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# Gender Attitudes in Africa: Liberal Egalitarianism Across 34 Countries

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This study provides a first descriptive mapping of support for women's equal rights in 34 African countries and assesses diverse theoretical explanations for variability in this support. Contrary to stereotypes of a homogeneously tradition-bound continent, African citizens report high levels of agreement with gender equality that are more easily understood with reference to global processes of ideational diffusion than to country-level differences in economic modernization or women's public-sphere roles. Multivariate analyses suggest, however, that gender liberalism in Africa may be spreading through mechanisms not typically considered by world-society scholars: Support for equal rights is largely unrelated to countries' formal ties to the world system, but it is stronger among persons who are more exposed to extra-local culture, including through internet and mobile phone usage, news access, and urban residency. Forces for gender liberalism are conditioned, moreover, by local religious cultures and gender structures.

*"Equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace."* (Mission statement to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 1995)

*"Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls"* (Goal 5 of United Nations' 17 Sustainable Development goals, 2015)

In linking gender equality with human rights, Hillary Clinton's widely publicized address to the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing built upon decades-long efforts by global feminists and other civil-society leaders to resolve North–South debates about the meaning of women's

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empowerment in the context of massively uneven development (Purkayastha 2018; Tripp 2015; Wyrod 2008). Twenty years later, in 2015, this rights-based framing helped pave the way for 193 heads of state to unanimously adopt gender equality as one of 17 UN Sustainable Development goals.

Global affirmations of women's equal rights have drawn upon principles laid out after World War II in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly and in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. These documents established the intrinsic equality and moral standing of all persons as a central organizing principle of world society institutions. They also helped embed in these institutions a liberal cultural logic that treats individual persons as the fundamental building blocks of society and defines equality in formal procedural terms, as nondiscrimination and equal opportunity. Liberal egalitarian principles are limited in the scope of inequities that they can address and are often loosely coupled to actual behaviors and outcomes (Cole and Ramirez 2013; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). But, they can be powerful ideological instruments supporting more local collective actions to extend equal human rights to historically unrecognized groups, including women (Berkovitch 1999; Frank and Moss 2017; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Snyder 2006).

Perhaps because of this perceived emancipatory potential, social scientists have devoted considerable effort to exploring the characteristics of persons and societies that predict support for gender equality. Within-country analyses have identified education, gender, and religiosity as consistent individual-level predictors, and comparative analyses have revealed gender-egalitarian effects of societal affluence, Christian religious culture, and/or exposure to global cultural scripts (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Chatillon, Charles and Bradley 2018; Davis and Greenstein 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Pierotti 2013).

The existing literature leaves important conceptual and empirical gaps, however. One is a persistent inattention to the multidimensional structure of gender ideology. Despite strong evidence to the contrary (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Knight and Brinton 2017; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019), comparative scholars often treat gender ideology as a unidimensional entity, whose diverse indicators rise and fall together in response to increasing societal egalitarianism or traditionalism. A second research gap relates to geographic coverage. We know little about variability in gender attitudes within and across less economically developed countries, especially in Africa. Most micro-level investigations have used samples from the United States and other affluent societies, and macro-level analyses have mostly involved comparisons among industrial societies or across countries spanning a wide range of economic development. This is an important limitation, because two important theoretical accounts of ideological variation—by world society and modernization scholars—differ in their predictions about levels and patterns of attitudinal liberalism in less developed countries.

The primary goal of the present study is to explore variability on a single attitudinal tenet: the general belief that “women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” Based on individual- and country-level

data covering more than 45,000 persons in 34 African countries, I address the following questions: To what extent is the liberal understanding of gender equality that is endorsed by world society elites evident in the attitudes of ordinary African citizens? And what accounts for variability in support for “gender liberalism” within and across African countries?

In addition to the standard individual-level predictors of gender attitudes, I assess macro-theoretical arguments that have not yet been considered in an African context. These include influential world society and modernization theories, which locate forces for ideological change at the global and national levels, respectively. World society theory describes a broad global dissemination of liberal egalitarian norms, including to poor African countries and especially to those with stronger formal ties to world-societal institutions (Frank and Moss 2017; Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1997). Modernization scholars treat egalitarian values as an outcome of socioeconomic forces that operate in more proximate socioeconomic environments—for example through the higher costs of discrimination and/or the weaker salience of concerns about material security in more economically developed countries (Inglehart 2018; Treiman 1970). Other possible country-level sources of variation in gender liberalism include differential levels of women’s participation in labor markets and other public-sphere institutions (Bradley and Ramirez 1996; Baker and Letendre 2005), and differential exposures to political conflict and to women’s leadership and activism during men’s extended wartime absences (Hughes and Tripp 2015).

Survey responses considered here reveal widespread support (or reported support) for women’s equal rights in Africa that is more easily understood with reference to global processes of ideological diffusion than to country-level differences in modernization or women’s sociopolitical roles. Further analysis suggests, however, that gender liberalism may be spreading in Africa through mechanisms not typically considered by world-society scholars: Support for women’s equal rights is unrelated to countries’ formal world-society ties, but is significantly stronger among persons with more exposure to extra-local culture, including through internet and mobile phone usage, news access, and urban residence. Forces for liberalism appear to be conditioned, moreover, by local religious cultures and gender structures.

In the following section, I review the comparative literature on gender ideology and introduce four theoretical accounts of cross-national variability.

## Gender Ideology and its Genesis

Ideology is a central force in the generation and maintenance of gender inequalities. Understanding its variability over time and across societies and social groups is a central concern of feminist scholars (Ridgeway 2011; Chatillon et al. 2018). Although ideology has mostly been conceptualized (and measured) as a continuum that ranges from traditional to egalitarian depending on societies’ levels of modernity or patriarchy (e.g., Inglehart 2018; Jackson 1998), recent cross-national and historical analyses have revealed a clear multidimensional structure (Grunow et al. 2018; Scarborough et al. 2019). Charles and Grusky

suggest independent causal effects of two distinct ideological tenets: *male primacy*, which represents men as hierarchically superior (and therefore entitled to more rights), and *gender essentialism*, which represents men and women as intrinsically different but not necessarily unequal (2004; see also [Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011](#)). Knight and Brinton's analysis of trends in 17 European societies distinguishes three types of egalitarianism, "liberal," "familist," and "flexible," which are gradually replacing traditionalism (male primacy) (2017).

The present study focuses on just *one* of the ideological contrasts identified by Knight and Brinton: that between liberal individualistic and traditional gender beliefs, measured here as agreement with the statement that men and women have equal rights and should be treated equally, as opposed to women remaining subject to traditional laws and customs. This survey item, available in the fifth wave of the Afrobarometer survey, maps closely onto the "rights-based" conceptualization of gender equality that is hegemonic in the United Nations and other contemporary world society institutions. Although the liberal egalitarian principles espoused by the UN often coexist alongside persistent gender inequality and injustice, they have been used historically in collective actions to expand the categories of persons entitled to basic human rights ([Soysal 1994](#), [Meyer 2010](#)) and to delegitimize actions that treat women's rights as secondary to ethnic, religious, and other particularistic practices ([Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005](#); [Moghadam 2013](#); [Snyder 2006](#); [Tripp 2015](#)).

Most of what we know about variability in gender attitudes is based on analyses in relatively affluent, democratic, and Christian-majority societies—in particular the United States and Europe since the 1960s. Race and gender are the demographic characteristics with the best-documented relationships to gender ideology in the US, although the nature of this association depends on the specific attitudinal tenets considered ([Davis and Greenstein 2009](#); [Chatillon et al. 2018](#)). Other demographic predictors of particular gender beliefs include religion, age, social class, educational attainment, labor force participation, parental role models, place of residence, and family structure. There is also much evidence that race, class, gender, religion, and other identities interact in the production of gender attitudes in the West ([Davis and Greenstein 2009](#); [Damaske 2011](#); [Scheible and Fleishmann 2012](#)).

I use data from the Afrobarometer and diverse international statistical sources to measure the overall level of support for gender liberalism in Africa and to assess how this support varies across social groups within countries, and across countries that vary in exposure to world cultural scripts, socioeconomic modernization, public-sphere incorporation of women, and stability of gender regimes. The relevant macro-theoretical arguments are described below.

### **Exposure to World Culture**

World society theory treats exposure to world cultural scripts as a primary driving force in the mass dissemination of egalitarian belief systems. By this account, liberal individualistic principles of intrinsic human equality that are

rooted in Western European Christian thought have gained worldwide cultural authority, especially since World War II (Meyer 1989; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). The interpretive frames and legitimacy demands that grow out of these ideals lead governments and nongovernmental organizations around the world to endorse—although not always enforce—principles of equality, including gender equality (Meyer et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999; Meyer 2004).<sup>1</sup> Through ongoing exposure to the liberal egalitarian ideals propagated by world society elites, ordinary citizens absorb and respond to a universalistic “worldwide picture of how women should live and be educated” (Meyer 2004, p. 45).

Comparative research in this tradition has consistently identified international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and other formal institutional linkages to world society as central drivers of universalistic policies and practices—related, for example, to educational attainment, legislative representation, civil rights, and legal protections (Frank and Moss 2017; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Robinson 2015; Russell, Lerch and Wotipka 2018; Schofer and Meyer 2005). The effect of world society linkages on attitudes has received relatively little sustained empirical attention, although the underlying theoretical arguments imply that people learn world-society norms through mass media, schools, and other carriers of global culture. In Africa and the Middle East, exposure to extra-local culture increasingly occurs through digital media, including internet-connected computers and mobile phones (Burrell 2012; Ferree and Pudrovska 2006; Gorman and Seguin 2018; Pew 2015; Zayani 2015). Residence in urban areas also affords exposure to world-cultural values because cities are home to more diverse populations, including world society elites (Pierotti 2013).

I model countries’ formal linkages to world society using a commonly used measure of total INGO density. Additional measures considered include gender-related INGO (WINGO) density, foreign direct investment, and official development aid, as well as individual-level information on internet, mobile phone, and news access, and urban residence. Based on the idea that English language and British culture may contribute to a stronger penetration of liberal individualistic culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010), I also examine the effect of British colonial legacy.

## **Modernization**

Socioeconomic development is perhaps the most studied macro-level predictor of gender equality. Traditional modernization theories treat egalitarian values and structures as byproducts of (post) industrialization and the growing competitive pressures that drive modernizing societies to move from ascriptive to achievement-based systems of social stratification (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Treiman 1970; Jackson 1998). More recently, Ronald Inglehart and his col-

<sup>1</sup> In practice, state policies fall short of these liberal ideals (Cole and Ramirez 2013; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Some African governments, for example, sanction overt restrictions on women and girls that are difficult to reconcile with their endorsement of the African Union’s 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (Al Nagar and Tønnessen 2017).

laborators have documented a country-level association between broad-based material security and the spread of “post-materialist” values, including support for gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart 2018). By this account, decreasing concern about existential security allows people to focus more on rights of individual self-expression, rights that are gradually extended to women as well. Although modernization scholars have generally not considered how specific dimensions of gender ideology respond to the rise of post-materialist values, comparative and historical research suggests that the liberal “equal rights” dimension is the form that increases most with societal affluence.<sup>2</sup>

Some modernization arguments suggest nonlinear or lagged cultural effects, with attitudinal variability evident only beyond a certain threshold level of development, or with long delays between the experience of material security and the rise of post-materialist values (Inglehart, Ponarin, and Inglehart 2017). This implies that some African countries may not have reached a level of prosperity that is high enough to generate gender-egalitarian values, or that they have not been at that level for long enough. I begin to explore these possibilities by modeling lagged, unlagged, and nonlinear effects of societal affluence on gender liberalism.

Inglehart also suggests cultural effects on gender attitudes, specifically that the rise of egalitarian values is inhibited by religious traditionalism (especially Muslim religious culture) and supported by political democracy (see also Adams and Orloff 2005; Cole and Geist 2018; Hadler and Symons 2018). Since affluence may be correlated with political and religious liberalism at the country level, I examine attitudinal effects of societal affluence while controlling for political democracy and Muslim-majority religious culture.

Modernization and world society theories differ not only in how they understand the drivers of gender liberalism; they also imply different *levels* of support. Accounts of global ideational diffusion suggest widespread support (or at least reported support) for women’s equal rights in Africa that should be more or less independent of national economic development and should be strongest in countries with most exposure to world cultural scripts. Modernization accounts, by contrast, imply generally weak support for gender equality in Africa (due to its generally low level of economic development), with strongest support in the more economically developed of the African societies.

### ***Women’s Public-sphere Incorporation***

Some sociologists posit second-order ideological effects of the egalitarian structural changes that accompany socioeconomic modernization. By this account, the mass-incorporation of women into labor markets, educational systems, and political institutions contributes independently to women’s cultural redefinition as equal citizens, and this in turn increases popular support for gender equality (Bradley and Ramirez 1996). David Baker and Gerald LeTendre argue, for

<sup>2</sup> Gender essentialist ideologies, by contrast, appear to be highly persistent in advanced industrial societies (Charles and Grusky 2004; Ridgeway 2011).

example, that “(b) y the very act of educating students as students regardless of their gender . . . , a powerful meaning about the irrelevance of gender in academic matters arises” (2005:28). In this sense, the gender-integration of major societal institutions may be both cause and consequence of liberal gender attitudes.

I assess attitudinal effects of public-sphere incorporation using indicators of women’s representation in the economy, education, and politics.

### ***Local Feminism and Unstable Gender Orders***

While world society scholars describe top-down diffusion processes, others emphasize the capacity for grass-roots egalitarian change through local feminist mobilization and networking (Fallon 2008; Moghadam 2013; Tripp and Badri 2017; Zahidi 2018). Hughes and Tripp (2015) suggest, for example, that the traditional gender order is more easily renegotiated following periods of political instability, and that this “post-conflict” effect has been strengthened by the global legitimacy and visibility associated with the project of gender equality since the 1995 UN Conference on Women. This line of work has yielded convincing evidence that feminist activism and social disruption have produced egalitarian policy and electoral outcomes in some post-conflict African countries. But effects on *attitudinal* egalitarianism have not been investigated so far. This is an important distinction, since Western varieties of feminism have sometimes been received in the global South as overly individualistic, as pitting women against men, and/or as inconsistent with indigenous values (Tripp and Badri 2017).

I explore the relationship between disrupted gender regimes and gender liberalism using country-level indicators of the density of women’s social movement organizations (SMO), armed political conflict, and political instability since the 1995 UN Conference. I also examine whether attitudinal effects of local social movement activism are conditioned by INGO penetration or digital connectivity.

### **Data and Methods**

Data are drawn from the fifth wave of the Afrobarometer Surveys, conducted between 2011 and 2013. Afrobarometer is a pan-African research network with locally-based research teams in participating countries. In-person interviews are conducted by trained interviewers in the language of the respondent’s choice. The sample of persons with valid scores on the primary variables is comprised of 22,669 men and 22,557 women from 34 countries. While these countries do not represent the entire African continent, they do cover much of its landmass and provide considerable regional, economic, and cultural diversity.

The primary analyses are based on mixed effects logistic regression models computed using Stata’s XTMELOGIT procedure, with continuous covariates centered on the sample mean to facilitate interpretation. The mixed effects specification fits individual- and country-level effects while accounting for clustering of cases within countries. All models are computed for the full sample and then



separately by gender; intersections of gender with major religious denomination (Christian versus Muslim) are discussed where important differences are found. In supplementary analyses, I explored contextual variability by computing the baseline model for each country separately, with weights applied to make samples nationally representative.

### ***Measuring gender liberalism***

This study focuses on a specific tenet of gender ideology: the belief that men and women should have equal rights. Respondents to the fifth Afrobarometer survey wave were presented with two statements and given the opportunity to agree or agree strongly with either or to agree with neither. Statement 1: “In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” Statement 2: “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.” The wording of statement 1 closely represents the “equal-opportunity” egalitarianism represented in liberal feminist ideology and world society institutions. The forced choice between “equal rights” and “traditional laws and customs” implicitly equates gender egalitarianism with modernity, a contrast that aligns well with Western liberal understandings. The primary objective of this study is to understand variability within and across African countries in strong agreement with statement 1, which I interpret as a claim of unqualified endorsement of gender liberalism. Approximately, 2.5 percent of respondents provided no response or responded that they did not know or that they agreed with neither statement. They were excluded.

I carried out sensitivity tests using three alternative dependent variables. The first aggregates supporters and strong supporters of the original statement into a single binary response category, effectively distinguishing those who express any level of support for women’s equal rights (75 percent of respondents) from those who express any level of support for traditional gender laws and customs (25 percent); the second measures responses to the original survey item on a four-point ordinal scale; and the third combines three attitudinal survey items into a composite 10-point index (Cronbach’s alpha = .56).<sup>3</sup> Country scores and definitions for the four dependent variables are shown in [table A1](#).

### ***Explanatory and control variables***

Individual-level variables include measures of social identity (gender, religion, class, and race), age, urban versus rural residence, education, employment status, internet and mobile phone access, news consumption, and information on the interviewer and the interview experience. [Table 1](#) shows sample means on the individual-level predictors for men and women. Country-level predictors include focal indicators of economic development, ties to global culture, women’s socioeconomic status, and social stability and conflict, as well as diverse controls.

<sup>3</sup> The low reliability of this index supports a multidimensional conceptualization of gender ideology.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Predictors**

	Men		Women
	N = 22,669		N = 22,557
Gender equality, strong support (=1)	.408	***	.500
Age, in years	38.540 (15.114)	***	35.701 (13.767)
No formal educ (=1)	.162	***	.228
Some primary educ (=1)	.164	***	.186
Completed primary educ (=1)	.142	—	.143
Some secondary educ (=1)	.210	**	.198
Completed secondary educ (=1)	.167	***	.142
Post-secondary educ (=1)	.154	***	.104
Paid job (=1)	.403	***	.264
Indoor plumbing (=1)	.244	—	.245
Subjective disadvantage (=1)	.351	—	.356
No advantage/disadvantage (=1)	.358	—	.360
Subjective advantage (=1)	.291	—	.284
Minority race (=1)	.042	—	.045
Highly religious (=1)	.854	***	.893
Catholic (=1)	.191	—	.191
Evangelical/Pentecostal (=1)	.083	***	.102
Other Christian (=1)	.317	*	.327
Muslim (=1)	.334	—	.328
Traditional/other/no religion (=1)	.075	***	.052
Other(s) at interview (=1)	.283	***	.350
Woman interviewer (=1)	.442	***	.473
Use internet regularly (=1)	.207	***	.140
Own mobile phone (=1)	.790	***	.663
Access news daily (=1)	.674	***	.567
Urban residence? (=1)	.401	—	.408

**Note:** Values are means (standard deviations). \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , and \*\*\* $p < .001$  for  $t$ -tests of gender difference.

Country scores and zero-order correlations are shown in tables 2 and A2, respectively. Details on measurement follow.

### ***Respondent-level predictors and controls***

Respondents were classified by the interviewer as either a man or a woman and as belonging to one of seven racial categories: Black, Arab/Lebanese/North African, Colored, South Asian, White, and Other. The vast majority of respondents

**Table 2. Scores on Country-level Predictors**

	Human devel index	GDP per capita	% Non- agric'l employt	Democracy score (1-10)	75%+ Muslim? (=1)	Women's % formal labor force, 2010	Women/men avg. years schooling	Women's % parliament, 2010	Gender equality index, 2010	INGO member- ships	WINGO member- ships	Official develop assist, \$US millions	Foreign dir investmt, %GDP	British colony political conflict (=1)	Armed political conflict (=1)	Polity changes 1995-2010	Women's rights SMOs (as % SMOs)
Algeria	.725	12494.10	87.50	3	1	17.40	.75	7.70	.48	1665	34	201.3	1.43	0	1	2	8.89
Benin	.468	1636.60	54.70	7	0	47.30	.43	10.80	.38	1240	37	687.3	.77	0	0	1	6.59
Botswana	.681	13349.20	71.20	8	0	46.60	—	7.90	.50	1063	32	154.7	1.71	1	0	2	8.33
Burkina Faso	.378	1417.70	19.20	2	0	47.50	.50	15.30	.39	1237	38	1,044.6	.43	0	0	5	7.83
Burundi	.39	725.30	9.20	7	0	51.60	.61	31.40	.50	823	30	627.6	.04	0	1	5	7.38
Cameroon	.486	2570.80	36.30	1	0	45.70	.59	13.90	.38	1818	54	540.2	2.27	0	0	1	9.43
Cape Verde	.629	6004.90	69.80	10	0	38.70	.92	18.10	—	383	13	327.0	6.98	0	0	2	7.41
Cote d'Ivoire	.444	2892.20	39.70	5	0	37.80	.58	8.90	.32	1580	30	845.3	1.44	0	1	7	5.06
Egypt	.681	10620.60	71.20	0	1	24.30	.69	1.80	.43	3021	58	599.2	2.92	1	0	5	9.92
Ghana	.554	3064.90	46.60	8	0	47.70	.71	8.30	.43	1984	56	1,697.2	7.86	1	0	4	7.42
Guinea	.388	1185.40	25.70	4	1	45.10	.28	19.30	—	770	29	221.0	2.14	0	0	4	6.11
Kenya	.529	2502.40	35.20	9	0	46.10	.91	9.80	—	2632	63	1,631.3	.45	1	0	7	6.73
Lesotho	.472	2228.50	58.00	9	0	48.10	1.24	24.20	.43	746	26	256.1	.40	1	0	5	6.67
Liberia	.405	688.50	52.70	7	0	45.50	—	12.50	.34	706	25	1,416.1	34.99	1	1	5	6.90
Madagascar	.504	1390.40	29.50	6	0	49.00	—	7.90	—	1157	28	477.3	9.28	0	0	6	4.46
Malawi	.42	737.30	20.50	6	0	51.30	—	20.80	.38	1062	32	1,016.9	1.39	1	0	5	9.73
Mali	.409	1663.60	41.10	6	1	35.10	.49	10.20	.32	1124	37	1,091.5	3.48	0	1	7	9.26
Mauritius	.756	15225.30	90.90	10	0	38.00	.87	17.10	.62	1248	35	124.6	4.30	1	0	1	9.94
Morocco	.611	6465.70	63.70	1	1	26.40	—	10.50	.44	2231	43	985.5	1.33	0	0	3	9.50
Mozambique	.401	932.80	24.50	6	0	52.90	.58	39.20	.38	1099	31	1,943.1	12.39	0	0	4	7.26
Namibia	.61	8438.00	68.30	6	0	46.50	.95	26.90	.49	1024	28	261.3	6.80	1	0	1	8.55
Niger	.326	841.20	36.00	7	1	31.10	—	9.70	.29	858	23	741.4	13.92	0	1	8	4.50
Nigeria	.493	5113.70	69.40	4	0	42.60	—	7.00	—	2667	67	2,052.4	1.63	1	1	3	8.71
Senegal	.456	2181.70	44.50	7	1	43.70	.56	22.70	.43	1807	50	936.4	2.10	0	1	3	8.98
Sierra Leone	.388	1346.50	31.30	8	0	51.20	—	13.20	.34	935	39	458.3	9.11	1	1	6	9.77

Table 2. Continued

	Human devel index	GDP per capita	% Non- agric <sup>1</sup> employmt	Democracy score (1–10)	75%+ Muslim? (=1)	Women's % formal labor force, 2010	Women/men avg. years schooling	2010 parliament 2010	Gender equality index, 2010	INGO member- ships	WINGO member- ships	Official developmt assist, \$US millions	Foreign dir investmt, %GDP	British colony (=1)	Armed political conflict (=1)	Polity changes 1995–2010	Women's rights SMOs (as % SMOs)
South Africa	.643	11650.80	95.40	9	0	42.80	.95	44.50	.58	4632	82	1,036.3	.98	1	1	1	7.95
Sudan	.465	3326.70	65.70	0	1	29.60	—	18.90	.38	1180	35	2,025.9	3.14	1	1	5	8.55
Swaziland	.525	6511.70	77.80	0	0	39.30	—	13.60	.43	735	31	91.1	3.06	1	0	2	8.99
Tanzania	.5	1345.20	27.80	2	0	49.70	1.13	30.70	.44	1797	47	2,960.3	5.77	1	0	2	7.63
Togo	.459	1246.00	36.90	1	0	50.50	.39	11.10	.40	1132	33	403.4	3.94	0	0	3	6.13
Tunisia	.714	10408.90	84.90	7	1	28.10	.75	27.60	.69	1928	43	550.2	3.03	0	0	5	9.09
Uganda	.473	1294.00	26.30	1	0	49.10	.84	31.50	.44	1677	53	1,690.1	2.70	1	1	3	9.50
Zambia	.555	3450.80	35.00	7	0	45.50	—	14.00	.45	1478	47	919.3	8.53	1	0	4	7.92
Zimbabwe	.46	1984.20	31.60	5	0	49.00	.85	15.00	.42	1908	54	712.5	1.22	1	0	5	9.09
Mean	.5	1312.8	49.40	5.26	.27	42.38	.72	17.12	.43	1510.21	40.09	903.72	4.76	.53	.35	3.88	7.95
Std. dev.	.11	4246.49	23.20	3.11	.45	8.91	.24	9.90	.09	824.84	14.43	677.44	6.40	.51	.49	1.98	1.53

(nearly 95 percent) were classified into one of the first two racial categories. To examine how race influences support for women's equal rights, I distinguish between national racial minorities and others. Although this does not come close to capturing the complexity of African racial and ethnic stratification, comparison of specific racial groups is less meaningful in a cross-national context because of differences across societies in the culturally salient racial distinctions. The experience of racial minority status may sensitize people to discrimination and unequal treatment, although we know from South Africa and elsewhere that numerical minority status is not always associated with disadvantage.

Class position is measured using subjective responses to a question asking respondents to assess their relative living condition: "In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [Algerians, Beninese, etc.]?" Those selecting "better" or "much better" than others in their country are classified as materially advantaged, those selecting "worse" or "much worse" are classified as disadvantaged, and those selecting "the same" serve as the reference category. In addition, a more objective measure of material living standard is taken from a survey item asking whether the respondent's house had indoor plumbing.

Other demographic variables include age, educational attainment, and employment status. Unfortunately, no data are available on respondents' marital status or number of children. Education is measured by distinguishing between respondents with no formal education, some primary education, a complete primary education, a complete secondary education, and at least some post-secondary education.<sup>4</sup> Approximately one-third of the sample reports "having a job that pays a cash income" (11 percent part-time, 22 percent full-time). These persons are distinguished with a dummy indicator from respondents who are either not in the formal labor force or looking for a paid job.

Attitudinal effects of religion are assessed with regard to intensity and denomination. The open-ended question, "What is your Religion?" yielded nearly 90 distinct categories, many very small. These were collapsed into a five-category classification: Catholic (19 percent), Evangelical/Pentecostal (9 percent), Other Christian (32 percent), Muslim (33 percent), and Other (6 percent). The last category includes respondents who claimed a traditional African religion (2 percent), no religion" (2 percent), or something else (2 percent). To the question, "How important is religion in your life?" a vast majority (87 percent) responded "very important." The religious intensity variable distinguishes those respondents from all others.

Indicators of internet usage, mobile phone ownership, daily news consumption, and urban residence convey information on respondents' potential exposure to extra-local culture. Regular internet use is defined as at least a few times a month, mobile phone owners are identified with the item "I use a mobile phone that I own," and daily news consumers are those who reported getting news every

<sup>4</sup> Only about 4 percent of respondents reported having a university degree, and their gender attitudes are similar to those with some post-secondary education. Focal relationships are unchanged when a more fine-grained educational classification is used.

day from either radio, television, newspaper, or the internet. The urban/rural distinction was interviewer-coded based on the sampling unit designation.

Dummy indicators for “woman interviewer” and “others present during the interview” are included to gather evidence on possible social desirability effects or external influences, which may tell us something about the perceived normativity of gender liberalism and tensions between world society ideals and individual positionality.

### ***Country-level predictors***

Societal affluence is measured using the 2010 Human Development Index (HDI) score, which takes into account life expectancy, education, and national income (UNDP 2016). The HDI fluctuates less in response to short-term ups and downs in the economic cycle and offers a broader perspective on living standards and existential security of the population than purely economic measures. I explore linear, nonlinear, and lagged effects of HDI, as well as diverse alternative indicators of socioeconomic modernization. The latter include gross domestic product (GDP), nonagricultural employment, urbanization, and mass communication density.<sup>5</sup>

To assess effects of societal affluence net of political and religious values, modernization models include country-level controls for democratic and Muslim cultural influences. National democracy is measured based on each country’s 2010 score (1–10) on the Polity Project’s Institutionalized Democracy scale (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). A subjective democracy score, aggregated from Afrobarometer respondents’ placement of “our country today” on a 0–10 democracy scale, was used for sensitivity tests. National religious culture is measured with an indicator of Muslim cultural influence, defined as Muslim self-identification by more than 75 percent of national Afrobarometer respondents. In sensitivity tests, I substituted a 50 percent cutoff and a continuous “percent Muslim” score, with similar results.

Countries’ linkages to world society are measured primarily on the basis of total INGO memberships. As additional measures, I consider memberships in organizations devoted specifically to women and gender issues (WINGOs), official development aid, and foreign direct investment in 2010.<sup>6</sup> Effects of

<sup>5</sup> Nonlinear effects of HDI are measured using the natural log; lagged effects are measured using 1980 HDI (UNDP 2007). HDI data from the 1980s are unavailable for Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania; values for Cape Verde and Uganda are from 1985. Alternative indicators of modernization are measured as the natural log of the 2010 GDP (UNDP 2016); the percentage share of the 2010 labor force working in the nonagricultural sector (ILO 2017); the percentage of the 2010 national population living in urban areas (UNDP 2018); and the sum of the percentages of Afrobarometer respondents who report (a) owning and using mobile phones and (b) regular internet usage (author’s calculations). Correlations of alternative measures with HDI range from .66 to .92.

<sup>6</sup> Data on 2010 INGO memberships were collected by the Union of International Association and compiled into an archive licensed by the University of California, Irvine. WINGO data are for 2005 and are based on counts by Feral Cherif (UC Riverside) that were added to a longitudinal archive originally created by Berkovitch (1999). Data on total official development assistance received, in \$US millions, are from OECD archives (2016); foreign direct investment, as percent of GDP, is from World Bank (2017).

British colonial heritage are assessed using a dummy variable.<sup>7</sup> Continuous indicators of world-society linkage are measured on a logarithmic scale to reduce the leverage of outliers.

I measure women's public-sphere incorporation based on the relative gender composition in three major social institutions in 2010 (or the closest available year): women's share of the formal labor force (World Bank 2013), the ratio of women's to men's average years of schooling (UNESCO 2017), and women's share of parliament or lower legislative house seats (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017).<sup>8</sup> In addition, I used a composite "Gender Equality Index", which combines information on reproductive health (maternal mortality and adolescent birth rates), empowerment (female education and parliamentary seats occupied), and economic status (female labor force participation) (UNDP 2018).<sup>9</sup>

Local feminism and disruptions to the traditional gender order are measured at the country level with reference to armed political conflict, political instability, and transnational women's activism. Conflict is measured with a dummy indicator for one or more armed political conflict between 1994 and 2004 (taken from Marshall 2006 for sub-Saharan Africa; author coding for other countries), and political instability is measured as the number of times countries changed polities in the 15 years between the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women and 2010 (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2014). Transnational women's activism is measured as the percentage of transnational SMOs that are dedicated to women's rights in each country in 2003, the latest available year (author's calculation from Smith and Wiest 2012).

## Results

Contrary to Western stereotypes of a homogeneously tradition-bound African continent, I find that a large plurality, 45 percent, of Afrobarometer respondents report strong agreement with equal rights for women and an additional 30 percent report agreement. Only 25 percent of respondents agree (13 percent) or agree strongly (12 percent) with the alternative statement affirming traditional laws and customs.


Figure 1 shows the percentage of women and men in each national population that reported strong agreement with equal gender rights between 2011 and 2013. Not surprisingly, the figure reveals a strong positive correlation (.84) between men's and women's country mean scores (evident in the clustering around the

<sup>7</sup> Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are former British colonies.

<sup>8</sup> Women's parliamentary representation is as reported to the Inter-Parliamentary Union on January 31, 2010. Education data are missing for Botswana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zambia. The weak correlation of women's representation across these three public-sphere domains (Table A2) supports multidimensional understandings of women's status (Charles 2011).

<sup>9</sup> The GEI is calculated as 1-the UNDP's 2010 Gender Inequality Index (2012 for Egypt; 2011 for Niger and Tanzania). Scores are missing for Cape Verde, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, and Nigeria.

**Figure 1. The percentage of women and men in each national population that reported strong agreement with equal gender rights between 2011 and 2013.**



parity line), and a tendency for women to express somewhat more egalitarian views than men (evident in the preponderance of data points to the left of the parity line; see also [table 1](#)). The rate of strong agreement ranges widely from just over 10 percent of men in Niger to just under 70 percent of women in Uganda.

Before exploring patterns of cross-national variability, it is useful to examine the demographic predictors of gender liberalism in Africa. [Table 3](#) shows results from models with individual-level covariates only, first for the full sample and then separately for men and women.<sup>10</sup> Similar models broken down simultaneously by gender and major religious denomination (Muslim and Christian) are applied in [table A3](#).

<sup>10</sup> Intraclass correlation coefficients from null mixed effect models (i.e., models with no covariates) indicate that approximately 7.4 percent of attitudinal variability occurs across countries for women and about 8.7 percent for men, with the remainder occurring within countries.



**Table 3. Individual-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality in 34 African Countries**

	1	2	3
	All	Men	Women
Woman	.481*** (.021)	— —	— —
Age, in years	.002* (.001)	.004*** (.001)	-.001 (.001)
No formal educ <sup>a</sup>	-.335*** (.038)	-.344*** (.056)	-.286*** (.052)
Some primary educ <sup>a</sup>	-.183*** (.034)	-.215*** (.049)	-.130** (.048)
Completed primary educ <sup>a</sup>	-.135*** (.036)	-.170*** (.050)	-.0954 (.050)
Completed secondary educ <sup>a</sup>	.128*** (.034)	.0642 (.047)	.197*** (.050)
Some post-secondary educ <sup>a</sup>	.206*** (.039)	.137** (.052)	.296*** (.060)
Paid job	.0114 (.023)	.0215 (.031)	.0391 (.034)
Indoor plumbing	.0216 (.034)	.022 (.048)	.012 (.047)
Subjective class disadvantage <sup>b</sup>	.047 (.024)	-.005 (.035)	.092** (.034)
Subjective class advantage <sup>b</sup>	.109*** (.026)	.053 (.037)	.152*** (.036)
Minority race	.085 (.057)	.082 (.082)	.081 (.079)
Highly religious	.017 (.065)	.150 (.096)	-.105 (.091)
Catholic <sup>c</sup>	-.031 (.090)	.138 (.13)	-.175 (.13)
Evangelical/Pentecostal <sup>c</sup>	-.067 (.130)	-.028 (.180)	-.091 (.180)
Other Christian <sup>c</sup>	-.138 (.085)	-.028 (.120)	-.210 (.120)
Traditional/other/no religion <sup>c</sup>	.050 (.092)	.291* (.130)	-.218 (.140)

Table 3. Continued

	1	2	3
Highly relig × Catholic <sup>c</sup>	.270** (.091)	.102 (.13)	.432** (.13)
Highly relig × Evangelical/Pentecostal <sup>c</sup>	.280* (.13)	.232 (.19)	.326 (.18)
Highly relig × other Christian <sup>c</sup>	.302*** (.085)	.196 (.12)	.390** (.12)
Highly relig × traditional/other <sup>c</sup>	.094 (.10)	−.103 (.14)	.305 (.16)
Regularly use internet	.174*** (.033)	.193*** (.044)	.180*** (.050)
Own mobile phone	.118*** (.026)	.054 (.039)	.148*** (.035)
Access news daily	.128*** (.023)	.181*** (.033)	.058 (.032)
Urban residence	.105*** (.023)	.054 (.034)	.162*** (.033)
Others at interview	−.051* (.022)	−.101** (.033)	−.011 (.031)
Woman interviewer	.234*** (.021)	.315*** (.029)	.157*** (.029)
Constant	−.947*** (.110)	−1.025*** (.150)	−.409** (.130)
Std. deviation, constant	.494 (.061)	.559 (.070)	.468 (.059)
Log likelihood	−29,139.286	−14,350.56	−14,719.524
N (country N)	45,226 (34)	22,669 (34)	22,557 (34)

**Note:** Values are coefficients (standard errors) from mixed effects logistic regression models.  
\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup>Reference category is some secondary education.

<sup>b</sup>Reference category is no class advantage/disadvantage.

<sup>c</sup>Reference category is Muslim.

The attitudinal gender gap evident in figure 1 remains in the multivariate specification: Controlling for baseline demographic characteristics, women's odds of reporting strong agreement with gender equality is approximately 62 percent greater than men's ( $\exp[.481] = 1.618$ ). Country-specific analyses (not

shown) confirm a positive woman-to-man gender gap in all 34 countries, with statistical significance at the 5 percent probability level in 26 of 34 countries.<sup>11</sup>

Support for gender equality is higher among older than younger men (but not women). This positive age effect was not expected and may be attributable to the greater likelihood that older men have daughters or wives (both unmeasured here) for whom they support equality. It may also reflect shifts toward traditional or anti-Western values among younger cohorts in some societies.<sup>12</sup> I found no evidence of nonlinear age effects.

Africans' support for gender liberalism increases with education, as found in the West. Models in [table A3](#) suggest a somewhat stronger and more linear education effect among Christians than Muslims. This interaction requires further study; it may reflect influences of European missionary activity and/or Muslim theological seminaries on school curricula ([Inglehart and Norris 2003](#); [Nunn 2010](#); see also [Manglos and Weinreb 2013](#) and [Glas et al. 2018](#) on how attitudinal effects of education may be conditioned by religion). Net of education, having a paid job is unrelated to support for gender equality among men and women, Christians and Muslims.

Effects of subjective social class (perceived material advantage) differ by gender. While no significant relationship is evident for men, women (and especially Muslim women) who perceive that their living conditions to be "the same" as their compatriots report less liberal gender views than women who perceive either advantage or disadvantage. Net of subjective class location, neither living in a structure with indoor plumbing nor minority racial status shows an association with gender attitudes. Supplementary analyses revealed no significant interactions between race and class.

Religion and religiosity are related to women's (but not men's) attitudes, with highly religious Christian women more likely to express strong support for gender equality than highly religious Muslim women. Christian–Muslim differences in attitudes about gender and sexuality have been linked to the cultural influences of Christian individualism, some states' codification of Islamic family law, and ideas about gender complementarity versus gender equality ([Inglehart and Norris 2003](#); [Sadiqi 2017](#)). Muslim women and Muslim women's movements show a great deal of ideological heterogeneity, however ([Charrad 2011](#); [Glas et al. 2018](#); [Moghadam 2013](#); [Scheible and Fleishman 2012](#); [Tripp and Badri 2017](#)).

I find significant positive relationships for internet, mobile phone, news access, and urban residence that are consistent with cultural exposure arguments. Persons who use the internet regularly are, for example, 19 percent more likely to report strong support for gender equality than those who do not (exp.[.174] = 1.190). Coefficients in columns 2 and 3 suggest that men's attitudes may be especially influenced by exposure to news and other carriers of world-society norms that equate gender equality with modernity, whereas living in cities

<sup>11</sup> Gender difference in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Liberia, and Zambia are significant at  $p < .10$ , and differences in Burundi, Malawi, Mali, and Sierra Leon show  $p$ -values exceeding .10.

<sup>12</sup> Country-specific models show the largest age coefficients for Guinean and Tunisian men.

and using mobile phones may influence women's attitudes more—perhaps by expanding and diversifying their social networks and increasing opportunities for anonymity and interpersonal mobilization. Results in [table A3](#) show an especially liberalizing effect of mobile phone usage for Christian women, an especially liberalizing effect of urban residence for Muslim women, and an especially liberalizing effect of daily news consumption for Muslim men. These differences underscore the utility of an intersectional approach in comparative gender analyses ([Bose 2012](#); [Charles 2000](#); [Cook 2011](#)).

Some clues about possible intervening mechanisms in this relationship can be found in contemporaneous “Arabbarometer” surveys conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. Controlling for education, class, and age, I find that men and women who use mobile phones for political purposes in these five countries are also more likely to report support for gender equality.<sup>13</sup> This association is consistent with the argument that liberal universalistic values can be diffused through digitally-enabled political discourse and activism ([Altoaimy 2018](#); [Sadiqi 2017](#)), although it is also consistent with an effect of liberal attitudes on digital activism.

Individual-level coefficients reveal significant effects of the interview context as well. Being interviewed by a woman increases men's odds of expressing strong support for gender equality by 37 percent and women's odds by 17 percent ( $\text{exp} [.315] = 1.370$ ;  $\text{exp} [.157] = 1.170$ ). Effects are especially strong for Muslim men ([table A3](#)). The meaning of this interviewer effect likely depends upon the respondent's gender. Women may be more comfortable revealing agreement with gender equality to another woman, while men may be more comfortable revealing *disagreement* to another man (i.e., a woman interviewer may motivate men to inflate their agreement and allow women to be more honest in reporting theirs). This result may also reflect respondents' general expectation that women—as presumed beneficiaries of gender equality—are more likely to hold them accountable to liberal gender-egalitarian principles.

The presence of others during the interview is associated with less liberal responses by men, especially Muslim men. This may reflect shame associated with transgressing local norms of masculinity, or men's interest in maintaining the legitimacy of their patriarchal privilege over wives or daughters who may witness the interview.<sup>14</sup> Muslim men may be more susceptible to social desirability effects because they presume a greater disparity between the tenets of their religious faith and the Western world-society orthodoxy and feel more need to save face or protect privilege. Although the present data cannot identify conditions under which liberal responses are more or less honest, the tendency

<sup>13</sup> The percentage of men who agree strongly with women's equal rights is 28 percent for those who do not report using mobile phones for political purposes and 37 percent for those who do.

<sup>14</sup> A recent ethnographic study in the Democratic Republic of Congo revealed a similar reluctance by men to be held publicly or morally accountable to the egalitarian principles promoted by a Western-led INGO, even when they were willing to embrace the prescribed egalitarian behaviors privately on a voluntary basis. For example, some men reportedly increased their shares of domestic labor without discussing the change with their wives for fear that “women would start to make orders” ([Pierotti et al. 2018](#), p. 555).

for men and women to adjust reports of their own liberalism to the audience would seem to indicate an awareness of global egalitarian norms, as well as an experienced tension between these norms and respondents' quotidian gender relations.<sup>15</sup>

One way to understand the magnitude of the observed interview effects is to compare reported levels of gender liberalism across respondent groups with different interview experiences. For men, the highest reported rates are 44.84 percent strongly agreeing and 28.69 percent agreeing (when interviewed by a woman with no other witnesses), compared to lowest rates of 38.41 percent and 30.49 percent (with a man interviewer and others present). For women, the highest reported rates are 52.06 percent strongly agreeing and 30.01 percent agreeing (with a woman interviewer and others present), compared to 48.88 percent and 28.07 percent (with a man interviewer and others present). Although these are substantial differences, even the minimum values suggest widespread identification with gender liberalism among African citizens.

The models in [table 3](#) serve as baseline for the four macro-level accounts of gender ideology elaborated above: modernization, exposure to global culture, women's public-sphere participation, and grass-roots feminism. To conserve degrees of freedom, I consider the frameworks one at a time, adding to the baseline model four sets of theoretically relevant variables, along with relevant macro-level controls. Results are shown in [tables 4–7](#). Because country-level effects vary little by gender (exceptions are noted) and individual-level effects vary little by model, I pool the men's and women's samples and restrict attention to the focal variables for each theoretical account.

## **Modernization**

[Table 4](#) represents modernization accounts of variability in support for gender equality. Regression coefficients are shown for five different indicators of socioeconomic development HDI, per capita GDP, size of the nonagricultural labor force, urbanization, and mass communication density. In models 1–5, each of these measures is added separately to the baseline model along with controls for national political democracy and religious culture. Models 6 and 7 estimate quadratic and lagged HDI effects. The complete set of coefficients for model 1 are displayed in [table A4](#).

Results show no linear association between economic modernization and gender liberalism. Neither is a nonlinear effect evident, although it is possible that the liberalizing influence of societal affluence occurs beyond a threshold that these African countries have not yet reached. The coefficient for HDI remained

<sup>15</sup> In supplementary models, I included information on interviewers' assessments of respondents' honesty and susceptibility to outside influence. Interviewers did not appear to perceive a tendency toward false liberalism; men and women who reported agreement with gender equality were generally described as more, not less, honest. It is noteworthy, moreover, that respondents were reporting to (educated) country nationals, not to outside members of the global elite.

**Table 4. Socioeconomic Modernization: Focal Predictors**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
HDI	.144 (.675)	—	—	—	—	.159 (.794)	—
GDP (ln)	—	-.121 (.077)	—	—	—	—	—
Nonagric'l employmt, %	—	—	-.005 (.003)	—	—	—	—
Urban, % popul	—	—	—	-.002 (.005)	—	—	—
Mass communn density	—	—	—	—	-.711 (.607)	—	—
HDI squared	—	—	—	—	—	-.242 (6.763)	—
HDI in 1980 <sup>a</sup>	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.143 (.680)
Democracy score (1–10)	-.016 (.025)	-.012 (.024)	-.010 (.024)	-.014 (.025)	-.017 (.024)	-.016 (.027)	-.004 (.025)
Muslim religious culture	-.619*** (.177)	-.564** (.172)	-.549** (.176)	-.597** (.180)	-.569** (.176)	-.616** (.197)	-.547** (.177)

**Note:** Values are coefficients (standard errors) from mixed effects logistic regression models predicting strong support for gender equality. Models include all individual-level covariates in model 1 of Table 3.

<sup>a</sup>*N* (country *N*): 45,226 (34). *N* (country *N*) = 38,666 (29).

\*\**p* < .01, and \*\*\**p* < .001, two tailed.

statistically insignificant in a model where it was the sole country-level predictor and in a series of sensitivity tests that eliminated individual countries one at a time (i.e., in 34 different 33-country iterations of model 1). Further analyses revealed no significant interactions of political democracy or religious culture with HDI.

The one consistent macro-level predictor in table 4 relates to religious culture. Net of personal religious denomination, respondents in countries with predominantly Muslim-identifying populations show odds of expressing strong agreement with gender equality that are about 46 percent lower, according to model 1 (exp.[-.619] = .538). Supplementary analysis show that this relationship is stronger for men than women, and that it persists in models using a 50 percent cutoff and using a continuous measure of percent Muslim. This association

**Table 5. Exposure to World Culture: Focal Predictors**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Country-level predictors								
INGO (ln)	-.107	-.094	-.068	-.127	—	—	—	—
	(.151)	(.156)	(.155)	(.160)	—	—	—	—
WINGOs (ln)	—	—	—	—	-.055	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	(.206)	—	—	—
Foreign investmt (ln)	—	—	—	—	—	.046	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	(.058)	—	—
Developmt aid (ln)	—	—	—	—	—	—	.134	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	(.083)	—
British colony	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.014
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	(.159)
Country-level controls								
Urbanization, % population	—	-.002	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	(.005)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mass commun density	—	—	-.615	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	(.632)	—	—	—	—	—
HDI	—	—	—	.263	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	(.704)	—	—	—	—

**Table 5. Continued**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Individual-level predictors								
Regularly use internet	.174***	.174***	.175***	.175***	.174***	.174***	.175***	.174***
	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)
Own mobile phone	.118***	.118***	.119***	.119***	.118***	.118***	.118***	.118***
	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Access news daily	.129***	.129***	.129***	.129***	.129***	.129***	.129***	.129***
	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Urban residence	.104***	.104***	.103***	.104***	.104***	.104***	.103***	.104***
	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)

**Note:** Values are coefficients (standard errors) from mixed effects logistic regression models predicting strong support for gender equality. All models include a country-level indicator for Muslim religious culture plus the individual-level covariates shown in Table 3. *N* (country *N*): 45,226 (34). \*\*\* $p < .001$ , two tailed.

**Table 6. Women's Public-sphere Incorporation: Focal Predictors**

	1	2	3	4
Women % labor force	.016	—	—	—
	(.013)	—	—	—
Women/men educ ratio <sup>a</sup>	—	-.049	—	—
	—	(.443)	—	—
Women % of parliament	—	—	.007	—
	—	—	(.008)	—
Gender equality index, GEI <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—	.491
	—	—	—	(.931)
	—	—	—	—

**Note:** Values are coefficients (standard errors) from mixed effects logistic regression models predicting strong support for gender equality. Models include a country-level indicator for Muslim religious culture plus the individual-level covariates in model 1 of Table 3. *N* (country *N*): 45,226 (34).

<sup>a</sup>*N* (country) = 31,803 (23).

<sup>b</sup>*N* (country) = 37,973 (29).



**Table 7. Disruption of Traditional Gender Order: Focal Predictors**

	1	2	3
Armed political conflict	-.304*	—	—
	(.151)	—	—
Polity changes since 1995	—	.016	—
	—	(.041)	—
Women's SMO	—	—	.028
	—	—	(.050)
	—	—	—

**Note:** Values are coefficients (standard errors) from mixed effects logistic regression models predicting strong support for gender equality. Models include a country-level indicator for Muslim religious culture plus the individual-level covariates in model 1 of Table 3. *N* (country *N*): 45,226 (34).

\* $p < .05$ , two tailed.

is consistent with previous comparative studies (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Hadler and Symons 2018), and I find no evidence that it can be attributed to oil-dependence (Ross 2008), or Middle Eastern geographic location. Evidence is mixed, however, on whether attitudinal liberalism translates into women's stronger representation in higher education, politics, and scientific labor markets in Christian-majority contexts (Charles 2017; Cole and Geist 2018; Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012; Moghadam 2013; Tripp and Badri 2017). Because of its consistently significant effect, an indicator of Muslim religious culture is included as a country-level control in all subsequent models.

Political democracy scores show no relationship to gender attitudes, including when the Polity Project measure is replaced with subjective democracy scores aggregated from Afrobarometer responses.

### **Exposure to extra-local culture**

Table 5 displays regression coefficients for variables representing world society accounts of global ideational diffusion. The first four models explore liberalizing effects of INGO density on gender liberalism. The estimated INGO effect is weak on its own (model 1) and when holding constant its possible correlates: urbanization, mass communication density, and HDI (models 2–4).<sup>16</sup> Models 5–8 substitute alternative measures of world society linkage and an indicator of British colonial heritage. None show statistically significant effects. Supplementary analyses revealed no interactions of INGO membership with national religious culture or women's SMO.

<sup>16</sup> This finding was unchanged in diverse sensitivity tests (not shown) that omitted the individual-level measures of extra-local exposure, excluded country outliers, and measured INGO membership on a linear, instead of logarithmic, scale.

While the standard macro-level indicators of world-cultural exposure are poor predictors of variability in gender liberalism across these African countries, significant positive effects remain for the individual-level exposure measures: internet and mobile phone usage, news consumption, and urban residence. This suggests that attitudinal effects associated with proliferation of mass-communication technology and urbanization in Africa operate at the micro, not macro level: Persons who access digital information or live in urban areas report more liberal gender attitudes, but living in a country that is more urbanized or has a greater density of digital technology is not a significant predictor of gender liberalism. Results are consistent with the idea that African men and women absorb liberal egalitarian values directly through urban contacts, digital media, and news reports. The causal processes underlying the observed associations require further study—ideally with over-time data.

### ***Women's public-sphere incorporation***

None of the four coefficients shown in [table 6](#) supports the idea that degendering of major public-sphere institutions promotes support for gender liberalism. Conclusions are unchanged when models are run separately by gender (not shown), with one exception: Men's odds of strong agreement with women's equal rights increase by about 3 percent with each percentage-point increase in women's share of the national labor force ( $\exp.[.033] = 1.034$ ). This finding aligns with micro-level evidence of more egalitarian values among US men who are married to employed women ([Bolzendahl and Myers 2004](#)). This country-level association warrants further study, however, especially given the error-prone measurement of labor force activity in Africa.<sup>17</sup> I found no significant effects of female labor market participation and educational attainment when the UNESCO and World Bank measures were replaced with statistics aggregated to the country level from the Afrobarometer survey responses.

It bears noting, finally, that the models in [table 6](#) offer a generous evaluation of the cultural spillover argument, since the reverse causal relationship—from egalitarian values to women's educational, occupational, and political participation—is also likely positive.

### ***Local feminism and unstable gender orders***

[Table 7](#) provides little evidence that disruption of the traditional gender order is associated with gender liberalism in the African context. Political unrest and

<sup>17</sup> This measurement error also confounds efforts to distinguish effects of women's employment from effects of Muslim religious culture, which are highly correlated ( $r = .70$ ). In supplementary analyses, the coefficient for female labor force participation grew larger and became statistically significant for both men and women when the indicator for Muslim religious culture was omitted from model 1. One interpretation is that the codification of Islamic family law affects gender attitudes in part by constraining women's formal employment. An alternative interpretation is that the attitudinal effects of Muslim religious culture are spurious and largely attributable to exogenously determined differences in female labor force activity ([Ross 2008](#)).

the density of women's SMOs show no relationship to the likelihood of strong support for gender equality. And although the coefficient for armed political conflict is statistically significant, it is *negative* rather than positive. Analyses broken down by gender (not shown) reveal that this negative relationship holds for men only, suggesting that armed conflict and physical insecurity may strengthen patriarchal ideology (Inglehart 2018), even while it opens up local leadership opportunities for women. In supplementary models, I find no support for the idea that liberalizing effects of women's social movement activism are strengthened by exposure to transnational gender-egalitarian ideals (as measured by cross-level interactions of women's SMO density with internet and mobile phone usage and urban residence). Substituting alternative measures of disrupted gender regimes did not change conclusions.<sup>18</sup>

While previous research has shown that disruption of traditional gender regimes opens up formal political and leadership roles for African women (El-Bushra 2003; Tripp 2006), effects of this unrest on *attitudes* are not evident in the present data.

### ***Sensitivity tests using alternative attitudinal measures***

To ensure that conclusions are robust to different measures of gender liberalism, I explored relationships with three alternative dependent variables, shown in table A1. Table A4 shows the original modernization model (from table 4) applied to all four measures of gender liberalism. Results are very similar across models. The most notable difference is a positive relationship of economic development (HDI) when support and strong support for gender equality are combined (model 2). Analyses split by gender show that this relationship holds only for women. It may be that greater material security provides women more freedom to reject traditionalism (i.e., to agree with statement 1), but that the intensification of gender-egalitarian aspirations (i.e., strong agreement) depends upon other factors, such as exposure to legitimating liberal discourse. Consistent with this interpretation, Muslim religious culture is negatively associated with women's strong support for equal gender rights, but unrelated to support.<sup>19</sup>

## **Conclusion**

This first descriptive mapping of gender attitudes in Africa reveals widespread support for the liberal variety of gender egalitarianism that predominates in

<sup>18</sup> Alternative measures include a dichotomous indicator of political instability (defined as five or more polity changes since 1995), a scale of political instability that is capped at "six or more" polity changes, and social movement variables based on the absolute number (rather than percentage share) of women's SMOs, and based on a broader definition of "gender-relevant" activism (calculated from Smith and Wiest 2012).

<sup>19</sup> In a parallel series of sensitivity tests (not shown), I used the three alternative dependent variables to recompute model 1 from Tables 5–7. The only new association was between the composite gender-egalitarianism index and women's employment rates. As with the original dependent variable, this relationship was positive and restricted to the men's sample.

elite world-society institutions and affluent Western societies. Between 2011 and 2013, nearly half (45 percent) of Afrobarometer respondents reported strong agreement with the statement that “women should have equal rights and be granted the same treatment as men do,” and a full three-quarters reported agreement. Although men agree less often than women and Muslims agree less often than Christians, it is noteworthy that more than 62 percent of surveyed Muslim men report either agreement or strong agreement with equal gender rights. The pervasiveness of this gender-liberal response among African citizens is difficult to reconcile with linear modernization theories and with Western stereotypes of a homogeneously tradition-bound continent. It does accord with theories of global ideational diffusion (Meyer 2004), although modes of transmission appear to differ from those typically considered by world society scholars.

With respect to attitudinal variation within Africa, the country-level relationships documented here provide support for neither modernization nor world society theory. Differences in gender liberalism across Africa are at best weakly related to structural factors such as economic modernization, feminist activism, formal world-society linkages, and armed conflict that have been linked previously to degendering of roles and social policies. In other words, world society theory finds support in the high prevalence of gender liberalism reported by African respondents, but not in the distribution of these values across African countries—especially as concerns formal ties to world society. Results suggest, however, that global liberalism may be diffusing to African citizens through the alternative channels provided by digital media and urban social networks.

What accounts for discrepancies between the present results and previous research that shows equalizing effects of formal world society linkages such as INGO memberships and foreign financial flows? One possible explanation is that structures of inequality (e.g., gendered educational and occupational policies and outcomes) and popular attitudes about inequality are governed by different causal logics. Formal ties to world society may make global norms highly salient to policy makers and other elites who can gain legitimacy (or development aid) for their countries through enactment of egalitarian policies and practices. But, these formal ties do not necessarily generate much awareness in the general African public. Similarly, the capacity of gender-egalitarian behaviors and structures (such as women’s public-sphere incorporation) to liberalize popular attitudes will depend on the degree to which ordinary people are exposed to alternative gender schemas and on the relationship of these alternative schemas to the local gender order (Deutsch 2007; Pierotti, Lake, and Lewis 2018; Swidler and Watkins 2017; Wyrod 2008).

The relationship between reported and actual gender beliefs and the effects of each on social outcomes remain open questions. Findings from this study point to significant interviewer and audience effects on reported support for women’s equal rights. While it certainly matters what people truly believe, survey responses can provide important information about what are understood to be normative—or safe—responses in a given context. For example, men’s tendency to report more liberal beliefs to woman than to man interviewers suggests an awareness of modern world society norms and a belief that women—as

presumed beneficiaries—will view them more favorably if they report agreement with these norms (or that men will view them less favorably). While awareness is a poor predictor of individual behavior in the short term, research suggests that even pretend agreement with equality principles can be consequential (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Pierotti 2013). Global and African feminists report that liberal world society norms provide powerful ideological leverage that can legitimate rights claims and better position local activists to press for change and promote nondiscriminatory standards of behavior (Snyder 2006; Moghadam 2013). The codification of equal rights in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, for example, helped African women’s groups marshal international pressure “to bolster their claims for representation and to construct women’s political representation as the norm for modern nation states” (Hughes and Tripp 2015: 1531).

The observed effects of religious denomination and religious culture on popular attitudes suggest an ongoing conflict and coexistence of globally- and locally-based cultural logics, especially as concerns the relationship between the individual and society. I find that men and women who live in predominantly Muslim societies are less likely to report strong support for women’s equal rights, regardless of their own religious beliefs. Although the precise mechanisms driving this relationship will vary by context, the cultural influence of religious family law and the legacies of European colonial rule may be contributing factors. In country and sociopolitical contexts where women are legally subordinated in families and segregated from men in public spaces, people’s daily life experiences will more clearly contradict liberal individualistic understandings of universal human autonomy. This incommensurability may be amplified by the political connotations of Western gender liberalism. Challenges to patriarchal family law and practices have almost always been met with fierce resistance from religious authorities, including in Anglo-European societies during the late 20th century. Religious-based resistance may be especially intense in formally colonized Muslim societies, where national identity is partly constructed around the contrast between indigenous traditions and Western values, including Western feminism (Badran 2009; Charrad 2011; Friedland, Afary, Gardinali and Naslund 2016; Htun and Weldon 2011). It is not surprising that Christian cultures have been more receptive to liberal individualistic principles that are rooted in European Christendom (Meyer 1989; Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

The role of digital media as a conduit through which liberal egalitarian values are disseminated, shaped, and debated around the world warrants much more sustained empirical attention. Computers and mobile phones are increasingly important as information sources, modes of global exchange, and platforms for political mobilization in Africa (Altoaimy 2018; Ferree and Pudrovska 2006; Pew 2015; Zayani 2015). But little is known about the gender content of digitally-accessed information and about how this content is received in different geographic areas and by different socio-demographic groups. The current analysis focuses on the liberal egalitarian content dimension, but Western gender-essentialist stereotypes and Muslim feminist perspectives are also represented and disseminated through online communities in African and Arab societies (Altoaimy 2018; Burrell 2012).

## Appendix

**Table A1. Mean Country Scores on Alternative Dependent Variables**

	1. Equal rights for women: strongly agree	2. Equal rights for women: agree + strongly agree	3. Equal rights for women (1–4 scale)	4. Egalitarian index (3–12 scale)
Algeria	0.427	0.844	3.224	8.782
Benin	0.471	0.690	2.954	8.823
Botswana	0.500	0.791	3.175	10.166
Burkina Faso	0.398	0.711	2.996	9.296
Burundi	0.440	0.823	3.166	9.739
Cameroon	0.469	0.762	3.140	9.643
Cape Verde	0.604	0.898	3.460	9.887
Cote d'Ivoire	0.236	0.626	2.753	8.829
Egypt	0.313	0.709	2.955	8.136
Ghana	0.568	0.850	3.338	9.849
Guinea	0.316	0.589	2.709	8.795
Kenya	0.557	0.872	3.370	9.886
Lesotho	0.389	0.521	2.556	9.220
Liberia	0.520	0.807	3.227	9.618
Madagascar	0.412	0.822	3.176	8.459
Malawi	0.560	0.726	3.090	9.699
Mali	0.204	0.389	2.205	7.894
Mauritius	0.487	0.843	3.284	9.852
Morocco	0.344	0.792	3.061	8.866
Mozambique	0.556	0.813	3.279	9.275
Namibia	0.291	0.747	2.965	9.031
Niger	0.188	0.434	2.315	7.887
Nigeria	0.341	0.680	2.881	8.486
Senegal	0.271	0.551	2.555	8.579
Sierra Leone	0.393	0.730	3.056	8.994
South Africa	0.392	0.774	3.090	9.331
Sudan	0.420	0.682	3.002	7.973

**Table A1. Continued**

	1. Equal rights for women: strongly agree	2. Equal rights for women: agree + strongly agree	3. Equal rights for women (1–4 scale)	4. Egalitarian index (3–12 scale)
Swaziland	0.426	0.737	3.029	9.416
Tanzania	0.625	0.826	3.374	10.007
Togo	0.531	0.882	3.357	10.040
Tunisia	0.445	0.781	3.142	8.859
Uganda	0.604	0.808	3.263	9.672
Zambia	0.570	0.796	3.262	9.848
Zimbabwe	0.464	0.780	3.154	9.583

**Note:** Scores in columns 1–3 are based on the following survey item: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? (1) In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do. (2) Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so. Responses are coded: 4 = Agree very strongly with statement 1, 3 = Agree with statement 1, 2 = Agree with statement 2, 1 = Agree very strongly with statement 2. Agreement with neither and “don’t know” responses are coded missing. Values in column 1 give the proportion agreeing very strongly with statement 1; values in column 2 give the proportion agreeing or agreeing very strongly with statement 1; values in column 3 give country means on the 1–4 scale. Scores on the composite gender-egalitarianism index are calculated by summing responses to three survey items (Cronbach’s alpha = .56). The first is the item described above. The second offers a choice between the following statements: (1) Men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women, and (2) women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men. The third offers a choice between: (1) If funds for schooling are limited, a boy should always receive an education in school before a girl, and (2) If funds for schooling are limited, a family should send the child with the greatest ability to learn. The second and third items are reverse coded.

Table A2. Correlations among Primary Country-Level Predictors

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. HDI	1.000													
2. Democracy score	.112	1.000												
3. Majority Muslim	.102	-.270	1.000											
4. INGOs (ln)	.339	-.193	.125	1.000										
5. WINGOs (ln)	.169	-.205	.005	.917	1.000									
6. Devel aid (ln)	-.397	-.121	-.008	.425	.435	1.000								
7. Foreign investmt (ln)	-.226	.191	-.099	-.351	-.342	.176	1.000							
8. British colony	.212	.082	-.369	.205	.351	.076	.105	1.000						
9. Women % lab force	-.493	.263	-.764	-.209	.018	.167	.101	.202	1.000					
10. Women educ ratio	.446	.340	-.342	.113	.053	.017	.062	.724	.001	1.000				
11. Women % parliam	-.054	.165	-.175	.028	.066	.191	-.056	.058	.334	.337	1.000			
12. Armed conflict	-.290	.017	.254	.078	.079	.287	.174	-.044	-.217	-.102	.081	1.000		
13. Polity changes	-.520	.104	.241	-.100	-.120	.316	.192	-.117	-.052	-.163	-.270	.265	1.000	
14. Women's activism	.393	-.226	.146	.283	.406	-.061	-.266	.363	-.218	.196	.089	.004	-.362	1.000

**Note:** Values are zero-order correlations with pairwise deletion of cases with missing values. See Table 2 for country scores.



**Table A3. Individual-level Predictors of Strong Support for Gender Equality, by Gender and Religion**

	1	2	3	4
	Christian men	Christian women	Muslim men	Muslim women
Age, in years	.003* (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.005* (.002)	-.002 (.002)
No formal educ <sup>a</sup>	-.442*** (.082)	-.284*** (.070)	-.289** (.101)	-.292** (.096)
Some primary educ <sup>a</sup>	-.276*** (.061)	-.111 (.058)	-.056 (.105)	-.094 (.101)
Completed primary educ <sup>a</sup>	-.210*** (.062)	-.113 (.060)	-.023 (.110)	.032 (.110)
Completed secondary educ <sup>a</sup>	.110 (.057)	.192** (.059)	-.174 (.111)	.236* (.116)
Some post-secondary educ <sup>a</sup>	.121 (.067)	.346*** (.077)	.171 (.101)	.245* (.112)
Paid job	.003 (.039)	.026 (.042)	-.014 (.062)	.073 (.072)
Indoor plumbing	.086 (.062)	.056 (.060)	-.041 (.090)	-.035 (.085)
Subjective disadvantage <sup>b</sup>	-.016 (.045)	.076 (.044)	.018 (.067)	.137* (.063)
Subjective advantage <sup>b</sup>	.068 (.047)	.144** (.046)	-.027 (.072)	.176** (.068)
High religiosity	.323*** (.054)	.290*** (.059)	.103 (.100)	-.136 (.096)
Use internet regularly	.176** (.057)	.150* (.065)	.189* (.082)	.177* (.089)
Own mobile phone	.001 (.050)	.146** (.045)	.101 (.084)	.114 (.066)
Access news daily	.132**	.037	.341***	.095

**Table A3. Continued**

	1	2	3	4
	Christian men	Christian women	Muslim men	Muslim women
	(.041)	(.039)	(.069)	(.062)
Urban residence	.082	.125**	-.003	.245***
	(.044)	(.042)	(.062)	(.059)
Woman interviewer	.250***	.104**	.580***	.385***
	(.037)	(.036)	(.060)	(.058)
Others at interview	-.076	.045	-.170*	-.087
	(.042)	(.039)	(.066)	(.058)
Constant	-.701***	-.436***	-1.423***	-.659***
	(.131)	(.120)	(.213)	(.197)
Std. dev., constant	.501 (.074)	.430 (.064)	.619 (.110)	.572 (.102)
Log likelihood	-8,733.578	-9,176.787	-3,901.528	-4,193.508
N (country N)	13,258 (25)	13,834 (25)	6,829 (18)	6,714 (18)

**Note:** Values are coefficients (standard errors) from mixed effects logistic regression models.

<sup>a</sup>Reference category is some secondary education.

<sup>b</sup>Reference category is no class advantage/disadvantage.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , and \*\*\* $p < .001$ , two tailed.

**Table A4. Coefficients from Modernization Model with Alternative Attitudinal Measures**

	Strong support	Support + strong support	Level of support (1–4)	Composite index (3–12)
	1	2	3	4
Individual-level variables				
Woman	.481***	.505***	.464***	.649***
	(.021)	(.024)	(.019)	(.050)
Age, in years	.002*	.002*	.002*	.004**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
No formal educ <sup>a</sup>	-.333***	-.444***	-.365***	-.571***
	(.038)	(.041)	(.033)	(.067)
Some primary educ <sup>a</sup>	-.181***	-.291***	-.221***	-.335***
	(.034)	(.039)	(.031)	(.063)

**Table A4. Continued**

	Strong support	Support + strong support	Level of support (1–4)	Composite index (3–12)
Compl prim educ <sup>a</sup>	-.133***	-.186***	-.139***	-.207***
	(.036)	(.042)	(.032)	(.056)
Compl sec educ <sup>a</sup>	.128***	.117**	.120***	.183***
	(.034)	(.042)	(.031)	(.041)
Some post-sec educ <sup>a</sup>	.207***	.288***	.217***	.327***
	(.039)	(.049)	(.036)	(.077)
Paid job	.011	-.027	.002	-.046
	(.023)	(.027)	(.021)	(.059)
Indoor plumbing	.028	.026	.010	.048
	(.034)	(.040)	(.030)	(.055)
Subjective disadvantage <sup>b</sup>	.047	-.051	.006	.011
	(.024)	(.028)	(.022)	(.045)
Subjective advantage <sup>b</sup>	.108***	.010	.067**	.132**
	(.026)	(.030)	(.023)	(.045)
Minority race	.085	.246***	.129*	.231*
	(.057)	(.071)	(.051)	(.093)
Highly religious	.016	-.098	-.072	.055
	(.065)	(.072)	(.055)	(.13)
Catholic <sup>c</sup>	-.043	-.038	-.053	-.095
	(.090)	(.100)	(.079)	(.160)
Evangel/Pentec <sup>c</sup>	-.080	-.013	-.088	-.092
	(.130)	(.140)	(.110)	(.170)
Other Christian <sup>c</sup>	-.152	-.024	-.135	-.117
	(.085)	(.095)	(.074)	(.180)
Trad/other/no relig <sup>c</sup>	.037	.055	.024	.195
	(.092)	(.100)	(.079)	(.160)
Highly relig × Catholic <sup>c</sup>	.271**	.407***	.333***	.435**
	(.091)	(.110)	(.080)	(.150)

Table A4. Continued

	Strong support	Support + strong support	Level of support (1–4)	Composite index (3–12)
Highly relig × Evangel/Pentec <sup>c</sup>	.281*	.276	.310**	.391*
	(.130)	(.150)	(.110)	(.180)
Highly relig × other Christian <sup>c</sup>	.304***	.288**	.331***	.370*
	(.085)	(.095)	(.073)	(.150)
Highly relig × tradl/other <sup>c</sup>	.095	.195	.138	.005
	(.10)	(.120)	(.090)	(.14)
Regularly use internet	.174***	.244***	.174***	.193***
	(.033)	(.041)	(.030)	(.055)
Own mobile phone	.118***	.089**	.097***	.127**
	(.026)	(.029)	(.023)	(.041)
Access news daily	.129***	.140***	.127***	.084*
	(.023)	(.026)	(.020)	(.033)
Urban residence	.104***	.053	.091***	.066
	(.023)	(.027)	(.021)	(.046)
Others at interview	−.050*	−.041	−.042*	−.039
	(.022)	(.026)	(.020)	(.044)
Woman interviewer	.235***	.177***	.202***	.329***
	(.021)	(.024)	(.018)	(.087)
Country-level variables				
HDI	.144	1.671*	.945	−.001
	(.675)	(.718)	(.640)	(.529)
Democr score	−.016	−.028	−.033	.009
	(.025)	(.027)	(.024)	(.024)
Muslim relig culture	−.619***	−.573**	−.624***	−.867***
	(.177)	(.188)	(.167)	(.215)

**Note:** Values in column 1 are coefficients (standard errors) from model 1 of Table 4, predicting strong support for gender equality; column 2 shows analogous values for models predicting "agree" and "strongly agree" responses combined; column 3 shows values from ordinal mixed effects logit models (MELOGIT in Stata); column 4 shows values from linear regressions with robust standard errors (XTREG).

<sup>a</sup>Reference category is some secondary education.

<sup>b</sup>Reference category is no class advantage or disadvantage.

<sup>c</sup>Reference category is Muslim.

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , two tailed.

## About the Author

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