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What "Pierces the Eye and Revolts the Heart": Boundaries of Obedience and Complexities in Moral Reasoning in the Israeli Military

by

Alona Dana Roded

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Education

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Elliot Turiel, Chair
Professor Susan Holloway
Professor Tania Lombrozo

Spring 2013

What “Pierces the Eye and Revolts the Heart”:
Boundaries of Obedience and Complexities in Moral Reasoning in the Israeli Military

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by

Alona Dana Roded

Abstract

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The power of hierarchical institutions and figures of authority to influence individuals and command compliance has been the focus of considerable controversy. Yet unjust authority and undue power also stir dissent and social change. The military, especially, presents an institution in which authority, discipline, and obedience are central, alongside examples of conscientious objection and morally-driven disobedience. The current study examines Israeli soldiers' use of a variety of social concepts (moral, social-conventional, personal, and pragmatic) in reasoning about acts of both resistance and adherence to military and non-military authority.

The sample consisted of 64 Israeli reserve soldiers, recently discharged from mandatory service in the Israel Defense Force (IDF). Participants were interviewed about 10 hypothetical situations depicting both acts of obedience and of disobedience to direct commands, rules, or regulations in the IDF or in the civilian work-place. Judgments and justifications of the protagonists' actions were compared by institutional context (military or non-military), domain of social knowledge (moral, conventional, or mixed-domain/political), and by the protagonist's response (violation or compliance).

Across contexts, disobedience in the moral domain was more positively evaluated than violations of social conventions as well as politically-driven refusal. Across domains, resistance was judged as more legitimate in the civilian workplace than in the military. Finally, obedience and disobedience were not evaluated as inverse-opposites, but rather evaluations and justifications revealed more complex relations between these two behavioral responses, and this relationship differed by domain.

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What "Pierces the Eye and Revolts the Heart"[1]: Boundaries of Obedience and Complexities in Moral Reasoning in the Israeli Military

From hideous acts of collective or individual atrocity, to inspiring acts of moral courage and social change, responses to authority in hierarchical relationships have been the subject of considerable social-science inquiry. Codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and explicit rules are important aspects of all societies and cultures; these aspects and the diverse individual responses to them, as well as the social-cognitive reasoning underlying these responses, have been studied in a broad range of social contexts, such as schools, families, and laboratory settings (e.g., Laupa, Turiel, & Cowan, 1995; Milgram, 1963; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Zimbardo, 2007). For several reasons, elaborated below, the military has been a focus of several inquiries into individuals' reactions to institutions and structures of authority (e.g., Elizur & Yishay-Krien, 2009; Grassiani, 2009; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008; Linn, 1996).

The military is characterized by a clear and strict hierarchy, a reliance on both formal commands and informal norms of behavior, and codification of expectations for obedience and disobedience, including explicit sanctions to unacceptable behavior in this realm (Mayseless, 2002; Nevo & Shur, 2003; Unger, 2010). At the same time, the military derives its legitimacy for certain acts of violence, aggression, and subjugation of others from its defined mission to protect the safety and security of individuals, groups, and nations. Military service, especially during times of political upheaval, presents difficult situations that involve moral conflict with grave consequences, and is therefore a particularly fruitful social context for the study of diverse reactions to authority. Lastly, the scope of personal responsibility and moral agency in the military has been the subject of ethical, legal, social, and political debates regarding soldiers' rights and duties (Nevo & Shur; Parush, 1996). This issue of scope is especially relevant in social contexts where military service is not voluntary, and the choice whether or not to become a soldier is not entirely left to individuals, such as it is in Israel.

In choosing to focus on moral reasoning in the military, the Israel Defense Force (IDF), in particular, presents an interesting case study opportunity for several reasons[2]. First, military service in Israel is mandatory, and every 18 year-old is served with induction orders (although not all eligible young adults actually enlist, for a variety of personal, political, and social reasons[3]); mandatory service makes the IDF heterogeneous along many socio-demographic variables, as well as making the boundaries between the military and civilian worlds more permeable than in other countries, as embodied in the so-called "citizen-soldier" ethos (Ezrachi, 2012, p. 279). Second, the relations between societal, political and military circles in Israel are highly complex, and although traditionally, the military and the political echelons have been considered as two different realms of activity (Amidror, 2012), "in reality, it is hard to maintain a dichotomous separation between the two, because every military action will have a political aspect and every political decision will have military consequences" (Nevo & Shur, 2003, pp.

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[1] From Military Court MC 3/57, Chief Military Prosecutor v. Major Shmuel Malinki et al. in which soldiers were first convicted for obeying a manifestly illegal command in Israel. This translation is quoted from Dinstein (2012, p. 9).

[2] See Mayseless (2002) for a review of the unique aspects of the IDF from a developmental perspective.

[3] Approximately 67% of the 2010 cohort (Jewish population only) actually served in the IDF. About 13% did not serve for religious reasons, and 6% for medical or psychological reasons (based on data published in Channel 2 news, http://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-1ed1f66305b5131004.htm, retrieved 7/24/2011).

22-23). Lastly, since its inception in 1948, the IDF has continuously been in a state of military tension and active combat to varying degrees. Between official wars, there have been ongoing tasks of security maintenance and targeted operations both within and outside the international borders of Israel (e.g., Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories). Many of these military operations have been politically and socially controversial and several wars and operations have been an impetus for organized public dissent and refusal movements (Unger, 2010). It should be noted that such waves of dissent and resistance remain in the context of generally high levels of patriotism. Such mixed perceptions of the IDF and the State of Israel can be seen, for example, in a survey of IDF veterans (6mo-3.5yrs after discharge) reporting that 43-48% of respondents endorsed such statements as "proud to be Israeli", whereas 23-24% reported being "disappointed in the nation/country" (Mayseless, 2002, pp. 172-173)[4]. For all these reasons, the IDF provides a promising opportunity to study a broad range of psychosocial responses to institutional norms and military structures of authority.

Obedience, Conformity, and What Else?

Military atrocities, sometimes called "crimes of obedience" (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, p. 1), are often said to be committed in the name of national security and justified with the need for discipline in the military. Yet the extensive literature on this so-called *psychology of evil* (Zimbardo, 2007) often underemphasizes or even ignores the diversity of responses to authority, ranging from degrees and types of participation, through covert subversion, to overt resistance.

Unpacking compliance. Distinctions made in other areas of psychological study can be informative to flesh out the broad range of behavioral responses to authority, as well as the psychological meaning they may carry. For example, the notion of *committed compliance*, borrowed from the field of parenting practices and child-rearing, is reserved for cooperative adherence to parental directives that demonstrates the child's agency and whole-hearted agreement; committed compliance is therefore distinguished from other forms of behavioral compliance that may not reflect such agreement (Kuczynski & Navara, 2006). *Situational compliance* denotes yielding to external pressures, and may be observed especially in situations of direct monitoring by the authority figure. *Unwilling compliance* is a way for the child to show agency by complying with the face-value of parental directives (or the 'letter of the law'), while expressing protest against the intended meaning (or the 'spirit of the law'). Finally, *accommodation* refers to situations where a child may exhibit a cooperative attitude, but the behavioral response may include creative interpretations of the parental request, and thus the accommodative response may represent a kind of negotiation between the two parties (Kuczynski & Navara, 2006). This more refined taxonomy of compliant behaviors reveals both the difficulty in inferring attitudes and judgments regarding authority from surface behavioral responses, as well as the nuanced and sometimes conflicting attitudes individuals may espouse towards authority directives. Behavioral compliance in toddlers, but also in older children and adults, may indicate genuinely agreeing with the command, but it may very well reflect a balance of considerations including pragmatic constraints, social motivations, and personal convictions.

[4] Translation of quotes from all articles and books published in Hebrew are mine. A.D.R.

Unpacking resistance. In addition to the range of compliant behaviors and attitudes, authority sometimes elicits behaviors aimed at resistance, opposition, and subversion. Such acts of resistance can range from covert subversion and evasion, to public refusals and objections (for example, see Linn, 1996, on "White refusal" and "Gray Refusal" in the military). Fireman and colleagues (Fireman, Gamson, Rytina, & Taylor, 1978) examined adults' responses to a situation of unjust authority, and distinguished between five categories of responses: *compliance*, *evasion*, verbal *dissent*, behavioral *resistance*, and *struggle* aimed to prevent the authority from achieving its ends through other agents. This variety of responses is also revealed outside the laboratory setting, in such historical examples such as the Kafr Qassem Massacre[5] in 1956 when 47 Arab-Israeli citizens, including 15 women and 11 children, were shot to death after returning to their village past the military curfew-time, which was imposed while they were away from the village. The Kafr Qassem Massacre and other notable military atrocities are called crimes of obedience because the emphasis is, understandably, on those soldiers who complied with such unconscionable instructions. Yet little attention is paid to the fact that soldiers in Kafr Qassem exhibited a variety of reactions to the battalion commander's order to shoot-to-kill those who violated curfew. Menuchin (2011) described a broader range of responses including intentional disobedience (i.e., resistance), avoidance without open disobedience (i.e., evasion), attempts to follow the command without killing anyone (i.e., accommodation), and full obedience which perhaps can be considered committed compliance[6].

Even in the My Lai Massacre in the Vietnam War, famous for the large numbers of soldiers who followed orders and participated in killing civilians, a significant number of soldiers refused to shoot, or simply did not participate (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). The most well-known example of resistance to the My Lai massacre is CWO Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot who upon seeing what was happening on the ground, reported to headquarters, landed to rescue the wounded, protected them with his own body, and issued orders to his subordinates to aim their weapons at the American soldiers in order to secure a safe evacuation of the wounded Vietnamese civilians. Thompson's response can surely be classified as struggle, as it was aimed not simply at not participating in the massacre himself, but at preventing others from executing the unjust commands[7].

It becomes clear that both compliance and refusal are heterogeneous behavioral responses stemming from a range of beliefs, attitudes, and motivations that are considered in relation to each other and are grounded in a given social context. In fact, both may stem from similar beliefs and convictions. Menuchin (2011) emphasized that both participation in democratic activity and opposition to undemocratic laws and actions can be an expression of commitment to the same values. Similarly, Kohlberg (1963) claimed that "moral disobedience to the law must spring from the same root as moral obedience to law" (p. 20), and this sentiment is reflected in narratives of Israeli conscientious objectors (Linn, 1987; Press, 2012).

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[5] For a historical overview of this famous incident and its legal and ethical implications in Israel, see Parush (1996).

[6] Note also the events at Kafr Bara, a neighboring village, where although the regional commander received the same orders as the commander at Kafr Qassem, none of the villagers were killed in the imposition of the curfew (Press, 2012).

[7] More recently, atrocities in a US military prison in Iraq were also exposed in the media (see for example White, Davenport, & Higham, 2004). Again, most of the media coverage and public discourse focused on the perpetrators of horrendous acts of humiliation, violence, and torture. Less was advertised about those soldiers who resisted, reported, and tried to stop such conduct. For example, William J. Kimbro refused to participate in the interrogations he deemed inappropriate and unnecessary; Lt. David O. Sutton put an end to one incident and reported it up the chain of command; and Specialist Joseph M. Darby provided evidence that helped build the case (O'Connor, 2004).

Rather than speculate about the variety of reasons and motivations underlying these diverse behavioral responses, the central aim of this study is to systematically examine and delineate some of the social-cognitive concepts that are at play when soldiers evaluate obedience and refusal in the military, and how these concepts are coordinated in various situations.

Provisions for morally-based disobedience. In such well-known cases as the My Lai Massacre or Kafr Qassem, as well as other military atrocities, historical and political hindsight results in the acknowledgement that "under certain conditions obedience is indeed itself a war crime" (Groll-Ya'ari, 1994, p. 466). The need for a safeguard in the form of individual judgment has been institutionalized as the relief from criminal liability for refusing to comply with a *manifestly illegal command* (Osiel, 1999). A command is determined *manifestly* illegal based on its moral gravity, its procedural irregularity, and the clarity of the legal prohibition it violates (Osiel, p. 5). The IDF, like many other armies, has a provision for disobedience in this form, which was first formally codified in the ruling of Judge B. HaLevi in the case of the soldiers who participated in the Kafr Qassem Massacre. In his decision, Judge HaLevi coined the famous *black-flag test* for distinguishing a manifestly illegal command:

> The distinguishing mark of a 'manifestly unlawful order' should be displayed *like a black flag* [emphasis added] over the order given, as a warning reading 'Prohibited!' Not formal unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, not unlawfulness which is discernible only to the eyes of legal experts is important here, but a conspicuous and flagrant breach of the law, a certain and imperative unlawfulness appearing on the face of the order itself, a clearly criminal character of the order or of the acts ordered, an unlawfulness which *pierces the eye and revolts the heart* [emphasis added], if the eye is not blind and the heart not obtuse or corrupted—that is the extent of 'manifest' unlawfulness required to override the duty of obedience of a soldier, and to charge him with criminal responsibility for his acts. (as quoted in Dinstein, 2012, p. 9)

The provision for disobedience to manifestly illegal orders regards individual soldiers as responsible for conduct in war (Jus in bello), but not for questioning whether the war itself is justified (Jus ad bellum). But morally-based disobedience in the military is not restricted to specific concrete commands. Handel (2008) noted that many testimonials of Israeli conscientious objectors are comprised of a series of relatively minor everyday events, each in itself not necessarily manifestly illegal, but that as a whole these events reveal the actions of the military as unjustified and unjustifiable, and therefore as legitimizing resistance and even disobedience. The Israeli objectors to the First Lebanon War (1982-1985) also were not disobeying specific and concrete orders in combat; they were resisting the Israeli government and military's decision to invade Beirut, deeming it unjustified and morally reprehensible (Linn, 1996). This kind of moral disobedience is not codified as part of the soldier's right or obligation under the provision of the manifestly illegal order, but rather falls under the purview of what has been termed *selective disobedience*. Full conscientious objectors are most commonly pacifists who object to all war and violence, whereas selective objectors concede that war is sometimes necessary and are willing to participate in most military actions, but refuse to serve in specific military activities that they perceive as violating moral principles. Thus, in addition to gray refusal, evasion, and avoidance, formal resistance itself can come in at least three forms: refusal to comply with a specific command determined to be manifestly illegal, selective refusal to

participate in a war or military operation, and full conscientious objection to participate in any military activity.

Regardless of the legal and political status of various forms of morally-based resistance in the military, in reality the phenomenon occurs; soldiers have and continue to engage in various forms of moral resistance to authority. Because the act of military disobedience on moral grounds is so rare and extreme in nature, refusers have been studied to try and explain the psychological conditions that enable this mode of action (see Press, 2012). Hypotheses range from moral maturity (Linn, 1995; Presley, 1985), through individualism (Linn, 1988; Linn, 1995) and attitudes towards authority (Presley, 1985), to political commitment (Boyden, 2003; Gans, 1996; Linn, 1987). The motivation to study this sort of behavior in order to better understand how to prevent combat atrocities is admirable. Yet, studying moral disobedience separately from compliance to controversial commands and policies obviates the continuity between these possible reactions to unjust authority[8].

Moreover, much of the existing psychological analyses of conscientious objection focus on a narrow set of constructs that are conceptualized as dichotomies (e.g., the individualist rebel vs. the conforming authoritarian, the soldier vs. the civilian, the post-conventional vs. the conventional). In the following section I present some of these interpretations, and argue that employing such false dichotomies obscures rather than elucidates the psychological reality of social reasoning about authority and its limits.

The Situational and Dispositional Dichotomy

Many of the current psychological explanations of people's reactions to institutions and authority have privileged either contextual (*situational*) factors or individual (*dispositional*) ones (Zimbardo, 2007). Situational and dispositional accounts each focus on one aspect of social interactions, the former on the social environment, the latter on the individual. In doing so, they rely on the underlying assumption of constancy of the hypothesized influence of situational and dispositional factors across cases (cases can be people or situations, depending on the approach). Both approaches thus neglect the structural and functional relations between individuals and groups and their social environments, and the processes that emerge from such relations.

Situational accounts. Currently, most social psychological explanations of human violence, obedience, and conformity emphasize the primacy of situations over personal dispositions (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Bar-On, 2012; Grassiani, 2009; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008; Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007). The now-famous examples of Milgram's (1963) obedience-to-authority study and the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973) represent paradigmatic examples of the situational approach, and to some extent, its empirical foundation and beginning. Such situational accounts attempt to explain differences in behavior by focusing on physical and social contextual factors, such as role definitions and expectations (Haney et al., 1973), local norms and practices (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), influence of authority figures (Milgram, 1974), or the physical conditions in which soldiers carry out their work (Grassiani, 2009), and how such factors shape individuals' beliefs and actions in systematic and predictable ways.

[8] But see Fireman et al. (1978) for an interactional analysis of individual and group processes in reactions to unjust authority.

In doing so, situational theorists have argued against folk-beliefs and traditional psychiatric and criminological models of violent behavior, which focus on individual differences: "It is not the character of the acting individuals, not their opinion or the level of their morality are the crucial elements in determining their behavior on duty, but rather it is the situation that dictates how things will play out" (Engel & Sharon, 2012, p. 232). Thus, situational conditions are conceptualized as eliciting relatively predictable responses from individuals, who in turn are seen as more or less malleable and passive.

Mechanisms proposed in the situational hypothesis rely on principles of cultural transmission, socialization, and social learning, and emphasize the power of the military to weaken soldiers' moral inhibitions and enable them to commit acts that under different conditions they may judge as immoral (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Situational conditions enable military atrocities to occur by creating an atmosphere which renders victims as "expendable" and the violent actions taken against them as "strategic necessities" (Kelman & Hamilton, p. 14). This climate or *culture of brutality* is conceptualized as a split between normal reality and the "alternate reality" of the battlefield (Elizur & Yishay-Krien, 2009, p. 261). Psychological processes that allow the culture of brutality to take hold may include *authorization*, *routinization*, and *dehumanization* (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), as well as defense mechanisms such as *denial* and *repression* in order to sustain a belief in the justness of one's actions and establish a clear divide between the ingroup and the enemy or target of violent acts (Bar-On, 2012). The military system purportedly employs methods of socialization, using reinforcements and sanctions with an explicit purpose of "significantly influencing the value system" of soldiers in training (Stevens, Rosa, & Gardner, 1994, p. 473). More specifically, *militarized socialization* characterizes the combat soldier as an ideal of civic participation, and emphasizes ostensibly military values such as hierarchy, obedience, centralized authority, domination, and control (Levy & Sasson-Levy, 2008). Although, in this approach it is acknowledged that the socialized are not "passive recipients" (p. 353) of these messages, the dominant response is nonetheless expected to consist of "conformity and obedience, mainly expressed in unquestioning acceptance" (p. 350).

Grassiani (2009) evoked the notion of *moral numbing* to describe the process she claimed that soldiers undergo which erodes their moral competence and sensibilities, thus effectively losing "the ability to recognize and act upon a moral aspect of a certain situation" (p. 125). Because of the specific nature of the IDF's activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), she has claimed that "soldiers find themselves in situations within which their senses are numbed, their stress levels are high and their moral abilities are compromised" (Grassiani, 2009, p. 211). Furthermore, Grassiani described the moral discourse of IDF soldiers as one based predominantly on what she termed *instrumental morality* (Grassiani, 2009, p. 187), based not on principles of justice and concern with the welfare of others, but rather on promotion of interests of the self or ingroup.

Social-cognitive theorists (e.g., Bandura et al., 1996; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008) have expanded such situational accounts by specifying the underlying psychological processes of cognitive changes that form the link between situational factors, background demographic variables, and behavior. Such *mechanisms of moral disengagement* serve to suspend normative moral principles and are described as unconscious and nonrational. Moral disengagement is achieved through re-construal of aggressive acts (e.g., as aimed toward moral ends), of perpetrating actors (e.g., by diffusion or displacement of responsibility), of harmful consequences (e.g., by minimization or distortion), and of recipients (e.g., as deserving or dehumanized). For example, Kimhi and Sagy (2008) claimed that the mechanism of *moral*

justification applied to the use of checkpoints by the IDF functions to mitigate stress and conflict among Israeli soldiers, enabling them to perform their duties. Moral justification in this study was operationalized as endorsement of such statements as "The roadblocks are a necessary evil resulting from the need to fight terror," "The service at the roadblocks causes soldiers to behave unethically," and "My service teaches me that, overall, the IDF is an ethical army" (p. 183). Yet without further probing it is difficult to interpret an aggregate score based on endorsement of such varied statements. Kimhi and Sagy interpreted the findings as indicative of integration of the stated military goals of the checkpoints into the soldier's values, yet alternative interpretations might take into account participants' own explanations of their agreement with such statements.

Together, situational and social-cognitive (SCT) accounts form a relatively unified perspective according to which people are unknowingly subject to social influences and nuanced situational conditions that cause them to participate in harmful or unjust acts, regardless of—or even despite—their otherwise prosocial dispositions, attitudes, and beliefs.

Dispositional accounts. In stark contrast to this situational approach, many laypersons, as well as personality psychologists, psychiatrists, and criminologists understand perpetration of violent or brutal acts, as well as acts of morally-driven dissent and resistance, from a dispositional approach. Such explanations emphasize individual differences in responses to social situations by focusing on psychological constructs theorized to be stable and coherent within persons. The dispositional perspective may take the form of enduring personality traits, such as sadism or authoritarianism (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999; Blass, 1995; Tarr & Lorr, 1991), taxonomies of personality types, such as ideologically violent, restrained, or incorruptible (Elizur & Yishay-Krien, 2009), moral maturity (Linn, 1995; Presley, 1985), personal moral philosophies (Forsyth, 1992), or broad orientations such as individualism/collectivism (Linn, 1988).

Some dispositional accounts focus on trait-like predispositions, such as Right Wing Authoritarianism, conceptualized as a tendency to adhere to authority, abide by social norms and conventions, and espouse conservative views (Tarr & Lorr, 1991). Authoritarianism, as well as sadism, thrill-seeking, and narcissism are presumed to render some individuals considerably more susceptible to engaging in aggressive action. Other dispositional explanations focus more on explicitly moral aspects of the self. For example, Forsyth (1992) identified four *personal moral philosophies*, generated by crossing the two dimensions of *relativism* and *idealism*, and used these personal belief systems to explain moral judgments and attitudes towards a variety of controversial business practices. Still other moral psychologists have emphasized the role of *moral identity*, a richer dispositional construct which is comprised of judgments of responsibility, the centrality of morality in one's identity, and the desire for self-consistency (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Finally, some psychologists have stressed either individualistic or collectivistic tendencies in explaining soldiers' behavior. Linn (1988) suggested that the act of disobedience is individualistic in nature and requires a certain degree of social and emotional separation from the group. In contrast, Ross (2000) emphasized subjective elements of identity that provide "a particular emotional intensity to group differences and become the basis for collective action undertaken in the name of the group" (p. 30). The California F-Scale, measuring authoritarianism, as well as the RWAS, measuring Right Wing authoritarianism are both designed to tap what may be considered collectivist tendencies towards conformity and

conventionalism, and in fact have been used to predict obedient behavior on Milgram-like tasks (Blass, 1995).

These varied explanatory constructs all have in common an emphasis on personal, internal, and relatively stable psychological dimensions of individuals, and attention to individual differences in attitudes and behavior. This approach can be illustrated by the counter-argument to the claim that the Occupation of the OPT corrupts soldiers who participate in its enforcement: "It is not the Occupation which creates the differences between people, but rather the moral infrastructure with which recruits entered the military, and the values which were imparted to them by their commanders over the course of their service" (Amidror, 2012, p. 179).

Problems with the dispositional-situational dichotomy. The pervasive focus on either dispositional differences or situational conditions to explain individuals' behaviors in hierarchical authority situations, and especially in the military, has limited our understanding of such behaviors as part of a broader range of human reactions (Elizur & Yishay-Krien, 2009). By emphasizing the extreme (either exceptional people or extraordinary situations), such accounts blur the continuity between these behaviors and more ubiquitous (and arguably, developmentally typical) reactions to authority and conflict situations. Turiel (2005) has argued for a reinterpretation of contextual variations in judgments, as reflecting socio-cognitive processes of weighing, balancing, and coordinating different considerations, rather than as indicating a unidirectional situational determinism.

The limitations of the situational-dispositional dichotomy are three-fold. First, as discussed above, both approaches have tended to focus on either perpetration or dissent, but few psychological inquiries have attempted to encompass the broad range of possible reactions to authority in social institutions[9]. Within social psychology especially, various modes of resistance, overt and covert, have often been underemphasized or even ignored completely.

Second, by limiting explanations to either situational or personal factors the explanatory mechanisms of behavior have been reduced to discrete forces and eliminated the explanatory potential of the relation between persons and situations. Inquiring into individuals' understanding and evaluation of complex social situations taps that very interaction, and reveals how soldiers make sense of their social environment and make decisions about how to act upon it. Asch (1952) has argued that the interaction between conditions and individuals is the basic property of any social action. This interaction, in his theory, is cognitively mediated, and it is the cognitive structures of comprehension, interpretation, and evaluation that free individuals from becoming situation-bound. Systematic examination of these relations between environments and individuals is needed in order to uncover meaningful patterns and more fully understand why and how people respond to authority, in the military, and elsewhere. Social psychologists have suggested that the fundamental attribution error (Ross L. , 1977) has caused us to underemphasize situational reasons for behavior and overemphasize dispositional ones (Bar-On, 2012), but it appears the pendulum has swung too far. Social situations are not separable from the human agents who interpret them and act upon them. Because authority is a relational construct that is dependent on these other considerations, it cannot be operationalized or theorized as an individual characteristic: "The authority attribute of social position is not really a characteristic of a person, but a description of a social relation that holds between two individuals within a given social-organizational system" (Laupa et al., 1995, p. 143).

[9] See Elizur and Yishay-Krien (2009) and Fireman et al. (1978) for exceptions.

Lastly, both types of explanation—situational and dispositional—imply, or sometimes explicitly claim, a diminished degree of moral agency. Milgram's (1974) interpretation of his findings rests predominantly on his notion of entering an *"agentic state"* (Milgram, 1974, p. 133), which despite the name, actually emphasizes lack of agency on the part of the obedient participants: "The essence of obedience consists in the fact that a person comes to view himself as the *instrument for carrying out another person's wishes* [emphasis added], and he therefore *no longer regards himself as responsible for his actions* [emphasis added]" (p. xii). Yet without an in-depth examination of the process of reasoning underlying acts and judgments, it is impossible to empirically distinguish between so-called moral disengagement and moral judgment. The distinction is not merely a semantic one; there are important theoretical and real-world implications to this distinction between nonconscious processes occurring outside individuals' control, and conscious and rational processes that lead to differing substantive judgments. As noted by Press (2012): "something too often lost in contemporary accounts of evil … is that deciding whether to conform or resist is just that: a choice" (pp. 8-9). By obviating the role of agency, volition, and autonomy in individuals' actions, traditional accounts of social behavior in the military also raise questions of personal responsibility and legal culpability for actions of individual soldiers[10]. The former characterizes the moral agent as unconsciously subjected to situational manipulations and circumstantial influences unbeknownst to him. The latter suggests that identifiable and stable personal tendencies or character traits determine an individual's propensity to behave in predictable ways.

Gazit and Ben Ari (2012) argued against such a split, which they conceptualized as a disciplinary divide between psychology and sociology. They, too, identified the way in which individuals perceive and interpret behavior as the connecting link between the individual and societal, cultural, and political aspects of military violence. In particular, they emphasized one aspect of social agency, namely, the way in which a soldier understands the operational rationale of the mission. Such an emphasis on active interpretive construal of social situations and the responses to them addresses the three main problems of the dispositional-situational split highlighted above; it enables a unified understanding of a broad range of negative and positive reactions to authority structures, it targets the meeting-point of persons and their social environments, and especially the bilateral transactions between them, and it places a premium on human agency and personal responsibility.

Bridging Dichotomies: Developmental Accounts

In the current study, I draw on developmental and interactional approaches to human reasoning and behavior (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965; Turiel, 1983) that highlight the very aspects absent from the traditional dichotomous accounts as described above. This is an alternative approach to interpret and understand responses to authority—both adherence and resistance to norms, rules, and even military commands—as stemming from social and moral reasoning using concepts that develop in the interaction of individuals with their social environments from infancy and throughout the lifespan. Such an approach is well-suited to understand soldiers' behaviors as reflecting coherent patterns of thought and judgment that are sensitive to contexts, but not governed by them.

[10] For a comprehensive analysis of the legal and philosophical implications of Milgram's argument regarding personal agency, responsibility, and obedience, see Parush (1996).

Several social-cognitive constructs and processes have been offered to explain how apparent individual differences in moral judgment may in fact be driven by conscious and rational thought processes that leave room for coexistence of ambiguous, conflicting, and competing demands (Turiel, 2005). This study is designed to bring to the forefront the role of those very ambiguities and contradictions in typical development broadly, and specifically in reasoning about complex social and moral situations such as those facing soldiers in combat. This theoretical approach relies on several key theoretical assumptions: (a) individuals interact within social contexts, (b) thinking individuals are self-directed agents, and (c) thought processes cannot be directly inferred from surface behavioral responses.

Domains of social knowledge. A large body of research has demonstrated that different types of social concepts, or *domains* of social reasoning, are identified, evaluated, and coordinated when engaging in moral evaluations of acts and actors (Richardson, Mulvey, & Killen, 2012). Several such domains have been identified: moral, conventional, personal, and prudential. Matters of justice, welfare, and rights are in the *moral* domain, whereas matters of authority, tradition, and local norms are considered *conventional* (Turiel, 1983). Issues of privacy, personal preferences, and bodily integrity and control are associated with the *personal* domain (Nucci, 1981), and matters of personal safety and wellness are within the *prudential* domain (Smetana, 2006). The criteria for distinguishing between the moral and social-conventional domains are formalized in eight parameters, or *criterion judgments* (Turiel, 1983), including obligatoriness, impersonality, generalizability, alterability, universality, social consensus, rule contingency, and authority jurisdiction. Furthermore, the domain distinction is clearly seen in people's *justification categories* (Turiel, 1983) for their judgments. Judgments in the moral domain are justified using notions of justice, harm, and rights, whereas conventional justifications include social order, tradition, and authority. Social domain theory (SDT) has yielded a variety of empirical inquiries into people's conceptualizations of authority, personal autonomy, and how various courses of action may be employed to achieve different ends in hierarchical relations (e.g., Laupa et al., 1995; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005; Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2008).

Coordination of domains. Many social situations encountered in daily life, and certainly in the military, rarely map on to a single domain of knowledge, but rather involve multiple considerations that may compete, conflict, or complement one another. *Coordination* of domains may occur in several ways (Turiel, 1989), and although an impressive body of empirical findings has been amassed supporting the distinction *between* domains across ages, cultures, and social situations, the empirical and theoretical elaboration of the process of coordination is still underway (Richardson et al., 2012). Nucci and Turiel (2009) argued that the ability to apprehend, appreciate, and ultimately coordinate moral and non-moral aspects of social situations unfolds with development. Young children attend to salient moral features of social situations, yielding straightforward categorical moral judgments. Older children and young adolescents begin to appreciate multiple and competing aspects, moral and non-moral, and this complexity gives rise to greater moral ambiguity and ambivalence in their judgments. Finally, older adolescents (and presumably adults) more successfully and systematically coordinate the host of considerations they perceive to bear on a social situation. This developmental trajectory forms a U-shaped pattern of moral judgment. Thus, "moral development includes periods of transition in which the expanded capacity to consider aspects of moral situations leads to variations in the application of

moral criteria" (Nucci & Turiel, p. 155). In reasoning about both hypothetical and actual mixed-domain situations, children recognized salient moral and conventional aspects (with a high rate of agreement with independent coders), and prioritized them in different ways (Turiel, 2008b).

In the context of judgments related to authority and obedience, Laupa and colleagues (1995) identified three main components of situations where an authority figures commands compliance—(a) the type of command, (b) the attributes of authority figure, and (c) the social context—which are integrated in children's judgment of the situation and contribute to their evaluations of different responses to such commands. Importantly, their findings provide evidence that each of these aspects alone is not enough to understand people's reasoning about situations of obedience to authority. Rather, it is these multiple aspects in coordination that better explain evaluations regarding the legitimacy of disobedience or the obligatoriness of compliance.

Informational assumptions. In addition to coordinating concepts from different domains of knowledge, social decision making involves a consideration of the facts of the situation. An important distinction is thus drawn between prescriptive principles of judgments, and descriptive notions of perceived reality (Wainryb, 1991; Wainryb & Turiel, 1993). What may appear as differences in moral judgment may not reflect changes in moral reasoning or moral principles, but instead changes in the interpretation of behavior leading to a different construal of reality. The incorporation of such *informational assumptions* (Wainryb, 1991) into moral judgments contributes to the process and outcome of social decision making. By analyzing the informational and evaluative components of participants' judgments about goal-directed actions such as corporal punishment, segregation in schools, and discrimination in the workplace, Wainryb (1991) demonstrated that there is a powerful relationship between informational assumptions about the effectiveness of such practices, and the judgments about their legitimacy. Wainryb (1991) emphasized that informational assumptions do not *determine* moral judgments, but rather indirectly influence them by affecting the subjective interpretation of meaning given to an act.

Laupa and colleagues (1995) used their analysis of three components of judgments about authority (i.e., the command, the authority figure, and the context), to explain situations that may lead to so-called crimes of obedience. A plausible combination of situational, relational, and informational factors that may lead to committing such acts would include some degree of coercion by an authority figure with perceived legitimacy to issue a command and to punish due to their social position, but an illegitimate command (Laupa et al., p. 148). Informational assumptions about the goodness, the superiority, and the power of the authority figure may therefore all contribute to judgments about its legitimacy, as well as the actor's sphere of action.

Allowing an important role for informational assumptions in the decision-making process further reveals how a *lack* of knowledge or information may lead to error and misattributions, thereby affecting moral judgments (Turiel, 2008a). Controlling the nature and amount of knowledge available may be a powerful strategy that influences people's moral judgments in a certain direction. Distortion and limiting of information as well as mixed messages are often noted by scholars as a feature of the military context, and in the IDF's activities in the Intifada and other contentious military actions in particular (Lieblich, 1987; Linn, 1996; Shamir, 2012). This limiting of information may have also played a part in the responses of the participants in Milgram's study, for example. In the situational paradigm, such a control of information is not only external, but also an inherent aspect of the power of the figure of authority "to define reality for the person who accepts his or her authority," and to accept that definition uncritically (Blass,

2000, p. 39). In the current interpretation, however, individuals are presumed to actively assess the information they have access to, and construct an understanding of the situation—even if partial, mistaken, or based on misinformation—in the service of ultimately making a moral judgment about it. Thus, it appears that one's understanding of an event varies systematically by one's vantage point in that event, and one's judgment of the event varies systematically by one's construal of it.

To conclude, the military arena is rife with situations where individuals need to negotiate conflicting demands of strict social conventions, personal safety, interpersonal commitments, partial and conflicting informational messages, and considerations of justice, welfare, and rights of various actors. Examples from the military have been used to support competing theoretical accounts rendering behavior as stemming from non-conscious and nonrational psychological processes (Elizur & Yishay-Krien, 2009; Grassiani, 2009; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008). The current study is intended to advance a reinterpretation of soldiers' thinking about such mixed-domain situations, which represent a variety of considerations and interests, focusing on how individuals employ and distinguish between different domains of knowledge, coordinate them, and ultimately reach a decision. For example, examining individuals' construal of the demands of such decisions as whether to prevent a Palestinian civilian from passing through a military checkpoint, or whether to open fire at an ambiguous suspect, as well as their explicit evaluation and justification of concrete action choices in such situations, can reveal systematic patterns in the social-cognitive processes underlying behavior in hierarchical social institutions. Domain theory thus offers powerful theoretical and methodological tools with which to explore these complicated questions without oversimplifying them, but also to remain within a structured, systematic framework, with clear explicit assumptions and predictions.

The Current Study: Aims, Research Questions, and Hypotheses

The aim of this study was to investigate the reasoning processes of young adults about authority and its limits in hierarchical social institutions. This was done by presenting Israeli soldiers with hypothetical situations of conflict between authority and other moral, social, personal, and political concerns, and eliciting their judgments and justifications of protagonists' acts of compliance and refusal. Specifically, the following four research questions and related hypotheses were addressed:

1. Are acts of refusal to commands or violation of rules in the military evaluated *uniformly*, or does the nature of the violated directive make a difference in evaluating refusal and violations? Contrary to other theoretical models, it is hypothesized that disobedience will be evaluated differentially and reflect flexibility along domain lines. More specifically, my hypotheses were that (a) *evaluations* would be largely positive for refusal of commands that are morally wrong, largely negative for resistance to conventional norms and regulations, and mixed for political refusal; (b) *justifications* would be domain-concordant for prototypically moral and conventional situations and reflect competing concerns from multiple domains for political refusal situations; and finally, (c) *criterion judgments* would reflect the social concepts being employed, such that moral acts would be judged as noncontingent on rules, generalizable, or culture-independent, and impersonal, whereas conventional practices would be judged as rule-contingent, culture-specific, and personal (Turiel, 1983).

2. How are acts of *political* refusal conceptualized? Using the SDT framework to systematically identify and analyze evaluations, justifications, and criterion judgments, it is possible to parse out the various social concepts employed in reasoning about acts of political selective disobedience and shed some light on this little-studied form of resistance to authority. Moreover, such mixed-domain situations present an opportunity to elaborate patterns of coordination of multiple concepts from different domains to enrich our understanding of the nature of this social cognitive process.

3. Are judgments about resistance to authority different in a *military* context than they are in a *civilian* one? Much has been written about obedience to authority, both in the military and in other social contexts, but a direct comparison of similar situations in these two contexts can elucidate both the similarities and differences between them. This question was addressed by comparing participants' responses to matched military and non-military (i.e., workplace) vignettes. Differences *between* domains were hypothesized to emerge in justifications and criterion judgments in both military and civilian situations. Second, *within the conventional domain*, evaluations of noncompliance were expected to be more negative in military than in civilian situations; and finally, *within the moral domain*, fewer differences between the military and civilian contexts were hypothesized.

4. Are judgments of *resistance* in the military the mirror-image of judgments of *compliance*; and is this the case across types of resistance (moral, conventional, and political)? The argument put forth in this work places emphasis on moving away from a dichotomous view of responses to authority, and greater attention to the gray areas between the polarities of committed compliance on the one hand, and full conscientious objection on the other. Therefore, an examination of both judgments of obedience and of disobedience of the same directives, and especially the relations between them can inform a richer conceptualization of the broader range of responses to authority. It is hypothesized that in moral situations, more categorical reasoning would lead to a clearer inverse relationship between judgments about following and resisting directives, whereas in conventional and mixed situations, this relationship will not necessarily hold, such that in the same situation participants may judge both compliance and resistance as acceptable (in some conventional situations) or not acceptable (in some political situations).

To sum, the present study aimed to gain better understanding of how individuals conceptualize and evaluate authority directives, and whether these conceptualizations and evaluations are sensitive to the broad institutional context, the specific acts involved, and the subordinate's response to such directives.

Methods

Population and Sample

Because of the exploratory nature of this study, I have chosen to focus on a circumscribed and relatively homogeneous population to flesh out the hypothesized components of social reasoning while controlling for person variables such as gender, military rank, position, and tenure. The study therefore was focused on male reserve soldiers (non-officers), who have completed their mandatory service in a combat unit within five years of the interview time. This group was selected to represent a prototypical role of a subordinate (non-officer) soldier responding to orders of higher-ranking commanders (see Grassiani, 2009 for similar rationale in the selection of the population and sample).

Combat soldiers in the IDF undergo a minimum of six months of basic and professional training before being deployed in security maintenance or combat assignments. In addition to "anticipatory socialization" (Mayseless, 2002, p. 164) in high-school, where the mandatory state curriculum includes military preparation courses (Levy & Sasson-Levy, 2008), combat training includes extensive and explicit instruction in military regulations, including, among other topics, discipline and the military chain of command, the IDF code of ethics, and the legal implications of manifestly illegal commands in the IDF.

Sixty four participants were recruited at local universities and colleges, as well as from online forums for military veterans. After verifying that they met the exclusion criteria described above, informed consent was obtained, and interview meetings were scheduled at a time and location convenient to the participant. Participants were offered nominal compensation (25 NIS) for their time. Participants were, as noted, all male, and ranged in age from 21-29 years of age (M = 24.8, SD = 1.67). Fifty four (84.4%) of the participants were born in Israel, and the remaining immigrated from the U.S. or Western Europe (6), the former U.S.S.R. (3), and Latin America (1); mean age at immigration was 9.33. Forty seven (73.4%) of the participants were college students at the time of the interview, and the rest either worked or were unemployed (shortly after discharge).

Duration of military service ranged from 16-61 months (M = 36.1, SD = 9.2). Typical mandatory military service for men in Israel is 36 months, but there are several reasons for shorter or longer service duration. First, the IDF has an arrangement (*Hesder* in Hebrew) with several religious yeshivas, whereby young men can combine Talmudic studies with military service. Although the overall length of such programs is 4-5 years, active military duty lasts 16 months. Eight (12.5%) Hesder soldiers participated in the study, and were discharged at the rank of sergeant. Second, certain elite units and prestigious positions require soldiers to extend their service by as long as two additional years. Seven (10.9%) of the participants in the study extended their service and were thus discharged at the rank of sergeant first class. The remaining 49 participants (76.6%) served the typical three years and were discharged as staff sergeants.

The sample included soldiers from a variety of combat units in the IDF. Thirty-eight participants (59.4%) were infantry-men, 14 (21.9%) were from the armored corps or artillery units, eight (12.5%) were from volunteer elite units, and four additional participants (6.3%) were from other miscellaneous combat units (e.g., combat intelligence, military police, and the Oketz canine unit). The vast majority (93.8%) of participants indicated that they had participated in active combat activity during their service, although four participants only had combat training but did not themselves participate in combat activities. Most of the participants (90.6%)

indicated that they continue to serve as reserve soldiers since their discharge from full-time mandatory military service.

One last note about the characterization of this sample is particularly relevant to some of the topics discussed in the interviews. Because of the political nature of two of the vignettes, participants were asked whether they self-identify as right wing, left wing, or center in their political views. A surprisingly large proportion of the sample (32.8%) indicated that they do not identify politically at all. Twenty-two (34.4%) participants self-identified as right wing, seventeen (26.6%) as left wing, and four (6.3%) as center.

Research Design and Procedure

The study consisted of semi-structured clinical interviews about ten (five sets of two) hypothetical situations depicting acts of adherence or resistance to authority directives (i.e., direct commands, or rules and regulations) by either soldier-protagonists in the IDF, or civilian-protagonists in the workplace.

Two distinct domains were the main focus of the design of this study—the moral domain (pertaining to issues of justice, welfare, and rights), and the social-conventional domain (pertaining to issues of social norms, common practices, and structures of authority, rules, and regulations). Because much of the public discourse around military refusal in Israel revolves around political refusals[11], a third category which includes components from both domains was represented as judgments in a political context (labeled *mixed-political*). The study therefore included three types of hypothetical scenarios: *moral*, *conventional*, and *mixed-political*.

The two military-moral stories[12] depicted (a) detaining a Palestinian civilian who had been rude at a military checkpoint (infringing on his right of free movement), and (b) opening fire at a suspect without confirmation of the threat. The civilian-moral stories depicted (c) detaining a messenger who had been rude at an office building, and (d) opening fire at a burglary suspect at a farm without confirmation of the threat. The two military-conventional stories depicted (e) violating regulations of uniform and dress, and (f) violating regulations of saluting high-ranking officers. The two civilian-conventional stories depicted (g) violating dress code regulations at a law firm, and (h) violating rules of using titles and last names to address physicians in a dental clinic. Finally, the two mixed-political stories depicted (i) eviction of civilians from settlements near Gaza, and (j) participation in combat activity in the OPT. No parallel political stories in a civilian context were used in this study. Half of the participants started with the six military stories, and the other half started with the four civilian stories.

To assess participants' reasoning about both obedience and disobedience, half of the stories were presented first with the protagonist complying with the directive, and then followed with a question about noncompliance with the same directive (i.e., Suppose that since he thought it's not ok to X, he refused to follow the command? Would that be all right or not all right?). The other half of the stories reversed the order such that the baseline condition depicted resistance to the directive and the follow-up question depicted adherence in the same situation. Order of presentation (baseline and follow-up) was counterbalanced between participants.

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[11] Two notable waves of military refusal in contemporary Israel are associated with political ideology; left-wing refusal has centered on military actions in Lebanon and the OPT judged as illegitimate and unjustified, whereas right-wing refusal has focused on the illegitimacy of evicting and evacuating Israeli citizens from settlements in the OPT. See Unger (2010) for a historical review of refusal movements in the IDF.

[12] The complete set of vignettes and questions is presented in the Appendix.

Following each story, participants were asked a series of questions, beginning with an *evaluation* of the actions of the protagonist (i.e., is it all right or not all right that X refused to do Y [did Y] in this situation?). Evaluations were followed by *justifications* (i.e., why is it all right?/why is it not all right?). Next, participants were asked to evaluate and justify the opposite response, as explained above. Finally, after evaluations and justification were obtained, a series of questions that tap three of the criterion judgments of the moral and conventional domains were asked. These questions were designed to examine participants' judgments of *rule contingency* (i.e., is the act right or wrong in the absence of a rule/command?), *generalizability* (i.e., suppose the act was in a different army/workplace in a different country, does that make it all right?), and *impersonality* (i.e., is it up to the protagonist to decide what to do in this situation?). In the two moral-military stories, in order to separately assess the contingency of the evaluation of an act on commands as opposed to military rules and regulations[13], participants were asked two rule-contingency questions. First, they were asked whether the act would be legitimate for the soldier to commit in the absence of a command. Next, they were asked whether the act would be permissible if it were legal, vis-à-vis military laws (i.e., suppose there was a military law that said it was ok to X, would it then be ok?).

In summary, the research design included three within-subject comparisons (3 domains: moral, conventional, mixed-political; 2 institutional contexts: military vs. workplace; and 2 responses: adherence vs. resistance), and two between-subject control variables (baseline and story order). Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to each of four groups (total N = 64) and responded to a total of ten stories.

All interviews were conducted in Hebrew, by the author, and were audio-recorded electronically. The audio files of the interviews were transcribed verbatim in Hebrew, and coded by the author. A subset of the transcripts were also coded by a second Hebrew-speaking coder, trained by the author, to measure inter-rater reliabilities of the coding scheme.

Coding

As a first step, evaluations of obedience and disobedience in each vignette were coded as positive, negative, or ambivalent/mixed/inconsistent. Justifications of these evaluations were coded according to a coding scheme that was developed in an iterative process which was both theory- and data-driven. An initial list of justification categories was generated following a close reading of the first 16 interviews (25% of the sample). This first set of codes was informed by previous studies in SDT, as well as by these 16 participants' actual responses. This initial scheme was then applied to the rest of the interviews and gradually modified. After all 64 interviews had been read at least once, the final version of the coding scheme was determined, and reapplied to the entire dataset. Justification codes were organized by domain (i.e., moral, conventional, personal) and by other categories (e.g., pragmatic considerations, epistemological considerations). Finally, codes with an overall frequency of less than 5% were eliminated, as were codes that did not exhibit inter-rater reliability. The final set of codes by justification category is presented in Table 1.

[13] See Parush (1996) for the legal distinction between moral disobedience of a command and morally-driven violations of law.

Table 1

Justification Categories by Domain

Code	Description
	Moral Justifications
Act Wrong	Justification of obedience/resistance hinges on wrongness of act.
Harm	Harm to alter (life, finances, freedom, dignity, violation of rights).
Security	Self-protection, self-defense, national security, protection of property.
No Security	Not a threat to security (protection subordinated).
Reciprocity1	Teach man a lesson, legitimate response to alter's transgression.
Reciprocity2	Disproportionate response, abuse of power.
	Conventional Justifications
Social Functioning	Societal or system functioning, threats to social solidarity, appeals to democratic decisions of the state.
Respect for System	Respect for army, workplace; importance of respect for rules. Note that interpersonal respect was coded elsewhere.
Discipline	Dangers of eroding discipline/obedience, slippery slope, could lead to greater disobedience of protagonist or others.
Public	Representativeness, public image, being judged on appearance.
	Personal Justifications
Agree	Agreed to rules when took the job, free to quit job, chose to go into combat unit, personal obligation or commitment.
Personal Responsibility	Protagonist's responsibility/culpability.
Private sphere	Justification hinges on the act occurring in private (own office, unit, base, home).
	Pragmatic Justifications
Cost Benefit	Consideration of personal benefits, interests, or rewards; weighing of costs versus benefits.
Effective	Act is effective in this situation; obedience is more effective than refusal.
Consequences	Negative consequences of refusal (jail, punishment, getting fired, relationships, reputation).
No Consequences	As long as doesn't get caught, as long as accepts consequences; punishment is irrelevant/subordinated.
	Epistemological Justifications
Soldier information	References to protagonist's assumed or missing facts/information.
Boss/commander information	Commander/boss knows something that protagonist does not, has access to intelligence.
Competence	Assumption or belief in commander's competence (includes references to status or "quality" of IDF officers), expression of confidence in authority figure's good judgment.

No Competence	Commander/boss made a bad call, error, no faith/confidence in commanders' good judgment.
Perspective/ Vantage point	Being "on the ground", seeing with own eyes.
	Behavioral Alternatives
Subvert	Avoid situation, evade, kind of obey, leeway in the "how", gray refusal.
Confront	Challenge authority directly, convince, report up chain of command.
	Miscellaneous
Responsibility of Authority	Commander/boss's responsibility/culpability, protagonist is "covered".
Act Right	Act is legitimate, justified under circumstances.

Criterion judgments were mostly coded in the same way as evaluations, as positive, negative, or ambivalent/mixed/inconsistent, with one exception. The rule contingency question regarding military law, which was asked only in the moral stories, created a problem. The question was designed under the hypothesis that most participants would judge the initial act as wrong, and was meant to probe whether a law could legitimize it. Since many participants actually judged obedience in the detaining story as legitimate, the question was modified depending on the participant's initial evaluation, and was therefore coded differently. Participants' responses were coded into one of five categories: (a) *Rule can legitimize act,* when an act that was negatively judged was then judged more positively when made legal; (b) *Rule cannot legitimize act*, when an act that was negatively judged remained illegitimate regardless of law; (c) *Rule can delegitimize act*, when an act that was positively judged was then judged more negatively when made illegal; (d) *Rule cannot delegitimize act*, when an act that was positively judged remained legitimate despite being now illegal; and (e) *Ambivalent/mixed/inconsistent*.

Reliability

To assess inter-rater reliability, 20% of the interviews were coded by an additional trained coder. Inter-rater agreement in scoring *evaluations* and *criterion judgments*, using Cohen's kappa (κ), ranged from .61 to .92 (77% -96% agreement). Total evaluations (excluding law, which had a different number of response categories and therefore could not be included in the overall calculation of κ) was .82 (90% agreement). Table 2 presents κ values and agreement rates for each of these variables.

Table 2

Cohen's Kappa Values (and Agreement Rates) for Evaluations and Criterion Judgments.

Obedience	Disobedience	Rule Contingency [a]	Law Contingency	Generalizibility	Impersonality
.920 (96%)	.779 (87%)	.797 (88%)	.862 (90%)	.738 (86%)	.826 (90%)

[a] Combined *No Command* for moral stories and *No Rule* for conventional Stories.

Inter-rater agreement in scoring justification categories, ranged from .63 to .83 (81% - 93% agreement). Total reliability of domain justification categories was .70 (86% agreement). Total agreement for individual justifications was .63 (91% agreement).

Table **3** presents κ values and agreement rates for each of the domains.

Table 3

Cohen's Kappa Values (and Agreement Rates) for Justifications Categories

Moral	Conventional	Personal	Pragmatic	Epistemological
.720	.630	.655	.633	.826
(86%)	(81%)	(85%)	(82%)	(93%)

Results

Evaluations, justifications, and criterion judgments were analyzed using generalized linear models, with order and baseline as control factors, and domain and institutional context as predictive factors. Table 4 presents evaluations of obedience and disobedience across all ten stories.

Table **5**-

Table **9** present justifications across all ten stories. Table 10-Table 12 present criterion judgments across eight stories (excluding mixed-political stories).

Research Question 1

Are acts of refusal to commands or violation of rules in the military evaluated *uniformly*, or does the nature of the violated directive make a difference in evaluating refusal and violations in the military?

Evaluations. Because obedience is the expected norm in the military, I was particularly interested in situations where disobedience was explicitly and unequivocally endorsed. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, participants' evaluations of disobedience in the military were recoded into a binary variable whereby 1 indicated a positive evaluation of disobedience, and 0 indicated a non-positive evaluation; in other words, negative and ambivalent evaluations were collapsed in this analysis. A generalized linear model with order and baseline as control factors and domain as a predictive factor was generated to predict positive evaluations of disobedience in the military. Baseline was found to be a non-significant predictor, and was therefore removed from the model.

Order was found to be a significant predictor of evaluations of refusal, LR $\chi^2 = 4.69$, $p < .05$. Participants who began with military-based stories were more likely to evaluate disobedience in the military positively (35.42%), compared with participants who began with civilian-based stories (26.84%). It appears that beginning the interview with discussions of the limits of obedience and authority in the civilian workplace, negatively influenced participants' judgments of disobedience in the military, perhaps because it heightened the differences between the two institutional contexts.

Broadly, the data revealed significant variability in soldiers' judgments of disobedience and rule violation in the military related to the nature of the act, as domain was found to be a highly significant predictor of evaluations of disobedience in the military: LR $\chi^2 = 10.53$, $p < .01$. This suggests soldiers do not regard all rules and commands categorically and as equally obligatory. To recall, my first hypothesis was that evaluations would be largely *positive* for refusal of commands in the moral domain, largely *negative* for resistance to conventional norms and regulations, and *mixed* for political refusal. This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Conventional transgressions in a military context were indeed judged negatively by most participants, and relatively few participants said it was okay to violate regulations of uniform (25%) and of saluting high-ranking officers (25%). As for the violation of commands in the moral domain, a more complex picture emerged; as expected, 65.6% of the sample said it was okay to refuse to shoot an unarmed suspect. But in the case of detaining a civilian in a military checkpoint, only 17.2% of participants said refusing this command was permissible. In fact, of all ten vignettes, disobedience was least accepted in this situation. As will be reviewed in later

sections, this particular vignette (Checkpoint Story) yielded interesting and surprising results on other measures as well. I will return to this unexpected finding in the discussion section. Lastly, political refusals did indeed receive mixed judgments, which are presented in detail in the next section (Research Question 2).

Table 4

Evaluations of Obedience and Disobedience by Story (Raw Frequencies and Percentages in Parentheses)

	Obedience			Disobedience		
	Okay	Not Okay	Mixed/ Ambivalent	Okay	Not Okay	Mixed/ Ambivalent
Checkpoint Story (n=64)	47 (73.4%)	10 (15.6%)	7 (10.9%)	11 (17.2%)	49 (76.6%)	4 (6.3%)
Shooting Story (n=64)	12 (18.8%)	40 (62.5%)	12 (18.8%)	42 (65.6%)	9 (14.1%)	13 (20.3%)
Uniform Story (n=64)	61 (95.3%)	0	3 (4.7%)	16 (25%)	35 (54.7%)	13 (20.3%)
Salute Story (n=64)	62 (96.9%)	2 (3.1%)	0	16 (25%)	39 (60.9%)	9 (14.1%)
Settlement Story (n=63)	48 (76.2%)	6 (9.5%)	9 (14.3%)	22 (34.9%)	30 (47.6%)	11 (17.5%)
OPT Story (n=63)	54 (85.7%)	2 (3.2%)	7 (11.1%)	12 (19%)	47 (74.6%)	4 (6.3%)
Messenger Story (n=64)	36 (56.3%)	19 (29.7%)	9 (14.1%)	40 (62.5%)	17 (26.6%)	7 (10.9%)
Farm Story (n=64)	1 (1.6%)	62 (96.9%)	1 (1.6%)	63 (98.4%)	1 (1.6%)	0
Lawyer Story (n=63)	61 (96.8%)	0	2 (3.2%)	21 (33.9%)	30 (48.4%)	11 (17.7%)
Doctor Story	59	0	3	21	31	9

(n=62)	(95.2%)	(4.8%)	(34.4%)	(50.8%)	(14.8%)

Justifications. Justifications of these evaluations were hypothesized to be domain-concordant for prototypically moral and conventional situations and to reflect competing concerns from both domains for political refusal situations. These hypotheses were partially confirmed. Generalized linear models, with order and baseline as control factors, and domain as a predictive factor were generated to predict moral, conventional, personal, pragmatic, and epistemological justifications of disobedience in the military. Neither baseline nor order were found to be significant predictors for *moral, conventional, personal* or *informational* justifications, but order was found to be a significant predictor for pragmatic justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 5.49$, $p < .05$). Participants were more likely (40.62%) to evoke pragmatic justifications when they began with the military-based stories first, as opposed to those participants who began with civilian-based stories (29.17%). It appears that beginning the interview with discussions about military violations of rules and commands heightened participants' consideration of pragmatic considerations, such as the negative consequences of refusal.

It is worth mentioning that in all stories, justifications reflected complex coordination of multiple concerns including moral, conventional, personal, pragmatic, and epistemological considerations. However, a distinct pattern emerged for prototypically moral and conventional stories (justifications in the mixed-political stories will be discussed in the next section).

***Moral justifications*.** Domain was found to be a significant predictor of moral justifications in a military context: LR $\chi^2 = 300.25$, $p < .001$. All of the participants evoked moral considerations in evaluating disobedience in the Shooting Story and the Checkpoint Story, regardless of whether they ultimately judged disobedience positively or negatively in these situations. Moral justifications included such reasons as the absence of a security threat (38% and 67%, respectively), its presence (50% and 44%, respectively), or harm to alter (44% and 69%, respectively). For example, several participants referred to the abuse of power by soldiers against civilians as wrong:

> Here he is using the power he has to do something that I think is about his ego, he's using the fact that he is there with a rifle, and… it's… it's corruption! (Participant 40D)

Not surprisingly, the Shooting Story evoked more references to harm than the Checkpoint Story, and it appears many participants regarded detaining a civilian as minimally harmful, as illustrated in the following participant's words:

> The previous case was about treatment of civilians in a checkpoint, and it wasn't a case of endangering human life, and there was no harm to property and no abuse. Here it's really an extreme situation where you're potentially endangering a civilian's life for no reason. (Participant 25A)

Nonetheless, some participants regarded detaining as a violation of rights or as harmful to the civilian:

> Okay, so this was when we were in Bethlehem, so we were in the checkpoint and my sergeant detained some guy with an ice-cream truck and took out all the popsicles, and… it all went to hell, all his merchandise was ruined. …
> *What made it wrong?*
> Because there was no reason. **You're also hurting someone, beyond the humiliation, you're hurting they're livelihood**. (Participant 15C, emphasis added)

In evaluating infractions of uniform and saluting, on the other hand, moral justifications were very rare indeed (2% and 9%, respectively). As expected, disobedience in the mixed-political stories was sometimes justified with moral considerations (45% in the Settlement Story, and 53% in the OPT story). Although security considerations were considerably less prevalent, other moral considerations such as harm were evoked, as will be elaborated in the next section (Research Question 2). The complete set of moral justifications, and the frequencies with which they were evoked across the ten stories, is presented in
Table **5**.

Table 5

Moral Justifications by Story

	Checkpoint	Shooting	Uniform	Salute	Settlement	OPT	Messenger	Farm	Lawyer	Doctor
Act Right[a]	.36	0	.08	0	.13	.14	.20	.02	.03	.03
Act Wrong	.66	.50	0	0	.19	.13	.31	.75	0	.02
Harm	.44	.69	0	.09	.21	.11	.44	.73	.03	.27
Security	.50	.44	0	0	.11	.40	0	.09	0	0
No Security	.38	.67	.02	0	.10	0	0	.58	.02	0
Reciprocity1	.45	0	0	.02	.02	0	.53	.02	0	.05
Reciprocity2	.44	.08	0	0	0	0	.27	.27	0	.02
Moral Evoked	1.00	1.00	0.02	0.09	0.45	0.53	0.84	1.00	0.05	0.30

[a] *Act Right* is not included in the Moral justification category

Conventional justifications. Although conventional justifications were quite frequent across the board when evaluating disobedience in the military, domain was nonetheless found to be a significant predictor: LR $\chi^2 = 24.26$, $p < .001$. Evaluations of conventional transgressions, and especially in the Uniform Story, were justified using social-conventional reasons (92% for Uniform Story, and 45% for Salute Story), such as functioning of the social system (36% and 20%, respectively), and the importance of discipline (56% and 11%, respectively). For example, many soldiers described a concern that seemingly minor transgressions would erode discipline and may lead to more severe problems:

> It's important to set a tone… it's an atmosphere the army works on. It's like… that cliché you see every time there's, I don't know, some accident, a bullet discharges. Then first thing, they go check when they had the last morning lineup, and when everybody shined

> their shoes, because it gives a feeling of order in the camp. It's not holy… you don't have to kill yourself over stuff like that, but it is important. (Participant 25A)

On the other hand, some participants subordinated this way of thinking explicitly:

> I don't know, it's funny, because that's what they always say: "open laces, open safety".
> *And do you agree?*
> On principle, yes, but in practice, no.
> *Why not?*
> Because I would go without Gumiyot[14] and still keep my safety closed. (Participant 43C)

Another common conventional justification was referring to the need for obedience in order to maintain the smooth functioning of the military system, as illustrated in the following participant's words:

> Because in this act **he is weakening the army**. … In the IDF there's not really an element of fear, what could happen? Worst case he'll get punished, a few days in jail… the punishments aren't really scary. **What's scarier is the situation where anyone will refuse any command**. (Participant 55C, emphasis added)

Conventional justifications were less frequent in the Shooting Story (22%), but quite common in the Checkpoint Story (64%) and in the two mixed-political stories (77% in the Settlement Story and 63% in the OPT Story). The complete set of conventional justifications, and the frequencies with which they were evoked across the ten stories, is presented in Table **6**.

Table 6

Conventional Justifications by Story

	Checkpoint	Shooting	Uniform	Salute	Settlement	OPT	Messenger	Farm	Lawyer	Doctor
Social Functioning	.55	.19	.36	.20	.76	.62	.09	.05	.13	.08
Respect for System	.11	0	.14	.17	.08	.03	.03	.02	.16	.13
Discipline	.08	.05	.56	.11	.10	.13	.05	0	.14	.06
Public	.08	0	.67	.17	.02	.02	.03	0	.59	.33
Conventional Evoked	0.64	0.22	0.92	0.45	0.77	0.63	0.19	0.06	0.75	0.50

***Personal justifications*.** Domain was also found to be a significant predictor of personal justifications in a military context: LR $\chi^2 = 7.43$, $p < .05$. Personal justifications were particularly prevalent when evaluating conventional transgressions, and especially in the Uniform Story

[14] Gumiyot are rubber bands used to seal the bottom of soldiers' pants.

(39%, and 13% in the Salute Story). For example, 34% of participants evoked the legitimacy of regulating one's behavior in the privacy of one's own office or base, and that argument was used to subordinate conventional considerations regarding the importance of rules and regulations:

> What do you mean okay? It's okay in**… in your own office**. **It's kind of your home**, you wouldn't sit in your own living room with gumiyot, or if you're in the middle of work, then it's like you're… 'half-Bet' [fatigue-pants and a t-shirt], that sort of thing… I get it. (5A, emphasis added)

It appears that the participants who justified violating conventional military regulations with this type of reasoning considered the soldier's office or home-unit as part of their private sphere, where issues of personal jurisdiction and personal choice override social conventions and military regulations. Participants coordinated such personal considerations with conventional and other considerations, and issues of personal expression were often subordinated to other considerations, as in the following example:

> Yeah, but within limits. If I were to come with an orange Kipa that says Gush Katif[15] or something, at least at certain times in the army that was like…. forbidden. No, but soldiers find where to express their own thing. If it's on their rifle-straps, or whatever. (Participant 19B)

In the moral situations, on the other hand, such personal justifications were considerably less frequent (5% in the Checkpoint Story and 20% in the Shooting Story). When personal justifications were used to justify moral disobedience, they more commonly involved the personal responsibility and culpability of the protagonist (e.g., 19% in the Shooting Story). This is exemplified in the following participant's words:

> There's this concept, I don't think it's written anywhere, but it's called "combatant's considerations"… it's like **the judgment you exercise because your commander can't exercise it for you**, which means you have to figure it out yourself. (Participant 34B, emphasis added)

Political stories revealed considerable variability between the two stories, but overall a lower rate of personal justifications (8% in the Settlement Story and 31% in the OPT Story), as will be elaborated in a later section. The complete set of personal justifications, and the frequencies with which they were evoked across the ten stories, is presented in
Table **7**.

Table 7

Personal Justifications by Story

	Checkpoint	Shooting	Uniform	Salute	Settlement	OPT	Messenger	Farm	Lawyer	Doctor

[15] Leading up to the disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005, residents of the Gush Katif area which was to be evacuated and their supporters used the color orange as a symbol of their protest against the withdrawal.

Private sphere	0	0	.34	.02	0	0	0	0	.29	.06
Agree	.03	.02	.05	.03	.03	.29	.17	.05	.62	.25
Responsibility of Authority[a]	.16	.28	.13	.14	.02	0	.06	.09	.10	.08
Personal Responsibility	.02	.19	.02	.08	.05	.05	.08	.42	.10	.02
Personal Evoked	0.05	0.20	0.39	0.13	0.08	0.31	0.19	0.45	0.75	0.31

[a] Responsibility of Authority is not included in the Personal justification category.

Pragmatic justifications. Domain was not found to be a significant predictor of pragmatic justifications of disobedience in the military: LR χ^2=2.39, n.s. Pragmatic considerations were brought to bear on evaluations of all three types of disobedience in the military examined in this study. The situations that evoked the fewest pragmatic justifications in the military were the Shooting Story (22%) and the Settlement Story (27%), and these mostly concerned negative consequences of obedience or disobedience. For example, many participants referred to the possibility of going to military jail for disobeying such commands, or more minor punishments for conventional transgressions:

> You don't do it because you feel that it's wrong, you do it because you don't want to get punished, and that's okay. The fact that the system works on punishment like that, I get it. It sucks, and you try to get away with stuff. (Participant 50B)

Notably, many participants (28.4%) explicitly subordinated pragmatic considerations such as the negative consequences of disobedience, suggesting that the protagonist could decide to take the risk that he might "get away with it" or simply accept the punishment. This is illustrated in the following participant's words:

> I, for example, was willing to get a lot of punishments for jokes. All sorts of jokes. I told myself that in order to get through the… this service in good spirits, I'm willing to… all sorts of things. (Participant 40D)

The two conventional situations also evoked consideration of personal consequences, but included another type of pragmatic justifications as well. When evaluating infractions of uniform and saluting, some participants (12% and 16% respectively) indicated that the decision ultimately hinged on a cost-benefit analysis.

> …Sometimes there are lots and lots of situations where you just… um, the commander decides something, do this, so here the question is only a question with yourself, am I willing to swallow the sanctions. (Participant 33A)

Lastly, the Checkpoint Story elicited yet a third type of pragmatic justification, regarding the effectiveness of the act of detaining a Palestinian civilian for the broader goals of the IDF. It seemed that for some of the participants (16%), the evaluation of this act was not solely a moral

evaluation of right and wrong, but also a pragmatic evaluation of the effectiveness of the practice:

> Because it wouldn't give the intended result. The result is supposed to be that he understands that, buddy, you don't bother a soldier doing his job, and then you can let him go. (Participant 63C)

This type of justification also came up in the mixed-political stories, and especially the OPT Story (21%), as will be discussed in the next section (Research Question 2). The complete set of pragmatic justifications, and the frequencies with which they were evoked across the ten stories, is presented in
Table **8**.

Table 8

Pragmatic Justifications by Story

	Checkpoint	Shooting	Uniform	Salute	Settlement	OPT	Messenger	Farm	Lawyer	Doctor
Cost Benefit	0	0	.12	.16	0	0	.16	.03	.35	.22
Effective	.16	0	0	0	.03	.21	.06	0	.05	0
Consequences	.38	.22	.33	.38	.24	.16	.50	.14	.46	.35
No Consequences	.19	.11	.39	.31	.43	.29	.27	.20	.38	.25
Pragmatic Evoked	0.50	0.22	0.36	0.42	0.27	0.33	0.55	0.16	0.61	0.41
Pragmatic Subordinated	0.19	0.11	0.39	0.31	0.42	0.28	0.27	0.20	0.38	0.25

Epistemological justifications. Domain was found to be a significant predictor of epistemological considerations when evaluating disobedience in the military: LR $\chi^2 = 218.67$, $p < .001$. Participants evoked the relevance of information available or unavailable to actors mostly in the moral situations (77% in the Checkpoint Story and 88% in the Shooting Story). More specifically, they referenced the soldier's knowledge and access to information (31% and 56%, respectively) or the commanders' knowledge or access to intelligence (47% and 59%, respectively). For example, as one participant said:

> I guess if he [the commander] decided, then chances are he knows why he made that decision. **Lots of times, you, as a soldier, don't know**. Especially in the IDF, one of the strongest things is that most of the commanders that make these policies are really people who did these things in your place. I mean they don't come from some school, or college for command, and then start making decisions. **They did it, and they know what the situation is**, and if they decide that some heavy gear is more important than one more functioning soldier, or something like that, or say that it's better for a person to wait in the checkpoint and learn his lesson and understand that we mean business… (Participant 42B, emphasis added)

Another type of epistemological consideration was a more basic confidence or trust in commanders' competence and/or judgment (33% in the Checkpoint Story and 44% in the Shooting Story), or lack of such confidence (11% and 25%, respectively). This can be illustrated in the following remark revealing the deep confidence many soldiers have in officers' judgments and decisions:

> Because, the way I see it, a battalion commander, it's like, **it's super high-quality people**, who… **their considerations are almost always rational**. Definitely when it comes to security. They're careful about every little detail. And that's why I don't really see in this case how a battalion commander would tell him to do something inhumane, or if it's inhumane, then **there's something else behind it**. On the contrary, I will do it with more "rabak"[16]. (Participant 5A, emphasis added)

Yet another type of epistemological consideration was the relevance of the actor's vantage point, being the person on the ground, as opposed to a commander sitting in HQ (34% in the Checkpoint Story and 39% in the Shooting Story). For example, one participant referred to the high-ranking command as detached from the battlefield and its concerns, from their vantage point looking at plasma computer screens at HQ:

> Lots of times, when it comes to… I mean, when it gets to the very high echelons, **they have considerations that aren't necessarily the right ones** at the checkpoint, not necessarily the right ones on the ground. It comes from not knowing the field. From being in the "plasma-war", like during the second Lebanon war. (Participant 48D, emphasis added)

Such varied and nuanced considerations of the role of knowledge and information as bearing on the evaluation of acts of disobedience in the military were not evident in either conventional stories (11% in the Uniform Story and 2% in the Salute Story) or political ones (8% in the Settlement Story and 14% in the OPT Story). The complete set of epistemological justifications, and the frequencies with which they were evoked across the ten stories, is presented in Table **9**.

Table 9

Epistemological Justifications by Story

	Checkpoint	Shooting	Uniform	Salute	Settlement	OPT	Messenger	Farm	Lawyer	Doctor
Soldier information	.31	.56	.02	0	.05	.06	.12	.31	0	.02
Boss/ commander information	.47	.59	.02	0	0	.03	.19	.06	.02	.03

[16] Rabak is a slang word meaning doing something with gusto or commitment.

Competence	.33	.44	.03	0	.03	.03	.14	.03	0	0
No Competence	.11	.25	.06	.02	.02	.02	.05	.06	0	0
Perspective/ Vantage point	.34	.39	0	0	.02	.03	.11	.08	.02	0
Epistemological Evoked	0.77	0.88	0.11	0.02	0.08	0.14	0.39	0.42	0.02	0.05

Criterion judgments. Criterion judgments were hypothesized to reflect the social concepts being employed, such that moral situations were expected to be judged as non-contingent on rules, culturally-independent, and impersonal, whereas conventional situations were expected to be judged as contingent on rules, culturally-dependent, and personal. Again, responses were recoded into binary variables for the purposes of this analysis, such that rule contingency was coded as either contingent (positive responses) or noncontingent (negative and ambivalent responses), generalizability was coded as culture-independent (negative responses) or culture-dependent (positive and ambivalent responses), and impersonality was coded as either autonomous (positive responses) or limited autonomy (negative and ambivalent responses).

Generalized linear models with order and baseline as control factors, and domain as a predictive factor were generated for each of the three criterion judgments. Baseline and order were found to be non-significant predictors of any of the criterion judgments, and were therefore removed from the models.

Rule contingency. As hypothesized, domain was found to be a highly significant predictor of rule contingency in the military: LR $\chi^2 = 204.33$, $p < .001$. Both moral stories in the military were judged to be non-contingent on the command or even on military law, albeit to varying degrees. When asked whether shooting at an unarmed suspect could be okay without a command to do so, only 3.1% of participants said yes, and 51.7% of participants said that even if the IDF were to codify in military law that such a shooting was legal, it would still not be okay. As one participant succinctly put it: "… if there's a lookout procedure or there's no lookout procedure, you're not supposed to shoot people for no reason" (Participant 4D).

The Checkpoint Story revealed greater variability between participants, but nonetheless, only 28.1% said it would be okay for a soldier to detain a civilian in such a situation without a command (compared with 73.4% with a command), and 29.1% said that IDF laws could not legitimize this act (in contrast with 7.3% who said military law could legitimize it). One such participant reveals in his words the complex coordination of conventional and moral considerations in this conflict situation:

> It's problematic, because there are situations where the law shouldn't always matter. His personal judgment, that's what matters. So that's why Oren should act according to what he thinks. Like, it could be that the company commander is right… in this case, that's less likely, or less relevant, I think. In other complicated cases, the commander could be right. (Participant 27C)

As explained in the Methods Section, because so many participants endorsed obedience in this scenario, they were asked a variant of the question assessing contingency on military law.

Participants who initially said it was okay to follow the command to detain a civilian were asked whether military law could *delegitimize* this command. In other words, if the soldier knew that the order to detain the individual was illegal under IDF rules, would that make it an illegitimate order that must be disobeyed? 52.7% of participants responded that it wouldn't (in contrast with 3.6% who said that military law could delegitimize this act). Thus, it appears that the act of detaining was judged regardless of military law, and that other social factors were driving the evaluation of this act.

In contrast with the moral stories, both social-conventional violations were judged to be largely contingent on rules. 96.8% of participants said that if there was no rule about tucking your shirt in, it would be okay to wear your shirt untucked. And 98.4% of participants said that if there was no rule about saluting commanding officers, it would okay for the soldier not to do so if he did not want to. As one participant put it:

> Because... yes, because... Okay, when we go to a situation like this one, which is, how should I put it, boring. There's no.... no soldier keeps all the uniform regulations in the IDF, I mean, unless you're Raful's[17] son or something. Then **you don't do it because you believe in this value. You do it because it's the rule**. (Participant 29A, emphasis added)

It is worth noting that many participants stressed that it would *not* be ok not to have any rules regulating these behaviors, but that the *specific content* of the rules did not matter, for example:

> Um, yes, I mean, every army picks its customs and etiquette. If it's not saluting, then it's something else. But the army is a hierarchical system and it needs expressions for that. If it's not saluting... I mean saluting is something symbolic, it's not a value. (Participant 51C)

Table 10

Judgments of Rule Contingency by Story (Raw Frequencies and Percentages in Parentheses)

Is it ok or not ok for X to do this in the absence of a command/rule?			
	Okay	Not Okay	Ambivalent/Depends
Checkpoint Story (n=64)	18 (28.1%)	36 (56.2%)	10 (15.6%)
Shooting Story (n=64)	2 (3.1%)	57 (89.1%)	5 (7.8%)
Uniform Story (n=64)	61 (95.3%)	2 (3.1%)	1 (1.6%)
Salute Story (n=64)	63 (98.4%)	0	1 (1.6%)
Messenger Story (n=64)	27 (42.2%)	32 (50%)	5 (7.8%)
Farm Story	2 (3.1%)	62 (96.9%)	0

[17] Raful was a COS who was famous for being a stickler for uniform regulations.

(n=64)			
Lawyer Story (n=64)	58 (90.6%)	2 (3.1%)	4 (6.3%)
Doctor Story (n=64)	60 (93.8%)	2 (3.1%)	2 (3.1%)

What if there was a law that said it was ok to Y; would it then be ok for X to Y?

	Law can legitimize act	Law cannot legitimize act	Mixed/ Ambivalent	Law can delegitimize	Law cannot delegitimize
Checkpoint Story (n=55)	4 (7.3%)	16 (29.1%)	4 (7.3%)	2 (3.6%)	29 (52.7%)
Shooting Story (n= 58)	17 (29.3%)	30 (51.7%)	7 (12.1%)	1 (1.7%)	3 (5.2)

Generalizability. Domain was also found to be a highly significant predictor of generalizability: LR $\chi^2 = 81.05$, $p < .001$. Very few participants judged either conventional violation (uniform and saluting) to be categorically forbidden in a different army (6.7% and 1.7%, respectively), whereas a majority judged the prototypically moral violation (shooting an unarmed suspect) in that manner (63%). The general issue of obedience was regarded by many participants as culturally independent:

> Morally, I don't think it's something cultural, specific to Israel. I think all armies all over the world should have the exact same rules, that an illegal command is something you have to obey, and a command that is manifestly illegal, that justifies breaking everything, breaking the system, that you're not allowed to obey. (Participant 19B)

The checkpoint situation again revealed mixed responses. About half the sample (45.6%) judged it to be okay in another army, and a similar proportion (43.9%) judged it not to be okay in any army. It is unclear if this finding reflects mixed judgments regarding the generalizability of this act, or is simply a reflection of the fact that it was not uniformly considered morally wrong. Although many participants' judgments on this question revealed commands within the moral domain to be independent of cultural norms, several participants referred explicitly to the IDF as being held to a different moral standard in their view. The commonly expressed perception of the IDF as the "most moral army in the world[18]" was seen, for example in such statements: "I trust the IDF rules because it's the IDF. I don't trust any other army… definitely" (Participant 48D). But another, more critical attitude also emerged in some cases, as for example in the following quotation: "I am easier on other places than I am on us, because… well because people do the exact opposite" (Participant 21A).

[18] This phrase is commonly used in public discourse in Israel, was mentioned by a number of participants in this study, and was also used by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, when he was Minister of Defense in 2009 (quoted in Elizur, 2012).

Table 11

Judgments of Generalizability by Story (Raw Frequencies and Percentages in Parentheses)

What if it was in a different country that had a rule that said it was ok to XXX; could it be ok?			
	Okay	Not Okay	Mixed/Ambivalent
Checkpoint Story (n=57)	26 (45.6%)	25 (43.9%)	6 (10.5%)
Shooting Story (n=54)	8 (14.8%)	34 (63%)	12 (22.2%)
Uniform Story (n=60)	56 (93.3%)	4 (6.7%)	0
Salute Story (n=58)	57 (98.3%)	0	1 (1.7)
Messenger Story (n=58)	40 (69%)	13 (22.4%)	5 (8.6%)
Farm Story (n=60)	9 (15%)	43 (71.7%)	8 (13.3%)
Lawyer Story (n=59)	58 (98.3%)	1 (1.7%)	0
Doctor Story (n=56)	50 (89.3%)	4 (7.1%)	2 (3.6%)

Autonomy of judgment. Domain was also found to be a highly significant predictor of impersonality: LR $\chi^2 = 33.54$, $p < .001$. The direction of this significant difference, however, was in the opposite direction than that hypothesized. Rather than judging moral issues as impersonal and conventional issues as personal, participants indicated that there was a relatively broader range of autonomy in moral decision making for the soldier, compared with conventional decisions. Participants claimed that the decision whether or not to obey commands in the moral domain was up to the soldier (37.1% in the checkpoint scenario, and 67.2% in the shooting scenario). One participant described the importance of such autonomy of judgment by referring to something he heard from his commander in basic training:

> Yes, he must exercise his judgment, always. There's a saying by one of the former COSs that every soldier should see himself as a potential COS. What if in war the entire chain of command gets killed and he stays alone, he has to have a "big head[19]" and know what's happening and why the company commander thinks this man should be detained. (Participant 13A)

In the conventional stories, however, soldiers' autonomy was considerably more restricted according to the participants in this sample. Only 17.5% said it was up to the soldier to decide how to wear his uniform, and only 18.3% said it was up to him to decide whom to salute.

[19] Having a "big head" is slang that means taking initiative and responsibility beyond one's immediate sphere (called having a "small head").

Thus, it appears that many participants interpreted the impersonality question as referring to the degree of autonomous decision making, rather than to personal preference. A small number of participants referred to the impersonality of moral decisions, as is illustrated in the following quotations:

> And let me clarify that, the cases when you're not allowed [to make the decision] are either when there's some moral decision where **there's no leeway, no freedom of action, because, you're like, morally obligated to do something**, or the second example is when there's some principle or another value that's imposed, that's preventing you that freedom, like for example the value of obeying military commands. (Participant 43C, emphasis added)

> *Is it up to him to decide?*
> No. And I think that business of a manifestly illegal command, **that's also not personal judgment**. It's not… even if he thinks it completely okay not to let someone through despite the fact that he could die, it's still something he has to refuse to do because it's… **it seems to me like something more objective**. (Participant 19B)

Table 12

Judgments of Autonomy of Decision by Story (Raw Frequencies and Percentages in Parentheses)

	Is it up to X to decide whether to Y in this situation?		
	Yes	No	Mixed/Ambivalent
Checkpoint Story (n=62)	23 (37.1%)	19 (30.6%)	20 (32.3%)
Shooting Story (n=64)	43 (67.2%)	7 (10.9%)	14 (21.9%)
Uniform Story (n=63)	11 (17.5%)	45 (71.4%)	7 (11.1%)
Salute Story (n=60)	11 (18.3%)	42 (70%)	7 (11.7%)
Settlement Story (n=58)	37 (63.8%)	17 (29.3%)	4 (6.9%)
OPT Story (n=57)	25 (43.9%)	29 (50.9%)	3 (5.3%)
Messenger Story (n=63)	53 (84.1%)	4 (6.3%)	6 (9.5%)
Farm Story (n=62)	53 (85.5%)	6 (9.7%)	3 (4.8%)
Lawyer Story (n=58)	18 (31%)	20 (34.5%)	20 (34.5%)
Doctor Story (n=59)	23 (39%)	27 (45.8%)	9 (15.3%)

To sum, findings from the analysis of evaluations, justifications, and criterion judgments suggest that soldiers do not regard all acts of disobedience in the military uniformly, and exhibit flexibility in reasoning about infractions of rules and refusal to obey certain commands, depending on the nature of the act. Despite the unexpected results in the Checkpoint Story, *domain* was found to be a significant predictor of positive *evaluations* of disobedience in a military context, such that moral disobedience was more positively judged than violations of conventional rules, and politically-based refusal, which were similar in this measure. It also significantly predicted the use of moral, conventional, personal, and epistemological justifications, whereas pragmatic justifications did not differ by domain. In moral situations, participants justified their evaluations using predominantly moral, pragmatic, and epistemological considerations, whereas in conventional situations, they employed conventional, personal, and pragmatic justifications. Three criterion judgments, rule contingency, generalizability, and impersonality, also significantly distinguished moral from conventional situations of disobedience in the military. Moral acts were *less* contingent on rules, commands, or military law, *less* culture-specific, and were allowed *greater* autonomous judgment than conventional practices. Thus, the well-established distinction in social reasoning between the moral and conventional domains was replicated in a military context.

Research Question 2

Are acts of *political* refusal conceptualized using moral or social-conventional concepts, or some combination/coordination of the two domains? This question was addressed by examining participants' responses to the mixed-political stories compared with prototypically moral stories on the one hand, and prototypically conventional stories on the other.

Evaluations. Recall that domain was found to be a significant predictor of evaluations of disobedience in the military (see Research Question 1). Pair-wise comparisons revealed that evaluations of disobedience in the mixed-political stories were significantly different from those in the moral stories (mean difference = 0.17, $p < .01$), but not different from such evaluations in the conventional stories (mean difference = 0.01, n.s.). However, the two political stories were not evaluated equally, and will therefore be discussed separately.

Refusal to participate in evacuation of settlements was more positively evaluated than refusal to participate in an operation in the OPT (34.9% and 19%, respectively). Put in the context of other forms of disobedience, refusing to participate in military action in the OPT was judged as negatively as refusing to detain a civilian in a checkpoint, and more negatively than violating conventional regulations, whereas refusal to evacuate Israeli citizens from settlements was judged less negatively than conventional regulations, but more negatively than refusing to shoot an unarmed suspect.

Justifications. Domain was found to be a significant predictor of moral, conventional, and epistemological justifications. Pair-wise comparisons of the domain difference in moral justifications revealed that political situations differed significantly both from moral situations (mean difference = 0.51, $p < .001$), and from conventional ones (mean difference = 0.44, $p < .001$). Moral justifications were more prevalent in reasoning about politically-driven refusal (45% in the Settlement Story and 53% in the OPT Story) than about conventional transgressions, but less prevalent than about moral disobedience. When evaluating Right wing refusal,

participants evoked some moral considerations such as the wrongness of the evacuation (19%), and harm to the evacuees (21%), and when evaluating Left wing refusal, arguments of national security (40%) were more common. For example, one participant explained how the command to evacuate settlements was wrong in his view:

> Because it's taking people out of their homes, first off. Second, it's about ideology, like I wouldn't do it. What is this? Especially when they're taking Jewish people out and you know that Arabs are going to move in, like happened in Gaza, when they made the wall. They took the Jews out and since then terror attacks, terror attacks, Cast Lead, a mess. That just proves the evacuation was completely dumb. (Participant 47A)

Another participant justified obeying the command to serve in the OPT on security grounds, and despite the fact he did not agree with the politics behind the motivation to refuse this command, was able to relate to it through an example of a friend of his:

> I have a friend who is exactly like that. Exactly the situation you described, one-to-one, and he did it.
> *He refused?*
> No, he didn't refuse. He obeyed. We talked about it, and he said that, for example, he goes to the demonstrations in Sheikh Jarrah every Friday[20] and everything, and he says that it's clear to him that as much as there is an occupation and this and that… At the end there are terrorists and you have to catch them and stop them, and it's a situation that's not black-and-white. He thinks the big picture is wrong, but there still needs to be someone who stops these terrorists… So I think it's not illegal and not immoral that he obeyed the command. That's what I think. (Participant 42B)

Pair-wise comparisons of the use of conventional justifications revealed a significant difference between political refusals and moral ones (mean difference = 0.27, $p < .001$), but not between political refusals and conventional ones (mean difference = 0.01, n.s.). In both the Settlement Story and the OPT Story, the vast majority of conventional reasons referred to social functioning (76% and 62%, respectively). Many participants explicitly referenced the democratic process by which decisions were made both to evacuate settlements and to continue operating in the OPT:

> It's okay that he participates, but there is... He should see that he's doing it because he understands.... why he's doing it. Not because he got a command. He's doing something that is against his conscience because he understand that **a collective decision was made** that hurts some of the people, and that's why he should do it. (Participant 10C, emphasis added)

> Because by doing it I get the legitimacy to say whatever gets decided democratically, when it plays in my favor, everyone will do it, and when it doesn't play in my favor then I will also have to do it. (Participant 6B)

[20] Solidarity Sheikh Jarrah is a protest movement, which grew from weekly protests in East Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. See http://www.en.justjlm.org/.

Pair-wise comparisons of personal justifications suggested that the pattern of justifications in political situations was not significantly different than either conventional (mean difference = 0.07, n.s.) or moral situations (mean difference = 0.06, n.s.). Interestingly, this measure revealed considerable variability between the two political stories. Whereas in the Settlement Story, personal justifications were very infrequent (8%), but a few participants evoked the potential harm to a sense of self or to the psychological welfare of the soldier if he participated in something he disagrees so strongly with. One participant was especially eloquent in describing the personal level of this kind of conflict in the evacuation story:

> I think there is, even as a soldier, you're still a person. I mean, it's true that you give up certain things, it's true… But the core, the base, the nucleus, is that you're still a person. Now you're a person who's a soldier. There are lots of implications to that, on your personhood that's inside you, I don't know how to say it, there are implications, but up to a certain limit**. I think there's a core of conscience in that situation, that can't be bended to that. There's a limit how subordinate you are as a soldier and how much of a person you are as a person**. (Participant 20D, emphasis added)

In the OPT Story, such considerations also came up, but a more frequent (29%) personal argument against refusing referred to the protagonist's personal choice to become a combat soldier (or leave his combat unit), and by implication, his obligation to participate in such combat activity. As one participant said:

> Because a person who **chooses to be a combat soldier** knows it's part of it, because that's what the army does. If you don't like it, then from the get-go don't enlist to a combat unit and you won't have to deal with this kind of thing. (Participant 47C, emphasis added)

Although there was no main effect for domain in predicting the use of pragmatic justifications, it is worth noting that the *effectiveness* argument that came up in the Checkpoint Story, also came up quite frequently in the OPT Story (21%). In particular, some of the participants who do not support the occupation of Palestinian territories, argued against refusal to serve in the OPT on the grounds that serving is a more *effective* response to enable social change and resistance to some of what they consider to be immoral practices of the IDF in the OPT. For example, one participant said:

> I don't think he'll change the political situation if he refuses the command. He'd just be leaving the army in the hands of people who are much more extreme than him, and I think that if he has any kind of influence in that time of his life, then he actually should go serve in the territories. (26B)

Lastly, pair-wise comparisons of the domain differences in epistemological considerations revealed significant differences between political situations and moral ones (mean difference = 0.71, $p < .001$), but not conventional ones (mean difference = 0.05, n.s.). This is because, much like in the conventional scenarios, epistemological concerns were very infrequent (8% in the Settlement Story and 14% in the OPT Story).

Criterion judgments. The only criterion judgment question that was comparable across all three domains in the military was the impersonality question. Interestingly, whereas evaluations, as well as conventional and epistemological justifications, suggested that political stories were similar to conventional ones and different from moral ones, judgments of impersonality revealed the opposite pattern. Pair-wise comparisons of the domain effect in judgments of impersonality revealed that such judgments in the mixed-political stories were significantly more positive than those in the conventional stories (mean difference = 0.36, $p < .001$), but similar to such evaluations in the moral stories (mean difference = 0.02, n.s.). Again, the two political stories revealed differences between them. Whereas many participants (63.8%) indicated that the decision whether or not to participate in evacuation of settlements was a personal one, up to the soldier to decide, considerably fewer (43.9%) granted a similar level of autonomy in the decision to serve in the OPT.

In sum, when comparing reasoning about politically-driven disobedience to moral disobedience on the one hand, and conventional violations on the other, many of the measures indicated similarities between such political resistance and conventional violations. This was evident in relatively high rates of regarding such refusal as illegitimate (evaluations), and in the types of justifications brought to bear on this issue (conventional, personal, pragmatic, and epistemological reasons). However, some indications of moral concepts being involved in the reasoning about political refusal were also evident, most notably the use of some moral justifications and judgments of impersonality that paralleled those in the two military-moral situations in this study.

Research Question 3

Are judgments about resistance to authority different in a *military* context than they are in a *civilian* one? This question was addressed by comparing participants' responses to the matched military and non-military (i.e., workplace) vignettes. For the purposes of maintaining symmetry in this analysis, mixed-political stories were dropped from the analyses.

Evaluations. Recall that an interaction was hypothesized between domain and institutional context, such that within the *conventional* domain, evaluations of noncompliance were expected to be more negative in military than in civilian situations, and within the *moral* domain, fewer differences were hypothesized. These hypotheses were partially confirmed. A generalized linear model with order and baseline as control factors, and domain and context as predictive factors was generated to predict positive evaluations of disobedience.

Baseline was not a significant predictor of evaluations of disobedience across both contexts: LR $\chi^2 = 0.35$, n.s., but significantly interacted with domain: LR $\chi^2 = 8.13$, $p = .004$. In the moral situations, framing the stories in terms of disobedience led to more positive evaluations of disobedience (65.6%) as opposed to framing them in terms of obedience (56.3%), whereas in the conventional situations, the effect was reversed (23% for a disobedience frame and 36% for an obedience frame). Order was found to be a significant predictor of evaluations of disobedience (LR $\chi^2 = 8.25$, $p = .004$), such that disobedience was more positively judged when participants began with military vignettes (50.6%) than when they began with civilian ones (40.2%). Order also interacted significantly with both domain: LR $\chi^2 = 5.51$, $p = .019$ and context: LR $\chi^2 = 5.50$, $p = .019$. Closer examination of these interaction effects reveals that the described order effect was rather pronounced in conventional stories (40% vs. 19%), but

nonexistent in moral ones (60.9% vs. 60.9%), and also that it was more pronounced in civilian stories (68% vs. 47.6%) than in military ones (33.6% vs. 32.8%). Thus, it appears the order effect is being driven by an anomaly in a small subset of the stories (conventional-civilian stories). Note that this is the same pattern that was found for mixed-political situations when only the military stories were considered.

As expected, context was a significant predictor of evaluations of disobedience, such that disobedience was overall more positively evaluated in the civilian workplace than in the military (LR $\chi^2 = 28.88$, $p = .000$), and this difference was moderated by the type of directive that was disobeyed (LR $\chi^2 = 12.02$, $p = .001$). Contrary to the hypothesis, however, context differences were found in the moral domain (LR $\chi^2 = 42.47$, $p = .000$), and not in the conventional domain (LR $\chi^2 = 2.53$, n.s.). Conventional infractions were evaluated slightly more positively in the civilian workplace (34.1%) than in the military (25%), but this difference was not significant. However, unexpected variability emerged in the moral situations between evaluations of disobedience in the military compared with the civilian workplace. Violating morally-questionable directives in the civilian workplace was regarded as considerably more legitimate (80.5%) than refusing comparable commands in the military (41.4%). As hypothesized, the domain distinction held in both contexts, and domain was found to be a significant predictor (LR $\chi^2 = 56.31$, $p = .000$). Across institutional contexts, disobedience was more positively evaluated in moral situations (60.9%) than in conventional ones (29.5%).

Justifications. Justifications of these evaluations were hypothesized to be domain-concordant across both institutional contexts. Generalized linear models, with order and baseline as control factors, and domain and context as predictive factors were generated to predict moral, conventional, personal, pragmatic, and epistemological justifications of disobedience. Neither baseline nor order were found to be significant predictors for *moral* or *conventional* justifications, and these factors were dropped from their respective models. However, order was found to be a significant predictor for *pragmatic* justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 10.51$, $p = .001$). Participants were more likely (47.3%) to evoke pragmatic justifications when they began with the military-based stories first, as opposed to those participants who began with civilian-based stories (33.2%). It appears that beginning the interview with discussions about military violations of rules and commands heightened participants' consideration of pragmatic considerations, such as the negative consequences of refusal. Order and context interacted significantly in predicting *epistemological* justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 10.04$, $p = .002$). This order effect was in the opposite direction than that described for pragmatic justifications (28.9% when starting with the civilian stories, and 14.8%, when starting with the military ones) in the civilian context (LR $\chi^2 = 7.51$, $p = .006$), but not in the military (LR $\chi^2 = 1.28$, n.s.). Baseline was found to significantly interact with domain in predicting *personal* justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 10.59$, $p = .001$). Participants were more likely to evoke personal justifications for evaluations of moral disobedience when stories were presented with a disobedience frame (30.5%) than when they were presented with an obedience frame (14.1%): LR $\chi^2 = 10.14$, $p = .001$. In justifying their evaluations of conventional disobedience, no significant differences emerged in the frequency of personal justifications: LR $\chi^2 = 1.33$, n.s.

Moral justifications. Both domain and context were found to be significant predictors of moral justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 459.90$, $p = .000$, and LR $\chi^2 = 4.37$, $p = .036$, respectively). Moral justifications were extremely prevalent in all four moral stories (84% in Messenger Story and

100% in the other three stories). Participants coordinated considerations of reciprocity, justice, and harm to the other person, as illustrated in the following example:

> The messenger did something wrong, so report him to his employer, don't pay them for the service, stop all interactions with that company. There are lots of commercial means. You don't have **to hurt anybody on a personal level**. The only justification to follow this order is that ultimately bosses are more powerful than the workers in the office and a person shouldn't always have to risk his job for every single thing. (Participant 25A, emphasis added)

Such moral considerations were hardly evoked in conventional stories, with one exception (2% Uniform Story, 9% Salute Story, 5% Lawyer Story, but 30% in Doctor Story). It appears that refusing to call a doctor by his title was perceived to harm the doctor's feelings, reputation, or finances, as of all the moral justifications, *harm* was the most common (27%). For example, one participant explicitly said that the potential harm to the doctor was the only problem with not using his title at the clinic:

> Because here, it's possible that clients who come see something…. It could hurt that person and his livelihood. That's it. That's the only reason I see. (Participant 24D)

In most conventional situations, participants either did not mention moral considerations at all, or explicitly negated their relevance, as can be seen in the following quotation:

> In every job, there's always somebody who breaks the rules a bit. The question is, the rules you're breaking, what does it hurt? If it hurts others or not. I don't see any reason in the world that him dressing that way would bother anyone. (Participant 15C)

Participants were somewhat more likely to evoke moral justifications in the civilian context (54.7%) than in the military context (52.7%). Context and domain significantly interacted: $\chi^2 = 22.70$, $p = .000$. This interaction is likely due to the anomalous finding of moral justifications in the Doctor Story.

***Conventional justifications*.** Both domain and context were found to be significant predictors of the use of conventional justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 82.54$, $p = .000$, and LR $\chi^2 = 23.19$, $p = .000$, respectively). Conventional justifications were frequently evoked in conventional stories regardless of context (92% in the Uniform Story, 45% in the Salute Story, 75% in the Lawyer Story, and 50% in the Doctor Story). Participants acknowledged the importance of social conventions even when they are in conflict with personal comfort, preference, or cause an inconvenience. One participant explained it by comparing dress codes in the workplace to academic writing conventions:

> It's not okay. It would really piss me off that people just slack off like that. You know the rules, and if you don't feel… What can you do, that's life… It's like when I write a paper in school and I write the bibliography. As annoying as it is to put in all those commas and periods, that's the standard. What can you do? (Participant 64D)

As hypothesized, such conventional considerations were hardly evoked in the prototypically moral story of shooting a suspect in a civilian context (6% Farm Story), but surprisingly, they were evoked (albeit to varying degrees) in the other three moral stories (64% in the Checkpoint Story, 22% in the Shooting Story, and 19% in the Messenger Story). It appears that the act of detaining was construed as mixed to some extent in both institutional contexts, and conventional considerations were brought to bear on this conflict and coordinated with other considerations. Overall, conventional justifications were much more frequently evoked in the military context (55.9%) than in the civilian one (37.5%). It appears that the military context added a layer of conventional considerations above and beyond the nature of the act. This interpretation also gains support from the finding of a significant interaction between domain and context: LR χ^2 = 11.56, p = .001. In other words, the domain difference was significant for use of conventional justifications across both contexts, but this effect was considerably greater in the civilian context (LR χ^2 = 72.91, p = .000), than it was in the military (LR χ^2 = 17.46, p = .000).

***Personal justifications*.** Both domain and context were significant predictors of the use of personal justifications when evaluating disobedience of authority (LR χ^2 = 19.96, p = .000, and LR χ^2 = 34.07, p = .000, respectively), but did not significantly interact (LR χ^2 = 0.02, n.s.). Personal justifications were more common in conventional situations (39.5%) than in moral ones (22.3%). In fact, in some cases, personal considerations such as autonomy and personal freedom were used to override conventional considerations such as rules, hierarchy, and social norms, as illustrated in the following quotation:

> Yes, and let me emphasize this, because **his personal freedom** to call people 'Dr.' or by their first name is higher than… it **has a superior moral standing over the company's right to dictate that for him**. (Participant 43C, emphasis added)

Above and beyond domains, moreover, personal justifications were much more common in a civilian context (42.6%) than in a military one (19.1%). This is because in the military context, personal justifications were elicited predominantly by the Uniform story (39%), but less so in other stories (Checkpoint Story – 5%, Shooting Story – 20%, and Salute Story – 13%), whereas in the civilian context, they were brought to bear on all issues, albeit to varying degrees (Messenger Story – 19%, Farm Story – 45%, Lawyer Story – 75%, and Doctor Story – 31%). Dress is a prototypically personal issue and it is not surprising that the two stories related to regulating dress (Uniform Story and Lawyer Story) elicited many personal justifications. The more surprising finding was that personal considerations were also brought to bear on the Farm Story, and to a lesser extent, on the Shooting Story (see Research Question 1). Closer examination of the specific justifications used by participants reveals that 42% of participants mentioned the employee's (and 19% of the soldier's) personal responsibility and culpability in this scenario. There were similar arguments in the civilian context:

> Let him say whatever he wants! What, I'm going to murder this person because my boss said so? Who'll go to prison? Me or the boss? (Participant 47C)

and in the military context:

> The question isn't what commanders say. Commanders say wonderful things, but at the end, the problem is a moral one, and what you consider is…. **The one who has to live with it is you and nobody else**, and so there's no room here for… the fact the commander said so doesn't excuse you of anything. (Participant 14C, emphasis added)

Thus, the personal domain was evoked in this prototypically moral issue because it was considered to be within the protagonist's sphere of autonomy and moral agency. In the Messenger Story, a different personal argument was more common. Like in the scenarios of political refusal described above, some participants (17%) evoked the protagonist's willing acceptance of his job, and personal freedom to enter into this hierarchical relationship or leave it:

> You came to work somewhere, you knew there are rules, you accepted those rules when you took the job. They're not violating any of your rights. You committed to this before you came, so it's not okay [to violate]. (Participant 20D)

***Pragmatic justifications*.** No context effect was found for the distribution of pragmatic justifications: LR $\chi^2 = 1.53$, n.s. Domain, however, was a significant predictor of pragmatic justifications: LR $\chi^2 = 4.42$, $p = .036$. Recall that no domain effect was observed in pragmatic justifications when only the military scenarios were examined, and the addition of the civilian stories appears to be driving this effect (although the context-domain interaction was non-significant: LR $\chi^2 = 2.08$, n.s.). Pragmatic justifications were significantly more common in the conventional situations (44.9%) than in the moral ones (35.5%). Notably, both the Shooting Story and the Farm Story, the two stories that revealed a pattern consistent with prototypically moral reasoning, elicited the fewest pragmatic justifications (22% and 16%, respectively). Interestingly, although pragmatic arguments were frequently brought up in the conventional situations, they did not necessarily drive the ultimate judgments. Many participants (33.2%) explicitly subordinated pragmatic considerations such as the negative consequences of disobedience, suggesting that the protagonist could decide to take the risk that he might "get away with it" or simply accept the punishment:

> I think they would send him to jail, but I think he would go wholeheartedly. It makes a difference, if you go to jail wholeheartedly or not. (Participant 15C)

Epistemological Considerations. Both context and domain were significant predictors of epistemological justifications (LR $\chi^2 = 208.80$, $p = .000$ and LR $\chi^2 = 13.76$, $p = .000$, respectively), but did not significantly interact (LR $\chi^2 = 2.72$, n.s.). Epistemological considerations were much more common in response to the moral situations (61.3%) than the conventional ones (4.7%). As in the military, concerns with information, access to it, and who may have it bore on the moral judgment of whether obedience was justified or not:

> Why is it not okay? Because, again, it's a very amorphous situation, **you don't really know what's going on**. Again, there's not much difference between you and the boss, because **the boss doesn't have any more information than you do**. I mean, he's in exactly the same situation. In this situation they're equal, he doesn't have more knowledge. He doesn't. (Participant 20D, emphasis added)

Nonetheless, above and beyond domains, epistemological considerations were more common in the military (44.1%) than in the civilian context (21.9%), suggesting that these types of concerns are particularly relevant in a military context where information flow is more controlled, and the assumption that commanding officers are privy to knowledge or facts inaccessible to soldiers is widespread.

Criterion judgments. As expected according to SDT, Criterion judgments were found to be less sensitive to institutional context, and fewer differences were found between the civilian workplace and the military in these measures. Rule contingency, generalizability, and autonomy of judgment were predicted using generalized linear models with order and baseline as control factors, and domain and context as predictive factors. Baseline was not a significant predictor of any of the three criterion judgments, and order was not a significant predictor of either rule contingency or generalizability, so these terms were dropped from their respective models. However, order was found to be a significant predictor of judgments of impersonality (LR χ^2 = 8.11, p = .004). Participants who began with military-based stories were more likely to allow autonomy of judgment to participants across all eight stories (53.1%) than those who began with civilian-based stories (42.7%). It appears that beginning the discussion in with the military actually heightened participants' emphasis on autonomy of judgment.

***Rule contingency*.** Domain was a significant predictor of rule contingency judgments (LR χ^2 = 344.6, p = .000), whereas context was not (LR χ^2 = 0.57, n.s). There was, however an interaction effect between the two predictors (LR χ^2 = 4.69, p = .03). This was because the domain difference in rule contingency judgments was somewhat more pronounced in the military context than in the civilian one, albeit highly significant in both contexts. In the military context, acts in the moral domain were very rarely judged as contingent on rules (15.6%), and conventional practices were judged as highly contingent on rules (96.9%). The same pattern, although slightly more moderate, emerged in the civilian context (moral rule contingency was 22.7%, and conventional rule contingency was 92.2%).

***Generalizability*.** Domain was a significant predictor of generalizability judgments (LR χ^2 = 144.06, p = .000), whereas context was not (LR χ^2 = 0.002, n.s), nor was the interaction between the two predictors (LR χ^2 = 0.44, n.s). As discussed above (Research Question 1), conventional practices, such as dress and titles or saluting, were seldom judged to be culture-independent or generalizable (3.9%), and it was generally acceptable for these rules or norms to be different in another country. More specifically, only 6.7% of participants said it was wrong to wear one's shirt untucked in another army, none (0%) said it was wrong not to salute a Lt. Col., 1.7% said it was wrong for a lawyer not to wear a tie, and 7.1% said it was not okay to call a doctor by his first name. The culture-dependence of conventions of dress, for example, was also tied to the importance of adhering to them and to negative evaluations of flouting them:

> I think it's nice [to wear a tie to work], and it also relates to the next question you're going to ask about other cultures and countries. Dress codes at wedding, where in the U.S. is a tuxedo and here it's jeans and a button-down shirt. So, if I go in jeans and a shirt to a wedding in the U.S., that's not okay. And also here with a tuxedo it's probably not okay. (Participant 19B)

Acts in the moral domain, such as shooting a suspect, were evaluated as generalizable, and therefore not okay in any country (63% in the military Shooting Story, and 71.7% in the civilian Farm Story). Several participants were quite adamant about the generalizability of not shooting, in the Farm Story especially:

> **There is no planet where it would be okay**. I can't see how it could be okay. It's just messed up. Even if it is a burglar, he's just a burglar, he's not a murderer. (Participant 50B, emphasis added)

The act of detaining a person for rudeness exhibited mixed results, as 43.9% of participants said that it was categorically and universally wrong in the military and only 22.4% made a similar judgment in the civilian context. As noted above (see Research Question 1), it is unclear if this finding reflects less generalizability of the act of detaining, or mixed judgments of its wrongness. The following quotation suggests the latter interpretation might be the case:

> Not everything if the norm is different would actually be okay to do. I mean, if, for example, in Germany the norm was to kill Jews, that doesn't mean it's okay. In this specific case, I can see the logic in the norm, it makes sense. (Participant 55C, Messenger Story)

***Impersonality*.** Autonomy of judgment was the only criterion judgment that revealed any context differences. Both domain and context were highly significant predictors of judgments of impersonality (LR $\chi^2 = 98.59$, $p = .000$ and LR $\chi^2 = 37.40$, $p = .000$, respectively), but did not significantly interact (LR $\chi^2 = 2.95$, n.s.). As found when only the military context was examined, participants were more likely to endorse autonomy of judgment in moral situations (68.5%) than in conventional ones (26.3%) across both institutional contexts. And across domains, participants were more likely to allow autonomy of judgment in civilian situations (60.7%) than in military ones (35.3%). Several participants referred to the limited autonomy of low-ranking soldiers in making operational decisions. For example, one participant summarized it aptly:

> Because in the army you don't make the decision even if you want to. How do they say, your opinion is important but doesn't determine anything.
> *Is that from your experience as a soldier?*
> Yes. Think all you want, do as you're told. (Participant 47C)

It is worth noting, as can be seen in the above example, that soldiers were not necessarily seen as lacking autonomy, but rather, their autonomy and personal choice were subordinated to other, often conventional, considerations such as hierarchy, rules, and the authority system. This type of coordination is seen in the following example:

> That's the rules and you have to go by the rules, because in this case, there's no justification. The fact you don't like it doesn't justify breaking the rules. In this case, they're more important. The very fact of keeping the rules and maintaining military hierarchy is more important in this case than that soldier's personal preferences. (Participant 19B)

In contrast to such portrayals of limited autonomy in the military, the scenarios in a civilian context evoked a subordination of conventional considerations to the employee's realm of agency and autonomous decision making, for example:

> Because Gadi [the protagonist] can't be **a pawn** in this confrontation between the boss and the messenger. It's not his place. If the boss wants to do something to the messenger, he should do it with his own means, **not use the people under him**. (Participant 48D, emphasis added)

In considering differences in social reasoning between the military and civilian contexts, it is worth noting participants' explicit references to the comparison between the two contexts. The vast majority of participants (61 of 64) explicitly referred to the military-civilian comparison in at least one of the stories. These spontaneous comments reflected varied reasoning and led to different, and at times conflicting, conclusions regarding which context requires stricter adherence to the authority of rules, regulations, or directives from superiors. Not surprisingly, some participants expressed the stereotypical perception of the military as stricter and more focused on hierarchy and obedience, for example:

> Look, a citizen, he's allowed to do everything that's not prohibited. A soldier, he has to only do what is allowed. That's why there's no in-between. (Participant 23B)

When some of these comments were further probed, many participants evoked the importance of obedience in the military as fundamentally stemming from its *operational purpose* and the potential risk to human lives, in contrast with a civilian business that is merely about monetary profits, for example:

> Because in the army, the meaning of refusing a command can ultimately mean refusing a command in enemy territory or in the middle of combat activity that could lead to hurting someone's life. And at work, that kind of damage will, in the end, only cause some kind of financial loss or personal harm, something you can stomach. (Participant 53A)

Another major difference that appeared in participants' comments is the *total and insular nature* of the military, as opposed to the civilian workplace. This more limited nature of the workplace role as opposed to the full-time nature of the soldier role was sometimes used to argue that obedience is in fact less obligatory in the military, as can be seen in the following quotation:

> If part of the image of this office is wearing a tie and stuff, he should wear one. There's a difference from the soldier as far as I'm concerned. The difference is that a soldier is 24/7. You don't come, do your job, and go. Work, you do it for a few hours and then go home. Go wear whatever you want on the weekends. It's different. (68B, Lawyer Story)

Another type of difference between the two institutional contexts focused on the *voluntary and reciprocal nature* of the boss-employee relationship or social contract. This difference sometimes led to the conclusion that obedience in the military is more obligatory than in the civilian workplace:

> Because the boss's authority is **consensual authority**. It's like, I choose to work for you, you choose to hire me, I don't owe you anything beyond that. So, like, what does he gain? He sees that he's about to kill or wound someone that he doesn't even know if… He's not posing any risk to him, he's not armed. **There's no superior value of obedience**. Worst case, he'll fire me. I'd rather he fire me than now have on me this killing of a person. (Participant 34B, emphasis added)

At other times, this same difference was evoked to support the opposite conclusion:

> Because **he agreed to something** and he's not fulfilling that something, so in a way, he's a liar. He can wear a tie and then go to the union and try to change it. And if it doesn't change, he can get another job, or maybe he won and it will change. The point is, he's got tools, he's not helpless in dealing with something, like in many cases in the army when you're dealing with something and, there's nothing you can do so you use your own judgment, because nobody asks you, and **your back is against the wall**. (Participant 33A)

Notably, not all spontaneous references to the military-civilian comparison emphasized differences between the two contexts. Some participants commented on the similarity between the two in certain moral and even conventional situations:

> Yes, yes. I mean… Even in, even in civilian life you can get… you can find yourself in situations that aren't legal, that are harmful, so I think **in the same way**, unless you're being asked to do something that is morally wrong or is in serious conflict with your values and has severe consequences, then you should obey. (Participant 29A, Messenger Story, emphasis added)

> Like, what's the difference between that and…I think **it's not all that different** from a school uniform. (Participant 67B, Uniform Story, emphasis added)

To sum, both differences and similarities emerged when comparing reasoning about resistance to authority in the military and in the civilian workplace. Broadly, participants were more accepting of disobedience, and particularly moral disobedience, in the civilian workplace than in the military. Nonetheless, in both institutional contexts, domain differences in reasoning were apparent across all three types of measures, namely, evaluations, justifications categories, and criterion judgments. Notably, two criterion judgments (generalizability and rule contingency) and one justification category (pragmatic considerations) were insensitive to institutional context. However, moral and personal justifications were more common, and judgments regarding autonomy of judgment were more positive, in the civilian stories compared with military ones. Conventional and epistemological justifications, in contrast, were more common in the military stories compared with civilian ones. Significant interactions between domain and context suggest that on some measures, the domain distinction was more clear-cut in the military (i.e., judgments of rule contingency), and on others, it was more clear-cut in the civilian context (i.e., conventional justifications).

Research Question 4

Are judgments of *resistance* in the military the mirror-image of judgments of *compliance*; and is this the case across types of resistance (moral, conventional, and political)? This question was addressed using the Cramer's V correlation coefficient on the original three-level coding of evaluations of obedience and disobedience to test the direction and strength of the association between these two sets of judgments. Recall that my hypothesis was that in moral situations, more categorical reasoning will lead to a clearer inverse relationship between judgments about following and resisting directives in the moral domain (i.e., a stronger negative correlation), whereas in conventional and mixed situations, this relationship would not necessarily hold, or be weaker (i.e., a more moderate negative correlation). This hypothesis was confirmed. Table 13 presents the cross-tabulation of evaluations of obedience and disobedience by story.

Table 13

Cross-tabulation of Evaluations of Obedience and Disobedience by Story (Raw Frequencies and Percentages in Parentheses)

			Obedience		
			Okay	Ambivalent	Not Okay
Checkpoint Story (n=64)	Disobedience	Okay	3 (4.7%)	2 (3.1%)	6 (9.4%)
		Ambivalent	2 (3.1%)	1 (1.6%)	1 (1.6%)
		Not Okay	42 (65.6%)	4 (6.3%)	3 (4.7%)
Shooting Story (n=64)	Disobedience	Okay	5 (7.8%)	1 (1.6%)	36 (56.3%)
		Ambivalent	1 (1.6%)	9 (14.1%)	3 (4.7%)
		Not Okay	6 (9.4%)	2 (3.1%)	1 (1.6%)
Uniform Story (n=64)	Disobedience	Okay	15 (23.4%)	1 (1.6%)	0
		Ambivalent	11 (17.2%)	2 (3.1%)	0
		Not Okay	35 (54.7%)	0	0
Salute Story (n=64)	Disobedience	Okay	15 (23.4%)	0	1 (1.6%)
		Ambivalent	8 (12.5%)	0	1 (1.6%)
		Not Okay	39 (60.9%)	0	0
Settlement Story (n=63)	Disobedience	Okay	11 (17.5%)	6 (9.5%)	5 (7.9%)
		Ambivalent	8 (12.7%)	2 (3.2%)	1 (1.6%)
		Not Okay	29 (46%)	1 (1.6%)	0
OPT Story (n=63)	Disobedience	Okay	7 (11.1%)	4 (6.3%)	1 (1.6%)
		Ambivalent	1 (1.6%)	3 (4.8%)	0
		Not Okay	46 (73%)	0	1 (1.6%)
Messenger Story (n=64)	Disobedience	Okay	19 (29.7%)	6 (9.4%)	15 (23.4%)
		Ambivalent	4 (6.3%)	2 (3.1%)	1 (1.6%)
		Not Okay	13 (20.3%)	1 (1.6%)	3 (4.7%)
Farm Story (n=64)	Disobedience	Okay	1 (1.6%)	1 (1.6%)	61 (95.3%)
		Ambivalent	0	0	0
		Not Okay	0	0	1 (1.6%)
Lawyer Story (n=63)	Disobedience	Okay	21 (33.9%)	0	0
		Ambivalent	10 (16.1%)	1 (1.6%)	0
		Not Okay	29 (46.8%)	1 (1.6%)	0
Doctor Story	Disobedience	Okay	19 (31.7%)	1 (1.7%)	0

(n=62)	Ambivalent	7 (11.7%)	2 (3.3%)	0
	Not Okay	31 (51.7%)	0	0

Overall, evaluations of obedience and disobedience were negatively correlated, but this correlation was relatively moderate: V = .42, *p* = .000. Across domains and contexts, 66% of evaluations revealed the inverse relationship (negative judgments of disobedience and positive judgments of obedience, and vice versa[21]). More specifically, 42.7% of directives were evaluated positively for obedience and negatively for disobedience (i.e., *obligatory* directives), and 19.8% of directives were evaluated negatively for obedience and positively for disobedience (i.e., prohibited directives). In some cases, however, participants positively judged both obedience and disobedience (i.e., *permissible* but not obligatory directives), or they negatively judged both obedience and disobedience (i.e., *true dilemma* directives). 18.4% of directives were evaluated as permissible, whereas only 1.4% of directives were found to show a pattern of true dilemmas. Examination of these four types of directives and the strength of the negative association between judgments of obedience and disobedience by domain revealed the hypothesized difference between domains.

Although the negative correlation between evaluations of obedience and disobedience was significant in all three types of situations, big differences were found in the strength of this association. The strongest association was found in the moral situations: V = .51, *p* = .000, followed by political situations: V = .38, *p* = .000, and the weakest associations was found in the conventional situations: V = .18, *p* = .003. The majority of moral directives elicited evaluations that presented an inverse relationship between judgments of obedience and disobedience (74.6%), compared with a more moderate proportion of directives that presented this inverse pattern in political situations (68.2%) or conventional ones (56%).

Most moral directives were considered to be either prohibited (46.1%) or obligatory (23.8%). 3.1% of moral directives were construed as true dilemmas whereby both obedience and disobedience were negatively evaluated, and it appears these were situations where "no choice is without pain, loss or harm" (Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2008, p. 175). One participant summarized the true dilemma of soldiers in such situations quite aptly:

> It could be that **your decision is between bad and worse**, but ultimately you have to make a decision and a choice and you have to be able to stand behind that choice in every situation and every case. (Participant 14C, emphasis added)

Only 10.9% of moral directives were considered permissible whereby both obedience and disobedience were positively evaluated, and it seems these were situations where neither behavioral response was considered obligatory, and the protagonist was granted room for personal choice. For example, the following response was given by a participant who initially evaluated disobedience as legitimate in the Messenger Story. When then asked about obedience in the same situation, his reasoning was such:

> Is it okay to obey? Yes. Again, I think it depends specifically in this situation, if he's not doing anything illegal, holding him down and not letting him move, but just not signing,

[21] Ambivalent judgments are not reported, but those subjects who were ambivalent in their evaluation of both obedience and disobedience to the same directive were included in the calculation of "perfect inverse" relationship.

> and not letting him leave. I don't see any professional violation here. I think sometimes the fear from the boss, or some kind consideration or another… The boss is thinking about all the employees, the receptionist is also the boss's employee, he's responsible for her too. So it could be that in this case it's also okay to obey the boss. I think it's okay both ways. (Participant 20D, Messenger Story)

More specifically, the directive in the Farm Story was considered by most participants as prohibited (95.3%). In fact, for many participants, this situation was so straightforward, that it did not present any dilemma, as illustrated in the following quotation:

> We described it as a very not-dangerous situation. He hasn't even broken in yet, he's just walking along the fence. If you said, he broke in, and you see it, you still don't need to shoot at him, but maybe that would start coming close to a dilemma. **What you're describing isn't even a dilemma. It doesn't require any thinking**. (Participant 50B, Farm Story, emphasis added)

The parallel military directive in the Shooting Story revealed more variability, with 56.3% of participants considering shooting the suspect in this scenario prohibited and 9.4% considered this same command obligatory. Nonetheless, the inverse relationship between judgments of obedience and disobedience in these prototypically moral situations was quite robust, suggesting they were evaluated more categorically than other conventional and mixed-domain situations. A surprising and interesting finding was revealed in the two stories about detaining. In the Checkpoint Story, only 9.4% considered the directive prohibited, whereas 65.6% considered it obligatory. The Messenger Story showed the greatest variability and the inverse relationship did not hold at all. The majority of participants (29.7%) construed the directive to detain a messenger as permissible (but not obligatory), followed by 23.4% who considered it prohibited, and 20.3% who considered it obligatory.

In the conventional stories, the frequency of a perfect inverse relationship between judgments of obedience and disobedience was, as noted above, considerably smaller (56%), and this was driven mostly by directives construed as obligatory (53.6%), with hardly any directives construed as prohibited (0.4%). True dilemmas whereby both choices are negatively judged were virtually nonexistent (0%). In contrast, and as hypothesized, many more conventional stories were judged as situations where both obedience and disobedience are permissible (28%).

More specifically, in the military context, both regulations of uniform and of saluting a high-ranking officer were most often considered obligatory (54.7% and 60.9%, respectively), with a sizeable minority of participants construing them as permissible (23.4% in both situations). In the civilian workplace, a similar pattern emerged, with a slightly greater proportion of participants considering dress code rules and use of titles as permissible (33.9% and 31.7%, respectively), but the majority still considering them obligatory (46.8% and 51.7%, respectively).

The political situations, as in other measures, were in between moral and conventional scenarios and elicited inverse evaluations in 68.2% of participants, as noted above. The majority of these judgments reflect a construal of such directives as obligatory (59.5%) and only a small minority of participants considered commands that go against one's political beliefs as prohibited (4.8%). Interestingly, one participant ended up deciding that this type of directive was prohibited

after evaluating refusal positively. His reasoning was that if this type of refusal is accepted, then it becomes obligatory:

> I think if that's what he believes, he should refuse. **Because before I said he can refuse**, and the repercussions are tolerable, **then I guess he has to refuse**. (Participant 43C, emphasis added)

Only 0.8% of participants considered these political situations as true dilemmas whereby neither obedience nor disobedience is legitimate, and 14.3% of participants indicated that both responses were permissible.

More specifically, the two mixed-political situations revealed considerable variability between them. Serving in the OPT was construed by a large majority of participants as obligatory (73%), with only one participant considering it prohibited (1.6%), and one participant considering it a true dilemma (1.6%). 11.1% of participants construed this directive as permissible and considered both participation and refusal as legitimate. Participating in evacuation of settlements, on the other hand, was evaluated as obligatory by considerably fewer participants (46%), and prohibited by more (9.5%). No participants evaluated this as a true dilemma, but 17.5% considered it permissible.

Alternative responses to obedience or disobedience. Although questions in this study pertained to two possible behavioral responses, namely, obedience and explicit disobedience, in some situations, participants spontaneously evoked alternative responses to situations where perhaps neither the choice to obey, nor that to refuse to obey was preferred. This spontaneous evoking of alternative responses is consistent with the argument elaborated in the introduction chapter, whereby both compliance and resistance can be unpacked to reveal substantively different responses to authority. Akin to the distinctions between committed compliance, situational compliance, unwilling compliance, and accommodation, participants in this sample also described shades of obedience, as the following excerpt demonstrates:

> You can obey the command very unequivocally, even go 'above and beyond', be aggressive, be firm. Or you can obey a command by explaining to the man that it's a command. You can also try to see what's going on, maybe take a friendlier approach. In the end, he'll probably get angry because he's being delayed, but it's also up to you how you fulfill your role. (Participant 6B, Checkpoint Story)

Participants' references to alternative responses to authority were classified into two broad categories: confrontation and subversion. *Confrontation* refers to attempts to avoid obeying authority by trying to convince, request, or argue with the commander or boss directly, or by reporting him up the chain of command. For example, one participant, who ultimately endorsed obedience in the forced-choice evaluation question, made a point of emphasizing opportunities to engage the boss and perhaps change his mind about a directive he perceived as illegitimate:

> Yes. It's coming and **asking**, **talking** to him, **explaining**. It's also possible the boss is pissed in that moment or something, so come and ask him. Ultimately, what the boss

> says, that decides it, but **you can talk his ear off about it**. (Participant 35C, Messenger Story, emphasis added)

Subversion refers to attempts to avoid obeying authority by trying to circumvent or evade the command without outright disobedience. Subversion may include various modes of what has been termed "gray refusal" (Linn, 1995, p. 128), as well as other modes of obeying the letter of the law without actually fulfilling the intended purpose of the directive. For example, as noted by Kelman and Hamilton (1989), when receiving orders to shoot in questionable situations, some soldiers miss the target intentionally. A similar notion of subverting a command to open fire that is considered illegitimate was described by one of the participants in this study, and can be compared to the notion of accommodation (Kuczynski & Navara, 2006) referring to a creative interpretation of the directive:

> In practice there are tricks. 'I can't recognize [the target], I'm not this, that,' All sorts of ways to stall the execution of the command in a way that you're not brutally refusing it, but you smooth things over until you're sure enough of yourself, that it sits right with you. (Participant 19B)

The distribution of such references to alternative responses across all ten stories is presented in Table 14. Generalized linear models with order and baseline as control factors, and domain and context as predictive factors were generated to predict references to subversion and confrontation. Neither order nor baseline were significant predictors of subversion and confrontation and were therefore removed from their respective models.

Table 14

Alternative Responses: Beyond the Obedience/Disobedience Dichotomy

	Checkpoint	Shooting	Uniform	Salute	Settlement	OPT	Messenger	Farm	Lawyer	Doctor
Subvert	.11	.23	.06	.17	.22	.25	.19	.03	0	.05
Confront	.67	.33	.05	.05	.24	.17	.31	.06	.13	.10

***Subversion*.** Participants evoked subversion differentially both by domain (LR $\chi^2 = 14.25$, $p = .001$) and by context (LR $\chi^2 = 10.91$, $p = .001$). No significant interaction between the two predictors was evident (LR $\chi^2 = 2.77$, n.s.). References to subversion were more common in stories about politically-motivated refusal (23.8%), and to a lesser extent, moral disobedience (14.1%), whereas they were quite rare for conventional infractions (7.1%). When subversion was suggested as a means of avoiding compliance with conventional regulations, it often took the form of unwilling compliance (Kuczynski & Navara, 2006), as in the following example:

> I show my disrespect for the man. I'm not showing disrespect for the rank. I would do that a lot to my commanders. When they made me do stuff I didn't want to do, I would do it in the most professional way, the best way possible, all the time showing them the utmost contempt. (Participant 25A)

Pair-wise comparisons revealed that all three types of situations were significantly different from each other (all *p*s < 0.03). It appears that subversion was more commonly evoked as a way to circumvent commands that go against one's deeper beliefs including political ideologies and moral principles than to avoid conventional regulations that go against personal preference. Subversion was also evoked significantly more often in a military context (17%) than in a civilian one (7%). This finding is consistent with the argument that subversion is a mode of resistance that is typical in asymmetrical relationships, and is often used by individuals in subordinate social positions of lesser power (Turiel, 2002).

***Confrontation*.** Participants suggested confronting authority figures differentially by domain (LR $\chi^2 = 49.72$, $p = .000$). Although no main effect was found for institutional context (LR $\chi^2 = 8.12$, n.s.), domain and context significantly interacted (LR $\chi^2 = 18.69$, $p = .000$). Confrontation was most commonly evoked in moral situations (34.4%), to a lesser extent in the face of commands that go against one's political beliefs (20.6%), and very rarely to cope with conventional regulations one disagrees with (7.9%). Pair-wise comparisons revealed that all three domains were significantly different from each other (all *p*s < 0.02). This domain difference was very stark and statistically significant (LR $\chi^2 = 76.55$, $p = .000$) in the military context (50% in the moral stories as opposed to 20.6% in the mixed-political ones, and 4.7% in the conventional ones), and nonsignificant (LR $\chi^2 = 2.94$, n.s.) in the civilian context (18.8% in the moral stories as opposed to 11.1% in the conventional ones), yielding the above-mentioned domain-context interaction. Again, it is seen that situations that go against one's deeper and strongly-held beliefs evoke alternative modes of resistance more so than social conventions which one might not want to comply with.

An interesting example of the use of alternative responses to obedience and disobedience in situations of conflict with authority is evident in one particular participant, who was raised in an ideologically right wing family, and resisted the evacuation of Settlements in Gush Katif during the 2005 disengagement, but has since then changed his views, and in this study self-identified as endorsing left wing views. Here are his thoughts about obedience in the OPT Story:

> I can really accept and respect a person who stands up for their principles and everything, but with that said, understands the importance of the law. That's basically what I'm doing now. I don't want to serve in the army anymore. I don't believe in what it's doing, I don't believe in my role, etc. etc. we won't get into that right now. But I'm still going to do reserve duty. **I'll try to find the gray area with them** of reserve service that's not in the Territories, but I will serve, because obedience to the law matters to me. It's exactly the same thing.

And about the Settlements Story:

> I have done that myself. I was supposed to evacuate my uncles in Gush Katif and I didn't. I grew up Right wing, and then when I was supposed to participate in the evacuation I was Right wing, and **I went to my commanders, and they let me not evacuate**. (Participant 60B, emphasis added)

To sum, obedience and disobedience are related but not identical concepts, as evidenced by low to moderate correlations and by alternative responses. This becomes particularly relevant

in true-dilemma situations (where neither response is acceptable), and in situations where both responses are permissible. True dilemmas also elicited more alternative responses such as subversion and confrontation. These were especially common in the two detaining stories (Checkpoint Story: 11% and 67%, Messenger Story: 19% and 31%), providing yet further evidence to the interpretation that these were considered complex mixed-domain situations. For comparison, The Farm Story, which was interpreted as a more prototypically moral situation elicited very few such references to alternative responses (3% and 6%, respectively).

Discussion: Human Diversity, Situational Complexity

A sign at the IDF regional brigade near Ramallah reads "To win and to remain human beings". One of the junior commanders in this brigade once jokingly suggested replacing this lofty slogan with a more humble goal: "Not to lose and not to come out shits" (Harel, 2012). This anecdote touches upon the difficult dilemmas and complex decisions soldiers are called upon to make, and how they may often feel caught between a rock and a hard place. In this dissertation project I set out to systematically examine some of the social concepts employed by soldiers when they contemplate such situations of conflict, and in particular how they think about obedience, authority, and their limits.

The reality for all soldiers, in combat and in routine security maintenance, is one of a multitude of concerns, individual, social, military, and national. More often than not, these myriad concerns come in conflict with each other and demand careful consideration, evaluation, and ultimately action. This study demonstrated some of the patterns of reasoning that soldiers exhibit when evaluating authority directives. The study revealed a different picture than that portrayed by dominant psychological accounts emphasizing a suspension or transformation of typical moral judgment in the military, such as *moral disengagement* (Bandura et al., 1996; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008), *moral numbing* (Grassiani, 2009), or the development of a *culture of brutality* (Elizur & Yishay-Krien, 2009). By employing the framework and methodology of social domain theory, clear and significant differences were found in participants' judgments and justifications of acts of adherence and resistance to authority directives in moral, conventional, and political situations, in the military and in the civilian workplace.

Overview of Findings

Broadly, participants demonstrated *positive evaluations* of acts of disobedience of directives they considered morally wrong, such as shooting at a suspect prior to confirmation of the threat, alongside more *negative judgments* of disobedience for other reasons, such as personal preferences regarding social conventions, or even political ideologies and beliefs. These judgments showed sensitivity both to the broad context of the authority structure (i.e., *civilian vs. military*), and to the specifics of the situation at hand (i.e., *the moral vs. the conventional domains*).

Replication of the domain-distinction in the military. The data confirmed the hypothesis underlying the first research question—that soldiers employ flexible reasoning processes according to domains of social knowledge—and thus preclude the stereotypical view of the soldier as a blindly obedient automaton. As one participant in this study noted: "If they didn't need someone with good judgment, I think they could just place landmines around the farm and that's it" (Participant 10C). The domain distinction was seen not only in the evaluations, but also in participants' *criterion judgments*. Conventional directives in the military were judged to be *more contingent on rules*, *less generalizable*, and afforded *less autonomy of judgment* than moral directives.

Moreover, participants evoked different and domain-concordant *justifications* for their evaluations. When considering the boundaries of obedience in prototypically moral situations, the issues brought to bear on decision making included *harm and welfare* of others, personal and national *security*, and notions of *reciprocity*, along with *epistemological* considerations of the

knowledge and information presumed to be accessible to soldiers and their commanders. In contrast, when evaluating the duty to obey conventional rules and regulations, relevant concerns included the functioning of the *social system*, the importance of *discipline*, and *representativeness* in the public eye, along with personal considerations such as personal *choice* and freedom, as well as *personal responsibility* for one's actions.

Politically-motivated disobedience. This study was guided by clear hypotheses regarding commands in the moral and conventional domains, but much of Israeli public discourse about military obedience and disobedience revolves around political refusal, and so, the second research question—regarding mixed-political scenarios—was included as a more exploratory component of the design. The data suggest that military commands that go against one's political beliefs and viewpoints elicited a pattern of reasoning that was in some respects similar to conventional issues (i.e., in evaluations, and in conventional and epistemological justifications), in some respects similar to moral issues (i.e., in evaluations of autonomy of judgment), and in some respects was in between the two domains (i.e., in moral and personal justifications). Selective conscientious objection to politically controversial practices is often regarded as either personally or morally motivated (Handel, 2008; Linn, 1996; Unger, 2010), and thus it is perhaps not surprising that these two justification categories emerged as distinguishing features of these mixed-domain situations.

Soldiers or citizens? The relevance of institutional context. The data are also consistent with the hypothesis underlying the third research question—regarding continuity across institutional contexts of the domain distinction. Indeed, the expected domain difference was robust across evaluations, justifications, and criterion judgments in both the military and civilian contexts. Differences *between* the two contexts emerged predominantly regarding the degree of autonomy, which was deemed greater in the civilian context than in the military one (as evidenced by prevalence of personal justifications, judgments of impersonality, and overall more positive evaluations of resistance to authority).

However, some findings were inconsistent with the hypotheses of the study. It was hypothesized that context differences would be more pronounced in the conventional domain, as opposed to the moral domain, and the findings suggest the opposite pattern. It seems that when evaluating moral disobedience *in the military*, most participants construed situations which were designed to be prototypically moral as mixed-domain situations, and therefore they brought conventional concepts (especially social functioning) to bear on their judgments, thus generating smaller differences between the two domains, in contrast to the civilian context, which elicited starker domain-differences. This was evident across multiple measures in this study, including conventional justifications, more limited autonomy, and generally more negative evaluations of disobedience in the military as opposed to the civilian workplace, especially in the moral domain. In particular, the Checkpoint Story, and to some extent the matched Messenger Story, yielded surprising results to be discussed at length in a later section.

(Dis)obedience: Not a binary construct. The hypothesis underlying the fourth research question—that moral situations would evoke more categorical judgments of obedience and disobedience than conventional ones—was also confirmed. This was evidenced by moderate (in moral situations) to weak (in conventional situations) negative associations between judgments of obedience and judgments of disobedience, suggesting that participants judged moral situations

as either obligatory or prohibited, whereas conventional directives were sometimes judged as permissible. Furthermore, the prevalence of evoking alternative responses such as subversion and confrontation, geared towards avoiding either unquestioning obedience or out-and-out refusal, were significantly more common in mixed-political and moral situations than in conventional ones.

Surprising Findings: The Checkpoint Story

The findings of this study demonstrate that soldiers in the IDF grapple with complex situations and attend to multiple facets of such situations in an attempt at their coordination. The Checkpoint Story, which yielded mixed and unanticipated results across multiple measures, can serve as a fruitful ground to begin to unravel the different aspects that bear on various decisions soldiers have to make in their daily military routine. In order to better understand the complex coordination elicited by this hypothetical situation, it is particularly informative to examine participants' responses against the backdrop of two other scenarios employed in the study, namely, in contrast to the Shooting Story, which evoked the hypothesized prototypical moral reasoning, and in contrast to the Messenger Story, which included a similar act in a civilian context, and also evoked a very mixed response.

Checkpoints – some background. Military checkpoints, sometimes called roadblocks, have been used ubiquitously by the IDF since the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Their stated rationale is to obstruct the free movement of terrorists in the OPT and thus prevent attacks and maintain security (Amidror, 2012; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008). IDF checkpoints have been the topic of considerable public discourse as they have become one of the most visible and prominent signs of the military occupation of the OPT by the IDF, as well of one of the dominant activities of IDF soldiers serving in the OPT (Handel, 2008). Of 170 sampled soldiers, 35% served for a duration of six months or longer at IDF checkpoints in the OPT (Kimhi & Sagy, 2008). Checkpoints were also noted as one of the most frequent themes of IDF soldier testimonials in such venues as Breaking the Silence and others (Handel, 2008). And yet, according to public opinion surveys, a considerable proportion (55%) of the Jewish-Israeli population supports their use in counterterrorism (Maoz, 2012), and most soldiers consider delaying Palestinians at checkpoints a normative military activity (Gazit & Ben-Ari, 2012).

Findings from the Checkpoint Story. The findings from the Checkpoint Story used in this study reveal a seemingly contradictory picture. On the one hand, the command to detain a civilian was considered by most participants as one that does not require or even allow moral disobedience (see Table 4), and these negative evaluations of disobedience were justified using a combination of moral, conventional (social functioning), pragmatic, and epistemological considerations. On the other hand, two-thirds of the sample explicitly and spontaneously expressed a negative judgment of the *act* of detaining a civilian under such circumstances (compared with 50% in the Shooting Story and 31% in the Messenger Story), whereas about a third said it was justified and legitimate (compared with 0% in the Shooting Story and 20% in the Messenger Story, see

Table **5**). It appears that contrary to findings from surveys reported above, there was no consensus regarding the legitimacy of detaining civilians as a means of punishment or

deterrence, yet despite the ambiguity of the justness of the act, obedience was nonetheless determined to be obligatory in such a situation by the majority of participants.

Judgments of generalizability also reflected the mixed view of the legitimacy of detaining misbehaving civilians. Almost half of the sample indicated that this act would be okay in another country (compared with 14.8% in the Shooting Story and 69% in the Messenger Story, see Table 11), and some even compared it to civilian border crossings, such as airports; but a similar proportion considered it wrong in any country (compared with 63% in the Shooting Story and 22.4% in the Messenger Story). Participants were also quite mixed in their judgments of how much autonomy the soldier was allowed in this scenario. About a third indicated it was up to the soldier to decide, about a third said it was outside his jurisdiction, and another third gave mixed or ambivalent judgments (67.2% and 84.1% allowed the protagonist autonomy of judgment in the Shooting and Messenger Stories, respectively, see Table 12). Furthermore, two thirds of the sample alluded to the soldier's autonomous judgments by evoking the possibility of confronting the commander or trying to convince him to let the man through (see Table 14).

Finally, when comparing the pattern of evaluations of restricting a person's movement as punishment or retaliation for his misbehavior between institutional contexts, it seems this act was judged more categorically in the military than in the civilian context. The majority of participants presented a pattern of judgments in the civilian Messenger Story suggesting that it is permissible (positive evaluations of both obedience and disobedience), whereas in the military Checkpoint Story, the majority saw it as obligatory (positive evaluations of obedience and negative evaluations of disobedience). Both these situations are in contrast with the Shooting Story, which the majority regarded as prohibited (negative evaluations of obedience and positive evaluations of disobedience).

It becomes evident that the checkpoint situation, as common as it is, and despite the fact that most of the participants have had ample personal experience manning checkpoints in the OPT, remains quite murky, evokes contradictory and ambivalent judgments, and touches upon dilemmas that bear on multiple domains of knowledge including the welfare of Palestinian civilians (44%), the use and abuse of power (44%), national and personal security (50%), personal consequences (38%), the functioning of the overall social system (55%), and interpersonal and hierarchical relationships between soldiers and commanders (see
Table **5** and
Table **6**).

Construals. A closer examination of the specific justifications brought to bear on this issue, reveals that two distinct construals of this scenario emerged in the data, each consistent with a different judgment of the act of detaining a civilian at a checkpoint under these circumstances. One construal emphasized the justifiability and even necessity of punishing people who misbehave at the checkpoint (*Reciprocity1*), the importance of behavior regulation as part of the legitimate job of the soldier manning such checkpoints to maintain security (*Security*), and the relatively minimal harm to the detainee (*Act Right*).

> Because, I think this is **a minor thing** on the one hand, I mean it's not like you're about to drastically hurt this person. You're detaining him, for **disciplining**, for educating, because it **gets in the way of the work** in the checkpoint, it **hurts human lives**, your best friends, IDF soldiers. That means in this case you understand the situation, you understand why he [the commander] said it, I would just agree. I think, in my personal

> opinion, I wouldn't do anything beyond, but I wouldn't refuse the command, that's for sure. Not in this case. (Participant 63C, emphasis added).

This construal is partially consistent with what Kimhi and Sagy (2008) considered as an illustration of the moral disengagement mechanism of *moral justification*. In this study, however, it is interpreted not as an unconscious and irrational mechanism aimed to disinhibit conduct and resulting in suspension or transformation of moral principles; rather, such justifications were seen alongside other moral and non-moral considerations, some of which were ultimately subordinated.

The second construal was based on the claim that it was not the army's job "to educate" Palestinians and was therefore wrong (*Act Wrong*), and that being rude did not constitute a security threat (*No Security*). Moreover, reciprocity was differently interpreted, and contextualized in the asymmetrical relationship between the Palestinian and the soldier. Such a construal portrayed the act of detaining as a disproportionate abuse of power in a sensitive situation (*Reciprocity2*):

> Here he is **abusing the power** he has in order to do something, which I think is about his ego. He's using the fact that he's there with a rifle, and… it's, it's **corruption**. (Participant 40D, emphasis added)

> Why is the command wrong? Again, what is this? Asking the man to apologize? **A company commander is not an educator, he's a service provider**, twice. Once to the people, to the country, and a second time to the Palestinians crossing at the checkpoint. He provides a service to the country by operating a security checkpoint that belongs to the State of Israel, and the security checkpoint's job is in some respect to be of service to the population that uses it. In the end, **the checkpoint's job is not an educational one, it's not to take responsibility for people's behavior**. (Participant 39C, emphasis added)

It appears the participants in this study were divided on whether it is part of soldiers' job to police civilians in the OPT and regulate their behavior, and on whether punishment and a forceful hand are necessary and effective for deterrence and so-called "searing of consciousness" (Breaking the Silence, 2012, p. 9). Such divergent construals of the situation in the checkpoint, and of their role as IDF soldiers manning such a checkpoint, may very well underlie some of the differences in the evaluations of obedience and disobedience in the Checkpoint Story.

The relevance of different construals of situations for moral judgment, as well as action, was demonstrated in previous studies. For example, Turiel (2008b) identified two reasons for positive or mixed judgments of actual moral transgressions reported by children and young adolescents, both related to differential interpretations of the situation by various participants and observers. Wainryb and colleagues (2005) also found that moral judgment was related to different construals of actual interpersonal conflicts reported by children and adolescents; these construals differed when participants were either the victims or the perpetrators of harm. It is important to note the difference between this explanation of such systematic differences in construal—one that rests on assumptions about development and reasoning as a constructive and rational process of reflection and abstraction from experience—and other social psychology explanations of heuristics and biases in social perception and judgment—ones that rely on irrational and nonrational (i.e., self-preserving and self-serving) information processing

mechanisms (Bandura et al., 1996; Kimhi & Sagy, 2008). Although the process by which individuals come to know and understand reality may have distortive elements or erroneous conclusions, it is nonetheless a process that is agentive and constructive in nature (Wainryb et al., 2005).

Moreover, such construals may also be related to actual behavior. Avisar (2012) attributed the decline in brutality and violence of IDF soldiers in the OPT following the First Intifada to a combination of three factors: (a) clearer and more explicit guidelines and judicial regulations, (b) soldiers' understanding that violence incites hostile antagonism and violent protest by Palestinians, and (c) soldiers' reduced sense of threat. These three factors reflect some of the informational assumptions described above underlying gratuitous detaining and even harassment of Palestinian civilians as (il)legal, (in)effective, and (un)necessary for personal and national security, and demonstrate the coordination of conventional, pragmatic, and moral considerations.

Is detaining a civilian a manifestly illegal command? In addition to disagreements about how the situation was construed, and concomitant moral judgments associated with such differential construals, another important conceptual determination contributed to evaluations of obedience and disobedience in the Checkpoint Story, namely the determination of the status of the command in this scenario as *legal*, *illegal*, or *manifestly illegal*. Parush (1996) suggested the possibility that some of the participants in Milgram's experiments may have determined that although the instructions they received were unjust, it was not to a degree that overrode their obligation to obey. Parush distinguished this interpretation from Milgram's own explanation relying on the notion of the agentic state, in that he regards the determination that obedience is obligatory as the result of autonomous judgment, albeit faulty, of the wrongness of the directive (Parush, 1996, p. 35). Extrapolating that hypothesis to obedience in the military and elsewhere, Parush described a class of actions that are wrong, but nonetheless may be evaluated as requiring obedience.

The courts in Israel have conceptualized commands that require disobedience as ones that "pierce the eye and revolt the heart" (Dinstein, 2012, p. 9), and this interpretation leads to the conclusion that minor moral infractions are not included in the category of manifestly illegal commands. It appears that a substantial subset of the sample in this study espoused this determination. Of the 42 participants who indicated the act of detaining a Palestinian for rudeness was wrong (See

Table **5**), only 10 considered it wrong enough to disobey, and four were ambivalent about the legitimacy of disobedience in this scenario (See Table 4). Thus, 28 of these 42 participants, despite their negative evaluation of the act, endorsed obedience in this situation:

> Well, it's very complicated. On the one hand, he broke a command. Now break a command, but save it for open fire, like, save it for when they tell you to slap somebody. Oh! That – refuse, and report to the Artillery officer, and phone Carmella Menashe[22] because her number is online, do it. Save it for that. (Participant 23B)

Parush criticized the court's reliance on the so-called Black-Flag test for this very reason, and argued that some commands may be morally wrong, even if not egregious to an extent that

[22] Carmella Menashe is an Israeli journalist famous for reporting on military cover-ups and scandals.

"pierces the eye and revolts the heart" such as in the Kafr Qassem massacre; he claimed that such commands should nevertheless be disobeyed. One of the participants in this study explicitly expressed a similar view:

> It's not human life, and not torture, and not kidnapping. So according to the army, it's not a manifestly illegal command, but I would put it in the category of something you shouldn't obey. (Participant 51C, Checkpoint Story)

Overall, the responses to the Checkpoint Story seem to encompass a variety of issues addressed in this study, including conflict and coordination of social concepts from multiple domains, the role of informational assumptions about the IDF's role in the OPT, the necessity and effectiveness of the use of military checkpoints in counterterrorism and security maintenance, and the definition of manifestly illegal commands in making social and moral judgments. All these epistemological and evaluative considerations need to be coordinated in making a determination in a single moment (albeit repeatedly, over the course of days, weeks, and sometimes months of service at a checkpoint) about whom to let through and whom to stop, about which commands to obey and which to challenge or resist.

Theoretical Implications of the Findings

The findings of this study suggest a complexity of reasoning employed by soldiers when confronted with authority directives they disagree with. Put in the context of SDT, these findings allow some interpretation of central theoretical concepts such as conflicted judgments, coordination of social concepts, and the role of informational assumptions.

Conflict and ambivalence. Some of the situations presented in this study presented a clear choice for many participants, but others presented serious dilemmas that revealed conflicts between competing considerations participants valued and considered as equally important. As one soldier phrased it, there are situations where only the aftermath and consequences can indicate whether the soldier is a praiseworthy hero or a blameworthy rogue:

> So in the end what will happen is that if Assaf [the protagonist] was right he'll come out a hero, if not, he'll sit in jail. Tzalash or Tarash [honorary citation or demotion to rank of Pfc]. (Participant 27C, Shooting Story)

As explained in the Results Section, for the purposes of statistical analyses evaluations were recoded as binary variables, but some responses were in fact quite ambivalent, mixed, or expressed a conditional judgment of obedience or disobedience depending on some aspect not specified in the vignette (e.g., the nature of the soldier's personal relationship with his commander). Such *ambivalent* evaluations were not distributed evenly across the ten stories. The Farm Story, which on all measures exhibited the clearest pattern of a prototypically unjustified directive in the moral domain, evoked the fewest ambivalent judgments of either obedience or disobedience. In a sense, it can be concluded that this situation was so clearly wrong in the eyes of the participants, that they saw no dilemma or conflict, and evaluated it easily and categorically. In other words, there was little need for complex coordination of considerations in this unambiguous situation. In a structural-developmental perspective, it is expected that simple

problems will elicit simple solutions, and in other studies of moral reasoning similar findings were found, whereby some situations are so straightforward, they evoke unambiguous reasoning across age-groups (Nucci & Turiel, 2009).

In the four conventional scenarios, evaluations of *obedience* also appear to be rather straightforward and elicited relatively few ambivalent judgments, but when considering *disobedience* in these same situations, about 14-20% of participants were classified as ambivalent. It seems that obeying conventional rules one does not like or does not agree with is relatively unambiguous, but disobeying them is a more complicated social decision, whose legitimacy is not always clear-cut. Because they were construed as mostly harmless directives (indicated by low prevalence of *harm* justifications), the reasons to violate such rules and regulations included considerations of personal autonomy, choice, and preference. The need to coordinate social-conventional considerations of societal and institutional functioning on the one hand, and personal expression and autonomy on the other, remained ambiguous and unresolved for some participants, leading to a higher frequency of ambivalent judgments.

The most complex and intricate pattern of ambivalence emerged in the three remaining moral scenarios: the Checkpoint Story, the Shooting Story, and the Messenger Story. If the civilian shooting story in the farm elicited the fewest ambivalent judgments, the parallel military shooting story elicited the most. About a fifth of the sample was classified as ambivalent in their evaluation of obeying this command (18.75%), or of disobeying it (20.31%, see Table 4). It appears that the same situation which was unambiguously wrong in a civilian context, when set in a military context with its added considerations of security threats, social functioning, hierarchy, and discipline, became a serious dilemma, one that many participants had difficulty resolving in a definitive and unequivocal way.

The two stories about detaining showed the opposite pattern than that seen in the conventional situations, namely, greater ambivalence regarding obedience than regarding disobedience. Overall, more ambivalence was seen in the civilian workplace than in the military. Considering that many participants construed the directive in the checkpoint situation as wrong but not egregious, it seems that disobeying such directives evoked less conflict than obeying them, which was highly conflictual. Participants recognized the reasons to obey this command, and for the most part were unequivocal about the illegitimacy of outright disobedience in this case, but nonetheless had considerable reservations about endorsing obedience. In the civilian workplace, however, it seems that both obedience and disobedience were seen ambiguously, and the difficulty in reaching a resolution rested on the need to have a better sense of the particulars of the situation. This interpretation also gains support from the finding that there was no consensus among participants as to whether this act was *obligatory, permissible*, or *forbidden* (see Research Question 4 in the Results Section).

So, some source of potentially harmful or morally questionable behavior by soldiers may reflect such dilemmas or situations of unresolved conflict, where soldiers are either unsure as to what the right course of action might be, or have difficulty coordinating and prioritizing between competing considerations that are all important and valuable to them:

> I never thought about it too much, but suppose, there could be a situation where you felt that it could be that your commander is making a mistake, but there could be a situation that really…that you would know that something is wrong here, and that you have to tell him, 'listen, this doesn't make any sense. Why shoot at him?' **But to tell you the**

> **difference? I don't think I can know like that. Only at a certain point you really know.** (Participant 34B, emphasis added)

Coordination of social concepts. According to SDT, individuals *coordinate* social concepts from different domains and make decisions that reflect that process of coordination. For example, Laupa and colleagues (1995) reinterpreted the behavior of Milgram's participants as involving attempts to coordinate concerns of the conventional and moral domains (p. 160). In the current study, there were many examples of coordination whereby participants laid out multiple considerations and ultimately resolved the conflict between them:

> Again, it's a judgment call. There is this wrong act, on the one hand, on the other hand you want the army... what can you do, for it to exist there has to be obedience to commands, and... You make some sort of balance, and if you decide that the action, the command given, its moral gravity is not that severe, that in this case it so happens that the value of obedience to commands is greater. (Participant 43C)

When several competing considerations from different domains are relevant to a social problem or conflict, an individual may sometimes *subordinate* some considerations to other, more valuable, important, or pertinent ones in that particular situation. That is not to say the subordinated concerns are irrelevant or unimportant, but rather that in a particular set of circumstances, some other concern was determined to override them. For example, it was demonstrated in the Results Section how in some cases, participants subordinated pragmatic considerations regarding punishment and other negative consequences to personal issues. In more simple terms, they determined that the risk of punishment is worth expressing personal choice, autonomy, or opinions (e.g., in the Salute Story). Another prominent example of subordination occurred when participants subordinated personal considerations to conventional ones, by indicating that military uniformity and representativeness were important enough to relinquish some personal expressions (e.g., in the Uniform Story). In the following quotation, the participant acknowledged the principle of personal freedom, but ultimately subordinated it to the authority of military regulations of dress:

> Yes, I think it's okay [to obey]. I also don't see serious harm here. I mean, of course there's **a violation of Omer's [the protagonist's] freedom**, but it's definitely not an unusual violation, certainly not beyond all the other violations of freedoms in the military. I also don't see anything ethical about keeping the regulations. I mean, of course if they try to enforce the regulations, he will have to follow them in practice. (Participant 41A, emphasis added)

Subordinating moral considerations. When considerations from different domains come in conflict, it is not obvious that moral concerns will (or should) always override non-moral ones. This study's participants demonstrated many examples of subordinating moral considerations to conventional ones, such as those instances when it was determined that what was considered to be a relatively minor violation of another person's rights (moral consideration) did not warrant disobedience (conventional consideration), or when acting against one's ideological convictions was justified with the importance of maintaining the social system or the high personal price one might pay (pragmatic consideration). The documented narratives of some conscientious

objectors echo this claim; as one Israeli objector in the First Lebanon War aptly put it: "If I had to follow my principles all the time, I would find myself a prisoner of principles, and in this situation you cannot act. I am not only motivated by moral principles but also by practical considerations" (quoted in Linn, 1987, p. 399). Nachi Alon, a prominent clinical psychologist in the IDF mental health department, described the intricate balance needed to be achieved between moral obligations, societal commitments, and pragmatic considerations of effectiveness within the military system. He claimed that "an absolute moral stand, which is not backed by evidence and does not identify practical course of action, is worthless" (quoted in Avisar, 2012, p. 169).

Subordinating considerations within one domain. Sometimes, there are competing concerns that all belong to the same domain of social knowledge. Moral dilemmas are typically characterized as such situations when two or more *moral* considerations are in conflict or competition with each other. The two moral-military scenarios, although they were designed with an attempt to reduce or even eliminate security concerns, clearly presented at least some of the participants with just such a dilemma. About half of the participants evoked security considerations, and a similar (or in the Shooting Story, even greater) proportion evoked considerations regarding the potential harm to another person (see

Table **5**), suggesting that they were trying to coordinate these different moral considerations in making their evaluation regarding the duty to obey or disobey these commands. In some cases, a security threat was deemed not severe or likely enough to warrant shooting the suspect and potentially taking another person's life. In other cases, security considerations were determined to override the harm caused to a person when he is delayed or detained in a military checkpoint, but it is crucial to note that this harm was not dismissed as irrelevant and was often explicitly acknowledged by these participants:

> The thing is that there are norms that clash. Your entire life, there are norms that clash – it's the same thing even with basic human rights that any… in lots of situations they clash, and then **you have to decide what's more critical** and what's more appropriate to protect. And in the previous case, then there are two norms, as far as offending a person [i.e., the boss] and detaining him [i.e., the messenger], so in the end, they're pretty close to each other. Here [in the Farm Story], you're talking about killing a person or money being stolen… So when you're talking about killing a person, **the value is much higher, no doubt**. (Participant 55C, emphasis added)

Negating considerations. In contrast to subordinating one relevant concern to another, there were times when participants explicitly *negated* the relevance of an issue to the decision. It is likely that often, considerations that are deemed irrelevant to a social situation are simply not mentioned in the justifications; but there were times, either in response to a probing question, or even spontaneously, when participants made that determination explicit. For example, many participants negated moral considerations such as harm to others in evaluating conventional transgressions:

> First of all, I **don't see it as a question of morality**. I see it as a question of… the ethics of the place. Like, **it doesn't really hurt anyone**. It's a matter of the rule, and if he's not going to be seeing clients, then the only person who is really bothered by it is the boss, and if the boss says it's okay, then it's okay. (Participant 64D, emphasis added)

In other situations, personal or interpersonal considerations, such as the feelings or relationship between two people, were negated as irrelevant in predominantly moral (e.g., in the Checkpoint Story) or conventional (e.g., in the Salute Story) situations:

> Because **that [the fact he was rude] is not the consideration** of whether they should cross [the checkpoint] or not. It could be that some people are less polite, less courteous, and even… generate a lot of hate towards the side that lets them cross the checkpoint, but, uh, that's human nature. There are nicer ones, less nice ones. It's not… (Participant 10C, Checkpoint Story, emphasis added)

> No, like I said, **it's not supposed to be personal considerations**, whether you like him or don't like him. (Participant 4D, Salute Story, emphasis added)

In yet other situations, especially the prototypically moral situation of the Farm Story, conventional considerations such as authority and obedience were negated as irrelevant to the decision:

> *What about the authority and hierarchy of the boss? Does it play a role?*
> No.
> *Not at all?*
> Yeah, it's not relevant. (Participant 27C)

Lastly, mixed-political situations in some cases evoked either negation of personal or of moral considerations, especially when political views were construed as personal beliefs or convictions and not as obligatory and universal moral prescriptions:

> Because this act, this act of… occupation, or however you want to whitewash it, is an act that's subject to all these criticisms, and if it's the policy of an elected government that is acting legally within the Israeli and international rules, then the dilemma… **his personal views are irrelevant**. (Participant 29A, OPT Story, emphasis added)

> Okay, but like, I think the army works a certain way. It's not a place of democracy, and nobody asks you, and for a good reason too. There's a reason it works that way. Because if they started considering every person we wouldn't get anywhere. So what can you do, you do things that are unpleasant and go against your conscience, but... I don't think... evacuating **doesn't seem to me... I don't know how to call it, "natural human conscience".** I don't know if there is such a thing, but I guess. Things you're born with, that you just know--not to murder, not to rape. (Participant 52D, Settlements Story, emphasis added)

Thus, rather than a picture of moral disengagement, moral numbing, or callous disregard for members of the out-group, as soldiers are often claimed to fall prey to, the participants in this study fully engaged with moral and non-moral aspects of complex conflict situations. They identified considerations that were pertinent to each scenario, as they understood and conceptualized it, and weighed them when they came in conflict with each other. When

attempting to coordinate the relevant considerations, in some cases they resolved the conflict and reached a determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of obedience, and in other cases, they remained to some extent ambivalent regarding the boundaries of obedience.

Informational assumptions. Informational assumptions about the justness of commands, the quality of authority figure's decision making, their status and power, and their knowledge and expertise may all contribute to judgments about the legitimacy of particular commands, as well as the actor's sphere of independent judgments and action (Laupa et al., 1995). An unavoidable aspect of the experience of the rank-and-file soldier is that he inevitably has relatively limited knowledge and information about his missions, the intelligence associated with them, and sometimes the rationale behind them:

> Most of my job was mainly surveillance, and it's basically… surveillance is like an invasion of privacy. Really, it's watching a person no matter what he's doing. Seriously, when he's taking a dump, whatever. You watch him, like, **and there's a reason, when they tell you to observe him, but they don't tell you why, they don't tell you what**… They don't really tell you… They say 'wanted person'. There was maybe one time when they told me why this person was wanted and I had to monitor him. Most of the people, say, this person who… you don't know. **Maybe he's really innocent? How should I know?** Maybe, like, there's not enough intelligence, so the army distributes… I don't know. Maybe I'm just… maybe it's a conspiracy in my head, but **I personally had no idea**. (Participant 57A, emphasis added)

For this reason, soldiers often espouse a profound confidence in their commanders and the upper echelons of decision makers. Mixon (cited in Blass, 1996) advanced an alternative interpretation of Milgram's results that hinges on this issue of trust in the figure of authority; rather than accepting the explanation of the agentic state and concomitant relinquishing of responsibility espoused by Milgram, Mixon postulated that in light of repeated reassurances regarding the safety of the electric shocks (e.g., "Although the shocks can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage." Milgram, 1963, p. 373), and the credibility of the scientific context of the experiment, participants continued to adhere to the experimenter's directions because they trusted him and believed him that no harm would come to the learner. It was only when doubts arose for some participants regarding these statements of the experimenter that they disobeyed and stopped the experiment (Blass, 1996).

This issue of confidence and trust in figures of authority can manifest in the military as belief in the operational merit, moral justifiability, and legitimacy of the authority of both commanders and military law. Participants in the current study made many references to such epistemological issues, which seem to constitute a foundational informational assumption upon which many evaluations about the limits of authority in the military rest:

> I don't know if it is always warranted, but as a subordinate I think **you have no choice**. **You have to trust your commander**, unless you know him really well and you know otherwise. (Participant 20D, emphasis added)

Yet, as seen in the previous quote of the surveillance-unit soldier, and in the following quote as well, soldiers are to different extents aware of the problematic nature of this assumption, and its limits:

> If there was an indication to… if someone said on the radio, 'such and such coordinates,' I mean the man was incriminated, and they tell you to shoot, you shoot. Because you want, **you believe that the person giving you the order is pure enough in his thoughts and deeds**, that's he's not trigger-happy, and if he gives you an order to open fire, it's to open fire. That in saying 'fire' it's as if he pulled the trigger himself. And again, here comes the thing about automats, like a record.
> *In your service, broadly, most people… most of the time, did you believe they really are pure at heart, in their thoughts, and when they give the order….*
> **No, no. Heaven forbid**. Why, the reason people go to become officers, ooh-ah… not the reason we would like, that I would be happy were the reason… (Participant 16D, emphasis added)

Participants justified their trust in commanders' not only with epistemological considerations, but also with conventional ones. The importance of placing so much trust in authority, although not limitless, was considered extremely important for the military to continue to function and to exercise its security mission effectively.

> Why? Again, because of the delicateness that comes with power. **You have a vested interest in building your commander's power**. It's in your interests that your commander's word will mean something. In the end, **you're not turning your commanders into dictators**, you're turning them into... Basically, the ideal situation is that commanders have power, and what their soldiers say, they do… **up to a certain point**, because commanders can make mistakes too. Now, there are mistakes that… **I would rather accept occasional mistakes by a commander, than that he doesn't have a word, and then the army can't function**, as opposed to a mistake that will cost in human lives. (Participant 55C, emphasis added)

If participants expressed a considerable degree of trust in their commanders and their judgment, the degree of trust they revealed about the IDF system in general and about rules and regulations in particular was even greater. This was especially prominent when they responded to questions about rule contingency. Some participants actually rejected the hypothetical change in military law to allow practices they considered unjust, because they considered it implausible that the IDF would codify such regulations:

> I don't see, I can't see a situation where somebody changes a law like that. Like, it would be like, Purity of Arms[23]… that's, that's what the army stands on. **There's no way they would change that**. (Participant 35C, emphasis added)

[23] Purity of Arms is one of ten values specified in the Spirit of the IDF, the Israeli army's code of ethics. Purity of arms refers to a commitment to using only necessary force in combat activity, and avoiding "harm to lives, bodies, dignity and property of noncombatants" (http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/doctrine/ethics.htm).

However, it cannot be overstressed that this confidence and trust in military authority was in no way blind or thoughtless. Rather, participants explained their rationale for following commands and rules, and in trusting their authority. Their explanations were about the reasons behind the procedure. Thus, evaluations that appeared to suggest that commands in the moral domain are rule-contingent, in fact told of a more complicated coordination of beliefs, assumptions, and evaluations:

> As a result of what [did they change the law]? The way I know the IDF, it's as a result of many soldiers being killed, and they understood **that things are changing and you need to change procedures to deal with the new situation**. If that's the case, then presumably you have to follow the rules, but if really it was just someone who decided to change the rules, or… I don't know... Lieberman[24] took over the army [laughing], then, then no. Then you need to get out on medical [exemption], I don't know, I would quit the army. (Participant 33A, emphasis added)

The participants' responses also shed light on another set of underlying informational assumptions related to the messages they receive from their commanders and the upper echelons of the IDF. Informational assumptions about the IDF's missions as exclusively defensive and preventive, about the Palestinian population as hostile and dangerous, and about the effectiveness of intimidation for deterrence of terrorist activity, were evidenced in some participants' responses. Such assumptions also may lend support to many of the IDF's controversial activities in the OPT, such as restriction of movement, mass-arrests, and lenient open-fire procedures (See Breaking the Silence, 2012 for a fuller analyses of the role of such assumptions in IDF policies). Shimon Shamir (2012) surveyed several occupations in history, and noted that many occupying forces operated under the premise that forceful responses to resistance were a necessary and efficacious means of preserving the occupying force's credibility and prestige, but concluded that ultimately this assumption is false. As shown in the section devoted to the Checkpoint Story, some participants certainly justified detaining the civilian based on similar notions of reciprocal punishment, deterrence, and the importance of maintaining order in the checkpoint for security reasons. Yet others rejected such justifications, and revealed a different, and arguably more critical, construal of the role of the IDF in general, and the soldier at the checkpoint in particular.

Mixed messages. Many of the informational assumptions described above are part of the explicit messages that soldiers receive in their official training and throughout their service by commanders. Yet, additional—and sometimes contradictory—messages are also conveyed, often more implicitly. Soldiers are acutely aware of such mixed messages promoted by the military. For example, Nir (2012) described the mixed messages and contradictions between explicit regulations and implicit expectations conveyed down the chain of command. He related a conversation he had with a young officer after the first Intifada, who said they were not necessarily guided by formal commands, but rather by the understanding that the higher echelons expect them to react with determination, force, and authority towards the Palestinian uprising of resistance. Junior officers reported understanding regulations to avoid vindictive aggression towards Palestinians as issued "with a wink" (Nir, 2012, p. 97). The *Spirit of the IDF*, the formal ethical code of the IDF, is viewed by many soldiers as an empty slogan to be recited, and as

[24] This refers to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman, known for his extreme right-wing remarks.

irrelevant or incongruent with the reality they face in the field (Gazit & Ben-Ari, 2012). One of Grassiani's (2009) participants related his view of the Spirit of the IDF as relevant "only in basic training, it's bullshit, you don't use it" (p. 190). Soldiers interviewed in the media also bring this dual message to light: "Ever since basic training, they've emphasized to us in practically every context, that there are two dimensions to operating in the territories… There's the theoretical dimension, which you learn from the start of basic training, and then there's the tachlis[25], the way things really work" (Fogelman, 2010). It is therefore not unlikely that some of the participants in the current study subordinated formal regulations to the commander's judgment, or at times, even the soldier's judgment (in the rule contingency question), as reflecting this double-layer of meaning, and as more congruent with the IDF's "true" intent as it is perceived by them, as opposed to its stated policies.

In sum, soldiers operate and make decisions in fundamentally ambiguous situations of informational uncertainty. Informational assumptions about the rationale behind authority dictates, about the knowledge and expertise of commanders, about the IDF's goals, intentions, and scope of activity, and about the efficacy of certain practices for preventing or thwarting terrorist activity, may all play an important part in the coordination of considerations leading to judgments of the legitimacy of obedience and disobedience in the military.

Beyond the compliance/resistance dichotomy: alternative responses. As described in the Results Section, the findings regarding alternative responses to obedience or disobedience were consistent with the theoretical argument that this plain dichotomy does not capture many important psychological and behavioral responses to authority. Participants' reference to and even preference for a variety of modes of subversion or confrontation were both ubiquitous and varied by the situation and context.

Recall that both subversion and confrontation were more commonly evoked in moral situations than in conventional ones. However, closer examination of the four moral vignettes reveals that this was the case for three of the four stories. The Farm Story, which for most participants did not constitute a real moral dilemma, but rather an unambiguous case of a directive seen as morally wrong, evoked very few references or suggestions that the protagonist subvert the directive or confront the authority figure. It appears that such nuanced responses, which are neither fully obedient nor explicitly disobedient, are employed in situations of moral conflict, when multiple moral and non-moral considerations require careful coordination and delicate balance.

Second, the institutional context also played a role in the likelihood of evoking alternative responses. Subversion was more commonly evoked in a military context than in a civilian one, and confrontation demonstrated a more complicated interaction between domain and context. The suggestion to confront the authority figure, either directly or indirectly (by reporting him) was very common in military-moral situations, and very rare indeed in military-conventional ones. This could perhaps be because the latter were considered more legitimate, or alternatively, because confrontation in a strict hierarchical system such as the military was not considered a viable option for such minor disagreements. In the civilian workplace, on the other hand, conventional rules that the protagonist disagreed with were sometimes considered to warrant confrontation, in an attempt to change or eliminate them, more so than in the military. The possibility of negotiating over rules is more likely to be evoked in power structures that are more

[25] *Tachlis* is slang meaning real, concrete, or actual.

egalitarian and reciprocal than they are in unilateral power relations, such as those that characterize the military (Turiel & Perkins, 2004).

When considering directives that clearly violate moral principles in unambiguous situations, however, and especially when they involved serious harm to others (i.e., the Farm Story), participants were considerably less likely to suggest such confrontation. This could be because they were more likely to endorse explicit disobedience in this case, and did not see the need for a more delicate mode of resistance. Studies examining unjust directives, or ones that exert undue power in asymmetrical relationships in other contexts (e.g., the family, peer relationships, and schools) have demonstrated that in such situations, deception is often considered a legitimate mode of subverting such undue power or other injustices (Perkins & Turiel, 2007). It seems that in the military context, with its emphasis on asymmetrical hierarchical relationships, subversion is sometimes preferred as a mode of resistance to outright disobedience, or even to confrontation with authority, especially perhaps, by rank-and-file soldiers who are in a decidedly weaker position of power in this social system. The following excerpt demonstrates the perception some soldiers may have of limited self-efficacy in changing unjust practices in the military:

> And then he can… talk about it with other people, see if he doesn't feel alone, see if there's something that can be done about it. If he can… **When you're in the army you can't really do much about it**, especially if you're not some high-ranking officer and that… (Participant 57A, emphasis added)

Thus, it appears from the findings of the current study that not only do soldiers consider a broad range of responses to authority, including disobedience, covert subversion, and direct confrontation, they also select different modes of resistance depending on both their perceived sphere of influence in the power hierarchy, and on the nature of directive they disagree with. Conventional regulations in the civilian workplace may be more likely to be challenged using confrontation and negotiation with the authority figure, whereas in the military, they are more likely to be subverted. Situations of directives that unambiguously violate moral principles are more likely to be explicitly resisted by disobeying the directive. Lastly, situations where the directive evoked moral conflict elicited more nuanced responses than either full obedience or flagrant disobedience; these are the situations in which many participants suggested the best course of action may be to try and reason or argue with authority, or else, to avoid executing the directive in covert ways.

To conclude, the findings of the current study lend empirical support to theoretical claims regarding conflict and ambivalence about considerations from multiple domains of reasoning, efforts to coordinate these conflicting concerns, the role of informational assumptions, especially those that bear on the legitimacy of military authority and laws, and the range of intricate responses to authority beyond straightforward obedience and refusal.

A Developmental Perspective: Social and Personal Change

Although this study did not examine age-related differences, the hypotheses and theoretical grounding of the project are developmental in nature. This means that attention is paid to how individuals construct knowledge in their ongoing interactions with the social and physical world, and to how social concepts and their coordination change over time. Further

research directly comparing judgments and justifications of distinct developmental groups (such as high-school students in anticipation of their enlistment, and different groups of reserve soldiers at different time-points) could be informative as to the impact of the unique experiences of military service in the IDF on the development of social and moral reasoning. The current design does not afford any direct conclusions about individual development, but participants' retrospective reflections about this issue can perhaps point to a few potential hypotheses to be tested in a more systematic fashion. It is worth noting that all the participants in the current study had served in combat units in the IDF, and thus had some personal experience and specific training associated with that role. Comparisons with control samples of civilians who had not served in the IDF, or who served in non-combat positions may also shed light on the role of experience on social decision making and moral judgment in the military. It can be hypothesized that the nature of the situations presented may interact with the kinds of experiences that participants commonly faced in their service. For example, although for the majority of the participants the vignettes presented familiar everyday dilemmas, a few of the participants in the current study expressed their difficulty in making a judgment in the Checkpoint Story, because they had not themselves served in checkpoints. The role of experience in moral development and reasoning could also be addressed by examining participants' judgments and justifications of actual acts of resistance and adherence engaged in during their own military service. Studies have shown that judgments in the domains of morality and social convention about actual events correspond with judgments about hypothetical situations, but are not exactly the same (Turiel, 2008b). More specifically, judgments about hypothetical situations evoke a clearer distinction between domains as evidenced in both evaluations and criterion judgments.

Moreover, development, conceptualized broadly (Saxe, 1999), includes not only processes of individual change over the lifespan (i.e., ontogenesis), but also processes of social and cultural change (i.e., sociogenesis), and participants alluded to such change as well. The picture that emerges in this study by which soldiers actively interpret, scrutinize, and sometimes resist messages received from authority figures and through rules and regulations "can be seen as essential to moral growth at an individual level and moral progress at the societal level" (Nucci, 2005, p. viii).

Ontogenesis: Individual change. Levy and Sasson-Levy (2008), coming from a political-socialization perspective, espoused an approach which gives serious consideration to the ways in which people construct their ideas in terms of patterns of personal change and growth in order to avoid a portrayal of people as "empty containers" (p. 352) and incorporate both personal agency and practices of resistance to cultural messages in understanding political socialization. This more contemporary conceptualization within socialization theorizing leaves room for change and progress among individuals, societies, and political systems, which was arguably lacking in more traditional socialization accounts (Levy & Sasson-Levy, 2008).

From heteronomy to autonomy? Piaget (1965) conceptualized moral development as a progression from social heteronomy and subordination in the face of authority, to moral autonomy and independence of thought and action. This position has been critiqued, and demonstrations of moral autonomy in early childhood abound (Turiel, 2010), alongside subordination of personal views to authority later in life. Nonetheless, a general trajectory from lesser to greater independence of thought and action is often highlighted in development generally, and in militarized socialization especially. The soldier is presumed to undergo a

process of socialization which purportedly "'changes' the value system [of cadets] in accordance with occupational role definitions" (Stevens et al., 1994, p. 474). In the IDF, duration of time served in the military has indeed been associated with greater identification with the army and state (Kimhi & Sagy, 2008). Also, findings from the field of identity formation support the characterization of soldiers as immature, and of military service as associated with a temporary pause in some aspects of personal development. Mayseless (2002) reported findings from a number of studies (both cross-sectional and longitudinal) which demonstrated that combat soldiers (in comparison to noncombat soldiers and to combat and noncombat officers) exhibited fewer indicators of vocational, political and ideological *exploration* and of *commitment* to an achieved or accepted identity (Marcia, 1980), and therefore had a higher rate of individuals classified as *identity diffused* than either combat or noncombat officers (Mayseless, 2002). There seems to be a dominant view of soldiers, and especially early-service non-officers, as relatively immature, and as lacking autonomy of thought and behavior.

However, a qualitative study using in-depth interviews, found that alongside what was termed a *dominant response to militarized socialization* of conformity, obedience and a "pattern of blindness" (Levy & Sasson-Levy, p. 356), an alternative response surfaced, one that included elements of subversion and ambivalent resistance to the military ethos of the Israeli combat soldier. Moreover, Stevens and colleagues (1994) examined the effects of four years at a military academy on the values and attitudes of cadets; yet their cross-sectional findings failed to reveal many significant changes. Longitudinal data did demonstrate some changes, albeit somewhat counter-intuitive ones, from the perspective of these authors; they reported a decline in conformity alongside an increase in independence, leadership, and need for recognition (Stevens et al.). Taken together, these studies reveal a mixed picture regarding the effects of military service on individual soldiers' attitudes, beliefs, and identities, one that includes elements of affiliation with the military, as well as resistance, of conformity, as well as independence.

In the current study, participants' responses were not coded directly for topics of change and development, and the following discussion serves as anecdotal description of themes that may serve as starting points for future elaboration in research. A central theme that emerged in participants' reflections about individual change over the course of military service was regarding a shift from a rather unilateral to a more reciprocal relationship to authority; one that included greater autonomy of both judgment and action. Participants contrasted the position of novice soldiers, early in their service and training, with that of more seasoned and experienced soldiers, and even more so with that of reservists (*Miluim*) after discharge from mandatory full-time service (*Sadir*). They characterized the former position as both less *able* to demonstrate independent thinking and action (for reasons of immaturity, lack of confidence, and limited knowledge, information, and expertise), and as being afforded less freedom to do so by the system, in both formal-structural and implicit ways:

> Let's put it this way, if I were Oren [the protagonist] in that situation, I suppose I would also obey the command. First of all, **in Sadir it's, I think, different**. You're also not… you're… when you're in the military system then you think with a more 'military-head', and you don't think as much about what's around and the civilians. **I suppose that if it happened to me today, if I was in reserve duty, then I don't think it would be the same**.
> *Why? What's the difference?*

> Because, again, if… when you're in a military system you only think in a military way. And when you're in reserves, then you've already had a chance to form opinions and positions about all sorts of topics, and you… it's not your main life, you're in other places too. (Participant 37A, emphasis added)

Thus, immaturity, and possibly even more so, limited knowledge and a social position of inferiority in a highly hierarchical system may all contribute to young soldiers' stance of limited autonomy. Rather than a structural and all-encompassing developmental stance, heteronomy in this context can be reinterpreted as characterizing an epistemological position in particular situations, especially those that involve considerable disparity in access to information, experience, expertise, and power, as that of the novice soldier vis-à-vis his commanders, or even more seasoned peers. This is not to suggest that young soldiers can be characterized as completely heteronomous with regard to military authority; rather, in specific situations, they may entrust authority, when it is perceived to be knowledgeable, powerful, and trustworthy. But this stance is far from unquestioning heteronomy, and it is far from absolute in nature, as soldiers maintain some aspects of autonomy in various ways and express it in various situations (see for example the in-depth discussion of personal justifications in this study).

Cognitive conflict and equilibration. The kinds of experiences of personal and moral struggle and ambivalence described in the current study could be seen as part of typical development which includes processes such as cognitive conflict. Cognitive conflict—or disequlibration—is presumed to be a major force promoting growth and development, in pushing the individual to accommodate existing cognitive concepts to new environmental stimuli in progressively sophisticated ways (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988; Kohlberg, 1969). In this sense, error, disagreement, and ambivalence can be powerful experiences that cumulatively and gradually contribute to an individual's changing conceptions and understandings. Supporting this idea of growth resulting from conflict in actual experiences is the finding that exposure to events of the Intifada was a mediating variable predicting greater identity exploration, along with low levels of commitment (Mayseless, 2002). It seems that for some soldiers, the complex experiences, and more specifically, the attempts to deal with them by coordinating multiple considerations and aspects, may generate questions and present challenges to previously held beliefs, thus making them more likely to explore alternative viewpoints and less likely to commit to a particular identity or to identify wholeheartedly with a particular viewpoint. An example for this very kind of process can be seen in the reflections of one the current study's participants, who described changing his views on the Israeli Settlement in Hebron:

> I look at Hebron. Hebron… it's 400 people and 400 soldiers protecting them. It's a nightmare! Not a nightmare, it's a crazy situation that is very hard to justify. **And I actually visited Hebron quite a few times, before I enlisted, and after I enlisted and I was sent there for guard-duty, it turned my whole opinion about Hebron**.
> *From what to what?*
> From apathy, or 'of course we have to…', or not 'of course', but if, okay, if it's decided that people are going to live there… I don't know. There is some… Hebron also has religious significance, let's put it this way. On the other hand, it's like a reality of… I don't see a future with this. I guess in the meantime they're surviving there, what can I tell you… (Participant 64D, emphasis added)

Documented first-person narratives of some Israeli refusers also echo this notion. Avner Wishnitzer, one of the Matkal commando unit soldiers who signed the Combatants' letter of 2003 (Unger, 2010), and was one of the founders of the Israeli-Palestinian *Combatants for Peace*[26] organization, described the shift he underwent from a committed belief in the justice of the IDF's actions, to a more critical stance, and ultimately to the act of selective disobedience (Press, 2012). Press, who documented Avner's story, distinguished this example from other situations of disobedience in World War II and in the Yugoslav War, in that in the Israeli case, it wasn't the actual situation that changed, but rather individuals' perception, ideas, and understanding of the situation changed: "In these cases, the fiercest conflicts take place inside a person's mind and heart as commitments that once went unquestioned come to be reexamined and, at a certain point, betrayed" (Press, p. 93).

So cognitive conflict and disequilibration can lead to growth and change in individuals, but this change is not necessarily a monotonic sequence from putatively 'low' to 'high' levels of morality. Two aspects of development as it is theorized to occur in structural developmental accounts render that sort of linear sequence unlikely. First, such theories prioritize structural transformations over accumulation of content knowledge, and so development would be evident in progressively more sophisticated ways of coordinating concepts of social knowledge, rather than in increasingly 'moral' content in reasoning. Second, and derivative of the theorized development in coordination abilities, greater complexity in one's appreciation of the social situation may often result in transitional periods of flux, ambivalence, or partial solutions, rendering moral development as non-monotonic, or as following a U-shaped trajectory, as seen in other developmental domains (Nucci & Turiel, 2009).

Developmental research of children and adolescents' reasoning about authority (Laupa et al., 1995; Perkins & Turiel, 2007) has demonstrated that, as early as 4-6 years of age, children make straightforward negative evaluations of an authority's misuse of power toward harmful or unjust ends. At around 10 years of age children have a more complex understanding of authority relations and their moral implications, and they begin to include pragmatic, social, and psychological considerations in their evaluations of resistance and compliance to unjust authority (Laupa et al., 1995). This demonstrates the growing ability to attend to, and ultimately coordinate, multiple facets of complex social situations, which may very well continue to develop as individuals grow and participate in novel and diverse social arrangements and institutions. For example, findings on evaluations of deception indicate that 16-year olds judged adolescent deception of parents in personal situations more positively than 13-year olds (Perkins & Turiel, 2007), but that college students judged deception by marital spouses over moral and personal matters more negatively than older married adults (Turiel, Perkins, & Mensing, 2009). Therefore there is no monotonic increase or decrease in judgments of the legitimacy of deception in relationships involving both intimacy and power. A plausible interpretation of these findings in conjunction is that the actual experience of married life informed the social concepts involved in evaluating deception in the family and their coordination (Turiel, 2010). In similar fashion, the actual experiences of IDF soldiers are likely to generate cognitive conflict and spur changes in both informational assumptions and the coordination of social concepts when evaluating authority directives and the appropriate response to them.

[26] See http://cfpeace.org/.

In conclusion, military service, and the complex multifaceted social situations it presents for individual soldiers, is certainly likely to play an important part in ongoing lifespan development of social and moral reasoning, but a simple conclusion of either developmental stagnation or monotonic moral maturing do not appear to capture this developmental process.

Sociogenesis: Social and cultural change. Conscientious objection is often portrayed as motivated by personal considerations and geared towards maintaining a clear conscience for the individual (Gans, 1996; Press, 2012), and in that sense differentiated from civil disobedience which is aimed at changing society by generating political pressure on a society's policy makers (Unger, 2010). This distinction has legal ramifications, as, for example, the Israeli courts recognize the right for conscientious objection only for reasons of personal conscience, and as long as the refusal does not qualify as an act of civil disobedience (Unger, 2010). Moreover, personally motivated individual acts of disobedience are sometimes criticized for their limited scope. Maslach (Zimbardo, Maslach, & Haney, 2000) claimed that "disobedience by the individual must get translated into systemic disobedience that forces change in the situation or agency itself and not just in some operations of good dissidents or even heroic rebels by giving them medals for their deeds and a gift certificate for keeping their opinions to themselves" (p. 220).

I would like to argue that the distinction between *personal resistance* (manifested in refusal, giving testimony, or in other ways) and *political struggle* may be somewhat arbitrary and artificial, as at least some conscientious objectors couch their choice in political terms and explicitly state societal aims towards change and progress in both public opinion and social policy. The range of impact of particular acts of resistance, small and covert or broad and highly publicized, is difficult to assess, but should be regarded cumulatively and in a historical perspective that is well beyond the scope of the psychological analysis presented in this paper. The potential or actualized link between individual resistance and socio-political change was acknowledged by some of the participants in the current study, who in some situations prioritized moral ends over conventional violations of harming the military system:

> A law that would allow shooting without identification **reflects how dull morality has become**. I don't… that's a very big problem. **I know I'm harming the military system, but I'm glad I'm causing that harm, because maybe it will change the**… 'wait, why is X not around? Oh, because X got kicked out of Reserves, Why was he kicked out? Because he refused to shoot. Why did he refuse? Oh, okay, that's wrong.' That means there's a consequence for every action a person takes.
> *So this refusal can change something?*
> Yes, absolutely. We know about lots of laws that changed because of refusals.
> (Participant 16D, emphasis added)

Yet, just as I have been arguing that disobedience is not the only form of moral resistance, it is also not the only path to social change. Some participants indicated that refusal is not the preferred response to unjust military and governmental policies, and in fact, may even hinder social progress. They claimed that refusing means removing oneself from the game entirely, whereas the way to influence society and promote change is from within the military:

> Being part of a society that needs to protect itself, and not, like I said, **not to wash yourself clean of it**, because you can't, you're part of a society that's in a certain situation, and **you want to be part of it, and you want to not… to not let other people do the dirty work that you're supposed to**. And that's it. That's the desire, not a very big desire, but anyway…
> Again, there's the question of the 'big' desire and the… and I think that if you, if you go into the army, and you're, say, a peace-person, or humane, or all sorts of things like that, then you tell yourself that **there is a situation of injustice and you don't want to wash your hands**. I don't know if you want to enter it, but **to try, like, to integrate that truth into reality**, which is sometimes opposite, and then, in that reality, you have to manage to understand what the right battles are, the ones you can fight. And if the Battalion Commander is right there in the checkpoint and he tells you 'detain him,' and you, like, don't give a shit, to his face, then you're going to get yourself in trouble, and you won't be able to continue, like… So, **in order to fight bigger battles**, or to be, to be there and, because of your big desire to be there. (Participant 40D, emphasis added)

This argument about changing the system from within is rather common in Israeli discourse about refusal. For example, Linn (1995) interviewed a group of Peace-Now[27] activists who objected to the war in Lebanon, but nevertheless chose to continue to participate in it. These soldiers had similar negative judgments about the war to their refusing peers, but chose to manifest them differently: "Although they ended up pursuing different actions, refusing and non-refusing soldiers agreed in their perception of the injustice of the war" (Linn, 1995, p. 401).

Concluding Comments

This study demonstrated that even when soldiers decide to obey commands they disagree with for a variety of reasons, they do not do it thoughtlessly. Previous research has amply demonstrated that even after engaging in harmful behavior, whether in the context of interpersonal relationships (Wainryb et al., 2005), family dynamics (Laupa et al., 1995; Perkins & Turiel, 2007), or political strife and combat (Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2008; Linn, 1996), people are "fully engaged in wrestling with a conspicuous feature of moral life—the conflict between the demands of morality and the interests of the individual" (Wainryb et al., 2005, p. 79). This active and constructive engagement may manifest as behavioral compliance (whether committed, instrumental, or unwilling), or as one of many forms of resistance. The present study sought to shed light on the reasoning of soldiers about authority in a variety of situations, and demonstrated that reasoning is flexible and sensitive to both the institutional context (civilian or military), and the substantive content of authority directives (moral, conventional, or political). The findings of this study revealed that there may be few situations that are relatively clear-cut and about which there is near-consensus. Such clear cases where either obedience (i.e., conventional regulations in the military) or disobedience (i.e., a command to shoot a suspect in the civilian workplace) are generally accepted as the appropriate response, are merely the bookends between which many more multifaceted dilemmas are flanked. Several situations employed in this study evoked complex reasoning that included multiple considerations,

[27] Peace Now is a social-political peace movement founded in 1978 supporting a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and opposing the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. See http://peacenow.org.il/eng/.

including moral (harm, welfare, and justice), conventional (social functioning, discipline, and representativeness), personal (personal choice, responsibility, and individual prerogatives), pragmatic (positive and negative consequences for the actor, and effectiveness of acts), and epistemological (access, validity, and quality of information) considerations.

A fundamental question at the background of this study, as well as many other social science inquiries into the psychology of soldiers, is how to interpret and understand harmful behavior which seems to go against moral principles. Some have explained such behavior as stemming from nonrational or irrational individual processes such as moral disengagement or moral numbing; others have explained it focusing on proximal situational or distal cultural external forces exerting their pressure on seemingly passive actors. The problems with such accounts have been addressed at length throughout this paper. I take a stance based on the assumption of human agency, while not disregarding the complexity of situations and evolving cultural contexts. The current study targeted the juncture where thinking individuals and complex situations meet—the locus of social and moral reasoning.

The findings of this study point to three possible (but likely not exclusive) aspects of this juncture that may help understand what is happening when soldiers respond to unjust authority. First, as was amply demonstrated, some multifaceted and ambiguous situations evoke considerable ambivalence, uncertainty, and conflict. Although the participants in this study attempted (and in many cases succeeded) to coordinate the various concerns they perceived as relevant to every situation, in some cases, they remained ambivalent, or the unsuccessful coordination yielded mixed or inconsistent evaluations. Coordination has been conceptualized and examined developmentally (Laupa et al., 1995; Nucci & Turiel, 2009; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006), and it has been demonstrated that young children typically attend to salient moral features, and may disregard other aspects, whereas older children and adolescents demonstrate more of an appreciation for the ambiguity inherent in multifaceted dilemmas. However, studies with adults (e.g., Turiel et al., 2009), and the present study as well, suggest that coordination may not be a once-and-for-all developmental achievement. Such a lifespan-developmental approach suggests that in novel and complex situations, it is through ongoing experiences that social concepts and their coordination continue to evolve in complexity and systematicity. This perhaps explains why some soldiers who give testimony about their actions after discharge have a different, more nuanced, and more critical understanding of the activities of the IDF than they did, according to their own words, as conscripts.

Second, rather than moral disengagement, entering an agentic state, moral numbing or even moral corruption, the findings of this study suggest that sometimes moral considerations are acknowledged, but subordinated, either to other moral concerns, or to non-moral ones, such as social functioning or personal risks. This was clearly seen in the Checkpoint Story, but is also consistent with philosophic and legal scholarship (Parush, 1996). This explanation is less relevant to atrocities such as massacres or extreme abuse, but is highly applicable to what some consider an even more important phenomenon, whereby small, everyday transgressions cumulatively desensitize actors to the harm inflicted on others, and contribute to maintaining an unjust status quo in the OPT (Breaking the Silence, 2012; Engel & Sharon, 2012; Handel, 2008). The responses of many participants in this study suggest that soldiers are not blind to the harm inflicted in such practices as detaining a Palestinian at a checkpoint for arbitrary or unjust reasons, but the majority do, however, judge obedience to such a command as obligatory. There is need to address such situations more explicitly in both educational efforts and legislative policy regarding the boundaries of obedience (Parush, 1996).

Finally, informational assumptions about security and how it is achieved, about the effectiveness and necessity of different military practices officially aimed at deterrence or prevention, and about confidence in the justness of the system in general and authority figures in particular, all play an important role in the individual soldier's decision-making process. Discrediting false assumptions is presumed to go a long way in changing the reasoning, and possibly behavior of IDF soldiers.

These three potential explanations share several important features that distinguish them from dominant situational and dispositional accounts. First, they do not rely on moral relativistic explanations whereby harmful behavior is equated with judging morally wrong acts as moral. Second, they do not rely on characterizing actors as falling prey to cognitive fallacies and sinister situational manipulations. Lastly, they attend to both the sphere of cognition and the sphere of action as relationally and mutually dependent on each other to explain how it could be that healthy and ordinary people engage in both resistance to and participation in practices involving harm, violence, and violations of rights of other ordinary, healthy people.

I would like to conclude with a quote from a newspaper article published several years ago in a leading daily Israeli newspaper. The article was a response to a public lamenting of the inactivity of social protest movements against the Israeli occupation. The author suggested that as civilians, we make heavy demands of our reservists: "We expect our soldiers to simultaneously be the fighters who defend us, the refusers who clear our conscience, and the protestors who correct our injustices" (Galili, 2006). This quote exemplifies that even in the general public's view, IDF soldiers are not regarded as automatons responding to external social, political, legal, and military forces, but rather that they are expected to grapple with complex situations and maintain a flexible and multifaceted point of view.

The social dynamic in Israel is somewhat unique in that the majority of soldiers are reservists, and therefore predominantly operate in the civilian sphere, and a substantial proportion of civilians either have direct experience as soldiers, or are closely related to soldiers in active duty. Perhaps it is this unique dynamic that highlights the complex role of the soldier reflected in Galili's statement quoted above. It is not only Israeli soldiers, but rather people in general, who actively and constructively coordinate different considerations and demands when faced with authority that is sometimes legitimate, and other times unjust; because ultimately, as moral agents, people "want to make sense of the world and to stand in a meaningful relation to their surroundings" (Asch, 1952, p. 301).

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Appendix: Interview Protocol

Demographics: **Date of Interview: _____**

Date of Birth: _____
Place of Birth: _____ (If not Israel, date of immigration: _____)
Current occupation: _____
Date of induction into IDF: _____
Number of months served in IDF: _____
Rank: _____
Position in the IDF: _____
History in the IDF (different units, positions): _____
Have you participated in active combat? _____
Participating in reserve duty: _____
Political Affiliation: _____

The IDF has lots of rules and commands about lots of different behaviors. Some behaviors don't have explicit rules, but are generally followed. Sometimes people agree with these rules, commands, or practices, and think they are good; and other times people disagree or think that the rules, commands, or practices are not good. Today's interview will be about situations when soldiers disagree with rules, commands, and norms, and what they think and do in such situations. I am looking for your honest opinions and thoughts, there are no right or wrong answers, and your responses will remain anonymous when they are analyzed and reported.

First I'm going to tell you a series of six stories about soldiers who reacted in different ways to rules, commands and norms of behavior in their units. After each story, I will ask you a series of questions about each situation.

Story 1a (Military/Moral/Compliance)
Oren is stationed at a security checkpoint near Gaza. One day, his company commander gets angry at a man who is about to be admitted through the crossing for being rude and cursing at them loudly. He tells Oren not to let him through, until he apologizes. Oren thinks this is not ok, but he follows the command, and doesn't let the man through.

[OBEY] Is it all right or not all right that Oren follows the command to keep the man from crossing the checkpoint? Why (not)?
[If needed, clarify that the reason for detaining is not a security threat, that he has the required permits, and that there are no security alerts at this particular time and place]

[REFUSE] Suppose that since he thought it's not ok to stop the man, Oren refused to follow the command? Would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoCOMMAND] Lets' suppose that the story was different, and that Oren's commander had never told him anything, but that Oren decided all on his own to keep the man from crossing the checkpoint until he apologized; is it ok or not ok for Oren to do this in the absence of a command?

[LAW] Suppose there was a military law that said it was ok to stop a man from crossing a checkpoint for rudeness; would it then be ok to stop him?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different army in a different country where they had a rule that said it was ok to stop a man from crossing a checkpoint for rudeness; could it be ok/not ok there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Oren to decide who can cross and when in this situation?

Story 2b (Military/Moral/Refusal)
Assaf serves in a border police unit posted along the Egyptian border. One day, while on a routine patrol they spot a suspicious movement. They see a person near the border, but can't tell if he's armed or not. The person is walking away from where they're standing so they only see his back. They try to get verification, but cannot get a definitive answer from the observation point. While they are still waiting for confirmation, Assaf's company commander issues a

command to shoot at the person. The regular procedure for opening fire stipulates that confirmation is needed before shooting directly at a target, but the commander doesn't want to wait in case the person gets away. Assaf thinks this is not ok, and refuses to shoot at the person.

[REFUSE] Is it all right or not all right that Assaf refuses the command to shoot in this situation? Why (not)?

[OBEY] Suppose that even though he thought it's not ok to shoot in this case, he had followed the command to shoot? Would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoCOMMAND] Lets' suppose that the story was different, and that Assaf's commander had never issued the command to shoot, but that Assaf decided all on his own to shoot; is it ok or not ok for Assaf to do this in the absence of a command?

[LAW] Suppose there was a military law that said that soldiers were allowed to shoot even before confirmation from the observation point; would it then be ok to shoot at the person?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different army in a different country where they had a rule that said it was ok to shoot at a suspect in a situation like this; could it be ok/not ok there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Assaf to decide whether or not to shoot in this situation?

Story 3a (Military/Conventional/Compliance)
Omer serves in a small post on the Northern border of Israel. When he is working at his post, or just walking around the base, Omer prefers to wear his shirt untucked, unlace his boots, and take off his "gumiyot" [rubber bands used to seal the bottom of soldiers' pants]. But military code requires that all soldiers wear their shirts tucked in and their boots laced anywhere on the base. So, despite his personal preference, Omer keeps his boots laced and his shirt tucked in all the time.

[OBEY] Is it all right or not all right that Omer follows the regulations about uniform despite his preferences? Why (not)?

[VIOLATE] Suppose that since he didn't want to, Omer didn't follow the regulations and wore his boots unlaced and his shirt untucked; would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoRULE] Suppose there was no rule about shirts and shoes; would he still have to wear his uniform that way if he didn't want to?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different army in a different country where there was no rule about shirts and shoes; would it be ok/not ok for a soldier to untuck his shirt there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Omer to decide how to wear his uniform?

Story 4b (Military/Conventional/Refusal)
Yoav serves in a medium-sized base in Central Command, and like all the soldiers in the base, he participates in guard-duty at the main gate to the base. The guards at the gate are supposed to salute all officers ranked Lt. Col. or higher when they come into the base. A man Yoav knows from where he grew up, whom he really dislikes, was just promoted to Lt. Col. and was stationed at Yoav's base. Yoav really doesn't want to salute this man that he dislikes so much. So, despite the regulations, Yoav greets him and lets him in the gate without saluting him.

[VIOLATE] Is it all right or not all right that Yoav doesn't salute a Lt. Col.? Why (not)?

[OBEY] Suppose that even though he didn't want to, Yoav followed regulations and saluted the officer he dislikes; would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoRULE] Suppose there was no rule about saluting higher ranking officers; would he still have to salute him if he didn't want to?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different army in a different country where there was no rule about saluting high-ranking officers; would it be all right or not all right for a soldier not to salute an officer there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Yoav to decide whether to salute in this situation?

Story 5a (Military/Mixed/Political/Compliance)
Ran politically identifies with right wing political parties. Until now, his unit was in training and participated in routine security maintenance along the southern Egyptian border (a very quiet border). Now, his unit is scheduled to participate in evacuating small Settlements near Gaza. Ran objects to the evacuation on principle, but he follows the command to participate in the evacuation.

[OBEY] Is it all right or not all right that Ran follows the command to evacuate settlements in this situation despite his beliefs? Why (not)?

[REFUSE] Suppose that since he thought it's not ok to evacuate settlements, Ran refused to follow the command; would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[DECISION] Is it up to Ran to decide what to do in this situation?

Story 6b (Mixed/Political/Refusal)
Itay politically identifies with left wing political parties. Until now, his unit was in training and participated in routine security maintenance along the southern Egyptian border. Now, his unit is scheduled to participate in a combat operation in the West Bank. Itay objects to the operation on principle, and refuses the command to participate in the operation.

[REFUSE] Is it all right or not all right that Itay refuses to participate in the operation in this situation? Why (not)?

[OBEY] Suppose that even though he thought this operation was unjustified, he had followed the command to participate? Would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[DECISION] Is it up to Itay to decide what to do in this situation?

Most workplaces also have lots of rules and regulations about lots of different behaviors; and here too, people agree with some of them and disagree with others. These next four stories are about situations when employees disagree with rules, instructions, and norms, and what they think and do in such situations. Again, I am looking for your honest opinions and thoughts, there are no right or wrong answers, and your responses will remain anonymous.

Story 7a (Civilian/Moral/Compliance)
Gadi works in a large office near Tel Aviv. One day, his boss gets angry at a delivery man who came by to drop off a package for being rude and cursing at them loudly. He tells Gadi not to sign for the package and not let the delivery man leave until he apologizes. Gadi thinks this is not ok, but he does what his boss tells him, and doesn't sign the receipt.

[OBEY] Is it all right or not all right that Gadi follows the instruction to keep the man from leaving? Why (not)?

[REFUSE] Suppose that since he thought it's not ok to keep the man from leaving, Gadi refused to do what his boss told him to? Would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoCOMMAND] Lets' suppose that the story was different, and that Gadi's boss had never told him anything, but that Gadi decided all on his own to keep the man from leaving the office until he apologized; is it ok or not ok for Gadi to do this in the absence of a direction?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different office in a different country where it was an accepted and common practice for an employee to refuse to sign and release a service-provider if they were rude; would it be all right or not all right for Gadi to keep the man then?

[DECISION] Is it up to Gadi to decide what to do in this situation?

Story 8b (Civilian/Moral/Refusal)
Amit works on a small ranch in the Negev. Recently, there have been several cases of burglary in the area, and all the ranch owners are tightening up security such that the workers now carry weapons and serve as security guards as well. One day, while he and his crew are working in the field they spot a suspicious person. The person is walking away from where they're standing so they only see his back. They try to get a better look, but cannot see the person very well. While they are still trying to figure out if it's a burglar, Amit's boss (supervisor of the ranch workers) doesn't want to wait in case the person gets away, so he tells Amit to shoot at the man. Amit thinks this is not ok, and refuses to shoot at the person.

[REFUSE] Is it all right or not all right that Amit refuses to shoot in this situation? Why (not)?

[OBEY] Suppose that even though he thought it's not ok to shoot in this case, Amit had followed his boss's instructions to shoot? Would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoCOMMAND] Lets' suppose that the story was different, and that Amit's boss had never told him anything, but that Amit decided all on his own to shoot at this person; is it ok or not ok for Amit to do this in the absence of an order?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different ranch in a different country where they had a law that said it was ok to shoot at a suspect in a situation like this; could it be ok/not ok there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Amit to decide whether or not to shoot in this situation?

Story 9a (Civilian/Conventional/Compliance)
Nadav works as an intern in a small law firm in Jerusalem. His office has a dress code that requires all employees to wear collar-shirts and ties. Nadav really hates wearing a tie and tucking his shirt in, especially when he is just working at his desk and not seeing clients. But the firm's policy is very strict. So, despite his personal preference, Nadav keeps his tie on and his shirt tucked in all the time.

[OBEY] Is it all right or not all right that Nadav follows the firm dress code despite his preferences? Why (not)?

[VIOLATE] Suppose that since he didn't want to, Nadav didn't follow the dress code and took his tie off and untucked his shirt? Would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoRULE] Suppose there was no dress code about shirts and ties; would he still have to wear them that way if he didn't want to?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different office in a different country with a different dress code that didn't include wearing collar-shirts and ties? Would it be ok/not ok for a lawyer to untuck his shirt there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Nadav to decide how to dress to work?

Story 10b (Civilian/Conventional/Refusal)
Yaron is a receptionist at a dentists' clinic. He is supposed to address all the dentists by their last names and titles. A man Yaron knows from high school, whom he really dislikes, just graduated and was hired as a dentist at Yaron's clinic. Yaron really doesn't want to call this guy that he dislikes so much "Dr." So, despite the rules, Yaron addresses him by his first name.

[VIOLATE] Is it all right or not all right that Yaron addresses a dentist by his first name? Why (not)?

[OBEY] Suppose that even though he didn't want to, Yaron followed the rules and called the dentist he dislikes "Dr."; would that be all right or not all right? Why (not)?

[NoRULE] Suppose there was no rule about how to address doctors at this clinic; would he still have to call him Dr. if he didn't want to?

[OTC] Suppose it was a different clinic in a different country where there was no rule about addressing doctors by their titles? Would it be all right or not all right for a receptionist to address a dentist by his first name there?

[DECISION] Is it up to Yaron to decide how to address the dentists at the clinic?