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8 **Fundamentals of Estimating the Net Benefits of Ecosystem Preservation:**
9 **The Case of the Salton Sea**

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38 _____
39 This paper has not been submitted elsewhere in identical or similar form, nor will it be during the
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Abstract

This article, both theoretical and methodological in nature, argues the potential merits of using a net benefits framework as a tool to aid policy makers in their efforts to compare Salton Sea restoration alternatives and inform the public as to the potential magnitude and distribution of trade-offs associated with each alternative. A net benefits approach can provide a more accurate comparison and evaluation of the potential net returns from public spending on Salton Sea restoration than what would be provided under the suggested criteria of current legislative mandates. Furthermore, a net benefits framework provides a more lucid and systematic accounting framework by which to enumerate the full array of benefits and costs of each alternative for policy analysis. Finally, net benefits analysis serves to add transparency to the decision making process so that the public gains an understanding of how its scarce resources, including both financial and natural capital, are being appropriated. Additionally, we illustrate and emphasize the importance of estimating the non-market values associated with many of the ecosystem services provided by the Salton Sea and describe the major techniques that do so.

59 **Introduction**

60 The objectives of this article are two-fold. First, we emphasize the potential merits of using a net
61 benefits framework as a tool to aid policy makers in their efforts to compare Salton Sea
62 restoration alternatives and inform the public as to the potential magnitude and distribution of
63 trade-offs associated with each alternative. A net benefits framework is a framework that uses
64 the differences between the benefits and costs of a policy or action as a means of comparison.
65 Currently, legislation mandates that the Secretary of the Resources Agency for the State of
66 California establish “suggested criteria for selecting and evaluating alternatives” (Section 2081.7
67 of the California State Fish and Game Code, part (e)). Two explicitly mentioned criteria include
68 an evaluation of the construction, operation, and maintenance costs of each alternative, hereafter
69 referred to as engineering costs, and the identification of a cost-effective, technically feasible
70 option. Relative to these suggested criteria, a net benefits framework can provide a more accurate
71 comparison and evaluation of the potential net returns from public spending on Salton Sea
72 restoration. Furthermore, a net benefits framework provides a more lucid and systematic
73 accounting framework by which to enumerate the full array of benefits and costs of each
74 alternative. Finally, net benefits analysis serves to add transparency to the decision making
75 process so that the public gains an understanding of how its scarce resources, including both
76 financial and natural capital, are being appropriated.

77 Second, we emphasize the importance of estimating the non-market values associated with
78 many of the ecosystem services provided by the Salton Sea, describe the major techniques that
79 do so, and suggest how these techniques could be applied to the Sea. The Salton Sea is a natural
80 asset that provides many services to society, including unpriced non-market goods and services
81 for bird watching, fishing, boating, and camping. The Sea is home to the endangered desert

82 pupfish, as well as over 400 species of migratory and resident birds, approximately fifty of which
83 have garnered special status as threatened, endangered, or species of concern. These sorts of
84 ecosystem services have been shown to be highly valued by society in other regions around the
85 state, nation, and world, and, accordingly, should be treated as such in any objective economic
86 analyses concerning their use. Indeed, as the National Resource Council (2004) argued recently,
87 assigning a dollar figure to non-market ecosystem services is essential to accurately weight the
88 trade-offs among environmental policy options. Overlooking these values often results in an
89 implicit value of zero being assigned to them in the economic analyses, which is incorrect and
90 unnecessary because numerous analyses exist that have estimated the monetary value of similar
91 services. Wilson & Carpenter (1999), for example, provide a summary of the economic value of
92 freshwater ecosystem services in the U.S., noting 30 refereed published articles in the scientific
93 literature from 1971 to 1997. This literature is quite extensive and includes values derived for all
94 manner of ecosystems, including wetlands, forests, and marine environments.

95 We begin with a description of the mandate imposed upon the California Resources Agency
96 in its endeavor to identify a preferred alternative. Shortcomings of the process are identified
97 relative to what might be provided by a net benefits framework in evaluating alternative
98 restoration plans. A description of how to perform a net benefits analysis is then provided. Since
99 many of the benefits associated with restoring the Salton Sea reside in the ecosystem services the
100 Sea provides to society, a description of the main non-market valuation techniques used to
101 estimate the value of these services is presented. Summaries of previous studies attempting to
102 value a healthy Salton Sea are provided, including a recent report developing suggestive
103 estimates of the recreation and preservation values using the results from non-market valuation
104 studies of somewhat similar California habitats. Finally, we summarize our findings.

105 **Background and Motivation**

106 The California Resources Agency is mandated to identify a preferred alternative for the
107 restoration of the Salton Sea. As noted by California State Senator Ducheny at recent conference
108 centered on the Salton Sea, this will be no easy task (Remarks by State Senator Ducheny at “*The*
109 *Salton Sea Centennial Symposium*”, San Diego, CA., April 1, 2005). First, the legislature will be
110 required to operate under a set of preexisting rules and regulations that will limit how much
111 financial and natural capital (i.e., water) it can allocate to solving this problem. California has
112 been mandated to adhere to its Colorado River water entitlement of 4.4 million acre-feet, down
113 from the approximately 5.2 million acre-feet it has grown accustomed to using. Additionally, as
114 part of the Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) signed in 2003, the Imperial Irrigation
115 District has agreed to transfer 200,000 acre-feet of water to San Diego (Cohen & Hyun, 2006).

116 Second, given the complex set of linkages in the region, mostly driven by water, the
117 effectiveness of any particular restoration alternative will be largely dependent on, or place
118 restrictions upon, upstream users of the water, particularly agriculture. Agriculture, whose
119 drainage flows are responsible for nearly 85% of the inflow into the Salton Sea, will be largely
120 responsible for this cutback; as such, less applied irrigation water will lead to less drainage and
121 thus less inflow to the Salton Sea. Less inflow will strain the effectiveness of any particular
122 restoration solution, and leave more Salton Sea lakebed exposed as shorelines recede. As the area
123 of exposed lakebed increases so will the amount of fine windblown dust in this high wind region
124 which is currently not in compliance with state and federal air quality standards and is
125 characterized by the highest rates of hospitalization of children for asthma in the state (Cohen &
126 Hyun, 2006). Alternatively, requirements for agriculture to maintain historic inflow levels will
127 likely affect the economic health of this very poor region that has nearly 19% of its population

128 considered living in poverty (United State Department of Agriculture, 2004). These impacts may
129 directly affect the productivity and profitability of agriculture and, consequently, labor and
130 income associated with agriculture and agricultural-related activities.

131 Third, across the feasible set of restoration alternatives there are significant differences in
132 habitat configuration, elevation, and both the quantity and quality of inflow assumed;
133 consequently, each alternative will provide a different array of ecosystem services. Hence, the
134 benefits of restoration are likely to differ depending on the alternative chosen, including those
135 benefits associated with recreation and preservation at the local, state, and national level.

136 As part of its decision-making process, the Resources Agency will perform a "...restoration
137 study to determine a preferred alternative for the restoration of the Salton Sea Ecosystem and the
138 protection of wildlife dependent on that ecosystem" and report the findings to the legislators
139 (California State Fish and Game Code, Section 2930: 93). Elements of this study are to include:

- 140 (a.) an evaluation of restoration alternatives including consideration of salinity control, habitat
141 creation and restoration, and different shoreline elevations and surface area configurations,
- 142 (b.) consideration of a range of possible inflow conditions,
- 143 (c.) suggested criteria for selecting and evaluating alternatives, including, but not limited to at
144 least one most cost-effective, technically feasible alternative, and
- 145 (d.) an evaluation of the magnitude and practicality of costs of construction, operation, and
146 maintenance of each alternative evaluated.

147 These elements, in addition to providing some necessary bounds on the problem, identify factors
148 that can substantially influence the costs and benefits of any particular alternative. For instance,
149 consider item (b) related to inflow conditions. The engineering costs of the final restoration
150 alternatives considered in the Salton Sea Reclamation Act of 1998 varied between \$320 million

151 and \$1.4 billion depending on the inflow assumption. While none of the alternatives listed in the
152 1998 legislation were enacted, the cost estimation exercise did highlight how the engineering
153 costs of any particular alternative depend on the values assigned to possible factor inputs.

154 Consider the remaining elements listed above. Similar to the 1998 legislation, engineering
155 costs of each restoration alternative are to be estimated and compared (d), yet an explicit call for
156 the identification of a cost-effective solution is to be included (c). Cost-effectiveness typically
157 refers to the least-cost approach to achieving a particular level of environmental quality, or in
158 this case, ecosystem services. Yet, as emphasized in (a), each restoration alternative likely will
159 provide a different array of ecosystem characteristics.

160 Hence, while the stated intent of the restoration study is to inform policy makers of the
161 potential trade-offs associated with each alternative and it is acknowledged that any particular
162 restoration strategy can deliver a different stream of benefits to society, there is no discussion of
163 how to evaluate and quantify these benefits. Unlike goods that are bought and sold in the
164 marketplace, the economic benefits of natural resources are not revealed through market
165 transactions. The benefits derived from these resources are thus termed “non-market values.”
166 Most of the benefits from restoring the Salton Sea consist of these non-market values (e.g., those
167 values we place on recreation or the preservation of endangered and threatened species).

168 Implicit in performing a cost-effectiveness analysis or engineering cost comparison is that
169 the benefits are assumed constant across restoration alternatives, in contrast to what is suggested
170 in element (a) above. This is clearly not the case with the proposed alternatives for restoration of
171 the Salton Sea, either in the alternatives proposed in the 1998 legislation, or the eight alternatives
172 listed in the Salton Sea Ecosystem Restoration Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact
173 Report (California State Resources Agency, 2006). Because the California Resources Agency is

174 not required to consider how the returns to each investment will differ relative to the costs, their
175 selection may not allocate resources to their highest valued uses since achieving such efficiency
176 requires a comparison of the costs and benefits of each alternative. The process of itemizing,
177 quantifying, and comparing the costs and benefits is known as benefit-cost analysis. Whether
178 formalized or not, this practice is perhaps the most fundamental tool used in decision-making by
179 individuals, private organizations (e.g., firms), and public institutions (e.g., state governments).

180 Further, as indicated in the 1998 legislation, the attractiveness of any alternative is
181 inextricably linked to assumptions about the inputs (e.g., inflows), outputs (e.g., level of
182 ecosystem services), and scale of analysis. For instance, what might be considered the cost-
183 minimizing engineering solution may not be the cost-effective alternative when the impacts on
184 regional agricultural production, the regional economy, or human health from poorer air quality
185 also are included. Continuing, what might be the regionally efficient solution may not be the
186 efficient solution from the state perspective, and so on. Given that the state government will be
187 involved, it seems reasonable to assume that the California Resource Agency would consider the
188 local, regional, and statewide impacts in their efforts to choose a preferred alternative. This does
189 not suggest that broadening the analysis even further has no value, though. As Ciriacy-Wantrup
190 (1964) noted, consideration of the broad impacts of a policy may be a preliminary step toward
191 broadening the repayment base—a base which is sometimes rather narrow if confined to primary
192 benefits. Enumerating and quantifying the benefits of Salton Sea preservation to a broader
193 population might be a first step towards justifying federal assistance.

194 Finally, it is important to note that while the popular press has only recently begun extolling
195 the importance of placing a value on non-market environmental goods and services (e.g., The
196 Economist, 2005, April 3rd-29th: 76-78; Business Week, 2004, December 29th; Infocus Magazine,

197 2005; 4.3; Outside Magazine, March, 2005: 106-123), these values, and the non-market
198 valuation methods used to estimate them, have been given standing in legislative mandates and
199 by state and federal government agencies for decades, including the Comprehensive
200 Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act (CERCLA) of 1980, the Oil Pollution
201 Act (OPA) of 1990, U.S. Water Resources Council, the U.S. Department of Interior, and the U.S.
202 Forest Service. Federal and state agencies also consider non-market values when making natural
203 resource allocation decisions. Since 1979, for example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
204 Bureau of Reclamation have been required to assess the value of recreation benefits in cases
205 where federal projects impact areas of high visitation (Loomis, 2005). The U.S. Environmental
206 Protection Agency (EPA) is required to conduct benefit-cost analyses of environmental
207 regulations and must include estimates of non-market benefits. CERCLA mandates that lost
208 recreation values and “passive use” values from toxic waste sites and hazardous materials spills
209 must be assessed in order to measure the full value of damaged natural resources. Many states
210 have funded studies measuring non-market values associated with recreation and ecosystem
211 preservation, including the State of California, which sponsored an analysis of the values of
212 protecting Mono Lake as a bird habitat (Loomis, 2005). Hence, the validity of valuing changes in
213 environmental or natural resource quality and its usefulness in guiding resource allocation
214 decisions has been invoked at state and federal levels.

215

216 **Net Benefits: Background and Conceptual Issues**

217 As noted above, a commonly employed litmus test in judging whether a project should be
218 undertaken or not is whether it passes the present value benefit-cost test (i.e., whether the present
219 value benefits are at least as great as the present value costs). The formal use of benefit-cost

220 analysis for large water-related projects can be traced back to Eckstein (1958) in his evaluation
221 of federal water-resource programs. In particular, Eckstein (1958: 2) references the Flood
222 Control Act of 1936, which suggests that only projects where “the benefits, to whomsoever they
223 may accrue, are in excess of the estimated costs” would be considered. Eckstein described
224 benefit-cost analysis as a very promising approach for evaluating the use of scarce natural and
225 financial capital that can provide a much stronger foundation for policy decisions than what
226 might otherwise be available. This is especially true when many agencies with jurisdictional
227 overlap are involved in the decision-making process, such as in the case of the Salton Sea. In
228 response to the problems associated with multi-agency involvement and overlap, Eckstein
229 stressed the importance of a general set of standards by which projects can be appraised and
230 compared. Such standards, he continued, would also serve a wider interest in informing the
231 public about the merits of a project and what they will be asked to forego in return.

232 It should be emphasized that just because the estimated benefits of an alternative are in
233 excess the estimated costs does not mean that this alternative is the economically efficient
234 alternative. Indeed, there may be more than one alternative that meets this condition. Of course,
235 the alternative that is in the best interest of society from an economic efficiency perspective is
236 that alternative providing the highest net benefits, which are defined as the difference between
237 the total benefits and total costs.

238 Why there has not been greater focus on using benefit-cost analysis or net benefits analysis
239 in the context of Salton Sea restoration is puzzling, especially when such an approach has been
240 prominent for more than 30 years at federal level in consideration of major environmental,
241 health, and safety regulations (Morgenstern, 1997). Under President Clinton’s Executive Order
242 12866, federal agencies are now allowed to “include both quantifiable measures and qualitative

243 measures of costs and benefits” and to “select those approaches that maximize net benefits
244 (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages;
245 distributive impacts, and equity).” Furthermore, numerous real world examples exist of
246 governments incorporating the benefits of preserving natural and environmental resources into
247 their decision-making, both in the U.S. and abroad. Such evaluations cover a wide array of
248 resources, including the Glen Canyon Dam (Bishop et al., 1989), Hell’s Canyon (Krutilla &
249 Fischer, 1975), Mono Lake (Loomis, 1987), the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest (Hagen et
250 al., 1992), Kootenai Falls in Montana (Duffield, 1982), and the Kakadu Conservation Reserve in
251 Australia (Imber et al., 1991), to name a few. In these and other studies, the preservation
252 benefits associated with environmental and natural resources were quantified and given standing
253 in benefit-cost analysis. In each case, the quantification of such benefits either supported an
254 action for preservation, or modified an existing development scheme to be more environmentally
255 friendly. In all cases, a large—if not the largest—component of the value of preservation was
256 non-market value.

257 Before moving on to the various steps involved in estimating the net benefits, it is useful to
258 clarify what economists mean by economic value, especially in the context of environmental and
259 natural resource goods and services. Economic value is defined by what one (or a group) would
260 be willing and able to pay for a good, not by what one has to pay for it—what one has to pay for
261 a good is what it costs, and is considered an expenditure. In contrast to the benefits of an action,
262 the costs of achieving a particular objective can be measured by what is foregone to achieve that
263 objective, and include both direct engineering costs as well as *opportunity costs*. The former
264 includes both current and discounted future costs, and the latter represents the value associated
265 with the opportunity to use the forgone resources in another activity.

266 We must also recognize that economic value, which is meaningful from an anthropocentric
267 perspective only, extends beyond the marketplace to *non-market goods* such as clean air or
268 water, open space, and wildlife preservation. Furthermore, the economic value of these goods is
269 comprised of both *use* and *non-use* values. The values associated with catching tilapia for
270 consumption and bird watching would be examples of *use* values associated with the Sea, while
271 the value that people derive from knowing that the Salton Sea ecosystem exists for current and
272 future generations would be an example of *non-use* value.

273

274 **Components of Net Benefits Estimation**

275 For large projects, efforts to estimate the net benefits may seem insurmountable; thus it is best to
276 have a road map as to what might be the necessary steps to perform a net benefits analysis.
277 Borrowing upon previous work (Boardman et al., 1996; Morgenstern, 1997), we present a
278 description of the main steps in performing a net benefits analysis and identify how each step
279 could be applied to the restoration of the Salton Sea.

280 ***Specify the portfolio of alternative projects***

281 Finding the efficient solution requires identifying, investigating and comparing numerous
282 alternatives with the outcome that would occur if no action were taken, i.e., the baseline. In the
283 Salton Sea Reclamation Act of 1998, over 50 proposals were identified, of which five were given
284 additional scrutiny, but eventually deemed “too costly and too impractical to implement.”
285 (California Department of Water Resources, 2003: iii). These analyses did prove valuable in that
286 the CDWR, along with other agencies (e.g., USBR, USFWS, Salton Sea Authority), could now
287 focus on a narrower set of feasible alternatives. Currently there are eight proposals to evaluate
288 relative to two “no action” alternatives. These alternatives differ in many dimensions including

289 construction and maintenance costs, strategies for salinity control, shoreline elevations, water
290 body size, depth, salinity, and surface area configurations, and wildlife habitat.

291 Well-defined objectives and criteria will go far in narrowing the possible choice set. The
292 Salton Sea Restoration Act puts forth the following objectives to be considered when evaluating
293 alternatives: sustain avian biodiversity at the Salton Sea without maintaining elevation of the
294 entire Sea; maintain near-current salinity and elevation; and represent the most cost-effective
295 technical alternative. Regarding this last objective, care must be taken here not to prejudge
296 alternatives too quickly based on *ex ante* costs alone for risk of defining the choice set too
297 narrowly. Because the proposed alternatives provide a wide array of environmental benefits, the
298 most cost-effective solution may not be that which maximizes net benefits.

299 ***Decide whose benefits and costs have standing***

300 The benefits and costs of a particular regulation or action can be realized at the local, regional,
301 state, national, and even international level. As Boardman et al. (1996) note, national
302 governments typically consider costs and benefits at the national level. It is not uncommon,
303 though, for cities, municipalities, or states to overlook the impacts of their actions on one another
304 in terms of who counts. Political boundaries and the level of administrative unit will often drive
305 who is included in a benefit-cost study.

306 With respect to the Salton Sea, many different groups will be directly or indirectly impacted
307 by the choice of restoration alternative, extending from recreational users of the Sea, to the
308 localities around the Sea, to the growers in the Imperial and Coachella agricultural regions, to
309 state, federal and tribal agencies, as well as to those living abroad. A potential difficulty that
310 arises with so many agencies and political boundaries is that what might be efficient at one level
311 of analysis (or political boundary) may not be efficient at another level (or boundary). For

312 instance, a cost-effective restoration alternative might not be cost-effective when the impacts on
313 agriculture or regional employment and income are considered, or when the impacts on human
314 health from dust particles from the exposed seabed are acknowledged. What might be the
315 efficient solution for Imperial County and residents of the Salton Sea might not be efficient for
316 the state of California. Performing a broad-based net benefits analysis to determine the extent of
317 the market would provide transparency as to the distribution of benefits and costs among
318 different stakeholders. This will be useful so that criteria other than efficiency, such as equity,
319 are part of the decision-making process.

320 *Catalogue the impacts and select measurement indicators*

321 Many types of impacts may result from regulatory and policy actions. What is necessary for
322 benefit-cost analysis is to catalog these impacts as either benefits (positive impacts) or costs
323 (negative impacts) and decide upon a measurement unit for the impact. These impacts can be
324 measured in a variety of ways, including economic, environmental, and health effects.
325 Economic indicators include jobs, time, income and changes in consumer and producer welfare.
326 Environmental indicators may include quantitative assessments of species viability, ecosystem
327 productivity, and water and air quality. Indicators of public health might include the avoidance of
328 health care costs or benefits associated with changes in quality or longevity of life.

329 Such categorization and measurement are certainly suitable for the Salton Sea restoration
330 alternatives. Benefits and costs may accrue to landowners, farmers, local businesses (especially
331 those relying on tourism), recreationists such as bird watchers and anglers, environmental
332 groups, and local and regional governments. While the category of measurement for the
333 engineering costs of restoration will be dollars, each restoration alternative may affect or be
334 affected by upstream activities related to agriculture. That is, the response from agriculture to the

335 reduction in California's take of Colorado River water can affect the inflow volume into the Sea;
336 consequently, additional mitigation activities will be required to offset the reduced volume and
337 surface elevation of the Sea. For instance, as the shoreline recedes due to lower inflow and in
338 lieu of additional mitigation, increased dust and particulates will be generated exacerbating an
339 already exorbitant regional air quality problem.

340 Alternatively, if the inflow volume is required to remain constant, then presumably
341 agriculture may need to engage in additional water conservation schemes (e.g., reduce applied
342 water rates, more efficient irrigation measures, land fallowing) in order to reduce their applied
343 water rates sufficiently to provide enough mitigation water to maintain inflow volume
344 requirements. These activities can and should be measured in terms of productivity, additional
345 labor hours, income, and employment. The indirect impacts from the restoration alternatives
346 may be very important and thus, at a minimum, should be acknowledged via a categorization of
347 this type. Insight into possible agricultural-related and regional impacts would be further
348 enhanced by applying a regional agricultural production model for agricultural activities (e.g.,
349 Schwabe et al., 2006) and a social accounting matrix model (multiplier analysis) to account for
350 the employment and income effects within the region (e.g., Berck et al., 1991).

351 Additionally, the impacts of the restoration alternatives on ecosystem services should be
352 considered. These impacts will differ by restoration alternative, and thus will have varying
353 effects on tourism and recreation, such as time and income spent on recreating, and wages and
354 income earned from tourism. Such impacts may extend beyond the immediate area, certainly to
355 the state, and perhaps to the nation in terms of non-use values. Indeed, perhaps the largest benefit
356 associated with preserving and restoring the Salton Sea does not necessarily accrue to current
357 users of the Sea, but rather to people that care about the Sea regardless of whether they tangibly

358 use the Sea currently. People have been observed benefiting from environmental resources, and
359 willing to pay to protect them, just by knowing the resources exist. For example, Sanders et al.
360 (1990) estimates what people are willing to pay (i.e., their value) for preserving free flowing
361 rivers with no intention of ever visiting them. Alternatively, Olsen et al. (1991) estimate peoples
362 willingness to pay (value or benefits) for maintaining salmon migrations, again, without actively
363 engaging in any recreation activities (e.g., fishing, photography) involving these salmon. This
364 sort of value is called a non-use or passive-use value and captures that value people have for
365 resources for possible future use by themselves, future use by future generations, current use by
366 others, or simply because they think it is the right or moral thing to do.

367 ***Predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of the project***

368 A comprehensive classification of impacts and their associated costs and benefits is complicated
369 by the extent to which direct impacts transfer across agents, markets and natural systems, and the
370 degree to which this transfer is measurable. The future time path of changes to health, the
371 economy, and the environment must be estimated in some way. This estimation may rely on an
372 extensive review of existing scientific knowledge and data, or may rely on a new analysis.

373 As part of the restoration plan, the California Resources Agency is to prepare a Program
374 Environmental Impact Report (PEIR) that will analyze the potential environmental impacts of
375 the alternatives included in the Ecosystem Restoration Plan. For the restoration of the Salton Sea,
376 a lengthy time horizon and complex interactions will certainly make the estimation of cause and
377 effects difficult and costly. When constructing and evaluating the Draft PEIR, this cost must be
378 weighed against the importance of accurate estimation, or the cost of making the wrong decision.
379 It may indeed be impossible to directly measure some impacts. When this is the case, a proxy
380 measurement must be constructed to account for the impacts.

381 ***Monetize (attach dollar values to) all impacts***

382 Once all impacts have been identified, cataloged and estimated, their monetary value must be
383 determined. In this way, benefits and costs can be compared in dollars. When the impacts occur
384 through markets (such as costs associated with construction, or the benefits of created jobs),
385 monetization is relatively straightforward. These values can be derived using the appropriate
386 demand curve and estimated changes in market prices and quantities. The estimation of non-
387 market (and especially non-use) values presents a challenging problem in measuring the full
388 value of resources, but is facilitated by well-established valuation techniques, the most popular
389 common of which are discussed below.

390 ***Discount benefits and costs and obtain present value***

391 Many projects related to the environment will have costs and benefits that accrue over time. For
392 restoration projects, it is often the case that costs are borne “up front”, or in the present, while
393 benefits do not accrue until sometime in the future. Because dollars or resources consumed today
394 are worth more than the same dollars or resources consumed in the future (due to peoples’
395 preferences to consume now rather than later), values that occur in different time periods need to
396 be converted into a common period equivalent by “discounting” future values to their present
397 value via a social discount rate.

398 The social discount rate, as noted in Pearce & Turner (1990), should reflect the rate at which
399 society is willing to trade current dollars for future dollars, and depends on the degree of risk
400 associated with the future payoff. Since there are a wide variety of opinions as to society’s
401 aversion to risk, choice of this rate is a matter of much debate. Mathematically, lower discount
402 rates make the present value of future dollars appear higher, and vice versa. Hence, higher
403 discount rates weaken the case for projects with benefits that occur over long time horizons

404 relative to up-front costs. With this in mind, using a predetermined rate removes the temptation
405 to choose a discount rate in order to achieve a desired net benefits result. Indeed, many projects
406 funded by the U.S. government use a real (inflation adjusted) discount rate of 7% (Boardman et
407 al., 1996). However, because the discount rate can affect the outcome substantially, a range of
408 discount rates and their corresponding net benefits should be analyzed and presented.

409 Once future costs and benefits for project or policy alternatives have been discounted, the
410 present value of costs should be subtracted from the present value of benefits in order to arrive at
411 the net present value (NPV) of each alternative. When deciding among competing alternatives,
412 including the baseline, the project or policy with the highest NPV will yield the highest net gains
413 to society and, thus, is considered the efficient choice.

414 ***Perform sensitivity analysis and make a recommendation***

415 Even with the best available scientific information, most projects will involve some degree of
416 uncertainty in predicting impacts, deriving their monetary value, or discounting future values.
417 This uncertainty may be due to unknown parameters, lack of data, or lack of information about
418 future environmental or economic conditions, which are often complex and difficult to predict.
419 Such uncertainties exist with regard to the restoration alternatives for the Sea, including future
420 annual inflows, salinity, habitat and wildlife impacts from construction, and the amount and
421 nature of dust that will be created as the Sea's elevation drops over time. When some degree of
422 certainty can be assigned, the most probable or plausible values of the uncertain parameters
423 should be identified and reported as a "base case" scenario. Examination of a reasonable range of
424 parameter values and probabilities around this base case acknowledges the uncertainty of the
425 estimation and provides a means of examining the sensitivity of results to underlying
426 assumptions. It is critical for the analyst to report on the robustness of the results to underlying

427 assumptions so that policy makers can be fully informed. If net benefits remain consistent over a
428 range of possible values, one can be more confident in the results. Within a reasonable range of
429 uncertain parameter values, the alternative with the highest NPV should be recommended. With
430 respect to the Salton Sea, a present value net benefits approach with sensitivity analysis would
431 seem useful for evaluating the proposed restoration alternatives and their trade-offs.

432

433 **Valuing Environmental Goods and Services**

434 For most goods and services, the starting point for estimating value is the market price. Yet for
435 many environmental and natural resource goods and services, no such market price exists. For
436 goods such as clean air, biodiversity, endangered species, and wildlife habitat, rarely are there
437 market transactions revealing the price and subsequently the value of these goods and services to
438 society. Consequently, the value of these goods and services is not readily apparent to policy
439 makers in charge of determining how these scarce and often unique resources are to be allocated.
440 As an example of this problem, consider the decision of how to allocate an acre of land in, say,
441 Sequoia National Forest. There is value associated with the timber that could be obtained from
442 these giant trees. Yet, there also is value in preserving the forest in its present state for recreation
443 activities such as hiking, camping, and photography today and in the future. There is value
444 indirectly in the habitat these forests and trees provide for other wildlife resources we enjoy.
445 There is value also in simply knowing that these resources exist for use by others, and possible
446 future use by current and future generations. As such, we define the value of a resource that is
447 not revealed through market transactions as its non-market value. Without knowledge these non-
448 market values, benefit-cost analysis is limited in its usefulness in aiding policy makers on how to
449 efficiently and equitably allocate these resources.

450 The objective of non-market valuation is to estimate the economic value of these
451 environmental and natural resources to society. Quantification of the benefits gives these goods
452 and services standing in benefit-cost analysis. In considering the benefits of preservation, the
453 total value of the resource should be considered, where total value is defined as:

$$454 \quad \textit{Total Economic Value} = \textit{Use Value} + \textit{Non-use Value}.$$

455 Use value relates to the tangible use of the resource presently, and can include both consumptive
456 use (e.g., *catch and keep* fishing) and non-consumptive use (e.g., photography, or *catch and*
457 *release* fishing). Non-use value, as described in Kopp & Smith (1993: 340), is that
458 "...component of the value of a natural resource that does not derive from the in situ
459 consumption of the resource." There are four general categories for non-use values, including:
460 *option value*—the value that people place on a good or service for future possible use; *altruistic*
461 *value*—the value someone places on the preservation of a resource for use by others in the
462 current generation; *bequest value*—the value someone places on the preservation of a resource
463 for use by future generations; and *existence value*—the value one places on a resource for its
464 mere existence, possibly for moral or ethical reasons.

465 In considering the non-market values associated with preservation of the Salton Sea, a
466 variety of stakeholders come to mind. The Sea provides many non-market benefits to the State of
467 California. Thousands of visitors frequent the Sea annually for bird watching, it has been the
468 only Tilapia sports fishing area in the state, and other activities such as camping, boating, and
469 swimming occur throughout the year. Indeed, the Salton Sea has been considered one of the most
470 productive fisheries in the world (Cohn, 2000), especially during the years from 1960 to 2000. In
471 1987, there were nearly 2.6 million visits by recreators to the Salton Sea, making it a more
472 popular destination than Yosemite National Park (CIC Research, 1989).

473 The Sea also provides non-market benefits to the nation as a whole. The Salton Sea is
474 ranked as the second highest birding area in the nation. Indeed, 90% of the North American
475 population of eared grebes, more than 80% of the entire western U.S. population of white
476 pelicans, and nearly half of the U.S. population of Yuma clapper rails (an endangered
477 subspecies) utilize this habitat. The Sea is one of two nesting areas in the western U.S. for gull-
478 billed terns, a bird proposed for listing as a threatened species. From a fishery perspective, the
479 Sea has supported eight species of fish, including the federally endangered desert pupfish.

480

481 **Non-market Valuation Techniques**

482 Three of the most popular methods for estimating non-market values for natural resources
483 include the Travel Cost Method, the Random Utility Model, and the Contingent Valuation
484 Method. The first two techniques are *revealed preference* methods—methods which examine
485 decisions that individuals make regarding market goods that are used together with non-market
486 goods to reveal the value of the non-market good. These methods require that a link be
487 established between changes in the environmental resource and changes in the observed behavior
488 of people. For instance, changes in water depth and salinity in the Salton Sea may result in fewer
489 fish. Anglers may then move to another part of the Sea, move to a different fishing location, or
490 take fewer fishing trips. In establishing this link, it is important to account for any other factors
491 that may be causing behavior to change. With this information, a demand or marginal
492 willingness to pay function can be estimated, which allows one to estimate the value of
493 environmental resource changes. While revealed preferences methods allow for estimation of use
494 values, they cannot be used to estimate non-use values. To elicit such values, *stated preference*

495 methods, which ask people directly about the values they place on non-market goods, must be
496 used. The most widely-used stated preference method is the Contingent Valuation Method.

497 ***Travel Cost Method***

498 The travel cost method (TCM), one of the most widely used revealed preference valuation
499 techniques, uses information on actual behavior to estimate a trip demand curve from which the
500 value of the resource can be derived. The demand curve is estimated using visitation data,
501 including travel costs and the number of trips taken by each individual to a particular site. Using
502 distance traveled as a proxy for the price of a trip, and the number of trips as the quantity,
503 individual or group demand curves can be estimated for a site. The net benefits of a particular
504 site or the value of the resources within each site can then be estimated.

505 As noted in Loomis & Walsh (1997), the recreational benefits from a well done TCM
506 analysis should be fairly accurate, partly as a result of over 45 years of investigating and
507 improving upon this technique. This method has been used by both state and federal agencies to
508 value a wide variety of non-market goods and services. For instance, the TCM was used by Beal
509 (1995) to estimate the value of camping at Carnarvon National Park. Results suggested that the
510 annual net present value for camping at this park alone was nearly \$40 million. Other recent
511 analyses include valuing hiking in National Forests in Colorado and Montana (Hesseln et al.,
512 2004), canoeing in Canada (Hellerstein, 1991), hunting in California (Creel & Loomis, 1990),
513 Chinook Salmon sport fishing in Alaska (Layman et al., 1996), and ecotourism and wildlife
514 viewing in Costa Rica, and Kenya (Menkhaus & Lober, 1996; Navrud & Mungatana, 1994). This
515 method could similarly be employed to value the flow of recreation services from the Salton Sea.
516 Application would require a survey of recreationists who use the Sea. In addition to a host of

517 demographic information, survey respondents would be queried about the frequency of their
518 participation in recreation activities at the Sea.

519 *Random Utility Model*

520 While application of the TCM would provide useful information on the value of recreation
521 services from the Sea in its current state, a variation of this method, the Random Utility Model
522 (RUM), may be more applicable to valuing potential changes in the Sea under the various
523 restoration alternatives. The RUM has been used in a variety of applications, most commonly
524 freshwater and saltwater recreational fishing (Bockstael et al., 1987; Schuhmann & Schwabe,
525 2004). It has also been used to value a wide assortment of activities at unique recreation areas,
526 such as hiking in the Grand Canyon or Yellowstone National Park, rafting in the Middle Fork of
527 the Salmon River in Idaho, and ecotourism and wildlife viewing in Italy (Font, 2000). RUMs are
528 commonly used to model the choice among a set of qualitatively different recreation sites. By
529 estimating how the choice of alternative sites is dependent upon the characteristics of those sites,
530 the RUM allows the researcher to value changes in the quality or characteristics of those sites.

531 Given that each restoration alternative is likely to result in a different level of ecosystem
532 services (e.g. expected changes in length of shoreline, elevation, availability of bird habitat, or
533 fish catch rates), which in turn will differentially impact the quality or quantity of recreational
534 activities, the RUM would be a very appropriate method of estimation. Such an application
535 would require identification of substitute sites for each recreation activity at the Sea, a catalog of
536 current measures of quality at each site, measures of the expected changes in quality that would
537 result from the restoration alternatives, and a survey of recreationists at each site. As the RUM
538 relies on information gained from actual choice occasions, this survey could be conducted in-
539 person at the alternative recreation sites. This analysis would provide a quantitative assessment

540 of the likely impacts on recreation benefits prior to any restoration action, so that the net benefits
541 of each alternative are more completely understood.

542 *Contingent Valuation Method*

543 The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is a well-accepted technique for valuing non-market
544 goods, with far greater than 1600 CVM studies to date estimating non-market values in over 40
545 countries (Carson et al., 1994). The U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) has adopted CVM to
546 measure non-market values associated with damages under CERCLA 1980; NOAA has endorsed
547 the use of this method for damage assessment under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990; and it is
548 recommended by the Water Resources Council (1979) for use in benefit-cost analysis.

549 The goal of CVM is to create a realistic, albeit hypothetical, market where peoples' values
550 for a good are expressed. A CVM survey consists of four main elements. The first element is a
551 description of the program the respondent is asked to value or vote upon. This element often
552 involves a description of the baseline services with no action, and an improved level of services
553 with some type of policy action. Identifying the conditions of the "no-action" alternative and
554 other restoration options may require research by physical and biological scientists. The second
555 element of the CVM is specifying a mechanism for eliciting value or choice. There are a variety
556 of options for eliciting value, the most well-accepted being a referendum type question that asks
557 each respondent to vote yes or no to a specified price or prices. A payment vehicle describing the
558 manner in which the hypothetical payments are collected is the third element. Such vehicles have
559 included higher taxes or utility bills, or a payment into a trust fund (Loomis et al., 2000). The
560 fourth element consists of collecting information on respondent characteristics including
561 socioeconomic data and environmental attitudes.

562 Because non-use values entail no actual observable use of a resource, the ability to measure
563 non-use values reliably has been questioned (Hausman, 1993). To assess the reliability of CVM
564 in measuring non-use values, NOAA convened a panel of prominent social scientists co-chaired
565 by two Nobel Laureate economists. The panel concluded that if CVM practitioners follow a
566 certain set of conditions, the results obtained from CVM are likely to be reliable (Arrow et al.,
567 1993). Subsequent research has discussed issues associated with the conclusions of the NOAA
568 panel, and provided additional procedures that ensure CVM reliability (Hanemann, 1994).

569 *Examples of Benefits Estimation for Preserving the Salton Sea*

570 To date, little has been done in terms of quantifying, in monetary terms, the benefits of
571 preserving the Salton Sea. No studies were found that used the methods discussed above to
572 estimate the possible benefits from the proposed restoration alternatives. This is unfortunate
573 since such information can be extremely useful in informing policy makers of the relative
574 attractiveness of one option over another and justifying, *ex ante* or *ex post*, a particular decision.
575 Two studies that have attempted to estimate the value of the Salton Sea include CIC Research
576 (1989) and the Inland Empire Economic Databank and Forecasting Center (IEEC, 1998);
577 unfortunately, neither study estimates the non-market benefits of preservation.

578 CIC Research (1989), for instance, focused on estimating the expenditures of Salton Sea
579 recreationists and, subsequently, the potential impact those expenditures might have on both the
580 local and regional economy, often referred to as the *secondary market effect*. Based on responses
581 from a telephone survey of Southern Californian residents and an intercept survey at the Salton
582 Sea, approximately 154,600 households engaged in recreation at the Salton Sea in 1987 for a
583 total of 2.6 million recreation days. Household expenditures that could be directly related to
584 recreation at the Salton Sea amounted to \$76 million, of which \$53 million was spent directly in

585 counties contiguous with the Salton Sea. Using regional and local economic multipliers, it was
586 estimated that the \$76 million in direct expenditures generated an additional \$221 million in
587 secondary market impacts. Unfortunately, the ability to use these impacts to measure the benefits
588 of preserving the Salton Sea is tenuous since this study measures expenditures, not benefits.
589 Hence, very little in terms of the value of preserving the Salton Sea can be gleaned from the CIC
590 Research study with expenditure information alone.

591 Alternatively, the IEEC (1998) focused on the economic benefits of cleaning up the Salton
592 Sea. IEEC categorized these benefits into how changes in Salton Sea water quality would affect
593 (i) privately-held developable property within a one-half mile of the Salton Sea shore and (ii)
594 public sector revenues generated from taxes on property values and economic activity in the
595 area. In estimating the benefits to private property owners for changes in water quality, IEEC
596 considered changes in property values that would likely accompany an increase in water quality
597 using retail market values from other tourist and recreation markets in the Southwest. Added to
598 these privately-held property values, they calculated the expected change in tax revenue that
599 would accompany the changes in both property values and economic activity.

600 The combined present value benefits of increasing Sea water quality was estimated to be
601 between \$2.6 and \$3.2 billion, with slightly over half accruing to private property owners and the
602 rest generated from tax revenues. A serious problem with these estimates, from both a qualitative
603 and quantitative perspective, is their treatment of tax flows. While they account for tax dollars
604 earned, they do not account for tax dollars paid—symmetry should apply. Furthermore, tax
605 generation is simply a transfer of wealth from one group to another. If the taxes are paid by
606 agents outside the region, then local governments in the Salton Sea vicinity would experience an
607 increase in tax revenues while governments elsewhere would experience a decrease. More

608 problematic is their estimation of the value of preventing further degradation of the Sea. In
609 particular, they assume that the benefits of prevention can be approximated by the costs of
610 prevention with the justification that if society is observed incurring the cost, it must be that the
611 benefits exceed these costs (IEEC, 1998: 13). Yet, politicians and government agents may make
612 decisions regarding resources on criteria other than economic efficiency.

613 Neither CIC Research (1989) nor IEEC (1998) nor any other study to date directly estimates
614 the non-market values from preserving the Salton Sea. In cases like this where a primary
615 valuation study for the resource of concern is absent, economists sometimes rely on existing
616 valuation studies for similar resources to obtain a somewhat less accurate but still potentially
617 useful benefits estimate. The use of previous non-market valuation studies to inform current
618 decisions is known as *benefits transfer* (Freeman, 2003; Rosenberger & Loomis, 2003).

619 K2 Economics (2007) recently conducted a simple benefits transfer study for the Salton Sea
620 that relied primarily on estimated values for two similar natural resources in California: San
621 Joaquin Valley (SJV) wetlands and the Mono Lake ecosystem. Citing several analyses of
622 contingent valuation survey data for SJV wetlands, K2 Economics determined that a
623 conservative estimate of the current annual value of 1,000 acres of SJV wetlands to the residents
624 of California is approximately \$50 million. Assuming wetlands at the Salton Sea provide
625 services similar to those provided by wetlands in the SJV, and assuming people value these
626 services similarly, K2 Economics argued that this estimate also can be applied to wetlands at the
627 Salton Sea. Transferring this value to the wetland acreage associated with each of the eight
628 restoration alternatives implies a current state-wide annual value of at least \$600 million, yet
629 more likely in the range of \$1.9-\$4.4 billion for preserving the Sea (K2 Economics, 2007).

630 K2 Economics also used results from multiple contingent valuation surveys for the Mono
631 Lake ecosystem to develop a separate transferable estimate for the value of preserving the Sea to
632 the residents of California. Making conservative assumptions about values expressed for
633 restoration of Mono Lake, K2 Economics determined that the current state-wide annual value of
634 preserving the Sea is around \$1.5 billion and possibly higher. Again, this estimate relies on
635 strong assumptions about similarities between both the services provided by Mono Lake and the
636 Salton Sea as well as the populations receiving the benefits. It also involves a relatively large
637 amount of uncertainty compared to a primary valuation study of the Sea. Regardless, after
638 considering both the SJV and Mono Lake benefit transfer results, K2 Economics concluded that
639 a conservative order-of-magnitude estimate of the non-market benefits provided to the residents
640 of California from preserving the Sea would be in the range of \$1-\$5 billion annually.

641 Interestingly, the estimated construction costs of the eight restoration alternatives range from
642 \$2.3 to \$5.9 billion (California Resources Agency, 2006), a large number indeed. Yet, if one
643 were to take the results from K2 Economics (2007) as a conservative order-of-magnitude
644 estimate, the benefits of preserving the Salton Sea to California residents alone would seem to
645 pass the benefit-cost test (i.e., positive net benefits). Furthermore, consider the results of Loomis
646 (2000) who, in evaluating six different resource preservation programs, finds that residents
647 within the states where each resource is located hold only a fraction of the total national value.
648 This suggests that from a national perspective, the \$1-\$5 billion range is a very conservative
649 estimate of restoration benefits to residents of the U.S.; consequently, the net benefits of
650 preserving the Salton Sea are large. Of course, until a more detail primary non-market valuation
651 study is performed, comparison of the individual restoration alternatives from a net benefits
652 perspective would not be very informative and accurate.

653 **Conclusions**

654 The Salton Sea is a natural asset that provides many ecosystem services that directly and
655 indirectly impact the quality of life for people at the local, regional, state, and national level.
656 Such services include boating, fishing, hiking, photography, bird watching, and habitat provision
657 for an abundance of birds, including migratory and resident as well as endangered and threatened
658 species. The viability of this ecosystem and its ability to continue to provide such services will
659 be dependent on the engineering solutions devised for restoration, yet it will also be influenced
660 by regional agricultural activities and the quantity and quality of the associated drainage water.
661 Any additional impositions on agriculture will likely impact agricultural-related industries and
662 activities and, subsequently, effect regional employment and income.

663 In consideration of these effects, this article has argued that a net benefits framework would
664 be the most useful approach in which to evaluate and compare alternative restoration strategies.
665 Relative to a cost-effectiveness or cost-minimizing approach, net benefits analysis can provide
666 more accurate information regarding potential net returns associated with a particular restoration
667 alternative and present a clearer picture of the magnitude and distribution of benefits and costs at
668 the local, state, and national levels. Certainly, it would seem useful for the legislature to have
669 information on both the potential returns that each restoration alternative provides as well as the
670 magnitude of the resources society is being asked to forgo to provide those returns. If such
671 returns and costs cannot be quantified and monetized, then at the very least an enumeration of
672 the trade-offs associated with each restoration alternative should be provided to inform the
673 discussion. In addition to a description of how the physical characteristics of the Sea will differ
674 across the restoration alternatives, qualitative information on the differences that each alternative
675 presents for recreation opportunities, air quality, wildlife preservation and other changes that

676 society values should be provided. This enumeration exercise will help to identify what is
677 missing, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in efforts to account for the full array of impacts of
678 any particular alternative. This framework highlights the trade-offs associated with each
679 alternative and exposes the limitations, thereby stimulating the need for additional scientific
680 research to achieve better understanding.

681 Equally important, we have emphasized the fact that non-market goods, such as many of the
682 ecosystem services provided by the Salton Sea, have been and should be part of any sound
683 economic analysis involving habitat restoration. The recreational and preservation benefits
684 derived from the natural resources of the Salton Sea will be directly dependent upon which
685 restoration alternative is selected. These types of benefits have been given standing by state and
686 federal legislation and regulatory mandates, and have been shown to be one of the most
687 important arguments in determining the class and scope of preservation that should occur.

688 While no primary non-market valuation studies have been performed to estimate the value
689 of preserving the Salton Sea, and thus an accurate comparison of the alternative restoration
690 strategies is limited, other research has estimated the value of somewhat similar ecosystems and
691 their services (e.g., Mono Lake or wetlands in the San Joaquin Valley). The results from these
692 other studies seem to suggest that the benefits of preserving the Salton Sea far exceed the costs.
693 This is not surprising considering the research of Loomis and White (1996), who perform a
694 meta-analysis of valuation studies for rare, threatened, and endangered species. The authors find
695 that even for the most costly endangered species preservation efforts, the benefits are likely to
696 exceed the costs. Yet for the particular case at hand, to accurately compare the trade-offs
697 associated with different restoration alternatives, a primary valuation study is necessary and
698 should be couched as one part, albeit a significant part, of a net benefits analysis.

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