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American Class Identity

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Paul S. Teten

September 2024

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To my husband, Jesús.

You are the brightest and most resilient person I know.

Your unwavering support made this possible.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

American Class Identity

by

Paul S. Teten

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
University of California, Riverside, September 2024
Dr. Benjamin G. Bishin, Chairperson

Democratic theory presumes that individuals will coalesce around shared goals and
work collectively to advance the interests of the group. However, scholars have observed a
divergence between many Americans' economic interests and their political attitudes and
behavior. I offer identity as a potential explanation for this phenomenon. Research in
political science demonstrates the central role of identity to politics, yet we know very little
about the extent that Americans form a psychological attachment to their class and how that
class identity informs their political attitudes and behavior.

We might expect class identity to lead individuals to consider their class when
forming political attitudes and increase the likelihood that classes act collectively to advance
their economic interests. However, the limited evidence of this in American politics suggests
that Americans either do not hold meaningful identities based in class or if they do those
identities are not salient to their political behavior.

In Chapter 2, I examine the level of Americans' class identity using an original survey
to gauge the extent that respondents have a psychological attachment to their class. I find

that many Americans have strong class identities, with the strength of the attachment increasing alongside class position.

In Chapter 3, I employ an original vote choice experiment to assess whether class identity informs Americans' voting behavior. I find that class identity influences the vote choice for those in the working class with strong class identities but has little influence on the vote choice of middle and upper class Americans.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the extent that Americans rely on identities based in party and race in lieu of their class identity, by further analyzing the results of the vote choice experiment. I find strong evidence that Americans are more likely to rely on their racial and partisan identities to inform their vote choice, rather than their class identity.

The findings here indicate that the disjuncture between Americans' political behavior and their economic interests is in part a function of the limited role of class identity in informing their political attitudes and behavior.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

A Tale of Two Insurrections

In August of 1786 a group of insurrectionists in rural Massachusetts blocked the entrance to a county courthouse, successfully preventing the court from performing its duties and sparking a violent confrontation with the state government. This group of subsistence farmers, led by Revolutionary War hero, Daniel Shays, rallied together to prevent the Massachusetts government from seizing assets from farmers in their community under the pretext of debt collection. Shays' Rebellion would last less than a year, but the deadly confrontations and inability of the national Congress to facilitate aid to Massachusetts would shape the political development of the newly independent States.

To many historians this insurrection against the state government represented a severe form of class-conflict between two "class-conscious" groups, the agrarian class consisting of subsistence farmers in the west and the commercial class consisting of merchants in the east (Beard and Beard 1927; Morris 1962; Kaplan 1952; Taylor 1954). On one side of the confrontation was the Massachusetts government lead by Governor Bowdoin, a son of a wealthy merchant family who ran on a platform of fiscal responsibility. In office, Bowdoin confronted an economic crisis fueled by war debt, a reduction in global trade, and a scarcity of hard currency. In response, Bowdoin enacted harsh debt collection policies favored by the coastal merchant class, that required debtors pay back what they owed to the merchants with hard currency (Szatmary 1980). Left unpaid, the merchants could sue debtors and the courts could then seize their land and other assets to give over to the creditors.

On the other side of the conflict were farmers in western Massachusetts, many of whom returned from fighting in the Revolutionary War to find their farms in disarray and the pay they were promised by the Continental Army was never to come due to the shortages of hard currency. As a result many of these farmers accumulated small amounts of debt to merchants who would traditionally accept payment in the form of farm goods (Szatmary 1980). However, this changed once Bowdoin implemented new collection policies and taxes that even some of his political allies, such as John Adams, considered to be a burden "heavier than the People could bear" (Richards 2014, pg.88).

The farmers began to rally together to call on the government for debt relief. After circulating petitions calling for relief, lobbying their representatives in government, they would reach a breaking point after the legislature failed to act on their behalf (Szatmary 1980). Daniel Shays led a force of approximately 4,000 farmers in an insurrection to thwart the government's seizure of assets (Richards 2014). Ultimately, Bowdoin, with the help of other wealthy merchants, would pay out of pocket to hire a mercenary army to put the insurrection down by force after failing to acquire assistance from other state governments.

Shays' Rebellion highlighted massive failures with the Articles of Confederation in its inability to create institutions capable of overcoming the collective action problems associated with governing. It became the impetus for the Constitutional Convention where delegates would meet to design the U.S. Constitution and form the government of the United States of America we know today. While insurrection is not a symptom of a healthy democracy, the underlying dynamics of Shays' Rebellion is one that conforms to certain expectations of a democratic society. In a democracy we expect people to coalesce around shared economic interests and work together to achieve the goals of their group.

243 years later on January 6th, 2020, America would witness another violent insurrection. This time, a group consisting primarily of men from the working and middle class would attempt to obstruct Congress from certifying the results of a democratic election (Denbeaux and Crawley 2023).[1] This time the intent of the insurrectionists was to overthrow the results of the election in favor of President Donald Trump. This stands in stark contrast to the insurrection led by Daniel Shays where members of an economic group worked together to advance their shared interests. The insurrectionists on January 6th worked together to advance the interest of a billionaire who as President pursued policies that were detrimental to the economic interests of many of the participants. For example, perhaps the most significant legislative achievement of the Trump administration was the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that disproportionally favored the interests of the upper class (Gale, Hoopes, and Pomerleau 2024).

There has been some scholarly debate as to the ultimate goal pursued by Shays' rebels but the motivation for the insurrection was clearly tied to the interests of their economic group. Why on January 6th would a coalition of working and middle class men storm the U.S. Capitol to preserve a President that did not serve their economic interests? The reality is that this disconnect between class and political behavior is endemic in modern American politics.

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[1] Information on the insurrectionists' class backgrounds is based on the aggregation and analysis of the Department of Justice's legal filings and arrests between January 6, 2021, and January 6, 2022 in a report by Mark Denbeaux and Donna Crawley for Seton Hall Law School Legal Studies Research. They base their definition of class on defendants' occupation with the largest occupational group being small business owers (24.7%) and the second largerst being Blue Collar/Working Class (17.2%). However, we do not know what class any of these individuals would place themselves in or if they have a psychologial attachment to their class so we cannot draw firm conclusions of the class dynamic in this insurrection.

A different time and radically different economy makes the condition of today's

working class vastly different than that of Shays and his fellow subsistence farmers. But there

remain significant challenges faced by those at the bottom of the economic ladder. For

decades, economic inequality has grown unabated creating an enormously wealthy upper

class and leaving little behind for the working and middle classes (Saez and Zucman 2016).

While a majority of Americans support the idea of the government doing more to reduce

inequality, the national government has done little to remedy the growing gap between the

rich and poor and disproportionately serves the interests of the wealthy (Hayes 2013; Gilens

and Page 2014).

Support for inequality reduction is strongest among the least well off, including those

that may consider themselves working class, yet significant portions of the working class

vote for candidates that promote policy detrimental to their economic interests by

exacerbating economic inequality (Bartels 2016; Erikson 2015). This raises the question: Why

is the political behavior of so many Americans at odds with their economic interests?

The Puzzle

We generally expect individuals to make decisions that are consistent with their

interests. In a democratic system where majorities rule, we expect groups to form around a

shared interest and act collectively to achieve their goals. However, large numbers of

Americans' behavior is at odds with their economic reality. This includes a majority of

working-class whites, who support candidates that pursue economic policies that

overwhelming benefit members of the upper-class. While it is less frequently discussed by

scholars, this phenomenon exists for segments of every class including many in the upper-

class who support candidates that pursue redistributive policies. This behavior contradicts expectations that people are motivated by self-interest and fosters concerns regarding their ability to act collectively to protect their interests. How can we explain why people support policies and candidates that are detrimental to their economic interest?

A significant body of research has been dedicated to the study of the relationship between individual's preferences and behavior and their economic interest. The literature on this issue has produced mixed findings regarding the consistency of this relationship. In some areas there does seem to be consistency between a person's economic condition and their political attitudes and behavior. For example, the poor are more likely than the rich to support the general idea of reducing inequality and raising the minimum wage (Horowitz, Igielnik, and Kochhar 2020). The poor are also more likely to favor redistributive measures implemented at the state and local level (Franko, Tolbert, and Witko 2013; Newman and Teten 2020).

In other areas there is less consistency between attitudes and economic status. For example, there is broad support among the poor for policies such as repealing the estate tax, a one-time tax levied on inheritors of multi-million dollar estates, and the Bush era tax cuts that disproportionally favor the interest of the wealthy (Bartels 2016). Perhaps the most consequential example is that a majority of working-class Whites regularly vote for candidates that advance the interest of the upper-class, at the expense of their own class (Carnes and Lupu 2021). This particular example has received the most attention from scholars, in part because the consequence of this behavior has led to the implementation of policy that has exacerbated economic inequality and to whatever extent that leads to further political inequality (Solt 2008; Bonica et al. 2013). The inconsistency between behavior and

our expectations of each class may not be exclusive to American politics but in comparison to other advanced democracies, Americans vote with their class at lower rates (Evans 2000).

There are a range of explanations offered for this puzzle. One of the most prominent is that Americans *would* vote on the basis of their economic interest but they do not have the political sophistication to connect policies to their outcomes (Bartels 2018; Macdonald 2020). However, this explanation cannot account for areas where we do find consistency between a person's economic reality and support for redistribution.

By other accounts the mismatch observed for the white working-class is due to their prioritization on social issues which happen to align with the party that serve the economic interests of the wealthy (Frank 2007). On closer examination, it is not clear that the white working-class hold preferences on social policy that is actually closer to the Republican party than it is to the Democratic party (Bartels 2006).

Another possibility is that preferences on economic policy are driven by racism, exemplified by the significant decline in support for policies that are perceived to benefit Blacks among racially resentful Whites (Gilens 1996). This cannot explain inconsistency in preferences for redistributive policies that have not been racialized such as the poor's support for repealing the estate tax or wealthy proponents of redistribution.

It is not my goal to reject these theories outright, rather I believe that past research does not appreciate that the inconsistency we observe may arise in part because people are driven by identity and it is unclear to what extent class identity plays a role relative to an individual's economic interests.

Argument

Social identities are the part of an individual's self-concept that are derived from their membership to a group (Tajfel 1982). Identifying with a politically relevant group can generate political cohesion through a shared outlook and conformity to group norms of political activity (Miller et al. 1981). A growing body of research has demonstrated the central role that social identity plays in a person's political attitudes and behavior. Strong identities make an individual more likely to engage in a variety of political activities such as voting and volunteering for a campaign (Fowler and Kam 2007). Social identities also increase the likelihood of group members taking up collective action (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Additionally, they can lead members to view fellow group members more positively and harbor negative feelings toward non-group members (Kinder 2013).

The inconsistency we find between a person's economic reality and their behavior could be a result of the extent to which they identify with their class. If Americans do not have a class identity, they would be less likely to consider their class when engaging in politics and more likely to draw on other identities to inform their preferences, which at times may be at odds with the interests of their class. If the extent that individuals form attachments to their class varies between people, those who have a strong class identity may be more likely to act in accordance with the interests of their class while those with a weak class identity may be less likely to act in accordance with their class's interests. Another possibility is that class identity is not always salient to Americans' political context. In cases where it is salient, individuals would be more likely to have preferences and behave in a manner consistent with the economic interests of their class. When it is not salient they would be more likely to adopt the preferences of a more salient identity.

Plan of the Dissertation

To examine the role of class identity in Americans' political attitudes and behavior, I center the following chapters on three pertinent questions: Do Americans have a class identity? Does class identity influence Americans' voting behavior? Do Americans rely on other identities, in lieu of class identity, to inform their voting behavior?

In Chapter 2, I examine the extent to which Americans have a class identity. It is unclear if Americans have a class identity, but it could help us explain why some act in a way that is contrary to the economic interests of their class. If Americans do not have a class identity, they are more likely to rely on other identities to inform their political preferences. This could result in people adopting the preferences of the group they identify whose interests may put them at odds with the interests of their class. On the other hand, there may be a disjuncture between Americans perceived class and their objective reality, and they may actually be acting in a manner that is consistent with the interests of their perceived class. It may also be that class identity varies in strength between people and those who act contrary to their objective economic interest, may do so because they have weak attachments to their class and more readily defer to considerations of a group that they have a stronger attachment to.

To examine the extent that Americans have a class identity, I analyze data from an original survey of Americans across the class spectrum. I begin by demonstrating the significant disjuncture between the class individuals subjectively identify with compared to objective measures of class often used in scholarly research. I then construct a scale to measure the extent to which individuals have a psychological attachment to their class and consider it important to their self-concept. This allows me to analyze differences in class

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identity strength by groups. I find that class identity strength increases with class position, such that those in a lower class are less likely to have a strong class identity than those in the class above them. Finally, I discuss why this may be the case in conjunction with factors that moderate the effect of class position on class identity strength.

In Chapter 3, I turn to look at whether class identity influences Americans' voting behavior. It may be the case that Americans do not rely on their class identity to inform their political behavior, such as when deciding who to vote for. While the identity literature has produced substantial evidence of the central role of identity in motivating and informing political behavior, not all identities are salient to voters. However, there is good reason to expect that class identity would be germane to Americans' vote choice. Class is fundamentally rooted in economic status and a host of redistributive policies promoted by candidates have implications for the interests of one's class. Further, candidates often appeal to class over the course of their campaign (Robison et al. 2021; Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). We might expect these factors to raise the salience of class identity to the electoral context increasing the likelihood that voters rely on their class identity to inform their vote choice.

To examine the role of class identity in an electoral context I utilize an original survey experiment. I employ a conjoint design that presents respondents with two candidate profiles and asks them to choose one candidate to vote for. The profiles contain information that indicates various candidate attributes such as their class background. I then estimate the effect of these attributes on the likelihood of a candidate getting the vote and compare results across respondents' class and class identity strength. Overall, I find that class identity has minimal influence on most Americans' voting behavior. However, the influence of class

identity is conditioned by class and class identity strength. While those in the middle class are less influenced by class identity, individuals in the working class with strong class identities are more likely to support candidates that share their class background and appeal to their class directly.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the extent to which Americans rely on identities based in groups other than class to inform their voting behavior. Political scientist have produced substantial evidence regarding the influence of partisan and racial identities on Americans political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 2002; Piston 2010; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Further, a number of scholars have pointed to these identities to explain the lack of class-based voting, particularly for those in the working class (Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Harris and Rivera-Burgos 2021; Mutz 2018). It is possible that identities based in party and race are more likely to be salient to Americans' vote choice and lower the likelihood that they rely on their class identity to inform their behavior.

Further examining results from the conjoint experiment, I find evidence that partisan and racial identities do in fact play a more consistent and robust role in Americans' electoral behavior than that of class identity. However, there are surprising interactions between class, party, and race that confound theories that place these identities at the heart of the political behavior of the working class. In this study, the working class are less likely to vote based on candidate race than those in the middle and upper classes and they are the most likely to vote for candidates that share their class background.

The findings in this research shed light on why so many Americans' political behavior is at odds with their economic interests. The prevalence of weak class identities among those in the working class may limit the extent that they rely on their class identity to

inform their political preferences. Further, the middle class's ambivalence to candidate class and class-based appeals suggest that they do not connect their class identity to their political behavior. Finally, the robust influence of partisan and racial attitudes on vote choice may override considerations of one's class at the ballot box. However, there is also reason to believe that class could play a larger role in future elections.

While rates of strong class identities are lower for the working class, those in the working class that have a strong class identity are more likely to rely on class to inform their vote choice and support pro-class candidates. Additionally, individuals with strong class identities are more likely to attest to the importance of working with their class to achieve common goals. These findings suggest that parties that advance more working class candidates and appeal to working class voter's class identity can raise their level of support from this group. This could in turn reduce the inconsistency between Americans' voting behavior and their economic interests.

Chapter 2: American Class Identity

Introduction

The extent to which Americans' class influences their political attitudes and behavior is not well understood, yet there are reasons to expect class to play an important role. By most definitions class is tethered to an individual's economic standing in society; the greater one's wealth, the higher their class position. Therefore, a person's class informs much of their lived experience and determines how redistributive policy affects them. We routinely encounter the constraints or privileges afforded to us by the economic status of our class. In addition to the economic consequences of class there are social implications to belonging to a class. We are more likely to live in areas surrounded by those in our class, work with them, and form shared cultural ties with those in our class (Archer and Blau 1993). Certain cultural and social norms are shared between members of our class, such as how we communicate and present ourselves.

Class, as an academic concept, is ubiquitous in the literatures of various disciplines including political science, sociology, economics, and psychology. Yet, for the pervasiveness of class in our lives and scholarly pursuits, there is little consensus on how to define or measure class and we know very little about how class influences the way people think about and interreact with politics. In this research, I aim to fill in some of these gaps and examine the extent to which Americans consider class and how that influences their political attitudes and behavior.

The research here proceeds as follows: first I examine the reliability of commonly used objective measures of class in scholarly research by comparing them to results from an

original survey where respondents subjectively identify their class. I show that there is significant divergence between objective and subjective measures of class and discuss the limitations this raises for political science research. Second, I develop a framework for conceptualizing class through the lens of social identity theory and construct a scale to estimate class identity strength. To my knowledge, this is the first measure that enables researchers to assess gradients in class identity. Finally, I examine variation of class identity strength and discuss the implications for Americans' politics. I find that class identity strength increases with class position such that those in a putatively lower-status class are less likely to have strong class identity as someone in the class above them. This finding demonstrates the challenges for those in lower classes to act collectively to secure their own economic interests.

Literature Review

One of the puzzles scholars of American politics have long been interested in is why so many Americans, particularly those in the lower and working classes, support candidates who promote policies that are detrimental to their economic interests (e.g. Bartels 2016). It appears that self-interest has the largest influence on political attitudes when policies have a significant and clear benefit to a person's economic interest (Feldman 1984; Franko, Tolbert, and Witko 2013; Sears and Funk 1991). However, it is important that we disentangle the effects of self-interest from the effects of group-interest, which may be more politically consequential than self-interest alone (Bobo 1983). For instance, wealthy Blacks who feel that their fate is tied to that of their racial group, are more likely to support economic

policies they perceive to benefit the group even when it comes at the expense of their own self-interest (Tate 1994).

An individual may consider themselves members of many different social groups, but not all groups fit what scholars consider a social identity. There are important distinctions between identification, social identity, and identity strength. Identification with a group is a matter of categorizing oneself with a group based on the boundaries, or characteristics, that delineate group members from non-members. A social identity entails imbuing membership in a group with importance to your self-concept, informing how one thinks about who they are as an individual (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Identity strength goes one step further to measure the extent to which a person emphasizes a group identity as important to their self-concept (Huddy 2001; 2013). Individuals place varying levels of importance on the groups they identify with and the extent to which a person emphasizes membership in a group can vary depending on that salience of the group to their context. A social identity requires three conditions to affect attitudes and behavior, the cognitive classification of oneself in a group, a psychological attachment to the group, and a context that causes the group identity to become salient (Bishin and Muttram 2023).

The literature tells us that identities are central to politics. Social identity theory offers a way to understand behavior through an individual's psychological attachment with a group. When individuals identify with a politically relevant group, they are more sensitive to issues that affect their group, more knowledgeable about those issues, and are more likely to be politically active (Bishin 2009). Identifying with a politically relevant group can generate political cohesion through a shared outlook and conformity to group norms of political activity (Miller et al. 1981). A growing body of research has demonstrated the central role

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that social identity plays in a person's political attitudes and behavior. Strong identities make an individual more likely to engage in a variety of political activities such as voting and volunteering for a campaign (Fowler and Kam 2007). Strong social identities also increase the likelihood of group members taking up collective action to advance the interests of the group (Simon and Klandermans 2001).

Some identities, such as race and partisanship, are endemic to American politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Members who strongly identify with these groups are the most likely to hold preferences and behave in a manner that advance the interest of their group (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). The disjuncture between some Americans' behavior and their economic reality raises questions regarding the extent that they identify with their class and how that identity influences their political decisions. However, many if not most social identities are irrelevant to politics and therefore are not a source of information or motivation for political attitudes and behavior – or what we might consider political identities (Huddy 2001). However, there are reasons to expect that class identity would often be a political identity.

Relative deprivation theory has been advanced as an explanation for when social identities become politicized. This theory argues that when individuals perceive that their group's economic or political interests are deteriorating or worse relative to other groups, it will spur political cohesion between the members of the jeopardized group (Gay 2006). This seems pertinent to class considering that for decades the United States has experienced high and rising economic inequality, where members of the upper-class are accumulating massive amounts of wealth while the those in lower classes have seen little to no growth in their economic power (Saez and Zucman 2016; Piketty and Saez 2003).

In light of the growing economic inequality, we would expect class identity to be a salient and powerful influence on the political cohesion of groups whose economic conditions and political power are in jeopardy. However, in American politics, we often do not observe meaningful political cohesion between members of the lower and working class. In fact, we observe that the lower and working classes are less likely to turnout to vote, the least consistent in their vote choice, and the most likely to vote against their economic interests (Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010; Bartels 2016; Campbell et al. 1960; Leighley and Nagler 1992). This raises questions regarding the extent that American's rely on their class identity to inform their vote choice.

The inconsistency we find between a person's economic reality and their behavior could be a result of the extent to which they identify with their class. If Americans do not have a class identity, they would be less likely to consider their class when engaging in politics and more likely to draw on other identities to inform their preferences, which at times may be at odds with the interests of their class. If Americans do have a class identity, there may be a disjuncture between their perceived class and their objective reality, in which case they may actually be acting in a manner that is consistent with the economic interests of their perceived class. Class identity strength may also play a role such that those who have a strong identity are more likely to act in accordance with the interests of their class than those with a weak identity. Given the attention to economic interests and political behavior, it is surprising that the literature is scant on studies that consider class identity.

The study of class identity presents scholars with challenges. While some groups have clearly set boundaries, class is difficult to capture with objective measures because there are no definitive qualifications to categorize people into the appropriate class. Consequently,

a researcher may have a different conception of class boundaries than the subjects in their study and categorize subjects in a class they do not identify with. Social identities are a psychological attachment to a group and are therefore reliant on the individual's perception of what group they belong to and not the researcher's expectations.

For example, a self-employed tradesman who makes $75k a year could be reasonably categorized as middle class by a researcher defining class via income quantiles, but if the tradesman thinks of themselves as working-class, the expectations of the researcher will be confounded by the individual's identity with a different class. This may not be a significant issue if the researcher is only interested in how a person's economic self-interest influences their behavior, but they will overlook how the tradesman's identity as working class shapes preferences derived from considerations of their class identity. Because class is a group that has relatively ambiguous boundaries, there is greater potential that an individual's perception of their class may contradict the expectations of the researcher, relative to groups with more clearly defined boundaries such as race or sex. However, the vast majority of research that considers class, rely on objective measures to determine what class a person belongs to such as their income, education, or occupation (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 2013).

Scholars have noted the tendency for Americans to disproportionally place themselves in the middle class. For instance a seminal study by Richard Centers (1949) asked respondents to select their class from three categories (upper, middle, and lower) and found that nearly 80% chose middle class. However, more recent work shows that adding a fourth category, working class, splits the majority of respondents between the working and middle class (Adair 2001; Hout 2008). It may be that the American ethos of individualism, self-responsibility, and egalitarianism engender pejorative connotations toward labels such as

"lower" or "upper", driving more Americans to identify with the middle or working classes (Adair 2001; Archer and Blau 1993).

The tendency for Americans to identify as middle class raises complications with objective measures of class. Comparing respondents subjective class identification to that of objective measures, Sosnard et al. (2013) find that as many as two-thirds of respondents place themselves in a different class than objective measures would predict. In the survey here I find a similar disparity in that a majority of respondents identify with the working or middle class. However, because social identity is a psychological attachment that relies on an individual's perception and attachment to a group, if there is disagreement between the researcher's definition and the subject's perception of their class, the research will be unable to account for the influence of class identity.

Identity Strength

I define identity strength as the extent to which people place importance on their membership in a group to their self-concept, which is how they conceptualize who they are as an individual. Research has shown that individuals vary in the extent that they place importance on group identities and this variation has important implications for their political attitudes and behavior (Huddy 2001; 2002). In a meta-analysis of more than 60 studies on the effect of a social identity on collective action, Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) provide compelling evidence that strong identities in groups with shared interests are a powerful motivator for spurring collective action. Considering the economic interests shared by fellow class members, we would expect that if Americans have a strong class identity, there would be more consistency in the voting behavior within each class.

However, compared to other advanced democracies, there are lower levels of class-line voting especially among those considered lower and working class (Evans 2000; Evans and Tilley 2012). Further, it has been observed over several decades that a majority of Whites in the working class support presidential candidates who promote policies that are detrimental to their economic interests (Carnes and Lupu 2021; Bartels 2016; Frank 2007).

The inconsistency we find between a person's economic reality and their behavior could be a result of the extent to which they identify with their class. Americans who weakly identify with their class would be less likely to consider their class when engaging in politics and more likely to draw on other identities to inform their preferences which at times may be at odds with the interests of their class. Therefore, it may be that those in the lower and working class will have weaker class identities than those in the middle and upper class.

The valence, or emotional association linked to a group, also seems to play a part in identity development. Some groups have a positive valence, in which attributes associated with group members are favorable, raising the perceived social status of the group. Other groups have a negative valence, where attributes associated with group members are unfavorable, lowing the perceived social status of the group. Social identity theory posits that people are less likely to embrace identities in low-status groups because it is more difficult to bolster their self-esteem through membership in that group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Studies show that individuals in low-status groups are less likely to feel similar to members of the in-group, rate in-group members less favorably, and less likely to consider collective solutions to the groups low-status (Jackson et al. 1996a; Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990). For example, an experiment that manipulated the perceived group status of Asians through

photographs of powerful Asian political figures, strengthened Asian identity among Asian American subjects (Junn and Masuoka 2008).

Class identity may be particularly vulnerable to the role of group status. Class by its nature confers a status hierarchy in terms of one's economic standing or the social prestige. The terms used to describe class such as "lower" and "upper" connotate status differences between groups and studies show that individuals perceive status differences between those in different classes (Robison and Stubager 2018; Piston 2018; Stubager et al. 2018). Further, it is clear that those in economically advantaged classes do in fact have more access to political power and a greater sway over political outcomes than those in an economically disadvantaged class (Gilens 2005; Gilens and Page 2014; Enns et al. 2014). Therefore, it may be that those in economically disadvantaged classes are less likely to develop an attachment to their class identity and consequently are less likely to rely on it to inform their political behavior.

These factors may depress the likelihood of those in the lower and working classes from forming strong class identities in a putatively low-status group. Instead, individuals in a low-status class may more readily emphasize other identities based in groups that are perceived as higher status. Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis:

Status Hypothesis: Those in a high-status class will be more likely to have a strong class identity than those in a low-status class.

While a group's perceived status influences the readiness of members to embrace an identity based in that group, the effect is often conditioned by the permeability of group

boundaries and the ambiguity of group membership (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Mendes et al. 2008; Jackson et al. 1996b). Permeability of group boundaries describes the ability to move between groups of the same category (e.g. going from working class to middle class). In the case of class, permeability of group boundaries is often referred to as social mobility, I will use these terms interchangeably here.

When group boundaries are permeable, individuals can shift from one group to another either by choice or changes in circumstance that alter the characteristics that define membership in a group. For example, someone may grow up in a working class family but end up in a career that advances them into the middle class. Conversely, some social identities are based in groups with impermeable boundaries, that cannot be easily changed. For example, individuals cannot realistically change their race so the boundaries that define an individual's racial identity are impermeable.[2] Research has found that when group boundaries are impermeable, members of putatively low-status groups tend to strengthen their identity and enhance their groups standing by emphasizing positive qualities of members of the in-group and promoting collective action to raise the groups status (Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990; Bettencourt et al. 2001; Wright 1997).

The permeability of class boundaries is somewhat complicated. On one hand, America is commonly thought of as the "land of opportunity" where anyone willing to work hard can work their way up the economic ladder and there are certainly some cases in which this occurs. On the other hand, growing economic inequality since the 1970s has

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[2] This is not to say that racial identity is objective or intrinsically bestowed. Racial and ethnic definitions are ultimately social constructs that fluctuate with time and context (Bowler and Segura 2011). Further, many individuals have more than one racial heritage and may identify with multiple racial groups – or none at all.

concentrated more wealth in the upper class while income has stagnated for those in the lower and working class (Piketty and Saez 2003; Saez and Zucman 2016). The growing economic gulf between classes, makes it difficult for those at the bottom of the economic ladder to work their way upward.

The prospects for intergenerational mobility, or the likelihood that a child will eventually earn more than their parents, is moderated by their starting point. Studies show that a 10% increase in parental income is associated with a 3.4% increase in a child's future income (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, et al. 2014; Chetty et al. 2018). Furthermore, the likelihood of intergenerational mobility varies widely by region. For example, a child born to a family in the lowest income quintile in the Midwest has an approximately 16% chance to end up in the highest income quintile by adulthood, whereas in the South a child in the bottom quintile has less than a 5% chance to move into the top income quintile (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez 2014).

However, apart from the reality that the vast majority of Americans will remain in the same class for their lifetime, perceptions of potential mobility are more relevant to social identity. Whether they remain in the same class for their lifetime or not, if they perceive mobility as a strong likelihood, then they are more likely to perceive class boundaries as permeable. According to social identity theory, this should effect the extent to which they identify with their class, particularly for those in lower-status classes. Therefore, I expect that class identity strength will be moderated by experienced mobility and perceptions of mobility and offer the following hypothesis:

Permeability Hypothesis: Those that have experienced mobility or perceive a high likelihood of mobility will have weaker class identities than those that have not experienced mobility or perceive a low likelihood of mobility.

Another factor interconnected to the permeability of group boundaries is the ambiguity of group membership. Ambiguity of membership is the extent to which membership in a group is readily identifiable. When group boundaries are ambiguous it may lower the chances that individuals consider and internalize their membership in a group. Further, if group boundaries are ambiguous, it lowers the chances an individual can be externally labeled by others as a member of a group. This offers members of low status groups more flexibility to eschew considerations of their place in the low status group and instead emphasize their membership a higher status group. However, if membership in a low-status group is unambiguous and boundaries are impermeable, instead of emphasizing other identities to boost their self-esteem, they are forced to "double-down" on that identity and utilize strategies such as social creativity, to change the perception of the groups status (Jackson et al. 1996a; Pagliaro et al. 2012).

This raises challenges for the development of class identity as membership in a class may be ambiguous to an outsider as there are not external features that definitively delineate members of a class. Some objective indicators of wealth may be reasonably considered as signaling someone's class. For example, a person driving a luxury car may be assumed to belong to the upper class but such conclusions are not exact or ubiquitous. However, as with other factors involved in the development of social identities, the perception of ambiguity

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may be more consequential as some may see class as unambiguous while others do not. Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis:

Ambiguity Hypothesis: Individuals who perceive class membership as unambiguous will have stronger class identities than those who view class membership as ambiguous.

Methods

To test these hypotheses, I use data from an original survey of 996 American adults who were recruited through Amazon's MTurk platform to take a survey online from May-June 2020. Respondents were asked to identify their class from a list of four choices: lower class, working class, middle class, and upper class. Respondents that chose middle class were presented with a follow up question asking them if they considered themselves lower-middle class or upper-middle class. Previous studies show that Americans tend to disproportionately identify as middle class, by some measures more than half of those that identify as middle class would be placed in the upper class or working class based on objective measures (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 2013).

Asking middle class respondents to place themselves in the lower or upper half gives me the ability to assess differences between middle class respondents that perceive themselves as closer to the working or upper classes. This is potentially a consequential factor for class identity as individuals at either end of the middle class may have divergent lived experiences and interests. For example, the average reported household income for respondents in the lower-middle class is ~$58,000 whereas the average income for the upper-middle class is ~$73,000. As seen in Figure 2.1, this represents a significant difference

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in the income between the lower- and upper-middle class with each having more overlap in income with the adjacent class than with each other. This suggests that the economic interests of the lower-middle class are more closely aligned with the interests of the working class and those of the upper-middle class are more aligned with the upper class. Importantly for this research, the differences in income between the lower- and upper-middle class may change the perception of the social status of their class and the readiness to embrace their class identity. Therefore, in the analyses that follow I present findings that separate the lower- and upper-middle class.

NOTE: The box represents the 25th-75th percentile, the line indicates the median, and the whiskers represent the upper and lower values

Figure 2.1: Reported Household Income by Class.

There are important limitations to the sample used here that distinguish it from the American public. Similar to previous studies recruiting respondents through MTurk, respondents in the sample are mostly white (~76%), have high levels of education (~71%

have a college degree), and somewhat more male (~58%) than the population of the United States. See Appendix A for the full demographic breakdown. This limits my ability to reach definitive conclusions related to class identity for non-Whites and those with lower education levels.

Consistent with other research using subjective measures of class, most respondents identify as either working or middle class (~90%). This leaves few observations for respondents that identify as lower class (n=56) and upper class (n=34). This limits the ability of this research to reach strong conclusions about those who identify as lower and upper class. The larger number of observations and relatively even distribution of respondents in the working class (n=310), lower-middle class (n=284), and upper-middle class (n=312) provides a more suitable number of observations to analyze these groups. However, the limited number of observations for each group still raises challenges with statistical power making it more difficult for significance tests to detect an effect.

Using data from this survey I will first assess how well objective measures of class align with the class that Americans place themselves in. Then I will analyze the extent to which Americans identify with their class by testing the hypotheses posited here, see Table 2.1 below for summary. I conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of class identity on Americans political attitudes and behavior.

<div align="center">**Table 2.1** Hypotheses Overview</div>

| Name	Hypothesis
Status Hypothesis	Those in a high-status class will be more likely to have a strong class identity than those in a low-status class.
Permeability Hypothesis	Those that have experienced mobility or perceive a high likelihood of mobility will have weaker class identities than those that have not experienced mobility or perceive a low likelihood of mobility.
Ambiguity Hypothesis	Individuals who perceive class membership as unambiguous will have stronger class identities than those who view class membership as ambiguous.

Findings

While measures of class are routinely included in scholarly research, most studies rely on objectives measures of class in which the researcher categorizes individuals into classes based on demographic features that are reputedly a proxy for class (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 2013). The most common demographic features used in objective measures of class are based on income, education, or occupation (e.g. Stonecash 2018; Bartels 2006; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). However, these objective measures often do not align with subjective measures of class where individuals are given the chance to report their class. For example, Sosnaud et al. (2013) find discordance between objective measures of class based on income and respondent's self-placement for as many as a half to two-thirds of respondents in ANES surveys from 1972-2004. In the survey here, I find an even larger disjuncture between the subjective class that respondents place themselves in and the class they would be placed in based on some objective measurements.

Figure 2.2 shows the level of concordance in class identification between objective measures of class based on income quintiles and the subjective class that respondents

identified for themselves. I consider an identity to be concordant when the respondent's subjective class matches the class they would be categorized in using objective measures and discordant when they do not match. There is considerable disjuncture between these measures with more than 70% discordance for the working, middle, and upper classes. The level of discordance is similar for objective measures based on income quartiles (compared to subjective class categories without splitting the middle class) and specific income thresholds used by some class scholars, see Appendix B for these results. This demonstrates a profound failure of objective measures based on income to pinpoint the class that people identify with, making it unlikely that studies using these measures are able to pick up on the effects of class identity. However, as seen in Figure 2.1 above, there remains a clear economic pattern to class identification as higher incomes are more likely to place themselves in a higher class than those with lower incomes.

Note: Objective class measured by income quintile

Figure 2.2: Concordance Between Objective and Subjective Measures of Class.

Objective measures of class based on educational attainment are also at odds with subjective measures. For example, studies such as Bartels (2006;2008) have delineated the working and middle class based on educational attainment, those without a college degree are considered working or lower class and those with a college education are considered middle or upper class. However, this relationship does not map on to the survey here where 47% of those who identify as working class also report having a college degree. This disparity is likely exacerbated by the MTurk survey sample that is known to have higher levels of education than the general public (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). However, the evidence here nonetheless reveals a significant disparity in scholarly expectations of class boundaries and the reality of the class identity held by Americans.[3]

One of the challenges faced by identity scholars is finding a robust and reliable way to gauge the strength of an identity. Several question batteries have been developed and refined to measure identity strength. These batteries ask respondents to report their agreement with questions regarding how important belonging to a group is to their individual identity, how they feel about in-group members, and the extent that they perceive their fates as tied to the fates of the group. The questions used by scholars are often tailored to a specific dimension of identity that is relevant to their research question or been found to be a consequential factor for the group. For instance, race scholars tend to rely on a measure of linked fate to measure racial identity as this dimension has been shown to be consequential for predicting political attitudes (Tate 1994; Bobo et al. 2000; Pérez, Deichert,

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[3] Unfortunately, occupational data could not be used to compare respondents' subjective class with objective measures based on their occupational prestige, a measure commonly used in sociological studies (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992).

and Engelhardt 2019). However, other scholars argue that social identities are better measured as a function of multiple dimensions that are relevant to social identity theory (Abdelal et al. 2006). I measure class identity strength by tapping three dimensions of social identity that have been shown to be consequential for political attitudes and behavior: identity centrality, linked-fate, and group affect.

The extent to which a person views their membership as important to who they are as an individual is what I refer to as identity centrality. To measure identity centrality respondents are asked to report their agreement with three statements on a four-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For example, one prompt states: "In general, being in the (working class) is important to my sense of the kind of person I am."[4] See all statements used to measure class identity strength in Appendix C.

This is an important facet of understanding a class identity because it could be the case that Americans simply do not think of themselves in terms of their class and do not believe it is an important aspect of who they are as an individual. If so, they would be less likely to rely on class identity to inform their attitudes and behavior instead rely on identities based in groups that are important to their self-concept.

Linked fate is the idea that an individual's interests are connected to their group's interest. Identities exhibit greater influence on political attitudes and behavior when a person believes that what happens to other members of their group will have repercussions for themselves (Simon and Klandermans 2001). This dimension should be relevant to class identity and its impact on political behavior because redistributive policies have distinct

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[4] Respondents report their class prior to these batteries so that each statement references the class they identify with.

ramifications based on an individual's economic status. To measure this dimension of class identity, I ask respondents to report their agreement with three questions such as, "Do you think what happens generally to people in the (middle class) in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"

Social identity scholars have produced an extensive collection of evidence that social identities influence the affective perception of members of the in-group and out-group. Strongly identifying with a group leads to more favorable feelings toward members of one's group and at times it can engender negative feelings toward members of an out group (Kinder and Kam 2010). Social identity scholars posit that the mechanism underpinning in-group bias is the desire for positive group distinctiveness. By emphasizing the advantageous attributes of one's group, a person can fortify their own self-esteem by applying those attributes to their individual self-concept (Tajfel 1982). Thus, individuals reporting positive feelings about their class is indicative of a stronger class identity than those who are neutral or hold negative feelings toward their class. To measure group affect, I ask respondents to report agreement to four statements that reflect their affective disposition toward their class such as: "When people praise the (working class) it makes me feel good."

Building a combined scale of all ten questions, tapping multiple dimensions of identity, increases the confidence that the measure represents an accurate picture of class identity strength. I assign a point value to each response option; 1-strongly disagree, 2-somewhat disagree, 3-somewhat agree, 4-strongly agree, higher scores represent a stronger identity. Because some dimensions have more questions than others and there are occasionally missing values for a question, I average the score for each dimension so that each has a standardized range of scores between 1-4. I then construct a composite scale of

class identity strength by calculating the mean for all the three dimensions, for every respondent. This gives me a continuous scale of identity strength with a minimum value of 1 and maximum value of 4.[5]

Contrary to the expectations of some scholars, it appears that many Americans do in fact have a strong class identity. The scale ranges from 1-4 with values greater than 2 representing respondents that on average agree with the statements affirming the significance of their class identity. The distribution of scores is near normal with a slight leftward skew and mean score of 2.84 (SD: 0.58), see Appendix E. This indicates that the average American has a meaningful attachment to their class identity. However, there is significant variation in class identity strength between respondents and classes.

Testing the Status Hypothesis

While the average respondent in this survey affirms the importance of their class identity, there is variation in the strength of class identity by class. As seen in Figure 2.3 there is a positive correlation between class position and class identity strength. Using OLS regression to estimate the effect of respondents' class on class identity strength results in an

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[5] Social identities are a psychological attachment to a group which raises challenges because it is an attempt to measure a something that cannot be directly observed. While the questions used to estimate class identity strength are theoretically grounded in the social identity literature, and similar versions of these questions have been employed and vetted by previous scholars, it is important to verify that the scale developed here is in fact picking up on the underlying dimension that it is intended to measure. If the scale is picking up on the underlying dimension, then we should find that the items used in the scale vary together. To that end the reliability of the class identity strength scale can be assessed using Cronbach alpha to estimate the covariance of the items used to make the scale. Generally, a score at or above .70 is considered to be reliable in most social science disciplines (Zeller and Carmines 1980). The results show that the scale is reliable both at the dimension and combined scale level. All three dimensions vary together with an alpha coefficient of .7728. Additionally, the composite scale is reliable after combining questions from all three dimensions the scale has an alpha coefficient of .8779. Therefore, the scale appears to be picking up on the underlying dimension of class identity strength.

15% increase in class identity strength with each step up the class ladder. The effect remains robust when adding other relevant independent variables to the model such as political party, political ideology, gender, age, and unemployment status, see regression tables in Appendix D.

Figure 2.3: The Effect of Class Position on Class Identity Strength.

Furthermore, subjective class has a larger effect on class identity strength than income and education which are commonly used for objective measures of class, see Table D1 in Appendix D. That it does not correspond to objective measures affirms the importance of understanding class as a social identity. It is a psychological attachment to a group that drives identity strength more than an objective reality of the individual's economic status.

Another confirmation that subjective class position has important ramifications for class identity is the divergence in class identity strength between those with inflated versus

deflated class identities, see Figure 2.4. Those with inflated identities, who identify with a higher class than predicted by income, are more likely to have strong class identities than those with deflated identities, who identify with a lower class than predicted by income. This suggests that the effect of ones perceived class and status are more important to class identity than their material reality.[6]

Figure 2.4: The Effect of Discordant Class Identity on Class Identity Strength.

That class identity strength increases alongside class position confirms expectations from social identity theory that individuals more readily embrace identities based in higher status groups. This effect may be driven by individuals' need for positive self-esteem which can be gained via the groups they identify with. This is not to say that members of one class

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[6] Regression estimates show a 10% increase in class identity strength for those with inflated identities (p= 0.011) and a -6% decrease in class identity strength for those with a deflated identity (p= 0.089). While the overlapping confidence intervals indicate we should take caution in drawing firm conclusions about this effect, the estimates reach marginal significance at the p<.10 level, so we can reasonably reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect.

are intrinsically better than members of another class. However, class has a built-in hierarchy such that those in the higher classes have, and are perceived to have, more resources at their disposal and more power in society (Haddon 2019). These are advantages that any individual would reasonably desire and aspire to obtain. The self-esteem gained from belonging to a higher class may be particularly acute in American society that emphasizes social mobility through individual's hard work and merit (Adair 2001).

Testing the Permeability and Ambiguity Hypotheses

Drawing on social identity theory I expect that class identity strength will be conditioned by perceived permeability of class boundaries and the ambiguity of class membership. Those who perceive the boundaries of class to be permeable, and a person can move between classes, will have a weaker class identity than those that feel fixed in their current class. Similarly, those that perceive class boundaries as unambiguous will be more likely to internalize their class identity resulting in stronger class identities.

Respondents were asked two questions to gauge their perception of boundary permeability. First, they were asked to report if they grew up in the same class that they belong to now or if they have experienced mobility over their lifetime and then they were asked to report the likelihood of their child growing up to be in the same or a different class. To estimate perceptions the ambiguity of group membership, respondents were asked to report their agreement to the statement: "When you meet someone for the first time, can you usually determine what class they belong to?"

I find that both experienced mobility and the perception of likely child mobility, weakens respondents' class identity, see Figure 2.5. Using OLS regression to estimate the

effect of these variables on class identity strength, I find that individuals that have experienced mobility at some point in their life saw a 22% reduction in class identity strength, see table D2 in Appendix D for full results. Those who believed their child would belong to a different class than they belong to now saw a 14.5% decrease in class identity strength for each increment increase in the perceived likelihood of their child's mobility.

Individuals who perceive class membership as ambiguous have a weaker class identity than those who view membership as unambiguous. For each incremental increase in the likelihood that an individual can determine someone's class, class identity strength increases by 19.5%. Taken together these findings confirm the role of these factors in moderating class identity strength.

Figure 2.5: The Effect of Boundary Permeability and Ambiguity of Membership on Class Identity Strength.

The findings from this analysis confirm the posited hypotheses, summarized in Table 2.2 below. I find that class identity strength increases with class position such that individuals in higher classes are more likely to have a strong class identity than individuals in the class

below them. This may be a function of self-esteem as a putatively higher-status class may imbue individuals with a sense of importance. This effect may be amplified by the American ethos that venerates wealth and promotes the idea that one can raise their social status if they work hard enough. While today there is less opportunity for social mobility in the US, those that have experienced mobility or perceive opportunity for future mobility are less likely to embrace their class identity. This raises barriers to the development of strong class identities for those in the lower and working class and may decrease the extent that class identity plays a role in their political attitude and behavior.

Table 2.2 Hypotheses Outcome

Name	Hypothesis	Outcome
Status Hypothesis	Those in a high-status class will be more likely to have a strong class identity than those in a low-status class.	Confirmed
Permeability Hypothesis	Those that have experienced mobility or perceive a high likelihood of mobility will have weaker class identities than those that have not experienced mobility or perceive a low likelihood of mobility.	Confirmed
Ambiguity Hypothesis	Individuals who perceive class membership as unambiguous will have stronger class identities than those who view class membership as ambiguous.	Confirmed

Discussion

These findings have important implications for political behavior and may shed light on other research that shows how perceptions of mobility influence political attitudes on redistributive politics. When individuals believe in the prospect for future upward mobility, they are less supportive of policies that redistribute wealth in a way that would benefit them in their current economic position (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Benabou and Ok 2001). This finding coupled with the findings here indicates that individuals that perceive future

social mobility, are more likely to have a weak class identity and will thus be less likely take up collective action with their class to advance the group's interests. Further, weaker class identity among the lower and working classes may reduce the likelihood of these groups from taking up collective action to address issues such as growing economic inequality.

Awareness of the social position of one's class and acting collectively to advance the group's interests is reminiscent of Marx's idea of class consciousness (Marx and Engels 1848). Research has shown that social identities increase the likelihood of a group acting collectively to advance a shared interest (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Therefore, we would expect that those with strong class identities would be more likely to act collectively to advance the interests of their class.

To assess this proposition, respondents were asked to rate the importance of their class working together to achieve their political goals. While I find no significant differences in responses by class, there is a significant positive correlation with class identity strength, see Table D3 in Appendix D. As can be seen in Figure 2.6, those with stronger class identities were more likely to believe in the importance of working together with their class to reach their goals.

*Class consciousness question: How important is it for members of your class to work together to achieve your political goals?

Figure 2.6: The Effect of Class Identity on the Perceived Importance of Acting Collectively to Advance the Interests of One's Class.

This suggests that class identity has important implications for Americans' political behavior. In light of the unabated growth in economic inequality and concentration of wealth into the hands of the few, it is unlikely to be addressed without collective action taken by those in the working and lower class. However, weak class identities raise a barrier for these groups to work together to advance the interests of their class. All the while, stronger class identities among the economically advantaged classes may increase the likelihood that individuals act in accordance with their class interests to oppose the redistribution of resources or forfeit political power.

However, the research here cannot speak to the ability for political elites to raise the salience of class identity and increase the likelihood of a class-based collective action. It may be that politicians appealing to the lower and working class are able to change the way voters perceive and leverage their class identity to inform their political behavior. In the following

two chapters, I will examine this possibility through an original survey experiment that

manipulates the salience of class identity in an electoral context and observes the

ramifications for respondents' vote choice.

Chapter 3: The Electoral Implications of Class Identity

Introduction

  In a representative democracy, the linkages between political candidates and voters are of paramount importance. Through elections, voters wield the power to choose the leaders of government and hold incumbents accountable for their actions in office. Democratic theory relies on the proposition that a majority of voters will elect candidates who will in turn deliver on their campaign promises by advancing policy that bolsters the interests of the people. In practice, this requires that the electorate be able to align themselves with candidates that promote policy that is beneficial to their interests. However, scholars have raised questions regarding the extent to which this condition is met by American voters as many support candidates who promote policies that are directly at odds with their economic interests (Bartels 2016).

  The expectation that a voters' behavior will align with their economic interests assumes a level of knowledge regarding how policy outcomes impact their financial wellbeing. However, the public tends to have limited knowledge regarding the effect policy (Macdonald 2020). In lieu of such knowledge, voters can bring their behavior in line with their interests by relying on psychological shortcuts, such as cues from a group they identify with, to inform their decision at the ballot box. For example, identities based in a political party are commonly employed by voters to inform their behavior while lowering the cognitive burden of assessing each individual candidate (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004).

A long line of research has demonstrated the importance of identity to voter behavior including identities based in groups such as political party, ethnicity, gender, and religion (Campbell et al. 1960). Yet a there is a paucity of research examining the role of class identity on electoral behavior, despite compelling reasons to expect it to be a relevant factor. Class, however it is defined, is fundamentally linked to a person's economic standing and thus members of a class share similar incentives on redistributive policy. However, Americans do not seem to vote along class lines, particularly in comparison to other advanced democracies (Evans 2000; Evans and Tilley 2012). Moreover, inconsistencies between voters' economic interest and vote choice are prevalent for Americans across the economic spectrum. A portion of wealthy citizens vote for candidates who promote redistributive programs that would increase their tax burden and a portion of poor citizens vote for candidates who promote lowering taxes on the rich and cutting the redistributive programs they benefit from. This raises questions regarding the extent to which Americans rely on their class identity to inform their political behavior. It may be the case that Americans view class as irrelevant to politics and therefore rely on other identities to inform their behavior.

In an era of growing economic inequality, the inconsistent voting behavior for the poor seems to have the most sweeping consequences. On a host of economic policies, the working class would gain more economic benefits from the redistributive policies promoted by the Democratic party and yet in seven of the last ten presidential elections, a majority of Whites in the working class supported Republican candidates who promoted policies that would by most accounts exacerbate the disparity of wealth between the working and upper

class.[7] Additionally, survey data from PEW shows that a majority of Americans, support the idea that the government should do more to limit economic inequality, are supportive of a broad range of redistributive policies, and among those with lower-income, view reducing inequality as a "top priority" (Horowitz, Igielnik, and Kochhar 2020). The inconsistency between these opinions and Americans' voting behavior raise questions as to why so many lower-income Americans support candidates that do not align with their values and interests.

The voluminous literature on voting behavior has demonstrated the central role of identity to voter preferences (Huddy 2013; Druckman and Lupia 2016; Kalin and Sambanis 2018). The human brain has limited information-processing capacity and are thus designed to be "cognitive misers," unconsciously finding shortcuts to reduce the cognitive burden of complex tasks (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Due to the vast amount of information pertinent to making electoral decisions, voters rely on mental shortcuts, called heuristics, to lower the cognitive burden associated with deciding who to support (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Redlawsk 2002; 2004). When salient to the electoral context, identities serve as heuristic mechanism that voters subconsciously rely on to inform their decision (Wade and Richardson 2021). Candidates can leverage the effect of identities by appealing to groups that people identify with to increase their support from the targeted group (Bishin 2009; Thau 2021; Stephens-Dougan 2021). However, few studies directly examine campaign appeals made to identities based in class. This is a surprising dearth in our knowledge considering the prominent role of identity in electoral behavior and the disparate impact of economic policy for people belonging to different classes.

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[7] Based on data from the ANES 1980–2016; CCES 2012–2016, see Carnes and Lupu (2020).

The research here is well positioned to examine the extent to which class identity informs Americans' voting behavior. I utilize a conjoint experiment that presents respondents with information about two hypothetical candidates running for the U.S. House of Representatives and asks them to vote for their preferred candidate. The research here makes several contributions to our understanding of class and electoral behavior. First, I demonstrate the extent to which Americans utilize class identity to inform their political behavior. Up to this point, scholars have speculated that Americans do not have a politically meaningful class identity (Dalton 1996; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). However, I find that many do identify with a class and that it can consequential for their political behavior under certain conditions.

Second, this is the only study to my knowledge to incorporate a measure of class identity strength to the study electoral behavior. I find that gradations of class identity strength are an important component to understanding the extent to which class identity influences vote choice, for some groups. Those in the working and lower-middle class with a strong class identity are more likely to consider the candidates economic background and are more sensitive to appeals made to class, than those with a weak class identity.

Finally, I contribute to the growing number of studies utilizing a conjoint design to study elections by including a novel attribute that contains a candidate quote which cues various group identities. Conjoint designs have a number of advantageous features, one of which is the ability to estimate the causal effect of a treatment in a multi-dimensional context. This allows me to examine the influence of class identity in context where multiple identities are present, instead of priming identities in isolation, as is the more common

approach in experimental research.[8] While this design produces more conservative results, it is more consistent with the experience of a real election where voters are likely to encounter cues to multiple groups. Overall, this method provides a more robust test of the influence of class identity on vote choice as respondents may rely on other identities that are also potentially salient to their decision.

The results indicate that class identity is consequential for Americans' vote choice, but the effect is conditioned by the electoral context, the voter's class, and the extent to which the voter has a psychological attachment to their class. The evidence here shows that class identity is influential for those in the working class, who have strong class identities, who are more supportive of candidates that share their class background and express symbolic support for the working class. However, class identity appears to be less consequential for the voting behavior of the middle class and more context dependent for the upper class. The findings have important implications for the representation of the working class in government and the strategies adopted by campaigns seeking to advance their interests.

Literature Review

Social identities are the part of an individual's self-concept that are derived from their membership to a group (Tajfel 1982). While social identity theory was originally developed and studied in the field of psychology, political scientists have since applied it to the study of politics and uncovered the central role these identities play in the formation of political

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[8] One notable exception is Klar (2013) who primes multiple identities, with competing interest, to assess the efficacy of different framing strategies on support for relevant policy proposals.

attitudes and motivating political behavior. Social identities can generate political cohesion

through a shared outlook and conformity to group norms regarding political activity (Huddy

2003; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Salient social identities make individuals more likely to

engage in a variety of political activities such as voting and volunteering for a campaign,

increase the likelihood of group members taking up collective action, and increase

knowledge of policies pertinent to the groups interests (Fowler and Kam 2007; Simon and

Klandermans 2001; Bishin 2009).

Not all social identities have political repercussions. People may be categorized into

many groups based on their relevant attributes, but not all are considered social identities. To

be considered a social identity the individual must form an affective attachment to their

group and internalize membership with the group and apply it to their self-concept (Tajfel

and Turner 1979; Brewer 2001). Social identities can become politically consequential once

the identity becomes salient to a political context (Bishin and Muttram 2023). Some

identities, such as partisan identity, are chronically salient to American politics while others

are irrelevant. There are compelling reasons to expect that class identity would be strongly

connected to electoral politics.

Class, however it is defined, is fundamentally linked to a person's economic standing

and thus members of a class share similar incentives on redistributive policy. Classic political

philosophers, such as Karl Marx, centered their work around class cleavages and theorized

something akin to what would today be considered a political identity in that it is a way that

groups recognize their shared political interests and act collectively to advance them, what he

terms "class-consciousness" (Marx and Engels 1848). According to democratic theory, in a

system where political power resides with the people, advancing the interests of a group can

be achieved through the election of sympathetic representatives who in turn seek to enact policy germane to the group's interests. Scholars have long seen politics through the class lens arguing that elections are the "democratic translation of the class struggle" (Lipset 1960, pg. 220). We might then expect class identity to play a prominent role in informing voting behavior and result in electoral coalitions built around class cleavages with voters aligning with candidates that promote policy inline with the interests of the class groups they represent.

However, Americans do not vote along class lines to the same extent as in other advanced democracies (Evans 2000; Evans and Tilley 2012). Further, many Americans support candidates and policies that are at odds with the interests of their class. This raises questions regarding the extent to which Americans rely on class identity to inform their political behavior. It may be the case that Americans view their class as irrelevant to politics and therefore rely on other identities to inform their behavior. Or they may connect their class identity to politics but when elites cue other identities it raises the salience of identities based in other groups, increasing the likelihood that voters place primacy on those identities to inform their attitudes and behavior.

Class may receive less attention in part due to the ambiguity of class boundaries resulting in a higher cognitive burden for voters to decern a candidate's class background, compared to less ambiguous identities such as a candidate's race or gender that are more readily apparent. This may raise the salience of identities based in groups with more conspicuous boundaries that voters can easily connect to a candidate and in turn provide a heuristic to inform their behavior based on their own identity with the respective category. However, campaigns and the media often do present information regarding a candidate's

economic background and framing candidates in this way can shift opinions about a candidates characteristics, likability, and competence (McDonald, Karol, and Mason 2019; Carnes and Lupu 2016; Carnes and Sadin 2015).

The extent to which information regarding a candidate's class background is received by the public is unclear and the reliability of such information is questionable. When candidates do mention their economic backgrounds, they tend to over-emphasize experienced hardships and use vague terminology, such as poor or hard-working, in lieu of identifying their class by name (Carnes and Sadin 2015). This may in part explain why Americans also vastly underestimate the disparity in wealth between the public and their representatives in government (Carnes and Lupu 2022). However, it remains unclear to what extent class identity informs preferences for candidates based on their economic background.

There are important reasons to research the relationship between class identity and electoral behavior. Social identities lead members to view fellow group members (in-group) more positively and in some instances harbor negative feelings toward non-group (out-group) members (Kinder 2013). Research shows that voters are more likely to be mobilized in elections where an in-group member is on the ballot and are more likely to support the in-group candidate (Barreto 2007; Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2012). Therefore, if class identity is a relevant factor for voters, we should see higher levels of support for in-class candidates that share a voter's class and lower levels of support for out-class candidates that belong to a different class.

There is some supporting evidence for this proposition based on observational studies that show a positive correlation between the number of working class voters and the

number of representatives from working class backgrounds (Carnes 2016). Other research

shows an increased likelihood of support for candidates from "low-status" occupations

among working class voters (Carnes and Sadin 2015; McDermott 2009). These findings

suggest that class identity may play a role in shaping voter behavior, but it remains unclear to

what extent a candidates class has a direct effect on vote choice and how that is conditioned

by the voters class identity and the electoral context.[9] If class identity is relevant to

Americans' political behavior, we should see increased likelihood of support for candidates

when they share a voter's class. Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis:

Shared Identity Hypothesis: Voters are more likely to support candidates that belong to

their class.

A wealth of research on social identities has demonstrated the near ubiquity of in-

group favoritism in a variety of contexts, but social identity theory also predicts that

identities may promote hostility toward the out-group (Tajfel 1982). However, antipathy

toward an out-group does not occur with the same regularity as in-group favoritism and

appears to be more contextual than in-group favoritism, such as feeling threatened by an

out-group which leads to greater out-group hostility (Caporael and Brewer 2006; Brader,

Valentino, and Suhay 2008). The extent to which Americans view members of their own

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[9] There is also the potential that class provides voters with in-direct cues regarding candidate traits such as their competency. For example, an upper class candidate may be perceived as more experienced in financial matters and therefore more competent in handling the national economy. The experiment used here cannot directly address the potential that voters perceive upper class candidates as more competent or working class candidates as less competent on economic policy. However, as I discuss in more detail below, upper class candidates do not fare well among respondents from all class backgrounds, suggesting that candidates from higher-status classes are not viewed as more competent than those from a lower-status class.

class more favorably is not well understood but there is mounting evidence that Americans hold unfavorable views toward those in the upper class. Economic inequality has grown unabated for decades and there is evidence of rising populistic sentiment among Americans, particularly those considered to be in the working class, who are antagonistic toward those in positions of economic and political power (Saez and Zucman 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017).

Public opinion research has demonstrated that Americans have unfavorable views toward the "undeserving rich" who are prospering while opportunities for higher paying jobs and public goods decline (McCall 2013; Piston 2018). This suggests that candidates from the upper class may be particularly vulnerable to backlash based on their class background compared to candidates from the working or middle classes. Other experimental research supports this proposition as candidates from white-collar professions and higher incomes underperform among American and UK respondents compared to candidates from working class occupations (Carnes and Lupu 2016). Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis:

Aversion to the Rich Hypothesis: Voters are less likely to support candidates from the upper class than candidates from the working or middle classes.

However, it is not clear if Americans' negative disposition toward the rich is informed by their class identity or some other factor. To gain leverage on this question I examine the role of identity strength. Research in psychology on social identity and self-categorization theory demonstrates the influence of category salience in shaping preferences (Brewer 1979). When people are categorized into groups, even those based on arbitrary

factors such as shared preference for an artist, it can facilitate in-group favoritism and bias toward the out-group (Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig and Tajfel 1973). However, subsequent research shows that the effect of identity on behavior is conditioned by the strength of the identity (Perreault and Bourhis 1999; Noel, Wann, and Branscombe 1995; Huddy 2001).

Identity strength can be thought of as the extent to which people place importance on their membership in a group to their individual identity. Identities that are more important to an individual's self-concept are thought to be more easily accessible and therefore more likely to inform behavior (Morris 2013). Strong identities have a greater influence on attitudes and behavior than weak identities (Huddy 2013; Fowler and Kam 2007; Huddy and Khatib 2007). For example, Blacks who strongly identify with their racial group are more likely to support policies that are perceived to benefit blacks as a group, than blacks with weaker racial identity (Tate 1994). Other research finds that strong identities are more likely to foster hostility toward out-groups and defensiveness for members of the in-group (Simon and Klandermans 2001; Kinder and Kam 2010).

If class identity is relevant to Americans' political behavior, it should be most influential in informing the preferences and behavior for those with the strongest class identity. It may be the case then that the inconsistency we see in class voting behavior is a result of Americans having weaker class identities than voters in other advanced democracies and are therefore less likely to rely on their class identity to inform their political behavior. Or it may be that class identity is simply not perceived as relevant to the political context and even strong identifiers do not utilize their class identity as a heuristic to inform their political attitudes and behavior. Therefore, I offer the identity strength hypothesis:

Identity Strength Hypothesis: Voters who strongly identify with their class will be more likely to support in-class candidates and candidates that appeal to their class, than voters who weakly identify with their class.

Beyond scholarly accounts regarding the importance of social identities to politics, political elites seem to believe they are consequential as well. Candidates frequently appeal to groups that voters identify with and campaigns regularly distribute signs that signal a connection between a candidate and a group such as "Veterans for Biden" or "Moms for Romney" etc. Research suggests that appealing to groups is a way for candidates to strategically raise their support from voters that identify with the group and potentially gain some "slack" for divergent policy preferences (Dickson and Scheve 2006). Appealing to identity groups is a more efficient way for candidates to raise support among voters, who more reliably turnout to vote than strategies that involve appealing to the average or median voter (Bishin 2009). When campaigns appeal to a group, they activate identity for individuals who have an attachment to the group, making the identity salient to their context and leading to preference formation informed by considerations of the group's interests.

However, research shows that the effectiveness of these appeals is conditioned by the content of the appeal and the context in which it is received. For example, Hersh and Schaffner (2013) find that candidates can also lose support when they mistarget their appeal and signal support for a group to which the recipient does not belong. While appealing to groups can increase a candidates vote share from the targeted group, they carry a risk of alienating members of a relevant out-group. This may lead candidates to hesitate appealing to certain groups, especially if they are reliant on support from an out-group for electoral

success. For example, research shows that candidates make symbolic and substantive appeals to racial minority groups, only when the appeals are unlikely to be received by whites (Nteta and Schaffner 2013). Campaigns may be hesitant to appeal to a class if they believe it could decrease their vote share among members of another class. This may disproportionally limit willingness of candidates to appeal to the working class, who turnout to vote at lower rates than those in the middle and upper class (Franko, Kelly, and Witko 2016).

When appealing to groups, candidates may directly connect the interests of the group to a policy, such as appealing to parents by promoting a policy that advances their interests, such as universal pre-K education. Research shows that connecting a group interest to an appeal has a greater chance of increasing support from the relevant group, but candidates then increase the risk of repelling voters that oppose the policy (Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2010; Hersh and Schaffner 2013). Consequently, campaign appeals to groups are often symbolic and offer little clarification regarding what they will do to advance the group's interest and instead prefer to leave ambiguity regarding specific policy that will advance the groups interest (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009; Klar 2013).

In this experiment the appeals made to groups are symbolic and do not make a connection to a specific interest or policy objective. This signals that the candidate is an ally of the group without offering a substantive interest that will be advanced. While symbolic appeals may be less informative to the voter, they offer a better test of the mechanisms behind the influence of identity and, to the extent possible, avoid conflating the effect of identity with the influence of self-interest. It also bolsters the external validity of the study as symbolic appeals are common in American campaigns because they give candidates the

opportunity to raise their level of support from the targeted group but maintain ambiguity around policy positions that may alienate some voters.

While there is an abundance of studies that examine campaign appeals to various groups, the literature is scant on research examining appeals made to class. The studies that do exist are primarily focused on countries outside the US, which have unique cultures and histories with class, but these studies can offer some clues as to what we can expect in the study here. Research examining the effect of class appeals in the UK found that parties appealing to voters' class can increase the "class gap" or the extent that the electorate votes along class lines (Thau 2021). While fewer studies examine the impact of symbolic class appeals in the US, one notable exceptions is Robison, Stubager, Thau, and Tilley (2021) who employ a vignette experiment design to test the impact of making symbolic appeals to the American and Danish working class. They find that appealing to the working class has a polarizing effect in which working class respondents become more favorable of candidates appealing to their class, while middle and upper class respondents are unmoved or become less favorable of the candidate.

Unlike the Robison et al. experiment, the experiment here includes an appeal to the middle class as well as the working class and requires respondents to vote for one of two candidates in a matchup. This provides an opportunity to examine the effect of a class-based appeal in a context that reflects a decision in an actual election. However, I expect that there will be a similar pattern in support for candidates that appeal to class such that appealing to a respondent's class increases the likelihood of support for the candidate while appeals made to an out-class will lower the likelihood of getting the respondent's vote. Therefore, I offer the class polarization hypothesis:

Class Polarization Hypothesis: Candidates that appeal to a class will increase their vote share among voters from the targeted class, but their vote share will remain the same or decrease among voters from a non-targeted class.

Early accounts of social identity theory predicted out-group animosity as a way for individuals to increase the positive distinctiveness of their in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Subsequent research found that out-group animosity is more prevalent among low-status groups and when individuals perceive a threat to their groups status, which increases conformity to group norms and promotes hostility to an out-group (Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers 1997; Brewer 1979).[10] Additionally, evidence suggests that members of a low-status group are more likely to favor outcomes that adversely damage the perceived status of the higher-status out-group (Leach and Spears 2008). These findings suggest that campaigns can increase the salience of a social identity and the likelihood that members adhere to group norms by signaling a threat to the group's status. Other research has demonstrated the strong influence of negative emotional appeals in predicting candidate support and the increasing frequency of negative campaigns in American elections (Brader 2006; Fowler and Ridout 2013).

While American political elites may be hesitant to negatively depict a class by name, there are many examples of negative rhetoric using terms that may be euphemistically

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[10] Although the reaction to threat toward a low-status group may be conditioned by the extent to which group boundaries are permeable and unambiguous (Scheepers and Ellemers 2005). Individuals in low-status groups tend to respond to group threat more defensively when membership in the group is clearly identifiable and cannot be changed e.g. race (Jackson et al. 1996a). Individuals may perceive membership in their class group as opaque and fluid and therefore may avoid considering their class identity in a context where the group status is threatened.

tethered to class, such as rich or poor. These negative appeals may raise the salience of class

identity and foster considerations regarding the interests of the recipient's class. For

example, portraying the rich as corrupting the political process may be perceived as a threat

to the political efficacy of those in a lower-status class as well as elevating the moral

superiority of the less well off. A notable example of such tactics can be found in Bernie

Sanders campaign in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries. Sanders centered his

campaign on grievances toward the "billionaire class" and the ways in which the wealthy

corrupt the political system. Some have argued that his support among the working class is a

result of his rhetoric that negatively portrayed the rich (Piston 2018).

While it is possible that appeals to the rich and poor may not raise the salience of

class identity, this type of rhetoric is often interpreted as a class-based appeal by scholars and

the media. Piston (2018) centers his study on "class attitudes" by analyzing the use of terms,

rich and poor, in open-ended questions from the ANES (1992-2008). He finds that

Americans regularly consider the relevance of economic groups such as the rich and poor in

responses to questions about politics and that respondents are significantly more likely to

feel sympathy toward the poor and resentment toward the rich (pg. 48-50). Further, Piston

shows that when candidates send clear signals to voters regarding their allegiance to the poor

over the rich, they increase support from those that have sympathy for the poor and

resentment for the rich. He finds these dispositions strongly predict the probability of voting

for Obama in 2012 and favorability toward Sanders in the 2016 Democratic Primary (pg.

114-120).

Other evidence such as studies examining feeling thermometer ratings toward social

groups supports the idea that Americans generally feel substantial warmth toward the poor

(Bartels 2016). However, subgroups of the poor may be viewed unfavorably if they are framed as lazy or lacking a strong work ethic by the media or political elites (Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004; Rose and Baumgartner 2013).

It remains unclear if, or to what extent, appeals to the rich and poor activates class identity. Because class is tethered to economic position, I would expect that those in the working class would feel aligned with the poor and those in the upper class would feel more aligned with the rich. If rhetoric regarding the rich and poor raises the salience of class identity, we would expect that candidate messages containing negative sentiment toward the rich would increase support among those in the working class and decrease support among those in the upper class. On the other hand, candidates that negatively portray the poor should increase their level of support from the upper class and decrease support from those in the working class.[11]

It is less clear which group the middle class would feel more closely affiliated with but considering the broad bias against the rich in public opinion research, it is reasonable to expect that the middle class would feel more aligned with, or at minimum, sympathetic

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[11] Campaign rhetoric that negatively portrays the poor is perhaps less obvious than the anti-rich rhetoric observed in the Sanders campaign, but negative portrayals of the poor have featured prominently in modern campaigns. A noteworthy shift came in the 1960's in response to President Johnson's "war on poverty" that centered the blame for poverty on societal failure and sought to expand opportunities for the poor. Subsequently elites in the Republican party began to reframe poverty as a symptom of moral failure and pinned the blame on an individual's actions such as, having children out of wedlock, drug abuse, and laziness. Negative portrayals of the poor took on a national prominence during the 1976 Republican primary where Ronald Reagan regularly highlighted an example of welfare fraud which the media would begin referring to as "welfare queens". This framing changed the discourse surrounding poverty programs and the poor among candidates from both parties including candidates that generally favored the programs. Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign that pledged to "end welfare as we have come to know it" and would go on to negotiate the "The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act" with Republicans in Congress. The Act would add work requirements and other limitations that targeted abuse of the programs. This framing of the poor would permeate into the media who frequently and increasingly portray the poor as lazy and undeserving of assistance (Rose and Baumgartner 2013).

toward the poor. Crucially, if the effect of these negative-valence appeals is driven by class identity, rather than self-interest or another mechanism, we should see a larger effect from those with a strong class identity than those with weak class identities. Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis:

Negative Valence Hypothesis: Candidates that deride the rich will increase their vote share among the working class and decrease their vote share among the upper class. Candidates that deride the poor will increase their vote share among the upper class and decrease their vote share among the working class. Change in vote share will be greater among those with strong class identities relative to their peers with weak class identities.

Up to this point we do not have a clear picture of how class identity informs political behavior. Testing the five hypotheses posited here will increase our understanding of how class identity influences Americans' voting behavior, see Table 3.1 below for summary of the hypotheses. This will give us leverage on questions stemming from puzzling findings that show Americans vote along class lines at lower rates than we might expect and often vote for candidates that promote policy that degrades their economic interests. These observations may be symptomatic of a limited role played by class identity in informing the political attitudes and behavior of Americans.

Table 3.1. Hypotheses Overview

Name	Hypothesis
Shared Identity Hypothesis	Voters are more likely to support candidates that belong to their class.
Aversion to the Rich Hypothesis	Voters are less likely to support candidates from the upper class than candidates from the working or middle class.
Identity Strength Hypothesis	Voters who strongly identify with their class will be more likely to support in-class candidates and candidates that appeal to their class, than voters who weakly identify with their class.
Class Polarization Hypothesis:	Candidates that appeal to a class will increase their vote share among voters from the targeted class, but their vote share will remain the same or decrease among voters from a non-targeted class.
Negative Valence Hypothesis	Candidates that deride the rich will increase their vote share among the working class and decrease their vote share among the upper class. Candidates that deride the poor will increase their vote share among the upper class and decrease their vote share among the working class. Change in vote share will be greater among those with strong class identities relative to their peers with weak class identities.

Methods

      To examine the relationship between class, identity, and electoral behavior, I conducted a conjoint survey experiment recruiting 1,094 respondents from Amazon's Mturk who completed the survey on the Qualtrics platform. The conjoint design has several advantageous features for the examination of electoral behavior. They have become increasingly popular in political science research as they allow researchers to examine behavior in a multidimension context. This makes conjoint experiments well positioned to provide leverage on questions regarding the role of identity in a context where multiple identity cues are present.

Respondents will be presented with a series of matchups between two hypothetical candidates running for a seat in the House of Representatives and must "vote" for one of the two candidates. For each matchup the respondent is provided with a table comparing seven attributes of two hypothetical candidates. Each attribute can take on a set of possible values (levels) associated with it for example, the attribute Gender has two levels and can take on the value of male or female. See Table F1 in Appendix F, for a breakdown of each attribute and level used in the experiment.

The key to the effectiveness of a conjoint experiment is the random selection of attribute levels. Randomizing the value that an attribute takes for each matchup allows the researcher to estimate the causal effect of moving between two levels within an attribute, averaged across the values of the other attributes. Because every potential value of an attribute is randomly drawn and has an equal chance to appear in the candidate profile, researchers can estimate the effect of changing values within one attribute (e.g. the effect of going from a male candidate to a female candidate) as if all other attribute values are held constant.

By including attributes that provide respondents with information about the candidates' class and other characteristics, I am able to examine change in support based on a candidate's class, race, sex, and political party. Additionally, the candidate quote attribute allows me to manipulate cues designed to raise the salience of particular identities. I can then break down the respondent sample into categories based on their class, race, sex, or political party and observe the interaction between identity and support for candidates with corresponding traits. While this is not an exhaustive list of identities that may be relevant to the American voter, I include race, sex, and political party because identities based in these

groups are chronically salient to American elections (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kam, Archer, and Geer 2017; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).

It is possible that when making political decisions voters place more importance on belonging to certain groups than they place on their class and therefore the influence of an individual's class identity is mitigated by considerations based in these groups. While this likely dampens the measurable effect of the class treatments, making it more difficult to evoke statistically significant results, it is important to examine voter behavior in a multidimensional context that is more reflective of a real election. We can learn much about the nature of identities from studies that manipulate the salience of a single identity in isolation. However, these studies are limited by the fact that people have identities based in multiple groups and candidates often prime multiple, sometimes competing, identities that are not mutually exclusive (Klar 2013). Using the conjoint design allows me to emulate a context that is closer to what voters' encounter in a real election where multiple identities may be relevant to their decision.

Though the conjoint design has multiple beneficial qualities, the validity and utility of a conjoint experiment relies on several key design features. Poorly constructed designs can bias the results and damage both the internal and external validity of the experiment. Appendix H details various key design features of this experiment and discusses their implication for the results.

Before respondents are presented with the candidate matchups, they are asked to report demographic information and answer questions regarding identities based in class, race, gender, and political party. The most pertinent of these group identities for the research here is information on the respondent's class identity.

Respondents first indicate their class by choosing between the options of lower class, working class, middle class, and upper class. Prior research has shown that, compared to categorizations based on objective measures of class, Americans are disproportionately likely to consider themselves as part of the middle class (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 2013). However, social identities are a psychological attachment to a group, so the subjective perception of one's class is more germane to questions regarding class identity, than objective measures imposed by the researcher. However, this creates a middle class with a broad range of income levels such that there are divergent economic interests within the middle class between those at either end of the economic spectrum. Such divergent interest within one group may limit the extent that the middle class can cohere around shared goals.

In the American Class Identity Survey, discussed in the prior chapter, I find noteworthy differences in the reported income of respondents that identify themselves as lower-middle class compared to those in the upper-middle class, see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. Perceptions regarding the boundaries of the middle class (such as level of income) among the middle class are influenced by an individual's own income, with higher income earners perceiving higher income among the middle class. These differences in the perceived group boundaries may influence the extent that respondents rely on their class identity to inform their decisions. For example, a candidate using anti-rich rhetoric may raise the salience of

class identity for those in the upper-middle class but not those in the lower-middle who may not feel threatened by such a message.

For the sake of external validity, I use the term "middle class" in the experimental treatments as it is the more commonly used term. However, in the following analyses, I estimate the effect of the experiment treatments for respondents that identified themselves as lower-middle class and upper-middle class separately to examine potential differences between the effects of treatments for those at either end of the middle class.

After answering the demographic questions respondents are presented with questions to gauge the strength of their identity with various groups based on class, race, gender, and partisanship. Research shows that the impact of a social identity on political behavior varies based on the extent to which a person places importance on belonging to a group to their self-concept (Huddy 2003). For the identity groups examined here, I include question batteries that have been validated in prior studies to measure identity strength for gender, race, and political party (Pérez, Deichert, and Engelhardt 2019; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). For class I utilize the question battery developed in the previous chapter. Each battery consists of a set of questions that ask participants to report their agreement on a four-point scale from strongly disagree [1] to strongly agree [4]. For example, "Being a member of the middle class is important to how I see myself." OR "Generally speaking, do you think that what happens to white people in this country will have something to do with

what happens in your life?" I then calculate the mean for each battery at the respondent level to create an identity strength scale that is a continuous variable ranging from 1-4.[12]

While these question batteries are important to the analysis, they could potentially bias the results of the experimental treatments. Asking questions related to identities likely raises the salience of those identities before the respondents are exposed to the treatments included in the candidate matchups. The conventional wisdom is to avoid asking questions that may bias results of an experimental treatment by asking the questions after respondents complete the experiment. However, moving the identity batteries after the experiment introduces the possibility of treatment effects that could bias answers to the identity batteries.

Due to the sensitive nature of identity priming, deciding on the placement of these question batteries is acutely difficult for identity scholars (Klar, Leeper, and Robison 2020). Researchers must weigh the tradeoffs of priming identities to determine the optimal placement for their study. I chose to ask the identity questions prior to the candidate matchups. However, I aim to limit the potential priming bias of any one identity, by including multiple identity batteries in the pretest. To limit potential order-effects induced by biasing the respondent to emphasize the identity that was most recently asked about, I randomize the order they are asked for each respondent. That way if order effects do occur, they should be mitigated in the full sample.

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[12] The interitem covariance of this scale are internally reliable with a Cronbach alpha score of .78. That the question responses covary together suggests that the scale is picking up on the underlying dimension of class identity strength.

After the pretest, respondents were presented with a table comparing two candidates running for Congress and asked to vote for their preferred candidate. The table included seven attributes: party, race, economic background, sex, government experience, work experience, and a candidate quote. Each attribute can take on one of two or more potential values (also referred to as levels) that are randomly selected for each matchup. The number of levels for an attribute range from 2 (sex) to 9 (candidate statement). See Appendix F for breakdown of each attribute and level.

After voting for one of the candidates, respondents were presented with the next, randomly generated, candidate matchup. Altogether respondents participated in 15 iterations of candidate matchups. A total of 1,094 respondents completed the experiment, each saw 15 matchups and evaluated 30 candidates, resulting in a total 32,820 observations.

Analyzing Conjoint Data

To analyze the results of the conjoint experiment, I primarily rely on analysis of the marginal means (MM) for each attribute level. Marginal means are the mean outcome for each attribute level, averaging across all other features. They describe the level of favorability toward profiles that contain a particular attribute level. In a forced choice experiment with two alternatives, such as the design used here, MMs can be directly interpreted as probabilities (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). In the context of a simulated election experiment, the MM represents the average probability that respondents' vote for a candidate with the corresponding characteristic. A MM of 0 indicates a zero percent chance that a profile with a particular attribute level is selected and 1 representing a 100% chance a

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profile with the respective level is selected.[13] Visually, I plot MM point estimates with a 95%

confidence interval bands, with a midline at the .50 level that represents an equal chance of

candidates with a given attribute getting the vote. For the hypotheses tested here, MMs at

the .50 mark confirm the null hypothesis that a particular attribute value has no statistically

significant effect on the probability of a candidate getting the vote.

Analysis of the marginal means is especially advantageous for the comparison of

subgroups in forced choice designs, compared to the more commonly used average marginal

component effect (AMCE). While the AMCE is useful for estimating the causal effect of

moving between two levels within an attribute, the relational nature of the AMCE and its

sensitivity to the baseline attribute value it is compared against can lead to problematic

interpretation of the results, especially when comparing subgroups within the data (Leeper,

Hobolt, and Tilley 2020; Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022; Ganter 2023). See further

discussion of the AMCE in Appendix H.

Subgroup analysis is crucial to the research questions under examination here

because there are divergent expectations on the effect of a candidate's attributes for

respondents in different classes (e.g., working class respondents should be more favorable of

working class candidates than middle class respondents). Additionally, there is reason to

investigate the extent that voting behavior is informed by preference for the in-group versus

aversion to an out-group Therefore the research here relies on analysis of the marginal

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[13] I employ a fully randomized design without constraints on the value (level) an attribute can take for any
iteration. This means that there is some degree of overlap in attribute levels, allowing competing profiles to
contain the same value for a given attribute (e.g. in some matchups both candidates belong to the same class).
Consequently, it is not possible for any of the attribute level to have a MM of 0 or 1. Instead the MM here can
range from the probability of co-occurrence to 1 minus that probability. For example, candidate class can take
3 values so the probability of co-occurrence is $1/3*1/3 = 0.11$ thus the MM for candidate class can range from
0.11 - 0.89.

means by subgroup because it is less vulnerable to misinterpretation than the AMCE (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020).[14]

While marginal means lack the immediate causal interpretation of the AMCE, it provides a straightforward measure of favorability for all levels of an attribute without the need to specify a baselevel. This makes it useful in subgroup analysis as the researcher can estimate the MMs to examine the extent that subgroups in the sample differ in support for all levels of an attribute and avoid issues related to the sensitivity of baselevel selection. Further, because of the randomization of attribute levels, the pairwise difference between two marginal means for levels of the same attribute has a direct causal interpretation (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). For example, Independent candidates have a MM= 0.487 compared to Democrat candidates with a MM= 0.519, among all respondents (see Appendix I). Therefore, we can conclude that respondents are 3% (0.032) more likely to vote for a Democrat over an Independent candidate.

Conceptually marginal means are well suited for research related to the relationship between identity and behavior. While MMs do not represent majority preference, the averaging involved captures both the direction and intensity of the effect of an attribute level (Bansak et al. 2022). Strong identities are argued to inform both the direction of preferences and the intensity of those preferences in motivating behavior (Mason 2013). Marginal means capture this important feature of identities as they do not merely represent a preference for a particular attribute level but also the extent to which that preference is strong enough to

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[14] Analyzing the results of the experiment using AMCEs does not change any of the conclusions reached through the analysis of the MMs, I report the AMCEs in Appendix J.

motivate vote choice. For example, it may be that working class Americans generally prefer candidates from the working class but the preference is not strong enough to inform behavior.

Findings

There is much to unpack from the results of the experiment, see Table 2 below for a summary of the outcomes of the hypotheses tested here. Overall, I find mixed support for the influence of class identity on Americans' electoral behavior. While class identity informs the preferences of some respondents, it is most influential among those with strong class identities in the working class and, to a lesser extent, the lower-middle class who are more likely to support candidates who share their class background or appeal to their class.[15] There is little evidence that respondents in the upper-middle and upper classes rely on their class identity to inform their preferences as they do not appear to favor candidates that share their class background or appeal to their class.

There is also clear evidence of an aversion to candidates from the upper class among respondents in the working and middle classes, with the effect increasing with class identity strength. Similarly, there is a strong aversion to candidates who appeal to the working class among respondents in the upper-class. These findings suggest that class identity *can* be a consequential factor informing the electoral behavior of Americans. However, at the class

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[15] Because identity is a psychological process, the influence of identity cannot be directly observed. Therefore, we cannot be certain that respondents are relying on their class identity to inform their decision. However, forced choice experiments offer compelling indirect evidence of the influence of identity by providing respondents with multiple dimensions on which they can use to make their vote choice and randomizing the values of each dimension such that we can isolate the causal effect of specific characteristics on the likelihood of support for a candidate. Coupled with insights from the literature on identity and measures of identity strength, we can reasonably infer the role of identity in informing respondent vote choice.

level, including those with strong and weak CIDs, there is limited evidence of bias in favor of candidates who share respondents' class and very little effect on support for candidates that appeal to the middle class. The findings here indicate that the role of class identity in Americans' electoral behavior is conditioned by the voter's class and the strength of their class identity.

I focus my discussion below on effects for which I can reject the null hypothesis, that an attribute value has no statistically significant effect on support, with p-values <0.05, unless otherwise noted. Additionally, I rely on vote choice as my dependent variable as this represents a more consequential effect with implications for electoral outcomes. Full results of the experiment can be found in the MM tables in Appendix I and the AMCE tables in Appendix J.

Testing the Shared Identity Hypothesis

Social identity theory, and its off-shoot self-categorization theory, posits that people form psychological attachments to their group which results in forming more favorable assessments of in-group members and a propensity to form negative assessments of out-group members (Turner et al. 1987). Research shows evidence of voter preference for candidates with whom they share various traits such as religion, party, race and occupation (Campbell et al. 1960; Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2012; Campbell and Cowley 2014). Therefore, it is expected that respondents will be more likely to support candidates that come from their class than they are to support candidates from another class. However, the results here do not indicate a strong preference for candidates from one's own class.

Figure 3.1 plots the marginal means for candidates whose class is congruent or incongruent with the respondents' class. There is some evidence of a class bias for those in the working and lower-middle classes. Among working class respondents, out-class candidates (MM= .492, SE= .005) are ~2% less likely to get the vote than in-class candidates (MM= .512, SE= .008). Similarly, among the lower-middle class, out-class candidates (MM= .491, SE= .004) are ~2% less likely to get the vote than in-class candidates (MM= .510, SE= .008).

Note: Estimates show the marginal means of candidate class congruence with respondent class on probability of vote; bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3.1: The Effect of Candidate and Respondent Class Congruence on the Probability of Vote

While this may be suggestive of the influence of class identity, only the estimates for the out-class candidates reaches statistical significance at the .95 level with the confidence interval for the in-class candidates crossing the .5 midpoint. Therefore, we cannot definitely reject the null hypothesis that there is no preference for the in-class candidate among the working and lower-middle classes. Even more stark is the absence of evidence indicating a

preference for an in-class candidate among respondents in the upper-middle and upper classes. For both these groups, candidates that came from their respective class saw virtually no increase in likelihood of support.

<u>Testing the Aversion to the Rich Hypothesis</u>

It is surprising that there is not a more evidence of in-class favoritism, considering the pervasive in-group favoritism found in studies on social identity. These finding suggests that class identity has a minimal impact on Americans' preference for candidates who share their class. However, there is evidence that class identity promotes antipathy toward an outgroup among the working and lower-middle classes. Breaking it down further it appears that this effect is driven by an aversion to candidates from the upper-class as candidates from the working and middle classes do not see a decrease in probability of support from working and lower-middle class respondents, see Figure 3.2 below.

NOTE: Estimates show the MM of candidate class on the probability they get the vote with 95% confidence intervals

Figure 3.2: Effect of Candidate Class on Probability of Vote, by Respondent Class

Candidates from the upper class have sub-0.5 MMs for respondents from the working class and lower-middle class representing a decreased probability these groups will vote for an upper class candidate. Among working class respondents, the difference between candidates from the working class (MM= .512, SE= .008) and candidates from the upper class (MM= .486, SE= .008) results in a 3% decrease in the probability upper class candidates get the vote compared to the in-class candidate.[16] Likewise, among lower-middle class respondents, the difference between candidates from the middle class (MM= .510, SE= .008) and candidates from the upper class (MM= .483, SE= .008) also see a 3% decrease in

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[16] Confirming this effect, estimating the AMCE of going from a working class candidate to an upper class candidate results in a 3% decrease (p-value= .072) in probability of support among respondents from the working class. While the p-value (.072) is just shy of significance at the .95 level, it meets the threshold for significance at the .90 level. See Appendix J for full results.

probability of support among lower-middle class respondents.[17] However, the same aversion does not appear to be present for those in the upper-middle and upper class. While the MM is below the .5 mark for upper class candidates among the well-to-do classes, the estimates do not reach statistical significance so I cannot reject the null that there is no effect for these groups.

That there is not more evidence of in-class favoritism, but evidence of out-class aversion, raises questions regarding the extent to which Americans rely on their class identity to inform their vote choice. The fact that respondents in the upper-middle and upper class show no in-class favoritism is especially surprising considering that respondents in these classes tend to have stronger class identities than respondents in the working and lower-middle class (see Figure 3.3 below). Expectations drawn from the literature on social identity would predict that those with strong identities would be more sensitive to group cues and more supportive of in-group candidates, than those with weak identities (Huddy 2013; Morris 2013). Closer examination of the interaction between class identity strength and the candidates class reveals a more conditional effect of class identity on vote choice.

Testing the Identity Strength Hypothesis

Variation in class identity strength between classes found in this study follows the pattern found in the previous chapters analysis with class identity increasing along the class hierarchy, see figure 3.3 below. Using OLS regression to estimate the effect of respondents'

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[17] The AMCE of going from a middle class candidate to a upper class candidate results in a 3% decrease (p-value= .031) in the probability of support among lower-middle class respondents. See Appendix J for full results.

class on class identity strength results in a 10% increase in class identity strength with each step up the class ladder. This shows that strong class identities are more likely for those in higher-status classes than for those in the class below them.

Note: Plots fitted values for the predicted effect of class on class identity strength with 95% confidence interval.

Figure 3.3: Class Identity Strength by Respondent Class

My measure for identity strength is a continuous variable ranging from 1-4, however to analyze the effect of identity strength on vote choice, I create a discrete dichotomous variable that splits respondents of each class into two quantiles for those with scores above and below the median class identity score for their respective class. This way I can calculate the estimators for those with weak and strong class identities separately for each class. Figure 3.4 plots the marginal means for in-class candidates by respondent class identity strength.

Figure 3.4: Effect of Class Identity Strength on Support for In-Class Candidates

The analysis here lends support to expectations that those with stronger class identities will be more favorable toward candidates from their class, among those in the working class. For working class respondents with a weak class identity, there is no discernable change in support based on a candidate's class. However, for working class respondents with a strong class identity, in-class candidates see a 4% increase in probability of support (MM = 0.534, SE = 0.013) relative to in-class candidates among those with a weak class identity (MM= 0.499, SE = 0.011). Conversely, there is no statistically significant change in support for in-class candidates among those in the middle and upper classes with weak or strong class identities.[18]

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[18] While there was no statistically significant increase in support for in-class candidates among middle class respondents with strong class identities, there is evidence that suggests this pattern may exist for the lower-middle class. Support for middle class candidates among those in the lower-middle class with weak class identities (MM= .505, SE= .011) versus those with strong class identities (MM= .517, SE= .012) is suggestive of a preference for in-class candidates among the strongly identified. The limited sample size and numerous factors involved in the experiment here may not provide the statistical power required to delineate the effect.

While the strongest evidence of in-class bias comes from the working class, there is evidence that strong class identities lead to greater opposition to candidates from the upper class among those in the working and middle classes. Among respondents in the lower-middle class with strong class identities, candidates from the upper class (MM= 0.478, SE = 0.011) see a 4% decline in the probability of support relative to middle class candidates (MM = 0.517, SE = 0.012). However, the strongly identified in the lower-middle class seem to be specifically opposed to upper class candidates as we do not see a significant decline in the probability of supporting candidates from the working class (MM = 0.506, SE = 0.011). While these estimates are suggestive of an in-class bias among the strongly identified in the lower-middle class, the MM for middle class candidates does not reach the level of statistical significance (p-value= .166) with the confidence interval overlapping the .5 midpoint. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no preference for in-class candidates among the strongly identified in the lower-middle class.

There is some evidence that those in the upper-middle class with strong CIDs are also averse to candidates from the upper class (MM= 0.485, SE = 0.009) compared to those with a weak class identity where I find no statically significant change in support based on candidate class. However, there is no evidence to suggest in-class favoritism among the strongly identified in the upper-middle class as there is virtually no difference in the probability of supporting middle class candidates between those with strong and weak class identities in the upper-middle class.

It is unclear why those in the middle class with strong class identities are not more favorable toward middle class candidates or unfavorable toward working class candidates. Considering the greater effect of class identity strength on the preferences for those in the

lower-middle class compared to those in the upper-middle hints at the potential influence of perceived distance between groups. It may be that the lower-middle class feels more akin to the working class and perceive a greater distance between themselves and upper class. Thus, when comparing candidates from the middle and working class, class identity is less likely to be salient to their vote than it is in a context involving an upper class candidate.

Class identity strength does not appear to be as consequential for those in the upper class as there are not clear differences between the those with weak and strong class identities. However, firm conclusions cannot be made as the sample size for each group in the upper class may be too small to produce reliable estimates (weak class identity=24 respondents, strong class identity=48 respondents).

The fact that respondents in the upper-middle and upper classes, report having strong identities based in class but are less effected by the candidate's class than those in the classes below them, suggests that class identity may not be a politically meaningful identity for these groups. Not all social identities have implications for political behavior and there can be variation in the extent that identities based on similar attributes have divergent political relevance. For example, ethnic identity is more consistently relevant to political behavior for Black Americans than it is for Asian Americans (Junn and Masuoka 2008).

However, there is evidence to suggest that fraternal deprivation, or feelings that one's group is worse off than another, promotes shared grievances among group members and drives political cohesion among low-status groups (Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2013). It may be the case that those in economically disadvantaged classes are more likely to perceive this deprivation, making their class identity salient to a political context. Whereas those in the more well-to-do classes benefit from more economic and political power, are less likely

to feel deprived of material or symbolic interests and are therefore less likely to consider their class identity as pertinent to politics.

Testing the Class Polarization Hypothesis

Candidate class background aside, I also expect to find divergence between classes in their support for candidates that appeal to class. When candidates signal support for a group, they raise the salience of identities based in the targeted group increasing the likelihood that voters rely on the relevant identity to inform their behavior. In the experiment here, each candidate profile displayed one of nine possible quotes attributed to the candidate. Two quotes directly appealed to either the working or middle class. Another two contained messages that negatively portrayed the poor or the rich.

Analyzing the effects of these messages by respondent class provides an opportunity to examine the potential tradeoffs candidates faces when appealing to groups. An appeal made to one group may raise support from the targeted group but lower support from the corresponding out-group (Hersh and Schaffner 2013). The results here demonstrate this tradeoff when candidates appeal to the working class but not when appealing to the middle class. The polarization observed is most significant between respondents from the working and upper class, while those in the middle class are unmoved. Figure 3.5 plots the effect of candidate class appeals by respondent class.[19]

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[19] The high number of levels contained in the candidate quote attribute (9) raises issues regarding the statistical power required to estimate the effect of each level when breaking down the sample into subgroup as I am unable to produce reliable estimates for groups smaller than at the class level. Consequently, I am limited in examining the role of class identity strength for this attribute which requires breaking the sample down by class and then again by CID strength.

Note: Estimates show the marginal means of candidate appeals on probability of vote; bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3.5: Effect of Candidate Appeals on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Estimating the marginal means by class results in a 15-point divergence in the

probability respondents in the working class (MM= .537, SE = .016) voted for the pro-

working class candidate versus those in the upper class (MM= .394, SE = .033).[20] This

evidence suggests that appealing to the working class raises the salience of class identity for

those in the working and upper class and has strong implications for electoral outcomes.

However, class identity may only be relevant for those in the upper class when they perceive

a threat to the status of their class.

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[20] Digging deeper into this divergence by calculating the AMCE of the pro-working class appeal compared to the pro-middle class appeal, results in a 6% increase in the vote share among working class respondents and a 10% decrease in the vote share among upper class respondents. Estimating the AMCE using the pro-USA quote as a baseline returns similar results for the pro-working class quote, decreasing the probability of support for upper class respondents by -13% and increasing the probability of support from working class respondents by 3%. However, this is only significant at the $\alpha=0.05$ level for the upper class (p-value = 0.02) and not the working class (p-value = 0.16).

The pro-working class message does not indicate a specific interest or policy objective, instead the symbolic appeal elevates the importance of the working class to the country's economy and need for a voice in Congress, see full text of all appeals in Appendix F. It may be that respondents in the upper class inferred support for policy that damages their economic interests or a threat to their disproportionate influence (voice) in Congress.[21] But since there was no mention of any substantive action supported by the candidate, it would seem that those in the upper class perceived the message as a threat to their social status. By elevating the importance of the efforts of the working class to the national economy, those in the upper class may feel as though their contributions are diminished and consequently their social status diminished.

The Ambivalent Middle Class

According to these findings, candidates that appeal to the middle class do not face the same tradeoff. The pro-middle class message does not decrease support among those in the working- or upper classes. However, the flip side to this is that the pro-middle class message does not seem to meaningfully increase the vote share among respondents in the middle class, so candidates may not have much to gain from appealing to the middle class. This is a somewhat striking finding considering the fact that appealing to the middle class is perhaps the most common class appeal observed in US elections (Rhodes and Johnson 2017).

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[21] see Gilens 2005; Gilens and Page 2014

It is not clear what promotes the ambivalence of and toward the middle class, but possible explanations drawn from the literature include group size, group distinctiveness, and intergroup competition. It may be a function of the large size of the group; survey data from the ANES and GSS consistently showing that a majority of Americans identify as middle class (Hout 2008). Which is also consistent with this study in which 64% of respondents identified as middle class. Compared to some objective measures of class, research has found that half of respondents that identify as middle class have either deflated or inflated perceptions of their class position (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 2013). This creates a middle class with a broad range of economic interests such that it makes it difficult to pinpoint a specific goal that would serve the interests of the group as a whole, making it more challenging for the middle class to cohere around a shared political goal compared to more economically homogenous groups. The ambiguity surrounding the groups interests and goals may limit the perceived relevance of class identity in informing the behavior of the middle class.

The disparate economic interests of the middle class also raise challenges to decerning where the interests of the middle class diverge from those in classes above and below. The divergence between the economic interests of the working and upper class is more obvious than for the middle class. The competition surrounding redistributive policy could motive individuals in the working class and upper class to more readily consider their class identity in a political context. Whereas the middle class may not perceive a threat to their interests when candidates appeal to the working class and feel generally less inclined to rely on their class identity to inform their behavior.

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An alternative possibility is that the perceived majority status of the middle class, lessens the psychological motivations underpinning the development of politically meaningful identities. Research shows that group identification is typically more pronounced among numerical minority groups than numerical majority groups (Leonardelli and Brewer 2010). One explanation for this is optimal distinctiveness theory which postulates that social identities are driven by an individual's pursuit of two competing needs for inclusion and distinctiveness. Identifying with a social group can engender a sense of belonging among members of the in-group, satisfying the need for inclusion, and provide a means to distinguish oneself from members of a relevant out-group, satisfying the need for distinctiveness. According to this theory, when an identity is salient to an individual' context, they can satisfy their desire for inclusion via identification with a numerical majority or minority group, but they are less likely to fulfill the need for distinctiveness if they identify with larger group (Brewer 1991). [22] Considering that a majority of Americans think of themselves as middle class, it may be that identifying as middle class does not satisfy the need for distinctiveness and so members of the middle class tend to rely on other identities that provide more distinctiveness.

Testing the Negative Valence Hypothesis

In some contexts, candidates might prefer to avoid mentioning a class by name and instead appeal to groups such as the rich and poor. This may be to avoid alienating voters

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[22] One challenge to this explanation is the fact that some identities based in large groups, such as partisanship, have long been shown to have significant influence voter behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2000; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2004). However, while political parties may be a large – or a numerical majority group– they are explicitly political in nature and therefore partisan identities are chronically salient to elections and confer clear goals for group members to cohere around.

from a different classes or to appeal to a broader group (Horn et al. 2021). There is evidence

that these terms are frequently used in appeals by political elites as well as commonly used

among the public (Rhodes and Johnson 2017; Piston 2018). However, because class is

fundamentally linked to a person's economic standing, it is reasonable to suspect that

candidate messaging directed at the poor or rich may raise the salience of class identity and

become a relevant source of information for the voter. For example, Piston (2018) argues

that the success of Bernie Sanders campaign in the 2016 Democratic primary was a function

of raising support from working class voters by excoriating the rich. Others argue the

success of Donald Trump's campaigns also stem from his ability to raise support from the

working class by using populist rhetoric to deride the rich and powerful (Lamont, Park, and

Ayala-Hurtado 2017; Morgan and Lee 2018).[23]

As seen in Figure 3.5, the results here do not support these expectations as

candidates that deride the rich do not raise their level of support from working class

respondents or any other class. Breaking respondents down by income level also fails to

produce any significant change in vote choice based on the respondent's level of income.

This undermines expectations that those in the working class are disproportionately

motivated by populistic campaign rhetoric that negatively portrays the wealthy.

The anti-poor message appears to be broadly unpopular among respondents in every

class, but the effect does not reach statistical significance for any class. This is somewhat

surprising given the evidence that a majority of Americans feel sympathy toward the poor

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[23] There is a level of dissonance in Trump's populistic rhetoric as he himself is a man born into great wealth and relied heavily on his father to fund his businesses, providing at least $413 million over the course of his life, according to a *New York Times* expose on October 2, 2018. However, there is evidence that many working class voters are unaware of Trump's privileged background and overestimate his contributions to his economic standing (McDonald, Karol, and Mason 2019).

but seem unmotivated to punish candidates that deride the poor. However, when breaking respondents down by class identity strength there is a statistically significant decline in support for the anti-poor candidate among those in the working class (MM= .448, SE= .022) and lower-middle class (MM= .464, SE= .021) with weak, but not strong, class identities. Taken together these findings suggests that appeals to the rich and poor do not activate class identity, as we would expect to see cleavages in candidate support emerge between classes and those with strong class identities to be the most effected by such appeals.

Discussion

The results from the experiment here offer mixed support for the hypotheses. Table 3.2 below summarizes the outcomes of the hypotheses tested here, by respondent class. The literature on social identity has demonstrated the potency of identities to political behavior. This research adds to the literature in a several important ways. First, few studies have focused on the effect of class identity, conceptualized through the lens of social identity theory, on political behavior. Studies that do consider class often rely on objective measures that place individuals into a class that they would not place themselves. Doing so obfuscates the influence of class identity which is a psychological process by which individuals subjectively consider the groups they belong to as pertinent to their individual identity. For example, I find that individuals in the working class are responsive to candidates who appeal to their class directly, such that candidates can increase their vote share among this group by showing symbolic support. However, objective measures of class would not pick up on this

effect. Estimating the marginal means by level of income, education and employment do not

produce any significant change in support for candidates appealing to the working class.

Table 3.2: Hypotheses Outcome

Name	Outcome	Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Shared Identity Hypothesis	Rejected	**X**	**X**	**X**
Aversion to the Rich Hypothesis	Confirmed	✓	✓	**X**
Identity Strength Hypothesis	Mixed	✓	✓	**X**
Class Polarization Hypothesis:	Mixed	✓	**X**	✓
Negative Valence Hypothesis	Rejected	**X**	**X**	**X**

*Check marks indicate evidence from the experiment that confirms the hypothesis for the respective class. X marks indicate the absence of evidence to support the hypothesis.

Another contribution this study makes is the inclusion of a measure of class identity

strength. Scholars have found the extent to which an individual identifies with a group, the

more likely they are to rely on the identity to inform their behavior. I find that gradations of

class identity strength have important implications for political behavior that would be

missed by studies that do not consider the strength of an identity. Those who strongly

identify with their class are more likely to consider a candidate's class background than those

who weakly identify with their class. Individuals that strongly identify as working class are

more likely to vote for a candidate with the same class background. Those in the working class and lower-middle class that have a strong class identity are more averse to voting for candidates from the upper class, compared to individuals that weakly identify with their class.

The effect of class identity on political behavior is also conditioned by class. It appears to be most influential to the political behavior of those in the working class. This is a surprising finding considering that the working class is prone to voting for candidates that promote policy that is detrimental to their economic interests. We would expect that considerations of class would lead the working class to align themselves with candidates that seek to improve their economic standing through redistributive policy. However, this disjuncture may be a function of two conditioning factors, identity strength and the salience of class identity to the electoral context. Individuals in the working class are less likely to have a strong class identity relative to those in the classes above them. The evidence here that shows that those in the working class with a weak class identity are less likely to consider a candidate's class background and are less effected by appeals made to their class, than those with a strong identity. Therefore, the fact that there are fewer in the working class with strong class identities may raise barriers for the class to cohere around a shared goal and act collectively to advance their interests.

While the lack of strong working class identities may hinder their ability to act collectively, this could potentially be mitigated by a context where candidates elevate the social status of the working class. When candidates appeal directly to the working class, they increase their vote share among this group. This evidence suggests that part of the reason working class identity does not translate to acting collectively to support a candidate is due

to the lack of candidates who appeal directly to them. The evidence here also shows, there is not a clear substitute for appealing to voters' class identity. Appeals regarding the rich and poor do not appear to raise the salience of class identity to the voter's context. Politicians like Bernie Sanders that lambast the wealthy may be able to capitalize on support from those who feel resentment toward the rich, but it does not automatically translate to support from the working class. Instead, candidates that seek to improve their standing with working class voters may want to consider a more direct appeal to their class identity.

This research affirms the continued importance of research on social identities and class. Identities play an important role in American elections and for too long class identity has been ignored. There are questions raised by this study that deserve future examination. In chapter 2, I demonstrate that Americans often do have identities based in class. However, in this study, class identity appears to have a limited influence on the voting behavior of Americans, especially those in the middle class. In the following chapter I will examine a possible explanation for this, that Americans tend to rely on identities based in other groups when deciding how to vote.

Chapter 4: Identity Primacy in a Multidimensional Electoral Context

Introduction

Bill Teten grew up in a working class family in "the projects" of New York City. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy at age 18 where he converted to Christianity and decided to become a minister once his term of service expired. He would dedicate his life to extolling biblical virtues such as humility, integrity, and selflessness. As a Republican, he often saw these qualities reflected in the character of the party's candidates. This was not the case in 2016 when the Republican Party selected Donald Trump as their nominee for President. He viewed Trump as an egotistical liar who only looks out for himself. Asked who he voted for after the election, he responded, "I couldn't bring myself to vote for Trump, so I voted Republican." While this tongue-in-cheek response was meant to be bit of levity, it reflects a broader pattern of partisan identity in American politics. Voting behavior in the U.S. today seems to be driven more by partisan attachments and less by policy differences or candidate-centric considerations (Bartels 2000; Cohen 2003; Mummolo, Peterson, and Westwood 2021).

Over the past several decades, Americans have sorted into increasingly ideologically homogenous political parties and formed strong psychological attachments to their party (Levendusky 2009; Greene 1999). There is growing alignment in party's religious, racial, ethnic, and gender composition (Mason 2018). Further, Americans drastically overestimate the extent of overlap between social groups and political parties, perceiving themselves to be in partisan competition with a homogenous group of outsiders (Ahler and Sood 2018). This social sorting is argued to amplify the effects of partisan identity, turning partisanship into a mega-identity that subsumes identities based in other groups, such as class (Mason 2018).

Evidence presented in the prior two chapters indicates that Americans do identify with a class and many hold strong attachments to their class identity, seeing it as an important aspect of who they are as an individual. However, I find that the extent that class identity informs their voting behavior is significantly limited. For those in the upper-middle and upper class, class identity has little effect on their vote choice based on a candidate's class background. I do find evidence that those in the working and lower-middle classes, who have strong class identities, rely on this identity to inform their vote choice when it is salient to the electoral context. Yet, it is the disjuncture between the economic interests of this group and their electoral behavior that is at the heart of the questions driving this research. For decades, a majority of Whites in the working class have voted for candidates that promote economic policies that overwhelmingly advantage the upper class (Bartels 2016; Carnes and Lupu 2021). Americans' also vote along class lines at lower rates than voters in many European countries (Evans 2000). Why do so many Americans vote for candidates that promote policies that degrade the economic wellbeing of their class? Why is there less class line voting in America than many of its European peers?

One possible explanation for the apparent lack of class-based voting is that Americans tend to rely on identities based in groups other than their class when engaging with politics, such as those based in their party or race. Social identity theory provides a way to understand political behavior via an individual's psychological attachment to a group. Research shows that when individuals identify with a politically relevant group, they are more sensitive to issues that pertain to the group and more likely to engage in political behaviors, such as voting (Bishin 2009; Fowler and Kam 2007). Identities can generate political cohesion and increase the likelihood that members act collectively to achieve a

shared goal (Miller et al. 1981; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Identities can also lead to in-group favoritism and increase the likelihood that voters support candidates that belong to a group they identify with (Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2012).

Political parties have always played an important role in American politics. While early American leaders, such as George Washington, were hesitant to embrace a party system, they quickly became engrained in our institutions (Hofstadter 1969). Political scientists have long considered parties to be a critical component of a functioning democracy (Schattschneider 1942). Race also has historic and enduring relevance to American political issues including suffrage, civil rights, and criminal justice reform. The relevance of these groups to political outcomes coupled with the fact that information about a candidate's party and race are often more readily available to voters than a candidate's class, may raise the salience of identities based in these groups and increase the likelihood voters rely on partisan and racial identities to inform their vote choice, in lieu of their class identity.

While there are many studies examining the role of identity in political behavior, most research focuses on a single identity and manipulates the salience of the relevant group in isolation from others (Klar 2013). However, the political context voters find themselves in an election is rarely so siloed. In an election cycle, voters are routinely exposed to rhetoric and information that cue many different groups, raising the salience of identities based in those groups to inform their vote choice. While candidates often appeal to class, the presence of additional cues to groups that voters identify with may supersede the salience of class identity to the electoral context. Identities that are more important to an individual's self-concept are thought to be more readily accessible and therefore likely to inform

behavior (Morris 2013). If Americans have stronger attachments to identities based in groups such as party and race, it may undercut the influence of class identity in informing their political behavior.

The research here is well positioned to examine the role of identity in a multidimensional context where respondents are presented with information that may prime considerations based on a candidate's class, party and race. I find evidence that identities based in each of these groups can influence the vote choice of respondents, though to significantly different degrees. Partisan and racial identities have the most robust effect on vote choice while the influence of class identity is considerably more limited. However, I do find evidence that contradicts narratives about the interaction between identities based in class and race. Contrary to expectations that the white-working class is disproportionately motivated by racial concerns, I find that they are less motivated by considerations of a candidate's race compared to Whites in the middle and upper classes. Overall, this research suggests that one reason we observe a minimal role of class identity in Americans' political behavior is because of the predominance of considerations based on racial and partisan identities.

Literature Review

Scholars have produced a substantial literature demonstrating the centrality of identity to political behavior. Seminal studies such as the American Voter (1960) showcased the important role that identity plays in political behavior. They conceptualize partisan identity as an affective attachment to a political party formed early in life, find that it remains stable throughout one's life and shapes how the individual perceives politics and forms

political attitudes leading to their vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960). Subsequent studies have confirmed the powerful influence of partisan identity on Americans' perception of political issues and vote choice (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Bartels 2002; 2000).

That we find differences in attitudes and voting behavior between political parties is not surprising as parties are fundamentally coalitions of like-minded individuals formed to overcome the collective action problems associated with politics. However, research shows that partisan identity extends beyond instrumental purposes and encompasses a psychological attachment to the party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004). For example, change to the party's status provokes a stronger emotional reaction among partisans than a potential loss or victory on central policy issues, with those with the strongest attachment to their party having the strongest reaction (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). This denotes the expressive nature of partisan identity that can better account for the stability of partisanship over time, the limited influence of short-term economic and political fluctuations, and its robust influence on vote choice compared to instrumental accounts (Cohen 2003; Dancey and Goren 2010).

Observing the conceptual overlap between party identity and social identity theory, first articulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979), political scholars began examining party identity through the lens of social identity theory. Social identities are the part of an individual's self-concept that is derived from attachment to groups they belong to and they tend to promote consideration of the distinctiveness of one's group compared to a relevant out-group, often times leading to in-group bias (Tajfel 1982). This is akin to patterns observed by political scientists in the bias in opinion formation and ultimately voting behavior for one's own party that goes beyond instrumental accounts.

Scholars have sought to understand why there is not a stronger pattern of class-based voting, especially considering that a majority of the American public place economic issues at the top of their priorities for the government and class is fundamentally linked to one's economic standing in society (Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010). Further confounding the puzzle of limited class-based voting is rising economic inequality between the classes and the growing polarization between the parties preferred economic policies (Saez and Zucman 2016; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). We might expect these factors to increase class-based voting however this does not appear to be the case for American voters.

The inconsistency between voters' economic interests and their vote choice coupled with lower rates of class-line voting in America compared to other advanced democracies, has led some scholars to conclude that Americans do not form politically meaningful identities based in class (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Dalton 1996). Meanwhile race scholars have produced substantial evidence regarding the impact of racial identity on Americans' electoral behavior (e.g. Stephens-Dougan 2021). Other evidence suggests that Americans' preference for public policy that we might expect to relate to a person's class identity, such as preferences for redistributive programs, is driven by considerations around race. For example, a seminal study by Gilens (1996) finds that preference for redistributive policy among white Americans is shaped by the perceived race of the recipient of the program more than their own economic standing.

Examining the relationship between race and class is of substantive importance as identities based in these groups may produce interaction effects that condition the extent that one or both identities inform political behavior, yet few studies have investigated this

interaction (Harris and Rivera-Burgos 2021). One exception is a study involving African elections that found that the salience of ethnic identities increased the closer they were to an election and resulted in a corresponding reduction in the salience of class identities (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Other research on the American electorate suggests that the prominence of racial issues, particularly in the American South, have historically limited the extent that the public cohere around class cleavages (Brewer and Stonecash 2001). More recent scholarship has argued that race, more than class, shapes Americans voting behavior and electoral outcomes (Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Hajnal 2020). While these studies suggest that considerations of race are more prevalent than considerations of class in American politics, scholars have called for more studies that explicitly examine racial identity in conjunction with class identity (Harris and Rivera-Burgos 2021). It may be that class identity plays a limited role in Americans' electoral behavior because voters are more likely to rely on their racial identity to inform their behavior.

Issues surrounding race have long been a feature of American politics and the 2016 election was no exception. The Republican candidate, Donald Trump, frequently made racially bigoted remarks that did not seem to damage his level of support among Republican voters. He would go on to win a majority of votes from the white working class (WWC). Pundits were quick to conclude that Trump had found a way to connect to the WWC more than the candidates before him. While his level of support from this group may not have been as unique as many claimed, Trump nonetheless continued the decades-long trend of Republican candidates winning a majority of white working class voters (Carnes and Lupu 2021).

One explanation as to why a New York businessman born to the upper-class received the support of working class Whites, was by appealing to their shared white identity (Jardina 2019). Jardina (2019) shows that Whites who strongly identify with their racial group were more likely to vote for Romney in 2012 and Trump in 2016, than Whites that weakly identify with their racial group. Other scholars have argued that the WWC is particularly motivated by racial concerns as a response to feeling a "status-threat" due to the growing number and status of immigrants and racial minorities (Mutz 2018; Harris and Rivera-Burgos 2021). Research examining the 2016 election suggests that concerns regarding race and immigration were more relevant to WWC voters than issues concerning class (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Hajnal 2020). Others link support for Trump to the indirect effect of higher levels of racial resentment among the lower classes (Zingher 2020; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta 2018). It may be the case that the disjuncture we observe between the economic interests of Whites in the working class and their voting behavior stems from a disproportionate readiness to rely no racial identity to inform their preferences.

Expectations and Hypotheses

The influence of identity on political behavior is well established in the literature, yet we do not have a clear understanding regarding the role of class identity. A number of scholars suggest that partisan loyalties outweigh the influence of class in forming vote and some studies find that partisan identity is more predictive of voting behavior than an individual's class, sex, or religion (Salisbury and Black 1963; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004). If the influence of partisan identity supersedes that of class identity, I should find that

respondents are more likely to vote based on a candidate's party than their class. Accordingly, I advance the following hypothesis:

Partisan Loyalty Hypothesis: A candidate's party will have a larger influence on Americans' vote choice than a candidate's class.

Other evidence indicates that Americans prioritize considerations of race to inform their political behavior (e.g. Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Hajnal 2020). If Americans prioritize their racial identity over their class identity, then I should find that a candidate's racial background has a bigger effect on the probability they receive the vote than their class background. Therefore, I offer the following hypotheses:

Racial Primacy Hypothesis: A candidate's race will have a larger influence on Americans' vote choice than a candidate's class.

Finally, a number of scholars have argued that the political behavior of the white working class is disproportionally motivated by racial concerns (Zingher 2020; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta 2018). The experiment here is well positioned to examine the proposition that racial considerations have an outsized effect on working class Whites. If true, then I should find that white respondents from the working class place a higher premium on the racial attributes included in the experiment than Whites in the middle and upper-class. Accordingly, I test the following hypothesis:

Racially Motivated WWC Hypothesis: A candidate's race will have a larger effect on the vote choice of Whites in the working class than the vote choice of Whites in the middle class and upper class.

Methods

To examine the relationship between identity and electoral behavior, I conducted a conjoint survey experiment recruiting 1,094 respondents from Amazon's Mturk who completed the survey on the Qualtrics platform. The conjoint design has several advantageous features for the examination of electoral behavior in a multidimensional context. Respondents are tasked with choosing between two candidate profiles that contain information about various traits including their class, race, party, and gender. The traits can take on different values that are randomly assigned for each matchup. This randomization enables the researcher to estimate the effect that a particular value has on the probability of a profile being selected. In the context of a hypothetical election for a seat in the House of Representatives, this effect equates to the change in probability of a candidate with a particular attribute value getting the vote. This makes conjoint experiments well positioned to provide leverage on questions regarding the role of class identity in a context where multiple identity cues are present.

Since respondents are presented with information on the candidate's class, party, and race, they can make their decision of who to vote for based on any of these attributes (or any other attribute involved, see description of all attributes in Appendix F). Therefore, if a candidate's party or race has a larger effect on the likelihood that they get the vote, compared to a candidate's class, we can conclude that these attributes were more consequential to

respondents' vote choice. Then by breaking down the respondent sample into groups based on their class, party, and race, we can indirectly observe the interaction between identities based in those groups and support for candidates based on their related characteristics.[24] Applying the logic of social identity theory, this finding would suggest that voters are more likely to rely on identities based in party and race than on they are to rely on class identity to inform their preferences.

The key to the effectiveness of a conjoint experiment is the random selection of attribute levels. Randomizing the value that an attribute takes for each matchup allows the researcher to estimate the causal effect of moving between two levels within an attribute, averaged across the values of the other attributes. Because every potential value of an attribute is randomly drawn and has an equal chance to appear in the candidate profile, researchers can estimate the effect of changing values within one attribute (e.g. the effect of going from a male candidate to a female candidate) as if all other attribute values are held constant.

While the candidate matchups are not an exact replica of what voters encounter in an election, the profiles contain information that is typically available to the American voter in a national election. In conjunction with candidate class, I examine the effect of a candidate's party and race to test the hypotheses posited here. Though the conjoint design is advantageous in its ability to include multiple dimensions that may influence a voter's

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[24] Because a social identity is a psychological attachment to a group, it cannot be directly observed. However, we can test expectations of how social identity influences voting behavior by drawing from the literature on social identity.

decision, this makes for a more conservative test than traditional vignette designs that only manipulate cues to one group in isolation.

Before respondents are presented with the candidate matchups, they are asked to report demographic information and answer questions gauging their attachment to groups based on class, race, gender, and political party. See Appendix H for more information on important design features of the conjoint experiment used here.

Respondents were then presented with a table comparing two candidates running for Congress and asked to vote for their preferred candidate. The table included seven attributes: party, race, economic background, sex, government experience, work experience, and a candidate quote. Each attribute can take on one of two or more potential values (also referred to as levels) that are randomly selected for each matchup. The number of levels for an attribute range from 2 (sex) to 9 (candidate statement).

After voting for one of the candidates, respondents would be presented with the next, randomly generated, candidate matchup. Altogether respondents participated in 15 iterations of candidate matchups. A total of 1,094 respondents completed the experiment, each saw 15 matchups and evaluated 30 candidates, resulting in a total 32,820 observations. See demographic breakdown in Appendix G.

Analyzing Conjoint Data

To analyze the results of the conjoint experiment, I rely on the average marginal component effect (AMCE) to estimate the dependent variable used in this analysis. The AMCE, first defined by (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), is by far the most commonly used quantity of interest in political science research employing a conjoint design

(Bansak et al. 2022). The AMCE can be computed using basic difference-in-means OLS regression and interpreted as the average effect of going between two levels within an attribute, on the probability that the profile will be chosen, over the distribution of the other attributes (Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022). When used to interpret conjoint designs simulating elections, the AMCE can also be interpreted as the causal effect of an attribute value on the candidates predicted vote share (Bansak et al. 2020).

While the AMCE remains the standard approach for analyzing forced-choice experiments in political science, there has been push back as to how it is interpreted by researchers (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020; Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022; Ganter 2023). One of the factors that can be easily overlooked when interpreting results is the relational nature of the AMCE and its sensitivity to the baseline attribute value it is compared against. For example, the AMCE of being a Democrat may be drastically different whether the baselevel for comparison is an Independent or a Republican. However, I am chiefly interested in the effect of how social identity biases voter behavior by increasing the likelihood that voters prefer candidates from a relevant in-group.

The social identity literature demonstrates that identities tend to lead individuals toward a biased favoritism toward in-group members and in some cases they may lead to negative bias against a relevant out-group (Turner et al. 1987; Tajfel 1982). Therefore, I am interested in the extent of bias for in-group candidates compared to out-group candidates. In the analysis here I am able to mitigate some of the issues involved in interpreting the AMCE by collapsing the relevant candidate traits into a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the trait matches that of the respondent. For example, a Republican candidate is coded 0 for a respondent that is a Democrat and 1 for a respondent that is a Republican. This enables

me to estimate the AMCE for an attribute value going from 0 (non-matching) to 1 (matching) and avoid bias introduced by comparing groups that have divergent preferences for a particular attribute level chosen as the base level. Consequently, the AMCE estimated this way is a measure that captures both directions that could be biased by an identity, preference for the in-group and antipathy for an out-group. However, the full results of the experiment measured by the marginal means for each level can be found in Appendix L.

Conceptually the AMCE is well suited for research related to the relationship between identity and behavior. While it does not represent majority preference, the averaging involved captures both the direction and intensity of the effect of an attribute level (Bansak et al. 2022). Strong identities are also argued to inform both the direction of preferences and the intensity of those preferences in motivating behavior (Mason 2013). The AMCE captures this important feature of identities as they do not merely represent a preference for a particular attribute level but also the extent to which that preference is strong enough to motivate vote choice. For example, it may be that working class Americans generally prefer candidates from the working class but, in a context where multiple identities are salient, they are more likely to rely on other identities to inform their decision.

Findings

The findings from the conjoint experiment confirm expectations regarding the strong influence of partisan and racial identities, which are more consistently predictive of vote choice than class identity, see Figure 4.1 below. When a candidate's party or race matches the party or race of the respondents, they are significantly more likely to receive their vote. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant effect when a candidate's

class matches the respondent's class, in the full sample. However, there are important interactions between class, race and party that shed light on the conditions in which class identity plays a role in Americans' electoral behavior.

NOTE:Estimates represent the AMCE on the probability of getting the vote when a candidate's attribute matches the corresponding attribute of the respondent.

Figure 4.1: Effect of Matching Attributes on Probability of Vote

Testing the Partisan Loyalty Hypothesis

Estimating the AMCE for the full sample of respondents, candidate party has a large clear effect on the probability of vote choice. Respondents are on average 6.8% more likely to vote for candidates that share their party. This effect holds when breaking down respondents by party, Democrats are 9.1% more likely to vote for a Democrat and Republicans are 5.3% more likely to vote for a Republican (see full results in Appendix K).[25]

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[25] There was no statistically significant effect of matching party for Independent candidate/respondents. This is not surprising considering that "independent" is not a formal political party, rather a declaration of no party preference. Therefore, an Independent label does not provide meaningful insight into the candidates priorities and may not entail a psychological attachment to Independents as a group identity.

Considering the prominent effect of party found in other research, these findings may seem like modest effects. However, the results from a conjoint design are innately more conservative than results from the more traditional vignette design experiments where only a few variables are manipulated. The results in this type of design are tempered by the number of variables involved including seven candidate attributes, each containing 2-9 levels, therefore each candidate matchup has 14 characteristics that may influence the respondent's vote. Furthermore, I employ total randomization of levels for each attribute which means that respondents are at times presented with matchups of two candidates from the same party. Though this will make for a more conservative effect size on any given dimension, the full randomization is an important aspect of the conjoint design that allows the researcher to estimate the causal effect of moving between two levels within an attribute, averaged across the values of the other attributes. Finally, the effect size of candidate party is likely be conditioned by the inclusion of Independents, which elicited less aversion amongst partisan respondents and did not increase support among respondents who identified as Independent.

The influence of candidate party on vote choice is prevalent for respondents in every class, see Figure 4.2 below. Respondents in each class are significantly more likely to vote for a candidate from their party increasing the probability of vote by 6.2% for the working class, 7.8% for the lower-middle class, 7.1% for the upper-middle class, and 5.1% for the upper-class.[26]

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[26] The confidence interval for the upper class is considerably larger than any other class and slightly overlaps with zero. This is likely a feature of the limited number of respondents (72) for this group. However, the estimate still reaches marginally statistical significance with p-value = .068 thus we can reject the null hypotheses that candidate party has no effect on this group.

Figure 4.2: The Effect of Matching Party on Probability of Vote, by Class

The effect of matching party between respondents and candidates holds even when looking exclusively at candidates from an out-class for each class. This suggests that voters are more likely to rely on their partisan identity to inform their vote choice even when the candidate belongs to an out-class. However, there does appear to be an additive benefit when the candidate belongs to both their party and class, particularly among working class voters. When a candidate's class and party match that of working class respondents, their vote share increases by 2% compared to copartisans from an out-class. For middle and upper class respondents there is less than a 1% increase for candidates with matching class and party. The additive effect indicates that, while voters prioritize party, candidate class remains a relevant factor for their vote choice.

Research shows that partisan bias is most powerful among those with strong attachments to their party (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Huddy and Khatib

2007). Breaking respondents down by partisan identity strength results in greater support

for copartisans candidates among those with strong partisan identities. Copartisan candidates

vote share increases by 4.9% among weak partisans and 9% among strong partisans, see

Appendix K for full results. The fact that even weak partisans are more likely to vote for

candidates from their party demonstrates the broad importance of partisan identity to

Americans' electoral behavior.

That fact that strong partisans are especially motivated to vote for copartisan

candidates sheds light on how this identity may override considerations of class. As

discussed in the prior chapter, those in the working and lower-middle class with strong class

identities are more likely to support candidates that appealed to their class. Here, I find a

correlation between class identity strength and partisan identity strength, see Figure 4.3

below.[27]

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[27] Partisan identity is measured by responses to the question: "Do you consider yourself a strong
Democrat/Republican?" for respondents that indicated a party preference. "Leaners" are respondents that did
not immediately identify with a party but were asked a follow-up question: "Do you think of yourself as closer
to the Republican or Democratic party?"

Figure 4.3: The Effect of Partisan Identity on Class Identity

As demonstrated in Figure 4.3, those with a strong class identity are also more likely to have a strong partisan identity. Why this might be the case is not clear and beyond the scope of this analysis. However, this evidence indicates a further impediment for class identity to shape Americans' political behavior. Those who are most likely to consider their class, individuals with a strong class identity, are also more likely to have strong partisan identities that may supersede the salience of their class identity in a political context.

That partisan identity drives electoral behavior is not surprising considering it is an explicitly political identity that provides significant information to voters about a candidate. Further, partisan attachments seem to be more potent in voters decision making as we see an increase in copartisan voting among those with the strongest partisan identities. The findings here confirm the partisan loyalty hypothesis as matching party has a larger and more consistent effect on vote choice than matching class.

There is no shortage of examples of race playing a role in American politics and the experiment here is no exception as can be seen in Figure 4.1. Among white respondents, candidates that shared their race were 7% more likely to get their vote. Among non-whites there was no statistically significant effect but that may be due to the limited sample size of non-whites who participated in this study, raising issues of statistical power. [28] See Appendix G for demographic breakdown.

Breaking respondents down by racial identity strength shows that white respondents with strong racial identities are more likely to vote for candidates that match their race than those with comparatively weak identities. The probability of supporting white candidates compared to non-white candidates increases by 5.8% among Whites with a weak racial identity and 11.7% among Whites with a strong racial identity, see Appendix K for full results.

Similar to trends in class identity strength, Whites in the middle and upper class are also more likely to have a strong racial identity compared to Whites in the working-class. Unfortunately, my ability to delve into differences between class groups and non-white respondents based on racial identity strength is limited by the increasingly small number of observations available for each subgroup in the sample. These findings largely confirm the Racial Primacy Hypothesis as candidate race has a stronger influence on Whites' vote choice than candidate class, which does not have a statistically significant effect.

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[28] White respondents account for almost 90% of the sample leaving only 112 non-white respondents who identify as black (n=33), Latinx (n=36), or AAPI (n=43).

Contrary to the expectation that the white working-class would be disproportionately swayed by considerations around race, Whites in the working-class were the least effected by the race of the candidate and the only class to not see a statistically significant increase in preference for white candidates, see Figure 4.4 below. Among lower-middle class Whites the probability of a white candidate getting the vote increases by 6% and increases by 11% among upper-middle class and upper class Whites.[29]

NOTE: Estimates represent the AMCE on the probability of getting the vote when a candidate's race matches the respondents.

Figure 4.4: The Effect of Matching Race on Probability of Vote, by Class.

These findings undermine the proposition that the WWC is uniquely motivated by racial considerations. In fact, here we see that candidate race has a more prominent effect on

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[29] Among white respondents, latinx candidates see a 3% decline in vote share from the working class, a 4% decline from the lower-middle class, a 10% decline from the upper-middle class, and an 8% decline from the upper-class, relative to a white candidate. Black candidates do not see a statistically significant effect in probability of support from working class whites. However, black candidates see a 5% decline from the lower-middle class, an 11% decline from the upper-middle class, and 8% decline from the upper-class, compared against a white candidate.

the probability of support from the middle- and upper-classes. If the WWC was uniquely motivated by racial identity, they should not only prefer white candidates, but it should increase white candidates votes share beyond that observed for Whites in the middle and upper classes. Since I find the opposite effect, I can reject the Racially Motivated WWC Hypothesis.

However, the results here cannot rule out the possibility that racial identity plays a bigger role in motivating the behavior of the WWC in other contexts. For example, candidates may increase reliance on racial identities by portraying other racial groups as an existential threat to the interests of working-class Whites. Nevertheless, these results challenge claims that Whites in the working class are more predisposed to center their political preferences on racial considerations than Whites in other classes.

Another important caveat that must be taken into consideration when interpreting these results is the high level of education for respondents in the sample. Studies that examine class via objective measures often include educational attainment as a key feature, typically defining working class as those without a college degree. Education has also been shown to moderate the effect of racial priming (Huber and Lapinski 2006). However, the majority of respondents in this sample report having a college degree, including nearly 70% of respondent in the working-class. The small number of respondents without a college degree limits my ability to pick up on the interaction between class and level of education. It may be the case that working class voters without a college degree are more effected by racial considerations. However, estimating the AMCE of candidate race for those with and without a college degree, for all Whites, results in nearly identical estimates, suggesting that

education did not significantly condition the effect of the treatments for those in the working-class in this context.

Why Whites in the middle- and upper-classes are affected by candidate race to the extent that they are is unclear. However, experimental research has shown that candidates who are racial minorities are perceived to be more liberal than white candidates (Fulton and Gershon 2018). Therefore, it could be that Whites in more well-to-do classes are more hesitant to support minority candidates, fearing they will be more likely to enact policies that damage their economic interests.

Discussion

The results from the conjoint experiment demonstrate the enduring influence of partisan and racial identities to Americans voting behavior. While there is evidence of a role played by class identity, it appears that Americans put a premium on their attachments to party and race. The dramatic change in vote for candidates based on their party and race compared to the more contextually limited effect of class suggest that Americans are less likely to rely on class identity to inform their political behavior. This may be one reason that Americans tend to vote along class lines at lower rates than we would expect and support candidates that promote policies that are detrimental to their economic interest.

Research shows that partisanship is becoming increasingly influential in electoral behavior overtime (Bartels 2000). In part this may be due to Americans sorting into ideologically and socially homogenous parties which strengthens partisan identity, spurring greater partisan bias in political attitudes and behavior (Levendusky 2009; Mason 2013; 2015;

2018). The growing importance of partisan identity to Americans' political behavior may inhibit the salience of class identity in an electoral context.

Much of the scholarly curiosity surrounding class and electoral behavior centers on the white working class and their propensity to vote for candidates that promote policy that is detrimental to their economic interests. While the findings here regarding the influence of candidate race on Whites' vote choice is a sobering reminder of the country's fraught history with race, it also offers a glimmer of hope. Contrary to popular narratives, working class Whites were not driven by considerations of the candidate's race to the degree some would expect. This coupled with the findings from the previous chapter that show that those with a strong class identity in the working class were the most motivated by considerations of class, suggests that the working class can be mobilized around class under the right conditions.

Political parties have an opportunity to increase support from voters in the working class by shifting focus from appealing to racial identities toward appealing to their class identity. While this may not be a silver-bullet that solves America's growing economic and political inequality, it could be a step toward coalitions that better represent the interests of the people. However, as demonstrated here, the influence of partisan identity is hard to overcome and may inhibit the development of class-based coalitions any time soon.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Class, however it is defined, is often considered to be central to politics. Classic political philosophers such as Marx centered their theories of society around class cleavages. American history contains examples where class played an important role in political outcomes. Shays' rebellion represents an example of a class-based conflict that shaped the political context in which the American Constitution was formed. Further, democratic theory is premised on the idea that groups mobilize around a common interest and act collectively to advance their goals and the economic basis of class presents a clear group interest regarding redistributive policy. Class also seems important to political elites as candidates regularly appeal to class while campaigning for public office.

Yet for the pervasiveness of class in our lives, scholarly debate, and pollical culture, there is surprisingly little evidence of the influence of class in Americans' political behavior. For example, prominent scholars consider elections as the "democratic translation of the class struggle" (Lipset 1960, pg. 220). Yet there is less class line voting in American elections than many of its European peers (Evans 2000). Further, large portions of the American electorate vote for candidates that promote policy that is detrimental to their class interest (Bartels 2016).

In the preceding chapters I have offered an explanation for this puzzle by examining the role of class identity. The literature shows that identity is central to Americans' political behavior (Huddy 2013). When individuals form a psychological attachment and internalize membership in a group, it can inform their political attitudes and behavior when the identity is salient to the political context. Identities based in a politically relevant group can provide a heuristic shortcut to lower the cognitively taxing burden of making decisions such as who to

vote for. Identities based in a politically salient group make individuals more likely to participate in political behavior (Fowler and Kam 2007; Miller et al. 1981). They increase the average knowledge about political issues pertinent to the group (Bishin 2009). They also increase the likelihood of mobilizing members to take collective action to further the interests of the group (Simon and Klandermans 2001).

If Americans have a psychological attachment to their class, we should see high levels of class line voting and a clearer alignment between their class's interests and the candidates they choose to support. The lack of these features in modern American politics raises questions regarding the extent to which Americans identify with their class: Do Americans have a class identity? Does class identity influence their political behavior? Or do Americans tend to rely on identities other than class to inform their political behavior? These questions are key to understanding the extent that class identity informs Americans' political attitudes and behavior.

For an identity to inform political behavior, individuals need to not only classify themselves as a part of a group but also have a positive affective attachment to the group, view it as important to their self-concept, and be in a context where the identity is made salient (Bishin and Muttram 2023). It may be that we do not see more evidence of class based political outcomes because Americans do not form an attachment to their class. Or if they do have a class identity, it may be that it is not salient to their political context. Finally, identities that are viewed as more important to an individual's self-concept also seem to be more readily accessible and therefore likely to inform behavior when salient to their context (Morris 2013). Therefore, it could be that the limited influence of class identity is because

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other identities, such as race or political party, are more important to Americans self-concept and are more likely to inform to voters' decisions.

In Chapter 2, I examine the extent to which Americans identify with their class. First, I demonstrate the vast disparity in the class that Americans place themselves in and the class that researchers often categorize them via objective measures based on income and education. I find that a majority of respondents in the working, middle and upper class would be misclassified using objective measures. Because identity is a psychological attachment to a group, this disjuncture limits scholar's ability to observe the influence of class identity. The findings here affirm the importance of researchers studying class to rely on subjective measures of class where possible to avoid cofounding the results due to mismatched expectations of one's class identity.

I then construct a scale to measure class identity strength, which is the extent to which individuals view their class as important to their self-concept, form positive affective attachments to their class, and see their fate as linked to the fate of their class. These components are critical for an identity to influence social behavior. Contrary to some expectations that Americans do not identify with their class, I find that many Americans do have a strong class identity. However, strong class identities are more likely for individuals in a high-status class than they are for individuals in the class below.

This has important implications for the lower and working class as weaker attachments to their class identity may limit the extent that individuals in these classes rely on their class identity to inform their political behavior and act collectively to advance the interests of their class. This is further confirmed by the finding that individuals with strong class identities are more likely to agree with the importance of working together with their

class to achieve common goals. The fact that we see large portions of the working class support candidates that promote policy that is detrimental to the interests of their class, may be because individuals in this class have weaker class identities and thus are less likely to rely on this identity to inform their vote choice.

In Chapter 3, I examine whether class identity influences Americans' political behavior. I analyze results from an experiment that asks respondents to pick between two hypothetical candidates running for the U.S. House of Representatives. Respondents were presented with two candidate profiles, side by side, that contained information indicating various traits such as their class background and a quote that appealed to a specific class.

I find evidence that class identity influences political behavior under certain conditions. While the middle class seems to be largely unaffected by class identity, those in the working class with a strong class identity are more supportive of candidates that share their class background and candidates that appeal directly to their class. Conversely, those in the upper class do not appear to be more supportive of candidates that share their class background, but they are adamantly opposed to candidates that appeal to the working class. What explains their opposition to the pro-working class candidate, and not candidates that appeal to the middle class, is not entirely clear. It may be that the greater distance between the economic standing of the working class and upper class increases the likelihood that they perceive a threat to the status of their class when candidates symbolically appeal to the working class.

These findings have important implications for American politics. On the one hand, this suggests that the working class can be mobilized to support pro-class candidates who directly appeal to their class identity. There are opportunities for politicians, such as Senator

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John Fetterman, who have strong working class credentials to mobilize and form a coalition of working class voters by appealing to their class identity. These findings lend support for the idea that the lack of consistency we find in the voting behavior of the working class, may be informed by the scarcity of working class candidates and candidates willing to appeal to the working class directly, rather than voter hesitancy in supporting candidate from the working class (Carnes and Lupu 2016).

On the other hand, the fact that individuals in the working class are less likely to have a strong class identity raises a barrier to mobilizing the working class as a whole. Further, the upper class's aversion to candidates that appeal to the working class may limit the willingness of candidates from pursuing a working class coalition. This may be exacerbated by the disproportionate resources at the disposal of the upper class to shape political outcomes. Candidates may be able to avoid upper class rancor by appealing to the middle class. However, they may not gain much ground by doing so as the middle class appears to be generally apathetic to class-based appeals. This is somewhat ironic given the frequent appeals made to the middle class by modern candidates in both parties (Rhodes and Johnson 2017).

In Chapter 4, I examine the extent that Americans base their vote choice on identities based in party and race, in lieu of their class identity. Further examining the results from the conjoint experiment, I estimate the effect of identities based in class, party, and in a multidimensional context where cues are present for each group. This context provides respondents the opportunity to base their vote on any of these attributes. I find evidence of a strong influence of partisan and racial identities such that the increase in vote share for white and copartisan candidates dwarfs the effect of a candidate's class. However, contrary

to expectations that the white working class is disproportionally effected by candidate race, I find that Whites in the working class are less influenced by candidate race than Whites in the middle and upper classes.

The findings in chapter 4 indicate that Americans, in general, are more likely to rely on their partisan and racial identities to inform their vote choice. It is no surprise that partisan identity has such a significant effect considering the usefulness of this identity in providing voters a heuristic to inform their vote choice. Studies in political science have demonstrated the extensive influence of partisan identities, going back to early studies such as *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). Partisan identities are fundamentally rooted in politics and provide individuals with a robust amount of information about a candidate with limited cognitive effort.

The substantial influence of candidate race in this experiment is far more sobering. Race has long been a component of American politics, but the implications of the racial bias found here are a stark reminder of the country's fixation on race. The findings suggest substantial hurdles faced by racial minorities to sway white Americans' vote choice. While America has seen an increase in the number of racial minorities elected to public office, this confirms findings that show these candidates must work extra hard to earn the support of American voters (e.g. Tesler and Sears 2010).

While the research here answers some questions as to why class seems to play a limited role in Americans' political attitudes and behavior, it also raises questions to be addressed by future research. While many Americans do form meaningful class identities, its impact on their political behavior is limited. However, given the relevance of class to economic policy, it is not clear why class identity is not more salient. It may be that the lack

of class diversity represented in government suppresses the likelihood of considerations around class. For example, the median net worth of members of Congress exceeds one million dollars, far outpacing the economic standing of the average American (Evers-Hillstrom 2020). While the conjoint experiment created a context where respondents had an equal chance to vote for working, middle, and upper class candidates, in reality American voters are more likely faced with choosing between Rockefellers and Carnegies.

It may also be the case that reliance on class identity is less common for Americans because campaigns do more to appeal to party and race, increasing the salience of these identities to the electoral context. It remains unclear if class identity can be influenced by a context where candidates center their campaign around appealing to the working class. It may be that campaigns that elevate the perceived status of the working class could increase the likelihood that voters embrace their working class identities and mobilize to achieve goals that advance the interests of their class. Future research could explore these areas to further our understanding of Americans' political behavior. Rising economic inequality and political polarization threaten to undermine confidence in our institutions. Continued failure to address these issues could bring us to the brink of more political violence that might otherwise be avoided by class-based coalitions that can effectuate change through the democratic process.

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Appendix A: American Class Identity Survey Demographics

	Respondent Demographic Breakdown		
Category	**Level**	**Number of Respondents**	**Percent of Respondents**
Class	Lower Class	56	5.62%
	Working Class	310	31.12%
	Lower-Middle Class	284	28.51%
	Upper-Middle Class	312	31.33%
	Upper-Class	34	3.41%
Race	White	754	76.08%
	Black	108	10.90%
	Latinx	42	4.24%
	AAPI	73	7.37%
	Other	14	1.41%
Party	Democrat	535	57.28%
	Republican	399	42.72%
Sex	Male	579	58.25%
	Female	408	41.05%
	Other	7	0.70%
Education	0-12 years completed	59	5.94%
	High School Diploma	66	6.64%
	Some College	163	16.40%
	College Degree	513	51.61%
	Graduate Degree	193	19.42%

Income of Respondents

Note: Dotted Green Line = Normal Distribution, Solid Red Line = Kernel Density Estimator

Age of Respondents

Note: Line = Normal Density Curve

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
Appendix B: Concordance / discordance between objective and subjective measures of class

Objective and Subjective Class Identity Concordance
By Educational Attainment

percent

100
80
60
40
20
0

Lower Class   Working Class   Middle Class   Upper Class
Subjective Class

Concordant Identity
Discordant Identity

Note: Objective class measured by educational attainment

Objective and Subjective Class Identity Concordance
Four Class Categories

percent

100
80
60
40
20
0

Lower Class   Working Class   Middle Class   Upper Class
Subjective Class

Concordant Identity
Discordant Identity

Note: Objective class measured by income quartile

Objective and Subjective Class Identity Concordance

Note: income cut points established by Thompson and Hickey (2005), adjusted for inflation

Appendix C: Class Identity Battery

Identity Dimension	Questions
Centrality of Identity	Being [respondent class] is an important part of how I see myself.
	The fact that I am [respondent class] is an important part of my identity.
	In general, being in the [respondent class] is important to my sense of the kind of person I am.
Group Affect	I feel good about being a member of the [respondent class].
	When I meet someone who is a member of the [respondent class], I feel connected.
	When people praise the [respondent class] it makes me feel good.
	I am glad to be a member of the [respondent class].
Linked Fate	Do you think what happens generally to people in the [respondent class] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?
	In general, what is in the best interest of the [respondent class] is also in your best interest?
	I have a lot in common with other people in the [respondent class].
Response Options	Strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree.

Table D1: Respondent Class and Class Identity Strength

Variable	Subjective Class	Objective Class	Subjective + Objective Class	Demographic Variables	Combined
Social Class	0.155***	-	0.153***	0.130***	0.130***
	(0.02)	-	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household Income	-	0.018**	-0.002	-	-0.008
	-	(0.01)	(0.01)	-	(0.01)
Education Level	-	0.021	0.005	-	0.009
	-	(0.02)	(0.02)	-	(0.02)
Age	-	-	-	-0.002	-0.002
	-	-	-	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male	-	-	-	0.012	0.009
	-	-	-	(0.04)	(0.04)
White	-	-	-	-0.038	-0.037
	-	-	-	(0.04)	(0.04)
Single	-	-	-	-0.164***	-0.183***
	-	-	-	(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployed	-	-	-	-0.248**	-0.272***
	-	-	-	(0.08)	(0.08)
Democrat	-	-	-	0.013	0
	-	-	-	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	2.380***	2.609***	2.369***	2.611***	2.651***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)
R-sqr	0.072	0.014	0.068	0.103	0.106
DF	990	934	933	984	927

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: OLS regression estimates predicting class identity strength with standard errors in parentheses. Social class selected by respondent's subjective identification.

Table D2: Mobility and Ambiguity on Class Identity Strength

Variable	Experienced Mobility	Perception of Child Mobility	Ambiguity of Membership	Combined
Social Class	-	-	-	0.095***
	-	-	-	(0.02)
Experienced Mobility	-0.220***	-	-	-0.083*
	(0.04)	-	-	(0.04)
Child Mobility	-	-0.145***	-	-0.109***
	-	(0.02)	-	(0.02)
Ambiguity	-	-	0.195***	0.142***
	-	-	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	3.139***	3.246***	2.326***	2.600***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.12)
R-sqr	0.031	0.079	0.060	0.152
DF	908	891	972	834

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: OLS regression estimates predicting class identity strength with standard errors in parentheses.

Table D3: Class Identity Strength on Class Consciousness

Variable	Social Class	Class Identity Strength	Combined
Social Class	-0.016	-	-0.117***
	(0.03)	-	(0.03)
Class Identity Strength	-	0.588***	0.643***
	-	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	3.608***	1.887***	2.078***
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.16)
R-sqr	0.000	0.112	0.125
DF	970	970	970

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: OLS regression estimates predicting support for the idea of working with your class to achieve common goals with standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E: Distribution of Class Identity Strength

Distribution of Class Identity

Appendix F: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels

Table F1: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels

Attribute	Levels	
Political Party	Independent, Democrat, Republican	
Racial Background	White, Black, Latino/Latina	
Economic Background	Working class, Middle class, Upper class	
Sex	Male, Female	
Government Experience	No prior experience, Mayor, State Senator, School Board Superintendent, Congressional Staffer	
Work Experience	Lawyer, Farmer/Rancher, High School Coach, Business Executive, Teacher, Trades Worker	
Candidate Quote	Pro-Working Class	The working class are the backbone of the economy. It is their labor and dedication that keeps America running. We must fight to make sure every working-class person has a voice in Congress.
	Pro-Middle Class	The middle-class built this country and made the country what it is today. Middle-class folks worked hard to achieve the American dream, and they deserve a representative in Congress who will look out for them.
	Anti-Rich	The wealthy corrupt our society and government. They use their money to elect politicians who make them even richer. It's well past time representatives in Congress stand up for the honest and hard-working Americans.
	Anti-Poor	The poor just want handouts from the government to reward their laziness, instead of making smart investments to attain the American dream for themselves. Congress needs a champion for the people who make wise choices.
	Pro-Blacks	Black Americans are a resilient community that have overcome a great deal of hardship to make the country a better place. They deserve a representative in Congress who supports the black community.
	Pro-Whites	Our country is where it is today because of the determination and success of white people. Representatives in Congress should respect the contributions of whites to America's development and stand with the community.

	Pro-Women	Women are the heart and soul of America. When times are tough, we have always been able to count on women, now its time they have someone in Congress that they can count on.
	Pro-Men	Men made this country what it is and continue to drive it forward. Today more than ever, American men need a representative in Congress who has their back and speaks to their issues.
	Pro-USA	Since its founding, the United States has been a beacon of hope and inspiration to the rest of the world. We need a Congress that stands behind the American people and works for them.

Appendix G: Conjoint Experiment Descriptive Statistics

Respondent Demographic Breakdown

Category	Level	Number of Respondents	Number of observations	Percent of Respondents
Class	Lower Class	39	1,170	3.56%
	Working Class	284	8,520	25.96%
	Lower-Middle Class	273	8,190	24.95%
	Upper-Middle Class	426	12,780	38.94%
	Upper-Class	72	2,160	6.58%
Race	White	978	29,340	89.72%
	Black	33	990	3.03%
	Latinx	36	1,080	3.30%
	AAPI	43	1,290	3.94%
Party	Democrat	561	16,830	51.90%
	Republican	372	11,160	34.41%
	Independent	148	4,440	13.69%
Sex	Male	695	20,850	63.53%
	Female	399	11,970	36.47%
Education	No College	161	4,830	14.72%
	Some College	36	1,080	3.29%
	College Degree	787	23,610	71.94%
	Graduate Degree	110	3,300	10.05%

Appendix H: Conjoint Design Features

<u>Number of Profiles</u>

The vast majority of conjoint experiments in the political science literature use a paired profile design where respondents are presented with two candidate profiles to compare (Bansak et al. 2021). Respondents will see a table presenting attributes of two candidates running for the House of Representatives. This mimics the choice most voters face when making a decision on who to support in an election. Even though voters often encounter more than two choices on a ballot, races are typically only competitive between the top two candidates and elections are broadly presented in the media as a contest between the two frontrunners. Given the nature of American elections that generally require voters to choose between two alternatives, the paired profile design make the most sense for this research.

Other advantages to the paired profile approach, opposed to a single-candidate profile design, is that respondents are forced to make a choice between alternatives. This requires them to weigh the benefits of different attributes when forming their decisions and will inevitably present a context where respondents are cross-pressured and must decide which attribute is more important to their decision. In real elections candidates often send cues to multiple groups in an effort to maximize their support from the largest number of people. When multiple identity cues are present, voters must adjudicate between the competing influence of identities based in different groups. This is a particularly valuable feature for examining the proposition that class identity is less relevant to American voters than identities based in race, gender or party.

<u>Number of Attributes</u>

The number of attributes to include in the candidate profiles requires a careful balance. If there are only a few attributes displayed, respondents may try to infer attributes not presented by those that are, such as assuming a candidate appealing to the working class is a Democrat. Including too few attributes also reduces the external validity of the experiment if respondents do not have the kind of information that is typically present in a real election. On the other hand, providing too many attributes can be cognitively taxing on the respondents incentivizing them to take short cuts or make choices at random.

Most studies using forced choice designs in political science tend to stick to around 10 attributes (Bansak et al. 2018). This enables the researcher to include attributes known to be relevant to voter behavior but not so many that it jeopardizes the reliability of the study. The present study includes seven attributes: party, race, economic background, sex, government experience, work experience, and a candidate quote.

The candidate quote attribute is more cognitively taxing as it requires more time and effort to read a quote than the other attribute levels which are only one or two words. Accordingly, I only include seven attributes to limit the potential for respondent survey fatigue. Including seven attributes lessens cognitive burden on the respondents, while still capturing many of the characteristics we know to be important to voters and are commonly revealed to them throughout a campaign.

<u>Attribute Levels (Values)</u>

Each attribute can take on one of two or more potential values (also referred to as levels) that are randomly selected for each matchup. The number of levels for an attribute range from 2 (sex) to 9 (candidate statement).

For the sake of external validity, I include attributes in the experiment that represent information that is reasonably available to voters in a typical Congressional election. Party and professional background represent information that is commonly presented to voters on a ballot or voter guide. Race and gender are characteristics that require minimal effort for a voter to ascertain. The candidates economic background (class) is somewhat more opaque in a natural setting, but candidates often present information about their economic background throughout their campaign, though they tend to downplay their current level of wealth (Carnes and Lupu 2016). The economic background attribute in this experiment includes three levels: working-class, middle-class, and upper-class. While I am not aware of any examples of candidates that explicitly describe themselves as "upper-class", the vast majority of members of Congress would be placed in the upper-class by objective measures (Carnes 2013).

Researchers sometimes prohibit the combination of certain attribute levels that create unrealistic profiles, such as a doctor without a college degree. While this may be worthwhile for some designs, manipulating possible combinations comes at a cost. Restricting combinations infringes on the underlying logic of conjoint analysis that relies on the randomization of values across attributes to unbiasedly estimate the effects of changing values within an attribute.

For the present study, there are combinations that are less likely to be observed in the real world, such as an upper-class trades worker, but these counterintuitive combinations represent a small number of the total possible profiles. Further, while some combinations are less plausible than others, none are categorically impossible.

More recently, scholars have advocated weighing the probability that an attribute takes on a value to correspond with the probability that it is observed in the real world (de la Cuesta, Egami, and Imai 2022). For instance, about 10% of MCs in the 117th Congress are black, so limiting the probability that black is selected as the candidate's race to only 10% of the profiles may increase the external validity of the study. However, there are costs to this approach that make it a suboptimal strategy for the experiment here.

Randomly selecting levels with equal probability make the results more directly interpretable as each level has the same chance of appearing and presumably a roughly equivalent number of observations relative to the other levels within a given attribute. Changing the probabilities to reflect the composition of characteristics in Congress would leave me with too few observations to estimate the effect of candidates who are not wealthy, white, men with law degrees. This issue is particularly acute when I break the sample into subgroups for more detailed analysis. Further, the focus of the research here is to uncover the effect of class identity in a context where multiple identities are salient. It is vital that I have enough observations that take on values cueing various identities, even if that happens more frequently in the candidate matchups than it does in the real world. Therefore, I follow the standard practice in the literature of giving each level of an attribute equal probability.[30]

<u>Attribute Order</u>

In addition to randomizing the appearance of attribute levels, the order attributes are presented to respondents may influence what they emphasize when forming their preferences. For instance, respondents may rely more on the last bit of information they

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[30] de la Cuesta et al. 2022 find that uniform attribute distribution is used in 88% of conjoint designs in political science journals since 2014.

come across to inform their choice, so the attribute appearing at the bottom of the conjoint table could receive the most attention bias in the results. However, because respondents will be viewing multiple iterations of the matchups, changing the order of attributes for each iteration could be disruptive and cognitively taxing leading to survey fatigue.

Ideally, I could randomize the order attributes are displayed across respondents, while maintaining the same order for each respondent. Unfortunately, the software used to conduct this experiment was unable to accommodate this kind of a setup. Consequently, I cannot verify if there were order effects based on the order attributes appeared in the profile tables. However, prior research have found little or no order effects when comparing the effect of attributes displayed in different orders in a conjoint design (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Outcome Variables

I include two outcome variables in this experiment, vote choice and likelihood of support. Respondents are presented with a paired profile table comparing the attributes of two candidates and asked to choose one of the two candidates to vote for. Respondents are not given the option to decline supporting both candidates, as they could chose to do in a real election. Because I am interested in observing the impact of competing identities it is important to force respondents to reconcile with the tradeoffs of each candidates' attributes – even if neither candidate is ideal. While voters technically have more options in an election (vote for third party or write-in candidate), voters often only have a choice between two candidates with a realistic shot at winning and have to decide which to support even when neither is their ideal candidate.

After choosing a candidate to vote for, respondents rate each candidate on seven-point scale of how likely they would be to support the candidate in a real election. This rating allows me to pick up on the effect of characteristics that may be washed out by the forced vote choice. For instance, it may be that respondents have preferences for certain candidate characteristics but when forced to choose, respondents ultimately vote for the candidate who shares their political party out of a sense of loyalty. Since they rate both candidates, respondents can demonstrate their favorability for candidates without the restrictions imposed by a forced choice. Ultimately, the analysis discussed in the text focuses on the vote as the dependent variable as it speaks to a more consequential outcome.

Analyzing Conjoint Data: AMCE vs MM

Typically, the most commonly used quantity of interest in political science research employing a conjoint design is the average marginal component effect (AMCE), first defined by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) (Bansak et al. 2022). The AMCE can be computed using basic difference-in-means OLS regression and interpreted as the average effect of going between two levels within an attribute, on the probability that the profile will be chosen, over the distribution of the other attributes (Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022). When used to interpret conjoint designs simulating elections, the AMCE can also be interpreted as the causal effect of an attribute value on the candidates predicted vote share (Bansak et al. 2020).

While the AMCE remains the standard approach for analyzing forced-choice experiments in political science, there has been push back as to how it is interpreted by researchers (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020; Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik 2022; Ganter 2023). One of the factors that can be easily overlooked when interpreting results is

the relational nature of the AMCE and its sensitivity to the baseline attribute value it is compared against. For example, the AMCE of being a Democrat may be drastically different whether the baselevel for comparison is an Independent or a Republican. Accordingly, the researcher must be careful in the selection of baselevels and should analyze results using different baselevels to verify the accuracy of the estimates.

The sensitivity to baselevels can be especially troublesome when estimating the AMCEs for subgroups within a sample. Interpretation of subgroup AMCEs can be misleading when there is divergence between groups in their preference for the baselevel of an attribute (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). For example, if Democrats prefer working class candidates more than Republicans but both groups have similar preferences for middle class candidates, the AMCE of going from working class to middle class will make it appear as though Republicans are more supportive of middle class candidates than Democrats. Even if their level of support for middle class candidates is the same, the change in support between candidates from either class will be different because of their divergent preferences for candidates from the working class.

Subgroup analysis is crucial to the research questions under examination here because there are divergent expectations on the effect of a candidate's attributes for respondents in different classes. Therefore the research here relies on analysis of the marginal means by subgroup because it is less vulnerable to misinterpretation than the AMCE (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). The marginal mean represents the average probability a profile is selected given an attribute level. It is closely connected to the AMCE which is essentially the differences between marginal means for every attribute level and the marginal mean in the reference category, across all the other features. While the MM lacks

the direct causal interpretation of the AMCE, it provides a straightforward measure of favorability for all levels of an attribute without the need to specify a baselevel. This makes it useful in subgroup analysis as the researcher can estimate the MMs to examine the extent that subgroups in the sample differ in support for all levels of an attribute and avoid issues related to the sensitivity of baselevel selection. Analyzing the results of the experiment using AMCEs does not change any of the conclusions reached through the analysis of the MMs, I report the AMCEs in Appendix D.

Number of Iterations

One of the major advantages of the conjoint design is that a single respondent can repeat tasks multiple times without raising the validity concerns associated with other designs (Bansak et al. 2021). Respondents in this study will be presented with 15 paired profiles and evaluate 30 candidates. Increasing the number of tasks involved in a survey, raises the threat of respondent satisficing. When encountering long surveys, respondents may begin feeling fatigued by the task which can degrade the reliability of their responses (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014). However, (Bansak et al. 2018) show that inferences from conjoint designs are robust for up to 30 iterations of a paired profile tasks, similar to the experiment used here. I limit my experiment to 15 iterations to err on the side of caution while still generating enough observations to effectively analyze the results. A total of 1,094 respondents completed the experiment, each saw 15 matchups and evaluated 30 candidates, resulting in a total 32,820 observations.

Candidate Messages

This experiment includes a novel attribute category that displays a quote attributed to the candidate. Election studies using conjoint designs often include policy statements that

identify where a candidate stands on a particular policy issue. However, in this study I am not concerned about how voters weigh policy tradeoffs. Instead, I seek to uncover how Americans adjudicate between cues that signal varying identities.

Social identities provide a decisional and behavioral context that act as a reference point for opinions and behavior based on the interests of the group they identify with. A person that identifies with a politically relevant group sees politics through the lens of this identity which can lead members to cohere around shared political goals. However, this effect is not necessarily through a member's rational calculous of what they determine is the groups interest, rather they are given cues and internalize the appropriate preference for members of their group.

Self-categorization theory posits that individuals are constantly switching between their individual and social identity (Turner et al. 1987). In order for a social identity to effect political attitudes and behavior, the identity must be salient to the context. The effect of identities on attitudes and behavior is contingent on which identity is salient to an individuals context. For example, white Americans are more supportive of spending on minority education when national identity is made salient versus when their racial identity is salient (Transue 2007). Candidates can leverage the effect of social identity by increasing the salience of a group to the political context, shifting the identity relied upon to inform voters preferences.

There are a total of nine candidate quotes used in this experiment. The messages emulate the type of statements made by candidates running for Congress. See summary table in appendix A. The pro-USA quote is designed to be used as the baseline for estimating the effect of the other 8 quotes that all cue a specific identity group. Signaling support for a

group should raise the salience of that identity and increase the probability a candidate gets the vote from respondents that identify with the targeted group. In some contexts, appealing to one group may engender opposition from the out-group, particularly if the out-group perceives a threat to their groups status or resources (Lowery et al. 2006).

Two quotes directly signal support for a specific class, the "pro working-class" and "pro middle-class". The idea here is to raise the salience of class identity and increase support among members of the targeted class. Messages of support for a group without a connection to policy objectives is common in campaigns as candidates try to raise support from the target of the appeal and avoid making promises that they will not be able to keep in office (Klar 2013). While these quotes do not specifically threaten the out-group, it is possible that respondents from another class will perceive the message as threat to their status.

I do not include a pro-lower-class or pro-upper-class quote because these terms are rarely used in political discourse. However, I include a "anti-rich" and "anti-poor" messages that may illicit a polarizing effect for those on different end of the class hierarchy because of the differences in their economic status. However, the effect of these messages may be conditioned by the target of the message. Specifically, the anti-poor message may be seen as "punching-down" toward a more vulnerable group and illicit opposition from even the more well-to-do respondents.[31] The remaining four quotes entail positive messages regarding a

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[31] While there is precedent for anti-poor rhetoric, it is usually couched in more socially acceptable terms or something political elites do not intend for a public consumption, such as Presidential candidate Mitt Romney's infamous remarks regarding the 47% of people dependent on government handouts.

race or gender (pro-women, pro-men, pro-black, and pro-white). These quotes provide the opportunity to compare the effect of identity primes based in different groups.

While the quotes differ in the group they target, I made efforts to normalize the messages to be as similar as possible to avoid bias toward messages that are inherently higher in quality than others. Each message is roughly the same length (33-35 words) so that none are more cognitively taxing than another. Each quote mentions the targeted group by name two times so that they equally cue the group identity. Quotes contained two valence statements that either express a positive or negative assessment of the targeted group (e.g. "the middle-class is the backbone of the economy"). Because the baseline quote (pro-USA) may prime an American identity, I include a reference to America in every other quote to lessen the extent that any candidate appears less supportive of America. Finally, I attempt to normalize the word choice used to demonstrate symbolic support for the targeted group across the quotes by using putatively similar phrasing indicating that the candidate will *fight for, look out for, stand up for, work for, be a champion for*, the targeted group.

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote

All Respondents
Number of Observations: 32,820 | Unique Respondents: 1,094

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.487	0.004	-3.152	0.002***	0.479	0.495
	Democrat	0.519	0.005	4.059	0.000***	0.510	0.529
	Republican	0.489	0.005	-2.405	0.016**	0.480	0.498
Racial Background	White	0.540	0.005	8.100	0.000***	0.530	0.549
	Latino Latina	0.478	0.004	-5.080	0.000***	0.469	0.486
	Black	0.478	0.004	-4.846	0.000***	0.470	0.487
Economic Background	Working Class	0.504	0.004	0.965	0.335	0.496	0.512
	Middle Class	0.503	0.004	0.840	0.401	0.495	0.511
	Upper Class	0.488	0.004	-2.898	0.004***	0.480	0.496
Sex	Male	0.497	0.003	-0.942	0.346	0.491	0.503
	Female	0.500	0.003	-0.090	0.928	0.494	0.506
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.479	0.006	-3.554	0.000***	0.468	0.491
	Mayor	0.508	0.006	1.471	0.142	0.497	0.519
	Congressional Staffer	0.504	0.006	0.693	0.489	0.493	0.515
	S.B. Superintendent	0.493	0.006	-1.273	0.203	0.482	0.504
	State Senator	0.508	0.006	1.412	0.158	0.497	0.519
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.501	0.006	0.162	0.871	0.489	0.513
	Farmer Rancher	0.511	0.006	1.920	0.055*	0.500	0.523
	High School Coach	0.483	0.006	-2.765	0.006***	0.471	0.495
	Business Executive	0.490	0.006	-1.677	0.094*	0.478	0.502
	Teacher	0.503	0.006	0.429	0.668	0.491	0.515
	Trades Worker	0.502	0.006	0.372	0.710	0.490	0.514
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.496	0.008	-0.543	0.587	0.480	0.511
	Pro-Working Class	0.506	0.008	0.727	0.468	0.490	0.522
	Pro-Middle Class	0.499	0.008	-0.082	0.935	0.484	0.515
	Anti-Poor	0.482	0.008	-2.161	0.031**	0.466	0.498
	Anti-Rich	0.504	0.008	0.544	0.587	0.489	0.519
	Pro-Black	0.507	0.008	0.876	0.381	0.491	0.523
	Pro-White	0.492	0.009	-0.987	0.324	0.475	0.508
	Pro-Women	0.493	0.008	-0.841	0.400	0.478	0.509
	Pro-Men	0.506	0.008	0.757	0.449	0.490	0.522

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Working Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.489	0.008	-1.473	0.142	0.473	0.504
	Democrat	0.519	0.009	2.133	0.034**	0.501	0.536
	Republican	0.488	0.009	-1.392	0.165	0.470	0.505
Racial Background	White	0.511	0.008	1.337	0.182	0.495	0.527
	Latino Latina	0.484	0.008	-2.096	0.037**	0.469	0.499
	Black	0.501	0.008	0.085	0.933	0.484	0.517
Economic Background	Working Class	0.512	0.008	1.406	0.161	0.495	0.528
	Middle Class	0.497	0.008	-0.342	0.733	0.482	0.513
	Upper Class	0.486	0.008	-1.710	0.088*	0.469	0.502
Sex	Male	0.501	0.006	0.135	0.893	0.489	0.513
	Female	0.496	0.006	-0.655	0.513	0.483	0.508
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.487	0.011	-1.196	0.233	0.464	0.509
	Mayor	0.513	0.011	1.217	0.225	0.492	0.535
	Congressional Staffer	0.513	0.011	1.208	0.228	0.492	0.535
	S.B. Superintendent	0.476	0.011	-2.183	0.030**	0.454	0.498
	State Senator	0.502	0.011	0.156	0.876	0.480	0.523
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.512	0.012	0.947	0.344	0.487	0.536
	Farmer Rancher	0.519	0.012	1.546	0.123	0.495	0.542
	High School Coach	0.471	0.012	-2.436	0.015**	0.447	0.494
	Business Executive	0.486	0.012	-1.136	0.257	0.462	0.510
	Teacher	0.496	0.013	-0.284	0.776	0.471	0.521
	Trades Worker	0.505	0.012	0.385	0.700	0.481	0.528
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.504	0.015	0.286	0.775	0.474	0.534
	Pro-Working Class	0.537	0.016	2.366	0.019**	0.506	0.568
	Pro-Middle Class	0.477	0.017	-1.411	0.159	0.444	0.509
	Anti-Poor	0.473	0.017	-1.535	0.126	0.439	0.507
	Anti-Rich	0.504	0.016	0.236	0.814	0.473	0.534
	Pro-Black	0.501	0.016	0.066	0.947	0.470	0.532
	Pro-White	0.483	0.018	-0.971	0.332	0.448	0.518
	Pro-Women	0.493	0.016	-0.430	0.668	0.461	0.525
	Pro-Men	0.512	0.017	0.706	0.480	0.479	0.545

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Lower-Middle Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.475	0.008	-2.943	0.004***	0.459	0.492
	Democrat	0.516	0.010	1.600	0.111	0.496	0.536
	Republican	0.500	0.009	0.000	1.000	0.482	0.518
Racial Background	White	0.527	0.010	2.776	0.006***	0.508	0.546
	Latino Latina	0.482	0.009	-1.944	0.053*	0.465	0.500
	Black	0.481	0.009	-2.115	0.035**	0.464	0.499
Economic Background	Working Class	0.499	0.008	-0.139	0.889	0.483	0.514
	Middle Class	0.510	0.008	1.231	0.219	0.494	0.525
	Upper Class	0.483	0.008	-2.163	0.031**	0.467	0.498
Sex	Male	0.494	0.006	-0.901	0.368	0.482	0.507
	Female	0.500	0.006	-0.020	0.984	0.488	0.512
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.464	0.012	-3.101	0.002***	0.441	0.487
	Mayor	0.500	0.011	0.027	0.979	0.478	0.523
	Congressional Staffer	0.502	0.011	0.204	0.839	0.481	0.523
	S.B. Superintendent	0.497	0.011	-0.300	0.765	0.475	0.519
	State Senator	0.523	0.011	2.076	0.039**	0.501	0.545
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.503	0.012	0.245	0.807	0.479	0.527
	Farmer Rancher	0.506	0.012	0.515	0.607	0.482	0.530
	High School Coach	0.480	0.012	-1.587	0.114	0.456	0.505
	Business Executive	0.495	0.013	-0.374	0.709	0.470	0.521
	Teacher	0.504	0.012	0.353	0.724	0.481	0.528
	Trades Worker	0.493	0.013	-0.526	0.600	0.468	0.518
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.487	0.016	-0.820	0.413	0.455	0.518
	Pro-Working Class	0.508	0.016	0.486	0.627	0.477	0.539
	Pro-Middle Class	0.516	0.015	1.076	0.283	0.486	0.547
	Anti-Poor	0.483	0.016	-1.048	0.296	0.451	0.515
	Anti-Rich	0.484	0.016	-1.026	0.306	0.453	0.515
	Pro-Black	0.513	0.016	0.783	0.434	0.481	0.544
	Pro-White	0.495	0.017	-0.307	0.759	0.462	0.528
	Pro-Women	0.493	0.014	-0.493	0.623	0.464	0.521
	Pro-Men	0.495	0.017	-0.301	0.764	0.461	0.528

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Upper-Middle Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.488	0.007	-1.790	0.074*	0.475	0.501
	Democrat	0.527	0.008	3.561	0.000***	0.512	0.542
	Republican	0.481	0.008	-2.532	0.012**	0.466	0.496
Racial Background	White	0.570	0.008	8.322	0.000***	0.553	0.586
	Latino Latina	0.472	0.007	-3.834	0.000***	0.458	0.486
	Black	0.456	0.007	-5.951	0.000***	0.442	0.471
Economic Background	Working Class	0.506	0.007	0.939	0.349	0.493	0.519
	Middle Class	0.499	0.007	-0.194	0.846	0.485	0.512
	Upper Class	0.492	0.007	-1.195	0.233	0.478	0.505
Sex	Male	0.500	0.005	0.016	0.987	0.491	0.510
	Female	0.498	0.005	-0.474	0.636	0.488	0.507
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.486	0.009	-1.565	0.118	0.467	0.504
	Mayor	0.509	0.009	1.008	0.314	0.491	0.527
	Congressional Staffer	0.506	0.009	0.674	0.500	0.488	0.524
	S.B. Superintendent	0.495	0.009	-0.542	0.588	0.477	0.513
	State Senator	0.499	0.009	-0.128	0.898	0.481	0.517
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.492	0.010	-0.725	0.469	0.472	0.513
	Farmer Rancher	0.509	0.009	1.030	0.303	0.492	0.527
	High School Coach	0.488	0.010	-1.209	0.227	0.469	0.507
	Business Executive	0.486	0.009	-1.514	0.131	0.468	0.504
	Teacher	0.510	0.010	1.059	0.290	0.491	0.530
	Trades Worker	0.507	0.010	0.713	0.476	0.488	0.526
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.494	0.013	-0.445	0.657	0.469	0.520
	Pro-Working Class	0.501	0.013	0.055	0.956	0.476	0.526
	Pro-Middle Class	0.498	0.013	-0.138	0.890	0.473	0.523
	Anti-Poor	0.485	0.013	-1.106	0.269	0.460	0.511
	Anti-Rich	0.513	0.012	1.070	0.285	0.490	0.536
	Pro-Black	0.504	0.013	0.282	0.778	0.478	0.529
	Pro-White	0.502	0.013	0.157	0.875	0.476	0.528
	Pro-Women	0.488	0.012	-0.983	0.326	0.463	0.512
	Pro-Men	0.505	0.013	0.411	0.681	0.480	0.530

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Upper Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.510	0.017	0.595	0.554	0.476	0.545
	Democrat	0.513	0.020	0.661	0.511	0.474	0.552
	Republican	0.476	0.019	-1.248	0.216	0.437	0.514
Racial Background	White	0.552	0.019	2.733	0.008***	0.514	0.590
	Latino Latina	0.470	0.018	-1.683	0.097*	0.435	0.505
	Black	0.480	0.017	-1.173	0.245	0.447	0.514
Economic Background	Working Class	0.491	0.013	-0.681	0.498	0.465	0.517
	Middle Class	0.517	0.014	1.219	0.227	0.489	0.545
	Upper Class	0.492	0.014	-0.596	0.553	0.463	0.520
Sex	Male	0.483	0.010	-1.671	0.099*	0.463	0.503
	Female	0.518	0.011	1.688	0.096*	0.497	0.540
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.470	0.025	-1.219	0.227	0.420	0.519
	Mayor	0.497	0.023	-0.154	0.878	0.451	0.542
	Congressional Staffer	0.478	0.021	-1.030	0.306	0.436	0.520
	S.B. Superintendent	0.554	0.022	2.438	0.017**	0.510	0.599
	State Senator	0.499	0.021	-0.058	0.954	0.457	0.540
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.501	0.027	0.055	0.957	0.448	0.555
	Farmer Rancher	0.540	0.024	1.680	0.097*	0.493	0.588
	High School Coach	0.490	0.024	-0.430	0.669	0.442	0.537
	Business Executive	0.480	0.026	-0.766	0.446	0.429	0.531
	Teacher	0.467	0.024	-1.393	0.168	0.419	0.514
	Trades Worker	0.521	0.022	0.939	0.351	0.477	0.565
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.520	0.031	0.653	0.516	0.459	0.581
	Pro-Working Class	0.394	0.033	-3.193	0.002***	0.328	0.460
	Pro-Middle Class	0.492	0.033	-0.227	0.821	0.427	0.558
	Anti-Poor	0.495	0.031	-0.152	0.880	0.434	0.557
	Anti-Rich	0.496	0.030	-0.125	0.901	0.437	0.555
	Pro-Black	0.526	0.036	0.723	0.472	0.455	0.597
	Pro-White	0.464	0.036	-1.014	0.314	0.393	0.535
	Pro-Women	0.565	0.035	1.879	0.064*	0.496	0.635
	Pro-Men	0.534	0.031	1.100	0.275	0.473	0.594

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Working Class Respondents with Weak Class Identity

Number of Observations: 5,460

Unique Respondents: 182

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.490	0.010	-0.954	0.341	0.470	0.510
	Democrat	0.520	0.011	1.744	0.083*	0.497	0.542
	Republican	0.482	0.012	-1.552	0.122	0.459	0.505
Racial Background	White	0.504	0.010	0.361	0.719	0.484	0.523
	Latino Latina	0.486	0.010	-1.404	0.162	0.466	0.506
	Black	0.503	0.010	0.268	0.789	0.483	0.523
Economic Background	Working Class	0.499	0.011	-0.077	0.939	0.478	0.520
	Middle Class	0.506	0.010	0.594	0.553	0.486	0.526
	Upper Class	0.488	0.010	-1.206	0.229	0.467	0.508
Sex	Male	0.510	0.007	1.413	0.159	0.496	0.524
	Female	0.484	0.008	-2.022	0.045**	0.468	0.500
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.491	0.014	-0.617	0.538	0.464	0.519
	Mayor	0.513	0.014	0.897	0.371	0.485	0.540
	Congressional Staffer	0.504	0.014	0.265	0.791	0.477	0.531
	S.B. Superintendent	0.473	0.014	-1.971	0.050**	0.446	0.500
	State Senator	0.506	0.015	0.381	0.703	0.477	0.534
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.486	0.014	-1.003	0.317	0.457	0.514
	Farmer Rancher	0.523	0.015	1.515	0.131	0.493	0.552
	High School Coach	0.475	0.016	-1.591	0.113	0.444	0.506
	Business Executive	0.487	0.016	-0.783	0.435	0.455	0.519
	Teacher	0.494	0.016	-0.360	0.719	0.463	0.526
	Trades Worker	0.518	0.015	1.171	0.243	0.488	0.547
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.493	0.018	-0.367	0.714	0.458	0.529
	Pro-Working Class	0.533	0.020	1.635	0.104	0.493	0.572
	Pro-Middle Class	0.487	0.021	-0.612	0.541	0.447	0.528
	Anti-Poor	0.448	0.022	-2.328	0.021**	0.404	0.492
	Anti-Rich	0.512	0.020	0.610	0.543	0.472	0.553
	Pro-Black	0.506	0.021	0.280	0.780	0.465	0.547
	Pro-White	0.491	0.022	-0.423	0.673	0.447	0.534
	Pro-Women	0.491	0.021	-0.443	0.659	0.450	0.532
	Pro-Men	0.516	0.022	0.731	0.466	0.473	0.559

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Working Class Respondents with Strong Class Identity

Number of Observations: 3,060
Unique Respondents: 102

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.485	0.012	-1.263	0.210	0.462	0.508
	Democrat	0.517	0.014	1.222	0.224	0.489	0.545
	Republican	0.497	0.014	-0.208	0.836	0.470	0.524
Racial Background	White	0.524	0.014	1.722	0.088*	0.496	0.553
	Latino Latina	0.481	0.012	-1.641	0.104	0.458	0.504
	Black	0.497	0.015	-0.205	0.838	0.468	0.526
Economic Background	Working Class	0.534	0.013	2.542	0.013**	0.507	0.561
	Middle Class	0.483	0.013	-1.392	0.167	0.458	0.507
	Upper Class	0.482	0.014	-1.240	0.218	0.454	0.511
Sex	Male	0.484	0.010	-1.556	0.123	0.463	0.504
	Female	0.516	0.011	1.558	0.122	0.496	0.537
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.478	0.019	-1.166	0.246	0.440	0.515
	Mayor	0.515	0.017	0.840	0.403	0.480	0.549
	Congressional Staffer	0.531	0.019	1.683	0.095*	0.494	0.568
	S.B. Superintendent	0.481	0.019	-1.007	0.316	0.444	0.518
	State Senator	0.495	0.017	-0.271	0.787	0.462	0.529
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.559	0.022	2.658	0.009***	0.515	0.604
	Farmer Rancher	0.511	0.020	0.558	0.578	0.471	0.551
	High School Coach	0.464	0.018	-2.015	0.047**	0.428	0.499
	Business Executive	0.484	0.018	-0.876	0.383	0.447	0.520
	Teacher	0.500	0.021	0.000	1.000	0.458	0.542
	Trades Worker	0.480	0.019	-1.070	0.287	0.442	0.517
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.525	0.028	0.914	0.363	0.470	0.580
	Pro-Working Class	0.545	0.026	1.769	0.080*	0.494	0.596
	Pro-Middle Class	0.457	0.028	-1.527	0.130	0.402	0.513
	Anti-Poor	0.522	0.027	0.809	0.421	0.469	0.575
	Anti-Rich	0.488	0.024	-0.479	0.633	0.441	0.536
	Pro-Black	0.493	0.024	-0.295	0.768	0.446	0.540
	Pro-White	0.470	0.029	-1.040	0.301	0.412	0.527
	Pro-Women	0.497	0.026	-0.115	0.909	0.445	0.549
	Pro-Men	0.505	0.026	0.179	0.859	0.453	0.557

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Lower-Middle Class Respondents with Weak Class Identity

Number of Observations: 4,680
Unique Respondents: 156

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.480	0.012	-1.733	0.085*	0.456	0.503
	Democrat	0.508	0.013	0.626	0.533	0.483	0.533
	Republican	0.497	0.013	-0.219	0.827	0.473	0.522
Racial Background	White	0.524	0.013	1.793	0.075*	0.498	0.550
	Latino Latina	0.473	0.012	-2.226	0.027**	0.449	0.497
	Black	0.488	0.012	-0.998	0.320	0.464	0.512
Economic Background	Working Class	0.494	0.011	-0.576	0.565	0.471	0.516
	Middle Class	0.505	0.011	0.449	0.654	0.484	0.526
	Upper Class	0.486	0.011	-1.209	0.229	0.464	0.509
Sex	Male	0.480	0.009	-2.317	0.022**	0.463	0.497
	Female	0.510	0.008	1.245	0.215	0.494	0.525
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.462	0.016	-2.357	0.020**	0.430	0.494
	Mayor	0.500	0.015	0.000	1.000	0.470	0.530
	Congressional Staffer	0.503	0.013	0.246	0.806	0.478	0.529
	S.B. Superintendent	0.497	0.015	-0.219	0.827	0.467	0.526
	State Senator	0.513	0.015	0.856	0.393	0.483	0.542
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.484	0.016	-0.982	0.327	0.452	0.516
	Farmer Rancher	0.504	0.017	0.229	0.819	0.471	0.537
	High School Coach	0.484	0.016	-1.012	0.313	0.452	0.516
	Business Executive	0.497	0.018	-0.184	0.854	0.461	0.532
	Teacher	0.520	0.016	1.214	0.227	0.488	0.551
	Trades Worker	0.481	0.017	-1.097	0.274	0.447	0.515
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.506	0.021	0.306	0.760	0.466	0.547
	Pro-Working Class	0.512	0.023	0.525	0.600	0.467	0.557
	Pro-Middle Class	0.527	0.021	1.296	0.197	0.486	0.568
	Anti-Poor	0.464	0.021	-1.708	0.090*	0.423	0.506
	Anti-Rich	0.506	0.022	0.260	0.796	0.462	0.549
	Pro-Black	0.484	0.021	-0.774	0.440	0.443	0.525
	Pro-White	0.471	0.022	-1.300	0.195	0.428	0.515
	Pro-Women	0.489	0.021	-0.523	0.602	0.448	0.530
	Pro-Men	0.492	0.023	-0.342	0.733	0.447	0.538

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Lower-Middle Class Respondents with Strong Class Identity

Number of Observations: 3,510

Unique Respondents: 117

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.470	0.012	-2.598	0.011**	0.447	0.493
	Democrat	0.527	0.016	1.660	0.100	0.495	0.559
	Republican	0.504	0.013	0.296	0.767	0.479	0.529
Racial Background	White	0.531	0.014	2.175	0.032**	0.503	0.558
	Latino Latina	0.496	0.013	-0.304	0.761	0.469	0.523
	Black	0.472	0.013	-2.119	0.036**	0.446	0.498
Economic Background	Working Class	0.506	0.011	0.549	0.584	0.484	0.527
	Middle Class	0.517	0.012	1.393	0.166	0.493	0.541
	Upper Class	0.478	0.011	-2.008	0.047**	0.457	0.500
Sex	Male	0.513	0.009	1.411	0.161	0.495	0.531
	Female	0.487	0.009	-1.409	0.161	0.468	0.505
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.466	0.017	-2.010	0.047**	0.433	0.500
	Mayor	0.501	0.017	0.041	0.967	0.466	0.535
	Congressional Staffer	0.501	0.018	0.041	0.967	0.466	0.536
	S.B. Superintendent	0.497	0.017	-0.204	0.839	0.463	0.530
	State Senator	0.537	0.017	2.232	0.028**	0.504	0.570
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.530	0.018	1.634	0.105	0.494	0.565
	Farmer Rancher	0.509	0.017	0.544	0.587	0.475	0.544
	High School Coach	0.476	0.019	-1.253	0.213	0.439	0.514
	Business Executive	0.493	0.018	-0.367	0.714	0.457	0.530
	Teacher	0.485	0.018	-0.849	0.398	0.449	0.521
	Trades Worker	0.510	0.019	0.506	0.614	0.472	0.547
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.459	0.025	-1.611	0.110	0.409	0.509
	Pro-Working Class	0.502	0.022	0.114	0.910	0.460	0.545
	Pro-Middle Class	0.502	0.023	0.110	0.912	0.458	0.547
	Anti-Poor	0.510	0.026	0.375	0.709	0.459	0.560
	Anti-Rich	0.455	0.022	-2.021	0.046**	0.410	0.499
	Pro-Black	0.547	0.025	1.883	0.062*	0.498	0.596
	Pro-White	0.529	0.025	1.179	0.241	0.480	0.579
	Pro-Women	0.498	0.020	-0.124	0.901	0.459	0.536
	Pro-Men	0.499	0.026	-0.053	0.958	0.448	0.549

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Upper-Middle Class Respondents with Weak Class Identity

Number of Observations: 6,570

Unique Respondents: 219

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.488	0.009	-1.283	0.201	0.470	0.506
	Democrat	0.534	0.010	3.590	0.000***	0.516	0.553
	Republican	0.475	0.010	-2.486	0.014**	0.455	0.495
Racial Background	White	0.553	0.012	4.389	0.000***	0.529	0.576
	Latino Latina	0.472	0.010	-2.798	0.006***	0.453	0.492
	Black	0.477	0.010	-2.269	0.024**	0.458	0.497
Economic Background	Working Class	0.500	0.010	0.000	1.000	0.481	0.519
	Middle Class	0.502	0.009	0.180	0.857	0.484	0.519
	Upper Class	0.498	0.010	-0.155	0.877	0.478	0.519
Sex	Male	0.505	0.006	0.733	0.465	0.492	0.517
	Female	0.495	0.006	-0.732	0.465	0.483	0.508
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.487	0.012	-1.078	0.282	0.463	0.511
	Mayor	0.520	0.012	1.709	0.089*	0.497	0.542
	Congressional Staffer	0.502	0.012	0.154	0.878	0.477	0.526
	S.B. Superintendent	0.489	0.013	-0.875	0.383	0.464	0.514
	State Senator	0.502	0.013	0.152	0.880	0.477	0.527
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.490	0.014	-0.686	0.494	0.462	0.519
	Farmer Rancher	0.529	0.013	2.243	0.026**	0.503	0.554
	High School Coach	0.490	0.015	-0.689	0.491	0.460	0.519
	Business Executive	0.479	0.013	-1.674	0.096*	0.454	0.504
	Teacher	0.504	0.014	0.286	0.775	0.476	0.533
	Trades Worker	0.508	0.014	0.621	0.535	0.482	0.535
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.495	0.020	-0.263	0.793	0.456	0.534
	Pro-Working Class	0.518	0.017	1.014	0.312	0.483	0.552
	Pro-Middle Class	0.491	0.018	-0.525	0.600	0.455	0.526
	Anti-Poor	0.501	0.017	0.077	0.938	0.467	0.536
	Anti-Rich	0.503	0.017	0.163	0.871	0.470	0.536
	Pro-Black	0.501	0.019	0.075	0.940	0.465	0.538
	Pro-White	0.493	0.019	-0.401	0.689	0.456	0.529
	Pro-Women	0.502	0.016	0.125	0.901	0.470	0.534
	Pro-Men	0.497	0.017	-0.193	0.847	0.462	0.531

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Upper-Middle Class Respondents with Strong Class Identity

Number of Observations: 6,210

Unique Respondents: 207

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.488	0.009	-1.245	0.215	0.470	0.507
	Democrat	0.519	0.012	1.555	0.122	0.495	0.543
	Republican	0.487	0.011	-1.162	0.247	0.464	0.509
Racial Background	White	0.588	0.012	7.496	0.000***	0.565	0.611
	Latino Latina	0.472	0.011	-2.616	0.010**	0.450	0.493
	Black	0.434	0.011	-6.179	0.000***	0.414	0.455
Economic Background	Working Class	0.513	0.009	1.382	0.169	0.495	0.531
	Middle Class	0.495	0.010	-0.436	0.664	0.475	0.516
	Upper Class	0.485	0.009	-1.656	0.099*	0.467	0.503
Sex	Male	0.495	0.007	-0.620	0.536	0.481	0.510
	Female	0.500	0.008	0.022	0.983	0.485	0.515
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.484	0.014	-1.133	0.258	0.456	0.512
	Mayor	0.498	0.014	-0.173	0.863	0.470	0.525
	Congressional Staffer	0.511	0.013	0.799	0.425	0.484	0.537
	S.B. Superintendent	0.501	0.013	0.090	0.928	0.476	0.526
	State Senator	0.495	0.014	-0.331	0.741	0.469	0.522
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.495	0.015	-0.335	0.738	0.465	0.525
	Farmer Rancher	0.489	0.013	-0.867	0.387	0.464	0.514
	High School Coach	0.487	0.012	-1.062	0.290	0.462	0.511
	Business Executive	0.494	0.013	-0.460	0.646	0.467	0.520
	Teacher	0.517	0.013	1.285	0.200	0.491	0.543
	Trades Worker	0.505	0.014	0.380	0.704	0.478	0.533
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.494	0.017	-0.370	0.712	0.460	0.528
	Pro-Working Class	0.483	0.019	-0.926	0.355	0.446	0.520
	Pro-Middle Class	0.506	0.018	0.365	0.715	0.472	0.541
	Anti-Poor	0.468	0.020	-1.614	0.108	0.428	0.507
	Anti-Rich	0.523	0.016	1.385	0.168	0.490	0.555
	Pro-Black	0.506	0.018	0.341	0.733	0.470	0.542
	Pro-White	0.512	0.019	0.641	0.522	0.475	0.549
	Pro-Women	0.473	0.019	-1.447	0.150	0.435	0.510
	Pro-Men	0.514	0.018	0.778	0.437	0.478	0.550

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Upper Class Respondents with Weak Class Identity

Number of Observations: 720
Unique Respondents: 24

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.488	0.025	-0.494	0.626	0.435	0.540
	Democrat	0.534	0.032	1.041	0.309	0.467	0.600
	Republican	0.479	0.029	-0.723	0.477	0.420	0.538
Racial Background	White	0.526	0.034	0.765	0.452	0.456	0.595
	Latino Latina	0.446	0.037	-1.450	0.161	0.370	0.523
	Black	0.529	0.030	0.944	0.355	0.466	0.592
Economic Background	Working Class	0.483	0.022	-0.767	0.451	0.436	0.529
	Middle Class	0.543	0.029	1.469	0.156	0.482	0.604
	Upper Class	0.477	0.023	-1.025	0.316	0.429	0.524
Sex	Male	0.477	0.017	-1.387	0.179	0.443	0.511
	Female	0.524	0.017	1.409	0.172	0.489	0.560
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.520	0.043	0.463	0.648	0.431	0.608
	Mayor	0.496	0.045	-0.081	0.936	0.404	0.589
	Congressional Staffer	0.472	0.042	-0.657	0.518	0.385	0.560
	S.B. Superintendent	0.527	0.039	0.697	0.493	0.446	0.609
	State Senator	0.482	0.038	-0.469	0.644	0.404	0.561
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.574	0.049	1.520	0.142	0.473	0.675
	Farmer Rancher	0.556	0.038	1.480	0.152	0.478	0.635
	High School Coach	0.430	0.032	-2.201	0.038**	0.364	0.496
	Business Executive	0.517	0.048	0.350	0.729	0.417	0.617
	Teacher	0.419	0.036	-2.261	0.034**	0.346	0.493
	Trades Worker	0.504	0.036	0.101	0.920	0.429	0.578
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.506	0.062	0.098	0.923	0.378	0.634
	Pro-Working Class	0.343	0.063	-2.476	0.021**	0.212	0.474
	Pro-Middle Class	0.432	0.046	-1.466	0.156	0.336	0.528
	Anti-Poor	0.500	0.038	0.000	1.000	0.422	0.578
	Anti-Rich	0.506	0.052	0.125	0.902	0.399	0.614
	Pro-Black	0.586	0.048	1.780	0.088	0.486	0.686
	Pro-White	0.520	0.060	0.331	0.744	0.395	0.645
	Pro-Women	0.583	0.054	1.546	0.136	0.472	0.695
	Pro-Men	0.505	0.054	0.094	0.926	0.394	0.616

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength

Upper Class Respondents with Strong Class Identity

Number of Observations: 1,440

Unique Respondents: 48

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.522	0.023	0.956	0.344	0.476	0.568
	Democrat	0.503	0.024	0.123	0.902	0.454	0.552
	Republican	0.474	0.026	-1.013	0.316	0.422	0.526
Racial Background	White	0.565	0.023	2.828	0.007***	0.519	0.612
	Latino Latina	0.482	0.019	-0.937	0.354	0.445	0.520
	Black	0.457	0.019	-2.226	0.031**	0.418	0.496
Economic Background	Working Class	0.495	0.016	-0.309	0.758	0.462	0.528
	Middle Class	0.505	0.015	0.328	0.744	0.474	0.536
	Upper Class	0.500	0.018	0.000	1.000	0.463	0.537
Sex	Male	0.486	0.013	-1.087	0.282	0.460	0.512
	Female	0.515	0.014	1.096	0.279	0.487	0.543
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.442	0.030	-1.937	0.059*	0.383	0.502
	Mayor	0.497	0.026	-0.131	0.896	0.444	0.549
	Congressional Staffer	0.481	0.024	-0.781	0.439	0.433	0.530
	S.B. Superintendent	0.567	0.027	2.490	0.016**	0.513	0.622
	State Senator	0.507	0.025	0.292	0.772	0.457	0.558
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.471	0.030	-0.961	0.341	0.410	0.532
	Farmer Rancher	0.531	0.031	1.014	0.316	0.469	0.593
	High School Coach	0.517	0.031	0.550	0.585	0.455	0.580
	Business Executive	0.464	0.030	-1.194	0.238	0.404	0.525
	Teacher	0.492	0.031	-0.273	0.786	0.430	0.554
	Trades Worker	0.532	0.029	1.102	0.276	0.474	0.589
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.528	0.033	0.851	0.399	0.462	0.595
	Pro-Working Class	0.418	0.038	-2.138	0.038**	0.340	0.495
	Pro-Middle Class	0.522	0.043	0.518	0.607	0.435	0.610
	Anti-Poor	0.493	0.043	-0.166	0.869	0.407	0.578
	Anti-Rich	0.492	0.036	-0.216	0.830	0.420	0.565
	Pro-Black	0.490	0.048	-0.215	0.831	0.393	0.587
	Pro-White	0.438	0.045	-1.404	0.167	0.348	0.527
	Pro-Women	0.558	0.044	1.294	0.202	0.468	0.647
	Pro-Men	0.550	0.037	1.348	0.184	0.475	0.625

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Party

Democratic Respondents

Number of Observations: 16,830

Unique Respondents: 561

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.481	0.006	-3.265	0.001***	0.470	0.492
	Democrat	0.557	0.006	8.884	0.000***	0.545	0.570
	Republican	0.456	0.006	-6.847	0.000***	0.444	0.469
Racial Background	White	0.556	0.007	7.982	0.000***	0.542	0.569
	Latino Latina	0.468	0.006	-5.167	0.000***	0.455	0.480
	Black	0.472	0.006	-4.544	0.000***	0.459	0.484
Economic Background	Working Class	0.509	0.006	1.625	0.105	0.498	0.521
	Middle Class	0.506	0.006	1.080	0.281	0.495	0.518
	Upper Class	0.479	0.006	-3.468	0.001***	0.467	0.491
Sex	Male	0.497	0.004	-0.701	0.484	0.488	0.505
	Female	0.500	0.004	-0.054	0.957	0.491	0.508
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.476	0.008	-3.010	0.003***	0.460	0.492
	Mayor	0.505	0.008	0.617	0.538	0.489	0.520
	Congressional Staffer	0.504	0.008	0.457	0.648	0.488	0.519
	S.B. Superintendent	0.501	0.008	0.153	0.878	0.486	0.516
	State Senator	0.507	0.008	0.863	0.389	0.492	0.522
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.495	0.009	-0.531	0.596	0.478	0.512
	Farmer Rancher	0.504	0.008	0.474	0.636	0.488	0.519
	High School Coach	0.483	0.008	-2.089	0.037**	0.466	0.499
	Business Executive	0.491	0.009	-1.064	0.288	0.474	0.508
	Teacher	0.504	0.009	0.411	0.681	0.487	0.521
	Trades Worker	0.514	0.008	1.638	0.102	0.497	0.530
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.496	0.011	-0.373	0.710	0.475	0.517
	Pro-Working Class	0.507	0.011	0.597	0.551	0.484	0.529
	Pro-Middle Class	0.493	0.011	-0.593	0.553	0.471	0.516
	Anti-Poor	0.493	0.012	-0.576	0.565	0.470	0.516
	Anti-Rich	0.515	0.011	1.323	0.187	0.493	0.536
	Pro-Black	0.506	0.011	0.564	0.573	0.485	0.528
	Pro-White	0.481	0.011	-1.677	0.094*	0.459	0.503
	Pro-Women	0.485	0.011	-1.290	0.198	0.463	0.508
	Pro-Men	0.509	0.011	0.768	0.443	0.487	0.531

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Party

Republican Respondents

Number of Observations: 11,160
Unique Respondents: 372

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.486	0.007	-2.155	0.032**	0.473	0.499
	Democrat	0.477	0.008	-2.982	0.003***	0.461	0.492
	Republican	0.538	0.008	4.815	0.000***	0.523	0.554
Racial Background	White	0.525	0.008	2.968	0.003***	0.508	0.541
	Latino Latina	0.489	0.007	-1.559	0.120	0.475	0.503
	Black	0.487	0.008	-1.626	0.105	0.472	0.503
Economic Background	Working Class	0.497	0.007	-0.511	0.610	0.484	0.510
	Middle Class	0.502	0.006	0.299	0.765	0.489	0.514
	Upper Class	0.501	0.007	0.218	0.828	0.488	0.515
Sex	Male	0.497	0.005	-0.559	0.576	0.488	0.507
	Female	0.503	0.005	0.560	0.576	0.493	0.513
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.489	0.010	-1.021	0.308	0.469	0.510
	Mayor	0.521	0.010	2.046	0.041**	0.501	0.541
	Congressional Staffer	0.510	0.009	1.154	0.249	0.493	0.528
	S.B. Superintendent	0.481	0.010	-1.972	0.049*	0.461	0.500
	State Senator	0.498	0.010	-0.179	0.858	0.478	0.518
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.508	0.011	0.733	0.464	0.487	0.529
	Farmer Rancher	0.510	0.011	0.997	0.320	0.490	0.531
	High School Coach	0.484	0.010	-1.593	0.112	0.465	0.504
	Business Executive	0.498	0.010	-0.240	0.811	0.478	0.517
	Teacher	0.504	0.010	0.338	0.736	0.483	0.524
	Trades Worker	0.496	0.011	-0.383	0.702	0.474	0.517
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.480	0.014	-1.474	0.141	0.453	0.507
	Pro-Working Class	0.512	0.013	0.898	0.370	0.486	0.537
	Pro-Middle Class	0.502	0.014	0.111	0.912	0.474	0.529
	Anti-Poor	0.477	0.013	-1.710	0.088*	0.451	0.503
	Anti-Rich	0.497	0.013	-0.214	0.830	0.472	0.522
	Pro-Black	0.506	0.014	0.392	0.696	0.478	0.533
	Pro-White	0.506	0.015	0.417	0.677	0.477	0.535
	Pro-Women	0.508	0.013	0.597	0.551	0.482	0.533
	Pro-Men	0.512	0.014	0.824	0.411	0.484	0.540

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Marginal Means of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Party

Independent Respondents

Number of Observations: 4,440
Unique Respondents: 148

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	0.508	0.012	0.702	0.484	0.485	0.531
	Democrat	0.487	0.012	-1.072	0.285	0.462	0.511
	Republican	0.489	0.011	-0.966	0.336	0.467	0.511
Racial Background	White	0.520	0.012	1.665	0.098*	0.496	0.544
	Latino Latina	0.486	0.012	-1.206	0.230	0.463	0.509
	Black	0.477	0.012	-1.838	0.068*	0.453	0.502
Economic Background	Working Class	0.497	0.012	-0.255	0.799	0.474	0.520
	Middle Class	0.501	0.012	0.087	0.931	0.477	0.525
	Upper Class	0.486	0.011	-1.246	0.215	0.464	0.508
Sex	Male	0.496	0.008	-0.441	0.660	0.480	0.513
	Female	0.493	0.008	-0.850	0.397	0.476	0.509
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	0.470	0.016	-1.901	0.059*	0.439	0.501
	Mayor	0.493	0.014	-0.505	0.615	0.465	0.520
	Congressional Staffer	0.489	0.016	-0.725	0.470	0.458	0.520
	S.B. Superintendent	0.490	0.015	-0.643	0.521	0.460	0.521
	State Senator	0.531	0.016	2.024	0.045**	0.501	0.562
Work Experience	Lawyer	0.499	0.019	-0.035	0.972	0.461	0.537
	Farmer Rancher	0.544	0.017	2.566	0.011**	0.510	0.578
	High School Coach	0.476	0.019	-1.244	0.215	0.437	0.514
	Business Executive	0.468	0.017	-1.838	0.068*	0.434	0.502
	Teacher	0.504	0.017	0.234	0.815	0.471	0.537
	Trades Worker	0.473	0.017	-1.600	0.112	0.441	0.506
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	0.535	0.023	1.494	0.137	0.489	0.581
	Pro-Working Class	0.474	0.023	-1.111	0.268	0.429	0.520
	Pro-Middle Class	0.514	0.021	0.643	0.521	0.472	0.556
	Anti-Poor	0.445	0.025	-2.169	0.032**	0.395	0.495
	Anti-Rich	0.494	0.020	-0.282	0.778	0.454	0.534
	Pro-Black	0.516	0.024	0.663	0.509	0.469	0.562
	Pro-White	0.493	0.026	-0.274	0.785	0.440	0.545
	Pro-Women	0.485	0.021	-0.705	0.482	0.444	0.526
	Pro-Men	0.496	0.024	-0.177	0.860	0.448	0.543

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Appendix J: Conjoint Experiment AMCE Tables for Chapter 3
AMCE of Attributes on Probability of Vote
All Respondents
Number of Observations: 32,820 | Unique Respondents: 1,094

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Democrat	0.032	0.007	4.350	0.000***	0.018	0.047
	Republican	0.001	0.007	0.171	0.865	-0.013	0.015
Racial Background	White	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Latino Latina	-0.062	0.008	-7.764	0.000***	-0.078	-0.046
	Black	-0.062	0.008	-7.579	0.000***	-0.078	-0.046
Economic Background	Working Class	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Middle Class	0.000	0.007	0.002	0.998	-0.013	0.013
	Upper Class	-0.016	0.007	-2.240	0.025**	-0.030	-0.002
Sex	Male	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Female	0.002	0.006	0.406	0.685	-0.009	0.014
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mayor	0.029	0.009	3.187	0.001***	0.011	0.047
	Congressional Staffer	0.025	0.009	2.789	0.005***	0.007	0.042
	S.B. Superintendent	0.014	0.009	1.520	0.129	-0.004	0.031
	State Senator	0.029	0.009	3.235	0.001***	0.011	0.047
Work Experience	Lawyer	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Farmer Rancher	0.011	0.009	1.126	0.261	-0.008	0.029
	High School Coach	-0.018	0.010	-1.870	0.062*	-0.037	0.001
	Business Executive	-0.012	0.009	-1.276	0.202	-0.030	0.006
	Teacher	0.001	0.010	0.094	0.925	-0.018	0.020
	Trades Worker	0.001	0.010	0.081	0.935	-0.018	0.020
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Pro-Working Class	0.010	0.012	0.840	0.401	-0.013	0.033
	Pro-Middle Class	0.002	0.012	0.212	0.832	-0.020	0.025
	Anti-Poor	-0.015	0.012	-1.201	0.230	-0.039	0.009
	Anti-Rich	0.008	0.011	0.703	0.482	-0.014	0.030
	Pro-Black	0.012	0.012	0.982	0.326	-0.012	0.035
	Pro-White	-0.004	0.012	-0.339	0.735	-0.028	0.020
	Pro-Women	-0.003	0.012	-0.217	0.828	-0.026	0.020
	Pro-Men	0.010	0.012	0.827	0.408	-0.014	0.034

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

AMCE of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Working Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Democrat	0.030	0.014	2.128	0.034**	0.002	0.058
	Republican	0.000	0.014	-0.006	0.995	-0.027	0.027
Racial Background	White	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Latino Latina	-0.026	0.013	-1.982	0.048**	-0.053	0.000
	Black	-0.010	0.014	-0.698	0.486	-0.037	0.018
Economic Background	Working Class	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Middle Class	-0.013	0.014	-0.927	0.355	-0.040	0.014
	Upper Class	-0.025	0.014	-1.727	0.085*	-0.053	0.003
Sex	Male	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Female	-0.006	0.012	-0.511	0.609	-0.030	0.017
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mayor	0.027	0.018	1.500	0.135	-0.008	0.062
	Congressional Staffer	0.027	0.018	1.528	0.128	-0.008	0.062
	S.B. Superintendent	-0.011	0.017	-0.628	0.531	-0.044	0.023
	State Senator	0.015	0.017	0.863	0.389	-0.019	0.049
Work Experience	Lawyer	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Farmer Rancher	0.006	0.019	0.323	0.747	-0.031	0.044
	High School Coach	-0.041	0.018	-2.249	0.025**	-0.077	-0.005
	Business Executive	-0.026	0.019	-1.382	0.168	-0.063	0.011
	Teacher	-0.016	0.019	-0.842	0.401	-0.054	0.022
	Trades Worker	-0.007	0.019	-0.356	0.722	-0.045	0.031
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Pro-Working Class	0.033	0.023	1.415	0.158	-0.013	0.079
	Pro-Middle Class	-0.027	0.023	-1.151	0.251	-0.073	0.019
	Anti-Poor	-0.030	0.025	-1.199	0.231	-0.079	0.019
	Anti-Rich	-0.001	0.023	-0.060	0.952	-0.046	0.043
	Pro-Black	-0.002	0.023	-0.091	0.927	-0.047	0.043
	Pro-White	-0.021	0.024	-0.900	0.369	-0.068	0.025
	Pro-Women	-0.011	0.023	-0.487	0.627	-0.057	0.034
	Pro-Men	0.008	0.024	0.331	0.741	-0.040	0.056

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

AMCE of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Lower-Middle Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Democrat	0.040	0.016	2.541	0.012**	0.009	0.071
	Republican	0.024	0.014	1.727	0.085*	-0.003	0.050
Racial Background	White	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Latino Latina	-0.043	0.016	-2.686	0.008***	-0.075	-0.012
	Black	-0.046	0.016	-2.867	0.004***	-0.077	-0.014
Economic Background	Working Class	-0.012	0.013	-0.917	0.360	-0.037	0.014
	Middle Class	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Upper Class	-0.028	0.014	-2.047	0.042**	-0.054	-0.001
Sex	Male	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Female	0.005	0.012	0.466	0.642	-0.018	0.028
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mayor	0.038	0.018	2.107	0.036**	0.002	0.073
	Congressional Staffer	0.038	0.017	2.278	0.023**	0.005	0.071
	S.B. Superintendent	0.034	0.018	1.880	0.061*	-0.002	0.069
	State Senator	0.060	0.018	3.387	0.001***	0.025	0.095
Work Experience	Lawyer	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Farmer Rancher	0.003	0.018	0.151	0.880	-0.033	0.039
	High School Coach	-0.023	0.019	-1.230	0.220	-0.060	0.014
	Business Executive	-0.009	0.019	-0.501	0.617	-0.046	0.027
	Teacher	-0.001	0.019	-0.053	0.958	-0.038	0.036
	Trades Worker	-0.011	0.019	-0.555	0.579	-0.048	0.027
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Pro-Working Class	0.020	0.023	0.866	0.388	-0.026	0.066
	Pro-Middle Class	0.027	0.024	1.146	0.253	-0.020	0.074
	Anti-Poor	-0.007	0.025	-0.270	0.787	-0.055	0.042
	Anti-Rich	-0.004	0.022	-0.189	0.850	-0.048	0.039
	Pro-Black	0.026	0.024	1.083	0.280	-0.021	0.074
	Pro-White	0.007	0.025	0.275	0.783	-0.042	0.055
	Pro-Women	0.004	0.023	0.174	0.862	-0.041	0.049
	Pro-Men	0.006	0.025	0.255	0.799	-0.043	0.056

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

AMCE of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Upper-Middle Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Democrat	0.041	0.012	3.404	0.001***	0.017	0.064
	Republican	-0.007	0.012	-0.615	0.539	-0.030	0.016
Racial Background	White	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Latino Latina	-0.098	0.014	-7.165	0.000***	-0.125	-0.071
	Black	-0.114	0.014	-8.221	0.000***	-0.142	-0.087
Economic Background	Working Class	0.007	0.011	0.610	0.542	-0.015	0.029
	Middle Class	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Upper Class	-0.008	0.012	-0.643	0.520	-0.031	0.016
Sex	Male	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Female	-0.003	0.009	-0.284	0.777	-0.021	0.016
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mayor	0.022	0.014	1.510	0.132	-0.007	0.050
	Congressional Staffer	0.021	0.014	1.451	0.148	-0.007	0.049
	S.B. Superintendent	0.010	0.014	0.714	0.476	-0.018	0.038
	State Senator	0.013	0.015	0.861	0.390	-0.016	0.041
Work Experience	Lawyer	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Farmer Rancher	0.017	0.015	1.161	0.246	-0.012	0.046
	High School Coach	-0.003	0.015	-0.224	0.823	-0.034	0.027
	Business Executive	-0.007	0.015	-0.467	0.641	-0.037	0.023
	Teacher	0.017	0.015	1.119	0.264	-0.013	0.048
	Trades Worker	0.014	0.015	0.937	0.349	-0.016	0.045
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Pro-Working Class	0.010	0.019	0.512	0.609	-0.028	0.048
	Pro-Middle Class	0.001	0.018	0.075	0.940	-0.035	0.038
	Anti-Poor	-0.008	0.020	-0.421	0.674	-0.047	0.030
	Anti-Rich	0.019	0.018	1.051	0.294	-0.017	0.055
	Pro-Black	0.009	0.020	0.478	0.633	-0.029	0.048
	Pro-White	0.009	0.020	0.475	0.635	-0.029	0.048
	Pro-Women	-0.006	0.019	-0.306	0.760	-0.043	0.032
	Pro-Men	0.013	0.019	0.672	0.502	-0.024	0.050

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

AMCE of Attributes on Probability of Vote by Respondent Class

Upper Class Respondents

Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Democrat	-0.003	0.033	-0.089	0.929	-0.068	0.062
	Republican	-0.044	0.033	-1.361	0.178	-0.109	0.021
Racial Background	White	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Latino Latina	-0.086	0.032	-2.725	0.008***	-0.150	-0.023
	Black	-0.081	0.030	-2.699	0.009***	-0.141	-0.021
Economic Background	Working Class	0.004	0.024	0.164	0.870	-0.044	0.051
	Middle Class	0.034	0.025	1.339	0.185	-0.016	0.084
	Upper Class	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sex	Male	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Female	0.038	0.020	1.856	0.068*	-0.003	0.078
Government Experience	No Prior Experience	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mayor	0.031	0.037	0.829	0.410	-0.044	0.106
	Congressional Staffer	0.015	0.039	0.375	0.709	-0.063	0.092
	S.B. Superintendent	0.084	0.039	2.159	0.034**	0.006	0.161
	State Senator	0.034	0.036	0.951	0.345	-0.037	0.106
Work Experience	Lawyer	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Farmer Rancher	0.042	0.039	1.099	0.276	-0.035	0.119
	High School Coach	-0.010	0.044	-0.221	0.826	-0.097	0.077
	Business Executive	-0.021	0.040	-0.535	0.594	-0.101	0.058
	Teacher	-0.034	0.039	-0.877	0.384	-0.111	0.043
	Trades Worker	0.022	0.037	0.577	0.566	-0.053	0.096
Candidate Quote	Pro-USA	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Pro-Working Class	-0.132	0.051	-2.598	0.011**	-0.233	-0.031
	Pro-Middle Class	-0.031	0.046	-0.672	0.504	-0.122	0.060
	Anti-Poor	-0.031	0.047	-0.656	0.514	-0.124	0.063
	Anti-Rich	-0.023	0.042	-0.547	0.586	-0.108	0.061
	Pro-Black	0.000	0.044	0.003	0.998	-0.088	0.088
	Pro-White	-0.061	0.051	-1.203	0.233	-0.163	0.040
	Pro-Women	0.050	0.052	0.967	0.337	-0.053	0.154
	Pro-Men	0.006	0.043	0.136	0.892	-0.080	0.092

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Appendix K: AMCE Tables for Chapter 4

AMCE of Matching Attributes on Probability of Vote
All Respondents

Number of Observations: 31,650
Unique Respondents: 1,055

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.010	0.006	1.575	0.116	-0.002	0.022
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.068	0.007	9.786	0.000***	0.055	0.082
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.070	0.007	9.441	0.000***	0.055	0.084
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.014	0.006	2.410	0.016**	0.003	0.026

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

AMCE of Matching Attributes on Probability of Vote
Democrat Respondents

Number of Observations: 16,530
Unique Respondents: 551

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.021	0.009	2.413	0.016**	0.004	0.038
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.091	0.010	9.282	0.000***	0.072	0.110
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.093	0.010	8.956	0.000***	0.073	0.114
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.027	0.008	3.152	0.002***	0.010	0.043

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

AMCE of Matching Attributes on Probability of Vote
Republican Respondents

Number of Observations: 10,530
Unique Respondents: 351

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	-0.004	0.010	-0.411	0.681	-0.024	0.016
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.053	0.012	4.415	0.000***	0.030	0.077
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.052	0.013	4.092	0.000***	0.027	0.077
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	-0.007	0.010	-0.725	0.469	-0.027	0.013

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Effect of Matching Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class
AMCE Non-matching – Matching

Working Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.021	0.012	1.720	0.087*	-0.003	0.046
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.062	0.013	4.866	0.000***	0.037	0.087
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.015	0.012	1.279	0.202	-0.008	0.039
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.009	0.012	0.729	0.467	-0.015	0.032

Lower-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.017	0.011	1.450	0.148	-0.006	0.039
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.078	0.014	5.622	0.000***	0.051	0.106
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.057	0.014	4.045	0.000***	0.029	0.085
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.013	0.012	1.143	0.254	-0.010	0.036

Effect of Matching Attributes on Probability of Vote by Class (Cont.)
AMCE Non-matching – Matching

Upper-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.001	0.010	0.147	0.883	-0.018	0.021
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.071	0.011	6.292	0.000***	0.049	0.093
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.110	0.013	8.756	0.000***	0.085	0.135
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.021	0.009	2.306	0.022**	0.003	0.040

Upper Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Economic Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	-0.014	0.022	-0.656	0.514	-0.057	0.029
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.051	0.027	1.854	0.068*	-0.004	0.105
Racial Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.092	0.028	3.349	0.001***	0.037	0.147
Sex	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	-0.006	0.021	-0.284	0.777	-0.048	0.036

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Effect of Matching Class on Probability of Vote by Class Identity Strength
AMCE Non-matching – Matching

Weak Class Identity
Number of Observations: 17,430
Unique Respondents: 581

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Class Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.004	0.008	0.509	0.611	-0.012	0.020

Strong Class Identity
Number of Observations: 14,220
Unique Respondents: 474

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Class Background	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.016	0.009	1.721	0.086*	-0.002	0.034

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Effect of Matching Party on Probability of Vote by Partisan Identity Strength
AMCE Non-matching – Matching

Weak Partisan Identity
Number of Observations: 17,580
Unique Respondents: 586

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.049	0.009	5.303	0.000***	0.031	0.067

Strong Partisan Identity
Number of Observations: 15,240
Unique Respondents: 508

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Political Party	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Matching	0.091	0.010	8.891	0.000***	0.071	0.111

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Effect of Matching Race on Probability of Vote by Racial Identity Strength
AMCE Non-matching – Matching
(White respondents only)

Weak Racial Identity
Number of Observations: 23,070
Unique Respondents: 769

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Racial	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
Background	Matching	0.058	0.008	6.889	0.000***	0.042	0.075

Strong Racial Identity
Number of Observations: 6,270
Unique Respondents: 209

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Racial	Non-matching	-	-	-	-	-	-
Background	Matching	0.117	0.018	6.514	0.000***	0.082	0.153

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

Appendix L: Marginal Mean Tables for Chapter 4

MM of Matching Class on Probability of Vote by Class

Working Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.491	0.004	-1.902	0.058*	0.483	0.500
Class	Matching	0.512	0.008	1.406	0.161	0.495	0.528

Lower-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.491	0.004	-2.121	0.035**	0.482	0.499
Class	Matching	0.510	0.008	1.231	0.219	0.494	0.525

Upper-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.499	0.003	-0.295	0.768	0.492	0.506
Class	Matching	0.499	0.007	-0.194	0.846	0.485	0.512

Upper Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.504	0.007	0.595	0.554	0.490	0.518
Class	Matching	0.492	0.014	-0.596	0.553	0.463	0.520

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

MM of Matching Party on Probability of Vote by Class

Working Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.478	0.005	-4.793	0.000***	0.469	0.487
Party	Matching	0.540	0.009	4.676	0.000***	0.523	0.557

Lower-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.471	0.005	-5.726	0.000***	0.461	0.481
Party	Matching	0.550	0.010	5.198	0.000***	0.531	0.569

Upper-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.476	0.004	-6.007	0.000***	0.469	0.484
Party	Matching	0.545	0.008	5.894	0.000***	0.530	0.560

Upper Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.484	0.008	-1.934	0.057*	0.468	0.500
Party	Matching	0.537	0.019	1.964	0.053*	0.499	0.575

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

MM of Matching Race on Probability of Vote by Class

Working Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate Race	Non-matching	0.493	0.004	-1.680	0.094*	0.485	0.501
	Matching	0.510	0.008	1.183	0.238	0.493	0.526

Lower-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate Race	Non-matching	0.479	0.005	-4.218	0.000***	0.469	0.489
	Matching	0.536	0.010	3.621	0.000***	0.516	0.556

Upper-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate Race	Non-matching	0.464	0.004	-8.523	0.000***	0.456	0.472
	Matching	0.573	0.009	8.485	0.000***	0.556	0.589

Upper Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate Race	Non-matching	0.472	0.008	-3.297	0.002***	0.456	0.489
	Matching	0.566	0.019	3.403	0.001***	0.527	0.605

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)

MM of Matching Gender on Probability of Vote by Class

Working Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,520
Unique Respondents: 284
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.494	0.006	-0.993	0.321	0.481	0.506
Gender	Matching	0.503	0.006	0.482	0.630	0.491	0.515

Lower-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 8,190
Unique Respondents: 273
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.490	0.006	-1.698	0.091*	0.478	0.502
Gender	Matching	0.504	0.006	0.672	0.502	0.492	0.517

Upper-Middle Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 12,780
Unique Respondents: 426
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.488	0.005	-2.443	0.015**	0.479	0.498
Gender	Matching	0.510	0.005	2.021	0.044**	0.500	0.519

Upper Class Respondents
Number of Observations: 2,160
Unique Respondents: 72
Null Hypothesis = 0.5

		Est.	SE	t	P>|t|	LCI	UCI
Candidate	Non-matching	0.504	0.011	0.348	0.729	0.483	0.525
Gender	Matching	0.496	0.011	-0.347	0.730	0.475	0.518

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed)