's insurgent congress to abandon its futile "disputing and hesitating about independency."[1345]

For now, shared sentiments of hatred, sorrow, and tempered joy, circulated to unite the rebels. Yet John Adams hesitated, as he identified the foremost difficulty for British America's fledgling rebellion. To "penetrate and comprehend all the intricated and complicated Interests which compose the Machine of the Confederate Colonies" Adams wrote in April 1776, would require "that Serenity of Mind and Steadiness of Heart which is necessary to watch the Motion of Friends and Enemies."[1346] The people of Massachusetts had resisted, defeated, and excluded imperial regulars from America's emotional community of revolution. Yet this enemy did not engage the passions of all colonial rebels with the same fervor. The people of Virginia and New York would have to identify, and then politically other, their own hated agents of imperial tyranny. Only then might British America's rebels achieve affective cohesion, and thereby codify their exclusionary patriotic ethos.

Virginia's War against the Enslaved and Indigenous Other:

Unlike Massachusetts, where the insurgent elite's affective rhetoric primarily othered imperial regulars, Virginia's exclusionary discourse targeted enslaved and Indigenous peoples, as well as those agents of Parliament who courted imperial allegiances from North America's non-white inhabitants.[1347] In Virginia, delineating and maintaining the boundaries of America's emotional community of revolution required the fierce and violent vilification of those whose status as racial others already denied them the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all British subjects.

Enslaved revolts had acquired and sustained the affective value of terror within Viriginia's affective economy since the early-eighteenth century.[1348] To deter the colony's enslaved population from committing atrocities against their white enslavers, the House of Burgesses ratified three laws in the 1720s, which declared that all unsupervised meetings of enslaved Africans illegal.[1349] Any conspiratorial actions taken by enslaved Africans were made punishable by death, and the colony's militia was given authority to police all enslaved peoples within the state, thereby "instituting Virginia's first formal slave patrols."[1350] Nevertheless, Virginians continued to fear enslaved insurrections, which increased in moments of social instability and military conflict, such as the Seven Years' War.[1351]

Virginia's preoccupation with internal colonial security remained elevated throughout British America's taxation and quartering crises. In March 1767, Landon Carter submitted a notice to the *Virginia Gazette*, in which he expressed concern for the rowdy, insubordinate conduct of his enslaved laborers.[1352] After discovering that several "precious metal pots" had been stolen from his "out-houses," Carter warned his fellow planters to be on guard, as the enslaved peoples of the greater

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[1345] Richard Henry Lee to Landon Carter, April 1, 1776, in Letters of RH Lee, 1:173.

[1346] John Adams to James Warren, April 20, 1776, in *Warren-Adams Letters*, 1:232.

[1347] Visibility functions as an important tool to incite violent acts of political othering in early-years of British America's civil war for independence. Albeit able to remove while off-duty, British regulars' iconic redcoats made it that much easier for the Massachusetts insurgents – specifically those living in garrisoned Boston's – to take note of and oppose acts of perceived cruelty and tyranny performed by Parliament's soldiers. The visibility of Virginia's political others is that much more stark, as most enslaved and Indigenous peoples found it near impossible to blend into colonial society because of their skin's darker pigmentation.

[1348] Sally E. Hadden, *Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 29.

[1349] Hadden, *Slave Patrols*, 29-30.

[1350] Ibid.

[1351] Ibid, 152-153.

[1352] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), March 12, 1767.

Richmond area had been "corrupted by Liquors" and become thieves.[1353] Carter's brief notice evoked three crucial emotions: fear at the potential violence that intoxicated Africans might commit against their enslavers, sorrow for himself and his fellow Virginians for having to endure such ominous daily threats, and a subtle, implicit hope that an informed, educated white public might ensure the colony's safety. Several months later, a "Number of Negros" in Alexandria had "conspired to poison their Overseers." [1354] Though they were unsuccessful, at least of four of the enslaved conspirators were executed, in accordance with the House of Burgesses' zero-tolerance policy.[1355] To deter further enslaved resistance, Alexandria's officials had the executed conspirators decapitated, and then hung their heads atop "the Chimnies of the Court-Houses."[1356] The grotesque public mutilation of Black bodies reveals not simply white Virginians' unabating terror of and unapologetic hatred for their enslaved labors, but also their belief that civic-sponsored cruelty was the best path to ensure enslaved submission and obedience.

Whether they were suspected, averted, or successful, acts of enslaved violence dominated both Rind's and Purdie and Dixon's *Virginia Gazette*.[1357] When Virginia entered a devastating economic crises in 1772, colonists began to fear that decreasing wages might make their slave patrols derelict.[1358] During this economic downturn, the people of Virginia witnessed one of the most brutal episodes of private violence committed against an enslaved African recorded in British America's late-colonial era. On December 23, 1773, the *Virginia Gazette* reported that a "certain R.M. of A----a," – likely Alexandria – had "wantonly[,] cruelly, and inhumanely imbruine His Hands in the Blood of his miserable Slaves."[1359] The *Gazette* went on to describe R.M. as a "Savage Monster" guilty of

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[1353] *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), March 12, 1767.

[1354] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 31, 1767. Several of the executed slaves belonged to George Mason, whom George Washington noted was "disappointed of receiving £350 of the Publick" as recompense "for his executed Negroes," see George Washington to John Posey, June 11, 1767, in *GW Papers: CS* 8:211, 215 n.4.

[1355] Ibid.

[1356] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 31, 1767.

[1357] One such example of a successful act of enslaved violence may be found in Purdie and Dixon's *Virginia Gazette* from June 15, 1769. Robert and William Knox of Stafford reported that their brother, John, had been "barbarously murdered" by his enslaved laborers "near the door of his dwelling-house" the evening of May 29. The brothers warned the Stafford community to be on guard for these dangerous fugitives and promised a monetary reward upwards of £105 for their capture. It is important to note, however, that neither Robert nor William witnessed the murder, and therefore assumed that John's enslaved laborers had committed the crime; see *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), June 15, 1769.

[1358] The colony of Virginia never had a stable supply of specie, and thus commerce relied heavily on impersonal and "informal credit networks." To address this lack of currency, the House of Burgesses ratified a law in 1754 that made tobacco the method of paying for the slave patrol's salaries. Ironically, the 1750s saw Virginia's tobacco economy enter into a prolonged "boom and bust cycle," which forced many tobacco planters into debt with English merchants, as tobacco prices began a downward spiral towards the end of the Seven Years' War. The instability of tobacco prices, therefore, resulted in a significant fluctuation within the actual salary for slave patrollers, as they received ten pounds of tobacco per twenty-four-hour shift. Tobacco prices rebounded in 1764, yet they once again plummeted in 1772, instigating a near-two-year economic crisis within Virginia. Robert Carter argued that the devastation wrought across these two-years demonstrated, without a doubt, that tobacco was "completely adapted for restraining the Progress of Population, and of natural Wealth" of the people of Virginia; see Robert Carter to Reverend I. Murye, June 30, 1772; Robert Carter to William Taylor, July 1774, in "The Robert Carter Papers," MSS. American Antiquarian Society; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), August 5, 1773. Breen, *Tobacco Culture*, 96; 125-127, 199-200; Hadden, *Slave patrols*, 30.

[1359] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), December 23, 1773. The brutality exhibited by R.M., however, was not as uncommon as the *Virginia Gazette*'s narrative suggested. For example, Philip Vickers Fithian recorded a conversation he had with overseer working on George Lee's planation on December 23, 1773. Whipping slaves, the overseer explained, was an inefficient manner to secure their obedience. The overseer then argued that if a slave withheld information, the best practice was to "Lay upon your Floor a large thick plank, having a peg about eighteen Inches long, of hard wood, & very Sharp, on the upper end, fixed fast in the plank --then strip the Negro, tie the Cord to a staple in the Ceiling, so as that his foot may just rest on the sharpened Pen, then turn him briskly round, and you would laugh…at the Dexterity of the Negro, while he was relieving his Feet on the sharpened Peg!" Fithian, disgusted with this practice, declared that

the "Crimes of [a] Tyrant," which included wantonly murdering "upwards of fifty Slaves" over the past fifteen years.[1360] As reported, R.M. reveled in torturing enslaved people, such as Hampshire, who suffered "the lash repeatedly, had his Ears cut off, both his Legs [broken], and underwent Castration."[1361] No longer able to endure these cruelties, Hampshire fled, only to be caught sixty miles from R.M.'s plantation and imprisoned in the Charlotte County Jail. Rather than suffer future "Barbarity" from R.M., Hampshire "set Fire to the Prison, and Perished in the Flames."[1362]

Enslaved suicide was not uncommon in British America's southern colonies, yet enslavers frequently worked to suppress public reports of such horrors.[1363] For the *Virginia Gazette* to publish an article that recounted, in detail, such a violent episode of enslaved suicide reflects a larger political purpose. If enslaved people living under such brutal conditions were willing to suffer death by self-immolation – no longer terrified of such excruciating physical pain – imagine what horrors they might feel emboldened to inflict upon their enslavers. The *Virginia Gazette* concluded with a plea that Virginia's royal government execute R.M., as the "willful Murder of a Negroe" without just reason was a "Capital crime" that, if unaddressed, might incite an *en masse* enslaved insurrection throughout Alexandria, or worse yet, the entire colony.[1364] If individual enslavers were willing to defy the colony's best interest, then Virginia's officials must use both law and corporal punishment to deter such cruelty, and thereby prevent the deaths of white colonists at the hands of enslaved insurrectionists.

British colonists skirted a careful line with its anti-enslaved, anti-Black rhetoric. The threat of enslaved violence, this rhetoric argued, *should* stir terror within the hearts of every Virginian. To prevent such atrocities, enslaved laborers must be controlled through civically sanctioned forms of public intimidation and corporal deterrence. Simultaneously, Virginians must not succumb to bloodlust and mutilate their own enslaved laborers, lest casual cruelty spark a horrifying revolt, the nightmare of every tobacco planter. Such was the precarious balance that Virginians strove to maintain when Boston's tea riot and Parliament's retributive Coercive Acts ignited rumors of imperial rebellion. If a "hostile rupture" did occur between British America and England, James Madison observed, then imperial loyalists were likely to shatter the colony's fragile peace by inciting enslaved insurrections with promises of manumission and "freedom."[1365]

While the specter of enslaved insurrection terrified Virginia's larger plantations and burgeoning metropoles, the colony's backcountry settlers conjured their own terrifying fantasies of Indigenous raiding. Governor John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, worked to dispel such frontier anxieties, hoping to acquire both personal profit and political clout. Dunmore's victory against the Shawnee and Mingo in late-autumn 1774 won him the admiration of most Virginians, regardless of their imperial politics. Dunmore built upon this victory in January 1775, when he reported that Cherokee leaders already had executed those responsible for murdering several western settlers late the previous year. The Cherokee's unsolicited initiative in this matter had proven their "sincere desire" to remain in "peace and good agreement" with Virginia.[1366] To solidify the colony's emergent

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God "will take vengeance on such Inventions"; see Philip Vickers Fithian, *Journals and Letters*, ed., John Roger Willaims (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1900), 69.

[1360] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), December 23, 1773; Terri L. Snyder, *The Power to Die: Slavery and Suicide in British North America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 98-99, 127-128,

[1361] Ibid.

[1362] Ibid.

[1363] Snyder observes that the *Virginia Gazette* did not print its first account of an enslaved person dying by suicide until 1752, see *Power to Die*, 60-65.

[1364] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), December 23, 1773.

[1365] James Madison to William Bradford, November 26, 1774, in the *Papers of James Madison: CS*, 1:129-130.

[1366] *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), February 16, 1775.

détente with these Indigenous polities, yet seemingly in contradiction to the brutal campaign he had led against the Shawnee several months earlier, Dunmore forbid all Virginians from committing "violence upon, or doing any injury to, Indians of whatsoever tribe or nation," and promised "protection…by every means in [his] power" to the colony's neighbors.[1367] Dunmore understood that, for Indigenous relations to remain peaceful, only the arm of the state could swing the sword of intimidation – the same policy which colonists had applied to their enslaved laborers.

Declarations of peace, however, did not eradicate white suffering in Virginia's backcountry. To wage war against the Shawnee and Mingo – the same Indigenous polities which he now protected – Dunmore had authorized his military forces to commandeer provisions from the inhabitants of Augusta County.[1368] As late as April 1775, these settlers still found themselves in want of "[e]very necessity of life."[1369] Virginia's backcountry had become so impoverished from Dunmore's war, Nicholas Cresswell observed, that even "Grain [was] not to be got for money."[1370] From the perspective of Augusta County's starving farmers, whose lives were supposed to improve with the Shawnee and Mingo's defeat, Dunmore's proclamation to protect Virginia's Indigenous enemies hinted at a foreboding reality: that the governor would not hesitate to exert force against white Britons to achieve his political objectives.[1371]

When news of Lexington and Concord reached Virginia, insurgents immediately began courting those Indigenous polities which harbored hatred for Lord Dunmore, seeking temporary, mutually beneficial alliances.[1372] At a meeting with several Shawnee leaders in August 1775, George Gilmer issued an incendiary claim: that George III, "formerly the father of all," had "destroyed by fire, sword and violence, our houses, our wives and children, and numbers of our good brethren, and has declared that he is powerful."[1373] After his unflinching, and likely shocking rebuke of the British king, Gilmer begged the Shawnee to join with Virginia's rebels, "bury [their] Tomahawks in the Center of the Earth," and resist the "yoke of wicked men."[1374] Virginia's insurgents "desire[d]," now more than ever, "to keep the chain of peace and love" with the Shawnee "bright and strong, no more to be stained with blood, or rusted with contention, or broken asunder with discords."[1375] Ending his overtures of alliance, Gilmer warned the Shawnee not to believe any of Dunmore's promises. The governor had "failed in his word with [them] already" and was a "deceitfull" politician, unworthy of their trust.[1376] Gilmer had secured a new alliance and pact of friendship with the Shawnee by stoking fear of and rage for Virginia's royal governor, thereby exploiting the suffering that the Shawnee so recently had endured at Dunmore's hand.

Gilmer's diplomatic speech to the Shawnee exemplified the affective, negotiatory rhetoric with which British America's rebellious elite sought to forge *temporary* wartime alliances with their Indigenous neighbors. As president of America's insurgent congress, John Hancock sent official correspondence to all potential Indigenous allies in proximity to the thirteen rebellious colonies. Hancock's letters appealed to the "one heart" which he shared with his Indigenous "brothers" while

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1367 *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), February 16, 1775.
1368 Nicholas Cresswell, April 11, 1775, in *A Man Apart*, 38.
1369 Ibid.
1370 Cresswell, April 11, 1775, in *A Man Apart*, 38.
1371 For a more detailed analysis of the formation of British-Indigenous alliances transformed notions of "barbarism and national character" for both Britain and British America, see Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 242-244.
1372 George Gilmer To Young Cornstalk, Wolf, &c., Shawnee Chiefs, August 1775 in "Papers, Military and Political, 1775-1778 of George Gilmer, M.D." in *Collections of the Virginia Historical Society, Ser. 3* (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1887), 6:114-115.
1373 Ibid.
1374 Ibid.
1375 Ibid.
1376 Ibid.

chastising their king who, seduced by the "evil counsel of some foolish young men," now sought the destruction of his colonies.[1377] George Washington fostered similar sentiments among New York's Haudenosaunee, asking that they view him "as their brother," and join him in opposing imperial regulars who sought to "rob" both colonists and natives of their "Lands and [their] Houses." [1378] Washington promised the Haudenosaunee that "the malicious insinuations, or practices of [their] Enemies" would "never be able to break [their] Union" or their "Chain of friendship."[1379] Through their shared hatred for, and potential shared suffering at the hands of, imperial loyalists and regulars, America's rebels presented themselves as the only ally who might help their Indigenous neighbors survive the coming war with British empire. The promise of friendship, however, did not include admission into America's emotional community of revolution.

While America's rebellious elite courted Indigenous allies to pacify their western borders, Virginia's eastern inhabitants remained preoccupied with the threat of enslaved insurrection. Two-days after the skirmish at Concord, the *Virginia Gazette* reported that the General Court had executed William Pitman for the brutal murder of "his negro boy" – enacting the same punishment recommended for R.M. two Christmases earlier.[1380] Drunk and enraged, Pitman had tied the child "by the neck and heels, beat him most cruelly with a large grape vine, and then stamped him to death."[1381] The General Court's decision to executed Pitman came from neither sorrow nor compassion for the enslaved child. Rather, the judges hoped this punishment would serve as "warning to others to treat their slaves with moderation, and not give way to unruly passions," lest they incite enslaved insurrection.[1382] Through his recklessness, Pitman had exposed his fellow colonists to the brutality of enslaved reprisal – a mistake for which he paid with his life. The General Court's warnings were reinforced one week later, when Norfolk's civic leaders arrested, tried, and executed two enslaved men for "being concerned in a conspiracy to raise an insurrection in that town."[1383] Throughout the rest of the month, attempted enslaved insurrections occurred in Williamsburg, Prince Edward County, and Northumberland, in the most successful of which two enslaved men razed the home of a Virginia militia officer.[1384] The specter of enslaved revolt had become only more terrifying as Virginia prepared for civil war.

Dunmore sought to use this terror to his advantage. Rather than fall prey to the provocative, subversive discourse of Virginia's rebels, the governor urged imperial loyalists to guard against both their western "savage enemy…ready to renew their hostilities" against the king's subjects, and Virginia's own "internal weakness" of enslaved revolt.[1385] Further, Dunmore issued a proclamation on May 6, which required all loyal subjects of King George to "oppose…by every means" those treasonous Virginians who had instilled a "great Terrour [in] all his Majesty's faithful subjects" and "put themselves in a Posture of War."[1386] Through this political ultimatum, James Madison

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[1377] John Hancock, "Letter Written by John Hancock to the Indians by the Order of the Continental Congress," in the "Hancock Papers"; Massachusetts Historical Society.
[1378] George Washington to Joseph Johnson, February 20, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW*, 3:349.
[1379] Ibid.
[1380] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), April 21, 1775.
[1381] Ibid.
[1382] Ibid.
[1383] *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), April 29, 1775.
[1384] Edmund Pendleton to George Washington, April 21, 1775, in *GW Papers: CS*, 10:340; Michael A. McDonnell, *The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 49.
[1385] *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter) April 22 and May 6, 1775; DeLay, *Aim at Empire*.
[1386] John Murray, Earl of Dunmore, "Proclamation of May 6, 1775" (Williamsburg: Dixon & Hunter, 1775); American Antiquarian Society; McDonnell, *Politics of War*, 64-65.

observed, Dunmore proved himself a hypocrite, for even as he "profess[ed] an ardent friendship" with all Virginians, he exhibited "unparalleled malice" through his "villainy."[1387]

Dangerous rumors began to circulate that Dunmore had prepared to "make great Use" of enslaved Virginians "in case of a civil war."[1388] When Patrick Henry led a group of Piedmont insurgents to seize Williamsburg's public gunpowder supply on April 21, Dunmore privately "swore" that "if a Grain of Powder was burnt" by these traitors, he would "declare Freedom to the Slaves, and reduce the City of Williamsburg to ashes."[1389] While Governor Gage's plea to enlist Indigenous "blood hounds" and "Negroes" had remained secret, Dunmore's furious rant entered the House of Burgesses' public record the following day, and it intensified Virginians terror of enslaved insurrection. Madison disapproved, but reluctantly concurred with Dunmore that enslaved revolts were "the only part in which the Colony" was truly "vulnerable."[1390] Virginians' speculative terrors became a lived reality in mid-July, when a small group of escaped enslaved laborers boarded the Royal Navy's *H.M.S. Fowey* and received refuge under Dunmore's protection.[1391] Fear gave way to hatred throughout British America. A group of New York farmers burned Dunmore in effigy, unequivocally agreeing with their fellow Chesapeake rebels that the governor's "tampering with [their enslaved laborers] would incite many of them to cut their masters throats while they slept."[1392]

Hearing that enslaved people had escaped to the *H.M.S. Fowey*, some Virginians naively believed that the their most "trusted slaves" would reject Dunmore's implicit promise of freedom.[1393] Conversely, some of the colony's most radical insurrectionists proposed arming imperial loyalists' own enslaved laborers to fight against the British army.[1394] To defeat those "filthy, groveling vermin" still subservient to Parliament, Virginia's rebels must request aid from the "the powerful and warlike Indian nations" to their west and recruit those tens of thousands of enslaved Virginians who would fight for the "freedom" that British America's revolutionaries "so ardently desire they should enjoy."[1395] The effectiveness of this stratagem was never tested, as Washington, his fellow military officers, and most of the delegates to America's insurgent congress viewed enslaved enlistment as too reckless and desperate an act.[1396]

Without a clear path to deter enslaved insurrection or defection in Virginia, tensions continued to escalate into the fall. By permanently stationing *H.MS. Fowey* and the royal navy in Norfolk's harbor, Dunmore's displayed his willingness to "commence hostilities against his majesty's peaceable subjects" and to incite "the insurrection of [their] slaves," who continued to flock to his vessel for protection.[1397] By Halloween eve, Virginia's rebels were "ripe for revolt" and spoke "nothing but Curses and imprecations against England[,] her Fleets, Army, and Friends."[1398] Acutely

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[1387] James Madison to William Bradford, June 16, 1775, in *Madison Papers*, 1:153; Taylor, *Internal Enemy*, 22-23.
[1388] James Madison to William Bradford, June 16, 1775, in *Madison Papers*, 1:153; Taylor, *Internal Enemy*, 22-23.
[1389] *Journal of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1773-1776*, ed., John Pendleton Kennedy (Richmond, 1905), 231. DeLay, *Aim at Empire*; Taylor, *Internal Enemy*, 23-24
[1390] Ibid.
[1391] *Virginia Gazette* (Pickney), July 13, 1775.
[1392] "Extracts of a Letter from a Clergyman in Maryland to his Friend in England," August 2, 1775, in *American Archives 4*, 3:10; Horne, *Counter-Revolution 1776*, 222-225.
[1393] *Virginia Gazette* (Pickney), July 13, 1775.
[1394] Ibid.
[1395] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), September 22, 1775. While this anonymous letter does praise the potential manpower of Virginia in British America's forthcoming civil war, Virginians themselves had limited militia experience, most of which they acquired during the Seven Years' War, the experience of which, when coupled with the current economic hardships suffered within the colony, deterred many from initially enlisting; see McDonnell, *The Politics of War*, 21-27.
[1396] Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 173-176.
[1397] *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), October 26, 1775; *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), November 4, 1775.
[1398] Creswell, October 30, 1775, in *A Man Apart*, 89.

aware of Virginia's growing instability and eager to preempt the outbreak of armed rebellion, Dunmore issued a proclamation on November 7, 1775, which profoundly transformed the affective discourse of British America's civil war for independence.

"I have ever entertained Hopes that an Accommodation might have taken Place between great Britain and this Colony," Dunmore began, yet with no visible path to peace, the governor, as Gage before him, felt pressure to enact the "most disagreeable, but now absolutely necessary Step" of declaring martial law.[1399] Any Virginians who failed to assert their fidelity to, and fight on behalf of, George III will now "be looked upon as Traitors to his Majesty's Crown and Government."[1400] Furthermore, Dunmore proclaimed that "all indented Servants, Negroes, or others (appertaining to Rebels) free," so long as they were "able and willing to bear Arms" and voluntarily enlisted in "his Majesty's Troops."[1401] Through this single royal decree, Governor Dunmore manifested *the* greatest terror for southern colonists: that Parliament would free their enslaved laborers, so long as they took up arms and fought for British tyranny.

Dunmore's proclamation provided Virginia's rebels with a rhetorical gift, as it justified the scathing criticisms which they had lobbied against their royal governor. This broad liberation of enslaved laborers, Patrick Henry declared, was "fatal to the public safety" of Virginia.[1402] Dunmore had abandoned his responsibility to porrect Virginia's colonists, and Henry now took it upon himself to authorize "Constant, and well direct[ed slave] Patrols" to prevent insurrection within Hanover County.[1403] With a hate-fueled rhetoric, Purdie's *Virginia Gazette* built upon Henry's condemnation, denouncing the "baseness of [Dunmore's] heart, his malice and treachery against the people who were once under his government, and his officious violation of all law, justice, and humanity."[1404] Of all "the legions [in] horrid hell," the *Virginia Gazette* concluded, none were worse than Lord Dunmore's.[1405]

Contemporaneously, Pickney's *Virginia Gazette* published an anonymous letter, entitled "God Save the King," which threatened any enslaved Virginian who consider fleeing to Dunmore's banner.[1406] Mindful of the colony's recent attempts to curb white brutality against Black bodies, the epistolary warned enslaved men not to become "flattered" with the desire of "freedom," for if they chose to abandon their enslavers, then those unable to flee – the "[a]ged, the infirmed, the women, and children" – shall suffer the rage of their "provoked" masters.[1407] Dunmore's proclamation, the *Virginia Gazette* claimed, was deceptive and "cruel," for the freedom it promised required enslaved

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[1399] John Murray, Earl of Dunmore, "Proclamation, November 7, 1775" (Norfolk: Virginia, 1775); Library Company of Philadelphia.

[1400] Ibid.

[1401] Ibid.

[1402] Patrick Henry, "Proclamation, November 20, 1775" (Williamsburg, 1775); Library Company of Philadelphia.

[1403] Ibid.

[1404] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), November 24, 1775. "Malice," as defined by Samuel Johnson, refers to either the "deliberate mischief" or "ill intention to any one" and "the desire of hurting." Adam Smith argues that the "idea of a mischievous, though sensible being, indeed naturally provokes our hatred; but the ill-will which in this case we bear to it is really the effect of our universal benevolence. It is the effect of the sympathy which we feel with the misery and resentment of those other innocent and sensible beings whose happiness is disturbed by its malice." Malice and malicious actions, therefore, serves as one of the primary emotions which elicits sympathetic hatred from those who witness it; see Johnson, *English Dictionary*, "Malice"; Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 235.

[1405] Ibid.

[1406] *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), November 23, 1775. The enslaved literacy rate of the greater Richmond-Hanover County region was likely significantly higher than most of the American south thanks to Samuel Davies campaign to increase literacy among Virginia's enslaved inhabitants; for a detailed account of Davies' literacy campaign, see Jeffrey H. Richards, "Samuel Davies and the Transatlantic Campaign for Slave Literacy in Virginia" *Virgina Magazine of History and Biography* 111 (2003): 333-378.

[1407] Ibid.

men to abandon the weaker members of their families and communities to the vicious whims of their offended enslavers.[1408] Furthermore, this Virginian argued that enslaved peoples must remain guarded against Dunmore himself, as he was as likely to sell them to "barbarous master[s]" in the West Indies as he was to grant them their freedom.[1409] "God Save the King" concluded with a simple plea to all enslaved peoples: consider their "welfare" and refuse Dunmore's incitements.[1410]

To the horror of Virginian rebels, Dunmore's "infernal scheme" failed to unite the colony in opposition to Parliament.[1411] Instead, it had a "wonderful effect" upon the morale of imperial loyalists, as enslaved laborers from Richmond and Williamsburg "flock[ed]" to the royal standard.[1412] In response, Virginia's General Congress declared that any enslaved person who committed the "unlawful and wicked" act of enlisting in Dunmore's forces would "suffer death, and be excluded all benefit of clergy."[1413] Enslaved fugitives, congressional president Edmund Pendleton explained, might receive a pardon, but *only* if they voluntarily surrendered themselves to militia Colonel William Woodford and then peaceably returned to their enslavers.[1414] Submission to the daily barbarities of southern enslavement was the only "mercy" that Virginia's insurgent government now offered.[1415]

The profound hatred which Virginia's rebels had expressed toward Dunmore, and then toward the enslaved laborers he had recruited, further extended to Parliament. The "Ministry have taken every pitiful, puerile, and contemptible method to distress" all of British America, one Virginian insurgent argued.[1416] Parliament had ordered Dunmore to "give arms and freedom to the Negroes," to send "tomahawks, scalping knives, arms and ammunition to all the Indian tribes…[and] encourage them to attack," and to establish a "papacy in Canada," as he now "ordered an army to be raised of Roman Catholics, to attack the southern provinces."[1417] Dripping with rage and hatred, this epistle reaffirmed the overwhelming, profound betrayal that Virginians felt because of Parliament's provocation of Catholics, Indigenous warriors, and above all else, enslaved laborers to murder those colonial rebels fighting to protect their freedoms. When Prime Minister Frederick North stood before the House of Commons and reassured the empire that "there was never any idea of raising or employing the negroes or the Indians, until the Americans themselves had first applied to them," it further damaged British America's opinion of Parliament.[1418] Tragically unaware

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[1408] Ibid.

[1409] *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), November 23, 1775.

[1410] Ibid.

[1411] Approximately Over 800 enslaved men, and another 800 enslaved women and children had entered into the governor's protection by early-1776Philip Vickers Fithian, November 28, 1755, in *Philip Vickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776; Written on the Virginia-Pennsylvania Frontier and in the Army around New York*, Robert Albion and Leonidas Dodson, eds. (Princeton, 1934), 135; Richard Henry Lee to Catherine Maccauley, November 29, 1775, in *Letters of the Continental Congress*, 2:406; Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 154. An Officer of the Army, *History of the Civil War in America*, 1:145-146; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), November 17, 1775, January 26, 1776; Taylor, *Internal Enemy*, 23-24. For a detailed account of how print media encouraged enslaved laborers flight to Dunmore, see Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 154-163.

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[1413] *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), December 16, 1775.

[1414] Ibid.

[1415] Ibid.

[1416] *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), December 23, 1775.

[1417] Ibid.

[1418] *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America* , 6:656. Piecuch, *Three Kings*, 43.

of Dunmore's proclamation, North's speech provided bias-confirmation to the popular beliefs held by Virginia's insurgents: either every minister was a hypocritical liar, or Parliament had lost its ability to control its corrupted agents within the colonies. Both options proved the necessity of British America's rebellion.[1419]

Amid this hostile political environment, Virginia's rebellious elite began to theorize the atrocities which they themselves might need to commit to win their rebellion. Days after Dunmore's incendiary proclamation freeing enslaved Virginians, John Page informed Jefferson that those imperial loyalists living in rebel occupied Norfolk were "under dreadful Apprehension" that Colonel Woodford would order "the Town burnt."[1420] Page's letter is noteworthy for its absence of fellow-feeling, as it callously recounted that every Virginian loyalist "deserve[d]" only to be "ruined and hanged."[1421] Filled with hatred for his fellow Virginians, Page urged the colony's rebels to "destroy" Norfolk, if necessary.[1422] The aim was not to inflict the retribution that their loyalist neighbors so rightfully deserved, but rather to prevent the city from being "garrisoned by [their] Enemies."[1423] To the shock of Virginia's rebels, however, it was Governor Dunmore, not their own leaders, who initiated the destruction of Norfolk.

Two months passed and, by late-December 1775, Dunmore's chances of retaking Norfolk had collapsed. Thus, the governor "retired" to the *Liverpool* with those British colonists and enslaved peoples "well affected" to his government.[1424] At approximately 3pm on January 1, 1776, Dunmore ordered the *Liverpool*, the *Kingfisher*, and the *Otter* to begin a "heavy Cannonading" of Norfolk and, within the hour, a party of British sailors had "sett Fire to the Town."[1425] Great "melancholy" consumed those rebels who witnessed "women and children running through crowds and shot to escape the town, some with [their] children at their breast."[1426] Ablaze for three days, ninety percent of Norfolk was "reduced to ashes," resulting in approximately £300,000 of property damage.[1427] The Virginia General Convention's £1,000 procurement for the "immediate relief to the poor distressed inhabitants" of Norfolk proved woefully inadequate.[1428]

Virginia's rebels blamed Dunmore for Norfolk's destruction, but it remained unclear whose soldiers inflicted the greatest suffering upon the city. Dunmore, however, proclaimed his innocence. While he had given orders to cannonade and raze Norfolk's waterfront buildings, the governor remained firm that Virginia's rebels themselves had "cruelly and unnecessarily completed the

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[1419] Parliament had at least some inclination of Dunmore's plan, as Governor Gage had informed Lord Dartmouth, in a letter dated May 15, that he had heard "private Letter that a Declaration his Lordship had made, of Proclaiming all the Negroes free who join him, has startled the Insurgents"; see Thomas Gage to Dartmouth, May 15, 1775, in *Gage Correspondence*, 1:3990

[1420] John Page to Thomas Jefferson, November 11, 1775, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 1:258-259.

[1421] Ibid.

[1422] Ibid.

[1423] Ibid.

[1424] "A Letter from a Midshipman on Board the Liverpool, Off Norfolk in Virginia," January 4, 1776, in *Naval Documents of the American Revolution*, ed., William Bell Clark (Washington D.C., 1968), 3:621.

[1425] Journal of Captain James Montagu, January 1, 1776, in *Naval Documents of the American Revolution*, 3:565; Henry Bellew to Philip Stephens, January 11, 1776, in *Naval Documents of the American Revolution*, 3:738.

[1426] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), January 5, 1776.

[1427] Fithian, January 3, 1776, in *Fithian Journal*, 165; Lamb, *Original and Authentic Journal*, 95-96; *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), February 10, 1776.

[1428] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), January 12, 1776; Robert Carter to John Ridout, January 23, 1776, in "Robert Carter Papers"; American Antiquarian Society. For a more detailed analysis of how the destruction, intentional or accidental, of homes, towns, and cities informed contemporary political justifications for British America's civil war for independence, see Carp, "'Disreputable among Civilized Nations,'" 168-181.

destruction of the whole town, by setting fire to the houses in the streets back."[1429] At least one British officer and one civilian loyalist corroborated Dunmore's narrative, attesting that those insurgents under Colonel Robert Howe's command had "set the whole town in flames" in an act of "Barbarity, Folly, & Injustice."[1430] It is uncertain as to whether the destruction of Norfolk "proceeded from orders, or the dictates of [Howe's] own diabolical heart."[1431] What is certain, however, is that the grim strategy which Howe perfectly enacted aligned with the recommendations Page had presented to Jefferson only six weeks earlier.

Trying to spare Boston from a similar fate, Washington rejected any speculation that his fellow rebels had destroyed Norfolk. Rather, the general mourned for the people of Norfolk. Lauding the spirit of his fellow "Countrymen," the general implored the people of Norfolk to "rise superior to any losses" suffered under Dunmore's unabashed cruelty.[1432] The city's unwarranted and indiscriminate destruction, Washington further stressed, had "no other effect than to unite the whole Country in one indissoluble Band against a Nation which seems to be lost to every sense of Virtue, and those feeling which distinguish a Civilized People from the most barbarous Savages."[1433] The devastation of Norfolk, Washington astutely concluded, had fueled the hatred and sorrow necessary to strengthen Virginia's intracolonial and America's intercolonial bonds of fellow-feeling.

Purdie's *Virginia Gazette* concurred with Washington's assessment, as accusations that Dunmore indeed razed Norfolk gave the "world specimens of British cruelty and American fortitude."[1434] The constant brutality exhibited by both imperial regulars and loyalists – "stimulated by cruelty, a rancorous malice, and an infernal spirit of revenge" – now forced America's rebels to "cut the Gordian knot which has hitherto bound [them] to Britain."[1435] By razing Norfolk, seducing enslaved laborers to violent insurrection, and abandoning those colonists whom he had sworn to protect, Lord Dunmore had stirred an unrelenting, unifying hatred within the hearts of every Virginian rebel.

America's insurgent elite affectively othered both imperial regulars and enslaved peoples, refining further their emotional community of revolution. Imperial regulars had earned their exclusion by voluntarily fighting on behalf of corrupted leaders – like governors Gage and Dunmore – to suppress the rights and freedoms of their fellow Britons. By contrast, enslaved peoples already had been born excluded from British freedoms because of their African heritage and their status as bound laborers. Enslaved peoples' willingness to flee their enslavement under Virginia's rebels, and subsequently sacrifice British America's civic freedom for their own bodily autonomy, only cemented their status as political others. American insurgents now demarcated the enemies of their political independence by color: either that of a red coat or of black skin.

The distinction between fellow rebel, strategic ally, and political other proved much more complicated and dangerous for those Indigenous polities whom Virginia's rebels had courted in early-1775. Common "motives for bloodshed – racial antipathy and competition for land – remained

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[1429] John Murray, Earl of Dunmore, "Account of the Burning of Norfolk" Printed in the *Virginia Gazette* aboard the Ship Dunmore, in the Norfolk Harbor, in *American Archives 4*, 4:540-541.
[1430] Officer of the Army, *History of the Civil War in America*, 151-152; *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), February 10, 1776; Walke, *Remarkable Occurrences*, 7.
[1431] Officer of the Army, *History of the Civil War in America*, 151-152; *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon & Hunter), February 10, 1776.
[1432] George Washington to Joseph Reed, January 31, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW*, 3:225-229.
[1433] Ibid.
[1434] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), January 5, 1776; John Kukla credits this piece to Patrick Henry in "*We Should Declare Ourselves Independent": Three Newly Discovered Virginia Gazette Essays by Patrick Henry*, ed., John Kukla (Brookneal: Patrick Henry Memorial Foundation, 2008).
[1435] Ibid.

strong as ever" in Virginia's backcountry and the larger Ohio territory in 1775 and 1776.[1436] Without a stable colonial government to support their aggressive, western expansion, Virginians – rebel and loyalist alike – rarely sought conflict with their Indigenous neighbors.[1437] The rapid success of, and subsequent instability brough by, Dunmore's flight from Richmond and the Second Continental Congress's *Declaration of Independence* only added further deterrents for settlement in the Ohio territory.[1438] Indigenous leaders, such as Lenape sachem White Eyes, worked tirelessly to secure promises from Virginia's insurgent government that they would honor the promises which Dunmore had made in the years prior.[1439] The fluidity of these complex networks of British-Indigenous alliances only became more difficult to parse as British America's civil war for independence drug into its third year.

In early-spring 1777, insurgent governor Patrick Henry ordered Superintendent of Indian Affairs George Morgan and Continental Colonel John Nevill to persuade both the Shawnee and the Lenape to provide aid in a forthcoming assault against the Chippewas, Ottawa, and Wyandots currently occupying Pluggy's Town, near modern-day Columbus, Ohio.[1440] To elicit their martial support, Henry urged Morgan and Nevill to remind their Indigenous allies that these "villainous Indians" had sided with the British, and by "their frequent mischiefs, may breed Suspicion against [Virginia's] innocent friends & Allies; for it is often difficult to tell what Nations are the Offenders."[1441] Embracing a central racist paradigm of eighteenth-century anti-Indigenous hatred – that *all Indians look the same* – Henry subtly threatened the Shawnee and Lenape with popular violence for their visible political otherness. The implicit solution: help to defeat those Indigenous polities who had aligned with Britain and violently raided the colony's western settlements. Eliminating these threats for the people of Virginia had an added benefit, as it supposedly would spare the Shawnee and Lenape from the indiscriminate retaliation of the colony's enraged, bereaved, reckless insurgents. Despite his less than subtle threat, Henry sternly reminded Morgan and Nevill to give "strict orders" that their militiamen must neither "molest [nor] offend" any Indigenous person except those British allies who occupied Pluggy's Town.[1442]

Henry's implicit threat of indiscriminate anti-Indigenous violence proved prophetic. In early-1778, an unidentified group of British colonists murdered Shawnee Chief Cornstalk – the very same leader who had forged an alliance with George Gilmer against Lord Dunmore in August 1775.[1443] Shawnee commitments to Virginia, General Edward Hand reported from the Ohio territory, immediately "vanished," as many believed that a group of rebels had murdered their chief in cold-

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[1436] Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 68.

[1437] Ibid.

[1438] Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 71-79.

[1439] Ibid, 80-82.

[1440] Patrick Henry to George Mason and John Nevill, March 12, 1777, in *Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence, and Speeches*, ed., William Wirt Henry (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), 3:46-47; Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32-33, 166.

[1441] Ibid.

[1442] Patrick Henry to George Mason and John Nevill, March 12, 1777, *Henry's Life & Correspondence* 3:46-47. Silver argues that British American revolutionaries' anti-Indigenous rhetoric, often in the form of fear and hatred of Indigenous peoples' perceived savageness and brutality, led to "extraordinary anti-Indian violence" in the later years of British America's civil war for independence, of which this episode is but one episode; Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, xxii-xxiii.

[1443] Patrick Henry to William Preston, February 19, 1788, in *Henry's Life & Correspondence*, 3:145; Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 375. It is important to note the personal and communal risk that Cornstalk himself took entering into such an alliance with Virginia's rebellious elite. As discussed in Chapter 1, Cornstalk had forged similar bonds of political attachment with Lord Dunmore in late-autumn, 1774, and thus by entertaining and allying with Gilmer, had violated his polity's peace with both Virginia and the British empire.

blood.[1444] Fearful of Shawnee "hostility," Henry ordered Colonel William Preston to "have every Gun in your County put into good order….ready for action," as the careless deeds of a "few wicked men" had placed Virginia on the precipice of a new, bloody frontier war.[1445] Henry was enraged at the likelihood that Virginian rebels had murdered Cornstalk, and he quickly dispelled public rumors that he would "not suffer the apprehension of the murderers."[1446] Rather, Henry informed Preston that if these backcountry settlers would "not submit to the Laws" of Virginia, then they would "not be considered and entitled to [its] protection."[1447] Desperate to preserve his crumbling Shawnee alliance, Henry prayed that the "Murderers [were] Torys," possibly exacting revenge for the Shawnee's betrayal of Dunmore, as blaming such wanton cruelty on imperial loyalists might preserve both the "Honor" of Virginia and its wartime alliances not just with the Shawnee, but rather with the Lenape and Cherokee as well.[1448] Regardless of which side was guilty, Henry made it abundantly clear to Colonel Preston that he must bring the "Murderers of [these] Indians to Justice."[1449]

Henry's pleas went unanswered, and a few weeks later the governor learned that intoxicated rebels had murdered Cornstalk, mistaking him and his fellow Shawnee for a group of Indigenous warriors who had murdered one of their fellow militiamen.[1450] To ameliorate escalating tensions with the Shawnee, Henry issued a proclamation, imploring every true patriot of Virginia to capture these fugitive murderers, avenge the "barbarous and atrocious murder" of Chief Cornstalk, and heal this "deep wound…to the honor and faith of this country."[1451] Loyalist newspapers covered Cornstalk's "assassination" in detail, whereas Purdie's insurgent sympathizing *Virginia Gazette* provided only minimal coverage.[1452] Virginia's insurgent elite were in a bind. If they publicly and repetitiously condemned their militiamen for the cruelty with which they brutalized Indigenous bodies (especially when the victims were assumed allies of the British empire), then they risked weakening the bonds of intrastate fellow-feeling, as well as destabilizing their membership in America's emotional community of revolution. Virginia's insurgent elite, therefore, displayed proper horror and sorrow for the death of one of their most trusted Shawnee allies, but they did not rebuke the "Indian-hating" violence which had helped secure British America's frontiers during the Seven Years' War, and now promised to strengthen America's own political identity.

The unrelenting power of British America's anti-Indigenous hatred arose not simply from racist ideology, but also from anecdotal evidence carefully circulated throughout the colonies' public sphere.[1453] Four months before Cornstalk's murder, British General John Burgoyne published a decree that promised New York's imperial loyalists the "protection [of] his power."[1454] Burgoyne's protection, therefore, should have extended to Jenny McCrea, the fiancé of David Jones, a loyalist

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[1444] Edward Hand to Jasper Yeats, November 24, 1777, in "Edward Hand Papers"; New York Public Library; Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 375.

[1445] Patrick Henry to William Preston, February 19, 1778, in *Henry's Life & Correspondence*, 3:145-146. For a detailed account of the assault on Pluggy's Town and the subsequent murder of Cornstalk, see Harper, *Unsettling the West*, 84-104.

[1446] Patrick Henry to William Preston, February 19, 1778, 3:146.

[1447] Ibid.

[1448] Ibid.

[1449] Ibid.

[1450] Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 375-376.

[1451] *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), April 3, 1778.

[1452] *Royal American Gazette*, June 2, 1778. Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 376.

[1453] Parkinson observes that accounts of Jenny McCree's murdered circulated throughout at least eighteen British American newspapers from July 31 to September 11, 1777, which included the following: *New York Packet*, July 31, 1777; *New-York Journal*, August 4, 1777; *Independent Chronicle*, August 7, 1777; *Boston Gazette*, August 11, 1777; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), August 13, 1777; *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), August 22, 1777. Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 340.

[1454] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 113-114; Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors,* 245-248.

officer who aided Burgoyne's army in the Glens Falls region of New York.[1455] McCrea waited to rendezvous with her betrothed at Fort Edward, when a British-allied Indigenous raiding party passed the fort. McCrea became their prisoner and, while bargaining for her life, one of the Indigenous "monsters," consumed with "savage barbarity…struck his tomahawk into her skull, and immediately stripped off her scalp."[1456] Burgoyne took no responsibility. Upon learning of this horrid murder, he immediately denied that he had paid these Indigenous warriors to procure the scalps of colonial rebels, assuring America's military officers that he had only authorized them to "receive compensation for prisoners."[1457] McCrea, Burgoyne lamented, was simply the tragic victim of a "fit of savage passion."[1458]

Massachusetts's *Independent Chronicle* took this anti-Indigenous rhetoric one-step further. The "infernal ferocity" of America's Indigenous "enemies, who, devil like, delight in the most barbarous acts of cruelty," shall always have an "insatiable thirst for human blood, without discrimination for friend or foe."[1459] This horror-eliciting rhetoric reinforced a deep-seated (and blatantly hypocritical) fear among America's rebels – that their Indigenous allies might mistake them (through either negligence or apathy) as imperial loyalists faithful to George III, and thus murder them without hesitation. America's insurgent presses thereby cultivated a fictious terror – that every Indigenous person held indiscriminate, anti-white violence within their hearts – whilst simultaneously ignoring British colonists' own inclination towards the same, racist behavior. Further, America's newspapers rarely depicted Indigenous peoples as anything other than bloodthirsty savages who, if permitted, would enact untold horrors for their own carnal pleasure. Ignoring the temporary alliances forged during British America's civil war for independence, colonial insurgents and revolutionaries ensured that all Indigenous peoples remained hated political others, unworthy of accessing the benefits of America's emotional community of revolution.

New York City: A Den of Loyalist Traitors:

Since the news of Lexington had reached their city, New York's imperial loyalists fought to ensure that their colony remained a stronghold for the faithful subjects of George III. New York City's numerous loyalist population, therefore, made the city a "preferable" headquarters to combat British America's rebellion.[1460] Even those imperial loyalists most sympathetic to their rebellious brethren's grievances advocated for a "legal and constitutional means" for securing their freedoms as faithful subjects of the British crown.[1461] These British colonists truly "feared that independence" from their empire would "result in political anarchy and social chaos."[1462]

Mutual enmity only grew. Continental soldiers stationed in New York had less patience for imperial sycophants. General Henry Knox of Massachusetts confessed to his wife Lucy that he

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[1455] Parkison, *Common Cause*, 340.
[1456] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 113-114.
[1457] Ibid, 114-115.
[1458] Ibid; Throughout British America's civil war, insurgents readily attributed the characteristics of barbarity and savageness not only to Indigenous peoples, but also to those imperial loyalists and British regulars who facilitated and encouraged such cruelty and violence; see Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 240. A distinction, however, remained in how British American insurgents retaliated, as Continental soldiers readily scalped Indigenous peoples allied with Britain, but rarely scalped imperial loyalists, as exemplified in General John Sullivan's campaign against the Iroquois in 1778-1779; see, Wayne E. Lee, *Barbarians & Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 219-225.
[1459] *Independent Chronicle*, August 14, 1777; Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 342.
[1460] Thomas Gage to William Legge, Lord Dartmouth, August 20 and October 1, 1775, in *Gage Correspondence* 1:413, 418; Chopra, *Unnatural Rebellion,* 46.
[1461] Chopra, *Unnatural Rebellion*, 58; Peterson, "War in the Cities," 203.
[1462] Ibid.

found New York's "Toryism" to be an "Unsufferable" crime, for which "they must repent in dust and ashes."[1463] By early-1776, New York's loyalists themselves began to lose patience, particularly with the insurgent elite's fallacious argument that "nothing but independence" from the British empire would "keep the peace of [British America] and preserve it inviolate from civil wars."[1464] Appealing to the "passion of the populace," Reverend Charles Inglis urged the denizens of New York City to reject such promises and schemes.[1465] Fighting a civil war to achieve independence would serve only to "dismember this happy country" and "make it a scene blood and slaughter."[1466] Death, not freedom, awaited British America if its boisterous rebels courted treasonous ambition.

New York's rebels were only encouraged, however, when Howe evacuated Boston in mid-March 1776. The "Breasts of every Friend to America" swelled with "new Hopes of Conquests" and a sincere desire "to rescue" the rest of the colonies "from the Shackles & Oppressions of a British Parliament."[1467] These lofty objectives rested heavily upon New York City, for its capture by the British army would be a "fatal stab" to both British America's rebellion and its desire for independence.[1468] Eagerly awaiting the arrival of their Continental army, New York's insurgent elite demanded that all imperial loyalists surrender "their Arms, & take an Oath, that [they will] resist every attempt made by the British Ministry to violate the rights and Liberties of America, or at least not assist them in any of their secreat Machinations."[1469] If they refused to display publicly their *American* patriotism, then they would become prisoners of the rebellion.[1470] New York's insurgents only became bolder once America's insurgent congress declared their colony, as well as its twelve co-conspirators, sovereign states, independent of the British empire. Ironically, the *Declaration of Independence* received unanimous approval only through the abstention of New York's delegation.[1471]

Neither the *Declaration* nor the presence of Washington's army deterred Howe from besieging New York City in summer 1776. The political terrain was muddled: British America's rebellious colonies had declared independence, but they were not internationally recognized. Howe, therefore, responded with a proclamation of his own the morning of July 14. George III had granted him the authority to pardon "all those, who, in the Tumult and Disorder of the Times, may have deviated from their just Allegiance" to the British empire, but now are "willing, by speedy Return to their Duty, to reap the Benefits of the Royal Favor."[1472] In the wake of the *Declaration of Independence*, Howe's offer of absolution struck a profound chord with New York's imperial loyalists, who reaffirmed their "unremitting love of monarchy" and their firm belief that their king might still save

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[1463] Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, January 5, 1776, in *The Revolutionary War Lives and Letters of Lucy and Henry Knox*, ed., Philip Hamilton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2017), 25.

[1464] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, in *Common Sense, the Crisis, & Other Writings from the American Revolution*, ed., Eric Foner (New York: Library of America, 2015), 3; Chopra, *Unnatural Rebellion*, 44.

[1465] Inglis, *The Deceiver Unmasked*, iii-vii, 87.

[1466] Ibid.

[1467] Jonathan Varick Jr. to Richard Varick, April 1, 1776, in *Correspondence 1775-76*, 90-91.

[1468] George Washington to Pierre van Cortlandt, January 8, 1776, *Papers of GW: RW*, 3:55-56.

[1469] John Varick Jr. to Richard Varick, May 14, 1776, in *in New York City during the American Revolution*; 91; "Secret Committee Warrant for the Arrest of John Campbell," June 26, 1776, in *Selected Jay Papers*, 1:259-260.

[1470] Ibid. Donald F. Johnson argues that pragmatic considerations, such as "protecting families, securing food and shelter, and preventing destruction of property," often informed the political allegiances professed by those living in garrisoned cities or under martial occupation. Furthermore, such pressures often encouraged individuals to "switch sides multiple times or even take hostile attitudes towards both sides" of a war. Throughout the occupation of New York, material instability, accusations of martial plunder, and disputes over imperial quartering further exacerbated the already ambiguous allegiances within the city and significantly inhibited Howe's ability to persuade rebels to return to the British fold; see Johnson, *Occupied America*, 7-8, 15, 113-114, 118-119, 121-123, 129; 138-141.

[1471] George Washington, "General Orders" July 9, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW,* 5:245-246; Beeman, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes*, 415.

[1472] *New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, November 4, 1776.

them from this "unnatural civil war."[1473] Adoration of and optimism for Howe's forces only intensified as, that very evening, New York's loyalists watched a mob of civilians tear down the city's statue of George III and melt it into musket balls for the purpose of making "deep impressions in the Bodies of some of [the king's] red Coated and Torie Subjects."[1474] Branded traitors of the nominally-independent United States, New York's terrified imperial loyalists welcomed Howe's military occupation.[1475]

Britons on both sides of the Atlantic criticized America's rhetoric of righteous independence as deceptive. Merchant Israel Mauduit chastised British rebels for making "a show of public virtue" and for hiding their treasonous behavior under the "cloak of patriotism."[1476] By "singing "the syren song of liberty," they hoped to "seduce" the empire's faithful subjects into the "worst slavery – the banishment of reflection, and the tyranny of passions."[1477] America's insurgent congress unjustly nurtured a "malicious spirit of revenge."[1478] Ambrose Searle, Howe's personal secretary, echoed Mauduit's political opinions with greater passion. "Rebellion is indeed as the Sin of Witchcraft," Serle observed, for it "hardens the heart against every sound Principle of Religion and Duty."[1479] The British officer felt great "Sympathy" for New York's imperial loyalists, as he had received countless reports that they had been "hunted for their Lives[,] like Game into the Woods and Swamps, only because they would not renounce their allegiance to their King and affection for their Country."[1480] Under the guise of "Patriotism" and "superior Liberty," Searle sarcastically concluded, America's insurgent elite had unleased the "choicest Blessings" of their violent "Faction" against New York's imperial loyalists, with the sole purpose of subjecting them to the "worst of Bondage."[1481] Consumed by both rage and disgust, Searle unequivocally believed that America's rebellious traitors – by subjecting their fellow Britons to the fetters of political anarchy – had abandoned both their empire and all vestiges of human decency. Although not intended for circulation, Serle's words reflected the valence of disgust which had become central to imperial loyalists own emotional community.

Despite the yawing chasm of hatred that now separated colonial rebels and imperial loyalists, interstate bonds of patriotic fellow-feeling proved difficult to nurture within Washington's regionally diverse army. The general himself felt "great concern" for the "Jealousies" that had "arisen among the troops from the different provinces" now stationed in New York City.[1482] All Americans must support the "noble cause" of independence with "one hand and one heart," Washington advised his soldiers, just as they must prioritize the "safety of [their] bleeding Country" before their own interregional prejudices.[1483] It was paramount that every single Continental recruit become "the best

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[1473] Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 152.

[1474] *New York Journal; or the General Advertiser,* July 11, 1776; Isaac Bangs, July 10, 1776, in "Journal of Isaac Bangs, 1776,". Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 150; Van Buskirk, *Generous Enemies*, 18-19.

[1475] America's insurgent congress defined treason on June 24, 1776, declaring that "all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from the same, owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members of such colony." By assuming most, if not all, colonial inhabitants under this definition, the United States Congress granted themselves the right to declare any imperial loyalist who "shall levy war against any of the said colonies…or be adhered to the King of Great Britain, or others the enemies of the said colonies," or gave "aid or comfort" to said enemies, shall be "guilt of treason against such colony"; see June 24, 1776 in *JCC* 4:475; Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 58-59.

[1476] Mauduit, *Considerations on the American War*, 35-36.

[1477] Ibid.

[1478] Ibid.

[1479] Ambrose Serle, July 16, 1776, in *The American Journal of Ambrose Serle: Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776-1778* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1940), 35-36.

[1480] Serle, July 23, 1776, in *American Journal of Serle*, 40.

[1481] Ibid.

[1482] George Washington, "General Orders," August 1, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW*, 5:534-535.

[1483] Ibid.

Soldier, and the best Patriot" to safeguard the "glorious work" of shared independence.[1484] Patriotic appeals aside, engrained cultural assumptions did not dissolve overnight, and the labor of creating a truly *national* army plagued Washington for the entirety of British America's civil war. Unlike General Howe, who only had to provide imperial loyalists with a safe venue to reaffirm their long-held affection for their sovereign, Washington had to persuade his fellow rebels that the promise of political independence was worth the risk of dying as traitors to the only empire, the only identity, they had ever known.

By mid-August, "melancholic concern" consumed Washington, as he had become convinced that New York City would "very soon be the scene of a bloody conflict."[1485] When Howe's forces arrived on Long Island the evening of August 22, Washington questioned whether his army had the courage necessary to "save their country," and therefore sternly ordered that any soldier who "retreat[ed] without Orders [would] be instantly shot down as example," praying that "no such Scoundrel [would] be found."[1486] Threats of execution suggest that Washington found himself unable to stir either affection for the forty-nine-day-old United States or to forge the necessary bonds of interstate fellow-feeling. Desperate, the general coerced his soldiers to at least act as patriots, even if they still prioritized personal safety over collective independence.

When the battle of Long Island began on August 27, the "manifest superiority" of Howe's eight thousand soldiers was immediately apparent.[1487] With little hope against such a formidable opponent, "fear" struck Washington's army, including one soldier who, "sniveling and blubbering," begged for forgiveness from every man he had wronged, certain he would die in battle.[1488] Cowardice gripped Washington's soldiers so tightly that the officers had to "push them on with their Swords."[1489] After two days, the British army had "gained a little ground," bought "almost as dear as they did [at] Bunker's hill."[1490] Still, the losses inflicted upon the Continental army were too great to endure and, no longer able to hold Long Island, Washington reluctantly ordered a retreat.[1491]

Washington's evacuation from Brooklyn saved the lives of at least 9,500 Continental soldiers, ensuring that America's infirmed army survived to fight another day.[1492] Howe, however, suffered harsh criticism for allowing Washington's escape.[1493] After the devastating loss of Long Island, Washington confessed, the Continental army struggled to hold itself together: "When Men are irritated, & Passions inflamed, they fly hastily, and chearfully to Arms, but after the first emotions are over, to expect, among such People as compose the bulk of [this] Army, that they are influenced by any other principles than those of Interest, is to look for what never did, & I fear never will happen."[1494] Interest now struck Washington as the main impediment to fighting for, and

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[1484] Ibid.
[1485] George Washington to the New York Convention, August 17, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW* 6:54-55.
[1486] George Washington, "General Orders," August 23, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW* 6:109-110.
[1487] Graydon, *Memoirs of a Life*, 159; Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 26, 1776, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 1:505-506.
[1488] Joseph Plumb Martin, *Ordinary Courage: The Revolutionary War Adventures of Joseph Plumb Martin, 3rd edition*, ed., James Kirby Martin (Maiden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 16-18.
[1489] Serle, *American Journal of Serle*, 78, 84.
[1490] "Extract of a Letter from New York," August 28, 1776 (Annapolis, 1776); Maryland Historical Society; Nash, August 30, 1776, in "Nash's Diary"; *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), September 13, 1776
[1491] Ibid.
[1492] Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 116.
[1493] Officer of the Army, *History of Civil War in America*,186-187; *Remarks upon General Howe's Account of his Proceedings on Long-Island, in the Extraordinary Gazette of October 10, 1776* (London: Fielding and Walker, 1778), 8-10; New York Historical Society; Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 116.
[1494] George Washington to John Hancock, September 25, 1776, in *Papers of GW: RW*, 6:394.

winning, America's independence. Only true, selfless patriotism – the ideological repository for American rebels' hatred, horror, terror, sorrow, and joy – might now guarantee their victory.

Profound sorrow and hatred now guided New York's loyalists and rebels alike in their accusations of cruelty, treason, and betrayal. Imperial loyalists and British regulars swiftly condemned the brutality of the Continental soldiers' "Ignoble Warfare," as they "burnt & destroyed Houses & Barns," targeting those "whose Proprietors they believed were attached to G[reat] Britain."[1495] Rebels even attempted to raze New York City itself amid their retreat.[1496] Imperial loyalists' hatred reached a boiling point on September 21, when New York's civilian rebels set fire to Harlem. Having "removed all the bells from the city" to prevent the sounding of alarm, they razed a significant portion of the city.[1497] The next day, several of the arsonists were captured and "Emediately hang'd" for treason against the British empire.[1498]

As bouts of insurgent violence continued throughout garrisoned New York, Howe reaffirmed his willingness to issue pardons to all "delinquents who had appeared in arms" against the British empire, so long as they swore allegiance to the king within sixty days.[1499] It was "Strange," imperial loyalist Nicholas Cresswell observed, "that the artifices of a few designing Villains should have it in their power to ruin such a number of honest, well-meaning people."[1500] The "horrid lies" of America's insurgent congress had persuaded these rebels to abandon the "blessings of peace, [and] the sweet enjoyment of real and happy liberty in exchange for the dreadful horrors of War, poverty, and wretchedness."[1501] By continually offering pardons to New York's inhabitants, Howe had hoped to break the sway of America's insurgent elite, and thereby convince those seduced by the promise of American independence to forsake their treasonous endeavors and reaffirm their fidelity to the British empire.

Many inhabitants of New York, however, believed Howe's offers of leniency and forgiveness to be nothing more than a cruel charade. To prove their accusations, New York's rebels circulated accounts of the physical and emotional turmoil endured by Howe's prisoners of war. American soldiers held within garrisoned New York were not only "crowded into holds of prison ships…churches, and open sugar houses…without covering or a spark of fire," but also often received "provisions and water for three days" that were "insufficient for one."[1502] Worse yet, British and Hessian soldiers regularly tortured their prisoners, such as Samuel Tallman, an Indigenous man from the 17th Connecticut Regimen who was "taken & strip'd by the Barbarians [Hessians]," forced to stand "as a mark for them to shoot at for Diversion or practice" and, after being shot twice, was left to die through the "Cruel Art of Starving."[1503] The same "barbarous treatment," James Thacher

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[1495] Carl Leopold, *Revolution in America: Confidential letters and Journals, 1776-1784*, *of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces*, edited and translated by Bernhard A. Uhlendorf (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 40; Serle, *American Journal of Serle*, 78.

[1496] Leopold, *Revolution in America*, 40; Serle, *American Journal of Serle*, 78.

[1497] Jabez Fitch, *The New-York diary of Lieutenant Jabez Fitch of the 17th (Connecticut) Regiment from August 22, 1776 to December 15, 1777*, ed., W.H.W. Sabine (New York, 1954), 144; New York Historical Society; *New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury,* September 30, 1776; Mary Silliman to Gold Selleck Silliman, September 21, 1776, in *Words of Women*, 57-58; Walke, *Remarkable Occurrences*, 9.

[1498] Ibid.

[1499] Officer of the Army, *History of Civil War in America*, 235.

[1500] Cresswell, July 19, 1777, in *A Man Apart*, 188.

[1501] Ibid.

[1502] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 90; Edwin G. Burrows observes that British American insurgent prisoners of war received approximately 1,640 calories a day, leaving them significantly malnourished, and died at accelerated rates due to "hulk imprisonment," see Burrows, *Forgotten Patriots: The Untold Stories of American Prisoners during the Revolutionary War* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 19; 55-56.

[1503] Fitch, *New-York Diary*, 137; Burrows, *Forgotten Patriots*, 7.

observed, had killed hundreds of insurgent prisoners in the first few weeks of Howe's occupation.[1504] Overwhelmed with hatred for British soldier and sorrow for their suffering comrades, American insurgents praised the "integrity and patriotism" of their fallen friends, who bravely submitted "to death rather than become rebels to their own country."[1505]

Abuse offered America's insurgent elite a rhetorical opportunity, as they repurposed the lived hardships of Continental soldiers to condemn both the immorality of both the British regulars who inflicted this torture, and the imperial loyalists who aided and comforted these soldiers. The inexcusable treatment of New York's imprisoned rebels, "Miserecors" argued in the *Boston Gazette*, reaffirmed a truth that every patriotic Bostonian already knew: there were "no bounds" of "cruelty" for the British regular.[1506] Alongside their red-coated, blood-soaked soldiers, imperial loyalists publicly "boast[ed] of their politeness, humanity, and compassion," but then privately "insult[ed] and vex[ed] the distressed."[1507] Further, these imperial loyalists aided Britain's imperial regular in "murder[ing] by hundreds and thousands" those rebellious colonists "who had submitted" to the empire's "power" and mercy.[1508] Miserecors then asked, "Where were savages ever found in the wilds of America more cruel, more murderous, more blood thirsty, more brutal, [and] more destitute of every human virtue" than the British soldier?[1509] By endowing British regulars with the barbarity of Indigenous peoples, Boston's rebels had tapped into Virginia's exclusionary rhetorics. Miserecors, then, took this one-step further. By simultaneously placing equal blame for such cruelty upon those who defended, supported, and sought protection from Britain's regulars, he designated imperial loyalists – specifically those living in New York City – as another category of unworthy political other, precluded from membership in America's emotional community of revolution.

Evocative and damning, this exclusionary rhetoric targeting New York's imperial loyalists nonetheless failed to mobilize significant support. Howe's enticements of reconciliation, when coupled with the horrors and terrors of imprisonment as a traitor to the empire, seduced many of the "inhabitants of the United States" to abandon "the interest and welfare of their country" and "repair to the enemy."[1510] To "distinguish between the friends of America and those of Great-Britain," Washington ordered that all inhabitants of the United States, either living in regions which the British army now occupied or currently serving in the Continental army, must swear new oaths of allegiance to America's league of mutual friendship and defense.[1511] Forced political oaths, however, only revealed those willing to declare their opposition to America's independence, and thus did nothing to prevent private defection.

Thomas Paine's "The American Crisis No. I" worked to deter such political betrayal by presenting an aggressive, rhetorical appeal to disinterested patriotism. Horrified at Howe's willingness to "ravage" New York City, Paine condemned the British general's immorality, declaring it on par with that of a "a common murderer, a highwayman, or a housebreaker."[1512] Paine encouraged readers to embrace rage at the self-interested spirit of their imperial enemies. All true citizens of the newly independent American states, Paine continued, must embrace the rage they feel towards the "mean principles" of imperial loyalists, whose cowardice and self-interest led them to

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[1504] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 90.
[1505] Ibid.
[1506] *Boston Gazette*, March 17, 1777.
[1507] Ibid.
[1508] Ibid.
[1509] Ibid.
[1510] George Washington, "Proclamation concerning Persons Swearing British Allegiance," January 25, 1777, *Papers of GW: RW*, 8:152-153.
[1511] Ibid.
[1512] Thomas Paine, "The American Crisis, No. I" in *Common Sense*, 91-92.

desire "peace in [their] day," even if snuffed out the "flame of liberty."[1513] Self-interest was even more heavily emphasized in the epistle's opening lines, where Paine warned all patriots to be weary of the irresolute rebel. British America's civil war for independence will "try men's souls," Paine declared, and American rebels should not be surprised that the "summer soldiers and the sunshine patriot, will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country," just like New York's imperial loyalists had done.[1514] "Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered," Paine conceded, but all who remain resolute in America's struggle for independence will be not simply be victorious, but rather will receive "the love and thanks of man and woman."[1515]

These bonds of fellow-feeling, however, remained out of reach for most imperial loyalists. The people of the United States, Nathaniel Whitaker argued in *The Antidote Against Toryism*, must not foolishly and selfishly accept Howe's offers of mercy and forgiveness. British America's colonies had not "commence[d]" the current "contest with the tyrant of Great-Britain."[1516] America's rebels, therefore, should be consumed with "horror" to learn that some "free-born sons of America" were "so lost to all sense of honor, Liberty, and every noble feeling" that they joined "the cry" for the political enslavement of British America.[1517] One again, self-interest served as a refrain. Whitaker condemned the "cruel, revenge, unmerciful temper" of British regulars, as well as the imperial loyalist and treasonous insurgent who, "fear[ing] a heavier yoke," abandoned the struggle of independence for "[p]rivate interests and selfish considerations."[1518] Any civic punishments laid against these traitors to the United States, Whitaker concluded, must emerge "not out of hatred to their persons, but their crimes."[1519] Whitaker sought unity by stoking terror and horror of, and thereby hatred for, those British colonists who so selfishly betrayed the cause of independence.

The horrors that one had to endure to conquer tyranny, survive the hellish conditions of warfare, or find mercy and forgiveness upon the killing field gradually took its toll on rebels and loyalists alike. Lucy Knox regretted that the "art of killing has become a perfect science" across North America, as the once united British people had covered the "fruitful fields of war" with "the dead and dying of the heartfelt."[1520] John Eliot questioned the ethics of America's continued civil war for independence, wondering whether a "stranger" to this conflict would conclude that "patriotism" and the "moral virtues" of liberty had incited such horrors.[1521] The crime of "regicide is innocent in comparison, for it only kills a man," Eliot observed, whereas the "destroyer of his country is the murderer of a people."[1522] Rebels caused imperial loyalists throughout British America profound suffering, as they worked to "inflame he minds of the people" and cause them "to vent their rage on these poor unhappy men."[1523]As a corollary to the anxieties about defection which Washington, Paine, and Whitaker expressed, Eliot wondered "who [will] draw" such lines "between Whig & Tory"?[1524]

[1513] Paine, "The American Crisis No. I," 95.
[1514] Paine, "The American Crisis No. I," 91.
[1515] Ibid.
[1516] Nathaniel Whitaker, *The Antidote Against Toryism* (Newburyport: John MyCall, 1777), 18.
[1517] Whitaker, *Antidote Against Toryism*, 14.
[1518] Ibid, 20-23, 30.
[1519] Ibid, 33.
[1520] Lucy Knox to Hannah Flucker Urquhart, April 1777, in *Knox Lives and Letters*, 77-78.
[1521] John Eliot to Jeremy Belknap, May 9, 1777, in the "Belknap Papers," *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 6th Series* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1891), 4:109-110.
[1522] John Eliot to Jeremy Belknap, May 9, 1777, in the "Belknap Papers,"4:111.
[1523] Ibid.
[1524] Ibid.

Distinctions between American rebel and British loyalist became further convoluted following America's victory at Saratoga in autumn 1777.[1525] To cover their retreat, British General Henry Clinton and Major General John Vaughan razed Kingston "to ashes" and continued to "ravage and burn all" that lay before them on "both sides of the Hudson River."[1526] General Horatio Gates questioned whether either officer believed that their relentless brutality would "make converts to the royal cause."[1527] Britain's "cruelty," Gates attested, had cemented "the glorious act of Independency, upon the broad basis of the general resentment of the people," warning that these vicious imperial officers would one day face the "just revenge" of the "injured" American people.[1528] To the shock of New York's rebels, America's insurgent congress not only pardoned imperial loyalists who did not evacuate with Clinton and Vaughn, but permitted them to reside within the state.

New York's insurgent elite, however, refused to ignore the willful and continued aid which imperial loyalists had provided to Britain's recoats. Firebrand Alexander McDougall declared, in *To the Supporters and Defenders of American Freedom and Independence in the State of New-York*, that the "most barbarous acts of tyranny, rapine, murder and cruelty" committed by British regulars would have been impossible without their "advisers, guides, and assistants" – the imperial loyalists.[1529] Pardoning New York's imperial loyalists *en masse*, Dougall continued, was akin to pardoning murderers who have yet to exhibit any "sincere penitence for their guilt."[1530] Undeserved leniency would encourage loyalists to continue to "seduce multitudes" of American rebels, and thereby would "expose" the fledgling United States "to a thousand difficulties and dangers."[1531]

Anxieties about insurgent allegiances only intensified as multiple episodes of espionage occurred within America's Continental army. The morning of October 16, 1777, American soldiers found one Daniel Taylor "Lurking" around General George Clinton's headquarters in Saratoga.[1532] Brought before an American Court Martial, Taylor alleged that he had served as an express messenger for both Clinton and British General John Burgoyne, and that the Continental soldiers who seized him had been dressed "in British Uniform" and thus "deceived" him into professing a false allegiance to the George III.[1533] The officers who heard Taylor's case, however, found no merit in his pleas, declared him guilty of espionage, and ordered him to be hanged.[1534] Most insurgents viewed imperial loyalists as reprehensible traitors to the values liberty and freedom. Yet, disguising oneself as a Continental soldier to further the whims of tyranny, and thus corrupting the guise of the American patriot was a treason so indefensible, so evil, that it warranted immediate death.

Technically, imperial loyalists were traitors to the United States, in accordance with patchwork laws which America's insurgent congress had passed in months following their *Declaration*. These Britons suffered social ostracization and shaming, civic punishments such as fines, loss of suffrage, and limitations placed upon their movements and economic activities, or the

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[1525] Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 200-204; Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 358-363.
[1526] Horatio Gates, "Extract of a Letter, dated camp at Saratoga, October 18, 1777", New York Historical Society. Purdie's *Virginia Gazette* also published this letter extract on November 14, 1777.
[1527] Gates, "Extract of a Letter, dated camp at Saratoga, October 18, 1777."
[1528] Ibid.
[1529] Alexander McDougall, *To the Supporters and Defenders of American Freedom and Independence in the State of New-York.* (New York, 1778), 2; American Antiquarian Society.
[1530] McDougall, *To the Supporters and Defenders*, 6, 10.
[1531] Ibid.
[1532] George Clinton, "Account of Court Martial, October 16, 1777" in *Public Papers of George Clinton: First Governor of New York, 1777-1795, 1801-1804*, ed., Hugh Hastings (New York: State of New York, 1899), 2:
[1533] Ibid.
[1534] Ibid.

occasional unsanctioned act of *de facto* mob violence.[1535] The penalties which political spies and saboteurs endured, however, were unlike the ones exacted from imperial loyalists, let alone those wrought against British regulars, Indigenous peoples, or enslaved Africans. Almost every American rebel concurred that saboteurs were too dangerous a political enemy to survive their crimes. The ability of spies to disguise their inherent otherness and slip past the boundaries of America's emotional community of revolution required their apprehension and, whenever possible, their immediate execution.[1536] Despite their best efforts, the Continental army failed to capture and execute every traitorous spy. One such failure, that of Benedict Arnold, instigated the crystallization of both America's emotional community of revolution and its exclusionary, patriotic ethos.

General Benedict Arnold and the Second Coming of General de Montcalm:

Victory at Saratoga emboldened anti-loyalist hatred amongst America's colonial rebels. Further, it helped America's insurgent congress secure a necessary, yet contentious, alliance with the French empire.[1537] The rebels' fierce opposition to the tyranny of "English Barbarians" had made it possible for the French empire to overcome the fierce enmity that it had held for British colonists during the Seven Years' War. France cultivated a rhetorical distinction between American insurgents and British royalists, even though many officers now fought alongside their empire's former enemies.[1538] For the United States, rhetorical justifications for their alliance with Louis XVI proved much more difficult to produce. Just a few months after receiving his commission as Commander of the Continental Army, General Washington implored Boston's militia to abandon their Pope Day celebrations, as they already had begun to court the "friendship and alliance of the people of Canada," many of whom were Catholic or of French descent.[1539] America's insurgents, therefore, needed to treat them as if they were "brethren embark[ing] in the same cause."[1540] Recruiting French Canadians living within the boundaries of the British empire, however, was not the same as an alliance with the people of France.

Deep-rooted, ancestral hatreds did not immediately cave to the pragmatism of political policy or military necessity. As American and French soldiers began to fight side-by-side against the British, Mercy Otis Warren astutely observed that many of the older French officers "half doubt[ed]" America's "disinterested friendship."[1541] To the contrary, France's younger officers and enlisted – those who had not served in the Seven Years' War – "extend[ed] their arms to embrace

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[1535] For a detailed analysis of such experiences within the colony of Pennsylvania, see Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 40-68.
[1536] America's political and military leaders agreed that any crimes of aiding and abetting the enemy committed by imperial loyalists should be tried before an individual state's Superior Court. Concurrently, military spies and saboteurs must be tried before a court-martial and, if found guilty, executed (as outlined under eighteenth-century British conventions of war). Discrepancy arose, however, with the prosecution of civilian spies, such as one James Molesworth of Philadelphia, a civilian caught spying for Britian whom General Horatio Gates tried and found guilty before a military court-martial. After receiving approval from America's congress, Gates executed Molesworth, an act so irregular that it evoked trepidation in both Washington and Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman; see Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 73-75.
[1537] If the British empire "would acknowledge [America's] independence, and enter into a liberal alliance with us, I should prefer a connextion with her to a league with any power on earth," specifically the unknown of a treaty of mutual amity with France, see "John Jay to Gouvernor Morris, April 29, 1778"; Rare Books and Manuscripts, Columbia University. Brendan McConville, "A Deal with the Devil: Revolutionary Anti-Popery, Francophobia, and the Dilemmas of Diplomacy," in *Against Popery*, 242, 244.
[1538] David A. Bell notes that "one French volunteer fighting with the Americans simply refused to believe that the imposing general [Washington] was the same man as Jumonville's murderer); see Bell, *Cult of the Nation in France*, 99.
[1539] George Washington, "General Orders," November 5, 1775, *GW Papers: CS*, 2:300. McConville, "Deal with the Devil," 241.
[1540] Ibid.
[1541] Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams, October 15, 1778, "Mercy Otis Warren Papers," McConville, "Deal with the Devil," 242.

their new [American] allies" with an "honest joy."[1542] Remarkably, America's younger insurgents were equally open-minded, as they welcomed their French allies with a "Gen[eral] rejoicing."[1543] Despite such overtures of friendship, it is important to note that America's alliance with France bore similar civic characteristics to their alliance with the Shawnee, another enemy from the Seven Years' War. Although based on the promise of mutual aid and support, America's insurgent elite never considered the possibility of performing the affective labor necessary to grant either French soldiers or Indigenous warriors' membership into their emotional community of revolution. The French might help the United States win their independence, but no victory granted them access to America's exclusionary political identity.

Upon learning of America's alliance with France, imperial loyalists swiftly condemned the insurgent congress for revealing its true ambition: to erect popish tyranny throughout all of British America.[1544] As one loyalist cried, true Britons must recognize that America's rebellion is now "sold to the French King, and that all their boasted struggle for liberty, will end in wretched submission to French despotism, and popish superstition, should Great-Britain give up her colonies."[1545] America's most fervent *patriots*, this New York loyalist concluded, had paved the way for their political enslavement to a Catholic king. Unbeknownst to America's insurgent congress or the ranking officers of the Continental army, such anti-French sentiments soon would catalyze the most damning act of treason yet to be committed against the United States.

Alliance with France had disrupted the emotional community of revolution that American rebels had worked so hard to build, precisely because of the affective and ideological dissonance it evoked. It gradually took a toll upon the morale of rebellious civilians and soldiers alike, none more important than Benedict Arnold. A well-respected solider and beloved hero of the battle at Saratoga, Arnold was revered by Continental officers and enlisted alike, earning even the personal trust Washington himself.[1546] By spring 1779, however, Arnold had become disgusted with the "impolicy, tyranny, and injustice" of the insurgent congress, "particularly their alliance with France."[1547] Arnold believed that he and his fellow Americans had been "duped, by a virtuous credulity, in the incautious moments of intemperate passion."[1548] British colonists unwittingly had sacrificed their happiness to "to serve" Louis XIV, who wanted nothing less than the "destruction of both the mother country and the provinces."[1549] The American people were fools, Arnold continued, if they believed that the French held any true "affection for the liberties of mankind," while their own Catholic king held them "in vassalage and chains."[1550] As Henry Clinton later observed, Arnold's epiphany made him "desirous" to defect to the "cause of Great Britain."[1551]

Arnold's treason against the United States, or rather his patriotic return to the British empire, began when he reported to British Major John André on America's inability to secure foreign loans

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[1542] Ibid.

[1543] Caleb Gibbs, April 6, 1778, in "Caleb Gibbs Diary"; American Antiquarian Society. McConville, "Deal with the Devil," 242.

[1544] McConville, "Deal with the Devil," 248-249.

[1545] *Rivington's Gazette*, August 22, 1778; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 171-173.

[1546] For Washington's trust and support of Arnold, see James Kirby Martin, *Benedict Arnold: Revolutionary Hero, An American Warrior Reconsidered* (New York: New York University Press, 1997)184-185, 308-315.

[1547] Benedict Arnold, *To the Inhabitants of America* (New York, 1780); New York Public Library; Henry Clinton, *The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 214; *Royal American Gazette*, October 10, 1780. Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 157-158, McConville, "Deal with the Devil," 249.

[1548] Arnold, *To the Inhabitants of America*; *Royal American Gazette*, October 10, 1780.

[1549] Ibid.

[1550] Ibid.

[1551] Clinton, *American Rebellion*, 214.

to fund its war effort.[1552] Deeming Arnold a worthy informant, André scheduled an in-person meeting in late-September 1780 to acquire strategic plans to help the British capture West Point. Before André embarked for this meeting, General Clinton expressly ordered him "not to change his dress or name," lest he be caught and charged with espionage.[1553] André's meeting with Arnold ended in disaster. While Arnold escaped from New York unscathed, American soldiers captured André, who had on his person "several papers in Arnold's handwriting," revealing the officer's "shocking" and "unexpected" betrayal.[1554]

Arnold's defection to the British army had dire, unintended consequences for those closest to him. Arnold abandoned his wife, Peggy Shippen, to ensure his escape, and thereby relegated her to the mercy of Washington's forces at West Point. Writing to his own wife Eliza, Alexander Hamilton expressed profound sorrow for Shippen, "an amiable woman frantic with distress for the loss of a husband she tenderly loved," but now branded "a traitor to his country."[1555] Shippen's suffering, Hamilton declared, was "the most affecting scene" he had ever witnessed"[1556] Even Washington took pity on the "perfectly innocent" Shippen, comforting her as she "raved" and "melted into tears" upon learning of her husband's abandonment and treachery.[1557]

Simultaneous to Shippen's suffering, Ebenezer Hazard reported that the people of Philadelphia had declared Arnold a "Traitor to his native country" and had "burned" both him and the devil "in effigy." (see Figure 4.2).[1558] The intense hatred displayed in Philadelphia paralleled British America's anti-stamp tax riots and Pope Day celebrations. Americans, thereby, affirmed their sincere hope that "Divine justice" and "vengeance" might punish their once beloved hero.[1559] In Virginia, St. George Tucker rebuked Arnold's "cankered heart" for its willingness to "impose the galling yoke" of political enslavement upon his kinsmen for nothing more than a bribe of gold.[1560] Arnold stood alone for having fallen "so far beneath the rank of human race," and thus his punishment must equal his unparalleled crime: "Perpetual anguish shall torment his breast,/ And hellish demons haunt his troubled rest;/ Not even death shall shield his hated name,/ For, still, the caitiff shall survive to fame;/ By fate's decree! who thus pronounced his lot:/ "Too bad, to live! too base, to be forgot!/ Thy crimes succeeding ages shall proclaim,/ And Judas be forgot, in Arnold's name!"[1561] For Tucker, for Hazard, for the people of Philadelphia, for the soldiers in New York, and for all *American patriots*, Arnold's treason had overshadowed even the crimes of Christ's betrayer.

The greatest victim of Arnold's treason, however, was Major John André, whom Arnold had persuaded to disguise himself as one John Anderson, and thereby committed the fatal crime of espionage.[1562] Aware of his near-unavoidable execution, André privately confessed that he was

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[1552] Benedict Arnold to John André, May 23, 1779, "The Arnold-André Correspondence" in *Secret History of the American Revolution*, Carl van Doren (New York: The Viking Press, 1941), 442.
[1553] Clinton, *The American Rebellion*, 215.
[1554] George Washington to George Clinton, September 26, 1780, in *Public Papers of Clinton*, 6:256-263.
[1555] Alexander Hamilton to Eliza Schuyler, September 25, 1780, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 2:441-442.
[1556] Ibid.
[1557] Ibid, George Washington to Samuel Huntington, September 26, 1780, in *GW: Writings*, 388-389.
[1558] Ebenezer Hazard to Jeremey Belknap, October 2, 1780, in "Jeremy Belknap and Ebenezer Hazard Correspondences" in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, *5th Ser.* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1877), 2:77-78; *A Representation of the Figures exhibited and paraded through the Streets of Philadelphia, on Saturday, the 30th of September, 1780*. Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 197-199.
[1559] Ebenezer Hazard to Jeremey Belknap, October 2, 1780, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondences," 2:77-78.
[1560] St. George Tucker, "On General Arnold," in *The Poems of St. George Tucker of Williamsburg, Virginia, 1752-1827*, ed. William S. Prince (New York: Vantage Press, 1977), 121-122.
[1561] Tucker, "On General Arnold," 121-122.
[1562] *Proceedings of a Bord of General Officers…. Respecting Major John André* (New York: James Rivington, 1780), 3-6, 8.

"prepared for any Fate to which an honest Zeal for [his] Kings Service may have devoted [him]."[1563] Despite formal intercession from both Arnold and Clinton, the Continental army's Board of General Officers convicted André as "a spy from the enemy" and condemned him to death.[1564] André accepted this outcome with decorum and courage, only requesting that he not be hanged like a common spy, but receive a "professional death" from a firing squad, a privilege due to him as a British officer.[1565] Reluctantly, Washington denied the request and hanged André on October 2, 1780.[1566] According to witnesses, André's final words brimmed with noble honor and martial duty – "I am reconciled to my death, but I detest the mode" and "I pray you bear me witness that I meet my fate like a brave man" – a stark contrast to Arnold's own treason and cowardly flight.[1567]



Figure 4.2: *A Representation of the Figures exhibited and paraded through the Streets of Philadelphia, on Saturday, the 30th of September, 1780.*
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

The death of Major John André profoundly affected Britons and Americans like, regardless of political loyalty. Aghast at Washington's "cruel" execution of André, Clinton wrote that his "heart [did not] cease to bleed" when "reflect[ing] on the very unworthy fate of this most amiable and

[1563] John André to Henry Clinton, September 29, 1780, in "The Arnold-André Correspondence," 475
[1564] Ibid, 9.
[1565] Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, October 11, 1780, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 2:469.
[1566] Alexander Hamilton to Eliza Schuyler, October 2, 1780, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 2:448-449; Horace Walpole argued that Washington's refusal to spare André emerged from his desire to exact revenge on Lord Charles Cornwallis, who recently hung "120 Carolinians"; see Horace Walpole, *Journal of the Reign of King George the Third, from the Year 1771 to 1783,* ed., Dr. Doran (London: Richard Bentley, 1859), 2:431.
[1567] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 273.

valuable young man."[1568] "No language," one British regular remarked, could "describe the mingled sensations of horror, grief, sympathy, and revenge that agitated" the entire of imperial army.[1569] Those soldiers who served with André shed "many tears" for their comrade, and even the officers took to wearing "crepe[s]" as "an indication of how much his death [was] lamented."[1570] This profound sorrow reached London, as Horace Walpole rebuked "Arnold's treachery," for it cost Britain "the life of a much better man."[1571] "[M]elancholy and gloom," however, also "pervaded" the Continental army after André's "affectingly awful" execution.[1572] Hamilton, who witnessed André hung, believe that the major's "composure" had "excited the admiration and melted the hearts of [his] beholders."[1573] The greatest tragedy, Hamilton observed, was that either "Arnold or [André]" had to be the "victim" of America's just wrath, and with the hate-worthy traitor beyond Washington's reach or "power," there was "in truth no way of saving" the major.[1574] The sorrow which Americans felt for Major John André revealed that even the detestable crime of espionage, if committed by a patriot on behalf of his country, was a sin more forgivable than that of treason.

Days after André's gloomy execution, Thomas Paine branded Benedict Arnold an immoral "desperado."[1575] Surprisingly, Paine claimed that Arnold's "treason of the deepest dye" only "heighten[ed]" America's "national character," as it valorized those patriots who had "detected" and exposed his betrayal.[1576] Further, Paine believed that Arnold's haphazard defection proved the "declining power" of the British empire, as it now relied on deception and espionage to undermine America's patriotic army.[1577]

Commissioned as a royal officer in George III's army, Arnold embraced his status as an American villain when he besieged Richmond on January 5, 1781.[1578] Barely escaping the garrison, Thomas Jefferson wasted no time rebuking Arnold.[1579] The assault on Richmond exemplified the cruelty of "the forces of the Britannic Majesty," Jefferson declared, as Arnold had "seiz[ed] peaceable citizens while in their beds or employed in domestick occupation," and "extort[ed] from them paroles" that they would not aid or assist the "enemies of Great Britain."[1580] Filled with rage and desperate for vengeance, Jefferson authorized J.P.H. Muhlenberg to gather a group of "proper characters" to capture "this greatest of all traitors."[1581] Now the target of a vicious manhunt, Arnold found himself elevated to a singular rank within America's emergent national identity, that of "*Founding Traitor.*"[1582]

[1568] Clinton*, The American Rebellion*, 218.
[1569] Lamb, *Journal of the Late American War*, 329.
[1570] Leopold, October 6, 1780, in *Revolution in America*, 388.
[1571] Walpole to Horace Mann, November 20, 1780, in *Walpole Correspondence*, 25:98.
[1572] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 273-274.
[1573] Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, October 11, 1780, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 2:469.
[1574] Ibid.
[1575] Alexander Hamilton to Eliza Schuyler, September 25, 1780, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 2:441-442 Paine, "The Crisis Extraordinary," (Philadelphia, William Harris, 1780), 17; American Antiquarian Society.
[1576] Ibid.
[1577] Ibid.
[1578] John Graves Simcoe, *Journal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers* (Exeter: Printed for the Author, 1789), 108; Huntington Library; Leopold, January 30, 1781, in *Revolution in America*, 411; *Virginia Gazette* (Richmond), January 13, 1781.
[1579] Gordon-Reed and Onuf, *"Most Blessed of Patriarchs"*, 82.
[1580] Thomas Jefferson, "Proclamation, January 18, 1781," in *Papers of Jefferson*, 4:403-405.
[1581] Thomas Jefferson to J.P.G. Muhlenberg, January 31, 1781, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 4:487.
[1582] Brad A. Jones rightfully argues that from "the fall of 1780, Benedict Arnold became the *Founding Traitor* of the American Revolution"; see Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 157.

The popular late-eighteenth century ballad "To the Traitor Arnold" best encapsulated the hatred which American insurgents felt for their founding traitor.[1583] "Arnold! thy name, as heretofore,/Shall be Benedict no more," the song begins, "Since, instigated by the devil,/Thy ways are turn'd from good to evil."[1584] More than any other document to date produced in the northern states, this ballad aligned with Virginia's rhetoric of political othering. Joining the British empire's interests with those of Satan, the ballad compared Arnold to those of enslaved laborers, who betrayed their masters and "cut [their] throats in sleep."[1585] It likewise compared him to the "savage Indians," who betrayed their allies by taking their "lives and [their] scalps," and, worst of all, to those "Tories," who betrayed their fellow Britons to the horrors of tyranny to satisfy their craven self-interest.[1586]

Vengefully, the songs concludes: "Then in this class of Britain's heroes/The Tories, savage Indians, Negroes,/Recorded, Arnold's name shall stand,/While Freedom's blessings crown our land./And odious for the blackest crimes,/Arnold shall stink to latest times."[1587] Both an effective and affecting tune, "To the Traitor Arnold," depicts America's betrayer as its greatest unifier. Both an American traitor and a British officer, Arnold now embodied the same villainy and cruelty which America's insurgents previously had attributed to imperial regulars, enslaved Africans, Indigenous peoples, and imperial loyalists. Within his singular person, Arnold now personified every political other barred from America's emotional community of revolution. In addition, Arnold would take up the affective mantel of an American de Montcalm, more so than General Howe, Lord Dunmore, or Governor Gage had before him. For the treason of Benedict Arnold gave the United States a singular enemy against whom they might direct their violent hatred for the British empire.

The Siege of Yorktown:

To liberate Richmond, repel the British army's incursion into central Virginia, and hopefully "execute" Arnold, "in the most summary way," for his "treason and desertion," Washington dispatched his close friend, the French noble Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette.[1588] The near-four-hundred-mile march from upper New York to Richmond, however, granted Arnold ample to time weaken Virginia's insurgency. The "malice…wickedness, and…avarice" which Arnold now showed the people of Virginia, Richard Henry Lee observed, proved a "fit instrument" to submit his former countrymen "the rage of despotism" and the "tyrannous and senseless rancour" of the British empire.[1589] Chased by Lafayette throughout the spring, Arnold continued "burning and wasting his native country" and, by late-May, he had rendezvoused with General Charles Cornwallis, whose combined forces now amounted to seven thousand British regulars, German mercenaries, and "Indians savages," plus another five thousand enslaved peoples whom the British "had stolen" from Virginia's rebels.[1590] After three months of further violence and destruction, Lafayette reported to Washington that Cornwallis had entrenched himself in the well-developed waterfront town of York, located fifteen miles southeast of Williamsburg.[1591] Desperate to weaken Cornwallis and

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[1583] "To the Traitor Arnold," in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*, 333-334.
[1584] Ibid, 333.
[1585] Ibid, 334.
[1586] "To the Traitor Arnold," in *Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution*, 334.
[1587] Ibid.
[1588] George Washington to Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, February 20, 1781, in *This Glorious Struggle: George Washington's Revolutionary War Letters*, ed., Edward G. Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 225.
[1589] Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, October 12, 1781, in *Letters of Lee*, 2:260.
[1590] Henry Deerborn, *Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Deerborn, 1775-1783*, ed., Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckman (Caxton Club: Chicago, 1939), 217; Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, May 28, 1781, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 6:32-34; Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 323-329.
[1591] McDonnell, *Politics of War*, 473; Musselwhite, *Urban Dreams, Rural Commonwealth*, 230-232.

liberate his home state, Washington ordered his entire force to Virginia on August 19, 1781.[1592] Six weeks later, Washington laid siege to York.[1593]

The brutality of siege warfare swiftly descended upon garrisoned town as rebels from Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia all fought to capture Cornwallis stronghold. Joseph Plumb Martin of Massachusetts provides a graphic, detailed narrative of the battle, recounting the following, dreadful scene: a musket ball narrowly missed the head of a fellow soldier from New York, but when Martin rushed to tend to him, he saw that soldier's skull had "shattered" from internal hemorrhaging, as "blood flow[ed] from his nose and mouth."[1594] St. George Tucker echoed Martin's sorrow and horror after he witnessed "one Man mortally wounded…by a Cannon Ball which carried off part of his Hips."[1595] By October 11, Cornwallis's forces too had suffered significant casualties from "excessive fatigue….noxious water," and of course, "the enemy's fire."[1596] Three days later, Lafyette and Hamilton captured two of the garrison's leftward redoubts.[1597] The British navy's inability to penetrate the French blockade, and thereby furnish the York garrison with necessary supplies and reinforcements, struck a devastating blow.[1598] Terror now seized both British soldiers and royal provincials within York, and at least "sixteen deserters" fled to Washington's army.[1599] Pleas for mercy revealed that the British army was "fatigued," "very sickly," and fearful to become prisoners of either their historic imperial enemy or their traitorous American cousins.[1600] Desperate to "alleviate the misfortune and distress" of those under his command, Cornwallis reluctantly capitulated to General Washington on October 17.[1601]

Washington felt an "Ardent Desire to spare the further Effusion of Blood," yet he showed neither mercy nor leniency towards Cornwallis, demanding the imprisonment of every British and German soldier who fought at York.[1602] Unable to negotiate a better outcome, Cornwallis reluctantly accepted Washington harsh terms and formally surrendered on October 19, 1781.[1603] As imperial regulars and royal provincials limped from the garrison's smoldering remains, they "felt their honor wounded" and appeared not only "disrobed" of all the "terrors" that they once had inflicted upon

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[1592] McDonnell, *Politics of War,* 473.
[1593] Ibid.
[1594] Martin, *Ordinary Courage*, 157.
[1595] St. George Tucker, "St. George Tucker's Journal of the Siege of Yorktown," ed. Edward M. Riley, *William and Mary Quarterly* 5, No. 3: 384.
[1596] Banastre Tarleton, *A History of the Campaign of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America* (London: T. Cadell, 1787), 388; American Antiquarian Society; John Connolly, ""Narrative of the Transactions, Imprisonment, and Sufferings of John Connolly, an American Loyalist and Lieut. Col. in his Majesty's Service," in *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 12:282.
[1597] Deerborn, *Revolutionary War Journals*, 219; Tarleton, *Campaign of 1780 and 1781*, 385.
[1598] Ibid.
[1599] Ibid, 220.
[1600] Ibid.
[1601] Ibid, 220-221
[1602] George Washington to Charles Cornwallis, October 17, 1781 in *GW: Writings*, 464; Washington's refusal to permit the British and German soldiers to return home on parole, so long as they had sworn an oath not to fight against the United States for the duration of the war, arose from his belief that they deserved the "same honours" of imprisonment that Cornwallis granted the Continental soldiers who surrendered to him in Charleston, South Carolina; see Leopold, *Revolution in America*, 474; Tarleton, *Campaigns of 1780 and 1781*, 389-390. Deerborn notes that a majority of the British enlisted and German mercenaries remained prisoners throughout the Chesapeake, whereas most of the British officers received a limited parole upon their arrival in New York, Deerborn, *Revolutionary War Journals*, 221.
[1603] Charles Cornwallis to Henry Clinton, October 20, 1781, in *The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis*, ed. Henry P. Johnson (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1881), 183; Virginia Historical Society; Deerborn, *Revolutionary War Journals*, 221; Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, October 19, 1781, in *Knox Lives and Letters*, 160; George Washington, "Journal of the Yorktown Campaign," October 19, 1781, in *George Washington: Writings*, ed. John Rhodehamel (New York: Library of America, 1997), 461-462.

America, but also "sad" and "ashamed."[1604] Conversely, America's victory had stirred "every [insurgent's] heart to feel" a profound sense of both "joy and gratitude."[1605] Washington himself expressed immense pride at the "singular Spirit of Emulation" that guided the liberation of York, proclaiming that the Continental army's attachment to America's independence shall "inspire every citizen of these States with sentiments of the most unalterable gratitude."[1606] As Washington noted, joy temporarily entered the affective valence of America's emotional community of revolution. This patriotic joy arose from defeating George III's complex coalition of political others, who held the power to unify America's rebellious states into a singular, independent nation.

Seizing upon a rare moment of insurgent euphoria, chaplain Israel Evans commemorated the United States' victory with a sermon of divine thanksgiving.[1607] "[J]oin in heart and spirit, ye patriots and friends to posterity," Evans implored, "and form one general concert of praise to HIM who has aided us!"[1608] God's mercy, Israel assured his audience, will protect the "triumphant" United States from the "the injustice of [Britain's] tyrants" and its "hostile armies," who employed "weapons of death and the shedding of blood" to demand unconditional submission to political enslavement.[1609] The Lord's will, too, had produced the United States' newly established alliance with France, Israel declared, as it moved Louis's "magnanimous" heart to "[spare] neither blood nor wealth" in securing America's "freedom."[1610] Intertwining piety and patriotism, Evans unequivocally condemned the sinful British empire: "Praise him who gives us to repel,/The Powers of Britain and of Hell,/With thankful hearts his goodness own,/And bow before Jehovah's throne."[1611] Evans imbued his *Discourse Delivered near York* with pious love for a God, whose divinely sanctioned victory justified America's hatred of the British empire. It further exemplifies the exclusionary affective rhetoric by which the United States had depicted their treasonous rebellion against George III as nothing more than a necessary act of moral patriotism. Temporarily, France had shifted from excluded "other" to political ally in America's emotional community of revolution. This affective realignment proved a risky venture, one which eventually threatened the viability of America's own independent republic.

News of Cornwallis's defeat reverberated throughout the British Atlantic. In New York City, imperial loyalist Willaim Smith gave "no Credit" to initial reports of Washington's victory, believing it "an Artifice to prevent the Insurrection of the Loyalists" who longed for reunification with the British empire.[1612] From Braintree, Abigail Adams joyously observed that the battle at York granted America the privilege to "boast that she has accomplished what no power before her ever did, contending with Britain" and emerging the victor. [1613] The people of London, Horace Walpole

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[1604] William Fontaine, "Description of the Surrender [at Yorktown]," in *The Yorktown Campaign*, 178; Martin, *Ordinary Courage*, 158; Daniel Trabue, *Westward into Kentucky: The Narrative of Daniel Trabue*, ed., Chester Raymond Young (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2015), 119.

[1605] Holland Park to Jonas Holland, February 28, 1832, in *Journal of Holland Park*, ed., Jeffrey H. Fiske and Sally Ostergard Fiske (New Braintree: Towtaid, 2000), 16; Thacher, *Military Journal*, 346-347.

[1606] George Washington to Thomas McKean, October 19, 1781, in *This Glorious Struggle*, 245-246; George Washington, "Congratulatory Order to the Allied Army" in *The Yorktown Campaign*, 178. Sarah J. Purcell argues that Washington's prediction proved correct, and gratitude for the Continental army laid one of the foundational pillars for America's emergent national identity; see Purcell, *Sealed with Blood*, 50-91.

[1607] Israel Evans, *A Discourse Delivered near York in Virginia, on the Memorable Occasion of the Surrender of the British Army to the Allied Forces of America and France* (Philadelphia: Francis Bailey, 1782); Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

[1608] Evans, *Discourse Delivered near York*, 18.

[1609] Ibid, 5, 18.

[1610] Ibid, 26.

[1611] Ibid, 46.

[1612] Smith, *Historical Memoirs*, 461.

[1613] Abigail Adams to John Adams, December 9, 1781, in *Adams Family Correspondences*, 4:255.

feared, may "not live to see an end of the American war," for it had become apparent that "its consequences [were] far from conclusion."[1614]

Nowhere was this imperial instability more apparent than in the memorandum which George III penned on March 3, 1782.[1615] The "sudden change of Sentiments" among Parliament's ministers, the king confessed, now "incapacitated him from either conducting this War with effect, or from obtaining any Peace but on conditions" that would "prove the destruction" of the "Rights of the British nation."[1616] With "much sorrow," the king concluded, "He can be of no further Utility to His Native Country," and therefore must take the "painful steps of quitting it for ever."[1617] Albeit never delivered to Parliament, this letter reveals that the failures of Britain to quell the America's revolution had brought George III to the brink of abdicating his throne.

Against the backdrop of imperial chaos, John Adams saw America's victory as an opportunity to recast its national identity. Originally composed in July 1780, Adams's "Letters from a Distinguished American, No. XII" argued that the imperial loyalists' refusal to fight for independence forever transformed the political landscape of British America.[1618] Adams specifically highlighted it as a moment when individual Americans, those true patriots of the nation, had successfully set aside their self-interest. Notably, he also commented on the role which rhetoric had played in this transfiguration. Disgusted at the perceived selfishness of those who put personal comfort above communal freedoms, America's insurgents rose to "a Pitch of Passion and Enthusiasm."[1619] As all "[m]en are governed by Words, [as] their Passions are inflamed by Words," rhetoric became the central tool for converting passion and enthusiasm into acts of disinterested patriotism.[1620] Parliament's sycophants understood this as well, Adams observed, as they "took Care to instruct" America's insurgents "in the Nature and Punishment of Treason." [1621] These "scare tactics," however, held no sway over America's patriotic rebels, whose "Love of Liberty was stronger than death."[1622] Britain's hostile incitement to civil war and the ravaging of North America, Adams continued, erected an "eternal Barrier to any Reconciliation short of Independence" – an independence for which thousands of American patriots had fought and died. These struggles and horrors, however, did not produce melancholy in the native son of Massachusetts. Rather, Adams professed an unwavering faith that the newly forged citizenry of the United States would never resubmit to George III's tyranny, lest they be forever "construed into Rebells and Traitors."[1623] By eliding political passion and patriotic disinterest, Adams attributed a unique and contradictory affective blend to America's rebels, who had proven themselves worthy of their freedom. These sons of America bore stark contrast to their loyalist brethren, whose "love" for their country – for British America – had dissipated at the first sign of struggle and inconvenience.

The Rise of America's Exclusionary Patriotic Ethos:

When Britain finally entered into diplomatic negotiations to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the United States in early-1783, Washington echoed Adams's optimism, proclaiming

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[1614] Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, November 26, 1781, in *Walpole Correspondences*, 25:213.
[1615] George III, "Memorandum of Abdication," March 3, 1782; in the "Georgian Papers," GEO/MAIN/4555; Royal Trust Collection of the Royal Achieves. The entire Georgian Papers collection has been made available online via https://gpp.rct.uk/default.aspx.
[1616] George III, "Memorandum of Abdication," March 3, 1782; in the "Georgian Papers," GEO/MAIN/4555.
[1617] Ibid.
[1618] John Adams, "Letters from a Distinguished American, No. 12" in *Papers of Adams*, 9:584
[1619] Adams, "Letters from a Distinguished American, No. 12," *Adams Papers*, 9:584.
[1620] Ibid.
[1621] Ibid, 9:585.
[1622] Ibid.
[1623] Ibid.

that those Americans who served within the Continental army – those who had "persevered, through every extremity of hardship; suffering and danger," – would be "immortalized by the illustrious appellation of the *patriot Army*."[1624] Having liberated Virginia and all of the American colonies from the cruel yoke of British tyranny, Washington readied his retirement from military service. Less than four months after the ratification of the *Treaty of Paris*, on Christmas Eve's eve 1783, Washington stood before the American congress and resigned his military commission, fulfilling his last "indispensable duty" to his nation.[1625] Washington declared it his intention to "leave all the employments of public life" and return to his sorely neglected tobacco fields.[1626] Fresh from his own brush with political abdication, George III apocryphally observed that if such rumors were true, then Washington "would be the greatest man in the world."[1627] Relinquishing power – as none would have forced Washington to resign – the beloved general now embodied and exemplified the disinterested patriotism for which Adams had advocated three years earlier. By "turning [his] Sword into a ploughshare" and retiring to Mount Vernon, Washington had proven that a defense of liberty, not a lust for power, had governed America's fight for independence.[1628]

Britain's diplomatic recognition of the United States now ensured the gradual withdrawal of all British regulars, who were an invading foreign army now infringing upon a nation's sovereign soil. British America's two-decade-long quartering crisis had ended, but another equally substantial problem remained. America's emotional community of revolution had empowered itself by politically othering not only British regulars, but also Indigenous warriors, enslaved insurrectionists, and imperial loyalists. America's former insurgents – barely able to articulate the criteria of their peacetime national identity – still had to reckon with the continued presence of these three marginalized cohorts. America's rebels, now citizens, had the option to develop methods for integrating those former enemies into their national identity. Instead, the thirteen united states maintained the *us-versus-them* political dichotomy that had helped win their independence, and through this exclusionary patriotic ethos, continued to describe their Indigenous, enslaved, and loyalist neighbors as enemies whose presence threated their security and independence.

The unfathomable cruelties of Indigenous raiders served as an affective and moral justification for Americans' anti-Indigenous hatred and revenge driven atrocities. In late-winter 1782, the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* reported that one New England militia found itself "struck with horror" upon finding "Packages" containing the "SCALPS of our unhappy Country-folks" from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, which the "Sennecka Indians" – one of the British allied members of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy – had taken over the past three years.[1629] Each of the over one thousand scalps reportedly had individual markings, which indicated how each victim had died: those who had been "burnt alive, after being scalped," those women who shed "Tears of Grief" prior to their death, those who had their "Brains beat out," and those who were either infants or yet unborn and were "ript out of their Mothers' Bellies."[1630] The *Pennsylvania Chronicle* did not speculate that this scalp-collecting campaign might have been its own act of impassioned revenge, with Senaca warriors seeking retribution for Major General John Sullivan's vicious razing of their

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[1624] George Washington, "General Orders," April 18, 1783, in *This Glorious Struggle*, 276-277.
[1625] George Washington, "Resignation Address to the Continental Congress," in *This Glorious Struggle*, 288-289.
[1626] Ibid.
[1627] This story comes from Benjamin West, who recounted his conversation with King George III to fellow artist Joseph Farington; see Joseph Farington, December 28, 1799, in *The Diary of Joseph Fairington*, 8 vols. ed., James Greig (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1923), 1:278-279; Andew Roberts, *The Last King of America: The Misunderstood Reign of King Goerge III* (New York: Viking, 2021), 454
[1628] George Washington to John Hancock, Trenton, December 20, 1776, in *This Glorious Struggle*, 81.
[1629] *Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser*, March 12, 1782.
[1630] Ibid.

capital, Genesee, in late-summer 1779.[1631] Instead, Lieutenant Fitzgerald offered to take the scalps to England and "hang them" upon the trees in "St. James's Park," so that the king may gain "some Compunction of Conscience" for the horrors he had unleashed on his former subjects.[1632] Through Fitzgerald's declaration, the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* attributed this wartime atrocity to the inherent barbarity of the Indigenous other, depicting the Seneca as immoral savages. It also implied that they had acted at the behest of the British king, making both equally worthy of America's hatred.

Other accounts that described Indigenous warriors torturing American prisoners only intensified the unifying power of America's Indian-hatred. When the Lenape captured John Knight in June 1782, he witnessed the torture of his commanding officer, Colonel Crawford, whom the Lenape shot with musket powder, lacerated, and burnt with poles.[1633] Crawford eventually begged for the Lenape to have "mercy on his soul" and kill him, a request which they granted only after subjecting him to such "extremities of pain" for two more hours.[1634] After scalping Crawford, the Lenape "repeatedly threw" his scalp at Knight, mocking the bravery of his "great captain."[1635] Knight claimed to have narrowly escaped his own death, as the Lenape were going to give him to the Shawnee, who planned to burn Knight alive in "a whole day[']s frolic."[1636] Through popular narratives and personal anecdotes such as Knight's, veterans of the Continental army affirmed the stereotype of the bloodthirsty Indigenous other, who reveled in the sorrow they inflicted, and therefore deserved no mercy from Americans' patriotic hearts.

Anti-Indigenous rhetoric taught America's citizens to expect nothing but cruelty and barbarity from their frontier neighbors. The violence which enslaved insurrections ostensibly committed on George III's behalf had dealt an equally potent blow to the internal security of the United States, one that was even more terrifying. Titus Cornelius, one of Lord Dunmore's earliest enslaved refugees and recruits, fought for several years in New Jersey under the "honorific" of "Colonel Tye."[1637] Throughout the summer of 1780, Tye commanded a band of enslaved Africans, British rangers, and imperial loyalists who wrought havoc upon American insurgents living in Monmouth County.[1638] Tye's exploits induced terror so affectively that Governor William Livingston received multiple petitions that he "restore in some measure the Security of [Monmouth] County."[1639] Remarkably, Tye avoided capture for almost two years, until one Captain Huddy killed him during a routine raid. Remarkably, Tye's death evoked mixed feelings from America's insurgents. As one such American observed, the "famous negro Tye," through his devastating, years-long assault in New Jersey, was more "feared and respected, as an enemy, than any of his brethren of the fairer complexion."[1640] The sentiments accompanying Americans' othering of enslaved Africans were profoundly complicated. Terrified of the unspeakable retributions that they might face at the hands of armed and enraged Black soldiers, American citizens still acknowledged the nobility of Tye's motivations: the desire to obtain his own personal freedom. Relying on stereotypical assumptions about Black intelligence, Americans dismissed Tye as too naïve to comprehend that he never would gain his freedom as a subject of British tyranny. This offensive,

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[1631] Calloway, *American Revolution in Indian Country*, 50-53; Parkinson, *Common Cause*, 434-439.
[1632] *Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser*, March 12, 1782.
[1633] John Knight, "An Account of the Barbarous Execution of Col. Crawford" in *Narrative of a Late Expedition against the Indians* (Philadelphia: Francis Bailey, 1783), 9-11; University of Pittsburgh.
[1634] Knight, "An Account," 11
[1635] Ibid, 11-12.
[1636] Ibid, 13-14; John Slover, "The Narrative of John Slover" in *Narratives of the Expedition*, 27-28.
[1637] Egerton, *Death or Liberty*, 66-68; Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 337-338.
[1638] *Pennsylvania Evening-Post*, June 16, 1780, and June 30, 1780.
[1639] David Forman to William Livingston, June 9, 1780, in *Papers of William Livingston*, ed., Carl E. Prince, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 3:423.
[1640] *New Jersey Gazette*, April 24, 1782.

racist assumption counterintuitively elevated Tye's political morality above that of his "brethren of the fairer complexion" – white imperial loyalists.[1641] For every imperial loyalist knew the tyrannical ambitions of George III and, despite such knowledge, still chose comfort and political enslavement under his reign instead of the moral just struggle for American liberty.

Further, American rebels regularly condemned the British empire's treatment of the tens of thousands of black imperial loyalists under its care and command. Throughout the siege at York, "herds of Negroes" fled into the woods because Cornwallis turned them "adrift."[1642] Ostensibly motivated by "love and pity," he offered them "no other recompense… than the smallpox for their bounty and starvation and death for their wages."[1643] After Cornwallis's surrender, Joseph Plumb Martin reported that several of these Black loyalist refugees were captured by their former enslavers. One of them, Colonel Banister, showed mercy and promised "not [to] injure a hair of their heads" so long as "they returned…to their duty."[1644] Martin's rhetoric reveals the tragic, hypocritical assumption that underpinned America's exclusionary patriotism: enslaved bondage for Black Americans, if offered with mercy and forgiveness, not hatred and violence, was preferable to the possibility of freedom they might receive as subjects in the British empire.

America's free Black inhabitants, however, were not spared the stigma of political otherness. While passing through Delaware, Martin asked a white woman to provide him with some liquor, to which she responded that her husband would fulfill his request.[1645] A brief moment later, "a great pot-bellied Negro man" entered the home.[1646] "[T]hunderstruck," Martin watched the woman call him "My Dear," and ask him to provide Martin with "a quart of rum."[1647] Martin confessed in his journal that he hurried from the home, "fearful" that witnessing such interracial romance might "give [him] the ague."[1648] Within America's exclusionary patriotic ethos, every Black person in the United States – whether free or enslaved, a voluntary soldier for the British empire or a coerced laborer for a southern rebel – had been affectively branded as a dangerous political other.

Of all those who fought on behalf of British tyranny, however, imperial loyalists suffered the greatest net displacement from the center of America's emotional community of revolution. British Serjeant Roger Lamb observed that, in months following Washington's victory at York, the "spirit of political rancor in America" against imperial loyalists had "risen to an uncommon height" and "raged beyond all bounds."[1649] Two types of imperial loyalists now resided within the United States, Nathaniel Whitaker argued. One group aligned themselves with the British empire from "fear," and therefore led a "quiet" live among America's insurgents, and the second, whose hands were "soacked in the blood of their brethren" and whose "hearts so long inured to barbarity and slaughter."[1650] To Whitaker, it might have been possible to simply ignore the former, but not the latter. Citizens of the United States had just "escaped [Britain's] rage with the skin of their teeth, and still carr[ied] the scars of their barbarity." [1651] Whitaker feared that Americans, with imperial loyalists as neighbors, would condemn themselves to suffer under the threat of "innumerable and constant

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[1641] Ibid.
[1642] Martin, *Ordinary Courage*, 158
[1643] Ibid.
[1644] Ibid. 159.
[1645] Ibid, 161.
[1646] Ibid.
[1647] Ibid.
[1648] Ibid.
[1649] Lamb, *Original and Authentic Journal*, 416-417; Horace Walpole to William Mason, November 28, 1781, in *Walpole Correspondences*, 29:268
[1650] Nathaniel Whitaker, *The Reward of Toryism* (Newburyport: John Mycall, 1783), 19; American Antiquarian Society, 19-20.
[1651] Whitaker, *Reward of Toryism*, 21-23.

dangers."[1652] The only solution, the Massachusetts minister concluded, was to "purge" the United States of those "traytors" who "still abhor peace."[1653] Whitaker's stance proved popular. One New Yorker gleefully proclaimed that America's "unfortunate sufferers" would now be avenged.[1654] The imperial loyalists who had persuaded "the British army to burn [rebels'] houses and cut [their] throats" soon would endure "irresistible vengeance" and "just sacrifice," either through their "blood" or their "banishment."[1655]

As hatred festered among America's citizens, Parliament held little authority to protect its imperial subjects. Article V of the *Treaty of Paris* granted each American state autonomy in how it administered repatriation of their native loyalists.[1656] These efforts easily devolved into violence. Hannah Ingraham "cried" herself to sleep in autumn 1783 when a group of American "rebels" surrounded her home and forced her to watch as they seized her father, an imperial loyalist, whom they took away as their prisoner.[1657] Just north of New York City, the *Newport Mercury* described how American vigilantes captured imperial loyalist Joshua Booth, whom they tarred and feathered. First, the New Yorkers shaved his head, then they covered him with "a very high cap of feathers… well plum'd with soft tar" and attached to his front a paper with "a man drawn with two faces, representing Arnold and the Devil's imps."[1658] The popular British print *The Savages Let Loose, or the Cruel Fate of the Loyalists* (see Figure 4.3) both reprimanded and immortalized the brutality and cruelty which Joshua Booth and other imperial loyalists endured in the wake of American independence. [1659] The graphic depicts America's hate-fueled rebels as Indigenous warriors, drunk on the bloodlust born of their violent civil war, eager to exact vengeance upon their former imperial brethren. As the cowering Briton to the right so aptly surmises: "O Cruel Fate! is this the Return for Our Loyalty."[1660]

Not all imperial loyalists, however, believed coexistence in America unachievable. Preacher Samuel Seabury implored all New Yorkers to embrace the spirit of "Brotherly Love."[1661] Advocating for a society built upon "tenderness of love, and sympathy of affection," Seabury urged his listeners to reject "Malice and revenge and ill-nature," as each of these sins "carry their own punishment" and will "torment the bosom that indulges them."[1662] Invoking the once firm familial affections that had united all Britons on both sides of the Atlantic, Seabury condemned those American rebels who, consumed by hatred, had "rush[ed], needlessly and wantonly, into a state destructive of the human race" – civil war. Above all else, Seabury begged his fellow New Yorkers – rebel and loyalists alike – to heal the wounds inflicted by those whose violence would incur their "mutual destruction!"[1663]

Seabury's desire for reconciliation proved incompatible with the ethics of violent ostracization that American rebels had cultivated within their emotional community of revolution. America's patriotism had been, and continued to be, profoundly excluded. Thousands of imperial loyalists had begun fleeing to Nova Scotia even before Cornwallis' defeat at York, destitute of any

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[1652] Ibid.
[1653] Ibid, 32.
[1654] Brutus, "To All adherents to the British Government and Followers of the British Army Commonly Called Tories, Who are present within the City and County of New York." (New York: Morton and Horner, 1783); New York Historical Society.
[1655] Ibid.
[1656] Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 224
[1657] Hannah Ingraham, September-November 1783, in *Words of Women*, 274-276.
[1658] *Newport Mercury*, November 15, 1783; Chopra, *Unnatural Rebellion*, 212; Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 224-225.
[1659] *The Savages Let Loose, or, The Cruel Fate of the Loyalists* (London: W. Humphrey, 1783); Lewis Walpole Library.
[1660] Ibid.
[1661] Samuel Seabury, *A Sermon…On the Anniversary of St. John the Evangelist* (New York: Robertson, 1783), 7; New York Historical Society.
[1662] Seabury, *A Sermon*, 10-11.
[1663] Ibid, 17-18.

"hope for peace and protection" and "fearfully maltreated by the Americans."[1664] By mid-1783, Washington had begun to receive reports that "not less than fifteen thousand inhabitants will be drove from this Country who are not conscious of any other Crime than that of residing within the British Lines."[1665] The reports blamed the "warm publications in [insurgent] papers and the unconstitutional proceedings" of America's *de facto* rebel governments.[1666] William Smith, who finally fled New York in autumn 1783, observed that this forced evacuation was not simply "cruel," but rather "fatal to the Reunion" of those families who had been torn apart by British America's civil war.[1667] It was America's rebels who had committed treason against their king and empire, whereas it had been imperial loyalists' steadfast political allegiance had earned them unjust title of "traitor."

Figure 4.3: *The Savages Let Loose, or, the Cruel Fate of the Loyalists.*
London: W. Humphrey, 1783.
Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library.

The irony is striking. Adam Smith notes that the title of traitor most accurately refers to one who "fancies he can promote his own little interest by betraying to the public enemy that of his

[1664] Leopold, *Revolution in America*, 561-562; Walke, *Remarkable Occurrences*, 10-11. For the flight of imperial loyalists such as Myles Cooper, see Jones, *Resisting Independence*, 199; for that of Andrew Eliot, see Johnson, *Occupied America*, 189. For the most popular literary example of such flight, see J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, "Letters XII: Distresses of a Frontier Man," which details both the horrors of British America's "civil division," and the flight of James, an imperial loyalist, into the Pennsylvania-New York backcountry; see de Crèvecouer, "Letter XII" in *Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of an Eighteenth-Century American*, ed., Albert E. Stone (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 202-217.
[1665] William S. Smith to George Washington, July 15, 1783, in *New York City during the Revolution*, 144-145.
[1666] Ibid.
[1667] Smith, *Historical Memoirs*, 606; Johnson, *Occupied America*, 185

native country" and, "regardless of the judgment within his breast, prefers himself."[1668] By abandoning "all those with whom he has any connection," the traitor thereby "appears to be of all villains the most detestable." [1669] To William Smith, and to his fellow imperial loyalists, it was America's rebels who had rebuked all bonds of imperial fellow-feeling, abandoned Britain to satiate their own lust for power, and rightfully deserved the title of traitor. America's rebels, however, had won the civil war of sword and pen. Blazoned with an unjust name, imperial loyalists were the left with an unsatisfying ultimatum: flee as refugees from the only home they had ever known or endure the unrelenting hatred of their former countrymen.

Figure 4.4: Benjamin West, *John Eardley Wilmot*. 1812.
Yale Center for British Arts, Paul Mellon Collection.

To grasp the full political scope of America's exclusionary patriotism, one only needs to consider Benjamin West's portrait of John Eardley Wilmot. A British magistrate, Wilmot was one of the royal officials who investigated claims made by imperial loyalists "hop[ing] to receive some Compensation" for "the Losses" they sustained during British America's civil war (see Figure 4.4).[1670] Occupying the portrait's right foreground, Wilmot contemplates the important work that lay before him: offering aid and comfort to loyal, deserving subjects of George III. The portrait's left background, however, presents a more grim, melancholy picture. Britannia's cloak stretches over

[1668] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228.
[1669] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 228.
[1670] Charles Inglis to G. Bancker, September 25, 1783, in "Charles Inglis Letters"; Benjamin West, *John Eardley Wilmot* (1812); Yale Center for British Art, Paul Mellon Collection.

British America's royal officials and those respectable subjects of political influence and personal wealth. Yet it barely has fabric enough to cover those loyalist families of modest means and prospects. Beyond Britannia's cloak stands those Indigenous and enslaved peoples who fought for the British empire, as well as the poorest of imperial loyalists, who would have escaped the fury of America's rebellion with nothing more than clothes on their backs. West's portrait of Wilmont emphasizes the tragic, lived cruelty of America's exclusionary patriotism. Yet it also shows that the British empire actively deprioritized Indigenous, enslaved, and non-elite loyalists – the very same communities whose marginalization by American insurgents had made them exceptionally vulnerable. It was those groups who received the least protection from the British crown, and thus endured the greatest suffering as hostile enemies to America's emotional community of revolution.

Conclusion:

As Jeremy Belknap reminded Ebenezer Hazard on the morning of March 20, 1782, the "terms of affection and respect" with which British Americans once "[spoke] of the King" were "worthy of notice."[1671] After reviewing the correspondences exchanged between Massachusetts and New York's Sons of Liberty during British America's anti-stamp tax riots, Belknap concluded that even the most politically radical colonists felt "the warmest expressions of duty and loyalty to the King, his person, family, and constitutional authority," and that these "public professions of loyalty… were sincere."[1672] No hint of civil war or political independence touched these letters, as their authors "were far, very far from desiring to disunite what was then the British empire."[1673] Despite his sober analysis, even Belknap remained vulnerable to America's exclusionary, patriotic ethos. The Bostonian felt that "the blame" for the recent war "must be laid elsewhere" than at the feet of the citizens of the United States.[1674]

America's independence relied upon a single deception, one which delineated the boundaries of its emotional community of revolution: those who remained *loyal* to the British empire had betrayed the liberties and freedoms that underwrote their imperial identity, whereas those who committed treason against the British crown had committed a profound act of *patriotism*. According to this narrative, the proof was in their willingness to fight and to die to spare themselves and their fellow countrymen from a lifetime of so-called political enslavement under the yoke of George III. America's insurgent elite stoked and cloaked this political deception with the passions of patriotism. Ratcheting up terror, rage, and horror through both print media and word of mouth, America's revolutionaries convinced rebels within thirteen disparate colonies to fight for their political independence. Furthermore, these insurgents excessively brutalized those political others who fought on behalf of George III: the British regular, the enslaved insurrectionist, the Indigenous warrior, and the imperial loyalist. The chaos of British America's civil war forged newfound bonds of intercolonial, and then interstate, fellow-feeling, as the sorrow and hatred which American rebels shared laid the foundations for both their exclusionary patriotic ethos and their emergent national identity.

Political unity, however, proved elusive for the United States. Less than one year later, Jeremy Belknap again picked up his pen to write to Ebenezer Hazard. Upon reading Thomas Paine's "last Crisis," Belknap found himself fearful for the future of America's firm league of mutual defense and friendship. The "individual sovereignty" of the thirteen independent states were only

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[1671] Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, March 20, 1782, "Correspondence between Jeremey Belknap and Ebenezer Hazard," in the *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 5th Series* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1877) 2:121.

[1672] Ibid.

[1673] Ibid.

[1674] Ibid.

"connected [by] that of the united sovereignty" of America's congress.[1675] Together, these now weak bonds of interstate affection "form[ed] a solecism in politics" that "may prove dangerous if it be not corrected."[1676] Without realizing it, Belknap had excavated at a profound, foundational truth of the national character of the United States: fighting a war against a collective *them* was easier than governing a diversified *us*. Dangerous enemies and political others had allowed America's revolutionaries to draw together in defense and friendship. Now, America's citizens had to decide whether they actually had forged bonds of fellow-feeling strong enough to cohere their thirteen independent states into a single, united republic.

[1675] Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, May 19, 1783, in "Correspondence between Jeremey Belknap and Ebenezer Hazard," 2:206-207.

[1676] Ibid. Thomas Paine published his "Last Crisis" on April 19, 1783, in which he argues that America's "great national character depends" upon the "UNION OF THE STATES." Paine continues: The union is the "most sacred thing in the constitution of America, and that which every man should be the most proud and tender of. Our citizenship in the united states is our national character. Our citizenship in any particular state is only our local distinction. By the latter we are known at home, by the former to the world. Our great title is, AMERICANS; our inferior ones varies with the place." Finally, Paine warns all Americans to follow his example and to see that "the little wranglings and indecent contentions of personal party, are as dishonorable to our characters, as they are injurious to our response"; see Paine, "Last Crisis," in *Common Sense*, 351-353. Larson makes an important point: while "treason" committed against the United States was a central mechanism for defining who has and lost the rights and protections of the American government, and thus helped to form "a common national citizenship and a common national identity," this "new allegiance would ultimately not be enforced by the gallows." For despite the "violent civil war drenched with vicious rhetoric" that Americans had fought against imperial loyalists, they remained "unwilling to see their fellow citizens executed for crimes and disloyalty." The important distinction, here, is that Larson refers to official mechanism of state, not the type of popular, *ad hoc* brutalization of loyalists that the common American engaged in both during and after British America's civil war for independence; see Larson, *Trial of Allegiance,* 230, 251.

PART III:

"That Sacred Knot Which Binds": Republican Citizens, 1777-1796

Alexander Hamilton's *Federalist 15* offered an affective solution to a non-existent political problem. In its antecedent, James Madison implored the people of the United States to discount those "unnatural voices" that had risen to prominence within the nation's discourse.[1677] Ignore the political dissidents and rabble-rousers who argue that the American people, despite being "knit together" by "so many chords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue as the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great respectable and flourishing empire."[1678] Madison then urged his fellow Americans to "Shut [their] hearts against the poison" of this "misguided council."[1679] Only by rejecting this ideological pessimism, Madison concluded, may the thirteen united states ratify the proposed federal constitution, and thereby safeguard their political unity.

The necessity of ratification, Alexander Hamilton argued, was apparent to any American who made an honest evaluation of their current confederation. The United States "have almost reached the last stage of national humiliation," and there is "scarcely any thing that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation" that American people "do not experience" already.[1680] The United States, Hamilton listed in a series of rhetorical questions, "owe[s] debts to foreigners and to [its] own citizens" without "proper or satisfactory provision or their discharge"; has "valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power"; and has lost all international status, as its "ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty."[1681]

The blame for this "melancholy situation," Hamilton continued, lies with the "very maxims and councils which would now deter" the American people "from adopting the proposed Constitution," and thereby "plunge" the unstable nation into "the abyss" of chaos and violence.[1682] Without a more powerful federal government, Hamilton observed, each individual state would submit "to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience," and subsequently withdraw itself from America's confederation, until that government's "frail and tottering edifice seem[ed] ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins."[1683] The New York nationalist then made a rousing to plea to his fellow countrymen: "make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity."[1684]

The rhetoric put forward in the fourteenth and fifteenth *Publius* epistles depicts a United States on the brink of irreparable political disunion. At first read, such conclusions seem logical, given the nation's volatile preceding quarter century. By July 1788, America's thirteen rebellious colonies not only had slayed their political allegiance to George III and the British empire, but also had committed their first domestic coup, replacing their "firm league of friendship" with a, significantly empowered national government. The ratification of the *United States Constitution*, however, did not lessen, but rather accentuated, the political and ideological divisions that plagued the early republic. To add insult to injury, the nationalists' lauded victory had been embarrassingly

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[1677] James Madison, *Federalist 14*, *New York Packet*, November 30, 1787, in *Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution*, ed., Merrill Jensen, John P. Kaminski, et al. (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), 14:316.
[1678] Ibid.
[1679] Ibid, 14:317.
[1680] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 15*, *New York Independent Journal*, December 1, 1787, in *DHRC*, 14:325
[1681] Ibid, 14:325-326.
[1682] Ibid.
[1683] Ibid, 14:331.
[1684] Ibid, 14:326.

narrow, with a ratio of 1.8 votes for the ratification of the proposed constitution for every 1 vote against it. Even more alarming, the composite ratio of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York – three states whose presence was deemed necessary for the republic's success – was worse, with 1.16 votes for ratification for every 1 vote against it.[1685] By forcing the disparate members of America's confederation into a more cohesive, and therefore more restrictive, political union, the United States' new, national government had incited that which Alexander Hamilton had promised it would dispel. The vitriolic ratification of the *United States Constitution* now posed the greatest threat to severing "that sacred knot which binds the people of America together."[1686]

[1685] Massachusetts's ratio of victory was 1.11 to 1; Virginia's ratio was 1.13 to 1; and New York's ratio was 1.11. The next narrowest margin of an individual state was that of Pennsylvania, which had a ratification margin of 2 to 1.
[1686] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 15*, in *DHRC*, 14:324.

CHAPTER FIVE:

"To Make Us Feel Our Need of Union": Weakening the Bonds of Political Affection within America's Federated Republic, 1777-1788

Introduction:

The Confederation Congress completed only a few, mundane tasks when it convened in New York City on Thursday, March 9, 1786.[1687] The assembled representatives from Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia approved the creation of two subcommittees of review: one for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs' report on France, and a second for the Secretary of War's report on court martials.[1688] After appointing three representatives to each subcommittee, America's congress referred to the Secretary of War a petition from Caleb Bryan Bruen, in which he "pray[ed] for compensation for expenses and services" he both incurred and performed during America's recent war against the British empire.[1689] With no urgent business left to discuss, Congress recessed their uneventful day.

Three hundred miles to the northeast, Jeremy Belknap composed a fretful letter to Ebenezer Hazard.[1690] Hidden among pleasantries, familial gossip, and inquiries into the "real state of danger from the Indians" in the Ohio territory, Belknap expressed his fears that America's "firm league of friendship" might cleave apart under the pressures of regional discord and "internal repulsion."[1691] The statesman and scholar confessed a profound "pity" for the members of America's federated congress, who lacked substantive power over the state's individual legislatures.[1692] To prevent such a tragedy and to preserve the United States' tenuous, fraying bonds of wartime affection, Belknap concluded that he and the American people must "want some imminent, common danger, pressing hard upon us, to make us feel our need of union."[1693] Indeed, Jeremy Belknap was right. America's emotional community of revolution had relied on the threats of vilified others to forge, strengthen, and solidify political affection among its members. Absent an "imminent, common danger," and now fearful of the confederation's impending political disunity, a subsection of America's revolutionary elite worked to crystallize the United States' fragile bonds of national fellow-feeling. America's nationalists, however, made a grave miscalculation, and their quest to achieve a more perfect affective union nearly struck a fatal blow to both the United States and its fledging national identity.

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Though he never once uttered the terms "affective economy," "emotional community," "political other," or "exclusionary patriotism," Belknap's anxieties confirmed the acute sensitivity of

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[1687] March 9, 1786, in *JCC*, 30:108.

[1688] Ibid, 30:108 n.2.

[1689] Ibid. Charles Pickney of South Carolina, Rufus King of Massachusetts, and John Laurence of New York were appointed to review the report from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Arthur St. Clair of Pennsylvania, Henry Lee of Virginia, and John Laurence of New York were appointed to review the report from the Secretary of War.

[1690] Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, March 9, 1786, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 2:430.

[1691] Ibid. Belknap's concerns for Congress's weakening political influence likely intensified in early-1786, as both the Massachusetts and Virginia state legislatures refused to support any amendments to grant Congress additional commerce powers; see George William van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government: The Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 117-124.

[1692] Belknap to Hazard, March 9, 1786, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 2:430-431. *Act of Confederation of the United States of America* in *DHRC*, 1:86.

[1693] Belknap to Hazard, March 9, 1786, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 2:431.

America's revolutionary elite to the relationship between political passions and national identity.[1694] The importance of historical moments in which British Americans found themselves facing an "imminent, common danger" is undeniable – the battle of Québec, opposition to the stamp tax and tea tax, the battle at York. Notably, these were also moments in which British colonists, and then American rebels, felt and expressed their "need of union" with the most fervent words and the most violent actions. Shared dangers, however, did not vanquish the threat of "internal repulsion," but rather obfuscated it. In these moments, British American colonists had prioritized the transformation of French soldiers, Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, British regulars, and imperial loyalists into dehumanized political others, against whom all Americans might unite. Each of these marginalized cohorts held within them foundational characteristics – including imperial allegiance, race, ethnicity, and religion – that made them easy to identify, and even easier to exclude from Americans' political bonds of fellow-feeling. None of these tried-and-true affective strategies, however, allayed fears within, or mutual suspicions between, America's independent states.

For ten years, America's federated republic and the thirteen sovereign states which composed it worked to enshrine their most sacred constitutional liberties. Fearful of the avarice, bloodlust, and tyrannical ambitions which had infiltrated and corrupted both Parliament and their former colonial governments, America's revolutionaries sought to limit the fiscal powers and military authority of their national, federated congress.[1695] The *Articles of Confederation*, therefore, intentionally restricted congress's purview to those powers necessary for waging war, conducting international diplomacy, and resolving interstate conflict.[1696]

These calculated efforts to limited the federated congress' power inadvertently encouraged a growing faction of America's political elite to espouse a rhetoric of fear; one which argued that their legislative body lacked the requisite authority to protect individual property rights, to defend the United States from undue foreign influence, to resolve interstate boundary disputes across the western borderlands, and to mitigate popular resentment festering throughout the nation.[1697] The federated congress' near-decade of governance was imperfect, yet moderately successful. Nevertheless, America's emergent nationalists insisted that continued adherence to the *Articles of Confederation* would result in both material want and political instability for the United States.

In late-1786, these hypothetical fears swiftly transformed into both lived and rhetorical terrors, as socioeconomic unrest and popular rebellion erupted in the western townships of Massachusetts. America's ardent nationalists seized on these so-called acts of anarchy to condemn Massachusetts's regulation, and thereby fostered an interstate rhetoric of terror and hatred. Advocates for a stronger central government subsequently criticized the irrational, selfish, and popular passions which nourished this episode of political chaos. Months after the dissolution of Massachusetts's regulation, when insignificant popular uprisings broke out in both New York and Virginia's western borderlands, America's nationalists further exploited the populace's well-nurtured

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[1694] Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotions*, 44-45, 218-219; Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions," 842-843; powell and Menendian, "The Problems of Othering," 17.

[1695] Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*, 3-4.

[1696] Article II, *Act of Confederation of the United States of America*; 1:86. Merrill Jenson, *The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1783* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), 239-240, Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*, 3-4.

[1697] Peter S. Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983) 10-17, 173-185. Van Cleve argues that the desire to reform the Confederation "was driven most heavily by the perceived need to create a sovereign national government that could preserve American independence, protect western expansion, combat foreign trade aggression, provide unified continental government and law enforcement, and maintain internal order." Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*, 8.

terror. The result: a clarion call for an interstate convention to redress America's ineffectual government.[1698]

Nationalists appeared to have found an "imminent, common enemy" in the perils of anarchy. Amendments to the *Articles of Confederation* now promised to renew the United States' political affection, and twelve states sent delegations to Philadelphia in summer 1787.[1699] The delegates shocked the American populace, however, when they emerged from their near-four month sequester. These lauded statesmen and revolutionaries had not drafted amendments to empower America's confederation, but rather proposed a new, federal constitution for the individual states to ratify. These delegates hoped that a further empowered central government would foster "political attachment" to their republic, and thereby solidify the United States' complex, and quite novel, national identity.[1700] Instead, the proposed constitution sowed profound discord.

As before, affective rhetoric played a key role in America's political transformations, but it followed far more intricate rules. Proponents of the constitution encouraged ratification and obedience to the centralized government, playing up emotions of both fear and hatred. Embracing

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[1698] Max Edling agrees that the "need to secure the survival of the American union of republics as an independent nation" not only fostered the belief that the "challenges" of independency could not "be effectively addressed with the framework of the Articles of Confederation," but also that, by 1787, "the American states faced the choice of either reinvigorating their union or dissolving it." Max M. Edling, *Perfecting the Union: National and State Authority in the US Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 8-9.

[1699] Constitution crises may be categorized into two camps: operational crises, in which "important political disputes cannot be resolved within the existing constitutional framework" and crises of constitutional fidelity, in which "important political actors threaten to become no longer willing to abide by existing constitutional arrangements or systematically contradict constitutional proscriptions." Emily Pears argues that the constitutional crisis which erupted in late-winter/early-spring 1787 around the *Articles of Confederation* best aligns with an operational crisis. Conversely, historians like Max M. Edling, George William Van Cleve all understand the failure of the *Articles of Confederation* to arise, at least in part from a crisis of faith, as Van Cleve explicitly argues that both support for the Philadelphia Convention and the ratification of the *United States Constitution* by Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York occurred because "enough influential citizens with lives and property to protect concluded (for very different reasons) that neither their states nor the Confederation was capable of protecting their interests" and, therefore, was a crisis of constitutional fidelity. I argue in alignment with Van Cleve's interpretation, concurring that the delegates to Philadelphia Convention had an opportunity to propose amendments to the *Articles of Confederation* that might have resolved the issues and flaws onto which America's nationalists had latched and fervently bemoaned. Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 4-6; Edling, *Perfecting the Union*, 9 Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*, 277. For the definitions of "operational crisis" and "constitutional crisis of fidelity," see Keith Whittington, "Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?" *William and Mary Law Review* 43 (2002):2101, 2109-2112.

[1700] Emily Pears argues that the "American Founders designed [their] constitutional republic to reply for its legitimacy on citizen's political attachments," which are the "patriotic sentiments and beliefs that connect individuals to their institutions of government" and then function to "reinforce regime stability by emotionally connecting citizens to a set of status quo institutions." Political attachments differ from patriotism, Pears explains, as they both require "deep emotional connection," but only political attachments require the citizenry to "adhere to even the least popular of legal mandates" while allowing "critical evaluation of the nation within the bounds of lawful commitment to constitutional dictates." Through such political attachment, America's political elite believed, would "ensure that citizens were willing to uphold political institutions and the Constitution even when it was personally or politically inconvenient." Pears then sketches the three types of mechanisms by which America's political elite sought to foster such "political attachments": utilitarian, which engenders "loyalty to [one's] government in exchange for personal benefit"; cultural, which uses "symbolism, storytelling, and shared historical narrative" to make the institutions of government seem "worthy of affection"; and lastly, " participatory, which creates a closeness to the citizenry through the government's ability to provide for the citizenry's needs. Pears rightfully argues that such political attachments "do not necessarily require connections or affinities among citizens, but such sentiments aid in their development." While Pears understands political attachments to be maintainable without affinities between the citizenry, I argue that the divisive ratification of the *United States Constitution* so profoundly harmed the bonds of fellow-feeling among the United States' citizenry, which in turn hindered the cohesiveness of the republic's national identity and, as I discuss in Chapter 6, the American people's political attachments to the federal government. Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 11-12,15, 50-62, 246, 258.

the misnomer of federalists, they warned that, without a stronger national government, the United States would inevitably succumb to political instability, anarchy, and finally, another civil war. Even as they promoted fear, however, these federalists consciously presented their arguments with tempered, moderate discourse. Indeed, they claimed that unruly, popular passions were to blame for America's current political crisis. Keenly aware that displays of fervent political emotion would expose them to accusations of hypocrisy, federalists measured their own rhetoric. These nationalists then regularly exhibited predictive sorrow for the profound suffering which the American people would endure if they foolishly rejected the proposed constitution.

Conversely, antifederalists condemned the proposed constitution by deploying fiercer rhetorics of terror, rage, and sorrow. Horrified and aggrieved at the secret betrayal which occurred in Philadelphia, antifederalists argued that this new system of government exposed the American people to the dangers of arbitrary power. Within this constitution, antifederalists saw executive tyranny, legislative tyranny, and worst of all, political enslavement – the same perils which plagued the British empire, the same perils from which the America people had just escaped.

As political debate degraded into vicious, *ad hominem* attacks, federalists and antifederalists alike rebuked their opponents for betraying America's revolutionary ideals and, in the most extreme cases, labeled one another as patriotic turncoats, guilty of abandoning their civic duties. The ratification conventions held in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York exemplified this vitriolic, political infighting. As each state ratified the constitution, however, federalists' arguments acquired greater affective credibility. Not wasting their political momentum, federalists celebrated each successive ratification with interstate rhetorics of joy, depicting their new, national government as both beneficial to the American people and ultimately inevitable. Antifederalists proved willing to concede and supported each state's ratification, so long as the new, federal congress consented to codify the individual state's proposed amendments into a functioning, national bill of rights. By placing national accord above ideological victory, antifederalists sustained America's intra- and interstate bonds of fellow-feeling, and thereby ensured the popular acceptance of the *United States Constitution*. No less critically, antifederalists' concessions had saved themselves from being branded as political others, unworthy of membership within the United States' exclusionary, national identity.

Narrowly ratified and contentiously opposed, the *United States Constitution* inadvertently revealed a profound vein of disunion within the bedrock of America's early republic. The swiftness with which former comrades-in-arms turned on one another in the name of patriotism and good government illuminates the profound limitations of America's nascent national identity. Federalists had forcefully attempted to harmonize the discordant United States into a cohesive political entity, yet they inadvertently worked against their own interests. These nationalists had revealed the potential power of affective discourse to deny the most ardent of American revolutionaries the epithet of patriot, and thereby exclude them from the bonds of national fellow-feeling. The resultant, inharmonious federal republic now held within its political institutions the power not only to weaken the American citizenry's bonds of fellow-feeling, but also to dissolve their need for union.

Governing Independence, Resisting Reconciliation:

Two million people – mostly civilians and noncombatants – had been subjected to the material hardships and political instabilities of civil war. For civilian and solider alike, however, fears of illness and starvation had equaled, if not overshadowed, the horrors of combat.[1701] Distraught at

[1701] Moses Morse to Commanding Officer at Crown-Point, July 9, 1776, in *American Archives*, 5th Series, ed., Peter Force (Washington D.C.: Unite States Congress, 1843), 1:145; Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 53-54. Two heart-wrenching anecdotes of the brutality of smallpox come Abigail Adams and Geroge Washington. Desperate to protect her family, Abigail Adams made the difficult choice to inoculate her children against the disease, yet such preventative measures did not spare her

the devastation which plagued his ancestral home, imperial loyalist and Massachusetts expatriate Thomas Hutchinson composed a scathing condemnation of the *Declaration of Independence*. The insurgent congress's decision to brand Geroge III a "tyrant" must stir "Indignant resentment" within "the breast of every loyal subject," the Massachusetts exile declared.[1702] Britain's sovereign had acted neither "cruel" nor "merciless" towards any British subject, even those currently engaged in rebellion against his throne.[1703] Rather, it was the delegates to America's extralegal congress who coveted tyrannical power and, in pursuit of such desires, subjected their fellow colonists to both pestilence and famine. In New York, Samuel Seabury bemoaned the spiritual weakness of those British Americans who embraced mankind's more "selfish, malignant and vindictive passions."[1704] These spiteful sentiments, Seabury concluded, had persuaded thousands of British Americans to reject the "tender, sociable and humane feelings of the heart" in favor of the "horrid front" and "bloody banners" of rebellion.[1705] If these deceived colonists only abandoned their insurgent congress and "beat their swords into plowshares," then all Britons might return to a state of "peace, unity, brotherly love, and concord," and thereby be spared the sorrows of civil war.[1706]

Before either Hutchinson or Seabury had finished composing their pleas for reconciliation, America's revolutionaries had begun the difficult, yet necessary labor of drafting their state constitutions. America's insurgent congress had hoped that these new, stable forms of self-government would sever any lingering affection for, or bonds of fellow-feeling with, the British empire. These independent governments, the delegates advised, should be founded on the "authority of the people," preserving "internal peace, virtue, and good order," and defending their citizens from "the hostile invasions and cruel depredations" of their former king and parliament.[1707] The core principles of British constitutionalism, however, remained a bedrock within the former colonies, and politicians constructed their respective state constitutions around the ideologies of republicanism and popular sovereignty.[1708]

In particular, America's revolutionaries were eager to prohibit, at all costs, the dangers of legislative tyranny. Ratified two weeks before its complimentary constitution, Virginia's *Declaration of*

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eleven-year-old daughter, Nabby, from the disease's most aggressive symptoms. One month after Nabby's inoculation, pustulates so extensively covered the poor child's body that she could "neither walk, sit, stand, or lay with any comforts. Bouts of smallpox so aggressively plagued military camps in both New York and Virginia that General Washington followed Mrs. Adams example and ordered the inoculation of all Continental soldiers, somberly remarking they have "more to dread from [the disease], than from the Sword of the enemy." Simultaneously, the ever-present pangs of wartime hunger only exacerbated such grim living conditions. As one colonist noted, the "Cry for Bread" and "complain[ts] of being hungry" had become the common refrain heard throughout all of British America. For smallpox, see Abigail Adams to John Adams, August 14, 1776, in *AFC* 2:93; George Washington to William Shippen, February 6, 1777, in *Papers of George Washington: RW*, 8:264; for an analysis of the complexity of inoculating the entire Continental Army, as well as Washington's indecision regarding an order of such magnitude, see Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 92-98. For hunger, see Abigail Adams to John Adams, March 8, 1777, in *AFC*, 2:172; Martin, *Ordinary Courage*, 28-30. For an excellent analysis of the ways in which hunger prevention and victual warfare functioned within British America's wartime strategies against Black loyalists and Indigenous peoples allied with the British empire, see Rachel B. Herrmann, *No Useless Mouth: Waging War and Fighting Hunger in the American Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 38-157.

[1702] Hutchinson, *Strictures upon the Declaration*, 30.

[1703] Ibid.

[1704] Samuel Seabury, *Discourse on Brotherly Love* (New York: Hugh Gaines, 1777), 11; New York Historical Society.

[1705] Seabury, *Discourse on Brotherly Love*, 8-9, 12.

[1706] Ibid, 20.

[1707] May 15, 1776, in *JCC* 4:357-358; Willi Paul Adams, *The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era, Expanded Edition* (Lanham: Madison House Book, 2001), 60-61.

[1708] Adams, *First Constitutions*, 16, 24; for a detailed analysis of how the thirteen American states collectively addressed their concerns regarding the structure of government, such as minimizing the power of the state governors in comparison to their colonial, royal predecessors, or the importance of developing representative legislatures, see Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 125-197.

Rights emphasized its citizens' abhorrence for arbitrary power and legislative corruption. To prevent their own legislature from pillaging the people's purses, as Parliament had done with its duties on stamped paper and tea, Virginia's revolutionaries forbade any citizen from being "taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives."[1709] To further assuage Virginians' fears of the state legislature and its fiscal-military power, the *Declaration of Rights* prohibited peacetime standing armies, as they were "dangerous to liberty," and its subsequent constitution imbued the governor with civilian control over the state's militias.[1710] To the north, New York's constitution mirrored Virginia's fears of abuse from armed soldiers. Profoundly affected by their imperial quartering crisis and their current military occupation under General Howe, New York's revolutionaries prohibited the creation of a peacetime standing army within their state. [1711] These revolutionaries also empowered their governor and supreme court to "revise all bills" passed "into law by the legislature," if they proved "inconsistent with the spirit of [the] constitution or with the public good."[1712] These provisions granted an important constitutional safeguard to the people of New York, as it ensured that they never again would be coerced into quartering or funding the soldiers of legislative tyranny.

Much more deliberative than its southern neighbors, Massachusetts did not ratify its own constitution until summer 1780. Extensively detailed, Massachusetts's constitution included an anti-arbitrary taxation clause, an anti-standing army clause, and an anti-quartering clause, which specifically forbade soldiers from taking residence "in any house without the consent of the owner."[1713] It also featured a clause guaranteeing any citizen charged with a capital crime to the right of "a trial by jury."[1714] Unlike Virginia or New York, Massachusetts also explicitly limited gubernatorial powers within its constitution. Mindful of the so-called tyrannical ambitions Francis Bernard, Thomas Hutchinson, and General Thomas Gage, Massachusetts required annual gubernatorial elections.[1715] Only because of this failsafe did it grant its governor the right to deploy the state's militia and to suppress civilian rebellion. Over the past twenty years, America's revolutionaries had developed an acute hatred for and fear of legislative, and to a degree executive, tyranny, and therefore did all in their power to prevent these evils from arising within their independent state governments.

Even as these state constitutions were composed, America's insurgent congress drafted a new, federated government to address the shared concerns of its thirteen constituent members. Following months of intense debate, Congress adopted the *Act of Confederation of the United States of America* in November 1777, which preserved the states' political autonomy by "delegat[ing] narrowly limited powers to the central government."[1716] The ratification of the *Articles of Confederation* by the individual states, however, occurred in fits and starts: Virginia ratified in late-December 1777; Massachusetts in March 1778, but with several proposed alterations; and New York one month

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[1709] George Mason authored the first draft of Virginia's *Declaration of Rights*; for the first draft, see *Papers of George Mason*, ed., Robert A. Rutland (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1:276-282; for the adopted version, see *Papers of George Mason*, 1:287-292; Adams, *First Constitutions*, 70-71.

[1710] Virginia's *Declaration of Rights* in *Papers of George Mason*, 1:287-292; Constitution of Virginia (1776), in *The Constitutions of the Several Independent States of America* (Philadelphia: Francis Bailey, 1781), 143.

[1711] New York's militia clause also provides service exemptions for Quakers and those who, "from scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of arms"; Constitution of New York (1777), in *Constitutions of the Several States*, 64, 76.

[1712] Ibid.

[1713] Constitution of Massachusetts (1780), in *Constitutions of the Several States*, 11-14.

[1714] Ibid.

[1715] Ibid, 24-26.

[1716] *Act of Confederation of the United States of America* in *DHRC*, 1:86-93. For the Congress's debates, see *JCC* 9:779-809; for this interpretation of the purpose of the *Articles of Confederation*, see Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*, 3-4.

earlier, but with an addendum: they would recognize the *Articles* as binding only after they had "been duly ratified, and confirmed by….all the said United States in Congress assembled."[1717] Maryland proved the final holdout, refusing to ratify unless Virginia ceded its disputed western land claims to the federated congress for arbitration.[1718] When Virginia's assembly finally consented in January 1781, Maryland's subsequent ratification granted America's federated congress the legal power to act on behalf of the *entire*, confederated United States.[1719]

Between the drafting and the official enactment of the *Articles of Confederation*, America's insurgent congress had to fend off one of the greatest political threat's to independence: a royal peacekeeping mission led by Frederick Howard, the Earl of Carlisle.[1720] Desperate to reunify the British empire and spare it the loss of further blood and treasure, Parliament proposed a shocking list of concessions to their American colonies, which included the repeal of the tea tax, the *Port Bill*, and the *Massachusetts Government Act*; the termination of all nonconsensual deployment of British regulars to the American colonies; and the recognition, and further empowerment, of the colonial legislatures' fiscal autonomy.[1721] Furthermore, Parliament did not require a public retraction of the *Declaration of Independence* – an ideological overture which arose from the empire's belief that all actions of America's insurgent congress were illegal, and therefore would be "in effect rescinded by the Conclusion of the Treaty."[1722]

When Carlisle arrived before America's insurgent congress in early-summer 1778, he implored its delegates to work with him for the "the sacred purpose of restoring tranquility and stopping the effusion of human blood."[1723] To do so, Carlisle claimed, they must embrace their "love of [their] country, [their] anxious care of its interests, [their] compassion for its sufferings, [their] honest zeal for its future glory, [and their] fears for its declension."[1724] By mid-July, however, Carlisle reluctantly accepted that his affective pleas had fallen upon hardened hearts, as the congress – comprised of America's most zealous politicians – adamantly refused to consider any proposed peace treaties that failed to recognize their "independency and separation" from Britain.[1725] By mid-October, Carlisle's delegation had begun preparations to return home empty handed.

[1717] For Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York's respective ratifications of the *Articles of Confederation*, see *DHRC*, 1:103-124; Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1783* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), 188-190.

[1718] At the time of ratification, Maryland and Virginia had an ongoing dispute over the right to westward territories which Maryland feared it would jeopardize its western claims by ratifying the *Articles of Confederation*. Richard Henry Lee argued that Maryland's refusal to ratify emerged from jealousy and "Fear" of Virginia's "power" in the south, blaming the state's selfish desires for allowing New York to operate outside Congress's authority. Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, November 15, 1778, in *Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, 1:452-453. Onuf, *Origins of the Federal Republic*, 87-96.

[1719] "Act of Ratification" in *DHRC*, 1:135-136. Onuf, *Origins of the Federal Republic*, 87-96. For chronological context, the Continental Congress adopted the *Articles of Confederation* approximately two months after the United States' victory at the Battle of Saratoga, and Maryland did not ratify it (and thus bind New York to the Confederation's authority), until one month after Benedict Arnold had laid siege to Richmond, Virginia.

[1720] Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the British Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 61-64; for an exceptional analysis of the political poignancy of the Carlisle Peace Commission, see Anthony Gregory, "'Formed for Empire: The Continental Congress Responds to the Carlisle Peace Commission," *Journal of the Early Republic* 38 No. 4 (2018): 643-672.

[1721] "Instructions by King George III to his Commissioners to treat with the North American Colonies" in *The Manuscripts of the Earl of Carlisle* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1897), 322-325; Lewis Walpole Library.

[1722] "Instructions by King George III to his Commissioners to treat with the North American Colonies," *Manuscripts Carlisle*, 333.

[1723] Lord Carlisle, June 1, 1778, *Manuscripts Carlisle*, 339-340.

[1724] Ibid.

[1725] Lord Carlisle to Lord Gower, July 1778, *Manuscripts Carlisle*, 351.

The cruelties and horrors which British Americans had both inflicted and suffered during the first three years of their civil war for independence should have made Carlisle's sympathetic rhetoric of reconciliation both affecting and appealing. The peace treaty redressed every abuse that Parliament had committed against the colonies, and Carlilse himself might have expected America's congress to receive a barrage of corruption accusations from appalled imperial loyalists and war-weary rebels. Carlisle, however, had no authority to circumvent America's insurgent congress and appeal directly to the people. George III had explicitly instructed him "not to make any public appeal to the Inhabitants of America" until he was "satisfied" that America's revolutionaries – which included congress, the individual state legislatures, and General Washington himself – would "refuse to enter into or proceed in such Treaty."[1726] Tragically, Carlisle had achieved this satisfaction too late. Victory at the battle of Saratoga and France's increased financial and military support had doomed any hope of convincing America's rebels to return to the fold of the British empire.

Reverence for proper diplomatic decorum and rhetorical secrecy had doomed Carlisle's peacekeeping mission, as American insurgents were increasingly voluble in dismissing Parliament's overtures. In his sixth *Crisis* epistle, Thomas Paine depicted Britain's peacekeeping commissioners as nothing more than mere villains, who sought to subject the American people to new cruelties, imported directly "from the original ware-house of Hell."[1727] Continental soldiers echoed Paine's distrust. To them, Parliament remained a tyrannical legislature that "endeavour[ed] to ensnare" the United States "with the insidious offer of peace" – the acceptance of which would "necessarily and inevitably" subject all Americas to "the most humiliating slavery."[1728]

Unwilling to entertain imperial reconciliation and now freed from Carlilse's presence, America's revolutionaries refocused their attention on ensuring the stability of the United States. By autumn 1778, Richard Henry Lee harbored a resolute fear that internal division might snuff out American independence. The tipping point for Lee was a recent surge of counterfeiting throughout the United States, which he believed might lead to "the loss of [America's] liberty."[1729] Elbridge Gerry echoed Lee's fear. If the American people valued personal profit and financial gain above their collective independence, then their liberties would "burst, and leave not behind, a Trace of their former existence."[1730] Congress had difficulty both catching American counterfeiters and regulating the inflation of their wartime currency, which only stoked further concerns for the Confederation's political efficacy.[1731]

As Lee and Gerry fretted over the instability that might emerge from the Confederation's limited fiscal authority, Alexander Hamilton feared the growing resentment within America's military forces. Only the "personal influence" of General Washington, Hamilton confessed to confidant James Duane, now held together the Continental army.[1732] Enlisted men had begun to whisper that they would "obey their state in opposition to Congress," if so ordered.[1733] "Without a speedy change," Hamilton feared, the "army must dissolve," for it had transformed into nothing more than a unruly "mob…without cloathing, without pay, without provision, without morals, without

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[1726] "Instructions by King George III to his Commissioners to treat with the North American Colonies," *Manuscripts Carlisle*, 324.
[1727] Paine, "The Crisis, No. VI," 181.
[1728] Thacher, *Military Journal*, 162.
[1729] Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, November 15, 1778, in *Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, 1:451-452.
[1730] Elbridge Gerry to James Warren, November 8, 1778, in *A Study in Dissent*, 132.
[1731] For counterfeiting in during America's civil war for independence, see Philip L. Mossman, *From Crime to Punishment: Counterfeit and Debased Coinage in Colonial and Pre-Federal America* (New York: American Numismatic Society, 2013), 224-235
[1732] Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780, *Hamilton Papers*, 2:402.
[1733] Ibid, 2:402.

discipline."[1734] Hamilton counted himself an American soldier, and conceded that they had begun "to hate [their] country" – specifically the congress – "for its neglect of [them]" and their material needs.[1735] Indeed, the "country" – the tax paying inhabitants of the United States – had begun to "hate" the indefinite burden of provisioning the Confederation's standing army as well.[1736] Doubtful that Congress had the power to redress the grievances of either soldier or civilian, Hamilton concluded that the Continental army's unity was "[h]eld together by the slenderest ties…ripening for a dissolution."[1737]

Hamilton's cynicism about the efficacy of the federated congress only intensified. One month before the battle of York, the general anticipated that a second civil war might soon engulf the United States. Writing under the pseudonym *Continentalist*, Hamilton blamed a combination of greed and the individual states' unequal access to both land and trade. Within a few years, the New Yorker predicted, the largest states in the confederation – likely Virginia and Massachusetts – would be so "populous, rich and powerful," that they would "nourish ideas of separation and independence" from America's enfeebled confederation.[1738] Although some members of those states might desire to "preserve the union, their vanity and self-importance" would "very likely…overpower that motive."[1739] "[P]retexts for war" could "easily" be found among "competitions of boundary and rival ships of commerce."[1740] Economic self-interest would encourage every state to abandon the bonds of patriotic affection and national fellow-feeling. Anyone who doubted this terrifying future should remember that even now, amidst their current war against Britain, several states had refused to comply with congressional requisitions, and thereby established a precedence for future political selfishness.[1741] Terrified of the chaos that awaited the fledgling United States and enraged at the inability of the Confederation to combat man's worst inclinations, Hamilton implored the American people to work, "without delay, to ENLARGE THE POWERS OF CONGRESS."[1742] For only a stronger central government might spare the United States from yet another civil war.

Despite Hamilton's warnings, the Confederation's powers were not enlarged. Furthermore, the ratification of the 1783 *Treaty of Paris* did little to alleviate popular anxieties regarding the nation's political stability. Citizens of the United States, Mercy Otis Warren remarked, had "set Great Britain at defiance, [had] weathered the shocks of war – [had] hazarded all, and waded through rivers of blood to establish the independence of America."[1743] And yet, Warren observed, if the United States had "any national character," it was a volatile, "heterogeneous mixture," which had infused a "republican form of government with the principles of monarchy, the freedom of democracy, with the servility of despotism, the extravagance of nobility, [and…] the poverty of peasantry."[1744] The inherent political dissonance held within the newly independent United States might best be summed up in a single toast recorded in New York by Sally Jay on July 4th, 1783: "The United States of America, may *they* be perpetual."[1745] By design, America's confederation did not demand that the

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[1734] Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780, *Hamilton Papers*, 2:406
[1735] Ibid.
[1736] Ibid.
[1737] Ibid.
[1738] "The Continentalist, No. 3" in *New York Packet,* August 9, 1781.
[1739] Ibid.
[1740] Ibid.
[1741] Ibid.
[1742] Ibid.
[1743] Mercy Otis Warren to Elbridge Gerry, June 6, 1783, in *A Study in Dissent*, 162.
[1744] Ibid.
[1745] Sally Jay to Kitty, July 16, 1783, in *Selected Letters of John Jay and Sarah Livingston*, ed., Landa M. Freedman, et al. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2004), 138.

inhabitants of its thirteen states allow national fellow-feeling to outshine devotion to their individual governments.

The British press went much farther than Warren and criticized America as nothing more than a "scene of continued riot and anarchy…groaning under the oppressions of heavy taxes."[1746] Thomas Jefferson was dismayed by London's newspapers. As the Virginia sarcastically remarked, Britain's press had presented the United States' "assemblies and congresses" as both "tyrranising over their constituents" and "possessing no power at all."[1747] Defiant of this "apostasy," Jefferson held the United States aloft as both the "greater pillar on which British glory was raised," and "the instrument" which now "levell[ed] that glory with the dust."[1748] Not all Virginians, however, matched Jefferson's bravado. St. George Tucker's poem, "Ode to Peace," revealed the tempered optimism which many Americans felt after securing independence.[1749] Beckoning "sweet Peace" to arrive, Tucker confessed his hope that the people of America will abandon "Slavery, famine, and despair," along with "cruel war," and thereby embrace "Friendship, sweetest balm of life,/Love, that rivals bliss divine,/[and] Gentle Peace; be ever thine."[1750] The "Gentle Peace" which Tucker and his fellow Americans so desperately sought proved ephemeral, however, as post-war fiscal fluctuations ignited popular rebellions throughout the United States. The perceived weakness of the nation's federated congress thereby intensified fears of both legislative tyranny and unrestrained mobocracy.

Rebellion Redux: Northampton, Greenbriar, and Tioga:

Taxes and the power to collect them. The relationship between fiscal autonomy, military might, and arbitrary power had provided a central justification for America's rebellion against the British empire. Debates over the right of taxation continued to govern the political trajectory of America's confederation, and thereby elicited familiar rhetorical themes from America's emotional community of revolution: those of fear and betrayal.

By early 1785, Richard Henry Lee had convinced himself that the American people, yet again, had fallen prey to the allure of arbitrary power. According to the Virginian, every European and American to whom the United States was indebted uttered one cry in unison: "The Congress must have more power."[1751] These lenders concluded that only enlarged taxation powers would enable the Confederation to begin to repay its substantial wartime debt. It was a "melancholy consideration," Lee confessed to Samuel Adams, that "many wise & good men" now succumbed to the "selfishness and corruption" of personal avarice that had ruined the British empire.[1752] Despite his fears of American and foreign avarice, Lee simultaneously believed that the United States would not "be secure & happy until Congress command[ed] implicitly both purse & sword."[1753] Every dutiful republican must recognize what was proven "necessary by the fairest, fullest & most mature experience," and therefore amend the congress's powers.[1754] With these words, Lee opened a new era of America's emotions rhetoric: one in which elites occupied a position of disinterest and dispassion, relinquishing their stronger, more heated feelings to the unruly, dangerous mob.

[1746] Thomas Jefferson, "Reply to the Representations of Affairs in America by British Newspapers," November 20, 1784, in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 7:540.
[1747] Jefferson, "Reply to British Newspapers," *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 7:540-541.
[1748] Ibid.
[1749] St. George Tucker, "Ode to Peace," in *Tucker Poems*, 124.
[1750] Ibid.
[1751] Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, March 14, 1785, in *Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, 2:343-344.
[1752] Ibid.
[1753] Ibid.
[1754] Ibid.

Despite Lee's warnings, the Confederation still felt the lightness of its purse. Massachusetts representative Rufus King expressed his reservations regarding the fiscally ineffectual congress in a letter to Elbridge Gerry in April 1786. Congress was now "without money or the prospect of it in the Federal Treasury."[1755] King blamed the individual states, which "care[d] so little about the union."[1756] Without centralized, fiscal stability, King feared that the United States would suffer an inevitable and harmful "dissolution."[1757] Fellow New Englander Jeremey Belknap agreed with King, fearful that the Confederation's inherent weaknesses and negligible authority over the individual states threatened to disband America's "firm league of friendship."[1758] Significantly, Belknap turned to an old remedy. An "imminent common danger, pressing hard upon [them]," Belknap concluded, would make the American people "feel [their] need of union" and thereby encourage them to place the stability of the nation above their regional, selfish interests. [1759]

An opportunity to fabricate such a danger emerged in Massachusetts. In 1785, the state's public debt had reached approximately £1,600,000, or £3 of debt for each of the state's near-half-a-million free laborers.[1760] To reduce its wartime debt, stabilize its own currency, and fulfill its outstanding fiscal obligations to the Confederation, Massachusetts's legislature passed new taxation laws, which required the payment of all direct taxes in specie.[1761] George Minot observed that these taxes created a dilemma: the legislature must either "govern without appearing to tyrannise" or "relieve" this new fiscal burden without "appearing to be overcome" by popular whims.[1762] At once depicted as tyrannical and powerless, the public image of Massachusetts's government now resembled the civic dichotomy at which Jefferson had so casually scoffed.

Cash-poor western farmers lacked the silver necessary to pay Massachusetts's direct taxes. In response, farmers from Worcester, Berkshire, and Pelham demanded that the Massachusetts's government call a convention to amend the state's constitution.[1763] The Massachusetts legislature foolishly ignored this request. These farmers then joined with veterans – soon to be called regulators – who were no longer willing to endure the perceived abuses of their state's legislative tyranny. Massachusetts's regulators first closed both Northampton and Worcester's courthouses in autumn 1786, hopeful for "Constitutional Relief from the Insupportable Burdens they now Labour under.[1764] As the regulators' "riotous disposition" spread throughout western Massachusetts, the federated congress resolved to increase its national army from 700 to 2,000 men, and then to deploy these newly recruited troops to suppress the insurrection.[1765]

The tyrannical potential of a standing army within the United States had elicited both fear and controversy since the ratification of the *Treaty of Paris*. Imperial loyalist Jonathan Sewall astutely

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[1755] Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, April 30, 1786, in *The Life and Correspondences of Rufus King: Comprising his Letters, Private and Official, his Public Documents, and his Speeches*, ed., Charles R. King (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894), 1:134.
[1756] Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, April 30, 1786, 1:134.
[1757] Ibid.
[1758] Ibid; *Act of Confederation of the United States of America* in *DHRC*, 1:86.
[1759] Belknap to Hazard, March 9, 1786, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 2:431.
[1760] Alan Taylor, *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), 366-367.
[1761] Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 359-360.
[1762] George Minot, *The History of the Insurrection in Massachusetts* (Worcester: Isiah Thomas, 1788), 17.
[1763] Minot, *The History of the Insurrection in Massachusetts*, 41; Leonard L. Richards, *Shays's Rebellion: The American Revolution's Final Battle* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 4-9.
[1764] Daniel Shays and Daniel Gray to Benjamin Lincoln, January 25, 1787, "Shays's Rebellion Papers Collection," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society. Richards, *Shays's Rebellion*, 10-11.
[1765] Ibid, 15; Robert A. Gross notes that part of the power of Massachusetts's regulators arose from their ability to "appropriate the symbols of the Revolution" in their resistance of speice taxation; see "From Citizen to Subjects: The Formalization of Authority in Post-Revolutionary Massachisetts," in *People and Power: Rights, Civizenship, and Violence* (Milan: University of Milan, 1992) 27; Hattem, *Past and Prologue*, 199.

observed the paradoxical nature of America's postwar standing army: by disbanding its military, America would be "annihilating the supreme authority of Congress, & dissolving the federation union," but to keep it would "bring on mobs, insurrections, anarchy, confusion, and bloodshed."[1766] Sewall's latter point best fit Massachusetts' regulation, as many of the state's inhabitants had begun to suspect other states of political malfeasance. Further, Massachusetts's regulators saw mere political ruses in Virginia and Georgia's current wars against their western Indigenous neighbors. As Elbridge Gerry opined, these conflicts had been incited purposefully, and for the sole purpose of "obtain[ing] a Standing Army" to strengthen the political will of America's confederation.[1767]

Congress raised dark, historic fears when it decided to enlarge its peacetime army to put down Massachusetts' intrastate tax revolt. The decision struck too stark a parallel to General Gage's deployment of the 14th and 29th Regiments to Boston almost twenty years earlier. In addition, Congress foolishly lied to the American people, claiming that it was enlarging the national army to bolster defenses in the Ohio backcountry. Once this deception was exposed, it confirmed popular, conspiratorial fears of legislative tyranny.[1768] The cost of such political maneuvers proved higher than their results, as Congress raised barely raised one hundred new recruits by January 1787.[1769]

The Confederation's inability to enlisted new soldiers, coupled with its murky constitutional authority to deploy its national army against an intrastate rebellion, left the burden of suppressing Massachusetts's regulation to the state itself.[1770] To end "the rage" of Massachusetts's "malcontents," Governor James Bowdoin raised a private army of over four thousand men.[1771] Within six weeks, General Benjamin Lincoln had routed the regulators first in Petersham, and then in Berkshire, ending their rebellion with a whimper.[1772] The military defeat of Massachusetts's regulators, however, did not hinder their ultimate objective. When Massachusetts's assembly met later that year, it agreed to pass a moratorium on debt collection, reduce the direct taxes currently collected, and end the requirement for taxes to be paid in specie.[1773] Massachusetts's regulation had been a noteworthy success, if measured by the achievement of western farmers' political objectives. It also displayed the ability of an individual state to suppress internal unrest and redress popular discontent, all of which proved the intended merits of America's federative government.

Here the inklings of a new affective repertoire again arose; one in which proto-nationalists equated passions with self-interest and mob rule. These nationalists, however, still remained susceptible to the allure of inflamed rhetoric, and now condemned the so-called "Shays's Rebellion" with a terror and hatred grossly disproportionate to the actual violence which had occurred.[1774] When Rufus King first learned of the regulators' assault on Worcester's court, he feared that if Massachusetts's government had "not [the] Energy & Strength sufficient to seize, try and punish the

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[1766] Jonathan Sewall to Mrs. Higginson, September 10, 1783, "Robbie-Sewall Papers"
[1767] Elbridge Gerry to Rufus King, October 29, 1786, "Elbridge Gerry Letters."
[1768] Ibid, 15-16.
[1769] Ibid.
[1770] Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*, 225-227.
[1771] Minot, *The History of the Insurrection in Massachusetts*, 44; Richards, *Shays's Rebellion*, 23.
[1772] Richards, *Shays's Rebellion*, 22-35.
[1773] Ibid, 119.
[1774] Mark Peterson argues that the decision to label this episode as "Shays's Rebellion" reflects an attempt to discredit the validity of the regulators' claims, as Daniel Shays had only recently moved to Pelham and therefore, within Massachusetts's political culture, was "a nobody…with no family, no history, and no connections." Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 360. Sarah Purcell argues that American nationalists used popular fears surrounding Shays's Rebellion as a tool not simply to validate their own quest for power, as the creation of a stronger national government would allow those disgruntled veterans and farmers to receive the financial support they so desperately needed; Purcell, *Sealed with Blood*, 74-76.

Ringleaders of these measures," then "all must be given up to lawless influence."[1775] To succumb to the whims of a mob, King continued, would besmirch the United States' revolution, as the "cause of America, which [they had] thought to be the cause of Freedom and Humanity," would degenerate into "the Scorn of nations."[1776] Abigail Adams described the regulators as nothing more than "lawless banditti" eager to "destroy [their] Government," while her cousin-in-law Samuel admonished their misdirected aggression, proclaiming that any "man [who] dares rebel against the laws of a republic ought to suffer death."[1777]

Holland Park, a captain in Governor Bowdoin's army, diverged from New England's ardent nationalists and presented a more sympathetic, humanizing account of the regulators' actions. One cold, February morning, a small band of regulators appeared at Park's home and terrified his wife, as it was well known that Holland was "unfriendly to Shays" and currently served in the governor's army.[1778] Despite her fears, Park's wife welcomed the "half-starving, half-frozen" regulators into her home, offered them "breakfast," and then, after they ate, observed their departure without suffering any molestation to either her property or her person.[1779] Contrary to popular depictions, the regulators had not threatened the people of Massachusetts with the "madness of Democracy."[1780] More sympathetic to the regulators plight than either his wife or his cousin, John Adams urged Thomas Jefferson not to be "alarmed at the late Turbulence in New England," as it arose from the Massachusetts legislature's decision to lay a tax "rather heavier" than the specie-poor "People could bear."[1781] Reassurances were unnecessary, however, as Jefferson himself confessed to Abigail that he was glad to "see the people awake and alert," reminding *her* that "a little rebellion now and then" was good for a republic, as it prevented its citizens from losing their "spirit of resistance."[1782]

Measured ideological justifications did little to dispel the fervent, terror-eliciting rhetoric that surrounded Massachusetts's regulation. At the onset of the conflict, James Warren feared that a disgruntled mob would plunge his state into "Anarchy and Confusion[,] bordering on a Civil War."[1783] If Massachusetts, or worse yet all of America, continued upon its current trajectory of discord and revolt, Henry Knox confided to George Washington, then the United States "shall be involved in all the horror of faction and civil war without a prospect of its termination."[1784] George Washington echoed his former general's dismay and terror, as he too believed that Massachusetts's regulation was but one example of "combustibles in every State, [to] which a spark may set fire" and incinerate their republic.[1785]

[1775] Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, September 17, 1786, in *Letters of the Delegates*, 23:563.
[1776] Ibid.
[1777] Abigail Adams to Mary Smith Cranch, February 25, 1787, in *Adams Family Papers*, 7:470; William Vincent Wells, *The Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams: Being a Narrative of His Acts and Opinions, and of His Agency in Producing and Forwarding the American Revolution. With Extracts from His Correspondence, State Papers, and Political Essays* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1865) 3:246; Richards, *Shays's Rebellion*, 15-16.
[1778] Holland Park to Jonas Holland, February 28, 1832, in *The Journal of Holland Park*, 29.
[1779] Ibid.
[1780] Rufus King to Theodore Sedgwick, June 10, 1787; "Papers of Theodore Sedgwick," MSS. Massachusetts Historical Society.
[1781] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, November 30, 1786, in *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams*, ed., Lester J. Cappon (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 156.
[1782] Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, February 22, 1787, in *Adams-Jefferson Letters*,
[1783] James Warren to John Adams, October 22, 1786, in *Papers of John Adams*, 18:485.
[1784] Herny Knox to George Washington, October 23, 1786, in *Papers of George Washington: Confederation Series*, ed., W. W. Abbotts (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1995) 4:301.
[1785] George Washington to Henry Knox, December 26, 1786, in *The Papers of George Washington: Confederation Series*, ed., W.W. Abbott, et al. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995), 4:482.

Even as Massachusetts successfully restored its orderly government, America's nationalistic press stoked terror of Daneil Shays's supposedly treasonous agenda. In both Virginia and New York, newspapers printed notices of rewards for the capture Shays and the rebellion's "principals, abettors and supporters."[1786] Further, these papers spread unfounded rumors that the hateworthy Shays had fled to Vermont to rendezvous with a "great number of men" eager to "commence immediate hostilities" against Massachusetts.[1787] Reports even alleged that several "rebel leaders in Vermont" had begun enlisting "men for service of the King of England."[1788] Amid such uncertainty, the *Virginia Independent Chronicle* warned that a "federal Shays" might soon emerge – one who had the influence and charisma to gather disgruntled insurgents from across the United States – to usurp the "weak, imperfect, and distracted" Confederation.[1789]

The claim – that a man like Daniel Shays might have more success unifying the inhabitants of the United States than its federated congress – was striking. It should not have gained traction. After all, Massachusetts's had ended its regulation without congressional aid. Political passion, however, triumphed over rational conclusions. The *Albany Gazette* warned the people of the United States to act swiftly in late-June 1787, for if unaddressed, the woeful inadequacy of the Confederation would stir the terrifying, hateworthy agents of anarchy throughout the United States to action. The author confidently condemned "the prevailing rage of excessive democracy—this fashionable contempt of government—of public and private faith," and then predicted the immediate emergence of "another Shays, as mad and audacious as the present."[1790]

The citizens of New York did not long ponder who would be the next Daniel Shays, as another popular uprising already had begun on their western borders. In 1784, an armed, interstate conflict had erupted between settlers from Connecticut and Pennsylvania over competing claims to the Wyoming Valley.[1791] After three years of sporadic skirmishes, the Pennsylvania Assembly passed the Confirming Act of 1787, which acknowledged all Connecticut land claims made prior to 1782, when the Confederation granted Pennsylvania jurisdiction over the valley.[1792] Pennsylvania's acknowledgement of these claims, however, failed to placate separatists, such as John Franklin, who advocated for Wyoming to declare its political independence.[1793] Panic flew across the region, as some believed that Franklin and his settlers "labored to involve the country in civil war" and would "*call for the assistance of the British*," if they were "*unable to stand against the States*."[1794] By September 1787, Franklin had amassed a "number of disorderly people" near Tioga Point, supposedly waiting for "reinforcements from Shays's late partisans."[1795] Aware that bloodshed in the Wyoming Valley would spread beyond Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin warned New York Governor George Clinton to guard against the "mischief" of these "Banditti," whose leaders were said to be from

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[1786] *Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser*, March 8, 1787; *Albany Gazette,* May 3, 1787.
[1787] Ibid.
[1788] *Massachusetts Centinel*, May 19, 1787.
[1789] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, June 13, 1787.
[1790] *Albany Gazette*, June 21, 1787.
[1791] Kathryn Shivley Meier, "'Devoted to Hardships, Danger, and Devastation': The Landscape of Indian and White Violence in Wyoming Valley, Pennsylvania, 1753-1800," in *Blood in the Hills: A History of Violence in Appalachia*, ed., Bruce E. Stewart, et at. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012), 67.
[1792] For more information on the Trenton Decree and the Second Yankee-Pennamite War, see Meier, "Devoted to Hardships," 66-69.
[1793] Meier, "Devoted to Hardships," 68-69.
[1794] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 10, 1787; Letter from Samuel Gordon, quoted in Louise Welles Murray, *A History of Old Tioga Point and Early Athens, Pennsylvania* (Athens: Penna, 1907), 288-289. Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 227-228
[1795] Benjamin Franklin to Governor George Clinton, September 22, 1787, in *The Works of Benjamin Franklin*, ed., John Bigelow (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904), 11:357-358.

Clinton's state.[1796] Benjamin Franklin's warning proved unnecessary, however, as Pennsylvania's government seized John Franklin and charged him with high treason on October 2.[1797]

Contemporaneous to the unrest at Tioga, Virginia confronted its own backcountry insurrection. In mid-August 1787, approximately 300 men from Greenbriar County formed an Association "to oppose the payment" of both state taxes and "all debts."[1798] Virginian James McClurg believed that the Greenbriar insurgents were following tactics similar to those of Massachusetts's regulators. The Greenbriar Association, McClurg had learned, was being led by one "Adonijah Matthews" of New England, who intended to "stop the proceedings of the next court."[1799] Mirroring Tioga, however, the Greenbriar insurrection failed before it even started, as Matthews was arrested in Botetourt in late-September before he and his comrades had descended upon Virginia's courts.[1800]

America's nationalists had made much – frankly too much – of the three acts of popular unrest that had occurred in the western farmlands and frontier borders of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia. These disturbances could hardly be called insurrections, yet if viewed in the proper affective light, they provided terrifying, hate-eliciting evidence that anarchy loomed over the entire United States. Politically persuasive, such claims lacked logistical merit. At the onset of Massachusetts's regulation, James Warren, Herny Knox, and Geroge Washington all expressed dark forebodings. The regulation's longevity in Massachusetts, and the proximity of Northampton, Pelham, and Worcester to Boston made their concerns of governmental usurpation plausible, albeit improbable. The same, however, cannot be argued for the would-be insurrections at Tioga Point and Greenbriar. Neither insurrection gained significant momentum, nor did they occur in close enough proximity to each state's capital so as to threaten political destabilization (see Figure 5.1).[1801]

These glaring differences were ignored by the nationalistic presses within each state. After learning that Daniel Shays received a pardon from Massachusetts's legislature, the *New York Daily Advertiser*, the *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, and Massachusetts's *Hampshire Gazette* all printed the same article: "This rebel, equally defective in spirit and understanding, has shewn that it is in the power of the most contemptible of beings, to disturb the peace of society; but we hope his fate will be a lesson to the factious heroes of Tioga and Greenbriar, and convince their adherents, that honesty and industry are preferable to tumult and licentiousness."[1802] These newspapers misdirected popular sentiments by imbuing the minor events at Tioga and Greenbriar with the same terror and hatred that Massachusetts's political elite had felt towards their recent regulation. These reports, therefore, begged an existential question: how might the American people prevent such insurrections in the future? Conveniently, America's political elite had drafted an answer one month earlier in a small meeting house in Philadelphia.

[1796] Benjamin Franklin to Governor George Clinton, September 22, 1787, in *Works of Franklin*, 11:357-358

[1797] Murray, *History of Old Tioga*, 290.

[1798] James McClurg to James Madison, August 22, 1787, in *Papers of James Madison*, 10:155.

[1799] Ibid.

[1800] *Virginia Gazette and Alexandria Advertiser*, September 20, 1787; *New York Country Journal*, September 26, 1787; *Massachusetts Centinel*, October 6, 1787.

[1801] Pelham, Massachusetts is approximately eighty-five miles from Boston, Tioga Point is approximately one hundred eighty miles from both Philadelphia and New York City, and Greenbriar is approximately two hundred thirty miles from Richmond.

[1802] *New York Daily Advertiser*, October 24, 1787; *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, October 31, 1787; *Hampshire Gazette*, November 7, 1787.



Figure 5.1: John Cary, *An Accurate Map of the United States of America*, 1783.
Leventhal Map Center, Boston Public Library
Blue Dots (North to South): Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Richmond
Red Dots (North to South): Northampton, Tioga, Greenbriar.

The Philadelphia Convention – Usurping the Confederation:

As Massachusetts's western farmers closed Northampton and Worcester's courts, delegates from Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia met in Annapolis to resolve the "important defects" present in America's central government.[1803] Although quick to agree that the weaknesses of the *Articles of Confederation* were both "greater and more numerous" than anyone initially had comprehended, the assembled delegates lacked the prerogative to act without representatives from each of the thirteen states, and therefore could not propose amendments for congressional consideration.[1804] Annapolis's convention therefore adjourned with a recommendation to call a subsequent convention in Philadelphia, where delegations from all thirteen states might "render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union."[1805]

[1803] "Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis, Maryland, 11-14 September 1786" in *DHRC*, 1:181-184.
[1804] Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Rhode Island each appointed delegates to the Annapolis Convention, yet none attended, whereas Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, and South Carolina did not even appoint delegations; see "Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis," *DHRC* 1:183-184.
[1805] "Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis," *DHRC* 1:183-184.

For James Madison, Philadelphia's convention could not arrive fast enough, as his fear-based nationalist rhetoric depended on fresh memories of Massachusetts's regulation. It was striking, if not alarming, that "at least half" of Massachusetts's regulators had "decline[d]" the state legislature's offer of amnesty.[1806] Far more worrisome for Madison was the "impunity with which they shew[ed] themselves on public occasions" and the subsequent "popular favor" which the people of Massachusetts had "conferred on them" in their state's most recent elections.[1807] Madison believed that he and the people of the United States were now trapped between the Charybdis of legislative corruption and the Scylla of an enfeebled national confederacy. "Vices of the Political System of the United States," Madison's resultant essay, listed every weakness he found within America's confederation – be it the refusal of states to comply with constitutional requisitions, the formation of interstate compacts without congressional approval, or the routine violation of international treaties. All, he claimed, arose from the inferior political authority of the Confederation vis-à-vis individual states.[1808] Despite their political supremacy, Madison found the states incapable of protecting their citizens from "internal violence," willfully ignoring that Massachusetts *had* resolved its regulation without any congressional support.[1809] The thirteen independence states could not be relied upon to display "unanimous and punctual obedience" to the federated government, Madison concluded, and therefore America's union now teetered on the verge of collapse.[1810]

America's press resoundingly agreed with Madison's terror-laced rhetoric of impending disunion.[1811] "We are no longer the United States," reported the *Massachusetts Centinel*, "because we are not under any firm or energetic compact."[1812] Worse yet, every "link of the chain of union [has been] separated from its companion" and the "appearances of friendship" among America's citizenry only obscured more sincere sentiments of "hate and envy."[1813] The malice that grew between the states, the newspaper continued, complimented their respective, internal turmoil. The *Massachusetts Centinel* further propagated a myth, equally false and terrifying, that the individual states

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[1806] James Madison to George Washington, March 18, 1787, in *Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series*, 9:315.
[1807] Ibid.
[1808] James Madison, "Vices of the Political System of the U. States" in *Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series*, 9:348-351; Edling, *Perfecting the Union*, 54-56.
[1809] Ibid, 9:350-351.
[1810] Ibid.
[1811] Adelman notes that for "various reasons, especially the strong correlation between printing and cities, most printers were indeed federalists – that is, pro-ratification" and supportive of the benefits they would receive from a stronger national government. Once the "ratification process began, pro-Constitutional arguments dominated newspaper coverage, far out of proportion to the support for the Constitution among the American population"; Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks*, 198-199. Furthermore, Pasley observes that approximately eighty of the ninety-two newspapers printed within the United States consistently refused to publish any tracts that rebuked the need for a stronger national government or overly criticized the proposed constitution; see Pasley, *The Tyranny of Printers*, 15-16, 42-45. Despite this bias, antifederalists still relied greatly on America's robust print culture to disseminate their affective, albeit less coordinated, rebukes of constitution; see Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks*, 197-198; Cornell, *The Other Founders*, 11-31. Albeit symptomatic of emergent ideological division among the American people, Jürgen Heidking argues that the "debate over the Constitution led to the emergence of a national Party press which was to develop its full potential during the following decade in the dispute between Federalist and opposition Republican newspapers"; see Heidking, *The Constitution Before the Judgment Seat: A Prehistory and Ratification of the American Constitution, 1787-1791*, ed., John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 85.
[1812] *Massachusetts Centinel*, April 11, 1787, in *DHRC*, 13:79.
[1813] Ibid. Henry Knox observed such interstate and regional discord in January 1787: "The Southern States are jealous enough already. If New England, and particularly Massachusetts, should decline sending delegates to the convention, it will operate in a duplicate ratio to injure us by annihilating the rising desire in the Southern States of effecting a better national system, and by adding to their jealousies of the designs of New England"; Herny Knox to Stephen Higginson, January 28, 1787, in "Henry Knox Papers II," MSS. Massachusetts Historical Society.

had proven themselves incapable of "preserv[ing] their citizens from rebellion."[1814] Others agreed. As Herny Knox confided to Rufus King, it is the "accursed" and "vile" existence of the state governments that now prevented the United States from truly becoming "a nation."[1815]

It was undeniable, one "Political Freethinker" argued in *New York Daily Advertiser*, that the "fear and suffering" felt throughout the entire United States had necessitated a "Convention of States."[1816] Thankfully, the state legislatures chose men of proper, respectable "character" to travel to Philadelphia to make the alterations necessary to preserve America's confederation.[1817] The reputation of Virginia's "illustrious fellow citizen, George Washington," reaffirmed the hope of many nationalists that a newfound sentiment of "united Zeal, Policy, and Ability" would emerge from Philadelphia.[1818] Thomas Jefferson, however, doubted that the convention's collection of "demigods" would spare it from the torment of public scrutiny. From Paris, Jefferson confided to John Adams his dismay at the convention's "abominable" decision to bind its members' "tongues" to complete secrecy.[1819] "Nothing can justify this example," Jefferson remarked, "but the innocence of their intentions, and ignorance of the value of public discussion."[1820] Both in public and in private, America's nationalists chose to represent political decisions as belonging to an arena outside of popular will and judgment. America's political elite disagreed, however, as to whether the mysteries of statecraft should be kept from the public as well. While Jefferson disapproved of secrecy, others felt it better to complete their work absent of the American people's fickle opinions.[1821] America's emotional community of revolution had been altered now to deny the salvific nature of shared affect, and thereby rejected the very proposition that popular fellow-feeling might sustain political unity.

When all fifty-five delegates convened in Philadelphia on May 25, they immediately and unanimously elected George Washington as their president, and then determined their own policies and procedures, which included the gag-rule that Jefferson had called "abominable."[1822] Harmony and accord, however, had refused their invitations. For all their claims to serene reason, impassioned disagreements swiftly emerged on the convention floor. Ironic but unsurprisingly, even the United States' most fervent nationalists found themselves advocating on behalf of their individual state's best interests in the earliest days of debate, unable to shed their own regional loyalties and personal attachments.[1823]

By June 15, the Philadelphia convention had received two proposal for enlarging the legislative scope and powers of the Confederation: the "Virginia Resolutions," which proposed that larger states gain greater authority and influence within the amended national legislature, and the "New Jersey Resolutions," which would have granted similarly, proportional benefits to America's smaller states.[1824] The "Virginia Resolutions," however, advanced the nationalists' objectives much

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[1814] *Massachusetts Centinel*, April 11, 1787, in *DHRC*, 13:79.
[1815] Henry Knox to Rufus King, July 15, 1787, in "Henry Knox Papers II."
[1816] "To the Political Freethinkers of America," in *New York Daily Advertiser*, May 24, 1787, in *DHRC* 13:113-114.
[1817] Ibid.
[1818] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, April 11, 1787, in *DHRC*, 13:78. Interstate discourse through the press escalated rapidly and continued throughout the United States' entire constitutional moment. For example, two newspapers in New York and one in Virginia reprinted the *Massachusetts Centiel*'s article from April 11, and this article from the *Virginia Independent Chronicle* was reprinted in four newspapers in Massachusetts and six in New York.
[1819] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 30, 1787, in *Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 196.
[1820] Ibid.
[1821] Maier, *Ratification*, 28.
[1822] Ibid.
[1823] Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 41; 46-47.
[1824] The Virginia delegation presented their resolves to the Philadelphia convention on May 29, 1787, and the New Jersey delegation on June 15; for the full text of the "Virginia Resolutions,", see *DHRC* 1:243-245 and for the "New Jersey

more aggressively than the "New Jersey Resolutions." Madison's vaguely-worded proposal granted the federated congress authority in "all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."[1825] It also reserved for the federal government the right to veto any individual state law which conflicted with "the opinion of the National Legislature [or] the articles of Union."[1826]

Madison's unwavering advocacy for national supremacy earned him valuable allies, including Elbridge Gerry, Rufus King, and Alexander Hamilton, as well as fierce opponents, such as Robert Yates and Edmund Randolph. As the convention's nationalists and federalists began to debate the core components of both Virginia and New Jersey's proposals – the power of taxation, the formation of a standing army, the procedures for ratifying foreign treaties, the separation of powers within the Confederation, and the necessity of federal supremacy – three overarching, ideological concerns arose. The terror of anarchy preoccupied nationalists, while the federalists held aloft the threat of tyranny. Their ideological division, in turn, intensified a third, less tangible, yet equally influential fear: that the bonds of national fellow-feeling, which had tenuously underwritten America's political identity since its inception, had weakened to the point of dissolution.

Advocating for the "Virginia Resolutions," Elbridge Gerry argued that all the "evils" which the American people "now experience" had "flow[ed] from the excess of democracy."[1827] To prove his point, Gerry looked no further than the people of Massachusetts, whom he argued had become the "dupes of pretended patriots," like Daniel Shays, whose "false reports" had mislead them "into the most baneful measures and opinions."[1828] It was the responsibility of this convention, Gerry concluded, to safeguard the United States from the capricious whims of the people and the "danger" of democracy's "levelling" spirits.[1829] The true danger of democracy, nationalists argued, was that it was but one small step from anarchy. The annals of history had shown, Madison explained, that confederacies have a "greater tendency…to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than to usurpations of the federal head."[1830] To check the American people's dangerous inclination toward revolt, they must strengthen the legislative powers of the federated congress.[1831]

While Madison and Gerry worked to stoke fear of American anarchy, Edmund Randolph urged his fellow delegates not to overcorrect the Confederation's current weaknesses and inadvertently subject the United States to tyranny. "The sentiments of the people ought to be consulted" in this amendment process, Randolph argued, as they will not accept any "semblance of

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Resolutions," see *DHRC* 1:250-253. The historiography of the early American republic is rich with analyses of nuanced agreements, differences, and tensions between and within Virginia and New Jersey's respective resolves. For such detailed, comparative analyses of both reform plans, see Edling, *Perfecting the Union*, 57-91, Michael J. Klarman, *The Framer's Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 139-159; Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985), 225-261, Jack Rakove, *Original Meaning: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 59-66.

[1825] "Virginia Resolutions,", see *DHRC* 1:243-245; Rakove, *Original Meaning*, 60; for an excellent analysis of Madison's role in both shaping the *United States Constitution* and the historical memory of the events that transpired at Philadelphia's convention, see Mary Sarah Bilder, *Madison's Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 49-179.

[1826] "Virginia Resolutions,", see *DHRC* 1:243-245; Rakove, *Original Meaning*, 60.

[1827] James Madison, May 31, 1787, "Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention" in *The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, which framed the Constitution of the United States of America*, ed., Gaillard Hund and James Brown Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920).

[1828] Ibid.

[1829] Ibid.

[1830] James Madison, June 21, 1787, in "Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention" in *Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*

[1831] Ibid.

monarchy" within their government.[1832] Randolph was not content simply to oppose the creation of a national executive, whose personal biases inevitably would "neglect" those states most "remote" from his own. [1833] Rather, he advocated that America's thirteen individual states be divided into three geographic regions, each with their own executive, so as to prevent "disaffection" towards the government.[1834] Though Randolph's impractical proposal gained little traction, his condemnation of the perils of tyranny resonated with almost every delegate – except Alexander Hamilton.

Horrifying his fellow delegates from New York, Hamilton not only echoed Madison's call to invest the national congress with veto powers over the individual state legislatures, but also argued that the Confederation should subsume the individual states' militia into a singular, national army.[1835] Smacking too much of dictatorship, a not-so-distant cousin of tyranny, Hamilton's proposal received little more than tepid recognition and a hurried dismissal. Flying too close to America's nationalistic sun and severely scorching his rhetorical wings, Hamilton retired from Philadelphia, branded with the damning epithet of "monarchist."[1836]

Despite his fierce rhetoric and nationalist ideology, Hamilton understood that political compromise must begin among Philadelphia's delegates, as only then might it be practiced by the people of the United States. The convention's proposed amendments, Hamilton confided to David Humphreys, "may not be equal to the wishes of the most enlightened & virtuous" members of the thirteen state legislatures, yet they simultaneously may be "too high-toned to be adopted by our popular Assemblies."[1837] If the watchmen against anarchy and tyranny could not find it within themselves to consent to civic compromise, Hamilton concluded, than America's "political Ship will be left afloat on a Sea of Chance, without a Rudder as well as without a Pilot."[1838]

Participants in the Philadelphia Convention – including those preoccupied with the twin terrors of anarchy and tyranny – understood that their revisions to the *Articles of Confederation* must engender the American people's attachment both to government and to a shared national identity. "Every man" elected to the House of Representatives, James Wilson observed, would "possess a double character," as both "a citizen of a particular state and also of the U.S."[1839] To ensure that these statesmen advocated for their constituents while fostering a cohesive, American identity, Wilson proposed that the citizens of each state, not their legislatures, elect these representatives.[1840] Transforming the House of Representatives into the people's house, however, failed to address the

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[1832] Robert Yates, June 2, 1787, in *Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787* (Richmond: Wilbur Curtiss, 1839), 105-106; Library of Congress.
[1833] Ibid.
[1834] Ibid.
[1835] "Alexander Hamilton's Plan" in *DHRC* 1:253-255; David J. Hulsebosch argues that, under the Confederation, New York was able "to violate the peace treaty with Britain, obstruct excise collection, and negotiate land purchases directly with Native American tribes." While these actions significantly hindered the authority and reputation of the United States' Congress, it benefitted New York greatly. The appointment of Yates and Lansing Jr. as delegates to the Philadelphia convention aligned with the New York legislature's desire to ensure that their state's autonomy did not suffer. Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire*, 3; 204; Maier, *Ratification*, 35; Dennis C. Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun: The Disillusionment of America's Founders* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 66-69.
[1836] Robert Yates and John Lansing Jr. refused to sacrifice New York's political and economic autonomy to strengthen the Confederation government and, as the New York delegation consisted of only these three men, Hamilton was likely to be outvoted in every measure by 2-1, thus preventing him from having any impact on the Philadelphia convention's proceedings. Linda Grant De Pauw, *The Eleventh Pillar: New York State and the Federal Constitution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 54; 60-62, 65; Maier, *Ratification*, 92-93.
[1837] Alexander Hamilton to David Humphreys, September 1, 1787, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 4:241-242.
[1838] Ibid.
[1839] Rufus King, June 25, 1787, in "Notes of Rufus King in the Federal Convention of 1787," in *Life and Correspondence of King*, 607-608.
[1840] Ibid.

inherent duality of America's political allegiances. The people of the United States, Gerry warned, were "neither the same Nation nor different Nations," and if they forced national supremacy upon the citizenry, then they might inadvertently foster "secession."[1841] America's national government must not be too forceful in its demands for political attachment, Gerry concluded, lest the United States crumble under such affective pressure.

After almost four months of debate, the Philadelphia convention did not revise the *Articles of Confederation*, but rather drafted and endorsed a new, federal constitution.[1842] Of the forty-two delegates still in attendance, only Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and Edmund Randolph and George Mason of Virginia, refused to sign.[1843] Contrary to these individuals acts of dissent, two-thirds of New York's delegation had left Philadelphia earlier that summer, and therefore Alexander Hamilton signed the constitution as an individual citizen, with no mandate from his legislature.[1844] Near universal delegate endorsement, however, provided no guarantee that America's thirteen states would ratify this proposed constitution, especially as the convention had overstepped its sanctioned parameters.[1845] To prevent any obstruction from the state legislatures, whose power the proposed national government stood poised both to overshadow and curtail, the Philadelphia convention recommended that state conventions, comprised of delegates elected by each state's voting population, should ratify or reject America's new constitution.[1846] For this plan to work, the people needed to learn about this constitution and, to do that, they turned to the American press.

"The War of Printed Words" – Debating America's Proposed Constitution:

Thanks to the Philadelphia convention's self-imposed gag-rule, their proposed constitution reached the American people in mid-September 1787 with minimal political context. To remedy this, the political leaders of all thirteen states rapidly composed newspaper articles and pamphlets advocating for either its ratification or its rejection.[1847] From early-October 1787 through early-August 1788, the American press circulated and amplified his discourse. During the first four months of this discursive explosion, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York's pro-constitution nationalists (federalists) and its anti-constitution federalists (antifederalists) solidified their core affective arguments.

Federalists relied primarily on stoking the American people's fear of and hatred for political anarchy. To achieve this objective, federalists performed two important rhetorical maneuvers: first, they depicted Massachusetts's regulation as an indicator of the chaos that awaited the United States under the current *Articles of Confederation* and, second, they emphasized the dangers of such popular, unrestrained passions by adopting more tempered affective rhetorics.[1848] The federalists' political

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[1841] James Madison, July 5, 1787, in "Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention" in *Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*.

[1842] James Madison, September 15, 1787, in "Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention" in *Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*. Maier, *Ratification*, 39-49; for the complete text of the *United States Constitution*, including both Article VII, which outlines the process of ratification, and the signatures of the individual delegates, see *DHRC* 1:306-317.

[1843] Ibid.

[1844] Robert Yates and John Lansing Jr. left the Philadelphia convention in early-August, as they "heartily disagreed" with the extreme, nationalistic direction the delegates now pursued; De Pauw, *The Eleventh Pillar*, 62-63; Maier, *Ratification*, 29, 35.

[1845] Maier, *Ratification*, 29-30.

[1846] Ibid.

[1847] For a detailed analysis of the role of the American press in the ratification debates, see Maier, *Ratification*, 70-95.

[1848] Nicole Eustace argues that "elite anger," prior to the American Revolution, often took the form of resentment, as it was connected with both "reason" and "honor." While "[p]assionate anger," specifically "rage" and "fury," became virtuous forms of anger during the Seven Years War, it remained important for the elite to restrain it. Finally, on the eve

remedy for America's current instability was disinterested and rational, dispositions that they contrasted with those that were ostensibly selfish and emotional. Furthermore, federalists argued that the creation of an empowered, central government would both solidify the United States' national identity and revitalize the American people's weakening bonds of fellow-feeling.

Antifederalists bemoaned that the proposed constitution lacked a bill of rights. To remedy this error, they cultivated rhetorics of terror, hatred, and justified anger to illustrate how America's nationalists had exploited and exaggerated the dangers of popular dissent. Antifederalists thereby hoped to counteract federalists' agenda, which they had adorned with a mask of disinterest to coerce the American people to willingly subject themselves to the horrors of executive and legislative tyranny. Perhaps the only ideological point on which both federalists and antifederalists agreed was that their respective opponents had abandoned their patriotic duty to the United States and therefore, in the most extreme examples, deserved to be branded as dangerous political others.

The ratification of the proposed constitution, federalists swiftly argued, might be reduced to a simple choice between order and chaos. As one Massachusetts federalist warned, "Anarchy, with her haggard cheeks and extended jaws" would "soon swallow" the American people, "unless some efficient form of government [was] adopted.[1849] Only "knaves, harpies, and debtors," would welcome the anarchy brought forth by its rejection.[1850] Bushrod Washington echoed these sentiments, imploring his fellow Virginians to endorse the constitution, despite its "imperfections," as without it the United States "must shortly be involved in Anarchy, that certain road to Despotism."[1851] Hamilton refined these ideas in *Federalist* 17, arguing that it was essential to grant the central government power legal prerogative. The right to administer both "criminal and civil justice," a power traditionally reserved for individual states, would be crucial to creating stability, "popular obedience and attachment."[1852] The national government must be able to mediate the "internal concerns" of the state, Hamilton concluded, in order to strengthen "the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it."[1853]

Anarchy, federalists warned, arose not only from insurrectionists, but also from the inability of a government to protect its citizens from external threats and enemies. "From the peculiar situation of the United States," one Virginian argued, "a standing army is essentially necessary."[1854] The idea, however, contravened two decades of anti-standing army affective rhetoric. The army, federalists argued, would protect the "defenceless frontiers from the indiscriminating cruelties and horrid devastations" that Indigenous peoples now "committed…in their midnight excursions."[1855] Anyone who opposed the new government "must have a heart callous indeed," one federalist proclaimed, for rejecting it would subject the American people to "pernicious scenes of carnage."[1856] Hamilton reminded the public that the national government must be entrusted with the power to maintain a robust, yet purely defensive peacetime standing army.[1857] "From Maine to George," the United States was surrounded by the "territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations."[1858]

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of the American Revolution, "just anger" became the way in which all men could express anger, so long as it was for a proper cause, such as the defense of liberty. Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*, 160-161, 179-180, 186, 189, 391-392.

[1849] *Cassius II*, in *Massachusetts Gazette*, November 23, 1787, in *DHRC* 4:306.

[1850] Ibid.

[1851] Bushrod Washington to Robert Carter, November 4, 1787, in *DHRC* 8:143-144.

[1852] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 17*, in *New York Independent Journal*, December 5, 1787, in *DHRC* 15:354

[1853] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 27*, in *New York Packet*, December 25, 1787, in *DHRC* 15:97; Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 51-53.

[1854] *Virginia Independent Chronicles*, November 28, 1787, in *DHRC* 8:179-180.

[1855] Ibid.

[1856] Ibid.

[1857] Ibid.

[1858] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 25* in *New York Packet*, December 21, 1787, in *DHRC* 15:60-62.

Unity was essential, Hamilton explained in *Federalist 25*, as the nation's "common" dangers must be resolved by "common councils," "common treasuries," and a nationally controlled army.[1859]

To their antifederalist opponents, the claims advanced by Hamilton and his associated were faulty, not only for their civic negligence, but also for their egregious fear-mongering. The constitution, now subject to scrutiny and deliberation, had revealed itself to be an instrument of tyranny. "God forbid that standing armies should ever find an establishment in America," Virginian antifederalist Tamony proclaimed, as their path leads only to "arbitrary power."[1860] New York statesmen, leading antifederalist organizer, and soon to be thorn in Alexander Hamilton's side, Melancton Smith, concurred on the evils of a peacetime standing army. A "free republic," Smith declared, must "never keep a standing army to execute its laws."[1861] Rather, the United States should "depend upon the support of its citizens," a faith it would earn not through threats of the sword, but rather by nurturing the populace's "confidence, respect, and affection."[1862] Tamony further warned that this national authority, as outlined in the proposed constitution, was "unrestrained by law or limitation."[1863] Citizens and enlisted men were potentially surrendering the protection of their rights to "the mercy of armed slaves," as they had done under the British empire.[1864] The American people, therefore, would be foolish to submit to such a government, especially one which evoked the terror of military force and political enslavement. As another antifederalist argued, the president's unilateral power to "to Call the Militia of any State in the field to any part of the United States," would be "sufficient to Inslave" the American people "to the worst of tyranny."[1865] "Poplicola" of the *Boston Gazette* summed up these sentiments: "I do not believe there is a man on earth to whom it would be safe for the people to intrust the powers of a despot."[1866]

James Madison sought to refute antifederalists' terror of and rage at the proposition of an American standing army when he composed *Federalist 46*. National affection, he argued, had reached new heights during the United States' civil war for independence. At that time, the federated congress had the power to engage in the "protection of everything that was dear" to the American people.[1867] When the war ended and those powers reverted back to the individual states, the people's "attention and attachment" followed, costing the Confederation its status as the "idol of popular favor."[1868] It was a preposterous fantasy, therefore, to believe that America's national army would ever seek to conquer the state governments, which still commanded their citizens' "affection and confidence."[1869] As Madison concluded, no standing army would be able to defeat the "near half a million citizens" armed with muskets and years of combat experience, who would fight "for their common liberties" against a despotic, national military.[1870]

[1859] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 25* in *New York Packet*, December 21, 1787, in *DHRC* 15:60-62.
[1860] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, January 9, 1788, *DHRC* 8:287. Tamony quotes Richard Price, *Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, and the Means of Making it a Benefit to the World* (Boston: Powars and Willis, 1784), 15-16; American Antiquarian Society.
[1861] Melancton Smith, *Brutus I*, *New York Journal*, October 18, 1787, in *Anti-Federalist Writings*, 176-177.
[1862] Smith, *Brutus I*, *New York Journal*, October 18, 1787, in *Anti-Federalist Writings*, 176-177.
[1863] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, January 9, 1788, *DHRC* 8:287.
[1864] Ibid.
[1865] Peter Elting and Richard Varick to Peter van Gaasbeek, September 25, 1787, in *DHRC* 19:53.
[1866] *Boston Gazette*, December 24, 1787, in *DHRC* 5:509. For an analysis of the political power of pseudonyms within the public debate over the *United States Constitution*, see Heideking, *The Constitution Before the Judgment Seat:* 74-76.
[1867] James Madison, *Federalist 46*, in *New York Packet*, January 29, 1788, in *DHRC* 15:489-490; Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 51-52.
[1868] Ibid.
[1869] Ibid.
[1870] Ibid.

When it came to executive tyranny, however, antifederalists faced an almost insurmountable hurdle. They needed to address the towering Virginian in the room, George Washington, a man renowned for having the "good of America at heart," and who had already resisted the siren song of military dictatorship.[1871] If nine states ratified the federal constitution (and one of them was Virginia), then Washington likely would serve as the United States' first president. As Melancton Smith grappled with the extensive power granted to the proposed executive branch, he felt pressed to concede Washinton's personal virtues. No country "had ever a more patriotic army" than that which had won America's independence from Britain under Washington's command.[1872] Smith added, however, that the American people were extremely lucky that Washington was "a patriot as well as a general."[1873] If the Continental army had been commanded by a man who "possessed of the spirit of Julius Caesar or a Cromwell," then the "liberties" of the United States would have been, "in all probability, terminated with the war."[1874] For Smith, Washington was the virtuous exception that proved the rule of inevitable tyrannical corruption.

Other antifederalists, however, began to worry that even the hero of York had abandoned his patriotic devotion to the United States. Boston's press began circulating a terrifying and lamentable rumor, which purported that Washington secretly harbored a tyrant's heart.[1875] The general, this rumor continued, had confessed that if nine states did ratify the proposed constitution, he would use the "BAYONET" to "compel the minority" of dissenting states to "submit" to his presidency.[1876] If even the virtuous Washington might be corrupted by the new constitution, antifederalists concluded, then it must be hated, feared, and rejected.

According to antifederalists, tyranny's corrupting influence had spread beyond the constitution's executive office and had invaded its legislative apparatus. As Melancton Smith declared, the purpose of "every tyrannical government is the happiness and aggrandizement of the one, or a few," to which "the public felicity, and every other interest must submit."[1877] The few, as Smith implied, would soon cease to identify with the many. Richard Henry Lee agreed. The structure of the new, national legislature encourage such aristocratic despotism, for it required representatives to be "too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them."[1878] This affective distance, Lee concluded, would sacrifice national fellow-feeling to the self-interest of the "factions of the few," and thereby ensured the United States to be "corrupted by slow degrees."[1879] Antifederalists urged the American people to fear not only the despotic powers of the president, but also the interested designs of their own congressional representatives.

The absence of a national bill of rights further enraged antifederalists, and thereby helped to validate their claims that the proposed constitution would sacrifice American liberty upon the altar of despotism and tyranny. Within "all the constitutions of our own states" Melancton Smith declared, "there is not one of them but [that which] is either founded on a declaration or bill of rights, or has [a] certain express reservation of rights interwoven in [them]."[1880] Even "more astonishing," Smith continued, was that the Philadelphia convention *intentionally* refused to attach the

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[1871] *New York Daily Advertiser*, July 26, 1787, in *DHRC* 19:15.
[1872] Melancton Smith, *Brutus X*, *New York Journal*, January 24, 1788, *Anti-Federal Writings*, 229.
[1873] Ibid.
[1874] Ibid.
[1875] *Boston Independent Chronicle*, January 24, 1788, in *DHRC* 15:138.
[1876] Ibid.
[1877] Melancton Smith, *Brutus IV*, *New York Journal*, November 29, 1787, in *Anti-Federalist Writings*, 192.
[1878] Richard Henry Lee, *Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican*, "Letter VII," in *DHRC* 20:992.
[1879] Ibid; Richard Henry Lee, *Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican*, "Letter VIII," in *DHRC* 20: 997.
[1880] Melancton Smith, *Brutus II*, *New York Journal*, November 1, 1787, in *Anti-Federalist Writings*, 156.

"grand security" of a bill of rights to their proposed constitution.[1881] Federalists, Lee complained, had prioritized the "acquisition of power unlimited, not the security of Civil liberty," and thereby left the "the happiness of the people" to "the mercy of Rulers."[1882] To remedy this grave error, Lee demanded that national government adopt a federal bill of rights to protect the American people from "the wicked & Tyrannic."[1883] Elbridge Gerry publicly concurred in a letter to the Massachusetts General Court, positing that the people might lose their liberties if they ratified this constitution without such "Security."[1884] To reject the proposed constitution outright seemed equally dangerous, however, as Gerry believed that "Anarchy may ensue" if the United States continued to exist without a stronger, national government.[1885] More moderate than Smith or Lee, Gerry's arguments elicited profound "fears" among the people of Massachusetts. Even the state's presses began to question whether federalists, like Washington and Rufus King, had abandoned their patriotic attachment to the United States and had become true "enemies" of the American people.[1886]

Despite the damning absence of a bill of rights, federalists unwaveringly argued that the constitution would establish a national government under which every American citizen shall "have but little to fear, and every thing to hope."[1887] The "local prejudices which have so long retarded" the United States' "growth," one federalist argued, "will be now annihilated."[1888] Only this proposed national government, Hamilton argued, had the pragmatic political powers necessary to prevent the "frequent and violent" interstate conflicts and boundary disputes which had occurred under the Confederation.[1889] Some federalists, however, took this argument a step farther, and posited that the greatest internal threat to the United States were the misguided antifederalists themselves. One federalist author, writing in the *Massachusetts Centinel*, went so far as to suggest that antifederalists were closeted royalist sympathizers, who still believed that the American people were "the happiest people on earth, under the arbitrary domination of a British king."[1890] If the United States could embrace their national government's supremacy, Hamilton concluded, then it would be able to stem the dangers that emerged both "between the States themselves" and "from domestic factions and convulsions," including those inhabitants who still harbored fealty to George III.[1891]

Federalists' belief in the unifying power of the proposed constitution, however, arose from its assumed ability to rekindle America's once passionate, and now tepid, bonds of the fellow-feeling. "It is expected the new government will abolish party," one federalist had hoped, "and make us once more, Members of one great political Family."[1892] After reading the "dazzling splendor" of the proposed constitution, one Virginian federalist could not help but proclaim his "ardent love" for the United States.[1893] As Curtius declared in the *New York Daily Advertiser*, the proposed constitution will permit the United States to "become a respectable nation" upon the world's stage.[1894] America's

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[1881] Melancton Smith, *Brutus II*, *New York Journal*, November 1, 1787, in *Anti-Federalist Writings*, 156.
[1882] Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, October 27, 1787, *DHRC* 13:485; Richard Henry Lee to William Shippen Jr., October 2, 1787, in *DHRC* 8:32-33.
[1883] Richard Henry Lee to William Shippen Jr., October 2, 1787, *DHRC* 8:32-33; Lee, *Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican*, "Letter II," in *DHRC* 19:217.
[1884] Elbridge Gerry to Massachusetts General Court, October 18, 1787, in *DHRC* 4:98-99.
[1885] Ibid.
[1886] *Massachusetts Centinel*, November 14, 1787, in *DHRC* 4:231.
[1887] *American Herald*, October 1, 1787, *DHRC* 4:28.
[1888] Ibid.
[1889] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 6*, in *New York Independent Journal*, *DHRC* 14:96.
[1890] *Massachusetts Gazette*, November 23, 1787, *DHRC* 4:313-314.
[1891] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 6*, in *New York Independent Journal*, *DHRC* 14:96.
[1892] *Massachusetts Centinel*, October 6, 1787, *DHRC* 4:52.
[1893] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, November 28, 1787, in *DHRC* 14:242-244.
[1894] *Curtius I*, *New York Daily Advertiser*, September 29, 1787, in *DHRC* 19:67.

"national existence," therefore, "depended as much as ever upon [the people's] Union."[1895] "Let us then be of one heart, and of one mind," Curtius concluded, and make "worthy the ashes of our slaughtered brethren, and our own sufferings."[1896] For Curtius, as for many federalists, the proposed constitution was the final patriotic culmination of America's civil war for independence.

Perhaps the greatest defense of the affective power of the national constitution came from James Madison in *Federalist 14*: "Hearken not to the unnatural voices which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many chords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family….can no longer be fellow citizens of one great respectable and flourishing empire."[1897] Signally, Madison's call for unity contained notes of hostility toward antifederalists, who were likely ostracized from this choir of affection. The Virginian was a prime practitioner of inciting fear and hatred to promote obedience to America's centralized government. The American people must "Shut [their] hearts against the poison" spewed by the deceptive, near-traitorous antifederalists, who wished to misrepresent the proposed constitution as both reckless and unattainable.[1898] The United States now must hold firm to one simple, affective truth: that "the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, [or] enemies."[1899] To prevent this division, "preserve [their] liberties and promote [their] happiness," Madison concluded, the citizens of the United States must reject the antifederalists' emotionally exploitative mistruths and ratify this necessary, and beneficent, federal constitution.[1900] Even the traditionally pessimistic John Adams concurred with Madsion's thinking, confessing to Jefferson that he truly believed this constitution held the power to "preserve the Union, to increase Affection, and bring [Americans] all to the same mode of thinking."[1901]

Not all federalists, however, brimmed with either Adams or Madison's optimism. One such federalist praised the constitution's "glorious frame of government," as it will spread "*Peace, Liberty,* and *Safety*" throughout the entire nation.[1902] The same federalist, however, expressed dark concerns that the "disunited states of America, at this all-important crisis may be fitly compared to thirteen distinct, separate, independent, *unsupported* columns," which precariously sustain the "*superb edifice*" of government.[1903] At present, this federalist concluded, the individual states remained vulnerable to the "ruthless attacks of *anarchy*, on the one hand, and of *despotism*, on the other." [1904] The "Union," Alexander Hamilton argued in *Federalist 15*, was of paramount importance to the American people's "political safety and happiness."[1905] For if the thirteen united states did not abandon the *Articles of Confederation* and adopt the proposed constitution, then "[t]he sacred knot which binds the people of America together [would] be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation."[1906] Hamilton's arguments distilled the federalists' fear-mongering rhetoric into a single image: one of a nation in civic turmoil, teetering on the precipice of bloody warfare and

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[1895] *Curtius I*, *New York Daily Advertiser*, September 29, 1787, in *DHRC* 19:67.
[1896] Ibid.
[1897] James Madison, *Federalist 14*, in *New York Packet*, November 30, 1787, *DHRC* 15:316-317; Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 1, 9.
[1898] Madison, *Federalist 14*, *DHRC* 15:316-317.
[1899] Ibid.
[1900] Ibid.
[1901] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, November 10, 1787, in *Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 210.
[1902] *Massachusetts Gazette*, December 7, 1787, in *DHRC* 4:400.
[1903] Ibid.
[1904] Ibid.
[1905] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 15*, *New York Independent Journal*, December 1, 1787, *DHRC* 14:324.
[1906] Ibid.

political anarchy, from which only its citizens might provide rescue and relief. The past four months of intense partisan discourse and discord, however, had made that relief seem a near impossibility.

A Wish for Good Government – Massachusetts's Ratification Convention:

Though the proposed constitution required only nine states to take effect, both federalists and antifederalists understood that America's central government would be politically impotent if Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, or New York rejected it.[1907] Pennsylvania's swift ratification, second only to Delaware, disappointed antifederalists and federalists alike, as the latter lamented that that only two-thirds of the state's delegates had voted to ratify.[1908] This lackluster endorsement within the home state of Philadelphia's convention worried the most astute of federalists, who predicted greater challenges in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York. Federalists dominated print media in all three states, yet each possessed vocal antifederalist cohorts who fearlessly published and circulated unrelenting criticisms of the constitution.[1909] Although the topics of debate varied across each of these states' ratification conventions, both federalist and antifederalist delegates employed the same rhetorics which had dominated the nation's print discourse since autumn 1787: for federalists, a tempered rhetoric of fear and hatred, for antifederalists, a more passionate rhetoric of terror, hatred, and justified anger. Further, both federalists and antifederalists expressed sorrow for the violence, chaos, and disunity which the American people would suffer if their respective opponents achieved political victory. Only the federalists, however, had the opportunity to incorporate joy into their affective rhetoric, as each subsequent state ratification emboldened America's nationalists. Through this rhetorical addition, federalists persuasively asserted themselves as speaking on behalf of the people of the United States, and thereby depicted the enactment of their new, constitutional republic as a near-inevitable act of popular will.

Virginia and New York scheduled their ratifications conventions for June 1788, and therefore federalists' "hopes" fell first upon Massachusetts, whose delegates planned to gather in Boston that January.[1910] If Massachusetts ratified the constitution, one New York federalist optimistically remarked, there would be "no doubt" of the federal government's enactment by late-spring.[1911] Massachusetts's antifederalists, however, garnered such unwavering support from the state's regulators and "insurgents" that James Madison worried its vote for ratification would be "in the negative."[1912] Both federalists and antifederalists understood that if Massachusetts rejected the constitution, then New York and Virginia would "not hesitate one moment to follow the example….the fatal consequences" of which none could "foresee."[1913]

When Massachusetts's delegates assembled on January 9, the federalists suffered an immediate political blow: the convention elected antifederalist John Hancock as its president.[1914] To rebound from this set-back, federalists returned to their moderate, tempered rhetoric of fear, by

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[1907] Maier, *Ratification*, xiii.

[1908] Maier, *Ratification*, 119-122; *DHRC* 2:611-612; Pennsylvania ratified the constitution on December 15, 1787.

[1909] Klarman, *The Framer's Coup*, 398. Edmund Carrington observed that Massachusetts and Virginia, individually, held the political influence and might "if not to prevent the effects of the Government altogether, to hold it in suspense longer than the state of our affairs can well admit." Furthermore, Carrington noted that New York's "uniform opposition to every federal interest for several years, gives [the American people] reason to expect her dissent even to the calling a convention"; see Edmund Carrington to James Madison, February 10, 1788, *DHRC* 8:360.

[1910] *Massachusetts Centinel*, December 29, 1787, *DHRC* 5:554-555; Maier, *Ratification*, 125, 348.

[1911] Ibid.

[1912] James Madison to George Washington, January 20, 1788, in *Papers of James Madison: CS,* 10:399.

[1913] Cyrus Griffin to Thomas FitzSimons, January 13, 1788, in *DHRC* 5:705; Melancton Smith to Abraham Yates Jr., January 23, 1788, in "The Papers of Abraham Yates Jr.," MSS; New York Public Library.

[1914] "Massachusetts Ratification Journal," January 8, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1162; For Hancock's antifederalist sympathies and general "approbation" to the constitution, see *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 12, 1788, *DHRC* 2:696

which they refuted the antifederalists' arguments that the proposed constitution would subject Massachusetts to the horrors of legislative tyranny and political enslavement. The liberties of the individual citizen, Fisher Ames calmly explained, depended primarily upon "the due restraint" of "the liberty of others."[1915] The people's liberties were "far from being endangered or destroyed" by the proposed constitution, and thus its ratification would grant the United States' national government the powers necessary to keep Americans' liberty "extended and secured."[1916] Rufus King chimed in, positing that the House of Representatives' biennial elections would protect individual liberty from political corruption, as the American people retained the authority to "remove an unfaithful representative, or to continue a faithful one" without the interference from the state legislatures.[1917]

Federalists' depiction of America's new national government as a stalwart protector of liberty failed to assuage the terror that antifederalists felt at the thought of submitting themselves, once again, to the yoke of legislative tyranny. The federalists' rhetorical use of intentional, moderated emotions had been too overt. According to antifederalists, the proposed constitution was both "a bottomless ocean, where the sinking into Slavery [was] endless" and "a deep mine, where iron shackles are produced…without the weight of the Hammer."[1918] This new congress, antifederalists lamented, possessed excessive power over both the nation's "pursestrings" and "sword."[1919] Its members would be tempted, inevitably, to engage in fiscal and military abuses akin to those which the American people had suffered so recently under Britain's Parliament.[1920] This horrifying future, antifederalists argued, was plain to see in the constitution's design, which lacked any explicit bill of rights to protect the American people from arbitrary taxation, maltreatment at the hands of peacetime standing armies, or judicial corruption.[1921]

The antifederalists' focus on the absence of a national bill of rights had the benefit of being both affectively persuasive and factually accurate, and it stirred acute anxiety among Massachusetts's leading federalists. An "apprehension that the liberties of the people are in danger," King reluctantly informed Madison, will "have a more powerful Effect upon the minds of our Opponents than any specific Objections against the constitution."[1922] King also noted that antifederalists used affective rhetoric to stoke popular "distrust of men of property or Education" who had endorsed the constitution.[1923] Antifederalists, through such accusations, further discredited the disinterested intentions of the new, national government.[1924] Reminiscent of the anti-Parliament conspiracy theories that dominated British America's public sphere in the late-1760s and early-1770s, King observed that "every Attempt to remove [the antifederalists'] fixed and violent Jealousy" toward the constitution only served as "confirmation of that baneful passion."[1925] To make matters even worse, antifederalists genuinely believed that they had "an unalterable majority on their side," a confidence which their opponents sorely lacked.[1926]

[1915] *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, January 15, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1191.
[1916] Ibid
[1917] Ibid, 6:1203.
[1918] *American Herald*, January 21, 1788, *DHRC* 5:758.
[1919] *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, January 21, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1287.
[1920] Ibid.
[1921] Theophilus Parson, "Notes of Convention Debates," January 21, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1296-1297; *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, January 23, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1316-1317.
[1922] Rufus King to James Madison, January 20, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1539.
[1923] Ibid.
[1924] Ibid.
[1925] Ibid.
[1926] Ibid.

Discrediting the antifederalists' impassioned arguments as imprecise, impetuous, and irrational proved difficult, especially as federalist had to do so while simultaneously justifying the enhanced political powers which the constitution had entrusted to America's national government. "Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments by which popular governments are destroyed," Ames proclaimed, for "democracy is a volcano, which conceals the fiery materials of its own destruction."[1927] The popular passions to which antifederalists now appealed manifested a greater danger, Ames posited, than any action which the new national government might commit. Driving this argument to its logical conclusion, one federalist asked whether the American people should "object to all governments; because power may be abused."[1928] If so, Massachusetts would "be reduced to anarchy and a state of nature," in which "passions, prepossessions, and party spirit," would smother "reason" and communal necessity.[1929] Only by ratifying and embracing a central government capable of restraining the people's worst inclinations and desires, federalists argued, might the United States be spared the same political turmoil and unrest which swept across western Massachusetts but a year earlier.

For two weeks the Massachusetts convention debated whether the horrors of legislative tyranny outweighed the terror of impassioned anarchy. With federalists no closer to securing ratification, Jonathan Smith of Lanesborough rose from his seat the morning of January 25 and, in the most affecting speech of the entire convention, detailed both the "effect of anarchy" and the "reasons why [he] wished for good government" both in Massachusetts and throughout the United States.[1930] When aggrieved citizens willingly take-up arms against their own freely elected government, Smith began, they inevitably choose to "rob you of your property, threaten to burn your houses" and "oblige you to be on your guard night and day."[1931] When Massachusetts's regulators descended upon the state's western towns and farms, Smith recalled, "children were taken out of their schools and carried away" while those who did not join the regulators were "killed by their own friends."[1932] These acts of violence and chaos proved so "distressing," Smith confessed, that if anyone with the power to protect his town had "come and set up [their] standard," then every inhabitant of Lanesborough would "have flocked to it, even if it had been a monarch, and that monarch might have proved a tyrant."[1933] The people of Massachusetts must reject the temptations of unrestrained freedom and rather embrace the constitution's promise of security *now*, Smtih warned, lest they "never" have another such "opportunity."[1934] Smith's sorrowful, terrifying rhetoric proved a triumphant movement for Massachusetts's federalists. It skillfully portrayed the evils that man commits in a state of anarchy. Implicitly, its tempered language also expressed hatred for those callous individuals – those antifederalists – who ignored their fellow Americans' pleas for security and, on political principle alone, rejected the protections offered within this constitution.

Unsurprisingly, antifederalists took grave offense at Smith's hyperbolic rhetoric, particularly those Massachusetts delegates who had served as regulators.[1935] Federalist, however, failed to understand their objections. As Jeremey Belknap observed, they arose "more from an Enmity to all or any Government than from any defects in [its] proposed form," and therefore these

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[1927] *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, January 15, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1192-1193.
[1928] Ibid, January 17, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1227
[1929] Ibid.
[1930] *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, January 25, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1346.
[1931] Ibid.
[1932] Ibid.
[1933] Ibid.
[1934] Ibid
[1935] Maier, *Ratification*, 160.

antifederalists will "not be convinced" to support ratification.[1936] Belknap, however, proved a bit too pessimistic. Days after Smith's anti-anarchy speech, renowned Massachusetts antifederalist Agrippa began publishing tracts which endorsed ratification, so long as the state's convention attached a proposed bill of rights to the constitution.[1937] One day later, John Hancock – personally emboldened by federalists' promise that he would be elected as America's first president if Virginia rejected the constitution – declared his support for ratification, so long as his fellow delegates consented to the "introduction of some general amendments" to protect the liberties of the American people.[1938] Following his compatriot's lead, Samuel Adams declared that it "is of the greatest importance," that the American people remain "united in sentiment," as it will help them "withstand [their] common enemy" and "preserve their valuable rights and liberties."[1939] The current flames of passion and division threaten this unity, and therefore Adams conceded that this "federal government" may be salvaged with a national bill of rights.[1940]

Exploiting this shift in the convention's political landscape, Fisher Ames warned his fellow delegates that America's "political dissolution [was] approaching," as "Anarchy and uncertainty" now "attend [their] future State."[1941] "The union is essential," as it is a "dyke to fence out the flood" of foreign invasion and domestic revolt.[1942] Despite the necessity of such political unity, America's national pillars – its civic manifestations of fellow-feeling – were "crumbling to powder" and, without immediate repair, shall wash away "in one common destruction."[1943] Two days after Ames's ominous speech, Hancock gave his "assent to the Constitution in full confidence that the amendments proposed will soon become a part of the system," somberly acknowledging that Massachusetts, and the entire the United States, "must all rise or fall together."[1944]

Federalists' rhetorical fear of popular anarchy and political disunity, coupled with antifederalists' belief that a national bill of rights might suppress the constitution's horrifying inclination to legislative tyranny, narrowly secured Massachusetts's ratification, with 187 yeas, 168 nays, and 9 abstentions.[1945] By proposing and endorsing a compromised ratification, antifederalists not only took the most important step to securing Massachusetts's support for this new national government, but also established a political precedent which informed Virginia and New York's own ratification conventions. Furthermore, these ideological concessions discouraged federalists from branding their political opponents as hated political others, unworthy of the American people's fellow-feeling. The disinterested politics of Massachusetts's antifederalists, not popular adoration for the federalists' constitution, had forestalled – at least temporarily – the dissolution of America's once resolute bonds of fellow-feeling. Federalists, therefore, still believed it possible to repurpose the affective remnants of America's emotional community of revolution into a powerful national identity for their early republic.

Despite this lackluster victory, proclamations of joy and national unity dominated Massachusetts's federalist presses. "Hail the DAY, and mark it well,/Then Old ANARCH's Kingdom fell—/," the *Independent Chronicle* proclaimed, "Then our dawning GLORY shone,/Mark it,

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[1936] Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, January 25-26, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1547-1548.
[1937] *Agrippa XV*, *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 29, 1788, *DHRC* 5:822-825.
[1938] *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, January 30, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1383; Maier, *Ratification*, 194-197.
[1939] Ibid, January 31, 1788, *DHRC* 6:1383-1384.
[1940] Ibid.
[1941] *Debates, Resolutions, and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention*, February 5, 1788, *DHRC*, 6:1447-1448.
[1942] Ibid.
[1943] Ibid.
[1944] Ibid.
[1945] Maier, *Ratification*, 207.

FREEMEN, 'tis our own./Ratification of the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, by Massachusetts!"[1946] The *Massachusetts Gazette* offered a detailed account of the state's celebratory procession, during which "[r]epeated marks of joy were exhibited… by the lovers and well-wishers of our country."[1947] When news of Massachusetts's ratification reached New York, the state's federalists exhibited "joy and satisfaction," as they believed it would "certainly convince [their] brethren in the sister States" that Massachusetts "cherishes in her bosom, many virtuous citizens, who most ardently wish for a government calculated 'to form a more perfect Union.'"[1948] Shockingly, even Massachusetts's antifederalist pamphleteers began cautiously endorsing the ratified constitution. "I cannot say my mind is entirely satisfied, in every point," one antifederalist wrote, but "I [would] rather rejoice than mourn, at the determination of that respectable body" who chose ratification.[1949] Even John Hancock now embraced his part as the ideal national executive, informing the Massachusetts General Court that the constitution, once strengthened through the proposed amendments, shall enact the "most perfect System of Government" for the United States.[1950]

Not all federalists, however, felt such optimism in the wake of Massachusetts's ratification. Federalist Nathaniel Barrell, a Boston born delegate representing York, Maine, feared that America's antifederalists, despite their recent concessions, still posed the greatest danger to the United States. Barrell remarked to George Thacher that some antifederalists still "wish[ed] to be under a British Government," particularly those who "were ill treated as torrys and [were] now ready to sacrifice all for revenge."[1951] Barrell further implied that some antifederalists were crooked financial schemers, who opposed the central government in hopes to maintain their impunity and now "fear[ed] they shall not have paper money to cheat their creditors" under America's new government.[1952] Anxious of the antifederalists' schemes, Barrell admitted that he still "pit[ied]" those of "honest ignorant minds" who had become the "dupes" of the antifederalists, "persuade[d]" to believe that "their libertys are in danger" and that "they will be made slaves" under the new constitution.[1953] Barrell's pity, however, did not extend to "Insurgents," such as Massachusetts's regulators, who had "neither property nor principle," but desired only "Anarchy."[1954] If the federal congress rejected Massachusetts's proposed amendments, Barrell warned, antifederalists' interested, traitorous urges would reignite, and thereby instigate "little short of a revolution" throughout the United States.[1955] While Barrell beseeched "Heaven" to protect Massachusetts from such horrid violence, most federalists believed that the power to preserve America's fragile union now resided in Virginia.

<u>The Happiness or Misery of Mankind – Virginia's Ratification Convention:</u>

At the time Massachusetts became the sixth pillar of the United States' new republic, most of Virgnia's newspapers and political pamphlets endorsed ratification, and the affective rhetoric deployed by northern federalists found expression within the south.[1956] Virginia will "decide perhaps the fate of millions" and "the future happiness or misery" of America's "remote posterity," posited one federalist in the *Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal*.[1957] If Virginia foolishly rejected the constitution,

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[1946] *Independent Chronicle*, February 7, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1606.
[1947] *Massachusetts Gazette*, February 8, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1612.
[1948] *New York Packet*, February 15, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1641.
[1949] *Independent Chronicle*, February 21, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1705.
[1950] John Hancock, "Speech to Massachusetts General Court," February 27, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1668.
[1951] Nathaniel Barrell to George Thacher, February 20, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1589-1590
[1952] Ibid.
[1953] Ibid.
[1954] Ibid.
[1955] Nathaniel Barrell to George Thacher, February 20, 1788, *DHRC* 7:1589-1590.
[1956] "Public Commentaries on the Constitution," *DHRC* 9:634.
[1957] *Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal*, May 21, 1788, *DHRC* 9:831.

this federalist argued, then "she alone must answer for all the horrors of a civil war" – the "cries of our weeping matrons….their slaughtered husbands, the rapes of their daughters, and the mangled bodies of their sons."[1958] This fear-mongering federalist then concluded: "Any heart of sensibility will bleed in reading [this] melancholy list," and then will work to prevent these "calamities" by unequivocally supporting the constitution.[1959]

To counteract these affective pleas for ratification, antifederalists launched a strategic assault against Virginia's most popular federalist: George Washington. Massachusetts's antifederalists had already impugned his moral and civic character by accusing him of tyrannical ambition.[1960] Eight days before the Norfolk County delegate election, the *Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal* echoed the *Boston Independent Chronicle*'s allegations against Washington and published a scathing rebuke of the Virginian's supposed betrayal of the United States.[1961] Despite his "long life of virtue and patriotism," the newspaper argued, Washington, in his "old age" and with his "metal faculties unimpaired," had "lent the sanction of [his name] to establish a system of tyranny!"[1962] While antifederalists assaulted one of the United States most adored wartime heroes, federalists disavowed Virginia's second most notable revolutionary: Patrick Henry. Federalists lamented that Henry's political views "were so industriously propagated" throughout Virginia "that the people" were "disposed to be his blind followers."[1963] Eager to besmirch the lauded patriot's reputation, federalists argued that those Americas "who are the loudest about liberty, have always been the greatest tyrants themselves."[1964] For even after Massachusetts's ratification, Henry remained "almost avowedly an enemy to the union" and was likely to "oppose every plan that would cement it."[1965]

Led by the state's most proficient and reputable orator, Virginia's antifederalists gained another profound advantage in June, when their state's convention assembled with the option to ratify the constitution with proposed amendments. Following Massachusetts's example, Richard Henry Lee expressed his commitment to reject the constitution unless it was accompanied by protections for the press, trial by jury, and the political independence of civil judges.[1966] The most fervent of antifederalists hoped that Virginia, even if it "should be the only dissenting state," had the necessary "spirit to oppose [this] System of domination." [1967] Virginia must remind their fellow states of "their duty" to defend personal liberty – just as it had been the first colony "to counteract British oppression" during the stamp tax crisis.[1968] The "conduct" of Virginia and New York during the ratification conventions, antifederalists believed, would determine the "preservation of Liberty" in the United States, and as such they urged both states to reject the constitution if, for no other reason, than it only required the ratification of nine states, not *all thirteen*, to become the supreme law

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[1958] *Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal*, May 21, 1788, *DHRC* 9:831.
[1959] Ibid.
[1960] *Boston Independent Chronicle*, January 24, 1788, in *DHRC* 15:138.
[1961] *Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal*, March 12, 1788, *DHRC* 8:481; "Dates of Election for the Virginia Convention," *DHRC* 9:563.
[1962] Ibid.
[1963] *State Soldier III*, *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, March 12, 1788, *DHRC* 8:487; Edward Carrington to James Madison, February 10, 1788, *DHRC* 8:359.
[1964] Ibid.
[1965] George Nicholas to James Madison, April 5, 1788, *DHRC* 9:703.
[1966] Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 26, 1788, *DHRC* 9:878-879; Lorri Glover argues that Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, and Patrick Henry led Virginia's antifederalists in not only condemning the proposed constitution, but also making the inclusion of a bill of rights a non-negotiable demand for ratification, see Lorri Glover, *The Fate of the Revolution: Virginians Debate the Constitution* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2016), 17-19, 41, 57.
[1967] Caleb Wallace to William Fleming, May 3, 1788, *DHRC* 9:784.
[1968] Ibid.

of their republic.[1969] Given "the present temper of America," antifederalists remained optimistic that either state's rejection would both protect the "natural & unalienable Rights of Men in a Constitutional manner" and force their federalist opponents to endorse a national bill of rights.[1970]

When Virginia's delegates assembled in Richmond on June 2, Patrick Henry passionately condemned the constitution's inclination toward legislative tyranny. The Virginia orator's rhetoric was, once again, saturated with affect. As a "centinel over the rights, liberty, and happiness" of the people of Virginia, Henry began, "I represent their feelings when I say, that they are exceedingly uneasy" with the constitution. [1971] It did not "amend" the Confederation, but represented a new government of "pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous" principles.[1972] The people of Virginia, Henry feared, would suffer the destruction of their liberties not by the "licentiousness of the people," but by the "tyranny of rulers."[1973] Further, the "deformities" of the constitution, especially the absence of a bill of rights, skewed America's national government dangerously close to "monarchy."[1974] If the "President may easily become king," Henry observed, then this constitution must "raise indignation in the breast of every true American" who hated the shackles of arbitrary power.[1975]

After only three days of debate, federalists began to worry that Henry's oratorical prowess had doomed all hope for ratification. Desperate to rout the antifederalist's influence, James Madison conveyed his concerns that *emotion* might unduly bias Virginia's delegates against the federalists' more reasoned arguments. In so doing, Madison pivoted against the federalist presses' own foray into impassioned rhetoric. The purpose of Virginia's convention, Madison argued, was to determine whether the proposed constitution would "promote the public happiness." [1976] To perform this task effectively, the delegates "ought not to address [their] arguments to the feelings and passions" of their fellow Virginians, but rather must perform "a calm and rational investigation" of the text laid before them.[1977] Federalists' claims to dispassionate analysis not only broke with a recent rhetoric pattern, but belied their continuing reliance on impassioned political rhetoric. Indeed, just a few moments earlier, Madison himself had provided a "few observations" from his "heart," including his personal fears that Virginia's "political happiness and existence, depend[ed] on the Union of states; and that without this Union the people of this and other States" would "undergo the unspeakable calamities, which discord, faction, turbulence, war, and bloodshed, have produced in other countries."[1978] Despite his condemnation of affective rhetoric, Madison himself could not help but conjure the terrifying prospect of the United States, once again, succumbing to the horrors of disunity, destruction, and civil war.

Unsurprisingly, Madison's hypocritical appeal to dispassion did little to prevent antifederalists from warning of the constitution's tyrannical inclinations. Early in Virginia's print debates, an "Impartial Examiner" drew attention to the excessive martial powers which the constitution granted to the national government and reminded its readers of a trusted, old British truism: "standing armies in times of peace are dangerous to a free country."[1979] Virginians had suffered greatly at the hands of Parliament's redcoats during their recent civil war for independence,

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[1969] "Address to the Members of the New York and Virginia Conventions," *DHRC* 17:260-261.
[1970] Ibid.
[1971] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 4, 1788, *DHRC* 9:929-931; June 5, 1788, *DHRC* 9:951
[1972] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 4, 1788, *DHRC* 9:929-931; June 5, 1788, *DHRC* 9:951
[1973] Ibid, June 5, 1788, *DHRC* 9:955-956
[1974] Ibid, *DHRC* 9:963.
[1975] Ibid.
[1976] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 6, 1788, *DHRC* 9:989.
[1977] Ibid.
[1978] Ibid, 9:988.
[1979] *Impartial Examiner I*, *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, February 27, 1788, *DHRC* 8:422.

and many in the state still distrusted armed soldiers. "Besides being useless," peacetime standing armies were "inconvenient and expensive," and almost always comprised of "the dregs of the people."[1980] The discipline required of soldiers "reduce[d] them to a degree of slavery" which made them "fit instruments of tyranny and oppression."[1981] Another antifederalist warned that the legislature's increased access to the "revenue" of the states, when coupled with the executive's "full and absolute disposal of the militia," granted the national government the power to banish every American into to the "dark regions of slavery."[1982] To prevent such a horrific future, antifederalists concluded, the people of Virginia must refuse to submit to a national army and must choose to rely upon their "properly formed" militias, which are comprised of "the people themselves, and render regular troops in a great measure unnecessary." [1983]

Ignoring these warnings, Virginia's federalists presented a national, peacetime standing army as necessary, especially to defend the state's western settlers from Indigenous raids. Patrick Henry, however, balked at this claim. The former governor did not object to making a strawman of Indigenous cruelty, conceding that the "savage Indians" could "destroy" all of America, as they are "as terrible to the other States" as they are to Virginia.[1984] After conjuring terror, however, Henry reminded his fellow Virginians that they "have nothing to fear," for they could easily defend themselves, as the "superiority" of their "back settlers…increases daily."[1985] Many of the delegates assembled in Richmond remembered, if not directly participated in, Governor Dunmore's incursions against the Shawnee in 1774. Virginia's militias had won this conflict without the support of Britain's North American standing army. Henry conceded that those states which lacked proficient militias might desire a federal army to repel Indigenous border raids, but Virginians have no such need. For the people of Virginia will "sip sorrow" for those who, out of fear of their safety, foolishly choose "any other security" than the laws and militias of their state.[1986]

Federalists seized precisely on fears of state security to counter Herny's affective rhetoric. Making the federal congress's power to form a national army dependent on the consent of the individual states, Madison warned, would "destroy" the union, as. personal selfishness and regional interests would "sacrifice particular States" to the violent horrors of anarchy.[1987] Edmund Randolph agreed with Madison's rationalization of the constitution's military powers, even though he had been a dissenter at the Philadelphia convention. The reluctant federalist then lobbed a scathing attack against Henry's distrust of Virginian patriotism, painting an improbable scenario. If Virginia's militia officers were "called upon to destroy the liberty of their country" by a tyrannical government, Randolph asked, would they abandon their "attachment" to both Virginia and the liberties of their fellow Americans and "assent to such an act of suicide?"[1988] The "love of liberty" had rooted itself too deeply "in the hearts of Americans," Randolph concluded, to let a standing army, led by a corrupted national government, subject the people of Virginia to political enslavement.[1989]

Massachusetts's successful ratification of the constitution with proposed amendments, however, had validated the political rationale behind antifederalists' terror of legislative tyranny and

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[1980] *Impartial Examiner I*, *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, February 27, 1788, *DHRC* 8:422..
[1981] Ibid.
[1982] *Winchester Virginia Gazette*, March 7, 1788, *DHRC* 8:471.
[1983] *Impartial Examiner I*, *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, February 27, 1788, *DHRC* 8:422-423; Richard Henry Lee, "Letter XVIII," in *Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican*, *DHRC* 20:1072.
[1984] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 9, 1788, *DHRC* 9:1054-1055.
[1985] Ibid.
[1986] Ibid.
[1987] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 14, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1274; Glover, *Fate of the Revolution*, 123-124.
[1988] Ibid, *DHRC* 10:1288-1289.
[1989] "A Freeholder," *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, April 9, 1788, *DHRC* 9:723; *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 7, 1788, *DHRC* 9:1012, 1014.

political enslavement. To sidestep this insurmountable obstacle, federalists presented the constitution as a central mechanism for affectively uniting the American people into a singular, national identity. Randolph, a fierce advocate for a national bill of rights, affirmed that the patriotic intent of the Philadelphia convention had been to provide the United States with the cohesive "national" government it so desperately required.[1990] Dismissing Henry's adoration for America's confederation, Randolph argued that both "common danger" and "the spirit of America" laid the foundations for the "bonds of [their] Union."[1991] Shared struggles and affection, not an "insignificant piece of paper" or a collection of laws, had carried America through its "dangerous war" against Britain.[1992] John Marhsall concurred. If America's new, national government emerged "from the people," then their "feelings and interests" would not be ignored.[1993] Hence, the people of Virginia had nothing to fear from the national government's enlarged powers and political purview.[1994] As Virginia's federalists concluded, only by creating affection for the nation, one which surmounted both loyalty to one's state and individual self-interests, might the United States preserve its citizens' liberties.

After almost three weeks of contentious debate, Virginia's federalist press speculated that ratification would evoke "an equal proportion of joy and sorrow" among the state's inhabitants.[1995] "Can that mode of government be good," one antifederalist astutely asked, "which so much divides the free and independent citizens of this Republic?"[1996] This Virginian believed that the people of the United States already had been bound together by "the closet ties of consanguinity."[1997] By "signing this horrible act" – the proposed constitution – federalists would dissolve these bonds of blood and affection, and thereby expedite an "*awful crisis of danger*," which would turn "brother against brother, and father against the son."[1998] Madison was keenly aware of antifederalist's fear that ratification might incite another civil war. As the Virginia confided to King, the margin of error within his state was so narrow that one "change of opinion" would stymie any hope for ratification.[1999]

When Virginia's delegates finally began to consider a compromised ratification, Patrick Henry rose and gave one final speech against the constitution.[2000] "I see the awful immensity of the dangers with which [the constitution] is pregnant," Henry proclaimed, "I see it—I feel it."[2001] By peering "beyond the horrison that binds human eyes, and look[ing] at the final consummation of all human things," Henry was certain that "the consequent happiness or misery of mankind…will depend" on what the people of Virginia "now decide."[2002] For Virginia's ratification, Henry ominously declared, would not only effect its future "happiness," but also might "involve the misery

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1990 *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 7, 1788, *DHRC* 9:1016.
1991 *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 5, 1788, in *DHRC* 9:946.
1992 Ibid.
1993 *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 16, 1788, in *DHRC* 10:1312.
1994 Ibid.
1995 *Petersburg Virginia Gazette*, June 19, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1655.
1996 Ibid.
1997 Ibid.
1998 Ibid.
1999 James Madison to Rufus King, June 18, 1788, *Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series*, 11:152.
2000 *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 24, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1506.
2001 Ibid.
2002 *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 24, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1506; note how this mirror the rhetoric present in federalist arguments presented in the *Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal*, May 21, 1788, *DHRC* 9:831.

of the other hemispheres."[2003] As if punctuated by divine forces, thunder roared and lightning struck Richmond, and the convention hurriedly adjourned for the day.[2004]

When the delegates reconvened the next morning, Henry accepted a hard truth: that his impassioned rhetoric had failed to prevent ratification. The people of Virginia had refused to risk their exclusion from America's new republican government.[2005] The despondent orator, however, understood that he still had one major role to play: to ensure that Virginia ratified the constitution only with contingent amendments. Standing before his federalist colleagues, Henry promised to serve as "a peaceable citizen" of the republic, whose "head," "hand," and "heart" would work to "remove the defects" of the constitution while "patiently wait[ing]" for the national government to make itself "compatible with the safety, liberty and happiness of the people."[2006] After Herny's admission of defeat, Virginia's federalists secured ratification, with proposed amendments, by a vote of 89 yeas and 79 nays.[2007] With a margin of victory narrower than that of Massachusetts, Virginia confirmed that ratification by all thirteen states had never been guaranteed.

Virginia, however, did not play as pivotal of a role in the formation of the new government as its delegates initially had believed, for the *United States Constitution* had received its ninth ratification four days earlier.[2008] Virginia's status as the tenth pillar of the American republic, however, did nothing to dampen the joy or sorrow felt by citizens everywhere. The *Virginia Journal* reported toasts given in Alexandria to "Union and harmony among the members of the federal empire."[2009] Adoration for the "Union," the *Virginia Independent Chronicle* declared, may now "sit enthron'd, in ev'ry Freeman's heart."[2010] These celebrations set the tone for that year's fourth of July festivities, as Virginians toasted to "1788," hoping that this "civil revolution [will] form the great epoch of American honor, happiness and glory."[2011]

The profusion of joy, however, remained checked by a strong current of sorrow, as antifederalists mourned the death of their "Constitutional Liberty."[2012] An "Obituary for Constitutional Liberty," published in the *Virginia Gazette*, described how their once beloved guardian had been carried to its final resting place by the "four great Pillars of state" – freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, taxation through representation, and trial by jury.[2013] The seventy-nine "fettered souls" who witnessed this horrendous murder stood before his tomb overwhelmed with "anguish, pity, rage, terror, [and] fury."[2014] The "solemn scene" concluded with the "Goddess Liberty shedding tears for the loss of her departed Hero."[2015] This affecting obituary begged its readers first to "drop a tear of pity on his ashes," and then carry forward Constitutional Liberty's

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[2003] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 24, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1506.
[2004] Maier, *Ratification*, 298-300.
[2005] New Hampshire ratified the proposed constitution on June 21, 1788, only three-days before Henry's famous "thunder speech." Given the approximately six-hundred miles that news of the ninth state's ratification would have to travel, the delegates of Virginia only knew for certain the America's new constitution was but one state away from entering into effect; Maier, *Ratification*, 313.
[2006] *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 25, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1537.
[2007] James Madison to Rufus King, June 25, 1788, *Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series*, 11:178; *Virginia Ratification Journal*, June 25, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1542.
[2008] New Hampshire ratified the proposed constitution on June 21; Maier, *Ratification*, 313.
[2009] *Virginia Journal*, July 3, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1717.
[2010] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, July 2, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1728.
[2011] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, July 9, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1743-44.
[2012] "Obituary for Constitutional Liberty," *Virginia Gazette and Independent Chronicle*, June 28, 1788, *DHRC* 10:1691-1693.
[2013] Ibid.
[2014] Ibid.
[2015] Ibid.

"cause " and avenge his "horrid" demise.[2016] While Virginians might have abandoned the freedoms of their revolution, the fires of hope still burned in New York.

A "Raging" Fire on the Fourth of July – New York's Ratification Convention:

New York's ratification convention guaranteed a more volatile debate than those held in either Massachusetts or Virginia. This was the state in which both the *Federalist* and *Brutus* epistles had originated, and it was home to some of America's most politically biased newspapers.[2017] As one New Yorker remarked, the "Most Violent parties prevail[ed]" in his home state, and they are "federal and antifederal."[2018] New York's federalists, however, believed that such fierce partisan tensions, when coupled with the terror of civilian unrest and riots, might rally support for the constitution. The "clouds of public commotion" presaged a "fearful explosion," one Poughkeepsie federalist warned, as the people of New York might "unsheathe the blade of human vengeance" and "moisten the earth with [their] brother's blood, because his sentiments or practices are different."[2019] To restore "tranquility" to the United States and prevent an "abhorrent" future in which men "enlist under the banners of heated party," the people of New York must ratify the constitution.[2020] To underscore their pleas for national stability and order, federalists depicted their political opponents as devoid of America's most prized civic values, including "reason, justice, patriotism, and public spirit."[2021] Antifederalists were at best ignorant and foolish, and at worst malcontents, eager to subject the United States to partisan violence and political chaos.

When New York's delegates assembled in Albany in mid-June 1788, neither New Hampshire nor Virginia had ratified the proposed constitution. New York, therefore, held the potential to be either the first state to reject the constitution or the ninth state to ratify it. In mid-May 1788, antifederalist John Lamb confided his "anxious" desire to Richard Henry Lee that both men facilitate a strategic "Union" – akin to the committees of correspondences of the 1770s – among the antifederalists of New York and Virginia.[2022] To protect the "Republican Principles and Maxims" that "gave rise to the late glorious Revolution and supported the Patriots of America," Lamb proposed that antifederalists in New York and Virginia work in tandem to "procure" similar amendments to attach to the constitution prior to ratification.[2023] Echoing the arguments of Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams, Lamb believed that by systematically advocating for a bill of rights, the antifederalists might save the United States' liberties and revolutionary ideals from the corrupting designs of the federalists' constitution.[2024]

Although sixty-four delegates attend New York's convention, Melancton Smith and Alexander Hamilton – the respective authors of the *Brutus* and *Federalist* epistles – dominated the floor debates, which devoted significant time to the tense relationship between congressional

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[2016] Ibid.

[2017] In 1788, New York published twelve newspapers, seven of which were printed in New York City and only one of those, Thomas Greenleaf's *New York Journal*, regularly published antifederalists essays. The other five newspapers printed in New York remained under the control of federalist publishers. The most influential of New York's newspapers, however, was Francis Childs's *New York Daily Advertiser*, which was "the first [newspaper] to set [the federal Constitution] in type" and distribute it to "the citizens of New York" on September 21, 1787. Maier, *Ratification*, 333; De Pauw, *Eleventh Pillar*, 91.

[2018] Lewis Morris Sr. to Lewis Morris Jr., March 7, 1788, *DHRC* 20:851.

[2019] *Poughkeepsie Country Journal*, March 18, 1788, *DHRC* 20:865-866.

[2020] Ibid.

[2021] *Albany Journal*, February 18, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1360.

[2022] John Lamb to Richard Henry Lee, May 18, 1788, *DHRC* 20:814-815.

[2023] Ibid.

[2024] Ibid.

representation and political passions. The House of Representatives must be enlarged, Melancton Smith argued, so as to include not only "men of the first class," but also "admit those of the middling class."[2025] Even though the "same passions and prejudices govern all men," Smith believed that citizens of middling class endure "less temptation" than their elite counterparts, which thereby made it easier for them to enforce "bounds to their passions" and serve their constituents with authentic political disinterest.[2026] Most federalists, however, harbored profound suspicions of the common citizen's political aptitude, civic ethics, and personal passions – a distrust which the rhetorical terror surrounding Massachusetts's regulation only intensified. Rejecting Smith's proposition and echoing Madison's own condemnation of political passions, Robert Livingston defended the constitution's strict limitation on representation, as it would "prevent the vices, the infirmities, and the passions of the people" from corrupting congress.[2027] It would be both foolish and dangerous to grant the middling class access to such an august body, Livingston concluded, for Smith had gotten it backwards: "the sympathy of the poor is generally selfish" when compared to the "more disinterested emotion" of the contented "rich."[2028]

Hamilton shared Livingston's opposition to enlarged representation, and declared that most men are "frequently led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion."[2029] The individual state legislatures, which were often comprised of middle-class men, must be prohibited from recalling their appointed federal senators, Hamilton continued, since this power would "render" those officials "slave[s] to all the capricious humors among the people."[2030] Worse still, instability in the senate would strip the United States of its "national character," as "prejudices would govern the public deliberations, and passions rage in the counsels of the union."[2031] For Hamilton, empowering either the uneducated American citizen or self-interested state legislatures would court only mobocracy and corruption. Smith, however, refused to submit to the federalists' terror of the common people. Representatives of the state legislatures, he argued, were "chosen for their superior wisdom" and "calm and regular conduct."[2032] Much like their federal counterparts, they embodied the civic virtue and republican disinterest necessary to resist their constituents' political whims and violent passions.[2033] Inverting Hamilton's proposition, Smith argued that the common man, and by proxy his state legislatures, were necessary to prevent tyranny within the national government. Despite their ideological differences, Smith and Hamilton agreed that unregulated human passions were a great, if not the greatest, danger to their American republic.

Two days later, New York's delegates learned that New Hampshire had provided federalists with their ninth ratification. Remarkably undeterred, New York's antifederalists continued to oppose ratification, forcing Hamilton to conclude that the convention's "only chance of success" was Virginia's own ratification.[2034] Enraged that his antifederalist colleagues had tainted a moment of national celebration with petulant attempts to reduce the federal congress's taxation powers, Hamilton himself launched into a heated, as grossly inappropriate, jeremiad. The New Yorker first accused antifederalists of "cherish[ing]" the "political demon" of foreign indebtedness and then

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[2025] Francis Childs, *The Debates and Proceedings of the Convention of the State of New York, Assembled at Poughkeepsie, on the 17th of June 1788,* June 21, 1788, *DHRC* 22:1750.
[2026] Childs, *Debates*, June 21, 1788, *DHRC* 22:1751; Maier, *Ratification*, 354-355.
[2027] Childs, *Debates*, June 23, 1788, *DHRC* 22 :1810-1811.
[2028] Ibid.
[2029] Childs, *Debates*, June 24, 1788, *DHRC* 22 :1862
[2030] Ibid.
[2031] Ibid, *DHRC* 22:1862. 1866.
[2032] Childs, *Debates*, June 25, 1788, *DHRC* 22:1902.
[2033] Ibid.
[2034] Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, June 27, 1788, *Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series*, 11:183.

lambasted them for "run[ning] blindly against [New York's] own interest" to satisfy their political pride.[2035]

Amid his impassioned tirade, Hamilton realized that he had gravely breached the tempered rhetorical decorum with which most Massachusetts and Virginia's federalists had spoken in their own conventions. Hamilton relinquished the floor and apologized for his fervent tone.[2036] The New York federalist had inadvertently embodied the very same uncontrollable passions against which he had argued, and against which the constitution had promised to safeguard the American people. Now, Hamilton franticly worked to justify the "the warmth of [his] feelings" and earn forgiveness for statements "too vehement" for civil discourse.[2037] Aware that he had exposed himself to accusations of political hypocrisy, Hamilton confessed that he had "ever condemned those cold, unfeeling hearts, which no object can animate," suggesting that his outburst had arisen not from his unruly, irrational passions, but rather from a profound "concern" for the well-being of the people of New York and of the United States.[2038] Despite his political contrition, Hamilton had revealed a glaring flaw in the federalists' pro-ratification rhetoric: that every inhabitant of the United States, regardless of status or ideology, was susceptible to popular rage and political passion.

As tempers flared in Albany, New York learned on July 2 that Virginia had gifted federalists their tenth ratification.[2039] Terrified that New York's partisan passions might erupt into chaos and bloodshed, the *New York Museum* published a bulletin encouraging all who attended the state's fourth of July "Federal Procession" to leave "Party Spirit…at home" and rather promote the "*harmony, conviviality, and friendship*" felt by all patriotic Americans.[2040] Simultaneously, some Americans expressed a new, profound terror: if New York rejected the proposed constitution, then it inevitably would be compelled to "form part of an American Confederacy" with North Carolina and Rhode Island, the only other states which had yet to ratify.[2041] If Americans foolishly divided themselves into two nations, then "thousands of accidents may give rise to hostilities," resulting in the former United States suffering, once again, the horrors of "civil war."[2042]

Despite being embroiled in escalating partisan tension, most of New York's fourth of July celebrations occurred without violence, as festivities in Brooklyn, Fredericksburgh, Hudson, Jamaica, Kingston, Lansingburgh, and New York City all were conducted in a spirit of friendship.[2043] The

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[2035] Childs, *Debates*, June 28, 1788, *DHRC* 22:1986, 1989.
[2036] Childs, *Debates*, June 28, 1788, *DHRC* 22:1989.
[2037] Ibid.
[2038] Ibid, 22:1986, 1989.
[2039] Maier, *Ratification*, 370.
[2040] *New York Museum*, July 1, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1589.
[2041] Nathan Dane to Melcanton Smith, July 3, 1788, *DHRC* 1254-1256.
[2042] Ibid; John P. Kaminski, "New York: The Reluctant Pillar" in *The Reluctant Pillar: New York and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution*, ed. Stephen L Schechter (Troy, New York: Russell Sage College, 1985), 116
[2043] David Waldstreicher, in *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes*, demonstrates how early American political celebrations, such as the fourth of July, were often sites of partisan disputes, not political harmony, not only arguing that "relentless politicization gave nationalist rituals their most important meanings," but also proposing that these "[c]onflicts" helped to produce the culture of the American nation as one in which "contestants tried to claim true American nationality and the legacy of the Revolution"; see David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 8-9. Simon P. Newman builds upon Waldstreicher's argument, stating that the partisan nature of national ceremonies and celebrations continued after ratification, with federalists and republicans using these events to further their own political agendas. For Newman, newspapers proved especially important to expanding Americans' comprehension of the relationship between popular symbols, national festivities, and the political culture of their early republic; see Simon P. Newman, *Parades and Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early Republic* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 4, 83-85. For narratives of these non-violent celebrations, see *New York Daily Advertiser*, July 5, 1788, July 9, 1788, July 10, 1788; *Poughkeepsie Country Journal*, July 22, 1788, July 29, 1788; *Hudson Weekly Gazette*, July 8, 1788; *New York Packet*, July 4, 1788, July 8, 1788, July 15, 1788;

most offensive actions reported at these celebrations were the federalists' intentionally partisan toasts, such as one given in Brooklyn which requested that "continual disappointment and never-dying remorse, pain, poverty, and contempt, ever attend those antifederalists" who "stand opposed to the government."[2044] Only Albany's fourth of July celebrations devolved into bloodshed.

When New York's delegates awoke that Friday morning, surely some of them saw flames licking the horizon above Fort Frederick. The embers and smoke that wafted through the summer air were not the remnants of fireworks, but rather fell from a tall tree that approximately fifty men had erected.[2045] Enraged at Virginia's ratification, these antifederalists displayed their displeasure by publicly torching a copy of the constitution.[2046] By setting the text ablaze, antifederalists not only fueled the fiery, partisan passions that now consumed the state's capital, but also gravely wounded the federalists' pride. Later that afternoon, several hundred federalists formed a mob, tied the constitution to their own pine tree, and processed it throughout the city.[2047] Determine to offend their opponents in equal measure to their own suffered slight, Albany's federalists passed "Hilton's Tavern," one of the antifederalists' favorite watering holes, and returned their "morning compliment."[2048] Intoxicated and either unable or unwilling to control their rage, dozens of antifederalists rushed from Hilton's Tavern into the street and ignited a vicious riot, in which "both parties [fought] with the greatest rage" until the federalists emerged the unquestionable victors.[2049]

Regrettably, Albany's antifederalists had strengthened the federalists' rhetorical footing. Condemning their opponents' "frantic rage and wild derision," New York's federalists branded the state's antifederalists not simply as dangerous, but rather as embodying the same irrational passions which the constitution sought to expunge from America's national government.[2050] Furthermore, an anonymous letter printed in the *New York Daily Advertiser* reported that "one poor man, a copper," had "received a mortal wound from a bayonet" during the riot.[2051] By reporting that the only possible fatality of the Albany riot was neither a federalist nor antifederalist, but rather an innocent bystander, the author implicitly reaffirmed the danger of the antifederalists' frenzied passions.[2052]

New York Journal, July 3, 1788, July 10, 1788, July 12, 1788, July 14, 1788; *Lansingburgh Federal Herald*, July 7, 1788; *New York Impartial Gazette*, July 5, 1788; see *DHRC 21*:1275-1292.

[2044] New York's *Daily Advertiser*, July 5, 1788, in *DHRC 21*:1276.

[2045] New York's *Daily Advertiser*, July 10, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1266; *Vermont Gazette*, July 14, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1271.

[2046] Maier, *Ratification*, 361, 370. The citizens of Albany did not learn of Virginia's ratification until approximately 4:30pm on July 3, 1788; *DHRC* 21:1264; New York's *Daily Advertiser*, July 10, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1266.

[2047] *Vermont Gazette*, July 14, 1788, in *DHRC* 21:1271. The *Vermont Gazette*, however, notes that the Federalists' procession numbered "the amount of 500," yet no other report of the Albany's fourth of July riot corroborates this extremely high number. The *New Jersey Brunswick Gazette*, on July 22, 1788, reported that approximately one hundred Antifederalists "were collected…at Hilton's tavern" just prior to the riot outbreak, *DHRC* 21:1274. With this in mind, and knowing that the federalists won the riot, it would be accurate to assume that the federalists and antifederalists had at least equal numbers and, therefore, the Federalists in the procession would have numbered at least one hundred. The following seven newspapers published unique articles regarding Albany's fourth of July riot between July 8, 1788, and July 22, 1788: Litchfield Connecticut's *Weekly Monitor*, New York's *Daily Advertiser*, *New York Journal*, *Connecticut Courant*, *Vermont Gazette*, *New York Packet*, and New Jersey's *Brunswick Gazette*; see *DHRC* 21:1264-1275.

[2048] *DHRC* 21:1271.

[2049] *New York Daily Advertiser*, July 10, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1266-1267.

[2050] *Weekly Monitor* July 7, 1788, *DHRC* 21:1265-1266. The editors of the *Documentary History of the Ratification Conventions* note that leading antifederalists Peter W. Yates, Abraham G. Lansing, Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, and John Price were also present at the riot, *DHRC* 21:1264. Kaminski, "New York: The Reluctant Pillar,"101.

[2051] *New York Daily Advertiser*, July 10,1788, *DHRC* 21:1267.

[2052] Thorough careful examination of the Wilkite Riots of the 1760s and 1770s, George Rudé argues that although "damage was done" during political protests, the violence was "strictly discriminating and was directed against carefully selected targets," limiting almost all violence to the destruction of property. Extending his analysis to the Gordon Riots of 1780, Rudé notes "of all the lives lost in 1780…all were from the side of the rioters and not one from among their victims." Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, 59-60.

Relentless in their condemnation of Albany's impassioned mob, federalist newspapers deftly argued that only the ratification of the constitution would prevent such violence and anarchy from erupting throughout all of New York. Only Thomas Greenleaf's *New York Journal* dissented from this accepted narrative, depicting Albany's antifederalists as calm, rational protesters who "burn[ed] the constitution" and then foolishly participated in a "violent engagement" consistent with British America's own out-of-doors political traditions.[2053] By late-July, however, newspapers in only three states had reprinted Greenleaf's account, confirming the federalists' political stranglehold over the American press.[2054]

The disastrous riot in Albany, accompanied by Virginia's ratification, applied enough political pressure to New York's antifederalists that John Lansing initiated a targeted discussions of attaching a "Declaration of Rights" to the constitution prior to ratification.[2055] One week later, Melancton Smith conceded the necessity of ratification, but still urged the convention to adopt a temporary stay on the federal congress's taxation and military powers, at least until a national convention had reviewed each state's proposed amendments.[2056] Unwilling to let New York impede America's national objectives for a third time in as many decades, Hamilton admonished Smith's request. The people of New York and all the delegates assembled in Albany should fear the ramifications of ratifying the constitution with any such qualifiers, Hamilton warned, painting a very dark scenario of the possible consequences. Antifederalists' demands might inadvertently exclude New York from the American union and, once excluded, they might subsequently be forced to form "an Alliance with Brittain" to ensure their survival.[2057] Hamilton's hyperbolic rhetoric highlighted the possibility of self-imposed political otherness, sowed fear, and finally wore down Smith. Following the example of his colleagues in Virginia and Massachusetts, Smith endorsed ratification with proposed amendments.[2058] New York then ratified the constitution on July 26, with 30 yeas to 27 nays – the narrowest ratification margin to date.[2059]

In the days that followed, federalists praised New York's "unconditional ratification" while many of the state's own citizens expressed "great joy" at being "admitted to the Union" as the eleventh pillar of its "Federal Edifice" (see Figure 5.2)[2060] The absence of a bill of rights, however, stirred great anxiety among antifederalists, who feared that the American people had enacted a national government with "no proper restrictions of power."[2061] "A Union with our sister states I as ardently wish as any man," one antifederalist professed, yet the constitution had established a flawed system which promised the "certain destruction" of American "liberty."[2062] Resigned to an uncertain and possibly dangerous political future, this antifederalist warned that there are "no advantages, that can arise from a Union, which can compensate the loss of freedom; nor can any evils be apprehended from a disunion, which are so much to be dreaded as tyranny."[2063] For many of the early republic's newly minted citizens, the United States had taken the first, dreadful step towards rejecting the patriotic ideals and bonds of fellow-feeling which had guided their rebellion against the

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[2053] *New York Journal*, July 14, 1788, in *DHRC* 21:1267-1269.
[2054] Ibid.
[2055] "Declaration of Rights," *DHRC* 22:2110-2111.
[2056] *New York Convention Journal*, July 15, 1778, *DHRC* 22:2177-2178.
[2057] "Convention Debates and Proceedings," July 17, 1788, *DHRC* 23:2194.
[2058] "Convention Debates and Proceedings," July 23, 1788, *DHRC* 23:2278.
[2059] "Convention Debates and Proceedings," July 26, 1788, *DHRC* 23:2323-2324.
[2060] George Washington to John Jay, August 3, 1788, *DHRC* 23:2446; Abigail Adams Smith to John Adams, July 27, 1788, *DHRC* 23:2429; *Massachusetts Centinel*, August 2, 1788.
[2061] *Albany Register*, January 5, 1789, *DHRC* 23:2554-2555.
[2062] Ibid.
[2063] Ibid, *DHRC* 23:2558.

British empire. The people of America, antifederalists now feared, stood poised to embrace the civic despotism from which they so recently had gained their independence.



Figure 5.2: "The Eleventh Pillar," *Massachusetts Centinel*, August 2, 1788.
Library of Congress.

Conclusion:

Less than two years before Massachusetts's regulation, Noah Webster published a forty-eight page pamphlet entitled *Sketches of America Policy*.[2064] Under the heading "American states; or the principles of the American Constitutions contrasted with those of European states," Webster observed that there were three primary "principles" which successfully unified "the members of society under some supreme power: a standing army, religion, and fear of an external force."[2065] The terror and horror of external enemies had served, at various moments throughout British America's history, to unite its colonists under federated institutions that promoted their mutual aid and defense. Now, Webster curiously noted, the Confederation lacked all three of these affectively motivating forces: standing armies, "the instrument of tyranny," would "probably never exist in America"; religion would "have little or no influence in preserving the union of the state"; and European nations had "too much business at home, to think of conquering" this fledgling republic.[2066] The American people, Webster concluded, must "find new bonds of union to perpetuate the confederation," overcome the "prejudices between the states," and "harmonize the

[2064] Noah Webster, *Sketches of American Policy* (Hartford: Hudson and Goodwin, 1785); American Antiquarian Society.
[2065] Webster, *Sketches of American Policy*, 30.
[2066] Ibid.

feelings and views of all the citizens."[2067]Only such bonds of national fellow-feeling would allow the United States to truly prosper as an independent republic.

By summer 1787, America's ardent nationalist still believed in Webster's clarion call for a stronger union, yet they had lost all faith in the ability of the *Articles of Confederation* to create such affective bonds. To remedy this problem, fifty-five men assembled in Philadelphia and, after three months, thirty-nine of them brazenly proposed to usurp of America's confederation and replace it with a supremely empowered national government. Federalists from New England to Georgia worked tirelessly to ensure the ratification of their technically treasonous governing document. The *United States Constitution*, however, created a far deeper political problem than the ones it had fixed. Its divisive ratification debates – exemplified in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York – had included vituperative mutual recriminations. Affective rhetoric had forged fellow-feeling between former British colonists. It had created a complex, shared vocabulary of hatred, terror, horror, rage, betrayal, sorrow, love, joy, and hope – one which had worked to brand French colonists, Indigenous and enslaved peoples, British regulars, and imperial loyalists as political others, excluded from membership in America's revolutionary identity. Now, federalists and antifederalists turned these well-tested rhetorical techniques against one another, but with an added dimension – they invoked differences among class-appropriate passions, and thereby attempted to claim that their opponents were unfit for political leadership. Affect itself became the subject of further scrutiny, as political passion eclipsed the revolutionaries' sought-after government of reason.

In other words, the debate over the ratification of the federal constitution unearthed acute veins of disunity that had been woven into America's independent republic over the previous thirty years. Furthermore, the affective rhetorics with which federalists and antifederalists attacked one another only weakened America's fickle, lingering bonds of wartime fellow-feeling. The ratification of the *United States Constitution*, and the implementation of its new federal government, did not "harmonize the feelings and views" of the American people, but rather continued the process of affectively fracturing the early republic's fragile national identity.

[2067] Webster, *Sketches of American Policy*, 45; Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 146-147.

CHAPTER SIX:

"Instead of Feeling as a Nation, a State is Our Country": The Affective Deterioration of Early America's National Identity, 1789-1796

Introduction:

Philadelphia's freezing winds carried ominous news the morning of February 17, 1792.[2068] A thirty-four-year-old lawyer from Dedham, Massachusetts forewarned of an imminent danger that jeopardized the stability of America's constitutional republic.[2069] The crisis of which this congressional representative wrote was neither a new, transatlantic war instigated by Europe's imperial powers, nor the outbreak of either Indigenous or enslaved violence throughout the nation's western borderlands or rural south. Rather, it was the intensifying political strife among the citizens of the United States – the truest harbinger of civil war – that now struck Fisher Ames with terror.

As Ames remarked to his confidant, George Richard Minot, uniting the inhabitants of all fourteen states under a single political identity had proven too difficult, for the seat and influence of the federal "government [was] too far off to gain the affection of the people."[2070] Americans were divided in their sentiments, the representative lamented, and as a result, they now "look[ed] with indifference, often with hatred, fear, and aversion, to the other states." [2071] To make matters worse, national "Faction" had found support in, and sought "reenforcements" from, America's well-established "state factions."[2072] The unity of the America people, Ames concluded, existed only in name and constitutional mechanics, for "Instead of feeling as a nation, a state is our country."[2073] Despite the shared suffering and extensive political efforts of revolutionaries and federalists alike, the citizens of the United States had proven themselves incapable of nurturing the bonds of fellow-feeling necessary to forge, and then maintain, a cohesive, affectively unparalleled, national identity.

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The *Declaration of Independence* and the *United States Constitution* were pivotal in shaping the early republic, yet both documents had failed in one key respect: neither successfully cancelled the prior allegiances, identities, and mutual prejudices held by the American people. Not every British colonist had abandoned his love for and attachment to George III and the British empire in 1776, and not every American citizen had relinquished his state-centered bonds of political affection in 1788. Nor were the inhabitants of the United States prepared to reconsider the politically and socially liminal positions that they had assigned to Indigenous peoples, as well as enslaved, emancipated, and free-born African Americans. Further, the America people worked to bar those of non-British ancestry and those who still suffered from the epithet of imperial loyalist from accessing the rights and benefits of republican citizenship.[2074]

[2068] *The New Pennsylvania Almanac, For the Year 1792* (Philadelphia: Robert Campbell, 1791), 6; New York Public Library.
[2069] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, February 16, 1792, in *The Works of Fisher Ames*, ed., Seth Ames and W.B. Allen (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), 2:912-914.
[2070] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, February 16, 1792, in *Works of Ames*, 2:913.
[2071] Ibid, 2:914.
[2072] Ibid, 2:913.
[2073] Ibid.
[2074] *An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization*, codified much of the race-based exclusionary principles that Americans had propagated in the past thirty-five years through violent, affective political othering. Passed in March 1790, the act only permitted "any Alien being a free white person" from completing the process to become a citizen of the United States. The act, however, did permit individual state legislatures to naturalize those individuals who did not have an explicit pathway through this law. *An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization* (New York: Francis Childs and John Swain, 1790); American Antiquarian Society.

For the purposes of identity construction, the exclusive category of citizenship in America's early republic is best understood as a form of "political action," in which "[i]ndividuals participating in the public sphere define the nature of citizenship through the fulfillment of specific responsibilities."[2075] Those deemed fit to exercise, and thereby access the benefits of, political action citizenship within the United States were mostly white men, often of English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish decent. Demographic homogeneity, however, did little to minimize tension within the early republic. Rather, when proponents of the federal constitution forced the creation of an affectively distant, powerful national government, they further exposed the glaring regional and ideological differences that existed among the citizens of America's tenuously united states.

The political division that simmered under America's confederated republic reached a rolling boil during the presidency of George Washington. The fissures which emerged within America's constitutional republic were direct responses to the diplomatic, economic, and social crises of the 1790s. Concrete factors – negotiating foreign treaties with France and Britain, enforcing new national taxation laws, determining the most appropriate titles to bequeath upon the executive office – instigated seismic changes within the United States' political culture. The impact and longevity of these ruptures, however, arose from the acute application of those affective rhetorics, violent acts of political othering, and exclusionary patriotic ethics that British Americans had spent the past forty-years practicing and perfecting. Impassioned discourse had become so engrained in the early republic's political culture that, by 1789, political elites no longer had to teach the American people how to assign values within their regional affective economies. Rather, America's elite only had to refer or allude to the historical objects themselves to elicit an emotional response.

These rhetorical short-cuts, however, came at a cost. Politicians often miscalculated the responses that their affective discourse would elicit, as they failed to comprehend that the American people lacked a national character. Hence, objective-based affective rhetorics inadvertently permitted misinterpretation and even oppositional sabotage. These political blunders reaffirmed the intrinsic disunity that underlay America's national identity. This final chapter, therefore, explores the divisive dynamics within Washington's inaugural executive cabinet and the federal congress, particularly their inability to establish an affective political identity powerful enough to overcome the blatant discord that plagued the early republic. It further questions whether it would have even been possible to construct and maintain a cohesive national identity within America's contentious political culture.

The *United States Constitution* fomented national division, and this chapter begins by exploring how fierce disagreements erupted in New York City among members of the federal government. Despite their ambitious goal of national unification and stability, neither the executive nor the legislative branches proved capable of collectively overcoming either their regional interests or personal ideologies.[2076] Representatives bitterly argued over which national taxes to lay upon the republic's citizens. Senators fiercely debated the appropriateness of honorific titles of America's chief executive, a battle further exacerbated by the enthusiastic, yet wholly unwelcome participation of Vice President John Adams. In these instances, the irreconcilable differences that had crystallized during America's civil war for independence became only more apparent, as they now were amplified within the structures and strictures of America's centrally located federal government.

[2075] Cohen and Ghosh, *Citizenship*, 21.

[2076] Washington's initial executive appointments were as follows: from Massachusetts – Henry Knox as Secretary of War; from Virginia – Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State and Edmund Randolph as Attorney General; from New York – Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of Treasury and John Jay as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Finally, Vice-President John Adams hailed from Massachusetts. For an excellent collection of minibiographies for each of these appointees, as well as astute analysis of Washington's rationale for each appointment, see Lindsay M. Chervinsky, *The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution* (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 2020), 56-87.

Legislative conflicts over taxation and titles, unfortunately, set a combative political tone for Washington's first presidential term. Fissures within America's constitutional bedrock deepened as the members of the president's executive cabinet fought both amongst themselves and with the House of Representatives over the economic and diplomatic future of the United States. Antagonism between Alexander Hamilton's federalists and James Madison and Thomas Jefferson's republicans not only stymied the smooth operation of the federal government, but birthed America's first political parties.[2077] By late-1792, the animosity and distrust that America's nascent parties felt for one another had come to dominate the early republic's national affective discourse.[2078]

This fluctuating political topography reignited fears of unrestrained democracy among America's federalists. To counter this perceived threat, American federalists – led by Hamilton – began to deploy "rhetorics of 'enemyship.'"[2079] This term, coined by Jeremy Engels, refers to a "mutual antagonism," often achieved through a "solidarity of fear, a community of spite, a kinship in arms, and a brotherhood of hatred," in contrast to friendship, which relies upon the bonds of "mutual affection."[2080] Engels argues that federalists deployed their rhetoric of enemyship to hinder popular, democratic inclinations through three affective mechanisms: first, transform the common people into "enemies" of the republic; second, "engage in a politics of distraction and displacement" to direct "citizen anger" against groups identified as enemies; and last, forge an environment of "fear" which emphasized the need for "obedience, hierarchy, and authority against democratic demands for equality."[2081] Federalists acted on these strategies, targeting people who ostensibly had fallen prey to the whims of democracy, depicting them as "barbarian, savage, crazy, disobedient, and uncivilized."[2082] Hamilton's proto-political party thereby entrapped America's national identity in dangerous, incompatible rhetorics of "antithesis."[2083]

Engels insightful scholarship, however, misses one very important observation: this affective, counter-revolutionary rhetoric of enemyship was not an American invention, but rather had been derived from British conventions.[2084] These rhetorics had acquired their power and influence only because of eighteenth-century British America's preestablished, and very successful, violent culture of political othering. The proven success of affective rhetorics to dehumanize French colonists, Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, British regulars, imperial loyalists – and now even antifederalists – laid the foundation for Alexander Hamilton and his fellow federalists' volatile assault against the political whims and interested passions of the common American people.

Without an external threat to the United States – a discernable, powerful, and dangerous political other against whom the American people might unite – federalists and republicans turned

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[2077] For a detailed analysis of the emergence of the ideological feud between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison that helped lay the foundations for the birth of opposition political parties within the United States, see Drew R. McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 136-166.

[2078] Fisher Ames's letter to George Minot in February 1792 aligned with James Madison's work to consolidate the political faction arising within the United States into two political parties; see below, 47-53.

[2079] Engels, *Enemyship*, 3.

[2080] Ibid, 13.

[2081] Ibid, 28.

[2082] Ibid, 31.

[2083] Ibid, 31.

[2084] Engels observes that America's elite – Jefferson in particular – believed that the nation's revolutionary spirit might be channeled into making constant new laws for the nation. This idealistic hope of perpetual, civic revolution failed to manifest, partially due to the framers of the *United States Constitution* rejecting such impermanent and flexible foundations for their national government. Federalists, Engels concludes, developed and applied their rhetoric of enemyship to secure the ratification of the *United States Constitution*, and it is at this moment when such vitriolic, partisan language became endemic to the political culture of the American people; see Engels, *Enemyship*, 9-17.

their vicious affective rhetorics inward, assaulting each other's civic policies and personal character. Neither political party intended to destabilize the United States, but both further fractured an already divided nation. To demonstrate the debilitating effects of partisan discourse upon America's national identity, the second-half of this chapter analyzes three of the early republic's definitive political crises: the Neutrality Crisis of 1793, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, and the ratification of the *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* in 1796.[2085] Though these were vastly different political conflicts, each reaffirmed the discord festering within the federal government, and thus further frayed the American people's already threadbare cords of national fellow-feeling.[2086] When Washington left the presidency in 1797, America's affective, exclusionary rhetoric had become endemic to the nation's political culture, and thereby became the core methodology by which federalists and republicans politically branded one another. Each called the other ideological turncoats, and thereby proclaimed themselves the true, disinterested stewards of the early republic's revolutionary, patriotic ideals. Ironically, one of the greatest legacies of the Washington administration was that it had expedited the affective deterioration of the early republic. Those, like Fisher Ames, who had the political acumen to see the disunity festering among the American people, were forced to recognize a somber truth: the bonds of affection and political attachment which tethered the citizens of the United States to one another, and to their early republic, remained just as unstable and impermanent as those which had tethered the British colonists to their fellow subjects, to their king, and to their once beloved empire.[2087]

"Emotions of the Most Affecting Kind" – Erecting America's New Republic:

To finalize the bloodless coup which overthrew America's confederation and ratified the *United States Constitution*, the citizens of the United States needed to select their first president. The Confederation Congress desired a swift transition and, six weeks after the adjournment of New York's ratification convention, they passed a national election guidance law. To participate in the election of America's chief executive, each state had to appoint its presidential electors by no later than January 7, who then would assemble in their respective state capitals and vote for the president on February 4.[2088] Only eleven of British America's thirteen rebellious colonies had secured the right to participate in this election, as neither North Carolina nor Rhode Island had ratified the federal constitution.[2089] To complicate matters further, New York – the habitual problem state of America's collective governance – failed to appoint its electors before January 7, and thus did not participate.[2090] The first president of the United States, therefore, would be chosen by electors representing only eighty-percent of free white men sixteen and older, or to put another way, less than twenty-one-percent of the inhabitants of America's constitutional republic.[2091]

[2085] For narrative summaries of each of these conflicts, see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, *The Age of Federalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For the European Neutrality Crisis and the Genêt affair, see 330-354; for the Whiskey Rebellion, see 461-489; for the ratification of Jay's Treaty, see 406-449.

[2086] Leonard and Cornell, *The Partisan Republic*, 4-6, 42ff.

[2087] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 489.

[2088] September 13, 1788, in *JCC*, 34:522-523; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 33.

[2089] North Carolina did not ratify the *United States Constitution* until November 1789, and Rhode Island until May 1790, see Maier, *Ratification*, 457-458.

[2090] New York's failure arose from the feud between its antifederalist controlled state assembly, and federalist controlled state senate; see *Documentary History of the First Federal Election, 1788-1790*, ed., Gordon DenBoer, et al (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 3:197.

[2091] The total population of free white males within the United States, who were 16 years of age or older in 1790, was 813,365. New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island's population of the same demographic were as follows: 83,700; 69,988; and 16,019. The population of the United States circa 1790, including Vermont, Kentucky, and the western territories, was approximately 3.94 million. The electors which chose George Washington as the first president of the

Little doubt, however, surrounded the election's outcome. When the electors convened on February 4, they unanimously chose George Washington to serve as President of the United States.[2092] Despite the endorsement of his colleagues, Washington remained reluctant to accept this political honor and personal burden. Exhausted from his past thirty-five years of public service, the Virginian had scoffed at any suggestions of his election.[2093] To an overly enthusiastic Hamilton, Washington confessed his fear that accepting the presidency would lead to accusations of "inconsistency and ambition."[2094] Washington's "great and sole desire," he admitted, was "to love and live, in peace and retirement, on [his] own farm" for the remaining years of his life.[2095] Even so, Washington conceded that his "conviction of duty" would compel him "to take an active part in public affairs," if the presidency fell upon his shoulders.[2096] Washington's hypothetical dilemma became a reality on April 14, when he received official documentation from the newly convened federal congress that certified his election.[2097] Disinterested duty trumped private desire and the president-elect began his journey to the republic's capital, New York City, on April 16.[2098]

Popular adoration of President Washington spread like wildfire in late-April. While New York's citizens had not been represented in America's first presidential election, they expressed universal "joy and satisfaction" at Washington's "safe arrival" on April 24.[2099] As the fifty-seven-year-old veteran processed into the city, women stood "at the windows" of their home and "wave[d] their handkerchiefs, threw flowers before him, and shed tears of joy and congratulation."[2100] Fisher Ames observed, with "very strong emotion," that "no man ever had so fair a claim to veneration" as America's president-elect.[2101] New York's most impassioned patriots even composed an ode to Washington: "Far let America /Thy praise resound/ Joy to our native land!/Let ev'ry heart expand,/For Washington's at hand./With Glory crown'd!"[2102] "Your CHIEF advances," the ballad

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United States, therefore, represented less than 21% of those living under the authority of America's national republic. This percentage, however, is inherently too high, as the census which the United States conducted in 1791 did not accurately or consistently record those Indigenous peoples living within the thirteen United States, Vermont, Kentucky, or the western territories. For this information, see United States Census Office, *Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States* (Philadelphia: Childs and Swaine, 1791), 3; American Antiquarian Society; Thomas Jefferson, "Report on Census," October 24, 1791, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 22:227-228.

[2092] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, March 1, 1789, in *Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 236-237; U.S. *House Journal* 1789. 1st Cong. 1st. Sess. April 6. Some, however, expressed concern at the unquestionable political power that George Washington would wield as president. Thomas Jefferson privately bemoaned that a prominent "defect" within the *United States Constitution* was the absence of presidential term limits. Jefferson worried that "the perpetual re-eligibility of the same president, will probably not be cured during the life of General Washington. His merit has blinded our countrymen to the dangers of making so important an officer re-eligible. I presume there will not be a vote against him in the U.S." Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, August 12, 1788, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 13:502.

[2093] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 46-49. Through his resignation as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army in 1783, Washington had already modeled his civic life after the Roman Cincinnatus, as he had turned his "Sword into a ploughshare" and retired from public life once his country no longer required his services. For an account of Cincinnatus's retirement and reluctant return to public service, see Livy, *The Early History of Rome*, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 3.26-29.

[2094] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, August 28, 1788, in *DHRC*, 18:352-353.

[2095] Ibid.

[2096] George Washington to Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette, January 29, 1789, in *Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series*, ed., W. W. Abbott, et al. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987), 1:263.

[2097] Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 124-125.

[2098] Ibid.

[2099] Boston's *Independent Chronicle*, April 30, 1789; *Boston Gazette*, May 4, 1789.

[2100] Eliza S.M Qunicy, *Memoir of the Life of Eliza S.M. Qunicy* (Boston: John Wilson and Son, 1861), 50-51; American Antiquarian Society.

[2101] Fisher Ames to William Tudor, April 26, 1789, in *DHFFC*, 15:365.

[2102] Boston's *Independent Chronicle*, April 30, 1789; *Boston Gazette*, May 4, 1789; *New-York Journal and Patriotic Register*, April 30, 1789.

continued, America's "matchless Hero," who gave you "Liberty" with some "gen'rous" aid from France."[2103] The ode then concluded with an optimistic promise for the future of the United States: its people will trade "the din of arms" for "Olive's charms," will nurture a republic "Unsully'd by a throne," and will appoint as their chief executive the "much lov'd Washington,/The Great, the Good!"[2104] A humble leader, born of the crucibles of suffering and civil war, the exalted Washington stood poised to fulfill the promise of America's late-revolution and lead the United States into an era of peace and glory.

The morning of April 30, 1789, crowds of New Yorkers gathered to watch Washington's carriage arrive at Federal Hall, where he took the presidential oath of office before members of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and most importantly, the republic's citizens.[2105] Met with "universal shouts of joy and welcome," Washington solemnly swore to protect and serve both the United States and its federal constitution, and then retired to the Senate chamber to give his first *Inaugural Address*. Beyond "establishing the functions of the executive branch," the President of the United States knew that his first official speech needed to revive the flickering embers of national fellow-feeling.[2106] Patriotic, political attachment first to the *Articles of Confederation,* and now to the *United States Constitution*, had been and still remained weak. Political affection still remained strongest between inhabitants of individual states, which cohered around either regional interest or ideological concurrence.[2107] To begin the process of strengthening national attachment, Washington emphasized and exhibited the political affection which all Americans must feel towards their republic and towards *all* of their fellow citizens.[2108]

Boldly, Washington began his address with a humble admission: "no event could have filled [him] with greater anxieties" than his election to the office of the president.[2109] Despite being "summoned by [his] Country, whose voice" he "never hear[d] but with veneration and love," Washington understood not only the "magnitude and difficulty of the trust" with which the American people had bestowed him, but also his "own deficiencies."[2110] Through this unflinching depiction of his own anxieties and self-perceived weaknesses, Washington transformed himself from the towering Virginian – in moral character, political reputation, and physical presence – into a simple American, ready to answer the call of his nation and fulfill his civic duty to the republic. Amid this "conflict of emotions" – a tension of love and fear – Washington stated that his "affectionate sensibility" for the "confidence of [his] fellow-citizens" had given him the courage necessary to accept this challenging honor.[2111] Humbling himself before the federal congress and the people of the United States, Washington offered a preemptive defense for any mistakes that he

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[2103] Boston's *Independent Chronicle*, April 30, 1789; *Boston Gazette*, May 4, 1789; *New-York Journal and Patriotic Register*, April 30, 1789..

[2104] Ibid.

[2105] "Dairy of Tobias Lear, April 30, 1789," in *The Writings of George Washington; Being His Correspondence, Addresses, Messages, and Other Papers, Official and Private, Selected and Published from the Original Manuscripts*, ed., James Sparks. (Boston, 1833–1837), 10:463-464; U.S. *House Journal*. 1789. 1st Cong. 1st Sess. May 1.

[2106] Chervinsky, *The Cabinet,* 126.

[2107] Pears, *Cords of Affection*, 28-29

[2108] George Washington, *First Inaugural Address*, April 30, 1789, in *Papers of GW, Pres. Ser.* 2:173-177. The *New York Daily Advertiser* and *New-York Packet* reprinted Washington's address, in its entirety, on May 1, 1789, after which it quickly disseminated throughout the republic, and by May 11 it had been printed in the following newspapers: *Gazette of the United States* (New York), *New York Daily Gazette*, *Massachusetts Spy*, *New York Journal*, Boston's *Independent Chronicle*, *Boston Gazette*. For an excellent analysis of the delivery, cultural impact, and political legacy and memory of Washington's *First Inaugural Address*, see Stephen Howard Browne, *The First Inauguration: George Washington and the Invention of the Republic* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, Press, 2020), 107-167.

[2109] Washington, *First Inaugural Address*, *Papers of GW, Pres. Ser.* 2:173.

[2110] Ibid.

[2111] Ibid, 2:173-174.

might make as president. Simultaneously, the Virginian exhibited his own belief that every American citizen must be ready to confront their fears, sacrifice of themselves, and do what was necessary to protect the republic which they all so deeply loved.

After reflecting upon the immense power of both personal fear and national love, Washington assured his audience that "no local prejudices, or attachments; no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage of communities and interests."[2112] Rather than succumb to the division wrought by self-interest, Washington promised that "the foundations of [America's] National policy" would be "laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality" and "the pre-eminence of a free Government." By adhering to such values, the federal republic would "win the affections of its Citizens, and command the respect of the world."[2113] Motivated by political disinterest and an "ardent love for [his] Country," Washington believed that the United States would grow into a nation rooted in the "indissoluble union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy, and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity."[2114] Unable to carry this burden alone, Washington concluded with a strategic call-to-arms: "the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the Republican model of Government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people."[2115] The United States could only fulfill the political promise of its recent revolution by fostering unbreakable bonds of national fellow-feeling. Only then might America become the envy of the Atlantic world.

Fisher Ames was "entranced" by Washington's humility, tenor of voice, and awe for his executive responsibilities, and his speech "produced emotions of the most affecting kind upon the members" of Congress.[2116] The same sentiments circulated beyond New York City. Print copies of Washington's *Inaugural Address* transformed his brief speech into a compact with the American people who, like their president, now must embrace their civic duty and their affectionate commitment to one another.[2117] "A National Spirit distinguishes and adorns the present age," reported Boston's *Independent Chronicle* on May 14.[2118] Washington's rhetoric of disinterested national love, combined with his "dignity" and "affability," had engendered the trust of the American people, who now believe that the federal government would promote "local interests" *only* if they aligned with "NATIONAL PRINCIPLES," and thereby "advance[d] the happiness and prosperity of the Union."[2119] The "spirit of devotion, modesty, patriotism, firmness, and integrity" exhibited in the *Inaugural Address*, Jeremy Belknap concluded, had proven Washington the "greatest and best man that ever appeared at the head of any nation," at least since the biblical reigns of "Moses and Joshua."[2120] Americans' affection for President Washington, and by proxy for the republic he led, mirrored the historic, rhetorical, and cultural impact of the near-universal adoration that British colonists once felt for General James Wolfe; of the unbridled, popular joy that emanated from

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[2112] Washington, *First Inaugural Address*, *Papers of GW, Pres. Ser.*, 2:175.
[2113] Ibid, 2:175.
[2114] Ibid.
[2115] Ibid.
[2116] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 3, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames* 1:568.
[2117] Washington also took official tours throughout New England, Long Island, and the southern states during his first term as president. A grueling undertaking for the fifty-six-year-old, two war veteran, Washington believed this a necessary step both to strengthen the bonds of national fellow-feeling and to exhibit to the American populace that the chief executive officer was the living embodiment selfless nationalism; see Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 142-168.
[2118] Boston's *Independent Chronicle*, May 14, 1789.
[2119] Ibid; Abigail Adams to Mary Smith Cranch, July 12, 1789, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 8:388-389.
[2120] Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, May 8, 1789, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 3:124.

Parliament's repeal of the hated stamp tax; and the of political pride which swelled in American insurgents' upon declaring their independence from George III.

Invested with the powers and responsibilities of the presidency, and buoyed by the American people's support, Washington began staffing the executive branch.[2121] By early-September 1789, the president had received congressional approval to create three executive departments, which would respectively manage foreign affairs, the federal treasury, and matters of war.[2122] "I anticipate that one of the most difficult & delicate parts of the duty of my office," Washington wrote to Virginian Edward Rutledge, "will be that which relates to the nominations for appointments," the most personal of which were his cabinet secretaries.[2123] Initially conceived as an advisory entity that, antithetical to Britain's Privy Council, would not convene for in-person meetings, the executive cabinet presented a unique challenge for Washington. The president believed that the proper management of these civic departments was of "infinite consequence to the present and future happiness of the Citizens of the United States."[2124] Political pragmatism no doubt guided Washington's decision to staff his cabinet with advisors from New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts – three states whose support the federal government required to survive. The president, who felt like a "culprit…going to the place of his execution," desired men – or rather co-conspirators – whom he personally trusted to help him carry the solemn burden of his office.[2125]

For Secretary of the Treasury, Washington appointed his former aide-de-camp Alexander Hamilton, a New Yorker whose "Patriotism, Integrity, and Abilities" the president held in "special Trust and Confidence."[2126] Washington chose the experienced Virginia diplomat and drafter of the *Declaration of Independence*, Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, asserting that "no person" would "better execute the Duties."[2127] For Secretary of War, Washington requested that Henry Knox of Massachusetts, a close wartime confidant, continue to perform the office's duties, as he had done for America's federated congress.[2128] Finally, Washington chose "one of the fittest characters to expound the law, and dispense justice" as Attorney General: friend and fellow Virginian Edmund

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[2121] Washington did not finish filling his executive cabinet until January 1790, with Thomas Jefferson's appointment as Secretary of State, and Washington did not convene the cabinet to an official, in-person meeting until November 26, 1791. George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, January 21, 1790, *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 5:30; Chervinsky, 4. One of the first inclinations of the necessity of in-person cabinet meetings, however, occurred on April 4, 1791, when Washington was preparing for a tour of the southern states. Writing collectively to Hamilton, Jefferson, and Knox, Washington instructed them that it was his express "wish, if any serious and important cases should arise during [his] absence, (of which the probability is but too strong) that the Secretaries for the Departments of State, Treasury, and War may hold consultations thereon, to determine whether they are of such a nature as to require [his] personal attendance at the seat of government—and, if they should be so considered, [he] will return immediately from any place at which the information may reach [him]." George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Henry Knox, April 4, 1791, *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 8:59-60

[2122] U.S. *House Journal.* 1789. 1st Cong. 1st Sess. May 21. For the creation of each department within the House of representatives, see June 24, June 27, and July 2; for the president signing each departmental bill into law, see July 27, August 7, September 2.

[2123] George Washington to Edmund Randolph, May 5, 1789, in *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 2:218.

[2124] George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, January 21, 1790, *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 5:30. Washington makes a similar claim to Edmund Randolph, stating that the "arrangement of the judicial department [was] essential to the happiness of our country and to the stability of its' political system," see George Washington to Edmund Randolph, September 28, 1789, in *Papers of GW, Pres. Ser* 4:107. Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 96-99, 112.

[2125] George Washington to Henry Knox, April 1, 1789, in *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 2:2-3; Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 150; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 54.

[2126] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, September 11, 1789, in *Papers Hamilton*, 26:481-482. Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 82-87.

[2127] George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, January 21, 1790, *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 5:30; Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 75-82

[2128] George Washington to Henry Knox, May 9, 1789, in *Papers of GW*, *Pres. Ser.* 3:239; Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 57-67

Randolph.[2129] The president's recommendation that John Jay serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the election of John Adams as the republic's first vice-president ensured that all three states held an equal number of high-ranking federal appointments.[2130]

The almost year-long process of creating the executive cabinet, however, did little to resolve the most pressing threats to the stability of America's national government: political self-interest. Five-days before Washington's inauguration, Fisher Ames regretted the dangerous, "fiery zeal" of "intemperate party spirit" among both the national and individual state legislatures.[2131] Much as James Madison observed in *Federalist 10*, Ames understood the inherent difficulty of "giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."[2132] Unlike his Virginian colleague, however, the Massachusetts lawyer believed that political faction and regional loyalties would not limit the tyrannical ambitions of an unchecked political majority. Instead, he believed it provided an avenue by which individual states might "disturb the [national] tranquility" and "endanger the rights" of America's "citizens."[2133] Ames "hope[d]" that the people of the United States might begin to "think and act as a nation," yet he soon realized that the arduous tasks of governing America's disparate eleven (soon to be fourteen) states held as much power to divide as it did to unite.[2134]

Dangerous Interests – The House of Representatives & the Molasses Tax Controversy:

Upon his arrival in New York City in early-March 1789, Fisher Ames began to moderate his expectations for the efficacy of America's first federal congress. When the House of Representatives reached a quorum on April 1, Ames found himself surrounded by men who had "experience, the virtues of the heart, and the habits of business."[2135] Ames admired their political aptitude and moral character, but confessed that he was "rather less awed and terrified at the sight" of his fellow legislators than he initially expected, observing that there were only a "few shinning geniuses"

[2129] George Washington to Edmund Randolph, September 28, 1789, in *Papers of GW, Pres. Ser* 4:107; Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 67-75.

[2130] Although Washington ensured that the Justices of the Supreme Court represented six states, he awarded the position of Chief Justice to John Jay, citing "the love which [Jay] bear[s] his Country" as justification; see George Washington to John Jay, October 5, 1789, in *Papers of GW, Pres. Ser.* 4:137.Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 54. James Madison informed Thomas Jefferson in October 1788 that he found it "impossible to say" whether John Adams or John Hancock, the two presumed nominees for vice president, "would be preferred, or what other candidates may be brought forward." This ambivalence towards both John Adams and the vice-presidency further revealed itself in the final electoral tally for 1789. While Washington received a unanimous sixty-nine electoral votes for the office of the president, the electoral votes for the Vice-President were divided among eleven candidates, with the victorious John Adams receiving thirty-four. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 8, 1788, in *Papers Madison*, 11:2376-277; U.S. *House Journal* 1789. 1st Cong. 1st. Sess. April 6. In a private letter of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison astutely predicted the political logic of Washington's selection of executive officers: "It is already agreed in the form of resolutions that there shall be three departments one for finance, another for foreign affairs, and the third for war. The last will be continued in the hands of General Knox. The second will remain with Mr. Jay, if he chooses to keep it. The first is also to be under one head, though to be branched out in such a manner as will check the administration. Chancelor [Robert R.] Livingston wishes this department but will not succeed. It will be given I think to Jay or Hamilton. The latter is perhaps best qualified for that species of business and on that account would be preferred by those who know him personally. The latter is more known by character throughout the U.S. I have been asked whether any appointment at home would be agreeable to you. Being unacquainted with your mind I have not ventured on an answer." See James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 27, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:185-187.

[2131] Fisher Ames to William Tudor, April 25, 1789, in *DHFFC*, 15:351.

[2132] *Federalist 10*, *New York Daily Advertiser*, November 22, 1787, in *DHRC*, 14:176.

[2133] Ibid, 178-179; Fisher Ames to William Tudor, April 25, 1789, in *DHFFC*, 15:351.

[2134] Ibid. Vermont became the fourteenth state to ratify the *United States Constitution* in May 1791; Maier, *Ratification*, 459.

[2135] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, April 4, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:563; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 389-390.

among them.[2136] Wryly, Ames confessed that anyone who "expected a Roman senate" would be "disappointed." [2137] The antifederalists would soon "laugh at their own fears" that the *United States Constitution* had the power to bring forth a legislature of tyrants.[2138] Though he was a strong judge of character, Ames made one grave misstep in this initial assessment, as claimed that the House of Representatives contained, "for the most part," no "men of intrigue."[2139] While the House's representatives strove to fulfill their responsibilities under a republican ethos of political action citizenship, Ames soon learned that its members held very different definitions of what those responsibilities were, and to whom they were owed.

The specters of intrigue, avarice, and regional interest swiftly emerged within the proposals of Ames's own federalist colleague: James Madison. Standing before his fellow representatives on April 9, Madison advocated that congress impose import and tonnage duties on foreign commodities and trading vessels entering America's harbors.[2140] Most federalists, including Ames, supported the republic's newly granted power to raise necessary revenue through taxation.[2141] Furthermore, New England would benefit greatly from prohibitive tonnage duties, as it would encourage citizens of the southern states to purchase commodities from American merchants.[2142] At first blush, it seemed as though the federal legislature might pass its first taxation bill with ease.

Discord, however, consumed the House when it began debating the individual taxation rates for each enumerated commodity. "It is agreed I presume," Madison began on April 14, "that spirits of every kind are proper objects of taxation."[2143] Accordingly, the Virginian charged his fellow representatives with deciding whether they should tax the "spirits" themselves or "the article" which produces them.[2144] To "avoid a more disagreeable measure" and the consternation of the American people, Madison suggested that they place import duties upon the raw commodities themselves, and therefore suggested transferring the eight-cent duty on rum to molasses.[2145]

Terrified of the Virginian's inconsiderate and dangerous proposition, Fisher Ames rose in opposition to the eight-cent molasses tax. Though he supported the House's right to tax an "article of luxury" or "pretty general consumption," Ames believed that such duties must "fall equally upon all."[2146] No other enumerated commodity had been laid with a tax equal to fifty-percent of its market value.[2147] Furthermore, Ames and New Yorker John Laurence argued that it was the responsibility of the House to legislate with sympathy for their most vulnerable constituents. If the House taxed molasses as a luxury, both men concluded, the prohibitive eight-cent duty would deprive "the poorer classes of citizens" of a much-needed foodstuff.[2148] Fisher Ames, however, further observed that this proposed molasses tax now threatened Massachusetts's rum distillers with "sudden" and "certain ruin," as it made imported European rum cheaper than that produced within the United

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[2136] Ames to Minot, April 4, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:563-564.
[2137] Ibid.
[2138] Ibid.
[2139] Ibid, 1:563.
[2140] Madison, April 9, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:69-74.
[2141] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 64
[2142] Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 391-392.
[2143] Madison, April 14, 1789, in *Papers of Madison* 12:80.
[2144] Ibid.
[2145] Ibid.
[2146] Ames, April 14, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:589; *Gazette of the United States*, April 15, 1789; *New York Daily Advertiser*, April 16, 1789.
[2147] Ibid.
[2148]Ames, April 14, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:589-592; Thomas Lloyd, "Notes of the First House of Representatives," April 14, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 10:96-97, 102-103; *Gazette of the United States*, April 15, 1789; *New York Daily Advertiser*, April 16, 1789. Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 392.

States.[2149] Lastly, Ames concluded, the relatively exorbitant tax would make it impossible for New England's fisheries to profitably trade their poor-quality cod for West Indian molasses.[2150]

Fearful of the "deadly wound" that the House's excessive and discriminatory tax might inflict upon New England, Ames appealed to "national prudence," arguing that such a blow to one-fourth of the American economy would jeopardize the republic's "very existence."[2151] Ames emphatic pleas, however, secured only a two-cent reduction. For the next two weeks, consensus-minded representatives belabored Ames's arguments. Benjamin Goodhue and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts not only condemned the devasting impact of the molasses duty upon their state's fisheries, but also observed that 180 cents of molasses duties per annum was too high a burden for any man, let alone a poorer fisherman.[2152] Peter Silvester of New York concurred that the molasses tax must at least be reduced to five cents per gallon, lest it "bear hard on any class of citizen, especially the poorer class."[2153] Invocations of collective suffering, however, failed to stir those aligned with Madison's proposal, and the molasses duty remained unchanged.

Frustrated with his colleagues interest and obstinacy, George Thacher posed a dangerous, explosive question to the House: "[s]uppose a member from Massachusetts was to propose an impost on negroes, what would you hear from the Southern gentlemen, if fifty dollars was the sum to be laid?"[2154] Thacher's hypothetical scenario directly violated Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the *United States Constitution*, which prohibited laying a "tax or duty" greater than "ten dollars" upon any enslaved person imported to America.[2155] Ignoring the illegality of his statement, Thacher pressed forward, reminding his colleagues that such a tax would have a relatively lower value "than the proportion laid upon molasses," and thereby implied the unconstitutionality, at least in principle, of the six-cent molasses duty.[2156] Thacher, through his impassioned rhetoric, attempted to illustrate to Madison (and his allies) that this tax was irresponsible, as it would harm a great portion of the American populace. Further, Thacher believed that the interest, and possibly avarice, with which his fellow members acted was antithetical to the disinterested emotions which he and his fellow New Englanders believed to be both inherent and necessary to consensus, political action citizenship.

Mortified at Thacher's assault upon both the southern states' enslaved labor economy and the constitution itself, Madison dismissed the speech as it neither expressing "the deliberate temper of [Thacher's] own mind, [n]or the good sense of his constituents."[2157] Madison's refusal to engage with the merits Thacher's economic argument did not spare him from accusations of fiscal hypocrisy. "The gentleman from Virginia," Ames began, "fears the loss of revenue from the success" of rum manufacturing.[2158] If loss of revenue was Madison's primary concern, Ames angrily posited, then why did he "ingeniously urge" for a "discrimination in favor of the brandy of

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[2149] Ames, April 14, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:591.
[2150] Ames, April 14, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:589-592; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 392.
[2151] Ibid.
[2152] "Congressional Register," April 27, 1789, in *DHFFC*, 10:334, 337. Elbridge Gerry concluded that the average fisherman annually used approximately twelve gallons of molasses "while engaged in his occupation," whereas his family used another eighteen, resulting in the 180 cents molasses duty per year.
[2153] "Congressional Register," April 27, 1789, in *DHFFC*, 10:338.
[2154] George Thacher, April 28, 1789, in *The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States*, ed., Joseph Gales (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834-1856), 1:215; Thomas Lloyd, "Notes of the First House of Representatives," April 28, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 10:339-340. Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 394.
[2155] See Article I, Section 9 in *United States Constitution* in *DHRC* 1:310; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 394.
[2156] George Thacher, April 28, 1789, *Debates and Proceedings of the Congress*, 1:215; Thomas Lloyd, "Notes of the First House of Representatives," April 28, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 10:339-340.
[2157] Madison, April 28, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:114.
[2158] Ames, April 28, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:594.

France."[2159] For Ames, the abhorrent yet obvious answer was regional interest. It is "well known that a great proportion" of the American people did not consume "genteel" brandy, which often "affect[ed] disgust and loathing at [its] very name."[2160] Comparatively, "No decent family can do without something by way of sweetening; whether this arise from custom, or necessity of nature."[2161] If his colleagues "admitted," that molasses was "a requisite for the support of life," then taxing it would be as "repugnant to the first principles" of America's moral economy as would be "a tax on bread."[2162] The "House will not suppose," Ames fervently concluded, that the representatives of New England "are actuated by local interests in opposing a measure" of such "dangerous consequences to the existence of the Union."[2163] Rather, the "the interests of particular states," – in this case New England – served to "increases the general welfare" of the United States, as the republic would benefit from a healthy, robust northern economy not inhibited by a six penny molasses duty.[2164] Ames's appeal to reduce the molasses tax to one-cent per gallon arose from a rare compatibility of both regional interest and "national principles," and therefore was antithetical to Madison's avaricious protection of French brandy, which only benefitted the acquired tastes of the south's planter elite.

Amid these debates, both Ames and Madison began to question the other's status as a disinterested citizen of the United States, precisely because of the other's perceived unwillingness to fulfill his political action responsibilities. To drive their points home, they engaged the rhetorics of "enemyship" by accusing one another of considering himself a more disinterested, and therefore morally superior, human being. While Ames accused his Virginian colleagues of regional interest, questioning his patriotic attachment to the republic, Madison berated Ames's haughty, self-righteous, and near-aristocratic demeanor. "Are the northern people made of finer clay," Madison sarcastically asked his fellow representatives, or do "their breasts burn with a more generous ardor for their rights as men, or for their country's happiness and glory?"[2165] Did the men of Massachusetts really believe their own patriotism, their own love of country and fellow-man, to be greater than those who hailed from the first colony to decry Parliament's stamp tax? To defuse Madison and Ames's escalating feud, Peter Silvester proposed that the House derive a "middle course" and resolve the duty "by way of compromise," aware that neither Massachusetts nor Virginia's representatives would concede.[2166]

Madison's rage-fueled accusations of moral superiority shook Ames, who hastily apologized for the use "of any language [that] injure[d] any gentleman's feelings," as he never meant "to infer that the people of Massachusetts possessed any excellence over their southern brethren," whose "hearts beat with equal warmth" as his own.[2167] To avoid a regional schism within the federal congress, Ames shifted towards strengthening the now weakened bonds of fellow-feeling within the House and reassured Madison that "the most cordial regard subsisted on the part of the citizens of

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[2159] Ames, April 28, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:594.
[2160] Ibid.
[2161] Ibid, 1:598.
[2162] Ibid; for a detailed analysis of the power of a "moral economy" within eighteenth century British political culture, see E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" *Past and Present* 50 (1971): 76-136.
[2163] Ames, April 28, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames* 1:600.
[2164] Ibid, 1:594.
[2165] Madison, April 28, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:119
[2166] "Congressional Register," April 28, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 10:380.
[2167] Ames, April 28, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:600. Ames's declaration was likely sincere, as he later confided to Minot that he never held "contempt" in his "heart" for James Madison, but rather lamented the "error" and "mischief" to which the Virginian representative directed his "great knowledge and merit"; Fisher Ames to George Richard Minot, May 29, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames* 1:636.

Massachusetts towards their fellow-citizens in other states."[2168] Although Ames had launched an impassioned assault against both the excessive tax on molasses and the offensively light duty on foreign brandy, he did not wish to engender animosity among his fellow Americans. Madison, however, continued to deploy the rhetoric of enemyship. Furthermore, the Virginian either did not share or remained oblivious to Ames's fear of interstate congressional hatred. The "interests and ideas of the Northern and Southern have been less adverse than was predicted by the opponents or hoped by the friends of the new Government," Madison curiously remarked to Jefferson on May 9, believing the tax on molasses to be one of the only points of current contention.[2169]

By May 12, Madison reluctantly conceded that while neither fiscally nor legally improper, the six-cent tax on molasses likely would stir resentment among the American people.[2170] To this end, Madison made a seismic rhetorical shift and declared himself opposed to the passage of America's first federal impost bill in perpetuity, as it was "dangerous" to the "republican principles" of any government to "draw revenue from the pockets of the people" without limitation.[2171] Shocked at this eleventh-hour revelation, Ames advocated that these federal taxes must lay the foundations of a "permanent system" of revenue collection, for subjecting them to constant renewal would expose the American people to "partial politics and opposing interests."[2172] Further, Ames explained to his colleagues that he had argued with "such energy" against the six-cent molasses duty precisely because he assumed it to be permanent, until legislatively revoked.[2173] Speaking from the "purest principles of patriotism, and an ardent love for his country's happiness," John Laurence concurred that federal stability demanded a permanent impost bill.[2174] Here, the New York representative lived up to the disinterested principles of political action citizenship, looking beyond the interests of his constituents, and rather advocated for the legislative action which he believed to benefit the greatest number of America's citizens. By calling for collaboration, Laurence proposed an alternative to the rhetoric of enemyship which embroiled Ames and Madison's debate.

When the House of Representatives voted May 16, forty-one representatives supported the impost bill's passage while limiting its lifespan to "a few-years."[2175] Ironically, Madison's victory had required him to wield the cudgel of majority tyranny – that same force which he had promised the *United States Constitution* capable of nullifying. Despite Madison's regionally interested victory, Ames still hoped that his own "zeal" and impassioned defense of New England's economy had "kindled" enough disinterested patriotism to persuade his senatorial colleagues to lessen the tax.[2176] If such a reduction was successful, Ames predicted, then Madison and his southern representatives would subsequently oppose any spirit excises intended to compensate for the lost molasses revenue, as they remained hypocritically "afraid for their whiskey" and of any "odious, unpopular tax" that might "fall unequally on them."[2177] Ames's foresight proved accurate, and only through senatorial assistance did the federal congress agree to reduce the molasses duty to two-and-one-half cents per

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[2168] Ames, April 28, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:600. Several days later, Ames expressed to Minot that, while he respected the political mind and oratory eloquence of James Madison, he believed that the Virginian "is afraid of [his] state politics, and of his popularity there, more than…he should be"; Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 3, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:569.
[2169] James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 9, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:142.
[2170] Madison, May 12, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:158-159.
[2171] "Congressional Register," May 15, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 10:681.
[2172] Ibid, 10:690; Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 16, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 15:564-565.
[2173] Ibid, 10:692
[2174] Ibid.
[2175] U.S. *House Journal*. 1789. 1st Cong. 1st Sess. May 16.
[2176] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 14, 1789, in *Works of Ames*, 1:582.
[2177] Ibid.

gallon.[2178] The legislative victory which Ames had helped to secure for both New England and the national economy rang hallow, however, as the young, horrified representative had witnessed Madison willingly "sacrifice national principles to local interests."[2179] Through this experience, Ames had learned a valuable political truth: that these representatives of United States were ready to sever the bonds of national fellow-feeling in pursuit of regional and self-interested desires; that they were citizens unwilling to fulfill their political action obligations to their country. For Fisher Ames, personal interest now had emerged as the greatest threat to the early republic's national identity.

The Need for National Attachments – The Senate & the Executive Titles Controversy:

The fragility of America's national identity, however, became even more apparent as the Senate weathered its first, albeit minor, constitutional controversy regarding the formal titles bestowed to the chief executive. Despite Washington's unanimous election and the outpouring of joyous newspaper articles following his inauguration, not all Americans celebrated their new president. One political cartoon, entitled "The Entry," began circulating in early-April, which depicted Washington "mounted on an Ass" and carried "in the arms of his Mulatto Man Bill," with an awe-struck crowd chanting "Hosannas and Birth day odes."[2180] The political imagery presented within the "The Entry" not simply depicts Washington as a satirical second-coming of Jesus Christ, but rather emasculates and infantilizes him – a president in need of care from his enslaved servants. As one New York senator observed, "wit spares nothing – neither Washington nor God."[2181]

The rare popular jibe or taunt against the president-elect quickly became a preoccupation for Vice-President John Adams. Unlike Washington's near unanimous election, the Massachusetts rebel, stateman, and ambassador had won the vice-presidency with just over fifty-percent of the electoral votes. [2182] A self-conscious politician who often perceived himself as "'persecuted and tormented' for his 'most virtuous and glorious actions,'" Adams found himself consumed with anxiety about the political division latent within the republic.[2183]

Adams's insecurities and fears became only more acute as Washington's future cabinet secretaries – still leading political voices in their own right – revealed themselves as irreconcilably divided over the vice-president's election. Jefferson found it impossible to "suppress the effusions of [his] heart" upon learning that America's electoral college wisely had chosen Adams as Washington's preemptive successor.[2184] "I have concluded to support Adams" as vice-president, a relieved Alexander Hamilton confessed to James Madison in November 1788.[2185] Grateful that a "declared partisan" and supporter of the *United States Constitution* had won the vice-presidency, Hamilton still held grave reservations towards Adams's political aptitude and personal designs.[2186] A man of significant influence among the "Eastern States," Hamilton worried that if Adams had lost this election, he might have received a subsequent nomination to "some important office for which he

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[2178] "Debates on Imposts and Provisions for the Public Credit," in *Works of Ames*, 1:584; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 393.
[2179] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 16, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames,* 1:624. Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 399-400.
[2180] John Armstrong Jr. to Horatio Gates, April 7, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 15:214-215. Note: at this moment, I have been unable to find any extant copies of "The Entry."
[2181] Ibid.
[2182] U.S. *House Journal* 1789. 1st Cong. 1st. Sess. April 6.
[2183] James M. Farrell "John Adams Autobiography: The Ciceronian Paradigm and the Quest for Fame," *The New England Quarterly 62* (1989): 506; 523.
[2184] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, May 10, 1789, in *Adams-Jefferson Correspondence*, 238.
[2185] Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, November 23, 1788, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 5:235-236.
[2186] Ibid.

[was] less proper" or, even worse, "become a malcontent" to the current administration.[2187] Grossly underestimating Adams's disinterested support for the federal government, Hamilton believed the limited scope of the vice-presidency served as an ideal position to cloister away the Massachusetts statesman, lest he cause undue political trouble. Hamilton, however, undervalued the political influence that Adams could, and swiftly did, exercise as the President of the Senate.[2188] The debates that unfolded became couched in the rhetoric of enemyship, as they sowed fear of tyranny and unrestrained avarice. Once again, participants in this debate invoked passions as a cudgel to undermine their political opponents, and thereby weakening the bonds of national fellow-feeling.

One-week before Washington's inauguration in New York City, the Senate formed a committee to "consider and report, what style or titles it will be proper to annex to the office of the President and of the Vice President of the United States."[2189] To Adams, this committee provided a rare political opportunity. At the moment, the United States was merely a "Composition of thirteen Omnipotences against one Omnipotence."[2190] Further, Adams believed that the "main danger to liberty" within the United States resided within the aspirations of the "upper classes."[2191] To curb the worrisome undercurrent of popular disrespect for the chief executive, combat the influence of the individual states, and satisfy the political ambitions and personal avarice of America's "conservative aristocracy," the vice-president looked to "titles."[2192]

By creating titles connected to federal offices that did not pass down through familial lines, the United States afforded itself an avenue to appropriate "objects of ambition" that were "Sufficient to satiate the appetites that crave."[2193] The root of such unsatiated appetites – avarice – was one of the most dangerous passions to civic stability. Adam Smith observes that humanity's inclination toward both avarice and ambition arise from society's predisposition to "sympathize more entirely" with an individual's "joys than with [their] sorrows."[2194] The poor man often is "ashamed of his poverty," as society has "scarce fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers," whereas the actions of the rich man are the "objects of public care" and "observed by all the world," and as such he is rarely "altogether neglected."[2195] The relationship between avarice, ambition, and civil rank, therefore, served two unique purposes for Adams. By aligning material self-interest with civic ambition, America's *de facto* aristocracy might pursue their own advancements, and thereby curb their baser passions through political actions that bettered the republic.[2196]

[2187] Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, November 23, 1788, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 5:235-236.

[2188] Article I, Section 3 states that the "Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have not Vote, unless they be equally divided." This clause, however, states nothing as to the ability of the Vice-President to present new business to the Senate, a power that John Adams would both assume and exercise in the early days of his office; see *United States Constitution* in *DHRC* 1:307. Several members of the Constitutional Convention, such as George Mason, believed it foolish to grant the "unnecessary and dangerous" vice-president legislative power only "for want of employment"; see George Mason, "Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention," *DRHC* 13:349; various iterations of these objections were printed in the Winchester *Virginia Gazette*, November 1, 1787, and the *Massachusetts Centinel*, November 21, 1787. Rakove, *Original Meaning*, 270.

[2189] U.S. *Senate Journal* 1789. 1st Cong. 1st. Sess. April 23; for the logistical details of this debate, I am indebted to the thorough research and analysis present in Kathleen Bartoloni-Tauzon's *For Fear of an Elective King: George Washington and the Presidential Title Controversy of 1789* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Bartoloni-Tauzon notes that Congress, along with the American press and citizenry, debated "more than thirty titles" for the office of the president in the spring and early-summer of 1789, see Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 1.

[2190] John Adams to Nathaniel Sargent, May 22, 1789, in *DHFCC*, 15:610; Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 4.

[2191] Ibid.

[2192] Ibid.

[2193] John Adams to William Tudor Sr., May 28, 1789, in *Papers of Adams*, 19:479-480.

[2194] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 50-51.

[2195] Ibid.

[2196] Hirschman, *Passions and the Interests*, 108-112.

Furthermore, by establishing a rank of men whose status directly relied upon civil service, the United States might create a political culture in which politicians served as the focal point of popular admiration and sympathy, and thereby nurtured national bonds of fellow-feeling.[2197]

Adams believed that titles held the power to instill proper political etiquette within the nation's citizenry, who must learn to subordinate their personal and regional interests to those of their nation. The "human passions are instable," Adams lamented, for "instead of being extinguished, moderated, or contented, they always strengthen by indulgence and gratification."[2198] Aligned with the sentimental philosophies of Adam Smith, the vice-president argued that the "only security" against these volatile passions were "checks" from "civil or ecclesiastical Societies" – the only two institutions powerful enough to suppress, or more likely redirect, man's natural "love of power" and "Love of Riches."[2199] To achieve disinterested national loyalty, Adams foresaw only two political paths: one "founded in force," in which the federal government deployed its military might to "detect illicit Trade and to quell insurrections," or one rooted in the allure and prestige of civic hierarchy.[2200] "Titles would cost much less" Adams wryly remarked, and would be "less dangerous to Liberty" than political order derived from the sword.[2201] Public titles further had the potential to ensure that the American people, even the "criminal and abandoned," would submit to social pressures and "respect" the "offices and laws" of their nation.[2202] The surest way to promote the stability of the United States, Adams concluded, was to incentivize its citizens to invest their love and their patriotism, their ambitions and their avarice, into the nation. Implicit here was the belief in fulfilling one's obligation toward the wider (national) community – the foundational principle of political action citizenship.

As America's minister to the British empire from April 1785 to February 1788, Adams did not personally witness the fervor with which antifederalists depicted the proposed constitution as a Trojan Horse for American monarchy. The populace's "enthusiasm" for Washington, it seemed, had awakened those old anxieties.[2203] Rumors had already begun to circulate that "most zealous federalists" had begun the process of bestowing President Washington with "a title that would approximate him more closely to a true sovereign."[2204] From the roaring applause and adoration which the president received upon finishing his *Inaugural Address*, French diplomat Elénor-François-Elie, the Comte de Moustier, concluded that those Americans in attendance might have even been convinced "to approve" the title of "Majesty" to their chief executive.[2205] Moustier further learned that several unnamed federalists had proposed raising a private guard for the president. A personal security detail, America's "republican zealots" argued, was "too monarchical" a proposal, as the "best guard for the President" was "the affection of the people."[2206] For federalists like John Adams, who feared the fickleness of human passions, the "affection of the people" proved insufficient, unreliable, and unsustainable. Confident in his own assessment of the need for executive titles, Adams carelessly stepped into a political maelstrom.

[2197] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 52-54

[2198] John Adams to Jeremy Belknap, June 5, 1789, in *Writings from the New Nation, 1784-1826,* ed., Gordon Wood (New York: Library Company of America, 2016), 217.

[2199] Ibid.

[2200] John Adams to William Tudor Sr., May 28, 1789, in *Papers of Adams*, 19:479-480.

[2201] Ibid.

[2202] John Adams to Benjamin Rush, July 5, 1789, in *Writings from the New Nation*, 225-226.

[2203] Comte de Moustier, "Description of the Inauguration," April 30, 1789, in *DHFFC*, 15:405.

[2204] Ibid.

[2205] Ibid.

[2206] Ibid.

To ensure the creation of these necessary, esteemed titles, Adams ventured into constitutionally murky waters and embroiled himself in senatorial debate. The liminality of the vice-presidency, as its powers and responsibilities emanated from both the executive and legislative branches, posed "great difficulty" as Adams tried to determine "how to act" in the Senate.[2207] Despite proceeding with care and caution, Adams inadvertently instigated a contentious presidential title debate the afternoon of April 30, when he lauded Washington's *Inaugural Address* as "his most gracious speech."[2208] Bestowing the honorific of "gracious" to the president's speech proved one of the worst, if not *the* worst, miscalculations of Adams's entire vice-presidency.

Aghast at the monarchial undertones of Adams's benign compliment, Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania addressed the Senate the next day. The American people "had a hard struggle for [their] liberty against kingly authority."[2209] The "minds of men are still heated," and as such the words which Adams "prefixed to the President's speech....the same that are usually placed before the speech of his Britannic Majesty," would inevitably "give offense."[2210] Embodying America's justified, popular anger towards the British monarchy, Maclay demanded that the vice-president's "improper" language immediately be struck from the Senate's record.[2211] Blindsided, Adams humbly (and rather foolishly) conveyed "the greatest surprise that anything should be objected to on account of its being taken from the [British government], under which [they] had lived so long and happily."[2212]

Enraged at and horrified by Adams's unapologetic admission of Anglophilia, Maclay retorted that the "abuses" which the American people had suffered under the reign of the George III not only "taught them what they had to fear" from monarchy, but also instigated a "revolution in the sentiments of the people," as they "now abhorred" all aspects of British government.[2213] Maclay further argued that Adams's decision to invoke the "trappings and splendor of royalty" in his description of the president's *Inaugural Address* only served to reignite antifederalist fears. The latter would brand such language, Maclay continued, as proof that the federal government had taken its "first step [on] the ladder in the ascent to royalty."[2214] Unprepared for such a hostile rebuke, Adams apologized for his grave mistake, which he attributed to his ignorance of "the temper of the [American] people," having been stationed in Britain these past three years.[2215] Yet again, Maclay seized upon Adams's blunder and accused the vice-president of "unequivocally avow[ing]" his true "motive": to transfer "the diadem and scepter from London to Boston, New York, or Philadelphia" and, under a "new monarchy in America," acquire "riches" from the "temple of royalty."[2216] Through his application of anti-monarchical horror, outrage, and terror, Maclay had used the rhetoric of enemyship to cast Adams (with the vice-president's own inadvertent assistance) as the first minister to America's newly coronated King George I.

Rhetorically affective and effective, it was both inaccurate and unjust to characterize Adams as a treasonous royalist still enamored with the embellishments of empire. Neither the vice-president nor any other British American had awoken the morning after the ratification of the *Treaty of Paris*

[2207] William Maclay, April 25, 1789, in *Journal of William Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791*, ed., Edgar S. Maclay (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1890), 2-3; American Antiquarian Society.
[2208] Maclay, May 1, 1789, in *Journal of Maclay*, 10; for a detailed analysis of this debate, see Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 96-109.
[2209] Maclay, May 1, 1789, in *Journal of Maclay*, 10.
[2210] Ibid.
[2211] Ibid.
[2212] Ibid.
[2213] Ibid, 10-11.
[2214] Ibid.
[2215] Ibid, 11.
[2216] Ibid.

and declared to the world: "I no longer feel British; I feel only American. I hate and fear all things British; I love only those things which are American." Eager to combat the personal avarice which had so thoroughly corrupted British American politics and desperate to strengthen the new, federal republic – whose independence the vice-president had been instrumental in procuring – Adams had grasped at the familiar language of the monarchy to imbue respect and reverence for the presidency. Rationale mattered little, however, as Maclay's rhetoric had branded Adams a dangerous monarchist – an epithet which would follow him for the rest of his political career.

The Senate debated the proper titles for the presidency in fits and starts throughout the next week, culminating in Maclay's speech on May 8. Refuting Adams's political worldview, Maclay proclaimed that the American people – as cultural monolith – no longer felt any "veneration for titles."[2217] After the success of British America's civil war for independence, all of "mankind now considered themselves as little bound to imitate the follies of civilized nations" as they did the "brutalities of savages."[2218] The "abuse of power and the fear of bloody masters" once had "extorted titles as well as adoration….from the trembling crowd," but now such reverence and submission to "kingly authority" filled the enlightened and unshackled American mind only with "horror."[2219] Despite Maclay's fiery rhetoric, the Senate appointed another committee to reconsider how best to title the presidency.[2220] Disheartened at the effort spent on such a trivial topic, Maclay privately blamed Adams for embroiling the federal senate, and now the entire republic, in "all the fooleries, fopperies, finches, and pomp of royal etiquette."[2221] Maclay became only further despondent when he learned that Adams might have been correct – that the American people still enjoyed civic "fopperies" and "pomp" – as his fellow senators recommended "His Highness the President of the United States of America and Protector of the Rights of the Same."[2222]

Two days after this recommendation, James Madison led the House in opposition to such a grandiose presidential title.[2223] More moderate than his senatorial colleagues, Madison conceded a minor victory to Adams and acknowledged that titles were not "so pregnant with danger as some gentlemen apprehend."[2224] The President of the United States, "cloathed with all the powers given in the Constitution would not be a dangerous person to the liberties of America," if one subsequently granted him "all the titles of Europe or Asia."[2225] Rather than employing Maclay's fear-mongering, anti-monarchical rhetoric, Madison opposed such titles because they were "not very reconcilable with the nature of [America's] government, or the genius of [its] people," who had moved beyond the need for such undue extravagance.[2226] Even those representatives more aligned with Adams's own federalist principles, such as Fisher Ames, expressed agnosticism toward presidential titles, neither "fear[ing] tyranny from giving, nor contempt from refusing" them.[2227] After receiving this tepid response in the House, the Senate approved the title "President of the United States" on May 14 – the exact title granted to the office in the *United States Constitution*; the exact title for which Maclay had advocated.[2228]

[2217] Maclay, May 8, 1789, in *Journal of Maclay*, 23.
[2218] Ibid
[2219] Ibid.
[2220] Ibid, 24.
[2221] Ibid, 25.
[2222] Ibid; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 23, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:182-183.
[2223] Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 103.
[2224] James Madison, "Title for the President," May 11, 1789, in *Papers of Madison*, 12:155.
[2225] Ibid.
[2226] Ibid.
[2227] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 27, 1789, *Works of Ames*, 1:634.
[2228] U.S. *Senate Journal* 1789. 1st Cong. 1st. Sess.; Maclay, May 14, 1789, in *Journal of Maclay*, 32-37; Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 106.

Having learned his political lesson, Adams remained silent during the final days of debate. The Senate's decision not to bestow any prestigious titles upon the presidency, however, had exposed the vice-president to further, and much more public, anti-monarchical attacks.[2229] Disgusted, St. George Tucker rebuked Adams's interested desire for embellished titles, and then condemned "the Baseness, Servility and Apostacy" of those who supported the vice-president, as they had abandoned "those principles for which thousands of their sons and Brothers [had] shed their dearest Blood."[2230] Edward Church's satirical poem *The Dangerous Vice* further lambasted Adams, depicting him a man "Tainted with foreign vices," who had "Already dubb'd [himself] a King, in royal dreams."[2231] If left unopposed, Church warned, Adams would strip away those now cherished liberties which America's "heroes earn'd with their best blood."[2232] Horror of Adams's self-interested abandonment of America's revolutionary ideals, hatred for those who endorsed the vice-presidents machinations, and a renewed terror of federal monarchy were some of the most poignant, lingering ramifications of the Senate's debate over executive titles.

Almost two years later, the American press stilled remained wary of Adams's true allegiances, unable to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory parts of his civic identity: the Massachusetts revolutionary who helped establish an independent United States and the federalist vice-president whose lingering attachment to Britain's political culture stank of monarchy.[2233] The answer, *New York Journal* concluded, was that Adams was an unapologetic, covert royalist whose support for the revolution arose not from any "real virtue" or sincere bonds of fellow-feeling, but rather from "ambition and vanity," as he believed himself capable of gaining greater power and prestige in the colonies if they separated themselves from Parliament's purview.[2234] New York's Melancton Smith reaffirmed these "allegations" in the first of his *Lucius* essays, assuring the American people that Adams's "attach[ment] to a government of king, lords, and commons" are "presumed…true."[2235] These statements called into question not only Adams's moral character, but his qualities as an American citizen.

These *ad hominem* attacks initially failed to diminish the vice-president's adamance, and Adams remained convinced that "Titles" and the "Pageantry of Government" were necessary to foster a cohesive national identity.[2236] Further, Adams suspected that the most vicious of these attacks, such as Church's *The Dangerous Vice*, arose not from personal "malice," but rather from a misguided sense of "patriotism." [2237] Still, the vice-president invoked passion to demean Church's arguments, proclaiming them motivated by "mere caprice[,] or the lust for fame" (the latter of which, ironically, a civic title might quell).[2238] The summer and early-autumn of 1789, however, took a notable toll upon Adams, who understood that his advocacy for executive titles had transformed him into "the Scape Goat on whom all the sins of Unpopularity [were] to be laid."[2239] The political

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[2229] Maclsay, May 13, 1789, in *Journal of Maclay*, 32; Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 102.
[2230] St. George Tucker to Thomas Tudor Tucker, June 3, 1789, in *DCFFC* 16:691-963; Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 140.
[2231] Edward Church, *The Dangerous Vice* (Boston: Thomas and Andrew, 1789), 14-15; American Antiquarian Society.
[2232] Ibid.
[2233] Willaim Reddy observes, in relation to emotive sincerity and self-deception, that "no one can be faulted for not knowing everything that is going one with herself" and thus two emotions, albeit contradictory to others, may be true and sincere within an individual; see Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 108-110.
[2234] *New York Journal*, *February 3, 1791*; Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 140; Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 142.
[2235] Melancton Smith, *Lucius No. 1*, in *Anti-Federalist Writings of Smith*, 368; this essay was printed in both the *New York Journal*, November 24, 1792, and the *American Daily Advertiser*, November 24, 1792.
[2236] John Adams to Benjamin Rush, June 9, 1789, in *Writings from the New Nation*, 219.
[2237] John Adams to Jeremy Belknap, September 26, 1789, in *DHFFC* 17:1617.
[2238] John Adams to Jeremy Belknap, September 26, 1789, in *DHFFC* 17:1617.
[2239] John Adams to John Lowell, September 14, 1789, in *DHFFC* 17:1538; Bartoloni-Tauzon, *Fear of an Elective King*, 146.

failures and personal rebukes which Adams had suffered brought him to a somber epiphany regarding his republic's future: "My Country appears to me…in great danger of fatal divisions, and…I Scarcely know of [two Persons], who think, Speak and Act alike, in matters of Government."[2240] Within a few short months, America's first vice-president had gone from nursing a moderated fear of political disunity to harboring terror of an inevitable, irreparable national schism.

In the wake of these volatile debates on titles and taxation, Fisher Ames's opinion of the federal congress had plummeted. Three "classes" of "troublesome" men now corrupted the House, Ames observed. First are the "antifederalists, who alone are weak" for the continued fear of the *United States Constitution*.[2241] Next, are those naïve Americans who have become the "dupes of local prejudices, who fear eastern influence, monopolies, and navigation acts."[2242] Last, and perhaps most dangerous, are those "violent republicans," those members of the "aristocracy of the southern nabobs," who are more inclined to "expatiate upon, some high-sounding principle of republicanism, than to protect property, cement the union, and perpetuate liberty."[2243] Perhaps more so than any other member of the federal congress, Fisher Ames empathized with Adams's terror of national schism. Both men hailed from Massachusetts and ascribed to federalist ideologies, and therefore it is unsurprising that they became two of the fiercest advocates for consensus political action and the supremacy of the national government.[2244]

By late-autumn, however, the disheartened Ames and the vilified Adams had begun to question whether the federal government had the ability to engender national affection among its citizens. Proscribing to the political theories of Welsh philosopher Richard Price, both men understood one's nation not as "the soil, or the spot…on which [its citizens] happen to be born," but rather the "companions and friends and kindred who are associated…under the same constitution of government, protected by the same laws, and bound together by the same civil polity."[2245] The American people, therefore, must express national love by preventing "private interest [from] overcoming the public affections" and "defending" their nation from against its "enemies" both abroad and at home.[2246] The affinity which Ames and Adams shared in the earliest months of America's constitutional government emerged from their profound desire, yet tragic inability, to secure a federative precedence for the United States, in which legislators never jeopardized the collective good so as to promote regional interests or personal avarice. From Ames's perspective, the elected representatives to the federal congress had failed to ensure that national fellow-feeling superseded state interests. Adams's inability to secure any prestigious titles for the

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[2240] John Adams to Benjamin Rush, June 9, 1789, in *Writings from the New Nation*, 219-220.
[2241] Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, July 9, 1789, *Works of Fisher Ames*, 1:686.
[2242] Ibid.
[2243] Ibid.
[2244] Mark A. Peterson provides an excellent summary of the similarities between the personal lives and political ideologies of John Adams and Fisher Ames, Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 387-390. Beyond his service as my dissertation advisor, I am particularly indebted to Peterson's insightful analysis of Ames's political duality: believing it possible to secure legislation that benefited New England's economy while simultaneously furthering the stability and cohesion of the early republic. Furthermore, Peterson provides remarkable insight into the glaring distinction between Madison's majority political strategy, which was anathema to the Massachusetts style consensus politics which Ames and Adams both arose from and propagated.
[2245] To provide some contextual framework, I am relying on Richard Price's concepts of love and patriotism, which he explored in his *Discourse on the Love of our Country* (1789). Price's *Discourse* provides an excellent context for the title and molasses controversies, as it is not only contemporaneous to the struggles which Adams and Ames faced, but also reflects the ideologies of a Welsh Briton who endorsed the political objectives of America's revolutionary elite; see Richard Price, *Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (Boston: Powars, 1790), 6-7; Yale Library, Franklin Collection.
[2246] Ibid, 9, 26

presidency had revealed the republic's own inability to move beyond superficial applications of anti-monarchist affective discourse, even if failure to do so ran the risk of exacerbating political division. The people of Massachusetts's concerns for national unity, at this moment, transcended even political ideology. Despite her antifederal predilections, Mercy Otis Warren concurred that the early republic's union was not indivisible. The American people may "feel an immutable attachment" to one another, yet "extraordinary political events" might catalyze "the most sudden reverse of private friendship and a dereliction of former attachments," the ramifications of which "at once surpizes and wounds the heart."[2247] Together, regional loyalty and emergent partisan conflicts fostered an rhetoric of enemyship that had laid the foundations for Adam's greatest terror – one which had consumed the people of British America for over two decades – the likelihood of "Civil War."[2248]

To prevent the violent, civic destruction of the United States, Adams made a calculated decision to reengage with the republic's political discourse by circumventing the federal government and speaking directly to his fellow citizens through the press. Beginning in 1790, the vice-president penned a series of essays for the short-lived, federalist *Gazette of the United States*, entitled "Discourses on Davila," in which he examined the political histories and cultural practices of the most successful of early-modern governments.[2249] Of particular note was "Discourse No. 9," in which Adams analyzed the importance, yet "unwieldy" nature of "national passions and habits."[2250] Here, the vice-president both acknowledged the importance of emotions as a potentially unifying force while questioning their instability and impermanence. The "number of persons in any country, who are known even by name or reputation, to all the inhabitants…ever must be, very small."[2251] Further, it is those individuals "whose characters have attracted the affections, as well as the attention of an whole people," that "acquire an influence and ascendancy that it is difficult to resist."[2252] In the most ideal political conditions, Adams concluded, the "first magistrates" would emerge from these respectable individuals, as did George Washington for the United States.[2253]

The unrivaled adoration which the American people felt for Washington had ensured his election to the presidency, but only because of the absence of political parties within the fledgling republic. If a "nation is divided into two parties," the vice-president continued, then "national attachment" to the first magistrate would first be "inflamed" by the "passions of his party," and then be transformed into dangerous, "ardent enthusiasm."[2254] In the worst-case scenario, the presentation of "two candidates, each at the head of a party" would incur a hostile election, after which the American republic would be "divided into two nations" and its citizens would be "soon, bitterly

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[2247] Mercy Otis Warren to Catherine Macaulay, July 1789, in *Selected Letters*, 221

[2248] John Adams warned Benjamin Rush that without proper "Ballance" within the federal government the "Progress will soon be, from Libels to Riots, from Riots to seditions, and from seditions to Civil Wars." John Adams to Benjamin Rush, June 9, 1789, in *Writings of the New Nation*, 222.

[2249] John Adams, *Discourse on Davila: A Series of Papers, on Political History. Written in the Year 1790 and then Published in the Gazette of the United States* (Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1805); American Antiquarian Society. The *Gazette of the United States* was instrumental in helping federalists secured the ratification of the *United States Constitution*. Furthermore, its founder and editor, Bostonian John Fenno, envisioned the *Gazette* as a "newspaper voice" for the United States which, "[f]ollowing the British model of government relations," would "unquestionably exalt the new government and aggressively defend its legitimacy, personnel, and policies." Through this single newspaper, Fenno hoped to transform the "disparate societies of the United States into a single unified nation." It is unsurprising, therefore, that Adams found a publication home for his *Discourses on Davila* in Fenno's *Gazette of the United States*. Heideking, *Before the Seat of Judgement*, 79, 91; Pasley, *Tyranny of Printers*, 51-53.

[2250] Adams, "Discourse No. 9" in *Discourse on Davila*, 57-58.

[2251] Ibid.

[2252] Ibid.

[2253] Ibid.

[2254] Ibid.

enraged against each other."[2255] Adams reiterated this horrific future in "Discourse No. 13," as he urged the American people to remember that "National rivalries are more frequently the cause of war than the ambition of ministers, or the pride of kings."[2256] Deploying the terrors of civil war to stoke patriotic love had worked before, and Adams now hoped that such rhetoric might spur the American people to reinforce their bonds of national fellow-feeling. A rhetorically sound tactic, Adams's reputation had suffered too greatly, and once his name had been attached to the *Davila* epistles, his political opponents dismissed them as nothing more than the hyperbolic text of a royalist who masqueraded in revolutionary clothing.[2257]

One year after George Washington had taken the oath of the presidency, both John Adams and Fisher Ames had failed in their respective attempts to foster national fellow-feeling. Interested resistance to consensus politics and popular fears of the trappings of monarchy had delayed the formation of a cohesive, national identity. By the mid-1790s, reports had emerged that the nation's most powerful states had begun to lose faith in their federal republic, specifically that Virginia's "public mind" had become "more irritable sour & discontented than…any other state in the Union, except Massachusetts."[2258] The prolonged weakness of the United States' affective national identity, no longer sustained by admiration for George Washington alone, had carved a path for the emergence of the political parties which John Adams so acutely feared. To the president's dismay, the instigators for such partisan division emerged from within his own cabinet.

A Trinity of Crises – Debts, Banks, and Revolutions:

To survive as an independent nation in the Atlantic world, the United States needed to project both its fiscal credibility and diplomatic stability, tasks which fell to secretaries of treasury and state. The inherent problem: the emergent rhetoric of enemyship facilitated Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, as well as the federal legislators who supported them, to argue to the American populace that only their respective political visions for the United States held the power to preserve the republic inviolate.[2259] In their estimation, they alone understood the political action duties that the American people needed to fulfill to be considered citizens. Both men feared that any divergence from their respective ideological paths would lead the United States toward corruption and ruin. These limited, profoundly biased hopes for the future of the American republic implicitly denied their opponents' claims to citizenship, and thereby reinforced partisan fears of, anger towards, and hatred for their former revolutionary compatriots and political allies.

To nurture a robust national economy, Hamilton believed that the United States must first pay the "price of liberty" and assume the debts which the individual states had incurred during America's civil war for independence.[2260] By placing the burden of repayment upon the federal congress, the treasury secretary sought to refute the image of fiscal "non-compliance" that had emerged under the *Articles of Confederation*.[2261] The people of Massachusetts, and much of New England, endorsed this plan, as their states would benefit greatly from the economic relief which Hamilton promised.[2262] New Englander Jeremiah Wadsworth's further observed "there [would] be a general clamor through all the eastern states against the national government" if the House refused

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[2255] Adams, "Discourse No. 9" in *Discourse on Davila*, 57-58.
[2256] Adams, "Discourse No. 13," in *Discourse on Davila*, 74-75.
[2257] Melancton Smith, *Lucius No. 1*, in *The Anti-Federalist Writings of Smith*, 368.
[2258] George Washington to David Stuart, June 15, 1790, in *Papers of GW: Presidential*, 5:524.
[2259] Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 8.
[2260] Alexander Hamilton, "Report on Public Credit" in *Papers of Hamilton*, 6:69.
[2261] Hamilton, "Report on Public Credit," 6:69; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 118-120.
[2262] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 120.

to authorize the treasury secretary's plan.[2263] Beyond such regional interests, Fisher Ames hoped that debt assumption might achieve two important, disinterested objectives: promote financial equality among the individual states and foster popular attachment to the republic. With neither "money nor troops," Ames recalled, America's insurgent congress had "appealed to the good-will and patriotism of the states" to "furnish supplies to the extent of their powers" to oppose British tyranny.[2264] If "the war had been confined to a corner" of the United States, and if "one state had incurred the whole debt," Ames asked, would it then be "just to leave the burden" of repayment to that individual state, even though all Americans now benefitted from independence?[2265] To fulfil their duties as citizens, the House must support debt assumption. Reminding his colleagues of this obligation required Ames to restoke the embers of national fellow-feeling. Instead, the ensuing political debate stoked only distrust, resentment, and enmity.

The idea of national debt assumption threw Virginia's "demagogues," into "some degree of ferment"[2266] Hamilton's northern interested proposal, Virginia's representatives argued, had ignored their state's "disproportionate sacrifices," as it already repaid a significant portion of its wartime debts without federal assistance.[2267] Massachusetts's representatives, like Fisher Ames, misunderstood the precedence and political ramifications of debt assumption, Madison argued, and were naïve to believe that it might "add strength to the national government."[2268] Albeit as "anxious" for the republic's "success" as any American, Madison feared that "the public debt [was] a public evil."[2269] By foolishly enlarging the federal debt to lessen those of the individual states, Madison concluded, the House would encourage financial insolvency, not national attachment.[2270] Unlike Ames, Madison argued that such extensive federal interference into the individual states' economies ran the risk of depicting the federal congress as an improper, unconstitutional equivalent to Britain's Parliament.

The federal debate over national debt assumption further revealed the American people's anxieties of political disunion. Massachusetts federalist Christopher Gore feared that absent a "chain of more & stronger links [to] bind the Union" together, a political tragedy, such as the "dissolution of the president," would result in the "America people ceas[ing] to exist as a nation."[2271] Hamilton's plan for debt assumption, Gore told New York senator Rufus King, provided one such affective link, as it would ensure that "the interests" of America's "men of property" remained intertwined with "the prosperity of the Government."[2272] If bonds of national fellow-feeling remained unattainable, America's federalists sought to exploit the populace's self-interest, and thereby bind them together through the tethers of economic interdependence.

Despite its fiscal and affective benefits, national debt assumption initially failed within the House.[2273] This stark political impasse, Elbridge Gerry lamented to James Monroe, was but another of the federal congress's "embarrassments," one of many that may yet incite the rise of secret

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[2263] *New York Daily Advertiser*, April 27, 1790.
[2264] Fisher Ames, "Debates on Measures to Fund the Public Credit," in *Works of Fisher Ames*, 2:742-743.
[2265] Ibid.
[2266] Theodore Sedgwick to Peter van Schaak, January 2, 1791, in *DHFCC* 21: 303.
[2267] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 120.
[2268] James Madison, "Assumption of the States Debts," April 22, 1790, in *Papers of Madison*, 13:167-168; a summation of Madison's remarks was published in the *New York Daily Advertiser*, April 27, 1790.
[2269] Ibid.
[2270] Ibid.
[2271] Christopher Gore to Rufus King, May 30, 1790, in *Life and Correspondence of King*, 1:388.
[2272] Ibid.
[2273] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 150-151.

"cabals" to govern the United States.[2274] Gerry's pessimism proved prophetic. As Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson had avoided any official endorsement or rejection of Hamilton's debt assumption plan. The evening of June 20, however, the Virginian hosted a dinner between his close-friend James Madison and the treasury secretary to facilitate "some temperament for the present fever."[2275] In his personal diary, Jefferson observed that Hamilton's failure to pass his assumption bill had left him "sombre, haggard, and dejected beyond description," as even his "dress [was] uncouth and neglected."[2276] Presenting himself as a political savior and compromiser extraordinaire, Jefferson brokered a back-room deal in which all three statesmen consented to use their political influence to ensure that the federal congress passed not only the *Funding (Assumption) Act* (1790), but also the *Residency Act* (1790), which situated America's new federal capitol next to the Potomac River.[2277] While Jefferson later admitted that national assumption proved an "unjust" and "oppressive" policy, he acknowledged that the House "acquiesced…merely from a fear of disunion."[2278]

Remarkably, the *Funding Act* proved to be one of the treasury secretary's least controversial fiscal proposals. In December 1790, Hamilton submitted his "Report on the National Bank," which advocated that the federal congress charter a bank for the "prosperous administration" of the republic's finances and to help establish national credit.[2279] Opposition to the national bank arose, yet again, from James Madison, who argued that Hamilton's national bank – inspired by, if not a direct copy of, England's own bank – violated the *United States Constitution*, as the federal legislature had not received such an enumerated power.[2280] Madison then denied that a national bank was "necessary to the government," and might be characterized, at best, as politically "convenient."[2281] The incorporation of national bank also threatened to validate one of the antifederalists' deepest fears: that given enough time and power, the federal legislature would abuse their economic authority. Massachusetts and New York's support for the national bank rendered Madison's arguments moot, and the House endorsed the First Bank of the United States in early 1791.[2282]

The people of Virginia, however, continued their fierce condemnations Hamilton's national bank. Jefferson concurred with Madison that "erecting a bank" and "regulating commerce" were not the same legislative power.[2283] Further, the foreign secretary privately advised Washington to veto the *Incorporation Act*, arguing that the federal legislature must have been "misled by error, ambition, or interest" to pass such an unconstitutional law.[2284] As two of Virginia's most accomplished and respected politicians had condemned the national bank, Hamilton worked swiftly to persuade his former commanding officer of its constitutionality. Rejecting both Madison and Jefferson's limited reading of the *United States Constitution*, Hamilton argued that a national bank was both "necessary

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[2274] Elbridge Gerry to James Monroe, June 25, 1790, in *Some Letters of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, 1784-1804*, ed., Worthington Chauncey Ford (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1896), 9.
[2275] Thomas Jefferson, "Account of the Bargin on the Assumption and Residency Bills," 1792, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 17:205-208.
[2276] Ibid.
[2277] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 156-160.
[2278] Jefferson, "Account of Assumption and Residency," 1792, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 17:205-208.
[2279] Hamilton, "Report on the National Bank," in *Papers of Hamilton*, 7:305. McCoy, *Elusive Republic*, 147-148
[2280] James Madison, "Speech Opposing the National Bank," February 2, 1791, in *Papers of Madison*, 13:371-379; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 230-231; McCoy, *Elusive Republic*, 41-42; 152-153.
[2281] Madison, "Speech Opposing the National Bank,", *Papers of Madison*, 13:380.
[2282] Twelve of the votes in favor of the First Bank of the United States came from Massachusetts and New York, and the only representative from either state to oppose the bank was Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts, see U.S. *House Journal* 1791. 1st Cong. 3rd Sess. February 8. The northern block's support for the *Incorporation Act* only reinforced Madison's fear that a national bank would unjustly favor "northern merchants and speculators at the expense of farmers, particularly those in the South"; Chervinsky, *The Cabinet*, 157.
[2283] Thomas Jefferson, "Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank Bill" in *Papers of Jefferson*, 19: 280.
[2284] Ibid.

and proper," as it would have the ability to fund the republic's national defense if the United States found itself embroiled in war but unable to levy taxes.[2285] Hamilton's calculated rhetoric harkened to memories of wartime hardships, illness, and starvation – memories of fear and suffering – which the treasury secretary and president, as veterans themselves, were well acquainted. To Jefferson and Madison's chagrin, Hamilton's martial pragmatism proved victorious, and Washington signed the *Incorporation Act* into law on February 25.[2286]

The financial systems which Hamilton had shepherded into existence not only laid the foundations for economic and political attachment to the national government, but also promoted and secured acute regional interests: Massachusetts's desire rid itself of wartime debt, Virginia's proximity to the national capital, New York's acquisition of the national bank. The treasury secretary's deft political maneuvers, however, further eroded popular perceptions of national unity. After learning of the secret bargin which Hamilton struck at Jefferson's dining table, Massachusetts representative Thomas Dwight forewarned that if "such jobbing, such shameful jockeying" became the "common mode of carrying private points in…public councils," then there would be a "speedy end" to the American people's "existence as a nation."[2287] The executive cabinet, like the federal legislature, had exposed itself to charges of the same self-interest and political corruption that had turned British America's insurgents against both Parliament and their loyalist neighbors. The United States had purchased its fiscal credibility at too steep a price, these detractors argued. Hamilton's economic systems, and the federal congress which enacted, had engendered distrust, fear, and anger.

Simultaneous to America's economic transformation, Washington's executive cabinet grappled with its first international crisis: the outbreak of political revolution in France. 1789's spirit of reform took a much more volatile form in Europe, however, than it did in North America. Three weeks before the Philadelphia convention had circulated their proposed constitution throughout the United States, the French National Assembly had approved their own *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, which detailed "the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man" upon which they would erect their new, republican government.[2288] Arising from the "high ideals" of freedom, civic equality, and the protection of human rights for all white men, France's revolutionary politics – like their American counterparts – remained intertwined with emotion.[2289] Through a rhetoric of national affection, restoration, and rebirth, French revolutionaries worked to manifest a unifying republican ethos.[2290] Much like their American counterpart, the French republic – especially in the years following the execution of Louis XVI – relied on public festivities and out-of-door political action to develop patriotic sentiments and thereby forge the popular bonds of national fellow-felling.[2291]

Historians, however, have more successfully incorporated the methodologies of emotions history into their analysis of revolutionary France than revolutionary America. William Reddy, in his groundbreaking *The Navigation of Feeling,* explores the "rise and fall" of sentimentalism throughout eighteenth and early-nineteenth century France, arguing that "sentimentalists' doctrine" were a

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[2285] Alexander Hamilton, "Opinion of the Constitutionality of a National Bank," February 23, 1791, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 8:124-128.

[2286] Consequently, the Incorporation Bill did not outlaw state banks and some, such as Christopher Gore, expressed concern that their continued existence may "be injurious to the growth of national politics"; Christopher Gore to Rufus King, August 7, 1791, in *The Life and Correspondence of King*, 1:401. Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 233.

[2287] Thomas Dwight to Theodore Sedgwick, July 19, 1790, in "Theodore Sedgwick Papers."

[2288] French National Assembly, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* (1789); Beinecke Library, Yale University. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (London: Abacus, 1977), 79-80; Timothy Tackett, *The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2015), 60-63.

[2289] Tackett, *Coming of the Terror*, 2.

[2290] Bell, *Cult of the Nation in France*, 144; 153.

[2291] Ibid, 164-166. Bell further notes that from 1750 to 1789, the French monarch had served as the affective center of France's patriotic identity; see *Cult of the Nation in France*, 68-69.

governing force throughout the revolution, but then quickly were suppressed following the death of Maximilien Robespierre in July 1794.[2292] Timothy Tackett aptly moves beyond Reddy's analysis of "undifferentiated," abstract sentiment.[2293] Individual emotions, Tackett argues, were essential instruments for instigating social and political transformation, at both and the regional and national levels, during the Atlantic world's Age of Revolutions. France's revolution, Tackett observes, stirred not only "hope and enthusiasm" within the people for their future republic, but also burdened them with "overwhelming fear" of the imminent "collapse" of political order and civility.[2294] "Fear of invasion, fear of chaos and anarchy, fear of revenge," when coupled with rising "anger and hatred" both among and for France's detested elite, gradually birthed a "paranoid style of politics" which governed the revolution's more violent dimensions.[2295] Like France's revolutionary ideals, these political passions resonated with America's revolutionaries. For the next two years, affective tensions between hope, fear, anger, and hatred dominated both the French people's participation in their own revolution and the American people's assessment of their sister republic's political success.[2296]

Responses to France's revolution oscillated between such hope and fear within Washington's cabinet, and thus provide another point of contention and animosity among his executive staff. An invaluable commentator on the Marquis de Lafayette's initial draft of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, Jefferson lauded France's revolution as a "most unexampled success" of popular republican principles.[2297] Initial diplomatic reports, however, confirmed that a riot of "mischief and plunder" had resulted in the execution of one hundred citizens in Paris, and that the "want of bread" had led to "perhaps a dozen or twenty" deaths throughout the provinces.[2298] The foreign secretary thoroughly downplayed these episodes, lest their more common names – mobocracy and starvation – stir fear within the hearts of the American people. Empathy and optimism for France's anti-monarchial, anti-aristocratic, revolution was unsurprising, as it arose from the Virginian who had decried the "lunacy" of George III, sympathized with Massachusetts's regulators, and believed that the "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."[2299] At his most extreme, Jefferson even lauded France, not America, as the greatest protector of human liberty. "While you are exterminating the monster aristocracy, and pulling out the teeth and fangs of its associate monarchy," Jefferson confessed to Lafayette, a "contrary tendency" has emerged within America.[2300] The federalist sect – comprised of "stock-jobbers and King-jobbers" – had begun the gradual, abominable work of subjecting America's republic to a new, "English constitution," fit with a "bed of corruption."[2301]

More surprising, however, was the enthusiastic support that Massachusetts federalist and war secretary Henry Knox initially expressed for the French republic. The "importance of the revolution in France is astonishing," Knox wrote to Lafayette, as one "looks around in amazement and asks is

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[2292] Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, x-xii, 174.
[2293] Tackett, *Coming of the Terror*, 7.
[2294] Tackett, *Coming of the Terror*, 58; 122.
[2295] Ibid, 7.
[2296] For a detailed analysis of how hope and fear served as the governing emotions of the early years of France's revolution, see Tackett, *Coming of the Terror*, 121-141.
[2297] For Jefferson's praise of France's Revolution, see Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 11, 1789, *Papers of Jefferson*, 15:121-122; "Lafayette's Draft of a Charter of Rights," June 3, 1789, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 15:167-168.
[2298] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 11, 1789, *Papers of Jefferson*, 15: 121-122
[2299] Thomas Jefferson to William Smith, November 13, 1787, *Papers of Jefferson*, 12:355-357; Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, December 4, 1788, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 14:328-329.
[2300] Thomas Jefferson to Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, June 16, 1792, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 24:85
[2301] Ibid.

it not a delusion, can it be true?"[2302] The honorable commitment of the French people to the procurement of universal human rights, Knox continued, is "a new Lesson to the Gods of the earth that there [distinction]" between the classes of men is "but a phantom of the imagination."[2303] If victorious in their endeavors, France will provide yet another illustrious example of how a people "ought to repress the abuses and oppression of their rulers."[2304] By buttressing personal astonishment with political optimism, Knox demonstrates his belief that France and America's twin revolutions might change the course of human politics.

Unsurprisingly, the treasury secretary's fears of France's democratic, and possibly anarchic, tendencies provided an affective and ideological counterbalance to Jefferson and Knox. Filled with a "mixture of Pleasure and apprehension to the Progress of events" in France, Hamilton urged Lafayette to guard against the horrors of perpetual revolution and submission to the will of the people.[2305] Despite professing himself "a friend to mankind and to liberty," Hamilton felt profound "dread" for the "vehement character" of the French people, whom he "fear[ed]" may find it easier – like the unruly Americans of Northampton, Tioga, and Greenbriar – to incite a revolution for personal profit than to "keep within the Proper bounds" of respectable republican government.[2306] Ever the pragmatist, the treasury secretary's letter concluded with an assurance to Lafayette that he would work with haste to ensure America repaid its outstanding debts to France.[2307]

Washington skirted between optimism and caution, befitting his role as an affective equilibrium between his secretaries of state, war, and treasury.[2308] France's revolution, the president confessed, was "so wonderful in nature that the mind can hardly realize it."[2309] If successful in erecting a republican government, then France might likely become "the most powerful and happy" nation of Europe.[2310] Washington, however, simultaneously suspected the political character of the National Assembly. The president worried that its members lacked "[g]reat temperance, firmness, and foresight" – qualities inherent to America's conception of political action citizenship.[2311] The National Assembly, Washington feared, might lead France into chaos and turmoil, as "running from one extreme" of government to "another is no easy matter," as "rocks and shelves not visible at present may wreck the vessel."[2312]

Two years of prolonged civic tension within Paris, and perpetual acts of popular violence throughout the republic, gradually eroded Washington's confidence in and hope for Frace's political stability. One month after the National Assembly captured Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette as they fled the capital, Washington chastised the "tumultuous [urban] populace," whose "indiscriminate violence [had] prostrate[d] for the time all public authority" and had produced "extensive and terrible" consequences.[2313] A firm ally, in principle, of the National Assembly's republican objectives, Washington's criticism of the French people sounded frighteningly similar to that of British statesmen, like Horace Walpole, who thought that the "Parisian Mob" had succumbed to "violence,

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[2302] Henry Knox to Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, October 15, 1789, "Henry Knox Papers," MSS; Gilder Lehrman Institute.
[2303] Ibid.
[2304] Henry Knox to Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, October 15, 1789, "Henry Knox Papers."
[2305] Alexander Hamilton to Marquis de Lafayette, October 6, 1789, *Papers of Hamilton*, 5:425-426.
[2306] Ibid
[2307] Ibid.
[2308] Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 3-4.
[2309] George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, October 13, 1789, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 4:177.
[2310] Ibid.
[2311] Ibid.
[2312] Ibid; Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 12-13, 18.
[2313] George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, July 28, 1791, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 8:377-379.

injustice, and savage cruelty," and now feared the spread of Jacobin politics to their own shores.[2314] A dilemma now stood before Washington: if France's admirable quest for republican government devolved into unjust bloodshed and political anarchy – if the leaders of France began to resemble Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, butcher of Fort William Henry, instead of the Marquis de Lafayette, revolutionary and republican ally – how would he, and thus the United States, respond?

With the French republic in a state of violent, political fluctuation, Congress took greater steps to bolster America's own financial stability. In January 1791, the House passed a tax on spirits both "imported abroad" and "distilled within the United States."[2315] Its purpose: to "discourage the excessive use of those spirits, and promote agriculture as to provide support for the public credit, and for the common defense and general welfare" of the nation.[2316] John Laurence, Fisher Ames, Elbridge Gerry, and even James Madison supported this excise, aware that "such revenues were necessary" to buoy the federal economy now beholden to, and stretched thin by, Hamilton's assumption of state debts and incorporation of a national bank.[2317] Not all of Hamilton's opponents, however, accepted the necessity of a national spirits excise. Horrified to learn that the federal legislature had enacted this "most oppressive" tax, Melancton Smith lambasted the spirit excise as both "the engine of Tyrants" and "the enemy of Liberty," as it inevitably would "subvert the rights of the free citizens of America."[2318] Unlike the complex, legalistic arguments regarding assumption and incorporation, the passage of the so-called whiskey tax immediately, and quite vividly, stirred the passions of America's mid-Atlantic backcountry farmers..

One political cartoon, simply titled "An Exciseman," perfectly captures the bubbling rage felt for the spirit excise (see Figure 6.1).[2319] The graphic itself depicts the violent execution of a federal exciseman, hung from a noose above a flaming barrel of whiskey. To the right, several enraged whiskey distillers gleefully watch the execution. The bottom-half of the graphic then narrates how the exciseman, after "Carrying off two Kegs of Whiskey," was "pursued by two farmers intending to tar and feather him." While fleeing, the exciseman was intercepted by "his evil genius" – the Devil – who "clapp[ed] an hook in his nose" and led "him off to a Gallows where he [was] immediately hanged." Upon his death, the people then put "a barrel of whiskey under him" and" sets fire to it." The whiskey-fueled flame provided but a temporary "shrouding" to "hide" the exciseman's "shame," for after a few moments the whiskey had "burn[ed]," and the barrel "bl[ew] him up."[2320]

For anyone who wondered as to the fate of the exciseman's soul, the cartoon's companion poem explained that he was "Launched off quick to gauge the River Styx,/Where he'll get Sulphur all his drink to mix/Ah! Farmers come and drop the tear of woe./ 'Cause Pluto did get him long

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[2314] Horace Walpole to Mary Berry, May 4, 1791, in *Walpole Correspondences*, 11:260; Horace Walpole to Mary Berry, June 23, 1791, *Walpole Correspondences*, 11:296. E.P. Thompson remarks on the longevity of the French revolution and egalitarian politics upon the political culture of British Empire, arguing that "sensibility of the Victorian middle class was nurtured in the 1790s by frightened gentry who had seen miners, potters, and cutters reading [Thomas Paine's] *Rights of Man*." France's revolution had incurred a "serious alarm" throughout the British government that in May 1792 the crown issued a Royal Proclamation against "seditious" publications, such as the *Rights of Mani* – as they had the political power both to stir popular, revolutionary passions and to convert English subjects into British Jacobins. As Sir Samuel Romily's observed, the French revolution had produced "among the higher orders…a horror of every kind of innovation" among the British people; see E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working-Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 56-57, 106-107, 156-159.

[2315] U.S. *House Journal* 1791. 1st Cong. 3rd Sess. January 27

[2316] Ibid.

[2317] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 226.

[2318] Melancton Smith to Theodore Sedgwick, January 30, 1791, *Anti-Federalist Writing of Smith*, 392.

[2319] "An Exciseman" (1792); Philadelphia History Museum, Atwater Kent Collection at Drexel University.

[2320] Ibid.

ago."[2321] A sarcastic reminder of the historic hatred which Americans felt towards tax collectors, yet imbued with traces of political sorrow for their fellow citizens who became enthralled by the Devil's villainy and corruption, "An Exciseman" invoked affective and visual rhetorics akin to British America's anti-stamp and anti-tea tax political cartoons. These parallels become even more explicit as the farmers and distillers who participated in this exciseman's execution proclaim, as British America's anti-stamp tax radicals had before them, that they would "pay all due deference and respect to Congress" and would "not refuse to contribute amply for Support of Government."[2322] By early-1792, it seemed that the American people had begun to wonder whether all agents of federal government – legislative or executive – truly deserved their deference, respect, support, and affection.



Figure 6.1: "An Exciseman" (1792). Philadelphia History Museum, Atwater Kent Collection at Drexel University.

A House Divided – The Rise of Partisan Politics within the United States:

The rage, hatred, and fear that many Americans felt towards Hamilton's financial systems, when coupled with Washington's own rapidly souring opinion of France's revolution, provided James Madison the rare political opportunity to delineate a cohesive, oppositional ideology to address the republic's most pressing economic and diplomatic concerns. To achieve this objective, Madison courted public opinion through the ever-expanding American press. The Virginian subsequently published a torrent of serialized essays within Philadelphia's *National Gazette*. Formed by Thomas Jefferson, Francis Childs, and Philip Freneau as the partisan antithesis to Fenno's pro-government *Gazette of the United States*, the *National Gazettes* served as the central vehicle by which

[2321] "An Exciseman" (1792).
[2322] Ibid.

Madison rebuked the "the monarchial trappings that had been set up around President Washington and the inequalities of wealth and power being fostered by Alexander Hamilton's financial systems."[2323]

Madison began crafting his oppositional ideology in December 1791, when he advocated for a consolidation not "of the states into one government," but rather of the American people's "interests and affection."[2324] If the citizens of the United States shared "concord and confidence," Madison argued, then they would be more capable of "sympathiz[ing] with each other… interpos[ing] a common manifestation of their sentiment… tak[ing] alarm at usurpation or oppression… [and] consolidat[ing] their defence of the public liberty."[2325] It must be "the patriotic study of all," Madison concluded, both to protect America's "constitutional sphere" and to "erect…one paramount Empire of reason, benevolence, and brotherly affection" within the United States.[2326] By prioritizing national interest and nurturing the bonds of fellow-felling – rhetoric espoused more commonly by federalists like Fisher Ames – Madison framed himself and those who shared his political ideologies as the disinterested protectors of America's constitutional republic.

Madison's subsequent essay, simply entitled "Parties," built upon these foundational arguments. Conceding their unavoidability, the Virginian posited that political parties may strengthen the republic by properly mitigating "difference of interest, real or supposed," throughout the United States.[2327] A necessary evil, Madison concluded that the republic's emergent political parties may serve to "check" one another, which in turn would further the American people's attachment to disinterested "republicanism."[2328] An innovation within the federalists' separation of powers theory, "checks" within America's republic were now to be factional: the passions of one group serving as an institutional balance against the passions of another.

"Spirits of Government," published in February 1792, continued Madison's analysis of partisan politics. The nations of the world, Madison recounted, are prone to three types of governmental frameworks. First, there are those governments which function through a "permanent military force." These martial regimes, which "still oppress…almost every country of Europe," are at once "the cause of burdens on the people, and of submission in the people to their burdens."[2329] Next, there are those governments which function through "corrupt influence; substituting the motive of private interest in place of public duty."[2330] With "an army of interested partisans," these governments supply a popular "terror of the sword," through which they may "support a real dominion of the few, under an apparent liberty of the many."[2331] Thankfully, Madison observed, no such governments have appeared in North America – a truth which the United States may preserve, so long as it "never descend[s] to mimic [such] costly pageantry."[2332] After two not-so-subtle insults against Hamilton's defense of an American standing army and Adams's advocation for honorific titles, Madison detailed the third form of government, which justly derives its "energy from the will of the society."[2333] It is "the glory of America," Madison concluded, to "have invented," and "possess" in "unrivaled happiness," both national and state-based "republican governments."[2334]

[2323] Pasley, *Tyranny of Printers*, 66-67
[2324] James Madison, "Consolidation," *National Gazette*, December 3, 1791, in *Papers of Madison,* 14:137-139.
[2325] Ibid.
[2326] Ibid.
[2327] James Madison, "Parties," *National Gazette*, January 23, 1792, in *Papers of Madison*, 14:197-198.
[2328] Ibid.
[2329] James Madison, "Spirits of Government," *National Gazette*, February 20, 1792, in *Papers of Madison*, 14:233-234.
[2330] Ibid.
[2331] Ibid.
[2332] Ibid.
[2333] Ibid.
[2334] Ibid.

Two months after praising the structural magnificence of America's constitutional republics, Madison published "The Union: Who Are Its Real Friends?" – the culmination of his anti-Hamiltonian partisan ideology. True friends of the United States, Madison began, were not those who "alienat[ed] the affection of the people" by either accumulating national debt or establishing unjust taxes, but rather were those who voluntarily suppressed their own interest and ambition to better submit to the "authority of the people."[2335] True American patriots, therefore, supported a "limited and republican system of government," resisted the "injurious" public debt, and opposed "the spirit of usurpation and monarchy" that had emerged within the federal government's executive branch – tenets which served as the ideological pillars for Madison's new political party.[2336]

Through these four essays, Madison deftly defended what he perceived as the inevitable creation of political parties within the United States – a transformative moment in which the Virginian hoped to unify, and thus use to his political benefit, those Americans who harbored distrust for the Washington administration. If competing parties are unavoidable, then the most altruistic opposition party would serve to "check" the corrupted machinations of Hamilton and his federalist allies, whose covetous grab at fiscal-military power jeopardized national stability, and therefore deserved the hatred and fear of the American people. Three weeks later, the *National Gazette* conveniently observed that 'two parties…ha[d] shown themselves" within the federal government.[2337] As Adam Smith astutely observed, a "true party-man hates and despises candour; and in reality, there is no vice which could so effectually disqualify him for the trade of party-man as that single virtue."[2338] The birth of America's two-party system signaled the death of national trust.

Madison did not birth a second political party by himself. Rather, the Virginian ex-federalist had keenly observed, and then strategically exploited, the divisions inherent among the American people. The early republic's political elite, however, had exacerbated these divisions through their reliance upon the impassioned rhetoric of enemyship. Three weeks after Madison had published "The Union," Abigail Adams confessed to her sister Mary that she "firmly believe[d]" if she lived but "Ten Years longer" she would "see a division of the Southern & Northern States, unless more candour & less intrigue, of which I have no hopes, should prevail."[2339] One week after Abigail's letter, one New Yorker, likely Philp Freneau, published "Sentiments of a Republican," which chastised those Americans who sought to "substitute in the room of our equal republic, a baneful monarchy," specifically through the "proposition for titles, for an equestrian statue, for keeping birth days, and for emitting royal coins" to honor the president.[2340] The epistle then lambasted those self-interested, so-called patriots who endorsed the national debt, as it was "a monster, from whose foetid bowels proceed monarchy, aristocracy, and slavery."[2341] By early-September 1792, John Beckley observed that the American people had coalesced themselves around two ideologies: those of Alexander Hamilton and those of "the people" – referring to the supporters of Madison and Jefferson.[2342] To punctuate the hatred between these two parties, Beckley reported that he had heard from a reliable source, that Hamilton now considered Madison his "personal & political enemy."[2343]

[2335] James Madison, "The Union: Who Are Its Real Friends?", *National Gazette*, March 31, 1792, in *Papers of Madison*, 14:274
[2336] Ibid.
[2337] *National Gazette*, April 30, 1792; Pasley, *"Tyranny of Printers,"* 68-69.
[2338] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 155.
[2339] Abigail Adams to Mary Cranch, April 20, 1792, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 9:279.
[2340] *National Gazette*, April 26, 1792.
[2341] Ibid.
[2342] John Beckley to James Madison, September 2, 1792, *Papers of Madison*, 14:354
[2343] Ibid, 14:355.

Contemporaneous to Hamilton's newfound hatred for Madison, the Virginian published "A Candid State of Parties," which further delineated America's two "proto-parties" into the Republican party, which desired to "save republicanism," and the Antirepublican (Federalist) party, which desired the restoration of "monarchy or aristocracy."[2344] Antirepublicans (federalists), Madison explained, were ruled by "moneyed" men, who took "advantage of all prejudices, local, political, and occupation" to "prevent or disturb a general coalition of sentiments" among the American people.[2345] By inciting such political division, these corrupted leaders maintained power within the federal government. Subtly echoing the elitist, interested charge often levied against imperial loyalists, Madison stoked both fear of and hatred for those Americans who had betrayed their revolutionary ideologies for status and profit. Conversely, Madison presented his fellow republicans as political midwives who now labored to procure a "general harmony" of "interest and sentiment" among "the mass of people in every part of the union, in every state, and of every occupation."[2346] Devoted to restoring America's bonds of national fellow-feeling, republicans depicted themselves as disinterested patriots, unwilling to endanger their republic's constitutional government or its citizens' personal freedoms. To solidify this crucial partisan distinction, Madison made one final publication in December, entitled "Best-Keepers of Liberty." In this text, Madison succinctly argued that antirepublicans believed the American people to be "stupid, suspicious, licentious" and therefore demand their "obedience," whereas republicans are "[t]he people themselves," and therefore are worthy of the "sacred trust" and responsibilities of government.[2347]

To Madison's political benefit, the executive cabinet had already succumbed to the partisan division depicted within the *National Gazette*. By mid-October 1792, Washington had reprimanded both Hamilton and Jefferson for their unrelenting animosity towards one another.[2348] To Hamilton, Washington bemoaned the readiness of "zealous patriots," who claim to desire nothing above the welfare of their republic, but then sowed discord by "impregnat[ing]" America's newspapers with "wounding suspicions, and irritating charges" against their ideological opponents.[2349] To Jefferson, Washington conveyed not only his "regret" at the "difference in opinions which [had] arisen" between two of "the best Citizens of the United States," but also his "arden[t] wish that some line could be marked out by which both [men] could walk."[2350] To Washington's chagrin, reconciliation and compromise proved unattainable, as Hamilton valued not reconciliation, but rather proving himself the victim of Jefferson's "uniformed opposition."[2351]

Beyond offending the delicate sensibilities of Washington's treasury secretary, Jefferson's "uniformed opposition" already had tarnished his once beloved friendship with Washington's vice-president. In spring 1791, the *National Gazette* had printed Thomas Paine's refutation of the *Discourses on Davila*. A error occurred, however, which resulted in the publication of one of Jefferson's personal letters, in which he conveyed his "displeasure" for Adams's essays.[2352] "I have a dozen times taken up my pen to write to you and as often laid it down again, suspended between opposing considerations," Jefferson confessed to Adams in July 1791.[2353] Confident in their "friendship,"

[2344] James Madison, "A Candid State of Parties," *National Gazette*, September 22, 1792, in *Papers of Madison*, 14:370-372; Leonard and Cornell, *Partisan Republic*, 51-52.
[2345] Madison, "A Candid State of Parties," *National Gazette*, September 26, 1792.
[2346] Ibid.
[2347] James Madison, "Best-Keepers of Liberty," *National Gazette*, December 20, 1972; in *Papers of Madison*, 14:426-428.
[2348] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, August 26, 1792; George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, October 18, 1792, both in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series* 11:38-39.
[2349] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, August 26, 1792, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series* 11:38-39.
[2350] George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, October 18, 1792, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series* 11:238-239
[2351] Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, September 9, 1792, *Papers of Hamilton*, 12:348.
[2352] Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, May 8, 1791, *Papers Washington, Presidential Series*, 8:163-164.
[2353] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, July 17, 1791, *Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 245-246.

Jefferson provided an "explanation" for his actions, and hoped that Adams would forgive the egregious betrayal.[2354] While the vice-president conceded that the public nature of this attack was likely accidental, he refused Jefferson's apology, for the Virginian's critiques had reinforced a popular falsehood: that Adams had "favour[ed] the Introduction of hereditary Monarchy and Aristocracy" to the United States.[2355] Despondent at both the "floods and Whirlwinds of tempestuous Abuse" which he had suffered for his political writings and the "unbridled Rivalries which [had] already appeared" within the republic, Adams confessed that he wished to retire from public life, tepidly reassuring Jefferson that their friendship "still [was] very dear to [his] heart."[2356]

Both Washington's cabinet and the federal congress had fallen into such affective and political discord that many of the nation's leaders feared that they might live to see the republic's "sacred knot" finally severed. By Christmas 1792, the vice-president had contemplated retirement from public service and the treasury secretary prepared to engage in a one-man ideological war against both the secretary of state and the most influential member of Congress. Despite his own longings for retirement, the president found it impossible to abandon the republic at such a precarious moment of infighting, distrust, and disunion.[2357] Washington's reelection, however, condemned him to steer the federal ship of state through a relentless, three-year torrent of partisan fear, anger, hatred, and betrayal, all of which began in the spring of 1793.

Terrifying Revolution, Terrified Diplomats – Citizen Genêt and America's War for Neutrality:

France's republic began 1793 with a wave of bloodshed and violence. The morning of January 21, cheers of "Long live the nation! Long live the Republic!" were heard emanating from the Place de la Révolution.[2358] At least 80,000 people eagerly gathered and watched as Louis XVI lay his head upon the republic's execution block, softly proclaimed his innocence, uttered a prayer to God that his "blood" not stain "France," and then unleashed a "frightful scream, that was stifled only with the fall of the blade."[2359] Now liberated from their monarch, the National Assembly declared war against Britain on February 1.[2360] Amid both civil strife and diplomatic fluctuations, Edmond-Charles Genêt set sail from Rochefort on February 20.[2361] The diplomat's mission: to negotiate a new treaty with the United States which secured the republic's support of France's "maritime war against both British and Spanish shipping," encouraged the immediate repayment of all debts still owed, and protected France's favored access to American ports.[2362] Lastly, France's revolutionary

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[2354] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, July 17, 1791, Adams-Jefferson Letters, 245-246..

[2355] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, July 29, 1791, *Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 247.

[2356] Ibid.

[2357] For Washington's desire to retire from the presidency after his first term, see Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, May 23, 1792; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, July 29, 1792, both in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 10:408-414, 588-592. Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 28

[2358] Tackett, *Coming of the Terror*, 240-242

[2359] Ibid; Tackett notes that the brutal execution of France's former king emerged from one of the greatest legislature failures of French statesman Maximillien Robespierre, who was unable to convince the National Assembly to outlaw the death penalty in May 1791, see *Coming of the Terror*, 35-36.

[2360] William R. Casto, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution in the Age of Fighting Sail* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 19

[2361] Boston's *Argus*, April 19, 1793; Castro, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 9; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 330 ff.

[2362] Casto explains that the Articles 17, 21, and 22 of the *Treaty of Amity and Commerce* (1778) "expressly guaranteed French ships and their prizes access to American ports, and expressly barred the enemies of France from fitting out privateers in America and crewing them with Americans." France, however, also understood these articles to grant France the implicit right "to fit out French privateers in America and to crew them with Americans"; see Castro, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 14-17.

government urged Genêt to foment insurrection, whenever possible, within British Canada, Spanish Florida, and the Louisiana territory.[2363]

News took weeks, sometimes months, to reach the United States from Paris. By December 1792, reliable reports that French republicans had implemented the guillotine finally crossed the Atlantic. Worried for the safety of her own husband, Abigail Adams desperately hoped that America's own newly-minted republicans would "not follow the French example & Lop of[f] Heads" of those federalists in Washington's cabinet.[2364] Aware of the escalating, anti-monarchical passions raging in France, Jeremy Belknap observed in mid-March that the American people remained "uncertain" as to "whether Louis XVI is Louis Capet or Louis sine capite."[2365] Unbeknownst to Belknap, Washington's cabinet soon received their definitive, horrifying answer.

A few days after Belknap penned his darkly humored letter, Washington's secretaries began to receive confirmation of Louis XVI's execution.[2366] This singular event forced an uncomfortable political question: had revolutionary France achieved the greatest of political victories or had it sunk to the basest of savage passions by perpetrating one of the few acts of anti-monarchical violence which America's own revolutionaries had fantasized, but never intended to commit, against George III. Unabashedly displaying his Franco-republican sensibilities, Jefferson conveyed shock that "the death of the king of France [had] not produced as open condemnations from the Monocrats"– the federalists – as he had "expected."[2367] Albeit not as vocal as anticipated, the execution of France's sovereign encouraged Hamilton to preach both patience and fear. The United States must enter into a period of strict non-enforcement of its treaty with France, the treasury secretary anonymously argued in the *Gazette of the United States*, as the republic must not become involved in France's "*pending* and *disputed* revolution."[2368] Despite the National Assembly's questionable, if not illegitimate, diplomatic authority, the Hamilton reluctantly conceded that Jefferson, as Washington's Secretary of State, must officially receive Genêt upon his arrival in Philadelphia.[2369] Diplomatic protocol aside, Hamilton privately worked to convince both Washington and the federal congress to invoke European neutrality.[2370]

To Jefferson's dismay, Washington proved susceptible to the treasury secretary's arguments. By late-March, Washington had confided to Gouverneur Morris that America would be "unwise…in the extreme to involve [itself] in the contest of European Nations," as its contribution "could be but small; tho' the loss to [itself] would be certain."[2371] At the core of Washington's diplomatic strategy lay a simple fear: that America's republic, struggling to navigate its own economic stability and internal political discord, would not survive another transatlantic war. Several weeks later, Washington learned that hostilities had "commenced" between the French republic and the British empire, cementing his belief that the federal government must "use every means in its power to prevent the citizens" of those nations, such as Genêt, "from embroiling" the United States in

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[2363] Castro, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 14.
[2364] Abigail Adams to John Adams, December 4, 1792, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 9:333-334; for an excellent and concise analysis of how the cabinet responded to the first few months of 1793, see Chervinsky, *Cabinet*, 201-203.
[2365] Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, March 20, 1793, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 3:325.
[2366] For such accounts, see Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 24, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 25:442-443; Alexander Hamilton, *Gazette of the United States*, Mid-March to April 1793, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 14:267-268.
[2367] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 24, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 25:442-443.
[2368] Alexander Hamilton, *Gazette of the United States*, Mid-March to April 1793, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 14:267-268; Casto, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 26-27
[2369] Thomas Jefferson, March 30, 1793, in *The Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson*, ed., Franklin B. Sawvel (New York: Round Table Press, 1903), 115-116.
[2370] Casto, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 28.
[2371] George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, March 25, 1793, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 12:380

war.[2372] Resolute, Washington concluded that the federal government must "maintain a strict neutrality."[2373]

Unable to change the president's mind, Jefferson petitioned Edmund Randolph, whom Washington had charged with drafting his executive neutrality proclamation, to employ language that subtly benefitted France, including a provision for the National Assembly's to access American funds.[2374] France, however, received no such beneficial status within Washington's "Proclamation of Neutrality," which declared that the United States would "pursue a conduct friendly and impartial" toward all "belligerent powers." [2375] Aware that many Americans harbored sympathy for their revolutionary compatriots in Frace, Washington warned that severe punishment would follow any citizen who violated this order of neutrality "by committing, aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles, which are deemed contraband."[2376] If apprehended by a foreign power, American smugglers would find no protection from the Washington administration. The President of the United States, for the first time in the republic's brief history, had forbade its citizens from participating in revolution and war.

Washington's desire for neutrality, however, created a host of new problems for the executive cabinet. While federalists like Rufus King praised the proclamation, Jefferson not only "fear[ed] that a fair neutrality [would] prove a disagreeable pill" to France's republicans, but also felt grave concern over the improper diplomatic precedence which Washington now established: that the United States nullified its international treaties at the first sign of armed conflict.[2377] The "people who constitute a society or nation [are] the source of all authority in that nation," Jefferson argued.[2378] The treaties in question were not formed "between the U.S. and Louis Capet," but rather were "between the two nations of America & France."[2379] The "danger," that would emerge from abandoning these promises of friendship, Jefferson concluded, would be "great, inevitable & imminent."[2380] America's first international action upon the world stage, Jefferson now feared, had ruined its diplomatic reputation.

Unsurprisingly, Hamilton categorically rebuked Jefferson's Franco-republican arguments. It is a "melancholic truth," Hamilton lamented, that there is a "discription of men" within the United States who, consumed by "infatuation or depravity," oppose the current administration and intend to "disturb the tranquility, order, and prosperity" of their "truly happy" republic.[2381] The "zeal for the liberty of mankind" had produced "universal sympathy" among the American people for the "first stages" of France's revolution.[2382] But to succumb to the will of America's rabble-rousers and subject their own republic to the frivolous violence of European warfare, Hamilton concluded, would only harm the "welfare" of the United States.[2383] Unburdened with Jefferson's fears of

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[2372] George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, April 12, 1793, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 12:448.
[2373] Ibid.
[2374] Chervinsky, *Cabinet*, 200; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 338-339.
[2375] George Washington, "Proclamation of Neutrality," April 22, 1793, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series* 12:472-473
[2376] Ibid.
[2377] Rufus King to Alexander Hamilton, April 24, 1793, in *Life and Correspondence of King*, 1:439; Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 28, 1793; "Opinion on the French Treaty," April 28, 1793, both in *Papers of Jefferson*, 25:619; 608-618
[2378] Jefferson, "Opinion on the French Treaty," April 28, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 25:608-609.
[2379] Ibid. For Hamilton's belief that America's treaty was with Louis XVI, see "Pacificus No. 4," July 10, 1793, in *The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794: Toward the Completion of the American Founding*, ed., Morton J. Frisch (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007)
[2380] Ibid.
[2381] Alexander Hamilton, "Defence of the President's Neutrality Proclamation," in, 2.
[2382] Ibid, 2-3.
[2383] Ibid, 2-3.

diplomatic impotence, Hamilton appealed to the bonds of national fellow-feeling, hopeful that his fellow Americans would not risk the lives of their own countrymen for the sake of France's chaotic revolution and foolhardy war against Britain. To Jefferson's chagrin, Hamilton's arguments gained further credibility when Genêt, now port-hopping across the United States, began to incite "public manifestations" of "cordiality" for the French republic.[2384]

When Genêt finally docked in Philadelphia in May 1793, he "received the most flattering marks of attention," as American "farmers and merchants readily offered" him "their flour and other articles of provision at a lower price than to the agents of any other nation."[2385] The *Massachusetts Spy* reported that Genêt had "awakened" within Philadelphia's republicans "sentiments of gratitude for [their] generous allies, the defenders of the rights of man."[2386] The *Virginia Chronicle and Norfolk and Portsmouth General Advertiser* recounted one shocking "Republican Dinner," at which Philadelphians brazenly toasted "The French Republic" before "The United States," and then proclaimed an ardent desire for "all heads [to] be soon under one cap, that of liberty."[2387] Further emboldened, Genêt privately lambasted Washington's neutrality as the "cowardly abandonment" of "friends in the moment when danger menaces them."[2388] Genêt then impetuously argued that the federal government's supposed betrayal of the French republic was "certainly not the intention of the American people."[2389] Jefferson's hypothetical fears had transformed into lived terrors, as the French diplomat not only perceived the United States as diplomatically deceptive, but also had circumnavigated the national government to appeal directly to the passions of the American people. Genêt's carelessness now exposed him to federalist accusations that he, as well as the French republic, intended to incite treasonous, partisan violence among the citizens of the United States.

While Genêt basked in the fraternal adoration of the American people, Hamilton and Madison engaged in an affective press war over Washington's neutrality proclamation.[2390] Under the apt pseudonym of Pacificus, Hamilton rebuked any claim that the United States' current neutrality was "inconsistent with the gratitude due to France, for services rendered" during America's own revolution.[2391] Rather, the treasury secretary argued that the executive cabinet had to make the unenviable yet necessary decision to prioritize the peace and well-being of the American people over the United States' friendship with and affection for France. [2392] Unwilling to "sacrifice the true interests of the Country," Washington rightfully chose neutrality.[2393]

Pacificus, however, also urged the American people to remain cautious of the National Assembly, as it had decapitated Louis XVI, whose generosity and "will alone" had provided the United States with the aid and arms necessary to secure its own independence.[2394] "If there was any kindness in the decision," Pacificus argued, that "demand[ed]" a "return[ed] of kindness" from the American people, "it was the kindness of Louis the XVI," for "his heart was the depository" of that "sentiment."[2395] Lastly, Hamilton rhetorically redirected the American people's rising fear and anger

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[2384] *Virginia Gazette and Alexandria Advertiser*, May 16, 1793.
[2385] *Massachusetts Spy*, May 30, 1793.
[2386] Ibid.
[2387] *Virginia Chronicle and Norfolk and Portsmouth General Advertiser*, June 8, 1793.
[2388] Edmund Genêt to Thomas Jefferson, June 8, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 26:231-233.
[2389] Ibid.
[2390] For an extensive legal and diplomatic analysis of the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, see Casto, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 59-82, Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 360-62; note that the Pacificus essays were both printed in the *Gazette of the United States*.
[2391] Alexander Hamilton, "Pacificus No. 4," July 10, 1793, in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 30
[2392] Hamilton, "Pacificus No. 4," 30-31.
[2393] Ibid, 32-33.
[2394] Hamilton, "Pacificus No. 5," July 13-17, 1793, in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 37-38.
[2395] Ibid.

from Washington towards the republicans, whose desire to express "gratitude" toward the French republic was so great that they were "not ashamed to brand Louis the XVI as a Tyrant, and La Fayette as a Traitor."[2396] To achieve their interested political ambitions, republicans not only ginned-up a false sense of indebtedness to France's anarchical government, but also betrayed the trust of those French patriots who had sacrificed their own blood and treasure for America's independence.

Desperate to curb Hamilton's sway over the American people, Jefferson begged Madison to "take up [his] pen" and "cut" the New Yorker "to pieces."[2397] A "grating" task, Madison reluctantly authored the Helvidius essays, which fueled popular terror of and rage against the Washington administration's monarchial abuses of power.[2398] The Senate, not the executive, held the constitutional power to make war and to ratify treaties with foreign nations.[2399] Helvidius chided Pacificus for defending the executive's improper grab at diplomatic power, declaring it "an absurdity" in theory, and "in practice a tyranny."[2400] The fury which Americans should feel against the executive's betrayal, Helvidius continued, paled in comparison to the federalists' own terrifying lust for power, which had emboldened them to abandon their affection for the French people and to imbue the president with all the "royal prerogatives of the British government."[2401] If the federal congress foolishly consented to Washington's neutrality proclamation, Helvidius warned, then nothing might stop a future, less patriotic president from unilaterally declaring war for his immoral profit. Such a precedence, therefore, would condemn the American people to suffer under the "strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses" of their chief executive – "ambition, avarice, vanity, [and] the honorable or venial love of fame" – which then, in turn, would neutralize his "desire and duty of peace."[2402] Unlike Hamilton's assault upon the French republic's anarchical violence, Madison demonized the executive cabinet for its tyrannical violation of the *United States Constitution*.

The American people's eagerness to defend Genêt public irreverence toward the Washington administration, however, affectively mooted Madison's accusations of executive tyranny. Two weeks before the publication of the first Helvidius essay, the *New York Journal and Patriotic Register* published an anonymous letter from "A Mechanic," which emphatically refuted popular rumors that Genêt had insulted President Washington and two of New York's most influential federalists: John Jay and Rufus King.[2403] This "injurious" report, "A Mechanic" concluded, had unjustly discouraged the American people from "paying tribute of attachment to the French republic."[2404] Jay and King swiftly responded. Both federalists confirmed that they had received credible intelligence that Genêt intended to circumvent proper diplomatic channels and incite the American people into disobeying Washington's proclamation.[2405] Simultaneously, New York's *Columbian Gazetteer* published a letter from Genêt to Jefferson, in which he accused Washington of failing to "correspond with the views of the people of America," who held "affectionate regard" for France's "cause of liberty."[2406]

[2396] Hamilton, "Pacificus No. 5," July 13-17, 1793, in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 37-38, 40.
[2397] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, July 7, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 26:443-444.
[2398] James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 30, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 26:585-587.
[2399] James Madison, "Helvidius, No. 1," August 24, 1793, in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 59
[2400] Madison, "Helvidius, No. 1," in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 59.
[2401] Ibid, 63; Madison, "Helvidius, No. 2 & No. 3," August 31 – September 7, 1793, in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 65 ff.
[2402] Madison, "Helvidius, No. 4," September 14, 1793, in *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 87.
[2403] *New York Journal and Patriotic Register*, August 10, 1793; in *Selected Papers of Jay*, 5:562.
[2404] Ibid.
[2405] John Jay and Rufus King, August 12, 1793, *The Diary, or Loundon's Register*, in *Selected Papers of Jay*, 5:562; this letter was also reprinted in the *Massachusetts Spy* and the *Virginia Gazette*; Casto, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 140-142.
[2406] *Columbian Gazetteer*, August 22, 1793; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 345-352.

Amid this diplomatic debacle, Henry Knox noted the emergence of a horrid political cartoon, entitled the "Funeral of George W----n and James W----n, king and judge," which depicted the president laid upon an American guillotine.[2407] To make matters worse, Washington had seen the cartoon himself, after which he passionately proclaimed that he would "rather be in his grave" than continue to endure such "personal abuse."[2408] To combat such grotesque imagery, the *Albany Gazette* praised Washington's "patriotic conduct" and reassured the American people that they had "not the least reason to suspect" that the president had, or ever would, "knowingly pursue" actions "injurious to his country."[2409] Unlike the interested republicans within his cabinet, the president's own bonds of national fellow-feeling had never succumbed to the lust for power.

To continued their anti-republican assault, federalists printed their own political cartoon, *A Peep into the Antifederal Club* (see Figure 6.2), which mocked the political clubs that republicans had begun to form.[2410] At the top left of the cartoon, the antifederal club's bylaws are listed, including anarchical tenets such as "Government [is] but another name for Aristocracy," "Liberty is the Power of doing anything we like," and "Laws are unwholesome restraints on Natural rights."[2411] This rhetoric evoked, in unambiguous terms, federalists' terror that France's anarchical politics had infiltrated America's own republic. To emphasize the extensive threat of these political organizations, this antifederal club's members included Secretary of State Jefferson; Citizen Genêt, who holds a plan for the "entire subversion" of the American government; an enslaved African named "Citizen Mungo," who endorsed France's revolution as it will lead to his "turn nex"; and the devil himself, who boasts: "I never knew an Institution Equal to this since the Creation. What a Pleasure it is to see one's work thrive so well."[2412] Harkening back to the deep-seated hatred which British Americans felt for devil-worshiping French Catholics and those who courted enslaved rebellion, *A Peep into the Antifederal Club* confirmed the horrific anarchy which the people of the United States would suffer under a government of republicans.

The brazenness of Genêt's public decorum, the ineffectuality of Madison's rhetoric, the perceived diplomatic ineptitude of Jefferson, and the hostile depictions of Washington's execution gradually erased popular support for France's revolution.[2413] If "all the people in America were now assembled" before him, Hamilton confided to Randolph in mid-November 1793, he would not hesitate to "declare" his "abhorrence" for France's botched revolution.[2414] That said, small bands of American republicans stalwartly defended the "flowers of Jacobincal Rhetorick," hoping that their republic might still assist France in its "War with England" while sustaining "Peace" with "the rest

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[2407] Thomas Jefferson, "Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genêt," August 2, 1793, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 26:601-603.

[2408] Ibid, Jefferson reported the following: "Knox in a foolish incoherent sort of a speech introduced the Pasquinade lately printed, called the funeral of George W—n and James W—n, king and judge &c. where the President was placed on a Guillotin. The Presidt. was much inflamed, got into one of those passions when he cannot command himself. Run on much on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him. Defied any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in the government which was not done on the purest motives. That he had never repented but once the having slipped the moment of resigning his office, and that was every moment since. That *by god* he had rather be in his grave than in his present situation. That he had rather be on his farm than to be made *emperor of the world* and yet that they were charging him with wanting to be a king. That that *rascal Freneau* sent him of his papers every day, as if he thought he would become the distributor of his papers, that he could see in this nothing but an impudent design to insult him. He ended in this high tone."

[2409] *Albany Gazette*, August 12, 1793.

[2410] *A Peep into the Antifederal Club* (New York, 1793); Library Company of Philadelphia.

[2411] Ibid

[2412] Ibid

[2413] Casto, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 142-143.

[2414] Thomas Jefferson, November 15, 1793, in *The Anas*, 178.

of Europe."[2415] Relatively quiet following the controversy of his *Discourse on Davila*, John Admas privately expressed to his son Charles that he hoped the American people would abandon their folly and finally admit that the French republic had transformed into a state of "Uncontrolled Power, at the disposition of Uncontrolled Passions" – in other words, that it had succumbed to "Tyranny."[2416]

Figure 6.2: *A Peep into the Antifederal Club* (New York, 1793)
Library Company of Philadelphia.

To consolidate the rising tide of anti-French sentiment, Hamilton reframed France's revolution as a dangerous political crisis in his "Americanus" epistles. The National Assembly had succumbed to "principles and opinions so wild, so extreme" and "passions so turbulent, so tempestuous," that they would be unable to form a stable government.[2417] Further, Hamilton lauded the president's swift invocation of neutrality, which had prevented the United States from "rashly mingl[ing]" its "destiny in the consequences of the errors and extravagances of another nation."[2418] Massachusetts federalist Christopher Gore took this argument one step further, and condemned Genêt as "the author of the political errors" of America's "false patriots."[2419] It had been the French

[2415] For examples of Jay and King's continual press assault against Genêt, see *New York Daily Advertiser*, November 26, 1793; December 2, 1793; John Adams to Charles Adams, December 23, 1793, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 9:482-483.
[2416] John Adams to Charles Adams, May 17, 1794, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 10:183.
[2417] Alexander Hamilton, "Americanus, No. 1," January 31, 1794, *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 100-101.
[2418] Alexander Hamilton, "Americanus, No. 2," February 7, 1794, *Pacificus-Helvidius Debates*, 115.
[2419] Christopher Gore, "Manlius No. 2", *Columbian Centinel*, September 6, 1794.

diplomat's secret intention, Gore argued, to incite civil war in three of America's most populace states – Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts – and then encourage his supporters to assume the names of "Republican, Democrat, and Constitutional" to justify their "seditious and tyrannical designs" against the federal government.[2420] By early-spring 1794, federalists had branded France's revolution, and those republicans who supported it, as the hated harbingers of anarchy and treason.

Congress finally passed its *Neutrality Act* in summer 1794, legitimizing the spirit of Washington's initial proclamation.[2421] Federalists' diplomatic and partisan victory, however, came at a profound cost for both Washington and the lingering threads of national unity. Since May 1793, Jefferson found himself disgusted with the sway that federalist "satellites and sycophants" held over the president.[2422] "Naked," Washington "would have been sanctimoniously reverenced" by all Americans.[2423] The federalists, however, had "inveloped" the president in the "rags of royalty"; hostile garments which "can hardly be torn off" without suffering painful "laceration."[2424] The unchecked power and authority which these anti-republican Anglophiles granted the president, Jefferson feared, might be "supported" through Washington's "personal character," but "no character after him could ever maintain" such authority without being called a tyrant.[2425] The president's favoritism towards Hamilton and his Francophobic sentiments finally disillusioned Jefferson from his once unbound admiration for the president. Unable to stomach the federalist cabal that he perceived as controlling the executive cabinet, Thomas Jefferson resigned his office on December 31, 1793; an act of political protest that only cemented the early republic's inherent and profound divisiveness.[2426] As "American Minerva" wrote the New-Year's edition of the *Columbian Centinel* , "party spirit is as great a curse to society as can befall it; it makes honest men hate each other, and destroys good neighbourhood…and makes fellow citizens greater strangers and more adverse to each other, than if they were of two different nations."[2427] Hatred and adversity had befallen the United States, and its frayed bonds of national fellow-feeling soon became even more apparent in the violence that erupted in a small, western Pennsylvanian town.

<u>To Rage Against Taxation – America's Whiskey Rebellion:</u>

France's revolution was not the sole affective catalyst for the escalation of partisan division that occurred both within Washington's cabinet and throughout the United States. Simultaneous to these contested battles over transatlantic neutrality, the federal republic engaged in its first fiscal-miliary offensive against its own citizens. Congress's excise on domestically distilled spirits arose from a pragmatic need to sustain Hamilton's extensive plan for establishing America's public credit.[2428] Ironically, Hamilton's fiscal agenda required the national government to reject the "narrow compass" of taxation powers which the treasury secretary had first proscribed to the House in *Federalist 12*.[2429] Further exacerbating concerns of federal overreach, Congress passed a new militia act in 1792, which outlined uniform criteria for mustering, managing, and discipling the individual

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[2420] Christopher Gore, "Manlius No. 2", *Columbian Centinel*, September 6, 1794.

[2421] Castro, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 158-162; Castro observes that the only item which Madison and his republican contingent within the House were able to strike from the Senate's initial bill was the "provision outlawing the sale of prizes and cargoes."

[2422] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 9, 1793, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 26:241.

[2423] Ibid.

[2424] Ibid.

[2425] Ibid.

[2426] Chervinsky, *Cabinet*, 233.

[2427] *Columbian Centinel*, January 1, 1794.

[2428] U.S. *House Journal* 1791. 1st Cong. 3rd Sess. January 27.

[2429] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 12*, in *DHRC* 14:237-238; Thomas Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 186), 97.

state's militias when called forth by the president for "national defence."[2430] The perceived aggrandizements of the federal government's purse and saber struck a sour chord among backcountry farmers in Pennsylvania, Virginia, the Carolinas, and the Kentucky territory, as they believed that the "woes of frontier life" had "excused" them from the "the inquisitive and peremptory spirit," as well as the political responsibility, of submitting to Congress's excise laws. [2431]

Like western England's anti-cider tax protests of 1763 and the British colonies' anti-stamp tax resistance of 1765, America's western farmers directed their popular, violent rage toward federal excisemen. In October 1791, an "unhappy man of the name of Wilson" entered western Pennsylvania "affect[ing] to be, and perhaps thought he was, an excise man."[2432] Official reports described Wilson as an individual who was "in some measure disordered in his intellects" – an antiquated description for one who suffered from a socially noticeable mental, psychological, or emotional disability, and therefore explains the odd description that Wilson "thought" himself a federal tax collector.[2433] Shortly after his arrival, a band of enraged farmers seized him from his bed, "stripped [him] of his cloaths," and then "inhumanely burnt" him with a "heated iron,…tarred and feathered" him, and then drove him out of the town "naked, wounded, and otherwise in a very suffering condition."[2434] Beyond this singular act of horrid violence, unsubstantiated reports began to emerge from Pittsburgh that radicalized farmers were discussing formal secession from both Pennsylvania and the federal republic.[2435] Pennsylvania's western farmers had exhibited both the impassioned violence of British America's anti-Parliament radicals and the secessionist rhetoric falsely attributed to Massachusetts's regulators. Northern federalists swiftly condemned the farmers' "irregular proceedings" and calculated acts of "sedition."[2436] The rights of resistance, rebellion, and revolution, however, proved difficult to purge from America's "public memory," and the federalists' fiery rebuke of western Pennsylvanians inadvertently nurtured popular "disenchantment, frustration, and anger" towards the federal government.[2437]

Either oblivious or apathetic to popular accusations of monocratic ambition, Hamilton urged Washington to denounce these western farmers and, if necessary, deploy armed soldiers to end their rebellion.[2438] Impatient, the treasury secretary drafted an unauthorized executive proclamation which ordered Pennsylvania's farmers to "desist" their revolt, lest they suffer the full "force" of the United States.[2439] While Washington reluctantly endorsed Hamilton's coded threat of state-sanctioned violence against American citizens, he did so with a terse warning: the deployment of federal soldiers must be "the dernier resort," as their presence in Pennsylvania's backcountry would ignite a new debate over the appropriateness of "standing armies" within the republic.[2440]

[2430] *An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National Defence by Establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States* (Philadelphia: Francis Childs and John Swaine, 1792); Library of Congress.
[2431] Hamilton, *Federalist 12*, in *DHRC* 14:237-238; Engels, *Enemyship*, 120-121.
[2432] Alexander Hamilton, *The Proceedings of the Executive of the United States, Respecting the Insurgents, 1794* (Philadelphia: John Fenno, 1795) 104; American Antiquarian Society; William Findley, *History of the Insurrections, in the Four Western Counties of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: Samuel Harrison Smith, 1796), 58; American Antiquarian Society.
[2433] Ibid.
[2434] Ibid.
[2435] Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 117.
[2436] Ibid.
[2437] Engels, *Enemyship*, 115; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 117
[2438] Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, September 22, 1792, *Papers of Hamilton*, 12:412-415; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 117, 122.
[2439] Ibid.
[2440] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, September 17, 1792, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 11:126; for the "Proclamation," see September 15, 1792, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 17:150-151; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 122-123.

By mid-1793, western Pennsylvania's resistance to the federal spirits tax caught the severely preoccupied attention of Thomas Jefferson. Fatigued from his diplomatic responsibilities and eager to leave the "tumult" of public life, the foreign secretary still found time to report to Madison that a band of western farmers, "blacked & otherwise disguised," had visited a local "excise officer & threatened to burn his house."[2441] The parallel to Boston's tea riot – participating in an impassioned act of economic violence while garbed in the attire of a racialized political other – is striking. The farmers' enraged, hate-fueled assault proved affective. Like Andrew Oliver, James McEvers, and George Mercer before him, the Pennsylvania tax collector, so terrified of bodily harm, immediately resigned his appointment. The "frontier rabble of foreign anarchists," Hamilton concluded, had so corrupted America's rural west that the federal government held "no possibility" of "execut[ing]" its excise without first exercising martial force.[2442] Since the publication of the *Publius* epistles, Hamilton had presented the American military as one of the loci of nationalism for the early republic.[2443] It is unsurprising, therefore, that Hamilton depicted the western insurrectionists as traitors to both the national sentiments and constitutional government of the United States. By refusing to fulfill their political action responsibilities as American citizens, these western farmers had become the new target of Hamilton's impassioned rhetoric of enemyship.

By early-1794, federalists saw the specter of "dread anarchy" rising on two, equally concerning horizons: western farmers' violent opposition to federal taxation and the resurgence of "Frenchif[ied]" politics in Jacobin inspired Democratic Societies. [2444] The citizens of France had substituted "Monarchy & Nobility" with "a Tyranny of Clubbs and Majorities," lamented the vice-president, the latter of which was "the worst Tyranny that ever existed among Men."[2445] To federalists' dismay, these ostensibly tyrannical organizations began to form throughout the United States. The most prominent of these clubs, the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, purported itself to oppose popular ignorance, "the irreconciled enemy of Liberty."[2446]As nearly of all its members proscribed to Franco-republican political ideologies, these Democratic Societies had become scapegoats for the social unrest and political violence that now plagued the United States.[2447] By late-summer 1794, even the president himself had come to suspect that Genêt, the "father" of America's Democratic Societies, had fostered their creation for the sole purpose of "shak[ing]" the federal government "to its foundations."[2448] Federalists believed their conspiratorial fears proven true when farmers in Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland – the same Pennsylvanian insurrectionists who had refused to register their whiskey stills for taxation the previous June – began to enroll as members in Washington Town's Democratic Society.[2449] Frenchified republicans,

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[2441] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 19, 1793, and June 9, 1793, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 26: 61-62; 240.
[2442] Jefferson to Madison, May 19, 1793, *Papers of Jefferson*, 26:61-62; Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, September 3, 1792, in *Selected Papers of Jay*, 5:449-450; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 59, 139. Rasmussen argues that Hamilton understood the American military as the loci of nationalism for the early republic. within his rhetoric of enemyship; see *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 62, 80-82.
[2443] Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 62, 80-82.
[2444] Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, March 26, 1794, *Works of Ames*, 2:1038; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 415-456
[2445] John Adams to Charles Adams, February 14, 1795, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 10:391.
[2446] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 456.
[2447] Ibid.
[2448] George Washington to Henry Lee, August 26, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:601-602.
[2449] The Democratic Society of Washington Town formed in April 1794, see Hugh Henry Brackenridge, *Incidents of the Insurrection in the Western Parts of Pennsylvania*, *in the Year 1794* (Philadelphia: John M'Culloch, 1795) 3:25; Elkins and McKitrick, 461-463; Elkins and McKitrick explain that the federal excise law required stills to be register every June. The increase of violence against excisemen in late-Spring 1793, coupled with the intimation that violence may be extended to those farmers who voluntarily registered their stills, ensured an extremely low compliance rate that June.

federalists asserted, now subjected the American people to taxation revolts, political division, and quite possibly the horrors of civil war.

Despite western Pennsylvania's rising anti-government rage, Inspector of Excise John Neville and United States Marshall David Lenox began the dangerous task of issuing writs to those farmers who had refused to register their whiskey stills.[2450] After serving one such writ to Oliver Miller of Allegheny in June 1794, a "number of men" rode Neville and Lenox out of town, firing upon them not "to injure, but intimidate."[2451] The next morning, Neville awoke to group of hostile farmers, led by Oliver Miller.[2452] Fearful for his own life, Neville fired into the crowd, not only killing Miller, but instigating a firefight that took the lives of five other farmers.[2453] The parallels to the killing of Chistopher Sneider and to Boston's King Street riot had not been lost Pennsylvania's anti-taxation farmers. The next day, approximately five hundred Pennsylvanian militiamen musted near Mingo Creek, home to the state's newest Democratic Society, and subsequently rode to Neville's private home, accused him of murdering Miller, and demanded his resignation.[2454] Another firefight ensued, and while Neville and his family were able to escape thanks to the federal soldiers stationed at Fort Pitt, the skirmish ended with several fatalities and the capture of Major James Kirkpatrick.[2455]

Horrified at the tyrannical ambition of the national government, terrified for their lives and those of their families, and enraged at the willingness of federal soldiers to spill American blood, six thousand Pennsylvanians congregated at Braddock's Field the morning of August 1.[2456] To deter any future abuses from the federal government, these Pennsylvanians threatened to raze Pittsburgh to the ground.[2457] The farmers' fervor seemed genuine, and the inhabitants of Pittsburgh swiftly exiled several men who had insulted the "anti-excise rioters," thereby proving their sympathetic and patriotic bonds of intrastate fellow-feeling.[2458]

The federal spirits excise had transformed the United States into "one inflammable mass," Hugh Henry Brackenridge recounted, and "it required but the least touch to inflame it."[2459] These tensions should not have surprised any American, for Pennsylvania's western farmers displayed only the same "spirit" that had "prevailed at the time of the stamp act."[2460] This spirit of rage, terror, and horror had ignited British America's "revolution from the government of Great Britain," Brackenridge observed, yet these passions had not been "so general" or "so vigorous, amongst the common people" in 1765 as they "now existed" throughout Pennsylvania.[2461] While the six thousand person crowd never laid waste to Pittsburgh, its message of armed resistance began to spread beyond the state. David Bradford, a prominent lawyer living in Washington Town, solicited farmers from Monongahela, Virginia to oppose the spirits excise with their Pennsylvanian brethren in one "head, heart, hand and voice."[2462] Bradford's insurrectionist appeal had echoed the collective attempt

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[2450] Brackenridge, *Incidents*, 1:5-6.

[2451] Neville and Lenox rode for Pittsburgh and Bower Hill, respectively; see Brackenridge, *Incidents*, 1:6; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 463; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 177-178.

[2452] "Testimony of John Holcroft" in Brackenridge, *Incidents* 3:133-134; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 179.

[2453] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 463; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 179.

[2454] Ironically, these soldiers had mustered to "fulfill President Washington's call for additional Indian soldiers" to reinforce those currently fighting in the Ohio territory; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 178.

[2455] Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 178-181.

[2456] Ibid, 181-185; Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 235-236.

[2457] Ibid.

[2458] Ibid.

[2459] Brackenridge, *Incidents*, 1:41.

[2460] Ibid.

[2461] Ibid, 1:41.

[2462] David Bradford to the Inhabitants of Monongahela, Virginia, August 6, 1794, in *Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd Ser.*, ed., John B. Linn and Wm. H. Egle (Harrisburg: E.K. Meyers, 1890) 4:95-96; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 184-185.

of Pennsylvania and Virginia's frontier settlers to secede from the United States in summer 1776 and form the independent state of Westsylvania.[2463] Horror and panic struck federalists, who perceived Bradford as the "Shays of Pittsburgh," if not the manifestation of the once hypothesized "federal Shays."[2464]

After reporting on the assault against Neville, the coercion of Lenox "to execute no more processes" within Pennsylvania's "disaffected counties," and Braford's current attempts to form an extralegal interstate alliance against the federal government, Hamilton implored Washington to deploy a federal militia to end this "Treason" and prevent the "effusion" of more American "blood."[2465] To the American people, Hamilton directly argued that the United States "can scarcely lose its liberty from any other cause than that of anarchy."[2466] Washington himself could not deny the "regret" which he now felt towards this "lawless & outrageous c[on]duct" in western Pennsylvania.[2467] Unable to divorce himself from partisan rhetoric any longer, Washington privately concurred with one of the federalists' central politic arguments: that the "artful & designing members" of western Pennsylvania's Democratic Societies had "sow[ed] the Seeds of Jealousy & distrust among the people," and therefore were responsible for these anti-taxation "insurgents."[2468] The president's new secretary of state, Edmund Randolph, further decried these republican clubs for unjustly depicting the spirits excise as "oppressive, hostile to the liberties of this country, and a nursery of vice and sycophancy."[2469] Even Fisher Ames agreed that these "self-made societies" and "parricide clubs" had begun "poisoning the public mind" against the federal government.[2470] According to the republicans' slanderous, rage-eliciting rhetoric, all federalists were "tyrants, usurpers, and plunderers" whom the American people "abhorred" and would soon "hurl" from their thrones of power.[2471] The insurrection that now plagued western Pennsylvania, Washington ultimately concluded, was the "first ripe fruit" of America's "Democratic Societies."[2472]

Less than a week after receiving Hamilton's official report, Washington issued a proclamation in which he ordered Pennsylvania's western farmers to "disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes" by September 1.[2473] To enforce this order, the president called forth a federal militia to quell the insurrection. Washington, however, made clear that the mustered militiamen from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland marched not solely to enforce federal laws for "laying duties upon Spirits distilled," but also to apprehend the "Armed Banditti" who had imposed "cruel and humiliating punishments upon private citizens for no other cause than that of appearing to be friends of the law."[2474] By evoking terror of western Pennsylvanians' anarchial whims and rage at their willingness to put personal interest before national stability,

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[2463] Brackenridge, *Incidents*, 1:113-115; Engels, *Enemyship*, 120-123

[2464] *Virginia Independent Chronicle*, June 13, 1787; Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, September 11, 1794, in "Belknap-Hazard Correspondence," 5:350.

[2465] Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, August 2, 1794, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 17:16-18.

[2466] Alexander Hamilton, *Tully No. 3*, in *Dunlap and Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser*, August 28, 1794, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 17:159-161; Engels, *Enemyship*, 125-126.

[2467] George Washington to Henry Lee, August 26, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:600-601.

[2468] Ibid.

[2469] Edmund Randolph, "Letter X" in *Germanicus* (Philadelphia, 1794), 32-35, 38; Library Company of Philadelphia.

[2470] Fisher Ames, "Propriety of Replies to the President's Speeches," November 26, 1794, *Works of Ames*, 2:1067-1068.

[2471] Ibid.

[2472] George Washington to Burgess Ball, September 25, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:722-723.

[2473] George Washington, "Proclamation for Calling for the Militia," August 7, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:531-534; Supreme Court Justice James Wilson certified that the insurrection in western Pennsylvania met the necessary criteria of lawless, as laid out under the Militia Act of 1792, for the executive to muster federal troops; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 478-479.

[2474] Ibid.

Washington sought to justify his controversial decision to deploy a federal militia to suppress an internal state insurrection. The president knew that both political and public victory required him to rhetorically align western Pennsylvania's insurrectionists not with the disinterested and honorable anti-stamp tax rioters of 1765, but with the selfish, anarchical ambitions commonly misattributed to both Massachusetts's regulators and America's flourishing Democratic Societies.

The affective middle path that Washington's proclamation offered, "reconciliation… with one hand…terror borne in the other," partially arose from political pragmatism, as Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin demanded that the president "exhaust all peaceful means to quelling the unrest" within his state.[2475] If the president marched a federal militia into Pennsylvania without Mifflin's support, then he would cast himself as the American tyrant that so many republicans now feared him to be. Edmund Randolph, however, worried that the terror of Washington's proclamation would overshadow its mercy, as Pennsylvania's insurgents would interpret his promise of "peace" as a duplicitous tactic first to "divide" them, and then to "discover the most culpable persons…for punishment."[2476] The United States had derived its strength from the "affection of the people," and Randolph now warned that brandishing the federal "sword" might "produce a flame" of hostility and revolution not easily extinguished.[2477] The only peaceful path forward, therefore, was for Washington to end this anti-taxation insurrection without shedding a drop of American blood.

The smoldering embers of popular violence and partisan discord, however, already had reached Morgan Town. Pennsylvania's anti-taxation farmers ordered the town's exciseman to "resign his office and papers," and if he did not, they promised to "destroy them with all his property."[2478] The tax collector immediately fled, yet the town's inhabitants "assembled a body" to protect themselves and their homes from further assault and molestation from the state's insurrectionists. On at least "two or three instances," the citizens of Morgan Town had skirmished with Pennsylvania's enraged, anti-taxation farmers.[2479]

When the federal militia finally arrived in western Pennsylvania in early-September, it expeditiously and quite bloodlessly ended the anti-taxation revolt. Militiaman David Ford observed that within Pennsylvania's western counties "many people [remained] very much in favor of the rioters," despite the militia's presence.[2480] To rationalize their anti-government sentiments, Ford described these farmers as "the most ignorant and uniformed part of society," who believed the "most strange and absurd notions…propagated" by "wicked incendiaries" – including the outlandish claim that the federal congress intended to lay "a tax of two dollars on every male child that is born."[2481] Either oblivious to the federal government's impending victory, or too consumed by his own anti-government rage and hatred to care, one farmer, "very busy…in the ways of sedition," proclaimed that he would "blow the President's brains out" if he led his federal militia "against the insurgents."[2482] While no one attempted to take Washington's life, minor skirmishes did erupt between farmers and the federal militia. Almost every injury suffered in western Pennsylvania, however, arose from the conditions in which the militia had imprisoned the insurrectionists.[2483]

[2475] Edmund Randolph to George Washington, August 5, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:523-529; Thomas Mifflin to George Washington, August 5, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:541-519; Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 196.

[2476] Edmund Randolph to George Washington, August 5, 1794, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 16:526-528.

[2477] Ibid.

[2478] *General Advertiser* (Philadelphia), August 25, 1794.

[2479] *New York Daily Advertiser*, September 4, 1794

[2480] David Ford, "Journal of an Expedition Made in Autumn of 1794," September 19, 1794, MSS; New York Historical Society.

[2481] Ford, "Journal of an Expedition," September 29, 1794.

[2482] Ibid.

[2483] Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 218-219.

By late-autumn, Washington had procured at least twenty "obscure characters" from western Pennsylvania whom United States Attorney General William Bradford charged with treason.[2484] Ironically, only John Mitchell and Philip Vigol – neither of whom owned any whiskey stills – had received guilty verdicts.[2485] The jurors, however, believed that both men deserved the president's "mercy" and federal pardons, as Mitchell was a harmless "simpleton," Vigol a "rough ignorant German" prone to an "outrageous temper" and the "occasional fits of insanity," and neither man a true threat to the republic's safety.[2486] Federalists subsequently praised the president's "bloodless expedition" into western Pennsylvania, as well as his unparalleled mercy, as he granted pardons to both Mitchell and Vigol.[2487] Weary from yet another political crisis, Washington "hope[d]" that "the spirit of anarchy in the western counties" had been "entirely subdued."[2488] Furthermore, the president believed that his victory over insurrection and anarchy had proven to the American people, yet again, that "republicanism [was] not the phantom of a deluded imagination," but rather the government best suited for the United States' "liberty" and "happiness."[2489]

Pennsylvanian Hugh Henry Brackenridge, however, refused to leave America's future in the untrustworthy hands of hope. Unlike the anti-stamp tax riots of 1765, America's frontier settlers never achieved their joyous crescendo of legislative repeal, and therefore still nurtured a simmering rage for the federal government. To prevent further anti-taxation insurrections, Brackenridge encouraged the federal government to redirect the American people's unruly passions towards an economically urgent and political unifying task: the defense of the Ohio backcountry from its recently displaced Indigenous peoples.[2490] Appealing to America's foundational hatred and horror of Indigenous people's barbarity and savagery, Brackenridge presented the United States not on the verge of partisan warfare between federalists and republicans, but rather as a young republic still engaged in the defense of its frontier settlements.[2491] The simultaneity General Anthoy Wayne's victory against the Ohio Confederacy at Fallen Timbers and Washington anti-insurrectionist proclamation lent further credence to Brackenridge's claim the Indigenous other, once again, had become the enemy against whom the American people might affectively unify.[2492]

The president, however, took a different approach to quelling discord throughout the United States. To the federal congress, Washington unequivocally blamed "certain self-created societies" for western Pennsylvania's insurrection.[2493] Encouraging every citizen to protect their constitutional republic with "affectionate vigilance," Washington ended his congressional address with a bold claim: after careful contemplation, every true patriot would conclude that the recent insurrection had

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[2484] Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 219; Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 236.

[2485] Ibid.

[2486] Findley, *History of the Insurrection*, 210-212; Albert Gallatin to Hannah Gallatin, May 25, 1795, "Albert Gallatin Papers," MSS, New York Historical Society; Edward Tilghman and Joseph Tomas to George Washington, June 13, 1795, in *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 18:224, n.1. Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 239.

[2487] Edward Carrington to Alexander Hamilton, December 12, 1794, *Papers of Hamilton*, 17:438-441; *Maryland Journal*, December 16, 1794; Larson, *Trials of Allegiance*, 240. Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 220.

[2488] George Washington to Edmund Pendleton, January 22, 1795, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 17:424-427.

[2489] Ibid.

[2490] Engels, *Enemyship*, 129-130.

[2491] Brackenridge, *Incidents of Insurrection*, 1:41, 106. Engels, *Enemyship*, 129-130; Brendan W. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jefferson Philanthropy and the American Indian* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 6.

[2492] For detailed analyses of the events of the Battle of Fallen Timbers, see Calloway, *The Indian World of George Washington*, 438-442; Wiley Sword, *President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 299-319.

[2493] George Washington, "Sixth Annual Message to Congress," November 19, 1794, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 17:181-188.

been "fomented by combinations of men who…disseminated, from an ignorance or perversion of facts, suspicions, jealousies, and accusations of the whole Government."[2494]

Aghast at the president's overtly partisan rhetorical assault, Jefferson remarked that this "denunciation of the democratic societies [was] one of the extraordinary acts of boldness" that Americans must now expect "from the faction of the monocrats."[2495] Further, the ex-secretary conjectured that the federalists' beloved "excise law," if unamended, might become the "instrument" by which the American people "dismember[ed] the Union."[2496] Fretful of the festering passions that plagued America's increasingly partisan republic, Jefferson somberly admitted to Madison that he had expected the federalists to take advantage of Washington's expedition into western Pennsylvania and use the insurrection as a means of "justifying [the] arming one part of the society against another" or, even worse, "of declaring a civil war" against their republican opponents.[2497] Acerbic and pessimistic, Jefferson's observations arose from an affective truth: by 1795, the terror of civil war once again dominated the nation's rhetoric, and not even the president had the popularity or strength of character to prevent partisan rupture within the United States.

Hated Echoes of the British Empire – America's *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation*:

When federal militiamen finally withdrew from western Pennsylvania in June 1795, another partisan crisis already had consumed the United States. By mid-1793, Britain had determined that revolutionary France's unmolested trade with America was "too valuable" of a wartime asset.[2498] By November, Parliament had authorized the British navy, whose overwhelming might "trumped international law" and "neutral rights," to seize any and all ships that "carried goods and produce to or from" the French colonies.[2499] Within a few short months, Britain had captured approximately three hundred American merchant ships. The people now "are in a rage," Fisher Ames observed, at the British empire's maritime "insolence."[2500] Firm in his own condemnation of the British navy, Ames recognized the political hypocrisy present within the United States Congress, as republicans said "nothing" as France "stopped…more than an hundred" American vessels over the course of the war.[2501] The "mortal poison" that makes America's current "peace so sickly," Ames concluded, was not its animosity towards England, but rather its "French mania."[2502]

Enraged by Britain's egregious violation of maritime law, Hamilton declared that the "great mass of opinion in the Eastern States and in the State of New York" remained "against" any declarations of war.[2503] It is paramount, the former treasury secretary advised the president, that the United States remain a neutral actor – so long as America's neutrality may be maintained "without

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[2494] George Washington, "Sixth Annual Message to Congress," November 19, 1794, 17:181-188.

[2495] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, December 28, 1794, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 28:228-230.

[2496] Ibid.

[2497] Ibid.

[2498]Todd Estes, *The Jay Treaty Debate, Political Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), 23.

[2499] Estes, *Jay Treaty Debate*, 23-24.

[2500] Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, March 26, 1794, in *Works of Ames*, 2:1037.

[2501] Ibid.

[2502] Ibid.

[2503]Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, April 14, 1794, *Papers of Hamilton*, 16:269. Hamilton, within this letter, also describes federalists as a more rational party, seek to avoid war with the British empire until all other avenues had failed, whereas republicans aim "to say and to do every thing which can have a tendency to stir up the passions of the people and beget a disposition favourable to war." Fascinatingly, Hamilton notes there is a third party which wishes to benefit from prolonged conflict between the United States and Britain, and a fourth, miniscule group which "fluctuates between Reason & Passion," and thus are entirely unpredictable, see 16:267.

absolute dishonor or the ultimate sacrifice" of its "essential rights and interests."[2504] The federal congress, therefore, must legislate with caution, as ending trade with, or ceasing payment of any debts owed to the British empire might signal that the United States had abandoned its "originally pacific" views.[2505] Worse yet, Hamilton feared that Parliament might perceive any retributive economic sanctions as "provacatives to a Declaration of War."[2506] Unsurprisingly, Madison disagreed. If the British empire committed acts of naval warfare against the republic, Madison explained, it would do so neither to "vindicate [its] commercial interests…against the commercials rights of the United States," nor to punish America's sympathy for France, but rather "to root out Liberty from the face of the earth."[2507] Both men agreed that the people of the United States had just reason to fear the wrath of the British empire, yet Hamilton agonized over economic stability while Madison fretted over republican independence.

To still the violent passions churning both within the federal government and across the Atlantic Ocean, Washington appointed John Jay as "Envoy Extraordinary from the united States of America to the Court of his Britannic Majesty" – a fateful decision that depleted the last ounces of popular affection for the president.[2508] Jay's diplomatic orders contained only two absolute stipulations: do not violate the republic's current agreements with France and procure a guarantee that American merchants may trade with the British West Indies.[2509] The federalist's departure for England on May 12, 1794, stirred immediate controversy, as republicans, still angered over Jay's public condemnations of Genêt the year prior, questioned if the New Yorker still held patriotic affections for the United States.

Rebuking such unfounded accusations within his *Manlius* essays, Christopher Gore decried the eight republican senators who opposed Jay's appointment, branding them "lovers of war, rather than peace."[2510] Republicans had no moral ground to charge Jay with political infidelity, Gore continued, as they themselves had embraced unamerican, Frenchified politics when they formed their "anarchical clubs."[2511] Further, republicans had "excus[ed]" and "justif[ied]" the "treasons and murders" of Pennsylvania's insurrectionist all while having the gall to accuse Washington of "unconstitutional, improper, and inexpedient" intentions in his appointment of John Jay.[2512] For America's Jacobins, only James Madison was "worthy of confidence."[2513] The people of Massachusetts and the entire United States, *Manlius* concluded, must reject the republicans' unjustified hatred against those "patriots," like Washington, who had "grown grey in [their] service" to the republic.[2514] Reciprocal, festering hatred between federalists and republicans all but ensured that any treaty with the British empire would become tainted by partisan passions.

After months of grueling negotiations, John Jay endorsed a *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His Britannick Majesty and the United States* on November 14, 1794.[2515] Although trapped between the political Charybdis of British "hostility" and the affective Scylla of "French friendship," Jay's deft diplomacy secured three major victories for the American people: the removal

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[2504] Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, April 14, 1794, *Papers of Hamilton*, 16:269.
[2505] Ibid.
[2506] Ibid.
[2507] James Madison, *Political Observations* (Philadelphia, 1795), 8-9; Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
[2508] "Appointment of John Jay as Envoy Extraordinary," April 19, 1794, *Selected Jay Papers*, 5:622.
[2509] Estes, *Jay Treaty Debate*, 25-26.
[2510] Christopher Gore, *Manlius 4*, *Columbian Centinel*, September 13, 1794.
[2511] Gore, *Manlius 4*, *Columbian Centinel*, September 13, 1794.
[2512] Ibid.
[2513] Gore, *Manlius 6*, *Columbian Centinel*, September 20, 1794.
[2514] Ibid; George Washington to Edmund Pendleton, January 22, 1795, *Papers of GW: Presidential Series*, 17:424-427.
[2515] "Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His Britannick Majesty and the United States" (Philadelphia: Bache, 1795); American Antiquarian Society.

of British soldiers from the United States by June 1, 1796; the formation of bilateral commissions to remediate "contentious issues," including the republic's outstanding debts to British merchants and acquiring proper compensation for American vessels seized by the royal navy; and commercial advantages, including trade access to the East Indies and a guarantee of "reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation" with all European nations.[2516] Article 12 of the *Treaty of Amity*, however, tempered these victories, as it limited American trade to the British West Indies and stipulated that such restrictions would remain in effect for two years after the empire ended its war with France.[2517]

Jay knew that "attempts" would be made by republicans to "frustrate" the treaty's ratification[2518] Political pragmatism, however, did not prevent the diplomat from hoping that Congress might check their partisan ideologies, prioritize the stability of their republic, and ensure that "mutual animosities" between the United States and the British empire "[gave] way to mutual good will."[2519] The federal congress, however, did not live up to Jay's standards. Even though the American people eagerly anticipated news of Jay's negotiations, the treaty's contents were not released to the public until the Senate convened on June 8, 1795.[2520] After fifteen days of debate, and without the support of a single republican senator, America's federalist ratified Jay's treaty with Great Britain, pending the "suspension or renegotiation of the West Indies article."[2521] For fourteen months, the American people had wondered what Jay might procure on their behalf, and whether he would succumb to his supposed Anglophilia. Prolonged speculation, exacerbated by the federal congress's own secrecy, further entrenched the ideological divisions and political paranoia born from America's neutrality crisis and western insurrections.[2522] When the *Treaty of Amity* reached most of the nation's citizens, it came already ratified, awaiting either a signature or a veto from President Washington. Political secrecy and an expedited ratification had preemptively soured popular opinion for Jay's hard-fought diplomatic victory.

Melancton Smith observed that, by early-August, "five sixths" of the American people "reprobate[d]" America's *Treaty of Amity*, with Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia as the epicenters of such impassioned opposition.[2523] Angered both by their limited access to the West Indies and a perception that Britian had acquired greater diplomatic advantages, the people of Boston had fallen into a "very inflammatory state."[2524] Fisher Ames even worried that a forthcoming town meeting within the city might devolve into "folly and violence."[2525] No such outbursts

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[2516] See Article 2 through Article 7, as well as Article 13 and 14, in *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation*; Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate* 29.

[2517] See Article 12, Article 28, in *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation*; Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 29-30.

[2518] John Jay to George Washington, September 13, 1794, in *Selected Letters of Jay*, 244.

[2519] Ibid.

[2520] Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 33-34.

[2521] All twenty federalists in the Senate voted for conditional ratification, and all ten republicans voted against it; Elkins and McKittrick, *Age of Federalism*, 418-419; for a detailed analysis of moderate republicans' major criticisms of the treaty, see St. George Tucker, *Remarks on the Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce* (Philadelphia: Henry Tuckniss for Matthew Carry, 1796); American Antiquarian Society.

[2522] For a detailed analysis of how the debates on Jay's Treaty served as both a culmination and crystallization of the partisan division that the Neutrality Crisis and Whiskey Rebellion had fomented throughout the United States, see Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 35-70.

[2523] Melancton Smith to James Monroe, August 6, 1795, in *Anti-Federalist Writings of Smith*, 395; Rufus King observed that the republicans had "concerned their plans" to oppose Jay's Treaty, and "by manifesting a noisy opposition in the large Towns at the same Time, they expected to surpize and gain the public opinion," Rufus King to Christopher Gore, July 24, 1795, in *Correspondence of King*, 2:16; *American Remembrancer, or an Impartial Collection of Essays, Resolves, Speeches, &c., Relative, or Having Affinity, to the Treaty with Great Britain* (Philadelphia: Henry Tuckness for Matthew Carry, 1795); American Antiquarian Society.

[2524] Fisher Ames to Oliver Wolcott, July 9, 1795, *Works of Ames*, 2:1107.

[2525] Ibid.

occurred, yet the town council voted to denounce the *Treaty of Amity*, which then spurred two hundred Boston federalists to sign a circular letter expressing their "disapprobation" for the council's decision.[2526] "If ever a period existed in the history of any people," one New Yorker argued, "in which great prudence and circumspection were essential to the preservation of public liberty, that period is now completely realized in the affairs" of the United States.[2527] Stoking popular fears that, yet again, Americans' liberties were in peril, this New Yorker warned his fellow citizens to guard against the federalists, who relied upon the "dangerous banners of party," as well as "resentment and passion," to obscure an irrefutable truth: none of America's "steady patriots" had endorsed this treaty.[2528] To the south, the people of Richmond echoed northern opposition and drafted resolutions addressed to the "chief magistrate of the United States," in which they denounced Jay's treaty as "Injurious to the interest, Dangerous to the security, and Repugnant to the constitution of the United States."[2529]

Republicans' opposition to the *Treaty of Amity* did not stop with petitions to the president. Rather, out-of-doors republican violence directly targeted John Jay, chastising him for abandoning his bonds of national fellow-feeling and betraying his republic. Seven years after Albany's antifederalists burned the *United States Constitution* in opposition to New York's federalists, three hundred members of the Democrat Society of Philadelphia gathered to "burn Mr. Jay's effigy opposite the president's home."[2530] Deterred only by the presence of militia officers, these republicans did not abandoned their Fourth of July festivities.[2531] Moving "as silent as a funeral procession" to just above Vine Street, and "supposing themselves out of danger," these republicans gave "three cheers" and, according to both the *Boston Gazette* and Massachusetts's *Impartial Herald*, set the hated monarchist ablaze.[2532] The *Federal Spy*, however, reported that Philadelphia's mounted cavalry forcibly prevented the emulation of Jay's effigy, wounding several republicans in the skirmish.[2533] Like Lord Bute, George III, and the federal constitution before him, John Jay was "burned in effigy, guillotined in effigy, [and] hanged in effigy" throughout the United States.[2534]

Resolute despite such vicious attacks, Jay believed that the American people would grant this treaty the "commendation or censure" it justly deserved.[2535] It would be in "vain to lament" that the United States was "not entirely free" from partisan "evils." [2536] Rather, Jay optimistically observed that America's political parties had no reason to be "less conducive to good government, than moderate fermentation [was] necessary to make good wine."[2537] Remarkably, Jay posited that that the partisan passions which dominated America's republic still had the power to mature into a strong

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[2526] "Dissent of a Number of the Citizens of Boston," July 15, 1795, in *American Remembrancer* 1:125-126, Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 75

[2527] "Address to the Citizens of New York," in *American Remembrancer*, 3:233-234

[2528] Ibid.

[2529] "Resolutions of the Citizens of Richmond," July 29, 1795, in *American Remembrancer*, 1:133-134; John James Beckley to DeWitt Clinton, July 24, 1795, "Papers of John James Beckley," MSS; Virginia Historical Society. Note: Beckley corroborates reports that the inhabitants of Boston, New York City, and Virginia had convened meetings, in which they drafted memorials to the president in opposition to the "Treaty of Amity."

[2530] *New York Journal*, July 8, 1795; *Boston Gazette*, July 13, 1795; *Impartial Herald*, July 14, 1795, *Argus*, July 15, 1795; *Federal Spy*, July 13, 1795.

[2531] Ibid.

[2532] Ibid.

[2533] Ibid.

[2534] *Cambridge Modern History*, ed., A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes (New York: Macmillain Company, 1903), 7:320. Massachusetts's *Guardian of Freedom* reported that republicans throughout the south, including Norfolk, Virginia and Charlestown, South Carolina, had burned Jay in effigy as well.

[2535] John Jay to Henry Lee, July 11, 1795, in "Papers of John Jay," MSS; Columbia University Library.

[2536] Ibid.

[2537] Ibid.

political drink – one that, if consumed in moderation, had the ability to better the United States' health and overall happiness. Unlike the federalist diplomat, the president did not wish for America's impassioned rhetoric, symbolic acts of political violence, or partisan division to ferment any further, and therefore signed the *Treaty of Amity* into law on August 14.

The chief executive's endorsement of Jay's supposedly monarchist treaty ignited yet another vitriolic press war between republicans and federalists. New Yorker Robert Livington, in his *Cato* essays, lambasted the treaty's limited commercial benefits and even weaker protections against British naval impressment.[2538] "The ill effect which this treaty must have upon our national character exceeds all calculation," Livingston argued in his tenth *Cato* essay.[2539] The United States had arisen from "bold resistance" and "an ardent passion for honour and freedom" that "left all calculation for personal interest out of sight."[2540] Federalists, however, had abandoned such revolutionary values. Chided as "villain" and "scoundrel," federalists were self-interested men who persuaded the "young nation" to "debase [its] character" through "submission to the injuries of Britain," and thereby "invit[ed] infinitely greater evils in the future" than those which they "feared to meet at present."[2541] Livingston's hatred for those "few advocates" of Jay's treaty peaked in *Cato 13*, as he rebuked federalists' political deceptions.[2542] Those federalists who "pretended to be zealously attached to the constitution of the United States" and who argued that opposition to Jay's treaty had arisen from "party principles," Livingston concluded, had truly abandoned their political responsibilities to the republic.[2543] To validate republicans' just condemnation and federalists gross misrepresentation of the *Treaty of Amity*, one must look only to the states with the "least of party spirit" – South Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, and New Hampshire – as they already have "manifest[ed]" the "most warmth and most unanimity in their opposition" to it.[2544]

To curb the republicans' anti-treaty rhetoric, Hamilton authored twenty-eight essays defending the economic prosperity and international security which the United States would acquire from Jay's now maligned treaty.[2545] In *Defence 2*, Hamilton argued that "[f]ew nations can have stronger inducements" than the United States to "cultivate peace" with the nations of Europe, and as such, Jay's treaty would help the republic "avoid War" at least another "ten or twelve years more."[2546] The American people, Hamilton continued, must reject the republicans "intemperate and illiberal passions," and rather listen to the "true Patriot," – the federalist – who "never fears to sacrifice popularity to what he believes to be the cause of [the public] good."[2547] Through this singular rhetorical claim, Hamilton skillfully recast the federalists not simply as American patriots, but rather as disinterested citizens who, unlike the republican opponents, strived to maintain bonds of national fellow-feeling. Alarmed once again at the persuasive powers of Hamilton's pen, Jefferson

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[2538] Robert Livingston, *Explanation of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between the United States and Great Britain, in Several Numbers: By Cato* (New York: Thomas Greenleaf, 1795)
[2539] Robert Livingston, *Cato 10*, in *Explanation of the Treaty of Amity*, 59.
[2540] Ibid.
[2541] Ibid.
[2542] Robert Livingston, *Cato 13*, 71-72.
[2543] Ibid.
[2544] Ibid; Livingston believes that the states with the "least of party spirt" to be South Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and New Hampshire.
[2545] Alexander Hamilton, *The Defence*, *Papers of Hamilton*, 18:480 ff. Please note that while *The Defence* 23-30 and 34-35 will not be quoted within this paper, authorship for these essays had been attributed to Rufus King, see *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 18:476.
[2546] Alexander Hamilton, *The Defence 2*, *The Argus*, July 25, 1795, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 18:495-499.
[2547] Alexander Hamilton, *The Defence 5*, *The Argus*, August 5, 1795, in *Papers of Hamilton*, 19:89-90.

confided to Madison that the former treasury secretary remained "a colossus to the antirepublican party," for "[w]ithout number, he [was] an host within himself."[2548]

While Hamilton fought to recapture popular support for the *Treaty of Amity,* congressional republicans had one final strategy to inhibit its enactment: prevent the House from appropriating the funds necessary for America's diplomatic adjudicators.[2549] Republicans had the votes necessary to block appropriations outright, but they knew that this defiance of senatorial and presidential powers required a more explicit justification. To this end, Edward Livingston of New York requested that the executive office furnish the House with copies of Jay's official instructions and "all correspondence and other documents pertaining to the treaty."[2550] Livingston's resolution passed 62-37, yet it presented a dangerous federal precedent, as it suggested that the House believed it proper to determine appropriations for a ratified treaty based upon its "merits" – a power which seemed unnervingly similar to the Senate's own right to ratification.[2551] Even Madison's rhetoric fell uncharacteristically flat, as the Virginian found himself ineffectual at defending House republicans' tenuous, if not unconstitutional, position.[2552] Republicans' strategic misstep provided an affective avenue for Madison's congressional rival to foil the Virginia's plans one final time.

Ill and greatly fatigued, Fisher Ames rose in opposition to Madison and offered his fellow representatives a masterful defense of the *Treaty of Amity* on April 28, 1796.[2553] Without allocating the necessary funds to enact this treaty, Ames admitted, the United States might avoid armed conflict with the powers of Europe, yet it would gain security in exchange for a diplomatic future "worse than war."[2554] Terror would fall upon the American republic, as its citizens would suffer "[p]eace without security, accumulation of injury without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, contempt for ourselves, [and] intestine discord and anarchy."[2555] Horrified at such a future, Ames asked his republican colleagues whether this is "the peace" that they fought "with such fearless confidence, to maintain?"[2556] If Britain then declared formal war against the United States, the frontiers of North America would become inhospitable, as George III, yet again, would entice and encourage Indigenous raiders to lay wase to the nation's backcountry settlements. By rejecting this treaty through a constitutional technicality, the House would "light the savage fire" of war and render itself to "account to the widows and orphans whom [its] decision [would] make, to the wretches that [would] be roasted at the stake, to [its] country….to conscience, and to God."[2557] To achieve their anti-British objectives, republicans must be willing to cleave apart the bonds of national fellow-feeling with a sword drenched in American blood.

Beyond protecting the United States from both volatile warfare and an equally dangerous peace, Ames implored his fellow representatives to act in accordance with "public sensibility."[2558] The members of the federal congress, Ames explained, are not exempt from the "passion" that every American citizen feels, and therefore must acknowledge they neither are "disinterested," nor should they be "dispassionate."[2559] To fulfill their constitutionally appointed responsibilities, every representative must embrace their patriotic spirit, which is not "a narrow affection for the spot

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[2548] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 21, 1795, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 28:475.
[2549] Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 29; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 432.
[2550] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 444.
[2551] Ibid; Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 154-155, 160.
[2552] Estes, *Jay's Treaty Debate*, 160-161.
[2553] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 448.
[2554] Fisher Ames, "Defense of the Jay Treaty," April 28, 1796, *Works of Ames*, 2:1179.
[2555] Ibid.
[2556] Ibid.
[2557] Ibid, 2:1176.
[2558] Ibid, 2:1145.
[2559] Ibid, 2:1145.

where a man was born," but rather "an extended self-love" through which one might see and defend their "country's honor."[2560] If the House is submissive to the will of patriotism, and thereby willing to appropriate the *Treaty of Amity,* then it will secure the republic's honor, which every citizen not only "cherishes" as "precious" and "sacred," but rather is willing "to risk his life" to defend. [2561]

Uncertain as to the affecting nature of his own rhetoric, Ames concluded his speech with one final, ominous warning: if the House's "vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will with the public disorders to make confusion worse confounded, even I, slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive the government and Constitution of my country."[2562] Horror rippled through the House's chambers, as Ames posited a dreaded question, one which every representative had entertained, at least once, since the formation of their republic: what if I outlived the nation I fought so hard to build? Unlike the molasses tax debate, Ames's rhetoric of terror, horror, grief, and patriotic love outmaneuvered Madison, who offered no retort to his colleague's speech.[2563] The young federalist, John Adams reported, had orated "one of the best Speeches he ever [had] produced," as there was "not a dry Eye…in the House," except for a few – likely republican – "Scoundrels" and "Jack Asses."[2564]

Through a razor thin margin of 51-48, the House appropriated the *Treaty of Amity* and, as with almost every crisis that plagued both British America and the United States since 1754, a victor had emerged, but only just barely. British colonists, then American revolutionaries, and then federalists and republicans had relied upon impassioned rhetoric to forge bonds of imperial, intercolonial, interstate, and now national fellow-feeling. These affective rhetorics, however, had proven to be as destructive as they were conducive to the formation of a shared, cohesive political identity for the inhabitants of eastern North America.

Conclusion:

George Washington's reputation did not survive the tumult and hostility that consumed his second term as President of the United States. Two months before Jay's treaty with the British empire reached America's shores, reports had emerged of despondent Virginian republicans toasting to the "speedy death to General Washington."[2565] The purest, most direct assault against the American president's character, however, came from British expatriate and Jacobin sympathizer Thomas Paine. Unlike his transformation of James Wolfe into an American patriot in 1775, Paine's rebuke of Washington – born from a sense of personal betrayal and public horror at the president's decision to abandon France to the mercy of the British empire – cast the Virginian in equal moral standing to that of British General Thomas Gage.[2566] The economic and diplomatic "ground upon which America now stands," Paine remarked, began with the republic's "loss of character."[2567] If there was "sense enough left in the heart to call a blush into the cheek," Paine continued, then "the Washington administration must be ashamed to appear" before the American people.[2568] The author of *Common Sense* then turned his gaze towards the irredeemable behavior of the president himself. A man "treacherous in private friendship…and a hypocrite in public life," Paine damned Washington's

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[2560] Fisher Ames, "Defense of the Jay Treaty," April 28, 1796, *Works of Ames*, 2:1170.
[2561] Ibid.
[2562] Ibid, 2:1182.
[2563] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 449.
[2564] John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 30, 1796, *Adams Family Correspondence*, 11:278.
[2565] Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, January 10, 1795, *Works of Ames*, 2:1095-1096.
[2566] Thomas Paine, *Letters to George Washington, President of the United States of America, On Affairs Public and Private* (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin Bache, 1796).
[2567] Paine, *Letters to Washington*, 63.
[2568] Ibid, 63-64.

reputation to the infamy of "apostate" or "impostor," and then charged the world to determine whether the leader of America's republic had "abandoned good principles…[or] ever had any?"[2569]

George Washington, and the federal government which he had shepherded into existence, failed to unite the inhabitants of British America's thirteen rebellious colonies under a single, affectively sustainable, national identity. Without a terrifying, hated, horrific political other to oppose, America's impassioned, volatile, patriotic rhetorics turned inward, and thus created a partisan fissure within the United States. Washington, however, failed to understand that America's shared political identity and national culture – to the extent to which it had one – arose from rhetorics of enemyship and violent acts of political othering.

America's diplomatic neutrality throughout the Atlantic world was both a centerpiece of Washington's presidential agenda and a pragmatic necessity to ensure the survival of the early republic. Desperate to prevent another political or ideological civil war within his young nation, Washington further hoped that diplomatic neutrality might serve as a national panacea, and thereby balm the wounds of partisan faction and internal political conflict. The president, however, was unable to fathom that international neutrality – specifically the absence of prolonged warfare – might further erode America's tenuous bonds of national fellow-feeling. Unable to grasp true nature of his country's affective, national identity, Washington watched in horror as the United States sunk further and further into partisan spirit, political discord, and affective disunity.

[2569] Ibid.

CONCLUSION:

To Adopt Through Passion What Reason Would Reject: The United States, 1797-1815

The weight of America's republic rested heavily upon both the shoulders of George Washington and the pen of Alexander Hamilton the morning of September 19, 1796.[2570] With less than six months remaining in his second term as President of the United States, Washington swiftly and quietly retreated home to Mount Vernon just before dawn broke across the Philadelphia skyline. The praised and lambasted American general and statesman fled from neither an angry mob nor an adoring crowd, but rather a public spectacle of his own making. When the people of Philadelphia received their copies of Claypoole's *American Daily Advertiser* that morning, they all – some faster than others – would have glanced across an unassuming piece, entitled "Friends and Citizens," which confirmed what, to date, had only been rumor and speculation: George Washington intended to retire from the presidency.[2571]

Washington's *Farewell Address*, ghostwritten by Hamilton working from a 1792 draft penned by James Madison, laid out "a series of general maxims to guide the construction of a wise foreign policy" that, if followed closely, would promote America's national interest.[2572] Further, the president took this opportunity to make one final plea to his fellow citizens: make it their life's duty to reinforce the now threadbare cords of national fellow-feeling that tethered these United States. Although saturated with the disinterested, patriotic rhetoric that had proliferated and intensified throughout British America since the eve of the Seven Years' War, Washington's *Farewell Address* failed to negate the rising partisan tensions and internal ideological divisions that plagued America's vulnerable republic.

Washington's *Farewell Address*, much like his *First Inaugural Address*, begins with an act of political humility. Despite his decision to resign from the presidency, Washington expressed the "debt of gratitude which [he] owe[d] to [his] beloved country, for the many honors it has conferred" upon him.[2573] It is from his love for both the republic and its citizens, the president continued, that he hoped the American people's "Union & brotherly affection may be perpetual—that the free constitution…may be sacredly maintained…[and] the happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete."[2574] The patriotic task which the retiring chief executive now left to his fellow citizens was of the singular and utmost importance: preserve their fragile republic. A nation, Washington explained, has a "right to concentrate [the] affections" of its "Citizens by birth or by choice."[2575] The citizens of the United States had brought forth the "name of AMERICAN" through not simply a "just pride of Patriotism," but rather their "common cause fought and triumphed together" and their "common dangers, sufferings, and success."[2576] It was the struggles and horrors that they had overcome to acquire "independence & Liberty," Washington continued, that truly united the American people.[2577]

[2570] George Washington's *Farewell Address* was first published in Claypoole's *American Daily Advertiser* the morning of September 19, 1796; Jeffrey Malanson, *Addressing America: George Washington's Farewell and the Making of National Culture, Politics, and Diplomacy, 1796-1852* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2015), 8, 31.
[2571] Ibid.
[2572] Malanson, *Addressing America*, 2, 27.
[2573] George Washington, *Farewell Address*, September 16, 1796, in *GW Papers: Pres. Ser.*, 20:704.
[2574] Ibid, 20:704-705.
[2575] Ibid, 20:706.
[2576] Ibid.
[2577] Ibid.

The United States' great republic, however, already had begun to succumb to the domestic threat of partisan spirit. "The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge" has "perpetrated the most horrid enormities" and is of itself "a frightful despotism."[2578] It is a mistake, Washington argued, for the American people to perceive political parties as a method to "keep alive the spirt of Liberty."[2579] "A fire not to be quenched," party spirit "demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest instead of warming it should consume."[2580] To combat such heated partisan passions, the president urged his fellow citizens to make the "continuance of the UNION" the "primary object of Patriotic desire."[2581] At first read, this holds an internal logic within the overall argument of Washington's *Farewell Address*. The problem: Washington believed that his fellow Americans might achieve this objective through strict international neutrality, specifically by "steer[ing] clear of permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world."[2582]

Having watched his fellow citizens, the federal congress, and his own executive cabinet divide themselves in accordance with their own, self-proclaimed Anglophilia and Francophilia, Washington understood international alliances to be the death nail of their American republic. Any "Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave" to "its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."[2583] The president believed that any attachments beyond those to one's own nation inevitably bred "a variety of evils," such as jealousies, ambition, corruption, ill-will, and betrayal, any of which might encourage the American people to "sacrifice the interests of their own country."[2584] By absolving themselves from all international political attachments, Washington believed that the United States might achieve its true greatness. Finally, the president concluded his address with a humble thanks to the American people, who now permitted him, "without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in the midst of [his] fellow Citizens, the benign influence of good Laws under a free Government—the ever favourite object of [his] heart."[2585] As he had done in 1783, Washington had proven himself incorruptible to the American people by surrendering power, relinquishing his office, and embracing once more the title of fellow citizen.

The affective impacts of Washington's *Farewell Address* immediately rippled across the popular consciousness of the United States.[2586] By 1798, Washington had discarded the robes of tyrannical ambition and once again dawned the cloak of disinterested patriotism and national affection. No single image better encapsulates this transformation than Cornelius Tiebout's *Sacred to Patriotism*, which depicts a political shrine to America's first president, honoring the sacrifices which he made, and the liberties which he had secured, for the citizens of the United States (see Figure 7.1).[2587] Awash in civic and martial glory, adorned by the very states whose independence he had

[2578] Washington, *Farewell Address*, September 16, 1796, in *GW Papers: Pres. Ser.*, 20:710; Leonard and Cornell, *Partisan Republic*, 72-73.
[2579] George Washington, *Farewell Address*, September 16, 1796, in *GW Papers: Pres. Ser.*, 20:711.
[2580] Ibid.
[2581] Ibid, 20:707.
[2582] Ibid, 20:715. Malanson, 27-29
[2583] George Washington, *Farewell Address*, September 16, 1796, in *GW Papers: Pres. Ser.*, 20:713-714.
[2584] Ibid, 20:714.
[2585] Ibid, 20:718.
[2586] For a detailed analyses of these varied impacts, see Malanson, *Addressing America*, 33-55.
[2587] Cornelius Tiebout, *Sacred to Patriotism* (1798); Mount Vernon Ladies' Association.

wrestled from the British empire, Washington stood as a political god, apotheosized as General James Wolfe had been just four-decades earlier.[2588]

Figure 7.1: Cornelius Tiebout, *Sacred to Patriotism*, 1798
Courtesy of the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association.

The political legacy of Washington's *Farewell Address*, however, is much more complicated, as it provided a roadmap for America's increasing disunity in the decades to come. It is unsurprising

[2588] For popular reverence for Washington following his death, see Purcell, *Sealed with Blood*, 5-7, 15, 126 ff; for Washington's near-divine status by the War of 1812, see Troy Bickham, *The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, The British Empire, and the War of 1812* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 16.

that the president wished for the United States to be spared the crucible of further warfare, having lived through three wars, fighting in two himself, and helping forge a new, independent nation from the ashes of the last.[2589] Washington's personal desires for peace, however, prevented the president from understanding that political tranquility would not absolve the nation of partisan spirit and internal discord. Rather, to overcome the allure of party spirit and embrace a shared, affective national identity, the American people required a political other against whom to oppose, and thereby unite. To create an enemy who posed such a menacing, near-existential threat to the entire republic, American revolutionaries, and British colonists before them, had deployed impassioned rhetorics of exclusionary patriotism and enemyship. The problem, however, is that these rhetorics rarely achieved their intended result – the intense sentiments of political cohesion and fellow-feeling – if directed against a single political other. Rather, these rhetorics were most effective when deployed against coalitions of political others – be they French colonists and soldiers, Indigenous and enslaved peoples, British regulars, imperial loyalists, or even partisan dissidents.

By promoting a strict policy of international neutrality, George Washington had advocated a political worldview anathema to the violent foundations of America's unstable national identity. Absent an affectively unifying enemy, the republic's governing elite, and subsequently the American populace, continued to turn their hostile, political passions inward, and thereby exacerbated the nation's fraught partisanship. Fierce conflicts during the next three presidencies – centering on the Alien and Sedition Acts, the purchase of the Louisiana territory, and the War of 1812 – further fueled the flames of partisan discord and reaffirmed that the American people's bonds of national fellow-feeling remained strongest when they were battling a dangerous coalition of political others. Despite his best intentions, Washington had laid a path for his presidential successors, one which embraced a partisan government destined to "adopt through passion what reason might reject."[2590]

The Alien and Sedition Acts – Federalist Fears of Revolution and Disunion:

Elected to the presidency with a narrow, three-vote margin and saddled with Thomas Jefferson as vice-president, John Adams inherited a profoundly divided republic.[2591] As George Washington apocryphally remarked to the newly inaugurated president: "I am fairly out and you fairly in! See which of us will be the happiest."[2592] Misery seemed destined to plague Adams's four interminable years as president, as the Massachusetts statesman found himself in constant oscillation between reserved optimism and outright pessimism for the future of the United States.[2593] Despite internal and external obstacles, Adams sought – contrary to popular perceptions – to manifest an American republic rooted in international neutrality.

The first two years of Adams's presidency endured a barrage of political and diplomatic crises which took center stage in the American press.[2594] Prior to leaving office, Washington had

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[2589] For a detailed analyses of how Washington's presidency informed his views on political neutrality as well, see Malanson, *Addressing America*, 8-31.

[2590] George Washington, *Farewell Address*, September 16, 1796, in *GW Papers: Pres. Ser.*, 20:714.

[2591] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 528.

[2592] John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 5, 1797; in *Adams Family Correspondences*, 12:9-10.

[2593] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 534; Leonard and Cornell, *Partisan Republic*, 74-77.

[2594] Heideking observes that partisan newspapers helped to forge a "highly competitive national system of communication, information, and propaganda," which compelled Americans to address a crucial question: what were the "proper manner and limit of conducting political dispute within" this new "frame of reference" this question proved central to the debates surrounding and passage of the *Alien and Sedition Acts*; see *Constitution Before the Judgement Seat*, 88ff. Rasmussen notes that prolonged fears of Jacobinism and French intrigue into American politics compelled Alexander Hamilton to compose *The Warning*, which inadvertently stirred anti-standing army sentiments among the American populace, as its publication aligned with the creation of a standing army amid the XYZ affair; see Alexander Hamilton, *The Warning, No.1*, in *Papers of Hamiton*, 20:490; Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 87-91.

appointed Charles Pinckney of South Carolina as the new American ambassador to France. A moderate federalist who had supported France's revolution, Pinckney curried no favor with Paris, which refused to acknowledge his appointment.[2595] A diplomatic slight, Paris's refusal of Pinckney placed the Adams administration on its backfoot, as France had increased its assault on American shipping vessels in retaliation for the United States' *Treaty of Amity* with Britain.[2596] To resolve this crisis, Adams appointed a three-man committee comprised of Elbridge Gerry, John Marhsall of Virginia, and the rebuffed Pinckney to negotiate with Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgold.[2597] Adams's envoys, however, suffered insult and delay from The Directory's chief diplomat, and by summer 1798, all three had deemed their diplomatic mission – popularly dubbed the XYZ Affair – an abject failure, and returned home.[2598]

Simultaneously, two transatlantic, revolutionary developments exacerbated tensions both within the Adams administration and throughout the United States. Revolution in Saint-Domingue against both France and the institution of slavery had stirred a multitude of American passions. Initially viewed with fascination by the early republic's northeastern, more anti-slavery citizens, the modest concerns and anxieties of American southerners devolved into outright terror and horror as news circulated of the viciousness with which Black Haitians fought to secure their political freedoms and personal emancipation.[2599] Racially motivated terror only intensified as the "French negroes" political and military successes birthed an impassioned, transatlantic, anti-slavery rhetoric.[2600] To the shock of southern republicans, the Adams administration initially supported Toussaint Louverture and the political order which he brought to revolutionary Haiti.[2601] When suspicious fires erupted in Massachusetts, New York, and Georgia in December 1796 and January 1797, even federalists began to question the undue influence of Saint Domingue's Jacobin ideologies.[2602] The Adams administration walked a careful political line: it had enacted a more cohesive anti-French policy, it had maintained diplomatically beneficial relations with Louverture's revolutionary government, and it now tried, with little success, to diminish the popular terror felt toward the Atlantic world's first Black republic.[2603]

As Saint Domingue inched closer to political independence, revolutionary ideologies infiltrated southern Ireland.[2604] Under the leadership of Wolfe Tone and the "United Irishmen," a cohort of Irish Jacobins led an anti-British insurrection in Wexford during late-spring and summer 1798.[2605] Napoleon Bonaparte had promised to aid the United Irishmen in their war against the

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[2595] Terri Diane Halperin, *The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798: Testing the Constitution.* (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press, 2016), 28.
[2596] Halperin, *Alien and Sedition Acts*, 41; Elkins and McKitrick, 549, 643-645.
[2597] Halperin, *Alien and Sedition Acts*, 42-45.
[2598] Ibid, 45-46.
[2599] James Alexander Dun, *Dangerous Neighbors: Making the Haitian Revolution in Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 18-25
[2600] Ibid, 145.
[2601] Ibid, 147.
[2602] Ibid, 156-158.
[2603] Ibid, 158-164; Leslie M. Alexander, *Fear of a Black Republic: Haiti and the Birth of Black Internationalism in the United States*, (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2022), 2-3.
[2604] France's revolution and the United Irishmen's rebellion at Wexford both emerged from great socio-economic instability, specifically following an uptick in foot riots in the years prior their respective movements of popular unrest. For increase of French bread riots in 1788-1789, see Cynthia A. Bouton, *The Flour War: Gender, Class, and Community in Late Ancien Régime French Society*, 213-215 (Philadelphia: Penn State University Press, 1993), ; for the increase of Irish foot riots in 1795-1796, see James Kelly, *Food Rioting in Ireland in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The 'moral economy' and the Irish Crowd* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017), 46-49.
[2605] Thomas Pakenham, *The Year of Liberty: The History of the Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*, (New York: Random House Books, 1969), 13-14.

British empire. France, however, never fulfilled these promises, and the fierceness of the United Irishmen stood no chance against the superior numbers of General Charles Cornwallis.[2606] A complete failure when compared to the revolution in Saint Domingue, the Irish Rebellion stirred acute fears within the American people, especially those living in northern cities – like Boston, New York, and Philadelphia – which were common destinations for Irish immigrants.[2607] Federalists particularly worried that Britain had been encouraging the exportation of its "rebellious population" to the United States, thereby exposing the America republic to the potential machinations of a yet unknown Irish Genêt.[2608]

Terror of the transatlantic instability wrought by revolutionary France, Saint Domingue, and Ireland paved the way for one of the worst failures of John Adams's political career: the passage of the Naturalization Act, the Alien Friends Act, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Sedition Act.[2609] A desperate attempt both to limit the undue influence of Jacobin immigrants within domestic politics, and to strengthen the bonds of national fellow-feeling by silencing all criticism of the federal government, the Alien and Sedition Acts only galvanized partisan animosity.[2610] Escalating well beyond the congressional feud of Fisher Ames and James Madison, federalist Roger Griswold of Connecticut and republican Matthew Lyon of Vermont engaged in a vicious brawl on the House floor whilst debating the passage of the politically controversial Sedition Act (see Figure 7.2).[2611]

Partisan politics aside, federalists held the requisite votes necessary to pass these acts, which Adams then signed into law in summer 1798. The Alien and Sedition Acts reflected the popular mood of the Federalist party, as two months prior a group of discontented federalists assaulted the printing press of Benjamin Franklin Bache, whose Philadelphia newspaper, the *Aurora*, regularly criticized the Adams administration.[2612] Federalists continued their assault against political dissention the following spring, when they rebuked John Fries's popular protest against congressional taxation.[2613] In particular, John Fenno's *Gazette of the United States* hyperbolically and unjustly branded Fries's resistance as a "more serious and formidable" act of political treason than the insurrection against the federal spirits tax that had occurred in Pennsylvania just five years earlier.[2614]

To combat the federalists' dangerous rhetoric of terror and political conformity, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison worked with the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia to pass resolutions which proclaimed that individual states had the power to nullify unconstitutional laws – a direct challenge to the "Supremacy Clause" of the *United States Constitution*.[2615] These resolves, when

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[2606] Pakenham, *The Year of Liberty*, 242, 301ff.

[2607] Nearly "150,000 people emigrated from Ireland to North America" from 1783 to 1815 and, despite most being of the Protestant faith, American federalists still worried of their potential Jacobin politics. For Irish immigration in the eighteenth-century to the end of the War of 1812, see Hidetaka Hirota, *Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of American Immigration Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 18-21.

[2608] Halperin, *Alien and Sedition Acts*, 37.

[2609] The Naturalization Act increased residency requirements for American citizenship from five years to fourteen, "established a federal registry of all aliens and prohibited state courts from naturalization"; the Alien Friends Act granted the president power to deport or jail those he suspected of suspicious activities, yet its powers terminated in June 1800; the Alien Enemies Act held the same executive powers, but became active only when the United States issued a formal declaration of war; and the Sedition Act granted the executive branch power to fine or imprison those American citizens who, by word or pen, criticized the national government; see Halperin, *Alien and Sedition Acts*, 6.

[2610] Halperin, *Alein and Sedition Acts*, 6-7; 72-73.

[2611] "Congressional Pugillsts," (Philadelphia, 1798); Library of Congress. Halperin, *Alein and Sedition Acts*, 8-82; 87. Joanne B. Freeman, *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 172-175.

[2612] Halperin, *Alein and Sedition Acts,* 1.

[2613] Engels, *Enemyship*, 185-191.

[2614] Ibid, *Gazette of the United States*, March 11, 1799.

[2615] Halperin, *Alein and Sedition Acts*, 101-109.

coupled with popular abhorrence for the Adams administration's restriction of both speech and immigration, exhibited the first signs of an ideological shift within the early republic. The "spell" which the federalists held over the American people, Jefferson observed, was "dissolving [and] the public mind [was now] recovering from the delirium into which it had been thrown."[2616] Jefferson's observation was more wishful thinking than political fact. New York and Massachusetts's state legislatures decried the dangerous instability proposed in Virginia and Kentucky's resolutions. Saturated in "inflammatory and pernicious sentiments," these resolves threatened to provide a pathway by which political malcontents might reduce the *United States Constitution* "to a mere cypher – to form and pageantry of authority, without the energy or power" it once held.[2617] This lukewarm response from northern state legislatures, however, did little to aid Adams's contested bid for re-election in 1800, which he narrowly lost to his own vice-president.[2618] Now freed from the federalists' "reign of witches," Thomas Jefferson – like his former friend and current political enemy – inherited a republic plagued by the political passions of terror, horror, and partisan resentment.[2619]

Figure 7.2: "Congressional Pugillsts." Philadelphia, 1798.
Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

[2616] Thomas Jefferson to Robert Livingston, February 23, 1799, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 31:57; Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*, 156.
[2617] *The Communications of the Several States, on the Resolutions of the Legislatures of Virginia, Respecting the Alien and Sedition Laws* (Richmond, 1798), 7, 15-16; Library of Congress. Halperin, *Alein and Sedition Acts*, 107.
[2618] Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 687-690.
[2619] Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, June 4, 1798, *Papers of Jefferson*, 30:389; Halperin, *Alien and Sedition Acts*, 120.

The Louisiana Purchase – Republican Hatred for America's Racialized Political Others:

Thomas Jefferson's inaugural address in March 1801 included a direct promise to the American people: to ensure "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."[2620] Echoing Washington's *Farewell Address*, Jefferson sought to reassure the United States that the partisan infighting which the federalists had permitted and encouraged was but a thing of the past, and his administration would ensure that the *national* interest came before either party politics or regional desires. French Louisiana provided a stark, immediate test of the Virginian's lofty political vows.

In 1800, Spain signed the *Treaty of San Ildefonso*, which ceded almost nine percent of North America's landmass to Napoleon's France.[2621] The reintroduction of post-revolutionary France to the United States western borders reignited the once popular, now dormant fears of French-Indigenous alliances throughout the Louisiana territory.[2622] Simultaneously, the president's home state thwarted an enslaved revolt in Richmond.[2623] Reports, however, swiftly emerged that the enslaved leader – a man named Gabriel – was actually a "French Negro" sent to the United States from Saint Domingue to incite insurrection.[2624] Upon receiving such news, southern Americans whipt themselves into a terror-fueled rage, believing Haiti to be a "chaotic, even demonic entity" which desired to destroy America's own republic.[2625] By the time Haiti had declared its independence in 1804, the United States had learned of, and greatly feared, the horrors that plagued their Atlantic neighbor: "The French….are in the most distressing situation….whites are daily missing, supposed to be secretly murdered, and their property immediately confiscated and sold at auction," as "No age or sex [was] spared from the outrage and inhumanity of the blacks."[2626] Exacerbating tensions further, the writings of an "Injured Man" – a radical defender of Haiti's revolution – began circulating throughout the United States, which posited that any person who opposed Haitian independence was "guided by avarice, and the love of oppressing their fellow creatures."[2627]

Beyond stoking southern terror and horror of enslaved insurrections, Haiti's revolution and all-but-certain independence had devastated France's economic stability. Political serendipity thereby afforded Jefferson a unique opportunity; one which allowed him to resolve popular fears of French-Indigenous alliances in the Louisiana territory while acquiring merchant access to New Orleans and the Mississippi River.[2628] Desperate for funds, Napoleon offered to sell the entire Louisiana territory to the United States for a mere $15 million, granting the American people, Jefferson mused, land enough for one-thousand generations.[2629] The acquisition of the Louisiana territory now made "westward expansion" a profitable venture for America's northern merchants, western farmers, and

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[2620] Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," March 4, 1801, in *Papers of Jefferson*, 33:149-150.
[2621] Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 347-348.
[2622] Ibid.
[2623] For a detailed analysis of Gabriel's Revolt and its actual and assumed connections to Haiti's revolution, see Dun, *Dangerous Neighbors*, 180-192.
[2624] Ibid, Taylor, *internal Enemies*, 94-97.
[2625] Ibid; Erin Austin Dwyer observes that intense fears of enslaved insurrection rarely resulted in "concrete policy changes." For example, South Carolina had closed its ports to the international slave trade to curb fears of Haitian revolutionaries and incendiaries entering their state, yet reversed this after Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory from France; see Dwyer, *Mastering Emotions*, 35.
[2626] *New York Gazette*, May 15, 1804; Alexander, *Fear of a Black Republic*, 20; Sharples, *The World that Fear Made*, 246-251.
[2627] *Commercial Advertiser*, May 25, 1804; Alexander, *Fear of a Black Republic*, 21-23.
[2628] McCoy, *Elusive Republic*, 196-198.
[2629] Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 348-349.

southern plantation owners, as well as a political necessity for "republican civilization itself."[2630] A golden opportunity to exert federal power, America's expansion into the Louisiana territory would also further Secretary of War James McHenry's mission to achieve "a more perfect control" over the United States' western Indigenous neighbors.[2631]

The Indigenous other, however, did not have the opportunity, once again, to serve as a horrific, terrifying political enemy of the United States.[2632] Federalists had rejected Jefferson's proposed expansion into the Louisiana territory, decrying his proposal as nothing more than partisan opportunism designed to enlarge the political power of the slave holding south.[2633] Some federalists even argued that the integration of such a large region would further erode Americans' bonds of national fellow-feeling. An unrelenting thorn in republicans' side, Fisher Ames chided the Jefferson administration for foolishly encouraging the American people to "rush like a comet into [the] infinite space" beyond the Mississippi River.[2634] Despite benefitting the regional interests of those northeastern merchants who would transport cash crops grown within the Louisiana territory, New England's federalists in particular perceived Jefferson's purchase as nothing more than the reach of tyrant – the same accusation which republicans once hurled at Washington. The Jefferson administration, Timothy Pickering observed, will "commit ever arbitrary act" required to achieve its transcontinental empire of slavery.[2635] Jefferson's subsequent embargo against Haiti in 1806 and the suspension of all foreign trade with Britain and France beginning in 1807, had made it clear to northern federalists that republicans cared little for their personal suffering or for the national interest.[2636] If such partisan discord resulted in the "division of the States," Henry Knox somberly observed in March 1804, then the "only alternative to save the Constitution, & restore it to its former splendour" would be to engage, yet again, in a "civil war."[2637]

<u>The War of 1812 – America's Second Revolution, America's Second National Identity:</u>

By the time that James Madison had been elected as the fourth president of the United States, Washington's entrenched policy of international neutrality collided with the unavoidability, at least for republicans, of another war with the British empire. Nicole Eustace's brilliant *1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism* explores how America's "Era of Good Feeling" arose from the ashes of an international war in which most American citizens did not fight.[2638] Both national fellow-feeling and national feelings, Eustace argued, did not exist in the United States at the beginning of America's second war against Britain.[2639] Republicans rallied together through expressions of patriotic love for

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[2630] McCoy, *Elusive Republic*, 199; Martin Öhman, "The Mississippi Question in Jeffersonian Political Economy" in *Jeffersonians in Power: The Rhetoric of Opposition Meets the Realities of Governing,* ed. Joanne B. Freeman and Johanna N. Neem (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2019), 48-52.

[2631] James McHenry, "Draft of Proposal for a Person to Examine Public Policy," May 23, 1800; in "James McHenry Papers," MSS, Clements Library, University of Michigan; Gregory Ablavsky, *Federal Ground: Governing Property and Violence in the First U.S. Territories*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 231-233.

[2632] For a detailed analysis of the anti-Indigenous violence which occurred on the western borders of the United States throughout the 1790s, which provided a direct cultural antecedent for anti-Indigenous violence and displacement in the early-19th century, see Ablavsky, *Federal Ground*, 139-167.

[2633] Leonard and Cornell, *Partisan Republic*, 118-120.

[2634] Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, October 3, 1803, in *Works of Ames*, 1:323-324; McCoy, *Elusive Republic*, 200-201

[2635] Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, March 3, 1804, in *Liberty and Order: The First American Party Struggle,* ed. Lance Banning (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 313; Leonard and Cornell, *Partisan Republic*, 119.

[2636] For a detailed analysis of New Englanders' response to the Embargo Act of 1807, see Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 417-422,

[2637] Henry Knox to Samuel Thatcher, February 9, 1804, in "Henry Knox Papers III," MSS; Massachusetts Historical Society.

[2638] Nicole Eustace, *1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2012), xi-xii.

[2639] Eustace, *1812*, 36-39.

the defense of their country.[2640] Conversely, federalists felt disgust both for America's sinful engagement in an unnecessary, partisan war and for the political rage which republicans had used to incite popular support for their anti-British, pro-slavery ideologies.[2641] The *New Bedford Mercury*'s poem "War" perhaps best incapsulates federalist horror: "Oh! Must Columbia's sons forsake their home/To crimson over Canada with blood,/Or hostile, o'er the mirm'ring billows roam,/To stain, with human gore, the ocean flood?"[2642] Despite federalist opposition, republicans' victory in the War of 1812 fostered a new set of patriotic, national feelings among the citizens of the United States.

Historians have often described the War of 1812 as America's Second Revolution, but few have grasped fully the accuracy of that title. Much like British America's civil war for independence, the War of 1812 nurtured profound interstate sympathy and national fellow-feeling, as it provided the American people with a foreign, external enemy (the British empire) against whom they might direct their vicious passions and violent acts of political othering. As with British America's revolutionary affective discourse, Indigenous people and enslaved Africans were aligned with the British empire, and therefore provided another outlet for popular terror, hatred, rage, and horror. To vilify the objectives of Tecumseh's pan-Indigenous Confederacy and to justify the violence perpetrated against the Muscogee Red Sticks, Americans redeployed impassioned, Indian-hating rhetorics and thereby chastised the British empire for inciting, yet again, the worst inclinations of North America's "savage" populations.[2643] For enslaved peoples of the American south, the British navy brought renewed promises of freedom through imperial military service, and at least three thousand Black Americans escaped their enslavement during the war.[2644] Many of these escaped Americans now fought against the United States, proving themselves invaluable to the British as they razed Washington, D.C. in 1814.[2645] Republicans depicted the destruction of the nation's capital as an assault upon the United States' "family home"; an unthinkable horror committed by a group of disgruntled enslaved peoples whose actions had demonstrated that Black Americans, whether enslaved or free, remained a serious threat to the security of the America republic.[2646]

Beyond othering Indigenous and enslaved peoples, the War of 1812's rhetoric of enemyship cast the Federalist party as a dangerous threat to the stability of the United States. By 1814, the war had taken a dire toll on New England's merchants, especially as the British navy had imposed a blockade across Massachusetts's coast and Madison had imposed an embargo not simply on all transatlantic trade, but rather on all "internal coasting trade within the United States."[2647] To strategize how to save their region from economic ruin, representatives from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont met in Hartford in December 1814. Despite the presence of young "hotheads," the Hartford Convention produced a "Great Pamphlet" that called for the restoration of federative politics within the United States government, so as to "defend the region's interests and [to] heal the nation's woes."[2648] Committed to America's national experiment, the Hartford Convention explicitly avoided advocating for "secession, nullification, or insurrection," and rather prioritized reconciliation and a return to unifying national interests.

[2640] Eustace, *1812*, xi-xvi; 36-39. Eustace further details the importance of feminine romantic love, as a tool promote masculine courage and help male soldiers overcome fear and fulfill their patriotic duty, see 42-57.
[2641] Ibid, xi-xvii, 109-110; Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance*, 184-186.
[2642] *Salem Gazette*, July 21, 1812 (reprint); Bickham, *Weight of Vengeance*, 179.3
[2643] Eustace, *1812*, 119-134; Hämäläinen, *Indigenous Continent*, 370-376
[2644] Taylor, *Internal Enemy*, 175-176, 203-205, 208, 271.
[2645] Ibid, 275-314, especially, 313-314.
[2646] Eustace, *1812*, 168-210.
[2647] Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 431-432.
[2648] Ibid, 436-437.

Much like British America's imperial loyalists, federalists' tame rhetoric of reconciliation, when coupled with historical contingency, ensured their political downfall. The threat of secession may have encouraged those states divided over Madison's war – New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina – to engage in good-faith talks to resolve the profound strife felt throughout the northeast. Without such extreme rhetorical threats, however, the cheers of patriotism and national pride silenced the Hartford Convention's pleas. Before presenting their grievances to the federal congress, the Hartford delegation had learned that Andrew Jackson had secured a pivotal victory for the United States at New Orleans, and that the republic had signed the *Treaty of Ghent* with the British empire.[2649] Emotional catharsis rippled throughout the United States, and republican Charles Ingersoll proclaimed on the House floor: "for the richest kingdom in Europe, I would not exchange my American citizenship – for the most opulent endowment I would not surrender the delight which I derive from the feelings of this moment."[2650] Patriotic love and reinvigorated bonds of national fellow-feeling, Ingersoll concluded, were the just spoils of America's military and diplomatic victories.

News of the Hartford Convention's grievances, therefore, cast America's federalists – like imperial loyalists before them – in an unfair political light. Even Massachusetts republican John Quincy Adams decried the Hartford Convention as furthering a traitorous "conspiracy" against the American republic and its constitutional government.[2651] Republicans' hatred for the Hartford Convention's perceived royalism and Anglophilia is most apparent in the popular political cartoon *The Hartford Convention, or Leap No Leap*, in which George III courts Massachusetts delegate Harrison Gray Otis with the promise of "molasses and Codfish; plenty of goods to Smuggle," and with the "Honours, titles and Nobility" that federalist vice-president John Adams had so desperately sought for the chief executive twenty-five-years earlier (see Figure 7.3).[2652] The War of 1812, Jefferson informed the Marquis de Lafayette, had not simply killed the Federalist party, but had ended partisan division in America.[2653] The "evanition of party dissentions" Jefferson concluded, "has harmonized intercourse, & sweetened society" in the United States "beyond imagination."[2654] By deploying rhetorics of terror, rage, hatred, horror, and grief against British soldiers, Indigenous peoples, enslaved Americans, and even members of the Federalist party, republicans had birthed a second national identity for the United States – one rooted in the patriotic, white masculinity that Andrew Jackson, like George Washington and James Wolfe before him, now embodied.[2655]

[2649] Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 440-441. The invasion of New Orleans occurred on January 8, 1815, and the Treaty of Ghent had been signed on December 24, 1814 – almost two weeks before the Hartford Convention issued its official report on January 5.

[2650] "INGERSOLE'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE PASSAGE Of the Resolutions expressive of the thanks of Congress to Gen. Jackson," *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, D.C.), February 20, 1815; Eustace, *1812*, 220.

[2651] For John Quincy Adams's opposition of the Hartford Convention, see "Reply to the Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists," in *Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1800-1815*, ed. Henry Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1877), 107-329. Eustace, *1812*, 207-208; Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 442-443.

[2652] William Charles, *The Harford Convention, or Leap no Leap* (Philadelphia, 1814); Library of Congress.

[2653] Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis de Lafayette, May 14, 1817, in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, *Retirement Series*, ed., J. Jefferson Looney (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 11:353-354 Rasmussen, *Fear of a Setting Sun*, 187.

[2654] Ibid.

[2655] Eustace, *1812*, 228-230.

Figure 7.3: William Charles, *The Harford Convention, or Leap no Leap*
Philadelphia, 1814. Library of Congress.

Affective Schisms of Identity, Not Revolutions in Sentiment:

William Clay was incorrect – a "revolution in the sentiment of the [American] people" had not occurred between 1754 and 1797, nor had it occurred between 1797 and 1815.[2656] Rather, the subjects of George II and George III had fought in three international wars which had, in turn, produced two affective schisms of identity. Over this sixty-year period, the affective economies of British America, and then the United States, had defined and redefined the political otherness of French colonists, Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, British regulars, radical insurgents, imperial loyalists, antifederalists, federalists, and republicans. The affects associated with these various cohorts, however, remained consistent: hatred, terror, horror, anger, betrayal, and avarice for those deemed political others, and grief, sorrow, love, hope, and joy for those deemed worthy of sharing in the bonds of either imperial or national fellow-feeling. By participating in the practice of collective sympathy, imperial subjects and republican citizens had received, to varying degrees, membership within British America's fluid emotional communities.

British America's first affective schism occurred when America's insurgent elite imbued imperial loyalists with terror, hatred, horror, betrayal, and avarice; associated them with the savagery and villainy of Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, and British regulars; and finally excluded them from membership in their emotional community of revolution. Exclusionary patriotism had thereby helped America's revolutionaries win their civil war for independence, abandon their imperial identity, and forge new, national bonds of fellow-feeling among the citizens of the United States.

The ideological and partisan division that emerged immediately following America's victory against the British empire, however, initiated a second affective schism within the United States.

[2656] Maclay, *Journal of Maclay*, 10-11.

Prolonged, just like British America's imperial crisis, it took twenty years for American federalists to suffer an affectively parallel, yet significantly less severe, political fate as British America's imperial loyalists. Beginning in Washington's second presidential term, republicans targeted federalists with a fierce rhetoric of enemyship, which criticized their self-interested political motivations. To intensify these negative sentiments, republicans then associated federalists with dangerous, racialized political others, specifically during the War of 1812. Unlike imperial loyalists, however, America's federalists had never taken up arms against, nor directly aided and abetted the enemies of, their beloved republic. This is an important distinction, as it helps to explain why so few republicans called for the expulsion of federalists from the citizenry of the United States in 1815. Republicans' silencing of the Federalist party, therefore, helped to midwife the United States' second national identity, one founded in white masculine democracy and impassioned patriotic action.[2657] The implicit legacy of the Federalist party's political ideologies on America's "Age of Democracy" is another equally complex emotions history – one in desperate need of telling.

The transformation of British America from 1754 to 1815 reveals that, in the early-modern Atlantic world, the cohesion of both imperial and national identities was an inherently emotional labor. Like sand in a sieve, however, affective cohesion was a fleeting, impermanent achievement. The story of revolutionary America, therefore, was always one of tragedy: not simply for the inability of British Americans to sustain the bonds of fellow-feeling necessary to achieve a stable emotional community, but rather, and much more importantly, for those marginalized cohorts who suffered profound and brutal acts of violence in America's vain attempt to procure a shared, affective identity. This work hopefully provides an analytical jumping-off point for further research into how political others coopted British America's affective rhetorics and exclusionary patriotic ethos both to resist the expansion of the United States and to fight for recognition as citizens within the republic in which they already lived. Finally, the relationship between affective rhetoric, popular violence, and political identity – especially the argument that patriotic love emerges most intensely after wartime victories, but then almost immediately spurs peacetime internal division – deserves much greater analysis throughout the history of the United States.

One final observation. Flashback to 2020, when Susan B. Glasser told the American people – through the pages of the *New Yorker* – that Republican strategist Richard Berman "managed" public opinion with fear, love, anger, greed, and sympathy."[2658] The minutiae of linguistic evolution and the need for the impressively patriotic "FLAGS" acronym aside, Berman's strategy rings eerily similar to the affective rhetoric which revolutionary Americans used to win their political independence. The United States, it seems, has always been an emotional republic, one which has sought to erect its patriotic identity upon a powerful, yet woefully impermanent, American feeling.

[2657] For an excellent analysis of the centrality of white male democracy to the United States' political culture in the aftermath of the War of 1812, see Leonard and Cornell, *Partisan Republic*, 155-177.
[2658] Glasser, "The Trials of a Never Trump Republican."

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APPENDIX:

Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language*, 1755

Introduction:

Words matter. Let me belabor that point: as a historian, all of my research hinges on the words which eighteenth century British Americans used to convey emotions. Understanding, evaluating, and interpreting emotions is a difficult task, as no single word ever fully captures the intricate nuances, contradictions, and fluidity of an individual's emotional state. Questions of sincerity, naivete, and deception further complicate this task. To grapple with the impact of emotions on the cultures, social norms, and politics of the early-modern world, with all its inherent uncertainty, might seem like a fool's-errand. That challenge – to balance the affective knife's edge of the near-inaccessibility, yet undeniable universality, of emotions to humanity, to what it means to be *human* – is what made the study of historical emotions my intellectual passion.

When I began my archival research for this project in July 2018, I knew that Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* would be a guiding ideological and philosophical text for my inquiry into early-modern British American identity. I did not expect, however, to stumble upon a massive tome that would become a second intellectual pillar for my research. Samuel Johnosn's *Dictionary of the English Language*, first published in 1755, complimented my reliance on Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* almost too perfectly. The comprehensiveness of Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language* allowed me (as I hope this Appendix will allow my readers) to understand the definitions of words in mid-eighteenth century British American culture, and thereby comprehend how Smith himself understood the emotions upon which he opined. To the best of my knowledge, I have included the definitions of every emotions word that I quote and reference within this dissertation. In addition, I have included definitions of non-emotions concepts that are integral to my arguments and conclusions. Finally, I have listed these words alphabetically. I wish for readers who engage with this Appendix to not be biased by either Adam Smith's or my own categorization of emotions, but rather to immerse themselves in the emotional lexicon of the early-modern British empire.

Three notes on sources. First, all definitions included below come from the 1755 edition of Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language*. Second, the only definitions which I excluded are those that explain the grammatical positionality of a word, or those only used by a single English author (as denoted by Johnson). Finally, when I began this project, one had to find a physical or electronic copy of Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language* to perform this linguistic research. Mercifully, the College of Arts and Humanities, and the Center for Humanities and Digital Research at the University of Southern Florida, with support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, have created a digitally accessible and fully searchable database, entitled *Johnson's Dictionary Online*, which grants access to both the 1755 and 1773 editions of the text. For those who wish to probe further into the meaning of words in the early-modern Atlantic world, *Johnson's Dictionary Online* may be accessed here: https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/index.php

Words matter. With the help of Samuel Johnson and Adam Smith, I believe that we may understand, with a bit more precision, how and why emotions were so important to both the political culture, and the identity politics, of eighteenth century British America.

Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755, selected entries):

Abhor (v. a.):

1. To hate with acrimony; to detest to extremity; to loath.

Adoration (n.):

1. The external homage paid to the Divinity, distinct from mental reverence.
2. Homage paid to persons in high place or esteem.

Adore (v. a.):

1. To worship with external homage; to pay divine honours.
2. It is used, popularly, to denote a high degree of reverence or regard; to reverence; to honour; to love.

Afeard (adj.)

1. Frightened; terrified; afraid.

Affect (n.):

1. Affection; passion; sensation.
2. Quality; circumstance.

Affect (v. a.)

1. To act upon; to produce effects in any other thing.
2. To move the passions.
3. To aim at; to endeavour after: spoken of persons.
4. To tend to; to endeavour after: spoken of things.
5. To be fond of; to be pleased with to love; to regard with fondness.
6. To make a shew of something; to study the appearance of any thing; with some degree of hypocrisy.
7. To imitate in an unnatural and constrained manner.
8. To convict of some crime; to attaint with guilt: a phrase merely juridical.

Affection (n.):

1. The state of being affected by any cause, or agent. This general sense is little in use.
2. Passion of any kind.
3. Love; kindness; good-will to some person; often with to, or *towards*, before the person.

Affective (adj.):

1. That which affects; that which strongly touches. It is generally used for painful.

Afraid (adj.):

1. Struck with fear; terrified; fearful.

Ambition (n.):

1. The desire of preferment or honour
2. The desire of any thing great or excellent.

Anarchy (n.):
1. Want of government; a state in which every man is unaccountable; a state without magistracy.

Anger (n.):
1. [U]neasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge.
2. Pain, or smart, or a sore or swelling.

Anger (v. a.):
1. To make angry; to provoke; to enrage.

Anxiety (n.):
1. Trouble of mind about some future event; suspense with uneasiness; perplexity; solicitude.
2. In the medical language, depression; lowness of spirts.

Anxious (adj):
1. Disturbed about some uncertain event; solicitous.
2. Careful; full of inquietude; unquiet.
3. Careful; as of a thing of great importance.

Ardour (n.):
1. Heat.
2. Heat of affection, as love, desire, courage.

Avarice (n.):
1. Covetousness; insatiable desire.

Barbarity (adj.):
1. Savageness; incivility.
2. Cruelty; inhumanity.
3. Barbarism; impurity of speech.

Barbarous (adj.):
1. Stranger to civility; savage; uncivilized.
2. Ignorant; unacquainted with arts.
3. Cruel; inhuman.

Betray (v. a.):
1. To give into the hands of enemies by treachery, or breech of trust.
2. To discover that which has been entrusted to secrecy.
3. To make known something that were better concealed.
4. To make liable to fall into something inconvenient.
5. To show; to discover; in a neutral sense.

Chaos (n.):

1. The mass of matter supposed to be in confusion before it was divided by the creation into its proper classes and elements.
2. Confusion; irregular mixture.
3. Any thing where the parts are undistinguished.

Citizen (n.):

1. A freeman of a city; not a foreigner; not a slave.
2. A townsman; a man of trade not a gentleman.
3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any place.

Civil (n.):

1. Relating to the community; political relating to the city or government.
2. Relating to any man as a member of a community.
3. Not in anarchy; not wild; nor without rule or government.
4. Not foreign; intestine.
5. Not ecclesiastical.
6. Not natural.
7. Not military.
8. Not criminal.
9. Civilized; not barbarous.
10. Complaisant; civilized; well bred; elegant of manners; not rude; not brutal; nor coarse.
11. Grave; sober; not gay or shwey.

Community (n.):

1. The commonwealth; the body politick.
2. Common possession; the state contrary to property or appropriation.
3. Frequency; commonness.

Compassion (n.):

1. Commiseration; sorrow for the suffering of others; painful sympathy.

Compassionate (adj.):

1. Inclined to compassion; inclined to pity; merciful; tender; melting; soft; easily affected with sorrow by the misery of others.

Corrupt (adj):

1. Vitious; tainted with wickedness; without integrity.

Corrupt (v. a.):

1. To turn from a sound to a putrescence state; to infect.
2. To deprave; to destroy integrity; to vitiate; to bribe.
3. To spoil; to do mischief.

Courage (n.):

1. Bravery; active fortitude; spirit of enterprise.

Covet (v. a.):
1. To desire inordinately; to desire beyond due bounds.
2. To desire earnestly.

Covetousness (n.):
1. Avarice; inordinate desire for money; eagerness of gain.

Cowardice (adj.):
1. Fear; habitual timidity; pusillanimity; want of courage.

Cruel (adj.):
1. Pleased with hurting others; inhuman; hard-hearted; without pity; without compassion; savage; barbarous; unrelenting.
2. [Of things.] Bloody; mischievous; destructive; causing pain.

Cruelty (adj.):
1. Inhumanity; savageness; barbarity.

Deceive (v. a.):
1. To cause to mistake; to bring into errour; to impose upon.
2. To delude by stratagem.
3. To cut off from expectation.
4. To mock; to fail.

Demagogue (n.):
1. A ringleader of the rabble; a populous and factious orator.

Desire (n.):
1. Wish; eagerness to obtain or enjoy.

Desire (v. a.):
1. To wish; to long for; to covet.
2. To express wishes; to appear to long.
3. To ask; to intreat.

Despotick (adj.):
1. Absolute in power; unlimited in authority; arbitrary; unaccountable.

Devotion (n.):
1. The state of begin consecrated or dedicated.
2. Piety; acts of religion.
3. An act of external worship.
4. Prayer; expression of devotion.
5. The state of the mind under a strong sense of dependance upon God.
6. An act of reverence, respect, or ceremony.
7. Strong affection; ardent love; such as makes the lover the sole property of the person loved.

Disinterest (n.):
1. What is contrary to one's wish or prosperity; that which any one is concerned to prevent.
2. Indifference to profit; superiority to regards of private advantage.

Disinterested (adj.):
1. Superior to regard of private advantage; not influenced by private profit.
2. Without any concern in an affair; without fear or hope.

Distain (v. a.):
1. To stain; to tinge with an adventitious colour.
2. To blot; to sully with infamy.

Distrust (n.):
1. Discredit; loss of credit; loss of confidence.
2. Suspicion; want of faith; want of confidence in another.

Distrust (v. a.):
1. To regard with diffidence; to defied in; not to trust.

Dread (adj.):
1. Terrible; frightful.
2. Awful; venerable in the highest degree.

Dread (n.):
1. Fear; terrour; affright.
2. Habitual fear; awe.
3. The person or thing feared; the cause of fear.

Dread (v. a.):
1. To fear in an excessive degree.

Emotion (n.):
1. Disturbance of mind; vehemence of passion; or pleasing or painful.

Empire (n.):
1. Imperial power; supreme dominion; sovereign command.
2. The region over which dominion is extended.
3. Command over any thing.

Enemy (n.):
1. A publick foe.
2. A private opponent; an antagonist.
3. Any one who regards another with malevolence; not a friend.
4. One that dislikes.
5. [In theology.] The fiend; the devil.

Enrage (v. a.):
1. To irritate; to provoke; to make furious; to exasperate.

Envy (n.):

1. Pain felt and malignity conceived at the sight of excellence or happiness.
2. Rivalry; competition.
3. Malice; malignity.
4. Publick odium; ill repute.

Envy (v. a.):

1. To hate another for excellence, happiness, or success.
2. To grieve at any qualities of excellence in another.
3. To grudge; to impart unwillingly; to withhold maliciously.

Exclusion (n.):

1. The act of shutting out or denying admission.
2. Rejection; not reception in any manner.
3. The act of debarring from any privilege, or participation.
4. Exception.

Fear (n):

1. Dread; horrour; painful apprehension of danger.
2. Awe; dejection of mind at the presence of any person or thing.
3. Anxiety; solicitude.
4. That which causes fear.
5. The object of fear.

Fear (v. a.):

1. To dread; to consider with apprehensions of terrour; to be afraid of.
2. To fright; to terrify; to make afraid.

Fear (v. n.):

1. To live in horrour; to be afraid.
2. To be anxious.

Feeling (n.):

1. The sense of touch.
2. Sensibility; tenderness.
3. Perception.

Fellow-feeling (n.):

1. Sympathy.
2. Combination; joint interest: common in an ill sense.

Fondness (n.):

1. Foolishness; weakness; want of sense; want of judgment.
2. Foolish tenderness.
3. Tender passion.
4. Unreasonable liking.

Freedom (n.):

1. Liberty; exemption from servitude; independence.
2. Privileges; franchises; immunities.
3. Power of enjoying franchises.
4. Exemption from fate, necessity, or predetermination.
5. Unrestraint.
6. The state of being without any particular evil or inconvenience.
7. Ease or facility in doing or showing any thing.

Friend (n.):

1. One joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy; opposed to foe or enemy.
2. One without hostile intentions.
3. One reconciled to another.
4. An attendant, or companion.
5. Favourer; one propitious.
6; A familiar compellation.

Friend (v. a.):

1. To favour; to befriend; to countenance; to support.

Friendship:

1. The state of minds united by mutual benevolence.
2. Highest degree of intimacy.
3. Favour; personal kindness.
4. Assistance; help.
5. Conformity; affinity; correspondence; aptness to untie.

Fury (n):

1. Madness.
2. Rage; passion of anger; tumult of mind approaching to madness.
3. Enthusiasm exaltation of fancy.

Gratitude (n.):

1. Duty to benefactors.
2. Desire to return benefits.

Grief (n.):

1. Sorrow; trouble for something past.
2. Grievance; harm.
3. Pain; disease.

Grieve (v. a.):

1. To afflict; to hurt.

Grievous (adj.):
1. Afflictive; painful; hard to be born.
2. Such as causes sorrow.
3. Expressing a great degree of uneasiness.
4. Atrocious; heavy.

Hate (n.):
1. Malignity; detestation; the contrary to love.

Hate (v a.):
1. To detest; to abhor; to abominate; to regard with the passion contrary to love.

Hatred (n.):
1. Hate; ill-will; malignity; malevolence; dislike; abhorrence; detestation; abomination; the passion contrary to love.

Happy (adj.):
1. In a state of felicity; in a state where the desire is satisfied.
2. Lucky; successful; fortunate.
3. Addressful; ready.

Happiness (n):
1. Felicity; state in which the desires are satisfied.
2. Good luck; good fortune.
3. Fortuitous elegance; unstudied grace.

Honor (n.):
1. Dignity; high rank.
2. Reputation; fame.
3. The title of a man of rank.
4. Subject of praise.
5. Nobleness of mind; scorn of meanness; magnanimity.
6. Reverence; due veneration.
7. Chastity.
8. Dignity of mien.
9. Glory; boast.
10. Publick mark if respect.
11. Privileges of rank or birth.
12. Civilities paid.
13. Ornament; decoration.

Hope (n.):
1. Expectation of some good; an expectation indulged with pleasure.
2. Confidence in a future event, or in the future conduct of any person.
3. That which gives hope; that on which the hopes are fixed; as an agent by which something desired may be effected.
4. The object of hope.

Hope (v. a.):
1. To expect with desire.

Hope (v. n.):
1. To live in expectation of some good.
2. To place confidence in futurity.

Hopeful (adj.):
1. Full of qualities which produce hope; promising; likely to obtain success; likely to come to maturity; likely to gratify desire, or answer expectation.
2. Full of hope; full of expectation of success.

Horror (n.):
1. Terrour mixed with detestation; a passion compounded of fear and hate, both strong.
2. Gloom; dreariness.

Identity (n.):
1. Sameness; not diversity.

Imperial (adj.):
1. Royal; possessing royalty.
2. Betokening royalty; marking sovereignty.
3. Belonging to an emperor or monarch; regal; royal; monarchical.

Independence (n.):
1. Freedom; exemption from reliance or control; state over which none has power.

Insurrection (n.):
1. A seditious rising; a rebellious commotion.

Interest (n.):
1. Concern; advantage; good.
2. Influence over others.
3. Share; part in any thing; participation.
4. Regard to private profit.
5. Money paid for use; usury.
6. Any surplus of advantage.

Interest (v. a.):
1. To concern; to affect; to give share in.

Jealousy (n.):
1. Suspicion in love.
2. Suspicious fear.
3. Suspicious caution, vigilance, or rivalry.

Joy (n.):
1. The passion produced by any happy accident; gladness; exultation.
2. Gaiety; merriment; festivity.
3. Happiness; felicity.
4. A term of fondness.

Joy (v. a.):
1. To congratulate; to entertain kindly.
2. To gladden; to exhilarate.
3. To enjoy; to have happy possession.

Joy (v. n.):
1. To rejoice; to be glad; to exult.

Joyous (adj.):
1. Glad; gay; merry.
2. Giving joy.

Liberty (n):
1. Freedom, as opposed to slavery.
2. Freedom, as opposed to necessity.
3. Privilege; exemption; immunity.
4. Relaxation of restraint.
5. Leave; permission.

Love (n.):
1. The passion between the sexes.
2. Kindness; good-will; friendship.
3. Courtship.

Love (v.):
1. To regard with passionate affection, as that of one sex to the other.
2. To regard with the affection of a friend.
3. To regard with paternal tenderness.
4. To be pleased with.
5. To regard with reverent unwillingness to offend.

Loyalty (adj.):
1. Firm and faithful adherence to a prince.
2. Fidelity to a lady, or lover.

Malice (n.):
1. Badness of design; deliberate mischief.
2. Ill intention to any one; desire of hurting.

Melancholic (adj):
1. Disordered with melancholy; fanciful; hypochondriacal; gloomy.

Melancholy (adj):
1. Gloomy; dismal.
2. Diseased with melancholy; fanciful; habitually dejected.

Melancholy (n.):
1. A disease, supposed to proceed from a redundance of black bile; but better known to arise from too heavy and too viscid blood: its cure is in evacuation, nervous medicines, and powerful stimuli.
2. A kindness of madness, in which the mind is always fixed on one object.
3. A gloomy, pensive, discontented temper.

Mercy (n.):
1. Tenderness; goodness; pity; willingness to save; clemency; mildness unwillingness to punish.
2. Pardon.
3. Discretion; power of acting at pleasure.

Merciful (adj.):
1. Compassionate; tender; kind; unwilling to punish; willing to pity and spare.

Mourn (v. a.):
1. To grieve for; to lament.
2. To utter in a sorrowful manner.

Mourn (v. n.):
1. To grieve; to be sorrowful.
2. To wear the bait of sorrow.
3. To preserve appearance of grief.

Mourning (n.):
1. Lamentation; sorrow.
2. The dress of sorrow.

Nation (n.):
1. A people distinguished from another people; generally by their language, original, or government.

National (adj.):
1. Publick; general; not private; not particular.
2. Bigotted to one's own country.

Other (pron.):
1. Not the same; not this; different.
2. Not I, or he, but some one else.
3. Not the one, not this, but the contrary.

Passion (n.):
1. Any effect caused by external agency.
2. Violent commotion of the mind.
3. Anger.
4. Zeal; ardour.
5. Love
6. Eagerness.
7. Emphatically.

Passionate (adj.):
1. Moved by passion; causing or expressing great commotion of mind.
2. Easily moved to anger.

Patriot (n):
1. One whose ruling passion is the love of his country.

Patriotism (n.):
1. Love of one's country, zeal for one's country.

Pity (n.):
1. Compassion; sympathy with misery; tenderness for pain or uneasiness.
2. A ground of *pity*; a subject of *pity* or of grief.

Pity (v. a.):
1. To compassionate misery; to regard with tenderness on account of unhappiness.

Pitiful (adj.):
1. Melancholy; moving compassion.
2. Tender; compassionate.
3. Paltry; contemptible; despicable.

Pleasure (n.):
1. Delight; gratification of the mind or senses.
2. Loose gratification.
3. Approbation.
4. What the will dictates.
5. Choice; arbitrary will.

Politics (n.):
1. The science of government; the art or practice of administering publick affairs.

Political (adj.):
1. Relating to politicks; relation to the administration of public affairs.
2. Cunning; skillful.

Rage (n.):
1. Violent anger; vehement fury.
2. Vehemence of exacerbation of any thing painful.

Rage (v. a.):
1. To be in fury; to be heated with excessive anger.
2. To ravage; to exercise fury.
3. To act with mischievous impetuosity.

Rebel (n.):
1. One who opposes lawful authority.

Rebel (v. n.):
1. To rise in opposition against lawful authority.

Rebellion (n.):
1. Insurrection against lawful authority.

Rebellious (adj.):
1. Opponent to lawful authority.

Rejoice (v. a.):
1. To exhilarate; to gladden; to make joyful to glad.

Rejoice (v. n.):
1. To be glad; to joy; to exult; to receive pleasure from something past.

Republic (n.):
1. Commonwealth; state in which the power is lodged in more than one.

Revolution (n.):
1. Course of any thing which returns to the point at which it began to move.
2. Space measures by some revolution.
3. Change in the state of a government or country.
4. Rotation in general; returning motion.

Sadness (n,):
1. Sorrowfulness; mournfulness; dejection of mind.
2. Melancholy look.
3. Seriousness; sedate gravity.

Savage (adj.):
1. Wild; uncultivated.
2. Untamed; cruel
3. Uncivilized; barbarous; untaught.

Savage (n.):
1. A man untaught and uncivilized; a barbarian.

Savagery (n.):
1. Cruelty; barbarity.
2. Wild growth.

Sedition (n.):
1. A tumult; an insurrection; a popular commotion; an uproar.

Sensibility (n.):
1. Quickness of sensation.
2. Quickness of perception.

Servile (adj.):
1. Slavish; dependant; mean.
2. Fawning; cringing.

Servility (n.):
1. Slavishness; involuntary; obedience.
2. Meanness; dependance; baseness.
3. Slavery, the condition of a slave.

Sincerity (n.):
1. Honesty of intention; purity of mind.
2. Freedom from hypocrisy.

Slave (n.):
1. One mancipated to a master; not a freeman; a dependant.

Slavery (n.):
1. Servitude; the condition of a slave; the offices of a slave.

Sorrow (n.):
1. Grief; pain for something past; sadness; mourning. Sorrow is not commonly understood as the effect of present evil; but of lost good.

Sorrow (v. n.):
1. To grieve; to be sad; to be dejected.

Spirit (n.):

1. Breath; wind in motion.
2. An immaterial substance.
3. The soul of man.
4. An apparition.
5. Temper; habitual disposition of mind.
6. Ardour; courage; elevation; vehemence of mind.
7. Genius; vigor of mind.
8. Turn of mind; power of mind moral or intellectual.
9. Intellectual powers distinct from the body.
10. Sentiment; perception.
11. Eagerness; desire.
12. Man of activity; man of life; fire and enterprise.
13. Persons distinguished by qualities of the mind.
14. That which gives vigour or cheerfulness to the mind; the purse part of the body bordering…on immateriality.
15. The likeness; essential qualities.
16. Any thing eminently pure and refined.
17. That which hath power or energy.
18. An inflammable liquor raised by distillation.

State (n.):

1. Condition; circumstances of nature or fortune.
2. Modification of any thing.
3. Stationary points; crisis; height; point from which the next movement is regression.
4. Estate; signiory; possession.
5. The community; the publick; the commonwealth.
6. [In relation for] individuality.
7. A republick; a government not monarchical.
8. Rank; condition; quality.
9. Solemn pomp; appearance of greatness.
10. Dignity; grandeur.
11. A seat of dignity.
12. A canopy; a covering of dignity.
13. A person of high rank. Obsolete.
14. The principal persons in the government.
15. Joined with another word it signifies publick.

Subject (n.):

1. One who lives under the dominion of another.
2. That one which any operation either mental or material is performed.
3. That in which any thing inheres or exists.

Suffer (v. a.):

1. To bear, to undergo; to feel with a sense of pain.
2. To endure; to support; not to sink under.
3. To allow; to permit; not to hinder.
4. To pass through; to be affected by.

Suffer (v. n.):
1. To undergo pain or inconvenience.
2. To undergo punishment.
3. To be injured.

Suffering (n.):
1. Pain suffered.

Suspicion (n.):
1. The act of suspecting; imagination of something ill without proof.

Sycophant (n.):
1. A flatterer; a parasite.

Sympathy (n.):
1. Fellow-felling; mutual sensibility; the quality of being affected by the affection of another.

Terror (n.):
1. Fear communicated.
2. Fear received.
3. The cause of fear.

Terrify (v.):
1. To fright; to shock with fear; to make afraid.

Traitor (n.):
1. One who being trusted betrays.

Treason (n.):
1. An offence committed against the dignity and majesty of the commonwealth: it is divided into high treason and petit treason.
    - High treason is an offence against the security of the commonwealth, or of the king's majesty, whether by imagination, word, or deed; as to compass or imagine treason, or the death of the prince, or the queen consort, or his son and heir-apparent....; or levy war against the king in his realm, or to adhere to his enemies by aiding them; or to counterfeit the king's great seal, privy seal, or money; or knowingly to bring false money into this realm counterfeited like the money of England, and to utter the same; or to kill the king's chancellor, treasurer, justice of the one bench, or of the other; justices in Eyre, justices of assize, justices of oyer and terminer, when in their place and doing their duty; or forging the king's seal manual, or privy signet; or diminishing or impairing the current money: and, in such treason, a man forfeits his lands and goods to the king: and it is called treason paramount.
    - Petit treason is when a servant kills his master, a wife her husband; secular or religious kills his prelate: this treason gives forfeiture to every lord within his own fee: both treasons are capital.

Trust (n.):

1. Confidence; reliance on another.
2. Charge received in confidence.
3. Confident opinion of any evidence.
4. Credit given without examination.
5. Credit without payment.
6. Something committed to one's faith.
7. Deposity; something committed to charge, of which an account must be given.
8. Fidelity; supposed honesty.
9. State of him to whom something is entrusted.

Trust (n.):

1. To place confidence in; to confide in.
2. To believe; to credit.
3. To admit in confidence to the power over any thing.
4. To commit with confidence.
5. To venture confidently.
6. To sell upon credit.

Tumult (n.):

1. A promiscuous commotion in a multitude.
2. A multitude put into wild commotion.
3. A stir; an irregular violence; a wild commotion.

Tyranny (n.):

1. Absolute monarchy imperiously administered.
2. Unresisted and cruel power.
3. Cruel government; rigorous command.
4. Severity; rigour; inclemency.

Tyrant (n.):

1. An absolute monarch governing imperiously.
2. A cruel despotick and severe master; an oppressor.

Wicked (adj.):

1. Given to vice; not good; flagitious; morally bad.
2. It is a word of ludicrous or slight blame.
3. Cursed; baneful; pernicious; bad in effect.

Vice (n.):

1. The course of action opposite to virtue; depravity of manners; inordinate life.
2. A fault; an offence.
3. The foll, or Punchinello of old shows.
4. A kind of small iron press with screws, used by workmen.
5. Gripe; grasp.

Virtue (n.):

1. Moral goodness.
2. A particular moral excellence.
3. Medicinal quality.
4. Medicinal efficacy.
5. Efficacy; power.
6. Acting power.
7. Secret agency; efficacy, without visible or material action.
8. Bravely; valour.

Zeal (n.):

1. Passionate ardour for any person or cause.