UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Seaborne Sovereignties:
Pacific Trade and the Evolution of
American Commercial Maritime Imperialism, 1787-1848

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Graeme Mack

Committee in Charge:

Professor Mark Hanna, Co-Chair
Professor Rachel Klein, Co-Chair
Professor John Blanco
Professor Dana Velasco Murillo
Professor Rebecca Jo Plant

2022

The dissertation of Graeme Mack is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically.

University of California San Diego

2022

DEDICATION

With all of my love, I dedicate this dissertation

to my wife Dana and my daughter Sofia. Dandelions for my girls.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For my studies at the University of California, San Diego, I could not possibly have asked for better mentors. Along every step of the way, Mark Hanna, Rachel Klein, and Dana Velasco Murillo provided me with a tremendous amount of thoughtful advice and consistent support. Taking a history seminar with Mark during my first quarter at UCSD was a blessing both because Mark is an excellent teacher and an exemplary historian. Over the years since that seminar, Mark has taught me a great deal about how to meaningfully think and write about the past and about how to navigate the historical profession. I thank him for always sharing that wisdom with me. Since the beginning of my doctorate, Rachel was always available to talk, offer advice, and, when necessary, provide a healthy dose of skepticism that always pushed me to evolve my ideas. Rachel read my work carefully and offered some of the most thoughtful comments I've received. Dana, "my shadow advisor," has had a transformative impact on me as a scholar and I attribute a great deal of my intellectual development and understanding of the significance of historical work to her thoughtful suggestions and real-world advice. I owe Rachel, Mark, and Dana an enormous debt, and I can only hope that this project will prove worthy of their faith in me. I would also like to thank Rebecca Jo Plant and Jody Blanco for their participation in my intellectual growth and their commitment to the development of this project.

Along my intellectual journey, I was fortunate enough to have many thought-provoking interactions with fellow graduate students. My peers at UCSD offered me many valuable suggestions and insightful comments during seminar discussions, over coffee and drinks, and in the margins of my chapters. I am grateful to Kevan Malone, Jordan Mylet, Reuben Silverman, Pete Braden, Edwin López Rivera, Matthew Hall, Chris Costello, Kevan Aguilar, Taylor Gray,

and Thomas Chan, for making my experience as graduate student a fulfilling one. While I participated in many writing groups throughout my graduate career, by far the most transformative and collaborative experience I had was with Geoffrey West, Kelly Silva, and Kalli Kefalas. I thank Geoff, Kelly, and Kalli for helping me to become a better writer, thinker, and collaborator.

UCSD is home to many talented professors who are deeply committed to training young historians and from whom I learned a great deal. I would like to thank Nancy Kwak, Luis Alvarez, Rebecca Plant, Daniel Widener, Sarah Schneewind, Stan Chodorow, Mark Hendrickson, and Wendy Matsumura. In a variety of different mentoring capacities, these individuals offered helpful and inspiring suggestions and guidance as I developed my thinking about the United States and global history. From my time at McGill, I would also like to thank Jason Opal, who was an excellent M.A. advisor, Allan Greer, and Gil Troy. I would not be completing my dissertation today if not for Michel Ducharme. I was lucky enough to take Michel's class as a UBC undergraduate with a naïve plan for grad school. Michel helped to make that dream a reality. Beyond generous with his time and energy, Michel carefully read and commented on my work (and continues to do so until this day!). I thank him for his continued belief in me and my development as a scholar.

Conducting research all over the world would simply be impossible without the help and guidance of peers and mentors. For providing archival tips or graciously sharing duplicates of their own archival documents, I thank Tracy Goode, Linda Arnold, Jordan Howell, Walter Brem, David Igler, and Michael Block. Researching and writing at the Huntington Library for several months was an especially rich intellectual and social experience. I thank Juan Gomez, Steve Hindle, Clay Stalls, Peter Devine, Morex Arai, Sam Wylie, Verónica Castillo-Muñoz, Greg

Nobles, Lindsey O'Neill, Louis Warren, Rachel St. John, Kristen Block, Amy Watson, Will Cowan, Skyler Reidy, and Jordan Keagle. I would also like to thank Maria Neill for help with translation. Finally, a big thank you to all of the library and archival staff at institutions I have visited. A special thanks to the folks at UCSD's Geisel Library and Interlibrary Loan who always worked hard to fulfil my (many) requests for materials.

Over the years, I was fortunate to attend, organize, and participate in many conference panels. "Seaborne Sovereignties," the title of this dissertation, first came to me while conceptualizing a panel for the OAH. Conference participants always provided me with invaluable career and life advice, research suggestions, and inspiration. With much gratitude, I thank Edward Melillo, Kristin Oberiano, Kristie Flannery, Matt Matsuda, Laurie Dickmeyer, Alastair Su, Ian Shin, Courtney Sato, Sean Fraga, Genevieve Clutario, Kariann Yokota, Lissa Wadewitz, Caitlyn Fitz, Tyson Reeder, Fabricio Prado, Paul Gilje, Tatiana Sejas, Naomi Sussman, Shira Lurie, Holger Droessler, Niklas Frykman, Ryan Fischer, Robert Senkewicz, and Rose Marie Beebe.

The generous support of many organizations made the completion of this dissertation possible. I thank the University of California's Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), the Harvard Business School, the Huntington Library, my donors from the Gleason-Grossman family, the Tinker Foundation, the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies (RMCLAS), the Organization of American Historians (OAH), the American Historical Association (AHA), and the University of California's Chancellor's Research Excellence Scholarship (CRES).

Finally, I thank my wife Dana, my daughter Sofia, and my canine companion, Dexter, for bringing me more joy in life than I ever could have imagined possible. For over a decade, I have been fortunate to have Dana by my side, offering her sage advice, giving pep talks (when needed), making me laugh and smile, and always patiently helping me to fix my terrible Word formatting habits. For the past ten months, Sofia's beautiful smile, loving coos, and silly babbles have always warmed my heart and filled me with a deep appreciation for all that I have in life. As I researched, reflected on, and revised this dissertation, Dexter took me on daily walks that did wonders for my mental health. His puppy-dog energy always pushed me to enjoy the little moments. My little family elicits the most profound feelings of meaning and purpose in my life. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation.

VITA

2012 Bachelor of Arts in History, University of British Colombia

2013 Master of Arts in History, McGill University

2022 Doctor of Philosophy in History, University California San Diego

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Seaborne Sovereignties:
Pacific Trade and the Evolution of
American Commercial Maritime Imperialism, 1787-1848

by

Graeme Mack

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2022

Professor Mark Hanna, Co-Chair
Professor Rachel Klein, Co-Chair

This dissertation charts the evolution of what I call American commercial maritime imperialism, a process pursued by American merchants and U.S. officials working to control sailor populations and American property overseas—far beyond the national borders of the United States. Between 1787 and 1848, the United States expanded its sovereignty from the east coast of North America westward to the ports and corridors of the Pacific Ocean. As American merchants and U.S. officials worked to create an infrastructure of authority and control over strategically important spaces in the Pacific, a maritime working population labored and resisted

the terms of their service aboard vessels and ashore at ports of trade. By employing a multi-local approach to examine five commercial nodes of American imperialism in the Columbia River region, the Chile-Peru coast, the Hawaiian Islands, the Pearl River Delta, and the California waterfront, this dissertation demonstrates how obstructions to American global trade prompted the United States to establish and expand new and dynamic forms of sovereignty in the Pacific. It considers how the commercial activities of American merchants, their crews, and U.S. officials shaped the contours of early American state formation, economic growth, and foreign diplomacy.

This approach to American imperial expansion represents a break from much of the scholarship on the subject. Studies of American Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century generally focus on westward migration, forced labor, and military conflict in northern Mexico and on what became the southwestern part of the United States. Histories of American foreign diplomacy overseas typically focus on the Spanish American War (1898) when the nation seized islands across the Pacific and in the Caribbean. By examining developments in the commercial maritime history of early America, this dissertation creates a global history of the United States. With its focus on maritime workers and merchant investors, this study contributes to new histories of U.S. political economy, global capitalism, and antebellum American foreign diplomacy.

Introduction

Main Arguments

After reflecting on several decades of American commercial growth in the Pacific, the editor of the *New York Journal of Commerce* described American imperialism in purely oceanic and economic terms, as a system chiefly in competition with Britain. “The grand conquest we [Americans] have to make is not over English armies, but over English commerce, wealth, and industry. We have before us the opportunity of taking over the first position among the maritime and commercial nations." The newspaper editor therefore envisioned an imperial system that prioritized the assertion of state control over markets and commercial routes rather than the acquisition of new territories and political rule over native populations.[1]

This understanding was distinct from the conventional view of nineteenth-century European imperialism, which saw empire as a sovereign state created through military conquest. According to this view, an empire brought together different territories and peoples under a central authority, maintained its control through economic and social coercion and displays of physical force, and divided its sphere into a dominant center and subordinate peripheries. For most Americans, the word “empire” did not carry a negative connotation until the late nineteenth century when, as some twentieth-century historians understood it, the United States started to act more like a conventional empire.[2]

---

[1] *The New York Journal of Commerce* (April 7, 1864); Ernest N. Paolino, *The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Diplomacy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 33, 30, 44.
[2] Immerman, *Empire for Liberty*, 5-8; Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 30, 35. The concept of empire, which was initially associated with Napoleon III’s reign in France (1852-1870) and Benjamin Disraeli’s government in Britain (1874-1880), did not come into common usage in the United States until the late nineteenth century. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of empire in the American context, see: Richard Immerman, *Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6-7.

This project explores the evolution of American commercial maritime imperialism during the first half of the nineteenth century as the United States expanded its sovereignty from the east coast of North America westward to the ports and corridors of the Pacific Ocean. It explores how obstructions to American global trade—which existed outside the parameters of U.S. territorial sovereignty—prompted the United States to expand and establish alternative kinds of sovereignty in the Pacific. American commercial maritime imperialism established a system of protection for vessels from external and internal obstructions and focused on controlling the maritime working population aboard vessels and at ports of trade.

Antebellum U.S. imperialism was tethered to American investment in Pacific commodities, trade networks, markets, and naval technologies. To demonstrate this connection, this study examines American fur traders, merchant consuls, whalers, and opium traffickers as they developed shipping networks and trading routes between coastal communities of East Asia, the Hawaiian Islands, the North and South American Wests, and the U.S. eastern seaboard. This examination highlights the important connection between seafaring Americans and government efforts to create imperial sovereignty in the Pacific. Establishing American sovereignty in the Pacific depended upon American merchants and U.S. officials controlling maritime workers at sea aboard their vessels and ashore at ports. American merchants and U.S. officials restricted the movements of sailors through ship officers, U.S. and European naval vessels, consuls, and treaties. American maritime merchants and U.S. officials pursued imperial expansion as a means to protect their long-distance trade in the Pacific.

Historiography

This conception of American imperial expansion represents a break from much of the scholarship on the subject. When examining U.S. imperial expansion, scholars tend to emphasize

the ideology of "manifest destiny," which celebrated America's supposedly God-given claim to the continent and underwrote the seizure and settlement of western lands.[3] Scholars typically describe American imperialism with a linear narrative about westward migration over land, the extension of the slave-plantation system, and violence perpetuated against Native Americans who stood in the way of American migration and continental expansion.[4] One consequence of

[3] Early narratives of U.S. history emphasized "manifest destiny" as a guiding principle for the evolution of the United States. These accounts stressed the rugged individualism of American settlers who migrated westward across North America. This concept stemmed from scholarship in the late nineteenth century. In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner's "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," *Report of the American Historical Association* (1893) gave rise to a conception of American history as a continual national expansion across new territories, a process—Turner argued—enabled the development of American democracy. Turner's student, Eugene Bolton, challenged this interpretation of American history, contending that historians needed to consider the Spanish-American experiences of those already inhabiting the West. See Herbert Eugene Bolton, "The Spanish Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies." *The American Historical Review* 23, no. 1 (October 1917). In the late twentieth century, western historians pushed back on this idea, diversified its narratives about the North American West, and debunked many of its main tenets. For examples, see David Weber, *The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); 42-61; Thomas Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Amy Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," *American Literature*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Sept. 1998); Patricia Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York: Norton, 1987). However, even Pacific histories continue to embrace the westward migration of white settlers and articulating this vision of manifest destiny, including in Eric Jay Dolin, *Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America* (New York: Norton, 2010); Arrell Morgan Gibson, [with John Whitehead], *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993).

[4] This scholarly trend gave rise to a number of important subfields, such as the New South, the New Western History, and Native American Studies. Important New South histories focused on the connections between slavery and capitalism, including Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); Walter Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Edward Baptist, *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2014). Related literature expanded the discussion to include "free" labor, including Seth Rockman's *Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). Southern planters became more central to scholarly understandings of the federal government through works, such as Kevin Waite, *West of Slavery: the Southern Dream of a Transcontinental Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2021); Matthew Karp, *This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). The New Western History focused on North America and the West as a geopolitically complex landscape inhabited by European, American, and British settlers and Indigenous peoples. For examples, see: Stephen Aron, *American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Adam Arenson and Andrew R. Graybill, *Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015); Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); and Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Native American Studies also began to actively re-interpret Indigenous experiences in what became the American West. See, for examples, Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); James Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinships, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, 2002); Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Some work expand their investigations to include Pacific spaces, which brought new groups and geographies

this focus has been that the mid-nineteenth century rallying cries of expansionist Democrats, the bloody onslaught of the U.S.-Mexico War, and the mass migration triggered by the California Gold Rush stand in as the major historical catalysts of the United States' imperial expansion.[5] Therefore, studies of American imperialism and American westward expansion looked almost exclusively at northern Mexico and on what became the southwestern part of the United States.

Emphasizing aspects of American maritime history changes the temporal framework for understanding when the United States began to engage in imperialism beyond North America. Diplomatic histories of United States empire typically focus on the late nineteenth century when

---

into the scholarly discussion, see Joshua Reid, *The Sea is My Country: The Maritime World of the Makahs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Kevin Waite, *West of Slavery*; Jason Smith, *To Master the Boundless Sea: the U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018).

[5] For readings on expansionist Democrats, see Foster Rhea Dulles, *America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansion* (Boston: Da Capo, 1969); Norman Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion* (Claremont: Regina Books, 1989); Donald Johnson, *The United States in the Pacific: Private Interests and Public Policies, 1784-1799* (Westport: Praeger, 1995); Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2012); John Belohlavek, *Caleb Cushing and the Shattering of the* Union (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2005); Gary May, *John Tyler, the 10th President* (New York: Henry Holt, 2008); Edward Crapol, *John Tyler, the Accidental President* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Lyon G Tyler, "President John Tyler and the Ashburton Treaty," *The William & Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (July 1916): 1-8; Robert Merry, *A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the Mexican War and the Conquest of the American Continent* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

For readings on the Gold Rush, see Minyong Lee, "Circuits of Empire: The California Gold Rush and the Making of America's Pacific" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2018); Mae Ngai, "Chinese Gold Miners and the "Chinese Question" in Nineteenth-Century California and Victoria," *Journal of American History* Vol. 101, no. 4 (March 2015); Malcolm Rohrbough, *Rush to Gold: The French and the California Gold Rush, 1848-1854* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Joshua Paddison, *American Heathens: Religion, Race, and Reconstruction in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Elizabeth Sinn, *Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012); James Delgado, *Gold Rush Port: The Maritime Archaeology of San Francisco's Waterfront* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Susan Lee Johnson, *Roaring Camp: The Social World of the California Gold Rush* (New York: Norton, 2000); Aims McGuiness, *Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush* (Ithaca, 2008); Albert Hurtado, *Intimate Frontiers: Sex, Gender and Culture in Old California* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999).

For readings on the U.S. Mexico-War, see Neal Harlow, *California Conquered: The Annexation of a Mexican Province, 1846- 1850* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Timothy Henderson, *A Glorious Defeat: Mexico and its War with the United* States (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008); Amy Greenberg, *A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013); DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*; Fred Anderson, Andrew Cayton, *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America,1500*-2000 (New York: Viking, 2005); Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

the nation seized islands across the Pacific and in the Caribbean during the Spanish American War. For some scholars of the twentieth century, the 1890s marked the "Great Aberration" even a "tragedy" in the greater scope of United States history because it was when the United States moved towards global empire-building.[6] With time, a scholarly consensus formed about the United States' goals for expansion beyond North America before the 1890s, which characterized American diplomacy as generally defensive in nature and not imperialistic.[7]

This tendency to overlook much of the United States' first century of foreign diplomacy overseas can be remedied by examining antebellum American imperialism in both the Far American West and the Pacific Ocean.[8] Only recently has scholarship begun to consider American imperialism in the Pacific before the mid-nineteenth century.[9] Beginning with the first transpacific merchant ship voyages to China, and concluding with the United States' territorial annexation of much of North America's Pacific coastline, this dissertation examines the history

[6] For the "Great Aberration," see Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York: Holt, 1936), 468. For "tragedy," see William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 1-6*;* Immerman, *Empire for Liberty*, 6-7.

[7] For a discussion of this historiography, see: Edward Crapol, "Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16 (Fall 1992).

[8] For examples of this scholarship, see: Daniel Bender, Jana Lipman, *Making the Empire Work: Labor and United States Imperialism* (New York: New York University Press, 2015); Julia Greene, "The Wages of Empire: Capitalism, Expansionism, and Working-Class Formation," in *Making the Empire Work*; Julia Greene, *The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal* (New York: Penguin, 2009); George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1777* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Louis Pérez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.); Gregg Jones, *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America's Imperial Dream* (New York: Penguin, 2013); Dulles, *America in the Pacific;* Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy;* William Appleman Williams, *The Roots of the American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of a Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society* (New York: Random House, 1969); and William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament* (New York: Delta Publishing Co., 1980).

[9] For examples of this literature, see Kevin Waite, *West of Slavery*; David Igler, *The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Matt Matsuda, *Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); David Armitage and Alison Bashford, eds. *Pacific Histories: Ocean, Land, People* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Rafael Bernal, *El Gran Océano* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012); Evan Lampe, *Work, Class, and Power in the Early American Pacific: The Labors of Empire (*Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013); Brian Rouleau, *With Sails Whitening Ever Sea: Mariners and the Making of an American Maritime Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

of American transpacific trade and asks how this commercial activity shaped the contours of early American foreign diplomacy, economic growth, and national sovereignty.

Each chapter of this dissertation focuses on a pivotal imperial node that sustained American transpacific shipping and business operations. Connected by trade winds and oceanic currents, these commercial hubs included the Columbia River region, Chile-Peru waterfront, the Hawaiian Islands, the Pearl River Delta in East Asia, and the California coastline. By demonstrating how imperial expansion was bound to American merchant investment in cargoes, commercial networks, markets, and laborers, this project integrates a wider array of historical actors and geographies into the national narrative than the traditional historiography. These peoples and places included itinerant Euro-American sailors on U.S. vessels in the South Pacific, the Nuu-chah-nulth fur traders of present-day Vancouver Island, Spanish American colonists at the Juan Fernández islands, Kānaka Maoli sailors in the central Pacific, and Chinese businessmen of the Cohong at Guangzhou. This examination challenges the theoretical framework of American exceptionalism, which conceives of early Americans as generally reluctant to build empire beyond North America.[10] It argues that leading figures of the early U.S. republic established networks of power overseas by redirecting state resources to protect trade and strengthen national authority at Pacific ports.[11]

[10] For a useful discussion of this exceptionalist framing of American imperialism, see Brooke Blower, "Nation of Outposts: Forts, Factories, Bases, and the Making of American Power," *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 41, no. 3 (2017), 445, 459.

[11] For examples of literature that discusses U.S. leaders' interest in overseas intervention and engagement, see John Haddad, *America, First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013); Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); William Earl Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992); Graeber, *Empire on the Pacific;* John H. Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire: the Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-1861* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985); Claude Hall, "Abel P. Upshur and the Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 69, no. 3 (1961); K.E. Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain:' Daniel Webster and the Origins of American Foreign Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific, 1841-1852," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* Vol. 129, No. 3 (September 1985), 225-259.



Figure 0.1: "Trade winds and currents in the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean," SEOS, Ocean Currents https://seos-project.eu/oceancurrents/oceancurrents-c02-p03.html

Why Write a Multi-Local History of American Imperialism in the Pacific?

A multi-local history of American imperialism in the Pacific has several advantages. It facilitates an understanding of interconnectivity among multiple local experiences of Americans across space and time. Examining five distinct locations is a challenging task for any historian, particularly for one writing a dissertation. However, historians benefit a great deal by doing history that considers multiple locations concurrently because it reflects how American mariners experienced and understood their work.[12] The foreign policies pursued by U.S. officials in

[12] Some illustrative examples of what I conceive of as multi-local history include Anne Hyde, *Empires, Nations, and Families: A New History of the North American West, 1800-1860* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Steven Hahn, *A Nation Without Borders: The United States and its World in an Age of Civil Wars, 1830-1910* (New York: Penguin, 2016); Karp, *This Vast Southern* Empire; Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed*

Washington, and the local circumstances of island and coastal communities, collectively shaped seafaring Americans' experiences in substantive ways. From a mariner's perspective, American imperialism operated across a multidirectional maritime space as sailor crews extended—through their movements and behavior—models of American business, law, and culture all over the world, especially in the Pacific.[13]

To have focused on one community would have risked obscuring the interconnected experiences of maritime workers. A vast gulf of difference exists between the experiences of a U.S. captain leading an expedition in the South Pacific and a hide and tallow drogher processing cattle products on the California coast. Yet both individuals helped to create an American imperial infrastructure in the Pacific.[14] By privileging interconnectivity across space and time, this study provides transpacific comparisons that enable readers to see the variety of conditions in which Americans worked, ate, traded, invested, thrived, failed, and died in the Pacific. It enriches our understanding of nineteenth-century United States history by examining the establishment of American networks and shipping routes to multiple locations, recasting not only when and where American imperialism originated, but also how it developed. In the Pacific, antebellum American imperialism formed a system of control, one unevenly reinforced by American sailors, naval officers, merchant shipping, cargo flows, warships, treaty agreements,

Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); David Igler, *The Great Ocean;* Matsuda, *Pacific* Worlds; Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)*;* Ryan Fischer, *Cattle Colonialism: An Environmental History of the Conquest of California and Hawai'i* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Mark Hanna, *Pirate Nests and the Rise of British Empire, 1570-1740* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

[13] Hietala, *Manifest Design*, 260-262; Paolino, *The Foundations of the American Empire,* 37.

[14] For example, in early 1826, one naval captain carried executive orders to seize California for the United States if the territory seemed under threat by Britain. In Peru, the captain received intelligence from a U.S. consul at Mazatlán (who had obtained the report from Mexican merchants) stating that Mexican officials planned to turn over California to the British in exchange for settling hundreds of thousands of dollars of Mexican debt. For more on this episode, see: John Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire,* 67.

investments and loans, and private traders serving as consuls. This process of control established a dynamic and multilayered web of sovereignties, which manifested in political, social, economic, and military forces, and was fueled by a constant urge among U.S. officials and American merchants to enhance U.S. power and spread American business abroad.

In doing a multi-local history, this study also emphasizes the significant role that wealthy merchant families on the U.S. eastern seaboard played in the expansion of the early republic's global power and authority.[15] Rather than seeing a federal state dominated by Southern planters as recent scholarship has tended to do, we also need to envision a U.S. state apparatus influenced by powerful Northeastern merchant families invested in long distance shipping.[16] In important ways, Northern society was organized around these influential households located in the major cities of the United States, and these communities' efforts contributed to the extension of American power overseas. The federal government's authority was often tied to the support of merchant communities, especially at a time of instability and change at the executive level. During the 1840s, U.S. presidents died early in office and were replaced by one-term vice presidents. In 1840, John Tyler replaced Whig President William Harrison when Harrison died one month into office. A pariah for bucking party on many policy issues, Tyler was not nominated by the Whigs for the 1844 election cycle. His unprecedented bid for the other party's (Democratic) nomination also failed. In 1848, Millard Fillmore assumed the presidency when

[15] Some literature that emphasizes the role of merchant communities, see Noam Maggor, *Brahmin Capitalism: Frontiers of Wealth and Populism in America's First Gilded Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017); Magdalene Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821: An Insight into the American Acquisition of California." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970); Terrance Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974); Magdalen Coughlin, "California Ports: A Key to West Coast Diplomacy, 1820-1845, *Journal of the West,* Vol. 5, no. 2 (April 1966): 153-172.

[16] For example of United States history scholarship that focuses on the Southern planter class as the driving imperialist force in American politics, see Kevin Waite, *West of Slavery;* Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*; Edward Baptiste, *The Half Has Not Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2014)*;* Matthew Karp, *This Vast Southern Empire*.

Whig President Zachary Taylor died four months into his tenure. The Whig Party did not nominate Millard Fillmore for an 1852 presidential run. During this period of flux in the United States' highest office, what persisted on a policy level were often the goals of merchant families who lobbied for their interests.[17]

John Quincy Adams is a significant figure in this study because he exemplified the close relationship between wealthy Northeastern merchants and federal officials, but also because he played a leading role in the early development of U.S. imperial expansion into the Pacific. As secretary of state (1817-1821), president (1825-1829), and a congressman (1831-1848), Adams identified with the New England merchant communities and formed his most lasting friendships with several merchant family patriarchs, including William Sturgis, Thomas H. Perkins, and John Perkins Cushing. While holding positions of high office, Adams looked to these powerful men for information and advice. He formed many of his ideas about American expansion to the Pacific through discussions and correspondence with these men. Merchant influence over political officials became so notorious that one early-twentieth-century historian described congressional representatives as the "political chanteymen" of New England merchants.[18]

U.S. officials and American merchants drew on the state's resources to control the maritime working population on board their ships and at ports of trade. Consequently, they established American sovereignties in peripheral spaces through captains, naval ships, informal consuls, and international treaties (which often committed foreign governments to regulating the

[17] Belohlavek, *Broken Glass,* 109-112; Shewmaker, "Forging the Great Chain," 225-229.
[18] Rachel Tamar Van, "Free Trade & Family Values: Kinship Networks and the Culture of Early American Capitalism," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2011), 127; William Sturgis to George Bancroft, Dec. 17, 1845, George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Quote from Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), 167; Terrence Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844," *Oregon Historical Quarterly,* Vol. 76, no. 3 (1975), 221; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 25-26.

behavior of sailors).[19] Warships and trading vessels served as main arteries of connectivity and communication for (witting or unwitting) agents of American imperialism between coastal communities worldwide. What resulted was a network of American sovereignties dependent on commercial depots that served as waystations for trade, access to markets worldwide, and an American sphere of influence over North America.[20]

Their shared interest in containing Britain's commercial sphere of influence also prompted U.S. officials and American merchants to work together. U.S. officials and American merchants sought to control ports, coastal regions, and islands associated with American trade. American sovereignties existed tenuously in spaces where American business dominated, which were claimed by militarily weaker states, and contested by stronger states than the United States. Within this multi-polar world of the Pacific, fluid networks of personal relations and financial incentives established American sovereignty along important sea routes and ports of trade. This process of control functioned through hotspots of power and systems of authority. Only occasionally did it include a formal claim to territory overseas for the United States.

U.S. officials and merchants often coordinated their efforts in response to British competition. The British establishment of political power and authority in Asia and Latin America without establishing colonies demonstrated Britain's willingness to exercise sovereignty informally for the purposes of protecting trade. Contests to establish sovereignty brought Americans in conflict with the British Navy's determination to control sea routes and ports. When addressing Congress in 1842, Massachusetts Democrat Caleb Cushing warned that the British would "soon possess a complete belt of fortresses environing the globe, to the

[19] Rolf Strootman, Floris van den Eijnde, Roy van Wijk, *Empires of the Sea: Maritime Power Networks in World History* (Boston: Brill, 2019), 3-4.
[20] Paolino, *Rise of the American Empire*, 2.

imminent future peril, not only of our territorial possessions, but of all over vast commerce on the Pacific."[21] The British imperial custom of establishing trading forts along coastal regions aimed to protect and sustain its global business. Seeing Pacific trade as invaluable and therefore in need of protection against the British Navy, Cushing advocated for a substantial increase in naval expenditures.[22]

Scholars of British history have examined the connection between the British Crown and British merchants, highlighting the strategies and techniques employed by the British military to control trade networks and sea routes worldwide. [23] However, this same level of attention has not been paid to American efforts to assert national sovereignty overseas. This study demonstrates how ideas of freedom of trade and gunship diplomacy—often on behalf of creditors and investors—were prominent features of American commercial maritime imperialism. The need for governmental policing of maritime labor at Pacific ports, which targeted sailor desertion and mutinies, was a paramount concern for American merchants.[24]

---

[21] Secretary of the Navy Abel Upshur to U.S. Congress, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," Dec. 4, 1841, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/secnav-reports/annual-reports-secretary-navy-1841.html; Hietala, *Manifest Design*, 59; Belohlavek, *Broken Glass*, 154-155.

[22] Ernest N. Paolino, *The Foundations of the American Empire*, 33, 30, 44; K.J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-1860," *Diplomatic* History, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1988), 32.

[23] For this idea, I draw on a British historiographical tradition focused on investigating Great Britain's informal empire based on British overseas commerce. See Marc William Palen, *The 'Conspiracy' of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalization, 1846–1896* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Simon Potter, *British Imperial History* (New York: Palgrave, 2015); Alan Knight, "Rethinking Informal Empire in Latin America" in *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce, and Capital,* ed. Matthew Brown (Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Philip Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Andres Baeza Ruz, *Contacts, Collisions and Relationships: Britons and Chileans in the Independence Era, 1806-1831* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019); Peggy K. Liss, *Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 6, 1 (1953); and Charles Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

[24] In the U.S. history field, some historians have examined American engagement in global trade in the late eighteenth century and traced its impact on the British Empire, such as James R. Fichter, *So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). Other historians have explored how key U.S. leaders pursued an imperialism based on the expansion of American trade, see Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*; Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire*.

Sources and Methodology

To complete this dissertation I have drawn from a wide variety of sources. I examine materials, such as personal correspondence, journals, bills of lading, newspapers, congressional records, treaties, ordinances, and governmental correspondence collected from U.S., British, Spanish, Mexican, and Chilean repositories. I build my historical narrative of American imperialism by pairing distinct types of sources, such as diplomatic statements and policy pronouncements and logbooks and sailor diaries. I conducted archival research at or obtained duplications of materials from American institutions, such as the Bancroft Library, the Huntington Library, the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, the Bishop Museum Archives, the Hawaiian Mission Children's Society Library, the Benson Latin American Collection, the Baker Library, the Library of Congress, and the Massachusetts Historical Society; British institutions such as the British Library; Spanish repositories such as the Archivo General de Indias; Chilean repositories, such as the Archivo Nacional de Chile; and Mexican institutions, such as Mexico City's Archivo General de la Nación and Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Collectively, this breadth of material enables me to discern how commercial maritime imperialism fostered the expansion of American sovereignty in the North American Far West and in the Pacific.

This multi-local history of American imperialism brings together the fields of continental U.S. history, Atlantic maritime literature, and Pacific and Indigenous studies. In the late twentieth century, continental U.S. historians emphasized the effect of non-Anglo-American inhabitants, including European colonists, Africans, and indigenous groups, on the east-to-west

migration of white settlers.[25] Contemporaneous Atlantic scholars reframed oceanic spaces as facilitators rather than impediments to humanity's intellectual, commercial, and cultural exchanges. They showed how seaward and landward histories mutually constituted the transatlantic movements of peoples, goods, and ideas between the United States and Afro-Eurasia.[26] Finally, another line of inquiry featured Pacific and Indigenous studies scholars who focused on the ocean's archipelagoes and examined the ways that Pacific Islanders exchanged products and ideas with Euro-Americans, policed them as government officials, or served as laborers and translators on their ships.[27]

My work is indebted to these bodies of scholarship and it builds upon them by considering how Pacific communities, who transferred customs, cargos, and peoples to societies of the North American West, influenced American merchants and U.S. officials' pursuit of American imperialism. This study elucidates how global interactions—between peoples and products on land and sea in the Pacific and North America—shaped antebellum American imperialism. It demonstrates the transformative nature of land/water connections between U.S. state intervention and American overseas business.[28] Emphasizing this connection changes our

[25] Patricia Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest;* Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier*; Alan Taylor, *American Colonies;* Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman;* Aron, *American Confluence;* Alan Taylor, *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804* (New York: Random House, 2016); Alan Taylor, *American Republics: A Continental History of the United States, 1783-1850* (New York: Norton, 2022); Stephen Aron, *Peace and Friendship: An Alternative History of the American West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
[26] Hanna, *Pirate Nests;* Paul Gilje, *Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Daniel Vickers, Vince Walsh, *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[27] Kerry Howe, *Where the Waves Fall: A New South Sea Islands History from First Settlement to Colonial Rule* (Honolulu, 1988); Epeli Hau'ofa, "Our Sea of Islands" from *A New Oceania* (Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, 1993); Ian Campbell, *Worlds Apart: A History of the Pacific Islands* (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2003); Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago, 1985); Greg Dening, *The Death of William Gooch* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998); Nicholas Thomas, *Entangled Objects* (Cambridge, 1991); David Chappell, *Double Ghosts: Oceanian Voyagers on Euroamerican Ships* (Armonk: M.E. Sharp, 1997).
[28] For a good example of a historical study that investigates how maritime laborers influenced American engagement overseas and U.S. foreign diplomacy, see: Rouleau, *With Sails Whitening Every Sea.*

understanding of American history's most pervasive "grand narratives," which conventionally portray U.S. expansion as a process confined to North America and fueled by the overland migration of white settlers. When, in actuality, major components of nineteenth-century American imperialism emerged in commercial spaces in the Pacific.

Overview of the Chapters

This project examines how obstructions to American commerce in the Pacific prompted U.S. empire-building. Each of its five chapters delve into an episode of commercial obstruction and government intervention. The first chapter examines interference in the American sea otter trade along the Columbia River by Indigenous and European traders. The competition for this trade prompted U.S. officials to exert naval power, political influence, and territorial sovereignty in the North Pacific. When Indigenous and European attacks killed sailors and destroyed cargoes, the U.S. government tasked warships and quasi-state agents to mitigate commercial disruptions in the Pacific Northwest. In 1818, U.S. officials gained international recognition of American claims to the Columbia River region, marking the first U.S. claim to territorial sovereignty on the west coast of North America.

Scholarship on the sea otter trade offers useful insights into the history of this business in the North American West.[29] Most literature on American expansion into the region focuses on

[29] For scholarship that offers histories of the sea otter trade, see Richard Ravalli, *Sea Otters: A History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018); Jonathan Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed With Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017); David J. Silverman, *Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America* (London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016); Colin Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West Before Lewis and Clark* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003); Daniel Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Mary Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast: The American Maritime Fur Trade, 1788-1844* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1998); Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*; James Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992); Adele Ogden, *The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

U.S. competition with European powers, such as Russia, Spain, and Britain. This literature seldom considers how American-Indigenous relations shaped U.S. foreign diplomacy and international security. By connecting the U.S.-Native otter trade to U.S. expansion, this chapter shows how an American imperialism based on maritime commerce, exploration, impromptu settlement, and military prowess shaped American expansion to the Pacific Northwest.[30]

The second chapter investigates American activities in the southeast Pacific, where frequent desertions by American mariners disrupted silver and copper shipments and compelled U.S. officials to send navy ships to the Chile-Peru coast. As independence wars spread across Spanish America, U.S. vessels faced confiscation by rival factions and many Americans deserted when they discovered they could earn higher wages on Chilean privateers. The U.S. government responded by sending warships and state agents to the southeast Pacific. With the Monroe Doctrine (1823), U.S. officials also committed the federal government to the protection of American trade in Spanish America through gunboat diplomacy and treaty negotiations.

Literature on the Chile-Peru coast has provided illustrative histories of the independence wars in South America. Historians of early-nineteenth-century U.S.-Chile relations often examine U.S. activities in South America as remote and isolated interactions that seldom influenced federal U.S. politics, commercial policies, and foreign diplomacy.[31] Some scholars

[30] I embrace Brian DeLay's call for scholars of international foreign relations to take seriously the formal diplomatic and private relations that U.S. officials conducted with the Indian nations of North America, much as scholars long have when considering American relations with European powers. I imagine the various Indigenous communities of the Pacific Northwest acting as independent nation states, conducting foreign diplomacy, both with other bands and tribes as well as Euro-American nation states. Brian DeLay, "Indian Polities, Empire, and the History of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 39, No. 5 (2015).

[31] For examples of literature that considers U.S. activities on the Chile-Peru coast, see Simon Collier, William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Arthur Preston Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830* (Russell & Russell, 1962); John J. Johnson, "Early Relations of the United States with Chile" *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 13, 31 (September 1944); Samuel Flagg Bemis, T*he Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943); Eugenio Pereira Salas, *Don Mateo Arnaldo, 1773-1819* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1941).

have written biographies of American adventurers who sailed to Chile or Chilean travelers who journeyed to the United States but often examined their experiences abroad as generally divorced from events in their native countries.[32] By examining the efforts of U.S. merchants, informal diplomats, and officials to protect trade along the Chile-Peru coast, this chapter argues that trade in independence-era Chile fueled American imperial expansion to the west coast of South America.

The third chapter investigates how high demand for whale products and challenges to American whaling near the Hawaiian Islands prompted the United States to expand its national power to the archipelago. During the 1820s and 1830s, the American whaling industry redefined U.S.-Hawaiian relations and reoriented U.S. foreign diplomacy to focus on the Hawaiian Islands. High consumer demand for whale bones and whale oil caused American whalers to undertake long voyages to the central Pacific, where they routinely stopped at the archipelago. When an increased number of sailors abandoned their whaling ships to remain in Hawai‘i, U.S. officials sent naval squadrons to pressure Hawaiian rulers for anti-desertion laws. The Tyler Doctrine (1842) expanded national power to the Hawaiian Islands and sought to assert U.S. authority over trade routes and protect American whaling interests.

---

[32] For examples of these types of biographies, see Beatriz Bragoni, *José Miguel Carrera: Un Revolucionario Chileno en el Río de la Plata* (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2012); Natalia Perea, *The Caudillo of the Andes: Andrés de Santa Cruz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Charles H. Bowman, "A Spanish American Patriot in Philadelphia, 1796-1822," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* Vol. 94, No. 1 (Jan. 1970); John C. Pine, "William G.D. Worthington: United States Special Agent, 1817-1819." *Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science,* Vol. 12 (1958); Edward J. Aud, "W.G.D. Worthington: His South American Mission" (M.A. Thesis, Northwestern State Teachers College, 1937); Eugenio Pereira Salas, "La Misión Bland en Chile," LXXXVIII, No. 86 (1936): 80-103; Herbert Everett Putnam, *Joel Roberts Poinsett: A Political Biography* (Mimeoform Press, 1935); Fred J. Rippy, *Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1935); Salas, *Don Mateo Arnaldo;* Eugenio Pereira Salas, *Henry Hill: Comerciante, Vice-Consul y Misionero* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1940); Eugenio Pereira Salas, *Jeremías Robinson, Agente Norteamericano en Chile (1818-1823)* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1937); Charles Lyon Chandler, "The Life of Joel Roberts Poinsett," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1935); Watt Stewart, "The Diplomatic Service of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires," *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 1934); Charles Stillé, *Life and Services of Joel Poinsett: The Confidential Agent in South Carolina of President Jackson During the Troubles of Troubles of 1832* (Philadelphia: 1888).

Scholarship on American whaling has provided in-depth studies of the industry and its importance to the United States' economy.[33] Meanwhile, literature on American imperialism in Hawai'i often focuses on missionaries and planters who introduced Western land ownership and large-scale agriculture during the second half of the nineteenth century.[34] Many scholars also concentrate on the 1890s when the United States annexed the Kingdom of Hawai'i.[35] By examining efforts to regulate sailors and protect business activities in and around the Hawaiian Islands during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, chapter three demonstrates how American whaling merchants pursued the United States' expansion to Hawai'i. Through a "system of vigilance," a turn of phrase I borrow from an 1826 New Bedford newspaper article,

[33] For examples of scholarship on the whaling industry, see Nancy Shoemaker, *Native Whalemen and the World: Indigenous Encounters and The Contingency of Race* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Margaret Creighton, *Rites and Passages: The Experience of American Whaling, 1830-1870* (Cambridge, 1995); Briton Cooper Busch, *"Whaling Will Never Do For Me:" American Whaleman in the Nineteenth Century* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994); Eduard Stackpole, *Whales & Destiny: The Rivalry Between America, France, and Britain for Control of the Southern Whale Fishery, 1785*-1825 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1972); Edouard Stackpole, *The Sea-Hunters: The New England Whalemen During Two Centuries, 1635-1835* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1953); Elmo Paul Hohman, *The American Whaleman: A Study of Life and Labor in the Whaling Industry* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928); and Alexander Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery from its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878).

[34] For literature focused on missionaries and planters and American expansion, see Clifford Putney and Paul Burlin, ed., *The Role of the American Board in the World: Bicentennial Reflections on the Organization's Missionary Work, 1810-2010* (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2012); Jennifer Fish Kashay, "Competing Imperialisms and Hawaiian Authority: The Canonading of Lahaina in 1827, *Pacific Historical Review*, 77 (August 2008), 369-90; Jennifer Fish Kashay, "Agents of Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth-Century Hawaii," *New England Quarterly*, 80 (June 2007), 280-98; Noenoe Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press 2004); Jonathan Osorio, *Dismembering Lãhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002); Sally Engle Merry, *Colonizing Hawaii: The Cultural Power of Law* (Princeton, 2000); Sandra Wagner-Wright, *The Structure of the Missionary Call to the Sandwich Islands 1790-1830: Sojourners Among Strangers* (San Francisco: Mellon Research University Press, 1990); Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. I: Foundation and Transformation, 1778-1854* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1965).

[35] For scholarship that examines the United States' annexation of Hawai'i in the 1890s, Ernest Andrade, *Unconquerable Rebel: Robert W. Wilcox and Hawaiian Politics 1880-1903* (Denver: University of Colorado, 1996); William Russ, *The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893-1894* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1959). 1992); Charles Campbell, *The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865–1900* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Gavin Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968); Ralph Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. III, The Kalakaua Dynasty, 1874-1893* (Honolulu, 1967); Sylvester Stevens, *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898* (Philadelphia: Harrisburg, 1945); Foster Dulles, *America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansion* (New York: Da Capo P., 1969).

American merchants and officials bound laborers to their voyages and forcibly recruited sailors onshore through laws, diplomacy, and military force. [36] An examination of American whaling therefore reveals the extent to which U.S. imperialism was tethered to the labor demands of American merchants.

The fourth chapter explores how challenges to the opium trade with Guangzhou (in present-day China) prompted the expansion of American power and territorial sovereignty along the Pearl River Delta. An increased demand for opium enabled U.S. merchants to substitute hard-to-obtain specie with opium and British credit, generating small fortunes for some American shippers. After the Qing government's anti-opium campaign crippled U.S. trade by sparking anti-foreign riots, trade bans, and property confiscation, American merchants petitioned the U.S. government for assistance, prompting U.S. officials to send warships and diplomats to the South China Sea. While exhibiting modern warships at Qing ports, U.S. consuls pushed for the ratification of an international treaty with the Qing Empire in 1844 that brought American trade in East Asia under U.S. legal protections and guaranteed Americans increased access to Chinese markets.

Scholarship on early American business in China has offered important insights into American trade during the boom-and-bust cycles of the Canton System.[37] Literature on China's

[36] "System of vigilance" was a phrase that appeared in the *New Bedford Mercury,* December 15, 1826: 19, 3, 1 in R. Gerard Ward, *American Activities in the Central Pacific, 1790-1870,* Vol. 3 (Ridgewood: Ridgewood Press,1967), 132.

[37] In the early nineteenth century, American trade operated under the "Canton System," which was a strictly regulated procedure for all international trade that took place in China. The Canton System allowed the Qing Emperor to generally control trade with the United States and Europe within its realm by focusing all trade on the southern port of Canton (present-day Guangzhou). Qing Emperors created this protectionist system beginning in 1757 as a response to a perceived political and commercial threat from foreign commercial nations. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Chinese merchants, known as Hongs, managed all trade at that port. Working out of thirteen factories on the banks of the Pearl River outside Canton, in 1760, by order of the Qing Emperor, they became officially sanctioned as a monopoly known as the Cohong. Chinese merchants engaged with foreign trade through the Cohong under the supervision of the Guangdong Customs Supervisor. For examples of English-language literature on American trade under the Canton System, see John Rogers Haddad, *America's First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013); James Fichter, *So*

opium trade tends to focus on British participation and only occasionally considers U.S.-British cooperation in this illicit business.[38] Seldom does this literature explore how obstructions to China's opium trade prompted the U.S. government to intervene in China and establish territorial sovereignty at ports along the Pearl River Delta.

The fifth chapter examines how the hide and tallow trade facilitated the expansion of American sovereignty in California. It constitutes this study's final example of commercial maritime imperialism. During the 1830s and 1840s, the trade of cattle hides and tallow (cow-fat) rapidly expanded and drew hundreds of American sailor migrants to California. As American influence in California's hide and tallow trade grew, Mexican federal and California authorities countered the threat of U.S. power by working to establish a political economy that was shaped by local elites—rather than by Americans. Elite Californios fought to install their political allies to government posts where they enforced protectionist policies that challenged the supremacy of American shipping. American merchants responded to this challenge by pressuring U.S. officials to commission modern naval squadrons, appoint private traders as consuls in California, and reorient American diplomacy toward western Mexico and the North Pacific.

Literature on the American hide and tallow trade in California has provided detailed

---

Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast*; Jacques Downs, *The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of the American China Policy, 1784-1844* (London: Associated University Presses, 1997); Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in* Paradise; and James R. Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods*.

[38] Mao Haijin, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War: The Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Joyce A. Madancy, *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin The Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Peter W. Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which they Forced Her Gates Ajar* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); Chang Hsin-pao, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). For literature on British and American relations in China, see Macabe Keliher, "Anglo-American Policy and Origins of U.S. China Policy;" *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2007); Fichter, *So Great a Proffit;* Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-1860," 19-37; Nathan Allen, *The Opium Trade: Including a Sketch of its History, Extent, Effects* (Lowell: J.P. Walker, 1853).

histories of the day-to-day operations of processing cattle products and the commercial exchanges that accompanied the trade.[39] The American naval seizures of California's capital Monterey in 1842 and four of its ports during the U.S.-Mexico War (1846-1848) signaled the United States' willingness to formally conquer and annex territory of commercial interest to the Union—in this case, Mexican. As had American diplomats from earlier periods, Cabinet members of the Polk administration (1845-1848) consulted with New England merchants when creating U.S. strategy in the Pacific. American leaders saw an urgency in establishing U.S. outposts on the Pacific. In 1845, U.S Secretary of State James Buchanan appointed Thomas Larkin a consul of California, defining the administration's prime objective in Mexican California: "The possession of the Bay and harbor of San Francisco is all important to the United States. The advantages to us of its acquisition are so striking, that it would be a waste of time to enumerate them here."[40] California ports were central to U.S. officials' vision of an American-based commercial maritime imperialism.

These five chapters chart the United States' expansion from a republic on the east coast of North America to an imperial nation asserting its national sovereignty across the continent and

[39] Scholarship on California's hide and tallow trade is fairly old and does not connect the trade to American imperialism. For examples of this literature, see: Robert Cleland, "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California: An Account of the Growth of American Interest in California, 1835-1846," *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly,* Vol. 13, no. 1 (July 1914); Adele Ogden, "McCulloch, Hartnell, and Company: English merchants in the California hide and tallow trade." (M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1924); Sherman Forbes Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California, 1822-1846" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1955); Robert Glass Cleland, *The Cattle on a Thousand Hills: Southern California, 1822-1880* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1969); Raymond A. Rydell, *Cape Horn to the Pacific: The Rise and Decline of an Ocean Highway* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952); Jessie Hughes Davies Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California,* (New York: Arno Press, 1976); Adele Ogden, "Boston Hide Droughers along California Shores." *California Historical Society Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 4 (Dec. 1929), 289-305; Louis Pubols, *The Father of All: The De La Guerra Family, Power, and Patriarchy in Mexican California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
[40] James Buchanan to Thomas Larkin, 17 October 1845 from William Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations.* Vol. 3 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Place, 1925-1926), 169, 171.

at outposts and corridors in the Pacific.[41] Obstructions to American commerce in the Pacific frequently encouraged American empire-building. American imperialism took distinct shapes depending on what kind of infrastructure was necessary for merchants to profit from their trade. In many instances, the high demand for labor and the "unreliability" of sailor workers elicited governmental intervention (as it did in the Hawaiian Islands and on the Chile-Peru coastline). In other episodes, the threat of commercial obstruction by foreign governments through protectionist policies and property confiscation prompted American empire-building (as was the case along the Pearl River Delta and in California). In most instances, American merchants took advantage of wartime disruptions to sell goods for substantial profits (as was the case in the Columbia River region, on the Chile-Peru waterfront, along the California coastline, and along the Pearl River Delta). U.S. officials asserted sovereignties in Pacific hubs through signing treaties, which bound foreign governments to regulating sailors from American vessels (as they did in the Hawaiian Islands and along the Pearl River Delta and the California coast). American economic competition and armed conflict with Europeans and Indigenous communities in the Pacific compelled U.S. officials to militarily intervene overseas. This characteristic featured in all five nodes: in the Columbia River region, the Chile-Peru coast, the Hawaiian Islands, the Pearl River Delta, and along the California waterfront. In the end, what most provoked the United States to expand its networks of power and sovereignty were interruptions to American economic activities.

[41] As I understand it, commercial maritime imperialism involved processes that one historian of the Pacific has described as "extract colonialism" and "transport colonialism." See Nancy Shoemaker, "A Typology of Colonialism," *AHA Perspectives on History,* Oct. 1, 2015.



Figure 0.2: "Key Nodes of American Commercial Maritime Imperialism." Map by Geoffrey West. Figure shows key commercial nodes and currents in the Pacific.

Conclusion: Sea Changes in American Imperialism

Long before the United States became a global imperial power with territorial claims to islands in the Pacific and the Caribbean, the American Republic pursued an overseas imperialism that brought Americans into regular contact with communities in the Pacific. As these interactions became increasingly profitable, American maritime merchants drew on the resources of the state to establish American sovereignties at pivotal commercial nodes. However, the nature of American relationships with Pacific communities differed from a "standard" colonial-subject dynamic.[42] During the first half of the nineteenth century, American imperialism in the

[42] In describing antebellum U.S. imperialism in Hawai'i, one historian described the relationship as existing "in ways that were far less self-assured, far more tentative, and far more curious than an anachronistic focus on colonialism, imperialism, and 'nation' might suggest." See Noelani Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic:*

Pacific suffered from political and institutional limitations and therefore its power and authority always existed in an uncertain and tenuous form. Within these contested spaces, local societies played an important role in both resisting and facilitating the growth of American commercial maritime imperialism. Examining antebellum American-Pacific interactions therefore enables historians to better understand a much longer trajectory of American imperial expansion.[43]

Founded in a period when mercantilism was nearly ubiquitous among overseas traders, the American Republic often bound expansionism to ideas of freedom of trade. Many American leaders believed that preserving national independence and the American republican system depended on the Union extending "across space" into new territories. Rather than "through time"—in the corruption-prone manner of more-densely populated European empires—this process of American expansion depended on international trade remaining open and unimpeded by government restrictions.[44] Influential late-eighteenth-century thinkers advocated for free trade practices. British economist Adam Smith attributed China's imperial decline to the Qing Empire's refusal to open its channels to the free flow of world commerce. Moreover, Americans believed that pursuing free trade offered them the opportunity to circumvent empires like the Qing Dynasty by building a dynamic and profitable system of commercial maritime imperialism.[45]

Since the establishment of the American republic, the United States as a political entity

---

Sovereign Hawai'i and the Early United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2019), 55. For a discussion of "the longue durée" of U.S. state and empire building, see Blower, "Nation of Outposts," 439.

[43] For a useful discussion of the limitations of imperial control in Spanish-Portuguese contexts, see Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2015), 1-16.

[44] Drew McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 9; Leon Fink, *Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World's First Globalized Industry, 1812-Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 26-27.

[45] Kendall Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom: China and the Early American Romance of the Free Trade* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2017), 25-26.

aspired to expand. An imagined American "frontier" played a substantial part in shaping this American diplomatic approach to the outside world. While many Americans today see the nation's growth as somehow inevitable, this process required public support and widespread acceptance of an ideology justifying American expansion and control over foreign peoples. Expansion required a general willingness among Americans to go to war, work as missionaries overseas, engage in scientific expeditions, move west, and engage in global trade as merchants, consumers, and producers. During the first half of the nineteenth century, American merchants and U.S. officials harnessed this disposition as they pursued a commercial maritime imperialism in the Pacific and the North American West. As is well-known, this effort included acquiring new territory on the North American continent, but it also involved substantially expanding American power in the Pacific. The expansion of the U.S. Pacific naval squadron, the adoption of commercial accords with new powers, and the development of the international consular service for diplomats at ports of trade, collectively reinforced American control over commercial nodes in the Pacific. Recognizing this Pacific expansion reveals the ways that nineteenth-century American imperialism was rooted in maritime activity and focused on facilitating American business interests in overseas markets.[46]

[46] Hietala, *Manifest Design*, 57-58; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 92-94, 705-708.

Chapter 1: "A Contest for Dominion on the Shores of the Pacific:"[47] American Merchants, the Otter Fur Trade, and Commercial Maritime Imperialism in the Pacific Northwest, 1787-1818

During the early nineteenth century, otter furs became one of the most valuable commodities in the world. Wealthy Chinese elite who paid extraordinary prices for otter pelts motivated U.S. merchants to invest their capital in sea otter voyages. Characteristically short on the hard coinage demanded by Chinese merchants, U.S. traders used otter furs as currency to buy Chinese silk, tea, and porcelain. On their voyages to China, U.S. traders began to obtain thousands of otter furs from coastal Indigenous communities in the Pacific Northwest. As American shipping in the region generated considerable profits for U.S. merchant houses, the U.S. government increasingly focused its attention and resources on maintaining the security of their trading vessels. [48]

The peoples and products introduced by this succession of foreign ships spurred violent conflicts across the Pacific Northwest. In one such episode, the Nuu-chah-nulth people of Nootka Sound (present-day Vancouver Island, British Columbia) attacked the American merchant ship *Boston* in March 1803.[49] The attack created a second "Boston massacre," as a survivor named John Jewitt remembered. U.S. sailors were "overpowered and murdered" by Nuu-chah-nulth soldiers. After "cutting their heads off" and "throwing their bodies into the sea," the Nuu-chah-nulth placed the heads of crew members "arranged in a line" for identification by

[47] Washington Irving, *Astoria: Or, Enterprise Beyond the Rocky Mountains* (Paris: Baudry's European Library, 1836), 325; James Ronda, *Astoria & Empire* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), xii.
[48] Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur*, 45.
[49] John Jewitt, *A Journal Kept at Nootka Sound* (Boston: Garland, 1807), 29-30.

Jewitt.[50] During the next two years, Jewitt, the *Boston*'s former armorer, was employed working metals as a "slave" of the chief Maquinna on Vancouver Island. After escaping in 1805, Jewitt wrote a popular account of his experience with the Nuu-chah-nulth and their attack on the *Boston* became infamous in the United States.[51]

The fate of the *Boston* all but confirmed American merchants' deepest fears. When organizing the establishment of a fur trading post on the Columbia River, the prominent New York merchant John Jacob Astor warned his employees "to be particularly careful on the coast, and not to rely too much on the friendly disposition of the natives." Astor connected the failure of previous ventures to Native disruptions to trade, claiming, "All accidents which has as yet happened there arose from too much confidence in the Indians."[52] For years, Astor pressured top U.S. policymakers to provide some measure of security for U.S. ventures engaged in the Pacific otter trade, an effort that bore fruit in the late 1810s.[53]

By examining American participation in the Pacific otter trade, this chapter argues that American engagement with Indigenous traders shaped American imperialism in the Pacific Northwest. Past scholarship on the sea otter trade has offered useful insights into its development in the North American West.[54] Meanwhile, literature on American imperialism in the Pacific Northwest has typically focused on U.S. competition with European powers, such as Russia,

[50] Jewitt, *Journal Kept*, 29-30; Alexander Walker, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West of America in 1785 & 1786*, edited by Robin Fisher and J.M. Bumsted (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), 193.
[51] In 1807, Jewitt published a popular account of his time with the Nuu-chah-nuthl, followed by an autobiography (1815) and a biography (1835).
[52] John Jacob Astor to Jonathan Thorn, September 5, 1810, New York, Astor Papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire.* 100.
[53] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 2-10.
[54] For scholarship on the history of the sea otter trade, see Ravalli, *Sea* Otter: Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed With Fur*; Silverman, *Thundersticks*; Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*; Clayton, *Islands of Truth*; Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest* Coast: Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in* Paradise: James Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods*: Ogden, *The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848*.

Spain, and Britain.[55] Scholarship seldom connects these two lines of inquiry or consider how U.S.-Indigenous relations shaped U.S. foreign diplomacy and international security in this region at this time.[56]

This chapter shows how an American imperialism—which functioned through maritime commerce, exploration, impromptu settlement, and military prowess—took shape in the Pacific Northwest as this region grew in importance to the otter fur trade.[57] This form of commercial maritime imperialism helped to construct the meanings of "possession" and sovereignty in this region at this specific time. By the turn of the century, pro-U.S. expansionists defined the existence of an ambulatory sovereignty in the Columbia River region, a sovereignty that stemmed from Kendrick's negotiations and Gray's exploratory expeditions. American claims to the region were also strengthened by increasing violence perpetuated by Americans, an important characteristic of American expansion worldwide.[58]

The New American Draw: The Sea Otter Trade in the North Pacific

American involvement in the Pacific otter trade began in the 1780s, shortly after the United States achieved its political independence. The United States' break from the British Empire in the late eighteenth century forced the new republic to seek its own trading networks

[55] For example, Samuel Bemis focused largely on how the Pacific fur trade impacted U.S.-Spanish relations. See his *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Diplomacy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956). In another example, Howard Kushner dedicated a full monograph to the subject of U.S.-Russian relations as they pertained to the Pacific Northwest. See his *Conflict on the Northwest Coast: American-Russian Rivalry in the Pacific Northwest* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975). Finally, James Gibson focuses largely on how U.S.-British relations developed through the Pacific sea otter trade. See his *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods* (1992).
[56] DeLay, "Indian Polities, Empire, and the History of American Foreign Relations."
[57] This approach builds on how some scholars of U.S. imperialism have understood nineteenth century American empire taking shape. Unlike their European rivals, who formally maintained colonies and other infrastructure of overseas empire, the United States' empire has functioned largely based on informal networks and commercial transoceanic movements. For more on an informal U.S. empire, see Immerman, *Empire for* Liberty; Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global* Empire; Hietala, *Manifest Design.*
[58] For a discussion of exploratory and commercial-based claims to American sovereignty, see Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy" 72-76.

beyond its traditional transatlantic markets. British explorer Captain James Cook's third expedition had "discovered" Indigenous communities inhabiting a two-thousand-mile coastline (stretching from present-day Oregon on the south and the Alaskan panhandle on the north). In the 1780s, Cook's final voyage captured Americans' attention and drew them westward to the Pacific with accounts attesting to the high value of otter furs in China. An unofficial account of Cook's final voyage was published in 1781, which sold out quickly in the United States. Then one Philadelphia-born sailor, who served as an officer on Cook's final voyage, also published his account in 1783. Finally, the official account of the voyage came into publication in England in 1784.[59] All of these accounts of Cook's travels fed a wave of excitement among mariners seeking economic opportunity in the Pacific. These communities enjoyed access to rich fields of valuable sea otter furs, a much-coveted item in China, which they readily exchanged for metal tools, items of special importance to the highly skilled woodworkers of the Pacific Northwest.[60]

Rumors spread quickly via transatlantic trade networks of the expedition's success in exchanging these otter furs from the Pacific Northwest for immense profits in China.[61] Merchants from the United States were intrigued by the expedition's enormous profits of 1,800 percent.[62] At a time when a pound of butter cost twelve cents and a pound of flour cost sixty-nine cents, returns for otter furs were immense.[63] One of Cook's officers recalled how a single sea

[59] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 9.
[60] Silverman, *Thundersticks*, 155.
[61] Gray, *The Making of John Ledyard*, 85-88.
[62] For the statistic of 1,800 percent, see William Turkel, *The Archive of Place: Unearthing the Pasts of the Chilcotin Plateau* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 87; Char Miller, *Not So Golden State: Sustainability vs. the California Dream* (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 2016), 101.
[63] Carroll D. Wright, "Wages and Prices, 1752-1860," from *Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor* (Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., State Printers, 1889), 172-173.

otter fur fetched between $80 and $120 in Canton (present-day Guangzhou). Chinese consumers reportedly paid about nine times more for an otter fur than a beaver pelt.[64]

It was the high regard in which otter furs were held and the high demand for them among Chinese consumers that made their sale in East Asia so profitable.[65] Consumers from the northern provinces of China traveled to Canton each January to purchase sea otter furs from Chinese Hong merchants.[66] Chinese elites sought clothing manufactured with sea otter furs because of its great warmth and attractive appearance.[67] Sea otter fur had a dark glossy coat that was silky smooth when dry and denser (650,000 hairs per square inch) than any other species in the animal kingdom.[68] Otter fur garments were waterproof, durable, and warmer than most other furs.[69] Otter fur took on cultural significance in China in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For the Manchu ruling class, the furs came to symbolize their cherished history of hunting and rustic living. The vast majority of ethnically Han Chinese embraced otter furs as a mark of elevated social status and many Chinese mandarins saw them as the epitome of high fashion.[70] Chinese Hong traders, eager to meet the high demand, offered silks, nankeens, tea, and porcelain—items much coveted in the United States—in exchange for the furs that Americans

[64] John Ledyard, James Kenneth Munford, *John Ledyard's Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage* (Whitefish: Literary Licensing, 2012), 70; John Ledyard, James Zug, *The Last Voyage of Captain Cook: The Collected Writings of John Ledyard* (Washington: National Geographic Adventure Classics, 2005), 46; Silverman, *Thundersticks*, 158.
[65] Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 359.
[66] Haddad, *America's First Adventure in China,* 64-65.
[67] Barry M. Gough, "The Northwest Coast in Late 18th Century British Expansion," from Thomas Vaughan, ed., *The Western Shore: Oregon Country Essays honoring the American Revolution* (Portland: Durham & Downey, 1976), 60-61.
[68] Igler, *The Great Ocean*, 106.
[69] Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur*, 45.
[70] Schlesinger, *Empire Trimmed with Fur*, 8, 12-13, 17-18; Ogden, *The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848*, 1-3; Claudio Saunt, *West of the Revolution: An Uncommon History of 1776* (New York: Norton, 2015), 72-75; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 6-9.

carried to Canton.[71] Because consumers for furs existed across China, they provided a potentially enormous market for U.S. merchants.

In 1784, the *Empress of China*, the United States' first vessel to voyage to China, traversed the Atlantic Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope en route to Canton in 1784. When it returned to the United States in 1785, the crew reported the modest revenue of $37,000 or a profit margin of about 25 percent.[72] The crew's safe return encouraged Boston mercantile firms to plan future voyages to China. However, it was also clear to U.S. merchants that the *Empress* had missed out on an opportunity to profit from the Pacific Northwest's sea otter population by taking its transatlantic route. To maximize profits, merchants determined to collect otter furs in the Pacific Northwest en route to China.[73]

In 1787, the *Columbia* was the first U.S. ship to journey to Canton via the Pacific Northwest. The voyage of this modestly sized 213-ton vessel spearheaded the United States' entry into the Pacific otter fur trade and prompted U.S. merchants to integrate the trade with the Canton market, the largest economy in the world.[74] Foreign trade with China grew exponentially through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While in the 1760s, about twenty foreign ships per year visited China, by the 1840s, there were over 300 annually.[75] During the decade between 1785 and 1795, 107 U.S. vessels visited the Pacific Northwest looking for furs for the Canton

[71] Nankeens were cotton cloth manufactured in Nanking or Nanjing, China. They were manufactured from a natural-colored yellowish Chinese cotton. British manufacturers eventually emulated the product using ordinary white cotton acquired from India and by dying it yellow to imitate nankeens' desired appearance. Ogden, *The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848*, 1-3; Saunt, *West of the Revolution*, 72-75.
[72] Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast," 18. Coughlin lists a series of newspapers that reported on the voyage's successes, including the *Independent Gazette*, the *Providence Gazette*, and the *Independence Chronicle*. See Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast," 83.
[73] Herman Krooss, Charles Gilbert, *American Business History* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972), 87.
[74] Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Canton, Dec. 18th, 1789, from *Voyages of the "Columbia,"* 128-129.
[75] Peter Perdue, "Rise and Fall of the Canton Trade System," *Visualizing Cultures, Massachusetts Institute of Technology* (2009) https://issuu.com/hkmm/docs/rise___fall_of_the_canton_trade_system_iii (Accessed May 2, 2022).

market.[76] It was essential for U.S. merchants to collect large numbers of otter furs because they typically possessed little silver and furs offered an alternative commodity to trade in China.[77] Three U.S. vessels had visited Canton before the *Columbia.* However, the *Columbia* was the first American vessel to travel to the Pacific Northwest on the way to Canton.[78]

Reflecting the almost immediate notoriety of these otter voyages, America's first president, George Washington, expressed considerable interest and pride in American involvement in the Northwest sea otter trade. In June 1790, he reflected on the profits that Americans had accrued so far, boasting that already "two vessels fitted out for the fur trade to the North West coast of America have succeeded well." He contended, "The whole outfits of Vessels and cargoes cost but $7,000" yet they "have deposited $100,000 of their profits in China." These commercial voyages portended a prosperous American future, as Washington understood them, and they "show the spirit of enterprise that prevails" in the United States.[79] During the 1790s, the Pacific Northwest quickly became "well Known for a good harbour and the Skins the best that is to be got," as one merchant described it.[80]

[76] Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 161, 96-97.
[77] Lack of specie was a persistent problem in the United States, dating back to its time as British colonies. British coins circulated only rarely in the colonies because the colonists had an unfavorable balance of trade with Britain; the value of the goods they imported from Britain exceeded the value of goods exported back. Most specie that flowed into colonies immediately returned to Britain in payment for products. British colonists and U.S. citizens also had no access to specie through domestic gold or silver discoveries. They were forced to substitute commodities for money. For more details, see: John Prevost to John Quincy Adams, 10 March 1821, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. 2, 1049.
[78] Gray to Barrell, Canton, Dec. 18th, 1789, from Haswell, *Voyages of the "Columbia" to the Northwest Coast*, 128; Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts*, 45-46.
[79] George Washington to Marquis de La Fayette, Washington, June 1790 from Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 60.
[80] Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 75-76; John Hoskins, "*Voyages of the Columbia*" *to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990), 485-486; Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast*, 31.

The "American Takeover:" U.S. Traders Dominate the Otter Trade

One historian described the turn of the century as the "American Takeover" of the Pacific otter trade, a dominance reflected in the oceangoing traffic.[81] Between 1785 and 1794, 35 British otter ships versus fifteen American ships visited the coastline. However, from 1795 to 1804, this trend reversed. The United States sent 50 otter ships to the Pacific Northwest, while the British sent only nine.[82] Between 1788 and 1825, 176 American ships—most carrying cargoes that included otter furs—sailed to China: 120 ships from Boston, 1 from Salem, 26 from New York, 15 from Rhode Island, 9 from Philadelphia, 3 from Baltimore, 2 from Connecticut, and 1 from Virginia.[83] By the early nineteenth century, U.S. traders had seized the upper hand in the sea otter trade.

European shortcomings and weaknesses as well as American flexibility and ingenuity facilitated U.S. domination of the Pacific otter trade. British traders, Americans' biggest competitors, suffered handicaps to their success. They worked under the East India Company and South Sea Company monopolies, which largely prevented them from trading freely in the Pacific anywhere west of Cape Horn. British trade outfits were legally required to obtain licenses from the East India Company or the South Sea Company. Operating through the East India Company officials could be very expensive and demanded British traders to pay out a large percentage of their earnings to the East Indian Company. The Company also typically prohibited British traders from exporting Chinese goods to Europe. These terms deprived British traders of

[81] James Gibson devotes an entire chapter to a process he calls "the American Takeover" of the sea otter trade. See Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods*, 36-61.
[82] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 10.
[83] Barragy, "The Trading Age," 198.

the most profitable portion of the exchange in the otter skin business, giving American traders a huge advantage in the sea otter trade.[84]

Americans also benefitted from the obstacles faced by Russian fur traders, while they were stationed on the Alaska coastline, by assisting Russians ship their wares. Since the mid-eighteenth-century, Russians had been active in Alaska. Russian fur traders and Aleutian laborers had travelled eastward from the Aleutian Islands in pursuit of sea otter furs, reaching the mainland in the late eighteenth century.[85] Lacking in ships in the vicinity, Russian traders often relied on U.S. carriers to ship their goods to Asia. Chinese officials also refused to allow them to conduct trade in Canton, constituting another disadvantage for the Russians. Qing law therefore required Russians to transport all goods overland through Siberia.[86] American shipping allowed Russians to transport goods easily between the North Pacific and East Asia by offering readily available ships on which they could bypass Chinese trade restrictions.[87] These conditions all benefitted Americans, who operated outside the bounds of a formal European empire.

Unencumbered by complex trade regulations, well-financed American merchant houses made the most out of trading sea otter furs in part by personally investing in their voyages.[88] As one rival fur trader observed, Americans were "masters & part owners of their Vessels & cargoes" and pursued their voyages in "the most economical & cheapest manner." For their efforts, the American sailor could "enjoy facilities & privileges in his Canton Dealings," an arrangement Europeans were often "deprived" of by their shipowners.[89] American traders were

[84] Ravalli, *Sea Otters*, 52.
[85] Ryan Tucker Jones, *Empire of Extinction*: *Russians and the North Pacific's Strange Beasts of the Sea, 1741-1867* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1-18.
[86] Kushner, *Conflict on the Northwest Coast,* 10.
[87] Kushner, *Conflict on the Northwest Coast,* 23.
[88] Ravalli, *Sea Otters*, 53.
[89] Richard Somerset Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific, 1793-1843* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 127; Gibson, *Otter Skins*, 121; Ravalli, *Sea Otters*, 59.

therefore financially invested in the success of their voyages, while most British and Russian captains and officers were generally prevented from such direct investment.

American commercial success in the Northwest otter trade also derived from Americans' willingness to adapt and improvise their trading patterns. Traders typically went ashore, travelled to Indigenous villages, and remained with a community for a few weeks, peddling their goods for furs. One merchant, Joseph Ingraham, took advantage of this custom, finding "it more to my advantage to remain awhile when in a good place" where "not a day passed but we purchased more or less skins."[90] In the process, these foreign visitors unintentionally introduced deadly diseases, such as measles and smallpox. Until the early nineteenth century, communities of the Pacific Northwest had been free of these illnesses.[91] While prolonged periods of contact often benefitted U.S. traders who were able to barter and accrue larger quantities of furs, these periods of exposure could be fatal for many communities over the long term as foreign diseases spread in their midst.[92]

Americans also altered their trade routes according to seasonal variations. Since Cook's fatal voyage in the late 1770s, merchant ships had customarily traveled to the Hawaiian Islands to stay for the winter after spending the summer on the west coast of North America. After resting their crews and restoring their vessels, merchant vessels had customarily traveled to neighboring Pacific Islands, arriving in Canton in the late summer, and returning to the United States following spring.[93] However, in the 1790s, Americans began returning to the Northwest coast for the winter after completing a round trip from the Hawaiian Islands to obtain provisions

[90] Joseph Ingraham, *Journal of the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of North America*, transcribed by Mark Kaplanoff (Barre: Print Society, 1971), 146-147.
[91] Howay, "An Outline Sketch of Maritime Fur Trade," 8-9.
[92] Silverman, *Thundersticks*, 156.
[93] Downs, *The Golden Ghetto*, 71-72.

for their crews. Few foreign ships traversed the coast during the wintertime. Those ships that remained enjoyed a market with high demand and low supply. U.S. traders offered much-desired products such as rice, bread, and biscuits taking advantage of seasonal scarcities by trading in times of low merchant traffic and high indigenous demand.[94]

Traders' success during winters depended in part on their broader awareness of markets along the Pacific Northwest coast. Some crews spent their winters at the mouth of the Columbia River, where the weather was milder and calmer, because they knew they could trade with the Chinook for clamons (leather armor made of elk skin), which they later exchanged with the Haida Gwaii (located at present-day Queen Charlotte Islands, British Columbia) for otter furs.[95] Other crews lived in improvised shelters on Vancouver Island where they could hunt otters with the assistance of Nuu-chah-nulth marksmen. Some companies continued to visit Indigenous villages during the winter, hoping their improvised cargoes would align with local demand, and allowing them to take advantage of otherwise non-profitable months.[96] Americans' willingness to remain on the coast through the winter months also offered them first access to the sea otter market come springtime.[97]

Americans' winter-long stays served the short-term needs of Indigenous communities and savvy Americans varied their cargoes when necessary to suit the demands of Indigenous consumers. After arriving to the Queen Charlotte Islands in 1791, Joseph Ingraham of the *Hope* complained that his crew had arrived "the day after the fair." The Haida showed no interest in his cargo despite the inclusion of traditionally appealing goods, such as clothing, tools, and culinary

[94] William Sturgis, *Journal of William Sturgis*, ed. S.W. Jackman (Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1978), 120-121.
[95] David E. Jones, *Native North American Armor, Shields, and Fortifications* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 117; Gibson, *Otter Skins*, 211.
[96] Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods*, 211; Howay, "An Outline of the Maritime Fur Trade," 10; Pethick, *First Approaches to the Northwest Coast*, 117, 147; Ingraham, *Journal of the Brigantine Hope,* 128, 130.
[97] Pethick, *First Approaches to the Northwest Coast,* 132.

utensils, likely because he did not offer firearms.[98] However, after observing "a pattern I saw on a woman's neck," Ingraham ordered that his blacksmith construct a series of iron collars out of half-inch wide iron rods "twisted together about the size of a man's finger" and these iron collars became highly desirable items.[99] Ingraham succeeded by tasking his blacksmith to make an entirely new product under the hypothetical belief that the tastes of one trader's wife represented those of her village.

Varying cargoes also involved Americans re-directing wares acquired in the Canton market back to the Pacific Northwest. Rather than transporting all of their Chinese products back to Boston, as had been the custom, Americans began to barter them in Indigenous villages in the Northwest. Indigenous communities fully integrated these Chinese wares into their daily lives; as one observer recalled, the seventy-year-old Nuu-chah-nulth chief Cunneah wore two blue frocks that were ornamented with Chinese coins and sporting silk breeches decorated with small gold flowers while hosting potlatches.[100] In 1799, William Sturgis reported that the most coveted items among the Nuu-chah-nulth had become camphorwood trunks (painted chests), red vermillion paint, "great coats made of thin serge, some cloth," and "various trinkets."[101] Another New Englander recalled how a captain "imployed [the carpenter] making trunk[s] they being in great demand with the natives," which they exchanged "for a prime skin Each" in the Pacific Northwest.[102]

Americans also succeeded in the sea otter trade by re-directing cargoes from Europe to barter in the Pacific Northwest. In 1804, Russell Sturgis wrote his son Nathaniel Sturgis in

---

[98] Ingraham, *Journal of the Brigantine Hope,* 143.
[99] Ingraham, *Journal of the Brigantine Hope,* 104-105; Howay, "An Outline Sketch of Maritime Fur Trade," 8.
[100] Peter Puget, "The Vancouver Expedition: Peter Puget's Journal of the Exploration of Puget Sound, May 7-June 11, 1792," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 30 (1939), 189; Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 408.
[101] Sturgis, *Journal of William Sturgis*, 131; Malloy, "*Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast,* 37.
[102] Bernard Magee, "Log of the *Jefferson*," 20 April 1793, MS. N-2020, Logbook, Massachusetts Historical Society; Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast*, 35.

London requesting that he acquire glass beads from Venice, which he believed would be highly valued by Indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest. "It is necessary for our N.W. trade to have something to resemble, as near as possible, what the Indians call highgau, called by some wampum," he wrote. He hoped to find beads with the same likeness as "what the Indians get themselves off the rocks on some part of the coast."[103] In Venice and Livorno, Sturgis believed merchants offered glass beads "made of the same kind of stuff" as these much-coveted items for jewelry. Due to this resemblance, Sturgis believed the acquisition of these beads was "of great importance" to his commercial success in the Pacific Northwest.[104] However, Sturgis' innovation was not unique to his business. He reported that Jonathan Lamb, another American merchant involved in the sea otter trade, had obtained this type of bead in Amsterdam to trade in the Pacific Northwest in the past.[105] By re-directing glass beads from continental Europe to coastal Pacific Indigenous communities, Americans bolstered their purchasing power and their commercial influence in the sea otter trade

By the end of the eighteenth century, the United States dominated commercial activities in the Pacific Northwest after prospering in the trade during the 1790s. The value of exports from the United States to the Pacific Northwest jumped from $10,362 between 1789 and 1790 to a ten-year high of $74,153 between 1799 and 1800. This value again increased in the subsequent

[103] Sturgis was likely confusing wampum with either dentalium shells (native to the Pacific Northwest) or olivella bipilicata (from the coast of California). But these glass beads all served a similar purpose for indigenous communities in the Pacific Northwest. Wampum was made of strings and belts of white beads made from quahog shells, which were native to the U.S. eastern seaboard. Dentalium shells and olivella bipilicata were similarly used to create indigenous jewelry, which were highly coveted as symbols of spiritual power and political authority. Dentalium was highly valued by Natives of the Pacific Northwest who kept waterbeds of the beads shrouded with secrecy and elite families regulated the few places off Vancouver Island where dentalium shells could be found. For more details, see Jon D. Carlson, "The Otter-Man Empires: The Pacific Fur Trade, Incorporation & the Zone of Ignorance," *Journal of World-Systems Research*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 2002), 425.
[104] Russell Sturgis to Nathaniel Russell Sturgis, Boston, July 14, 1803, from Julian Sturgis, *From Books and Papers of Russell Sturgis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894), 56-57.
[105] Russell Sturgis to Nathaniel Russell Sturgis from *Books and Papers of Russell Sturgis*, 56-57.

decade, with U.S. commerce averaging $197,359 annually.[106] One Russian trader reported that, since 1792, ten to fifteen American ships annually traded on the Northwest Coast and had obtained over 160,000 sea otter furs in the process.[107] A Boston trader well acquainted with the trade reported that he "had known a capital of $40,000, employed in a northwest voyage, yield a return exceeding $150,000." He also recalled "an outfit not exceeding $50,000, gave a gross return of $284,000."[108] Consequently, the late-eighteenth-century Pacific otter trade brought in considerable wealth for many savvy U.S. traders.

Through the sea otter trade, American traders also drew coastal Pacific communities into an emerging global trading network, one they had been generally disconnected from prior to the late eighteenth century. As the Pacific Northwest became a regular market for American exports and re-exports, the sea trade brought roughly 5,000 U.S. sailors to the region between the late 1780s and the early 1820s, constituting the most important American presence on the Pacific coast before the large American overland migration to the Oregon territory in the 1840s.[109] The integration of the Pacific seaboard between Vancouver Island and Russian Alaska helped transform consumption habits, hunting patterns, trading strategies, and warfare (with the addition of U.S. firearms) among many communities inhabiting this coastline. Market integration softened the ground for Americans to eventually exert an increased influence in this maritime space.

---

[106] Silverman, *Thundersticks,* 161-162.
[107] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 63.
[108] William Sturgis, *Fur Traders from New England: The Boston Men in the North Pacific, 1787-1800: The Narratives of the William Dane Phelps, William Sturgis, and James G. Swan,* edited by Briton Cooper Busch and Barry Gough (Spokane: Arthur Clark, 1997), 98.
[109] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 198.

Obstacles to the Sea Otter Trade and the Need for an Imperial Response

Trade always coexisted with some tension and disagreements, which sometimes escalated into violent encounters. These encounters demonstrated the Euro-American desire to connect Indigenous coastal Pacific communities into global markets. The rapid accumulation of wealth and frequent exchange of resources among Euro-American traders and Native communities along the Pacific coastline depleted the otter population, which intensified the desperation of Euro-American and Indigenous communities when they came into contact. The near extinction of the sea otter population introduced a new level of instability in transactions. As Euro-Americans worked to make Indigenous communities of the Pacific Northwest more dependent on global trading networks, many Native groups responded by attempting to halt the process or to mitigate or mold its impact on their communities through armed resistance.

With the emergence of the sea otter trade in the Pacific Northwest, different Native groups on the coast took center stage in the acquisition of furs. These coastal societies included Indigenous groups such as the Tlingits in southwestern Alaska, the Haida Gwaii on the Queen Charlotte Islands, the Chinook in the Columbia River region, and the Nuu-chah-nulth on the west coast of Vancouver Island.[110] Before the late eighteenth century, contact between Euro-Americans and the peoples of the Pacific Northwest Coast was limited. Risky sea travel around the Horn had somewhat insulated Indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest from maritime traffic from the U.S. eastern seaboard and Europe. Vast stretches of mountainous terrain in the North American interior had also limited coastal peoples' interactions with Euro-Americans.[111]

[110] Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 401.
[111] Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 398.

Because the Rocky Mountains to the east of these coastal communities functioned as a barrier to overland travel, they had long relied on the sea for most of their nourishment and goods.[112]

In the American otter trade, Indigenous leaders and laborers became central conduits for the otter trade. Otter hunting took a great deal of time, experience, and skill. Indigenous hunting parties relied upon traditional practices that drew on the use of canoes, spears, and environmental knowledge, allowing them to collect hundreds of furs in short periods of time.[113] Their furs were also of the highest quality. Because Indigenous women often wore otter furs for the winter season before trading them, their furs were free of the thorny hairs that otherwise required removal. The furs also featured a fine, oiled consistency, derived from their prior use as clothing, that many garment manufacturers preferred.[114] With increasing number of Americans engaged in the otter trade, more and more U.S. merchants obtained sizeable profits from the trade as they expanded their commercial influence, pursing the acquisition of otter furs both by barter as well as violent coercion.

As American merchants pursued regular trade along the Pacific coast, Native groups found it increasingly difficult to sustain themselves as the sea otter trade introduced a series of unprecedented changes for Pacific Northwest people. By the early nineteenth century, Native communities, such as the Nuu-chah-nuthl around Vancouver Island, the Haida Gwaii of the Queen Charlotte Island, and the Chinook in the Columbia River Valley, were reeling from the social, political, and environmental transformations introduced by the sea otter trade. The late-eighteenth-century introduction of firearms by foreign ships escalated intertribal warfare. The re-direction of a larger proportion of Native labor to focus on catching and skinning sea otters and

[112] Carlson, "The Otter-Man Empires," 392.
[113] Ogden, *The California Sea Otter Trade*, 6.
[114] Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods*, 22, 115.

away from fishing, agriculture, and food gathering left many communities struggling with starvation come wintertime.[115] After several productive years of otter hunting in the 1790s, the sea otter population neared extinction in certain places, diminishing Native communities' power to barter for foreign goods. All of these factors put increased pressure on Indigenous communities and motivated some to pursue more violent means to sustain themselves.

Attesting to the persistent threat of Native attack, merchant ships engaged in the otter trade were "well armed, and amply furnished with the munitions of war," according to the longtime trader William Sturgis. "Separated from the civilized world, and cut off for a long time from all communications with it," Sturgis explained, American traders had long "been accustomed to rely on their own resources for protection and defense."[116] However, if armed attack was "made by a force so superior as to render resistance hopeless," Sturgis observed that traders "look with confidence to their Government for redress and support."[117] Sturgis' distinction—between violence that could be mitigated independent of the federal government and violence that could not—reflected American merchants' assumption about their relationship with the U.S. state. When the specter of a threat exceeded what they believed they could reasonably deal with, they expected the federal government to intervene. This dimension of the American sea otter trade in the Pacific often gets lost among many scholars who consider these voyages to be almost entirely autonomous of government oversight and investment. When senior officers of merchant vessels could no longer guarantee stability among their crews and secure transactions with Indigenous communities, merchants in the United States expected the U.S.

[115] Natives of the Pacific Northwest had long hunted sea otter for their furs and for sustenance. However, they did so on a much smaller scale when these efforts only sought to acquire sea otters for Native use. See Ravalli, *Sea Otters*, 28, 73-74, 82, 86.
[116] William Sturgis, *Fur Traders from New England*, 38.
[117] William Sturgis, "An Examination of the Russian Claims," *The North American Review*, Vol. 15, Issue 37, October 1822, 370-402.

government to intervene on their behalf. At the same time, as U.S. merchants pursued regular trade along the Pacific coast of North America, Native groups experiences increased pressures on sustaining themselves. Some of them reacted through intimidation and military offenses on foreign ships that might in some way benefit their communities' circumstances.



Figure 1.1: The Columbia Attacked by Indians." Drawing, 1792, by George Davison of Gray's crew, Granger/Bridgeman Images.

The violent character of the sea otter trade often played a major role in defining U.S.-Indigenous relations. For example, John Kendrick, captain of the *Columbia*, who, at times, succeeded in the trade through peaceful exchange, used other tools when necessary to ensure the financial success of a voyage. In 1788, after Indigenous people had stolen clothing from his ship, Kendrick had ordered his men to seize some chiefs, "placed them under their guns, and

threatened to blow them to pieces unless the stolen items were returned." Even after the return of the clothing, Kendrick refused to free the chiefs until Indigenous traders agreed to exchange their furs.[118]

In 1791, the *Columbia* returned to the Pacific Northwest, its visit sparking another altercation with coastal communities. Kendrick claimed some Haida men had absconded with the keys to two of the ship's arms chests. He ordered his crew to take up arms and punish this theft, which resulted in them killing over sixty Haida Gwaii. Afterwards, his crew marched into a nearby village and forcibly took what they claimed to be stolen property. Kendrick's voyages "got off clear after purchasing many valuable furs." His crew sailed away, and "happily no person was hurt on board."[119] Having returned a chief back to his village in irons and demeaning him in the eyes of his people, the *Columbia* fostered a long-term grudge among Haida Gwaii that would haunt future otter exchanges.[120] These violent encounters contributed to a broader culmination of bloodshed and portended what was to come.

The crew of the *Washington*, which served as the *Columbia'*s "tender" (a smaller vessel that transported between deep water anchoring points and shallow coastlines), also experienced bloodshed during its voyage. When at Vancouver Island, Captain Robert Gray discovered from a Hawaiian crewman that a secret conspiracy was afoot among the Nuu-chah-nulth. The crewman had learned that a Nuu-chah-nulth chief named Wickananish planned to "take the Ship & Massacre all the Crew" in a middle-of-the-night attack.[121] Upon learning of this news, one of the crewmembers complained bitterly about what he saw as Native betrayal: "[That] men who have

[118] Howay, "An Outline Sketch of Maritime Fur Trade," 9.
[119] Ingraham, *Journal of the Voyage of the Brigantine "Hope,"* 181.
[120] Briton Busch, Barry Gough, "Introduction," *Fur Traders from New England,* 23.
[121] Haswell, *Log of the Second Voyage,* 26-27; Richard Nokes, *Columbia's River: The Voyages of Robert Gray, 1787-1793* (Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society, 1991), 172.

been treated by us like Christians and brothers…should now seek our lives is an action which none but a savage heart is capable of conceiving." These "savages" simply pursued material gain from this assault, he claimed, "to possess themselves of our property which to them appeared immense."[122] Indigenous communities felt some desperation in light of the destabilizing effects that Euro-American ships had on Native lives as various groups competed for resources and struggled to find ways to sustain itself in a changed environmental, political, military, and economic world.

Bloodshed was on the minds of other crewmen of the *Washington.* One officer estimated how foreign ships had traded some "200 stands of arms and much ammunition" to the Nuu-chah-nulth who had "become skilled in ye use of them."[123] He speculated that the conspiracy might grow, fearing Wickananish had already "invited [adjacent] tribes to partake of the glory of the vanquishing and prospect of shairing [sic] the spoil," recruiting perhaps as many as "two thousand fighting men" against them.[124] If Gray had not uncovered the plot, the officer concluded, such an assault, "in all probability…would have been successful".[125]

After pursuing a series of measures to prevent a concentrated attack and conducting some trade, the *Washington*'s crew prepared to disembark.[126] Before the vessel left, Gray ordered one officer, John Boit, to take a party on shore and destroy the nearby village of Opitsahtah. "I was sent with three boats all well man'd & arm'd to destroy the village of Opitsahtah," Boit remembered. "It was a command I was no ways tenacious of & am griev'd to think Capt Gray should let his passion go so far." As a result, Boit reported, "the village of roughly two hundred

[122] John Hoskins, *Narrative of the Second Voyage of the "Columbia,"* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990), 155-157; Nokes, *Columbia's River*, 173.
[123] Haswell, *Log of the Second Voyage*, 29-30; Nokes, *Columbia's River*, 175.
[124] Haswell, *Log of the Second Voyage*, 29-30; Nokes, 29-30; *Columbia's River*, 175.
[125] Haswell, *Log of the Second Voyage*, 29-30; Nokes; *Columbia's River*, 175.
[126] Nokes, *Columbia's River*, 174.

houses…was in a short time totally destroyed."[127] The party burned the village to the ground, though it seems that the community was absent at the time of the village's destruction.[128]

Americans' violent and coercive methods against Indigenous communities spawned Native resentment and an increased desire to engage with Euro-Americans through a show of force. As many Native communities of the Pacific Northwest came to learn, diplomatic and commercial strength in the sea otter trade derived from military prowess and strength. Visiting ships pursued profits through peaceful means if possible, but often relied on physical coercion to shape how a transaction took shape. Similarly, some Indigenous communities mirrored this violence back to Euro-Americans, employing armed force against the visitors as a means to ensure their own demands of the otter trade be met.

In the summer of 1803, the U.S. merchant ship *Boston* experienced the consequences of this Native approach to the otter trade.[129] A bitter argument erupted aboard the *Boston* over a faulty gun that the ship's captain, John Salter had given one leader Maquinna as a gift. After Maquinna brought the gun back to see if it could be repaired, the captain cursed at him and verbally denigrated the chief. Salter then pointed a musket at Maquinna and ordered him off the ship.[130] Maquinna understood English profanity. He did not respond immediately but bided his time as he plotted his response.[131] Maquinna found his opportunity for revenge when the *Boston* anchored near his village in October 1803. After encouraging Salter to send a party off to fish for salmon, Maquinna returned to the ship under the auspices of trade. The crew permitted Maquinna and a party of warriors to come aboard and trade their sea otter pelts. At Maquinna's

[127] Haswell, *Log of the Second Voyage*, 34; Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 414.
[128] Nokes, *Columbia's River*, 176; Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 414.
[129] Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast,* 51, 82.
[130] John Scofield, *Hail Columbia! Robert Gray, John Kendrick, and the Pacific Fur Trade* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1993), 340.
[131] Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 112.

signal, the warriors removed their knives and hatches hidden in bundles of furs and attacked the crew. Salter and most of his crew (25 of 27 men) died in the attack. Maquinna spared two men: John Jewitt, whose skill in making and repairing muskets and his work with other metallic objects made him a valued captive of Maquinna; and John Thompson, the ship's sailmaker, whose talents Maquinna also imagined serving his interest in developing his community's ship craft. In the end, the chief and his men beached the *Boston*, carried much of its cargoes and fittings, and burned the vessel.[132] From this attack, they acquired over two thousand muskets and fowling pieces from the *Boston'*s hold. [133]

Maquinna's rage was heightened by the captain's badgering but resentment had been building for years based not only on treatment by Americans traders but also on interactions with European merchant ships. In one previous incident at Nootka Sound in April 1791, American crewmen raided his household while he was absent, abused the women, and ransacked his furs. In retrospect, the captive John Jewitt attributed the assault that soon followed largely to an earlier Spanish attack that "had brutally killed three of their chiefs." Jewitt's thinking built on century-old tropes of the Black Legend (wherein the Spanish were uniquely cruel colonizers).[134] The Nuu-chah-nuthl "were therefore resolved to have revenge on the first ship they should fall in with," Jewitt claimed, "which unfortunate event happened to befall us" and left most of the *Boston*'s crew dead.[135]

In addition to an act of vengeance, the attack on the *Boston* was an expression of desperation on the part of the Nuu-chah-nulth.[136] By 1803, this community had lost their

[132] Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 112.
[133] Scofield, *Hail Columbia!*, 340.
[134] Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 112; Roca Barea, María Elvira, *Imperiofobia y Leyenda Negra. Roma, Rusia, Estados Unidos y el Imperio Español* (Madrid: Siruela, 2016), 1-10.
[135] Jewitt, *Journal Kept*, 13-16.
[136] Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 415.

traditional status as middlemen between foreign maritime traders and interior Native groups. In part, this change was due to a dramatic decline in the sea otter population around Vancouver Island. With augmented demand for otter furs in China came also an increase in the hunting of sea otters in the North Pacific. The global sea otter population dwindled from roughly 400,000 in the early eighteenth century to fewer than 2,000 by the end of the eighteenth century.[137] By the early 1800s, overhunting impacted Vancouver Island particularly hard, a region that served as a major resource for otter furs in the late eighteenth century. Recognizing the area's depleted otter population, foreign ships began to seek furs in regions further north along the coast of British Columbia, bringing them into contact with new Native communities. On the northern British Columbian coast, for example, the Tsimshian increasingly began to serve as middlemen between Euro-American ships and interior Native groups around the turn of the century.[138]

As the trade drew in new Indigenous groups, conditions for others became more precarious. Villages like Maquinna's wrestled with diminished geopolitical influence. Much like frustrated U.S. captains who took Native captive and fired on others to pressure trade, Native communities responded to their newfound precarity through armed force. The instability that Native attacks posed to U.S. voyages prompted U.S. merchants to seek ways to establish a more secure position in their trading operations. The increasingly precarious position of Pacific Northwest communities strengthened the impulse to employ military force against foreign ships that visited their coastlines laden with valuable cargoes.

Settling for Empire: Americans Establish Permanent Settlements on the Columbia River

[137] Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur*, 132-133; Igler, *The Great Ocean*, 106-107.
[138] Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 415.

From the outset of the American otter trade, U.S. merchants sought ways to establish semi-permanent settlements in the Pacific Northwest that could strengthen the United States' commercial position. In 1791, John Kendrick, captain of the *Columbia,* purchased a large tract of land for his Boston investors. One British observer reported that the transaction had included an exchange of muskets for the "purchase" of a "9 mile radius of Cahstacktoos [sic] harbor."[139] One officer of the *Columbia* attested to this sale, recalling the transfer that included "all the circumstances of hoisting the flag, and planting some New England pine-tree shillings under a tree, naming the river after the ship [the *Columbia*]."[140] The actions of the first American visitors served as a basis for U.S. territorial claims on the Columbia. In another account, an observer indicated that Kendrick had purchased 5,184 square miles of land on Vancouver Island during the *Columbia's* visit.[141] Decades later, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams acquired documents from Boston investors, which they provided as proof of the exchange to be reviewed by President James Monroe.[142] One Boston investor told Adams that Kendrick had "made several purchases of lands from the Indians about Nootka sound." He contended these purchases were all accompanied by transfers of land titles involving "much formality, the American flag hoisted, a bottle sunk in the ground" and with "many chiefs present."[143] Since the beginning of U.S.-Native relations in the Pacific Northwest, Americans sought to establish a permanent

[139] James Cook, *The Journal of Captain James Cook on the His Voyages of Discovery: The Voyage of the Resolution and Discovery, 1776-1780,* Vol. 1-2, edited by John Beaglehole (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1973), 323; Carlson, "The Otter-Man Empires," 417, fn 36.
[140] John Boit, "A New Log of the Columbia on the Discovery of the Columbia River and Grays Harbor," edited by Edmond Meany (Seattle: University of Washington 1921), 15-16; John Boit, *Remarks on the Ship Columbia's Voyage from Boston (On a Voyage Round the Globe),* MS, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, 101; Nokes, *Columbia's River,* 294; Robert Buell, Charlotte Skladal, *Sea Otters and the China Trade* (New York: McKay, 1968), 93.
[141] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 90-92.
[142] John Quincy Adams to Charles Bulfinch, Washington, December 1, 1817 from "Appendix 5," Nokes, *Columbia's River,* 294.
[143] Boit, "A New Log of the Columbia," 15-16; Nokes, *Columbia's River,* 293.

trading post. These interactions also served as the basis for U.S. claims to territory along the Pacific coast.

In addition to Kendrick's efforts, Robert Gray's two-week exploration and mapping of the Columbia River in 1792 formed the basis of the United States' claim to the territory.[144] While trading for otter furs, Gray's crew had chartered a large swath of the Columbia River and named the waterway after his ship the *Columbia.* By the turn of the century, pro-U.S. expansionists consistently pointed to Kendrick's negotiations and Gray's exploration as evidence for the United States' possession of the Pacific Northwest. These American territorial claims to the Columbia emerged out of three decades of the American sea otter trade. Commercial and imperial forces compounded in the otter trade as Native "violence" worked to defend their territory from increasing foreign encroachment. Native resistance only intensified over time as some U.S. investors transitioned from merely seeking to trade along the coast to instead actively attempting to establish permanent settlements on the coast.

[144] Gray remains the first known Euro-American to navigate the Columbia River.



Figure 1.2: "Chart of the Entrance of the Columbia River," Oct. 1792, The Voyage of the Racoon, F851. V68 1958, University of California, San Diego.

A coordinated effort by Boston merchants to create a post in the Columbia River Valley reinforced American territorial claims in the region. In 1810, half a dozen New England investors sent the merchant ship *Albatross* to the Columbia River under the command of Abiel Winship. They stocked the ship with supplies and livestock and tasked the captain and his crew with establishing a permanent fur trading post. After one aborted effort due to flooding, the *Albatross* sent out a "whale boat to search for a spot which would answer for the intended settlement" along the Columbia River, where the crew located a promising spot at present-day

Oak Point, Washington.[145] Over the subsequent weeks, crewmembers of the *Albatross* devoted themselves to breaking ground, planting gardens, and commencing work on a log house.[146]

Unfortunately for the expedition, the *Albatross*'s crew discovered that the Indigenous community residing in the area "would brook no competition" to their existing sea otter trade.[147] The Chinook of the Columbia River region had controlled the local trade for centuries and vehemently opposed the American incursion which, they believed, would cut them out of their role as middlemen. As a U.S. mariner named William Gale contended, "The Cheenooks [Chinook] are strongly set against our coming" and opposed the fur trading post being "built among themselves and the lower tribes" further north. He explained that the Chinook traders were "in the habit of purchasing skins of the upper tribes and reselling them to the ships which occasionally arrive." For that reason, "They are afraid and certainly with reason," Gale admitted, that the new trading post would "injure their own trade." [148]

Like the Nuu-chah-nulth of Vancouver Island, the Chinook soon expressed their opposition to American efforts through displays of force. One morning in February 1811 some boats visited the site, Gale recalled, "containing many natives all armed with bows and arrows or muskets." Their presence increasingly unnerved the crew, the officer recalled, as "Indians with their arms began to gather where the people were at work" and "it was strongly suspected that they were planning to cut off our people on shore" by preventing reinforcements from travelling between the main vessel and the coast. "Such interference serves only to prevent our work going on as we wish," Gale complained. While they "might easily be brought to reason by the use of

[145] Briton Busch, Barry Gough, "Introduction," *Fur Traders from New England,* 26
[146] Busch, Gough, "Introduction," 26.
[147] Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of the Northwest Coast,* Vol. 2 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 131-135; Busch, Gough, "Introduction," 26.
[148] Gale, *Fur Traders from New England,* 63-65; Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast,* 40.

force," the sailor conceded, "it would last no longer than while our ship was here, and when she left the river, those left behind must suffer for it."[149] Ensuring the security of the trade required more Americans to settle the post and regular visits from U.S. ships to supply Americans with war munitions. At present, Gale concluded, "Any force the ship could leave would not be sufficient to defend the house if the Indians should attack them," he contended, and their efforts to "openly cultivate the ground would give the natives a chance to pick them off easily."[150]

Eventually, the Chinook forced Americans to abandon the effort. The expedition's collapse came on June 11 when Astoria's laborers saw "the Indians gathering around them in considerable numbers" and "sending their women and children away." The men refused to continue working and "declared they did not feel safe to be on shore without arms." As the crew began to treat from the coast to the *Albatross*, Gale described the escalating situation: "The natives scattered about among the trees, firing their muskets and shouting." Eventually, Gale contended, "One of the savages pointed a musket at Captain Winship," as he sat on the deck's handrail, "but did not fire," demanding the captain follow his men back to the *Albatross*.[151] "Much to our chagrin," one officer reported, "we find it is impossible to prosecute the business as we intended." As a result, the crew decided to "abandon all attempts to force a settlement."[152] With few arms on their person and no warships on the coast, the expedition surrendered the trading post. Tensions stemming from commercial competition in the otter trade between American, Chinook, and other competing traders, New England investors worked to establish a permanent trading post near the Columbia. As the Chinook suspected, a permanent American

[149] William Gale, *Fur Traders from New England,* 63-65.
[150] Gale, *Fur Traders from New England,* 63-65.
[151] Gale, *Fur Traders from New England,* 63-65; Barragy, "The Trading Age, 202-203.
[152] Gale, *Fur Traders from New England,* 63-65.

settlement on the coast better positioned Americans to serve as middlemen in the otter trade, which the Chinook refused to accept.[153]

After the *Albatross* failed to establish a permanent trading post near present-day Oak Point, Washington, a subsequent American expedition forged ahead and labored to create a trading post on the northwest corner of present-day Oregon. This endeavor was funded by the prominent New York merchant John Jacob Astor and resulted in the erection of the fur trading post Astoria by Astor's Pacific American Fur Trading Company employees.[154] This 1811 effort reflected years of organizing on Astor's part. In 1808, Astor had obtained both a New York charter for his American Fur Company as well as the blessing of President Thomas Jefferson for the undertaking.[155] To Jefferson, Astor framed it as a patriotic endeavor, one requiring U.S. federal government support. Because Astoria would be a permanent institution, Astor believed it was in the interests of the U.S. government to protect the settlement as a means to eventually claim the region for the United States.[156] Astor boasted to Navy Secretary William Jones that Astoria would "place the monopoly of the fur trade of the world in the hands of this country, and at no remote period extend its dominion over a most interesting part of the opposite coast of the North American continent" from the U.S. eastern seaboard.[157]

Although Jefferson refused to grant Astor's desire for a trade monopoly over the region, the U.S. president told Astor he could count on the federal government's support. To keep the

[153] Barragy, "The Trading Age, 203.
[154] John Jacob Astor's fortunes in fur trading, shipbuilding, and opium trading established him as one of the wealthiest men of the early nineteenth-century United States. Astor had first ventured to China in the 1790s. Astor's construction of Fort Astoria on the Columbia River was an expensive side project that began in 1808 after he chartered the American Fur Company in the state of New York with a million dollars of his personal fortune. The Pacific Fur Company followed the next year. For more details, see Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom*, 196.
[155] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 74-75.
[156] Kushner, *Conflict on the Northwest Coast*, 18.
[157] John Jacob Astor to Secretary William Jones, Washington, April 19, 1813, Astor Papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 223

sea otter trade in "the hands of our citizens and to oust foreign traders" Jefferson assured Astor, "every reasonable patronage and facility in the power of the Executive will be afforded."[158] Astor often reminded Jefferson's successors of this executive commitment. If the effort to secure Astoria should fail, "which it must if you do not give us aid," Astor told President James Madison (1809-1817), its failure "for many years to come will discourage any Americans from entering in the trade."[159] From Astor's point of view, the success of U.S. settlement on the Columbia required government protection and the future of the American sea otter trade depended on the Astoria's success.[160]

By June 1811, the American Fur Company had established Fort Astoria as a largely operational fur trading fort.[161] Citing a need for supplies by the fall, the *Tonquin*'s captain decided to disembark to Vancouver Island to gather supplies, leaving behind thirty men to tend to the daily affairs of Astoria.[162] The captain planned to return to Astoria in three months' time before finally he continued on to Canton in late 1811.[163] The *Tonquin* sailed north to Clayoquot Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island where in July the ship's crew began to conduct business with a substantial number of Nuu-chah-nulth. As a sign of friendship, a Nuu-chah-nulth chief invited the ship's supercargo (in charge of selling cargo) to spend several days at a nearby village, while the crew continued to conduct shipboard trade. In the supercargo's absence, one U.S. trader flew into a rage at a Native chief who had complained about prices, stuffing the

[158] Thomas Jefferson to John Jacob Astor, April 13, 1808, *Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* Andrew Lipscomb, ed. (Washington: Memorial Association, 1903), vol. 12, 28; Kushner, *Conflict on the Northwest Coast*, 19; Ravalli, *Sea Otters*, 66.
[159] Astor to Jones, Washington, July 30, 1813, Beinecke; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 273.
[160] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 273-274.
[161] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 78.
[162] John Jacob Astor to John Quincy Adams, January 4, 1823, New York from Robert Greenhow, *The History of Oregon and California and the Other Territories on the North-West Coast of North America* (New York: Appleton, 1845), 439-444, 470.
[163] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 235.

headman's face in the furs to embarrass him.[164] In response, several days later, the chief and twenty other Nuu-chah-nulth appeared alongside the *Tonquin*, waving furs and requesting to be allowed on board.[165] In a later report to the U.S. State Department, New York investor John Jacob Astor condemned the *Tonquin*'s captain for "not attending to the precautions necessary…to guard against an attack" and allowing "a whole tribe of Indians to come on board…his ship." When a second canoe filled of men arrived, the crew grew worried. Astor contended, "An attack was made," the Indians drew knives, clubs, and hatchets stored beneath their furs and killed most of the *Tonquin*'s crew.[166]

Back at Astoria, thirty American Fur Company employees reinforced their fort and conducted trade unaware of the *Tonquin*'s fate. Chief factor of the American Fur Company, Duncan McDougall, began to hear rumors in late July about an attack on the *Tonquin.* However, the stories were so contradictory that the partners initially discounted them. Subsequent months brought more Native and foreign traders carrying similar news of an attack.[167] Finally, confirmation came when Astor's second ship, the *Beaver*, arrived in May 1812 and relayed direct knowledge of the attack.[168] The Nuu-chah-nulth attack on the *Tonquin* represented an act of Native resistance against Euro-American abuse of men laboring in the otter trade. The previous year, the captain of the *Mercury* had convinced twelve Nuu-chah-nulth men to join a sea otter hunt along the California coast. When the mission was completed, the captain abandoned them on an island off the California coast instead of returning the men to their village. When the men made it back, their community was outraged and exacted revenge against the first Euro-

[164] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 236.
[165] Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast,* 164.
[166] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 236-237.
[167] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 236.
[168] The *Beaver* was a second ship that Astor sent to the Columbia River with a cargo identical to the *Tonquin*, which was set sail on October 1811 and arrived in the region in May 1812. The ship included twenty guns and sixty to seventy men. See Greenhow, *The History of Oregon and California,* 468; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 236.

American vessel to enter their waters, the *Tonquin*.[169] It seems likely that they had been prompted by multiple grievances concerning the sea otter trade, including the treatment of Indigenous laborers by Euro-Americans and the diminishing otter population around Vancouver Island. Of the crew, the Nuu-chah-nulth spared one Native translator.

Back in the United States, reports about the loss of the *Tonquin* made U.S. officials fear that U.S. presence in the Columbia River Valley was in jeopardy. One U.S. captain well-acquainted with the otter trade claimed the Pacific Northwest had "become very dangerous" that any venture "without a large comlipment [sic] of men and well armed" was in serious jeopardy.[170] The attack posed crippling challenges to maintaining the operations of Astoria and it was exacerbated by the outbreak of the War of 1812 (1812-1814) between Britain and the United States. However, this development also strengthened many Americans' resolve to establish a permanent settlement for the United States in the Columbia River Valley. Due to slow communication, Astoria's employees only learned of the war when hearing that a British naval vessel had been commissioned to take possession of Astoria. In late January 1813, Astor personally called on U.S. Secretary of State James Monroe in Washington for assistance. To capture the attention of the secretary of state, Astor framed American settlement in the Columbia River Valley as part of a larger British-American competition for control of the maritime fur trade. To this meeting, Astor carried letters from Astoria, detailing British merchants' efforts to secure royal support for an enhanced British presence in the Oregon territory.[171] By October 1813, the failure of U.S. merchants to resupply Astoria, compounded with an impending British

[169] Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 112-113.
[170] Captain Eliah Grimes to Josiah Marshall, 1821, from Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods*, 137.
[171] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 259.

assault on Columbia, prompted American Fur Company employees to sell the fort to the British North West Company, a fact unbeknownst to Astor until 1814.[172]

Building an Imperial Framework: U.S. Diplomats Enhance U.S. Power in the Pacific Northwest

Pressure from American merchants engaged in the otter trade prompted action from U.S. officials. During the War of 1812, John Jacob Astor pressed his personal friend Albert Gallatin, the U.S. foreign minister to Britain, to help secure federal support for Astoria. For several months, Astor corresponded with his Gallatin, pressing him to use his influence to send U.S. warships to the North Pacific. When forwarding Astor's letter on to James Madison's Cabinet, Gallatin pushed for the New York merchant's agenda by including a note encouraging military intervention. "Suppose a frigate to be sent to cruise off Canton or vicinity," he suggested, one that would "go by way of mouth of Columbia river and land there a company of marines, so as to embrace this opportunity of taking possession."[173] Through this process, Astor's agitating Gallatin for a show of strength in the Columbia River Valley was a message conveyed to top U.S. policymakers and reinforced by the professional recommendation of a diplomat abroad.

As U.S. foreign policy increasingly aligned with the interests of American merchants, a consensus emerged for establishing a permanent American presence on the coast. In December 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe met with Astor at the Capitol. Afterwards, Monroe instructed foreign minister John Quincy Adams and his fellow commissioners in London to cede

[172] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 79; Kushner, *Conflict on the Northwest Coast*, 23-24.
[173] Gallatin noted the following on the bottom of Astor's letter. John Jacob Astor and James Monroe, February 6, 1813, New York, Astor Papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 261, 309. In October, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin W. Crowninshield ordered the frigates J*ava* and *Guerriere* to prepare for a Pacific voyage. Although those plans were abandoned by the end of 1815, they suggested a national government increasingly aware of western interests. For more details, see Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*, 55.

no territory on the Columbia when negotiating the terms of peace with the British.[174] Also at the behest of Astor, Monroe informed the British foreign minister in Washington of the United States' intention to reoccupy Astoria "without delay" according to the terms of the Treaty of Ghent.[175] Monroe asked the minister to address a letter to British officials in the Columbia River Valley that would facilitate the fort's restoration.[176] The U.S. diplomats succeeded, formalizing a peace treaty that promised the United States a claim to territory along the Columbia River. This British recognition effectively strengthened the U.S. government's legal justification to claim some national ownership to land on the Columbia River. The treaty built on previous U.S. claims based on the exploration and discoveries of the *Columbia* and the *Washington*. Its negotiation effectively prevented Astoria from becoming a permanent British settlement by pushing Astoria's British occupants to recognize some U.S. claim to the region.

By the late 1810s, U.S. officials sought to secure an American claim to the Pacific Northwest, one that could endure Native and British resistance. In 1817, the incoming president James Monroe appointed John Quincy Adams to be his secretary of state. As head of the State Department, Adams repeatedly used the federal government to strengthen U.S. territorial claim along the Columbia River. Adams worked to avoid conflict with European rivals over the otter trade in the North Pacific, while also striving to safeguard American access to transpacific markets and commerce with "the aboriginal inhabitants of the country."[177]

John Quincy Adams's close ties with New England merchants shaped how he approached the security of the maritime fur trade. His interest in the Pacific Northwest reflected his devotion

[174] Bemis, *John Quincy Adams,* 282.
[175] Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 282.
[176] Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 282.
[177] John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, July 22, 1823 from Kushner, *Conflict on the Northwest Coast,* 45, 61; Immerman, *Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism,* 68.

to promoting the maritime and commercial interests of New England. During his lifetime, Adams socialized with approximately fifty maritime merchants invested in the Pacific otter trade, a group that boasted ownership of almost two-thirds of all American vessels engaged in the otter business.[178] As a lawyer in the 1790s and early 1800s, he maintained business contacts with eight of the nine firms most active in the Pacific Northwest. When in financial difficulty, he turned to these people for assistance. Between 1810 and 1817, Adams traveled overseas to serve in U.S. diplomatic positions in Russia, the Netherlands, and Britain. He secured passages to the European continent largely through loans from major New England merchants.[179]

Through their support, U.S. merchants engaged in the otter trade helped shape Adams's foreign diplomacy. When negotiating with Russia, Spain, and Britain, Adams sought advice from merchants pertaining to the Pacific Northwest. His discussions with maritime merchants informed his thinking about American Pacific expansion. These merchants included Charles Bulfinch, the primary investor in the voyages of the *Columbia*; Thomas H. Perkins, a long-term investor in the China trade; William Sturgis, a principal investor in the Pacific Northwest; and James Lloyd, an owner of several merchant vessels.[180] During his tenure as secretary, maritime merchants threw numerous public dinners in Adams' honor. These included a New York gala thrown by John Jacob Astor as well as a two-hundred-person dinner party in Boston hosted by

[178] Barragy, "The Trading Age," 206.
[179] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy" 4.
[180] Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 6; Barragy, "The Trading Age," 206.

William Gray, brother of the *Columbia*'s captain Robert Gray.[181] Their support helped ensure that top U.S. officials attended to their security interests overseas.

Figure 1.3: "Thomas Handasyd Perkins," ATH356518, 1832, Bridgeman Art Library, Boston Athenaeum.

The Monroe administration labored to strengthen American influence over the Columbia River Valley. Monroe commissioned the sloop-of-war *Ontario* to assert American power and authority along the Columbia River, encapsulating a push among U.S. merchants, officials, and diplomats to secure U.S. trade in the Pacific.[182] For the assignment, Secretary Adams jointly

[181] Barragy, "The Trading Age," 209-11.
[182] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 100.

tasked Captain James Biddle and U.S. commercial agent John Prevost to "proceed to the Columbia River with a view to assert there the claim of sovereignty in the name and on the behalf of the United States, by some symbolical…claim to national authority and dominion."[183] When the British foreign secretary learned of this expedition, he confronted Adams, accusing him of trying to injure British interests in the Pacific. But Adams defended the action, pointing to the fact that "our settlement…was broken up by force" by British settlers during the War of 1812 and "restoration" of Astoria had been "demanded" by then-secretary of state James Monroe. Marking a concession on the part of the British, the British minister to Washington had responded, claiming that British settlers had "immediately withdrawn" from Astoria shortly after taking over the fort in 1813 and "destroying the American settlement." The minister therefore claimed that the British claimed "no possession of the place after it had been taken."[184] Adams's diplomacy reflected his commitment to securing American control over the Pacific Northwest, which meant mitigating disruptions to the otter trade.

By assigning the sloop-of-war *Ontario* to this expedition in the Columbia River Valley, Adams delayed a naval expedition to South America by over a month. The Monroe administration had previously commissioned the *Ontario* to transport U.S. agents to South America and survey its coastlines as independence wars raged across the continent. The secretary of state's decision to stall this envoy in favor of asserting U.S. power in the Columbia River Valley demonstrated the high importance of this mission to powerful members of the Monroe administration.[185] Reflecting the close ties between federal intervention and overseas business

[183] John Quincy Adams to John Prevost, Washington, September 29, 1817, Diplomatic Instructions, Vol. 8, 149, Record Group, 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire,* 55; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 92-93; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire,* 311.
[184] James Monroe to Anthony Baker, February 4, 1815, Washington, *American State Papers and Foreign Relations,* Vol. 4, 852 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834); Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Diplomacy*, 283; Weeks, *John Quincy Adams*, 56.
[185] Weeks, *John Quincy Adams,* 58.

interests, the Monroe administration ensured that officials kept John Jacob Astor updated on the expedition.[186] The *Ontario*'s naval captain, James Biddle, believed that his instructions to visit the Columbia River was of the highest priority. However, his counterpart, John Prevost, disagreed, arguing that the Chilean campaign to oust Royalists from Peru warranted the United States' immediate attention. During the 1810s, American merchants increasingly coveted Chile's resources and coast, representing further proof of U.S. imperial ambitions. Reflecting the growing significance of the American claim to the Columbia River among U.S. officials, Biddle refused to divert the mission and the *Ontario* set sail for the Columbia River, leaving an enraged Prevost in Chile.[187] Chile's draw on American business during the 1810s therefore shaped U.S. imperial interests in the Pacific.

The *Ontario*'s expedition to the Columbia River reflected the U.S. government's determination to intervene in the Pacific Northwest to assert American power and influence in the region. On August 19, 1818, Biddle anchored outside the mouth of the Columbia River and took a boat to the north bank where his expeditionary force raised the American flag, turned up a sod of earth, and nailed a leaden plate to a tree trunk. From the mouth of the river, the *Ontario*'s guns commemorated the occasion by firing salutes. All of these acts constituted signs of territorial possession. Biddle's party then traveled upriver to the location of Fort Astoria (now renamed Fort George) and explained the *Ontario*'s objective to the British North West Company's chief factor, James Keith, who offered little more than tacit approval for American interest in the river region. Before Biddle departed and sailed onwards to China, he nailed a sign

[186] Kenneth Wiggins Porter, *John Jacob Astor: Business Man* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), Vol. 1, 241. Seretary Adams wrote that it was the "desire of the President [James Monroe] that Mr. Astor, of New York, be informed of the measure contemplated in relation to Columbia River. See John Quincy Adams to J.B. Prevost, Captain Biddle, Nov. 11, 1817, Miscellaneous Personal Collections, Letter book, J.J. Astor, Baker Library.
[187] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 314.

about a mile away from Fort George that read: "Taken possession of in the name and on the behalf of the United States by Captain James Biddle, commanding the United States sloop of war, Ontario, Columbia River, August 1818."[188]

The *Ontario*'s expedition did not mark the United States' final effort that year to assert a national presence in the Columbia River Valley. In October, Biddle's counterpart, John Prevost, sailed from Chile on board the British warship *Blossom*, which the British Crown had commissioned to oversee the Anglo-American transfer outlined in the Treaty of Ghent. Like Biddle, Prevost aimed to demonstrate American possession to the region for both local and global audiences.[189] However, compared to Biddle's visit, Prevost's effort garnered much greater British involvement. On October 6, 1818, the *Blossom*'s captain, Frederick Hickey, North West Company Factor James Keith, and U.S. agent John Prevost together performed the transfer of title ceremony. It included the saluting of cannons, the lowering of the British flag over Fort George, followed by the raising of the American flag.[190] James Keith formally accepted Monroe's official letter detailing the treaty transfer.[191] After the ceremony, Prevost authored a report to the U.S. State Department that outlined the many possibilities that the Columbia River Valley held for the United States.[192]

---

[188] Quote from Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 285.
[189] John Quincy Adams to John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the U.S. to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru, September 29, 1817, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. 1, 45; JQA to Onís, 31 October 1818, *Memoirs*, Vol. 4, 145; Charles Griffin, *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822: A Study of the Relations of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish Colonies* (Octagon, 1968), 140, 181 fn88.
[190] Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 315; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 95.
[191] F. Hickey, James Keith, J.B. Prevost, "Act of Surrender and Acknowledgement," 6 October 1818, in *American State Papers*: *Foreign Relations, Vol. 4: 1815-1822* (Buffalo: Hein, 1998), 856; John Quincy Adams to the President [James Monroe], 30 September 1817, Washington, Adams, John Quincy and Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed. *Writings of John Quincy Adams* (WJQA) Vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1913-1917), 206; JQA to John Adams, 21 December 1817, Washington, WJQA, Vol. 6, 225-228; James Traub, *John Quincy Adams*: *Militant Spirit* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 215-218.
[192] John B. Prevost to John Quincy Adams, Special Agent of the U.S. to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru, September 13, 1819, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. 2, 1040-1042; Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 285.

Biddle's and Prevost's efforts marked formal assertions of U.S. ownership to territory along the Columbia River Valley. These territorial assertions built on three decades of American engagement in the Pacific otter trade. While they reflected a concrete intervention based on an international agreement negotiated among U.S. and British officials in 1814, American claims to the Columbia River dated back to the 1790s. They stemmed from John Kendrick's negotiations with Chinook leaders and Robert Gray's navigation and chartering of the waterway as he traded for otter furs with Chinook communities. These initial actions were followed by efforts by U.S. merchants of the otter trade to establish semi-permanent trading posts in the territories visited by Kendrick and Gray. Continued opposition from coastal Indigenous groups to the U.S. shipping of otter furs by visiting ships and by trading post employees formed major obstacles to this American commerce. Eventually, the growth of American commerce and increased disruptions to the flow of U.S. shipping prompted the U.S. government to take more concrete action. U.S. officials responded to threats to U.S. business by asserting American power and influence along the Columbia River through sending warships and informal diplomats to reinforce its territorial aspirations. Biddle and Prevost's expeditions reflected U.S. officials' willingness to commit resources to this imperial project.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the Pacific sea otter trade fueled nineteenth-century U.S. expansion to the Pacific Northwest. The extension of the trade, and the risk of Native disruptions to profits, prompted the U.S. government to project an augmented American presence in the North Pacific. Initially, this effort manifested in the exploration and trade of armed otter vessels. Later it emerged in American efforts to establish a permanent U.S. post on the Columbia and the use of U.S. warships to police the Pacific coast. This impulse culminated

in 1818 when two naval envoys traveled to the waterway and U.S. representatives formally asserted American power and ownership of the coastal region. By the late 1810s, the American otter trade in the Pacific had been so lucrative, and the threat of Native resistance to U.S. trade had become so dire, that the Monroe administration was willing to officially project a U.S. territorial claim in the Pacific Northwest.

The commercial exploitation of sea otters helped determine the shape that U.S. empire took in the Pacific Northwest. By connecting the Pacific otter trade to U.S. empire in the Columbia River Valley, it is possible to see how this commerce shaped the ways that U.S. officials imagined American expansion. The harbors, ports of trade, and waterways of the Pacific Northwest sustained nearly all sea otter voyages. From an official perspective, these geographies evolved into imperial nodes of a larger U.S. empire, that required naval protection. This understanding of empire underscores the intimate connections between international markets, gunboat diplomacy, intertribal and Native-European violence and fatalities, and U.S. territorial expansion in the Pacific Northwest. It also highlights the ways that the Nuu-chah-nuthl, the Haida Gwaii, and the Chinook shaped the diplomatic character of U.S.-Native relations and the process of U.S. expansion.

Chapter 2: "Now That The Doors of Its Commerce Are Thrown Open:"[193] Chilean Independence, American Maritime Commerce, & U.S. Expansion in the Southeast Pacific, 1810-1823

Navigating the trade winds and Pacific currents from the Columbia River region, American merchant ships travelled southward to routinely call at ports along the Chile-Peru coast. During the 1810s, American merchants coveted Chile's resources (silver, wheat) and markets (for U.S. guns) and the maritime traffic that these fostered reinformed U.S. imperial ambitions to control sea routes. In 1817, the newly-elected president James Monroe and his secretary of state John Quincy Adams aggressively made the expansion of American power in the Pacific a high priority, especially in relation to Latin American ports formerly under the Spanish Crown.[194] In late 1817 and early 1818, U.S. S. commodore James Biddle and John Prevost spent months policing the Chile-Peru coast. A passenger of this naval voyage, the newly-appointed U.S. consul Theodorick Bland excited officials back in Washington, D.C. with tantalizing reports of commercial opportunities in Chile.[195] A Maryland judge and former congressman, Bland told John Quincy Adams, "Now that the doors of its [Chile's] commerce are thrown open, the demand for Chili [sic] grain has already so extended that the price has risen." Bland thought in imperial terms, concluding that future American settlement on the Columbia River would benefit from this flow of wheat. Presuming this American settlement's substantial

[193] Theodorick Bland to John Quincy Adams, Nov. 2, 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, Vol. 2, 998-99.
[194] Ronda, *Astoria and Empire*, 310.
[195] Bland to Adams, Nov. 2, 1818, Manning, 2, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 998-99.

and rapid growth, Bland predicted that its demand for this wheat would "furnish" an "unrivalled market" for this Chilean commodity.[196]

Throughout the 1810s, increased American shipping between the Pacific slope of the Americas and the U.S. eastern seaboard raised the stakes for American merchants to secure governmental protection in the southeast Pacific where Chilean and Peruvian patriots battled Spanish forces. By examining the efforts of U.S. merchants, informal diplomats, and officials to protect trade along the Chile-Peru coast, this chapter argues that transpacific commerce fueled U.S. imperial expansion to the Pacific slope of South America. Literature on the Chile-Peru coast has provided illustrative histories of the independence wars in South America. Meanwhile, scholarship of nineteenth-century U.S.-Chile relations has tended to examine U.S. activities in South America as remote and isolated interactions that seldom influenced federal U.S. politics, commercial policies, and foreign diplomacy during the period.[197] Many scholars have written biographies of American adventurers who sailed to Chile or Chilean travelers who journeyed to the United States but often examine their experiences abroad as generally divorced from events in their native countries.[198]

During the 1810s, interactions and trading activities helped shape U.S. foreign diplomacy and imperial expansion to the southeast Pacific. Interest in preserving trade on the Chile-Peru

[196] Bland to Adams, Nov. 2, 1818, Manning, 2, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1004.
[197] For examples of literature that considers U.S. activities on the Chile-Peru coast, see Collier, Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808*-1994: Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800*-1830; Johnson, "Early Relations of the United States with Chile"; Bemis, T*he Latin American Policy of the United State*s; Salas, *Don Mateo Arnaldo, 1773-1819.*
[198] For examples of these types of biographies, see Bragoni, *José Miguel* Carrera: Perea, *The Caudillo of the* Andes; Bowman, "A Spanish American Patriot in Philadelphia, 1796-1822"; Pine, "William G.D. Worthington: United States Special Agent, 1817-1819"; Aud, "W.G.D. Worthington: His South American Mission"; Salas, "La Misión Bland en Chile"; Putnam, *Joel Roberts Poinsett*; Rippy, *Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American*; Salas, *Don Mateo Arnaldo;* Salas, *Henry Hill: Comerciante, Vice-Consul y Misionero*; Salas, *Jeremías Robinson, Agente Norteamericano en Chile (1818-1823);* Chandler, "The Life of Joel Roberts Poinsett"; Stewart, "The Diplomatic Service of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires"; Stillé, *Life and Services of Joel Poinsett*.

coast prompted U.S. officials to pursue an informal imperial presence in the southeast Pacific. Their imperial efforts manifested in the commissioning of warships and diplomats to the region and the creation of a policy of U.S. hegemony over the western hemisphere. This chapter primarily focuses on how American commercial maritime imperialism evolved in Chile. It benefits from rich new accounts of nineteenth century Chile as it aims to fully understand American imperialism in the southeast Pacific and its influence over American sea routes and trade along the Chile-Peru coast.[199]

The creation of an American imperial infrastructure on the Chile-Peru coast began with the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Chile in 1810. In September 1810, a gathering of prominent Chileans in Santiago declared independence from leadership in Spain. Like other Spanish American colonies, the Chilean Junta refused to recognize the new Spanish king, Joseph Bonaparte. His brother, the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, had installed him on the throne after capturing Spain's monarch King Ferdinand and seizing control of the realm. Elites in Santiago now functioned as a government independent of Spain.

The New American Draw: Chilean Ports, Markets, and Exports

During the 1810s, conditions for American trade in Chile fluctuated, reflecting a more intensified version of imperialism than previous decades. U.S. commercial investment along the Chile-Peru coastline dated back to the late eighteenth century. After securing independence from

[199] For examples of generative new scholarship on Chile, see: Baeza Ruz, *Contacts, Collisions and* Relationships; Blumenthal, *Exile and Nation-State Formation in Argentina and Chile, 1810-1862*; Manuel Llorca-Jaña and Juan Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s and its Entry into the World Economy" *Bulletin of Latin American Research* Vol. 36, no. 3 (April 2016), 254-369; Juan Luis Ossa Santa Cruz, *Armies, Politics and Revolution: Chile, 1808-1826* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014); Ana María Stuven, Cid Gabriel, *Debates Republicanos en Chile, Siglo XIX* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2012); Gabriel Salazar, *Construcción de Estado en Chile (1800–1837)* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005); John Rector, *History of Chile.*

the British in the 1780s, U.S. citizens sent dozens of American ships to Chile. Between 1788 and 1810, 257 ships from the United States traded at Chilean ports.[200] An estimated 194 of these ships visited Chile from the United States between 1800 and 1809 alone.[201] Dozens of British ships also visited Chilean ports during this period however exact numbers unknown. To a lesser extent, French, Prussian, and Swedish vessels also called at Chilean ports for products before 1810.[202]



Figure 2.1: "A Map of Chile, Peru, and Bueno Aires," c. 1820, Philadelphia M. Carey & Son. (Philadelphia), G1019 C253. Library of Congress.

[200] Collier, Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994*, 17; Eugenio Pereira Salas, *Buques Norteamericanos en Chile a Fines de la Era Colonial* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1936), 23-40; John Rector, *History of Chile* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003), 60.
[201] David Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), 28.
[202] J.L. Rector, "Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy in Chile, 1810-1840," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1976), 16, 20.

Much of this trade was illicit. Since the late fifteenth century, Spain had struggled to enforce a trade monopoly in Spanish America. However, Spain also made repeated short-term concessions to offset the disruption of trade during the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars to allow Spanish Americans to trade with foreign (non-Spanish) ships.[203] During this period, U.S. merchants shipped a variety of goods to Chile, such as foodstuffs, cattle, tallow, silk, porcelain, wines, and sugar, in exchange for products, including gold, silver, copper, and wheat.[204] When the Crown reimplemented a monopoly, illicit trade between Spanish colonists and foreign ships continued often with the tacit approval of those local authorities who benefited from contraband trade.[205] Then in February 1811 an independent Chilean Junta in Santiago formally opened four of its major ports to non-Spanish traders, severing its official commitment to trading primarily with Peru's Vice Royal. American merchants responded by sending more ships to Chile.

The opening of Chile's major ports prompted the U.S. government to appoint informal state representatives on the west coast of South America. The U.S. government could not appoint official ambassadors because it had not yet formally recognized Chile as an independent country. However, in 1811, the U.S. State Department appointed a merchant present in Santiago, Mathew Hoeval, to be a U.S. consul for three of the major ports: Santiago, Valparaíso, and Coquimbo. Consuls were informal representatives with little power to conduct state diplomacy but they sought to protect American trade in the region. These individuals were often associated with a

[203] Collier, Sater, *A History of Chile*, 17; Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America*, 4, 12-13.
[204] Henry Clay Evans, *Chile and its Relations with the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1927), 4-9; William Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 1947), 204-206.
[205] Evans, *Chile and its Relations with the United States*, 4-9; William Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence," 204-206.

U.S. merchant house. By having informal representatives on the ground to negotiate with emerging local leaders and safeguard American trade in the area whenever possible, U.S. officials sought to secure a permanent American presence in Chile.[206] With the official opening of Chile's ports in 1811, American vessels helped replace the traditional shipping lines from Spain and neighboring Peru. Partly as a result of the increased American trade in the region, commercial traffic rose over the next two decades. By the 1820s, more than 200 ships anchored in Valparaiso alone each year—more than four times the annual total in 1810.[207] The value of Chile's external trade double between 1810 and the 1830s.[208]

This growing trade depended principally on the exchange of precious metals (hard currency or specie), wheat, and war materiel, and the acquisition of whaling products. Precious metals came from Chilean and Peruvian mines in the form of gold, silver, and copper. Through the 1810s, the average amount of silver mined in Chile was 10,000 kilograms each year. This development marked a dramatic increase from the previous decades when the average annual amount of silver mined in Chile was 7,000 kilograms. The 1810s also saw Chilean miners produce 2,000 kilograms of gold and 1,500 tons of copper annually.[209] Production increased when Chileans discovered new deposits in northern Chile (in Agua Amarga) in 1811. Despite ongoing warfare, production at the northern mines, where Chileans labored to extract precious metals, was little affected by these conflicts. With the opening of Chilean ports to foreign shipping as well as the discovery of new mineral deposits, and growing international interest in copper and silver, opportunities for accruing wealth from the export trade increased.[210] Gold was

[206] Dorothy Martha Parton, *The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1934), 28-31; John J. Johnson, "Early Relations of the United States with Chile," 266; Salas, *Don Mateo Arnaldo*, 13-14, 22.
[207] Collier, Sater, *History of Chile,* 43-44.
[208] Collier, Sater, *History of Chile,* 43-44.
[209] Llorca-Jaña, Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s," 9-10.
[210] Salazar, Pinto, *Historia Contemporánea de Chile III*, 19-23; Collier, Sater, *History of Chile,* 44-45.

another valuable Chilean export. Over the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Chile accounted for nearly one-sixth of the world supply of gold.[211]

This trade served important American demands. Precious metals offered access to an expendable form of currency, something to which most Americans lacked access. Shortage of specie (namely, silver and copper) had long plagued Americans. Since the United States severed its ties from Britain in the late eighteenth century, U.S. citizens had faced a scarcity. Imperial officials and merchants in London had traditionally been U.S. traders' source for hard currency.[212] As a result, many U.S. merchants had conducted business largely through barter. However, silver and copper remained the primary currency for transacting business in China, where U.S. merchants purchased much-coveted tea, porcelain, and silk. Some bartering was possible in Canton; however, most U.S. merchants required specie to attract Chinese merchants.

Specie was needed because Chinese merchants did not desire much in the way of imports from outside nations. With the exception of some novelty items, including sea otter furs and seafood delicacies from the Pacific Islands, Chinese productions satisfied the Chinese market. As a manufacturing powerhouse, the Qing Empire was basically self-sufficient. Americans pursued trade in Chile because wanted silver to trade in China. Chile offered hard currency to U.S. traders in the same way that the Columbia River region offered them sea otter furs. U.S. merchants typically purchased at least half of their cargo at Guangzhou with specie.[213]

Chilean silver and copper presented a remedy to this longstanding American problem by offering U.S. merchants hard currency to spend in China. One American consul in Chile (1812-1814) Joel Poinsett alerted U.S. officials of this possibility: "The commerce of Chili [sic] offers

[211] Collier, Sater, *A History of Chile,* 14.
[212] Timothy Pitkin, *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America* (Hartford: James Eastburn & Co., 1817), 134.
[213] Fichter, *So Great a Proffit,* 109-110.

great advantages to the traders to China and East India," he determined. "It is well known fact that specie is almost our only medium of trade with those countries." If American merchants shipped "the goods suited to that market [in Chile] such as furniture and French and German manufactures," he contended, they would be guaranteed Chilean silver and copper in return. He was unequivocal in his praise for Chilean mines, describing them as "the most productive ever wrought," filled to the brim with "the most extraordinary product of silver."[214] A few years later, another consul reported a regular traffic of U.S. vessels between Chile and China based on the exchange specie. "This commerce combined with the exchange of European Commodities obtained in return for our raw materials not only offers new sources of Individual wealth," the agent predicted, "But also presents the means of avoiding the drain of specie which takes place from the U[nited] States."[215]

To some observers, Chile was a source of abundance in precious minerals, a source that might augment American traders' access to them. In 1819, one commercial agent Jeremy Robinson reported to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams: "The quantity of metals extracted from the earth is annually increasing, especially copper, has augmented one half within two years."[216] A former merchant from Salem, Massachusetts, Robinson was appointed Agent for Commerce and Seamen to Chile and Peru by the U.S. secretary of state in March 1817. He arrived in Chile later that year on an American shipped laden with munitions shipped for Chilean patriots.[217] By 1818, Robinson had made an impression on Chilean leaders when Bernardo

[214] Joel Poinsett to John Quincy Adams, 4 November 1818, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. 1, 457.
[215] Jeremy Robinson Papers, 1806-1832, Microfilm 137 (reel 62), Library of Congress, 46.
[216] Jeremy Robinson Papers, 1806-1832, 46-48.
[217] Silvio Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson, Special Agent to Chile and Peru, 1817-1823 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Florida, 1972), 60-62; 1, 11.

O'Higgins entrusted Robinson with the task of securing a much-needed loan for Chile from the United States.[218]

Figure 2.2: "Bernardo O'Higgins," c. 1854, Colección de biografías, Galería Nacional, Santiago de Chile.

Chilean interest in foreign imports accompanied the growing availability of minerals. As Robinson put it, "The habits of the people have undergone some changes - their tastes have become more refined, and they require more manufactured commodities which will again react, and increase the demand for the precious metals."[219] Another American observer, Samuel

[218] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 224.
[219] "Jeremy Robinson Papers, 1806-1832," Microfilm 137 (reel 62), Library of Congress (henceforth "Robinson Papers"), 83.

Johnston, argued that, if a U.S. merchant "shipped a cargo of copper and carried his surplus specie to China, and returning to Chili [sic] with silks and fancy articles of China manufacture, his profits would be immense."[220] As Johnston pointed out, U.S. merchants could use Chilean specie to purchase Asian luxury goods and then re-export them for greater profits when returning to Chile.

During the late 1810s, Chilean minerals provided an increasingly important link for American merchants engaged in the transpacific trade to Asia. Between 1815 and 1825, 75 percent of Chilean copper travelled directly to China and India.[221] Hard currency mined in western South America therefore constituted an overwhelming majority of the world's supply of copper, primarily travelling to southeastern and southcentral Asia. Chile's mines served a vital function for maritime traders visiting its ports, seeking provisions, and negotiating trade. If a merchant could acquire hard currency for his domestic and re-exported manufactures, he possessed the most valued commodity in the Canton trade. In Canton, his domestic and re-exported manufactures possessed little in value.

Foreign carriers (of which Americans constituted the second highest number next to Britain) served important Chilean shipping needs. Chile had no local capacity to ship its own goods. Having relied upon Peruvian shipping, its local capacity to carrying products was limited when it became a newly independent nation. Chileans could now send their goods through foreign shippers and therefore no longer had to ship their products to Europe from Lima as the Spanish system had required. For much of the 1810s, Chile had few sailors and fewer vessels

[220] Samuel Burr Johnston, *Letters Written During a Residence of Three Years in Chili* (Erie: Curtis, 1816), 33-34; Parton, *The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett*, 204.
[221] William Ruschenburger, *Three Years in the Pacific; Including Notices of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru* (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, Blanchard, 1834), 155; Llorca-Jaña, Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s," 5-6; Collier, Sater, *A History of Chile*,14.

enlisted in maritime services. The patriot governments focused on raising an army of roughly 8,000, which demanded nearly seventy percent of the government's finances and the attention of much of its available labor pool.[222]

Foreign shipping also benefitted Chilean mine-owners who had long faced barriers to growth including the taxes collected by government-run customhouses. Foreign carriers brought new technologies such as smelting furnaces, which allowed miners to more efficiently produce copper. These ovens heated up sulfide ore to help separate the ore from copper. The heating process sped production by replacing more antiquated methods such as amalgamation (extracting copper from ore by grinding the material in machinery and scraping away the copper).[223] Chilean mine owners could now also obtain mercury, the chemical element used to separate silver from ore. The mercury trade had been a highly regulated commerce, long held under monopoly by the Spanish Crown, and its functioning sometimes relied on patchwork connections.[224] By trading outside the Spanish Crown's monopoly, miners now had access to far larger quantities of mercury (typically acquired in nearby Peru to as well as in Slovenia and Spain) that flowed into Chile. Foreign carriers made mercury and cattle products more widely available and a glut arose and drove down costs for mine-owners. Merchant vessels could purchase mercury for silver production and cattle, which they used to extract the tallow for the candles that lit Chile's mines.[225] Finally, Chilean mine-owners also used foreign shipping to by-pass the conventional

[222] Llorca-Jaña, Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s," 11-12; Sergio Villalobos, *Historia de Chile, Vol. 3* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1974), 120; Griffin, *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822,* 262.
[223] Rector, "Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy in Chile, 1810-1840," 248.
[224] Llorca-Jaña, Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s," 4-5; Collier, Sater, *History of Chile,* 14-15.
[225] Maria Graham, *Journal of a Residence in Chile during the Year 1822 and a Voyage from Chile to Brazil in 1823* (London: Longman, Hurst, Reed, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1824), 91; James Gilliss, *Chile; its Geography, Climate, Government, Social Conditions, Mineral and Agricultural Resources, etc.* (Washington: Nicholson, 1855); Rector, "Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy," 173.

process of minting most of their silver, which included a twenty-five percent government tax. Instead, they shipped their un-minted silver directly to Europe without paying exorbitant duties.[226]

As Chile's mineral production and export economy expanded through foreign shipping, American observers identified other possible exports. Some American visitors dreamed of Chilean wheat becoming a highly profitable item of the American re-export trade. In late 1817, the Monroe administration assigned Theodorick Bland to administration to travel to South America. Bland served as part of a three-man U.S. commission tasked with collecting information about the South American revolutions. Soon after his arrival, Bland identified the potential of re-exporting wheat: "Chili is now, and must, from the nature of things, continue to be, the great granary of all the countries fronting on the shores of the Pacific and South Atlantic ocean of this continent." Bland's inspiration likely came from observing the growth of the wheat exports during the 1810s. In the 1810s, the total export value of wheat per year averaged 1,340,000 pesos per year (compared to 917,000 pesos during the previous decade). The 1820s saw wheat's value rise again to an annual value of 1,845,000.[227]

Wheat featured as a major re-export product that U.S. shippers could take from Chile and trade elsewhere. Bland's entrepreneurial vision was also shaped by the United States' capacity to re-export products, which the republic had been heavily invested since independence.[228] By better connecting markets of the southwest Atlantic with the southeast Pacific, U.S. carriers could profit from selling much-needed wheat in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, places facing

[226] John Miers, *Travels in Chile and La Plata including Accounts Respecting the Geography…and the Mining Operations in Chile, Vol. 2* (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826), 452-457.
[227] Llorca-Jaña, Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s," 7.
[228] Theodorick Bland to John Quincy Adams, 2 November 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, Vol. 2, 998-99.

serious food shortages in the 1810s. These regions had long been claimed by European planters who tasked their enslaved labor forces to raise valuable commodities.[229] This relative unproductiveness was exacerbated by ongoing military conflicts. Compounding these Atlantic communities' needs for sustenance, nearby areas in their proximity could not remedy this shortfall. Bland pointed out, "None of the tropical regions of America, either on the Atlantic or Pacific shores, produce wheat, or indeed any bread-stuff, in sufficient abundance for their inhabitants."[230]

East of these communities, the Caribbean islands offered little in the way of food relief, despite possessing more fertile lands than its proximate coasts. Planters in the Caribbean invested almost exclusively in the slave labor-based production of sugar and cotton. Rather than dedicate their land to the cultivation of less valuable staple crops such as wheat and rice, Caribbean planters devoted their soil to growing valuable cash crops including sugar and cotton. The resulting sparsity in the Caribbean diminished opportunities for Spanish Americans to import provisions. Demand for wheat in eastern South America positioned Chile as a potential major resource. This trade dated back to the colonial period, when the region of Chile provided a substantial amount of wheat, a supply that major ports like Lima, Acapulco, and ships en route to Manila relied on.[231]

Desire for wheat in the Pacific also offered potential wealth for Americans. Bland contended, "At present, there is no island in the north or south of all that great ocean [the Pacific], nor any civilized settlement on the shores of the continent, which either cultivates or is suited to the growth of wheat other than Chili." Bland chose to ignore the fact that wheat also

[229] Douglass North, *Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860* (New York: Norton, 1966), 37-38.
[230] Bland to Adams, 2 November 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States* Vol. 2, 998-99.
[231] Arturo Giráldez, *The Age of Trade: The Manila Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy* (New York: Rowman and Little, 2015), 1-7.

grew in northwestern South America because he was unimpressed with the Government of Buenos Ayres and instead worked to enhance American influence in Chile.[232] Nonetheless, he was focused American imperialism in Chile. Throughout the Pacific, he insisted, "The great, constant, and increasing demand for Chili wealth is to be found" with the vast coastline of the western Americas, which were "entirely dependent on Chili for bread." [233]

Chile's role as a "bread country" to surrounding areas was important to the United States according to American observers because American vessels would profit from the re-export trade. Bland saw this trade as a means for U.S. merchants to acquire specie. He suggested, "The opening of the ports of the Pacific for the admission of bread-stuffs will be, that a very great proportion of the precious metals will make its way out, through them, from every part of the rich mine districts of the Andes to the northward of Chili."[234] In 1818, one U.S. consul in Chile John Prevost insisted, "The United States already possesses the advantage of shipping the productions of every part of the Globe from the spot in which they are manufactured and can exclude all competition if aided."

Bland also urged U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to protect and encourage American shipping in the southeast Pacific. He insisted the U.S. government should focus its "attention to the incalculable sources of wealth which an ascendancy in the commerce of this Country offers to the U. [sic] States." American interest in shipping Chile's goods seemed apparent to non-American observers. One suspicious British observer claimed Americans were "endeavoring to impress on the government that Chile has no business with ships of war, or for

[232] Wayne Rasmussen, "Diplomats and Plant Collectors: The South American Commission, 1817–1818." From James Gerber, Lei Guang, eds. *Agriculture and Rural Connections in the Pacific, 1500–1900: The Pacific World: Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific, 1500–1900*, Vol. 13 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 53–62.
[233] Bland to Adams, 2 November 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, 1000, 998-99.
[234] Bland to Adams, 2 November 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, 1000.

trade for these hundred years to come" and should instead "employ foreign carriers."[235] John Prevost indicated as much in his correspondence with U.S. officials by affirming his belief that U.S. merchants would supply most of these shipping needs.[236] So too did U.S. agent Jeremy Robinson, who claimed that when it came to the shipping industry in the southeast Pacific, "The competition for their supply will rest between the manufacturing European nations and the Asiatics [sic], whilst the United States, having no manufacturers to vend will or rather can only enter into a contest for a participation in the coasting and carrying trade."[237]

Many Chileans embraced the expanding possibilities that came with foreign shipping. Foreign carriers emboldened Chile's economic standing in the world economy. Due to foreign merchants' oversaturation of Chilean markets during the 1810s, the cost of common imports fell significantly. Yet the worth of Chilean wheat remained relatively constant. As a result, its purchasing power increased between 100 and 200 percent. Chileans could therefore purchase growing amounts of foreign imports.[238] Even Chilean-born creole merchants, who faced increasing foreign competition, begrudgingly recognized the benefits and routinely coordinated with foreign carriers in privateering expeditions, merchandise consignments, and in joint freight shipments.[239] They recognized that foreign shipping brought new markets, labor, and technologies that could help invigorate Chilean commerce, agriculture, and industry.[240]

---

[235] John Prevost, Special Agent of the United States, to John Quincy Adams, 20 April 1818, Valparaiso, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. 2, 920.
[236] Jay Kinsbruner, "The Political Influence of the British Merchants Resident in Chile during the O'Higgins' Administration, 1817-1823," *The Americas.* Vol. 27, No. 1 (July 1970)," 36; Villalobos, *A Short History of Chile,* 99.
[237] "Robinson Papers," 83.
[238] Edward Poppig, *Un Testigo en la Alborada de Chile, 1826-1829*, trans. Carlos Keller (Zig Zag, 1960), 343.
[239] *Boletin de las Leyes i Decretos del Gobierno, 1810-1822*, ed. Mateo Enrique Cerda, 4 Vols. (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Nacional, 1898-1901), Vol. 1, 22, 42, 53.
[240] *Archivo de la Contaduría Mayor de Chile, Segunda Serie,* Vols. 2350, 2367; Rector, "Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy," 174.

Foreign shipping also supported a growing arms trade in Chile in which Americans took a central part. Shortly after establishing political autonomy, Chileans sent a request for war materiel to the United States, asking for 2 cannons, 6,000 rifles, 1,000 pairs of pistols, and 1,000 sabers. They also offered to pay 50 percent above cost plus a duty reduction on tobacco and mercury to the firm which imported these items.[241] The growing Chilean-U.S. gun trade was bolstered by negotiations between Chilean leader José Miguel Carrera and U.S. consul Joel Poinsett. The two first met in late 1811. José Miguel Carrera, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars in Spain and a recent returnee to his native land of Chile, had risen to power by force in November 1811.[242] In December 1811, Poinsett arrived in Santiago after sailing to Buenos Aires and traveling over the Andes. The two men became fast friends.

Figure 2.3: "Posthumous portrait of the Chilean general José Miguel Carrera," c. 1854, Don José Miguel Carrera, Galería Nacional, Santiago de Chile.

[241] Rector, "Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy," 45
[242] Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence,* 1808-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 45-49.

Poinsett contributed his skills and talents to support Chilean independence. The U.S. consul presented Carrera with a draft constitution for potential use in the Chilean republic.[243] Having some instruction in military science while studying in England, Poinsett also offered Carrera advice. He also served in the Chilean army during campaigns against Spanish royalists. Poinsett defended his participation in military activities, which violated U.S. neutrality, by claiming he sought only to defend American lives and property in the region. Before Poinsett's arrival, several American ships had been captured and their cargoes seized by Spanish royalists.[244] He contended that he aimed to pressure royalists to return the property or compensate American shipowners for their losses. Poinsett's active involvement in the conflict well positioned him to expand the U.S. arms trade into Chile.

Political events eventually pushed patriots to travel to the United States. In mid-1814, Spanish royalist forces defeated Carrera's army and forced it to flee the capital.[245] In response, the Chilean junta appointed General Bernardo O'Higgins to replace Carrera as leader. However, in late 1814, O'Higgins also failed to stop royalists. Royalists defeated patriots in central Chile and seized the city of Rancagua. Faced with overwhelming force, many of the surviving patriots fled over the Andes to seek refuge in Mendoza, Argentina. Those patriots who failed to escape were captured by Spanish royalists and held as prisoners on the Juan Fernández Islands. Prisoners included one U.S. consul, Mathew Hoevel, who had fought in a patriot battalion.[246] Carrera hurried from Buenos Aires to the United States, seeking support from that nation to recapture Chile from Royalists.

---

[243] Baeza Ruz, *Contacts, Collisions and Relationships,* 210.
[244] Joel Poinsett to James Monroe, 29 April, 5 August 1814, in Poinsett Papers, Vol. 1, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; William Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence," *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 1947*),* 209.
[245] Aud. "W.G.D. Worthington: His South American Mission," 33.
[246] He was only freed in 1817 when U.S. Secretary of State Richard Rush intervened on his behalf. See Eugenio Pereira Salas, *Don Mateo Arnaldo*, 23-28.

In the United States, Carrera worked to secure business connections to facilitate his return to power. Joel Poinsett, based in the Capitol, facilitated a meeting between Carrera and the U.S. secretary of state James Monroe. Poinsett also connected Carrera to U.S. dealers of arms and munitions in New York and Baltimore by providing Carrera with names and addresses of gun makers, saddlers, and clothiers, and writing letters of introduction.[247] One merchant house, Darcy & Didler, single-handedly loaned Carrera $4,000 to purchase arms.[248] Word of Carrera's efforts circulated back to Chile where one British observer reported rumors that Carrera had secured the delivery of five vessels with arms, ammunition, and swords.[249]

The Chilean-U.S. arms trade was bolstered by changing political circumstances in Chile. In early 1817, Chilean patriots, after years of rebuilding their ranks in Argentina, crossed the Andes and won a series of victories over Spanish forces. Bernardo O'Higgins was at the center of re-establishing independence. The general led a successful campaign in the Battle of Chacabuco on February 12, which re-established a vital foothold for the Chilean independence movement. Patriots soon secured an independent government in Santiago and an assembly of leading Santiago citizens soon appointed O'Higgins, Chile's Supreme Director.[250] In late February 1818, Bernardo O'Higgins, as Supreme Director, proclaimed Chile's total independence from Spain. Two months later, patriots struck a major blow against Spanish forces with a victory at Maipu, which permanently secured patriot control over much of Chile (with the exception of the island of Chiloe).[251]

---

[247] Charles Ronan, "Some Aspects of the Mission of Joel Roberts Poinsett to Buenos Aires and Chile, 1810-1814" (M.A. Thesis, Loyola University, 1954), 70-72.
[248] Fred J. Rippy, *Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American,* 43, 62; Parton, *The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett,* 39-40.
[249] Graham, *Journal of a Residence in Chile,* 380-383.
[250] Villalobos, *A Short History of Chile,* 98.
[251] Villalobos, *A Short History of Chile,* 97-98.

The success of independence forces re-opened Chilean ports to the shipment of war materiel by American merchants. A commercial network forged by Carrera and U.S. arms dealers in the United States during 1815 and 1816 spawned a growing Chilean-U.S. arms trade. For example, in 1816, a representative of one New York merchant house sent 5,600 rifles with bayonets, 1,120 kegs of powder, and a sizeable quantity of munitions. As it shipped arms to Chilean patriots, one Baltimore firm instructed its supercargo "to endeavor to make contracts with the Government of Chile for arms, powder, loathing, etc," reflecting American merchants' interest in continuing and expanding the arms trade. The firm expected to possess "10,000 muskets in a few days" and it pushed the supercargo to contract a cargo for $100,000 minimum if possible.[252]

In 1817, 1818, and 1819, U.S. merchant firms sent arms, ammunition, and other contraband to the Chile-Peru coast in growing numbers, with some ships also supplying war materiel to Spanish royalists in Peru.[253] In May 1817, the first shipment on board the *Savage* arrived in Chile with 3,000 muskets with bayonets, 15,000 pounds of powder for cannon, 200 pistols, 50,000 flints, 1,2000 bridles, and 100 saddles, all under a contract with Carrera (who was imprisoned in Bueno Aires).[254] A second shipment arrived on one Philadelphia ship in September 1817 carrying 4,500 muskets and 3,500 kegs of powder from London. In October, a Providence ship followed suit, delivering 500 muskets and 8,500 barrels of powder to

[252] D'Arcy and Didier to Henry Hill, May 23, 1817, Records of the Department of State, Chile, Claim No. 5, Eugene L. Didier, Admr, August 7, 1892, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Dorothy Burne Goebel, "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade, 1817-1820," *Journal of Economic History*. Vol. 2, No. 2 (Nov. 1942), 191-192.
[253] Edward Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America: Chile and Peru, 1817-1825," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1965), 9.
[254] Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence," 194. When Carrera arrived back in South America at the port of Buenos Aires, he was quickly captured by rivaling independent fighters who had spent the previous year building and organizing an Army of the Andes that planned to Andes and reconquer Chile in early 1817. Leaders of the Army imprisoned Carrera to prevent him from dividing the patriot forces in Chile. See: Cruz, *Armies, Politics and Revolution: Chile, 1808-1826*, 121-122.

Valparaiso, and a Philadelphia vessel delivered 67 cases of muskets re-exported from Rotterdam.[255] During the first half of 1818, another five ships laden with arms and munitions visited the Chile-Peru coast.[256] Between 1817 and 1829, nine American vessels (compared to one British) shipped arms to Chile.[257] As trade grew, U.S. merchants expressed a growing need to protect their cargoes.[258]

The opening of Chile's economy, which was bolstered by independence efforts in 1811 and 1817, fueled a growing foreign shipping trade. American merchants benefited from access to precious minerals (gold, silver, and copper) mined in Chile, which they acquired on their voyages around Cape Horn en route to China. The ability to acquire much-coveted hard currency enabled Americans to competitively purchase goods in Canton. Goods brought to Chile through foreign shipping helped to bolster mineral production in Chile's northern mines. Wheat also featured as a major product for U.S. carriers who re-exported it to communities across the Pacific. In addition U.S. shipping supported a growing arms trade with Chilean patriots. The commercial transactions and networks facilitated by these trades created an infrastructure for American influence in the region. U.S. citizens on the Chile-Peru coast worked to maintain these networks and labored to reinforce a measure of American commercial sovereignty at its major ports.[259]

[255] Johnson, "Early Relations of the United States with Chile," 269.
[256] Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence," 219
[257] Neumann, "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence," 219.
[258] Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 14-15.
[259] Goebel, "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade, 1817-1820," 190-194.

Combating Desertion and Seizure: The Growth of U.S. Empire in the Southeast Pacific

In the late 1810s, the Chilean independence wars engulfed the Chile-Peru coastline, sparking conflicts not only between patriots and royalists but also with foreign shippers, which threatened American commerce in the southeast Pacific. By 1819, Secretary John Quincy Adams saw the condition of U.S. trade in Chile as a matter of "dire consequence." Between 1817 and 1821, a quarter of all ships to enter Chile's major port of Valparaiso was from the United States. From May 1817 to June 1818, sixteen U.S. merchant ships, fewer only than British ships, which accounted for twenty merchant vessels. During that same period, Prussia shipped 2 vessels and Sweden one.[260] The British were the United States' greatest competitor. Between 1819 and 1823, British exports accounted for about 80 percent of Chile's total collections on foreign duties.[261] In 1823, the United States sent 73 ships compared to Britain's 91 vessels. French ships meanwhile account for seven, and the Netherlands three. However, the tonnage on United States' ships outweighed British at 18,223 tons of goods compared to only 15,823.[262]

As American trade in the southeast Pacific increased, security for commerce in the area became paramount for U.S. leaders. Sailor desertion and the seizure of merchant ships by royalist and patriot factions endangered the growth of American commerce in the southeast Pacific. The Monroe administration (1817-1825) responded by sending consecutive warships to the region.[263] President Monroe, in many of his addresses, emphasized the importance of building up the U.S. navy.[264] According to Monroe's administration, naval support was needed

[260] Goebel, "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade, 1817-1820," 195.
[261] Thomas Ray Shurbutt, *The United States and Chile, 1812-1850* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 235.
[262] Llorca-Jaña, Navarrete-Montalvo, "The Chilean Economy During the 1810s," 4.
[263] Shurbutt, *The United States and Chile, 1812-1850*, 232-234.
[264] For examples of Monroe highlighting the importance of the Navy, see the Miller Center's "Presidential Speeches," including Monroe's First Annual Address (1817) https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-2-1817-first-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022);) Second Presidential Inauguration

for the United States to exert an informal imperial presence in the southeast Pacific. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. government stationed naval squadrons in the Mediterranean and East India. However, in the 1810s, U.S. naval presence in the Pacific was much sparser. Only in 1821 did the government establish an official Pacific squadron, reflecting the growing importance of U.S. trade in that ocean.[265]

The problem of desertion grew exponentially in 1817. After the patriot victory at Chacabuco in February, the Chilean government began to assemble a national maritime defense strategy by building a navy. Following that consequential battle, the Chilean general and newly appointed Supreme Director of Chile, Bernardo O'Higgins, reportedly claimed, "This victory and a hundred others, will be of no account unless we gain command of the sea."[266] Given Chile's longstanding reliance on Peruvian shipping, the greatest obstacle to its naval ambitions was finding experienced sailors. Patriots sought to fil the void by recruiting sea-hardened foreign sailors. Britons and Americans could make large demands of employers. As one American observer recalled, "The English and North American sailors, who were the only ones valued as intelligent…placed their pretensions very high & lent their volunteered services at a very dear rate."[267] Certainly, this observer presumed an Anglo-American superiority. However, he also pointed to an advantage enjoyed by American and British sailors. These circumstances meant that most officers in the navy were either British or American despite their population only

(1821) at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-5-1821-second-inaugural-address (Accessed April 26, 2022) and Sixth Annual Address (1823) https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1822-sixth-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022).

[265] Lieut. George Emmons, *The Navy of the United States, From the Commencement, 1775 to 1853, A Brief History of Each Vessel's Service and Fate* (Gideon& Co., 1850), 11.

[266] Cruz, *Armies, Politics and Revolution: Chile, 1808-1826*, 151; Quoted in Stephen Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins and the Independence of Chile* (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), 175.

[267] Bland to Adams, Nov. 2, 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 949; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 106.

comprising about forty percent of naval enlistees.[268] Naturally, this development caused some bitterness and resentment among native-born Chilean sailors. It also demonstrated the changing involvement of Americans in Chilean affairs during the 1810s. Their involvement moved from commerce, to possession, to requesting governmental intervention, to the arms trade, and finally to overthrowing royalist regimes.

Chilean officials made foreign sailors competitive offers to desert U.S. vessels and join a privateering boat of patriot forces. Promises included quick promotions (at least twenty Americans became officers between 1817 and 1819), as high as a 30-dollar bonus, comparable wages to U.S. naval men ($10 per month), and a percentage of prizes after the navy seized enemy vessels.[269] Initially, the Chilean government promised crews half of the total value of each confiscation. However, this promise expanded to encompass the total amounted seized in 1819.[270] Foreigners also found work at Chilean ports as carpenters, riggers, blacksmiths, painters, and artisans, where they could demand two and a half dollars per day. Some specialists could request as much as thirty-five dollars a month for their services.[271] As a result of these incentives, sailors frequently abandoned U.S. ships in search of better opportunities in Chile. In November 1817, U.S. agent Henry Hill reported, "Every ship in this port loses more or less of her crew in consequence of the privateers."[272]

---

[268] Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence,* 57-58.
[269] Goebel, "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade," 106, 193; W.G.D. Worthington to Secretary of State, 9 July 1818, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, 942; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 228; Goebel, "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade," 193; Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence,* 18.
[270] Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence,* 46.
[271] Charles Deblois, Jan. 31, 1819, "Private journal kept on board the U.S. Frigate, John Downes, Esqr., Commander, on a Cruise from Boston, Massachusetts, to the Pacific Ocean, by C.J. Deblois, Captains Clerke, Said Frigate, in the years 1819, 1819, Private Journal," National Archives (Microfilm); Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 150.
[272] Goebel, "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade," 193.

The creation of the Chilean navy made patriots enthusiastic about their capacity to defend the seas. In 1819, the Chilean Navy consisted of nine warships.[273] Its leaders hoped that Chile might become a naval power in the world, second only to the British Royal Navy.[274] These bold ambitions collided with growing U.S. imperial interests in the southeast Pacific. Some American observers worried that, if Chile managed to preserve its navy after its wars for independence, the new nation would compete with U.S. commercial interests.[275] In August 1821, Jeremy Robinson reported to the U.S. State Department that "the next grand movement" of Chilean leader "will be…to push his military and maritime successes into the more Northwardly Provinces of Spanish America and particularly the Isthmus of Darien and the west coast of Mexico and if practicable to the Philippines Islands."[276] The prospect of Chilean power and influence in the Pacific motivated American efforts to control the movements of men, ships, and cargoes in ways that benefitted U.S. trade.

The Chilean Navy also posed immediate threats to U.S. shipping. Merchants invested in transpacific commerce complained as Chileans aggressively worked to recruit Americans willing to desert to serve in the Chilean navy. Using the navy to combat desertion from American vessels was a central objective of the Monroe administration. In 1818, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams sent an informal U.S. diplomat to Spanish America, warning him about the "enticement of seamen belonging to merchant vessels" by Chilean officials who sought "to enlist them in privateers or public arm vessels." He instructed the consul to "use every exertion in your power…to protect the seamen of the United States from all such enlistments, and the owners and

[273] "Jeremy Robinson Papers, 1806-1832," Microfilm 137 (reel 62), Library of Congress (henceforth "Robinson Papers"), 21.
[274] Baeza Ruz, *Contacts, Collisions and Relationships,* 214.
[275] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 85.
[276] "Robinson Papers," 61.

masters of the merchant vessels…from the loss of their men by such means."[277] His inclusion of owners and captains revealed his interest in safeguarding merchant property and ensuring that American trade in the southeast Pacific continued uninterrupted.

The first American naval squadron to visit Chile after re-establishing its independence asked that Chilean officials stop recruiting and accepting American sailors.[278] Nonetheless, in April 1818, Chilean naval officers boarded an American ship at Valparaíso and offered a ten-dollar bonus and shares of any prize money seized in service of the Chilean navy. Five men signed up. The captain of the vessel complained that the Chilean navy had been preventing vessels from leaving through embargoes and blockades. [279] In May 1818, Chilean officials escalated their recruiting efforts, sending representatives to every ship at Valparaíso. Each representative demanded that the crew surrender four men for an upcoming naval expedition to Peru. Another American captain complained that Chilean officials continued to recruit men from his crew, even after the American captain had loaned them his ship's carpenter for repairs. The drain of manpower, in royalist and patriot blockades and embargoes, kept American ships at Valparaíso for six months.[280]

Patriots were sometimes bold enough to try and recruit men in the presence of American warships. In 1820, the commodore of the *U.S.S. Macedonian* complained that one evening while the warship harbored at Lima, a Chilean naval ship visited the U.S. merchant vessels to entice Americans to desert and join its ranks. These efforts were only stopped when the commodore

[277] John Quincy Adams to John M. Forbes, 5 July 1820, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 1, 132.
[278] In April 1818, James Biddle wrote San Martin demanding that the government cease accepting Americans. See Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 44-46.
[279] Affidavit of Solomon Townsend and Shubal Burr, Valparaiso, April 27, 1818, copy, encls., Robinson to Adams, June 8, 1818, Special Agents, Naval Records of the Office of Naval Records and Library, National Archives (Microfilm), 5; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 65.
[280] Affidavit of Charles S. Carey, Valparaiso, 1 May 1818, copy, encls., Robinson to Adams, June 8, 1818, Special Agents (Microfilm), 5; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 65.

ordered a boat to "row guard" around the vessels at Lima.[281] In Valparaíso the following year, another naval captain discovered that two American sailors deserted one evening while his ship harbored. The captain immediately pressed Chilean officials to remedy the situation and the leading Valparaíso official ordered that the Chilean navy "deliver them up."[282] Clearly the U.S. Navy was proactive in its efforts to stem the tide of desertions.

The desertion problem became so dire that it brought together naval captains from the two biggest commercial rivals in the southeast Pacific, Britain and the United States. Naval officers of both nations were alarmed by sailor desertion and came to believe that collaboration could mitigate the problem. Captain James Biddle of the *Ontario* negotiated a reciprocal arrangement in early 1818 that called for the capture of "any mutinous merchant seamen of either nation." When Biddle's ship arrived in Valparaíso in February 1818, the first American warship to do so since Chilean patriots re-established independence from Spanish royalists earlier that month, Lieutenant David Conner described a situation where U.S. ships were "beleaguered" by both Spanish royalists and Chilean patriots. A royal squadron patrolled Valparaíso, forming a blockade ready to seize and raid any U.S. vessels that attempted to disembark from the patriot-held port. Meanwhile, as U.S. merchant ships waited idly at port, Jeremy Robinson, an American agent, recalled the "seduction of seamen" from U.S. vessels by patriots who promised them higher wages, rapid promotion, and prize money if they enlisted in the Chilean Navy.[283] After recapturing much of Chile in 1817, patriots worked to build a national navy, largely by attracting foreign sailors.

---

[281] Charles Gauntt, "Private Remarks of Lieutenant Charles Gauntt, of the U.S. Ship *Macedonian,* John Downes, esqr., Commander, made during a cruise in the Pacific Ocean in the years 1818, 1819, 1829, 1821," National Archives, (Microfilm), 102; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 202.
[282] John Downes to Secretary of Navy, 18 April 1819, National Archives (Microfilm); Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 157.
[283] David Conner, "Journal of the U.S.S. Ontario, fragments, kept by Lieutenant David Conner, 1817-1819," Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Jeremy Robinson to John Quincy Adams, 29 July 1819, "Robinson Papers," 9.

Meanwhile, as U.S. merchant ships waited idly at port, one American agent Jeremy Robinson recalled the "seduction of seamen" from U.S. vessels by patriots who promised them higher wages, rapid promotion, and prize money if they enlisted in the Chilean Navy.[284] After recapturing much of Chile in 1817, patriots worked to build a national navy, largely by attracting foreign sailors. Some American vessels lost so many crewmen to patriot recruiters that, even if royalists had lifted their blockade, most would not have been able to safely continue their voyages.[285] In desperation, the captain of the *Ontario* James Biddle appealed to Valparaíso's patriot officials to stop recruitment efforts and "open incitement to desertion ceased." Biddle likely succeeded because he assisted the patriot navy by tasking his armorers and carpenters to help repair some of its vessels.[286] While patriot recruitment temporarily ceased, few deserters returned to their ships and U.S. vessels still faced the threat of seizure by the royalist blockade. Biddle petitioned the Spanish admiral to permit U.S. ships to depart from Valparaíso. However, the admiral refused, accusing American ships of illicitly supplying Chilean rebels with arms and provisions. Based on how involved American merchants were in selling arms in Chile, this admiral's suspicions seemed justified. The problem of sailor desertion, and royalist and patriot seizures of U.S. ships, continued to threaten U.S. ventures trading on the Chile-Peru coast and became a growing concern for U.S. officials.

While witnessing this crisis, Robinson urged U.S. officials to remedy the situation by sending U.S. warships and agents. He believed the U.S. government should provide "a respectable maritime force in these seas…accompanied by determined, independent civil public

[284] David Conner, "Journal of the U.S.S. Ontario, fragments, kept by Lieutenant David Conner, 1817-1819," Library of Congress; Jeremy Robinson to John Quincy Adams, 29 July 1819, "Robinson Papers," 9.
[285] Conner, "Journal"; James Biddle, Journal and Correspondence of Captain James Biddle; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America: Chile and Peru, 1817-1825," 41-42.
[286]Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 90.

officers, to prevent the seduction of American seamen" and "protect American commerce."[287] Ideally, it would commission some four or five naval ships to the southeast Pacific, Robinson contended, and "the mere exhibition of this force, with a knowledge that it was to remain, would probably check aggression and a recurrence of a multiplicity of aggravating depredations" and put an end to "the wanton seizure, by the rapacious hand of military violence." [288] Robinson concluded that "the presence of a naval force and intelligent men…[might]…awe the Government" thereby resulting in the "immediate release" of American deserters and its merchants' confiscated vessels."[289]

U.S. officials in Washington did not ignore these local concerns about desertion and ship seizures by patriot and royalist forces in the southeast Pacific. Between 1810 and 1823, the U.S. government sent ten warships to the southeast Pacific.[290] It also appointed twenty-two informal diplomats to travel to Spanish America and defend the interests of U.S. merchants.[291] In December 1823, President James Monroe made a formal declaration that extended American presence across the western hemisphere, vowing to oppose any future European efforts to colonize the Americas. By late 1823, the growing profitability of American trade in the southeast Pacific, as well as the persistent threat posed by desertion and ship seizure, prompted the Monroe administration to project the United States' power and influence on the Chile-Peru coast.[292]

In March 1819, Chilean officers reportedly gave some British sailors on shore five dollars apiece and enlisted them to serve on a Chilean privateering ship. After returning to their ships, these British sailors refused to obey orders from their captains and announced that they

[287] "Robinson Papers," 2.
[288] "Robinson Papers," 2.
[289] "Robinson Papers," 6.
[290] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 90; Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire*, 320-322.
[291] Henry Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Gloucester: Smith, 1967), 418-423; Ferry de Goey, *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism, 1783-1914* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 94-97.
[292] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 2-10; Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence*, 25, 28, 45.

intended to join the Chilean Navy. After learning about these circumstances and at the request of two British captains, the *U.S.S. Macedonian* sent a force of men aboard the British brigs the *Thomas* and the *Rebecca*. This force captured eleven mutineers and returned the men to the *Macedonian* in irons.[293] When the British warship *Andromache* returned a week later, the *Macedonian* sent the mutineers to the naval ship for disciplinary actions. In December 1819, the captain of the *Andromache* repaid the favor. When the *Macedonian* returned to port, the British captain sent over two American deserters that he had been holding for several days.[294]

Other U.S. warships maintained the Anglo-American collaboration. Captain Charles Ridgely of the *U.S.S. Constellation* described the experience of American crews in the southeast Pacific as being constantly besieged by "the excessive outrages committed daily by the Chilean crews" and stunted by the "impossibility of the masters of the merchantmen receiving protection from the Chili [sic] authorities in the ports of Chili [sic]."[295] He praised Anglo-American collaboration, underscoring that the United States had far fewer warships in the Pacific than the British. One observer estimated that the British Navy enjoyed a four-to-one advantage in the Pacific when compared to the United States.[296] Over the short term, Ridgely saw the wisdom of Anglo-American cooperation. But over the long term, he believed that the U.S. government needed to keep U.S. warships stationed in the Pacific to preserve crews on American vessels.[297]

In the midst of ongoing independence wars, the presence of a British naval squadron could help protect business in the region from patriot harassment. In the spring of 1822, the vice

[293] Gauntt, "Private Remarks," 36-37; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 158-159.
[294] Downes to Secretary of Navy, 27 Dec. 1819, Letters from Captains, National Archives (Microfilm); Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 181.
[295] Ridgely to Secretary of Navy, Valparaiso, March 7, 1821, Letters from Captains, National Archives.
[296] Diego Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile,* Vol. 10 (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1902), 432, 437-438; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 257-259.
[297] Ridgely to Secretary of Navy, Valparaiso, March 7, 1821, Letters of Captains, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 228.

admiral of the Chilean Navy, Thomas Cochrane, implemented a patriot blockade over the southern Peru and vowed to "capture and condemn all vessels which shall violate it."[298] Cochrane, a retired British royal navy officer and former captain of the Napoleonic Wars, had assumed leadership over the Chilean Navy in late 1818. Even though Chilean forces had yet to gain control of much of Peru, Cochrane also announced that a steep duty would be placed on all foreign trade in Peru.[299] In June 1822, one British squadron commander responded to this "outrage" by committing his ships to "a convoy of British Merchant vessels into…Peru, to protect them whilst there, and out again."[300] Counselling all British merchants in the region to keep close to his squadron and "to keep their transactions within their control, preparatory to any coercive measures he may be forced to adopt," this commander revealed the British Navy's dedication to protecting British commerce. [301] Its officers were willing to resort to force if necessary to protect commerce on the Chile-Peru coast.

Americans saw a benefit in the British Navy's presence on the Chile-Peru coast. In August 1822, patriot constraints on trade "exasperated" another British commander and "incensed the British Merchants" at Valparaíso "to that degree that it is now some what [sic] questionable whether he will admit any blockade whatsoever."[302] As the U.S agent Jeremy Robinson recalled the incident, the British naval officer would likely cease respecting any kind of patriot blockade because he saw patriot restraints on trade as so unreasonable. These instances of British opposition, Robinson contended, "improve the interests, or influence of the United States or her citizens here." British pushback ensured that markets remained open to foreign

[298] Beginning in March 1819, Cochrane declared a blockade of Peruvian ports and began to interdict Spanish shipping. (Rector, *History of Chile*, 67)
[299] "Robinson Papers," 47.
[300] "Robinson Papers," 47.
[301] "Robinson Papers," 47.
[302] "Robinson Papers," 52.

shipping even in the midst of the attempted blockade. Conversely, Robinson observed, when the British suffered from obstacles to conducting trade, American interests also "tend to deteriorate from that of the British."[303] Reflecting a more implicit form of collaboration between Americans and the British navy, the presence of the Royal Navy served American interests by keeping business open to foreigners.

American commercial vessels in the southeast Pacific faced possible seizure by patriots and royalists alike. As Robinson remembered, "depredations were committed by both."[304] During the first half of the 1810s, the most pertinent risk to American shipping in the southeast Pacific was Spanish royalists. Since hostilities began in 1811 with Chile, royalists in Peru had utilized their maritime advantage over Chilean patriots who still lacked a formal navy. They occupied the Chilean island of Chiloe until 1826 and used it as a crucial stronghold for their maritime operations against Chilean patriots.[305] As royalists patrolled the southeast Pacific, they worked to blockade foreign shipping from supplying patriots in Chile. Royalists focused especially on curbing arms shipments to patriots. As a result, the Spanish confiscated American vessels on a variety of occasions. In fall 1817, a New York merchant vessel stopped at the port of Talcahuano believing it to be held by Chilean patriots. However, Talcahuano was in possession of the royalists. While the captain claimed to be in need of provisions and without intentions of selling cargoes, the vessel was heavily laden with arms and munition and the Spanish suspected the ship was sent to supply patriots. Royalists, who were also in desperate need of war materiel, seized the ship's entire cargo, accusing the American crew of intending to illegally arm

[303] "Robinson Papers," 52; Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 67.
[304] See "Robinson Papers," 52.
[305] Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence*, 82-86.

patriots.[306] This type of seizure became commonplace for American ships and remained a pertinent threat to U.S. shipping ventures in the southeast Pacific.

By 1817, Chilean patriot forces had seized the upper hand in their struggle with royalists for control over the southeast Pacific. The Chilean government fitted its first warship in 1817 and continued to build this force over the next three years. In early 1818, Thomas Cochrane lent his services to Chile's patriot cause, helping to organize and train a Chilean naval squadron. Cochrane became a Chilean citizen in December 1818 and the government appointed him Vice Admiral, effectively giving him command over most of the Chilean Navy. In his new position, Cochrane often aggressively pursued blockades of the Chile-Peru coast, targeting any vessels that attempted to trade with royalists.

In addition to the dangers posed by royalist blockades, American ships in 1817 now also faced possible attacks by patriot naval forces and total confiscation. For a merchant, the risk of seizure could mean the forfeiture of the voyage, including lost ships, cargoes, and profits. When merchants grew anxious about this threat, they called on U.S. state representatives. In early May 1818, one influential Maryland politician Samuel Smith urged the U.S. secretary of the navy to act, contending that Philadelphia merchants "had alarmed themselves lest the Patriot Privateers, or Pirates sailing under their flag may intercept out specie ships."[307] Smith sounded the alarm to U.S. officials that merchants were calling for a response.

Alarmed by the seizure of U.S. ships, Monroe's cabinet members convened on May 13, 1818 to discuss possible remedies. As John Quincy Adams remembered it, the body discussed "whether an armed force shall be sent to visit both sides of the coast of South America for the

[306] John Prevost to John Quincy Adams, Santiago, 9 February 1818, Special Agents, National Archives; "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 40.
[307] Hon. S. Smith to Secretary of Navy, Baltimore, 13 May 1818, Miscellaneous Letters Received, National Archive; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America,"139.

protection of our commerce, and to countenance the patriots."[308] While Adams provided no further details on the meeting, on May 30, 1818, the administration commissioned the *U.S.S. Macedonian* to survey the Pacific Ocean, address acts of confiscation, and pursue repayment of American loans.[309] As this example shows, merchants petitioning U.S. representatives could prompt them to send American warships to Spanish America.

The goal of the naval squadron was to protect American property and lives, which often manifested in displays of power and intimidation. The United States instructed Captain Thomas Ridgely of the *U.S.S. Constellation* to offer "protection and relief to the Commerce."[310] Upon arrival in Valparaíso in 1821, he demanded an immediate audience with the city's chief official regarding a recent seizure of an American merchant ship.[311] Earlier that year, as an American crew transported its cargo between Peru and Chile, patriots seized the shipment. This cargo included 70,000 dollars in coined money and bar silver, which patriots accused them of transporting for royalists.[312] Despite the shipmaster's protests that the money was property of U.S. citizens (and therefore did not belong to royalists), Chilean officers distributed it to crews of the navy.[313] Captain Stewart accused the head of the Chilean Navy Thomas Cochrane of confiscating property and recruiting deserters to the extent that voyages were left "ruined and destitute."[314] Thomas Cochrane was a former British naval officer of the Royal Navy and a

[308] John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848*, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Vol. 4 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1875), 91-92; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 140.
[309] James Monroe, *The Writings of James Monroe*, Vol. 5, ed. Stanislaus Hamilton (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1901), 338; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 139.
[310] Secretary of Navy to Thomas Ridgely, 11 June 1820, Confidential Letters, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 220-221.
[311] Stewart, "Proceedings of Courts-Martial," *Naval Affairs*, 517-518; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 269.
[312] John Bassett Moore, *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations*, Vol. 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), 1449-1452.
[313] Ridgely to Secretary of Navy, Valparaiso, 2 November 1821, Letters from Captains, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 246.
[314] Ridgely to Secretary of Navy, Coquimbo, 16 May, Letters from Captains, National Archives.

successful captain of the Napoleonic Wars. When the British Crown dismissed him from the Navy in 1814 under suspicion of fraud, Cochrane traveled to South America where he organized and lead anti-royalist navies on behalf of Chile, Brazil, and Peru.[315]

In March 1821, the *Constellation* traveled to Coquimbo in northern Chile to retrieve the *Chesapeake* and the *Warrior* from Chilean officials, who held the two ships under the suspicion that they aimed to supply royalists. The patriots had seized some nine thousand dollars in gold from the vessels and had removed their sails, rigging, rudder, and guns, rendering them non-operational. Patriots had also forced twelve sailors to serve in the Chilean navy.[316] After the American squadron arrived, Ridgely sent demands to the patriots, asking that they release them ships and return the confiscated gold. Patriots liberated the vessels and Ridgely sent repairmen to fix the vessels and replenished the crews with men from his own ship.[317] However, patriots refused to return the confiscated monies. To U.S. officials and merchants, this episode demonstrated that the navy could, however imperfectly, ameliorate the problem of desertion and ship seizure along the Chile-Peru coast.

By the 1820s, U.S. officers feared that the Chilean Navy would act even more aggressively. In 1820, Cochrane seized the monies of the newly formed Peruvian state in order to pay his crew. This raid intensified an already-deep fissure between Chile's independence leaders, San Martin and Bernard O'Higgins, and their vice admiral. The captain of the *U.S.S. Macedonian* contended that Cochrane was a man "governed only by his private feelings" and in

[315] David Cordingly, *Cochrane The Dauntless: The Life and Adventures of Thomas Cochrane* (London: Bloombury, 2007), 10, 20.
[316] John Downes, "Narrative of a Cruise made by the United States Frigate Macedonian, John Downes, Esqr, Commander," Letters from Captains, 1821, vol. 3; John Downes to Secretary of Navy, 19 June 1821, Letters from Captains, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 211, 199.
[317] Ridgely to Secretary of Navy, Coquimbo, 16 May 1821, Letters from Captains, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 230.

constant pursuit of "plunder."[318] The fissure between Chilean officials and its nascent Navy under the leadership of Cochrane led Americans to worry. Should all of his ties to the government be severed, they worried that Cochrane might lead even more aggressive privateering operations. These fears prompted the Monroe administration to intervene more aggressively in the area.[319]

As this section has demonstrated, the problem of sailor desertion from American ships was compounded by the loss of U.S. vessels to raiding patriot and royalist forces. By 1817 and 1818, U.S. shipping in Chile had become a valuable and highly profitable trade. American business in in this region faced obstacles to growth from Spanish and Chilean forces as they vied for geopolitical control and sought to recruit more American deserters to serve on their side These threats to its continued profitability compelled U.S. merchants invested in the southeast Pacific to lobby U.S. officials to send warships to safeguard American activities on the Chile-Peru coast. Seeking to assist the process of American economic penetration into emerging markets in Chile and Peru, the U.S. government sent ten naval ships to protect American shipping in the Pacific during a six-year period (1817-1823).[320] The biggest challenge to U.S. shipping might have been American deserters' awareness that one's economic mobility was best pursued by selling one's labor to the highest bidder, particularly at times when sea labor was scarce.

[318] Downes to Secretary of Navy, Panama, 5 January 1820, Letters from Captains, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 184.
[319] Shurbutt, *The United States and Chile, 1812-1850,* 232-234; Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence,* 73.
[320] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 74.

Informal U.S. Empire Consolidates in the Southeast Pacific

These disruptions to American commercial growth prompted U.S. officials to consolidate the United States' power and influence on the Chile-Peru coast. For the Monroe administration (1817-1825), addressing disruptions to U.S. shipping in the southeast Pacific became a top priority, one often solved through state intervention. As secretary of state for the Madison administration (1811-1817), Monroe had witnessed the many weaknesses of American military defense during the United States' mostly disastrous war effort against Britain in the War of 1812 (1812-1814). As president, Monroe envisioned a federal government bolstered by the strength of a powerful navy. The U.S. government needed a navy to protect international American commerce.[321] From his first annual address in 1817, Monroe focused on sending U.S. naval forces below the equator to survey the Spanish American independence movements and American commerce in the region. The navy was necessary, he asserted, to "secure proper respect to our commerce in every port and from every flag."[322] What was crucial in his view was reinforcing an international system that allowed for "free trade" on the high seas and penalized "piracy" and any unlawful seizure of capital.[323]

[321] Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 94.
[322] First Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1817, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-2-1817-first-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022).
[323] This idea of "free trade" derived from an existing practice pursued by U.S. merchants, where they would seek new markets of trade in regions previously closed to foreign trade, such as Spanish America. Initially, these merchants' efforts relied upon peaceful negotiation and over time these networks became more entrenched. However, when confronted with local or imperial opposition, U.S. merchants often looked to the U.S. government to protect their commerce through military action. Historians of British Empire have discussed free trade in a similar fashion. For example, in their article "The Imperialism of Free Trade," John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson discuss the idea of an "informal imperialism" practiced by Britain in the nineteenth century where Britons sought to open new markets of trade across the globe. They pursued "trade with informal control if possible, trade with rule when necessary." See John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Trade," *The Economic History Review* vol. 6, 1 (1953), 13.

Monroe sought to protect the United States' ability to trade in every sector of the world interested with the navy. Should the United States' global trade face international challenges, he reasoned, the United States would "always have it in their power to adopt such measures respecting it as their honor and interest may require."[324] This statement implied that the U.S. government could justifiably defend its overseas commerce through military force if needed. Time and again, Monroe pointed to the importance of the U.S. Navy to safeguard American trade overseas, determining it "necessary to maintain a naval force on the Pacific for the protection of the very important interests of our citizens engaged in commerce and the fisheries in that sea."[325] This belief reflected the broadly held sentiment among U.S. merchants and officials that the United States was justified in trading unimpeded in the Pacific and in using its navy to protect its national trade by force if necessary.

Monroe's secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, was also committed to the expansion of the U.S. Navy. In March 1818, Adams published an article in the widely circulated *Niles Register*, asserting the importance of creating an American navy. "The foundation of an American navy," Adams contended, "is a grand era in the history of the world. The consequences of it will be greater than any of us can foresee." A navy gave the United States a global reach, as Adams understood it: "Look to Asia and Africa, to South America, and Europe for its effect…The four quarters of the world are in a ferment." Reflecting the administration's impulse to proactively safeguard American commerce, he claimed, "We shall interfere everywhere. Nothing but a navy, under Heaven can secure, protect or defend us."[326] The

[324] Second Annual Message, 16 November 1818, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/november-16-1818-second-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022).
[325] Third Annual Message, 7 December 1819, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1821-fifth-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022).
[326] 4 March 1818, *Niles Register,* Vol. 4; Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 88.

secretary of state envisioned an interventionist United States, actively engaged with the rest of the world on the high seas through its navy.[327]

In viewing the issue of naval intervention, Monroe's administration believed that money and property acquired or transported in the southeast Pacific required mechanisms of force to protect them. Because of its consistently high value, hard currency was the most prized possession onboard U.S. ships. The duty to protect this valuable cargo generally fell upon the U.S. Navy. During the late 1810s, the Monroe administration legally restricted some forms of trade between U.S. merchants and the communities on the Chile-Peru coast. However, it always excepted hard currency from these restrictions, reflecting the extent to which the U.S. government valued this commodity. [328] In the 1820s, naval boats in the southeast Pacific functioned, as on historian claimed, like "floating banks" in this often-volatile maritime space.[329] During the 1822 trading season, one observer described the *U.S.S. Franklin* as the central bank of the American merchant community in Valparaíso.[330] He referred to the squadron's other vessels, the *Dolphin* and the *Peruviano,* as smaller and more mobile branches of this bank as they transported currency. In one example, the captain of the *U.S.S. Franklin* transported 60,000 dollars onboard the *Cora*, which allowed U.S. merchants to also clear the port without paying

[327] The Monroe administration's interest in expanding the navy to safeguard trade in the Pacific has generally been overlooked by scholars of the early U.S. republic. Many scholars have viewed Monroe's presidency as a continuation of Jeffersonian agricultural expansion and an "Era of Good Feelings" at home. However, as this chapter demonstrates, protecting trade in the Pacific was a major priority of the administration. For literature that examines the federal government's interest in the U.S. navy in more depth, see Brook Poston, *James Monroe: A Republican Champion* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019); David Head, *Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States in the Early Republic* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015); Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*; Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire;* Howe, *The Political Culture of the American* Whigs; Billingsley, "The United States Navy"; Worcester, *Sea Power and Chilean Independence.*

[328] Secretary of Navy to Ridgely, July 11, 1820, Confidential Letters, National Archives; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 220.

[329] Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 220.

[330] Testimony of Charles G. Ridgely in "Proceedings of Courts-Martial," *Lieutenants Joshua R. Sands and William M. Hunter, American State Papers, Naval Affairs, II* (Gales and Seaton, 1860), 495-496.

Chilean customs. Naval transportation therefore could mean that U.S. merchants did not have to pay the typically steep duties charged by Chilean government custom houses.[331] Patriots were either ignorant of these activities or they ignored them to avoid direct conflict with an American warship.

Beginning in 1817, U.S. businessmen sought to use warships to transport hard currency back to the United States whenever possible. Aware of this demand, some naval captains even charged a fee for transporting hard currency for American ships and earned a revenue from this practice. During the *Ontario*'s cruise (1817-1819), Captain James Biddle collected a freight rate of two and half per cent on currency that he transported. This practice could sometimes raise tens of thousands of dollars.[332] During the *Macedonian*'s two-year cruise, the warship carried over two million dollars' worth of hard currency for American vessels.[333] This amount netted the expedition around $50,000 at the standard freight rate of two and half per cent.[334] While some American observers objected to this practice, the Monroe administration refused to discipline or rescind command of naval captains who engaged in this process.[335]

In approaching the independence conflicts on the Chile-Peru coast, the Monroe administration strove to preserve and promote American trade by pursuing a policy of neutrality. According to this position, the United States favored neither Spanish nor rebel forces and its merchants would pursue trade with either side purely out of economic interest. Neutral trade required that the Monroe administration treat patriots and loyalists "equally." With this objective

[331] Stewart, "Proceedings of Courts-Martial," *Naval Affairs*, 495-496, 498; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 294; William M. Hunter, USS Franklin, 1821-1824, "Logbook and Shipboard Journal," Huntington Library.
[332] Stewart, "Proceedings of Courts-Martial," *Naval Affairs*, 495-496; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 130.
[333] Gauntt, "Private Remarks," 123; Billingsley, "The United States Navy," 215.
[334] Gerald S. Graham and R.L. Humphreys, *The Navy and South America, 1807-1823, Correspondence of the Commanders-in-Chief on the South American Station* (London: Navy Records Society, 1962), 372-374; Whitaker, *Independence*, 300-310.
[335] Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 361.

in mind, Monroe stated, "Our ports have continued to be equally open to both parties and on the same conditions and our citizens have been equally restrained from interfering in favor of either to the prejudice of the other."[336] Defending against criticisms from both sides who condemned Americans for selling arms to their rivals, Monroe contended that patriots and loyalists "have enjoyed an equal right to purchase and export arms, munitions of war, and every other supply, the exportation of all articles whatever being permitted under laws which were passed long before the commencement of the contest." That inhabitants of Spanish America were now engaged in civil war did not change the United States' commitment to trading with patriots and royalists on equal terms, Monroe contended, and consequently American "commerce with each has been alike protected by the Government."[337] His mention of protection underscored the U.S. position in which forceful intervention might be necessary to preserve commercial activities.

In addition to using American warships and political neutrality to protect and promote American commerce, the U.S. government also appointed a series of informal diplomats to help secure U.S. business on the Chile-Peru coast.[338] These individuals frequently pursued the return of confiscated cargoes and outstanding loans to American merchants. During the first half of the 1810s, the administration appointed eight consuls.[339] Between 1817 and 1823, the administration appointed thirteen Americans to serve as informal representatives in Spanish America.[340] U.S.

[336] Third Annual Message, 7 December 1819, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1821-fifth-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022).
[337] Second Annual Message, 16 November 1818, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/november-16-1818-second-annual-message (Accessed April 26, 2022).
[338] The American consular service grew from six individuals in 1790 to 131 by 1830. See Goey, *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism*, 94-97.
[339] These agents included Joel Poinsett, Mathew Hoevel, Robert Lowry, Luis Goddefroy, William Gilchrist Miller, Henry Hill, Alexander Scott, and William Shaler. Wriston, *Executive Agents*, 25, 410-414; Goey, *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism*, 94-97.
[340] These appointees included Jeremy Robinson, Thomas Loyd Halsey, C.A. Rodney, John Graham, Theodorick Bland, W.G.D. Worthington, John Devereaux, John B. Prevost, John Forbes, Washington Stewart, John Higginson, Michael Hogan, and William Tudor. See Wriston, *Executive Agents*, 418-423.

officials often recruited individuals from merchant families with ties to trading houses at commercial ports across New England and the mid-Atlantic states.[341] Their backgrounds enabled them to petition royalists and patriots for the return of U.S. merchants' property because they had a history of trading with individuals in government and enjoyed power and influence with top U.S. officials.

Some U.S. agents strove to ensure repayment of American loans credited to Chilean patriots. The U.S. informal agent, Theodorick Bland, had a son-in-law, J.H. Skinner, who was a wealthy Baltimore merchant. While Bland travelled Spanish America, he aimed to collect an outstanding loan, credited to José Miguel Carrera during his time in the United States in 1816. When Bland arrived at Spanish American shores furnished with letters of recommendation for Carrera from J.H. Skinner & Co.[342] Bland was to collect this loan from the Chilean government along with a staggeringly large interest.[343] Bland's expedition stopped at Montevideo on the voyage to Buenos Aires, specifically to meet Carrera, who acted as a guide to the city for the commission.[344] Unfortunately for Bland, Carrera was unable to repay his debt at that time. But Bland's efforts reflected U.S. informal agents' interactions with Chilean patriots. Their behavior was shaped by U.S. business interests in Chile.

Other U.S. agents worked to reclaim American property seized by Spanish royalists. In 1821, U.S. agent Jeremy Robinson traveled to Peru to retrieve the American ships *Beaver* and *Canton* from royalist authorities which, he complained, were "forcibly seized by the rapacious hand of military and maritime violence, their cargoes taken out, appropriated and command for

[341] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 9.
[342] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 52-53.
[343] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 35.
[344] Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 52; Eugenio Pereira Salas, "La Misión Bland en Chile," 87.

the use of the King of Spain and afterwards both vessels and cargoes were condemned."[345] In his private journal, Robinson confided that he was close friends with one of the *Beaver*'s main investors, New York merchant John Jacob Astor.[346] When U.S. warships were present, diplomats could draw on the power and prestige that these vessels provided to protect commerce and restore U.S. merchant voyages. After the *Beaver* and the *Canton* were recovered, Captain James Biddle of the *Ontario* attributed the mission's success to the presence of his naval squadron.[347] In this way, the administration sent these agents to press royalists and patriots to release American ships and sailors and enable these American voyages to continue generating profits.

Some U.S. informal agents saw their presence on the Chile-Peru coast along with a U.S. warship as an opportunity to garner wealth. This sentiment informed how they related to loyalists and patriots alike. In 1818, U.S. agent John Prevost and Captain James Biddle facilitated the purchase of wheat in Chile, which they later sold to royalists in Peru at exorbitant rates. Both reaped profits from this transaction.[348] Naval officers also coordinated with informal U.S. agents to profit from Chilean privateering. Jeremy Robinson reported that Captain Charles Stewart of the *Franklin* and the U.S. agents Henry Hill, W.G.D. Worthington, John Higginson, and John Prevost all invested in one Chilean naval expedition against the Spanish in Peru.[349] After the Chilean Navy seized a major Spanish warship, Robinson contended, these men "sold out" their interests, Robinson reported, in "apprehension of censure" from U.S. officials.[350]

In short, during the second decade of the nineteenth century, U.S. officials labored to protect and promote American commerce on the Chile-Peru coast through the use of warships, a

[345] "Robinson Papers," 14.
[346] Wriston, *Executive Agents,* 418-423; Porter, *John Jacob Astor,* 651; "Robinson Papers," 14.
[347] James Biddle, 6 Dec. 1818, "Journal and Correspondence"; Billingsley, "The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America," 95.
[348]Alvarez, "Jeremy Robinson," 54.
[349] "Robinson Papers," 88.
[350] "Robinson Papers," 88.

policy of political neutrality, and the stationing of informal agents on the ground. Naval ships acted as "floating banks" for hard currency, which afforded opportunities for expeditions to raise revenue in exchange for transportation. The presence of a warship strengthened American efforts to reclaim U.S. merchant's property on the Chile-Peru coast. Political neutrality provided U.S. merchants with some legal cover as they conducted trade with both patriots and royalists. Informal agents petitioned patriots and royalists to return confiscated U.S. ships and cargoes, strove to collect payment of U.S. loans, and coordinated with navy officers to expand American trade. Warships, political neutrality, and informal agents all featured as components of an expanding U.S. imperial infrastructure in the southeast Pacific. They functioned as panaceas that could mitigate the disruptions to American trade posed by patriot and royalist forces.

This emerging U.S. imperial infrastructure in the southeast Pacific was bolstered a more interventionist foreign diplomacy from the Monroe administration. In late January 1823, the U.S. government officially recognized the political autonomy of Chile and the U.S. Senate confirmed the nomination of Herman Allen of Vermont as a formal envoy to Chile. The administration followed this recognition with an annual address, today known as the Monroe Doctrine, in December 1823. The doctrine claimed that "America was for Americans" and framed the United States as a protector of this new conception of hemispheric sovereignty. In doing so, the administration positioned the United States as an influential power in the western hemisphere, which claimed and protected U.S. sovereignty over commercial maritime spaces. In the doctrine, the U.S. state vowed to oppose efforts by European powers to colonize and govern new territories in the Americas.[351]

[351] *The Monroe Doctrine*, 2 December 1823, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp (Accessed April 26, 2022).

The Pacific coastline was a concern of President Monroe's when he issued the doctrine in late 1823.[352] In the beginning of his address, Monroe stressed the need to rebuff Russian encroachment in the Pacific Northwest.[353] In 1821, the Russian Tsar had aggressively extended the Russian Alaskan boundary to the Columbia River region, prohibiting all non-Russian maritime traffic north of it. U.S. agents in Chile had long ago sounded the alarm about Russian encroachment on the Pacific coast. In 1819, Robinson cautioned "that Russia seemed to be grasping at American and Asiatic objects." He feared, "I have heard that she has already encroached on the U. States by having made a settlement on her North West territory."[354] Monroe's secretary of state seized on these challenges as a "opportunity for us to take our stand" against all European intervention in the Americas. In response, John Quincy Adams articulated the United States' formal opposition to European colonial intervention in the Americas, the core tenet of the Monroe Doctrine.[355]

Conclusion

[352] Scholars often examine the Monroe Doctrine in the context of Spanish American wars for independence and U.S. fears that the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, and Prussia) would reconquer the colonies on behalf of Spain. However, scholars seldom consider how American access to the Pacific coast featured in U.S. officials' decision making. U.S. officials issued the doctrine after Britain had proposed a joint Anglo-American declaration to oppose any recolonization of Spanish America. When the United States decided to make a statement on its own, the British generally reinforced the Monroe Doctrine because it served their own interests in keeping other European countries out of the western hemisphere. For literature that offers overviews of the changing historical interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, see Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine;* Duncan Andrew Campbell, *Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship* (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2007); Peter Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Dexter Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1963); Charles Lyon Chandler, "The United States Commerce with Latin America at the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* vol. 38, no. 3 (May 1924); S.E. Morison, "The Origin of the Monroe Doctrine, 1775-1823" *Economica, No. 10* (Feb. 1924).

[353] *The Monroe Doctrine,* 2 December 1823, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp (Accessed April 26, 2022).

[354] "Robinson Papers," 48.

[355] John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs,* Vol. 6, 163.

For the United States, what began with a moderate commercial interest in the Chile-Peru coastline evolved to become a concrete and expansive U.S. mandate to intervene in the southeast Pacific to protect U.S. trade. After the growth of American trade on the Chile-Peru coast, the disruptions it faced from patriot recruitment and from patriot and royalist raiding were partly remedied by the intervention of U.S. warships and informal agents. For a time, a policy of political neutrality allowed U.S. merchants to trade with both sides. However, this state of affairs had changed by late 1823. With the Monroe Doctrine, the Monroe administration was prepared to define the western hemisphere as one free of European colonization and open to free trade. The Monroe Doctrine asserted U.S. power and influence on the Chile-Peru coast because the U.S. government saw it as a policy that best suited American commerce in the region.

The 1823 Monroe Doctrine reinforced existing structures of U.S. power and influence already functioning in the southeast Pacific. American interest and investment in business ventures in the southeast Pacific, and the governmental responses to commercial threats that it faced, collectively facilitated the growth of an imperial infrastructure on the Chile-Peru coast. This imperial infrastructure stemmed from the presence of U.S. business, naval ships, diplomats and was defined by the Monroe Doctrine. This imperial system did not seek formal political control over territory. Rather, it positioned the United States as a hegemonic power with a prerogative to intervene in the affairs of Spanish American communities whenever its commerce was under threat.

As American empire expanded in the southeast Pacific before the mid-nineteenth-century, private enterprise and state intervention functioned as two closely intertwined and mutually dependent forces. This chapter connects U.S. imperial expansion to American investment in commodities, trade networks, markets, and forms of labor on the Chile-Peru

coastline because it incorporates often-overlooked places (the southeast Pacific), peoples (South American patriots and royalists, Anglo-American deserters), and products (guns, wheat, precious minerals) into the broader narrative of nineteenth-century American expansion. This approach also pushes us to consider how American trade on the Chile-Peru coast influenced American ideas about free trade, the growth of the U.S. Navy, and the crafting of the Monroe Doctrine.

Chapter 3: Pursuing a "System of Vigilance" in the Kingdom of Hawai‘i: American Whaling, Maritime Merchants, and the United States' Expansion to the Central Pacific, 1819-1849

Sailing westward along trade winds and Pacific currents from the Chile-Peru coast to the Hawaiian Islands, American commercial vessels visited the ports of Honolulu and Lahaina to trade and acquire provisions. As American concerns deepened their involvement in Pacific whaling in the 1820s and 1830s, the Hawaiian Islands became a major node in American commercial maritime imperialism. This American traffic drew an increased American interest in acquiring provisions for whale hunting voyages and in protecting shipping between the Hawaiian Islands and the Americas. By examining the efforts of American merchants, informal diplomats, and officials to protect trade in and around the Hawaiian Islands, this chapter highlights how the whaling industry fueled the evolution of American commercial maritime imperialism in the central Pacific.

In January 1824, a mutiny erupted on board a Nantucket whaling ship about 900 miles away from the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, which drew increased American attention to the archipelago. The mutineers decapitated the captain in his sleep and attacked three senior officers and threw them overboard. The event captured national attention as details of the grisly mutiny appeared in newspapers and popular accounts penned by survivors of the *Globe*'s voyage. As one survivor recalled the episode, the *Globe*'s captain had recruited several of the mutineers in Hawai‘i, a "rough set of cruel beings which were neither fit to live or die," who had poisoned the crew's morale and incited the mutiny. This detail prompted American merchants and U.S. officials to associate sailor unrest with the archipelago. For American merchants, the mutiny on

the *Globe* typified a broader trend playing out across the central Pacific as maritime laborers increasingly resisted their terms of service by mutinying and deserting.[356]

Consequently, addressing sailor mutiny, desertion, and piracy became top of mind for American merchants and U.S. officials. John Coffin Jones, a Honolulu merchant for the Boston firm Marshall & Wildes, who also served as the U.S. consul to the Kingdom of Hawai‘i (1820-1839), described a widespread lawlessness among sailors on the islands. “A large number of the most abandoned of that class of people” lived on the islands, Jones warned, “far from the laws and restraints of civilized society” and “familiar with every vice, lost to all sense of right, and ready to assist and aid in acts of Mutiny, Piracy and Murder.” To remedy the situation, Jones recommended U.S. officials “extending a strong arm of protection” to the central Pacific by using the U.S. Navy to give “the appearance, if not the actual force, of power.” Jones was not alone in his calls for government intervention. Nearly two hundred New England whaling merchants also petitioned the government, urging officials to increase U.S. naval presence in the central Pacific. As the global economy expanded and more firmly integrated the Hawaiian Islands into world markets, merchants increasingly sought governmental aid to protect their business on the islands. In response, the U.S. government used diplomacy and military power to

[356] George Comstock, “Narrative of the Mutiny,” Appendix B, in Thomas Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe: The Fatal Voyage of Samuel Comstock* (New York: Norton, 2002), 223. For more on the mutiny, see Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*, 189, 52, 65-66. Accounts of the mutiny appeared in at least a dozen newspapers in late 1824, including *Eastern Argus* (Portland, Maine), October 21, 1824; *Columbian Centenial American Federalist* (Boston, Massachusetts), December 1, 1824; *Salem Gazette* (Salem, Massachusetts), December 2, 1824; *Boston Commercial Gazette* (Boston, Massachusetts), December 2, 1824; *The Essex Register* (Salem, Massachusetts), December 2, 1824; *Rhode-Island Republican* (Newport, Rhode Island), December 4, 1824; *Providence Gazette* (Providence, Rhode Island), December 4, 1824; *Connecticut Mirror* (Hartford, Connecticut), December 6, 1824; *Eastern Argus* (Portland, Maine), December 6, 1824; *American Mercury*, December 7, 1824; *Connecticut Courant* (Hartford, Connecticut), December 7, 1824; *Gazette & Patriot* (Haverhill, Massachusetts), December 9, 1824; *Hallowell Gazette* (Hallowell, Maine), December 15, 1824.

reshape Hawaiian labor systems and practices of governance to help ensure the safety of commercial ventures and the availability of maritime labor in Hawai‘i.[357]

During the 1820s and 1830s, the changing demands of the American whaling industry redefined U.S.-Hawaiian relations and reoriented U.S. foreign diplomacy to focus more on the central Pacific. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine focused state diplomacy on protecting business in Latin America after most Spanish American colonies had secured their independence from the Spanish Empire. The policy opposed European efforts to recolonize these states, fearing the return of mercantilist obstructions. With the creation of the Tyler Doctrine in 1842, U.S. officials expanded their field of interest from the Americas westward to include the Hawaiian Islands. U.S. officials justified their support for merchants' commercial ventures by citing their right to defend American property and ensure that American ships remained adequately manned. The Tyler Doctrine asserted an American right to protect business where it existed. This diplomatic posturing gave the United States pretext to enhance American power in Hawai‘i through laws, diplomacy, and military force and modelled a distinctly American overseas imperialism.[358]

Scholarship on American imperialism in Hawai‘i often focuses on missionaries and planters who introduced Western land ownership and large-scale agriculture during the second half of the nineteenth century. Many scholars also concentrate on the 1890s when the United States annexed the Kingdom of Hawai‘i. Literature on American whaling has provided in-depth

[357] John C. Jones, Jr. to Lieut. John Percival, April 13, 1826, John Percival Papers, 1826–1841, Ms. N-691, Massachusetts Historical Society; Gregory Rosenthal, *Beyond Hawai‘i: Native Labor in the Pacific World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 62; Robert Stauffer, "The Hawai‘i-United States Treaty of 1826," *The Hawaiian Journal of* History, Vol. 17 (1983), 44.

[358] John Tyler, "Message from the President of the United States, respecting the trade and commerce of the United States with the Sandwich Islands, December 30, 1842," from United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations and the United States* (*FRUS*) *1894 Appendix II: Affairs in Hawaii* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), 39. For more on the Monroe Doctrine and its connection to the Tyler Doctrine, see Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013), 112-14.

studies of the industry and its importance to the United States' economy. An examination of American whaling therefore reveals the extent to which U.S. imperialism was tethered to the labor demands of American merchants.[359]

American merchants and U.S. officials' efforts to regulate sailors and protect business activities in and around the Hawaiian Islands fueled the United States' expansion to Hawai'i. Relationships between American merchants and U.S. officials defined American expansion in the Pacific and its connections to global imperial processes. This chapter demonstrates how American whaling merchants pursued the United States' expansion to Hawai'i. I consider how participants in the Pacific whaling industry understood the function of an American "system of vigilance" in Hawai'i, a turn of phrase I borrow from an 1826 New Bedford newspaper article. This term describes a system operating in the Hawaiian Islands that bound laborers to their voyages and forcibly recruited sailors onshore through laws, diplomacy, and military force.

[359] For literature focused on missionaries and planters and American expansion, see Putney and Burlin, ed., *The Role of the American Board in the World;* Fish Kashay, "Competing Imperialisms and Hawaiian Authority; Fish Kashay, "Agents of Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth-Century Hawaii"; Silva, *Aloha* Betrayed; Osorio, *Dismembering* Lãhui; Merry, *Colonizing* Hawaii; Wagner-Wright, *The Structure of the Missionary Call to the Sandwich Islands 1790*-1830; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom.* For scholarship that examines the United States' annexation of Hawai'i in the 1890s, see Jones, *Honor in the* Dust; Andrade, *Unconquerable* Rebel; Russ, *The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893*-1894; Soutter Campbell, *The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865–* 1900; Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of Hawaiian Islands*; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol.* III; Stevens, *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842*-1898; Dulles, *America in the Pacific: A Century of* Expansion; Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. For examples of scholarship on the whaling industry, see Shoemaker, *Native Whalemen and the World;* Creighton, *Rites and Passage*; Busch, *"Whaling Will Never Do For Me"*; Stackpole, *Whales & Destiny*; Stackpole, *The Sea-Hunters*; Hohman, *The American* Whaleman; and Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*. For literature that considers the connection between maritime commercial expansion and empire, see: Smith, *To Master the Boundless* Sea; Rouleau, *With Sails Whitening Ever Sea*; Alex Roland, Jeffrey Bolster, and Alexander Keyssar, *The Way of the Ship*: *American's Maritime History Reenvisioned, 1600-2000* (Hoboken: John Wiley, 2008); Helen Rozwadowski, *Fathoming the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)*;* Rosenthal, *Beyond Hawai'*i; Seth Archer, *Sharks Upon the Land: Colonialism, Indigenous Health, and Culture in Hawaii, 1778-1855* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Thus, an examination of American whaling reveals the extent to which U.S. imperialism was often tethered to the labor demands that American commercial expansion required.[360]

The New American Draw: Whaling in the Pacific

American whaling built on decades of American trade with communities across the Pacific en route to Manila and Guangzhou where Americans bartered for Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain. One of the most important goods used by American traders to purchase Chinese products was Hawaiian-grown sandalwood. Beginning in the 1790s, American fur traders had acquired sandalwood and learned of its high demand in East Asia. The fragrant heartwood was used by Chinese buyers for incense, medicinal purposes, architectural details, and carved objects. With at least seven species of it growing across the Hawaiian Islands, sandalwood quickly became a valuable Hawaiian export. Kānaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians) sold what they saw as a relatively useless wood to traders in exchange for much-coveted American cargoes. Following the death of Kamehameha I in 1819, his successor Liholiho lifted a decade-long government monopoly on sandalwood and harvesting of the tree expanded expontentially. American traders saw their best returns between 1821 and 1823. However, by 1824, the easily accessible stands of sandalwood had been collected and Kānaka Maoli harvested far less wood than previously. Perhaps the most important legacy of sandalwood was the Hawaiian debts that emerged in the late 1820s as the Ali‘i (Native Hawaiians of chiefly rank) overpromised future sandalwood to American merchants in exchange for their re-exports of European and Asian manufactures.[361]

---

[360] "System of vigilance" was a phrase that appeared in the *New Bedford Mercury,* December 15, 1826: 19, 3, 1 in R. Gerard Ward, *American Activities in the Central Pacific, 1790-1870,* Vol. 3, 132.

[361] Mark Merlin, Dan VanRavenswaay, "The History of Human Impact on the Genus *Santalum* in Hawai‘i," *Proceedings of the Symposium on the Sandalwood, USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech Rep. PSW-11* (1990), 53; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Vol. 1*, 92; Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition, during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842,* V (Philadelphia, 1849), 262; Gavin Daws, "The High

The needs of the whaling industry and long distance shipping ventures drew increasing numbers of Americans to Hawai‘i despite dwindling supplies of sandalwood. The flow of winds and ocean currents in the Pacific typically carried vessels to Hawai‘i as sailors navigated between fisheries and ports of trade. All long voyages depended on fresh water, fruit, vegetables, meat, and salt. Most U.S. voyages in the Pacific found these resources available in Hawai‘i. Sailors regularly visited the islands to repair their vessels, find recruits, and transship materials (such as spermaceti and whale oil) to the United States. Hawai‘i offered American whaling and merchant ships a crucial waystation in the mid-Pacific.[362]

Increased demand in the United States and Europe for whale products in the 1820s encouraged an enhanced American investment and participation in the whaling industry. The commodification of whale products meant that cities and towns fueled their streetlamps and lit their lighthouse beacons with sperm oil, a substance that rarely froze, enjoyed a high melting point, and burned without odor. Melted whale blubber lubricated the iron gears of industrial machinery. Craftsmen used hardened spermaceti to create high-grade candles. Heating spermaceti also yielded fatty acids used to manufacture soap and paints. Whalers harvested sperm whale’s teeth, too, and traded them to Pacific Islanders who wore them as sacred ornaments. Ambergris—a substance composed of the undigested squid “beaks” inside a whale’s stomach —served as an important fixative in women’s perfume, which imparted homogeneity

Chief Boki: A Biographical Study in Early Nineteenth Hawaiian History,” *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (March 1966), 67.

[362] Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, 96; Rhys Richards, *Honolulu Centre of Trans-Pacific Trade, 1820 to 1840* (Canberra: Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, 2000), 9, 25; Hiram Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands* (Hartford: Huntington, 1847), 134; Susan A. Lebo, “A Local Perspective of Hawai‘i’s Whaling Economy: Whale Traditions and Government Regulation of the Kingdom’s Native Seamen and Whale Fishery,” *Coriolis*, 1 (2010), 8-9; Lance Davis, Robert Gallman, Karin Gleiter, *In Pursuit of Leviathan*: *Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 29; Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 133.

and permanency to fragrances. A substance favored by consumers in the Middle East and China as a spice and aphrodisiac, ambergris became a major export for U.S. merchants. Finally, the bristly comb-like plate found in the mouth of right whales functioned as "the plastic of the day," as one historian phrased it. When heated, whalebone was modified by craftsmen to make women's corset stays and skirt hoops, riding and carriage whips, chair springs, fish rods, umbrellas, and other objects requiring flexibility and strength.[363]

Figure 3.1: "Images of Whaling," Hawai'i, c. 1830, Nantucket Historical Association.

[363] Rosenthal, *Beyond Hawai'i,* 52-53; Francis Olmsted, *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage* (New York: Appleton, 1841), 135; Thomas Osborne, *Pacific Eldorado: A History of Greater California* (New York: John Wiley, 2013), 71; Hohman, *American Whaleman,* 4; Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise,* 132-33; J.R. McNeill, "Of Rats and Men: A Synoptic Environmental History of the Island Pacific," *Journal of World History,* 5 (Fall 1994), 320-22.

By the mid-century, this global demand for whaling products made whaling the United States' largest industry outside of agriculture (cotton, tobacco, wheat, and rice). In value of output, whaling was the fifth largest sector of the United States' economy. Despite not receiving federal subsidies like other fishing ventures such as the cod industry, whaling led among American fisheries. Fueled by growing consumer and industrial production demands, whaling became larger than all other U.S. fishing industries combined. In the 1830s, U.S. whalers collectively earned over three million dollars annually in profits. By the 1850s, annual earnings exceeded ten million. Despite increased hunting, whale products' value remained stable in the 1840s while the United States' leading export, cotton, decreased in value due to production surpluses in the slaveholding South. Many Americans also labored in building and repairing ships, harpoons, sails, and rope. Others found employment in raising provisions for whalers, making clothing, and running lodges.[364]

One reason that American whalers increasingly hunted whales in the Pacific was a decline in the whaling population in the South Atlantic. By the end of the eighteenth century, American whalers—as well as British, French, and Swedish ships—had exhausted fisheries in the South Atlantic. In 1818, American whalers found fisheries off the Chile-Peru coastline. In November 1819, the first American whaling ships to visit Hawai'i, the *Equator* of Nantucket and the *Balaena* of New Bedford, acquired provisions at Honolulu after whaling off South America's west coast. Reflecting a trend that grew during the subsequent decades, the *Balaena* recruited

[364] Johnson, *The United States in the Pacific,* 45, 52; Emory Johnson, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce* (New York: B. Franklin, 1967), 157-61; Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery,* 700; Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter, *In Pursuit of Leviathan,* 4-5; Creighton, *Rites and Passages,* 18-19, 21; Emory Johnson, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce,* 172; U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Chapter U, International Transactions and Foreign Commerce (Series U 1-186)," from *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington: Government Print Office, 2013), 899; Hohman, *American Whaleman,* 5; J.R. Williams, "The Whale Fishery," *North American Review,* XXXVIII (January 1834), 84-116.

Kānaka Maoli for the voyage ahead. The following summer a Nantucket vessel discovered a new sperm whale fishery off the coast of Japan and brought knowledge of the new grounds back to the United States. This intelligence prompted growing numbers of New England merchants to send whaling expeditions to the Pacific. In 1822, more than thirty whalers visited the waters off of Japan, collecting an unprecedented level of gross tonnage for American merchants. The following year the number of American ships rose to sixty. Then, in the 1830s and 1840s, whalers found productive fisheries across the Pacific off the coasts of Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Alaska, and off the Antarctic coastline.[365]

Hawai‘i: A Developing Imperial Node for American Whaling

The expansion of the Pacific whaling industry drew increased American attention to the Hawaiian Islands. Demonstrating the U.S. government's augmented interest in the archipelago, U.S. officials appointed John Coffin Jones, a New England-born merchant, to the Hawaiian consulship in 1820. His assignment prompted the jingoist British editor of Australia's first newspaper to accuse Americans of seeing the Hawaiian archipelago to be "under their protection" and themselves to be "in the closest bonds of alliance with those islanders." Jones's actions did little to disprove this British suspicion as he pushed for the U.S. government's "constant protection." Hawai‘i was vital for American ships, he argued, because "there is no place in this ocean which can afford them equal advantage for refreshing their crews or refitting their ships and thither they must come or those voyages be much protracted on account of their having to seek some distant ports." Due to the seasonality of commercial vessels' visits, Hawai‘i

[365] Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*, 195-96; Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, 225; Richards, *Honolulu Centre of Trans-Pacific Trade*, 9-10; Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 138; Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, 94-96; Donald Johnson, *The United States in the Pacific*, 50; Charles Melville Scammon, *Marine Mammals of the North-western Coast of North Amnerica* (San Francisco: J.H. Carmany, 1874), 212-14; Eric Jay Dolin, *Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America* (New York: Norton, 2007), 227-29.

never saw a constant stream of sailors. Instead, the archipelago saw huge and sustained influxes of whaling ships during the fall and spring seasons. Various sources from American sailors indicate that as many as 2,000 foreign seamen could visit Hawaiian shores at a time. These visitors caused disruptions to Hawaiian life and created a demand for Hawaiian provisions, prostitutes, and alcohol.[366]

Kānaka Maoli women sometimes drew American men to the islands and prompted them to outstay their ship's shore leave. Some men settled in Euro-American enclaves, worked as blacksmiths and shopkeepers, and engaged in long-term unions with Hawaiian women and fathered multiracial children. After years aboard a whaling ship, the author Herman Melville described the transformation of many sailors from being "parsimonious persons" who "not three days after getting ashore" were found "rolling around the streets in penniless drunkness." Hawaiian prostitution was also a booming business. One expert estimated that profits from prostitution reached as high as $100,000 in a year from the sex trade in the principal ports, more than the annual revenue of the government in the 1840s. Resulting in pregnancy and in the spread of venereal diseases, the sex trade altered Native reproduction by spawning multiracial families while also rendering some Hawaiian women sterile.[367]

---

[366] *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser,* August 24, 1827, 3; John C. Jones to Secretary of State Henry Clay, July 1, 1827, Microcopy No. 144, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820-1903, 1834*-1903, vol. 1, October *2, 1820-June 30, 1843* (Microfilm: Roll 1), National Archives (Washington, D.C.); Patrick Strauss, *Americans in Polynesia, 1783-1842* (East Lansing, 1963), 38, 88-89; Patrick V. Kirch and Marshall Sahlins, *Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii, vol. I: Historical Ethnography* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 106-07; Rosenthal, *Beyond Hawai'i,* 74; Levi Chamberlain Journal, vol. 2, October 1823, Hawaiian Mission Children's Society Library (Mission Houses Museum Library, Honolulu, Hawai'i), Honolulu, Digital Archives, Typescript.

[367] Herman Melville, *White Jacket; or, The World in a Man-of-War* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1850), 314; Shoemaker, *Native Whalemen,* 117; Chester Smith Lyman, *Hawaiian Journals of Chest Smith Lyman,* April 11, 1847, Typescript, Hawaiian Mission Children's Society Library; Kirch, Sahlins, *Anahulu,* 107-08; Creighton, *Rites and Passages,* 152; Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic,* 161.

Large-scale transformations in Hawaiian politics and society facilitated the islands' integration into global economies and migration flows. After Kamehameha I established unified rule over the Hawaiian Islands in the 1790s, he and his progeny worked to exert royal authority over every island. Much as their father had done, Kamehameha II (Lihohilo) and Kamehameha III (Kauikeaouli) often collaborated with foreigners when coordinating state responses to sailor misconduct and asserting their authority through enforcing laws, policing, and imprisonment. Such coordination revealed how much the interests of local rulers and the demands of U.S. merchants overlapped on the archipelago. The coalescing of support among the aliʻi for whaling and merchant shipping helped ensure that international business on the archipelago remained favorable. Many aliʻi regularly participated in foreign markets and came to depend on a regular flow of exports and Euro-American imports.[368]

Disruptions to Commerce: Deserters and Mutineers in the Central Pacific

The explosion of the whaling industry in the 1820s and 1830s drew Americans increasingly to the Hawaiian Islands and the central Pacific. As more sailors visited the Hawaiian Islands, desertion rates on whaling and merchant ships spiked. By the early 1840s, ships rarely returned with more than half of their original crew. There are many reasons why American whalers deserted their ships and remained in Hawaiʻi on a long and short term basis. Poor treatment by captains was a common complaint of most men on American whaling ships and motivated many sailors to abandon their ships. Enduring the "absolute rule" of a captain often meant that sailors experienced confinement, denial of sleep, food, and water, grueling labor assignments, "cycles of whippings," and other brutal forms of punishment, such as hanging a

[368] Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic*, 225; Daws, "The High Chief Bok," 65-67.

sailor from the rigging for hours. The most common sentence was 12, 18, or 24 lashes. However, some men received as many as 100 lashes. Because the number of crewmembers on a whaling ship was triple that of a merchant vessel, most of the sailor population at port were usually sailors from whaling ships. These factors meant that a very high percentage of deserters in the Hawaiian Islands were from whalers.[369]

The conditions at sea prompted many sailors to break their contract and desert. A whaling ship's living quarters, which were usually infested with rats, cockroaches, bedbugs, and fleas, and sailors' spoiled rations and drinking water, also motivated many of them to desert. One whaler described the sailors' quarters as "a compound of foul air" that was "black and slimy with filth, very small and as hot as an oven." Another whaler described his diet as "nothing but salt cod, pork and hard bread. The pork at least five years old, the water is very bad." It did not help that whaling expeditions were expontentially longer than others. Whaling averaged between three and five years, while non-whaling merchant vessels typically completed their voyages in under two years. An average voyage of 29 months between 1815 and 1824 extended to 42 months between 1833 and 1842. By the 1840s, whale populations had declined due to overhunting and whaling crews routinely followed a "circuit" to no fewer than six fisheries. These voyages required them to spend four months away from land at a time, putting them at risk of scurvy.[370]

---

[369] Edward Melillo, "Making Sea Cucumbers Out of Whales' Teeth," *Environmental History,* Vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2015), 464; Busch*, "Whaling Will Never Do For Me,"* 26-28, 463; Hohman, *American Whalemen,* 316-17; Creighton, *Rites and Passages,* 93-95, 112, 134, 145; Melville, *White Jacket*, 25, 111; Fink, *Sweatshops at* Sea, 60.
[370] Olmsted, *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage*, 151; Ross Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise* (London: J. Murray, 1846), 24; Elmo Hohman, "Wages, Risk, and Profit in the Whaling Industry," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 40, no. 4 (Aug. 1926), 644-48; George Taylor, "Nantucket Oil Merchants and the American Revolution," *The Massachusetts Review*, Vol. 18, no. 3 (Oct. 1977), 581-83; J.*;* Busch, *"Whaling Will Never Do For Me,"* 13-14, 83, 11; Bark *Clara Bell*, Mattapoisett, Mass., Aug. 18, 1855, Blunt White Library, Mystic Seaport Museum, 164; Melville, *White Jacket,* 51; Strauss, *Americans in Polynesia,* 35; Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise,* 138-140.

Financial hardship drove many sailors on whaling ships to run away to the islands. Whalers typically worked for a "lay" (a percentage of the voyage's total profits). Non-officer mariners typically received 1/180 of a voyage's profit—a far cry from an officer's 1/45 cut. One historian estimated that in the early 1840s a common sailor made 17 cents per day, while a contemporary unskilled worker in an American city made 90 cents daily. Sailors often struggled to repay their debts to employers. The filthy dissections and extreme climes that came with whaling work required sailors to purchase clothing on credit at an "exorbitant profit." One whaler complained that his "hard earned wages were spent on replacing necessary clothing often." The likelihood of mariners ending a voyage indebted to their employers was high, particularly if a sailor bought too many goods on credit, or his captain deducted pay for infractions. Shrewd captains worked to deprive men of their end-of-journey pay by abandoning injured men onshore without any compensation.[371]

The dangers that accompanied hunting and processing whales prompted many sailors to desert and stay in Hawai'i. During a typical hunt, one observer contended "many boats are destroyed and many more lives lost." A whale's "flukes" (tail fins) often maimed or killed men. The destruction of the Nantucket whaling ship *Essex* in 1820 was a cautionary tale among sailors in which sperm whales near Chile killed almost an entire crew. Even after sailors successfully killed a whale, the steel harpoons and lances they used during the "cutting in" process often impaled men and the boiling oil in their try pots often scalded men during turbulent weather. Oil and blood slickened the decks and caused many whalers to slip overboard to the sharks gathering

[371] Edward Melillo, "Making Sea Cucumbers Out of Whales' Teeth," 464; Busch, *"Whaling Will Never Do For Me,"* 20-21, 12-14, 96-99, 91; Olmsted, *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage*, 144; Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise*, 24; Bark *Clara Bell*, Mattapoisett, Mass., Aug. 18, 1855; Hohman, *American Whaleman*, 240; Howard Hartman, *The Seas Were Mine* (London: G.G. Harrap, 1936), 44-46; Robert L Hadfield, *Mutiny at Sea* (Standfordville: E.M. Coleman, 1979).

below. One sailor summed up the whaler's bleak existence: "Covered with oil, suffocating under the fumes of the try-works, in perpetual danger of life and limb, he thus toils." The harsh realities of whaling prompted many men to desert.[372]



Figure 3.2: "Illustrations for Loss of the Ship Essex," MSS 106/Folder 3, Nantucket Historical Association.

[372] Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise*, 114, 120; Olmsted, *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage*, 315; Olmsted, *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage*, 142-44, 114, 505; Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*, 137.

The life of a whaler involved many hardships and men often resisted this service in favor of finding respite on a Pacific archipelago. One form of resistance that American merchants feared more than desertion was sailor mutiny. One of the most famous examples of an American mutiny took place in January 1824 onboard the Nantucket whaling ship *Globe* as its crew traveled from a hunt off the coast of Japan to return to Hawai‘i. The episode captured national attention through newspapers and best-selling books. Nine hundred miles south of the Hawaiian Islands, the *Globe*'s harpooner Samuel Comstock schemed with several recruits from Hawai‘i to overpower their senior officers. Comstock's brother George, who also served on the *Globe,* blamed the mutiny on Samuel's ability to find allies among those recruited in Hawai‘i. These "cruel beings" worked "very much against us all," George recalled, and they joined Samuel in a mutiny.[373] Thus, popular narratives of the mutiny directly connected the episode to deserters on the Hawaiian Islands for their American audience.

A Strengthening U.S. Presence: Sailor Unrest and the U.S. Navy

Word of the *Globe* mutiny travelled back to Nantucket and New Bedford beginning in October 1824, making the subject a frequent topic of discussion among New England's business class. In late 1824 and early 1825, nearly two hundred New England merchants and shipowners sent petitions to presidents James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, complaining of the lawlessness of sailors and of the precariousness of their business ventures in the central Pacific.

[373] Cyrus Hussey, William Lay, *A Narrative of the Mutiny, on Board the Ship Globe, of Nantucket* (New London: W. Lay, and C.M. Hussey, 1828), 50-70, 16. *A Narrative of the Mutiny* was was penned by two survivors cleared of any wrongdoing. Another work that helped to popularize the event was authored by Samuel Comstock's brother, William. See William Comstock, *The Life of Samuel Comstock, the Terrible Whalemen: Containing an Account of Mutiny, and Massacre of the Officers of the Ship Globe* (Boston: J. Fisher, 1840). Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe,* 61-62; Nancy Shoemaker, *Native Whalemen,* 80-82; George Comstock, "Narrative of the Mutiny," in Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*, 189. For more on the mutiny, see Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*, 196.

As New England merchants learned more details about the *Globe* mutiny, they increasingly associated it with the Hawaiian Islands. In 1825, a Nantucket memorandum to President John Quincy Adams signed by forty-four merchants claimed that the mutiny was "matured" by recruits from Hawai'i, "whose atrocities they fear may be attempted by others of the same character." In the Hawaiian Islands, they contended, over 150 men "principally deserters from the whale-ships" were "prowling about the country, naked and destitute." Thus, they concluded that the freedom available to these men in Hawai'i allowed them to wreak havoc.[374]

The Nantucket memorialists' suggested remedy was a naval squadron that would ensure "protection, not only of their commerce, but of American commerce generally." A December 1824 Nantucket petition signed by 137 merchants agreed with this sentiment and asked the federal government to send a naval squadron to Hawai'i, "where so much property and so many lives are exposed," because it would "have a powerful tendency to prevent such fatal occurrences" as the *Globe* mutiny. In May 1825 a petition from thirteen New Bedford merchants joined the protest arguing that an American naval presence "can be the only safe ground of reliance for the security of American property and life" on the Hawaiian archipelago. Nantucket and New Bedford petitioners inhabited two of the most important whaling communities in the United States. The two communities were the first to send American whaling vessels to the Hawaiian Islands. In the mid-1820s, New Bedford boasted the biggest whaling fleet in the United States, while Nantucket possessed the industry's second largest. Reflecting the power and

[374] Aaron Mitchell and others to President Adams, Nantucket, April 5, 1825, in *House Reports*, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, No. 92, 9-14; Harold Bradley, The *American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers, 1789-1843* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1944), 105.

influence that these merchants enjoyed in American society, at least a dozen American newspapers ran notices about the mutiny in fall 1824 and called for naval intervention.[375]

The U.S. government responded to merchant calls by sending the U.S.S. *Dolphin* under the command of John Percival to the central Pacific. In late 1825, the warship captured two survivors from the *Globe* mutiny on Mili Atoll. Nearly all of the *Globe's* crew had perished by the time of the ship's arrival. After sending the two survivors back to the United States, Percival turned his attention to the Hawaiian Islands to round up deserters. "The safety of our commerce, as well as the peace and good order of these Islands," the Navy secretary instructed, "require that [deserters] should, in some proper way, be removed from scenes of mischief they are promoting and perpetrating."[376]

After the *Dolphin* arrived in Honolulu in January 1826, Percival used intimidation and threats of violence against Hawaiian authorities to push for royal intervention. Jones learned that Hawaiian authorities had prohibited all women from visiting his crew to engage in prostitution. In 1825, royal authorities had banned the decades-long sexual laisons that sailors had come to

---

[375] *Eastern Argus* (Portland, Maine), October 21, 1824; Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*, 196; *Hunt's Merchant Magazine and Commercial Review*, III (November 1840), 374; Strauss, *Americans in Polynesia*, 34-35; William Coffin and others to President Monroe, Nantucket, December 24, 1824, *House Reports*, No. 92, 9-14; Aaron Mitchell and others to President Adams, Nantucket, April 5, 1825, in *House Reports*, No. 92; Gideon Howland and others to President Adams, New Bedford, May 8, 1825, *House Reports*, No. 92, 9-14; Bradley, The *American Frontier in Hawaii*, 105; Mitchell and others to Adams, Nantucket, April 5, 1825, from *House Reports*, No. 92, 9-14; *Eastern Argus*, October 21, 1824; Davis, Gallman, Gleiter, *In Pursuit of Leviathan*, 415. At least a dozen newspapers ran these notices, including the *Columbian Centenial American Federalist* (Boston, Massachusetts), December 1, 1824; *Salem Gazette* (Salem, Massachusetts), December 2, 1824; *Boston Commercial Gazette* (Boston, Massachusetts), December 2, 1824; *The Essex Register* (Salem, Massachusetts), December 2, 1824; *Rhode-Island Republican* (Newport, Rhode Island), December 4, 1824; *Providence Gazette* (Providence, Rhode Island), December 4, 1824; *Connecticut Mirror* (Hartford, Connecticut), December 6, 1824; *Eastern Argus* (Portland, Maine), December 6, 1824; *American Mercury*, December 7, 1824; *Connecticut Courant* (Hartford, Connecticut), December 7, 1824; *Gazette & Patriot* (Haverhill, Massachusetts), December 9, 1824; *Hallowell Gazette* (Hallowell, Maine), December 15, 1824.

[376] Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*, 132-38; Samuel L. Southard to Isaac Hull, 24 May 1825, *House Reports*, No. 108; David Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America.* vol. III, Doc. 54 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), 254-55; Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic*, 182.

expect. Believing that sailors' access to Hawaiian prostitutes as a right, Percival pressured the Hawaiian government to repeal the ban. Citing his willingness to use force, Percival cautioned Hawaiian authorities that though "his vessel was small, it was like fire." After threatening to shoot one American missionary, Percival promised that he would "shoot" any Hawaiian official that attempted to take women from his men. His behavior reflected the broader assumptions of U.S. naval officers who saw coercion as an entirely appropriate form of diplomacy with the Kingdom of Hawai'i. Percival's manner of intimidation and threats of violence formed one part of a commercial maritime imperialism in Hawai'i, setting a precedent for how future U.S. naval power would be used.[377]

Percival's aggressive approach helped to incite a riot in Honolulu. In February 1826, Percival's men stormed a church and a missionary leader's home brandishing clubs and knives. During a struggle, one sailor struck a Hawaiian chief and dozens of Kānaka Maoli responded by attacking the sailors with stones and clubs. Perhaps more for appearances, Percival caned his men into submission and ordered lashes for two of the rioters. However, the event achieved what Percival desired: Hawaiian authorities suspended the ban on prostitution. For the remainder of the *Dolphin*'s stay in Hawai'i, from late February to late April 1826, women visited the ship. One missionary contended that Hawaiian authorities had lifted the ban "no doubt in consequence of the repeated threats and persevering efforts of Lieutenant Percival and many others now in port." Percival had successfully pressured for adjustments in local laws in Hawai'i.[378]

---

[377] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands*, 283-84; Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic*, 182; Edward Beechert, *Honolulu: Crossroads of the Pacific* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 48-49; Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic*, 132-33, 182.

[378] Loomis Journal, February 27, 1826, Journal Collection, HMCSL; Daws, "The High Chief Boki," 71; Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic*, 139, 182, 189.



Figure 3.3: “Women of the Sandwich Islands,” Louis Choris, 1822, 910.4C45F, Hawaiian Historical Society.

Percival’s antagonistic diplomacy also involved securing the support of royal officials in the policing of sailors onshore. As Honolulu merchant Stephen Reynolds recalled, “Percival went to [Oahu governor] Boki’s and got him to establish a new Regulation,” requiring each seaman to carry a letter from his captain declaring him a “sober, peaceable man.” According to Reynolds, this law committed authorities to imprisoning sailors in the “Fort,” Honolulu’s prison,

and holding them until retrieved by their captain. Percival also secured a guarantee from Hawaiian leaders for the repayment of sandalwood debts to U.S. merchants. "The king and chiefs by the exertions of Lieut. Percival acknowledged the debts due to American Citizens, to be Government debts," commented one American observer, while also giving them assurance of their timely liquidation. The naval officer's actions constituted an example of how gunboat diplomacy extracted concessions from Hawaiian authorities that served American commercial interests.[379]

Despite the rioting that accompanied the *Dolphin*'s visit to Honolulu, U.S. Consul John Coffin Jones reported to the U.S. State Department that "good order was preserved" on the islands and that the *Dolphin* ensured their "seamen conducted themselves with propriety." The few that did misbehave "were retaken and returned to their respective ships." The *Dolphin* performed an "important service" in the Hawaiian Islands, Jones contended, because "there is no where [sic] an armed vessel is more needed for the protection of our commerce." Jones also advocated for "the necessity of a strong arm" of the U.S. state in the islands for the "protection, assistance, and security" of American commerce. Jones's effort to persuade U.S. officials of the *Dolphin's* efficacy reflected his own belief that regular naval supervision was necessary in Hawai'i. Some of the largest outstanding debts on the islands were owed to Jones as an agent for the Boston firm of Marshall and Wildes, which likely motivated him to advocate for naval protection of American business.[380]

---

[379] "Extract of a letter from Mrs. Bingham," *Religious Intelligencer* (New Haven, CT), December 23, 1826, 466; Stephen Reynolds, *Journal of Stephen Reynolds*, vol. I: 1823-1829, ed. Pauline N. King (Honolulu, 1989), 126; Arista, *The Kingdom and the Republic*, 190; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Vol. 1*, 92.

[380] John Coffin Jones to Henry Clay, Oahu, May 8, 1826, Consular Letters, Honolulu 1, United States Department of State (USDS); Ross H. Gast, *Contentious Consul: A Biography of John Coffin Jones, First United States Consular Agent at Hawaii* (Los Angeles: Dawson's Book Shop, 1976), 66-67; C.S. Stewart, William Ellis, A *Visits to the South Seas in the U.S. ship Vincennes, during the years 1829 and 1830* (London: Fisher & Son, 1833), 365-69, 312-

As many as six newspapers published a notice praising the *Dolphin*'s work, revealing some consensus among New England merchants that the expedition was a success. In December 1826, the *New Bedford Mercury* commended the *Dolphin* for pursuing a "system of vigilance" that remedied the "evils attendant on desertion" by seizing men "loitering about the islands." The *Dolphin*'s visit "had a most salutary influence" on the problem of desertion, the newspaper stated, because of the "surprisingly advantageous influence" of warships in Hawai'i. Its visit set a precedent, Philadelphia's *American Daily Advertiser* reported, which demonstrated with "certainty that the guilty perpetrators of the foulest of all acts, will not escape the punishment which the enormity of their crime so richly deserves." Thus, merchants and their allies advocated for the U.S. government to keep sending warships to the Pacific.[381]

A Growing Legal Infrastructure: The U.S. Navy, Desertion, and Treaty Negotiations

A second U.S. expedition visited the Hawaiian Islands in September 1826 under the command of Thomas ap Catesby Jones. Focusing on "the evil of desertion," Jones pursued a draconian crackdown on Honolulu's sailor population. His orders from the Navy secretary were to place "willing" sailors on whaling and merchant ships and "unwilling" mariners "under summary arrest." In coordination with other anti-desertion forces in Honolulu, Jones introduced a "rule" to Hawaiian authorities that all sailors "who had deserted, however remote the period, should be removed from the Islands." Thus, he made desertion an offense punishable in

16; Gast, *Contentious Consul*, 109; Stauffer, "Hawai'i and Treaty of 1826," 49; John Coffin Jones to Henry Clay, July 1, 1827, *Despatches*, Roll 1; John Coffin Jones to Louis McLane, May 25, 1834, *Despatches*, Roll 1; Jones to Clay, July 1, 1827, *Despatches*, Roll 1; Stauffer, "Hawai'i and Treaty of 1826," 49-50.

[381] *New Bedford Mercury* (New Bedford, Massachusetts), December 15, 1826; *Poulson's American Daily Advertiser* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), August 29, 1826. This notice appeared in *Poulson's; Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser* (Baltimore, Maryland), August 30, 1826; *Louisinana State* Gazette (New Orleans, Louisiana), September 26, 1826; *Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser* (Baltimore, Maryland), November 4, 1826; *Newport Mercury* (Newport, Rhode Island), November 4, 1826.

perpetuity. Regardless of how many years had passed since a sailor's desertion, captains could reliably compel a suspected deserter to enlist. This approach to fulfilling labor demands enabled captains to recruit sailors more effectively on the islands.[382]

One Honolulu blacksmith, John Colcord, recalled an effort by Jones and his allies to force sailors on whaling and merchant vessels. Recognizing a labor shortage, a group assembled, featuring Commodore Jones, U.S. Consul John Coffin Jones, British Consul Richard Charlton, O'ahu Governor Boki, and various whaling captains. "A plan was laid," Colcord contended, "to man the Ships" with men on shore. The blacksmith recalled how police rounded up a group of Americans and "enclosed [them] in a large yard like so many sheep or hogs" until the assembly "called in" each man to "interrogate us." Those assembled forced around thirty men to labor on whaling and merchant vessels and committed about a dozen sailors to serve on Commodore Jones's warship. Jones also imprisoned two men and discharged a third who he described as a man "of notorious bad character." Thus, Jones's campaign applied force to ensure that American vessels in the Hawaiian Islands were manned by sailors and their business transactions went uninterrupted.[383]

Commodore Jones's mission culminated in the U.S.-Hawaiian *Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation* in December 1826, which created a semi-formal legal infrastructure for regulating American sailors in Hawai'i. The treaty committed Hawaiian officials to "use all practicable means to prevent desertion from American ships" on the islands, making it the "duty"

[382] Samuel L. Southard to Isaac Hull, May 24, 1825 from Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, 254-55; Thomas ap Catesby Jones to Navy Department, Nov. 4, 1826, from Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, 278; Stauffer, "The Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 46.
[383] Colcord, *The Journal of N. Colcord*, 8-9, 9-11; Jones to Southard, Nov. 4, 1826, Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, 278-79; Wilson Heflin, Mary Bercaw, Thomas Heffernan, *Herman Melville's Whaling Years* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004), 193.

of Hawaiian officials "to apprehend all deserters" and "deliver them over" to their former vessels. Colcord recalled that the treaty required "all stragglers & runaways" not assigned to a ship "be taken up & sent to the fort [prison] and sentenced to hard labor." In return for his sailors, the ship captain paid compliant officials by deducting pay from the sailors' future earnings. Commodore Jones also sought to make it more difficult for deserters to find lodging by restricting the number of licenses for boardinghouses. Another law targeted other sites of sailor refugees by charging a $50 penalty to anyone caught harboring a deserter.[384]

Colcord's experience on the receiving end of Commodore Jones's campaign represented a manifestation of U.S. state power on the microlevel. It reflected the extent to which a system of vigilance had taken effect on the Hawaiian Islands because of the changing needs of the whaling industry. Hawaiian authorities and other local elites collaborated in anti-desertion measures often because they themselves were invested in American whaling and shipping voyages. Hawaiian cooperation also enabled leaders to ensure more political stability and social cohesion. In the 1820s, Hawaiian leadership was deeply fractured. After the deaths of Kamehameha in 1819 and Kamehameha II (Lihohilo) in 1823, royal power splintered with the accession of Kamehameha III (Kauikeaouli) under the guardianship of the King's Regent Kaʻahumanu and Prime Minister Kalanimōkū. King Kamehameha III and Boki, the governor of Oʻahu, often worked to favor the interests of the business community in Hawaiʻi, while resisting Kaʻahumanu and Kalanimōkū's efforts to enact policies aligned with American missionaries.[385]

[384] John Colcord, *The Journal of John N. Colcord*, 9-10; Jones to Southard, November 1, 1826, "Cruises of the U.S.S. Cyane," National Archives; "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Sandwich Islands," Honolulu, December 23, 1826" from Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, 269-72.
[385] Stauffer, "Hawaiʻi and Treaty of 1826," 57; Archer, *Sharks Upon the Land*, 93, 102.

In December 1826, Jones negotiated an agreement that favored American business interests, while also butressing British efforts to assert greater influence on the islands. Jones, Kaʻahumanu, Kalanimōkū, and several high ranking chiefs signed a new treaty between the United States and Hawaiʻi, which committed Hawaiian Aliʻi to the repayment of American debts through future sandalwood harvests. Hawaiian authorities preferred this agreement to the countering British offer of transferring up to one fourth of the Hawaiian Kingdom to British landowners in exchange for debt liquidation.[386]

This form of diplomacy practiced by naval officials helped to establish a system of vigilance in the Hawaiian Islands, which protected business ventures and ensured that American ships were adequately manned. U.S. naval commodores rounded up "deserters" to work on visiting ships (many of whom had been abandoned by U.S. whaling captains who did not want to pay them at journey's end). With U.S. merchants constantly needing maritime hands for their Pacific voyages, the U.S. Navy sought to support them through displays of power. During the cruise of the *United States Exploring Expedition* (1838-1842), its commodore Charles Wilkes conceived of power as something maintained by force. He described the "imperative necessity" of punishing "unruly" sailors who, as sailors on whaling vessels, were "most generally . . . disposed to be disorderly." He saw their punishment as "a good opportunity to show the crews of all these vessels [anchored at Honolulu] that authority to punish offences existed." Determined to make an example of this group of men, he ordered the whipping be put "into execution publicly." Pleased with the outcome of this punishment, Wilkes concluded, the "ship became orderly."[387]

[386] Frank Gapp, "The Kind Eyed Chief: Forgotten Champion of Hawaiʻi's Freedom," *Hawaiian Journal of History*, Vol. 19 (1985), 106-07; Daws, "The High Chief Boki," 76, 79, 73.
[387] Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition,* IV, 57-58; Smith, *To Master the Boundless Sea,* 43-44, 41-42.

The *United States Exploring Expedition* (also known as the Ex. Ex.) built on several years of American naval intervention in the Hawaiian Islands. The aggressive recruitment of sailors and public displays of state retribution by the U.S. Navy strengthened American influence on the islands because naval officers began to exercise an extraterritorial power over sailors onshore. The expedition also aided American merchants by gathering valuable intelligence about sea routes and ports of trade. After returning to the United States in June 1842, the Ex. Ex. transmitted the voyage's reports to Congress. Political allies of Pacific trade in that body soon authorized their publication for public consumption. Despite the expedition's cost of nearly one million dollars, major Boston newspapers declared that the data collected alone was worth the expense. Finally, the expedition's reports were instrumental to U.S. Navy Secretary Matthew Maury's creation of the first official American maps of whaling grounds and sea currents in the Pacific in 1852.[388]

[388] Donald Johnson, *The United States in the Pacific,* 57; Ryan Tucker Jones, *"*Running into Whales: The History of the North Pacific from below the Waves," *American Historical Review,* Vol. 2 (April 2013), 371; Bert Chapman, "Initial Visions of Paradise: Antebellum U.S. Government Documents on the South Pacific," *Journal of Government Information,* Vol. 30 (2004), 743-45; *Hunts' Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review,* XII (May 1845), 445; Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition,* V, 261-63.

Figure 3.4: "Map of the Hawaiian Islands," n.d., Maps, Drawer 2, Hawaiian Islands, Hawaiian Historical Society.

Creating a "Free Trade" Empire and a New Treaty with Extraterritorial Aspirations

In addition to commissioning naval squadrons to patrol the Pacific, U.S. officials also crafted foreign policy dedicated to protecting the flow of American trade in Hawai‘i. In late December 1842, President John Tyler gave his annual address to Congress where he laid out the Tyler Doctrine. This doctrine articulated a new vision for American empire that, on the surface, committed the United States to protecting Hawaiian sovereignty against European intervention. However, on a fundamental level, it defined an American imperialism that sought to keep ports of trade open, American ships adequately manned, and port authorities collaborating in anti-desertion measures. U.S. officials supported a Hawaiian state that they could pressure to act in

their economic interests. They also framed the need to protect U.S. investments overseas as a legitimate reason for military intervention when the Hawaiian monarchy failed to do so.[389]

The Tyler Doctrine encapsulated the worldview of Tyler's secretary of state, Daniel Webster, whom historians credit as a major contributor to the doctrine. Webster envisioned U.S. maritime expansion in commercial maritime terms. One of his objectives was controlling strategic harbors across the Pacific so that American commerce in East Asia could grow. His vision was shaped by lifelong relations with New England merchants who had experience trading and whaling in the Pacific. These merchants had recruited Webster and funded his political campaigns. As a representative in the House, Webster had also invested and earned commissions on some of their voyages. Webster figured as such a notable ally of the whaling industry that U.S. whaling ships were named in his honor. The imperial vision of Pacific expansion encapsulated in the Tyler Doctrine focused on countering European influence and preserving ports for future American whaling ventures.[390]

In the Tyler Doctrine, John Tyler described the Hawaiian Islands as a major commercial node in a way similar to American whaling merchants. The islands served as "the stopping place for almost all vessels passing from continent to continent across the Pacific Ocean . . . especially those engaged in the whale fishery in those seas" and where American ships comprised "five-

[389] James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823, *Annals of Congress*, 18th Congress, 1st Session, 14, 22–23; John Tyler, "Message from the President of the United States, December 30, 1842," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix II, Affairs in Hawaii* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1895), 39-41; Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain:'" 225-27.
[390] Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821," 259, 277; *The Friend* (Honolulu, HI), February 1, 1845, 3, 21, 2, Ward, *American Activities in the Central Pacific,* 219; *Newburyport Courier* (Newburyport, November 12, 1845, 1,2 6, Ward, *American Activities in the Central Pacific,* 223; Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain," 229-30; Daniel Webster to Mrs. Sullivan Washington, Feb. 27, 1818, from Fletcher Webster, ed., *Webster's Private Correspondence*, Vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1902), 273; Haddad, *America's First Adventure in* China, 139-40. For a discussion about Webster's contribution to the Tyler Doctrine, see Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain,'" 252.

sixths" of all traffic. During the 1820s and 1830s, American merchants dominated the Hawaiian Islands' international commerce. Of the 1,565 whaling vessels that visited Honolulu between 1820 and 1840, 1,286 were American, comprising 82 percent of all whaling boats. Great Britain, the closest competitor, sent only 260 whaling ships (16 percent), while the remaining 19 came from other European powers such as France. By American standards, British whaling ventures after 1835 were neither productive nor profitable and British whaling ships soon ceded much of the competition to their American rivals. When Tyler issued the doctrine, the future for American whaling appeared bright and the United States enjoyed a relatively unchallenged economic supremacy in the Hawaiian Islands. In 1844, the American whaling fleet numbered more than 640 vessels, employed as many as 17,500 American sailors, and generated over $19,430,000. As the United States competed with Europeans to assert power overseas, the Tyler Doctrine articulated a vision of how U.S. empire should function in the central Pacific. This imperial framework established a model for how the United States could strengthen its authority in Hawai'i.[391]

The Tyler Doctrine represented a formal expression of the U.S. government's commitment to defending American access to Hawaiian ports. But U.S.-Hawaiian relations were still legally defined by the unratified 1826 *Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation*. In March 1846, British and French conventions with Kamehameha III produced new bilateral agreements. Fear that British and French treaties might weaken American influence on the archipelago, U.S. officials sought a new U.S.-Hawaiian treaty that could reinforce some of the

[391] Tyler, "Message from the President of the United States, December 30, 1842," *Appendix II,* 39-41; "Port of Honolulu, Arrivals 1820 to 1840: Whalers and Others Contrasted," from Richards, *Honolulu Centre of Trans-Pacific Trade*, 12; "Total Whaleships," from Richards, *Honolulu Centre of Trans-Pacific Trade,* 14-15; Davis, Gallman, Gleiter, *In Pursuit of Leviathan,* 480; Fink, *Sweatshops at Sea,* 11-12; Olmsted, *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage,* 131; Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise,* 535; Hohman, *American Whaleman,* 4-6.

Tyler Doctrine's goals. In spring 1849, a U.S. commissioner to the Hawaiian Kingdom, Ten Eycks, agitated for more extensive rights for U.S. citizens living in Hawai'i. According to one government report, the U.S. commissioner "became indiscreetly . . . involved in serious differences of opinion with the Government of Hawaii, respecting the rights of American residents, and his attitude became finally one of hostility." Although the U.S. State Department dismissed Eycks, his replacement negotiated a treaty that preserved American rights and American access to trade. In December 1849, U.S. and Hawaiian representatives signed a treaty and officials exchanged ratifications in August 1850, making the treaty the first bilateral U.S.-Hawaiian agreement. In November 1850, one U.S. official described it as the "first perfected treaty between the two powers."[392]

The new U.S.-Hawaiian treaty protected American property rights on the archipelago. U.S. citizens "would be subject to the same precautions of police which are practiced towards the subjects or citizens of the most favored nations" in Hawai'i. The treaty also empowered U.S. consuls and Hawaiian authorities to issue warrants for the arrest of men suspected of desertion and mutiny. The 1849 treaty also guaranteed U.S. merchants and consuls "the assistance of the local authorities for the search, arrest, detention, and imprisonment of the deserters from the ships of war and merchants of their country." According to the agreement, Hawaiian police would keep them "detained until the time when they shall be restored to the vessel to which they belonged." Back in 1841, the commander of the Ex.-Ex. Charles Wilkes had described a police force in Honolulu "so efficient that it would have been impossible for them [sailors] to be riotous, if so disposed, without finding themselves prisoners in the fort." Wilkes also praised

[392] "Blount Report: Affairs in Hawaii," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix II* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), 12-13; Bradley, *The Hawaiian Frontier in Hawaii,* 99; Gast, *Contentious Consul,* 100-01.

Honolulu police's enforcement of the Sabbath when "even the least orderly of the foreigners are prevented from indulging in any excesses." This "proof of the excellence," Wilkes contended, made police forces "the guardians of the law." These successful instances of sailor regulation prompted American merchants and officials to further pursue legal commitments from Hawaiian police.[393]

The new U.S.-Hawaiian treaty sought to control a transient sailor population in Hawai'i and reflected the U.S. government's longstanding interest in protecting American whaling in the Pacific. For the next half century, the treaty legally defined how U.S.-Hawaiian trade and business occurred. In August 1898, the United States terminated the agreement when it officially annexed Hawai'i and legitimized its intervention into Hawai'i on the basis of protecting economic interests, building on a custom that had long characterized U.S-Hawaiian relations.[394]

Conclusion

By examining American efforts to protect business in the central Pacific, this chapter demonstrates how the United States created a system of vigilance in the Hawaiian Islands. As American sailors deserted their ships and congregated on the islands, American merchants lobbied for U.S. military intervention. Consecutive visits by U.S. warships and the new diplomatic posturing of the Tyler Doctrine established legal precendents for how power would be exercised in spaces where American shipping occurred. U.S. officials vowed to oppose any power claiming the Hawaiian archipelago. Finally, the 1849 U.S.-Hawaiian treaty created a legal apparatus that enabled captains to forcibly recruit sailors. American enforcement of the treaty

[393] "Blount Report: Affairs in Hawaii," 13; Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition,* IV, 52, 57; "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation," December 20, 1849, Library of Congress, 867.
[394] "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation," 868-70; Tyler, "Message from the President of the United States, December 30, 1842," *Appendix II,* 39-41.

often infringed upon Hawaiian sovereignty and altered Hawaiian ways of living and practices in local government.[395]

By mid-century, U.S.-Hawaiian relations reflected a major transformation in how the United States pursued empire in the Pacific. Shortly after the first American whaling ships arrived in Hawai‘i, U.S. President James Monroe issued his 1823 Monroe Doctrine, focusing foreign diplomacy on supporting new Spanish American political systems that championed free trade. Beyond supporting business-friendly governments, the U.S. government's role in trade overseas remained relatively minimal. However, three decades of growth in American whaling prompted the U.S. government to aggressively assert itself in the Pacific. By connecting American whaling to the United States' imperial expansion, scholars can more fully understand changes in U.S.-Hawaiian relations and broaden their thinking about the evolution of American foreign diplomacy during the first half of the nineteenth century. By the late 1840s, U.S. officials worked to pressure Hawaiian authorities to resist any effort to constrain commerce on the archipelago. This "free trade" diplomacy reflected more informal types of European imperialism in the Pacific.[396]

This new diplomacy also underscored the enhanced power of American maritime merchants in U.S. politics and society by the mid-nineteenth century. American maritime merchants and officials pursued a system of vigilance that was distinct from the European model of direct rule over colonies. Instead, they sought to secure American access to Pacific ports,

[395] H.W. Bradley, "The Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Fur Trade, 1785-1813," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, Vol. 30, no. 3 (July 1939), 434; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Vol. 1*, 431-35.
[396] Rosenthal, *Beyond Hawai'i,* 8-10. British-Qing relations after the First Opium War (1839-1842) established a model for Western powers in the Pacific. While the Qing Emperor officially acted as an independent sovereign, his governance increasingly conformed to Western business interests. For more on this development of "free trade" diplomacy, see Johnson, *The New Middle* Kingdom, 26-28.

ensure that American ships were adequately staffed, and consolidate their influence over port authorities. As Tyler's secretary of state Daniel Webster understood it: each port of trade functioned as a node of empire within a larger web of interactions, a "link" in a "great chain" that spanned the Pacific Ocean.[397]

The commercial exploitation of whales helped determine the shape that American commercial maritime imperialism took in Hawai'i. Scholarly focus on missionaries, sugar planters, and naval officers can sometimes obscure this transformative link. By connecting American whaling in the Pacific to U.S. imperialism in Hawai'i, it is possible to see how whaling shaped the ways that American merchants and U.S. officials imagined American empire. Expanding American sovereignties in the Hawaiian Islands were made up of international markets, resources, labor demands, and gunboat diplomacy. These interdependent forces brought the United States increasingly into contact with the archipelago in ways that would inform the two nations' diplomatic relations throughout the nineteenth century.

[397] Haddad, *America's First Adventure in China,* 140; Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain,'" 225.

Chapter 4: "We Yankees…Intend to Remain Here and Do All Business:"[398] U.S. Merchants, the Opium Trade, and the United States' Expansion to the Pearl River Delta, 1821-1844

Traveling westward via the trade winds and currents of the Pacific from the Hawaiian archipelago, American merchant ships journeyed to the Pearl River Delta on the far western shores of the Pacific. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, an increased demand for opium on the far western shores of the Pacific along the Pearl River Delta enabled American merchants to substitute hard-to-obtain specie with opium and British credit. While American merchants, informal diplomats, and officials worked to protect shipping in and around the Hawaiian Islands and the collection of whaling products in the central Pacific, American merchants, informal diplomats, officials, and sailors along the far western shores of the Pacific in and around Guangzhou labored to facilitate the movement of opium, which shaped American commercial maritime imperialism along the Pearl River Delta. This traffic drew an increased American interest in acquiring provisions for and protecting the shipping of American sea otter voyages, silver and copper collection along the Chile-Peru coastline, whaling ventures, and the opium trade in the Pearl River Delta.

As Americans played an increased role in trade in China, former U.S. president and current congressman for the 12th district of Massachusetts John Quincy Adams condemned how trade operated in China, claiming that "the fundamental principle of the Chinese Empire is anti-commercial." For Adams, the "vital principle of commerce is reciprocity" in which "the duty of each is to hold commercial intercourse with the other." However, according to the congressman,

[398] Robert Bennett Forbes, May 25, 1839, from R.B. Forbes, *Personal Reminisces* (Boston: Blunt White, 1882), 149.

the Qing Empire did not support this value. The Qing Empire "admits no obligation to hold commercial intercourse with others. It utterly denies the equality of other Nations with itself."[399] During the Opium War (1839-1842), Adams took a controversial position of support for the British assault on the Qing Empire. "These principles of the Chinese Empire, too long connived at, and truckled by the mightiest Christian nations of the civilized world, have at length been brought into conflict, with the principles and the power of the British Empire." The former president expressed his hope that a British victory would establish an open system of trade along the Chinese coast, ensuring "that the future of Commerce shall be carried on upon terms of equality and reciprocity."[400] Challenging the popular conception that Britain had waged the war because of the opium trade, Adams blamed the "arrogant and insupportable pretension of China, that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the relation between lord and vassal."[401]

This view of commercial reciprocity was at the center of American intervention into China during the first half of the nineteenth century. This theory of expansion defined how the United States extended its sovereignty along the Pearl River Delta, which is a dimension that has not been reflected in literature on the American China trade. Scholarship on early American business in China has offered important insights into American trade during the boom-and-bust cycles of the Canton System.[402] Most literature on China's opium trade focuses on British

[399] John Quincy Adams, "The Opium War and the Sanctity of Commercial Reciprocity," from *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Speeches, and Papers,* Walter LeFeber, ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 50.
[400] Adams, "The Opium War and the Sanctity of Commercial Reciprocity," 50.
[401] Adams, "The Opium War and the Sanctity of Commercial Reciprocity," 51.
[402] For scholarship that offers insights on various American trades that functioned in boom-and-bust cycles during the Canton System in the China trade, see Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005); Dael Norwood, *Trading Freedom: How Commerce with China Defined Early America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022)*;* James R. Fichter, *So*

participation and only occasionally considers U.S.-British cooperation in this illicit business.[403] Seldom does this literature explore how disruptions to China's opium trade influenced U.S. foreign diplomacy, Sino-American relations, and the extension of American sovereignties along the Pearl River Delta.

The United States' merchant class was central to the American imperial response in China. During the 1820s and 1830s, prominent American families on the U.S. northeastern seaboard organized large business ventures to China. After investing capital and organizing labor systems to sustain their China ventures—enterprises that rested upon merchants' assumption that trade ought to be accessible to all sellers and buyers—they saw the security of their investments threatened by local riots and Qing campaigns to restrict foreign commerce. Merchants agitated for their U.S. representatives to contribute what they could to securing American overseas business endeavors. The social and political networks created through commerce enabled Americans in China, such as John Perkins Cushing and Robert Bennett Forbes, to draw on their family and state connections back in the United States and enhance U.S. sovereignties, and state power and influence, over long-distance trade in the South China Sea.[404]

Great a Proffit; Kendall Johnson, *Narratives of Free Trade: The Commercial Cultures of Early US-China Relations* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011); Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom;* Angela Schottenhammer, *The East Asian Maritime World 1400–1800: Its Fabrics of Power and Dynamics of Exchanges: East Asian Economic and Socio-Cultural Studies* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007); Haddad, *America's First Adventure in* China; Fichter, *So Great a* Proffit; Malloy, *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast*; Downs, *The Golden* Ghetto; Gibson, Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise*; and Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841*.

[403] Haijin, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War*; Madancy, *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin The Opium Trade*; Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842*; and Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*. For literature on British and American relations in China, see Keliher, "Anglo-American Policy and Origins of U.S. China Policy;" Fichter, *So Great a Proffit;* Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-1860"; and Allen, *The Opium Trade.*

[404] Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844"; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy"; Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821"; Charles Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1912), 163.

These merchant families brought the power of the American state to bear. Their efforts bore fruit and prompted the U.S. commissioning of naval squadrons and informal diplomats traveling to China in the 1830s and 1840s. Unlike the British government, which tightly regulated its East India Company monopoly in Asia until 1833, the U.S. government generally left the management of day-to-day commercial operations to American traders in Canton.[405] As U.S. merchant communities worked to protect their business investments, they often shaped how American power and authority manifested in the South China Sea. Challenges to the continued success of American commerce, which was frequently intertwined with opium, pushed U.S. merchants to lobby U.S. officials for an enhanced military presence in the South China Sea.[406]

The Growth of American Trade in China

Over a roughly forty-year period, the American China trade evolved from one dependent on sporadic and uncertain long-distance ventures within the Canton System to a more open, comprehensive, and economically integrated commercial undertaking.[407] When American merchants entered the China trade after establishing national independence, they entered a maritime commerce shaped by characteristics first established by European trade in the late sixteenth century. Between the 1780s and 1820s, Americans struggled to acquire commodities of consistent value in the Canton market. They also dealt in quantities that were too small to

[405] Before 1834, the British East India Company monopolized British trade with China. However, when the British Parliament ended the monopoly—in part due to arguments in favor of free trade—any British trader could conduct business in Guangzhou with the Hong merchants. For more details, see Laurie Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly: the US-China Trade and Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century," (University of California, Irvine, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2017), 41-44. When the East India Company's monopoly on the China trade dissolved, there was no longer a group of British merchants in China interested in and capable of restraining the growth of the opium trade and the smuggling that accompanied this business. See Norwood, *Trading Freedom,* 75.
[406] Clayton, *Islands of Truth,* 75; Howay, "An Outline Sketch of Maritime Fur Trade," 1.
[407] For details, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade,* 161-176.

compensate for the United States' negative balance of trade with China.[408] For example, they bartered ginseng, otter skins, and sandalwood in Canton for tea, silk, and porcelain. Each commodity ran in booms and busts based on scarcity and surplus.[409]

Figure 4.1: "View of the Foreign Factories, Canton," c. 1800, PEM216846, Bridgeman Art Library.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the integration of opium into their cargoes began to change that trade dynamic. In the early 1800s, American merchants began acquiring Turkish-grown opium at the port of Smyrna and shipping it to China. Dozens of American merchants from Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore made this interaction a regular occurrence.[410] Between 1800 and 1812, American merchants participated in a fairly lucrative

[408] Paul E. Fontenoy, "Ginseng, Otter Skins, and Sandalwood: The Conundrum of the China Trade," *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1997), 1-3.
[409] Jacques Downs, "American Merchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800-1840," *Business History Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter 1968), 422.
[410] Downs, "American Merchants," 421-22.

trade with China with roughly twenty-nine American ships annually visiting China.[411] During the War of 1812 (1812-1814), U.S. traders in China found it valuable to seize Bengalis-grown opium from British ships when possible.[412] In 1814, the largest U.S. merchant house in China, Perkins and Company was "very much in favor of investing heavily in opium. While the war lasts," one leading employee explained, "opium will support a good price in China."[413] With the conclusion of the war, more Americans joined the illicit trade, giving rise to a series of "opium rushes."[414] Between 1816 and 1820, thirty-nine American vessels annually visited China.[415] An increased willingness of the Chinese to buy the drug from Americans was due in part to a decline in British importing of Indian opium (down about 1,000 chests of opium annually).[416] By 1820, American trade with China exceeded all other nations except Britain.[417] The opium business had become so successful that one leading China trader suggested that the business temporarily "suspend all shipments to China except opium."[418]

Between the late 1780s and the mid-1820s, specie had been the single most essential import from the United States to China. During this time, hard currency had constituted between roughly half and three-quarters of total American exports to China.[419] While this specie drain was substantial, it was necessary. Merchants still profited handsomely from re-exporting Chinese

[411] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations,* 166.
[412] For example, when Perkins encountered two British ships at sea, his crews captured the ships, which were loaded with opium. John Perkins Cushing, head of the firm's Canton operations, reported this cargo's welcome reception by the Canton market, their proceeds having "turned a good profit." After more than two decades of living in Canton, John Perkins Cushing resigned his post in 1828 and the firm consolidated with another American firm to form Russell & Co. See Robert Bennett Forbes, *Letters from China,* 14.
[413] Stephen Girard to Mahlon Hutchinson, Jr., & Myles McLeveen, January 2, 1805, Stephen Girard Papers, Girard College Library, Philadelphia, PA (microfilm at the American Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia); Downs, "American Merchants," 422.
[414] Girard to Hutchinson, January 2, 1805, Stephen Girard Papers; Downs, "American Merchants," 422.
[415] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations,* 167.
[416] Downs, "American Merchants," 425.
[417] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations,* 167.
[418] R.B. Forbes, *Letters from China,* 14.
[419] Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The History of Early Relations Between the United States and China, 1784-1844* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), 71; Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*, 41.

teas, silks, and porcelain to the United States and Europe.[420] After a conglomerate of merchant interests established Russell and Company and absorbed Perkins & Co. in 1829, the new firm took up the illicit business and soon almost monopolized the American China opium trade.[421] When the British East India Company's (BEIC) China monopoly ended in 1834, British traders not associated with the BEIC participated in all facets of the opium trade, including the American-dominated Turkey market. By the late 1830s, the volume of the opium trade soared, nearly doubling the volume of the previous years.[422]

In addition to bartering in opium, Americans also used British bills of exchange associated with the opium trade to purchase Chinese commodities.[423] Bills of exchanges were written orders requiring an individual make a specified sum to the signatory. Typically, Americans bought Chinese goods with bills based on London merchants and banks. By accepting this medium of currency, the Chinese consumer agreed to receive repayment from British lenders (often through opium re-exported from the Indian subcontinent). As opium constituted an increased portion of their cargoes, which also diminished their dependence on specie, Americans gained a competitive edge in commercial exchanges in China. In the 1820s, Americans' ability to draw credit abroad increased. For American traders in Canton, Southern cotton exports were of particular significance because they made larger amounts of British commercial paper available in the United States, where it was issued as payment by the U.S. agents of major London and Liverpool merchant banks who bought bales of cotton for British textile firms. By the late 1820s, a system of global exchange had crystallized, as one historian of China quipped, in which

[420] Latourette, *The History of Early Relations*, 71.
[421] Horsea Ballou Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict 1834-1860* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1910), 83-84.
[422] Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly," 44-46.
[423] Norwood, *Trading Freedom*, 29.

"Americans drank Chinese tea paid for by Southern cotton through the medium of London bills and Asian opium." [424] Trading in opium (or bills of exchange) freed Americans from the long-standing need to engage in long voyages to amass sufficient specie to acquire a full cargo in China.[425]

China, once a major drain on the United States' nationwide specie collection, now became a market where American merchants could buy and sell with increased frequency. Americans exchanged bills of credit, manufactures, furs, culinary delicacies, and opium for Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain, which they then sold for profit in Europe and North America.[426] This new trend unnerved Americans concerned with the stability of the Canton System. In 1830, John Perkins Cushing warned that he was "fearful of recommending extensive operations" in China to Russell and Company "as it will not be a great while before this Country will be entirely drain'd [sic] of its specie and the merchandise wanted by foreigners will not pay for the single article of Opium."[427]

The opium trade fundamentally reshaped the flow of specie between China and the world. Between 1831 and 1840, the importation of specie from the United States to China declined by eighty percent compared to the previous decade.[428] In exchange, American as well as European merchants transported roughly 19,000 chests annually (up from 8,000 per year in the 1820s). Through much of the 1830s, the volume of the opium soared. The annual average of the years 1835-1839 was almost double that of the previous seven years.[429] During the 1830s, the

[424] Downs, *Golden Ghetto*, 111; Norwood, *Trading Freedom*, 64-65.
[425] Downs, "American Merchants," 434.
[426] Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of United States' Policy in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1922), 72-73.
[427] J.P. Cushing to John Cabot, October 20, 1830, from Charles Stelle, *Americans and the China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Arno Press Inc., 1981) 62; Vernon Briggs, *History and Genealogy of the Briggs Family, 1254-1937* (Boston: C.E. Goodspeed, 1938), Vol. 1, 319.
[428] Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 72-74; Stelle, *Americans and the China Opium Trade,* 61-62.
[429] Downs, "American Merchants," 439.

increased importing of opium by Euro-American ships furnished widespread addiction in China. Chinese users smoked opium with tobacco, which created a more potent and addictive high. This custom also established opium consumption as a social activity initially among the wealthy and later among a broader contingent of society as the drug became more widely available and cheaper.[430] That traders conducted this business illicitly deprived the Qing government of a substantial part of its tax base, which it had historically collected in the form of specie. As this changing trade dynamic drained the Qing state, this pressure forced the Qing Empire to respond to the impending crisis.[431]

Ruptures in American Trade in China

During the late 1830s, the Qing Empire began to severely target the illicit opium trade due in part to it draining the empire of silver.[432] At this time, opium's market value was four times greater than the narcotic's weight in silver coins. Silver served as the standard global currency and constituted one of the most-coveted items around the world at the time. After three or four decades of sustained growth of the trade in opium, as one American merchant Robert Bennett Forbes explained, Qing imperial officials were "alarmed by the large amount of specie going out of the country to pay for it."[433] One possible remedy that the Qing emperor considered was legalizing the opium trade, which offered a prospect of boosting the Qing's capacity to then tax the trade. In the summer of 1836, a high officer of the Qing court, Heu-Naetse, proposed the legalization of opium in a memorial to the Qing emperor, a motion supported by Canton's local

[430] Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly," 44.
[431] "A Memorial from the American Merchants at Canton, 1839," *Memorial of R.B. Forbes and Others to the Congress of the U.S.* from Paul Clyde, *United States Policy Towards China: Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 4-5.
[432] Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 94.
[433] R.B. Forbes, *Personal Reminisces,* 144.

government.[434] However, by 1838, the Qing emperor had ruled out this idea. Instead, he decided to halt the opium trade in order to reduce the flow of outward specie and limit foreign influence in China.[435]

December 1838 marked an inflection point for the Qing Empire's anti-opium campaign. On December 3, Qing officials seized two chests of opium (each filled with roughly 140 pounds of the narcotic) from the American ship *Thomas Perkins*. The Qing emperor sought to make an example of the illegal venture. The *Thomas Perkins* had intended to deliver the illicit cargo to a British merchant named James Innes. However, leading Qing officials also included an American merchant named William Talbot with the failed smuggling effort. The government ordered the expulsion of both James Innes and William Talbot and cut off all foreign trade at Canton until the two traders exited.[436] Because Innes had intended to sell his opium supply to the Hong merchant A-sien, Qing officials promptly put A-sien in stocks and publicly humiliated him.[437] Talbot was exculpated for the charge when Hong officials proved he was not involved in the affair. However, pressure mounted for Innes's expulsion. After Innes's landlord threatened to tear down his lodging, on December 16, 1838, James Innes fled Canton and found refuge in Macao.[438] Despite Innes's exit, foreign trade remained closed as this crisis bled into other controversies involving foreign merchants at Canton.

Controversy was sparked by Qing officials' plans to execute an opium dealer outside of Canton's merchant factories. On December 12, 1838, twenty Mandarins and over one hundred soldiers arrived outside the foreign factories intent on strangling the Chinese opium dealer Ho

[434] *Chinese Repository,* Vol. 7 (May 1838-April 1839).
[435] Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 93; Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War,* 37.
[436] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire,* 196.
[437] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire,* 196.
[438] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire,* 197.

Lao-kin in the public square. Qing authorities justified this public spectacle on that basis that "all foreigners who are engaged in the traffic of this prohibited article may witness the dreadful punishment inflicted on the natives for their violation of the laws of the Empire."[439] In recent days, Qing officials had begun to seize Chinese merchants suspected of trading in opium and to confiscate their property, imprison them, expel them, or execute them.[440] As many as eighty American and British traders mobilized to prevent the execution of Ho Lao-kin. However, as one Kentuckian and Chinese-speaking Canton resident, William Hunter remembered, the opium smuggler "was tied up and strangled in a twinkling [wooden cross]."[441] The U.S. consul Paul Snow explained, "the execution was considered by the foreigners [non-Chinese merchants] a direct and positive insult," an attempt by Qing officials to intimidate them.[442] News of the factory grounds' "desecration by public execution" soon spread and provoked a response from "a large and desperate mob," who Hunter claimed, had been "raised by the imprudence of a small number of English and American young men."[443] Dozens of foreigners, as Hunter remembered, "armed with sticks…charged the multitude" of local Chinese surrounding the execution site "and

[439] *House Documents* 119: 26-1, Dispatch No, 17, March 5, 1839; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 95.
[440] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire,* 197.
[441] William Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty, 1824-1844* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882), 136.
[442] Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 95.
[443] Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty*; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 94.

drove them to some distance" from the factories, when "things began to wear a more serious aspect."[444]

Figure 4.2: "Chinese Merchants of the Hong," Trade and Commerce; Arts and Artefacts Reference: SNM128712 Copyright: National Museum, Stockholm, Sweden/Bridgeman Art Library.

What followed was a widespread anti-Euro-American riot, which the merchant community described in colorful and incendiary terms to its audience back in the United States. A crowd of what one American estimated to be "eight or ten thousand of the vilest of the population seemingly bent on the destruction of the 'foreign devils,'" carried out an "attack upon all foreigners who happened to be out of their residences." Their factories were "besieged by many thousands of vagabonds, who kept up an incessant attack on windows and gates with stones and brickbats," Hunter contended.[445] Local Chinese "tore down" large posts outside the

[444] Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty*, 45-46; Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 198, fn81.
[445] Hunter, *The 'Fan* Kwae' *at Canton Before Treaty*, 47.

factories and used them as "battering rams" while "yelling and shrieking like so many wild animals."

As the affair escalated, the American merchant community grew alarmed for their safety. "Rather anxious that some [of the local Chinese] should force their way in," Hunter remembered, traders barricaded factory entrances with "great casks of coal," they "distributed broken bottles in great quantities up and down the main entrance to our own Factory" to slow "barefooted" intruders and took up all "weapons as they had amongst them, revolvers and fowlingpieces."[446] The factories were warehouses in which non-Chinese traders lived, ate, and stored their imports and exports, specie, and conducted their trade with Hong merchants (see Figure 4.3). Merchants of the American factory also sent out calls for assistance to one powerful Hong merchant.[447] By evening, Qing soldiers had restored order. Hundreds of soldiers dispersed the crowd and "caused a rush towards every outlet from the Square, and even to the river, where several [local Chinese] were drowned."[448] In the end, the Qing Empire protected merchants from harm. But their precarious position as non-Chinese merchants in Canton still remained. In the aftermath, many Americans attributed the violence to local Chinese's desire to seize their supply of silver, but Qing officials laid the blame with foreigners.[449] The widespread chaos unleashed by state executions and clashes between foreigners and local Chinese resulted in Qing officials keeping all trade closed in Canton until January 1, 1839.[450]

In an effort to halt the opium trade, authorities appointed an imperial commissioner, Lin Zexu, to oversee a widespread crackdown. This campaign constituted the most severe challenge

[446] Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty,* 47.
[447] Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty,* 46.
[448] Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty,* 47.
[449] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 201-204.
[450] Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 197.

to Euro-American commerce in China. After arriving in Canton in early March, the only Chinese port open to foreign commerce, Lin Zexu worked A-sien, to stop the importation of opium. On March 18, Linn sent an ultimatum to the foreign merchant community in Canton, William Hunter remembered, which "ordered all Opium held by them to be surrendered, and that they should sign bonds to discontinue the trade 'under penalty of death.'"[451]

This announcement alarmed many U.S. merchants because it put their lives and a large amount of wealth at stake. The merchant community was accustomed to the provincial government intimidating opium dealers with empty proclamations. For this reason, foreign merchants had dismissed the edict as an attempt by Linn to solicit a bribe from them. When Linn threatened to behead Hong merchants if foreigners refused to comply, they finally agreed to surrender 1,037 chests of opium. Lin responded by commuting the sentences of Hong merchants but he was unsatisfied with what he considered a paltry proportion of the opium possessed by foreigners at Canton. He ordered that the British merchant Lancelot Dent, one of the largest opium smugglers, surrender himself to the authorities for questioning. Fearing for his life, Dent refused.[452]

Linn intensified his anti-opium campaign. On March 22, 1839, Commissioner Linn prohibited international commerce entirely. As Linn waited for the Euro-American merchant community to comply with his orders, Linn ordered all Chinese servants away from the factories, prohibited the import of supplies into the factories, and surrounded the warehouses with over 500 soldiers and dozens of military boats, ensuring that foreigners could not leave their factories until they surrendered their opium. Linn also ordered port authorities to stop issuing red cards (passes required for foreigners to enter Canton) and he dispatched soldiers to secretly monitor foreign

[451] Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty, 1824-1844*, 138.
[452] Johnson, *The New Middle* Kingdom, 154; Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty*, 87-88.

residences.[453] Lin did not interact directly with them but rather communicated his wishes through Chinese merchants (the Cohong).[454] Issuing directives through the Cohong, as another American resident William Hunter remembered, Linn "ordered all Opium held by them to be surrendered, and that they should sign bonds to discontinue the trade, under penalty of death." With this governmental intervention, approximately 350 foreign merchants found themselves confined in the 66,000-square-mile merchant settlement in southwest Canton.[455] As Robert Bennett Forbes explained, "We were prisoners in our own factories or houses; all trade ceased, and we were thrown on our own resources."[456]

[453] Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War*, 90-91.
[454] The Cohong was a body of twelve merchants. They were Chinese businessmen with significant means who owned extensive commercial establishments with numerous warehouses. See Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 171.
[455] Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War*, 91-92.
[456] R.B. Forbes, *Personal Reminisces*, 145; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 94-96; Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War*, 91.



Figure 4.3: "European Factories and Custom Houses at Canton," c. 1835, A Sampling of the Sturgis Letters, L556, Boston Athenaeum.

Finally, on May 18, 1839, Qing officials released all foreign merchants and officially ended a 47-day stand-off. Much had happened over that time. On March 28, the British Superintendent of Trade Charles Elliot wrote to Lin. He addressed Lin with the *bing* character (a gesture indicating the commissioner's superiority), representing a concession on the part of the British officer.[457] In the letter, Elliot informed Lin that merchants would collectively surrender

[457] Euro-Americans commonly believed that Chinese officials viewed them as inferior "barbarians." But this belief is based on a misinterpretation of the word 夷 (yi), which is better translated as "foreign(er)" or "non-Han." See Laurie Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly," 41-44.

over 20,283 chests of opium. Elliott's concession partly stemmed from his fear that local Chinese would attack the merchant community at Canton.[458] As a gesture of good will, on March 29, Lin allowed basic supplies to again flow into the factories. On April 12, when he received the first portion of the narcotic, Linn permitted Chinese servants to return. In May, anticipating the timely surrender of the remaining opium, Linn lifted the military blockade. With the exception of Lancelot Dent and fifteen other major dealers, Linn released foreigners from their factories. After all the opium had been handed over on May 22, Dent and the sixteen remaining merchants signed a pledge promising never to return to China. Elliott and most of the foreign merchant community then left Canton.[459]

On June 3, 1839, Linn destroyed the 20,283 chests of opium with heat and brine, a massive stock worth about ten million silver dollars, in a major public display at Canton harbor.[460] This act was the greatest destruction of foreign cargo at Canton. An American observer who witnessed the event expressed his awe at "the degree of care and fidelity, with which the whole work was conducted." Valued at over ten million dollars and weighing over 1,400 tons, the American claimed the opium's destruction "far exceeded our expectation."[461] This cargo of opium constituted about 60 percent of all the narcotic brought to China during the 1838-1839 monsoon season.[462] This mass confiscation and destruction left an indelible mark on how foreign merchants conducted business at Canton under Qing rule.

[458] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations,* 189.
[459] Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 95.
[460] Dong Wang, *The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (New York: Rowman and Little, 2013), 49.
[461] *Chinese Repository*. Vol. 7 (May 1838-April 1839); Wang, *The United States and China,* 95.
[462] Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 92; Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 93.

Growing Commercial Crises: the Qing Crackdown and Piracy in the South China Sea

The Qing government's decision to confine 350 merchants in their factories and destroy millions of dollars' worth of opium prompted U.S. traders to seek U.S. governmental intervention for protection in China. They contended that what was needed to protect their business ventures from future threats was a stronger projection of American power and influence in the South China Sea. On May 25, 1839, Robert Bennett Forbes authored a petition to the U.S. government, co-signed by eight other U.S. merchants in Canton. That Robert Bennett Forbes acted as lead author of the petition was not incidental. As a managing partner of Russell and Company and captain of its primary opium-smuggling ship the *Lintin,* Forbes was a central figure of the American opium interest in Canton.[463] The 1839 memorial protested that U.S. traders had been "made prisoners in our factories and surrounded by armed men and boats," "cut off from all communication," and threatened to surrender opium under "punishment by death." While memorialists blamed these "acts of violence and aggression" partly on the expanding opium trade, they accused the Chinese of widespread hypocrisy. Despite a formal prohibition on the opium trade, "the highest officers in the province" were "active participants" who "have not only connived at the smuggling or introduction of the drug" but had also earned sizeable duties on each chest.[464] While some American merchants conceded that the opium trade was "evil," most of them condemned the "robbery committed upon British subjects here" by Qing officials and their "detention of the persons, ships and property" of individuals such as themselves who, he claimed, were "entirely disconnected from the obnoxious trade."[465]

[463] Norwood, *Trading Freedom,* 86-88.
[464] "Memorial," Clyde, *United States,* 5-6; Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 93.
[465] "Memorial," Clyde, *United States,* 5-6; Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 93.

Memorialists recommended remedies to these crises in the South China Sea that included sending diplomats and U.S. naval ships. "The appointment of an agent or commissioner qualified by his commercial and general information," they contended, accompanied by "a sufficient naval force to protect our commerce" would restore stability. To remedy the kinds of commercial stoppages that had occurred through 1838 and 1839, they believed that the United States needed to secure "permission for foreign envoys to reside near the court at Pekin [modern day Beijing]" from the Qing Empire. This placement would allow their representatives to resolve "difficulty with the local authorities in the prosecution of our commercial pursuits."[466] Memorialists expressed their "candid conviction, that the appearance of a naval force from the United States," could "obtain from this government such acknowledgements and treaties as would not only place our commerce upon a secure footing" but also "greatly increase the extent and the importance of our relations with this empire."[467] They claimed that these measures might help make Qing law more similar to American jurisprudence, where "punishment for wrongs committed by foreigners" in the China trade "shall not be greater than is applicable to the like offense by the laws of the United States."

The confinement of Americans in 1839 reached a broad audience in the United States.[468] Representatives, such as Abbott Lawrence of Massachusetts in February 1840, Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts in March 1840, and Levi Lincoln Jr. in April 1840, read these accounts on the floor of Congress.[469] The particulars of the memorial were printed in other leading U.S.

---

[466] "Memorial," Clyde, *United States,* 5-6; Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 93.
[467] "Memorial," Clyde, *United States,* 5-6; Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 93.
[468] As Dael Norwood points out how, in the decade before the 1840s, only one or two articles on China appeared in the popular American newspaper *Niles Register*. However, beginning in 1839, an article on China appeared in the majority of issues. These appearances often included documents written by key participants in the conflict. See Norwood, *Trading Freedom,* 80-81.
[469] Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 104; Macabe Keliher, "Anglo-American Policy and Origins of U.S. China Policy," *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2007), 247.

newspapers, such as the *Niles Register*, *Hunt's Merchants Magazine,* the *North American Review,* and the *Great Western.* This attention helped create a ground swell of support for a government response.[470]

Between May 1839 and June 1840, the British ceded their shipping operations (and its profits) to American merchants. In protest to their treatment by the imperial commissioner between March and May 1839, the British left Canton in late May. As one American observed the circumstances that followed: "Trade is at a stand. Elliot [the Chief Superintendent of British Trade] has forbidden his countrymen having anything to do with the Chinese, and has returned to Macao," the Portuguese-run island at the mouth of the Pearl River Delta. "Opinions…are very various," he reported, "But all seem to think American vessels will be perfectly safe."[471] In this British absence, twenty-five American merchants remained, continuing all carrying services from China to Anglo-American consumers for the next thirteen months. Consequently, a lucrative shipping trade emerged along the Pearl River Delta, one conducted entirely by Americans. As one American described the advantageous situation: "One thing is certain, the Americans have a clear coast of it as there are very few vessels of other nations in the port" where the remaining Americans "trade as usual & have no bad odor attached to our names as on the Chinese records."[472]

With much of their competition seeking refuge in Macao and with the prospect of a lucrative U.S.-led shipping trade before them, on May 25, 1839, Robert Bennett Forbes and dozens of his associates petitioned the U.S. government to intervene on their behalf to protect

[470] R.B. Forbes, *Letters from China,* 143-144.
[471] John Cunningham, May 3, 1839, "Journal in Singapore and Penang, Pedir Coast, Macao & Canton," John Cunningham Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly," 47.
[472] John Cunningham, August 5, 1839, John Cunningham Papers; Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly," 49.

them. With the help of a Massachusetts Whig, manufacturer, and an associate of senior partners in firms engaged in the China trade, Abbott Lawrence, the House passed a resolution on February 7, 1840 requesting that the federal government provide the body with more intelligence on American commercial activities in China so that it could decide on a course of action.[473]

One threat that loomed large over the lucrative American trade in the South China Sea was piracy. At the height of piratical activities in the South China Sea, over 70,000 Chinese pirates operated in that maritime space during the first decade of the nineteenth century. For the subsequent decades, the Ladrones Islands (present-day Washan Archipelago), Hong Kong, and Leizhou Peninsulas served as hotbeds for Chinese piracy.[474] American anxiety about piracy in the South China Sea had long plagued U.S. traders. In 1830, a group of American merchants in Canton reported to one U.S. naval squadron about their "anxiety and disquietude" about "armed vessels of doubtful character cruising in the tracts of ships, which from their pafic character are without the means of defence [sic] themselves, nor any where to look for that protection that so valuable a commerce demands."

The threat that piracy posed to Americans' commercial ventures in the South China Sea left the group of merchants "decidedly of opinion that the fostering care of the general government for the protection of commerce cannot be extended to one of more importance than the China trade." The sending of "vessels of war" to the South China Sea, the merchants contended, "will be attended with the most beneficial results."[475] As the Qing Empire ramped up

[473] "China Trade – Merchants of Boston and Salem, Massachusetts, Communication from Thomas H. Perkins and a Great Number of Other Merchants, of Boston and Salem, Mass., April 9, 1840, Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs," 26th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 170, *United States Congressional Serial Set*, 1-2; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 103; Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom*, 112; Norwood, *Trading Freedom*, 86-88.
[474] Dian Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Robert J. Antony, "The Suppression of Pirates in South China in the Mid-Qing Period," *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1992), 98-99.
[475] *Chinese Repository*, Vol. 7, 536; Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 186.

its anti-opium campaign in the South China Sea in the late 1830s, the campaign consumed much of the attention of the Qing's forces, leaving fewer resources to police piracy in the region. The governor of Guangdong reported the growing phenomenon of "life-forfeited and desperate" Chinese fishermen who frequently "put themselves into these fast-crab boats, and go out to sea, robbing and plundering the merchant traveler."[476] Cautioning that "if utmost efforts be not directed to their utter extermination," the Qing minister surmised, piracy "will be the bringing forth of some great disaster."[477]

The dangers of piracy also weighed on the minds of merchants in the United States as they saw profits pour in from the American shipping monopoly and feared that heightened Sino-British tensions might exacerbate the issue. On April 9, 1840, Thomas H. Perkins (Robert Bennet Forbes' uncle and a longtime China trader) authored a petition about American interests in China, which was co-signed by nearly forty merchants and firms. In addition to fears that the British might set up a blockade in the South China Sea, the merchant petitioners also expressed growing concerns about the growth of piracy. "The coast of China is always lined with hundreds of large fishing and smuggling vessels," they reported, which were "filled with half-starved men, who never let pass a favorable opportunity to rob a vessel in distress." U.S. governmental support was needed to restrain Chinese pirates "who were with difficulty kept from open piracy, when the whole efforts of their own Government are used to retrain them."[478] On several occasions, they reported, Chinese pirates "have taken complete possession of the entrance to Canton river, capturing all weak vessels within their reach" and "murdering the crews."

[476] *Chinese Repository*, Vol. 7, 536; Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 186.
[477] *Chinese Repository*, Vol. 7, 536; Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 186.
[478] "Merchants of Boston and Salem, Massachusetts, Communication from Thomas H. Perkins," April 9, 1840, *United States Congressional Serial Set,* 1-2; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia,* 103.

According to the memorialists, piracy endangered all U.S. shipping along the Pearl River Delta. The entire coast of China was "dangerous to any merchant-vessels" and required that they "advocate most strongly the sending of a national force to China, for the protection of American commerce from illegal aggression." As tensions between the Qing and British empire escalated, the British Crown had publicly commissioned British naval forces to travel to the South China Sea and they would likely enforce a blockade of Qing's ports. The memorialists worried about the possible consequence: Chinese mariners, "freed from the restraint of their own laws, and irritated against foreigners by a [British] blockade…will form hordes of open and desperate pirates." Here these pirates would make easy prey of "lightly manned and armed" American merchant ships. Demonstrating the power and sway that merchants held on Congress, the memorial appeared for consideration in April 1840.[479]

In late June 1840, the British Empire waged its first naval engagement against the Qing Empire with squadron comprised of 4 steam-powered gunboats, 15 barracks vessels, and 25 smaller ships. The British naval squadron sent an ultimatum to the Qing government that demanded compensation for British losses related to Lin's destruction of opium and the halting of trade for several months' time. When Qing authorities in Canton dismissed the demand, the British responded by patrolling the Pearl River estuary to Canton and blockading all traffic along that waterway. After months of failed negotiations, British warships attacked and occupied the city of Canton.[480]

In the subsequent months, important U.S. leaders voiced their full-throated support for the British attack on the Qing Empire, including former U.S. president and current Massachusetts

[479] R.B. Forbes, *Letters from China,* 143-144; Keliher, "Anglo-American Policy and Origins of U.S. China Policy," 247; "No. 19930," *The London Gazette,* December 15, 1840, 2990–2991.
[480] Mao, *The Qing Empire and the Opium War,* 101-104.

congressman, John Quincy Adams. In his fiery 1841 speech to a packed house in Massachusetts, Adams framed the conflict as one concerning the "rights" and "principles" of the "Christian Law of Nations." While Euro-American powers respected and sought only commercial reciprocity, Adams contended, Qing officials did "not consider themselves bound by the Christian precept, to love their neighbour [sic] as themselves." He concluded, Chinese traders dismissed "the right of commercial intercourse" that existed "independent of the precept of Christianity," and pursued their business based on the notion that "every one [sic] has a right to buy, but no one is obliged to sell."[481] American newspapers of all kinds distributed Adams' remarks, which helped to make his speech one of the most hotly debated subjects of the First Opium War (1839-1842). Even the American community in China were familiar with his remarks. For example, the May 1840 issue of the *Chinese Repository* printed the former president's speech.[482]

Having grown increasingly interested in American trade in China, in December 1841 John Quincy Adams requested "all documents in the Department of State, showing the origin of any political relations between the United States and the empire of China." One week after Adams's request, Horace Everett, a Vermont Whig, requested another report on China, calling for correspondence between the United States and the British government "relative to any proceeding on the part of that Government which may have a tendency to interrupt our commerce with China."[483] American business in China had captured the attention of American merchants and U.S. officials who became intent on intervention.

[481] Adams, "The Opium War and the Sanctity of Commercial Reciprocity," 50-52.
[482] Adams, "The Opium War and the Sanctity of Commercial Reciprocity," 50-52; "Adams' Lecture on the War with China," *Chinese Repository*, 11 (May 1842), 274– 89.
[483] *House Journal,* 26th Congress, 2nd Session, December 23, 1840, 97; Norwood, *Trading Freedom,* 88.

American Solutions to Commercial Crises: The U.S. Navy & the Cushing Mission

Back in the United States, momentum was building for strengthening the United States' naval capacities. In October 1841, President John Tyler replaced the existing secretary of navy with Abel Upshur—a staunch advocate for the expansion of the U.S. Navy.[484] With Upshur at the helm, naval officers leveraged reasons for why U.S. naval expansion was essential. Upshur cited the events of the 1839 Qing siege of the foreign factories as evidence. He pointed to how a historically limited U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea had prevented assisting U.S. merchants when in danger. In April 1839, a U.S. warship visited Macao and learned of Americans' imprisonment in Canton. However, the commodore could do little to help his fellow Americans. Certainly, the warship did "all that could have been expected," Upshur admitted. That Americans made it out of imprisonment safely, Upshur contributed "more on good fortune than to our strength." He credited the British superintendent's decision to surrender thousands of chests of opium with saving Americans from harm. [485]

With the increased danger of British naval blockades and piracy in the South China Sea, the U.S. government commissioned a U.S. naval squadron to travel to the region. In April 1841, President John Tyler appointed Lawrence Kearny and the East India Naval Squadron (which included the sloops of war *Constellation* and *Boston*) to travel to the South China Sea.[486] While anchored near Hong Kong, Kearny received several letters from American residents demanding redress for "outrages" committed against them and listing a number of grievances. In May 1841, Qing authorities absconded one U.S. merchant suspected of trading in opium from his factory

[484] Hall, "Abel P. Upshur and the Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," 293.
[485] Report of the Secretary of Navy, Dec. 1842, *Congressional Globe,* 27th Congress, 3rd Session (1842-1843), Appendix, 38-44; Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire*, 65.
[486] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations,* 190-191.

and imprisoned him at Canton. In November, another American merchant suspected of opium smuggling faced more severe punishment. While travelling with two of his ships to Whampoa, Qing soldiers attacked one of his vessels, killed one American sailor, and wounded the rest of the crew.[487] Qing officials then rounded up all of the survivors and imprisoned them in Canton.[488] In January 1843, hundreds of Chinese rioters attacked the U.S. Canton factory and destroyed "considerable amounts of property" belonging to the Augustine Heard and Company. As a means to redress these "outrages," Kearny petitioned Qing officials for Americans' release and for compensation of financial losses. Qing officials promised to expedite the release of prisoners and to compensate for losses.[489]

Kearny's experiences patrolling South China Sea shaped his view of the importance of American naval power in the region. From his post in the Pacific, Kearny contended that "the appearance of some of our large class ships upon this coast, and a more frequent visit of our vessels…would seem to claim attention, and the propriety of such a step is most respectfully submitted."[490] While the vast Pacific Ocean had been customarily policed by one U.S. naval squadron composed of three sloops of war and one schooner during the previous decades, in the early 1840s, Congress appropriated greater funds for doubling the size of the U.S. Navy.[491] Congress approved more than $6,588,894 (including $2,000,000 for the increase and repair of warships) for a naval buildup. This sum, combined with special appropriations totaling $250,000 and an 1841 surplus of $742,000, marked the largest investment in the navy during peacetime since the founding of the republic. In 1842, the Navy topped this amount by spending

[487] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 194-195.
[488] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 201-204
[489] Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 201-204.
[490] Kearny to Secretary of the Navy, 11 May 1843, *Congressional Series*, 53; Carroll Alden, *Lawrence Kearny*: *Sailor Diplomat* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936), 156.
[491] Upshur sought to make the American Navy half the size of the British Navy, which was the largest naval force in the world at the time. Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire*, 62.

$8,397,000, an amount that comprised approximately thirty-three percent of federal expenditures for the year.[492]

American confidence in expanding the national fleet stemmed partly from the apparent high regard in which Qing officials held foreign navies. One American missionary reported on the initial impact that one U.S. squadron had made on a Qing admiral, who "stood like a statue fixed in perfect amazement" before it. After witnessing a marine drill, "The admiral found it impossible entirely to conceal his feelings, though the lines of his face were screwed up to the highest pitch he could command."[493] Two days later, a group of Qing officers visited the squadron. Afterwards, according to one American present, the officials admitted "they had supposed, from all reports, that the foreign men-of-war were strong, but till then they never believed them so strong as they now found them to be."[494] According to these American stories transported back to the United States, the presence of warships displayed American military power and prowess at China's ports in ways that seemed to inspire respect from Qing officials.

U.S. officials believed that the war between the British and Qing empires opened up new opportunities for trade in China. With the conclusion of the First Opium War in August 1842, the British subjected the Qing Empire to a humiliating defeat. The British Crown extracted unprecedented concessions from the government in Peking (modern-day Beijing), including British access to numerous Chinese ports previously closed to foreign trade. As a means to take advantage of this new vacuum of power, the Tyler administration worked to create an official China envoy. In his December 1842 address to Congress, Tyler contended this upheaval "can not but be interesting to the mercantile interest of the United States, whose intercourse with China at

[492] Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire,* 64-65, 67.
[493] Elijah Bridgman, *Chinese Repository,* 1842, Vol. 11, 333-334; Paullin, "Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels," No. 4, 1088.
[494] *Chinese Repository,* Vol. 11, 333-334; Paullin, "Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels," No. 4, 1089.

the single port of Canton has already become so considerable."[495] The American China trade demanded "a degree of attention and vigilance," Tyler asserted, and that Congress "make appropriation for the compensation of a commissioner to reside in China to exercise a watchful care over the concerns of American citizens and for the protection of their persons and property."[496] Reflecting the importance of the undertaking, Tyler contended "a citizen of much intelligence and weight of character" ought to be appointed and that "compensation should be made corresponding with the magnitude and importance of the mission."[497]

Whig politicians believed it was in the U. S. national interest to affirm the American presence in postwar China. Despite the disdain that most congressmen felt for President Tyler, a Whig majority deemed it in its interest to secure Congressional approval for the expedition in the face of Democratic opposition.[498] The Congress passed the measure recommended by Adams's report on February 21, 1843, thereby appropriating funds (over $40,000) for a diplomatic envoy to China that included a naval squadron.[499] With approval behind it, the Tyler administration ensured the expedition was headed by individuals dedicated to American trade in the Pacific. As leader, Tyler appointed former Massachusetts congressman Caleb Cushing. That Cushing was the son of a wealthy and powerful merchant from Newburyport (the heart of the American China trade) revealed the close ties between the U.S. administration and leading China merchants. Caleb's father, John Newmarch Cushing, was a successful shipbuilder, sea merchant, and the "fifth richest man in Newburyport" by 1840. Caleb was also the cousin of John Perkins

[495] John Tyler, "Message from the President of the United States…December 30, 1842," from *Foreign Relations and the United States,* 39.
[496] Tyler, "Message from the President…December 30, 1842," 39.
[497] Tyler, "Message from the President…December 30, 1842," 40.
[498] Howe, *What Hath God Wrought,* 708.
[499] 27 *Congress,* 3 Session, February 28, 1843, *Congressional Series,* 113-15, 368; Norwood, *Trading Freedom,* 92.

Cushing.[500] Because of his familial relations, Cushing had heard much about the "potential riches" to be gained from expanding American transpacific commerce between western North America and Asia.[501] He advocated for a strong American presence in China and in the Pacific, in regions where Americans and British competed for economic and territorial control. Like many merchants and politicians, Cushing worried about the British Empire dominating Chinese markets, claiming new territories, and obstructing American commercial expansion. John Tyler and Daniel Webster valued Cushing's advice and gave serious consideration to his concerns about the British.[502]

For Cushing's entourage, Tyler selected Fletcher Webster, the son of U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster—the Cabinet Member who had been instrumental in securing Fletcher's appointment as Cushing's personal secretary. That the secretary of state ensured that his son was associated with the venture demonstrated the mission's import to the Tyler administration and the grand prospects they entertained for it. The administration also selected Warren Delano, the vice consul to Canton and Massachusetts based trader; E.K. Lane a company surgeon; and four young men who volunteered to join the expedition without pay, hoping instead to gain experience in foreign affairs.[503] The Tyler administration also assembled a large American naval force to accompany the diplomatic expedition.[504] Under the command of Commodore Foxhill Parker, the East India Naval Squadron included four ships of war: the steam frigate *Missouri,* the frigate *Brandywine,* the brig *Perry, and* the sloop *St. Louis*.[505] The administration intended to use

[500] Howe, *What Hath God Wrought,* 708.
[501] Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom,* 174.
[502] Dickmeyer, "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly," 52.
[503] Jules Davids, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China, Series 1, The Treaty System and the Taiping Rebellion, 1842-1860. Vol. 1: The Kearny and Cushing Missions* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1973), xliii.
[504] Belohlavek, *Broken Glass*, 159-160.
[505] Belohlavek, *Broken Glass,* 159-160; Latourette, *The History of Early Relation,* 134.

the 200-gun fleet, which included an 1,800-ton coal-powered steam frigate, as a display of force to awe Chinese and European observers.[506]

Ahead of the envoy's arrival in China, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster instructed Cushing to prioritize American business interests. The U.S. interest in China was "commercial, not political," Cushing explained. His "primary purpose" was to "make satisfactory arrangements for the prosecution of our commerce with this country, under new and more favorable circumstances."[507] When Cushing's expedition arrived in the South China Sea in February 1844, the diplomat strategically positioned the envoy for negotiations with the Qing. After arriving in Macao, the customary first stop for all foreign traders, Caleb Cushing formed a miniature court for the U.S. consulship. For this purpose, the U.S. envoy successfully obtained the house of the former Portuguese governor to conduct affairs. In Macao, Cushing broadened his entourage by appointing two American missionaries, Peter Parker and Elijah Bridgman, to serve as secretaries and translators.[508]

For Cushing, strategically positioning the mission for success also included using the U.S. naval squadron to project American power.[509] Striving to negotiate a treaty with Qing officials, Cushing wrote to Guangdong's Governor General Kíying and suggested (or threatened) to send a naval ship upriver to Peking to meet personally with the emperor. Kíying rejected the idea, fearing the threat of foreign vessels in the nation's capital so soon after the Qing defeat to the British.[510] Growing impatient, Cushing sent a warship to make a "courtesy call" to the

[506] Belohlavek, *Broken Glass*, 159-160.
[507] Caleb Cushing, "Dispatch 86, Caleb Cushing to Secretary of State Calhoun, 19 August 1844," *In Senate of the United States, January 28, 1845.* U.S. Congressional Serial Set. 28th Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Document 67 (Serial Set 450, Number 2, Washington, 1845), 91–92.
[508] Peter Parker, *Life, Letters, and Journals of the Rev. and Hon. Peter Parker, M.D.: Missionary, Physician, and Diplomatist.* ed, George Stevens (Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, 1896), 249.
[509] Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom*, 198.
[510] Latourette, *The History of Early Relations,* 137.

outpost of Whampoa, requesting that the captain cruise as close to Canton as possible to exchange cannon salutes. Qing officials refused to return the salute and the governor ordered the warship to return to Macao. He complained to Cushing that a "visit of such a formidably armed vessel was a strange exhibition of courtesy."[511] Cushing responded by accusing the Qing diplomat of intentionally insulting his country and suggesting that this kind of diplomacy was to blame for China's conflict with Britain.[512] The U.S. enjoy also warned the governor that American naval presence in the South China Sea would be soon expanding with the arrival of two more U.S. warships.[513] Cushing reported the exchange to the U.S. government and speculated that the governor now "may see the inexpediency of any quarrel with the United States."[514]

Likely learning from the British example coming out of their successful war against the Qing, the United States was clearly willing to use warships as leverage in negotiations. Warships were symbols of military prowess. Caleb Cushing intentionally used them as a means to apply pressure on Qing officials. After their defeat to the British, Qing officials had already considered granting other foreigners' greater access to trade, partly as a way to play various Euro-American powers off one another.[515] Nonetheless, the appearance of foreign warships on the Canton River likely reinforced this inclination. Opening ports to several foreign nations diluted the power of

[511] Acting Governor, Kíying to Caleb Cushing, April 20, 1844, Davids, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers*, 206; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 150; Belohlavek, *Broken Glass*, 165.
[512] Caleb Cushing to Acting Governor, Kíying, April 16, 1844, *Davids*, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers*, 205. Belohlavek, *Broken Glass*, 166.
[513] Caleb Cushing to Acting Governor Kíying, May 10, 1844, Davids, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers*, 225; Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 151.
[514] Caleb Cushing to Abel Upshur, 11 May 1844, Doc. No. 98 from Davids, *American Diplomatic and Public Papers*, 225.
[515] Governor General Ke to Commodore Kearny, April 16, 1843, Imperial Commissioner Kíying to Consular Agent King, August 1, 1843, Davids, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers*, 79, 94.

the British. It offered officials an opportunity to reposition the Qing Empire in a somewhat more advantageous way relative to other nations after finding itself in a severely weakened position.



Figure 4.4: "Map of Canton River," n.d., Correspondence of Russell and Mary G Sturgis, Boston Athenaeum.

Formalizing Imperial Ties: The Treaty of Wangxia

By July 1844, the Cushing mission's efforts to secure a treaty with the Qing government bore fruit. After months of negotiation, the Treaty of Wangxia was formalized by representatives of the United States and the Qing government. On July 3, in a village temple outside of Macao, Cushing and Kíying signed the document, a process that included four originals in English and four in Chinese. Cushing sent two copies in English and two copies in Chinese back to Washington.[516]

[516] Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom*, 177.

The Treaty of Wangxia highlighted the ways that the U.S. government sought to redefine its relationship with the Qing Empire. The agreement guaranteed that Americans would be allowed to trade and reside at the five ports: Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. The treaty stipulated that Americans would pay the same customs fees as other nations, and that any changes to customs fees would be made in consultation with the American consulate. The United States could also appoint consuls to communicate directly with the Qing government. U.S. citizens in China would also have extraterritoriality and be subject to a U.S. legal regime overseen by U.S. consuls. Unlike the British, Cushing did not demand the annexation of land on the China coast. Reflecting American interest in addressing merchant concerns, U.S. officials pushed for treaty terms that offered legal and military protection for Americans doing business in China. The treaty guaranteed that U.S. citizens "receive and enjoy, for themselves and everything appertaining to them, the special protection of the local authorities of Government." With these terms, Qing officials promised to "defend them from all insult or injury of any sort on the part of the Chinese."[517]

The treaty terms offered protections for merchants from riots and pirates. If Americans' "dwellings or their property be threatened or attacked by mobs, incendiaries, or other violent or lawless persons," the terms stated, Qing officials "will immediately dispatch [sic] a military force to disperse the rioters." Furthermore, Qing officials agreed to "apprehend the guilty individuals and punish them with the utmost rigour [sic] of the law."[518] The shape that the treaty terms took revealed the lasting impact that past anti-foreigner riots had on U.S. diplomacy. The agreement also promised to protect U.S. shipping against piracy: if American vessels were

[517] Article 19, from "Treaty Of Wangxia (Treaty Of Wang-Hsia), May 18, 1844," *USC US-China Institute*, https://china.usc.edu/treaty-wangxia-treaty-wang-hsia-may-18-1844 (Accessed April 28, 2022).
[518] Article 19, from "Treaty Of Wangxia."

"plundered by robbers or pirates…while within the waters over which the Chinese Government exercise jurisdiction," Qing officials were obliged to "arrest the said robbers or pirates and punish them according to law." The commercial agreement also committed Qing officials to pursing the recovery of American property and to return it to the owner through the U.S. consul.[519]

Through the treaty's clauses, U.S. diplomats empowered U.S. officials stationed in China to act in concert with Qing authorities to protect U.S. commerce. "Acts of violence and disorder," the employment of "arms to the injury of others" and other sorts of "disturbances endangering life," according to the terms, would be met with a joint-effort by Qing and U.S. representatives to "enforce order and to maintain the public peace by doing impartial justice in the premises."[520] These terms aimed to prevent rioters from disrupting U.S. trade. They assigned a multinational force of officers to capture and punish infractions as a means to protect American business and property holdings.[521]

The commercially oriented treaty also gave U.S. consuls the legal right to intervene in Chinese affairs when necessary to protect American trade. U.S. merchant ships "lying in the waters of the five ports of China open to Foreign commerce will be under the jurisdiction of the officers of their own Government."[522] American commerce in the South China Sea would be governed by U.S. officers. "All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between citizens of the United States in China," the treaty stated, would be under the direct "jurisdiction of and regulated by" U.S. consuls stationed at Qing ports.[523] This broad

[519] Article 26, from "Treaty Of Wangxia."
[520] Article 29, from "Treaty Of Wangxia."
[521] Article 29 from "Treaty Of Wangxia."
[522] Article 26, from "Treaty Of Wangxia."
[523] Article 25, from "Treaty Of Wangxia."

definition of consuls' authority gave U.S. law an extraterritorial influence over American trade in Canton.[524]

Naval officers patrolling the South China Sea also secured enhanced rights through the treaty's terms. The treaty guaranteed that officers of U.S. warships "cruising for the protection of the commerce of their country" could always "hold intercourse" with Chinese at open ports. According to the treaty, these ships of war would never be refused "all suitable facilities" from Qing officials, which included "the purchase of provisions, procuring water, and making repairs, if occasion require."[525] On several past occasions, Qing officials had refused to allow U.S. warships to disembark and purchase provisions. By promising to replenish American warships cruising in the South China Sea, these measures emboldened U.S. power and influence on the Pearl River Delta.[526]

The Treaty of Wangxia was only a tentative agreement before its ratification. Following its unanimous passage in the U.S. Senate, the treaty was ratified by President John Tyler on January 17, 1845. Next the Tyler administration commissioned a naval squadron to deliver the ratified agreement to the Qing government. The expedition left New York harbor on June 5, 1845 and reached Canton by way of Cape Horn in December.[527] Arriving on December 24, 1845, Commodore James Biddle and his senior officers were met by U.S. consul at Canton Paul S. Forbes and the two American missionaries Peter Parker and Elijah Bridgman. On December 31, 1845, U.S. and Qing officials exchanged ratified copies at the estate of a Chinese negotiator and

[524] Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom,* 133.
[525] Article 32, from "Treaty Of Wangxia."
[526] Acting Governor, Kíying to Caleb Cushing, April 20, 1844, Davids, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers*, 206; Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 177.
[527] Curtis Henson, *Commissioners and Commodores: East India Squadron and American Diplomacy in China* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 60-62.

former Cohong merchant.[528] On the Qing side, many of the same men who participated in the 1844 negotiations also took part in the 1845 ceremony.[529] With its ratification, the agreement marked the formal culmination of American merchants' efforts to protect their businesses after decades of American commercial growth in the South China Sea.

Conclusion

By examining American participation in the China opium trade, this chapter examined how commercial interactions in Canton transformed relations between the United States and the Qing Empire. Shifting dynamics enabled the United States to better secure its merchants trading in China by pressuring Qing officials for legal and military commitments.[530] Literature on American trade in China does not sufficiently explore how crises sparked by the opium business enabled the United States to assert itself as an imperial power along the Pearl River Delta. Most literature on the opium trade in China primarily focuses on British participation. Seldom does this literature explore how the Qing's opium crackdown influenced U.S. foreign diplomacy, policymaking, and statecraft. This chapter contributes to these scholarly discussions by exploring how opium-related crises helped to reshape U.S.-China relations.

During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, American commercial activities in China prompted U.S. governmental intervention in the South China Sea. Increased Chinese demand for opium enabled U.S. traders to substitute hard-to-obtain specie with opium and

[528] "Journal of Occurrences," *Chinese Repository*, Vol. 14 (December 1845), 590; Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom,* 178-179; 38; Edward Hale, *Sketches of the Lives of the Brothers* Everett (New York: Little, Brown, 1878); Belohlavek, *Broken Glass,* 147.
[529] *Chinese Repository*, Vol. 14 (December 1845), 590. These officials included Kíying, Hwáng Ngantun, Chau Chángling, and Pwán Sz'shing, Liú Tsin, mayor of Canton, and a number of junior officers.
[530] Yankees used the opium crisis to their benefit. The conflict between the Qing Empire and the British ultimately enabled Americans to build, what one American missionary referred to as an "imperium in imperio" (roughly translated as a sovereign state within an empire). See Kendall Johnson, *The New Middle Kingdom,* 198.

British credit. This substitution offered merchants the flexibility and leeway necessary to earn substantial profits. In the process, some of them built small fortunes shipping goods to and from Canton. However, when the Qing emperor launched a major anti-opium campaign, the effort crippled U.S. trade by sparking anti-foreign riots, trade bans, and property confiscation in Canton.

This commercial rupture incentivized American merchants to lobby for commercial reciprocity—not unlike the kind advocated for by John Quincy Adams. American merchants understood the stationing of diplomats and warships in the South China Sea as part of the U.S. government's responsibility to them. By dedicating sloops of war and consuls to Chinese affairs, the U.S. government secured the first U.S. international treaty with the Qing Empire and one that was focused on creating ideal commercial conditions. This agreement marked a major enhancement of American influence in China by securing Americans' commercial transactions in China with U.S. legal protections. By the mid-1840s, Americans had established an imperial sphere of influence along China's coastline that aimed to counter any Qing impediments to the free flow of American trade. This new American presence constituted a tangible expression of U.S. power and influence in the region and established a tentative sovereignty over commercial spaces in the South China Sea.

Chapter 5: Sea Changes in California: American Maritime Merchants, the Hide and Tallow Trade, and Commercial Maritime Imperialism in the North Pacific, 1829-1848

Sailing eastward along the wind-driven equatorial currents, American commercial vessels traveled homeward from the Pearl River Delta to the California coast on the far eastern shore of the Pacific. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, increased American maritime traffic in the Pacific drew American merchants to California to acquire cattle hides and tallow (cow fat) to fuel the leather industry in the United States and Europe and the mining industry in South America. Contemporaneous efforts of American merchants, informal diplomats, and officials to protect shipping along the Pearl River Delta and expand commercial activity that built on the success of the illicit opium trade along the China coast. During this period, parallel forces of commercial maritime imperialism transformed the California coast, premised on the boom and busts of the American hide and tallow trade and U.S. naval efforts to police the coastal Pacific waterways of North America. American merchants, informal diplomats, officials, and sailors on the Mexican California waterfront enabled the United States to extend its power to major California ports.

In August 1846, Massachusetts-based merchant and investor Samuel Hooper offered the U.S. secretary of the navy, George Bancroft, the opportunity to use his company traders in California to communicate and conduct important governmental affairs. “Send your letters to me,” Hooper advised Bancroft, “and I will send them on—addressed in my usual hand so absolutely no one will know what is going on.” Samuel Hooper headed one of the largest American hide and tallow trading companies in California in the mid-1840s, Edward Appleton & Co., an organization that came to see U.S. imperial expansion to the North Pacific as a major

priority. Hooper's offer to communicate governmental affairs aimed to subvert Mexican federal and local rule in California in favor of establishing an American form of governance. Contained within Hooper's correspondence was a letter from another Appleton associate, F.W. Sultonstall, who volunteered himself to serve as a U.S. agent in Santa Barbara. He asked that Bancroft "clothe" his appointment as a "private" position rather than a public one because it "would be more efficacious."[531]

By the mid-1840s, U.S. officials routinely appointed American hide and tallow traders living in California as U.S. consuls who informally conducted state affairs at California ports, providing some diplomatic infrastructure that strengthened American power in California.[532] Hide and tallow traders collected cow hides for manufacture into leather in New England and candles on the Chile-Peru coastline for mining. These appointments represented a style of diplomacy that I describe as maritime commercial imperialism. This imperial process was catalyzed by years of American engagement in the California hide and tallow trade. While hide and tallow were only temporarily profitable for Americans—for about two decades, from roughly the late 1820s to the late 1840s—examining this trade enables us to better understand American merchant ambitions and the United States' expansion to California. American merchants and U.S. officials pursued an ad hoc imperial process, one that often responded to preceding economic maritime activity. The 1848 Treat of Guadalupe Hidalgo codified into law an unequal power dynamic between the United States and Mexico that favored American

[531] Samuel Hooper to George Bancroft, Aug. 19, 1846 (including letter from F. W. Sultonstall), Bancroft Papers, Manuscripts, Massachusetts History Society (MHS).
[532] The government appointed six traders to serve as consuls. See Natalia Summers, *List of Documents Relating to Special Agents of the Department of State, 1789-1906* (Washington: The National Archives of the United States, 1934), 2-10; Goey, *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism*, 94-97.

business, which merchants and officials used to hasten the expansion of their shipping operations, foster new markets, and exert control over ports and sea lanes in the North Pacific.

Literature on maritime business's impact on American foreign diplomacy typically focuses on the period of U.S. history after the 1890s. The 1890s, for some historians, represented a "Great Aberration" even a "tragedy" in the greater scope of United States history. They understood this pivotal moment as the one when the United States first pursued global empire-building. Scholars tend to focus on the Spanish-American War and the American seizure of islands across the Caribbean and Pacific.[533] Consequently, a scholarly consensus formed about the United States' goals for expansion before the 1890s as a process confined to North America. This terrestrial bias seems to come from the view that the movements of United States citizens for much of the nineteenth century were limited to the continent. This bias led some scholars to identify the precepts of U.S. imperialism in the U.S.-Mexico War in the late 1840s, which brought California, as well as modern-day New Mexico, most of Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming into the Union. This new territory accounted for nearly 20% of the United States' total land mass in the 1840s.[534]

By examining the United States' social, political, and economic integration of California through the hide and tallow trade, this chapter argues that the expansion of American sovereignty in California and the destabilizing of Mexican governance on that nation's northwestern frontier

[533] See Immerman, *Empire for* Liberty, 6-7. For examples of this literature, see Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United State*s, 468; Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*; and Williams, *The Roots of the American Empire*; and Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life*.

[534] These works include Daniel Immerwahr, *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2019); Jane Burbank, Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 251-306; Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand* Deserts; Fred Anderson, Andrew Cayton, *The Dominion of War*, and Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier*; David J. Langum, *Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821-1846* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987); Strootman, Eijnde, Wijk, *Empires of the Sea*, 3-6.

were processed driven by maritime commerce. Literature on the American hide and tallow trade in California has provided detailed histories of the day-to-day operations of processing cattle products and the commercial exchanges that accompanied the trade. [535] But scholarship has not connected this trade to the development of American commercial maritime imperialism in the North American West and U.S. annexation of the Mexican territory of Alta California. This process stemmed from a change in American merchant attitudes. While in the late 1820s hide and tallow merchants saw coordination with Mexican governance be in their best interests, by the 1840s the expansion of U.S. governmental authority to California was their primary objective. Advocates for naval intervention on the coastline, such as William Sturgis and his son-in-law Samuel Hooper, enjoyed close friendships with top U.S. Navy officials. These included the secretaries of the navy, James Paulding (1838-1841) and George Bancroft (1845-1846), who both commissioned build ups of the Navy. Maritime merchant-federal government coordination was instrumental in shaping American expansion to California.

As American maritime merchants helped to ship war materiel to California on behalf of the U.S. government, they also coordinated the appointments of California traders willing to integrate political affairs with business.[536] It was this maritime commercial imperialism that gave these interest groups the pretext and rationale to enhance U.S. power in California. In this way, commercial maritime forces that fueled American empire-building in the 1890s were already

[535] For examples of literature on the American hide and tallow trade in California, see Cleland, "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California"; Ogden, "McCulloch, Hartnell, and Company"; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California, 1822-1846"; Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821"; Cleland, *The Cattle on a Thousand Hills: Southern California, 1822-1880*; Rydell, *Cape Horn to the Pacific*; Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican* California; Ogden, "Boston Hide Droughers along California Shores"; Pubols, *The Father of All*.

[536] Matthew Karp, "Slavery and American Sea Power: The Navalist Impulse in the Antebellum South" *The Journal of Southern History* Vol. 77, No. 2 (May 2011), 308; Theodore Hittel, *George Bancroft and His Services to California: Memorial Address Delivered May 12, 1891 before the California Historical Society* (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1893), 14.

alive and well in the early nineteenth century. This chapter investigates the dynamic and multilayered system that employed naval ships to patrol trade routes along California's coastline.[537] This system consisted of informal, personal relations, through overseas markets and international diplomacy; and through the dedication of U.S. state resources to controlling peripheral spaces, peoples, and the flow of goods claimed by the weaker Mexican state.[538]

California: A Developing Imperial Node for the American Leather Industry

The growth of American interest in California stemmed from the expansion of the New England leather manufacturers who made shoes and boots for customers worldwide. At the same time, California hide production increased first with the expansion of Spanish missions and then with the growth of Mexican ranches. Demonstrating the scale of the trade at its peak between 1822 and 1844, California's largest hide and tallow supplier Bryant, Sturgis & Co. collected over half a million hides from California.[539] As the hide and tallow industry expanded during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, California drew increased American attention and prompted hundreds of American mariners to its coastline.

Between the 1770s and 1820s, California's missions produced a surplus of agricultural and livestock products and dominated most of California's fertile coastal lands. Franciscan missionaries had migrated to the California frontier in the late eighteenth century under instructions of the Spanish Crown to settle the region and convert the Indigenous population.

---

[537] Strootman, Eijnde, Wijk, *Empires of the Sea,* 3.

[538] For this idea, I draw on a British historiographical tradition focused on investigating Great Britain's informal empire. See Potter, *British Imperial History*; Alan Knight, "Rethinking Informal Empire in Latin America"; Liss, *Atlantic* Empires; Gallagher, Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade"; Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830.*

[539] Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844," 201-202.

Within a half-century, they had established twenty-one missions along the coastline and stewarded the agricultural labor and livestock raising of over twenty thousand Native Californians. Spanish military bases (presidios) were commonly built alongside the missions. After the eruption of independence conflicts in New Spain in 1810, California missionaries engaged in illicit exchanges with traders from the United States, Britain, Europe, and Russia because Spanish ships ceased to supply California with provisions. Missionaries offered their cattle products, grains, and wine to merchants in exchange for religious garb, paintings, books, and basic necessities.[540]

In 1821, Mexico declared its independence from Spain and claimed California as one of its northernmost states, which opened up new business opportunities for American merchant ships, particularly with Catholic missions, which now openly traded their cattle products with non-Spanish and non-Mexican vessels. Hundreds of vessels visited the coastline, and regular and sustained trade and immigration flowed from the U.S. eastern seaboard and California. From the early 1820s to the mid-1840s, California's non-Indigenous population rose from roughly 3,270 to 10,500. During this time, hundreds of merchants from the United States and Europe had settled in California, married local women, converted to Catholicism, became naturalized Mexican citizens, and established familial and commercial networks extending along the Pacific coastline.[541]

---

[540] Manuel P. Servín, "The Secularization of the California Missions: A Reappraisal." *Southern California Quarterly*, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1965); Steven W. Hackel, *Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Osborne, *Pacific* Eldorado, 53-56; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 88.

[541] Doyce Nunis, "Alta California's Trojan Horse: Foreign Immigration," *California History*, Vol. 76, No. 2/3, (1997), 313-315; H. Louise Pubols, "The De La Guerra Family: Patriarchy and the Political Economy of California, 1800-1850" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2000), 586-587; Robert W. Cherny, Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo, Richard Griswold del Castillo, *Competing Visions: A History of California* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2014), 57, 87.



Figure 5.1: Hide Droughing in 1830s Mexican Alta California, Richard Henry Dana, *Two Years Before the Mast* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1840).

Beginning in the mid-1830s, the political process of mission secularization—the mass transfer of vast mission-owned cattle lands to private ranchers—transformed the California landscape. These transfers of wealth and power (based on control over land and labor) ushered in a new political and economic order along California's coast.[542] On August 17, 1833, the Mexican

[542] Secularization was a movement to divest the Franciscan monastic order of its monopoly over California's most fertile coastal lands. It was a political and legal process that aimed to reduce missions to small parishes and to transfer much of the land to local elites. Despite repeated efforts toward secularization, the process did not fully

Congress passed its Decree for the Secularization of the Missions of the Californias. With this policy, California's governor transferred mission lands to private ranchers, fueling the expansion of the hide and tallow trade. Elite Californios (Spanish-Mexican ranchers who descended from California's late-eighteenth-century presidio soldiers) drove the process by installing local Californios in governmental posts and establishing large-scale haciendas to raise cattle.[543] Government officials distributed tracts of land (between 10,000-20,000 acres per family on average) to Californios who used them to establish ranchos with the labor of former mission Indians. During the period from 1820 to 1840 the number of ranchos in California rose from about twenty to over 800. By 1840, local officials had delivered much of the mission lands into private hands.[544]

This process depended upon the coercion and enslavement of thousands of Indigenous laborers who raised the cattle, slaughtered them, processed the hides, and rendered the tallow. Theoretically, federal authorities intended secularization to return the land to Indigenous groups in California.[545] However, the control of local Californios over the process ensured that most of the land went to wealthy Californio elites. Most Indigenous laborers failed to acquire land and they were instead coerced by local elites to work on their new ranches. Californios took

---

commence until the mid-1830s. Secularization had a long history. Spanish officials originally intended for the mission system to only be a temporary infrastructure to convert Natives to Christians and committed imperial subjects. However, the system continued for a half century with little opposition from officials and missionaries. For more on secularization, see: Hackel, *Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis*, 369-420.

[543] Californios were largely descendants of Spanish colonists (often creole and mestizo soldiers) who had migrated to the northern California frontier in the late eighteenth century. After a few generations, they began to see themselves as a group (the Californios) that was distinct from Spanish subjects and Mexican citizens in central Mexico. See Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 518-538; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California, 1822-1846," 88.

[544] Osborne, *Pacific Eldorado*, 59-60; Hackel, *Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis*, 374; Pubols, *The Father of All*, 215.

[545] *The Decree for the Secularization of the Missions of the Californias* re-assigned over half of mission property and land to Christianized California Indians. These thirty-three-acre land grants was meant to be fertile enough to raise cattle. Moreover, the decree promised Christianized California Indians half of the mission herds for their own use. See: Zephyrin Engelhardt, *The Missions and Missionaries of California* (San Francisco: James H. Barry, 1913), Vol. 3, 488-95.

advantage of missions Indians' displacement from missions by offering them basic necessities and wages in exchange for their labor.[546]

During the 1830s and 1840s, this whole system served the increased demand of American merchant ships for cattle products. Heavy rain seasons during the 1830s helped to create lush pastures available to growing populations of cattle.[547] During the late-spring and early-summer slaughtering seasons, laborers processed tens of thousands of hides and hundreds of tons of tallow. They sold these products at the ports of San Diego, San Pedro, Santa Barbara, and Monterey, which served as major hubs of trade between cattle ranchers, resident merchants, and American and European ships. Merchant houses based in the United States sent their ships to California to collect hides for delivery back to North American leather manufacturers and mining operations in Chile and Peru.[548]

The hide and tallow trade built on an increasing demand for leather products in the United States and Europe and for soap and candles in South America. American and European manufacturers used cowhides to create boots, shoes, horse bridles, harnesses, saddlery, leather trunks, suitcases, chairs, picture frames, wall coverings, gloves, garments, book bindings, drums, carriage tops, curtains, and aprons for carriages.[549] In exchange for cattle products, American merchants offered mixed cargoes from the United States and East Asia, including tools (ploughs, axes, hammers, screwdrivers), textiles (silks, cotton linens, muslins, satins), manufactured leather products (boots, shoes), and books, musical instruments, guns, and gunpowder.[550] Mine

---

[546] Servín, "The Secularization of the California Missions" 133-137; Osborne, *Pacific Eldorado,* 53-56.
[547] Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 255; Steven Hackel, "Land, Labor, and Production: The Colonial Economy of Spanish and Mexican California, *California History*, Vol. 76, No. 2/3, 113.
[548] Pubols, *The Father of All*, 110, 143; Hackel, "Land, Labor, and Production," 137.
[549] Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California, 1822-1846," 295; Hackel, "Land, Labor, and Production, 132-134.
[550] Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 275-276; Rydell, *Cape Horn to the Pacific*, 46-47; 53; Osborne, *Pacific Eldorado,* 65-67.

operators in Chile and Peru created a high demand for California's tallow. In Peru and Chile, laborers processed the tallow into candles and soap, which were sold to silver miners who used these products to light deep caverns and to scrub the soot from their workers.[551] The American hide and tallow trade built on decades of American business with communities along the Pacific Northwest and the California coastline where merchants collected sea otter furs, provisions, and cowhide and tallow en route to the Southeast Asian ports of Manila and Guangzhou where Americans bartered for Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain.[552]

The most successful trading company of the California hide and tallow trade was the Boston-based merchant house Bryant, Sturgis & Co. From 1822 to 1844, this single merchant house sent sixteen vessels (each capable of holding 40,000 hides) to California and exported approximately 500,000 hides to the United States (four to five times as many hides as their largest competitor).[553] Attesting to Bryant, Sturgis & Co.'s domination of California business, in 1835 one company officer estimated, "Nearly two thirds of all the articles of import into the country" were sent by "the single house of Bryant, Sturgis & Co."[554] Robinson's tenure (1829-1840) as the company's California agent kicked off a decade-long boom of the hide and tallow trade in California. A hide that sold for roughly 50 cents in the mid-1820s was priced at $2.25 by the mid-1830s.[555] Under the leadership of one Boston-born merchant Alfred Robinson, who was stationed in Santa Barbara, the firm nearly monopolized the trade of cowhides and tallow in California.

---

[551] Osborne, *Pacific Eldorado,* 60.
[552] Downs, *The Golden Ghetto,* 71-72.
[553] Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844," 202; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 10.
[554] Richard Henry Dana, *Two Years Before the Mast: A Personal Narrative of Life at Sea*, ed. Thomas Philbrick. (New York: Penguin, 1981), 125.
[555] William Barger, "The Merchants of Los Angeles: Economics and Commerce in Mexican California" *Southern California Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Summer 2000), 137.

Thus, American merchant communities were strongly invested in California's trade prospects. Between 1826 and 1848, as some historians estimate, American traders alone shipped more than six million hides and seven thousand tons of tallow from California. In the 1830s, ships were collecting an average of 285,000 hides and 7,125 tons of tallow annually. The expansion of this business helped to turn the California coastline into a commercial hub and resource-rich hinterland for American merchants during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.[556]

Merchant Support for Governmental Intervention: Debt Collection & Governmental Policies

Californios acquired many American re-exports (from Europe and East Asia) on credit, which contracted a portion of the ranchers' future cattle products. In the 1830s, substantial debts held by Californios to American traders remained unpaid. Repayment became a major challenge for American hide and tallow traders. "Do not come to the coast," Alfred Robinson told his employers in late 1842, "There are too many goods now on hand, and the payment of debts are horrible. It appears if everyone had come to a conclusion that it was not necessary to pay old debts." Increased trade of cattle products in California meant that American traders brought a steady flow of American manufactures and European and Asian re-exports, which Californio ranchers acquired with promises of future yields of hides and tallow each *matanza* (slaughtering season). Robinson advised that merchants who had "in demand" cargoes "should not be anxious to dispose of them on a credit" and should collect payment for goods during commercial

[556] Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific,* 49-51; Pubols, *The Father of All,* 110.

transactions as much as possible. His advice revealed merchants' general attitude and feeling of disappointment in the current system of debt repayment.[557]

By the 1840s, California ranchers had little incentive to repay massive debts. In the late 1820s, hide and tallow production had been high. With an increased revenue flow, opportunities to obtain foreign credit became increasingly available to Californio elites. Californios took advantage of buying new American exports and European re-exports on credit yet they seldom prioritized the repayment of these debts. As the most powerful class in California society, they saw these recently-arrived American traders as socially indebted to them. American merchants often did not acquire wealth, material comfort, or social approbation without first trading for several years. Because of these uncertainties, merchants spent a lot of time and energy currying favor with missionaries and Californios to help to secure their social and economic standing in elite society. Californios struck hard bargains with American businessmen and exploited their commercial connections when possible. They leveraged their societal positions and wealth by integrating influential American men into their familial and kinship networks, and establishing themselves as vital middlemen between smaller inland producers and coastal merchant houses.[558]

The problem of debt repayment was exacerbated by a long series of drought years in California beginning in the late 1830s and continuing through 1845.[559] With the cattle population dying of famine, American merchants increasingly struggled to collect repayment from Californios as they drew on a diminished supply of available hides and tallow. "There must be a

[557] Thomas Larkin to Joseph Carter, Monterey, Nov. 18, 1842, *Larkin Documents*, Bancroft Library; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade," 248.
[558] Nunis, "Alta California's Trojan Horse: Foreign Immigration," 305-306; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 248.
[559] Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 300. In 1840 and 1841, no rain fell for eighteen months. Livestock died from starvation. Crop yields, such as wheat, were so poor in California that merchants sent ships to San Blas and Guaymas looking for flour. See William Cowan, "The Pacific Slope Superstorms and the Big Winter of 1861-1862" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2021), 56.

considerable amount of debts from which little will ever be realized," Bryant, Sturgis & Co. pessimistically assessed at the end of the 1839 season. The company ordered its agents to take "every precaution" to "hasten" the collection of their outstanding debts. "The great mistake heretofore made in this business," the company contended, stemmed from "a too great anxiety to sell goods, when the real difficulty lies in getting paid for them."[560] So pervasive was the problem with debt collection that one New York merchant suggested in October 1846 that the United States take California as compensation for outstanding debts. "If I were President," Aaron Leggett suggested, "I would order one of our Ships to go and take Monterey and all California & keep it as pay for what Mexico owes us." Leggett's threat signaled a growing willingness among American merchants to embrace military force to protect their interests in California.[561] Because uncollected debts undermined American merchants' ability to conduct profitable interactions, they put increased pressure on the U.S. government to use military power to protect their property and their business capacities on California's coast. The presence of the U.S. Navy in California enhanced merchants' ability to collect monies owed by California debtors.[562]

During the 1830s and 1840s, trade had rapidly expanded and drawn hundreds of American sailor migrants to California. The changing market and labor demands of American business also drew the attention of the U.S. government. As American influence in California's maritime commerce grew, federal Mexican officials and California authorities countered by working to establish a political economy that was shaped by local elites—rather than Americans.

---

[560] Bryant, Sturgis & Co. to Henry Mellus, April 12, 1839, Bryant & Sturgis Records, Vol. 11, Letter book, 1837-1872, Baker Library, Harvard Business School.

[561] Aaron Leggett to William Marcy, Oct. 16, 1845, from "An Important Letter," *California Historical Society*, Vol. 11 (March 1932), 33-34. Leggett was clearly familiar with Thomas ap Catesby Jones's invasion of Monterey in late 1842 and his comments reflected a growing support among American merchants for a seizure of Monterey in 1846 even though the 1842 invasion of Monterey had ended in embarrassment for Jones's expedition. See Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific*, 114-116.

[562] Thomas Larkin and others, Monterey, July 1, 1840, Vol. 9, Despatch No. 10, U.S. Legation in Mexico, Department of State, National Archives (NARA).

Californios fought to install their peers in government posts. Once in office, these political allies worked to enforce protectionist policies in California that challenged the supremacy of American shipping.[563] With these new allies in California government, American merchants navigated newly implemented trade restrictions, which were often enforced unevenly among California customs officials. Californios installed their peers in government posts to enforce protectionist policies that challenged the supremacy of American shipping.

California depended almost entirely on revenue from trade tariffs, duties, and other charges to fund its local governance. Yet the treasury was almost always empty. In 1838, the California government was bankrupt, and the recently-confirmed governor, Juan Bautista Alvarado, assumed a share of the public expenses in order to preserve his government. "Funds have been completely…exhausted," he contended, "for any indispensable expenditures I must make very great sacrifices." Alvarado was even forced to pay Monterey's presidio soldiers out of his own pocket.[564]

Mexican and Californio authorities also encouraged international competition between French, British, and American traders, which threatened aspects of American business in California. European and British imperial aspirations to control California's commercial access and trade networks exacerbated American anxieties in the United States. Commercial competition formed an important part of the commercial and political environment that American merchants and their governmental supporters had to contend with in California. It also raised the stakes for the U.S. authorities when they contemplated coming to the aid of the

[563] Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California,* 237-246.
[564] M.G. Vallejo to Department Treasurer, July 10, 1839, in Vallejo Family Papers, Manuscript, Vol. 6, no. 147, 5, Bancroft Library; Bancroft, *History of California, Vol. 3* (San Francisco: A.L. Bancroft & Co., 1885), 617, 10; Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 191-192; Juan Alvarado to M.G. Vallejo, in Vallejo Family Papers, Vol. 5, no. 145, 5.

Americans. American merchants responded to these challenges by agitating U.S. officials to send naval squadrons and to reorient American diplomacy with Mexico.[565]

These dire circumstances also prompted Californios to enhance the state's authority. After years of half-hearted enforcement, in late 1838 Alvarado ordered his Administrators of Customs to alert American merchants that customs and duties on trade would "be enforced to the letter." In 1839, Alvarado's government imposed a tax on Euro-American hide-salting establishments in San Diego (the main headquarters for hide and tallow production). In order to gain tighter control over customs collections, in January 1841 Alvarado published an order restricting the coasting trade to Mexican vessels.[566] It required that all traders ship their cargoes to Monterey to pay all customs and duties and to sell the bulk of their goods to California's inhabitants. Later that year, the Mexican Congress voted to approve of Alvarado's policy implementations, giving them an official legality.[567]

Like California authorities, Mexican federal officials also sought to raise revenue from the commerce of Euro-American traders in California. In 1843, a federal decree strengthened prohibitions on retail trade by non-Mexican nationals across Mexico. In response, the U.S. government sent a minister, Anthony Butler, to protest this Mexican decree. Butler argued that this new legislation infringed upon the U.S.-Mexican *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* (1831), because it imposed duties on trade without adequate notice and targeted certain traders with discriminatory policies.[568] On a local level, authorities largely ignored the

[565] Thomas Larkin and others, Monterey, July 1, 1840, Vol. 9, Despatch No. 10, U.S. Legation in Mexico, Department of State, National Archives (NARA). For Californio writing on protectionist economic policies, see: M.G. Vallejo, *Exposición* (México: Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1835), 21.
[566] The shipment of goods would be conducted by vessels registered under the Mexican flag only.
[567] Bancroft, *History of California, Vol. 3*, 617; Bancroft, *History of California, Vol. 2, 62;* Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 249; Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 248 fn 171; Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 204 fn 89.
[568] Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 252.

1843 law and did not generally force visiting traders to pay these fees. However, this Mexican policy prompted merchants to expand their authority to create an infrastructure in the Pacific that better protected their trade. They focused their energies on keeping California ports open to trade, their vessels adequately manned, and their merchandise safely stored.[569]

Establishing a "Free Trade" Empire: The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation

One way that American hide and tallow traders aimed to protect their interests in California was through treaties with Mexico. The earliest treaties between the United States and Mexico revealed how much maritime traders shaped diplomatic interests. For example, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, which was ratified by Mexico and the United States in early 1832, offered a legal framework for "free trade" by secure their commercial access, property, and diplomatic representatives at Mexican ports. Establishing free trade meant guaranteeing unrestricted American access to Mexican ports.[570] The 1831 treaty ensured that American traders would "have liberty freely and securely to come with their vessels and cargoes" to all Mexican ports of trade. Americans would pay "no higher or other duties" on imports into Mexico or on "tonnage, light or harbor dues, pilotage, or the salvaging" of shipwrecked American vessels than other non-national traders. The agreement also guaranteed residency to American traders, who "could remain and reside" at ports and "hire and occupy houses and Warehouses for the purposes of their Commerce." While residing in Mexican ports, American merchants would have "full liberty…to direct or manage themselves in their own affairs."[571]

---

[569] "U.S. Government Document," 28th Congress, 1st Session, *Senate Document*, no. 390 (Ser. 436), 16-19; Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 252-255.

[570] Mexico ratified the treaty on January 14, 1832, and the United States ratified it on April 5, 1832. "Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," from Charles Bevans, ed. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949,* Vol. 1, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968-1976), 766.

In addition to negative freedoms, American traders also pursued positive freedoms, which included guarantees from the Mexican government to protect their property. The treaty promised that American traders' "houses, persons and properties…shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their Commerce." While in Mexico, American traders "shall not be disturbed or molested."[572] These negotiations reinforced an American vision of free trade in the Pacific. The treaty protected Mexican and American traders from confiscation of their cargoes and seizure of their maritime laborers if "a war should unhappily break out" between the United States and Mexico. Any Mexican or American ship "besieged, blockaded or invested by the other" at a port of trade would not "be restrained from quitting such a place with her Cargo." Should Mexican citizens confiscate any goods, the treaty promised that all goods "shall be restored to the owner thereof. American ships, it stated, would not "be liable to any embargo, nor shall their Vessels, cargoes, Merchandize [sic] or effects, be detained for any Military expedition nor for any public or private purposes whatsoever."[573]

The treaty gave American merchants a measure of protection in Mexico during wartime, guaranteeing "a term of six months to the merchants, residing on the coast" to get their affairs in order during which the Mexican state would protect their shipping activities.[574] It also kept merchants' loans to Mexican citizens intact during wartime. The treaty guaranteed that "debts between individuals…monies in the public funds, or in public or private banks" and "shares in Companies" would never "be confiscated, embargoed, or detained."[575] Revealing the importance

[572] "Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 768, 765, 773.
[573] "Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 771, 767.
[574] "Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 773.
[575]"Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 773.

of trade to the U.S.-Mexican relationship, the agreement forbid federal and local confiscation of American cargoes and funds in Mexico in the case of a U.S.-Mexican conflict.[576]

For American merchants, preserving the labor force on their ships was crucial. The *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* guaranteed that American sailors were "exempt from compulsory service in the Army or Navy" imposed by Mexican forces, ensuring that sailors did not face impressment and that merchant ship crews would largely remain intact for the duration of their voyages. Through the work of U.S. consuls, American captains could also secure governmental assistance in recapturing sailors who deserted. The treaty promised that U.S. merchant consuls would "enjoy the rights, prerogatives, and immunities which belong to them by their character" as diplomatic agents. It stated that these representatives "shall have power to require the assistance of the authorities of the country…for the arrest, detention, and custody of deserters from the public and private vessels of their Country."[577] The treaty therefore created a legal infrastructure which empowered newly-deputized U.S. diplomats in Mexico and committed Mexican officials to compelling American sailors to serve on their vessels.[578]

Unfortunately for American merchants, the *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* failed to secure them optimal access to Mexican markets and protect them against commercial regulations on American business. Six years after the treaty's ratification, American merchants in California petitioned the U.S. government for government assistance and railing against Mexico's "hasty and unlawful alterations" to commercial policies, which functioned much "to the injury of the business of vessels."[579] By identifying some of the policies that were detested by

[576] "Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 773-774; William Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1916), 205-213.
[577] "Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 774-775.
[578] Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California,* 251-253; Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations,* 205-213.
[579] Thomas Larkin and others, Monterey, July 1, 1840, Vol. 9, Despatch No. 10, U.S. Legation in Mexico, Department of State, National Archives (NARA).

American traders, we can better understand their impact on merchants' aspirations and commercial planning. These policy failures likely influenced the owners of Bryant, Sturgis & Co. decision to relinquish the hide and tallow business. They cautioned their California agents that these regulations would "prove fatal to our trade" and ordered them "to abandon the business while these regulations exist" and to sell their company ships "to a concern who have more energy than ourselves to continue the trade."[580]

A Growing Support for Military Intervention

An 1840 petition from American merchants in California indicated that the *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* had failed. The treaty was unable to protect American business against steep taxation and what merchants saw as punitive governmental policies. This failure prompted the memorialists to call for an increased U.S. naval presence on the California coast that could police trade at its ports and maintain a "peaceable order" with the sailor population.[581] During the early 1840s, key allies for Pacific expansion enhanced their lobbying efforts, which helped to establish more frequent American surveillance in California than in the 1830s.[582] In an 1840 petition from American merchants in California, the memorialists contended that a naval presence would ensure fair treatment of Americans conducting business there. Citing an effective example of naval intervention, the petitioners claimed that French traders in California enjoyed more security than they did because of an overt display of naval power in early 1840. The petitioners contended that this naval visit demonstrated to California

[580] Bryant Sturgis to Alfred Robinson Boston, July 13, 1841, George Bancroft Papers; Bancroft, *History of California*, Vol. 2, 62; Francis, *An Economic History and Social History of Mexican California,* 202-207; Langum, *Law and Community on the Mexican California* Frontier, 159.
[581] Bryant, Sturgis & Co. to Alfred Robinson, Boston, July 13, 1841, Bryant & Sturgis Records.
[582] Paullin, "Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels," 1073.

authorities the French government's "determination to protect them [French traders] in any emergency."[583]

This effort coincided with Pacific expansionists taking positions of power in the U.S. Navy, which together helped to concentrate American power in California and the Pacific. In his 1841 annual report to Congress, Secretary of the Navy, Abel Upshur asked for representatives to focus their attention on "American interests in the Pacific ocean," which were "an interest of vast magnitude and importance" and valued at "not less than forty millions of dollars."[584] He contended that American trade "cannot be safe…except under the protection of our naval power" and advocated for the exploration of California's coast and a doubling of the navy's size in the Pacific. He concluded by requesting that Congress allocate funds for a major increase in the Pacific squadron.[585]

U.S. naval and governmental officials were increasingly persuaded by American merchants of new opportunities for profit in the hide and tallow trade. By the early 1840s, the market had become unexpectedly more lucrative. Ongoing independence wars in South America hurt the cattle industry and obstructed the production of cattle products in the area. "This autumn the prospect is favorable for a good market for her Hides," Bryant, Sturgis & Co. predicted in 1839, "as the continuation of the blockade at Buenos Ayres [sic] diminishes the supply from South America." Hides from California now sold at a much higher price than they did a few years earlier. In January 1840, Bryant, Sturgis & Co. reported that "prospects for Hides the coming Fall are very good, owing to the continuation of the blockade of the Rio and the small

[583] Thomas Larkin and others, Monterey, July 1, 1840, Vol. 9, Despatch No. 10, U.S. Legation in Mexico, Department of State, National Archives (NARA).
[584] Abel Uphsur, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," December 4, 1841, *Naval History and Heritage Command https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/secnav-reports/annual-reports-secretary-navy-1841.html* (Accessed April 28, 2022).
[585] "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," December 4, 1841; Hietala, *Manifest* Design, 57-59; Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Old China Trade* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1977), 57-60.

stocks on hand both here and in Europe." Bryant, Sturgis & Co. reported that the Boston merchant community "contemplates a more active state of things in the fall."[586] Despite major reservations about debt collection, duties, and regulations, American merchants still believed California held promising business prospects. This conviction prompted many merchants to persuade and apply political pressure on U.S. officials to intervene on the California coast as a means to better secure their future trading prospects in California.[587]

With increased financial investment from the U.S. federal government, and with increased pressure from American merchants to intervene in California, the U.S. Navy pursued aggressive expansionism in the Pacific. In early 1842, the U.S. Navy dispatched a squadron under the command of Commodore Catesby Ap Jones, a Virginian and expansionist Democrat. The secretary of the navy Abel Upshur warned, "There is some reason to think the policy of England contemplates one or settlements on the borders of the Pacific Ocean, which affect our interests, and perhaps, our rights." Upshur ordered Jones to "take prompt measures…in the event powers….take unauthorized possession."[588] When the commodore received intelligence that a British seizure of California was imminent, he sailed northward from Peru to California's capital, Monterey. Arriving in early October, Jones's squadron seized the capital and raised the American flag. While Jones returned the capital some days later and renounced any U.S. claims to California, this form of gunboat diplomacy exemplified the collaboration among merchants and officials in crafting foreign policy that protected the flow of American trade in and around the California coast.[589]

---

[586] Bryant, Sturgis to Robinson, January 17, 1840, Bryant & Sturgis Records, MSH; Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime* Empire, 51-53.
[587] Bryant, Sturgis to Robinson, January 17, 1840; Thomas Larkin and others, Monterey, July 1, 1840, NARA; Bryant, Sturgis to Thomas Shaw, Boston, September 10, 1839, Bryant & Sturgis Records, MSH.
[588] Karp, "Slavery and American Sea Power," 309-310.
[589] John ap Catesby Jones to Abel Upshur, September 13, 1842; Jones to Captains James Armstrong, C. K. Stribling, and Thomas A. Dorwin, September 8, 1842, "Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding

American competition with European and British powers was central to Jones's gunboat diplomacy. Because correspondence took several months between Pacific posts and Washington, DC, Jones needed to assess intelligence independently. Tyler's Cabinet officials contended that Jones acted on his own volition. However, John Quincy Adams—a figure steeped in American Pacific strategy—was convinced that Jones had simply followed the Navy's orders. He cornered the secretary of state Daniel Webster at the State Department for three hours to find out specifics on the government's policy towards California.[590] Even after President Tyler had disavowed Jones's actions, Upshur refused to dismiss the commodore and fiercely defended his actions, suggesting that Jones's did not stray that far from official naval doctrine.[591] Upshur held the conviction that "commerce…may be regarded as our principal interest because, to a great extent, it includes within it every other interest," revealing his desire to coordinate naval surveillance with American business.[592]

In addition to rupturing U.S.-Mexican relations, Jones's seizure of the capital also put American merchants in danger of Mexican retaliation. In October 1842, while in San Diego, William Phelps told his Bryant, Sturgis & Co. associates about recent threats caused by the American occupation of Monterey. The Mexican government had sent hundreds of men to spread out across the California coast between San Diego and Monterey and reinforce Mexican control of this space. Fearing a military assault on his ships, Phelps's superior, Alfred Robinson, had ordered him to "abandon the property on shore if it seemed necessary for the preservation of

Officers of Squadrons, 1841-1886: Pacific Squadron, 1841-1886," Record Group 45, National Articles, Washington, D.C., National Archives Microfilm Series AMS M-89, reel 31; Karp, "Slavery and American Sea Power," 310.
[590] Gene Smith, "Thomas ap Catesby Jones and First Implementation of Monroe Doctrine," *Southern California* Quarterly, Vol. 76, Issue 1 (July 1994), 148.
[591] Gene Smith, "Thomas ap Catesby Jones and First Implementation of Monroe Doctrine," 147-148.
[592] Uphsur, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," December 4, 1841; Hietala, *Manifest Design,* 59.

the ship."[593] As he later recalled events, Phelps claimed that retreat meant abandoning over 30,000 cowhides and determined to meet any Mexican military effort with force.[594] By the 1840s, most American concerns had established warehouses to store their cattle products in San Diego. The port best served hide and tallow production because it was consistently warm, free from rain, fog, and heavy surf, thereby providing an ideal environment for laborers to dry, cure, and store hides. Merchants therefore expected the U.S. government to protect this base of the California cattle product trade.[595]

While his men hurriedly loaded hides onto the vessel, Phelps ordered a team of sailors to build up barriers for defense. Thus, a leading Bryant, Sturgis & Co. official at San Diego predicted a forthcoming Mexican military assault and reportedly decided to resist it by force.[596] Fortunately for American merchants, the Mexican battalion ceased its plan for an invasion when Jones returned Monterey to California authorities. Jones's squadron retreated to the Hawaiian port of Honolulu after learning that the U.S. government had disavowed his actions. Nonetheless, this political turmoil in California made it clear that American merchants were willing to resist Mexican intervention with force.[597] American merchants resisted by calling on the U.S. government to intervene and by establishing their own force to resist Mexican forces.

The Consolidation of Mercantile-Governmental Interests and the U.S. Seizure of California

U.S. officials and American merchants collaborated to militarily protect American commerce in California. U.S. officials crafted foreign policy dedicated to securing the shipping

[593] Oct. 24, 1842, from "Webfoot" or William D. Phelps, *Fore and Aft, or, Leaves from the Life of an Old Sailor* (Boston: Nichols & Hall, 1871), 261-262.
[594] Phelps, *Fore and Aft,* 261; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 299-300.
[595] Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific,* 59; Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 181-182.
[596] Phelps, *Fore and Aft, 263.* Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California," 250-256.
[597] Phelps, *Fore and Aft,* 263.

of American traders in and around the California coast. American traders argued that the necessity for governmental protection of U.S. investments in California justified military intervention. Developing a form of American imperialism that aimed to keep ports of trade open, American ships adequately manned, and port authorities coordinating with them, merchants and government officials worked to enhance their authority and power on the coastline.[598] What the merchants wanted was protection and, for the most part, they relied on the U.S. government to provide it.

American merchant houses and investors had a vested interest seeing a regular naval presence along the California coast. In July 1845, William Sturgis, co-owner of Bryant, Sturgis & Co, California's most important shipper of hide and tallow products, petitioned the U.S. Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft for naval intervention. "There is a large amount of American property on Shore in the Port of St. Diego in California which can be saved and embarked by the presence of a vessel of War." Sturgis's son-in-law Samuel Hooper echoed this desire the following year, asking the Navy to "order a small vessel to St. Diego as it is made the depot for the collections of homeward cargo until the vessels are to be loaded for the homeward voyage."[599] Their requests revealed San Diego's importance to the merchant community in New England and represented their struggle to protect their interests there.

Highlighting a deepening political-economic coordination among merchants and U.S. officials, Sturgis implied and acknowledged a shared interest in promoting trade in California. "I am confident that you desire to give every protection to the commercial interest," he confided to the secretary of the navy, and "that orders have been given to take care of this branch in case of hostilities with Mexico." Sturgis was a close acquaintance of George Bancroft who was

[598] Immerman, *Empire for Liberty*, 1-10; Paolino, *The Foundation of American Empire*, 3-7.
[599] Samuel Hooper to George Bancroft, June 25, 1846, July 12, 1846, Bancroft Papers, MHS.

appointed U.S. secretary of the navy in 1845 by President James Polk.[600] Like Bancroft, Sturgis was a lifelong New Englander. In 1845, Sturgis assured a family friend that his "connexion [sic] and personal intimacy" with George Bancroft "enables me to communicate unofficially with the [Polk] Administration, and to learn every thing [sic] that can with propriety be communicated by a member of the Cabinet to a personal friend."[601] Leading hide and tallow traders therefore had the attention of top U.S. naval officials and were courted by others to exercise their influence.

By the mid-1840s, Samuel Hooper headed the biggest hide and tallow trading company in California, William Appleton & Co.[602] In July 1846, Hooper pledged his support for an American military occupation of California. Hooper contended that he saw "no reason why the American Flag should not be hoisted" in San Diego, Los Angeles, Monterey, and San Francisco because they were "so important to the mercantile interests to have...under the equal laws of the United States." U.S. occupation, Hooper reasoned, would provide improved security to business and "enable [Americans] to continue their trade as before along the whole coast." "Having been long in the California trade," Hooper reasoned that an American presence would enable him to remain in a strong position "to follow up any business that may offer there." For Hooper, the

[600] William Sturgis to George Bancroft, Boston, Dec. 17, 1845, Bancroft Papers, MHS; Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast," 283; Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast," 283; Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844" 211; Barragy, "American Maritime Otter Diplomacy," 33-34.
[601] Sturgis to Bancroft, Dec. 17, 1845, Bancroft Papers; Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast," 283.
[602] The Edward Appleton and Co. sent a vessel to the coast annually from 1842 to 1846. The company, which included former Bryant, Sturgis & Co. employees, obtained about 125,000 hides from the California coast in 1846, while its competitors, Joseph Eaton & Co. and Benjamin Reed & Co., each collected roughly 90,000 hides that year. For more on these trading companies, see Dallas, "The Hide and Tallow Trade," 251 and Adele Ogden, "Boston Hide Droughers along California Shores," 297-301.

American legal system best secured his property and commercial access on the California coast.[603]

Figure 5.2: "Hon. Samuel Hooper, Massachusetts," Still Picture Records Section, Special Media Archives Services Division (NWCS-S).



Figure 5.3: "Captain William Sturgis," Walton Advertising and Printing Company.

[603] Samuel Hooper to George Bancroft, June 25, 1846, Bancroft Papers, MHS; Adele Ogden, "Alfred Robinson: New England Merchant in Mexican California," *California Historical Society Quarterly,* Vol. 23, 3 (Sept. 1944), 201 fn 37; Coughlin, "California Ports," 169-173.

In 1846, California ports were again seized by American naval ships, this time permanently during the U.S.-Mexico War (1846-1848). To achieve this end, American merchants openly coordinated with U.S. officials to ensure that arms, munitions, warships, and wartime communications reached California. Merchants helped to create an American imperial web in California by using their ships to bring arms, men, and provisions, as well as selling vessels to serve as warships. In the summer of 1846, Hooper proposed selling the government a 250-person capacity vessel, which could also carry thousands of barrels of military stores to California.[604] Demonstrating his desire to participate in governmental military operations in California, Hooper offered to supply ships of "first rate and the terms are as low as could afford."[605]

American merchants like Hooper further facilitated military intervention in California by using their resident traders to clandestinely communicate government intelligence along the coast. In 1844 Thomas Larkin, a New England-born trader living in Monterey, was appointed to be a U.S. consul to Monterey by the secretary of state, although U.S. officials shrouded his appointment in secrecy.[606] As U.S. consul, Thomas Larkin advocated for American imperial expansion. Larkin contended that the prospect of an American takeover enjoyed widespread support among California's population. Describing Mexican efforts to control California's communities, Larkin claimed, "They will fight all troops Mexico may send here, to the last drop of their blood." Larkin contended that "immediately" after Mexican soldiers intervened in California, the Californios, "will drive off all the cattle to try first to starve them away." The

[604] Coughlin, "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821," 285-286.
[605] Samuel Hooper to George Bancroft, July 6, 1846, Bancroft Papers, MHS.
[606] James Buchanan to Thomas Larkin, October 17, 1845 from Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 8, 169, 171; Alfred Robinson to Thomas Larkin, Sept. 28, 1844, *Larkin Papers, 1844-1846,* Vol. 4, George Hammond, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 105, 196; Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844," 205-206; Goey, *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism*, 94-95.

Californios were friendly to the United States, Larkin claimed, and would "prefer to see the United States troops, to those from Mexico, to govern the country." Certainly, Larkin's assessment exaggerated Californio support for an American invasion. However, his efforts of persuasion reflected the sentiments of American traders in California who wanted the U. S military to invade the territory and seize it for the United States.[607]

As news of the U.S.-Mexico War circulated along the California waterfront in mid-1846, U.S. officials responded by pursuing ways to strengthen American authority along the coast. Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft asked naval commanders and merchant consuls to survey California and determine "who could be counted upon" in the case of an American seizure. Bancroft went so far as to instruct his subordinates: "If you *can* take possession of it [California]…you should do so."[608] In time, the territory of California, as well as much of northern Mexico, fell under U.S. governance. This annexation bore the fruits of merchants and officials' years of expansionist efforts.

After an American naval and army invasion of California, Mexican and U.S. officials signed the *Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo* (1848). U.S. officials pressured the defeated the Mexican government to sign the agreement, which saw Mexican cession of nearly half of its northern territory to the United States. In addition to ensuring that the 1831 *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* be "revived" in its near entirety, the *Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo* also encompassed many other aspirations of maritime merchants who had focused on expanding American trade along the California coast since the 1820s, including ensuring that ports of trade remained open, steep duties were not imposed by customs officials, consuls were safe to conduct

[607] Thomas Larkin to James Buchanan, Monterey, July 10, 1845; Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 3, 772-773.
[608] U.S. Navy Department to Commodore John Sloat, Commanding U.S. Naval Forces in the Pacific Ocean, Washington July 12 ,1846 from Hittel, *George Bancroft and His Services to California,* 14.

their duties, and that deserters from American ships would be compelled to return to service on their vessels.[609]

The treaty's emphasis on minimizing disruptions to American business revealed merchants' influence on American foreign diplomacy. One clause guaranteed American vessels "free and uninterrupted passage" through to the Gulf of California and along the Colorado River. The treaty assured that Mexico could not "impede or interrupt, in whole or in part, the exercise of this right" and that Mexican custom officials would not charge traders any "tax or contribution."[610] This clause reflected an American push—in competition with other nations that vied for influence in the Pacific—to make "free trade" an established right in Mexico.

Like the *Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* (1831-1832), the *Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo* (1848) sought to secure merchants goods even in the event of U.S.-Mexican conflict. Article 19 promised merchants that Mexican authorities would not assert wartime authority to confiscate their cargoes. In fact, in the case of war, customs officials would give merchants two months advanced notice about any new tariffs. For a minimum of two months, Mexican officials would not charge "duty, tax, or imposts of every kind" on American cargoes.[611] In the case of a declaration of war, Article 22 guaranteed that merchants could collect their debts within the period of six to twelve months. During wartime, American merchants would enjoy "full liberty to depart, carrying of all their effects without molestation or hindrance." The *Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo* reflected the intensity of American interest in

[609] Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, 252; Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific*, 221-226; "Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the United States of American and the United Mexican States concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848," (the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo) https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (Accessed April 28, 2022).
[610] The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, Article 11; Article 7, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (Accessed April 28, 2022).
[611] The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, Article 19 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (Accessed April 28, 2022).

establishing a "free trade" imperial infrastructure in the North Pacific. The existence of such an imperial infrastructure took on especial significance after the United States acquired the California coastline.[612]

Conclusion

American merchant communities with interests in the California hide and tallow trade played an important role in the American government's extension of power into the Pacific and in defining U.S.-Mexican relations during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. An examination of the United States' social, political, and economic integration of California exemplifies how deeply-connected the U.S. government and maritime merchant communities were in establishing an American empire in the nineteenth century. This chapter explored the connection between the American hide and tallow trade and the projection of U.S. power because this causal relationship structured the commercial maritime imperialism that emerged along the California coast. By connecting the expansion of the American hide and tallow trade to the destabilizing of Mexican governance on its northwestern frontier and the enhancement of American sovereignty there, this chapter contributes to a rich California historiography dealing with the cattle ranching business. It also offers insight into interactions among American maritime merchants and Californios, cases of intermarriage, Indigenous-Spanish-Mexican ethnogenesis, and evolving conceptions of race in Mexican-era California.

The commercial node of California helped to define American foreign diplomacy during the first half of the nineteenth century. It influenced how leading American figures imagined

[612] Johnson, *The New Middle* Kingdom, 12-15, 27-29; Burbank, Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 306; the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, Article 22 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (Accessed April 28, 2022).

westward expansion and the ways that merchants approached their business in East Asia and the South Pacific. American aspirations for California shaped American foreign diplomacy in the 1840s. However, historians typically consider American interest in Texas and/or Oregon when explaining escalating tensions between Mexico and the United States and in the outbreak of the U.S.-Mexico War (1846-1848). As the United States prepared for war with Mexico, its leaders also jockeyed with Britain over territorial claims to the Pacific Northwest in an affair that Americans called "the Oregon Question." When the United States annexed the Oregon territory in 1846, the expansionist Democrat and President, James Polk, agreed to concede to the 49th parallel with the British because of California. His campaigns had rallied for the 54/40 line in present-day Alaska to ensure that Americans could obtain the choicest ports located in modern-day British Columbia. His administration made this concession only because officials intended to take ports further south along the coast of California. Without plans to go to war with Mexico and to seize over 800,000 acres of that nation's Pacific coastline, it is doubtful that the Polk administration would have settled on the 49th parallel.[613]

By connecting the California hide and tallow trade to American foreign diplomacy, the evidence presented here underscores the significance of California's coast to American expansion. This interest in California stemmed from decades of American commercial activity in the Pacific—dating back to the China voyages in the 1780s. By examining the maritime commercial imperialism pursued by American merchants and U.S. officials, we can see the methods by which the United States expanded its power, authority, and national sovereignty. This imperialism operated through a mix of business channels, social habits and customs,

[613] Dulles, *America in the* Pacific, 52; *Congressional Globe*, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 13 April 1846, 662-64; John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 1795-1848*, Vol. 12 (Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co., 1877), 221; Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundation of American Foreign Policy*, 513.

commercial agreements, informal agents, and naval ships during the first half of the nineteenth century. It represented a distinctly American model of imperialism, one that the United States would draw on many years later as it emerged to become a global hegemonic power in the twentieth century.[614]

[614] The United States' effort to seize California was more subdued in part because its claim was more dubious than in Texas and Oregon. Congressmen justified an American territorial right to Oregon based on Robert Gray's 1792 "discovery," exploration, and mapping of the Columbia River and to Texas based on U.S.-Spanish negotiations concerning the Louisiana territory. Nothing like these diplomatic justifications existed for California. For more details, see Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Canton, Dec. 18th, 1789; Thomas Randall to Joseph Barrell, New York, 14 August 1790, from Haswell, *Voyages of the "Columbia" to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 128; *Congressional Globe*, 28th Congress, 1st Session, 318-321; Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and International Policy*, 515.

Conclusion: The Evolution of American Commercial Maritime Imperialism

The five chapters of this dissertation highlight an evolution in American foreign diplomacy as American global business interests kickstarted the creation of a U.S.-based commercial maritime imperialism. With its population lining the east coast of North America in the 1780s, the early American republic had significantly expanded by the mid-nineteenth century and transformed into a commercial maritime imperial nation that asserted its power, sovereignty, and authority not only on the North American continent but also at outposts and corridors across the Pacific. While leaders of the early republic harbored big imperial dreams, they possessed few state resources and little government infrastructure to act on their expansionist desires.

It was the growth of transpacific trade that pushed U.S. officials to expand the capacities of the state. At critical junctures, the high demand for labor on merchant vessels and sailor workers' resistance to terms of employment in and around the Hawaiian Islands and the Chile-Peru coast elicited governmental intervention in the 1820s and 1830s. Threats of commercial obstruction by local governments implementing new protectionist policies and property confiscation in the Pearl River Delta and in California sparked American empire-building. At ports along the Columbia River region, the Chile-Peru waterfront, the Hawaiian Islands, the Pearl River Delta, and the California coastline, American merchants took advantage of wartime disruptions to sell goods for substantial profits. At all five of these commercial hubs on the Pacific, American economic competition and armed conflict with Europeans and Indigenous communities in the Pacific compelled U.S. officials to militarily intervene overseas. American imperialism took distinct shapes depending on what kind of infrastructure best served maritime business.

Americans often bound expansionism to ideas of freedom of trade, a vision that prioritized keeping international business flowing and major markets open and accessible to American sellers. In an age of European mercantilism, ideas of free trade appealed to maritime merchants and investors who were interested in selling goods in new markets. It also caught the attention of American farmers who wanted to sell their crops overseas and American sailors and officers who saw opportunity in new markets in the Pacific.[615] Therefore, free trade helped to furnish consensus support among Americans for maritime expansion. During the first half of the nineteenth century, American merchants and U.S. officials harnessed this expansionist impulse among American society, prompting the state to reinforce long-distance maritime shipping, the exportation of staple crops and manufactures, and the re-export of valuable global commodities. The United States' chief rival in its pursuit of shipping supremacy was Britain. Much of American merchants at U.S. officials' efforts served as responses to British actions that Americans viewed as threats to the expansion of their commercial shipping.

As imperialist impulses crystallized in the U.S. territorial acquisition of a large swath of North America, contemporaneous forces also worked to consolidate American power in the Pacific. The expansion of the U.S. Pacific naval squadron, the adoption of new commercial accords with Pacific societies, and the development of the international consular service at ports of trade reinforced American control over these five commercial nodes.[616] Commercial maritime imperialism took shape in new U.S. international policies and governmental systems of control. Therefore, nineteenth-century American diplomacy, business, and national governance were shaped by the priorities and demands of maritime interests. While Northeastern merchant communities generally resisted the American practice of seizing territory through military

[615] Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-1860," 37-38.
[616] Hietala, *Manifest Design*, 57-58.

conquest, they still pursued a system of economic imperialism that often benefitted from gunboat diplomacy and other displays of state power and violence.[617]

During this dissertation's period of interest (1787-1848), some of the imperial nodes discussed became United States territory, such as the Columbia River region (with an Anglo-American 1846 treaty) and California (with an 1848 U.S.-Mexico treaty). Others, like the Hawaiian Islands, continued to be governed by an independent Native monarch for another half century before falling under American territorial sovereignty. However, the American whaling industry, which enabled the United States to establish commercial maritime imperialism on the archipelago, placed future American merchants and sugar planters in a position to exert considerable influence over Hawaiian affairs during that period. Then, in the 1890s, pro-American business interests coordinated to overthrow the Hawaiian Queen. The U.S. secretary of state John Foster (1892-1893) quietly supported this coup, promising recognition of the new U.S.-led government, and strived for the immediate annexation of Hawai'i to the United States. The provisional government set up by American business interests made Sanford Dole, an American-born judge, president of the Republic of Hawai'i. Finally, in 1898, U.S. President William McKinley signed the Newlands Resolution which officially declared the U.S. annexation of the Hawaiian archipelago.[618]

Sovereignty in the Pearl River Delta and the Chile-Peru coast remained outside of U.S. territorial annexation efforts. Though the Pearl River Delta remained under the control of the Qing dynasty until the early twentieth century, international trade at that commercial node

[617] Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 706-707.
[618] Norma Lois Peterson, *The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler* (Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 141-142; Michael Devine, "John W. Foster and the Struggle for the Annexation of Hawaii," *Pacific Historical Review*, Feb. 1977, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Feb. 1977), 34-36; Shizhang Hu, *Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy*, 1919-1937 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 97-100.

ensured that it existed under multiple Euro-American sovereignties. With the implementation of the American-led Open-Door Policy agreement (1899), which fought for guarantees of "equal" trade, the United States, Japan, Britain, and several European powers asserted their sovereignty over commercial spaces at Chinese ports.[619]

Figure 6.1: "Open Door," c. 1900, American cartoon depicting Uncle Sam propping the 'Open Door' policy with China." Granger/Bridgeman Images.

Business along the Pacific slope of South America remained under Chilean and Peruvian sovereignty. During the second half of the nineteenth century, tens of thousands of Chileans and Peruvians migrated northward to the coast of American California following the discovery of gold. At the same time, American California became the greatest importer of Chilean wheat.[620] By the late nineteenth century, Chile had become South America's wealthiest country and had established military hegemony on the Pacific coast of South America. However, its power and

[619] Xuedong Ding, Chen Meng, ed. *From World Factory to Global Investor: Multi-Perspective Analysis on China's Outward Direct Investment* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 1-6.
[620] Sergio Villalobos, *Historia De Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1974), 155-165.

influence paled in comparison to the United States' hegemonic power in the North Pacific by 1898.[621] Though the United States never established full territorial sovereignty over all of the commercial nodes discussed in this dissertation, the territorial strongholds that the American republic occupied in California, the Pacific Northwest, and then in Hawai'i, enabled the U.S. republic to consolidate its control over transpacific shipping and assert its influence over business at major Pacific ports.

American maritime traders and private investors pursued the establishment of American imperial sovereignty and dominion in the Pacific. The movements of American ships, peoples, and products all constituted parts of an expanding imperial network between the United States and the world as transportation routes connected major sites of business and emigrant communities. The U.S. government and American business communities asserted commercial sovereignty over hotspots of American power along ports and corridors in the Pacific. With time, U.S. state power expanded its geographical influence. By the mid-twentieth century, the Pacific Ocean had become an "American Lake" as some historians have referred to it.[622]

This study of American commercial maritime imperialism demonstrates the necessity of rethinking the periodization of American Empire. United States historiography is still split between continental expansion in North America and maritime expansion overseas. By connecting five commercial nodes of American interest in the Pacific, this dissertation integrates the histories of the American West, the Pacific World, and American global empire and

[621] Robert Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 35, no. 1 (Feb. 1955), 37-50; V.G. Kiernan, "Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 35, no. 1 (Feb. 1955), 16-24.
[622] For a discussion of the Pacific as an "American Lake," see Rainer Buschmann, *Iberian Visions of the Pacific Ocean, 1507-1899* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 1-3.

illustrates how transpacific business elicited north-south movements between North and South America and encouraged east-west traffic between the Americas and the Pacific Basin.

This maritime framework provides a more comprehensive view of the United States' history of territorial annexation. American territorial expansion often built upon extant imperial infrastructures based on regions that were valuable to commercial shipping, sea routes, and networks of exchange It also helps us better understand the model of imperialism pursued by the United States, at its founding in the 1780s, during its nineteenth-century growth, and built on during its ascent to global hegemony in the twentieth century. This model was distinct from the previous globally dominant systems pursued by Europeans. Therefore, a study of early nineteenth century American imperialism allows us to better assess the development of the United States—the world's hegemonic power since the mid-twentieth century. In order to understand the last seventy-five years of American economic and military supremacy worldwide, Americans ought to go back and study the imperial processes and systems established by seafaring Americans along the Pacific slope of the Americas, in and around the Hawaiian Islands, and on the Pearl River Delta during the republic's first formative seven-five years of existence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives

American Philosophical Society Library

Stephen Girard Papers (microfilm)

Archivo and Biblioteca Nacional de Chile

Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins
Archivo de la Contaduría Mayor de Chile
Archivo Fondo Varios
Archivo del Ministerio de Hacienda
Archivo del Ministerio del Interior

Bancroft Library

Robinson, Jeremy. "Jeremy N. Robinson Letters, 1818-1823."
Larkin Documents
Vallejo Family Papers

Baker Library

Bryant & Sturgis records MSS 766 (1801-1872).
Letter book, J.J. Astor, 1813-1815

Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library

Astor Papers

Benson Latin American Collection

Hernández y Dávalos Manuscript Collection

British Library

Various Correspondence Concerning South America, Jan. 1825-July 1827

Cushing House and Historical Society of Old Newbury

Caleb Cushing Manuscripts

Government Documents

Congressional Globe
Congressional Series of United States Public Documents
House Reports
House of Representatives Documents
Senate Documents
United States Congressional Serial Set

Hawaiian Mission Children's Society Library

Hawaiian Journals of Chest Smith Lyman
Levi Chamberlain Journal
Loomis Journal Collection

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

Poinsett Papers

Huntington Library, San Marino, CA

Abel Stearns Papers, 1821-1935
Guerra Family Collection, 1752-1955
Hamond Collection, 1706-1926 "Family. Series 4: South American Station, 1825-1838"
Henry Dalton Papers, 1819-1942
William M. Hunter, USS Franklin, 1821-1824 "Logbook and Shipboard Journal"

Library of Congress

David Conner "Journal of the U.S.S. Ontario"
James Biddle "Journal and Correspondence of Captain James Biddle, commanding the U.S.S. Ontario" (microfilm)
Jeremy Robinson Papers, 1806-1832
Ontario (Sloop of War) and Dolphin (Schooner) Journals, 1817-1821

Massachusetts Historical Society

The Diaries of John Quincy Adams
Dorr Family Papers, 1684-1887
George Bancroft Papers
James and Thomas Handsayd Perkins Papers, 1898-1799
John Boit, Remarks on the Ship Columbia's Voyage from Boston
John Cunningham Papers
John Percival Papers, 1826–1841
John Suter Papers, 1804-1848
Log of the *Jefferson*
Russell Family Papers, 1759-1928
Thomas Lamb Papers, 1783-1867

Mystic Seaport Museum

Bark *Clara Bell*

National Archives and Records Administration

Charles Deblois, Private Journal Kept on Board the U.S. Frigate Macedonian, John Downes, Esqr., Commander, on a Cruise from Boston, Massachusetts, to the Pacific Ocean in the years 1819, 1819 (Microfilm)

Charles Gauntt, of the U.S. Ship *Macedonian*, John Downes, esqr., Commander, made during a cruise in the Pacific Ocean in the years 1818, 1819, 1829, 1821 (Microfilm)

Consular Letters, Honolulu, United States Department of State

Confidential Letters

Cruises of the U.S.S. Cyane

Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, 1790-1906

Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820-1903

Diplomatic Instructions

John ap Catesby Jones to Captains James Armstrong, C. K. Stribling, and Thomas A. Dorwin, September 8, 1842, "Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons, 1841-1886: Pacific Squadron, 1841-1886."

John Downes, “Narrative of a Cruise made by the United States Frigate Macedonian, John Downes, Esqr, Commander.” (Microfilm)

Letters from Captains

National Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, National Archives (Microfilm)

Records of the State, Chile

U.S. Legation in Mexico

Newspapers

American Journal of Science and Arts
American Mercury
American Registry
Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser
Boston Commercial Gazette
Canton Gazette
Canton Register
Chinese Courier
Chinese Repository
Columbian Centenial American Federalist
The Congressional Globe
Connecticut Courant
Connecticut Mirror
Eastern Argus
Edinburgh Philosophical Journal
The Essex Register
The Friend
Gazette & Patriot
Great Western
Hallowell Gazette
Hunt’s Merchants Magazine
The Independence Chronicle
Independent Gazette
The London Gazette

London Literary Gazette
Louisinana State Gazette
New Bedford Mercury
Newport Mercury
New York Gazette
The New York Journal of Commerce
Niles' Weekly Register
North American Review
The National Journal
The National Register
The North American Review
Poulson's American Daily Advertiser
Providence Gazette
Religious Intelligencer
Rhode-Island Republican
Salem Gazette
Western Recorder

New York History Society

John Ledyard Papers

Philips Library, Peabody Essex Museum

Log of Captain George Newell

Library of Congress

Caleb Cushing Papers

Published Primary Sources

Abeel, David. Memoir. *Memoir of the Rev. David Abeel, Late Missionary to China.* Edited by G.R. Williamson. New York: R. Carter, 1848.

Adams, John Quincy and Walter LaFeber, ed. *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Papers, and Speeches.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965.

Adams, John Quincy and Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed. *Writings of John Quincy Adams.* Volumes 1-7. New York: Macmillan Company, 1913-1917.

Adams, John Quincy. *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848*. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. Vol. 4. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1875.

Adams, John Quincy. *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848*. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. Vol. 12. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1877.

Allen, Nathan. *The Opium Trade: Including a Sketch of its History, Extent, Effects…in India and China.* Lowell: J.P. Walker, 1853.

Bancroft, Hubert Howe. *History of the Northwest Coast,* Vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

Bancroft, Hubert Howe. *History of California, Vol. 3.* San Francisco: A.L. Bancroft & Co., 1885.

Benton, Thomas Hart. *Debates of Congress from 1789-1856, 1 Congress, 1 Session, vol. 1*. New York: Appleton, 1857-1861.

Benton, Thomas Hart. *Debates of Congress from 1789-1856, 1 Congress, 1 Session, vol. 2*. New York: Appleton, 1857-1861.

Bevans, Charles, ed. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949.* Vol. 1. Washington, DC, 1968-1976.

Bingham, Hiram. *A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands*. Hartford: Huntington, 1847.

Boit, John. "A New Log of the Columbia on the Discovery of the Columbia River and Grays Harbor." Edited by Edmond Meany. Seattle: University of Washington, 1921.

Boletin de las Leyes I Decretos del Gobierno, 1810-1822, 4 Vols. Edited by Mateo Enrique Cerda, 4 Vols. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Nacional, 1898-1901.

Briggs, L. Vernon. *History and Genealogy of the Briggs Family, 1254-1937*. Boston: C.E. Goodspeed, 1938.

Browne, Ross. *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise.* London: J. Murray, 1846.

Cary, Thomas. *Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins, Containing Extracts from His Diaries and Letters.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1856.

Cary, Thomas. "Thomas Handasyd Perkins" from Freeman Hunt, *Live of American Merchants.* New York: Office of Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 1856.

Clay, Henry. *The Papers of Henry Clay.* Edited by Melba Porter Hay. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992.

Cleveland, Richard J. *A Narrative of the Voyages and Commercial Enterprises.* 2 Volumes. Cambridge: J. Owen, 1843.

Clissold, Stephen. *Bernardo O'Higgins and the Independence of Chile*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968.

Clyde, Paul. *United States Policy Towards China: Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939.* New York: Russell & Russell, 1964.

Colección de Historiadores y de Documentos Relativos a la Independencia de Chile. Santiago: Imprenta Cultura, 1950.

Comstock, George. "Narrative of the Mutiny," Appendix B, in Heffernan, *Mutiny on the Globe*: *The Fatal Voyage of Samuel Comstock.* New York: Norton, 2002.

Comstock, William. *The Life of Samuel Comstock, the Terrible Whalemen: Containing an Account of Mutiny, and Massacre of the Officers of the Ship Globe.* Boston: J. Fisher,1840.

Cook, James. *The Journal of Captain James Cook on the His Voyages of Discovery: The Voyage of the Resolution and Discovery, 1776-1780,* Vol. 1-2. Edited by John Beaglehole. Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1973.

Coughlin, Magdalene. "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821: An Insight into the American Acquisition of California." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970.

Coughlin, Magdalene. "California Ports: A Key to West Coast Diplomacy, 1820-1845." *Journal of the West,* Vol. 5, no. 2 (April 1966): 153-172.

Cushing, Caleb. *An Oration Pronounced at Boston before the Colonization Society of Massachusetts, on the anniversary of American independence, July 4, 1833*. Boston: Lycuem Press, 1833.

Cushing, Caleb. *An Oration, delivered in Newburyport, on the forty-fifth anniversary of American independence, July 4, 1821*. Newburyport: E.W. Allen, 1821.

Cushing, Caleb. *An Oration, on the Material Growth and Progress of the United States, delivered at Springfield, Massachusetts on the Fourth of July, 1839.* Springfield: Merriam, Wood, and Co., 1839.

Cushing, John Perkins. "Memo. For Mr. Forbes Respecting Canton Affairs." *The Business History Review,* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1966): 98-107.

Dana, Richard Henry. *Two Years Before the Mast: A Personal Narrative of Life at Sea,* ed. Thomas Philbrick. New York: Penguin, 1981.

Davids, Jules, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China, Series 1, The Treaty System and the Taiping Rebellion, 1842-1860. Vol. 1: The Kearny and Cushing Missions.* Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1973.

Daws, Gavin. *Shoal of Time: A History of Hawaiian Islands.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968.

Dorr, Sullivan, Richard Corning. “Letters of Sullivan Dorr,” ed. Howard Corning, *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* Third Series 67 (Oct. 1941 – May 1944): 178-364.

Emons, George F. *The Navy of the United States from the Commencement, 1775 to 1853.* Washington: Gideon, 1850.

Ellis, William, C.S. Stewart, A *Visits to the South Seas in the U.S. ship Vincennes, during the years 1829 and 1830.* London: Fisher & Son, 1833.

Fanning, Edmond. *Voyages Round the World: Voyages to the South Seas, North and South Pacific Oceans, China, etc.* New York: Collins & Hannay, 1833.

Fitch, Taylor. *The Flag Ship, or a Voyage Around the World in the Frigate Columbia*. Vol. 2. London: Forgotten Books, 2018.

Forbes, John Murray. *Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes*. Edited by Sarah Forbes. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899.

Forbes, Robert Bennett. *Letters from China: The Canton-Boston correspondence of Robert Bennet Forbes, 1838-1840,* ed., Phyllis Forbes Kerr. Mystic: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1996.

Forbes, Robert Bennett. *Personal Reminiscences.* Boston: Blunt White, 1882.

Forbes, Robert Bennett. *Remarks on China and the China Trade.* Boston: Samuel Dickinson, 1844.

Foreign Relations and the United States (*FRUS*) *1894 Appendix II: Affairs in Hawaii.* Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1895.

Gilliss, James. *Chile; its Geography, Climate, Government, Social Conditions, Mineral and Agricultural Resources, etc.* Washington: Nicholson, 1855.

Goodrich, Samuel, Richard Alsop. *The Captive of Nootka, or, The Adventures of John R. Jewitt.* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1835.

Graham, Maria. *Journal of a Residence in Chile during the Year 1822 and a Voyage from Chile to Brazil in 1823.* Longman, Hurst, Reed, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1824.

Greenhow, Robert. *The History of Oregon and California and the Other Territories on the North-West Coast of North America.* New York: Appleton, 1845.

Haswell, Robert. *Voyages of the “Columbia” to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, ed. Frederic W. Howay. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1941.

Hill, Henry. *Incidents in Chili, South America, 1817-1821.* Weymouth: A.W. Blanchard, 1889.

Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970. Washington: Government Print Office, 2013.

Hunt, Freeman. *Lives of American Merchants.* Vol. I. New York: Office of Hunt’s Merchant Magazine, 1856.

Hunt, Freeman. *Lives of American Merchants.* Vol. 2. New York: Derby & Jackson, 1858.

Hunter, William. *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before Treaty, 1824-1844.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882.

Hussey, Cyrus, William Lay. *A Narrative of the Mutiny, on Board the Ship Globe, of Nantucket.* New London: W. Lay, and C.M. Hussey, 1828.

Ingraham, Joseph and Mark D. Kaplanoff. *Joseph Ingraham's Journal of the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of North America.* Barre: Print Society, 1971.

Irving, Washington. *Astoria: Or, Enterprise Beyond the Rocky Mountains.* Paris: Baudry's European Library, 1836.

Jefferson, Thomas. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* Edited by Andrew Lipscomb. Washington: Memorial Association, 1903, vol. 12

Jewitt, John. *A Journal Kept at Nootka Sound.* Boston: Garland, 1807.

Jewitt, John. *A Narrative of the Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt, Only Survivor of the Crew of the Ship Boston: during a Captivity of Nearly Three Years among the Savages of Nootka Sound.* New York: Fanshaw, 1816.

Johnston, Samuel Burr. *Cartes Cartas de un Tipógrafo Yanqui.* Translated by José Toribio Medina. Buenos Aires: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1967.

Johnston, Samuel Burr. *Letters Written During a Residence of Three Years in Chili.* Eerie: Curtis, 1816.

Khlebnivkov, Kyrill T. *Colonial Russian America: Kyrill T. Khlebnikov's Reports, 1817-1832.* Translated by Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Baughan. Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976.

Larkin, Thomas. *Larkin Papers, 1844-1846,* Vol. 4. George Hammond, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Ledyard, John and James Kenneth Munford. *John Ledyard's Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage.* Whitefish: Literary Licensing, 2012.

Ledyard, John and James Zug. *The Last Voyage of Captain Cook: The Collected Writings of John Ledyard.* Washington: National Geographic Adventure Classics, 2005.

Lisiansky, Urey. *A Voyage Round the World, in the Years 1803, 4, 5, & 6.* London: John Booth, 1814.

Loring, George, ed. *A Memorial of Caleb Cushing from the City of Newburyport.* Newburyport: Order of the City Council, 1879.

Loris, Charles Greely. *Memoir of the Honorable William Sturgis.* Boston: Press of J. Wilson and Son, 1864.

MacPherson, Duncan. *Two Years in China: Narrative of the Chinese Expedition.* London: Saunders, 1843.

Madison, James. *The Papers of James Madison.* Edited by Robert J. Brugger. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1986.

Manning, William. *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations.* Vol. 1. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Place, 1925-1926.

Manning, William. *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations.* Vol. 2. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Place, 1925-1926.

Manning, William. *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations.* Vol. 3. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Place, 1925-1926.

Martínez, Melchor. *Memoria Histórica sobre la Revolución de Chile desde el Cautiverio de Fernando VII, hasta 1814.* Valparaíso: Imprenta Europea, 1848.

Meares, John. *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from China to the North West Coast of America*. London: Logographic Press, 1790.

Melville, Herman. *White Jacket; or, The World in a Man-of-War.* New York: Russell & Russell, 1850.

Miers, John. *Travels in Chile and La Plata including Accounts Respecting the Geography…and the Mining Operations in Chile.* London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826.

Miller, David Hunter. *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-1937.

Miller, John, *Memoirs of General Miller in the Service of the Republic of Peru.* London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1829.

Monroe, James. *The Writings of James Monroe,* vol 5-6. Edited by Stanislaus Murray Hamilton. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1898.

Myers, John. *The Life, Voyages and Travels of Capt. John Myers, Detailing His Adventures Round the World.* London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, 1817.

O'Higgins, Bernardo. *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins, vol. 19.* Luis Valencia Avaria, ed. Santiago: Imprenta Cultura, 1962.

Olmsted, Francis. *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage.* New York: Appleton, 1841.

Onís, Luis de. *Memoir Upon the Negotiations Between Spain and the United States of America, which led to the treaty of 1819.* Washington: E. DeKrafft, 1821.

Osio, Antonio María. *The History of Alta California: A Memoir of Mexican California*, edited by Rose Marie Beebe and Robert M. Sienkiewicz. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.

Parker, Peter. *Life, Letters, and Journals of the Rev. and Hon. Peter Parker, M.D.: Missionary, Physician, and Diplomatist.* ed, George Stevens. Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, 1896.

Perkins, Thomas Handasyd, James Perkins, and James Elliot Cabot. *Extracts from Letterbooks of J & T H Perkins, 1786-1838*.

Phelps, William D. *Fore and Aft, or, Leaves from the Life of an Old Sailor*. Boston: Nichols & Hall, 1871.

Phelps, William, William Sturgis, James Swan. *Fur Traders from New England: The Boston Men in the North Pacific, 1787-1800: The Narratives of William Dane Phelps, William Sturgis, and James Gilchrist Swan.* Edited by Busch, Briton C. and Barry M. Gough. Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1997.

Pitkin, Timothy. *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America.* Hartford: James Eastburn & Co., 1817.

Puget, Peter. "The Vancouver Expedition: Peter Pudget's Journal of the Exploration of Pudget Sound, May 7-June 11, 1792." *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 30 (1939): 177-217.

Read, George. *A Narrative Voyage in the East India Squadron under Commodore George Read. By an Officer of the Navy.* New York: C.S. Francis, 1840.

Reynolds, Stephen. *Journal of Stephen Reynolds,* vol. I: 1823-1829, ed. Pauline N. King. Honolulu, 1989.

Ruschenburger, William. *Three Years in the Pacific; Including Notices of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru.* Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, Blanchard, 1834.

Scouler, John. "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to N.W. America." *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 6 (1905): 276-287.

Sesiones de Cuerpos Lejislativos de la Republica de Chile, 1811 a 1845, Vol. 2. Edited by Valentin Letelier. Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1887-1908.

Shaler, William. *Journal of a Voyage Between China and the Northwestern Coast of America, Made in 1804 by William Shaler.* Claremont: Saunders Studio Press, 1935.

Shaw, Samuel, and Josiah Quincy. *Life and Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, First American Consul at Canton with A Life of the Author.* Boston: William Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1847.

Spark, Jared. *Memoirs of the Life and Travels of John Ledyard, from his Journals and Correspondence.* London: Henry Colburn, New Burling Street, 1828.

Stillé, Charles. *Life and Services of Joel Poinsett: The Confidential Agent in South Carolina of President Jackson* During the Troubles of Troubles of 1832. Philadelphia: 1888.

Sturgis, Russell. *From the Books and Papers of Russell Sturgis.* Julian Sturgis, ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1894.

Sturgis, William. "An Examination of the Russian Claims." *The North American Review*, Vol. 15, Issue 37 (October 1822): 307-401.

Sturgis, William and Mary Malloy, ed. *A Most Remarkable Enterprise: Lectures on the Northwest Coast Trade and Northwest Coast Indian Life.* Middleborough: Rock Village Publishing, 2013.

Sturgis, William and S.W. Jackman, ed. *The Journal of William Sturgis.* Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1978.

Tagart, Edward. *A Memoir of the Late Captain Peter Heywood With Extracts from his Diaries and Correspondence.* London: Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, 1832.

U.S. Congress. *The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, Seventeenth Congress, Second Session, 2 December 1822 to 3 March 1823.* Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1855.

U.S. Congress. *American State Papers and Foreign Relations,* Vol. 4, 852. Buffalo: Hein, 1998.

United States Department of State. *Foreign Relations and the United States* (*FRUS*) *1894 Appendix II: Affairs in Hawaii.* Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1895.

Vallejo, M.G. *Exposición*. México: Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1835.

Walker, Alexander. *An Account of a Voyage to the North West of America in 1785 & 1786,* edited by Robin Fisher and J.M. Bumsted. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982.

Ward, Gerard R. *American Activities in the Central Pacific, 1790-1870*, Vol. 3. Ridgewood: Ridgewood Press, 1967.

Webster, Daniel. *Diplomatic and Officials Papers, While Secretary of State.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1848.

Webster, Daniel. *The Papers of Daniel Webster, Correspondence*. Edited by Charles Wiltse. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1974-1985.

Webster, Daniel. *The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster.* Vol. 9. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1903.

Webster, Fletcher, ed., *Webster's Private Correspondence*. Vol. 1. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1902.

Wilkes, Charles. *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition, during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842,* Vol. 5. Philadelphia, 1849.

Williams, Frederick Wells. *The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams.* New York: Putnam, 1889.

Williams, J.R. “The Whale Fishery.” *North American Review,* XXXVIII (January 1834): 84-115.

Secondary Sources

Alden, Carroll Storrs. *Lawrence Kearny*: *Sailor Diplomat.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936.

Alvarez, Silvio. “Jeremy Robinson, Special Agent to Chile and Peru, 1817-1823.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Florida, 1972.

Anderson, Fred, Andrew Cayton. *The Dominion of War*: *Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500*-2000. New York: Viking, 2005.

Andrade, Ernest. *Unconquerable Rebel: Robert W. Wilcox and Hawaiian Politics, 1880-1903.* Denver: University of Colorado, 1996.

Antony, Robert J. “The Suppression of Pirates in South China in the Mid-Qing Period.” *American Journal of Chinese Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1992): 95-121.

Arana, Diego Barras. *Historia General de Chile, vol. 10*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1902.

Archer, Seth. *Sharks Upon the Land: Colonialism, Indigenous Health, and Culture in Hawaii, 1778-1855.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Arenson, Adam, and Andrew R. Graybill. *Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015.

Armitage, David and Alison Bashford. *Pacific Histories: Ocean, Land, People.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Aron, Stephen. *American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Aron, Stephen. *Peace and Friendship: An Alternative History of the American West.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Arista, Noelani. *The Kingdom and the Republic: Sovereign Hawai‘i and the Early United States.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019.

Aud, Edward J. “W.G.D. Worthington: His South American Mission.” M.A. Thesis, Northwestern State Teachers College, 1937.

Baeza Ruz, Andrés. *Contacts, Collisions and Relationships: Britons and Chileans in the Independence era, 1806-1831*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019.

Baptiste, Edward. *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism*. New York: Basic Books, 2014.

Barger, William. “The Merchants of Los Angeles: Economics and Commerce in Mexican California.” *Southern California Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 125-144.

Barman, Jean and Bruce McIntyre Watson. *Leaving Paradise: Indigenous Hawaiians in the Pacific Northwest, 1787-1898.* Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006.

Barr, Juliana. *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Barragy, Terrance. “American Maritime Otter Diplomacy.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974.

Barragy, Terrence. “The Trading Age, 1792-1844.” *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 76, no. 3 (1975): 197-224.

Bean, Susan S. *Yankee India: American Commercial and Cultural Encounters in India in the Age of Sail, 1784-1860*. Ahmedabad: Mapin, 2006.

Beckert, Sven. *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.

Beechert, Edward. *Honolulu: Crossroads of the Pacific*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.

Belohlavek, John. *Broken Glass: Caleb Cushing and the Shattering of the Union.* Kent: Kent State University Press, 2005.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *A Diplomatic History of the United States*. New York: Holt, 1936.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *John Quincy Adams and the Foundation of American Foreign Policy.* New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1956.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *John Quincy Adams and the Union*. Norwalk: Easton Press, 1987.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation.* San Diego: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943.

Bender, Daniel, Jana Lipman. *Making the Empire Work: Labor and United States Imperialism.* New York: New York University Press, 2015.

Bernal, Rafael. *El Gran Océano.* México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012.

Bernstein, Harry. *Origins of Inter-American Interest, 1700-1812.* New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.

Billingsley, Edward. “The United States Navy and the Independence of Latin America: Chile and Peru, 1817-1825.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1965.

Blackhawk, Ned. *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Block, Michael D. “New England Merchants, the China Trade, and the Origins of California.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2011.

Blower, Brooke.“Nation of Outposts: Forts, Factories, Bases, and the Making of American Power,” *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 41, no. 3 (2017): 439-549.

Blumenthal, Edward. *Exile and Nation-State Formation in Argentina and Chile, 1810-1862.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2019.

Bolton, Herbert Eugene. “The Spanish Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies.” *The American Historical Review* 23, no. 1 (October 1917): 42-61.

Bowman, Charles H. “A Spanish American Patriot in Philadelphia, 1796-1822.” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.* Vol. 94, No. 1 (Jan. 1970): 26-53.

Bradley, Harold. The *American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers, 1789-1843.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1944.

Bradley, Harold. “The Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Fur Trade, 1785-1813.” *Pacific Northwest Quarterly,* Vol. 30, no. 3 (July 1939): 275-299.

Bragoni, Beatriz. *José Miguel Carrera: Un Revolucionario Chileno en el Río de la Plata*. Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2012.

Brauer, Kinley J. “The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-1860.” *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1988): 19-37.

Brooks, James. *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinships, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

Brook, Timothy and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952.* Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000.

Brown, Gordon S. *Latin American Rebels and the United States, 1806-1822*. Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 2015.

Buell, Robert, and Charlotte Skladal. *Sea Otters and the China Trade.* New York: McKay, 1968.

Burbank, Jane, Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Burr, Robert. “The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay.” *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 35, no. 1 (Feb. 1955): 37-60.

Busch, Briton Cooper. *“Whaling Will Never Do For Me:” American Whaleman in the Nineteenth Century*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994.

Buschmann, Rainer. *Iberian Visions of the Pacific Ocean, 1507-1899*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014.

Calloway, Colin G. *One Vast Winter Count: The Native American Wet Before Lewis and Clark.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003.

Campbell, Charles. *The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865–1900*. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

Campbell, Duncan Andrew. *Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship.* New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2007.

Campbell, Ian. *Worlds Apart: A History of the Pacific Islands.* Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2003.

Campbell, Randolph B. "The Spanish American Aspect of Henry Clay's American System." *The Americas*. Vol. 24, No. 1 (July 1967): 3-17.

Carlson, Jon D. "The Otter-Man Empires: The Pacific Fur Trade, Incorporation & the Zone of Ignorance." *Journal of World-Systems Research*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 390-442.

Carr, Jacqueline Barbara. *After the Siege: A Society History of Boston 1775-1800.* Boston: Northwestern University Press, 2005.

Chandler, Charles Lyon. "The Life of Joel Roberts Poinsett." *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.* Vol. 59, No. 1 (1935): 1-31.

Chandler, Charles Lyon. *Inter-American Acquaintances.* Sewanee: University Press, 1917.

Chandler, Charles Lyon. "The United States Commerce with Latin America at the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine." *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* vol. 38, no. 3 (May 1924): 466-486.

Chang, David. "Borderlands in a World at Sea: Concow Indians, Native Hawaiians, and South Chinese in Indigenous, Global, and National Spaces." 98, no. 2 (September 2011): 384-403.

Chang, Hsin-pao. *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Chappell, David. *Double Ghosts: Oceanian Voyagers on Euroamerican Ships*. Armonk: M.E. Sharp, 1997.

Chapelle, Howard I. *The History of American Sailing Navy: The Ships and their Development.* New York: Bonanza Books, 1949.

Chapman, Bert. "Initial Visions of Paradise: Antebellum U.S. Government Documents on the South Pacific." *Journal of Government Information,* Vol. 30 (2004): 727-750.

Chen, Song-Chuan. *Merchants of War and Peace: British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017.

Cherny, Robert W., Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo, Richard Griswold del Castillo. *Competing Visions: A History of California*. Boston: Wadsworth, 2014.

Clayton, Daniel W. *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000.

Collier, Simon, William F. Sater. *A History of Chile, 1808-1994*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Cleland, Robert Glass. *The Cattle on a Thousand Hills: Southern California, 1822-1880.* San Marino: Huntington Library, 1969.

Cleland, Robert Glass. "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California: An Account of the Growth of American Interest in California, 1835-1846." *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly,* Vol. 13, no. 1 (July 1914): 1-40.

Collier, Simon. *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence,* 1808-1833. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Cooper, William J. *Lost Founding Father: John Quincy Adams and the Transformation of American Politics*. New York: Liveright, 2018.

Cordingly, David. *Cochrane The Dauntless: The Life and Adventures of Thomas Cochrane.* London: Bloombury, 2013.

Coughlin, Magdalene. "Boston Merchants on the Coast, 1787-1821: An Insight into the American Acquisition of California." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1970.

Cowan, William. "The Pacific Slope Superstorms and the Big Winter of 1861-1862." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2021.

Craine, Eugene. "The United States and the Independence of Buenos Aires." Ph.D. Dissertation, Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1961.

Crapol, Edward. "Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 16 (Fall 1992): 573-597.

Crapol, Edward. *John Tyler, the Accidental President*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

Creighton, Margaret. *Rites and Passages: The Experience of American Whaling, 1830-1870.* Cambridge, 1995.

Cruz, Juan Luis Ossa Santa. *Armies, Politics and Revolution Chile, 1808-1826*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015.

Dallas, Sherman. "The Hide and Tallow Trade in Alta California, 1822-1846." Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1955.

Dauenhauer, Nora, Richard Dauenhauer, and Lydia Black. *Russians in Tlingit America.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008.

Davis, Lance, Robert Gallman, and Karin Gleiter, *In Pursuit of Leviathan*: *Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Daws, Gavin. "The High Chief Boki: A Biographical Study in Early Nineteenth Hawaiian History." *The Journal of the Polynesian Society,* Vol. 75, No. 1 (March 1966), 65-84.

DeLay, Brian. "Indian Polities, Empire, and the History of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History,* vol. 39, No. 5 (2015): 65-84.

DeLay, Brian. *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

Delgado, James. *Gold Rush Port: The Maritime Archaeology of San Francisco's Waterfront.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Dening, Greg. *The Death of William Gooch*: *A History's Anthropology.* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press,1998.

Dening, Greg. *Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land: Marquesas, 1774-1880.* Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988.

Dennett, Tyler. *Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of United States' Policy in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century.* New York: Barnes and Noble, 1922.

Devine, Michael. "John W. Foster and the Struggle for the Annexation of Hawaii." *Pacific Historical Review,* Feb. 1977, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Feb. 1977): 29-50.

Dickmeyer, Laurie. "The Ghosts of the Hong Monopoly: the US-China Trade and Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2017.

Ding, Xuedong, Chen Meng, ed. *From World Factory to Global Investor: Multi-Perspective Analysis on China's Outward Direct Investment.* New York: Routledge, 2017.

Dolin, Eric Jay. *Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America*. New York: Norton, 2010.

Dolin, Eric Jay. *Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America.* New York: Norton, 2007.

Donahue, William. "The Caleb Cushing Mission." *Modern Asian Studies,* Vol. 16, No. 2 (1982): 193-216.

Downs, Jacques M. "American Merchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800-1840." *The Business History Review.* Vol. 42, 4 (Winter 1969): 418-442.

Downs, Jacques M. "The Merchant as Gambler: Major William Fairchild Megee, 1765-1820." *Rhode Island History* (Fall 1969): 99-110.

Downs, Jacques M. *The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844.* London: Associated University Press, 1997.

Dubin, Lois Sherr. *North American Indian Jewelry and Adornment: From Prehistory to the Present.* New York: Harry Abrams, 1999.

Dulles, Foster Rhea. *America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansion*. Boston: Da Capo P., 1969.

Dulles, Foster Rhea. *The Old China Trade.* Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1977.

Elkins, Stanley. *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Elliott, T.C. "An Event of One Hundred Years Ago." *The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 1918), 181-187.

Engelhardt, Zephyrin. *The Missions and Missionaries of California*. San Francisco: James H. Barry, 1913.

Engerman, Stanley and Robert E. Gallman. *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Vol 1, The Colonial Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Evans, Henry C. *Chile and its Relations with the United States.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1927.

Eyzaguirre, Jaime. "La Conducta Política del Grupo Dirigente Chileno durante la Guerra de Independencia, *Estudios de Historia de las Instituciones Abierto de 18 de Septiembre de 1810.* Santiago: Academia Chilena de Historia, 1960.

Fay, Peter Ward. "The Protestant Mission and the Opium War." Vol. 40, No. 2 (May 1971): 145-161.

Fay, Peter Ward. *The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which they Forced Her Gates Ajar.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.

Felstiner, Mary. "Kinship Politics in the Chilean Independence Movement." *The Hispanic American Historical Review.* Vol. 56, No. 1 (Feb. 1976): 58-80.

Fichter, James R. *So Great Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Fischer, Ryan. *Cattle Colonialism: An Environmental History of the Conquest of California and Hawai'i.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Fitz, Caitlin. *Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions.* New York: Norton, 2016.

Fink, Leon. *Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World's First Globalized Industry from 1812-Present.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

Fish Kashay, Jennifer. "Agents of Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth-Century Hawaii." *New England Quarterly*, 80 (June 2007): 280-298.

Fish Kashay, Jennifer. “Competing Imperialisms and Hawaiian Authority: The Canonading of Lāāhainnāā in 1827.” *Pacific Historical Review*, 77 (August 2008): 369-390.

Flynn, Dennis O, Arturo Giráldez, and James Sobredo. *Studies in Pacific History: Economics, Politics, and Migration*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2002.

Flynn, Dennis O., Lionel Frost, and A.J.H. Latham, eds. *Pacific Centuries: Pacific and Pacific Rim History since the Sixteenth Century.* New York: Routledge, 1999

Foner, Eric. *Give Me Liberty: An American History.* Vol. 1. New York: Norton, 2011.

Fontenoy, Paul E. “Ginseng, Otter Skins, and Sandalwood: The Conundrum of the China Trade,” *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1997), 1-16.

Formisano, Ronald. *The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-1840s.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Francis, Jessie Hughes Davies. *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*. New York: Arno Press, 1976.

Frank, Caroline. *Chinese Commodities in Early America.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Fuess, Claude M. *Life of Caleb Cushing,* Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923.

Fuess, Claude M. *Life of Caleb Cushing,* Vol. 2. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923.

Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson. “The Imperialism of Trade.” *The Economic History Review* 6, 1 (1953): 1-15.

Gantenbein, James. *The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy: A Documentary Record.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.

Gapp, Frank.“The Kind Eyed Chief: Forgotten Champion of Hawai‘i’s Freedom.” *Hawaiian Journal of History*. Vol. 19 (1985): 101-121.

Gast, Ross H. *Contentious Consul: A Biography of John Coffin Jones, First United States Consular Agent at Hawaii.* Los Angeles: Dawson’s Book Shop, 1976.

Gibson, Arrell Morgan [with John Whitehead]. *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993.

Gibson, James R. *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992.

Gibson, James. *California Through Russian Eyes, 1806-1848*. Norman: Arthur H. Clark Company, 2013.

Gilje, Paul. *Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Giráldez, Arturo. *The Age of Trade: The Manila Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

Goebel, Dorothy Burne. "British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade, 1817-1820." *Journal of Economic History*. Vol. 2, No. 2 (Nov. 1942): 190-202.

Goey, Ferry de. *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism, 1783-1914.* New York: Routledge, 2014.

Gootenberg, Paul Eliot. *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Graebner, Norman A. *Empire on the Pacific a Study in American Continental Expansion*. Claremont: Regina Books, 1989.

Graham, Gerald S. *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958.

Graham, Gerald S., R.L. Humphreys. *The Navy and South America, 1807-1823, Correspondence of the Commanders-in-Chief on the South American Station.* London: Navy Records Society, 1962.

Gray, Edward G. *The Making of John Ledyard: Empire and Ambition in the Life of an Early American Traveler*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

Greenberg, Amy. *A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.

Greenberg, Michael. *British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-1842.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Greene, Julia. *The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal.* New York: Penguin, 2009.

Griffin, Charles. *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822: A Study of the Relations of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish Colonies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1937.

Gulick, Edward. *Peter Parker and the Opening of China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Gurney, Alan. *Below the Convergence: Voyages towards Antarctica, 1699-1839*. New York: Norton, 2007.

Hackel, Steven W. *Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.

Hackel, Steven W. "Land, Labor, and Production: The Colonial Economy of Spanish and Mexican California." *California History*, Vol. 76, No. 2/3 (Aug. 1997): 111-146.

Haddad, John Rogers. *America's First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013.

Haddad, John Rogers. *The Romance of China: Excursions to China in U.S. Culture, 1776-1876.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Hadfield, Robert L. *Mutiny at Sea.* Standfordville: E.M. Coleman, 1979.

Haeger, John Denis. *John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance of the Early Republic.* Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Hahn, Steven. *A Nation Without Borders: The United States and its World in an Age of Civil Wars, 1830-1910*. New York: Penguin, 2016.

Hale, Edward. *Sketches of the Lives of the Brothers* Everett. New York: Little, Brown, 1878.

Hall, Claude. "Abel P. Upshur and the Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy." *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 69, no. 3 (1961): 290-299.

Hämäläinen, Pekka. *The Comanche Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

Hancock, David, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Hanes, Travis and Frank Sanello. *The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another.* Naperville: Sourcebooks, 2002.

Hanna, Mark. *Pirate Nests and the Rise of British Empire, 1570-1740.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Harlow, Neal. *California Conquered: The Annexation of a Mexican Province, 1846- 1850.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

Hartman, Howard. *The Seas Were Mine.* London: G.G. Harrap, 1936.

Haswell, Robert, John Hoskins. *Voyages of the "Columbia" to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793,* ed. Frederic Howay. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1941.

Hau'ofa, Epeli. "Our Sea of Islands" from *A New Oceania*: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands. Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, 1993.

Head, David. *Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States in the Early Republic*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015.

Heffernan, Thomas. *Mutiny on the Globe: The Fatal Voyage of Samuel Comstock.* New York: Norton, 2002.

Henderson, Timothy. *A Glorious Defeat: Mexico and its War with the United* States. New York: Hill and Wang, 2007.

Heflin, Wilson, Mary Bercaw, and Thomas Heffernan. *Herman Melville's Whaling Years.* Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004.

Henson, Curtis. *Commissioners and Commodores: East India Squadron and American Diplomacy in China.* Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982.

Herring, George. *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1777*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Herzog, Tamar. *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015.

Heyrman, Christine Leigh. *Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1960-1850.* New York: Norton, 1984.

Hietala, Thomas. *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America.*Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Hill, Hamilton. *Trade and Commerce of Boston, 1630 to 1890*. Boston: Damrell and Upham, 1895.

Hine, Robert V., John Mack Faragher. *The American West: A New Interpretive History.* New Haven, 2000.

Hittel, Theodore. *George Bancroft and His Services to California: Memorial Address Delivered May 12, 1891, before the California Historical Society.* San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1893.

Hobbs, William Herbert. "The Discoveries of Antarctica within the American Sector, as Revealed by Maps and Documents." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society.* Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1939): 1-71.

Hohman, Elmo Paul. *The American Whaleman: A Study of Life and Labor in the Whaling Industry.* New York: Longmans, Green, 1928.

Hohman, Elmo Paul. "Wages, Risk, and Profit in the Whaling Industry." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 40, no. 4 (Aug. 1926): 644-671.

Horsman, Reginald. *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Hoskins, John, ed. *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793.* Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990.

Howay, F. W. "An Outline Sketch of Maritime Fur Trade." *Report of the Canadian Historical Association* (1932): 5-14.

Howe, Daniel Walker. *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

Howe, Daniel Walker. *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Howe, Kerry. *Where the Waves Fall: A New South Sea Islands History from First Settlement to Colonial Rule*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988.

Howe, Stephen. *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurtado, Albert. *Intimate Frontiers: Sex, Gender, and Culture in Old California*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999.

Hu, Shizhang. *Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy*, 1919-1937. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995.

Hyde, Anne. *Empires, Nations, and Families: A New History of the North American West, 1800-1860.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011.

Igler, David. *The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Immerman, Richard. *Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Immerwahr, Daniel. *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States.* New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2019.

Jensen, Merrill. *The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

Johnson, Donald. *The United States in the Pacific: Private Interests and Public Policies, 1784-1799.* Westport: Praeger, 1995.

Johnson, Emory. *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce.* New York: B. Franklin, 1967.

Johansen, Dorothy O., and Charles M. Gates. *Empire of the Columbia: A History of the Pacific Northwest*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

Johnson, John J. “Early Relations of the United States with Chile.” *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 13, 31 (September 1944): 260-270.

Johnson, Walter. *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Jasanoff, Maya. *Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.

Johnson, Kendall. *Narratives of Free Trade: The Commercial Cultures of Early US-China Relations.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011.

Johnson, Kendall. *The New Middle Kingdom: China and the Early American Romance of Free Trade.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017.

Johnson, Susan. *Roaring Camp: The Social World of the California Gold Rush.* New York: Norton, 2000.

Jones, David E. *Native North American Armor, Shields, and Fortifications*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010.

Jones, David Meirion. "A Luminous Constellation Pointing the Way? The Connectivity of Rioplatense and U.S. Union and State-Formation, 1815-1820." M.A. Thesis, University of York, 2013.

Jones, Gregg. *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America's Imperial Dream.* New York: Penguin, 2012.

Jones, Ryan Tucker. *Empire of Extinction*: *Russians and the North Pacific's Strange Beasts of the Sea, 1741-1867.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Jones, Ryan Tucker. *"*Running into Whales: The History of the North Pacific from below the Waves." *American Historical Review,* Vol. 2 (April 2013): 349-377.

Kaplan, Amy. "Manifest Domesticity." *American Literature,* Vol. 70, No. 3 (Sept. 1998): 581-606.

Karp, Matthew. "Slavery and American Sea Power: The Navalist Impulse in the Antebellum South." *The Journal of Southern History* Vol. 77, No. 2 (May 2011): 283-324.

Karp, Matthew. *This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.

Keith, Alice B. "The Relaxation of British Restrictions on the American trade with the British West Indies, 1783-1802." *The Journal of Modern History* 2 (March 1948): 1-18.

Keliher, Macabe. "Anglo-American Policy and Origins of U.S. China Policy." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2007): 227-257.

Kiernan, V.G. "Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific." *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 35, no. 1 (Feb. 1955): 14-36.

Kinsbruner, Jay. "The Political Influence of the British Merchants Resident in Chile during the O'Higgins' Administration, 1817-1823." *The Americas.* Vol. 27, No. 1 (July 1970): 26-39.

Kirch , Patrick V., Marshall Sahlins. *Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii, vol. I: Historical Ethnography.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Knight, Alan. "Rethinking Informal Empire in Latin America" in *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce, and Capital.* Matthew Brown, ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 23-48.

Krooss, Herman and Charles Gilbert, *American Business History.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972.

Kuo, Ping Chia. “Caleb Cushing and the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844.” *The Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 1933).

Kushner, Howard. *Conflict on the Northwest Coast: American-Russian Rivalry in the Pacific Northwest.* Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975.

Kuykendall, Ralph S. *The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. I: Foundation and Transformation, 1778-1854.* Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1965.

Kuykendall, Ralph S. *The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. III, The Kalakaua Dynasty, 1874-1893.* Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967.

Lamar, Martha. “The Merchants of Chile, 1795-1823: Family and Business in the Transition from Colony to Nation.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1993.

Lampe, Evan. *Work, Class, and Power in the Early American Pacific: The Labors of Empire.* Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.

Langum, David J. *Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821-1846.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *The History of Early Relations Between the United States and China, 1784-1844.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917.

Lazich, Michael C. “American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in Nineteenth-Century China.” *Journal of World History,* Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 2006): 197-223.

Lebo, Susan A. “A Local Perspective of Hawai‘i’s Whaling Economy: Whale Traditions and Government Regulation of the Kingdom’s Native Seamen and Whale Fishery.” *Coriolis,* 1 (2010): 3-37.

Leggett, Aaron, William Marcy. “An Important Letter.” *California Historical Society,* Vol. 11 (March 1932): 33-34.

Lee, Henry. “The Magee Family and the Origins of the China Trade.” *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society,* Third Series 81 (1969): 104-119.

Lee, Minyong. “Circuits of Empire: The California Gold Rush and the Making of America’s Pacific.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2018.

Linebaugh, Peter, and Marcus Rediker. *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.

Liss, Peggy. *Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983.

Limerick, Patricia. *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West.* New York: Norton, 1987.

Llorca-Jaña, Manuel, and Juan Navarrete-Montalvo. “The Chilean Economy During the 1810s and its Entry into the World Economy.” *Bulletin of Latin American Research.* Vol. 36, no. 3 (April 2016): 254-369.

Mackie, Richard Somerset. *Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific, 1793-1843.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997.

Madancy, Joyce A. *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin, The Opium Trade, and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Madsen, Axel. *John Jacob Astor America's First Multimillionaire*. New York: John Wiley, 2001.

Maggor, Noam. *Brahmin Capitalism: Frontiers of Wealth and Populism in Americas First Gilded Age.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Malloy, Mary. *“Boston Men” on the Northwest Coast: The American Maritime Fur Trade, 1788-1844*. Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1998.

Manning, William R. *Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1916.

Mao, Haijin. *The Qing Empire and the Opium War: The Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Mariano Moziño, Jose. *Noticias de Nutka: An Account of Nootka Sound in 1792.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.

Matsuda, Matt. *Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

May, Gary. *John Tyler, the 10th President*. New York: Henry Holt, 2008.

McCoy, Drew. *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

McCusker, John and Kenneth Morgan, ed. *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

McMaster, John Bach. *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. 3. New York: Appleton and Co., 1906.

McNeill, J.R. “Of Rats and Men: A Synoptic Environmental History of the Island Pacific.” *Journal of World History*, 5 (Fall 1994): 299-349.

Melillo, Edward. “Making Sea Cucumbers Out of Whales’ Teeth.” *Environmental History,* Vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2015): 449-474.

Merlin, Mark, Dan VanRavenswaay.“The History of Human Impact on the Genus *Santalum* in Hawai‘i.” *Proceedings of the Symposium on the Sandalwood, USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech Rep. PSW-11* (1990): 46-60.

Merritt, Jane T. *The Trouble With Tea: The Politics of Consumption in the Eighteenth-Century Global Economy.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017.

Merry, Robert. *A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the Mexican War and the Conquest of the American Continent.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.

Merry, Sally Engle. *Colonizing Hawaii: The Cultural Power of Law.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Miller, Char. *Not So Golden State: Sustainability vs. the California Dream*. San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 2016.

Moore, John Bassett. *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations*. Vol. 2. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Maritime History of Massachusetts.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921.

Morison, S.E. "The Origin of the Monroe Doctrine, 1775-1823." *Economica.* No. 10 (Feb. 1924): 27-51.

Morrison, Dean. *True Yankees: The South Seas and the Discovery of American Identity.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.

Morrison, Samuel Eliot. *The Maritime History of Massachusetts.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921.

Morse, Hosea Ballou. *International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict 1834-1860.* New York: Longmans, Green, 1910.

Murray, Dian. *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Nettels, Curtis P. *The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775-1815: Vol. 2, The Economic History of the United States*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962.

Neumann, William. "United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence." *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 1947): 204-219.

Ngai, Mae. "Chinese Gold Miners and the "Chinese Question" in Nineteenth-Century California and Victoria." *Journal of American History* Vol. 101, no. 4 (March 2015): 1082-1105.

Nichols, Roy F. "Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809." *The Hispanic American Historical Review.* Vol. 13, No. 3 (August 1933): 289-313.

Nokes, John Richard. *Columbia's River: the Voyages of Robert Gray, 1787-1793*. Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society, 1992.

North, Douglass C. *The Economic Growth of the United States.* New York: Norton, 1966.

Norwood, Dael. *Trading Freedom: How Commerce with China Defined Early America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022.

Nunis, Doyce. "Alta California's Trojan Horse: Foreign Immigration." *California History.* Vol. 76, No. 2/3, (1997): 299-330.

Ogden, Adele. "Alfred Robinson: New England Merchant in Mexican California." *California Historical Society Quarterly,* Vol. 23, 3 (Sept. 1944): 193-218.

Ogden, Adele. "Boston Hide Droughers along California Shores." *California Historical Society Quarterly,* vol. 8, no. 4 (Dec. 1929): 289-305.

Ogden, Adele. *The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1941.

Ogden, Adele. "Hide and Tallow: McCulloch, Hartnell and Company, 1822-1828." *California Historical Society Quarterly* Vol. 6, no. 3 (September 1927): 254-264.

Ogden, Adele. "McCulloch, Hartnell, and Company: English Merchants in the California Hide and Tallow Trade." M.A. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1924.

Osborne, Thomas. *Pacific Eldorado: A History of Greater California.* New York: John Wiley, 2013.

Osorio, Jonathan. *Dismembering Lãhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002.

Ossa Santa Cruz, Juan Luis. *Armies, Politics, and Revolution: Chile, 1808-1826.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014.

Paddison, Joshua. *American Heathens: Religion, Race, and Reconstruction in California*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Paine, Ralph D. *The Ships and Sailors of Old Salem: The Record of a Brilliant Era of American Achievement.* New York: The Outing Publishing Co., 1902.

Palen, Marc William. *The 'Conspiracy' of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalization, 1846–1896*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Panzac, Daniel. "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century." *International Journal Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 189-206.

Paolino, Ernest N. *The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Diplomacy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973.

Parkinson, C. Northcote. *The Trade Winds: A Study of British Overseas Trade During the French Wars, 1793-1815.* Leicester: Blackfriars Press Limited, 1948.

Parton, Dorothy Martha. *The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett.* Washington: Catholic University of America, 1934.

Paullin, Charles. “Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels to the Orient.” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* Vol. 36, No, 2, No. 136. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1910.

Paullin, Charles. “Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels to the Orient.” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* Vol. 36, No, 3, No. 136. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1910.

Paullin, Charles. “Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels to the Orient.” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* Vol. 36, No, 4, No. 136. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1910.

Paullin, Charles. *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1912.

Paxson, Frederic L. *The Independence of the South-American Republics: A Study in Recognition and Foreign Policy.* Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1903.

Peabody, Robert E. *The Log of the Grand Turks*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, Riverside Press Cambridge, 1926.

Pereira Salas, Eugenio. “La Misión Bland en Chile.” LXXXVIII, No. 86 (1936): 80-103.

Pereira Salas, Eugenio. *Buques Norteamericanos en Chile a Fines de la Era Colonial.* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1936.

Pereira Salas, Eugenio. *Don Mateo Arnaldo (1773-1819).* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1941.

Pereira Salas, Eugenio. *Henry Hill: Comerciante, Vice-Consul y Misionero.* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1940.

Pereira Salas, Eugenio. *Jeremías Robinson, Agente Norteamericano en Chile (1818-1823).* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1937.

Perea, Natalia. *The Caudillo of the Andes: Andrés de Santa Cruz*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Pérez, Louis. *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

Perkins, Dexter. *A History of the Monroe Doctrine.* Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1963.

Peterson, Norma Lois. *The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler*/ Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 1989.

Pethick, Derek. *First Approaches to the Northwest Coast.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979.

Pine, John C. “William G.D. Worthington: United States Special Agent, 1817-1819.” *Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science.* Vol. 12 (1958): 43-51.

Pomeranz, Kenneth L., ed. *The Pacific in the Age of Early Industrialization.* Burlington: Ashgate, 2009.

Pomfret, Richard. *The Economic Development of Canada*. Osprey: Nelson, 1989.

Poppig, Edward. *Un Testigo en la Alborada de Chile, 1826-1829*. Santiago de Chile: Zig Zag, 1960.

Porter, Kenneth Wiggins. *John Jacob Astor: Business Man*, vol. 1. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.

Poston, Brook. *James Monroe: A Republican Champion*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019.

Potter, Simon. *British Imperial History*. New York: Palgrave, 2015.

President and Fellows of Harvard College. "Perkins and Company, Canton 1803-1827." *Bulletin of the Business of the Business Historical Society*. Vol. 6, no. 2 (March 1932):1-5.

Pubols, H. Louise. "The De La Guerra Family: Patriarchy and the Political Economy of California, 1800-1850." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2000.

Louis Pubols, *The Father of All: The De La Guerra Family, Power, and Patriarchy in Mexican California*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Putnam, Herbert Everett. *Joel Roberts Poinsett: A Political Biography.* Washington: Mimeoform Press, 1935.

Putney, Clifford, and Paul Burlin, ed. *The Role of the American Board in the World: Bicentennial Reflections on the Organization's Missionary Work, 1810-2010.* Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2012.

Rasmussen, Wayne. "Diplomats and Plant Collectors: The South American Commission, 1817–1818." From James Gerber, Lei Guang, eds. *Agriculture and Rural Connections in the Pacific, 1500–1900: The Pacific World: Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific, 1500–1900*, Vol. 13. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006.

Ravalli, Richard. *Sea Otters: A History.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018.

Rector, J.L. "Transformaciones Comerciales Producidas por la Independencia de Chile.*"* Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía. Vol. 143 (1975): 1-10.

Rector, John Lawrence. "Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy in Chile, 1810-1840." Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1976.

Reid, Josh. *The Sea Is My Country: The Maritime World of the Makahs, an Indigenous Borderlands People.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.

Remini, Robert V. *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845.* New York: Harper & Row, 1984.

Remini, Robert. *Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time.* New York: Norton, 1997.

Reséndez, Andrés. *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Richards, Rhys. *Honolulu Centre of Trans-Pacific Trade, 1820 to 1840.* Canberra: Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, 2000.

Rippy, Fred J. *Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1935.

Rippy, Fred J. *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America (1808-1830).* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929.

Robertson, William Spence. "Documents Concerning the Consular Service of the United States in Latin America." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review.* Vol. 2, No. 4 (March 1916): 561-568.

Robertson, William Spence. *Hispanic American Relations with the United States.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1923.

Roca Barea, María Elvira, *Imperiofobia y Leyenda Negra. Roma, Rusia, Estados Unidos y el Imperio Español.* Madrid: Siruela, 2016.

Rockman, Seth. *Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

Rohrbough, Malcolm. *Rush to Gold: The French and the California Gold Rush, 1848-1854.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

Rojas, Martha Elena. "'Insults Unpunished' Barbary Captives, American Slaves, and the Negotiation of Liberty." *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal.* 1.2 (2003): 159-186.

Roland, Alex, Jeffrey Bolster, and Alexander Keyssar. *The Way of the Ship*: *American's Maritime History Reenvisioned, 1600-2000*. Hoboken: John Wiley, 2008.

Ronan, Charles Edward. "Some Aspects of the Mission of Joel Roberts Poinsett to Buenos Aires and Chile, 1810-1814." M.A. Thesis, Loyola University, 1954.

Ronda, James. *Astoria & Empire.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.

Rosenthal, Gregory. *Beyond Hawai'i: Native Labor in the Pacific World.* Oakland: University of California Press, 2018.

Rouleau, Brian. *With Sails Whitening Ever Sea: Mariners and the Making of an American Maritime Empire.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Rozwadowski, Helen. *Fathoming the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Russ, William. *The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893*-1894. Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1959.

Rydell, Raymond A. *Cape Horn to the Pacific: The Rise and Decline of an Ocean Highway.* Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952.

Sáenz, Jorge León. "Los Asilleros y La Industria Marítima en el Pacífico Americano: Siglos XVI a XIX." *Diáologos*. Vol. 10, No. 1 (Febrero-Agosto 2009): 1409-1469.

Sahlins, Marshall. *Islands of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Salazar, Gabriel. *Construcción de Estado en Chile (1800–1837)*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005.

Salazar, Gabriel and Julio Pinto. *Historia Contemporánea de Chile III: La Economía: Mercados, Empresarios y Trabajadores.* LOM Ediciones, 2002.

Saunt, Claudio. *West of the Revolution: An Uncommon History of 1776*. New York: Norton, 2015.

Scammon, Charles Melville. *Marine Mammals of the North-western Coast of North America*. San Francisco: J.H. Carmany, 1874.

Schlesinger, Jonathan. *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017.

Schottenhammer, Angela. *The East Asian Maritime World 1400–1800: Its Fabrics of Power and Dynamics of Exchanges. East Asian Economic and Socio-Cultural Studies.* Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007.

Schroeder, John H. *Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy.* Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985.

Scofield, John. *Hail Columbia! Robert Gray, John Kendrick, and the Pacific Fur Trade.* Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1993.

Seaburg, Carl and Stanley Paterson. *Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T.H. Perkins, 1764-1854.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Seager, Robert. *And Tyler, Too: A Biography of John and Julia Gardner Tyler.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

Servín, Manuel P. "The Secularization of the California Missions: A Reappraisal." *Southern California Quarterly*, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1965): 133-149.

Sexton, Jay. *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*. New York: Hill & Wang, 2012.

Shepherd, James F. and Gary M. Walton. "Economic Change After the American Revolution: Pre-and Post-War Comparisons of Maritime Shipping and Trade." *Explorations in Economic History* 13 (1976): 397-422.

Shewmaker, Kenneth. “Forging the ‘Great Chain:’ Daniel Webster and the Origins of American Foreign Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific, 1841-1852.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* Vol. 129, No. 3 (September 1985): 225-259.

Shoemaker, Nancy. *Native Whalemen and the World: Indigenous Encounters and The Contingency of Race.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Shoemaker, Nancy. “A Typology of Colonialism,” *AHA Perspectives on History,* Oct. 1, 2015.

Shurbutt, Thomas Ray, ed. *The United States and Chile, 1812-1850*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991.

Silva, Noenoe. *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.

Silverman, David J. *Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America.* London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016.

Sinn, Elizabeth. *Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012.

Smith, Gene. “Thomas ap Catesby Jones and First Implementation of Monroe Doctrine.” *Southern California* Quarterly, Vol. 76, Issue 1 (July 1994): 139-152.

Smith, Jason. *To Master the Boundless Sea: U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018.

Smith, Peter. *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Stackpole, Edouard. *The Sea-Hunters: The New England Whalemen During Two Centuries, 1635-1835.* Westport: Greenwood Press, 1953.

Stackpole, Eduard. *Whales & Destiny: The Rivalry Between America, France, and Britain for Control of the Southern Whale Fishery, 1785*-1825. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1972.

Starbuck, Alexander. *History of the American Whale Fishery from its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878.

Stauffer, Robert. “The Hawai‘i-United States Treaty of 1826.” *The Hawaiian Journal of History*, Vol. 17 (1983): 40-63.

Stelle, Charles. *Americans and the China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century.* New York: Arno Press Inc., 1981.

Stern, Philip. *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundation of the British Empire in India*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Stevens, Sylvester. *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898.* Philadelphia: Harrisburg, 1945.

Stewart, Watt. “The Diplomatic Service of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires.” *The Hispanic American Historical Review.* Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 1934): 202-218.

Stillé, Charles. *Life and Services of Joel Poinsett: The Confidential Agent in South Carolina of President Jackson During the Troubles of Troubles of 1832.* Philadelphia, 1888.

Strauss, Patrick. *Americans in Polynesia, 1783-1842.* East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963.

Strootman, Rolf, Floris van den Eijnde, Roy van Wijk. *Empires of the Sea: Maritime Power Networks in World History, Cultural Interactions in the Mediterranean, Vol. 4.* Boston: Brill, 2019.

Stuven, Ana María. Cid Gabriel. *Debates Republicanos en Chile, Siglo XIX*. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2012.

Sudipta, Sen. *Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.

Summers, Natalia. *List of Documents Relating to Special Agents of the Department of State, 1789-1906.* Washington: The National Archives of the United States, 1934.

Taylor, Alan. *American Colonies: The Settling of North America.* New York: Penguin, 2001.

Taylor, Alan. *American Republics: A Continental History of the United States, 1783-1850.* New York: Norton, 2022.

Taylor, Alan. *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804*. New York: Random House, 2016.

Taylor, George. “Nantucket Oil Merchants and the American Revolution.” *The Massachusetts Review,* Vol. 18, no. 3 (Oct. 1977): 581-606.

Thomas, Nicholas. *Entangled Objects*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Tikhmenv, P.A. A History of the Russian American Company. Translated by Richard A Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978.

Traub, James. *John Quincy Adams*: *Militant Spirit.* New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Turkel, William. *The Archive of Place: Unearthing the Pasts of the Chilcotin Plateau.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007.

Turner, Frederick Jackson. “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” *Report of the American Historical Association* (1893): 197-227.

Tyler, Lyon G. “President John Tyler and the Ashburton Treaty.” *The William & Mary Quarterly,* Vol. 25, no. 1 (July 1916): 1-8.

Tyler, John W. *Smugglers and Patriots: Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution.* Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986.

Unger, Harlow G. *The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation's Call to Greatness*. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2010.

Valdivieso, Sergio and Eduardo Galvez, eds. *Chile en la Cuenca del Pacifico: Experiencias y Perspectivas Comerciales en Asia y Oceania.* Santiago: Editorial Andés Bello, 1989.

Van, Rachel Tamar. "Free Trade & Family Values: Kinship Networks and the Culture of Early American Capitalism." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2011.

Van Dyke, Paul A. *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005.

Vaughn, Thomas, ed. *The Western Shore: Oregon Country Essays honoring the American Revolution.* Portland: Durham & Downey, 1976.

Vickers, Daniel, Vince Walsh, *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

Villalobos, Sergio. *A Short History of Chile.* Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1996.

Villalobos, Sergio. *Historia de Chile.* Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1974.

Wagner-Wright, Sandra. *The Structure of the Missionary Call to the Sandwich Islands 1790-1830: Sojourners Among Strangers.* San Francisco: Mellon Research University Press, 1990.

Waite, Kevin. *West of Slavery: The Southern Dream of a Transcontinental Empire.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021.

Waley, Arthur. *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Walton, Gary M. and Hugh Rockoff. *History of the American Economy,* 10. ed. New York: Thomson South-Western, 2005.

Wang, Dong. *The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present.* New York: Rowman and Little, 2013.

Warden, G.B. *Boston, 1689-1776.* Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970.

Weber, David. *The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982.

Webster, Charles. *Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1938.

Weeks, William Earl. *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992.

Welch, Richard E. "Caleb Cushing's Chinese Mission and the Treaty of Wanghia: A Review." *Oregon Historical Society,* Vol. 58, No. 4 (December 1957): 328-357.

Whitaker, Arthur Preston. *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830.* New York: Russell & Russell, 1962.

Williams, William Appleman. *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Roots of the American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of a Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society*. New York: Random House, 1969.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* New York: Delta Publishing Co., 1972.

Wong, John. *Global Trade in the Nineteenth Century: The House of Houqua and the Canton System.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Worcester, Donald. *Sea Power and Chilean Independence.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962.

Wright, Carroll D. *Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor*. Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., State Printers, 1889.

Wriston, Henry. *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations.* Gloucester: P. Smith, 1967.

Online

Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, "John Jay's Treaty, 1794-95." https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/jay-treaty (Accessed May 31, 2022).

Perdue, Peter. "Rise and Fall of the Canton Trade System." *Visualizing Cultures, Massachusetts Institute of Technology* (2009) https://issuu.com/hkmm/docs/rise___fall_of_the_canton_trade_system_iii (Accessed May 2, 2022).

Uphsur, Abel. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," December 4, 1841, *Naval History and Heritage Command*, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/secnav-reports/annual-reports-secretary-navy-1841.html (Accessed April 28, 2022).

Yale Law School. *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy.* "British-American Diplomacy, The Jay Treaty; November 19, 1794." http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jay.asp (Accessed May 31, 2022).