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ures of religiosity but seems to have a more direct connection to relatively poor recent economic performance (especially unemployment rates) than to county crime and divorce rates and is labeled as “adaptability” (to the new market order). In the case of the Czech Republic, the religiosity and social pathology measures seem to load on the basic urban/rural dimension, leaving the second factor affecting party vote shares as almost purely an expression of recent economic performance results. These general results resemble findings for determinants of party vote shares in many advanced industrial democracies with multi-party systems, where parties also tend to define their appeals according to an economic winners-losers dimension, cross-cut by some other dimension that is more reflective of cultural differences between geographic regions than economic in character.

Professor Tworzecki’s book is very ambitious, so it is unsurprising that aspects of his analysis turn out less than perfectly satisfactory. Methodology buffs will find fault with his annoyingly frequent use of the beta coefficients from very large multiple regression models to assess the relative explanatory power of individual attitudinal, SES and biographical variables without paying proper attention to the strong likelihood of extensive multicollinearity problems in the data. Greater attention to tracing out causal path diagrams for the expected relationships among the many variables of interest (and pondering the implications for expected statistical outcomes) would have substantially sharpened his data interpretation. Nevertheless, this is an important, path-breaking work on a relatively underanalyzed new set of cases in the democratic universe, and we can be sure that all subsequent research on post-communist voting behavior and party systems will have to take Tworzecki’s research as its starting point.

Paul M. Johnson, Auburn University


This erudite and clearly written book provides a tour d’horizon on the development of modern comparative politics by exploring the evolution of Joel S. Migdal’s “state-in-society” perspective. Building on impressive familiarity with cases from the Middle East, to Africa, Latin America, and South Asia, the approach seeks to replace Parsons’s social-system approach and its postulate of a teleological progression into a single set of (Western) social values and norms. It also eschews society-centered approaches as well as the statist literature positing the power and autonomy of states. Instead, Migdal suggests that the study of domination and change requires an examination of multiple sites of political struggle and of the coalitions—spanning state and societal actors—that form around them. No society has one, uncontested, universal code for guiding people’s lives but, rather, multiple sets of competing formal and informal guideposts pro-
moted by different groupings. States are only one contender, often faced with unexpected and unintended results, not the purposeful, monopolistic, and “successful” actors that some extensions of Weber’s definition had made them to be. Migdal advances that comparative politics has been too concerned with deviations from Weberian ideal-types and proposes a new definition: “the state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (16–17). Practices can bolster that image of the state but they can also batter it.

This definition carries methodological implications for comparative research. The state and other social forces are neither monolithic nor fixed entities, forcing us to reformulate our questions and to focus on process rather than conclusive outcomes. Practices at the periphery of the state play a far more important role than previously theorized. Furthermore, struggles among state and societal forces can transform their respective goals. This fluidity in the competition for domination accounts for the fact that similar state structures may lead to different outcomes. Four possible outcomes (Weberian ideal types?) are theorized: state domination over social forces, state incorporation of social forces, social forces’ incorporation of the state, and social forces’ domination of society. The contingent nature of the framework explains the difficulty in specifying a road map for these distinctive evolutions. The democratic, autocratic, or totalitarian nature of states does not appear to play significant roles in the processes leading down one path or another.

Among the most probing and difficult questions the book seeks to answer is “Why Do So Many States Stay Intact?” The experience of most East Asian states, even after the 1990s crisis, continues to fuel interest in efficiency interpretations of the state, although their evolution can no longer sustain the kind of hyper-statist assumptions that Migdal warns against. But a far more penetrating question addressed by this book is why do states that are unable to deliver the goods and remain afflicted with enduring weakness still survive. The book considers the creation of a master narrative to be more part of the answer than state efficiency in the provision of public goods or the rational calculation of leaders. Even weak states can create a centripetal sense of belonging and shared meaning that endows them with resilience. They do so through the generation of law, the sharing of public rituals, and the continuous renegotiation of rules regarding informal behavior in the public sphere. As Migdal recognizes, the universality of this durability of states also compels attention to international or systemic—rationalistic as well as constructivist—conceptions of state sovereignty as mutually reinforcing. Counter to “globalization-age” theories of withering states, the book acknowledges the durability and centrality of (limited) states into the twenty-first century.

The “state-in-society” approach is a sophisticated analytical move that offers a way out of stale debates over state autonomy and efficiency. It forces greater
attention to social forces (as distinct from civil society), networks, and movements competing for domination. It benefits from a deep familiarity with most regions of the world. It is imbued with recent theoretical developments in political science and beyond that offer a powerful alternative to hard causality. It traverses many layers essential to illuminate the essence of modern states, from the international and transnational to the individual-psychological. These remarkable strengths make “state-in-society” an invaluable manual for comparativists seeking a fresh and richer understanding of the politics of the industrializing world.

Etel Solingen, *University of California Irvine*


The study of democratic transitions is in a muddle. Few other topics in recent years have generated so voluminous an encyclopedic academic literature. But for all this vast outpouring of research, our understanding of the complex relationship between development and democracy has not been greatly advanced. For each clear and convincing presentation of a core theoretical argument, there is an equally cogent rebuttal. The result is that we inhabit a scholarly universe in which each of the variables we turn to for explanatory assistance proves to be either powerful or feeble, or both, depending upon the sources we choose.

A leading example of this dilemma has to do with the relationship between a country’s level of economic development and its prospects for democratic governance. Since Seymour Martin Lipset wrote on this topic in the mid 1950s, democratic theory has assigned almost canonical status to the idea of a powerful relationship between level of development and democratic politics. Today, however, scholars of democratic transitions know that the relationship between social wealth and democratic politics is trickier. A number of relatively poor countries are democratic; a number of relatively well-to-do countries rank high on the autocracy scale. And countries that are seemingly quite wealthy, but whose wealth is based principally upon resource extraction, appear to present a different developmental category altogether. We are similarly uncertain about the democratic effects of the presence (or absence) of a robust civil society or the presence or absence of a powerful middle or upper class. Each of these explanatory variables has had its moment in the sun as a theory of democracy but, as yet, the scientific evidence for each has been subjected to equally strong counter-claims.

Candor is called for. Our inability to speak authoritatively to even the most basic questions about the development—democracy relationship is an embarrassment to the discipline. The list of questions we cannot presently address with scientific conviction is extensive and includes practically all of the key dimensions of democratic development. At the present time, for example, we are unable