

# UCLA

## UCLA Previously Published Works

### Title

From Kampung to Condos? Contested accumulations through displacement in Jakarta

### Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3fm8p13f>

### Journal

Environment and Planning A Economy and Space, 50(2)

### ISSN

0308-518X

### Authors

Leitner, Helga  
Sheppard, Eric

### Publication Date

2018-03-01

### DOI

10.1177/0308518x17709279

Peer reviewed



**Commodifying an urban commons: Contested accumulations through displacement in Jakarta**

Journal:	<i>Environment and Planning A</i>
Manuscript ID	Draft
Manuscript Type:	<font color="#622108">Theme issue Paper</font color>
Keywords:	Land transformation, Informal settlements, Displacement, Contestation, Accumulation by dispossession

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

Review Only

## Commodifying an urban commons: Contested accumulations through displacement in Jakarta

### ABSTRACT:

Across cities of the global South, major initiatives are underway to assemble land from informal settlements, in order to make it available for large-scale infrastructure projects and commercial real estate projects. Driven by global city aspirations, profit-seeking developers, demands from emergent middle classes for modern residential, consumption and recreational spaces, and, last but not least, the availability of finance, these land transformations seek to commodify, privatize and enclose residential urban commons. Operationalizing the framework of geographical political economy, we seek to conceptualize how these processes work in Jakarta, Indonesia. Through an examination of two field sites, an authorized kampung where land is being acquire through negotiations between kampung residents with land rights and developers' land brokers, and an unauthorized kampung whose residents were evicted in the name of flood mitigation, we conclude that the default theory for explaining these processes—accumulation by dispossession—is inadequate for capturing the variegated and complex nature of such processes. Thus we propose an alternative conceptual framework: Contested accumulations through displacement.

KEYWORDS: Land transformation, informal settlements, displacement, contestation, accumulation by dispossession

## Introduction

A dramatic urban land transformation is underway across Asian cities (and many other cities of the post-colony). In the context of the variegated neoliberalization of global urbanism, conjoined with political elites' intents that their city achieve world class status and an emergent middle class aspiring for the western urban lifestyle, real estate developers seek to convert informally settled spaces of an urban commons into privatized, commodifiable land assets. This is a geopolitical struggle over space, shaped by political and economic power relations. Yet it also is one that exceeds the classical, international domain of geopolitics. While influenced by supra-, inter- and national scale developments, it plays out locally—at the neighborhood and household scales of everyday and grassroots geopolitics. Further, these processes are not only variegated but also contested, entailing geopolitics from below. Finally, they intersect with issues of subject formation and materiality. In short, they stretch across the breadth of geographical political economy (Author 2011).

It has become conventional to conceptualize this commodification of the commons in terms of accumulation by dispossession: The dispossession of those living in more-than-capitalist ways on land from which they pursue their livelihoods, enabling capital accumulation by developers and other capitalists who use that land for commodity production. There is much to this argument, but also much that it misses. Thinking through Jakarta has provoked us to complicate this conceptualization, bringing into view multiple forms of displacement and accumulation, and contestation (Authors 2007). Studies of these processes in other 'southern' contexts—from Rio de Janeiro to Shanghai—are dominated by stories of eviction. In Jakarta, one of the world's largest metropolitan areas—albeit

1  
2  
3 understudied by non-Indonesian scholars—authorized informal settlements are  
4  
5 commodified via land brokers' negotiations with residents holding rights claims to urban  
6  
7 land (Kusno 2013; Santoso, Febrina, and Ferry-Cuellar 2009). Since 1998, eviction is  
8  
9 largely reserved for state-led razing of 'illegal' kampungs, currently in the name of flood  
10  
11 mitigation.<sup>1</sup> For these various vectors of displacement, differently positioned participants  
12  
13 face unequal opportunities to accumulate economic and political capital. Displacement is  
14  
15 not the same as dispossession, and there are multiple opportunities and pathways for  
16  
17 accumulation. Finally, these processes are contested, doubly: Contestations include  
18  
19 contesting displacement itself (resistance), but also persisting in the more-than-capitalist  
20  
21 livelihood practices associated with kampung life. In short, capitalist Development (Hart  
22  
23 2002) is never complete.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

30 In this paper, we draw on our research experience in Jakarta, taking seriously its  
31  
32 positionality and post-colonial attributes, to develop the notion of *contested accumulations*  
33  
34 *through displacement*. Put otherwise, thinking through Jakarta, in the spirit of geographical  
35  
36 political economy and post-colonial (urban) theory, enables us to rework (perhaps  
37  
38 provincialize) accumulation by dispossession into a more capacious framework for  
39  
40 understanding such land transformations. In the first section we compare two GPEs,  
41  
42 geopolitical economy and geographical political economy, arguing that the latter is a better  
43  
44 fit for our purpose. In the second section, we review current scholarship on the urban  
45  
46 commons and the application of accumulation by dispossession to explain its  
47  
48 commodification in 'southern' cities, and make the conceptual case for *contested*  
49  
50 *accumulations through displacement*. The third section turns to contemporary Jakarta,  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56

---

57  
58 <sup>1</sup> Informal settlements in Indonesian cities are called kampungs ('village' in Bahasa).  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 placed within the 'context of context' (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010) of its encounters  
4  
5 with globalizing capitalism and global geopolitics, to report on two case studies suggestive  
6  
7 of contested accumulations through displacement—one examining negotiations, the other  
8  
9 forced evictions. In the conclusion, we draw out the implications for this theoretical debate,  
10  
11 also for those bodies and places caught up in land transformation.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17

## 18 **2. A tale of two GPEs: Decentering macro-geopolitics**

19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 In his framing essay, Glassman (this issue, p. 1 of MS) discusses the “somewhat short and  
25  
26 spotty, if suggestive, history” of the term geopolitical economy. Noting variegated uses of  
27  
28 the term, and of the GPE acronym, he leans toward one that “foregrounds some of the  
29  
30 specifically geopolitical determinants ..., as part of a broader geographical political  
31  
32 economy” (p. 7). This emphasizes geopolitics as a global and structuring process. There is  
33  
34 no question that any analysis of struggles over urban land in Jakarta must be placed within  
35  
36 such a global geopolitical context, if the city’s status as a post-colonial metropolis is to be  
37  
38 taken seriously (Roy 2011; Authors 2013). The spatial colonizing policies of the Dutch, who  
39  
40 founded Jakarta as Batavia, created an intra-urban geography of formal and informal  
41  
42 settlements that persists to this day (Santoso et al 2009). After successful armed struggle  
43  
44 against colonizing powers reluctant to grant Indonesian independence, President Sukarno  
45  
46 helped catalyze the post-Bandung movement of former colonies seeking a third way to  
47  
48 those of capitalism and communism. Under him, Jakarta was redesigned as a symbol of  
49  
50 nationalism and unity in diversity (as read from Java): a city reflective of the strong,  
51  
52 progressive state he sought to put in place. His violent replacement by President Suharto  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 triggered a US-oriented authoritarian regime. Suharto presented himself as Indonesia's  
4 father figure, guiding its Rostowian, market-oriented development (Kusno 2013). During  
5 this period, sweetheart deals between Suharto, his family and Indonesia's Indo-Chinese  
6 family conglomerates opened up vast tracts of land for commercial real estate and  
7 infrastructure development, as Jakarta stretched into its current megalopolis  
8 (Jabodetabek), now with some 28 million residents. A further global event, the 1997 Asian  
9 financial crisis, spelt the end for Suharto, and his replacement by a putatively democratic  
10 regime characterized by the devolution of power from central to local state institutions  
11 (*reformasi*) (Bunnell and Miller 2011). It is only fifteen years later, with the 2014 election  
12 of President (previously Jakarta governor) Joko Widodo (Jokowi), that the determined grip  
13 on power by those associated with the legacy of Suharto is being loosened—a process that  
14 remains far from certain or predictable.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 Notwithstanding the influence of this broader geopolitical context, our focus in this  
33 paper is different. It resonates more closely with initiatives by others to extend geopolitics  
34 into the local and the everyday, under such labels as feminist geopolitics, everyday  
35 geopolitics, and geopolitics from below (e.g., Routledge 2003; Dixon and Marston 2013;  
36 Smith and Pain 2012). This is partly a question of scale: The struggles over urban and peri-  
37 urban land in Jakarta that we analyze here resonate with the unequal power struggles to  
38 occupy and control territory that are the very stuff of classical geopolitics but play out  
39 largely at scales ranging from the household, to the neighborhood and megalopolis. Yet  
40 simply shifting the scale of geopolitical struggle remains insufficient for our purpose. It also  
41 is necessary to conceptually extend what is meant by geopolitics, going beyond state-  
42 centric conceptions of the geopolitical that focus on the exercise of state sovereign and  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 biopolitical power within and beyond the territory of the nation-state, and the privatization  
4  
5 and depoliticization of the public sphere. While these processes are vital to acknowledge,  
6  
7 politics cannot be reduced to the exercise of and struggle to possess power: "Politics ought  
8  
9 to be defined on its own terms, as a mode of acting put into practice by a specific kind of  
10  
11 subject and deriving from a particular form of reason" (Rancière, Panagia, and Bowlby  
12  
13 2001). We thus seek to attend to the powers and practices of a diverse set of non-state civil  
14  
15 society actors in relation to one another, as well as in relation to levels and agencies of the  
16  
17 state. In particular, arguably of particular importance in the post-colony, geopolitical  
18  
19 accounts that focus on the powerful run the danger of neglecting the necessity and  
20  
21 possibilities of contestations from less powerful places and bodies (Slater 2004).  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 We find a variant usage of GPE more amenable to our purposes: Geographical  
28  
29 political economy (Glassman acknowledges this alternate, tracing some of its genealogy).  
30  
31 As we use it, geographical political economy stresses four aspects of capitalist political  
32  
33 economic processes (Author 2011). First, *the economy (and society more generally) and its*  
34  
35 *spatialities are co-implicated*: Political economic processes 'produce' distinct, multifaceted  
36  
37 spatiotemporalities in particular contexts, but these processes also are shaped by emergent  
38  
39 spatiotemporalities. The late, lamented Ed Soja (1980) enduringly dubbed this the socio-  
40  
41 spatial dialectic. Second, *economic processes cannot be separated from other societal and*  
42  
43 *more-than-human processes and events*, even for the purpose of analysis (nor are other  
44  
45 processes reducible to or dominated by economic logic). Such econocentrism, hegemonic in  
46  
47 mainstream/geographical economics and a lingering hazard also for Marxian political  
48  
49 economy, must be resisted. Geopolitical economy emphasizes how political processes are  
50  
51 bound up with and constitutive of economic processes. Geographical political economy—  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 taking advantage of Geography's 'radical intra-disciplinarity' (Domosh and Magilligan,  
4 personal communication)— extends this to incorporate cultural processes (discourse and  
5 representation, but also identity and performativity) and materiality (more-than-human  
6 agency). In this view, cultural, biophysical, political and economic processes are co-  
7  
8 constitutive of one another.  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13

14  
15 Third, following from this, is the importance of attending to *socio-spatial*  
16 *positionality* (Author 2002; Authors 2008). This accounts for the unevenly empowered  
17 relations between human agents reflective (and constitutive) of their different social  
18 locations and intersectional identities, but also how these relationalities are shaped by  
19 spatial location (Mohanty 2003; Nagar and Geiger 2007; Valentine 2007). Positionality also  
20 is an attribute of places. Indeed, geographical political economic analysis of globalizing  
21 capitalism finds that the bodies and places occupying marginalized positionalities (e.g., in  
22 the postcolony) are persistently disadvantaged by capitalist political economic relations—  
23 relations that produce prosperity for some at the expense of precarity for others.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36

37 Fourth, it is vital to attend to the geography of knowledge production: To where  
38 various imaginaries of economy and development and their attendant practices emanate  
39 from. Those embedded in the global north habitually imagine a single path to capitalist  
40 development and prosperity to be followed by all. The power of this locus of enunciation is  
41 such that this discourse has become commonsense. Yet those embedded in the global  
42 south, encountering capitalist development as a force associated with impoverishment and  
43 marginalization, have a very different take (Escobar 1995). From this vantage point,  
44 alternatives to capitalist development trajectories are both desirable and necessary—other  
45 worlds must be possible (Fisher and Ponniah 2003; de Sousa Santos 2007). Indeed, from  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 these loci of enunciation North Atlantic social science theory should itself be opened up to  
4  
5 the possibility that it may need to be provincialized (e.g., Chakrabarty 2000; Derickson  
6  
7  
8 2014; Authors 2016). In this spirit, it is by thinking through Jakarta that we argue for  
9  
10 extending accumulation by dispossession to contested accumulations through  
11  
12 displacement.  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17

### 18 **3. Commodifying the urban commons: Contested accumulations through** 19 20 **displacement** 21 22 23

24  
25  
26 A shared feature of urbanism across the post-colony is the high proportion of land occupied  
27  
28 by informal settlements—informal in the sense both that residents generally do not  
29  
30 possess freehold rights to their spaces of habitation, and that they frequently work within  
31  
32 the informal economy. The United Nations estimates that one-third of urban populations in  
33  
34 ‘developing regions’ reside in informal settlements (862 million people); in Jakarta, this  
35  
36 proportion is approximately 60% (Silver 2007; UN Habitat 2013). This feature is reflective  
37  
38 of distinct processes of urbanization in those parts of the world whose long-standing  
39  
40 peripheral positionality—dating back to encounters with European colonialism—  
41  
42 undermines the possibility that they can follow Rostow’s (1960) stages of capitalist  
43  
44 development.<sup>2</sup> In much of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania, urbanization has been  
45  
46 significantly more rapid than in Europe, Japan and white settler colonies, has not been  
47  
48 matched by economic growth and job creation in the formal sector. It also has not resulted  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54

---

55  
56  
57 <sup>2</sup> Disadvantaged positionality, produced through globalizing capitalism; undermining capitalist development  
58 possibilities in these places  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 in the wholesale transfer of populations from rural to urban areas observed in wealthier  
4  
5 capitalist economies—the rural-urban transition.  
6  
7

8 Informal settlements<sup>3</sup> create a challenge for capitalist economic development  
9  
10 because they lie outside the market. Their pervasiveness also challenges North Atlantic  
11 urban theory, in which it is presumed that residential urban land is available to the land  
12 market, and thus that rent theory can account for urban land use patterns (Alonso 1964;  
13 Harvey 1972). Asserting the applicability of a common development trajectory for all  
14 places and bodies, mainstream analysts seek to resolve this disjuncture between theory  
15 and reality in favor of the theory. For example, Scott and Storper (2015, 12) seek to “guard  
16 against over-hasty impulses to take certain dramatic or peculiar instances of urban  
17 development (e.g. ... the extensive slums of Mumbai ...) as a clear-cut signal that a  
18 reformulation of theory is required”. Further, major initiatives have been undertaken to  
19 privatize (“normalize”) land ownership in cities of the post-colony in the name of  
20 modernization and development. Inspired by Hernando de Soto’s (2000) claim that urban  
21 poverty can be reduced, and by social justice arguments that the poor’s occupancy of urban  
22 land should be legally recognized, the UN and the World Bank have pushed post-colonial  
23 urban administrations to undertake cadastral surveys and ‘regularize’ property rights in  
24 informal settlements (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2012).  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56

---

57  
58 <sup>3</sup> Informal settlements: places produced through capitalist development  
59  
60

### *An urban commons*

We follow others in conceptualizing informal settlements as a significant space of the urban commons (e.g., Foster 2009; Jeffrey, McFarlane, and Vasudevan 2012). But what constitutes an urban commons? One influential approach is common property regimes, developed by Elinor Ostrom in a lifelong body of scholarship that persuasively undermines the presumption that collective ownership of resources is a tragedy in the making—the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Common property is defined as: “Property owned by no-one...owned and defended by a community of resource users...used by multiple individuals regardless of the type of property rights involved” (Schlager and Ostrom 1992, 249). The third part of this definition is applicable to urban land, but this land generally is not a resource in the sense meant here: A collectively organized means of production for primary commodities. While common property theory challenges the presumption that primitive accumulation represents economic progress, its applicability to the urban context is thus limited.

The urban commons includes a heterogeneous bundle of spaces, including parks, roads and the spaces of mass transit, public housing, community gardens, as well as informal settlements. These are important spaces in all cities, spaces whose extent and status as an urban commons is increasingly contested everywhere in this era of neoliberal global urbanism (Staehele and Mitchell 2008). Nick Blomley (2008, 320), analyzing struggles over the recommodification of a former department store in a low income area of Vancouver, extends the definition of the commons beyond collective ownership and use, seeking a legal basis that is not rooted in land tenure: “[T]he claim to the commons of the poor ... is based upon and enacted through sustained patterns of local use and collective

1  
2  
3 habitation, through ingrained practices of appropriation and 'investment'. By virtue of  
4 being in place for a long time and using and relying upon the commons, residents both  
5  
6 acquire and sustain a legitimate property interest." Such an urban commons is a  
7  
8 particularly trenchant feature of cities of the post-colony. Informal settlements are the  
9  
10 most land extensive aspect, but definitions from North Atlantic theory should be further  
11  
12 extended to embrace other characteristics of 'southern' urbanization: "municipal garbage  
13  
14 that provides livelihoods to waste-pickers; wetlands, water bodies, and riverbeds that  
15  
16 sustain fishing communities, washerwomen, and urban cultivators; streets as places where  
17  
18 people work, live, love, dream, and voice dissent; and local bazaars that are sites of  
19  
20 commerce and cultural invention" (Gidwani and Baviskar 2011, 43).  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27  
28 Informal settlements pose a challenge for real estate and finance capital seeking to  
29  
30 make urban land occupied by informal settlements investable (Li 2014) through  
31  
32 incorporation into the urban land market. The pressure to commodify informally settled  
33  
34 urban land is particularly strong at present. This pressure reflects the convergence of  
35  
36 several processes: Fast policy initiatives to 'regularize urban land ownership, referred to  
37  
38 above; the rapid emergence of a wealthy urban middle class demanding urban spaces  
39  
40 consonant with living a 'modern' lifestyle (condominiums, villas, shopping centers, office  
41  
42 towers, etc.); developers seeing profits to be made in supplying this upper end of the  
43  
44 residential population; municipal officials, seeking to enhance the attractiveness of their  
45  
46 city to mobile capital and wealthy residents; and last, but not least global finance capital,  
47  
48 residents with disposable incomes, developers, all engaging in speculation, with urban  
49  
50 land and property being a highly attractive investment option worldwide (Goldman 2011).  
51  
52 Informal settlements are at the sharp end of this pressure to privatize, commodify and  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

assetize all urban land, triggering a body of research accounting for this under the conceptual label of accumulation by dispossession.

### *Accumulation by dispossession*

In cities across post-colonial Asia, Africa and Latin America, scholars have determined that the commodification of informal settlements commonly involves displacement through forcible eviction. The mechanisms driving this range from formal declarations of eminent domain—whereby state power is used to abrogate property rights in the name of what is declared a high societal priority (with compensation for displaced residents)—to various informal and illegal pressures and violence. Responding to this, the critical urban studies literature has devoted considerable attention to dispossession and enclosure. This process resonates with Marx' (1967 [1867]Part 8) analysis of primitive accumulation: The enclosure of rural commons in eighteenth century England, dispossessing peasants of the means of food production and displacing them to cities to become an industrial working class. In Marx' account, primitive accumulation clarifies the transition from a feudal land-based political economy to industrial capitalism. Others have argued, however, that such processes are a permanent feature of capitalism's enrollment of non-capitalist practices and practices into its logic (Glassman 2006; Perelman 2000; De Angelis 2001). In this spirit, Harvey developed accumulation by dispossession to conceptualize the many ways in which contemporary capitalism, colonizes its constitutive outsides in order to redress emergent internal contradictions and repeated crises:

1  
2  
3 What accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets  
4 (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost.  
5  
6 Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn  
7  
8 them to profitable use. In the case of primitive accumulation as Marx  
9  
10 described it, this entailed taking land, say, enclosing it, and expelling a  
11  
12 resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the  
13  
14 land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation. ... [I]f capitalism  
15  
16 has been experiencing a chronic difficulty of overaccumulation since 1973,  
17  
18 then the neo-liberal project of privatization of everything makes a lot of  
19  
20 sense as one way to solve the problem. (Harvey 2003, 149-50)  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

30 Urban scholars have turned to accumulation by dispossession to illuminate  
31  
32 processes of land transformation, land 'grabs' and struggles over land. Dispossession and  
33  
34 enclosure have been elevated to mid-range concepts that illuminate struggles over land as  
35  
36 varied as global 'land grabs', the privatization and sales of council housing in the UK, and  
37  
38 the clearing and 'upgrading' of urban informal settlements across the post-colony (Anwar  
39  
40 2012; Ghertner 2014; Hodgkinson 2012; Jou, Lund Hansen, and Wu 2012; Li 2010; Ince  
41  
42 2014; Gillespie 2015; Shin 2015). Enclosure in particular has become a broad-ranging  
43  
44 term, capable of capturing multivalent processes of dispossession in variegated contexts  
45  
46 (Vasudevan, McFarlane, and Jeffrey 2008; Jeffrey, McFarlane, and Vasudevan 2012; White  
47  
48 et al. 2012; Sevilla-Buitrago 2015). With respect to dispossession, Rossi (2012, 348) goes  
49  
50 as far as to argue that it constitutes one element of capitalism's ontological "dispositif".  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4 Across the post-colony, scholars examining land commodification have sought to  
5  
6 place accumulation by dispossession into conversation with post-colonial theory, offering  
7  
8 cautionary comments on and proposing modifications to North Atlantic theory. With  
9  
10 respect to primitive accumulation, Ince (2014) argues that applying a genealogical  
11  
12 approach to the role of globalizing capitalism in the post-colony raises questions about  
13  
14 whether enclosure of the commons necessarily entails the spatial displacement of peasants  
15  
16 theorized by Marx. For example, land grabs can commodify subsistence land for globalized  
17  
18 commodity production without displacing peasants (who become an agricultural labor  
19  
20 force, albeit with increasingly precarious livelihoods). With respect to enclosure, Jeffrey et  
21  
22 al. seek to extend its conceptual capacity beyond the fencing off of land, to incorporate  
23  
24 “materialities, spatialities, and subjectivities” (Jeffrey, McFarlane, and Vasudevan 2012,  
25  
26 1249), thereby acknowledging the constitutive role of spatial, cultural and biophysical  
27  
28 processes. Further, challenging pessimism about capitalism’s capacity seemingly to  
29  
30 dispossess, enclose and commodify everything, they argue that processes of communing  
31  
32 continue to contest those of enclosure: “If enclosure is a seizure of the commons, the  
33  
34 commons is a generative spacing that is not simply reducible to but that variously  
35  
36 precedes, responds to, and exceeds processes of enclosure” (Jeffrey, McFarlane, and  
37  
38 Vasudevan 2012, 1249).

39  
40 Gillespie makes a similar point in seeking to provincialize accumulation by  
41  
42 dispossession. Thinking through Accra, he argues that North Atlantic theorists neglect the  
43  
44 ongoing capacity of residents and social movements to push back against dispossession  
45  
46 through acts of ‘quiet encroachment’ (Bayat 2000; Gillespie 2015). This resonates with  
47  
48 others’ arguments about the persistence of contestations and alternatives to globalizing  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 capitalism (Escobar 2001; Escobar 2008; Gibson-Graham 2008; Authors 2007). Relatedly,  
4  
5 Ghertner questions whether gentrification, as conceptualized in the North Atlantic realm, is  
6  
7 applicable to the displacement of residents in cities of the post-colony, where the social  
8  
9 upgrading of housing occurs through wholesale replacement of the housing stock by large  
10  
11 real estate developments (see also Lees 2011). Finding that it has limited relevance in  
12  
13 Mumbai, he concludes that “‘urban revolution’, ‘enclosures’, and ‘accumulation by  
14  
15 dispossession’, while equally abstract terms, ...” are better suited than gentrification for a  
16  
17 north-south comparative analysis of displacement (Ghertner 2014, 1554). Examining  
18  
19 ‘gentrification’ in Guangzhou, Shin finds that dispossession is an important precondition for  
20  
21 implementing upmarket residential developments, unlike in the North Atlantic economies.  
22  
23 Beyond this, he questions whether forcible dispossession is adequate for describing the  
24  
25 putative vectors of displacement: “dispossession occurs in a nuanced way, involving a mix  
26  
27 of co-optation and coercion, or ‘negotiated consent to displacement and forced eviction’”  
28  
29 (Doshi 2013, 848; quoted in Shin 2015, 14).  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

### 38 *Contested accumulations through displacement*

39  
40 Thinking through Jakarta underlines Shin’s reservations about the adequacy of  
41  
42 accumulation by dispossession for explaining geopolitical struggles over land in Asian  
43  
44 cities. Land transformations are not simply about dispossession and capitalist  
45  
46 accumulation, but are more complex. As we will show, displacement cannot be reduced to  
47  
48 dispossession, but takes a variety of forms. Second, it is not only capitalists who have the  
49  
50 opportunity to accumulate; a variety of actors are unequally socio-spatially positioned to  
51  
52 accumulate wealth and power through the land transformation process. Last, but not least,  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 contests over land transformation may block or exceed the logic of the capitalist land  
4 market (For similar arguments, see Levien 2012; Sarkar 2016).  
5  
6  
7

8 *First, variegated vectors of displacement exceed the usual meaning of dispossession.*

9  
10 Under former President Suharto, the principle articulated in the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law  
11 that still governs land policy—management ‘for the people’—was reinterpreted “to equate  
12 the people’s well-being with the state’s capital-intensive developmentalist program” (Lucas  
13 and Warren 2013, 8). Large tracts of state-owned land were handed over to well-connected  
14 Indonesian conglomerates, whose urban land developers told us that land assembly and  
15 evictions were easy because they could call on the state to come in and remove people.<sup>4</sup>  
16  
17 Since Suharto was deposed in 1998, ushering in democratization and *reformasi*, developers  
18 seeking to assemble informal settlement kampung land must resort to the market:  
19  
20 initiating a complex and time-consuming process of negotiating sales with kampung  
21 residents holding land rights. By contrast, evictions from ‘illegal’ kampungs have been  
22  
23 ordered by Governors of DKI Jakarta in recent years, not for real estate development but in  
24  
25 the name of flood mitigation and modernization (Authors 2016).  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38

39 *Second, there are multiple forms of, and conditions of possibility for, accumulation,*  
40  
41 exceeding Marx’ definition of capitalists’ accumulation of profits for expanded commodity  
42 production. With respect to money capital, not only developers but also land brokers and a  
43 variety of residents are unequally positioned to benefit from the land transformation  
44 process, in the form of investment capital and/or wealth (Simone 2014a). Depending on  
45 the land rights they can document, their willingness to sell and their negotiating skill,  
46  
47 kampung residents may make a great deal of money or none at all during the land  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55

56  
57  
58 <sup>4</sup> Interviews with developers, Jakarta, December 2013  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 acquisition process. Even households facing eviction may be (differentially) compensated,  
4  
5 opening up opportunities to invest in small-scale commodity production, engage in land or  
6  
7 other speculation, or participate in other urban commons (Levien 2012; Doshi 2013).  
8  
9

10 There are also multiple, unequal opportunities to accumulate power and influence, tracking  
11  
12 but also exceeding those of monetary wealth. These asymmetries are associated with  
13  
14 different socio-spatial positionalities.  
15  
16

17  
18 Third, *accumulations through displacement are contested*. On the one hand, are  
19  
20 attempts to resist the commodification or alienation of kampung land: Residents and their  
21  
22 allies may protest, refuse to sell, or resort to the courts to prevent land transformation,  
23  
24 blocking the expansion of land and finance capital. On the other, are practices that exceed  
25  
26 such expansions. Those displaced may purchase or simply occupy cheaper or more thinly  
27  
28 settled kampung land in peri-urban areas. For those making windfall profits, instead of  
29  
30 converting these into entrepreneurial activities of capital accumulation (cf. de Soto 2000)  
31  
32 they may choose to use (or lose) the money in a variety of more-than-capitalist activities.  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39

#### 40 **4. Land transformations in Jakarta**

41  
42  
43  
44

45 In Jakarta, the demand for housing, commercial space and offices has exploded over the  
46  
47 past decade, fueled by a number of developments. As elsewhere in Asia, a rapidly  
48  
49 expanding middle class aspires to the North Atlantic urban lifestyle, also seeing investment  
50  
51 in land as more secure than the stock market in light of their experiences with *krismon* (the  
52  
53 1997 Asian financial crisis that remains far more influential over Indonesian imaginaries  
54  
55 and practices than the 2008 global financial crisis). Identifying urban real estate as a  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 profitable investment opportunity, Indonesian conglomerates have become very active in  
4 urban real estate development. Able to sell every unit they build, with anticipated profits  
5 approaching 30% annually<sup>5</sup>, they have built urban super-blocks, peri-urban new towns and  
6  
7  
8 'integrated' industrial estates, also now turning to Dubai-style island reclamations (17  
9 currently permitted) between Jakarta's north shore and a planned Great Sea Wall (Kusno  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

profitable investment opportunity, Indonesian conglomerates have become very active in urban real estate development. Able to sell every unit they build, with anticipated profits approaching 30% annually<sup>5</sup>, they have built urban super-blocks, peri-urban new towns and 'integrated' industrial estates, also now turning to Dubai-style island reclamations (17 currently permitted) between Jakarta's north shore and a planned Great Sea Wall (Kusno 2013). In 2012 and 2013 it is estimated that Jakarta offered the highest return on luxury real estate investment in the world (37%) (Chow 2014). Spectacular, gated and defensive architecture, combined with provision of a full range of services (retail, office, primary to university Anglophone education, religious facilities), has created communities where the better off can segregate themselves from the poverty and congestion that they associate with Jakarta's kampungs and streets (Firman 2004; Suryono et al. 2013). From the perspective of national and municipal officials, such real estate projects will enhance Jakarta's global competitiveness as a destination for mobile investment capital and economic and political elites.

Given these pressures, urban and peri-urban kampungs are highly sought-after spaces from which land can be assembled for real estate development, and thereby commodified. Kampung residents pursue urban lifestyles that cannot readily be reduced to the western, neoliberal capitalist norm (Simone 2014a). Many participate in the informal economy. Kampung politics are a hybrid of Indonesian representative democracy (overseen by locally elected representatives: RTs and RWs), indigenous political structures that accompanied rural-urban migrants to Jakarta, and fixers (*preman*) who take it upon themselves to mediate between the two (Simone 2014b). Neighborhood life has a strong

---

<sup>5</sup> Interviews with developers, Jakarta, December 2013

1  
2  
3 urban commons orientation: Helping out neighbors, socializing in and maintaining  
4 kampung public spaces, and collective decision-making (as well as conflicts). Jakarta's  
5  
6 Kampung are of highly variable quality. They range from those dating back to the Dutch  
7  
8 era, where families have lived for several generations and have benefitted from kampung  
9  
10 improvement programs, to desperately poor and unhealthy spaces occupied by first-  
11  
12 generation rural-urban migrants on marginal state land. Although all kampungs begin life  
13  
14 as squatter settlements, most long-standing kampungs have been accorded legal  
15  
16 recognition by the state (authorized kampungs). Unauthorized kampungs are increasingly  
17  
18 dubbed illegal, and/or slums, to legitimize their erasure.<sup>6</sup>  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

25 Some residents of kampungs hold land rights, but these need not be freehold. In  
26  
27 Indonesia, as elsewhere across the post-colony, newly independent nation-states sought to  
28  
29 craft land rights that recognize both indigenous principles (*adat* in Indonesia) as well as  
30  
31 western-style formal legal principles (Seidman and Seidman 1994; Fitzpatrick 2008).  
32  
33 Michael Leaf (1993) describes the persistence of two systems of recognized land rights in  
34  
35 Jakarta: unregistered 'indigenous' *adat* land rights (*girik* and *garapan*) that Indonesians  
36  
37 had been granted on foreign-owned land, managed by the Lurah (the appointed official in  
38  
39 charge of a *Kelurahan*)(footnote), and rights registered with the National Land Agency  
40  
41 (Badan Pertanahan Nasional—BPN). Only limited progress has been made with land  
42  
43 registration, notwithstanding the 1981 PRONA (*program nasional*) national certification  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

---

50 <sup>6</sup> Public and media discourse uses legal and illegal to distinguish between kampungs based  
51 on whether or not they are accorded official recognition. Yet this distinction is more a  
52 political decision than an official category, 'illegal' is deployed to justify evictions also from  
53 kampungs that have received public support in the past. In addition, recently the English  
54 word slum has been deployed to encode kampungs as undesirable living spaces that are  
55 rife with social pathologies and environmental degradation. We use un/authorized to avoid  
56 such loaded and misleading language.  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 program and the creation of BPN in 1988, tasked with formalizing land ownership. As of  
4  
5 2001, 22.3 million of Indonesia's 60.7 million parcels of land had been registered, mostly  
6  
7 on urban and peri-urban land (Wallace 2008). Leaf estimates that land rights in Jakarta's  
8  
9 kampungs were 'almost exclusively' unregistered in 1993, with such rights 'grudgingly and  
10  
11 unofficially' recognized by the state for market transactions (as are purchase receipts from  
12  
13 such transactions) (Leaf, 1993, 489). In the spirit of Hernando de Soto and neoliberal global  
14  
15 urbanism, World Bank-initiated attempts at land reform in 1991 (the Land Administration  
16  
17 Project) and 2004 (the Land Management and Policy Development Project) sought to  
18  
19 "improve land tenure security and enhance the efficiency, transparency, and improve  
20  
21 service delivery of land titling and registration"  
22  
23 ([http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P064728/land-management-policy-development-](http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P064728/land-management-policy-development-project?lang=en)  
24  
25 [project?lang=en](http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P064728/land-management-policy-development-project?lang=en), accessed December 20, 2015). In part as a result of these programs,  
26  
27 registered land rights now have penetrated Jakarta's kampungs, but these take a variety of  
28  
29 forms, including use rights (*hak pakai*) and the right to build (*hak guna bangunan*), in  
30  
31 addition to freehold ownership (*hak milik*).  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38

39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
Kampung residents wishing to convert unregistered land titles into BPN-registered  
*hak milik* find this very difficult. The registration process is time-consuming and costly—  
costs that are elevated by under-the-table payments to officials, and by the cost of  
conforming to the numerous planning requirements that apply to registered landowners.  
Political connections to local officials (RT, RW and the Lurah) also are important to this  
process. It follows that lower income residents cannot afford to register their land  
(Monkkonen 2013). For developers, by contrast, a system of development and building  
permits created under Suharto (*Izin Lokasi* and *Izin Mendirikan Bangunan*) enable them to

1  
2  
3 acquire development rights to tracts of land from local governments, also in Jakarta's long-  
4 standing kampungs. Legally, the residents of these tracts can only sell to this developer,  
5  
6 undermining their negotiating power. This arrangement also imposes constraints on  
7  
8 developers; developers cannot begin construction until the land governed by these permits  
9  
10 is acquired and registered as *hak milik* (Monkkonen 2013).<sup>7</sup>  
11  
12  
13  
14

15 Under *reformasi*, Suharto's authoritarian pro-market developmentalist regime  
16  
17 underwent democratization, including the re-scaling downward of state power. With the  
18  
19 devolution of spatial planning decisions to local authorities, Indonesia's top-down spatial  
20  
21 planning process has become increasingly ambiguous and manipulable as national-scale  
22  
23 laws and implementation rules are countermanded at the local scale. The development  
24  
25 arms of large Indonesian conglomerates are expert at working with local officials to game  
26  
27 the changing system to their advantage. This exemplifies how *reformasi* has yet to  
28  
29 significantly reshape Suhartan hierarchies of power and influence, notwithstanding  
30  
31 international expectations of and pressure for 'good' governance (Hadiz and Robison 2013;  
32  
33 Hadiz 2010).  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

## 45 5. Jakarta's Kampungs: Displacement, accumulations and contestation

46  
47  
48  
49

50 In order to examine the variegated nature of land transformation in the kampungs of  
51  
52

---

53  
54 <sup>7</sup> According to the World Bank's 'doing business' calculations, Indonesia has the fourth  
55 highest cost in southeast Asia for registering property (after East Timor) and the fourth  
56 highest cost for obtaining construction permits (<http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>,  
57 accessed January 16, 2016).  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 contemporary Jakarta, we analyze two case studies from fieldwork between 2013 and  
4  
5 2015.<sup>8</sup> The long-standing, authorized kampung of Menteng Atas in south central Jakarta  
6  
7 has been shrinking since 1992, when Bakrieland began its signature Epicentrum  
8  
9 development including the corporate headquarters and a series of condominium towers. As  
10  
11 several developers explained to us, eviction was the order of the day under former  
12  
13 President Suharto, easing land assembly and the commodification of kampung land.<sup>9</sup> Since  
14  
15 1998, however, this has become very rare: developers are compelled to conform to market  
16  
17 norms and negotiate sales with residents holding land rights. By contrast, for unauthorized  
18  
19 kampungs built over the banks of the Ciliwung River and the Pluit retention pond, the city  
20  
21 administration has declared these as illegal, as the basis for rapid, forced eviction.  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33

---

34  
35 <sup>8</sup> The findings reported here draw on multiple sources of information. In collaboration with  
36 Miya Irawati, Rully Mardona and Wita Simatupang we conducted three rounds of fieldwork  
37 in December 2013, August and September 2014, September and October 2015. The  
38 fieldwork included individual intensive interviews with developers of large-scale  
39 development projects and residents in central and peri-urban kampungs, and focus groups  
40 with residents of a south central Jakartan kampung. The intensive interviews and focus  
41 groups were supplemented by intake questionnaires soliciting information on the  
42 sociodemographic characteristics and settlement history of residents, and by informal  
43 individual conversations. These were complemented by observations in kampungs and  
44 development projects; and archival records (including newspaper articles, documents on  
45 spatial planning, land laws, relevant government policies). Focus groups with residents  
46 were. Resident participants were recruited through elected neighborhood representatives  
47 (RT and RW), and developers and public employees through e-mails. The focus groups  
48 were separated by gender, held in a private kampung home, lasted approximately two  
49 hours, and were audiotaped. Interviews and focus groups were conducted in English and  
50 Bahasa. Interview and focus group transcripts, intake questionnaires, debriefing notes, and  
51 observations were transcribed and analyzed through iterative coding, based on repeated  
52 close readings of the transcripts.  
53  
54  
55  
56

57  
58 <sup>9</sup> Interviews with developers, Jakarta, December 2013.  
59  
60



### ***An authorized kampung: Land assembly and negotiated displacement***

In central Jakarta, authorized kampungs, on very valuable land squeezed in between and surrounding highrise office and apartment buildings and shopping malls, have been a prime target for land acquisition by developers. Similar dynamics can be observed in peri-urban areas where developers are acquiring land for the future expansion of new towns and integrated industrial estates. In the post-Suharto era, land assembly by and large has been a quiet and piecemeal encroachment of the modern into these traditional settlements. Developers and land brokers pursue, sometimes haunting, residents to sell their land, ensuing often in a lengthy negotiation process over the price of land. It begins with a few people agreeing to sell their land and the home in which they have lived for 30 plus years, raised their children and carved out a living. The process usually speeds up as more and more people sell their property, until only a few holdouts are left behind. We were able to experience this first hand in a sub-area of Kampung Menteng Atas in South Central Jakarta that we stumbled into by chance in December 2013. At that point in time just a handful of properties had been sold. These were typically razed to the ground, and the property enclosed with a fence or concrete wall, but the area was otherwise inhabited and intact (see Figure 1). Spirits were high, with heated negotiations between residents and various brokers, as well as local public officials (RT, RW, Lurah) about whether and when to sell the land and at what price. As we walked around the kampung residents roped us into this discussion, seeking our opinion as to whether they should sell or hold onto the land, and how they could negotiate a good price.

Figure 1 about here

1  
2  
3  
4 Interviews with residents revealed that local public officials frequently serve as  
5  
6 intermediaries between brokers and developers, in various ways.<sup>10</sup> They may help  
7  
8 residents to obtain land certificates, giving them the rights necessary to be able to negotiate  
9  
10 with brokers, but may also smooth the sale of the property. Notwithstanding the  
11  
12 excitement around land transformation in the kampung, residents had not formulated a  
13  
14 collective response. Indeed, their negotiations with brokers were highly individualized;  
15  
16 brokers told them not to share with their neighbors the price they had obtained for their  
17  
18 land. The going price in December 2013 was between 10 and 12 million Rupiah – US \$800-  
19  
20 1000 per square meter. Many families' land plots were 100 sq.m., making the prospect of  
21  
22 being paid US \$100,000 extraordinarily tempting. According to interview responses,  
23  
24 household incomes in this sub-district averaged between 2 and 6 million rupiah (US \$150-  
25  
26 450) per month.<sup>11</sup> For those earning approximately US \$200, with a plot of 100 sq.m.,  
27  
28 selling the rights they hold to their home paid them a sum equivalent to wages for almost  
29  
30 40 person years of work.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 Under these pressures, Menteng Atas experienced dramatic transformations of its  
38  
39 urban commons. Within a 5 month period 1/3 of the housing in the subdistrict was sold  
40  
41 and enclosed, and 2 ½ years later most of the subdistrict had been cleared (Figure 2).  
42  
43 Residents repeatedly commented that their willingness to sell was not only due to pressure  
44  
45 from the brokers; the destruction and enclosure of other residents' homes undermined  
46  
47 kampung sociability, making the neighborhood increasing undesirable as a place to live. If  
48  
49 negotiation, demolition and enclosure was one trajectory, an alternative could be observed  
50  
51 elsewhere in the kampung. Speculating on these changes, some developers, brokers, and  
52  
53  
54  
55

56  
57 <sup>10</sup> Interviews with Menteng Atas residents, December 2013.

58  
59 <sup>11</sup> Interview with Menteng Atas residents, September 2013  
60

1  
2  
3 wealthy individuals, acquire property from kampung residents, which they then rent out to  
4  
5 newcomers working in adjacent commercial and residential developments. The lack of  
6  
7 affordable rental units in the new high-rise apartment complexes for office and retail  
8  
9 workers has enhanced demand for space in remaining nearby kampungs.  
10  
11

12  
13 Figure 2 about here  
14

15 The accumulations associated with such negotiated displacements depend on the  
16  
17 participants' socio-spatial positionality. Residents with rights to sell stand to gain what, for  
18  
19 them, is an unprecedented accumulation of wealth. However, legal residents who have  
20  
21 been unable to obtain any kind of recognizable land right cannot take advantage of this  
22  
23 opportunity and renters are simply displaced without compensation (as in any capitalist  
24  
25 market). Brokers make undetermined monetary gains, local officials trade on their political  
26  
27 influence, and landlords gain returns on their speculative investments. Developers stand to  
28  
29 gain the largest profits: Residents' negotiated land prices, while presented to us by some  
30  
31 developers as usurious, were described to us by other developers as less than 50% of the  
32  
33 market price.<sup>12</sup> Eventually, once land has been developed the developers' potential for  
34  
35 long-term capital accumulation is enormous.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42 It is easily imaginable that the prospects of potentially life-changing windfall-profits  
43  
44 are hard for kampung residents to resist. This makes them complicit in the assetization of  
45  
46 kampung land, as well as in undermining the kampung as an urban commons and a space  
47  
48 of sociability. At the same time, these changes are regretted by some kampung residents,  
49  
50 This became the center of conversation in interviews and focus groups with residents who  
51  
52 had already sold their property and moved further out towards the urban fringe. Women  
53  
54  
55

56  
57  
58 <sup>12</sup> Interview with developer, September 2015.  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 and youth, in particular, expressed very deeply the loss of community, neighborliness, and  
4 sociability and the informal social safety net that their kampung had provided (when I was  
5 sick neighbors collected money so that I could pay for my medication). Some regularly  
6 return to their old kampung to visit friends left behind.<sup>13</sup> In a girls' focus group,  
7 participants weighed gains in housing quality and status against loss of sociability, seeking  
8 both. As one girl put it: "My dream is to combine the quality of a rumahan with the life-style  
9 and neighborliness of the kampung."<sup>14</sup> The experience with and desire for maintaining  
10 community and sociability leads families to seek out and construct similar living and  
11 material environments on the urban fringe. Indeed, one developer told us that he offered  
12 kampung residents a condominium in lieu of monetary compensation, but none took up  
13 this offer. This exemplifies contestation: Taking advantage of the capitalist market to make  
14 money that is reinvested in another informal urban commons.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 As this example of land transformation in an authorized South Central Jakartan  
33 kampung demonstrates, there is more to land transformation in the urban commons than  
34 dispossession and capitalist accumulation: a variety of different actors accumulate capital  
35 but also wealth, albeit unequally.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54

---

56 <sup>13</sup> Interview with kampung residents, September 2014.

57 <sup>14</sup> Focus group discussion, September 2015.  
58  
59  
60

### ***Unauthorized kampungs: Evictions and contestations***

Unauthorized kampungs house the poorest of the urban poor in Jakarta, who have built their makeshift shelter on marginal state-owned land, particularly along the city's riverbanks, canals and retentions ponds. These are areas that bear the brunt of flood events that have intensified in recent years. For example, two well-established kampungs along the Ciliwung River – Kampung Pulo and Bukit Duri - flood every year during the rainy season, damaging the homes and belongings of poor residents and often forcing them to evacuate temporarily. Residents of these kampungs not only are the most vulnerable and exposed to these environmental threats, but also find themselves at the center of the local politics of flood mitigation. They have been blamed by political leaders, the media and the middle and upper classes for contributing to clogged-up rivers and thus responsible for flooding. Thus Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), the current governor of DKI Jakarta, publicly stated that Jakarta floods because the rivers “are surrounded by illegal residences. Therefore the rivers’ surroundings cannot properly absorb the overflowing water” (Wardhani, “Governor Ahok Defends”). Discourses advancing the need for river revitalization measures, laying blame on unauthorized kampung residents for the flooding, and designating these residents as illegally occupying state land have been mobilized to justify forced evictions from the community that they built with sweat equity.

Since 2013 thousands of residents in such kampungs have faced ever-increasing threats of eviction as part of internationally funded flood mitigation measures, which also include river dredging, embankment reinforcement, and new development set-back regulations. Governor Ahok has been uncompromising in implementing forceful evictions since July 2015. In the early morning of August 20, police, bulldozers, heavy machinery, and

1  
2  
3 construction crews moved in to raze riverside housing in Kampung Pulo, leveling the area  
4  
5 and destroying hundreds of homes within a few days. We observed the aftermath of this  
6  
7 eviction (Figure 3). Bukit Duri likewise was cleared on December 13. Although the river  
8  
9 dredging and reinforcement programs include a plan for resettlement and full  
10  
11 compensation for those displaced, Jakarta government officials declared that these  
12  
13 inhabitants are illegally occupying state land, thereby asserting the right to evict them (de  
14  
15 facto eminent domain). Residents need to hold land rights certificates and/or a Jakarta  
16  
17 identity card to qualify for any compensation, but many of those residing along the  
18  
19 Ciliwung River do not possess such documents. Even those possessing required  
20  
21 documentation and able to obtain replacement housing and/or compensation remark on  
22  
23 its inadequacy, such as the insufficient and inappropriate provision of resettlement  
24  
25 housing, whether in-situ or on the outskirts of Jakarta.  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 Figure 3 about here  
33

34  
35 We could document concerns with respect to a previous evictions of kampungs  
36  
37 along the shore of the Pluit retention pond in North Jakarta, where thousands of residents  
38  
39 were evicted and their homes destroyed in order to restore the flood reservoir to its full  
40  
41 capacity. These evictions were to enable extensive dredging of the reservoir, enhancing its  
42  
43 capacity to absorb floodwaters from Jakarta's rivers, and to construct a park for the  
44  
45 recreation of the adjacent upper income residential neighborhood. Evicted residents'  
46  
47 biggest grievance has been that the newly built housing units are too few to accommodate  
48  
49 all those evicted, that they are often poorly built, that the design is ill-suited to residents'  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 needs, and that piped water is inadequate.<sup>15</sup> The largest nearby replacement public housing  
4  
5 complex, the Rusunawa Waduk Pluit project, was constructed under the previous governor  
6  
7 (now President of Indonesia) Joki “Jokowi” Widodo. It provides 1,200 apartments in twelve  
8  
9 four-story apartment blocks for residents evicted from the banks of the Pluit reservoir. The  
10  
11 apartments average approximately 30 sq.m, accommodating households of 4 to 8 people.  
12  
13 Dian, who we visited in September 2015, commented on the advantages and disadvantages  
14  
15 of her new home, where she lives with her husband, two children and 1 cousin in a 36 sq.m.  
16  
17 unit on the top floor.<sup>16</sup> She emphasized how much she had looked forward to a cleaner  
18  
19 environment and finally having piped water in her home. Yet the housing project only  
20  
21 receives piped water intermittently and of poor quality, forcing residents to continue to  
22  
23 purchase water from water vendors at a higher price than they paid in the kampung.  
24  
25 Asked about the biggest difference between her everyday life in the rusunawa compared to  
26  
27 the kampung, she lamented the loss of community with her neighbors: They no longer live  
28  
29 near one another, or share food when individual families have too little to eat.<sup>17</sup>  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 Yet it would be wrong to portray inhabitants of these informal settlements as  
38  
39 passive victims. In collaboration with non-profit organizations, such as Ciliwung Merdeka  
40  
41 (a non-profit organization seeking to empower residents on the banks of the Ciliwung  
42  
43 river), the Urban Poor Consortium (an advocacy and service organization for housing  
44  
45 rights, social and environmental justice), RUJAK (a non-profit think-act tank promoting  
46  
47 grassroots democracy and sustainable urban development), and Jakarta Legal Aid,  
48  
49 kampung residents resist evictions through a variety of strategies, including legal appeals  
50  
51  
52

---

53  
54 <sup>15</sup> Interviews with Rusunawa residents, and the Urban Poor Consortium staff, September  
55 2015.

56 <sup>16</sup> Interview with Dian, September 2015.

57 <sup>17</sup> Ibid.  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 (Winayanti and Lang 2004). Non-profits also have helped kampung residents to advance  
4 demands for replacement housing and compensation, and for a voice in the design of  
5 replacement housing. For example, Ciliwung Merdeka helped residents of Bukit Duri  
6 document and map the homes they have constructed, maintained, and improved over time,  
7 drawing attention to the historical significance of this kampung and its residents'  
8 contributions to Jakarta's economy, seeking to legitimate their demands for compensation  
9 after eviction. A violent protest during the Kampung Pulo eviction caused significant  
10 ripples within a government nervous about unscheduled protests of any form. Despite such  
11 local resistance, appeals against eviction orders and alternative proposals, evictions  
12 continue apace at the time of writing (February 2016).  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27  
28 Although these various contestations pushed the local government to develop  
29 resettlement plans for the evicted, the disjuncture persists between promises and  
30 practices, especially in terms of the insufficient quantity, poor quality, and unsuitability of  
31 replacement housing. Rusunawa projects are too small in scope to provide replacement  
32 housing for all evicted residents, the apartments are too small for extended family units,  
33 and the building design is ill-suited to the needs of residents employed in informal sector  
34 activities. Residents and their advocates also continue to be marginalized from the  
35 planning and decision making process.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45

46  
47 Such evictions undermine the ways in which co-habitation in an urban commons  
48 enables the poorest of the poor to find foothold in Jakarta. But they are consistent with  
49 middle-class desires to remove the poor from their sight and make the city a respectable  
50 playground, and with official aspirations that Jakarta should become world-class (Firman  
51 1998). In these ways, such evictions, framed as mitigating flooding, also facilitate longer-  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 term accumulation strategies for political and economic elites and middle class residents.  
4  
5 Yet they tend to reinforce impoverishment of the very poor, who have no option but to  
6  
7 pursue resistance and contestation.  
8  
9

## 10 11 12 13 14 **6. Conclusions** 15 16 17

18  
19 It is important to reiterate that the complex local dynamics experienced in Menteng Atas  
20  
21 and along the Ciliwung River in Jakarta, while specific to this geographical context, bear a  
22  
23 family relationship to urban land transformations underway across cities of the post-  
24  
25 colony, but also elsewhere. Under the overarching umbrella of the norms of neoliberal  
26  
27 global urbanism, and the policy mobilities propagating this in variegated forms worldwide,  
28  
29 urban elites actively seek to modernize/westernize their cities: privatizing urban land  
30  
31 ownership, formalizing economic and settlement activities, promoting infrastructure  
32  
33 development and urban sustainability, and enjoining citizens to self-identify as  
34  
35 entrepreneurial and responsible individuals. Emergent middle classes, benefitting from  
36  
37 these processes, are both investing in urban spaces designed for their lifestyles and making  
38  
39 speculative real estate purchases. Profit-seeking developers are commodifying informally  
40  
41 settled land to construct spectacular real estate projects, and global finance firms  
42  
43 underwrite the funding. All of these come together particular ways to create a perfect  
44  
45 storm of urban land transformation—a storm that too often washes away the urban  
46  
47 poor/majority.  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53

54  
55 We use the lens of geographical political economy to make sense of these processes  
56  
57 in Jakarta. Enlisting the socio-spatial dialectic, the urban morphology constructed by the  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Dutch, and reinforced under Sukarno, created a postcolonial landscape of compact  
4  
5 kampungs encased by major roads. This is ideally suited for developers, facilitating a piece-  
6  
7 by-piece assemblage and assetization of Jakarta's informal urban commons. These local  
8  
9 events are shaped by (and may possible shape) inter-scalar and horizontally networked  
10  
11 political and economic relations. Socio-spatial positionality is key to understanding who  
12  
13 gains and loses through these processes. Developers, their backers and funders, well-  
14  
15 connected local political and economic elites, the middle classes and well-off kampung  
16  
17 residents each are positioned to accumulate capital, wealth and/or power. The urban poor,  
18  
19 particularly recent rural-urban migrants, are disadvantaged from the beginning. They are  
20  
21 compelled to squat on marginal land, unwanted by others, where they seek through mutual  
22  
23 aid to gain a foothold in the urban economy. As middle class families find ways to separate  
24  
25 their activity spaces from those of the urban poor—living in gated estates rather than  
26  
27 interacting daily with the urban informal economy and settlements—they become  
28  
29 increasingly dismissive of the urban poor. At the same time, the poor contest such attempts  
30  
31 to excise them, as eyesores and unwanted detritus, from valued urban spaces. They  
32  
33 continue to pursue more-than-capitalist 'informal' livelihood practices, and openly resist  
34  
35 and fight marginalization and exclusion.

36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44 Thinking through Jakarta, taking this field site seriously as a place from where urban  
45  
46 processes can be rethought, we are dissatisfied with the current default concept for  
47  
48 understanding land transformations seeking to commodify the informal urban residential  
49  
50 commons. The variegated forms of land transformation—from quasi-market transactions  
51  
52 to evictions, the various ways in which multiple actors may accumulate money and power,  
53  
54 and ongoing contestations of these attempts to transform Jakarta into a capitalist city  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

proper, cannot be reduced to accumulation by dispossession. We thus propose reformulating and extending accumulation by dispossession, as contested accumulations through displacement.

For Review Only

## References

- Alonso, W. 1964. *Location and Land Use*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Anwar, N. H. 2012. State Power, Civic Participation and the Urban Frontier: The Politics of the Commons in Karachi. *Antipode* 44 (3):601-620.
- Bayat, A. 2000. From 'Dangerous Classes' to 'Quiet Rebels': Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South. *International Sociology* 15 (3):533-557.
- Blomley, N. 2008. Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor. *Social & Legal Studies* 17 (3):311-331.
- Brenner, N., J. Peck, and N. Theodore. 2010. Variegated neoliberalization: Geographies, modalities, pathways. *Global Networks* 10 (2):182-222.
- Bunnell, T., and M. A. Miller. 2011. Jakarta in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Decentralisation, Neoliberalism and Global City Aspiration. *Space and Polity* 15 (1):35-48.
- Chakrabarty, D. 2000. *Provincializing Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Chow, J. *Jakarta Is World's Hottest Luxury Property Market*. Wall Street Journal 2014 [cited February 10, 2016. Available from <http://blogs.wsj.com/scene/2014/02/12/jakarta-is-worlds-hottest-luxury-property-market/>.
- De Angelis, M. 2001. Marx and primitive accumulation: the continuous character of capital's enclosures. *The Commoner* 2 (September).
- de Soto, H. 2000. *The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere else*. New York: Basic Books.
- de Sousa Santos, B. ed. 2007. *Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond northern epistemologies*. London: Verso.

- 1  
2  
3 Derickson, K. D. 2014. Urban geography I: Locating urban theory in the 'urban age'.  
4  
5  
6 *Progress in Human Geography* 39 (5):647-657.  
7
- 8 Dixon, D. P., and S. M. Marston eds. 2013. *Feminist Geopolitics: At the sharp end*. London:  
9  
10 Routledge.  
11
- 12 Doshi, S. 2013. The Politics of the Evicted: Redevelopment, Subjectivity, and Difference in  
13  
14 Mumbai's Slum Frontier. *Antipode* 45 (4):844-865.  
15  
16
- 17 Durand-Lasserve, A., and L. Royston eds. 2012. *Holding their Ground: Secure land tenure for*  
18  
19 *the urban poor in developing countries*. London: Earthscan.  
20  
21
- 22 Escobar, A. 1995. *Encountering Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
23
- 24 ———. 2001. Culture sits in places: Reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of  
25  
26 localization. *Political Geography* 20 (2):139-174.  
27  
28
- 29 Escobar, A. 2008. *Territories of Difference: Place, movements, life, redes*. Durham, NC: Duke  
30  
31 University Press.  
32  
33
- 34 Firman, T. 1998. The restructuring of Jakarta metropolitan area: A 'global city' in Asia. *Cities*  
35  
36 15 (4):229-243.  
37  
38
- 39 ———. 2004. New town development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region: a perspective of  
40  
41 spatial segregation. *Habitat International* 28 (3):349-368.  
42  
43
- 44 Fisher, W., F., and T. Ponniah eds. 2003. *Another World is Possible: Popular alternatives to*  
45  
46 *globalization at the world social forum*. London: Zed Books.  
47  
48
- 49 Fitzpatrick, D. 2008. Beyond Dualism: Land acquisition and law in Indonesia. In *Indonesia:*  
50  
51 *Law and Society*, ed. T. Lindsey, 224-246. Sydney: The Federation Press.  
52  
53
- 54 Foster, S. R. 2009. Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma. *University of Miami Inter-*  
55  
56 *American Law Review* 40 (2):261-284.  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Ghertner, D. A. 2014. India's urban revolution: geographies of displacement beyond  
4  
5 gentrification. *Environment and Planning A* 46 (7):1554-1571.  
6  
7  
8 Gibson-Graham, J. K. 2008. Diverse economies: performative practices for 'other worlds'.  
9  
10 *Progress in Human Geography* 32 (5):613-632.  
11  
12  
13 Gidwani, V., and A. Baviskar. 2011. Urban Commons. *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVI  
14  
15 (50):42-43.  
16  
17  
18 Gillespie, T. 2015. Accumulation by urban dispossession: struggles over urban space in  
19  
20 Accra, Ghana. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*:n/a-n/a.  
21  
22  
23 Glassman, J. 2006. Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumulation by  
24  
25 'extra-economic' means. *Progress in Human Geography* 30 (5):608-625.  
26  
27  
28 Goldman, M. 2011. Speculative Urbanism and the Making of the Next World City.  
29  
30 *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35 (3):555-581.  
31  
32  
33 Hadiz, V. R. 2010. *Localising Power in Post-authoritarian Indonesia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford  
34  
35 University Press.  
36  
37  
38 Hadiz, V. R., and R. Robison. 2013. The Political Economy of Oligarchy and the  
39  
40 Reorganization of Power in Indonesia. *Indonesia* 96 (1):35-57.  
41  
42  
43 Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. *Science* 162.3859:1243-1248.  
44  
45  
46 Hart, G. 2002. Geography and development: Development/s beyond neoliberalism? power  
47  
48 ,culture, political economy. *Progress in Human Geography* 26 (6):812-822.  
49  
50  
51 Harvey, D. 1972. *Society, the City and the Space-economy of Urbanism*. Washington, DC:  
52  
53 Association of American Geographers, Resource Monograph #18.  
54  
55 ———. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
61  
62  
63  
64  
65  
66  
67  
68  
69  
70  
71  
72  
73  
74  
75  
76  
77  
78  
79  
80  
81  
82  
83  
84  
85  
86  
87  
88  
89  
90  
91  
92  
93  
94  
95  
96  
97  
98  
99  
100

- 1  
2  
3 Ince, O. U. 2014. Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and Global Land Grabs: A  
4  
5 Theoretical Intervention. *Rural Sociology* 79 (1):104-131.  
6  
7  
8 Jeffrey, A., C. McFarlane, and A. Vasudevan. 2012. Rethinking Enclosure: Space, Subjectivity  
9  
10 and the Commons. *Antipode* 44 (4):1247-1267.  
11  
12  
13 Jou, S.-C., A. Lund Hansen, and H.-L. Wu. 2012. Accumulation by Dispossession and  
14  
15 Neoliberal Urban Planning: 'Landing' the Mega-Projects in Taipei. 102:151-171.  
16  
17  
18 Kusno, A. 2013. *After the New Order: Space, politics, and Jakarta*. Honolulu: University of  
19  
20 Hawai'i Press.  
21  
22  
23 Leaf, M. 1993. Land Rights for Residential Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: the Colonial  
24  
25 Roots of Contemporary Urban Dualism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional*  
26  
27 *Research* 17 (4):477-491.  
28  
29  
30 Lees, L. 2011. The geography of gentrification: Thinking through comparative urbanism.  
31  
32 *Progress in Human Geography* 36 (2):155-171.  
33  
34  
35 Levien, M. 2012. The land question: special economic zones and the political economy of  
36  
37 dispossession in India. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3-4):933-969.  
38  
39  
40 Li, Tania M. 2010. Indigeneity, Capitalism, and the Management of Dispossession. *Current*  
41  
42 *Anthropology* 51 (3):385-414.  
43  
44  
45 Li, T. M. 2014. What is land? Assembling a resource for global investment. *Transactions of*  
46  
47 *the Institute of British Geographers* 39 (4):589-602.  
48  
49  
50 Lucas, A., and C. Warren. 2013. The land, the law, and the people. In *Land for the People: The*  
51  
52 *state and agrarian conflict in Indonesia*, eds. A. Lucas and C. Warren, 1-37. Athens,  
53  
54 OH: Ohio University Press.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Marx, K. 1967 [1867]. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1*. New York:  
4  
5 International Publishers.  
6  
7  
8 Mohanty, C. T. 2003. 'Under western eyes' revisited: Solidarity through anti-capitalist  
9  
10 struggles. In *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity*,  
11  
12 221-251. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
13  
14  
15 Monkkonen, P. 2013. Urban land-use regulations and housing markets in developing  
16  
17 countries: Evidence from Indonesia on the importance of enforcement. *Land Use*  
18  
19 *Policy* 34:255-264.  
20  
21  
22 Nagar, R., and S. Geiger. 2007. Reflexivity, positionality and identity in feminist fieldwork:  
23  
24 Beyond the impasse. In *Politics and Practice in Economic Geography*, eds. A. Tickell,  
25  
26 T. Barnes, J. Peck and E. Sheppard, 267-278. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
27  
28  
29 Perelman, M. 2000. *The Invention of Capitalism: Classical political economy and the secret*  
30  
31 *history of primitive accumulation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
32  
33  
34 Rancière, J., D. Panagia, and R. Bowlby. 2001. Ten theses on politics. *Theory & Event* 5 (3).  
35  
36  
37 Rossi, U. 2012. On the varying ontologies of capitalism: Embeddedness, dispossession,  
38  
39 subsumption. *Progress in Human Geography* 37 (3):348-365.  
40  
41  
42 Rostow, W. W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*.  
43  
44 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
45  
46  
47 Routledge, P. 2003. Anti-geopolitics. In *A Companion to Political Geography*, eds. J. A. Agnew,  
48  
49 K. Mitchell and G. Toal, 236-248.  
50  
51  
52 Roy, A. 2011. Slumdog cities: Subaltern urbanism and itineraries of recognition.  
53  
54 *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35 (2):223-238.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



- 1  
2  
3 Santoso, J., A. Febrina, and M. Ferry-Cuellar. 2009. *The Fifth Layer of Jakarta*. Jakarta:  
4  
5 Graduate Program of Urban Planning, Tarumanagara University.  
6  
7  
8 Sarkar, S. 2016. Beyond Dispossession. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the*  
9  
10 *Middle East* 35 (3):438-450.  
11  
12  
13 Schlager, E., and E. Ostrom. 1992. Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A  
14  
15 Conceptual Analysis. *Land Economics* 68 (8):249-262.  
16  
17  
18 Scott, A. J., and M. Storper. 2015. The Nature of Cities: The scope and limits of urban theory.  
19  
20 *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 39 (1):1-15.  
21  
22  
23 Seidman, R., and A. Seidman. 1994. *State and Law in the Development Process: Problem-*  
24  
25 *solving and institutional change in the Third World*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
26  
27  
28 Sevilla-Buitrago, A. 2015. Capitalist Formations of Enclosure: Space and the Extinction of  
29  
30 the Commons. *Antipode*:n/a-n/a.  
31  
32  
33 Shin, H. B. 2015. Economic transition and speculative urbanisation in China: Gentrification  
34  
35 versus dispossession. *Urban Studies*.  
36  
37  
38 Silver, C. 2007. *Planning the megacity: Jakarta in the twentieth century*. London: Routledge.  
39  
40  
41 Simone, A. 2014a. *Jakarta: Drawing the city near*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota  
42  
43 Press.  
44  
45  
46 Simone, A. 2014b. 'We Are Here Alone': The Ironic Potentials and Vulnerabilities of Mixed  
47  
48 (Up) Districts in Central Jakarta. *International Journal of Urban and Regional*  
49  
50 *Research* 38 (4):1509-1524.  
51  
52  
53 Slater, D. 2004. *Geopolitics and the Post-colonial: Rethinking north-south relations*. Oxford,  
54  
55 UK: Blackwell.  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Smith, S. J., and R. Pain eds. 2012. *Fear: Critical geopolitics and everyday life*. Aldershot, UK:  
4  
5 Ashgate.  
6  
7  
8 Soja, E. 1980. The Socio-spatial dialectic. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*  
9  
10 70:207-25.  
11  
12  
13 Staeheli, L., and D. Mitchell. 2008. *The People's Property? Power, politics, and the public*.  
14  
15 London: Routledge.  
16  
17  
18 Suryono, H., L. J. Tjung, I. Susilowai, and R. Suryadjaja. 2013. 25 years of the new town  
19  
20 development in Jakarta Metropolitan Area: An evaluation. In *The Great*  
21  
22 *Transformation workshop*. Tarumanagara University, Jakarta.  
23  
24  
25 UN Habitat. 2013. *The State of the World's Cities 2012/2013: Prosperity of Cities*. New  
26  
27 York.  
28  
29  
30 Valentine, G. 2007. Theorizing and Researching Intersectionality: A Challenge for Feminist  
31  
32 Geography. *The Professional Geographer* 59 (1):10-21.  
33  
34  
35 Vasudevan, A., C. McFarlane, and A. Jeffrey. 2008. Spaces of enclosure. *Geoforum* 39  
36  
37 (5):1641-1646.  
38  
39  
40 Wallace, J. 2008. Indonesian land law and administration. In *Indonesia: Law and Society*, ed.  
41  
42 T. Lindsey, 191-223. Sydney: The Federation Press.  
43  
44  
45 White, B., S. M. Borras Jr, R. Hall, I. Scoones, and W. Wolford. 2012. The new enclosures:  
46  
47 critical perspectives on corporate land deals. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3-  
48  
49 4):619-647.  
50  
51  
52 Winayanti, L., and H. C. Lang. 2004. Provision of urban services in an informal settlement: a  
53  
54 case study of Kampung Penas Tanggul, Jakarta. *Habitat International* 28 (1):41-65.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

For Review Only

Figure 1: Land Assembly and enclosure, Menteng Atas, September 2013  
Source: Authors



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Figure 2: Land use Menteng Atas RW2, May 2015  
Source: Map drawn by Rully Mardona



Review Only



Figure 3: Evictions, Kampung Pulo, August 2015  
Source: Authors



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60