

Red Sun, Red Star:
Japanese Members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1937-1958

by

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Abstract

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From 1937 to 1958, thousands of Japanese soldiers, medical workers, and civilians collaborated with the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese People's Liberation Army, some as volunteers and others as captives or conscripts. Many of these Japanese individuals became formal members of the PLA, received medals of distinction, and had their acts of sacrifice and heroism recorded in the official histories of the Chinese military divisions they joined. Japanese soldiers assisted the Chinese communist war effort during the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, while Japanese nurses and doctors tended to Chinese patients, often on the front lines of battle, and helped establish and manage the earliest medical institutions and public health and inoculation campaigns of the PRC. Japanese filmmakers worked in the production of some of the early PRC's most iconic films such as *The White Haired Girl*, and Japanese specialists in practically every field contributed their expertise to the establishment of the Chinese communist state and its civil infrastructure. The experience of membership in the PLA and of work in communist China was a profoundly transformative one for the former settlers of the Japanese empire. For many, it marked an awakening to an entirely novel worldview, an embrace of socialist ideals, the development of lifelong friendships and relationships, and the discovery of China as a 'second motherland'. For the returnees, contact with Chinese communism proved to be a stigma when seeking entry into the Japanese home island workforce and society, while also serving as a bonding experience, creating a cohort of individuals unified by their extraordinary experiences on the continent.

In memoriam

Paul Lunde

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Contents

- Introduction iv

- Chapter 1: The Outcast Soldiers: Japanese Military POWs, Conscripts, and Volunteers in Communist China 1

- Chapter 2: Red Sun, Red Star, Red Cross: Colliding Medical Systems in Colonial and Post-Colonial China 29

- Chapter 3: The Setting Sun: Japanese Refugees, Conscripts, and Captives at the End of Empire 75

- Chapter 4: The Second Homeland: Three Oral Accounts of Japanese Members of the PLA 117

- Chapter 5: Moving Pictures, Moving Empire: Japanese Members of CCP and PLA Film Production Teams, 1945-1958 141

- Conclusion 176

- Bibliography 179

Introduction

The Unlikely Allies

In 1999, as part of the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, two unlikely guests held positions of honor at the balcony overlooking Tiananmen Square: Aihara Kyō and Aihara Keiko, a Japanese couple who had served as medics in the Chinese People's Liberation Army¹ for seven years following Japan's surrender at the end of World War II.² Given the centrality of the PLA among the instruments of legitimacy of the CCP, there is something almost sacrilegious about the fact that remnants of Japan's Imperial forces and colonial stragglers—civilian, military, and paramilitary—joined China's red armies and served alongside Chinese soldiers in the continental campaigns of the Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949, in the civil construction of the PRC following the founding of “New China,” and in a supporting capacity during the Korean War of 1950-1953. That the PLA and its branch forces, the “most powerful weapon of propaganda in the Communist movement”³—whose chief objective was the expulsion of the Japanese presence from China, whose top cadres received their training at the “Anti-Japanese Military and Political University,” and whose members formed and enjoyed the works of the “People's Anti-Japanese Dramatic Society”—should have accepted Japanese comrades into their ranks seems astonishing. However, one estimate suggests that at least 4,000 to 7,000 Japanese individuals were, indeed, conscripted or voluntarily joined the PLA during WWII and after Japan's surrender.⁴ Another estimate by Furukawa Mantarō, in a study of Japanese soldiers “left behind” on the Chinese continent, places the number somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000, and this counting only former IJA soldiers who served in the PLA after Japanese surrender, around 3,000 of whom served in active military duty on the front lines of the Chinese civil war.⁵ Given how much informal recruitment there was from the colonial population, the vast numbers of recruits from the Japanese Red Cross Society and Manchukuo

¹ Henceforth, “PLA.”

² Dong Bingyue, “rijiqian jiefangjun guanbing de minjianxiezuo” (Ex-PLA Japanese soldiers' unofficial writing), *ershiyishiji shuangyuekan* 78 (August 2003), (Hong Kong: xianggang zhongwen daxue), 94.

³ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1968), 101.

⁴ Accurate estimates for the numbers of Japanese members of the PLA and CCP are extremely difficult to establish. The two principal causes of this difficulty are the destruction of records during the Cultural Revolution and the substantial measures taken by Japanese cadres to pseudonymize and conceal their involvement with the CCP and its associated organizations, both before and after repatriation. Dong's data comes from a series of interviews with Nakamura Yoshimitsu, an organization dedicated to the reintegration of returning Japanese who were former members of the Fourth Field Army. The numbers come from the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, and are roughly corroborated by Chinese official sources on the official Japanese membership of the PLA. For details, see: Dong, “rijiqian jiefangjun guanbing,” 91. For a commentary on the destruction of records during the cultural revolution, see: Lu Xijun, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai de katsuyakushita nihonjin: Aru guniin no kiseki,” *Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū* 6 (Sendai: Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū Sentā, 2004), 2. For corroboration of the assessment of Cultural Revolution-era documentary destruction in the official records of the Chinese Fourth Field Army of the PLA, see: Gao, Enxian, Fan Niu, and Xin Liu, eds., *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun disiyezhanjun weisheng gongzuoshi ziliao xuanbian, August 1945 – May 1950* (Beijing: Renminjunyi Chubanshe, 2000), 401.

⁵ Furukawa Mantarō, *Chūgoku zanryū nihonhei no kiroku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), iii – iv.

Red Cross Society, and how much irregular conscription also took place, the number is likely much greater.

Imperial Japanese Colonial Presence on the Continent

Throughout the late 19th and early-to-mid-20th century, Imperial Japanese colonial policy spurred a series of population movements that transformed northeast Asia. Japanese settlers—civilian, corporate, and military—emigrated *en masse* as part of governmental efforts to relieve overpopulation at home, consolidate Japan's hold over its expanding territories, create a military buffer zone, and generate revenue in Japan's new, exploitative frontiers. Simultaneously, Japan's growing economic importance and cutting-edge academic and military institutions attracted migrants of all classes from its East Asian neighbours. The internationalizing effect of these exchanges was profound: vast numbers of Japanese migrants affected far-reaching transformations of the colonies, while ambitious thinkers such as Chiang Kai-Shek and Lu Xun moved to Japan to devise doctrines of nationalist, military, and cultural modernization that could be adapted and imported to the continent.

Japanese policies in each of its colonial holdings varied substantially across time and space, often reflecting the idiosyncrasies and concerns of specific colonial administrators and of the public and private institutions that populated the colonial frontiers. The final synthesis of the colonial complex came with the consolidation of informal and formal instruments of imperial control into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁶ This political entity, first articulated by Japanese foreign minister Arita Hachirô in 1940, imagined the peoples of Asia united in struggle against Western imperialism under the benevolently-paternalistic guidance of the Imperial Japanese state.⁷ As argued by John Dower in his analysis of the secret *Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race As Nucleus*, the GEACPS held several contradictions at its core, in the form of discourses of racial hierarchy among supposed equals and of anti-colonial colonialism. These contradictions were negotiated in part by a segregation of discourse between the colonies and the home islands, such that counter-Western Asian ethnic solidarity was promoted abroad even as racial-supremacist discourse justified the colonial project at home.⁸

At the moment of Imperial Japan's formal surrender on September 2nd, 1945, nearly 9 percent of Japan's population lived outside the home islands—an estimated 6.9 million people, just over half of whom were military personnel.⁹ At war's end, the Allies set about the task of unweaving the demographic tapestry of Japan's empire, repatriating 5 million Japanese by the end of 1946, and transferring over a million Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese from the Japanese home islands to the continent in the same period. The deconstruction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the massive population exchanges that the Allies orchestrated, “more than the war itself, shaped East Asia in the latter half of the century.”¹⁰

⁶ Henceforth, “GEACPS.”

⁷ William Theodore De Bary, *Sources of East Asian Tradition, Volume 2: The Modern Period* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008), 622.

⁸ For details, see John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986), 262-290.

⁹ Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 2.

¹⁰ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 3.

In the aftermath of Japanese defeat, a primary concern for the victorious parties was the absorption of Japanese leftover war paraphernalia and human resources. The Soviets saw Japanese captives as potential sources of manpower to aid the restoration of their disfigured economy, while the KMT saw potential allies in the increasingly unavoidable anti-communist civil war. The Chinese communists, sorely lacking in technical expertise, strategic support staff, medical personnel, and war materiel, made the seizure of Japanese equipment and the absorption of Japanese talent a paramount objective.

The experience of surrender undergone by Japanese soldiers and civilians on the Chinese mainland varied enormously depending on where they found themselves as the war drew to a close. For some, surrender was a prolonged process that involved waiting for the arrival of American troops, who were often regarded by entrenched Japanese military detachments as their true “conquerors.”¹¹ For others, surrender meant relatively amicable exchange of the reins power from the Japanese command to the Chinese Nationalists.¹² For approximately 600,000 Japanese individuals occupying the northeastern regions overrun by the Soviet advance, surrender meant capture and transport to labor camps in the USSR; ten percent of those captured by the Soviets died in the camps.¹³ For the group of Japanese former soldiers and colonists who are the subject of this study, surrender meant the beginning of a decade of service in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

The advantages of incorporating surrendering Japanese troops into the PLA had been demonstrated before war’s end by Japanese communists such as Nosaka Sanzō, who worked alongside the CCP in Yan’an to formulate a discourse and praxis of Sino-Japanese socialist collaboration. These efforts allowed swaths of surrendering Japanese troops to be absorbed by a pre-existing structure designed to accommodate them, and produced a framework for the incorporation of Japanese civilians, medical staff, and other technicians into the PLA. This framework, combined with the location of the bulk of Japanese colonial presence between communist bastions of power in northern China and their Soviet allies, goes some way to explain the “Lack of anti-Japanese sentiment” with which Japanese troops and colonists were absorbed by the Chinese Red Army.¹⁴ In practice, incorporation of Japanese individuals into the PLA was a relatively rare occurrence compared to the vast scale of POW seizure and exploitation conducted by the Soviets—yet the unique experiences of this cohort shed light on an extraordinary moment in Sino-Japanese amity and collaboration in the wake of one of the darkest episodes of human history.

Historiographical Challenges to the Study of Japanese Membership of the PLA

One issue faced by the researcher of this topic is the dual problem of memory and orality. The bulk of available resources on Japanese members of the PLA are self-published memoirs, usually supplemented with primary and secondary documents relating to the general activities of the PLA in the period of 1937-1958, including official histories of the PLA, which lean towards

¹¹ Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, “Staying on: Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, 1945-49,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 42, No. 3 (May 1983), 497.

¹² Gillin and Etter, “Staying on,” 499-500.

¹³ For a thorough discussion of Japanese internment by the Soviets, their experiences in the gulags and of re-education, and their subsequent repatriation, see: Andrew Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945-1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

¹⁴ Gillin and Etter, “Staying on,” 502.

political expediency, or Japanese governmental records that are largely restricted to dry quantification. The reasons for this documentary paucity are threefold: First, upon repatriation, the majority of Japanese individuals had their diaries (and any other written or photographic documents, as well as medals, uniforms, etc.) impounded by PRC authorities. This documentary seizure was stimulated partly by a desire among CCP officials to conceal their (ultimately abortive) designs for the instigation of a communist revolution in Japan, and, partly, to protect Japanese communists from persecution post-repatriation in the increasingly anti-socialist environment of Reverse-Course Japan.

The second challenge is related to the first: Because diaries and other personal effects were seized, the first memoirs written by Japanese former members of the PLA began to be published many years after repatriation, with the first wave emerging in the late 1970s. The historian Dong Bingyue, who has conducted interviews with Japanese former members of the PLA, speculates that this date roughly correlates with the years in which the majority of JMPLA reached retirement age, and hence found the time to pen their memoirs. This large temporal gap between events and the formal construction narratives complicates the process of historical inquiry.

The third challenge, related more broadly to the conduct of interviews and the production of oral history, is the question of the institutional regimentation of historical memory and the impact of recipients of intensive socialist education while in the PLA. Oral narratives of this period also reflect the influences of re-patriation organizations, social institutions formed of returnees from the continent, and the doctrines of the PLA itself. Some of these social-support groups for former members of the PLA in Japan print newsletters, organize yearly meetups, hold poetry competitions, and, in at least one case, run a crossword that includes communist terms of art. The fact that all PLA members, Japanese or not, were drilled in an educational (or “re-educational”) program that included instruction in Marxism-Leninism somewhat compounds the challenge. Nonetheless, an individual’s self-determination of experience is of intrinsic value and historical interest, and the diverse documentary corroboration of the emergent narratives points to the possibility of approximating a clear image of the period, as I hope this study will demonstrate.

In “The Positivist Myth of Objective and Neutral History,” Ueno Chizuko argues that there exists a fundamental distinction between positivist and feminist historical methodologies, a distinction that centers around the question of documentary valuation. Ueno proposes that positivist historians overvalue printed documents at the expense of oral testimonies, a tendency that diminishes the historical validity of subjective experiences and extinguishes voices—especially voices of the systemically disempowered or subaltern—from the historical record.¹⁵ As Franziska Seraphim puts it in her study of Japanese historical memory, “[Ueno] argued for the equal validity of victim’s testimonies as historical evidence.”¹⁶ My sentiment is that there is a middle ground to be found between Ueno’s characterizations of “positivist” and “feminist” history, and that a consolidation of both views is both possible and desirable. There is nothing *ipso facto* positivist about the rejection of oral testimonies, and oral reports can be subjected to the same scrutiny for credibility, reliability, and plausibility as may be any other type of document within a positivist or empiricist historiographical framework. Similarly, there is nothing about printed matter that exempts it from authorial subjectivities or a myriad other

¹⁵ Ueno, Chizuko, *Nationalism and Gender*, trans. Beverley Yamamoto (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2004), 114-119.

¹⁶ Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (New Jersey: Howard, 2006), 310-311.

compromises. Admittedly, documentary scrutiny of oral testimonies may strain the terms of the relationship between the historian and the witness, or otherwise violate legal or social norms that govern the interactions between living people, but the same is true of disputes relating to the authenticity, veracity, accuracy, or authorial motivation of printed documents, be they primary or secondary, particularly while the authors or their descendants are alive. I concur with Ueno about the impossibility of achieving real neutral objectivity in the production of historical accounts and analysis, but I find equal value in attempting to approximate objectivity through the best instruments available to us, such as cross-reference, contextual consideration, accumulation of data, the search for contradictory data, and so forth. Throughout this work, I attempt to bridge the gap that Ueno identifies, and present oral documents alongside other primary documents, endeavoring to treat the two categories of source with equal respect, attention, and scrutiny.

Challenges of Sino-Japanese Transnational Historiography

In 2010, Tokyo University professor and politician Kitaoka Shin'ichi brought together the *Nicchū rekishi gōdō kenkyū kaigi* ('Sino-Japanese Joint Historical Research Committee), one objective of which was to publish a collection of historical collaborations between scholars from Japan and their opposite numbers from the PRC. The format involved establishing topic titles, then assigning the titles to a scholar from each country, and publishing the resulting articles in tandem with a commentary on the two papers.¹⁷ This optimistic project was fraught from the start, as the historians involved failed to agree even on the titles of the articles they would be working on. In one case, the committee agreed to publish articles under differing titles:¹⁸

第2章 日中戦争—日本軍の侵略と中国の抗戦

(日本側) 日中戦争—日本軍の侵略と中国の抗戦 波多野澄雄・庄司潤一郎

(中国側) 日本の中国に対する全面的侵略戦争と中国の全面的抗日戦争

栄維木

A direct translation of conflicting article titles might read as follows:

- (Japanese Representatives): *The Sino-Japanese War – The Invasion of the Japanese Army and the Chinese War of Resistance.*
- (Chinese Representatives): *Japan's Total War of Invasion of China and the Chinese Total War of Resistance Against Japan.*

In reference to the Japanese invasion, the Chinese delegates rejected the use of the character 軍 ("military/army") from its collocation next to the word "Japan", and included two 全面的 ("total") to modify both the character of the Japanese invasion and that of the Chinese war of resistance.¹⁹ As well as illustrating some of the profound challenges to historical writing in this area and the

¹⁷ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, ed., *Nicchū rekishi gōdō kenkyū hōkokusho, daiichiki* (Nihon kokusaimondai kenkyūjo, Tokyo 2010). A stable copy of this document is available via the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/rekishi_kk.html (Accessed April 12, 2020)

¹⁸ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, ed., "Mokuji", in *Nicchū rekishi gōdō kenkyū hōkokusho, daiichiki* (Nihon kokusaimondai kenkyūjo, Tokyo 2010), ii.

¹⁹ For a detailed discussion of the historiographical importance and challenges surrounding the historical nomenclature of the Pacific War, including the difficulties of transnational narrative consolidation, see: Ryūichi Narita, *Kingendai nihonshi to rekishigaku: Kakikaerarete kita kako* (Tokyo: Chūō shinsho, 2012), 209-243.

difficulty of reaching a consensus that bridges the Sino-Japanese scholarly communities, this episode is indicative of an important historiographical trend, with two principal features: First, the ambiguation of individuals with state and military projects, with the effect that both Chinese collaboration with Imperial Japanese colonialism and Japanese defection to the Chinese resistance is elided in favor of a flattening discourse that privileges nationality or ethnicity and Manichean dichotomies of the conflict.²⁰ Secondly, the analysis of Imperial Japan's involvement in war and empire as "total," with the concomitant implications for civilian responsibility and the tacit rejection or deprecation of theses of military dictatorship, internal empire, and domestic coercion, let alone Japanese socialist solidarity and volunteering.²¹ This latter trend is itself part of a much longer historical conversation that addresses questions of war responsibility in Japan, initiated, immediately after Japanese surrender, in the work of Maruyama Masao, which continues to be a flashpoint for both historical and political controversies today.²² Attempts to reduce this historical narrative by rejecting the human distinctions within the Japanese military complex, or between the Japanese military and civilian populations in the colonies, must contend with the fact that contemporary Chinese observers, ranging from individual soldiers' and journalists' reports to the explicit statements of political and military leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, *did* draw such a distinction, both at the level of theory and at that of personal experience—views which I will explore at length throughout this paper.²³

Chapter Overview

In Chapter 1, I describe the interwar collaboration between Japanese communist sympathizers such as Nosaka Sanzō and the CCP leadership in Yan'an to develop a program for the incorporation of Japanese POWs into the PLA. This program was expanded into an ambitious recruitment and propaganda campaign designed to attract defectors from the IJA and to put them to work in a variety of Chinese communist organizations. The production of Japanese-language instructional materials, cultivation of trust between Japanese volunteers and the CCP and PLA membership, and establishment of a theoretical and practical framework for the absorption of Japanese nationals into the PLA were essential factors in the PLA's expanded postwar conscription of Japanese ex-colonists and surrendering soldiers.

In Chapter 2, I describe the characteristics of the interwar Chinese communist and Imperial Japanese medical establishments, and the ways in which the Japanese colonial medical system interfaced with the autochthonous populations of the continent, at the theoretical, institutional, and personal levels. I show the extreme paucity of the state of medical materiel and expertise in the communist "liberated areas," and the influence of foreign volunteers to the provision of healthcare. I demonstrate how the leadership of the CCP realized the importance of seizing

²⁰ For critical analyses of this view, see Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), and Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

²¹ This question is addressed with delicacy by Louise Young in *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 3-21.

²² For details on Maruyama's concept of Imperial Japan as a "System of irresponsibility," see: Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 345-348.

²³ In recent years, there has been some attention given to the Japanese captives and conscripts of the CCP and PLA, for instance in the 2012 NHK documentary *Ryūyōsareta nihonjin: nicchū shirarezaru sengoshi*, or the 2015 Hong Kong PST documentary *Huadao weiju: riji jiefangjun laobing jiyi*.

Japanese medical infrastructure and of conscripting Japanese medical workers, how it designed integration policies with the objective of incorporating Japanese medical workers into the CCP's civil and PLA's military medical complex, and how Japanese medical institutions experienced an improbable postcolonial afterlife under the direction of the CCP and the PLA.

In Chapter 3, I detail the conditions on the continent immediately after surrender, the Japanese refugee experience, and the details of the *hikiage* repatriation efforts. I describe the violence suffered by Japanese civilians, especially at the hands of the Soviet Red Army, and provide a comparative and theoretical analysis thereof. For those Japanese ex-colonists and soldiers who surrendered to the 8RA, or whose repatriation was managed by agents of the CCP, conscription into the PLA became a real possibility in lieu of repatriation to the home islands. I show the ways in which Japanese nationals were incorporated into the PLA, by force or otherwise, their experiences of providing medical or military service in the PLA during the Chinese Civil War and Korean War, the recognition of their military and/or medical service at the highest level of the PLA, their experience of “red education,” and their ultimate repatriation in 1953-58.

In Chapter 4, I provide the contents of three unabridged interviews with Japanese former members of the PLA, with a brief commentary. Details of the methodology surrounding these interviews are detailed below.

In Chapter 5, I describe the structure of the Manchukuo Film Association and the objectives of its employees and administrators. I trace the trajectory of film production in interwar communist China, and the race to absorb Japanese film institutions following imperial surrender. Large numbers of Japanese film workers, producers, editors, and actors were absorbed into the Chinese film industry, alongside the film-making infrastructure left behind in the aftermath of empire. I discuss the role which Japanese film expertise played in the production of seminal Chinese communist films, such as *The White-Haired Girl*, and provide personal insights from a Japanese former employee of Man'ei who remained in China producing films for the CCP for a decade after war's end.

Notes on Terminology: Acronyms

Any study of military organizations or socialist institutions is doomed to become burdened to the point of semilegibility by a dizzying number of acronyms. The fact that moments of revolutionary upheaval are also moments in which organizations, names, and places tend to be serially renamed further compounds the problem. Similarly, agglutinate proper nouns, which are succinct and illustrative in Japanese and Chinese, frequently become unwieldy when translated into English. Although a few elegant solutions have been found (such as the growing Anglophone adoption of “*Mantetsu*” in place of “SMRC”), for the most part, it is inescapable that our document should be populated with acronyms. For the sake of clarity, I will include the full name of each organization at the first instance of occurrence in each chapter, with a footnote specifying the acronym to be employed thereafter. I will attempt to use similar acronyms to those of other Anglophone scholars who have waded in these waters, but full standardization is an unrealistic objective. On this point, I will use the acronym “CCP” to refer to the Communist Party of China, in favor of the autonomous “CPC”—in this case, to align my writing with the vast majority of English scholarship. Below is a list of the majority of acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this work:

- CCP: Chinese Communist Party
- PLA: (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army
- IJA: Imperial Japanese Army
- SRA: Soviet Red Army
- Mantetsu: South Manchuria Railway Company
- Man’ei: Manchukuo Film Association
- 8RA: Eighth Route Army (of the PLA)
- N4A: New Fourth Army (of the PLA)
- 4FA: Fourth Field Army (of the PLA)
- JRCS: Japanese Red Cross Society
- MRCS: Manchukuo Red Cross Society
- IRCS: International Red Cross Society

The PLA and IJA

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Imperial Japanese Army are/were colossal military organizations, with storied genealogies and vast quantities of preorganizations, suborganizations, branches, divisions, and the like, all of which were tremendously mutable in the periods under study. Throughout this essay, I will attempt to refer explicitly to the appropriate division where possible and relevant; where I believe it would introduce unnecessary ambiguity or obscurity, I will instead use “PLA” and “IJA,” respectively, as catch-all terms for the respective armies. I apologize if this mapping strikes some readers concerned with the minutiae of military history as excessively roughshod, and ask for generous understanding of my theoretical interests and of my belief that excessive detail often obscures more than it illuminates.

“Nurses”

Throughout this study, and, in particular, in Chapter 2, I will make frequent reference to the term “nurse.” A note should be made on the ambiguity of the gender-neutrality of this term in the English language today. In the vast majority of Japanese-language documents produced during the time periods under study, the female-coded term *kangofu* (Nurse: female) is used in lieu of the currently-preferred *kangoshi* or *kangonin*.²⁴ While recent Japanese historical scholarship does tend to use gender-neutral terminology to refer to the women concerned, it is incumbent upon us to appreciate the gendered nature of this type of labor at its historical moment, and to appreciate the particularities of the experiences of the women involved, without intrusion by parochial 21st-century anachronisms or anatopisms. Unless otherwise specified, any reference to “nurses” indicates the gendered term *kangofu*, and hence refers specifically to women and, on some occasions, girls. It is also worth indicating that the Chinese term *hushi*, established as the official Mandarin Chinese translation of “nurse” at the first conference of the Nurses’ Association of China, in 1914, does *not* possess clear gendering, but the profession that the term denotes was, as we shall see, very much gendered in the periods of our concern.

²⁴ The term ‘Kangonin’ is present in this period, but refers to (male) army medics. It was in use since at least 1890, and, likely, earlier than that. These original *kangonin* were invariably (male) soldiers who were trained in medical assistance and served on the front lines. The term has undergone a transformation in its use in the intervening years.

Chinese/Japanese pseudonyms, homographs, and alternate readings

Certain Japanese individuals throughout this work used Mandarin readings for their names while in China, and are variously listed under either the Mandarin or Japanese reading in references and publications. In order to facilitate the work of future researchers on this topic, I will attempt to provide both readings for the names of for such individuals. Some of the individuals under discussion also made use of pseudonyms, for reasons that will become apparent. With the exception of public figures such as Nosaka Sanzō, I will generally refer to the pseudonymous individuals in question by whichever *nom de guerre* (or *de plume*) they appear to favor.

Manchuria

‘Manchuria’ and its Japanese variants *manshū* and *manmō* (Manchuria/Mongolia) are exonyms intimately associated with the Imperial Japanese colonial project, and while they remain useful designators of a region and in particular helpful to understand the formation of the polity of Manchukuo, it is difficult to use these terms without somewhat tacitly endorsing the representation of northeast Asia that they encode. Unless referencing a contemporary document or other scholar’s work, I will attempt to avoid using these terms, in favor of ‘continental northeast’ (or, on occasion, ‘Dongbei’), with apologies to the reader for the admittedly inelegant solution.

Kaitaku

The Japanese word *kaitaku* is variously translated as “development,” “exploitation,” or “exploration,” and is typically used in reference to resource exploitation projects, such as those that were conducted in Hokkaidō in the Meiji period, or to the colonial settlements of Imperial Japan’s pan-Asian expansionism. While translating the term as “exploitation” may accurately reflect the activities it references, “development” is closer to the nuance of the Japanese word. Difficulties with the validity of this family of terms is by no means a purely academic conceit, nor is it limited to problems of translation. One of the former colonists who resided in a *kaitakuchi* before her conscription by the Eighth Route Army, Kawabatake Ichiko, puts the problem as follows:

“Although they were called *kaitakudan*, their objective was not *kaitaku* (“development”), but, rather, to seize and steal the property of Chinese people, or to buy it for a paltry sum, and to take over their homes and live in them.”²⁵

Kawabatake’s implication clearly indicates a positive connotation to the word *kaitaku*, which she considers inappropriate given the actual nature of the activity. Nonetheless, this descriptor is ubiquitous in the literature, and given its potential for translation as ‘exploitation’, it retains a certain aptitude when used in an English text. For this reason, and to ensure cross-referential uniformity with other scholars’ works, I will use the term *kaitaku* without modification.

‘Bodies’

Throughout this work, I will attempt to avoid the use of the term “body” to refer to (contemporaneously) living humans. Although this cartesian-dualist terminology enjoys a

²⁵ Kawabatake Ichiko, *Taiga no nagare no yō ni* (Tokyo: Kōyōshuppansha, 1999), 13.

venerable pedigree and has subscribers of widely-acknowledged intellectual and moral accomplishment,²⁶ and is also extremely current in scholarly literature on the topic of medicine and empire, I consider its use troublingly analogous with the types of systematic discursive dehumanization that this research addresses. Even if used in a tongue-in-cheek manner, it strikes me as inappropriate given the subject matter at hand: to give but one example, the human vivisectionists and biological-weapon researchers of Unit 731 used similar terminology to dehumanize Chinese captives and facilitate their murder. I realize that this is a departure from the norms of the majority of recent scholarship on the topics I cover, especially in Chapters 2 and 3, and I hope that the field will consider my arguments against this particular terminological habit, at least in the contexts concerned. Apart from the similarities to genocidal discourse, I also generally subscribe to the loosely monist position that a person and their body are one and the same, certainly as regards physical harm, and hence, insofar as my theoretical orientation is concerned, there is no particular clarity provided by statements such as “damaging people’s bodies” that is not contained in the statement “damaging people.”

Euphemisms

The reader should be advised that this document directly addresses some of the most harrowing and disturbing acts of violence in history. I frequently discuss death, murder, sexual violence, torture, genocide, starvation, illness, and every other imaginable form of human suffering. I consider it an act of respect to the dead and a duty to strive towards truth as a historian, to avoid the use of euphemisms such as ‘neutralize’ or ‘secure’ to describe acts of murder. As a consequence, some passages of this text will be as psychologically challenging for the reader to read as they were for me to research and write. Nonetheless, we are human, and nothing human is alien to us: I believe that we are morally obligated to study what we have done and to understand what we are capable of doing.

Oral interviews: Overview

Between 2015 and 2018, I conducted ten oral interviews with Japanese former members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and/or former captives of the same. Upon request, and to protect the privacy and safety of several of my interviewees and their families, I have omitted the content of four of these interviews from this paper. Due to the information disclosed, I will also use pseudonyms for two of my informants – “Tachibana Maiko” and “Miura Kenji.” Out of respect for the wishes of one of these individuals, I will also omit certain sections of their experiences in the PRC between 1953 and 1958, referring only obliquely to the details. I have been asked to emphasize that no crimes or ethical misdeeds took place during this period, to the knowledge of the parties concerned. It is only out of an abundance of caution, and, in particular, to protect the anonymity and safety of their former comrades and colleagues, that I will ellipse such segments of the interviews from this record. Similarly, while I will gladly make my interview transcripts available upon request to other scholars interested in my archive, I ask for understanding that I am obligated to censor the segments pertaining to this period in the interviews in question. Out of respect for my readers, I have ensured that none of the concealed

²⁶ In the Anglosphere, traceable at least half a century back, to Mario Savio’s exhortations that we “put our bodies upon the gears” of the corrupt machinery of the University, and, later, to Judith Butler’s *Bodies that Matter*, numerous pro-abortion-legalization activists; more recently, popularized by critical race theorists such as Michelle Alexander, Ibram X. Kendi, Robin DiAngelo, among others.

elements are ones that fundamentally substantiate or contradict the theses of my work, and have therefore focused the lens of my analysis on the period leading up to 1953.

The majority of these interviews were arranged with the kind assistance of members of the Japanese Communist Party and the *Nihon chūgoku yūkō kyōkai*, the Japan-China Friendship Association.²⁷ Franziska Seraphim has argued that the postwar Japanese government has rarely intervened as a “national consensus builder” of Japan’s war memory, instead delegating the construction of historical memory to independent organizations with frequently antagonistic objectives.²⁸ Seraphim identifies five primary organizations involved in this process: the Association of Shintō Shrines, the Association of War-Bereaved Families, the Teacher’s Union, the JCFA, and the Memorial Society for the Student Soldiers Killed in War.²⁹ Of these, the JCFA “insists on atoning for Japanese wartime aggression against Chinese victims ... [and] demanding compensation for Asian War victims”.³⁰ The organizational objectives of the JCFA should be considered as a pertinent context to the contacts and interviews that I have conducted with their former and current members. By this, I do not mean that content of the interviews is any less reliable or in any way documentarily compromised, but, rather, that I acknowledge that a degree of selection bias is present as a consequence of the ways in which I contacted interviewees.

In conducting interviews, I faced a deep sense of urgency caused by the advanced age of those concerned. As Seraphim notes in her discussion of the necessity to swiftly record memories of the war: “Public hearings and other testimonies as well as oral histories assumed a now-or-never urgency, sustained by a new realization of the political consequences of half a century of silences and silencings.”³¹ This time pressure was already present when Seraphim wrote the above in 2006, and it is now a tragic possibility that my interviews will form one of the last systematic collections of records of their type. In the course of my writing, more than one of my interviewees has experienced sickness or passed away. It is hard to convey the pain that this brings me, or the weight of responsibility that I feel towards preserving, and accurately and respectfully communicating, the recollections of those I have interviewed.

Three of my interviewees expressed a preference for me to present the entirety of our discussion with as little abridgement as possible, except upon request, perhaps fearing that I might cherry-pick the content of our discussion. I have done my utmost to honor their wishes, and these three interviews are presented in longform in Chapter 4. As the interviews and discussions had the freewheeling quality of normal conversations, I have taken certain liberties with regards to arrangement and the provision of additional details, but have, in all cases, included the entire content of our discussions.

All translations of the content of these interviews are my own. Page notations refer to my translation of the corresponding page of the interview transcript, in the format: “Surname Firstname, Personal interview, p. XX”. I have received permission to make the original

²⁷ Henceforth, “JCFA.” For further details on the JCFA’s activities and role in the production of war memory, see: Seraphim, Franziska, “People’s Diplomacy: The China-Japan Friendship Association and Critical War Memory in the 1950s”, in *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, August 1st, 2007, vol. 5, issue 8.

²⁸ Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945 - 2005* (New Jersey: Howard, 2006).

²⁹ Seraphim, *War Memory*, 7.

³⁰ Seraphim, *War Memory*, 29.

³¹ Seraphim, *War Memory*, 306.

transcripts available to scholars who wish to consult the documents in question in detail, and am amenable to doing so upon request. As noted above, I will excise sensitive elements of these documents in accordance with the instructions of my interviewees.

Tokunaga Junko: Tokunaga Junko is a former member of Man’ei who was recruited into the PLA primarily to conduct cultural work and remained in China for over a decade after the end of WWII. Our interview was conducted in 2018, at her residence.

“Miura Kenji:” “Miura” is a current member of the JCFA. He served in the IJA, was captured by the Soviets, and, after some time in a Siberian work camp, was released and joined the 8RA in Harbin. Miura remained in China until 1958 as a member of the PLA, and speaks fluent Mandarin.

“Tachibana Maiko:” Tachibana is a member of the JCFA. Our meeting was facilitated by Urabe Fukiko and Wang Xiangming. As this interview took the format of a spirited back-and-forth discussion among Tachibana and her friends, I have taken substantial editorial liberties to rearrange it into an approximately chronological narrative without altering any of the content. “Tachibana Maiko” is a pseudonym, used to protect her identity and the identities of several of her former comrades.

Odagiri Kesashi: Odagiri is a friend of Mori Hikoaki, a JCP member and *hikiagesha* who kindly arranged for us to meet at Odagiri’s residence, an old house nestled among the apple orchards of rural Nagano. Odagiri himself was a civilian settler at a *kaitaku* village in the northeast before his conscription by the 8RA.

Kiyono Kiyokazu: Kiyono was a former IJA soldier. We briefly met at a Q&A session with Paul K. Maruyama at a *hikiagesha* function in Nagano. Kiyono had nothing positive to say about his experience in China or his treatment by the 8RA, and had no affiliation to the JCP or any other Sino-Japanese amity organization. Kiyono’s experience serves as an important counterpoint to the comparatively sanguine descriptions of life in communist China provided by my other interviewees.

Saitō Yoshio: Saitō is a medical technician and current member of the JCP. He arrived in China as a settler, and was conscripted by the 8RA immediately after Japanese surrender. He received medical training in the 8RA, worked as a medic during the Chinese Civil War, and remained in the PRC until 19

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The Outcast Soldiers: Japanese Military POWs, Conscripts, and Volunteers in Communist China

Introduction: From Captives to Cadres

Prior to Imperial surrender, Japanese sympathizers of international socialist and communist causes travelled beyond the borders of the empire to lend what assistance they could to anti-fascist and anti-imperialist struggles abroad, collaborating with the Soviet Comintern, the Communist Party of China,¹ and a variety of organizations throughout Europe and Asia. In China, some of these individuals—best exemplified by Nosaka Sanzō—worked alongside their Chinese allies to lay the groundwork for a system of educational institutions, political policies, military doctrines, and social and interpersonal relations that created the possibility of incorporating Japanese soldiers and auxiliaries into the Chinese People’s Liberation Army² and its related preorganizations. In the early 1940s, this complex was adapted to the task of managing Japanese POWs who arrived in Yan’an, Shaanxi, and other communist “Liberated Areas.” These POWs were successfully incorporated into the Yan’an settlement, and, alongside the proactive Japanese collaborators, demonstrated the success of the integration project and the promise of its potential.

The integration project required the reconfiguration of some aspects of anti-Japanese rhetoric that had become a ubiquitous component of the Chinese war of resistance in general, and of the communist armed struggle against Japanese imperialism in particular. Specifically, the CCP leadership began to draw clear distinctions at the levels of policy, ideology, and propaganda between the “Japanese proletarian soldiers” and the “Japanese militarists,” a strategy that was highly effective among the officers and enlisted soldiers of the 8RA, although it had somewhat more mixed results with Chinese rural communities in the Liberated Areas before extended contact with Japanese cadres took place.

Japanese and Chinese communists in Yan’an established organizations tasked with producing Japanese-language propaganda and to serve as processing centers for Japanese POWs, defectors, and conscripts arriving from the battlefields of the northeast. Foremost among these were the *Nihon rōnō gakkō*, (“Japanese Workers’ and Peasants’ School”) the *Nihonjin hansen dōmei* (“Japanese Anti-War Alliance”) and the *Nihon jinmin kaihō renmei* (“Japanese People’s Liberation League”). Members of these organizations engaged in “conversion sorties”—dangerous and often deadly expeditions to the frontlines with the objective of disseminating Japanese-language CCP propaganda materials or otherwise making contact with soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army,³ in the hopes of encouraging them to defect. These operations demonstrated the commitment of Japanese recruits to the CCP’s cause and were instrumental

¹ Henceforth, “CCP.”

² Henceforth, “PLA.”

³ Henceforth, “IJA.”

in establishing the Japanese communists as coequal enlisted members of the PLA. In this chapter, I will detail the pre-surrender integration of Japanese POWs and soldiers into the CCP's operational and cultural structures, and describe how this phenomenon shaped the post-surrender possibility of formally incorporating thousands of Japanese individuals into the PLA to serve in military, medical, and logistical capacities in the Chinese Civil War, Korean War, and peacetime.

Nosaka Sanzō and the International Japanese Socialist Volunteers

Nosaka Sanzō was a central figure in the Yan'an settlement's development of Japanese-language communist education curricula, communist propaganda, psychological operations, and policies for the integration of Japanese individuals into the PLA and CCP. The trajectory of his involvement with the CCP profoundly shaped that of the Japanese PLA member's experiences, both during the second Sino-Japanese war and after Imperial Japanese surrender.

The son of a merchant from Hagi in Yamaguchi prefecture, Nosaka experienced a socialist awakening following the bankruptcy of his family and the execution of Kōtoku Shūshui and Kanno Sugako in the 1910 High Treason Incident.⁴ Attending Keiō University, Nosaka began to read English and German socialist tracts and joined Suzuki Bunji's labor-organizing political association, the *Yūaikai*. Suzuki recognized Nosaka's "deep burning passion" for socialism,⁵ and, in 1917, assisted Nosaka in founding the *Rōgakukai* ("Worker-Student Association"). After reading Lenin's *State and Revolution*, Nosaka travelled to the United Kingdom, where he became a founding member of the British Communist Party and a representative of its London Branch at the inaugural conference.⁶ After organizing a labor strike in London, Nosaka was promptly deported by the British authorities as an "undesirable foreigner," and travelled to Moscow via France, Germany, and Switzerland. In Moscow, Nosaka made acquaintance with the Marxist political activists Katayama Sen and Suzuki Shigesaburo, and returned to Japan to continue his work in the reformed *Yūaikai* and as editing contributor to its sister publication *Rōdō* ("Labor"). Securing a brief lecturing job at Keiō, Nosaka met the communist theoreticians Noro Eitarō and Akizawa Seinosuke, and became involved in the foundational meetings of the then-outlawed Japanese Communist Party.⁷ Nosaka's activities continued until his incarceration, alongside the imprisonment and execution of many other communists and socialist sympathizers, under the directives of the Peace Preservation Law of 1928. After spending over two years alternating between prison and police custody, Nosaka succeeded in fleeing Japan to the Soviet Union in 1931, thus beginning his sixteen years of exile from the Japanese home islands.

In protest against the 1931 Mukden Incident, in which the Kwantung Army expanded its military invasion of China proper, Nosaka began organizing an anti-war movement, joining Katayama in creating appeals to foreign nations and international observers to catalyze international condemnation of the invasion.⁸ After a brief, secret mission to the USA in 1935-36, Nosaka collaborated with Comintern agents and Indonesian communist sympathizers to arrange to be smuggled into China and then cross the fraught KMT-CCP border checkpoints disguised as one of Zhou Enlai's bodyguards. In Yan'an, he was met by Mao Zedong, who welcomed him as his "Japanese comrade!"⁹ Nosaka's experiences in founding and

⁴ Ichiro Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure: Nosaka Sanzō, Japanese Anti-War Soldiers, and the Yanan Experience* (Diss. Kyushu University, 1982), 4.

⁵ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 7. Translation Korogi's.

⁶ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 8.

⁷ Henceforth, "JCP."

⁸ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 12.

⁹ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 17.

mobilizing transnational labor movements, and the remarkable agility that he demonstrated in his border-crossing socialist endeavors, found a home in the international collaborationist atmosphere of Yan'an, and was instrumental in shaping the policies of the CCP in Yan'an towards foreign comrades.¹⁰

During his time in Yan'an, Nosaka was called "The Japanese national who undoubtedly contributed the most in the war against Japanese militarism."¹¹ For this reason, he was targeted for assassination by the IJA throughout his time in China, a fact that drove him to operate under multiple aliases, including Yeban Cansan, Gang Yejin, Okano Susumu, Lin Zhe, and others. The practice of adopting aliases in order to avoid persecution by the Japanese government, as distinct from the adoption of Sinicized or Sinophone names for purposes of camaraderie with the Chinese comrades, became a regular feature of Japanese inductees into the PLA and the CCP, and, to some extent, continued after Japan's surrender, as repatriated Japanese members of the PLA sought to conceal their interwar involvement in "red" activities.

In Yan'an, Nosaka collaborated with Comintern cells and the CCP leadership to develop "conversion propaganda" with which to secure the military and tactical collaboration of Japanese POWs, and which could be used as a strategy to demoralize IJA troops and encourage their defection and surrender. Although the use of educational materials to "re-educate" captives is prefigured in both Soviet and PLA activities,¹² Nosaka's contribution to this pedagogical body was a departure from the inculcation of orthodox theoretical doctrine encouraged by the Cominform, instead constituting an emphasis on fomenting sincere collaboration on the basis of mutual respect, dignity, and camaraderie.

The opening pages of Nosaka's *Heiwa e no tatakai*, a manifesto and memoir of his work alongside the 8RA, succinctly explains his view of the moral necessity to oppose Japanese imperialism, and of the class-based distinctions that existed in Imperial Japan's war machine:

"If an armed burglar breaks into a home, threatening the lives of its inhabitants, and they, in order to protect their lives and property, take up arms and engage in a life-and-death struggle of resistance, who bears the blame? No matter what, the invader is in the wrong, and regardless of what actions the inhabitants take to defend themselves, they are entirely justified... The circumstances surrounding Japan's interactions with its neighbors, be it the 'Manchurian Incident', the 'China Incident', or the 'Pacific War', are precisely the same... However, I must clarify that when I speak of 'Japan', I do not refer to the Japanese people in general. Rather, I am referring to Japan's dominant classes: the militarists, the capitalists, and the large landlords."¹³

While Nosaka's career was exceptional, his journey across the liminal spaces of the empire, his experiences with the Chinese communists in Yan'an, and the development of his socialist conscience both

¹⁰ Reference to Chapter 2's "Hyperrevolution."

¹¹ Koji Ariyoshi, *From Kona to Yanan: The Political Memoirs of Koji Ariyoshi*, eds. Alice M. Beechert and Edward D. Beechert (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 123.

¹² For details of POW and captive communist re-education in the 1920s and early '30s, see: Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of 'Brainwashing' in China* (New York: Norton Press, 1961), 390-395.

¹³ Sanzō Nosaka, *Heiwa e no tatakai: Hansendōmei shūsenki* (Tokyo: Kiryuake* shobō, 1947). (*Speculative romanization.)

reflected and influenced the trajectories that Japanese POWs, and, later, Japanese volunteers, defectors, and conscripts would trace through the institutions of the inter- and post-war CCP complex.

Incorporation of Japanese Nationals into Soviet and Chinese Communist Organizations

Nosaka was a trailblazer, but he was not alone. By 1940, the possibility of successfully incorporating Japanese nationals, in an operational capacity, into the Soviet Red Army's¹⁴ political projects was demonstrated by the efforts of several individuals. Miyake Ichio was one such Comintern-backed Japanese socialist mobilizer, who became a founding Soviet-based Officer of the Sino-Soviet National Exchange Committee. Born in Sinuiju (a railway town founded under Japanese colonial rule in present-day North Korea) and educated in military-propaganda training in the USSR, Miyake was responsible for the production of political materials to attract potential Japanese and Korean sympathizers to the Communist cause.¹⁵ In the same year, Japanese individuals in communist-controlled areas in China were granted the right of franchise and even the right to stand for election to positions in regional Consultative Councils. In this case, Japanese nationals took advantage of the arrangements that emerged from the United Front policies intended to generate harmonious relations among the KMT, the CCP, and unaffiliated third parties, expanding the interpretation of these integrationist moves to enable the possibility of Japanese political collaboration. In 1941, a general election was held in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region, and a former Japanese POW named Mori Takeshi was elected to the Council alongside Zhou Yang, a representative of the much-larger Lu Xun Art Institute.¹⁶ In the same year, Nakakoji Shizuo was elected to the Consultative Council of Yan'an.¹⁷ In October of 1941, thirty-five Japanese former POWs were sworn in as official members of the 8RA at a function of the Congress of Representatives of Eastern Peoples Against Fascism in Yan'an.¹⁸ The Japanese soldiers who joined the 8RA wore the same uniforms as their comrades, and received the same salaries,¹⁹ meal plans, cigarette allotments, and access to leisure activities, such as the theatre, in Yan'an. In all respects, these Japanese cadres were the first of many full and coequal members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. In a 1942 address to the Huabei Soldiers' Conference, Zhu De made the following statement about them:

“You, the Japanese masses and soldiers who oppose fascism, are our true friends. You are our good friends who are building the future East Asian peace and happiness. Unite the several million Japanese soldiers in China and point the muzzle of your weapon toward those (remaining fascist) Japanese soldiers who are your and our common enemy.”²⁰

¹⁴ Henceforth “SRA.”

¹⁵ Tairiku mondai kenkyūjo, “Nihonjin kaihōgun towa?” *Tairiku mondai*, May 16, 1952, 58.

¹⁶ No relation to Lieutenant General Mori Takeshi, who was assassinated during the Kyūjō Incident of 1945. Although the *Global Times* reports this person's name as “Mori Takeshi,” both Margaret Denning and Korogi Ichiro propose the readings “Mori Ken / Sen Jian,” and I will use “Mori Ken” henceforth.

¹⁷ *Global Times*, “‘The Eighth Route Army Treats Us as Friends, Brothers and Comrades.’ — A Cradle of China-Japan Friendship on Baota Mountain,” *Global Times*, May 21, 2021.

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1224120.shtml>

¹⁸ *Global Times*, “The Eighth Route Army Treats Us as Friends.”

¹⁹ Typically between 3 and 5 yuan per month in 1941, pre-hyperinflation.

²⁰ Ōyama Mitsuhiro/Dashan Guangyi, “Huabei Riben”, in Mori Ken/Sen Jian, *Cong diguo junren dao fanzhan yongshi* (Beijing : Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe: Xinhua shudian Beijing faxingsuo faxing, 1987), 83, cited in Margaret B. Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs in Yan'An, 1939-1945,” in *Resisting Japan: Mobilizing for war in Modern China 1935-1945*, ed. David Pong (Manchester: Eastbridge, 2008), 147. Translation Denning's.

Japanese Communist Organizations in Yan'an

From 1941, Nosaka collaborated with the Zhu and the rest of the CCP leadership to establish several organizations tasked with re-educating Japanese captives.²¹ In his memoir of the war, Dixie Mission attendee Ariyoshi Koji says of Nosaka's propaganda work:

"Our first meeting with Nosaka took place in the 18th Army Group Headquarters....²² [He showed us] a survey of his psychological warfare work and prisoner re-education.... The prisoner converts were well-trained. They published their own news bulletins and issued anti-militarist leaflets which were used in the front lines."²³

The early iterations of the "re-education" of captives took two steps: first, de-programming "imperialist," "militarist," and "capitalist" ideas, and secondly, the instruction in the basics of Marxist-Leninism and socialism. This program was an outgrowth of an initiative first proposed by Zhu De, Commander in Chief of the CCP army in 1938. Zhu believed that, through good treatment of Japanese captives, the CCP could undermine the morale of Japanese proletarian soldiers in the Imperial Japanese Army, discouraging zealous fighting and encouraging defection.²⁴ Zhu outlined the general principles of what would later become a multi-layered psychological operations campaign: as well as humane treatment, Zhu advocated the formation of a re-education curriculum and educational infrastructure, the production of Japanese-language propaganda materials for distribution to captured and active Japanese soldiers, and direct contact by Japanese CCP adherents with the relatives and friends (in Japan) of their former comrades, to create a Japanese domestic initiative that would undercut the Japanese war effort from the home front.²⁵ Zhu and Nosaka's ideas became the backbone of the Anti-War League (*Hansen dōmei*), the Japanese People's Liberation League (*Nihon jinmin kaihō renmei*), and the Japanese Workers' and Peasants' School (*Nihon rōnō gakkō*),²⁶ themselves outgrowths of the 8RA's political department.²⁷

The Japanese Workers' and Peasants' School

The JWPS was founded at the foot of the Baota Mountain in Yan'an on May 15, 1941, with the objective to "diligently put into practice peace, justice, and friendship ... to take a stand on behalf of the working class," by means of training Japanese POWs as agents for the Chinese communist cause.²⁸ It was established under the auspices of the Enemy Army Propaganda Department of the 8RA, in collaboration with Nosaka, several other Japanese communists, and thirty Japanese POWs who had been residing in Yan'an since 1938, enjoying a high degree of freedom.²⁹ The JWPS was the first, but not the only, academy of its kind. Soon after its establishment, similar schools were founded in Shaanxi, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong, under the tutelage of Wang Xuewen, Kaji Wataru, and Sugimoto Kazuo.³⁰

²¹ Teddy White, "Inside Red China," *Life*, December 18, 1944, 38-46.

²² The '18th Army Group' was the Nationalist army's administrative designation of the N4A and 8RA.

²³ Ariyoshi, *From Kona to Yanan*, 124-126.

²⁴ Henceforth, "IJA."

²⁵ Zhu De, "On Anti-Japanese guerrilla war (1938)," in *Selected Works* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986), 52.

²⁶ Henceforth, "JWPS."

²⁷ A full discussion of this topic is given in Kobayashi, Kiyoshi, *Zai zhongguode tudi shang: Yi ge "Ribei balu" de zishu* (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1985), 91-92.

²⁸ Denning, "Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs," 130.

²⁹ Kobayashi, *Zai zhongguode tudi shang*, 92.

³⁰ Denning, "Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs," 129.

Kaji had flown to Chongqing in 1939 and become a founding member of the Anti-War League, playing an important part in the creation of the JWPS curriculum.³¹ The core curriculum, formulated by Zhu De and Wang Jiashang, covered Marxist-Leninist doctrine, anti-militarism and anti-imperialism, and denunciations of the Japanese invasion of China, and “encouraged the uprising of the ‘exploited’ Japanese labor class, of which the students were a part.”³² From April 1943 onwards, the program was expanded to cover “the history of the development of socialism, political science, political economy, philosophy, Chinese issues, Japanese issues, the history of the Communist party, contemporary issues, and Chinese language.”³³ In practice, these extensive classes were only extended to Japanese individuals who had spent some time in Yan’an, or who expressed some exceptional aptitude or credentials as potential communist allies, such as former members of the JCP who had fled Japan before the outbreak of war, or a small contingent of early military defectors.

The reporter Agnes Smedley described the school during her visit to Yan’an:

“By mid 1942, [Zhu De] said, the surrender and desertion of Japanese had become frequent. These POWs were never put in chains nor herded into concentration camps. They were given Chinese uniforms and placed in class-rooms to study.”³⁴

By 1944, many of the chief instructors and administrators of the school were themselves Japanese nationals, or Chinese comrades who had lived in Japan before the war and had experience with the Japanese language and cultural attitudes. While the CCP recognized the value of Japanese ex-military members for their revolutionary project, there was also a recognition that Chinese cadres who had studied in Japan had a unique insight into Japanese imperialism, which they could bring to bear upon the question of a socialist revolution in the Japanese home islands. On February 16th, 1942, leading CCP dignitaries such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi attended a function at the Yan’an Military Club to discuss precisely this question, bringing together the Japanese members of the PLA with the Chinese members who knew Japan personally, in the hopes of designing revolutionary strategy.³⁵ Nosaka argued that the Rice Riots of 1918 demonstrated the revolutionary potential and capacity for spontaneous action of the Japanese proletariat, and should be modelled as a template for future action.³⁶

Another factor that facilitated the cultural integration of the Japanese soldiers into the PLA and the broader Yan’an community was their class background. The vast majority of Japanese soldiers who arrived in Yan’an were of rural and proletarian provenance, as might be expected from low-ranking draftees of the IJA in the later stages of the war. Chart 1 shows the professions of 700³⁷ of the JWPS students drawn from among the several thousand Japanese POWs captured by the PLA by 1944.

³¹ Details of which he describes at length in his memoir of the period: Kaji Wataru, *Nihon heishi no hansen undō* (Tokyo: Dōseisha, 1982).

³² Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 138.

³³ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 179.

³⁴ Agnes Smedley, *The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956), 388.

³⁵ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 133.

³⁶ Umeda Teruhumi/Meitian Zhaowen, “Yi yan’an”, in Mori Ken/ Sen Jian, *Cong diguo junren dao fanzhan yongshi* (Beijing : Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe: Xinhua shudian Beijing faxingsuo faxing, 1987), 116-120.

³⁷ Kaoru Ikeya, *Ari no heitai: Nihonhei 2,600-nin sansei-shō zanryū no shinsō* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2007), 2-3.

Pre-Draft Occupations of JWPS Students, 1944



Chart 1: Occupations of the JWPS student body, 1944.³⁸

As the influx of Japanese POWs and the capture of Japanese soldiers in the field increased from 1943 onwards, the focus of the JPWS became the production of a core “de-conversion” program, with the aim of overcoming the “imperialist indoctrination” of the soldiers, and the expansion of its operations beyond the bounds of the physical school institutions in Yan’an. These operations took the form of “field conversions” carried out by trusted members of organizations affiliate to the JWPS, such as the *kakusei renmei* (“awakening league”), which sent Japanese-speaking cadres on propaganda missions alongside members of the 8RA and later PLA.³⁹ The process of rapidly de-indoctrinating Japanese captives thus served a dual purpose: to ensure POW passivity and compliance, and to prepare the captives for the possibility of integration into the PLA from the first moment of contact.

As well as relieving pressure on resources, the release of captives served another purpose: the 8RA high command was confident that the good treatment of POWs at the hands of the communists would in itself serve as a powerful propagandistic tool, regardless of whether the ideological (and counter-ideological) principles embodied in the JPWS re-education programs took hold or not. Simply by reporting the policies of the red army vis-à-vis captives, and, indeed, the humane treatment of civilians and soldiers by their military superiors, the fellows of Japanese units accepting released captives would, it was believed, begin to question their own superiors, actions, and the greater motives of the imperial state.

From Japanese Bandits to Brave International Fighters

In 1947, PLA attaché Feng Lu published his experiences of accompanying the N4A in Subei in *Gangtie de duiwu*, “Columns of Steel.” This document, seemingly intended to promote the communist cause in China and advertise the positive social effects of the PLA’s passage, is remarkable both for its internationalist character and for the importance that it places on the PLA as an agent of the resolution of civil problems faced by Chinese rural communities. *The first few chapters describe the abject poverty of Subei, with the correspondingly orthodox Marxist diagnosis that these dire circumstances were “all because of the Bourgeoisie.”*⁴⁰ Later, Feng describes Subei after the surrender of the “Japanese bandits,” and the N4A policies towards Japanese POWs:

³⁸ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 139. Denning’s data most likely comes from: Hansen dōmei kiroku henshū iinkai, *Hansen heishi monogatari: Zaika nihonjin hansen dōmeiin no kiroku* (Tokyo: Nihon kyōsantō chūō iinkai shuppanbu, 1963), 102.

³⁹ See, for instance, the war memoir of Kunita Osamu, *Hôkô Senri: kôgun ni haitta nôgun heishi no shuki* (Tokyo: Ôzaki shoten, 1985), 97-98.

⁴⁰ Feng, Lu, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu* (Hong Kong: Yángzǐ chūbǎnshè yínháng, 1947), 4.

“Because the N4A carried out the correct policies towards POWs, it broke the Japanese army’s martial *bushidō* spirit, destroying the enemy from within, managing to make even more enemies lay down their arms, become docile, and come to the N4A, so that before long they had started to work for the N4A, and each of them became a brave international fighter (*‘guoji zhanshi’*).”⁴¹

Feng describes the PLA’s treatment of POWs as excellent, and reports that re-education they received, in addition to being voluntary, was focused on transforming them into post-national combatants for the international socialist cause. The process by which this occurred is described in almost religious terms, and the magnanimity of their N4A captors is emphasized:

“[The Japanese POWs] were educated until they achieved personal enlightenment⁴² and became happy with their life with the New Fourth Army. If they didn’t want to stay and wanted to re-join the Japanese forces, they were welcome to do so.”⁴³

Feng describes the difficulties of disciplining N4A members who wished to harm the Japanese POWs, obstacles that had to be overcome through education, with Chinese N4A soldiers being instructed by their commanders that the “spirit of internationalism” (國際主義精神) must supersede narrow nationalist or ethnocentric attitudes. Feng states that the Japanese rank-and-file are innocent of any crime and have been manipulated by the “vicious propaganda of the officers and *zaibatsu*,”⁴⁴ and describes the process of their re-education as consisting of three stages. The first stage was making them surrender and convincing them that no harm would come to them: N4A soldiers took to repeating “Don’t worry, there’s no need to be afraid” (*ni fang xin, bu yao pa*) as a mantra to every newly-arriving POW. The second phase involved teaching Mandarin to the POWs, and making them read N4A-created Japanese-language newspapers.⁴⁵ In the third stage, the POWs would achieve “enlightenment” (覺悟) and take up the fight against the “Japanese warlords” as fully-paid members of the N4A. Upon completion of the three stages, the new Japanese recruits earned the status of full-ranking members of the PLA and received the same wages as when they served in the Imperial army: 800 yuan for squad leaders and 200-300 yuan for foot soldiers. However, complaints from the foot soldiers led to the abolition of rank distinctions, so that they all came to be paid the same amount of money.⁴⁶

Baseball and *Weiqi*

While studying an intensive curriculum of Marxist-Leninism and communist doctrine, the students of the JWPS also enjoyed remarkable amounts of leisure time, describing how they found the time to play

⁴¹ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 72.

⁴² The term that Feng uses is 自己覺悟, *ziji juewu*.

⁴³ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 72.

⁴⁴ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 73.

⁴⁵ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 74. Said newspapers are described as being products of the Subei Japanese Peasant and Worker’s School, possibly modeled on Nosaka’s Yan’an school, that was tasked with the ideological conversion of Japanese POWs and the production of conversion propaganda. Feng describes the school’s activities in detail on page 78 of *Gangtie de duiwu*.

⁴⁶ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 77.

baseball and volleyball, mahjong, and *weiqi*, and hosted monthly theatrical performances for the enjoyment of their comrades.⁴⁷

Feng describes the pastimes of the Japanese POWs, which included singing and dancing “in the Japanese style”⁴⁸ and games of baseball, with teams divided between soldiers and officers. Feng describes, with amusement, how the officers would practice all day long, presumably so as not to lose to the privates. As one might expect, only a small minority of Japanese POWs were of the officer class, with only 7.5% being higher than *kashikan* (NCO) rank; the vast majority were *ittōhei* (56.1%), *jōtōhei* or *heichō* (25.7%), and *nitōhei* (10.7%)—all Private designations.⁴⁹

On one occasion, Feng overhears two Japanese soldiers—these already having undergone the “three stages” of conversion and now ranking alongside the Chinese members of the N4A as fully-trusted comrades—playing a game of *weiqi*, in which white and black stones are used to capture each other and territory. The two soldiers, Kiyomizu and Naganawa, took turns playing, until one of them eventually suffered a casualty and had a few stones captured. He asked his comrade: “What will become of my captured pieces?” The answer he received was a jocular “*ni fang xin, bu yao pa!*”⁵⁰

Feng also details the activities of the Anti-War League, describing it as a task force of Subei-based Japanese N4A members that produced and distributed Japanese-language Communist propaganda to Japanese military units that had not yet surrendered. One member of this organisation was Yoshida Hatsumi, a model “converted” Japanese from a peasant family who spoke impeccable Chinese. Yoshida returned to Japan in the repatriations, causing Feng to muse: “I hope that he is safe and happy, and is still fighting for the revolution in Japan.”⁵¹

The Anti-War League and Frontline Conversion Sorties

While the JWPS was tasked with the theoretical aspects of the anti-war and anti-imperial intellectual work of the Japanese branch of the 8RA, it remained a subsidiary of the Anti-War League, the primary praxis task of which was carrying out dangerous psychological operations on the front lines. Nosaka describes these “conversion” activities in detail in his 1947 memoir *Heiwa e no Tatakai* (“The Fight for Peace”), which provides several vivid accounts of Japanese 8RA members risking their lives to deliver communist propaganda to IJA soldiers on the frontlines.⁵² This document describes Japanese 8RA soldiers braving gunfire, hostile terrain, and deadly cold to deliver pamphlets or speeches across no-man’s-land to their opposite numbers in the IJA, with the objective of instigating a voluntary capitulation. Conversion sorties were exceptionally dangerous, with 25 Japanese 8RA fatalities recorded during the course of these activities by the beginning of the winter of 1944,⁵³ but also extremely successful, as evidenced by the changes to the ratio of forcibly-captured POWs to that of capitulating defectors who had voluntarily travelled to the communist Liberated Areas attending the JWPS, as shown in Table 1.

⁴⁷ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 132.

⁴⁸ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 75.

⁴⁹ Hansen Dōmei, *Hansen heishi monogatari*, 102-104.

⁵⁰ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 73.

⁵¹ Feng, *Gāngtiě de Duiwu*, 79.

⁵² Sanzō Nosaka, *Heiwa e no tatakai: Hansendōmei shūsenki* (Tokyo: Kiryuake* shobō, 1947). (*Speculative romanization.)

⁵³ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 143.

Year	% POWs in JWPS student body	% Voluntary defectors in JWPS student body
1940	93%	7%
1941	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
1942	82%	18%
1943	52%	48%
1944	3%	97%

Table 1: Ratio of Captured POWs to Defectors in the JWPS Student Body, 1940-1944.⁵⁴

The conversion activities and enticement to defection that Nosaka and his comrades carried out was facilitated by two major factors: first, the increasingly dire circumstances that common soldiers faced as the IJA's war effort was ground down by its territorial overextension, failing logistics, and the impact of guerrilla harassment. Secondly, many Japanese draftees reported deep resentment of the harsh treatment they received at the hands of their officers; this latter fact, in particular, became the object of the communist propaganda work that focused on the incommensurable class interests between the Japanese proletariat and the imperial-capitalist oppressors.⁵⁵ One handbill distributed by Anti-War League operatives specifically called out the names of IJA officers known for their draconian treatment of the privates, and demanded an end to the practice of "face-slapping" and *shitekiseisai* corporal punishment, much-resented humiliations that officers frequently visited upon the rank-and-file.⁵⁶ These points were addressed in another one of the publications distributed behind enemy lines to IJA soldiers, the "*Friends of the Japanese Soldier*," a Japanese-language periodical that Nosaka helped produce alongside the 8RA's Enemy Army Propaganda Department.⁵⁷ The content of the periodical was formulated at the 1942 Huabei Soldiers' Conference, and included the exhortation to "arouse [the IJA soldiers'] desire to engage in class struggle" and "focus on needs that would precipitate the waning of enthusiasm to fight for their Japanese superiors."⁵⁸

In addition to pamphleting and verbally hailing soldiers from a distance, the Anti-War league painted murals on the sides of houses in the path of IJA advances, and sometimes even on the sides of IJA blockhouses and barracks. The content often intended to evoke demoralizing pathos, for instance, in the form of depictions of soldiers' worried mothers kneeling in prayer. As with discussions of food, these images emphasized the existential security that would come from defection, appealing not only to sentiments of self-preservation, but to filial piety as well. The recruitment work was to some extent facilitated by the extreme personnel shortages faced by the IJA. One month before Soviet attack, the Kwantung Army initiated the *nekosogi dōin*, the 'Root-and-Stem Initiative', a wide-net forcible conscription policy that conscripted 200,000 of the 350,000 men of age in Manchukuo. Once Operation August Storm began, every remaining man in Manchukuo was mobilized; many of those conscripted

⁵⁴ Denning, "Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs," 138.

⁵⁵ For one such report, see: Ōyama, "Huabei Riben," 95.

⁵⁶ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 28.

⁵⁷ Kobayashi, *Zai zhongguode tudi shang*, 83.

⁵⁸ Ōyama, "Huabei Riben," 92, cited in Denning, "Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs," 144. Translation Denning's.

were boys, including pre-teens.⁵⁹ The IJA's conscription of vast numbers of unwilling and untrained men and boys also produced a large pool of demoralized and recalcitrant soldiers, who were amenable (or vulnerable) to the PLA's outreach.

Another strategy involved the distribution of *imonbukuro*, "care packages" that contained food, sweets, and reading matter. The care packages were, in Nosaka's estimation, "by far the most successful of our strategies, more so than the night-time hailing, pamphleting, or other propaganda work."⁶⁰ Appropriately for a doctrine founded in Marxist-Leninist materialist philosophy, the Yan'an schools focused their appeals on the acknowledgement of the immediate, physical needs of IJA soldiers, on the one hand, and their psychological desire to escape their virtual enslavement within the Imperial Japanese war machine and brutal treatment by its officers, on the other. Contrasted with the abstract spiritual rhetoric of self-sacrifice, glorious death, servitude to the emperor, obeisance to the *kokutai*, etc., the simple, practical promises of food, warmth, and dignity had a devastating effect on the morale of IJA soldiers exposed to these conversion approaches.

Revolutionaries with Gardens

Food was a recurring feature of bonding experiences between Japanese members of the PLA and their Chinese comrades. On one occasion in 1944, an arrangement was made for Japanese students from the Yan'an JWPS to spend the Lunar New Year with Chinese families. One student was hosted by a family named Wu, and reported that he was given wine and that his hosts "never ceased to force food" onto his plate. This moment also provides us with an insight into the widespread Yan'an interpretation of the Japanese presence, as Mr. Wu offered the following toast:

"[Mr. Wu told] his guests that despite the fact that they did not share the same nationality, they could work together to drive the Japanese imperialists from China and to liberate the Japanese people from their grasp."⁶¹

The second part of Mr. Wu's toast demonstrates an acknowledgement that the "Japanese imperialists" were subjugating not only the Chinese people, but the Japanese people, too, and elegantly illustrates the discursive disaggregation of the Japanese "proletarian soldier" from the militarists who were held responsible for the violent invasion of China, a sentiment that reflects Zhu De's own view that "The Japanese masses and soldiers who oppose fascism, are our true friends."⁶²

Substantial food accommodations were made for the Japanese POWs attending the JWPS, as indicated by one official report describing the concessions made to their nutrition:

"The Japanese trainees in the school were treated as foreign friends. Despite the harsh conditions, they were rationed to 7.5 kg of rice, 7.5 kg of flour, 1.5 kg of pork and 15 kg of vegetables per month per person at a

⁵⁹ Yamada, p. 72.

⁶⁰ Nosaka, *Heiwa e no tatakai*, 56-57.

⁶¹ Umeda, "Yi Yan'an", 120, cited in Denning, "Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs," 134. Translation Denning's.

⁶² Ōyama Mitsuhiro /Dashan Guangyi, "Huabei Riben", in Mori Ken/Sen Jian, *Cong diguo junren dao fanzhan yongshi*, (Beijing : Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe: Xinhua shudian Beijing faxingsuo faxing, 1987.), 83, cited in Denning, "Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs," 147. Translation Denning's.

time when sometimes even millet rice was a luxury for the CPC cadres and soldiers.”⁶³

Oral reports indicate that the necessity of ensuring that rice rations were allotted to Japanese soldiers in order to maintain their morale appears to have become a standard procedure for the 8RA and 4FA, akin to the protocols for handling dietary proscriptions of Muslim enlistees. Anecdotally, the importance of rice rations, and especially liberation from eating the dreaded *gaoliang* (sorghum) gruel, appears to have been a major concern of Japanese enlistees in the PLA, corroborating the wisdom of these policies.⁶⁴

Nosaka’s reports on the interwar psychological operations of the Japanese members of the 8RA illustrates the ways in which food was elemental to their efforts, juxtaposing the materialist appeals of the Marxist converts against the more numinous doctrines of the Imperial Japanese military. After crossing a freezing river and creeping up on an IJA position in late December, Nosaka crouched in the shadows and hailed a pair of shivering guards at their post, leading to the following exchange:

“[Nosaka]: Hey, can you hear me?”

“Who goes there? I hear you!”

“...New Year’s Day is fast approaching. I wonder if you lot have anything lined up. Over where my comrades and I are, we’ve been busy with all sorts of preparations. We’ve got mochi, Japanese food, and *wagashi* candy. We’re going to put on a theatre play, too.”

“That’s some pretty mouthwatering talk. You really have all that out there in your mountain hideout?”

“Don’t trash-talk our mountain hideout! We have all kinds of great stuff over there. Why don’t you two come over and spend New Year’s Day with us?”

The soldiers laughed.”⁶⁵

Although Nosaka’s descriptions of the food situation in interwar Yan’an plainly struck the sentinels he was attempting to convert as improbably optimistic, there is some evidence that successive policies by the CCP to improve food production following the 1941 KMT blockades were relatively successful, and Nosaka describes sweets being included in the Anti-War League’s *imonbukuro* care packages strewn in IJA-controlled areas.⁶⁶ Reports describe a staple diet of millet for interwar 8RA soldiers, but also supplements of more desirable foods, including weekly rations of rice and meat and regular side dishes of bread and wheat noodles, a diet that compared extremely favorably to the IJA rations as the war wore on.

The relative plentitude of food was due, in part, to the Production Movement, developed by the CCP leadership in response to the KMT logistics blockades. The Movement was described by a contemporary journalist from the *Chongqing New People’s Daily* as being of such importance that the entire success of the CCP’s governmental and military project depended upon it. As General Wang Zhen put it: “The army and the people had no intention of allowing themselves to be starved or destroyed, nor could the army live

⁶³ Global Times, “The Eighth Route Army Treats Us as Friends.”

⁶⁴ Three of my interviewees explicitly stated their strong objections to having to eat *gaoliang*, and the great pleasure of receiving special rice allotments, as discussed in Chapter 4.

⁶⁵ Nosaka, *Heiwa e no tatakai*, 78-80.

⁶⁶ Nosaka, *Heiwa e no tatakai*, 81.

entirely off the people.”⁶⁷ In recognition of what Bill Mollison has condemned as “the futility of revolutionaries who have no gardens, who depend on the very system they attack, and who produce words and bullets, not food and shelter,”⁶⁸ the communists brought draft animals, goats, sheep, and pigs to Yan’an, where they raised them to feed the soldiers and civilians alike. Japanese cadres were also involved in food production, contributing their labor to the communal farms in and around Yan’an.⁶⁹ As one ex-PLA Japanese memoir describes:

“Akiyama Yoshiteru was a faculty member at the Japanese Peasant-Workers School during the Production Movement. He recalls utilizing the skills of their students to further production. They cultivated the wasteland by planting potatoes, beans, pumpkins, and wheat... The students who did not have any [farming] skills learned how to use a spinning wheel.”⁷⁰

In recognition of the dire logistical circumstances of the IJA in the years of ’43, ’44, and ’45, a focus on food became a recurring motif of the communist psyops: one leaflet distributed by the Anti-War League behind enemy lines bore the Chinese title *Rang women chibao fan*, “Let Us Eat Until We Are Full.”⁷¹ At the level of Maslowian hierarchy, these communication strategies addressed the major grievances of IJA’s low-ranking conscripted soldiers, while also signaling the CCP and PLA leadership’s attitude towards the rank-and-file, specifically in their acknowledgement and prioritization of the material and physical needs of the “proletarian soldiers.” IJA soldiers were required to recite the *Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of the Emperor Meiji* at mealtimes,⁷² a liturgy that became increasingly hollow as food supplies for the Army dwindled from 1943 onwards. The themes of spiritualism, discipline, and sacrifice that characterized the IJA’s mealtime rituals stood in diametric contradistinction to the uncomplicated promises of the Chinese communist’s *imonbukuro*: “Let us eat until we are full.” Even the most devoted soldiers sincerely committed to self-sacrifice for nation and Emperor would have likely perceived the contrast in priorities between the two military institutions’ leaderships, a fact that goes some way towards explaining the success of the Anti-War League’s activities, and which sheds light on the psychologies of the men trapped in, and collaborating with, Imperial Japan’s ghastly war machine.

Iniquitous access to medical treatment was also a feature of the experiences of low-ranking Japanese soldiers vis-à-vis the IJA officer class, a recurring grievance among the rank and file that was used in the Anti-War League’s demoralization campaign materials, who emphasized that the Japanese soldiers would be treated in an egalitarian manner if they joined the PLA, regardless of their rank.⁷³ Despite the deficiencies of the PLA’s medical establishment, great pains were taken to ensure that injured Japanese POWs were treated well, and that if they wanted to return to their IJA unit that their wishes would be accommodated. Similarly, 8RA and 4FA units were instructed to treat the bodies of slain IJA soldiers with respect, wash them, and ensure their return to IJA lines for proper burial, a process that sometimes required the recruitment of civilian intermediaries.⁷⁴ In its efforts to encourage defection and convince the

⁶⁷ Smedley, *The Great Road*, 386.

⁶⁸ Bill Morrison. *Introduction to Permaculture* (Stanley, Tasmania: Tagari Publications, 1991), 169-170.

⁶⁹ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 140.

⁷⁰ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 31.

⁷¹ Denning, “Chinese Mobilization of Japanese POWs,” 148.

⁷² De Bary, Tsunoda, et al., eds., “Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of the Emperor Meiji” in *Sources of Japanese Tradition Volume II*, (Columbia University Press, 1958).

⁷³ Denning, p. 146.

⁷⁴ Denning, p. 151.

IJA rank-and-file of the immorality of their collaboration with the Empire of Japan's colonial project, the PLA leadership made strategic use of the humane treatment of captives and respectful treatment of the deceased. However, these efforts transcend pure military pragmatism and also form part of a consistent moral and intellectual complex that valued the lives of the proletariat ensnared in the wars waged by 'militarists' and 'capitalists'.

Ivan Morris has argued that indifference towards one's own death is an aesthetic concept that enduringly underpins Japanese high culture, a form of suicidal nobility that characterizes the ideals of the samurai aristocracy and that was a requisite attribute of leadership in WWII.⁷⁵ Alan Tansman has made similar arguments regarding the integration of violence and death into Japanese high aesthetic constructs, the "spiritual glorification of the shedding of blood."⁷⁶ While scholars such as Oleg Benesch and Ota Norio have critiqued the historicity of the "nobility of failure," and proposed that *bushidō* aesthetics surrounding death are less features of *longue durée* aristocratic values and more a product of constructions stemming from the 19th-century nationalist expediencies of the Meiji state's internal pacification projects,⁷⁷ the readiness to self-destroy should, nonetheless, be understood as a fundamentally aristocratic fascination.⁷⁸ From the perspective of the Yan'an thinkers, this violent spiritualism, glorification of death, and indifference to physical wellbeing had little to say to the proletariat of any nation, and the substructural realities of class relations always trumped superstructural indoctrination, however insistent or beautiful. In this vein, when Morris-Suzuki proposes that: "For the great majority of Japanese... joining the Chinese forces was not a matter of ideological commitment but rather a question of survival or *force majeure*,"⁷⁹ we should contextualize her assessment in reference to the fact that the ideological forms of Marxist materialism that gained their apogee in the Yan'an settlement through the work of Nosaka, Peng, Zhu, et al., explicitly prioritized human survival. To the orthodox Marxist who prioritizes full bellies for the proletariat, "ideological commitment" and "survival" are not mutually exclusive; it is no coincidence that the Japanese defectors found this ideology to be accommodating of their desire to continue living, as the question of survival *was* the ideological commitment of the Yan'an thinkers.

It is notable that the policy focus based on respectful consideration of the material needs of the proletariat was, overwhelmingly, the product of the high levels of influence of Peng Dehuai and Zhu De in the post-Long March and Yan'an settlement's development of military doctrine, and their personal involvement in developing the curriculum of the JWPS. As Mao Zedong came increasingly to monopolize the CCP's leadership in the late 40's and 50's (and again during his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), this school of policymaking was largely discarded in favor of higher-level, ideological considerations related to questions of superstructural reconfiguration, cultural work, destruction of historical records and artefacts, political purges and hierarchical social categorizations, Hegelian historical destiny, Stalinist governance, and Trotskyite permanent revolution. As the IJA officers had done to their rank-and-file with the *Imperial Rescript*, Mao contrived, in the 1950s, to fill his people's mouths with words rather than

⁷⁵ Ivan Morris, *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan* (New York: New American Library, 1975), i-xiii.

⁷⁶ Alan Tansman, *The Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 50-51.

⁷⁷ For a representative critique, see: Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2-3.

⁷⁸ An observation that forms the substance of much of Dazai Osamu's work, in particular, his ruminations on the paradox of lamenting the loss of an aristocratic ideal that is itself fascinated with stoically accepting destruction; the most representative work in this vein being his masterful *Shayō*. Mishima Yukio, similarly, addressed these concepts in his work, and, indeed, embodied them in the most literal possible sense.

⁷⁹ Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, "Prisoner Number 600,001: Rethinking Japan, China, and the Korean War, 1950-1953," in *The Journal of Asian Studies* 74, no. 2 (May 2015), 416.

food. The return to consistent materialist policymaking by the government of the PRC would not occur until after Mao's death, with Deng Xiaoping's reforms; despite the interruption of the Maoist era, the valuation of food presents a form of continuity that unites Deng Xiaoping's policymaking in the '70s to the epistemologies of the Yan'an military doctrines, tragically and disastrously abandoned during the Mao years.

Conversion and *kakusei*

Feng's abovementioned account of "personal enlightenment" corresponds to recurring language, found in Japanese contemporary accounts, interviews, and memoirs, that describes the experience of defection from the IJA to the Chinese communist fold as a moment of "conversion," "awakening," or "enlightenment." Specifically, the terms *kakusei* ("awakening") and *mezame* ("eye-opening"), are common motifs of self-reports of the experience of departing the Imperial fold and of encountering communist philosophy. In recognition of this phenomenon, one of the splinter organizations of the Anti-War League, formed in 1943 under the management of Peng Dehuai, was named the *Nihon kakusei renmei* ("Japanese Awakening Alliance").⁸⁰ Other expressions, such as *zaisei* ("rebirth") or receiving a *shinsei* ("new life") also appear in personal descriptions of defection from the IJA and induction into the Chinese socialist communes.⁸¹ As well as referencing the immediate act of defection, these terms are used in reference to the dual educational experience of encountering critiques of the Emperor and of Japanese imperialism, on the one hand, and encountering Marxist-Leninism and socialist ideas, on the other. In both cases, the use of quasi-religious language strongly conveys the depth of the identity transformation that these experiences supposed for the Japanese comrades. This linguistic framing may well share its genetic origins with another piece of Japanese military slang: specifically, the term *shaba* ("the free world," or "the real world") to refer to existence outside of military duties.⁸² This term has its roots in the Sanskrit *saha*, and continues to carry Buddhist connotations in Japanese.⁸³ For one former IJA soldier, the experience of "awakening" was less religious and more atheistic, manifesting as a loss of faith in the divinity of the emperor: "I gave up on religion. I no longer believe in God, Amaterasu, or the emperor."⁸⁴ The language did not necessarily imply a rejection of violence, either: the night before deployment to the front lines of the Korean war to continue to fight the Americans under the communist banner, several Japanese members of the PLA described their awakening to the necessity to fight on the side of the North Koreans as a process of "kakusei."⁸⁵

Separating the "Japanese" from the "Imperial"

While the JWPS and the League's objectives were directed towards retraining Japanese defectors and POWs as productive members of the socialist revolution and setting them to the task of recruiting more of their former brothers-in-arms, a parallel task had to be undertaken, which was the reconfiguration of the culture of the Yan'an settlement into one that could accept the erstwhile Japanese enemies into the ranks of the PLA. The task of separating the "Japanese" from the "Imperial" in the discursive community of

⁸⁰ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 22.

⁸¹ Nicchū yūkō kyōkai, "Imada 'senzen no sennō' kara mezamenai hito ga iru!", *Nicchūyūkō shinbun*, March 5th, 2013.

⁸² For a brief discussion of this topic, see Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 34.

⁸³ The term continues to be used in both military and prison slang, to refer to the "free world" or "civilian life" outside of the military or prison.

⁸⁴ Saitō, Personal interview, 34.

⁸⁵ Makiko Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite: kangofutachi ga mita "futatsu no sensō"* (Tokyo: nijishobō, 1987), 173.

Yan'an was far from trivial. It was necessary to overcome the phenomenal inertia of CCP "Anti-Japanism," the profundity of which is evident in this 1937 statement by Mao:

"Political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement."⁸⁶

"Anti-Japanism" lay at the heart of the PLA's guerrilla doctrine. It was also a fundamental legitimating concept for the CCP's state project, as the communist leadership positioned themselves as the steadfast opponents of Japanese imperialism, while accusing the KMT of collaborationism or insufficiently dedicated resistance.

Zhu De's work on the JWPS curriculum was instrumental in producing a rhetorical framework for the necessary disaggregation of the "Japanese" from the "militarists." This conceptual separation had two primary orientations: as a guiding principle of the Yan'an "discursive community," a self-orientation intended to reform the attitudes of CCP members (and, especially, soldiers in the 8RA) such that they could align with the pragmatic outcomes of his psyops project without the inhibitions that would spring from a more broadly anti-Japanese sentiment, and as an orientation towards the Japanese soldiers, to create a discursive space in which their ideology, rather than they themselves, could be freely criticized — for instance, with their participation in self-criticism sessions — without alienating the Japanese individual from the objectives of the 8RA. Zhu's discursive balancing act was a success, and it hinged on the ideic re-structuring of the Japanese soldier. Separating the "soldier" from the "militarist", and, indeed, the "Japanese" from the "militarist," essentially permitted the architects of the Yan'an ideological orthodoxy to incorporate Japanese individuals into the greater program of anti-Japanese guerrilla resistance, without giving rise to irreconcilable contradictions that might otherwise compromise the unlikely alliance.

The concept of "international socialist volunteers" (or "international fighters," as Feng described them above) also played an important part in the production of integrationist doctrinal and ideological frameworks. Maeda Mitsuhide, in his memoir of capture and subsequent conscription by the 8RA, recalls being lectured by his captor, the Japan-educated 8RA member Zhang Xiangshan:

"We believe this war brings disaster not only to the Chinese people, but to the Japanese people as well... we believe that the Japanese who are sent here to fight are, for the most part, of the labouring classes; however, they have been tricked by the one-sided education of the Japanese government."⁸⁷

Zhang's view, that the war was as destructive to the Japanese proletariat as it was to the Chinese, constitutes a narrative of innocence that genuinely permitted the exoneration of the IJA rank-and-file in terms of their misdirection by militarist brainwashing. This discourse gained its apogee in the Yan'an

⁸⁶ Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Illinois: University of Illinois, 2000), Chapter 6.

⁸⁷ Maeda Mitsuhide and Kagawa Takashi, *Hachirogun no nihonjin heitachi* (Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai, 1984), 154.

settlement, and is perhaps best exemplified by Norman Bethune's description of treating injured soldiers while volunteering for the communists:

“Any more? Four Japanese prisoners. Bring them in. In this community of pain, there are no enemies. Cut away that blood-stained uniform. Stop that haemorrhage. Lay them beside the others. Why, they're alike as brothers! Are these soldiers professional man-killers? No, these are amateurs-in-arms. Workman's hands. These are workers-in-uniform.

What is the cause of this cruelty, this stupidity? A million workmen come from Japan to kill or mutilate a million Chinese workmen. Why should the Japanese worker attack his brother worker, who is forced merely to defend himself. Will the Japanese worker benefit by the death of the Chinese? No, how can he gain? Then, in God's name, who will gain? Who is responsible for sending these Japanese workmen on this murderous mission? Who will profit from it? How was it possible to persuade the Japanese workmen to attack the Chinese Workman – his brother in poverty; his companion in misery?

Is it possible that a few rich men, a small class of men, have persuaded a million men to attack, and attempt to destroy, another million men as poor as they? So that these rich may be richer still? Terrible thought! How did they persuade these poor men to come to China? By telling them the truth? No, they would never have come if they had known the truth, Did they dare to tell these workmen that the rich only wanted cheaper raw materials, more markets and more profit? No, they told them that this brutal war was “The Destiny of the Race,” it was for the “Glory of the Emperor,” it was for the “Honour of the State,” it was for their “King and Country.” False. False as hell!”⁸⁸

In the following chapter, I will further explore this internationalist volunteer identity and the related exoneration of the Japanese proletarian collaborators of empire with reference to the medical volunteers of the Yan'an settlement, as well as the way that foreign medical volunteers influenced the development of the CCP's integrationist policies towards Japanese medical workers.

Another source of integrationist facilitation lay in the formal marching orders of the 8RA, including Peng Dehuai's specific injunctions to communist soldiers regarding military discipline towards Japanese POWs:

“Japanese captives are not to be injured or harmed. Do not take their personal possessions. Give medicine and medical treatment to all those who are sick. Those who wish to leave are to be permitted to do so. Those who wish to work in China are to be given jobs. If any wish to study, they are to be inducted into appropriate schools. Any who wish to correspond with family and friends are to be assisted in the matters of

⁸⁸ Norman Bethune, “Wounds,” in *The Wounds*, ed. M. M. Pickersgill (Ontario: Alive Press Limited, 1940), 32.

postal service. Japanese who die on the battlefield are to be suitably buried, and their graves are to be marked.”⁸⁹

Peng’s policies made the humane treatment of Japanese captives a matter of PLA doctrine. These policies fit into the general framework of marching discipline of the Chinese communist armed forces, as detailed in the standardized discipline guidelines issued by the General Headquarters of the Chinese PLA in October 1947.⁹⁰ The comparatively disciplined conduct of the PLA towards enemies and allies formed a part of a grander project to secure popular support and international legitimacy prior to the predicted (and seemingly inevitable) contest with the KMT for rule over the mainland once hostilities ended. However, the specific demand for good treatment of Japanese captives formed part of a narrower project initiated by the 8RA’s political department, with decidedly pragmatic objectives, specific to the conduct of guerrilla action against the Japanese and the tactical imperatives of dislodging Japanese strength in northeast China.

Prior to the development of the Japanese re-education curricula and the integration of Japanese cadres into food production, the Chinese communists, having limited resources and infrastructure with which to sustain captives, released a great many of the Japanese POWs: "Out of 2407 prisoners, the communist troops kept only 322."⁹¹ Aside from relieving pressure on the limited resources of the Chinese communist forces, the releases also served a tactical purpose, as released captives became vectors of the CCP’s propaganda efforts: the CCP believed that former captives returning to their units would report the good treatment, access to good food, and medical assistance they had received at the hands of the communists.

Overcoming Bitterness

One obstacle to overcome in the integrationist project, detailed in Ariyoshi’s biography, was the personal bitterness felt by most Chinese towards the Japanese: Nosaka attempted to address these sentiments by spearheading a campaign to refocus the ire of Chinese peasants onto the "Japanese fascist militarists," and to balance the necessity for a spirit of anti-Japanese resistance with kindness to Japanese captives. Nosaka’s approach bears genetic resemblance to Zhu’s articulations of the Japanese/militarist dichotomy, but the essence of Nosaka’s strategy lay in separating the Japanese rank-and-file from their commanders: the former were characterized as proletarians coerced by “fascist militarists,” whilst the latter were subjected to re-education, often at the hands of their former charges under the guidance of members of the PLA.⁹² Ariyoshi describes in detail one such re-education session, which involved extensive group-assisted self-criticism:

"I was impressed by the fact that here in this cold and dark cave, human attitudes and thinking were being remolded. It was unlike anything I had seen. The atmosphere was charged with the seriousness of this earnest group of men searching for the truth. Their past was dead, so they felt. The Japanese army had sent ashes to their homes, and their families were mourning for them."⁹³

⁸⁹ Peng Dehuai, quoted in Maeda Mitsuhige and Kagawa Takashi, *Hachirogun no nihonjin heitachi* (Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai, 1984), 147.

⁹⁰ For a detailed description of these guidelines, see Chapter 3, p. 96.

⁹¹ Ariyoshi, 129.

⁹² Ariyoshi, 129.

⁹³ Ariyoshi, 132.

Through this process, Japanese POWs were indoctrinated into communist thought; perhaps more importantly, they came to be perceived by their new Chinese comrades as having undergone a strenuous and transformative process that permitted them to interact—and even fight alongside each other—without suspicion or rancor. One can detect a certain delight in the descriptions of the cathartic suffering of the officer class. When one officer, faced with repeated criticisms from his former underlings, begged: "I am only human. It is impossible to reform overnight, but I will do my best from tomorrow," he was commanded to start reforming "this very minute."⁹⁴

The necessity of a cathartic redemptive process can be understood in the context not only of Chinese troop morale – some sort of sincere and plausible exculpation must have been expected before Japanese soldiers were redeployed alongside 8RA soldiers – but also as part of the frameworks of political self-criticism that represented a major avenue for the internal resolution of political disputes and consolidation of power struggles within the CCP. Koyama Hideyo observes in his memoir, *The Tale of One Japanese Joining the 8RA*, how he and his superiors were subjected post-capture to a process that tightly parallels the self-criticisms of party cadres which came to be a core part of CCP participation in later decades, as well as the rites of imperial-ideology renouncement that came to be an expected performance of Japanese captives of the 8RA. Interestingly, it seems that the demand for such performances largely stemmed from the fellow rank-and-file of the 8RA, rather than from official pronouncements of the unit leaders or military co-ordinators in Yan'an.⁹⁵

In fact, Nosaka's hard work led to remarkably few documented "conversions." When, in 1945, he marched alongside other Japanese Communists to a repatriation center in northeast China, their total numbers were reported as barely exceeding 300.⁹⁶ However, Nosaka's success in helping formalize and institutionalize an intellectual framework that promoted mutual understanding between Japanese POWs, their PLA captors, and the Chinese populace at large was instrumental in enabling Japanese communist sympathizers—and, later, politically unaffiliated *zanryū*, 'left behind' Japanese colonists—safely to remain in China in the postwar, and to join the PLA and its splinter units. Nosaka's vision of Sino-Japanese collaboration under a red flag never came to fruition as he had pictured it, but it is hard to imagine the facility with which Japanese individuals were able to join and serve in the PLA from 1945-1958 without Nosaka's contribution. Nosaka's work, alongside that of the other senior officials of the 8RA's political department throughout the Yan'an years, created the framework by which Japanese individuals, in principle and in practice, could become members of the CCP or 8RA, fully coequal in status and salary with their Chinese and Soviet comrades.

The production of an institutional and ideological framework that enabled the incorporation of Japanese POWs and military defectors into organs of the CCP, including the 8RA, had ramifications beyond immediate military pragmatism. Precisely because the 8RA was a fighting force which drew its manpower heavily from conscription and volunteering from a militarily amateur civilian population, the policies of incorporation devised for Japanese soldiers were rapidly re-purposed, often *in situ* and on an ad-hoc basis, for the incorporation of other, non-military affiliated Japanese individuals. The fact that the curricula of the JWPS and underpinning frameworks of organizations such as the Anti-War League emerged in the context of the Yan'an rectification movement, in which the CCP drove to increase collaboration with the party by the populations in its territories, supports this thesis. Towards the end of the war, and in the aftermath of Operation August Storm, it was this second type of conscription, which I term 'guerrilla conscription,' that became the most ubiquitous avenue through which Japanese individuals

⁹⁴ Ariyoshi, 132.

⁹⁵ Koyama Hideyo, *Hitori Nihonjin no hachirogun Jungun Monogatari* (Tokyo: Nicchu Shuppan, 1974), 35-36, 60-61.

⁹⁶ White, "Inside Red China," 41.

found themselves joining the PLA and, later, the CCP. Most notable among these guerrilla conscriptions were medical staff, trained and untrained, largely drawn from ‘liberated’ hospitals in former Japanese colonial holdings that became contested territories in the civil war of 1945-49; these individuals will be the primary subject of the next two chapters. A substantial number of other civilians, including many with no military or medical credentials, were also forcibly incorporated into units of the 8RA following the Japanese surrender. Dong Bingyue, who has produced one of the few analyses of the memoirs of Japanese members of the People’s Liberation Army,⁹⁷ refers to these men and women as an “outcast group,”⁹⁸ less for their roles in 1945-1952 than for their treatment—or rather, the lack thereof—in post-war historiography.

The End of the JWPS, and Japanese Cadres at War’s End

In 1943, several CCP-led Japanese organizations, such as the *Zaika nihonjin hansen dōmei* and the *kakusei renmei*, consolidated into the *Hansen kahoku rengō kai*, the “Hebei Anti-War Association,” which, by 1944, had spread into thirteen distinct chapters, before being reformed once again into the *Kaihōrenmei*, the “Liberation Alliance.” This latter reformation was intended to shift the focus of the organization from the anti-war activities and psychological operations work of its earlier incarnations to the more proactive objective of bringing about what Sanzō called the “democratization of Japan.”⁹⁹ Plans began to be sketched for training Japanese cadres to carry out a leadership role in socialist organizing in Japan, and the possibility of instigating an armed communist revolution in Japan became a possibility that was entertained by Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership well into the ’50s.¹⁰⁰ However, the early phase of the US occupation and the SCAP administration saw the implementation of far-reaching social reform policies intended to address the grievances of Japanese laborers, including massive land reform policies, the enfranchisement of women, and the democratization of government institutions and of education. These moves by the SCAP deflated the Japanese public’s interest in communist organization, and stimulated Nosaka’s inclination to pivot the JCP towards peaceful liberal reform and away from violent revolution. The extreme war-weariness of the Japanese public and growing negative sentiments towards ‘Red’ returnees from Soviet internment played another part in Nosaka’s decision.¹⁰¹

On August 30th, 1945, the JWPS terminated its operations and held a farewell party. General Ye Jianying addressed the convened attendees as follows:

“We welcomed you as our good friends before, and now we have to see you off as our good friends. We shall be good friends forever. We hope that you, our comrades, will develop the friendship between the Japanese and Chinese people.”¹⁰²

In January of 1946, Nosaka returned to Japan bearing the endorsement of Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong and the support of John S. Service, one of the US ‘China Hand’ diplomats who served on the Dixie

⁹⁷ Henceforth, “JMPLA.”

⁹⁸ Dong, “rijiqian jiefangjun,” 90.

⁹⁹ Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 27.

¹⁰⁰ These plans proved abortive, although the CCP did train Japanese cadres for a brief period, until the breakdown of the project in 1958, a topic that I will address in Chapter 3.

¹⁰¹ Moore, Joe, *Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945-1947* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 32-40.

¹⁰² Korogi, *Under the Tower of Treasure*, 49-50. Translation Korogi’s.

Mission.¹⁰³ Nosaka joined the JCP, and, in contravention of the wishes of the Cominform, promoted “peaceful revolution:” gradualist, nonviolent approaches to social reform.¹⁰⁴ Following the Reverse Course anti-leftist turn of the SCAP and the unpopular direct action violence surrounding the railroad strikes of 1949-50, Nosaka found himself caught between growing public resentment against communist militancy and the Cominform’s increasing demands for hardline commitment to revolution by any means necessary. On January 6th, 1950, a Cominform missive declared that “The Japanese Communist Party’s commitment to a peaceful revolution is a mistake,” a fact that was publicized in print and newsreel,¹⁰⁵ and directly attacked Nosaka, accusing him of reactionary collaborationism:

“Nosaka...endeavored to prove that all the necessary conditions are at hand in postwar Japan for affecting the peaceful transition to socialism, even under the conditions of the occupying regime.... As for the occupation army ... in the opinion of Nosaka, far from hindering the aims of the Japanese Communist party will, on the contrary, in pursuing its mission, facilitate the democratisation of Japan.... Nosaka's attempt to invent a "new" theory ... is nothing more than a Japanese variation of the anti-Marxist and anti-Socialist "theory" ...”¹⁰⁶

The JCP went on to briefly endorse the Cominform’s militant line in the form of the *gojūichinen kōryō*, the “1951 platform” of armed struggle and rejection of pacifism, but their decision to do so led to legal censure and public backlash. Ultimately, the JCP returned to peaceful party politics and, in 1955, reinstated Nosaka, who went on to serve as chairman of the party from 1958-82.¹⁰⁷

Nosaka enjoyed the privileged position of a respected statesman with substantial backing from the CCP, and a welcoming and invested cohort of allies excited to develop socialist political movements in the newly-liberalizing Japan. Nosaka’s swift repatriation and immediate participation in socialist political mobilization in the Japanese home islands was by no means representative, however, of the experiences of the majority of Japanese members of the PLA. The Chinese historian Dong Bingyue has called these individuals “outcast soldiers,”¹⁰⁸ and with good reason: for many of them, war’s end did not signal a transition to peace, repatriation, or any kind of return to normalcy. Instead, they remained enlisted and engaged in the proliferating postcolonial conflicts of Asia, their fates unclear, their status designated as *ryūyōsareta* (“left behind” or, perhaps, “kept back”). The very term *ryūyō* captures some of the contingency and liminality of their status, as the responsibility for their remainder on the continent is only obliquely gestured towards: did they linger of their own volition? were they abandoned by their government? or were they forcibly conscripted by their former enemies? As we will see in Chapters 3 and

¹⁰³ For details on the Dixie Mission and the USA’s attempts, from 1944-1947, to establish stable relations with the CCP and the PLA in Yan’an, refer to: David D. Barrett, *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yanan, 1944* (Berkeley: University of California Center for Chinese Studies, 1970).

¹⁰⁴ John Taylor, *The Japanese Communist Party, 1955-1963* (CIA/RSS DD/I Staff Study, Reference Title: ESAU XXIV), March 20, 1964, ii.

¹⁰⁵ *Nihon nyūsu*, no. 211 (1950).

¹⁰⁶ Taylor, *The Japanese Communist Party*, 6.

¹⁰⁷ A scandal, corroborated by the JCP’s *Akahata* newspaper investigation, marred Nosaka’s otherwise impeccable credentials as a socialist statesman and revolutionary. A 1993 investigation revealed that he had denounced two colleagues to the KGB in 1939, which led to their arrest and execution. For representative coverage of the scandal, refer to: Eric Pace, “Sanzo Nosaka, 101, Communist in Japan Ejected by the Party,” *New York Times*, November 15, 1993.

¹⁰⁸ Dong, “rijiqian jiefangjun,” 1.

4, the subjective experiences of *ryūyō* status reveal the complexities of the interfaces between state force and personal agency in negotiating their new and emergent identities.

The Korean War as Continuity: Matsushita Kazutoshi and Ōhaba Hiroyuki,

The experience of Matsushita Kazutoshi, “prisoner number 600,001,”¹⁰⁹ provides us with an insight into an exceptional case of continuous military service by an IJA soldier following Japanese surrender. A Kyūshū fisherman turned steel-plant laborer, Matsushita was conscripted in 1944 and deployed to the Kwantung Army’s railway brigade in Mudanjiang. He participated in the devastating *Ichigō sakusen*, the southwards sweep of the IJA with the objective of capturing Nationalist cities, which, alongside the scorched-earth retreats by the KMT armed forces, caused unspeakable devastation and exacerbated the internal refugee crisis within China.¹¹⁰ In the chaos of the advance, Matsushita deserted and was declared dead, only to reappear as an enlistee in the 74th Division of the Chinese Nationalist Army under the name “Han Yisheng,” alongside “thousands” of other pseudonymous Japanese individuals.¹¹¹ Matsushita/Han’s division was defeated by the communist East China Field Army at Menglianggu, and its survivors directly recruited by the same. Matsushita was ultimately deployed to the Korean War—possibly by accident, as Japanese members of PLA forces were kept away from the Korean front for reasons of political signaling¹¹²—where he was captured and transported to the UN POW camp, becoming the first and only Japanese POW of the war. Ōhaba Hiroyuki was another “outcast soldier” trapped in the unbroken hostilities of “postwar” Asia: Ōhaba was a “youth volunteer,” conscripted by the IJA at the age of 14, who was later absorbed by the 4FA’s 136th Division and served in the Korean War, supporting the North Korean war effort.¹¹³ For Ōhaba, war with the USA and its allies was a phenomenon entirely unbroken by Imperial Japanese surrender.

Morris-Suzuki has called for a reconceptualization of the transnational character of the Korean War and the necessity to “pay closer attention to the historical continuities linking the Asia-Pacific War and Chinese Civil War to the Korean War.”¹¹⁴ In particular, Morris-Suzuki argues for a rejection of the treatment of August 15th, 1945 as a “total rupture between ‘war’ and ‘postwar,’” in favor of seeing it a phase in the “history of violence that flows seamlessly from the Asia-Pacific War to the Korean War.”¹¹⁵ This study strongly substantiates Morris-Suzuki’s insight, as we have shown that, for many Japanese colonists, soldiers, and medics, as well as for soldiers in the PLA, KMT armed forces, and, indeed, Korean military organizations, the rupture of Imperial Japanese surrender was expressed only in a proliferation of possibilities for the future, rather than in a noticeable reconfiguration of present experience.

Japanese Members of the Viet-Minh

Continuous warfare against Allied powers was by no means limited to the case of the Korean War. Post-surrender, Japanese soldiers were integrated into the military organizations of successor regimes beyond northeast Asia, serving alongside former colonial populations in their decolonization struggles and in the opening conflicts of the Cold War. Christopher Goscha describes how Japanese medics, technicians, and

¹⁰⁹ Matsushita was the one and only Japanese (a nationality designated by the number 6) POW at UN POW Camp no. 1 in Pusan in 1952. Morris-Suzuki, “Prisoner,” 412.

¹¹⁰ Morris-Suzuki, “Prisoner,” 415.

¹¹¹ Morris-Suzuki, “Prisoner,” 415.

¹¹² I will discuss the topic of Japanese PLA recruits’ involvement in the Korean War in Chapter 3.

¹¹³ Oral history interview by the NHK, cited in Morris-Suzuki, “Prisoner,” 417.

¹¹⁴ Morris-Suzuki, “Prisoner,” 411.

¹¹⁵ Morris-Suzuki, “Prisoner,” 413.

soldiers were integrated into the Viet-Minh during the First Indochina War, detailing the process whereby, from August 1945 to December of 1946, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam¹¹⁶ north of the 16th parallel recruited from among surrendered Japanese soldiers, retaining, by the end of 1946, some 15,000 individuals in indeterminate circumstances from among the pre-surrender civilian and military Japanese population of 97,000.¹¹⁷ Of these, Goscha estimates, approximately 2,000 became involved with the Viet-Minh between 1945 and 1950.¹¹⁸ As well as conscription, the acquisition by communist guerrillas and armed forces of abandoned or surrendered war machinery and materiel from the IJA was a feature of Imperial Japanese surrender and handover in Vietnam.¹¹⁹

Nguyen Binh, an appointee of Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Min, recognized the need to recruit military instructors and veteran officers with experience in warfare:

“Like Giap, Binh did not hesitate to recruit his officers from among the Japanese officers who remained in Indochina, employing them as advisors and even as bodyguards.”¹²⁰

Goscha argues that the pro-Asian and anti-European propaganda of the Japanese, alongside their military renown, facilitated their integration into the Viet-Minh, just as it had a parallel impact on Indonesian decolonial military organization.¹²¹

These Japanese members of the Viet-Minh operated well beyond an advisory role; many were fully salaried and enlisted soldiers of the Viet-Minh. One Japanese officer, Komaya Toshio (alias ‘Nguyen Quang Thuc’), served in North Vietnam from 1947-50, and was rewarded for his “elite services” by being given a higher pay than that of his Vietnamese comrades.¹²² Japanese members of the Viet-Minh played an especially important role in military instruction, in particular, at the *Truong luc quan trung hoc Quang Ngai* (“Quang Ngai Second Infantry School”), from 1946-49. Founded by Nguyen Son, himself an international communist revolutionary and Long March survivor who collaborated with the Chinese communists under the name Hong Shui, the school had six Japanese officers appointed as chief instructors. Like their comrades in China, the ex-IJA officers assumed local names: “Nguyen Van Thong” (Ishii Takuo), “Phan Lai” (Ikari Kazumasa), “Nguyen Thinh Tam” (Saitō?), “Minh Ngoc” (Nakahara Mitsunobu), “Long” (Konishi?), and “Hai” (Nabeya?).¹²³ One Japanese officer assumed the name “Ai Viet,” “He who loves Vietnam,” providing us with a glimpse, perhaps, of the mentality of some of these recruits.¹²⁴ At least 36 Japanese soldiers served as military instructors at military academies in Quang Ngai; many of these instructors were involved in military operations, and imparted the expertise they had painfully acquired over the course of Imperial Japanese southward expansion to their new charges. One such instructor, Chief Sergeant Oshikiri, developed a course for Vietnamese soldiers on the development of *tokkōhan* (‘Special Assault Teams’), which emphasized the importance of guerrilla warfare in a

¹¹⁶ Henceforth, “DRV.”

¹¹⁷ Christopher E. Goscha, “Alliés tardifs : Les apports techniques des déserteurs Japonais au Viet-Minh durant les premières années de la guerre Franco-Vietnamienne,” in *Presses Universitaires de France: Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 2, no. 202-203 (2001), 89.

¹¹⁸ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 89.

¹¹⁹ For details on Vietnamese communist seizures of Japanese war materiel, see: Vo Nguyen, Giap, *People’s War, People’s Army*, (Michigan: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 19-24.

¹²⁰ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 85. Translation mine.

¹²¹ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 87.

¹²² Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 105.

¹²³ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 99.

¹²⁴ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 101.

manner that was colored by the distinctive objectifying and suicidal rhetoric characteristic of IJA doctrine:

“Do not complain about having insufficient weapons. Although the Viet-Minh may lack tanks, warplanes, and artillery, it has no shortage of courageous soldiers. We have human tanks, human warplanes, and human artillery. The enemy are close by. We surround them. We understand the geography of this region perfectly. We understand our adversaries perfectly. As soon as the order is given, we shall pounce on our enemy, bearing explosives, grenades, or incendiaries.”¹²⁵

The military epistemologies of the Japanese Empire found an improbable afterlife in the martial doctrines of the Viet-Minh through the direct instruction of communist guerrillas by former officers of the IJA. These Japanese members of the Viet-Minh also saw combat, for instance, at the battle of Nam Dinh in December of 1946. On another occasion, during the recapture of Hanoi, a French Expedition Corps identified that they had been attacked by an elite assault unit composed of some 150 Japanese soldiers.¹²⁶

Japanese colonial administrators who lingered in Vietnam past Imperial Japanese surrender also played a role as economic advisors or in other types of managerial roles, such as the administration of the Tonkin mines at Minh Khai, which was managed by a man named Sugimoto Toshiyori until the 1950s. Other Japanese individuals worked with the DRV as financial advisors, explosives manufacturers, bankers, and doctors.¹²⁷ By the mid-1950s, the majority of these Japanese advisors, soldiers, military instructors, and other technicians were dismissed and repatriated to Japan, but their contributions to the Viet-Minh and the DRV stand as a remarkable testament to the post-surrender continuities of the Empire of Japan and as a parallel to the trajectories of Japanese soldiers who served in the Chinese PLA.

Repatriation, Memory, and Erasure

Upon their repatriation in the 1950s, the Japanese members of the PLA found their personal effects subjected to a series of documentary purges. CCP officials seized personal diaries and medals of distinction that tied the Japanese to the PLA, and went so far as to alter or destroy photographs that showed Japanese alongside their Chinese comrades. In the foreword to his memoirs of his time in the PLA, Imamura Kyôhei states that: “When I was in the army, I recorded many things in my journal. But when I returned to Japan, they took it from me. So this book is written from memory and some loose notes”.¹²⁸ Similarly, two former Japanese Red Cross medics conscripted from northeast China, the Aiharas, noted that both of their diaries were confiscated by the Chinese at the point of return to Japan in 1953.¹²⁹ Dong speculates that the Chinese government, aware of the “outcast” status of the JMPLA, made a concerted effort to suppress their “special historical memory.”¹³⁰

In his analysis of the war diaries kept by soldiers in the Asia-Pacific theatre, Aaron Moore describes the seizure of Japanese privates’ diaries by superiors within the Japanese army, incidents which are also recounted in Ishikawa Tatsuzô’s *ikiteru heitai*: “Japanese soldiers tied their diaries to the inside of their

¹²⁵ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 100. Translation mine.

¹²⁶ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 104.

¹²⁷ Goscha, “Alliés tardifs,” 108-109.

¹²⁸ Imamura, Kyôhei, *Akai hoshi no motode: kaihôgun iryûyô hachinen no kiroku* (Nagano: 1967), maegaki.

¹²⁹ Dong Bingyue, “rijiqian jiefangjun guanbing de minjianxiezuo” (Ex-PLA Japanese soldiers’ unofficial writing), *ershiyishiji shuangyuekan* 78 (August 2003) (Hong Kong: xianggang zhongwen daxue), 90.

¹³⁰ Dong, “rijiqian jiefangjun,” 91.

thighs to avoid confiscation during routine inspections”.¹³¹ The IJA officers were alarmed by the ramifications of permitting soldiers to record their own experiences, and acted to prevent these small usurpations of the military’s panoptic power by protecting its ability to narrate its activities at the institutional level without any contradictory noise from the conscience and perception of individual, human subjectivities. These suppressions, Moore argues, affected the later construction of the Japanese soldier’s historical memory. Many memoirs by returning soldiers—and the Japanese members of the PLA are no exception in this regard—were written twenty or thirty years after the fact, and are complicated by post-war self-censorship and even textual amendments to diaries.¹³² In the case of the Japanese cadres, the problem is twofold: not only did soldiers have to evade their Japanese officers during their enlistment in the IJA, they were then subjected to further suppressions by the officers of the PLA. Whatever intersection of permissible narratives might exist between Japanese militarists and CCP officials is unsurprisingly slender, and, as a consequence, there are no extant contemporary diaries that have survived the double informational purge. As Tokunaga Junko, one Japanese former member of the PLA recalls:

“I only wrote my diary after I came back [to Japan]... Things like army uniforms, PLA clothes and hats, were kept for us. They weren’t confiscated exactly. Rather, they were kept for our safety. The head of the Shanghai Foreigner’s Affairs Office of the Public Security Bureau – the bureau that manages the affairs of all foreigners – kept everything for us. If he hadn’t kept our things, we might’ve been killed upon return to Japan.”¹³³

It is likely that, by the early 1950s, the CCP was fearful that publicity of the Japanese membership of the PLA posed a threat to the legitimacy of the CCP and the PLA, by compromising the integrity of their anti-Japanese character. “Anti-Japanism” was synonymous with the CCP’s political and military mobilization efforts from 1937-45, and, regardless of the utility of incorporating Japanese individuals into the PLA on a low-scale basis, by 1949, the anti-Japanese genie was irreversibly out of the bottle: Mao’s dictate that “the anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction” had taken root as an inextirpable part of CCP political doctrine. However, the extent of the CCP’s dissociation from its Japanese membership, as exemplified by the documentary censorship of returnees, reveals an inconsistent policy towards the acknowledgement of Japanese communist collaboration in the postwar, although this has started to change since 2020, with articles discussing the Japanese in Yan’an, albeit still with little mention of the Japanese participation in the Chinese Civil War under the banner of the 8RA.

The achievements of Japanese cadres have periodically been the subject of high-profile acknowledgement: In a 1956 address at the Zhongnanhai, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that:

“We are very grateful to some Japanese during the liberation war—ones who participated as doctors, soldiers, technicians, which boosted our confidence in forming a friendly relationship with the Japanese people. Although Japanese militarism was cruel, there were still a great deal of Japanese people who helped us.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ Aaron Moore, *Writing War: Soldiers Record the Japanese Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 15.

¹³² Moore, *Writing War*, 247.

¹³³ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, p. 5.

¹³⁴ *Disiyezhanjun weisheng gongzuoshi* (Beijing: renmin junyi chubanshe, 2000), 413.

Japanese participation in China's Communist revolution, Japanese anti-fascism, and Japanese proletarian revolution were consistent with the Marxist-Leninist doctrines of communist internationalism promoted by the Comintern and Cominform throughout the 20th century and endogenized by the founders of the CCP. The capacity for the internationalism of the communist cause to co-exist with the explicit anti-Japanese rhetoric of the CCP is a function of the vigorous efforts made by Peng Dehuai, Zhu De, and Mao himself—among others—to organize formal and ideological structures within the Yan'an polity that could endure what might have seemed like a contradiction to many Chinese individuals during the 1937-1949 period: namely, the membership of Japanese individuals in the PLA. Needless to say, the ability to endure contradiction is a characteristic of Mao's political and philosophical thought: in his 1937 treatise *On Contradiction*, he describes the presence of nested contradictions within dialectical relationships, such that it is possible for two small contradictions—for instance, the collaboration of Japanese and Chinese soldiers—to coexist if there is a greater (or "principal") contradiction, such as the war between communism and imperialism. The flexibility of the CCP leadership's thought expressed itself in the management of the Japanese cadres, just as its pragmatism guided the efforts to generate plausible discursive structures for the accommodation of the massive potential gains of tapping Japanese human resources.¹³⁵

In his 1965 speech at the commemoration ceremony for the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Japan, Lin Biao stated that:

"Our army also pursued correct policies in winning over enemy officers and men in giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. During the anti-Japanese war we not only brought about the revolt and surrender of large numbers of puppet troops, but succeeded in converting not a few Japanese prisoners, who had been badly poisoned by fascist ideology. After they were politically awakened, they organized themselves into anti-war organizations such as the League for the Liberation of the Japanese People, the Anti-War League of the Japanese in China and the League of Awakened Japanese, helped us to disintegrate the Japanese army and co-operated with us in opposing Japanese militarism. Comrade Sanzo Nosaka, the leader of the Japanese Communist Party, who was then in Yenan, gave us great help in this work"¹³⁶

As well as reiterating Zhou Enlai's recognition of Japanese contributions to the war effort, Lin emphasizes the purifying effect that exposure to Communist doctrine had on them. The "political awakening" Lin speaks of is precisely equivalent to the "enlightenment" that Ariyoshi and Nosaka report in their descriptions of Japanese soldiers' conversion to Communism in Yan'an. In the genealogy of the CCP narrative of Japanese conversion through exposure to its ideology, Lin's speech stands uncontested in the official historiography of the PLA; his rendition of events, consistent with Feng Lu's descriptions of "correct policies" in 1947, has not been subject to substantial revision in over half a century. However, the civilian conscriptions that characterized a large number—likely, the majority—of Japanese conscripts

¹³⁵ For more details on Mao's attitude towards nested pairs of theses/antitheses, see Mao Zedong, *On Contradiction*, in Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Volume I* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1937).

¹³⁶ Lin Biao. "Build a People's Army of a New Type", in *Long Live the Victory of People's War!* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). Accessed January 23, 2015. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/

of the PLA remain largely unaddressed in the histories published by the PLA and its branch organizations. It is these largely invisible guerrilla conscriptions that I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4. The efforts made by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Mao Zedong himself to decouple the concept of the “Japanese” from that of the “Japanese militarist” in the rhetoric of the Yan’an settlement was the product of military expediency and pragmatism, of personal connections to Japanese collaborators such as Nosaka Sanzō, who were committed to the global project of socialist revolution, and the natural consequence of the principled application of Marxist-Leninist conceptions of communist internationalism, influenced in part by Soviet international organizations such as the Comintern and Cominform.

Conclusion

After returning to Japan, Ōyama Mitsuyoshi, one of the first Japanese soldiers to join the 8RA formally, wrote an open *Letter to the Commanders and Soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army*, in which he recalled:

"You didn't insult us, kill us or treat us as the enemy, but gave us full freedom, equality, safety and favorable treatment. The Eighth Route Army treated us as friends, brothers, and comrades."¹³⁷

The interwar years saw the creation, in Yan’an, of social, educational, and doctrinal structures designed to produce redemptive educational experiences that exonerated soldiers of the IJA from the sins of the Empire of Japan and incorporated them into the ranks of the PLA. These structures were the product of collaboration between diverse agents, including Japanese volunteers such as Nosaka, Long March leaders such as Mao, Zhu, and Peng, and Japanese defectors and POWs. Pragmatically, the intent of the various organizations that embodied these structures was to propagandize the IJA frontlines via psychological operations and facilitate the management of Japanese POWs in the Liberated Areas. However, they also represent dramatic reconfigurations of the theoretical discourses of the Sino-Japanese conflict, generating an international socialist identity that profoundly transformed both the Japanese and the Chinese cadres. Collectively, these events lay the groundwork for the broader recruitment and conscription of Japanese soldiers and civilians following Imperial Japanese surrender; as the CCP’s reach expanded across the continent during the Chinese Civil War, the blueprints for absorbing Japanese personnel designed in the small scale of Yan’an became crucial components of the PLA’s war effort. In the following chapter, I will examine the parallel development of the collision between the Japanese and the communist Chinese medical system, and, in Chapters 3 and 4, I will describe experiences of Japanese conscription into the PLA from 1945 onwards.

¹³⁷ Global Times, “*The Eighth Route Army*.”

2

Red Sun, Red Star, Red Cross: Colliding Medical Systems in Colonial and Post-Colonial China

Welcome, Old Japanese Comrades!

In August 2012, a group of around thirty elderly Japanese men and women were invited by the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to travel to the PRC as guests of honor to attend the 85th People's Liberation Army Day—the anniversary of the 1927 Nanchang uprising and the establishment of the Chinese PLA.¹ Saitō Toshio, who was among those invited, vividly describes the pomp of the week-long festivities:

“We visited Tiananmen Square and the Great Hall of the People. We were seated right in the middle of the hall, and the Defense Minister Liang Guanglie gave a speech before us. We travelled to Beijing, Harbin, and Dalian, entirely on the Chinese government's dime. There were a large number of military officers in attendance at all of the events, and we were instructed to wear our uniforms and display our medals. I have four medals... We were all respected as *lao geming*,² welcomed as soldiers of the Eighth Route Army,³ and treated as guests of state. We each had six or seven attendants, and were even escorted by a special convoy to and from the airports... One evening, I had the opportunity to reminisce about old times with a lieutenant general of the 8RA, and we sang old 8RA marching songs together. It was a deeply nostalgic moment. We all missed the good old days.”⁴

Saitō was one of over 3000 Japanese doctors, nurses,⁵ and medical technicians to have been officially recognized as full members of the Chinese communist armed forces.⁶ This number

¹ “China holds reception to mark 85th anniversary of PLA founding,” *Xinhua* (Beijing, PRC), July 31, 2012.

² “Old revolutionaries”

³ Henceforth, “8RA.”

⁴ These excerpts are translations of an interview with Saitō Toshio conducted in the summer of 2015, at the Tokyo headquarters of the Japanese Communist Party. Page number refer to my translation of the interview transcript, which I am authorized to make available upon request. This quotation corresponds to Saitō, part 2, 19-20. All translations into English are mine unless noted otherwise.

⁵ For a disambiguation of the term ‘nurse’, its gender-coding, its non-English variants, and my usage of the word in this paper, please refer to Introduction: Notes on Terminology, p. xi.

⁶ Gao, Enxian, ed., *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun disiyezhanjun weisheng gongzuoshi, August 1945 – May 1950*. (Beijing: Renminjunyi Chubanshe, 2000), 405 (henceforth, “Gao, *gongzuoshi*.”)

only includes those healthcare workers who were formerly enlisted in the Kwantung army or other Imperial Japanese institution, and who received some type of medical training prior to joining one of the precursor organizations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.⁷ As I will discuss in this chapter, in addition to trained medical personnel, substantial numbers of medically inexperienced Japanese former colonists—including many children and teenagers—were also conscripted into medical corps, field hospitals, and other Chinese medical institutions in an irregular capacity, and received on-the-job healthcare training and communist re-education.

It is challenging to ascertain the precise number of Japanese healthcare workers who served in the PLA and its affiliate organizations after 1945, but I can state with confidence that 3,000 is the absolute lower bound of that number. The official records of the Japanese Red Cross Society⁸ (JRCS) estimate that the number of Japanese medical conscripts was closer to 4,000, noting also that, between 1946 and 1955, 269 JRCS military nurses evaded conscription and successfully repatriated to the Japanese home islands, while 72 never returned at all.⁹ In his study of the postwar conscripts of the Dongbei communist armed forces, Lu Xijun estimates that the number of Japanese who “shed blood and sweat for China’s revolution...joining Chinese communist military medical units...exceeded 7,000 persons,” a number that more comprehensively incorporates the records of the dizzying tallies of military organizations in the continental northeast prior to 1949.¹⁰ One reason for the surprising indeterminacy of these estimates is given in the Fourth Field Army’s¹¹ official history: the vast majority of records pertaining to this moment were destroyed during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.¹²

As for the proportion of medical staff of Japanese extraction, Lieutenant-General He Cheng, who served as head of the Dongbei Military Command Medical Division, stated in January 1948:

“Right now, at our military hospitals, over 80% of staff are ‘former enemies’ (Japanese), formerly employed at the puppet state of Manchukuo’s hospitals. We were only able to send a single hospital director of our own to serve in one hospital, so we have instead sent military representatives to the majority of the [liberated hospitals]. We lack expertise...and have been struggling to catch up with Japanese techniques.”¹³

The incorporation of Japanese medical personnel into Chinese communist military and civilian organizations following Imperial Japan’s surrender was the culmination of the highly-variegated historical trajectory of medicinal institutions in mainland China. In the following chapter, we will trace this hybrid genealogy, discussing late imperial, Meiji, and Republican medical

⁷ Henceforth, “PLA.”

⁸ Henceforth, “JRCS.”

⁹ Nihon sekijūjūjūshū, *Nihon sekijūjūjūshū shashikō: Shōwa 21 nen – Shōwa 30 nen*, 6 (1972): 229.

¹⁰ Wei Gongkan, *Ribenren guanli weiyuan huide chengli jingguoji jinhou gongzuo jihua* (Diss. Tōhoku University, 2004), cited in Xijun Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai de katsuyakushita nihonjin: Aru guniin no kiseki,” *Tōhoku Aija Kenkyū*, no. 6 (2004): 35-36.

¹¹ Henceforth, “4FA.”

¹² Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 401.

¹³ He Cheng, *Zai xiningshixiade weishenggongzuo* (Dongbei: Dongbei junqu weisheng huiyi, 1948), 179.

institutions, Western and Japanese colonial medicine, the strictures that successive wars imposed on the Chinese medical establishment and the state of medicine in communist “Liberated Areas” such as Yan’an, the role of foreign philanthropists and volunteer agents, the particularities of nursing and the status of women in Chinese medicine, the features of epidemic control in the continental northeast, and, finally, the CCP’s assessment of its medical needs and its development of a political-military strategy to satisfy these by absorbing Imperial Japan’s ex-colonial medical system. There are two principal objectives to the overview contained in this chapter: First, to engage critically with the pre-existing scholarship on medical institutions in China in the first half of the 20th century, and to enrich this literature with the narrative of creative synergism that we identify in the CCP and PLA’s approach to the absorption of the Imperial Japanese medical establishment; and secondly, to describe adequately the theoretical and practical landscapes that contextualize the incorporation of Japanese individuals into PLA medical units, setting the scene for the oral testimonies showcased in Chapter 3.

Meiji Public Health, the JRCS, and ‘Humanitarian Imperialism’

In the 19th century, the Meiji government undertook an ambitious development of Japan’s public healthcare system, modelled on the “centralized and interventionist model of Prussian *Staatmedizin*.”¹⁴ From 1874 to 1882, the number of hospitals in Meiji Japan ballooned from 52 to 626, a dramatic expansion that became the blueprint for the developments that Imperial Japan imposed upon Taiwan and its continental colonial territories in the ensuing decades. Medical professionalization and the establishment of Western European and US American-style philanthropic medical institutions followed suit, with these Meiji organizations rapidly outstripping their Western peers in size. Founded in 1887, by 1903 the JRCS already boasted nearly a million members, a number an order of magnitude higher than its equivalent in France and vastly greater than that of the USA.¹⁵ By the turn of the century, the JRCS was the largest organization of its kind on the planet.¹⁶

In his study of the JRCS, Sho Konishi indicates that the puissance of the organization perplexed Western observers, as its undergirding philosophy challenged the conception of the Red Cross International Committee¹⁷ of what a Red Cross society could be, in particular, by not explicitly endorsing a missionary Christian ethic. In lieu of Abrahamic moral theological discourse, the JRCS embraced principles of *jindō* (“humanism”) and *jinjutsu* (“the art of compassion”), and in its official documents drew an indigenous genealogy back to Seki Kansai’s Boshin-war-era *yasen byōin* (“field hospitals”)—indigenous, that is, given the preexisting hybridities inherent in the ‘Dutch medicine’ that Seki and his colleagues practiced.¹⁸ Discussions surrounding the definitions of ‘humanism’ and ‘morality’, and their relationship to health, formed a prominent

¹⁴ Thomas David DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity in Northeast China, 1905-1945,” *Frontiers of History in China* 9, no. 4 (2014), 510.

¹⁵ Sho Konishi, “The Emergence of an International Humanitarian Organization in Japan: The Tokugawa Origins of the Japanese Red Cross,” *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 4 (October 2014), 1129.

¹⁶ Rotem Kowner, *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War* (University of Michigan: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 314.

¹⁷ Henceforth, “IRCS.”

¹⁸ Konishi, “The Emergence,” 1142-1143.

backdrop to the founding of the JRCS, with philosophers of the moment, such as Nishi Amane and Inoue Tetsujirō, debating the necessity of establishing universal criteria for morality, and Inoue in particular rejecting the adoption of Christian ethics by Meiji intellectuals on the basis of their excessive parochialism. The principles described below came to underpin the founding charter of the JRCS itself.¹⁹

Konishi takes a sanguine view of the JRCS, drawing our attention to its conceptual ruptures with other subsidiaries of the IRCS, immiscibly connected as they were to imperialism, Christian missions, and industrial capitalism.²⁰ In Konishi's reading, the intellectual constitution of the JRCS, in particular, suggests that imperialist collaboration was at best epiphenomenal to IRCS-sponsored humanist philanthropies, and not an overdetermined feature of their organizational charters. Nonetheless, following the 1st Sino-Japanese war and Imperial Japan's expanding colonial acquisitions, Japanese medical institutions came to be part of what Ruth Rogaski calls the "hypercolonial" continental landscape, already well-populated by the bridgeheads of European and American territorial acquisitions and their attendant medical institutions.²¹

The high-minded humanistic ideals of *jindō* and *jinjutsu* were by no means restricted to the nongovernmental philanthropic associations of this period. In 1915, the directives of the Imperial Japanese Army's²² medical department, overseen by Surgeon General Hashimoto, laid out the importance of generating trust and goodwill between patient and military medic, and the importance of compassion towards, and humanizing treatment of, patients by medics: "The main purpose of the medic role is to treat patients with affection and in good faith."²³ While these attitudes indicate an extrinsically sincere commitment to the protection of human wellbeing, there are other considerations at play, as suggested by Iimori Akiko's study of the "humanitarian assistance" activities of the JRCS.²⁴ Iimori argues that the provision of state-of-the-art medical care to allies and enemies alike became an issue of international political prestige, as the Imperial Japanese government identified the waging of the first Sino-Japanese war as a *bunmei no sensō*,²⁵ or "enlightened war," as a strategy to secure international support for Japan's continental territorial expansions. One example of JRCS relief work becoming a component of

¹⁹ Gregory John DePies, *Humanitarian Empire: The Red Cross in Japan, 1877-1945* (Diss. UC San Diego, 2013), 19-20.

²⁰ Konishi, "The Emergence," 1130.

²¹ "Hypercolonial," in this case, refers to the superimposition of multiple colonial projects onto the same (typically urban) space. We will elaborate on this idea below, but for Rogaski's own explanation, see Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 11.

²² Henceforth, "IJA."

²³ Imukyoku Rikugun, *Kango kyōtei* (Tokyo: Kobayashi Matashichi, 1915), 3, cited in Reut Harari, "Between trust and violence: medical encounters under Japanese military occupation during the War in China (1937-1945)," *Cambridge Journals: Medical History* 64, no. 4 (Oct 2020), 500.

²⁴ Akiko Iimori, "Nihon sekijūjisha to jindō enjō," *Shigaku zasshi* 119, no. 12 (2010), 2026-2034.

²⁵ Iimori, "Nihon sekijūjisha," 2027.

Imperial Japanese political maneuvering was the deployment of JRCS nurses to assist Britain on the home and Western fronts of WWI.²⁶

JRCS organizers believed that the establishment of the JRCS unambiguously signified Japan's "occupying an honoured place rated on par with civilised countries in Europe with equal rights,"²⁷ efforts that appear to have had the intended effect, at least in generating positive press coverage in the Anglosphere.²⁸ The function of the JRCS as a political and imperial organ demonstrating Japan's international status atop an Asian hierarchy of civilization is further indicated by the JRCS's resistance to the establishment of the Chinese Red Cross Society, and its involvement in the forcible disbanding of the abortive Korean national Red Cross society in 1909.²⁹ This objective is explicitly recorded in the JRCS's own official histories, as indicated by this 1910 JRCS memorandum:

"[Japan] tolerated the stupidity and obstinacy of this country [China] by unbounded magnanimity..." and "...showed the virtue of our country known by her righteousness and revealed the brightness and modest character of our nation before the eyes of the world public."³⁰

In these readings, JRCS activities were instrumentalized into an organ of colonial consolidation, internationally publicized by the government through photographs and prints with the objective of distributing images of Japan's civilizational advancement. In these ways, the JRCS provided Western observers with a testament that Japan had reached the status of an 'enlightened nation' and served as a contrasting point to the characterization of the rest of Asia as 'backward' and ripe for paternalistic conquest.³¹

In his extended analysis of the JRCS, Gregory J. DePies suggests that the apparent contradiction between the organization's humanitarian objectives and its collaboration with Japanese

²⁶ For detailed accounts of the JRCS' activities in Britain and their utility as Taishō political strategy, see Hiroko Tomida and Gordon Daniels, "Medical Ambassadors: Japanese Red Cross Nurses in Britain, 1915-1916," *Shakai inobeishon kenkyū* 4, no. 1 (2009), 99-122, and Gordon Daniels, "Humanitarianism or Politics?: Japanese Red Cross Nurses in Britain, 1915-1916," in *Japanese Women: Emerging from Subsistence, 1868-1945*, ed. Hiroko Tomida and Gordon Daniels (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005).

²⁷ Shashi hensan iinkai, *Nihon sekijujisha shikou* (Tokyo: nihon sekijujisha, 1911), 505, cited in Yoshiya Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise: Medical Activities of the Red Cross Society of Japan in the Northeastern Region of China during the Russo-Japanese War," in *Entangled Histories: The Transcultural Past of Northeast China*, eds. Dan Ben-Canaan, Frank Grüner, and Ines Prodöhl (Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 193. Translation Makita's.

²⁸ See, for instance, the glowing report on the JRCS in the 17 December, 1894 issue of the New York Times, cited in Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise," 196. For an examination of the role that "civilization" played in Imperial Japan's Pan-Asianist rhetoric, see: Prasenjit Duara, "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," in *Journal of World History* 12 (2001), 99-130, 100-101.

²⁹ Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise," 195. For a comprehensive account of these developments in colonial Korea, see also DuBois, "Public Health and Private Charity," 512-513.

³⁰ Keiichi Kawamata, *Nihon sekijujisha hattatsushi* (1910), 248-50, translation Makita's. Cited in Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise," 195. While Makita's translations are somewhat uncharitable (for instance, translating the somewhat pejorative *dojin* ('native') as 'barbarian'), they accurately convey the imperious sentiment of the document.

³¹ Iimori, "Nihon sekijujisha," 2032.

imperialism can be understood by considering the compatibility generated by the application of a universalist moral framework that “encourages us to imagine humanity as a single abstract whole”, a phenomenon that he terms “humanitarian imperialism.”³² As DePies puts it:

“This concept of universal humanity implies particular epistemological assumptions for the humanitarian. The suffering of others can be known and mitigated precisely because all humans are supposed to share certain universal values, capacities, emotions, and desires, including rationality. Offering medical relief to sick and wounded soldiers on the battlefield, helping disaster victims, and preventing the spread of contagious disease all count as morally good acts because they are means which adhere to the end of promoting the wellbeing of humanity as an abstract whole.”³³

DePies’s reading connects the humanitarian aspects of the JRCS’s activities to a Saidian definition of imperialism, in which the metropole not only physically dominates a distant territory, but also imposes its “practice, theory, and attitudes” upon it.³⁴ This duality is made possible through the tacit incorporation of Kantian deontological views of universal morality, which manifest as uncritical and invisible assumptions for the metropolitan agents, but as alien and visible impositions for the subjugated peoples.

Colonial Medicine, Epidemic Prophylaxis, and the Foreign Medical Complex

As was the case in colonial Korea and Taiwan, Japan’s medical infrastructure in northeast China likely originated from a prophylactic objective, designed to protect Japanese settlers, colonial administrators, and members of the military from indigenous health hazards, with a particular focus on the health of urban populations.³⁵ This objective was shared with the other foreign agents vying for influence, territory, and dominion of the Chinese mainland: at the turn of the century, virtually all organized medical care in northeast China was provided by foreign organizations. The China Eastern Railway, a Russian-owned corporation, managed ten hospitals and some twenty clinics along the concourse of its tracks, in addition to a hospital in ‘Dalniy’ (later Dairen, then Dalian). While hospital records of the China Eastern Railway indicate tens of thousands of Chinese care recipients by 1902, these hospitals “existed primarily for the employees of the CER, and...as a first line of epidemic defense of Russia itself.”³⁶ Following the Russo-Japanese war, the JRCS also established medical clinics throughout northeast China. In

³² This term, at least in part, being influenced by the work of Michael Barnett, and, in particular, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011).

³³ DePies, *Humanitarian Empire*, 2-3.

³⁴ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 8.

³⁵ The Taiwanese case is extensively described in Michael Shiyung Liu, *Prescribing Colonization: the Role of Medical Practices and Policies in Japan-Ruled Taiwan* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2009); for a more detailed discussion of Imperial Japanese colonial medicine, refer to: Wataru Iijima and Kōhei Wakimura, “Kindai ajia ni okeru teikokushugi to iryō kōshū eisei”, in *Shippei kaihatsu teikoku iryō: ajia ni okeru byōki to iryō no rekishigaku*, eds. Masatoshi Miichi, Osamu Saitō, and Kōhei Wakimura (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2001), 75–104.

³⁶ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 509.

1905 alone, the Japanese constructed clinics and hospitals in Andong (now Dandong), Fenghuancheng, Liaoyan, Haicheng, Yingkou, Gaiping (now Gaizhou), and Dalian. In the same period, Mantetsu oversaw the construction of six new hospitals along its infrastructural network and the expansion and reclassification of multiple clinics into hospitals.³⁷

Foreign medical organizations rapidly proliferated through the ‘hypercolonial’ milieu of coastal and northeastern China: From 1906 onwards, the IRCS founded several medical schools, including the *Beijing xiehe yixueyan* (Peking Union Medical College, still operational today).³⁸ In the same period other schools were founded by the various colonial powers vying for influence in China, including the Hunan-Yale College, St. John’s College in Shanghai, the Franco-Chinese Doumer hospital, the Jesuit Aurora University, and the German Donaji Medical College, also in Shanghai. Mantetsu founded its own South Manchuria Medical College in Shenyang in 1911, although, unlike the European and American institutions, Chinese enrolment in the Mantetsu school never peaked at around 10%, the rest consisting of Japanese students who typically returned to Japan upon graduation.³⁹ These foreign-managed hospitals were primarily intended to provide care to the colonial and ‘semi-colonial’ populations of the nation responsible for the hospital’s construction and management, with the occasional member of the Chinese elite. Japanese hospital admissions follow this pattern, to a degree: for instance, Japanese patients outnumbered Chinese patients by a factor of 4.3 in 1914, and of 2.2 in 1929, in Mantetsu-run hospitals.⁴⁰ The declining ratio does, however, suggest a substantial expansion of medical access to the local populations over this period, and the ratios demonstrate that Japanese medical practitioners would have developed substantial experience through treating the Chinese populace.

From the 1920s onwards, the expansion of medical facilities in Northeast China accelerated under the direction of Zhang Zuolin and, later, Zhang Xueliang, with the supervision of Imperial Japanese advisors and governors.⁴¹ Epidemic control remained a major concern of the colonial powers and their collaborators: in 1925, the head of the Mantetsu Health Bureau, Kanai Shōji, set the eradication of tuberculosis in the northeast as a top priority, and ordered the construction of an elaborate network of anti-tuberculosis sanatoria, measures that were “entirely unique to areas under Japanese control.”⁴² Following the establishment of Manchukuo, the colonial government

³⁷ For an exhaustive list of the new constructions of hospitals and clinics in Manchukuo, see: Bill Sewell, *Constructing Empire: The Japanese in Changchun, 1905-45* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019), 142-146, and DuBois, “Public Health,” 520-522.

³⁸ Henceforth, “PUMC.” This school suffered from perpetually low enrolment, so much so that, by 1932, it had graduated only 64 doctors, making it a comparatively minor contributor to the trajectory of Chinese medical institutions, despite the substantial attention it received from contemporary commentators.

³⁹ Tao Lee, “Some statistics on medical schools in China for the year 1933–34,” *China Medical Journal*, 49 (1935), 894–902., cited in S. M. Hillier and Tony Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine in China, 1800-1982* (Oxford: Taylor and Francis, Kindle Edition, 2005), 43-44.

⁴⁰ Minamimanshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha, *Minamimanshū tetsudō fuzokuchi eisei gaikyō* (1928), 325, cited in DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 522, translation DuBois’s.

⁴¹ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 510. For a detailed list of hospitals constructed in this period, their costs, capacities, etc., refer to Table 1 in DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 517.

⁴² DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 521.

constructed another 15 hospitals and drafted a plan for a further 130 clinics.⁴³ Collectively, these developments saw the superimposition onto Chinese space of a colossal foreign system of medical infrastructure, medical workers, and medical epistemologies. The patterns of this development reflect the varied interests of the Western Powers in China, as well as the internal trajectories of Imperial Japan as projected onto its colonial holdings.

The number of foreign-trained Chinese doctors familiar with the latest medical technologies barely exceeded 100 individuals between 1932 and 1933—and of these, around 70% had been educated in Imperial Japan, which indicates that even the autochthonous medical class trained in Western medicine had substantial experience with Japanese medical discourses and procedures.⁴⁴ In 1930, Dr Rajchman, representing the League of Nations' Health Organization, commented:

“Hospitals in China are, as a rule, in foreign hands ... the majority of the subordinate staff is frequently Chinese ... there are only a handful of Chinese doctors in China today who have had experience as the administrative head of hospitals.”⁴⁵

This lack of Chinese experts trained in hospital management, and in nearly every other aspect of the public health and medical system, was not immediately remedied by the expulsion of colonial powers from China after 1945—a reality that became a major consideration in the CCP's decision to prohibit Japanese medical workers from repatriating and conscript them into such roles.

While it is compelling to conclude that the provision of medical treatment, and, in particular, of hygienic and counter-epidemic interventions, to local non-Japanese populations in northeast China was influenced by a desire to protect soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army⁴⁶ and Japanese settlers from contagion, there is evidence that the proportion of local admissions to JRCS and other Japanese-run hospitals due to infectious diseases was, in fact, extremely low—somewhere in the region of 2.1% of all non-Japanese admissions—the vast majority being for other, non-epidemic health concerns typical amongst manual laborers.⁴⁷ Makita's study describes the tangible contributions to public welfare for the indigenous population that these institutions provided, and the ways in which locals proactively sought out Japanese physicians in order to receive medical attention.⁴⁸ As with many other aspects of the Imperial Japanese medical projects in Dongbei, there exist substantial contradictions in intent and execution that resist convenient classification.

⁴³ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 526.

⁴⁴ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 45.

⁴⁵ China Medical Association, League of Nations Health Organisation, “Proposals of the National Govt. of the Republic of China for collaboration with the League of Nations on Health Matters,” *China Medical Journal* 44, no. 7 (June 1930), cited in Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 63.

⁴⁶ Henceforth, the “IJA.”

⁴⁷ Makita, “The Ambivalent Enterprise,” 198-199.

⁴⁸ Makita, “The Ambivalent Enterprise,” 197-198.

Biopower and Ascendant Scholarly Approaches to Japanese Colonial Medicine

One influential approach to interpreting the interrelation between empire and medicine draws upon Michel Foucault's conception of "biopower"—that is, "the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power..."⁴⁹ Under this reading, the architects of Japan's empire realized that medical institutions proved to be highly effective instruments of social control, and the medical epistemologies that Japanese agents disseminated throughout Asia functioned as both instrument and justification for colonial expansion. While the possibilities of political and social control through medicine would have previously become apparent to Japanese administrators domestically during the formation and expansion of the Meiji *Staatzmedizin* system, a uniquely colonial aspect of "biopolitical" control manifested through the production and distribution of discursive contrasts between Japan's advanced clinical modernity and China's "superstitious backwardness," distinctions that neatly aligned with antagonistic discourses between Meiji Japan's widespread adoption of Western medical techniques and the enduring popularity of traditional, non-Western medical practices on the continent. By the time they arrived in continental China, these discourses had been refined through their systematic application to the "intracolonial" spaces of Ezochi/Hokkaidō, the Ryūkyūs, and, later, Taiwan and Korea. New medical knowledge and praxis demonstrably served to discredit preexisting indigenous power structures that drew legitimacy from the provision of human wellbeing, supplanting them with new, quasi-monopolistic epistemologies with accompanying linguistic, gendered, educational, and ethnic barriers to entry that heavily favored the Imperial Japanese colonial bureaucracy.

These patterns were a consistent feature of Japanese colonial projects from the Meiji period to the end of WWII, perhaps best exemplified in their early form by the actions of former medical doctor and governor-general of Taiwan c.1898, Gotō Shinpei, who asserted that the administration of Taiwan should be underpinned by *seibutsugaku no gensoku*, "biological principles."⁵⁰ Shinpei refers not only to a novel, medical justificatory narrative of colonial expansion, but also to a methodology for colonial administration. Yoshiya Makita argues that the establishment of medical institutions in the colonial northeast strengthened the "medical control over the native population."⁵¹ In Makita's reading, the JRCS were entirely complicit in this process: during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the "medical gaze of Red Cross workers provided a moral basis for the Japanese semi-colonial order over the region," thus establishing a dichotomous discourse of civilization separated by knowledge of Western medicine and applying it to generate asymmetric relations between the Chinese population and the Japanese "semi-colonists" of the early 20th century.⁵²

⁴⁹ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1. For an elaboration of this concept, refer to: Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1979), and Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge* (London: Penguin, 2020).

⁵⁰ Shin'ichi Kitaoka, *Gotō Shinpei: gaikō to vijon* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1988), 40.

⁵¹ Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise," 199.

⁵² Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise," 189.

Similarly, Miriam Kingsberg, in her study of narcotics in the Japanese empire, argues that the eradication of drug addiction (and, in particular, opiate addiction) served as both a “justification of imperialism [and] as a rationale for Manchukuo statehood,”⁵³ emphasizing the centrality of medical projects to Japanese colonialism from the 1930s onwards. Aside from the high-minded philanthropic and humanistic goals they extrinsically articulated, medical institutions also acted as important elements in Imperial Japan’s appeals for the international recognition of its territorial acquisitions in Asia; just as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere represented an articulation of pan-Asian solidarity for ostensibly mutual benefit, medical institutions throughout Imperial Japan’s colonial holdings conferred to it a degree of respectability on the international stage: the “civilizing” rhetoric of European imperial projects applied to Japan’s own “Orient.”⁵⁴

***Weisheng*, Imperial Japanese Colonial Medicine, and Rogaskian Hygienic Modernity**

In her study on China’s “hygienic modernity,” Rogaski traces the ways in which *weisheng*—a semantically complex term that became a functional cognate of the English word “hygiene,” or “health”—was transformed from a private concern into a public one. One aspect of this transformation was articulated in the work of Mori Ōgai, who characterized the Daoist pursuit of longevity and health as elitist and detached from civic good, and called for the democratization and public orientation of the study and dissemination of medical and hygienic knowledge.⁵⁵ This process became enmeshed in other Meiji modernization projects focused on the power of the state, new visions of sociotechnical progress, and an emergent preoccupation with Japanese racial fitness.⁵⁶ Rogaski’s approach, consistent with Foucauldian biopower framings⁵⁷, argues that this shift instigated the embrace of an emergent hegemonic perspective towards medicine and health among China’s elites, was exemplified by negative comparisons of China with European countries, and was accompanied by the “acceptance of a picture of the Chinese people as inherently lacking when compared with Western-defined standards of health.”⁵⁸

Rogaski’s analysis opens a rich vein of discussion on the topic of biopower in East Asia, the hegemonics of medicinal epistemologies, and the relationship between national statecraft and public hygiene. In particular, Rogaski draws attention to how, in the Meiji period, the Japanese term *eisei* was denuded of its historic Daoist and moral overtones and endowed with a neutral scientific meaning, whereupon it was immediately put to the service of the emergent Imperial Japanese family-state ideology, with the objective of transforming Imperial subjects into “healthy constituents of the national body.”⁵⁹ This development was then projected outwards, alongside Japan’s other colonial ambitions, as Rogaski argues:

⁵³ Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 173.

⁵⁴ For a discussion of the rhetorical parallelisms at play, see: Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), esp. “Part 2: Creating Difference.”

⁵⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 209-212.

⁵⁶ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 1.

⁵⁷ For a summary of the “biopower” referenced by Rogaski, see: Timothy Rayner, “Biopower and Technology: Foucault and Heidegger’s Way of Thinking,” *Contretemps* 2 (May 2001), 142–56.

⁵⁸ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 9.

⁵⁹ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 222.

“In the twentieth century, *eisei* as hygienic modernity would become a foundational element in the creation of the Japanese empire. For certain parts of China, the introduction of this new vision of hygienic modernity would come suddenly and violently, with the arrival of the combined forces of the modern world’s imperial powers.”⁶⁰

Rogaski’s study illuminates the ways in which colonial Tianjin medical institutions—both physical and epistemic—were placed at the service of Japanese statist and imperialist administrative objectives, a process that frequently elicited the collaboration of Chinese intellectual elites, and which mirrored the racial, cultural, and territorial imperialism of the European powers. Rogaski also describes the generation and espousal of a masoracist ethnic discourse by the Chinese intelligentsia in Tianjin, whose adoption of the Western/Japanese medical gaze necessitated a pejorative attitude towards indigenous ethnicities.

Complaints of the pernicious intersections between medical science and deleterious foreign hegemonies in China are by no means limited to 21st-century scholarship. In 1920, Bertrand Russel said of the PUMC:

“Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the needs of the country.... Americans...always remain missionaries...not of Christianity, but of Americanism.... in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines.... If the American influence prevailed it would no doubt by means of hygiene save the lives of many...but would at the same time make them not worth saving.”⁶¹

The interweaving of autophobic racial discourse with medical institutions, while presumably beneficial to collaborationist intellectuals and other potentates, must be regarded as an obstacle to the wholesale adoption of those medical institutions by a popular and counterelitist state project such as that of the CCP. However, as we will describe below, the leaders of the CCP and PLA proved more than equal to the task of extirpating the racialist imperial residue from the epistemic structures absorbed during the decolonial process, and, in doing so, they simultaneously created an international socialist framework for the integration of Japanese workers into the PLA. Regarding the PLA’s absorption of the JRCS’s remnants, in particular, the serendipitous alignment between the latter’s universalist moral underpinnings and the former’s international socialism provided sufficient common ground for the comparatively seamless integration of the two complexes.

⁶⁰ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 222.

⁶¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Problem of China* (New York: Century Co., 1922).

Japanese Nursing and Imperial Japanese Military Nurses

By the late 19th century, the value of nurses in military deployments was widely acknowledged by military organizations in the Western world. In the Crimean war, Florence Nightingale's Daughters of Charity reduced the fatality rate of injured soldiers from 40% to 2.2%⁶²—an astonishing increase in survival rates that radically transformed not just military doctrines, but global medical practices in virtually all arenas, and, in particular, those relating to hygiene. Nightingale's work also opened paved the way for women's entry into other historically male-dominated professions, and heralded one of the first instances of the incorporation of women into modern military organizations. The Imperial Japanese military was relatively quick to recognize the value of professional nursing, and the first nurses to be attached to Japanese military units were deployed to the battlefield during the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894.⁶³ These military nurses were first-aid specialists, trained by the JRCS, and while the Japanese army initially opposed the adoption of female auxiliaries, the outspoken advocacy of Japanese Army Surgeon Inspector General Ishiguro Tadanori stimulated the policy change. The JRCS nurses were expected to maintain army discipline to the same degree as the men, and obeyed the same stringent rules that regimented the lives of the rank-and-file soldiers of the IJA.⁶⁴ On occasion, when the unit they were attached to was facing defeat or capture, they were ordered to commit suicide alongside the soldiers, in accordance with the *gyokusaishugi*, ('principle of shattering like a jewel')⁶⁵—acts that occurred with some frequency even among the earliest deployments of JRCS nurses, and which continued throughout their IJA deployments and are recorded even after the Japanese surrender in 1945, in the face of Soviet advance.⁶⁶

DePies, in his study of JRCS activities from 1877 to 1945, indicates that the expectation that JRCS members adhere to principles of self-sacrifice for the nation was not only a matter of official doctrine, but one that permeated the realm of cultural production. This observation is consistent with Louise Young's description of "Total Empire," the process whereby each element of Imperial Japanese social and cultural structures was subsumed into a collaborative relationship with the broader colonial enterprise.⁶⁷ A representative example of this phenomenon in the context of the imperial subsumption of nursing is the following 1944 poem by Hosoda Chitora:

⁶² P.A. Kalisch and B.J. Kalisch, *The Advance of American Nursing*, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1995), 51.

⁶³ Noriko Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara dainijisekaitaisenka no jūgunkangofu – nihon sekijūjisha wo chūshin ni* (Diss. Kanagawa University, 2010), 1.

⁶⁵ Hiroaki Sato, "Gyokusai or 'Shattering like a Jewel:' Reflection on the Pacific War," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 6, no. 2 (February 1, 2008), 1.

⁶⁶ For details on casualties among the first Japanese nurses, see Shūji Sawamura, *Jūgunkangofu no kindaishi: nihon no naichingeiru* (Tokyo: Toshoshinbun, 2013), 77-82.

⁶⁷ Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 10-11.

The Red Cross flag
Still flutters with the morning's breeze in central China.
Beneath this beautiful flag
We hygiene corps members
Weep at the honor of offering up our lives
*For the emperor.*⁶⁸

In her study of gender and nationalism in Meiji Japan, Ueno Chizuko argues that the Meiji state incorporated women into its nationalist objectives by generating a militarized discourse of femininity, with women acting as “reproductive soldiers” and as “warriors in the economic war.”⁶⁹ DePies, similarly, purports that the interwar production of media that characterized military nurses as *hakui no tenshi*, “angels in white,”⁷⁰ was another manifestation of this production of a female-gendered discourse of military participation.⁷¹ While the genealogical connection between these discursive artifacts is robust, it is worth noting that the Meiji-era terms that Ueno identifies use militarized language in a figurative sense, framing the nationalist contributions of young women in corresponding terms to those of young men, a phenomenon that Sharon Sievers discusses in her treatise on Japanese female textile workers: “For men, the army/ For women, the mills.”⁷² By contrast, the military nurses discussed in this chapter were conscripted into the IJA in a literal sense, often under similar circumstances to the men, and faced literal, rather than figurative, military deployment. This distinction explains one dimension of how, through the construction and propagation of a female military identity, women and girls—both those involved and those uninvolved with military medical work—came to be considered for conscription by the PLA after Imperial Japanese surrender.

Nursing in Manchukuo

In 1938, the Manchurian Red Cross Society⁷³ was founded as an extension of the JRCS, and took over the process of training nurses to supply the labor demands of hospitals in the provinces of Manchukuo, as well as providing military nurses for the Manchukuo Imperial Army,⁷⁴ the synthetic military organization comprised of Zhang Xueliang’s former National Revolutionary Army troops, diverse recruits and conscripts from the populations of the continental northeast,

⁶⁸ Chitora Hosoda, *Sekijūjiki to tomoni: shishū* (Tokyo: Shitokayōnosha, 1944), 49. Translation DePies’s. Cited in DePies, *Humanitarian Empire*, 229.

⁶⁹ Chizuko Ueno, *Nationalism and Gender*, trans. Beverly Yamamoto (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2004), 44-45.

⁷⁰ The origin of this term is almost certainly a reference to the popular 1936 biopic of Florence Nightingale, which bears the same name.

⁷¹ DePies, *Humanitarian Empire*, 220-221.

⁷² This example, referencing a textile workers’ song from the Meiji era, is provided by Sharon Sievers in her *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 54 (translation Sievers’s).

⁷³ Henceforth, “MRCS.”

⁷⁴ Henceforth, “MIA.”

and a wide array of Japanese officers, soldiers, and advisors. In the summer of 1945, the majority of these nurses were re-conscripted to service in IJA units. Prior to this, the JRCS and MRCS held a monopoly on the training of military nurses for the IJA, professional women who were referred to as *Nihon sekijūjisha kyūgo kangofu*, ‘JRCS first-aid nurse’.⁷⁵ Only male combat medics (*gun’i* and *eiseihei*) were cleared for deployment to the front lines alongside IJA troops, however. Nurses remained behind the battle lines, working in field hospitals, hospital ships, and other military medical installations. However, as the IJA’s military situation deteriorated, it was not uncommon for the front lines to be thrust upon the field hospitals where nurses worked. Ōte Kane of the Gunma 271 Unit stationed at Jinzhou and Ōsoki Mikie at the Hangzhou Army Hospital both witnessed combat first-hand in 1937, finding themselves desperately attending to gunshot and bayonet wounds as soldiers stormed their hospitals.⁷⁶ It was also not entirely uncommon for hospitals to come under attack in air raids, accidentally or not: Throughout the winter of 1944-45’, the 12th Army Hospital in the Philippines was “attacked continuously... a large formation of B29 bombers carpet-bombed the whole area... more than a dozen nurses died in the attack.”⁷⁷

In 1944, facing emergencies on all fronts and a critical lack of personnel, the Kwantung Army issued the *Rikugun tokubetsu kangofu seido*⁷⁸ (‘Extraordinary Army Nursing Policy’), a far-reaching recruitment policy designed to provide rapid rudimentary nurse training to students at all-girls schools throughout Manchukuo. These short-term trainee nurses received a few scant months’ instruction at Army hospitals before being sent off to field hospitals throughout the northeast. This policy was extremely effective at rapidly conscripting large numbers of nurses, so that, at war’s end, there were approximately 25,000 Japanese nurses in former Manchukuo, of whom around 6,500 were schoolgirls captured by the *Rikugun tokubetsu kangofu seido*, while the remaining 18,500 or so were formal members of the JRCS, trained and recruited on the Japanese home isles.⁷⁹ This is a formidable number when contrasted with the low numbers of accredited nurses trained through the Imperial Japanese pre-emergency channels, or, indeed, the near-total absence of trained nurses in communist Liberated Areas. Although there are no known extant records of the number of nurses in the employ of the MRCS at war’s end, the contents of the MRCS’s internal bulletin allows us to estimate that, between 1938 and 1941, approximately 370 nurses graduated through pre-emergency channels and transferred directly to Manchukuo hospitals, suggesting that the difference between the pre- and post-*seido* channels is one of orders of magnitude.⁸⁰

The Women’s Volunteer Corps, the National Mobilization Law, and Sex Slavery

Once war began in earnest, a major channel through which Japanese women arrived in the continental colonies was as part of the *Joshi teishintai*, the “Women’s Volunteer Corps”. These

⁷⁵ Yamada, 2.

⁷⁶ Yamada, 3.

⁷⁷ Yamada, 4.

⁷⁸ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 2.

⁷⁹ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 2.

⁸⁰ Estimates obtained from “*Aijin*,” *Manshūkoku sekijūjisha* 4, no. 1, (January 1942), 4, cited in Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 2.

were units of civilian women workers formed through the *Kokka sōdōinhō*, the “National Mobilization Law” of 1938, later extended into the *Joshi teishin kinrōrei*, the “Women’s Volunteer Labor Law” of 1944. These policies captured mostly unmarried young women and “deployed” them to war-critical industries to shore up labor shortages as the Japanese economy was mobilized for total war. As with other Japanese subjects brought under the administration of the National Mobilization Law, the *Kokumin choyōrei* (“National Service Draft Ordinance”), and similar policies, these women were not extended the options of either refusing or leaving their allocated jobs.⁸¹ Over the course of the Law’s existence, the Japanese imperial government used it effectively to enslave approximately 4,500,000 Japanese civilians, not counting military draftees.⁸² In the case of women captured by the Women’s Volunteer Corps, their “allocation to key industries” by the Imperial Japanese government included the possibility of being designated as sex slaves.

In her study of *teishintai* sexual enslavement, Janet Hunter notes that “Prostitution was even sponsored by the [Japanese] government with the enrollment of the ‘Women’s Volunteer Corps,’”⁸³ borrowing or directly translating the terminology of earlier Japanese scholars who used the term *baishun* (‘prostitution’) to describe this forced activity. It is worth clarifying that given the women’s lack of elective engagement with the activity, their inability to voluntarily quit, the duress under which they were trafficked, and the fact that they usually were not paid, the term ‘sexual enslavement’ is substantially more precise than ‘prostitution’ as it is used in any normal sense. However, in defense of Hunter and scholars such as Ienaga Saburō who originally popularized the term *baishun* with reference to this historical moment, it was frequently contextualized with clear designations of the violence and hardship that the women endured: for instance, throughout his work Ienaga collocates *baishun* with *hiningensei* (‘inhumaneness’), suggesting a refinement of the term *baishun* that is perhaps lost in its direct translation to English.⁸⁴ Similarly, Japanese euphemisms such as *ianfu* (‘comfort women’) have at this point become so ubiquitous in the literature that we may regard them as terms of art that are relatively unambiguous in what they signify. It is also worth noting that while the term ‘Women’s Volunteer Corps’ is the conventional translation of the Imperial Japan-era term *Joshi teishintai*, the reader should understand that by no reasonable definition could the individuals recruited under these policies be accurately described with the English word ‘volunteers’, nor indeed is this particularly implied in the Japanese term *teishin*, which has acquired a term of art status of its own signifying these wartime policies. As we shall see below, many women captured by this law were also sent to the continent to receive hurried training in elementary nursing techniques and deployment alongside the IJA, MIA, or other Japanese military organization, and some of these went on to be conscripted once again into the Chinese communist armed forces.

⁸¹ Sōji Takasaki, *Hantō joshi teishintai’ ni tsuite: Ianfu mondai chōsa hōkoku* (Zaidan hōjin josei no tame no ajia heiwa kokumin kikinkan, 1999), 369.

⁸² Erich Pauer, ed. *Japan’s War Economy* (Oxford: Routledge, 1999), 13.

⁸³ Hunter, Janet *Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 172.

⁸⁴ Ienaga, Saburō et al., Eds., *Kyōto daigaku bungakubu kokushi kenkyūshitsu hen “Nihon kindaiishi jiten”* (Kyoto: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1958), 501.

Aida Yūji's research provides us with examples of direct recruitment from girls' schools into medical roles by the Imperial Japanese military in Manchukuo in 1944.⁸⁵ These wide-net and frequently improvised recruitment policies forcibly conscripted women and girls from the civilian settler population of Imperial Japan's northeastern continental colonies into its failing war machine, paralleling the *Nekosogi dōin* ("Root-and-Stem Recruitment") policies, which practically mobilized the entire adult male population of Manchukuo, also alongside many boys.⁸⁶ The parallel is almost exact, especially given that, by war's end, the majority of IJA *eisetai* medics were not trained doctors, but, rather, regular soldiers who were selected for limited medical training, a procedure that accelerated as casualties increased and medical training capacity became insufficient.⁸⁷ In both cases, it is apparent that systematic policies of forced conscription were designed and implemented by the Imperial Japanese colonial administration with little regard for the freedom or preferences of its civilian subjects, and that such policies incorporated the rudimentary training and incorporation of adults and children into the military complex in all manner of roles. This experience is present in the reports of individuals who experienced both *Joshi teishintai* or *Nekosogidōin* recruitment and, later, conscription by the 8RA. A representative sentiment is conveyed in detail by biographical historian Ōhara Makiko's pseudonymous informant "Azuma," who states that she "had no choice but be sent to the Chinese mainland" as part of the *Joshi teishintai*, before her conscription and service in the 8RA.⁸⁸ These policies long predate the arrival of either the Soviet Red Army or the Chinese communist armed forces in the northeast, and thus challenge us with pertinent evidence that the Soviet and Chinese forcible conscription of the former Japanese colonial population is a continuation, not a rupture, of some aspects of Imperial Japan's own policies towards its civilian subjects and other residents of the continental northeast.

Unhygienic Modernity and Immoral Nations

While colonial administrators such as Gotō concerned themselves with constructing a "hygienic empire," and, to a credible extent, did promulgate cutting-edge medical knowledge and invest in medical training and public health infrastructure to some popular benefit, from the 1930s onwards the actualities of Japanese military aggression and territorial expropriation placed a severe burden on China's medical establishment and the wellbeing of the Chinese people. If epistemic violence was done to the colonized Chinese through the construction of racial hierarchies and medicalized justifications of Chinese biological inferiority, more tangible forms of violence became ubiquitous from 1937 onwards. Imperial Japanese invasions reduced the training capacity of doctors in the ROC and damaged and destroyed large swaths of Chinese medical infrastructure, simultaneously generating huge numbers of casualties in dire need of

⁸⁵ Yūji Aida, *Aida yūji henshū: kaisō āron shūyōjo* (Tokyo: kakugawashoko, 1979), 27.

⁸⁶ For a discussion of the immediate effects of the nekosogi dōin on Japanese communities in northeast China up to and after surrender, see: Nakajima Yoshimasa, *Senshi sōsho kantōgun (2): kantokuen to shūsenji no taisosen* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shuppansha, 1974), 411-412.

⁸⁷ For an extended description of extraordinary training of IJA soldiers as medics, see: Noriko Suzuki, "Eiseitai hensei ni muketa rikugun kangoseido no dainiji kaikaku," *Kokushikan shigaku* 14 (2010), 85-104.

⁸⁸ Makiko Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite: kangofutachi ga mita "futatsu no sensō"* (Tokyo: nijishobō, 1987), 134.

medical attention.⁸⁹ Accompanying these military incursions were near-constant outbreaks of disease; for instance, from 1937 to 1949, China experienced yearly cholera outbreaks, with the infected numbering in the tens of thousands on each occasion.⁹⁰ From 1937, plague outbreaks also became a yearly occurrence in northeast China under Japanese occupation, as well as in adjacent territories. In the same period, the modest improvements to Chinese infant mortality rates made in the first half of the twentieth century were all but wiped out by the violence of Imperial Japanese aggression.⁹¹

These interwar pandemics were, on occasion, the product of deliberate acts on the part of the Imperial Japanese military: the International Scientific Commission's report on bacterial warfare in Korea and China found evidence that the IJA had intentionally spread plague vectors throughout China and Korea as a strategy of war.⁹² The possibility exists that Japanese biological weapons were deployed after Imperial Japanese surrender, acquired by the USA and deployed during the US bombing campaign of North Korea. This bombing campaign was one of the most intensive bombings in world history, destroying around 85% of all structures in the region.⁹³ After the US government rejected a plan to have the IRCS examine the allegations of biological weapon attacks in North Korea, the Chinese and North Koreans convened the International Scientific Commission, headed by Joseph Needham and including Dr. Zhukov-Verezhnikov, one of the medical experts involved in the Khabarovsk Trial of Japanese officers involved in Unit 731. The report found that bacterial 'leaflet bombs' were dropped by American planes in Liaotung Province,⁹⁴ although this evidence has been disputed and subject to a great deal of controversy both in official and historiographical circles in the decades since.⁹⁵

Some of the outbreaks may have been unintended, but nonetheless predictable, outcomes of the medical-adjacent military research conducted by the Imperial Japanese government on the continent. This research included violations of nearly every contemporary medical ethical principle, including the vivisection of Chinese captives⁹⁶ and biological weapons research that

⁸⁹ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 44-45.

⁹⁰ For a comprehensive list of the plagues that struck during this period, see Ruth Rogaski, "Vampires in Plagueland: The Multiple Meanings of *Weisheng* in Manchuria," in *Health and Hygiene in Chinese East Asia: Policies and Publics in the Long Twentieth Century*, eds. Angela Ki Che Leung and Charlotte Furth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 135.

⁹¹ Fang Shih-Shan, "Effects of war on the health of the people," *China Medical Journal* 71, no. 5 (September-October 1953), 322, cited in Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 57.

⁹² International Scientific Commission (ISC), *Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the facts concerning bacterial warfare in Korea and China* (Beijing, 1952), 11. Henceforth 'ISC Report'.

⁹³ Kim, Taewoo (2012). "Limited War, Unlimited Targets: U.S. Air Force Bombing of North Korea during the Korean War, 1950–1953". *Critical Asian Studies*. 44 (3), 467–92.

⁹⁴ ISC Report, 403.

⁹⁵ For some representative discussion on the topic, see: "Wu Zhili, 'The Bacteriological War of 1952 is a False Alarm'," September, 1997, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*, *Yanhuang Chunqiu* no. 11 (2013). 36–39. Trans. Drew Casey.

⁹⁶ For an extended discussion of Japanese war crimes in this period, refer to: Joshua Fogel, ed., *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). For descriptions of vivisection and medical crimes, see: Keiichi Tsuneishi, *Nanasan'ichi butai* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1995).

contravened the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1925.⁹⁷ As was frequently the case in IJA enterprises, callous indifference to the loss of human life extended to their own Japanese rank-and-file: Tamura Yoshio, in his description of the human experimentation and germ warfare research of Unit 731, notes the poor containment protocols of the research facilities, describing that the Japanese orderlies tasked with handling plague cultures frequently succumbed to the diseases themselves:

“When we were assigned to the bacterial unit... we were designated ‘chemical weapon handlers’... We now became official members of the bacteriology unit, though we were still technically civilians. We exerted ourselves to make ever-more lethal bacteria. Of course, if you cut corners in your work, you yourself might be infected. One scratch and you could die. During the first year, two of us died.”⁹⁸

A similar case of IJA officials treating their own medical staff as disposable is found in the quarantine efforts surrounding the 1940 bubonic plague epidemic in Manchukuo, when “authorities knew quarantine work was so dangerous, sending nursing women on this kind of mission was a deliberate sacrifice.”⁹⁹ In her study of the JRCS, Narahara Harusaku argues that the women were sent specifically because IJA officials considered them to be more disposable than male medics,¹⁰⁰ a fact that led to the organization of substantial reparations demands by ex-military nursing associations in the postwar period.¹⁰¹

After Japanese surrender, many of the high-ranked officers of Unit 731 who had escaped Soviet capture and trial for war crimes returned to Japan and enjoyed relatively peaceful retirements, often continuing to work in the fields of biological and even medical research.¹⁰² Similarly, many architects of Imperial Japan’s “hygienic empire,” from hospital directors to colonial bureaucrats, who avoided captivity or execution at Soviet hands, experienced unremarkable repatriations. However, large numbers of ex-colonial Japanese medical staff, from nurses, doctors, and medical technicians to high-ranking hospital managers, experienced a very different fate, becoming integrated into the CCP’s nation-building project, joining the PLA, and dedicating years of their lives to the provision of healthcare services to the Chinese people. As I will elaborate below and in the following chapter, many of these physicians ended up working in epidemic disease control, risking their lives to prevent the spread of contagious diseases in order to protect the people of China.

⁹⁷ Japan was a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Convention, although the country did not ratify it until after the end of WWII.

⁹⁸ Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore Faylor Cook, “Unit 731” (Transcription of an oral account by Tamura Yoshio), *Japan at War: An Oral History* (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 162.

⁹⁹ DePies, *Humanitarian Empire*, 239.

¹⁰⁰ Harusaku Narahara, *Hakui no tenshi jūgun kangofu* (Tokyo: Kokushokankōkai, 1985), 88-89.

¹⁰¹ For details, see: Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai, *Nihon sekijūji jūgun kangofu: senjō ni sasageta seishun* (Tokyo: Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai, 1958).

¹⁰² Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai, *Nihon sekijūji*, 167.

Senbuyaku, Pacification, and Sino-Japanese Medical Humanitarianism

However calculating or captured the incentives of their leadership, the JRCS and IJA medical staff on the ground in Korea and Northeast China during the early 20th century did extend access to lifesaving medical interventions to non-Japanese patients, conducting themselves in a manner that lent real weight to the international reputational campaign waged in their name. During the Russo-Japanese war, contemporary observers noted the charity of the JRCS's activities, with thousands of local non-combatant patients and Russian captives alike receiving high-quality medical attention under Japanese care.¹⁰³ Makita argues that these interventions also lay the groundwork for the kinds of medicalized state control described above, by demonstrating the public-relations utility of visible humanitarian activity, by providing proof-of-concept of what would later become the 'pacification' activities of the IJA, and by generating a network of systemic interfaces between the Japanese colonial project and the Chinese people. It was the consequences of this last element that proved the most decisive in facilitating the incorporation of Japanese medical workers into the PLA.

The scale and content of the JRCS and MRCS outreach work is remarkable, especially if we consider the comparison to the nigh-nonexistent public-health provisions of the late imperial, Republican, and subsequent pre-PRC polities:

“In 1928, the [JRCS] maintained 15 branch offices in Manchuria, along with hospitals in Dairen and Fengtian, and 13 free or subsidized clinics. By 1933, their medical staff included 544 doctors, 160 dentists, 584 medical assistants, and 1,107 nurses. More than the Mantetsu, it was the Japanese Red Cross that filled the particular niche of providing basic medical care to a mass clientele. Not only did the [JRCS] participate in medical initiatives such as the campaign to eradicate tuberculosis, they also dispatched traveling medical teams to Kantō, Tieling and Andong: by 1928, these teams had provided free treatment to 1.167 million people.”¹⁰⁴

As well as providing and/or imposing healthcare upon the Chinese public and supporting the international and domestic production of legitimating discourses for Imperial Japan's colonial project, these programs led to a cohort of Japanese medical workers with a vast accumulated knowledge of treating Chinese individuals on a personal level. This familiarity, and the cultivation of “trust,” became an essential feature of the smooth transition of Japanese medical workers into the PLA and, later, the PRC civilian public-health system.

The provision of free healthcare, and its eager uptake by the Chinese public, foreshadows the ways in which it would be documentarily irresponsible to characterize the entire Imperial Japanese medical complex solely in terms of the violence and subjugation it was implicated in, or by association to its vilest elements, such as Unit 731. In her study of Sino-Japanese medical

¹⁰³ Makita, “The Ambivalent Enterprise,” 197-198.

¹⁰⁴ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 524.

encounters under Imperial Japanese occupation, Reut Harari draws our attention to the “small moments of humanity and benevolence within a violent environment,”¹⁰⁵ as oral testimonies demonstrate the ways in which Japanese doctors attended to the injuries and sicknesses of their Chinese patients. Harari’s study of Sino-Japanese medical encounters provides us with a high-resolution example of the complexities of the incorporation of medical care into the broader Imperial Japanese colonial strategy. Harari argues that, while the Japanese military by no means prioritized the provision of healthcare to the Chinese population, nonetheless “medicine...became a site of encounter and intimate interaction between Japanese soldiers and local people and even served as a tool for mobilizing local support, crucial for maintaining the unstable occupation.”¹⁰⁶

One mechanism for this mobilization is tied to the medical aspects of the IJA’s *senbukōsaku*, or “pacification activities,”¹⁰⁷ which included the provision of medical assistance in regions devastated by IJA attacks as *senbuyaku* via small teams of medics, an explicit strategy for generating trust among the Chinese populace via medical assistance.¹⁰⁸ *Senbuyaku* teams usually worked independently, providing basic healthcare services such as iodine wound treatments and antidiarrheal medicine to Chinese communities in regions designated by the colonial authorities, always with the objective of facilitating “the military’s takeover of those regions,” but, equally, enjoying some level of local demand, as Chinese patients would go out of their way to access IJA and *senbuyaku* field clinics.¹⁰⁹ Japanese non-governmental philanthropic organizations were also incorporated into pacification projects, including several without affiliation to the JRCS or the IRCS. One such organization was the Dōjinkai, the “Mutual Benevolence Association,” founded in 1902 by Japanese civilians with the hopes of promoting health education and provision in China.¹¹⁰ This organization, and the hospitals it operated, like many others of its type, was absorbed into the IJA after 1937, and its activities formally folded into the *senbuyaku* missions. In his study of medicine in the Japanese colonies, Iijima Wataru argues that medical institutions and policies came to be routinely directed by the military, to the extent that drawing a clear boundary between the medical activities of the IJA, independent philanthropic organizations, and the colonial authorities in this period is extremely difficult.¹¹¹

As IJA officers and colonial administrators alike were gravely concerned with the question of epidemic management, which they regarded as an existential risk both to the Japanese settlers and the IJA military units, the Pacification Teams were able to draw upon military assistance to provide vaccine courses and management of contagious diseases such as dysentery and typhoid

¹⁰⁵ Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 494.

¹⁰⁶ Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 496.

¹⁰⁷ Many of these activities originate in 1937, with *mantetsu senbuan* (“pacification teams”) aimed at generating local collaboration with the Japanese and the Manchukuo government. For details on these, and on the IJA’s *senbu* pacification activities, see also Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 41-44, 51-52.

¹⁰⁸ In particular, the objective was cultivating *shinrai* or *shinyō* (“trust”). For details, see Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 498-499.

¹⁰⁹ Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 505.

¹¹⁰ Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 498.

¹¹¹ Iijima and Wakimura, “Kindai ajia,” 188-190.

fever. In these cases, the advantages to Chinese patients can be regarded as either incidental, effectively epiphenomenal to the broader objective of protecting the IJA and Japanese colonial-settler health, or instrumental, in that it explicitly served the broader colonial project by disabling resistance. Forcible vaccinations also appear to have been a part of these IJA-mandated programs, with Chinese communities violently coerced into accepting vaccines.¹¹² On the level of individual health, neither interpretation necessarily diminishes the advantages to the Chinese individuals who received vaccinations or other prophylactic treatments, however perverse the incentives of the *senbuyaku* administrators or violent their methodologies—a fact that further complicates linear narratives of these interactions.

Harari's interview of Imazu Shigeru, an IJA medic involved in these activities, illustrates the kinds of work involved, with descriptions of how Shigeru's unit provided basic first aid and pharmaceutical provision for the "Chinese common people."¹¹³ While the hasty training that IJA medics received focused on the types of traumatic injury and sickness that one might expect young men to suffer on a battlefield, the hearts-and-minds program of the *senbukōsaku* had the effect of accustoming non-physician IJA medics to all manner of other types of medical need, including those of women and the elderly.¹¹⁴

The provision of health services to Chinese patients at the behest of the IJA extended to the medical treatment of women captured by the Imperial Japanese army and forced into sexual slavery. These individuals routinely suffered venereal infections and other forms of physical harm at the hands of their Japanese captors, and their treatment was ordered largely to protect the health of the soldiers who abused them. Internal IJA documents indicate the presence of JRCS involvement in health management surrounding military sexual services and sexual enslavement, starting in 1905 with the Russo-Japanese war and continuing throughout later continental colonial expansions.¹¹⁵ The medics tasked with treating them received no training whatsoever in women's health, and the process is a reminder of the ways in which the medical establishment was both subordinated to and complicit in the IJA's objectives. Some medical workers describe the inner conflict that this work generated; one such IJA medic, Miyayama Suezō, recounts how he assisted a Chinese woman giving birth and attended to the mother's and the infant's health: "I was taught that medicine was a 'benevolent art' (*jinjutsu*). Therefore, I decided that even though they were Chinese, I would provide the best treatment I could."¹¹⁶

These pacification activities, explicitly designed to consolidate Imperial Japanese territorial gains and reduce the incidence and motivation for guerrilla activities, also recognized the increasing profile of competing state projects in China's northeast. As one *senbuhān* member, Shimazaki Akemi, observed in 1940:

"The people in northern China are hungry, injured and sick. We must help them. If we don't find the most appropriate, the most

¹¹² Rogaski, "Vampires in Plagueland," 149.

¹¹³ 2013 Interview with Imazu Shigeru, translation Harari's. Cited in Harari, "Between trust and violence," 502.

¹¹⁴ Harari, "Between trust and violence," 503.

¹¹⁵ Makita, "The Ambivalent Enterprise," 200.

¹¹⁶ Cited in Harari, "Between trust and violence," 514. Translation Harari's.

suitable method of treatment, we will not be able to win a perfect victory...The sick in northern China are currently at a crossroads, deliberating straightforwardly between the Eighth Route Army and the Japanese military. If the enemy administers poison, we should immediately provide an antidote. If the enemy gives out medicine, we have to produce better medicine...”¹¹⁷

However cynical the IJA’s objectives may have been, Shimazaki’s predictions of the impending collision with the 8RA were entirely prophetic, although he could not have foreseen the turn at the “crossroads” that eventually took place, with Japanese medical expertise becoming incorporated into the 8RA and PLA. Similarly, while the humanitarian principles of healthcare provision were undeniably captured by the voracity of the military-industrial complex of Japan’s “Total Empire,” the individual, psychological, and subjective experiences of Japanese medical workers interacting with their Chinese patients produced a mutuality and an amity that long outlived the Empire of Japan.

The latent potential for Chinese state and public toleration of continued Japanese presence on the continent following surrender is explored by Barak Kushner in his work on postwar Chinese diplomatic responses to Imperial Japanese atrocities. Kushner reflects U.S. Office of War Information Officer Graham Peck’s contemporary observations that many members of the Chinese public regarded the Japanese as no more than “one in a long line of oppressive overlords,” and that, in the case of the desperately-poor rural regions, the Chinese people had more pressing existential concerns to attend to than the pursuit of retribution or revenge.¹¹⁸

These are two distinct arguments, worth addressing in turn: the first is that, at least insofar as the war-weary Chinese majority were concerned, and especially for impoverished Chinese rural communities, there was no categorical distinction between Imperial Japanese, Manchukuoan, KMT, CCP, or other state projects in northeast China in this period. This perspective is consistent with some aspects of Suzanne Pepper’s descriptions of widespread ambivalence towards the KMT takeover of formerly Japanese-held regions, and the debatable improvements that handover supposed for day-to-day governmental administration, especially in urban centers and as regards tax burdens.¹¹⁹ The argument is also supported by some contemporary observations from Japanese observers. As Yamazaki Miyuki, a Japanese surgical nurse in the 8RA, reported in her description of the ‘people’s tribunals’ organized during the land reform campaigns of 1948-50:

“However much they may have hated the Japanese, the Chinese farmers held far more hatred and anger for the landlords [in the People’s Tribunals], even though the landlords were fellow

¹¹⁷ Cited in Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 510. Translation Harari’s.

¹¹⁸ Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 23-24.

¹¹⁹ Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 7-9. See also 149-152 for details of the onerous KMT tax policies and their debilitating effect on rural communities under their jurisdiction.

Chinese... they'd call for the landlords to be beaten to death or shot.”¹²⁰

Given the great range of Chinese experience of contact with the Japanese Empire—a range that includes everything from extreme violence and destruction to profitable collaboration and the reception of desired medical attention—the applicability of these perspectives should be taken as circumstantial rather than universal, but compelling nonetheless.

The second is the argument that, in the aftermath of WWII, a type of poverty-induced pragmatism made the useful exploitation of Japanese labor and technical ability far more appealing than the pursuit of revenge or retaliatory violence. This thesis is at the heart of Kushner's work, and is consistent with the discourse and policymaking articulated by the CCP and PLA leadership. The desire for vengeance is explicitly addressed as a “left-wing excess” in the PLA doctrine, and flagged as an ideological confusion in need of remedy, not for pragmatic reasons, but as a matter of maintaining a consistent socialist internationalism that identifies China's enemies as the “militarists,” not the “proletarian soldiers” or “civilians,” irrespective of their origin or ethnicity.¹²¹ This analysis is robustly substantiated by some of the oral reports of the period. One example comes from the reports from two Japanese medical workers incorporated into the 8RA, comrades Yamazaki and Higo. Upon being transferred to Number 7 Hospital in Fujin alongside their 8RA unit, the pair reported encountering open aggression from Chinese patients:

“Perhaps because there were a fair number of Manchurians and Chinese who had been pushed around by the Japanese before war's end, they held a grudge. Whenever we refused one of the patients' demands, they'd shout: ‘Japanese devil! Motherfucker!’ The 8RA leaders interceded on our behalf when they heard this kind of language. Privately, they explained that the patient's anger was misdirected: “You're being scapegoated. You're not ‘Japanese devils’, but rather representatives of the Japanese proletariat.”¹²²

The experiences of Chinese individuals who had had positive encounters with Japanese medics appear to have made a mixed impact on public sentiments towards Japanese healthcare providers, with hesitance being notably higher with civilians outside of the PLA, where a certain amount of trust and camaraderie with the Japanese health workers was inevitably cultivated. Nevertheless, these interwar *senbuyaku* activities are a valuable reminder of the great variance in experiences of Sino-Japanese contact throughout this period and its dependence on regional contingencies, and the nontrivial pre-existing groundwork in creating acceptance of Japanese military and colonial presence that may have had a lingering effect after surrender.

Contrasting with images of the JRCS nurses as “angels in white,” Rogaski argues that there existed a popular characterization of Japanese doctors as the “embodiment of evil, white-

¹²⁰ Ôhara, *Kanashimi wa shôkakô*, 117.

¹²¹ Yun Chen et al., *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun disiyè zhanjunzhanshi* (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1998), 141.

¹²² Ôhara, *Kanashimi wa shôkakô*, 114 - 115.

jacketed agents of empire who gouged out organs and stole (or intentionally tainted) the blood of their victims: monsters or vampires who employed the techniques of hygienic modernity to kill and conquer.”¹²³ While some suspicion of Japanese doctors and treatment hesitancy by Chinese patients are features of the documents I have examined, I have failed to encounter similar degrees of vividness.¹²⁴ Rogaski proposes that the distinctions between the Japanese practitioners of human vivisection in Unit 731 and Japanese doctors may have been blurred in the minds of many members of the Chinese public, such that “no consideration of needle rumors can separate itself from the legacy of Unit 731.”¹²⁵ This insight addresses the personal and psychological dimensions of treatment hesitancy, without necessitating the projection of a widespread awareness of the abstractions and technicalities of the ‘hygienic empire’ onto the contemporary Chinese public.

Harari’s study on Sino-Japanese medical interactions in the interwar period provides us with “rosy” descriptions of the cultivation of trust between Japanese medical practitioners and Chinese individuals in occupied territories, describing how, on some occasions, Chinese individuals actively sought out Japanese *senbuyaku* or IJA medical detachments of their own volition to request medical attention.¹²⁶ However, the study also incorporates examples of the sorts of hesitancy described above, variations of which are also discussed in the PLA official histories.¹²⁷ In one instance, Harari references the experiences of Fujimoto Hidemi, a pacification team medic who encountered fear and treatment hesitancy from women and girls in Chinese communities that had been subjected to sexual violence by the IJA prior to the pacification team’s arrival. In another case, an IJA unit medic operating a *senbuyaku* field clinic in Dangyang, Hubei, noted that the locals took several weeks before entrusting their health to the hands of Japanese health workers.¹²⁸ These wildly variant experiences of contact with the Japanese, ranging from extreme violence to healthcare provision, were orchestrated as an explicit demoralization strategy to foster Chinese collaboration and undermine resistance to the colonial project. Nonetheless, this strategy may have also facilitated the integrationist policymaking of the CCP and 8RA, as designating a distinction between Japanese militarists and the “good Japanese,” “Japanese proletarians,” etc., became not only a matter of abstract socialist internationalist philosophizing, but a psychological and experiential reality for Chinese individuals in formerly occupied territories.

In contradistinction to the Foucauldian frameworks that characterize the JRCS and Imperial Japanese medical establishment as existing in an immiscibly collaborative relationship with Japan’s colonial project, Olive Checkland, in her extensive study of the JRCS’s official archives, proposes that the humanitarian mission of the JRCS came into conflict with the military and

¹²³ Rogaski, “Vampires in Plagueland,” 133.

¹²⁴ For more examples, including vivid descriptions of trypanophobia, “extermination needles,” etc., see: Rogaski, “Vampires in Plagueland,” 139-140.

¹²⁵ Rogaski, “Vampires in Plagueland,” 155.

¹²⁶ Harari, “Between trust and violence,” 504-510. In particular, see the testimony of Matsumoto Masayoshi, 508.

¹²⁷ For descriptions of Chinese patients refusing medical attention from Japanese physicians and nurses, consult: Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406.

¹²⁸ For an example, see: Hidemi Fujimoto, *Senjō ni okeru kango nisshi* (Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2002), 35–7.

imperialist ambitions of the Imperial Japanese government, and that it was the ascendancy of the latter that co-opted and inhibited the genuinely humanitarian mission of the organization.¹²⁹ This perspective is representative of the JRCS's official position, which incorporates criticism of the JRCS's collaboration with the militarism of empire and associated activities (especially after the Russo-Japanese war), but largely sees this imperial collaboration as an antagonistic obstruction to the JRCS's humanist mission, rather than the type of organistic complex that Rogaski and DePies identify using the terms "hygienic modernity" and "humanitarian imperialism." In our examination of the capture of Japanese medical institutions and the conscription of medical staff into the CCP's state-building project, this study finds some evidence that the imperialist and militarist subordination of medical practices on the continent was successfully excised by the CCP and PLA administrations. As this development points to an essential epistemic separation between the Japanese military-imperial complex and the medical one, including the various elements of the JRCS, it necessarily provides support to Checkland's argument and to the autocharacterizations of the JRCS. Oral testimonies indicate a Kantian "condition of possibility" that enabled critical action upon an oppressive system from within its confines, performed by Japanese healthcare personnel thrust into contact with colonized populations, and understood by the CCP and PLA leadership as evidence of proletarian transnational collegiality. Following the defeat of Japanese imperialism and the collapse of Imperial Japan's pan-Asian territorial ambitions, the humanitarian aspects of the JRCS and broader Japanese medical practice in the former colonies endured to a remarkable degree, manifesting in the actions of Japanese individuals as life-saving interventions and heroic exertions on and off the battlefield, becoming memorialized by the PLA's official histories, and recognized in the hagiographies of the PLA's official histories. The JRCS's continental afterlife of medicine *sans* empire is thus suggestive of an essential capacity for separation, under certain conditions, of the 'imperialist' from the 'humanitarian' dimensions of the Imperial Japanese medical complex.

20th-Century Chinese Medicine: Precontexts to the PRC's Medical State

In contrast to the Meiji adoption of Prussian state-medical centralization and its continuities, manifest in the expansion of Imperial Japanese medical developments in the colonies, the trajectory of the medical establishment of the PRC is largely defined by the extreme ruptures caused by the KMT-CCP conflict, the pressures on the communist Liberated Areas, Imperial Japanese incursion, and the Chinese Civil War. Despite the traumatic disjunctures of the '30s and '40s, the medical and military-medical complexes of the CCP and its suborganizations at the moment of Japan's surrender retained several characteristics of pre-existing Chinese medical institutions, and preserved syncretic indigenous medical epistemologies. In order to understand the motivation and methodology of the incorporation of Japanese medical workers, materiel, and public health strategies during the Civil War and the nascent PRC state project, it is necessary briefly to examine these characteristics.

Late imperial China had a medical elite—the *ruyi* scholar-physicians who studied medical texts, and the *shiyi* hereditary physicians who obtained medical knowledge through familial

¹²⁹ Olive Checkland, *Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan, 1877-1977* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 92-96.

apprenticeships—although neither class had any form of established, spatially transferrable accreditation beyond heredity and local reputation. In addition to these two categories, there was a wide variety of low-status itinerant healers and folk doctors, who also operated without formal accreditation or official oversight.¹³⁰ During the Qing dynasty, everyday care for the sick of the sort that came to be classified as nursing care was usually provided by a patient's familial circle.¹³¹ The professionalisation, systematised accreditation, and female gender-coding of this type of care largely took place following the Opium War and subsequent opening of China to European and American Christian missions, some of which brought with them Florence Nightingale's approaches and began to introduce the emerging Chinese public to forms of medical treatment and the concept of nursing in more or less the forms that they possess today.¹³² In 1888, the American Ella Johnson opened a nursing training school in Fuzhou;¹³³ soon after, Nina Gage, a member of the Yale mission, established a nursing training program and served as president of the newly-minted Chinese Nursing Association in the first decade of the 20th century.

Chinese women physicians began studying Western medical techniques in the missionary hospitals of the late Qing dynasty, a process that incorporated Sino-Japanese transnational encounters from its inception. A prominent example was Dr. Kin Yamei, an 1885 graduate of New York Women's Medical College, who became a medical doctor and ran a women's hospital in Kobe from 1890 to 1894, before founding the Northern Medical School in Zhili (present-day Hebei) in 1907, where she trained dozens of nurses as well as provided medical services to the local community.¹³⁴ The particular medical needs of women, and the unsuitability of much of the foreign medical establishment to meet these, was recognized by Dr. Li Pingshu, co-founder of the *Nuzi zhongxi yiliaoyuan*, 'Chinese-Western Hospital for Women,' in Shanghai, who described the situation in 1904 Shanghai as follows:

“While there are a quite a few hospitals in the foreign settlements, they are all founded by foreigners... In 1904, in consideration of

¹³⁰ Late imperial China was not particularly unique in its lack of governmentally-sanctioned medical accreditation in this period: before the 1890s, doctors in the USA interested in “Scientific Medicine” had to travel to western Europe to obtain training and official accreditation at government-run medical schools, and, even in these cases, such licenses were only offered in five or six European nations. For details, see: Connie Shemo, “‘Her Chinese Attended to Almost Everything’: Relationships of Power in the Hackett Medical College for Women, Guangzhou, China, 1901-1915,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 24, no. 4 (2017), 321-346, 327.

¹³¹ John Watt, “Breaking into public service: The development of nursing in modern China, 1870-1949,” *Nursing History Review* 12 (2004), 67-96. For a further discussion of intrafamilial and close-community nursing provision in late imperial and Republican China, see also Evelyn Lin, “Nursing in China,” *The American Journal of Nursing* 38, no.1 (January 1938), 2-3.

¹³² Derek R. Smith and Sa Tang, “Nursing in China: Historical development, current issues and future challenges,” *Japanese Journal of Nursing and Health Sciences* 5, no. 2 (2004), 16-20.

¹³³ S. Chan and F. Wong, “Development of basic nursing education in China and Hong Kong,” *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 29 (1999), 1300-1307.

¹³⁴ “Chinese Women Doctors: Dr. Yamei Kin Tells of Training Schools at Tien-Tsin,” *The New York Times*, July 21, 1915.

the scarcity of women doctors in China, I opened the Chinese-Western Medical School for Women.”¹³⁵

Another example of Chinese women’s acquisition of Western-style medical training and practice was the Hackett Medical College for Women in Guangzhou, which was predominantly managed and run by the Chinese women students.¹³⁶ The incorporation of women into the PRC and PLA medical establishment is thus amply prefigured in the Chinese context, and with similar conceptual underpinnings to that of Imperial Japan: in 1938, Evelyn Lin, president of the Nurses’ Association of China, argued that the purpose of nursing, like that of medicine, was “serving humanity,”¹³⁷ mirroring the universalist and humanitarian discourse of the Red Cross Associations, philanthropic organizations, and Christian missions.

By 1915, the PUMC offered five-year degrees in nursing, and dedicated nursing schools flourished in Nationalist China throughout the 1930s. By 1937, there were 187 registered schools of this type,¹³⁸ and, at around the same date, there were approximately 6,000 nurses officially registered with the Nurses’ Association of China.¹³⁹ Although large numbers of healthcare workers and non-professionalized individuals continued to provide care outside of these new institutional frameworks, two elements pertaining to the status and numbers of skilled medical practitioners and healthcare workers in China are apparent from 1937 onwards. First, that the speed and extent of medical training in Imperial Japan, as discussed above, dwarfed the equivalent efforts in China in absolute terms, even without considering relative population sizes. Secondly, that the communist Chinese settlements and military organizations, especially from the Yan’an period onwards, suffered from a severe lack of medical expertise, equipment, and personnel. These two factors were decisive in shaping CCP policy towards Japanese POWs and other captives in the continental northeast.

In 1915, the China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation noted that Chinese-run hospitals were “with few exceptions, ineffective” at providing high-quality healthcare.¹⁴⁰ This analysis, surely satisfying to Imperial Japanese administrators intent on drawing international attention to the contrast between their imported “hygienic modernity” and the situation in extracolonial China, was even starker when the conditions in the northeast and the communist Liberated Areas are considered. The fact that Chinese official support for medical institutions tended to wax and wane with the fates of the latter’s gubernatorial advocates, and given the brevity and volatility of political careers in the Qing-Republican transitional period, it is not surprising that stable patronage of public health institutions was virtually nonexistent.¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ Chieko Nakajima, *Body, Society, and Nation: The Creation of Public Health and Urban Culture in Shanghai* (Harvard: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2018), 63. Translation Nakajima’s.

¹³⁶ Despite contemporary Anglophone descriptions to the contrary, that, according to Connie Shemo, systematically diminished the role of Chinese women’s labor, as described in: Shemo, ““Her Chinese...,” 324.

¹³⁷ Lin, “Nursing in China,” 1.

¹³⁸ Y.S. Hong and R. Yatsushiro, “Nursing education in China in transition,” *Journal of Oita Nursing and Health Sciences* 4 (2003), 41-47.

¹³⁹ Watt, “Breaking into public service,” 67-96.

¹⁴⁰ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 507-508.

¹⁴¹ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 510-511.

Chinese Redemptive and Philanthropic Societies

Parallel to the foreign Red Cross societies and Christian missions, indigenous Chinese philanthropic organizations, or *shantang* (“benevolent associations”), typically operated with the assistance of local elites and under loose supervision of the government, but were not systematically integrated into a comprehensive public health policy, with their activities instead focused on providing assistance to those at the margins of society, such as “relief to beggars, shelter to widows and orphans, feeding the hungry, and burying the indigent dead.”¹⁴² Organizations such as the *Shijie hongwanzi hui* (“Red Swastika Society”, est. 1922)¹⁴³ also proliferated in the early Republican period, typically as offshoots of what Prasenjit Duara categorizes as “redemptive societies,” many of which combined the public medical philanthropic engagement of their Western cognates with indigenous traditions and/or novel philosophical and spiritual principles.¹⁴⁴ Concrete details of these organizations are elusive, in particular as regards their membership numbers: While the Red Swastika Society claimed an official membership of “7 to 10 million” in 1937, contemporary Chinese nationalist accounts such as Wing Tsit-chan’s place the figure as closer to “30,000... in 1927,” suggesting either formidable growth or highly-motivated assessments in either direction.¹⁴⁵ Citing the “paucity of Chinese data” on the topic, Duara does not commit to an interpretation; similarly, in our study, I failed to encounter any substantial reference to, or a concrete number of, medical practitioners from these “redemptive societies,” suggesting their comparatively scant impact on the constitution of medical care in the communist armed forces or the continental northeast from 1938 onwards. Duara does note, however, that these organizations flourished in Manchukuo, as Japanese advocates of pan-Asianism saw the utility of philanthropic organizations denuded of Western and Christian principles and symbolism.¹⁴⁶

In his study on public health in northeast China, Thomas David DuBois draws a distinction between the role of health charities within the Japanese colonial spaces (including Manchukuo), and their role in the indigenously-administered regions of the northeast. DuBois argues that, while the Chinese regimes failed to establish comprehensive public health programs, leaving charities to “fill the gaps” in public health provision, the Imperial Japanese administrations

¹⁴² DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 508.

¹⁴³ Although the translations “Red Swastika Society” or “International Red Swastika Society” are the usual Anglophone renditions of *Shijie hongwanzi hui* (世界红卍字会), and I will use the former version for reasons of cross-referential clarity and backwards-compatibility, it nonetheless contains a slight inaccuracy that invites clarification. The word “Swastika” refers to the right-facing symbol 卐, a common motif in Eurasian and Mesoamerican religious symbolism and used (in its 45° tilted form) by the German Nazi party. The symbol used by the *Shijie hongwanzi hui*, however, is the left-facing symbol 卐 (sometimes disambiguated as “sauwastika” in English). Both symbols have the same pronunciation in Mandarin (Wan4), although the Japanese language distinguishes between *manji* and *gyakumanji* or *migimanji*. A more precise translation of the name of this organization which acknowledges the chirality of the symbol, therefore, would be “Red Sauwastika Society”, although I suspect such a spelling would be treated as a typographical error outside of specialist circles.

¹⁴⁴ Prasenjit Duara, “Of Authenticity and Woman: Personal Narratives of Middle-Class Women in Modern China,” in *Becoming Chinese*, ed. Wen-Hsin Yeh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 343.

¹⁴⁵ Duara, “Of Authenticity,” 348.

¹⁴⁶ Duara, “Of Authenticity,” 348-349.

“instituted a farsighted and multivalenced medical policy” that was able to “channel medical voluntarism into a hybrid state-charitable sector”.¹⁴⁷ Assimilating the JRCS, MRCS, the Red Swastika Society, and a variety of other medical philanthropic organizations, DuBois convincingly argues that “Manzhouguo did not merely shepherd its charitable sector, it pioneered a new type of national charity that would operate as a branch of government.”¹⁴⁸

Origins of Epidemiology and Public Hygiene Campaigns in China and PRC

In the early Republican period, Cambridge-trained Dr. Wu Lien-teh became one of the first popularizers of germ theory in the Sinosphere. His contributions to epidemic-control policymaking in response to the 1911 pneumatic plague outbreak in northeast China, which claimed at least 60,000 lives, dramatically transformed continental Chinese medical and institutional epidemiological knowledge and practices.¹⁴⁹ One challenge that Dr. Wu faced was the widespread lack of understanding of contagion vectors among indigenously-trained Chinese medical purveyors, a problem that was accentuated in rural regions and in the northeast, where doctors faced mortality rates of over 50% due to preventable exposure to airborne diseases:

“The native practitioners as a rule entertained wrong ideas of the cause of pneumonic plague and when called in for consultation, normally sat facing the coughing patient without wearing any protective masks though the need for taking the utmost precaution had been continuously impressed on them.”¹⁵⁰

The epidemics and the work of Dr. Wu led to the establishment of the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service, the National Epidemic Prevention Bureau, and, later, to a growing number of regional municipal Departments of Health. In 1928, the national Ministry of Health was founded, later renamed the National Health Administration. This organization provided governmental accreditation to medical schools at the national and provincial level, and, as of 1934, oversaw the enrolment of around 3,600 students, one-sixth of whom were women, with around 550 qualified women physicians recorded in this year.¹⁵¹

Following the realization that large-scale epidemic control strategies depended on widespread behavioral modification and the dissemination of information in an accessible and trustworthy manner, mass campaigns came to play an important part in raising public awareness of quotidian strategies for epidemiological control, demonstrating as they did so the efficacy and political potential of architectures for mass instruction. The imaginative propaganda of the 1920 Fuzhou anti-cholera campaign, which pitched health information in a clear and entertaining manner through theatrical performances and storytelling, is one example that proved exceptionally successful at achieving its objective of contagion reduction. The Fuzhou campaign combined the experiences of missionary organizations in distributing medical education to diverse

¹⁴⁷ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 506.

¹⁴⁸ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 527.

¹⁴⁹ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 39.

¹⁵⁰ Wu Lien-teh, *Plague Fighter: The Autobiography of a Modern Chinese Physician* (Cambridge: Heffer & Sons, 1959), 33.

¹⁵¹ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 39-46.

communities, typically interdicted by language and literacy barriers, with the assembled technical expertise of the newly-formed Council of Health Education. This particular campaign spared Fuzhou from the worst of the cholera epidemics of the period, and through it, its organizers created a blueprint for public awareness and propaganda campaigns that was to inspire the Chinese communists in subsequent years.¹⁵² In contrast, the KMT New Life Movement campaigns, with their emphasis on abstract ethical purity and the accompanying excesses of their Blue Shirt advocates,¹⁵³ represent failures of these types of mass campaigns, in particular due to their focus on berating the public for their moral failings rather than the provision of practical, clear advice. While the movement began with the objective of promoting “social welfare of the people,” medical historian Tony Jewell persuasively argues that:

“[The New Life Movement] nevertheless degenerated into a barren list of rules, which attacked ignorance and bad health rather than the fundamental social difficulties which caused them. This is an example of ‘victim blaming’. The New Life campaigns were referred to bitterly as ‘toothbrushes for starving people’”¹⁵⁴

Rogaski describes similar challenges faced by medical and intellectual elites based in Tianjin, as germ theory and public hygiene became inextricably muddled with Western and Japanese conceptions of racial hierarchy, eugenics, and Chinese ethnoracial inferiority.¹⁵⁵ As with the New Life Movement, the combination of antagonistic, contradictory, and moralistic objectives with public health messaging and mass campaigns, which were almost exclusively reflections of the narrow interests of an elite minority, proved to be a significant obstacle to their efficacy, an effect that was amplified when the messaging included oikophobic or derogatory attitudes towards the target audience of the Chinese general and rural population. From 1945 to the mid-1950s, one significant innovation of the architects of mass-instruction health campaigns in the PRC was to eliminate these ‘bourgeois’ affectations, focusing instead on the ‘Fuzhou model’ of straightforward descriptions of best practices for epidemic control without appeal to Confucian ethics, Western mimetic aspirations, or other nonmedical ideological artefacts—although the structural methodologies of these mass informational campaigns were applied separately to the national project of Marxist and Maoist instruction.

The plague epidemic of 1910-1911 marked a turning point in public health policies in the northeast. Faced with total state paralysis and a lack of leadership by the Qing administrator Xiliang, the Russians and the Japanese took their own steps to contain the pandemic and protect their respective railway assets, frequently acting with violence and impunity towards the local populations affected.¹⁵⁶ Following the downfall of the Qing regime, the establishment of stable indigenously-managed public health policies—projects that had begun to take shape and acquire the support of the Qing governors—fell by the wayside. The northeast transitioned first into the

¹⁵² Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 40.

¹⁵³ For details on the New Life Movement and the Blue Shirts, refer to: Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (1975), 946 – 948.

¹⁵⁴ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 44.

¹⁵⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 299-301.

¹⁵⁶ DuBois, “Public Health and Private Charity,” 514.

Fengtian clique leadership, then, after 1928, into the nominal control of Zhang Xuelian. In this tumultuous context, philanthropic organizations and foreign actors stepped in to provide medical aid, a development that the architects of Japanese colonial expansion interpreted as a vacuum of state presence that could be leveraged to generate momentum for Imperial Japan's pan-Asianist ambitions. Despite the prominence of Imperial Japan's projects in the region, domestic efforts to construct a public medical infrastructure, such as those by Dr. Wu, play a major part of this institutional trajectory: "Manchuria in 1930 possessed a foundational infrastructure of hospitals, medical schools and sanitary facilities... Manchuria never experienced another epidemic disaster on the scale of 1910–11."¹⁵⁷ In this way, the trajectory of epidemiological and public hygiene policies in the PRC followed an idiosyncratic course, beginning with transnational epistemic exchanges in the "hypercolonial" milieux of Shanghai, Tianjin, etc., transitioning to the threadbare conditions of the post-Long March exile and interwar violence, and culminating with a broad-based integration of Nationalist, Western-volunteer, PRC-trained, indigenous philanthropic, and ex-colonial Japanese and Manchukuoan institutions, epistemes, and workers. In the final phases of this integration, and, in particular, from 1945-1956, Japanese medical institutions and physicians played a key role in shaping the characteristics of PRC epidemic and hygiene policy.

Foreign Volunteers and Extreme Poverty: Medical Care in Chinese Communist Regions

Whatever the potentialities and developments of the medical establishment in the urban centers of Nationalist China, rural communities remained critically underserved, with a threadbare medical infrastructure and "Very primitive conditions."¹⁵⁸ Dr. Wu described the situation in the countryside in 1937 in the following terms:

"Firstly the supply of doctors is so limited that it is estimated that the provision of one doctor per two thousand of population will be difficult to realise within two decades. With so few a number and relatively large territories to cover it is essential that they be provided with assistants to undertake that part of their work which does not require the degree of technical skill and knowledge of the doctor. Further, personnel may even be required at times to work in villages more or less remote from a doctor, they must on occasions be able to function independently of him."¹⁵⁹

Similarly, a damning *China Medical Journal* editorial noted in 1944 that "China has never had a competent health service," specifically pointing out the lack of penetration into the countryside.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ DuBois, "Public Health and Private Charity," 520.

¹⁵⁸ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 57.

¹⁵⁹ Wu Lien-teh, "Fundamentals of state medicine," *China Medical Journal* 51, no. 6 (June 1937), 789, cited in Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 64.

¹⁶⁰ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 49.

If the general conditions of the Chinese medical establishment were poor, internecine pre-civil-war violence between the CCP and KMT and the massive escalation of violence of the IJA invasions meant that, by the late '30s and early '40s, the realities of medical staffing and infrastructure in the communist Liberated Areas in and around Yan'an could not have been more dire. From 1941 onwards, the KMT blockaded all movement of IRCS, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and other official international relief organizations from entering communist-controlled areas. In 1946, one UNRRA worker granted exceptional permission to travel from ROC-controlled Chongqing to Yan'an described the situation as "very serious," noting that the majority of medications available to the 80-100 million persons living in the Liberated Areas was "dependent on traditional medicines and drugs derived from local herbs."¹⁶¹ In 1945, The China correspondent for the Associated press, Gunther Stein, painted a vivid picture of the medical situation in Yan'an, describing hospital wards carved out of muddy caves, without electricity or running water, and with virtually no medication or functioning equipment.¹⁶²

As happened with the Spanish Civil War, international socialist solidarity caused many foreign volunteers to flock to China to provide succor to their beleaguered comrades. Prior to the incorporation of Japanese doctors and nurses into the medical operations of the PLA, there existed a substantial precedent for the incorporation of non-Chinese individuals into CCP-affiliated medical organizations, and many of these were not members of the Comintern (and, later, Cominform), nor otherwise Soviet affiliates or advisors. This process was neither entirely unidirectional nor exclusionary of the revolutionary potential of the Japanese people, as suggested by the open letter from Mao to the Spanish people of May 15, 1937:

*"Salutamos les pueblos bravísimos de la España [sic]... ("We salute the courageous peoples of Spain") Your struggle is our struggle. We are excited to learn that the International Brigades have been formed by many nationalities. Among them Chinese and Japanese."*¹⁶³

Mao and the rest of the CCP leadership were thus well aware of the contributions of comrades from abroad, many of whom had risked life and limb to assist them. This fact infused policymaking of this period with a markedly optimistic outlook towards international solidarity. The knowledge that Nosaka Sanzō had been a key figure in the foundation of the British Communist Party,¹⁶⁴ as well as an awareness of Japanese communist sympathizers, such as Jack

¹⁶¹ W. A. Reynolds, "A Journey to Yen'an, 1946," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 17 (1977), 43-54, 44. Plate 17 of this article shows the Bethune Memorial Hospital in Yan'an, a plain single-story structure.

¹⁶² Gunther Stein, *The Challenge of Red China* (London: Pilot Press, 1945), 216-17.

¹⁶³ Nandy Tsou and Len Tsou, "The Asian Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War: A Report," *Science & Society* 68, no.3 (Fall 2004), 342-350, 343.

¹⁶⁴ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966* (London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 4-5.

Shirai, travelling to Spain to fight on the side of the Republic, would likely have factored heavily into the CCP's attitudes towards the Japanese in particular.¹⁶⁵

Medical Hyperrevolutionaries

If the overlaid semicolonial projects of coastal China represent a 'hypercolonial' space of competing interests for dominion over Chinese territory and over the Chinese people, Yan'an and the Liberated Zones became their 'hyperrevolutionary' counterpart. As with the Spanish civil war, foreign sympathizers risked their lives to assist Mao's revolution by volunteering their medical knowledge and labor, and, in doing so, changed the fate of the PRC's medical establishment forever. One such foreign volunteer was N4A commander Chen Yi's colleague Dr. Jakob Rosenfeld,¹⁶⁶ a Jewish member of the Viennese Social Democrat Party who was arrested by the Nazi party. After surviving a year's internment in Dachau in 1938, Rosenfeld applied for visas at the Chinese Legation in Vienna and escaped to Shanghai. There, he set up a medical clinic, until his recruitment by the Health Commissioner for the N4A, Dr. Shen Qishen. Inspired by rumors of the success of democratic and egalitarian politics in CCP-held areas, Rosenfeld disguised himself as a German missionary to avoid Nationalist scrutiny and travelled to Shandong province, where he became a field doctor at the N4A's Junan county headquarters.¹⁶⁷ Rosenfeld focused on the medical training of his Chinese comrades, as well as providing medical care to N4A soldiers and locals. German-Jewish doctor Hans Müller, similarly, volunteered with the 8RA and remained in the PRC providing medical instruction and healthcare services long after the end of the Chinese civil war.¹⁶⁸

Like Rosenfeld and Müller, Canadian surgeon and international socialist volunteer Norman Bethune, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, arrived in Shaanxi in January of 1938, to assist the Chinese communist cause. Commenting on the state of medical care in the CCP-controlled regions, Bethune indicated that the 8RA had only "five Chinese graduate doctors" and around fifty untrained ones.¹⁶⁹ Nor were the working conditions he described much better:

"The kerosene lamp overhead makes a steady buzzing sound like an incandescent hive of bees. Mud walls. Mud floor. Mud bed. White paper windows. Smell of blood and chloroform. Cold. Three o'clock in the morning, December 1, North China, near Lin Chu, with the 8th Route Army."¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Tsou and Tsou, "The Asian Volunteers," 344.

¹⁶⁶ Rosenfeld's grave, in Tel Aviv, is where the Chinese Embassy to Israel has paid its yearly respects since the Sino-Israeli normalization in 1992, and at least one Shandong hospital bears his name.

¹⁶⁷ Qiufu Gao, *Women he nimen: zhongguo he yiselie youhao gushiji* (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2014), 44 – 52.

¹⁶⁸ Guang Pan, *A Study of Jewish Refugees in China (1933–1945): History, Theories and the Chinese Pattern*, (Singapore: Springer, 2019), 63–83.

¹⁶⁹ Ted Allan and Sydney Gordon, *The Scalpel, the Sword: The Story of Dr. Norman Bethune* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1952), 219.

¹⁷⁰ Norman Bethune, "Wounds," *The Wounds*, ed. M. M. Pickersgill (Ontario: Alive Press Limited, 1940), 27-32.

Rosenfeld, Müller, and Bethune were far from the only foreign volunteers assisting the Chinese communists. Jean Ewen, a fluent Mandarin-speaker and Franciscan missionary, also travelled to Shaanxi to provide medical care and training to the communists. Her memoirs include vivid depictions of the harsh conditions, lack of medical education in the communist regions, and her frustrations with the male doctors, as historical biographer Sonya Grypma details:

“Jean Ewen recalled surprising a Dr. Wong when she delivered a child while working with the Fourth Army: “He was angry because he had never had a delivery and probably would not know what to do with a forceps.” And, when she diagnosed a patient with a tetanus infection and suggested antitetanus serum, Dr. Wong “only laughed at me in his ignorance.” The patient died twelve hours later. According to Jean Ewen, in the months after she parted from Bethune, she instructed pharmacists on how to make proper pharmaceutical solutions, doctors on how to deliver babies, and dressers on how to change dressings, take out bullets, and set fractures. She removed a bomb fragment from a young man’s leg using “only my fingers and a chop stick,” and dug up graves to find bodies to teach autopsies.”¹⁷¹

Ewen also describes the great difficulties she faced teaching basic medical techniques to north Shaanxi youths “whose knowledge of Chinese characters was far beneath [her] own.”¹⁷² Grypma advises the reader that these anecdotes are verified only by Ewen’s own testimony, and, given Ewen’s frequently uncharitable descriptions of her Chinese comrades, should be treated with suitable caution. However, her observations, in particular those relating to the cavalier attitude towards septicemia, are supported by some of the scholarship on the topic. The crude death rate in 1930s China is estimated at 25-35 per 1,000, with substantial variance between rural areas and urban centers.¹⁷³ For comparison, the 1931 Japanese crude death rate was around 19 per 1,000.¹⁷⁴ The Chinese infant mortality rate in this same period was an alarming 200-300 per 1,000 births,¹⁷⁵ a fact that J. A. Jewell specifically attributes to the general lack of attention to antisepsis in deliveries supervised by the mother’s familial circle or “old-style” midwives. This situation was not ameliorated until the 1929 establishment of the First National Midwifery School, under the direction of Dr. Yang Zhong Rui, who popularized midwifery techniques that

¹⁷¹ Inline quotations correspond to Jean Ewen, *China Nurse 1932-1939: A Young Canadian Witnesses History*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1981), cited in Sonya J. Grypma, “China Nurse Jean Ewen: Embracing and Abandoning Communist Revolutionaries,” *Journal of Historical Biography* 9 (Spring 2011), 37-68.

¹⁷² Ewen, *China Nurse*, 70-71.

¹⁷³ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 29-30.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Department of Commerce, *Mortality Statistics, 1931: Thirty-second Annual Report* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 9.

¹⁷⁵ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 40.

reduced infant mortality by over 50% upon adoption—but the adoption was far from widespread, especially in poor and rural areas.¹⁷⁶

The incorporation of women into the CCP and PLA medical establishment proved possible, but was far from seamless, and represents a case of an “incomplete revolution” that did not entirely break the historical inertia of normative assumptions about women’s roles. On the occasion of the 1942 celebration of International Women’s Day in Yan’an, socialist author Ding Ling criticized the unreformed masculinism of Yan’an culture, drawing attention to the unfair double standards that revolutionary women were subjected to by their fellow comrades and bemoaning the endurance of Confucian gender norms among the communist cadres.¹⁷⁷ The ambivalent status of professional women in Mao’s revolution, which Ding drew attention to, manifested in the fact that, while the Chinese communist leadership endorsed the training and incorporation of women into the PLA, they were overwhelmingly and reflexively designated as nurses. Furthermore, untrained female recruits were *de facto* streamed into nurse-training programs, suggesting that, despite sustained knowledge of and/or personal exposure to Drs. Lin, Kin, Ewen, et al., normative assumptions of women’s position in the medical establishment tended to result in the women being guided into nursing. This topic merits extended scholarly attention beyond the scope of the present project, but a preliminary analysis of the evidence suggests that, despite the nominal gender egalitarianism articulated by Mao and the CCP leadership, it is doubtful that women in the early PRC enjoyed greater, or even equal, freedom and access to medical education across all fields of medicine and careers than their counterparts in the Japanese, Western, or ROC systems.

Identifying and Addressing the Problem of Medical Insufficiency: CCP Responses

The lack of medical infrastructure and personnel in communist-controlled regions of China was a glaring problem for the CCP leadership throughout the ’40s, a fact explicitly identified by Lieutenant-General He Cheng.¹⁷⁸ As early as 1940, Mao himself drew attention to the urgent need to ameliorate the situation, indicating his ambitions at the occasion of the renaming of the 1931-established Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army Medical School to the considerably more optimistic China Medical University.¹⁷⁹ A compounding factor of the medical insufficiency in communist-controlled regions lay in the rapidly growing number of casualties sustained by PLA soldiers as the CCP’s armies transitioned from guerrilla skirmishes to pitched battles intended to seize and secure territory from the KMT in Dongbei and beyond. This latter type of direct military confrontation for territorial control produced vastly more casualties than the previous types of military operations that the PLA had conducted. For instance, one month after engaging the KMT in Liaodong, the 3rd and 4th divisions of the communist forces in Liaodong had sustained 5,000 severe injuries, 2,000 light injuries, and 1,500 sickness-related casualties,

¹⁷⁶ Mei Yu Cheng, “An Investigation of Infant Mortality and its Causes in Chengtu,” *Chinese Medical Journal* 62 (1944), 47-54.

¹⁷⁷ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), 289-292.

¹⁷⁸ Enxian Gao, Fan Niu, and Xin Liu, eds., *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun disiyezhanjun weisheng gongzuoshi ziliao xuanbian, August 1945 – May 1950* (Beijing: Renminjunyi Chubanshe, 2000), 177-203 (henceforth, “Gao, ziliao”).

¹⁷⁹ Hong Meng, “Mao zedong wei yiliaoweisheng zhanxian de tici,” *dangshibolan* (Beijing: General Review of the People’s Party of China, April 1, 2021), 14-19.

against a hospital capacity of a mere 250. Sun Binghua, deputy commissioner of the Dongbei Medical Corps, put it succinctly: “The situation is hopeless.”¹⁸⁰

Despite the gravity of these assessments, there is little evidence in these declarations that the autophobic attitudes that Rogaski identifies in the Tianjin elites, regarding an endogenized, medicalized view of the Chinese people as “lacking,”¹⁸¹ were present to any meaningful degree in the Yan’an settlement or among PLA officers. Rogaski argues that the germ theory of disease was an idea that “by the 1930s had become a centerpiece in Chinese elite’s understanding of the deficiencies of their ‘race.’”¹⁸² a fact that led intellectuals such as Ding Zilang to reject germ theory altogether in favor of Chinese medicinal understandings of disease. Again, the masoracist tendencies that Rogaski identifies are notably absent among the CCP leadership: their concern was firmly focused on institutional, personnel, educational, and material insufficiencies, rather than essentialist claims of ethnocultural or racial inferiority. Nor was this accidental: the PLA’s official ethnic integration policies adhered to the pre-Fanonian Marxist orientation, which explicitly rejected racialist frameworks as “rightist.” While the mass education campaigns share some superficial similarities with the discourses of the “hygienic modernity” of Tianjin, Manchukuo, and the foreign concessions, there is little evidence of embedded presumptions of “deficiencies of their race,” and substantial evidence of the successful excision of these racialist claims from otherwise effective positivist medical epistemologies.¹⁸³

It is noticeable that in the extensive re-education policies and materials produced in Yan’an for the reformation of former IJA soldiers, Japanese colonial settlers, and Mantetsu ‘capitalists’, there is little mention of the need to address anti-Chinese racism or racial discrimination by Japanese individuals in general. In fact, most of the references to race manifest as exhortations to the Chinese PLA members to disregard racial thinking as a ‘rightist’ tendency, and as reminders to treat the Japanese proletarian soldiers equitably. Even in the curricula of the JWPS, drafted at the height of the Rectification Movement and specifically designed to exhaustively deprogram imperialist, capitalist, and militarist tendencies from the Japanese ex-POWs in attendance, makes no mention of the necessity to address race or racialist thinking.¹⁸⁴ I would like to present three pertinent interpretations of these facts, two of which are historical and one of which addresses the metatext of historiographical production. Firstly, there exists the possibility that the CCP and PLA leadership were simply unaware of anti-Chinese racism as an issue, and thus the omission of anti-racist deprogramming is an oversight on the part of the integration policy and re-education curricula designers. Alternatively, we can conclude that the PLA and CCP were well aware of the racist tendencies of many of their Japanese captives, but considered racialist thinking as a superstructural epiphenomenon of class and material relations, and hence that racial thinking would be addressed *en passant* through socialist education and by eliciting an awakening to class consciousness. I believe that this second interpretation is the one best

¹⁸⁰ Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai,” 38.

¹⁸¹ Rogaski, “Vampires in Plagueland,” 9.

¹⁸² Rogaski, “Vampires in Plagueland,” 300.

¹⁸³ “Effective” in the sense of reducing maternal mortality, contagious disease spread, survival from traumatic injury, etc., without significantly advancing the agenda of adversarial racial or colonial projects.

¹⁸⁴ For a detailed translation of the JWPS’ curriculum, refer to Denning, pp. 136-137.

supported both by the descriptions and documentary evidence of the integration policies and propaganda of the period, and by its proximity to orthodox Marxist-Leninist philosophy which underpinned the creation of those policies. Addressing the historiographical question, it is valuable to remind ourselves that Anglophone scholarship has tended to have a fascination with race, racism, and ethnicity. This observation is not intended normatively or pejoratively, but simply as a description of the academic interests and the types of interpretative lenses that many scholars from the Anglosphere have favored for understandable reasons. Nonetheless, my study of the relevant primary and secondary sources has failed to find substantial reference to racial or ethnic essentialism in the policymaking of the CCP and PLA in this period, even as an adversarial object designated for an ideological purge, despite the fact that most of my Japanese interviewees admitted to holding very discriminatory racial attitudes prior to their contact with the PLA.

Chinese Communist Policies for the Recruitment of Japanese and KMT Workers

The encounters between the CCP leadership, transnational socialist sympathizers, and foreign medical volunteers produced an interpersonal familiarity and an institutional confidence in the possibility of structuring a socialist medical establishment centered upon internationalist collaboration. Following Japanese surrender, the Yan'an leadership rapidly devised a strategy to address the medical crisis in the form of a comprehensive series of policies designed to seize, conscript, and/or recruit as much medical materiel and personnel as possible. Below is the five-point outline of these policies, describing the expansion of communist China's medical capacity to 33,900 medical personnel:

- 1) Gather the 1,600 medical personnel from the 8RA.
- 2) Request the assistance of the approximately 4000 Chinese medical personnel currently operating in the various regions of Manchuria.
- 3) Seize all Mantetsu and other Japanese hospitals, and convert them into 8RA hospitals, then gather several thousand Japanese medical personnel from among Japanese individuals awaiting repatriation. Explain Communist Party policy to them, provide them with necessary assistance to ensure their livelihoods, then boldly put them to work and give them promotions.
- 4) As the KMT POWs are the same race [as us], take them and educate them; aim to gather ~500 personnel from the KMT army.
- 5) Gather 23,800 individuals who have completed medical training of any sort from among medical school students, medical school graduates, Kwantung Army medical schools,

medical training units, and nurse training units throughout the region.¹⁸⁵

As points 3) and 5) of the plan illustrate, the provisions of this policy clearly lay out a framework for the integration of Japanese “medical personnel,” as well as Japanese students of medicine, into the Chinese communist forces. These policies likely originated with Lieutenant-General He and Sun Yizhi, deputy director of the N4A health service from 1945-1948, head of the 4FA’s medical division until 1955, and who later was promoted to Major General of the PLA.¹⁸⁶ As we shall discuss more comprehensively below, while this outline does cover some characteristics of the early process of medical conscription and recruitment, conscription practices were far broader than indicated, with medical conscription coming to be applied not only to medical practitioners and medical students, but to unrelated civilians as well.

Chinese Communist Policies for the treatment and integration of Japanese workers

In September of 1946, as the necessity of Japanese integration became apparent to the CCP leadership, elaborate integration policies were drawn up by the *Dongbei Minzhu Lianjun*,¹⁸⁷ the Dongbei division of the PLA. The details of these policies are extant in the official histories and worth citing in full, as they reveal both the optimism and the concerns of the leadership regarding their ambitious project:¹⁸⁸

- 1) We must overcome two separate incorrect trends in our approaches [to integrating the Japanese]. On the one hand, what we might call a ‘left’ propensity, namely to disrespect the personhood of the Japanese, treating them as defeated captives, taking a coercive attitude towards them, and failing to provide them with the basic necessities of life. On the other, a ‘right’ propensity, molly-coddling them and attending to their every whim, no matter how excessive. Of these two, the ‘left’ propensity is the most pronounced, and we must rapidly act to amend it.
- 2) The following principles are to be observed regarding the welfare of the Japanese:
 - a. Japanese doctors and their families are to receive the same rations as Chinese doctors and their families.
 - b. Salaries shall be paid to the Japanese on a bimonthly basis if possible. Heretofore unpaid salaries are to be compensated as soon as possible.
 - c. Consideration is to be made for those Japanese technicians whose families are in difficult straits. Insofar as it is possible, every effort should be made to ensure that those who wish to cohabit with their families are able to do so.
 - d. Treat all sick Japanese with kindness.

¹⁸⁵ Chen et al., *Zhongguo renmin*, 75.

¹⁸⁶ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 76-77.

¹⁸⁷ Renamed the *Dongbei renmin jiefangjun* in 1948.

¹⁸⁸ Dongbei minzhu lianjunzong weishengbu zhengzhibu: “Guanyu muqian jinji gongzuo renwu de zhishi,” September 9, 1946, cited in Gao, 16-18, and in Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iriyōtai,” 40-42.

- e. Where possible, provide the Japanese with Japanese food.
- 3) Observe the following points regarding the humane treatment of the personhood of the Japanese:
- a. Insofar as they do not seriously violate Chinese cultural sensibilities, the Japanese are permitted to observe their ethnic customs.
 - b. Treat the Japanese with a kind and good-faith disposition.
 - c. Do not harass Japanese women with indecent acts.
 - d. Do not assault or insult the Japanese.
- 4) Appreciate the importance of Japanese technical expertise and encourage its cultivation.
- a. Understand what precious human resources the Japanese technicians are, and do everything possible to learn from them.
 - b. Those Japanese technicians who are low-skilled, who have a bad attitude towards medical care, and/or who are irresponsible are to be severely admonished, are to be corrected, and are to be made to improve. However, they are not to be treated with either hatred or contempt.
- 5) Waste no time in checking and directing the Japanese work.
- a. Hold regular meetings, establish a system to report on activities, carry out regular inspections of all work, and create clear lines of feedback so that opinions on how to improve processes can be articulated.
 - b. Establish systems for promotion, demotion, and the meting out of rewards and punishments. Encourage exemplary behavior and discourage reprehensible behavior.
 - c. Train those whose skills and techniques are inferior.
- 6) Provide ideological cultivation to the Japanese, and, in particular, seek to overcome the following problematic attitudes:
- a. A lack of understanding of the causes of Japan's defeat at war.
 - b. Positive sentiments towards the Emperor System.
 - c. A lack of appreciation of the power of the PLA, or a lack of trust in the PLA.
 - d. An inability to differentiate between the CCP and the KMT.
 - e. Inattention towards work, and a desire to return to Japan.
 - f. Dissatisfaction towards extensions of their period of employment.

These policies are illustrative of the remarkable compassion and open-mindedness of the PLA leadership in its treatment of its Japanese membership in this period. In Point 1, we can see the explicit call to temper both vindictiveness and obsequiousness, and to treat the Japanese as coequal members of the organization, without succumbing to crudely partisan behavior. In Point 2, we can see these principles set out in practical terms, with specific explanations of the equal employment status of the Japanese (2.a-b), emphasis on the importance of generosity and compassion towards them (2.c-d), and even an acknowledgement of the necessity to make specific cultural accommodations to ensure their comfort (2.e). The insistence on gastronomic accommodations, denotes an awareness that merely equal treatment might result in some discomfort, and hence that egalitarianism is best served by making special dispensations that account for cultural diversity. Point 3 expands upon the importance of treating the Japanese humanely, with 3.c indicating a special requirement to protect Japanese women from sexual misconduct. Points 4 and 5 address pragmatic questions of maximizing the contributions of Japanese labor and cultivating their technical expertise. Here, again, even when noting the need to correct or admonish those Japanese comrades who fail in their duties, as in 4.b, we are reminded of the importance of restraining “hatred and contempt.” Point 6 outlines six ideological or educational concerns regarding the mental state of the Japanese members, and likely provides a framework for the content of the re-education and self-criticism sessions that Japanese comrades were required to enroll in throughout their time in the PLA. Point 6.a is tantalizing, but enigmatic: without further clarification, we might tentatively speculate that the misconception at play would be an underemphasis of the communist (both Chinese and Soviet) role in Japan’s defeat. In contrast, 6.b is self-explanatory, and a recurring concern in the management of recalcitrant Japanese POWs throughout and after the war; 6.d is of particular interest to us, as it again illustrates the anti-ethnoessentialist character of the PLA’s policymaking in this period. The general tenor of these policies is demonstrably designed to absolve the Japanese membership of any ethnic or racial inheritance of the crimes of Imperial Japan, and to discourage the Chinese comrades from perceiving the Japanese members in this way; conversely, 6.d discourages the Japanese from perceiving the Chinese people as monolithic, but, rather, as variously engaged on opposing sides of a revolutionary civil war. Points 6.e-f are the most coldly pragmatic of the policies, clearly designating to the cadres that they should expect resistance from those Japanese whose return to Japan is delayed and/or whose service in the PLA is forcibly extended. Taken as a whole, these policies appear to have facilitated the smooth integration of Japanese individuals into PLA units. Whatever skepticism the historian may harbor at the official emphasis on humane and equitable treatment of the Japanese must be tempered by the fact that nearly every Japanese memoir and oral report of their PLA experience contains a glowingly positive description of their treatment and of the conduct of their Chinese comrades, consistent with the policies outlined above, with few exceptions.

Addressing the state of Mandarin-language scholarship on this historical moment, Rogaski notes that the study of “biomedical activities in Manchuria helps to blur the border between colonizer and colonized, a line vividly demarcated in most contemporary mainland Chinese scholarship on Japanese science in Manchuria.”¹⁸⁹ While the vividness of this demarcating line is definitive in the

¹⁸⁹ Rogaski, “Vampires in Plagueland,” 133.

context of recent continental scholarship on the topic, the above documents stand as a body of CCP and PLA official documentation that radically redraws these demarcations along Marxist and international socialist lines. The CCP leadership's commitment to dialectical materialism as the core philosophical framework underpinning political and military doctrine played a significant part in their ability to absorb Imperial Japanese medical expertise. To the extent that there was awareness of the ways in which Japanese and Western medical knowledge had been used to subjugate and deindividuate the Chinese people as part of a Saidian imperial hegemony, there was an equal confidence in the ideological vigor of communism and the ability of CCP cadres to convert colonial theory into decolonial praxis.

The design and execution of integrationist policies aimed at incorporating Japanese individuals into Chinese organizations was assisted by the pre-existing Japanese communist sympathizers and collaborators in Yan'an, some of whom, such as Nosaka Sanzō, had been long-term supporters of the Chinese communist cause. As Monma Yasuo, a Japanese POW captured by the Chinese communists, puts it:

“There were Japanese individuals who assisted in the 8RA's conscription of Japanese people. In every internment camp, one could find remnants of the organizations that had assisted in managing the detention of Japanese people by the Chinese communists: these were Japanese nationals who were in charge of *shisō kantoku* (“thought direction”), and whose position within the 8RA was that of *minzoku kanji* (“ethnic coordinator”).”¹⁹⁰

These “ethnic coordinators” were politruks of sorts, ethnically-focused political commissars tasked with providing educational instruction to their fellow countrypeople in the form of lectures, study groups, and organized self-study of primarily Marxist-Leninist doctrine.¹⁹¹ In Mandarin, the position is referred to as *minzukezhang*,¹⁹² “head of ethnic personnel,” and by 1949, at least one Japanese person, listed as “Comrade Kojima,” held this position above the rank of *tuan* in the Northeast Field Army medical corps, thus earning themselves a mention in the corps' official history appendix.¹⁹³ These Japanese staff of the 4FA operated within the *minzuke*, or “ethnic affairs administration,” and handled operational concerns involving Japanese POWs, internment camps, repatriation logistics, and the conscription and integration of Japanese individuals into Chinese military and civilian medical units. The “ethnic coordinators” also performed the function of smoothing Chinese-Japanese interactions, by functionally appointing Japanese managers to units of Japanese workers, and by ensuring that “Japanese cultural habits were respected and to reinforce the chain of command.”¹⁹⁴ The *minzuke* concept originated in the nonmedical army divisions of the 4FA, where a “Comrade Koga” was appointed and enacted an ideological and political curriculum for the edification of Japanese former soldiers in

¹⁹⁰ Yasuo Monma, *Aru Chūgoku ryūyōsha no kaisōroku* (Suwa: Chōeisha, 1999), 58.

¹⁹¹ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō*, 111.

¹⁹² Not to be confused with *zhengwei* (“political commissars”), who are civilian Party members deployed alongside PLA units in order to provide the latter with military and leadership experience.

¹⁹³ Gao, *ziliao*, 804.

¹⁹⁴ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406.

consultation with the *nihonjin kaihō dōmei* (“Japanese Allies of Liberation,” an organization formerly named *nihonjin hansen dōmei*, “Japanese Anti-War Allies”).¹⁹⁵ The official records describe these policies as a resounding success, not only for the sympathetic Japanese, but also for the more recalcitrant conscripts: following comprehensive re-education programs, the Japanese medical staff are described as having become “unswervingly loyal to the PLA.”¹⁹⁶ These organizations also served as bastions of the international socialist integrationism of the Yan’an period: As well as Chinese and Japanese members, there were Korean, Indian, and Indonesian delegates in Yan’an who provided their insights on strategies for collaborative transnational revolution.¹⁹⁷

Sino-Japanese administrative collaborations led to the creation of several policies aimed at simultaneously integrating Japanese individuals into the Chinese communist units and reducing friction among the new international comrades. Various policy prescriptions indicate this concern: for instance, categorical distinctions were drawn up to differentiate between “Japanese militarists” and “Japanese civilians,” between “officers” and “war criminals,” and between “POWs” and “immigrants,” with each different category receiving a different regime of educational instruction and treatment.¹⁹⁸ It is particularly noteworthy that, in these policies, no cumulative assumptions were made about the Japanese *in toto*, nor were any racially essentialist policies formalized, beyond discussions of Japanese dietary preferences or other minor distinctions of acculturation; a firm commitment to a class-based and/or ideological analysis of difference is maintained throughout, a fact that likely facilitated the integrationist objectives. Intermarriage was initially prohibited, most likely to prevent resentment among the soldiers, but the policy was partially backtracked in January 1948, as described in the official 4FA history:

“On January 1948, at the Northeast Army Division medical unit conference, He Cheng declared that Japanese medical technicians should be treated fairly, respected, and be given the ability to live a good life, as well as given the opportunity to develop their technical skills. Those who perform well should be rewarded the same way as Chinese people are. Japanese people should receive awards in accordance with the same criteria as Chinese people. Japanese male doctors, pharmacists, and technicians, and above given right to marry if they wish.”¹⁹⁹

Although this segment makes no mention of nurses’ rights, cases of intermarriage of this type can be found, suggesting a similar relaxation of policy, if not a policy violation.²⁰⁰ Lu notes that,

¹⁹⁵ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406.

¹⁹⁶ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406-407.

¹⁹⁷ Denning, 143.

¹⁹⁸ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406-407. Note the term *yimin* (“immigrant”) is used, rather than “colonist,” “settler,” or similar.

¹⁹⁹ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 407

²⁰⁰ I will detail one such example in Chapter 5.

at the time, all PLA soldiers were forbidden from marriage, so these policies in fact indicate the extension of a privilege rather than denoting a targeted restriction of action.²⁰¹

These inclusion policies provided a structural framework for collaboration among remarkably diverse hospital workforces. For example, by the end of 1946, the Harbin 9th Backline Hospital had 191 staff members, of whom 42 were Chinese, 104 were Japanese, and 45 were Korean. Similarly, in August 1946, the Bingzhan hospital, formerly the Manchukuo Acheng Field Hospital, had a staff team comprised of 39 Chinese, 101 Japanese, and 4 Korean workers.²⁰² In terms of achieving their objectives, the conscription policies were a resounding success. The 4FA had around 1,600 medical staff in total upon entering Dongbei in 1945; within two years, that number had grown to 29,000, of whom large numbers had been recruited from *riwei jigou*, “Japanese/Manchurian organizations.”²⁰³

We have examined the many ways in which humanistic and/or religious concepts of service, mercy, and benevolence underpinned the extrinsic (and often intrinsic) motives, and certainly provided intellectual and philosophical justificatory frameworks, for the large number of the medical institutions on the Chinese continent from the late 19th century onwards. The concept of *wei renmin fuwu*, “serving the people,” immortalized by Mao in a 1944 speech commemorating the death of a comrade,²⁰⁴ came to occupy a similar location in the PLA’s medical doctrines. The term became a motif of the ideological instruction of both Japanese and non-Japanese medical personnel, and is regularly cited among Japanese personnel as a guiding motivation for the continuation of their medical work on the continent. As *jindō* and *jinjutsu*, Christian ethics, Kantian universalism, and Buddhist mercy were guiding concepts of the medical philanthropies and institutions that prefigured the establishment of the PRC, *wei renmin fuwu* proved to be a syncretic vessel that seamlessly absorbed them into the communist project, re-articulating these principles in the language of Marxist international socialism.

Rescuing Hygiene from the Empire

There exists a profound conflict within the critiques of ‘hygienic modernity’ and ‘humanitarian imperialism’ discussed above: Namely, the difficulty of reconciling the imposition of a medical regime as an instrument of colonial domination with the concrete, physical advantages that this regime often provided to the indigenous communities upon whom the system was imposed. We have seen examples of the cynicism of Imperial Japanese colonial administrators, and of JRCS officials, in using medical institutions as formal or informal instruments of colonialism, as well as examples of the deleterious ways in which medical knowledge was used against the Chinese people, for instance, through the construction of scientifically-justified bioracial hierarchies or the conduct of bioweapons research upon Chinese captives. However, we have also seen the ways in which Chinese locals valued these institutions, sought out their services of their own

²⁰¹ Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai,” 41.

²⁰² Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō*, 218.

²⁰³ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 401. The official history also draws the reader’s attention to the fact that some numerical inaccuracies arose from the destruction of records during the Cultural Revolution.

²⁰⁴ Mao Zedong, “Serve the People” (September 8, 1944), Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. III* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970).

accord, benefited from real reductions in mortality and illness—for instance, via the introduction of antiseptics and maternal care technologies—and, later, prioritized their incorporation into China’s most successful state project of the 20th century. If we treat these two phenomena as intractable, we are forced to conclude either that the medical aspects of the Imperial Japanese colonial project were benevolent as per their propaganda, or that the Chinese public and governing officials were confused about the harmful purpose of these organizations and hence misguided in valuing them. Rather than emphasizing their separability, Rogaski argues that *weisheng* underwent an adoptive transformation, so that, by the rollout of the 1952 *aiguo weisheng yundong* (“Patriotic Health Campaign”), *weisheng* had been transformed from an instrument of Imperial Japanese coloniality into a public, participatory system of national health under the guidance of the government.²⁰⁵ While this view provides interpretative space to conclude that it was precisely the CCP’s uncritical adoption of unexpurgated artefacts of colonial hierarchal iniquity that infected the PRC’s early public health projects and indirectly influenced the various endocidal CCP campaigns of the 1950s,²⁰⁶ it equally recognizes the possibility that those elements had been entirely reconstituted into an unrecognizable, decolonized form.

The sociologist Niklas Luhmann has proposed that it is precisely the incorporation of moral language into ‘amoral’ discursive spaces that generates a dangerous potential for social conflict and the enticement of violence, in violation of the general preference for nonviolent social stability that constitutes the overwhelmingly preferred norm of human communities.²⁰⁷ It is challenging to imagine that the catastrophic death tolls of the CCP’s mass campaigns of 1948-1976 could have been achieved without the systematic production of a moral justificatory discourse for violence and the radical redirection of human energy away from intuitive existential concerns such as food production and towards abstract objectives of civilizational and historical progress or class struggle. These campaigns relied on colossal propaganda machinery designed to proliferate via grass-roots participation of local agents: the success of the medical mass campaigns of the late 1940’s-50’s may well have supplied structural paradigms to the mass propaganda campaigns of the Land Reform Movement, Great Leap Forward, etc. This interpretation indicates that the CCP’s (and later, Mao’s loyalists’) capacity to vector information throughout every community of China, including rural communities (and in this regard vastly outperform the ambitions of the May 4th reformers or any equivalent elite, urban-based national proselytizing project) was robust irrespective of the informational content. The horrific humanitarian cost of the decision by Mao and his clique to utilize these structures to instigate communal violence, designate human classificatory taxonomies that included ‘black’ classes against whom crimes would not be prosecuted or were encouraged,²⁰⁸ and dictate the adoption of experimental and empirically unsubstantiated agricultural-industrial reconfigurations was a

²⁰⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 298.

²⁰⁶ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 393-395.

²⁰⁷ Niklas Luhmann, "Paradigm Lost: On the Ethical Reflection of Morality: Speech on the Occasion of the Award of the Hegel Prize 1988", in *Thesis Eleven*, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990), 82–94.

²⁰⁸ For details on the ‘Five Black Categories’ (sometimes listed as ‘Seven Black Categories’, and counterpoised with the ‘Five Red Categories’, see: Guo, Jian, Yongyi, Song, Yuan, Zhou, eds., *Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 14, 25, and 205.

predictable outcome of this configuration of media and messaging, in particular when coupled with the violent suppression of dissent and of silent abstention through forced participation.

Our study of the collisional trajectory of the CCP's medical personnel and institutional policies present us, therefore, with three phenomena that constitute, if not exceptions, then at least refinements to Rogaski's theories of hygienic empire: First, the 'hyperrevolutionary' ways in which non-colonial and non-state actors, such as international socialist volunteers, communist sympathizers, anarcho-syndicalists, and members of various anti-war, anti-imperialist, and anti-fascist organizations, played a significant part in the promulgation of Western medical concepts without subordination to adjacent coloniality, racialism, or other peripheralizing projects, and frequently in explicit opposition to those projects. The question of salvaging technology from imperial domination was one that Chinese communists openly addressed. A statement published in the *New China Daily*, in reference to the atomic bombing of Japanese cities by the USA, is equally germane to the questions of hygienic technologies:

“The aim of the war is the destruction of Japanese militarism, not the Japanese people... the achievements of science should be devoted to the advancement, instead of the destruction of the human race.”²⁰⁹

Secondly, the fact of the powerful and indigenously-Chinese demand for these medical knowledges and institutions, as evidenced not only by the statements of the Yan'an leadership and top medical directors, but by the internal policies of the 8RA, and by the unsanctioned activities of PLA units in northeast China following Japanese defeat: specifically, the proactive capture and conscription of Japanese physicians to serve in their PLA units. Thirdly, the extraordinary inertia in these institutions that continued unabated even after the total destruction of the Japanese Empire and the disembowelment of its political, philosophical, and spiritual claims, both privately, through communist re-education, and on the public, international stage under the auspices of the SCAP.

The reason for this enduring inertia is, naturally, open to interpretation. I propose that “hygienic modernity” and Western medical practices undeniably proved to be useful instruments for colonial control, and were enthusiastically adopted as strategies to legitimate Japan's imperial encroachment, justify discrimination against non-Japanese subjects, and generate logics of bodily control, intrusion into private spheres, and the reorganization of public ones; nonetheless, those applications were neither inherent nor teleologically overdetermined, but, rather, contingent instrumentalizations of medicine, apiece with what Louise Young calls the ‘Total Empire’. In other words, that the universalist-humanist medical discourse that centers physical, social, and psychological wellbeing appears to have been both salvageable and separable from the grim projects of Imperial Japan and Western coloniality in China. Inasmuch as this argument seeks to extricate some part of modern medicinal practice from coloniality, it is necessarily orthogonal to a strict interpretation of biopower that views the two as inextricable. A corollary claim— although it risks naively replacing one teleology with another – would be to propose that the Meiji

²⁰⁹ Smedley, 415.

sterilization of *eisei* was incomplete, and, in fact, that the *jindō* and *jinjutsu*, alongside the myriad syncretisms of the Christian missions, socialist organizations, philanthropic societies, and other humanitarian collectives dedicated to healing, survived the epistemic violence of Japan's colonial project: that the socialist liberation of medicine itself proved possible. The fact that vast proportions of the early PRC's medical staff were Japanese citizens, and that many of the material and institutional components of the early PRC's medical establishment were appropriated from Japan's retreating empire, provides some tentative credibility to this interpretation, which I hope will ventilate the conversation on hygienic modernity and medicine in empire.

There are two further notes on Rogaski's argument that are germane to the contents of this chapter, and worth addressing immediately. One is the importance of acknowledging the large number of TCM practitioners among the PRC medical staff in the '30s and '40s,²¹⁰ a state of affairs that remains true today, and which operates through a relatively clear division of labor based on objectives: prioritizing Western medical approaches for combatting epidemics, traumatic injuries, maternal and prenatal care, data collection, etc., and prioritizing TCM for questions of spiritual wellbeing, nutrition, general health, malaise, and other holistic questions, with pharmacological research and public health policy resting somewhere in between.²¹¹

Two—given the topics under discussion, it is valuable to temper our theoretical considerations with an approach that centers human experience and is sensitive to human suffering. This type of subaltern concern is one of the many admirable aspects of Rogaski's work, and it is precisely this impulse that leads us to an appreciation for the near-miraculous reductions in mortality that many of the PRC's early hygienic interventions brought about once they were decoupled from the Japanese colonial machinery, but with the full assistance of Imperial Japan's former medical agents. These Herculean efforts halved infant and maternal mortality in the space of a decade, and their capacity to protect the sanctity of human life were neither ideological compromises nor grudging adoptions of the Lordean “master's tools” in lieu of superior indigenous cultural approaches, but, rather, projects carried out in full synergy with the CCP's grand objectives of socialist liberation, anti-colonialism, anti-fascism, and proletarian revolution. The evidence for the possibility of decoupling is strong, and foreshadowed—perhaps even shaped—the kinds of robust pragmatism that became a staple of the CCP leadership after the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death, best exemplified by Deng Xiaoping's immortal dictum: “Who cares if it's a black cat or a tabby cat—if it catches mice, it's a good cat.”

²¹⁰ For details, see Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 57, 60 – 82.

²¹¹ For a recent example of these intersections, recently distributed COVID-19 vaccination leaflets in Fengxian District, Shanghai, instruct vaccinees to “avoid eating spicy food and seafood” after receiving the vaccine. These types of dietary proscriptions, which are virtually mandatory in TCM pharmacology, are typically included alongside Western medicinal instructions as a way of reassuring patients of the efficacy of the intervention, the holistic caution of the physician, and to localize the medical experience within a comfortable cultural one. There is evidence from as early as the 1920s of Chinese physicians' concern with intersecting Chinese and Western medical concepts in non-antagonistic ways. For details, see Nakajima's discussion of *qihua*, *xuelun*, and *tigong*, in Nakajima, *Body, Society, and Nation*, 63-64.

Conclusion: Colonial Theory, Decolonial Praxis

In this chapter, we have examined the principal characteristics of the prewar and interwar Japanese colonial medical establishment, from the high-level abstractions of “hygienic modernity” and “humanitarian imperialism” to the granularities of Sino-Japanese contact exemplified by *senbuyaku* activities. This medical system was highly syncretic, both in its military-civilian interfaces and in its absorption of a wide variety of organizations and philanthropic societies, both Japanese and indigenous; its accurate depiction, therefore, strongly resists simplification. Towards the end of the war, the Imperial Japanese government initiated emergency processes of recruitment, training, and deployment of its home-island and colonial civilian populations, rapidly absorbing large swaths of Imperial Japanese subjects into the medical core of its war machine; these protocols of civilian conscription proved to be persistent features of the medical establishment of Northeast China, even after Japanese surrender, as the PLA and CCP enacted similar strategies for the incorporation of civilians and medical professionals into their own hygienic complex.

Counterpoising the “hypercolonial” milieux of coastal Chinese urban spaces, and their status as sites of production and reinforcement of dehumanizing, medicalized discourses intended to racially deindividuate and hierarchalize the relations between colonizer and colonized, the Liberated Areas became “hyperrevolutionary” sites, in which medicine was defined in terms of international socialist collaboration and foreign assistance. In this context, the CCP and PLA leadership designed organization protocols both to incorporate and to de-program ideologically the former members of the Imperial Japanese war machine and colonial settlers, inducting them into communist units as coequal members. An important component of these protocols was the explicit rejection of ethnoracial conceptions of hierarchical status, a process of excision that separated the “hygienic” from the “empire” and the “humanitarian” from the “imperialism.” Similarly, the humanitarian logics of the variegated medical institutions throughout China in this period found a home and expression in the Maoist concept of *wei renmin fuwu*, “serving the people.” The extreme paucity of conditions in these areas contributed to the urgency of these designs, and the velocity of their ultimate deployment, which will be the main topic of the next chapter.

Ideological retraining was an important component of the CCP’s protocols for the integration of Japanese individuals into PLA medical units, as was the case with recruits of all ethnic and national backgrounds. Nonetheless, certain assumptions and conceptual structures remained largely untouched, although not entirely undiscussed at the highest levels of Chinese communist theorizing. The antifascist egalitarianism of the CCP did not, for instance, reverse assumptions of gendered work, although this phenomenon was contested by critiques within the Yan’an intellectual community. Similarly, structural remnants of the Manchukuo establishment, such as hospitals, clinics, and field treatment centers, frequently continued to serve their intercolonial purpose, often without significant reconfiguration of the leadership or staffing. In the following chapter, I will demonstrate the forms these phenomena took in practice, and in Chapter 4, I will discuss “institutional inertia” as a theoretical instrument for grappling with these types of deep structural continuities.

While the treatment of Unit 731 a synecdoche for the entire Imperial Japanese hygiene complex, is symbolically and psychologically apt, and there exists a peril of stumbling into an apologia for empire by means of detailing the positive dimensions of this impositionary medical system, there nonetheless exists compelling evidence that Imperial Japan's medical complex was far from monolithic, but, rather, encompassed a dizzying variety of agents, philosophies, and objectives, and that many of these both predated and survived the collapse of Japan's ambitions of pan-Asian dominion. Whatever the intentions of the architects of the colonial medical establishment, the subjective experiences of Sino-Japanese medical contacts outside of Imperial managerial oversight generated a liminal space in which new meanings of medicine and hygiene emerged, negotiated between human agents in contexts dictated by emergent circumstance. This distinction was identified and addressed by the CCP's international socialist collaborative philosophies vis-à-vis medical collaboration and encoded in their protocols for the conscription of Japanese workers. The CCP and PLA's vision was conceived and refined in the crucible of Yan'an, and the conceptual and doctrinal structures developed in that "hyperrevolutionary" context proved entirely capable of absorbing—and sanitizing—the remnants of the Imperial Japanese medical system, and, ultimately, turning their labor to the project of national communist liberation.

3

The Setting Sun: Japanese Refugees, Conscripts, and Captives at the End of Empire

Introduction: Dust Before the Wind

From August 9th to August 20th of 1945, the SRA swept south across the border of Manchukuo, sending the Kwantung Army into disarray and seizing strategic military and civilian objectives in their path. Operation August Storm ushered in the end of Japan's continental empire and was followed by the Emperor's "Jewelled Voice Broadcast," the official statement that finally converted the material reality of Imperial Japan's defeat into the political reality of its surrender.¹ The defeat of the IJA in Manchukuo triggered one of the largest refugee crises and population transfers in human history, capturing vast numbers of Japanese soldiers and colonists, and exacting terrible violence on the populations of the northeast. Simultaneously, the intermittently dormant civil war between the CCP and KMT flared into its final and most intense phase, as the two principal Chinese national state projects vied for control of the mainland and for inheritance of the spoils of Japan's fallen empire.

In the present chapter, I will describe the conditions in the former colonies following Imperial Japanese surrender, the management—or lack thereof—of evacuation by Japanese authorities, and the Herculean Allied effort to rescue Japanese refugees, as well as the political project of mass-scale repatriation and expatriation throughout the former Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. I will describe the violence of the SRA in Manchukuo, and place it in a comparative framework against the SRA's actions in Europe and against the actions of the 8RA and other divisions of the PLA in northeast China encountering surrendering Japanese soldiers and civilians. I will describe the specific PLA policies that impacted the treatment of surrendering Japanese nationals, and detail the character and extent of conscription, including "guerrilla conscriptions" of untrained and often underage Japanese colonists. In the process, I will critique some historiographical orientations that generate totalizing and essentialist identifications of civilian populations, and propose reasons for the ellipsis of this episode from historical memory in Japan. Finally, I will examine the experiences of Japanese members of the PLA and their recognition in Chinese official documents and ceremonies, in preparation for a thorough examination of oral reports of Japanese conscription by the PLA in the following chapter.

Unweaving the Rainbow Flag of Manchukuo: Repatriation, Ethnicity, and the *Hikiagesha*

¹ Hasegawa Tsuyoshi has argued that Operation August Storm was the proximate cause of Imperial Japanese surrender, a proposal that raises serious questions about the purpose of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For details, refer to: Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

At war's end, nine percent of the Japanese population found themselves in territories outside the home islands: approximately 3.7 million soldiers and 3.2 million civilians. At the same time, some two million Koreans, 200,000 Ryūkyūans, 56,000 Chinese nationals, and 35,000 Taiwanese nationals had moved to the home islands during Japan's imperial expansion, and a further 1.5m Koreans lived in Japan's former outer colonies. As Lori Watt puts it in her authoritative study of the repatriation efforts following Japanese surrender, "Japan's empire facilitated a degree of ethnic mixing in East Asia not seen before or since."²

While the unmixing of ethnically diverse empires tends to be a protracted process,³ this was not the case with Imperial Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in northeast Asia. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Business Bureau (*gaimushō eirikyoku*), by February 1st, 1950, there remained only 374,429 unrepatriated Japanese nationals on the continent, 60,312 of whom were in Manchuria, and the remainder, in the Soviet Union.⁴ Overwhelmingly, those who experienced *zanryū* ("abandonment") or *ryūyō* ("being kept behind and put to work") were the Japanese captives of the SRA who were transported to the USSR, but a substantial number were in China proper as well, as indicated by Table 2 below:

Region	Repatriates (as of Jan 1 st , 1950)	Unrepatriated (<i>ryūyō</i>)	% Unrepatriated
Soviet Union	1,308,102	316,617	24%
China	3,058,120	60,312	2%
Southeast Asia	745,497	0	0%
US Territories	994,440	0	0%
Australian Territories	139,477	0	0%

Table 2: Numbers and proportion of Japanese repatriates by January 1st, 1950.⁵

The first census of Manchukuo, conducted in 1940, calculated the territory's population at 43,203,000, of whom only 820,000 were Japanese.⁶ The remainder, ethnically designated by Imperial Japanese administrators as *kan-man-kei*, were subjects of the Japanese Empire only in qualified terms. With the empire's collapse, the principle of diverse multiethnicism collapsed, too, to be gradually replaced with the ethnostatist logic characteristic of postcolonial national movements, applicable in former colonial spaces as well as in the home islands. This new reality was reflected in the treatment of the "non-Japanese" subjects of the former Empire of Japan, as described by Andrew Barshay in his study of Japanese captives in the Soviet Union:

² Watt, Lori, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 2.

³ Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples," in *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, eds. Karen Barker and Mark Von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 168.

⁴ Hikiage engo yakusho, *Hikiage engo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Hikiage Engochou, 1951), 94.

⁵ Hikiage engo yakusho, *Hikiage engo no kiroku*, map insert. Although this table's data on Southeast Asia appears to contradict Goscha's research on continuing Japanese advisory and military presence in Vietnam, discussed in Chapter 1, it nonetheless provides a general index of the state of registered repatriation and internment at the outset of the Korean War.

⁶ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 31.

“Official narratives... stress the grand “movement of our nation” (*minzoku idō*) in its epic homeward journey, and the concern and solicitude of the Japanese state for its people. Let us add here that ‘its people’ did mean, explicitly, those of Japanese ethnicity. The Japanese state was rigorous in denying its solicitude to former imperial subjects—Koreans most of all—who were not ethnically one of ‘us.’”⁷

As we will discuss below, even those repatriates that were determined to be ethnically Japanese faced discrimination upon return to the home islands; many were regarded as a ‘different race’ entirely, and Manchurian girls and women were seen as being excessively independent, “snobbish,” and “disrespectful”.⁸ Here, we encounter the historiographical challenge of adequately framing the experience of “repatriation” without endorsing the teleologies of ethnicity and nation produced by the Empire of Japan. Moreover, for many *hikiagesha*, their “repatriation” or “return” to Japan was nothing of the sort, as it represented the first time many of them had ever set foot on the home islands.

Another cohort of “abandoned” Japanese nationals and their families and descendants exists: These are the children abandoned or given up for adoption to Chinese families by fleeing colonists, or whose refugee parents died during the evacuation, referred to as the *zanryū hōjin* (“Abandoned Japanese”) and *zanryū koji* (“abandoned orphans”).⁹ Following Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972, the establishment of *jus sanguinis* citizenship rights and repatriation of the remaining *zanryū* Japanese began, a process that often consisted of several generations of extended families moving from the PRC to Japan. The total number of *zanryū hōjin* repatriates was estimated at approximately 100,000 in 2003.¹⁰ Chan Yeeshan has exhaustively discussed the problems facing study of *Zanryū hōjin* ethnicity, in particular, by drawing attention to the various terminological and categorical issues surrounding the “Japanese” and “Chinese” ethnicities and the anachronisms and atopologisms that plague the study of East Asian ethnic discourses in the mid-20th century.¹¹

⁷ Andrew Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945-1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 200.

⁸ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 56-57.

⁹ For an extended study of the *zanryū koji*, refer to: Itoh Mayumi, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

¹⁰ Chan Yeeshan, *Abandoned Japanese in Postwar Manchuria: The Lives of War Orphans and Wives in Two Countries* (London: Routledge, 2011), i-iv.

¹¹For further discussions of this sensitive topic, besides Chan’s work, see: Robert Arthur Eford, *Japan’s War Orphans and New Overseas: History, Identification, and (multi)ethnicity* (Diss. Washington University, 2004); Li Narangoa, “Japanese Orphans from China: History and identity in a returning migrant community,” *East Asian History* 25/26 (2003); and Rowena Ward, “Japaneseness, Multiple Exile and the Japanese Citizens abandoned in China,” *Japanese Studies* 26, no. 2 (2006).

Japanese Military and Governmental Paralysis Regarding Organizing Evacuation

This large-scale repatriation effort was a response to one of the largest refugee crises in history, triggered by the brutality of the invading SRA. However, it was orchestrated with little input from Japanese political or military authorities. Prior to surrender, the Japanese government had no practical repatriation policies in place, perhaps due to the fear that designing or even proposing such a policy would be a blasphemous admission of the possibility of defeat. After surrender, the transitional government hastily assembled the *Shūsen shori kaigi* (“War’s End Management Commission”) to devise arrangements for Japanese nationals stranded outside of Japan’s suddenly-diminished borders.¹² On August 31st, 1945, the Commission infamously ordered refugees to stay where they were (*teichaku saseyo*).¹³ Then, on September 5th, they changed their mind and ordered the initiation of repatriation from the ex-colonies. However, less than a week later, they flip-flopped again, issuing an ambiguous order that instructed refugees to stay put, unless they needed to come home, in which case they should do so. The incompetence of the Commission and its ambiguously-phrased, mercurial orders became the substance of recrimination and lawsuits against the Japanese government by former refugees in the postwar.¹⁴ Exasperated with the Japanese government’s apparent inability to safeguard the wellbeing of its overseas population, on September 29th, the SCAP intervened and terminated all “possibility of Japanese central government leadership on repatriation.”¹⁵ Japanese official histories note that the Foreign Ministry did make moves to initiate the safe repatriation of Japanese civilians starting on the 14th of August, 1945, but that the GHQ-ordered cessation of Japanese foreign-ministry activities brought these efforts to a halt, ultimately leading them to fall under the purview of the occupation government.¹⁶

The IJA, despite having the greatest resources, familiarity with the northeastern territories, and leadership infrastructure, proved similarly ineffective at organizing evacuation routes or protecting Japanese refugees. As Barshay observes about the torrent of dilemmas faced by Kwantung Army officers in the face of the “enormous systemic rupture” of surrender, “surrender had taken the form of an order, but one that seemed to nullify the giving and taking of any further orders.”¹⁷ A particularly vexing issue related to the status of civilian ex-colonists: Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration specified the territorial bounds of Japan to the archipelago that we know today, more or less corresponding to the territories of the interwar *naichi* (‘Home islands’), while Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration specified a requirement immediately to demobilize and repatriate all Japanese military units abroad. However, the Declaration made no mention of what should be done with civilians.¹⁸ In the face of governmental paralysis and military

¹² Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 62. Two other organizations, the *Shūsen jimu renraku iinkai* and the *Shūsen jimu renraku iinkai kanjikai*, were also convened for this purpose, although, like the *Shūsen shori kaigi*, they proved largely ineffective.

¹³ For an extended description of the failures of the Japanese government to evacuate civilian populations in the aftermath of surrender, see also Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 407-409.

¹⁴ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 63-65.

¹⁵ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 65.

¹⁶ *Kōseishōshakai engokyoku, Kōseirōdōshō no engo gojūnenishi* (Tokyo: engokyoku henshū iinkai, 1997), 29. (Henceforth, *Engo gojūnenishi*.)

¹⁷ Barshay, *The Gods Left First*, 147.

¹⁸ *Engo gojūnenishi*, 28.

indifference, many Japanese refugees had to make difficult decisions regarding their next steps. Some gathered into mutual-help associations, while others sought out traffickers and other independent agents to assist them in leaving the continent. Many in the rural colonial farm-settlements continued with work as usual, and their fates were largely decided by whether their village was “liberated” by the Soviets—typically, a disaster—or by the KMT or the PLA.

The Mechanics of Repatriation

Frustrated with the slow movement of the Japanese authorities, and fearing a vengeful bloodbath on the continent, the US government began to orchestrate emergency evacuation efforts for the Japanese refugees, collaborating with the Nationalist and Soviet government to establish staging points in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Huludao, and Tianjin. Repatriates were transported to processing *hikiage* centers in Sasebo, Hakata, and Maizuru; a major component of this processing was medical treatment and quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable diseases “caused by refugee status.”¹⁹ The USA pledged large numbers of American vessels to assist in this herculean effort, committing 100 Liberty cargo ships and 85 Landing ships to the project; by July of 1946, the vast majority of Japanese nationals north of the 16th parallel had been evacuated to the Japanese home islands, in what must be one of the most formidable humanitarian acts of the century.²⁰ The Soviet Union was in charge of administering Japanese repatriation from North Korea and former Manchukuo, and arranged for a further ~1,000,000 repatriations throughout 1946, although contact with the Soviet-managed evacuation routes frequently resulted in transport to Siberian labor camps. Smaller-scale repatriation programs, including airlifts for Japanese refugees stranded by the Chinese civil war, were also conducted intermittently, with Allied assistance.²¹

The majority of returnees were repatriated under the auspices of these early Allied efforts in the year immediately following surrender, but for many of those ~1.7m Japanese who remained outside of the home islands past December 1946, repatriation was to become a considerably more complex matter. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, one obstacle for Japanese nationals in China was the lack of formal diplomatic ties between the Japanese government and the new communist authorities in China. As a consequence, repatriation in the period of 1953-58 was almost entirely mediated by three NGOs: the Japanese Red Cross, the Japan-China Friendship Association, and the Peace Liaison Society.²² In Korea, the *Keijō Nihonjin Sewakai* assisted with repatriation efforts.

Refugees and Repatriation in Japanese Official Records

In 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Labor and Welfare compiled an extensive historical document that serves as an official record of the experiences of Japanese refugees in the colonies following Imperial Japanese surrender. The document describes the general procedures of evacuation and provides some details on regional variation in the evacuation process, as well as some incidents related to repatriation. The initial efforts, which began in earnest in the spring of 1946, involved

¹⁹ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 38.

²⁰ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 46.

²¹ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 52.

²² Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 9.

moving refugees to Nationalist-controlled territories first, and afterwards repatriating them to Japan with the assistance of the US navy. Due to the massive infrastructural damage caused during the war and by the continuing Chinese civil war, movement to Nationalist areas was slow, arduous, and dangerous, and refugee centers were typically cramped and disease-ridden. The first phase of repatriations, from May 1946 to October 30th, 1946, accounted for around 773,000 individuals from Nationalist areas, and 237,000 from communist ones, for a total of approximately 1,010,000 people.²³ The second phase of repatriation took place from October 25th, 1946 to December 1946, and involved the repatriation of a few thousand individuals primarily from northeastern regions. The third phase, which began in December 1946, was a response to a growing governmental and public awareness of the dire circumstances of many remaining refugees in the northeast. The Japanese People's Association (*nihonjinminkai*) dispatched rescue groups, who rescued around 18,000 people by transporting them to repatriation centers in Huludao.²⁴ As the civil war intensified, repatriation efforts became significantly more complicated. From June 4th to June 7th, 1948, a further 2,500 emergency repatriations were conducted from the continent in the "fourth phase."

Many Japanese people north of the 38th parallel in North Korea joined the stream of refugees fleeing south from former Manchukuo, some disguising themselves as Koreans or hiring Korean guides to try and flee to south of the 38th parallel. A large proportion of these refugees were picked up by the US army centers stationed at the parallel, with express purpose of processing Japanese refugees and overseeing their relief and repatriation.²⁵ From the immediate postwar to March 1946, approximately 43,000 Japanese were recorded to have been processed at US-led centers in Seoul. Many more arrived in other parts of South Korea, often escaping on smaller vessels in an effort to make it to the southern part of the peninsula, where safe repatriation was likely.²⁶ In June 1946, The Soviet Army Administration forbade Japanese people from travelling south of the 38th Parallel, putting a stop to the steady stream of refugees, but, nonetheless, from July to October, around 90,000 more Japanese refugees risked their lives to escape across the 38th parallel. Refugees fleeing the SRA from the border regions of Manchuria ended up in central and southern cities of former Manchukuo, and took refuge in public structures such as schools, temples, or hospitals. Japanese refugees organized relief collectives such as the *nanmin kyūzai iinkai* ("Refugee Emergency Assistance Collective") to distribute food, clothing, and medicine, but, due to widespread shortages and poor living conditions, there were many casualties; typhus and cholera, in particular, were major causes of death for refugees.²⁷

There were approximately 380,000 civilians in Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands at war's end. Early refugee movement evacuated some 76,000 women, children, and elderly Japanese settlers, until the USSR attacked three evacuation ships on August 22nd, killing some 1,700 refugees, then officially ordered a stop to all evacuations the following day.²⁸ A similar incident occurred in 1948, when two repatriation ships set off from Dalian to Japan under the auspices of the newly-minted evacuation compact between the SCAP and the Soviet Union. The passengers of one ship

²³ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 38.

²⁴ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 38.

²⁵ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 41.

²⁶ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 41.

²⁷ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 32.

²⁸ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 32.

were listed as being 898 “Japanese women, children, and elderly persons,” as well as 229 injured ex-IJA soldiers. The second ship’s passengers included 1,734 “Japanese technicians and their families.” The PLA intercepted the ships, capturing 1,200 technicians and permitting the rest of the refugees to continue on their journey to Japan. The captured technicians remained in China until after the Korean War, and, very likely, came to form part of the PLA cohort described in the later part of this chapter.²⁹

There were approximately 275,000 Japanese civilians residing in the Korean peninsula north of the 38th parallel at war’s end. A further 70,000 residents in former Manchukuo tried to escape south of the 38th parallel by train; many were detained in North Korea and taken to improvised detention centers, while around 30,000 were returned to Manchuria for processing by the Soviets. Of those stranded in North Korea, a large majority were children and elderly people who depended upon local Japanese Citizen’s Associations to survive, but, due to a lack of food and resources, as well as to communicable diseases, a large number of these refugees died.³⁰ Japanese nationals were expelled from cities in Liaodong from the 23rd of August. By the 2nd of October, the majority ended up in Dalian. There, they were allowed to engage in economic activity and enjoyed comparative peace and quality of life. However, Mantetsu railway engineers, electric company technicians, doctors, mine technicians, and other technical specialists were all captured and conscripted into work.³¹

The Soviet Captives

Following Operation August Storm and the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo and other territories of the Empire of Japan, vast numbers of soldiers of the Kwantung Army, and many civilians in the former imperial territories, were captured by the Soviet Red Army³² and transferred to labor camps in Siberia and beyond. In the last week of August, the SRA began its “Japanese-hunt” of the northeastern cities, capturing able-bodied Japanese men for transfer to forced labor camps. The SRA “waged a sustained campaign of rape and expropriation and summary violence. The targets were Japanese, Chinese, Koreans—it did not matter which.”³³ Many Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians, and others were also captured by the SRA and condemned to forced labor.³⁴ Although precise figures are difficult to establish, at least 600,000 individuals were taken captive by the Soviets, with around half released by 1950 and the majority released by the autumn of 1956. The mortality rate for captives transferred to the Soviet Union was approximately 10%, an exceedingly high rate that reflects the harshness of conditions in Soviet labor camps.³⁵

Intensive instruction in Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, and other strands of communist doctrine was a prominent feature of captivity for the Japanese internees in the Soviet Union.³⁶ Beginning

²⁹ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 42-50.

³⁰ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 33.

³¹ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 33.

³² Henceforth, “SRA.”

³³ Barshay, *The Gods Left First*, 147.

³⁴ For a thorough analysis of the numbers of former subjects of the Empire of Japan captured by the SRA and transferred to USSR labor camps, see: Barshay, “Appendix: How Many?” in *The Gods Left First*, esp. Tables 1-2.

³⁵ Barshay, “Appendix: How Many?” Table 1.

³⁶ Described in detail in the chapters “Coda” and “Knowledge Painfully Acquired: Takasugi Ichirō and the ‘Democratic Movement’ in Siberia” of Barshay’s *The Gods Left First*.

in the mid-1946, and intensifying from 1949 onwards, the “democratic movement” was a Soviet-guided program of ideological re-education for Japanese internees conducted in the USSR labor camps.³⁷ In his authoritative study of Japanese internment in the Soviet Union, Andrew Barshay suggests that many Japanese captives were incentivized to demonstrate enthusiasm for the re-education programs as a way of accelerating their repatriation, as these programs formed part of a larger Soviet administrative objective to swell the ranks of the Japanese Communist Party with doctrinaire loyalists to the USSR.³⁸ The content of the Soviet re-education included extraordinary statements of loyalty and obeisance to Stalin, described in an open letter with over 60,000 Japanese signatories as the “Greatest Genius of the Human Race and Guiding Star for Workers of the World.”³⁹ These displays do not appear to have been entirely the product of performative pragmatism and self-preservation, but, in many cases, signaled real ideological commitment that had ramifications for the repatriation process and the public perception of repatriates in the home islands:

“As the days of return approached, mass meetings in labor camps and at the assembly points in Nakhodka, with their centerpiece of criticism and self-criticism sessions, consumed much time and energy. Aboard the repatriation ships at this stage, there were attempted lynchings of captains and crew members by their charges, along with violent attacks on activists now beyond Soviet protection. On arrival at the main repatriation port of Maizuru, returnees marching down the gangplank proclaimed themselves to be “landing before the enemy on the emperor’s island,” refused to cooperate with repatriation officials, and demanded transport directly to Communist Party headquarters in Yoyogi (Tokyo)... returnees in the period of the democratic movement often faced suspicion—had they returned “Red”?—and police surveillance.”⁴⁰

As anti-communist anxiety became more pronounced, from 1949 onwards, images of angry, combative, and “brainwashed” *akai hikiagesha* (“red repatriates”) were widely distributed in Japanese newspapers and newsreel.⁴¹ One representative image, depicting a frowning group of men with *hachimaki* headbands inscribed with communist slogans, was printed alongside the legend: “A group of ‘red repatriates’ alight from the vessel. Ignoring their families and loved ones who have come to welcome them, they march forth in silence.”⁴² In another case, the January 5th, 1950 edition of *Nippon News* showed the first *hikiage* vessel of the year, the Takasunamaru, arriving in Maizuru. The disembarking passengers had divided themselves into two groups, the “hinomaru-gumi” (Pro-Japanese-Flag Coalition) and the “han-hinomaru-gumi” (Anti-Japanese-Flag Coalition).⁴³ These images were juxtaposed with news of the arrival of 693

³⁷ Barshay, *The Gods Left First*, 96.

³⁸ Barshay, *The Gods Left First*, 97.

³⁹ Barshay, *The Gods Left First*, 98.

⁴⁰ Barshay, *The Gods Left First*, 99.

⁴¹ For an in-depth analysis of the question of Japanese official reception of “Red” returnees, refer to: Endō, Yumi, “J. M. neruson hikiage kyōiku jigyō no tenkai to tokushitsu (sengo senryōki kyōiku seisaku kenkyū”, in *Gekkan shakai kyōiku* 31(1) hen, 1987.01, 68-77.

⁴² Maizuru Hikiagekō, *Maizuru no kioku* (Maizuru: Yoshida insatsu, 1985), 19.

⁴³ *Nippon News* 212, January 5, 1950.

Japanese war criminals from Java on the same day, and came the day after reports from the Soviet Cominform complaining that “The Japanese Communist Party’s commitment to a peaceful revolution is a mistake”.⁴⁴

Other forms of media filtering back from the continent captured moments where cameras could not reach. Many Japanese captives illustrated their experiences in captivity, and there are several extant collections of illustrations of captivity and repatriation, some of which were drawn during or immediately after the events in question. The largest such collection is exhibited at the Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum, near the site of one of the largest *hikiagesha* repatriation centers in Maizuru City. Former IJA paratrooper Kiuchi Nobuo, who was captured by the Soviet Union, made a vivid series of illustrations depicting the experiences of Japanese refugees, captives, and repatriates. One of these shows Japanese communists angrily arguing with, and attempting to convert ideologically, other repatriates at the internment centers.⁴⁵ Another captive of the SRA, Haneda Mitsuo, drew similar images, noting the “angry vehemence” of the Japanese communists and their frequent verbal and physical altercations with other repatriates.⁴⁶ Not all images of *akai hikiagesha*, however, cast exposure to communist ideology in such a negative light. Although, admittedly, of minor distribution, *Nihon to Chūgoku*, a publication of the *yūaikai*, displayed images of smiling Japanese women dressed in PLA uniforms on the front page of their December 5th, 1950 issue, alongside enthusiastically-positive descriptions of the experiences of the Japanese comrades in the PRC.⁴⁷

The “Japanese People’s Liberation Army”

Concerns regarding the spread of communist ideology and the importation to the home islands of *bona fide* communists from Soviet and Chinese internment also manifested in the form of the spectral *Nihonjin kaihōgun*, the “Japanese People’s Liberation Army.”⁴⁸ One of the earliest references to the “JPLA” corresponds to a 1952 article in *Tairiku Mondai*, an international politics journal especially concerned with tracking the spread of communism. *Tairiku Mondai* ran a regular column called “Reporting from behind the iron curtain,” which provided first-hand reports of developments in the USSR. In the May 1952 issue, a reporter asks:

“One occasionally sees newspaper and magazine reports that in Siberia, Manchuria, Karafuto, and the Kuriles, a number of Japanese divisions of the People’s Liberation Army have been founded, and that they’re being led by so-and-so ... But, in all honesty, does such a thing as a Japanese People’s Liberation Army (*Nihonjin kaihōgun*) truly exist?”⁴⁹

⁴⁴ *Nippon News* 212, January 6, 1950.

⁴⁵ Kiuchi Nobuo, “Kikoku chokugo ni kakareta kiokuga,” in Maizuru hikiage kinenkan shūzō shiryō, *Maizuru e no seikan, 1945-1956* (Maizuru: Maizuru hikiage kinenkan, 2016), 32 (Plate 205).

⁴⁶ Haneda Mitsuo, “Yokuryū kara kikoku made jikeiretsu ni egakareta kirokuga,” in *Maizuru e no seikan*, 37 (Plate 243).

⁴⁷ “Dōshiteiruka? Zaika nihonjin no seikatsu,” in *Nihon to Chūgoku*, December 5, 1980, Issue 7, 1.

⁴⁸ Henceforth, “JPLA.”

⁴⁹ *Tairiku mondai kenkyūjo*, “Nihonjin kaihōgun towa?” *Tairiku Mondai*, May 16, 1952, 58.

The author's unnamed informant from beyond the Iron Curtain describes the existence of a pan-Asian network of communist cells akin to those created by Nosaka Sanzō.⁵⁰ Though the contact is unsure as to the actual nature of a "JPLA," they express the fear that, just as native "PLAs" served as vanguards in the invasion of Korea, a Japanese PLA, combined with *akai hikiagesha* ("Red repatriates") that might operate as fifth columns within Japan, could co-ordinate with strikes against Hokkaidō and Kyūshū to bring down the Japanese government and install a communist regime.⁵¹ The concern of this article lies less with Japanese soldiers and civilians who joined or were captured by the 8RA or N4A, and more with the possibility of a dedicated invasion force being trained on the continent to attack Japan—a "JPLA" designed violently to overthrow the Japanese government with assistance from the Cominform, CCP, and other international communist organizations.

Descriptions of this "JPLA", allegedly obtained from telegram remittances to a Hong Kong newspaper, are rife with contradictions and fatalistic claims about impending war, outlined across three "theories:"

1) *The theory that the JPLA was born in Beijing*

This claim suggests that the "JPLA," created under the guidance of the Far East Cominform, is composed of, at most, around 4,000 members, drawn from the Siberian internment camps and the *chūkyō zanryū bunshi* (Japanese war-orphans left behind in Communist China).

2) *The theory that the JPLA is an offshoot of the Manchurian International Communist Army*

This claim maintains that a "JPLA," formed of 7,000 Japanese volunteers, was an offshoot of China's volunteer forces that were assembled for the Korean War by the CCP.

3) *The theory of 25,000 JPLA soldiers Mustering in Karafuto*

This claim argues that a massive force split in two divisions, and numbering a total of 25,000 men, formed in Manchuria, is currently stationed in Karafuto. This multi-ethnic "JPLA" has been created with the objective of attacking Japan. An alternate source describes a similar "JPLA," numbering 70,000 men from China, Korea, and Japan, of whom 15,000 are Japanese.⁵²

While the claims that any kind of armed invasion of Japan was being seriously considered by the Cominform or CCP are improbable, they do highlight three very real phenomena that affected the public reception of the Japanese returnees from the continent. First, the Cominform's call for militancy, and its involvement in pressuring the JCP to abandon Nosaka's pacifist line in favor of direct action, was an explicit endorsement of communist-directed violence on the home islands, and had significant ramifications for the reputation of the JCP, in particular, and socialist organizations in general, not least by galvanizing right-wing suppression of leftist movements. The Cominform's demands were widely reported, and the association with revolutionary violence doubtless also increased public wariness towards Japanese returnees from the continent.

⁵⁰ *Tairiku Mondai*, May 16, 1952, 60.

⁵¹ *Tairiku Mondai*, May 16, 1952, 62.

⁵² All three theories appear in *Tairiku Mondai*, May 16, 1952, 58.

Secondly, it is highly plausible that Japanese cadres who stayed on in China past 1953, and especially those who attended further education at the *Renmin daxue* (“People’s University”) in Beijing, did, in fact, receive political training to prepare them for leadership positions in some type of communist organization intended as a sort of “JPLA” or Japanese-led Cominform-style institution. Whatever plans were drafted never materialized, in part due to the extreme interruptions to CCP foreign outreach activities caused by the Cultural Revolution and the deteriorating relations between China and the USSR, and in part due to the increasingly visible success of postwar Japanese peaceful governance to address socialist demands and alleviate poverty, especially when contrasted with the disasters of the Great Leap Forward. Thirdly, the increasing media visibility of the “Red Repatriates,” which affected discriminatory attitudes towards returnees who had remained on the mainland past 1946, intensified for those who had spent longer on the continent and thus were perceived (in most cases, accurately) as having been more thoroughly exposed to communist doctrine.

Those Who Were Left Behind

In the wake of the Soviet offensive, the hospitals closest to the Soviet border—Qiqihar, Hailar, Songo Hospital Number 1 (in modern-day Sunwu), Hulin, Suiyang, Andong (modern-day Dandong), Dongning, and Mudanjiang—became sites of terrible violence, with reports of surrendering medical staff being subjected to sexual violence and killed by Soviet soldiers.⁵³ In the face of the onslaught, there exist reports of noncombatant women committing suicide, often alongside their children, to avoid capture by the SRA.⁵⁴ Whereas the Nationalists and Chinese communists typically observed the moratorium on violence against surrendering Japanese soldiers and Japanese civilians and worked to expedite their repatriation or their movement to camps for future repatriation, the Soviet armies captured men as prisoners and transported them immediately to work camps in the USSR, while also stripping communities of their valuables, food, and medicine.⁵⁵

The Kwantung Army’s surrender and withdrawal from Manchukuo was rife with confusion. Many soldiers received no clear orders beyond the need to evacuate the north immediately, and the Imperial Japanese government had prepared no meaningful contingency for the loss of its continental colonies, nor made any provisions to ensure the safe passage of the hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees trapped outside of the suddenly-contracted borders of the empire and desperate to return to the home islands. Fleeing their settlements, civilians begged the retreating Kwantung Army for protection; in one case, civilian refugees asking for military

⁵³ Yamada Noriko, *Nicchūsensō kara daijijisekaitaisenka no jūgunkangofu – nihon sekijūjisha wo chūshin ni* (Dissertation, Kanagawa University, 2010), 64. Yamada also cites a hospital as being in ‘Dong’an’ (東安), in what is very likely a minor typo involving the inversion of the intercolonial (right-to-left) spelling of Andong/Antō (安東).

⁵⁴ For detailed descriptions of the hardships endured by Japanese civilian refugees during the SRA’s attack, see Nakajima, Yoshimasa, *Senshi sōsho kantōgun (2): kantokuen to shūsenji no taisosen* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shuppansha, 1974), 410-412.

⁵⁵ For a comparison of the differing experiences of surrender based on the military administration in charge of managing the handover, refer to: Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, “Staying on: Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, 1945-49,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 42:3 (May 1983), 417-518.

assistance were told by retreating soldiers that “we have received no such orders”,⁵⁶ and, indeed, there is little evidence of any such command or even inclination on the part of Kwantung Army and IJA officers. There is evidence that the retreating IJA, on several occasions, intentionally left Japanese civilians behind as ablative shields, to act as speedbumps for the Soviet advance and provide army servicemen with the time they needed to escape, in full awareness of the treatment those civilians could expect at the hands of the SRA.⁵⁷

By contrast, medical personnel stationed at clinics and hospitals—most of whom, like the Kwantung army soldiers, had also received no clear orders on how to manage the chaos—generally remained tending to the wounded and sick refugees. As one nurse put it: “We had to continue treating the injured. That was our duty.”⁵⁸ When there were no safe hospital facilities available, the remaining nurses collaborated with doctors and residents to transform schools into makeshift hospitals, even as the army abandoned them. The transformation of schools and other public buildings into hospitals, a product of the expediencies of the retreat from the Soviet onslaught and the SRA’s targeting of hospitals for looting and asset-stripping by the Soviet armies, became standard procedure once the 8RA and other Chinese Communist military units began consolidating the continental northeast and discovered that nearly all medical installations had been looted. The institutional memory of this process may well have been acquired by the PLA via conscription of refugees who had been involved in creating *ad hoc* treatment centers during the flight from the Soviets, although it has some antecedents in the impromptu clinics of the interwar Liberated Areas.

Tsumura Namie, a nurse stationed at Jiandao (Modern-day Yanji) military hospital in Manchukuo when the Soviet army arrived, and who was later conscripted into the 4FA, where she remained as a medical worker until her repatriation in 1958, described her experiences as follows:

“On the ninth of August, the Soviet armies arrived, and stripped us not only of our weapons and food, but of our medicine, medical equipment, bedsheets, and anything else that they could carry with them. Since the Soviet military headquarters were located in Jiandao, there was no fighting like in Mudanjiang, but the number of patients grew as Japanese POWs who’d been sent to Siberia and then fallen ill were sent back to us for treatment. Since the Soviet army had taken all our food, we didn’t have enough medical supplies, so huge numbers of us died there in Manchuria. The nurses would slip soybeans into the pockets of our white uniforms,

⁵⁶ These experiences went on to inform the complaints made by the plaintiffs of the *Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai* (Association of Former Japanese Red Cross Military Nurses) in a case against the Japanese government in the 1950s. For details of this incident, see: Moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai, *Nihon sekijūji jūgun kangofu senjō ni sasageta seishun* (Tokyo: moto nisseki jūgun kangofu no kai, 1958), 114.

⁵⁷ For a detailed account of this behavior on the part of the IJA, see Ide, Magoroku, *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin: okisarareta rokujūyonen* (Iwanami Shinsho: 2008), 7-74. See also several eyewitness accounts collected by Dong Bingyue in Dong, “rijiqian jiefangjun guanbing de minjianxiezuo,” 96.

⁵⁸ Oral testimony of former JRCS nurse Tsumura Namie, given in interview with Yamada and cited in Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 71.

and slowly chew on them throughout the day to stave off the agony of an empty stomach.”⁵⁹

It is sobering to contemplate how the autorepresentation of the IJA and the Kwantung Army as guardians of the Japanese people proved diaphanous in the face of defeat and surrender, and to contrast this fragility with the endurance of the humanist principles of medical workers and the stoic heroism of those who remained behind, risking their lives—and in many cases, forfeiting vast tracts of their futures—in order to continue providing medical assistance to the destitute refugees.

The refugee centers where Japanese nationals gathered to await transport to repatriation points under Allied coordination became loci of terrible disease outbreaks, including typhus, dysentery, and cholera. With little or no sanitation, food shortages, and scarce access to medical care, as well as enduring appalling weather conditions and a bitter winter,⁶⁰ Japanese refugees suffered many casualties, even after the end of formal hostilities between the Allies and Imperial Japan. One eyewitness described “piles of dead children”⁶¹ at one of the *chūōkaku* assembly centers, and similarly grisly scenes were reported throughout northeast China.⁶² The mortality rates for Japanese refugees who took part in the earliest rounds of evacuation were considerably higher than the rates for those who stayed behind and joined the Chinese communists. In part, the SRA and PLA seizures of medical equipment, capture of hospitals, and conscription of medical personnel are likely to have exacerbated this loss of life for the refugees, as well as improved the survival rates of those who remained behind, in proximity to the newly-assimilated medical establishment. Japanese records of the *hikiage shūyōsho* (“repatriation camps”) in regions administered by the SRA indicate high numbers of fatalities, despite contemporary Soviet claims to the contrary.⁶³ It is difficult to speculate to what degree the CCP medical conscription policies in particular increased the mortality rates of Japanese refugees, but it would be irresponsible to disregard these policies as a direct factor in increasing the number of deaths of Japanese civilian refugees and demobilized combatants in the period of 1945-46.

Sexual violence by the Soviet Red Army

There exists a troubling academic and journalistic neglect of the topic of sexual violence against women by the SRA in the former colonies following Japan’s surrender. Some attention has been paid to the extent of sexual violence committed by the Allies, and especially by Soviet soldiers, on the collapsed Eastern front following Nazi surrender: In *The Fall of Berlin, 1945*, Antony Beevor estimates that up to two million German women were raped by the SRA.⁶⁴ The work of

⁵⁹ Interview with Tsumura Namie, cited in Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 71.

⁶⁰ Operation August Storm took place during a historic downpour that turned Dongbei into an “ocean of mud,” as vividly described in: Dmitriy Loza, *Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza*, trans. James F. Gebhart (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 115.

⁶¹ Makiko Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite: kangofutachi ga mita “futatsu no sensō”* (Tokyo: nijishobō, 1987), 60.

⁶² For several eyewitness descriptions of sexual violence and looting by the SRA, see: Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 67-68.

⁶³ Hikiage engo yakusho, “Soren chiiki ni okeru mikikansha mondai,” in *Hikiage engo no kiroku*, 94.

⁶⁴ Antony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin, 1945* (New York: Viking, 2002), 28-36.

Norman Naimark and Barbara Johr suggests a similar order of magnitude to the atrocity.⁶⁵ The details of these events in East Germany were poorly publicized among Allied nations at the time, although they were well-known by all concerned governments, militaries, and war correspondents.

One record of mass rapes on the Eastern Front by the SRA comes to us through the Russian author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who witnessed the widespread sexual violence of the SRA during the entrance of his regiment into east Prussia—scenes of obscene horror that he recounts in his poem *Prussian Nights*:

“The town’s a chaos... A moaning, by the walls half-muffled: The mother’s wounded, still alive. The little daughter’s on the mattress, dead. How many have been on it? A platoon? A company, perhaps? A girl’s been turned into a woman, a woman into a corpse. It’s all come down to simple phrases: Do not forget! Do not forgive! Blood for blood! Tooth for a tooth!”⁶⁶

Contained in Solzhenitsyn’s poem, and reflected in many of the assumptions made of this period, is the view that the Soviet soldiers were exacting a vicious but understandable revenge on a people who had brought them terrible personal suffering: “blood for blood.” This reasoning, however, dissolves under scrutiny. First, while the fighting of Operation August Storm was extremely intense, with casualties on both sides numbering 12,031 killed and 24,425 wounded for the Soviets, and 21,389 killed and about 20,000 wounded for the Japanese, in the first two weeks,⁶⁷ the “revenge” view fails to explain the SRA’s equivalently violent actions in the Japanese former colonies without equivalent “justification,” in particular, when juxtaposed with the discipline of the Chinese armed forces. If vengeance was the determinant or even *a* determinant factor, we would expect less sexual violence by the SRA in former Manchukuo and more by the PLA, but the pattern we witness is, in fact, the precise opposite. Similarly, while the IJA inflicted unprovoked serial sexual assault upon the indigenous populations of Korea and Northeast China, there is, again, very little evidence in that case to substantiate the *prima facie* dubious “rape as revenge” hypothesis.

Secondly, this theory fails to question the reasons why a total identification was possible between the fascist regime or military organization and civilians, given the total destruction of the former and the demonstrable vulnerability of the latter, especially where children or the elderly were concerned. Again, in the Eastern Front, we can see this problem illustrated by an eyewitness account of an SRA soldier murdering an East German woman and raping her daughter:

⁶⁵ For details, refer to Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), and Barbara Johr, *Befreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder* (Munich: A. Kunstmann, 1992).

⁶⁶ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Prussian Nights: A Poem*, trans. Robert Conquest (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977).

⁶⁷ Alvin Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), 1176.

“A young German woman, a little over thirty, mother of a twelve-year old girl, knelt at the feet of a Russian corporal and prayed to God that the Soviet soldiers take her and not the girl. Yet her prayers went unanswered... One of the soldiers hit the woman on the face with his boot. ‘Damned fascist pig!’ he yelled. The young woman fell on her back. The soldier who had hit her, shot her in the head and killed her.”⁶⁸

Scenes of mass rape and gang rape were also described in the diary of the marine infantryman Zakhar Agranenko, who served in East Prussia: “Red Army soldiers... Nine, ten, twelve men at a time - they rape [German women] on a collective basis”.⁶⁹ Watt’s study provides us with a similar account in Manchukuo, drawn from a *hikiagesha* memoir:

“The worst period of sexual violence perpetrated on Japanese women by the Soviets was during the first few weeks after the Soviet attack, when soldiers described as undisciplined “prisoner-troops” raped in a chaotic atmosphere. To give just one report, according to a history of the end of the war in Manchuria, *Manmō shūsen shi*, on August 22, 1945, the Soviet military occupied the Dunhua Nichiman Pulp Factory in Jilin Province. More than 300 Soviet troops removed all of the Japanese men from the company dormitory but held the remaining 170 Japanese women and their children and used the women for sex.”⁷⁰

To imagine that the identification of the individual with the state in this manner is a product of a desire for vengeance is precisely to invert the arrow of causality. The identification of a defenseless child with “fascist pigs” demonstrably *precedes* the brutal acts of violence, and, indeed, is likely a necessary precursory step to committing the violence—a step that the 8RA leadership explicitly acted to foreclose. The manufacture of these “synechdochal identities,” where individuals are identified with an ideological, religious, or state construct in preparation for violence, is a component of the broader process of dehumanization, characteristic of genocidal acts throughout history, which should be rejected as an object of uncritical historiographical endorsement.

Violence Towards Civilians as a Matter of Allied Policy

One difference between the conduct of the Soviet and the Chinese armies may lie in the differing disciplinary directives of the military institutions. Laurence Rees has argued that the Soviet command regarded rape and theft as mere spoils of war, and even explicitly endorsed it: Stalin

⁶⁸ Walter S. Zapotoczny Jr., *Beyond Duty: The Reason Some Soldiers Commit Atrocities* (Stroud: Fonthill Media, 2007), 143.

⁶⁹ Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin*, 28. It is worth noting that Russian historians, such as Oleg Rzheshevsky, as well as Russian politicians, such as Russian Ambassador to the UK Grigory Karasin (2002-2005), have categorically denied the occurrence of mass rapes by the SRA in East Germany. For a representative denial, see: Grigory Karasin, “Lies and Insinuations,” *The Telegraph*, January 25, 2002.

⁷⁰ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 110.

himself stated that it was understandable if “a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometres through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle... we lecture our soldiers too much, let them have their initiative.”⁷¹ Rees further argues that the Soviets regarded sexual violence, looting, torture, and other atrocities committed against the surrendered German populace as a potential disincentive to future belligerents that might challenge the Soviet Union: a pre-emptive tactic explicitly intended to raise the cost of waging war against the Soviet Union higher than any population could bear.⁷²

Hasegawa Tsuyoshi has argued that similar reasoning provided a justification for the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,⁷³ as did the totalizing narratives in the Anglosphere that erased the distinction between military targets, soldiers, civilians, and even children and babies, classing all as equivalently legitimate targets of violence.⁷⁴ An intelligence officer for the Fifth Air Force articulated the sentiment in a July 21st, 1945 report: “The entire population of Japan is a proper Military target... THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN.”⁷⁵ The fact that there was very little violent resistance to US occupation, far from disproving this reasoning, served as a teleological proof of the success of the bombing campaign at breaking the alleged suicidal bushidō spirit of the Japanese people, a lesson that, in the interim, has become deeply inscribed into the fabric of the US and UK military-cultural-political complex. The sentiment continues to be reproduced in mainstream US academic and popular publications, with countless books and articles defending or even celebrating the moral and pragmatic necessity of incinerating and irradiating Japanese civilians, including infants.⁷⁶ The reasoning that it was these bombing campaigns that secured surrender and thus, paradoxically, saved lives is both ahistorical and logically puzzling, given the fact that no moves towards surrender occurred after the first 60-odd Japanese cities were flattened, including the capital city, Tokyo, which was reduced to ashes alongside a third of a million of its inhabitants. If that did not secure surrender, why would the

⁷¹ Laurence Rees, *World War Two Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis, and the West* (London: BBC Books, 2009), 361-383. See also Chapter 3 of Zapotocny Jr., *Beyond Duty* (“The Russian Army in Germany: 1945”).

⁷² Rees, *World War Two*, 361-383.

⁷³ Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy*, 182-189.

⁷⁴ For a thorough overview of the general characteristics of anti-Japanese racial hatred in the Anglosphere during WWII, see Dower, John W., “Apes and Others”, in *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986), 77-94.

⁷⁵ Richard B. Frank, “There Are No Civilians in Japan,” The National WWII Museum, New Orleans, August 4, 2020, accessed December 21, 2020, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-civilians-japan>

⁷⁶ For a recent example in popular history, see Malcolm Gladwell’s disconcertingly sanguine paean for the US bombing of Japan, *The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation, and the Longest Night of the Second World War* (New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company, 2021).

destruction of Hiroshima, and if not Hiroshima, why Nagasaki?⁷⁷ It was a demonstrable fact, discovered by the American Air Force through repeated experimentation in the form of murdering civilians, that the Imperial Japanese high command was indifferent to the death of its subjects.

Claims of heavy-hearted, dispassionate utilitarianism conceal the fact that many of these *post facto* justifications came from the desks of men who used Japanese skulls as ashtrays and who considered non-whites to be subhuman.⁷⁸ As Robert McNamara recalled Air Force General Curtis LeMay putting it: "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals"⁷⁹—but, in fact, there has been no prosecution in courts, and very little in Anglophone popular historical memory or mainstream educational curricula. The continued use of indiscriminate bombing campaigns, and the indifference towards mass civilian casualties—exemplified by the recent Iraqi, Afghan, and Libyan wars, and countless other bombing campaigns of the 20th century, including Vietnam and Korea—is a predictable consequence of the Allied nations' historical consensus on the acceptability of murdering civilians, provided one's political objectives are suitably noble. Until serious historical criticism emerges from within military, judicial, and academic establishments on this question, we can expect the US and UK governments to continue using civilian bombing campaigns as a core technique to secure concessions from adversarial political regimes, whatever the human costs—a fact that is abetted by the historians who have made it their life's work to explain the moral necessity and strategic perks of killing children.

Allied Censorship of Reports on Rape and Continued Omissions in Historical Memory

Aware of the threat that reports of sexual violence posed to the maintenance of the Allied moral high ground that justified the terms of the Japanese occupation, SCAP censors moved swiftly to enact bans on reporting crimes committed against Japanese civilians by occupation forces or their allies, including the SRA.⁸⁰ The SCAP forbade criticism of the Soviet Union for the first

⁷⁷ These questions were asked, and answered, by many in the US military chain of command. As Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz put it: "The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral William Leahy put the sentiment in starker focus: "My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." In 1946, Fleet Admiral William Halsey Jr. stated that "the first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment.... It was a mistake to ever drop it.... [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it." For sources of the above citations, and a discussion of the US military attitudes towards the bombing, refer to: Gar Alperovitz, "The War Was Won Before Hiroshima – And the Generals Who Dropped the Bomb Knew It," *The Nation*, August 6, 2015, accessed May 31, 2016, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bombed-hiroshima/>

⁷⁸ For details on headhunting and corpse trophy collection by US soldiers during WWII, see Simon Harrison, "Skull Trophies of the Pacific War: transgressive objects of remembrance," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 12, no. 4 (2006), 817–836, esp. 822.

⁷⁹ Errol Morris, dir., *Fog Of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara* (2003;).

⁸⁰ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), 412.

years of its tenure in Japan, censoring any mention of Soviet atrocities against Japanese settlers on the continent,⁸¹ and explicitly censoring any mention of the rape of Japanese women.⁸² As a consequence, there are few extant contemporary Japanese-language accounts of Soviet excesses, nor is there a substantial record of Soviet sexual violence against populations caught in the wake of Operation August Storm.⁸³ Nonetheless, without exception, every single one of my interviewees reported directly witnessing rape, sexual assault, or some form of sexual misconduct by the Soviet Red Army. The ubiquity of sexual violence by the SRA in oral reports did not translate into a substantial body of printed documentary evidence in the aftermath of Japanese surrender, although The Japanese Welfare Ministry's official history of repatriation does make reference to Soviet violence targeting Japanese refugees who fled the brunt of the SRA assault.⁸⁴ Similarly, the Japanese governmental body charged with overseeing repatriation from 1950 onwards published its own report on the situation, noting obliquely the "profound problems" faced by women stranded on the continent.⁸⁵

Because of the paucity of documentation, it is extremely difficult to provide an estimate of how many women in the continental northeast suffered sexual assault at the hands of the SRA. Laws on abortion were relaxed for women returning from the continent, leading to the widespread coordination of abortions for returnees, many of which were conducted under makeshift conditions, aboard hospital ships or at the clinics in the repatriation centers on Japanese soil, such as at Maizuru.⁸⁶ In his study of the mass-scale abortions, medical doctor Takeda Shigetarō places the number at between 30,000 and 40,000.⁸⁷ In an April 24th, 1946 article of the *Asahi Shinbun*, an estimated 30-40% of women returnees "have been given the burden of raising a mixed-race child," the implication plainly being that these children were conceived by rape.⁸⁸ In the same year, the *Mainichi Shinbun* ran an editorial entitled *Akai heitai no ko ga umarenu wake* ("So that the children of the Red Army are not born").⁸⁹

At present, comparatively little attention has been given by the Japanese associations dedicated to preserving and curating historical memory to the sexual violence committed by Soviet forces against women of all nationalities in the former Japanese colonies following surrender. For instance, the *Manmō heiwa kinenkan* in Nagano, which includes an exceptional and otherwise comprehensive collection of documents relating to the colonization and evacuation of

⁸¹ For details on postwar SCAP censorship of anti-Soviet content, see: Kimoto Itaru, *Zasshi de yomu sengoshi* (Tokyo: Shinchōsen-sho, 1985), 39-41.

⁸² Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 144.

⁸³ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 83.

⁸⁴ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 32.

⁸⁵ Hikiage engo yakusho, "Saigo Dankai no hikiage engo," in *Hikiage engo no kiroku*, 97.

⁸⁶ The politics surrounding the legal status and treatment of mixed-race children in Asia born as a consequence of mass wartime rapes is by no means exclusive to this moment, nor exclusive to the violence committed by Japanese and Soviet soldiers, but is, rather, a part of the troubling continuities of the mid-20th century. Controversies surrounding the *Lai Dahan*, Vietnamese-Korean children born of South Korean rapists and Vietnamese mothers during the Vietnam War, have recently begun to attract wider political and scholarly attention, as have the experiences of Japanese and Okinawan women raped by US soldiers during the occupation.

⁸⁷ Takeda, Shigetarō, *Chinmoku no yonjūnen: Hikiage jōsei kyōsei chūzetsu no kiroku* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1985), 196.

⁸⁸ *Asahi Shinbun*, "Hikiage ni mo jōsei no chikara," *Asahi Shinbun*, April 24, 1946.

⁸⁹ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 116.

northeastern China, makes no reference to sexual violence faced by women on the continent in the wake of Operation August Storm. Watt reports a parallel finding in the early '90s: "The Prime Minister's Office instituted a program to commemorate the hardship faced by repatriates after the war but it did not address sexual violence."⁹⁰ Similarly, Tessa Morris-Suzuki has argued that attempts to dislocate established historical paradigms, for instance, by connecting WWII violence against women to the events of Bosnia in 1993, fell victim to "backdoor censorship" via cancellation and deplatforming.⁹¹ Social pressures also play a part of this conspiracy of silence: in reference to Japanese "comfort women" forced into sexual slavery by the IJA, as well as victims of SRA sexual assault, Ueno Chizuko has noted the reluctance of Japanese women to come forward, and the concomitant absence of their experiences from official records or public historical memory.⁹²

Watt proposes that one reason for the lack of condemnation of sexual assault of Japanese women stems from the Japanese government's questionable moral authority to condemn sexual violence, given the actions of the IJA in Nanking, the sexual enslavement of Korean women, etc.,⁹³ yet, it is worth noting that the omissions appear to extend to the NGOs that manage much of the preservation of Japan's historical memory, indicating social phenomena that extend beyond governmental instruments. Furthermore, Watt's analysis of the Japanese government's reasoning is contingent, once again, on the purposeful and totalizing indistinction between nation, military complex, soldier, and civilian. It is, however, both descriptively valuable and normatively possible to condemn the sexual violence committed by soldiers of the IJA without diminishing the suffering of civilian women assaulted by soldiers of the SRA.

Discipline in the 8RA

In contradistinction to the statements by Stalin and the SRA officers' lax attitudes towards military discipline, the leadership of the PLA took substantial pains to prevent violence against civilians, including Japanese former colonists and surrendering soldiers of the Kwantung Army. One reason for the PLA demanding strict maintenance of military discipline was the need to differentiate their soldiers' behavior from the extreme violence and inhumanity of the IJA, in particular, after General Okamura Yasuji initiated the 1942 *Sankōsakusen* ("Three Alls Strategy: kill all, burn all, loot all."), which left deep scars throughout the northeast. A more immediate reason is rooted in the core disciplinary doctrine of the PLA, dating back at least to the conflicts between the PLA and the KMT military of the late 1920s, which was reissued on at least two later occasions with minor modifications. According to the *People's Daily*, in October 1947, the General Headquarters of the PLA issued a standard version of the Three Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention:

⁹⁰ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 122.

⁹¹ Franziska Seraphim. *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (New Jersey: Howard, 2006), 310-311.

⁹² Ueno, *Nationalism and Gender*, 128.

⁹³ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 122.

The Three Main Rules of Discipline:

- (1) Obey orders in all your actions.
- (2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
- (3) Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points for Attention:

- (1) Speak politely.
- (2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
- (3) Return everything you borrow.
- (4) Pay for anything you damage.
- (5) Do not hit or swear at people.
- (6) Do not damage crops.
- (7) Do not take liberties with women.⁹⁴
- (8) Do not ill-treat captives.⁹⁵

These policies were systematically drilled into recruits, including the Japanese recruits of the PLA, during daily instruction sessions. One branch of the 8RA converted them into marching songs, which were to be sung by soldiers on the move and which served as useful mnemonics.⁹⁶ One Japanese former member of the PLA, Saitō Yoshio, recalls the severity of discipline:

“In some ways, discipline in the 8RA was extremely strict. I’m sure you’re familiar with the tight marching discipline of the 8RA: The Three Rules and the Eight Points of Attention. If you violated these rules during peacetime, you’d be extremely strictly disciplined in a “criticism session.” Those sessions were no joke. They were really dreadful. If you violated the rules on the battlefield, you’d be shot on the spot. In particular, violence towards women, gambling, and stealing would be punished with the utmost severity. I witnessed two on-the-spot executions while working as a medic near the front lines. The men were shot right where they stood. We were all quite casual in some ways, but the maintenance of those rules of discipline was absolute.”⁹⁷

Another explanation for the difference in treatment of civilians by the PLA and the SRA resides at the level of the differential underpinning philosophical logics that informed policy-setting by the two armies’ respective leaderships, and that percolated down to decisions by officers and soldiers on the ground. The distinction resides in the different conceptions of “contradiction” in

⁹⁴ An earlier version of the Eight Points lists Point (7) as “Do not bathe in the presence of women.”

⁹⁵ The version I have chosen corresponds to 1947, and is found in Mao Zedong, “On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention—Instruction of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (October 10, 1947),” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: Vol IV* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977).

⁹⁶ Miura Kenji, Personal interview, 13.

⁹⁷ Saitō Yoshio, Personal interview, 18.

Stalinist vs. Maoist interpretations of Marxist-Leninism. In addressing the question of “contradiction”, Mao distinguished between “antagonistic” and “non-antagonistic” contradictions:

“The contradictions between ourselves and the enemy are antagonistic contradictions. Within the ranks of the people, the contradictions among the working people are non-antagonistic, while those between the exploited and the exploiting classes have a non-antagonistic as well as an antagonistic aspect.”⁹⁸

This doctrinal distinction generated a difference in military and political praxis: in the PLA, there existed a potential non-violent space for conflict resolution, hinging on the definition and application of the categorizer “enemy.” As we have seen in previous chapters, while it might seem intuitive that IJA soldiers and even civilian settlers would have satisfied this designation, the reality of CCP/PLA contact with surrendering Japanese soldiers and civilians was neither so simple nor so antagonistic. In 1937, Mao already referred to this question in the following terms:

“Japanese officers and soldiers captured and disarmed by us will be welcome and will be well-treated. They will not be killed. They will be treated in a brotherly way. Every method will be adopted to make the Japanese proletarian soldiers, with whom we have no quarrel, stand up and oppose their own fascist oppressors. Our slogan will be: ‘Unite and oppose the common oppressors, the Fascist leaders.’ Anti-Fascist Japanese troops are our friends, and there is no conflict in our aims.”⁹⁹

In contrast to Mao’s granular approach, Stalin did not differentiate between “antagonistic” and “non-antagonistic” contradictions, but, rather, treated all contradiction as antagonistic and necessitating resolution through force, without space for peaceful negotiation of difference. As the PLA and SRA encountered surrendering armies and populations, the ways in which this philosophical distinction played out in practice became starkly apparent: the PLA forces showed restraint towards their captives, while the SRA forces acted with extreme violence.

These insights allow us to further revise the view that Soviet violence in East Germany during the SA occupation was motivated primarily by vindictive animosity, as argued by Richard Bessel, among others.¹⁰⁰ In fact, the SRA levelled a similar degree of violence against the Japanese Manchukuo settlers, against whom Soviet soldiers would have presumably held few personal grudges. The causes of the SRA’s conduct of peacetime violence against surrendering soldiers and occupied civilians were multivalent, but principal among them was not merely a

⁹⁸ Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” speech at the Eleventh Session of the Supreme State Conference (February 27, 1957), in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: Vol V* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977).

⁹⁹ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1968), 92.

¹⁰⁰ For a representative argument to this effect, see: Bessel, Richard “Hatred after War: Emotion and the Postwar History of East Germany,” *History and Memory* 17, no. 1-2, Special Issue: Histories and Memories of Twentieth-Century Germany (Spring-Winter 2005), 195-216.

lack of military discipline, but a disciplinary doctrine for the treatment of enemies that was informed by Stalin's understanding of the rectitude of violent antagonism in the treatment of adversaries, rather than born of a desire for vengeance against former oppressors. The widespread violence towards non-combatants, women, and children already suggests this explanatory dimension; it is further substantiated by reports from the Western front of SRA troops forcibly conscripting British soldiers released from German POW camps and transferring them to factory labor, seizing their personal property, and raping British women freed from those same camps.¹⁰¹

Japanese Fears of the 8RA and Abuse by the 8RA

In the aftermath of surrender, rumors abounded among Japanese settlers of atrocities at the hands of the communist forces, including the 8RA, the most visible division of the PLA in China's northeast. Given the relative scarcity of reports, oral or otherwise, of violent excesses against the Japanese by the PLA, it is possible that these rumors stemmed in part from a confusion between the activities of the SRA and those of the Chinese armies. Nonetheless, 8RA official reports from the period note that the Japanese were ubiquitously afraid of being killed, enslaved, or sexually violated, and PLA officers were instructed to take painstaking measures to ensure that Japanese civilians did not commit suicide rather than interact with the Chinese communist military units sent to liberate Dongbei.¹⁰²

Fears of brutal treatment at the hands of the Chinese communist armies rarely appear to have translated into reality, and, by the end of 1945, the differences in treatment between captives of the PLA and those of the SRA had become obvious to the former colonists. The majority of reports of interaction in this period describe the discipline of the PLA in glowing terms, with PLA soldiers strictly observing the rights of their Japanese captives. Japanese women, in particular, report consistently that to be captured and put to work by the 8RA was to be "rescued" from the far-worse fate of falling into the hands of the Soviets.¹⁰³ As one captured nurse put it: "The soldiers of the 8RA were always kind and polite,"¹⁰⁴ another, a medical worker, stated: "Being saved by the 8RA was comparatively good fortune... [I] was grateful to be given food, clothing, and shelter by them."¹⁰⁵ In an autobiographical memoir describing her experiences of 8RA conscription at the age of 17, Honda Kyōko notes: "The people of China treated us humanely. We were not prisoners, but humans."¹⁰⁶ Honda also describes how her fears of the Chinese communists was allayed entirely through contact with them, but not so her apprehension of the Soviets. A similar pattern emerges in the interviews of Japanese conscripts of the PLA that I conducted, featured in the next chapter.

Despite the majority of evidence corroborating the good discipline of the PLA, by no means are all reports of capture or contact with the Chinese communist armed forces positive. Many

¹⁰¹ For details, see *Foreign Office to Washington*, 31st May 1945, PRO, F0371, 47882, N5846. Specifically, *Anglo-United States-Soviet relations. Code 38 File 165 (papers 4919-7168)*.

¹⁰² Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406.

¹⁰³ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 135.

¹⁰⁴ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 113.

¹⁰⁵ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 150, 180.

¹⁰⁶ Honda Kyōko, *Botankō wo koete: jūnanasai no jūgunkangofu* (Tokyo: Kōyōshuppansha, 1997), 101.

Japanese captives faced forced labor under brutal conditions, in much the same way as the captives transferred to the USSR. One such forced laborer was Kiyono Kiyokazu, a young employee at an IJA field hospital in northern Manchukuo in 1945, when he was captured by the 8RA and transferred to work at a munitions factory near Harbin. He remained at the factory for eight years, performing forced labor until his repatriation in 1953, alongside “one hundred or so other Japanese captives.” Kiyono describes bitter experiences of slavery: “They stole my life. They stole my youth. Make sure that you tell everyone that I hate the communists.”¹⁰⁷ Kiyono’s negative experiences of the PLA are not isolated. Mori Hikoaki, the son of a Mantetsu employee who was drafted into the IJA in May 1945, escaped to Sasebo with his mother and his younger brother and sister. The flight took over a year, during the course of which his two siblings died of hunger. Mori later heard that his father had been executed by PLA soldiers after surrendering his weapons.¹⁰⁸

Incorporation of Japanese Refugees into PLA Medical Units

The twelve-point *General Order Number 1* of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, a document that detailed the surrender procedures for IJA soldiers, made no mention of a protocol for Japanese surrender to Chinese communists. Rather, Japanese soldiers surrendering on the Chinese continent were ordered to do so to “Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,” and those in “Manchuria [or] Korea north of 38 latitude shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.”¹⁰⁹ As far as the Allies were concerned, the legitimate government of China in 1945 was the KMT, and the Chinese communists, despite their alliance with the USSR, were in no position to accept formal Japanese surrender or process refugees, even in areas where PLA forces had engaged in direct battle with the IJA. In this context, from the perspective of the new international legal order that the Allies were formulating for East Asia, all Japanese conscripts of the PLA in 1945-46 were “guerrilla recruits,” captured outside of the US-KMT-USSR sanctioned legal framework.

It was clear to the PLA leadership that some level of coercion would be necessary to conscript many of the Japanese ex-colonists, given their widespread eagerness to repatriate and general fear of the communist armies. The PLA’s official histories note that “only a small proportion came of their own accord.”¹¹⁰ Hirota Ayako, who was personally affected by the conscription policies, describes her own reluctance and that of her Japanese compatriots:

“In the first February after surrender, an emissary from the Benxi City Japanese Neighborhood Association came and told us that the Eighth Route Army hospital needed manpower, so each household had to hand over one daughter. Just like that, I was taken away. Presently, rumors that our unit would have to urgently redeploy

¹⁰⁷ Kiyono Kiyokazu, Personal interview, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Mori Hikoaki, Personal interview, 3.

¹⁰⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “General Order Number 1, J.C.S 1467/2, 17 August, 1945,” in *United States Congressional Record* (6 September 1945).

¹¹⁰ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406.

started to circulate, and all the Japanese conscripts started to cry and raise hell, but there was nothing we could do about it.”¹¹¹

These kinds of “guerrilla recruitments” were also a prominent feature of conscriptions to medical units of the PLA. The JRCS archives largely chronicle the experiences of official JRCS personnel, and the PRC official histories such as the 4FA’s *gongzuoshi*, indicate that the majority of the recruited Japanese medical personnel came from “railway hospitals,” “mine hospitals,” “city/prefectural hospitals,” “farming *kaitakudan* hospitals,” “pharmaceutical factories,” “medical schools,” “medical technology facilities,” and Imperial Japanese Army and Kwantung Army medical units.¹¹² In these records, little mention is made of the ways in which Japanese civilians and nonmedical personnel came to be conscripted, trained in medical techniques, and incorporated into the PLA’s preorganizations. Lu identifies three primary avenues for Japanese recruitment:

- 1) Hospital employees who remained in place following the communist takeover and who declined or were refused permission to repatriate.
- 2) Individuals who, fearing existential danger at the hands of the Soviets, destitution caused by the widespread destruction in the wake of Operation August Storm, or the appalling conditions for Japanese refugees at repatriation centers, decided voluntarily to enlist in PLA hospitals as a strategy to secure their livelihood.¹¹³
- 3) Locals who were forcibly conscripted from their homes, refugee camps, or repatriation routes.¹¹⁴

An examination of memoirs and oral histories of Japanese individuals in northeast China at war’s end suggests that this latter group, though poorly represented in the official histories, nonetheless constituted a nontrivial proportion of the PLA’s Japanese recruits, and that many of them were conscripted as teenagers, or even as children.

PLA Conscription Under False Pretenses and Recruitment of Teens and Children

The Japanese Welfare Ministry notes that, by war’s end, there were virtually no fighting-age males among the 1,550,000 civilians remaining in the former Manchurian territories, as they had all been conscripted into the Kantōgun as part of the *nekosogi dōin*.¹¹⁵ These policies of “root-and-stem” recruitment, which ran a fine dragnet through the colonial population, drawing them into military service, experienced an improbable afterlife with the 8RA’s guerrilla conscriptions. According to Japanese official records, generally speaking, civilians were not captured by the Soviets. However, due to manpower shortages, some men were put to work in work teams, on

¹¹¹ Lu Xijun, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai de katsuyakushita nihonjin: Aru guniin no kiseki,” in *Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū* 6 (Sendai: Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū Sentā, 2004), 37.

¹¹² Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 406.

¹¹³ Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai,” 39.

¹¹⁴ Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai,” 38.

¹¹⁵ *Enjo gojūnenishi*, 32.

the presumption of being disarmed soldiers. Of these, approximately 55,000 died from overwork, exposure, and similar causes in the work camps. Including civilians, a total of approximately 70,000 died in captivity.¹¹⁶ The 8RA, by contrast, showed no compunction in conscripting from among the civilian settler population.

The 8RA's conscription of teens and young adults does not appear to have been accidental, but was the product of explicit orders by the officers on the ground. Kawabata Ichiko's experience is representative of the character of these decisions. Born in 1931 in Yamanashi, she and her family emigrated to work on a *kaitakuchi* in Manchukuo in 1940. On January 1st, 1946, while the villagers were awaiting logistical support to begin the process of moving to one of the coastal staging camps to prepare for repatriation, the *kaitaku* village head received a letter from the chief medical officer of the 8RA unit stationed in the village, requesting "30 or so youths of around 18 to work as hospital orderlies." Kawabata was one of those chosen. She was 14 at the time of her conscription, and did not return to Japan until 1958.¹¹⁷

In the winter of 1945-46, word began to spread of the ways in which the 8RA conscriptors were separating children and teens from their families. One example is the case of Aihara Keiko, who was sent to Harbin to receive nurse training in 1942 and, ultimately, became chief nurse at the Tonghe Field Hospital Number 2. Aihara was recruited by the 8RA at the age of 19 from the Nangang clinic in which she was treating Japanese refugees, alongside her colleagues Nimori Noriko (aged 16) and Honda Utako (aged 18). The 8RA arrived in a truck, and the soldiers asked the nurses to help them out "for three days." As Aihara recounts the event:

"Since it was only three days, we only brought three days' worth of changes of clothes with us. But in the end, it wasn't three days! Nor was it three months. It was seven or eight years!"¹¹⁸

Despite the dubious circumstances of their incorporation into the 8RA, by the time the three were due to repatriate from Shanghai in 1953, they had taken such a liking to their work in China that "they discussed running away and hiding until the ferry left."¹¹⁹

Ōhara's description of Yamazaki's deceptive recruitment provides us with another example. Yamazaki was serving at an IJA hospital in Jinzhou when a young doctor from the 8RA unit in charge of accepting her unit's surrender asked for her services for "two or three months at most," promising that she would be discharged after the winter and allowed to repatriate alongside her countrymen. Yamazaki was transferred to an 8RA field hospital in Shuangcheng, southeast of Harbin, but, as the Chinese civil war intensified, her orders to remain were extended. As

¹¹⁶ *Engo gojūnenshi*, 34. These numbers approximately match those elucidated by the research of Andrew Barshay research, discussed on page 83.

¹¹⁷ Kawabata Ichiko, *Ōgawa no nagare no yō ni* (Tokyo: Kōyōshuppansha, 1999), 13.

¹¹⁸ Aihara's experiences are recorded in an interview conducted by Dong Bingyue and published in his collection entitled "Seeking the Japanese former members of the Eighth Route Army," in *Xunfang riben laobalu* (Beijing: xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2015), 8-10. (Henceforth, "*Laobalu*.") All translations from the Japanese are Dong's, and retranslations from the published mandarin are my own. Another example under almost identical circumstances is provided by Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 71-72.

¹¹⁹ Dong, *Laobalu*, 23.

casualties mounted during the Siping campaign of 1947-48, it became clear that her services would continue to be needed, and she remained in China serving in the 8RA until 1958.¹²⁰

These reports invite three major interpretations regarding the intentions of the 8RA recruiters encountering Japanese settlements during the first winter after Japanese surrender. One reading is that the promises of short duration of employment made by 8RA officers, whether “three days” or “three months,” were intentional misrepresentations with the objective of allaying the fears of the Japanese refugees that they would be conscripted long-term and prevented from repatriating—fears which, in fact, proved entirely justified. A second possibility is that the 8RA themselves did not predict the intensity of the widening Chinese civil war. In this reading, while their initial intentions were to secure short-term medical assistance for their field hospitals and army units, as the weeks turned to months and the casualties of CCP-KMT combat began to increase, especially following the start of the Siping campaign, they reneged on their earlier promises and extended the period of conscription. A third interpretation is logistical: namely, that access to repatriation routes, staging points, refugee camps, and the coastal regions where the repatriation vessels were operating became inhibited for the communist forces, and that their Japanese workers were effectively stranded in the communist regions by the territorial strictures of the civil war. A full analysis of this third proposition would require a detailed examination of the specificities of territorial exchange during the military engagements in this period, a project which goes beyond the scope of our study. Without robust documentary evidence suggesting any formal articulation of the need to deceive the Japanese conscripts, and given the evident respect and good treatment of the Japanese comrades of the 8RA in other areas described throughout this chapter, I am inclined to favor the second interpretation, that is, that the officers were initially sincere in their expectations that the duration of conscription would be comparatively brief.

One fact that is incontrovertibly supported by these reports is the explicit targeting of youths by the 8RA recruiters. Although there is no documentary record detailing this preference as an official PLA policy, nearly every memoir and oral report examined in our study supports the observation that teens and young adults were systematically selected for recruitment. Again, we can only speculate as to the reasons for this: most forthcoming are the possibilities that the 8RA considered youths to be easier to train, easier to “deprogram” ideologically, physically more robust, and/or consider that they might feel a deeper affinity for China by dint of having spent the majority of their lives on the continent and possibly having little or no memory of the Japanese home islands.

One potential reason to prioritize the conscription of inexperienced Japanese youths, with the objective of training them for medical roles after, lay in the abovementioned fact that medical knowledge and expertise in the northeast was, by the end of 1945, overwhelmingly contained either within Japanese institutions or embodied by Japanese individuals. Given that most Japanese settlers were functionally monolingual, a fact that extended even to those physicians who had had relatively extensive contact with autochthonous populations, such as Pacification Team members or physicians at the Fushun mine hospital, the transmission of medical education to non-Japanese-language speakers was structurally hampered. In addition to this, medical textbooks, medical supplies, and even forms of medical knowledge, such as medicine-jar labels or gestural terminology, were overwhelmingly encoded in a Japanese-language epistemology.

¹²⁰ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 107.

Access to this body of knowledge was already inhibited by substantial complexity and literacy barriers of the sort described by Ewen's abortive attempts to teach in Shaanxi, and the additional distance generated by the language barrier supposed an obstacle that Chinese communist cadres identified as impossible to overcome in the short term. Considering the recent experiences of the difficulty of acquiring medical knowledge and praxis, even among the highly-motivated comrades of Yan'an, it is less surprising that the PLA resorted to the apparently convoluted expedient of recruiting Japanese youths as nurses and medical technicians-in-training. This fact also sheds light on Sections (4. b) and (5. c) of the 1946 PLA integration directives described in the previous chapter, passages that indicate that education should not be limited to the politically-orthodox matters of Marxism-Leninism and Maoist thought, but also to the cultivation and improvement of medical techniques among Japanese recruits.

In this way, the material transfer of Imperial Japanese colonial institutions to the Chinese communists, and inversion of the Japanese colonists' status from occupiers to occupied, did little to disrupt the epistemological inertia of language-coded and embodied medical knowledge. If the process of capture and redistribution of Japanese physical materiel was fairly immediate, the process of transfer of epistemic assets was considerably slower and required a high level of intentional organization. At the macroscopic level, we can understand this as a tripartite process, involving the pragmatic concerns of the PLA in the face of the broadening Chinese civil war, the ideological desire to expand the scope and influence of socialist internationalism, and the systematic project of transferring ownership of the vast assets of the Imperial Japanese colonial enterprise the Chinese people.

Resistance at the Borders: Honma Masako's Flight Across the Yalu River

Not all of those captured by the 8RA readily accepted their fate; some resented their conscription and did their utmost to escape and reach a repatriation center, or find some other route to Japan. One such person was Honma Masako, the civilian wife of a Mantetsu engineer, who was 21 years old when the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo began.¹²¹ Honma managed to evade the advancing Soviet army, becoming separated from her husband as she did so, whereupon she was captured and conscripted by the 8RA. She was forced to work as a nurse, enduring the "humiliation of helping injured soldiers relieve themselves."¹²² Over the next five years, she attempted to escape several times.

The last of these attempts took place in 1947, when Honma's medical unit was stationed on the north bank of the Yalu River. During this deployment, over a dozen Japanese workers attempted to escape, but were invariably caught by the 8RA guards, as the nearby harbor was closely monitored. Near their position was a Japanese-run restaurant, whose owner had remained in China following surrender. He advised Honma and two other nurses that, if they could make it south of the Yalu River, it would be relatively easy to secure passage on a repatriation vessel back to Japan. Honma was trusted by the 8RA officers due to her diligence at work, and she was not suspected as she made her preparations for escape. Alongside a hospital unit leader and fellow nurse Endō Kyōko, she slipped away at night and rendezvoused with the restaurant-owner and several other escapees. The owner procured a small boat for them, and they crossed the Yalu

¹²¹ Dong, *Laobalu*, 36-38.

¹²² Dong, *Laobalu*, 36.

River under the cover of night. After landing on the North Korean shore, the restaurant-owner put them up in a farmhouse, with instructions to wait for a liaison who could grant them safe passage to a repatriation vessel.

The nurses remained at the farmhouse waiting for the rendezvous for over a month, during which time two of them lost patience and tried to escape southwards of their own accord, but were promptly captured by Chinese patrols. Finally, hearing no word and running low on food, Honma and the others decided to venture out and hand themselves over to one of the Chinese patrols. However, they encountered a North Korean military police patrol, who led them to a bunker garrisoned by other North Korean soldiers.¹²³ There, the soldiers attempted to rape Honma, and were only prevented from doing so by Endō raising the alarm. The women fled back towards the Yalu River and were fortuitously rescued by an 8RA patrol, which escorted them back to the hospital. As they were reunited with their old field hospital, the director welcomed them with open arms. He “had a good laugh, and assured [Honma] and the others that [he] didn’t blame them for trying to escape”.¹²⁴ The women’s only punishment was one week of latrine detail. This episode highlights the high level of freedom and agency afforded to Japanese PLA members, even within the context of their forcible conscription. Similarly, the punishment for escape was light because the 8RA officers regarded escape as its own punishment: as far as they were concerned, the Japanese were objectively better off with them than anywhere else. By 1950, Honma had experienced a complete change of heart, and was “ready to give her own blood to save the [8RA] soldiers.”¹²⁵ Honma was awarded a military distinction for her services. In 1953, Honma remarried after getting word that her estranged (and repatriated) husband had also done so. She returned to Japan soon after.

Honma’s experiences reveal one of the central contradictions of Japanese workers’ incorporation into the PLA: that of the personal transition from involuntary captive and forced laborer to a voluntary and enthusiastic member of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the PRC state project. We can identify several salient reasons, including the communist education and re-education policies that all PLA members were subjected to, the development of personal bonds, friendships, and relationships, and the cultivation of familiarity through increasingly long-term exposure. Honma’s flight, however, sheds light on another aspect of this trajectory, which is the increasing exposure to the dangerous circumstances outside of the PLA-controlled areas, and the reports of negative comparison of lived experience between those Japanese who had been captured by the 8RA, and those who had experienced nearly any other fate, including travel to refugee camps and repatriation centers.

Honma and her colleagues’ attempted escape also highlights the ever-present threat and actuality of sexual violence that women in northeast China faced during this period, which was a permanent feature of life for refugees and the displaced. There is a danger of trivially concluding that this phenomenon is an overdetermined consequence of the context of violent upheaval, military conflict, and territorial re-negotiation. However, such a conclusion is discredited by the 8RA’s ability to maintain comparative discipline in this regard, and the relative safety that women enjoyed in the communist-controlled regions of the northeast. We are presented with a

¹²³ Dong, *Laobalu*, 37.

¹²⁴ Dong, *Laobalu*, 37.

¹²⁵ Dong, *Laobalu*, 38.

question of framing: was the 8RA's ability to reduce sexual violence in the regions they administered and within their units a surprising exception to the rule of war, or a norm that was violated in SRA-controlled regions through identifiable, systemic features? I consider this emergent question to be of great interest, and hope that further scholarship will fully examine which features of the 8RA, IJA, SRA, and others may have contributed to the wildly disparate outcomes in this area.¹²⁶ Above, we have seen how the doctrines of the PLA not only proscribed violence against women and discouraged the harboring of racial resentment, but proactively generated a normative construct of Japanese identity that was explicitly humanized and that PLA soldiers were encouraged to both empathize and sympathize with. There is no Soviet equivalent of these policies or identities, and, although we should be cautious not to treat these facts as univariately deterministic, I am compelled by the evidence that the official doctrines of the CCP and the PLA led directly to the comparatively-humane treatment of Japanese individuals in this period.

Experiences of Japanese Medical Workers in the PLA

During the military retreats and refugee escapes from Operation August Storm, Japanese medical workers made use of whatever resources were available to provide what assistance they could to the sick and injured, frequently converting schools or public buildings into makeshift field hospitals.¹²⁷ During the early phases of the Chinese civil war, the KMT air force made full use of its air superiority to conduct bombing raids on the undefended PLA lines. As a consequence, the majority of PLA operations and troop movement took place at night, including the work of the medical units. Agonizing night marches for weeks at a stretch, with little respite, and constantly working in makeshift conditions, was the norm for 8RA medical workers of all nationalities throughout 1946-47.¹²⁸ This pattern continued into the Chinese civil war, as illustrated by Ōhara's biographical description of Yamazaki's work in the 8RA:

“Yamazaki had experience as a surgical nurse, so wherever she was deployed, people would bring her the injured in need of surgical attention. Stopping at villages, civilians would bring in their wounded mounted up on makeshift stretchers made from unhooked doors and ask her to perform surgeries on them. Even in those makeshift conditions, Yamazaki performed hundreds of life-saving surgeries on Chinese soldiers and civilians alike, sometimes staying up two or three nights in a row, working without pause.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ This question is adjacent to recent scholarship into comparative studies of post-disaster violence—examining why natural disasters lead to outbreaks of violence in some regions and not others. One such study is: Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, "Trust Shaken: Earthquake Damage, State Capacity, and Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 4 (2014): 419-37.

¹²⁷ A Japanese doctor recorded his experience of work in the PLA's medical core, which was published in Imamura Kyōhei, *Akai hoshi no motode: kaihōgun iryūyū hachinen no kiroku* (Nagano: 1967)—one of the earliest published memoirs written by a JMPLA.

¹²⁸ For some examples of the exertions of these night marches from Ōhara's biographical work, see Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 130-132.

¹²⁹ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 105.

Surgeons and skilled nurses like Yamazaki were highly valued for their life-saving abilities, and, despite the coercive circumstances of their recruitment, there is also substantial anecdotal evidence of the deep respect that their Chinese comrades held for them, beyond that dictated by the official PLA policies of fair treatment. In one instance, during the intense Siping campaign, the field hospital where Yamazaki was working came under aerial bombing, and the order to retreat was issued; the nurse began to gather her medical tools, whereupon her superior stopped her, saying: “The enemy is closing upon us. Those objects can be bought with money, but the same isn’t true for you surgeons.”¹³⁰ The importance of the Japanese comrades is highlighted by the fact that, despite the circumstances of their conscription, Japanese medical workers in the PLA received a salary identical to that of their Chinese counterparts. Newly-recruited nurses earned between 60 and 100 *fen* per month. Experienced nurses and doctor’s assistants received 110 to 150. Doctors of various levels received between 160 and 250 *fen* per month.¹³¹

A Japanese nurse named Azuma provides a description of food preparation in the 8RA that offers us insights into the egalitarian treatment of Japanese members, and the ways in which Japanese medical workers’ knowledge of hygienic practices influenced the 8RA at the most granular levels. The 8RA’s principal rations were the staple *gaoliang*—sorghum gruel, usually served without accompaniment and seasoned with salt. When available, there might also be cabbage, potatoes, or meat cooked alongside it. Although many Japanese recruits complained about *gaoliang* gruel, to Azuma and many others who had experienced famine conditions after Imperial Japan’s surrender, this simple food was “so delicious that [we] fell into a trance eating it.” Each person was assigned a 5 or 6 centimetre-deep ration in their metal food canteens, which were also used for drinking, storing liquids, and making tea. In Azuma’s unit, there would also be rice and *gyōza* once per week, and, on occasion, also *doubing* or *laobing*. Azuma recollects that *gyōza* days were always something everyone looked forward to.¹³²

Pigs were crucially important to the 8RA, but came with their own set of health hazards. Before relocating, the 8RA would always go and purchase piglets from farmers, which would then be raised and fattened, and went on to become a valuable source of protein. Not a single part of the pig was wasted; congealed pig’s blood cubes were a staple addition to soup, the bone meal was ground down and added to flour, and the pig’s heads were added to soup to make stock. On occasion, they ate dog meat, too.¹³³ Due to poor hygiene in the mess kitchens—specifically, the failure to clean adequately the surfaces upon which pigs were slaughtered and carved—pork-borne parasites often spread through the ranks. The Japanese nurses frequently requested that stricter sanitary measures be taken by the mess coordinators, to avoid the spread of disease and parasites.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 107.

¹³¹ Given the hyperinflation of the renminbi (RMB) during this period, it is exceptionally difficult to estimate how much money these sums of *fen* represent. By the end of WW2, the yuan (CNY) was trading against USD at the rate of 1,222/USD, before spiralling up to 23,289,000 CNY/USD by the end of 1949. In 1955, a second RMB issuance replaced the old CNY at the rate of 10,000 old/1 new. However, suffice to say that these salaries were, very likely, quite low, and were often paid in the form of meal chits, which was ill-received by Chinese civilians, who remained sceptical of the CCP’s chances of success at forming a state and stabilizing the economy.

¹³² Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 152-153.

¹³³ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 155.

¹³⁴ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 155.

Red Study, Self-Criticism, and “Awakening”

As the 8RA broadened its recruitment policies and began to incorporate Dongbei locals with little knowledge of communist doctrine, study sessions covering the basics of Marxism-Leninism, anti-imperialism, and Maoist thought became a staple feature of military life. In addition to this, the internal upheavals and purges within the Party and the 3-antis campaign, 5-antis campaign, and land reform policies of the late '40s and early '50s led to the institutionalization, within the PLA, of the frequently-harrowing procedures of self-criticism and struggle sessions. The Japanese members of the PLA were not exempt from these gruelling ordeals, and Japanese-language variants of these sessions were organised by Yan'an-trained Japanese cadres, forming the Japanese-language component of the CCP-wide “thought rectification” program.

Kawabata recalls that studying communism in the 4RA was non-optional, and that punishment was meted out to those deemed insufficiently dedicated either to the rejection of imperialism and militarism, or to the enthusiastic adoption of communism. Although special materials were prepared for the Japanese communist education programs, the general content was aligned with that of materials distributed to other, Chinese recruits of the 4RA, and the necessity to deprogram imperialist and militarist tendencies was extended to Chinese recruits from the north-eastern regions.¹³⁵ As with their Chinese comrades, Japanese members of the 4RA were expected to engage in public displays of repentance, self-criticism, and mutual criticism. In addition to continuing their study of medicine and medical training—usually organized by senior doctors and physicians from Mantetsu or IJA military hospitals—they were required to study, discuss, and debate current affairs, the proclamations of the CCP, and transcripts of the speeches of Mao Zedong. Political theory was required for study as well, as were the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao “in accordance with the abilities of the student in question” (this latter clause, presumably, intended to account for the high rates of illiteracy among new recruits, especially those from rural areas).¹³⁶ There were also occasions in which suitable language skill considerations for the political education of Japanese comrades were not made. For instance, when two Japanese medical workers attended a study group in Keshan with their 8RA unit in 1946, no accommodations whatsoever were made to account for their meagre command of the Chinese language. Nonetheless, attendance was mandatory, and the pair recall sitting uncomprehendingly through long educational sessions in the hope of hearing some news of Japan.¹³⁷ Recounting her experiences of group education sessions conducted in 1947 at the Taipingchuan Backline Hospital Number 7, one Japanese nurse described the lessons as follows:

“Education began with the history of the CCP: how it was born, and how it flourished... When they started to cover the history of the war of resistance against Japan, and we were made to criticize the Emperor System, I felt a desire to object welling up within me, but as the truth of things was laid out, and the real facts of what had happened were explained, I began to see things as they truly

¹³⁵ Kawabata, *Ōgawa no nagare*, 12-15.

¹³⁶ Oka Haruyuki, *Seishun banri: Chūgoku jinmin kaihō sensō jūgunki* (Tokushima: Tokushima shūppan, 1988), 362-363.

¹³⁷ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 111.

were... The 8RA soldiers, who had been labelled enemies and ‘communist bandits’ by the Japanese army, had in fact treated us with kindness. The Japanese army, by contrast, which supposedly should have defended us, had instead abandoned us; it was the 8RA that treated us with humanity. Was it not the 8RA that had saved our lives?”¹³⁸

The public airing of grudges was a core component of Chinese communist ideological consolidation in the late ’40s and early ’50s. It laid the groundwork for the systematic dehumanization of an entire class of Chinese civilian, a “classicide” modelled after Soviet dekulakization, that resulted in somewhere between 3,000,000 and 5,000,000 deaths and millions of *laogai* (“reform through labor”) interments and injuries.¹³⁹ One manifestation of this practice, integral to the Land Reform Movement phases of 1946-53, was *suku*, “the profession of bitterness,” a communal activity in which individuals were encouraged and carefully guided to declare their class grievances, and, in particular, to identify the landlord class as the source of their adversities. As Li Lifeng argues in his study on the construction of Chinese revolutionary memory: “Revolutionary memories locked in the minds of rural people did not form naturally but resulted from purposeful shaping by the revolutionary party and the socialist state.”¹⁴⁰ Li’s position is that the CCP developed a systematic protocol for constructing, through guided communal rituals, a memory-based framework that situated the problems facing the proletariat and rural communities squarely in the physical persons of the landlords, with the implied objective of laying the psychological groundwork for mass murders. Li argues, if not for the inauthenticity of these claims, at least for their artificiality:

“Throughout the land reform movement, the Chinese Communist Party and the state transformed private experiences and memories of bitterness into a public discourse. By using such effective tactics as promoting anger, fostering activists, tapping into awareness of consanguinity, and condemning landlords, the party and the state emotionalized and homogenized rural public’s memories of bitterness and integrated them into the grand narratives of class, revolution, liberation, and nation-state. Incorporated by the collective and homogenous memory, personal and group memories of bitterness therefore provided an important source of legitimacy for the party and the state.”¹⁴¹

It is a striking feature of Li’s exhaustive study that, in these *suku* collective performances of grievance, grudges against the Japanese former colonists are notably absent. Why were the

¹³⁸ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 133-135.

¹³⁹ For the lower-bound estimates, see: Chiro, Daniel, *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 187. For the upper-bound estimates, largely drawn from official CCP sources, see: Rudolph J. Rummel, *China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 222.

¹⁴⁰ Li Lifeng, “From Bitter Memories to Revolutionary Memory,” *Chinese Studies in History* 47, no. 1 (October 2013), 71-94.

¹⁴¹ Li, “From Bitter Memories,” 71.

Japanese largely exempted as targets of *suku*? One intuitive reason for this is that there was a minimal Japanese presence in China at this point, so they no longer served as credible scapegoats for the problems of the rural classes. However, this view overestimates the speed of the northeast Asian population exchanges of 1945-47, underestimates the large numbers of Japanese people who remained in Dongbei, and entirely obscures the presence of Japanese workers in PLA organizations. Another argument, consistent with Yamazaki's description of struggle sessions above, is that the vast majority of rural Chinese individuals had had minimal contact with the Japanese, while potentially harboring severe personal resentment against local power holders, tax collectors, wealthy peasants, merchants, and landlords. However, this argument understates the intellectual rigor and ideological consistency of the CCP's Marxist doctrine, specifically in its rejection of ethnoessentialist and racialist reasoning and its recognition of a universal, borderless class struggle. There is evidence of the CCP leadership directly intervening to minimize anti-Japanese sentiment, while simultaneously promoting the communal construction of resentment (and later, the execution of vengeance) against the "class enemies" identified as directly responsible for proletarian suffering. Taken together, these facts weaken the purely pragmatic interpretations of the directives for the humane treatment of Japanese captives and comrades, as similar pragmatism that might recognize the advantages of CCP collaboration with landlords and other potentates was entirely absent.

The duress that re-education, self-criticism, and group criticism sessions entailed likely served as a bonding experience, an institutional hazing that culturally and psychologically integrated Japanese workers into the units in which they served, as well as into the broader communist Chinese national project. Given that these activities and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrines would have been equally novel to new recruits drawn from among the general north Chinese population, and, indeed, to any incoming members from outside of the communist enclaves, they likely acted as bonding experiences among the diverse conscripts, helping to explain the depth of positive mutual sentiment expressed in oral records, biographies, and memoirs of this cohort.

Japanese Epidemiologists and Medical Workers in PRC Public Health Campaigns

During the bombing campaign of the Korean War, one Japanese nurse working in the PLA recalls her readiness to die for the Chinese communist cause: "I never became someone as noble as the White-Haired Girl or Liu Hulan. However, I felt that, if I die here, I have no regrets."¹⁴² Although reports indicate that Japanese medics were largely kept away from the front lines of the Korean War, there is evidence of their involvement and death in conflict: "A cemetery near the city of Dalian contains the graves of fourteen Japanese medical workers and others who, as the monument by the gateway records, 'gave their lives for the cause of Victory in the War to Resist America and Air Korea'"¹⁴³ One 8RA officer supervising a medical team at the Yanji Number 3 Field Hospital when the American bombing of Dandong (formerly Andong) began, in 1950, put it as follows: "Even though you're Japanese, it's extremely dangerous for you to remain here. The situation is becoming an international crisis. It'd be best if you moved to a southern region."¹⁴⁴ The Japanese nurses and doctors in Yanji were transferred to the Norman Bethune

¹⁴² Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 173.

¹⁴³ Morris-Suzuki, 418.

¹⁴⁴ Ōhara, *Kanashimi wa shōkakō ni nagashite*, 167.

Memorial Hospital in Shijiajiang, and some ultimately travelled further south and became involved in vaccination campaigns in Hainan. While Japanese medical staff were largely kept away from the front lines of the Korean War, the war itself became a justification for the extension of Japanese conscription and was cited in refusals of Japanese requests for repatriation. Japanese doctors and nurses continued to work at 4FA and other PLA field hospitals behind the front lines of northeast China, providing emergency healthcare to the Chinese casualties of the war.¹⁴⁵ During this period, many Japanese medical workers were also rerouted into “civilian” medical roles (although usually while still being nominal members of their respective PLA organizations), to provide medical care and vaccinations to workers and to participate in the rollout of national health and hygiene campaigns.¹⁴⁶

The medical expertise of these “converted” Japanese doctors brought about great contributions to the PLA’s medical training program: in 1948, after the liberation of the Northeast, more than 1400 Japanese M&Ts went to Hainan with the Northeast Field Army, and played crucial roles in medical care and epidemic prevention. Epidemiologist Dr. Nishigaki wrote multiple articles sharing his experience in tropical diseases in the area, and was instrumental in setting up epidemiology institutes in southern China.¹⁴⁷ In the former Manchurian territories of the northeast, during the summer and autumn of 1949, nearly eight million people, a fifth of the total population, were inoculated against cholera, typhoid and plague.¹⁴⁸ The mass vaccination of the Chinese population was a top priority for Mao and the rest of the CCP leadership, and tens of millions received inoculations in the first few years after the establishment of the PRC. Many of these inoculation programs were designed and conducted by Japanese doctors and nurses.¹⁴⁹ Noda Akira was a former horse veterinarian who retrained as a medical technician upon conscription into an N4A medical team and was sent to administer vaccinations and epidemic control training during the southern campaigns of the Chinese civil war. His work brought him as far as Hainan, and, at every stage, he described high levels of resistance to the reception of vaccinations administered by Japanese medical staff, due to rumors of interwar engineered plagues and biological warfare. Nonetheless, his status as an enrolled member of the PLA, and the collaboration with Chinese medical cadres, were sufficient to overcome this initial hesitancy and made the inoculation programs he worked on a relative success. Noda remained in China of his own volition. He was promoted several times, and saw substantial frontline combat during the Civil War, that resulted in serious injuries. After receiving a gunshot wound during the liberation of Tianjin, Noda was given the option of returning to Japan on a hospital ship. He responded by saying that “Japan did terrible things to the Chinese people. I want to continue fighting on the frontlines. This is my atonement.”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 79.

¹⁴⁶ In one example, a 4FA unit of Japanese medical workers was assigned to provide medical care to workers at an electrical dam on the Yangtze, far from any military conflict (Oka, *Seishun banri*, 35).

¹⁴⁷ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 407.

¹⁴⁸ W. Tuckman (Friends Service Unit), “Rural health problems in China,” *The Lancet*, 8 March 1950, 509, cited in S.M. Hillier and Tony Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine in China, 1800-1982* (Oxford: Taylor and Francis, Kindle Edition, 2005), 65.

¹⁴⁹ Li Teh-chuan (Li Dequan), “Health work in New China,” *People’s China* II, no. 7 (1 October 1950), 11.

¹⁵⁰ Saitō Yoshio, Personal interview, 31.

The results of the public health movement and the medical expansion were reflected in the rapidly-improving health statistics. The infant mortality in Beijing had fallen from the 1949 level of 117.6/1,000 live births to 59.3 in 1953. Maternal mortality was almost halved, and there were no epidemics of cholera or smallpox between 1950 and 1956. In rural areas, the changes were less dramatic, but present nonetheless. Apart from the mobile anti-epidemic units that operated throughout the country, there were certain specific campaigns, for example, in favour of sandfly control to prevent the spread of kala-azar, and campaigns against malaria, schistosomiasis, and hookworm.¹⁵¹

Success of the PLA Medical Conscriptions and Institutional Absorption

The PLA integration policies were formidably successful, rapidly transforming the Chinese communist medical establishment from the dire paucity recorded by Bethune into an institution far closer—in terms of scale and of staffing—to that of the former Imperial Japanese colonies. This phenomenon can be seen most clearly from the speedy proliferation of communist-controlled hospitals and their ballooning patient treatment capacity in the few short years following Japanese surrender:

Year	Hospitals	Patient Capacity
1945	8	11,800 ¹⁵²
1946	41	65,000
1947	54	<i>No Data Available</i> ¹⁵³
1948	60	112,000
1949	600+	1,000,000+

*Table 3: Hospital Number and Patient Capacity in Chinese Communist Hospitals, 1945-49.*¹⁵⁴

As Chen Yun, head of the CCP’s Dongbei administration, put it in 1947: “Every single doctor and nurse in southern Dongbei is Japanese, and they all want to repatriate. If we don’t start gathering up doctors and nurses as we need them, it will be a catastrophe.”¹⁵⁵ A similar account is provided to us by Sakai Akiko, an IJA officer’s daughter coscripted by the 8RA at Benxihu. After being ordered to travel to an 8RA hospital, she observed that, “apart from the Chinese director, all the hospital staff were Japanese. There were JRCS doctors and nurses there. All the Chinese people were extremely kind to us, and I finally managed to calm down.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 71.

¹⁵² Values for 1945 found in Accounts of Stein, Gunther and Ma, Hai-teh, *The International Peace Hospitals in the twenty years of the China Welfare Institute* (Beijing: China Welfare Institute, 1958), 71, cited in Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 59.

¹⁵³ No data for patient capacity could be found for 1947, but supposing an average patient capacity of 1585 patients per hospital allows us to estimate a 1947 capacity of approximately 85,600.

¹⁵⁴ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 76. Yamada’s values for 1945, 1946, and 1948 most likely come from Chen Yun et al., *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun disiyè zhanjunzhanshi* (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1998), 140. For alternate, substantially more conservative, estimates for 1949, see also Hillier and Jewell, *Health Care and Traditional Medicine*, 66.

¹⁵⁵ Gao, *ziliao*, 64.

¹⁵⁶ Lu, “Tōhoku kaihōgun iriyōtai,” 37-38.

Official Recognition of Contributions by Japanese Comrades in the PLA

The PLA's official histories bear testament to the contributions of the Japanese: "Many Japanese picked up weapons and fought for us in the Hunan campaign... there were many acts of heroism under fire by Japanese participants in the Liaoshen campaign, showing their loyalty to the Communist and anti-fascist cause."¹⁵⁷ This work was also recognized by Zhou Enlai in 1956:

"We extend our profound thanks to those Japanese people who helped us. During the period of the War of Chinese Liberation, they helped us by sharing their skills as doctors, nurses, and medical technicians. This has strengthened by conviction that we must tie a close bond of friendship with the Japanese people."¹⁵⁸

Many Japanese medical workers in the PLA were awarded medals in recognition of their exemplary conduct. At one award ceremony held in May 1947, 16 of the 36 award recipients were Japanese.¹⁵⁹ A similar case is described in the PLA official histories:

"During the several years of the war of liberation's advance from the northeast to the southwest, over 80% of Japanese medical staff were recognized for their contributions. We awarded them medals irrespective of their nationality. They received the *Dongbei jiefang jinianzhang*, the *Huabei jiefang jinianzhang*, and the *Zhongnan jiefang jinianzhang* as rewards for their contributions. [The Japanese] regarded this as a great honor."¹⁶⁰

These documents also note that records of many of the contributions of the Japanese PLA members were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, but that of those "very incomplete" records that are extant, Japanese "brothers and sisters" were the recipients of nine *dagong* ("major contribution"), four *xiaogong* ("minor contribution"), and two *erdenggong* ("second-rank contribution").¹⁶¹ These categories designate exceptional contributions to the PLA's activities, and are achievements that follow the recipient for life in their *dangan* personal file. For their efforts, 20% of the Japanese M&Ts were granted special distinctions by the PLA. According to the statistics provided by 13th Army Corps in 1950, out of 1887 medical distinctions awarded in total—corresponding to 60% of the entire medical staff of the Corps—25% were Japanese. Some female Japanese nurses were also elected as delegates to attend the Asian Women's Congress in December of 1949.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ *Gongzuoshi*, 406.

¹⁵⁸ *Gongzuoshi*, 141.

¹⁵⁹ Gao, *Gongzuoshi*, 407.

¹⁶⁰ Gao, *Ziliao*, 750.

¹⁶¹ Gao, *Ziliao*, 757.

¹⁶² Lu, "Tōhoku kaihōgun iryōtai," 38.

The Last Repatriates

Between February 15th and March 5th, 1953, the Japanese government sent several committees of delegates to negotiate the repatriation of the remaining Japanese nationals on the mainland, although the official history of the 4FA notes that “many Japanese comrades did not want to return.”¹⁶³ Yamada proposes that the majority of repatriations after the first waves of 1946-47 took place in 1953, because this moment marks the conclusion of both the Chinese civil war and the Korean war, and hence the end of the emergent need for military and medical-military staff on the continent.¹⁶⁴ This thesis is consistent with a chronology of northeast Asian continental conflict that frames the Korean War as part of a “Long WWII,” the end of which signaled a final and near-total removal of Japanese nationals from the continent. Some two thousand Japanese nationals who had remained past 1953 returned to Japan in 1958 aboard the *Shiroyamamaru*. This final round of repatriation ended the large-scale Japanese membership of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

At war’s end, official designations of military nurses were abolished, but the masses of injured, ill, and malnourished refugees and repatriates required growing amounts of healthcare, and the medical workers attached to the IJA were offered re-employment contracts by the Japanese government, to work in a public capacity in the home islands. 88.05% of the tens of thousands of professional military nurses working for the JRCS at war’s end elected this option, transferring smoothly to work in public hospitals, hospital ships, and other medical clinics while remaining members of the Japanese Red Cross Society, often without relocating.¹⁶⁵ The remainder, liberated of their mandated military duties, sought work in the private sector, in sanatoria, or elsewhere. These proportions point towards a substantial continuity in the working staff of the JRCS across the pivot of Imperial surrender.¹⁶⁶ Nursing credentials obtained through the MRCS were fully compatible with those of the JRCS, and, even after Japanese surrender, nurses who had received their training entirely in Manchukuo medical institutions found their diplomas recognized by the postwar Japanese medical establishment.

Many Japanese former members of the 4FA and 8RA formed associations based around the regions in which they had lived and worked in China, such as the Guilin-kai and the Qiqihaer-kai.¹⁶⁷ Others joined organizations based around the military units they had joined, or the work team they had been a part of. These groups served as important loci for re-entry into civilian life, providing social support, jobseeking assistance, and community to Japanese individuals who had undergone an extraordinary—and, to some degree, alienating—experience on the continent. The official history of the 4FA indicates that contact between Japanese and Chinese cadres was entirely severed upon repatriation, in part due to the isolatory impact of the Cultural Revolution.¹⁶⁸ However, the oral record contradicts this claim, as many Japanese cadres

¹⁶³ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 410.

¹⁶⁴ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 77.

¹⁶⁵ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 5.

¹⁶⁶ Note that these data refer only to the nurses who received formal training as part of the JRCS or MRCS nursing-school programs, and, therefore, exclude the majority of nurses recruited and perfunctorily trained as part of the emergency recruitment policies beginning in late ’43 onwards.

¹⁶⁷ Gao, *ziliao*, 413.

¹⁶⁸ Gao, *gongzuoshi*, 410.

maintained contact with their former comrades, corresponding with them for decades after their return to the home islands. Tokunaga Junko, whose experiences in the PRC film industry are discussed in Chapter 5, succeeded in smuggling photographs of her Chinese friends and family back to Japan:

“Many of my *laozhanyou* (old comrades) passed away. We write letters, but many died. Some are in their 80s. Those people are called *lixiguanbu* (retired veteran cadres) because they participated in the revolution.... We send each other letters.... This woman was my *laozhanyou*, in the same *wengongtuan* (art ensemble) as I. This person was a writer, and this one was a translator. This was my husband. He was in the second field army, and I was in the fourth field army.”¹⁶⁹

Japanese Contributions to the PRC Medical Establishment

From 1945 to 1958, Japanese doctors, nurses, and medical technicians made formidable contributions—both willingly and unwillingly—to the establishment of the PRC’s medical institutions and to the direct treatment of Chinese soldiers and civilians alike. Those elements of the physical colonial legacy that remained untouched by Soviet looting in the wake of Operation August Storm went on to form the backbone of the early PRC’s medical infrastructure. Japanese labor, expertise, and materiel continued to play an important role in the medical history of post-colonial China, including in epidemic control in Dongbei and Hainan, and frontline medical assistance in multiple military engagements. Any member of the Chinese communist armed forces who was the object of a medical intervention during the Chinese civil war, and especially during the northeastern campaigns, stood a high chance of having their life saved by Japanese hands. Correspondingly, the Chinese communists’ treatment of their Japanese comrades was mainly characterized by humane and egalitarian policies, characteristics corroborated both by the contemporary Chinese records and Japanese memoirs and oral histories.

Scholarly approaches to hygiene and medicine in colonial spaces frequently emphasize the role that these institutions play in the legitimation of alien occupation and the exertion of metropolitan power over peripheralized subjects—with doctors, nurses, hospitals, health policies, and medical administrators acting as informal agents of imperial control and exerting intrusive control over the bodies, lives, and epistemic structures of colonial subjects. However, in the ruins of Japan’s colonial ambitions, many of the Japanese medical staff who had previously worked for Mantetsu, served in the IJA, or otherwise collaborated with colonial institutions were conscripted by the PLA and went on to heal, whether literally or figuratively, the wounds of the Japanese occupation. Even as the Japanese empire dissolved, both as a territorial and a conceptual claim, their commitment to human wellbeing—as exemplified by the Aiharas, by Imamura Kyôhei¹⁷⁰, or by Dr. Nishigaki and Noda’s work in Hainanese epidemiology—remained not only undiminished, but infused with a new and humanitarian purpose. The absolute faith in the possibility of redemption, exemplified at every level of the CCP and PLA’s policymaking towards their new Japanese comrades, proved entirely prescient, and the

¹⁶⁹ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 24.

¹⁷⁰ Whose experiences are described in Imamura, *Akai hoshi no motode*.

magnanimous policies towards former bitter enemies, informed by this faith, played a crucial role in the successful incorporation of Japanese members and knowledge into the PRC's early civil and military medical establishment. That Imperial Japanese medical knowledge and praxis survived the fall of Imperial Pan-Asianism and was seamlessly incorporated into the PLA's anti-fascist war, repurposed in objective to the provision of healthcare for the Chinese people, points to the possibility of some elemental separation between medical practice, on the one hand, and the extension of imperial power and the production of discourses of nation-state authenticity, on the other.

Conclusion: The Second Motherland

The collapse of Imperial Japan's continental colonies triggered one of the largest refugee crises in history, and one that the defeated Japanese government and military were entirely unprepared, or unwilling, to manage. The swift humanitarian intervention of the USA in coordinating the evacuation of Japanese colonists saved countless lives, even as the lines of escape for Japanese refugees were rife with disease, famine, and violence at the hands of the SRA. The institutional developments in the CCP-controlled territories that I have described in the previous two chapters set the framework for the integration of Japanese individuals into the PLA and the CCP's broader nation-state project, in particular as regards the establishment of a functioning medical system and public health strategy in northeast China, and, later, throughout the PRC. There was a remarkable degree of institutional continuity across the watershed of surrender, for instance, in the form of ongoing medical work and widespread civilian conscription in the northeast, suggesting that the collapse of the Empire of Japan was a gradual process that shaped the topographies of continental development and warfare in the ensuing decade, rather than an abrupt and total paradigm shift. While the treatment of Japanese conscripts and POWs of the PLA was generally reported to be benevolent, counterexamples do exist, and conscription was, in nearly all cases, coercive. The lack of medical staff and materiel along refugee evacuation lines may also have been impacted by the 8RA's "guerrilla recruitment" policies and SRA conscription and looting, leading to an exacerbation of the death tolls in the evacuation centers and on repatriation routes.

Violence against civilians, and especially sexual violence committed against Japanese women in the former colonies by Soviet soldiers, occurred on a massive scale. Reports of this violence were largely suppressed by Allied censors and by Japanese social and political pressures, and have not become a substantial part of the historiography or historical memory of the period in the intervening years. A comparison of the conduct of the 8RA with that of the SRA strongly suggests that military doctrine, leadership discourse, and maintenance of discipline by army officers played a significant part in explaining the outcomes of contact with the SRA as opposed to the 8RA; the examination of these outcomes strongly contradicts crude narratives of revenge or trivial resignations to the inevitability of military misconduct. I have drawn attention to the parallels with the Eastern Front, as well as the troubling indifference to civilian suffering, a product of totalizing synecdochal discourses that uncritically associate individuals with the vast systems in which they are embedded. These justifications typically serve as a preamble to violence or a *post facto* excuse for it, and their continued endorsement has real consequences for the character of contemporary military and political complexes.

The PLA official histories emphasize the purifying effect of Communist doctrine upon their Japanese members, and include reference to Japanese comrades among the anecdotes of self-sacrificing heroism “for the people.” The documents also reference Japanese comrades “coming to see China as a second motherland,”¹⁷¹ characterizations that are well corroborated by the personal reports of Japanese former members of the PLA. Dong notes that most of the memoirs written by Japanese former members of the PLA express the belief that, by recording and transmitting their experiences, they could act as pontiffs for Sino-Japanese amity. A representative sentiment can be found in the preface to Yokoyama Shikazô’s memoir:

“If one day my children or grandchildren open this book, and can glean an impression of the life I lived, and generation after generation can understand the meaning within, and take up the torch of Sino-Japanese friendship and pass it on, I will feel very happy.”¹⁷²

All but one of the Japanese former members of the PLA that I interviewed echoed these feelings, expressing their love for China and the Chinese people and indicating a hope that more widespread knowledge of their story might help to bring the two nations closer together in the future. In the following chapter, I will present three oral reports of this period in their entirety, and I am confident that the intensity of these sentiments, and the reasons behind them, will not escape the reader.

¹⁷¹ Yamada, *Nicchūsensō kara*, 15.

¹⁷² Yokoyama Shikazô, “atogaki,” *ryūten no seishun – chūgoku jinmin kaihō sensō jungunki* (Nagano: Self-published, 1986).

4

The Second Homeland: Three Oral Accounts of Japanese Members of the PLA

Tachibana Maiko: A Japanese nurse in the Chinese Communist armed forces

Tachibana Maiko was born in Antō in 1932. Today, the city is known as Dandong, resting on the northern shore of the Yalu river, across the water from the North Korean city of Sinuiju. The two cities are connected by the “Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge,” constructed by the Imperial Japanese Army¹ between 1937 and 1943. Next to this bridge lies a ruin: the *Yalujiang duanqiao*, “the broken bridge of the river Yalu.” This other bridge was erected in 1909, when the Empire of Japan sought, against the wishes of the Qing court, to integrate their occupied territories to the Eurasian rail network, which spanned from Busan to Calais.² During the Korean war, it was destroyed, alongside half of the city of Sinuiju, by the United States’ sustained bombing campaign, one of the most intensive bombardments of any region in human history.³

Pinned between empires for over a century, the place reveals a geology through its names: in 1876, Qing officials named it *Andong*, “Eastern Peace,” indicating their hopes for the Northeastern reaches of their domain. In 1894, following the first Sino-Japanese war, it was occupied by the Empire of Japan, who retained the Qing name Antō, and, later, incorporated it into Manchukuo in the 1930s, as Antō province. The city adopted its current name, *Dandong*, “Red East,” in 1965, on the eve of the first tremors of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Tachibana’s father was a high-ranking employee at the South Manchuria Railway Company, one of the men tasked with expanding and maintaining the railway hegemony of Imperial Japan.⁴ Tachibana’s family belonged to an upper class, even by the standards of the colonial population; she remembers the great prosperity her family enjoyed during her childhood, and the opulent Mantetsu-owned mansions her family had access to.⁵

Tachibana’s schooling took place entirely at Japanese-language all-girls’ schools, where she had limited contact with Chinese children, and made no Chinese friends. Tachibana recalls:

¹ Henceforth, “IJA.”

² Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *To the Diamond Mountains: A Hundred-Year Journey through China and Korea* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 75-76.

³ Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 168.

⁴ Henceforth, “Mantetsu.”

⁵ Tachibana Maiko, Personal interview, 3.

“There were some Koreans – one or two per class, carefully cherry-picked, and always described as ‘extraordinary’. At the time, I didn’t really know what was meant by ‘extraordinary’, but looking back, it probably didn’t mean academically exceptional, but rather that their families were landowners. Nonetheless, all the Japanese students looked down on the Koreans. We all believed that Japanese people were superior, of course. We’d been raised with that way of thinking, and we all shared that kind of bias.”⁶

When Tachibana was thirteen years old, her father was employed at the Mantetsu office at a location called Keikanzan.⁷ This town had no secondary school, so Tachibana was sent to attend a boarding school in Antō. On August 15th, 1945, almost immediately following the Emperor’s announcement of surrender, Tachibana was back home in Keikanzan for the summer holidays. Within days of official surrender, communist Eighth Route Army⁸ soldiers began to show up at the Tachibana house.

Rumors began to spread of atrocities committed by Soviet Red Army⁹ soldiers in the northern provinces that bordered the Soviet Union, and soon everyone had heard of the mass-murders and rapes committed by the Red Army soldiers. Tachibana notes that, as a child, she and her friends were only vaguely aware of these rumors and their meaning, and mostly learned about the actions of the SRA soldiers, and the fears of the adults in that respect, long after the fact. At the time of surrender, Tachibana and her neighbors did not know if the treatment at the hands of the 8RA would differ from that of the SRA, or even that any particular distinction existed between the two. “The adults insulated us from what was happening, but from the way they behaved, even the children knew, in some way, that we should be afraid.”¹⁰

The civil war between Nationalists and Communists had already begun in earnest, and the 8RA were engaging KMT troops in armed skirmishes, which led to a large number of casualties on both sides. 8RA officers were looking for people who could medically attend to their injured comrades, as well as provide nursing care, housing, and other types of assistance:

“The 8RA desperately needed doctors, nurses, cooks—personnel of all types. They were extremely short-staffed, so rumors began to spread that they had started to recruit Japanese people from all sorts of places. Everyone over the age of 18 was dragged off. The young women were particularly afraid, so they shaved their heads, stained themselves with ink, and took to wearing men’s clothes.

⁶ Tachibana, Personal interview, 11-12.

⁷ We had difficulty establishing the present-day name or location of ‘Keikanzan’. The closest reference I could find was ‘mount 203’, known in Chinese as Erlingshan (尔灵山), but the Japanese pronunciation doesn’t correspond precisely to this name. Tachibana noted that, as a child, she had moved home with her family several times, and acknowledged the possibility of a misrecollection regarding this place name.

⁸ Henceforth, “8RA.”

⁹ Henceforth, “SRA.”

¹⁰ Tachibana, Personal interview, 15.

Everyone who was able ran away to hide from the soldiers. So, the 8RA started taking younger and younger people. Even though I was just 13, and they weren't supposed to take anyone under the age of 18, since everyone had fled, they decided to take me anyway."¹¹

When the 8RA soldiers arrived at Tachibana's house, they expelled the family from their home, occupied it, and moved her parents into a Chinese family's residence while they awaited processing for repatriation to Japan. Tachibana's parents were not allowed to bring anything with them. What became of their property and money, Tachibana says, is anyone's guess: "They were chased out ... with nothing but the clothes on their back."¹² Tachibana, however, was not to join them. Crying and begging to be allowed to remain with her parents, she was dragged off by the 8RA soldiers and taken to a primary school in Keikanzan that had been converted into a makeshift field hospital. Injured soldiers were arriving in greater and greater numbers from the front, and they needed medical treatment.

At the time of her capture, Tachibana knew nothing of the 8RA, of communism, or of the communist party. She had never heard the term "Japanese Imperialism." She was desperate to return to Japan, and pleaded with the 8RA officers to let her rejoin her parents and get away from the civil war:

"I went and asked them to please let me return too. I pleaded with them, telling them that I want to go back with them – I want to go back alongside my parents. I went and begged, but they wouldn't let me go... So, it was no good. There was no hope, except for the sick and injured; they were allowed to return. The rest of us, the able-bodied ones, were absolutely forbidden from leaving."¹³

Tachibana had no nursing experience whatsoever, but was immediately ordered to join a unit tasked with caring for injured 8RA soldiers. She mostly distributed meals, cleaned, and assisted patients with relieving themselves. The 8RA officers in charge of directing the conscripted Japanese were monolingual in Chinese, and as Tachibana herself spoke no Chinese at the time, the majority of communication in the early days was conducted via gestures.

The Japanese that had been captured alongside Tachibana all ended up conscripted into medical units, either as nurses or as doctors. Tachibana recalls that every single doctor at her first hospital, the converted primary school in Keikanzan, was Japanese. The 8RA officers instructed the Japanese doctors to train as many Chinese doctors as possible, and a directive was issued to ensure that every work unit with Japanese members, be it nursing or medical staff, be comprised of at least fifty percent Chinese apprentices. Thus, Tachibana received her nursing training alongside both Japanese and Chinese women. All of her instructors were Japanese - former

¹¹ Tachibana, Personal interview, 3.

¹² Tachibana, Personal interview, 16.

¹³ Tachibana, Personal interview, 16.

doctors who had been serving as medics in the IJA. Despite Tachibana's extended cohabitation with Chinese people over the ensuing years, she never became fluent in Chinese:

“... there were so many Japanese people in all the nursing units I worked at, that there was never a need to learn Chinese beyond the basics and hand gestures (laughter). Of course, it's also because so many of the Chinese people in our units spoke Japanese.”¹⁴

Despite the views on Chinese and Korean people that she had grown up with, “there wasn't really any discrimination. We all had to work together.”¹⁵ As she spent more time working in her mixed team, Tachibana describes how her previously unquestioned views on racial hierarchy began to erode: “I encountered many truly extraordinary Chinese, and many truly extraordinary Koreans. We were all in it together. We had a job to do.”¹⁶

When Tachibana started work at the Keikanzan field hospital, she was detailed to night shifts caring for soldiers who had recently been injured in the civil war. She was barely adolescent, and the night shifts were agonizingly long and extremely hard on her body:

“All the patients were in a single ward, the sick room. Once, the patients took pity on me and called to me – ‘*Xiaohai, xiaohai*’¹⁷ they said, ‘*Xiaohai*, why don't you get a bit of sleep?’ So I went into the sick room and slept there till dawn. Well, I was fast asleep, but as you can imagine some of the patients needed help relieving themselves and getting food and so on, so the other patients who were relatively better off took care of the ones who couldn't help themselves. They were all so kind, considering the circumstances. That aspect of things was really splendid. So I slept until morning, while the able-bodied patients helped the ones who couldn't move go to the bathroom, gave them tea to drink, and so on. They were truly, truly, unimaginably kind.”¹⁸

Regarding seniority and rank, Tachibana recalls very few distinctions between the officers and the rank-and-file in the 8RA, at least while working at the hospital. She speculates that matters might have been different out in the military units, and with the medics working on the battlefield, but the hospital was largely devoid of hierarchies—for instance, all ranks took their meals together and ate the same food.

Food was a constant issue among staff and patients in the hospital. The rations distributed to the patients was of a higher quality than that available to the nurses. The nursing staff rations were

¹⁴ Tachibana, Personal interview, 8.

¹⁵ Tachibana, Personal interview, 9.

¹⁶ Tachibana, Personal interview, 12.

¹⁷ *Xiǎohái*, “young child” or “little kid”.

¹⁸ Tachibana, Personal interview, 13.

miserable, not just for the Japanese conscripts, but for their Chinese comrades, too, forcing them all to make the best they could of their situation:

“The food was really pitiful [laughs]. I can still remember the radishes bobbing in the soup. The patients, however, got a lot of meat with their meals. Vegetables, side dishes... they got to eat the good stuff. Meals with white rice! White rice with lots of meat side-dishes, they got all kinds of delicious stuff. We’d ferry those meals over to the patients, but our food was really pitiful. Adzuki beans cooked in Sorghum,¹⁹ boiled savory corn, that kind of stuff. Since that’s all we had to eat, we’d do something a bit naughty: we’d sneak the leftovers from the patient’s food and bring them to our quarters, the leftovers from the side-dishes and so on. We’d take the leftovers, sneak them away with us to our place, and secretly eat them. That was our little bit of wrongdoing. We were never found out. Everyone was doing it.”²⁰

Tachibana, alongside the other Japanese nurses working under the 8RA command, received a small allowance, and occasionally the same kind of military scrip that 8RA soldiers used to buy goods with. Her salary, though meagre, was the exact same as the that of the other conscripts, irrespective of their national origin. For entertainment, Tachibana, her Japanese comrades, and 8RA soldiers would on occasion have the opportunity to watch films. Of these, the most memorable were Indian films: “The memory that Indian films are very beautiful remains with me.”²¹ Another amusement Tachibana enjoyed was visiting the photographer to get her pictures taken with her friends.

All the nurses were issued 8RA military fatigues to wear. They wrapped gaiters around their legs, and wore wadded coats in the winter, as did others in the 8RA, irrespective of gender or nationality. When Tachibana returned to Japan, the Chinese authorities did not permit her to bring back her uniforms, or any of her other personal effects, including any of the photographs she had taken of herself and her comrades. The soldiers in charge of the confiscations prior to Tachibana’s transfer to the repatriation port at Huludao claimed that this process was for her own safety, as any object that associated her with communism or demonstrated her affiliation with the 8RA could cause her serious problems with the Japanese authorities, and could even land her in prison.

By 1947, two years after being captured, Tachibana’s roles included looking after patients, helping them eat, cleaning up, doing the laundry, and tidying the sick rooms. At the age of fifteen, she was selected to become an apprentice nurse, and immediately began her apprenticeship. Soon, despite her youth, she began working as a medical assessment technician.

¹⁹ *Gāoliáng*, 高粱, a Chinese variety of Sorghum. For the Japanese, *kōryan* was primarily associated with the manufacture of spirits and as animal feed, and as such was regarded less as a staple than as a last resort in case of famine. Without exception, my Japanese informants resented having to eat Sorghum.

²⁰ Tachibana, Personal interview, 14.

²¹ Tachibana, Personal interview, 16.

Tachibana drew blood, took electro-cardiograms (ECGs), and worked in the medical laboratory, which was where she came to work permanently by the start of the Korean war.

In general, the nurses were left to their own devices, and no great efforts were made to instruct them in communist philosophy. “However,” notes Tachibana, “as we were working in the hospital, we were thoroughly instructed to follow the principle of ‘*wei renmin fuwu*,’ ‘to serve the people’. I thought this was admirable. Even now, with all that has happened since, I feel that this aspect of communism is marvellous.”²²

Tachibana’s education in communist doctrine did not include much in the way of Mao’s writing: The *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* would not be published until 1964, and, although his speeches and essays were widely disseminated before this date, they didn’t make much impact on Tachibana’s instruction. Rather, once Tachibana and her colleagues turned 18, they began to attend classes hosted by Japanese cadres who had received their training in Yan’an:

“I don’t remember much of those lessons. They really didn’t leave a lasting impression. They were complicated and a little boring. I couldn’t tell you the first thing about Marx or Lenin, and I don’t think I could have done so back then either. The only truly memorable part of our instruction was the maxim ‘*To serve the people*’. Without a doubt, they tried to impress the view that ‘Communism is splendid’ upon us... However, what really convinced us was the fact that our living environment and treatment was pretty decent... So, we gradually changed our way of thinking to the point where we were basically ready to give our all for Communism. In the end, it was only a small portion of us who resisted.”²³

Despite the initial shock of her abduction by the 8RA, Tachibana had little to complain in her treatment by the 8RA officers: “The [8RA officers] really were extremely good to us Japanese girls. I didn’t experience any discrimination at the hands of the 8RA. If anything, I’d say I was rather spoiled by them.”²⁴ Tachibana describes her experiences with the 8RA as “extremely positive,” and the 8RA soldiers and officers with whom she had contact as “kind, good-hearted, and maintaining excellent discipline.”²⁵ She never experienced any violence at the hands of 8RA members, nor did she witness anything of the sort against her colleagues, Japanese or Chinese. After surrender, she heard a great deal of rumors of violence at the hands of the communists, but she personally had never witnessed anything of the sort. She does note, however, that the Japanese men working with the 8RA received worse treatment than the women:

“I gather that on occasion they were quite harsh to the men. I had the impression that the Japanese men did suffer from harsh

²² Tachibana, Personal interview, 10.

²³ Tachibana, Personal interview, 14.

²⁴ Tachibana, Personal interview, 12.

²⁵ Tachibana, Personal interview, 5.

treatment... We heard stories of some patients refusing to be attended by Japanese nurses, although I never personally experienced anything like that. I didn't know much about it at the time, but in regions where the [Kwantung Army] had committed atrocities against regular people, I heard that the units had to transfer [the Japanese medical staff] to other areas, because patients might even attack them. I never had any trouble like that, and never had any trouble with my Chinese comrades either. I think in general that the [Japanese] men got the worst of that kind of thing. The girls and women weren't really suspected of having militaristic ideas. I think that seeing our situation, many Chinese people felt sorry for us and looked out for us."²⁶

The reason for the greater severity with which the men were treated, Tachibana speculates, might have been because they were "more indoctrinated with Imperialist ideology. Militarism, too. That kind of thinking was very deep-rooted with the older generation, and especially the men."²⁷ The 8RA officers arranged for re-education of both men and women, including instruction in Marxism, communist principles, and attempts at de-programming "imperialist and militarist ideology". The most effective education, in Tachibana's estimation, was simply the good living conditions and benevolent treatment the Japanese received at the hands of the 8RA.

Japanese captives did make attempts to escape, especially in the first few months of capture, when the possibility of joining the refugee trains and being repatriated was still alive:

"At first, we all thought about running away, but there was really nowhere to go, and we were children after all. We wouldn't get far. Anyway, soon enough we saw that our treatment wasn't too bad, and we heard rumours that the repatriation camps were dangerous and rife with diseases, so we all set aside our thoughts of escape. However, there were some dyed-in-the-wool imperialists, who were stuck in their ideological way of thinking. They certainly did try to escape, or to sabotage the 8RA's activities. The 8RA didn't treat them particularly strictly, considering that some of the doctors tried to escape. They were captured and brought back, and then educated to some degree... They received communist education. The children didn't receive that kind of instruction, as we were too young, but all the adults received a communist education, deserters or not."²⁸

In Tachibana's recollection, the first years of the civil war were marked with tactical and strategic losses by the communists, and defined by frequent night-time retreats. Her tenure at the makeshift hospital in Keikanzan was short-lived, and followed by a period in which she and her

²⁶ Tachibana, Personal interview, 15 - 19.

²⁷ Tachibana, Personal interview, 14.

²⁸ Tachibana, Personal interview, 6.

unit were shuttled around the northeast, remaining behind the battle-lines of the intensifying civil war and tending to the wounded it produced:

“The 8RA were getting beaten pretty terribly – we were retreating all over the place. We would flee from the battlefield, deafened by the sound of their cannons. We couldn’t march during the day, since we’d get killed from the air by Nationalist bombers. So, we’d march at night. All we could bring as baggage was whatever we could physically carry on our backs. We’d wrap our spare clothes in a single flimsy sheet of futon, and carry them like that. We didn’t even have satchels. That was all the property we had in the whole world. Our plan was to shoulder our packs and escape, but since we were trying to retreat in the middle of the night, and I was still just a child, I was so sleepy that I couldn’t walk straight. I was falling asleep on my feet. On one of these night retreats, I remember hearing someone behind me repeating: ‘hey, walk straight, walk straight’. In the distance, I could see the lights of a house. Seeing that, I was overwhelmed by homesickness, but there was nothing I could do, so I kept walking. I kept marching on. It was truly heartbreaking. It was utterly brutal.”²⁹

Another hazard of these marches occurred when Tachibana’s unit passed through communities that had suffered from Japanese attacks:

“When we were marching through certain areas – areas that had a strong anti-Imperialist sentiment, because they’d been harried by the Japanese army, where villages had been burned to the ground, and people had been raped by Japanese soldiers – when we marched through those territories, we were ordered not to speak. If we were found out there was a chance we’d be killed. Even though we were members of the 8RA, when we were passing through those areas we couldn’t speak. Nothing could protect us if we did.”³⁰

According to Tachibana, the fact that there were Japanese members of the 8RA was generally concealed from Chinese civilians: “The 8RA was definitely hiding the fact that it had Japanese members from the general public.”³¹ In those early months, with Tachibana’s unit constantly on the move, they usually found themselves without any kind of stable hospital installation. Instead, they set up makeshift clinics inside peasant homes, and often treated civilians alongside injured soldiers:

²⁹ Tachibana, Personal interview, 15.

³⁰ Tachibana, Personal interview, 18.

³¹ Tachibana, Personal interview, 18.

“We were deeply inculcated in the belief that we had to offer ourselves up for the people... Hence ‘To serve the people’... That’s why we marched. However tired we might be, we’d go to the peasant homes and... In that part of China, at the time, there was no running water in regular people’s houses. We had to go to the river to collect it. From the river! To help the peasants, we’d run down to the river and collect water for them, carrying it back in bottles or whatever we had to hand. We were still children, you know. We’d be dragging the buckets of water on the ground, they were so heavy. That was really rough. But we’d give it our all, really put our heart and soul into it, trembling under the weight of the water on our backs... all to serve the people.”³²

In the villages that had not experienced direct attacks from the Japanese—which, in Tachibana’s telling, is the majority of villages that they passed through—there was no need to conceal her nationality or speech, nor was there any obvious hostility towards her and her fellow Japanese comrades. In fact, Tachibana remembers occasional parties being thrown for the 8RA soldiers as they passed through, in which all the Chinese and Japanese would join together, make *jiaozi* dumplings, and eat and drink.

On October 1st, 1949, the CCP consolidated its control over the majority of the Chinese mainland, and Mao Zedong announced the conclusion of the war of liberation and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In 1949, Tachibana was still a part of the armed forces, and had been deployed to a hospital in the provinces, in Cangzhou, Hebei. By this stage, Tachibana had long abandoned any hope of being permitted to travel to Japan or of reunification with her family, although the end of the civil war did bring with it the glimmer of the possibility of repatriation. That glimmer was extinguished at the outset of the Korean war. Japanese personnel were informed that travel to Korea was explicitly forbidden. Tachibana was, however, redeployed to several new hospitals between 1949-53, including field hospitals near the Yalu River, at the North Korean border.

Tachibana was subsequently transferred to a large military hospital in Changchun, where she met her future husband, an assistant professor at the People’s University in Changchun. He, too, was Japanese, the leader of a group of Japanese students who had moved there from Yan’an and were studying economics. “Needless to say, it was all completely Marxist, and you’d think all the stuff they talked about was terribly outdated if you saw it today.”³³ Originally born in occupied Korea, he had never been a member of the 8RA, although he had worked on occasion as an interpreter and translator for the Communist party.

In 1953, with the Korean war over and the fighting largely ended, Tachibana and her Japanese comrades’ conscription finally came to an end, and the time for their return to Japan via Huludao and Maizuru was finally at hand. Although Tachibana describes that final move to Japan as

³² Tachibana, Personal interview, 19.

³³ Tachibana, Personal interview, 20.

“repatriation,” she observes that it would, in fact, be the first time she ever set foot on the Japanese archipelago. Tachibana later learned that her parents had been repatriated in 1947, although she neither saw them nor heard from them at any point from the moment of her abduction in 1945 until the moment she saw them in 1953, at the Maizuru repatriation office, as a 21-year-old woman.

After returning to Japan, Tachibana notes that she doesn’t recall any special negative treatment as a *Hikiagesha*. However, she notes that her husband did suffer from the stigma associated with those who had spent too long in Communist China:

“When my husband was looking for a job, he wanted to be a school teacher. In order to get the job, he had to pass a series of exams. He’d pass the first stage of examinations, then he’d pass the department exams, then come up for interview. During the interviews, it’d inevitably come out that he’d lived in China after 1945, and since he was regarded as holding ‘red’ views, he’d ultimately be turned down for the jobs.”³⁴

Unable to find work in schools, Tachibana husband made ends meet by taking up odd jobs, eventually landing employment at a small electrical goods store.

Tachibana attended a class reunion in 2010, organized for the students from the Keikanzan school. At that reunion, several of the Korean students attended—of those, the majority spoke of their escape from the north to the south: “Those who remained in the north probably faced persecution – after all, they must’ve all been from families who, to some degree, owned property. The ones who made it to the reunion were the ones who managed to flee from the north.”³⁵

Inevitably, given her youth and the extended proximity and camaraderie generated by close collaborative work and intense circumstances, Tachibana made many Chinese friends. “Of course, I keep in touch with many of my old comrades to this day. There’s one couple with whom I exchange Lunar New Year’s cards. They became unit leader and assistant unit leader in the 8RA.”³⁶ By the time of her repatriation, Tachibana had developed a close bond with China and the communist struggle:

“I’d already been in China for a very long time, you know. I was very accustomed to living in China. To be honest, I didn’t feel a particularly strong desire to return to Japan... for me, China really is like a second homeland. A second homeland. To have been with the 8RA for such a long time... truly, I feel that China is my second homeland.”³⁷

³⁴ Tachibana, Personal interview, 9.

³⁵ Tachibana, Personal interview, 20.

³⁶ Tachibana, Personal interview, 21.

³⁷ Tachibana, Personal interview, 22.

“With Our Backs to the Rising Sun”: Miura Kenji’s experiences in the USSR and PRC

Miura Kenji was born in Sakai in 1929, and raised in Shimane alongside seven siblings. His father was an employee at Mantetsu in charge of a vehicle repair plant. The family moved to Fengtian (present-day Shenyang) in 1936, when Miura was eight years old. Miura’s family moved often, transferring to Hulan, then Acheng, and, finally, Sunwu in Heilongjiang, where Miura attended high school and later began working as a clerk at a Manchukuo Red Cross hospital: “The hospital had an ethnic quota. The ratio was set as three Japanese people for every two locals. We called them *manren* (“Manchu”). I was one of the Japanese employees. There were a few Chinese employees at the hospital too, and I befriended some of them. I learned a little Chinese in school, and at work.”³⁸

Miura was recruited into the IJA at the age of sixteen and assigned to mess duty. On the day of surrender, Soviet soldiers came to his barracks: “The SRA soldiers showed up, and we tried to communicate with them. I was in the kitchen, cooking. They said: *Ya ne ponimayu*. We thought they wanted Japanese rice (*nipponmai*), but in fact they were just trying to tell us that they didn’t speak any Japanese. We weren’t frightened at first.”³⁹ Miura was instructed to report to the county office in Sunwu, where he and his fellow soldiers were disarmed by the SRA and ordered onto a truck:

“The Soviet soldiers told us ‘Tokyo *domoy*’. We learned that *domoy* means ‘return’ in Russian. We all thought we were going back to Japan, and we were overjoyed. However, the truck travelled towards Heihe, then to the Amur river and we were ordered to build rafts to cross it, travelling in the direction of Blagoveshchensk. Even then, we didn’t give up hope. ‘Tokyo *domoy*’, that’s all the Soviets said to us, and we believed them. After crossing the river, we were loaded into trucks again. I remember falling asleep, and when I woke up, the sun rising was behind us. We were driving away from the rising sun. That was when the truth began to dawn on all of us.”⁴⁰

It was not only the Russians who forcibly conscripted laborers under false pretenses, as Miura reports that the CCP appears to have done the same:

“I heard that a group of Japanese people were loaded onto buses in Bei’an, headed to Suihua and told that they would be taken on to repatriation centers. But one group, at least 1,000 in total, were taken to the old Tsuruoka mine instead. The whole convoy, tricked. Deceived. I don’t know the details. Some of those former

³⁸ Miura Kenji, Personal interview, 1-2.

³⁹ Miura, Personal interview, 9.

⁴⁰ Miura, Personal interview, 4.

miners ended up becoming ‘Labor heroes’ and enrolling in our school, which is how I heard of them. It must have been hard for them, though.”⁴¹

Miura was loaded onto a cargo train and transported alongside the other captives to a work camp, where they were set to work harvesting potatoes. It was still early autumn, and the cold had yet to set in. After the harvest, Miura was moved to another work camp, and put to work digging three-meter-deep trenches to bury water pipes and, later, transporting bags of coal at a power plant:

“It was brutal. The Russians seemed to bear the cold without any problem, but it was almost impossible for us. They’d pick up iron bars with their bare hands. They really were extraordinarily resistant to the cold. ‘*Davai, davai!*’ they’d shout at us. They made us work until we collapsed. Even without the cold, the conditions were very harsh. We hauled coal all day and all night, in rotating eight-hour shifts. Some of us didn’t have gloves. Those men really suffered... All we did was work.”⁴²

The living conditions were no better:

“All the captives were treated the same. The toilets were just giant pits overflowing with piles of excrement, so it was extremely unsanitary. We were allowed one shower per week each. We all caught scabies or other skin diseases. My skin was festering within a few days. There was never enough food either, especially considering the hard work and the cold. Most of our meals were congee gruel made of *gaoliang* sorghum. I absolutely hate sorghum. Sometimes we’d have black bread, one slice per person, hard as a rock and frozen through-and-through. Still, it was better than sorghum. The Russians ate much better than us, so they were physically much stronger than us. I can still hear them shouting *davai davai* at me. There wasn’t any political instruction or anything like that. I was small, and I wasn’t used to the cold. Perhaps because I was so young, they decided to send me back to Blagoveshchensk. That probably saved my life.”⁴³

Miura was ultimately sent back across the Amur and joined some thirty or so other Japanese youths at a detention center. He contracted typhus and was transferred to a Red Cross hospital in Harbin to convalesce. It was there that Miura first encountered the *balujun*, the Eighth Route Army:

⁴¹ Miura, Personal interview, 22-23.

⁴² Miura, Personal interview, 7.

⁴³ Miura, Personal interview, 10-11.

“The clinic had been controlled by the KMT before the USSR took it over. Then, they were replaced by the 8RA. The guards defending the buildings changed three times in just one year. When the 8RA took over, they needed recruits, so they conscripted me to stand guard at the guardhouse. I had meals with them and, since I could speak Chinese, I chatted with them.”⁴⁴

Miura was recruited to work in a stretcher team, tasked with transporting injured patients from vehicles to the clinic. His unit were then transferred to Acheng and began frontline work, braving the frontlines of the civil war to assist fallen soldiers. After a year or so of working in the stretcher team, Miura was transferred once again, this time to the *bingzhanbu* logistics unit in Harbin. There, he worked loading and unloading trains, until he was transferred back to mess detail, as he had been in the IJA.

“The work wasn’t too hard. Compared to the work in the USSR, Harbin was like a holiday. Plus, even though I don’t think that China was much richer than the USSR at that date, the food was far better. We all ate together. They even had wheat flour! We made pancakes. They were incredible. They put me in charge of shopping for vegetables and drawing water from the wells for the big pots we’d cook in. I learned to use a Chinese cleaver to chop vegetables. Most of the people in my unit were Chinese, although some were Japanese.”⁴⁵

Miura, as a full member of the 8RA, learned a variety of Chinese marching songs. He also recalls being drilled in matters of proper comportment and doctrine:

“We were taught military discipline through song. One song was the *Sanda jilu ba xiang juli*, ‘Three main rules of discipline and the eight points of attention’. The rules were really enlightened. Thanks to those songs, the 8RA was extremely well-disciplined. Every soldier followed the rules. I can still remember them now! We were told to be respectful of women and of *laobaixing*, the peasants, and never to steal... Apart from the songs, we weren’t really drilled in any kind of education. At that time, what I learned of communism I learned through the example that the 8RA officers set. The Japanese soldiers were told not to use any racial slurs, so we stopped. Everyone followed the rules... A lot of the rules had to do with lodging. When the 8RA stayed overnight at peasants’ houses, we’d get up early the next morning and draw water for them, clean their yards, wash any pots and pans we used, and pay up for any firewood or food that we took. I was in charge of

⁴⁴ Miura, Personal interview, 9.

⁴⁵ Miura, Personal interview, 13.

accounting for a while. At first, we used money, but then we shifted to *chaipiao* and *liangpiao* (firewood chits and food chits), and around 1949 we started using silver to pay for things. We were forbidden from taking even a single needle without payment, or breaking a single bowl. Even in battle, we were forbidden from scuffing the farmer's land. If the Nationalists attacked, we were ordered to draw fire away from the farmer's homes and land, so that they wouldn't be caught up in the destruction. I didn't see much combat, however. The worst I saw was a comrade stepping on a landmine outside Tianjin during the liberation. He was killed."⁴⁶

Despite the emphasis on discipline, there was little expectation of the observance of formalities between officers and low-ranking soldiers 8RA:

"The Chinese treated their Japanese comrades as friends. When we were working, it never really felt as though we were being given orders. When the cooking team leader told us what we'd be doing that day, we'd simply say 'sure thing'. There was no real formality at all. At first I was worried, but after spending some time with the 8RA in Heihe and later in Acheng and Harbin, my worries completely faded. The 8RA treated us extremely kindly."⁴⁷

In 1949, Miura was transferred to a Navy unit in Beijing, where he remained for several years as a fully salaried member of the PLA, living alongside his comrades in the Hutongs and enrolling in the *Renmin daxue*, the People's University. There, Miura studied Japanese history, Chinese history, and economics, all through the analytic lens of Marxist-Leninism. He also began to have time for leisure:

"At the University, we formed a *wengongtuan*, an art collective. All the members were Japanese. We'd play violins and other musical instruments and sing songs. We were healed by those performances. For leisure, we played volleyball and baseball, and even watched Japanese films once a fortnight or so. However, that all stopped once the iron curtain went up in earnest."⁴⁸

Many of the instructors at the University were themselves Japanese.⁴⁹ The Japanese division's principal and vice-principals were all Japanese, as were the teaching assistants who facilitated classroom discussions:

"The objective was to train us to be *chiiki iin*, local leaders of the Communist Party once we returned to Japan. At the time, I asked

⁴⁶ Miura, Personal interview, 14 and 30.

⁴⁷ Miura, Personal interview, 15.

⁴⁸ Miura, Personal interview, 17.

⁴⁹ I have omitted the names of these individuals to protect their privacy.

myself ‘why should I do this?’ In the end, it never really came to fruition. When I returned to Japan, I worked as a milkman. I did end up joining the JCP, however.”⁵⁰

While in China, Miura used several pseudonyms, as did his other Japanese comrades in the PLA. Contact with his former Chinese comrades, however, and records of his time in China were complicated by the events of the cultural revolution:

“After repatriation, a lot of us who had been in China wanted to get together. We formed all sorts of groups, usually centered around whichever region or PLA unit we’d been in. However, because everyone had been using pseudonyms, we had to ask the CCP for assistance, getting lists of names. That worked for a while – for instance, it’s how the Tsuruoka Mine Group was formed - but once the Cultural Revolution started, it became impossible. The Red Guards destroyed all those records, and even keeping records of Japanese comrades became dangerous. For my former [Chinese] comrades, it was dangerous. They had to conceal the past. They had to destroy all the pictures and records that associated them with us. The Cultural Revolution was a tragedy.”⁵¹

From Colonial Plough to Scalpel of Liberation: Saitō Yoshio and the Eight Route Army

Saitō Yoshio was born in rural Yamagata prefecture in 1928. Shortly after finishing eighth grade, he decided to move to the colonies:

“I left primary school at around the same time as the government started promoting the idea that we all needed to go and settle in Manchuria. We were told that we needed to go to *kaitakuchi* and join *iminkaitaku* “migrant pioneer” teams to trailblaze in Mongolia and Manchuria. We were told that the settlement of Manchuria was necessary in order for Japan to successfully wage war. For a poor farm kid like me, it was a very attractive offer. In Japan there wasn’t any free land to cultivate, no rice paddies or arable fields available whatsoever. In Manchuria, however, we were promised ten hectares of rice paddy each, complete with a house, livestock, and farming equipment, all entirely for us, no questions asked. With these sweet words ringing in my ears, I set off for Manchuria at the age of fourteen.”⁵²

In March 1943, Saitō moved to Siping, between the present-day provinces of Liaoning and Jilin. He found work as a farm laborer in a *kaitakuson* settler village in Siping, alongside around one

⁵⁰ Miura, Personal interview, .23.

⁵¹ Miura, Personal interview, 24.

⁵² Saitō Yoshio, Personal interview, 1-2.

thousand other settlers, mostly from rural regions of Japan. Despite moving to the continent with the hopes of working as a farmer, and receiving promises that he could avoid the military draft, he saw his situation change abruptly in 1944:

“At first, it was fantastic. I came from a very poor region, and I couldn’t believe how fertile the land in Manchuria was. We were told that we had to ‘develop’ (*kaitaku*) the land, but in fact there was no need to develop anything. There was no wildland, it was already domesticated, and the land was incredibly fertile and high-quality. For a while, it was a dream come true. I’d grown up poor, and I just wanted farmland. We’d been promised that we wouldn’t been recruited, but as you know, that turned out to be a lie. The Kwantung Army started recruiting absolutely everyone, even the sick and the disabled. I was 16 when they recruited me into a reserve unit. It was tough. There were no adults whatsoever in our unit, we were all kids. Luckily, I never fought. Surrender came first.”⁵³

After surrender, the village head instructed the villagers to remain in place until repatriation arrangements were made. Saitō recalls that as a time of great anxiety:

“At war’s end, everywhere you went in China you’d hear stories about how extremely wicked and evil the 8RA was. You’d hear things like: ‘If Chiang Kai-shek’s men come, you’ll be alright, but if the 8RA come, you’ll be in deep trouble.’ There were rumors of people getting shot, too. At first, we were pretty nervous in approaching them, but the more we learned of the 8RA, the more we realized that far from being evil, in fact they treated us, a defeated people, with benevolence. When they took over the government, they still gave a great deal of consideration to how we’d feed ourselves and how we’d provide for our livelihoods. I gradually came to feel that they really were alright.”⁵⁴

The units that arrived at Saitō’s village belonged to the *dongbei renmin ziweijun*, the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army, an organization which would go on to become the Fourth Field Army. As Saitō spoke some Chinese, he was put to work as a translator and go-between for the Chinese army officers and the Japanese village administrators. The precarious status quo was shattered, however, by the resumption of violence of the Chinese Civil War:

“The Civil War was already heating up. I was sent off hither and thither to deliver messages from the communists to the *kaitakuson* village heads, sometimes travelling fifty miles at a stretch across

⁵³ Saitō, Personal interview, 31.

⁵⁴ Saitō, Personal interview, 4.

battlefields. It was extremely dangerous. Fighting broke out between communists and nationalists all around our region.”⁵⁵

Saitō recounted his first impressions of the 8RA:

The first time I laid eyes on the 8RA, their uniforms were mismatched, nobody’s boots fit properly, some soldiers were carrying weapons while others weren’t, some were even walking around with those old-fashioned Chinese *seiryūtō*.⁵⁶ They were such a motley bunch that it was hard to believe that this was the actual army. Up until then, none of us had ever seen any soldiers besides those of the IJA, and the odd glimpse of Soviet soldiers. The IJA all had clean, matching uniforms, as you’d expect. All of the 8RA’s uniforms were different. Some were yellow, others grey, while yet others were black. Some had gaiters, while others had wrapped *kyahan* leg bindings. Whereas the Japanese wrapped them tightly around their calves, the 8RA soldiers wrapped them several times all the way over the knee. They’d use about three lengths of cloth on each leg, so that even if one marched all day, they wouldn’t slip. They really didn’t look like an organised army of any sort. They looked like farmers. I later discovered that the finest weapons they had were *sanhachi-shiki hoheijū*, old models of the IJA’s Type 38 rifles. They had no automatic weapons whatsoever.”⁵⁷

By the end of the summer of 1945, the possibility of joining the Chinese communists became apparent to Saitō and many of his fellow villagers:

“I learned that the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army had already absorbed several thousand Japanese soldiers who were serving with them, so they were used to dealing with Japanese people. The Chinese officers brokered a deal with the village heads to make certain allowances for the Japanese villagers, assuring us that there wasn’t anything to worry about, and that since we had the means and knowledge of rice-farming, we should just continue doing that. Even though we were citizens of a defeated nation, we started to feel a ray of hope. Soon, however, the Nationalist army began advancing from Shanhaiguan Pass, pushing deeper and deeper into the rural heartland. As the fighting came closer, it became clear from both the 8RA and the *kaitakuson* heads that we wouldn’t be here peacefully farming rice for much longer. They

⁵⁵ Saitō, Personal interview, 3.

⁵⁶ Although the term *seiryūtō* refers to a legendary voulge wielded by Guan Yu, the weapons that Saitō saw were, most likely, *dadao*, large cleaver-like swords occasionally used by Chinese soldiers.

⁵⁷ Saitō, Personal interview, 19.

started to demand the collaboration of young people, especially to go work in the hospitals. That's when members of the village started to enlist in the 8RA."⁵⁸

A few days after the start of Operation August Storm, rumors of Soviet atrocities began to abound throughout the northern territories. The first time that 8RA soldiers came to Saitō's farmstead, looking for weapons, he was afraid of what they might do. In Saitō's recollection, the 8RA took any rifles they could find. Instead, they found his mother's sword, a family heirloom:

"The soldiers were angry at me, and I was terrified. I thought they'd force me to commit suicide. I'd told them we didn't have any weapons, but they found my mother's *katana*. Once I explained that it was my ancestor's sword, they had a good laugh, and everybody relaxed. One of the officers brought out some bowls of pork and rice, and told me to help myself. We made small talk. Eventually, the officer asked me to join the Eighth Route Army. I replied: 'I'll join your army if we can fight against the Soviet army.' I'd heard about the Soviets looting and raping women, and I wanted to fight them. The 8RA officer responded: 'We fight against villains, no matter if they're Soviet or not. If they hurt the people, they are our enemies.' Hearing that, I decided to enlist."⁵⁹

The 8RA was particularly interested in recruiting Japanese people to join its medical units and shore up their deficiencies in medical staffing:

"We were shuttled all over the countryside, and every day the prospect of returning to our village – let alone returning to Japan – grew ever more distant. At first we were told they just needed our help temporarily, but the weeks turned to months, and then the months to years. The communists wanted to train us to work as nurses and doctors. Initially I didn't understand why they'd want us to do it, but it made sense after a while. None of them spoke a word Japanese, but all the medicine in Manchuria was Japanese! I received perfunctory medical training, to put it mildly. The 8RA had a terrible lack of doctors."⁶⁰

The Chinese members of the PLA had obtained medical textbooks, but for the most part found themselves unable to read them, as they were written in Japanese. Instead, they decided to use them to train their new recruits. For villagers like Saitō, who had no medical training whatsoever, the experience was challenging:

⁵⁸ Saitō, Personal interview, 6.

⁵⁹ Saitō, Personal interview, 21.

⁶⁰ Saitō, Personal interview, 7.

“We were given Japanese medical books and told: ‘You’ve all received eight years of school education. So, if you read these books, you’ll be able to understand what’s going on. You have one week to catch up.’ We were then given a week to teach ourselves everything from basic surgery to medical practices, minor procedures, prescriptions, how to make vaccines, how to prepare bandages, the whole lot. It sounds crazy, but really, we had no option. There was nothing else we could do.”⁶¹

Saitō was transferred to a field hospital to begin work. By 1946, Saitō’s employment at the hospital meant that he was not permitted to travel to the coast to embark on a repatriation vessel:

“At the time there were a couple of hundred Japanese people working at that hospital. Over one hundred nurses, doctors, and chemists – most of us were employed as medical personnel. There were also several combat medics who had formerly served with the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces. A good number of former soldiers were handling medical affairs, but when the repatriation ships came through, every single one of them was taken home to Japan. So, me and four people my age, alongside twelve or thirteen Red Cross nurses and one Japanese doctor, ended up having to take care of around 600 hospital beds. Apart from us there was one single Chinese doctor.”⁶²

The language barrier remained a major obstacle for Saitō and his fellows. In order to perform his tasks as a medical technician and attend to the wounded and the sick, he found it necessary to brush up not only on his Chinese, but on Western languages, too:

“The most important jobs that we had to do were medical services, serving as the 8RA’s doctors. Obviously, if we couldn’t at least communicate a little, we wouldn’t be able to do our jobs properly. I found myself in this predicament as well, so everywhere I went I’d bring a Chinese newspaper with me, and one-by-one ask people how to pronounce each character. Back then none of us knew the Roman alphabet or pinyin or anything like that, so I really had no way of writing out the prescriptions until I familiarized myself with Chinese. We’d been brought up in an entirely Japanese age. Even if I had known the Roman alphabet, I would’ve had no idea of how to write or pronounce anything. One of the Japanese doctors of herbal medicine taught me the alphabet, and how to pronounce German words. At the time, most of our medicines

⁶¹ Saitō, Personal interview, 8.

⁶² Saitō, Personal interview, 8.

came from Germany. So, I learned how to write out simple prescriptions in German.”⁶³

Saitō excelled at his work. At the age of seventeen, he attended to soldiers who had fallen in battle, treating between fifty and a hundred patients each day. He became used to his new circumstances: “I never intended to become a medical doctor, but here I am. It was thrust upon me.” In 1948, Saitō was instructed to pick out six subordinates and set up a clinic. “I had no choice. I simply did it. There were no other options.”⁶⁴ Although he was accepted well enough by his 8RA comrades, some of his patients were not so welcoming:

“In the beginning, Anti-Japanese sentiment was very strong. The Japanese were called ‘evil’ at that time, or *Riben guizi* (‘Japanese devil’). When I treated patients, naturally, I’d cause them some kind of pain. When I did, they’d call out: ‘It hurts! You Japanese devil!’. On some occasions the patients would lash out at me with their crutches... However, half a year after we joined, those kinds of responses really died down. There were a lot of foreign doctors there, Mongolians, Germans, Russians, and Canadians too. We started to be called *guoji youren* (‘international friends’) and *tongzhi* (‘comrade’). I think the 8RA officers had something to do with the change of heart. They had policies about how to treat the ‘Japanese devils’, and they showed everyone how many doctors and nurses were Japanese. They taught the Chinese comrades that there was a difference between the Japanese people and the Japanese army. Eventually I became Saitō *tongzhi*.”⁶⁵

Saitō’s experience with the Japanese military involved a brief period of conscription directly before surrender, during which time he didn’t see combat. Nonetheless, he recalls the difference in character of the two armies:

“When Japan was in charge, if a Division Commander or someone of high rank came by, you’d have to stand stiffly to attention and salute, all with extreme deference and humility. Even civilian farmers were expected to bow and scrape for those guys, let alone recruits. In peacetime, the 8RA did absolutely none of this, and we were all accepted as regular comrades. When we stood before the city mayor or the Division Commander of the 8RA, “comrade” was fine as a form of address. Of course, on the battlefield, things were different: In a combat situation, you had to obey orders without question, or problems would arise. I grew up in the country and like a lot of the other rural men never much liked

⁶³ Saitō, Personal interview, 9.

⁶⁴ Saitō, Personal interview, 10.

⁶⁵ Saitō, Personal interview, 32.

stuffy formality, so honestly, just this was enough to really make us all come to a kind of mutual understanding with the Chinese.”⁶⁶

Saitō’s training was not restricted to medicine. As was standard for members of the PLA, he also received ideological instruction:

“In amongst all of the fighting, we were also required by the 8RA to perform “political study” and “study of the 8RA’s principles”, which even the Chinese 8RA soldiers themselves had to do. I resisted this brainwashing at the start, and frankly none of their politics ‘made it past my ears’, but it eventually became clear that not only were there no wicked people among the 8RA soldiers – in fact, they were really all quite excellent. Even though we were obviously foreigners, they nonetheless referred to us as *tongzhi* (‘comrade’).”⁶⁷

Food was a major topic of concern for the Japanese recruits, and appears to have been addressed by 8RA officials as part of the ethnic harmony policies and to maintain troop morale:

“As a rule, the 8RA soldiers ate whatever the locals ate. The staples up north were flour, millet, sorghum, and the odd bit of rice if you were lucky. Occasionally we’d get pork, and make gyoza with wheat flour. In the beginning, I complained constantly about the food. I hated eating sorghum. However, the 8RA went out of their way to make sure that the Japanese comrades got rice. I suppose we must have made terribly heavy weather about wanting rice... on the whole, the food was good, especially once I started working in hospitals. We were given an allotment of rice every month. They were quite accustomed to making special dispensations for the Muslim soldiers, who couldn’t eat pork. In that sense, the 8RA was very respectful of ethnic minority religious practices. After Japan lost the war, I gave up on religion. I no longer believe in God, Amaterasu, or the emperor.”⁶⁸

As with the other conscripts, Saitō was drilled in the 8RA’s disciplinary doctrines:

“In some ways, discipline in the 8RA was extremely strict. I’m sure you’re familiar with the tight marching discipline of the 8RA: The Three Rules and the Eight Points of Attention. If you violated these rules during peacetime, you’d be extremely strictly disciplined in a “criticism session”. Those sessions were no joke. They were really dreadful. If you violated the rules on the

⁶⁶ Saitō, Personal interview, 12.

⁶⁷ Saitō, Personal interview, 12.

⁶⁸ Saitō, Personal interview, 34.

battlefield, you'd be shot on the spot. In particular, violence towards women, gambling, and stealing would be punished with the utmost severity. I witnessed two on-the-spot executions while working as a medic near the front lines. The men were shot right where they stood. We were all quite casual in some ways, but the maintenance of those rules of discipline was absolute.”⁶⁹

Criticism sessions were a regular feature of enlisted life for Saitō and his comrades:

“During the lulls in the fighting, which is to say during most of the daily life among the troops, we would engage in vigorous group criticisms and self-criticisms. Every day without fail there would be some new directive from the central committee, whereupon there would be a new round of recriminations of some sort: “why did you do that?” “I’ve done something wicked”... and then one would have to confess and examine one’s own actions. These lessons would extend to our behavior on the frontlines as well. We never stole from POWs. That was strictly forbidden. At the start, me and the rest of the Japanese recruits didn’t know any of these rules. Some of us had been soldiers, and some of us had even been police officers, but I have to confess that on one occasion we went out to steal radishes, leeks, and onions from a farmer’s fields. When the chief secretary of our unit found out about this, he forced us to go to the farmers and properly pay for everything that we’d taken. It was pretty clear that nobody was going to get away with any sort of wicked activity. Within two or three years, we’d all inscribed these lessons in our hearts. I guess it took us Japanese recruits a while, because we had a *gunkokushugi* militarist mindset at the outset.”⁷⁰

The experiences in the 8RA opened Saitō’s eyes to the suffering of the Chinese people at the hands of Japan’s colonists and military:

“The 8RA liked to hold meetings, especially once the land reform movement started. We’d all gather together, and they were encouraged to voice their suffering. We Japanese were encouraged to join in too. It was in those meetings that I heard of the suffering of the Chinese people under Japanese rule. I heard of people who had lost their families in war. Gradually, I came to realize that the Japanese had been terrible enemies of the Chinese people.”⁷¹

⁶⁹ Saitō, Personal interview, 18.

⁷⁰ Saitō, Personal interview, 16.

⁷¹ Saitō, Personal interview, 27.

Regarding repatriation, Saitō recalls the lassitude of the Japanese government towards its stranded subjects with some bitterness:

“For sixteen years after Japan’s defeat, nobody from the Japanese government came to rescue us. I don’t think there was even an inquiry. If you look into it, you’ll find that Japan’s military and government basically told everyone who was left in the outer territories to make do as best they could. We were left behind. We’d all gone out there to Manchuria to help our nation. We’d done everything for our country, for the military and for the government. However, they did nothing for us. They sent nobody to help us, and didn’t even send out survey teams to find out how many of us had been left behind. Thirteen years passed after defeat, and still neither the Japanese government nor the military did anything to help us. Finally, we were helped by the Japanese Red Cross, the Japan-China Friendship Association, and by the Japan Peace Committee. These three organizations collaborated with the Chinese Red Cross to arrange for our repatriation.”⁷²

Saitō returned to Japan in 1958, after attending the *Renmin daxue* in Beijing. Upon his return, most of his personal effects were confiscated:

“Since I attended the university in Beijing, everything that could expose my identity was confiscated, including photographs. They did not want us to bring such items back to Japan in the future. Especially photos showing us in uniforms. While I was in China, I used a Chinese name, *Zhang*, and a Japanese pseudonym too.”⁷³

Despite the fact that Saitō was, by the time of his repatriation, a fully-accredited medical laboratory technician, life in Japan was not immediately welcoming:

“Things were hard, because I’d just arrived from an enemy nation – from the Communist Bloc. I’d spent thirteen years in enemy territory. Still, I was a qualified clinical technologist, so in theory all the hospitals were desperate for people with my skills. However, when they found out about my past, my job applications would get rejected. In my opinion, those who rejected me on the basis of ideology missed out on my skills. Tōhoku University Hospital declined my application, then all the hospitals in Yamagata. They’d give me some excuse, but the rejections were clearly because of my past. Finally, I came to Tokyo and visited the lab in Yoyogi Hospital. The director there was also a former member of the Eighth Route Army, a formidable and brilliant

⁷² Saitō, Personal interview, 15.

⁷³ Saitō, Personal interview, 8.

man.⁷⁴ He'd worked alongside one of my former comrades, who'd been employed at an 8RA hospital in Yanji."⁷⁵

After his repatriation, Saitō maintained many of his relationships with his former comrades, although correspondence was disrupted by the tumults of the '60s. In recent years, Saitō has attended state functions in the PRC, in which the labor and sacrifices of the Japanese members of the PLA were acknowledged.

⁷⁴ I have omitted this gentleman's name and some related details, to protect his privacy.

⁷⁵ Saitō, Personal interview, 29.

5

Moving Pictures, Moving Empire:

Japanese Members of CCP and PLA Film Production Teams, 1945-1958

The Manchukuo Film Association and the vision of Amakasu Masahiko

The Manchukuo Film Association (*Manshū Eiga Kyōkai*, henceforth ‘Man’ei’) was established in 1937 in Jilin as a collaboration between Mantetsu and the government of Manchukuo. This type of public-private configuration (*kokuchikugaisha*) was characteristic of Imperial Japan’s corporate and public ventures in Manchukuo. From its inception, a substantial proportion of Man’ei’s employees were ethnically Chinese,¹ and it was the explicit objective of Amakasu Masahiko, director of Man’ei from 1939 until his death by suicide in 1945, that the organization should not be a mere production facility of imperial exotica for the consumption of the Japanese home-island market, but rather a force of cultural legitimation that would contest the accusation that Manchukuo was no more than Imperial Japan’s ‘puppet state’.² Amakasu articulated his vision in no uncertain terms:

“There is absolutely no need to make films that exoticize Manchukuo for Japan. Japan will probably make their own films that get it wrong anyhow, vulgarizing the unusual aspects of Manchuria. We must not forget that our focus is the Manchurians and, after we make headway, nothing should keep us from producing films for Japan.”³

To understand the trajectory of Man’ei in the twilight of Japan’s empire, and the course that the organization undertook after Japan’s surrender, it is instructive to examine Amakasu’s character and his staffing decisions. Amakasu drew on the organizational experience obtained from his time as head of Manchukuo’s Ministry of Civil Affairs to shape Man’ei into an institution that did not merely execute the Imperial Japanese government’s colonial ambitions, but that actively upheld

¹ For a detailed discussion of the Chinese experience of Man’ei, consult: Zengyu Pang, *Man Ying: zhiminzhuyi dianying zhengzhi yu meixue de meiying* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2015).

² For an extended exploration of this aspect of Manchukuo society and institutions, see: Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

³ Amakasu Masahiko, “Manjin no tame ni eiga wo tsukuru,” in Baskett, Michael, *The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008), 3, originally published in *Eiga Junpō*, August 1, 1942.

its rhetoric as the cultural organ of an ostensibly independent state.⁴ It is challenging to disentangle whether Amakasu's strategy of recruiting a multi-ethnic and politically cosmopolitan workforce for Man'ei was born of a sincere commitment to the rhetoric of Manchukuo as a "rainbow state", if this was merely another facet of the elaborate theatrics of national legitimation that occupied so much of the time of the Manchukuo administrators,⁵ or if it was a decision born of pragmatism, or some other impulse. Given Amakasu's pivotal role in the inception of Manchukuo, which included accompanying the last emperor Aisin Gyoro Puyi to the territory (and, allegedly, threatening to kill him if he betrayed the Japanese emperor),⁶ it is reasonable to favor the first interpretation. Another indication of Amakasu's intent can be inferred from his notorious reputation: Young describes him as a "sadistic military police officer",⁷ referencing his service in the Imperial Japanese Military Police Corps (*kempeitai*) and his gleeful murder of Ōsugi Sakae, Itō Noe, and the infant Tachibana Munekazu, for which he served three years in prison before being released as part of a general amnesty to celebrate Imperial ascension.⁸ While Amakasu's *curriculum vitae* is a litany of infamy, it is his remarkable centrality in the construction of Manchukuo that made him keenly aware of the risk of delegitimation inherent in the state's objectification as an exotic cultural artifact to be served to the home-island Japanese public.

Amakasu appears to have both pre-empted, and attempted to move against, the types of critiques of the Manchukuo project that have since come to form a pillar of the Anglophone historiography of the state, as well as the decisively orthodox interpretation thereof in the PRC.⁹ In Amakasu's hands, Man'ei became embedded in a web of contradictions, as the outpost of Japanese colonial propaganda manufacture and testament to Japan's colonial modernity came to be staffed, in part, not only by Chinese workers,¹⁰ but by communist and socialist sympathizers as well.¹¹

⁴ Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 33.

⁵ A documentary example of this phenomenon can be observed in the large volume of publications produced for foreign consumption, with the explicit objective of constructing an informational, cultural, and quantitative framework that would substantiate the political, legal, and military claims of Manchukuo's sovereignty; many of these predate the establishment of the Manchukuo state itself and thus served as a teleological discursive groundwork for the new state. For some examples of these attempts to introduce Manchukuo into the Westphalian system of mutual recognition, refer, for instance, to: Publications of the Department of Foreign Affairs: Manchoukuo Government, *The Chief Executive's Proclamation: The Organic Law of Manchoukuo and Other Laws Governing Various Government Offices* (Manchuria: Publications of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Manchukuo Government, November 1932), or The South Manchuria Railway Company, *Report on Progress in Manchuria, 1907-1928*, (Dairen: The South Manchuria Railway Company, 1929). For a detailed discussion of another organization involved in the media dimension of this project, see Tomoko Akami's "Projecting a Fiction of the Nation State to the World: The Manzhouguo News Agency in Japanese-Occupied Northeast China, 1932–1945", in Ben-Canaan, Dan, Grüner, Frank, and Prodöhl, Ines, eds., *Entangled Histories The Transcultural Past of Northeast China*, (Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 205-234.

⁶ Edward Behr, *The Last Emperor* (Toronto: Futura, 1987), 193, 213.

⁷ Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 16.

⁸ For details, consult: J. Victor Koschmann, "Murder of an Anarchist Recalled: Suppression of News in the Wake of the 1923 Tokyo Earthquake," *Japan Focus* 5, no. 11 (5 November 2007).

⁹ For a discussion of the view of Manchukuo as "Japan's Orient", consult Young, 9-14.

¹⁰ Taeko Ishii, "Amakasu Masahiko to Manshū Eiga '94 Sai Saigo no Shōgen", *Bungeishunju*, October 2014, 324.

¹¹ Ishii, "Amakasu Masahiko."

Young describes the pan-Asianist architects of the Manchukuo state as a “motley crew,”¹² and nowhere is this appellation more apt than in the context of Man’ei. Whether out of uncynical obedience to the Imperial Co-Prosperity doctrine, or of the pure pragmatism of a devoted *realpolitik* consequentialist serving as Imperial agent, Amakasu’s Man’ei was indeed motley in its membership, if not entirely so in its output.¹³ As we will see, in aiming to transcend the peripherality of Manchukuo and concretize its status as a legitimate political and cultural entity, Amakasu established an institutional structure that proved to be astonishingly agile in its capacity to undergo a cardinal shift in political orientation with little or no loss of function.

Two episodes hint at the institutional culture that Amakasu shaped Man’ei into in the few short years of his tenure. Upon taking over the studio, Amakasu immediately set about transforming what he regarded as its *laissez-faire* workplace culture into something more regimented. Editor Kishi Fumiko recalls how Amakasu, on his first day as director, stood on his office balcony, overlooking the entrance to the Man’ei building, and berated any employee who arrived late, shouting: “What the hell do you think you’re doing?”. His disciplinarian approach to Man’ei was not limited to his treatment of the lower-level employees: He also conducted a purge of the top administrators, firing without compunction those he regarded as lazy or “parasitic”, going so far as to exile the head of production, Makino Eiyū, back to the Tokyo offices of Man’ei.¹⁴ With the end of the war in sight, Amakasu not only stubbornly ignored draft orders for his staff, but also arranged evacuation trains for the families and distributed five million yen to his employees. The filmographer Hirai Yō notes that more than 3,000 people, Chinese and Japanese, attended Amakasu’s funeral in Xinjing—an indication of the devotion he instilled in those around him.¹⁵ This account is supported by other descriptions of benevolence that were not purely paternalistic, but that suggest real camaraderie, even among the Japanese and Chinese staff: as the Soviet artillery began to strike the sites around Man’ei, Kishi recalls rushing to the company houses and packing her things. Some employees were resigned to what appeared to be certain death, while others clung to hopes of Soviet mercy. As Kishi was readying herself for escape, Bao Jie, a Chinese Man’ei employee, burst into the dormitory and addressed the Japanese employees: “I’ve brought you Chinese clothes. Everyone, quick! Change into these outfits and come to my house. I’ll protect you.”¹⁶ Many accepted the offer, but Kishi, among others, opted to remain at Man’ei. As her elder brother put it: “As Japanese people, we must accept our fate. You Chinese employees have nothing to fear. Go, and be safe!”¹⁷

Amakasu’s violence and zeal challenge the historian with the temptation to project a cynical awareness of the artificiality of the Manchukuo project onto his actions. However, it is valuable to

¹² Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 15.

¹³ For an exhaustive analysis of the filmographic content of Man’ei productions, consult Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931–1945* (London: Palgrave, 2007), especially 132–133.

¹⁴ Ishii, “Amakasu Masahiko,” 323. (All translations from this source are my own.)

¹⁵ Yō Hirai, “Manshū eiga kyōkai no kaisō” in *Eigashi kenkyū*, No.19, 1984., p. 79.

¹⁶ Ishii, “Amakasu Masahiko,” 324.

¹⁷ Ishii, “Amakasu Masahiko,” 324.

temper this impulse—and indeed, the impulse of reflexively framing Manchukuo as a ‘puppet’ state—with a degree of legitimacy categorically and qualitatively distinct from that of other, successful nation-state projects. As Prasenjit Duara argues, to overcommit to this view erases the subjectivity of the experiences of the citizens of Manchukuo, thus infra-dimensionalizing them as passive subjects of the Imperial Japanese military-capital-bureaucratic nexus, and simultaneously overemphasizing colonial agency while eroding that of the (frequently unwilling, uncooperative, and/or resistant) colonial subjects.¹⁸ As I hope to demonstrate below, careful examination not only of the documentary record, but of oral histories and lived experiences of the individuals involved, substantially obstruct such linear narratives.¹⁹ Similarly, any attempt to understand Manchukuo institutions solely in terms of colonial oppression or Imperial command render incomprehensible the capacity of those same institutions to be reoriented towards the CCP’s cultural- and nation-building project, to serve as instruments for the attainment of individual self-realization, and to act as organs for post- and anti-colonial cultural production.

A Motley Crew: Ōtsuka Yūshō, Uchida Tomu, and Kimura Sotoji

Amakasu was resolute in transforming Man’ei’s institutional culture, and this energy extended to his recruitment decisions: nowhere was his eclectic pragmatism in staffing Man’ei more evident than in his decision to recruit Ōtsuka Yūshō.²⁰ Ōtsuka was a Waseda graduate with socialist leanings, who began working for Mantetsu in the early 1920s. He joined the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in 1932, and became a central player in the “Red Gang Incident”, also known as the Ōmori Bank Robbery, the first recorded bank robbery of its type in Japanese history. The heist, the plan for which was “unknown to all but one member of the [JCP] Central Committee”,²¹ led to a collapse of public support for the JCP and their public association with the criminal underworld, and served as a stimulus for the mass arrests and brutal carceral treatment of socialists, Marxists, and other left-wing activists throughout 1933-34.²² Following his release from prison, Ōtsuka followed in the footsteps of many other left-wing thinkers and travelled to Manchukuo, where he was hired to work at Man’ei directly by Amakasu, despite the director’s apparent knowledge of Ōtsuka’s criminal past and political pedigree.²³

Ōtsuka was not the only source of ideological eclecticism at Man’ei. Two other Japanese filmographers of ambivalent political stripe found their way into Amakasu’s employ: Uchida Tomu and Kimura Sōtoji. Uchida cut his teeth working at Tanizaki Jun’ichirō’s Taishō Katsuei Film Company from 1920-1923, then went on to join Nikkatsu’s Tokyo Tamagawa studio, where he directed several critically-acclaimed films, including *Tsuchi* (1939), which featured “a realistic

¹⁸ For details, the reader may find it instructive to consult Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

¹⁹ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 8.

²⁰ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 10.

²¹ Andrew E. Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1988), 206. See also Ishii, “Amakasu Masahiko,” 324.

²² Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan*, 207.

²³ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 10.

depiction of the lives of poor Meiji-period tenant farmers.”²⁴ The final frame of this film, showing a farmer tilling his field, was used as a propaganda poster designed to encourage farmer-settler migration to the Manchukuo *kaitakuchi*, in a development that Craig Watts calls “prophetic”, but which we might also regard as tragically ironic.

Manchukuo and Man’ei proved to be alluring destinations for Japanese film-makers interested in escaping the direct supervision of Imperial instruments of cultural control, in particular regarding the production of films for entertainment or aesthetic purposes. Once American air raids on Tokyo began in 1945, the comparative safety of Manchukuo also became an existential consideration. Uchida saw in Amakasu a charismatic, if eccentric, leader: devoted to the emperor, to the samurai ethic, and to the fortification and legitimation of the Manchukuo project. Uchida plainly came to admire Amakasu, although he refused to join him in death as the Red Army closed in on Xinjing/Shinkyō (Present-day Changchun). Following his capture, and until his repatriation in 1953, Uchida was unable to continue producing films, as he was transferred, alongside many other Japanese captives at Man’ei, to work in the Hegang Coal Mine – a development we will explore in detail below.

Far ‘redder’ than Uchida was Kimura Sotoji, whose family—which included the Naoki-prize-winning author Kimura Soju—were involved in Mushakōji Saneatsu’s utopian-socialist commune in the mountains of Miyazaki Prefecture, the *Atarashiki-mura* of the late 1910s.²⁵ Kimura effectively rendered himself unemployable in the home-islands’ film industry by joining Prokino, the Proletarian Film League of Japan (*Nippon Puroretaria Eiga Dōmei*) in the late ’20s. Kimura’s politics permeated his works, for instance, in the Soviet-style depictions of workers in the opening sequence of *Ino and Mon* (1936). Prokino was eventually snuffed out by the Peace Preservation Law, leading Kimura to escape to Manchukuo, where he, too, was recruited by Amakasu.

Parallels, Collision, and Absorption: The Origins of the Northeastern Film Studio

In 1938, one year after the government of Manchukuo and Mantetsu brought together their formidable wealth and power to establish Man’ei in Changchun, a very different kind of development in film history was taking place to the south, in Wuhan. Dutch film-maker Joris Ivens had spent a year in China producing a documentary on the Sino-Japanese War, later released under the titles of *China in 1938* and *The 400 Million*. This film focused on the war of resistance against Japan as fought by the 8RA, eulogizing the heroism of communist soldiers to an extent that drew the attention and apprehension of KMT censors, who also suspected Ivens of harboring communist sympathies and of fostering a personal friendship with Zhou Enlai.²⁶ Frustrated by the harassment

²⁴ Craig Watts, "Blood Spear, Mt. Fuji: Uchida Tomu's Conflicted Comeback from Manchuria," *Bright Lights Film Journal*, July 14, 2009.

²⁵ For details, see: Angela Yiu, "Atarashikimura: The Intellectual and Literary Contexts of a Taishō Utopian Village," *Japan Review*, no. 20 (2008): 203–230. Intriguingly, the vexillological principle of the motifs of the Manchukuoan flag are shared almost entirely with those of the *Atarashiki Mura*. At present, Justus Watt’s upcoming dissertation on the socialist and anarchist communes and intentional communities of the continental northeast is the most promising scholarship on this fertile topic.

²⁶ Martha Gellhorn, *A Memoir: Travels with Myself and Another* (New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1978), 52.

from KMT officials and the KMT's censorship of his attempts to screen the film, and receiving word that he was forbidden from any further filming, Ivens decided to gift his camera secretly to members of the 8RA stationed in the city. The recipient of the camera in question was an 8RA officer named Wu Yinxian, who recalled:

“It couldn't be presented openly. The office of the 8RA was surrounded by KMT agents. It was decided that the camera would be handed over at night... [Ivens and I] didn't speak, we only shook hands. Ivens gave me the camera and a few thousand meters of film... This was the first camera owned by the 8RA. It was a 35mm American Eymo.”²⁷

This camera, alongside a second one obtained in Hong Kong by Yuan Muzhi—actor and prominent figure of the Diantong Film Company, an ephemeral left-wing film production company based in Shanghai during 1934-35, which produced one of the earliest Jiang Qing films—were transported to Yan'an by Wu, Yuan, and several others, including film editor Qian Xiaozhang. There, they formed the protean core of what would become the *Dongbei Dianying Gonsi* ('Northeastern Film Studio', henceforth NSF),²⁸ and it was by this group and on these two cameras that the only extant footage of the early Yan'an period was captured, including, in 1939, images of Norman Bethune performing surgeries. Conditions, however, were suboptimal, as Qian recalls:

“There were few film materials and no running water or electricity. Films were produced by hand. The Party did not have money to spend on film supplies, and besides, Yan'an was surrounded either by the KMT or the Japanese. All our supplies were originally brought in 1938. After 1940, we had almost nothing.”²⁹

Photographic equipment was so rare and treasured in interwar Yan'an that Norman Bethune's brief last testament, which consists of a few hastily scrawled lines to the General Secretary of the Canadian Communist Party, makes mention of his Kodak Retina 2, which he bequeathed to the communist documentarian Sha Fei.³⁰ In the face of these challenges and rapidly dwindling film stock, by 1941 the CCP was seriously considering dissolving the film group. However, the group's precarious fate was salvaged in the wake of Mao's *Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art*,³¹ and of the culture-oriented 1942 Rectification Campaign, in which Mao expressed the importance of the orthodox Leninist position on art—namely, that “Art belongs to the people. It must leave its deepest roots in the very thick of the working masses. It should be understood for the masses and loved by them. It must unite the feelings, thoughts and the will of the masses and

²⁷ Patricia Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio, 1946-1949,” in *Chinese Film: The State of the Art in the People's Republic*, ed. George Stephen Semsel (New York: Praeger, 1987), 15.

²⁸ Ishii, “Amakasu Masahiko,” 327.

²⁹ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 17.

³⁰ Cai Zie, “Cai Zie jiemu Sha Fei dang'an” Baiqiu jiang xin'ai de laidingna xiangji zengyu Sha Fei”, in *Dang'an tiandi*, 6 (2008): 12-22.

³¹ Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967).

raise them.”³² Mao conducted a political purge and thought-reform campaign targeting those artists deemed too bourgeois or insufficiently guided by the will and interests of the proletariat. In part, the film group was able to escape the severest censures by the intervention of Zhou Enlai, who stepped up in support of maintaining the group’s integrity. Zhou’s endorsement in the face of severe scrutiny of all artistic activities, and the widespread suspicion of film in particular, as the Shanghai-bourgeois and compradore art form *par excellence*,³³ points towards the Yan’an Forum as a pivotal moment for the fate of film production under CCP direction. We can surmise that the film group succeeded in marrying the Leninist view of art with a Benjamin-esque view of the revolutionary possibilities offered by massively-reproducible art for the masses.³⁴ The accessibility of cinema and its natural synergies with simultaneous, collective, and equalizing cultural experiences facilitated the film group’s defense of its methods and *raison d’être*, even if, in 1942, the possibilities of creating films were theoretical at best. In any case, the material paucity of conditions in Yan’an drove the film group to diversify beyond their immediate domain, working alongside the theatre, ballet, and opera groups to create revolutionary art more practically suited to wartime deprivation. This rapprochement explains why, once the NSF had secured the resources of Man’ei, some of the first productions they created were adaptations of those works with which they had acquired familiarity during the Yan’an period.

Soon after Japan’s surrender, the US Ambassador to China, General Patrick Hurley (and later, General George C. Marshall) arranged mediation efforts in Chongqing between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, ostensibly with the hopes of creating some type of political settlement that might bring together China’s disparate political parties into peaceful coexistence and avert the brewing civil war—or, more realistically, that would ensure the establishment of a KMT-centered government.³⁵ However, aside from the animosity between Mao and Chiang and the breakdown of these talks, several other events complicated the US’s political gambit. The short-lived China Democratic League,³⁶ led by the philosopher and activist Liang Shuming, demanded an end to US involvement in China’s Civil War, citing the considerable material and logistical assistance that the US had been providing the KMT. This aid, which began in late 1945, included the airlifting of large numbers of KMT troops to northeast China with the objective of preventing communist consolidations in the region, and to assist the KMT in winning the race to capture valuable assets left behind by the receding Empire of Japan. The League also protested US sales of war surplus (on credit) approaching \$1bn to the KMT.³⁷ The strength of these accusations was compounded

³² Vladimir Lenin, quoted in Clara Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin (January 1924)* (New York: International Publishers, 1934).

³³ For a detailed contemporary critique of compradore culture, refer to Mao Tun, “We Must Still Prepare for a Long and Determined Struggle,” in *Literature in the People’s Republic of China*, ed. Kai-yu Hsu and Ting Wang, trans. John Berninghausen (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980), 40-41, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and their Revolution, 1895-1980* (New York: Viking Press, 1981), 322.

³⁴ This interpretation of Walter Benjamin is shared by Paddy Scannell’s “Benjamin Recontextualized: On ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’” in *Canonic Texts in Media Research: Are There Any? Should There Be? How About These?*, eds. Katz et al (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 74-99.

³⁵ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 301.

³⁶ *Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng*, founded in 1941 and disbanded by the KMT in 1947.

³⁷ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 302.

by a major diplomatic incident in Beijing involving the Americans, which Spence describes in detail:

“In December of 1946, the alleged rape of a Chinese student at Beijing National University by two US Marines raised... the anger of students, and clumsy government attempts to discredit the young woman’s story by questioning her morality only inflamed the situation further. American military aid to Chiang Kaishek, the American presence in China, and the act of rape itself fused together in the public mind... Only a year after war’s end, the KMT seemed as incapable of meeting the needs of the Chinese people as the warlord regimes of the past, and the Americans were already replacing the Japanese as the key symbol of imperialist aggression.³⁸

Against this backdrop of growing multilateral tensions and the re-evaluation of the USA’s role in the fate of China, both by the Chinese public and by the CCP, 8RA officers—among other CCP-affiliated actors—began to explore in earnest the potential to set aside immediate animosity with the Japanese in the interest of achieving more concrete and immediate tactical objectives. Japan’s surrender triggered a race between the KMT, the Soviets, the CCP, and a variety of other, smaller actors to capture Japanese war materiel and civilian infrastructure in the former northeastern colonies. The CCP sent several units and representatives to Changchun, and it was there that Liu Jianmin and Zhao Dongli were deployed in order to seize the means of film production at Man’ei. Liu was not only interested in capturing cameras and rolls of film, however. Realizing that the Yan’an Film Group was lacking in technical proficiency and film-making experience, and that over four years without any substantial film production had dulled their talents, Liu set his sights on the recruitment and retention of the film-making crews of Man’ei, including both Japanese and Chinese members. Repatriations had not yet begun in earnest, and many defeated Japanese found themselves in the limbo of a fallen empire, while the day-to-day administration of Changchun oscillated between KMT, Soviet, and CCP management. Liu reasoned that some of these individuals would be amenable to collaborating with the cause of the Chinese communists, or, at the very least, would do so to tide themselves over until the Allies determined the fate of Japan’s millions of colonists-*sans*-colony.

Ma Shouqing, a Man’ei employee who had studied photography in Japan for two years, described his meeting with Liu and the other cadres as his first experience with communist doctrine or its Chinese adherents: “Liu Jianmin... gave me books to read, including Edgar Snow’s *Red Star Over China*.”³⁹ Liu and the rest wasted no time: by October 1st, 1945, the Northeastern Film Studio had been established, via what Ma recalls as a “free election.” From the 8RA perspective, this fact necessitated a careful balancing of competing considerations: on the one hand, the psychological and ideological demands to expunge any trace of imperialist, reactionary, and indeed Japanese elements from any and all Party enterprises; on the other, the pragmatic desire to retain rare technical skills and the acknowledgement—particularly prevalent among those who had

³⁸ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 304-305.

³⁹ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 18.

experienced the Yan'an cultural group milieu—of a real Japanese proletarian, communist, and counter-imperialist experience. As Ma recounts: “We used the following criteria concerning our former enemies: those who had oppressed and maltreated Chinese people during the Japanese occupation were not allowed to continue to work with us. We also sought those who were the most competent.”⁴⁰ This high priority placed on technical competence resulted in remarkably little change in the staffing of the new, CCP-run Man'ei: “All the main cameramen were Japanese... about two hundred [Japanese staff], therefore, remained after 1945.”⁴¹

As 1945 wore on, the situation in Changchun grew increasingly volatile. The Civil War began to gain momentum, and the fate of the formerly Japanese-held territories increasingly became a matter of dispute among the Soviets, the KMT, and the CCP. The 8RA and Chinese communists were outnumbered, under-equipped, and relied on the good graces of Soviet assistance and supporting members of the general public to survive the increasingly-hostile conditions in Changchun that, by the winter of 1945, had already begun to devolve into street-fighting and assassinations. Tokunaga Junko, an employee of Man'ei from 1944, alongside her father, experienced first-hand the events of this pivotal moment, as similar scenes were played out in Shenyang (then Fengtian), where Tokunaga recalls witnessing the chaos, sexual violence, and brutality of this period:⁴²

“After listening to the Jewel Voice Broadcast,⁴³ my mother and I took refuge at the *heiwa eigakan* (‘peace cinema’) run by the Japanese, alongside some other young girls. The Russians came, so we had to hide. We took turns peeking out of the second-floor window to see what was happening in the street below. We saw Russians drag women out and rape them. We saw a Russian soldier with a rifle wandering up and down the street. Then, a woman tried to run past him, and he grabbed her and raped her in broad daylight. We were three girls, as well as my mother [hiding in the cinema]. My mother dragged us away from the window, and didn't let us look out anymore after that.”⁴⁴

As control fell into the hands of the KMT and the revitalized former-Manchukuo security forces, the majority of 8RA agents were driven to operate undercover in the northern cities. In April 1946, the Soviets withdrew, transferring control of the city to the KMT and the demobilized ex-Manchukuo forces they'd consolidated with. The 8RA attacked Changchun on April 14th, and Qian was ordered formally to take over Man'ei and rename it the Northeastern Film Studio:

⁴⁰ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 18.

⁴¹ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 18.

⁴² Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 5-10.

⁴³ The Emperor's official (and ambiguous) surrender broadcast; it was the first time many had ever heard the Emperor's voice.

⁴⁴ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 28. For further descriptions of firsthand accounts of the Soviet Red Army's atrocities of this type, consult: Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Harvard: Harvard East Asian Series, 1967), 40-44.

“This was a military takeover, but we didn’t have time to change back into our uniforms. Though we were in the army, we still wore our civilian disguises. We summoned all the studio personnel for a meeting. We relayed the order that we were the military representatives. Our clothes were awful. Xu Ke and I were in long gowns, grey and black, with hats with wide brims. Tian Fang wore a shabby Western-style suit and looked like a beggar. Our stomachs bulged from the pistols we carried in our belts. It was like something out of a comedy.”⁴⁵

By May, the tides of the Civil War were turning against the communist forces, and the order came for them to withdraw and bring as much equipment from the NFS as was practical. Ma, who was fluent in Japanese, describes an “invitation” being extended to Japanese film workers from Party headquarters to evacuate alongside the Chinese communists, in which he was tasked with convincing as many of them as possible. Ma and Qian note that no duress was ever used, and that the Japanese who wished to remain under KMT-ruled Changchun, or take their chances traveling seawards towards the American-led repatriation program, were free to do so. Nonetheless, Ma was keen to bring as many Japanese film-makers as possible alongside the NFS materiel:

“I was in charge of persuading the Japanese to go with us to Harbin. I understood them and knew their technical skills. They could help us a lot... I spent a great deal of time trying to reassure them. One, a very experienced editor, perhaps in his forties, at first didn’t want to go because he had a wife and children. But finally he did, and he trained the first generation of Chinese film editors.”⁴⁶

Tokunaga’s account provides us a near-identical parallel, this time from the Japanese perspective:

“My father was retained at Man’ei as a film technician. All the Man’ei technicians were gathered together at the site and asked to join the PLA with the 8RA, to make films for them. An officer from the 8RA, who came from Yan’an, personally convinced my father. He was a pleasant man, and persuaded around a third of the Japanese technicians to enlist in the PLA. There was no ideological component to any of this. Most of the Japanese stayed purely because they trusted that one officer and liked his personality. Well, I say “personality,” but really it was his *weiren*. He was truly a good person, and many of us could see that and joined the 8RA.”⁴⁷

Ma and his 8RA comrades were successful in attracting a fairly large proportion of the Japanese crew. As Yago Yutaka, a former Man’ei scriptwriter, recalls:

⁴⁵ Xiao Bai, “A Happy Reunion 3 Years Later,” *China Daily* ‘Culture’ segment, November 5, 1981, 6.

⁴⁶ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 22.

⁴⁷ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 10.

“...We were told by Su Qun, in May 1946, that the KMT troops were about to enter Changchun. He invited us to go with them to Harbin and set up the studio there. He warned us that conditions would be hard, but said: ‘You can work, study, and live as Chinese do.’ I hadn’t read any progressive books, but I’d seen four armies: The Japanese, the Soviets, the KMT, and the Communists. The Soviets in the area were very savage. The 8RA was different from all the others. The soldiers were well-disciplined, and their simple style of work impressed me deeply... I also had children to feed.”⁴⁸

This sentiment is echoed by another Man’ei crewmember, named Kishi Hiromi, who was impressed by the 8RA’s “strict discipline.”⁴⁹ Takashima Kojirō, a sound specialist, gave a slightly different explanation of his decision to accept the 8RA’s invitation to accompany them voluntarily on the evacuation to Harbin:

“I had restored all the sound recording equipment in the studio, and I loved my machines. I didn’t want to see them damaged. I wanted to go with my equipment. Then, I was young and had a sense of adventure... I had seen that the 8RA was good...⁵⁰ The soldiers camped outside the houses so as not to disturb the civilians. Even if they borrowed a spoon, they always returned it.⁵¹ There was [no army] better in the world [than the 8RA]. I trusted them. Don’t think for a minute that we were forced to go. We all thought it over and made a free choice. As film workers, we’re artists and very liberal in our thinking. Nobody could have forced us to do anything, and if they had tried, we wouldn’t’ve worked so hard or so willingly.”⁵²

The presence of Japanese anarchist, communist, and proletarian-cultural sympathizers, such as Prokino members, at every level of Man’ei – including individuals such as Ōtsuka and Kimura – played a part in facilitating the remarkably smooth transition of Man’ei into the hands of the CCP, as well as guaranteeing the safety of the former colonial agents under the radically-new administration. These sympathies, evident in Takashima’s observations above – and, indeed, in those of Yagi, Tokunaga, and others – reveal a sentiment that has become a leitmotif of both memoir recollections and oral interviews with those Japanese who were present at this place and time: namely, a deep admiration for the 8RA, respect for the discipline and good conduct of the CCP officers and soldiers, and observations of the stark contrast they represented to the corrupt brigandry of the KMT-aligned troops and the violent indiscipline of the Soviets. As noted in my introduction, we must approach this uniformity of narrative judiciously, understanding that the

⁴⁸ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 22.

⁴⁹ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 22.

⁵⁰ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 22.

⁵¹ Bai, “A Happy Reunion 3 Years Later”, 6.

⁵² Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 22.

biases of our sample—comprised of those who both joined and *survived* the 8RA⁵³—naturally tend towards a sanguine narrative of the CCP’s activities. Nonetheless, quantity has a quality of its own, and the narratives of the Japanese captive/conscript/recruits of the PLA and 8RA differ radically from the experiences of those Japanese who experienced captivity under the Soviet Red Army,⁵⁴ and, indeed, of those who were held in KMT-secured zones until their repatriation.⁵⁵

As KMT forces encircled the beleaguered 8RA and its allies in Changchun, the CCP film-makers and their newly-minted Japanese comrades staged an operation to slip the noose and flee to Harbin with their film-making equipment. They travelled at night, to avoid aerial bombardment by the KMT air force, but nonetheless could not avoid having to jettison a large portion of their gear during the escape. Nor did they find safety in Harbin: no sooner had they arrived than the KMT army advanced once more, forcing the small team to move further north, to Jiamusi in Heilongjiang, and then on to Xinshang (present-day Hegang). Here, they converted a colonial Japanese primary school, cinema, and horse stable into a film studio and dormitories. Once again, the infrastructural remnants of Imperial Japan’s colonial project were subject to creative repurposing in the hands of the CCP’s nascent cultural-production complex. This project was, by necessity, highly decentralized, with executive decisions almost entirely devolved to ground-level cadres. Nonetheless, the Party intervened on more than one occasion, for instance, in 1946, when Wang Yang requisitioned the transfer of Chinese and Japanese film technicians to north-central China in order to establish a splinter film group, which would later become the Beijing Film Studio.

Relocating via mule-cart to Hebei, the guerrilla film production operated in extreme paucity and in the face of constant existential threats from the KMT, which demanded frequent adjustments and adaptations to their shifting and precarious circumstances. In this context, the Japanese members were not only sources of technical expertise and labor to be exploited, but reportedly were treated with the equanimity and status of full comrades united in the international struggle for communism. To this end, substantial accommodations were made to ensure their comfortable integration into the team. As Qian notes:

“In Hegang, we all worked and studied together... The Japanese friends were treated as equals. They lived just as we did. They went with us to the mines to learn life, and also took part in the Land Reform Movement. They contributed a lot to the new film cause. We believed in internationalism... We built a primary school so that they would not forget their mother tongue.”⁵⁶

⁵³ Indicating, for instance, that they likely do not belong to the groups who were sent to work in mines, munition factories, or at the front lines of the Korean War.

⁵⁴ For details on the experiences of Japanese captured by the Soviet Red Army, refer to our earlier chapter on the experiences of soldiers, and to Andrew Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

⁵⁵ For details on the experiences of Japanese soldiers and civilians who were captured and/or processed by the KMT, refer to Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, “Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 42, No. 3 (May, 1983), 497-518. Please consult this document with the caveat that it appears to include at least one severe bibliographical error.

⁵⁶ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 25.

The primary school that Qian refers to above was attached to a Japanese-language kindergarten, again to ensure that the children of Japanese members of the NFS maintained their language skills, as all parties involved were operating under the assumption of eventual Japanese repatriation.⁵⁷ These details of the benevolent treatment of Japanese captives by the 8RA, and the framing of Japanese labor as voluntary and free from coercion or duress, may strike us as improbable or even fanciful, yet these claims are supported by a remarkable breadth of oral and written testimony from the former Japanese captives themselves. As Tokunaga notes: “People like my father were treated really nicely... I was not discriminated for being Japanese. People treated each other like brothers. That’s why I was so impressed [with them]: The Japanese were their enemies.”⁵⁸ It is worth tempering this account with a recollection of the fact that many Japanese individuals did, indeed, experience hostility and violence from the general public, especially in those areas worst affected by the depredations of the Kwantung military; in general, the statements of benevolence are largely restricted to the behavior of the officers and rank-and-file of the 8RA, N4A, and, later, PLA. Attempts to reconstitute these relations in terms of absolute, intransigent enmity, characterized by unambiguously binary group membership and paralleled sentiments of hostility, such as those detailed in the introduction, are contraindicated by the accounts contained in this thesis.

After Yan’an fell to KMT forces in March 1947, the Yanan Film Group dissolved, and several of its members were captured, including former member Wu Menyong, who began overseeing anti-Communist broadcasts for Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing. Ling Zifeng, one of the surviving members of the scattered group, became involved in producing films and stills of party leaders, including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ren Bishi. During this period, the Party Leaders decided to organize the Northeast Work and Film Study Team, comprised of around twenty members, under the leadership of Zhang Jinzhi and Cheng Yin. Cheng Yin was a soldier with extensive frontline combat experience and little interest in ‘cultural work’, but, in the end, acquiesced to the demands of the Party high command and travelled to the Northwest to set up a studio.⁵⁹ In fact, the Party’s decision proved prophetic, as revolutionary film production by the CCP’s guerrilla film teams during the Civil War proved to be an extremely dangerous activity: the production of *The Last Battle to Liberate the Northeast* (1948) alone claimed the lives of three cameramen. Joining forces with Wang Yang’s North China Film team, Cheng—who had virtually no experience of watching films, let alone making them—began the process of learning about film production. It is here, once again, that Japanese technical expertise became central to the CCP’s cultural work: Japanese technicians working in the North China Film Team gave lectures on the principles of film-making and technical matters.”⁶⁰

By 1947, the role of Japanese technicians at the NFS became primarily pedagogical, as they were tasked with transferring their expertise to as many of their Chinese comrades as possible. As one cadre recalls: “Between May 1947 and May 1949, the NFS ran four training classes. The technical courses were taught mostly by the Japanese film specialists [in Hegang].”⁶¹ The studio also

⁵⁷ Bai, “A Happy Reunion 3 Years Later,” 5.

⁵⁸ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 13 and 23.

⁵⁹ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 26.

⁶⁰ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 27.

⁶¹ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 28.

produced several films during this period, including the educational *Guard Against the Plague* (1948). Produced by Ma Shouqing in response to an outbreak of the bubonic plague caused by Japanese bacteriological warfare research in the Northeast, the film described methods for preventing the spread of the plague, as well as its causes, symptoms, and vectors of transmission. The research, which involved human experimentation on Chinese civilians and prisoners of war, was conducted under exceptionally poorly-maintained quarantine conditions, and it was not uncommon for unintended outbreaks to occur among staff during the war.⁶² In this case, as in several others we have examined, Japanese individuals, and their expertise, played a crucial role in collaborating with the CCP to rectify some of the disfigurements that the Imperial Japanese colonial project had inflicted upon Northeast Asia.

In 1948, *The Bridge*, the first full-length feature film produced by the CCP, was released. The acting lead, Wang Jiayi, described in glowing terms the invaluable role that his Japanese comrades played in the film's production:

“There were three kinds of people on the film team: Japanese specialists, green hands from the 8RA, and Chinese personnel from the old Japanese studio... The technical side of the work was done by the Japanese. We were still just learning. After 1950, their names appeared on the credits as they officially became members of the studio... Those Japanese film-makers and the Chinese who had worked in the Japanese studio were given salaries... When we were doing the recording mix for the film, a fire broke out... Mr. Takashima had been working on the sound recording for the film and helped put out the blaze. He and his colleagues then worked nonstop to make up lost time.”⁶³

Wang's assessment is, again, corroborated by Tokunaga's description of Japanese involvement in the iconic production of *The White-Haired Girl*. While working on this production, Tokunaga assumed the Chinese name Shēn Wēi (申威), with “Shēn” referring to Shanghai, and “Wēi” bestowed by a PLA comrade and fellow filmographer to indicate Tokunaga's powerful dedication to the revolutionary cause. The assumption of a *nom de plume* – or perhaps *nom de guerre* – was only partially voluntary: Japanese names were strictly proscribed from appearing in the film credits by the cultural officers. The NSF's⁶⁴ production of *The White-Haired Girl* included a large number of Japanese staff, including Tokunaga's father. His family name was Morikawa (森川), and he opted for the whimsical name Mù Lín (木林). Cheerful wordplay aside, the rationale for expunging all signifiers of Japanese identity from the production credits was clear: while the picture was “designated as a ‘film created for Chinese People,’”⁶⁵ the subtext of this policy strongly implies

⁶² For details, refer to Tamura Yoshio, “Unit 731”, in Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore Failer Cook, *Japan at War: An Oral History* (Phoenix: 2000), 158 – 163.

⁶³ Wilson, “The Founding of the Northeast Film Studio,” 31.

⁶⁴ By this stage, it had been renamed to the ‘Changchun Film Studio’, but, for the sake of our collective sanity, I will continue to refer to it as the NSF for the remainder of the chapter.

⁶⁵ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 14.

that these films were also, at least ostensibly, created *by* Chinese people. Both aspects of this conceit lay at the heart of the 1942 Yan'an Rectification Movement, and underpinned the 1948-9 cultural adjustments (detailed below) and the three- and five-anti movements.⁶⁶ As Spence persuasively argues, cultural activities were every bit as concerning to Mao as military ones,⁶⁷ and thus the incorporation of Japanese names into the credits of these productions was, presumably, thought to be as egregious to the Chinese viewing public as was their incorporation into the PLA. Of course, we have by now discussed extensively the remarkable degree to which Japanese individuals were smoothly incorporated into various branches of the PLA—from the military, to medicinal practice, nursing, and cultural activities. This integration was marked by a high degree of acceptance of the Japanese not only by their rank-and-file Chinese comrades, but also by the cadres at the highest echelons of CCP decision-making. The tension—which was demonstrably identified by all parties at the NSF—only emerged when the optics of the Japanese comrades' presence were considered from the perspective of the civilian public. Tokunaga clarifies this point:

“[*The White-Haired Girl*] was ostensibly a film produced by Chinese workers, so it would be problematic to include any Japanese names [in the credits]. Though all of the technicians were Japanese – it was a matter of national pride. The new Chinese government cared very much about its pride.”⁶⁸

A further difficulty lay in the fact that these films were being produced by art ensembles drawn from the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Field Armies of the PLA,⁶⁹ as well as cadres belonging to the cultural associations that had blossomed in Yan'an, endured rectification, and received Mao's blessing. These cultural activities were immiscible from the military objectives of the PLA, and whatever cold pragmatism (or enlightened Marxist universalism) informed the incorporation of Japanese technicians into the art projects was assumed to be untranslatable to the general public. The Japanese origins of the NSF staff thus had to be concealed.

Although the PLA and its cultural production groups were accepting of the Japanese comrades in their ranks, the same was not always true of the nonmilitary Chinese public, as indicated by one description of the trepidation of having one's Japanese identity discovered:

“Usually, nobody noticed that I was Japanese. However, I was discovered because of one of my habits. In the operating room, whenever we [the Japanese] hand someone a bladed object, we offer it handle first, holding the blade ourselves. In China, they hold the handle and allow the blade to face the recipient. At least, that's how it was back then. At one point, I was on the bus, and someone asked me for a pair of scissors to cut something. I handed her my scissors, holding the cutting edge myself and offering them handle-first. I was careless. Immediately, I was asked if I was

⁶⁶ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 323.

⁶⁷ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 323.

⁶⁸ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 16.

⁶⁹ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 25-26.

Japanese. I exposed my identity. This was around 1948, right around the time I'd joined the PLA.”⁷⁰

In 1981, an anniversary celebration was held in Changchun to commemorate the founding of the Northeast Film Studio, which had by then been renamed the Changchun Film Studio. The gala was attended by luminaries of the Chinese film industry, celebrities from the acting world, and political figures. There was another delegation in attendance, however: fourteen Japanese individuals who had contributed to the Northeast Film Studio's formative years had been specially invited to the PRC so as to attend the function.⁷¹ One member of this delegation, Kishi Hiromi, was a Japanese cinematographer responsible for shooting the film *No. 6 Gate*, in 1952. He is listed in the credits for this film under his Chinese alias, Du Yu.⁷² As was the case with Kishi and Tokunaga, the use of Chinese names and aliases by Japanese members of the 8RA and other CCP-affiliate organizations has obfuscated the formidable efforts they contributed to the establishment and development of core cultural institutions of the PRC, not only in terms of imparting technical expertise and film-making knowledge to a new generation of revolutionary Chinese film-makers, but also in participating directly in the shooting, scripting, and production of films, frequently risking their lives on real battlefields or in exceptionally unsafe working conditions. Japanese comrades of the 8RA, N4A, and others made extraordinary contributions to the establishment of New China, a fact that I hope this thesis will assist in illuminating. The NSF and, later, Changchun Film Studio produced some of the most iconic films of the early PRC, including *The White-Haired Girl*, *Five Golden Flowers*, and *Daughters of China*. Kishi Fumiko, a film editor and wife of Kishi Hiromi, personally edited *The Bridge*, *The White-Haired Girl*, *Zhao Yiman*, and *The Invisible Front Line*. Kishi's description of the experience editing *The Bridge* with her Chinese comrades at the NSF includes a poignant anxiety that she had witnessed the seeds of a potential Sino-Japanese alliance that never quite came to full fruition: “It was a very wonderful experience working those years in China. Perhaps in the future there will be no such experiences again.”⁷³

Challenges, Tragedies, and Contradictions

Despite Tokunaga's sanguine attitude towards the 8RA and consistently positive account of her experiences as a JMPLA, we would be remiss to overlook her own reports of the very real suffering that 8RA policies inflicted upon her and those around her.⁷⁴ One example of the difficulties comes to us in Tokunaga's description of the forced labor conditions thrust upon many of her father's Man'ei colleagues:

⁷⁰ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 22.

⁷¹ Su Lan, “New China's First Studio,” *China Daily* ‘Culture’ segment, November 5, 1981, 5.

⁷² Lan, “New China's First Studio,” 5.

⁷³ Bai, “A Happy Reunion 3 Years Later,” 5.

⁷⁴ As noted in my introduction, it is anxiety-inducing to contemplate the ease with which the elision of certain facts, or the selective inclusion of select interview content to the exclusion of other items, could substantially alter the texture of our narrative. My general solution, in this chapter as elsewhere, has been to include every reasonably transcribable item with significant morphemic content, irrespective of the burden that this places on the flow of argumentation.

“We were separated from our fathers. Our fathers were swept up in one of the Communist campaigns⁷⁵ and sent off to the mines... They only came back to Changchun in 1958... The former Man’ei film crew were told to create new films at Hegang mining, in what was called a liberated area in the mountains. There they created new films or newsreels by hand. The Civil War became more severe, and many people did not have enough food to survive. This led to the campaigns. Technicians like my father agreed to go there to help, but in the end, many of them were thrown away and forced to work in the mines. Only those who made news and films remained. All the others were kicked out of the film crew through the campaign policies, and they were forced to do hard labor in the mines.”⁷⁶

While Tokunaga and her family escaped the worst mistreatment at the hands of the CCP, her description of forced labor is consistent with the previously-discussed oral report from Kiyono Kiyokazu, a Japanese soldier who was forced to work in the mines.⁷⁷

Ōtsuka became personally involved in the management of Japanese work teams at the mines, and ingratiated himself with the CCP cadres both through his status as a “communist sympathizer” and by demonstrating a hardline attitude towards those Japanese captives who had formerly held high-ranking positions at Man’ei; these individuals were frequently subjected to the hardest labor at the Hegang mine.⁷⁸ Ōtsuka is also referenced in connection to the gendered mistreatment of some of the Japanese women from Man’ei:

“...Four young women, including myself, were told to remain. I learned later that it was on Ōtsuka Yūshō’s orders. We were made to study Chinese, eight hours a day. Around 1947, we four were brought to Jiamusi, and we were allocated to work at a high-ranked Chinese leader from Yan’an’s private residence. We heard that this was organized by Ōtsuka in collaboration with the Chinese side. Several months later, an incident happened: one of the girls wrote in her diary that she hated the old leader, and that she wanted to kill him. Because of this, we other three were all moved away and sent to work as nurses at a PLA hospital. I don’t know what became of the other girl. Her name was Kudō, and she came from Hachinohe. I think it must have been very hard for her, whatever happened.”⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Most likely, judging by the dates, one of the following: the second (not 1942) Rectification Campaign, the Three-Anti Campaign, or the Five-Anti Campaign. For details, refer to Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 320-323.

⁷⁶ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 17 and 10.

⁷⁷ Kiyono’s experiences are discussed on page 99.

⁷⁸ Ishii, “Amakasu Masahiko,” 328.

⁷⁹ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 11-12.

Tokunaga and the highly-skilled Japanese crewmembers of the NSF who remained in China past the 1946 repatriation phase were not spared from the violence of the various Anti-Rightist Campaigns, nor the cataclysm of the Great Leap Forward. Tokunaga recalls the events as follows:

“Before the Great Leap Forward came the Anti-Rightist Campaign. All the people who were against the party’s policy were persecuted. The literati in our film company, around 80-90% of them, were identified as rightists. My husband was also identified as a rightist. I remember them shouting: *Youpai youpai!*⁸⁰ Then all of them were driven away to the countryside to do ‘reform through labor’.”⁸¹

The phenomenon that Tokunaga describes likely fell under the umbrella of the broader Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-59’, a political purge and Maoist governmental centralization push that led to the persecution and murder of between 550,000 and 2,000,000 suspected anti-Maoists, opponents of collectivization, political dissidents, artists, and other unfortunates who were accused of the stigma of being *youpai*, ‘rightists’.⁸² Part of this campaign involved the assignment of quotas for how many rightists were to be rooted out from each collective, work group, and political organization. One eyewitness described the process at his school:

“Mao set quotas for his political movements... I was a student of Chinese at Shandong University... when it was announced that our year had been allocated seven rightists... I was labelled a part of that contingent. According to the *History of Shandong University*, the school had been allocated a total of 204 rightists, of which 144 were middle school students and 54 were faculty, including 16 full and assistant professors...”⁸³

The use of quotas to identify fixed numbers of dissidents guaranteed that saboteurs and seditionists would be found lurking throughout every PRC institution, a fact that in turn justified the extremity and violence of the Anti-Rightist Campaign’s executors. In the rising brutality, even officers of the 8RA and PLA were not spared from persecution. The Campaign very likely accelerated the move to repatriate the remaining Japanese individuals, as they were natural targets for the types of popular resentment that was being endorsed and weaponized by the Maoist factions of the CCP in this period. Moreover, while the presence of Japanese comrades in the 8RA was well-known in official and military circles, it could easily have become a public relations nightmare (and existential danger) soluble only through the indictment as rightists of officers seen to be collaborating with the Japanese. The process of stripping the Japanese comrades of their insignia, taking their uniforms, and rapidly arranging for their repatriation may have been a matter of self-preservation just as much as it was spurred by a desire to protect the Japanese members of the PLA

⁸⁰ “Rightist, rightist!”

⁸¹ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 17-20.

⁸² Vidal, Christine, “The 1957-1958 Anti-Rightist Campaign” in *China: History and Memory (1978-2014)*. (Lille: University of Lille HAL, 2016), pp. 7-8.

⁸³ Li, Changyu, “Mao’s Killing Quotas”, in *China Rights Forum*, no. 4, (2005), p. 41. Translation Li’s.

from the proliferating communal violence on the continent. Japanese cadres also became involved in other infamous episodes of this period, as Tokunaga describes:

“[The Anti-Rightist Campaign] was followed by the Great Leap Forward. We all had to work hard to “surpass the UK.” We had to build a *tugaolu* to make steel. Our factories completely stopped, all of them. We all assisted the Great Leap Forward. Our film studio courtyard was totally occupied by a massive *tugaolu* made of bricks. We had to build a fire, and keep the bellows pumping while sending out teams to gather scrap iron. The capitalists in Shanghai all had iron doors on their houses, so at night, we’d go to steal their doors and throw them into our *tugaolu*. Then we put chemicals and stones into it and worked the bellows to melt the iron. We completely stopped all the other production, films, and artistic projects. We smashed up the sets in our studio, and during the process, the iron nails would scatter to the ground. We used magnets to gather them up, and fed them into the *tugaolu*. We didn’t do any real work, just endlessly fed the *tugaolu*.”⁸⁴

Tugaolu, officially referred to as *tǔfǎliàngāng*, refer to the infamous ‘backyard furnaces’, a mass project that took place during the Great Leap Forward in which the central government ordered communes to construct crude steel-smelting apparatus to manufacture steel in their backyards. Most of the “steel” produced in this manner was useless pig iron, and the opportunity cost borne by agricultural workers redirected from food production contributed significantly to the terrible famines and other hardships of this period. Tokunaga’s experience of having all her work group’s activities sidelined in favor of frenziedly tending to the *tugaolu* is fairly representative of the average impact of these policies,⁸⁵ although certain other film studios were tasked with producing documentaries to promote the steel production campaign: in 1958, three Beijing-based film production companies received orders to create such instructional films, in order to “propagate and spread the best techniques, so that tens of millions could learn these good technologies and begin to operate indigenous furnaces...nationwide.”⁸⁶ In fact, little effort was made to ensure that technical expertise was incorporated into the contents of such documentaries, as indicated by the

⁸⁴ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 17-20.

⁸⁵ For details on the contemporary engineering theory of the *tugaolu*, see: *Gangtie shengchan dayuejin lunwen xuanji* (Beijing: Zhongguo kexueyuan Jingji yanjiusuo, 1958). For a historical account of the brutal human cost of this project, see: Frank Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962* (United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), especially “Steel Fever”, 56-67, “Nature” 174-191, and “Capitalist Grain”, 108-116. For an examination of the political dimensions of the project, see: Wei Li and Dennis Tao Yang, “The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster,” *Journal of Political Economy* 113 (August 2005): 845.

⁸⁶ Shi Mei, “Guangrong de shiming: wei gangtie er zhan!” (A Distinguished Mission: Fighting the Battle for Steel and Iron!), *Dazhong dianying* (Mass Cinema), October 26, 1958, 22, quoted in Ying Qian, “When Taylorism Met Revolutionary Romanticism: Documentary Cinema in China’s Great Leap Forward,” *Critical Inquiry* 46, no. 3 (Spring 2020): 597.

film-maker Shi Mei's description of how she gave up on consulting technical manuals on the topic of steel production in favor of a more impressionistic approach:

“I couldn't understand the technical terms... An engineer tried to teach us, but I barely understood it... [however] After the head of the factory showed us around, I felt that making steel wasn't so mysterious. If we hadn't broken the mystique of steel making, who could have thought that in a simple brick house, one could make steel using iron scraps and other everyday materials?”⁸⁷

This type of subordination of expertise to political rectitude, and roughshod belief that good political intentions are a substitute for technical skills, was apiece with the broader Maoist ambitions to dismantle outdated or imperial-capitalist epistemologies of knowledge, without serious reassessment of the problems that the products of such epistemologies sought to address. Similar phenomena can be observed in the Four Pests Campaign, the abolition of the “bourgeois pseudoscience” of genetics under Soviet Lysenkoism,⁸⁸ rice paddy close-cropping, and elsewhere⁸⁹: all movements which were preceded by the promotion of skilled political entrepreneurs to influential technical leadership positions in substitution of technical experts, dramatic redefinitions of ‘expertise’ itself, and the suppression of feedback loops or other positivist epistemic instruments (including simply asking farmers or steelworkers for their opinions) that might obstruct the teleological political objectives. Shi's delight at the simplicity of steel-smelting—once the complicated technical manuals had been discarded—is emblematic of the moral self-satisfaction and counter-enlightenment attitudes that attained their political apogee during the Great Leap Forward and, later, in the Cultural Revolution, and which contributed significantly, though perhaps not maliciously, to one of the greatest tragedies in human history.

While a great deal of attention has been paid to certain archetypes of the genocidal architect in this period, from the indoctrinated soldier able to dehumanize the ‘other’ to the Arendtian bureaucrat that banally administers totalitarian brutality,⁹⁰ one must not underestimate the possibility of engineering cataclysmic loss of life through dramatic interventions in hypercomplex social or economic systems, without regard for the purpose, functioning, or risks of these systems, but, equally, without malicious intent to harm their constituents. In particular, a precondition for this type of calamity seems to be the occurrence of radical reconfigurations of “institutional inertia” across complex sociotechnical systems, a phenomenon that I describe in greater detail below. Similarly, it is apparent that dramatic redefinitions of competence and the admission of politically-motivated agents to control stable and complex sociotechnical systems (such as agricultural production), without concomitant experience or with an outright *adversarial* view of the experience of those systems' designers and participants, as took place both at the macro- and

⁸⁷ Shi Mei, “Guangrong de shiming”

⁸⁸ Yongsheng Liu, Baoyin Li, and Qinglian Wang, “Science and politics,” EMBO Reports 10, no. 9 (September 2009): 938–939.

⁸⁹ For details on these and other campaigns and policies with devastating consequences for both environments and populations, see: Judith Rae Shapiro, *Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁹⁰ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963).

micro-scale of the Great Leap Forward, generates a context where such tragedies proliferate. It is sobering to consider the fact that, as these attitudes are practically synonymous with a revolutionary or radical disposition, moments of paradigmatic break and intentional institutional deconstruction and reconfiguration almost certainly present uniquely high-risk environments for human-made disaster. Equally evident is the fact that the application of the ‘Chesterton’s Fence’⁹¹ approach, which proactively considers the purpose of previous institutional designs before dismantling them, is likely insufficient in cases where the epistemological foundations justifying the overthrown system are rejected by the new order.

In its human cost, as well as in the colossal scale of its impact, the Great Leap Forward strains our capacities for description and even comprehension. No stone was left unturned, and the NSF workers’ credentials as revolutionary soldiers and their significant contributions to the production of Mao’s personally-articulated vision of revolutionary art did little to insulate them from the persecutions of this period. Tokunaga’s husband, a Chinese citizen and soldier who served in the 2nd Field Army and whom Tokunaga married at a group wedding to celebrate the end of the Korean War, was labeled a rightist and sent to the countryside for ‘thought reform’ through hard labor. At the time, Tokunaga was assigned to the 4th Field Army cultural troupe; she recounts that around 90% of her colleagues were labeled rightists and punished to varying degrees of severity, ranging from standard group- or self-criticism sessions, to public humiliations, beatings, ‘reform through labor’, and execution. By the time the craze had burned itself out and the cultural workers’ reputations had recovered, Tokunaga’s husband had died from overwork. Tokunaga was never told where, or if, he was buried.⁹²

Tokunaga’s Telegram

As Alexander Cook diplomatically puts it, “Maoism proved a highly effective military doctrine, but a much less effective ruling ideology”.⁹³ A few short years after the Great Leap Forward, Mao began to set the stage for the next episode in his destructive ‘continuous revolution’: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This time, cultural institutions such as the NSF would not merely be involved in an ancillary capacity, but, rather, would be at the very heart of the political scrutiny, chaotic public campaigns, and violence. Tokunaga’s first misgivings about the direction of the Cultural Revolution were triggered by reports of the first round of the Anpo struggle,⁹⁴ and, specifically, the death of Kanba Michiko and Mao’s subsequent statement of support for her heroic martyrdom, which was published in the PRC press and read aloud at Kanba’s memorial service in Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo.⁹⁵ Tokunaga took the initiative of sending a telegram to the JCP, setting in motion a series of events from which she was lucky to escape alive:

⁹¹ In brief, “Don’t ever take a fence down until you know why it was put up,” summarized from G. K. Chesterton’s *The Drift from Domesticity* (1929).

⁹² Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 21.

⁹³ Alexander C. Cook, “Third World Maoism”, in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, ed. Timothy Cheek (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 312.

⁹⁴ For details on the Anpo struggle and specifics of Kanba’s death, refer to: Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 1-6.

⁹⁵ Masako Gavin and Ben Middleton, *Japan and the High Treason Incident* (London: Routledge, 2017), 105.

I sent a congratulatory telegram during the JCP's eighth convention, which was published in *Akahata*.⁹⁶ In the article, I was described as a Shanghai resident. Because of this, I was summoned by my organization — the Communist Party's film unit in Shanghai. They said that I had violated the organization's discipline. I explained that I am a Japanese. It was really quite amusing.

The problem with my actions was related to the slogan “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Mao Zedong believed in armed struggle. During the Anpo Struggle in Japan in the 1960s, Mao expressed his support for Kanba and called for widespread, armed resistance. The telegram I sent during the JCP's eighth convention expressed my support for a peaceful parliamentary struggle, but according to Mao's famous aphorism... It had to be armed struggle. There must be violence. Because I had expressed my wish of peace in my telegram, I was summoned. They were very angry. I said, “why should I obey the organization's discipline? It's my freedom to send a telegram.” They said, “no, you showed your hope for peace. You did not support an armed struggle.” It was really amusing. 90% of the people in my company were labeled as rightists during the anti-rightist campaign. All the art-related workers were attacked first because they supported the idea of “bǎihuā qífāng.”⁹⁷ It was a hard time. I'm lucky to survive that period.”⁹⁸

In many ways, the Shanghai disciplinary committee was correct in its assessment of the import of Tokunaga's message: her impeccable revolutionary pedigree, charismatic stubbornness, and first-hand experience of the most foundational cultural work of New China infused her critique of the brewing Cultural Revolution with a legitimacy that was hard to assail. Tokunaga was also accurate in her prediction of what the fallout of a second revolution might be among a war-weary *Japanese* proletariat, amply evidenced by the JCP's internal schism and subsequent fall from grace as it became implicated, in the general public's consciousness, with a series of violent direct-action incidents in the late '60s and '70s. Internal communiqués and public condemnations from first-hand witnesses such as Tokunaga – who personally experienced the cataclysms of the Anti-Rightist Campaigns and the Great Leap Forward – likewise may have played a part in the JCP's and its members' recalibration of their Chinese connections. Nonetheless, the concern of the Shanghai committee was clearly domestic only, and Tokunaga likely avoided serious consequences through lucky timing, having left China for Japan before the persecutions began in earnest.

⁹⁶ *Shinbun Akahata*, the official newspaper of the JCP.

⁹⁷ A (likely ironic) reference to the 1956-7 Hundred Flowers Campaign, although it is perfectly possible that, at the time, Tokunaga was still operating under the assumption that the invitation for the critique of Party policies was still open. For details of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, see: Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 539–43.

⁹⁸ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 5.

Tokunaga bore witness both to retaliatory violence in the wake of Imperial dissolution and to the olive-branch of forgiveness in the form of the camaraderie and inclusion she experienced in the 8RA, and firmly stood testament to the view that the former was a destructive and dehumanizing dead-end, while the latter was a fertile realm of generative possibility for genuine healing and progress. The 8RA’s demonstrable capacity to repurpose Amakasu’s grim project into an instrument for goodwill, art, and amity made the near-constant political purges and anti-rightist campaigns organized by the Party appear perplexingly misguided at best, and demonstrated, in Tokunaga’s eyes, the “profound error of Mao’s [cultural] revolution”.⁹⁹

Institutional Inertia

Man’ei was originally established to produce Manchukuo and Imperial Japanese propaganda; in Amakasu’s hands, as discussed above, its institutional objectives became somewhat more ambivalent. In its ultimate transition to the NFS, certain features of Man’ei’s foundational framework were retained even as its primary objective became the production of CCP propaganda, with its institutional polarity entirely reversed, from that of an Imperial agent to a counter-imperialist one. Despite this shift, however, there was remarkable institutional continuity: the materiality of Man’ei survived the evacuation to Harbin in the hands of the 8RA, and a large proportion of the staff (both Japanese and Chinese) stayed with the organization.

The Man’ei sound engineer Takashima’s report is illustrative of a phenomenon that can serve as a paradigmatic approach to understanding not only the human capital and physical-materiel transfers of the Man’ei-to-NSF transition, but, more broadly, to the institutional and human experiential transitions that characterized the collapse of Imperial Japan’s continental empire and the CCP’s victory in the Civil War and subsequent capture of the spoils. We will refer to the phenomenon in question as “institutional inertia,” a form of continuity of institutional features that endures dramatic paradigm shifts which transform all other social, political, and material contexts. Institutional inertia refers to those aspects of an institutional or cultural complex the telos of which is overdetermined to the degree that they resist reconfiguration by all but the most intrusive, destructive, or deliberate interventions. The levels at which this inertia can be observed can be subdivided infinitely, but for the sake of clarity, I will describe eight levels with examples in the accompanying table (see *Table 4*, below).

Form of Institutional Inertia	Example
Human embodied knowledge: conscious	<i>Technical understanding of film treatment, exposure, camera techniques, etc.</i>
Human embodied knowledge: unconscious	<i>Aesthetic preferences, perception of beauty, gender assumptions, norm perceptions, etc.</i>
Explicit institutional directives	<i>(no continuity)</i>

⁹⁹ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 30.

Implicit institutional directives	<i>Film production subordinated to ideological enterprise and/or managerial vision.</i>
Material, explicit	<i>Film cameras, studios, etc. continue to be used for designed purpose.</i>
Material, implicit	<i>Structural layout of film sets, available resources determine range of productions.</i>
Means of establishment	<i>(no continuity)</i>

Table 4: *Institutional inertia in the Man'ei-to-NSF transition.*

As illustrated by the above table, in the spaces where a discursive awareness is accompanied by an executable praxis, the discontinuities in the institutional transition are usually absolute: this is particularly evident if we consider nomenclature or the representations of the Imperial Japanese colonial projects, state, and agents. By contrast, where unconscious or implicit features exist which are not the objects of an explicitly articulated discourse, or are not earmarked for transformation or destruction, a remarkable degree of institutional inertia can be identified. Some elements of institutional settlements have vastly more momentum, both as a function of their centrality to the institution and of their visibility to the post-shift context; in this regard, some elements remain due to their covert status, which ensures that they are not exposed to redirecting or excising interventions.

Some of these transitions were the objectives of explicit educational work, and manifested themselves in highly personal interactions: Kishi initially rejected the view that she needed to undergo any 'thought reform,' protesting that she "had no ideology."¹⁰⁰ However, when she was first put to work editing a film that depicted the atrocities of the IJA, she noted that she had been raised to regard the IJA as the Emperor's sacred army, and didn't really believe that they would do the kinds of things that the NSF production depicted. The director, Yi Lin, took her aside and explained: "Kishi-san, the truth is that I personally experienced these things. The Japanese Imperial Army burned down my village and killed my family. I understand that it's hard for you to accept these facts, but for now, as you're our only editor... I hold no grudge against the Japanese people for this. However, militarism must be opposed at every turn."¹⁰¹ These types of revelations are a typical feature of Japanese civilian reports of immediate postwar contact with Chinese individuals, and although claims of ignorance regarding the violence that the Imperial Japanese Army visited upon the Chinese people strain credulity, it is reasonable to assume that the reframing of that violence as anything other than a holy crusade to defend the Emperor would indeed have surprised the former colonists of northeast China.

¹⁰⁰ Ishii, "Amakasu Masahiko," 329.

¹⁰¹ Ishii, "Amakasu Masahiko," 330.

A note should be made on the directionality or hierarchy of institutional absorption as it intersects with institutional inertia in the specific realms of embodied knowledge, norms, assumptions, and physical artefacts. It may strike us as intuitive that, given Imperial Japan's surrender, Amakasu's suicide, and the victory of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War, it would demonstrably be the case that the NSF was absorbed into Man'ei, and not vice-versa. While the nomenclative, ideological, and informational reconfigurations signal a decisive paradigm break, there exist imperial afterlives that, though renamed, rebranded, repurposed, and reimagined, nonetheless retained a cardinal momentum. The 'swords-to-plowshares' phenomenon of Japan's wartime industry's transition to a postwar civil technological complex, exemplified by the engineering genealogies of the Shinkansen, is one of many examples of this type of objective-transition without a total substance-transition; many of the engineers who had worked on the zeroes smoothly transitioned to working on high-speed trains and other civil-engineering projects. Other examples can be found throughout Imperial Japan's postcolonial spaces, as all manner of public and private institutions in Taiwan and South Korea today retain a substantial kernel of the characteristics of Japan's Imperial imaginaries in ways that present a nontrivial challenge to scholars of postcolonialism. In a similar way, Takashima's cameras expose imperial after-images. We should hesitate to conclude with the allegation that there exists a direct continuity between Amakasu's film designs and *The White-Haired Girl*, or with some superficial insinuation of a clear genetic proximity between the two. Rather, I propose a sensitive approach that carefully excavates the different strata of cultural complexes, and asks at which level the connections can be detected, and at which level they have been severed. Such an approach would avoid both trivial tautologies of chronological connection and callous cynicism towards the possibility of change, while illuminating aspects of this historical pivot from which there are hopeful lessons to be learned: it is apparent, as with the remarkable postwar repurposing of Japan's war machinery to civil craft, that transitions of form of sufficient magnitude appear to constitute transitions of substance, and that a careful analysis reveals which levels of institutional inertia can be redirected without cataclysmic loss of expertise and experience and to the great benefit to human flourishing. Major paradigm shifts, and the continuities that linger in their wake, can be better understood through a sensitive appreciation for the possibility of course-correction without the destruction of knowledge, and with a view to the remarkable capacity for human changes of heart and spiritual redemption.

The Fushun Mines and Xiao Jun's Fall from Grace

An example of institutional inertia manifested through a human-capital, structural, and material complex presents itself in the case of the Fushun coal mines in Liaoning. As we have seen, many former Man'ei employees endured "re-education through labor"—in most cases, a euphemism for dangerous forced labor—at various mines throughout the northeast, including Hegang and Fushun. The Fushun coal mine, in particular, provides us with a case study in the CCP's capture and integration of an exemplary institution of Imperial Japan's colonial-industrial apparatus, and the ways in which structural features of the institution endured the paradigmatic shift in political cardinality.

If Man'ei was the jewel of Imperial Japan's cutting-edge colonial film production, the Fushun coal mine was the jewel of its energy-extractive industry. Anticipating its value to the CCP's ambitious centrally-planned economy - already sketched out with the assistance of Soviet advisors at the highest levels of the Party administration - CCP cadres were dispatched to Liaoning to ensure a smooth acquisition and, crucially, an unbroken continuation of coal extraction. As with the abovementioned (and chronologically superseding) case of the *tugaolu*, there exist significant areas, especially in the fields of industry and energy production, in which the imagination of Mao and his fellow revolutionaries appears to have stumbled, despite their stated objectives to terminate the local and global substructures of capitalism and imperialism.

The Fushun Mining Affairs Bureau was formed to oversee the handover, and Wang Xinsan was placed in charge of operations.¹⁰² Wang immediately realized the necessity of harnessing Japanese expertise in mine management, and noted that there was a pressing need to ensure that Japanese technicians remain in Fushun so that the flow of coal would not be interrupted, but, rather, redirected to meet the growing and future energy needs of New China. As Wang put it: "We must regard the Japanese as our teachers and as our friends."¹⁰³ In 1949, three years after the majority of Japanese in the Northeast had either been repatriated to the home islands or dragged off to perform hard labor in Siberian work-camps, approximately one hundred Japanese technicians remained working full-time at the Fushun mine.¹⁰⁴

To Seow, the Fushun mine embodies an act of domination over nature that entailed also the "domination of Chinese miners, whose work sustained this energy enterprise and whose bodies... were not infrequently broken by the perils of the engineered environment."¹⁰⁵ Although the mine work was brutal, the Imperial Japanese treatment of the Chinese workers was not characterized exclusively by inflicted injuries; the Fushun hospital and clinic system, at the height of the Japanese empire, was primarily patronized by Chinese patients, and there was substantial provision of charitable healthcare to injured Chinese miners, albeit for practical reasons.¹⁰⁶ Naturally, the Fushun clinics operated under a superimposition of pragmatic, political, and humanitarian interests, but whatever their incentives, they did provide treatment to Chinese workers during and after the colonial period. Ultimately, the transfer of the Fushun mine technology to the administration of the CCP in the nascent PRC did little to substantially transform the mine administration's relationships to nature, labor, or the physical wellbeing of the Fushun miners.

As with the absorption of Man'ei, continuities often expressed themselves in the form of institutional inertia – materially, teleologically, and in terms of the application of human capital.

¹⁰² Wolfgang Bartke, *Who Was Who in the People's Republic of China: With More Than 3100 Portraits* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 478.

¹⁰³ Victor Seow, "Black Coal in Red China," (lecture, University of California, Berkeley, CA, February 13, 2020).

¹⁰⁴ Seow, "Black Coal in Red China."

¹⁰⁵ Victor Seow, "Sites of Extraction: Perspectives from a Japanese Coal Mine in Northeast China", in *Environmental History*, Vol. 24, (2019), pp. 504-513., 511.

¹⁰⁶ For a detailed table of patient provision in Manchukuo hospitals, see: DuBois, Thomas David, "Public Health and Private Charity in Northeast China, 1905-1945", in *Frontiers of History in China*, Volume 9: Issue 4, (2014), pp. 506-533., p. 523.

The political regime may have changed, but the coal regime certainly had not. Contradictions abounded: During Mao's visit to Fushun, any malfunction or laggard operation was automatically chalked up to Japanese sabotage, regardless of evidence or the credibility of the claim, or, indeed, despite the ample counterevidence presented by the continuing Japanese labor, indispensable to keep the mines functioning.¹⁰⁷ As with the film technicians' names, a contradiction manifested itself in the space of nomenclature: Japanese technical terms that had entered the miner's vernacular in some Sinicized form, such as *gǔlǔmǎ* (古鲁码, an indigenized version of the Japanese word *kuruma*, or 'cart'),¹⁰⁸ had to be renamed for reasons of political expediency, even as Japanese technicians oversaw both staff training and the day-to-day management of the mine.¹⁰⁹ What we can identify in this episode is the high degree of importance that the CCP began to assign to informational hygiene and discursive control, already foreshadowed by the 1942 Rectification Campaign, and the ways in which these central control objectives increasingly encroached on self-documented and experiential narratives of events, especially where Japanese individuals were concerned. Democratized and pluralized discourses were being gradually nudged off the table, and these episodes serve as illustrations of that liminal transition and narrowing of discursive space, in many ways in violation of the promises of the Chinese communist revolution.

In our analysis of renamings, both of proper names and *noms de plume* of Japanese technicians and of the technical and colloquial language of the northeast, it is appropriate to consider what Lydia Liu terms "translingual practice",¹¹⁰ albeit reoriented from Liu's East/West dichotomy to a framework consistent with Stefan Tanaka's characterization of the Imperial Japanese imaginary of China's northeastern regions as 'Japan's Orient'.¹¹¹ Liu examines the "condition of translation",¹¹² that is, the potentiality of translation as an instrument for agents in the periphery to destabilize epistemic orders centered on the metropole through their linguistic appropriations and re-inventions. We can see this process in action as part of the linguistic deconstructions and reconfigurations of the former Imperial Japanese colonial space, but we can also see its limits, as the power balance on the continent shifted and the orthodoxies of the Party from Yan'an and of the Soviet Union began to peripheralize epistemic alternatives, including those rooted in the experiences of the people of Dongbei.

¹⁰⁷ Seow, "Black Coal in Red China."

¹⁰⁸ Dongbei dialects of Mandarin Chinese still contain a large number of loan-words imported from the Japanese, reliquary artefacts of the colonial period. Rooting them out was only expedited in official contexts, where such terms might cause embarrassment to the high-ranking cadres of the Party, mostly following the strictures of the Anti-Campaigns of 1948-9 and, later, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. For details, inspect: Zhang Shidong, "Ni suo tingdao de dongbei fangyan, qishi henduo shiri yuci hui", accessed February 19, 2020, <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/63046021>.

¹⁰⁹ For further details on the topic, consult Victor Seow's upcoming book, "Black Coal in Red China," which will include a full discussion of the Fushun coal mine case. Seow also directs us to: Edwin W. Pauley: *Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria*, (United States Government Printing Office, 1946), as well as to the works of Zhang Dounan, Itō Kobun, and Matsumoto Toshiro.

¹¹⁰ Lydia He Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity--China, 1900-1937* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), xv.

¹¹¹ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), esp. "Part 2: Creating Difference".

¹¹² Liu, *Translingual Practice*, 26.

The condemnation of Man'ei's politically problematic artists to hard labor in the Hegang and Fushun mines, as well as mines in other locations, munitions factories, etc., was by no means a unique phenomenon, nor was it one reserved for Japanese individuals. As with many other CCP policies of the era, the Party's diktats were remarkably catholic in their application, and affected many cultural workers, as illustrated by the case of Xiao Jun. Born in 1907, Xiao was a left-wing author, friend of Lu Xun, and member of the *dōngběi zuòjiāqún*, the "Northeastern Writers' Association". Xiao had performed cultural work in Yan'an, where he gained the confidence of Mao and befriended Ding Ling, and gained fame for his novel *Village in August* (1935), which described the battles between communist militias and the Imperial Japanese.¹¹³ The CCP's cultural committee appointed Xiao editor-in-chief of the *Cultural Gazette*, a radical communist magazine covering the intellectual and artistic revolutionary developments in the northeast, but Xiao immediately set to work turning it into a platform from which to criticize the communist cadres operating in the region, condemning their attitudes and describing the Land Reform Movement as "unkind", "heartless", and "an unprecedented act of robbery."¹¹⁴ Perhaps more dangerously for the period, Xiao also criticized the Soviets in the northeast, both for their barbarism and for the fact that they had shipped so much-needed industrial materiel back to the Soviet Union, seriously hindering China's attempts at economic reconstruction. When the 1948 Rectification Campaign rolled around, Xiao Jun was a "perfect target", and any grudges that cadres or Soviet advisors held against him were brought to air.¹¹⁵ Struggle sessions ensued, but Xiao refused to recant. He was accused of insufficiently characterizing the Japanese as class enemies, and his critique of the Soviet allies was framed as scurrilous libel; the accusation that the Soviet Union, a nation founded on Marxist-Leninist principles, could ever become "an oppressor nation over other oppressed nations" was deemed an intolerable attack both on an ally and on the core ideology of the Party.¹¹⁶ These objections must have bemused Xiao, who was well aware not only of the Red Army's excesses, but of the behavior of the all-too-European Soviet Ambassador Iudin—a man who enjoyed rickshaw rides and on one occasion asked Zhou Enlai why Lüshunkou (Port Arthur) had no "monument to General Stepan Makarov, the prerevolutionary explorer and conqueror of the Russian Far East."¹¹⁷ Plainly, Xiao's criticism was simply ahead of its time, as within a few short years attitudes towards the Soviets would have soured throughout the Chinese leadership and the Sino-Soviet split would have been formalized. Nonetheless, Xiao's intractable honesty earned him a long stint at the Fushun coal mines.

Julia Strauss has contested the view that the early- to mid-1950s represent a 'golden age' of CCP leadership, in which the Party successfully implemented policies with wide public support. Rather, Strauss argues, this period marked the formation of the Party's policies of nation-state integration and education campaigns—including policies such as the land reform campaigns and the hunt for counter-revolutionaries—that entailed "extremely high" levels of violence and coercion, were

¹¹³ Tien Chun (pseud.), *Village in August, with Introduction by Edgar Snow* (London: Collins Pall Mall, 1942).

¹¹⁴ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 312-313.

¹¹⁵ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 312-313.

¹¹⁶ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 312-313.

¹¹⁷ Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance : An International History* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 3 and 22.

frequently ineffective, and were met with ambivalence or resistance by the Chinese public.¹¹⁸ It is precisely these characteristics that were exposed by Xiao, resulting in his predictably violent treatment by the Party. Xiao was from and of Dongbei, and had a deep personal bond with the land and its people. He would have likely seen, and certainly heard, of firsthand accounts of Soviet brutality against Japanese, Korean, and Chinese people alike. He doubtless witnessed the masses of Japanese refugees suffering from hunger and disease. It is perfectly plausible, given his high-level involvement in the arts, that he was aware of the Japanese presence throughout northeastern 8RA, N4A, and PLA activities, including those at the NSF and other cultural organizations. His refusal to deny the evidence of his eyes and ears, and his resolute defense of what he saw as the spirit of proletarian international socialism, the revolutionary potential of the Japanese ex-colonists, and his dispassionate anti-Imperialism in the face of personal losses and of the shifting allegiances of Party intrigues, resulted in his subjection to forced silence and condemnation to hard labor in the Fushun mines.

Interdisciplinary Theoretical Contemplations: From Tanizaki to Deleuze

The cultural critic Paul Virilio has discussed the ways in which the modern nation-state's power is amplified by access to, and development of, visual and military technologies, which exist in what Michael Baskett calls a "symbiotic relation...both material and ideological in nature."¹¹⁹ Baskett explains how this symbiosis led to a mutual evolution of both military and visual technologies, tracing the genealogies of film stock speed to meeting the exigencies of aerial reconnaissance in Air Force scouting operations, while noting the Wieneresque feedback loops as propeller-mounted machine-gun timing mechanisms were then incorporated into film camera apparatus.¹²⁰ Baskett argues that there was an embedded 'ideological power' to these technologies, as their possession, or lack thereof, generated structural distinctions between states' military capacities, which percolated into cultural systems and translated into an adversarial othering, not least as the military advantages conferred by these technologies was also applied to the propagation of the colonizer's worldview and the hegemonic imposition of its knowledges and epistemologies onto subaltern spaces. Baskett elaborates:

"Materially, film and military technologies enabled armies to fight wars against enemies of far greater number and in distant lands. Ideologically, the possession of film and military technologies demarked "advanced" nations from "underdeveloped" ones, and the power of the images created by these technologies in large part helped regimes consolidate and maintain power at home and abroad. The same technologies needed to wage wars also made the logistics of empire building a reality."¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Julia Strauss, "Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: Regime Consolidation and after, 1949-1956," *The China Quarterly* 188 (December 2006), 891.

¹¹⁹ Paul Virilio, *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception* (New York: Verso, 1989), cited in Michael Baskett, *The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 6.

¹²⁰ Baskett, *The Attractive Empire*, 6.

¹²¹ Baskett, *The Attractive Empire*, 6.

Just as the capture of Imperial Japan's military materiel, war infrastructure, and technical knowledges of warfare was a priority for the CCP, KMT, and Soviet disputes in China's northeastern regions, so, too, was the capture of the empire's ideological infrastructure in the form of Man'ei. Baskett's analysis marries Foucauldian understandings of the power relations embedded in vision technologies, and in the particular reproductions of power that exist between colonizer and colonized, with a close examination of the content of Imperial Japan and postwar Japan's film-production companies. Baskett's insights open a fertile space for interdisciplinary approaches that consider the interfaces between historiographical techniques and the analytic instruments of cultural and critical studies.

The view that there exists an intimate relationship between war and film is shared by Atsuko Sakaki in her study of Tanizaki's "photography as violence."¹²² Sakaki points to the objectifying materiality of photography, drawing upon Foucauldian framings of observer/observed and recorder/recorded power dynamics to scaffold a critique of the authenticity of images and to highlight photography's capacity for representational violence, mirroring both Baskett and Hotta's theoretical approaches to their exhaustive documentation of Imperial Japanese film production. Sakaki's instrumentalization of hybridity is particularly illuminating, as it points to the syncretism of the Man'ei/NSF construct, allowing us to approach the organization both as a trans-temporal and trans-ideological chimera, and as a meta-cinematic entity that is inescapably associated with both Japanese Imperial and, later, CCP violence. While a detailed comparison falls beyond the scope (and, arguably, genre) of this thesis, Sakaki's observations, specifically as applied to the "private" magisterium of photography and the consumption thereof, nonetheless translate into the "public" context of film and cinematography. The reciprocal potential and artificiality of the filmic medium by no means undermines its potential as a generative, destructive, and/or transformative force, in the same way that its privacy does not preclude its application to mass propaganda. As Ying Qian puts it: "Documentaries showcased experimental vernacular technology, organized mass production campaigns, and powered production, sometimes literally, with its electrifying energy."¹²³ The capturing of violence on film (as in the early NSF documentaries) was an eminently bidirectional process that parallels Virilio's observations at every level, and although we risk teleologically overdetermining the violence of the Cultural Revolution with the certainty of hindsight, events such as Tokunaga's telegram remind us of clear instances where informed contemporary actors were aware of the phenomena at play, even as increasingly monolithic forces moved to extinguish their voices.

One aspect of the redirection of the output of Man'ei can be understood in terms of the substantial transformation of the "message," in the McLuhan sense, accompanied by virtually no transformation of the "medium."¹²⁴ The medium of film appealed to the Manchukuo-Imperial establishment just as much as it did to the Yan'an revolutionaries, and likely for similar reasons, among which were the adaptability of its messaging and the ease with which a mass public could receive, and adjust to, the language of cinema. Appropriately, McLuhan's approach bears a

¹²² Atsuko Sakaki, "Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, or photography as violence," *Japan Forum* 22, no. 3-4: 381-404.

¹²³ Qian, "When Taylorism Met Revolutionary Romanticism," 578.

¹²⁴ Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 12.

profound similarity to the classical Marxist conception of substructure/superstructure relations, in which the ownership class of substructural (or material) base determines the epiphenomenal superstructural arrangements.¹²⁵ It is unsurprising that the theoretical inversion of this directionality took place during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao and Jiang Qing formally reassessed the structure of the hierarchy of culture on material and social reality.¹²⁶ This period led to the reconception of substructural arrangements as plastic subjects of superstructural, cultural movements, and hence to the emphasis on the latter in order to transform the former—in practice, leading not only to extremely close scrutiny, censorship, and micromanagement of cultural projects, but also to the purges and punishments of artists, as happened to most of Tokunaga’s colleagues.

Langdon Winner’s work on the political potentialities of inanimate objects provides us with another way of addressing the questions raised by Baskett, Virilio, and Sakaki.¹²⁷ Winner observes that, although a sensitivity to the social embeddedness of artifacts is a palliative to the technological-determinist view that “technology develops as the sole result of an internal dynamic, and then, unmediated by any other influence, molds society to fit its patterns,”¹²⁸ there is nonetheless value in tempering what might develop into an equivalently naïve form of social determinism, one that ignores the impact of technological materiality upon social systems. Winner proposes a syncretic approach that considers the role of sociotechnical feedback loops, a non-deterministic model designed to caution us against a linear conclusion of the necessary overdetermination of sociotechnical systems by their technological elements. Winner’s approach allows us to situate the trajectory of Man’ei into a hybrid narrative that places the material elements of the Imperial Japanese and Mantetsu project into a negotiation with the social and political forces that applied themselves through human agents to the institution, with outcomes emerging in a dialectical fashion. When describing these technical systems, we should also resist the temptation of drawing too discrete a boundary between the technical as “technique,” in the sense of an embodied, acquired knowledge or skill, and the technical as “technology”—described by Leo Marx as “an ostensibly discrete entity, one capable of becoming a virtually autonomous, all-encompassing agent of change,”¹²⁹ in what is functionally a technologically determinist account. The fact that the CCP agents tasked with restructuring Man’ei demonstrated little evidence of perception that such a distinction existed should also be acknowledged: their need to repurpose and relocate the non-human technologies of Man’ei was immiscibly integrated into their attitude towards relocating and ‘repurposing’ its *human* members, as illustrated by the praxis of thought-reform and other ideological conversion techniques.

While the above approaches are useful for positioning film production in a context that accounts for the specificities of both technological and colonial space, neither fully addresses the other types

¹²⁵ As described in Karl Marx’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859).

¹²⁶ Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 352-353.

¹²⁷ Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” *Daedalus* 109, No. 1 (Winter 1980), 121-136.

¹²⁸ Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” 122.

¹²⁹ Quoted in Sheila Jasanoff, *The Ethics of Invention: Technology and the Human Future* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2016), 18.

of transitions and displacements discussed in this chapter, in particular, as concerns the post-Civil-War incorporation of Imperial Japanese institutions into Maoist utopian state-cultural projects. On this point, Allan James Thomas's Deleuzian approach contends that cinema offers a non-human means to think the human relation to being in a way that is "profoundly and utterly political."¹³⁰ Thomas elaborates:

"Totality, totalisation, are realised in the realm of the human in the presence of the people: the 'dream' of the people as One, as unity and totality whose extremes are realised in totalitarianism and as fascism. The Holocaust lies at the centre and break between the cinemas of the movement-image and time-image... To believe in this world as it is, then, means neither submission to the existing reality or the cynicism of realpolitik, nor a messianic faith in a world or a people to come. It is, rather, to affirm being as vital difference, as creation. Against the powers of horror, of the totalisation of thought and world and the totalitarianism of politics, we must place a belief in creation and difference not as the possibility of the new, but as the condition of its reality."¹³¹

This "belief in the world," and its concomitant rejection of both the crassly cynical or the "messianic," represents a tight parallel to many of the Japanese filmographers' sentiments regarding the role of cinema and of violence in the Cultural Revolution, specifically towards the anti-totalizing implications of generative cultural production and of artistic creation, as indicated both by Kishi Fumiko's revelations through cultural production and by Tokunaga's opposition to the violent utopianism of Mao's "gun-barrel" politics.

Conclusion

Our approach and conclusions in this chapter fit to some degree into a burgeoning (or, perhaps, 'burgeoned') body of interdisciplinary scholarship¹³² that re-narrativizes colonial relations with special emphasis on the agency of colonial subjects, understanding the colonial milieu not as an absolute constraint on action, but, rather, as a non-elective context in which agency and free will are exercised, and even, problematically, in which multidirectional collaboration takes place.¹³³ As Marx observes: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given, and transmitted from the past." In a colonial space, we might replace the word "past" with "present"; the context being transmitted not through temporal inheritance, but through the imposition of a colonial order by an external rather than extemporal force. The issue is complicated by the temporal framings that surround the narrative of Manchukuo, and, in particular, by the

¹³⁰ Allan James Thomas, "Conclusion: The Crystal-Image of Philosophy," In *Deleuze, Cinema and the Thought of the World* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018), 245–253.

¹³¹ Thomas, "Conclusion," 250.

¹³² Arguably, originating in the anthropological works of James Scott.

¹³³ Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, 1852.

‘Manchukuan Modernity/Chinese Backwardness’ dichotomy, which underpinned much of the contemporary Japanese-language discourse of the colonial space.¹³⁴ Above, we spoke of the importance of not ‘overcommitting’ to a position that deleted subaltern experiences from historical agency, but it is equally important not to ‘undercommit’ and, in doing so, ignore the very real brutality and strictures of the colonial order and the extreme choice limitations that the Japanese empire imposed upon its colonial subjects.

The synthesis of Man’ei, the “most advanced film studio in Asia,”¹³⁵ with the beleaguered, under-supplied, and guerrilla NFS acts as a synecdoche for the CCP’s triumph in the Chinese Civil War and its subsequent absorption of Imperial Japan’s colonial remnants. The contradictions that manifested as the CCP’s organizational coda, inscribed at every level with assumptions of asymmetric conflict, were applied to the project of incorporating the newly-decoupled northeastern regions of Imperial Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and reflect similar developments we have examined in other magisteria, from medical infrastructure to resource extraction. It would not be until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao, and the ascendance of Dengist technocratic developmentalism that Mao’s ‘continuous revolution’ would finally be discontinued and political assumptions of perpetual asymmetry would be revised and replaced with the more muscular national chauvinism of subsequent administrations. The early post-victory CCP, however, demonstrated extraordinary flexibility—characteristic, in fact, of Mao’s theories of guerrilla warfare—in appropriating and repurposing Imperial Japan’s accidental legacy.

In this chapter, we have traced Man’ei’s hybrid identity as both a monument to, and of, Imperial Japanese colonialism, and a refuge for artistic creators from the scrutiny of the Imperial panopticon. We have examined the ways in which the personnel and structure of Man’ei collided with the NSF’s beleaguered, guerrilla filmmakers and the ensuing fusion of the two. The human experiences that undergird this transformation, transmitted by the Chinese and Japanese voices that narrate it, enrich our understanding of the ways in which Japanese individuals, as well as Japanese technology and expertise, played a central role in shaping one of New China’s most important cultural organs. Japanese labor, both voluntary and coerced, was set to this task, and its influence can be seen in some of the most iconic cultural artifacts produced by the CCP in this era, such as *The White-Haired Girl*. Incorporation into the CCP’s state cultural projects was also not without its costs for the Japanese cadres. As with other *Akai hikiagesha* ‘Red repatriates’, life was often difficult upon return to the Japanese home islands. Kishi recalls the conditions:

“After returning to Japan [in 1953], I hoped to get a job at a film production company. However, none of us were welcomed... every company was in the middle of carrying out extensive Red Purges.

¹³⁴ Louise Young’s work is particularly instructive on this point, but it may also interest the reader to refer to Yosano Akiko’s *Travels in Manchuria and Mongolia* and/or Natsume Sōseki’s *Mankan tokorodokoro*. For an extended discussion on the topic, refer to: Fogel, Joshua A., “Japanese Literary Travelers in Prewar China,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 49, no. 2 (1989): 575-602.

¹³⁵ Baskett, *The Attractive Empire*, 29.

Those of us who were coming back from Man'ei had the 'scarlet stigma' of those who had "gone red from lingering in China". I ended up doing freelance work."¹³⁶

This narrative substantially retextures our understanding of cultural production in the early years of the CCP, further elaborates the remarkable capacity for pragmatic integrationism and transnationalism of the CCP in this period, and reveals the impact that these decisions had on the Japanese members and conscripts of the CCP, PLA, and related Chinese communist organizations.



Tokunaga Junko's 8RA service medals. From left to right: 解放东北纪念章 Jiefang dongbei jinianzhang (1950), 解放华中南纪念章 Jiefang huazhongnan jinianzhang (1950), and 解放奖章 Jiefang jiangzhang (1955). These medals were 'held for safekeeping' in order to 'protect the life' of Tokunaga, upon her repatriation to Japan. They were held in safety by the Shanghai Foreigners' Affairs Office of the Public Security Bureau, and presented to her half a century later, around 2007.

¹³⁶ Ishii, Taeko "Amakasu Masahiko to Manshū eiga '94 sai saigo no shōgen'", in *Bungeishunju*, October 2014. p. 330.



More badges and medals awarded to Tokunaga Junko.

Conclusion

Japanese Members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army

From 1937 to 1958, thousands of Japanese soldiers, medical workers, and civilians collaborated with the CCP and the PLA, some as volunteers, others as captives or conscripts. Many of these Japanese individuals became formal members of the PLA, received medals of distinction, and had their acts of sacrifice and heroism recorded in the official histories of their Chinese military divisions. Japanese soldiers assisted the Chinese communist war effort during the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, while Japanese nurses and doctors tended to Chinese patients, often on the front lines of battle, and helped establish and manage the earliest medical institutions and public-health and inoculation campaigns of the PRC. Japanese filmmakers assisted in the production of some of the early PRC's most iconic films, such as *The White-Haired Girl*, and Japanese specialists in practically every field contributed their expertise to the establishment of the Chinese communist state. At the same time, the experience of membership in the PLA, and of work in communist China, was a profoundly transformative one for the former settlers of the Japanese empire. For many, it marked an awakening to an entirely different worldview, an embrace of socialist ideals, the development of lifelong friendships and relationships, and the discovery of China as a second motherland.

Moves Towards Memory

The *Global Times* is one of the CCP's state-sponsored media outlets, which provides the world with a fair insight into the dominant narrative orthodoxies sustained by the government of the PRC. On May 21st, 2021, the newspaper published an article entitled “*The Eighth Route Army Treats Us as Friends, Brothers and Comrades.*’ — *A Cradle of China-Japan Friendship on Baota Mountain*”. The article notes that “some Japanese comrades made the ultimate sacrifice for the anti-war cause,” and concludes as follows:

“On August 30, 1945, the Yan'an Japanese Worker and Peasant School, which had been running for more than four years and trained and educated hundreds of Japanese soldiers, finished its historic mission. The friendship between the Eighth Route Army and Japanese trainees forged in Baota Mountain is still fondly remembered today. This part of history shows that the Chinese nation has the backbone to defy aggression and the courage to fight back, and at the same time cherishes peace and benevolence all the more. The Chinese people strive to achieve peace and justice by pursuing international justice and the greater good.”¹

¹ Global Times, “*The Eighth Route Army Treats Us as Friends, Brothers and Comrades.*’ — *A Cradle of China-Japan Friendship on Baota Mountain*,” May 21, 2021. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1224120.shtml>

This passage, and the article itself, illustrate a level of continuing official recognition of the PLA's Japanese integration activities, although it omits mention of Japanese service in the Chinese Civil War: it is not entirely clear that the JWPS's "historic mission" ended on August 30th, 1945, as the content of its curriculum and propaganda material was put to use in the subsequent conscription and integration programs for Japanese soldiers, medical technicians, and cultural workers—and, indeed, the revolutionary ambitions of Japanese communists and their CCP comrades continued well into the 1950s. Nonetheless, it is unsurprising that this episode, nearly every detail of which casts the CCP and the PLA in a genuinely positive light—in particular, regarding the commitment to international socialist harmony—and substantiated by the oral testimonies of the Japanese individuals concerned, should have been selected for a raised profile at this moment of fraught international attitudes towards the PRC. The events of this period exemplify a rejection of racial chauvinism and ethnic vendettas by the CCP, and a commitment to the humanitarian treatment of defeated adversaries.

In Japan, the *Manmō kaitaku heiwa kinenkan* ("Manchuria-Mongolia Settlement Peace Memorial Museum") in Nagano is dedicated to the preservation of personal and historical memories of the continental colonies. The museum contains a variety of documents relating to the imperial Japanese settlement projects and the experiences of Japanese colonists and repatriates, and situates these in a broader narrative of advocacy for Sino-Japanese amity and pacifist politics. One set of museum leaflets bears the legend: "Now, we must recount the history of the Manchurian colonies: a plea for peace." Beneath this text is a lemma, printed in both Chinese and Japanese, that reads: "Do not forget the past: it is a lesson for the future." One of the permanent exhibits is named "Towards a peaceful future," featuring a wall of *ema*-style handwritten wishes for peace from visitors to the museum. While the museum's content mentions the extreme poverty of Nagano's poor in the first half of the twentieth century, and the promises of prosperity that the Japanese government used to attract settlers from rural communities in the region, it also hosts seminars and releases publications that directly reference the iniquities inflicted upon the Chinese and other indigenous communities by Japanese settlers, including descriptions of forced labor, violence, and expropriations:

"As Manchukuo was a colony produced by Japanese invasion, we refer to the so-called country as *giman* ("fake Manchukuo"). Ostensibly, the country was founded on the basis of harmonious coexistence between the "five races," but, in practice, it was a colonial state founded on the basis of racial discrimination."²

Impoverished farmers from Nagano and other rural regions were encouraged to travel to the "empty, virgin" lands of the continental northeast, only to discover their dual role as a civilian occupation force and as "human shields"—ablative armor against a potential future attack from the USSR, expected to slow the Soviet military advance with their bodies. The Museum centers

² Terasawa Hidefumi, *Manmō kaitaku no shijitsu kara manabu koto* (Nagano: Manmō kaitaku heiwa kinenkan, 2018), 2.

the proletarian experiences of these rural transplants and critiques the callousness of the imperial government:

“The Japanese peasants were recruited to “develop” the land, but, upon arrival in former Manchuria, they discovered that there already were houses and farms there. The Japanese violently expropriated the homes of the indigenous Chinese and Korean people. We must not forget that it was not just the Japanese who suffered in this period.... this was not ‘development’, it was violent conquest.... we must never repeat this violence.... Japan must become a nation of peace.”³

The transnational experiences of former Japanese colonists, as well as the suffering of Japanese refugees after the war, have ensured that the historical memory of the colonies is intimately tied to pacifist and amity political movements.⁴ As Tokunaga Junko puts it:

“China is my second homeland. I was raised there. I learned honesty, modesty, and frugality there. These three traditions are truly good.... People ate from the same pot, lived in the same house, and worked together. Everyone was appreciated. Human rights were appreciated. We were respected by the Eighth Route Army, and we respected them... I hope they can maintain this tradition. I hope they can maintain their original heart.”⁵

These examples reveal, in small ways, how the study of this historical moment holds some potential to mend the fraught relations between China and Japan. Low-resolution, simplistic narratives of deindividuated, total enmity erase the lived experiences of those concerned, render the historical record barely comprehensible, and fan the flames of crude jingoism. The existence of Japanese members of the PLA, and the contributions—voluntary and coerced—of Japanese nationals to the foundation of the PRC and the PLA’s military campaigns fundamentally challenge our understanding of postcolonial Sino-Japanese history.

³ Terasawa, *Manmō kaitaku* 3-5.

⁴ For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see also Franziska Seraphim, “People’s Diplomacy: The China-Japan Friendship Association and Critical War Memory in the 1950s,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 5, no. 8 (August 1, 2007).

⁵ Tokunaga Junko, Personal interview, 15.

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