Patricio De Hinachuba: Defender Of The Word Of God, The Crown Of The King, And The Little Children Of Ivitachuco

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Seventeenth-century Florida, like Chile, was a colony known for constant war, and unlike that other distant outpost, Florida had two borders and two seacoasts to defend, plus a declining Christian Indian population and the competition of English colonists for the trade and loyalty of the Indian nations. Between 1680 and 1706 the hinterland succumbed to tribes armed from Carolina, and the Spanish presence was reduced to St. Augustine. The native inhabitants all but disappeared. Scrub oak and palmetto grew over the wooden council houses and the ashes of churches and forts; Virginia creeper covered the cannons. Fruit trees and horses, cattle and hogs reverted to the wild. In the eighteenth century Lower Creeks from the Southeastern highlands drifted into the empty peninsula to interbreed with runaway blacks and become the Seminoles. Only an archaeologist can detect the signs of a life that once was: the elevated bed of an old road, or a rectangular patch of reddish earth where a clay-daubed convent burned.

One Hispanic Indian who should not fade into oblivion was the chief Patricio de Hinachuba. In the rough waters of the times he steered a daring and dangerous course, balancing Spanish factions, Indian rivalries, and even English attackers to get the best terms for his province, Apalache, and his town, Ivitachuco. This noble was a devout son of the

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Church who did not let the friar run his town, a brave captain who fought no unnecessary battle, and a loyal supporter of the Crown whom the Spanish could not take for granted. Feinting and dodging like a player on the Ivitachuco pelota team, don Patricio never lost his head and never forgot his priorities.

Patricio was his baptismal name. Perhaps his godfather was Patricio de Florencia, one of the first shipmasters on the pigs-and-chickens run between San Marcos, the port below present Tallahassee, and Havana, a week's sail away. Don was a Spanish title which the chiefs appropriated. Usinulo and Iniia were others of his titles, spelled in various ways. Chuba was the name of his aristocratic clan.1 Somehow don Patricio's surname was standardized by the Spanish to Hinachuba. Like other Southeastern tribes, Apalaches passed chieftainship matrilineally, to the eldest son of the chief's eldest sister. Don Patricio's cousins occupied positions of honor, not responsibility.

The young nobleman attended his first recorded council of chiefs in 1688, to discuss a defense problem.2 Neighboring Apalachicola Province was not subject to the Spanish. Its chiefs had refused friars, saying courteously that if God ever wanted them to become Christians they would let the Spanish know.3 The Deputy Governor of Apalache, Antonio Matheos, led two punitive forays into Apalachicola after English traders and gunrunners began finding in it a haven.4 The chiefs of Apalache petitioned that Matheos be removed, arguing that the four towns he had burned would certainly retaliate. At the council don Patricio spoke on Matheos' side, but as it turned out, the older chiefs were right. The Apalachicolos moved to the Ocmulgee region and became bitter and active enemies. The English knew them as Lower Creeks.5

It was 1695 before don Patricio's name again appeared in the permanent records, this time due to a hunting dispute between his town of Ivitachuco and neighboring San Pedro, one fourth its size.6 San Pedro was just across the Aucilla River in the Ustaquan district of the province of Timucua. Hunters from Ivitachuco had crossed the river to kill two bears, but Santiago, a carpenter from San Pedro, confronted the poachers and confiscated the bear skins and tallow. With twelve seasoned warriors don Patricio went to collect damages, but in San Pedro he encountered such resistance that he returned empty handed. Shortly afterward Santiago found himself being accused of murder. According to his story, while out hunting he had met a party of Creeks and in self defense had shot one. He returned to San Pedro displaying the scalp and giving the war cry so the people could follow him to the council house and celebrate. Messengers from don Patricio examined the remains and the site and proposed that the victim was not a Creek warrior but a refugee Chacato woman whom
only they had seen. Santiago, they said, had killed her. According to the practice in Indian criminal cases, Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala referred the matter to the official defender of the Indians, don Antonio Ponce de León, a cleric from an old Florida family. In his well written brief don Antonio revealed the disagreement between don Patricio and the carpenter. The testimony of Apalaches was not to be trusted, he said, for they always supported one another. The case was dropped.

Ivitachuco, on the border between Apalache and Timucua, was the ancient capital of the province, but the friars had chosen a more central location for their headquarters, at San Luis. Other Spaniards began moving their families to that town during the 1670s. In 1697 the chiefs completed a strong wooden fort there, paid for by the province’s tithes, and the Spanish showed their satisfaction by appropriating the land for a league around. Juana Caterina de Florencia, the imperious wife of officer Jacinto Roque Pérez, treated the Indians like personal servants, requiring fish on Fridays, a pitcher of milk daily, and six women to grind maize. Her brothers, Diego and Francisco, started ranches and let their livestock run unrestrained over native fields.

Don Patricio was an educated man, articulate and bilingual, whose letters retained only a few peculiarities of syntax and expression to betray his non-Spanish origin. In February, 1699, he and the chief of San Luis, don Andrés, wrote to the King himself, reporting that on account of the Florencias many individuals had abandoned the province. Some newly Christian Tamas, expert tanners, had gone over to the English because the Florencias refused to pay them. The chiefs politely requested the King to hear their grievances and provide a protector. The letter was carried to Spain by a Franciscan friar.

The relationship between chiefs and religiosos was long standing. When the Franciscans entered Apalache in the 1630s to stay, they introduced new cultigens and domesticated animals, instituting a second yearly planting of maize as a reserve against famine and a revenue for the native sanctuaries. Several governors trying to extend secular control over this surplus accused the friars of abusing the Indians for their own gain. In the 1680s there was a showdown. After Governor Juan Marques Cabrera had been denied the sacraments for a year he suffered a breakdown and deserted, but not before establishing governmental control over Apalache harvests and labor. During this imbroglio the chiefs played both sides against the middle. Friars and deputy governors might dispute which of them was to hold the second key to a community storehouse, but a chief always held the first.

In April don Patricio addressed a more detailed letter of complaint to Ensign Antonio Ponce de León (not the defender of Santiago but a kins-
man of the same name), who had been the governor's visitador (inspector) to Apalache. "Jesus Mary Joseph," the chief began in his precise and elegant handwriting. "May the Divine Majesty give Your Grace and all your children excellent health. My vassals and I are at your service." The Florencias had women on their ranches, he reported, although don Antonio had ordered them not to. They were also detaining school-age older boys who ought to be learning their prayers and attending mass. What concerned the chief most, though, was something he claimed had happened that winter. Young Francisco de Florencia, out with 40 Chacatos on a buffalo hunt, had met a smaller party of the Tasquique tribe on their way to Apalache with buffalo skins, bezoar stones and leather shirts. The two parties had exchanged greetings and camped in the same woods. At midnight Francisco and his Chacatos treacherously attacked the other camp, killing two-thirds of the men and robbing them of their goods. The plunder had been sold, and it was common knowledge that the shirts were decorated in the town of Ayubale. Deputy Governor Roque Pérez had let it be known that his brother-in-law Francisco was the one attacked, "and everything has been covered up," wrote the chief, "without fear of God." The whole province was on edge awaiting retribution. People were fleeing to the woods or to San Jorge (Charles Town). Don Patricio begged don Antonio to have his father, a former governor, ask the present governor to withdraw the Florencias. If the story was true, Francisco was a dangerous hothead. If not, then like Santiago he had done something to incur don Patricio's animosity.

In the meantime Charles II had received the letter from the two chiefs. Ill and bewildered as he was, the last Spanish Habsburg had the welfare of his Indian subjects on his conscience. To the newly appointed governor for Florida, Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda, the King summarized the Indians' grievances. "I desire greatly that these poor chiefs and natives should be well treated," he dictated, "and that you help, protect and defend them as is your duty and as I have ordered in repeated cédulas to the governors your predecessors."

The new governor had other preoccupations. Perfunctorily he warned the Chacatos (not the Florencias) to behave civilly in future, but his orders to Deputy Governor Roque Pérez in November, 1700, show that his main interests in Apalache were that it produce food for St. Augustine and be prepared for war. Early in 1701 he sent Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar to check on defenses. The governor was suspicious of recent French-arranged treaties calling for the Apalaches to supply packhorses to members of the Creek Confederacy, who would undoubtedly trade them to the English for firearms. Through Ayala he ordered all trade in European goods, whether weapons, clothing, silver or horses, to cease.
According to Zúñiga's mollifying report to the King, Captain Ayala made many reforms for the Indians' benefit. The governor was going to replace Roque Pérez as deputy governor soon, he promised, and attend to the other Florencias in person. In this he was less than candid. As everyone in Florida knew, Captain Ayala was a relative of the Florencias by marriage and his investigation had been a whitewash.

Don Patricio, however, was not the person to let any chance go by. Ayala had scarcely left Apalache when he received an obsequious letter in the name of all the chiefs and elders of Apalache. "Such a visit as Your Grace has just finished in this province those of us now living, born into this world, have never before seen. Small and great alike use their tongues to praise Your Grace. May God repay you, for we are a poor folk." The chiefs understood, said don Patricio, that Ayala was going to the Kingdoms of Castile. They wished him to implore His Catholic and Royal Majesty to relieve them of the sentence of compulsory labor so justly imposed upon their ancestors seventy years earlier for an uprising of the heathen Apalaches against the Christian ones. In return they would continue to fight loyally on the Spanish side at any occasion. They asked this by the bowels of Jesus Christ their Redeemer. Don Patricio was signing for all of them, they said, since he was the one who knew how.

The figure of seventy years was somewhat exaggerated. Interim Governor Francisco Menéndez Marquez, a distant relative of the founder of St. Augustine, had subjected both rebel and loyal Apalaches to the repartimiento (rotating labor service) in 1647, fifty-four years earlier, explaining frankly that the other provinces of Christians were nearly used up. Although obligatory, the repartimiento was not slave labor. Each Indian was paid one real a day, equivalent to one-eighth of a peso, in trade goods. The chiefs chose which of their vassals were to go into service. Both going and coming across Florida, the laborers were loaded with maize and trade goods like so many mules. When there were plenty of inhabitants in the province, the labor service was more humiliating than onerous, but the population was decreasing. A governor's census of 1675 numbered less than 9,000, while Lent counts of 1638 and 1676 indicated that the number of communicants had fallen during that period from 16,000 to only 5,000. Meanwhile, the number summoned to St. Augustine from Apalache rose from 100 to 300 after construction began on the stone fort in 1673, and this was in addition to those assigned to the Spanish living in the province. Still others had deserted their obligations to become a free labor force, wandering from ranch to ranch. In 1694 there were 19 married men missing from Ivitachuco alone.

Don Patricio's letter on the repartimiento was a masterpiece of maneuver. In the most subservient language he had suggested that the Apalaches
might no longer choose to fight on the Spanish side. It was the right time to parley for an advantage. Charles II had been dead for three months. To keep the grandson of Louis XIV off, or on, the throne of Spain much of the world would soon be at war. The English policy toward native allies had decided attractions. It was strictly a trade connection, with no labor service, no interference with customs, and no demands for food. As Governor Colleton of Carolina once said, "They have nothing to do with our government, nor do we trouble ourselves about them...showing no profit but of a few deerskins for which we sell them powder, guns and shot, as we do to all Indians indifferently." 25 Most Southeastern Indians shifted to the English side with alacrity. Those who had been baptized struck themselves on the forehead saying, "Go away water! I am no Christian!" 26

Don Antonio Ponce de León, the one who was Santiago's defender, was in Havana, where in 1698 he had been appointed organist to the St. Augustine parish church. 27 Ensign Antonio had referred don Patricio's letter of 1699 to him, since it had been impossible to get Governor Zúñiga to take an interest in the chief's complaints. The Florencias, wrote the clerical don Antonio to Philip V, were related to most of the garrison and had always managed to get into a new governor's good graces. The Indians forced to live a league out of San Luis hardly got to mass once a year. Captain Ayala not only had corrected nothing, he had left the natives disconsolate. Don Antonio entreated the new Bourbon monarch to provide justice before the province was utterly destroyed. 28 He enclosed Hinachuba's letter with his and entrusted the packet to the St. Augustine parish priest, who was going to Spain with grudges of his own against the Florencias. To the priest's presentation the Council of the Indies responded that the governors of Florida had twice been ordered to attend to this family and had not yet had time to reply. Philip V made a marginal note on the report to wait and see what the governor had to say. 29 Clergyman-Organist Antonio was sent one further title, that of ecclesiastical judge and visitador, but by the time he got back to St. Augustine in 1702 the church had been burned with the organ in it; 30 soon the Indians themselves would be scattered.

Less than a year from Captain Ayala's visita, some Apalache traders in Creek country attempted to buy muskets without supplying horses. The offended Creeks killed three of the traders, fracturing the precarious peace. On May 20, 1702, 100 Creeks surprised the town of Santa Fe in Timucua and were driven off after a three-hour battle, with the loss of twelve on the Spanish-Timucuan side. Although reprisal was not their duty, don Patricio and the other chiefs of Apalache asked permission to take 800 warriors and make war on the Creeks. Governor Zúñiga's
Council of War lent them Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza with 20 Spanish soldiers and some grenade mortars. The campaign was planned for that fall after planting time. Friars preached encouraging sermons. Warriors checked their weapons, donned feather headdresses, and painted their bodies red and black. They danced earnestly, prayed, and did secret magic with the hair of enemies.

It was around the middle of October, 1701, that the combined expeditionary force made camp in a piney woods clearing near the Pedernales, or Flint River. Suddenly they were attacked from all sides by 400 well-armed Creeks, who under English captain Anthony Dodsworth had been on their way to raid Hispanic border towns and carry off women. Grenade throwers were useless in the pine trees. The Battle of Pedernales turned into a rout. Only 300 of the Apalaches retreated together, and most of those left their weapons. The next day 200 more straggled back to San Luis without so much as their breechclouts, according to Captain Romo. They were all cowards, the captain announced bitterly, who in a fight could make use of their feet alone. A week after the battle a Christian Chacata from Creek territory appeared in San Luis with information about enemy strength and plans. She would have come in time to give more warning, she said, but she had been watched, and on her long walk to Apalache she had avoided the main trails. Passing the battlefield of Pedernales she found food among the swollen, unburied bodies, and ate. The next spring, when the maize was the height of one’s palm, the Creeks were coming to capture San Luis and take the province, and a hundred boats would descend on St. Augustine. The English were saying that the Spanish had little arms or munitions, and were no men.

 Barely 1,500 warriors were left in Apalache. As Governor Zúñiga wrote to the Crown, the natives were so disheartened that they were deserting en masse. If Apalache was invaded it would not be easy to coax them back to the ruins of their churches, convents and council houses. Even if the province were rebuilt, it could never be to its present perfection. He thought of the Indians’ great fields and their herds of livestock; of their construction skills on ships, roads and buildings; of their arts: pottery, shell and feathercraft, and historical murals done with great naturalness in colored clays. If help did not come soon all would be lost, for he had too few soldiers to protect even his own post.

The predicted attack came, not the next summer, but in just two weeks. Colonel James Moore came down the coast from Charles Town with an amphibious force of 680 Englishmen and 300 Indians. Governor Zúñiga sent for help to Havana and the new Gulf settlements of Spanish Pensacola and French Mobile. He ordered the deputy governors of Timucua and Apalache to consolidate their forces at San Luis, and as the
two-month siege wore on, instructed them to bring 600 Indians to his relief. Before this could be effected, ships arrived from Havana to break the siege. Moore’s retreating soldiers destroyed all the ranches and missions on the way back to Charles Town, driving the cattle before them. No one presumed that the war was over. The governor sent further orders to the provinces. No one was to hoard foodstuffs nor export them. Friars were to stay out of military councils. Each town was to build a palisade around its strongest building (usually the church or convent). When the defenses were complete San Luis had two stockades connected by a passage; Ivitachuco had a strong fort and a campanile, built in 1682, which served as a lookout and vantage point for archers.

In spite of the insecurity, life went on. In February, 1703, the repartimiento Indians gathered as usual at Ivitachuco to make the 80-league trek to St. Augustine. They wore cloth caps, leather shirts and cheap Mexican blankets. For food they carried a reconstitutable mixture of parched maize, dried medlars and berries, and nuts. To drink they had cassina (Black Drink), a caffeine-rich tea from the holly Ilex vomitoria. Each man had a knife in his sash and a large basket on his back. Five of them, carpenters, went on ahead to erect shelters in St. Augustine, where the siege had left barely 20 houses standing. Don Patricio and three other chiefs, all with new guns, escorted them. The governor had asked the chiefs for 25 horses and saddles for the cavalry company he was forming. He also wanted 50 chickens, 750 pounds of tallow, 600 coils of native rope, and 40 tanned hides.

Deputy Governor Roque Pérez had been suspended from office since June, 1701, but his substitutes were unable to get the cooperation of the powerful Florencias, and the abuses continued. While Hinachuba was with the labor levy in St. Augustine he must have made one last appeal for the relief of Apalache. The governor sent someone to administer justice, but his choice, Bernardo Nieto de Carvajal, returned to St. Augustine with mule loads of gifts from the Spanish settlers. It was too late anyhow. Four months after Carvajal’s departure war broke out in Apalache, and there were those who called it rebellion.

A party of Creeks and Englishmen swept into Apalache, raided the towns of Ocone, Patale and Ocuia, and either carried off or were joined by 500 people. On January 25, 1704, Colonel Moore reappeared, also in Apalache, with 50 Englishmen and 1,000 Ocmulgee Creeks. The Carolinians’ stated purpose was to deprive the French of allies and defeat the Spanish in their provinces. Their immediate object was the same as the Creeks’: church plunder, horses and cattle, and slaves for the market of Charles Town. Moore’s force struck first at the town of Ayubale. The defenders, under the leadership of Father Angel de Miranda, ran out of
ammunition and were forced to surrender. Deputy Governor Juan Ruíz de Méxiá gathered a party of 400 Apalaches and 30 Spaniards and marched to the rescue, fortified by more sermons than ammunition. In the ensuing Battle of Ayubale, according to Moore’s story, 14 Spaniards and up to 200 Apalaches were killed or captured. Moore suffered 4 casualties and his allies, 15. As was the custom among Southeastern Indians, they prepared to burn at the stake an equal number of prisoners. Father Miranda, walking about loose, demanded to know how Moore could allow this barbarity. When the Carolinian replied that his allies greatly outnumbered his own men, Father Miranda untied the prisoners and stormed at their captors that such things were not done to Christians, nor in their presence! The Creeks, always respectful of madmen, moved their captives to another place. Miranda and Méxiá were released to arrange ransom for the other Spaniards, but Roque Pérez, safely inside the blockhouse at San Luis, refused to negotiate.}

San Luis was too strong to carry by force and Moore had not come to lay siege. Two days after the Battle of Ayubale he sent word to “the King of the Attachookas . . . in his strong and well-made Fort” to come and talk terms. This was don Patricio, guarding his town with 130 warriors. The chief could not afford the insouciance of a Spanish captain. After carefully evaluating his chances, he compounded with the enemy, carrying out to them his church plate and horses laden with provisions. Ivitachuco was temporarily spared. Moore went on to destroy all the rest of Apalache up to two leagues away from San Luis. The people of two towns came over to him voluntarily to be resettled with their livestock on South Carolina plantations; all the rest were made slaves. According to Moore’s account, he liberated 1,300 persons in this campaign and enslaved or killed 4,325. The Spanish sources say he enslaved 600. They do not mention his deal with don Patricio.

The desperate state of the province called for emergency measures. Governor Zúñiga sent the deputy governor of Timucua to evaluate the devastation and make covert inquiries about culpability. He had orders to post on the blackened ruins of council houses. Pardon was offered to those who returned, and refuge to deserters and runaway slaves. The property of unrepentant insurgents was forfeit to the Crown, and that of the dead or captured without heirs, to the Church. No cattle or other food was to be sold to Havana or Pensacola. Two weeks later Zúñiga addressed the remaining native nobles as “My sons and cousins, chiefs and elders of Vitachuco and San Luis.” They must not despair. The war in Europe was going better. Allied arms had won great victories and at any time he expected news of a peace. The King of France would not ignore the problem of San Jorge (Charles Town). Meanwhile there was
something on which the governor needed their opinion. Juana Caterina de Florencia wished to take her children and move to Pensacola, escorted, naturally, by part of the Spanish soldiers. Zúñiga had told her husband to bring his family to St. Augustine instead, and wondered whether the chiefs would approve this temporary reduction of the garrison. He signed himself "the one who esteems you most highly." 50

In June, before the chiefs could tell the governor what he could do with Juana Caterina, enemy raids re-commenced, now guided by Apalache rebels. One troop destroyed the towns of Aspalage and, again, Patale. A larger party, including reputedly cannibal Chichimecos, moved into the evacuated town of Escambe, a cannon's shot from San Luis. Meanwhile, a small sailing ship the size of a tender came into San Marcos harbor from Pensacola to deliver musket matchcord and cattle drovers. The new deputy governor, Manuel Solana, entreated the 23 men aboard the tender, for the sake of God and the King, to come up to San Luis and help him. He also sent for help to Ivitachuco. Suddenly the enemy withdrew. Don Patricio, arriving with 45 warriors, feared they were heading to his town by another road. With four Spaniards assigned him by Solana, he made the 12-league journey back across the province by night. Some Apalache renegades captured on the way informed him that the enemy were not many and had little ammunition. At a council of war in San Luis the Spanish voted to take the offensive. The Indians of San Luis were less eager. They demanded a greater share of the ammunition, and for the Spanish to fight on foot the way they did. Again Solana sent word for don Patricio to bring men, and a meeting place was arranged half a league from enemy headquarters at Patale. Captain Roque Pérez remained, as before, to guard the blockhouse. 51

Accounts of what followed disagree. It appears that don Patricio arrived with his men shortly after five on the morning of the fourth of July to find a scene of havoc. Some of the Spaniards waiting in the dark had assaulted a small party of Creek foragers, part of whom had escaped to give the alarm. The enemy had issued from Patale in force and encircled the Spanish. The soldiers rushed for their horses, but the Indians from San Luis, anticipating this, had turned the horses loose. The Spaniards then tried to make a stand in the moat at Patale, but they were no match for superior numbers of Creeks. During the battle, all but sixteen of the San Luis Indians disappeared into the woods. In the retreat to the blockhouse twenty-three Spaniards and twelve of the sixteen Indians were killed or captured. Those in the fort the dreadful night of the fourth refused admission to any San Luis Indian who arrived apart from a Spaniard. Enemy losses must have been seventeen, for that is the number of captives whom they burned the next day, tied to trees and to crosses of
the *Via Crucis* around the Patale plaza. One of the eight Spaniards burned was crowned with a headdress of animal hair and parrot beaks to mark him as a brave slayer of warriors.52

Two days after the Battle of Patale an escaped prisoner reported that the marauders threatened to be back within the month, three thousand strong and led by Englishmen, to occupy Apalache Province and then to take Pensacola. Demoralization was complete. The friars and other Spaniards begged to abandon the province. Solana proposed to let the women and children leave by the tender, which would return for the religious images and ornaments. Most of the 200 Indian families of San Luis were already on the way to Pensacola with their chief, and those who remained were preparing to leave for destinations they would not disclose. They would not go to St. Augustine, the San Luis Indians told Solana, for there was no safety with Spaniards, and

*they were weary of waiting for aid from the Spaniards: that they [did] not wish merely to die; that for a long time we had misled them with words...that we who remain in the blockhouse, they well know, remain to die; that if they go, it will not be to the Spaniards, and if they remain until the return of the enemy, it will be in order [to go] against us, and they will burn us within the blockhouse, while they escape with their lives.*53

On the eighth of July Solana handed a packet of letters to the soldier Joseph del Pozo. At 8 A.M. on July 12th the saddle-weary rider was two hundred miles away, at St. Augustine, meeting with the governor's council of war.54 He brought a message from don Patricio, who had distinguished himself in the past four years more for his ability to preserve his people and his town than for foolhardy heroism. Nevertheless, the chief of Ivitachuco was the last remaining hold on the Apalache people. His message was that he would die as a good vassal among the Spanish. He had more people than ever in his care: frightened orphans, deserted families, refugees from other towns. He would bring all these women and children, plus the church images, ornaments and vestments, the cattle and the horses. His people would tear down their own blockhouse and palisade while the Spanish were destroying the one at San Luis, and together they would see what cannons, mortars and other arms could be salvaged. Don Patricio's plan was to join his people to the remnants of the Timucuans to form one good-sized town at San Francisco in Timucua, near where the cart road from Apalache crossed the water route from the Gulf, 30 leagues by mule trails from St. Augustine.55

Considering the news in the packet the Council had no alternative. Apalache had really been lost in January. Perhaps when his province had attained better form don Patricio could call back those who had fled to
various places and repopulate it. Meanwhile he must bring his people to a safer place. The journey would be perilous—one of the rivers was too deep to ford, and 60 leagues of the 80 from Apalache to St. Augustine were infested by bandits—but there was no other route. The Council agreed that don Patricio and Deputy Governor Solana must travel together, bringing the church treasure and the cattle. The tender, if it returned, must not enter San Marcos, which by then would be in enemy hands, but come up the San Martín (Suwannee-Santa Fe) with a pilot for the channels of the mouth. There was no time to lose for traitors among the Indians would inform the enemy as soon as plans became known.56

On July 23 the Spanish civilians boarded the tender for Pensacola. They left behind them the ruins of a province. Their remaining cattle had been sold, and drovers were to make the dangerous drive overland. Fewer than 30 Spanish soldiers remained at San Luis to destroy the blockhouses, spike and burst the guns, and assist the Indian evacuation.57 Solana hurriedly packed the treasure that remained, including 17 chismatorios and 16 diadems. During the previous war the enemy had carried off 8,000 pesos worth of church treasure from three towns alone.58 If each of the 14 towns in Apalache had a similar amount, the portable church property in Apalache must have been worth over 37,000 pesos before the wars—a sum that represented 296,000 days of labor to a common Indian, whose own most precious possession would be a brass medallion of Our Lady. Considering the way they were encumbered with oxcarts, the infantry moved rapidly. Two days after they set fire to the fort of San Luis they had crossed Apalache and caught up with the Indians of Ivitachuco, already five leagues down the road at San Pedro.59

Two accounts of the exodus have survived. To the viceroy of New Spain the officials of the royal exchequer wrote a pitiful story about how the chief of Ivitachuco with a handful of his people had sought refuge in St. Augustine, on foot for the enemy had driven off all their horses and cattle, leaving behind all they possessed, spiking the guns and burning or burying the church ornaments and bells. The officials knew better, for by the time they wrote, Solana had already arrived in St. Augustine with the Apalache treasure. Either they were misinforming the viceroy, from whom Florida hoped to get assistance, or the letter was a sham in case the bearer was captured by corsairs. One of the two officials signing this first letter was the buffalo hunter Francisco de Florencia, filling in for his kinsman the treasurer.60

The other exodus account, Governor Zúñiga’s to the Crown, is a more substantial and likely story.61 He said there were 400 persons in the caravan and their order of march was as follows: The deputy governor and one squad of soldiers went first, driving 600 cattle. A second squad
convoyed the oxcarts bearing the silver and ornaments, some images of saints, and the Spanish baggage. Next came the Indian women and children with their supplies and baggage. Protecting the rear with his head men and warriors was the principal chief of the provinces, don Patricio, carrying his staff of authority. The old friar of Ivitachuco had died; mad, fighting Father Miranda was at Hinachuba’s side now.\footnote{62}

The refugees’ progress was stopped short at the Guacara (Upper Suwannee), the deep and rapid river marking the boundary between Ustaqua and the rest of Timucua. There had once been a town and a ferry there, but the one had been destroyed in a raid sometime between 1687 and 1693, and the boatmen of the other had long since been run off by bandits.\footnote{63} To get their carts to the other side, don Patricio and Captain Solana probably built rafts to be pulled across by ropes, the way Hernando de Soto had gotten his baggage over swift Florida rivers 165 years earlier. The cattle and horses swam across fastened to a hawser.\footnote{64}

While this crossing was under way, two rearguard scouts arrived in camp with ominous news. They had seen a large body of Creeks led by English enter San Luis only two days after the Spanish left. Don Patricio’s band was burdened with baggage and dependents, but the Creeks did not pursue their advantage. Before following the Ivitachuco party they sent a detachment to intercept and kill the drovers taking the herd of cattle to Pensacola.\footnote{65} They also captured or killed the people of Escambe, who had stubbornly refused to leave their town a second time, intending to welcome the raiders when they came.\footnote{66} In all Apalache nothing was left to be killed or stolen.

At San Francisco, headquarters for Timucua Province, the soldiers transferred the treasure onto mules and packhorses to take on to St. Augustine. Governor Zúñiga had written urging don Patricio to come with them and settle south of St. Augustine where his people could be supplied from the garrison. The Apalaches’ enemies would not cease to persecute them, the governor warned.\footnote{67} But the chief had been thinking. He would not build new Ivitachuco close to St. Augustine or San Francisco to draw off the enemies of Spaniards. The governor would expect his warriors to be available on any occasion, leaving their own women and children defenseless. Zúñiga had been purchasing maize from Havana at speculators’ prices.\footnote{68} He had little of it to spare, and the chief knew that if anyone starved it would not be a Spaniard. To the south of San Francisco were a number of old, deserted ranches. At one called La Chua\footnote{69} the main house had been fortified and a few soldiers stationed to break horses and slaughter the half-wild cattle and hogs, drying or salting the meat for the garrison. A few leagues farther on was a place known as Abosaya, with an abundance of wild fruit and edible roots. Don Patricio
determined to take his people there, where there was some hope of subsistence. While they built their palisade and got the ground ready for planting they could live on cattle and what the women could fish or gather.79

Less than a month after Hinachuba and his people passed through the land of Ustaqua, the enemy entered it and destroyed the two remaining towns of San Pedro and San Mateo, killing or carrying off all the cattle and inhabitants. The stockade of Ivitachuco-at-Abosaya was barely raised when a second party of Creeks, armed with firearms, pistols and cutlasses, came to scour the environs of San Francisco. At La Chua they captured and quartered a black ranchhand. From St. Augustine the governor sent the Timucuan garrison what men he could spare on good horses, plus some ammunition for don Patricio, but he feared that the province might already be lost.71 While waiting to hear, Zúñiga issued letters-of-marque to corsairs to sack the outlying plantations of Charles Town. In response to that raid the English governor proposed a truce between the two cities. Somewhat distrustfully the Spanish accepted. Thirty leagues to the interior the raiding Creeks received word not to trouble places of Christians, and turned back.72

There was much that the new town of Ivitachuco needed: food, blankets, clothing, knives, hoes and axes, nails, powder and musketballs. Governor Zúñiga invited don Patricio to come to St. Augustine to be given these gifts and honored for his great loyalty. What this meant, of course, was that the Spanish would not undertake to supply Ivitachuco at Abosaya, and the risks of the journey would be the chief's. He agreed to come as soon as the governor could send some soldiers to reinforce his defenses.73

The truce did not last the winter. On the first day of February, 1705, Juan Lorenzo Castañeda, officer in charge of eight soldiers and three shotguns at La Chua, saw two new troops of enemies with about thirty men each.74 Don Patricio sent his nephew and heir, don Nicolás de Cárdenas, to the governor with an entreaty. The people of Ivitachuco could use more ammunition and six more musketeers. "I trust in Your Excellency for help and protection," the chief reminded Zúñiga, "in order to defend the word of my Lord and God, and the crown of my King, and the many little ones who are in this town."75 The governor responded with a small number of soldiers under don Patricio's old enemy, Francisco de Florencia. On Easter Sunday the smoke of unexplained campfires could be seen from the bastions of San Francisco, and on the 15th of June word came that a reconnoitering party from Ocmulgee was in the vicinity. Deputy Governor García went in person to Abosaya to ask don Nicolás to bring some warriors for the pursuit party.76
Two months passed without a direct assault. Leaving Abosaya in the hands of Captain Florencia and 50 armed men, Hinachuba went to St. Augustine for the promised supplies. While he was away three more troops of enemies left Creek country for Florida. They had arms and ammunition supplied by the English, and their numbers were swollen by renegades. On August 20 a troop of 200 attacked Abosaya. Again and again they assaulted the stockade, trying to break down the walls and set fire to the palmetto thatch inside. Florencia got word of the attack to St. Augustine, and sent to San Francisco for 600 musketballs and 25 pounds of powder. Captain García could spare only a third that much, which was just as well since the enemy captured the ammunition and one of the two bearers at the gate of the stockade. A week passed with no word from St. Augustine or don Patricio. The Creeks stripped the gardens bare around Abosaya and deployed a fourth of their forces to make cattle raids upon La Chua and the other ranches. It was estimated that they would stay no longer than twenty days in any place. At San Francisco, Deputy Governor García gathered in all the maize and squash. When a second week went by the defenders at Abosaya wondered what was happening at St. Augustine.

When the news came to Governor Zúñiga that Abosaya was under siege he offered don Patricio all the assistance he could spare: Captain Joseph de Begambre with a number of Spanish soldiers and some Yguaja and Cherokee auxiliaries from towns recently formed three leagues south of the city. The relief party of a hundred set out by the lower road into Timucua, the one coming out at La Chua. They were six leagues west of St. Augustine, crossing the north-flowing St. Johns by canoe, when word came that a second troop of the enemy had attacked the little fort at Salamototo, two leagues to the north. Since it was still a five-day march to Abosaya, don Patricio and Captain Begambre decided to go first to the relief of Salamototo. In the canoes they floated silently downriver, surprised the attackers, and killed one Creek warrior. While this was happening, the third enemy troop stole up to the town of the Cherokees, left in the care of an inadequate number of black militiamen. The Creeks captured seventy or eighty persons, including some of the soldiers. Harassed from all sides, the governor sent word for Captain Begambre to pursue this third party of raiders. He caught up with them in a marsh five leagues north of St. Augustine, where in a bloody battle on the 3rd of September he and many of his men were killed.

Don Patricio and his warriors had not been involved in this last battle. Worried about their own town, they had parted from Begambre’s party at the river and gone on with their ammunition toward La Chua. Word was awaiting them there from Florencia that Abosaya still held out, but
they should not try to enter it without a strong force. Hinachuba was still at La Chua waiting for Begambre to catch up with him when the enemy troop the two of them had dispersed at Salamototo surrounded the ranch blockhouse. The Creeks had captured a courier carrying the governor's message that he could send no more help. Within sight of the defenders they leisurely slaughtered livestock and broke wild horses. At Abosaya there was almost no food left. One man going out in the pre-dawn to look for squashes was picked up by a dozen of the enemy appearing out of nowhere. The desperate Captain Florencia sent a message to the governor: "Your Excellency, for God's sake take pity on these poor folk, for they can stand no more. P.S. Señor Gobernador, for God's sake, relief quickly!"

Information thereafter is fragmentary. Don Patricio eventually got into Abosaya with what was left of his ammunition, but his people were weak from hunger and many of them sick. Those who could walk went out to find food. Friar Miranda and 10 men left for San Francisco. On September 28 La Chua was attacked by what a hidden watcher thought were 2,000 of the enemy. Although Florencia and a few Spanish soldiers were still with them, the people of Ivitachuco-at-Abosaya did not wait to be next. They had had enough of the promised land flowing with wild fruits and cattle. During the winter of 1705-1706 they moved with don Patricio closer to St. Augustine. They were not given quarters inside the city (Indians were not yet permitted to live there), but south of it, and not even in a place of their own, but scattered among the fragments of tribes living on the miserable Spanish charity. There, in the spring of 1706, they were attacked by another band of Creeks and renegades who had marked their whereabouts and come to exterminate all remnants of Apalache Christians. A few escaped, some were captured, but by far the greater number were killed in what was not a battle but a massacre. Don Patricio de Hinachuba—ally of Spaniards, friend of Franciscans—died within sight of St. Augustine, making one final hopeless stand to protect the people of Ivitachuco. The letter that briefly reported his death and the end of his people was signed by Francisco de Florencia.

NOTES

2. Residencia of Deputy Governor Antonio Matheos, [1687], EC 156-E/17-39, 50-116 ST. The depository is the Archivo General de Indias in Seville. Archival ramos used are Escribanía de Cámara (EC) and Gobierno, section Audiencia de Santo Domingo (SD). Unless otherwise noted, the address of origin is St. Augustine and the addressee is the Crown. Date abbreviations include the century. Documentary collections used are the Jeannette Thurber Connor Papers (transcripts), on microfilm from the Library of Congress (JTC plus reel number); John B. Stetson photostats from the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville (ST); and Escribanía microfilms, the same library (EC). The lengthy residencia above was summarized by John H. Hann for the Division of Archives, History and Records Management, Florida Department of State.

3. Auto of five Apalachicolo chiefs, 9-20-1681, SD 226/95 JTC 3.

4. Matheos wrote his reports to the governor from five different towns: 9-21-1685, Casista; 12-26-1685, Bacuqua; 1-12-1686, Caveta; 2-8-1686, San Luis; and 3-14-1686, Tomole. All the reports are found in SD 839/82 JTC 5.


7. Don Patricio, Cacique of Ivitachuco, and Don Andrés, Cacique of San Luis, 2-12-1699, one of the documents translated by Boyd in Mark F. Boyd, Hale G. Smith and John W. Griffin, Here They Once Stood: The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions (Gainesville, 1951), p. 24; cited hereafter as HTOS.

8. Certification by Officials of the Royal Hacienda of the Construction Costs of the [Block]house in Apalache, 7-3-1697, HTOS, pp. 22-23.

9. Don Patricio, Cacique of Ivitachuco, and Don Andrés, Cacique of San Luis, 2-12-1699, HTOS, pp. 24-25.


12. Fr. Domingo de Ojeda, 2-20-1687, SD 864/4 JTC 6; Governor Juan Marques Cabrera, Instructions to Sergeant Major Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda, 4-11-1687, EC 156-C-15/57 JTC 1.

13. Don Patricio Hinachuba to Don Antonio Ponce de León, Ivitachuco, 4-10-1699, HTOS, pp. 26-27.


15. An Order from the Governor Don Joseph de Zúñiga, 11-5-1700, HTOS, pp. 30-32.


17. Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda, 6-22-1701, SD 840/18 JTC 5.

18. Don Antonio Ponce de León to the King on Behalf of Don Patricio Hinachuba, Havana, 1-29-1702, HTOS, p. 28.

19. Principal cacique of the provinces of Apalache, Nan hulu chuba, don
Patricio, to Captain don Juan de Ayala Escobar, Ybitachuco, 2-28-1701, SD 840/5 JTC 5.
20. Francisco Menéndez Marquez and Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, 7-27-1647, SD 235 JTC 4. Although both royal officials of the treasury signed the letter, Menéndez Marquez was the writer.
23. Franciscan Commissary General Fr. Juan Luengo to the Council of the Indies, [Madrid], 11-30-1676, SD 235/104 JTC 4.
25. Landgrave James Colleton, Governor of Carolina, to Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada, Charles Town, 4-4-1688, SD 839 JTC 5.
26. Francisco de Buenaventura, Bishop of Tricale, 4-29-1736, SD 863/119 JTC 6.
27. Juan de Pueyo and Juan Benedit Horruytiner, 11-10-1707, SD 847/10 JTC 6.
28. Don Antonio Ponce de León to the King on Behalf of Don Patricio Hinachuba, Havana, 1-29-1702, HTOS, pp. 27-29.
29. Parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo, 4-29-1697, SD 235/143 JTC 4; Council of the Indies, 8-11-1702, consulta on letter by Antonio Ponce de León, Havana, 1-29-1702, SD 863/43 JTC 6. (The letter without the consulta is found in HTOS, pp. 27-29.)
31. Governor Zúñiga to the King. Upon the raid into Santa Fe and the expedition upon which Captain Romo was sent, 9-30-1702, HTOS, pp. 36-38; Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702, p. 35.
32. Captain Francisco Romó de Uriza to Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda, San Luis, 10-22-1702, SD 858/B-14 JTC 6.
33. Deputy Governor Manuel Solana to Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda, San Luis, 10-22-1702, SD 858/B-12 JTC 6.
34. Captain Francisco Romó de Uriza to Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda, San Luis, 10-22-1702, SD 858/B-14 JTC 6.
35. [Governor Zúñiga], 11-1-1702, SD 858/B-237 JTC 6.
36. Alonso de Leturiondo, Relación, [Madrid], [ca. 1700], SD 853/14 ST-Hann.
37. The figure on the attacking force is from Governor Zúñiga, 1-6-1703, SD 840/61 JTC 5. A day-by-day account of the siege is in Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702; see especially pp. 41-42, 51.
39. John W. Griffin, "The Site of San Luis," HTOS, pp. 140-44; Memorandum [undated] by Governor Zúñiga, HTOS, p. 44.
40. Colonel Moore's Letter to Sir Nathaniel Johnson, 4-16-1704 [date improbable], HTOS, p. 92; Captain Francisco Fuentes to Governor Juan Marques Cabrera, San Luis, 11-27-1682, one of a collection of testimonies enclosed in Governor Juan Marques Cabrera, 6-28-1683, SD 226/105 JTC 3.
41. Testimony of Bernardo Nieto y Carvajal, in Interim Governor Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda, 6-22-1687, SD 234/82 JTC 4; Alonso de Leturiondo, Relación, [Madrid], [ca. 1700], SD 853/14 ST-Hann.

42. Royal Officials to Viceroy, 7-16-1704, HTOS, p. 60; Manuel Solana to the Governor, [Vitachuco], 2-3-1703, HTOS, pp. 41-42; Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702, p. 58; Memorandum [undated] by Governor Zúñiga, HTOS, p. 45.

43. Governor Zúñiga, 6-22-1701, SD 840/18 JTC 5.

44. Governor Antonio de Benavides, 11-28-1721, EC 145 / 46 and 47 rrC 1.

45. Extract of Colonel Moore’s letter to the Lords Proprietors, 4-16-1704, HTOS, p. 94; Crane, The Southern Frontier, pp. 78-80.

46. Governor Zúñiga, 3-30-1704, SD 840/66 JTC 5; Auto on the martyrdoms of Apalache, 6-6-1705, SD 863/54; Extract of Colonel Moore’s letter to the Lords Proprietors, 4-16-1704, HTOS, p. 94; Colonel Moore’s Letter to Sir Nathaniel Johnson, 4-16-1704 [date improbable], HTOS, pp. 91-92.

47. HTOS, p. 92.

48. Governor Zúñiga, 3-30-1704, SD 840/66 JTC 5; Extract of Colonel Moore’s letter to the Lords Proprietors, 4-16-1704, HTOS, p.94.

49. Governor Zúñiga to Captain Jacinto Roque Pérez and Adjutant Manuel Solana, 4-10-1704, and Governor Zúñiga, n.d., [Orders to Ensign Andrés García], SD 858/B JTC 6; Order from the Governor, n.d., HTOS, pp. 45-46.

50. Governor Zúñiga to the caciques and principales of Vitachuco and San Luis, 4-24-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6.

51. Auto by Governor Zúñiga, 7-12-1704, HTOS, p. 56; Letter from the Deputy of Apalache, Manuel Solana, to Governor Zúñiga, San Luis, 7-8-1704, HTOS, p. 50; Auto on the martyrdoms of Apalache, 6-6-1705, SD 863/54.

52. Letter from the Deputy of Apalache, Manuel Solana, to Governor Zúñiga, San Luis, 7-8-1704, HTOS, pp. 50-55; Royal Officials to Viceroy, 7-16-1704, HTOS, p. 59; Auto on the martyrdoms of Apalache, 6-6-1705, SD863/54; Commandant of Pensacola [Joseph de Guzmán] to Viceroy, Santa María de Galve, 8-22-1704, HTOS, pp. 62-63.


54. Auto by Governor Zúñiga, 7-12-1704, HTOS, pp. 55-56.


56. Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6; Royal Officials to Viceroy, 7-16-1704, HTOS, p. 60.

57. Commandant at Pensacola [Joseph de Guzmán] to Viceroy, Santa María de Galve, 8-22-1704, HTOS, p. 63; Governor Zúñiga to the King, 9-3-1704, HTOS, p. 66; Governor Zúñiga to the Viceroy, 9-10-1704, HTOS, p. 67.

58. Deputy Governor Manuel Solana, Inventory of silver from the churches of the province of Apalache, 8-19-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6; Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala to Joseph Blake, Governor of Carolina, 3-3-1695, SD 839/130 JTC 5.
59. Governor Zúñiga to the King, 9-3-1704, HTOS, p. 66; Governor Zúñiga to the Viceroy, 9-10-1704, HTOS, p. 67.
60. Royal Officials to Viceroy, 8-18-1704, HTOS, pp. 61-62; Governor Zúñiga, 9-3-1704, SD 852/A JTC 6.
61. Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6.
62. Auto on the martyrdoms of Apalache, 6-6-1705, SD 863/54.
63. Governor Zúñiga to the King, 9-30-1702, HTOS, p. 38; Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada, n.d. [seen in the Council of the Indies 10-19-1697], SD 840/TT1 JTC 5.
64. Narratives of De Soto in the Conquest of Florida as Told by a Gentleman of Elvas . . . , Buckingham Smith, trans. (Gainsville, 1968), pp. 51, 82.
65. Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6; Governor Zúñiga to the King, 9-3-1704, HTOS, p. 66; Governor Zúñiga to the Viceroy, 9-10-1704, HTOS, p. 67.
66. Francisco de Florencia and Juan de Pueyo to Governor Zúñiga, 9-9-1704, with Governor Zúñiga to Governor Luis Chacon of Havana, 10-3-1704, SD 852/C JTC 6.
67. Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6.
68. Francisco de Florencia and Juan de Pueyo to Governor Zúñiga, 9-9-1704, with Governor Zúñiga to Governor Luis Chacon of Havana, 10-3-1704, SD 852/C JTC 6.
70. Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6.
71. Francisco de Florencia and Juan de Pueyo to Governor Zúñiga, 9-9-1704, with Governor Zúñiga to Governor Luis Chacon of Havana, 10-3-1704, SD 852/C JTC 6; Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6.
72. Governor Zúñiga, 9-15-1704, HTOS, p. 69; Declaration of Bartholomé Ruiz de Cuenca, New Vera Cruz, 1-20-1705, HTOS, pp. 71-72; Anonymous letter for submission to the Viceroy, extract made at New Vera Cruz, 2-2-1705, HTOS, pp. 72-73; Andrés García to Governor Zúñiga, San Francisco, 6-17-1705, SD 858/4-104.
73. Governor Zúñiga, 10-6-1704, SD 858/B JTC 6.
74. Juan Lorenzo Castañeda to Governor Zúñiga, La Chua, 2-3-1705, SD 858/4 JTC 6.
75. Casique Patrisio to Governor Zúñiga, 5-29-1705, SD 858/4 JTC 6.
76. Andrés García to Governor Zúñiga, San Francisco, 6-12-1705 and 6-17-1705, SD 858/4, 100 and 104 JTC 6.
77. Information on the Ivitachuco-at-Abosaya siege is found in SD 858/B and 858/4 JTC 6. The one document from cuaderno B is Governor Zúñiga, 1-30-1706. Cuaderno 4 provided the following: Andrés García to Señor Castañeda, [San Francisco], n.d. [August, 1705]; Juan Francisco Pérez to Governor Zúñiga, La Chua, 8-21-1705; Francisco de Florencia to Lieutenant Andrés García, Ybitachuco, 8-23-1705; Andrés García to Governor Zúñiga, San Francisco, 8-24-1705; Francisco de Florencia to Juan Francisco [Pérez], [Ibitachuco], 8-27-1705; Juan Francisco Pérez to Governor Zúñiga, La Chua, 9-3-1705; Andrés García to Governor Zúñiga, San Francisco, 9-7-1705; Francisco de Florencia to Governor Zúñiga, Ybitachuco, 9-18-1705.
78. A summary of this campaign is in Governor Zúñiga, 1-30-1706, SD 858/B.
79. Ibid.; Francisco de Florencia to Governor Zúñiga, Ybitachuco, 9-18-1705, SD 858/4.
80. Pedro Rivera to Governor Zúñiga, Salamototo, 10-5-1705 and 10-9-1705, SD 858/4.
81. Francisco de Buenaventura, Bishop of Tricale, 4-29-1736, SD 863/119 JTC 6; Francisco de Florencia and Juan de Pueyo, 4-30-1706, SD 840/87 JTC 5.