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Augustus the Machiavellian Prince:
Pareto's Theory of Elites and the Changing
Models of Honor Acquisition and Conflict
Resolution in the Early Roman Empire

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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My dissertation employs a range of interdisciplinary methods to produce a diachronic narrative of the evolving modes of honor acquisition and conflict resolution by the ruling elites of the Roman Republic and the Early Empire. Traditionally, prominent Romans laid claim to political power by displaying “aggressive courage” in battle and then advertising their real or carefully constructed martial achievements to petition the Senate for a triumph. Celebrating a triumph provided extraordinary means for constructing an auspicious public image and augmenting one’s prestige and chances of winning elections for magistracies, thus directly translating personal bravery in battle into success in public life.

However, the rivalry for status and political power among Roman elites was characterized by the assertion of claims to social distinction upon others as well as by ranking oneself and one's peers in a social hierarchy. This was intensified by the ancient Mediterranean belief in limited good; it dictated that all good things in life were in finite supply and could not be increased. Since no human had direct power to augment the available quantities of glory and honor, the zero-sum game meant that a person who succeeded in gaining more honor for himself must have done so at someone else's expense, making him an immediate object of envy. Once the ruling elites stopped imposing any restraints upon their extraordinary ambitions and greed, they weakened the political system, turning the Republic into a classical Paretian demagogic plutocracy. The cycle of bloody civil wars resulted in the concentration of power first in the hands of a few dynasts and then in the hands of the single individual, Emperor Augustus.

Unlike most distinguished Romans, Augustus conducted himself as an exemplary Machiavellian prince: he ignored long-established practices and cunningly appropriated military achievements of others. While publicly maintaining the appearance of an audacious lion to exalt his own *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial prowess, he secretly acted like a shrewd fox, always looking for ways to reinforce his personal hold on power. In particular, the emperor reserved the privilege of acquiring exceptional *virtus* only for himself and the chosen male members of his family; he strongly discouraged Roman elites from pursuing traditional militaristic ways of honor acquisition. The radical change in the rules of the game forced Roman aristocrats and equites alike to seek alternative, non-military ways to augment their prestige. Not only did this play a role in ending the cycle of civil wars that had wrecked the Republic, but, coupled with Augustus' sole control of the military, it also contributed to the lasting peace.

The dissertation of Denis Alexander Deriev is approved.

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SVETLANAE, UXORI CARISSIMAE

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List of Abbreviations

AÉ – *L'Année épigraphique*

ANRW – *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*

BÉ – *Bulletin Épigraphique*

BM Coins, Rom. Emp. I – *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum* = Mattingly (1923)

BM Coins, Rom. Rep. – *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum* = Grueber (1910)

CIL – *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*

EJ – Ehrenberg and Jones (1976)

IG – *Inscriptiones Graecae* (1873 –)

IGRRP – *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes* = Cagnat (1906-1927)

ILLRP – *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae* = Degrassi (1963-1965)

ILS – *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* = Dessau (1892-1916)

Inscr. Ital. – *Inscriptiones Italiae XIII.i* = Degrassi (1947); *Inscriptiones Italiae XIII.ii* = Degrassi (1963)

LSJ – H. J. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* = Liddell et al. (1996)

MRR – *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* = Broughton (1951-1986)

*OCD*³ – *Oxford Classical Dictionary* = Hornblower and Spawforth (2003)

OLD – *Oxford Latin Dictionary* = Glare (2012)

*ORF*⁴ – *Oratorum Romanorum fragmenta* = Malcovati (1976)

*PIR*¹ – *Prosopographia Imperii Romani* = Klebs et al. (1897/8)

*PIR*² – *Prosopographia Imperii Romani* = Groag et al. (1933 –)

RE – *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumwissenschaft* = von Pauly et al. (1893-2000)

*RIC*² – *Roman Imperial Coinage* = Sutherland (1984)

RRC – *Roman Republican Coinage* = Crawford (1974)

Vita

Denis Alexander Deriev was born in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He lived in the Holy Land for several years and graduated from Jerusalem High School. Later, he graduated from Assumption College, Worcester, MA, with a B.A. in Classics and International Business. After working for several years for different companies, he entered Yale Divinity School, Yale University, where he obtained a master's degree in Church history. Then he entered the PhD program in ancient history at the University of California, Los Angeles. His dissertation elucidates the evolving modes of honor acquisition and conflict resolution in the Early Roman Empire and employs Pareto's theory of elites to investigate the decline of the Republic and the rise of the Augustan Principate. His current research interests include different modes of honor acquisition and status confirmation by the ruling elites of the Roman world as well as pre-Constantinian Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

INTRODUCTION

Some scholars have argued that the Principate, the regime established by Emperor Augustus (31 BCE – 14 CE), was “despotic and murderous,”¹ plagued by pervasive violence orchestrated by the emperor and exercised by the military power of the Roman legions which, with unprecedented blood-thirstiness, callously subjugated the enemies of the emperor as well as non-Romans, who were regarded as barbarians.² However, a careful analysis of the various methods of honor acquisition and conflict resolution in the early Roman Empire challenges this view. My dissertation employs a range of interdisciplinary methods derived from the fields of social history, classics, political science, sociology, theories of games and strategy, epigraphy, numismatics, and the visual arts to produce a diachronic narrative of the evolving modes of honor acquisition by the ruling elites of the Roman Republic and the Early Empire. From the very beginning of his political career, the young Caesar³ reserved exceptional *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial prowess, only for himself and the chosen male members of the *domus Augusti*; he strongly discouraged members of the Roman governing elite from pursuing traditional Republican ways of honor acquisition that emphasized displaying “aggressive courage” in battle, laying independent claim to *virtus*, and widely advertising one’s martial

¹ Syme (1939), 439.

² See, for example, Zimmermann (2006), and MacMullen (1986). This peculiar representation of the Roman Empire has also migrated to the field of New Testament studies. See, for example, Horsley (2005).

³ It is important to draw a chronological distinction between the different names of the first emperor. If I discuss events that took place before January of 27 BCE, when the Senate conferred the cognomen Augustus upon Gaius Iulius Caesar Octavianus, I refer to him as Octavian or the young Caesar. I call him Augustus when I talk about events that took place after January of 27 BC. Welch (2012), 12-15, correctly highlights the problems associated with the tendency of modern scholars to suppress the power of Caesar’s name by dubbing the princeps simply as Octavian or Augustus.

achievements.⁴ The radical change in the rules of the game forced Roman aristocrats and equites to seek alternative, non-military ways of honor acquisition.⁵ Not only did this play a role in ending the cycle of civil wars that had wrecked the Republic, but, coupled with the princeps' sole control of the military, it also contributed to the lasting peace.

Traditionally, members of the Roman governing elite, including the dynasts of the Late Republic, laid claim to political power by advertising their martial prowess and promoting their real or carefully constructed battlefield achievements. Such an augmentation of acquired honor and prestige enabled them to win elections for magistracies, directly translating personal bravery in battle into success in public life.⁶ By contrast, Augustus conducted himself as the ideal Machiavellian prince; in circumvention of long-established Republican practices, he cunningly appropriated military achievements of others. While publicly maintaining the appearance of an audacious lion and displaying all the positive leonine characteristics meant to exalt his own *virtus* and military competence, he secretly acted like a shrewd and cunning fox, utilizing, without it being known, the methods meant to augment his relative "honor rating," establish him superior beyond competition, and reinforce his personal hold on power.⁷

⁴ For the concept of manliness exemplified by "aggressive courage" demonstrated on the battlefield, see McDonnell (2006), who examines the changing usage of the notion of *virtus* from the Early to the Late Republic; William V. Harris (2006), 316; and Chapter I, pp. 22f. and 59f.

⁵ In the dissertation, I use the word "aristocracy" as a political term. The Roman aristocracy exclusively consisted of those citizens who won election to curule office and, as a rule, could expect to enter the Senate. See Hopkins (1983b), 107-116.

⁶ Malina (2001a), 33, defines acquired honor as "the socially recognized claim to worth that a person acquires by excelling over others in the social interaction that we shall call *challenge and response*." By contrast, ascribed honor is usually inherited by virtue of being born into a prominent and honorable family. For details, see Malina (2001a), 32ff.

⁷ I present the theory of Augustus the Machiavellian prince in Chapters II and III.

The dissertation's focus on Augustus stems from several premises. First, following Snyder, I argue that it is necessary to analyze the behavior of the official decision-maker in order to explain the *whys* of the actions taken by the Roman state.⁸ Having ascertained himself as the leader with most acquired honor and *auctoritas*, the young Caesar became the sole decision-maker in the Roman state.⁹ As such, he should be given ultimate credit for successfully ending the cycle of bloody civil wars that had devastated the Republic.¹⁰ The system of government the princeps constructed in the aftermath of Actium (31 BCE) guaranteed the more or less orderly succession and ensured the absence of major civil strife for the next hundred years or so, until the suicide of Emperor Nero in 68 CE. Second, Augustus' sophisticated manipulation of the traditional Roman notions of honor, kinship, and reciprocity challenges the simplistic preconceptions often advanced by the school of realism which views relations between the rulers and the ruled as the cynical pursuit of interests, the quest which is dominated by power and fear. By contrast, I draw upon the anthropological studies of the Mediterranean honor and shame society to elucidate the ancient cultural norms and explain the motivation of the first emperor.

⁸ See Snyder (1962) who produced one of the most important works in the field of foreign policy analysis ever published in English. Challenging the prevalent emphasis on national power and national interests that dominated the study of politics immediately after World War II, Snyder and his co-authors suggest that state action should be defined as the behavior of its official decision-makers. Such an approach provides a clear empirical focus for analyzing the behavior of nation-states as well as other political entities.

⁹ In *RG* 34.3, the emperor boldly proclaims, "Post id tempus auctoritate (= ἀξιώματι) omnibus praestiti...." Cf. also the edict quoted by Suetonius, where Augustus defines himself as "optimi status auctor" (*Aug.* 28.2). Although the exact meaning of the word *auctoritas* in Augustus' *Res Gestae* has been vigorously debated, both the Latin *auctoritas* and the Greek ἀξίωμα can be translated as "prestige" or "reputation." See *OLD* (2012), s.v. "Auctoritas," and *LSJ* (1996), s.v. "Ἀξίωμα." Following Lendon (1997), 129 and 275ff., and Galinsky (1996), 10-41, I think that Augustus' *auctoritas* was first and foremost rooted in his personal acquired honor or prestige, which was neither transferable nor potentially limited in scope. Cf. Reinhold (2002), 63f.

¹⁰ In the hundred years from 133 to 31 BCE, the people of Italy had experienced at first hand twelve civil wars.

After the First Settlement of 27 BCE, Augustus noticeably shunned naked force and preferred to rule by virtue of the suggestive power of his *auctoritas*, stressing his “material, intellectual, and moral superiority.”¹¹ His true power lay in his ability to suggest the terms which framed any important discussion.

In the first chapter, I use the “primitivist” concept of “strategic culture,” which is derived from modern strategic studies, to argue that the Roman aristocratic decision-makers were historically socialized into a specific mode of strategic thinking characterized by utter truculence, ferocity, and bellicosity. These traits formed an integral part of the Roman “strategic culture” which, in turn, informed all decision-making processes, influenced strategy, determined particular “strategic behavior,” and continually constituted and gave meaning to other material factors.¹² Elucidating the connection between martial valor and acquisition of honor in the Roman Republic, I suggest that successfully applied “instrumental violence” was an essential part of the Roman shared cultural consensus. Across generations, aristocratic decision-makers were conditioned by the dominant cultural values to behave in an exceptionally aggressive and violent manner because successfully applied and advertised violence on the real and imagined enemies of Rome contributed to the honor of the *res publica* and, by extension, increased one’s chances of being elected to public office. As a result, the ability to inflict violence and the desirability of such behavior became deeply embedded in the culture code of the Roman aristocracy and shaped the notion of honor of most Roman aristocrats, giving birth to a very distinctive “strategic behavior” concerning war initiation, territorial conquest, and balance-of-

¹¹ Joseph Hellegouarc’h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République* (Paris, 1963), 312.

¹² Gray (1999) discusses the link between “strategic culture” and “strategic behavior,” arguing that the former gives meaning to the latter and provides insight into what this behavior signifies.

power politics.¹³ In essence, Roman “strategic behavior,” which was often typified by wars of aggression and brinkmanship rather than balancing, was shaped and influenced by national historical behavior. It molded and shaped the national character by equating *virtus* and expansionist militarism with a strong personal commitment to the public good.¹⁴

First, I present contemporary political-science theories on the use, and the threat of use, of organized force for political purposes and discuss a military-security concept of “balancing.” In this context, I introduce the concepts of Roman “strategic culture” and “strategic behavior”; they provide a theoretical framework within which to present the surprisingly wide array of examples of a strong warrior ethos that imbued the Roman elite. Second, I explicate how the very close link that existed at Rome between high birth and martial courage on the one hand, and the acquisition of honor and public office on the other, facilitated the development of “strategic culture” characterized by ferocity and belligerence of aristocratic decision-makers. Finally, I demonstrate how military prowess served as an ideological vindication for aristocracy’s supremacy and prerogative to political leadership. In the Middle and Late Republic, members of the Roman ruling elite preferred to serve in the cavalry, and their honorable scars, the marks of frontal wounds sustained in battle, served as a dramatic manifestation of their bearers’ *virtus*. It is true that by the end of the second century BCE Roman aristocrats were using an extensive assortment of achievements in *urbanae artes* to demonstrate their service to the *res publica* and thus augment their prestige and establish a claim to glory. However, *virtus* remained essential to

¹³ As I discuss in Chapter I, pp. 53f., Rome’s very complicated relations with her neighbors in the days of the Early and Middle Republic also made the ruling elite develop a genuine “security complex.”

¹⁴ Cf. Haglund (2004), 491-498, who suggests that the concept of “strategic culture” can be further divided into (1) national historical behavior and (2) national character and identity.

the identity of the governing elite. Both valor demonstrated in battle and especially a record of real or invented victories that could secure a successful claim to celebrating a triumph (or at least to winning triumphal honors) greatly enhanced one's acquired honor and enabled him to lay much more effective claim to *auctoritas* and consequent political power.

The first chapter of the dissertation is followed by the case study of Cicero's exploits in Cilicia. The orator's governorship of the province demonstrates that even the least adventuresome aristocrats of the Late Republic were socialized into particular "strategic behavior" patterns, applying unrestricted physical violence on the bodies and property of real and imagined enemies of Rome every time they were elected or appointed to govern provinces or lead armies in the field. I argue that once Cicero was chosen to govern Cilicia for the year 51-50 BCE he immediately recognized opportunities now available to him to triumph from his province and restore the public image blemished by exile (cf. Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.13-14). After all, celebrating a triumph presented a *triumphator* with unparalleled means to secure the awe-inspiring record of victory by carefully constructing a flattering interpretation of what took place, thus augmenting his *auctoritas* and *dignitas*. This is why a short victorious war against the "free Cilician" mountaineers became the first order of business for Cicero, who engaged in brinkmanship and launched a war of aggression in order to lay successful claim to a triumph. In a frenzy of brazen "triumph-hunting," the statesman not only vastly inflated the effect of his military operations against the "free Cilicians" but also maliciously vilified military and diplomatic accomplishments of his colleagues in Syria who repelled the brunt of the Parthian incursion into the Roman territories. Cicero even had enough audacity to claim most credit for their victory! The proconsul's exploits in Cilicia as well as his incessant self-aggrandizement

clearly reveal military adventurism of the self-proclaimed “promoter of peace” (Cic. *Fam.* 7.23.2).

All this is not surprising because the Roman strategy making and foreign policy were culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated. They cannot be divorced from Rome’s geography, history, political culture or familiar ways members of the Roman ruling elite were accustomed to acquire glory and win a distinctive grant of status from others. The primary sources provide abundant material for a rewarding analysis of the competitive character of Roman society, where a strong warrior ethos imbued the Roman decision-making elite even during the Late Republic. As a result, warfare remained closely related to acquisition of honor and status, which were the criteria of one’s social ranking. With the agonistic culture reigning supreme at Rome, the relentless struggle for status and political power among aristocrats was characterized by the assertion of claims to social distinction upon others as well as by ranking oneself and one’s peers in a social hierarchy. This is why members of the governing elite often considered a lengthy period of peace with a major enemy to be dishonorable; they used to wage wars in order to demonstrate their *virtus* and achieve so-called “honorable peace” (Cicero *Pro Sestio* 98). If successful, they ceased hostilities only after negotiating an agreement advantageous to them and their clients, having acquired more honor for themselves.¹⁵

Motivated by militaristic ambitions, magistrates who happened to hold *imperium* habitually waged wars of aggression.¹⁶ Waging a military campaign enabled an aristocrat to lay successful claim to a triumph or at least to win triumphal honors. Both earned the individual a social grant

¹⁵ For details, see de Souza (2008), 76-79.

¹⁶ Cf. Mattern (1999), 162-210.

of glory, praise, and renown, greatly enhancing one's acquired honor and *auctoritas* and enabling him to lay much more effective claim to political power. More often than not, a person who won a military command or one of the highest elected public offices pursued exceptionally aggressive military policies in order to use his real or invented military accomplishments to lay claim to a triumph. If he were granted this greatly sought-after mark of excellence, he could significantly enhance his acquired honor and be survived by a glorious memory by producing triumphant textual and pictorial narratives that not only celebrated successfully applied violence and justified his claim to *auctoritas* and political power but also served as the symbol of Roman dominance over foreign people.¹⁷ This is why truculence, ferocity, and bellicosity were distinctive features of the Roman "strategic culture." Contrary to the assertion that only the great Roman dynasts suffered from *φιλοτιμία* which induced them to fight large-scale wars in the first century BCE, I argue that bellicosity, and cruelty were deeply embedded in the Roman "strategic culture" which was shaped by centuries of constant warfare and characterized by cultivation and glorification of *virtus*, the conspicuous exhibition of physical power and military prowess, shameless "triumph-hunting" against the real and imagined enemies of Rome, and general ferocity, truculence, and belligerence of the governing elite.¹⁸

I elucidate the main argument of my dissertation in Chapters II and III. In Chapter II, I combine Pareto's social equilibrium theory of elites and their periodic circulation with the key aspects of Machiavelli's political theory to offer a new insight into the causes of the decline of

¹⁷ Cf. Zimmermann (2006), 344-350.

¹⁸ For the *φιλοτιμία* argument, see Eckstein (2006b), 574f. and 582ff. For bellicosity and cruelty as integral parts of the Roman political culture, see Chapter I of this dissertation.

the Late Republic and the rise of the Augustan Principate.¹⁹ First, I introduce Pareto's social equilibrium theory and elucidate his argument regarding the cyclical circulation of the governing elites with mutually exclusive personality types of vulpine "speculators" and leonine "consolidators." Pareto offers endless examples to prove the following two important assertions: (1) constant cyclical changes in the fundamental character of societies are inevitable as one set of societal non-rational behavioral manifestations replaces the other and (2) maladaptivity of the ruling elites in the face of uncertainty and in the times of crisis causes their periodic circulation.²⁰ Since no elite that holds power for a long time is able to maintain an effective balancing of vulpine persuasion and leonine force, the resulting imbalance makes its degeneration inevitable and cyclical and causes plutocratic regimes established by the few for the good of the privileged assume either a form of a vulpine demagogic plutocracy or a form of a leonine military plutocracy.²¹ Second, I discuss the emphasis of Pareto's theory on the irrational basis of social behavior. Third, my analysis of some important developments in the history of the Late Republic demonstrates that from the middle of the second century BCE the members of the

¹⁹ Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian economist, sociologist, and political scientist who popularized the use of the term "elite" in social analysis. In 1900, he produced a study entitled "Un' applicazione di teorie sociologiche," where he brought out the main principles of his theory. See Pareto (1900) and its English translation, Pareto (1991).

²⁰ In the realm of historical studies, Pareto's focus on the two classes of psychosocial propensities of elites and masses is well chosen because the forces of "combination" and "preservation" complement each other. While the first one provides for change, the second one affords institutionalization, helping people embrace this change. This is why Pareto suggests that historical development of societies and the sequence of specific socio-cultural patterns mostly depend on the relative proportion of vulpine and leonine irrational behavioral manifestations in the ruling plutocracy, the governing and non-governing elites, and the rest of the society.

²¹ While Pareto emphasizes vertical as well as horizontal divisions in society, he significantly insists on the study of elites as organic whole. See Pareto (1935), §§ 2274-2276, and Pareto (1984), 55-62. Cf. also Powers (1984), 18-21.

Roman ruling elite began growing increasingly vulpine in their outlook, prioritizing personal gain over the duties toward their fellow citizens.

The alliance of the vulpine politicians, corrupt tribunes, and profit-seeking *publicani* “speculators” established a classical demagogic plutocracy which Pareto considers a particularly sinister form of government.²² I utilize the recent studies in contemporary political and business psychology to analyze the conditioning influences of the psychological and cultural biases that worked through the social personalities of the Late Republic and contributed to its downfall. In particular, I argue that the leading members of the Republican ruling elite were heavily influenced by the so-called “dark triad” of the socially aversive traits, the psychological construct of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy.²³ As a result, they were more and more willing to enter into “shifting combinations, to promote their preferred personal or public ends at a given moment.”²⁴ Their political shenanigans eventually brought to ruin the fortunes of the Republic, and the authoritarian dynasts effectively usurped the power of the Roman Senate. Once chronic civil strife and horrendous violence against fellow citizens became a new normalcy

²² See Pareto (1935), §§ 2274-2276.

²³ Paulhus (2002), who coined the term “dark triad,” demonstrates that the constructs of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy are inter-related and overlapping. Marshall (2012), 91-107, uses the concept of the “dark triad” to study the negative effect Pareto’s “foxes,” leaders strong in the psychosocial propensity of vulpine “combination,” have on the modern world in the milieu of risk and uncertainty.

²⁴ See Brunt (1988), 32-45. The quote can be found on page 38. Inability to feel moral guilt is one of the distinguishing characteristics of people suffering from the psychopathic syndrome. This may be due to abnormally poor connectivity in the emotional centers of the psychopathic brain. In his seminal study, Karpman (1948) estimates that only 15% of psychopaths have this biogenetic disorder; he calls them “primary psychopaths.” The other 85% who manifest different forms of psychopathy but do not have the disorder are called “secondary psychopaths.” However, in his study of a non-institutionalized population Levenson (1995) demonstrates that primary and secondary psychopathy blur together as a “continuous mixture.”

that plagued the Late Republic, it quickly turned into a failed state in dire need of a leader who could efficaciously balance vulpine persuasion and leonine force in order to stop the collapse of the governing institutions, reconstitute the governing elite, and bring peace to the core of the expanding Roman Empire.

Pareto's social equilibrium theory of elites and their periodic circulation may be occasionally quite general and elastic, especially when the author deals with empirically subtle qualities of elites, diminishes historical reality, and employs fragmented exposition with numerous *ceteris paribus* clauses.²⁵ However, his theory is appealing and stimulating precisely because of its generality and scope. Pareto brilliantly abandons the notion of simple cause-effect in favor of a conception of society comprised of elements of variables in a state of mutual interdependence: the introduction of change affecting any part will necessarily lead to reciprocal transformations in other parts as well as in the whole system. As a positivist, he also attaches great importance to the methodological unity of his theory.²⁶ While isolating and systematizing non-logical propensities and historic uniformities in order to unearth the "edifice" of the historical process, Pareto combs history for regular patterns and analyzes the recurring incidents for logical consistency, which serves as the only standard of truth.²⁷ Not unlike Marx, the author relates his

²⁵ While the author readily recognizes simplifications, he also asks his critics to think about the drawbacks of the traditional approach to history: "Today the inclination is to gather every minutest detail and argue endlessly over matters of no importance. That is helpful as regards the preparation of materials, but not as regards using them. It is the work of the quarryman who cuts the stone, not of the architect who builds the edifice. When one is looking for uniformities, details big or little are to be thought of as means, not as ends." See Pareto (1935), § 2543.

²⁶ For Pareto and positivism, see Femia (2006), 16-19.

²⁷ Pareto calls for the use of the so-called "logico-experimental" method of empirical "testing" which, in his opinion, can help find this very truth. Based exclusively on sense-experience and observation, the method requires examining only experimental, or observable, facts; moreover, logical inference alone determines causal relations between these facts. Thus, the method itself

theoretical propositions to particular events in history to show that they are consistent with historical reality.²⁸ In contrast to Marx, however, Pareto asserts that the structure of the historical process is characterized by a lack of the equilibrium in the two classes of the non-logical behavioral manifestations characterized by vulpine “combination” and leonine “preservation.” This is why I employ his theory as a tool to analyze the conditioning influences of the psychological and cultural biases that worked through the social personalities of the Late Republic and contributed to its downfall.

In Chapter III, I analyze the multifarious activities of the young Caesar and propose that the princeps personified many of the qualities of the ideal Machiavellian prince: he publicly maintained the appearance of an audacious lion but was the cunning fox at heart. In contrast to most Republican magistrates with *imperium* who acquired *virtus*, *auctoritas*, and ensuing political power on the battlefield, the first emperor, who had at least equivocal, if not altogether tainted, military record, shrewdly appropriated military achievements of others in order to augment his relative “honor rating,” establish himself superior beyond competition, and reinforce his personal hold on power. While publicly displaying all the positive leonine characteristics meant to exalt his own *virtus* and military prowess, Augustus secretly acted like a shrewd fox and utilized the clandestine methods to increase his own *virtus* and *auctoritas* at the expense of others. In particular, the young Caesar made the most of the system that contributed to the swift accumulation of his acquired honor through the victories of his generals; they acted as his legates and carried out his foreign wars. In the *Res Gestae*, the princeps claims that the great deeds were

is not “scientific” in the sense we understand the term today, but rather qualitative and interpretive. For details, see Pareto (1935), §§ 13; 16; 42; 69; and 2544-2545, and Femia (2006), 14f.

²⁸ See Pareto (1935), §§ 2410, 2543-2544, and Femia (2006), 74ff.

accomplished “under [his] standards” or “by [his] command and under [his] auspices” (*RG* 26.5), taking credit for the major victories of the civil war as well as for all the Roman foreign conquests in the post-Actium years.²⁹ Thus, he epitomizes the Machiavellian prince who only appears to possess certain qualities but yet succeeds in deceiving everyone.³⁰

Yet, Augustus’ leadership was characterized not only by brazen appropriation of others’ victories to augment his acquired honor and *auctoritas* but also by his unparalleled expenditure and munificence that contributed to the significant economic growth throughout the empire and helped the princeps maintain effective control over the Roman state for forty-four years (31 BCE-14 CE). Augustus’ efforts to feed the city of Rome led to the suppression of piracy in the Mediterranean and facilitated the creation of an interconnected set of grain markets that extended from Egypt to Lusitania and provided the capital with a regular and consistent supply of grain, all the while pumping tremendous amounts of money into the economy and spurring economic growth. Thanks to the princeps’ munificence and expenditure, the aristocracy and the imperial court in the city of Rome were spending freely on luxuries, and the Roman armies stationed in the frontier provinces had a steady demand for goods and services as well as the money to pay for them. At the same time, residents of the interior provinces of the Roman Empire needed to earn money to pay taxes. They earned cash by converting the locally produced surplus into higher value, lower volume manufactured goods that could be sold at distant markets, including

²⁹ For instance, see *RG* 25.2-3 for the victory at Actium; *RG* 26.1-3 for pacifying Germany and the Alps; *RG* 26.5 for advancing into Ethiopia and Arabia; and *RG* 30.2 for destroying the invading Dacians. In Chapter III, pp. 228f., I discuss how Augustus appropriated for himself the role of the commander in chief of the whole army of Rome.

³⁰ See Machiavelli (1979), 135f.

the frontier provinces.³¹ The increased monetization of the Roman economy made money an important medium of exchange and spurred trade flows all over the Roman world. As maritime shipping became safer and cheaper due to the *pax Augusta* and the monetization of economy increased due to the abundance of minted money used to pay the legions, the Roman economy began to show signs of gradual but consistent growth.

In Chapter III, I also suggest that the ongoing development of exceptional mental flexibility and versatility to use expeditiously both leonine force and vulpine shrewdness enabled Augustus first to win the struggle for power and then to solidify his domination of the Roman world and put an end to the civil wars. To my mind, the “extinguishing” or “annihilating” the civil wars (RG 34.1) was the single most valuable contribution to the well-being of the Roman state that the first emperor made.³² The poetry of the period vividly shows how much the Italians longed for peace; the young Caesar’s success in ending the fratricidal strife was one of the most important factors in winning him a grant of social approbation.³³ This being said, the actions of the rising Machiavellian prince also triggered a cycle of social change and Paretian elite circulation that swept away the senatorial aristocracy of old. After consolidating his power by establishing his personal *virtus* and *auctoritas* as surpassing that of anybody else and proving his munificence superior beyond competition, Augustus preferred to rule by *consent* rather than by *force*.³⁴

³¹ For details, see Hopkins (1980).

³² “In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia exstinxeram....” Significantly, the gates of the Temple of Janus were closed for the first time in the reign of Augustus, in 29 BCE, to symbolize the end of the civil wars (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.113 = EJ, 45; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 9; *Num.* 20; and Dio Cass. 51.20.4).

³³ For details and the list of literary sources, see Cooley (2009), 256f.

³⁴ Cf. Pareto (1935), § 2251, and Chapter IV, pp. 322-353.

Consequently, he maintained social control by co-opting support for his Principate through opportunistic compromises, crafty deals, concessions, demagogy, and trickery. Publicly maintaining the appearance of a lion, Augustus was the fox at heart.

In the case study of the equestrian Gaius Cornelius Gallus, I explicate the career of the elegiac poet whom the young Caesar appointed the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt. I suggest that after his return to Rome Gallus excessively boasted about his military and diplomatic achievements in Egypt so that he could win a social grant of glory, reputation, and prestige from the fellow equites in Rome. Dio Cassius reports that Gallus set up statues of himself throughout Egypt and even inscribed upon the pyramids a list of his achievements (Dio Cass. 53.23.5). More significantly, the trilingual inscription erected by the prefect at Philae, the Nile island located at the southern frontier of the Roman Egypt, is emblematic of the poet's tendency to self-aggrandize (*ILS* 8995). In the Latin version of the inscription, the prefect clearly aspires to the leadership style characteristic of the generals and governors of the Middle and Late Republic and claims the following important achievements to his name: (1) suppression of the Thebaid revolt; (2) organization of a punitive expedition into Lower Nubia, the region outside the southern border of the Roman Egypt; (3) active diplomatic engagement with the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush and even the exercise of *tutela* over the Meroitic king; and (4) installation of a *tyrannos* in the Triacostaschoenus, the liminal region between the Roman Egypt and the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush (*ILS* 8995).

By laying independent claim to manliness exemplified by “aggressive courage” in battle and appropriating to himself the privilege to receive foreign ambassadors, install new despots on the frontier of Egypt, and even offer foreign rulers Rome's protection, Gallus tested all the limits of

one's freedom of self-aggrandizement under the new regime. Unfortunately for the poet, Augustus had no tolerance for such hubris and shameless self-promotion on the part of others, especially in Egypt that filled the treasury with taxes and provided the capital with grain (cf. Dio Cass. 51.17.1). Not only could other people's claims to *virtus* and subsequent *auctoritas* jeopardize the princeps' status of *primus inter pares* and put at risk his carefully constructed claim to exceptional martial prowess, but they could also challenge Augustus' monopoly of power over the military, the control that was essential to any lasting peace from civil war in the Roman world. This is the vital consideration. Dio's account of Gallus' downfall sharply contrasts the prefect's actions with those of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa who not only repaired and adorned the edifice in the Campus Martius, naming it the Saepta Iulia in honor of Augustus, but also never claimed a share in the glory of the princeps (Dio Cass. 53.23.1-7).

After Gallus' "friend" Valerius Largus informed the princeps about prefect's self-exaltment, the young Caesar banned the poet from his house and prohibited him from entering the imperial provinces (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6). The formal renunciation of *amicitia* by the princeps opened the hunting season on Gallus: a flood of private accusations as well as the Senate's unanimous vote to convict him in the jury courts, exile him, and give his confiscated estate to Augustus sealed Gallus' fate. The poet committed suicide in 27 or 26 BCE (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6-7).³⁵ Gallus' failure to comprehend the *Zeitgeist* led to his demise, but his story is very instructive for understanding Augustus' sensitivities regarding inappropriate claims to *virtus* and subsequent *honor* by members of the Roman governing elite.

³⁵ For *amicitiam renuntiare*, see Rogers (1959), especially 227 and 229, and my discussion in Gallus' case study, p. 300.

In the last chapter of my dissertation, I employ Burn's theory of transformational leadership to suggest that after the First Settlement of 27 BCE Augustus based his claim to power on his immense *auctoritas*, presenting himself as the *auctor* par excellence.³⁶ The first emperor made the connection between the term *auctor* and the cognomen Augustus so strong that Tiberius once remarked that he preferred to be called a *suasor* (giver of counsel) rather than an *auctor* (Suet. *Tib.* 27).³⁷ Throughout Roman history, a prominent *auctor* was always much more than a simple counselor or persuader, even if he was clever enough to hide this fact so as not to offend aristocratic sensibilities. However, once Augustus accumulated the highest number of honors possible, he took the concept of *auctoritas* one step further and put it at the center of his rule. As the *auctor* par excellence, the princeps endorsed and guaranteed the initiatives and ideas of many different people. However, people who acquired a debt of honor to Augustus felt obliged to reciprocate in kind. This is why *auctoritas* of the princeps epitomized actual power: it empowered the emperor to serve as the ultimate guarantor (*auctor*) of a policy which then could be implemented by those who either owed him a favor or sought his approval.³⁸ Thus, Augustus distinguished himself as the transformational leader whose power was truly evocative.

I argue that the power of the princeps had clear moral connotations and accentuated his moral superiority (cf. Val. Max. 8.15.3) because he guaranteed peace in the *res publica* and took care

³⁶ According to Burns (1978), 20, transformational leadership strives to inculcate moral purpose and raise the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both the leaders and the followers. It amalgamates their purposes and has a transforming effect on both.

³⁷ See Scott (1932), 49. An alternative but inferior explanation is that Tiberius simply meant that his immense *auctoritas* held back others from deciding freely.

³⁸ Galinsky (1996), 12f., provides examples from the Twelve Tables and early Roman literature to demonstrate that vouchsafing and guaranteeing were one of the early meanings of the word *auctor*. Cf. also Heinze (1960), 46, and Chapter IV, pp. 321f.

of its welfare.³⁹ One of his truly amazing achievements was putting an end to civil strife by limiting the traditional militaristic ambitions of the bellicose Roman elites. To my mind, this was an extension of his program of moral transformation, the attempt to resocialize Roman elites into norms and values he considered exemplary (*RG* 8.5).⁴⁰ While emperor's laws about marriage and against adultery were not as effective as he wished, Augustus' success in imposing the limit on the militaristic ambitions of the governing elite and offering them alternative ways to acquire honor brought order, peace, and prosperity to the Roman world.

³⁹ Cf. also Hellegouarc'h (1963), 312, and Béranger (1953), 115. The latter speaks about "the absolute power of the emperor on another level, that of morality" and references Plin. *Ep.* 3.20.12: "sunt quidem cuncta sub unius arbitrio, qui pro utilitate communi solus omnium curas laboresque suscepit."

⁴⁰ "Legibus novis me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi." Such concern for the moral well-being of the upper classes also indicates that the emperor was a transformational leader.

CHAPTER I: THE REPUBLICAN DECISION-MAKING ELITE AND ITS “STRATEGIC CULTURE”

Introduction

When Gaius Marius sought the office of a military tribune around 124 BCE, all the tribes unanimously voted for him because of his martial reputation (Sall. *Iug.* 63.3-4; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 3.2-4.1). Although Marius was in all probability born into an undistinguished family of recent equestrian standing and lacked an ancient lineage, his military talents enabled him to rise quickly through a succession of offices. However, the consulship seemed closed to him because “the nobility transmitted the consulship from hand to hand within their own order,” judging any new man unworthy of that honor and actually polluting the office (Sall. *Iug.* 63.6-7).¹ In the early twentieth century, Gelzer was the first to realize that in the Middle and Late Republic the term *nobilis* exclusively designated a person of consular rank or a scion of consular houses.² The Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BCE required the election of at least one plebeian consul each year, offering great upward mobility opportunities to people from non-consular plebeian families. Within three or four generations, however, successful consular families constructed the various types of alliances, acquired extensive *clientelae*, and augmented their prestige to such a degree as to give consular candidates from their ranks a distinct edge over those from non-consular families.

¹ “... consulatum nobilitas inter se per manus tradebat. Novos nemo tam clarus neque tam egregiis factis erat quin indignus illo honore et quasi pollutus haberetur.”

² See Gelzer (1912) and cf. Vogt (1926), 24, n. 4. On the significance of the thesis, see Syme (1939), 10ff. Gelzer’s definition was reiterated by Shackleton Bailey (1986), 255-260, against Brunt (1982), 1-17.

An important implication of this development was that tenure of high magistracies, and especially of the consulship, not only granted the immediate formal powers to the successful candidate whose honor was greatly augmented but also bestowed ascribed honor, an affirmation of status granted to a person at birth, and thus enhanced prestige and social standing of his descendants.³ It is not surprising, then, that Marius' initial bid for consulship was blocked by Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109 BCE), who was his commander in Africa (Sall. *Iug.* 64.1-4 and Plut. *Mar.* 8.3). In response, Marius began to challenge his commander's authority, seeking to gain favor with the soldiers by relaxing discipline and promising to win promptly the war against Jugurtha (Sall. *Iug.* 64.5). He also incited the Roman traders in Utica, who were mostly equites, by alleging that Metellus was mulishly protracting the war out of his desire for power.⁴

In his bid for the consulship, Marius claimed for himself the mantle of traditional martial achievement and military expertise. Among his qualifications for the position, Sallust lists "the great knowledge of warfare [as well as] a spirit that was extraordinary in war but temperate in domestic affairs, the conqueror of passion and copiousness, the one that was greedy only for glory" (*Iug.* 63.2).⁵ At that time, many Roman *nobiles* could boast no military competence, which usually stemmed from significant battlefield experience, even if they still utilized their

³ For ascribed and acquired honor, see Malina (2001a), 32ff.

⁴ See Sall. *Iug.* 65.4; Cic. *Off.* 3.79; Vell. Pat. 2.11.2; and Plut. *Mar.* 8.5. Unlike other authors, Cicero gives an unsympathetic assessment of Marius' accusations against Metellus, criticizing his conduct as disloyal and unworthy of a good politician. At the same time, Badian (1963-1964), 146f., demonstrates that the accounts of Sallust, Plutarch, and Cicero are not mutually exclusive.

⁵ "... militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens, domi modicus, lubricinis et divitiarum victor, tantummodo gloriae avidus."

real and invented military achievements to win a social grant of glory (*gloria*), reputation (*dignitas*), and political “authority” (*auctoritas*) from others.⁶ For example, Quintus Lutatius Catulus, a man of old nobility who held the consulship with Marius in 102 BCE, was unable to defend the passes in the Alps against the Cimbri and was pushed all the way back to the Natisone River in eastern Friuli, which is today an area of northeast Italy on the border with Slovenia. There he lost control of his army that abandoned the main camp and fled in a state of panic in the face of the advancing enemy (Plut. *Mar.* 23.2-5). At the end, Catulus was saved from disaster by Sulla, who at one point left Marius’ service and joined the army of Catulus, conquering most Alpine tribes (Plut. *Sull.* 4).⁷ This is why Marius, who was looking for ways to challenge the hegemony of the aristocracy, repeatedly emphasized his own *virtus* and martial prowess and denied the existence of these qualities among the oligarchic aristocrats, turning his electoral campaign into an attack on the haughtiness of the nobility.⁸ Sallust even makes him say, “But if the *nobiles* justly despise me, let them also look down on their own forefathers, whose nobility began, like mine, from *virtus*” (*Jug.* 85.17).⁹

⁶ Cicero says, “Sin aliquis excellit unus e multis, effert se si unum aliquid affert, aut bellicam virtutem et usum aliquem militare, quae sane nunc quidem obsoleverunt...” (*De or.* 3.33.136). As I pointed out in the Introduction, footnote n. 9, a person’s *auctoritas* was ultimately rooted in one’s acquired or ascribed honor or prestige.

⁷ Badian (1957), 322ff., cogently argues that Catulus, who was a half-brother of one of the Caesares, was Marius’ special protégé and owed everything to him. Marius’ support brought Catulus the consulship after three prior *repulsae*. Despite Catulus’ dubious military successes, Marius selflessly celebrated a joint triumph with him. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that Marius had dispatched Sulla to advise Catulus.

⁸ See Sall. *Jug.* 73.5-7; 85.10-13; 85.29-30; 85.38-40; and Plut. *Mar.* 9.3.

⁹ “Quod si iure me despiciunt, faciant idem maioribus suis, quibus, uti mihi, ex virtute nobilitas coepit.” Cf. also *Jug.* 85.40, “... nam ex parente meo et ex aliis sanctis viris ita accepi: munditias mulieribus, laborem viris convenire, omnibusque bonis oportere plus gloriae quam divitiarum esse; arma, non suppellectilem decori esse.”

Before the foundation of the Principate by Augustus, *virtus*, manliness exemplified by “aggressive courage” in battle, was often the clearest criterion of one’s honor as well as the indispensable foundation to a meaningful political career.¹⁰ For instance, Sallust maintains that Julius Caesar yearned for a new war in which his *virtus* could shine out (*Cat.* 54.4).¹¹ Even Cicero (cos. 63 BCE), who is the first clear example of a consul who did not complete ten years of military service before his election to office, falsely fancies that *virtus* is a quality particularly reserved for the Romans.¹² In *De oratore*, the statesman mistakenly contrasts Roman *virtus* with Greek *doctrina* (3.34.137).¹³ He suggests that great feats are always stimulated by the pursuit of *gloria* and defines *virtus* as bravery characterized by a total contempt for pain and death (*Rep.* 5.7.9).¹⁴ To his mind, military exploits contribute all the glory and reputation one needs to to

¹⁰ See McDonnell (2006) who examines the changing usage of the notion of *virtus* from the Early to the Late Republic and argues, somewhat controversially, that until the first century BCE *virtus* primarily served as a moral rather than ethical concept. Cf. also William V. Harris (2006), 316.

¹¹ “... sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum novum exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset.” To the Roman mind, *virtus* and *gloria* shined. For example, Sallust says, “Et profecto ita se res habet: maiorum gloria posteris quasi lumen est...” (*Jug.* 85.23). See also Enn. *Ann.* 362 and Lendon (1997), 47 and 274.

¹² William V. Harris (1979), 12 and 257, points out that Cicero ran for the quaestorship with less than ten years of military service behind him. Cf. Plutarch (*Cic.* 3.2), who mentions that the orator served only for a short period of time during the Social War (91-87 BCE), and Cicero himself (*Phil.* 12.11.27).

¹³ “Sed ut ad Graecos referam orationem, quibus carere hoc quidem in sermonis genere non possumus--nam ut virtutis a nostris, sic doctrinae sunt ab illis exempla repetenda...” By contrast, McDonnell (2006), 90, says: “Although *virtus* was also the preeminent quality of a man, unlike ἀρετή, it was not considered an innate human quality set against supernatural power. Quite the contrary, at Rome *virtus* was itself viewed as a numinous quality granted to certain men.”

¹⁴ “... maiores suos multa mira atque praeclara gloriae cupiditate fecisse... quae virtus fortitudo vocatur, in qua est magnitudo animi, mortis dolorisque magna contemptio....”

win the consular elections while preeminence in the art of war is superior to all other qualities to acquire prestige (*Mur.* 22).¹⁵

In this chapter, I explicate the intricate relationship that existed at Rome from the earliest times until the Late Republic between demonstrating military courage in battle, acquiring honor that propelled an aristocrat into a magistracy with *imperium*, and constructing an auspicious public image that enabled the aristocrat to win a grant of social distinction from others by engaging in brinkmanship and launching wars of aggression against the “barbarians” and Greeks alike. I suggest that unrestrained competition for *laus* (praise), and *fama* (renown) historically and culturally conditioned Roman aristocrats to behave in an exceptionally aggressive and violent manner because successfully applied and advertised violence on the real and imagined enemies of Rome contributed to the honor of the *res publica* and, by extension, increased one’s chances of rising through a succession of ever-higher offices and being survived by glorious memory. As a result, truculence and bellicosity became deeply embedded in the culture code of the Roman aristocratic decision-makers, shaping the notion of honor of most Roman aristocrats and giving birth to a very distinctive “strategic behavior” in regard to war initiation, territorial conquest, and balance-of-power politics.¹⁶

¹⁵ “... qui potest dubitari quin ad consulatum adipiscendum multo plus adferat dignitatis rei militaris quam iuris civilis gloria? ... Ac nimirum--dicendum est enim quod sentio--rei militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus.”

¹⁶ As I discuss below, pp. 53f., Rome’s very complicated relations with her neighbors in the days of the Early and Middle Republic also made the ruling elite develop a genuine “security complex.”

The contemporary balance-of-power theory of international relations stipulates that equality of power between nation-states is most conducive to peace. Thus, weaker nations may contribute to general stability by pursuing the military-security policy of “balancing..., a countervailing policy designed to improve abilities to prosecute military missions in order to deter and/or defeat another state.”¹⁷ Since strong nations often destabilize the balance of power by continuing to arm, weaker states often take it upon themselves to build up their own economic and military capabilities (“internal balancing”) or develop alliances with other states (“external balancing”) in order to make it more complicated and consequently less likely for a more powerful state to flex its military muscles.¹⁸ The Greeks were quite familiar with the concept of “balancing” and occasionally even employed it. Describing the causes of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides says, “And the truest motive, though least revealed in speech, is, in my opinion, the fact that the growing strength of the Athenians and the fear it produced among the Lacedaemonians compelled the parties to make war on each other” (1.23.6).¹⁹ Similarly, Polybius praises Hiero, the king of Syracuse, who made an alliance with weaker Carthage despite a pre-existing treaty with stronger Rome because he was convinced that it was dangerous to leave Rome as the only dominant power (1.83.2-4).

¹⁷ See Elman (2003), 8.

¹⁸ Rosecrance (2003), 159, suggests the following rigorous set of criteria to determine balancing by a state: it must be driven by defensive and not offensive motives, join the weaker coalition, and be ready to defend its allies and restore equilibrium in power whenever it is threatened. For a survey of different theoretical issues raised by the balance-of-power theory, see Levy (2003), 128-153.

¹⁹ “Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν....”

By contrast, the Romans spurned balancing. Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos. 162 and 155 BCE), who opposed Cato the Censor and advocated Carthage's preservation in the years before the Third Punic War (149-146 BCE), is the only known prominent Roman statesman who insisted that hostile powers should be allowed to retain some strength to maintain domestic peace and harmony and save people from decadence.²⁰ One may wonder why the "strategic behavior" of important decision-makers in the times of the Republic was habitually typified by wars of aggression and brinkmanship. After all, unrestrained competition for *laus* and *fama* gradually led to the destructive *dignitatis contentiones* among the bellicose Roman aristocrats, who were increasingly resorting to the violent resolution of internal and external conflicts in order to fulfill their political aspirations. In the end, this resulted in the disastrous cycles of civil wars that destroyed the Republic. I suggest that this unproductive "strategic behavior" was a result of the very peculiar "strategic culture" that equated successfully applied violence on the real and imagined enemies of Rome and expansionist militarism with personal *virtus* and even a strong personal commitment to the public good.

The argument that culture can influence one's approaches to security policy has been made by Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz. In the 1970s, Jack Snyder brought the political and cultural argument into the realm of modern national security studies when he drew upon anthropology to develop a concept of "strategic culture" in order to interpret the military strategy of the USSR and express his concern regarding the then recently adopted Schlesinger Doctrine. His main argument was that the Soviet distinctive approach to nuclear strategy disallowed the new US concept of limited nuclear war. If provoked by an American limited nuclear attack

²⁰ See Diod. Sic. 34/35.33.3-6; Livy, *Per.* 48.4-5, 48.15, and 48.24; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27; Flor. 1.31.5; App. *Pun.* 69; August. *De civ. D.* 1.30-31; Oros. 4.23.9; and Zonar. 9.30. Cf. also William V. Harris (1979), 127f. and 266f., and Fornara (1983), 84-89.

against Soviet military facilities, the USSR was quite unlikely to limit itself to a reciprocal attack on US military targets, but very likely to respond with massive and crippling nuclear strikes against urban areas.

Snyder says:

Strategic culture can be defined as the sum total of ideals, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy. In the area of strategy, habitual behavior is largely cognitive behavior. This is true not only of the development of strategic doctrines but also of the weapons acquisition process and of crisis decisionmaking, during which the possible use of nuclear weapons might be considered.... Soviet strategy has been influenced by a number of factors unique to the Soviet historical experience. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that having confronted unique problems and having evolved in unique circumstances, the Soviet strategic culture would contain concepts that are in some respects unique.²¹

Suggesting that decision-making elites convey a unique “strategic culture” related to security-military affairs, Snyder argues that it represents a wider manifestation of public opinion, which is socialized into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking.

On the one hand, many early theorists on “strategic culture” inferred that different security communities were inclined to demonstrate in their strategic thought and behavior particular patterns that could be collectively categorized as cultural.²² Clifford Geertz, who was perhaps

²¹ Snyder (1977), 8f. Cf. also Booth (1990), 121, who broadly defines the concept of “strategic culture” as referring to “a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.”

²² See Gray (1999), 53. For a useful review of how different generations of scholars have addressed the concept of “strategic culture,” see Johnston (1995b), 36-43, and Haglund (2004), 482-493.

the best known and most influential American anthropologist of the second half of the twentieth century, famously defines culture as consisting of “socially established structures of meaning in terms of which people do ... things.”²³ Hence, Snyder suggests that national elites convey a unique “strategic culture” related to security-military affairs, and these distinctive ways of behaving represent a wider manifestation of public opinion, which is socialized into a specific mode of strategic thinking. His argument is as follows:

It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique “strategic culture.” Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of “culture” rather than mere “policy.” Of course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture.²⁴

Historians in other fields--China, for example--have also employed the notion of “strategic culture” to narrate history of warfare, diplomatic relations, and strategic thought in their respective field.²⁵

On the other hand, some early theorists on “strategic culture” also hypothesized that it was characterized by uniquely patterned styles of states’ “strategic behaviors” in regard to territorial

²³ Geertz (1973), 12. As a variant, anthropologist Marvin Harris (1979), 47, characterizes culture as “the learned repertory of thoughts and actions exhibited by the members of social groups--repertoires transmissible independently of genetic heredity from one generation to the next.”

²⁴ Snyder (1977), v.

²⁵ For instance, see Johnston (1995a) and Perdue (2000), 252-287.

conquest, war initiation, and balance-of-power politics intended to diminish or match military capabilities of a stronger state.²⁶ According to Booth:

A strategic culture defines a set of patterns of and for a nation's behaviour on war and peace issues.... Strategic culture helps shape behaviour on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine. As a result of continuities in these matters, it is legitimate to talk about a particular national "style" in the theory and practice of strategy.²⁷

It is unfortunate that Snyder, who coined the very term "strategic culture," has distanced himself from this particular line of reasoning. For instance, he denies, somewhat controversially, that some distinctive Soviet military strategy concepts can be traced back to Russian historical-cultural antecedents, and he refuses to view "strategic culture" as narrowly determining strategic choice.²⁸ At the same time, Snyder reiterates his belief that once decision-makers are socialized into a specific mode of strategic thinking, they tend to hold to it, making it a part of their cultural tradition. He says, "The term 'culture' was used [by me] to suggest that, once a distinctive approach to strategy takes hold, it tends to persist despite changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through process of socialization and institutionalization and through the role of strategic concepts in legitimizing these social arrangements."²⁹

²⁶ Cf. Gray (1999), 53. Bathurst (1993), 24, asserts, "The idea of the *structure*, in brief, is that nations have fairly consistent patterns of behavior around: time, space, the value of human life, initiating action (including signaling anger, threats of war, etc), leaders and led, and, probably the most important of all, context, whether a thing is customarily examined in isolation or as part of a whole."

²⁷ Booth (1990), 121.

²⁸ See Snyder (1990), 4-7. An insightful critique of Snyder's position is provided by Booth (1990), 121-125.

²⁹ Snyder (1990), 4.

But how does all this relate to the domestic- and foreign-policy choices members of the Roman governing elite were making in the times of the Republic? In the section below titled “*Gens, Virtus, and the Acquisition of Honor and Public Office in Republican Rome*,” I demonstrate that these choices were largely determined by the dominant cultural values which socialized aristocratic decision-makers, who mostly had served in the cavalry, to behave in exceptionally aggressive and violent manner. My analysis contradicts many of the conclusions of contemporary Roman historians who are influenced by a variety of twentieth-century political-science realist theories and insist that the foreign-policy choices Roman aristocrats were making were primarily determined by external circumstances that required a resolute response to the hostile environment. For instance, Eckstein, who studies the rise of Rome as the dominant power in the ancient Mediterranean world, employs the political-science realist theory to claim that “the systems of warlike and aggressive states that existed in the ancient Mediterranean conformed from the beginning to the grimmest and most unforgiving of Realist paradigms.” Since the author reiterates that his “study is in fact written largely to question this thesis of exceptional Roman bellicosity,” he attempts once again to resurrect the hypothesis of Roman “defensive” imperialism proposed by Frank in the 1920s.³⁰

Today’s school of realism is primarily a fruit of the Soviet studies of the Cold War era in the USA. Although realism has been widely employed in International Relations theory, it still quite simplistically views relations between states or between the rulers and the ruled as purely the cynical pursuit of interests dominated by power and fear. Over the last fifty years or so, the political-science realist theory went through three major succeeding phases: classical, neorealist,

³⁰ Eckstein (2006a), 10 and 33, and cf. Eckstein (2008). See also Frank (1921).

and neoclassical.³¹ In the late 1940s, Morgenthau ascertained the dominance of the realist model by explaining conflictual behavior of states by human failings.³² Then Waltz emphasized the generative nature of the international system of politics, and this approach became the new orthodoxy.³³ In his neorealist works, the author contends that the system of international relations is anarchic and inhabited by highly competitive nation-states that always vie with one another for power in order to maximize their chance of survival. Since the distribution of power favors strong nations, only great powers can take action that will result in a change. Naturally, they seek to take full advantage of weaker nations and always try to bolster their position even further. This makes the system prone to conflicts and wars as weaker states are regularly placed in difficult situations and forced to engage in balancing. Contrary to Waltz, neoclassical realists like Snyder correctly point out that it is counter-productive to look at nation-states as the only irreducible units whose power and interests are to be considered. Instead, it is much more important to focus on what happens within societies.³⁴ Finally, in the early twenty-first century Mearsheimer advanced a completely pessimistic theory of “offensive” realism that claims that the very structure of the international system compels states to engage in competitive policies toward each other, constantly attempting to tip the adversarial balance of power in their own favor.³⁵

³¹ For useful reviews of the changing approaches to realism, see Schweller and Priess (1997) and Rose (1998).

³² See Morgenthau (1948).

³³ See Waltz (1959 and 1979).

³⁴ See Snyder (1991), 19.

³⁵ See Mearsheimer (2001).

A realist theory of international systems of politics utilized by many political scientists and some modern Roman historians favors immediate, logical and positive causes that streamline model-building and help provide a rational explanation for complicated and unique events. However, it is uncomfortable with the cultural dimension of the decision-making process because it is not always easy to discern or relate to other factors.³⁶ Unlike realism, “primitivism” draws first and foremost upon anthropology, and it is heavily influenced by the notion of philological minimalism, the assertion usually associated with Oxford that maintains that the terms absent from ancient texts should not be read into antiquity. While the “realists” view relations between states as the simple pursuit of interests and emphasize power, fear of the “Other,” and desire to ensure one’s own security, the “primitivists” argue that foreign relations directly grow out of culture.

In the field of Roman history, two early “primitivist” works written in the late 1950s by Badian and Gagé stand out.³⁷ On the one hand, Gagé suggests that the Romans perceived the rival leaders in their world in terms of vertical ranking. Consequently, the major goal of the Roman foreign policy was to ensure that the Roman emperor was on the top of the pyramid.³⁸ On the other hand, Badian makes a persuasive case that the Romans imported the typical Roman social relationship of patronage from their civic life into their thinking about relations between states as well as between states and Roman aristocratic decision-makers. This claim creates a

³⁶ For a useful criticism of Waltz’s neorealism and its version of balance of power as the best theoretical approach for understanding modern international history, see Schroeder (2003), 114-127.

³⁷ See Gagé (1959) and Badian (1958).

³⁸ Cf. Alföldy (1985), 42-64 and 94-156, who depicts the Roman society as a very steep pyramid.

challenge to the proponents of the realist-theory worldview because it poses a question as to what extent the cultural concept of patronage influenced the Roman foreign policy in comparison to the simplistic concepts of power and fear, which, according to the school of realism, are the only motivators for policy making.

In 1979, William V. Harris published his classic work titled *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC*. In this book, he attacked the then-pervasive doctrine that the Romans had fought primarily defensive wars from which they not only emerged victorious but also greatly expanded their empire. Instead, Harris offered a distinctly “primitivist” account of the Roman bellicose culture during the Republican period, explicating how Roman aristocrats waged wars of aggression as a means to acquire personal supremacy in *gloria* and honor for political and social advancement.³⁹ According to the author, military glory and the expansion of the Republic’s territories, which served as rewards for warfare, were praiseworthy achievements that significantly augmented one’s claim to social distinction.⁴⁰ The problem is that Harris also claims that an itch for gain was the leading motivation for the Roman aristocrats to engage in foreign wars. Driven by *cupido praedae*, the aristocrats of the Middle and Late Republic supposedly used the Senate as their institutional instrument to organize a continuous series of aggressive wars.⁴¹ However, whether one advocates the case of fear or the case of profit, he is essentially engaged in a quarrel between two varieties of realism.⁴² In my view, Rome’s

³⁹ See William V. Harris (1979).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-53.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 54-104. Cf. also North (1981) who succinctly presents and supports William V. Harris’ views on the cogency of profit-seeking in occasioning Rome’s foreign wars.

⁴² Gruen (1984), 1:288-315, and Sherwin-White (1984), 15ff., reject William V. Harris’ emphasis on economic gain as the chief motivation for Roman policy in the East and

environment was multifaceted and the actions of its decision-makers were prompted by more complicated motivators than those assumed by today's proponents of the political-science realist theory.

Eventually, both "realists" and "primitivists" abandoned extreme positions. As a result, the current debate is fought more on the middle ground. The softer version of "primitivism" that descends from Gagé and Badian attempts to find a way to assert that the cultural patterns its advocates study--be it honor, reciprocity, revenge, kinship or ritualized friendship--are as important as the notions of power, fear, and security the adepts of the school of realism promulgate as the sole motivators for policy making. Consequently, one can make a case that the choices Roman aristocratic decision-makers were making were conditioned not only by external circumstances, which required a response to the hostile environment, but also by the cultural workings of their own society which socialized them to act in a culturally distinctive way. The two monographs published in the late 1990s represent this latest version of "primitivism."⁴³

In his book titled *Empire of Honor: The Art of Government in the Roman World*, Lendon persuasively argues that the concepts of "force, authority, and patronage" do not satisfactorily explain the unmatched political stability of the Principate because they fail to clarify "the workings of honour and pride, the underpinnings of loyalty and gratitude for benefactions."⁴⁴

demonstrate that the material benefits of empire were at first incidental. Moreover, Millett (1990) and Woolf (1990) persuasively argue that Roman exploitation of the provinces was neither administered from the center nor systematic.

⁴³ See Lendon (1997) and Mattern (1999).

⁴⁴ See Lendon (1997), 13.

The author declares that the concept of honor means almost nothing in the modern world. “We live in honour’s churchyard. Honour’s bones are still with us, but the muscles that drove them and the tissues that joined them have rotted away.”⁴⁵ By contrast, the very functioning of Roman-state mechanisms depended on honor and acquisition of prestige. Lendon says:

Honour among aristocrats, once acquired, was not a passive possession, like an engraved watch or an honorary degree. Rather, those who had honour were able to exert power in society by virtue of the desire of others for it, and the concern of others not to lose it....

By virtue of his honour, an illustrious man was capable of influencing the conduct of those around him. He could get his way by praising or blaming; the mere fact of his honour made others defer to him; by virtue of his honour he could get his way by participating, to his profit, in the exchange of reciprocal profits.⁴⁶

The author undertakes a scrupulous reconstruction of Rome’s prevalent ideology, identifying the three major roles honor played in Graeco-Roman society.⁴⁷ Emphasizing continuity rather than change, he strives to present “an alien civilization’s unconscious adherence to alien norms... as conscious strategy” and tracks the development of the concept and roles of honor over time.⁴⁸ His aim is “an investigation of political culture rather than political history... to discover how a whole political world worked by studying how a range of people expected it to work.”⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Ibid., 27.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 55.

⁴⁷ “First, honour was a source of value: it constituted some or all of the value of men’s actions, which might be honorific or dishonouring. Inextricably mingled with the exchange of goods and services, honour could be traded for goods, services, and further honour. Second, honour was a source of legitimate social authority, that is, of an authority people were brought up to obey. Deference, including obedience, to acknowledged possessors of honour was required in Graeco-Roman society. Third, honour was a social sanction. Fear of loss of honour—disgrace—enforced social norms and some of those norms... could be used to work one’s will in society” (Ibid., 69).

⁴⁸ Ibid., 31.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 28.

Lendon identifies the three important mechanisms of government that articulated a cultural world of the Romans: reciprocity, the attribution of praise and blame, and deference. First, Lendon amply shows how favors given and favors returned were essential to the running of the Roman Empire. He also emphasizes that the display of generosity and gratitude was a very important element of one's social status. Second, the author discusses the mechanism of the attribution of praise and blame. Because a social grant of reputation mattered a great deal, it was advantageous to be in a position to bestow recognition ("honors") or to inflict insults and humiliation. By showing honor, the emperor was able to command obedience of his subjects. Lendon says, "The Roman emperor ruled... as head of a society which defined rank by honour.... Others strove to attack him and control him by exploiting his honour's vulnerability...."⁵⁰ But the emperor himself was continuously judged and evaluated. If he were approved, his endorsement of someone else in turn carried particular weight because the emperor was seen as the virtual personification of society and its values. On the other hand, the emperor's disfavor toward an individual indicated that this person was weak and lacked authority. This made him the ready target for attacks.⁵¹ Finally, the *nobiles* also needed popular acclamation and public honors to maintain their prestige because the new system introduced by Augustus prevented open competition for political offices as well as unrestrained military contests for *laus* and *fama* characterized by brazen "triumph-hunting" against the "barbarians."⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid., 107f. and cf also Ibid., 21, where the author asserts that the Roman government was "not any official hierarchy but... a hierarchy of prestige and standing." See also Millar (1977), 275f., 283ff., and 296f., where the historian demonstrates how the emperor used major elevations to reinforce his power.

⁵¹ See Lendon (1997), 108-149.

⁵² In Chapter III of this dissertation, I discuss Augustus' policy to reserve exceptional *virtus* and martial prowess only for himself and the chosen male members of the *domus Augusti*. The lack of competitiveness may have led to the politics of munificence in the Roman Empire, with

Deference is the third and most interesting mechanism of Roman government that Lendon describes. People of superior standing had to be “honored,” or treated with respect, by others. Thus, obedience was frequently not only a matter of recognizing the formal authority of an official, but of showing due deference to a person of high social status. As long as the hierarchy of formal power and the hierarchy of social status coincided, the demands of honor strengthened government. However, when they diverged, as Lendon argues they did from the late third century CE on, a conflict between “under-honourable governors and over-honourable subjects” weighed down the government machine.⁵³ Lendon’s book competently explores the fine aspects of the Roman concept of honor that was utilized to exercise effective control over the vast empire.⁵⁴ According to the author’s compelling argument, the phenomena of honor and reciprocity rather than the more vulgar and simplistic concepts of fear and power were driving the exercise of power in the Roman Empire. The skillful application of these concepts ensured the empire’s lasting well-being.

Finally, Mattern launches a calculated attack on the school of realism in her book titled *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, where she aims to explicate the Roman Empire's military and foreign policy.⁵⁵ Developing the argument first proposed by Gagé, she

the elites assuming financial responsibility for local projects in exchange for acquiring honor and prestige from the communities. Cf. Nicols (1980) and Zuiderhoek (2009).

⁵³ See Lendon (1997), 223.

⁵⁴ Lendon (1997), 270, says, “Honour, whether used consciously or unconsciously, served to muffle the shouting of orders, the jingle of coins, and the screams of the tortured.”

⁵⁵ See Mattern (1999).

suggests that the Roman aristocrats who were involved in diplomacy sought glory for themselves and foreign deference for the Republic.⁵⁶ She says:

Image or national “honor” emerges as the most important [Roman foreign] policy goal.... [The] study suggests that international relations, for the Romans, were not so much a complex geopolitical chess game as a competition for status, with much violent demonstration of superior prowess, aggressive posturing, and terrorization of the opponent. The Romans behaved on an international level like Homeric heroes, Mafia gangsters, or participants in any society where status and security depended on one’s perceived ability to inflict violence.... The value attached to honor, which was maintained by conquest, terror, and retaliation, explains the repeated, often unsuccessful attempts at expanding the empire....⁵⁷

Following Millar, Mattern emphasizes institutional minimalism of the Roman state and points out the obvious fact that the Roman international relations were not conducted by trained diplomats and students of international politics and strategic studies.⁵⁸ The Roman foreign-relations decision-makers were the same wealthy aristocrats who composed what remains of Latin literature.

This is where the concept of “strategic culture” developed by Snyder may become useful for the study of the decision-making processes in the Roman Republic. In this context, “strategic culture” can be defined as a set of shared beliefs, presuppositions, and modes of behavior deduced from common experiences and accepted narratives within a particular culture. This set not only molds collective identity and relationships of one specific cultural group to alien

⁵⁶ See Gagé (1959).

⁵⁷ Mattern (1999), xii.

⁵⁸ See Millar (1982).

cultural groups but also shapes appropriate ends and means for realizing security objectives.⁵⁹

Gray perceptively points out:

One should resist the suggestion... that somehow strategic culture, or cultures, can be sidelined and offset by other influences upon strategic choice. The idea of strategic culture does not imply that there is a simple one-for-one relationship between culturally traceable preferences and actual operational choices. The claim rather, is that culture shapes the process of strategy-making, and influences the execution of strategy, no matter how close actual choice may be to some abstract or idealized cultural preference. This simple, but crucial, point can elude the intellectual grasp even of careful scholars.⁶⁰

Realists like Eckstein insist that the foreign-policy choices of the Roman governing elite were primarily determined by external circumstances that required a resolute response to the hostile environment.⁶¹ To my mind, however, those who claim that aristocratic decision-makers were only motivated by fear of the “Other” and desire to guarantee Rome’s survival in the default environment of international anarchy, where states engaged in a never-ending struggle with one another for primacy and security, miss the point that the people who decided on Rome’s military strategy and ensured her national security must have always functioned within the milieu of their own cultural influences and preferences. According to Gray, “Strategic culture is not only ‘out there,’ also it is within us; we, our institutions, and our behaviour, are the context.”⁶² Discussing the relationship between “strategic culture” and “strategic behavior,” Gray proposes that “strategic culture” as context gives meaning to “strategic behavior” and can

⁵⁹ Cf. Mahnken (2009), 70.

⁶⁰ Gray (1999), 55.

⁶¹ Eckstein (2006), 33, clearly states that his “study is in fact written largely to question this thesis of exceptional Roman bellicosity.”

⁶² Gray (1999), 53.

even provide insight into what this behavior signifies.⁶³ For him, “[S]trategic culture is the world of mind, feeling, and *habit in behavior*.”⁶⁴ This is why I suggest that the Roman foreign policy and strategy making were culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated; they cannot be divorced from Rome’s geography, history, political culture or familiar ways members of the Roman ruling elite were accustomed to acquire glory or win a distinctive grant of *auctoritas* from others.

In what follows, I elucidate how the very close connection that existed at Rome between high birth and martial courage on the one hand and the acquisition of honor and public office on the other contributed to the rise of a very unique “strategic culture” characterized by truculence, ferocity, and belligerence of the Republican ruling elite. Why was the “strategic behavior” of aristocratic decision-makers who held magistracies with *imperium* typified by wars of aggression, brinkmanship, and unrestrained and recurrent application of physical violence on the bodies of real and imagined enemies of Rome? One answer is that it was shaped and influenced by national historical behavior. From very early times in the history of the Republic, national historical behavior molded and shaped the national character by equating *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by military prowess, and expansionist militarism with a strong personal commitment to the public good.⁶⁵ I suggest that bellicosity became such a dominant cultural marker of Roman aristocratic identity that uninhibited competition for *laus* and *fama* among the *nobiles*

⁶³ Based on the Latin word *contextere*, Gray (1999), 50f., defines “strategic culture” as “that which weaves together.”

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁶⁵ Cf. Haglund (2004), 491-498, who builds on the foundation of Gray’s interpretation of “strategic culture as context” and suggests that the concept of “strategic culture” can be further divided into (1) national historical behavior and (2) national character and identity.

eventually resulted in the disastrous cycles of civil wars that destroyed the Republic. While pugnacity was a highly localized cultural marker of Roman identity, I would like first to provide a brief overview of more general cultural norms and beliefs shared by the people living around the Mediterranean basin. Let me begin with the most basic assertion: cultures differ. Contemporary Western cultural assumptions and expectations cannot be taken for granted when interpreting the ancient texts that were produced in a much different cultural milieu. Instead, an interpreter needs to learn the cultural norms and beliefs behind the texts he studies as well as to employ a social-scientific method of sorts in order to attempt to construe the important cultural markers of the Roman society through the lens of the original culture carriers.⁶⁶

Gens, Virtus, and the Acquisition of Honor and Public Office in Republican Rome

Landed wealth, *gens*, and *virtus* defined the life of the Roman governing elite during the Republic. Unlike highly individualistic and low-context English-speaking people who dominate the Western world today, the societies of the ancient Mediterranean were collectivistic and high-context.⁶⁷ While low-context societies have a tendency to “talk down” to people and spell out

⁶⁶ For what follows, I am particularly indebted to Bruce Malina, a New Testament scholar who draws on anthropological studies, including Mary Douglas’ “Group/Grid” social-scientific model, as well as on other tools of cultural analysis habitually employed in the social sciences to offer highly innovative and illuminating insights into the socio-cultural background of the New Testament milieu. See Douglas (1983 and 1996) and Malina (2001 and 2010).

⁶⁷ The concepts of “high-context” and “low-context” were developed by the anthropologist and cross-cultural researcher Edward Twitchell Hall, Jr. According to Hall (1976), 79, a high-context message communicates a rather implicit meaning, which is “either in the physical context or internalized in the person.” As a result, very little information is included in the “coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message.” For the cultural realm of high-context societies, see Hall (1983), 59-77. Malina (1991a) specifically discusses the Mediterranean as the realm of high-context societies.

everything, the discourse in high-context societies takes shared cultural values for granted and leaves many things untold. The people are socialized into widely shared ways of perceiving and acting, and the culture itself is allowed to explain, leaving much to the interpreter's imagination and common knowledge.⁶⁸ However, because so few things have to be spelled out in high-context societies, words and word choices become crucial for effective communication: a few words could convey a multifaceted message very effectively, but only in ingroup setting, where much could be easily assumed.⁶⁹

Similar to other preindustrial and agrarian societies around the Mediterranean, the Romans saw life in terms of a zero-sum game of pure competition in which limited resources could never be increased: when allocated, they would be divided either in one's favor or against one's best interests.⁷⁰ There were two widely held beliefs: (1) all good things in life, including manliness, martial courage, honor, and prestige, existed in limited quantities that could not be increased and (2) all people except blood relatives were untrustworthy unless proved otherwise.⁷¹ These

⁶⁸ Hall (1976), 98, says, "When talking about something that they have on their minds, a high-context individual will expect his interlocutor to know what's bothering him, so that he doesn't have to be specific. The result is that he will talk around and around the point, in effect putting all the pieces in place except the crucial one. Placing it properly—this keystone—is the role of his interlocutor. To do this for him is an insult and a violation of his individuality."

⁶⁹ An ingroup is a group whose members share similar cultural assumptions and are expected to adhere to similar cultural norms. The terms "ingroup" and "outgroup" were made popular by Henri Tajfel, an influential social psychologist who formulated social identity theory. For details, see Tajfel (1974).

⁷⁰ Zero-sum games are exchanges in which each participant's gain or loss of utility is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of utility of the other participants. Since the amount of "winnable goods" is fixed and one's loss is somebody else's gain, whatever the outcome, the payoffs to the players add up to zero. See Colman (1999), 53f.

⁷¹ The cultural assumption of limited good was first proposed by Foster (1965), 293-315, who did extensive anthropological fieldwork in Tzinzuntzan, Michoacan Mexico. In particular, Foster (1965), 296f., claims that agonistic reflexes naturally supplemented the belief that both

beliefs made kinship a focal institution of the Roman social system. Even if brothers, cousins or fathers and sons in the end found themselves on different political sides, especially in times of civil strife, a person could initially advance his social standing only at the expense of those who did not belong to his *gens*. As a result, he frequently depended on positive cooperation within his immediate family and the broader kin group to obtain a privilege of high status.⁷² This is why extreme concern with the family, which was made up of both the living members and the ancestors and unborn descendants, was not unusual. The eulogium for Lucius Caecilius Metellus (cos. 251 and 247 BCE) asserts that among the ten greatest and best things in life he accomplished was “*multos liberos relinquere*” (Plin. *HN* 7.43.139-140).

Under these circumstances, success in life greatly depended on having and making the right interpersonal connections. The immediate family not only taught one how to cultivate and benefit from ties to other persons but also introduced him to the right people within his *gens*. Münzer, who traced family relationships between the powerful senatorial families, famously formulated the theory that groups of families, rather than individuals, were the basis of political alliances at Rome. Although the theory of “family-based politics” is debatable, it is reasonable to suggest that ties of *amicitia*, of inter-marriage, and of mutual reciprocal obligations played a significant role in determining Senate’s policy decisions.⁷³ The organizing principle of life, then,

material and immaterial goods existed in limited supply. Cf. Malina (2001a), 36f., 89f., and 112-118.

⁷² Of course, the *nobiles* also relied on networks of hereditary clients they had all over the Roman world.

⁷³ See Münzer (1920). Brunt (1965) objects to the tendency to treat the term *amicitia* as a reliable marker of political relationship, but *amicitia* and *inimicitia* were definitely used to signify a semi-formal political relationship without any content of personal friendship as it is understood today.

was the emotional need to be accepted by and fit in the family because one's very identity depended on it. Driven by this need, a person followed the long-established principles which were based on the complementary concepts of honor and shame.⁷⁴

Equally important, the perception of limited good stipulated that honor existed in finite quantity that was always in short supply. This is why the honor of the family was a concern of all its members, and everyone willingly worked together to protect it. In all his actions, a member of the Roman governing elite was expected to follow one simple principle: to preserve and increase the family honor at all costs. The epitaph of an otherwise unknown son of Publius Cornelius Scipio the Augur states, "If you had been given a long life to take advantage of your office, reputation, martial courage, glory, and talent, you easily would have surpassed the glory of your ancestors" (*ILLRP* 311 = *CIL* I².10).⁷⁵ When Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus divorced his wife Mucia, who might have been unfaithful to him, to make himself available for a possible marriage alliance with the house of Cato the Younger, Mucia's cousins, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE) and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 57 BCE), were furious. An affront to the family honor caused the two aristocrats, who used to be legates of Pompeius and his loyal agents, to cut off the connection and turn against their *patronus*.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ For details, see Malina (2001a), 27-31, who identifies honor and shame as "pivotal values" of the Mediterranean world.

⁷⁵ "... honos, fama, virtusque / gloria atque ingenium. Quibus sei / in longa licuisset tibe utier vita, / facile facteis superases gloriam / maiorum." For the identification of the inscription, see Sumner (1973), 36f.

⁷⁶ On Mucia's divorce, see Cic. *Att.* 1.12.3; Suet. *Iul.* 50.1; and Plut. *Pomp.* 42.7. For the ire of the Metelli, see Dio Cass. 37.49.3.

As I demonstrate below, martial courage notably augmented an aristocrat's honor. Over generations, certain prominent families in Rome claimed to have accumulated exceptional valor. In due course, descendants of these families came to be regarded as having a greater store of ascribed *virtus* than others. This enabled them to add to their own acquired honor and assert stronger claims on magistracies and military commands, making the bond between *virtus* and *gens* indispensable. For instance, the Cornelii Scipiones often were elected to important magistracies or won exceptional honors while still young, simply by virtue of family's ascribed honor.

In 210 BCE, at the age of twenty-six Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder (cos. 205 BCE) was appointed as proconsul, becoming the first Roman to have obtained consular *imperium* without having previously served as consul or praetor (Livy 26.18.1). In 204 BCE, the Senate chose Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica (cos. 191 BCE), who was not old enough to run for the quaestorship, to receive the sacred stone of Magna Mater on its arrival to Italy because his "*principatus morum*" (Val. Max. 8.15.3) made him "*vir optimus*" (Livy 29.14.8).⁷⁷ Although Livy's sources provide no information as to why the Senate selected Scipio Nasica, and the historian himself declines to conjecture on the matter (Livy 29.14.9-10), he reports that the nomination as "the best man in the state" was coveted more than any military commands or magistracies, thus making it a sign of the highest distinction (Livy 29.14.7).⁷⁸ Since Scipio Nasica was a cousin of Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder, the Senate's decision must have kept the Scipionic family at the center of public attention and further augmented the family's

⁷⁷ "... explicata totos fastos, constitue omnes currus triumphales, nihil tamen morum principatu speciosius reperies" (Val. Max. 8.15.3). Cf. also Ov. *Fast.* 4.347.

⁷⁸ "... veram certe victoriam eius rei sibi quisque mallet quam ulla imperia honoresve suffragio seu patrum seu plebis delatos" (Livy 29.14.7).

ascribed honor. Even in the Late Republic, men with prestigious family names were regularly elected to high offices by the family names they bore.⁷⁹ For example, Cicero once insulted his opponent, Piso, by suggesting that he crept into office by mistake, solely on recommendation of his ancestor busts (*Pis.* 1.1-2; cf. *Rab. Post.* 1.2).

Cicero reports almost a universal admiration for magistracies and military commands among members of the Roman elite (*Off.* 1.71).⁸⁰ From the times of the Early Republic, when constant conflicts with neighbors led to the emphasis on the military competency of the upper magistrates (Plaut. *Amph.* 192 and 196), members of the prominent patrician-plebeian families vied for magistracies and military commands to acquire *auctoritas* and consequent political power. The Roman system of office-holding was characterized by two distinctive features.⁸¹ On the one hand, the age-regulated structure related to magistracies made an elite youth compete with men of his own age and class. On the other hand, the rivalry became more ruthless as one advanced further up the political hierarchy because there were simply fewer offices at each higher level.⁸² For instance, only six magistracies with *imperium* were available to compete for on the eve of the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE), and this number increased to eight after the creation of

⁷⁹ On the struggles *novi homines* faced in advancing their political careers compared to the *nobiles*, see Wiseman (1971), 100-116.

⁸⁰ Yakobson (1992), 50f., points out, “The Roman nobles... perhaps more than any other social elite in history, were dependent on popular elections for the very definition of their relative status in society.... The ultimate test and measure of *dignitas* for a republican *nobilis* (and no less so for an ambitious *homo novus*) was his ability to reach higher office.”

⁸¹ Mommsen (1887a) is still the most comprehensive guide to the literary sources related to the Roman magistracies. Loewenstein (1973), 41-57, explains the main principles of Roman magisterial office; Jolowicz (1972), 45-57, outlines the functions of different magistracies; and Broughton (1984-1986), provides a complete list of all known magistrates of the Republic.

⁸² See Beard and Crawford (1985), 53ff.

the additional two praetorships for the year 197 BCE.⁸³ No doubt, the voting assemblies gave greater preferences to the affluent.⁸⁴ Yet, an ambitious young Roman aristocrat running for his first office still needed to demonstrate his superiority in virtue to win the mass electorate's vote.⁸⁵

The easiest way to do so was to exploit one's *gens* by putting a claim on the glorious deeds of great forbearers (Cic. *Off.* 2.44).⁸⁶ In order to celebrate their ancestors and substantiate a family's claim to outstanding reputation, members of the leading Roman families filled the atrium, vestibule, and nearby rooms--the most public areas in the house--with ancestral spoils and portraits, genealogical tables, and archives of documents (Polyb. 6.39.10 and Plin. *HN* 35.2.6-7). Capitalizing on the accomplishments of his ancestors to legitimize his claim to power and promising to model his actions in office on their exemplary deeds, the young aristocrat with political aspirations would liberally use ascribed honor and accumulated family *virtus* to win his first office.⁸⁷ The significance of ascribed honor can be further demonstrated: if a *nobilis* ever made a mistake, he immediately used the brave deeds of his ancestors and the power of his kin as

⁸³ See Beck (2011), 237, and cf. Jashemski (1950), 40, and Brennan (2000), 1:191.

⁸⁴ See Taylor (1966), 84-106; Shatzman (1975); and Nicolet (1980), 219-224 and 246-267.

⁸⁵ For debates on the role of the people in the political system of the Republic, see Millar (1998); Mouritsen (2001); and Morstein-Marx (2004).

⁸⁶ "Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam..." Cf. Cic. *Off.* 1.78.

⁸⁷ Sallust makes Marius describe the *nobiles* in the following way: "Atque etiam, quom apud vos aut in senatu verba faciunt, pleraque oratione maiores suos extollunt: eorum fortia facta memorando clariores sese putant" (*Jug.* 85.21). On aristocratic birth as the essential precondition for successful political career in the Middle and Late Republic, see Wiseman (1971), 100 and 105ff., and Badian (1990), 371-413.

the compelling excuse (Sall. *Iug.* 85.4).⁸⁸ No wonder, then, so many Roman aristocrats, stimulated by pride and desire to augment family prestige and ascribed honor, engaged in the antiquarian studies.⁸⁹ The more ambitious of them even invented genealogies, tracing their ancestry from the gods themselves and linking their family history to the prominent Trojans.⁹⁰

However, once the young aristocrat accomplished great deeds in the service of the *res publica*, he acquired personal honor that enabled him to lay claim to his own *virtus*. To the Roman mind, a record of victory and success had to be preserved and commemorated. This is why *virtus*, unlike *gens*, was also within reach of “new men,” those who were not fortunate enough to have illustrious ancestors, but were willing to work hard for the benefit of the Republic, climbing the political ladder by virtue of their own ability rather than by the good fortune of high birth.⁹¹ In fact, when Polybius explicates reasons for the Roman victory in the Hannibalic War (218-201 BCE), he observes that the Romans prevailed because the Senate made every important decision related to managing the war. By contrast, the people were the sole decision-makers in Carthage (6.51.6-8). Polybius describes the senators as “most eminent men”

⁸⁸ “Ad hoc, alii si deliquere, vetus nobilitas, maiorum fortia facta, cognatorum et adfinium opes, multae clientelae, omnia haec praesidio assunt....”

⁸⁹ For the interest in the antiquities of Rome as the prominent feature of the cultural life of the Roman elite in the Late Republic, see Rawson (1985), 102f. and 233-249.

⁹⁰ See Wiseman (1974); Rose (2002); and Rose (2008), 96-102. Around 100 BCE, Asclepiades of Myrlea classifies genealogy in the following way: “Τῆς γὰρ ἱστορίας τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθοῦς εἶναι φησι τὴν δὲ ψευδοῦς τὴν δὲ ὡς ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ἀληθοῦς μὲν τὴν πρακτικὴν, ψευδοῦς δὲ ἢν περὶ πλάσματα καὶ μύθους, ὡς ἀληθοῦς δὲ οἷα ἐστὶν ἢ κωμωδία καὶ οἱ μῦθοι.... τῆς δὲ ψευδοῦς, τουτέστι τῆς μυθικῆς, ἐν εἶδος μόνον ὑπάρχειν λέγει τὸ γενεαλογικόν” (Sext. Emp. *Adv. gramm.* 1.252-253). Cf. also Cicero’s assessment of genealogies in *Brut.* 62.

⁹¹ Cf. Earl (1967), 20f., and Badian (1968), 12. For the Roman preference for *virtus* over *fortuna*, see, for example, *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.24 and 27; *Cic. Fin.* 5.71 and *Mur.* 15-17; *Sall. Iug.* 1.3; *Asc. Scaur.* 22; and *Luc. Phars.* 9.569-71. Beagon (2002), 120-123, offers a useful discussion of the topic.

and claims their decisions on public policy were a cut above anything the Carthaginian masses could conceive. Of course, one can dismiss this remark as pretentious snobbishness of a prominent Greek aristocrat, but the author's account of how one became "eminent" among the Romans is most instructive. In Polybius' view, the Roman aristocratic funeral ceremonies produced "men ready to endure anything to gain the reputation in their country for valor" (6.52.11).⁹²

Funerary rites played a very important role in Roman society. Since death was regarded as a form of pollution that could negatively affect the family of the departed, there was a strong separation between the space of the deceased and that of the living. Apart from the funeral, where the remains of the departed were honored and then disposed of, they had no important function in the religious or symbolic life of the community.⁹³ After the death of an illustrious Roman citizen, his eminent standing was commemorated in three different ways: (1) by a funeral procession conducted with utmost pomp and ceremony; (2) with the eulogies that were given at his interment; and (3) with the tombstone that memorialized his descent, offices, and military exploits (Polyb. 6.52.11-6.54.3).⁹⁴

The funeral procession accompanied by a band and professional female mourners signing a dreary and repetitive dirge (Varro, *De vita populi Romani* 3.110 and *Serv. Dan.* 6.216) put on a loud and public performance; its hullabaloo was proverbial (Hor. *Sat.* 1.6.43). During this elaborate and picturesque show, the family commemorated not only the accomplishments of the

⁹² "... ἄνδρας ὅστε πᾶν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τῆς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ φήμης."

⁹³ For the Roman funerary rites and the cult of the dead, see Toynbee (1971), 43-72.

⁹⁴ Cf. also Cic. *Brut.* 62 and Tac. *Ann.* 3.76.1-2.

deceased but also the achievements of all clan's forbearers who welcomed the deceased into their circle. Family members and possibly hired actors put on the masks (*imagines*) of the deceased ancestors of the clan and marched past, bringing the dead back to life and carrying their insignia (Polyb. 6.53.6-9).⁹⁵ These masks were usually made of wax; in former times, they had been carefully arranged, each in its separate niche, in the atria of houses (Plin. *HN* 35.2.6).⁹⁶ Once the procession arrived in the forum, one of the mourners delivered a funeral oration praising the departed and enumerating both his achievements and those of his ancestors. Besides lamenting an individual, the speech presented an excellent opportunity both to put on display and to re-assert family status. It also could endorse the society's values, helping the survivors to secure political success.⁹⁷ Finally, an epitaph inscribed on a tombstone offered an unparalleled opportunity to immortalize one's self-aggrandizement.

The epitaphs at the family memorial that contains the tombs of the Cornelia Scipiones are among the most famous examples of how prominent Romans strove to memorialize the deeds of their ancestors in order to augment their own ascribed honor and secure their *dignitas* and *auctoritas* both at home and overseas. The sepulcher of the Scipiones is located between the Via Appia and the Via Latina, near the Porta Capena. In the days of the Republic, the complex

⁹⁵ Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 187 and 175 BCE) ordered his sons not to spend more than a million sesterces on his funeral because "imagine specie, non sumptibus nobilitari magnorum virorum funera solere" (Livy, *Per.* 48.11). In his *Commentary on Virgil, Aeneid*, Servius reports that six thousand funerary *imagines* were carried in the funeral cortège of Sulla and six hundred in the funeral of Marcellus, the nephew of Augustus (*Dan.* 6.861; cf. *App. B Civ.* 1.105).

⁹⁶ Cf. also Tac. *Ann.* 4.9.2. For useful discussions of ancestral portraits in the atria of Roman houses, see Zadoks-Josephus Jitta (1932), 32; Rebuffat (1978), 92f.; and Flower (1996), 185-222.

⁹⁷ See North (1983), 170. On *elogia* and *imagines*, see also Hanfmann (1952); Bianchi Bandinelli (1961), 172-188; and Torelli (1975), 45-56.

served as a public monument that celebrated Roman history and commemorated the leading role of the Scipiones in the affairs of the Roman state.⁹⁸ The famous epitaphs engraved on the tombs there denote a martial aspect of *virtus* and highlight the tie between *virtus* and *gens*.⁹⁹ The earliest inscription honors the life and deeds of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298 BCE). It reads as follows:

Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus, begotten of his father Gnaeus, a brave and wise man, whose physique matched his courage. He was consul, censor, and aedile among you. He captured Taurasia and Cisauna in Samnium; he subdued all of Lucania and led away hostages (*ILLRP* 309 = *CIL* I².7).¹⁰⁰

The text gives the name of the deceased, summarizes his character and appearance, and lists his offices and main achievements. Although the epitaph pays respects to the Greek ideal of *καλοκάγαθία*, which extols the complete human personality, harmonious in mind and body, it also clearly distinguishes *καλοκάγαθία* from Roman *virtus*. It was Barbatus' martial courage and his successes in war that enabled him to win consulship and become the censor.¹⁰¹

The epitaph dedicated to Barbatus' son, Lucius Scipio (cos. 259 BCE), mentions the capture of Corsica and the city of Aleria as well as the dedication of the Temple to the Goddesses of Weather as rationale for a fabulously self-possessed example of aristocratic self-exaltment:

⁹⁸ See Giuliani (1986), 172-175, and Holliday (2002), 33-36.

⁹⁹ For useful discussions of the epitaphs found at the sepulcher and for bibliography, see Martina (1980), 149-170, and van Sickel (1987), 41-55.

¹⁰⁰ "Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus - Gnaivod patre / prognatus, fortis vir sapiensque - quoius forma virtutei parisuma / fuit, - consol, censor, aidilis quei fuit apud vos. - Taurasia Cisauna / Samnio cepit, - subigit omne Lucanam opsidesque abducit."

¹⁰¹ Cf. Badian (1968), 12f., and McDonnell (2006), 33ff.

“Most Romans agree that this man was the best among them” (*ILLRP* 310 = *CIL* I².9).¹⁰² It is significant that Aulus Atillius Calatinus (cos. 258 and 254 BCE), who won consulship elections the following year after Lucius Scipio, was determined not to be outshined.¹⁰³ Hence, his epitaph claims, “Most nations agree that this one man was first in rank among the Roman people” (Cic. *Sen.* 61).¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, when the Scipiones died young, before they could hold important magistracies, their epitaphs still mention *virtus* or *virtutes*, suggesting that the young men were honored for their martial exploits (*ILLRP* 311 = *CIL* I².10 and *ILLRP* 312 = *CIL* I².11).¹⁰⁵ If one’s own martial deeds were not impressive enough or could not match those of his ancestors, he could always lay claim to his forebears’ *virtus*, borrowing from the family’s deposit of ascribed valor and honor. Accordingly, the epitaph of a young Lucius Cornelius Scipio, a son of the famous Asiaticus, proudly declares, “My father conquered King Antiochus” (*ILLRP* 313 = *CIL* I².12).¹⁰⁶

Leasing a portion of family-ascribed prestige accentuated the importance of making one’s own contribution to the family’s depository of virtues so that future generations could continue to unreservedly borrow the accumulated family honor to lay stronger claim to entry-level

¹⁰² “Lucius Cornelios Luci filius Scipio / aediles, consul, censor. Hunc oino ploirume cosentiont Romane / duonoro optumo fuisse viro / Luciom Scipione. Filios Barbati / consul, censor, aedilis hic fuet apud vos. / Hec cepit Corsica Aleriaque urbe, / dedet Tempestatebus aide meretod.”

¹⁰³ To the Roman mind, such notions as *auctoritas*, *virtus* or *gloria* could shine. See footnote n. 11 above.

¹⁰⁴ “Hunc unum plurimae consentiunt gentes / populi primarium fuisse virum.”

¹⁰⁵ See McDonnell (2006), 35ff.

¹⁰⁶ “Lucius Cornelius Luci filius Publi nepos / Scipio, quaistor, / tribunus militum, annos / gnatus XXXIII / mortuos. Pater / regem Antiochom / subegit.”

military and political administration offices. Dishonorable actions of an individual could easily diminish not only the family honor but also the excellent reputation of his ancestors.¹⁰⁷ Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Hispanus (praet. 139 BCE) held the military tribunate twice and then served as quaestor, curule aedile, and *praetor peregrinus* (*ILLRP* 316 = *CIL* I².15).¹⁰⁸ In 149 BCE, he went together with Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos. 162 and 155 BCE) on the mission to disarm Carthage. As *praetor peregrinus*, he issued an edict that expelled astrologers and Jews from Rome and Italy (Val. Max. 1.3.3).¹⁰⁹ Composed in elegiac meter and written in the first person, his epitaph offers a significant record of the self-presentation and highlights the bond between *virtus*, which increases one's honor, and *gens*.

Through my good character, I increased deeds of valor of my *gens*; I gave birth to offspring and endeavored to equal the exploits of my father. I upheld the fame of my ancestors, so that they rejoice that I was begot into their line. My office has rendered famous my family (*ILLRP* 316 = *CIL* I².15).¹¹⁰

Polybius maintains that the funeral spectacles inspired elite youth with a political future before them to spare no effort to try to obtain the glory which awaited the brave (Polyb. 6.52.11), and his overall narrative accentuates the link that existed at Rome between demonstrating martial courage, acquiring honor, and winning public office (Polyb. 6.52.11-6.54.3).¹¹¹ Since members

¹⁰⁷ According to Pliny the Elder, “M. Sergio, ut equidem arbitrator, nemo quemquam hominum iure praetulerit, licet pronepos Catilina gratiam nomini deroget” (*HN* 7.28.104).

¹⁰⁸ “Gnaeus Cornelius Gnaei filius Scipio Hispanus, / praetor, aedilis curulis, quaestor, tribunus militum bis, decemvir litibus iudicandis, / decemvir sacris faciundis.”

¹⁰⁹ See Münzer, *RE* IV, col. 1493, and *MRR* 1:459 and 482.

¹¹⁰ “Virtutes generis meis moribus accumulavi, / progeniem genui, facta patris petiei. / Maiorum optenui laudem ut sibi me esse creatum / laentur; stirpem nobilitavit honor.” For *virtutes* denoting a martial quality, see McDonnell (2006), 38ff.

¹¹¹ Cf. also Sallust who says, “Nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maximum, P. Scipionem, praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, quom maiorum imagines intuerentur,

of the Roman ruling elite struggled for political power through the assertion of claims upon others and ranking themselves and their peers in a social hierarchy, the claimant's pre-eminence in *auctoritas* played a significant role in whether these claims were accepted or rejected. Hence, honor worked as a form of power in society at large, the currency that made one's claims more effectual.¹¹² Almost every aristocrat was interested in increasing his relative "honor rating" so that he could improve his rank in a social hierarchy, and military service presented an excellent opportunity to win a distinctive grant of reputation from others.¹¹³ When a young aristocrat displayed exceptional bravery in combat, he augmented his honor and significantly increased his chances to be elected to a magistracy in Roman or municipal elections. It should come as no surprise, then, that Polybius remarks that gaining reputation for courage was "nearly the most essential thing in every state, but especially in Rome" (31.29.1), where military valor functioned as the necessary basis for success in public life.¹¹⁴

It is difficult to overstate the significance the Romans attributed to martial courage.¹¹⁵ Cicero claims that *virtus* made Rome the mistress of the world (*Verr.* II.4.37.81), and Pliny the Elder

vehementissime sibi animum ad virtutem adendi" (*Iug.* 4.5). See also Badian (1968), 12f.; William V. Harris (1979), 24ff.; and Rosenstein (2006), 366.

¹¹² See Lendon (1997), 30-106.

¹¹³ For "honor rating," see Malina (2001a), 30f.

¹¹⁴ "Κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν ἐν πάσῃ μὲν πολιτείᾳ μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ." The author also points out that the Romans, who excelled the Carthaginians in martial valor (ἀρετή), were much more efficient in military matters (Polyb. 6.52.2-10).

¹¹⁵ See William V. Harris (1979), 9-53, and Rosenstein (1990), 114-147. For the importance of war in aristocratic ideology, see also Hopkins (1978), 25-37.

explicitly states the superiority of the Romans in the matter of *virtus* (*HN* 7.40.130).¹¹⁶ From the earliest days of the Republic, Rome continuously clashed with its neighbors, first battling the Latins, Sabines, Hernicians, Aequians, Volscians, and Etruscans and then fighting with powerful Celtic tribes to the north and confederations of Oscan-speaking Samnite peoples to the south. In response to these threats, the Roman decision-making elite, which did not want to be at the mercy of others, developed a genuine “security complex.”¹¹⁷ Now the Romans trusted only their military power, having developed the peculiar concept of defensive war that postulated the elimination of even potential menace to the Roman people. Their experience suggested that recourse to violence as the complete answer in conflict resolution was the most appropriate response that led to final superiority and stability.¹¹⁸ This eventually led to the rise of militaristic and expansionist ethos that equated *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial prowess, with a strong personal commitment to the public good.¹¹⁹ As a result, a distinctive “strategic culture” centered on the conspicuous exercise of physical power and successful application of violence on the real and imagined enemies of the Roman people originated; it helped establish a clear bond between service to the Republic and honor acquisition in the form of *virtus*.

¹¹⁶ “Non est querendum in hac civitate, quae propter virtutem omnibus nationibus imperat, virtutem plurimum posse” and “Gentium in toto orbe praestantissima una omnium virtute haud dubie Romana extitit.” Cf. also Cic. *De or.* 3.34.137.

¹¹⁷ For the bitter experience the defeated are subjected to, see the notorious sneer of the chieftain of the Senones named Brennus to the beaten Romans: *Vae victis* (*Livy* 5.48.9). This is why once the Romans began a war, they waged it without restraint. For details, see Rüpke (1995); Ziegler (1998); and Gillespie (2011), 112-118.

¹¹⁸ As I demonstrate in the case study of Cicero’s exploits in Cilicia presented below, indiscriminate violence in conflict often produced mostly illusory results because it seldom resolved anything.

¹¹⁹ See Raaflaub (2006), 138-143, and Eckstein (2006b), 573-581.

The Romans despised and gloated over passivity, especially in males.¹²⁰ On the one hand, the ability to serve the *res publica* as a soldier distinguished a Roman man from a Roman boy who was still under the authority of the *paterfamilias*. The overwhelming sway of *patria potestas* in the structure of the Roman household made the *paterfamilias* the only true man in the family, forcing a young Roman male to look for an alternative place to institutionalize his masculine identity. In order to prove his manhood, he served the Republic in military capacity, fought in war, and demonstrated his courage in battle. The warlike mentality made the Romans emphasize *virtus* as the central element in their cultivation of a sense of idealized manhood, creating the fundamental bond between *virtus* and the *res publica*. Thus, the word *virtus* came to mean first and foremost martial courage.¹²¹ On the other hand, the appropriate division of ages and activities in the Roman society made age determine one's social and political role. Livy's early history of Rome clearly sets apart those who carried arms from their elders who gave counsel. For example, the eighty-three-year-old Publius Scaptius contrasts his service in the army as a young man with his current role as a counselor, drawing a distinction between *manus* and *vox* (Livy 3.71.8).¹²²

After serving in the army, aristocrats competed for magistracies on the *cursus honorum*, where they could acquire primacy of honor by performing the greatest service for Rome and its citizens, the service which was often exacted on the battlefield. It is not a coincidence that the

¹²⁰ See Veyne (1998).

¹²¹ See McDonnell (2006), 173-180, who explicates the intrinsic link between the need for a Roman son to acquire manliness and the form of the Roman state.

¹²² For more examples, see Holliday (2002), 55f., who also discusses how this social and political organization is reproduced in Italic funerary art.

Latin *honos* (or *honor*) means not only “high esteem” and “honor” but also “a public office.”¹²³ Public offices paid no salaries, and only aristocratic ambition for prestige acquisition and status confirmation impelled the operation of the government, which relied exclusively on the voluntary labor of individual members of the upper class.¹²⁴ Before a Roman aristocrat acquired authoritative voice Publius Scaptius talks about, he had to submit himself repeatedly to popular judgment of the voters in the assemblies, the same men who fought in a war almost on annual basis and whose survival depended on the military expertise of those whom they elected (cf. Polyb. 6.14.9).¹²⁵ This is why for elite youth with political ambition, serving in the army became the main prerequisite for entering the political arena.

Military service at Rome usually began at the age of seventeen, and freeborn citizens had to spend at least ten years in the cavalry or sixteen years in the infantry before they could run for magistracy (Polyb. 6.19.2-5).¹²⁶ Although the actual amount of service for most cavalymen was almost certainly much less burdensome, especially toward the end of the second century BCE, Plutarch records Gaius Sempronius Gracchus’ assertion that he spent twelve years in the military when others were only obliged to serve for ten (*C. Gracch.* 2.5).¹²⁷ Those with a political future before them would normally serve the required time all at once, completing their term of service

¹²³ See *OLD* (2012), s.v. “Honos.”

¹²⁴ Cf. Hölkeskamp (2006), 478-495, and Rosenstein (2006), 370f.

¹²⁵ “Καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δῆμος δίδωσι τοῖς ἀξίοις: ὅπερ ἐστὶ κάλλιστον ἄθλον ἐν πολιτείᾳ καλοκάγαθίας.”

¹²⁶ For military service beginning in the eighteenth year, see Gell. *NA* 10.28.1 and Livy 25.5.8 and 27.11.15.

¹²⁷ For the light burden of military service required from members of the Roman elite, see McCall (2002), 150ff.

by their late twenties. As a result, young members of the Roman upper class received a significant training in warfare, and many of them held the office of military tribune.¹²⁸ More importantly, they established strong ties with their peers and superiors in the ruling elite. For example, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus the Younger (cos. 147 and 134 BCE), who destroyed Carthage in 146 BCE and vanquished guerrillas in Spain in 134-133 BCE, was Marius' commander in Spain and encouraged him to pursue a political career (Plut. *Mar.* 3-4). Similarly, Jugurtha, who served in the Roman army despite being a foreigner, was appreciated by Scipio for his martial courage, and his army service enabled him to build lifelong friendships with Roman aristocrats (Sall. *Iug.* 7.3-7 and 13.5-6).

From the second half of the fourth century until the early first century BCE, members of the Roman elite, including scions of the patrician-plebeian families, strove to distinguish themselves serving in the Roman cavalry, which was the privileged branch of the military.¹²⁹ Horses and horsemen were prominently represented in the Roman funerary art from at least the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third centuries BCE.¹³⁰ And it was not by chance that the ten-year term of military service mentioned by Polybius and required of any citizen who was running for office equaled the maximum service obligation for a cavalryman (Polyb. 6.19.5).¹³¹ Since fortune of 400,000 sesterces--the amount of the equestrian census in the late third century BCE--was the principal benchmark for enrollment in cavalry, this property qualification made the

¹²⁸ See William V. Harris (1979), 11-14. In Polybius' time, there were twenty-four elected tribunes: fourteen had to have served in the army for five years, and the other ten for ten years to be eligible for appointment (Polyb. 6.19.1).

¹²⁹ For dates, see McCall (2002), 100-113.

¹³⁰ For details, see Holliday (2002), 36-60.

¹³¹ See Mommsen (1887a), 1:505-509, and Astin (1958), 43f.

cavalry service a kind of privilege. In addition to granting numerous advantages, enrollment in cavalry enabled the wealthiest Roman citizens to be essentially publicly distinguished by the censors as individuals whose wealth and status surpassed that of the vast majority of their fellow citizens.¹³² As late as 44 BCE, Cicero was able to declare that service as a horseman was more esteemed than service as a centurion (*Phil.* 1.8.20).¹³³ Not only was the cavalry service a social mark of distinction that granted certain bragging rights, but it also allowed elite Roman youth to conspicuously exhibit their *virtus* by engaging in equestrian duels with the enemy.¹³⁴ If successful, they carried home the *tropaeum* of spoils taken from their opponents and earned a reputation for military prowess.¹³⁵ This considerably augmented their honor and prestige and could later be converted into political capital to win elections in Rome or in one of the *municipia*.¹³⁶

In antiquity, the cavalry often used its superior mobility to attack the flanks and rear of the opposing infantry formations or to exploit the shock effect by charging at the enemy at high

¹³² For the property qualifications, see Nicolet (1966 and 1974), 1:55-66. Rich (1983), 287-331, especially 309-314, offers a useful discussion of the census minima. For the numerous privileges of the cavalry service, see McCall (2002), 3ff.

¹³³ As distributions of money to soldiers indicate, the cavalry service paid better as well. See Nicolet (1980), 120.

¹³⁴ See McDonnell (2006), 185-195 and 216f. Oakley (1985), 392-410, collects all the recorded instances of duels, or monomachies, in the Republic. He demonstrates that the custom of single combat continued at least to 45 BCE. Out of the twenty-five episodes attributed to the Republican period, eleven individuals certainly fought from horseback. Significantly, after 349 BCE all recorded monomachies were equestrian duels. See also Feldherr (1998), 92-111.

¹³⁵ For the rite of *τροπαιοφορία* as the precursor to the Roman triumph, see Picard (1957), 133, and Bonfante Warren (1970), 52f.

¹³⁶ Nicolet (1976), 20-30, points out that only those who had the equestrian census actually succeeded in winning elections for magistracy.

speed. In both cases, the chief objective was to break up the enemy infantry line by scaring the foot soldiers into running away.¹³⁷ However, Roman horsemen, who were armed lightly until the late third century BCE (Polyb. 6.25.3-8), preferred close combat and stationary type of fighting that put them at great risk.¹³⁸ Initially, only legionaries who fought in formations were expected to stubbornly hold their ground in battle by engaging in close combat, but soon the practice received universal approbation among the Romans (cf. Polyb. 13.3.7).¹³⁹ For example, a recipient of the civic crown was required not only to save his comrade's life but also to demonstrate great valor by cutting down the enemy who threatened him, all without giving ground in the fight (Gell. *NA* 5.6.13; cf. Plin. *HN* 16.5.12). As a result, Roman cavalrymen often dismounted to battle on foot.¹⁴⁰ In order to physically intimidate the foe, they also took serious personal risks by initiating duels and engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

McDonnell presents a persuasive argument that bellicosity of *monomachists*, who fought in single combat to acquire military glory, intensified the martial sense of Latin word *virtus*, making it primarily signify “aggressive courage” in battle.¹⁴¹ Champions in duels gained a reputation for *virtus*, which even might have been represented on Republican coins as a mounted

¹³⁷ See Adcock (1957), 50f.; Tarn (1966), 62-66; and Keegan (1976), 94-97.

¹³⁸ For details, see McCall (2002), 37-41; 53-77; and 94-99.

¹³⁹ The Roman military ethos stipulated that legionaries had to hold their assigned positions regardless of the cost and under any conditions. The importance of holding one's ground under the intense pressure of close combat is discussed by Rosenstein (1990), 95-113, who also provides references to some relevant primary and secondary sources.

¹⁴⁰ See McCall (2002), 62-73.

¹⁴¹ See McDonnell (2006), 59-71.

figure (cf. Polyb. 6.39.4 and 6.54.4 and Sall. *Cat.* 7.6).¹⁴² As early as 217 BCE, a *semuncia* portrays on its reverse a horseman riding right and holding whip in right hand and reins in left hand, with ROMA inscribed below.¹⁴³ It is not surprising, then, that personal courage and martial prowess displayed in battle became the greatest sources of glory that generated praise and renown for the Roman elite.¹⁴⁴ Bravery in battle manifested *virtus* and served as the foundation for the ideological construct that justified aristocratic supremacy and an individual's prerogative to political influence.¹⁴⁵ More importantly, military accomplishments enabled one to acquire *gloria* and successfully run for higher public offices with *imperium* and membership in the Senate. This conferred even greater *laus* and granted a recognized privilege to superiority. As a result, the close link between military prowess on the one hand and the acquisition of honor and public office on the other was culturally constructed and perpetuated. Eventually, it gave birth to a distinctive "strategic culture" marked by ferocity and belligerence of its adherents.

In 221 BCE, Quintus Metellus (cos. 206 BCE) delivered an eulogium at the funeral of his father Lucius Caecilius Metellus (cos. 251 and 247 BCE). It is significant that he characterizes the deceased first and foremost as "*primarius bellator*," the first-rank warrior (Plin. *HN* 7.43.139-140).¹⁴⁶ In the praetorship of Marcus Sergius (pr. 197 BCE), his colleagues tried to

¹⁴² See William V. Harris (1979), 38f.; McCall (2002), 84f.; and McDonnell (2006), 151f. and 192f.

¹⁴³ See *RRC*, 150, no. 39.5, and pl. 7, no. 9.

¹⁴⁴ Cicero *Inv. rhet.* 2.166 makes a distinction between the three terms in the following way: "Gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude." Cf. Cic. *Phil.* 1.12.29-30. See also William V. Harris (1979), 17ff., and Lendon (1997), 273.

¹⁴⁵ See Rosenstein (1990), 132.

¹⁴⁶ For Roman fixation on military vocation, see Nicolet (1980), 89ff., and Finley (1983), 129.

exclude him from offering sacrifices because he had been maimed. The praetor had lost the right hand in battle in his youth and had been partially disabled in the left hand and both feet due to suffering twenty-three wounds in the course of two campaigns (Plin. *HN* 7.28.104-105).¹⁴⁷ Just as a sacrificial victim had to be perfect and without any blemish, “a priest had to be unmutilated” (Sen. *Controv.* 4.2) and “without any bodily defects” (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.21.3).¹⁴⁸ There is no evidence that Sergius was a priest, and he must have participated in the sacrifices as the praetor.¹⁴⁹ However, the fact that he had lost his right hand in battle and now had to use his left hand for the sacrifices might have caused some unease among his fellow magistrates. The right hand was used to pour a libation (Hom. *Il.* 24.283ff), and the use of the left hand in religious ceremonies probably had inauspicious connotations because the left was traditionally associated with the inferior, the bad, the unlucky, and the female.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Marcus Sergius was the great-grandfather of Lucius Sergius Catilina whose conspiracy to overthrow the government was thwarted by Cicero in 63 BCE.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Gell. *NA* 1.12.3, who stipulates that a Vestal virgin had to be free from any bodily defect, and Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 73, who states that an augur could not “take of the auspices” if he had any sore upon his body. The Jews had even stricter laws: Lev. 21:16-23 forbids any Aaron’s descendant with a bodily deformity or mutilation not only to sacrifice at the Jerusalem Temple but also to approach the altar or go near the veil of the Holy of Holies.

¹⁴⁹ In the praetorship of Julius Caesar, for example, the state sacrifice was carried out in Caesar’s house (Cic. *Att.* 1.13.3). Although many ancient sources mention Roman sacrifice *inter alia*, the only coherent descriptions are the attack on sacrifice by the Christian Arnobius (*Adv. nat.* 7) and the discussion of similarities between Greek and Roman practices in Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.72.15-18.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Lloyd (1962), 56-66, who discusses the widely held belief of the Greeks in the inherent superiority of the right-hand side, and a bronze statuette of a Roman priest who holds a *patera* in his right hand, extending it in a gesture of libation (the figurine is at the Römermuseum Weißenburg, Bavaria, Germany, and its picture is available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libation#/media/File:RMW - Opfernder Togatus.jpg>. Accessed on December 7, 2018).

Drawn into dispute with the fellow magistrates, Sergius gave a speech that outlined his military achievements and testified to his martial prowess.¹⁵¹ After losing his right hand in battle in his youth, the tragedy which would have put an end to the military careers of lesser men, Marcus Sergius vividly demonstrated his martial prowess by fighting in many battles left-handed, using an iron prosthetic hand to hold his shield, having two horses killed under him in battle, twice escaping from Hannibal's captivity, raising the siege of Cremona, defending Placentia, and defeating the Gauls on several occasions (Plin. *HN* 7.28.104-106).¹⁵² To Sergius' mind, his distinguished service in the cavalry provided clear evidence for his exemplary *virtus* and entitled him to participate in the religious responsibilities of his office. Around 115 BCE, the moneyer named Marcus Sergius Silus minted the denarius to memorialize and promulgate the exploits of his famous grandfather.¹⁵³ The reverse depicts Marcus Sergius (pr. 197 BCE) as horseman riding left and holding both sword and a severed Gaul's head in his left hand, the unique depiction that corroborates one of the more extraordinary details of Pliny's story.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ According to Garland (1995), 88-104, there was a strong tendency among the Greeks and the Romans to equate beauty and virtue. This is why, Sergius had to appeal to his outstanding valor demonstrated in many battles and through many adversities in order to assert his *virtus*.

¹⁵² In the excerpt, Pliny elevates Sergius to the status of unsurpassed exemplar of *virtus*, someone who conquered *fortuna* itself (*HN* 7.28.105-106). For details, see Beagon (2002), 111-132.

¹⁵³ The moneyers' custom of commemorating the deeds of their own ancestors began around 137 BCE. The young officials at the beginning of a senatorial career alluded to ancestral heroic acts in order to improve their chances of winning the next election by publicizing their claim to ascribed honor and inherited *virtus*. See Morstein-Marx (2004), 82-89. Although the preoccupation of aristocrats with war began at that time to decline, the majority of commemorations still related to *imperium* or military victory. See von Alfeldi (1956), 72ff., and *RRC*, 728f.

¹⁵⁴ See *RRC*, 302, no. 286.1, and pl. 39, no. 24. M. Sergius Silius' efforts at self-promotion most likely came to nothing, as he is not known to have progressed beyond the quaestorship.

Throughout their history, the Romans considered worthy of highest appreciation those who had distinguished themselves on the battlefield. In fact, a system of rewards encouraged the young cavalymen to forge reputations for martial courage by deliberately putting themselves in harm's ways (Polyb. 6.39.1-10). Personal bravery in battle directly translated into success in public life, and elite youth with political aspirations had to acquire a reputation for *virtus* before they could successfully run for office (Polyb. 31.29.1).¹⁵⁵ After the disaster at Cannae in 216 BCE, where more than eighty senators or those eligible for the Senate were killed, a special program had to be introduced to replenish the ranks of the Senate (Livy 22.49.16-17). It is significant that only two types of men were invited to join: (1) those who had filled a curule office or held various minor public offices and (2) those who had taken spoils from the enemy or had been awarded the civic crown for saving a citizen's life (Livy 23.23.5-6).¹⁵⁶ *Virtus* proven in battle set apart true leaders of the Republic from the followers. After augmenting their ranking in a social hierarchy, securing the recognition of their peers and superiors, and acquiring the necessary fame among those of the lower social orders, triumphant swordfighters significantly improved their rank in a social hierarchy and had much better chances to win highly competitive elections. The pyramidal structure of the *cursus honorum* made fewer offices available as one advanced further up, ensuring that many of those who had started on political career would ultimately fail. Consequently, it did pay to have an outstanding reputation for martial courage.

¹⁵⁵ On the role of *virtus* in winning elections, see William V. Harris (1979), 20-24 and 30-34; Rosenstein (1990), 131; and McCall (2002), 85-91.

¹⁵⁶ Spoils of war were obtained by stripping the enemy slain in a duel or in the general melee of battle (Gell. *NA* 2.11.3). The civic crown was awarded for saving a citizen's life, all while demonstrating exceptional bravery by cutting down the enemy and not giving ground in the fight (Gell. *NA* 5.6.13; cf. Plin. *HN* 16.5.12).

Cicero suggests the pursuit of *gloria* is the most important stimulus for human activity (*Rep.* 5.7.9), and Sallust attributes the rapid expansion of the Roman state to nothing else but aristocratic *cupido gloriae* (*Cat.* 7.3-6).¹⁵⁷ These statements confirm the existence of social competition among aristocrats who, with single-minded ambition, struggled to acquire enough honor and prestige to progress up the political hierarchy and obtain a privilege of high status by holding prominent magistracies and military commands.¹⁵⁸ Despite the fact that the Senate retained its traditional role of the ultimate decision-maker in the Republic, much of foreign policy was inevitably established by individual generals in the field.¹⁵⁹ These conclusions follow the earlier deductions of Sherwin-White, who maintains that Roman policy, within the context of general decisions made by the Senate, was regularly created on the spot by a long line of generals from Gnaeus Manlius Vulso (cos. 189 BCE), who, without any specific authority from the Senate, wandered with his army from Ephesus to Ancyra, shaking down local rulers for money and declaring war on the Galatians, to Marcus Antonius.¹⁶⁰

The contest to augment one's *dignitas* and *auctoritas* necessitated the tripartite synthesis of valorous deeds, their desired instantaneous witness by others, and the subsequent description and

¹⁵⁷ "... maiores suos multa mira atque praeclara gloriae cupiditate fecisse... principem civitatis gloria esse alendum, et tam diu stare rem publicam, quam diu ab omnibus honor principi exhiberetur..." (Cic. *Rep.* 5.7.9).

¹⁵⁸ For honor as the chief criterion of social ranking, see Lendon (1997), 34ff.

¹⁵⁹ See Eckstein (1987).

¹⁶⁰ See Sherwin-White (1984), especially 21f., and 115f. Gnaeus Vulso even succeeded in obtaining a triumph for his exploits, despite the fact that his army introduced foreign luxury in Rome (Plin. *HN* 34.8.14 and Livy 39.6.2-7.5). Cf. also my discussion in Chapter II, pp. 168-199, of the general moral decline of the Roman society.

interpretation of what took place during battle.¹⁶¹ In a system heavily skewed toward self-aggrandizement, the stakes to exaggerate and distort must have been very high. It is significant that simply holding the field was not enough for a claim of victory: the defeated needed to acknowledge publicly his debacle to enable the victor to take credit for victory.¹⁶² In this context, honorable scars, the marks of frontal wounds sustained in battle, became a striking manifestation of their bearer's *virtus*. Prior to the Hannibalic War, Roman cavalrymen did not wear cuirasses, choosing the greater freedom of movement over the adequate protection (Polyb. 6.25.3-4). They also favored hand-to-hand combat and stationary type of fighting that put them at great risk.¹⁶³ These preferences resulted in a much higher probability of suffering wounds, and honorable scars became an important symbol that exemplified one's martial valor. They enabled the battle-scarred veteran to prove personal worth and even make a claim to political authority.¹⁶⁴

The "Roman Achilles" named Lucius Sicinius Dentatus fought in one hundred and twenty battles, won eight single combats, had forty-five scars on the front of his body and not one on his back, and was elected tribune of the *plebs* in 454 BCE.¹⁶⁵ After Pyrrhus of Epirus (319-272 BCE) won the Battle of Heraclea in 280 BCE, he observed that all the Roman corpses had

¹⁶¹ See Holliday (2002), 5. Cf. also Roller (2004), 3-6, who introduces the four-part model of "exemplary" discourse in Roman culture, linking a spectacular deed, its evaluation by eyewitnesses, its commemoration by a variety of "monuments," and its imitation by primary and secondary spectators.

¹⁶² See Dowling (2006), 9.

¹⁶³ See McCall (2002), 26-77 and 94-99.

¹⁶⁴ See Rosenstein (2006), 367.

¹⁶⁵ See Plin. *HN* 7.28.101-102; Gell. *NA* 2.11.1-4; and Val. Max. 3.2.24.

wounds only on the front and displayed savage expression on their faces (Eutr. 2.11). In 167 BCE, Lucius Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182 and 168 BCE), the victor at the Battle of Pydna, was refused a triumph.¹⁶⁶ When Marcus Servilius Pulex Geminus (cos. 202 BCE), who personally slew twenty-three foes in single combat, decided to support Paullus' bid for triumphal glory, he laid bare his body and pointed to his scars, explaining to the people in what war each had been received.¹⁶⁷ This show effectively reaffirmed Pulex's authority to introduce proposals that will be accorded general acceptance and persuaded an assembly to grant the triumph to Paullus (Livy 45.39.16-17 and Plut. *Aem.* 31.4-10).

In 107 BCE, Gaius Marius, who was elected to the consulship based on his military reputation, was given the task to embark on war against Jugurtha.¹⁶⁸ However, he needed to recruit legionaries for his African campaign. Since Marius lacked the portraits of prominent ancestors to verify his credentials, he offered to show his scars and military rewards to an assembly in order to convince the people to follow him to Africa (Sall. *Iug.* 85.29). Similarly, sometime after 31 BCE an army veteran had to uncover scars from the wounds he sustained at the Battle of Actium to persuade Emperor Augustus to represent him in court (Dio Cass. 55.4.2 and Macrob. *Sat.* 2.4.27). As late as 18 BCE, Licinius Regulus, who was purged from the Senate by Augustus, could imagine that rending his toga in the curia to display his scars and then listing

¹⁶⁶ Interestingly, an equestrian monument of the self-aggrandizing Aemilius Paullus had been erected in Delphi in 168/167 BCE to commemorate his victory at Pydna. For details, see Kähler (1965) and Bergemann (1990), 151.

¹⁶⁷ It is significant that Pulex's descendants, Gaius Servilius Vatia, the moneyer in 127 BCE, and Marcus Servilius, the moneyer in 100 BCE, both commemorated their ancestor's propensity for single combat. See *RRC*, 289, no. 264.1, and pl. 38, no. 9, and *RRC*, 328, no. 327.1, and pl. 42, no. 19.

¹⁶⁸ At first, the Senate had given the African command to Metellus Numidicus, but it was transferred to Marius by vote of the people (Sall. *Iug.* 73.7).

the campaigns in which he had received them would help him stay in the Senate (Dio Cass. 54.14.2).¹⁶⁹

The ancient Roman custom of taking an extra name from the site of one's victory (e.g., Calenus, Messala, Africanus or Balearicus), from one's actions in battle (e.g., Torquatus) or from the people one vanquished (e. g., Allobrogicus, Macedonicus or Numidicus) also bears witness to the importance of status earned from deeds of war (cf. Luc. Ampel. 22-23). Throughout the history of the Roman Republic, aristocrats preferred to serve in the cavalry, and those who demonstrated outstanding martial valor or suffered wounds tremendously augmented their honor. Afterwards, the ambitious aristocrats found it much easier to seek highest magistracies and military commands because they already enjoyed outstanding reputation among their fellow citizens. Once in power and holding *imperium*, they had an excellent opportunity to win great military victories that would even further add to their *virtus*, help them win triumphal honors or even allow them to lay successful claim to a triumph, which in turn would grant them truly exceptional prestige. This is why so many members of the Roman governing elite made military accomplishments one of the main sources for honor acquisition and status confirmation, equating *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial courage displayed in battle, with a strong personal commitment to the public good.

Roman militaristic and expansionist ethos shaped by centuries of constant warfare formed a peculiar political culture centered on cultivation and glorification of *virtus* and the conspicuous exhibition of physical power and military prowess. However, the reverse side of the very close connection between high birth and martial courage on the one hand and the acquisition of honor

¹⁶⁹ For more examples, see McCall (2002), 87-94.

and public office on the other was quite sinister because it was characterized not only by a widespread practice of inventing individual martial accomplishments and fabricating military victories but also by shameless “triumph-hunting” against the “barbarians” and Greeks alike.¹⁷⁰ If not openly called upon, *imperium*-holders were expected to expand the territory of the Roman Republic (Cic. *Mur.* 22).¹⁷¹ Although much of the tradition about Appius Claudius Caudex (cos. 264 BCE) is debated widely, it appears that he initiated a war against King Hieron II of Syracuse (c.271-216 BCE) and Carthage only to augment his prestige (Polyb. 1.11-12).¹⁷² In fact, Bleckmann argues in his study of the First Punic War (264-241 BCE) that most Roman actions during the war were determined by personal *cupido gloriae* of the Roman generals rather than by any long-term strategy.¹⁷³ Similarly, unrestrained competition for *laus* and *fama* during the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) encouraged a number of consuls to play a dangerous game of political brinkmanship, demand Africa as a personal *provincia*, and even prolong their *imperium* to claim the glory of victory over Hannibal.¹⁷⁴

As time went by, ferocity, truculence, and belligerence became deeply embedded in the culture code of the Roman aristocracy, shaping a very peculiar “strategic behavior” on the calculated use of injurious force. More importantly, these traits also permeated all aspects of life

¹⁷⁰ In the case study of Cicero’s exploits in Cilicia presented below, I explicate how an ambitious holder of *imperium* could easily invent a fake record of military achievements in order to win a social grant of *gloria*, *dignitas*, and *auctoritas* from his fellow citizens and thus lay much more effective claim to political power.

¹⁷¹ Comparing occupations of a general and a jurist, Cicero says, “Ille exercitatus est in propagandis finibus, tuque in regendis.”

¹⁷² For details, see Beck (2011), 238, and *MRR* 1:202f.

¹⁷³ See Bleckmann (2002).

¹⁷⁴ For details, see Beck (2005), 350-353.

of the common Romans, making the discourse on and the representation of successfully applied “instrumental violence” an essential part of the shared cultural consensus.¹⁷⁵ As I demonstrate below, Roman generals in the field and Roman governors in the provinces exemplified this consensus when they applied unrestricted physical violence on the bodies and property of real and imagined enemies of Rome. At Rome itself, controlled acts of cruelty played out in public became an important part of the urban population’s everyday experience and a source of vicarious pleasure for Romans of every walk of life.

Violence as the Roman Way of Life

Historically, the Romans were quite willing to engage in violent actions, especially against alien peoples, as long as physical violence on other human beings was governed by expediency or advanced the community’s interests.¹⁷⁶ Polybius judgement is succinct: “In general, the Romans rely on force in all their enterprises, and they deem it necessary to carry out their projects in spite of all, as if nothing is impossible once they decided on it” (1.37.7).¹⁷⁷ In his famous denunciation of relentless Roman imperial expansion, Tacitus, through the Caledonian leader Calgacus, says:

Plunderers of the world, after they desolated everything they now neglect the land and ransack the sea. If the enemy is rich in land, they are avaricious; if he is poor,

¹⁷⁵ For “instrumental violence” as the calculated use of injurious force, “unpleasant but inevitable and routine part of life,” see James (2013), 101f.

¹⁷⁶ See Lintott (1968), 35-51; Lintott (1992c), 9f. and 26f.; and William V. Harris (1979), 51.

¹⁷⁷ “Καθόλου δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῇ βίᾳ καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν οἰόμενοι δεῖν κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἅπαξ δοξάντων....”

they are conceited; neither the East nor the West has been able to satiate them. Of all the people, they alone covet with equal passion riches and poverty. To robbery, slaughter, and pillaging and plunder, they lyingly apply the name of empire, and wherever they make a desert, they claim to have brought peace (Tac. *Agr.* 30.4-5).¹⁷⁸

This criticism of Roman craving for power may be compared to the grievances of the Britons in Boudica's time (Tac. *Agr.* 15.1-4) and those of the Gallic leader named Critognatus in Julius Caesar's time (Caes. *B Gall.* 7.77). Yet, it is significant that Petelius Cerealis, the general who was sent in 70 CE to suppress the uprising in the Rhineland, cogently rationalizes Roman imperialism in the only sustained argument of this sort produced by a Latin author (Tac. *Hist.* 4.73-74). Thus, several students of Roman history have argued that Tacitus actually validates Roman expansion.¹⁷⁹

In order to keep the subjugated populations at check and ensure security and order within their growing empire, the Romans regularly produced textual and pictorial narratives that celebrated successfully applied violence on the bodies of their enemies and thus served as the symbol of Roman sovereignty and power.¹⁸⁰ The use of injurious force was neither limited to

¹⁷⁸ "Raptores orbis, postquam cuncta vastantibus defuere terrae, iam mare scrutantur: si locuples hostis est, avari, si pauper, ambitiosi, quos non Oriens, non Occidens satiaverit: soli omnium opes atque inopiam pari adfectu concupiscunt. Auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."

¹⁷⁹ For synthetic consideration and bibliography, see Adler (2013), 298-301. For an alternative view, see De Souza (2008), 95ff., who interprets the Calgacus' passage as articulating the imperative for Roman generals to ascertain peace by conquest; he compares it to the statement that summarizes Agricola's proconsulship in Britain: "Tradiderat interim Agricola successori suo provinciam quietam tutamque" (Tac. *Agr.* 40.3). On the other hand, Woolf (1993), 176-181, argues that the Tacitean condemnation is an expressive inversion of the Augustan moral values of *pax*, civil harmony, and humanizing effects of Romanization.

¹⁸⁰ See Zimmermann (2006), 344-350, who also draws attention to the fact that the celebration of physical violence that dominated Roman imagery is quite unique among other ancient cultures and can be compared in scope only to that of the Assyrians.

martial violence carried out by legionaries and cavalrymen on behalf of the Roman state nor restricted to warfare or even use of weapons: much injustice was meted out with boot, fist or phallus.¹⁸¹ As Zimmerman correctly points out:

What is valued positively or negatively in today's understanding of legitimate or illegitimate, good or bad violence may have been understood quite differently in antiquity. When we think an ancient report wants to draw our attention to the victims, the ancient author might instead have been trying to give a positive portrayal of the perpetrator. Ancient and modern readers may have very different criteria of moral and ethical judgment.¹⁸²

Indeed, when Sallust's Julius Caesar discusses the political integrity required from senators, he contends that compassion as well as hatred, friendship, and anger are the emotions that corrupt and obscure good judgment (Sall. *Cat.* 51.1-4).

In the beginning of the Second Macedonian War (200-196 BCE), when Philip V (238-179 BCE) held an open-casket, mass funeral of his fallen cavalrymen, his soldiers were horrified at the sight of wounds inflicted by the Spanish swords used by the Roman cavalry and appalled at the prospect of fighting "against such weapons and such men" (Livy 31.34.4-5). In fact, not only did Roman cavalrymen mutilate their opponents in battle but Roman generals also purposefully executed ghastly massacres in conquered towns and carefully circulated the news in order to inspire fear and terror. For instance, all males were killed (and the women perhaps raped and then enslaved together with their children) at Cluvia around 311 BCE, possibly at Leontini in

¹⁸¹ See James (2013), 99. Cf. also Mattingly (2011), 94-121, who maintains that changes in sexual practices among the Romans correlate chronologically with the dramatic increase in overseas conquests; he views the Roman domination as a form of metaphorical rape of subjugated territories.

¹⁸² Zimmermann (2006), 344.

213 BCE, at Antipatrea around 200 BCE, at Cauca around 151 BCE, and at Corinth in 146 BCE.¹⁸³

During the siege of Uspe in the Crimea around 49 CE, the besieged actually offered to surrender but were rebuffed and slaughtered by the Romans who found it difficult to provide guards for the large number of the captives (Tac. *Ann.* 12.17.1-2).¹⁸⁴ As part of this strategy, Roman legionaries who stormed New Carthage in 209 BCE not only slaughtered the vanquished but also slashed dogs in half and had the limbs of other animals cut off (Polyb. 10.15.5).¹⁸⁵ During the Numantine War, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus the Younger (cos. 147 and 134 BCE) cut off hands of the leaders of the young men of Lusia who had sympathized with the Numantine rebels (App. *Hisp.* 94).¹⁸⁶ Finally, Marius succeeded in capturing Numidian Capsa without bloodshed, having used an elaborate stratagem. Despite the fact that the inhabitants of the city chose to peacefully surrender, the general treated them with excessive harshness: all the adult male Numidians were killed, the rest of population sold into slavery, and

¹⁸³ See Livy 31.9.2-3; 24.30.1-8; and 31.27.3-4; and App. *Hisp.* 51-52. For more examples, see Gillespie (2011), 112f.

¹⁸⁴ For an alternative view, see Gilliver (1996), who argues that Roman generals pragmatically used both brutality and mercy as tools of conquest.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. also Polyb. 11.5.5-7. For useful discussions of extreme violence with which the Romans treated the vanquished, see William V. Harris (1979), 50-53 and 263f.; Ziolkowski (1993); and Campbell (2002), 72-75. For a general study of atrocities in the Early and Middle Republic, see Westington (1938).

¹⁸⁶ Julius Caesar must have followed his example when he ordered to cut off hands of rebels in Gaul (*B Gall.* 8.44.2). The future dictator apologizes for this severity (*B Gall.* 8.44.1), but cf. Cicero who argues that no cruelty can be expedient (*Off.* 3.46).

the town was razed. Marius distributed among his legionaries the money made by selling the townspeople into slavery (Sall. *Iug.* 91.3-7).¹⁸⁷

Roman military commanders were willing to apply ultimate violence even on those only suspected of possible treason. During the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE), when several cities in Sicily revolted against their alliance with Rome in 214 BCE, Lucius Pinarius, who was the garrison-commander at Henna, anticipated trouble. In order to ensure the safety of the Roman garrison, he surprised and massacred the townspeople who had not even switched sides yet. This brutality enjoyed full support from Marcus Claudius Marcellus (cos. 222 and 214 BCE) who thought that this action would deter other Sicilians from revolt (Livy 24.38-24.39.7). In fact, the use of terror tactics to intimidate the enemy and end a war quicker is discussed in Sextus Julius Frontinus' *Strategemata*, which probably served as a standard textbook on the art of generalship.¹⁸⁸ For example, having defeated Hasdrubal at the Metaurus River, Gaius Claudius Nero (cos. 207 BCE) ordered to decapitate his opponent, preserved his head, and then threw it in front of Hannibal's outposts to demoralize the Carthaginians (Front. *Str.* 2.9.2; Livy 27.51.11; and Zonar. 9.9). Similarly, Sulla, who was laying siege to Praeneste in 82 BCE, gave a command to decapitate the corpses of Praenestine generals slain in battle, fasten their heads on spears, and exhibit them to the besieged in order to break their resistance (Front. *Str.* 2.9.3 and App. *B Civ.* 1.93-94).

¹⁸⁷ Sallust himself describes the treatment of Capsa as follows: "Id facinus contra ius belli non avaritia neque scelere consulis admissum, sed quia locus Iugurthae opportunus, nobis aditu difficilis, genus hominum mobile, infidum, ante neque beneficio neque metu coercitum" (*Iug.* 91.7).

¹⁸⁸ In the early 70s CE, Frontinus assisted in suppressing the revolt of Julius Civilis (Front. *Str.* 4.3.14) and then served as governor of Britain (73/74-77 CE), where he defeated the Silures and fought against the Ordovices (Tac. *Agr.* 17).

According to Valerius Maximus, a Roman general who wished to obtain the right to claim a triumph had to inflict death on a minimum of five thousand enemies of the Roman people in a single battle (Val. Max. 2.8.1). The author defines this stipulation as “*ius triumphale*,” but it has been argued that his account about the number of enemy casualties cannot be treated as an authoritative guide to “triumphal law.”¹⁸⁹ Yet, as part of the tripartite synthesis of valorous deeds, their witness by others, and their later interpretation, the model I discuss above, Roman commanders often publicly proclaimed the number of foes slaughtered under their command or bragged about the booty they seized and towns and fortresses they reduced to subjection.¹⁹⁰ The numbers must have been exaggerated, but they are still instructive. For example, Julius Caesar boasts about destroying 1,192,000 of the enemy (Plin. *HN* 7.25.92) and enslaving at least 1,000,000 people in Gaul alone (Plut. *Caes.* 15.5).¹⁹¹ Similarly, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus is credited with defeating and dispersing, killing or subjugating 12,183,000 people during his Eastern Mediterranean campaigns (Plin. *HN* 7.26.97).¹⁹² During the triumph of 61 BCE, a tablet listing the number of ships Pompeius captured, the cities he founded, and the kings he conquered

¹⁸⁹ See a somewhat reductionist interpretation of Mary Beard (2007), 209ff., who, however, does agree that Valerius Maximus’ stipulations help us understand how appeals to well-known or even invented precedents could be employed to win in the highly contested process of deciding whether one was to be granted or denied the privilege to triumph.

¹⁹⁰ For the tripartite model, see above, pp. 64f.

¹⁹¹ “Ἐτη γὰρ οὐδὲ δέκα πολεμήσας περὶ Γαλατίαν πόλεις μὲν ὑπὲρ ὀκτακοσίας κατὰ κράτος εἴλεν, ἔθνη δὲ ἐχειρώσατο τριακόσια, μυριάσι δὲ παραταξάμενος κατὰ μέρος τριακοσίας ἑκατὸν μὲν ἐν χερσὶ διέφθειρεν, ἄλλας δὲ τοσαύτας ἐζώγησεν” (Plut. *Caes.* 15.15).

¹⁹² In addition, Pliny refers to 846 ships sunk or captured by Pompeius and 1,538 cities and fortresses he conquered. The information comes from an inscription set up on the Temple of Minerva Pompeius erected from the booty seized in the Mithradatic War. Cf. also App. *Mith.* 117 and Plut. *Pomp.* 45.2.

was proudly carried in the procession (App. *Mith.* 117).¹⁹³ Finally, Augustus mentions that he captured 600 ships, paraded nine kings or kings' children in triumphs, and took into custody and returned to their masters 30,000 run-away slaves (*RG* 3.4; 5.3; and 25.1).

In addition to augmenting acquired honor of a triumphing general and enabling him to lay more effective claim to political power, triumphal celebrations also presented an opportunity to produce striking and instantly visible public triumphal monuments. Triumphal paintings, descriptive relief cycles, cuirassed and equestrian statues, and triumphal arches and columns offered a unique opportunity to construct an auspicious public image of the triumphing commander and enhance his reputation and prestige. In essence, they asserted both the proclaimed realia and the symbolic verity of one's achievement by narrating successfully applied violence on enemies of the Roman order. The realistic depiction of carnage was a central part of this carefully staged project. For instance, paintings representing the defeat, suffering, and death of Tigranes, Mithridates, and their relatives were flaunted during Pompeius' triumph of 61 BCE (App. *Mith.* 117).¹⁹⁴ Sometimes this practice went too far, with the triumphator even reveling in public humiliation of his *Roman* opponents. During his fourth triumph of 46 BCE, Julius Caesar, who did dare to celebrate a triumph to commemorate his victory in the civil war, paraded "on canvas" the deaths of his Roman adversaries: Metellus Scipio stabbing himself and then

¹⁹³ "Παρεφέρετο δὲ καὶ πίναξ ἐγγεγραμμένων τῶνδε· ἑνῆς ἐάλωσαν χαλκέμβολοι ὀκτακόσσιαι πόλεις ἐκτίσθησαν Καππαδοκῶν ὀκτώ, Κιλικῶν δὲ καὶ κοίλης Συρίας εἴκοσι, Παλαιστίνης δὲ ἡ νῦν Σελευκίς· βασιλεῖς ἐνικήθησαν Τιγράνης Ἀρμένιος, Ἀρτώκης Ἰβηρ, Ὀροΐζης Ἀλβανός, Δαρεῖος Μῆδος, Ἀρέτας Ναβαταῖος, Ἀντίοχος Κομμαγηνός." Cf. also Plin. *HN* 7.26.98 and Plut. *Pomp.* 45.1-2. For a useful comparative discussion of the triumph within the broader Roman tradition, see Beard (2007), 7-41.

¹⁹⁴ "Τῶν δὲ οὐκ ἀφικομένων εἰκόνες παρεφέροντο, Τιγράνους καὶ Μιθριδάτου, μαχομένων τε καὶ νικωμένων καὶ φευγόντων. Μιθριδάτου δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιορκία, καὶ ἡ νύξ ὅτε ἔφευγεν, εἵκαστο, καὶ ἡ σιωπή. ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ ἐδείχθη καὶ ὡς ἀπέθανεν αἱ τε παρθένοι αἱ συναποθανεῖν αὐτῶ ἐλόμενα παρεζωγράφητο, καὶ τῶν προαποθανόντων υἰέων καὶ θυγατέρων ἦσαν γραφαί...."

throwing himself into the sea, Petreius committing suicide at dinner, Cato the Younger eviscerating himself “like the wild animal” (App. *B Civ.* 2.101).

In a poem that praises Germanicus and his victories in the north, Ovid paints a vivid picture of Germanicus’ triumphal procession, where the models of conquered towns and precise representations of enemy terrain and battles are proudly paraded in front of the public at Rome (*Pont.* 2.1.37-39).¹⁹⁵ When Vespasian and Titus, who had suppressed the First Jewish Revolt, celebrated the joint triumph at Rome in the summer of 71 CE, *πήγματα*, the movable, painted models or platforms that reached the height of three or four stories, were pompously carried in their triumphal procession.¹⁹⁶ The models vividly depicted important episodes of the Jewish War and graphically represented all the bitter consequences of the rebellion to the public. With a realistic portrayal of how the Romans had brought torment, fear, and death to the insurgents, the triumphal representations and paintings gave spectators the sense of actually “being there” and allowed them to experience the very real emotions of the battle (Joseph *BJ* 7.5.5.139-147).¹⁹⁷

It is significant that the celebrations of the military triumphs in Rome contained an institutionalized mechanism for abasing the defeated enemy and exalting the victor. Enemy leaders who did not die in battle or commit suicide were often brought back to Rome, paraded in the triumphal procession, and occasionally ceremonially executed. Whipping or beating of

¹⁹⁵ “Protinus argento versos imitantia muros / barbara cum pictis oppida lata viris / fluminaque et montes et in altis proelia siluis...” Cf. also an even more contemptuous narrative of Germanicus’ triumph of 17 CE by Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.55.1 and 2.41.2-3).

¹⁹⁶ For details, see McCormick (1986), 14-17, and Beard (2007), 93-101.

¹⁹⁷ “Ἡ τέχνη δὲ καὶ τῶν κατασκευασμάτων ἢ μεγαλοῦργία τοῖς οὐκ ἰδοῦσι γινόμενα τότε ἐδείκνυεν ὡς παροῦσι” (Joseph *BJ* 7.5.5.146).

prisoners before execution was also a long-established and well-attested practice¹⁹⁸ For instance, Gaius Pontius, the Samnite commander, was beheaded in the triumph of Fabius Gurges in 292 BCE (Livy, *Per.* 11.2), and Simon ben Georas, the Jewish rebel leader, was executed in the triumph of Vespasian and Titus in 71 CE (Joseph *BJ* 7.5.6.153-155).¹⁹⁹ Cicero even claims that enemy leaders were always executed in an adjoining prison after the triumph (*Verr.* II.5.30.77). However, I will demonstrate below that this assertion does not really stand up to scrutiny. Since clemency to the conquered enemy leaders was often viewed as a sign of thorough victory, the sparing of one's foe could add to the fullness of one's triumph.²⁰⁰

This is why Lucius Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182 and 168 BCE), who celebrated the triumph over the Macedonians in 167 BCE, did not execute King Perseus but treated him rather sympathetically (Diod. Sic. 31.8.2-4 and 31.9.1-5 and Plut. *Aem.* 37.2).²⁰¹ After leading Jugurtha in chains in his triumph, Gaius Marius spared his life and put him in the Tullianum, where Jugurtha died six days later of starvation (Plut. *Mar.* 12.3-4). Appian mistakenly asserts that Aristobulus II, the Jewish High Priest and King of Judaea (67-63 BCE), was the only one put to death after being paraded in Gnaeus Pompeius' triumph of 61 BCE (*Mith.* 12.117). Since both Josephus (*BJ* 1.9.1.183 and *AJ* 14.7.4.123) and Dio Cassius (41.18.1) report that Aristobulus, who had been sent by Julius Caesar to take over Judaea, was poisoned by the Pompeians in 49 BCE, it is very likely that no enemy leaders were executed at the end of Pompeius' triumph of 61

¹⁹⁸ See Garnsey (1970), 138.

¹⁹⁹ Josephus provides the fullest surviving description of any imperial triumph. For details, see Beard (2003); Eberhardt (2005); and Millar (2005).

²⁰⁰ See Dowling (2006), 17 and 140.

²⁰¹ For a useful discussion of literary sources in regards to the fate of Perseus, see Westingtone (1938), 110.

BCE.²⁰² Finally, Ovid declares that most of German leaders paraded in Germanicus' triumph of 17 CE received pardon, even Bato, who had been the leading chieftain of the war (*Pont.* 2.1.45-46). Regardless of whether the enemy commanders were executed or not at the end of the triumph, the whole experience of being paraded in the streets of Rome before the vast and noisy throng of hostile spectators must have had a devastatingly degrading effect on the once illustrious captives and their retinue.²⁰³

The study of the iconography of barbarian facial features on Roman public triumphal monuments as well as on private sarcophagi, soldiers' tombstones, coins, and gems reveals that the artists tend to present the barbarians as the vanquished and agonizing subjects of Roman cruelty. While the faces of the victorious Romans convey concentrated determination or outright brutality, the faces of the kneeling figures of the defeated barbarians betray despair, suffering, and the horror of dying.²⁰⁴ For example, the gem dated to the period of the Late Republic depicts a Roman cavalryman spearing through a Gallic foot soldier and possibly portrays the achievements of one of Caesar's officers in Gaul.²⁰⁵ Similarly, the Augustan Mantua Relief that represents fighting Romans and Gauls shows at least one well-preserved head of a fallen barbarian whose facial expression suggests intense pain and suffering.²⁰⁶ By conspicuously

²⁰² Cf. Beard (2007), 128-132, who provides more examples of illustrious captives escaping death.

²⁰³ However, see also *Ibid.*, 107-142. Beard competently discusses continual fluctuations and ambivalences related to the status of victor and victim.

²⁰⁴ See Krierer (1995) and Zanker (1998), 56-62.

²⁰⁵ See Zwierlein-Diehl (1973-1991), 2:128, n. 1092, and pl. 83, no. 1092.

²⁰⁶ For dating the relief to the time of Augustus as well as for pictures, see Strong (1962), 28ff., and pl. XX.

demonstrating the effects of applying violence on the enemies of Rome and intensifying the humiliation of the vanquished, the artists magnify the measure of the victors' physical force and martial prowess and construct the pivotal relationship between Roman supremacy and barbarian servility. Since this axial connection strengthens well-known lines of typological representation, where one's reduction as an attribute determines the other's superior character, it enforces proper social rules and hierarchical relations.²⁰⁷ The deprivation of the *dignitas humana* of the enemy appears to convey a well-established Roman preference for unrestrained application of injurious force on the bodies of those who opposed the Roman order. After all, "the Romans always win."²⁰⁸

Outright acts of cruelty also served as public policy tools to exercise control over the populace, maintain appropriate hierarchical relations, and strengthen the ideological construct that justified aristocratic prerogative to political power. Lintott convincingly argues:

Fundamentally, it seems, sympathy for another's suffering was in proportion to his worth and deserts, his *dignitas* in the widest sense of the word. Cruelty in a provincial governor was the maltreatment of men who did not deserve to suffer at all or whose suffering was unduly aggravated by their position as men of substance, *dignitas* in the narrower sense. If gladiators were criminals, then their status as human beings was forfeit and they could be used legitimately as a spectacle. Deserters, cowards, rebels, and common criminals were morally worthless and had no claim on what was good; slaved and defeated enemies were liable to share this disqualification, though it was exploited with more discretion.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ See Schneider (1986), 18-57. Cf. also von Hölscher (1980).

²⁰⁸ A Greek graffito carved on a rock in the Hisma, a remote region of southwest Jordan, and dated to the second century CE says: "Ῥωμαῖοι ἀεὶ νικῶσιν, Λαυρῖκιος ἔγραψα χαῖρε Ζήνων." For details, see Tanner (1990), 184-188.

²⁰⁹ Lintott (1968), 46.

Of course, it has also been argued that in the Roman Republic only non-citizens were victims of physical violence and judicial cruelty while Roman citizens, especially members of the governing elite, enjoyed immunity from torture and judicial execution.²¹⁰ However, this amelioration was more ostensible than real. For instance, cruel actions of Gaius Verres, who was assigned Sicily as proconsul (73-71 BCE), clearly demonstrate how weak the protection supposedly provided by citizen status might be, especially in places where the locals did not have powerful links of patronage with Rome. Verres did not make any distinction between Roman citizens and aliens in respect to flogging (Cic. *Verr.* II.5.53.140). The proconsul used hot metal plates on citizens as a form of torture (Cic. *Verr.* II.5.63.163), condemned to hard labor and executed Roman citizens as if they were slaves (Cic. *Verr.* II.1.5.13-14), and imprisoned and then crucified Publius Gavius, even though the man had claimed to be a Roman citizen and offered to produce witnesses for deposition (Cic. *Verr.* II.5.63.164-II.5.66.170).

Besides public tortures and executions, extravagant manifestations of violence could also be encountered in the Roman arena, in the Circus Maximus, and even in a theater. Although Roman citizens and even members of the higher orders occasionally chose a career of a professional gladiator, most gladiators and *venatores* were chosen from prisoners of war and condemned criminals.²¹¹ Cicero even insults his political enemies, especially Marcus Antonius,

²¹⁰ See, for example, MacMullen (1986), 163, who postulates that this protection was absent only in two settings: “where masters confronted their slaves, or officers, their men.” Cf. also Julius Caesar’s claim that the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators constituted “genus poenae novum” (Sall. *Cat.* 51.18). However, Garnsey (1966), 167ff., demonstrates that citizens were not legally immune from judicial execution but were permitted to appeal against it. In order to avoid execution, defendants on capital charges could also go into voluntary exile. See Garnsey (1970), 111ff.

²¹¹ The literature on gladiators and gladiatorial combat is vast. Among the recent works worth consulting are Ville (1981); Hopkins (1983a); Barton (1993); Futrell (1997); Dunkle (2008); and

with the appellation *gladiator*.²¹² Julius Caesar was perhaps the first one who used condemned criminals in his aedilician games of 65 BCE dedicated to his long-dead father (Plin. *HN* 33.16.53; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 5.9).²¹³ In his games of 46 BCE, which were put on to commemorate his deceased daughter and his recent triumphs in Gaul and Egypt, Caesar introduced two more innovations: (1) members of the Roman elite, including one ex-senator, fought in gladiatorial contests (Suet. *Iul.* 39.1-2) and (2) whole detachments of foot soldiers as well as squadrons of cavalry mounted on horses and elephants challenged each other in the Circus (Dio Cass. 43.23.3-4).²¹⁴ Aside from Roman aristocrats, the sight of prisoners of war and condemned criminals fighting for their life in the arena massaged spectators' collective ego by affirming the ideology of the Roman mastery over the Mediterranean.²¹⁵

As to the Roman theater, one could encounter two distinct types of violence there. On the one hand, Plautus' adaptation of Greek New Comedy catered to the cruel and less refined tastes of general Roman spectators. "Torture is mentioned so often in Plautus," says Segal, "that it

Nosov (2009). On the *nobiles* performing in the arena, see Hopkins (1983a), 20f., and Gunderson (1996).

²¹² See *Phil.* 5.7.20; 6.5.13; and 7.6.17.

²¹³ See also Millar (1984), 134.

²¹⁴ In addition to the equites, the son of a praetor, and even the ex-senator, condemned criminals fought in the games once again. However, Caesar forbade the current senator to contend (Dio Cass. 43.23.5; cf. Suet. *Iul.* 39.1). In 41 BCE, men of equestrian standing performed in a beast-hunt in the Circus (Dio Cass. 48.33.4). Finally, in 38 BCE the Senate decreed an ad hoc ban on senators engaging in gladiatorial contests after a new Senate enrollee desired to fight as a professional gladiator (Dio Cass. 48.43.3).

²¹⁵ Cf. Gunderson (1996), 134, and Zimmerman (2006), 347.

may well be called an obsession--on the part of the playwright as well as his characters.”²¹⁶ The plot and action in Plautus’ plays are propelled by caricature characters who make the most of violent verbal abuse and frequently threaten slaves with torment or dreadful physical punishment, including crucifixion.²¹⁷ While such jokes may signal the inevitability and reality of Roman punishment, especially since there were no laws in this period to penalize an owner for killing his slave, Parker applies certain elements of Freudian analysis to the examination of Roman satire and argues that people often make comic remarks about the things that worry or scare them most.

Slaves freely roaming around were one of the most terrifying incongruities for the Romans. As the result, the vast number of references to punishment of the slaves helped uphold the society’s values, strengthen the everyday standards of right and wrong, and reassure the Romans of their own place in the world.²¹⁸ On the other hand, in the Roman Republic professional actors, even if citizens, were liable to physical punishment by aediles and praetors because the *infamia* associated with their occupation affected their privileges.²¹⁹ Plautus refers to the earliest measure that allowed the magistrates to punish actors anywhere and everywhere.²²⁰ Only Augustus’ edict limited the exercise of this measure just to the time of actual performance, in

²¹⁶ Segal (1968), 140. The issue of violence on stage in Roman comedy is investigated by Parker (1989).

²¹⁷ See Beacham (1992), 29-32. Among the many examples, see Plaut. *Asin.* 545-551 and *Epid.* 121; 311; and 625-626. For a comprehensive list of Plautus’ jokes about torture, physical violence, and crucifixion, see von Spranger (1984), 84ff.

²¹⁸ See Parker (1989), 235-238.

²¹⁹ See Edwards (1993), 98-126, who provides an extended discussion of the stigma of performance for the Romans.

²²⁰ See *Amph.* 81-85 and *Cist. Epil.* 4. Cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 45.3.

effect putting an end to beatings of actors for infractions in private or not directly related to their profession (Suet. *Aug.* 45.3; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.77.1-3).

By the time of the Late Republic, controlled acts of cruelty played out in public became an important part of the urban population's everyday experience and a source of vicarious pleasure for Romans of every walk of life. Likewise, the discourse on as well as the representation of successfully applied violence became an essential part of the Roman ideology, signifying that ferocity, truculence, and belligerence became not only deeply embedded in the culture code of the Roman aristocracy but also permeated all aspects of life of the common Romans. One can argue that the phenomenon of unrestricted violence many ancient authors so often ponder over was culturally coded: it was often represented in accordance with literary and iconographic narrative patterns that were based on a shared cultural consensus.²²¹ Lintott says, "[T]he Roman concern for cruelty was part of their own political culture, which was centered on the exercise of physical power and whose grades of *dignitas* made them especially sensitive to violence which produced humiliation."²²²

Conclusion

From at least the fourth century BCE, if not earlier, service to the Republic functioned as the most exclusive vehicle to acquire a grant of *gloria*, *dignitas*, and *auctoritas* from others. Since public accomplishment was intrinsically linked to office-holding, there was fierce competition

²²¹ See Orywal (1997).

²²² Lintott (1992c), 27.

for magistracies among Roman aristocrats. In a climate where one struggled for political power through the assertion of claims upon others and ranked himself and his peers in a social hierarchy, the claimant's pre-eminence in *auctoritas* played a significant role in whether these claims were accepted or rejected. For a typical Roman aristocrat, a claim to social distinction started from service in the cavalry, where a system of rewards encouraged the young cavalryman to acquire honor and forge reputations for military prowess by deliberately displaying "aggressive courage" on the battlefield, engaging in hand-to-hand combat, and putting himself in harm's ways (Polyb. 6.39.1-10). *Virtus* proven in battle remained one of the greatest sources of praise and renown until the very end of the Republic. For example, Lucius Licinius Murena (cos. 62 BCE) won consulship elections in large part thanks to his outstanding military reputation (Cic. *Mur.* 21-22).²²³ Similarly, the vast majority of would-be senators, particularly those who could not borrow freely from their families' deposit of ascribed honor, used army service as an excellent opportunity to win a social grant of reputation and prestige from others and advance their social standing.²²⁴

Since personal bravery in battle directly translated into success in public life, the elite youth with political aspirations had to acquire a reputation for *virtus* on the battlefield before he could successfully run for office (Polyb. 31.29.1). Even when oratory and advocacy became popular venues for honor acquisition and laying claim to glory, personal courage and martial prowess still remained essential to identity of the Roman governing elite, propelling the courageous aristocrats with reputation for bellicosity into magistracies with *imperium*. To the Roman mind, refusal of the young Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus the Younger (cos. 147 and

²²³ Cf. Cic. *Rep.* 5.7.9, where the author equates *virtus* to bravery.

²²⁴ See Wiseman (1971), 121f., and Nicolet (1980), 136f.

134 BCE) to aggressively pit himself against other advocates in the law courts first and foremost demonstrated his effete and un-Roman character that made him unfit to represent family interests (Polyb. 31.23.11-12).²²⁵ In the Late Republic, the Romans continued to ascribe extraordinary importance to military accomplishments, and military standards were utilized to measure success in non-military competitive venues. As late as 44 BCE, Cicero unsuccessfully tried to refute the prevalent notion that military achievements eclipsed civil service (*Off.* 1.74-77).²²⁶

Similar to such social institutions as the Sicilian Mafia or the Calabrian Ndrangheta, an individual aristocrat's ability to win a social grant of *gloria*, *laus*, and *fama* and thus advance his social standing largely depended upon his perceived ability to bring pain and suffering to the enemies of Rome.²²⁷ Since expansionist militarism and *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by military prowess, were the most distinct markers of one's commitment to the good of the *res publica*, aristocrats with reputation for bellicosity routinely won magistracies with *imperium*. Driven by *cupido gloriae* (*Cat.* 7.3-6), the *imperium*-holders desired to construct an even more auspicious public image that would allow them to successfully claim pre-eminence in *gloria*, *dignitas*, and *auctoritas* in order to win the coveted prize of a consulship and be survived by

²²⁵ “Δοκῶ γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡσύχιός τις καὶ νωθρός, ὡς ἀκούω, καὶ πολὺ κεχωρισμένος τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ πράξεως, ὅτι κρίσεις οὐχ αἰροῦμαι λέγειν. τὴν δ' οἰκίαν οὐ φασι τοιοῦτον ζητεῖν προστάτην ἐξ ἧς ὀρμῶμαι, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον: ὃ καὶ μάλιστα με λυπεῖ.” Cf. Cic. *Cael.* 73 and especially Tac. *Dial.* 34, where the author copiously uses military metaphors to describe the advocacy of the Late Republic.

²²⁶ “Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio” (Cic. *Off.* 1.74). Cf. also *Off.* 1.79-82. It is significant that Cicero held the opposite belief earlier in life. In *Pro Murena* 22, which was written twenty years earlier, he says, “Qui potest dubitari quin ad consulatum adipiscendum multo plus adferat dignitatis rei militaris quam iuris civilis gloria? ... Ac nimirum--dicendum est enim quod sentio--rei militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus.”

²²⁷ For the Roman elites behaving like a power syndicate of “organized crime,” see Mattern (1999), xii, and Malina (2001b), 27-30.

glorious memory. Even though the Senate retained its traditional role of the ultimate decision-maker in the Republic, much of foreign policy was inevitably created on the spot by individual generals in the field.²²⁸ This is why the ambitious *imperium*-holders regularly engaged in brinkmanship, wars of aggression, and relentless and brazen “triumph-hunting” against the “barbarians” and Greeks alike. If victorious, the aristocrats, then, produced textual and pictorial narratives that not only celebrated successfully applied “instrumental violence,” thus justifying their claims to political power, but also served as the symbol of Rome’s dominance over foreign people.

The enjoyment of violence permeated all aspects of life of the Romans, making the discourse on and the representation of successfully applied “instrumental violence” an essential part of the shared cultural consensus.²²⁹ Influenced by the dominant cultural values to behave in a culturally distinctive way, the Roman aristocratic decision-makers were historically socialized into a specific mode of strategic thinking characterized by utter truculence, ferocity, and bellicosity. These traits formed an integral part of the Roman “strategic culture” which, in turn, informed all decision-making processes, influenced strategy, determined particular “strategic behavior,” and continually constituted and gave meaning to other material factors. The ability to inflict violence and the desirability of such behavior became deeply embedded in the culture code of the aristocratic decision-makers, shaping the notion of honor of most Roman aristocrats and giving birth to a very distinctive “strategic behavior” concerning war initiation, territorial conquest, and balance-of-power politics. In essence, Roman “strategic behavior,” which was often typified by wars of aggression and brinkmanship rather than balancing, was shaped and

²²⁸ See Eckstein (1987).

²²⁹ See my discussion, above, pp. 70-83.

influenced by national historical behavior. It molded and shaped the national character by equating *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial prowess, and expansionist militarism with a strong personal commitment to the public good.²³⁰

In the case study of Cicero's exploits in Cilicia presented below, I demonstrate how even one of the least adventuresome aristocrats of the Late Republic could indulge in the brazen "triumph-hunting" and even invent a fake record of military achievements simply because he desperately needed to win a social grant of *dignitas* and *auctoritas* from his fellow citizens. Members of the Roman governing elite who happened to hold *imperium* regularly initiated wars of aggression because a successful campaign or just a fabricated record of military accomplishments enabled an enterprising aristocrat to lay claim to triumphal honors and even celebrate a triumph. Both earned the individual a social grant of glory, praise, and renown, greatly enhancing his acquired honor and helping him to lay much more effective claim to political power. Consequently, the "strategic behavior" of aristocratic decision-makers, who had been socialized into engaging in brinkmanship, launching wars of aggression, and indulging in "triumph-hunting," was regularly characterized by unrestrained application of physical violence on the bodies of real and imagined enemies of Rome. This should come as no surprise because the Roman foreign policy and strategy making not only were habitually created on the spot by individual generals in the field but were also culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated. Since truculence, ferocity, and bellicosity were distinctive features of the Roman "strategic culture," they informed all decision-making processes at home and abroad, influencing strategy and shaping a particular

²³⁰ Cf. Haglund (2004), 491-498, who suggests that the concept of "strategic culture" can be further divided into (1) national historical behavior and (2) national character and identity.

“strategic behavior” on the use of force by Roman governors in the provinces and Roman generals in the field.

CASE STUDY I: A “PROMOTER OF PEACE” OR A RUTHLESS TRIUMPH-HUNTER? CICERO’S GOVERNORSHIP OF CILICIA

Introduction

Cicero (cos. 63 BCE) is the first clear example of a consul who did not complete ten years of military service before his election to office, and he is better known as an orator adept at cultivating aristocrats, equites, and prominent Italians rather than as a general renowned for his military achievements.¹ Once the senatorial Cicero was returned from exile in 57 BCE, he attempted to re-enter politics but met little success because the exile did leave a stain of dishonor on his reputation. Hence, the statesman immediately seized an opportunity to restore his public image and increase his prestige when, in accordance with Pompeius’ *lex de provinciis* of 52 BCE, he was selected to govern Cilicia as a proconsul. After his arrival in the province, Cicero was eager to wage a small victorious war because he was sure that a military victory against the “barbarians” would enable him to win a triumph and thus enhance his *auctoritas* enough to silence criticism, re-enter politics, and restore his influence in the Senate.

The so-called “free Cilicians” were the easy target for Cicero’s ambition to triumph from his province, and the proconsul waged a brutal campaign of extermination against several tribes of highlanders in the Amanus Mountains. Cicero’s military operations in Cilicia, which were

¹ In his *Life of Cicero* 3.2, Plutarch states that the orator did only a brief stint of military service during the Social War (91-87 BCE). Cf. Cic. *Phil.* 12.11.27. Cicero’s friend Marcus Caelius Rufus also served only around a year as a *contubernalis* of Quintus Pompeius Rufus (cos. 88 BCE) before holding office (Cic. *Cael.* 73). This is why William V. Harris (1979), 12 and 257, points out that Cicero ran for the quaestorship with less than ten years of military service behind him. Cf. also Wiseman (1971), 143.

planned and conducted not even by him personally, but by a military expert named Gaius Pomptinus, who was a long-time friend (Cic. *Pis.* 24.58), were nothing more than routine punitive expeditions. In fact, they failed to achieve any long-lasting results. Despite all this, Cicero skillfully invented a fake record of military achievements and succeeded in persuading the Senate to grant him the *supplicatio*. With Rome on the brink of another civil war, however, his triumphal aspirations never materialized. Nevertheless, even in the midst of the conflict between Caesar and Pompeius the orator was refusing to lay down the *imperium* from which he hoped to triumph. Since crossing the *pomerium* would forfeit his *imperium* and right to triumph, throughout 49 and 48 BCE, Cicero wandered around Italy and Greece in a company of *lictors* carrying *fasces laureati*, the traditional symbol of a victorious general demanding a triumph (Cic. *Div.* 1.28 and Dio Cass. 44.4.3).

Road to Exile

Born in 106 BCE into the family of a wealthy and well-connected eques from Arpinum, Cicero was a *novus homo* who reached the consulship thanks to his distinction as an orator. Although the residents of Arpinum enjoyed the privileges of Roman citizenship from 187 BCE, prior to Cicero only one Arpinate, Gaius Marius, used the support of the *populares* to successfully overcome all the obstacles erected by the *nobiles* and win the consulships.² In his youth, Cicero received a superior education in philosophy and rhetoric: he attended legal consultations of Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Augur (cos. 117 BCE) and his son Quintus Mucius Scaevola the

² Cicero's grandmother Gratidia had marriage connections with Marius' family, and Cicero was especially impressed by his fellow *novus homo* and a distant relative. See Gelzer, *RE* VIIa1, col. 830.

Pontifex (cos. 95 BCE), listened to speeches given by Marcus Antonius (cos. 99 BCE) and Lucius Licinius Crassus (cos. 95 BCE), and came to the lectures of Philon of Larissa and Apollonius Molon who visited Rome (Cic. *Brut.* 296 and 306-307).³ In the late 80 BCE, Cicero began practicing law. His first court case was unsuccessful defense of Publius Quinctius in 81 BCE (*Pro Quinctio*), when the young advocate lost to Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, then the most eminent advocate in Rome.⁴

In the following year, however, Cicero won initial recognition and even augmented his reputation through his defense of Sextus Roscius (*Pro Roscio Amerino*).⁵ Roscius was accused of parricide by his two relatives who had conspired with Sulla's freedman L. Cornelius Chrysogonus to enter Roscius' name in the proscription lists and divide his property. Later in life, the statesman boasted that in his youth he had spoken against Sulla (*Off.* 2.51).⁶ Consequently, it has often been argued that Cicero's defense of Roscius as well as his subsequent (lost) defense of a woman from Arretium (Cic. *Caecin.* 97) reflected discreditably on certain aspects of the then contemporary regime of Sulla, especially because Cicero criticized in his speeches both the common misuse of the proscriptions for personal gain or revenge and Sulla's

³ See also Cic. *De or.* 2.1.1.

⁴ Due to ineptly done intercalating, the old Roman calendar of the time is known to have been about three months ahead of the solar, and all dates that follow are somewhat dubious.

⁵ Cf. also Cic. *Brut.* 312.

⁶ Cicero juggles facts here because in his speech he takes great care to distinguish between Sulla and Chrysogonus, attributing all blame to the latter. All possible criticisms of the Sullan regime (*Ros. Am.* 3; 22; 131; and 152-154) are best explained as later anachronistic revisions done before Cicero circulated the speech after his return to Rome around 77 BCE. See Berry (2000), 7f. Cf. also Plutarch who greatly embellishes the story and claims that Chrysogonus had trumped up the evidence so that Sulla could indict Roscius for the murder of his father. After Cicero won the case, he travelled to Greece out of fear of Sulla (*Cic.* 3.4-6).

punitive restriction of the citizen rights in Etrurian towns. However, the fact that we hear nothing of Chrysogonus after 81 BCE may indicate that Sulla, who genuinely wished to restore the privileges of the optimates, was not as vindictive as Plutarch or modern scholarship wants him to be.

Successful defense of Sextus Roscius brought Cicero more cases, but oratory was physically very demanding and the young advocate's health faltered (Cic. *Brut.* 313-314). Accompanied by his brother, Cicero travelled to the East, where both of them continued their studies of philosophy in Athens under Antiochus of Ascalon (Cic. *Brut.* 315). Later, Cicero also studied oratory in Asia Minor under Menippus of Stratonikeia and other illustrious Asiatic orators. He even went to Rhodes to study once more under Apollonius Molon (Cic. *Brut.* 315-316). As his health improved, Cicero returned to Rome around 77 BCE to pursue a public career. In 76 BCE, he was elected quaestor for 75 BCE and spent a year in Sicily, the province which was assigned to him by lot (Cic. *Brut.* 318). In 70 BCE, successful prosecution of Gaius Verres for abuses and extortions during his governorship of Sicily (73-71 BCE) established Cicero as the most distinguished advocate in the Roman courts. He won the aedileship that same year.

At the age of thirty-nine, the equestrian Cicero successfully ran for the praetorship, becoming a candidate at the earliest age at which he could legally qualify (Cic. *Brut.* 321). Elected the *praetor urbanus*, he allied himself with Gnaeus Pompeius, an able general but a mediocre politician and an insipid orator who was aspiring to become a new leader of the *populares*. In 66 BCE, Cicero delivered his first political speech titled *De imperio Gn. Pompei*. Despite strong opposition from the influential *boni*, the orator supported the proposal of Gaius Manilius (trib. 66 BCE) to grant Pompeius the extraordinary command in the Third Mithridatic War (75-63 BCE).

After this, Cicero regarded Pompeius as the only candidate worthy of his political allegiance.⁷ For the next two years or so, the *praetor urbanus* remained confident that Pompeius and he were the real leaders of the victorious *populares*, an illusion that would cost him dearly in the future. In 64 BCE, Cicero put himself up for the consular elections. Despite serious competition from Lucius Sergius Catilina, who advocated a welcome cancellation of debts, the orator's careful networking with aristocrats, equites, and Italian elites paid off; he was elected consul for 63 BCE. Thus, Cicero became one of a very few *novi homines* who had virtually no military background but won the elections due to their oratorical skills and personal connections.⁸

The consulship was the pinnacle of Cicero's career. Against all odds, he successfully secured evidence that implicated Catilina and his followers, including Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura (cos. 71 BCE), in a serious plot against the Republic. Following the consul's first speech against Catilina addressed to the Senate (*In Catilinam I*), Catilina left Rome in the early November of 63 BCE to join his army in Etruria (Sall. *Cat.* 31.5-9). Then Cicero persuaded the Senate to pass the *senatus consultum ultimum* against the plotters: Catilina's co-conspirators were arrested in Rome and promptly executed without trial (early December of 63 BCE). At first, Julius Caesar, who was quickly emerging as a rival contender for the leadership among the *populares*, swayed most senators to vote against the death penalty, but a speech by Cato the Younger changed their minds (Sall. *Cat.* 51.1-53.1).⁹ Most likely, Caesar had assisted the

⁷ In the 60s, Cicero also defended Pompeius' friends Cornelius and Manilius.

⁸ Q. Cicero says, "Non potest qui dignus habetur patronus consularium indignus consulatu putari" (*Comment. pet.* 2). For Cicero's varied connections, see Q. Cicero *Comment. pet.* 50 and Plut. *Cic.* 10.1.

⁹ In 63 BCE, Caesar was elected the *pontifex maximus*. That same year, he was also elected as a praetor for 62 BCE. These two elections as well as financial backing from Marcus Licinius

conspirators, but he concealed his involvement so well that Cicero, who to the end of his days was convinced of Caesar's participation in the conspiracy, had to proclaim his innocence (cf. Plut. *Cic.* 20.4-21.4 and 30.3).¹⁰

Meanwhile, Gaius Antonius "Hybrida" (cos. 63 BCE), having been bribed by Cicero with the proconsulship in Macedonia, marched out against the Catilinarians.¹¹ In the early January of 62 BCE, the forces of Catilina were caught between the army of Antonius commanded by his legate Marcus Petreius and that of Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE). With the number of his supporters rapidly dwindling, Catilina was forced to give battle near Pistoria (Sall. *Cat.* 57.1-5). After a protracted fight during which the Catilinarians put up a much stronger resistance than anyone had anticipated, Marcus Petreius defeated the conspirators. Catilina was killed in battle (Sall. *Cat.* 59.1-61.9), and the great Roman orator was hailed as the savior of Rome. Lucius Gellius (cos. 72 BCE) even suggested in the Senate that Cicero should be given a *corona civica* for saving the Republic from the conspiracy (Cic. *Pis.* 3.6 and Gell. *NA* 5.6.15).¹²

Crassus (cos. 70 BCE), who was the enemy of Pompeius, established Julius Caesar as a man of power and prominence.

¹⁰ See also Smith (1966), 92-98, contra Gruen (1995), 138. Caesar and perhaps Crassus were also behind a major agrarian bill introduced by Publius Servillius Rullus (trib. 63 BCE) and meant to redistribute *ager publicus* in Rome and the provinces (Cic. *Leg. agr.* 1.1; 2.25; 2.44; and 3.13). Cf. Mitchell (1979), 183f. Cicero wrote four speeches titled *De lege agraria* to secure the withdrawal of the bill, eventually allying himself with the optimates against the *populares*.

¹¹ Antonius' consulship was characterized by some bewildering behavior on his part, and there were rumors about his complicity in the Catilina's attempt to overthrow the government. See Cic. *Sest.* 8 and 12; *Pis.* 2.5; Plut. *Cic.* 12.3; and Dio Cass. 37.30.3. For Macedonia as a popular destination for those who desired to lay claim to a triumph, see Cic. *Prov. cons.* 4 and *Att.* 5.20.1.

¹² The oddity of this proposal is discussed by Weinstock (1971), 165. According to our sources, a recipient of the civic crown was required not only to save his comrade's life but also to demonstrate great valor by cutting down the enemy who threatened him, all without giving

In the last month of his consulship, Cicero became the leading man in the Senate and was even proclaimed *pater patriae*.¹³ In a fabulously foolish example of self-aggrandizement, the consul went as far as trying to make the Nones of December of 63 BCE the new birthday of Rome, claiming that the city received a new life on that day (Cic. *Cat.* 3.2).¹⁴ However, Cicero's extrajudicial execution of the conspirators opened him to the charge of having executed Roman citizens without trial, and this charge eventually resulted in his self-imposed exile to Macedonia. The episode of the conspirators' execution was indeed troubling because the act itself was a clear violation of the citizen's right to a trial. Cicero's incessant boasting about the deed made things even worse.¹⁵ Having lost the support of the *populares*, Cicero failed to gain the full trust of the optimates. After all, how could the *nobiles* recognize the *novus homo* as equal to themselves? Moreover, Pompeius, who became alarmed with Cicero's "arbitrary reign" in Rome, sent his legate, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 57 BCE), to the capital so that he could strengthen Pompeius' relations with the *populares*. After Nepos was elected tribune of the *plebs* for 62 BCE and assumed office in the early December of 63 BCE, he began harassing Cicero and, with Caesar's support, even attempted to secure a special command against Catilina for

ground in the fight (Gell. *NA* 5.6.13; cf. Plin. *HN* 16.5.12). This is something Cicero clearly did not do.

¹³ The senators acclaimed Cicero the *parens patriae* or *pater patriae* (Cic. *Pis.* 3.6; *Sest.* 121; and Plut. *Cic.* 23.6). There is a debate whether Cicero was the first to obtain such honor or there were others before him (e. g. Marcus Furius Camillus who rescued Rome from the Gauls (Livy 5.49.7)). Weinstock (1971), 201f., offers a useful summary.

¹⁴ Cicero would not have been himself had he not kept repeating this ridiculous proposal in an annoying manner again and again until it acquired a symbolic significance. See Cic. *Flac.* 102; *Att.* 1.19.6; *Red. sen.* 12; *Planc.* 90; *Fam.* 1.9.12; and Dio Cass. 46.21.4. Cf. also Plut. *Cic.* 24.1-3.

¹⁵ See Cic. *Sull.* 67; *Planc.* 85; and *Fam.* 5.7.

Pompeius (Cic. *Fam.* 5.2.6-10).¹⁶ Once this proposition was harshly criticized by Cato the Younger and caused a tumult in Rome, Nepos left the city and fled to Pompeius.¹⁷

Pompeius returned to Rome in 62 BCE and immediately celebrated a triumph. However, his very modest requests for land for his veterans and ratification of his Eastern settlements were frustrated in the Senate. No longer a *popularis* (Cic. *Att.* 2.1.6), Pompeius made peace with Cicero and attempted to use the ex-consul as an intermediary to help him get closer to the influential *boni*. He had little success. Perhaps both men thought that the other cold-shouldered him.¹⁸ The following year, Publius Clodius Pulcher (trib. 58 BCE) tried to mobilize the radical elements among the *populares* and become their leader. According to Plutarch, Cicero and Clodius used to be on friendly terms as late as 62 BCE, and Clodius even supported Cicero during the Catilinarian crisis (Cic. 29.1). However, the statesman made a mistake of antagonizing the *populares* in May of 61 BCE: when Clodius was charged with *incestum* for trespassing on the *Bona Dea* festival the previous December, the senatorial Cicero, who had been frustrated in his political aspirations, chose to give an incriminating testimony against him during the trial.¹⁹ Perhaps Cicero joined the prosecution in order to remind everyone about his *annus mirabilis* by combining a campaign against licentious youth with a story of Clodius' trespassing

¹⁶ See also Plut. *Cic.* 23.1-5; *Cat. Min.* 26.2-4; and Dio Cass. 37.43.1-3.

¹⁷ As a tribune, Nepos was not permitted to be absent from Rome even for a full day (Dio Cass. 37.43.4; cf. Gell. *NA* 13.12.9 and Macrob. *Sat.* 1.3.8). Unfortunately, our sources are unclear whether the Senate suspended Nepos' tribunate. See Plut. *Cat. Min.* 26.2-29.2; *Cic.* 26.10; and Dio Cass. 37.43.4.

¹⁸ For details, see Gruen (1995), 85ff. In May of 60 BCE, Cicero complains that he has no companions to accompany him along the "optimate road" but remains convinced that he chose the right path (*Att.* 20.1-2).

¹⁹ Balsdon (1966) offers a very useful overview of the course of the trial.

as the last echo of the Catilinarian conspiracy (Cic. *Att.* 1.14.5 and 1.18.2).²⁰ It is also possible that there is some truth in Plutarch's assertion that Cicero's wife Terentia influenced her husband to give a testimony against Clodius (Cic. 29.2-4). Having been insulted by Clodius' accusation of her half sister Fabia, a Vestal virgin, of *incestum* with Catilina back in 73 BCE, Terentia might have decided to take revenge on Clodius (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 19.3).²¹ The future developments showed that Cicero gravely miscalculated the risks involved in giving a hostile testimony against Clodius at the *Bona Dea* trial and thus laid a foundation for his own political demise.

After Caesar returned from Spain in the summer of 60 BCE, the Senate voted him a triumph. But Caesar also wanted to put himself up for the consular election of 60 BCE. Since crossing the *pomerium* would forfeit his *imperium* and right to triumph, he requested the permission to submit his candidacy for the consulship *in absentia*. However, Cato the Younger, who perhaps thought that the combination of celebrating a triumph and winning the consulship would make Caesar preeminent in honor, opposed the petition. As the future course of events proved, through their narrow-mindedness and sheer obstinacy and obstructionism, the influential *boni*, including Cato the Younger, managed to alienate all three dynasts one by one, compelling Pompeius, Crassus and Caesar to form a coalition that made each of them much more powerful than any of them could otherwise have become.²² Caesar decided to forego the glory of a triumph and instead

²⁰ See *Ibid.*, 68. If we are to trust Asconius (*Mil.* 44), Clodius was at least of two minds toward the Catilinarian conspiracy, and only personal hatred of Catilina prevented him from joining the plot. Consequently, Cicero relied on political similarity of the two to frame a case against Clodius as a successor to Catilina's policy of violence and revolution. See Cic. *Sest.* 42; *Har. resp.* 5; *Pis.* 5.11; *Planc.* 86; and *Mil.* 37.

²¹ See Epstein (1986), 232-235. Cf. also Cic. *Tog. cand.* Frag. 22; *Brut.* 236; *Cat.* 3.9; Asc. 91C; Q. Cicero *Comment. pet.* 10; Sall. *Cat.* 15.1; Oros. 6.3.1; and *MRR* 2:107f. and 114.

²² Cf., for example, Cic. *Att.* 1.18.7; 2.1.8; Vell. Pat. 2.44.1-2; and Flor. 2.13.9-12.

entered Rome to run for the consulship of 59 BCE (Suet. *Iul.* 18.2).²³ After Cicero refused to participate in the anti-Senate *factio*, Caesar quickly formed an alliance with Pompeius and Crassus.²⁴ In exchange for their support of his candidacy, he promised each man to obtain what they respectively wanted most from the Senate: (1) land for Pompeius' veterans and ratification of his arrangements in the East and (2) a reduction of the contract prices offered for the tithe of Asia by Crassus' over-optimistic *publicani* friends.²⁵ While the *tres homines* were taking the first steps toward radically changing the future of Rome, Cicero was preoccupied with a vain propaganda campaign to glorify his consulship of 63 BCE.²⁶

Caesar won the consular elections, but the optimates, who had set up an enormous bribery fund to buy the votes, succeeded in gaining a fitting counterbalance to Caesar's consulship: Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, Cato the Younger's son-in-law, defeated Caesar's ally Lucius Luceius and was elected as the second consul (Suet. *Iul.* 19.1). When Caesar attempted to carry out the legislation to accommodate the needs of Pompeius and Crassus, Cato the Younger's *factio* needlessly obstructed it in the Senate, and Bibulus vetoed Caesar's land bill in the

²³ See also Plut. *Cat. Min.* 31.3-4; *Caes.* 13.1-2; App. *B Civ.* 2.8; Dio Cass. 37.54.1-3; and 44.41.3-4.

²⁴ Cf. Cic. *Att.* 2.3.3-4 and 2.4.2. In June of 60 BCE, Cicero begins to worry about Publius Clodius Pulcher's ambition to become a tribune of the *plebs*, but he still feels comfortable enough to joke about the matter and to boast how he humiliated Clodius in the Senate (*Att.* 2.1.4).

²⁵ Cf. Suet. *Iul.* 19.2; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 31.2-4; *Caes.* 13.1-4; *Crass.* 14.1-3; App. *B Civ.* 2.8; and Dio Cass. 37.54.1-4. Gruen (1995), 87-90, provides a useful overview of how the alliance among the three dynasts was formed.

²⁶ For details, see Tempest (2014), 115f.

Centuriate Assembly.²⁷ In order to prevent Caesar from presenting any other bills to the populace, Bibulus also declared all other days on which the assemblies could convene during the year of Caesar's consulship to be feast days (Dio Cass. 38.6.1). Nevertheless, Caesar introduced his land bill in the *Comitia Centuriata* again. When Bibulus showed up at the Forum to protest it, he was harassed by angry supporters of the bill, his *fasces* were broken, and he himself was thoroughly humiliated (Dio Cass. 38.6.2-3).²⁸ After this, Bibulus retired from public life and spent the rest of his consulate shut up in his home; now Caesar had free reign to ratify all his bills (Suet. *Iul.* 20.1-3).²⁹

The obstructionism of the influential *boni* and their creature Bibulus actually strengthened the alliance of the three dynasts, and Cicero was completely removed from political affairs (cf. Plut. *Crass.* 14.2). He tacitly agreed to stay neutral in exchange for personal safety. Very soon, however, he made another fatal mistake. The triumvirs decided to prosecute Gaius Antonius "Hybrida" (cos. 63 BCE) for *res repetundae* in connection with his proconsulship in Macedonia (*Schol. Bob.* 94).³⁰ Antonius' accusers emphasized his hypothetical sympathies toward the Catilinarian conspirators and once again raised the question of the legality of the extrajudicial

²⁷ Cato the Younger hogged the Senate floor by speaking for hours (Gell. *NA* 4.10.8). As a result, Caesar commanded lictors to arrest him and put him in prison. Upon further deliberation, however, Caesar ordered to free Cato so as not to turn him into a martyr for the cause (Suet. *Iul.* 20.4; Plut. *Caes.* 14.11; and Dio Cass. 38.3.1-2).

²⁸ Cf. Suet. *Iul.* 20.1; App. *B Civ.* 2.11; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 32.1-2; and *Pomp.* 48.1-2.

²⁹ Cf. Cic. *Att.* 2.16.2; App. *B Civ.* 2.12-13; Plut. *Caes.* 14.9; and Dio Cass. 38.6.4-7.6. At the same time, many optimates regarded Bibulus' boycotting tactics as an appropriate response to Caesar's usurpation. See Cic. *Att.* 2.19.2; 2.19.5; 2.20.4; 2.20.6; 2.21.5; Suet. *Iul.* 9.2; and 49.2.

³⁰ Antonius managed to alienate not only Pompeius and Caesar but also other influential Roman aristocrats. For an excellent overview of Antonius' trial, see Gruen (1995), 287-291.

execution of the plotters.³¹ Antonius' possible conviction on the last charge was especially dangerous for Cicero because it came too close for his own comfort (*Cic. Flac.* 5 and 95). Hence, in March of 59 BCE, the orator decided to defend Antonius in court. While pleading the case, he reprimanded Caesar and censured the triumvirate in highly critical terms. In response, Caesar (in his capacity of the *pontifex maximus*) and Pompeius (as one of the augurs) authorized the transfer of Publius Clodius Pulcher to the plebeian status so that he could put himself up for the tribunician election of 59 BCE (*Suet. Iul.* 20.4 and *Dio Cass.* 38.10.4).³²

Once Clodius was elected tribune of the *plebs* for 58 BCE, he introduced several bills, including one on the distribution of free grain for the needy and another on the restoration of *collegia* (*Dio Cass.* 38.13.1-2). It appears that some form of reconciliation occurred between the tribune and Cicero early in Clodius' tribunate, and the statesman even supported Clodius' legislation legalizing the *collegia* (*Plut. Cic.* 30.4 and *Dio Cass.* 38.14.1-3).³³ However, once the demagogue had successfully carried his bills and his *popularis* program of reforms had helped him acquire a significant following, he immediately attacked Cicero.³⁴ Clodius moved a bill that interdicted from fire and water anyone who had put Roman citizens to death without trial or appeal to the people. In essence, this was an attack on the principle of consular condemnation

³¹ See *Cic. Cael.* 15; 74; and 78.

³² See also *Cic. Att.* 2.9.1; 2.12.1; 8.3.3; *Dom.* 41; *Prov. cons.* 17.42; *Har. resp.* 21.45; *Vell. Pat.* 2.45.1-2; *App. B Civ.* 2.14; *Plut. Cat. Min.* 33.3-4; *Caes.* 14.16-17; *Cic.* 30.4-7; and *Dio Cass.* 38.10.1; 38.12.1-3; and 38.14.3.

³³ For the full argument and sources, see Epstein (1986), 234f.

³⁴ Dio Cassius suggests that Cicero was deceived by Clodius (38.14.3). Cf. *Cic. Att.* 3.15.4. Gruen (1966) cogently argues that Clodius was a shrewd demagogue who, far from being an instrument of the three dynasts, cunningly exploited the weaknesses of his political opponents to further his own ends.

without trial, and Cicero was the primary target (Vell. Pat. 2.45.1-3).³⁵ Despite dynasts' previous assurances that the ex-consul had nothing to fear from Clodius, the triumvirs failed to support Cicero in his hour of need, perhaps because they themselves had been outsmarted and outmaneuvered by Clodius.³⁶ Similarly, the Senate under whose decree Cicero had executed the Catilinarian conspirators and whose influential members Cicero had asked for their opinion and their support before the executions were carried out did not move a finger to assist the orator.³⁷ Several senators ran out of the Senate House, rending their tunics and crying aloud in the streets (Plut. *Cic.* 31.1), but apparently no *homo optimus* was willing to stick his neck out for Cicero.

Back in July of 59 BCE, the great Roman statesman was very confident that he wanted to remain in Rome and fight Clodius (*Att.* 2.19.5).³⁸ Less than a year later, however, he was afraid of being prosecuted by the demagogue: in March of 58 BCE, Cicero fled Rome and escaped to Macedonia. In response, Clodius passed the second bill that declared Cicero an exile. Clodius' gangsters demolished the orator's house on the Palatine and badly damaged his villa at Tusculum (Plut. *Cic.* 31.6-33.6). In his letters from exile, Cicero displays quite strong emotions, blaming himself and others for his predicament, voicing concerns for the safety of his family, bursting into tears, and even sharing his desire to die. Although these are very poignant letters, one must

³⁵ See also Plut. *Cic.* 30.5; *Caes.* 14.17; App. *B Civ.* 2.15; and Dio Cass. 38.14.4-5.

³⁶ For the full argument and an exhaustive list of sources, see Gruen (1966), 125-128. Referring to the three dynasts, Cicero says, "Tribunum popularem a se alienare nolebant suaque sibi propiora esse pericula quam mea loquebantur" (*Sest.* 40-41). Cf. also *Cic. Dom.* 24; 54-55; and 129.

³⁷ In his letter to Atticus written in the late April of 59 BCE, Cicero complains, "Non me hercule me tu quidem tam isto exercitu quam ingratissimis animis eorum hominum qui appellantur boni, qui mihi non modo praemiorum sed ne sermonum quidem umquam fructum ullum aut gratiam rettulerunt" (*Att.* 2.16.2).

³⁸ "Sed ego hoc non repudio. Quid ergo est? Pugnare malo."

always remember Cicero's inclination to exaggerate and thus take his claims with a grain of salt.³⁹ If we are to believe Plutarch, the orator and his supporters were quite capable of putting up dramatic shows to elicit sympathy from onlookers (*Cic.* 30.6-31.1).

The attempts to gain Cicero's recall from exile started as early as the later months of 58 BCE, but they came to nothing. Clodius was in full control of his gangs, using violence to block any move to bring the statesman back from exile; Caesar was out of Rome, serving as the proconsul in Gaul; and Pompeius retired to the countryside in fear of assassination. Yet, Cicero's eventual recall in August 57 BCE was very much orchestrated by Pompeius.⁴⁰ Both Titus Annius Milo (trib. 57 BCE) and Publius Sestius (trib. 58-57 BCE) were working for Pompeius when they recruited their own gangs to oppose those led by Clodius. The other two triumvirs also supported Pompeius in his efforts to bring Cicero back from exile.⁴¹ At the Senate full meeting convened in July of 57 BCE, the overwhelming majority voted for Cicero's recall (*Cic. Sest.* 129). On August 4, 57 BCE, the Centuriate Assembly passed the bill into law; Cicero was back in Rome a month later, boasting to Atticus about his triumphant return (*Att.* 4.1.4-5).

³⁹ Hutchinson (1998), 25-48, offers quite a compassionate reading of Cicero's letters from this period; he suggests that the main causes for Cicero's outbursts are the ignominy and poverty inflicted by exile.

⁴⁰ See *Cic. Sest.* 67; 74; 107; *Red. sen.* 29; *Red. pop.* 16; *Dom.* 27-30; *App. B Civ.* 2.16; *Plut. Cic.* 33.2-3; and *Dio Cass.* 38.30.1-4.

⁴¹ For details, see Gruen (1966), 128ff.

Cicero often portrayed himself as a “promoter of peace” (*Fam.* 7.23.2), and he was the first clear example of a consul who did not complete ten years of military service before he was elected to office.⁴² Yet, his first recommendation to a young man who seeks *gloria* is to win it through military achievements (*Cic. Off.* 2.45).⁴³ Judging from Cicero’s biography, considerable military training and service were still expected of members of the Roman elite even in the first century BCE. After assuming the *toga virilis*, Cicero spent at least a year undergoing military training on the Campus Martius (*Cael.* 11). During the Social War (91-87 BCE), he served as a junior officer in Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo’s army against the Marsi and was present at important negotiations between the Roman and Italian leaders (*Cic. Phil.* 12.11.27).⁴⁴ Attending a general in war was an excellent opportunity to learn about military matters and provincial administration and to form strong ties with one’s peers and superiors. Cicero also witnessed the events of the civil war between Marius and Sulla, and his writings make it abundantly clear that both statesmen were of great importance to him, informing his self-representation.⁴⁵ Later in life, Cicero wore a breastplate during the consular election of 63 BCE in order to call attention to the

⁴² “Martis vero signum quo mihi pacis auctori?” (*Fam.* 7.23.2). For Cicero’s military service, see footnote n. 1 above.

⁴³ “Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt.”

⁴⁴ Later in the war, Cicero also served under Sulla (*Cic. Div.* 1.72 and *Plut. Cic.* 3.2). At that time, both Strabo and Sulla were politically attached to Marius.

⁴⁵ See Gnauk (1936), 38ff.; Wiseman (1971), 108; Diehl (1988), 122-125; Dugan (2005), 11ff.; and Santangelo (2008). Carney (1960) explicates how Cicero idolized the memory of Marius who, according to him, even deserved to be called the *pater patriae* (*Cic. Rab. Post.* 10.27). On Sulla, see Ridley (1975); Diehl (1988); and Dowling (2000), 305-313.

military-like aspects of his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy (Cic. *Mur.* 52).⁴⁶ Finally, in *De officiis* Cicero commends the military achievements of his son Marcus, who commanded a cavalry *ala* in Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus' army. In particular, the orator mentions Pompeius' appreciation of Marcus' service as the main precondition for the youth's prospective political career which was cut short by the civil war (*Off.* 2.45).⁴⁷

After returning from exile in 57 BCE, Cicero desperately needed to restore his public image and enhance his prestige, but his attempts to re-enter politics were unsuccessful.⁴⁸ In the speeches given to the Senate and the people shortly after his arrival in Rome, he discusses the other three *consulares* who suffered banishment: Publius Popilius Laenas, Quintus Metellus, and Marius. The orator claims that he is better than they are because he came back in the most honorable way, supported by the consensus of the Senate and the people. Yet, to the Roman mind *exilium* implied dishonor and brought shame upon a person in exile and his family. Later in life, Cicero vehemently argued that no banishment was disgraceful unless joined to wrongdoing, which, according to the author, he never committed (*Dom.* 72-76).⁴⁹ However, the ignominious connotations of Cicero's exile can be corroborated by the fact that his enemies

⁴⁶ See also Plut. *Cic.* 14.7-8; Dio Cass. 37.29.4; and Steel (2001), 162-189.

⁴⁷ Caesar's *lex Iulia municipalis* of 45 BCE allowed those who served three campaigns on horse in a legion or six campaigns on foot to bypass the minimum age requirement of being at least thirty years of age to qualify for municipal office elections. See *tabula Heracleensis* 89-104, in Crawford (1996), no. 24.

⁴⁸ For details, see Santangelo (2008), 599f.

⁴⁹ It is also important that Cicero left Rome before he could be prosecuted by Publius Clodius Pulcher (trib. 58 BCE). Only after the orator left did the tribune pass the second bill declaring him an exile. Cicero always deemed the bill unconstitutional.

taunted him with it (Cic. *Dom.* 72 and Dio Cass. 39.60.1).⁵⁰ The statesman himself also carefully avoided the term in all references to his expulsion from Italy.

In the same letter Cicero makes a declaration about his triumphant homecoming, he also grumbles about people who used to defend him during his exile but resent and envy him now (Cic. *Att.* 4.1.8). Clodius and his *populares* began to harass Cicero again almost immediately after his arrival in Rome (Cic. *Dom.* 14 and Dio Cass. 39.20.3-21.4).⁵¹ More importantly, Cicero's attempts to weaken the triumvirate of Pompeius, Caesar, and Crassus came to naught. When he chose to side with the dynasts (Cic. *Att.* 4.5.3), his opponents promptly labeled him *levissimus transfuga* (Ps.-Sall. *In. Cic.* 7). In a letter to his brother Quintus composed at the end of 54 BCE, the statesman shares his story of despair (*Q. Fr.* 3.5.4).⁵² A small victorious war, which could perhaps enable Cicero to claim a triumph, was an excellent opportunity to restore his reputation, silence criticism, and augment his *auctoritas* and influence among the senators. Thus, when the Senate, in accordance with a *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE, appointed the ex-consul the governor of poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Cilicia for the year 51-50 BCE and granted him proconsular *imperium*, the great orator immediately seized the opportunity and began to plan his shameless "triumph-hunting" campaign against the "barbarians."

⁵⁰ As an Arpinan, Cicero was also often called a foreign king and accused of tyranny by his enemies. See Juv. 8.237-238; Cic. *Sull.* 21-22; *Att.* 1.16.10; *Sest.* 109; *Vatin.* 23; and Ps.-Sall. *In. Cic.* 5.

⁵¹ For details, see Tempest (2014), 139-144.

⁵² "Angor, mi suavissime frater, angor nullam esse rem publicam, nulla iudicia, nostrumque hoc tempus aetatis quod in illa auctoritate senatoria florere debebat aut forensi labore iactari aut domesticis litteris sustentari, illud vero quod a puero adamaram, Πολλὸν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων, totum occidisse, inimicos a me partim non oppugnatos, partim etiam esse defensos, meum non modo animum sed ne odium quidem esse liberum."

As early as August 51 BCE, a friend of Cicero named Marcus Caelius Rufus conveyed to him not only his fears of a massive Parthian invasion but also the hope for a minor victorious war that would enable Cicero to claim a triumph (Cic. *Fam.* 8.5.1).⁵³ Even if Rufus' advice was mischievous, one should not be surprised with the military adventurism of the self-proclaimed "promoter of peace" (Cic. *Fam.* 7.23.2).⁵⁴ Historically, members of the Roman aristocracy used their real and invented military achievements to secure a record of military prowess and to win a social grant of *gloria*, *dignitas*, and *auctoritas* from others.⁵⁵ Sallust aptly points out that the Roman *nobiles* typically won their military glory at the price of simple legionaries' toil (*Jug.* 85.34). In the agonistic culture prevalent at Rome, the triumph was a greatly sought-after mark of excellence: it provided extraordinary means for constructing an auspicious public image and increasing one's reputation and prestige.⁵⁶ Celebrating a triumph or at least winning triumphal honors significantly enhanced one's acquired honor and *auctoritas* and enabled him to lay much more effective claim to political power. It is hardly surprising, then, that triumphal celebrations

⁵³ "Qua tu cura sis, quod ad pacem provinciae tuae finitimarumque regionum attinet, nescio; ego quidem vehementer animi pendeo. Nam si hoc modo rem moderari possemus, ut pro viribus copiarum tuarum belli quoque existeret magnitudo et quantum gloriae triumphoque opus esset adsequeremur, periculosam et gravem illam dimicationem evitarem, nihil tam esset optandum...." Cf. Cicero's reply in *Fam.* 2.10.2.

⁵⁴ Since a triumph was traditionally presented as apposite honor for vanquishing enemies of the Roman people, Beard (2007), 188, characterizes Rufus' advice as "a characteristically naughty piece of subversion." However, it was *un secret de Polichinelle* that real or invented military victories were simply an opportune device to lay successful claim to a triumph in order to augment one's prestige.

⁵⁵ Both Cicero (*Brut.* 62) and Livy (8.40.4) point out that triumphs and consulships were often falsely attributed, usually in order to augment family's ascribed honor by boosting up the achievements of all clan's forbearers.

⁵⁶ For the origins and history of the Roman triumph, see Barini (1952); Payne (1962); Bonfante Warren (1970); Versnel (1970); Künzl (1988); and Beard (2007).

were prepared with as much attention to detail as plans of the military campaigns (Diod. Sic. 31.8.13).⁵⁷

The earliest Roman triumphs were victory celebrations that praised the *monomachist* who had seized the *tropaeum* of arms from the vanquished enemy.⁵⁸ Later, celebrating a triumph considerably augmented an aristocrat's prestige, making the triumph a guaranteed way to win pre-eminence in status. At his moment of glory, a triumphator conspicuously displayed the acts of violence that had laid the foundation of victory, narrating his martial prowess, parading subjugated and humiliated enemies, and flaunting looted spoils for all to see and remember.⁵⁹ Today, one of the most recognized representations of all this can be found in the passageway relief on the Arch of Titus in Rome.⁶⁰ It is important to remember that Roman generals usually took the initiative in requesting a triumph since it was not automatically conferred on them by a grateful Senate or people.⁶¹ In his invective titled *In Pisonem*, Cicero repeatedly attacks Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 BCE) for his refusal to demand a triumph after being

⁵⁷ For the general as the impresario of the show, cf. Polybius who says: “Τοὺς γὰρ προσαγορευομένους παρ’ αὐτοῖς θριάμβους, δι’ ὧν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἄγεται τοῖς πολίταις ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἢ τῶν κατειργασμένων πραγμάτων ἐνάργεια, τούτους οὐ δύνανται χειρίζειν, ὡς πρέπει, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ συντελεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ συνέδριον συγκατάθῃται καὶ δῶ τὴν εἰς ταῦτα δαπάνην” (6.15.8).

⁵⁸ See Picard (1957), 130, and Bonfante Warren (1970), 52f.

⁵⁹ See, for example, the accounts of Lucius Aemilius Paullus' triumph over the Macedonians (Diod. Sic. 31.8.9-13 and Plut. *Aem.* 32.2-34.7), Pompeius' triumph over Mithridates (Plut. *Pomp.* 45.1-5 and App. *Mith.* 116-117), and Ovid's account of the imaginary triumph over the Germans (*Tr.* 4.2.1-56). Cf. also my discussion in Chapter I, pp. 70-83, of how violence permeated all aspects of life of the Romans.

⁶⁰ See Pfanner (1983), 44-76, and pls. 45-67.

⁶¹ See Phillips (1974), 267f. Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.11, where the statesman requests Cato the Younger's support of *supplicatio* vote.

recalled from Macedonia, pointing out that reputable Roman commanders always celebrated triumphs upon their return (*Pis.* 16.38 and 23.55-24.58). Cicero fulminates, “You are the first person ever who, having presided over Macedonia with consular authority, did not celebrate a triumph after your return” (*Pis.* 23.55).⁶² Since the great Roman orator claims that *cupiditas triumphi* is a fundamental element of Roman public life, Piso’s lack of interest in “triumph-hunting” becomes, in effect, a moral flaw (*Pis.* 24.56-57).⁶³

In contrast to Piso, Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57 BCE) and Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54 BCE), who governed Cilicia before Cicero, in 56-53 and 53-52 BCE respectively, did lay claim to a triumph. After winning military victories, both of them were saluted as *imperatores* by their soldiers.⁶⁴ This was the first necessary step in the process of securing a triumph since assuming the title of *imperator* enabled a victorious general to assert his right to a triumph before the Senate.⁶⁵ Hence, Lentulus requested a triumph and was awarded one (*Cic. Att.* 5.21.4). Pulcher also actively canvassed for a triumph but had to withdraw his claim in order to enter Rome and defend himself against prosecution (*Cic. Fam.* 3.9.2 and

⁶² “Tu inventus es qui consulari imperio praeditus ex Macedonia non triumphares.” Cicero also says, “Itaque et provinciam ornatam [Macedoniam] et spem non dubiam triumphi neglexi...” (*Fam.* 15.4.13). Brennan (2000), 2:534f., demonstrates that Cicero’s observation on the effortlessness of triumphing from Macedonia is quite tendentious.

⁶³ For details, see Beard (2007), 216ff. Cf. also *Cic. Rep.* 5.7.9, where the author asserts that human activity is primarily driven by the relentless pursuit of *gloria*. If we are to believe Dionysius of Halicarnassus, by the late first century BCE the Roman triumph turned into a lavish and ostentatious show-off designed as a display of wealth (*Ant. Rom.* 2.34.3).

⁶⁴ For Cilician *imperatores*, see *Cic. Fam.* 1.8.7; 1.9.2; and 3.1.1.

⁶⁵ For the history and significance of the *appellatio imperatoris*, see Combès (1966), 72-120, and Versnel (1970), 340-351.

10.1).⁶⁶ Following in the footsteps of his predecessors, Cicero was determined to celebrate a triumph as well. After returning from exile, which, to the Roman mind, bore a meaning fraught with dishonor, the statesman needed to restore his public image and enhance his reputation and prestige. Laying successful claim to a triumph offered unparalleled means to do so.⁶⁷ Even before entering the province, the proconsul informs his friend Atticus about his intention to spend the rest of the summer months of 51 BCE engaged in military affairs (*Att.* 5.14.2).⁶⁸

Unlike Syria or Macedonia, the province of Cilicia was not important enough to warrant the presence of a large Roman force. Cicero had only two poorly trained and undermanned legions and some auxiliaries at his disposal (*Att.* 5.15.1).⁶⁹ Plutarch estimates the strength of the proconsular army at twelve thousand foot soldiers and twenty-six hundred horsemen, but there is no way to know whether these figures are accurate (*Cic.* 36.1). Before his arrival in Cilicia, Cicero begged Claudius Appius Pulcher (cos. 54 BCE), the governor whom he was to succeed,

⁶⁶ The trial was probably initiated solely to obstruct Pulcher's attempt to acquire more *gloria* and *auctoritas* by celebrating the triumph. For competing triumphal claims of Roman provincial governors at that time, see Beard (2007), 189ff.

⁶⁷ In a long letter meant to persuade Cato the Younger to vote for his *supplicatio*, Cicero says: "Idem post iniuriam acceptam, quam tu rei p. calamitatem semper appellas, meam non modo non calamitatem sed etiam gloriam, studui quam ornatissima senatus populique R de me iudicia intercedere. Itaque et augur postea fieri volui, quod antea neglexeram, et eum honorem, qui a senatu tribui rebus bellicis solet, neglectum a me olim nunc mihi expetendum puto. Huic meae voluntati, in qua inest aliqua vis desiderii ad sanandum vulnus iniuriae, ut faveas adiutorque sis, quod paulo ante me negaram rogaturum, vehementer te rogo, sed ita, si non ieiunum hoc nescio quid, quod ego gessi, et contemnendum videbitur sed tale atque tantum, ut multi nequaquam paribus rebus honores summos a senatu consecuti sint" (*Fam.* 15.4.13-14). For detailed discussions of the letter, see Wistrand (1979), 10-18, and Hutchinson (1998), 86-100.

⁶⁸ "Erat mihi in animo recta proficisci ad exercitum, aestivos mensis reliquos rei militari dare, hibernos iuris dictioni." Ironically, when Cicero returned from exile, he declared that, like Marius, he would revenge himself on his enemies, albeit using peaceful methods since he was not accustomed to arms (*Cic. Red. pop.* 19-23).

⁶⁹ See also *Cic. Att.* 6.5.3 and *Fam.* 8.10.1-2.

not to discharge any of the soldiers (*Fam.* 3.3.2). In addition, the proconsul complained that prior to his arrival to Cilicia some units suffered from poor discipline and lack of commanding officers (*Cic. Fam.* 15.4.2-3).⁷⁰ With this force, which must have been spread thin to control the overland route from Asia Minor to the Aleian Plain in Cilicia, Cicero could not expect to establish an indisputable claim to a triumph by defeating a formidable enemy. In a letter composed on June 15, 51 BCE, he is hopeful the Parthians will keep quiet (*Att.* 5.9.1). Although Cicero's hopes were crushed when the Parthians raided Syria and Cilicia in August of that year, the proconsul still attacked several tribes of highlanders in Cilicia in order not to be outdone by the rival Roman generals in Syria and be able to petition the Senate for a triumph.

In August of 51 BCE, the Parthians crossed the Euphrates and raided Roman Syria and Cilicia, tardily following up their victory over Crassus at Carrhae (Harran) in 53 BCE (*Plut. Crass.* 17-31 and *Dio Cass.* 40.17-27). Their army, which was supported by Arab allies (*Cic. Fam.* 15.4.7), consisted mostly of cavalry whose objective was harassment of the Roman forces and plunder and destruction of property. Osaces, the renowned Parthian general who was probably training the young Prince Pacorus I, son of King Orodes II (57-37 BCE), for warfare, commanded the troops (*Dio Cass.* 40.28.3-4).⁷¹ After establishing a base of operations at Tyba in Syria (*Cic. Fam.* 15.1.2), the Parthian forces went two separate ways. A larger portion of the army overran Cyrrhestica and laid siege to Antioch, where Gaius Cassius Longinus was stationed with his legions (*Dio Cass.* 40.28.3-29.1 and *Cic. Att.* 5.20.3).⁷² He was awaiting the arrival of

⁷⁰ For more information on Cicero's forces, see Shaw (1990), 223f., especially n. 76.

⁷¹ See also *Cic. Fam.* 15.1; 15.3; 15.4.4-7; and *Att.* 5.18.1-2 and 5.20.2-3. Cf. Debevoise (1968), 96-104, and Ghirshman (1954), 252f.

⁷² Cyrrhestica was the part of Roman Syria that stretched from Cilicia in the north to Antioch on Orontes in the south (*Strabo* 16.2.8).

Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE), who had been appointed governor of Syria for the year 51-50 BCE (Cic. *Att.* 5.18.1 and *Fam.* 8.10.1-2).⁷³ A smaller portion of the Parthian army attacked eastern Cilicia and destroyed a small unit of Roman cavalry (*Att.* 5.16.4). However, Cicero had around twenty-six hundred horsemen altogether (Plut. *Cic.* 36.1), and it is not a coincidence that he regarded them highly (Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.3). At the city of Epiphanea, a cavalry task force Cicero had sent to patrol the territory bordering Syria routed Parthian and Arab cavalry (Cic. *Fam.* 15.2.3 and 4.7).⁷⁴ Although the proconsul, who was at Cappadocia with most of his troops, did not participate in this battle, the news he received about the Parthian incursion compelled him to march with his army further east in order to defend the Cilician Gates (Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.7-8 and *Att.* 5.20.2).⁷⁵

While Cicero and his troops were marching back and forth between Cappadocia and Cilicia, Gaius Cassius Longinus successfully repulsed the larger Parthian forces that had besieged Antioch.⁷⁶ Near Antigonea, he even managed to ambush and wound Osaces, who died a few

⁷³ Following Crassus' death at Carrhae (Harran) in 53 BCE, Cassius, who is best known as one of Caesar's assassins, governed Syria as proquaestor until the arrival of Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE) late in 51 BCE.

⁷⁴ Previously known as Oeniandus (Plin. *HN* 5.22.93), the city was renamed in honor of Antiochus VI Epiphanes (175-164 BCE). Strategically located in Cilicia Pedias (Ptol. *Geog.* 5.8.7), in the area of the Gülek Pass that connects the low plains of Cilicia to the Anatolian Plateau, Epiphanea was easy to defend (cf. Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.4).

⁷⁵ Strabo 12.2.7 locates the Cilician Gates in the Taurus Mountains. The road connecting Tyana in Cappadocia to Tarsus in Cilicia passed through this narrow passage.

⁷⁶ For his cursory account of events, see *Fam.* 15.14.7; *Att.* 5.20.3-4; and 5.21.2. Cicero is characteristically dismissive of others' success: "C. Cassius, frater Q. Cassi familiaris tui, pudentiores illas litteras miserat de quibus tu ex me requiris quid sibi voluerint quam eas quas postea misit, quibus per se scribit confectum esse Parthicum bellum. Recesserant illi quidem ab Antiochia ante Bibuli adventum sed nullo nostro εὐημερήματι..." (*Att.* 5.21.2).

days later (Dio Cass. 40.29.1-3 and Front. *Str.* 2.5.35).⁷⁷ The death of the veteran general forced the Parthians to withdraw into northern Syria, where they went into winter quarters in Cyrrhestica (Cic. *Att.* 5.21.2).⁷⁸ It is borderline absurd, but Cicero has enough audacity to claim most credit for this victory! In a letter to Atticus, the governor of Cilicia asserts that the Parthians withdrew from Antioch in a state of panic after they had heard rumors about his march to the Amanus Mountains (*Att.* 5.20.3).⁷⁹ With a touch of malice meant to downplay the military accomplishments of Cassius, Cicero suggests in another letter from October 51 BCE addressed to Appius Cladius Pulcher (cos. 54 BCE) that the Arab raiders with semi-Parthian equipment, not the Parthians themselves, invaded Syria (*Fam.* 3.8.10). The reality, of course, was very different. Cicero's desire not to be outshined by Cassius' victory in Syria compelled him to attack the towns of highlanders in the Amanus Mountains in mid-October, surely not the best time of the year for mountain warfare (Cic. *Att.* 5.20.5 and *Fam.* 15.4.8-10).⁸⁰

Back at the end of July of 51 BCE, yet unaware of the imminent Parthian invasion, Cicero craved for a small victorious war that would enable him to lay successful claim to a triumph and thus augment even further his *dignitas* and *auctoritas* at Rome (cf. *Att.* 5.14.2). Cilician

⁷⁷ Located approximately five miles northeast of Antioch, the city of Antigonea was founded at the Orontes River by Antigonus in 307 BCE (Strabo 16.2.4 and Diod. Sic. 20.47.5).

⁷⁸ Livy says, "C. Cassius, quaestor M. Crassi, Parthos, qui in Syriam transcenderant, cecidit" (*Per.* 108.2).

⁷⁹ "Interim (scis enim dici quaedam πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου) rumore adventus nostri et Cassio qui Antiochia tenebatur animus accessit et Parthis timor iniectus est. Itaque eos cedentis ab oppido Cassius insecutus rem bene gessit. Qua in fuga magna auctoritate Osaces dux Parthorum vulnus accepit eoque interiit paucis post diebus. erat in Syria nostrum nomen in gratia." Cicero is less boastful when he describes the sequence of events to Cato the Younger (*Fam.* 15.4.7).

⁸⁰ See Debevoise (1968), 102.

mountaineers presented themselves as the perfect target for proconsul's ambition to triumph from his province. Alarmed at Cassius' victory over the Parthians and fearful that his claim to a triumph may be slipping away, Cicero waged a ruthless campaign to suppress several tribes of highlanders in the Amanus Mountains. The orator claimed that they were unhappy with the Roman rule, harbored the deserters, and eagerly awaited the arrival of the Parthians (*Fam.* 15.1.3 and 4.10).⁸¹ After pillaging and burning down several rural hamlets, in mid-October of 51 BCE the proconsular forces seized the small town of Erana, which was the capital of Amanus; they also captured the settlements of Sepyra and Commoris.⁸²

In early November of 51 BCE, Cicero's troops marched to Pindenissus, which was a strongly fortified mountain town of the "free Cilicians." It took a six-week siege to force the residents of Pindenissus to surrender (*Cic. Fam.* 15.4.9-10).⁸³ Although victorious, the proconsul was well aware that his martial accomplishments were rather insignificant and could be easily disparaged back home by those who would want to deny him a distinctive grant of military glory. In a letter addressed to his close friend Atticus, Cicero unpretentiously says:

⁸¹ Although actions speak louder than words, it is quite ironic that at the end of his life Cicero championed quite different ideals regarding war and the treatment of enemies. In *De officiis*, which was composed in 44 BCE as the handbook for the ideal Roman statesman, he claims, "Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria conservandi i, qui non crudeles in bello, non inmanes fuerunt" (1.35). For the common tradition of Greek and Roman authors to treat mountaineers as a separate kind of people hostile to plainsmen, see Isaac (2004), 406-410.

⁸² Once again, in *De officiis* 1.38 Cicero advocates quite a different approach: "Cum vero de imperio decertatur belloque quaeritur gloria, causas omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum. Sed ea bella, quibus imperii proposita gloria est, minus acerbè gerenda sunt."

⁸³ Cf. *Cic. Fam.* 2.10.3 and *Att.* 5.20.1.

Early on the morning of the Saturnalia, the residents of Pindenissus surrendered to me, on the fifty-seventh day after we began our siege. “What the hell!” you will say, “Who are these people? I have never heard of them.” Well, what can I do? I do not have power to make Cilicia as famous as Aetolia or Macedonia, do I? (Cic. *Att.* 5.20.1).⁸⁴

On the one hand, it is significant that the would-be triumphator’s expeditions against the highlanders were planned and conducted not by him personally but by a military expert named Gaius Pomptinus, who was a long-time friend (Cic. *Pis.* 24.58) and had an impressive record of martial accomplishment.⁸⁵ Pomptinus was praetor in Cicero’s consulship in 63 BCE. As the military governor of Gallia Transalpina from 63 to 60 BCE, he suppressed the uprising of the Allobroges in 61-60 BCE and defeated the Helvetii who wanted to migrate into the province.⁸⁶ Despite Caesar’s opposition, in 59 BCE Pomptinus successfully claimed a *supplicatio* for his victories in Transalpina (*Schol. Bob.* 30). However, he was awarded a triumph proper only in 54 BCE, after a full five years of obstruction (Cic. *Pis.* 24.58 and *Att.* 4.18.4), becoming the first praetorian commander to triumph from “Gallia” since L. Furius Purpurio in 200 BCE.⁸⁷ Before

⁸⁴ “Saturnalibus mane se mihi Pindenissitae dediderunt septimo et quinquagesimo die postquam oppugnare eos coepimus. ‘Qui malum! Isti Pindenissitae qui sunt?’ inquires; ‘nomen audivi numquam.’ Quid ego faciam? Num potui Ciliciam Aetoliam aut Macedoniam reddere?” On the “effortlessness” of triumphing from Macedonia, cf. footnote n. 62 above.

⁸⁵ By the early first century BCE, once common knowledge of the principles of good generalship along with more specific technical training in planning and conducting military operations was preserved mostly within a smaller group of experts known as the *viri militares*. For details, see Smith (1958), 61-66; Campbell (1975), 11-31; and Rosenstein (2006), 378. Cf. also the electoral campaign of Marius. When he needed to challenge the hegemony of the aristocracy, he repeatedly emphasized his own *virtus* and military prowess and denied the existence of these qualities among the oligarchic aristocrats (Sall. *Iug.* 73.5-7; 85.10-13; 85.29-30; 85.38-40; and Plut. *Mar.* 9.3).

⁸⁶ For defeat of the Allobroges, see Caes. *B Gall.* 1.6; 1.44; 7.64; and Cic. *Prov. cons.* 32. For movement of the Helvetii, see Caes. *B Gall.* 1.2.

⁸⁷ For details, see the *Fasti Triumphales Capitolini* in Pais (1920), 1:16 and 266ff., and Brennan (2000), 2:578ff.

his departure from Rome, Cicero recruited Pomptinus to serve as his legate in Cilicia for the years 51-50 BCE.⁸⁸ The statesman's letters reveal the crucial role the general played during the campaign in the Amanus Mountains and thus undermine Cicero's personal claim to military glory (*Att.* 5.20.3 and *Fam.* 15.4.8-9).

On the other hand, the military operations in Cilicia could hardly justify the proconsul's claim to a triumph because they were nothing more than routine punitive expeditions that failed to achieve long-lasting results. After defeating the so-called "free Cilicians" (*Att.* 5.20.4), Cicero left for Asia Minor, where he stayed for five months. In June of 50 BCE, the orator returned back to his province and immediately noticed widespread brigandage (*Att.* 6.4.1).⁸⁹ Comparable events from the early imperial period clearly demonstrate that it was exceptionally difficult, if possible at all, to achieve effective and long-lasting control over the mountainous regions. For instance, according to Strabo, Cilicia was well suited to the needs of bandits and pirates; this is why it was governed by kings rather than by Roman prefects who had limited military resources to extend effective control over the region (14.5.6). Similarly, Dio Cassius reports that the Isaurian marauding expeditions reached the level of a full-scale war in 6 CE, over a hundred years after Cilicia had been first established as the province (55.28.3).⁹⁰

⁸⁸ After making the orator really anxious and even delaying him on his way to the province (*Cic. Att.* 5.1.5; 5.4.2; 5.5.1; 5.6.1; 5.10.1; and *Fam.* 3.3.2), Pomptinus at last joined Cicero at Athens in early July 51 BCE (*Att.* 5.11.4).

⁸⁹ "Magna in Cilicia latrocinia." For details, see Shaw (1990), 225f.

⁹⁰ Marcus Antonius (cos. 99 BCE) set up Cilicia as the province around 102 BCE (cf. *Cic. Brut.* 168; *De or.* 2.1.2; and *Livy, Per.* 68.1). For details on brigandage and piracy in the age of Augustus, cf. also Chapter III, pp. 249-256.

Determined to demand and be awarded a triumph, Cicero vastly inflates the effect of his campaign in his reports to the Roman magistrates and senators.⁹¹ The proconsul defends his attack against the highlanders as a show of force designed to intimidate Parthia and its supposed allies, the “free Cilicians,” and he asserts that his raid actually relieved both Cilicia and Syria from the pressure of the Parthian forces (*Fam.* 15.4.8-10).⁹² In essence, Cicero deftly claims not only to have won a great victory over the mountaineers but also to have assisted Gaius Cassius Longinus in driving the Parthians out of Syria by marching his troops back and forth between Cilicia and Cappadocia (*Cic. Fam.* 15.4.7-8 and *Att.* 5.20.2-3)! No wonder such a “military genius” had to be declared *imperator* by his troops at the end of the day (*Att.* 5.20.2-3), even though Gaius Pomptinus had done most of the fighting against the highlanders and the military operations in the Amanus Mountains fell short of resolving the conflict once and for all.⁹³ In order to put Cicero’s claim to triumphal honors into perspective, it helps to remember that he was declared *imperator* immediately after his troops seized the three very small towns in the Amanus Mountains (*Cic. Att.* 5.20.3; cf. *Fam.* 15.4.8-9). For comparison, Plutarch regards Crassus’ destruction of an important Greek city of Zenodotia in Mesopotamia as an insignificant deed unworthy of receiving the title of *imperator* (*Crass.* 17.3).⁹⁴

⁹¹ Once proclaimed *imperator* by his troops, a commander who canvassed for triumphal honors sent *litteras laureatas* to senators, announcing his victory and describing details of the campaign.

⁹² See also *Cic. Fam.* 15.1.3; 15.2.1-2; 2.10.3; and *Att.* 5.20.7. For summaries of campaigns, see Rawson (1975), 164-182; Shaw (1990), 223-226; and Mitchell (1991), 204-231. Wistrand (1979) presents a thorough reconstruction of events, and Marshall (1966) provides an interesting description of Cicero’s nonmilitary activities.

⁹³ “Imperatores appellati sumus” (*Att.* 5.20.3). See also *Cic. Fam.* 3.9.4.

⁹⁴ “Ἐπὶ ταύτης ἀλούσης δεξάμενος αὐτοκράτωρ ὑπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀναγορευθῆναι πολλὴν ὄφλεν αἰσχύνην, καὶ ταπεινὸς ἐφάνη καὶ περὶ τὰ μείζονα δύσελπις οὕτω πλεονέκτημα μικρὸν ἡγαπηκῶς.”

With his military authority recognized by the soldiers, Cicero could now establish a claim to a triumph. The first step was to launch the campaign for a *supplicatio*, which was a ceremony voted by the Senate to render thanks to the gods for a major victory over enemies of the Roman people.⁹⁵ In one of his letters to Atticus, the governor of Cilicia acknowledges sending a letter to all but two members of the Senate to sway the vote in favor of his “thanksgiving” (*Att.* 7.1.8). Since Roman generals were expected to demand a triumph and the Senate had to vote on the request, an active canvassing of senatorial votes and behind-the-scenes mobilization of senatorial support was not that unusual.⁹⁶ Three of Cicero’s canvassing letters survive, and they are addressed to Gaius Claudius Marcellus (cos. 50 BCE), Lucius Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50 BCE), and Cato the Younger (*Cic. Fam.* 15.10, 13, and 4).⁹⁷ The orator’s initial bid for triumphal glory was a success: in May or June of 50 BCE, the Senate agreed to grant him the *supplicatio*, even though Cato the Younger had voted against it (*Cic. Fam.* 8.11.2).⁹⁸

As much as Cicero extols his own achievements, he disparages those of his potential competitors for triumphal glory. In a letter dated from February of 50 BCE, the proconsul

⁹⁵ For a description of the ritual and Cicero’s *supplicatio*, see Halkin (1953), 99-105 and 48-58. Cf. also Versnel (1970), 170-174.

⁹⁶ See Phillips (1974), 267f., and Beard (2007), 197ff. It is interesting that the Senate deliberated triumph claims in the Temple of Bellona (*Livy* 26.21.1; 28.9.5; 28.38.2; and 31.47.6), which had been dedicated by Appius Claudius Caecus (cos. 307 and 296 BCE), the master of non-military *urbanae artes* (*Livy* 10.19.17-18).

⁹⁷ There is also a letter addressed to Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54 BCE), the ex-governor of Cilicia, where Cicero asks Appius to exert himself as much as possible to secure Cicero’s *supplicatio* (*Fam.* 3.9.4).

⁹⁸ I discuss some of the obstructionist tactics of Cato the Younger above, pp. 97-100. As an inflexible optimiate, Cato perhaps thought that such a *novus homo* as Cicero simply did not deserve triumphal honors, especially when Cato’s son-in-law, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE), was in the race for the same prize (cf. *Att.* 7.2.7 and a discussion below, pp. 123-127).

dismisses as idle talk Gaius Cassius Longinus' dispatch to the Senate about the end of the Parthian war and asserts that a most serious conflict is imminent (*Att.* 5.21.2-3).⁹⁹ Throughout 51 BCE, the governor of Cilicia bombarded the Senate and his friends and acquaintances in Rome with panicky communications.¹⁰⁰ First, in his dispatch to the Senate dated from September 22, 51 BCE, he urged the senators to send strong reinforcements to the East lest the Roman Republic is forced to give up all its eastern provinces (*Fam.* 15.1.3-5). However, most Roman legions were stationed in Spain, Gaul, and Italy. Since neither Pompeius nor Caesar was willing to part with any troops, in the end Cicero received no reinforcements.¹⁰¹ Second, Cicero feared the Armenians would actively support Osaces' and Pacorus' military operations on the Roman bank of the Euphrates and raid Cappadocia (*Fam.* 15.3.1; cf. *Fam.* 15.2.1-2).¹⁰² Finally, he expected a serious war for 50 BCE (*Fam.* 8.7.1), imagining Gnaeus Pompeius facing off against the Parthian King Orodes II (*Att.* 5.21.3).¹⁰³

⁹⁹ As usual, the great orator is full of himself and readily denigrates his colleague in Syria, "Recesserant illi quidem ab Antiochia ante Bibuli adventum sed nullo nostro ἐνημερήματι; hodie vero hiemant in Cyrrhestica, maximumque bellum impendet.... Quo autem die Cassi litterae victrices in senatu recitatae sunt, datae Nonis Octobribus, eodem meae tumultum nuntiantes. Axius noster ait nostras auctoritatis plenas fuisse, illis negat creditum" (Cic. *Att.* 5.21.2). See also Cic. *Att.* 6.1.14; 6.2.6; and *Fam.* 8.7.1.

¹⁰⁰ For example, cf. Marcus Caelius Rufus' response to Cicero (*Fam.* 8.5.1).

¹⁰¹ In 51 BCE, the Senate obliged both Pompeius and Caesar to send one legion each for the Parthian campaign. Pompeius immediately asked Caesar to return the legion he had lent him back in 53 BCE. Although Caesar obliged and even sent another legion on his own account, no troops were sent to the East. Instead, both legions were handed over to Pompeius and kept in Campania (*B Gal.* 6.1; 8.54-55 [Hirtius]; and *B Civ.* 1.4.3).

¹⁰² King Artavasdes of Armenia was brother-in-law of Prince Pacorus. See Debevoise (1968), 98.

¹⁰³ See also Cic. *Att.* 5.21.2-3; 6.1.3; 6.1.14; 6.2.6; and 6.4.1. Ever since his return from exile, Cicero felt obliged to Pompeius. But Marcus Caelius Rufus also mentions that some people at Rome proposed to send Caesar with his own army to wage war on the Parthians (Cic. *Fam.* 8.10.2).

Contrary to Cicero's expectations, a major Roman-Parthian war failed to materialize. Cassius and Bibulus, who bore the brunt of the Parthian operations, should be given most credit for this, but Cicero predictably attributes the end of hostilities to a "Parthian stroke of luck" (*Att.* 6.6.3).¹⁰⁴ However, Osaces was wounded in Cassius' ambush and died a few days later (Dio Cass. 40.29.1-3 and Front. *Str.* 2.5.35). Then the young Prince Pacorus withdrew his forces into northern Syria (Cic. *Att.* 5.21.2 and Dio Cass. 40.29.3). When Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE) arrived in Antioch late in 51 BCE, he had missed all action against the enemy (Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.7).¹⁰⁵ Not unlike Cicero, however, Bibulus was looking for a way to claim a triumph upon his return to Rome. Shortly after his arrival, he imprudently led his troops to the Amanus Mountains, the same region where Cicero had been fighting the "free Cilicians," only to suffer heavy losses there (Cic. *Att.* 5.20.4-5; cf. Rufus, in *Fam.* 8.6.4). It is significant that when Cicero first arrived in Cilicia, he appeared to have been well disposed to Bibulus. In the report to the Senate dated from September 22, 51 BCE, the proconsul describes the newly appointed governor of Syria as *fortissimus* (*Fam.* 15.1.5).¹⁰⁶ However, the orator quickly changed the tune after Bibulus' rash expedition to the Amanus Mountains. Once the governor of Syria was identified as a rival claimant of a triumph, gloves were off. In his private correspondence, Cicero openly gloats over the losses Bibulus suffered at the Amanus range when "he began looking for a twig of laurel in a wedding cake" (*Att.* 5.20.4-5 and *Fam.* 8.6.4).¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ See also Cic. *Att.* 7.1.2; 7.2.8; 7.26.3; and 8.11.7.

¹⁰⁵ See also Cic. *Att.* 5.21.2 and Dio Cass. 40.30.1.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Cicero's positive assessments of Gaius Cassius Longinus in *Fam.* 2.10.2 and 15.14.3.

¹⁰⁷ "In eodem Amano coepit loreolam in mustaceo quaerere" (*Att.* 5.20.4). The letters are dated from December 51 and February 50 BCE respectively. For cake recipe, see Cato *Agr.* 121.

The slaughter of Crassus' army at Carrhae (Harran) in 53 BCE as well as Gaius Cassius Longinus' successful operations against the Parthian forces must have eviscerated Roman legionary strength in Syria. As I described above, no reinforcements could be expected from the West. When the Parthians began raiding Syria again in the spring of 50 BCE (Cic. *Att.* 6.4.1 and 5.3), there was very little Bibulus could do.¹⁰⁸ After the unsuccessful attempt to recall Gabinius' soldiers from Egypt resulted in the murder of his two sons (Val. Max. 4.1.15; cf. Cic. *Att.* 6.5.3), the governor of Syria kept himself shut up in Antioch and supposedly even asked for reinforcements from Cicero (Cic. *Att.* 6.8.5).¹⁰⁹ Eventually, Bibulus focused on a diplomatic solution to the Roman-Parthian conflict.¹¹⁰ Having won the regard of Satrap Ornodapates, who bore a grudge against King Orodes II, Bibulus persuaded him to support Prince Pacorus' claim to the throne. The troops that had plundered Roman Syria were to be deployed against Orodes (Dio Cass. 40.30.2). Even though the Parthian king somehow learned of the conspiracy and recalled Pacorus, the Romans still benefited because the major Parthian invasion Cicero was so concerned about was averted, giving Rome a breathing space in the East (Just. *Epit.* 42.4.5).¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Cf. also Livy, *Per.* 108.5, "Resque a M. Bibulo in Syria gestas continet." Hence, Dio Cassius' assertion that, following the death of his veteran general Osaces, Pacorus never invaded Syria again must be wrong (40.29.3).

¹⁰⁹ See also Cic. *Att.* 7.2.6 and *Fam.* 12.19.2. Julius Caesar, who was also antagonistic toward Bibulus due to their rivalry during prior election campaigns (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.16.3) as well as Bibulus' obstructionism during their consular year, says, "Bibulum in obsidione habuerant" (*B Civ.* 3.31.3).

¹¹⁰ Around 55 BCE, Aulus Gabinius (cos. 58 BCE), who was then governor of Syria, was bribed by King Ptolemy XII Auletes (80-58 and 55-51 BCE) and sent soldiers to Egypt to restore the king to the throne. A detachment of Roman legionaries was left in Egypt to protect the king from the unruly citizens of Alexandria who had deposed him in 58 BCE. For the sequence of events that led to the murder of Bibulus' children, see Gray-Fow (1990), 180-185.

¹¹¹ The account of Justinus is somewhat confused, as the author never mentions Bibulus and gives all the credit to Cassius.

In mid-July of 50 BCE, the governor of Cilicia reported the Parthian threat removed and Roman garrisons quartered in Apamea and elsewhere withdrawn (Cic. *Fam.* 2.17.1 and 3).¹¹² For the next decade or so, the Parthians, who were squabbling among themselves, were not of any menace to Rome, and the Euphrates remained the boundary between the two empires.¹¹³ Cassius' military victory and Bibulus' diplomatic success effectively nullified the political impact of Carrhae, bringing peace to the Roman eastern frontier. After such accomplishment, the governor of Syria had every right to seek and be awarded a triumph at Rome, even if this galled Cicero who, despite his very marginal involvement with the Parthians, construed all his military steps as shows of force aimed at intimidating the enemy and its supposed allies (Cic. *Fam.* 15.1.3 and 2.1-2). The bottom line of Cicero's position appears to be the following: Bibulus wrongly took the whole credit for matters in which both governors had a share (*Fam.* 2.17.7).¹¹⁴ It is significant that for years Cicero passed over in complete silence Bibulus' diplomatic success in Syria, simultaneously pouring scorn on his overall strategy and insinuating that the governor of Syria had kept himself shut up in Antioch out of fear for the Parthians (*Att.* 6.8.5).¹¹⁵ As late as 46 BCE, two years after Bibulus' death, the great orator was still throwing dirt on his name.¹¹⁶

¹¹² The latter action brought about some criticism from Gnaeus Sallustius, the proquaestor in Syria (Cic. *Fam.* 2.17.3).

¹¹³ Cf. Debevoise (1968), 103f.

¹¹⁴ "Nam, ad senatum quas Bibulus litteras misit, in iis, quod mihi cum illo erat commune, sibi soli attribuit."

¹¹⁵ See also Cic. *Att.* 7.2.6 and 7.2.8.

¹¹⁶ In a letter addressed to Quintus Cornificius, who was the Caesar-assigned governor of Syria for 46-45 BCE, Cicero gives the following advice: "Quod si parvis copiis ad confligendum non habebis, non te fugiet uti consilio M. Bibuli, qui se oppido munitissimo et copiosissimo tam diu tenuit quam diu in provincia Parthi fuerunt" (*Fam.* 12.19.2). Because Cicero mocks the over-caution of Bibulus elsewhere, there is a touch of spite in this advice.

In his letters dated from June and October of 50 BCE, Cicero repeatedly urges Atticus to keep him informed as to what steps need to be taken for the triumph to be decreed and complains that the motion to award the honor based on his report to the Senate was not sufficiently pressed due to Atticus' absence from Rome (*Att.* 6.4.2 and 6.8.5).¹¹⁷ The last time the matter of Cicero's triumph was discussed publicly in the Senate was on January 7, 49 BCE, as the civil strife between Caesar and Pompeius was about to break out (*Cic. Fam.* 16.11.3).¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, Cicero continued to aspire to triumphal glory for the next two years or so. In the midst of the civil war, he was refusing to lay down his military authority (*imperium*) from which he hoped to triumph, wandering around Italy and Greece in a company of *lictors* carrying *fasces laureati*, the traditional symbol of a victorious general demanding a triumph (*Cic. Div.* 1.28 and Dio Cass. 44.4.3).¹¹⁹

The Paragon of Aristocratic Vanity and Competition

Cicero often points out that his friends' exhortations made him demand a triumph (*Att.* 6.3.3).¹²⁰ But this is nothing more than an attempt to save face in case his triumphal aspirations were

¹¹⁷ "Deinde de honore nostro. Quod enim tu afuisti, vereor ut satis diligenter actum in senatu sit de litteris meis" (*Att.* 6.4.2), and "Videas quid nobis de triumpho cogitandum putes ad quem amici me vocant" (*Att.* 6.8.5).

¹¹⁸ "Nobis inter has turbas senatus tamen frequens flagitavit triumphum; sed Lentulus consul, quo maius suum beneficium faceret, simul atque expedisset quae essent necessaria de re p. dixit se relaturum." For the date, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.5.4.

¹¹⁹ See also *Cic. Att.* 7.10; 8.3.6; 9.2A.1; 9.7.5; 11.6.2-3; and *Fam.* 2.16.2. Wistrand (1979), 200ff., discusses the supposed sequence of events that prompted Cicero to lay down his *imperium* and relinquish his triumphal ambitions.

¹²⁰ Cf. also *Cic. Att.* 6.6.4; 6.8.5; and *Fam.* 2.12.3.

thwarted.¹²¹ What really troubled Cicero was that Cato the Younger actively supported the motion to grant the twenty-day *supplicatio* to Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE), who was his son-in-law. As the governor of Syria in 51-49 BCE, Bibulus had suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of the “free Cilicians” (Cic. *Att.* 5.20.4-5; cf. Rufus, in *Fam.* 8.6.4). However, he later successfully used diplomacy to end the conflict with the Parthians (Dio Cass. 40.30.2 and Just. *Epit.* 42.4.5) and thus could potentially lay claim to triumphal honors or even a triumph. In a letter addressed to Atticus, Cicero explodes with the following tirade: “Cato... was indeed dishonorably ill-disposed toward me. He gave his testimony to my probity, fair-mindedness, clemency, good faith, the testimony which I was not seeking from him. But he denied to me the thing I really desired.... Keep in mind, it is he who voted a thanksgiving of twenty days to Bibulus! Pardon me, I cannot and will not tolerate this” (*Att.* 7.2.7).¹²²

At first glance, Cicero’s outburst may appear quite strange: did the orator really expect Cato the Younger to vote against the grant of triumphal honors to his own son-in-law?¹²³ Did Cicero anticipate to get voted a longer *supplicatio* than Bibulus? If we look at this situation from the viewpoint of the Mediterranean honor-shame society, it becomes clear that the great statesman is concerned with preserving his honor, and his angry outburst may actually cover a feeling of inferiority. Moreover, Cato the Younger may actually try to give Cicero an opportunity to save face when he lists his four cardinal virtues. Malina says:

¹²¹ See Beard (2007), 194-197.

¹²² “... Cato... in me turpiter fuit malevolus. Dedit integritatis, iustitiae, clementiae, fidei mihi testimonium quod non quaerebam; quod postulabam id negavit.... At hic idem Bibulo dierum xx. ignosce mihi; non possum haec ferre nec feram.” Cf. *Att.* 6.8.5.

¹²³ For kinship as a focal institution of the Roman social system, see Chapter I, pp. pp. 42f.

In the first-century Mediterranean world, every social interaction that takes place outside one's family or outside one's circle of friends is perceived as a challenge to honor, a mutual attempt to acquire honor from one's social equal. Thus gift-giving, invitations to dinner, debates over issues of law... – all these sorts of interactions take place according to the patterns of honor called challenge-riposte.

Because of this constant and steady cue in Mediterranean culture, anthropologists call it an *agonistic* culture. What this means, then, is that Mediterraneans tend to consider all social interactions outside the family, biological or fictive, as potential contests for honor. Furthermore, since honor and reputation, like all goods in life, are limited, every social interaction of this type can turn out to be an affair of honor, a contest or game honor, in which players are faced with wins, ties, and losses. What do these contests for honor look like?...

Challenge-riposte describes a constant social tug of war, a game of social push and shove. Challenge-riposte is a type of social communication, since any social interaction is a form of communication. Someone (source) sends a message by means of a culturally recognized channel to a receiving individual, and this produces an effect. The source here is the challenger, while the message is a symbolized thing (e.g., a word, a gift, an invitation) or event (e.g., a slap) or both. The channel of communication is always public, and the publicity of the message guarantees that the receiving individual will react, since even non-action is publicly interpreted, either as a riposte or a loss of honor.¹²⁴

Being voted the *supplicatio* or celebrating a triumph were culturally recognized channels to demonstrate preeminence in honor. They notably enhanced a triumphant general's *auctoritas* and ensuing political power because the claim to honor was now approved by the Senate and thus had to be acknowledged by one's social equals. By carefully constructing a flattering and often inflated interpretation of what took place on the battlefield, the triumphant general who wanted to be survived by glorious memory could easily create the "correct" and awe-inspiring record of his military accomplishments, whether real or invented, and thus fashion a propitious public image that helped memorialize his deeds for posterity. This is why Roman provincial governors of the Late Republic readily launched military operations in the territories they were

¹²⁴ Malina (1991b), 29.

entrusted to oversee and then laid competing claims to a triumph.¹²⁵ Appointed to administer provinces around the same time, both Cicero and Bibulus used military force to substantiate their claims to triumphal honors and a triumph proper.

However, when Bibulus secured the longer *supplicatio*, he did not just win a very public game of social push and shove; much more importantly, this lengthy thanksgiving secured his record of victory in Syria and won him goodwill among the fellow aristocrats, thus amplifying his relative “honor rating” among the governing elite, increasing his ranking in a social hierarchy, and helping him establish a stronger claim to consequent political power. Augustine argues that the Romans were first and foremost motivated in all their undertakings by *ambitio*. He defines it in the following way: “In truth, this is what is glory which the famous Romans were burning with a passionate desire for: it is the favorable judgment of men who think well of other men” (*De civ. D.* 5.12).¹²⁶ Bibulus’ success and goodwill he won asserted to the audience that he was greater in the world than Cicero because honor, like all other fine things in life, was perceived as a limited good that was always in short supply. This is why the great Roman statesman, who needed to augment his reputation and prestige in order to restore his public image tarnished by exile (cf. *Cic. Fam.* 15.4.13-14), construed Bibulus’ lengthy “thanksgiving” as an affront to his personal honor.¹²⁷ Cicero’s scorn of Cato the Younger and his son-in-law was a result of his frustrated ambition and desire for revenge, the phenomena not uncommon among Roman aristocrats. By contrast, it appears that Cato actually attempted to help Cicero

¹²⁵ For competing triumphal claims, see Beard (2007), 189ff.

¹²⁶ “Quando quidem gloria est, cuius illi cupiditate flagrabant, iudicium hominum bene de hominibus opinantium.” Cf. Sallust’s aristocratic *cupido gloriae* in *Cat.* 7.3-6.

¹²⁷ For the aristocratic expectation that office and privilege should go to honor, see Lendon (1997), 189ff.

save face: unwilling to vote triumphal honors to the egotistic *novus homo*, Cato, as a good Stoic, followed a sort of the philosopher's canon and attributed to Cicero four cardinal virtues.¹²⁸

In the Roman Republic, members of the ruling elite preferred to present their rivalries as commendable *aemulatio* or virile *contentio*, emphasizing noble collaboration among *viri boni*.¹²⁹ However, this façade often masked bitter *invidia* stimulated by the zero-sum game of ruthless competition for prominence in which one's gain was somebody else's loss. The institutionalized envy and inimical gossip were a corollary of the ancient Mediterranean belief in limited good, which dictated that all commendable things in life were in finite supply and could not be increased by humans.¹³⁰ Coupled with life in agrarian society, the utmost concern with honor and shame resulted in preoccupation with envy. According to Malina:

Honor, like all other goods in life, is limited in amount and the fund can neither be created nor destroyed. To win a challenge is to deprive another of his honor and to gain prominence; to lose is to surrender some dimension of one's honor and to lose precedence—but always among equals. The perception of limited good quality in such a society institutionalizes envy even among friends, especially among equals. Challenge-riposte constitutes a zero sum game in which the winner takes all, while the crowds look on and congratulate the winner, all the while hoping that they themselves might be in the winning position and envying the winner's success.¹³¹

Since no human being had direct power to increase the available quantities of glory and honor, this zero-sum game meant that an aristocrat who succeeded in gaining more honor for himself

¹²⁸ For the philosopher's canon, see Wallace-Hadrill (1981), 303.

¹²⁹ See Zerba (2002), 301.

¹³⁰ See Foster (1965), 296f.; Oakman (1991), 159; and Malina (2001a), 36f., 89f. and 112-118.

¹³¹ Malina (1991b), 31.

must have done so at someone else's expense, making him an immediate object of envy among his social equals.¹³²

Aristotle, who rationalizes that envy (*φθόνος*) arises from the “love of honor” or “personal ambition” (*φιλοτιμία*), states, “Those who seek after honor are more envious than the unambitious” (*Rh.* 2.10.3).¹³³ Cicero appears to be talking from personal experience when he makes the following observation about *invidia*: “But I do not know whether envy is not by far the most pungent emotion of all, and it requires no less effort to keep it subdued than to stir it up. People especially envy their equals or inferiors when they perceive themselves left behind, and they also deplore others' upward flight...” (*Cic. De or.* 2.52.209).¹³⁴ Toward the end of his life, the great orator comes to the following conclusion:

On the other hand, a great number of men are led astray to the point of losing sight of justice when they fall into a passionate desire for military commands, civic honors, and glory. The following saying of Ennius has a broad application: “There is no sacred bond / Nor faith where kingship is concerned.” For whenever something is of such a nature that only a few can be eminent in it, there is by and large such a great rivalry that it is exceedingly difficult to preserve “sacred bond” (*Cic. Off.* 1.26).¹³⁵

¹³² For details on peer envy and the evil eye rooted in it, see Walcot (1978); Ghosh (1983); and Neyrey (1988).

¹³³ “Καί οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων.”

¹³⁴ “... sed haud sciam an acerrimus longe sit omnium motus invidiae nec minus virium opus sit in ea comprimenda quam in excitanda. Invident autem homines maxime paribus aut inferioribus, cum se relictos sentiunt, illos autem dolent evolasse....” Cf. also Arist. *Rh.* 2.10.1-5; Vell. Pat. 2.92.5; and Plut. *Mor.* 537A and 537F.

¹³⁵ “Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt. Quod enim est apud Ennium: ‘Núlla sancta sócietas / Néc fides regni ést.’ Id latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit servare ‘sanctam societatem.’”

Yet, in his other writings Cicero regularly disparages and derogates his colleagues in Syria and exaggerates his own military achievements. The orator's outbursts against Cassius, Bibulus, and Cato the Younger are just the tip of the iceberg. Cicero's correspondence with friends and colleagues as well as his official reports to the Senate offer an unappealing insight into the world of the collapsing Republic, where commanding officers stationed on the eastern frontier constantly vied to augment their acquired honor and status at the expense of others and harbored bitter envy, mistrust, dissension, and ill feeling toward one another. All this is a testament to the intensity of aristocratic rivalry for primacy of status in the Late Republic. In the aftermath of the Social War (91-87 BCE), Roman citizenship was granted to all Italian allies, but the new Italian society, which consisted of many different ethnicities and cultures, often shared only the experience of common service in the Roman army. Thus, the votes in public assemblies were rearranged and heavily weighted against the new citizens in an attempt to limit the political power of Italian elites.¹³⁶

Nevertheless, the potential number of eligible candidates for magistracies significantly increased, making it impossible for a few Roman families that had ruled the Republic for generations to assert their claim to power through ascribed *virtus* and honor. As a result, a rivalry for public support and the honors it conferred intensified tremendously, resulting in a considerable rise in a number of competing demands for triumphal honors and triumphs proper, both of which earned an individual a social grant of glory, praise, and renown.¹³⁷ Obstruction of

¹³⁶ See Wiseman (1969), 60-67; Gabba (1976), 93f.; Yakobson (1999), 202f.; and McCall (2002), 110. Of course, one's ability or desire to travel to Rome to cast a vote must have presented yet another limitation.

¹³⁷ Hopkins (1983b), 31-119, offers a comprehensive statistical and demographic study of senatorial competition for high office. See also Badian (1990). For competing triumphal claims, see Beard (2007), 189ff.

these competing demands flourished as well, especially intensifying in the mid-60s BCE.¹³⁸ As aristocrats directed their energies against one another, mutual denigration became business of the day. Fierce competition for *laus* and *gloria* was characterized by reciprocal vilification, and I suggest it accounted for a sharp decline in a number of successful demands for a triumph in the early and middle years of the first century BCE. It can also explain to some extent Cicero's failure to be awarded a triumph proper, the development he must have been exasperated with.¹³⁹

With this being said, there was something in Cicero himself that rubbed many people the wrong way, even though there may have been good reasons why the orator was so fixated on self-exaltment. As a *novus homo*, he must have fought an uphill battle to win a grant of social approbation from the *nobiles*, and this experience may have skewed his self-perception.¹⁴⁰ Yet, Seneca the Younger astutely remarks that Cicero's incessant praise of his consulate was "non sine causa sed sine fine" (*De brev. vit.* 5.1). Coming from someone thoroughly versed in the culture that valorized egotism, vanity, and self-aggrandizement, this comment is priceless because it gives us an insight into how Cicero's attempts to exalt himself above everyone else were assessed by his near-contemporary peers.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ For details, see Brennan (2000), 2:534f.

¹³⁹ A dearth of triumphal celebrations at that time is noticed by Brennan (2000), 2:534f., and Beard (2007), 198. In order to secure the coveted triumph, commanders *cum imperio* who lingered outside the *pomerium* waiting for the Senate's vote were often willing to do all the Senate's bidding without a *senatus consultum ultimum*. See Brennan (2000), 2:596.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Sallust's assessment of how consulship was transmitted from hand to hand within the nobility: "Consulatum nobilitas inter se per manus tradebat. Novos nemo tam clarus neque tam egregiis factis erat quin indignus illo honore et quasi pollutus haberetur" (*Iug.* 63.6-7).

¹⁴¹ Of course, it is also unfortunate for Cicero that so much of his private correspondence, where his true colors shine ever so bright, has survived.

At Rome, there was an inherent link between one's relative "honor rating," which depended on how much one's claims to prestige were recognized by his social equals, and acquisition of a position of power.¹⁴² A Roman aristocrat was driven by single-minded ambition to win a social grant of praise and glory because he always needed to further enhance his reputation and relative "honor rating" in order to lay successful claim to a more eminent magistracy or military command. This is why he competed both at home and abroad, striving to secure a record of victory at the expense of others. And what better way was there to do so than to lay successful claim to a triumph?¹⁴³ Yet, Cicero's invectives are a vivid manifestation of how the great statesman could take the viciousness of the struggle for prominence among members of the Roman governing elite to completely another level. Dio Cassius grasps the very essence of Cicero's character, when he says:

As a result of this and because he plumed himself more than anybody else did and held nobody equal to himself, but in his words and life alike he despised everybody and did not deem it worthy to live on the equal footing with anybody, he was vulgar and burdensome. Because of these things, he was envied and hated even by those very people whom he tried to keep pleased" (Dio Cass. 38.12.7).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Cicero says, "In quo neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et faciliior et tutior et minus aliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum generi et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem publicam et ad magnas res gerendas accomodaverunt" (*Off.* 1.70).

¹⁴³ Even in the middle of the first century BCE, Roman decision-makers considered military accomplishments one of the main sources for prestige acquisition and status confirmation. For example, Tacitus, who clearly longs for the days past when Romana aristocrats could freely engage in unrestrained competition for *laus* and *fama*, abundantly uses military metaphors to describe the advocacy of the Late Republic (*Dial.* 34).

¹⁴⁴ "Ἐκ τε οὖν τούτου, καὶ διότι μέγιστόν τε ἀνθρώπων ἡῦχει καὶ οὐδένα ἐξ ἴσου ἑαυτῷ ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τε τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πάντα τε ὑπερεφρόνει καὶ ἰσοδίατος οὐδενὶ ἡξίου εἶναι, φορτικός τε καὶ ἐπαχθῆς ἦν, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων οἷς ἤρεσκε, καὶ ἐφθονεῖτο καὶ ἐμισεῖτο." Mommsen (1899), 147, characterizes Cicero as a sinister egotist, one of the "half-men who shrink not from wrongdoing but from its discovery."

Conclusion

Cicero often exalts civil accomplishments over martial deeds and emphasizes that political courage is akin to military prowess (*Off.* 1.74-80).¹⁴⁵ Criticizing the theory of exceptional belligerence and pathological aggression of the Roman aristocracy that was geared to war meant to bring in military glory and booty, some scholars have called attention to the growth of a civilian society in the Late Roman Republic.¹⁴⁶ Others downplay bellicosity of Roman aristocrats and attempt to revive the argument of Mommsen, Holleaux, and Frank about the “defensive” nature of Roman imperialism.¹⁴⁷ For example, Eckstein maintains that Cicero acquired pre-eminence in prestige exclusively through non-military venues. He also argues that such great dynasts of the Late Republic as Pompeius, Caesar, Crassus or Marcus Antonius, who fulfilled their extra-ordinary desires for the vast riches and high status through aggressive warfare, were atypical of Roman administration because they imitated Alexander the Great

¹⁴⁵ See also Cic. *Cat.* 3.23-27 and *De or.* 1.46.202. But it is also significant that the orator held the opposite belief earlier in life. In *Pro Murena* 22, which was written twenty years earlier, he says, “Qui potest dubitari quin ad consulatum adipiscendum multo plus adferat dignitatis rei militaris quam iuris civilis gloria?... Ac nimirum--dicendum est enim quod sentio--rei militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus.”

¹⁴⁶ For the importance of war in aristocratic ideology, see Hopkins (1978), 25-37, and William V. Harris (1979), 9-53; for the growth of the civilian society, see Cornell (1993), 164-168, and Rosenstein (2006).

¹⁴⁷ Eckstein (2006a), 118-243, and (2008) utilizes the political-science realist theory to advance the thesis of Roman “defensive” imperialism and challenge William V. Harris’ distinctly “primitivist” argument that Roman aristocrats waged wars of conquest and extended Rome’s power in order to acquire supremacy in *gloria* and honor for personal political and social advancement. But Eckstein never discusses passages like Livy 31.34.4-5. For my treatment of this and other similar passages, see Chapter I, pp. 71ff.

rather than Roman models.¹⁴⁸ However, this line of reasoning does not really stand up to scrutiny.

When Cicero was hailed *imperator* by his troops, the ceremony, whether by a coincidence or by a premeditated plan, took place at Issus, where the king of Macedon had routed the Persian army in 333 BCE. In a strange mixture of rhetorical self-abasement and fabulously misguided self-exaltment, Cicero mentions this fact on three different occasions in letters addressed to three different people: Marcus Caelius Rufus, Atticus, and Cato the Younger.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, the great orator semi-jokingly draws a parallel between his military achievements and martial prowess of Alexander the Great.¹⁵⁰ As early as 55 BCE, Cicero time after time attacks Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 BCE) for his refusal to demand a triumph after being recalled from Macedonia, portraying Piso's indifference to "triumph-hunting" as a moral flaw and essentially making *cupiditas triumphi* a fundamental element of Roman public life (*Pis.* 24.56-57).¹⁵¹ Furthermore, the statesman suggests that the pursuit of *gloria* is the most important stimulus for human activity (*Cic. Rep.* 5.7.9). When Cicero was appointed to govern Cilicia for the year 51-50 BCE, he immediately recognized opportunities now available to him to restore his public image blemished by exile (cf. *Cic. Fam.* 15.4.13-14). A short victorious war against

¹⁴⁸ See Eckstein (2006b), 574f. and 582ff. For an exhaustive treatment of imitation of Alexander in the Roman Republic, see Weippert (1972).

¹⁴⁹ See *Fam.* 2.10.3; *Att.* 5.20.3; and *Fam.* 15.4.9.

¹⁵⁰ "Imperatores appellati sumus. Castra paucos dies habuimus ea ipsa quae contra Darium habuerat apud Issum Alexander, imperator haud paulo melior quam aut tu aut ego" (*Att.* 5.20.3). Cicero might also have attempted to imitate Pompeius the Great who claimed to have been wearing a cloak of Alexander the Great during his third and last triumph of 61 BCE, when he celebrated his successes in the East (*App. Mith.* 117).

¹⁵¹ For details, see Beard (2007), 216ff.

“barbarians” became the first order of business because the proconsul saw a real opportunity to triumph from Cilicia and thus increase his *auctoritas* and *dignitas*. After all, celebrating a triumph presented a *triumphator* with unparalleled means to secure the awe-inspiring record of victory by carefully constructing a flattering description of what took place.

Realizing that he lacked an aptitude for devising a coherent strategy and leading the troops, Cicero recruited Gaius Pomptinus, a talented *vir militaris*, as his legate and then launched a highly aggressive campaign against the “free Cilicians.” Relentlessly canvassing first for triumphal honors and then for a triumph proper, the proconsul vastly inflated the effect of his military operations against the mountaineers. More importantly, he boastfully took credit for successfully driving back the Parthian incursion and quite inappropriately belittled military and diplomatic accomplishments of his colleagues in Syria. Cicero’s exploits in Cilicia as well as his brazen “triumph-hunting” and vilification of possible contenders to triumphal glory clearly reveal military adventurism of the self-proclaimed “promoter of peace” (Cic. *Fam.* 7.23.2). Contrary to the assertion that only the great Roman dynasts suffered from *φιλοτιμία* which induced them to fight large-scale wars in the first century BCE, I argue that bellicosity and cruelty were deeply embedded in the Roman political culture.¹⁵² Most members of the Roman governing elite made military accomplishments one of the main sources for honor acquisition and status confirmation because they equated *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial courage displayed in battle, with a strong personal commitment to the public good. As a result, Roman militaristic and expansionist ethos shaped by centuries of constant warfare formed a peculiar political culture. It was characterized by cultivation and glorification of *virtus*, the

¹⁵² For the *φιλοτιμία* argument, see Eckstein (2006b), 574f. and 582ff. For bellicosity and cruelty as integral parts of the Roman political culture, see Chapter I above.

conspicuous exhibition of physical power and military prowess; shameless “triumph-hunting” against the real and imagined enemies of Rome; and general ferocity, truculence, and belligerence of the governing elite.

Since a strong warrior ethos imbued the Roman decision-making elite even during the Late Republic, warfare remained closely related to acquisition of honor and status, which were the real criteria of one’s social ranking. With the agonistic culture reigning supreme at Rome, the relentless struggle for status and political power among aristocrats was characterized by the assertion of claims to social distinction upon others as well as by ranking oneself and one’s peers in a social hierarchy. In order to succeed in this man-eat-man competition, even the least adventuresome aristocrats of the Late Republic were socialized into particular “strategic behavior” patterns, where they applied unrestricted physical violence on the bodies and property of real and imagined enemies of Rome every time they were elected or appointed to govern provinces or lead armies in the field. More often than not, an aristocrat who won a military command or one of the highest elected public offices pursued exceptionally aggressive military policies in order to use his real or invented military accomplishments to lay claim to a triumph. If he were granted this greatly sought-after mark of excellence, he could significantly enhance his acquired honor by winning a social grant of *gloria*, *dignitas*, and *auctoritas* from others and be survived by a glorious memory. Consequently, most aristocrats in positions of power were motivated by militaristic ambitions and habitually waged wars of aggression.¹⁵³

If the great dynasts that fought devastating civil wars were not the only figures in the Late Republic who were motivated by excessive militaristic ambitions, what caused the ultimate

¹⁵³ Cf. Mattern (1999), 162-210.

demise of the Republic and gradual concentration of power in the hands of Octavian?¹⁵⁴ Some scholars attribute the transition from Republic to Principate to the dissolution of elite cohesion and growing polarization of the highly competitive aristocracy. As members of the Roman governing elite began to utilize an ever increasing number of non-military venues for prestige acquisition and status confirmation, it became more and more difficult to accurately measure elite status of individuals vying for a grant of reputation and prestige from others. In the end, aristocrats stopped imposing any restraints upon their extraordinary ambitions, weakening the political system and triggering the process of power concentration first in the hands of a few and then in the hands of the single princeps.¹⁵⁵

This hypothesis presents an elucidating starting point for further discussion, but I think the adaptation of Pareto's theory about the cyclical nature of the rise and fall of ruling elites with mutually exclusive personality types may offer an even broader perspective on the problem. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian polymath who examined the concept of the political aristocracy (*aristocrazia*) as an analytical category and popularized the use of the term "elite" in social analysis.¹⁵⁶ Chapter II of my dissertation employs Pareto's theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of governing elites to look at the Roman revolution and the princeps' consolidation of power through the prism of a later sociological theory that helps elucidate some of the transformations within Roman society that took place during the Augustan revolution.

¹⁵⁴ For the three influential accounts of the end of the Republic, see Brunt (1971b) and Brunt (1988); Gruen (1995); and Meier (1980).

¹⁵⁵ See Rosenstein (2006), 378ff., and Morstein-Marx (2006), 629-635.

¹⁵⁶ Today, students of political science are still engaged in a lively debate as to whether Vilfredo Pareto or Gaetano Mosca, who invented the concept of the ruling class, was the first to discover and state the principles of elite theory. See Scott (2012), 9f.

The replacement of the old Roman aristocracy by new men of Italian origin signaled the general change in sentiment and was part of a larger process of the forging of a new expanded citizen body which was actively involved in molding a new culture characterized by generally shared cultural norms.¹⁵⁷ As part of this process, Augustus, who was reinforcing his personal hold on power by establishing himself superior beyond competition, imposed limits on the militaristic ambitions of the new elite by actively promoting non-military venues for honor acquisition and curtailing ambitions of those aristocrats who did not want to conform to the changing reality. While life in the Late Republic was often characterized by violent resolution of internal conflicts and arbitrary aggressive wars against “barbarians,” the princeps succeeded in putting an end to civil war and imposed restrictions on random violence against the real and imagined enemies of Rome.

¹⁵⁷ See Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 441-454.

CHAPTER II: FOXES AND LIONS: PARETO'S SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF ELITE CIRCULATION AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

“It was not a book by Marx which has created the socialists;
it is the socialists who have made Marx's book famous”
(Vilfredo Pareto)

Introduction

Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian economist, sociologist, and political scientist who was best known not only for his successes in economics, where he most noticeably contributed to the study of general economic equilibrium and welfare-economic optimality, but also for his works in sociology and political science, where he laid out a grand scheme for comprehending human behavior in social systems. In 1900, Pareto published a study entitled “Un' applicazione di teorie sociologiche,” where he postulated the concept of the recurrent circulation of the ruling elites and brought out the main principles of the social equilibrium theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of governing elites, the first social-cycle theory in sociology.¹ Some important elements of this theory were corroborated in 1906, when Pareto discovered that twenty percent of the population owned eighty percent of the land in Italy and other European countries. Joseph M. Juran later generalized this discovery into the principle of factor sparsity, postulating that roughly eighty percent of the effects come from twenty percent of the causes. He named it Pareto principle.²

¹ See Pareto (1900) and its English translation, Pareto (1991).

² As Pareto's theory continued to evolve, this principle became one of its determining factors. Later, Pareto's doctoral student named Marie Kolabinska, who wrote her dissertation on *La circulation des élites en France* (1912), assisted Pareto in fine-tuning his new theory.

In his social equilibrium theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of ruling elites, Pareto proposes that members of the governing elites belong to mutually exclusive personality types of “lions” and “foxes.” The “lions” are conservative “consolidators” who are focused on attaining and strengthening social unity. Concerned about the preservation of the status quo, they thrive in highly centralized political systems ruled by force, and they usually rely on brute *force* to stay in power. By contrast, the “foxes” are liberal-individualistic “innovators” who flourish in decentralized political systems and rely on shrewdness, persuasion, and deception to maintain control. Always willing to make opportunistic compromises, crafty deals, and concessions, they prefer to rule by *consent* rather than by *force*, and they gain support for their rule through demagoguery and trickery. According to Pareto, the periodic circulation of elites with mutually exclusive personality types occurs in recurrent cycles because no permanent elite equilibrium--an effective balancing of leonine force and vulpine persuasion--is possible.³

A very important and significant aspect of Pareto’s theory is its emphasis on non-rational and conflicting psychosocial propensities as the principal driving force for human action. Pareto categorizes all human behaviors as either logical or non-logical and argues that much of human conduct belongs to the latter.⁴ Both vulpine and leonine types are motivated in all their actions by only a few non-rational sentiments which are responsible for all the basic and observable non-logical behaviors in humans. Serving as the key inducements of human actions, these

³ Below, in Chapter II, pp. 151f. and 155-163, and in Chapter III, pp. 206-212, I discuss in more detail the dual concept of “foxes” and “lions,” which was first proposed by Cicero and Machiavelli and then further developed by Pareto, and provide a brief review of the two distinct kinds of historic cycles Pareto talks about in his *Treatise on General Sociology* (1935).

⁴ See Pareto (1935), §§ 842 and 875. Today we would talk about “rational” and “non-rational” actions. The assertion that most human actions are non-rational is one of the central points of Pareto’s theory, and I discuss it in more detail below, on pp. 145-149 and 160f.

psychosocial propensities are a display of prevailing personality traits, frames of mind, persuasions, and actions. At first, members of a newly ascended governing elite preserve the efficacious balancing of vulpine persuasion and leonine force, the combination of psychosocial propensities that enabled them to win the struggle for domination. However, as time goes by, just one specific inclination becomes predominant among members of the ruling elite. It eventually begins to exert undue influence on elite's leaders, and they become prone to tendentiousness, inflexibility, and cumulating glaring miscalculations. A gradual process of decline, which is nothing short of degeneration, sets in. Ultimately, it culminates in a severe crisis during which groups and persons inclined toward the opposite psychosocial propensity seize power. However, a new cycle of decline begins almost immediately, as the new leaders become quickly ossified in just one psychosocial propensity.

Pareto's social equilibrium theory may appear vague and malleable. While discussing empirically subtle qualities of elites, the author often uses fragmented exposition with numerous *ceteris paribus* clauses and simplifies historical reality by introducing such theoretical constructs as irrational behavioral manifestations and "derivations."⁵ Thus, similar to any other theory in social sciences, Pareto's social equilibrium theory is not "scientific" in the sense we understand the term today. Since it depends on the observation rather than the testing, Pareto's theory is best defined as qualitative and interpretive rather than "scientific."⁶ Yet, it is appealing and

⁵ Although Pareto readily recognizes simplifications, he also asks his critics to think about the drawbacks of the traditional approach to history: "Today the inclination is to gather every minutest detail and argue endlessly over matters of no importance. That is helpful as regards the preparation of materials, but not as regards using them. It is the work of the quarryman who cuts the stone, not of the architect who builds the edifice. When one is looking for uniformities, details big or little are to be thought of as means, not as ends." See Pareto (1935), § 2543.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, §§ 2410; 2543-2544; and Femia (2006), 74ff.

stimulating precisely because of its generality and scope. Not unlike Marx, Pareto relates his theoretical propositions to particular events in history to demonstrate that they are consistent with historical reality.

The polymath offers important insights on the nature of the ruling elites that form a particularly dominant element in human societies. First, he notably emphasizes the study of elites as organic whole. Pareto abandons the notion of simple cause-effect in favor of a conception of society comprised of elements of variables in a state of mutual interdependence: the introduction of change affecting any part will necessarily lead to reciprocal transformations in other parts as well as in the whole system, making ruling-elite degenerations inevitable and cyclical. Second, the author hedges his theory and suggests that such principal actors as emperors, presidents, prime ministers or religious leaders can also be the focus of historical inquiry because their personalities, inclinations, and leadership styles provide a more accessible window into wider non-logical propensities of the governing elites.⁷ Finally, Pareto's dichotomy between the psychosocial propensity of vulpine "combination" and that of leonine group-persistence and "preservation" is significantly supported by recent studies in contemporary political and business psychology. For instance, when Marshall analyzed the 153 questionnaires returned by UK members of parliament, his analysis confirmed the existence of Paretian "foxes" and "lions" within a real political elite.⁸

⁷ Once Pareto realized that it was extremely difficult to compile bits of data on elites' personality traits, long-term circulation trends, the flexibility or rigidity of policies, and other factors, he focused his research on individuals. For details, see Higley (2012), 127.

⁸ For details, see Marshall (2007), 151-194. Cf. also my discussion of the "dark triad" of the socially aversive traits of "Machiavellianism," narcissism, and psychopathy below, pp. 183-196.

This is why I employ the sociological theory of Pareto as the framework for examining the political crisis of the Late Republic, the Augustan revolution, and the princeps' consolidation of power. My hope is that Pareto's theory helps me not only elucidate some of the transformations within the Roman society that took place during the Late Republic and the Augustan Principate but also prepare the ground in advance to present Augustus as personification of Machiavelli's conception of the ideal ruler. In Chapter III of my dissertation, I explicate how the first emperor, who publicly displayed all the positive leonine characteristics in order to appear as an audacious lion by exalting his own *virtus* and martial prowess, utilized, without it being known, the qualities of a shrewd and cunning fox to establish himself superior beyond competition and reinforce his personal hold on power.

In this and the following chapter, I combine Pareto's social equilibrium theory of elites and their periodic circulation with the key aspects of Machiavelli's political theory to offer a new insight into the causes of the decline of the Late Republic and the rise of the Augustan Principate: an important insight perhaps available through no other source. After introducing Pareto's social equilibrium theory of elite circulation and discussing its emphasis on the irrational basis of social behavior, I apply this theory to the study of the crisis of the Late Republic.⁹ Pareto insightfully suggests that the gradual growth of wealth in society leads to more complex social conditions that create much more pronounced hierarchies differentiated in affluence and status and generate a cultural and psychological shift toward the psychosocial propensity of vulpine "combination." Based on my analysis of some important developments in the history of the Late Republic, I argue that from the middle of the second century BCE the

⁹ Brunt (1971b), 74-147, and Lintott (1992a and 1992b) offer insightful overviews of the period of instability from 146 BCE to 27 BCE.

members of the Roman governing elite began growing increasingly vulpine in their outlook, prioritizing personal gain over the duties toward their fellow citizens. Eventually, the alliance of the vulpine politicians, unscrupulous tribunes, and profit-seeking *publicani* “speculators” established a classical demagogic plutocracy which Pareto considers an especially insidious form of government.¹⁰

Under the heavy influence of the so-called “dark triad” of the socially aversive traits, the psychological construct of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy, the fox-like politicians of the Late Republic were more and more willing to enter into “shifting combinations and promote their preferred personal or public ends at a given moment.”¹¹ As a consequence, they brought to ruin the fortunes of the Republic, and the domineering dynasts successfully usurped the power of the Roman Senate. Tension and strife resulting from civil discord quickly turned the Late Republic into a failed state. Hence, there arose a need for a dynast who could efficaciously balance vulpine persuasion and leonine force in order to normalize the affairs of the Roman state, regenerate the ruling elite, and bring peace to the core of the growing empire. The young Octavian fit the profile perfectly, and he succeeded marvelously in “extinguishing” or “annihilating” the civil wars (*RG* 34.1).¹² Augustan poetry brilliantly demonstrates how much

¹⁰ See Pareto (1935), §§ 2274-2276.

¹¹ See Brunt (1988), 32-45. The quote can be found on page 38. Paulhus (2002), who coined the term “dark triad,” demonstrates that the constructs of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy are inter-related and overlapping. Marshall (2012), 91-107, uses the concept of the “dark triad” to study the negative effect Pareto’s “foxes,” leaders strong in the psychosocial propensity of vulpine “combination,” have on the modern world in the milieu of risk and uncertainty. Marshall (2013) also suggests that the aversive personality patterns of Machiavellianism, primary and secondary psychopathy, and narcissism cluster and co-intensify in individuals.

¹² “In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia exstinxeram...” Significantly, the gates of the Temple of Janus were closed for the first time in the reign of Augustus, in 29 BCE,

the Italians longed for peace: the young Caesar's success in ending the fratricidal strife was met with universal approbation and was one of the most important factors that contributed to his political success.¹³ However, the actions of the rising Machiavellian prince triggered a cycle of social change and elite circulation that swept away the senatorial aristocracy of old.

Pareto's Social Equilibrium Theory of Elite Cycles and the Periodic Circulation of Ruling Elites

Pareto describes the ever-present ascendancy of elites and their recurring circulation in the following way:

Except during short intervals of times, peoples are always governed by an elite. I use the word elite in its etymological sense, meaning the strongest, the most energetic, and most capable--for good as well as evil. However, due to an important physiological law, elites do not last. Hence--the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of certain elites: as one ascends, another declines. Such is the real phenomenon, though to us it may often appear under another form.¹⁴

The author's initial argument is artfully demure: he divides all societies into two analytic and mutually related classes. On the one hand is the irrational populace that largely lacks authority or capacity to act. On the other hand is a powerful higher stratum that is subdivided into "governing" and "non-governing" elites that hold the socially defined monopoly on power

to symbolize the end of the civil wars (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.113 = EJ, 45; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 9; *Num.* 20; and Dio Cass. 51.20.4). For details and the list of literary sources, see Cooley (2009), 256f.

¹³ For details and the list of literary sources, see Ibid.

¹⁴ Pareto (1991), 36.

and privilege.¹⁵ Emphasizing vertical divisions in society, Pareto suggests that political and social change is effected primarily top-down and claims that any governing elite is dominated by a smaller decision-making oligarchy, the plutocratic regime typically established by the few for the good of the privileged. He says,

It is always an oligarchy that governs, finding ways to give to the “will of the people” that expression which the few desire, from the “royal law” that bestowed the *imperium* on the Roman Emperors down to the votes of a legislative majority elected in one way or another, from the plebiscite that gave the empire to Napoleon III down to the universal suffrage that is shrewdly bought, steered, and manipulated by our “speculators.”¹⁶

In all societies at all times, a smaller ruling oligarchy exists side-by-side with a larger governing elite; this plutocracy effectively manipulates the machinery of the state so that its members can seize the goods of others, either by legal or illegal means.¹⁷ It is interesting that Syme offers a very similar assessment of the Roman ruling oligarchy, and this raises the question as to what extent he might have been influenced by Pareto’s theory. Syme says:

In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the façade; and Roman history, Republican or Imperial, is the history of the governing class. The marshals, diplomats, and financiers of the Revolution may be discerned again in the Republic of Augustus as the ministers and agents of power, the same men but in a different garb.¹⁸

¹⁵ See Pareto (1935), § 2047, and cf. Lenski (1966), 219-242.

¹⁶ Pareto (1935), § 2183, and cf. § 2254.

¹⁷ See Pareto (1966), 117 and 139. For the great influence an oligarchy exerts upon government, see Pareto (1935), §§ 2182-2184.

¹⁸ Syme (1939), 7. The power of the Roman oligarchy is also emphasized by Kunkel (1972).

It is significant that the Paretian “elite” is a value-free term that comprises those who score highest on scales measuring a particular activity, especially in economics or politics.¹⁹ As a sociologist and a trained economist, Pareto was particularly interested in isolating the conditions for successful domination of the many by the few; he strove to understand why the ruling elite was able to keep its power and under what circumstances it lost it. However, when the savant first started researching the concept of “elite,” he faced the multitude of human actions that escaped a logical explanation. Pareto was especially disturbed at economics’ failure to predict accurately human behavior, which usually fell short of Adam Smith’s line of reasoning about the self-interested rational desire to maximize utility.²⁰ This is why he decided to shed light on the vast universe of “non-logical” behavior by studying the influence of non-rational sentiments on the rise and fall of the ruling elites as well as their impact on the changing fortunes of societies.

After postulating the existence of several forms of human agency that either disprove or elude the logical study of non-logical behavior, Pareto claims that non-rational actions have the greatest impact on the rise and fall of the governing elites as well as on the justifications the privileged offer for their ascendancy and exercise of power.²¹ The author’s observation that instinctive, non-rational motivation alone determines many human actions is one of the most important contributions he made to sociology, and it is a pity that Sigmund Freud has been unduly credited with proving a direct and overwhelming influence of the non-rational on human affairs. Convinced that reasons commonly provided for most human actions have nothing to do

¹⁹ For details, see Scott (2012), 10-13.

²⁰ See Aspers (2001). Pareto was also greatly perplexed by the growing popularity of Marxism in Italy; for him, commitment to Marxist theory was not that different from religious devotion. For details, see Finer (1999), 68f., and Femia (1999), 289f.

²¹ See Pareto (1935), §§ 150-157.

with the actual motives of these actions, Pareto argues that a proper analysis of the forms of non-rational behavior is essential for any adequate political theory. One can fully comprehend social phenomena only if he is knowledgeable about the irrational basis of social behavior, the species-defining storm of passions that rages under a gloss of logic coating human beings' conduct.

In his *Treatise on General Sociology*, Pareto identifies several basic observable behaviors that lie beneath a non-rational action or reasoning and serve as the key inducements of human actions. He names them "residues" and claims that they are immanent human behavioral manifestations in ideologies as well as in action.²² These psychosocial propensities "are usually wanting in definiteness, in exact delimitation" because they reflect certain irrational and conflicting behavioral manifestations, such as instincts, sentiments, physical states, and universal and unchanging natural feelings and emotions.²³ In essence, the psychosocial propensities serve as the modes of conduct and "drives" that urge individuals to actions and are behind non-rational actions typically found in religion and magic. However, they are also common in politics, where politicians regularly base important decisions on irrational motives and deceive themselves and others about the true causes of their actions.²⁴

For example, when the Bush administration decided to attack the sovereign nation of Iraq in the early 2000s, the American people and the world community were fed numerous lies about Saddam Hussein accumulating stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and hosting members

²² Because the term "residues" has been a common point of confusion among many readers, I substitute it with the expressions "irrational or non-logical behavioral manifestations" or "psychosocial propensities."

²³ Pareto (1935), §§ 851 and 870. Cf. also *Ibid.*, § 868.

²⁴ See *Ibid.*, §§ 585; 2268; and 2176-2177.

of Al-Qaeda. While lying to the faces of the fourteen other members of the UN Security Council about the Iraqi government's efforts to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, Colin Powell, the then US Secretary of State, even demonstrated a model vial of anthrax to substantiate Bush administration's wild lies, distortions, and fabrications.²⁵ In reality, according to Paul O'Neill, who served as the Treasury Secretary during the first two years of the Bush administration, the Bush regime began planning the war against Iraq from its very first National Security Council meeting.²⁶ Similarly, the Obama administration and particularly Hillary Clinton, the then US Secretary of State, were spreading lies about the Gaddafi's government indiscriminately attacking the civilians in the Islamists-held areas, all while knowingly facilitating the provision of weapons to al-Qaeda militias in Libya in order to effect violent government overthrow.²⁷

In addition to non-logical and irrational behavioral manifestations that have the greatest importance in elucidating the recurring circulation of the ruling elites, Pareto identifies two other important elements that determine the duration of elite cycles and the form of society. First, he

²⁵ Powel gave his notorious presentation to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003. See United States Security Council PV.4701, Wednesday, 5 February 2003, 10.15 a.m. The document is available from <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/sc2003-4701.pdf>. Accessed on December 8, 2018.

²⁶ See "Bush Decides to Remove Saddam on 'Day One'" by Julian Borger. The document is available from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/12/usa.books>. Accessed on December 8, 2018.

²⁷ See "Libya War Was Based on Lies, Bogus Intelligence, NATO Supported and Armed the Rebels. British Parliamentary Report" by Global Research Washington's Blog and "Hilary Clinton, 'Smart Power' and a Dictator's Fall" by Joe Becker and Scott Shane. The documents are available from <http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-war-was-based-on-lies-bogus-intelligence-nato-supported-and-armed-the-rebels-british-parliamentary-report/5547356> and <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html>. Accessed on December 8, 2018.

talks about the so-called “interests,” which I, following the polymath, designate as “economic interests” in this and the following chapters.²⁸ Second, Pareto isolates variable elements he calls “derivations.” Invented solely to justify one’s actions, these are incidental and non-logical verbal manifestations of the irrational and deep-seated beliefs. They reflect the emotional responses and superstitions individuals hold, serving as a sort of the pseudo-rational varnish to coat one’s actions.²⁹ Unlike the non-logical behavioral manifestations, which are basic, the “derivations” are variable and superficial: each time one “derivation,” or a set of arguments, is proven to be logically fallacious, another “derivation” emerges to take its place in support of the same purposes. In essence, new reasons are provided at different times and places for propositions that are motivated by the same instinct or sentiment. For instance, when the modern social contract theory was discredited, the natural rights theory immediately materialized as the rationalization of the demand for constitutional government and a degree of political liberty.³⁰ Similarly, when Augustus resigned from the consulship on July 1, 23 BCE, he still needed to consolidate his position against possible rivals. Not only was he given the proconsulship for life

²⁸ Pareto (1935), §§ 2009-2010, says: “Individuals and communities are spurred by instinct and reason to acquire possession of material goods that are useful... for purposes of living, as well as to seek consideration and honors. Such impulses, which may be called ‘interests,’ play in the mass a very important part in determining the social equilibrium.... That mass of interests falls in very considerable part within the purview of the science of economics....”

²⁹ For irrational behavioral manifestations and “derivations,” see *Ibid.*, §§ 119-122 and 868-870, and Baruchello (2012), 158f. According to Pareto (1935), § 975, “The usual purpose of a derivation, in fact, is to satisfy with pseudo-logic the need of logic, of thinking, that the human being feels.” Since the author asserts that these *post factum* fabricated rationalizations of human behavior contribute to the construction of ideologies that form a “culture” of society, he primarily uses them in content analyses of ideologies.

³⁰ See Macpherson (1999), 290. Pareto is well known for his scrupulous dissection of the concept of utility and effective deconstruction of such catch phrases as “national interest” and “public good.”

but the full tribunician power was granted to him for the thirty-seven consecutive times to last for the rest of his life (Dio Cass. 53.32.5), with the Senate's decree confirmed by a law (*RG* 10.1).³¹

Even though the “derivations” are not prominently reflected in Pareto's study of elites, they play an important role in the social equilibrium theory Pareto constructs in order to analyze the social systems, which, according to him, are the natural and highest forms of human organization.³² The author's interest in equilibrium analysis in economics and sociology can be traced back to his 1870 PhD dissertation in civil engineering entitled “The Fundamental Principles of Equilibrium in Solid Bodies.” In the early 1890s, Pareto became acquainted with the new general equilibrium theory proposed by Léon Walras, the professor of political economy at the University of Lausanne, and he enthusiastically expanded on this theory in a series of articles published in the *Giornale degli Economisti*. One of the very important and fundamental observations Pareto makes is that any social system is a systematic whole made of interdependent parts that exist in a state of dynamic balance.

This equilibrium is a consequence of the constantly changing combinations of external conditions and internal elements that continually move toward or away from the balance of non-rational propensities and specific economic interests that determine choices and actions of the governing elite. While the external conditions consist of the impact upon society effected by its geography and the influences represented by other systems or by the same system at an earlier

³¹ For details, see Salmon (1956), 468ff.; Brunt and Moore (1967), 10f.; Rich (1990), 169; Kienast (1999), 88ff.; and Ferrary (2001), 115-121. Also, despite what the emperor states in *RG* 5.3, there is a view that he did accept *imperium consulare* for life during the crisis of 19 BCE. For details, see Dio Cass. 54.10.5; Jones (1951), 117; Rich (1990), 187; and, with some reservations, Cooley (2009), 129f.

³² See Pareto (1935), § 2066.

historical stage, the internal elements can be subdivided into “irrational behavioral manifestations,” “derivations,” economic interests, social stratification, and “class circulation.”³³ The examples of social change Pareto offers indicate that changes in the economic environment are especially important because they always affect the proportion of vulpine “combination” and leonine “preservation” in those who have the most influence on societal transformations. To Pareto’s mind, clashing or changing economic interests become the main agents of change for the relative proportions of the “vulpine” and “leonine” propensities in the governing and non-governing elites as well as in the society at large.³⁴ Although the ruling elites always exhibit a mix of vulpine and leonine propensities, the polymath significantly suggests that the gradual growth of wealth in society leads to more complex social conditions that create much more pronounced hierarchies differentiated in affluence and status. As a consequence, this eventually generates a cultural and psychological shift toward the psychosocial propensity of vulpine “combination.”

In essence, Pareto abandons the notion of simple cause-effect and proposes a very interesting and rational conception of society comprised of elements of variables in a state of mutual interdependence: the introduction of change affecting any part will necessarily lead to reciprocal transformations in other parts as well as in the whole system. Even though one-by-one examination of the influence of the elements is often the only possibility in social sciences, the savant dismisses simple cause-and-effect relationships as erroneous. He argues that correlations among variables are not unilateral but *functional*, with the state of each variable depending on

³³ See *Ibid.*, §§ 2060-2061, and cf. §§ 1542-1727. It is also important to note that Pareto does not develop a theory of irrational behavioral manifestations and “derivations”; he uses both as empirical indicators to measure abstract properties. See Powers (1984), 10f.

³⁴ For details, see Macpherson (1999), 294.

the changes with other variables.³⁵ As the external conditions and the internal elements continually move toward or away from the equilibrium of non-rational psychosocial propensities and specific economic interests that determine choices and actions of the governing elite, they create constantly changing combinations. In particular, Pareto suggests that changes in social stratification and the recurrent circulation of the governing elites are manifested by important political and social transformations.³⁶ It is very significant that the author's conception of society as the social system characterized by a systemic state of dynamic equilibrium receives additional support from the fact that it is very similar to modern sociobiological theories of genetic diversity and balanced polymorphism. These theories propose that genetic variability is maintained in species by constant genetic drift caused by dual selection pressures operating at different levels in the population.³⁷

Pareto's social equilibrium theory incorporates six different classes of irrational behavioral manifestations, but the author uses only two of them--"Class I residues" and "Class II residues"--to describe the cyclical circulation of the ruling elites with mutually exclusive personality types of vulpine "speculators" and leonine "consolidators." Pareto contends that these two classes of irrational behavioral manifestations are very important in determining socio-cultural configurations in society, and he links them to broader social settings and patterns of historical

³⁵ In a quantitative sense, fluctuations in Pareto's equilibrium system functionally correspond to one another as a matter of the degree of relative correlation. See Pareto (1935), §§ 829; 861; 1731; and 2061.

³⁶ It is interesting that Pareto viewed himself as the pioneer who introduced Albert Einstein's principle of relativity into the social sciences. For details, see Powers (1984), 21.

³⁷ For details, see Houghton (1977), 36, though I am skeptical about the authors' overall argument regarding the evolutionistic intent of Pareto's general sociology.

development.³⁸ One non-logical behavioral manifestation, named by the author “Class I residues,” is “combination,” which is the psychosocial propensity to take risks, invent, and combine things in innovative ways.³⁹ Whenever this irrational behavioral manifestation is concentrated in individuals, it gives rise to the distinct personality type of liberal-individualistic “entrepreneurs” or vulpine “speculators.” These “foxes” are “innovators” who flourish in decentralized political systems and rely on shrewdness, persuasion, and deception to maintain control; they always prefer to rule by *consent* rather than by *force* and co-opt support for their rule through countless opportunistic compromises, crafty deals, concessions, demagoguery, and trickery. According to Pareto, classical Athens would be an excellent example of a society dominated by “foxes.”⁴⁰

The other non-logical behavioral manifestation, named by Pareto “Class II residues,” is the “persistence of aggregates.” As a sort of aggregate of parts carefully brought together to form a single body, it enables certain combinations, once created, to become stable. The author also terms it “preservation,” arguing that it is the psychosocial propensity to preserve group stability, avert risks, and consolidate the status quo.⁴¹ Whenever this irrational behavioral manifestation is concentrated in individuals, it gives rise to the distinct personality type of leonine conservative-

³⁸ See, for example, Pareto (1935), §§ 889-992; 2346; and 2538.

³⁹ “Combination” is a direct translation of Pareto’s “*combinazione*,” which can also mean craft, deceit, cunning, and guile. The author associates any era when sentiments of combination are strong with a period of “skepticism.” See, for example, Pareto (1935), §§ 157; 889; and 1680-1686.

⁴⁰ See *Ibid.*, §§ 2223 and 2419.

⁴¹ In essence, “preservation” implies mulish adherence to time-honored practices and involves resistance to any attempts to disjoin things previously combined. Pareto connects any era in which sentiments of preservation are strong with a period of “faith.” See, for example, *Ibid.*, §§ 157; 992; and 1680-1686.

collectivist “rentiers.” These so-called “lions” are “consolidators”: they thrive in highly centralized political systems ruled by force and focused on attaining and strengthening social unity, and they usually rely on brute force to stay in power. For instance, Sparta would be an example of a city-state where “lions” ruled supreme.⁴² In the *Treatise on General Sociology*, Pareto prefers to speak about elites strong in “Class I residues” and elites strong in “Class II residues” as well as about “entrepreneurs” and “rentiers,” but I will refer to all of them respectively as “foxes” and “lions” or use the adjectives “vulpine” or “fox-like” and “leonine” or “lion-like.”⁴³

Both the non-logical behavioral manifestation of “combination” and that of “preservation” complement each other. While the first one provides for change, the second one affords institutionalization and helps people embrace this change. This is why Pareto suggests that leaders of the ruling plutocracy always use a combination of *force* and *consent*, which are balanced in varying proportions, to successfully establish and maintain control over the people.⁴⁴ In order to acquire the popular consent, they may employ vulpine cunning, manipulation, demagoguery, and even outright *fraud* to persuade the masses that their ideals and interests are identical with those of the privileged, regardless of whether this is true or not. This becomes especially relevant when economic interests are at stake because “the administration of power ‘looks after’ the interests of the speculators....”⁴⁵ In essence, the smaller ruling plutocracy is a

⁴² See *Ibid.*, §§ 2223 and 2419.

⁴³ For the typology of “Class I entrepreneurs” and “Class II rentiers” and their respective classes of “irrational behavioral manifestations,” see *Ibid.*, §§ 2231-2239.

⁴⁴ See *Ibid.*, § 2255.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, § 2257.

“joint” that links hubs of influence to objects of economic patronage: the plutocratic government in power has control over a panoply of such “legitimate” forms of bribery as tariffs, public works, government contracts, legal immunities for trade unions, and many other schemes to keep the various clienteles happy and ensure their support.⁴⁶

While the ruling oligarchy is “the smaller, choicer class [that] effectively and practically exercises control,” there is also the governing and non-governing elites at large, which may be either conniving with the ruling plutocracy or opposed to it.⁴⁷ Pareto delineates these elites as a very broad category: they embrace the leaders of all political groups, and they must never be understood as identical with one or other of rival political parties.⁴⁸ Unlike the “concrete unit,” the ruling plutocracy which maintains effective control over the affairs of the state through the invisible government, the governing and non-governing elites are quite the opposite: different power centers may engage in competition, or even quarrel, with one another.⁴⁹ Yet, because a high degree of unity is a requirement of Pareto’s social equilibrium theory I discuss above, the author maintains that the elites display sufficient cohesion to be defined as a “class.”⁵⁰ On the one hand, since all members of the governing and non-governing elites are propelled by economic self-interest and an aspiration to preserve their influence, they are often inclined to act

⁴⁶ See *Ibid.*, §§ 2254; 2257; and 2265.

⁴⁷ See *Ibid.*, § 2254.

⁴⁸ Pareto (1991), 78, says: “After the generals come the captains, the non-commissioned officers, the soldiers, and they are all selected men. There is never, to be exact, one elite stratum, there are only various strata which together constitute the elite.”

⁴⁹ For example, the term “capitalist” is applied both to entrepreneurs and owners of savings, but on some matters (e. g. interest rates) the two groups have “diametrically opposed” interests. See Pareto (1935), § 2231.

⁵⁰ See *Ibid.*, § 2254; Finer (1999), 72f.; and Femia (1999), 292.

in a common direction without any factional sentiments. On the other hand, the smaller and choicer class of the ruling plutocracy always undergoes a slow but constant transformation, just as a great river that changes its nature from day to day. Pareto says: “The governing *élite*... flows on like a river, never being today what it was yesterday. From time to time sudden and violent disturbances occur. There is a flood--the river overflows its banks. Afterwards, the new governing *élite* again resumes its slow transformation. The flood has subsided, the river is again flowing normally in its wonted bed.”⁵¹

Pareto and the Ideal Machiavellian Prince

It is significant that Pareto’s social equilibrium theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of ruling elites with mutually exclusive personality types of vulpine “innovators” and leonine “consolidators” depends on the dual concept of foxes and lions proposed, among others, by Cicero and Machiavelli.⁵² In *The Prince*, Machiavelli creatively re-interprets Cicero’s binary of foxes and lions (*Off.* 1.41). The Florentine says:

You must, therefore, know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore, a prince must know how to use wisely the natures of the beast and the man. This policy was taught to princes allegorically by the ancient writers, who described how Achilles and many other ancient princes were given to Chiron the Centaur to be raised and taught under his

⁵¹ Pareto (1935), § 2056. Cf. Machiavelli’s comparison of Fortune to a ruinous river that would flood the plains unless people took precautions to control it with embankments and dikes (*The Prince* 25). See Machiavelli (1979), 159.

⁵² As I demonstrate below, Pareto’s sociological concepts make most sense when set within Machiavelli’s political theory. As to the binary of the foxes and the lions as respective symbols of *τέχνη* and *δύναμις*, it goes back at least to Pindar. For details, see Bundy (1986), 29-32.

discipline. This can only mean that, having a half-beast and half-man as a teacher, a prince must know how to employ the nature of the one and the other; and the one without the other cannot endure.

Since, then, a prince must know how to make good use of the nature of the beast, he should choose from among the beasts the fox and the lion; for the lion cannot defend itself from traps and the fox cannot protect itself from wolves. It is therefore necessary to be a fox in order to recognize the traps and a lion in order to frighten the wolves (*The Prince* 18).⁵³

At first, Machiavelli appears to imitate Cicero and adopts a distinction between the human and the beastly.⁵⁴ However, the two authors hold opposing views about whether leonine brute force and vulpine shrewdness are worthy of man. For instance, Cicero says: “Moreover, an injustice may be done in two ways: either by force or by fraud. Fraud seems to belong to the fox and force to the lion. Both are wholly alien to man, but fraud is worthy of greater aversion. However, of all forms of injustice, none is more perilous than those who make it their business to appear to be good men at the very moment when they deceive the most” (*Off.* 1.41).⁵⁵ Similar to many other classical thinkers who envision the political community as the natural setting for living the morally good life, Cicero postulates a special relationship between moral rectitude and legitimate political authority. He claims that moral philosophy is a necessary foundation of the art of government and asserts that moral judgment is a key element in political action. In *De officiis*, Cicero repeatedly emphasizes that moral conduct and what is good for a politician

⁵³ Machiavelli (1979), 133f.

⁵⁴ According to Cicero, “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore” (*Off.* 1.34).

⁵⁵ “Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam eorum, qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur.” Cf. also Cic. *Off.* 3.82.

coincide: the politician promotes his own interest by being virtuous because hypocrisy does not work (Cic. *Off.* 2.43-44).⁵⁶

By contrast, Machiavelli is a realist who is unequivocal in reminding us that the ruler needs to be cunning and devious in order to secure his hold on power. Interestingly, he compares the prince's political fortune to winning over a woman by any means necessary and admonishes the ruler to change the policy every time circumstances make it advisable. In particular, Machiavelli says:

I conclude, therefore, that since Fortune changes and men remain set in their ways, men will succeed when the two are in harmony and fail when they are not in accord. I am certainly convinced of this: that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, in order to keep her down, to beat her and to struggle with her. And it is seen that she more often allows herself to be taken over by men who are impetuous than by those who make cold advances; and then, being a woman, she is always the friend of young men, for they are less cautious, more aggressive, and they command her with more audacity (*The Prince* 25).⁵⁷

Elsewhere in *The Prince*, the Florentine contends that the legitimacy of man's political power is based solely upon his ability and willingness to use coercive force because no claim to political authority can be detached from the use of power to impose one's will on others. Discussing the relationship between law and force, Machiavelli declares, "The principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old or mixed, are good laws and good armies. And since there cannot exist good laws where there are no good armies, and where there are

⁵⁶ For a useful discussion of Cicero's association of civic virtue with an ideal republican constitution and the right to hold office, see Colish (1978), 84-90. At the same time, it is important to always keep in mind that, as I demonstrate in Cicero's case study above, the great orator rarely practiced what he preached.

⁵⁷ Machiavelli (1979), 161f.

good armies there must be good laws, I shall leave aside the treatment of laws and discuss the armed forces” (*The Prince* 12).⁵⁸ To Machiavelli’s mind, there can be no moral basis on which to judge the difference between licit and illicit uses of power because law and force are dependent on each other. While a well-ordered political system is founded upon good laws and strong armed forces, whoever has power also has the right to set rules. In fact, nobody will ever acknowledge the authority of the ruler and the laws he promulgates unless his claim to legitimacy is supported by a clear demonstration of power that renders obedience impossible to avoid. This is why the Florentine asserts that the authority of the prince is useless unless he has the power to enforce it.

The acquisition and maintenance of power should be the only concern of the prince, but brute force alone is often not enough to stay in power. Machiavelli draws attention to the very important paradox in politics: virtues become vices when circumstances change. “Since, carefully taking everything into account,” he says, “one will discover that something which appears to be a virtue, if pursued, will end in his destruction; while some other thing which seems to be a vice, if pursued, will result in his safety and his well-being” (*The Prince* 15).⁵⁹ Equally important is Machiavelli’s conviction that men are evil by nature and will easily break their promises to the prince if this benefits them (*The Prince* 18).⁶⁰ This is why a ruler who wants to stay in power should combine lion-like and fox-like qualities and acquire the *virtù* of

⁵⁸ See *Ibid.*, 115f.

⁵⁹ Machiavelli (1979), 128. Cf. also Pareto (1935), § 2274.

⁶⁰ See Machiavelli (1979), 134.

coping with ever-changing Fortune through force and fraud.⁶¹ In fact, any successful prince learns to rely on a combination of quick thinking and guile, becoming a great hypocrite and a liar skilled at turning himself “according to the way the winds of Fortune and the changeability of affairs require... and entering into evil when necessity commands” (*The Prince* 18).⁶²

Praising princely guile, Machiavelli criticizes Platonic idealism for offering the readers a vision of the ideal state instead of providing real-life political advice for successfully governing the state. He says:

But since my intention is to write something useful for anyone who understands it, it seemed more suitable to me to search after the effectual truth of the matter rather than its imagined one. And many writers have imagined for themselves republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in reality; for there is such a gap between how one lives and how one ought to live that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation... (*The Prince* 15).⁶³

To Machiavelli’s mind, the ideal prince should maintain the appearance of an audacious lion, but he must secretly act like a shrewd and cunning fox, displaying all the positive characteristics of the lion but utilizing, without it being known, the qualities unique to the fox.⁶⁴ It is important

⁶¹ The Machiavellian *virtù* has nothing to do with Christian virtues; its meaning is closer to the notion of Roman *virtus* and refers to the range of personal qualities the ruler needs to acquire in order to govern successfully for a long time.

⁶² See Machiavelli (1979), 135. Contrast Cicero who says, “Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est, tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat, tum amicitiae repugnat maxime” (*Amic.* 92).

⁶³ Machiavelli (1979), 126f. Cf. also Pareto (1935), §§ 277 and 300; Brown (2010), 168f.; and Unger (2011), 147, 219f., and 267.

⁶⁴ For an alternative view, see Benner (2009), who argues that Machiavelli is a moral philosopher whose political theory demonstrates a strong commitment to the “rule of law” over the “rule of men.” She also suggests that Machiavelli’s exhortation to the ruler to be cunning and devious is an act of dissimulation and maintains that the author’s positions are closer to those

that the Florentine easily finds examples of such tactics in Roman history. Discussing the circumstances of Septimius Severus' ascension to the throne, for example, he says, "I wish to demonstrate briefly how well he knew how to use the masks of the fox and the lion, whose natures, as I say above, a prince must imitate" (*The Prince* 19).⁶⁵

As a Machiavellian pragmatist, Pareto bases his theory upon "many maxims of Machiavelli which hold as true today as they were in his time."⁶⁶ In particular, Pareto rejects universality of ethical standards and rational truths, the so-called "liberal moralism" of contemporary moral and political philosophers.⁶⁷ Such philosophers as Rawls, Habermas, and Dworkin trace their ideas back to the abstract idealism of the Kantian moral tradition and speculate that only reason can provide access to a fixed and stable moral order. However, the major problem with their theorizing is an assertion that political philosophy is a branch of applied ethics, the claim that is both biased and strongly anti-political.⁶⁸ In contrast to the followers of Kant, Pareto refuses to order the world into exclusive moral categories; for instance, he claims that such concepts as "justice" or "liberty" are essentially contestable because there will never be an intersubjective

of other Renaissance civic humanists rather than to those of unscrupulous political realists. Benner's esoteric reading of Machiavelli's works fails to persuade, mainly because her use of textual evidence often seems forced.

⁶⁵ Machiavelli (1979), 142.

⁶⁶ Pareto (1935), § 2410.

⁶⁷ The term "liberal moralism" was coined by Femia (2012), 73f., who criticizes this model of political theory for paying too much attention to distinctively liberal themes of individual autonomy, human rights, and democratic deliberation.

⁶⁸ According to Williams (2005), 2 and 8, the "political moralism" which has taken captive today's Anglo-American political philosophy suffers from a strong anti-political bias because it postulates "the priority of the moral over the political." For realist objections to "political moralism," see Femia (2012), 73-79.

consensus on what these notions mean in practical terms.⁶⁹ Arguing against philosophical and political “essentialism,” Pareto opposes the hypothesis that “logic” and “reason” could or should dictate human behavior.⁷⁰ For example, he states:

A measure that is reprehensible from the ethical standpoint may be altogether commendable from the standpoint of social utility; and, *vice versa*, a measure commendable from the ethical point of view may be deleterious from the standpoint of social utility. But in that connexion it is better for the subject portion of the population to believe that there is an exact identity between the ethical value of a measure and its social utility.⁷¹

In essence, Pareto paraphrases Machiavelli’s assertion that virtues become vices once circumstances change (*The Prince* 15).⁷² To Pareto’s mind, moralistic criteria are nothing more than historically conditioned products of shifting circumstances and fluctuating “sentiments,” the subconscious values that function as standards of evaluation. This makes him propose two basic laws: (1) “The greater part of human actions have their origin not in logical reasoning but in sentiment” and (2) “Man, although impelled to act by non-logical motives, likes to tie his actions logically to certain principles; he therefore invents these *a posteriori* in order to justify his actions.”⁷³ Thus, Pareto significantly asserts that most human actions--especially those not based on scientific reasons or sound empirical information--have their origins in instinctive motivations and non-rational sentiments. Although these non-rational actions are driven by the dominant psychosocial propensities of vulpine “combination” or leonine “preservation,” humans

⁶⁹ Pareto also harshly criticizes the followers of Marx for exalting the human need for association as “essential” and dismissing the pursuit of self-interest as “unnatural.”

⁷⁰ See Pareto (1935), §§ 69; 300; and 471.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, § 2274.

⁷² See Machiavelli (1979), 128, and my discussion above, pp. 158f.

⁷³ Pareto (1991), 27.

prefer to rationalize and justify them *a posteriori* in theories which obfuscate the real subjectivity and present the actions in a socially positive light.

A recent study authored by Marshall seems to corroborate the existence of Machiavellian and Paretian “foxes” and “lions” within a real political elite.⁷⁴ In the study that bridges classical sociology and political psychology, the author investigates how personality traits that are incorporated into Pareto’s psychological model are assorted at the level of social personality throughout the UK parliament. It is very significant that Marshall’s study confirms several important insights of Pareto’s social equilibrium theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of governing elites. First, the study tests and verifies that conservative politicians tend to be risk-averse and uncreative while liberal politicians tend to have a higher tolerance for risk-taking and are more innovative. Second, it reveals that the politicians distributed more toward the higher echelons of the big parliamentary parties display higher scores of aggressiveness, thus lending some support to Pareto’s assertion that “Machiavellian” traits appear most saliently when one looks at the upper crust of the ruling elite.⁷⁵ Finally and most significantly, the study detects a substantial correlation between the political aloofness variable, which taps the Machiavellian’s anomic disenchantment and distrust, and psychological liberalism. Taken together with other measurable variables, this correlation indicates that there is a clear link between vulpine political liberalism and the so-called “dark triad” of the socially aversive traits of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy.⁷⁶ Since Marshall’s findings

⁷⁴ See Marshall (2007), 151-194.

⁷⁵ See Ibid., 177f.

⁷⁶ See Ibid., 191-194. For my discussion of the “dark triad,” see below, pp. 183-196.

seem to corroborate important aspects of Pareto's theory, it may be instructive to apply this theory to the study of the decline of the Late Roman Republic and the rise of Octavian.

Pareto's Social Equilibrium Theory of Elite Cycles and the Periodic Circulation of Ruling Elites in the Late Republic

Pareto conspicuously uses his social equilibrium theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of governing elites to analyze the history of Rome, tracing the historical development of the Roman elites from the days of the Early Republic to the fall of the Western Roman Empire.⁷⁷ While discussing shifts from demagogic to military plutocracies in the Late Roman Republic and during the Augustan Principate, he says:

Ancient Rome was a republic of farmworkers that became a plutocracy after the destruction of Carthage and the conquest of Greece. Agrarian laws [133-121 B.C.] initiated by the Gracchi brothers were intended to prevent this transformation and hastened it instead. But this is not at all unusual. On the contrary, politicians frequently seek to insure one state of affairs while unwittingly promoting the opposite. Roman demagogic plutocracy triumphed until Sulla's time [138-78 B.C., dictator 82-79 B.C.]. From that period until the time of Augustus [63 B.C.-14 A.D., effective ruler after 31 B.C.], the forces of demagogic plutocracy fought against the forces of military plutocracy.⁷⁸

When Pareto explains the decline of the Late Roman Republic in terms of the cyclical change between demagogic and military plutocracies, he applies functional analysis to the study of the Roman society which, according to him, included the smaller ruling plutocracy, governing and

⁷⁷ See Pareto (1935), §§ 2353-2365 and 2539-2609.

⁷⁸ Pareto (1984), 57. The author argues that both the demagogic and military plutocracies have long-term destabilizing effects that contribute to recurring circulation of the ruling elites. More generally, see *Ibid.*, 55-62, and Powers (1984), 18-21. Badian (1970), 21-25, provides a useful account of how the well-intentioned Gracchan reforms meant to ameliorate problems the Roman state faced hastened the disintegration of the Roman Republic.

non-governing elites, and the rest of the people.⁷⁹ The polymath treats this society as a social system made of interdependent parts that existed in a systemic state of dynamic equilibrium. This equilibrium was a consequence of the constantly changing combinations of external conditions and internal elements that continually moved toward or away from the balance of non-logical propensities and specific economic interests that determined choices and actions of the Roman ruling plutocracy.⁸⁰ In essence, Pareto proposes a very interesting and rational conception of society comprised of elements of variables in a state of mutual interdependence: the introduction of change affecting any part will necessarily lead to reciprocal transformations in other parts as well as in the whole system. One can ask the question of how this change is effected.

According to Pareto, causalities of political and social change can be located in a ruling elite's dominant psychosocial character that functionally correlates with ever-changing rates of circulation between the governing and non-governing elites and the masses on the one hand and the corresponding ratio of lion-like "consolidators" and fox-like "speculators" in the ruling oligarchy on the other.⁸¹ Thus, historical development of any society and the sequence of specific socio-cultural patterns within it are controlled by the relative proportions of non-logical

⁷⁹ Although the author never uses the term "function" in his analysis, his concept of "utility" serves the same purpose. For details, see Lopreato (1999), 333.

⁸⁰ On the one hand, Pareto classifies both geography and the influences adopted by the Roman society of the Late Republic either from other societies or from the Roman society itself at an earlier historical stage as the external conditions. On the other hand, he identifies "irrational behavioral manifestations," "derivations," economic interests, social stratification, and "class circulation" as the internal elements that directly affected the historical development and the sequence of specific socio-cultural patterns in the Late Roman Republic. See Pareto (1935), §§ 2060-2061, and cf. §§ 1542-1727.

⁸¹ It is understood that both governing and non-governing elites may supply cadres for the positions within the smaller ruling oligarchy.

behavioral manifestations of vulpine “combination” and leonine “preservation” in its elites. The crux of Pareto’s argument is that no elite that holds power is able to maintain an effective balancing of vulpine persuasion and leonine force indefinitely. The author offers endless examples to prove the two very important points: (1) constant cyclical changes in the fundamental character of societies are inevitable as one set of societal non-rational behavioral manifestations replaces the other and (2) poor adaptivity of the ruling elites in the face of uncertainty and in the times of crisis results in imbalance that causes their cyclical circulation.⁸²

Depending on the dominant psychosocial propensities in society and the relative proportions of each irrational behavioral manifestation in the governing and non-governing elites, government by the wealthy can assume either a form of a leonine “military” plutocracy controlled by “consolidators” or a form of a vulpine demagogic plutocracy dominated by “speculators.” While the changing proportions of vulpine-“combination” and leonine-“preservation” propensities shape preferences and actions of the ruling elite, they themselves are determined by the utilities produced by activities of both types of propensities as a return for both total societies and their component groups.⁸³ Thus, Pareto makes an important insight that the augmentation of wealth in society results in more complex social conditions that create much more pronounced hierarchies differentiated in affluence and status. In turn, such state of affairs generates a cultural and psychological shift toward the psychosocial propensity of vulpine “combination.”

⁸² I discuss the latter point in more detail below, pp. 183ff. For Pareto’s concern with the interplay of risk and uncertainty, see Marshall (2012), 88-91.

⁸³ See Pareto (1935), §§ 2274-2276; Houghton (1977), 32f.; and Higley (2012), 113ff. It should be also made clear that changes in the classes of non-logical behavioral manifestations predominant in different times and places cannot be attributed to any intrinsic principle of change in the psychosocial propensities themselves.

Pareto's inductive analysis of Roman politics is actually supported by literary sources, and it may help understand better a sudden rise to power of cunning politicians and entrepreneurial equites in the second century BCE. Although any governing elite manifests both vulpine and leonine proclivities, Roman expansionism and general prosperity at that time were mostly fueled by the proceeds from habitual predatory foreign conquests. Not only did this lead to the creation of more defined hierarchies but also enabled more cunning and shrewd politicians to take center stage. For instance, the Roman triumphs over Macedonia, the Galatian/Gallic tribal kingdoms in Asia Minor, Carthage, and Greece as well as Attalus' bequest resulted in an immense flow of cheap slaves and wealth into the city from the newly acquired territories.⁸⁴ This influx of wealth naturally led to the corruption of the morals of the governing elite.⁸⁵ As a consequence, in 149 BCE Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 133 BCE) established at Rome the first standing court to hear extortion cases committed by provincial officials (Cic. *Verr.* II.3.84.195).⁸⁶ All the jurors were to be senators, and Rome's subjects and allies could seek reparation from corrupt magistrates. While Cicero emphasizes the novelty of the *lex Calpurnia* (*Off.* 2.75), Tacitus significantly mentions that the law was a response to the greed of magistrates (*Ann.* 15.20.3).⁸⁷ Yet, in all the cases known to us those accused of peculation went free, which is a clear

⁸⁴ Hopkins (2009), 179, suggests that between one million and two million slaves were imported into Italy in the last two centuries BCE, and Scheidel (2005) gives an even higher estimate of between two and four million.

⁸⁵ For a useful discussion of literary sources, see Pareto (1935), § 2354, n. 1.

⁸⁶ Lucius Calpurnius Piso must have earned the cognomen Frugi for honesty and integrity. The court was set up during his tribuneship. For details and an excellent discussion of literary sources, see Cornell (2013), 1:231f.

⁸⁷ Cf. also Cic. *Brut.* 106 and Tac. *Ann.* 15.21.4. Forsythe (1994), 410-414, provides a useful collection of ancient sources on Piso Frugi's *lex de repetundis*.

manifestation of the increasing dominance of the psychosocial propensity of fox-like “combination” in the Roman ruling oligarchy.⁸⁸

It is also not a coincidence that the same Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi is the first known Roman author to have maintained a high moral tone in his *Annales*. In two different fragments preserved by Pliny the Elder, Piso comments on the general moral decline of the Roman society and even pinpoints it with an exact date. First, he contends that the introduction of luxury into Rome and the city’s addiction to it occurred in 187 BCE, during Gnaeus Manlius Vulso’s triumph for his victory over the Galatian tribes in Asia Minor (Plin. *HN* 34.8.14).⁸⁹ Sent by the Senate to Asia Minor to replace Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Younger (cos. 205 and 194 BCE), Manlius Vulso (cos. 189 BCE) wandered with his army from Ephesus to Ancyra, shaking down local rulers for money. At the end, he declared war on the Galatian tribal kingdoms, even though he had no authority from the Senate to do so.⁹⁰ Livy, who provides his own detailed account of Vulso’s triumph (39.6.2-39.7.5), probably borrowed from Piso both the description of the couches, sideboards, and one-legged tables and his allusion to the triumph as “the origin of foreign luxury.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ Decimus Iunius Silanus (praet. 141 BCE) was a partial exception to this rule. After being accused of embezzlement in Macedonia, he was turned over to his natural father Titus Manlius Torquatus (cos. 165 BCE) and committed suicide after being condemned in a private family hearing. See Cic. *Fin.* 1.24; Livy, *Per.* 54.5-6; and *MRR* 1:477.

⁸⁹ “Nam triclinia aerata abacosque et monopodia Cn. Manlium Asia deuicta primum inuexisse triumpho suo, quem duxit anno urbis dlxvii, L. Piso auctor est....”

⁹⁰ For literary sources and details, see *MRR* 1:360 and Sherwin-White (1984), 21f. and 115f.

⁹¹ See Cornell (2013), 1:239 and 3:213, F36.

Second, Piso narrates how in 154 BCE a fig tree, the symbol of sensuality manifesting Rome's loss of all shame, sprouted on the altar of Jupiter on the Capitol in place of a palm tree that had sprang up there during the Third Macedonian War (172-168 BCE) as an omen of the Roman imminent victory (Plin. *HN* 17.38.244).⁹² The author tells this story in relation to either the poisoning of Lucius Postumius Albinus (cos. 154 BCE) and Claudius Asellus by their wives (Livy, *Per.* 48.12 and Val. Max. 6.3.8) or the construction of the first permanent stone theater in Rome in 154 BCE (Livy, *Per.* 48.25 and Vell. Pat. 1.15.3).⁹³ Based on Piso's and Livy's remarks, an argument can be made that Roman expansionism and general prosperity fueled by foreign conquests, including the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BCE, strengthened governing elite's "combination" propensity so much that it led to a widespread alliance between vulpine politicians, demagogic tribunes, and profit-seeking "speculators" and "innovators."⁹⁴ The consequences of this alliance were both political and economic, and they culminated in the creation of an especially insidious form of government defined by Pareto as demagogic plutocracy.

In the realm of politics, long promagistracies and the grant of *imperium* to private citizens became one of the clearest manifestations of vulpine shrewdness of the ruling plutocracy of the

⁹² Cf. Forsythe (1994), 405.

⁹³ For the former, see also Jul. *Obs.* 17 and Forsythe (1994), 404-408. For the latter, see also Val. Max. 2.4.1-2; App. *B Civ.* 1.28; Oros. 4.21.4; August. *De civ. D.* 1.31-33 and 2.5; and Cornell (2013), 3:218, F40.

⁹⁴ For the rise of corruption in the Roman elite after the destruction of Carthage, see, for example, Sall. *Cat.* 10.1-12.3; *Iug.* 85.41-43; Livy, *Preface* 11-13; and Vell. Pat. 2.1.1-2.

Late Republic.⁹⁵ Proconsular and propraetorian *imperium* had been occasionally granted to experienced ex-magistrates of the Early Republic.⁹⁶ However, the practice of prorogation for long periods of time became widespread only during the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE), perhaps due to the shortage of qualified commanders. At that time, several *privati* were even given *imperium pro magistratu* by the people, even though they were not allowed to hold triumphs for their victories afterwards.⁹⁷ It is significant that both prorogation for many successive years as well as grants of praetorian *imperium* to nonmagistrates were abandoned immediately after the end of the war to be revived only in the last century and a half of the Republic.

First, starting from 197 BCE only six praetors and two consuls were elected on an annual basis. In a culture obsessed with honor, the temptation to use the special privilege of prorogation *pro consule* was irresistible because it offered a grant of social distinction by implying that the former praetor had performed a consular command and thus was worthy of consulship. This gave him a clear edge in the unrestrained competition for high office.⁹⁸ Second, the shrewd *nobiles*, who had come to dominate the Senate at that time, jealously guarded their privileges by always trying to deny to the scions of non-consular families any opportunity to enter the Senate

⁹⁵ For a generalization, see Polyb. 6.15.6. For specific examples, see Livy 31.8.9-10; 35.20.6; and 35.20.11. Drogula (2015), 209-231, offers a very useful discussion of prorogation, examining the phenomenon of *privati cum imperio* on 220-230.

⁹⁶ For details, see Jashemski (1950), 1-16 and 100.

⁹⁷ See Livy 28.38.4; 31.20.3; Val. Max. 2.8.5; and Plut. *Pomp.* 14.1. For details, cf. also Jashemski (1950), 17-39 and 101-112, and Brennan (2000), 191-197.

⁹⁸ For details, see Drogula (2015), 228ff.

and thus share in the consular dignity.⁹⁹ Among other things, in alliance with demagogic tribunes the vulpine *nobiles* devised new and cunning ways to keep magistrates in power after their normal year in office, including intentionally expanding the practice of extending the *imperium* of individual consuls or praetors by way of *prorogatio*. Under the law of Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (trib. 123 and 122 BCE) passed in 123 BCE, the Senate was obliged to name the two consular provinces for the following year *before* the electoral *comitia*, and no tribunician veto on the allocation was possible. In theory, after drawing lots to get the provinces allocated, each new consul could depart to his respective *provincia* at any time after the beginning of his consular year. If he belonged to the Paretian vulpine type and had the psychosocial propensity of “combination,” he could fleece the provincials not only to recuperate his electoral expenses but also to come back to Rome as a really wealthy man. If one year in the province was not enough, his provincial *imperium* could usually be prorogued.¹⁰⁰

In fact, the Late Republican Senate habitually used a shortage of men qualified to take on provincial governorship as an excuse to prorogue the *imperium* of pro-magistrates for several successive years or even grant it to private citizens.¹⁰¹ After Sulla’s reform in 81 BCE, it appears that the ten Roman provinces that existed at that time were assigned to the two proconsuls and eight propraetors who held a proconsulship or a propraetorship following their year in office at Rome; their powers could be extended once again by the Senate via *prorogatio* (Cic. *Q Fr.* 1.1.1-

⁹⁹ Cf. my discussion of Gaius Marius’ struggle for consulship in Chapter I, pp. 19ff.

¹⁰⁰ Jashemski (1950), 114-158, who provides names, dates, and source references for all the governors of the thirteen Roman provinces down to 27 BCE, can be consulted to see that many governors of the Late Republic held their positions for many successive years.

¹⁰¹ See *Ibid.* On the other hand, the appointment of *privati* as governors seems to have been a result of Sulla’s reform. For details, see Keaveney (2005), 143.

4).¹⁰² Cicero claims that at his time of life the command of the troops in the field was entrusted mostly to proconsuls and propraetors (*Div.* 2.36).¹⁰³ Of course, the downside of prorogation was that the cunning *nobiles* habitually used their extended terms in the provinces to greatly augment their *gloria*, *dignitas*, and *auctoritas*. In particular, they established a strong rapport with the troops stationed in the province and acquired extensive *clientelae* and vast financial resources. All this enabled them not only to cement their domination of high offices but also to add to their families' deposit of ascribed honor and resources, thus increasing the chances of their descendants to gain advantage in the man-eat-man contest for *laus* and *fama*.

After the expiration of his consulship in Spain, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE) fought Quintus Sertorius in the Pyrenees from 79 BCE to 71 BCE as a proconsul, acquiring a great number of clients and a vast fortune.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, in 77 BCE Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, though a *privatus*, used force and the far-reaching *clientelae* built up by his father Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89 BCE) to obtain for himself an *imperium extraordinarium* for Spain. After spending six years in the province and conquering numerous towns, the victorious general was recalled to Italy by the Senate.¹⁰⁵ There Pompeius finished off the War of Spartacus by destroying the dispersed remnants of mutinous slaves in the north and was granted his second triumph on December 29, 71 BCE. For obvious reasons, in most cases consulship or promagistracy preceded winning triumphal honors and celebrating a triumph. However, in a

¹⁰² Cf. Bleicken (1993).

¹⁰³ “Bellicam rem administrari maiores nostri nisi auspicato noluerunt; quam multi anni sunt, cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent!”

¹⁰⁴ For details and chronology, see *MRR* 2:79; 83; 86; 89; 93; 98; 104; 111; 117; and 123.

¹⁰⁵ A *tropaeum* erected in the Pyrenees bore witness to 876 cities subjugated by Pompeius (Plin. *HN* 7.26.96).

very unusual sequence of events the future dynast used his newly acquired prestige and wealth to win his first consulship the following year.¹⁰⁶

Although members of any governing elite manifest both fox-like and lion-like propensities, Roman expansionism driven by predatory conquests created irresistible opportunities for shrewd generals and cunning politicians to invent novel ways to stay in power longer and enrich themselves even more. Those who learned how to devise and successfully utilize such schemes--be it long promagistracies combined with provincial extortion or kick-backs from lucrative contracts in Italy--became very wealthy, acquired extensive *clientelae*, and could assert stronger claims on magistracies and military commands for themselves and their descendants.¹⁰⁷ In his account of the Roman affairs during the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE), Polybius describes an all-embracing system of public contracts administered by the Senate and manipulated by the censors who were awarding them to different companies of the equestrian *publicani* (Polyb. 6.17.1-4).¹⁰⁸

Following Pareto, I suggest that the growing wealth of the ruling elite of the Late Republic resulted in the gradual evolution of the dominant psychosocial propensities in society, favoring those who were strong in vulpine non-rational behavioral manifestation. After the Roman

¹⁰⁶ Crassus was his consular colleague that year. For details and literary sources, see *MRR* 2:124.

¹⁰⁷ The importance of wealth in politics is clearly emphasized by Seneca the Elder: “census senatorium gradum ascendit, census equitem Romanum a plebe secernit, census in castris ordinem promovet, census iudices in foro legit” (*Controv.* 2.1.17). Cf. also Plin. *HN* 14.1.5.

¹⁰⁸ For details, see Walbank (1957-1979), 1:692ff., who suggests that Polybius’ account corresponds to the period around 150 BCE, not to the times of the Second Punic War, but does not provide any literary evidence to support the claim.

victory over Macedonia, Cato the Elder (cos. 195 BCE) warned that success (*res secundae*) and general happiness (*laetitia*) were likely to steer people away from “the right counsel and the right insight” (Gell. *NA* 6.3.14).¹⁰⁹ When Cato was elected censor in 185 BCE, he decided to combat the growing influence of the fox-like “speculators” and imposed high taxes on luxuries. He also sharply reduced the cost of public contracts and increased the rent of public land. However, the majority of senators stood by the fox-like entrepreneurs: Cato’s contracts were annulled by the Senate, and the tribunes even fined him two talents (Livy 39.44.1-3 and Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 18.1-19.2). As time went by, the trend toward vulpine psychosocial propensities only increased in intensity. Marcus Licinius Crassus (cos. 70 and 55 BCE), a *nobilis* who came from a long line of usurers and dead-beats (Plin. *HN* 33.47.133-134) and made a fortune in Sulla’s proscriptions, was perhaps the paradigmatic type of the plutocrat-politician of the last years of the Republic.¹¹⁰

Thus, it should not be that surprising that Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, who benefited immensely from the fox-like practice of prorogation of *imperium* by ex-magistrates, nevertheless attempted to end this corrupt tradition. Gruen argues that the measure was a part of Pompeius’ legislation to professionalize governmental operations, but it also could have been a part of his ongoing struggle against Julius Caesar.¹¹¹ In any case, Pompeius conceived and pushed through

¹⁰⁹ “Advorsae res edomant et docent quid opus siet facto, secundae res laetitia transvorsum trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo.”

¹¹⁰ According to Mommsen (1887b), 4:13f., “As regards mental endowments, literary culture, military talent, [Crassus] was far in the rear of many men of his class, but he surpassed them in all tireless activity and in his stubborn resolve to own everything and be in the front of everything. He threw himself headlong into speculation.”

¹¹¹ For a useful discussion, see Gruen (1995), 457-460. According to Vell. Pat. 2.47.3, Pompeius used his third consulship to curb electoral abuses.

the Senate a *senatus consultum* of 53 BCE and a *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE.¹¹² Both legislation tried to address the problem of improper prorogation of *imperium* by vulpine ex-consuls and ex-praetors by specifying a five-year interval between the magistrate's office and the governorship. Although all high magistrates were still expected to take over a province after the end of their term in office, magistracies and promagistracies were now separated from each other by a hiatus of five years. As a result, the promagistracy lost the character of an extended power of office, and the proconsular and propraetorian *imperia* were detached from the consulship and praetorship.

Finally, vulpine sentiments were further strengthened in the Roman society as the whole when new groups of people sought and were granted the privileges of the *cives romani*. Pareto says, "The majority [of the new citizens] were of the shrewd type, rich in combination-instincts, since only such had the talent for maneuvering in the stormy waters of those days and procuring the rights of citizenship from the powerful."¹¹³ If we are to believe Plutarch, for example, Publius Sulpicius Rufus (trib. 88 BCE), who advocated for the equal distribution of the Roman enfranchised allies in the tribes, used to sell the Roman citizenship to freedmen and foreigners from a table that stood in the Forum (*Sull.* 8.1). Now, newcomers who demonstrated "combination" instincts were in greater demand and had the greatest chance at being admitted to the governing elite from below because they excelled in serving the economic interests of the

¹¹² See Dio Cass. 40.30.1; 40.46.2-3; and 40.56.1.

¹¹³ See Pareto (1935), § 2548 who also provides numerous references to the primary literature. Roman citizenship became a much sought-after commodity only in the second century BCE, when high-handed treatment of the Italian allies by Rome made many of them seek Roman citizenship. Before this, many Italian communities perceived Roman citizenship as a gross imposition on their autonomy. For details, see Lomas (2014), 238.

ruling plutocracy more efficiently.¹¹⁴ The contingencies of class-circulation also permitted the vulpine “speculators” and “innovators,” who lacked the record of actual military accomplishments, to rise successfully through the *cursus honorum* by excelling in the *urbanae artes* of jurisprudence and oratory. By contrast, people with a strong leonine propensity but who had no shrewdness were, for the most part, excluded from holding power and, hence, from the advantages granted to the ruling classes. Pushed to join the armies of such fox-like politicians as Marius, Sulla or the dynasts, they demonstrated *virtus* and military prowess on the battlefield and helped Rome establish dominance of the Mediterranean basin (cf. Sall. *Iug.* 86.2-3).¹¹⁵

Although a number of people with fox-like characteristics was steadily rising within both the governing elite and the populace of the Late Republic, the *publicani*, one distinct group of “speculators” that emerged from the midst of the equestrian class, contributed most to the creation of a Roman version of the Paretian demagogic plutocracy.¹¹⁶ Many of these enterprising equites shared business interests and political goals with some of the Roman aristocrats of old, and they cunningly used the tribunate to propose radical social and economic legislation from which both parties could benefit financially.¹¹⁷ However, the psychosocial inclination of the *publicani* “speculators” to take risks, invent, and combine things in innovative

¹¹⁴ See Pareto (1935), § 2300.

¹¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, § 2564. In § 2548, Pareto says, “The army, furthermore, which had at first been largely made up of property-owning citizens, rich, therefore, in Class II [leonine ‘preservation’] residues, tends to become in part a collection of paid soldiers, of men therefore who are the tools and the supporters of leaders rich in Class I [vulpine ‘combination’] residues.”

¹¹⁶ For example, cf. Flor. 2.5.3: “Equites Romani tanta potestate subnixi, ut qui fata fortunisque principum haberent in manu, interceptis vectigalibus peculabantur suo iure rem publicam....” For a sympathetic account of the activities of these private entrepreneurs, see Badian (1983).

¹¹⁷ See below, pp. 177-180.

ways in order to enrich themselves also provided them with every incentive to seek political influence. Once they pushed their way into the political arena, they quickly formed a plutocracy whose viciousness far exceeded that of the aristocratic plutocracy of old and settled wealth.

Pareto nicely sums up this process of power consolidation:

Speculators represent the majority in the *élite*. They may be seen forever shifting in the direction from which the wind seems likely to blow most favourably, now intriguing in the Forum, buying votes in the comitia as long as they find it profitable to do so, now switching with the greatest ease to the warriors if they see a chance of deriving some advantage from them. They are most conspicuous among the equestrians, but they are far from wanting in the other classes.... There, in its cradle, is the creature that will one day be named Plutocracy. An infant weakling, it remains subordinate. Once it gets its growth and its muscle, it will claim domination.¹¹⁸

Although evidence on contracts for army and navy supplies given out to groups of the *publicani* goes back to the late third century BCE, the true rise of the publicans to power started when the second-century Roman Republic began selling the collection of all public revenue, except the *tributum*, as public contracts at an auction to the highest bidder.¹¹⁹ In particular, Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (trib. 123 and 122 BCE), passed a law to have the taxes of the new and extremely wealthy province of Asia auctioned off to the *publicani* for five-year terms by the censors in Rome.¹²⁰ While in the past taxes in Asia Minor had been collected at a fixed rate directly by the governor who belonged to the senatorial aristocracy, now the fox-like *publicani* had an unprecedented opportunity to set up the form of a tithe to manipulate the tax rates and enrich themselves at the expense of provincials squeezed until the last drop. The *publicani*

¹¹⁸ Pareto (1935), § 2548.

¹¹⁹ For the early *publicani*, see Badian (1983), 16f.

¹²⁰ This was just one of the many bills Gracchus passed. Most literary sources interpret Gracchus' series of legislation as an elaborate plot to mount a populist challenge to the authority of the Senate.

“speculators” took full advantage of the opportunities tax-farming presented and quickly won for themselves privileges and guarantees unheard of in normal Roman company law.¹²¹ Strong in the Paretian propensity of vulpine “combination,” which is the psychosocial inclination to take risks, invent, and combine things in innovative ways, they immediately began to divert existing sources of revenue to themselves and their supporters. Very soon, the *publicani* started to undermine national prosperity because they were consuming much more than they produced.¹²²

Furthermore, under the false pretexts of protecting provincials from exploitation by promagistrates and securing the treasury’s major revenue against embezzlement, Gaius Gracchus and Manius Glabrio Acilius (trib. 122 BCE) passed *leges repetundae*.¹²³ Not only did these laws introduce elements of severe criminal procedure against the senators accused of extortion, but they also transferred from the senatorial class to the equestrian class the privilege of serving as jurors in the courts that tried provincial governors for abuses committed while in office (Cic. *Verr.* I.17.51-52). Judging from the fragments of the *lex de repetundis* on the “Tabula Bembina” from Urbino, the Acilian Laws of 122 BCE excluded senators, the relatives of senators, and all curule magistrates from the juries of the court *de repetundis*.¹²⁴ As I discuss above, the first

¹²¹ Cicero’s Verrine Orations provide important evidence for the organization of the companies of *publicani* in the Late Republic. Nicolet (1979), 89-95, offers a list of known Republican *societates* and records all their organizational details. Badian (1983), 67-81, discusses how the companies of *publicani* were granted legal personality under Roman law.

¹²² Hopkins (1980), 122, correctly points out: “Tax-farming was a mechanism of transferring some of the profits of empire to investors, who belonged to the Roman élite and sub-élites, who were not directly involved in conquest (as soldiers) or in government (as senators).”

¹²³ See, for example, Livy, *Per.* 60.7; Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5.2-6.2; and especially App. *B Civ.* 1.22. For the full list and an insightful discussion of all literary sources, see Brunt (1988), 194-204.

¹²⁴ For details, see Lintott (1992b), 75f. and 81f. Cf. also Sherwin-White (1972 and 1982) and Lintott (1983).

standing court of senators to hear extortion cases was established by Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 133 BCE) during his tribuneship of 149 BCE, and it is very telling that the vulpine Gaius Gracchus vehemently attacks its author in his oratory.¹²⁵ It is also significant that different ancient authors regularly grumble about the abuses committed in the provinces by the enterprising *publicani* “speculators” as well as about the judicial powers they managed to secure for their class.¹²⁶

On the one hand, Florus, who discusses the Gracchi brothers’ reforms that helped propel the equites to power, exposes the vulpine nature of the vigorous tribunician activity of the second half of the second century BCE in the following way:

The tribunician power was the original cause of all the insurrections. Under the pretence of protecting the plebeians, for whose aid it was originally established, the tribunician power was in reality strengthening its own domination; it courted popular support and favor by legislation for the distribution of lands and grain, and the thinning out of juridical power” (2.1.1).¹²⁷

On the other hand, Appian unmasks the corrupt nature of the Roman version of the Paretian demagogic plutocracy, which was a result of the unholy alliance between the enterprising equites and the fox-like tribunes. He says:

¹²⁵ For details, see Cornell (2013), 1:233, and cf. my discussion above, p. 156, of the *lex Calpurnia*.

¹²⁶ See, for example, Varro *ap.* Nonius Marcellus 728L; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 65; *Q Fr.* 1.1.2 and 1.1.32-33; *Verr.* II.3.41.94 and II.3.72.168; Livy 45.18.3-4; Vell. Pat. 2.6.3; and Flor. 2.1.6 and 2.5.3. Cf. also Badian (1970), 21f.

¹²⁷ “Seditionum omnium causas tribunicia potestas excitavit, quae specie quidem plebis tuendae, cuius in auxilium comparata est, re autem dominationem sibi adquirens, studium populi ac favorem agrariis, frumentariis, iudicariis legibus aucupabatur.”

As the equites voted in the election to sustain the power of the tribunes and obtained from them whatever they wanted in return, they became more and more formidable to the senators. So it shortly came about that the political mastery was turned upside down, with the political power being in the hands of the equites and the honor only remaining with the Senate. The equites indeed went so far that they not only held power over the senators, but they openly flouted them beyond their right. They also became addicted to bribe-taking, and when they too had tasted these enormous gains, they indulged in them even more basely and immoderately than the senators had done. They suborned accusers against the rich and did away with prosecutions for bribe-taking altogether, partly by agreement among themselves and partly by open violence, so that the practice of this kind of investigation became entirely obsolete. Thus, the judiciary law gave rise to another struggle of factions; it lasted for a long time and was not less pernicious than the former ones (*B Civ.* 1.22).¹²⁸

The extraordinary powers Gaius Gracchus and his circle gave to the equites by putting into their hands the court that sat in judgment on senators had serious repercussions for the well-being of the Roman state. The equites now obtained the means to bully good governors who attempted to prevent the wholesale fleecing and plundering of the provinces by shrewd *publicani* strong in the Paretian propensity of vulpine “combination.” For instance, in 94 BCE Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex (cos. 95 BCE) took on the governorship of Asia Minor together with his legate Publius Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105 BCE). Among other things, the two set up tribunals to investigate all the abuses of the *publicani* in the province and actually forced the “speculators” to compensate their victims, thus protecting the provincials from the excesses of the tax-farming corporations (Diod. Sic. 37.5.1-4). The Greeks appreciated Scaevola’s and

¹²⁸ “Συνιστάμενοί τε τοῖς δημάρχοις οἱ ἰππεῖς ἐς τὰς χειροτονίας καὶ ἀντιλαμβάνοντες παρ’ αὐτῶν, ὅ τι θέλοιν, ἐπὶ μέγα φόβου τοῖς βουλευταῖς ἐχώρουν: ταχὺ τε περιῆν ἀνεστράφθαι τὸ κράτος τῆς πολιτείας, τὴν μὲν ἀξίωσιν μόνην ἔτι τῆς βουλῆς ἐχούσης, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τῶν ἰπέων. Προϊόντες γὰρ οὐκ ἐδυνάστευον μόνον: ἀλλὰ καὶ σαφῶς ἐνύβριζον τοῖς βουλευταῖς παρὰ τὰς δίκας. Τὴν τε δωροδοκίαν μεταλαμβάνοντες καὶ γευσάμενοι καὶ οἶδε κερδῶν ἀθρώων αἰσχρότερον ἔτι καὶ ἀμετρότερον αὐτοῖς ἐχρῶντο. Κατηγόρους τε ἐνετοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πλουσίοις ἐπήγοντο καὶ τὰς τῶν δωροδοκιῶν δίκας, συνιστάμενοι σφίσι αὐτοῖς καὶ βιαζόμενοι, πάμπαν ἀνήρουν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἔθος ὅλως τῆς τοιαύδε εὐθύνης ἐπιλιπεῖν καὶ στάσιν ἄλλην τὸν δικαστικὸν νόμον οὐκ ἐλάσσω τῶν προτέρων ἐς πολὺ παρασχεῖν.”

Rufus' evenhanded administration so much (Cic. *Div. Caec.* 57 and *Verr.* 2.2.9.27) that they organized the games in Scaevola's honor (Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.21.51). More importantly, upon Scaevola's return to Rome the Senate decreed that all future governors of Asia had to imitate his leadership style (Val. Max. 8.15.6).

Although Scaevola's and Rufus' policy significantly improved the economic condition of Asia, it disrupted the well organized plunder of the province by the tax-farming corporations and enraged the enterprising *publicani*. Since Scaevola's *fama* and influence protected him from any attack, the vulpine "speculators" orchestrated Rufus' show-trial for alleged *repetundae*. Partisan judges from the equestrian class convicted him and sentenced him to pay damages that were greater than he could realize even by the sale of all his property (Cic. *De or.* 1.53.229-230 and *Brut.* 115).¹²⁹ As a result, he was compelled to go into exile, first to Mytilene and then to Smyrna (Cic. *Brut.* 85 and Livy, *Per.* 70.8), where he spent the rest of his life. The irony is obvious: as the place of his banishment Rufus chose the very province he had been found guilty of governing malignly.¹³⁰

Sallust, who reflects on the avarice-driven politics of the Late Republic, asserts that the destruction of Carthage and the newly acquired wealth quickly fostered promiscuity and arrogance in the ranks of the ruling elite: while the common people misused their liberty, the *nobiles* abused their authority. Every man took, pillaged, and plundered for himself. A relatively few members of the governing elite controlled the treasury, the provinces, and the

¹²⁹ Even Cicero, who plumed himself more than any other Roman politician ever did, saw Rufus as a paragon of virtue (*Rab. Post.* 10.27; cf. *Sen. Ep.* 79.14).

¹³⁰ Magie (1950), 1:173ff., provides an excellent overview of Scaevola's and Rufus' governorship and subsequent Rufus' trial and exile.

magistracies. While the commoners burdened with military service and poverty were being driven out from their homes, magistrates with *imperium* divided the war booty with a few friends and capitalized on the opportunity to increase their acquired honor by celebrating triumphs. According to Sallust, the widespread civil strife, which shook the Roman state as a powerful earthquake, was the natural outcome of the unrestrained avarice of the ruling elite (Sall. *Iug.* 41.1-10).¹³¹

Based on accounts like this, Pareto postulates that the augmentation of wealth in society results in more complex social conditions that create much more pronounced hierarchies differentiated in affluence and status. Leonine and vulpine propensities coexist in most human beings. However, when foreign conquests and bequests gave the Romans access to spectacular sources of wealth in the East, shrewd and cunning types were surely the ones who profited the most. This eventually led to a cultural and psychological shift within the society toward the psychosocial propensity of vulpine “combination.” As the number of fox-like types steadily rose in the Roman governing elite, non-governing elite, and the irrational populace, vulpine “speculators” directly or indirectly consolidated most power in their hands and began to dominate the political and economic life of the Late Republic.¹³² Eventually, they established

¹³¹ Cf. also Sall. *Cat.* 12.1-3 and Flor. 1.47.1-14. Among other things, Florus says: “Quae enim res alia civiles furores peperit quam nimiae felicitates? Syria prima nos victa corrumpit, mox Asiatica Pergameni regis hereditas. Illae opes atque divitiae adflixere saeculi mores, mersamque vitiis suis quasi sentina rem publicam pessum dedere. Unde enim populus Romanus a tribunis agros et cibaria flagitaret nisi per famem quam luxus fecerat? Hinc ergo Gracchanae prima et secunda et illa tertia Apuleiana seditio. Unde iudiciariis legibus divulsus ab senatu eques nisi ex avaritia, ut vectigalia rei publicae atque ipsa iudicia in quaestu haberentur?” (1.47.7-9).

¹³² For example, see Pareto (1935), §§ 2251; 2254; 2354; 2359; 2546; and 2548, especially n. 13. Cf. also Florus’ observation: “Iam ut speciosiora vitia tangamus, nonne ambitus honorum ab isdem divitiis concitatus? Atquin inde Mariana, inde Sullana tempestas.... Denique illa ipsa principatus et dominandi cupido unde nisi ex nimiis opibus venit? Atquin haec Caesarem atque Pompeium furialibus in exitium rei publicae facibus armavit” (1.47.12-14).

the demagogic plutocracy, which utilized society's fox-like inclinations to maintain the position of the privileged and augment their wealth. At first, this strategy worked very well. However, the problem was that the alliance of the vulpine politicians, unscrupulous tribunes, and profit-seeking *publicani* "speculators" came to be made up almost entirely of individuals who relied predominantly on intelligence and cunning, not on leonine brute force, to stay in power longer in order to enrich themselves even more.¹³³ Since these people were constantly inventing new ways to pursue this goal, their activities created critical social tensions in Roman society. In fact, Livy draws a direct correlation between one's wealth and his ambition and lust of power, the combination that ultimately destroyed the Republic (Livy, *Preface* 11-12).¹³⁴

The quick rise to dominance of fox-like "speculators" presented a major problem because the society's vulpine and leonine non-logical propensities are always in a state of mutual interdependence with specific economic interests of the ruling oligarchy, determining its choices and actions.¹³⁵ Once the equilibrium became disturbed by the dominance of fox-like types, the ruling plutocracy of the Late Republic became prone to partiality, closure, inflexibility, and cumulative errors of judgment that triggered first the decline and then the ultimate fall of the

¹³³ One of the manifestations of this trend was the decline of the knowledge of the principles of good generalship among members of the governing elite and the rise of a smaller group of military experts known as the *viri militares*. For details, see Chapter I, p. 21, and the case study of Cicero's exploits in Cilicia, footnote n. 85.

¹³⁴ "Adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat; nuper divitiae avaritiam et abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem pereundi perdendique omnia invexere." Cf. also Sallust's assertions: "Igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperii cupido crevit; ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere" (*Cat.* 10.3-4) and "Ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invader..." (*Iug.* 41.9).

¹³⁵ Velleius Paterculus emphasizes the fast pace of change that took place at that time: "quippe remoto Carthaginis metu sublataque imperii aemula non gradu, sed praecipiti cursu a virtute descitum, ad vitia transcursum..." (2.1.1).

Republic. Recent research in political and business psychology suggests that the Machiavellian and Paretian “foxes” tend to make decisions under the heavy influence of the socially aversive traits of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy. In what follows, I first elucidate how a heady cocktail of the socially aversive traits of the Roman ruling plutocracy facilitated the decline and fall of the Late Roman Republic and then discuss the three specific factors Pareto considers crucial in contributing to a degeneration and eventual fall of any ruling oligarchy.

The Socially Aversive Traits of the Paretian Demagogic Plutocracy and the Demise of the Late Republic

“History is a graveyard of aristocracies,” asserts Pareto; no ruling plutocracy that holds power for a long time is able to maintain an effective balancing of vulpine persuasion and leonine force.¹³⁶ Degeneration of a ruling oligarchy manifests itself in three interrelated ways: (1) a drastic decrease in the speed of circulation between the ruling plutocracy, the governing and non-governing elites, and the populace; (2) a deterioration of intellectual and political qualities of plutocrats; and (3) an ever-growing reluctance of plutocrats to use force or pursue aggressive or innovative policies to maintain their rule.¹³⁷ When members of a newly ascended ruling oligarchy seize power, they sustain the efficacious balancing of vulpine persuasion and leonine force, the combination of psychosocial propensities that enabled them in the first place to win the struggle for domination. However, the new plutocracy quickly becomes ossified in just one psychosocial propensity. This mainly happens because the talents of individuals who have once attained membership in the ruling plutocracy are not necessarily passed on to their descendants

¹³⁶ Pareto (1935), § 2053.

¹³⁷ See *Ibid.*, §§ 2057; 2054; 2178; and Higley (2012), 116.

who are yet protected from downward mobility. Once the less capable descendants take over, there is not much opportunity for upward mobility in society since the most gifted individuals from the governing and non-governing elites as well as from the populace have little chance to make it to the top. As a result, the speed of circulation slows down, and the ruling oligarchy becomes unable to accurately track changes in the society's dominant psychosocial propensities. A gradual process of degeneration that sets in gravely affects the ruling plutocracy's ability to navigate risk and uncertainty.¹³⁸ Every time the privileged fail to negotiate volatilities, risks menacing their continued prosperity amplify, becoming unsurvivable in the end.

All plutocracies eventually fall, but the Paretian demagogic plutocracies, which the author considers an especially insidious form of government, fall much faster and with an especially loud bang.¹³⁹ Since the elites strong in the psychosocial propensity of vulpine "combination" tend to combine things in innovative ways, they often take unwarranted risks. The leading fox-like "speculators" of any demagogic plutocracy habitually make decisions under the heavy influence of the "dark triad" of the socially aversive traits, the psychological construct of "Machiavellianism," narcissism, and psychopathy. Paulhus, who coined the term "dark triad," demonstrates that these constructs are inter-related and overlapping, and Marshall utilizes the concept of the "dark triad" to study the negative effects Paretian fox-like leaders strong in the psychosocial propensity of vulpine "combination" have on the modern world in the milieu of risk

¹³⁸ See Pareto (1935), §§ 2054-2059 and 2365, where the author reflects on the decline of the Western Roman Empire. Cf. also Femia (2006), 70 and 105.

¹³⁹ See Pareto (1984), 56f., and Powers (1984), 19f.

and uncertainty.¹⁴⁰ Of course, ancient authors were not equipped with theoretical tools--psychiatric and leadership theories and concepts--for the analysis of the crisis of power in the Late Republic. However, their narratives of how the avarice and desire for advancement corrupted the governing elite correspond closely to the distinguishing psychological attributes of the psychopathic syndrome: it is characterized by egocentrism and dissociation, narcissistic grandiose behavior and anti-social pursuit of power, manipulation of one-on-one interactions, pathological thrill-seeking, and complete lack of empathy and conscience.¹⁴¹

Several examples from the ancient authors should suffice. When the young Sallust entered the Roman politics, he quickly discovered that it was dominated by shamelessness, bribery, and greed (*Cat.* 3.3).¹⁴² The avarice and desire for advancement made many *nobiles* and *equites* duplicitous and cruel; they measured everything by the standard of profit and self-interest and were more interested in false appearances than in substance (*Sal. Cat.* 10.4-6).¹⁴³ As I discuss above, such dissociation is a manifest symptom of psychopathy. Similarly, Appian asserts that the politicians of the Late Republic suffered from the measureless ambition and dreadful lust of

¹⁴⁰ For details, see Paulhus (2002) and Marshall (2012), 91-107. Marshall (2013) also suggests that the aversive personality patterns of Machiavellianism, primary and secondary psychopathy, and narcissism cluster and co-intensify in individuals.

¹⁴¹ For example, Boddy (2011), who discusses the dangers of manipulative and exploitative leadership behaviors aimed at short-term self-aggrandizement, suggests that in the post-2008 financial crisis world Western-style capitalism is threatened by dark leadership in general and corporate psychopathy in particular.

¹⁴² “Sed ego adulescentulus initio, sicuti plerique, studio ad rem publicam latus sum, ibique mihi multa advorsa fuere. Nam pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigeabant.”

¹⁴³ “Namque avaritia fidem, probitatem ceterasque artis bonas subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit. Ambitio multos mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re sed ex commodo aestumare, magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum habere.”

power. In order to achieve their goals, they were willing to engage in all kinds of evil, including wanton violence and shameful contempt for law and justice (*B Civ.* 1.6 and 1.2).¹⁴⁴ The anti-social pursuit of power and pathological thrill-seeking are the other two features of psychopathy.¹⁴⁵ Describing the origins of the civil war between Marius and Sulla, Florus declares that Marius' insatiable desire for honors made him seek the province allotted to Sulla. Had not the conflict been initiated by the two greatest generals of the time, the author would have accepted it with greater equanimity because at that time it was quite common for plebeian leaders and *nobiles* alike to engage in this kind of behavior (*Flor.* 2.9.6 and 2.9.2).¹⁴⁶

Significant recent research into the changing psychological composition of modern political and business elites suggests that people at the top often make decisions that expose the cognitive biases, attitudes, ego defensive requirements, and emotional needs characteristic of the “Machiavellian,” “psychopathic” or “narcissistic” personality.¹⁴⁷ While narcissistic leaders may

¹⁴⁴ “Ταῦτα δ’ ὅπως ἐγένετο, συνέγραφα καὶ συνήγαγον, ἀξιοθαύμαστα ὄντα τοῖς ἐθέλουσιν ἰδεῖν φιλοτιμίαν ἀνδρῶν ἄμετρον καὶ φιλαρχίαν δεινὴν καρτερίαν τε ἄτρυτον καὶ κακῶν ἰδέας μυρίων...” (*B Civ.* 1.6) and ““Υβρις τε ἄκοσμος ἐπέιχεν αἰεὶ δι’ ὀλίγου καὶ νόμων καὶ δίκης αἰσχρὰ καταφρόνησις” (*B Civ.* 1.2).

¹⁴⁵ Rieber (1997), 8, identifies dissociation, the anti-social pursuit of power, and pathological thrill-seeking as the three main symptoms of the psychopathic syndrome.

¹⁴⁶ “Initium et causa belli inexplebilis honorum Marii fames, dum decretam Sullae provinciam Sulpicia lege sollicitat” (*Flor.* 2.9.6) and “Aequiore animo utcumque ferrem, si plebei duces aut, si nobiles, mali saltem ducatum sceleri praeuissent. Tum vero--pro facinus--qui viri! Qui imperatores! Decora et ornamenta saeculi sui, Marius et Sulla, pessimo facinori suam etiam dignitatem praeuierunt” (*Flor.* 2.9.2).

¹⁴⁷ For details, see Maccoby (2003) and Babiak (2006) who discuss the changing psychological composition of modern business elites in the aftermath of the organization wars of the 1970 and 1980s and suggest that important decisions are often made under the influence of the ego defensive requirements, cognitive biases, and emotional needs of the “Machiavellian,” “psychopathic,” or “narcissistic” personality. Their research appears to give credence to Machiavelli's and Pareto's perspectives on the dangers of vulpine liberal-individualistic ways of life.

be self-centered, arrogant, and self-enhancing, leaders high in subclinical psychopathy are emotionally cold and indifferent, lack empathy and consciousness, and have a strong tendency to engage in inter-personal manipulation, impulsive thrill-seeking, and anti-social behavior.¹⁴⁸ As fox-like leaders of the demagogic plutocracy become increasingly weaker in non-logical behavioral manifestations of leonine group-persistence and “preservation,” their vulpine psychosocial propensities manifest themselves in ever more aggressive, cavalier, and hubristic behavior which leads to progressively more devious governance, the phenomenon the ancient authors mention in their narratives of the crisis of the Late Republic. Sooner than later, the reckless governing practices of the vulpine “speculators” bring on the collapse of the ruling oligarchy and the ascension of the “military plutocracy” controlled by leonine “consolidators.”

Reflecting on the reasons Pareto outlines for the downfall of a demagogic plutocracy, I suggest that greed, fraud, and inability to defend itself were among the main factors that contributed most to the demise of the ruling oligarchy of the Late Republic. For example, the avarice and deceit of Roman “speculators” were manifested most clearly in the relentless expansion of latifundia I discuss below. One of the perennial problems of vulpine plutocrats is that the dark-triad individuals are myopically preoccupied with the present and near future. Since they are unable to consider longer-term risks or face the distant future, including their own death, they acquire a strong and almost exclusive fixation on the shorter-term risks only.¹⁴⁹ As a result, fox-like plutocrats always fail to look for new ways to encourage the generation of wealth by ordinary people; instead, they constantly devise ways to divert existing sources of revenue to themselves and their allies.

¹⁴⁸ See *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁴⁹ For details, see Marshall (2012), 100ff.

Because the plutocrats weave a complex web of visible and invisible exchanges between the various brokering agents who represent vested interests in the particular policy area, they always surrender to vested interests and tend to consume more than they produce. For example, when Florus describes the civil strife on the eve of the Social War (91-87 BCE), in the tribuneship of Marcus Livius Drusus (trib. 91 BCE), he attributes the pitiful state of the Republic to the incessant embezzlement of revenues by the equites who were now consuming much more than their fair share of the proceeds from tax farming and thus effectively bankrupting the state (Flor. 2.5.3-4).¹⁵⁰ Latifundia expansion and estate extension in the Late Republic is another conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Even though the Roman small-scale farmers, the leonine conservative-collectivist “consolidators,” conquered Italy and greatly augmented Rome’s possessions overseas, they became the main losers thereafter in both relative and absolute terms.¹⁵¹ Spoliation of their farms by shrewd plutocrats, who were much more concerned about the reallocation of wealth rather than its creation, greatly contributed to the social crisis of the second and first centuries BCE.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ “Iudiciaria lege Gracchi dividerant populum Romanum et bicipitem ex una fecerant civitatem. Equites Romani tanta potestate subnixi, ut qui fata fortunasque principum haberent in manu, interceptis vectigalibus peculabantur suo iure rem publicam; senatus exilio Metelli, damnatione Rutili debilitatus omne decus maiestatis amiserat.”

¹⁵¹ Brunt (1971a) offers the most detailed and coherent argument for the decline of Italian smallholders due to the burdens that Rome’s draft and overseas duty imposed on them. Rosenstein (2004) challenges many long-held assumptions about the effect of military service on Roman small-scale farmers. However, his arguments are weakened by his tendency to claim that both perceptions of modern historians about certain situations, including the agrarian crisis that Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (trib. 133 BCE) attempted to use for self-aggrandizement in 133 BCE, and the explanations for them preserved in the literary sources are wrong.

¹⁵² A stupefying disproportion between short-term expenditure on the whims of the plutocrats and long-term investment in human capital quickly undermines national prosperity and alienates the leonine “silent majority.” For details, see Pareto (1966), 142, and Femia (1999), 294f.

During the last centuries of the Republic, the Roman conquests brought both the dramatic increase in wealth and the influx of cheap slaves; these factors favored the development of extensive latifundia and animal husbandry. Eventually, both became the economic basis of the vulpine demagogic plutocracy.¹⁵³ As a result, Italian small-scale family farms growing grain as their principal crop became unsustainable because it was much cheaper to import grain by sea from Sicily, Sardinia, and North Africa, where large-scale, slave-worked latifundia emerged as the major grain producers. The Sullan proscriptions made the smallholders' financial ruin even worse by further accelerating the creation of vast farm complexes that enclosed entire landscapes.¹⁵⁴ In order to give the reader an idea of the size of the estates of the privileged in the first century BCE, it is sufficient to point out that Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54 BCE), who was collecting forces at Corfinium to fight Julius Caesar and was recruiting tenants from his vast latifundias for the purpose, promised each of his soldiers four jugera of land, with centurions and veterans receiving twice as much (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.17.4).¹⁵⁵

The rapid expansion of mammoth latifundias and the demise of smallholder farmers made a lot of people dependent on the grain dole, and this had a corrosive effect on public morals. The ruin of small-estate owners even prompted Pliny the Elder to attribute the perdition of Italy to the abundance of latifundia (*HN* 18.7.35).¹⁵⁶ As the idea that one needs to earn his living was

¹⁵³ As I discuss above, pp. 141-182, *passim*, Pareto suggests that vulpine propensities intensify as societies become more prosperous and complex.

¹⁵⁴ For details, see Plut. *Crass.* 2.1-4; 6.6-7; Cic. *Leg. agr.* 3.3; and 3.13-14.

¹⁵⁵ "Militibus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, quaterna in singulos iugera et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque."

¹⁵⁶ "Verumque confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam...." Cf. also Verg. *G.* 2.412-413; Columella, *Rust.* 1.3.8-12; and Sen. *Ep.* 89.20.

gradually retired, an ethic of greedy disgruntlement took root. Eventually, it excited an enervating and hedonistic egoism, making people on the grain dole increasingly indulge their tastes for immediate gratification.¹⁵⁷ All these processes demonstrate that from at least the middle of the second century BCE the vulpine senatorial plutocracy, which was greedily enriching themselves and competing with ever-increasing intensity among themselves for a social grant of *laus* and *fama*, ignored the public welfare and the needs of common people.

Shameless manipulation of public opinion that later turned into outright fraud was the second negative characteristic of the Roman demagogic plutocracy that contributed to the fall of the Republic. Pareto, who demonstrates that the patron-client relationship has been a defining feature of Mediterranean political anthropology for millennia, introduces the concept of patron-client regime. This concept can be used as a tool of comparative analysis to isolate unlikely connections between apparently dissimilar regimes.¹⁵⁸ Unlike the conservative “lions” who often rely on brute *force*, the liberal “foxes” prefer to rule by *consent*.¹⁵⁹ A widespread alliance of vulpine politicians, demagogic tribunes, and profit-seeking “speculators” maintains social control and manages conflicts between the governing and non-governing elites and the irrational populace by co-opting support for its rule through countless opportunistic compromises, crafty deals, concessions, demagoguery, and trickery.¹⁶⁰ However, this approach to governance suffers from a number of drawbacks.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Pareto (1984), 65ff.

¹⁵⁸ For details, see Femia (1999), 298.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Pareto (1935), § 2251.

¹⁶⁰ See *Ibid.*, §§ 2223 and 2419.

First, the “foxes” are more narcissistic than lions; they also have a strong sense of entitlement and want others to admire them.¹⁶¹ In his book titled *The Productive Narcissist: The Promise and Peril of Visionary Leadership*, Maccoby argues that narcissists are widely present in US business elites. Similar to primary and secondary psychopaths, they lack empathy, but, unlike the psychopaths, they have more genuine company loyalty and inspirational long-term vision. As a result, the narcissists often get promoted to the top-level management positions, especially during periods of disruptive change.¹⁶² Marshall utilizes a wide number of opinions from literary works and different social-sciences theories to produce a sociological meta-narrative on the rising levels of the “dark triad” of the socially aversive traits of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy throughout the modern English-speaking political and economic elites. He demonstrates that Pareto’s continuum that sets leonine conservatism in opposition to vulpine liberalism is very real. As societies grow more prosperous and complex, their cultural trajectories change, and the lion-like conservative propensities are displaced with the fox-like liberal sentiments characterized by the rising levels of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy.¹⁶³

Describing the peculiar type of the Machiavellian and Paretian “fox,” Marshall says,

¹⁶¹ Jonason (2009) associates narcissism with the strong sense of entitlement. Jonason (2010) also develops a twelve-item dark triad measure to explore the overlap among Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism. He calls the dark triad a “short-term, agentic, exploitative social strategy” (420), the definition that corresponds closely to Pareto’s idea that vulpine “speculators,” the cunning and manipulative self-seeking types, will be always likely to rise to the top echelons of the governing elite thanks to their superior ability to fling away loyalties, make deals, and negotiate complex and changing social networks.

¹⁶² See Maccoby (2003). Cf. also Sankowsky (1995) who studies excessive concern with admiration, status, and prestige among charismatic leaders and suggests that narcissistic leaders use their charisma to deceive followers and induce them to buy into their abusive behavior.

¹⁶³ See Marshall (2007), 136-142.

This type is also commonly admired for its charm and social astuteness, which evolutionary psychologists have put down in part to hardwired “Machiavellian intelligence” (Byrne and Whitten 1997). More psychoanalytically inclined commentators explain these characteristics differently. In Kohut (1971), the basic psychological process is associated with the “hollow self.” Narcissists compensate for identity confusion by manifesting whatever social identity will work well for them in each passing situation. Similarly, in Cleckley’s classic work on psychopathy, we find psychopaths presented as “persistently lacking the ability to become aware of what the most important experiences of life mean to others” (Cleckley 1941, p. 371). Yet, the powers of mimicry they develop to compensate for this are incredible. Their social cognitive apparatus operates as a “subtly constructed reflex machine” (*ibid.* p. 372) which throws our own emotions back at us, convincing us of an illusory emotional connection which the psychopath can then exploit ruthlessly.¹⁶⁴

At the same time, the “foxes” view the social world as a jungle where they feel they should be the dominant predators. As a result, they venture forth with false and overinflated confidence in the likely efficacy of short-term manipulative strategy, suffering from strategic hubris and obstinacy.¹⁶⁵ Their manipulative strategy is built around a Machiavellian “hit-and-run” approach to engaging with others, and it is characterized by continually making and breaking commitments.¹⁶⁶ This strategy works best where interpersonal links are short-lived and fleeting, but it backfires in a spectacular fashion once the leonine populace, which forms the silent majority, realizes that the vulpine ruling plutocracy parceled out its operating autonomy to different power blocks, special interests groups, and subordinate organizational units. Once all these players begin to fully exercise their power and squeeze the silent majority, all those who

¹⁶⁴ Marshall (2013), 553.

¹⁶⁵ See Marshall (2012), 103f.

¹⁶⁶ For details, see *Ibid.*, 104f.

have had to pay the price for the vulpine ruling plutocracy to maintain its control over society rise up in arms.¹⁶⁷

Second, with time the “foxes” grow confident in their ability to indefinitely manipulate popular opinion, stage-manage public sentiment, and deceive the governing and non-governing elites and the common people in order to advance their own political and economic interests. As a result, they begin to delude themselves with the idea that they can stay in power indefinitely as long as they employ shrewdness and are not squeamish about using outright *fraud*. This narcissistic grandiosity, which is at the heart of the dark-triad pattern, makes the vulpine politicians to construct a narrative not only based on a very selective use of facts but also primarily meant to express their ego.¹⁶⁸ In the end, their cumulative errors of judgment stemming from the conflation of strategic planning and identity work prove disastrous for the long-term survival of the demagogic plutocracy. For example, the obstructionism of the influential senators, including Cicero, who were convinced that they could indefinitely manipulate such *auctores* as Cnaeus Pompeius Magnus, Julius Caesar, Marcus Antonius or Octavian led to the creation of the triumvirates and contributed to the ultimate fall of the Roman Republic.

Finally, affairs of the Late Republic suffered from a lack of courage on the part of many vulpine members of the senatorial aristocracy. Because they had no ego strength to employ

¹⁶⁷ See Pareto (1935), § 1210; Pareto (1984), 47; and Femia (1999), 297.

¹⁶⁸ Raskin (1988) uses the term “grandiosity” to signify the public displays of superiority narcissists employ to obtain recognition and prestige.

force and defend themselves through violence, the authoritarian dynasts eventually appropriated the powers and prerogatives once traditionally enjoyed by the Roman Senate. Pareto says:

Advancing one step further, one notes that both in the fall of the Roman Republic and in the fall of the French monarchy, the respective governing classes were either unwilling or unable to use force, and were overthrown by other classes that were both willing and able to do that.... Both in ancient Rome and in France the victorious element rose from the people and was made up in Rome of the legions of Sulla, Caesar, and Octavius, in France of the revolutionary mobs that routed a very feeble royal power, and then of an army that vanquished the very inefficient troops of the European potentates.¹⁶⁹

Members of the ruling oligarchy always maintain social control by oppressing their subjects in one way or another.¹⁷⁰ Thus, the failure to use force is a major indicator that the ruling plutocracy is no longer capable of carrying out the functions of the government.¹⁷¹ Discussing violence that usually accompanies revolutions, Pareto asserts:

The slaughter and rapine are external symptoms indicating the advent of strong and courageous people to places formerly held by weaklings and cowards.... Had Louis XVI not been a man of little sense and less courage, letting himself be floored without fighting, and preferring to lose his head on the guillotine to dying weapon in hand like a man of sinew, he might have been the one to do the destroying. If the victims of the September massacres, their kinsmen and friends, had not for the most part been spineless humanitarians without a particle of courage or energy, they would have annihilated their enemies instead of waiting to be annihilated themselves. It was a good thing that power should pass into the hands of people who showed that they had the faith and the resolve requisite for the use of force.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Pareto (1935), § 2199. Cf. also *Ibid.*, §§ 2191; 2548, n. 6; and 2565.

¹⁷⁰ See *Ibid.*, § 2566, n. 3.

¹⁷¹ As the aggressive spirit wanes in the decaying ruling oligarchy, the sentiment named by Pareto “instinctive repugnance to suffering” becomes stronger and stronger. See *Ibid.*, §§ 1142-1143 and 1858.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, § 2191.

While the Roman demagogic plutocracy was in its infancy, such politicians as Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138 BCE) were still able to mobilize the psychosocial propensity of leonine group-persistence and “preservation” to convince the fellow senators to use the deadly force against the likes of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (trib. 133 BCE) in order to save the Republic. As time went on, however, vulpine members of the senatorial aristocracy, unscrupulous tribunes, and profit-seeking *publicani* “speculators” increasingly preferred to rely on cunning and fraud to stay in power. Driven by the deep inferiority complex, many narcissistic *nobiles* of the Late Republic were afraid of power wielded by others, suppressed information from sources perceived to threaten their jealously guarded “authority,” and fostered a worshipping consensus around their leadership decisions.¹⁷³ Unable to defend themselves or the Republic, the vulpine senators were repeatedly compelled to make opportunistic compromises and cunning deals with various dynasts. While the senators often hoped to dupe and outsmart their forced allies, they could rarely achieve the goal. The culmination of this policy was a formal grant of the *imperium* to the young and inexperienced Octavian in order to avert the threat of Marcus Antonius and his Macedonian legions (cf. Cic. *Phil.* 5.16.45). Of course, the Senate’s attempt to cynically use the young Caesar and his Caesarean veterans and then dispose of them ended in a fiasco.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ The Austrian psychotherapist Alfred W. Adler (1870-1937) developed a theory of organic inferiority and compensation that served as the prototype for his later famous theory of the inferiority complex. Pauchant (2006) and Marshall (2012), 103f., discuss how the leaders of “crisis prone” organizations mask their inferiority complex with strategic overconfidence, habitually ignore any critical feedback, and, as a result, fail to anticipate risk until it is too late.

¹⁷⁴ After the Senate turned down for the second time Octavian’s request for consulship, he marched on Rome at the head of his eight legions, accompanied by cavalry and the auxiliary troops (App. *B Civ.* 3.88). On August 19, 43 BCE, at the age of nineteen, Octavian seized his first consulship; his cousin named Quintus Pedius, a son of Julius Caesar’s older sister Iulia, was made the fellow consul. Cf. *RG* 1.4 and 6.3, where the author conceals all negative aspects of his actions; Livy, *Per.* 119.7; Vell. Pat. 2.65.2; Suet. *Aug.* 26.1; Dio Cass. 46.42.2-46.46.1; Eutr. 7.2.1; Wardle (2014), 199; and Bleicken (2015), 109ff.

Lucius Marcius Philippus (cos. 56 BCE) significantly asserted in an oration before the public assembly that no government could be carried on with the existing Roman Senate (Cic. *De or.* 3.1).¹⁷⁵ The combustible mix of greed, fraud, and inability to defend itself proved disastrous for the long-term survival of the demagogic plutocracy of the Late Republic. Under the influence of the “dark triad” of the socially aversive traits, the psychological construct of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy, the profit-seeking “speculators” and vulpine politicians dissipated their authority in vain attempts to placate a myriad of patrons and clients and destroyed the state’s viability by creating hampering political gridlocks.¹⁷⁶ Once the Senate lost control over the military and the dynasts, the warring factions became the source of security, and the Late Republic turned into a failed state.¹⁷⁷ Crawford, who explicates the intrinsic problems of that time, speaks about such “alternative states” as those of Quintus Sertorius in Spain, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus in the East or Julius Caesar in Gaul. These “states” emerged mostly in the provinces, boasted their own manpower resources and alternative career structures, and, most importantly, displayed little interest in being reintegrated into the empire. Their leaders negotiated with other states and conducted an independent diplomacy.¹⁷⁸

The Senate’s inability to resolve the political gridlocks, regain control over the military, and reign in the dynasts disrupted the economy, offended the conservative sentiments of the general population, and eventually culminated in social disturbances and rebellion of more conservative

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Pareto (1935), § 2548, n. 6.

¹⁷⁶ See Pareto (1984), 55-62, and Femia (2006), 70ff and 105.

¹⁷⁷ For a useful discussion, see Lange (2016), 22ff.

¹⁷⁸ See Crawford (2008).

individuals strong in leonine non-rational behavioral manifestations.¹⁷⁹ When the soldiers led by the dynasts turned on the demagogic plutocracy of the Late Republic, they set off the struggle between those gifted with non-logical behavioral manifestations of vulpine “combination” and those rich in non-logical behavioral manifestations of leonine group-persistence and “preservation.”¹⁸⁰ A series of civil wars and proscriptions that followed broke the power of the Roman nobility of old and forced the accelerated cyclical circulation of the ruling elites with mutually exclusive personality types.¹⁸¹ Dio Cassius laments the disappearance of many senatorial families caused by civil wars of the first century BCE and informs us that Octavian created new patricians in 29 BCE, perhaps by the *lex Saenia de plebeis in patricios adlegendis* passed at the end of 30 BCE (52.42.1-5).¹⁸² Thus, through their reckless governing practices “the speculators of the ancient Rome brought on the fall of the Republic and the dictatorships of Caesar and Augustus, but without knowing that they were headed in those directions and without the slightest desire to reach those goals.”¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ See Pareto (1984), 55-62, and Femia (2006), 70-76. and 105. Cf. also Pareto (1935), §§ 2548-2549 and 2583.

¹⁸⁰ See Ibid., § 2563.

¹⁸¹ See Ibid., §§ 2598-2599. Syme (1939), 490-497, who vividly describes the total degradation of the Republican leading families under the new regime, says: “The *nobiles*... were the survivors of a catastrophe, doomed to slow and inexorable extinction. The better cause and the best men, the brave and the loyal, had perished. Not a mere faction of the nobility had been defeated, but a whole class. The contest had been not merely political but social. Sulla, Pompeius and Caesar were all more than mere faction-leaders; yet the personal domination of those dynasts never meant so drastic a depression of the *nobiles*.... The *nobiles* lost power and wealth, display, dignity and honor.... For the *nobiles*, no more triumphs after war, no more roads, temples and towns named in their honour and commemorating the glory of the great houses that were the Republic and Rome” (490f.).

¹⁸² Cf. also Tac. *Ann.* 1.2.1. For the list of new patrician families, see Scheid (2007), 39.

¹⁸³ See Pareto (1935), § 2254.

After the alliance of the vulpine politicians, unscrupulous tribunes, and profit-seeking *publicani* “speculators” bankrupted the government and collapsed, the old sociopolitical order was supplanted by a broad coalition of lion-like conservative, religious, and nationalistic politicians and “rentiers” under the leadership of the young Caesar who temporarily restored the equilibrium of irrational behavioral manifestations, dominant social propensities, and specific economic interests.¹⁸⁴ Thus, the actions of the rising Machiavellian prince triggered a cycle of social change and elite circulation, sweeping away the senatorial aristocracy of old. The new alliance led by Octavian represented the interests of previously non-governing elites of Italy that had sought all the advantages of ruling status since before the Social War (91-87 BCE). Syme says:

It was not Rome alone but Italy, perhaps Italy more than Rome, that prevailed in the War of Actium. The Principate itself may, in a certain sense, be regarded as a triumph of Italy over Rome: Philippi, Perusia, and even Actium were victories of the Caesarian party over the *nobiles*. Being recruited in so large a measure from Roman knights of the towns of Italy, it found itself rewarded with power in the Senate and in the councils of the Princes.¹⁸⁵

Perhaps the Battle of Philippi (42 BCE) was the most merciless to the *nobiles* (Vell. Pat. 2.71.1-2).¹⁸⁶ Although the remnants of the old elite opposed Octavian’s domination even after Actium,

¹⁸⁴ Pareto (1935), § 2169, says, “Indeed the personalities of Augustus and Robespierre themselves disappear, in part at least, in reality, and we are obliged to say that the sentiments and interest that were represented by those individuals prevailed over the sentiment and interests represented by other individuals.” Cf. Syme (1939), 490, “Not a mere faction of the nobility had been defeated, but a whole class. The contest had been not merely political but social.”

¹⁸⁵ Syme (1939), 453. Cf. also my discussion of the increased competition for magistracies between the Roman patrician-plebeian nobility and Italian elites in the aftermath of the Social War (91-87 BCE) in Cicero’s case study, pp. 128f.

¹⁸⁶ For details, see Earl (1967), 85f. For the decline of the *nobiles*, see Syme (1939), 490-497.

this opposition, contrary to all expectations, was “scattered, isolated, ineffective, and, overall, minimal” (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.1.2).¹⁸⁷

Conclusion

Whether Pareto discusses the early Greek tyrannies, the Roman Republic, the Principate of Augustus or any other regime down to the twentieth-century demagogic plutocracies masquerading as liberal democracies, he offers endless examples to prove the following two important assertions: (1) constant cyclical changes in the fundamental character of societies are inevitable as one set of societal non-rational behavioral manifestations replaces the other and (2) maladaptivity of the ruling elites in the face of uncertainty and in the times of crisis causes their periodic circulation.¹⁸⁸ In the realm of historical studies, Pareto’s focus on the two classes of psychosocial propensities of elites and masses--vulpine “combination” and leonine “preservation”--is well chosen because the forces of “combination” and “preservation” complement each other. While the first one provides for change, the second one affords institutionalization, helping people embrace this change. This is why Pareto suggests that

¹⁸⁷ Raaflaub (1990), 454. According to Syme (1939), 368, “His name, his ambition and his acts had denied the revolutionary leader the support of the *nobiles* in his youth. Before his marriage to Livia, only one descendant of a consular family (Cn. Domitius Calvinus) belonged to the faction.” Earl (1967), 85, says, “The *nobiles* were the natural enemies of the Princeps.”

¹⁸⁸ For the twentieth-century Western democracies turning into demagogic plutocracies, see Pareto (1935), § 2257, who is perhaps the earliest outstanding antidemocratic political sociologist. Convinced that a smaller ruling plutocracy calls shots in all societies at all times, he elucidates systematic disadvantages imposed on those outside the unofficial circle of power that overrides the formal mechanisms of representation. Pareto significantly views “popular representation” as a “fiction” and cogently argues against the idea that political power in the West has become more widely distributed. See *Ibid.*, § 2244, and Nye (1999), 238. For Pareto’s concern with the interplay of risk and uncertainty, see Marshall (2012), 88-91.

historical development of human societies and the sequence of specific socio-cultural patterns mostly depend on the relative proportion of vulpine and leonine irrational behavioral manifestations in the ruling plutocracy, the governing and non-governing elites, and the rest of the populace. No elite that holds power for a long time is able to maintain an effective balancing of vulpine persuasion and leonine force. The resulting imbalance makes its degeneration inevitable and cyclical and causes smaller plutocratic regimes established by the few for the good of the privileged assume either a form of a vulpine demagogic plutocracy or a form of a leonine “military” plutocracy.¹⁸⁹

The recent studies in contemporary political and business psychology confirm important insights of Pareto’s social equilibrium theory of elite cycles and the periodic circulation of ruling elites with mutually exclusive personality types of “lions” and “foxes.” In particular, Marshall identifies two different clusters of personality traits common among powerful political actors in the UK parliament. While one set of personality traits is dominated by tolerant and risk-taking aptitudes characteristic of Pareto’s vulpine elites strong in “combination” propensities, the other one is typified by traditionalist risk-averse, group-loyalty, and anti-intraception tendencies distinctive of the leonine elites strong in non-logical behavioral manifestations of “preservation.”¹⁹⁰ This is why I have used Pareto’s theory as a tool to analyze the conditioning influences of the psychological and cultural biases that worked through the social personalities of the Late Republic and contributed to its downfall. Outside matters of detail, my contribution to scholarly debate lies in three main lines of argument.

¹⁸⁹ While Pareto emphasizes vertical as well as horizontal divisions in society, he significantly insists on the study of elites as organic whole. See Pareto (1935), §§ 2274-2276, and Pareto (1984), 55-62. Cf. also Powers (1984), 18-21.

¹⁹⁰ See Marshall (2007), 151-194, and my discussion above, pp. 140 and 162.

First, I argue that from the middle of the second century BCE the members of the Roman governing elite began growing increasingly vulpine in their outlook, prioritizing personal gain over the duties toward their fellow citizens. Eventually, a widespread alliance of vulpine politicians, demagogic tribunes, and profit-seeking “speculators” was formed. The consequences of this alliance were both political and economic, culminating in the creation of an especially insidious form of government defined by Pareto as the demagogic plutocracy. In order to maintain social control, reward their supporters, and manage conflicts between the governing and non-governing elites and the irrational populace, the vulpine politicians co-opted support for their rule through countless opportunistic compromises, crafty deals, concessions, and demagoguery. However, under the heavy influence of the so-called “dark triad” of the socially aversive traits of “Machiavellianism,” narcissism, and psychopathy, they quickly began to divert existing sources of revenue to themselves and their allies and govern through manipulation and outright *fraud*. As a result, the vulpine alliance brought to ruin the fortunes of the Republic and proved unable to take forceful action against the powerful dynasts who effectively usurped the power of the Roman Senate. Once permanent civil war became a new normalcy that plagued the Late Republic, it quickly turned into a failed state.

Second, in this and the following chapters I combine Pareto’s social equilibrium theory of elites and their periodic circulation with the most crucial aspects of Machiavelli’s political theory to offer a new insight into the young Caesar’s invention of the Principate. Pareto hedges his theory and suggests that such principal actors as emperors, presidents, prime ministers or religious leaders can also be the focus of historical inquiry because their personalities, inclinations, and leadership styles provide a more accessible window into wider non-rational propensities of ruling plutocracies. Amid widespread violence and civil strife the Late Republic

experienced, there arose a need for a dynast who could stop the collapse of the governing institutions, reconstitute the ruling elite, and bring peace to the core of the expanding Roman Empire.¹⁹¹ Because the young Caesar efficaciously balanced vulpine persuasion and leonine force, he succeeded where others had failed.

In the following chapters, I analyze Octavian's multifarious interests, activities, and relations with other men and propose that the princeps embodied the qualities attributed by Machiavelli to the ideal ruler. In Chapter III, I demonstrate that the emperor's leadership was characterized not only by brazen appropriation of others' victories to augment his acquired honor but also by unparalleled expenditure and munificence that contributed to the significant economic growth throughout the empire. The ongoing development of exceptional mental flexibility and versatility to use expeditiously both leonine force and vulpine shrewdness enabled the young Caesar first to win the struggle for power and then to put an end to the civil wars and maintain effective control over the Roman state for forty-four years (31 BCE-14 CE). To use Pareto's terminology, the reign of this Machiavellian prince was manifested by yet another short cycle of the governing elite circulation and the political regime change, with the demagogic plutocracy of the Late Republic replaced by the "military" plutocracy of the early Principate.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Augustus claims not just to have ended the civil wars, but to have "extinguished" or "annihilated" them: "In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia exstinxeram..." (*RG* 34.1). Significantly, the gates of the Temple of Janus were closed for the first time in the reign of Augustus, in 29 BCE, to symbolize the end of the civil wars (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.113 = EJ, 45; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 9; *Num.* 20; and Dio Cass. 51.20.4). Augustan poetry vividly shows how much the Italians longed for peace; Octavian's success in ending the fratricidal strife was one of the most important factors in winning him a grant of social approbation. For details and the list of literary sources, see Cooley (2009), 256f.

¹⁹² See Pareto (1984), 55-62, and Powers (1984), 18-21.

Third, the replacement of the old Roman aristocracy by new men of Italian origin during the Augustan revolution signaled the general change in sentiment; it was part of a larger process of the forging of a new expanded citizen body that was actively involved in molding a new culture characterized by generally shared cultural norms.¹⁹³ Compared with the Roman aristocracy of old, the new governing elite of this expanded citizen body displayed different personality traits, frames of mind, and persuasions. As I demonstrate both in Chapter III and in the case study on the downfall of Gaius Cornelius Gallus, the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, actions and ways of honor acquisition of the new Augustan aristocracy were very different as well. The princeps, who was reinforcing his personal hold on power by exalting his own *virtus* and martial prowess and establishing himself superior beyond competition, imposed limits on the militaristic ambitions of the new ruling elite by actively promoting non-military venues for honor acquisition and curtailing ambitions of those who did not want to conform to the changing reality. As a result, while life in the Late Republic was habitually characterized by violent resolution of internal conflicts, civil strife, and arbitrary aggressive wars against “barbarians,” Augustus masterly used vulpine persuasion and leonine force to put an end to civil wars and place restrictions on the use of violence against the real and imagined enemies of Rome.

¹⁹³ See Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 441-454.

CHAPTER III: AUGUSTUS THE MACHIAVELLIAN PRINCE AND THE INVENTION OF THE PRINCIPATE

“The leader of the state must be nourished on glory”
(Cicero)

Introduction

In the *Treatise on General Sociology*, Pareto maintains that Augustus was a leonine leader who primarily relied on military might and religious sentiment to maintain his rule.¹ In one instance, however, the author concedes that the princeps used both force and cunning in order to achieve his objectives. Pareto says, “The victory on which the Empire was founded was not, however, a victory of force exclusively; for Caesar and Augustus used a lavish supplement of cunning...”² In this chapter, I suggest that permanent tension and civil discord of the Late Republic required a dynast who could efficiently use both leonine force and vulpine persuasion in order to stop the collapse of the social institutions, reconstitute the governing elite, and bring peace to the core of the growing Roman state. Octavian fit the profile perfectly. The ongoing development of exceptional mental flexibility and versatility to use expeditiously both leonine force and vulpine shrewdness enabled the young Caesar first to win the struggle for power and then put an end to the civil wars and maintain effective control over the Roman state for forty-four years (31 BCE-14 CE).

¹ See, for example, Pareto (1935), §§ 2581 and 2583.

² *Ibid.*, § 2584.

Since Pareto widely employs the concept of elite cycles in his analysis of the reign of Augustus, I first discuss the long and short cycles the polymath talks about in his works. Then I combine Pareto's social equilibrium theory of elites and their periodic circulation with the key aspects of Machiavelli's political theory to suggest that the young Caesar personified many of the qualities of the ideal Machiavellian prince. In particular, I demonstrate that the princeps' style of military leadership hardly qualified him as the leader of the Paretian conservative leonine and bellicose elite strong in irrational behavioral manifestations of group-persistence and "preservation." Unlike most Republican commanders who acquired *virtus*, *auctoritas*, and ensuing political power on the battlefield, Octavian, in circumvention of long-established Republican practices, cunningly appropriated military achievements of others. While the young Caesar publicly maintained the appearance of an audacious lion and displayed all the positive leonine characteristics meant to exalt his own *virtus* and military prowess, he secretly acted like a shrewd and cunning fox, utilizing, without it being known, the methods meant to increase his relative "honor rating," establish his *auctoritas* superior beyond competition, and reinforce his personal hold on power.

The second important assertion I make in this chapter is that the emperor's multifarious interests, activities, and relations with other men were accompanied by unparalleled expenditure and munificence that affected the economic growth of the entire Roman world. My analysis of some Augustan and post-Augustan literary and epigraphic sources that discuss piracy and trade show that the princeps' efforts to feed the residents of Rome not only led to the suppression of most outrageous manifestations of piracy in the Mediterranean but also facilitated the creation of an interconnected set of cereal markets that extended across the Mediterranean and provided the capital with a regular and consistent supply of grain. The mercantile elites that controlled

commerce across the Mediterranean did extremely well in the reign of Augustus because the luxury goods could now be safely transported on grain ships.³ More importantly, the expenditure of the emperor and the Roman government as well as the princeps' unparalleled munificence pumped tremendous amounts of money into the economy. The increased monetization of the Roman economy made money an important medium of exchange and revitalized trade all over the Roman Empire. As maritime shipping became safer and cheaper due to the *pax Augusta* and the monetization of economy increased due to the abundance of minted money used to pay the legions, the economy's growth rates of the Roman Empire began to demonstrate gradual but consistent growth. To my mind, Augustus' non-traditional methods to acquire personal honor, *virtus*, and *auctoritas* as well as his enormous expenditure and munificence correspond well with Machiavelli's conception of the ideal ruler: the emperor often publicly emphasized his leonine qualities, but he preferred to act as a shrewd and cunning fox, capably balancing leonine force with vulpine persuasion to restructure the ruling elite and bring peace and prosperity to the Roman world.

Pareto's Elite Cycles and the Augustan Revolution

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the applicability of Pareto's theory about the periodic circulation of ruling plutocracies with mutually exclusive personality types for the study of the demise of the Late Republic. The polymath importantly suggests that the circulation of elites occurs in recurrent cycles because no permanent elite equilibrium--an effective balancing of

³ The East-West trade was concentrated in the hands of Syrian and Alexandrian merchants who had large business establishments at Puteoli and catered to the needs of Rome and Italy. Cf. Strabo 17.1.7.

vulpine persuasion and leonine force--is possible. To his mind, the crisis of the Late Republic and the invention of the Augustan Principate mark the end of a cycle typified by the supremacy of “speculators” strong in the psychosocial propensity of vulpine “combination” and the beginning of another cycle characterized by the ascendancy of a new ruling plutocracy strong in the psychosocial propensity of leonine group-persistence and “preservation.”⁴ However, the governing elites always display a mix of fox-like and lion-like propensities. Since Pareto most unfortunately offers only a vague account of the duration of elite cycles, this makes it very difficult to delineate their duration.⁵ Yet, it appears that he has two distinct kinds of cycles in mind.

On the one hand, there are long cycles that begin and end with ultimate downfalls of the ruling elites and the sociopolitical and socioeconomic orders they have administered. For example, Pareto talks about the eras of faith and skepticism, idealism and materialism, conformity and freedom, the epochs that continued for centuries and encompassed the rise and fall of the Roman Republic, the gradual decline of the Roman Empire, the Renaissance or the Protestant Reformation. These broad cycles feature long-lasting compositions of governing and non-governing elites and are accompanied by slow-shifting currents dominated by religious-

⁴ See, for example, *Ibid.*, §§ 2546 and 2549. Pareto says, “Towards the end of the Republic, a condition is reached where the ruling class is rich in Class I, poor in Class II, residues, while the subject class, especially in elements living far from the capital, is rich in Class II residues” (*Ibid.*, § 2546). When the author speaks about elites strong in “Class I residues” and elites strong in “Class II residues,” he really has in mind the Machiavellian “foxes” and “lions.” Cf. my discussion in Chapter II, pp. 151f.

⁵ Although the cycles can be separated by irregular intervals of time and even share some common features, Pareto appears to be willing to take into consideration the coexistence of short and long cycles, whereby long cycles subsume shorter ones. For details, see *Ibid.*, § 2056, and Higley (2012), 115.

ideological or secular-rationalist sentiments.⁶ On the other hand, there are short cycles characterized by some weakening of the ruling elites, which, in due course, manage to adjust and reinvent themselves through altering their dispositions and political regime type. In particular, the savant discusses shifts from demagogic to military plutocracies and back again in the Late Republic and during the Augustan Principate.⁷

According to Pareto, during the Augustan revolution intensification of non-logical behavioral manifestations of leonine group-persistence and “preservation” in the irrational populace and the non-governing elite alike produced new structures of ruling-class control. The young Caesar masterly used the psychosocial propensities that yielded success in warfare to consolidate his rule under the guise of restoring the Republic, forming a new “military” plutocracy at the end.⁸ Initially, both the princeps and the idealistic and conservative provincial “consolidators” who supported him chiefly relied on military might and brute *force* to stay in power. The new Augustan ruling elite consisted of such men as Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (cos. 37, 28, and 27 BCE), who was the life-long friend and lieutenant of Augustus; Titus Statilius Taurus (cos. suff. 37 and cos. 26 BCE), who commanded the land army at Actium; or Gaius Calvisius Sabinus (cos. 39 BCE), who commanded Octavian’s fleet against Sextus Pompeius in 38 BCE and ten years later triumphed from Spain. Pareto says, “Sulla’s constitution fell because the armed force

⁶ See Pareto (1935), §§ 627; 2227; 2382-2386; and 2539-2551 (Rome).

⁷ See Pareto (1984), 55-62; Powers (1984), 18-21; and my discussion in Chapter II, pp. 163f.

⁸ Cf. Syme (1939), 307: “Naked despotism is vulnerable. The imperator could depend upon the plebs and the army. But he could not rule without the help of an oligarchy. His primacy was precarious if it did not accommodate itself to the wishes of the chief men in his party.”

that might have compelled respect for it was not maintained. The constitution of Augustus endured because his successors were in a position to rely on the might of the legions.”⁹

The princeps also took advantage of the widespread religious sentiment; he flaunted himself as a conservative politician in order to maintain a better control over the common people. Pareto reasons that the people of Rome fully supported Augustus not because they were easily deceived.¹⁰ As formalists, they were fed a delusion that substance could not be changed as long as forms appeared to stay the same.¹¹ Relying chiefly on military might, brute *force*, and religious sentiment to stay in power, the young Caesar and his lieutenants not only summoned back what appeared to be “the traditional form of the state” (Vell. Pat. 2.89.3) but also imbued the governing elite with the propensity to mitigate risks, preserve stability, and consolidate the status-quo.¹² The lion-like politicians triumphed because the dominant psychosocial propensities in society now favored those strong in leonine non-rational behavioral manifestation. Since it was easier to maintain social control by selecting the lion-like class of propensities, these propensities were regularly selected in and vulpine propensities were selected out.¹³ As a result, the Augustan revolution triggered wide elite circulation and caused an influx of persons strong in

⁹ Pareto (1935), § 2180.

¹⁰ Augustus claims, “per consensum universorum potens rerum omnium” (*RG* 34.1).

¹¹ See Pareto (1935), §§ 174-175; 233; 2169; and 2199. According to Santirocco (1995), 229f., Augustus’ *Res Gestae* promulgates a number of misleading political messages, including “the suggestion that constitutional change was really continuity..., that the impulse toward autocracy... was actually based on popular consensus..., that public and private interests could in fact coincide, at least in the person of the princeps..., that civil wars were really fights with foreign foes..., and that war itself was effectively peace....”

¹² “Prisca illa et antique rei publicae forma revocata.” See also Pareto (1935), §§ 2274-2275; 2549; and 2581-2583. Finally, cf. Pareto (1984), 57f.

¹³ See a discussion by Houghton (1977), 35.

irrational behavioral manifestations of leonine group-persistence and “preservation.” In the Paretian lingo, “government by manipulation has given way to government by force.”¹⁴

Machiavelli famously proclaims, “The principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old or mixed, are good laws and good armies” (*The Prince* 12).¹⁵ Thus, Pareto correctly identifies Augustus’ control of the army as one of the pillars of the princeps’ rule.¹⁶ Yet, any ruling oligarchy is always a mix of vulpine and leonine proclivities, and the provincial oligarchy brought to power by the young Caesar is no exception. Throughout his reign, the princeps exhibited exceptional mental flexibility and versatility, using expeditiously both leonine force and vulpine shrewdness. As I demonstrate in this chapter, his Principate was characterized by two important features that make questionable Pareto’s treatment of the emperor as a harbinger of the completely new long cycle dominated exclusively by lion-like, conservative-collectivist sentiments characteristic of non-logical behavioral manifestations of leonine “consolidation” and “preservation.”

On the one hand, Augustus’ style of military leadership hardly qualified him as the head of the exceptionally leonine and bellicose governing elite because the emperor brazenly appropriated other people’s victories to augment his acquired honor. As a result, the new Augustan elite displayed very different personality traits, frames of mind, and persuasions in

¹⁴ Pareto (1935), § 2549, and cf. § 2340.

¹⁵ See Machiavelli (1979), 115.

¹⁶ Cf. also, for example, Syme (1939), 523, who views “people and the Army” as the “twin pillars” of Augustus’ power. On the Augustan army reforms, see Keppie (1984), 145-171, and Raaflaub (2009).

comparison with the Roman aristocracy of old.¹⁷ On the other hand, the princeps' multifarious interests, activities, and relations with other men were accompanied by unparalleled expenditure and munificence that contributed to the gradual economic growth throughout the Roman world.¹⁸ My argument is that the young Caesar personified many qualities of the ideal Machiavellian prince. While publicly displaying all the positive leonine characteristics meant to exalt his own *virtus* and military prowess, the emperor secretly acted like a shrewd and cunning fox who was increasing his relative "honor rating" at the expense of his generals in order to establish his *auctoritas* superior beyond competition and reinforce his personal hold on power.

This approach enabled the princeps first to win the struggle for power and then put an end to the civil wars and maintain effective control over the Roman state for forty-four years (31 BCE-14 CE). This is why I suggest that it makes most sense to regard the entire period from the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE until at least the death of Augustus in 14 CE as one long Paretian elite cycle dominated by fox-like, rationalist sentiments characteristic of non-logical behavioral manifestations of vulpine "combination." This long cycle encompassed a number of distinct and shorter cycles, with the Roman governing and non-governing elites becoming more leonine in their propensities in order to make the necessary adjustments that enabled them to persist until the next crisis. Accordingly, the invention of the Augustan Principate was just one of such readjustments, manifested by yet another short cycle of the elite circulation and the

¹⁷ Among other things, the princeps imposed limits on the militaristic ambitions of the new "military" plutocracy by actively promoting non-military venues for aristocratic honor acquisition and curtailing ambitions of those aristocrats who did not want to conform to the new system of power.

¹⁸ For example, limiting the scope of piracy in the reign of Augustus contributed not only to the creation of an interconnected set of grain markets that extended from Egypt to Lusitania but also spurred the rise of a new vulpine merchant elite. For details, see below, pp. 242-257.

political regime change. To use Pareto's terminology, the demagogic plutocracy of the Late Republic was replaced by the "military" plutocracy of the early Principate.¹⁹

Octavian's Virtus in the Civil Wars

In 27 or 26 BCE, the Senate and the Roman people presented Augustus with the *clupeus virtutis* (RG 34.2).²⁰ It was placed in the Julian Senate House, which had been started by Julius Caesar in 44 BCE (Dio Cass. 44.5.1-2) and then completed and dedicated by the young Caesar on August 28, 29 BCE (RG 19.1 and Dio Cass. 51.22.1).²¹ In the House, the shield of virtues was put alongside the statue of Victory that had been transferred from Tarentum to Rome, placed in the Senate chamber, and decked with the spoils of Egypt to celebrate Octavian's victory over Marcus Antonius and Cleopatra.²² Thus, the senators were constantly reminded of the man who was now the master of the Roman world. It is significant that the *clupeus* bore a laudatory inscription that in most uncompromising fashion praised the emperor's "courage, clemency, justice, and piety" (RG 34.2).²³ While these character qualities were expected from the leading

¹⁹ Cf. Pareto (1984), 55-62, and Powers (1984), 18-21.

²⁰ According to Syme (1939), 313, the shield was voted to the princeps on January 16, 27 BCE, three days after Octavian formally resigned all powers and all provinces and on the same day he was granted the new and defining cognomen Augustus. For the 26 BCE date, see Cooley (2009), 266f.

²¹ For a denarius with the front view of the Julian Senate House, see *BM Coins, Rom. Emp. I*, 103, no. 631, and pl. 15, no. 12. Cf. also Cooley (2003), 241f.

²² For the date and details, see Reinhold (1988), 158; Ando (2000), 278-281; and Cooley (2009), 183.

²³ "... et clupeus aureus in curia Iulia positus, quem mihi senatum populumque Romanum dare virtutis clementiaeque iustitiae et pietatis causa testatum est per eius clupei inscriptionem."

man in Rome, the very same qualities also gave him a social grant of *dignitas* and *auctoritas* from his fellow citizens.²⁴ The importance of propagating Augustus' "courage, clemency, justice, and piety" can be corroborated by the fact that copies of the *clupeus virtutis* were erected in provincial towns. For example, an unbroken copy of the shield in Italian white marble was discovered in a cryptoporticus in the *colonia* of Arelate (Arles).²⁵ The princeps also extensively used the image of the *clupeus virtutis* on his coins.²⁶

The widespread popularity of images of the shield of virtues is apparent from the many copies and adaptations on altars, including altars of the Lares Augusti and Gens Augusta in every ward of the city, and even on lamps throughout the empire.²⁷ According to Fears, the veneration of imperial virtues belongs to the "religious mentality which emphasizes the power rather than the personality of the godhead."²⁸ It appears that the princeps wanted to be viewed at a popular level as the universal patron and the providentially appointed agent of the gods who disbursed benefits to the people of the empire through the cult of hypostasized virtues whose specific

²⁴ See, for example, *CIL* IX.5811, the fragmentary inscription on the base of a copy of a Victory set up to Augustus in Rome; it records the dedication of the *clupeus virtutis*. Because several such inscriptions exist, the emperor and the senators loyal to him must have widely publicized the event.

²⁵ The shield bears the following inscription: "Senatus / populusque Romanus / Imp. Caesari Divi f. Augusto / cos. VIII dedit clupeum / virtutis clementiae / iustitiae pietatis erga / deos patriamque." See *AÉ* 1952, no. 165 = *ILS* 82 = *EJ*, 59, no. 22.

²⁶ See *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 58-61; 63; 67 and 70ff., nos. 316, 321-322, 333-343, 353-356, 381-383, 403-409, and 416-423. On all coins except one (no. 321), the legend S.P.Q.R. perhaps serves the same purpose as the *senatum populumque Romanum* of *RG* 34.2 quoted in footnote n. 23 above.

²⁷ For the evidence, see Ramage (1987), 74, and Dowling (2006), 132f. Fears (1981b) provides a very insightful and thorough discussion of the cult of virtues and its relation to the imperial propaganda. Cf. also Wallace-Hadrill (1981).

²⁸ Fears (1981b), 927.

powers the worshippers could invoke.²⁹ Judging from the particular sequence of virtues on the *clupeus virtutis*, Augustus especially desired to be praised for his martial prowess and courage. However, the problem was that his style of military leadership often did not correspond to the ideal of *virtus* propagated by the Republican aristocracy, nor did it resonate with the Paretian description of a classical leonine conservative “consolidator.”

Among other things, the Roman aristocratic ethos dictated that a general always needed to stand his ground and refuse to accept defeat.³⁰ The exceedingly competitive first century BCE added the expectation of demonstrating martial courage in the thick of the fighting. Now a commander was expected not only to address his legionaries and encourage them to fight (Caes. *B Gall.* 5.33.2) but also to demonstrate personal *virtus* and fight the battle from close behind the front line, leading individual units in charges and setting an example of bravery for his men.³¹ For instance, Marius was in the first line at the Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BCE), repelling the Teutonic onslaught and encouraging his men to crowd the Germans back with their shields (Plut. *Mar.* 20.5-21.1).³² During the Social War (91-87 BCE), the army at Nola rewarded Sulla a *corona obsidionalis*, one of the highest Roman military honors voted by the acclamation of all the soldiers to the commander who exhibited personal courage and saved a Roman legion or army in the field (Plin. *HN* 22.4.7-8 and 22.6.12). In his last battle in January of 62 BCE,

²⁹ See Harrison (2011), 139.

³⁰ See Rosenstein (1990), 120-140, and my discussion in Chapter I, pp. 56-67, of the bellicose Republican aristocracy whose members preferred to serve in the cavalry, where they could demonstrate outstanding martial valor and greatly augment their acquired honor.

³¹ Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 60.4 and Plin. *Pan.* 19.3. See also Goldsworthy (1996), 163ff.

³² Cf. also Plut. *Mar.* 45.6: “Οἰομένου τὸν Μιθριδατικὸν στρατηγεῖν πόλεμον, εἶτα, ὥσπερ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν εἰώθει τῶν ἀγώνων, σχήματα παντοδαπὰ καὶ κινήματα σώματος μετὰ συντόνου κραυγῆς καὶ πυκνῶν ἀλαλαγμάτων ἀποδιδόντος.”

Catilina not only commanded his troops and directed his reserves as the situation required but also demonstrated his *virtus* by fighting bravely. When all hope was gone, he charged into the thickest of the enemy and died a hero (Sall. *Cat.* 60-61).³³

Similarly, Julius Caesar, Octavian's adoptive father, frequently displayed personal courage on battlefield and demonstrated a willingness to share the dangers of combat with his men.³⁴ When the Belgae ambushed Caesar's legions at the Sambre River in 57 BCE, they almost penetrated the lines of the Twelfth Legion that was fighting on the right wing. Most centurions of the legion were killed or wounded, and the legionaries bunched together were on the verge of deserting the battlefield. Seeing that his men were hard pressed, Caesar seized a shield from one of the legionaries, advanced to the front of the line, and began giving orders to remaining centurions. He also encouraged the legionaries to open up their ranks so that they could use their swords more easily and then advance forward. Needless to say, Caesar's arrival animated the troops and prevented the legion from disintegrating (Caes. *B Gall.* 2.25). In essence, both successful Roman generals and Paretian conservative and leonine "consolidators" were the scars bearers, the very people who laid claim to political authority by displaying the marks of frontal wounds sustained in battle as a striking manifestation of their *virtus*.³⁵

³³ "Interea Catilina cum expeditis in prima acie vorsari, laborantibus succurrere, integros pro sauciis arcessere, omnia providere, multum ipse pugnare, saepe hostem ferire; strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia simul exsequebatur.... Catilina postquam fusas copias seque cum paucis relictum videt, memor generis atque pristinae suae dignitatis in confertissimos hostis incurrit ibique pugnans confoditur" (Sal. *Cat.* 60.4 and 60.7). For more instances of Roman generals personally entering the fray and leading by example, see Rosenstein (1990), 116-121.

³⁴ See, for example, Suet. *Iul.* 62 and Plut. *Caes.* 17.2.

³⁵ For details, see Chapter I, pp. 64-67.

In comparison with these commanders, Augustus' military record is at least equivocal, if not altogether tainted. This being said, nobody can unquestionably claim that the young Caesar was a coward.³⁶ Suetonius reports that Octavian was personally involved in five civil-war conflicts and two foreign wars (Suet. *Aug.* 9 and 20).³⁷ If we are to believe Marcus Antonius, the future *princeps* fled the battlefield during the first battle of Mutina on April 14, 43 BCE, leaving behind his general's cloak and horse (Suet. *Aug.* 10.3-4).³⁸ However, other sources, especially Cicero (*Phil.* 14.28.37), present more favorable accounts of Octavian's first battle. Since Marcus Antonius must have known that the young Caesar had not even been present at this engagement because he had been defending the camp outside Mutina (Dio Cass. 46.37.7 and 46.38.1), this story should be treated as a figment of Antonius' imagination and a part of anti-Octavian propaganda campaign.³⁹ A week later, the young Caesar fought courageously in the second battle of Mutina. He even picked up the legion's eagle from the wounded eagle-bearer and carried it for some time (Suet. *Aug.* 10.4).⁴⁰ However, this is one of the only two attested acts of

³⁶ To my mind, it is very unlikely that Julius Caesar would have made a coward and a military ignoramus his adopted son and main heir. For a remarkable fortitude of the young Octavian, see Suet. *Aug.* 8.1-3.

³⁷ "Bella civilia quinque gessit: Mutinense, Philippense, Perusinum, Siculum, Actiacum" and "Externa bella duo omnino per se gessit, Delmaticum adulescens adhuc et Antonio devicto Cantabricum." Cf. *RG* 3.1, where the emperor follows the same order: "Bella terra et mari civilia externaque toto in orbe terrarum saepe gessi...." On foreign wars, cf. Flor. 2.23.6 and 2.33.48. For details, see Cooley (2009), 116f., and Wardle (2014), 118.

³⁸ It was shameful for a general to lose his cloak (Suet. *Iul.* 64).

³⁹ For details, see Wardle (2014), 125.

⁴⁰ Cf. also Flor. 2.15.5; App. *B Civ.* 3.71; and Oros. 6.18.5. Death of a standard-bearer in battle and the subsequent loss of a military standard could result in panic and the rout. For details, see Goldsworthy (1996), 163f.

military prowess by the future emperor who, in this instance, succeeded in fulfilling the conventional role of the ideal general I discuss above.⁴¹

At the first battle of Philippi against Brutus and Cassius on October 3, 42 BCE, Octavian failed to stand his ground when he was driven out from his camp and forced to escape to the right wing commanded by Marcus Antonius (Livy, *Per.* 124.1).⁴² Perhaps the future emperor was sick at that time (Plin. *HN* 7.45.148).⁴³ It is significant that Octavian's *De vita sua* excuses his disappearance and the loss of the camp with a dream one of his friends, the doctor named Marcus Artorius, had about the need for the young Caesar to leave the *castrum*.⁴⁴ To be fair, at the second battle of Philippi on October 23, 42 BCE, the young Caesar stayed close to the fighting, directed the reserves, and encouraged his men, once again carrying out the duties of a general despite his continuing illness (App. *B Civ.* 4.128-130). Later in life, the emperor chose

⁴¹ See Ridley (2005), 58, who points out that the second act of bravery by Octavian was him suffering wounds on the battlefield in Dalmatia (Suet. *Aug.* 20), even though they were not inflicted in hand-to-hand combat.

⁴² See also Vell. Pat. 2.70.1-4; Suet. *Aug.* 13.1; App. *B Civ.* 4.110-113; and Dio Cass. 47.45.2-46.5.

⁴³ See also App. *B Civ.* 4.106-108; Suet. *Aug.* 13.1; Plut. *Brut.* 38.3 and 41; and Dio Cass. 47.37.2-3 and 47.45.2.

⁴⁴ See Val. Max. 1.7.1; Vell. Pat. 2.70.1; Suet. *Aug.* 91.1; Flor. 2.17.9-10; Plut. *Brut.* 41.7-8 and *Ant.* 22.2; App. *B Civ.* 4.110; Dio Cass. 47.41.3-4; and Cornell (2013), 2:884f., F7. *De vita sua* was the autobiography of Augustus in thirteen books that narrated his life until the end of the Cantabrian War in 26/25 BCE (Suet. *Aug.* 85.1-2) and of which only two dozen or so fragments remain. For *De vita sua* as the common source, see Blumenthal (1913), 281. Cf. also Plin. *HN* 7.45.148 for a more hostile narrative. For its interpretation, see Gabba (1985), 78 and 82-85.

to take full credit for both victories at Philippi, concealing the fact that the victory over Brutus and Cassius was actually won by Marcus Antonius (*RG 2*).⁴⁵

During the Sicilian War, the future princeps supposedly fell asleep before the decisive sea battle at Naulochus against Sextus Pompeius (36 BCE), and Marcus Antonius gives Agrippa all the credit for the victory (Suet. *Aug.* 16.1-2).⁴⁶ As the case of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus before the Battle of Pharsalus (48 BCE) indicates, to fall asleep at a critical moment was perceived as a dangerous weakness (App. *B Civ.* 2.68). To the Roman mind, the ideal general had to go without sleep (cf. Livy 21.4.6 and Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 4). However, since Alexander the Great slept before and during the Battle of Gaugamela (Plut. *Alex.* 32.1-4), Augustus might have presented himself as another Alexander in *De vita sua*.⁴⁷ On the other hand, when the battle at Naulochus took place on September 3, 36 BCE, it seems that the young Caesar remained ashore (Vell. Pat. 2.79.4-5).⁴⁸ In fact, Marcus Antonius accuses Octavian of cowardice because he was unable to look with steady eyes at the fighting fleet, even when standing on firm ground (Suet. *Aug.* 16.2).⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 13.1 and the *Fasti Anni Iuliani* for 42 BCE: “Imp. Caesar Augustus vicit Philippis posteriore proelio Bruto occiso” (EJ, 54). See also Ridley (2003), 166ff., who emphasizes the decisive role of Marcus Antonius in winning the day.

⁴⁶ See also App. *B Civ.* 5.106-108 and Wardle (2014), 141f.

⁴⁷ For Alexander sleeping, see also Curt. 4.13.17-24 and Just. *Epit.* 11.13.1-3. According to Wardle (2014), 141, Suetonius definitely borrowed this episode from a source hostile to the emperor.

⁴⁸ See also Dio Cass. 49.10.2-3; Woodman (1983), 201; and Wardle (2014), 141.

⁴⁹ See *Ibid.* Cf. also the account of Octavian’s flight from Marcus Aemilius Lepidus’ soldiers at the end of the Sicilian War. The soldiers were jeering at his cowardice (App. *B Civ.* 5.125). Vell. Pat. 2.80.3-4 offers a much more favorable interpretation of these events, where Octavian’s courage is actually exalted. Cf. also Oros. 6.18.30-31.

Despite his rather minor role in the decisive sea battle of the Sicilian War, the young Caesar awarded himself with an ovation on the occasion of the end of the war (Suet. *Aug.* 22 and App. *B Civ.* 5.130).⁵⁰ A quinarius minted to celebrate the victory at Naulochus depicts a galley with rowers on the obverse, with the legend IMP CAESAR. On the reverse is a Victory holding a wreath, long palm branch, and rudder, with the legend DIVI·F.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Agrippa was bestowed a *corona navalis* in acknowledgement of his crucial role in this naval victory (Livy, *Per.* 129.4).⁵² It is very significant that the official imperial records downplay Agrippa's role in the Sicilian War, all while emphasizing the young Caesar's role in bringing over Sextus Pompeius' and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus' legions.⁵³ Thus, the young Caesar assumed most of the credit for victory despite his rather minor role in the battle. No wonder the Senate voted Octavian annual solemnities and a golden statue in the Forum. The statue stood on a column decorated with the beaks of captured ships and bore the following inscription: "Peace, long-disturbed, he re-established on land and sea" (App. *B Civ.* 5.130).⁵⁴ The propagation of the young Caesar as the peacemaker was not limited to the audiences in Rome alone: a series of

⁵⁰ Cf. also *RG* 4.1 and the *Fasti Triumphales Capitolini* for 36 BCE: "Imp. Caesar divi f. C. f. II, IIIvir r. p. c. II, ovans ex Sicilia idibus Novembr" (EJ, 34).

⁵¹ See *BM Coins, Rom. Rep.* II, 581, no. 38. For an exhaustive discussion of the two large groups of silver and gold that were issued by Octavian boasting the legends CAESAR DIVI·F and IMP CAESAR, see Gurval (1995), 47-65. The author suggests that the issues should not be solely associated with the naval victory at Actium but assigned to the period of 36-27 BCE, from the naval victory at Naulochus to the conferment of the cognomen Augustus upon Octavian.

⁵² See also Vell. Pat. 2.81.3; Verg. *Aen.* 8.683-684; and Dio Cass. 49.14.3.

⁵³ See *RG* 3.4; 25.1; Vell. Pat. 2.79.4-2.80.4; and my discussion of the Augustan eradication of piracy below, pp. 249-256.

⁵⁴ "Τὴν εἰρήνην ἐστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν." See also Zanker (1988), 41f. In the past, both Hellenistic monarchs, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Cic. *Balb.* 6.16), and Julius Caesar (Dio Cass. 44.49.2) had also been proclaimed peacemakers and rulers over land and sea. For details, see Momigliano (1942) and Schuler (2007). Cf. also Rich (2003).

denarii, which were usually used to pay the army, was minted with a head of Octavian with laurel wreath on the obverse and an image of his golden statue atop of *columna rostrata* on the reverse, with the legend IMP CAESAR.⁵⁵

Not unlike the Republican aristocrats of old and the Paretian leonine “consolidators,” the young Caesar based his claim to power on his personal *virtus* and *felicitas*. In the *Res Gestae*, the princeps repeatedly extols his martial prowess and portrays himself as the iconic exemplar of *virtus*.⁵⁶ It is very likely that the Senate first celebrated Augustus’ *virtus* officially in 27 BCE.⁵⁷ However, the main difference between the princeps and the people he strove to imitate was that Augustus’ *virtus* was often acquired for him by others, the people who used their own *felicitas* to advance the interests of the emperor. Similar to the Paretian vulpine “innovators,” the young Caesar learned early on the importance of appearances; a fox at heart, he acted as the quintessential Machiavellian prince and only appeared to possess *virtus*.⁵⁸ As Pareto correctly observes, the people of Rome accepted a delusion of princeps’ military prowess because they

⁵⁵ See *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 103, nos. 633-636, and pl. 15, no. 15, and *RIC*², 61, no. 271, and pl. 5, no. 271.

⁵⁶ See, for example, *RG* 1.1; 2; 3.1; 26.5; and 29.1. Cf. also Cicero who lists the four characteristics of a successful general: “Ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere, scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem” (*Leg. Man.* 28).

⁵⁷ See Wardle (2014), 176.

⁵⁸ Machiavelli (1979), 135, says: “[The prince] should appear, upon seeing and hearing him, to be all mercy, all faithfulness, all integrity, all kindness, all religion.... And men in general judge more by their eyes than their hands; for everyone can see but few can feel. Everyone sees what you seem to be, few perceive what you are...” (*The Prince* 18).

were formalists who believed that substance could not be changed as long as forms appeared to stay the same.⁵⁹

In September of 30 BCE, the Senate voted Octavian the grass crown (*corona graminea*) on the occasion of the final defeat of Marcus Antonius and Cleopatra at Alexandria (Plin. *HN* 22.6.13).⁶⁰ Given for rescuing the whole army from grave danger, this was truly the extraordinary mark of distinction, the highest possible award a Roman could obtain (Plin. *HN* 22.4.6-5.10). If we are to believe Pliny the Elder, throughout the Roman history the *corona graminea* was given only to eight people, including the young Caesar (Plin. *HN* 22.5.10-6.14). Then, in January of 27 BCE, the Senate granted the emperor a crown of oak-leaves (*corona civica*) for “extinguishing” the civil wars and “transferring” the Roman state back into the control of the Senate and people (*RG* 34.1-2).⁶¹ While the civic crown was originally conferred on a man for saving a life of a fellow citizen on a battlefield (Plin. *HN* 22.4.8 and Gell. *NA* 5.6.11), in the Late Republic it was awarded more generally for a victory which had saved the lives of many citizens (cf. Val. Max. 2.8.7).⁶² It is significant that the civic-crown motif became

⁵⁹ See Pareto (1935), §§ 174-175; 233; 2169; and 2199.

⁶⁰ Cf. Dio Cass. 51.19.1-7, who lists all the honors voted to the emperor at around this time. Among them might have been an “Actian” arch erected at the Forum Romanum; I discuss the arch and its significance below, pp. 238f.

⁶¹ Cf. Ov. *Fast.* 1.589; Val. Max. 2.8.7; Dio Cass. 53.16.4; and *Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.113 = EJ, 45: “corona querna uti super ianuam domus imp. Caesaris Augusti poneretur senatus decrevit quod rem publicam p. R. restituit.” Because the key words “*rem publicam*” are missing from the inscription, most likely the gap should be filled by “*quod leges et iura p. R. restituit.*” Such restoration follows the legend carried on the reverse of an aureus from Asia Minor tentatively dated to 28 BCE. For details, see Rich and Williams (1999); Millar (2000), 6; Mantovani (2008), 32f.; and cf. Judge (1974), 288-298. At the same time, the so-called *Laudatio Turiae* speaks about the “restoration of the Republic”: “*pacato orbe tarrarum, restituta re publica quieta deinde nobis et felicia / tempora contigerunt*” (*ILS* 8393 = EJ, 161, no. 357, ll. 35-36).

⁶² Cf. Cooley (2009), 264ff., who offers a very insightful discussion of the *corona civica*.

quite popular on Augustan coins, variously appearing in combination with the name CAESAR AVGVSTVS, the two evergreen laurels, and the legend OB CIVIS SERVATOS or CIVIBVS SERVATEIS.⁶³

In order to remind the Roman aristocracy about the significance of the man who had saved the Republic from the horrors of the civil wars, a series of aurei was issued in 27 BCE. These coins propagate the newly acquired privileges granted to the princeps in January of 27 BCE as part of the First Settlement.⁶⁴ The obverse depicts bare head of Augustus facing right; the legend proclaims: CAESAR COS VII CIVIBVS SERVATEIS. The reverse portrays eagle with its wings spread, standing front on oak-wreath; two laurel branches are behind on the left and right. AVGVSTVS is written in arc above, and letters S and C are on the left and right of the wreath.⁶⁵ As the bird of Jupiter, the eagle serves as an effective allusion to Augustus' position of preeminence. The other elements of the reverse allude to the Senate granting the emperor the *corona civica* and the defining cognomen Augustus (*RG.* 34.2) as well as to the two evergreen laurels, the symbols of victory and peace (*Plin. HN* 15.39.127 and 15.40.133) associated with Apollo. The latter were placed at the entrance to Augustus' house (*RG* 34.2 and *Dio Cass.* 53.16.4).⁶⁶

⁶³ For details, see *Ibid.*, 265.

⁶⁴ See *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 106f., nos. 656-658, and pl. 16, no. 4.

⁶⁵ See *Ibid.*, 106, no. 656, and pl. 16, no. 4.

⁶⁶ For the list of other primary sources and the significance of the cognomen Augustus, see my discussion in Chapter IV, pp. 320ff.

The princeps' dissimulation of his own *virtus* during the civil wars was so successful that authors both in the West and the East fully buy into the princeps' construct of reality, praising him for his "aggressive courage" in battle and overall excellence.⁶⁷ For instance, Vitruvius begins his preface to *De architectura* in the following way:

While your divine mind and will, O Emperor Caesar, acquired the world through your military command, the citizens gloried in your invincible courage, triumph, and victory over all prostrated enemies. All subjugated tribes obeyed your bidding, and the Roman people and Senate, having been liberated from fear, were guided by your greatest plans and resolutions..." (*De arch.* 1, Preface 1).⁶⁸

Similarly, the Priene Calendar Inscription, which preserves a fragmentary decree by the Assembly of Asia and is usually dated to around 9 BCE, not only presents the emperor as the providentially chosen symbol of *virtus* (*ἀρετή*) but also assigns to him roles of the savior who stopped civil strife and the benefactor whose munificence would never be matched:

Since providence which has divinely arranged our life has eagerly and zealously mustered the most perfect [good] for life, having borne Augustus, whom she filled with virtue for the benefit of mankind, [having freely given] to us and to our descendants, as it were, [a savior] who stopped warfare, [and] who will arrange [peace; and since having come into being] Caesar surpassed the hopes of [all] those who anticipated [good news], not only outdoing those who had been [benefactors] before him, but [leaving] those yet to be born with no hope of [outdoing him]..." (EJ, 82, no 98(b), ll. 32-40).⁶⁹

⁶⁷ For the "aggressive courage," see Chapter I, pp. 22f. and 59f.

⁶⁸ "Cum divina tua mens et numen, imperator Caesar, imperio potiretur orbis terrarum invictaque virtute cunctis hostibus stratis triumpho victoriaque tua cives gloriarentur et gentes omnes subactae tuum spectarent nutum populusque Romanus et senatus liberatus timore amplissimis tuis cogitationibus consiliisque gubernaretur...."

⁶⁹ The translation is that of Cooley (2003), 192. According to Fears (1981a), 760, the words *ἀρετή* and *εὐτυχία* "formed the essential attribute of the successful general." Cf. also Plut. *De Alex. fort.* (*Mor.* 326D-345B).

Augustus' tendency to appropriate other people's victories and pass them off as his own becomes especially evident when one analyzes the princeps' involvement in foreign wars.⁷⁰ According to Suetonius, the emperor personally carried out only campaigns in Dalmatia (36-34 BCE) and Cantabria (26-25 BCE), having been wounded twice during the Dalmatian campaign (Suet. *Aug.* 20).⁷¹ Augustus might also have campaigned in Gaul in 27-25 BCE, where he reorganized Gallia Comata into the three provinces of Aquitania, Belgica, and Lugdunensis.⁷² The pacification of the Alpine districts also began around the same time, chiefly to eliminate banditry in the mountain passes.⁷³

On the one hand, Octavian as triumvir probably undertook the Dalmatian campaign to prove his personal bravery as well as his mastery of strategy and tactics, perhaps in response to

⁷⁰ As Syme (1939), 392, justly observes, "To the military men who served the dynasty and the State, Augustus and history have paid scant requital; the record of their achievements has been defaced and obliterated."

⁷¹ See also *RG* 26.2; 29.1; 30.1; Hor. *Carm.* 2.6.2; Livy 28.12.12; Livy, *Per.* 135; Vell. Pat. 2.90.1-4; Suet. *Aug.* 21.1; Flor. 2.23.6 and 2.33.46-53; App. *Ill.* 3.14-5.28; and Dio Cass. 49.36.1-37.6. Finally, cf. the *Fasti Triumphales Capitolini* for 25 BCE (EJ, 35): "imp. Caesar in Hispan. fuit."

⁷² Cf. Livy, *Per.* 134.2; Dio Cass. 53.22.5 and 53.25.2; Alföldy (1996), 451; and Goudineau (1996), 487f. Halfmann (1986), 157-162, collects all the evidence on the travels of Augustus in these and subsequent years.

⁷³ Cf. *RG* 26.3; Strabo 4.6.6-9; and Dio Cass. 54.22.1-2. For the full list of primary sources, see footnotes nos. 88 and 98 below. Although many modern scholars, including Cooley (2009), 223, claim that the Roman portrayal of mountaineers as lawless brigands was subjective and used mainly to justify the Roman conquest, even today many mountaineers tend to prosper at the expense of plainsmen, especially in the countries with weak central governments. For example, the so-called Chechen "freedom fighters" of the 1990s not only organized a profitable trade in Russian slaves and regularly took non-Chechen hostages for ransom but also used fake credit advice notes to steal over 1.5 billion dollars from the Russian banks.

criticism about the rather mediocre battlefield performance in the past.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the princeps' departure from Rome in the summer of 27 BCE was accompanied by the reopening of the gates of Janus (Oros. 6.21.1). This symbolized the beginning of the vast new program of pacification of the dangerous provinces and their neighbors and offered Augustus another important opportunity to augment his personal *virtus* by fighting a foreign enemy.⁷⁵ It is significant that the end of the Cantabrian War induced the Senate to close the shrine of Janus for the second time in the lifetime of Augustus (*RG* 13 and Dio Cass. 53.26.5), thus acclaiming the princeps once again as the bringer of peace throughout the empire.⁷⁶ Modern critics of Augustus have repeatedly pointed out that the *Res Gestae* is noticeably silent about the successes of earlier Roman generals who fought in these regions.⁷⁷ This is true, but one might maintain in Augustus' defense that the document was written to immortalize the achievements of the princeps, not his fellow aristocratic competitors.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Cooley (2009), 38; 220f.; and 246, suggests that Octavian's *De vita sua* emphasizes his successes in Illyria in order to rebut the critics of his military talent. Cf. App. *Ill.* 3.14-3.15 and Cornell (2013), 2:890f., F9.

⁷⁵ Rich (2003) persuasively argues that the commitment to pacification the princeps made during the First Settlement of 27 BCE was the single most important justification for his continued control of the army. Rich (2009) also notices that the victories in Spain represented the Augustus' last personal campaign in the field and provided an appropriate high note on which to end *De vita sua*.

⁷⁶ For details, see, Cooley (2009), 159f., and Wardle (2014), 166f. The gates of the Temple of Janus were closed for the first time in 29 BCE to symbolize the end of the civil wars (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.113 = EJ, 45; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 9; *Num.* 20; and Dio Cass. 51.20.4).

⁷⁷ See, for example, Ridley (2003), 126.

⁷⁸ Appian says: “Ὁὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας πράξεις ὁ Σεβαστός, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἑαυτοῦ συνέγραφεν, ὡς δ' ἀποστάντας ἐς τοὺς φόρους ἐπανήγαγε, καὶ ἑτέρους ὡς ἀρχῆθεν ἔτι ὄντας αὐτονόμους εἶλε, καὶ πάντας ἐκρατύνατο ὅσοι τὰς κορυφὰς οἰκοῦσι τῶν Ἄλπεων, βάρβαρα καὶ μάχιμα ἔθνη, καὶ κλοπεύοντα τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὡς γείτονα” (*Ill.* 3.15).

Octavian's victories in Dalmatia, at Actium (cf. *RG* 25.2), and in Egypt offered an occasion for an unprecedented triple triumph of 29 BCE, with celebrations on three consecutive days (*RG* 4.1 and 29.1).⁷⁹ Beard points out that the *Fasti Barberiniani* omits the Battle of Actium from the young Caesar's triple triumph entry, which also does not survive in the Forum list. She suggests that the *Fasti Barberiniani* record was an attempt to "clean up" triumphal history by erasing the memory about the fact that Octavian had been awarded a triumph for a victory in a *civil war*.⁸⁰ This may be true, but it is also very significant that Octavian, unlike Julius Caesar, at least refused to celebrate the deaths of his Roman adversaries by parading them "on canvas."⁸¹ At the same time, the princeps was not shy about widely advertising his supposedly leading role in the subjugation of Egypt.⁸² For example, the denarius minted in 28 BCE depicts a crocodile on its reverse, with the legend AEGVPTO above and CAPTA below, drawing attention to the young Caesar's conquest of Egypt and his triple triumph. On its obverse, the denarius shows the bare head of Octavian turned right, with *lituus* behind and the legend CAESAR COS VI.⁸³ Since the princeps from early on made the augur's staff his emblem and a symbol of imperial power, the

⁷⁹ Cf. also Livy, *Per.* 133.2 and Dio Cass. 51.21.5-9. For additional details, see Gurval (1995), 19-85.

⁸⁰ See Beard (2007), 303ff.

⁸¹ See Chapter I, pp. 75f., for my discussion of how Julius Caesar displayed the mocking scenes of suicide of the fellow prominent citizens during his triumph of 46 BCE. Cf. also Gurval (1995), 28f., and Dowling (2006), 63.

⁸² In 30 BCE, Octavian seized Alexandria, but his last conflict with Marcus Antonius was characterized more by treachery than by martial valor (Plut. *Ant.* 74.1-77.4 and Dio Cass. 51.8.1-58.11.1).

⁸³ See *RIC*², 61, no. 275a. This coin belongs to the famous AEGYPTO CAPTA series. Cf. also *RIC*², 61, nos. 275b-276, and Gurval (1995), 64f.

lituus indicates that the victory was won under the auspices of the emperor.⁸⁴ Later in life, the young Caesar officially took all the credit for adding Egypt to the Roman Empire (*RG* 27.1).⁸⁵

The emperor had every right to be acclaimed for the successful pacification of Dalmatia and the Spanish and Gallic provinces, where he even recovered Roman military standards lost under other generals (*RG* 29.1).⁸⁶ The problem is that Augustus also claimed to have extended the borders of *all* the provinces of the Roman Empire, publicizing his prerogative to world domination in the very heading to the *Res Gestae*.⁸⁷ Epitomizing the ideal ruler extolled by Machiavelli, the princeps made the most of the system that contributed to the rapid accumulation of his acquired honor through the victories of his generals, who acted as his legates and carried out all other foreign wars. In the *Res Gestae*, Augustus repeatedly declares that the great deeds were accomplished “under [his] auspices” or “by [his] command and under [his] auspices” (*RG* 4.2 and 26.5). Thus, he takes credit not only for the victory at Actium (*RG* 25.2-3) but also for

⁸⁴ From early on, Octavian appears to have advertised on coins the rapport between the augurate to which he was elected in late 43 or early 42 BCE and the *imperium* first granted to him in 43 BCE. For example, see Octavian’s aureus minted in 42 BCE: the reverse depicts an equestrian statue, with the horseman holding *lituus* in his right hand (*RRC*, 512, no. 497.1, and pl. 60, no. 497/1). Mommsen (1887a), 1:64 and 73, discusses the relationship of *auspicia imperiumque*, and Fears (1977), 106f., points out that the augur’s staff was the expressive symbol of this relationship. Cf. also an insightful discussion by Koortbojian (2013), 63-73.

⁸⁵ “Aegyptum imperio populi Romani adieci.”

⁸⁶ Our sources are unclear as to what standards were lost and then recovered in Spain and Gaul, and the occasions are open to speculation by modern scholars. In 35/34 BCE, Octavian recovered the standards lost in Dalmatia by Aulus Gabinius in 48 BCE and displayed them in the recently rebuilt *porticus Octavia* (*App. Ill.* 3.12; 5.25; 5.28; *RG* 29.1; and 19.1). For details and possible numismatic evidence, see Ridley (2003), 129f., and Cooley (2009), 241f. At the same time, the Cantabrians revolted in 19 BCE, and their resistance was finally crushed only by Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (*Dio Cass.* 54.11.2-6 and *Jer. Ab Abr.* 20 BCE).

⁸⁷ “Rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terra[rum] imperio populi Rom[a]ni subiecit.” Nicolet (1991), 29f., points out that claims to world dominance become a repetitive theme of the Augustan Principate.

pacifying Germany and the Alps (*RG* 26.1-3), advancing into Ethiopia and Arabia (*RG* 26.5), and destroying the invading Dacians (*RG* 30.2).⁸⁸

Augustus' use of the expression "*meo iussu et auspicio*" (*RG* 4.2 and 26.5), which is a traditional allusion to military *imperium* (cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 192 and Livy 3.1 and 10.7), as well as other forms of assigning credit is very significant because the emperor fully appropriates for himself the role of the commander in chief of the whole army of Rome.⁸⁹ Toward the end of the *Res Gestae*, "the army of the Roman people" changes to "my army" in the course of a single chapter (*RG* 30.1-2).⁹⁰ The long list of the military operations (*RG* 25-27 and 29-30) and the diplomatic successes based on the princeps' imaginary military reputation (*RG* 31-33) serve as a justification for Augustus' pretension to have personally brought the whole known world under Roman rule.⁹¹ After all, it is not a coincidence that the *Res Gestae* includes fifty-five geographical names, many of which must have sounded distinctly exotic to Roman ears.⁹² Virgil, who fully buys into the emperor's construct of reality, gives poetic expression to the

⁸⁸ See also *RG* 3.1; 4.2; 25.3; 26.5; and 30.2. Classical authors used the term *Aithiopia* to refer to the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush to the south of Egypt. For details, see Török (1997), 69-73. For the campaigns in Germany and the Alps, see footnote n. 98 below and cf. Ridley (2003), 192-203. For the campaigns in the Arabia and Ethiopia whose chronological sequence the emperor reverses in order to disguise the fiasco of the Arabian expedition, see Plin. *HN* 6.32.160; Strabo 2.5.12; 16.4.22-24; 17.1.46; and Dio Cass. 53.29.3-8 (the Arabia) and *CIL* III.14147 = *ILS* 8995 = EJ, 58, no. 21; Plin. *HN* 6.35.181-182; Strabo 17.1.54; and Dio Cass. 54.5.4-6 and 54.7.4 (Ethiopia). See also Jameson (1968) and Cooley (2009), 224-228. For the Dacian campaign, see Dio Cass. 54.36.2; 55.30.4; and Cooley (2009), 248f.

⁸⁹ See Raaflaub (1987), 266-269; Scheid (2003), 119; and Cooley (2009), 25, 124 and 224.

⁹⁰ Augustus also speaks about "[his] fleet" (*RG* 26.4). For details, see Cooley (2009), 25.

⁹¹ Velleius Paterculus says, "Aberat ordinandis Asiae Orientisque rebus Caesar, circumferens terrarum orbi praesentia sua pacis suae bona" (2.92.2).

⁹² For details, see Cooley (2009), 36f.

assertive military supremacy of Augustus by making Jupiter say: “To this people I have given power without limit” (*Aen.* 1.279).⁹³

However, the real movers and shakers in military matters were Augustus’ generals, not the princeps himself. Early on in the Principate, Marcus Licinius Crassus (cos. 30 BCE), proconsul of senatorial Macedonia and Achaia in 29 and 28 BCE, won spectacular victories against the Dacians, the Bastarnae, and the Geti, personally killing the Bastarnae King Deldo in battle, conquering Moesia, and recovering the standards lost by Gaius Antonius Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE).⁹⁴ After his first campaign, the governor took an imperatorial salutation (*ILS* 8810) and successfully petitioned the Senate for a triumph. However, the young Caesar denied Crassus the title of *imperator* and added the acclamation to his own total, appearing as “imp. VII” on a document from 29 BCE (Dio Cass. 51.25.2 and *ILS* 881).⁹⁵ Similarly, Prefects of Egypt, Gaius Cornelius Gallus, Aelius Gallus, and Gaius/Publius Petronius led the expeditions to Arabia and Ethiopia in 27-22 BCE.⁹⁶ In the Alps and Germany, different commanders waged victorious campaigns against various Alpine tribes in the 40s-20s BCE and won parts of Germany for the

⁹³ “Imperium sine fine dedi.” While other nations may excel in sculpture, matters of law or astronomy, the Romans’ destiny is to govern other nations. Virgil says, “Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento / hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem, / parcere subiectis, et debellare superbos” (*Aen.* 6.851-853). Cf. also Hor. *Carm.* 4.15.

⁹⁴ For details, see Dio Cassius 51.23.2-27.1, who narrates the events under 29 BCE. Cf. also Livy, *Per.* 134-135.

⁹⁵ Cf. Syme (1986), 273f., who points out: “To annex the acclamation of a proconsul, that was not to recur when proconsuls earned triumphs in the near sequel. The leader, who no longer carried the name and title of Triumvir, was asserting abnormal potency for his *imperium* as consul” (274). See also Gallus’ case study, pp. 275f.

⁹⁶ For the Roman expeditions into Arabia and Ethiopia, see footnote n. 88 above and Gallus’ case study below, *passim*.

Roman people in the 10s BCE.⁹⁷ For example, Nero Claudius Drusus and Tiberius Nero subdued the Alpine tribes in 15-14 BCE and conquered much of Germany in 12-8 BCE.⁹⁸ Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 16 BCE) crossed the Elbe around 1 BCE, acquiring the triumphal insignia for this achievement (Tac. *Ann.* 4.44.2). Finally, prior to the Pannonia Revolt (6-9 CE) and the Varus disaster (9 CE) the Roman conquests in Germany were consolidated by Marcus Vinicius (cos. suff. 19 BCE), who was in command of the Rhine army in 1-4 CE, and Gaius Sentius Saturnius (cos. 19 BCE), who served as legate under Tiberius Nero in Germany. Later, he led the Rhine army east for the campaign against Maroboduus and won *ornamenta triumphalia*.⁹⁹

Despite the undeniable achievements of his generals, throughout the *Res Gestae* Augustus repeatedly and quite deliberately puts himself at the center of attention and ignores all other personalities who may come naturally into the narrative. For instance, the document mentions no Roman outside the imperial family by name except for consuls, whose names appear in dating clauses as a constant reminder that the princeps restored and maintained constitutional normalcy.¹⁰⁰ Augustus' step-son Tiberius Nero (*RG* 27.2 and 30.1) and Augustus' adopted son Gaius (*RG* 27.2) are identified as the princeps' agents. The *Res Gestae* is especially silent about

⁹⁷ For details, see Ridley (2003), 126f., and Cooley (2009), 222f.

⁹⁸ For the pacification of Alpine tribes, see *RG* 26.3; Livy, *Per.* 135; Hor. *Carm.* 4.4 and 4.14; Vell. Pat. 2.90.1 and 2.95.1-2; Strabo 4.6.6-9; App. *Ill.* 3.15; and Dio Cass. 53.25.2-5; 54.20.1; and 54.22.1-5. For Drusus' and Tiberius' military campaigns in Germany, see Vell. Pat. 2.97.3-4; Suet. *Aug.* 21.1; and Dio Cass. 54.32.1-54.33.5; 55.1.2-5; and 55.6.1-5.

⁹⁹ The acephalous epitaph from Tusculum that records military operations against the Transdanubian tribes is usually attributed to Vinicius. See *ILS* 8965 = EJ, 63, no. 43a. For Saturnius, see Vell. Pat. 2.105.1-2 and Syme (1964), 156ff.

¹⁰⁰ For details, see Ramage (1987), 26ff. and 88.

the most outstanding generals who served Rome at that time. Even Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa who did so much for the ultimate triumph of the young Caesar is mentioned only twice, in both cases as a colleague of the princeps in a magistracy (*RG* 8.2 and 22.2). Similarly, Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus “the Augur,” who became immensely popular after his victory over the Getae (*Tac. Ann.* 4.44.1), appears only as a consul of 14 BCE (*RG* 16.2).¹⁰¹ Although it may be striking how the author of the *Res Gestae* reserves exceptional *virtus* only for himself and the chosen male members of the *domus Augusti*, one needs to keep in mind the epitaphic aspect of the work which was composed to secure the record of Augustus’ achievements.¹⁰² Advertising his uniqueness, the princeps simply follows conventional practices of the Late Republic in order to immortalize his own achievements and establish himself superior beyond competition.

The Visual Language of Augustus’ Virtus

In the first chapter of the dissertation, I explicated how *virtus*, exemplified by acquired reputation for military prowess and successful claims to a triumph, was the foundation for the ideological construct that justified aristocratic supremacy and one’s prerogative to political influence. The agonistic culture at Rome, which was characterized by the relentless struggle for status and political power as well as by ranking oneself and one’s peers in a social hierarchy, made *virtus* one of the primary means for members of the governing elite to demonstrate their service to the

¹⁰¹ Cf. also *Tac. Ann.* 1.27.1; 4.29.1; and the *Fasti* (EJ, 37). For a list of generals, see Ridley (2003), 126.

¹⁰² Cooley (2009), 30-34, succinctly discusses numerous parallels between the *Res Gestae* and Roman epitaphs and *elogia*. According to Suetonius, the original of the *Res Gestae* was cut upon bronze tablets and set up at the entrance to Augustus’ Mausoleum (*Aug.* 101.4).

res publica, increase their prestige, and ultimately win the consular elections. Because a strong warrior ethos imbued the Roman Republican elite, military accomplishments and successful claims to a triumph directly translated into success in public life and remained closely related to acquisition of honor and status, which were the criteria of one's social ranking.

As a result of all this, a Republican general could even occasionally sabotage the transfer of command in order to deny his personal rival an opportunity to lay claim to a triumph. For example, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143 BCE and censor 131 BCE) lost his right to a triumph from Hither Spain in 141 BCE because he intentionally handed his army over in bad shape to Quintus Pompeius (cos. 141 BCE) who happened to be his personal enemy (Val. Max. 9.3.7). In a bid to win triumphal honors, Roman generals also habitually exaggerated the number of enemy dead, understated Roman casualties, and downplayed one another's military achievements.¹⁰³ The problem became so severe in the Late Republic that Marcus Porcius Cato even passed a law around 63 BCE that required commanders to swear that their reports to the Senate were accurate. The law also punished those who submitted false numbers in their reports (Val. Max. 2.8.1).¹⁰⁴

Considering all this, one should not be surprised that Augustus' brazen appropriation of others' victories to augment his acquired honor and prestige was not limited to the *Res Gestae* but extended to all media of self-aggrandizement. For example, between 35 and 8 BCE, a number of Roman generals, including the princeps' stepsons Nero Claudius Drusus and Tiberius

¹⁰³ For specific examples of how Roman generals could downplay military achievements of their rivals for triumphal honors, see Cicero's case study above, pp. 119ff.

¹⁰⁴ For a somewhat reductionist interpretation of Valerius Maximus' account, the interpretation which, in my opinion, does not do it full justice, see Beard (2007), 209ff.

Nero, waged a series of successful wars against various Alpine tribes.¹⁰⁵ As a result, three new Alpine districts were set up: Alpes Maritimae, Alpes Gratiae, and Alpes Cottiae.¹⁰⁶ Yet, the Senate, wishing to celebrate the final incorporation of the mountaineers into the Roman Empire, ordered to erect the monument specifically dedicated to the princeps.¹⁰⁷ Constructed in 7 or 6 BCE and located at modern La Turbie, near Monaco, the *tropaeum Augusti* was a rotunda encircled by twenty-four columns with a triglyph frieze and topped by a conical roof with a statue of Augustus as a crowning finish.¹⁰⁸ The votive inscription on the plinth of the monument appears to have listed by name all four dozen subjugated tribes (Plin. *HN* 3.20.136-137).¹⁰⁹ Just as the Augustan Arch discussed below and the Altar of Augustan Peace in Rome (*RG* 12.2), this impressively large victory monument, constructed on a 486-meter-high outcrop that dominates

¹⁰⁵ For details, see Cooley (2009), 222f. In particular, Horace immortalizes Drusus' and Tiberius Raetian campaigns of 15-14 BCE (*Carm.* 4.4 and 4.14); these resulted in a tenth imperial acclamation for Augustus. Cf. also Strabo 4.6.9; Vell. Pat. 2.95.1-2; and Dio Cass. 54.22.1-5.

¹⁰⁶ The latter was governed by a dynastic king turned into equestrian prefect and Roman citizen, Marcus Iulius Cottius. Around 8 BCE, he erected a traditional Roman triumphal arch in honor of Augustus in modern Susa at the Alps. A large bronze inscription on the arch (*ILS* 94 = *EJ*, 101, no. 166) lists six of the tribes mentioned among the conquered people on the votive inscription at the *tropaeum Augusti* at La Turbie that I discuss next.

¹⁰⁷ “Imp. Caesari divi filio Aug. pont. max. imp. XIII tr. pot. XVII s.p.q.R., quod eius ductu auspiciisque gentes Alpinae omnes quae a mari supero ad inferum pertinebant sub imperium p. R. sunt redactae” (*CIL* V².7817 = *EJ*, 62, no. 40). A part of the inscription from the monument was discovered during the reconstruction; there are around 170 small fragments that are now inserted into the monument.

¹⁰⁸ For the exact geographical location, see Ptol. *Geog.* 3.1.2. After being used as a fortress throughout the Middle Ages, the monument was mostly destroyed by the French troops in the early 1700s. The structure was reconstructed and turned into a museum in the early twentieth century. For details, see Lamboglia (1955).

¹⁰⁹ Cf. also *CIL* V².7817 = *EJ*, 62, no. 40.

Monte Carlo on the Via Julia Augusta leading to Gaul, exemplified the ideology of the *pax Augusta*, “peace achieved by [military] victories on land and sea” (*RG* 13).¹¹⁰

Imperial cameos, the objects of art usually restricted only to the gaze of the members of the imperial circle, were also used to reinforce the princeps’ pretension that all military victories had been won under his command and auspices.¹¹¹ The *Gemma Augustea*, a large carved sardonyx cameo probably commissioned by Livia sometime between 7 BCE and 12 CE, memorializes Tiberius Nero’s victory as won exclusively under the auspices of Augustus.¹¹² The *gemma* is partitioned into two halves that are delineated by the thin ground line of the upper register.¹¹³ While the lower part of the cameo depicts Tiberius’ bound captives watching the legionaries erecting a trophy to commemorate the Roman victory, the upper part portrays three members of the *domus Augusti* surrounded by deities and personifications. In the center of the composition is the enthroned goddess Roma; Augustus sits to the right of her in the guise of Jupiter, with the Roman eagle sitting on the ground under the princeps’ seat. Portrayed in heroic semi-nudity, the emperor holds the augur’s staff to signal that Tiberius’s victory was won under his auspices.¹¹⁴ Augustus’ gaze is directed toward Tiberius, who is about to descend from a chariot driven by the

¹¹⁰ “... terra marique esset parta victoriis pax...” For details, see Rich (2003) and my discussion of the Augustan eradication of piracy below, pp. 249-256. For the Augustan Arch, see below, pp. 238f.

¹¹¹ For a rather limited audience of imperial cameos, see Fischer (2016), 40.

¹¹² For the range of dates and Livia as a possible commissioner of the cameo, see *Ibid.*, 42ff.

¹¹³ See Zanker (1988), 231, and Fischer (2016), 42, for photographs of the cameo.

¹¹⁴ Cf. footnote n. 84 above.

goddess Victoria.¹¹⁵ The cuirassed Germanicus, the great-grandnephew of Augustus, sports the attire of a cavalry officer and stands to the left of the goddess Roma. Zanker says, “The two princes are the emissaries of the universal ruler; his invincibility is transferred to them like a discreet entity. This is why Roma looks admiringly at Augustus and not at the actual victors.... Above Augustus’ head, the Capricorn shines against a disk (the sun?) and a star in the background, all three symbols of mythic and cosmic predestination.”¹¹⁶

Throughout his Principate, Augustus often chose to present even non-martial achievements as grandiose military victories. An especially startling case occurred in 20 BCE: the installation of a Roman appointee named Tigranes in Armenia and the peaceful surrender of Roman standards and captives by the Parthian King Phraates IV (37-2 BCE) provided an occasion for the princeps’ ninth imperial salutation.¹¹⁷ Perhaps it was well deserved since Augustus succeeded in recovering the standards from *three* different Roman armies. First, the lost standards and Roman prisoners had been held for a generation as Parthian prizes after Crassus’ disastrous defeat at Carrhae in 53 BCE.¹¹⁸ Julius Caesar was preparing a military campaign

¹¹⁵ Behind Augustus and to the far right of the cameo are images of Oceanus; Oikoumene, who crowns the princeps with the civic crown; and Tellus Italiae, who wears around her neck a *bullae*, the symbol of a freeborn youth. The personified “Land of Italy” sits on the ground, holding a cornucopia and surrounded by children.

¹¹⁶ Zanker (1988), 231.

¹¹⁷ For the Armenian affair, see *RG* 17.2; Strabo 17.1.54; Vell. Pat. 2.94.4; Joseph *AJ* 15.105; Suet. *Tib.* 9.1; and Dio Cass. 54.9.4-5. For the peaceful surrender of the Roman standards by the Parthians in 20 BCE, see *RG* 29.2; Ov. *Fast.* 5.579-584; Vell. Pat. 2.91.1; Suet. *Aug.* 21.3 and *Tib.* 9.1; and Dio Cass. 54.8.1-2.

¹¹⁸ Similar to many modern armies, the pride of Roman legions was invested particularly in their standards, which were held to be sacred. Every time a legion received a military distinction, battle honors were arranged upon the shaft of the legionary standard like the figures on a totem-pole. For details, see Helgeland (1978), 1473-1478; Maxfield (1981), 219; Lee (1996), 208; and William V. Harris (2006), 306f. and 310.

against the Parthians, but his assassination cut short his plans (Suet. *Iul.* 79.3-80.1 and Dio Cass. 44.15.3-4). Later, the legates of Marcus Antonius failed to retrieve Crassus' standards in 40 and 36 BCE respectively; they even lost their own banners (Dio Cass. 48.24.3-27.3 and Plut. *Ant.* 37.3-50.1).¹¹⁹ After Actium, the patriotic desire to recover the lost standards became a popular theme in Augustan poetry (Prop. 3.4 and Hor. *Carm.* 3.5.2-12).¹²⁰ It is significant that the emperor not only succeeded where others had failed but he achieved his goal without any military action and solely by discreet display of force and prudent diplomacy (Suet. *Aug.* 21.3)!

There was a dissension among the Parthians around 32 BCE, with the pretender to the Parthian throne, Tiridates II, rising against the Parthian King Phraates IV, who had been driven out by his subjects. After Tiridates was defeated two years later, the young Caesar permitted him to live in Syria. At the same time, the emperor received from Phraates one of his sons, Vonones, who was kept at Rome as a hostage (Dio Cass. 51.18.2-3 and Tac. *Ann.* 2.1.1-2). At some point, Tiridates returned to Seleucia, where he minted tetradrachms that praised him as the "friend of the Romans."¹²¹ In 26/25 BCE, he fled to Augustus for a second time. When Phraates IV sent an embassy to Rome and demanded the surrender of Tiridates, the princeps refused to hand him over to the Parthians. Instead, in 23 BCE the emperor sent Phraates' son Vonones back to Parthia on condition that the Parthians would return in exchange the Roman standards and prisoners (Dio Cass. 53.33.1-2).

¹¹⁹ Cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 21.3.

¹²⁰ See Cooley (2009), 242f.

¹²¹ For details, see *Ibid.*, 252.

However, once Phraates IV received his son back, he chose not to honor his side of the agreement. In a diplomatic game to assure a peaceful return of the Roman standards and captives, Augustus permitted Tiridates to go back to Syria, where the princeps kept him neither promoting his claims to the Parthian throne nor invalidating them. In effect, the emperor used Tiridates as a valuable bargaining tool whose capacity to stir up trouble in Parthia was supposed to persuade Phraates IV to return the lost standards and captives without the Romans actually declaring war on him (cf. Dio Cass. 51.18.2-3 and Just. *Epit.* 42.5.6-12). Around 20 BCE, the princeps personally traveled to the East, perhaps to put an additional pressure on the Parthian king (Dio Cass. 54.7.4-8.1). At the same time, Augustus' step-son Tiberius Nero, who was in charge of Roman legions stationed in Armenia, crowned Tigranes, son of King Artavasdes II (54-34 BCE), as the new king of Armenia.¹²² In the end, emperor's discreet display of force and prudent diplomacy persuaded the Phraates IV to keep his end of the bargain and return the Roman standards and captives that same year (*RG* 29.2 and Dio Cass. 54.8.1).¹²³

The non-violent return of the Roman standards allowed Augustus to wipe out a long-standing stain on Roman honor without engaging in war with Parthia. Yet, the emperor deliberately chose to present the whole affair as a great military victory over the barbarians (Dio Cass. 54.8.2). He even brags about his achievement in the *Res Gestae* (27.2 and 29.2), stating that the returned standards were placed next to the cult statue of Mars the Avenger in the temple of this god

¹²² See *RG* 27.2; Vell. Pat. 2.122.1; Tac. *Ann.* 2.3.2; and Suet. *Tib.* 9.1. Dio Cassius accuses Tiberius of empty boasting since the Armenians already slew Artaxes, the rival contender to the Armenian throne, even before Tiberius' arrival (54.9.4-6), but Velleius Paterculus presents the future princeps as the perfect hero (2.94.4).

¹²³ Cf. Sonnabend (1986), 197-227. Several scholars have also argued that the earlier Aelius Gallus' Arabian expedition was actually aimed at Parthia, making Phraates IV apprehensive of a possible Roman intervention in the region. See Sherwin-White (1984), 322f.; Campbell (1993), 220-223; Marek (1993), 150ff.; and Cooley (2009), 243. Cf. also footnote n. 88 above.

dedicated in the Augustan Forum in 2 BCE.¹²⁴ The recovery of the standards was widely celebrated in poetry, on coinage, and by monument.¹²⁵ Contemporary and later poets and historians praise it as a brilliant military victory.¹²⁶ In order to advertise his *virtus* and consequently augment his *auctoritas* even further, Augustus ordered to mint in large quantities the aurei, denarii, and tetradrachms with the legends ARMENIA CAPTA, ARMENIA RECEPTA, SIGNIS PARTHICIS RECEPTIS, and SIGNIS RECEPTIS.¹²⁷ Finally, the recovery of the standards is conspicuously depicted in the center of the cuirass of the celebrated statue of Augustus from Livia's villa at Prima Porta: a barbarian on the right, perhaps the Parthian king himself, hands over a legionary eagle attached to a battle standard to a cuirassed Roman military figure, the embodiment of Mars Ultor himself.¹²⁸ Equally important is that an arch erected in the Forum Romanum to memorialize the return of the standards became one of the programmatic monuments of the Augustan Principate.

As early as 30 BCE, the Senate decreed to construct an "Actian" arch in the Roman Forum because it wanted to commemorate Octavian's victory over Marcus Antonius and Cleopatra (Dio Cass. 51.19.1). It is unclear if the actual arch were ever erected, but the footings of a three-way arch between the Temple of Castor and the Temple of Divius Julius as well as a large inscription

¹²⁴ Cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 21.3 and Dio Cass. 54.8.3. For details, see Cooley (2009), 244f.

¹²⁵ According to Tacitus, the longer the princeps stayed in power the more conspicuous sycophancy and self-aggrandizement became (*Ann.* 1.1.2; 1.2.1-2; and 1.14.1).

¹²⁶ For details, see Cooley (2009), 242ff., and Wardle (2014), 178f.

¹²⁷ For example, see *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 108f., nos. 671-677; 110, nos. 679-681; and 114, no. 703. Cf. also *RIC*², 83, nos. 521-526; 62, nos. 287-290; 63, nos. 304-305; and 64, nos. 314-315.

¹²⁸ For details, see Zanker (1988), 188-192; Galinsky (1996), 156-164; and Rose (2005).

hailing “the preservation of the state” may have once been parts of it.¹²⁹ Later, the honorific triple Arch of Augustus was probably modified to memorialize the recovery of the Roman standards from the Parthians (cf. Dio Cass. 54.8.3). It has also been argued that the *Fasti Triumphales*, the document that recorded every triumph from Romulus down to Augustus, was mounted on it.¹³⁰ Thus, the arch became one of the programmatic monuments of the Principate, and it was even depicted on the reverse of a series of aurei and denarii minted in 18-17/16 BCE.¹³¹ The elaborately decorated keystone of the Augustan Arch, flanked by figures of winged Victories, vanquished enemies, and Roman standards, conveyed the message of a military triumph over the foreign enemy, thus representing the emperor once again as the embodiment of Roman military glory.¹³²

In the late 1970s, Luttwak suggested that Augustus, who wished to bring the empire under his sole control, developed a military plan of action based on economy of force. In order to secure internal peace and frontier stability, the emperor skillfully used mobile troops and loyal

¹²⁹ “Senatus populusque Romanus imp. Caesari divi Iuli f. cos. quinct. cos. design. sext. imp. sept. re publica conservata” (*ILS* 81 = *EJ*, 57, no. 17; cf. *Vell. Pat.* 2.60.1). Discovered in the sixteenth century near the Temple of Castor, the inscription was subsequently lost. Gurval (1995), 36-47 and 132, provides a brief but insightful discussion of all the issues associated with the construction and location of the arch. Cf. also Eck (1985), 138, and Beard (2007), 61-71 and 295f.

¹³⁰ See Rose (2005).

¹³¹ See *RIC*², 50, nos. 131-137, and pl. 3, no. 131, and *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 73f., nos. 427-429, and pl. 10, nos. 2-3. Cf. also Gurval (1995), 43f., and Rose (2005), 24f.

¹³² Cf. Ando (2000), 287f., who discusses how Augustan public monuments directed credit to the princeps. A large number of miniature copies of these monuments and their wide dissemination throughout the empire are a testament to the popularity of the themes associated with Roman military victories. For details, see Zanker (1988), 265-295, and Kuttner (1995).

dependencies, thus creating a united dominion under Roman rule.¹³³ However, in the aftermath of the First Settlement of 27 BCE, Augustus appears to have been much more concerned about consolidating his power and keeping control over the army. This is why he prioritized pacification of imperial provinces and used it as a justification for his continued control of the army.¹³⁴ Later in life, the princeps became preoccupied with a careful construction of his image as the ultimate world conqueror.¹³⁵ In this, he was not that different from many other prominent Roman *nobiles* of the past, except one crucial innovation: while most Republican commanders, including the dynasts, acquired *virtus*, *auctoritas*, and consequent political power on the battlefield, Augustus brazenly appropriated military achievements of others in order to increase his relative “honor rating” and establish himself superior beyond competition. Thus, his way of winning in aristocratic competition for acquired honor and magistracies differed greatly from established Republican practices and hardly qualified him as the leader of the Paretian conservative leonine and bellicose elite strong in irrational behavioral manifestations of group-persistence and “preservation.” Since the princeps only *appeared* to have martial prowess without really possessing it, he exemplified the qualities of Machiavelli’s ideal ruler.¹³⁶

¹³³ See Luttwak (1976), 13-50. Syme (1934), 351-354, was perhaps the first one who advanced the concept of defensive frontiers.

¹³⁴ See Rich (2003).

¹³⁵ Cf. Brunt (1990), 96-109 and 433-480, who views the world conquest as the ultimate goal of Augustus’ external policies.

¹³⁶ Cf. footnote n. 58 above.

In his *Life of Augustus*, Suetonius preserves a wonderful anecdote about the princeps. Shortly before passing away, Augustus went on a vacation to the Bay of Naples. Suetonius says:

As [Augustus] was sailing past the bay of Puteoli it chanced that passengers and crew of a ship from Alexandria which had only just put in, dressed in white, wearing garlands and offering incense, heaped upon him omens of good fortune and the highest praise: through him they were alive, through him they made their voyage, and through him they enjoyed freedom and good fortune. Delighted by this he distributed forty aurei to his companions and extracted from them a promise under oath that they would not use the money given to them for any purpose other than buying goods from Alexandria (Suet. *Aug.* 98.2).¹³⁷

At first glance, this story appears to support the claim that notwithstanding all his militaristic bravado the emperor advanced primarily the interests of the Paretian vulpine “speculators” strong in non-logical behavioral manifestations of “combination.” However, in what follows I suggest that Augustus effectively used both leonine force and vulpine shrewdness in order to solidify his domination of the Roman state. This makes him the Machiavellian prince par excellence.

Most contemporary students of Roman economy agree that unlike medieval Italy, where cities developed first and foremost as centers of manufacturing activities and commerce, large cities of the Roman world were centers of both consumption and manufacture and trade. It may be instructive to provide a brief historical overview of this consensus. Both Rostovzeff and

¹³⁷ The translation is that of Wardle (2014), 76. “Forte Puteolanum sinum praetervehenti vectores nautaeque de navi Alexandrina, quae tantum quod appulerat, candidati coronatique et tura libantes fausta omnia et eximias laudes congesserant: per illum se vivere, per illum navigare, libertate atque fortunis per illum frui. Qua re admodum exhilaratus quadragenos aureos comitibus divisit iusque iurandum et cautionem exegit a singulis, non alio datam summam quam in emptionem Alexandrinarum mercium absumpturos.” Cf. also a declaration of a member of the 13 CE Alexandrian embassy to Augustus that the citizens of Alexandria enthusiastically worship the Fortune of Augustus (*POxy.* 25.2435 verso).

Walbank considered the Roman economy quite sophisticated and viewed large urban centers as hubs of manufacturing and commerce.¹³⁸ However, in the 1970s and 1980s Jones and Finley rejected the models of mainstream economics and suggested instead the cellular self-sufficiency of the ancient economy. In particular, they claimed that large urban centers of Antiquity were first and foremost centers of consumption.¹³⁹ Their views became a new orthodoxy until the seminal studies of Hopkins on Roman economy. In his works, the author cogently demonstrated that until the second century CE the Mediterranean societies experienced modest economic growth stimulated by political change and the spread of technical and social innovation. Thus, Hopkins correctly deduced that the ancient urban centers were both centers of consumption and centers of production and commerce.¹⁴⁰

Recent studies by Greene and Wilson use archeological evidence to demonstrate that agricultural and manufacturing techniques of the Late Roman Republic and the Early Roman Empire were much more advanced than previously thought.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Temin, who re-emphasizes the scale of economic activity in the Roman world, proposes that ancient Rome had a vibrant market economy characterized by highly interconnected markets: extensive Mediterranean trade stimulated regional specialization, and comparative advantage of each region effectively raised incomes across the entire Mediterranean world.¹⁴² Finally, it is necessary to mention *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* published in

¹³⁸ See Rostovzeff (1963) and Walbank (1946).

¹³⁹ See Jones (1974) and Finley (1977 and 1985), 35-61.

¹⁴⁰ See Hopkins (1980; 1983c; 1995/1996; 2000; and 2009).

¹⁴¹ See Greene (2000) and Wilson (2002 and 2008).

¹⁴² See Temin (2001 and 2013).

2007.¹⁴³ Many authors of this volume take their cue from the methods and concepts of the so-called New Institutional Economics, which combines a clear focus on the study of particular economic institutions with a strong interest in economic performance.¹⁴⁴ As a result, the volume's chapters that study social political institutions and developments across the Roman world conform to the overall framework of moderate long-term economic expansion and limited growth in the Roman-dominated Mediterranean.

I want to start my analysis of Roman economy in the reign of Augustus with a very basic observation: it was prohibitively expensive to transport goods overland over long distances in Antiquity. As a result, large urban centers often depended on maritime imports of such staple goods as grain, olives and olive oil, and wine.¹⁴⁵ After the end of the Third Punic War (149-146 BCE), the Roman maritime trade flourished as never before. Between 100 BCE and 300 CE, the recorded number of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean basin grew more than threefold compared with either the preceding period or any other time until the High Renaissance.¹⁴⁶ Erdkamp points out, "Late Republican and early Imperial sources indicate that grain from almost the entire Mediterranean world arrived at Rome."¹⁴⁷ Similarly, the enormous trade in olive oil at the city

¹⁴³ See Scheidel (2007).

¹⁴⁴ For details, see Bang (2009).

¹⁴⁵ Ward (2003), 132, highlights the fact that the cost of shipping grain five hundred miles by sea was equal to transporting it overland for twenty miles. Hopkins (1983d), 104, and (2009), 186, claims that transport by land could cost as much as sixty times as transport by sea, but I find this estimate too high. See also Temin (2013), 30.

¹⁴⁶ See Hopkins (1980), 105f., and *OCD*³, s.v. "Trade," by Jeremy James Paterson. The apparent patterns of shipwrecks' distributions first identified by Hopkins on the basis of early studies by Parker have been confirmed by later studies of Parker (1992 and 2008, 187f.) and Paolilli (2008), 278ff.

¹⁴⁷ Erdkamp (2005), 207.

of Rome has been estimated at between twenty-three thousand and twenty-six thousand metric tons a year; the inhabitants of the capital also consumed between one million and one million and eight hundred thousand hectoliters of wine per annum.¹⁴⁸ As I demonstrate below, the massive imports of grain, olive oil, and wine attest to the emerging regional specialization in agricultural production across the Roman-dominated Mediterranean.

On average, the cost of production and maritime shipping of non-Italian wheat to Rome was much less than the cost of growing and transporting Italian-grown wheat to the capital. As a result, such regions as Sicily, Sardinia, North Africa, and Egypt after its conquest by the young Caesar became the main sources of grain supply to the city of Rome.¹⁴⁹ According to Pliny the Elder, the capital imported grain from as far as Gaul and southern Spain in the west and the Chersonese in the east (*HN* 18.12.66-67). But the regional specialization in agricultural production worked both ways. In response to declining prices for staple foods, the farmers at hinterland villas surrounding Rome stopped growing basic foods for life and switched to the production of such luxury foods as poultry, which brought in much more money.¹⁵⁰ The wars of the Late Republic severely disrupted Roman trade in the East, but commerce did revive between Levant and Italy after Octavian's victory at Actium.¹⁵¹ Now it was concentrated for the most

¹⁴⁸ See *OCD*³, s.v. "Trade," by Jeremy James Paterson, and Aldrete (1999), 194ff. According to Temin (2013), 30, oil was mainly imported from North Africa while wine arrived mostly from Italy and Spain.

¹⁴⁹ See Erdkamp (2005), 55-105 and 206-257, and Rathbone (2009), 322.

¹⁵⁰ See Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 332. Cf. also Geraghty (2007).

¹⁵¹ For example, many *negotiatores* and *publicani* in the cities of Asia Minor lost their wealth and their lives in the uprising incited by Mithridates in 88 BCE (*App. Mith.* 22-23).

part in the hands of Syrian and Alexandrian merchants who had large business establishments at Puteoli and catered to the needs of Rome and Italy (cf. Strabo 17.1.7).¹⁵²

Traders from Egypt imported to Italy linen, glass, wines, herbs, spices, cosmetics, and precious stones.¹⁵³ All these luxury goods were generally transported across the Mediterranean by the Alexandrian wheat fleet whose main task was to carry grain from Alexandria to Rome.¹⁵⁴ In Antiquity, cereals provided people with at least two-thirds of their calorie intake.¹⁵⁵ Since the importance of supplying the capital with enough grain was obvious to any emperor who wanted to maintain firm control over the city of Rome, the promotion of peaceful conditions for the wheat trade became both an important mechanism of self-preservation and yet another source of popularity for the princeps. The young Caesar's conquest of the vast portions of North Africa as well as his tight control over Egypt, where he seized all Cleopatra's estates, provided new, significant sources of grain supply and guaranteed an unprecedented level of food security for the inhabitants of Rome.¹⁵⁶ Soon after the capture of Alexandria, the young Caesar ordered the irrigation system of Egypt to be repaired and perhaps expanded to help produce even larger quantities of wheat (Suet. *Aug.* 18.2).¹⁵⁷ Although the city of Rome imported grain from different sources (cf. Plin. *HN* 18.12.66), it has been estimated that in the reign of Augustus

¹⁵² For details, see Ward (2003), 232, and Wardle (2014), 542.

¹⁵³ For Egyptian imports, see Johnson (1936), 1-7 and 241.

¹⁵⁴ For the sailing schedules of the wheat fleet, see Casson (1995), 297ff.

¹⁵⁵ For cereals as the staple of ancient diet, see Aldrete (1999), 172.

¹⁵⁶ See Garnsey (1988), 231.

¹⁵⁷ See also Dio Cass. 51.18.1; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 1.5; and Wardle (2014), 159. Cf. also Reinhold (1988), 145.

Egypt probably supplied around twenty percent of Rome's wheat.¹⁵⁸ No wonder this imperial province became one of the most carefully guarded, and the princeps was especially sensitive regarding inappropriate claims to authority there.¹⁵⁹

Despite large grain shipments from North Africa, there were still occasional wheat shortages in the capital. In fact, the state-sponsored system of grain imports could meet only a portion of the city's annual demand for cereals, and it was always supplemented by the free-market mechanisms. For instance, even the state wheat was processed and transported by private traders. In times of crisis, they demanded and received very substantial incentives to carry on their business (Suet. *Claud.* 18.2-19.1).¹⁶⁰ In 23 BCE, at the time of a severe grain shortage, the princeps bought and furnished a year's supply of supplementary wheat to approximately a quarter million of male citizens who were eligible for the grain dole (*RG* 15.1).¹⁶¹ Since the crisis continued the following year, the people asked Augustus to manage the city wheat supply, offering him the post of dictator twice and then a perpetual consulship.¹⁶² Having rejected both posts, the emperor resolved the crisis in a few days, perhaps buying up grain stocks hoarded by

¹⁵⁸ See Wardle (2014), 158. By the time of Emperor Vespasian (69-79 CE), Egypt probably satisfied around a third of the capital's grain needs. Josephus reports that Egyptian wheat fed Rome for four months and the grain for the capital for the other eight months was exclusively supplied by Africa (*BJ* 2.16.4.383 and 386). During the struggle against Vitellius, Vespasian even resorted to the strategy of trying to starve the capital out by his control of Egypt and North Africa (*Tac. Hist.* 2.82.3; 3.8.2; and 3.48.3).

¹⁵⁹ For details, see my discussion below in Gallus' case study.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Temin (2013), 32f.

¹⁶¹ See also Vell. Pat. 2.94.3 and Suet. *Tib.* 8.

¹⁶² These offers indicate that the crisis was quite serious. Augustus also had to postpone his trip to the East. Sattler (1960), 76, and Kienast (1999), 93, have suggested that the princeps himself caused the food shortages. To my mind, this is an empty speculation that lacks evidential argumentation from the primary sources.

speculators (*RG* 5.1-3 and Dio Cass. 54.1.1-4).¹⁶³ Whenever the Roman state experienced a shortfall in revenues and could not afford to pay for the public wheat distributions, Augustus simply made up the deficit himself. Hence, he provided supplementary distributions of grain from his own granaries or handed out money to people to buy wheat in 18 BCE, 2 BCE, and 6 CE (*RG* 18 and 15.4).¹⁶⁴

After the crisis of 22 BCE, the princeps appointed two ex-praetors to be chosen annually to oversee the distribution of the grain (Dio Cass. 54.1.4). Then, after the shortages of 6-9 CE, he finally set up a formal system to administer the supply of cereals at Rome, selecting two senior senators as officials who were responsible for acquisition and distribution of state grain (Dio Cass. 55.26.2 and 55.31.4). In the end, Augustus transferred their duties to an equestrian *praefectus annonae*, who was answerable to the emperor himself (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.7.2).¹⁶⁵ Since the individual allotment of five *modii* per month, or around 400 kilograms of wheat per year, was enough to feed two adults at subsistence level, it has been calculated that Rome needed around 240,000 metric tons of cereals per year. This required organizing, receiving, and processing a minimum of 1,000 shiploads of wheat and called for a wide access to grain markets all over the

¹⁶³ See Rich (1990), 172, and cf. *RG* 15.1; Vell. Pat. 2.89.5; Suet. *Aug.* 52; Dio Cass. 54.1.1-5; and Jer. *Ab Abr.* 24 BCE. Grain destined for Rome first arrived in Ostia, from where it was ferried to the capital on barges. Ostia had many large silos where the wheat could be stored to provide a buffer for the market. For details, see Temin (2013), 32. Since the curatorship of the grain-supply must have carried quasi-dictatorial powers anyway, the emperor was perhaps able to buy the wheat at lower prices. For details, see Judge (2008b), 118.

¹⁶⁴ See also Dio Cass. 55.26.3; 55.27.1; and 55.27.3 and cf. Suet. *Aug.* 41.2; Dio Cass. 55.31.3 and 56.12.1; and Wardle (2014), 313f.

¹⁶⁵ For details on the evolution of grain supply under Augustus, see Cooley (2009), 129, 171-174, and 181f.

Mediterranean.¹⁶⁶ Recently, a student of Roman economics has used regression analysis of wheat prices across the Mediterranean to demonstrate that the Early Roman Empire had an interconnected set of grain markets that extended from Egypt to Lusitania.¹⁶⁷ Augustus was well aware that providing a regular and consistent supply of cereals to the residents of the capital was the best way both to avert popular unrest and to augment his own popularity. In fact, the sophisticated administrative grain-supply system created by the young Caesar to feed the city of Rome worked so well that Tacitus acerbically remarks, “[The princeps] seduced the army with gifts, the people with grain, and everyone with the sweetness of peace” (*Ann.* 1.2.1).¹⁶⁸

A reliable supply of wheat to Rome and the flourishing of trade across the Mediterranean would have been impossible had not the emperor had a powerful navy that succeeded in bringing piracy under control. After Actium, Octavian retained a sizeable navy in permanent commission, with squadrons stationed as guards, couriers, and escorts at Rome and elsewhere along the coasts of the Mediterranean.¹⁶⁹ Whatever remained of Marcus Antonius’ fleet was sent with their crews to Fréjus (Forum Iulii) on the southern coast of Transalpine Gaul (*Tac. Ann.* 4.5.1). Keppie estimates the combined strength of the imperial navy at about fifteen to twenty thousand men, who operated between seventy-five and one hundred ships. While navy commanders were often hired from maritime Greek cities of the East, the crews were mostly enlisted from non-citizen

¹⁶⁶ See Aldrete (1999).

¹⁶⁷ See Temin (2013), 29-52.

¹⁶⁸ “... ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit....”

¹⁶⁹ Misenum and Ravenna became the main two naval bases (cf. *Tac. Ann.* 4.5.1).

provincials and some freedmen.¹⁷⁰ Two major naval bases were constructed at Cape Misenum, at the western end of the Bay of Naples, and at Ravenna, near the head of the Adriatic (Plin. *HN* 3.16.119 and Tac. *Ann.* 4.5.1).¹⁷¹ Smaller naval bases were also built on Corsica and Sardinia, at Ostia, Puteoli, Centumcellae, and the capital itself. In the East, three provincial fleets were stationed at Alexandria, where the triremes protected the Nile delta from which the wheat transports began their voyage to Rome, at Seleucia Pieria, in the Crimea, and on the northern coast of Asia Minor.¹⁷² The two bases at Cape Misenum and Ravenna housed two largest naval fleets: one patrolled the western Mediterranean and the coasts of Africa and Egypt, and the other operated in the Adriatic and the Aegean.¹⁷³

The main duties of the Roman fleets were to guard commerce, especially along the Italian coast, protect the grain supply flowing to the capital from Sicily, Sardinia, North Africa, and Egypt, transport troops going on campaigns, and keep piracy under control. In the thriving commercial ports of the Mediterranean, detachments of sailors and marines might have acted as a police force as there were no other units to assume this duty.¹⁷⁴ A large detachment of sailors from Misenum was also stationed at Rome, where it helped stage mock sea-battles (Tac. *Ann.*

¹⁷⁰ For instance, Tacitus reports that 6,000 Dalmatians were sent to the Ravenna fleet in the late 60s (*Hist.* 3.50). See also Keppie (1996), 383f., and Le Bohec (2001), 101. For different military ranks in the Roman navy, see Saddington (2007), 210-213, and Rankov (2007), 57f., who also gives a higher estimate of the overall strength of the Roman navy.

¹⁷¹ Cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 49.1 and Wardle (2014), 356.

¹⁷² In addition, there were also riverine fleets on the northern frontiers. For details, see Rankov (2007), and Saddington (2007), 208 and 213ff.

¹⁷³ See Keppie (1996), 383, and Rankov (2007), 55f.

¹⁷⁴ There is a debate as to whether Roman sailors also acted as a police force. For details, see Le Bohec (2001), 164.

12.56 and Suet. *Claud.* 21.6).¹⁷⁵ In most cases, a sizeable navy and astute trade policies enabled Augustus to keep piracy at check and promote the creation of vast maritime pan-Mediterranean trading networks that contributed to the explosive growth of travel and commerce.¹⁷⁶ However, as I demonstrate below, the princeps' claims to have achieved complete control over land and sea and to have fully eradicated piracy in the Mediterranean should at least be taken with a grain of salt, if not dismissed altogether as exaggerations.

Greatly magnifying his role in the suppression of piracy during the so-called "slave war" (*RG* 27.3), Augustus boasts, "I brought peace to the sea and cleared out pirates" (*RG* 25.1).¹⁷⁷ The ultimate irony of this claim is that the emperor refers to the conflict with Sextus Pompeius, son of Julius Caesar's antagonist Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus.¹⁷⁸ In 67 BCE, the father of the future "pirate" was empowered by the *lex Gabinia* to fight piracy across the whole Mediterranean; he supposedly eradicated it within forty or fifty days.¹⁷⁹ After the triumvirs proscribed Sextus Pompeius at the end of 40 BCE, he strengthened his hold on Sicily, which had served as one of the principal sources of wheat supply for Rome, and began to blockade all grain shipments to the

¹⁷⁵ Cf. also Saddington (2007), 209.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. pp. 243f. above, where I discuss the record growth of the number of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean basin.

¹⁷⁷ "Siciliam et Sardiniam occupatas bello servile reciperavi" (*RG* 27.3) and "Mare pacavi a praedonibus" (*RG* 25.1). It is significant that Livy (*Per.* 128.1); Horace (*Epod.* 4.19); and later Lucan (6.419-422) also refer to Sextus Pompeius as a brigand and pirate. For details, see Cooley (2009), 213f.

¹⁷⁸ The *Res Gestae* defines a conflict with Sextus Pompeius as a war (*bellum*) but fails to name Augustus' opponent by name (25.1 and 27.3). The young Caesar never mentions his Roman opponents in war by name, most conspicuously omitting Marcus Antonius' name.

¹⁷⁹ See Cic. *Leg. Man.* 35; 52-56; and Livy, *Per.* 99.3. Ridley (2003), 183-187, offers a cogent summary of all Augustus' distortions concerning his conflict with Sextus Pompeius.

capital. When grain riots erupted at Rome in 39 BCE, the triumvirs were forced to officially recognize Pompeius as equal and concede to him control of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Achaea for five years. In addition, they gave him an augurate and the right to seek and hold the consulship *in absentia*.¹⁸⁰ After his defeat at the Battle of Naulochus in 36 BCE, however, Pompeius withdrew to the East, where he was eventually captured and executed by Antonius' general named Marcus Titius (cos. suff. 31 BCE).¹⁸¹ Octavian's trusted general Agrippa played the decisive role in victory at Naulochus.¹⁸² Yet, in the aftermath of the battle, it was the young Caesar and not Agrippa to whom the Senate voted a golden statue with the following inscription: "Peace, long-disturbed, he re-established on land and sea" (App. *B Civ.* 5.130).¹⁸³ Subsequently, Octavian not only awarded himself with an ovation on the occasion of the end of the Sicilian War (Suet. *Aug.* 22) but also appropriated all the credit for the victory over Sextus Pompeius (*RG* 25.1 and 27.3).¹⁸⁴

Throughout the *Res Gestae*, the princeps presents the eradication of piracy as an important aspect of establishing and maintaining the *pax Augusta*, peace and prosperity achieved through

¹⁸⁰ By the Treaty of Puteoli, which Octavian himself signed, Sextus Pompeius was added to the Triumvirate as the fourth member, making it the Quattuorvirate. See Livy, *Per.* 127.5-128.1; Vell. Pat. 2.77.1-2; Suet. *Aug.* 16.1; Plut. *Ant.* 32.1-5; App. *B Civ.* 5.67-74; and Dio Cass. 48.31.1-6 and 48.36.1-48.38.3.

¹⁸¹ See Livy, *Per.* 129.1 and 131.1; Vell. Pat. 2.79.5-6; App. *B Civ.* 5.133-144; Dio Cass. 49.17.1-49.18.6; and Chapter IV, pp. 349f.

¹⁸² See my discussion of Octavian's role in the Battle of Naulochus above, pp. 218ff.

¹⁸³ "Τὴν εἰρήνην ἔστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν." Cf. also Zanker (1988), 41f., and footnotes nos. 54, 110, and 185.

¹⁸⁴ For the ovation, see also *RG* 4.1; App. *B Civ.* 5.130; and the *Fasti Triumphales Capitolini* for 36 BCE: "imp. Caesar divi f. C. f. II, IIIvir r. p. c. II, ovans ex Sicilia idibus Novembr" (EJ, 34).

military victory. He claims to have often conducted wars by land and sea” and “achieved peace by victories on land and sea (*RG* 3.1; 4.2; and 13).¹⁸⁵ By the time of the Late Republic, the Roman aristocracy constructed an ideology of war and peace according to which all of Rome’s foreign wars were just and undertaken with the purpose of either defending allies or responding to an act of aggression. The reestablishment of peace that benefited the Romans and their allies became the often declared aim of such wars.¹⁸⁶ Thus, the concept of pacification through an act of putting down of all that might imperil peace and tranquility appealed to the Roman governing elite, which viewed *pacatio/pacificatio* and *victoria* as closely related to each other. For instance, Cicero describes Macedonia as having been “pacified by many victories and triumphs” (*Prov. cons.* 4).¹⁸⁷ Similarly, Julius Caesar repeatedly marks his progress through Gaul by describing part or all of the territory as “pacified” by his victories.¹⁸⁸

Imitating Alexander the Great and Hellenistic rulers as well as Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (*Cic. Balb.* 6.16) and Julius Caesar (*Dio Cass.* 44.49.2), Augustus also portrays himself as the champion of civilization who defeated chaos in battle and restored a proper order by establishing

¹⁸⁵ “Bella terra et mari... saepe gessi” (*RG* 3.1), “Ob res a me aut per legatos meos auspiciis meis terra marique prospere gestas” (*RG* 4.2), and “... terra marique esset parta victoriis pax” (*RG* 13). See also Livy 1.19.3; Suet. *Aug.* 22; App. *B Civ.* 5.130; and Wardle (2014), 182.

¹⁸⁶ For details, see Rich (2003 and 2008).

¹⁸⁷ “Multis victoriis... triumphisque pacata.” For a useful discussion of Cicero’s understanding of peace and security, including his concept of the “*cum dignitate otium*” (*Sest.* 98), see de Souza (2008), 78f.

¹⁸⁸ See *B Gall.* 2.34.1; 3.7.1; 4.37.1; 6.5.1; and 7.65.4. Cf. also Rich (2003), 333, and Barton (2007), 248. At the same time, Caesar is cautious to always claim that his attacks on different Celtic and Germanic tribes are a result of his commitment to defending the territories of Rome and its allies as well as his desire to reach a secure and honorable peace. For details, see, for example, *B Gall.* 1.13-14; 1.35-46; and 2.12-15.

and maintaining the universal peace and prosperity on land and sea (*RG* 3.1-2).¹⁸⁹ Momigliano conjectures that the requirement for “peace created through victories on land and sea” mentioned by the emperor in the *Res Gestae* 13 was a part of the traditional ancient formula for closing the gates of Janus in 29 and 25 BCE.¹⁹⁰ Thus, it becomes important that the translator of the Greek version of the *Res Gestae* 13 chooses to paraphrase the passage and leave out the explicitly militaristic phrase “*parta victoriis pax*.”¹⁹¹ At the same time, Momigliano suggests that the young Caesar, who was always preoccupied with augmenting his *virtus*, perhaps gave a new meaning to the concept of the *εἰρηνοποιός/pacator* and made it one of the important credentials of the Roman princeps.¹⁹²

In the *Res Gestae* 25-33, Augustus, who openly boasts about his military exploits and the suppression of piracy throughout the Mediterranean, in fact elaborates on the claim to the world conquest he makes in the heading of the work (*RG* Heading).¹⁹³ The princeps himself as well as Augustan and post-Augustan literary and epigraphic sources I discuss below assert that piracy

¹⁸⁹ “*Bella terra et mari civilia externaque toto in orbe terrarum saepe gessi, victorque omnibus veniam petentibus civibus peperci. Externas gentes, quibus tuto ignosci potuit, conservare quam excidere malui.*” For details, see Braund (1993), 201-204. On the princeps’ deep interest in Alexander as a model, see Gruen (1985), 68-72, and Gurval (1995), 71-74.

¹⁹⁰ “*Ianum Quirinum, quem clausum esse maiores nostri voluerunt, cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax, cum, priusquam nascerer, a condita urbe bis omnino clausum fuisse prodatur memoriae, ter me principe senatus claudendum esse censuit*” (*RG* 13). See Momigliano (1942), 63, and cf. de Souza (2008). Cooley (2009), 159f., and Wardle (2014), 181f., offer useful discussions of whether the gates of Janus were closed twice or three times during the reign of Augustus.

¹⁹¹ See Cooley (2009), 158.

¹⁹² For details, see Momigliano (1942), 63f., who also provides an exhaustive list of primary sources.

¹⁹³ “*Rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit...*” For details, see Cooley (2009), 28, 36f., and 218f.

and brigandage were eradicated once and for all. However, incidental primary evidence suggests that this was not necessarily the case.¹⁹⁴ For instance, when Judaea came under direct Roman rule in 6 CE, Judas the Galilaeen organized a major anti-Roman rebellion (Joseph *BJ* 2.8.1.117-118).¹⁹⁵ Similarly, the advent of piratical enterprises that thrived on Sardinia reached major proportions by 6 CE (Dio Cass. 55.28.1), and there must have been similar developments in Cilicia and Pamphylia.¹⁹⁶ Dio Cassius reports that the Isaurian marauding expeditions reached the level of a full-scale war in 6 CE (55.28.3).¹⁹⁷ From a Latin inscription of similar date, we also know that an Augustan military officer named Q. Aemilius Secundus was sent by Sulpicius Quirinius, the Augustus' legate in Syria, to fight the Ituraeans of Mount Lebanon and succeeded in capturing their fortress (*ILS* 2683). All this indicates that even though we lack specific information on piratical activities in the East during the Augustan Principate, this cannot necessarily be ascribed to a lack of pirates themselves.¹⁹⁸

Thus, it is even more significant that many members of the provincial elites were willing to support the princeps' novel construct of reality. A very large group of the Pax cistophori minted

¹⁹⁴ Cf. de Souza (1999), 179-195, who discusses different instances of piracy after Pompeius' anti-piracy campaign of 67 BCE, the campaign that supposedly eliminated all the pirates once and for all.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. also Joseph *BJ* 2.17.1.433-434; 7.7.1.253; *AJ* 18.1.1.4-9; and Smallwood (2015), 152-156.

¹⁹⁶ For a long history of brigandage in Sardinia, see Varro *Rust.* 1.16.2; Livy 40.34.13; and Tac. *Ann.* 2.85.4. Cf. also Swan (2004), 189f.

¹⁹⁷ For details, see *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁹⁸ In a way of comparison, we know that Cicero's punitive expeditions against the brigands, especially in mountainous terrain with no roads, were utterly ineffective. See the case study of Cicero's exploits in Cilicia above, p. 115. On Cilician piracy, see de Souza (1999), 97-178. Similarly, Braund (1993) demonstrates that Augustus and his successors controlled piracy but were unable to suppress it completely.

in 28 BCE in Asia Minor, most likely at the mint of Ephesus, depicts the young Caesar as the peacemaker. The obverse bears the laureled head of the victorious young Caesar turned right and surrounded by an inscription: “*Imperator* Caesar, son of the god, consul six times, defender of the liberty of the Roman people.”¹⁹⁹ The reverse portrays the figure of Pax standing turned half-left on *parazonium*, which is the symbol of military courage, and holding short caduceus in the right hand. The word *PAX* is to the left of the figure, and snake emerging from cista mystica is to the right; the whole is in laurel wreath.²⁰⁰ Similarly, an inscription from Myra in Lycia hails the princeps as the absolute master of land and sea (*IGRRP* III.719), and the province of Baetica dedicates a gold statue in Rome to Augustus because “through his help and constant concern the province has been pacified” (*ILS* 103).²⁰¹

Augustan and post-Augustan authors carried on the tradition of applying the princeps’ conceptions of *pacatio/pacificatio*, *victoria*, and the *pax Augusta* to describe the then contemporary conditions of the Roman world. For instance, Velleius Paterculus asserts that Augustus “pacified the world by his victories” (2.89.6).²⁰² Similar sentiments can be discerned within Paterculus’ discourse on the blessings of Tiberius’ reign (14-37 CE), especially when the author talks about the universal diffusion of the Augustan peace and the complete eradication of

¹⁹⁹ “IMP•CAESAR•DIVI•F•COS•VI•LIBERTATIS•P•R•VINDEXT,” border of dots.

²⁰⁰ See *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 112, nos. 691-693, and pl. 17, no. 4; *RIC*², 79, no. 476, and pl. 8, no. 476; and Sutherland (1970), 12ff., 40-44, 85-90, and 114, and pls. 1 and 2.

²⁰¹ “Θεόν Σεβαστόν θεοῦ υἱόν Καίσαρα αὐτοκράτορα γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης...” (*IGRRP* III.719 = *EJ*, 72, no. 72). Cf. also *IGRRP* III.718 and III.721. “Imp. Caesari Augusto p. p. Hispania ulterior Baetica, quod beneficio eius et perpetua cura provincia pacata est” (*ILS* 103).

²⁰² “Bella sub imperatore gesta pacatusque victoriis terrarum orbis.” Cf. also *Vell. Pat.* 2.90.1 and 2.91.1, where the author discusses the pacification of the West, including Dalmatia, the Alps, and Spain, and above, pp. 251ff.

brigandage (2.126.3).²⁰³ The same theme can also be found in Livy (1.19.3) and Suetonius (*Aug.* 22).²⁰⁴ Augustus was unable to completely eradicate piracy and brigandage, but he succeeded in keeping them at check, thus promoting the creation of vast maritime pan-Mediterranean trading networks that contributed to the explosive growth of travel and commerce throughout the Roman Empire. As a result, many primary literary and epigraphic sources of the time generally *recognize* the Augustan reign as the period of universal peace, security, and prosperity. For instance, Strabo, who describes the trade activities between Spain and Italy, comments on the absence of pirates and praises peace the sailors enjoy (3.2.5), and Horace confidently includes the Augustan maritime peace among more familiar imperial achievements (*Carm.* 4.5.17-20).²⁰⁵

After the death of the princeps, post-Augustan authors carried on the tradition of applying the conception of the *pax Augusta* to maritime conditions. In his embellished laudation of the emperor, Philo claims that Augustus not only abolished hidden wars that resulted from the raids of pirates but also succeeded in clearing the sea from pirate ships and filling it with merchant vessels” (Philo *Leg.* 146). Bemoaning the lack of maritime exploration of his world, Pliny the Elder complains that in times of blessed peace most people undertake voyages at sea, which is wide open and offers hospitable reception on all its shores, in order to make profit, not gain knowledge (*HN* 2.45.117-118). Even Epictetus, who rarely praises emperors, concedes that

²⁰³ “Diffusa in orientis occidentisque tractus et quidquid meridiano aut septentrione finitur, pax augusta omnis terrarum orbis angulos a latrociniorum metu servat immunes.” To my best knowledge, this is the only occurrence of the phrase “pax augusta” in a literary source.

²⁰⁴ “Post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta” (Livy 1.19.3) and “terra marique pace parta” (Suet. *Aug.* 22).

²⁰⁵ “Πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ ἡ νῦν εἰρήνη, τῶν ληστηρίων καταλυθέντων, ὥσθ’ ἡ σύμπασα ὑπάρχει ῥαστώνη τοῖς πλοῖζομένοις” (Strabo 3.2.5) and “Tutus bos etenim rura perambulat, / nutrit rura Ceres almaque Faustitas, / pacatum volitant per mare navitae, / culpari metuit fides” (Hor. *Carm.* 4.5.17-20). Cf. also Prop. 3.4.1 and 3.11.59.

Augustus secured a profound peace, suppressed brigandage and piracy, and enabled safe sailing from sunrise to sunset (*Discourses* 3.13.9).²⁰⁶ Finally, Suetonius shares the charming story about the Alexandrian merchants and sailors who encountered the princeps sailing past the bay of Puteoli and enthusiastically made an offering to him, praising the emperor for their freedom and good fortune (Suet. *Aug.* 98.2).²⁰⁷ Thanks to the *pax Augusta* secured by the princeps, the Alexandrians delivered their cargo safely and gainfully, having been spared from being captured by the pirates, who could have sold them into slavery and taken possession of all their assets.²⁰⁸ Wardle points out that every element in Suetonius' description of the encounter underlines the religious context.²⁰⁹ In fact, a sacred precinct commemorating the princeps' disembarkation was even erected in Alexandria (Philo *Leg.* 150-151).

In response to being praised by the Alexandrian merchants and sailors, Augustus distributed forty aurei (4,000 sesterces) among his companions and instructed them to buy goods from the Alexandrians.²¹⁰ In the world where 480 sesterces would feed a family at subsistence level for one year and 900 sesterces was the annual pay of a legionary soldier, 4,000 sesterces was a very

²⁰⁶ For Epictetus' attitude to the imperial government, see Millar (1965), who discusses how subversive the political aspect of philosopher's teaching actually was. Cf. also Plut. *De tranq. anim.* 9, where Antipater of Tarsus remarks on how the sea allows people to sail in any direction without fear.

²⁰⁷ See above, p. 241. I use this anecdote as the launchpad for my current discussion that links the thriving Mediterranean trade, the emergence of an interconnected set of grain markets that extended from Egypt to Lusitania and provided the capital with a regular and consistent supply of grain, and Augustus' success in keeping at check the Mediterranean piracy.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Braund (1993), 200; Hopkins (2000), 260; and Wardle (2014), 543.

²⁰⁹ See Wardle (2014), 542f.

²¹⁰ "Qua re admodum exhilaratus quadragenos aureos comitibus divisit iusque iurandum et cautionem exegit a singulis, non alio datam summam quam in emptionem Alexandrinarum mercium absumpturos" (Suet. *Aug.* 98.2).

significant sum of money, even when divided among Augustus' companions.²¹¹ More importantly, gold was a prestige currency: as a store of value, not only was it used to pay for high-value luxuries, but it also spoke of a very high status of the payer.²¹² Three interrelated questions can be raised. First, what were the sources of Augustus' extraordinary wealth? Second, how did he spend his money? Third, what happened when tremendous amounts of money were pumped into the economy? The Appendix to the *Res Gestae* is not a part of Augustus' own composition, but it provides a summary of his expenditure from which one can learn that the total amount of money the emperor spent on largesse to the Roman state, his fellow citizens, and discharged soldiers was equal to astounding 2,400 million sesterces (*RG* Appendix 1).²¹³ The sums he spent on construction projects, games and shows, crisis relief, and private benefactions, including topping up the census qualification of individual senators, is said to have been incalculable (*RG* Appendix 4). This alone suggests that Augustus had more money than all the members of the Senate put together, and he was more solvent than the Roman state itself.²¹⁴

Nicolaus of Damascus and Suetonius report that Julius Caesar bequeathed three-fourth of his estate to Octavian (*Nic. Dam.* 17 and *Iul.* 83.2). This money must have served as the foundation for the young Caesar's vast fortune, even though it is unclear how much of Caesar's money he

²¹¹ Cf. 1,000-sesterces gifts the emperor gave to his dinner guests (*Suet. Aug.* 71.4). Hopkins (1978), 41 and 39, n. 52, calculates that 4.8 million sesterces will be generally enough to feed 10,000 families for one year. Cf. also *Idem* (2000), 265. Campbell (1984), 161ff., provides different tiers of pay in the Augustan army.

²¹² Cf. Hopkins (2000), 265f., and Wardle (2014), 543.

²¹³ "Summa pecuniae, quam dedit vel in aerarium vel plebei Romanae vel dimissis militibus: denarium sexiens milliens." Although this amount does not match exactly the sum of individual expenditures recorded in the *Res Gestae*, the discrepancy can be explained in a number of ways. For details, see Cooley (2009), 276.

²¹⁴ See Judge (2000), 124f., and (2008), 119f.

was actually able to get from Marcus Antonius in the first place (App. *B Civ.* 3.20).²¹⁵ If we are to believe Appian, M. Antonius and unnamed litigants seized most of Julius Caesar's properties in Rome (*B Civ.* 3.22.1). However, the young Caesar had also inherited a wide range of dictator's properties elsewhere, and Syme argues that Octavian not only obtained vast sums from Julius Caesar's friends and freedmen but also got his hands on the funds Caesar had amassed for his campaigns as well as on the annual tribute from the Eastern provinces.²¹⁶ Cicero (*Phil.* 3.2.3) and Augustus himself (Suet. *Aug.* 101.3) claim that most of Julius Caesar's inheritance was sold and the proceeds spent on the *res publica*, but this claim is an exaggeration.²¹⁷ Later, as one of the triumvirs, Octavian supplemented his fortune through proscriptions, confiscations, and new taxes.²¹⁸ After capturing Alexandria in 30 BCE, the young Caesar seized enormous booty, including the royal treasury, where Cleopatra had deposited all the offerings plundered from Egyptian temples; this enabled him to repay all his loans promptly (Suet. *Aug.* 41.1 and Dio Cass. 51.17.6-7).²¹⁹ In addition, Octavian received large sums of money from wealthy

²¹⁵ Lucius Pinarius Scarpus and Quintus Pedius (cos. suff. 43 BCE), who were probably nephews of Julius Caesar, not grandnephews as Suetonius claims, each received one-eighth of Caesar's estate (Suet. *Iul.* 83.2). However, Pedius renounced the inheritance in favor of Octavian, perhaps in exchange for the consulship of 43 BCE.

²¹⁶ See Syme (1939), 130f., and cf. Shatzman (1975), 356.

²¹⁷ See Wardle (2014), 564. "C. Caesar adulescens..., firmissimum exercitum ex invicto genere veteranorum militum comparavit patrimoniumque suum effudit: quamquam non sum usus eo verbo, quo debui; non enim effudit; in salute rei publicae collocavit" (Cic. *Phil.* 3.2.3) and "cum duobus paternis patrimoniis ceterisque hereditatibus in rem p. absumpsisset" (Suet. *Aug.* 101.3).

²¹⁸ See Syme (1939), 187 and 193-196. However, as I demonstrate below, Nicolet (1980), 204, is plainly wrong when he claims that Octavian's purse was "filled essentially by the proceeds of civil war."

²¹⁹ Syme (1939), 130f., discusses some of Octavian's early financiers.

Alexandrians accused of cooperating with Marcus Antonius; other wealthy citizens of the city were forced to pay the 66.67% capital levy on the property (Dio Cass. 51.17.7).²²⁰

Subsequently, a significant part of Augustus' income must have come from testamentary bequests of countless wealthy Romans who were leaving a portion of their estates to the emperor.²²¹ The princeps reveals in his will that he inherited 1,400 million sesterces during the last twenty years of his reign (Suet. *Aug.* 101.3), and Shatzman persuasively argues that the legacies of the first half of Augustus' life by far exceeded this sum.²²² For instance, Virgil bequeathed Augustus a quarter of his estate (Donat. *Vit. Verg.* 37); Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa handed down to him most of his assets (Dio Cass. 54.29.5); Gaius Maecenas bequeathed the emperor all his possessions with a few minor reservations (Dio Cass. 55.7.5); Herod the Great left him ten million drachmas, gold and silver vessels, and expensive garments (Joseph *AJ* 17.190); and even proverbially cruel and cunning Vedius Pollio left the princeps some properties (Dio Cass. 54.23.1-6).²²³ Interestingly, Valerius Maximus vilifies Titus Marius of Urbinum for declaring on multiple occasions that he would leave his fortune to Augustus but failing even to

²²⁰ Reinhold (1988), 144f., compares this levy to the triumvirs' capital levy of the same percentage exacted during the proscriptions of 42 BCE (Dio Cass. 47.17.1-2) and the 12.5% levy on the property of freedmen in 32 BCE (Dio Cass. 51.3.3).

²²¹ Suetonius says, "Exegit et ipse in vicem ab amicis benivolentiam mutuam, tam a defunctis quam a vivis" (*Aug.* 66.4). Millar (1977), 153-158, discusses the significance of inheritances and legacies as an important source of imperial income in the world where wealth could not be easily increased. Augustus himself set exemplary rules for the imperial practice of receiving inheritances. For details, see Wardle (2014), 431ff.

²²² See Shatzman (1975), 367.

²²³ In addition, Herod left five million pieces of silver to Livia (Joseph *AJ* 17.190), and Herod's sister, Salome, bequeathed land to Augustus' wife (Joseph *AJ* 18.31). Later, Augustus gave the money back to Herod's sons, keeping only the vessels as tokens of Herod's friendship (Joseph *AJ* 17.323).

mention the emperor in his will (7.8.6). Finally, the emperor also coined into money some eighty silver statues of himself that had been erected in Rome by Greek dedicators.²²⁴

Money was the major means of political patronage in Rome, and Augustus wisely used his extraordinary wealth to acquire political clout and augment his *auctoritas*.²²⁵ The princeps was willing to spend liberally his own funds, repeatedly assuming responsibility for many diverse activities that ultimately benefited numerous residents of the empire and affected all areas of life in Rome and the provinces. In the very beginning of his career, Octavian recruited an army based on his own deliberation and at private expense (*RG* 1.1).²²⁶ From the triumviral period until his death, around 500,000 legionaries gave an oath of allegiance to the princeps. All these men not only were paid regularly throughout their military service but also were either allotted plots of land or paid the *praemia* upon discharge (*RG* 3.3).²²⁷ According to Campbell's calculations, Augustus could have spent between 350 and 380 million sesterces a year to finance the army alone. The total expenditure included paying between twenty-five and twenty-eight legions (*Tac. Ann.* 4.5.1-3), various urban troops, and roughly 150,000 auxiliary troops (cf. *Tac.*

²²⁴ See *RG* 24.2; *Suet. Aug.* 52; and *Dio Cass.* 53.22.3. The *Res Gestae* and Suetonius maintain that the proceeds were used to dedicate gold tripods to Palatine Apollo, perhaps a form of a temple private deposit. See Duncan-Jones (1994), 9. Since a large number of statues made of precious metal brought to mind a type of honor offered to Hellenistic kings (*Plin. HN* 33.54.151), Augustus promptly melted them down. See Stewart (2003), 172f. While Suetonius' phrasing suggests the emperor's refusal of ruler cult in Rome, Dio Cassius claims that Augustus used this money to finance road-building. See Cooley (2009), 212, and cf. Wardle (2014), 371ff.

²²⁵ According to Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1917), 99, a savvy politician makes his schemes "rotate": "the prince... seeks to command in order to enrich himself, and to enrich himself in order to command."

²²⁶ "Annos undeviginti natus exercitum privata consilio et privata impensa comparavi...."

²²⁷ Brunt (1971a), 339, cogently demonstrates that Augustus must have excluded from his total of 500,000 men around 150,000 legionary soldiers who were in service in 14 CE. Brunt also estimates troops' wastage at two-fifth of all serving men or roughly two percent a year.

Ann. 4.5.4) as well as providing the *praemia* to discharged legionaries, praetorians, and *auxilia*.²²⁸ However, it is important to keep in mind that these were nominal expenses. The actual monetary expenditure was probably much lower because the soldiers not only had to pay for their food and clothes but were also charged for weapons, equipment, and even camp celebrations.²²⁹

The *Res Gestae* 15-24 gives a long list of Augustus' personal *impensae*: the emperor used his wealth to give copious donations to the people of Rome and his veterans (*RG* 15.1-18); he carried out numerous building projects and sponsored games and spectacles (*RG* 19.1-23); and he restored ornaments to temples in Asia and offered bounteous gifts to the gods (*RG* 24.1-2).²³⁰ The princeps, who distributed money to the *plebs frumentaria* on at least six different occasions and to his veterans at least once (*RG* 15.3), remained the most generous giver of *congiaria* until the reign of Hadrian (117-138).²³¹ Between 7 and 2 BCE, Augustus spent about 400 million sesterces to pay cash rewards to retiring legionaries, and in 6 CE he paid an additional 170

²²⁸ See Campbell (1984), 162f. The cost of the imperial fleets and the salary of senior officers are not included in these calculations. There is also a lively debate as to how much the auxiliaries earned. For details, see Le Bohec (2001), 211. Hopkins (1980), 116f. and 124f., estimates army expenditure at between 395 and 495 million sesterces a year, including the cost of the imperial fleets.

²²⁹ For details, see Herz (2007).

²³⁰ All the references in the *Res Gestae* to the sums of money the emperor expended concern his own finances, not the regular income and expenditure of the *res publica*. See Millar (1977), 191.

²³¹ See Wardle (2014), 311f., with a convenient table on page 312. In 29 BCE, the young Caesar gave a donative of 1,000 sesterces to each soldier who had been with him at Alexandria (*RG* 15.3 and Dio Cass. 51.17.8) and an additional handout to about 120,000 retired veterans, many of whom were Marcus Antonius' retired legionaries. For details, see Keppie (1983), 74f. Cf. also Reinhold (1988), 144f.

million sesterces to establish the *aerarium militare* (*RG* 16.2 and 17.2).²³² On four different occasions, the princeps deposited his own money to the treasury (*RG* 17.1), and the circumstances of three instances can be identified.²³³ Once, the funds were used to organize the *ludi Actiaci* in 28 BCE (*RG* 9.1 and Dio Cass. 53.2.1).²³⁴ The second time, the emperor paid for repaving the Flaminian Way (*RG* 20.5). The third time, in 12 BCE, he helped the province of Asia stricken by an earthquake to pay its annual tribute (Dio Cass. 54.30.3). Finally, Augustus liberally gave money to build temples, fora, theaters, and porticoes; to repair existing shrines, theaters, aqueducts, and roads; to stage games and shows; to support colonies, municipalities, and towns in times of emergency; and to help his friends and senators. These gifts are not recorded in the *Res Gestae* but are mentioned in the Appendix, which was probably penned in the Greek-speaking East for a provincial audience (*RG* Appendix 2-4).²³⁵

It is significant that Augustus repeatedly made gifts of money to senators to either make up their census qualifications or encourage them to hold certain offices or promote his laws about morals and marriage. For example, the emperor gave 1,000,000 sesterces to Marcius Hortalus (*PIR*² H210), grandson of the famous orator Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, to induce him to get married and raise children and thus prevent the extinction of a distinguished family (*Tac. Ann.*

²³² Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 49.2; Dio Cass. 54.25.5-6 and 55.24.9; Rich (1990), 203f.; Swan (2004), 172f.; Cooley (2009), 176-181; and Wardle (2014), 359f. Keppie (1983), 208, estimates that the sum of 400 million sesterces represents payments in the amount of 12,000 sesterces to approximately 30,000 veterans.

²³³ See Speidel (2000), 146f.

²³⁴ Cf. also Gurval (1995), 120-123, who questions the association of the games with Actium.

²³⁵ See Cooley (2009), 276.

2.37.1).²³⁶ Similarly, the princeps distributed a thousand sesterces for each son or daughter to the ordinary people of Italy as long as they could provide proof of children (Suet. *Aug.* 46). Suetonius does not specify whether this was regular practice by Augustus every time he went on an inspection tour through Italy or a one-time deal. However, this is not such an impossible proposition, especially taking into consideration the emperor's well-known munificence attested by other sources and his probable desire to promote his laws about morals and marriage and enhance the patron-client relationship between himself and the people.²³⁷

After capturing Alexandria, the young Caesar not only paid back all his loans and remunerated the legions but also gave large sums of money to the senators and equites who had fought in the war against Marcus Antonius (Dio Cass. 51.17.8). In 28 BCE, he augmented the personal wealth of some senators to bring them up to meet the census requirement of 400,000 sesterces introduced the previous year (Dio Cass. 53.2.1 and 54.17.3).²³⁸ During the second revision of the Senate in 18 BCE, the princeps increased the minimum property requirement for potential senators to 1,000,000 sesterces, perhaps to produce greater stratification between senators and equites (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.33.3). However, he again topped up the estates of some loyal senators to help them meet the new obligation (Dio Cass. 54.17.3 and 54.26.3).²³⁹ Finally,

²³⁶ For a long time, the transmitted Tacitean "Marci" was thought to be the genitive of the praenomen "Marcus." However, a fragment of the *Fasti Fratrum Arvalium* that records a certain "[.] Marcius Hortalus" as praetor peregrinus in 25 CE (*AÉ* 1987, no. 163) as well as other epigraphic evidence suggests that the "Marci" is the genitive of the *nomen gentile* of "Marcius." In order to call attention to his relationship to Augustus, Hortalus bore the family name of his grandmother. For details, see Corbier (1991); Briscoe (1993); and Eck (1993).

²³⁷ Cf. Wardle (2014), 345f.

²³⁸ For details, see Rich (1990), 133 and 194. Cf. also *RG* 8.2; Dio Cass. 54.26.3; and Cooley (2009), 138f.

²³⁹ For details, see Rich (1990), 194 and 204. Cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 41.1 and Wardle (2014), 311.

in 4 CE the emperor not only gave money to young senators and equites so that they could make up the census qualifications but also increased the wealth of more than eighty of them to 1,200,000 sesterces (Dio Cass. 55.13.3 and 6).²⁴⁰ In his usual manner, Tacitus links the bestowal of wealth upon the *nobiles* to their readiness for servitude (*Ann.* 1.2.1).²⁴¹ However, the considerable sums of money Augustus spent on individual aristocrats were supposed to bolster the equestrian and senatorial orders and enable their members to hold magistracies that required putting on games or engaging in other major expenditures.²⁴²

According to Judge, the amounts of money Augustus handed out to individual people greatly surpassed the scale of most government welfare programs today. Such largesse was meant to demonstrate inexhaustibility of the emperor's financial resources and prove that he was more solvent than the Roman state itself.²⁴³ Hence, one can ask: What happened to the Roman economy when vast amounts of money were pumped into it on regular basis? Basic economics states that if a quantity of money supplied increases, one of the two (or both) phenomena is likely to occur: (1) monetary inflation and/or (2) increase in production to accommodate the increased demand from consumers with money for desirables and luxuries.²⁴⁴ Indeed, ancient sources

²⁴⁰ According to Rich (1990), the third revision of the Senate membership happened in 4 CE. Cf. also Swan (2004), 144ff., and Talbert (1984), 52.

²⁴¹ "... ceteri nobilium, quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus et honoribus extollerentur...."

²⁴² Cf. Dio Cass. 48.53.4; 49.16.2; 53.2.2; 54.11.1; and 55.24.9. See also Cavallaro (1984), 217f.; Nicolet (1985), 94f.; and Rich (1990), 133f.

²⁴³ See Judge (2000), 124f., and (2008), 119.

²⁴⁴ According to Belke (2009), 349, "Sustained money growth in excess of the growth of output, adjusted for the trend change in income velocity of money, produces inflation. For ending inflation, money growth must be brought in line with the growth rate of real output, adjusted for the trend change in velocity."

confirm that when money supply increased in 29 BCE, prices went up as well. Suetonius says that Octavian used the spoils from Egypt to mint so many coins that interest rates in Rome were reduced and land prices across Italy increased (*Aug.* 41.1).²⁴⁵ Dio Cassius concurs, informing us that the prices for goods increased at Rome while the interest rates on loans dropped from 12% to 4% (51.21.5).²⁴⁶

In order to retire Marcus Antonius' veterans and pay the army, Octavian needed to strike coins. In addition, he was in need of coins to give the large sums of money to the senators and equites who had fought in the war against Marcus Antonius (Dio Cass. 51.17.8). Since many of the retired veterans required land and Roman aristocracy valued land assets as the a source of prestige and power, increased demand for land led to rising real estate prices. Not unlike many other aristocracies of pre-industrial agrarian societies, the Roman upper crust looked down on trade and merchants, displaying--at least publicly--open hostility toward entrepreneurial activities as a source of income.²⁴⁷ Roman history is full of stories about the *nobiles* working on and deriving profit from their own land, and treatises on agriculture and morality present landowning as the safest and most honorable occupation.²⁴⁸ Apart from a well-known fictional

²⁴⁵ In addition to seizing the royal treasury, the young Caesar confiscated two-thirds of the property of wealthiest citizens of Alexandria and penalized financially those who had cooperated with Marcus Antonius (Dio Cass. 51.17.7). Cf. also footnote n. 220 above.

²⁴⁶ Reinhold (1988), 156, is perhaps correct to view Dio's over exactness as a response to inflationary pressures of his own times. Cf. also Oros. 6.19.19.

²⁴⁷ In the late third century BCE, Quintus Claudius (trib. 218 BCE) carried the *lex Claudia*: it prohibited senators and sons of senators from owning ships that could carry more than 300 amphorae (Livy 21.63.3). Although this resulted in the official withdrawal of the *nobiles* from purely commercial enterprises, the law was mostly ignored in Cicero's times (*Verr.* II.5.18.45).

²⁴⁸ The theme first emerges in Cato's *De agricultura* and is later picked up in Cicero's *De officiis* and Varro's *De re rustica*. As late as 50s CE, Columella still vigorously insists on the pre-eminence of agriculture over any other economical activity.

example of Trimalchio, the freedman merchant turned landowner, we know about Lucius Tarius Rufus (cos. suff. 16 BCE), a military officer of humble origin who earned a large fortune and consulship by his dedication to Augustus. After accumulating an enormous 100 million sesterces, he invested the whole sum into buying up agricultural land in Picenum and farming it himself (Plin. *HN* 18.7.37).²⁴⁹

Yet, the increase in monetary inflation appears to have been short lived. Most students of Roman economy agree that long-term prices for goods remained stable in the Late Republic and Early Empire, with inflation averaging less than one percent a year.²⁵⁰ The Roman government, which was interested in monetary stability, carefully maintained the weight and relative value of bronze and silver coins in order to offset any negative effects of a changing ratio on the bimetallic currency.²⁵¹ Temin astutely points out,

Assume that the [Roman] government minted more denarii or debased existing denarii if it needed more resources in a hurry when it ran short. This rule does not require the emperor to think about the price level at all; he simply looked at his own demand for money. As the Pax Romana expanded and more people used currency based on the denarius, the emperor found that he was losing his currency to the provinces. He minted more money to keep up with his own demand.... We presume that this did not lead to a general inflation because the demand for money was rising fast enough at the time to absorb the increase in the number of denarii in circulation.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ “L. Tarius Rufus infima natalium humilitate consulatum militari industria meritis, antiquae alias parsimoniae, circiter |m| HS. liberalitate divi Augusti congestorum usque ad detrectationem heredis exhausit agros in Piceno coemendo colendoque in gloriam.” Cf. also Syme (1986), 223f.

²⁵⁰ For a very useful discussion, see Temin (2013), 70-91.

²⁵¹ See Lo Cascio (1981), 85.

²⁵² Temin (2013), 82.

Temin's analysis builds upon the famous taxes and trade theory Hopkins formulated in the 1980s.²⁵³ It postulates that imposition of money taxes and money rents in the Early Empire created a monetary circuit whereby wealth was first extracted from interior provinces and then re-distributed in Rome, Italy, and the imperial provinces, where it was used to support court and administrative expenditure as well as to pay the Roman legions stationed on the frontiers. Since the tax-exporting provinces needed to earn money before they could pay the taxes, they were compelled to export their goods. The transfer of money from the internal provinces to Rome and then from Rome to the imperial provinces increased monetization and commercialization of the Roman Empire and contributed to the gradual creation of complex networks of trade throughout the Mediterranean and urbanization of the western half of the empire. With "the city of Rome serving as the main engine driving the Roman monetary economy toward growth and integration..., the Roman empire could achieve modest, though significant, economic growth."²⁵⁴

The ever-increasing demand for the Roman money in the frontier provinces of the empire helps us understand why the inflation stayed low, but I suggest it also hints at a significant expansion in the quantity of manufactured and traded goods in the Roman world.²⁵⁵ Since the notably increased supply of minted money did not generate any considerable long-term inflationary pressure, one can argue that the Roman economy was expanding and generating the

²⁵³ The theory was first proposed in Hopkins (1980) and then tweaked and applied to the study of various aspects of Roman economy in Hopkins (1983c; 1983d; 1995/1996; and 2000).

²⁵⁴ The slightly modified quote is from Hopkins (2000), 259f.

²⁵⁵ Cf. Hopkins (1980), 108ff., and Geraghty (2007), 1045. The latter argues that the growth of money supply and expanding Mediterranean trade triggered the convergence of commodity prices throughout the Mediterranean.

real increase in production output of manufactured and traded goods and luxuries. On the one hand, the new Augustan aristocracy enriched by the princeps actively engaged in conspicuous consumption, driving up demand for staples and luxuries alike. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of the legionary and auxiliary soldiers, centurions, and legion officers stationed in the imperial provinces became the privileged consumers with disposable income they could spend on necessities and even desirable luxuries. I suggest that their newly acquired taste for spending created an increased demand for manufactured goods and caused a respective increase in manufacturing, helping bring the money growth in line with the growth rate of real output.

My discussion of the thriving Mediterranean trade, grain shipments to Rome, Augustus' success in keeping the Mediterranean piracy at check, and the emperor's expenditure and munificence makes it possible to make three important observations. First, the emperor himself as well as the Augustan and post-Augustan authors viewed full eradication of piracy as an integral part of the *pax Augusta*, peace obtained through emperor's victories on the battlefield. Second, Augustus' success in drastically limiting the scope of piracy made maritime shipping safer and much cheaper, facilitating the creation of a set of associated wheat markets that stretched from the eastern to the western Mediterranean. Finally, princeps' expenditure and unparalleled munificence contributed to the flourishing of trade and gradual economic growth, with the volume of surplus production in the interior provinces of the Roman Empire significantly increasing due to the ever-growing demand for goods and luxuries and the abundance of minted money. To my mind, all this indicates that Augustus was much more than a Paretian leonine consolidator or Syme's *dux* who simply relied on brute force to stay in power.

Conclusion

In the *Treatise on General Sociology*, Pareto proposes that the Augustan revolution brought to power leonine “consolidators” strong in irrational behavioral manifestations of group-persistence and “preservation” and argues that it marked the end of a long cycle characterized by the supremacy of vulpine “speculators” rich in irrational behavioral manifestations of “combination.” In essence, the author views Augustus as a lion-like conservative leader who primarily relied on military might and religious sentiment to stay in power.²⁵⁶ Instead, throughout Chapters II and III, I have suggested that Augustus exemplified many of the qualities inherent in Machiavelli’s ideal prince: the emperor developed exceptional mental flexibility and versatility to effectively use both leonine force and vulpine shrewdness in order to achieve his objectives and maintain effective control over the Roman state.

On the one hand, the princeps, similar to the Machiavellian “epic hero” or “farmer warrior,” shared with a lion-like conservative personality a marked interest in moral order founded upon society’s internalized norms, the rules of “civilization” most people get socialized into as children. To a large extent, the energy of Augustus was focused on the “domestication of nature” by the upholding of the “cult of the state” through the enforcement of social regulation.²⁵⁷ I discuss this topic in more detail in the last chapter of my dissertation. On the other hand, the emperor was not unlike the Renaissance cultural icon of the fox-like “confidence

²⁵⁶ Pareto (1935), §§ 2581 and 2583. There is only one instance where Pareto (1935), § 2584, concedes that Augustus used both force and cunning.

²⁵⁷ For the dichotomy of “epic hero”/“farmer warrior” and the Renaissance trickster, see Rebhorn (1988), who offers in-depth analysis of Machiavelli’s fictional and non-fictional writings. The quotes are from page 164.

trickster,” the personage who always emerges in times of rapid social change, when people are displaced and separated from their traditional way of life.²⁵⁸ As the product of the detraditionalized ways of life, the trickster is notorious for his critical skepticism toward and/or utter disregard for long-established norms; he thrives upon complexity and change and reshapes how people perceive the new social reality and themselves within it. As a result, there is a great leadership potential within this type: the “fox” who knows how to utilize the strategy of cunning and deceit in order to recognize and avoid the traps has a natural aptitude for political rule.²⁵⁹ In the case of the young Caesar, this was particularly conspicuous in the way he acquired personal honor and augmented his *virtus* and *auctoritas*.

As I demonstrate in this chapter, the princeps’ style of military leadership did not correspond to the characteristic spirit of Roman aristocracy, nor did it resonate with the Paretian description of a classical leonine conservative “consolidator.” While most Republican Roman commanders, including the dynasts, acquired *virtus*, *auctoritas*, and ensuing political power on the battlefield, the emperor, who had at least equivocal, if not altogether tainted, military record, brazenly utilized military achievements of others in order to increase his relative “honor rating,” augment his *auctoritas*, and establish himself superior beyond competition. Not unlike the dynasts of the Late Republic who used soldiers strong in leonine propensities to create extensive *clientelae* that

²⁵⁸ Rehorn (1988), 26, says: “The confidence man’s major traits—his deep moral ambiguity and his recognition of the contingency and transformability of the social order—reflect important aspects of Italy and Europe in the age of the Renaissance. The Renaissance fascination with the confidence men might be correlated, for example, with the increased number of rogues and vagabonds, charlatans and mountebanks, of the poor in general, which humanists and social reformers linked to the land enclosures precipitated by a developing capitalism, to the population shifts related to the spread of the plague and other diseases, and to the furious wars that raged during the period.”

²⁵⁹ Machiavelli (1979), 133-136, famously discusses the typology of “lions” and “foxes” in Chapter 18 of *The Prince*. Cf. also Chapter II, pp. 155-160.

helped them advance their interests, the young Caesar used the claim that all generals fought “by [his] command and under [his] auspices” (*RG* 26.5) to increase his own *virtus* and *auctoritas* at the expense of others.²⁶⁰ Thus, the princeps epitomizes the Machiavellian prince who only appears to possess certain qualities but yet succeeds in deceiving everyone. Machiavelli says: “And men in general judge more by their eyes than their hands; for everyone can see but few can feel. Everyone sees what you seem to be, few perceive what you are, and those few do not dare to contradict the opinion of the many who have the majesty of the state to defend them.... For ordinary people are always deceived by appearances and by the outcome of a thing....”²⁶¹

Equally important is that Augustus’ efforts to feed the city of Rome not only led to keeping the Mediterranean piracy at check but also facilitated the creation of an interconnected set of grain markets that extended from Egypt to Lusitania and provided the capital with a regular and consistent supply of grain. However, neither production nor consumption can exist on their own: trade is the vital link that bridges the two together and enables the producers to sell surpluses and consumers to obtain an array of goods they do not grow or make themselves. The expenditure of Augustus and the Roman government as well as the princeps’ unparalleled munificence pumped tremendous amounts of money into the economy and spurred economic growth. On the one hand, the aristocracy and the imperial court in the city of Rome were spending freely on luxuries, and the Roman armies stationed in the frontier provinces had a steady demand for goods and

²⁶⁰ For the dynasts, see Pareto (1935), § 2564. In § 2548, the author says, “The army, furthermore, which had at first been largely made up of property-owning citizens, rich, therefore, in Class II [leonine ‘preservation’] residues, tends to become in part a collection of paid soldiers, of men therefore who are the tools and the supporters of leaders rich in Class I [vulpine ‘combination’] residues.” For Augustus appropriating for himself the role of the commander in chief of the whole army, see above, pp. 228f.

²⁶¹ Machiavelli (1979), 135f.

services and money to pay for them. On the other hand, residents of the interior provinces of the Roman Empire needed to earn money to pay taxes. They earned cash by converting the locally produced surplus into higher value, lower volume manufactured goods that could be sold at distant markets, including the frontier provinces.²⁶² The increased monetization of the Roman economy prompted by the need to pay the legions made money an important medium of exchange and spurred trade flows all over the Roman Empire. As maritime shipping became safer and cheaper due to the *pax Augusta* and the monetization of economy increased due to the abundance of minted money, the Roman economy began to show signs of gradual but consistent growth.

It cannot be doubted that the Augustan revolution triggered wide elite circulation and caused an initial influx of persons strong in irrational behavioral manifestations of leonine “preservation.” However, when it comes to Paretian elite cycles, it is difficult to delineate their duration in the Roman history because the ruling elites are always a mix of fox-like and lion-like proclivities. To my mind, the entire period from the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE until at least the death of Augustus in 14 CE should be regarded as one long elite cycle dominated by fox-like, rationalist sentiments characteristic of non-logical behavioral manifestations of vulpine “combination.”²⁶³ This long cycle encompassed a number of distinct and shorter cycles, with the Roman governing elite making adjustments that enabled it to persist until the next crisis. Accordingly, the invention of the Augustan Principate was just one of such readjustments, with

²⁶² For details, see Hopkins (1980).

²⁶³ The alacrity one notices in Pareto to take into consideration the coexistence of short and long cycles, whereby long cycles subsume shorter ones, may help resolve the problem.

the fox-like shrewdness of “speculators” from the provincial oligarchy brought to power by the princeps still ruling supreme.

In my opinion, Augustus was not a Paretian leonine consolidator but the Machiavellian prince par excellence who cunningly appropriated the military achievements of others and whose expenditure and munificence promoted gradual economic growth across the Roman world. The emperor publicly maintained the appearance of an audacious lion and displayed all the positive leonine characteristics meant to exalt his own *virtus* and military prowess. However, he secretly acted like a shrewd and cunning fox, utilizing, without it being known, the methods meant to augment his *virtus* and *auctoritas* and reinforce his personal hold on power. After consolidating his power by establishing himself superior beyond competition and surpassing everyone else in munificence, Augustus preferred to rule by *consent* rather than by *force*.²⁶⁴ Consequently, he maintained social control by co-opting support for his Principate through opportunistic compromises, crafty deals, concessions, demagoguery, and trickery. Publicly maintaining the appearance of a lion, he was the fox at heart.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Pareto (1935), § 2251, and Chapter IV, pp. 322-353.

CASE STUDY II: GAIUS CORNELIUS GALLUS AND HIS UNAUTHORIZED CLAIM TO *VIRTUS*

Introduction

The downfall of the equestrian Gaius Cornelius Gallus, the elegiac poet and the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, is very instructive for understanding Octavian's sensitivities regarding claims to *virtus* and subsequent *honor* by members of the Roman governing elite. Those who aspired to the leadership style typical of the self-aggrandizing generals and governors of the Middle and Late Republic and continued to assert for themselves the traditional mantle of martial valor could easily jeopardize the princeps' status of *primus inter pares*.¹ Besides Gallus, at least two other governors tested the limits of one's freedom of self-exaltment under the new regime. Most likely, their claims to military honors and the ensuing social grant of glory, reputation, and prestige were stymied by the princeps who was unforgiving of the "insolence" of self-aggrandizement on the part of others.²

First, Marcus Licinius Crassus (cos. 30 BCE), proconsul of senatorial Macedonia and Achaia in 29 and 28 BCE, won stunning victories against the Dacians, the Bastarnae, and the Geti. In the best Republican traditions of acquiring honor and forging reputation for military prowess by deliberately displaying "aggressive courage" on the battlefield, engaging in hand-to-hand combat, and putting himself in harm's ways (Polyb. 6.39.1-10), Crassus killed Deldo, king of the

¹ "C. Cornelius Cn. f. Gallus eques Romanus post reges / a Caesare deivi f. devictos praefectus Alexandriae et Aegypti primus..." (*ILS* 8995 = *EJ*, 58, no. 21 = Adams (2003), 637ff.). See also Strabo 17.1.53; Dio Cass. 51.17.1; and Jer. *Ab Abr.* 27 BCE.

² Cf. Eck (1985), 131, and Judge (2008b).

Bastarnae, in hand-to-hand combat, conquered Moesia, executed punitive raids in Thrace, and recovered the standards lost by Gaius Antonius Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE).³ After his first campaign, Crassus took an imperatorial salutation (*ILS* 8810) and successfully petitioned the Senate for a triumph. However, the young Caesar denied the proconsul the title of *imperator* and added the acclamation to his own total, appearing as “imp. VII” on a document from 29 BCE (Dio Cass. 51.25.2 and *ILS* 881).⁴ More importantly, Octavian prevented Crassus from claiming the ancient right to offer *spolia opima* to Jupiter Feretrius: the princeps’ epigraphical research at the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius apparently indicated that only consuls qualified for this honor (Dio Cass. 51.24.4 and Livy 4.20.7).⁵ It is noteworthy that nothing is known of Crassus after he celebrated his postponed triumph in the summer of 27 BCE.

Second, the obscure Marcus Primus, proconsul of Macedonia from 24 to 23 BCE, was tried by a *iudicium publicum* for waging war against the Odrysae, one of the Thracian tribes, outside his province and without the prior authorization from the Senate or Augustus.⁶ When Primus referred to the instructions received from Augustus and Marcellus, the princeps presented himself in court without any formal summons and denied the allegation. After this, Marcus

³ For details, see Dio Cassius 51.23.2-51.27.1; he relates the events under the year 29 BCE. Cf. also Livy, *Per.* 134-135.

⁴ Cf. also Syme (1986), 273f., and Chapter III, p. 229, above.

⁵ Cf. also Nepos who mentions that Octavian followed the advice of Atticus and repaired the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitol (*Att.* 20.3). Dessau (1906) followed by Syme (1986), 274f., maintains that Crassus applied to the Senate for authorization to dedicate *spolia opima* and the emperor had his application rejected on the strength of his own epigraphic research mentioned by Livy. By contrast, Rich (1996) suggests that Crassus himself chose not to apply for the honor because he either did not want it (very unlikely in my view) or was pressured behind the scenes not to pursue it.

⁶ The Odrysae populated the eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains and the lower reaches of the Tonzus as far as Cabyle (cf. Hdt. 4.92).

Primus was probably condemned to exile and confiscation, even though some judges had voted for his acquittal (Dio Cass. 54.3.2-4).⁷ It is unknown who decided to prosecute Primus and why. According to Stockton, a case can be made that the person who initiated the prosecution wanted to call in question Augustus' assumption that he had a right to issue "advice" to governors of senatorial provinces. Alternatively, someone might also have wanted to undermine Marcellus' position. As a result, Augustus had to appear in court without any formal summons and lie under oath.⁸ However, I think there may be another possibility: a friend of the princeps initiated the prosecution of the triumph-hunting governor who then lied under oath about the princeps' instructions and thus forced Augustus to appear in court personally in order to secure the condemnation.⁹

In many ways, Cornelius Gallus' case is comparable to those of Marcus Licinius Crassus and Marcus Primus. As the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, Gallus waged a campaign in the Thebaid in 29 BCE (Strabo 17.1.53) and then led the Roman forces beyond the border of the Roman Egypt (*ILS* 8995), probably without receiving a prior authorization from Octavian. According to Dio, the poet erected statues of himself throughout Egypt and even inscribed upon

⁷ Dio Cassius dates the trial to 22 BCE, but Syme (1939), 330, n. 3; 333; and (1958b), 1:366, n. 2, dates it to 23 BCE. The long-standing consensus about the 23 BCE date was systematically attacked by Atkinson (1960), who advocated for Cassius Dio's date of 22 BCE. Her forceful article led to the most spirited debate in the pages of *Historia*, with Bauman (1966) supporting her assertion and Stockton (1965); Jameson (1969); and Daly (1978) attacking it. Later, Badian (1982) also advocated for the later date. Kienast (1999), 86, n. 72, provides an exhaustive list of literature on Primus' trial and Murena's conspiracy. Cf. also Raaflaub (1990), 425f., and Межерицкий (2016), 330f.

⁸ See Stockton (1965), 32, n. 47.

⁹ Since Macedonia was a Senatorial province, it is also possible that the Senate initiated the prosecution to punish Primus for waging war against the Odrysae without the Senate's prior authorization.

the pyramids a list of his achievements (Dio Cass. 53.23.5). The trilingual inscription in hieroglyphic Egyptian, Latin, and Greek carved on a stela and set up at Philae, the Nile island located at the southern end of the First Cataract, not far from Aswan, clearly attests to the poet's tendency to self-aggrandize (*ILS* 8995).¹⁰ In the inscription, Gallus aspires to the leadership style characteristic of the generals and governors of the Middle and Late Republic: he lays independent claim to manliness exemplified by “aggressive courage” in battle and appropriates to himself the privilege to receive foreign ambassadors, install new despots on the frontier of Egypt, and even offer foreign rulers Rome's protection.¹¹ The prefect's bold actions on the southern frontier of the Roman Egypt as well as his hubris and shameless self-promotion put him in hot water with the young Caesar, who must have been especially concerned about others' self-aggrandizing activities in the province that filled the treasury with taxes and provided the capital with grain (cf. Dio Cass. 51.17.1).¹² It is noteworthy that the stela with Gallus' trilingual inscription was first cut into two pieces and then reused, either in the foundation, possibly of the altar, at Augustus' temple constructed on the island of Philae in Augustus' year 18 (13/12 BCE)

¹⁰ The hieroglyphic version of the inscription provides the date of Pharmuthi 20 in Augustus' year 1 (April 13, 29 BCE). See Hoffmann (2009), 49, and Minas-Nerpel (2010), 273. The latter author converts Pharmuthi 20 to April 16, but the online Date Converter for Ancient Egypt I consulted gives the Julian date of April 15 and the Gregorian date of April 13. See <http://aegyptologie.online-resourcen.de/romanEmperors> accessed on December 3, 2018. For the Latin and Greek texts of the inscription that do not offer any dates, see *ILS* 8995 = EJ, 58, no. 21 = Adams (2003), 637ff.

¹¹ I discuss the text of the Philae inscription in more detail below, pp. 290-307. For the concept of manliness exemplified by “aggressive courage,” see McDonnell (2006), who examines the changing usage of the notion of *virtus* from the Early to the Late Republic; William V. Harris (2006), 316; and Chapter I above, pp. 22f. and 59f.

¹² Contra Boucher (1966), 55ff., and Daly (1979), 296f., who maintain that Gallus' disgrace stemmed from his activities in Rome. For various taxes collected by the Roman state in Egypt, see Capponi (2005), 123-155.

by the prefect P. Rubrius Barbarus (15/14-12 BCE), or simply as paving slabs in front of the sanctuary.¹³

Upon Gallus' return to Rome, his "friend" Valerius Largus denounced him for self-aggrandizement and indulging in disrespectful gossip against the princeps. Then Augustus banned the poet from his house and prohibited him from entering the imperial provinces (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6).¹⁴ In his other work, Suetonius also mentions that the young Caesar was very irritated by the fact that Quintus Caecilius Epirota, who had been suspected of adultery with the wife of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, was living most intimately with Gallus (*Gram.* 16).¹⁵ Since Agrippa's marriage is usually dated to 42 or 37 BCE, the supposed indignation did not stop the young Caesar from either employing Gallus as the commander in the attack from Cyrenaica against the forces of Marcus Antonius (Dio Cass. 51.9.1-4) or appointing him as the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt. In my view, the incident with Epirota had nothing to do with Gallus' subsequent downfall, but it might have been used *ex post* as yet another justification for Octavian's actions which were driven primarily by princeps' intolerance of the "insolence" of self-aggrandizement on the part of others.¹⁶ After all, their behavior could

¹³ I think the destruction of the stone was most likely related to Gallus' downfall and possible condemnation to *damnatio memoriae*. The two parts of the inscription were rediscovered in 1896 in front of the temple. For details, see Lyons (1896), no. 51, and Porter (1991), 253.

¹⁴ "... alteri ob ingratum et malivolum animum domo et provinciis suis interdixit" (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2). Cf. also *Ov. Am.* 3.9.63-64. For *amicitiam renuntiare*, see Rogers (1959), especially 227 and 229, and my discussion below, p. 300. Cf. also *Ov. Tr.* 2.445-446 and Dio Cass. 53.23.5, where the authors comment on imprudent remarks and idle gossip made by Gallus.

¹⁵ "Q. Caecilius Epirota... libertus Attici... cum filiam patroni nuptam M. Agrippae doceret, suspectus in ea et ob hoc remotus ad Cornelium Gallum se contulit, vixitque una familiarissime; quod ipsi Gallo inter gravissima crimina ab Augusto obicitur."

¹⁶ For the date of Agrippa's marriage to Attica, see Kaster (1995), 183ff., who also refers the "gravissima crimina" of Suet. *Gram.* 16 to the princeps' *De vita sua* and argues that this matter

put at risk the princeps' carefully constructed claim to exceptional *virtus* and his status of *primus inter pares*. The formal renunciation of *amicitia* by the young Caesar opened the hunting season on Gallus: a flood of private accusations as well as the Senate's unanimous vote to convict him in the jury courts, exile him, and give his confiscated estate to Octavian sealed Gallus' fate. The poet committed suicide in 27 or 26 BCE (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6-7).¹⁷

The Rise and Fall of the Poet

Born around 70 BCE, Gaius Cornelius Gallus was the son of a Roman citizen named Gnaeus, who was "a local dynast of Gallia Narbonensis. These men came of a class that was eminently presentable and highly civilized, Greek before they were Roman; they are the precursors of the famous Narbonensian senators of the first century of the Empire."¹⁸ In 41-40 BCE, the future prefect of Alexandria and Egypt might have served Asinius Pollio (cos. 40 BCE) as *praefectus fabrum* in the Cisalpine Gaul.¹⁹ One of the four Latin elegiac poets and a friend of Virgil, Cornelius Gallus perhaps became acquainted with Octavian through literary circles (cf. *Ov. Am.*

might also have been a factor in the charge against Gallus' "*ingratum et malivolum animum*" (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2).

¹⁷ Cf. also Amm. Marc. 17.4.5 whose account, in my opinion, is not very trustworthy. Dio Cassius narrates the story of Gallus' downfall under the year 26 BCE, but Jerome's date of 27 BCE should perhaps be preferred. See Jer. *Ab Abr.* 27 BCE; Syme (1939), 309ff.; and Wardle (2014), 427f.

¹⁸ Syme (1938), 43. However, Suetonius reports that Gallus rose from very modest circumstances (*Aug.* 66.1).

¹⁹ For details, see Syme (1939), 252, n. 4, and Hollis (2007), 226f.

3.9.63 and Serv. *Ecl.* 10.1).²⁰ In 1978, a papyrus containing lines of Latin elegiac verse was unearthed in Lower Nubia at Qasr Ibrîm, on the site of ancient Primis.²¹ The spot, which is located some 150 miles south of the Roman Egypt and on the very frontier with the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush, was garrisoned by Roman legionaries under the prefect Publius Petronius (24-22 BCE).²² One of the earliest known Latin papyri from Africa, the document mentions Gallus' girlfriend Lycoris, the mime actress named Volumnia Cytheris who was a one-time lover of Marcus Antonius.²³ Since Primis was most likely occupied by the Roman forces for a very short period of time, the papyrus must have been written either during Gallus' lifetime or shortly after his death.

Gallus' involvement with Africa probably began sometime after the Battle of Actium (31 BCE). After taking over and reinforcing the legions of Lucius Pinarius Scarpus in Cyrenaica, the poet successfully commanded them against the forces of Marcus Antonius (Dio Cass. 51.9.1-4

²⁰ According to Probus' introduction to the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*, Gallus was Virgil's schoolmate (Hagen (1902), 328). However, Hollis (2007), 225f., suggests a more recent friendship that probably stemmed from the shared patronage by Asinius Pollio. In his letter to Cicero, Pollio refers to Gallus as "*familiarem meum*" (*Fam.* 10.32.5). On the friendship between Gallus and Octavian, see Geraci (1983), 166 and 175.

²¹ For details, See *PQasrIbrîm* inv. 78-3-11/I (L1/2), col. I, ed. Anderson (1979); Capponi (2005), 179; and Hollis (2007), 224-230 and 241-252. The latter also provides a useful collection of excerpts from ancient authors on Gallus and his poetry.

²² Török (1997), 1-5, provides a useful overview of the endonyms for the native Kingdom of Kush that emerged in the Middle Nile region after the end of the Egyptian New Kingdom domination. To classical authors, this region was known as *Aithiopia* (*Ibid.*, 69-73).

²³ On Lycoris, see also Prop. 2.34.91-92; Verg. *Buc.* 10.42; Ov. *Am.* 1.15.29-30; *Ars. Am.* 3.333-334; *Tr.* 4.10.53-54; Mart. 8.73.5-6; and Serv. Ad Verg. *Buc.* 10.1. Hollis (2007), 226, suggests that Gallus' poetry for Volumnia started around 45 or 44 BCE. The poet wrote four books about Lycoris (Serv. Ad Verg. *Buc.* 10.1).

and Plut. *Ant.* 69.2).²⁴ Then, as a personal confidante of the young Caesar, Cornelius Gallus negotiated with the captured Cleopatra (Plut. *Ant.* 79.1). Finally, once again in his capacity of *praefectus fabrum*, he completed the Forum Iulium in Alexandria around 30 BCE (*AE* 1964, no. 255 = *EJ*, 169, no. 374).²⁵ In the 1960s, the text of this duplex inscription was discovered by Magi under another duplex inscription on the Vatican obelisk that had been raised in the Forum Iulium in Alexandria before Caligula (37-41 CE) ordered it to be brought to Rome and placed at the *spina* of the Caligula Circus.²⁶ In contrast to the later Gallus' trilingual Philae inscription I elucidate below, this inscription does list the full title of Octavian and acknowledges that the construction of the Forum Iulium was undertaken on the princeps' orders.²⁷

²⁴ Cf. also Oros. 6.19.15. Scarpus, who was the son of Julius Caesar's elder sister Julia, was one of the heirs of the dictator. After serving as a legate of Marcus Antonius at Philippi, Scarpus was entrusted with the command of four Antonius' legions in Cyrene. However, he refused to deliver these forces to Marcus Antonius and later turned them over to Cornelius Gallus. As a reward, Octavian confirmed Scarpus as governor of Cyrene. See *MRR* 2:422; *PIR*¹ P311; and Münzer, *RE* XX, cols. 1404-1406.

²⁵ "Iussu Imp. Caesaris Divi f. / C. Cornelius Cn. f. Gallus / praef. fabr. Caesaris Divi f. / forum Iulium fecit."

²⁶ The original inscription had been removed from the obelisk, possibly due to the Senate's *damnatio memoriae* of Cornelius Gallus. Magi reconstructed and deciphered the inscription from the erased nail-holes used to attach the bronze letters to the obelisk. For details, see Magi (1963).

²⁷ On the other hand, the identification of "Caesar" from Gallus' epigram found in the Qasr Ibrîm papyrus is disputed: he is either Julius Caesar or Octavian. I follow earlier scholarship and think that Gallus' "Caesar" refers to Julius Caesar and his carefully planned campaign against Parthia. For details, see Anderson (1979), 138-143 and 151-155, and Hollis (2007), 224 and 243f.

Upon his departure from Egypt in 30 BCE, Octavian made Gallus the first prefect of the province (Suet. *Aug.* 66.1).²⁸ According to Syme, “a knight of such exalted rank [was] the social equal of senators, politically a greater power than most consuls in the revived and fraudulent Republic of Augustus.”²⁹ *De jure*, Gallus’ power was determined *ad similitudinem proconsulis*, giving him extensive military, judicial, administrative, and religious authority.³⁰ It has been suggested that the poet’s appointment was nothing more than a career reward for a loyal supporter.³¹ However, even after all the tumult created by Cornelius Gallus in the province, the princeps continued to employ equites rather than senators as prefects of Alexandria and Egypt.³² Moreover, the career of Lucius Seius Strabo indicates that this prefecture essentially became the pinnacle of equestrian career, at least during the early Principate. First, Augustus made Strabo prefect of the guard. Then, after the emperor’s death, he swore allegiance to Tiberius (Tac. *Ann.* 1.7.2). Shortly after Strabo’s son Lucius Aelius Seianus was appointed as his colleague (Tac. *Ann.* 1.24.2), Tiberius made Strabo prefect of Alexandria and Egypt in 15 CE (Dio Cass. 57.19.6). To my mind, these arrangements indicate that the emperors were weary of appointing a senator of consular rank as their legate to govern the province that was so crucial to the uninterrupted supply of grain to the capital and provided a steady tax revenue to the treasury (cf.

²⁸ “... Cornelium Gallum, quem ad praefecturam Aegypti, ex infima utrumque fortuna provexerat.” Gallus received the official title only in April 29 BCE. For dates, see Schäfer (2000), 116.

²⁹ Syme (1938), 43. Strabo considers the prefect of Egypt equal in rank to a king (17.1.12). Cf. also Tac. *Hist.* 1.11.

³⁰ According to *Dig.* 1.17.1 (Ulp. *Ad Edict.* 15), “praefectus Aegypti non prius deponit praefecturam et imperium, quod ad similitudinem proconsulis lege sub Augusto ei datum est, quam Alexandriam ingressus sit successor eius, licet in provinciam venerit: et ita mandatis eius continentur.”

³¹ See Crook (1996), 74.

³² This is a very significant phenomenon, and I discuss it in more detail below, pp. 308-312.

Dio Cass. 51.17.1). Instead, Augustus and then Tiberius preferred to lean on the less politically dangerous equites who, in turn, relied on them for patronage and further advancement.

After his appointment as prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, Gaius Cornelius Gallus decided to lay claim to his own *virtus*, and an anti-Roman uprising in Upper Egypt offered him an excellent opportunity to assert significant military victories both in the Thebaid, the region that included thirteen southernmost nomes of Upper Egypt, and in the Triacontaschoenus, the luminal region between the Roman Egypt and the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush situated to the south, between the First and the Second Cataracts.³³ Strabo claims that the taxes imposed by Rome on the local inhabitants led to the insurrection in Heroönpolis (Pithom), a large city in the east Delta.³⁴ According to Strabo's account, Gallus easily subdued the city with only a few troops (17.1.53).³⁵ At the same time, Jerome reports that the city of Thebes, the political and religious center of Upper Egypt known to the Greeks and Romans as either Diospolis Megale or Diospolis Magna, was razed to the ground in 27 BCE, the same year Gallus committed suicide (*Ab Abr.* 27 BCE).³⁶

³³ The Triacontaschoenus is the Latinized *Τριακοντάσχοινος*, “Land of the Thirty ‘Schoinoi.’” As the geographical term, the word is first seen in an inscription made around 150 BCE by the Ptolemaic official named Boethos. For details, see Minas-Nerpel (2010), 287. For the extent of Gallus' military operations, see Török (2009), 431, who argues that the suppression of the revolt in Upper Egypt offered Gallus an opportunity to seize the whole valley between the First and the Second Cataracts.

³⁴ Heroönpolis was most likely located near the mouth of the Royal Canal that connected the Nile with the Red Sea.

³⁵ “Γάλλος μὲν γε Κορνήλιος, ὁ πρῶτος κατασταθεὶς ἑπαρχὸς τῆς χώρας ὑπὸ Καίσαρος, τὴν τε Ἡρώων πόλιν ἀποστᾶσαν ἐπελθὼν δι' ὀλίγων εἴλε, στάσιν τε γενηθεῖσαν ἐν τῇ Θηβαΐδι διὰ τοῦς φόρους ἐν βραχεῖ κατέλυσε.”

³⁶ “Thebae Aegypti usque ad solum erutae.” However, according to Gallus' trilingual inscription from Philae, the anti-Roman revolt in Upper Egypt was suppressed in 29 BCE. For dating the inscription to April 13, 29 BCE, see footnote n. 10 above.

The prefect's self-aggrandizing trilingual inscription from Philae does list Diospolis Magna among the five cities he conquered, but curiously Heroönpolis is not on the list (*ILS* 8810).³⁷ Since Strabo is mistaken about the city where the revolt took place, he is probably also confused about its causes which were perhaps more political than economic.³⁸ Török says:

Similarly to earlier times..., the Upper Egyptian rebels might also at this time have received help from [the Kingdom of] Meroe. In turn, Meroe in all probability tried first to exploit the opportunity presented by the troubled times in Egypt around 30 BC and then the Upper Egyptian revolt to make an attempt to firmly establish the northern frontier of Kush in the region of the First Cataract.³⁹

In my view, it is significant that Cornelius Gallus not only crushed the revolt in the Thebaid but also led the Roman forces on a punitive expedition across the frontier of the Roman Egypt and ended up reorganizing the political order of the Triacontaschoenus (cf. *ILS* 8995). This fact alone lends support to the view that the causes of the revolt were more political than economic.

The poet's military successes in the Thebaid and Triacontaschoenus, which ancient authors describe as the southern frontier of the Roman Egypt,⁴⁰ presented an irresistible opportunity for him to erect the self-exalting victory stela on the island of Philae in the Nile, not far from the

³⁷ "...V urbium expugnator, Boreseos, Copti, Ceramices, Diospoleos Megales, Ophieu..." While the exact location of Boreasis is unknown, Coptos is perhaps the Coptic Keft, a small town situated some twenty-seven miles north of Luxor, on the east bank of the Nile. Palme (1989), 125f., points out that Ceramices and Ophieum (modern Medamud and Luxor) used to be known as quarters of Thebes, but were probably "independent settlements" at the time of Gallus.

³⁸ Contra Rathbone (1993), 88, and Minas-Nerpel (2010), 282f. At the same time, Adams (2003), 639, notices that the language of Strabo's passage about Gallus (17.1.53) closely resembles the wording of the Greek version of Gallus' inscription and suggests that the historian, who actually visited Egypt a few years after the erection of the victory stela on the island of Philae, could have seen the poet's trilingual inscription.

³⁹ Török (1997), 449. Cf. also Capponi (2005), 155f.

⁴⁰ See Diod. Sic. 1.22.3; Strabo 17.1.49; and Plin. *HN* 5.10.59.

First Cataract.⁴¹ Made of pink Aswan granite, the material used for royal monuments, and imitating their traditional shape, Cornelius Gallus' victory stela features both textual and visual evidence.⁴² On the top is the lunette inside which the traditional Egyptian winged solar disk is carved. Below the disk is the register that depicts a warrior mounted on a rearing horse and either spearing through or striking with a sword a kneeling foot soldier who cowers on his knees beneath a shield. The scene is bordered by three columns of hieroglyphic text on both sides; they mention the names and epithets of the Philae and Elephantine principal gods and goddesses.⁴³ There are twenty-eight lines of Gallus' self-aggrandizing, trilingual inscription below the relief: ten in hieroglyphic Egyptian, nine in Latin, and nine in Greek.

If Gallus' victory stela was indeed erected in a public place of the Isis temple-complex on the island of Philae, the lunette, with the image of the triumphant horseman defeating his enemy carved in the center of it, perhaps served as the main feature of the monument since it was roughly on eye level or just below of a beholder.⁴⁴ Minas-Nerpel, who draws parallels between the image of Gallus carved on the victory stela and the Hellenistic equestrian statues of the rulers as well as the depiction on Ptolemy IV Philopator (221-204 BCE) on the Raphia monument,

⁴¹ The pictures of the stela and the inscription can be found in Lyons (1896), nos. 51-52; Hoffman (2009), pls. 1-3, 6, 8-13; and Minas-Nerpel (2010), 267f. Originally, the stela measured about sixty-seven inches high. However, at one point the stone was cut for reuse, and now it measures only sixty inches by forty-two and half inches, with approximately three inches in the middle removed. Hoffman (2009), 15, 19, and 33, and Minas-Nerpel (2010), 266 and 271f., provide useful reconstructions of the original stela.

⁴² As Minas-Nerpel (2010), 270, n. 8, correctly points out, "It is certainly necessary to look at both the visual AND all the textual components of the Gallus Stela with regard to the social context. They are not independent sources, as some Egyptologists, archeologists, or ancient historians tend(ed) to imply because of the lack of knowledge or interest...."

⁴³ For details on the deities, see *Ibid.*, 277f.

⁴⁴ For details as to where the stela might have stood, see Hoffmann (2009), 16ff.

argues that it was very unusual to represent a *living* horseman spearing the enemy as a relief motif; she suggests that the equestrian Cornelius Gallus intentionally made the visual representation of himself the main feature of the stela.⁴⁵ Minas-Nerpel says:

The horseman, Hellenistic in style, does not fit well on an otherwise Egyptian stela....

It was... quite unusual that Gallus as a *living* general wished to be depicted as a horseman in relief scene. The audience for his self-presentation included Greek, Roman, and Egyptian visitors.... Greeks and Romans will doubtlessly have recognized the triumphant attitude without any problem. At the same time, Egyptians could also understand this type of representation, since temple walls—especially on pylons—showed the pharaoh slaughtering enemies, even if the Egyptian king was never shown riding a horse in combat. This iconographic detail is only known in the Hellenistic period from the Raphia monument, which dates to 217 BC....

As on the Raphia monument, one could have moved the horseman to the left, but much closer attention would be paid to him in a central position, and this must have been Gallus' aspiration since far more viewers of the stela could comprehend the depiction than could (or would) read the inscriptions; except for the priests the Egyptian population was not able to read the hieroglyphs so that they would only apprehend a triumphant Hellenistic horseman.⁴⁶

To my mind, the image of the victorious horseman on Cornelius Gallus' stela was meant to display the prefect's *virtus* and augment his ascribed honor and prestige. As I demonstrate in Chapter I, members of the Roman elite strove to distinguish themselves by service in the Roman cavalry, which was the privileged branch of the military. As early as the Middle Republic, *virtus* might have been represented on Republican coins as a mounted figure, and as late as 44 BCE Cicero declared that service as a horseman was more esteemed than service as a centurion (*Phil.*

⁴⁵ In the past, some scholars identified the horseman in the center of the lunette as Octavian, but the hieroglyphic inscription above the image clearly identifies the horseman as the "representative of the son of Re" (Minas-Nerpel (2010), 273, and cf. Eide (1996), 692). Hoffmann (2009), 1-5 and 19-44, offers a useful discussion of the history of research on the hieroglyphic texts of Gallus' victory stela.

⁴⁶ Minas-Nerpel (2010), 275-278.

1.8.20).⁴⁷ Following the Battle of Pydna (168 BCE), an equestrian monument of the self-aggrandizing Lucius Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182 and 168 BCE) was erected in Delphi to commemorate his victory (Plut. *Aem.* 28.4).⁴⁸ Around 82 BCE, Sulla became the first living Roman to have set up an equestrian gilded statue of himself in Rome, right in front of the Rostra (App. *B Civ.* 1.97 and Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.23.31). In his restless thirst for self-exaltation, the dictator even put this statue on the reverse of an aureus, once again becoming the first Roman to have portrayed himself on the coin.⁴⁹ While Minas-Nerpel compares the image of the mounted Cornelius Gallus to Hellenistic triumphant statuary, there is a Roman example which is much closer chronologically and contextually. The gem dated to the period of the Late Republic depicts a Roman cavalryman spearing through a Gallic foot soldier. Possibly, it exhibits the achievements of one of Caesar's officers in Gaul.⁵⁰

Listing the transgressions of the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, Dio Cassius claims that Gallus recorded his achievements on the pyramids of Giza (53.23.5). While this assertion does not make much sense, it is possible that the prefect's name was written on obelisks he erected throughout Egypt.⁵¹ Costabile makes an interesting argument that Gallus' trilingual inscription from Philae was only the frontier version of a text envisaged for display in Latin only

⁴⁷ For details, see Chapter I, pp. 56-67.

⁴⁸ For details, see Kähler (1965) and Bergemann (1990), 151.

⁴⁹ See *RRC*, 397, no. 381.1a, and pl. 48, no. 22.

⁵⁰ See Zwierlein-Diehl (1973-1991), 2:128, n. 1092, and pl. 83, no. 1092.

⁵¹ According to Alföldy (1990), 39, the word *πυραμίδες* Dio uses may also mean "obelisks."

on an obelisk in Alexandria.⁵² Since the size of letters in the Latin inscription is twice as large as the size of letters in the Greek one,⁵³ an argument can be made that the message is mainly addressed to the Latin-speaking audience.

Not unlike the Scipionic epitaphs, the Latin and Greek versions of the Philae inscription follow a time-honored Republican tradition of display and actually memorialize Cornelius Gallus' deeds. They augment his ascribed honor and make it easier for him to lay claim to a subsequent social grant of glory, reputation, and prestige from the fellow equites in Rome.⁵⁴ It is also noteworthy that the hieroglyphic version of the inscription uses royal epithets to praise Gallus and refers both to his activities in constructing and remodeling Egyptian shrines and to his generous donations to the Egyptian deities.⁵⁵ I think there are two possibilities: (1) either the prefect was overly eager to extol his achievements to the native Egyptian elites and used the royal epithets to compete directly with Octavian or (2) the Egyptian priests who translated the text of the Philae inscription were not aware of Gallus' subordinate position to the princeps. The second possibility is more sensible, but it still begs the question as to why Cornelius Gallus deemed it unnecessary to disclose his place in the Roman hierarchy. As I demonstrate below, it appears that the prefect also concealed his subordinate position when he decided to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of Rome.

⁵² See Costabile (2001). Similarly, Adams (2003), 639-642, emphasizes "the stylistic markedness" of the Latin version of the inscription and convincingly argues that it was written by Gallus himself. Cf. also Hoffman (2010).

⁵³ See Eide (1996), 690.

⁵⁴ For my discussion of the Scipionic epitaphs, see Chapter 1, pp. 49-53. Adams (2003), 639ff., elucidates the inscription's numerous stylistic similarities both to the homecoming general's prayer of thanksgiving as mocked by Plautus and to Augustus' *Res Gestae*.

⁵⁵ For details, see Minas-Nerpel (2010), 269 and 292.

According to the Latin text of the Philae inscription,

Gaius Cornelius Gallus, son of Gnaeus, Roman equite, after the kings were defeated by Caesar, son of the divine (Caesar), the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, defeater of a defection of the Thebaid within fifteen days, in which he was victorious over the enemy twice in battle, taker of five cities, Boreosis, Coptos, Ceramice, Diospolis Magna, Ophieum, with the leaders of those defections killed, with his army led across beyond the [First?] Cataract of the Nile, into which place neither by the Roman people nor by the kings of Egypt have arms been carried, with the Thebaid, the common scourge of all kings, subjugated, with ambassadors of the king of the Ethiopians heard at Philae, with the same king received into guardianship, with a *tyrannos* set up at Triacontaschoenus on the frontier of Ethiopia, gave this gift to the ancestral gods and to the Nile, his assistant (*ILS* 8995).⁵⁶

Several important observations can be made about the claims Cornelius Gallus advances in the Latin and Greek texts of the inscription.⁵⁷ First, unlike the duplex inscription on the Vatican obelisk (*AE* 1964, no. 255 = *EJ*, 169, no. 374), where the prefect gives the young Caesar his full title and reaffirms that he constructed the Forum Iulium on his orders, both the Latin and the Greek texts of the Philae inscription omit Octavian's title *imperator*.⁵⁸ The Latin text also skirts

⁵⁶ The translation is that of Adams (2003), 638, slightly modified by me: "Caius Cornelius Cnaei filius Gallus, eques Romanus, post reges a Caesare deiui filio deuictos praefectus Alexandriae et Aegypti primus, defectionis Thebaidis intra dies XV, quibus hostem vicit bis acie, victor, V urbium expugnator, Boreseos, Copti, Ceramices, Diospoleos Megales, Ophieu, ducibus earum defectionum interceptis, exercitu ultra Nili catarhacten transducto, in quem locum neque populo Romano neque regibus Aegypti arma sunt polata, Thebaide communi omnium regum formidine subacta, legatis regis Aethiopum ad Philas auditis, eodem rege in tutelam recepto, tyranno Triacontaschoeni in Aethiopiae constituto dieis patrieis et Nilo adiutori donum dedit." For *Aithiopia* as the designated name used by classical authors to refer to the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush, see Török (1997), 69-73, and footnote n. 22 above.

⁵⁷ According to Minas-Nerpel (2010), 269, both versions are formally dedicatory texts to the Nile the assistant and the ancestral gods while the hieroglyphic version is a "historical" inscription since, among other things, it begins with a long-established Egyptian dating formula. Cf. also Hoffman (2009), 173.

⁵⁸ For the Vatican-obelisk inscription, see footnote n. 24 above.

the fact that Gallus was appointed to his post by the young Caesar.⁵⁹ To my mind, the omissions in the Greek and especially in the Latin versions of the Philae inscription clearly indicate that the poet wanted to deemphasize his subordinate position to the princeps.⁶⁰ In fact, some scholars even claim that the thank-offering to the Nile indicates that Gallus imagined himself in the role of the ruler of Egypt.⁶¹ Hence, Hollis is mistaken when he asserts that “Gallus’ two surviving Egyptian inscriptions do not go beyond the bounds of political acceptability.”⁶²

Second, following well-advertised Republican precedents, the Philae inscription skillfully uses mnemonic conventions to magnify military achievements of Cornelius Gallus and firmly establish his primacy in *gloria* and *fama*. Judge says:

... [A] Roman nobleman... sought to perpetuate fame by summing up one’s achievements according to certain conventions which had mnemonic force. Amongst these was the “diagrammatic” statement of territory conquered (e. g., Plaut. *Curc.* 447-448; Plin. *NH* 7.26.99; Plut. *Pomp.* 45.5), the claim to have done it *solus*, and the span of time from sighting the enemy, expressed in multiples of five days (e. g., *Insc. It.* 13.3.81, 90; Cic. *Fam.* 2.10.3; Caes. *BG* 4.18; *BC* 2.32.5; Liv. 45.41 [Aur. Vict.] *De vir. ill.* 77). Zela was won in five days of Caesar’s arrival (Suet. *Iul.* 35.2), but within four hours of sighting Pharnaces, and in a single action. It was the speed record, rather than the victory itself, which was advertised in the triumphal placard: *Veni. Vidi. Vici* (*ibid.*, 37.2), Caesar no doubt being happy to allow the false impression that all three events took place on one day, as Antony was later to claim for him (Cass. Dio 44.46.1). He was not

⁵⁹ See Judge (2008a), 73. While the Latin version uses the pompous “post reges a Caesare deiui filio deuictos praefectus Alexandriae et Aegypti primus,” the Greek version is toned down to “μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέων πρῶτος ὑπὸ Καίσαρος ἐπὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου κατασταθείς.”

⁶⁰ On the other hand, Cornelius Gallus chooses not mention his own part in Cleopatra’s and Marcus Antonius’ defeat and gives all the credit to Octavian; perhaps he had some understanding of the danger associated with claiming a part in this victory.

⁶¹ See Eide (1996), 694.

⁶² See Hollis (2007), 228.

the first to try for this particular hat-trick (Liv. 22.38.6-7; 51.2; *De vir. ill.* 49; cf. Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 10).⁶³

Besides claiming to have suppressed a revolt in the Thebaid in just fifteen days by winning two battles and capturing five cities, Cornelius Gallus also asserts his preeminence by priority: allegedly he was the first general to have crossed the First Cataract. He also reduced to subjection the Thebaid, “the common scourge of all kings” (*ILS* 8995).⁶⁴ It is interesting that the inability of the Ptolemies to subjugate the Thebaid is stressed much more in the Greek text of the inscription, possibly even causing offence to the Greek-speaking population of Egypt.⁶⁵ Török points out that Gallus’ claim to priority was quite “unjustified and absurd.”⁶⁶ Yet, from the standpoint of the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, his assertion may have made perfect sense, especially since he was somewhat familiar with the earlier history of the region.⁶⁷

After Alexander the Great conquered Egypt, the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush not only strengthened its position in Lower Nubia but also began incursions into Egypt itself. This forced Ptolemy I (323-282 BCE) to organize a punitive expedition to the region around 319/318 BCE.⁶⁸

⁶³ Ibid., 72. The author persuasively argues that the Latin text should read “quibus hostem *vidit*, bis acie victor,” not “quibus hostem *vicit* bis acie, victor” as restored by Mommsen (*CIL* III.14147) and Dessau (*ILS* 8995).

⁶⁴ “... exercitu ultra Nili catarhacten transducto, in quem locum neque populo Romano neque regibus Aegypti arma sunt polata, Thebaide communi omnium regum formidine subacta”

⁶⁵ For details, see Hauben (1976), 189, and Adams (2003), 640.

⁶⁶ Török (1997), 449. Cf. also Török (2009), 433.

⁶⁷ The fact that Cornelius Gallus uses in his inscription the Ptolemaic administrative name Triacontaschoenus to designate Lower Nubia indicates that he was well aware of the history of the “Land of the Thirty ‘Schoinoi.’”

⁶⁸ For details, see Huss (1994), 93f.

Around 274 BCE, the forces of Ptolemy II Philadelphos (283-246 BCE) invaded Lower Nubia once again; this time they annexed to Egypt the Triacontaschoenus, the region situated to the south of the Thebaid, between the First and the Second Cataracts (cf. Theoc. *Id.* 17.87).⁶⁹ Seventy years later, however, the Ptolemaic control over this territory collapsed as the result of the revolt led by Hor-Wennofer, the native usurper. He was backed both by the Theban priesthood, which played the Egyptian national resentment card, and by the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush.⁷⁰

The army of Ptolemy V Epiphanes (204-181 BCE) re-conquered Lower Nubia only around 185 BCE, having overcome the resistance of Ank-Wennofer, the successor of Hor-Wennofer, and his Meroitic allies.⁷¹ After this, the Triacontaschoenus was established as a special administrative district of the Thebaid in order to cut any links between Upper Egypt and the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush, secure the southern frontier of Egypt, and block any further Meroitic attempts to establish its dominance over the region.⁷² Nonetheless, this triumph was short-lived. The lack of inscriptions or any other evidence of Ptolemaic presence south of

⁶⁹ Török (1997), 432, says: “Since times immemorial, the region of Lower Nubia between the First and Second Cataracts fulfilled both the functions a corridor connecting the Mediterranean with the interior of Africa and of a frontier zone dividing Egypt from the polities of the Middle Nile Region. Its fate reflected the power relations in the Nile Valley. The ownership of Lower Nubia secured not only a strategic advantage but also access to the gold of the Wadis Allaqi and Gabgaba as well as control of the desert roads leading from modern Korosko to Abu Hamed and from there towards the Butana and beyond.”

⁷⁰ For details, see Török (2009), 384-393.

⁷¹ The second Philae decree of Ptolemy V Epiphanes written around 185 BCE records the suppression of the uprising supported by the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush. For details, see Eide (1996), 600-607.

⁷² See Török (1997), 449. Cf. also Geraci (1988), 387ff.; Huzar (1988), 343-382, *passim*; and Török (2009), 400-411.

Takompo/Maharraqa indicates that most of the Triacostaschoenus was out of Egypt's control by the middle of the second century BCE.⁷³ Thus, even though at first glance it may appear that Gaius Cornelius Gallus was just following in the footsteps of the Ptolemaic kings and not innovating a new policy, to his mind the victories must have been quite spectacular because he succeeded where the others had failed.

It was bad enough that Octavian's equestrian prefect was first suppressing indigenous revolts and leading the Roman forces beyond Egypt's border--perhaps without the prior princeps' authorization--and then eloquently articulating his martial achievements and asserting his preeminence by priority.⁷⁴ After making the verb *pacare* a catchword of his Principate (*RG* 26.2 and Vell. Pat. 2.90.1-91.1), the emperor at the end of his life actually claimed credit for augmenting the territory of all the Roman provinces that bordered peoples not yet subjected to the Roman rule (*RG* 26.1).⁷⁵ Cooley points out that this claim sets the tone for chapters 26-33 of the *Res Gestae*, where the princeps discusses his personal involvement in extending the Roman influence well beyond the officially recognized borders of the Roman Empire.⁷⁶ Earlier in life, Octavian, who celebrated an unprecedented three-day triple triumph in 29 BCE on the occasion

⁷³ See *Ibid.*, 411 and 433.

⁷⁴ Minas-Nerpel (2010), 284, says: "According to Octavian's/Augustus' propaganda of the country's liberation from the Ptolemies therefore marked the beginning of a new era, called *kratesis*. Indigenous revolts did not fit into this concept and reports about them on the public monuments in Egypt even less so. The beginning of Octavian's rule was supposed to be regarded as a new age of fortune, prosperity, and the return of order. Therefore, the Gallus stela—understood as a victory monument of the Roman prefect—was contradicting Octavian's proclamations for Egypt...."

⁷⁵ "Omnium provinciarum populi Romani, quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parent imperio nostro, fines auxi" (*RG* 26.1). Cf. also Chapter III, pp. 253ff.

⁷⁶ See Cooley (2009), 218ff.

of his victories in Dalmatia, at Actium (cf. *RG* 25.2), and in Egypt (*RG* 4.1 and 29.1), was not any less bold in promoting his predominance in *virtus* and acquired honor.⁷⁷ Thus, Gallus' transactions with foreign envoys, his establishment of a dynast in the Triacontaschoenus, and especially his reception into custody of the Meroitic king must have been particularly troubling to Octavian.⁷⁸

From early on, the young Caesar began to usurp the traditional role of the Senate in dealing with foreign affairs, and he certainly did not need or want any competitors. It is significant that Strabo reports that Rome's allied kings have always been a part of territories assigned to Octavian (17.3.25), and Suetonius takes for granted that the princeps had the ultimate authority over the kings (*Aug.* 48).⁷⁹ Cooley draws attention to the metamorphosis that the emperor's language undergoes in the *Res Gestae*. She says:

In speaking of the friendship enjoyed by foreign kings and envoys with Rome, Augustus first describes it as 'friendship with me and the Roman people', *amicitiam meam et populi Romani* (26.4). He then uses a more traditional expression, 'friendship of the Roman people', *amicitiam populi Romani* (29.2), before alluding to 'our friendship', *amicitiam nostram* (32.2), perhaps in a deliberately vague fashion.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ For Octavian's triple triumph, see also Livy, *Per.* 133.2; Dio Cass. 51.21.5-9; and Gurval (1995), 19-85. Cf. also Chapter III, pp. 224-231, where I discuss Octavian's claim to have acquired exceptional *virtus* and *fama* through waging foreign wars.

⁷⁸ In the Latin version of his trilingual inscription, Gallus boasts, "legatis regis Aethiopum ad Philas auditis, eodem rege in tutelam recepto, tyranno Triacontaschoeni in Aethiopiae constituto..." (*ILS* 8995).

⁷⁹ "Καὶ βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ δυνάσται καὶ δεκαρχαὶ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ ὑπῆρξαν ἀεὶ" and "nec aliter universos quam membra partisq[ue] imperii curae habuit." According to Wardle (2014), 355, "Suet. assumes that Aug. was the arbiter over the kings..., treating them as fully subject to Roman imperial control even though they were not directly administered..., or in some legal way treated as under Roman jurisdiction...."

⁸⁰ Cooley (2009), 25.

On the one hand, Augustus vaunts how rulers from distant and exotic lands sent personal embassies to him, sought refuge with him, and dispatched to Rome their sons and grandsons as hostages (*RG* 31-32).⁸¹ On the other hand, he brags about personally giving kings to foreign people (*RG* 33).⁸² The *Res Gestae* 33 emphasizes Augustus' claim to have had exercised effective control over who became king of Parthia and brings to the highest point the ostentatious but greatly exaggerated narrative of his successful diplomacy. Thus, it serves as a springboard for the two concluding chapters in which the emperor records his most significant achievements.⁸³

Augustus' preoccupation with diplomacy as well as his desire to use it as yet another instrument to augment his acquired honor meant that Gallus' dealings with foreign ambassadors, his installment of a *tyrannos* in the Triacontaschoenus, and especially his claim to have exercised *tutela* over the Meroitic king must have been perceived as a direct affront to the emperor's *auctoritas*.⁸⁴ As Braund demonstrates, once the Roman Republic became a dominant political power in the Mediterranean world, many kings began to view Rome as the natural choice for an external guardian to their heirs. As a result, the Roman governing elite frequently conceived the relationships between the Republic and the kings friendly to Rome as taking the kings and their

⁸¹ For details, see *Ibid.*, 249-256, and Wardle (2014), 176-180, who also offer useful references to the later Roman authors who buy into the princeps' narrative and even exaggerate and go beyond his own testimony.

⁸² "A me gentes Parthorum et Medorum per legatos principes earum gentium reges petitos acceperunt: Parthi Vononem, regis Phratis filium, regis Orodus nepotem, Medi Ariobarzanem, regis Artavazdis filium, regis Ariobarzani nepotem."

⁸³ Tacitus gives a very instructive account of how Augustus' single definitive attempt to get involved in the Parthian succession affairs resulted in a rather quick downfall of his creature (*Ann.* 2.1.2-3.1).

⁸⁴ I discuss Augustus' *auctoritas* in more detail in Chapter IV, *passim*.

heirs into *tutela* by the Roman people. Unsurprisingly, the guardianship was exercised either by the consuls (Cic. *Sest.* 64) or by prominent Roman aristocrats appointed by the Senate.⁸⁵ Braund suggest: “Rome provided the king with military support and protection. We have seen how the king might be regarded as under Roman *tutela*, Roman guardianship. In fact the concept of *tutela* was far more usual and important in the relationship than the notion of *clientela*, clientage, so favored by moderns.”⁸⁶ However, even though the term *tutela* was not fully equivalent to the concept of *clientela*, there was still the imbalance of power inherent in such a relationship, making a subject to wardship dependent on his warden.

After the young Caesar rose to power, he immediately monopolized the foreign policy of the Roman state. When the city of Mytilene wanted to obtain a status of an ally of Rome and remain a free, rather than subject, city, it sent a delegation to Rome. Since the emperor was in Spain at that time, Marcus Iunius Silanus (cos. 25 BCE) introduced the matter to the Senate which first consulted the princeps by letter and ratified the treaty only after receiving an approval from Augustus (*IG XII.2.35* = EJ, 137f., no. 307). Naturally, the emperor also took over the function of *tutela*, focusing the relationship between Rome and the friendly kings on his person. Suetonius maintains that the princeps promoted friendships and reciprocal relationships among the “allied kings” and even appointed guardians for those who were young or mentally ill (*Aug.* 48).⁸⁷ Although there is reported only one certain case in which the young Caesar appointed a guardian for Archelaus I of Cappadocia who might have suffered from dementia (Dio Cass.

⁸⁵ See Braund (1984), 136ff. and 144-147.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 182. On the danger of confusing *clientela* and *amicitia* see Lintott (1993), 32ff., and Kaizer (2010), 16-22.

⁸⁷ See Wardle (2014), 354ff., for a detailed discussion.

57.17.4-5), it is clear that Octavian could not have tolerated the exercise of *tutela* over foreign dynasts by provincial governors. The asymmetrical nature of the social relationship between the guardian and the ward would have formed a personal bond of dependence between the governor and the “client” king. In turn, this would have augmented governor’s *auctoritas* and threatened not only Octavian’s position as *primus inter pares* but also the unity of the Roman world.

This is why, in the aftermath of the victory at Actium Octavian was carefully erecting an edifice of his own diplomatic achievements by making dispositions among Rome’s allied kings in the East and redistributing the territories they controlled. Many kings appointed by Marcus Antonius in 37-36 BCE were outside the ruling dynasties and owed everything to the triumvir, becoming his clients. Surprisingly, the triumphant young Caesar retained most of them in power and removed from power only those who had caused significant harm or committed crimes against the Roman citizens (Suet. *Aug.* 48).⁸⁸ For instance, Polemon I of Pontus, who was first made king by Marcus Antonius, sent troops to him before Actium but also hedged his bets by not showing up in person at his camp. After Actium, Octavian allowed Polemon to keep his kingdom, but the king lost Armenia Minor. The confirmation of his position by the Senate was also delayed until 26 BCE.⁸⁹ More importantly, Polemon, who incurred a debt of honor, became

⁸⁸ “Regnorum quibus belli iure potitus est, praeter pauca, aut iisdem quibus ademerat reddidit aut alienigenis contribuit.” Cf. also Dio Cass. 51.2.1-3 and 54.9.2-3. For details on individual kings, see Magie (1950), 1:442-445, and Wardle (2014), 353, who also provides the useful lists of those who kept their kingdoms and those who lost them.

⁸⁹ See Dio Cass. 54.9.2 for the bestowal of Armenia Minor on Artavasdes of Atropatene and Dio Cass. 53.25.1 and Bringmann (2007), 133f. for the Senate’s enrollment of Polemon among the friends and allies of the Roman people.

a client of Octavian. Short of saving the princeps' life, how else could the king reciprocate the emperor in full for letting him keep the kingdom? Hence, perpetual clientage.⁹⁰

Daly argues that Gallus' downfall was caused by his indiscretion and arrogance after his return to Rome and postulates a direct link between the prefect's demise and the Quintus Caecilius Epirota's affair.⁹¹ While it is plausible that Gallus was not recalled from Egypt but crossed Octavian during his visit to Rome, the incident with Epirota had nothing to do with the prefect's ruin.⁹² In my view, the true cause of Gallus' demise was excessive bragging about his Egyptian achievements, the ostentation meant to win him a social grant of glory, reputation, and prestige from the fellow equites in Rome. The Philae inscription claims several important achievements on behalf of Gallus: (1) suppression of the Thebaid revolt; (2) organization of a punitive expedition into Lower Nubia; (3) active diplomatic engagement with the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush; and (4) installation of a *tyrannos* in the Triacontaschoenus (*ILS* 8995).⁹³ In contrast to the duplex inscription on the Vatican obelisk (*AE* 1964, no. 255 = *EJ*, 169, no. 374), where Gallus states that he built the Forum Iulium on Octavian's orders, the Philae inscription

⁹⁰ To Publilius Syrus mind, "Beneficium accipere libertatem est vendere" (Friedrich (1880), B5). For more details, see Chapter IV, pp. 344ff.

⁹¹ See Daly (1979), 296f. Suetonius mentions that Octavian was greatly offended by the fact that Quintus Caecilius Epirota, who had been suspected of adultery with the wife of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, was living most intimately with Gallus (*Gram.* 16).

⁹² For my argument, see above, p. 279f.

⁹³ "... defectionis Thebaidis intra dies XV, quibus hostem vicit bis acie, victor, V urbium expugnator, Boreseos, Copti, Ceramicos, Diospoleos Megales, Ophieu, ducibus earum defectionum interceptis, exercitu ultra Nili catarhacten transducto, in quem locum neque populo Romano neque regibus Aegypti arma sunt polata, Thebaide communi omnium regum formidine subacta, legatis regis Aethiopum ad Philas auditis, eodem rege in tutelam recepto, tyranno Triacontaschoeni in Aethiopiae constituto"

significantly fails to mention by whose authority the prefect engaged in all the above-mentioned activities.

In what follows, I suggest that Gallus overstepped his authority as the prefect of Alexandria and Egypt once he used the uprising in Upper Egypt as a pretext to augment his acquired honor and lay claim to *virtus* which the young Caesar considered his own. The prefect's diplomatic activities were especially affronting to the princeps since they appeared to put the equestrian Gallus in direct competition with the most powerful aristocrat of the Roman world. Poet's boasting in Rome about his diplomatic achievements was perhaps simply meant to win him goodwill among his fellow equites. To onlookers, however, he was poaching on Octavian's turf, trying to augment his acquired honor at the princeps' expense. Once the emperor was informed that Gallus was playing a public game of push and shove that was appropriate only between social equals, he officially renounced friendship with the haughty prefect and banned him from entering the imperial provinces (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6).⁹⁴ This prohibition was probably meant to prevent Gallus from returning to Egypt where he could attempt to stir up trouble by recruiting the legionaries personally loyal to him.

As the prefect of Alexandria and Egypt, it was Cornelius Gallus' responsibility to suppress the revolt in the Thebaid.⁹⁵ However, leading the Roman forces beyond the first Cataract of the

⁹⁴ For an agonistic culture of the ancient Mediterranean characterized by challenge-riposte communication among social equals, see Malina (1991b), 29-32. For *amicitiam renuntiare*, see Rogers (1959), especially 227 and 229.

⁹⁵ According to Tacitus, an imperial legate had the authority to use military force to suppress acts of hostility in his province: "Si quid hostile ingruat, quem iustius arma oppositum quam qui legati auctoritatem et propria mandata acceperit?" (*Ann.* 2.77.1). Cf. also *Dig.* 1.16.8 (Ulp. *Ad Edict.* 39) and Millar (2002), 274. At the same time, Gallus probably made costly *faux pas* when he advertised on the public monument the fact of the revolt. See footnote n. 73 above.

Nile, outside the southern border of the Roman Egypt, perhaps required a prior authorization from Octavian, who kept Egypt under his direct control.⁹⁶ In the late 20s BCE, Marcus Primus, proconsul of Macedonia from 24 to 23, was prosecuted by a *iudicium publicum* for the very similar offence: he waged war against the Odrysae outside his province and without authorization from the Senate (Dio Cass. 54.3.2-4).⁹⁷ On the one hand, Gallus could legitimize his expedition into the “Land of the Thirty ‘Schoinoi’” by declaring that this territory had been part of the Ptolemaic Kingdom. The fact that the Philae inscription uses the Ptolemaic administrative name Triacontaschoenus to designate Lower Nubia lends additional support to this hypothesis. On the other hand, any such claim would have been weakened by the prefect’s assertion that he was the first general to have successfully penetrated into the region to which the kings of Egypt had never carried their arms (*ILS* 8995).⁹⁸ Regardless of the possible line of defense chosen by the poet, neither Octavian nor the Senate would have been impressed by his unauthorized military expedition against the inhabitants of the Triacontaschoenus in 29 BCE. It is significant that the *Res Gestae* never mentions Cornelius Gallus’ incursions into Lower Nubia, but it discusses in detail how the prefect Publius Petronius (24-22 BCE) waged a campaign against the “Ethiopians” under the emperor’s command and auspices (*RG* 26.5).⁹⁹

⁹⁶ We know that Magius Maximus (14-15 CE), the last prefect of Alexandria and Egypt appointed by Augustus, used to receive written instructions from the emperor (Philo *In Flacc.* 10.74). Gallus probably received them too.

⁹⁷ Most likely, Primus was found guilty as charged and condemned to exile and confiscation. See my discussion above, pp. 276f.

⁹⁸ See Minas-Nerpel (2010), 291, and cf. my discussion above, pp. 291-294.

⁹⁹ “Meo iussu et auspicio ducti sunt duo exercitus eodem fere tempore in Aethiopiam et in Arabiam quae appellatur Eudaemon, magnaue hostium gentis utriusque copiae caesae sunt in acie et complura oppida capta. In Aethiopiam usque ad oppidum Nabata perventum est, cui proxima est Meroe.” Classical authors referred to the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush as *Aithiopia*. See Török (1997), 69-73, and footnote n. 22 above. For details of Petronius’ expedition, see Cooley (2009), 224-228, and Török (2009), 441f.

The same is true about the prefect's diplomatic activities; they could easily be interpreted as in direct competition with the foreign policy pursued by Octavian. As I discuss above, in the aftermath of Actium the princeps was busy making Marcus Antonius' client kings personally loyal to himself. This is why Gallus' unauthorized installation of a *tyrannos* in the Triacostaschoenus was most unfortunate. Similar to the provincial governors of the Republican period, the prefect of Alexandria and Egypt had a vested interest in augmenting his own ascribed honor. One way to do this was to acquire prominent native clients who would defer to his wishes. The *tyrannos* of the Triacostaschoenus perfectly fitted the profile as his title harkened back to a native tribal chief who used to govern the non-Egyptian population of Lower Nubia in 149/148 BCE.¹⁰⁰ Although the Philae inscription does not give the *tyrannos*' name, he might have been the Kuper whose deified sons were venerated in the Temple of Dendur constructed by Augustus.¹⁰¹ Minas-Nerpel persuasively argues that Gallus set up the Triacostaschoenus not as a client state but as a part of the Roman Egypt that retained some local autonomy.¹⁰² The problem was that the *tyrannos* appointed by the prefect to govern this territory was personally loyal to him, not to Octavian. What is even worse is that Cornelius Gallus chose to brag about exercising *tutela* over the Meroitic king, further jeopardizing his own standing with the young Caesar.

In the Latin version of the Philae inscription, the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt toots his own horn when he claims to have received into guardianship the king of the "Ethiopians" (*ILS* 8995).¹⁰³ Although none of the versions of the inscription mentions the king by name, most

¹⁰⁰ For details, see Eide (1996), 631-635 and 693.

¹⁰¹ See Aldred (1978), 30f.

¹⁰² See Minas-Nerpel (2010), 287ff. Cf. also Török (1997), 449f., and Costabile (2001), 317.

¹⁰³ "... eodem rege in tutelam receptor...."

likely he is identical with Teriteqas, who is attested in two Meroitic cursive inscriptions.¹⁰⁴ As I demonstrate above, *tutela* did not just provide protection per se; it created an asymmetrical social relationship characterized by the grave imbalance of power.¹⁰⁵ On the one hand, Alföldy suggests that Cornelius Gallus placed King Teriteqas under the protection of Rome, and Burstein even postulates that the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush had to accept the status of a protectorate and pay tribute.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, Minas-Nerpel, who correctly points out that King Teriteqas could not have been recognized as the *amicus et socius Romani*, nevertheless views the ruler of Meroe as a personal client of Cornelius Gallus. She asserts that the king made himself Gallus' client simply by sending an embassy to him.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, Török claims that the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt made the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush a client state of Rome.¹⁰⁸

Yet, it appears that a formal request from a king to appoint the Roman people as the protector of the king's heir was a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of *tutela*.¹⁰⁹ There is no evidence that the king of Meroe/Kush ever asked Gallus to be a guardian of his heir or his kingdom. This is why I think there was no formal *tutela* ever set up; the prefect simply exploited the fact of receiving the Meroitic embassy to augment his personal acquired honor by claiming in the Latin

¹⁰⁴ See Hintze (1959), 25f., and Eide (1996), 715-718.

¹⁰⁵ See my discussion above, pp. 296f.

¹⁰⁶ See Alföldy (1990), 99, and Burstein (1988).

¹⁰⁷ See Minas-Nerpel (2010), 285f.

¹⁰⁸ According to Török (1997), 450, Gallus' installation of the *tyrannos* in the Triacontaschoenus and his exercise of *tutela* over the Meroitic king "represented a first step towards establishing a client kingdom and later the annexing of the whole kingdom of Meroe."

¹⁰⁹ Such a request was usually recorded in royal wills. For details, see Braund (1984), 136ff. and 144-147.

version of the Philae inscription to have established *tutela* over King Teriteqas.¹¹⁰ In the limited-good world of the ancient Mediterranean, any spectacular deed that could add to one's acquired honor or *virtus* required not only instantaneous witness and evaluation by others but also subsequent proper interpretation and commemoration by a variety of "monuments."¹¹¹ Hence, the desire to exaggerate one's achievements and aggrandize was rampant. To Cornelius Gallus' mind, the mere fact of receiving envoys of King Teriteqas was enough to declare himself the guardian of the Kingdom of Meroe/Kush.

In contrast to the Latin version, the Greek version of the Philae inscription significantly reverses the roles: it states that Gallus actually accepted a proxeny from the king of Meroe/Kush.¹¹² Before and during the Classical Greek period, the term proxeny usually denoted an honorific status bestowed by Greek city-states on non-citizens who, in this manner, became their *proxenoi*. After a polis selected its own representative, a kind of honorary consul called the *proxenos*, from among the citizens of the host city-state, he would represent the interests of the polis in his own political community and facilitate good relations between the two states. In particular, the *proxenos* would serve as the intermediary for the polis' citizens in his own city and assist them with access to local civic institutions and networks. The grant of proxeny expressed "official friendship" between the polis and the *proxenos*, and the position was often

¹¹⁰ Cf. Locher (2002), 93f., n. 55, who points out that Gallus' claim cannot be taken at face value.

¹¹¹ For the models, see Holliday (2002), 5; Roller (2004), 3-6; and Chapter I, pp. 64f. and 74ff.

¹¹² "... προξενίαν παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως λαβών...." Minas-Nerpel (2010), 286, says, "The *proxenia*, granted mostly to major benefactors from a foreign city or country, was a very special honour. In regards to events on Philae, it would mean that the mediators brought with them a document of the *proxenos*-declaration for Gallus. The prefect would thus have become a *proxenos* of the Meroitic king."

much coveted because of the various honors and privileges the *proxenos* obtained in exchange for his services. The interstate institution of *proxenoi* slowly lost its real content when the Greek cities of the Hellenistic period began to confer the proxeny and honorary citizenship at the same time as distinctions of honor. By the Late Hellenistic period, the proxeny became little more than a title of honor. Yet, an inscription recently discovered in Chersonesus Tauricus indicates that it was still used as late as the second century CE to facilitate friendly relations between an allied Greek polis and a Roman financial procurator with military powers (*AE* 1996, no. 1359).¹¹³

Török argues that the fact that the author of the Greek version of the Philae inscription used the archaizing term proxeny means that Cornelius Gallus took on responsibility to represent the interests of King Teriteqas in Rome.¹¹⁴ This is highly unlikely. Why would a self-aggrandizing member of the Roman ruling elite agree to accept a subordinate position and serve as an intermediary of the king in Rome, especially immediately after the prefect beat off a Meroitic attempt to get firmly established in the Triacostaschoenus? To my mind, the Greek version that emphasizes Gallus' acceptance of a proxeny from King Teriteqas simply corrects the excesses of the Latin version that claims that the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt took the king of Meroe/Kush into *tutela*. Thus, the term proxeny should be understood simply as a title of honor, a kind of diplomatic etiquette intended to help establish friendly relations between King Teriteqas and the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt.

¹¹³ For details, see Haensch (2009).

¹¹⁴ See Török (2009), 434f.

This being said, Cornelius Gallus' flamboyant desire to be the pivot of the Meroitic-Roman relations is remarkable; it testifies to his mulish adherence to the traditional Republican ways of honor acquisition and self-aggrandizement the young Caesar was eventually so successful in stamping out.¹¹⁵ In 24 BCE, shortly after Gallus' demise, the army of Meroe/Kush seized the Triacontaschoenus and even occupied the islands of Elephantine and Philae as well as the city of Syene, all in the vicinity of the First Cataract that served as the border of the Roman Egypt. The Meroites carried off prisoners and statues of Augustus. A year later, the forces of Publius Petronius, the prefect of Alexandria and Egypt (24-22 BCE), re-conquered the Triacontaschoenus.¹¹⁶ In retaliation for the Meroitic sneak attack on the Roman territory, Petronius' legionaries marched all way up to Primis, which was located some 150 miles south of the Roman Egypt, and then razed to the ground Napata, the capital of Meroe. After fortifying Primis and leaving there provisions to feed four hundred men for two years, the prefect went back to Alexandria. Two years later, when the supplies in the fortress were running low, Queen Amanirenas, who had succeeded King Teriteqas, marched against Primis, but, to her surprise, Petronius arrived there first with the reinforcements.¹¹⁷ Then the queen sent envoys to negotiate a peace treaty with Petronius (Strabo 17.1.53-54).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ For details, see Chapter I of my dissertation, where I explicate the intricate relationship between demonstrating military courage in battle, acquiring honor that propelled a person into a magistracy with imperium, and constructing an auspicious public image that enabled the man to win a grant of social distinction from others by engaging in brinkmanship and launching wars of aggression against the "barbarians" and Greeks alike.

¹¹⁶ For the Greek epigram composed by Iunius Sabinus, the commander of the three Roman cohorts from Syene that participated in the punitive expedition against the Meroites, see Eide (1996), 713ff.

¹¹⁷ See *Ibid.*, 718-723, for the primary sources and a useful overview related to the reign of Queen Amanirenas.

¹¹⁸ See also *RG* 26.5; *Plin. HN* 6.35.181-182; and *Dio Cass.* 54.5.4-6.

Strabo says: “When the envoys arrived, [Petronius] ordered them to negotiate with Caesar. But when they asserted that they did not know who Caesar was and where they needed to go to meet him, [Petronius] gave them escorts. And they went to Samos because Caesar was there...” (17.1.54).¹¹⁹ Based on the information provided by Strabo, Minas-Nerpel cogently argues that Cornelius Gallus focused the relationship between Rome and the Kingdom of Meroe exclusively on his person. She makes two important observations: (1) once Cornelius Gallus left Egypt and the new prefect Aelius Gallus (27-24 BCE) replaced him, King Teriteqas did not feel bound any longer to the peace settlement he had negotiated with the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt in 29 BCE and (2) Strabo’s account demonstrates that Cornelius Gallus kept the Meroites in the dark about his actual position in Rome’s hierarchy, withholding from them information about the real master of Egypt.¹²⁰

In the end, the equestrian Gallus paid dearly for his adherence to the traditional Republican ways of honor acquisition that emphasized displaying “aggressive courage” in battle, laying independent claim to *virtus*, and widely advertising one’s achievements. Octavian, the budding Machiavellian prince who blatantly utilized the achievements of others in order to increase his own relative “honor rating” and establish himself superior beyond competition, on principle would not tolerate the “insolence” of self-aggrandizement on the part of others, especially in the provinces that were instrumental for securing his sole control of the Roman world. After Cornelius Gallus returned to Rome, where he must have unwisely boasted about his Egyptian achievements, the poet’s “friend” Valerius Largus denounced him for self-aggrandizement and

¹¹⁹ “... πρεσβευσαμένων, ἐκέλευσεν ὡς Καίσαρα πρεσβεύεσθαι· οὐκ εἰδέναί δὲ φασκόντων, ὅστις εἶη Καῖσαρ καὶ ὅπη βαδιστέον εἶη παρ’ αὐτόν, ἔδωκε τοὺς παραπέμψοντας· καὶ ἦκον εἰς Σάμον, ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Καίσαρος ὄντος...”

¹²⁰ See Minas-Nerpel (2010), 289ff.

indulging in disrespectful gossip against the princeps. Then the young Caesar banned Cornelius Gallus from his house and prohibited him from entering the imperial provinces (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6).¹²¹ The emperor's formal renunciation of friendship opened the hunting season on Gallus. After a flood of private accusations as well as the Senate's unanimous vote to convict Gallus in the jury courts, exile him, and give his confiscated estate to Augustus, the poet committed suicide in 27 or 26 BCE (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6-7).

Egypt's Special Place in Augustus' Schemes

Some ancient authors mistakenly viewed Egypt as a personal possession of Augustus (cf. Philo *In Flacc.* 19.158). However, there is no evidence that the princeps directly owned estates in Egypt, even though his close relatives, friends, and successors did.¹²² As Geraci points out, the presence of imperial properties in the province makes it illogical to characterize Egypt as the "private preserve" of the emperor.¹²³ Egypt should rather be seen as a unique province (Suet. *Aug.* 18.2; cf. *RG* 27.1) kept under the direct control of the imperial house and governed by an equestrian prefect whose status was too low to effectively challenge the princeps' *auctoritas* there (cf. Tac. *Hist.* 1.11).¹²⁴

¹²¹ Cf. also footnote n. 14 above.

¹²² Rostovzeff (1963), 671, provides a list of ten senators and equites who owned land in Egypt under the Julio-Claudians (mostly under Augustus). We also know that the princeps' relatives and friends, Livia, Antonia the Younger, Germanicus, and Maecenas, were large landowners there.

¹²³ For details, see Geraci (1983), 128-146, and (1988).

¹²⁴ For a useful discussion of how Roman aristocrats could use their *auctoritas* to wield substantial power over provincials, see Drogula (2011), 252-256.

As a result of the “First Settlement” of 27 BCE, Augustus kept control over the provinces of Cilicia, Syria, Egypt, Gaul, and Spain, where twenty or twenty-one legions were stationed (Suet. *Aug.* 47.1 and Dio Cass. 53.12.7).¹²⁵ However, as the princeps and the generals fighting under his auspices gradually conquered territories all the way to the Danube, the six or seven legions of Illyricum and Macedonia were transferred to the newly established imperial provinces of Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Moesia.¹²⁶ This development left only one legion, the III *Augusta*, stationed in Africa under the control of the Senate. By contrast, Egypt became the most carefully guarded of all the imperial provinces since it was the most populous and richest region in the Roman Empire. Diodorus Siculus maintains that there were at least seven million people living in Egypt in his day (1.31.8); according to the census, more than three hundred thousand free residents lived in Alexandria alone (17.52.6).¹²⁷ King Ptolemy XII Auletes (80-58 and 55-51 BCE), the father of Cleopatra VII, extracted from Egypt between six thousand (Diod. Sic. 17.52.6) and twelve thousand and five hundred talents a year (Strabo 17.1.13). Of course, Auletes’ subjects were oppressed by heavy taxes imposed on them by the king who needed to recuperate his expenses related to bribing the Roman dynasts and governors. Yet, the young Caesar should have been able to collect from Egypt at least four or five thousand talents a year in taxes.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Cf. also Strabo 17.3.25.

¹²⁶ Cf. Wilkes (1996), 565-573.

¹²⁷ Similarly, Josephus estimates the population of Egypt without Alexandria at seven million and five hundred thousand inhabitants from the poll-tax returns (*BJ* 2.16.4.385).

¹²⁸ For Egypt as one of the main revenue producing provinces, see Vell. Pat. 2.39.2; Strabo 17.1.12; and Huzar (1988), 370-379. Cf. also Josephus, who probably exaggerates when he declares that Egypt yielded more than twelve times as much revenue as the province of Judaea did (*BJ* 2.16.4.386).

As early as 30 BCE, Octavian prohibited senators and distinguished equites to enter Egypt without his express permission. In order to own land and live in Egypt, a senator needed a personal authorization from the new master of Egypt.¹²⁹ According to Tacitus, the emperor was concerned that a potential usurper could seize the province and then exert pressure on the populace of Rome by withholding grain supplies (*Tac. Ann.* 2.59.3).¹³⁰ Brunt dismisses Tacitus' and Dio's reports as a mere historical anachronism that retrojects the conditions of later times back to the reign of Augustus.¹³¹ However, Orosius reports that a Roman senator named Q. Ovinius was one of the few people put to death in the aftermath of Cleopatra's suicide (6.19.20). The prominent Roman had disgraced his rank by supervising the queen's textile factories, and his fate must have served as an admonitory example to Roman aristocrats wishing to enrich themselves by taking advantage of the economic power-base available in Egypt.

More importantly, in 29 BCE Octavian reaffirmed the Republican system by which members of the Senate were required to maintain a residence in Rome. Now, with the exception of traveling to Sicily, senators could not even leave Italy without emperor's permission (*Dio Cass.* 52.42.6-7).¹³² Furthermore, in 27 BCE the princeps directed all retiring governors to return to

¹²⁹ Dio Cassius says, “Οὐδενὶ βουλευτῆ ἢ οὐχ ὅπως ἐγχειρίσαι αὐτὴν ἐτόλμησεν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐνεπιδημεῖν αὐτῇ ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκεν, ἂν μὴ τι αὐτὸς ὄνομαστί συγχωρήσῃ” (51.17.1). Cf. also *Tac. Hist.* 1.11. Rostovzeff (1963), 671, provides a list of ten senators and equites who owned land in Egypt under the Julio-Claudians (mostly under Augustus).

¹³⁰ “Nam Augustus, inter alia dominationis arcana, vetitis nisi permissu ingredi senatoribus aut equitibus Romanis inlustribus, seposuit Aegyptum, ne fame urgeret Italiam quisquis eam provinciam claustraque terrae ac maris quamvis levi praesidio adversum ingentis exercitus insedisset.”

¹³¹ See Brunt (1983), 61ff.

¹³² Cf. *Tac. Ann.* 12.23.1 and *Dio Cass.* 60.25.6 on Claudius extending the range of travel to include Narbonese Gaul. For details, see Reinhold (1988), 212f., and Drogula (2011), 243-256.

Rome from their provinces within three months of the arrival of their successors (Dio Cass. 53.15.6). Drogula argues that all these prohibitions, which were quite new and unprecedented, must have been a part of the princeps' more subtle efforts to secure the sole control of the Roman state.¹³³ This is true, but one further caveat can be added here. I suggest that Augustus' negative program of prohibitions was partially influenced by the steps he needed to take to mitigate Cornelius Gallus' actions in Egypt and his ostentatious bragging in Rome.¹³⁴ Not only did the princeps officially renounce friendship with the conceited prefect, but he also banned him from entering the imperial provinces (Suet. *Aug.* 66.2 and Dio Cass. 53.23.6).¹³⁵ This interdict was probably meant to prevent the equestrian poet from returning to Egypt, where he could attempt to stir up trouble by recruiting the soldiers personally loyal to him.

Thus, the princeps' negative program of prohibitions was brought into being partially because of the actions of some members of the Roman governing elite who continuously tested the limits of one's freedom of self-aggrandizement under the new regime. The young Caesar implemented travel bans for senators and specific timeframes for retiring provincial governors so that nobody could use his family name and acquired honor and *auctoritas* to gain control over a military force stationed in one of the frontier provinces or undermine the authority of an imperial legate in a province and begin an insurrection.¹³⁶ Provincial governors often used their honor and *dignitas* to command deference from the provincials in order to administer their provinces

¹³³ See *Ibid.*, 244f.

¹³⁴ For 27 BCE as the year of Gallus' downfall, see footnote n. 17 above.

¹³⁵ For details, see p. 300 above.

¹³⁶ According to Tacitus, Tiberius (14-37 CE) became very upset when his adopted son Germanicus entered Egypt in 19 CE without securing prior permission from the princeps (*Ann.* 2.59.1-3).

most effectively.¹³⁷ However, the appearance of another prominent aristocrat could easily undercut their power to command obedience. For example, Philo describes how the unexpected arrival of King Herod Agrippa in Alexandria drew the ire of both Aulus Avilius Flaccus (33-38 CE), the prefect of Alexandria and Egypt under Tiberius and Caligula (37-41 CE), and Flaccus' friends (*In Flacc.* 5.30-31).

Conclusion

Ovid says, "The reproach against Gallus was not that he had celebrated Lycoris, but that he failed to hold his tongue after too much wine" (*Tr.* 2.445-446).¹³⁸ Writing some hundred and ten years later, Suetonius mentions Gallus' "ungrateful and spiteful spirit" as the reason for Octavian's formal renunciation of his friendship and the prohibition for the disgraced prefect to enter imperial provinces (*Suet. Aug.* 66.2).¹³⁹ In my view, the demise of the equestrian Gaius Cornelius Gallus was caused by superfluous boasting about his Egyptian achievements, the ostentation meant to win him a social grant of glory, reputation, and prestige from the fellow equites in Rome. Accustomed to the traditional Republican ways of honor acquisition and *virtus* augmentation, the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt aspired to the leadership style characteristic of the generals and governors of the Middle and Late Republic. However, he

¹³⁷ For an insightful discussion, see Lendon (1997), 191-222.

¹³⁸ The translation is that of Hollis (2007), 220: "Non fuit opprobrio celebrasse Lycorida Gallo, / sed linguam nimio non tenuisse mero." Cf. also Dio Cass. 53.23.5, where the historian comments on imprudent remarks and idle gossip made by Gallus.

¹³⁹ "... alteri ob ingratum et malivolum animum domo et provinciis suis interdixit." See also *Ov. Am.* 3.9.63-64: "Tu quoque, si falsum est temerati crimen amici, / sanguinis atque animae prodige Galle tuae." Finally, cf. Dio Cass. 53.23.6 and footnote n. 14 above.

failed to comprehend the *Zeitgeist* and understand Octavian's sensitivities regarding inappropriate claims to *virtus* and subsequent *honor* by members of the Roman governing elite.

It is significant that Dio's account of Gallus' downfall sharply contrasts the prefect's actions with those of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (cos. 37, 28, and 27 BCE), who not only repaired and adorned the edifice in the Campus Martius, naming it the Saepta Iulia in honor of Augustus, but also never claimed a share in the glory of the princeps (Dio Cass. 53.23.1-7).¹⁴⁰ By contrast, in the Philae inscription Cornelius Gallus claims for himself several important military and diplomatic achievements (*ILS* 8995).¹⁴¹ Unlike Gallus' duplex inscription on the Vatican obelisk (*AE* 1964, no. 255 = *EJ*, 169, no. 374), which clearly states that the Forum Iulium in Alexandria was constructed on Octavian's orders, the Philae inscription notably fails to reveal by whose authority the the first prefect of Alexandria and Egypt engaged in all the above-mentioned activities.

Gallus' bold military actions that extended beyond the borders of the Roman Egypt probably were not authorized by the young Caesar who was rapidly augmenting his acquired honor through the victories of his generals who acted as his legates and fought "under [his] standards" or "by [his] command and under [his] auspices" (*RG* 26.5). Similar to Marcus Licinius Crassus and Marcus Primus, the equestrian poet tested the limits of one's freedom of self-aggrandizement

¹⁴⁰ In particular, Dio Cassius says, "Καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως φθόνον τινὰ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὠφλίσκανεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἐτιμᾶτο (αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὰ φιλανθρωπότατα καὶ τὰ εὐκλεέστατα τὰ τε συμφορώτατα καὶ συμβουλεύων οἱ καὶ συμπράττων οὐδ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῆς δόξης αὐτῶν ἀντεποιεῖτο, ταῖς τε παρ' αὐτοῦ τιμαῖς οὔτε ἐς πλεονεξίαν οὔτε ἐς ἀπόλαυσιν ἰδίαν ἐχρῆτο, ἀλλ' ἐς τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐς τὸ τῷ δημοσίῳ συμφέρον)..." (53.23.3-5).

¹⁴¹ For details, see above, pp. 299f.

under the new regime. In order to win a social grant of glory, reputation, and prestige from the fellow equites in Rome, Cornelius Gallus tried to augment his acquired honor by asserting for himself the traditional Republican mantle of martial valor. However, the young Caesar had no tolerance for those who laid independent claim to their own manliness exemplified by “aggressive courage” in battle, especially in Egypt that filled the treasury with taxes and provided the capital with grain (cf. Dio Cass. 51.17.1).¹⁴² Not only could such claims jeopardize Augustus’ status of *primus inter pares*, but they could also challenge the princeps’ monopoly of power over the military, the control that was essential to any lasting peace from civil war in the Roman world.

Moreover, Gallus’ dealings with foreign ambassadors, his installment of a *tyrannos* in the Triacontaschoenus, and especially his claim to have exercised *tutela* over the Meroitic king appeared to put the equestrian prefect in direct competition with the young Caesar. Such hubris and shameless self-promotion must have been particularly affronting to Octavian who used diplomacy as yet another instrument to augment his acquired honor and *auctoritas*. The paramount importance of controlling the foreign policy of the Roman state as well as the abysmal depth of Cornelius Gallus’ diplomatic transgression can be illustrated by the following example. After Publius Petronius, the prefect of Alexandria and Egypt (24-22 BCE), punished the Meroites for their perfidious attack on the Roman Egypt by conquering Primis and destroying Napata, the capital of Meroe/Kush, Queen Amonirenas sent envoys to discuss terms of a peace treaty with him. However, Petronius promptly sent the Meroitic envoys to Samos, insisting that

¹⁴² Cf. footnotes nos. 12 and 13 above. For the concept of manliness exemplified by “aggressive courage” demonstrated on the battlefield, see McDonnell (2006), who examines the changing usage of the notion of *virtus* from the Early to the Late Republic; William V. Harris (2006), 316; and Chapter I, pp. 22f. and 59f.

they needed to negotiate with the princeps himself (Strabo 17.1.54).¹⁴³ The prefect of Alexandria and Egypt must have remembered very well why Augustus formally renounced friendship with Gaius Cornelius Gallus and what happened to him immediately afterwards.

¹⁴³ “... πρεσβευσαμένων, ἐκέλευσεν ὡς Καίσαρα πρεσβεύεσθαι· οὐκ εἰδέναι δὲ φασκόντων, ὅστις εἶη Καῖσαρ καὶ ὅπη βαδιστέον εἶη παρ’ αὐτόν, ἔδωκε τοὺς παραπέμψοντας· καὶ ἦκον εἰς Σάμον, ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Καίσαρος ὄντος....” See also *RG* 26.5; Plin. *HN* 6.35.181-182; and Dio Cass. 54.5.4-6.

CHAPTER IV: AUGUSTAN *AUCTORITAS* AS THE BASIS FOR HIS TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

When Tricho, a Roman eques who had flogged his son to death, was attacked by the fuming mob, it required all of Augustus' *auctoritas* to save him (Sen. *Clem.* 1.15.1).¹ In the *Res Gestae*, the emperor himself boasts of his preeminent *auctoritas*. He says, "After this time [27 BCE], I surpassed all in *auctoritas*, but I had no more *potestas* than any others who were my colleagues in each magistracy" (*RG* 34.3).² Suetonius also cites a portion of an otherwise unknown edict of Augustus, where the emperor wishes to be called *optimi status auctor* (*Aug.* 28.2). Finally, Aulus Gellius preserves a fragment of Augustus' letter to Gaius, where the emperor says he hopes to spend his remaining years in *statu rei publicae felicissimo* (*NA* 15.7.3).³ Since the emperor always took great care to express himself as clearly as possible (Suet. *Aug.* 86.1), a question arises as to why in the climactic section of his work Augustus chooses to differentiate between the two aspects of his power, accentuating his *auctoritas* and deemphasizing *potestates* he held?

¹ "Trichonem equitem Romanum memoria nostra, quia filium suum flagellis occiderat, populus graphiis in foro confodit; vix illum Augusti Caesaris auctoritas infestis tam patrum quam filiorum manibus eripuit."

² "Post id tempus auctoritate (= ἀξιωματι) omnibus praestiti, potestatis (= ἐξουσία) autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri, qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt." For a range of meanings of ἀξίωμα, see Lendon (1997), 277.

³ In the edict and the letter, Augustus builds upon Cicero's definition of the ideal republic as the "*optimus status civitatis*" (*Q. Fr.* 3.5.1). See Lepore (1954), 21ff. and 292ff., as well as Galinsky (1996), 73ff. For a range of translations of the phrase *optimi status auctor*, see Wardle (2005), 188-192, who dates the edict to the "first constitutional settlement" of 28-27 BCE (*Ibid.*, 200ff.).

Dio remarks that the Latin word *auctoritas* escapes precise translation into Greek (Dio Cass. 55.3.5). In the past, there was a lively debate about the exact meaning of the term, but the emerging consensus is that it designates “aristocratic prestige” or “acquired honor.”⁴ After all, both the Latin *auctoritas* and the Greek ἀξίωμα can be translated as “prestige” or “reputation.”⁵ Following Lendon and Galinsky, I think that Augustus’ *auctoritas* was first and foremost rooted in his personal acquired honor or prestige, which was neither transferable nor potentially limited in scope.⁶ Unlike ascribed honor, which is an affirmation of prestige granted to a person at birth,⁷ individual’s *auctoritas* may increase or decrease as a result of one’s actions, and it needs to be reacquired and confirmed through a constant game of social challenge and riposte.⁸

In the Late Republic, the term *auctoritas* had a range of meanings, but it usually referred to *auctorem esse* or the activity of the *auctor* or *auctores*. For example, the Republican Senate operated not by passing actual legislation, but solely by making recommendations on the basis of

⁴ Von Premerstein (1937), 176ff.; Grant (1946); and Magdelain (1947) argue that the term refers to statutory authority, the view that has been rejected by most scholars. Heinze (1960) provides an exhaustive discussion of the meaning of *auctoritas*. Fürst (1934) and Hellegouarc’h (1963), 295-314 and 330-335, offer a large number of primary sources. Cf. also Béranger (1953), 114-131; Wickert (1954); Ramage (1987), 38-54; Galinsky (1996), 10-41; and Cooley (2009), 271ff. For “aristocratic prestige,” see Lendon (1997), 129, n. 111. For “acquired honor,” see Malina (2001a), 32ff.

⁵ See *OLD* (2012), s.v. “Auctoritas,” and *LSJ* (1996), s.v. “Ἀξίωμα.”

⁶ For details, see Lendon (1997), 129 and 275ff., and Galinsky (1996), 10-41. Cf. also Reinhold (2002), 63ff., who points out that in the agonistic culture genuine *auctoritas* would be attained through the approbation of one’s achievements by his fellow citizens, making it nontransferable and potentially unlimited in scope.

⁷ See Malina (2001a), 32ff.

⁸ Cf. Galinsky (1996), 14ff., and Malina (2001a), 33ff.

its prestige, using its immense *auctoritas* to make or break laws.⁹ The threat of the general censure of the senators was overpowering (Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 12.3 and *Caes.* 10.11), and the tactics of honoring people to induce them to do one's bidding were widespread.¹⁰ However, the Senate depended on the general consensus in order to exercise its *auctoritas*; it became ever harder to realize such consensus after the Gracchan turmoil.¹¹ This is why Cicero's ideal constitution stipulates that the people enact the laws while the Senate uses its *auctoritas* to determine their content (*Laws* 3.28).¹² Likewise, in the beginning of the two climactic chapters of the *Res Gestae*, Augustus points out to the universal consensus by which he held absolute power prior to 27 BCE (*RG* 34.1).¹³

During the Republic, *auctoritas* was not limited to the clout enjoyed by the Senate; prominent Roman citizens wielded *auctoritas* as well, and they were not shy to flaunt it.¹⁴ Cicero implicitly defines political power as *auctoritas et gratia*.¹⁵ Presenting Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus' qualifications for command in the East, the orator lists *auctoritas* among the four

⁹ See Bleicken (1955).

¹⁰ For specific examples, see Lendon (1997), 56ff.

¹¹ Cf. Galinsky (1996), 14ff., and my discussion in Chapter II, pp. 176-182.

¹² "... cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in senatu sit...."

¹³ "... per consensum universorum potens rerum omnium...." It is significant that the *Res Gestae* also closes with a reference to Augustus' unsurpassed *auctoritas*, which motivated the Senate and people of Rome to hail him as the *pater patriae* (34.3-35.1).

¹⁴ For example, cf. Cic. *Off.* 3.100 (Regulus); *Mur.* 58 (Scipio Africanus); *Off.* 1.79 (Cato); and *Leg. Man.* 43-46 (Pompeius). See also Galinsky (1996), 16 and 395, n. 28, where the author references Livy and Cicero to demonstrate the link between *auctoritas* and the *principes viri*.

¹⁵ See Hellegouarc'h (1963), 307f.

characteristics of a successful general (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28).¹⁶ Similarly, when a tribune of the *plebs* ordered to celebrate the banned Compitalician Games, Quintus Metellus Celer, who was consul-elect for 60 BCE, “as the private citizen (*privatus*) prohibited [the games] to take place, and he achieved through his prestige (*auctoritas*) what he could not yet attain through his legal authority (*potestas*)” (Cic. *Pis.* 4.8).¹⁷ Thus, personal *auctoritas*, or aggregated sway of one’s ascribed and acquired honor, often superseded the power of Roman magistrates.

While in the Late Republic the term *auctoritas* usually referred to the activity of the *auctor*, under the young Caesar the word began to be used exclusively to signify a permanent quality attaching to the *auctor*.¹⁸ A connection between the terms *auctor* and *auctoritas* and the emperor’s role as the exemplar of moral virtue was stressed as well.¹⁹ In fact, the actions Octavian effected in January of 27 BCE demonstrate that he skillfully played the patriotic game of *recusatio*, giving up powers so as to have his standing and *auctoritas* further enhanced by the Senate. After surrendering all his extensive powers to the Senate and the Roman people, the young Caesar obtained a ten-year *imperium*, which enabled him to administer the provinces of Spains, the Gauls, Syria, and Egypt, where most legions were stationed (Dio Cass. 53.12.5-7 and 53.13.1-2). Just as in the case of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus’ *imperium* over all the provinces of Asia Minor (*lex Manilia* of 66 BCE), Octavian’s power was bestowed by the Senate, which was the recognized authority within the traditional *res publica* to legitimize such arrangements. In

¹⁶ “Ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere, scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem.”

¹⁷ “... *privatus fieri vetuit, atque id, quod nondum potestate poterat, obtinuit auctoritate.*” Cf. Galinsky (1996), 16.

¹⁸ For details, see Heinze (1960), 49ff. Cf. also Ramage (1987), 60.

¹⁹ See Hellegouarc’h (1987), 86.

addition, two laurel bough-pots were placed at the entrance to Octavian's house, and he was awarded an oak crown and a gold shield inscribed with the four virtues voted him by the Senate (*RG* 34.2).²⁰

More importantly, the senators followed the proposal of Lucius Munatius Plancus (cos. 42 BCE and censor 22 BCE), the ex-lieutenant of Marcus Antonius who switched sides and revealed the contents of Antonius' will to Octavian (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.83.1-2; Plut. *Ant.* 58.2; and Dio Cass. 50.3.1-5), and granted the emperor the new and defining cognomen Augustus on January 16, 27 BCE (*RG* 34.2).²¹ An alternative cognomen Romulus, earnestly desired by the emperor as acknowledgement of his position as the second founder of Rome who, like his predecessor, was marked out for his task by Jupiter, was eventually rejected because of challenging connotations to the royal status of Romulus, his conflict with his brother Remus (Suet. *Aug.* 7.2), and his murder by his own senators (Livy 1.16.4 and App. *B Civ.* 2.114).²² In addition, the cognomen Romulus had been appropriated by Camillus (Plut. *Cam.* 1.1 and 31.2), Marius (Plut. *Mar.* 27.5), and Julius Caesar, while the cognomen Augustus was exceptional and had no parallels.²³ After genuine debates in the Senate, the title Augustus became an integral part of the First Settlement.²⁴ It signified Octavian's transfer of his extensive *potestates* and

²⁰ For details, see Ramage (1987), 73-99; Galinsky (1996), 80-140; Cooley (2009), 262-269; and Chapter III, pp. 212ff.

²¹ Cf. *PIR*¹ M728; Livy, *Per.* 134.1; Ov. *Fast.* 1.589-590; Vell. Pat. 2.91.1; Suet. *Aug.* 7.2; and Dio Cass. 53.16.6-8. For Plancus and a possible reconstruction of his role in the construction of the name Augustus, see Watkins (1997), 124-127, and Chapter IV, pp. 349ff.

²² Cf. Flor. 2.34.66; Dio Cass. 52.40.1-2 and 53.16.7-8; and Serv. *Aen.* 1.292.

²³ On Julius Caesar's use of the Romulus motif, see Weinstock (1971), 175-199.

²⁴ See Liebeschuetz (1986), 352. Livy, who writes his early books soon after the emperor was given the title, tends to contrast the adjectives *augustus* and *humanus*, implying the superhuman

acquisition of extraordinary personal prestige in return (*RG* 34.1-3). In the *Res Gestae*, the young Caesar clearly links his new cognomen and his *auctoritas*, signaling that he wants to play a role of the “author-initiator” who leads by his moral example in a wide variety of matters.²⁵ In turn, the Senate, which conferred this cognomen on him, recognized that the emperor was the *auctoritas* personified.²⁶

Meyer Reinhold acutely points out,

An unprecedented name, “Augustus” was pregnant with potent polyvalent implications: sanctity; heroization; divine election; mediation between gods and the Roman people; relationship with Romulus, who had founded Rome *augusto augurio*, in the famous phrase of the Roman poet Ennius; association with *auctoritas* and with the sense of “increase” in the root *aug-*, as well as with augury, originally associated with rites of fertility.²⁷

The new honorific title of the emperor was extensively commemorated on coins.²⁸ A sestertius probably minted in one of the eastern mints after 23 BCE depicts Augustus’ bust, with the legend

status of the title’s bearer. See Taylor (1918). On genuine debates in the Senate, see Dio Cass. 53.21.3; 55.25.4-6; and 56.28.4-6. Raaflaub (1990), 417-454, demonstrate that Augustus did not really limit free expression of ideas.

²⁵ For Augustus as the “author-initiator,” see Reinhold (2002), 64. For emperor’s moral leadership, see Galinsky (1996), 12.

²⁶ Cf. the remark of Dio Cassius (53.18.2-3) that the name Augustus “δηλοῖ δ’ ἄλλως τὸ μὲν τὴν τοῦ γένους σφῶν διαδοχὴν, τὸ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀξιώματος λαμπρότητα”; it is significant that the historian uses the same Greek word for *auctoritas* (ἀξίωμα) as is used in the Greek version of the *Res Gestae* 34.3.

²⁷ Reinhold (2002), 64. Cf. Ov. *Fast.* 1.608-616, where the poet associates the word *augustus* with sanctity, augury, and amplification of authority and prestige, and Serv. *Dan.* 7.153.

²⁸ In antiquity, coinage was perhaps the most significant form of art available to disseminate political ideas. While buildings, sculptured portraits or paintings were limited to a specific place and required a presence of a sympathetic viewer to effect their power, practically everyone could be affected by the imagery on coins. The Hellenistic monarchs were the first to exploit the

IMP[ERATOR] AVGVST[VS] TR[IBUNICIA] POT[ESTATE] on the obverse and the legend OB CIVIS SERVATOS inside an oak-wreath in linear circle between two laurel-branches on the reverse.²⁹ After adopting the cognomen Augustus, which acknowledged his past achievements and promised even more spectacular accomplishments in the future, the princeps unmistakably demonstrated that he preferred to lead by *auctoritas*, not by *potentia* or *potestas*.³⁰

Auctoritas and *potestas* were contrasted quite often during the Late Republic, and the young Caesar conscientiously paid respect to Republican precedents. In the *Res Gestae*, the author engages in a process Michel Foucault once perceptively called a “politics of truth.”³¹ In order to assert a total monopoly over “truth,” Augustus constructs his own version of events in which *auctoritas* is brought to the fore so that the emperor could be remembered as advocate of the traditional pre-Gracchan means of coaxing and cooperation.³² Consolidating control over the Roman state, the young Caesar first and foremost strove to establish his *auctoritas* superior beyond competition so that he could serve as the leading power broker who would settle political conflicts without engaging in acts of violence against his fellow citizens. Having assumed, like his adoptive father, the dominating position in the state, the creator of the Principate began to

potential of coins to promote the personality, achievements, and policies of individual rulers. See Pollitt (1986), 25.

²⁹ See *RIC*², 86, no. 549. Cf. the *aurei* and *denarii* from Spanish and Roman mints (*RIC*², 43, nos. 29a and 30a, and 47, nos. 76a and 78).

³⁰ Millar (1973), 59ff., stresses that the vast triumviral powers appropriated by Octavian in 43 BCE were pushing him toward monarchy. Judge (1974), 287, calls attention to the fact that Augustus did not want a constitutionally defined position and just strove to secure a place of utmost honor for himself.

³¹ Foucault (1980), 131.

³² For details, see Galinsky (1996), 14f.

devise multifaceted social and political system that would enable him to hold to his position indefinitely, but without coming to the same end as Julius Caesar. This is one of the reasons why the princeps was unwilling to accept magistracies and extraordinary powers.

In the *Res Gestae*, Augustus provides a long list of his “*res non gestae*.”³³ Among them are his decision to decline the posts of dictator and perpetual consul (*RG* 5);³⁴ his rejection of a request to “be made the sole guardian of laws and customs with supreme *potestas*” (*RG* 6.1), the magistracy the princeps rejected three times (in 19, 18, and 11 BCE) because it was “*contra morem maiorum*”;³⁵ his refusal to become the *pontifex maximus* while Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was still alive (*RG* 10.2); and his nay to accepting crown-gold from municipalities and colonies of Italy (*RG* 21.3).³⁶ The young Caesar also objected to being addressed as *dominus* (Suet. *Aug.* 53). After restoring the Capitoline Temple and the Theater of Pompeius, he refused to have his

³³ Eder (2005), 14.

³⁴ Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.89.5; Suet. *Aug.* 52; and Dio Cass. 54.1.3-4. In 22 BCE, Augustus also refused to accept the office of censor for life (Dio Cass. 54.2.1 and Suet. *Aug.* 27.5). Dio Cassius claims that the princeps did receive the power of the censors for five years in 19 BCE (54.10.5), but most scholars dismiss the historian’s assertion as exaggeration. See Rich (1990), 187.

³⁵ “... curator legum et morum summa potestate solus crearer...” Suetonius maintains that the emperor did accept the post for life (*Aug.* 27.5), and Dio Cassius states that Augustus was elected to the post of supervisor of morals in 19 BCE (54.10.5) and then obtained the same magistracy for another five years in 12 BCE (54.30.1). Although the issue is debated by scholars, the biographer and the historian appear to be confused. Cf. Rich (1990), 187, and Cooley (2009), 130f. At the same time, Augustus did exercise his tribunician *potestas* to pass different legislations. See *RG* 6.2 and Cooley (2009), 131ff.

³⁶ Yet, Augustus did accept the curatorship of the grain-supply during the famine of 22 BCE (*RG* 5.2), and this office probably included some quasi-dictatorial powers. For details, see Chapter III, pp. 246ff. In 19 BCE, the emperor was invited to sit in the curule chair between two consuls and granted the right to use the twelve *fascēs* (Dio Cass. 54.10.5). This lifelong grant of consular *imperium* enabled him to conduct two censuses of 8 BCE and 14 CE (*RG* 8.3-4) to levy the troops. See Jones (1951), 118, and Salmon (1956), 473f.

name inscribed on them (*RG* 20.1).³⁷ Finally, instead of simply expropriating the land for the Temple of Mars Ultor, the Augustan Forum, and the Theater of Marcellus, the emperor used spoils from Philippi and his personal wealth to purchase land in order to complete the projects (*RG* 21.1 and Suet. *Aug.* 56.2).

After 23 BCE, Augustus refused to hold magistracies, and his *recusationes* became one of the prominent characteristics of his reign. However, the princeps used any means to increase his prestige. Since the *gens Octavia* was not particularly distinguished, the young Caesar at first had no claims to *auctoritas* apart from his adoption by Caesar (*App. B Civ.* 3.11-13). Following Cicero's proposal in January of 43 BCE, Octavian was admitted to the Senate and given extraordinary *imperium pro praetore* and a privileged *locus sententiae* (*Cic. Phil.* 5.16.45-5.17.48 and 11.8.20).³⁸ After seizing the consulship by force in August of 43 (*Livy, Per.* 119.6-7),³⁹ Octavian resolved his differences with Marcus Antonius and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus and joined the Second Triumvirate in November of the same year (*App. B Civ.* 4.1-2 and *Dio Cass.* 46.55.3-46.56.1). For the next thirteen years or so, he held on to his supreme triumviral authority which overarched that of consuls and provincial governors (cf. *RG* 7.1).⁴⁰

³⁷ Even though the emperor rejected the honor, the Theater of Pompeius still became known as "theatrum Augustum Pompeianum" (*CIL* VI.9404). Cf. also *RG* 19.1, "porticum ad circum Flaminium, quam sum appellari passus ex nomine eius qui priorem eodem in solo fecerat, Octaviam," and Suet. *Aug.* 31.5. On augmentation of one's honor even from refusal to put his name on a public building, see Eck (1985), 131f.

³⁸ Cf. *RG* 1.2; *Livy, Per.* 118.2; and *Dio Cass.* 46.29.2.

³⁹ Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 26.1 and *Dio Cass.* 46.45.1-46.46.1.

⁴⁰ For details, see Cooley (2009), 134.

As Caesar's heir, Octavian early on assumed the title "*divi Iuli filius*." He widely advertised this connection on coins because it enabled him to lay very practical claim to divinity and thus greatly enhance his ascribed honor.⁴¹ The earliest example is the *aurei* and *denarii* issued by Ti. Sempronius Graccus and Q. Voconius Vitulus in 40 BCE; all of them bear a variation of the following legend on the obverse: DIVI IVLI·F[ILIVS].⁴² A wide variety of subsequent Augustan gold, silver, and copper-alloy coins also trumpet the emperor as *divi filius*. For example, the denarius minted in 38 BC by Octavian and Agrippa displays on the obverse wreathed head of Julius Caesar and head of Octavian facing each other, with the legend DIVOS·IVLIVS DIVI·F[ILIVS] on left and right.⁴³ Since newly-minted coins were put into circulation as pay to the legionaries, such association with Julius Caesar quickly enhanced Octavian's prestige and made him popular among Caesar's veterans. During his lifetime, the young Caesar regularly utilized different forms of art to publicize the theme of Caesar's divinity as well as the continuing connection between himself and Julius Caesar.⁴⁴

After triumphing over Marcus Antonius at Actium and stabilizing the political situation in Rome, the princeps preferred to act as a private citizen, even though he was "a *privatus* with very

⁴¹ Zarrow (2003), 127, says, "As the *divi filius*, [Octavian] had a finer, more tangible claim to divinity than Sextus or even Caesar himself while he lived. Sextus looked to Neptune, and Caesar looked to Venus, but Octavian looked to Caesar. Pompey, after all, never received an apotheosis as had Octavian's *divus pater*, a man whose image and name became Octavian's own."

⁴² See *RRC*, 529f., no. 525.1-526.3, and Gurval (1997), who offers a very useful discussion on the early coinage of Octavian and its political ideology of titles and images of *Caesar divi filius*.

⁴³ See *RRC*, 535, no. 534.2.

⁴⁴ See Galinsky (1996), 160f., 208f., 318f., and 377f. The denarius issued in 17 BCE by M. Sanguinius subtly stresses the similarity between youthful Augustus and deified Caesar with youthful features. The legend on the obverse proclaims: AVGVSTVS DIVI·F[ILIVS]. See *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, 13, no. 71, and pl. 3, no. 1.

special powers.”⁴⁵ This approach is clearly reflected in the *Res Gestae*, where the opening sentence of the first chapter depicts the young Octavian as the private citizen who steps in to save Rome from the oppressive rule of a clique (*RG* 1.1).⁴⁶ The significance of private intervention in public life is also emphasized in the *Res Gestae* 25.2 and 34.1. In the first instance, the author portrays himself as the champion of unified Italy (*tota Italia*) who, though a private citizen, recruited troops to defend the state in a time of crisis.⁴⁷ In the second instance, Augustus claims to have taken a private action to restore constitutional government.

According to Cicero, there was a long line of *privati* dutifully intervening to preserve the well-being of the Roman state: Brutus in 510 BCE (*Rep.* 2.46), Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio in 133 BCE (*Off.* 1.76 and *Brut.* 212), and Pompey in 83 BCE (*Leg. Man.* 60-61).⁴⁸ Travelling in the East as a private citizen, a young Julius Caesar was captured by Cilician pirates near the island of Pharmacussa in 75/74 BCE. After making arrangements for nearby cities to pay his ransom and upon being freed by the pirates, he used his ascribed honor and the prestige of his family name to raise a fleet of ships and capture the corsairs. Furthermore, when Junius, the governor of Asia, postponed the punishment of these pirates, Caesar once again used his *auctoritas* of a Roman *nobilis* to remove them from the Pergamene prison and have them

⁴⁵ See Galinsky (1996), 11. Nevertheless, Octavian still served as consul from 31 BCE to 23 BCE.

⁴⁶ “Annos undeviginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi” (*RG* 1.1).

⁴⁷ “Iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua et me belli quo vici ad Actium ducem depoposcit” (*RG* 25.2). Cf. Cooley (2009), 215f.

⁴⁸ For details, see Galinsky (1996), 49-54; Ridley (2003), 161f.; and Cooley (2009), 106ff. Cf. also Chapter II, pp. 168-172.

crucified.⁴⁹ Later that year, while still acting as a private citizen, he raised an auxiliary force to fight Mithridates' troops that had been ransacking the territories of Roman allies in Asia Minor (Suet. *Iul.* 4.2). Non-magistrates who stepped in to correct the wrong in public affairs were often given the title of *princeps*, the very title with which Cicero raised the prestige and social status of young Octavian (*Phil.* 5.28).⁵⁰ Yet, the princeps' desire to liken his actions to those of the individuals whose decisive private actions saved Rome from harm could also bring to mind negative parallels. For example, in 77 BCE the Senate decreed a state of emergency when Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78 BCE) raised a private army and led it against the city (Sall. *Hist.* 1.77.22M).⁵¹

In 28 BCE, the young Caesar began to distance himself from his triumviral past, abolishing all nonconstitutional measures of the triumvirs (Tac. *Ann.* 3.28.2 and Dio Cass. 53.2.5). The following year, he returned the operations of the consulship to relative normalcy and brought back free elections of lower magistrates (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.89.3 and Suet. *Aug.* 40.2), thus restoring constitutional government.⁵² This event is even represented on an *aureus* probably minted in the province of Asia in 28 BCE. The reverse depicts Octavian as consul, sitting on a curule chair and handing out a scroll with his right hand in an act of "transferring the state into the control of

⁴⁹ See Vell. Pat. 2.41.3-2.42.3; Suet. *Iul.* 4.1-2 and 74.1; and Plut. *Caes.* 1.8-2.7.

⁵⁰ See Cooley (2009), 107, for a very useful discussion.

⁵¹ Tacitus, one of the earliest commentators on Octavian's private interventions in public affairs, has nothing good to say: "Pietatem erga parentem et tempora rei publicae obtentui sumpta; ceterum cupidine dominandi concitos per largitionem veteranos, paratum ab adolescente privato exercitum, corruptas consulis legiones, simulatam Pompeianarum gratiam partium; mox ubi decreto partum fascis et ius praetoris invaserit, caesis Hirtio et Pansa..., utriusque copias occupavisse; extortum invite senatu consulatum, armaque quae in Antonium acceperit contra rem publicam versa..." (*Ann.* 1.10.1-2).

⁵² See Salmon (1956), 457ff.; Scheid (2007), 89; and Cooley (2009), 258ff.

the Roman Senate and people” (RG 34.1). It bears the following legend: LEGES ET IVRA P[OPULO] R[OMANO] RESTITVIT.⁵³ Thus, time and again, Augustus reminds his audience that the Roman state had ceased to be essentially *res privata* and had become a *res publica* again only thanks to his private actions and the private expenditures he bore.⁵⁴

It is not surprising, then, that the emperor accepted only those offices that could significantly augment his *auctoritas*. For instance, he was *princeps senatus* and a member of all four great priestly colleges, including those of *pontifices* and *augures* (RG 7.2-3).⁵⁵ The young Caesar became a *pontifex* in 47 BCE, having replaced Domitius Ahenobarbus who had been killed at Pharsalus in 48 BCE (Nic. Dam. 4 and Vell. Pat. 2.59.3). As usual, emperor’s extraordinary accumulation of all four priesthoods was commemorated on coins. The reverse of the denarius issued at Rome in 16 BCE depicts a ladle, staff, tripod, and sacrificial bowl, the symbols of

⁵³ See *BM Coins, Rom. Emp.* I, accession no. CM 1995.4-1.1, discussed by Rich and Williams (1999).

⁵⁴ After 23 BCE, Augustus held the office of consul only twice more, in 5 and 2 BCE, perhaps to introduce the young Caesars, Gaius and Lucius, to public career (Suet. *Aug.* 26.2). In Chapter III, pp. 257-269, I discuss Augustus’ unparalleled expenditure and munificence that contributed to the significant economic growth throughout the Roman world.

⁵⁵ Augurs were responsible for taking auspices to determine divine will. At least three different etymologies for the word *augur* claim partial ancient ancestries, with Suet. *Aug.* 7.2 offering the following possibilities: “ab auctu vel ab avium gestu gustu.” Thus, the first theory is that the word *augur* is a verbal governing compound, where a first member is *auri* (“bird”) and a second member is *gur/gus*, an agential root noun from the root *gēus* (“taste, test”). See Neumann (1976). Both Festus *Gloss. Lat.* p. 2L and *Serv. Dan.* 5.523 associate the second half of *augur* with *gero*, and Festus *Gloss. Lat.* p. 2L also offers an alternative explanation (“ab avium garritu”). The second theory suggests that the word *augur* has a close etymological connection to the verb *augeo* “increase” as well as to the nouns *auctor* and *auctoritas*. Ov. *Fast.* 1.609-612 appears to be the first author to have formulated this theory, and the idea is resuscitated by Corssen (1854): 271. See also Walde (1982), 80 and 82f., and Ernout (1994), 56ff.

Augustus' four priesthoods.⁵⁶ Following the death of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the princeps assumed the office of pontifex maximus on March 6, 12 BCE (*RG* 10.2).⁵⁷ This office enabled him to exercise ultimate *auctoritas* in religious matters. The fact that Augustus did not take it from Lepidus while the incumbent was alive as well as the fact that he had a threefold claim to the position made it possible for him to assert that the emperor held the office legally, bringing him yet another formal honor.⁵⁸ The *Res Gestae* itself clearly demonstrates that accruals of honors served as strong basis of one's *auctoritas*.

The Romans perceived *auctoritas* as functioning in two special ways. First, there was *senatus auctoritas* or the *auctoritas principum*, a sort of ascribed honor which referred to a more general prestige and authority enjoyed by the *nobiles* who relied on a complex network of personal relationships to maintain their political power over many generations.⁵⁹ Then there was a personal *auctoritas*, a form of acquired honor obtained by individuals whose work for the good of the Roman state earned them a socially recognized claim to worth.⁶⁰ The *Res Gestae* as well as other pro-Augustan sources emphasize that the young Caesar did not turn away from fulfillment of his duties, taking the initiative to ensure that the Roman state ran smoothly. Following command of the Senate and people, the emperor created new patricians in 29 BCE

⁵⁶ See *RIC*², 69, no. 367.

⁵⁷ For details, see Cooley (2009), 148-151.

⁵⁸ See Ramage (1987), 51.

⁵⁹ For ascribed honor, see Chapter I, pp. 20 and 44-51, *passim*.

⁶⁰ Cf. Hellegouarc'h (1963), 295, 297, and 307; Grant (1946), 443; and Ramage (1987), 42. For acquired honor, see Malina (2001a), 32ff.

(*RG* 8.1).⁶¹ A program of road building in Italy was begun in 27 BCE “through his initiative and at his expense” (*CIL* XI.365 = *ILS* 84).⁶² Completed in 17-16 BCE, the project was memorialized with an engraved column which was erected in Region VII at Rome.⁶³ In 22 BCE, Augustus accepted responsibility for solving the problem of the grain supply (*RG* 5.2).⁶⁴ In 18 BCE, by virtue of his tribunician power he executed the things the Senate wanted him to do (*RG* 6.2).⁶⁵ In one way or another, all these private initiatives augmented the emperor’s prestige, and this was particularly noticeable in Egypt, where the emperor ruled as pharaoh. For example, a bilingual inscription from Alexandria records that Augustus brought in the Sebastos River, the waterway named after himself, to provide residents with water (*ILS* 9370).⁶⁶

Tacitus acerbically asserts, “[The princeps] seduced the army with gifts, the people with grain, and everyone with the sweetness of peace” (*Ann.* 1.2.1).⁶⁷ However, money was always one of the important means of political patronage in Rome. In order to acquire political clout,

⁶¹ This was done in accordance with the *lex Saenia de plebeis in patricios allegendis* which was passed at the end of 30 BCE (Dio Cass. 52.42.5).

⁶² “... consilio et sumptibus eius muniteis...” Cf. *RG* 20.5; Suet. *Aug.* 30.1; and Dio Cass. 53.22.1-2.

⁶³ The *denarii* issued by L. Vinicius in 16 BCE depict on their reverse the column bearing the following inscription: S P Q R / IMP[ERATORI] CAE[SARI] / QVOD V[IAE] / M[VNITAE] S[VNT] EX / EA P[ECVNIA] Q[V]IS / AD A[ERARIVM] DE[DIT]. See *RIC*², 68, nos. 360-362. It is possible that roads were also rebuilt in Spain. See Sutherland (1987), 29.

⁶⁴ For details, see Chapter III, pp. 246ff.

⁶⁵ Cooley (2009), 131f., argues that this statement primarily refers to Augustus’ “moral legislation,” which will be discussed below.

⁶⁶ “... flumen Sebaston ab Schedia induxit a milliario XXV quod per se toto oppido flueret...” *Σεβαστός* is the Greek word for “Augustus.”

⁶⁷ “... ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit...”

the young Caesar was willing to liberally spend his own funds, repeatedly assuming responsibility for many diverse activities that ultimately benefited numerous residents of the empire and affected all areas of life in Rome and the provinces.⁶⁸ This significantly enhanced the princeps' *auctoritas patroni* and served as one of the primary conditions of his power.⁶⁹ According to the eighteenth-century philosopher Jean-Jacque Rousseau, a savvy politician makes his schemes “rotate”: “the prince... seeks to command in order to enrich himself, and to enrich himself in order to command.”⁷⁰ Thus, political actors pursue power in order to become prosperous, wealth in order to control things, justice in order to acquire strength, and strength in order to protect just institutions.

At the end of the *Res Gestae*, Augustus rightfully boasts of his preeminent status, advertising his personal *auctoritas* as surpassing that of any other statesman (*RG* 34.3).⁷¹ According to Heinze, in the times of the Republic the exercise of *auctoritas* was a traditional way to circumvent the restrictions placed on legally guaranteed power in both the public and private spheres.⁷² This is why the young Caesar first consolidated his transactional powers of government and then increasingly emphasized the transforming aspects of his leadership in order

⁶⁸ In Chapter III, pp. 257-269, I discuss the sources of Augustus' extraordinary wealth and some of the ways he spent his money.

⁶⁹ See Hellegouarc'h (1963), 296f., and Béranger (1975), 355ff.

⁷⁰ See Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1917), 99.

⁷¹ “Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri, qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt.”

⁷² See Heinze (1960), 58. While in private life this mostly affected the prerogatives of the *paterfamilias*, in the realm of politics prominent Romans could wield their *auctoritas* to get around the one-year-term limitation on most magistracies.

to augment his *auctoritas*.⁷³ For example, he is not only *princeps* (RG 7.2, 13, 30.1, and 32.3) and *augustus* (RG 34.2) but also *pontifex maximus* (RG 7.3) and *pater patriae* (RG 35.1). The last title was granted to Augustus on February 5 of 2 BCE by the Senate, the equestrian order, and the people of Rome (RG 35.1).⁷⁴ However, a number of inscriptions from Italy and the provinces record that the emperor had been already called *pater* or *parens* long before the unanimous acclamation.⁷⁵ The young Caesar is similarly hailed as PARENT[I] CONS[ERVATORI] SVO in a series of *aurei* and *denarii* minted in Spain as early as 19 or 18 BCE.⁷⁶ Accordingly, Salmon points out that the official bestowal of the title *pater patriae* on the princeps represents “the culminating point, the peak and pinnacle” of Augustus’ career.⁷⁷

It has been argued that the offer of the title must have been carefully orchestrated by the princeps himself. Wardle points out,

Unanimity or consensus (*consensus*) was a prominent element in the self-presentation of the Augustan principate, manufactured and paraded at key moments in its evolution: in the oath of all Italy in 32..., in the decision to make war on Egypt (Dio 50.4.2), in his sole control of the Roman world after Actium

⁷³ For transactional and transformational styles of leadership, see below, pp. 340-344.

⁷⁴ For the exact date, see *Fasti Praenestini* (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.119 = EJ, 47). For detailed analysis of the significance of the title, including Republican antecedents, see von Alfeldi (1971); Weinstock (1971), 200-205; Ramage (1987), 104-110; Eder (2005), 27-32; and Cooley (2009), 273ff.

⁷⁵ For instance, see *CIL* X.823, Pompeii, 10 BCE; *CIL* III.6803 = *ILS* 101, Pisidian Antioch; *CIL* XII.136 = *ILS* 6755, Sion, Narbonensis, 8/7 BCE; and *CIL* II.2107 = *ILS* 96, Urgavo, Baetica, 6 BCE. For details, see von Alfeldi (1971), 92f., and Cooley (2009), 73.

⁷⁶ See *RIC*², 48, nos. 96-101.

⁷⁷ Salmon (1956), 477. The author also cogently argues that the emperor, who was a superstitious man (Suet. *Aug.* 90-95), was determined to have his position of the *princeps* fully defined by 2 BCE because he believed that his sixty-third year (the year 1 BCE) might prove perilous for him (Gell. *NA* 15.7.3).

(*RG* 34.1), in the speech of resignation in January 27 (Dio 53.4.2, 8.2), and, most importantly as a parallel for 2, in the award of the name Augustus....⁷⁸

Yet, it is significant that all literary sources highlight full consensus of all strata of the Roman society in granting the emperor the title of *pater patriae*.⁷⁹ In order to emphasize the exceptional nature of the acclamation even further, Augustus brags that the title was inscribed in his house, in the Curia Iulia, and under the chariot which stood in the Augustan Forum (*RG* 35.1).

The title *pater patriae* traditionally signified one's kinship with Aeneas and Romulus as well as with Roman deities that assumed the epithet *pater*.⁸⁰ Although Cicero was the first Roman to be officially honored with the title *parens patriae* for his role in the suppression of the revolt of Lucius Sergius Catilina in 63-62 BCE (Cic. *Pis.* 3.6),⁸¹ other prominent Romans had also been called "father" of Rome, always for delivering the city from the enemy. For instance, Cicero himself calls Marius *pater patriae* for rescuing Rome from the Cimbri (*Rab. Post.* 10.27).⁸² The title *parens* or *pater ob cives servatos* was also bestowed on Sulla (Plut. *Sull.* 34.2) and Julius Caesar (Livy, *Per.* 116.1 and Suet. *Iul.* 76.1). However, in the case of Augustus the title, for the first time, significantly referred to the salvation of the entire population of the *imperium*

⁷⁸ Wardle (2014), 391.

⁷⁹ See *RG* 35.1; Ov. *Fast.* 2.127-130; and Suet. *Aug.* 58.1-2. Cf. also von Alfeldi (1971), 93f.

⁸⁰ When Ennius (*Ann. Fr.* 113 Vahlen) speaks to Romulus, he says, "O pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum." The epitaph from Pompeii calls Aeneas *indiges Pater* (*CIL* X.808). According to Gell. *NA* 5.12.5, names of some deities have *-piter*, a form of the word *pater*, appended to them. For instance, there are *Marspiter* and *Iuppiter*. For *Marspiter*, see *CIL* I².970; Varro *Ling.* 8.49 and 10.65; Cato *Agr.* 141; and Macrobian *Sat.* 1.19.3.

⁸¹ "Me Q. Catulus, princeps huius ordinis et auctor publici consilii, frequentissimo senatu parentem patriae nominavit...." See also *Sest.* 121 and Plut. *Cic.* 23.6.

⁸² "C. Marium, quem vere patrem patriae, parentem, inquam, vestrae libertatis atque huiusce rei publicae possumus dicere...."

Romanum by one individual.⁸³ As a result, the entire *patria* was now placed under the *tutela* of Augustus the father (cf. Dio Cass. 53.18.3). After becoming the *pater patriae* and thus creating the asymmetrical relationship characterized by the grave imbalance of power, the princeps made the Roman world officially dependent on his persona.⁸⁴ Ovid brilliantly elucidates this concept by associating Augustus with Jupiter (*Fast.* 2.131-132).⁸⁵

One of Augustus' important innovations was to link the notion of *pater patriae* to that of the *paterfamilias*. Just as a Roman family was under the *potestas* of the *paterfamilias*, the Roman people were under the *potestas* of the *pater patriae* who was thought to have subordinated his interests to those of the citizens in order to protect the well-being of the Roman state (*Sen. Clem.* 1.14.2).⁸⁶ In *Geographia*, Strabo asserts that the affairs of the great empire could scarcely be administered except by committing them to one man as father (*Strabo* 6.4.2).⁸⁷ Eventually, the Augustan *potestas* of the *pater patriae* was even extended to elite foreign children who found

⁸³ For details, see Knoche (1952), 329 and 331f.

⁸⁴ In Gallus' case study, pp. 296f., I explain why the social relationship between the guardian and the ward, who could never fully reciprocate the benefits he had received from his warden, lacked symmetry and fostered the imbalance of power between the two.

⁸⁵ "Hoc tu per terras, quod in aethere Iuppiter alto, / nomen habes: hominum tu pater, ille deum." Cf. also *Ov. Tr.* 2.574; *Hor. Carm.* 3.24.25-32; and von Alfvöldi (1971), 48. For possible Republican precursors, see Weinstock (1971), 175-227.

⁸⁶ "Patrem quidem Patriae appellavimus, ut sciret datam sibi potestatem patriam, quae est temperantissima liberis consulens suaeque post illos reponens." Cf. also Dio Cass. 53.18.3. Finally, one can think of the *patres* of the Senate (*Cic. Rep.* 2.8.14 and 2.28.50 and *Sall. Cat.* 6.6), even though they were a bunch that could never attain the privileged position of a single *pater*.

⁸⁷ "Χαλεπὸν δὲ ἄλλως διοικεῖν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡγεμονίαν ἢ ἐνὶ ἐπιτρέψαντας ὡς πατρί." Cf. *Tac. Ann.* 1.9.4 and Dio Cass. 53.18.3.

themselves under the imperial tutelage.⁸⁸ Adopting and modifying the institution of Hellenistic royal fosterage, Augustus encouraged foreign leaders to send their sons to him at Rome, where they were incorporated into the *domus* of the emperor (Suet. *Aug.* 48). One such occurrence can be reconstructed from the complex of images on the Boscoreale Cups, the Ara Pacis, and the Lugdunum coinage, which depict a group of Gallic chieftains presenting their children to Augustus. As Kuttner's cogent analysis demonstrates, there was quite deliberate imposition of the institution of fosterage on western parts of the empire because the young Caesar promoted the ideology that foreign leaders and their scions stood to the *princeps* as children to their parents or favored clients to their patron.⁸⁹

However, the *patria potestas* of Augustus could not serve as a legal instrument to enforce rules because it was closely linked to his *auctoritas* and the *maiestas principis*.⁹⁰ As a result, the princeps had to prove his good intentions before he could be acclaimed as the *pater patriae* and become the ultimate decision-maker in the Roman world.⁹¹ Galinsky says:

Some of the major contradictions, perceived or real, center on [Augustus]. There was, first and foremost, his stunning conversion to a clement, if tough-minded, *pater patriae* after his earlier incarnation as angel, or demon, of death who was possessed of singular bloodthirst, unsparing savagery, and a marked lack of scruples. Events like the Perusine War remained etched in the memories of his

⁸⁸ From the second century BCE, some Eastern kings sent their sons to Rome for education. Often seen as potential hostages for their people's good behavior (Plut. *Sert.* 14.2, App. *B Civ.* 1.114, and Dio Cass. 51.16), the scions of royal families were entrusted to the paternal authority of the Senate and educated under the guidance of the Roman state. Cf. Allen (2006), 149-177.

⁸⁹ See Kuttner (1995), 94-123, and cf. Severy (2003), 110.

⁹⁰ For details, see Bauman (1967), 235-245.

⁹¹ Rich (1990), 152, points out that later emperors accepted the title of *pater patriae* only after they did something to earn it. For instance, Emperor Claudius (41-54 CE) initially rejected the title (Dio Cass. 60.3.2).

contemporaries and their descendants.... Even if some details and numbers were exaggerated, this event and others point to a decisive motif besides elimination of all rivals: the lesson learned from Caesar's clemency. The dictator had recalled and pardoned old enemies, only to be assassinated by them.¹¹⁸ Octavian was not about to repeat this mistake. Only when, in his own words, he "had gained control of all things" (*potitus rerum omnium*; *RG* 34.1) did he embark on his cooperative venture with the senate and the people of Rome. Many of them could hardly be blamed, therefore, for worrying about the old Octavian lurking behind the new Augustus. It took a generation until they proclaimed him *pater patriae*, the title he considered the true culmination of his efforts.⁹²

¹¹⁸ Cf. Alföldi (1985) 336. Velleius (2.100.4) makes the same point about Augustus' behavior toward Iullus Antonius.

Augustus used his authority of the patron to sponsor talented people whose work could attract attention and become the center of the conversation, evoking participation, interpretation, and response (Suet. *Aug.* 89.3). His patronage of prominent artists, who either lent their talent to the praise of their patron and his undertakings or suggested new venues for application of Augustus' *auktoritas*, encouraged a large number of art connoisseurs to discuss their work. Such conversations produced a range of responses, which could vary from strong agreement to thoughtful opposition.⁹³ In order to enhance their standing, the members of the new ruling elite throughout the empire were willingly borrowing elements from Augustan public art to "sanction" their own artistic constructs. In turn, wide adoption of many themes from Augustan public art augmented emperor's *auktoritas* even further.⁹⁴ For example, the number of his statues and

⁹² See Galinsky (1996), 371.

⁹³ See Syme (1939), 459-475, who offers a rigid "organization of opinion" model, and Galinsky (1996), 225-287 and 387f., who provides a much more nuanced treatment of Augustan literature.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, 388.

portrait busts surpass that of any other Roman, and his name is mentioned in building-inscriptions on buildings in whose construction he had not been even personally involved.⁹⁵

Colossal personal prestige accrued by Augustus enabled him to operate as *auctor*, a power broker with high personal *auctoritas* which encompassed all the elements of his power except for *potestas* and *imperium*.⁹⁶ Cicero uses the term *auctor* to designate a male who acts as trustee empowered to vouchsafe the promises and guarantees to others (*Caecin.* 72).⁹⁷ According to Heinze, an *auctor* is someone “who approves, in a measurable and effective way, an action which is to be undertaken by another person (or, what amounts to the same thing, the decision to do so) with the understanding, which is implicit in the term ‘measurable,’ that a certain degree of responsibility is assumed by the approver.”⁹⁸ Two ancient etymologies link the terms *auctor* and *augere* (Schol. Bern. Verg. Georg. 1.27 and GL 4 Plac. A. 59), and the standard etymological lexicons agree.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ For sculptural representations of Augustus, cf. Pfanner (1989), 178, who gives an estimate of between twenty-five and fifty thousand portrait busts, based on the existence of over a thousand cities in the time of Augustus. For inscriptions, see Cooley (2012), 155.

⁹⁶ Grant (1946), 443, says, “Every office, every power, and every success... enhanced the inherited *auctoritas* of Augustus until it became his unique and personal attribute or characteristic, enabling him to act (in a way not permitted to mere men) without *potestas* or *imperium*.”

⁹⁷ “... quod mulier sine tutore auctore promiserit, deberi.”

⁹⁸ Heinze (1960), 46.

⁹⁹ See Walde (1982), 80 and 82f., and Ernout (1994), 56ff. Watmough (1995-1996), 109, argues that “*auctor* is the agent noun to *augere* not in the inherited sense of ‘increase’ but in the sense of ‘increase in power’ or ‘advance in dignity or position’ known for the Latin verb.”

On the one hand, examples supplied mostly by Cicero demonstrate that the term *auctor* was frequently used in the late Republic to describe a leader who exerted powerful influence through intellectual qualities or military skills.¹⁰⁰ For instance, the orator lists *auctoritas* as one of the four qualities of a successful general (*Leg. Man.* 28). Later, Cicero asserts that commander's *auctoritas* has great weight in conducting wars (*Leg. Man.* 43-44). Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus the Younger (cos. 147 BCE), who destroyed Carthage in 146 BCE and sold all its inhabitants into slavery, has as much *auctoritas* as the city of Rome itself (Cic. *Mur.* 58). On the other hand, Octavian's *auctoritas* compels all Italy to swear allegiance to him and demand that he serve as the commander at Actium (*RG* 25.2).¹⁰¹ Due to immense *auctoritas* the young Caesar acquired, the people of Rome make a passionate plea to him to lead them. It is interesting that both Cicero in *Pro lege Manilia* and Augustus in the *Res Gestae* use the same verb, *deposcere*, to indicate one's appointment to the military command by popular demand.¹⁰²

Cicero also often conjoins the terms *auctor* and *princeps*, with the latter word referring to someone who holds superior position in the Roman state and takes the initiative to preserve its interests.¹⁰³ Many scholars think the two words are about synonymous. For example, Wagenvoort says:

Cicero often uses *princeps* in the sense of priority; it means especially the one who takes the initiative and is about synonymous with *auctor*. In its development of meaning the word now and then enters the political field: as when Cicero calls

¹⁰⁰ See Hellegouarc'h (1963), 321ff.

¹⁰¹ "Iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua et me belli quo vici ad Actium ducem deposcit."

¹⁰² See Ramage (1987), 42f.

¹⁰³ See *Dom.* 10; *Orat.* 3.63; *Prov. cons.* 25; *Rep.* 2.46; and *Sull.* 34.

himself *princeps libertatis defendendae* or *revocandae*, having taken the initiative against the ‘tyrant’ Antony, for the defence and preservation of the republican *libertas*; but he also occasionally omits the additional genitive and uses *princeps* without addition in the same sense.¹⁰⁴

Prior to the reign of Augustus, the term *princeps* was commonly used to describe leading Roman citizens.¹⁰⁵ Later, it even acquired some monarchical overtones. For instance, T. Pomponius Atticus is fully aware that both Octavian and Antonius aspired to be *princeps*, “not simply of the city of Rome but of the whole world” (*Nep. Att.* 20.5).¹⁰⁶ The young Caesar himself mentions three times that he is *princeps* (*RG* 13, 30.1, and 32.3) and once that he is *princeps senatus* (*RG* 7.2). As *auctor* and *princeps*, Augustus enjoyed such prestige that his acumen and words of advice were exceptionally weighty: they compelled without resorting to force, making the person who requested counsel from him to accept it without doubt.¹⁰⁷

In Rome, a prominent *auctor* was much more than a simple counselor or persuader, even if he was clever enough to hide this fact so as not to offend Roman sensibilities. After putting the concept of *auctoritas* at the center of his rule, Augustus accumulated the highest number of honors possible and turned into the *auctor* par excellence: he guaranteed peace throughout the Roman world and took care of its welfare. So strong the connection between the term *auctor* and the cognomen Augustus became that Tiberius once remarked that he preferred to be called a

¹⁰⁴ Wagenvoort (1956), 47. Cf. also Hellegouarc’h (1963), 297, 299, and 301.

¹⁰⁵ See Wagenvoort (1936), 206-221 and 323-345, and Hellegouarc’h (1963), 327-361.

¹⁰⁶ “... principem non solum urbis Romae, sed orbis terrarum esse cuperet.” Cf. Millar (1985), 39.

¹⁰⁷ See Grant (1946), 443, and Galinsky (1996), 13. Cf. the suggestion of Liebeschuetz (1986), 350, that the decree passed by the Senate on January 13 of 27 BCE stipulated that “the *princeps* would continue indefinitely as *auctor publici consilii*, or something of that kind.”

suasor (giver of counsel) rather than an *auctor* (Suet. *Tib.* 27).¹⁰⁸ Having succeeded where others had failed, Augustus became the champion of moral transformation and attempted to resocialize Roman elites into norms and values he considered exemplary (*RG* 8.5).¹⁰⁹ Such concern for the moral well-being of the upper classes indicates that the young Caesar was a transformational leader.¹¹⁰ The princeps' multiple travels to different parts of the Roman world in the first part of his reign are another testimony to the vibrancy of his leadership.¹¹¹ After introducing Burns' theory of transformational leadership, I will discuss how its characteristics are pertinent to the reign of Augustus.

In the 1970s, James McGregor Burns, a well-known American historian and presidential biographer, drew on individual lives of great men to develop the idealistic theory of transformational leadership.¹¹² His theory conceptualizes leadership as the transformational process and prioritizes motivations and ideals in assessing how a leader approaches power. For Burns, "leadership is followership and followership is leadership."¹¹³ Amidst competition with

¹⁰⁸ See Scott (1932), 49. An alternative but inferior explanation is that Tiberius simply meant that his immense *auctoritas* held back others from deciding freely.

¹⁰⁹ "Legibus novis me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi."

¹¹⁰ The concepts of transactional leadership and transforming leadership were invented by Burns (1978), 4 and 19f., and will be discussed below. Presently, the term transformational leadership is more widespread.

¹¹¹ After settling matters in the East, the emperor returned to Rome in 29 BCE. Then he spent time in Gaul and Spain (27-24 BCE), again traveled in the Greek-speaking East (22-19 BCE), and then went back to Gaul (16-13 BCE). Between 31 and 13 BCE, Augustus stayed in Rome for only about seven years.

¹¹² See Burns (1978).

¹¹³ Burns (2010).

other potential leaders, the true leader acquires followers and transforms them through his inspirational nature and charismatic personality in order to accomplish goals commonly held by his group. The historian says, “Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize goals mutually held by both leaders and followers, as in Lenin’s calls for peace, bread, and land.”¹¹⁴

Burns identifies two basic types of leadership: transactional leadership and transformational leadership. The former does not contain any moral element and is simply based on an exchange of valued things, which bring leaders and followers together. It involves either brokerage to work out differences or remuneration to reward followers for their political support. Transactional leadership also often focuses on carrying out the bureaucratic everyday activities of the government. By contrast, transformational leadership strives to inculcate moral purpose and raise the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both the leaders and the followers. It amalgamates their purposes and has a transforming effect on both.

Burns says:

[Transformational leadership] occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality.... Their purposes, which might have started out as separate but related, as in the case of transactional leadership, become fused. Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for common purpose. Various names are used for such leadership, some of them derisive: elevating, mobilizing, inspiring, exalting, uplifting, preaching, exhorting, evangelizing. The relationship can be moralistic, of course. But transforming

¹¹⁴ Burns (1978), 18.

leadership ultimately becomes *moral* in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both.... Transcending leadership is dynamic leadership in the sense that the leaders throw themselves into a relationship with followers who will feel “elevated” by it and often become more active themselves, thereby creating new cadres of leaders.¹¹⁵

On the other hand, Bass refines Burns’ theory and postulates that a leader is “one who motivates us to do more than we originally expected to do.”¹¹⁶ Raising the awareness level about the importance of outcomes and ways to reach them, transformational leaders create a sense of obligation for the group among their followers and inspire them to go beyond self-interest to achieve the greater good.¹¹⁷

Transformational leaders are visionaries who promote active moral commitments among their followers. As Warren Bennis, another pioneer of leadership studies once quipped, “Managers are people who do things right and leaders are people who do the right thing.”¹¹⁸ Inculcating new ideals and striving to satisfy needs that are more than material, transformational leaders encourage mutual simulation and elevation in the group of their followers. Eventually, this may convert leaders into moral agents who focus on terminal values and transform the very ideals of society by altering perceptions, aspirations, and expectations in order to satisfy the authentic needs of their followers.¹¹⁹ In their turn, the followers, who are guided by flexible

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁶ Bass (1985), 20.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Bennis (1985), 20.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Burns (1978), 4.

rules and regulations determined by norms prevalent in the group, acquire a sense of belonging because they can easily identify with the leader and group's purpose.

Burns unequivocally places such public values as liberty, justice or happiness at the top of his hierarchy of moral principles.¹²⁰ These values are based in human aspirations and needs, and they have an enormous causal effect by influencing people's social and political attitudes, thus shaping their behavior. In order to increase the efficacy of public values through synergic effect, they should be ideally made a part of an overall cultural system of moral principles.¹²¹ Burns uses the examples of FDR and Clinton to demonstrate that the real test of transformational leaders lies in their defense of public values and realization of changes that benefit the people at large. Great transformational leaders are judged by how much good they did for their fatherland, not by their personal failings in virtue and ethics.¹²² More often than not, a radical change of political and cultural systems effected by a transformational leader brings about the revolution that produces envisioned and lasting changes. But it also causes conflict and animosity. Hence, Burns points out that transformational leadership should be dissensual and conflict driven because leaders need to make enemies in order to demonstrate that change has occurred.¹²³

Many attributes of the theory of transformational leadership are applicable to the young Caesar who made the programs of religious revival, cultural renewal, and moral transformation of society the hallmarks of his reign. In a competition for leadership, the emperor actively

¹²⁰ See Burns (2003), 16, 23, 27ff., and 127.

¹²¹ Ibid., 205f.

¹²² Ibid., 28f.

¹²³ Burns (1978), 453f., and (2010).

acquired honors to augment his acquired honor and ensuing *auctoritas*. As a result, Augustus established himself as the person of highest status in Rome, basing his claim to power on his immense *auctoritas*. On the one hand, this *auctoritas* had clear moral connotations and accentuated his “material, intellectual, and moral superiority.”¹²⁴ On the other hand, its power was evocative, requesting participation, reaction, and elucidation from his followers. The princeps was able and willing to endorse and guarantee the initiatives and ideas of many different people who acquired a debt of honor to him and felt obliged to reciprocate in kind. In contrast to the transferable powers (*potestates*) of the magistrates and officials, Augustus’ *auctoritas* epitomized actual power because it empowered the emperor to serve as the ultimate guarantor (*auctor*) of a policy which then could be implemented by those who either owed him a favor or sought his approval.¹²⁵

In the limited-good world of the ancient Mediterranean, the informal principle of reciprocity was one of the most significant forms of social contact. For millennia, the people adhered to the idea that providing goods or rendering services created an obligation for requital, compelling the recipient to give a counter-gift or a counter-service. This is what Foster conceptualizes as “dyadic contract.” According to him,

A functional requirement of the system is that an exactly even balance between two partners never be struck. This would jeopardize the whole relationship, since if all credits and debits somehow could be balanced off at a point in time, the contract would cease to exist.... The dyadic contract is effective precisely

¹²⁴ Hellegouarc’h (1963), 312. Cf. Val. Max. 8.15.3 and Béranger (1953), 115, who speaks about “the absolute power of the emperor on another level, that of morality” and references Plin. *Ep.* 3.20.12: “Sunt quidem cuncta sub unius arbitrio, qui pro utilitate communi solus omnium curas laboresque suscepit....”

¹²⁵ Contra Salmon (1956), 461, who states, “*Auctoritas* enabled a man to propose a policy, it did not enable him to implement it.”

because partners are never quite sure of their relative positions at a given moment. As long as they know that goods and services are flowing both ways in roughly equal amounts over time, they know their relationship is solidly based.¹²⁶

The principle of reciprocity was at work both among men and women and between humans and the gods.¹²⁷ Although it was just a moral obligation that could not be enforced by any authority apart from one's sense of honor and shame, it was effective in binding persons beyond the nuclear family and facilitating contracts between persons of roughly equal status (*amicitia*).¹²⁸ Publilius Syrus declares, "The one who knows how to return favors receives the most."¹²⁹ Willingness to return favors augmented one's reputation, and ancient authors regularly portray gratefulness as a moral virtue that adds to one's honor.¹³⁰ However, when a recipient of favors was unable to reciprocate in kind, he became a client of the person who had supported him.¹³¹ To Publilius Syrus mind, "To accept a favor is to sell one's liberty."¹³² Clients who received favors and assistance (*beneficia*) from their patrons were expected to demonstrate

¹²⁶ Foster (1961), 1185.

¹²⁷ For women, see Tac. *Ann.* 13.20 and Plin. *Ep.* 7.19.10. For gods, see MacMullen (1981), 52f. In Cicero's opinion, reciprocity could be observed even among children (*Fin.* 5.61).

¹²⁸ Reflecting on *amicitia*, Pliny the Younger states, "Neque enim obligandus sed remunerandus est in amoris officio, qui prior coepit" (*Ep.* 7.31.7). Cf. Publilius Syrus, "Beneficium dando accipit, qui digno dedit" (Gell. *NA* 17.14.4 and Macrob. *Sat.* 2.7.9.11). Although Brunt (1965) objects to the tendency to treat the term *amicitia* as a reliable marker of political relationship, *amicitia* and *inimicitia* were definitely used to signify a semi-formal political relationship without any content of personal friendship as it is understood today.

¹²⁹ "Beneficia plura recipit qui scit reddere," in Friedrich (1880), B8. Cf. Cic. *Off.* 2.70.

¹³⁰ See Cic. *Planc.* 80-81; Val. Max. 5.2; Sen. *Ben.* 4.16.3 and 4.24.1; and Dio Cass. 8.36.13.

¹³¹ Clientage was a form of chronic favor-debt, and it was considered degrading. See Cic. *Off.* 2.69; Saller (1982), 8-11; and Lendon (1997), 66f.

¹³² "Beneficium accipere libertatem est vendere," in Friedrich (1880), B5.

gratia: they fulfilled their reciprocal obligations by offering services (*officia*) and displaying loyalty (*fides*), staying obedient forever.¹³³

By contrast, receiving a favor from a great man whose status was far superior to that of the recipient could potentially contribute to one's prestige. This enabled a person with greater *auctoritas* to choose less distinguished men for a series of continuing acts of give-and-take support that bound them together for long or short periods of time. Such transactions not only augmented reputation of a great man, for it was prestigious to have persons in debt for favors (Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 3.5.1), but also facilitated creation of social networks of mutual obligation and patronage, the relationships of patron and client necessary for the successful functioning of society.¹³⁴ In exchange for regular support in public life, an influential patron supported, protected, and advised his clients in various matters. Not only were such ties of patronage exploited widely to influence the result of elections and of other votes in the popular assemblies, but they were also used to help certain prominent families retain political power and status over many generations.

The reign of Augustus was characterized by the constant exchange of gifts, favors, and services between the *auctor* and his supporters. Those who did or could be induced to do what the princeps desired were reciprocally honored. An inscription from Apamea records that the name of a local notable, Dexandros, was inscribed on bronze tablets on the Capitol by the decree of Augustus. It is not a coincidence that the same Dexandros had been the first High Priest of the

¹³³ On clients' obedience, see Sen. *Brev. Vit.* 19.3.

¹³⁴ Cf. Malina (2001a), 94.

imperial cult in the province of Syria.¹³⁵ Quite often, reciprocal favors spread vertically over the vast social gaps that separated the *nobiles* from plebeians. When an army veteran approached the emperor and requested him to serve as his advocate in court, Augustus immediately asked one of his companions to speak on the man's behalf. Revealing his scars, the old soldier exclaimed, "Caesar, I did not look for a deputy when you were in peril at the battle of Actium, but I fought for you myself!"¹³⁶ Then the princeps personally appeared in the courtroom to plead the veteran's case (Dio Cass. 55.4.2 and Macrob. *Sat.* 2.4.27).¹³⁷

On another occasion, the emperor invited to dinner one of his bodyguards in whose villa he used to stay (Suet. *Aug.* 74). Such imperial attention must have significantly increased the bodyguard's status in the world and prompted him to praise Augustus in response.¹³⁸ Well aware of the damage the urban *plebs* could inflict to imperial honor, Augustus was exceedingly generous with the distribution of largess to the people.¹³⁹ The commoners reciprocated in kind. After emperor's house on the Palatine was destroyed by fire, people from all walks of life contributed money to restore it (Suet. *Aug.* 57.2). All citizens also repeatedly offered prayers for

¹³⁵ See *AE* 1976, no. 678; *BE* 1976, 718; Millar (1985), 54; and Millar (1993), 261.

¹³⁶ As I discuss in Chapter I, pp. 64-67, honorable scars, the marks of frontal wounds sustained in battle, became a striking manifestation of their bearer's *virtus*.

¹³⁷ "At non ego, Caesar, periclitante te Actiaco bello vicarium quaesivi, sed pro te ipse pugnavi" (Macrob. *Sat.* 2.4.27). Possibly, Suetonius describes the same episode in *Aug.* 56.4. According to Callistratus, in the Roman court of law greatest credence went to *existimatio* and *dignitas* (*Dig.* 22.5.3.1) and to *dignitas* and *auctoritas* (*Dig.* 22.5.3.2).

¹³⁸ To Cicero's mind, "valde decorum patere domus hominum illustrium hospitibus illustribus" (*Off.* 2.64; cf. *Verr.* II.4.15.33). Since increasing recipient's acquired honor through minor favors cost none of benefactor's honor, great men practiced a number of mutually laudatory techniques. For details, see Lendon (1997), 56ff.

¹³⁹ On the susceptibility of the emperor's honor to attacks from the *plebs*, see *Ibid.*, 120-125.

Augustus' good health (*RG* 9.2). Cooley says: "The sheer number of prayers and vows offered on behalf of a single individual was unprecedented. Not even Julius Caesar, for whom public prayers every four years were decreed in 45 BC, had rivaled the scale of vows offered and fulfilled for Augustus' well-being (*App. B Civ.* 2.106)." ¹⁴⁰

In politics, this principle of reciprocity represented a form of Burns' transactional leadership, where rewards and favors were granted in exchange for political endorsement. Building up the new Caesarian party and consolidating his power, the young Caesar sponsored and promoted an unusually large number of *novi homines*.¹⁴¹ After 19 BCE, the Senate was composed of a majority of ascending "new men," who came mostly from the municipalities of Italy, and a minority of traditional *nobiles*, who achieved office by *mos maiorum*. Rebuffing the assertion that the old-style aristocrats possessed inborn talent and experience, the energetic newcomers claimed moral superiority over the degenerate *nobiles* and advanced the new system of beliefs which had distinct moral overtones. In particular, they replaced the discourse about ancestral right based on the *gens* and *nobilitas* of a bloodline with arguments about personal *virtus*, *labor*, and *industria*, the same traits that enabled "new men" to provide valuable services to the *princeps*.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Cooley (2009), 145.

¹⁴¹ See Syme (1939), 349-368 and 372f.; Wiseman (1971), 165-169, 177-181, and 203; and Stern (2006), 84f. Syme (1939), 360f., acrimoniously remarks, "From the recesses of Apennine and the archaic Sabellian tribes creep forth the unfamiliar shapes of 'small-town monsters,' lured by ambition and profit, elicited by patronage, bearing the garb and pretext of ancient virtue and manly independence, but all too often rapacious, corrupt and subservient to power.... These dim characters with fantastic names had never been heard of before in the Senate or even at Rome. They were the first senators of their families, sometimes the last, with no prospect of the consulate but safe votes for the Princeps in his restored and sovran assembly of all Italy."

¹⁴² See Wiseman (1971), 107ff. Cf. Earl (1967), 44ff. Although Wiseman talks about "the ideology of *novitas*," it may be more apposite to talk about different emphases within the same

The memorable careers of Lucius Munatius Plancus (cos. 42 BCE and censor 22 BCE) and his nephew Marcus Titius (cos. suff. 31 BCE) provide a telling example of how the emperor granted rewards in exchange for political endorsement, advancing careers of enterprising *novi homines*.¹⁴³ One of the closest associates of Julius Caesar (Caes. *B Gall.* 5.24.3 and 5.25.4), Plancus allied himself with Marcus Antonius in 43 BCE. However, following a quarrel with Antonius about the advisability of keeping Cleopatra with the Roman forces in Greece, Plancus and Titius deserted to Octavian in 32 BCE and made known to him the contents of Antonius' will. This presented the young Caesar with a very useful propaganda tool: not only did the will of Marcus Antonius reveal his gifts of Roman territory to his children with Cleopatra, but it also contained a clause stipulating that his body, even if he died in Rome, should be buried in Alexandria (Vell. Pat. 2.83.1-2).¹⁴⁴ Syme says, "Plancus had never yet been wrong in his estimate of a delicate political crisis. The effect must have been tremendous, alike in Rome and in the camp of Antonius."¹⁴⁵ In return for their services, Octavian made Titius *consul suffectus* the following year.¹⁴⁶ Together with Titus Statilius Taurus, who was yet another successful

generally shared fundamental system of beliefs. See Bleicken (1972), 87; Rosenstein (1992), 123; and Yakobson (1999), 189.

¹⁴³ Of the two, Plancus was certainly more famous. Appian mentions humble origins of Titius (*B Civ.* 5.142), but Dio Cassius speaks about the high standing he acquired with Marcus Antonius (50.3.1).

¹⁴⁴ See also Plut. *Ant.* 58.2-4 and Dio Cass. 50.3.1-5. On Antonius' will and Octavian's propaganda campaign, see Reinhold (1988), 90-94.

¹⁴⁵ Syme (1939), 281.

¹⁴⁶ See *MRR* 2:420. In the beginning of his career, Titius served under Sextus Pompeius (Vell. Pat. 2.77.3), but he later attached himself to Marcus Antonius. In 36 BCE, Titius captured and executed Sextus Pompeius (Livy, *Per.* 129.1 and 131.1). The duplicity he exhibited in executing his ex-commander and constantly switching alliances caused a lot of hatred toward him (Vell. Pat. 2.79.5-6).

novus homo and one of the greatest generals of the young Caesar, Titius commanded Octavian's land forces at Actium (Vell. Pat. 2.85.2 and Dio Cass. 50.13.5).¹⁴⁷

As to Lucius Munatius Plancus, he applied his *industria* to the reconstruction of the Temple of Saturn in the Forum, the distribution of lands at the old Latin colony of Beneventum, and the foundation of the colonies of Lugdunum and Augusta Raurica in Gaul.¹⁴⁸ In January of 27 BCE, he proposed the *sententia* whereby the Senate conferred the cognomen Augustus upon Octavian (Vell. Pat. 2.91.1 and Suet. *Aug.* 7.2).¹⁴⁹ The services rendered by Plancus must have been exceptionally valuable: in 22 BCE the emperor appointed him a censor, making Plancus the first “new man” since 131 BCE to have attained this magistracy (Dio Cass. 54.2.1 and Vell. Pat. 2.95.3).¹⁵⁰ Despite being a *novus homo*, Plancus succeeded in securing the office which was the apex of the Roman political career and was rarely granted to “new men.”¹⁵¹ Both Velleius Paterculus and Seneca the Younger censure him for treachery and excessive flattery (Vell. Pat.

¹⁴⁷ Velleius Paterculus 2.127.1 claims that Statilius Taurus was closest to Augustus after Agrippa. He became *consul suffectus* in 37 BCE and then held his second consulship in 26 BCE. He was also hailed as *imperator* three times (*ILS* 893), perhaps for his victories in Africa (34 BCE), Dalmatia (32 BCE), and Spain (29 BCE). In 16 BCE, he occupied the post of city prefect (*Tac. Ann.* 6.11.3). See also Wiseman (1971), 263, and Cooley (2003), 378.

¹⁴⁸ According to the epitaph from his tomb near Caieta, Latium, “aedem Saturni fecit de manibus, agros divisit in Italia Beneventi, in Gallia colonias deduxit Lugudunum et Rauricam” (*CIL* X.6087 = *ILS* 886). Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 29.5 on the reconstruction of the Temple of Saturn.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *RG* 34.2; *PIR*¹ M728; Livy, *Per.* 134.1; Ov. *Fast.* 1.589-590; Suet. *Aug.* 7.2; Flor. 2.34.66; and Dio Cass. 53.16.6-8.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 37, who does not mention censors by name. Plancus' son, Munatius L. f. Plancus, became consul in 13 CE, the last full year of Augustus' life (Dio Cass. 56.28.1). Cf. Syme (1966).

¹⁵¹ See Watkins (1997), 139ff.

2.83.1 and Sen. *Q.Nat.* 4 *Praef.* 5).¹⁵² However, Julius Caesar, Marcus Antonius, and Octavian highly appreciated his services, and he was surely not the only supporter of Marcus Antonius to have gone over to Octavian. Plancus' subsequent illustrious career suggests that the princeps was willing to remunerate the sagacity and talent of those who would faithfully serve the new regime.¹⁵³

Similar to the overwhelming majority of shrewd politicians, Augustus deftly utilized Burn's transactional leadership, taking the initiative in the reciprocal trade in the power resources. For instance, the emperor often solicited votes on behalf of candidates he favored in the annual consular and praetorship elections (Suet. *Aug.* 56.1). By means of his consular *imperium* (Dio Cass. 54.10.5), he also shared with the consuls the right to accept or reject men who wished to be candidates. Perhaps the young Caesar limited himself to recommending no more than four *candidati Caesaris* in the annual elections (Vell. Pat. 2.124.4 and Tac. *Ann.* 1.15.1 and 1.81).¹⁵⁴ Yet, his rights of *commendatio* and *nominatio*, combined with the great personal *auctoritas* he enjoyed, gave a major advantage to men whom he supported (Dio Cass. 53.21.6-7).

¹⁵² Velleius Paterculus 2.83.1 labels Plancus "*morbo proditor*," and many scholars denounce the man as a chronic turncoat who constantly switched his allegiances to secure his own fortunes. However, Syme (1939), 512, astutely points out, "Fools or fanatics perished along with lost causes: the traitors and timeservers survived, earning the gratitude of the Roman People."

¹⁵³ See Watkins (1997), 117-143, where the author argues that Plancus also played an important role in the 20s BCE.

¹⁵⁴ "... moderante Tiberio ne plures quam quattuor candidatos commendaret sine repulse et ambitu designandos" (Tac. *Ann.* 1.15.1). Cf. *ILS* 944, where the phrase "per [commendation.] Ti. Caesaris [Augusti] ab senatu [cos. dest. patrono]" depends on a sixteenth-century transcript. It is probable that Tiberius' nomination of four candidates was modeled on an Augustan precedent. Cf. Jones (1955), 12 and 19; Holladay (1978), 880f.; and Pettinger (2012), 109.

The policy of personal endorsement of candidates was effective, but it did not always guarantee that emperor's favorites would win the elections. This prompted Augustus to take greater control of the electoral process by means of the *lex Valeria Cornelia*, which was passed in 5 CE. The law altered the procedure for voting in the *comitia centuriata* and established ten "destining" centuries, where the senators and the equites were to vote first and indicate their nominations for two consular candidates and twelve praetors. Before the remaining centuries voted, candidates who had received the majority of the votes in the ten centuries were credited with all of them, securing the election of men who had been preferred by Augustus.¹⁵⁵ However, this law might have caused the civil strife of 7 CE, compelling the princeps to personally appoint all the magistrates (Dio Cass. 55.34.2).¹⁵⁶ After this, starting from 8 CE, Augustus simply posted up the names of the candidates he endorsed, leaving the Centuriate Assembly no choice but to elect them (Dio Cass. 55.34.3; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.15.1). Benefiting from the services of his supporters and friends, the young Caesar rewarded them in return with magistracies, priesthoods, and provincial commands, augmenting their prestige and acquired honor and thus making his allies even more useful to himself.

The reciprocal process of giving and receiving services and favors enabled Augustus to secure supremacy over the Roman world; his determination to rule by virtue of the suggestive power of his personal *auctoritas*, which stressed his "material, intellectual, and moral superiority,"¹⁵⁷ made his leadership truly transforming.¹⁵⁸ Although Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Demougin (1988), 393-431. For a brief overview of the secondary research on the *lex Valeria Cornelia*, see Pettinger (2012), 107-122.

¹⁵⁶ See *Ibid.*, 114.

¹⁵⁷ Hellegouarc'h (1963), 312. Cf. Val. Max. 8.15.3 and Béranger (1953), 115, who speaks about "the absolute power of the emperor on another level, that of morality" and references Plin.

had introduced laws on morality in 52 BCE (Tac. *Ann.* 3.28.1) and Cicero had urged Caesar to initiate a program of moral legislation (*Marcell.* 23-24), it was the young Caesar who launched the long-term programs of religious revival, cultural renewal, and moral transformation of society.¹⁵⁹ “By new laws put in motion on my initiative,” declares the emperor, “I restored many exemplary practices of our ancestors that by then were passing away in our time, and I myself transmitted to later generations exemplary practices of many things worthy of emulation (*RG* 8.5).¹⁶⁰ The programs Augustus initiated became the hallmarks of his Principate, but they also demanded his unremitting attention from the early beginning of his reign to its very end. In particular, the princeps was concerned about restoring the *prisca virtus* of the the new governing elite, which supposedly lost its moral compass. Hence, many stipulations of his laws about morals, marriage, and the manumission of slaves were unambiguously aimed at the propertied classes.¹⁶¹

Ep. 3.20.12: “Sunt quidem cuncta sub unius arbitrio, qui pro utilitate communi solus omnium curas laboresque suscepit.”

¹⁵⁸ Burns (1978), 20, says, “Such leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality.... Transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both.”

¹⁵⁹ For overviews of these programs, see Syme (1939), 440-458; Galinsky (1981), 126-144; and Zanker (1988), 101-166. Zanker clearly demonstrates that bafflingly diverse residents of the Roman Empire readily and actively participated in the ideology that Augustus’ art and architecture conveyed, embracing its themes and motifs for their own use.

¹⁶⁰ “Legibus novis me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi.” Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 34.1 and Dio Cass. 56.6.4; both authors stress that the princeps modified earlier enactments by the Senate or people. For details, see Brunt (1971a), 559.

¹⁶¹ Syme (1939), 446, says, “To the governing class the penalties were in proportion to the duties of their high station.” Cf. Csillag (1976), 77, and Galinsky (1981), 129.

Once Augustus decided to legislate on morality and make people adhere to higher moral standards, he turned into a moral agent.¹⁶² Now the princeps had to inspire his followers and create authentic purpose for them, often by paying close attention to trivial details and employing pedagogical skills to educate people about the new meanings that were constructed.¹⁶³ It is not surprising, then, that the young Caesar searched Greek and Latin authors for edifying precepts that could be disseminated among his generals and governors (Suet. *Aug.* 89.2). In a bid to demonstrate that his laws and regulations emulated those advocated by great figures of the past, the emperor used to recite speeches of the famous Republicans in the Senate and make them known among the people via an edict (Suet. *Aug.* 89.2).¹⁶⁴ Defending his marriage laws, Augustus read out in the Senate the speech of Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143 BCE and censor 131 BCE) titled “De prole augenda” (Livy, *Per.* 59.6-9 and Suet. *Aug.* 89.2).¹⁶⁵ Similarly, the princeps delivered the speech by Rutilius Rufus (Suet. *Aug.* 89.2) in order to justify the prohibition to construct structures higher than seventy feet tall on the public streets (Strabo 5.3.7).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Cf. Burns (1978), 20.

¹⁶³ See Peters and Waterman (1982), 82f.

¹⁶⁴ Of course, legislations in archaistic style were nothing new: Cicero made some suggestions in *De re publica* in the late fifties and especially in *De legibus* (2.19-22), and Varro published his *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum* around 47 BCE.

¹⁶⁵ Aulus Gellius *NA* 1.6 quotes from the speech and assigns it to Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109 BCE), but he probably confused the two Metelli. See *ORF*⁴, 107. Augustus’ recitation of Macedonicus’ speech might also have served as the kernel for the invented emperor’s address on marriage and procreation in Dio Cassius (56.2.1-56.9.3). See Swan (2004), 227.

¹⁶⁶ Since the red granite obelisk brought to Rome by Augustus in 10 BCE and installed as the gnomon of the Solarium Augusti in the Campus Martius was exactly seventy feet high, the emperor perhaps did not want any other structure to obstruct the view.

Syme suggests that Augustus' policy of moral regeneration simply reflected the crucial aspirations of the municipal aristocracy of Italy.¹⁶⁷ A more nuanced argument is that the emperor shared the cultural concerns of the new ruling elite and was interested in the antiquarian studies (Nep. *Att.* 20.2).¹⁶⁸ On the one hand, these studies were integral to Augustus' attitude of respect toward Roman traditions and fueled his desire to revive them.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, they helped him early in his career to fend off rival claims to *virtus* and subsequent *auctoritas*.¹⁷⁰ Galinsky notably suggests that moral concerns were of the paramount importance to the princeps.¹⁷¹ By means of his laws about marriage and against adultery, the legislation solely grounded in moral principles, Augustus aimed to revive the old *mores* and turn the ruling classes into a morally superior people who were justified to rule over the vanquished due to their own ethical and spiritual superiority (cf. Hor. *Carm. saec.* 53-60 and *Carm.* 4.5.21-28).

The marriage laws the princeps promulgated were ostensibly aimed at restoring family life because some stipulations of legislation encouraged bequests to relatives even within the sixth degree (Ulp. 16.1).¹⁷² While strengthening the sense of blood identity within the immediate

¹⁶⁷ See Syme (1939), 453ff.

¹⁶⁸ On Augustus' relations with Atticus, see Millar (1988).

¹⁶⁹ See Rich (1996), 112-116.

¹⁷⁰ In Gallus' case study, pp. 275f., I discuss how Octavian's antiquarian studies helped him dissuade Marcus Licinius Crassus from asserting the ancient right to offer *spolia opima* to Jupiter Feretrius.

¹⁷¹ Galinsky (1981), 132-138, dismisses demographic reasons in favor of moral concerns. Cf. Rich (1990), 193, who thinks that Augustus' legislation demonstrates that the emperor was worried about morality as much as demographics. Finally, Brunt (1971a), 561f., suggests that the princeps did not encourage the poorer classes to procreate because there were few monetary inducements he could offer them.

¹⁷² Concerning degrees of the ascending line, see Paulus *Sent.* 4.40 and Ulp. 28.7.

family, these laws simultaneously weakened *patria potestas* of the *paterfamilias* and undermined his authority. For example, now both female and male children could appeal to a magistrate if their father turned down their request for marriage (*Dig.* 23.2.19).¹⁷³ The reason for this was quite simple. After Augustus had been acclaimed as the *pater patriae* in 2 BCE and became the ultimate savior and patron of the Roman state (*RG* 35.1), the princeps rather than an individual *paterfamilias* guaranteed reputation and moral propriety of each Roman household.¹⁷⁴ Since the emperor assumed this role on behalf of all the people, he could officially claim for himself the obedience demanded by Roman law from members of the household to the oldest male. As a result, Augustus' moral legislation affected practically every Roman citizen, and the state was now involved in policing the most private matters of human conduct.¹⁷⁵

Writing before 27 BCE, Horace postulates that a decline in morality actually leads to civil wars (*Carm.* 3.6; cf. *Carm.* 3.24.25ff.).¹⁷⁶ After his victory at Actium, Augustus legislated on morals at least on three different occasions, even though his legislation was opposed every single time (cf. *Suet. Aug.* 34.1).¹⁷⁷ The first legislative attempt was made in 29 or 28 BCE; it was unsuccessful, and many of the punitive provisions of the law were soon withdrawn (*Prop.*

¹⁷³ For more examples, see Raditsa (1980), 320f.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. von Alfvöldi (1971), 138, and Ramage (1987), 104-110. For the date, see *RG* 35.1 and the *Fasti Praenestini* (EJ, 47). For a brief discussion of the significance of the title, see above, pp. 331-335.

¹⁷⁵ For specific examples from Augustan jurists, see Csillag (1976), 215f.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *Dio Cass.* 54.16.6, where Augustus chastises a young man who tied the knot with a woman with whom he had committed adultery while she had been married to someone else. The emperor says, “πολλά... καὶ δεινὰ αἱ στάσεις ἤνεγκαν, ὥστε ἐκείνων μὲν ἀμνημονῶμεν, τοῦ δὲ δὴ λοιποῦ προνοῶμεν ὅπως μηδὲν τοιοῦτο γίγνηται.”

¹⁷⁷ Cf. *Flor.* 2.34.65 and *Oros.* 6.22.3. More general statements are made by *Vell. Pat.* 2.89.3-4 and *Tac. Ann.* 3.28.2.

2.7.1ff.).¹⁷⁸ However, it appears that Augustus later re-introduced some of the incentives of this early legislation. For example, while proconsuls for public provinces were usually chosen by lot from among the senators, married senators with a large number of children had the advantage (Dio Cass. 53.13.2-3).¹⁷⁹

In 19-18 BCE, the princeps made another attempt to legislate morals. After refusing a request to “be made the sole guardian of laws and customs with supreme *potestas*” (RG 6.1), Augustus used his tribunician power to effect the *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis* (RG 6.2).¹⁸⁰ Both laws targeted the new Augustan ruling elite and were meant to curb the pleasure-oriented way of life and restore hierarchical order as the basis of civic virtue.¹⁸¹ Financial rewards were offered for marriage and the begetting of children while unmarried men and women were assessed higher taxes (Dio Cass. 54.16.1).¹⁸² In his ode composed to celebrate the Secular Games of 17 BCE, Horace says,

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Livy *Praef.* 9. Similar to Book 1, Livy’s Preface was probably written before the second closure of the Temple of Janus in 26 BCE. For a view that Prop. 2.7.1-3 does not allude to Augustan legislation of 29-28 BCE, see Badian (1985).

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.51.1 and 15.19.1; Fronto *Ad Ant. Pium* 8.1; and Gell. *NA* 2.15.3-8. See also Talbert (1984), 348f., and Rich (1990), 144.

¹⁸⁰ “... curator legum et morum summa potestate solus creator...” (RG 6.1). For some stipulations of these laws, which appear to have been intended to restore a sound family life among the members of the propertied classes, see the *senatus consultum* on the Secular Games of 17 BCE (EJ, 60, no. 30); Gell. *NA* 2.15.4; and Dio Cass. 53.13.2, 54.16.1-7, and 55.2.6. For the sources in the jurists, see Csillag (1976), 79ff.

¹⁸¹ See Galinsky (1981), 128, and Syme (1939), 443. When the princeps learned that an actor of Roman plays named Stephanio was waited on by a matron with hair cut short to look like a boy, the emperor ordered to whip the actor through the theaters of Pompeius, Balbus, and Marcellus and then exiled him (Suet. *Aug.* 45.4).

¹⁸² Brunt (1971a), 561f., suggests that the princeps did not encourage the poorer classes to procreate because there were few monetary inducements he could offer them.

O goddess, bring into the world our offspring
And grant success to the Father's edicts on those
Who get married and
On the marriage law that promises to make abound
A new crop of children... (*Carm. saec.* 17-20).¹⁸³

Once again, Augustus' desire to promulgate morality among the governing elite caused an outcry in the Senate (Dio Cass. 54.16.3-5). Between 18 BCE and 9 CE, when the *lex Papia Poppaea* was passed, the princeps made several attempts to modify legislation about marriage and against adultery so as to make it severer (Suet. *Aug.* 34.1; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 3.25.1).¹⁸⁴ In particular, the marriage laws limited the ability of childless and unmarried individuals to inherit property. In the *lex Julia*, any single male between the ages of twenty-five and sixty and any single female between the ages of twenty and fifty could not take over inheritance unless within the sixth degree (Ulp. 16.1).¹⁸⁵ Such hard sanctions must have triggered even more opposition, forcing Augustus to mitigate legislation of 18 BCE and offer two consecutive periods of grace, the first of three years, the second of two (Dio Cass. 56.7.3-4). On the other hand, around 9 CE the emperor opposed the additional demands of the equites to abolish a law that distinguished between the married with and without children (Dio Cass. 56.1.2ff.). This tug-of-war finally resulted in the adoption of the *lex Papia Poppaea*, which offered yet more inducements for marriage. For instance, the legislation somewhat eased the restrictions on inheritance, stipulating

¹⁸³ "Diva, producas subolem patrumque / prosperes decreta super iugandis / feminis prolisque novae feraci / lege marita...."

¹⁸⁴ See Last (1934), 442f. Perhaps Tacitus is wrong when he alleges that the *lex Papia Poppaea* was meant to augment the treasury. Even though Augustus' successors could have used the law for these purposes, the princeps himself was driven by other concerns. Cf. Raditsa (1980), 324f.

¹⁸⁵ Bequests granted to friends and associates played a vital role in the social life of Rome, especially among the young aristocrats who often inherited from older and often childless men (Hor. *Sat.* 5). For testamentary bequests as a significant part of Augustus' income, see Chapter III, pp. 260f.

that married men and women without children could inherit half of the property left to them (Gai. *Inst.* 2.111).¹⁸⁶ However, this still did not quell the *fronde* among the propertied classes, with Tacitus explicitly criticizing the *lex Papia Poppaea* and the concept of the state as the parent of all (*Ann.* 3.28.2-3).¹⁸⁷

After establishing himself as the person with most prestige and glory in the Roman world, the young Caesar based his claim to power on his immense *auctoritas*. On the one hand, the princeps' power had clear moral connotations and accentuated his moral superiority (cf. Val. Max. 8.15.3).¹⁸⁸ As the *auctor* par excellence, Augustus made his power evocative because he endorsed and guaranteed the initiatives and ideas of many different people. On the other hand, the emperor distinguished himself as the transformational leader by making the program of moral rejuvenation of the propertied classes one of the main priorities of his reign. Once the Senate, the equestrian order, and the people of Rome unanimously acclaimed the emperor as the *pater patriae* on February 5 of 2 BCE (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.119 = EJ, 47), the Roman Empire was officially placed under the *tutela* of Augustus the father and became dependent on his persona. The principle of *patria potestas* as preserved in Roman law demanded obedience from children to their father and gave the princeps a certain authority over all the Romans (Dio Cass.

¹⁸⁶ For a good discussion of how the Augustan laws on marriage applied their sanctions to bequests, see Raditsa (1980), 322-325.

¹⁸⁷ “Sexto demum consulatu Caesar Augustus, potentiae securus, quae triumviratu iusserat abolevit deditque iura quis pace et principe uteremur. Acriora ex eo vincla, inditi custodes et lege Papia Poppaea praemiis inducti ut, si a privilegiis parentum cessaretur, velut parens omnium populus vacantia teneret.”

¹⁸⁸ Cf. also Hellegouarc’h (1963), 312, and Béranger (1953), 115.

53.18.3).¹⁸⁹ Among other things, Augustus used this newly acquired universal paternal power to keep hot heads in line and impose the limits on the militaristic ambitions of those who, like Gaius Cornelius Gallus, still pursued the traditional Republican ways of laying independent claim to *virtus* on the battlefield. While the princeps' laws about marriage and against adultery were not always effective, Augustus was much more successful in controlling the selfish power urges of both the equites and the remaining *nobiles*, thus bringing lasting peace and prosperity to the Roman world.

¹⁸⁹ “Καὶ ἢ τε τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπωνυμία τάχα μὲν καὶ ἐξουσίαν τινὰ αὐτοῖς, ἣν ποτε οἱ πατέρες ἐπὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔσχον, κατὰ πάντων ἡμῶν δίδωσιν....” Cf. also Sen. *Clem.* 1.14.2 and von Alfoldi (1971), 42-46.

CONCLUSION

In the first chapter of my dissertation, I discuss how *nobiles* and equites of the Middle and Late Republic strove to distinguish themselves by matching or surpassing ancestral *gloria* and *fama*. After serving for ten years in the cavalry, where honorable scars, the marks of frontal wounds sustained in battle, served as a dramatic manifestation of their bearers' *virtus*, they fiercely competed for magistracies on the *cursus honorum*. More often than not, they could acquire true primacy of honor only by winning military victories and then laying successful claims to triumphal honors and a triumph proper. Since celebrating a triumph presented a *triumphator* with unparalleled means to secure the awe-inspiring record of victory by carefully constructing a flattering and often very inflated description of what took place on the battlefield, he could easily claim to have performed the greatest service for Rome and its citizens.

After the young Caesar emerged victorious at Actium in 31 BCE, he quickly appropriated for himself the role of the commander in chief of the whole army of Rome.¹ Octavian reserved exceptional *virtus*, the manliness exemplified by martial prowess, only for himself and the chosen male members of his family.² He strongly discouraged members of the new governing elite from pursuing traditional Republican ways of honor acquisition that emphasized displaying “aggressive courage” in battle, laying independent claim to *virtus*, and widely advertising one's martial achievements. More significant, the princeps positioned himself as the chief benefactor

¹ See Scheid (2003), 119; Cooley (2009), 124 and 224; and my discussion in Chapter III, pp. 228f.

² Ovid significantly claims that eternal glory resides perennially in the *domus Augusti* (*Tr.* 3.35-46 and *Pont.* 2.8.18-26).

of the Roman world; his munificence could not be matched by any other aristocrat.³ The expenditure surge Augustus generated not only revitalized the Roman economy but also lifted him out of the category of magisterial *euergete* and made him the benefactor of the whole Roman world. Bosworth, who offers a new reading of the *Res Gestae* by suggesting a lineal connection between the deified Augustus and Euhemerus' Zeus, expands on the significance of the ideological centrality of redistribution of wealth under the new regime: the coalescence of world conquest and largesse entitled a human being for apotheosis.⁴

The princeps' monopolization of martial prowess and benefaction created the asymmetry of political power: once the young Caesar became the personification of *virtus*, *gloria*, *fama*, and *auctoritas* in the Roman world, members of the propertied classes were forced to stop the zero-sum game of ruthless competition for prominence in which one's loss was somebody else's gain.⁵ Narrating the biography of Gnaeus Iulius Agricola (cos. 76 CE?), who was *tribunus laticlavus* in Britain during the uprising of Boudicca (60-61 CE), Tacitus says, "There entered [young Agricola's] heart a desire for that military glory which was unwelcome to an age that regarded eminence of every kind unfavorably and in which good report was as perilous as bad"

³ In order to keep it this way, the emperor also limited the ways in which public largesse could be distributed, including the festivals and gladiatorial games funded by private individuals (Dio Cass. 54.2.3-5). For details, see Veyne (1990), 386-390.

⁴ See Bosworth (1999), who also accentuates the significance of Verg. Aen. 6.756-853. Cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 71.3, where the princeps jokingly makes a fundamental connection between benefaction and deification. For details, see Wardle (2014), 452.

⁵ Earl (1967), 73, says, "It was that when one *princeps* displaced the *principes*, he inevitably concentrated on himself all the privileges and prerogatives which they had shared and for which they had struggled. All real power and position, *auctoritas*, *dignitas*, and *gloria*, had passed into the possession of one man."

(Agr. 5.3).⁶ The emergence of the Augustan Principate heralded an end to the traditional Republican way of acquiring honor and prestige on the battlefield and then using them to lay claim to *auctoritas* and consequent political power.

Following Tacitus, many modern historians portray the one-man rule established by Augustus as morally degenerate, vindictive, and despotic. Although the “extinguishing” or “annihilating” the civil wars (*RG* 34.1) was the single most valuable contribution to the well-being of the Roman state that the young Caesar made,⁷ Tacitus begins *The Annals* with sneering suggestions that the curtailment of liberty was too high a price to be paid for the stability of the Roman world ravaged by permanent civil strife (*Ann.* 1.1.1 and 1.2.1).⁸ However, Pareto, who brilliantly unmask the twentieth-century Western demagogic plutocracies masquerading as liberal democracies, cogently argues that smaller ruling plutocracy calls shots in all societies at all times.⁹ His analysis elucidates systematic disadvantages imposed on those outside the unofficial circle of power and suggests that these shortcomings completely undermine any advantages of the formal mechanisms of representation. Thus, Pareto’s analysis can be fruitfully

⁶ “... intravitque animum militaris gloriae cupido, ingrata temporibus quibus sinistra erga eminentes interpretatio nec minus periculum ex magna fama quam ex mala.”

⁷ “In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia exstinxeram...” Significantly, the gates of the Temple of Janus were closed for the first time in the reign of Augustus, in 29 BCE, to symbolize the end of the civil wars (*Inscr. Ital.* XIII.ii.113 = EJ, 45; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 9; *Num.* 20; and Dio Cass. 51.20.4).

⁸ “Non Cinnae, non Sullae longa dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit” and “ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit, insurgere paulatim, munia senatus, magistratum, legum in se trahere....”

⁹ For the twentieth-century Western democracies turning into demagogic plutocracies, see Pareto (1935), § 2257, who is perhaps the earliest outstanding antidemocratic political sociologist. Cf. also Chapter II, footnote n. 188.

applied to the study of any regime, be it an early Greek tyranny, the Roman Republic or the Principate of Augustus.¹⁰

In the fifth century BCE, Mo Di, the Chinese great moral teacher of the Warring States era, proposed the earliest ethical theory of state consequentialism. A rough contemporary of Socrates, Mo Di lived at time when China was divided into various states that battled each other for hegemony. The philosopher must have known at first hand the horrors of civil strife. This is why he was totally committed to the notion of a harmonious and peaceful social order and advocated for the safety of all “under heaven.” Mo Di significantly argues that the moral worth of all actions, policies, and practices should be evaluated based on whether or not they promote the overall welfare of society. The policies that contribute to this goal should be regarded as morally right and those that interfere with it morally wrong. This utilitarian standard can also be used to evaluate the Principate of Augustus. In my opinion, there is a clear cause-and-effect correlation between the young Caesar acquiring the sole control of the Roman world and a huge increase in the number of Roman citizens.

In the *Res Gestae*, the princeps enumerates the number of Roman male adult citizens registered during each of the three censuses that were conducted during his reign (8.2-4). Between 29/28 BCE and 14 CE, the number of registered citizens increased by roughly 21.5%, from 4,063,000 to 4,937,000.¹¹ Ridley, who provides a very useful overview of the secondary

¹⁰ See *Ibid.*, § 2244, and Nye (1999), 238.

¹¹ The last Republican census performed in 70/69 BCE registered only around 900,000 citizens (Livy, *Per.* 98.2). According to Cooley (2009), 141, the significant increase in the number of registered citizens indicates a high level of under-registration during the Late Republic. At the same time, Brunt (1971a), 115f., suggests that the practical difficulties of administering a census,

literature on the census figures, snidely states: “In short, if Augustus changed the basis of reckoning, he was perfectly entitled to do so. For the keen-sighted, however, what he reveals is that during forty years of war and upheaval the census totals more than quadrupled by his calculations, while in the forty years of much-vaunted peace and prosperity they increased less than 25%.”¹² However, Ridley is well aware of the lively scholarly debate about the criteria of counting citizens in the Late Republic and the Early Empire and willingly concedes that “the arguments *at present* favour giving [Augustus] the benefit of the doubt.”¹³ To my mind, the continuous augmentation of the number of registered Roman citizens in each of the princeps’ three censuses not only explicitly exhibits the benefits of the Principate but also reflects citizens’ growing trust in Augustus’ reign that liberated them from the horrors of the civil wars.

including a widespread evasion related to fear of taxation, mean that the Augustan figures were probably short by 20-25%.

¹² See Ridley (2003), 145-148. The quote can be found on page 148.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 148.

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