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A Preference for Women Negotiation Partners: An Examination of Gender-Based Partner Effects

By

Charlotte Townsend

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Business Administration

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

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Spring 2024

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Abstract

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Charlotte Townsend

Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration

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Professor Laura J. Kray, Chair

Gender and objective value in negotiations have been studied extensively since the 1970s. However, gender differences in subjective value have received little to no attention, despite subjective value being more predictive of future economic outcomes. Across multiple samples, I find that negotiators prefer women as negotiation partners in terms of subjective outcomes. I find negotiators have more positive overall evaluations of women, which predicts a greater desire for future interaction with women negotiation partners. I also find this to be true when negotiations are anonymous, and individuals therefore cannot infer the gender of their partner. Follow-up testing shows that this is not due to individuals being able to infer their counterpart's gender from online conversations. I also find no gender difference in objective outcomes. Structural topic modeling suggests several partner gender differences in negotiation behavior which may explain this negotiation partner gender gap in subjective value. I then leverage the stereotype content model to examine perceptions of men and women negotiators, and whether gender differences in warmth and/or competence contribute to this gender gap.

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INTRODUCTION

Negotiations are discussions between two or more parties with the goal of reaching an agreement (Pruitt, 1998). Job or salary negotiations may be the prototypical negotiations that have been studied (Kolb, 2012; Kray & Thompson, 2004), but negotiations also include job descriptions and roles, work assignments, accommodations, resource allocations, and conflict resolution broadly. Because negotiations encompass a variety of important conversations, the implications of being a successful negotiator are far-reaching (Sturm, 2009).

Review of Gender and Negotiation Literature

Prior work has suggested that gender differences in outcomes may arise because women are less likely to initiate negotiations and achieve worse objective outcomes in negotiations (Bowles et al., 2007; Greig, 2008; Small et al., 2007; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). Researchers have theorized that these gender differences in negotiation outcomes are a result of incongruity between expectations that negotiators be agentic and assertive and expectations that women be communal and nice (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Early work showed this difference, highlighting that men are competitive when women are cooperative (Walters et al., 1998). This incongruence between expectations in the negotiator role and women's gender roles may lead women to not partake in certain behaviors in a negotiation, or initiate a negotiation, due to the inconsistency (Bear, 2011). Social role theory stipulates that gender roles and expectations are formed from stereotypes or beliefs that develop from observing gender differences in the behavior of men and women (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 2012). People observe men's and women's behavior and infer these differences are a result of underlying gender differences. These lead to gendered expectations, which when violated can result in social backlash (Butler & Geis, 1990; Phelan et al., 2008). Women may experience backlash across social contexts when acting agentic (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Martin & Phillips, 2017; Rudman & Glick, 2001), and seeking powerful or leadership positions (Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010; Rudman et al., 2012). In the negotiation literature, women receive backlash for initiating negotiations (Bowles et al., 2007; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012), being assertive and self-advocating (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013), as well as having high power in negotiations (Dannals et al., 2021). Therefore, gender roles are oftentimes not only descriptive, but also prescriptive, and reinforced.

Related gender theories rely on different underlying mechanisms, but ultimately yield the same hypotheses about the effect of gender on negotiation outcomes (Olekalns & Kennedy, 2020). From the self-construal literature, we know that women tend to have more interdependent self-construals than men, which means they think of themselves in more relational terms than men (Cross & Madson, 1997; Gelfand et al., 2006). As a result, women think about and pay closer attention to others and relationships and remember more about close others than men. These interdependent self-construals lead women to be more other-oriented. In a demonstration of this pattern in negotiations, Kray & Gelfand (2009) found that women experienced more relief after their first offer was accepted because they valued their relationship with their partner more so than men did.

However, gender effects in negotiations have been inconsistent with these basic stable trait theories (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Negotiation researchers have since discovered several moderators of the effect of gender (Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Kugler et al., 2018; Mazei et al., 2015), with each subsequent review categorizing and enumerating new contextual moderators to gender differences in negotiation outcomes. These moderators determine the role incongruity between women's gender roles and negotiation roles (Reif et al., 2019).

Moderators of Gender Effects in Objective Outcomes

Previously explored moderators of role incongruity are grouped into two categories in the literature: situational ambiguity and gender salience (also referred to as “gender triggers”) (Bowles et al., 2005). Situational ambiguity is the extent to which there is ambiguity about the negotiation, such as the norms of the negotiation, how the parties should interact, and what is negotiable (Bowles et al., 2005). Situational ambiguity moderates the extent of role incongruity between gendered expectations of women and negotiators. In industries with higher ambiguity about potential salary ranges, there was a \$10,000 gender gap in MBA starting salaries, with men earning significantly more (Bowles et al., 2005). However, the gender gap is significantly reduced when information about the bargaining range is provided, alleviating ambiguity about the range of possible negotiable outcomes (Mazei et al., 2015). Similarly, when women are explicitly told that wages are negotiable the gender difference in propensity to negotiate disappeared (Leibbrandt & List, 2015). Negotiation experience also reduces ambiguity surrounding the negotiation process (Thompson, 1990). Therefore, negotiation experience also significantly reduces the gender gap in negotiation outcomes (Mazei et al., 2015).

A larger body of work has focused on how the salience of gender moderates the influence of gender on negotiation outcomes. Kray & Thompson (2005) contributed several moderators to the discourse, including dyad composition. Negotiation with an opponent of the opposite gender may lead to different expectations about the negotiation and activate gender stereotypes (Bowles & Flynn, 2010; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008; Stuhlmacher & Zervos, 2020). People expect that negotiations with women will be characterized by cooperation compared to negotiations with men, in which people expect competitiveness and self-assertion (Kray et al., 2001). The majority of negotiations do not draw comparisons between same-gender and mixed-gender dyads. However, Kray and colleagues found that stereotype activation happened only in mixed-gender dyads (Kray et al., 2001). Supporting research has shown that women were more cooperative in mixed-gender groups, but men were more cooperative than women in same-gender groups (Balliet et al., 2011). The gender of a negotiation partner may lead individuals to make assumptions about the upcoming interaction and behave in a manner consistent with existing gender roles. Kray et al. (2001, 2002) have also shown how impactful gender stereotypes can be in negotiations. They found that women perform worse than men when masculine traits such as assertiveness are emphasized. However, when associating stereotypically feminine skills with negotiation success, women performed better. In a separate study, men performed better in negotiations when individuals were told that negotiation performance was diagnostic of ability. However, women exhibited stereotype reactance and performed better than men when gender stereotypes were explicitly activated, demonstrating how explicitly gender stereotypes are framed can affect performance. Similarly, when the negotiation was framed as an opportunity to

“ask” compared to an opportunity to negotiate, women were significantly more likely to initiate a negotiation (Small et al., 2007). Women were also just as likely as men to state that they would initiate a negotiation when the negotiation was framed as cooperative (Reif et al., 2020). The subject of the negotiation can also affect the perceived role congruity for women (Bear, 2011). By modifying the subject of an existing negotiation, Bear and Babcock (2012) found that the perceived masculinity of the negotiation moderated the gender gap in performance. Men performed significantly better than women when negotiating motorcycle parts, but there was no significant difference when negotiating the price of jewelry beads (Bear & Babcock, 2012). In addition to the domain, the medium of the negotiation impacts the salience of gender in negotiations. When negotiations occur virtually, be it via messages, email, or telephone, the salience of gender is reduced compared to when negotiating face-to-face. In a meta-analysis of forty-three negotiations studies, women performed better in virtual compared to face-to-face negotiations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007). Perhaps due to the reduced gender relevance, women profited more in virtual compared to face-to-face negotiations. Finally, the representation role (i.e., negotiating for oneself or on behalf of others), is also a “gender trigger” in a negotiation (Bowles et al., 2005; Kouchaki & Kray, 2018). Given that women are presumed to be communal and care for others, women negotiating as advocates for others does not violate gender role expectations for women. In fact, women executives negotiated compensation agreements of 18% higher when they advocated for others compared to when they were self-promoting (Bowles et al., 2005), an effect which has since been replicated (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010).

Importance of Subjective Value in Negotiations

As demonstrated, gender effects on objective performance outcomes in negotiations have been extensively examined. Largely ignored, however, is the role of gender in subjective value in negotiations (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Negotiations are a social exchange (Bottom et al., 2006), and therefore social perceptions should be examined (Gelfand et al., 2006). Subjective value is the social and emotional consequences of negotiations and can be more important than the economic value in the negotiation (Brown & Curhan, 2012; Curhan et al., 2006, 2009). For instance, subjective value predicted the desire to negotiate again with the same counterpart (Van Zant et al., 2022), which is crucial for building lasting relationships. Subjective value was also more predictive of long-term satisfaction than economic outcomes (Curhan et al., 2009, 2010). Subjective value and objective value are also not mutually exclusive (Schaerer et al., 2020). Prior research has shown subjective value in the first round of a multi-round negotiation is correlated with objective performance in the second round, controlling for economic outcomes in the first round, suggesting that creating subjective value in early negotiations is more financially rewarding in the long-term. Recent work by Hart & Schweitzer has illuminated new contexts in which low subjective value can undermine objective value (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020, 2022). They find that the negotiation itself can impact post-negotiation behavior in ways that reduce the economic value of the agreement, by reducing post-agreement motivation and productivity. Negotiations can cause increased perceptions of relational conflict, leading to reduced performance. Given the important implications of subjective value, it’s crucial to understand if there are gender differences, and if so, in what direction. This research answers calls for an examination of subjective and relational outcomes to better understand women’s outcomes in negotiations (Kennedy & Kray, 2015; Kray & Kennedy, 2017).

Masculine Default Account of Subjective Value

Over the years, feminist scholars have delineated how the very foundations of negotiation research and theory are gendered (Gray, 1994b, 1994a; Kolb & Putnam, 1997; Putnam & Kolb, 2000). In the traditional model of negotiations, the primary focus is the exchange and the outcome (Putnam & Kolb, 2000). Consistent with other areas of organizational research, there is a masculine default in negotiations (Cheryan & Markus, 2020). In their 2005 review, Kray & Thompson describe how effective negotiator traits align with masculine traits, while ineffective negotiator traits map on to feminine traits. Therefore, men are able to benefit from displaying stereotypical behavior in negotiations when women cannot. For instance, displaying anger can be used strategically to gain objective value in a negotiation (van Kleef et al., 2004). This behavior is stereotype congruent for men but not women, leading to gained status for men (Tiedens, 2001), but backlash for women (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). Individuals' perceptions of negotiators seem to be consistent with these stereotypes, as even negotiation students overwhelmingly believed that men have the advantage in negotiations (Bowles & Kray, 2013; Kray et al., 2001). Subjective value is by definition based on perceptions; therefore, we could expect that men will be perceived as creating more subjective value compared to women.

Relational Account of Subjective Value

However, as noted, subjective value is inherently relational, having to do with perceptions about the negotiation relationship, and about one's negotiation partner. Prior work has shown that women are more relational (Cross & Madson, 1997; Eagly, 1987), and are therefore expected to create more positive impressions in negotiations (Tannen, 1990). While both men and women equally value the economic aspect of negotiations, women value the relational aspect of negotiations more than men (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). In line with this relational emphasis, initial evidence has shown that women tend to be rated higher on important tenets of subjective value, such as trustworthiness (Buchan et al., 2008; Kong et al., 2014), and place greater value on subjective outcomes (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988). Women also tend to be more cooperative (Walters et al., 1998) and were more likely to develop reputations as cooperative negotiators compared to men (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). And, negotiators with positive reputations for cooperation were able to successfully leverage their expertise in the negotiations (Tinsley et al., 2002). Women are also consistently shown to care more about and have higher ethical standards (Graham et al., 2009; Kennedy & Kray, 2013; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998), which is important for negotiation satisfaction (Curhan et al., 2006). When negotiators use deception, they undermine subjective value in that negotiation and in subsequent negotiations (Van Zant et al., 2022). Based on this reasoning, we could anticipate a competing account that woman negotiation partners will be associated with greater subjective value ratings in a negotiation.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH

In this set of studies, I set out to explore whether and what gender differences exist in subjective value in negotiations. I first test which account will be born out in negotiation classroom data (Study 1) and online negotiations (Studies 2 and 3). I find no gender differences in objective outcomes across studies. I then use natural language processing methods to explore written partner feedback and determine whether there are gender differences in the behaviors

mentioned (Study 4). I then leverage the stereotype content model to test gender stereotypes in negotiations, and whether these stereotypes may provide an explanation for the greater preference and desire to work with women again (Studies 5 and 6). Last, I explore whether gender differences in perceived warmth and competence explain the gender difference in subjective value (Study 7).

CHAPTER 1: SUBJECTIVE VALUE IN NEGOTIATIONS

STUDY 1. MBA NEGOTIATION DATA

In Study 1, I analyzed the reported subjective value of full-time MBA students enrolled in a negotiations course. This is my first test of whether there is a masculine default or relational account of subjective value in negotiation data. If subjective value is based on a masculine default in negotiations I would expect to see men receiving higher ratings in subjective value, and a greater willingness to work with men again. However, if women are rated higher in subjective value, and a greater willingness to work with them again, this supports the relational account of subjective value.

Methods.

I used an archival dataset of existing measures from a full-time MBA negotiation course. The dataset includes over 2,000 observations from 231 students. In this course, students completed face-to-face negotiation role-playing exercises followed by post-negotiation online surveys every week. Students were randomly assigned their negotiation roles and negotiation partners. Students debriefed the negotiations after they took place and before completing the survey. In the post-negotiation surveys, students evaluated themselves and their partners on the same subjective value items and provided open-ended feedback on strengths and areas of improvement.¹

Measures.

Subjective value. Participants rated themselves and their partners on the extent from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Very Much*) they: were effective in building *trust*, *fair*, concerned with *satisfying [my/their] partner's interests*, looked after *[their/my] own interests*, acted very *competitively*, tried to create value and *expand the pie*, were an active and effective *communicator*, were an active and effective *listener*, and effective *overall*.

Desire to work together again. Participants also responded [Yes/No] to “Given the way your partner negotiated, would you want to work with your partner again?”

Objective value. For the first three negotiations, the students participated in negotiations with calculated objective outcomes (Yerba Mate, New Bike, and Internship). For the following negotiations: Salary, Tech Now, Grand Strand, and Bullard Houses, Research Assistants were trained to code negotiation outcomes from the reported agreements.

Distributive outcomes for dyads that reached an agreement were the summed monetary agreements of each negotiation. For instance, salary, bonus, stock, or sale price. I then winsorized outcomes at the bottom and top 1%, to account for outliers or for student errors inputting agreements that may have resulted in outliers. I then z-scored the points outcomes

¹ Students primarily provided feedback to negotiation counterparts, but also may have provided evaluations of other group members.

within negotiations and used this as a measure of comparative objective outcome. For Yerba Mate, Salary, Tech Now, Grand Strand, and Bullard Houses, the standardized scores were reversed for students in the roles of buyer, boss, and manager, as higher objective outcomes in the negotiation indicate worse performance in these roles.

Integrative outcomes were coded by Research Assistants based on Anderson & Thompson (2004). Agreements were coded “0” if dyads did not reach an agreement, “1” if dyads reached a non-integrative agreement, and “2” if they reached an integrative agreement (Anderson & Shirako, 2008; Anderson & Thompson, 2004).

Results.

Subjective value. I tested the effect of participant gender and partner gender on self-evaluations and partner evaluations.² I included a random intercept for the student/participant who completed the survey. See Tables 1A-D and 2 A-D for full results.

Self-evaluations. I found significant participant gender differences in self-evaluations for competitiveness and active listening, such that men rated themselves as higher in competitiveness ($b = .34$, $t(2219) = 2.36$, $p = .018$), but lower in active listening ($b = -.22$, $t(2222) = -2.65$, $p = .008$).

There were no partner gender differences in self-evaluations.

Partner evaluations. I found significant participant gender differences such that men rated their partners lower for communicating ($b = -.19$, $t(2261) = -2.45$, $p = .015$), listening ($b = -.16$, $t(2260) = -2.23$, $p = .026$), and overall ($b = -.20$, $t(2261) = -2.80$, $p = .005$).

I found several significant partner gender differences in partner evaluations, such that people rated women as higher in building trust ($b = -.17$, $t(2264) = -3.38$, $p = .001$), fairness ($b = -.21$, $t(2262) = -4.31$, $p < .001$), satisfying their partner’s needs ($b = -.22$, $t(2250) = -3.64$, $p < .001$), expanding the pie ($b = -.11$, $t(2260) = -2.06$, $p = .040$), communicating ($b = -.16$, $t(2261) = -3.58$, $p < .001$), listening ($b = -.21$, $t(2260) = -4.54$, $p < .001$), and overall ($b = -.13$, $t(2261) = -3.11$, $p = .002$). Men were rated as marginally higher in competitiveness ($b = .11$, $t(2262) = 1.86$, $p = .063$). There was no partner gender difference in satisfying their own interests ($b = .04$, $t(2261) = .86$, $p = .389$).

Desire to work together again. Participants were significantly more likely to want to work with women partners again compared to men ($b = -.42$, $p = .021$). The effect of participant gender was not significant ($b = .05$, $p = .833$).

Objective value. For the negotiations with measurable objective outcomes, I regressed participant gender and partner gender on the winsorized z-scored outcome measure and included a random intercept for the student/participant who completed the survey.

² Participant Gender x Partner Gender interaction did not predict any of the dependent measures but is included in Tables 1C-D and 2C-D for comprehensiveness.

I did not find a significant participant gender difference in the objective value ($b = .10$, $t(213) = 1.42$, $p = .157$). I also did not find a significant partner gender difference ($b = -.06$, $t(1025) = -.87$, $p = .387$).

I also find no significant difference in integrative outcomes by participant gender ($b = -.03$, $t(234) = -.83$, $p = .410$) or partner gender ($b = -.03$, $t(1109) = -.73$, $p = .466$).

Mediation. I conducted a parallel mediation, with ratings of building trust, being fair, satisfying partner interests, competitiveness, expanding the pie, and communication as mediators. The indirect effect of partner gender on willingness to work with them again through building trust, being fair, satisfying partner interests, and communication ratings were significant (building trust: $b_{\text{indirect}} = -.01$, 95% CI $[-.002, -.01]$, $z = -2.90$, $p = .004$; being fair: $b_{\text{indirect}} = -.01$, 95% CI $[-.02, -.01]$, $z = -3.76$, $p < .001$; satisfying partner interests: $b_{\text{indirect}} = -.00$, 95% CI $[-.01, -.0]$, $z = -2.64$, $p = .008$; communication: $b_{\text{indirect}} = -.00$, 95% CI $[-.01, -.0]$, $z = -2.80$, $p = .005$). Participants rated women partners higher in building trust, being fair, satisfying partner interests, and communication (compared to men) (building trust: $b = -.17$, 95% CI $[-.26, -.07]$, $t(2264) = -3.38$, $p = .001$; being fair: $b = -.21$, 95% CI $[-.3, -.11]$, $t(2262) = -4.31$, $p < .001$; satisfying partner interests: $b = -.22$, 95% CI $[-.33, -.1]$, $t(2250) = -3.64$, $p < .001$; communication: $b = -.16$, 95% CI $[-.25, -.07]$, $t(2261) = -3.58$, $p < .001$), which predicted wanting to work with them again (building trust: $b = .03$, 95% CI $[-.02, .04]$, $t(2243) = 5.36$, $p < .001$; being fair: $b = .05$, 95% CI $[-.04, .06]$, $t(2243) = 8.05$, $p < .001$; satisfying partner interests: $b = .02$, 95% CI $[-.01, .03]$, $t(2243) = 3.96$, $p < .001$; communication: $b = .02$, 95% CI $[-.01, .04]$, $t(2243) = 4.42$, $p < .001$).³ Competitiveness and expanding the pie ratings did not significantly mediate the effect ($ps > .10$). See Table 3 for full results.

Discussion.

In Study 1, I find support for the relational account. In a sample of over 2,000 MBA student peer evaluations, I found that negotiators rated women partners significantly higher in trustworthiness, fairness, satisfying partner interests, expanding the pie, and communicating, all of which predicted a greater likelihood of desire to negotiate with their partner again. I also did not find significant partner gender differences on self-evaluations, suggesting that participants did not change their behavior or perceive their behavior differently as a function of their partner's gender. Last I do not find differences in objective outcomes by participant or partner gender.

However, in Study1, participants are aware of the gender of their partner, which poses a couple of limitations. First, we are unable to determine if these results are due to alternative mechanisms, such as the “women are wonderful” effect, in which women are evaluated more favorably than men (Eagly et al., 1991). Additionally, I do not know whether these effects are due to true gender differences in behavior or due to differences in the perceptions of women and men.

³ All mediation analyses used R package *bruceR* (v0.7.2; Bao, 2021).

STUDY 2. ONLINE NEGOTIATION DATA

In Study 1, I explored support for two competing accounts of subjective value. In Study 1, I showed correlational evidence that individuals have more subjective value in negotiations with women. However, I am not able to determine whether these gender differences are due to differences in behavior or perceptions. While I speculate with the relational account that this gender difference is a function of women's emphasis on the relationship, it could also be a function of others' perceptions or behaviors being shaped by gender expectations. Expectations before negotiations affect decisions on whether and how to negotiate (Elfenbein et al., 2008; Reif et al., 2020). When individuals believe they are negotiating with counterparts with distributive reputations, they used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics (Tinsley et al., 2002). Individuals also change their behavior according to their partner's gender. In trust games, people offered women significantly less money than men, assuming that women would be satisfied with less (Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). People also took their partner's gender into account when deciding whether or not to deceive, and were more likely to use deception in a negotiation with a woman counterpart (Kray et al., 2014). Even when men and women were trained in the same manner to negotiate, women were quoted significantly higher for a new car compared to men (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995). In Studies 2 and 3 I attempt to determine the origin of the gender differences in Study 1.

The prior study provided compelling support for the relational account of subjective value. However, due to the correlational nature, I cannot distinguish whether people treat women differently in the negotiations or make assumptions about their negotiation partner because they are a woman (Kray & Thompson, 2004). In support of the relational account, I hypothesized that women's greater focus on the relationship in negotiations leads to greater subjective value. In Study 2, I examine partner gender differences in subjective value when negotiators are anonymous, and thus, no gender information is provided. By anonymizing the negotiation, I can determine whether or not the results are driven by gendered expectations or perceptions that "women are wonderful" (Eagly et al., 1991). With randomized and anonymous pairing, negotiators should not be able to ascertain their partner's gender. In this negotiation, an objective outcome was collected for all participants, and therefore I can also determine whether women's greater subjective value comes at a cost of objective value (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Curhan et al., 2008). To this point, prior gender differences in competitiveness were driven by face-to-face negotiations and not when anonymous (Walters et al., 1998). Further, while women value the relationship more than men, men do not value the economic outcome more than women, therefore I would not expect women to perform worse objectively in the negotiation (Kray & Gelfand, 2009).

Methods.

I used an archival dataset from previously published research available at: <https://huggingface.co/datasets/casino> (Chawla et al., 2021). The authors recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The sample had 1025 women, 1033 men, and 2 participants that did not indicate either gender. Ethnic composition was as follows: 1455 White American, 219 Black or African American, 203 Asian American, 106 Hispanic or Latino, 51 Multiracial, 13

Alaska Native or Native American, 8 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and 5 Other (open-ended). The average age was $M = 36.16$ years old, $SD = 10.44$.

They first conducted a pre-survey of participants' demographic information and personality measures.⁴ Next, all participants watched a video tutorial before their negotiation, which showed an example of a negotiation to encourage best practices and how to use the negotiation platform. Next, they participated in an online negotiation in which they were randomly paired and could communicate via chat to devise a deal. Although the negotiation was over fictitious campfire resources, participants were incentivized via a performance-based bonus of 8.33 cents per point. Once they agreed on a deal or reached an impasse, they completed a post-survey questionnaire. In the post-negotiation survey, students completed measures about their negotiation experience.

Measures.

Subjective value.

Liking. Participants responded to “How much do you like your opponent?” from 1 (*Extremely dislike*) to 5 (*Extremely like*).

Satisfaction. Participants responded to “How satisfied are you with the negotiation outcome?” from 1 (*Extremely dissatisfied*) to 5 (*Extremely satisfied*).

Objective value. Participants received points based on their final deal. If they arrived at an impasse, each participant received 5 points. Participants could earn a maximum of 36 points individually but jointly could earn either 36, 39, or 42 points (depending on the random assignment of points to resources). Each campfire resource was randomly assigned to be high (5 points per item), medium (4 points per item), or low value (3 points per item) for each participant, and they negotiated the division of three items for each resource. Due to randomization, each dyad's negotiation varied in the extent to which it was distributive (maximum 36 points) or integrative (maximum 42 points).

Results.

For all analyses, I tested the effect of participant and partner gender on opponent liking and satisfaction⁵. I included a random intercept for the negotiation dyad.

Subjective value.

Liking. I found a participant gender effect, such that men liked their opponents less than women ($b = -.19$, $t(1882) = -3.99$, $p < .001$). I also found a partner gender effect, such that women were liked significantly more by their partners than men ($b = -.11$, $t(1882) = -2.28$, $p = .023$), and when controlling for points ($b = -.11$, $t(1921) = -2.23$, $p = .026$). See Table 4 for full

⁴ See Chawla et al. (2021) for all measures collected.

⁵ Participant Gender x Partner Gender interaction did not predict any of the dependent measures.

results. These results also remain significant when controlling for additional partner demographic information: age, ethnicity, and education.

Satisfaction. I found a participant gender effect, such that men were less satisfied than women ($b = -.16$, $t(2017) = -3.55$, $p < .001$). There was no significant partner gender difference in reported satisfaction ($b = -0.06$, $t(2017) = -1.34$, $p = .181$), but directionally, those with women partners had higher satisfaction ratings.

Objective value.⁶ I regressed participant gender and partner gender on points. I did not find significant participant or partner gender differences in objective value (participant gender: $b = -.02$, $t(2055) = -.13$, $p = .897$; partner gender: $b = -.09$, $t(2055) = -.55$, $p = .586$). These results remain significant when controlling for additional partner demographic information: age, ethnicity, and education.

I also did not find a significant participant or partner gender difference in joint points (participant gender: $b = -.11$, $t(2055) = -.50$, $p = .62$; partner gender: $b = -.11$, $t(2055) = -.50$, $p = .62$).

Discussion.

I find further support for the relational account, such that individuals who negotiated with women, report greater opponent liking, and trending but non-significantly higher reported satisfaction.⁷ The fact that the gender difference in partner liking persists when negotiations are anonymous, suggests the gender difference is due to gender differences in behavior. Further, this addresses possible speculation that this effect is due to higher overall impressions of women. I also find no gender difference in objective value, eliminating this alternative explanation as well.

⁶ Participant Gender x Partner Gender interaction did not predict points or joint points.

⁷ I note because of the anonymity, participants should have less concern for the relationship when there is no opportunity for a future relationship, which may also reduce the size of the effects (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

STUDY 3. GENDER INFERENCES

Study 2 addressed many of the limitations of the previous studies: whether the effects were due to more favorable evaluations of women, or women relinquishing more points during negotiations. Additionally, the results indicated that these effects are due to women's behavior and not perceptions of women. However, previous researchers have demonstrated that individuals may be able to reasonably determine others' gender online even when it is not explicitly provided, by viewing their online profiles (Chan & Wang, 2018; Kricheli-Katz & Regev, 2016). Participants did not indicate what they believed to be the gender of their partner, which leaves open the possibility that individuals who took part in these negotiations inferred, correctly or incorrectly, their partner's gender, which affected their evaluations of their negotiation partner. To examine whether the negotiation chat conversations could be informative of the agents' gender, I recreated and displayed the real chat negotiations from participants in Study 3 to a new sample (Chawla et al., 2021).

Methods.

Participants. I recruited undergraduates at a large research university who completed the survey for course credit. Thus, the sample size was determined by course enrollment. All participants in the study completed the survey during the Spring Semester of 2023. In accordance with the preregistration, I excluded 65 participants who indicated they did not read the survey carefully. The final sample included 180 participants (97 women, 81 men, 2 nonbinary). Ethnic composition was as follows: 63 East Asian/East Asian American, 48 White/Caucasian, 34 South Asian/South Asian American, 29 Southeast Asian/Southeast Asian American, 21 Latino/Hispanic American, 9 Black/African American, 6 Middle Eastern/Arab American, 2 Native/American Indian, and 2 Something not listed. Participants could select multiple ethnicities. The average age was $M = 21.2$ years old, $SD = 2.62$.

Procedure. Participants were given a link to complete the survey in which they read recreated chat negotiations using the dialogues from real participants in Study 3. The procedure was based on prior work, in which participants try to infer and indicate which gender someone is online when gender information is not explicitly provided, for instance, in online marketplace profiles (Chan & Wang, 2018; Kricheli-Katz & Regev, 2016). I randomly selected a subset of conversations from 100 dyads to display to participants⁸. Each participant was shown five of the 100 possible conversations. See Figure 1 in the Appendix for an example conversation.

Measures.

Gender Inference. Participants were asked, "Please evaluate which gender you believe each agent is" and the response options were "Woman", "Man", or "Cannot discern".

⁸ All of the agents in the subset of dyads self-identified as a woman or a man.

Results.

For analyses, I used a binomial t-test, comparing participant accuracy to 50 percent accuracy, or chance. Accuracy was a binary measure, coded as 0 if participants incorrectly inferred the agent's gender, and "1" if participants were correct. "Cannot discern" was coded as "0", or incorrect.

Using a binomial test indicated that the proportion of accurate inferences of .43 was lower than chance, $p < .001$. Pre-registered as exploratory analysis, I also conducted a binomial t-test excluding "Cannot discern" responses from the data. I find that the proportion of accurate inferences of .52 was not significantly different from chance, $p = .109$.

In exploration, I conducted a chi-square test to examine whether there is an association between gender inferred and accuracy. There was no significant relationship between the two variables. People are not more accurate about inferring the gender of men or women agents, $X^2(1, N = 180) = .89, p = .35$. See Table 5 for count data.

Discussion.

To test that participants were not able to infer their partner's gender, I showed another group of participants a subset of the chats from the online negotiation and asked them to infer the gender of the agents. The results suggest that people do not accurately infer the gender of the agents, ruling out that participants may still be able to infer the gender of their counterparts based on their conversation. I found no difference between the gender inferred and whether the inference was accurate, suggesting that participants did not infer one gender more, or more accurately, than the other.

STUDY 4. STRUCTURAL TOPIC MODELING

The previous studies present evidence that there are gender differences in subjective value, in support of the relational account. Additionally, the evidence suggests that these gaps are due to differences in behaviors, rather than perceptions. In this study, I use an inductive approach to examine what behaviors may be explaining this effect. I leverage feedback that negotiators provided to their partner on their performance, to test whether there are gender differences in the behaviors mentioned for men and women. Structural topic modeling (STM) allows for *discovering* topics from the data as it is an unsupervised method, as opposed to having a priori assumptions when coding responses. I used this natural language processing method to explore this qualitative data. By determining patterns in the data, via topics, I discovered several gender differences in topics within open-ended negotiation feedback.

Methods.

Data and sample. In the weekly feedback surveys from Study 1, students also provided open-ended responses to their partners. Participants were asked to separately provide: "... feedback on what your partner did well" and "... feedback on the things your partner could do better". This feedback was provided after the negotiation was debriefed in class; thus, students should have had a sense of best practices and shortcomings in their negotiations.

Covariates. I used two covariates to examine topical prevalence across responses: participant gender and partner gender.

Results.

Preprocessing. I preprocessed the data in order to remove word differences that do not contribute to differences in contextual meaning in a manner consistent with published work (Grimmer et al., 2022; Roberts et al., 2014, 2016, 2019). Preprocessing includes removing punctuation and numbers, transforming all letters to lowercase, and stemming words by removing all prefixes and suffixes. I also removed the word "redact" from the corpus which had been inserted into the text to replace names throughout responses and does not contribute to topic interpretation.

Estimating the model. After preprocessing and preparing the open-ended responses for analysis, I estimated a series of STM models, each with a different number of topics, and then selected the most suitable model (Roberts et al., 2014, 2016, 2019). STM innovates on the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic model, by allowing for estimating topic models with the inclusion of document-level data. By including document-level data, researchers can discover topics and examine differences in topic prevalence in documents between groups, such as organizations or political parties. For the purposes of this research, I include the covariates participant gender and partner gender.

I estimated the number of topics in the model based on cross-validation, maximizing both exclusivity and semantic coherence (Airoldi et al., 2010). Exclusivity is defined as the top words for that topic that are unlikely to appear within top words of other topics and semantic coherence

is defined as high-probability words for the topic, which tend to co-occur within documents (Roberts et al., 2014). Maximizing both measures allows for topics with words that are unique to each topic yet informative. See Figure 2 for the semantic coherence-exclusivity plots for positive and negative feedback. I estimated the number of topics for the positive feedback to be twelve and the number of topics for the negative feedback to be ten. Once I determined the number of topics, I labeled the topics and compared the prevalence of topics in feedback written about men and women. See Table 6 and Table 7 for topics by percentage in the corpus. For analysis, I regressed participant gender and partner gender on the proportion of each open-ended feedback response about a given topic, also referred to as the prevalence of that topic.

Results.

Positive Feedback. See Figure 3 for plotted effect sizes. I found that compared to men partners, individuals wrote more about Topic 3, “Information reciprocity”, Topic 7, “Facilitating”, and Topic 9, “Inclusive”, for women partners. For Topic 3, information reciprocity, people mention women partners both asking their partner for information about their preferences and revealing their preferences at the appropriate time. Topics 7 and 9, appear to be specific to group negotiations, in which women are noted as facilitating group conversations and moving the discussions forward, as well as making sure all viewpoints were included and considered in deliberations.

I did not find a significant gender difference for the following topics: Topic 1, “Demeanor”, Topic 2, “Receptive”, Topic 4, “Expanding the pie”, Topic 6, “First offer”, Topic 8, “Focused”, Topic 10, “Building trust”, Topic 11, “Creating the deal”, and Topic 12, “Win-win”. I find a marginally significant effect for Topic 5, “Managing emotions”, such that this topic was more prevalent in positive feedback for men.

Negative Feedback. See Figure 4 for plotted effect sizes. I found that compared to women partners, individuals wrote more about Topic 6, “Authenticity”, and Topic 10, “Expanding the pie”, for men partners. For Topic 6, authenticity, students noted a lack of authenticity between what their partners said and their emotions or body language. For Topic 10, expanding the pie, students were more likely to note that their partners had missed out on opportunities to create value or expand the pie when their partner was a man.

I did not find a significant gender difference for the following topics: Topic 1, “Lack of pushback”, Topic 3, “Preparation”, Topic 4, “Demonstrate interest”, Topic 5, “Clarity”, Topic 7, “Communication”, and Topic 8, “Offers”. I find a marginally significant effect for Topic 2, “Stronger advocate”, and Topic 9, “No constructive feedback”, such that these topics were more prevalent in negative feedback for women.

Discussion.

To uncover potential mechanisms, I used qualitative methods. I conducted structural topic modeling to explore negotiation partner gender differences in the prevalence of topics in the open-ended feedback responses. I find that people were significantly more likely to discuss information reciprocity in positive feedback for women negotiators. I also found that for negative

feedback, people were significantly more likely to critique men for not creating value in the negotiation and a topic we labeled ‘authenticity’. More specifically, participants described the emotions or apologies of men partners as relatively inauthentic, as well as their body language being inconsistent with what they said. Topic 5, a marginal difference, “Managing emotions”, appears context specific to one negotiation in which participants in one role are instructed to be “angry” towards their negotiation partners. This positive association between men and anger is consistent with previous work on emotional displays, which finds that when men express anger they are conferred higher status, whereas, for women, anger displays have the opposite effect (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). However, more data would need to be collected with this negotiation to make any definitive claims. Another marginally significant gender difference is Topic 2, “Stronger pushback”, characterized by phrases such as “could have pushed back a bit more”, indicating the student was willing to concede more to their partner if pushed to do so. This could be consistent with Curhan and colleagues' (2008) account that women had lower joint economic outcomes. However, Curhan et al.'s finding is specific to dyads in which both partners are women, and further, I found no difference in objective outcomes (Study 1), suggesting this topic might be a misperception based on stereotypical expectations that women are not competitive.

CHAPTER 2: PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATORS

“Two traits – warmth and competence – govern judgments of individuals and groups, and these judgments shape people’s emotions and behaviors” – Cuddy et al., 2011 p. 73.

In Chapter 1, I find evidence of a preference for women negotiators. However, this preference may be due to gender stereotypes. In order to investigate the role of stereotypes, I leverage the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002). This model proposes that two dimensions, warmth and competence, undergird group stereotypes and impressions (Fiske et al., 2002). According to the stereotype content model, women are higher in warmth and lower in competence compared to men. If women are perceived as higher in warmth and lower in competence in negotiations compared to men, these stereotypes could provide an explanation for the greater preference and desire to work with women again.

In this set of studies, I set out to explore a possible causal chain through which stereotypes about women and men may impact liking and satisfaction in negotiations, and the desire to work with a woman negotiation partner again. I first examine warmth and competence stereotypes for women and men negotiators, and whether these stereotypes are consistent with unsuccessful or successful negotiators (Study 5). Next, I test how warmth and competence stereotypes impact partner perceptions via a negotiation vignette experiment (Study 6). Finally, I will use an experiment to test whether the actual gender of negotiators or the perceived gender, and therefore stereotypes, predict these effects (Study 7). I will first attempt to replicate the online chat negotiations with third party perceptions, and test for partner gender differences in perceived warmth and competence, and the desire to negotiate with the same partner again. I will also test whether individuals’ self-reported/actual gender is predictive of the dependent measures, above and beyond perceived gender.

STUDY 5. DO GENDER STEREOTYPES ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS PERSIST?

In Study 5, I examine individuals' perceptions of the warmth and competence of women and men, as successful and unsuccessful negotiators. To do so, I asked an online U.S. sample which traits they believed to be most typical of successful and unsuccessful women negotiators, and successful and unsuccessful men negotiators.

Methods.

Participants. I recruited a sample of 100 participants from the U.S. on Prolific and had 102 participants when the study completed. In accordance with the preregistration, I excluded 2 participants who indicated they did not read the survey carefully⁹. I also excluded 1 participant that reported they misunderstood the survey items¹⁰. The final sample included 99 participants (46 women, 52 men, 1 nonbinary). Ethnic composition was as follows: 73 White/Caucasian, 14 Asian/Pacific Islander, 4 Black/African American, 4 Hispanic/Latino, and 4 Other specified. The average age was $M = 38.0$ years old, $SD = 12.7$.

Procedure. Online participants partook in an online survey. I asked participants to evaluate traits on the warmth and competence dimensions. I randomized the order in which participants rated targets across the 2 (Negotiator gender) x 2 (Successful/Unsuccessful negotiator) within-subject target conditions as well as the order of the traits within each block.

Measures.

Participants were given a list of the following traits based on Fiske et al. (2002): confident, competent, capable, efficient, intelligent, skillful (competence traits), friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, and sincere (warmth traits). Participants were asked “How typical do you think each one of the following characteristics is in successful women negotiators,” on a scale from 1 (very atypical) to 9 (very typical). Participants were also be asked “How typical do you think each one of the following characteristics is in unsuccessful women negotiators,” “How typical do you think each one of the following characteristics is in successful men negotiators,” and “How typical do you think each one of the following characteristics is in unsuccessful men negotiators,” on the same 1 to 9 scale.

Results.

Typicality. I conducted a one-sample t-test comparing typicality ratings to the midpoint for each target and composite, to determine if warmth or competence were seen as typical for that target. See Table 8 for mean ratings for each target.

Successful women negotiators. Confident ($M = 7.92$, $SD = 1.28$, $t(98) = 22.78$, $p < .001$), competent ($M = 7.95$, $SD = 1.21$, $t(98) = 24.32$, $p < .001$), capable ($M = 7.90$, $SD = 1.05$, $t(98) = 27.35$, $p < .001$), efficient ($M = 7.67$, $SD = 1.24$, $t(98) = 21.45$, $p < .001$), intelligent ($M = 7.83$,

⁹ All remaining participants passed the attention check.

¹⁰ The participant reported in the comments that they interpreted unsuccessful negotiators as United Nations (UN) successful negotiators.

$SD = 1.18$, $t(98) = 23.88$, $p < .001$), and skillful ($M = 7.93$, $SD = 1.09$, $t(98) = 26.73$, $p < .001$) were traits perceived as typical of successful women negotiators. Further, friendly ($M = 6.61$, $SD = 1.75$, $t(98) = 9.11$, $p < .001$), well-intentioned ($M = 6.53$, $SD = 1.94$, $t(98) = 7.82$, $p < .001$), trustworthy ($M = 6.71$, $SD = 1.90$, $t(98) = 8.93$, $p < .001$), warm ($M = 6.27$, $SD = 1.87$, $t(98) = 6.76$, $p < .001$), good natured ($M = 6.60$, $SD = 1.71$, $t(98) = 9.30$, $p < .001$), and sincere ($M = 6.43$, $SD = 1.75$, $t(98) = 8.15$, $p < .001$) were also perceived as typical of successful women negotiators.

Unsuccessful women negotiators. Confident ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 2.08$, $t(98) = -7.64$, $p < .001$), competent ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 2.08$, $t(98) = -7.19$, $p < .001$), capable ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 2.23$, $t(98) = -6.13$, $p < .001$), efficient ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.76$, $t(98) = -9.60$, $p < .001$), intelligent ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 2.16$, $t(98) = -4.42$, $p < .001$), and skillful ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 2.14$, $t(98) = -7.22$, $p < .001$) were traits perceived as *atypical* of unsuccessful women negotiators. Further, friendly ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 2.21$, $t(98) = -2.59$, $p = .011$), trustworthy ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 2.05$, $t(98) = -4.90$, $p < .001$), warm ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 2.12$, $t(98) = -3.61$, $p < .001$), good natured ($M = 4.48$, $SD = 2.22$, $t(98) = -2.35$, $p = .021$), and sincere ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 2.21$, $t(98) = -2.92$, $p = .004$) were also perceived as *atypical* of unsuccessful women negotiators. Well-intentioned was marginally *atypical* ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 2.30$, $t(98) = -1.97$, $p = .052$).

Successful men negotiators. Confident ($M = 8.19$, $SD = 1.08$, $t(98) = 29.53$, $p < .001$), competent ($M = 7.73$, $SD = 1.15$, $t(98) = 23.59$, $p < .001$), capable ($M = 7.83$, $SD = .98$, $t(98) = 28.72$, $p < .001$), efficient ($M = 7.42$, $SD = 1.43$, $t(98) = 16.88$, $p < .001$), intelligent ($M = 7.48$, $SD = 1.23$, $t(98) = 19.84$, $p < .001$), and skillful ($M = 7.72$, $SD = 1.13$, $t(98) = 24.03$, $p < .001$) were traits perceived as typical of successful men negotiators. Further, friendly ($M = 6.48$, $SD = 1.57$, $t(98) = 9.43$, $p < .001$), well-intentioned ($M = 5.78$, $SD = 1.82$, $t(98) = 4.25$, $p < .001$), trustworthy ($M = 6.15$, $SD = 1.77$, $t(98) = 6.46$, $p < .001$), warm ($M = 5.72$, $SD = 1.86$, $t(98) = 3.83$, $p < .001$), good natured ($M = 5.86$, $SD = 1.85$, $t(98) = 4.61$, $p < .001$), and sincere ($M = 5.84$, $SD = 1.86$, $t(98) = 4.48$, $p < .001$) were also perceived as typical of successful men negotiators.

Unsuccessful men negotiators. Confident ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 2.16$, $t(98) = -6.39$, $p < .001$), competent ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.80$, $t(98) = -10.83$, $p < .001$), capable ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.98$, $t(98) = -8.83$, $p < .001$), efficient ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.71$, $t(98) = -11.34$, $p < .001$), intelligent ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.91$, $t(98) = -7.49$, $p < .001$), and skillful ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.94$, $t(98) = -9.15$, $p < .001$) were traits perceived as *atypical* of unsuccessful men negotiators. Further, friendly ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 2.07$, $t(98) = -4.92$, $p < .001$), well-intentioned ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.99$, $t(98) = -4.45$, $p < .001$), trustworthy ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 2.18$, $t(98) = -5.82$, $p < .001$), warm ($M = 3.85$, $SD = 1.98$, $t(98) = -5.78$, $p < .001$), good natured ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.99$, $t(98) = -5.10$, $p < .001$), and sincere ($M = 3.91$, $SD = 1.97$, $t(98) = -5.51$, $p < .001$) were also perceived as *atypical* of unsuccessful men negotiators.

I next used the following analysis strategy based on Prentice & Carranza (2002). For each of the composites, I analyzed ratings of typicality using a 2 (Negotiator gender) x 2 (Successful/Unsuccessful negotiator) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with within-subjects factors. I also included Participant Gender as a between-subjects factor.¹¹ Participant Gender was

¹¹ I excluded one participant who identified as nonbinary for this analysis.

not significant so I omitted this as a factor in my analyses as preregistered. For analyses that resulted in significant effects, I conducted t-tests to compare the typicality ratings for each pair of targets. To control for Type I errors, I set the α level at .01 for each test.

Gender condition. I found a significant difference by condition for the traits confident ($F(1, 97) = 4.89, p = .029$), competent ($F(1, 97) = 9.90, p = .002$), capable ($F(1, 97) = 4.93, p = .029$), efficient ($F(1, 97) = 4.55, p = .035$), intelligent ($F(1, 97) = 11.63, p = .001$), skillful ($F(1, 97) = 4.84, p = .03$), friendly ($F(1, 97) = 3.95, p = .05$), well-intentioned ($F(1, 97) = 19.19, p < .001$), trustworthy ($F(1, 97) = 9.38, p = .003$), warm ($F(1, 97) = 11.91, p < .001$), good natured ($F(1, 97) = 26.94, p < .001$), and sincere ($F(1, 97) = 22.10, p < .001$).

Conducting follow up t-tests were significant at the .01 level, well-intentioned was more typical of successful women than successful men ($t(193) = -2.78, p = .006$). Good natured was more typical of successful women than successful men ($t(193) = -2.90, p = .004$). Directionally, women negotiators were rated as more competent, capable, efficient, intelligent, skillful, friendly, trustworthy, warm, and sincere than men negotiators, across success conditions, while men were perceived as more confident across success conditions.

Success condition. I found a significant effect of success condition on the traits confident ($F(1, 97) = 329.54, p < .001$), competent ($F(1, 97) = 440.31, p < .001$), capable ($F(1, 97) = 363.42, p < .001$), efficient ($F(1, 97) = 402.61, p < .001$), intelligent ($F(1, 97) = 252.40, p < .001$), skillful ($F(1, 97) = 363.42, p < .001$), friendly ($F(1, 97) = 75.65, p < .001$), well-intentioned ($F(1, 97) = 39.05, p < .001$), trustworthy ($F(1, 97) = 71.32, p < .001$), warm ($F(1, 97) = 47.38, p < .001$), good natured ($F(1, 97) = 46.09, p < .001$), and sincere ($F(1, 97) = 43.73, p < .001$).

I find for both men and women, successful negotiators are rated significantly higher across all traits (all $ps < .001$).

I did not find any significant Gender Condition x Success Condition interactions.

Discussion.

This online survey examined lay perceptions of negotiators, specifically, whether individuals perceive warmth and/or competence to be typical of successful and unsuccessful negotiators, and whether these traits vary by the gender of the negotiator. I find evidence that both warmth and competence are perceived as highly typical for both men and women successful negotiators. Likewise, warmth and competence is perceived as highly atypical for men and women unsuccessful negotiators. I also find a target gender difference in typicality of both warmth and competence, such that these traits are directionally more typical for women, with the exception of the trait confident. These lay perceptions of a successful negotiator contradict the pervasiveness of the stereotype that men are better negotiators than women (Eckel et al., 2008), and the stereotype content model, which suggests women are high in warmth but low in competence (Fiske et al., 2002). Given that participants perceive warmth and competence as typical for successful negotiators, especially women, I am interested how warmth and competence impacts perceptions of negotiations and negotiation partners.

STUDY 6. HOW DO WARMTH AND COMPETENCE AFFECT PERCEPTIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS?

In Study 5, I examined perceptions of warmth and competence of unsuccessful and successful women and men negotiators. I found that both warmth and competence were perceived as typical for successful negotiators, and that women were rated higher on these dimensions. In Study 6, I manipulate competence, warmth, and gender, to test their causal impact on partner liking, satisfaction, and the desire to work with negotiation partners again.

Methods.

Participants. I recruited a nationally representative sample (age, ethnicity, and sex)¹² of 800 participants from the U.S. on Prolific. In accordance with the preregistration, I excluded 9 participants who indicated they did not read the survey carefully, and 56 participants who did not infer the buyer's gender correctly. The final sample included 735 participants (362 women, 356 men, 17 nonbinary). Ethnic composition was as follows: 484 White/Caucasian, 92 Black/African American, 80 Hispanic/Latino, 47 Asian/Pacific Islander, 23 Other specified, and 9 Native American/American Indian. The average age was $M = 46.6$ years old, $SD = 17.3$.

Procedure. Participants took part in an online survey. I asked participants to read the following vignette and respond to survey items. The study was a 2 (warmth: low, high) x 2 (competence: low, high) x 2 (buyer gender: woman, man) between-subjects experimental design. Participants read the following vignette, adapted from Kray et al., 2014:

Imagine you are selling your used car. After posting an ad on a community bulletin board, you were contacted by an interested buyer [Michael Taylor, Patricia Anderson]. You agree to the price of \$5,000, which was 90 percent of your asking price, and complete the sale. Based on your interactions, the buyer [Michael, Patricia] appears to be a [high competence: capable and skilled/low competence: lazy and disorganized] and [high warmth: sociable and caring/low warmth: unfriendly and insensitive] negotiator.

After reading the vignette, participants completed the manipulation check items and dependent measures.

Measures.

Manipulation checks.

Warmth. Participants evaluated the buyer's warmth using a composite of six items based on Fiske et al. (2002): "According to you, how friendly is [target]?", "... how well-intentioned is [target]?", "... how trustworthy is [target]?", "... how warm is [target]?", "... how good-natured is [target]?", "... how sincere is [target]?", from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*).

¹² I had trouble recruiting the last two percent of slots which included older participants, so I reallocated the slots. Therefore, the sample is not entirely age representative.

Competence. Participants evaluated the buyer's competence using a composite of six items based on Fiske et al. (2002): "According to you, how competent is [target]?", "... how confident is [target]", "... how capable is [target]", "... how efficient is [target]", "... how intelligent is [target]", "... how skillful is [target]", from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*).

Gender. Participants were asked, "Please evaluate which gender you believe the buyer is" and the response options were "Woman", "Man", or "Cannot discern". Participants who did not infer the correct gender were removed from the analyses as preregistered.

Dependent variables.

Liking. Participants responded to "How much would you like your negotiation partner?" from 1 (*Extremely dislike*) to 7 (*Extremely like*).

Satisfaction. Participants responded to "How satisfied would you be with the negotiation outcome?" from 1 (*Extremely dissatisfied*) to 7 (*Extremely satisfied*).

Desire to work together again. Participants responded to "How much would you like to negotiate with [target] in the future?" from 1 (*Extremely dislike*) to 7 (*Extremely like*).

Results.

Manipulation checks. To check that I successfully manipulated warmth and competence, I ran independent samples t-tests. Participants in the high warmth condition perceived the buyer as significantly higher in warmth ($M = 5.00$, $SD = .96$; $t(698) = 26.70$, $p < .001$), compared to the low warmth buyer ($M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.19$). Participants in high competence condition perceived the buyer as significantly higher in competence ($M = 5.45$, $SD = 1.00$; $t(728) = 25.35$, $p < .001$), compared to the low competence buyer ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 1.15$).

Key analyses. I conducted all analyses using a 2 (buyer gender) x 2 (buyer warmth) x 2 (buyer competence) ANOVA. I also tested for participant gender differences by including participant gender as a between-subjects variable but removed the variable as it was not significant.

Liking. I found a main effect of buyer gender, such that participants preferred women buyers ($F(1, 727) = 5.822$, $p = .016$). I also found main effects of both warmth and competence conditions. High warmth buyers were liked more than low warmth buyers ($F(1, 727) = 426.56$, $p < .001$). High competence buyers were liked more than low competence buyers ($F(1, 727) = 63.30$, $p < .001$).

I also found a significant Buyer Gender X Competence Condition interaction ($F(1, 727) = 4.28$, $p = .039$). Women buyers with high competence ($M = 4.39$, $SD = 1.47$) were liked marginally significantly more than men buyers with high competence ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.45$; $F(1, 355) = 3.27$, $p = .071$). There was no difference between women ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 1.32$) and men ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 1.46$) buyers in the low competence condition ($F(1, 376) = .10$, $p = .76$).

Satisfaction. Buyer gender was not significant ($F(1, 727) = 1.47, p = .226$). I again found main effects of both warmth and competence conditions. Participants with high warmth buyers reported greater satisfaction than in the low warmth condition ($F(1, 727) = 106.34, p < .001$). High competence buyers led to greater satisfaction than low competence buyers ($F(1, 727) = 33.36, p < .001$). No interactions were significant.

Desire to work together again. I again found a main effect of buyer gender, such that participants preferred women buyers ($F(1, 727) = 7.89, p = .005$). I also found main effects of both warmth and competence conditions. Participants had a greater desire to work again with high warmth buyers than low warmth ($F(1, 727) = 313.08, p < .001$). They also desired to work again with high competence buyers than low competence buyers ($F(1, 727) = 64.92, p < .001$). No interactions were significant.

Discussion.

In this study, I manipulated gender, warmth, and competence to test the causal effect on liking, satisfaction, and desire to work together again. Warmth and competence composites, as well as the gender inference item, were used to ensure that I successfully manipulated warmth, competence, and gender in the vignette. In the previous study, I found that individuals perceive successful negotiators to exhibit warmth and competence, and that women are perceived as higher in warmth and competence. Building on those findings, in this study I find that participants prefer buyers with high warmth and high competence. This study suggests that both warmth and competence are valued in negotiation partners. I also find that individuals prefer women buyers, as they report greater liking and desire to negotiate with women buyer's again. In the final study, I investigate whether these reflect actual gender differences in warmth and competence, and do they mediate the gender gap in subjective value?

STUDY 7. HOW DO WE INFER WARMTH AND COMPETENCE IN NEGOTIATIONS? THIRD-PARTY PERCEPTIONS OF NEGOTIATORS.

The studies in Chapter 1 demonstrated a preference for women negotiation partners. In this study, I first intend to replicate the results of the online negotiation study, Study 2, such that with no gender information, agents that self-identify as women, are liked more and their partners are more satisfied, compared to self-identified men participants. Because I cannot ask the original participants additional survey items, I rely on third-party perceptions. I also measure perceptions of the two stereotype dimensions, warmth and competence. Using third-party perceptions, I can test whether there are gender differences in warmth and competence and if so, do they contribute to differences in liking, satisfaction, and desire to negotiate again with the same partner. Finally, I test whether it is participants' actual gender or their perceived gender that is predictive of these outcomes, by manipulating the gender information provided to participants. In the control condition, I test whether the self-reported gender of the targets predicts the key measures. In the gender condition, I test whether self-reported gender or randomly assigned gender information predicts the key measures. If self-reported gender is predictive, this suggests true gender differences underlie these effects, not gendered perceptions.

Methods.

Participants. I recruited 800 U.S. participants from Prolific and 803 participants completed this experiment. In accordance with the preregistration, I excluded 30 participants who indicated they did not read each conversation carefully. The final sample included 773 participants (372 women, 383 men, 13 nonbinary, and 5 preferred not to answer). Ethnic composition was as follows: 498 White/Caucasian, 136 Black/African American, 81 Hispanic/Latino, 77 East Asian/East Asian American, 28 Southeast Asian/Southeast Asian American, 17 South Asian/South Asian American, and 9 who indicated something not listed. Participants could indicate multiple ethnicities. The average age was $M = 38.9$ years old, $SD = 12.8$.

Procedure. Participants were given a link to complete the survey in which they read recreated chat negotiations using the same dialogues from the online negotiation study. The procedure was similar to the gender inference study (Study 3), except I manipulated the gender information provided. Participants were randomly assigned to imagine they were one of the agents in the conversation. The other agent in the conversation was randomly assigned to be a woman or a man, or the control condition (in which no gender information is provided). I used the same random subset of 100 conversations from Study 3 to display to participants, and each participant was shown five of the 100 possible conversations. Participants either read five conversations with no identifying gender information or read five conversations in which the other agent was randomly assigned a gender (between subjects). After reading each conversation, participants provided their perceptions of their partner and the negotiation.

Measures.

Warmth. Participants evaluated agent warmth using a composite of six items based on Fiske et al. (2002): "According to you, how friendly is [target]?", "... how well-intentioned is

[target]", "... how trustworthy is [target]", "... how warm is [target]", "... how good-natured is [target]", "... how sincere is [target]", from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*).

Competence. Participants evaluated agent competence using a composite of six items based on Fiske et al. (2002): "According to you, how competent is [target]?", "... how confident is [target]?", "... how capable is [target]?", "... how efficient is [target]?", "... how intelligent is [target]?", "... how skillful is [target]", from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*).

Liking. Participants responded to "How much would you like [target] if they were your negotiation partner?" from 1 (*Extremely dislike*) to 7 (*Extremely like*).

Satisfaction. Participants responded to "How satisfied would you be with the negotiation outcome if [target] was your negotiation partner?" from 1 (*Extremely dissatisfied*) to 5 (*Extremely satisfied*).

Desire to work together again. Participants responded to "How much would you like to negotiate with [target] in the future?" from 1 (*Extremely dislike*) to 7 (*Extremely like*).

Results.

Control. I intended to extend and replicate the results of Study 2 with third party observers. More specifically, I conducted multilevel model regressions predicting perceived warmth and competence from agents' self-reported gender. I also conducted multilevel model regressions predicting ratings of liking, satisfaction, and desire to work together again, from agents' self-reported gender. I included random intercepts for participants.

Extending the results of Study 2, I find that self-reported women partners were perceived as higher in warmth ($b = 0.30$, $t(1816) = 5.11$, $p < .001$) compared to men. I also find that self-reported women were perceived as higher in competence than men ($b = 0.15$, $t(1742) = 3.13$, $p = .002$).

Replicating the results of Study 2, I find participants reported greater liking ($b = 0.29$, $t(1816) = 4.55$, $p < .001$), satisfaction ($b = 0.28$, $t(1856) = 4.14$, $p < .001$), and desire to work again ($b = 0.38$, $t(1857) = 4.99$, $p < .001$) with self-reported women partners compared to those partnered with men.

Participant gender did not significantly moderate these results.¹³

Exploratory analyses. Participants reported more positive negotiation outcomes with women partners, in part because of women's greater warmth in negotiations. There was a significant indirect effect of self-reported partner gender on liking, satisfaction, and future negotiations through warmth (liking: $b_{\text{indirect}} = 0.13$, $z = 3.77$, $p < .001$; satisfaction: $b_{\text{indirect}} = 0.12$, $z = 3.90$, $p < .001$; desire to work together again: $b_{\text{indirect}} = 0.15$, $z = 3.95$, $p < .001$), controlling for competence. Participants perceived women partners as greater in warmth ($b =$

¹³ For these analyses, I removed participants who responded "Prefer not to answer" for their gender.

0.15, $t(1943) = 3.79$, $p < .001$), and warmth predicted greater liking, satisfaction, and desire to negotiate again in the future (liking: $b = 0.87$, $t(1800) = 47.54$, $p < .001$; satisfaction: $b = 0.84$, $t(1882) = 32.39$, $p < .001$; desire to work together again: $b = 1.01$, $t(1839) = 40.86$, $p < .001$), controlling for competence.

The indirect effect of self-reported partner gender on the dependent measures through competence was not significant when controlling for warmth.

Gender information manipulation. I conducted multilevel model regressions predicting perceived warmth and competence from agents' self-reported gender and gender information displayed, and both gender variables were included in the models simultaneously. I also conducted multilevel model regressions predicting third-party ratings of liking, satisfaction, and desire to work together again from agents' self-reported gender and the gender displayed to participants. I included random intercepts for participants.

I find that self-reported women partners were perceived as higher in warmth ($b = 0.32$, $t(1798) = 5.34$, $p < .001$), and a marginal effect of displayed gender on warmth ($b = 0.12$, $t(1807) = 1.94$, $p = .052$), such that when agents were displayed as women they were rated marginally higher in warmth. I also find self-reported women partners were perceived as higher in competence ($b = 0.16$, $t(1744) = 3.22$, $p = .001$). I find no effect of displayed gender ($b = -0.02$, $t(1752) = -.40$, $p = .693$) on competence.

Consistent with the control condition and the results of Study 2, I find participants report greater liking ($b = 0.32$, $t(1826) = 4.82$, $p < .001$), satisfaction ($b = 0.35$, $t(1833) = 4.98$, $p < .001$), and desire to work again ($b = 0.34$, $t(1852) = 4.54$, $p < .001$) with self-reported women partners compared to those partnered with men. I find no effect of displayed gender on liking ($b = 0.07$, $t(1835) = 1.03$, $p = .302$), satisfaction ($b = 0.07$, $t(1842) = 1.03$, $p = .303$), or the desire to work again ($b = 0.08$, $t(1861) = 1.01$, $p = .313$).

Participant gender did not significantly moderate these results.¹⁴

Exploratory analyses. Again, there was a significant indirect effect of partner self-reported gender on liking, satisfaction, and future negotiations through warmth (liking: $b_{\text{indirect}} = 0.16$, $z = 3.90$, $p < .001$; satisfaction: $b_{\text{indirect}} = 0.14$, $z = 4.10$, $p < .001$; desire to work together again: $b_{\text{indirect}} = 0.17$, $z = 3.95$, $p < .001$), when controlling for competence and displayed target gender. Participants perceived women partners as greater in warmth ($b = 0.17$, $t(1898) = 4.17$, $p < .001$), and warmth predicted greater liking, satisfaction, and desire to negotiate again in the future (liking: $b = 0.93$, $t(1761) = 50.86$, $p < .001$; satisfaction: $b = 0.82$, $t(1829) = 32.76$, $p < .001$; desire to work together again: $b = 0.97$, $t(1813) = 40.40$, $p < .001$), controlling for competence and displayed target gender.

The indirect effect of self-reported gender on the dependent measures through competence was not significant when controlling for warmth and displayed target gender.

¹⁴ For these analyses, I removed participants who responded "Prefer not to answer" for their gender.

Discussion.

In this study, I intended to replicate and extend the results of the initial online negotiation study, with third party perceptions. I found gender differences in perceptions of warmth and competence when no gender information was provided, which suggests true gender differences in negotiations. I also replicated Study 3, and found participants perceived greater liking and satisfaction with self-reported women partners, even when no gender information is provided. Further, in examining the desire to work with the same partner again, I found greater intentions to work with self-reported women again compared to men.

I also tested whether the true effect of partner self-reported gender persists when I manipulate implied gender, by randomly assigning gender information displayed to targets. By randomly assigning the gender of the targets in the negotiation, I could determine whether individuals' self-reported/actual gender is predictive of the dependent measures, above and beyond perceived gender. I found self-reported gender predicts warmth, competence, liking, satisfaction, and desire for future negotiations. Further, assigned gender did not significantly predict any measures.

Last, exploratory analyses reveal warmth mediated the relationship between self-reported gender on liking, satisfaction, and desire to negotiate again in the future, controlling for competence. This suggests that while women are evaluated as higher in warmth and competence, it may be through warmth that women increase partner liking, satisfaction, and desire for future negotiations.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The results suggest a relational account of subjective value, wherein women partners are perceived as warmer than men, which contributes to greater liking, satisfaction, and a desire to negotiate with women again. In Study 1, I explored classroom negotiation feedback data, and found that women partners were rated higher in building trust, fairness, satisfying their partner's needs, expanding the pie, communicating, listening, and overall, and that building trust, being fair, satisfying partner interests, and communication contributed to a greater desire to negotiate with women partners again. In Study 2, I examined the effect of partner gender in online negotiations, in which negotiators are anonymous. I found that women partners are liked more, controlling for objective outcomes. In Study 3, I demonstrated that third parties are not able to infer gender from the online negotiations, suggesting the negotiations were truly anonymous. I leveraged an inductive approach in Study 4 and used structural topic modeling to identify potential differences in the negotiation behaviors of men and women.

In Studies 5 through 7, I examined perceptions of negotiators using the stereotype content model (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). In Study 5, I found people perceive warmth and competence to be typical of successful negotiators, both men and women, though of women more so. Using an experiment, I manipulated warmth, competence, and partner gender, to test the causal relationship between these factors and subjective value in Study 6. Again, I found that people prefer warm and competent negotiators, as well as women negotiators. In the final study, Study 7, I demonstrated that women partners are rated higher in warmth and competence, which contributes to greater liking, satisfaction, and the desire to negotiate with them again in the future.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

This research addresses several calls in the recent literature, to further explore gender and perceptions of the negotiation (Boothby et al., 2023). Further, this body of work joins with emerging research dispelling previous gender differences and recognizing women's unique strengths in negotiations (Kray et al., 2023; Ma et al., 2023). Kray and colleagues (2023) found that women now initiate negotiations more frequently than men, despite decades of research asserting the opposite. Ma et al., (2023) demonstrate that women avoid impasses and outperform men due to women's relational orientation. In this research, I found not only that women capture greater subjective value, but there is no gender difference in objective value in negotiations.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Negotiation researchers have left the fraught assertion that the gender of the negotiator is a stable and reliable predictor of negotiation behavior in the 1970s and early 1980s (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Similarly, these results may provide a main gender effect underpinned by various moderators which the field should explore.

One limitation of this set of studies is that the negotiations took place in settings in which there was low ambiguity as to whether negotiating is appropriate. Between negotiations, there is varying ambiguity in what and how to negotiate. However, in these studies, individuals were either enrolled in a negotiation course or participating in a negotiation experiment, leaving little uncertainty about whether they should negotiate. High situational ambiguity may moderate the effect of gender on subjective value. In situations with high ambiguity, Bowles and colleagues found that women were perceived more negatively when they initiated negotiations (Bowles et al., 2007).

Future research should also explore the effect of gender in group negotiations, unpacking the topics of “facilitating” and “inclusive”. Prior research has shown that groups with a higher proportion of women encourage more turn-taking and social sensitivity, which results in greater collective intelligence (Woolley et al., 2010). Perhaps group negotiations with a higher proportion of women will also create more objective and subjective value.

Prior research has forewarned the negative consequences of unbridled communality (Amanatullah et al., 2008). Objective value is lost when both individuals are too concerned about the relationship to push for their interests in the negotiation (Fry et al., 1983). Both individuals in a negotiation having high relational self-construal could lead to relational satisficing and lower individual and joint economic outcomes (Gelfand et al., 2006). However, I find that for women, higher subjective value does not come at the cost of objective value.

CONCLUSION

Negotiations occur at pivotal moments in individuals’ lives, making it an important mark for targeted research (Sturm, 2009). Prior work has shown the predisposition to stereotype men as assertive and competitive counterparts and women as agreeable and cooperative bargainers (Kray et al., 2001). Further, many of the attributes of effective negotiators are perceived to be masculine, while many of the attributes that define ineffective negotiators are perceived to be feminine (Williams & Best, 1982). Answering calls to update the narrative on what it means to be a successful negotiator (Kray & Kennedy, 2017), the present research examines whether, given the strengths associated with women negotiators such as cooperativeness and trustworthiness, negotiating with women produces greater subjective value. This work challenges the gender stereotype that men are inherently better negotiators and I hope that by emphasizing the importance of feminine traits in increasing subjective value, this research changes perceptions of effective negotiators (Kolb, 2012; Shan et al., 2016). Ultimately, negotiator effectiveness should be judged independently of negotiator gender, but to get there, more work is needed to dispel myths that may undermine women’s ability to recognize their strengths (Haines et al., 2016).

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APPENDIX

Table 1A. Study 1 participant and partner gender predicting self-evaluations.

Predictors	Self: Building Trust			Self: Fair			Self: Satisfying my interests			Self: Satisfying their own interests			Self: Acting competitively		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	-0.07	-	0.387	-0.10	-	0.196	-0.13	-	0.175	-0.03	-0.20 - 0.13	0.695	0.34	0.06 - 0.62	0.018
		0.23 - 0.09		0.24 - 0.05			0.32 - 0.06								
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.05	-	0.239	-0.03	-	0.495	0.03	-	0.525	-0.08	-0.17 - 0.02	0.103	-0.09	-	0.106
		0.13 - 0.03		0.11 - 0.06			0.07 - 0.14						0.20 - 0.02		
Constant	5.39	5.25 - 5.52	<0.001	5.53	5.40 - 5.66	<0.001	5.08	4.92 - 5.24	<0.001	5.71	5.56 - 5.85	<0.001	4.14	3.91 - 4.37	<0.001
Num. obs.		2269			2267			2255			2266			2267	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.005 / 0.164			0.008 / 0.136			0.007 / 0.104			0.001 / 0.232			0.008 / 0.353	

Table 1B. Study 1 participant and partner gender predicting self-evaluations.

Predictors	Self: Expanding the pie			Self: Communicator			Self: Listener			Self: Overall		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	0.01	-0.16 - 0.18	0.903	-0.16	-0.33 - 0.00	0.057	-0.22	-0.38 - -0.06	0.008	-0.13	-0.29 - 0.02	0.090
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.04	-0.13 - 0.06	0.434	-0.04	-0.11 - 0.04	0.385	-0.03	-0.11 - 0.05	0.440	-0.08	-0.17 - 0.00	0.058
Constant	5.33	5.18 - 5.47	<0.001	5.53	5.39 - 5.67	<0.001	5.71	5.57 - 5.84	<0.001	5.42	5.29 - 5.56	<0.001
Num. obs.		2225			2226			2227			2226	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.000 / 0.208			0.006 / 0.278			0.011 / 0.277			0.005 / 0.219	

Table 1C. Study 1 Participant Gender x Partner Gender interaction predicting self-evaluations.

Predictors	Self: Building Trust			Self: Fair			Self: Satisfying my interests			Self: Satisfying their own interests			Self: Acting competitively		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	0.01	-	0.947	-0.04	-	0.681	-0.02	-	0.842	-0.10	-	0.336	0.23	-	0.148
		0.19 – 0.20			0.22 – 0.14			0.25 – 0.20			0.31 – 0.10			0.08 – 0.54	
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	0.03	-	0.677	0.03	-	0.684	0.14	-	0.100	-0.14	-	0.060	-0.20	-0.37 – -0.02	0.029
		0.11 – 0.16			0.11 – 0.17			0.03 – 0.31			0.29 – 0.01				
Participant Gender X Partner Gender	-0.12	-	0.153	-0.09	-	0.299	-0.17	-	0.113	0.11	-	0.261	0.17	-	0.131
		0.29 – 0.05			0.27 – 0.08			0.38 – 0.04			0.08 – 0.30			0.05 – 0.39	
Constant	5.34	5.18 – 5.49	<0.001	5.49	5.35 – 5.64	<0.001	5.01	4.83 – 5.19	<0.001	5.75	5.59 – 5.91	<0.001	4.21	3.96 – 4.46	<0.001
Num. obs.		2228			2226			2225			2226			2224	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.002 / 0.240			0.003 / 0.180			0.004 / 0.211			0.002 / 0.216			0.013 / 0.406	

Table 1D. Study 1 Participant Gender x Partner Gender interaction predicting self-evaluations.

Predictors	Self: Expanding the pie			Self: Communicator			Self: Listener			Self: Overall		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	-0.00	-0.21 – 0.21	0.991	-0.16	-0.35 – 0.04	0.109	-0.24	-0.43 – -0.05	0.014	-0.14	-0.33 – 0.05	0.155
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.05	-0.20 – 0.10	0.529	-0.03	-0.16 – 0.10	0.619	-0.05	-0.18 – 0.08	0.424	-0.08	-0.22 – 0.05	0.233
Participant Gender X Partner Gender	0.02	-0.17 – 0.21	0.846	-0.00	-0.17 – 0.16	0.969	0.03	-0.13 – 0.20	0.679	0.00	-0.17 – 0.18	0.958
Constant	5.33	5.17 – 5.50	<0.001	5.53	5.38 – 5.68	<0.001	5.72	5.57 – 5.87	<0.001	5.42	5.27 – 5.58	<0.001
Num. obs.		2225			2226			2227			2226	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.000 / 0.208			0.006 / 0.278			0.011 / 0.277			0.005 / 0.219	

Table 2A. Study 1 participant and partner gender predicting partner evaluations.

Predictors	Partner: Building Trust			Partner: Fair			Partner: Satisfying my interests			Partner: Satisfying their own interests			Partner: Acting competitively		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	-0.05	-	0.516	-0.08	-	0.286	-0.11	-	0.179	-0.08	-0.25 - 0.09	0.377	0.28	-	0.053
		0.21 - 0.11		0.22 - 0.07			0.28 - 0.05						0.00 - 0.56		
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.17	-0.26 - -0.07	0.001	-0.21	-0.30 - -0.11	<0.001	-0.22	-0.33 - -0.10	<0.001	0.04	-0.05 - 0.13	0.389	0.11	-	0.063
Constant	5.74	5.60 - 5.88	<0.001	5.87	5.74 - 5.99	<0.001	5.42	5.27 - 5.57	<0.001	5.70	5.56 - 5.85	<0.001	3.88	3.64 - 4.11	<0.001
Num. obs.		2269			2267			2255			2266			2267	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.005 / 0.164			0.008 / 0.136			0.007 / 0.104			0.001 / 0.232			0.008 / 0.353	

Table 2B. Study 1 participant and partner gender predicting partner evaluations.

Predictors	Partner: Expanding the pie			Partner: Communicator			Partner: Listener			Partner: Overall		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	-0.03	-0.21 - 0.15	0.749	-0.19	-0.34 - -0.04	0.015	-0.16	-0.31 - -0.02	0.026	-0.20	-0.35 - -0.06	0.005
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.11	-0.22 - -0.01	0.040	-0.16	-0.25 - -0.07	<0.001	-0.21	-0.30 - -0.12	<0.001	-0.13	-0.22 - -0.05	0.002
Constant	5.27	5.11 - 5.42	<0.001	6.01	5.88 - 6.14	<0.001	6.04	5.91 - 6.17	<0.001	5.91	5.79 - 6.04	<0.001
Num. obs.		2265			2266			2265			2266	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.002 / 0.170			0.012 / 0.194			0.013 / 0.157			0.012 / 0.182	

Table 2C. Study 1 Participant x Partner Gender interaction predicting partner evaluations.

Predictors	Partner: Building Trust			Partner: Fair			Partner: Satisfying my interests			Partner: Satisfying their own interests			Partner: Acting competitively		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	-0.08	-	0.450	-0.04	-	0.672	-0.17	-	0.142	-0.09	-0.30 - 0.11	0.374	0.18	-	0.262
		0.28 - 0.12			0.23 - 0.15			0.39 - 0.06						0.14 - 0.50	
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.19	-0.35 - -0.03	0.018	-0.17	-0.32 - -0.01	0.033	-0.27	-0.46 - -0.08	0.006	0.02	-0.12 - 0.17	0.760	0.01	-	0.884
														0.18 - 0.21	
Participant Gender X Partner Gender	0.04	-	0.692	-0.06	-	0.541	0.09	-	0.479	0.03	-0.16 - 0.21	0.782	0.15	-	0.213
		0.16 - 0.24			0.25 - 0.13			0.15 - 0.33						0.09 - 0.39	
Constant	5.75	5.59 - 5.91	<0.001	5.84	5.69 - 5.99	<0.001	5.46	5.28 - 5.63	<0.001	5.71	5.55 - 5.88	<0.001	3.94	3.68 - 4.19	<0.001
Num. obs.		2269			2267			2255			2266			2267	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.005 / 0.164			0.009 / 0.136			0.007 / 0.104			0.001 / 0.233			0.008 / 0.355	

Table 2D. Study 1 Participant x Partner Gender interaction predicting partner evaluations.

Predictors	Partner: Expanding the pie			Partner: Communicator			Partner: Listener			Partner: Overall		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Participant Gender (ref = woman)	-0.16	-0.38 - 0.07	0.181	-0.17	-0.36 - 0.02	0.079	-0.14	-0.32 - 0.05	0.140	-0.15	-0.33 - 0.03	0.110
Partner Gender (ref = woman)	-0.24	-0.42 - -0.06	0.008	-0.14	-0.28 - 0.00	0.058	-0.18	-0.33 - -0.04	0.015	-0.07	-0.21 - 0.06	0.290
Participant Gender X Partner Gender	0.20	-0.02 - 0.43	0.074	-0.03	-0.21 - 0.15	0.719	-0.04	-0.23 - 0.15	0.677	-0.09	-0.27 - 0.08	0.293
Constant	5.35	5.17 - 5.53	<0.001	6.00	5.85 - 6.15	<0.001	6.03	5.88 - 6.17	<0.001	5.88	5.74 - 6.02	<0.001
Num. obs.		2265			2266			2265			2266	
Num. participants		231			231			231			231	
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²		0.003 / 0.171			0.012 / 0.193			0.013 / 0.157			0.013 / 0.182	

Table 3. Study 1 binomial regression predicting willingness to work with the same partner again and controlling for objective and integrative outcomes.

Predictors	Work Again [Y/N]			Work Again [Y/N]		
	Odds Ratios	CI	p	Odds Ratios	CI	p
Participant Gender [ref = woman]	1.05	0.67 – 1.64	0.833	1.56	0.83 – 2.92	0.167
Partner Gender [ref = man]	0.65	0.46 – 0.94	0.021	1.04	0.62 – 1.76	0.880
Partner: Building Trust				1.62	1.23 – 2.12	<0.001
Partner: Fair				2.03	1.52 – 2.69	<0.001
Partner: Satisfying my interests				1.49	1.18 – 1.89	0.001
Partner: Satisfying their own interests				1.07	0.80 – 1.42	0.667
Partner: Acting competitively				0.69	0.56 – 0.85	<0.001
Partner: Expanding the pie				1.27	1.01 – 1.59	0.042
Partner: Communicator				1.39	1.07 – 1.80	0.013
Partner: Listener				1.16	0.91 – 1.48	0.225
Partner: Overall				1.24	0.92 – 1.67	0.158
Num. obs.	2274			2252		
Num. participants	231			231		
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.010 / 0.234			0.583 / 0.723		

Table 4. Study 2 Participant and partner gender predicting partner liking controlling for points.

<i>Predictors</i>	Opponent liking		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
Participant gender [man, ref = woman]	-0.19	-0.28 – -0.10	<0.001
Participant gender [other, ref = woman]	0.36	-1.13 – 1.84	0.636
Partner gender [man, ref = woman]	-0.10	-0.20 – -0.01	0.026
Partner gender [other, ref = woman]	0.61	-0.88 – 2.09	0.424
Points	0.07	0.06 – 0.08	<0.001
Constant	2.91	2.66 – 3.16	<0.001
Num. obs.	2060		
Num. dyads	1030		
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.065 / 0.341		

Table 5. Study 3 gender inference counts by gender and accuracy.

	Inaccurate	Accurate
Woman	376	390
Man	342	391
Cannot discern	301	0

Note. Cannot discern counts were not included in chi-square analyses.

Table 6. Study 4 topics found in written positive feedback.

Topic ID	Topic label	Highly associated terms (PROB)	FREX	Topic Proportion
10	Building trust	trust, good, build, interest, listen, clear, communic	build, trust, communic, transpar, listen, clear, interest	13%
7	Facilitating	great, job, convers, negoti, also, group, move	convers, facilit, great, group, along, forward, control	10%
9	Inclusive	realli, negoti, thought, everyon, point, made, like	everyon, opinion, realli, argument, fact, heard, view	10%
5	Managing emotions	team, negoti, effect, manag, emot, well, anger	anger, team, emot, manag, play, rawmat, myti-pet	9%
6	First offer	offer, price, anchor, negoti, point, posit, first	price, batna, anchor, offer, high, resist, expect	9%
3	Information reciprocity	inform, ask, reveal, share, time, question, understand	inform, reveal, disclos, appropri, enough, ask, case	9%
11	Creating the deal	deal, packag, valu, negoti, get, effect, also	packag, deal, close, item, valu, around, differ	8%
2	Receptive	work, solut, concern, find, negoti, felt, fair	solut, concern, compromis, key, fair, find, compani	8%
4	Expanding the pie	pie, expand, way, get, help, issu, agreement	expand, pie, way, agreement, issu, opportun, invest	7%
8	Focused	think, job, good, negoti, also, partner, ground	think, ground, common, repres, advoc, firm, espec	6%
1	Demeanor	appear, honest, concess, will, trustworthi, flexibl, make	appear, honest, trustworthi, flexibl, will, tone, friend	6%
12	Win-win	tri, creat, ask, reach, negoti, question, work	creat, tri, reach, buyer, possibl, option, address	5%

Note. Highly associated terms are the words in each topic with the highest probability. FREX words are based on the FREX metric. FREX weights words by their overall frequency in the document and how exclusive they are to the topic. Therefore, these words distinguish the topic from others more than the highly associated terms.

Table 7. Study 4 topics found in written negative feedback.

Topic ID	Topic label	Highly associated terms (PROB)	FREX	Topic Proportion
4	Demonstrate interest	inform, interest, ask, question, need, pie, share	inform, interest, share, question, ask, reveal, priorit	14%
5	Clarity	negoti, point, deal, term, packag, believ, real	believ, best, packag, real, brought, term, item	12%
9	No constructive feedback	think, better, job, great, done, dont, overall	job, better, done, dont, great, feedback, construct	11%
8	Offers	offer, price, anchor, first, want, made, initi	price, lower, higher, bike, offer, anchor, high	11%
1	Lack of pushback	push, bit, back, time, litl, one, felt	back, push, area, improv, harder, issu, bit	10%
6	Authenticity	trust, build, effect, convers, made, make, felt	trust, build, anger, rigid, effect, away, walk	10%
2	Stronger advocate	may, like, want, posit, strong, compani, feel	compani, strong, aggress, opinion, set, may, part	9%
7	Communication	team, decis, peopl, negoti, group, make, other	team, decis, member, peopl, lawsuit, shadow, emot	9%
3	Preparation	time, case, well, someth, number, much, negoti	well, detail, went, product, prepar, spent, someth	8%
10	Expanding the pie	thought, realli, given, much, valu, end, work	thought, realli, given, noth, experi, learn, agreement	6%

Note. Highly associated terms are the words in each topic with the highest probability. FREX words are based on the FREX metric. FREX weights words by their overall frequency in the document and how exclusive they are to the topic. Therefore, these words distinguish the topic from others more than the highly associated terms.


Table 8. Study 5 ratings of typicality of competence and warmth traits by target gender and success.

	Men		Women		Overall	
	Successful (N=98)	Unsuccessful (N=98)	Successful (N=98)	Unsuccessful (N=98)	Successful (N=196)	Unsuccessful (N=196)
Confident	8.19 (1.08)	3.62 (2.16)	7.92 (1.28)	3.40 (2.08)	8.06 (1.18)	3.51 (2.12)
Competent	7.73 (1.15)	3.04 (1.80)	7.95 (1.21)	3.49 (2.08)	7.84 (1.18)	3.27 (1.95)
Capable	7.83 (0.980)	3.24 (1.98)	7.90 (1.05)	3.63 (2.23)	7.86 (1.02)	3.43 (2.11)
Efficient	7.42 (1.43)	3.05 (1.71)	7.67 (1.24)	3.30 (1.76)	7.55 (1.34)	3.18 (1.73)
Intelligent	7.48 (1.23)	3.57 (1.91)	7.83 (1.18)	4.04 (2.16)	7.66 (1.21)	3.80 (2.05)
Skillful	7.72 (1.13)	3.21 (1.94)	7.93 (1.09)	3.44 (2.14)	7.82 (1.11)	3.33 (2.04)
Friendly	6.48 (1.57)	3.98 (2.07)	6.61 (1.75)	4.42 (2.21)	6.55 (1.66)	4.20 (2.14)
Well-intentioned	5.78 (1.82)	4.11 (1.99)	6.53 (1.94)	4.55 (2.30)	6.15 (1.91)	4.33 (2.16)
Trustworthy	6.15 (1.77)	3.73 (2.18)	6.71 (1.90)	3.99 (2.05)	6.43 (1.86)	3.86 (2.11)
Warm	5.72 (1.86)	3.85 (1.98)	6.27 (1.87)	4.23 (2.12)	5.99 (1.88)	4.04 (2.05)
Good natured	5.86 (1.85)	3.98 (1.99)	6.60 (1.71)	4.47 (2.22)	6.23 (1.81)	4.23 (2.12)
Sincere	5.84 (1.86)	3.91 (1.97)	6.43 (1.75)	4.35 (2.21)	6.14 (1.83)	4.13 (2.10)

Figure 1. Study 3 example chat dialogue.

Chat Messages	
agent_2: Hello! I am excited for my trip, how about you?	
agent_1: I am also very excited. Thank you for asking!	
agent_2: I am in need of some water the most, what is your highest priority item?	
agent_1: Water too	
agent_2: OK, what is the item that is the next most important to you?	
agent_1: Well, I need food for energy. So that is the next most important thing for me.	
agent_2: OK, how about you take 2 water and 1 food and 1 firewood?	
agent_1: Could I have 2 water and 2 food instead? There are 9 items. Obviously, one person will get 4 and the other 5. If I am getting 4, I would prefer 2 food items.	
agent_2: I really will need 2 of either the water or the food, you can decide if you would like.	
agent_1: Then can I get 2 water, 1 food, and 2 firewood?	agent_2: Sure, that sounds good!
agent_1: Okay, then we have a deal.	
agent_1: Accept-Deal	agent_2: Submit-Deal

Figure 2. Study 4 exclusivity-semantic coherence plot for model selection. Model selected is circled and indicates the number of topics in the STM.
A. For positive feedback open-ended responses.



B. For negative feedback open-ended responses.




Figure 3. Study 4 effect sizes of partner gender differences of topic prevalence in positive feedback.




Figure 4. Study 4 effect sizes of partner gender differences of topic prevalence in negative feedback.

